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PITT AND NAPOLEON:
ESSAYS AND LETTERS

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PITT AND NAPOLEON

ESSAYS AND LETTERS

BY
J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D.
READER IN MODERN HISTORY, THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

LONDON
G. BELL AND SONS, LTD.
IQI2

CHISWICK PRESS: CHARIKs WH ITTINCH AM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, rHANCFRY LANE, I.dS'DON.

PREFATORY NOTE
THE following Essays, dealing with the characters
and careers of Pitt and Napoleon, are new, with the
exception of those entitled " The True Significance of
Trafalgar," and " General Marbot and his Memoirs." I
acknowledge with gratitude the valuable advice given by
Professor Oman, LL.D., on the "Waterloo" Essay; by
Mr. Julian Corbett, LL.M., on the "Invasion" Essay;
and by Mr. C. R. Fay, M.A., Fellow of Christ's College,
Cambridge, on Pitt's " Bill for the Relief of the Poor " ;
also Mr. A. M. Broadley's help in communicating the
new letter of Pitt on the Walmer Volunteers.
In the second part of this volume I have grouped to
gether important new letters illustrative of the career of
Pitt. My thanks are especially due to His Grace the
Duke of Portland for communicating the correspondence
of Pitt with the third Duke of Portland; to the Earl of
Harrowby for a similar service respecting Pitt's corre
spondence with the first Earl of Harrowby; also to Earl
Stanhope and E. G. Pretyman, Esq., M.P., for per
mission to search for and utilize letters of Pitt and others
contained in the archives at Chevening and Orwell Park
respectively. J. H. R.
January 191 2.

CONTENTS

PART I. ESSAYS
The Oratory of Pitt . ....
Pitt and Earl Fitzwilliam 
Was Pitt responsible for the Quiberon Disaster?
British Rule in Corsica 
Pitt and Relief of the Poor
Some New Letters of Pitt 
*-Did Napoleon intend to invade England?
The True Significance of Trafalgar
General Marbot and his Memoirs
An Interview with Napoleon in Elba
Napoleon's Conception of the Battle of Water
loo 

PAGE I
2037
60 79
93
114147157167 183

PART II. LETTERS

A. The King and Pitt.
B. Pitt to the Duke of Portland
C. Lord Grenville to Pitt
D. Pitt and Windham .
E. Burke to Windham
F. Pitt to Lord Harrowby
G. Lord Harrowby to Pitt
H. Canning to Pitt
I. Suggestions for the Act of Union
J. Pitt's Last Illness ....

201
249256275 292
306 3iS3»8 335
342

PITT AND NAPOLEON
PART I
ESSAYS
THE ORATORY OF PITT
IN his dialogue on the perfect orator Cicero sets forth two
ideals. Crassus, the representative of the more cultured and
florid style, maintains that the perfect speaker must not only
possess the physical and mental qualifications necessary for suc
cess in the art, but that he needs also to be versed in poetry,
science, politics, attainments of all kinds, so that from his well-
filled armoury he may overwhelm his opponent and fascinate his
auditors by charms of bewildering variety. The other chief dis
putant, the successful pleader, Antonius, demurs to these claims
as excessive, and, while admitting that the orator must be not
quite a tyro or novice in any business of life, declares that his
aim must be to convince and persuade: "He is one who, both
in forensic and in general cases, can employ language pleasing
to the ear and maxims suitable to carry conviction." 1 As the
discussion proceeds, it is clear that Cicero inclines to the wider
theory, even while his commonsense defers to the practical
advice of the pleader. In truth both methods are needed. The
cultured and magnificent style sways the minds of men at great
crises; but economy of effort is the prime condition of success
on more ordinary occasions. Doubtless Cicero intended to
advise young aspirants to master the essentials of the art for
use in forensic cases, in the hope that the inspiring, if unattain
able ideals set forth by Crassus would lead the best of them to
1 Cicero, " De Oratore," i, ch. xlix.
B

2 PITT AND NAPOLEON
acquire the learning and imbibe the graces which wing the
loftiest shafts.
Alone, perhaps, among English orators Pitt satisfied the two
ideals set forth by Cicero. Reared by the side of Chatham,
hearing day by day the recital of a chapter of the Bible or some
other classic, and trained to an almost pedantically careful use
of his mother-tongue, he grew up in a rhetorical forcing-house
such as Crassus would have wonderingly approved. Before pro
ceeding to Cambridge he ranged over classical and English
literature, became an adept in mathematics, and showed skill in
versification. At the university his intercourse was in the main
restricted to the austere circles presided over by his private
tutor, Wilson, and by the tutor of his college, the Rev. Dr.
Pretyman, with occasional relaxations in the society of young
men destined for a parliamentary career. Among his favourite
studies was Civil Law, lectures on which he called " instructive
and amusing." But his chief joy was attendance at the debates
in Parliament which hammered out the last scintillations of the
genius of Chatham.
Yet this training in the magnificent style was happily bal
anced by training as a barrister. After the death of his father,
he had perforce to bestow much time on the study of law, which
Burke declared to be more invigorating to the mind than all the
other kinds of learning put together.1 He even undertook a few
briefs and won commendation for his closely-argued statements.
All this was but preliminary to the parliamentary career which
alike realized his hopes and ripened his powers. His maiden
speech of 26th February 1781 astonished all who heard it; and
thenceforth he swayed the House of Commons during a quarter
of a century which vibrated also to the tones of Fox and
Sheridan. It is far from easy to illustrate in an essay the qualities of the
oratory of Pitt, which depended for its effect, not so much on
isolated outbursts as on a cumulative and finally overwhelming
pressure. His nature being less fiery and magnetic than that of
Chatham, he relied on continuous argument and cogent appeals
rather than on lightning flashes; and the reader is at times apt
to ask— where is the touch of genius in all this? The answer
must be that it pervades the whole speech ; it is in the under-
1 Burke, "Speech on American Taxation," 19th April 1774.

THE ORATORY OF PITT 3
lying reasoning, in the stately march of the reasoning, in the
unfailing vigour of its serried periods, and in the union of grace
and strength, of elevated thought and noble diction. These
powers, present from the first, steadily matured. His rhetoric is
not remarkable for the sudden unfolding of almost unsuspected
powers whereby Mirabeau astonished the States-General of
France in 1789. What it was in 1781 it remained in essence,
though endowed with greater vitality and grace, down to the
month after Trafalgar, when his two sentences uttered at the
Lord Mayor's banquet summed up for ever the achievements of
the past and winged all thoughts towards the duties and glories
of the future.
Those who heard his maiden speech' in Parliament were most
impressed by its perfection of form. Burke and Fox were loud
in their praise; Lord North pronounced it the best first speech
he had ever heard; and Storer, an equally good judge, declared
that the delivery was marked by a becoming confidence far
removed from pert self-assurance, so that there was not a word
or a look one would wish to correct.1 This is the more remark
able as Pitt had sharply inveighed against the sinecures attached
to the King's Civil List. Not content with insisting on the need
of economy, he boldly declared the object of the present pro
posal to be the reduction of the influence of the Crown —
An influence which is more to be dreaded because more secret in its
attacks and more concealed in its operations than the power of prero
gative. ... It ought to be remembered that the Civil List revenue was
granted by Parliament to His Majesty for other purposes than personal
gratification. It was granted to support the power and the interests of
the Empire, to maintain its grandeur, to pay the judges and the foreign
Ministers, to maintain justice and support respect; to pay the great
officers that were necessary to the lustre of the Crown; and it was pro
portioned to the dignity and opulence of the people. It would be an
ungracious task to investigate the great difference that there is between
the wealth of the Empire when that revenue was granted and the wealth
at the present time. It would serve, however, to show that the sum of
revenue which was necessary to the support of the common dignity of
Crown and people at that time, ought now to be abated as the neces-
1 So, too, in 1796, Horner (a harsh critic) admitted his " wonderful fluency
and correctness, approaching to mechanical movement." He blamed his
action as one who sawed the air with his whole body (F. Horner, " Mems.,"
i, 11).

4 PITT AND NAPOLEON
sities had increased. The people, who granted that revenue under the
circumstances of the occasion, are justified in resuming a part of it
under the pressing demand of an altered situation. They clearly feel
their right, but they exercise it with pain and regret. They approach
the throne with bleeding hearts, afflicted at the necessity of applying for
retrenchment of the royal gratifications; but the request is at once loyal
and submissive. It is justified by policy, and His Majesty's compliance
with the request is inculcated by prudence as well as by affection.
That one who had barely attained to manhood should venture
to assail the Monarch and the still unbroken phalanx of the
King's Friends caused surprise; that he displayed no agitation
in the midst of so desperate a tilt aroused enthusiasm; and
experienced members saw in that calmly confident demeanour,
that equable flow of words, that faultless grace of delivery, sure
signs of the advent of an athlete of debate.
A not unkindly destiny willed that Pitt's championship of
Reform and steadfast opposition to the Fox-North Coalition of
the year 1783 should entail uphill fights against large majorities.
The courage which appeared in his first daring utterance was
tempered by a long succession of struggles, seemingly hopeless,
were it not that the nation inclined to his side. What could be
more vigorous than the speech of 21st February 1783 in defence
of the preliminary terms of peace with France, Spain, and
America? It was delivered under unfavourable conditions. The
terms, however necessary, were deemed humiliating; and the
threatened union of Fox with North promised to overthrow the
Ministry of Earl Shelburne, in which Pitt was Chancellor of the
Exchequer. Yet in masterly style he showed that a peace was
rendered inevitable by the recklessness and incompetence of
Lord North, whose successors now secured terms far from un
favourable. Then, adverting to the rumoured Coalition of Fox
and North, he said : " I repeat, then, Sir, that it is not this treaty,
it is the Earl of Shelburne alone whom the movers of this
question are desirous to wound. This is the object which has
raised this storm of faction; this is the aim of the unnatural
Coalition to which I have alluded. If, however, the bane
ful alliance is not already formed, if this ill-omened marriage
is not already solemnized, I know a just and lawful impediment,
and, in the name of the public safety, I here forbid the banns."
No more thrilling metaphor has been used in Parliament.
Occasionally Pitt's metaphors and allusions were somewhat too

THE ORATORY OF PITT 5
literary and recondite to strike home.1 Classical quotations even
in that age cannot have been familiar to the mass of the mem
bers, and therefore did not call forth that immediate and over
whelming response at which the orator should aim. To hit the
golden mean, a metaphor should be neither too lofty for speedy
comprehension, nor too common for the dignity of the occasion.
That of Pitt recalled the challenge which always arouses a flutter
of anxious interest ; and lest it should seem too trite a phrase
for the present emergency, he winged and barbed it with the
nobly patriotic addition "in the name of the public safety."
Such a metaphor is worth a battery of arguments. They soon
become blurred, while words that trace out the situation in
strokes of fire burn into the memory. The glow of that phrase
shed lustre upon Pitt throughout his contest with the large but
discordant cohue of the Coalition. The speeches which he levelled
against that unnatural union and in defence of his Administra
tion which succeeded it have lost much of their interest; but
they abound in vigorous arguments based upon the needs of the
nation, and helped to secure from that final court of appeal the
triumphant verdict of May-June 1784. So far from the truth is
it that his speeches were merely parliamentary. Like Chatham,
he often appealed away from Parliament to the people.
The success of an orator depends largely on his ability to win
the good opinion of his audience; and Pitt, who had studied
Cicero to good effect, often sought to gain this advantage. On
one occasion at least, he departed from the precepts of the
ancients by placing this personal appeal not first, but last. It was
in the great speech of 21st February 1783, when the fate of the
Shelburne Ministry trembled in the balance and an adverse vote
implied for him a return to the Bar.
It has been the great object of my short official existence to do the
duties of my station with all the ability and address in my power, and
1 A case in point is his retort on 23rd January 1784 to General Conway,
who had charged him with bribing the country. After indignantly denying
the calumny, "he concluded — so runs the report — in a tone of high and
elevated sentiment, and with a classical text expressive of its being incon
sistent with dignity to attend to either their rash slanders or their modest
questions." Evidently the classical text went high over the heads of the
reporters and of their helpers. Wraxall (iii, 12) says that Pitt, out of regard
for the country members, cited the Classics not more than nine or ten times
in his career, a very doubtful estimate.

6 PITT AND NAPOLEON
with a fidelity and honour which should bear me up, and give me con
fidence, under every possible contingency or disappointment. I can say
with sincerity, I never had a wish which did not terminate in the
dearest interests of the nation. I will at the same time imitate the
honourable gentleman's candour, and confess, that I too have my
ambition. High situation, and great influence, are desirable objects to
most men, and objects which I am not ashamed to pursue, which I am
even solicitous to possess, whenever they can be acquired with honour,
and retained with dignity.1 On these respectable conditions, I am not
less ambitious to be great and powerful than it is natural for a young
man with such brilliant examples before him to be. But even these
objects I am not beneath relinquishing, the moment my duty to my
country, my character, and my friends, renders such a sacrifice indis
pensable. Then I hope to retire, not disappointed, but triumphant;
triumphant in the conviction that my talents, humble as they are, have
been earnestly, zealously and strenuously employed to the best of my
apprehension in promoting the truest welfare of my country.
. . . You may take from me, Sir, the privileges and emoluments of
place, but you cannot and you shall not take from me those habitual
and warm regards for the prosperity of Great Britain which constitute
the honour, the happiness, the pride of my life, and which, I trust,
death alone can extinguish. And, with this consolation, the loss of
power, Sir, and the loss of fortune, though I affect not to despise them,
I hope I soon shall be able to forget.
Laudo manentem. Si celeres quatit
Pennas, resigno quae dedit, . . .
 probamque
Pauperiem sine dote quaero."
The memoir-writer, Sir Nathaniel Wraxall, who heard this
peroration, describes the artifice adopted by Pitt as he approached
the middle words of the passage —
Et mea virtute me involve
Feeling them to be in excess of his merit, the orator paused for
a moment, fixed his eyes on the ground, and passed his handker-

1 A hit at the unnatural Coalition, which was neither honourable nor
dignified. 2 Horace, "Odes," iii, 29. "If she (Fortune) abides, I commend her. If
she shakes her fleet pennons for flight, I resign her gifts . . . and hail hones
dowerless Poverty as mine."

THE ORATORY OF PITT 7
chief once or twice over his lips. Then, as if recovering from
temporary embarrassment, he declaimed the final words, empha
sizing them by blows upon the table in front. In the judgement
of Wraxall no more masterly or beautiful piece of oratorical
acting was to be found in antiquity.1 The verdict shows how far
the standard of taste has changed since that time. A member
who in this matter-of-fact age should have recourse to such a
device would be voted a pedant and a prig.
In the main, however, the oratory of Pitt inclined to the
austere rather than to the florid style. Differing from Burke,
who poured forth profusely the treasures of his fancy, and from
Sheridan, equally lavish of wit, Pitt sought to persuade the
reason rather than to captivate the imagination or raise a laugh.
Not that he was destitute of these powers ; for his friends agree
that in private he excelled in sprightly repartee. On one occa
sion, at least, he gave fancy the rein. Fox, censuring the King's
Speech of 5 th December 1782, had ironically quoted against the
Prime Minister the lines —
You've done a noble turn in nature's spite ;
For tho' you think you're wrong, I'm sure you're right.
In reply Pitt levelled at Fox the following parody —
The praise he gives us in his nature's spite ;
He wishes we were wrong, but clearly sees we're right.
In general, however, his speeches want the touches of humour
or irony which light up the subject and entrance an audience.
Where in his speeches should we find so mordant a simile as that
which Disraeli, on 3rd April 1872, flung at the Gladstone
Cabinet in the days of its waning popularity? " As I sat opposite
the Treasury Bench, the Ministers reminded me of one of those
marine landscapes not very unusual on the coast of South
America. You behold a range of exhausted volcanoes. Not a
flame flickers on a single pallid crest." Possibly Pitt curbed his
satirical powers in the belief that only by the adoption of a
mature seriousness could he make up for the disadvantage of
his youth. To this motive we may refer the rebuke which, in
his twenty-third year, he administered to Burke, then in his
1 Wraxall, iii, 1 1, 12.

8 PITT AND NAPOLEON
fifty-second year, for flippant comments on the King's Speech
above referred to:
The gay flowers of a brilliant and exuberant fancy are proper for
their season, for hours of jollity and recreation. I shall be happy to
share in the delights of that fertile imagination which has so long been
the wonder and pleasure of this House; but I cannot consent to indulge
myself in admiring "the beautiful motes which people the sunbeam,"
when my mind is occupied with objects so serious and important as
those now before the House. ... I rise therefore to bring back the
House to sobriety and seriousness, and to tell them that this is neither
a fit time nor a proper subject for the exhibition of a gaudy fancy or
the wanton blandishments of theatrical enchantment. It is your duty
and business to break the magician's wand, to dispel the cloud, beautiful
as it is, which has been thrown over our heads, and to consider solemnly
and gravely the very perilous situation of the country.
Rarely has youth bestowed on maturity a graver censure, and
yet in words which hinted that the speaker could at will almost
vie with his opponent in wealth of imagination and grace of
diction. Pitt had his reward. True, we miss in his orations that
free outpouring of philosophic thought and lively fancy which
by turns instructs, surprises, and delights readers of Burke.
But, though Pitt was sometimes sententious and rarely dull, he
gained his end, which was to prove his case to the satisfaction of
Parliament and of the nation at large. Nevertheless, his speeches,
while adapted to present needs, arouse the interest which ever
belongs to the stately treatment of great themes. Among the
best specimens of this kind of oratory in the early part of his
career are, his description of his India Bill on 6th July 17S4
(one of the most luminous surveys of the affairs and needs of
that Empire), his three speeches of the session of 1785 on the
proposed commercial regulations with Ireland, that of 18th April
1785 on Reform, that of 13th June 1786 on the Warren Hastings
case, and the series of financial statements, among which the
most memorable is that of the 29th March 1786, on the intro
duction of the Sinking Fund. In these orations there is no
straining after effect; the language is clear and forcible; the
development of the theme, orderly; the refutation of opponents
vigorous; the conclusion, cogent. In his financial statements
Pitt towers above all Chancellors of the Exchequer, except
perhaps Peel and Gladstone, who followed where he led the

THE ORATORY OF PITT 9
way. Never before had a statesman succeeded in handling com
plicated statistics in an interesting manner. Wilberforce re
marked on the ill fortune of Pitt in having frequently to speak
"upon subjects of a low and vulgarising quality, such as the
excise on tobacco, wine, etc., topics almost incapable, with pro
priety, of an association with wit or grace, especially in one who
was so utterly devoid of all disposition to seek occasions for
shining."1 Apparently, Wilberforce did not discern the merits
of Pitt's speeches on finance, which, despite their lack of orna
ment, rank among the triumphs of the oratorical art. The
inquiry into the nation's resources and the conditions of prosper
ity is so luminous, the recommendations are so sound, the refuta
tion of opponents is so fair and convincing, as to open up fresh
vistas of thought, amidst which the eye discerns the dissolution
of the old and the advent of the new as at the bidding of a
Prospero. What, for instance, could be better than this reply to
the prophets of woe who foretold ruin to overtaxed, high-priced
Britons from the approximation to Free Trade with Ireland
which Pitt proposed in 1785:
It is said that our manufactures are all loaded with heavy taxes. It is
certainly true. But with all that disadvantage they have always been
able to triumph over the Irish in their own markets, paying the addi
tional ten per cent, on the importation to Ireland, and all the charges.
But the low price of labour [in Ireland] is mentioned Will that con
sideration enable them to undersell us? Manufacturers think otherwise.
There are great obstacles to the planting of any manufacture. It will
require time for arts and capital; and the capital cannot increase with
out the demand also; and in an established manufacture improvement
is so rapid as to bid defiance to rivalship. In some of our manufactures,
too, there are natural and insurmountable objections to their competi
tion. In the woollens, for instance, by confining the raw material to
this country, the manufacture is confined also. There may be some
branches in which Ireland may rival and perhaps beat England; but
this ought not to give us pain. We must calculate from general, not
from partial views, and above all things not look on Ireland with a
jealous eye. It requires not philosophy to reconcile us to a competition
which will give us a rich customer instead of a poor one. Her pro
sperity will be a fresh spring to our trade.2
1 " Private Papers of Wilberforce," 79.
2 The final sentences doubtless refer to the dictum of Adam Smith
(" Wealth of Nations," bk. iv, ch. iii, pt. ii) : " A nation that would enrich

10 PITT AND NAPOLEON
By passages like these Pitt shed on statistics the ennobling
light of his serene faith in the progress of humanity. Far from
being " of a low and vulgarising quality," finance became in
his hands a means of stimulating thought and effort. Perhaps
the most original of his speeches are those on this subject,
which Burke had touched only at the fiery point of American
taxation, and where Sheridan would have seemed but an inter
loper clad in motley.
The effect of a speech depends not only on the lucid, vigorous
and suggestive treatment of a great theme, but fully as much on
beauty of language, variety of illustration, and power of appeal
ing to the sense of humour, or sympathy, or of indignation. In
beauty of diction Pitt takes high rank. His choice of consecutive
vowel sounds shows a delicate and exacting ear. Examples of
this felicity may be found in the extract quoted at the end of
page 13. The sounds are pleasingly varied, and the avoidance
of monotony is seen in the use of the word "savageness"
instead of " savagery," which would offend the ear just before
the word " ferocity." Pitt was careful to avoid the sonorous
jingles which pompous speakers affect by the reiterated use of
words ending in — " tion." Nowhere in his speeches is there
a phrase like that used by the Earl of Beaconsfield in his first
speech in the House of Lords: " It is in this way only we can
secure an amelioration in the condition of the population of
the Ottoman Empire." Examples of the nicety of Pitt in the
choice of sounds will be noticed by the reader in the course of
this essay.
Perhaps the periods of Pitt are somewhat too regular, his
tones too uniform, to satisfy the admirers of Chatham, Burke,
and Fox. In the greatest efforts of Chatham the flash of the
levin now and again delights or appals the eye. Those of his
son shine with a fainter though more lasting radiance. His
diction also lacks the magical power of enriching, amplifying,
or illustrating thought in which Burke stands supreme. Rarely
does there shine forth in the speeches of Pitt a simile as glowing
as that in which Burke describes the decline of Chatham and the
rise of Townshend. " Even then, Sir, before this orb was entirely
set, and while the western horizon was in a blaze with his descend
ing glory, on the opposite quarter of the heavens arose another
itself by foreign trade is certainly most likely to do so when its neighbours
are all rich, industrious, and commercial nations."

THE ORATORY OF PITT n
luminary, and, for his hour, became lord of the ascendant." x Still
less had Pitt the power of etching a scene such as vivifies Burke's
attack on the noisy rhetoricians of Paris. " Because half-a-
dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the field ring with their
importunate chink, while thousands of great cattle reposed
beneath the shadow of the British oak, chew the cud and are
silent, pray do not imagine that those who make the noise are
the only inhabitants of the field." - Probably, too, Pitt deemed
it beneath his dignity to imitate the homely words with which
Burke sometimes surprised the House, as when he described
the clatter of white-sticks and yellow-sticks about the head of
an economical reformer who should try to abolish them; or,
again, when he inveighed against " the miserable inventions of
the wretched runners for a wretched cause, which they have fly
blown into every weak and rotten part of the country, in vain
hopes that, when their maggots had taken wing, their impor
tunate buzzing might sound something like the public voice." 3
Such an image Pitt would have scorned as vulgar. Neverthe
less, his speeches would have gained by occasionally dipping
from the heights of St. Stephen's to the level of the street and
the home. That a personal touch relieved the strain of an
almost Miltonic elevation of sentiment and style is often ap
parent in the speeches of the most human and most forcible of
English orators, John Bright. In one of his Philippics against
the Crimean War occurred the following interlude: "We all
know what we have lost in this House. Here, sitting near me,
very often sat the member for Frome. I met him a short time
before he went out, at Mr. Westerton's, the bookseller's, near
Hyde Park Corner. I asked him whether he was going out.
He answered, he was afraid he was — not afraid in the sense of
personal fear; he knew not that — but he said, with a look and a
tone I shall never forget, ' It is no light matter for a man who
has a wife and five little children.' The stormy Euxine is his
grave; his wife is a widow, his children fatherless." As has been
well pointed out,1 the effect of the climax is enhanced by the
preceding personal and local touches, which, trivial though they
1 Burke, " Speech on American Taxation."
2 Burke, "Reflections on French Rev.," a passage which is essentially
rhetorical. 3 Burke, " Speech on American Taxation."
4 C. A. Vince, "John Bright," p. 212.

12

PITT AND NAPOLEON

are, make the mind vividly receptive to the pathos of the last
overwhelming utterance.
On a lower plane than this noble passage are the personal
invectives of Fox. The speeches of the Whig orator are far
looser in texture than those of Pitt. Wraxall avers that Fox
paid little attention to the sequence of his arguments, from
a conviction that one third of the members were either asleep
or were absent at dinner; and he states that, at any consider
able influx (or signs of awakening ?), he would go over the same
ground, often to the manifest annoyance of those who had heard
their fill. Nevertheless, so manly was his bearing, so powerfully
did he first state, and then tear in pieces, the assertions of
opponents, and so skilfully did he " hit the House between wind
and water"— to use a phrase of Burke — that all defects were
forgotten. In truth, Fox had a signal advantage over Pitt. After
the year 1783 the leaden weight of official responsibility weighed
on the younger orator, while Fox, condemned to an almost hope
less opposition, could let his lively fancy roam at will. Attack is
always more inspiriting than defence; and for this reason the
speeches of leaders of the Opposition generally afford better
reading than those of Prime Ministers. True, these positions on
the whole suited the peculiar talents of Pitt and Fox; and if
Fox may almost be termed the Napoleon of debate, assuredly
Pitt was its Wellington. Fox, however, could generally choose
time and place for an attack ; and this is an immense tactical
advantage. Never, surely, has an assault been delivered with
more energy than that of Fox upon the Westminster Scrutiny.
In fullness of technical knowledge, masterly development of the
attack, and skilful play upon every feeling which could tell
against the Government, his speech of 8th June 1784 stands un
rivalled. Above all it pulsates with manly indignation against
ministerial pressure exerted upon a single member unprovided
with funds for the contest. Few passages have moved Parlia
ment more deeply than these:
Not to him [Pitt], but to its true cause do I attribute this shameful
attack; to that black, that obstinate, that stupid spirit, which by strange
infatuation pervades and has pervaded the counsels of this country
throughout the whole course of this unfortunate and calamitous reign;
to that weak, that fatal, that damnable system, which has been the
cause of all our disgraces and all our miseries ; to those secret advisers
who hate with rancour and revenge with cruelty. To those malignant

THE ORATORY OF PITT 13
men whose character it is to harass the object of their enmity with a
relentless and insatiable spirit of revenge; to those, Sir, and not to the
right honourable gentleman do I impute this unexampled persecu
tion. . . .
But if the right honourable gentleman neglects his duty, I shall not
forget mine. Though he may exert all the influence of his situation to
harass and persecute, he shall find that we are incapable of unbecoming
submissions. There is a principle of resistance in mankind, which will
not brook such injuries; and a good cause and a good heart will
animate men to struggle in proportion to the size of their wrongs and
the grossness of their oppressors.
The inconsistency of the two passages does not much impair
their effectiveness. In fact, this masterly diatribe owes much of
its force to the glowing appeal for personal sympathy ; and here
Fox succeeded to an extent scarcely attainable by Pitt. The
Prime Minister seldom trenched on the domain of personalities.
Even in his speeches on the French Revolution, which often
vibrated with passion, the personal note is usually absent. There
is no reference to Robespierre or Marat instinct with the con
centrated loathing which inflates the well-known diatribe of
Macaulay against Barere. The following outburst, of I st February
1793, uttered eleven days after the execution of Louis XVI, is
characteristic of the style of Pitt :
France has trampled under foot all laws human and divine. She has
at last avowed the most insatiable ambition and greatest contempt for
the law of nations, which all independent States have hitherto pro
fessed most religiously to observe; and unless she is stopped in her
career, all Europe must soon learn their ideas of justice, law of nations,
models of government, and principles of liberty from the mouth of the
French cannon.
On 2 ist January 1794, the anniversary of that execution, he
uttered these words :
We are called in the present age to witness the political and moral
phenomenon of a mighty and civilized people formed into an artificial
horde of banditti, throwing off all the restraints which have influenced
men in social life, displaying a savage valour directed by a sanguinary
spirit, forming rapine and destruction into a system, and perverting to
their detestable purposes all the talents and ingenuity which they
derived from their advanced stage of civilization, all the refinements of
art and the discoveries of science. We behold them uniting the utmost

14 PITT AND NAPOLEON
savageness and ferocity of design with consummate contrivance and
skill in execution, and seemingly engaged in no less than a conspiracy
to exterminate from the face of the earth all honour, humanity, justice,
and religion.
Again, on 7th June 1799, in language more pictorial than
usual, he calls the French Government " an insupportable and
odious tyranny, holding within its grasp the lives, the characters
and the fortunes of all who are forced to own its sway. . . The
French Republic is dyked and fenced round with crime, and
owes much of its present security to its being regarded with a
horror which appals men in their approaches to its infamous
battlements." Strange to say, it was Bonaparte who called forth his keenest
antipathy. Replying to Erskine on 3rd February 1800, shortly
after the rejection by the Government of the tentative and prob
ably illusory offers of peace by the First Consul of France, the
Prime Minister passed in rapid review the phases of French
policy, painting in vivid colours the acts of aggression, often
stained with perfidy, at the expense of neighbouring lands. He
then proceeded as follows : " This is the first and moving spirit
of the French Revolution: ... it has equally belonged to
Brissot, to Robespierre, to Tallien, to Reubell, to Barras, and to
every one of the leaders of the Directory, but to none more than
to Bonaparte, in whom all their powers are united." After
demonstrating his share in the plunder of Italy and Switzerland,
in the unscrupulous coup d'c'tat of Fructidor (1797), and the high
handed seizure of Malta and Egypt, Pitt added these words:
His hold upon France is the sword, and he has no other. Is he
connected with the soil, or with the habits, the affections, or the
prejudices of the country? He is a stranger, a foreigner, and an
usurper; he»unites in his own person everything that a pure Republican
must detest, everything that an enraged Jacobin has abjured, everything
that a sincere and faithful Royalist must feel as an insult. If he is
opposed at any time in his career, what is his appeal? He appeals to his
fortune; in other words to his army and his sword. Placing, then, his
whole reliance upon military support, can he afford to let his military
renown pass away, to let his laurels wither, to let the memory of his
achievements sink in obscurity? ... Is it nothing, with a view to
influence or example, whether the fortune of this last adventurer in the
lottery of Revolutions shall appear to be permanent?

THE ORATORY OF PITT 15
A lighter effort is his raillery at Sheridan. On 6th March
1805 the Whig orator brought forward a motion for repealing
Pitt's " Additional Force Act " of the previous year, pointing it
with reckless comments on the incompetence of the Ministry.
After treating the question at issue, Pitt thus turned the tables
on Sheridan:
The honourable gentleman seldom condescends to favour us with a
display of his extraordinary powers of imagination and of fancy; but
when he does come forward, we are prepared for a grand performance.
No subject comes amiss to him, however remote from the question
before the House. All that his fancy suggests at the moment, or that he
has collected from others, all that he can utter in the ebullition of the
moment, all that he has slept on and matured, are combined and pro
duced for our entertainment. All his hoarded repartees, all his matured
jests, the full contents of his common-place book, all his severe invectives,
all his bold hardy assertions, all that he has been treasuring up for days,
for weeks and months, he collects into one mass which he kindles into a
blaze of eloquence, and out it comes altogether, whether it has any
relation to the subject or not. Thus it is, with his usual felicity, that the
honourable gentleman finds a new argument for the repeal of the
present Bill, because the House and the country have less confidence
in the present than even in the late Ministers. . . .
But the most telling of Pitt's retorts was that flung back at
Tierney on 17th February 1800. That opinionated and for the
time self-constituted leader of the Whigs had annoyed the Prime
Minister by challenging him to state in one sentence, " with
out his ifs and buts, and special pleading ambiguity," what was
the object of the war, which he (Tierney) asserted to be for the
restoration of the House of Bourbon. At once Pitt took up the
gauntlet, and in one word declared the object of the war to be
" security." Then, turning to the charge respecting the Bourbons,
he said :
He [Tierney] has assumed the foundation of the argument, and has
left no ground for controverting it, or for explanation, because he says
that any attempt of explanation upon this subject is the mere ambiguous
unintelligible language of ifs and buts, and of special pleading. Now,
Sir, I never had much liking to special pleading; and if ever I had any,
it is by this time almost entirely gone. He has besides so abridged
me of the use of particles that, though I am not particularly attached
to the sound of an if or a but, I would be much obliged to the honour-

16 PITT AND NAPOLEON
able gentleman if he would give me some to supply their places. Is
this, however, a light matter that it should be treated in so light a
manner? The restoration of the French monarchy I will still tell the
honourable gentleman I consider as a most desirable object because I
think that it would afford the strongest and best security to this
country and to Europe. But this object may not be attainable; and if
it be not attainable, we must be satisfied with the best security which
we can find independent of it. Peace is most desirable to this country,
but negotiation may be attended with greater evils than could be
counterbalanced by any benefits which would result from it. And if
this be found to be the case; if it afford no prospect of security; if it
threaten all the evils which we have been struggling to avert; if the pro
secution of the war afford the prospect of attaining complete security;
and tf it may be prosecuted with increasing commerce, with increasing
means, and with increasing prosperity, except what may result from the
visitations of the seasons; then I say that it is prudent in us not to
negotiate at the present moment. These are my buts and my ifs. This
is my plea, and on no other do I wish to be tried by God and my
country. No more crushing reply has been heard in the House of Com
mons. One knows not whether to admire most the mental
alertness which could on the instant frame an answer full of wit
and wisdom, or the beauty of the language, or the cumulative
force of the period, which marches from the trivial to the last
indignant outburst. Especially admirable from our present
standpoint is the arrangement of sentences which develop the
but and if motif At first they are short and almost snappish,
leading up, however, to others more sonorous, stately, and pro
portioned to the rising grandeur of the theme. The words swell
and the phrases lift their crests until the final wave sweeps all
before it, Tierney and his crew being scarcely visible —
Rari nantes in gurgite vasto.
The effect of these outbursts of eloquence was singularly en
hanced by the personality of the speaker. If Pitt had not his
father's power of browbeating by a frown, or of cowing by a
flash of anger in those hawk-like eyes, he yet swayed the House
by a dignity of bearing and an indefinable authority possessed
by none of his contemporaries. Lord Monboddo summed up
the impression produced by this perfection of form in the
statement that "Pitt spoke, Fox barked, and Lord North

THE ORATORY OF PITT 17
screamed." The periods of Pitt were like those which Cicero
wrote, and such as no contemporary could either speak or write.1
Erskine, the most forcible of pleaders at the Bar, shrank from a
parliamentary duel with Pitt.2 It is said that on one occasion
when the great jurist was inveighing against the Ministry, Pitt
abashed him by ostentatiously tearing in pieces notes of a reply
which he had begun to prepare. The incident may seem trivial,
but it points to the existence of that last reserve of power which
places the great orator above the able speaker, the power of
personality. In beauty of language and elevation of thought, Pitt's well-
known speech of 2nd April 1792 on the abolition of the Slave
Trade transcended all efforts even in that golden age of eloquence;
but, as I have elsewhere quoted largely from it,3 I pass on to a
passage which well illustrates his power of investing a subject
with dignity. It occurs in the exordium of his speech of 21st
April 1800 on the proposed union of the British and Irish
Parliaments :
If we wish to accomplish the great work that we have undertaken, we
must look to the whole of this important and complicated question, we
must look at it in a large and comprehensive point of view; we must
consider it as a measure of great national policy, the object of which is
effectually to counteract the restless machinations of an inveterate enemy
[France], who has uniformly and anxiously endeavoured to effect a
separation between two countries whose connection is as necessary for
the safety of the one as it is for the prosperity of the other. We must
look to this as the only measure we can adopt which can calm the dis
sensions, allay the animosities, and dissipate the jealousies which have
unfortunately existed; as a measure whose object is to communicate to
the sister kingdom the skill, the capital, and the industry which have
raised this country to such a pitch of opulence; to give her a full
participation of the commerce and of the constitution of England; to
unite the affections and resources of two powerful nations; and to place
under one public will the direction of the whole force of the Empire. . . .
In deciding on this question, we ought to be actuated by another
feeling, a feeling which it is not necessary for me to state, because the
magnanimity of every gentleman must have suggested it to his own
mind. In the union of a great nation with a less, we must feel that we
ought not to be influenced by any narrow views of partial advantage.

1 a

Corresp. of Wilberforce," i, 33. 2 Wraxall, iii, 409.
Rose, " William Pitt and National Revival," p. 470.
C

18 PITT AND NAPOLEON
We must refute by our conduct . . . the idea that we have any other
object in view than that of promoting the mutual advantage of both
kingdoms. We must show that we are not grasping at financial advan
tages, that we are not looking for commercial monopoly; we must show
that we wish to make the Empire more powerful and more secure by
making Ireland more free and more happy. These, Sir, are the views;
these are the only views, with which I could ever have proposed this
measure; and it is with these views alone that it can be rendered
effectual to its object, and establish mutual harmony and confidence
between the two nations.
In Cicero's treatise, " De Oratore," Crassus declares that the
great orator is he who can speak judiciously, in set form, elegantly,
from memory, with dignity of action, on any subject that
requires elucidation. The claim may seem excessive; and he
who would satisfy it would be, not a parliamentary orator, but a
professional rhetorician. In the opinion of some, Pitt is open to
this charge. Macaulay in his generally unfair estimate of Pitt,
represents him as a driveller in military affairs, content to send
forth England's forces to defeat so long as his splendid declama
tion won triumphs at Westminster. A perusal of the speeches
of Pitt on the true policy of the first and second coalitions, or of
his able statements on national defence in the summer of 1804,
will reveal the falsity of this slander. Coleridge, followed by
Lecky, commented on the poverty of thought in the speeches
of Pitt. The criticism smacks of the study and leaves out of
count the imperative needs of Westminster. It was the fate of
the noble orations of Burke to fall flat owing to the superabund
ance of the imaginative gifts which now constitute their charm.
He thought in aphorisms and his speech scintillated similes;
but that intellectual galaxy dazzled or bewildered the House.
Compared with Burke, Pitt was sparing of generalizations and
similes, though they occurred often enough to dignify his
orations and charm his audience. In fact the great merit of his
speeches is the balance of their qualities. They took a middle
course between the Pegasus flight of Burke and the pedestrian
efforts of Grenville. While his sonorous cadences satisfy the ear
of an artist, his periods, like his thoughts, were rarely, if ever, too
complex for the halting wits of the country squires who formed
the bulk of the members.
Here he compares favourably with Gladstone, whose subtle
intellect, extreme conscientiousness, love of distinctions and

THE ORATORY OF PITT 19
reservations, often involved his statements in conditional clauses
which not unnaturally incensed the Tierneys of his day. In other
respects, if we allow for differences of temperament and creed, the
oratoryof the founderof theUnionandof the proposer of the Home
Rule Bill of 1 886 has much in common. Theirs were the essential
gifts of charming ear and eye by silvery speech and vigorous
action, of marshalling vast masses of facts with ease and clear
ness, of surrounding even unattractive themes with the halo of
intellectual superiority, of convincing the reason and enthralling
the fancy, and of merging these powers in a unity where beauties
of detail disappear in the symmetrical dignity of the whole. In
truth, the architectonics of the speeches of Pitt resemble the
design of an Ionic or Corinthian temple, not devoid of ornament,
but impressive in its simplicity and in a completeness which
defies alteration. Other styles have other merits. In majesty of
diction and thrilling power the orations of Chatham stand un
equalled; in debating dexterity and passionate declamation
those of Fox have not been surpassed; those of Burke will
always attract men of letters, those of Sheridan journalists ; but
the most perfect example of the union of grace and force, of
stately rhetoric and convincing argument fused in the white
heat of patriotism, is to be found in the speeches of Pitt the
Younger.

PITT AND EARL FITZWILLIAM
THE dispute between Pitt and the second Earl Fitzwilliam,
which complicated affairs in Ireland early in 1795, arose out
of the union of the Portland Whigs with Pitt's followers in the
previous summer. The accession of a number of influential and
expectant statesmen produced more than the usual amount of
haggling about the distribution of the spoils of office; but so great
was the desire of Pitt to form a truly national party, capable of
facing the increasing difficulties of the time, that he sought to
humour his exigent allies. Their leader, the Duke of Portland, de
manded the Home Office for himself, and the Irish Viceroyalty for
the Whig magnate, the Earl Fitzwilliam, to whom that appoint
ment was prematurely offered by the Prince of Wales and Fox
during the Regency Crisis of 1789. Cheated of their hopes at
that time by the recovery of the King from the attack of in
sanity which had produced that orgy of Cabinet-making, Port
land and Fitzwilliam now revived their claims with better
chances of success. Fitzwilliam had recently joined the Cabinet
as Lord President, but he longed for the Irish Viceroyalty, and
it is clear from Pitt's letter to the Duke of 2nd July 1794, quoted
in the sequel, that His Grace laid stress upon that appointment
In view of the democratic ferment in England and the collapse
of the campaign in Flanders consequent on the Austrian defeat
at Fleurus, Pitt could not refuse the request, even though it in
volved the recall from Dublin Castle of his old friend of Cam
bridge days, the Earl of Westmorland. He, however, stipulated
that some honourable position must be found for Westmorland,
and on the same understanding the King sanctioned the change.
Pitt's letters of 2nd and 3rd July to Portland showed an earnest
desire to meet his wishes; but unexpected difficulties arose, the
result being that the appointment of Fitzwilliam remained in
abeyance for several weeks.
In such circumstances the conduct of a Viceroy-elect should

PITT AND EARL FITZWILLIAM 21
be marked by tactful reserve. That of Fitzwilliam showed in
credible levity. On 4th August he wrote to Grattan, the fervent
champion of Irish nationality, asking him and his friends, the
Ponsonbys, for their support during his approaching Vice-
royalty. In a postscript he admitted that his appointment was
not settled and that the present offer was therefore premature.1
Nevertheless, without marking his letter " private," he began to
arrange for what was a complete change of system in Ireland.
Grattan seems to have behaved with equal imprudence in reveal
ing this State secret. At any rate it is certain that busybodies
at Dublin soon buzzed about the news of the approaching de
parture of Westmorland in a way which vastly increased the
difficulties of an already trying situation. On 23rd October
he complained bitterly to Pitt of the slight inflicted on him and
the harm done to the King's cause by putting Ireland in the
hands of those who had recently sought to hold His Majesty in
thraldom. By that time it was believed that there would soon be
drastic changes at Dublin ; and Westmorland, while appreciating
Pitt's efforts to secure for him either the Presidency of the
Council or the Privy Seal at Westminster, expressed deep pain
at his opening the door to almost revolutionary changes in Ire
land. The following words about Portland are significant : " Is it
indiscretion only, without consultation with you, to appoint a
Lord Lieutenant? Is it indiscretion only to insult the existing
Lord Lieutenant without pretence? Is it indiscretion only to form
a plan of removing the King's servants and changing the system
of measures?" 2 Dundas, also, who had been removed from the
Home Office to the War Office in order to make way for Port
land, expressed to Pitt keen resentment at the conduct of their
new allies. Writing at Walmer on 13th October, he charged
them with " abominable swindling, of which the Old Baillie pro
vides no example." 3 Pitt's reply on the morrow shows dignified
reserve, but evinces deep pain at the narrow personal spirit dis
played by the Portland Whigs at so grave a crisis. He also re
solved on no account to allow Fitzwilliam to dismiss that Pro
testant stalwart, Lord Fitzgibbon, from the office of Vice-
Chancellor of Ireland.1 This change, and the removal of another
staunch supporter of the Government, John Beresford from the
1 "Grattan Memoirs," iv, 173- 2 Chevening MSS.
3 Pretyman MSS. quoted by Lord Ashbourne, "Pitt," p. 184.
4 Stanhope, " Pitt," ii, 283. Fitzgibbon soon became Earl of Clare.

22 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Revenue Board and other emoluments, were those on which the
opponents of Westmorland set most store.
But the questions at stake in Ireland were far more than
political or personal; they were also religious. The French
Revolution, with its almost magical power of energizing diverse
impulses, now prompted the Roman Catholic Irishry to struggle
for a recognition of their creed in the Parliament at Dublin.
Hitherto none but Protestants could enter the portals at St.
Stephen's Green. The Romanists chafed at their exclusion; and
agrarian grievances, especially that of tithe to the Established
Church, further tended to band together the Presbyterians of
Ulster with the Celtic substratum of the other three provinces.
Hence the Society of United Ireland, formed in 1791 by the
able young Ulsterman, Wolfe Tone, succeeded in marshalling
three-fourths of the population against the privileged oligarchy
entrenched at Dublin Castle. As has been shown elsewhere,1
Pitt did much in the years 1792-3 to lessen the grievances of
Roman Catholics, but latterly Westmorland had embarked on a
policy of coercion which seemed to end their hopes during his
regime. Pitt had forbidden his making an official pronounce
ment which closed the door to hope; but the position was be
coming intolerable; and on general grounds much could be said
in favour of the adoption of the principles of religious equality.
Nevertheless, there was every need of caution before setting
about so important a change in the midst of the excitement
then prevailing; and it was here that Fitzwilliam went astray.
His unofficial action in approaching Grattan was such as to
excite hopes for the satisfaction of which he had no official
warrant. In his excuse it must be said that, though fifty-six
years of age, he had little experience of public life, and he seems
to have lacked the power of self-suppression so eminently need
ful during the time of waiting. Family influence and wealth
were his chief recommendations. As nephew and heir of the
Marquis of Rockingham, and husband of Lady Dorothy Caven
dish, he possessed a unique claim to supremacy in the Whig
phalanx which sought to guard and control the throne. Among
them personal ability was less desirable than a strong sense of
family and party solidarity. In these virtues Fitzwilliam was
rich. He also inherited the bureaucratic notions ingrained in
the old Whig families, and therefore regarded himself, with his
1 Rose, " William Pitt and the Great War," ch. xvi.

rill AND EARL FITZWILLIAM 23
great territorial and family influence in Ireland, as the necessary
executant of the policy of concession initiated by Portland in
his brief Viceroyalty twelve years previously. The powers of a
Lord Lieutenant were extensive; and a member of the Whig
oligarchy may almost be pardoned for looking on Ireland as a
political preserve during his tenure of that exalted office. West
morland had good reason to warn Pitt that a Lord Lieutenant
could always find means to dismiss whom he would; and he
added the striking words : " Either make up your mind to give
it [Ireland] to that party or keep it for yourself. There is no
medium — believe me."1
The Duke of Portland also maintained that he had joined the
Cabinet only on the understanding that the new Lord Lieutenant
should be a man in whom he had confidence; and as Portland
favoured concession to the Roman Catholics, this understand
ing, if it were so distinct as to be binding, implied a change of
system at Dublin. Evidently the Duke and Fitzwilliam believed
that they were to have a free hand; and, as we have seen, their
confidence was soon shared by the Ponsonbys and Grattan, who,
in their resolve to compass the overthrow of the ultra-Protestant
clique, proceeded to London in September 1794, and succeeded
in gaining the ear of Lord Loughborough, Lord Chancellor of
Great Britain. Lady Arden, wife of the Attorney-General, at a
dinner given by Loughborough to Grattan and others, heard a
conversation which betokened a complete change of system at
Dublin. Sir Richard Pepper Arden therefore wrote to Pitt ur
gently begging him to beware of committing that Government to
men who had behaved badly to the King at the Regency Crisis.
Pitt does not seem to have attached much importance to the
matter, so we may judge from a sentence of his letter of 24th
September 1794 to his brother, Lord Chatham: " I have heard a
variety of reports relative to Lord Fitzwilliam going to Ireland
immediately, but not a step has been taken towards creating
the vacancy." 3 This, of course, merely implies that no suitable
post had yet been found for Westmorland. But while arrange
ments at Court were thus delayed, Loughborough made over
tures to the Portland Whigs and their Irish supporters. How
far Pitt authorized them I have not discovered. It was an
1 Pitt MSS. 331. Westmorland to Pitt, 18th and 23rd October 1795.
2 See Rose, "William Pitt and the Great War," p. 341, for Arden's letter.
3 Pitt MSS., 103. Stanhope (ii, 260) omits this sentence.

24 PITT AND NAPOLEON
indiscretion to allow him to intervene at all; for the Lord Chan
cellor, once an impecunious barrister of East Lothian, Alexander
Wedderburn by name, had run a signally devious course before
settling down with dignity on the woolsack. In his earlier days
his shifts and turns aroused no less contempt for his faithless
ness than admiration at their easy grace; but by the year 1794
those devices were almost forgotten, and he was looked upon as
a Ulysses who, on reaching home, had put far from him the
wiles of war and navigation. Whether George III, no inexpert
judge, held this opinion may be doubted ; for, on hearing of his
death in 1805, he compiled the regal epitaph: "Then he has
not left behind him a greater knave in all my dominions."
Such was the man who now acted as go-between for Pitt and
Fitzwilliam. The following new letters of Loughborough to
Pitt show that it was he who suggested the conference between
the leaders, and besought him to go as far as possible in the
way of concession. By the middle of October Portland, Fitz
william and the other Whig recruits had threatened to leave the
Cabinet if their demands were not complied with, and in view
of the urgency of the political crisis Pitt could not defy them
to do their worst. To this time we may refer the following
undated letters: 1 Bedford Square, Friday, 11 a.m.
My dear Sir,
Late as it was when I left you last night I could not help writing
the enclosed paper, tho' there can be nothing in it which has not
occurred to you. I cannot renounce the hope that a free conference
would settle all this business, the real importance of which bears no sort
of proportion to the mischief it may produce. One immediate conse
quence is quite evident; if it is not settled, the impossibility of keeping
Ireland composed. That will be the first, but not the greatest, of the
train of evils that must follow; and that consideration very much
diminishes the value of any point that can be made with respect to that
Government, and raises the value of every mode of conciliation that
can be devised. There is hardly any arrangement that could be more
disadvantageous to the Irish Administration than a direct rupture, or
endanger their situations more. From the turn of the note you received
yesterday, I suspect that a party pride has a much greater effect than
either sense or duty should allow in a business on which the public
safety is so deeply staked. That, I am sure, will not obstruct in your
1 Pitt MSS., 328.

PITT AND EARL FITZWILLIAM 25
mind any accommodation that would secure the publick object, how
ever irksome it must be to be harassed with difficulties arising from
such a cause. I am obliged to stay at home the early part of this morn
ing, but about two o'clock I hope to be able to call upon you.
Yours ever most entirely,
Loughborough.
Memorandum of Lord Loughborough
[After asserting that the danger of a disruption of the Administration
of this country must and could be averted by a candid explanation
between the two parties, Loughborough states that the undefined term,
" new system," as applied to Ireland, has complicated the negotiation.
But it only implies a desire to unite in the Government of Ireland "all
the respectable interests of that country;" it implies "a spirit of con
ciliation, a disposition to acquire friends, to extinguish, not to create
opposition." A new system must refer both to men and measures in
Ireland. He believes that the men chosen by the one side will be
received with perfect cordiality by the other. He continues]: "The
persons in Ireland of the most consideration amongst those who have
stood apart from Government are Mr. Grattan, the Mr. Ponsonbys,
Mr. Conolly, the Duke of Leinster. To attach the first, it is only neces
sary to govern well. The Mr. P[onsonbys] might both be placed in the
highest degree of consideration, which would necessarily follow from
their connection with the Lord Lieutenant; and there could be no
difficulty in finding situations, without the necessity of any harsh un
qualified and precipitate removals, for all those whom the judgment of
the chief Governor on the spot would lead him to adopt. That con
fidence is implied in his appointment, could not be withheld from him
without endangering the Government, and most assuredly is not meant
to be in any degree narrowed in the present instance. The power of
removal must also be inherent in the office; for no government could
be carried on with credit and efficacy if any person forming a part of it
held [it] by such a tenure as to enable him to counteract it with safety.
But the exercise of his power requires great moderation and caution
especially in the case of a new-formed Administration, when a consider.
able portion of power and influence must of necessity pass from those
who have been in the possession of both. Every removal would require
either to be qualified by some accommodation, or distinctly to mark
(sic) the specific cause and prevent the alarm that might be excited by
it in others.
" With respect to measures, those that may be proposed must probably
have the same tendency with the measures that have for some time been
adopted by the English Government, the circumstances not being

26 PITT AND NAPOLEON
materially changed. It is therefore unlikely that any difference in prin
ciple should exist. Difference of opinion as to the extent or form is to
be settled by discussion, and it requires only to be stated what the
measures are in order to judge whether that difference can extend very
far. The most necessary step is that the persons chiefly concerned
should invite each other to an open and full explanation of their inten
tions regarding both men and measures. That once done, all conditions
would be totally unnecessary and in some degree unfit. The public
ought only to know that no difference subsisted; what had been agreed
should only be known by its effects. No man would then be disquieted
either by unreasonable apprehensions or extravagant hopes, and all
would be the better disposed to be reconciled to each other and to their
respective situations, as from the certain knowledge that an entire con
fidence had been re-established amongst the principals, no hope would
be left for the gratification of the humour or interest of particular persons."
Very noteworthy is the skill with which Loughborough in
sinuates that the new system, advocated by Fitzwilliam and
demanded by Grattan, was not a new system at all, but merely
the adoption of a friendly spirit, together with a few changes of
persons at Dublin which doubtless could be arranged to the
advantage of everyone concerned. Equally deft is the sug
gestion that the new Lord Lieutenant must have a free hand,
though, of course, he would act with moderation. In fact, his
measures would not differ materially from those adopted by the
British Government, and there would therefore be no difference
of principle, while details might be settled by friendly discussion.
Such a discussion should not be accompanied by conditions.
These plausible suggestions might have deceived a novice ; but
it is strange that Pitt did not at once put a stop to Lough
borough's parade of the olive branch. Apparently he did not.
Unfortunately no account survives of Loughborough's confer
ence with Fitzwilliam and Grattan. The only other letter of
Loughborough surviving in the Pitt MSS. refers to it only in
general terms. He seems to have shown to them the paper
which he drew up for Pitt. Probably, after inducing Pitt to give
some kind of assent to his statement, he thereafter persuaded
them to do the same. The blessings invoked on the peace
maker shed a halo on the following letter to Pitt: Sat" mng.
My dear Sir,
I saw L" Fitzwilliam and Mr. Grattan last night; the conversa
tion spread into a pretty considerable detail, the grounds of which were

PITT AND EARL FITZWILLIAM 27
perfectly conformable to the principles expressed in the paper. I read
it over, and it was agreed to be a very just state (sic) of his intentions —
adopted indeed entirely, with the very slight alteration of the word
desirous to willing— to state his sentiments. I did not fix any further
meeting because it appeared to me that there was a wish first to talk
with the Duke of Pfortland], and on Monday we shall all meet. I will
call upon you as soon as I can. Yours most entirely,
Loughborough.
I have found no account of Loughborough's interviews. In
deed Pitt soon excluded him from these negotiations, probably
because he detected his aim of enticing Ministers into vague
and therefore dangerous concessions. From the first Pitt dis
played a discreet reserve towards Fitzwilliam and his future sup
porters at Dublin. At a dinner given by the Duke of Portland,
at which Grattan, the Ponsonbys, and Sir John Parnell were
present, the Prime Minister behaved most affably to Parnell;
but to his remark commending the union of Irish Catholics with
Protestants, he replied, " Very true, Sir, but the question is,
whose will they be? " ' To Grattan also his demeanour was
equally cordial and cautious. The son and biographer of the
great Irishman ventures to assert that Pitt throughout this
affair resolved to cheat Ireland; but the facts disprove this reck
less and unproven slander.2 Pitt's letters to Windham, one of
the new Whig Ministers, evince a desire to go far in the way of
concession to his allies and therefore to Grattan; but he was
resolved not to allow Fitzwilliam a free hand at Dublin, still
less to dismiss Fitzgibbon and Beresford. On 16th October,
after conferring with Grattan, Windham assured Pitt that, if he
would sacrifice the C[hancellor],  might be saved. The dash
probably hints at Beresford, who, however influential at Dublin,
was a less redoubtable fighter than the Chancellor, Fitzgibbon.
As for his own feelings, Windham stated his desire to remain
in the Cabinet. Nevertheless, if Pitt's support of the ultra-
Protestants at Dublin led Portland to resign, he (Windham) must
also go out. It is clear, then, that Loughborough's efforts to
whittle down differences of principle had no effect with Pitt,
though they probably gave rise to the stories of his duplicity
1 " Mems. of Grattan," iv, 175.
2 Stanhope, " Pitt," ii, 285-7, with letters.

28 PITT AND NAPOLEON
which gained ready belief at Dublin. Grenville also stood firm,
and on 24th October wrote that the reports about a change of
system at Dublin had blown over, though in the meantime they
had wrought infinite harm.1 Not until 14th November did the
King receive Lord Mansfield's acceptance of the Presidency of
the Council, an arrangement which enabled Westmorland to
become Master of the Horse, and Fitzwilliam Lord Lieutenant
of Ireland.2 At once Pitt wrote to Portland requesting a second
meeting of those concerned in the last appointment, or, failing
that, a private interview beforehand :
Downing Street, Friday night, Nov. 14, 1794. 3
Mv dear Lord,
I have had some conversation this evening with Lord Fitzwilliam,
Lord Spencer and Lord Grenville, on the subject of Ireland. They have
agreed to resume it here at twelve to-morrow ; and, being very desirous
to lose no time in endeavouring to adjust satisfactorily the points which
remain for discussion, I trouble Your Grace with this information in the
hope that it may not be inconvenient to you to be present at this meet
ing, or that you will have the goodness to name the time which suits
you best, when I may have the pleasure of seeing you on the subject of
it. I am, etc., W. Pitt.
There is no sign of anxiety in this letter. Still less does it
breathe the spirit of intrigue. Evidently Pitt deemed the ques
tion capable of adjustment by ordinary means; but, unfortun
ately, owing to difficulties at Court, it was not until 10th Dec
ember 1794 that Fitzwilliam attended the King's levee to kiss
hands on his appointment to the Viceroyalty.
Some time in December there was held an important meeting
at which Pitt and Grenville discussed with the new Whig
Ministers the future policy of Fitzwilliam at Dublin. Grenville
committed to writing a full description, which saw the light first
in the year 1898 in Lord Ashbourne's work on Pitt, and, in
1 "Buckingham Papers," ii, 317. A passage which corrects the mis
statement of Mr. Bryce ("Two Centuries of Irish History," ch. v) that Port
land accepted office on condition of a complete change of system at Dublin.
Burke's long letters of 16th to 28th October to Windham (" Windham's Diary,"
321-333) display ignorance of certain facts of the case. They have been
largely followed by Lecky.
2 The King to Pitt, 14th November 1794. See p. 230 of this volume.
3 From Mr. Doulton's MSS.

PITT AND EARL FITZWILLIAM 29
extenso, in the " Dropmore Papers " published in the following
year. The account is far too long for quotation in full ; but the
following sentences are essential. The first refers to the pre
liminary discussions; the others, to the conference held at
Downing Street :
After much discussion on the subject of Lord Fitzgibbon's removal,
that idea was renounced, and the most explicit assurances were given by
Lord Fitzwilliam that he had not in view the establishment of any new
system in Ireland, but that he was desirous of strengthening his Govern
ment by the accession of Mr. Ponsonby and his friends, and the support
of Mr. Grantham. . . .
At the conference, " Mr. W. Ponsonby was proposed by Lord
Fitzwilliam for Secretary of State. It was objected that this office ought
to be annexed to that of Chief Secretary [for Ireland]. ... In answer
to these objections Lord Fitzwilliam strongly urged the necessity of his
bringing forward Mr. W. Ponsonby, for which he said there was no
other opening. It was then proposed to him that Mr. Ponsonby might
be made Keeper of the Signet, and the office of Secretary of State be
annexed to that of Chief Secretary. And this arrangement was, after
much difficulty and discussion, agreed to by Lord Fitzwilliam. . . . No
mention was made at this conversation of Mr. Curran; nor was it known
to some of the persons there present that Lord Fitzwilliam had ever
thought of proposing that gentleman for Solicitor-General till after Lord
Fitzwilliam's arrival in Ireland, when that arrangement became the
subject of public discussion there.
"... Nothing was intimated in this conversation of any idea of
removing Mr. Beresford, nor was even his name mentioned by Lord
Fitzwilliam. " . . . At the close of it [the conversation] Lord Fitzwilliam, who had
brought to the meeting a memorandum of matters to be talked of, was
repeatedly asked whether there were any other points to be discussed,
or any new measures to be proposed. The answer was that he knew of
none." x
The other important topic discussed at the conference was the
1 " Dropmore Papers," iii, 36-8. Lord Ashbourne, "Pitt," 187-9. Mr. Fort -
escue (" British Statesmen of the Great War," pp. 107-9) makes no reference
to this all-important document.
Fitzwilliam afterwards stated that in one of his conversations with Pitt he
had announced his intention of dismissing Beresford ; but Pitt denied that this
was so. The King at the end of his letter of 29th January 1795 t0 pitt states
(in a sentence omitted by Earl Stanhope) that Fitzwilliam had paid no
attention to what was understood at the time of his departure.

ao PITT AND NAPOLEON
proposal of Fitzwilliam to nominate George Ponsonby as
Attorney-General in place of Wolfe. This was vetoed; and
the new Viceroy was instructed to defer to the opinion of the
King's Government in London on so weighty a matter as the
granting of further concessions to Roman Catholics.
What, then, must have been the surprise of Ministers when
they heard of the proceedings of Fitzwilliam on his arrival at
Dublin? Landing on Sunday evening 4th January, he was con
fined to his room by indisposition the whole of the next day.
On Tuesday he transacted business. On Wednesday he sent
Daly to warn John Beresford, head of the Revenue Department,
of his coming dismissal; for he (Beresford), having made the
fortunes of Fitzgibbon and other high officials, had virtually the
Law, the Church, and the Army almost under his hands. Daly
advised Beresford quietly to retire. It afterwards transpired
that Fitzwilliam on the Tuesday raked up charges of financial
irregularities, and was also prepared to accuse him of duplicity
towards Pitt, in what matter is not known. On 15th January
the Lord Lieutenant wrote to Grenville that Beresford was satis
fied with this arrangement and promised his support.1
Beresford had said nothing of the kind. He wrote at once to
his old friend, Lord Auckland, urging him to appeal to Pitt for
fair play; and on 23rd January he set out for London.2 The
Prime Minister saw the gravity of the crisis; for, as he told
George Rose, the dismissal of Beresford " would be an open
breach of a most solemn promise." It was more than that; it
portended the change of system which Fitzwilliam had agreed
to waive. Beresford's later letters to Auckland show that Fitz
william and the Ponsonbys were bent on making a clean sweep
at Dublin Castle. By dint of several unfair dismissals they
succeeded; and Ponsonby, when under the influence of Lord
Shannon's vinous hospitality, declared that he had long worked
to this end and now had the reins in his hands.3 This was so.
When viewed at large, these changes seem a preparation for a
1 " Dropmore Papers," iii, 9.
Pitt MSS., 325. Auckland adds in a note, " Received January 15, 3 p.m. ;
wrote to Mr. Pitt, 5 p.m."
3 " Beresford Corresp.," ii, 60. The only letter of any importance from
Fitzwilliam to Pitt is a request for a pecuniary grant to the Chief Baron,
Yelverton, whom Fitzwilliam had raised to a peerage. He makes it almost a
question of confidence (Pitt MSS., 328).

PITT AND EARL FITZWILLIAM 31
measure of religious equality too long delayed. On examination,
there emerge unmistakable signs that that curse of Irish politics,
family jobbery, was only to reappear in a Whig guise.
On the larger question at issue, Fitzwilliam's conduct is more
defensible. He found the country in a ferment on the Catholic
question. True, this was largely the result of his own blazing
indiscretions and those of Grattan. There had been few signs
of an agitation on that question until the autumn.1 But then
the shadows of coming change at Dublin caused general excite
ment; and in the winter of 1794-5, when the disgraceful collapse
of the Allies in Holland chilled the hearts of all loyalists, there
was little show of resistance. Presbyterian Ulster had made
common cause with the Catholics in demanding the abolition of
all religious disabilities. In February, when the Dutch fleet was
in the hands of the French, rumours of an invasion became rife ;
and in these circumstances it was not unnatural for Fitzwilliam
to feel that the time had come for granting the last of the
Catholic claims.
Yet his conduct was such as to illustrate the difference be
tween obstinacy and firmness. While clinging to his preconceived
notions, he displayed no resourcefulness or courage in meeting
a threatening situation. He did little or nothing to dissuade
Grattan from proposing a Bill for Catholic Emancipation, though
his recent promise to Ministers should have bound him to that
course of action. Further, a man of magnanimous nature would
have appealed to Irishmen to sink their differences for the
present in face of a common danger. But Fitzwilliam, after
depressing the spirits of the loyal, now had not the nerve or the
tact to enliven them. On the contrary, his acts and his passivity
alike gave new life to malcontents. His letters to Portland and
Pitt exhaled discouragement and dismay. He warned them
that Government could not cope with the discontent, which
amounted to veiled rebellion. Clearly, Fitzwilliam was out of
his place at Dublin. Unfortunately owing to stress of weather a
long delay occurred in the despatch of the mails for England,
namely from 10th to 23rd January,2 a fact which fully explains
"the astounding neglect of duty," of the Pitt Ministry against
1 " Beresford Corresp.," ii, 44-
2 Beresford to Auckland, 19th January (Pitt MSS., 325)- At the close he
says he will sail by the first packet which sails. He did not sad until 23rd
January.

32 PITT AND NAPOLEON
which Lecky declaimed.1 On 28th January Grenville wrote to
Fitzwilliam in friendly terms, hinting, however, that the dismissals
at Dublin were not quite consonant with the former assurances
of the Earl.2 A few days later the Duke of Portland sent off
official rebukes drawn up in a far harsher tone.
To what are we to ascribe this change? Mainly, I think, to
the intervention of the King. On 5th February, after the
Drawing Room at St. James's, Portland handed to him letters
from Fitzwilliam announcing the proposal to admit Roman
Catholics to the Irish Parliament and his concurrence with it.
George did not say much at the time; he smothered his feelings,
slept on them, and on the morrow fired off a double-shotted
volley at Pitt. The Duke, he said, had undoubtedly sought to
sound his sentiments in view of the Cabinet meeting on the 7th.
He (the King) felt the utmost surprise at the conduct of the
Viceroy, who, after three weeks' stay in Ireland ventured "to
condemn the labours of ages," and to set at defiance the judge
ment of all men of property in that land. Every land must
have a Church Establishment. In Ireland there were few
Romanists of standing who could sit in Parliament. Grattan's
measure would therefore " disoblige the greater number to bene
fit a few." Besides being a peevish attempt to humiliate the
friends of Ireland, it trenched on the domain of conscience. "I
cannot conclude (wrote the King) without expressing that the
subject is beyond the decision of any Cabinet of Ministers." In
fact it would be better to change the Administration at Dublin
rather than admit so dangerous an innovation.3
These closing words were of terrible import. They closed the
door against Catholic Emancipation for that reign and forbade
the Cabinet even to discuss a matter which soared above their
jurisdiction into the realm of conscience. Ministers had not
placed a veto on the discussion of this question at some future
time; but now the King did; and his intervention must have
stiffened the attitude of the Cabinet. The proceedings of the
Cabinet meeting of 7th February are not known. But on the
following day Portland charged Fitzwilliam to do all in his
power to postpone the Catholic Question ; and on 9th February
the Prime Minister wrote to the Viceroy blaming the dismissal
1 Lecky, vii, 70. J "Dropmore Papers," iii, 13.
3 Stanhope, ii, App., pp. xxiii-xxv.

PITT AND EARL FITZWILLIAM 33
of officials both as a breach of promise and as burdening the
Irish revenue with a needless number of pensions.1 The letter
contained no reference to Grattan's proposals, but dwelt merely
on the personal questions at stake. The omission probably re
sulted from his writing in a way which supplemented the more
formal missive of Portland. In any case, the Lord Lieutenant
haughtily informed Pitt that he must choose between him and
Beresford; and to Portland he declared that he would not be the
man to put off the Catholics, and " by doing so raise a flame in
the country that nothing short of arms would be able to keep
down." It is clear, then, that his resignation resulted, not merely from
the dismissals (as Grattan recklessly stated2) but also from his
tacit encouragement of a measure which he had promised to hold
back. That both causes were operative appears in the letter of
George Rose to the Bishop of Lincoln (28th February): "... Mr.
Pitt has said nothing to me lately about Ireland, but I con
ceive it utterly impossible for Lord Fitzwilliam there, because he
said he positively went not (sic) if Beresford should be restored, on
which Mr. Pitt peremptorily insists ; there can be no doubt of his
coming away on other grounds, such as Catholic measures, etc."3
On 25th February, after receiving a further letter from Pitt in
the same sense as the former,4 the Lord Lieutenant informed Fitz
gibbon that the opposition shown to him on the Catholic Question
and Beresford's removal had decided him to retire within a week.5
Circumstances prevented his departure until near the end of
March, when, instead of leaving as quietly as possible, he took
the advice of Grattan and departed in a manner which evoked a
great popular ovation. With the utmost effusiveness the men of
Dublin dragged his carriage to the quay, and openly threatened
to subvert the authority of his successor, Earl Camden.
1 " Stanhope Misc.," i, 19-23.
It has been suggested that Fitzgibbon secretly influenced the King's
decision. But his letter of 14th February to Beresford shows that he intended
to send over Grattan's Bill with legal comments respecting the King's
Coronation oath. The King evidently formed his judgement on the letters of
Fitzwilliam shown to him by Portland on 5th February. See, however,
Lecky, vii, 103. The oft-quoted assertion that no petition was sent in against
Grattan's proposals is incorrect. The Corporation of Dublin and a few other
bodies sent in protests.
"Grattan Memoirs," iv, 195. 3 Pretyman MSS.
" Stanhope Misc.," i, 23. ' " Beresford Corresp.," ii, 74.
D

2 a

34 PITT AND NAPOLEON
For these commotions Fitzwilliam must be held responsible.
Before his departure he wrote to his old friend of Eton days, the
Earl of Carlisle, two long letters sharply impugning the good
faith of the Pitt Ministry, justifying his own acts, and accusing
Beresford of malversation of the public funds.1 It is said that
he intended these letters to be printed at Dublin only for private
circulation. Of course they at once became public, thereby
pouring oil on the flames of strife in Ireland. The populace at
once accused Pitt and Portland of perfidy and lauded Fitz
william to the skies as a true friend of Ireland, who was recalled
for dismissing a dishonest official and favouring a measure of
religious equality. With all the evidence now before us, we must
pronounce him guilty of a breach of promise to the Pitt Cabinet
and of acts so indiscreet and perverse as to shake the very
foundations of Government. Perhaps the worst act of the Earl's
public life was the citation, in the letter to the Earl of Carlisle,
of a passage from a confidential despatch of the Duke of Port
land. In it the Home Secretary declared that the postponement
of Catholic Emancipation would prove to be "the means of
doing a greater service to the British Empire than it has been
capable of receiving since the Revolution [of 1688] or at least
since the Union [with Scotland]." Probably Portland here re
ferred to the hoped-for Union of the British and Irish Parlia
ments, which Pitt desired to effect by means of the great, though
as yet unorganized, influence of the Roman Catholics in Ireland.
It is, however, unfair to accuse Pitt of keeping back that reform
merely as a bribe ; for there were larger issues than appeared on
the surface. To admit Catholic members to St. Stephen's Green
was a real danger to Protestant institutions in Ireland. To in
clude them in the future national Parliament at Westminster,
where they must form a minority, could involve no such danger.
But, as it is the habit of mankind to lose sight of wider con
siderations in the mean motives which everyone can under
stand, the postponement of that measure was deemed a cunning
deferment of a dainty morsel in order to garnish the unpalat
able dish which he had in store.
To sum up, Pitt did not handle the Fitzwilliam affair either
firmly or judiciously. Even in those leisurely days the delay of
more than five months from its inception to the actual appoint-
1 For this insult Beresford challenged Fitzwilliam. They met "near
Kensington," but a peace officer prevented the duel.

PITT AND EARL FITZWILLIAM 35
ment of Fitzwilliam must be pronounced slovenly in the ex
treme. So soon as the Earl began heedlessly to foreshadow
coming events at Dublin, there was obvious need of promptly
coming to a clear understanding with him. Far from doing so,
Pitt allowed Loughborough to have a hand in the negotiations
with Fitzwilliam and Grattan, the result being that the question
was involved in a cloud of specious verbiage which raised the
hopes of Irish malcontents and the demands of their Whig
allies, so as to threaten the overthrow of the Government.
Ultimately, and largely owing to the good sense and forbear
ance of Grenville, the issue stood forth clearly; and the Dec
ember conference of Ministers with Fitzwilliam left not a shadow
of doubt in any mind but his that he was precluded from
making any important change at Dublin without the consent of
the British Government. If this agreement had been framed in
August, instead of December, a vast amount of mischief would
have been avoided. Accounts of this dispute published before
the year 1898 assume that Fitzwilliam had a free hand at Dublin.1
We now know that the reverse was the case.
Therefore, while Pitt is open to the charge of weak and
dilatory procedure, the verdict on Fitzwilliam must be far more
severe. His conduct at Dublin contravened his recent agree
ment with Ministers, and he must be held responsible for the
turmoil which ensued. Finally his conduct at the time ot
leaving Ireland and his reckless charges against the Cabinet and
Beresford bear the stamp of a small and peevish nature which
scrupled not to increase the difficulties of his successor. The
marvel is that he was ever again asked to join an Administra
tion ; and it is a sign both of the generosity of Pitt and of the
gravity of the national crisis in the month of May 1 804 that he
advised his appointment as one of the Secretaries of State in the
national Administration which was vetoed by the King. Fitz
william did not reciprocate this magnanimity. Wilberforce, in
the year 1827, found him still obsessed by " deadly hostility " to
the memory of Pitt, whom he accused of a rooted dislike to
him.2 The statement implies a lasting vindictiveness in him who
made it.
1 E.g., Lecky, vii, 41 et sea.
2 " Life of Wilberforce," v, 280. See, too, " Rutland Papers " (Hist. MSS.
Commiss.), iii, 229, for Lord Sydney's comments on the peevish tone of
Fitzwilliam's speeches.

36 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Finally, we may judge of the rights and wrongs in this
painful dispute by the subsequent conduct of the other Whig
Ministers. Portland, Spencer and Windham knew all the details
of the case. Yet, after the recall of Fitzwilliam, they continued
to support Pitt, and manifested their sense of the Earl's mis
conduct by a chilling demeanour towards him. The editor of
the " Grattan Memoirs " explains this away by the voluminous
statement that the artful and insincere policy of Pitt had com
pletely succeeded.1 On the contrary, the clamour raised by
Fitzwilliam's hasty conduct told fatally against the policy of
firmness tempered by moderation, which Pitt looked on as pre
paratory to further measures of conciliation and of a closer
political union of the two islands.
1 "Grattan Mems.," iv, 211.

WAS PITT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
QUIBERON DISASTER?
THE answer to this question cannot be given offhand. It
demands careful examination of the motives which led to
the Quiberon enterprise, of the events attending it, and of the
causes, both obvious and secret, which ruined it. I shall there
fore endeavour in this essay to set forth the state of French
politics which induced Pitt to help the French Royalists, also
the plans for rousing Brittany from Quiberon as a base, and the
events which determined the issue. In a question which has
aroused furious feeling, the more objective the treatment, the
better. Many influences conspired to strengthen the royalist reaction
which swept over France after the end of the Reign of Terror.
Tallien and the other Jacobins, who overthrew Robespierre by
the coup d'etat of 10 Thermidor (28th July 1794), had no thought
of ruling with clemency. It was the force of public opinion, now
at last set free, which swept them back towards moderation,
which the ardour of the French nature promised to transform
into royal ism. By that time the golden visions of 1789 had
faded away into drab reality; and amidst the misery of the
winter of 1794-5 many would have echoed the pithy comment
of an old woman — " Ah, sir, under Robespierre we poor people
suffered, but in silence; now we suffer just as much, but we can
speak about it." The populace never uttered the once sacred
watchwords of the Revolution without a sneer or a grimace. At
the theatres they hissed down the Marseillaise and called for
anti-revolutionary songs. Two- thirds of the National Convention
posed as Moderates, a term which thinly veiled a preference for
monarchy. Everywhere the churches were reopened, and the
Sunday services were crowded, the Jacobinical day of rest,
le De'cadi, being ignored. In fact the general craving for political
security awakened an almost universal regret for the once
37

38 PITT AND NAPOLEON
detested ancien regime. It was therefore natural that Pitt, in his
resolve to abate the claim of France to her " natural frontiers " —
the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the ocean — should make
use of the French Royalists or Moderates who decried the
Jacobinical policy of aggrandizement.1
The course of British politics also inclined Pitt to pay more
heed to the requests of the French Emigre's. In July 1794 their
friend and champion, Windham, entered the Cabinet as Secre
tary at War conjointly with Henry Dundas ; so that the policy
of a royalist crusade, trenchantly advocated by Burke and
Windham, now had an official exponent. Further, there soon
arrived in London Comte Joseph de Puisaye, a man of com
manding stature and persuasive power, who had long and stoutly
warred against the Republic in Brittany. These services, it is
true, counted for little among the " pure " Royalists who sur
rounded the exiled French princes, the Comte de Provence and
the Comte d'Artois. To those reactionary cliques he, a champion
of constitutional royalty, was merely a tool to be used for a
time, and then flung aside.2 But his reason and moderation
commended him to Pitt and Windham, and his letters to Pitt,
which began at the close of September 1794, show how exten
sive was the support in arms and money thenceforth given to the
Bretons. At that time 1 22 officers and 1 50 privates, all Royalists,
sailed from Southampton with munitions of war. Puisaye re
mained behind to organize further expeditions on funds sup
plied by Pitt and Windham. These piecemeal tactics move
military historians to contempt; but it is clear that the north
west of France was roused in that way. Canton after canton
was won for the royalist cause in the winter of 1794-5, when
the allies were retreating from Holland into Germany. Puisaye's
lieutenants then wrote to him that the whole province was with
them; that the republican troops were few and ill-paid, and
could easily be seduced. On 22nd December the Council of the
Royal Army of Brittany urged Puisaye to return at once, and,
if possible, bring powerful succour from England. They are
especially needed. " A prince of the blood of France, the
1 In the autumn of 1793 P"t sought to come into touch with the Bretons,
who had thrown off the Republican yoke. For his letter of 25th November
1793) to the Earl of Moira, then in command of an expedition in the Solent,
destined to help the Bretons, see the " Quarterly Review " for 1912.
1 E. Daudet, " L'Emigration," i, 281.

THE QUIBERON DISASTER 39
e"migr<fs en masse, all those in England to be obliged to come ;
the emigre" corps raised by England; 12,000 British troops." :
To send so large a force as this to one of the most dangerous
coasts of Europe during the storms of winter was scarcely
feasible, even if the men and the ships had not been needed for
the Dutch and colonial campaigns. Carnot and his colleagues
doubtless counted on this, and decided to push hard the Duke
of York's force then retreating through Holland. They also
held out the olive branch to the Bretons; and it is probable
that the very easy terms which they offered to the brave Breton
leader, Charette, in the so-called Peace of la Jaunaie, were a
device for warding off a military collapse in the West, while
they threw all their energies into the Dutch campaign. The
conditions which Charette and some of his lieutenants imposed
at Nantes, and those embodied in the subsequent treaty of
20th April, always had an air of unreality.2 Could the Republic
carry out conditions utterly at variance with its previous claims?
Was not the whole proceeding a device for gaining time until
the troops set free by the hoped-for peace with Prussia and
with Spain were available for service in the West? Such were
the questions whispered secretly by Jacobins and Chouans. As
for the sturdy gamekeeper Stofflet, the rival of Charette, he
acceded to the peace most grudgingly; and incidents, such as
the murder of two Royalists by the garrison of Laval, threatened
a speedy end to this pretended reconciliation. On their side
Charette and Stofflet probably counted on help from England,
and, still more, on the Royalist reaction now rapidly gaining
strength at Paris.
Accordingly Puisaye assured Pitt that, if British help were
given effectively, the Bretons would rise as one man and throw
off the republican yoke for ever. Ministers took him at his
word, and procured powers from Parliament for raising regi
ments from among the French Emigre's, who came over in swarms
after the Jacobin conquest of Holland. If only the declared
Royalists had been enrolled, all might have gone well. But,
on the advice of Puisaye, Ministers decided to admit deserters
from the republican armies in Holland and Germany, and thus
to form eight regiments of 1,550 men each. The uniform was
to be scarlet with white facings ; the flag the fleur-de-lj/s.3 As
1 "Dropmore Papers," iii, 537, 538. 2 "Ann. Reg." (179S), P- W7-
3 Ibid., pp. 163-7.

4o PITT AND NAPOLEON
deserters came in very slowly, Puisaye hit upon another still
more questionable device, namely, of enrolling those prisoners
of war in England who volunteered for the royal army; and
again the Cabinet acted on his advice. In his "Memoirs" he
justifies his conduct on the ground that, up to the time of the
Quiberon expedition, men enrolled in this way had done their
duty.1 Another device which Pitt adopted, probably at the instance
of Puisaye, was the printing of royal assignats. So far back as
20th September 1794 Puisaye and his staff of the royalist army
in Brittany had decreed, by virtue of powers conferred on them
by the French princes, that paper money should be issued for
the support of their troops, the republican assignats being de
nounced as illegal and worthless. Asserting that the issue of
money belonged solely to the King or Regent, Puisaye called
on the loyalists to honour the paper notes soon to be circulated,
as these only would be recognized at the restoration of mon
archy.2 Puisaye's journey to England was probably in part
connected with the manufacture of these notes ; and certainly
the Royalists regarded the issue by the Republic of assignats
on the security of the lands seized by the Revolutionists as a
confirmation of an act of robbery which must be thwarted by all
possible means. Among them forged assignats had a prominent
place. Pitt and his colleagues allowed their fabrication for use
with the Duke of York's army in French Flanders; for that
date appears at the bottom of the pattern copy which has sur
vived. The notes were manufactured at Haughton Paper Mills
near Hexham, Langley Paper Mill near Durham, and at a mill
near Dartford. A distinction must, however, be drawn between
the forged assignats and those which bore a mark ensuring
their identification when the king " came to his own again."
Probably both kinds were manufactured in England, and with
the knowledge of Pitt.3
1 "Puisaye Mems.," ii, 594-603; v, 39-49. Other royalist leaders had
adopted the same plan. See Forneron, "Hist, des Emigre's," ii, 13, 14. In
view of the well-known fact that these prisoners of war enlisted in order to
get back to France, why do Sorel (iv, 365), and Fortescue (iv, pt. i, 415) say
that they were forced into the service?
2 See the decree in the " Puisaye Papers," B.M. Add. MSS. 8072.
3 Note by Mr. Maberly Phillips in the "Journal of the Institute of
Bankers," May, 1894; also "Notes and Queries" (Second Series, vi, 255);
Doubleday's "Financial History of England," and "Newcastle Weekly

THE QUIBERON DISASTER 41
During the spring of 1795 the British Ministry spent money
freely in order to further the royalist movement in Brittany. On
8th April Puisaye, in a letter to Pitt, refers to an agreement for
advancing the sum of £3,000 a month for the Breton cause, the
half of which he desires may be paid to him or his commissary,
Prigent, every fortnight in the way that Windham and Huskis-
son prescribe.1 Even up to the month of June the situation in
la Vendee and Anjou was far from clear. Charette was quietly
mustering his bands, as if for a struggle, while Stofflet, always
at feud with him, observed the peace with the Republic. In
Brittany, a royalist leader, Cormatin, reluctantly observed the
peace;2 and it was questionable whether the peasants would
rise en masse until the crops were garnered. The omens being
so doubtful, was it desirable to send an expedition to the Breton .
coast? Was it not better to struggle on in North Germany in
hopes of help from Austria and Russia? Or were not the
colonial enterprises, dear to Dundas, preferable to the risks of
trusting to leaders so little trustworthy as Charette now seemed
to be? Here was the problem confronting Pitt and his col
leagues. It became more acute as Spain showed signs of defec
tion from the monarchist league. Worse still, on 16th May, the
Dutch Republic came to terms with France. Thenceforth an
attack from the Dutch navy was only a matter of time.
In this perplexing state of things, when every week brought
new calls upon our little army, very few British troops were
sent to Brittany. Ministers had been collecting a force of
French Emigre's at Portsmouth and Southampton, under the
Earl of Moira and General Doyle. But I have found no decisive
proof that up to the date 12th June Pitt intended to despatch the
force to Brittany. On that day the Foreign Minister, Grenville,
wrote to the Earl of Bute, British Ambassador at Madrid,
urging him to encourage the Spanish court to persevere in the
Chronicle'' (Supplement), 14th April 1894. I have not been able to find one
of these royalist assignats. If their distinguishing mark was not wholly
concealed (and how could it be if they were redeemable at the Restoration?)
I think that they can no more be censured than Jefferson Davis' " Confederate
notes." 1 Pitt MSS., 169. See, later on, Windham's letter of 3rd July 1795 t0 Pi"
as to the help in money destined for Charette.
2 Cormatin, Sorilhac, Boishardy, and six other leaders signed a protest
against the peace, as undoing in one day the toil of years. It is in B.M.
Add. MSS., 37,859-

42 PITT AND NAPOLEON
royalist cause, seeing that an expedition would very soon pro
ceed to Brittany, thus leading to risings elsewhere in France,
and causing a powerful diversion in favour of Spain.1
There were therefore solid reasons why Pitt should persevere
with the royalist expedition: but unfortunately it was weakened
by the causes noted above, and also by the resolve of George III
to detain in Hanover a large part of the British and subsidized
forces. There was the less excuse for this as Prussia, in the
Treaty of Basle (5th April 1795), agreed to include the whole of
North Germany in a system of neutrality which would have
guarded Hanover from attack if the pride of George could have
stooped to acknowledge this trying form of protection. Unfor
tunately he delayed to do so, though Ministers brought pressure
to bear upon him. On 23rd May Cornwallis wrote to Ross that
the idea of neutrality for Hanover, however unpleasant, must be
acquiesced in as a military necessity. " It may not be easy," he
adds, " to make [the King] hear cool and dispassionate reason,
but still Ministers must do their duty." 2 George, however, would
not give way. So late as 28th August Dundas complained to
Grenville that as many as 30,000 British and subsidized troops
were kept idle in Hanover; but a few days later the Cabinet
drew up a minute requiring that the British cavalry should be
withdrawn. To this the King yielded an angry assent, but too
late to save the situation in the west of France.3 In truth,
George disliked the hnigre's and persistently used his influence
against efforts on their behalf. In view of the sharp criticisms
recently levelled at Pitt for neglecting the Quiberon expedition,4
it is well to remember the opposition which he encountered in
the highest quarters. If any Englishman be responsible for the
disaster, it is the King himself.
^ The reasons for not entrusting this first expedition to the
Comte d'Artois have been ascribed by French royalist writers
to Pitt's design of ruining the enterprise. Viewing the matter
calmly, we can see that he acted from motives of prudence. It
is incorrect to assert, as Earl Stanhope did,' that he urged the
prince to lead the expedition, but that, while not refusing out-
1 "F. O.," Spain, 37. » « Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 289.
3 See the King's letter of 9th September 1795 later in this volume: also
Dropmore Papers," iii, 128, 134.
Fortescue, "British Statesmen of the Great War," 111,114, n c
5 Stanhope, " Pitt," ii, 336.

THE QUIBERON DISASTER 43
right, the prince threw difficulties in the way. The letters of the
Comte d'Artois show that he was anxious to take the lead. On
3rd May he wrote to the Due d'Harcourt, his factotum in Lon
don: " I would sacrifice everything rather than miss the oppor
tunity of realizing the expedition, which forms the object of all
my wishes, and which I consider more than ever as a measure
most desirable for the interest and glory of England, as for the
salvation of my country." ' Harcourt informed the Government
of the wishes of the Prince. But how could the British Govern
ment risk the life of one who was so near the succession to the
French throne on a small and tentative expedition, the reception
of which in Brittany was wholly uncertain? On 19th June Gren
ville informed Artois that the object of the first expedition was
merely to convey arms and stores to the Bretons. No large
force would be sent. But when the Bretons and Vendeans had
taken up arms, then would be the time for him to put himself
at their head without too much compromising his personal
safety.2 Puisaye, then, was to act the part of forerunner, merely
holding the Quiberon Peninsula as a base for future operations
on a larger scale. If all went well the Prince was to appear.
The subsequent conduct of Artois leads us to suppose that he
fully appreciated this care for his safety.
Pitt, however, may have been actuated by another motive.
Possibly he desired to give to Puisaye the opportunity of assert
ing the constitutional principles of 1791 as against the reac
tionary creed of the Comte d'Artois and Charette. The British
Ministers favoured the cause of the Moderates at Toulon ; and,
whatever the Bretons might think, the greater part of France
disliked the antediluvian views of Artois. Certainly the choice
of Puisaye, though it confirmed the previous choice of the French
princes for their army in Brittany, provoked angry protests from
the Emigre's? But who would have been acceptable to those
homeless, waspish swarms?
1 " F. O.," France, 44.
2 Note the following words : " L'intention de cet envoi est plutot de pro-
teger le ddbarquement des provisions et des munitions militaires que Sa
Majeste" envoie aux royalistes de la Bretagne que de tenter une entreprise
militaire avec une force si peu considerable" ("F. O.," France, 44). The
construction put on this letter by E. Daudet (" L'Emigration," i, 296) is quite
unwarrantable. 3 "Memoires du Marquis Louis de Bouille," ii, ch. xxxv; "Dropmore
Papers," iii, 89, 94-101.

44 PITT AND NAPOLEON
In his memoirs Puisaye noted several proofs of the earnest
ness of Pitt and his colleagues in the royalist cause. Their
preparations, though tardy, were thorough. They placed at
the head of the British regiments designed to reinforce
Puisaye, a man who was the soul of honour, the Earl of Moira;
and the admirals who were told off to protect the convoy
were men of high reputation, Bridport and Sir John Borlase
Warren. Sir Sidney Smith, cruising off the north coast of
Brittany, also actively exerted himself to mislead the enemy
as to the point of attack. On 17th June 1795 Warren weighed
anchor in the Solent with his convoy, having on board some
3,800 French Royalists. They consisted of Hervilly's regiment
(1,200), Dresnay's (700), Hector's regiment of naval officers and
seamen (700), La Chatre's (600), and 600 artillerymen, mostly
refugees from Toulon.
At first all went well. Bridport dealt a sharp blow at a
squadron of the enemy off 1'Orient and captured three sail-of-
the-line, one being " Le Tigre," destined to win fame off Acre.
The rest of the fleet he drove into 1'Orient and blockaded it
there. The coast having been thus cleared, Warren felt his way
in hazy weather towards Quiberon :
The sickle sweep of Quiberon Bay
Whose beach once ran with loyal blood.
He cast anchor there on 27th June. Four ships which had
parted company soon arrived.
The Quiberon Peninsula stretches southwards into the Bay
of Biscay. In shape it is not unlike Portland ; but, though larger
and more fertile, it is lower in contour and more hooked in
shape, enclosing a deep bay which forms one of the best road
steads in France. The peninsula contained several hamlets of
fisher-folk, who named the outer sea la mer sauvage. The bay
was then in part commanded by two weak batteries not far from
the tip of the tongue, while a stronger fort, then called " Fort
Sansculottes," dominated the long and narrow isthmus. Such
was the place whence the royalist movement was to gather
itself up and sweep eastwards to the demolition of Jacobinism.
Disputes had begun while the force was at sea. By some
unaccountable blunder Dundas and Windham (always more or
less at variance) in their instructions of 6th June to Puisaye
appointed him commander of the French regiments in British

THE QUIBERON DISASTER 45
pay, from the time of disembarkation ; whereas the Admiralty
despatch of the same date appointed the Comte d'Hervilly to
that command, Puisaye accompanying the expedition as adviser.
It is possible that Ministers meant to designate Puisaye to the
supreme command of the whole force, which, it was hoped, would
speedily gather around the nucleus now sent. If so, the in
structions were drafted with gross carelessness. The results
were deplorable. Hervilly, a hot-tempered, brave and ambitious
man, at once asserted his claim to command, and at first refused
to allow the disembarkation.1 The arrival of favourable news
from Tinteniac and Boisberthollet, the scouts of the expedition,
overbore his objections, and the disembarkation took place on
the mainland not far from the mysterious cromlechs of Carnac
(27th June). Then came a scene which revealed the real feel
ings of the Bretons. Scarcely were the first troops ashore before
men, women, and children streamed to the beach uttering cries
of welcome, and bringing food and wine to their deliverers. The
next day witnessed a ceremony which testified to the piety
prompting the crusade. The venerable Bishop of Dol and a
band of priests, who had come in order to rouse that great pro
vince for the orthodox creed, celebrated mass in the open air
before thousands of adoring worshippers. Yet even here signs
of feud were not wanting. Hervilly, scornful of the rustics, and
mistrusting their eager rush for arms, held his paid regiments
aloof from the volunteers even in the act of worship.
Nevertheless, Puisaye was full of hope. On that day he wrote
to Windham, begging for the sum of £40,000 to enable him to
support the army of 80,000 men which would soon be under his
command. He also sent to Calonne, the once famous Minister
of Finance, now rusticating in his villa at Wimbledon, the
following urgent missive :
Depart, Sir, and announce to our Princes the first successes of our
expedition. Tell them that they will soon have an army of 80,000 men
ready to die for them. I can enter into no details, not having a moment
to spare. But I will limit myself henceforth for some days to writing
with the sword.
1 See B M Add. MSS., 7975, for the instructions; also Puisaye, " Mems.,"
vi 60 • L'Abbe Robert, "Exped. de Quiberon," ch. ii. In B.M. Add. MSS.,
8079, are some notes of Puisaye, inter alia, on "Projets des intngans pour
porter l'Exp^dition a la Vendee." Probably Hervilly was among them.

46 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Calonne received this enthusiastic message very coolly and
sent it on to Pitt, adding the curious comment, that he hoped
the Comte d'Artois would share Puisaye's views, but he (Calonne)
refused to take any action in a matter in which he desired not to
be involved.1 Nevertheless, the news of the successful landing
and the prospect of a general rising in Brittany, decided Pitt,
Windham, and Spencer to lose no time in sending for Artois. A
frigate was at once dispatched to bring him from his residence
near Bremen.2
The confidence of Puisaye seemed well founded. Armed
bands from the interior of Brittany soon appeared, and by 29th
June Warren reported that some thousands of peasants had
joined the array. Arming and enrolling occupied the first days.
Then, on 3rd July Puisaye and Hervilly led some 8,000 men, in
cluding British marines, along the isthmus towards the fort, while
Warren ranged his frigates alongside. The commander at once
surrendered with his 600 men. The greater number went as
prisoners to the ships ; but several of them, deserters from the old
Regiment de la Reine to the republican levies, manifested a
desire to return to their allegiance; and Hervilly was credulous
enough to enrol them.3 The fleur-de-lys and the Union Jack were
hoisted side by side over the fort, now re-named Fort Pen
thievre. Warren landed guns from the " Thunderer " in order to
strengthen its batteries. He also helped the operations of the
Royalists along the coast by means of gun-vessels and armed
chassemare'es. On 10th July he described the royal arm)- as
14,000 strong; he took on board more bands of prisoners, and
sent the whole number to England under convoy of warships.4
The next six days witnessed an utter change. Already there
were acute divisions at headquarters; Hervilly persistently
thwarted Puisaye's plan for a rapid march into the interior,
1 Pitt MSS., 119. a " Dropmore Papers," iii, 89.
3 The Report sent by the Marquis de la Jaille to "Monsieur" thus
describes this incident : " M. d'Hervilly avoit grossi son regiment de pres
de 200 hommes pris parmi les prisonniers faits k Quiberon. Cette mesure
<*tait dangereuse; elie fut blime'e et ge"ne"ralement rejett^e par tous les
autres chefs de corps. Ces nouveaux predicants ne tarderent pas k travailler
avec succes l'opinion des soldats engage's dans les prisons d' Angleterre "
(B.M. Add. MSS., 8079).
1 Adm. (Chan. Fleet, 103). M. l'Abbe Robert (" L'Expe"dition de Quiberon,"
1894), amidst his diatribes against the perfidy of Pitt, does not mention the
important services of the British Navy at Quiberon up to 21st July 1795.

THE QUIBERON DISASTER 47
which would sweep the scattered bands of Republicans into the
royalist net. Thus, time was given for them to rally under one
of the ablest of French leaders. General Hoche, " the saviour of
the Republic," was at this time twenty-seven years of age.
Rouget de Lisle, the composer of the " Marseillaise," has de
scribed the impression produced on him in those critical days at
Quiberon by the towering frame, soldierly bearing, and calm
steadfast gaze of the young hero, whose features were set off by
" a superb scar " that spread across his forehead. To see Hoche
in repose was to esteem, almost to love, him. To see him amidst
the rage of battle was to fear the pent-up powers controlled by
that terrible will. Speedily he rallied the " blues " near the town
of Auray, some ten miles inland, and recovered that important
post for the Republic.
Meanwhile the " whites '' persisted in futile inaction and de
moralizing quarrels. The hnigres and the peasants often fell out.
On one occasion a noble, on entering a tent at dusk, called out
to another, " Who is that fellow there? " — " Only a Chouan"
came the scornful reply, " one sees none but peasants here."
Finally the emigre's and the peasants had to be enrolled in
separate bodies, which eyed each other askance. Is it surprising
that these discordant leaders and suspicious bands lost ground
to Hoche? Hervilly, who now virtually commanded the expedi
tion, committed the strange blunder of exposing the untrained
Chouans to the first onsets of the Republicans, while he kept the
best troops in the peninsula. Mainly owing to this foolish dis
position of his troops, he was driven out of the fortified lines at
the village of Ste. Barbe near the neck of the peninsula. He
then rallied his men in and beyond the isthmus, where they had
the support of British gunboats.
Everything now depended on a speedy diversion from the in
terior of Brittany. For this purpose Puisaye had sent by sea, with
a convoy of British ships, some three or four thousand Chouans
under his faithful friend, Tinteniac, to rouse the country and take
Hoche's troops in the rear. The expedition arrived safely at the
mouth of the River Vilaine, and seemed likely to succeed, when,
on nth July peremptory orders of a contrary tenour arrived from
the secret royalist agency at Paris. Purporting to emanate from
Artois himself, they bade Tinteniac make for St. Brieuc or St.
Malo in the north of Brittany. It is now generally admitted that
these orders were given (probably by Duverne de Praile) in

48 PITT AND NAPOLEON
order to discredit Puisaye, to whom the royalist agency at Paris
was bitterly hostile.1 In any case, whether the outcome of
stupidity or of bigotry, they helped to wreck the campaign. Tin
teniac turned away from his appointed task, and fell in one of
the many skirmishes that attended his march northwards. His
place was then taken by Georges Cadoudal, who did nothing for
the relief of Puisaye.
Unconscious of this mishap, Puisaye placed some hope in the
Vendeans, some sixty miles to the south. Their brave leader,
Charette, though barely thirty-five years of age, had acquired a
complete hold over those fanatical peasants. At his command
they took up arms or skulked in their woods. Faithful unto
death for Church and King, they asked nothing better than to
slay or be slain under his leadership. Money he needed not. If
his men did not do their utmost, he himself beat them ; and they
then did better. His opinion about Puisaye stands fully revealed
in the account of the long interview which he had with Gren-
ville's envoy, the Baron de Nantiat, during the critical days that
decided the fate of the Royalists at Quiberon.
Pitt and Grenville have been reproached with doing little or
nothing to ensure united action in Brittany. But they sent Nan
tiat for this very purpose. Difficulties detained him at Nantes,
then firmly held by the Republicans ; and not until 23rd July
could he make his way, in the disguise of a mason, to the Breton
camp, a few leagues to the southward. The suspicions long
nursed by Charette soon came to light. Could it be that the
British Ministers, who had so long abandoned him, were now
about to send help? Nantiat strove to allay these feelings, and
proved to him that some of the stores sent to la Vendee must
have miscarried; certainly Windham and Grenville desired to
do their utmost for him. We may remark here that Charette's
suspicions were directed against Puisaye, not against the Pitt
Ministry ; for only three days before he had written to White
hall asking for help in arms and stores. In that letter he sought
to explain away his recent parleys with the Republicans on the
ground that they had promised to concur with him in the re
storation of royalty, and that he found himself grossly deceived.3
There must have been a large fund of simplicity in Charette.
1 E. Daudet, " L'Emigration," i, 317; Forneron, "Les Emigres," ii, in;
Puisaye, " Mems.," vi, 429.
2 " Nous n'avons pose1 nos armes un instant que parcequ'on nous avoit

THE QUIBERON DISASTER 49
On 23rd July he sought to play a game of bluff with Nantiat.
He declared that he wanted no money from England. His chief
needs were a few cannon, horses, and stores ; above all, powder,
powder, powder. " Ah," he cried, " if the English had only given
me half of what they gave Puisaye, who will do nothing at
Quiberon." Questioned as to this, he said that six of his
officers were there in disguise at the disembarkation and stayed
there eight days. They saw the lack of discipline, the heedless
offer of arms to all who applied for them, the quarrels, the de
lays, and the final retirement towards the peninsula. Above all,
Puisaye had not informed Charette of his plans, his force, or his
arrival.1 Report described that leader as eating oysters on the
coast when he should have been routing Hoche's detachments.
And why did not the Comte d'Artois come to inflame the hopes
of the Royalists?2 Nantiat replied that Monsieur burned to do
so ; but that the British Cabinet wished him not to land until he
could do so with safety. Would not 80,000 faithful troops form
an impenetrable rampart? asked the fierce Breton. As for
Puisaye, he would have nothing to do with him. In fact, the
Vendeans could not stir until they had reaped the harvest.
This important interview reveals the causes that led to the
failure at Quiberon. Charette's suspicion of Puisaye hindered
the unity essential to success. Had Artois been at hand and
enjoined united action, this might have been attained. As it
was, the Quiberon effort remained without the support on which
the British Ministers had reasonably counted.
Meanwhile, Pitt, on hearing news of the unsteadiness of the
Chouans in the fights at Auray and Carnac, prepared to despatch
3,000 British troops in support of Puisaye. Moira, too, by 13th
July had overcome his hesitations as to accepting a command of
some 7,000 British infantry, supported finally by a band of
Emigre's and the 3,000 horsemen still in Hanover.3 His instructions
bade him declare after landing that the aim of the expedition
promis de concourir au reteblissement de la royaute. Non seulement
trompes dans notre attente, mais menaces dans la personne de nos chefs,
dont quelques uns ont ete indignement egorge"s," etc. (" F. O.," France, 44)-
Despatched on 19th July, it was received on 25th August
1 "Dropmore Papers," iii, 112. This contradicts Puisaye's assertions
(" Mems.," vi, pt. i, 99, 120 et sea.).
2 On 30th June Charette wrote to the Comte d'Artois that la Vendee had
taken up arms and would fight to the death (B.M. Add. MSS. 37859)-
3 " Dropmore Papers," iii, 90, 100. E

50 PITT AND NAPOLEON
was the restoration of Louis XVIII, and that England in return
for this help, expected to gain some French possession, but not
in Europe. Artois was to proceed to Brittany at once, Moira's
force being auxiliary to that which the prince would command.
A secret letter of 15th July expressed the hope that His Royal
Highness would display towards his misguided subjects " those
sentiments of generosity, lenity and moderation which His
Britannic Majesty's servants have so strongly recommended." '
Within a week Hoche ruthlessly shore asunder the whole
scheme. While Moira was embarking the British infantry at
Southampton, the Republicans entrenched themselves before the
village of Ste. Barbe, thus threatening the neck of the Quiberon
Peninsula. An eye-witness describes the eager energy of "the
blues" in labouring at the trenches at that point, while "the
whites " wasted their energies in quarrels. The feud between
Puisaye and Hervilly was now at its height. The latter had at
first counselled dilatory tactics and was mainly responsible for
the retirement to the Quiberon Peninsula. But now he swung
round to the other extreme and advised an attack on Hoche's
lines at Ste. Barbe, at the very time when a squadron hove in
sight, bringing a body of 1,500 Emigre's from North Germany.2
There was some method in this madness. Puisaye and
Hervilly had not heard of the diversion of Tinteniac's corps, and
believed it to be on the point of assailing Hoche in the rear.
They also did not know of the ill success of an attack on
Hoche's left, near the village of Carnac, made by Vauban.3
Thus, heedless of the succour near at hand, and trusting in the
support of Tinteniac and Vauban, the Royalists filed along the
narrow ridge of shingle, deployed on the mainland, and very
early on the 16th July rushed on the lines of the Republicans.
At first their ardour carried all before it. They swept through
two lines. But Hoche, skilfully unmasking batteries on the two
wings, raked their ranks with a terrific fire that laid low hun
dreds of the noblest sons of France. Their onset withered away.
No signs of help appeared beyond those impenetrable ranks.
After daring their utmost against enemies triple their number
they fell back in utter exhaustion to the isthmus, losing men at
1 "W. O.," 176.
2 Louis de Bouille" (" Mems.," ii, 277), ascribes this change to Hervilly's
resolve to have the credit of victory for himself alone.
1 Vauban, " Mems. sur la Vendue," 120-130.

THE QUIBERON DISASTER 51
every step under the sabres of the republican horse. At the
narrow neck, where bands of panic-stricken peasants nearly
blocked the way with their carts and live stock, the crush
became frightful, and the little force must have perished
outright, had not Warren, after withdrawing the remnant of
Vauban's force, sent in his gun-vessels to beat off the pursuit.
As to the effectiveness of his action at this crisis a Frenchman,
the Marquis de la Jaille.thus testifies : " The indefatigable Sir John
Warren, after having re-embarked the troops of M. de Vauban,
had sent his gun-vessels towards the shingle ridge (falaise):
he arranged them with such skill that they crushed and com
pletely stopped the enemy's columns: he landed the English
soldiers who took part in M. de Vauban's expedition ; and for
the second time the army owed its safety to the valour of the
English and the foresight of the commodore." '
Not long after this pitiable rout the 1,500 veteran emigres
from North Germany landed. They found the peninsula
crowded with desperate men and wailing women. None but
a hero could save the situation; and their commander, the
young Comte de Sombreuil, was merely a chivalrous young
officer, endowed with no special gifts. His position had in it
every element of pathos. He had torn himself from the arms
of his bride at London to lead loyal Brittany in triumph to
Paris. He found demoralized bands cowering on a peninsula,
guarded only by gun-vessels and a single fort. Everything
depended on the possession of this fort, and Sombreuil de
manded that his men should hold it. With unpardonable per
versity Hervilly refused, from fear of offending his own corps of
Emigre's. He ought to have known that the newly enrolled
prisoners of war were wholly untrustworthy. One or two men
slipped away nightly to the enemy. So weak a watch was kept
on the isthmus that, on the night of the 19th July, only one
deserter was caught, while thirty slipped past. One of the
traitors, David Goujon by name, offered to lead Hoche's men
along the rocks at low tide to a place where they could scale
the walls of the fort.
Accordingly, on the night of 20th July, Hoche led his men
in three columns towards the isthmus. Furious storms of rain
1 B.M. Add. MSS., 8079. Vauban, " Mems.," 139-14°, thus praises Warren :
" aussi vrai que valeureux, pret a tout pour operer le bien, d'une activite
inimaginable."

52 PITT AND NAPOLEON
and hail beat in their faces and brought them to a stand ; some
companies lost their way, and after a night of misery they drew
near to the ramparts as the first rays of dawn glinted in the east.
The surprise in front and on the south, at the sheltered side of
the isthmus, failed; for there the faithful Toulonese gunners
opened a deadly fire. Hoche therefore ordered a retreat. But
on the outer side, where the waves lashed the rocks in fury, the
Republicans, guided by a few traitors, crept without hindrance
up to the wall. Hoisted shoulder high, they thrust their
bayonets into the crevices of the masonry, and by sheer skill
and daring clambered to the top. There, where a dozen faithful
men could have hurled them headlong, the friendly arms of
traitors pulled them in. In one band they rushed at the loyal
gunners and cut them down. They hoisted the tricolour, and
Hoche, turning about, ordered an attack which overbore the
faithful remnant.
There was now no time to throw up entrenchments on the
peninsula. To add to the misfortunes of the Royalists, the
storm had obliged Warren to keep his ships and gunboats far
out; and no news of the disaster reached him until it reached
its climax. Remorselessly, then, Hoche pressed his quarry
towards the tip of the peninsula. Sombreuil's men, still full of
fight, contested the advance at every available spot, but they
were hampered by the panic-stricken crowd which swept south
wards towards the little Port Allighen. There men and women
rushed into the water, shrieking for the help that did not come
from the ships. At last, Puisaye, after failing to send off his
aide-de-camp, la Jaille, resolved to go himself; and, at a later
time, he declared that he did so on the request of Sombreuil.
However that may be, he put off quickly in a boat so as to save
his confidential papers, and was followed by the curses of his
men. On his departure, and that of Hervilly, who was carried
off to the ships mortally wounded, the defence collapsed. Parts
of the Hervilly and Dresnay regiments went over to the enemy.
Sombreuil, with the faithful troops, had retired to Fort Neuf, on
rising ground near Port Allighen. Unhappily its guns could be
trained only on the friendly British, not on the pursuers. Never
theless, some of the survivors declared, that if he had held firm
until the tide rose, help would have come from the British war
ships, and his men could have embarked with little loss under
cover of their fire. He himself, in the last letter that he wrote to

THE QUIBERON DISASTER 53
Hoche.stated that,owing to Puisaye's carelessness and cowardice,
he had no cartridges ; and, on the arrival of guns for the victors,
he was fain to trust the generosity of his foes.
The exact truth on this matter will never be known ; for the
rush of events dazed every brain, and shame at the stampede
warped the account of every survivor. La Jaille and Vauban
defend Puisaye on the ground that he was not really in com
mand, and acted for the best in saving his papers and soliciting
help from the ships. But why then did he not return to rally
the panic-stricken masses at Port Orange or Port Allighen, and
help on the embarkation? His statement that he would have
done so but for the news of the capitulation is far from satis
factory.1 It seems clear that both he and Sombreuil lost nerve as
the horror of the daydeepenedwith broadening light. Sombreuil's
band, still some 1,300 or 1,400 strong, was not in a hopeless
position. They held a battery which partly screened them from
Hoche's attack; and though its cannon were useless, those of
H.M. corvette, " Lark," which in the teeth of the gale had worked
in near to Port Allighen, searched the approaches to the battery
with terrible effect. The twenty-four naval guns (says Vauban)
swept an open space across which the assailants passed to attack
the little fort. Thus, Sombreuil, however hard pressed from the
western shore, could not be surrounded so long as the " Lark "
poured in her volleys. Why then, if he had no cartridges, did
he not charge with the bayonet towards the open sea?
Certainly all the resourcefulness was among the Republicans.
According to Vauban they raised shouts for a capitulation in
order to stop the firing of the corvette. Then, under a flag of
truce, General Humbert approached and parleyed with Som
breuil.2 After him came Hoche himself. Those youthful and
stalwart champions of warring creeds eyed each other with
mutual esteem and admiration. The clemency of Hoche was
already well known ; and to him, it appears, Sombreuil repeated
his proposal to give his own life if his men might be spared.
To this Hoche is said to have given a verbal assent, adding
that he could do no more, seeing that the final decision must
rest with Tallien and Blad, the two reprhentants en mission.
Somewhat later they too came on the scene, and promised to do
1 Puisaye, " Mems.," vi, 524.
2 Puisaye (" Mems.," vi, 546) gives reasons for thinking that Humbert's
sole reason for parleying was to silence the fire of the " Lark."

54 PITT AND NAPOLEON
all in their power to secure pardon from the Convention at
Paris. But no incident of this bewildering tragedy is more
shrouded in mystery than this question of the capitulation. The
Emigre's certainly believed that their lives would be spared, though
some of them (among them Vauban) plunged into the sea,
preferring to brave waves and bullets rather than trust their
pitiless foes. Several of them reached the corvette, "Lark."
Others were picked up by the boats of " La Pomone " and
" Galatea." The following despatch from Warren sets forth the services
of his vessels at this time: H.M.S. " Pomone," Quiberon Bay, July 22, 1799.
I am extremely sorry to inform you that the fort and peninsula of
Quiberon was taken the morning of the 21st by assault, at 3 o'clock,
owing to treacherous measures. In addition to the misfortune of the
place having been surprized by treason, the night being remarkably
dark, with a hard gale of wind at N.W., rendered it impossible for
the gun-vessels to work up close to shore : as soon as day broke, seeing
the fort was taken and the enemy's troops on the march, I dropt down
to the south point of the island towards Fort Quiberon, where I made
a signal for the frigates to slip, and stationed them alongshore; the "Lark,"
sloop, and "Pelter," gun-vessel having run close into a sandy bay.
I sent myown boats, as well as those of the men-of-war and chassemaries,
inshore, and commenced a heavy fire upon the different columns of the
enemy who were pressing down on the remainder of the Army, among
whom were the regiments of Beon, Damas, and Salm, with part of
d'Hector's, under the Comte de Sombreuil, made (sic) a most excellent
defence until the enemy brought cannon upon their flank when they
were obliged to capitulate. I have been able to save about 1,000
troops, with all the generals and staff, [the] greater part of the Corp[s]
of Artillery and nine of the Engineers, with 1,400 Chouans, and several
regimental colours;1 and I should have been able to have embarked a
greater number, if the masters of the transports had paid the least
attention to my signals for their flat-boats, which I repeated with guns
four times, without seeing any one having arrived (sic).
[He then names with approval Captains Keats and Ogilvey for their
work in the embarkation, and Lieut. Tomlinson of the " Pelter " for annoy
ing the enemy during their march along the shore. He continues:]
' Chassin, (" Hoche a Quiberon "), gives the figures as 900 Emigre's, 1,400
Chouans, 800 unarmed peasants and women.

THE QUIBERON DISASTER 55
I have every satisfaction that no blame whatsoever can attach to the
officers and men of the navy in this disastrous affair, as every effort and
support was made use of by them in putting the place in a proper state
of defence, which nothing but the utmost defection of part of a regiment
on guard, whose advanced post deserted and gave the parole and
countersign to the enemy, and afterwards fired on their officers, could
have effected. I am sorry the loss of the fort puts the enemy in posses
sion of the greater part of our provisions, some valuable articles of
clothing, and a few arms, with the cannon taken on the island: the
residue I have secured in the transports which are with me; as soon as
I have things in order I intend to take possession of the Islands of
Hectic and Houat until joined by the army under Earl Moira, who are,
I am informed, on their passage; or receive orders to the contrary.1
La Jaille, who found refuge on Warren's frigate, adds some
significant details about the admiral's conduct respecting the
capitulation. Warren, doubting whether it were not a ruse to
induce him to cease firing, promptly sent to inquire the exact
terms. He received an evasive reply, but felt bound to maintain
the truce. As the chief effect of the capitulation was to silence
the warships and leave the Royalists helpless, Warren became
more and more uneasy. On the following day his suspicions
deepened; for when he again sent an officer to inquire the con
ditions, he was insolently informed that there were none.2 By
that time very many of the Royalists had been marched away
inland to Auray. Doubtless, Warren would have opened fire on
the forts but for the conviction that in that case vengeance must
have fallen on the captives.3
The last act of the tragedy now opens. It shows us Hoche
leaving Quiberon in haste for the revolted districts of North
Brittany; while Tallien hurries off to Paris to solicit from the
Convention pardon for the prisoners. That gifted and sensitive
soldier, Rouget de Lisle, travelled with him, and found his
speech full of dignity and clemency. Fortune also willed that
they should reach the capital on the first anniversary of the fall
of Robespierre. Thoughts of mercy were in all hearts. Disgust
1 Adm. Chan. Fleet, 103. The details here given correct the exaggerated
statement of the losses given by James, "Naval History," i, 279.
2 B.M. Add. MSS., 8079. The biographers of Hoche deny that there was
a capitulation. Daudet, Forneron, l'Abbe Robert (as well as Sombreuil and
Vauban), assert there was.
3 Puisaye, " Mems.," vi, 524, 537.

56 PITT AND NAPOLEON
at the brutal orgies of the Terror formed the theme of every
speech. When all the omens pointed to clemency, would not
Tallien save the lives of the prisoners huddled together on that
wind-swept peninsula or in the Chartreuse of Auray? He is said
still to have desired it. But the interview with his wife filled
him with dread. That ambitious creature warned him that
damning proofs of his intrigues with the Royalists were to hand.1
One loophole of escape remained, to vindicate the purity of his
patriotism by declaiming against the vile offscourings whom the
perfidious Pitt had thrown on their coast.
The result was seen a few days later at Auray. Men who had
marched quietly to that town, neglecting the chances of escape
afforded by their good-natured guards, now heard with indigna
tion their incredible fate. Nevertheless, bravely, as became
gentlemen of France, they filed from the Chartreuse, the church,
and the prison under the awe-struck gaze of the townsfolk. Two
by two, to the tap of drum, with hands bound, but heads erect
and eyes flashing defiance, they marched to a long and spongy
meadow that fringes the bank of the river. There the butchers
were ready. Volleys at short range laid their kneeling forms
low, swathe by swathe. Day by day the ghastly work went on,
as the military commission at Auray, Vannes, or on the peninsula
proceeded with the summary trials. At Vannes fell the men
whose fate aroused the most poignant grief. The vengeance of
the Republic required the lives of the aged Bishop of Dol, and
other chaplains of the royalist army. By the bent form of the
bishop there stood the towering figure of young Sombreuil.
With unshaken serenity each performed for the other the last
sad offices. The noble refused to kneel at the bidding of his
enemies. He did so at the advice of the bishop, and then spake
these words : " I bend one knee to my God : the other to my King."
These were among the last victims of the holocaust. Many
perished on the peninsula, where incredible blundering and
treason led to their undoing; but most of them raised their last
cry of Vive le Roi in the meadow near Auray. Twenty years
later, when Louis XVIII came to his own again, the bones were
reverently interred; and a chapelle expiatoirc now rises near
le champ des martyrs in memory of men who in their death alone
1 Tallien's royalist leanings had long been known. Puisaye, in his first
letter to Pitt (30th September 1794) states it as nearly certain that Tallien
would soon declare for royalty (Pitt MSS., 169).

THE QUIBERON DISASTER 57
were not divided. Perchance those 712 victims achieved more
by their death than in their life. The long-drawn-out brutality
of the executions, sickening even to the butchers, aroused a
furious hatred against the Government which crowned with
perfidy a triumph due to treachery. The act cowed only the
timid, and therefore it cowed few Bretons and Vend^ans. Char
ette, on hearing the news, decided to end his long balancings.
He began a war to the knife by slaughtering 300 Republican
prisoners. Thus, the furies of civil strife, fettered in the spring,
were let loose once more. The formidable royalist movement of
September at Paris, which, but for Bonaparte's cannon, would
have overthrown the Convention, had its roots in the loathing
inspired by a regime of crass brutality.
A storm of obloquy also broke upon Pitt. Puisaye, whose
conduct at the crisis aroused general detestation, was loudly
accused of being sold to that Minister, the arch-contriver of
ruin. Such a charge is intelligible amidst the ravings of bereaved
Royalists, who insinuated that the expedition was deliberately
wrecked in order to ensure the massacre of some fifty French
naval officers. But it is astounding to find some members of the
English Opposition echoing these wild charges. In a violent
outburst, which will ever be a stain on his memory, Fox accused
Ministers of deliberately sending noble gentlemen to a massacre.
The speech of Sheridan was an almost equally disgraceful dis
play of reckless ignorance and eager spite. He declared that,
though British blood had not flowed at Quiberon (which was
false), yet "British honour had bled at every pore."1 That
Englishmen who knew next to nothing of the facts should utter
slanders so diabolical is a striking tribute to the debasing power
of partisan malice.
Let us review the facts in the light of the documentary evid
ence now set forth. It was notorious that for several months
the Emigre's in London had urged the Ministry to send an ex
pedition to the Breton coast. Windham supported their impor
tunities; but Pitt, ever distrustful of the Emigre's, gave no definite
assent until the month of June, when that enterprise promised
to create a diversion highly favourable to Spain, and therefore
to the royalist cause in general. In face of the schism among
the Bretons and Vendeans, and their truce with the Republic,
1 "Pari. Hist," xxxii, 159, 170.

58 PITT AND NAPOLEON
an expedition could not have been sent at an earlier date. True,
a force had been mustering in the Solent, but Corsica or the
West Indies, equally with Brittany, had been thought of as its
destination. Finally, Ministers decided to send Puisaye to
Quiberon and make it a base of operations for a larger force of
Emigre's and British troops under the lead of Artois, if all went
well. Thus, in Pitt's view, the present enterprise was essentially
tentative and preparatory.1 That peninsula was to form a place
of arms, unassailable from the mainland so long as the fort was
firmly held, and yet, while covered by the fleet, affording the
easiest possible access to the mainland. From that starting-
point Brittany was to be roused and waverers everywhere en
couraged by the moderate royalism of Puisaye. The one in
excusable blunder of the British Government was the assigning
of equal powers to Puisaye and Hervilly. On this, and this
alone, can the charge of treachery be based; and those who
know the incoherence of work in British Departments will readily
find a more prosaic explanation. Further, if Pitt had desired to
betray their force, he could easily have arranged it by sending a
few lines to the Committee of Public Safety at Paris. But, as
we have seen, that body and Hoche were quite in the dark as
to the point of landing; and at first all went well. Puisaye's
ardour therefore flamed forth, and he planned a speedy march
into the interior. Hervilly with the paid troops remained in the
peninsula, leaving Puisaye's and Vauban's Chouans, with a small
force of British marines, to bear the attack of the regular troops
of Hoche. Meanwhile Tintdniac's movement against Hoche's
rear miscarried owing to contrary orders spitefully sent by the
secret royalist committee at Paris; and a similar intrigue kept
Charette from sending the help on which the British Ministry
and Puisaye reasonably relied. Even so, the disaster would
have been averted if Hervilly had waited a few hours for the
disembarkation of Sombreuil's troops before making his attack
on Hoche's lines at Ste. Barbe ; and if, after the repulse, he had
replaced the untrustworthy men in the fort by the tried troops
of Sombreuil. This it was which led him on his death-bed to
accept full responsibility for the disaster.2
1 Failure to realize this has betrayed M. Ernest Daudet into the statement
(" L'Emigration," i, 297) that Pitt expected to conquer France with 5,000 men.
2 Puisaye, " Mems.," vi, 605-8. The original of Hervilly's confession, with
Windham's endorsement, is in B.M. Add. MSS., 8079.

THE QUIBERON DISASTER 59
What does Fox's charge of premeditated perfidy imply? It
implies in Pitt and his colleagues a singular power of fore
ordaining events; of impelling Puisaye to push boldly on, and
of detaining Hervilly in the peninsula. It implies that Ministers
foreknew the ill-will of Charette, the resolve of Artois to over
throw Puisaye at the first opportunity, and the action of the
secret royalist agency at Paris which diverted Tinteniac from
his appointed task. Nor is this all. In the distorting lens of
partisanship, Pitt figures as responsible for Hervilly's resolve to
enrol part of the republican garrison of Fort Sansculotte ; for his
attack on Hoche's lines just before the landing of Sombreuil's
succouring force ; for the actions of deserters from the fort and
of traitors within ; for the unaccountable collapse at Fort Neuf
and the surrender of Sombreuil on verbal assurances; for the
craven volte face of Tallien at Paris and the wholesale condem
nations of the military commissions at Auray and Vannes. In
fine, did Pitt spend £1,120,000 on this expedition in order to
rob the future French royalist navy of some fifty officers?1
1 The Russian ambassador in London, Vorontzoff (Archives, xvi, 236-248)
states that these slanders were soon spread about by the Emigre's, who (be it
remembered) subsisted on money supplied by the British Government. He
ably refutes them. D'Andigne afterwards allowed them to be unjust.
E. Daudet (" L'Emigration," i, 297) affects to doubt whether the disaster
was due to the perfidy or ignorance of the British Government. Chassin (in
his scholarly work "La Vendue," ix, 72) absolves Pitt of the charge of
perfidy.

BRITISH RULE IN CORSICA
THE need of a good naval base in the Mediterranean led
the British Government to put forth several efforts in the
course of the eighteenth century. At first they centred in
Minorca, with results that are well known.1 Other islands
scarcely came into serious consideration. Our usually friendly
relations with the Italian States forbade all thought of the
seizure of Corsica, Sardinia, or Elba. As for the conquest of
Malta from the Knights of St. John, it would have been alike
sacrilegious and cowardly. The aggressive policy of France was,
however, to simplify the problem. In the year 1769 she acquired
Corsica from the Genoese Republic by far from reputable means;
and in 1798 Bonaparte continued at Valetta the policy, inaugur
ated in the previous year by the partition of Venetia, of seizing
small and unoffending neutral States, which previously had been
under the protection of Christian law and sentiment.
The outbreak of war with France in February 1793 led Pitt
to consider the means of attacking her from the south; and our
alliances with Spain, Austria, Naples, and the Kingdom of
Sardinia augured well for the proposed attempt to rouse the
Royalists of Provence against the Jacobinical Government then
struggling to hold its own at Paris. The hold of that faction on
Corsica was doubtful despite the desperate efforts of Bonaparte
to win over the loyal and religious islanders to the republican
cause. Their affections centred in Paoli, who, after a long time
of exile spent in England, was devoted to our institutions, and
early in that year sent an offer of the crown of Corsica to
George III. Signs are not wanting that it was welcomed both
at Windsor and Whitehall.
The chief cause for hesitation was the touchiness of the court
of Madrid, where some of the Ministers harboured designs on
1 See Mr. Julian Corbett, "England in the Seven Years' War," i, 374*6;
i, 174-5, ct seq. 60

BRITISH RULE IN CORSICA 61
Corsica. Godoy, Duke of Alcudia, the all-powerful favourite of
the Queen, was no less covetous of wealth than suspicious of
England. Accordingly, on 25th April 1793 our Foreign Minis
ter, Lord Grenville, wrote to Lord St. Helens, British ambassador
at Madrid : " I have said nothing about Corsica in my despatch,
but the language of the Duke of Alcudia disconcerts our pro
jects. I tremble for the moment when we come to discuss that
tender point of indemnities." Again, on 7th August, after con
cluding a treaty of alliance with the Court of Naples, Grenville
reminded General David Dundas that the objects of the Allies
in the Mediterranean ought to be the recovery either of Nice or
of Corsica. Sixteen days later, Lord Chatham warned Admiral
Hood that if he made an attempt on Corsica, he should secure
the help of Captain Mass6na, an old Paolist. Further, on 30th
November, Grenville expressed regret that the Court of Madrid
seemed to retract its former wish, that Corsica should go to
England. It is certain, then, that Pitt and his colleagues looked
to Corsica as one of the indemnities to be claimed from France
at the end of the war. Lord Macartney later on reported that
the Comte de Provence (Louis XVIII) made no objection to
this plan. But Spain early showed signs of resentment.1
The aims of Pitt and his colleagues were doubtless known to
Sir Gilbert Elliot, who was to act as the King's Commissioner
in the Mediterranean. Elliot, though long an opponent of Pitt,
had been so disgusted at the factious conduct of Fox as to
espouse the side of the Government, which nominated him as
Civil Commissioner, first at Dunkirk, and, on the collapse of that
enterprise, at the equally unfortunate post, Toulon. It is singu
lar that so distinguished a statesman as Elliot (the first Earl of
Minto) should have begun his official career with two fiascos and
next with a lengthier experiment, the failure of which was by
superficial observers attributed mainly to him.
In the closing days of 1793, after the evacuation of Toulon,
Hood and he resolved to support the Corsican Royalists, and to
continue their operations on the coast of Provence from that
island as a base. Accordingly, on 12th January 1794 Hood sent
Elliot, along with Colonels Moore and Koehler, to confer with
Paoli. It was on this mission that the future Sir John Moore
1 "Dropmore Papers," ii, 412; " F. O." Spain, 28. Grenville to St. Helens,
30th November 1793. In "F. O." France, 42, is a long Mdmoire on the
advantages of possessing Corsica, and a plan for securing it.

62 PITT AND NAPOLEON
undertook the first political work in a career which had already
been meritorious and was to end in a blaze of glory. The envoys
sought to discover the real aims of Paoli, whom Hood suspected
of shiftiness, the strength of the French garrisons remaining in
the island, and the disposition of the islanders. Elliot and the
two colonels found Paoli in a deserted monastery near Pietra
Alba, where he lived in simple patriarchal style, surrounded by
bands of armed peasants who relieved each other in turn. It
afterwards transpired that the French had put a price on his
head and that he was very near the end of his resources, a fact
which goes far to explain his eagerness for British help.
At the first interview the old general showed his dislike of
civilians by opening the conversation with Koehler and Moore;
and, on their referring him to Elliot as the King's Commissioner
in the Mediterranean, he curtly remarked that he was tired of
Ministers and negotiations. Why had not Hood sent him the
succour he had promised? However, he calmed down and finally
assured them that he would die only happy if he could but see
his countrymen under the government or protection of Great
Britain. He vouched for their readiness to accept either arrange
ment, and scouted the notion of consulting them until the
French were ousted from their three posts, St. Fiorenzo, Bastia,
and Calvi. He spoke as dictator of the island, and his country
men to a man seemed to acclaim his will as law. Their
cheers now, as always, were: "Long live Paoli, the Fatherland,
and the English Nation." As for the French garrisons, they
were said to number only 1,950 men, along with about 700
Corsican Republicans. Leonati, Paoli's lieutenant, said that
the British would need only a few cannon to reduce those gar
risons.1 Moore soon found cause for distrusting Paoli. Nevertheless, the
enterprise seemed so promising that Hood took steps to help
him. Though driven aside to Elba by a gale, the fleet on 7th
February made St. Fiorenzo Bay on the north-west of Corsica;
and General David Dundas, with the able assistance of Moore
and Koehler, before long reduced a powerfully constructed
tower at Martello Point. That work gave so much trouble that
it became the pattern for the many scores of smaller towers,
which, under the name of Martello Towers, still diversify parts
1 " Diary of Sir J. Moore," i, ch. ii ; " Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," vol. ii.

BRITISH RULE IN CORSICA 63
of our coastline.1 The correspondence of Hood with Paoli, pre
served in the British Museum, proves that Hood on 17th Feb
ruary sent on shore 10,000 dollars, 50 barrels of gunpowder, and
1 3,000 musket balls.2 On that same day the British and Corsicans
captured the last of the French batteries defending St. Fiorenzo
Bay ; but the native levies failed to cut off the retreat of most of
the garrison across the hills to Bastia on the east coast. The
Corsicans had also grossly understated the strength of the
French garrison at that town which numbered 3,500 trained
troops. Disputes between Hood and General Dundas led to a
spirited protest by the latter against the Admiral's claim to
supreme command in the Mediterranean ; whereupon he retired
home in high dudgeon. Hood's resolve to undertake the siege
of Bastia was sharply questioned by eight military officers (in
cluding Moore) in a council of war on 20th March. But Hood
and the naval officers had their way; and the siege was begun ; 3
It was some time before General Sir Charles Stuart arrived to
take the command of the troops. The feud between armyandnavy,
which had grown apace at Toulon, entered on a new phase with
the appearance of that able but choleric officer.
Meanwhile, despite Paoli's offer of the crown of Corsica to
George III, Pitt and his colleagues were acting with much cir
cumspection. Thus, on 7th March, Henry Dundas, one of the
Secretaries of State, wrote from Whitehall asking the advice
of Paoli as to the terms of the union, on which Ministers could
not decide until they heard from him. He, however, assured the
Corsicans that " whatever mode of connection may ultimately
be established with that island, if the arrangement of its internal
government depends upon the country, every reasonable degree
of liberty and personal security will be insured to the in
habitants." 4 On 31st March Dundas approved the conduct of
Elliot in furthering the plan of a union, but bade him stipulate
that the British Governor should have " the supreme executive
power, with the command of the military, and with a right of
negative of all legislative acts." The constitution and the
1 Fortescue, iv, 182. Sir George Cornwall Lewis derives them (more con
vincingly, I think) from the Torre di Martello (Hammer Towers) in which
the striking of a hammer on a bell gave the warning in case of raids by
pirates (" Stanhope Miscellanies," ii, 59).
2 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS., 22688.
3 "H. O.," Adm. Medit. (1794). J B. M. Add. MSS., 22688.

64 PITT AND NAPOLEON
fundamental laws of Corsica were to remain unchanged, unless
by the act of its Legislature, assented to by George III, and
signified by the British Governor.1
After gaining the consent of Paoli to these conditions, Hood
and Elliot declared themselves empowered to agree to the per
petual union of Corsica with Great Britain, the islanders receiv
ing due guarantees for the maintenance of their constitution,
fundamental laws, and religion. Paoli thereupon issued a sum
mons for a Consulta or Parliament to meet at Corte, the old
capital in the interior. Three weeks before it met, Bastia suc
cumbed to the joint pressure of the British fleet and the relatively
scanty land forces of the Royalists (21st May). As is well
known, Commodore Nelson distinguished himself during these
operations, and during the siege of Calvi which followed.2 At
the latter place he lost the sight of his right eye. The surrender
of Calvi ended the French sway in the island.
The assembly of the Corsican deputies at Corte presented a
quaint yet moving spectacle. The members were nearly all
chieftains, and they came up to that rock-crowned city, musket
at the side, and clad with the trophies of the chase. For once
these fierce and factious clans were moved by one impulse.
They shouted for Paoli, and almost thrust him into the presi
dent's seat. In due course the old man made a telling appeal
against France and for union with England. On 19th June this
motion passed with enthusiasm, George III being acclaimed
unanimously as King, with Sir Gilbert Elliot as Viceroy. In an
eloquent speech uttered in French, Elliot expressed his fervent
hopes for the future of the two peoples thus happily united. A
constitution was -soon decreed, which, while democratic in form,8
gave to the Executive the needful amount of authority. Elliot's
powers as Viceroy were nearly on a par with those of the Lord
Lieutenant of Ireland, and included the control of the armed
forces. This brought him into collision with General Sir Charles
Stuart, Commander-in-Chief of the British troops in the Medi-
1 w. O., 70, I. B.
- For details see Fortescue, iv, 182-191. As a sign of Hood's brusqueness,
note that he thus answered the claim of Pozzo di Borgo, Paoli's agent, to
share in the capitulation of Bastia : " I always understood the island of
Corsica was to become English and governed in the same manner Ireland is.
Consequently, of necessity, the capitulation must be with me alone" (B. M.
Add. MSS., 22688).
3 " Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," ii, 270; Jollivet, 28-32.

BRITISH RULE IN CORSICA 65
terranean, a man whose hotness of temper and impatience of
control marred an otherwise promising career. The quarrel arose
in part out of an expression by Elliot of a desire to visit the
military hospitals. Stuart curtly declared that he would be
welcomed as Sir Gilbert Elliot, but not as Governor or Viceroy,
for he had no authority over the army. Elliot contested this
dictum, and referred the matter to Whitehall. Unfortunately,
the Ministerial changes which brought the Duke of Portland to
the Secretaryship of State in place of Dundas protracted the
usual official delays, and not until 2nd December did the Duke
declare decisively in favour of Elliot. Thereupon Stuart threw
up his command in high dudgeon (6th January 1795). Major-
General Trigge took his place, but proved to be incompetent for
his duties.
The need of troops in other quarters, notably in the West
Indies, Brittany, and at the Cape of Good Hope, prevented the
despatch of the 4,000 or 5,000 men from England whom
Ministers had promised for the spring of 1795 ; and the defence
of Corsica depended largely on four battalions of the islanders
raised by Elliot. Fortunately a French expedition which set
sail for the recapture of Corsica was driven back at a time when
the scanty British garrisons were attenuated by fever; L but the
French sent reinforcements from Brest to Toulon, while few
arrived from Plymouth ; 2 and the situation encouraged French
men to plan the recapture of an island valued for its supplies of
timber and naval stores.
The neglect of Corsica by Pitt and his colleagues (Elliot's
despatches usually brought no reply within four or five months),
the activity of France, and the sloth of our ally, Spain, weighed
on the spirits of the loyal Corsicans and enabled the factious to
cavil at British rule. Among a backward, clannish people, the
heat engendered by disputes usually rises in proportion to their
pettiness. It was so in Corsica. The islanders fretted because
the British, as the French before them, made Bastia the capital,
1 " Mems. of Elliot," ii, 297.
2 Mahan, i, 192; Nelson Despatches, ii, 11-24. Hood (then in England)
wrote to Pitt in April 1795 most despondingly about the small reinforce
ments accorded to the Mediterranean fleet. His tone was so pressing that
the Ministry decided not to send him out. In July 1795 he again wrote to
Pitt, bemoaning the loss of St. Lucia, also of a large convoy near the
Windward Isles. On 2nd December 1795 he requested the Governorship of
Greenwich Hospital, which was granted to him (Pitt MSS., 146).
F

66 PITT AND NAPOLEON
in place of inaccessible Corte. Again, there were ominous
mutterings because the old national flag (a Moor's head on a
silver ground) was replaced by the British ensign, though the
security afforded by the latter at sea might have stilled those
insular qualms. The difficulty of administering Corsica received
curious illustration from an attempt to institute trial by jury.
Pitt hoped that this palladium of liberty would prove a boon in
a country where the custom of the vendetta was believed to
spring from the corruptibility of judges; but trial by jury proved
to be the mother of crime. Rarely could twelve jurymen be
brought to agree on a verdict against a prisoner; and, when
they did agree, the result was the starting of twelve vendettas
against the champions of law and order. In the interests of
humanity, therefore, Elliot abrogated trial by jury; and Ministers
at home sorrowfully acquiesced.
In the main, however, the storm-centres of the island were
Moore and Paoli. It is far from easy to fathom the matters in
dispute between them and the Viceroy. Troubles began at
Toulon, where Elliot sided with Hood against the soldiery.
Stuart took up the feud bequeathed to him by General David
Dundas, and passed it on to Moore. Brave and chivalrous
almost to a fault, and extremely sensitive to the claims of
honour, Moore reminds us of that noble but pathetic figure,
Tellheim, in the " Minna von Barnhelm " of Lessing. Like him,
Moore was apt to balance the rights and wrongs of a question
with an introspection almost Hamlet-like in its nicety; and this
peculiarity sharpened his critical faculties until his judgements
became censures, and his censures reprimands. " He maintained
the right with a vehemence bordering on fierceness." So says
his admirer, Colonel Napier. Others sometimes found him more
able to criticise than to act with decision.1 Certainly in Corsica
Moore let his critical faculties run riot. Readers of his " Diary ''
will infer that Elliot was a vain, meddlesome proconsul, whose
absurd mistakes ruined the British Administration. But Moore's
statements are grossly one-sided, and he certainly did much to
aggravate the difficulties of the Viceroy. When northerners
undertake to administer the affairs of the most excitable and
factious race in the Mediterranean, its officials ought loyally to
support one another. Yet Moore, then Adjutant-General, did
1 See examples in Prof. Oman's " Peninsular War," i, sect. vi.

BRITISH RULE IN CORSICA 67
not scruple to write in his " Diary " about the " little low art " of
the Viceroy, of his equating his position with that of the Lord
Lieutenant of Ireland merely from a sense of vanity, of his
governing now too strictly, now too leniently,but always by means
of bribery. Further, how could things work smoothly when
Moore sought to persuade Trigge not to let himself be shackled
by Elliot? In point of fact it was Moore who managed Trigge.
And what can we think of an officer who, though not on the
spot, ascribed the failure at Toulon to Admiral Hood's " stupid
obstinacy"? l This criticism by one who knew next to nothing
of the wider causes of that disaster, stamps him as by nature a
frondeur. Such a man, though admittedly an able officer, was
peculiarly dangerous in Corsica, when he began to associate
with the opponents of the Government, and openly criticised its
proceedings. Accordingly the Viceroy asked that Moore should
be recalled. The Duke of Portland complied with the request,
and added, with needless severity, that Moore must leave Corsica
within forty-eight hours. After passionately protesting against
Elliot's conduct, that officer left the island on 4th October 1795.
After arriving in London, he saw Pitt, who heard what he had
to say against the Viceroy, and then advised him to speak to
the Duke of Portland, not in " the language of passion," but to
say calmly all that would tend to his justification.2
Pitt's cold manner affected Moore somewhat painfully; for he
afterwards complained of it to Dundas, only to be informed that
the Prime Minister had thought that he (Moore) had been hardly
used and should be employed again. It is clear, then, that Pitt
valued his services highly (he afterwards used his military
advice), but wished to read the hothead a lesson in prudence and
official reserve. The resulting statement by Moore did not con
vince the Duke of Portland. Moore describes the Duke as
silent and embarrassed, as if he were struck with the force of
arguments which he could not answer. But the Duke was a
nervous and silent man. On 30th April, when affairs settled
down in Corsica, he thus cumbrously congratulated the Viceroy
on the change. " Nothing can more clearly manifest the causes
which obstructed the return of the disposition of mind which
was necessary for this purpose, or more fully justify the wishes
you at last allowed yourself, and I trust not too late, to express
for the removal of Colonel Moore and General Paoli, than the
1 Moore, " Diary," chs. v, vi. 2 Ibid., i, 171-4, 179, 180.

68 PITT AND NAPOLEON
demonstrations of that temper which has universally shown itself
since their departure from the island." '
The so-called retirement of Paoli to England is a question
the merits of which depend on the truthfulness of many in
dividuals of an essentially southern race. Paoli himself is far
from trustworthy. Civil war, exile and privations had told on
him ; and at fifty-five years of age he was no longer the stately
and imposing leader who overawed Boswell by his penetrating
glances.2 Age, vanity, a fancy far too lively for his otherwise
mediocre abilities, and a truly Corsican proneness to schism and
intrigue, made of him a bundle of nerves and prejudices irritating
to a northerner, but fascinating to his own kindred. He was the
people's idol ; and the fact that his influence had brought about
the union with England seriously complicated matters. The
situation somewhat resembled that which arose in September
i860, when Garibaldi, after freeing Southern Italy, met Victor
Emmanuel near the River Volturno; and, unlike the red-shirt
chieftain, Paoli did not speedily retire. What position, then,
could he possibly hold under Elliot? Fortunately his growing
infirmities prevented his acceptance of the Presidency of the
Consulta; and a nonentity named Giufferi was chosen. More
important was the choice of the head Minister ; and here Elliot
made the mistake of exalting a skilful, designing advocate,
named Pozzo di Borgo. Undoubtedly he was a very able man.
The scion of a noble family, endowed with a commanding
presence, handsome features, an eloquent tongue, and consider
able facility both as a journalist and man of affairs, Pozzo had
been the adviser of Paoli during the strife against the Jacobins.
But, that being settled, self-interest and difference of character
sundered them. Indeed, his gifts were so varied, and his ambi
tion so insatiable, that in that island he could not long be a
follower of any chief. And his part once taken, he clave to it
with Corsican obstinacy. Such was the de~but of a career which
brought him finally into favour with the Czar Alexander I.3
In truth, Corsica was too small a sphere for impetuous natures
like Paoli, Bonaparte, and Pozzo di Borgo. In that cockpit of
the Mediterranean, where the deadly customs of the vendetta
were alike the supreme law and the chief check on over-popula-
1 W. O., 70, I. B. 2 J. Boswell, " An Account of Corsica," p. 315.
3 Moore calls Pozzo (" Diary," i, 138) " a low, mean-minded man, with some
cunning and intrigue, but totally devoid, in my opinion, of talents."

BRITISH RULE IN CORSICA 69
tion, it was difficult for England to succeed where Genoa and
France had failed. The people combined the fickleness of the
mediaeval Florentines with the independence of islanders and
the fighting qualities of mountaineers. Bonaparte summed up
the character of his compatriots in the statement that their
imagination and their passions were most lively, and that they
themselves were extremely difficult to understand.1 This ex
plains much. At first, of course, the islanders welcomed the
British because they ousted the French. But in reality they
merely wanted to govern themselves in the rough-and-tumble
ways which had so much fascination for Rousseau. Having ful
filled in the person of Bonaparte the Genevese thinker's lucky
forecast that they would one day astonish Europe, they were
now to reveal the hollowness of his statement that theirs was
"the one country in Europe capable of legislation."2 In point
of fact, their ideal was a clannish anarchy which defied all
legislation. The one thing essential for the preservation of anything like
order in Corsica was to keep Paoli in a good humour ; and, now
that his head was in no danger from the French, this was no
easy task. The appointment of Pozzo di Borgo to the Pre
sidency of the Council of State was in his eyes an unpardonable
sin. For had not he (Paoli) raised Pozzo from obscurity? In
vain did the latter consult the old man and flatter him by all
possible means.3 Paoli was inconsolable. From his retreat at
Orezza the acrid ferment spread through the mountainous in
terior. The hillmen were already aggrieved at the choice of
Bastia as the seat of Government; and the Corsican deputies,
who went to England to lay the crown at the feet of George III,
dwelt on this and other matters, until the Duke of Portland lost
patience with them and read them a well-deserved rebuke.
Meanwhile, however, the bungling of the Duke's subordinates
at Whitehall had given Paoli a handle against Elliot and the
British Government. The King had ordered that a miniature
of himself set in brilliants and hung from a gold chain should
be sent to Paoli. In due course Mr. Pollock of the Treasury
delivered to Mr. Richard Stewart, who was setting out to Corsica
with despatches, six packages, in one of which the picture was
1 Napoleon, " Corresp.," ii, 163.
2 " Contrat Social," bk. ii, ch. x.
3 Jollivet, op. cit., 157, proves this incontestably.

70 PITT AND NAPOLEON
supposed to be. On his arrival it was missing. Elliot carefully
investigated the matter and found that Stewart could not have
received the miniature. He forwarded to Paoli Stewart's letter
of explanation ' and ordered close inquiries to be made at
Whitehall. But the matter remained in mystery; and this gave
to Paoli the opportunity of insinuating that the Viceroy was
the thief.
" It is often seen " (says Bacon in his " Essay on Faction ")
" that a few that are stiff do tire out a greater number that are
more moderate." This happened again and again in the French
Revolution ; and Corsica was now to witness to the truth of the
saw. There is every reason to believe that British rule had the
tacit approval of the majority. But the restless minority fastened
on every incident, until a scratch on a bust came near to rousing
a Revolution. The incident came about thus. During a visit
of the Viceroy to Ajaccio in June 1795 the officers of one of the
Corsican battalions arranged a public ball in his honour at the
Town Hall. The function went off brilliantly, and Elliot de
parted for Bonifacio, charmed by his reception. Meanwhile
envious rumour had been at work on a very ordinary accident.
A large bust of Paoli had to be removed during the preparations
for the ball and sustained a slight injury, a piece of plaster about
the size of a sixpence being flaked off from the top of the nose.
Soon the story ran that Captain Colonna, an aide-de-camp of
the Viceroy, had overthrown the bust, his comrades thereupon
stabbing it with their daggers and pitching it away into a cup
board. In vain were the dimensions of the wound measured
In vain did Colonna solemnly declare that he did not enter the
Town Hall until the ball began. In vain did Elliot return, hold
an inquest on the bust, and set forth the truth. Indignant
patriots declared that the honour of Corsica, incarnate in Paoli
1 R. Stewart wrote thus to Elliot from Bastia, on 24th November 1794:
" Six days previous to my quitting London, I was informed by the Duke of
Portland and by Mr. Pollock of the Treasury that I should be entrusted with
despatches to Your Excellency, amongst which would be included H. M.'s
picture for Gen1. Paoli. On the 21st, the day I left London, Mr. Pollock put
into my hands a parcel containing six packages directed for Y. E. ; and
tho' Mr. Pollock did not mention it at the time, I conceived from what he
said that one of them contained the picture alluded to. The six packages I
delivered to Y. E. ; but from the description you give of the picture and of the
chain annexed to it, they could only have been packed in a box ; and I am
therefore very certain I never received them" (B.M. Add. MSS. 22688).

BRITISH RULE IN CORSICA 71
and therefore in his bust, had been deliberately outraged by the
Viceroy and his myrmidons. Pozzo di Borgo was made to
figure as an accessory to the " assassination." A proces verbal
at Ajaccio, drawn up by ardent Paolists, was widely circulated ;
and the letters of Paoli prove that he sought to make capital
out of the affair, with the result that Corsica heaved with pas
sion at the loss of a flake of plaster.1
So threatening became the unrest in September 1795 that the
Viceroy resolved to remove Paoli. Already, in September 1794,
he referred the matter to the British Government, which was
aware that the dictator, during the first discussions of a union,
had offered, on its accomplishment, to retire to England. After
a very trying delay Portland assented to the proposal, and
gilded the pill by awarding Paoli £2,000 a year apart from the
pension of £1,000 previously accorded. Elliot also accom
panied the patriot to the warship that conveyed him to the
mainland. But the old man never forgave him or the British
Cabinet. In his correspondence there is a long and acrid letter
(probably to Sir Charles Stuart) in which he complains that, on
his arrival in London, Ministers resented the criticisms that
he once more levelled against Elliot.2 There was reason for
their resentment. By that time they had heard from Francis
Drake, our envoy at Genoa, of the secret dealings of Paoli with
an unfrocked monk, named Pancrazzio d'lstria, who was sent
over by Chiappe, a Corsican exile. The report ran that Pan
crazzio was to set on foot a scheme for arousing discontent
against the taxes and other details of Elliot's administration,
the aim being to restore Paoli to power. Such was the report
sent to Drake early in September by a secret agent named
Timorani. Pitt and his colleagues attached some importance to
it; for on 5th October Portland wrote to Elliot that the whole
affair " confirmed the suspicion, which you were evidently un
willing to give way to, of Paoli's baseness and treachery.
Whether this clue will lead to further discoveries, or whether
you will think it right to pursue it, rests solely with you."
Portland then promised " a comfortable retreat " for Paoli " on
1 Jollivet, 157-9; Elliot (" Mems.," ii, 319-21). Moore accepted the state
ments against Colonna; so does his editor on very weak evidence (" Diary,"
i, 159, 165-9).
2 B. M. Add. MSS., 22688. Sir C. Stuart wrote to him in equally bitter
terms on 2nd November 1796.

72 PITT AND NAPOLEON
the express condition of his withdrawing himself immediately
and for ever from Corsica and engaging to pass the remainder
of his days in this kingdom." 1 Such, then, was the inglorious
ending of Paoli's career. The mural tablet to his memory in
Westminster Abbey tells one tale. The British Records tell
another and a very different one.
After the removal of Moore and Paoli Corsican affairs pro
ceeded quietly. At the close of 1795 Frederick North, one of
Elliot's Secretaries of State, succeeded in framing a treaty with
the Dey of Algiers, which not only freed Corsican vessels from
the Barbary rovers, but secured the liberation of 195 Corsicans
held in bondage. Already Elliot had sent a Frenchman, de
Sade, to open up close relations with the Knights of St. John at
Malta.2 Pitt and his colleagues fully approved these overtures;
and we learn from Portland's letter of 2nd December 1794 to
Elliot, that the Grand Master offered to sell stores and galleys
for the defence of Corsica; while the Bailli de la Tour de St.
Quentin promised Portland to endeavour to secure the loan of
4,000 Maltese for that purpose.3 In this he did not succeed; but
the promise explains why the Home Government did not for
some time send off troops to reinforce the garrison. The incid
ent is also of interest as illustrating the truly prophetic dread of
France prevalent among the Knights, and the need of furthering
the Mediterranean policy on which Elliot laid so much stress.
Thanks to the efforts of a British agent, Sir John Hippisley, at
Rome, Elliot succeeded in settling various questions in dispute
with the Papacy." Further, an act was passed founding a university
at Corte and advanced schools at Ajaccio and Bastia. On
30th April 1796 Portland congratulated Elliot on these efforts,
and expressed the hope that Oxford and Cambridge would help
Corsica in matters educational.
Up to the month of August 1796 a continuance of British
rule in Corsica seemed probable. Work was begun at a naval
dock at Ajaccio ; but, though the military men had strongly ad
vised the strengthening the defences at Bastia and St. Fiorenzo,
Portland forbade those undertakings until sanctioned by the
1 " W. O.,"7o, I. B.; "F. O." Genoa, 12. I have published the reports of
Timorani®in the " Revue Napoleonienne " for 1910.
2 "A History of Malta" (1798-1815), by W. Hardman, ed. by J. H. Rose,
p. 180.
3 " W. O.," 70, I. B. " " Castlereagh Corresp.," iii, 476.

BRITISH RULE IN CORSICA 73
Board of Ordnance;1 and nothing was done. Indeed, on several
occasions Elliot wrote bitterly of the apathy of the Home
Government. Portland, who corresponded with him, was by
nature a balancer. " Portland will look at his nails" (so wrote
Elliot), " and raise his spectacles from his nose to his forehead for
a fortnight or so before he answers me."2 For these delays Pitt
must ultimately be held responsible. Owing to party reasons he
had raised the Duke to the Home Office, which mismanaged
not only internal affairs but also those of Ireland and the
colonies ; and it was the duty of the Prime Minister to see that
Corsica was not neglected. But Pitt lost interest in the war after
the autumn of 1795. His one aim now was to secure indemnities
for its expense and to gain the best terms possible from France.
Probably the peace between France and Spain, and the jealousy
of the latter respecting Corsica, convinced him that the island
would be a source of more danger than of advantage.
Here we have one of the reasons for the failure of that interest
ing experiment. The Corsicans soon came to question the con
tinuance of the British occupation. Paoli, on meeting Moore at
Cuxhaven in November 1795 expressed a fear that Pitt, under the
demoralizing influence of Dundas, would give up Corsica.3 I have
found no proofs of Pitt's opinion on this question. He and his col
leagues maintained a prudent reserve ; and one cannot argue with
certainty from such phrases as — " The possession of Corsica, if it
remains with us," — in one of Grenville's letters.4 Further, the
fact that no public works were pushed on except at Ajaccio,
does not imply a resolve to leave Corsica, but rather a prudent
economy in money and men at a time when they were more
urgently needed elsewhere. It is, however, noteworthy that Pitt
in his great speech of 9th December 1795 named Martinique,
Cape Nicolas Mole, and the Cape of Good Hope as the three
great acquisitions of the war, and made no mention of Corsica.5
In the spring of 1796 Government sent thither two fine regi
ments, one of French Emigre's, under Edward Dillon (" le beau
Dillon "), the other of Swiss under de Rolle. Their arrival strength
ened the monarchists at a time when, owing to the brilliant
victories of Bonaparte in North Italy, discontent once more be-
1 " W. O.," 70, I. B. 2 Elliot, " Mems.," ii, 326.
3 Moore, "Diary," i, 178.
4 " Dropmore Papers," iii, 12, Grenville to Portland, 26th January 1795.
5 " Pari. Hist.," xxxii, 585.

74 PITT AND NAPOLEON
came rife. Finally it broke out in a rising near Corte. Elliot
tactfully met the demands of the leaders by dissolving Parlia
ment, accepting the resignation of five unpopular officials, and
promising to consider the remission of the salt and land taxes.
This lenity, which appeased the people for a time, probably re
sulted from Elliot's doubts as to the intentions of Ministers.
Portland, when at last he did write, penned these paralysing
words : — " You must remember that the possession of Corsica is
not more gratifying to the public than that of Gibraltar, and that
the expenses belonging to it are not likely to make it popular.
Remember that our worthy countrymen are not foreign
politicians."1 This is true enough. But what are we to think of a statesman
who, on a matter on which the public can form no judgement,
hedges and trims according to their varying moods? Resolution
and firmness in the early spring of 1796 would have saved Eng
land and Europe from an Iliad of war. At that time Bonaparte's
communications with France lay along the Italian riviera; and
a blow struck at Vado Bay, or Oneglia, would have clogged his
operations at the outset. Here again, then, the Ministry failed
to act betimes and must share with Austria the responsibility of
allowing its ally, Sardinia, to be crushed by the young con
queror. Even up to the middle of May the landing of a small
force on that coast would have checked his progress through
Lombardy. He had always taken a keen interest in the fate of
his native land, witness his letter of 23rd September 1794 (after
the French success on the Riviera), that they must now chase
the English from Corsica,'a position which gives them the mastery
of the Mediterranean.2 Other signs betoken his resolve to carry
out this plan at the earliest possible time. It is probable that
the rising near Corte and Bocognano, in the spring of 1796, was
due to his emissaries, it being always his plan to busy his
enemies by stirring up revolts in their midst. Owing to Elliot's
tactful acquiescence in the demands of the islanders, the danger
soon passed; for Nelson, when off Genoa on 14th May, wrote:
' Corsica is, I hope (at least the Viceroy says so), in a fair way,
of being made quiet, the refractory are few, and he is now fully
equal to face either outward or inward enemies." 3
The prospect soon darkened. The raid of Bonaparte's troops
1 Elliot, " Mems.," ii, 345. * " Nap. Corresp.," i, 58.
3 " Nelson Dispatches," vii, lxxii.

BRITISH RULE IN CORSICA 75
against British shipping at Leghorn at the end of June, besides
doing great damage to our commerce, threatened Corsica with a
new danger. As is well known, the young conqueror organized at
that seaport a corps of Corsican exiles for an expedition to the
island. The arrival of Nelson off Leghorn, and his blockade of
that port, checked the scheme; but Nelson saw that it could be
frustrated only by a bold counter-stroke, the occupation of Elba.
As he wrote to Elliot on 2nd July: " The way to Corsica, if our
fleet is at hand, is through Elba." Elliot therefore directed him
to seize that island, and he did so on 10th July. Elliot at that
time reported matters as " better than quiet in Corsica."1 This
report contradicted a rumour that reached Trevor, our envoy at
Turin, as to " foul play in that cursed Corsica." In fact Corsican
privateers helped Nelson in capturing the enemy's vessels along
the Italian coast.
Up to the middle of August, all the danger to Corsica was
from the side of Leghorn. But now a cloud rose in the West,
which soon overcast the whole sky. Spain was on the brink of
war with us. At first, that is on 15th August Nelson feared
little even if the Dons should come ; for he knew their fleet to be
" ill-manned and worse officered." But after three days' reflec
tion he penned the ominous words, " If they do [come], we must
give up Corsica, that is all. Our fleets will cover every sea but
the Mediterranean." He hoped that the British force in those
waters, when reinforced by Mann's squadron from off Cadiz,
would number 22 sail-of-the-line. As for the troops in Corsica,
they were " more than usually healthy and prepared for service." 2
Still, the main question was — could Corsica be held, now that
the Spanish navy threatened our communications with that
island? Closely linked with this was the further question — Aus
tria having lost Italy by the defeat at Castiglione, was it worth
while to keep a large fleet in that sea, to assist a Power which
could not help herself? Pitt, as I have shown elsewhere, was aim
ing more and more at peace. Certainly he no longer relied on
Austria, as of yore. Naples being also bent on an accommoda
tion with France,3 there was little reason for keeping a fleet in that
sea, as the treaties of the summer of 1793 required. Moreover,
1 "Nelson Dispatches," ii, 194-21 1, 238.
2 Ibid., ii, 241, 242; vii, p. ci.
3 Naples signed an armistice with France at Pistoja on 26th June 1796
(" Nap. Corresp.," i, 687).

76 PITT AND NAPOLEON
the Franco-Spanish combination threatened, not only the British
West Indies, but also the United Kingdom on its most vulner
able side, Ireland.
Clearly, then, the supreme need of the moment was concen
tration of sea-power. Too long had England spread out her
efforts in what may be termed an enveloping strategy against a
State which had most effectively retorted by blows from an inner
arc. Holland, Brittany, Hayti, Toulon, Corsica — these had been
our points of attack on France. The last-named proved the most
serviceable of those bases. But now the defection of Spain ne
cessitated its abandonment. On 31st August the Duke of Port
land sent off an order for the evacuation of the island and of
Elba. Elliot heard the news with consternation, for nothing
previously had foreshadowed so abrupt a resolve.1 There is
scarcely a shred of evidence for the assertion often made, that it
was due to the discontent of the Corsicans. On the contrary,
the islanders were at that time unusually quiet. Captain Mahan
quotes Nelson's statement of 20th May that Corsica was not
worth holding in the present temper of the inhabitants.2 But he
does not quote later letters of a more hopeful tenour. Besides,
Nelson could not know the causes of the decision of the Ministry,
though on 1 8th August he made the shrewd surmise quoted above.
If we compare the date of that decision with those of the rup
ture with Spain, we find them to tally very closely. During the
month of August events marched quickly towards war. On or
about the 26th, the Spanish ambassador pettishly left England
on a flimsy excuse; and by that time Pitt and Grenville knew
that the French squadron had left Cadiz under convoy of the
Spanish fleet.3 In view of this openly hostile act, what Govern
ment would not have taken steps to guard against a Spanish
attack? The most vulnerable of our possessions were Hayti,
Gibraltar, and Corsica. Ministers had already taken steps to
strengthen the garrisons at Gibraltar and in Hayti. Portugal,
menaced by Spain, also called out for British succour. These
pressing claims involved retrenchment elsewhere, namely, at
Corsica. Such, then, is the cause of the evacuation of Corsica. Par
tisans of Moore and critics of Elliot may ascribe it to the in-
1 Elliot, "Mems.," ii, 355. This corrects Mr. Frewen Lord ("Lost Pos
sessions of England," p. 219), as to Elliot's "relief" at being recalled.
2 Mahan, " Life of Nelson," i, 243. 3 " F. O.," Spain, 43.

BRITISH RULE IN CORSICA 77
competence of the latter and " the change from enthusiastic
loyalty to revolt." * But this charge is refuted by the facts above
stated, which prove that the abandonment of Corsica resulted
from the victories of Bonaparte and the perfidy of the Spanish
Court. If further proofs are needed, they may be found in two
facts. First, that the Pitt Ministry on 31st August decided to
evacuate Elba as well as Corsica. Now, to hold Elba was a
comparatively easy task ; and from its excellent harbour, Porto
Ferrajo, the Sea Power could threaten the coasts of Italy under
French control. Nevertheless Elba was also given up. Secondly,
on 20th October Ministers countermanded the evacuation of
Corsica and Elba.2 Could anything show more conclusively that
the retention of Corsica depended, not on the whims of the
islanders, but on the trend of military and naval events?
The reason for the strange oscillation of Pitt's plans on 20th
October is to be found, not in the encouraging news of Austrian
successes in Swabia (as Captain Mahan asserts) but in the recent
resolve of the Cabinet to offer Corsica to the Empress Catharine.
She had lately offered to send 60,000 Russians against France,
if England and Austria would satisfy her pecuniary demands,
which were scarcely in accord with her eager royalism. As British
credit was on the brink of a collapse, Pitt viewed her proposals
with suspicion, and on 19th October he and his colleagues
unanimously resolved to offer to her Corsica, which she was known
to covet, provided that its ports were open to the British fleet
during the war, and thereafter to British commerce.3 Alas for
the proposal, Nelson and Elliot completed the evacuation of
Bastia on the very next day! And by the end of the month the
young commodore set sail from St. Fiorenzo Bay for Elba with
the remaining troops and stores. Further, it is doubtful whether
the tempting offer ever reached the ears of Catharine, for on 16th
November, after a long and distressing illness, she expired. With
her died the last hopes of the First Coalition, which her eager
professions had nursed to life and her calculating selfishness had
scandalously betrayed. Whether, in those last sad weeks, she
intended to do anything more than incite England and Austria
to further fruitless efforts is a problem which she carried with her
into silence. Her son Paul forthwith reversed her policy, and
little more was heard of Russian rule in Corsica.
1 Sir F. D. Maurice, in Moore's " Diary," i, 31.
" "Auckland Journals," iii, 363. 3 "Dropmore P.," iii, 246-9, 261.

78 PITT AND NAPOLEON
For yet another reason the prompt withdrawal of Britain from
Corsica was most opportune. By a grave error of judgement,
Admiral Mann, who was ordered to reinforce Admiral Jervis,
commanding the Mediterranean fleet, decided that the risks of
encountering a superior Spanish force were too great, and made
sail for Spithead. On his arrival he was promptly disgraced.
His retreat necessitated the prompt evacuation of the Medi
terranean by Jervis and Nelson.1
The conduct of the British Government towards Corsica was
weak and dilatory. Pitt must have known of Portland's delays
in answering despatches ; for Windham wrote to Elliot that the
Cabinet's fault was not to have thought or acted wrongly about
him, but not to have thought at all.2 Windham was at that time
smarting under the Quiberon disaster and the proposals for a
peace with France. But his letter convicts the Prime Minister
of neglect of the other Departments of State, which in this case
implied leaving Corsica at the mercy of Portland. The results
of the evacuation were very great. The re-conquest of the island
by the French enabled them to draw thence the timber and the
naval stores on which the dockyard at Toulon largely depended.
The French navy therefore speedily recovered its wonted strength
in the Mediterranean ; and Austria, lacking the naval support of
England in the Adriatic, threw on us the responsibility for the
conclusion of the separate peace to which the triumphs of Bona
parte in Styria reduced her in the month of October 1797. From
the wreck of their fortunes the Hapsburgs snatched Venice and
Eastern Venetia; but the Ionian Isles perforce went to France,
which for a time became undisputed mistress of Italy and the
Mediterranean. The young Corsican hailed in these events the
dawn of a far more brilliant future. The recovery of his native
island and the gain of Corfu beckoned him on to the conquest
of Egypt and of India. Not without reason, then, did General
Stuart on 2nd November 1796 write to Paoli that the abandon
ment of Corsica was an eternal disgrace to the British Govern
ment.3 1 Mahan, "Sea Power," i, 213-5. A large number of Corsican Royalists
went into exile and formed a battalion, the Corsican Rangers, which did
excellent service under Colonel Hudson Lowe (" Napoleon and Sir Hudson
Lowe," by R. C. Seaton, 44). For the British attempt to retake Corsica in
1814 see Jollivet, App XIII.
2 Elliot, "Mems.," ii, 277. » B.M. Add. MSS., 22688.

PITT AND RELIEF OF THE POOR
THE English poor have rarely if ever been plunged into
deeper distress than in the years 1794-7. Uncertainty of
work, heavy taxes, and an alarming increase in the prices of the
necessaries of life strained to breaking-point the antiquated
system of poor relief. Dating from the forty-third year of Queen
Elizabeth's reign, it assigned to the magistrates of each parish
the responsibility for the poor of that parish; and there was
little or no supervision from London of the parochial systems
which grew up. Seeing that differences in the scale of relief
induced pauper vagrants to seek out the most desirable place
of abode, Parliament, in the reign of Charles II, passed Acts of
Settlement so severe as to check even migration in search of
work. Adam Smith pointed out that they killed all enterprise
in the English rural poor, who were as much tied to the soil, or
rather to the parish, as under the old Feudalism. To this cause
we may in part ascribe the curious inequalities in wages and
well-being then prevalent in English villages, some being bur
dened with an excess of helpless desponding drones, while others
languished for want of hands.1 Scotland and Ireland, which had
no Poor Law until far into the next century, showed no such
perplexing diversities.
Despite some attempts to remedy the cramping effects of the
Acts of Settlement, no material change took place until 1782,
when the philanthropist, Gilbert, succeeded in carrying through
an Act which bears his name. With the purpose of facilitating
the movement of labour, he provided that parishes should be
allowed to form Unions, which, furnishing relief in common,
would replace the village poor-houses by one central workhouse.
Paid guardians were to be chosen by the justices of the peace,
the duties of the overseers being limited to the collection of the
1 A. Smith, " Wealth of Nations," i, ch. x, § 2 ; Aschrott, " English Poor
Law System," 9-13 ; Gamier, " Annals of the British Peasantry," ch. xvi.
79

80 PITT AND NAPOLEON
poor-rate. As the Act was permissive, and was taken up by
only 924 parishes, it never attained to national importance,
though it heralded the dawn of a national system. In one
respect Gilbert's well-meant effort led to highly mischievous
results. A clause of his Act enabled the guardians to provide
the able-bodied poor with work near their own homes on terms
which would ensure their maintenance.1 It was soon found that
this charitable proposal led to the adoption of lax schemes of
out-door relief, that form of succour which needs the closest
supervision. The interest of Pitt in these questions appears in his institu
tion of a Parliamentary Inquiry. The resulting Report, issued
in 1786, is a thin production compared with its famous successor
of 1834; but it shows the strangely diverse customs prevalent
even in London parishes. Some had houses of industry, others
had not. Some let out their paupers at 3J. 6d. or \s. each per
week to contractors at Blackfriars, Hoxton, etc. In other work
houses the paupers toiled on behalf of the rates; elsewhere, for
the benefit of the master or mistress. The occupations were
mostly spinning, weaving, or oakum-picking. In the country
workhouses spinning or weaving was the rule ; but the method
of sale of the produce is not stated. In view of the future
developments in Berkshire, it is worth noting that that county
had no workhouse; but there were three workhouses in Reading.2
The Report, meagre though it is, testifies to the slipshod ways
of the English people, who very rarely organize well on a large
scale except under the lead of a genius or the pressure of dire
necessity. A fact not very creditable to the intelligence of the race is the
continuance of the oppressive Act of Settlement without any
considerable change from 1662 to 1795. In the latter year Pitt
undertook to mitigate one of its severities by enacting that a
settler should not be expelled from his new abode until he
became actually chargeable to the rates. This seems a small
concession; and, from his memorable speech of 6th February
1796, it is clear that he regarded it as inadequate. Nevertheless
he then helped in some measure to restore liberty of movement
1 Nicholls, "History of the English Poor Law," ii, ch. xi; Aschrott,
19-21. 2 P'tt MSS., 307. This packet contains several proposals and criticisms
by Gilbert and copies of earlier Acts.

RELIEF OF THE POOR 81
to the workers, and to promote the fluidity of labour so desir
able in the ever-changing phases of the Industrial Revolution.1
Meanwhile, the magistrates of Berkshire, assisted by " several
discreet persons," assembled at Speenhamland near Newbury on
6th May 1795, took a step fraught with momentous issues. Find
ing that the weavers of that district and the makers of broad
cloth at Newbury were in sore distress owing to lack of work and
the high price of bread, they resolved to systematize the custom
of supplementing wages from the poor-rates, which, as we have
seen, was legalized by Gilbert's Act of the year 1782. They
preferred this course to the alternative of raising the wages of
day labourers by magisterial enactment, a custom which, besides
being almost obsolete, entailed much friction at the ensuing time
of reduction of wages. Accordingly, they enacted that, when
the gallon loaf of second flour cost one shilling, every poor
and industrious man should receive three shillings a week for
himself and half that amount for his wife and each child. When
the loaf cost one shilling and fourpence, the relief was assessed
at four shillings for the man and one shilling and tenpence for
the wife or child. For every penny of increase in the price of the
loaf, the dole rose by threepence and one penny respectively.2
Now, it is only fair to remember that the magistrates of mid-
Berkshire were confronted by a serious crisis, and that they
endeavoured to meet it by an expedient adopted from Gilbert's
Act. They further sought to guard their experiment from abuse
by restricting relief to the " poor and industrious man." 3 But
how long was a man likely to remain industrious on those terms?
All unwittingly they sapped independence at its very base ; for
they made a man's wage depend, not on the effectiveness of his
work, but on the price of bread and the size of his family. The
same provision induced the recipient to view with unconcern
the rise in the price of wheat, and to hail with joy the birth of
every child as an economic gain. It therefore encouraged early
and improvident marriages, families of patriarchal size, and
thriftless housekeeping. Not without reason did Malthus brand
1 Pari. Hist., xxxii, 708; 35 Geo. Ill, cap. 101.
2 Nicholkii, 131; "Mercury," nth May, 1795 J Sidney and Beatrice Webb,
" Hist, of the Poor Law," § 6.
3 See Sidney and Beatrice Webb, " County and Parish," 545-7, 594, with
evidence defending the Berks Justices. Those of Dorset adopted a similar
plan, but apparently only for a time. G

82 PITT AND NAPOLEON
this so-called " Speenhamland Act " as the effective cause of a
race of bounty-bred and bounty-'fed paupers; for it nullified all
the previous attempts to withhold relief from able-bodied paupers
unless they came into the workhouse, and enabled them comfort
ably to slide into pauperized domesticity. It demoralized not
only labourers but masters. Farmers, knowing that the minimum
wage would be made good out of the rates, began to reduce
wages, and thereby threw an added burden on ratepayers. The
same cause, then, tended to impair the energies of villagers and
to increase their burdens. Is it surprising that by the year 1803
the poor-rates of Witley in Surrey rose to eighteen shillings in
the £ ? 1 Or that some twenty-five years later, in Cholesbury, a
village of Bucks, everybody but the parson was a pauper? So
much lay enfolded in the kindly experiment of the Berkshire
magistrates. Pitt, as we shall see, abetted their slipshod philan
thropy; but it should be remembered that the Report of
Sturges Bourne's Committee in 18 17 and the Parliamentary
Report of 1833 were the first documents which proved conclusively
that the Speenhamland experiment was bringing England to
the brink of financial and moral bankruptcy.
The distress of the years 1795, 1796 prompted other note
worthy expedients. In December 1795 Whitbread introduced
a Bill enabling justices of the peace to fix a minimum wage of
labour. On the second reading he supported his proposals by
quoting the dicta of Price, that during two centuries wages had
increased only threefold, or at most fourfold, while the prices of
meat and of clothing were sevenfold and fifteenfold respectively.
In a hundred years the poor-rates had risen from ^100,000 to up
wards of ^3,000,000, though Whitbread judged it to be doubtful
whether the population had increased. In his opinion it was
needful to assess the minimum wage in all callings, even as the
Lord Mayor and Council of London controlled that of the silk-
weavers of the metropolis. In reply on 12th February 1796 Pitt
asserted that the figures of Dr. Price were illusory, as leaving out
of account the very different conditions of life at the two periods.
He further objected to all attempts to draw a hard-and-fast line
in regard to wages, seeing that " trade, industry, and barter will
always find their own level and will be impeded by regulations
which violate their natural operation and derange their proper
1 I am indebted for this fact to Mr. H. E. Maiden, M.A., editor of the
Victoria County History for Surrey.

RELIEF OF THE POOR

83

effect." There spoke the pupil of Adam Smith. He left firm
ground for morass when he pleaded for the assessment of relief
in proportion to the number of children, with the aim of making
a large family a blessing, not a curse. He trod safely once more
in adverting to the subject of Friendly Societies. In this con
nection we may notice that Pitt's friend, George Rose, had in
1793 introduced a measure which for the first time recognized
the existence of those praiseworthy unions and assisted them
by procuring relief from undue financial burdens as well as
securing their members from arbitrary removals under the Acts
of Settlement. Thereafter they increased rapidly in number
and usefulness, a proof that the war period was far from being so
barren in remedial legislation as is generally supposed. Whit-
bread's Bill was negatived, but Pitt now outlined a plan for
assuring compulsory payment to one of the Friendly Societies.
In this proposal he had many sympathizers. Gilbert and his
compeers had set the fashion for social reforms; and that genera
tion now discerned the important truth that they were more
immediately beneficial than merely political changes such as the
widening of the franchise. Amidst the misery of 1795-6, when
Parliamentary Reform was at a discount, social questions came
uppermost; and pamphlet literature, which two years earlier
bristled with electoral tirades, now beamed social betterment.
One of the many plans for assuring comfort in old age may here
be noticed. John Harriott put forward what must be one of the
earliest schemes for Old Age Pensions. Its chief provisions
may be thus summarized :

EVERY WEEKLY
SUBSCRIBER OF

SHALL RECEIVE WEEKLY AT

65 YEARS

70 YEARS

75 YEARS

s. d.

j. d.

... d.

,. d.

0 2

I 0

1 7
3 6
0 3
I 2
1 9
4 0
0 4
1 3
1 10
4 4
° 5
1 4
111
4 9
0 6
1 5
2 0
5 0
1 0
2 0
2 6
6 6
Harriott also touched on the question of compulsory subscrip
tion, but admitted it to be very difficult if not impracticable.
84 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Nevertheless he hoped to sweep sluggards into his beneficent
net by procuring parliamentary sanction for his scheme, along
with the proviso that every person who did not subscribe should
be termed a drone, and, on applying to the parish for relief,
should be compelled to wear a badge bearing in large red letters
the word " DRONE." ' The incongruity of sex in the case of
half of the applicants apparently did not trouble Harriott.
Two other proposals of Pitt in the speech of 12th February
1796 deserve notice. He suggested the founding of parochial
Schools of Industry, for the training of children in some useful
trade. Locke and Lord Hale had advocated such schools, and
they had proved serviceable both in imparting technical skill
and in enabling families to keep the wolf from the door. He
also strongly recommended the publication of what he termed
an Annual Poor-Law Budget, including official evidence as to
the general working of the system. Both suggestions were of
the utmost value; and it is most unfortunate that they were not
adopted.2 The assembly of the new Parliament on 27th September 1796,
the fear of invasion and the scarcity of money, delayed the pre
sentation of the Poor Bill which Pitt's speech of 12th February
so hopefully outlined. The year 1796, however, witnessed two
noteworthy departures. Pitt lent his support to a measure which
allowed magistrates to assess relief to the poor in proportion to
the price of wheat, provided that the whole amount thus paid
was not more than double of that already awarded. The second
Act extended to all parishes the permission, already accorded
to Gilbert's Unions, of granting outdoor relief to able-bodied
persons. This lax custom having crept in, other parishes clam
oured for the same liberty or licence; and Pitt was weak enough
to accord it to " industrious poor persons " in time of temporary
distress.3 In consequence the recipients ceased to be industrious,
the village was impoverished, and the custom took permanent
hold until it was uprooted by the drastic reform of 1834.
Finally, on presenting his Poor Bill on 12th November 1796,
Pitt had to meet Sheridan's charge that he had taken the matter
out of Whitbread's hands. He easily repelled this peevish
attack, showing that Whitbread had sought merely to enforce
a minimum wage, while the present Bill contained constructive
1 Pitt MSS., 308. ' Pari. Hist., xxxii, 705-12.
3 36 Geo. Ill, caps, io and 23.

RELIEF OF THE POOR 85
proposals of far-reaching import. As illustrating an almost un
known side of his career, I propose to describe them somewhat
fully. A sign of his singularly sanguine nature appears in the
preamble of the Bill, which thus outlines its aims: "To improve
the condition [of the poor], and to ensure a more comfortable
maintenance and support to them and their families, to encourage
habits of industry and good order, and thereby gradually to
reduce the excessive amount of the rates."
The chief provisions of the Bill may be summarized as fol
lows: A father entitled to poor relief, who is unable to support
his children exceeding two in number, or a widow unable to
support more than one child, shall receive not less than one
shilling a week for each child above that number, until the child
becomes self-supporting. If a poor and industrious person can
not maintain himself, it shall be lawful to make good from the
rates the deficiency in his earnings. If by the purchase of a cow
or other animal a poor person can maintain a family without the
receipt of further relief, the parish shall be at liberty to advance
money for such purchase, the loan being repaid on terms to be
agreed on. No person shall be excluded from poor relief unless
his or her property or belongings exceed £30 in value ; but those
who have not a legal settlement in the parish shall not benefit
by the present legislation. Section 6 deserves quoting almost in
full. " For the securing a competent provision in cases of sick
ness, infirmity, and old age, it may be expedient to establish a
parochial fund, which may arise partly from subscriptions or
voluntary contributions and benefactions, and partly from an aid
to be given out of the poor-rates, whereby the persons sub
scribing may become entitled to greater allowances than can be
secured to them by such savings as can be expected to be made
by them out of their own earnings." Accordingly, on the de
cision of two local magistrates, " a parochial fund for the relief
of sick, infirm, and aged subscribers may be formed for pro
viding a stock for the relief of subscribers in sickness, infirmity,
and old age by certain allowances increasing in proportion to
the periods for which they have subscribed." Suggestions are
then given as to the methods which may be adopted, the mem
bers of legally established Friendly Societies being entitled, on
a moderate subscription, to the benefits of that fund.
The next clause is equally important. In pursuance of the
aims of the Elizabethan Act of 1601, a School of Industry shall

86 PITT AND NAPOLEON
be established in each parish or union of parishes for the train
ing of children in some useful trade or calling.1 The school is
to be supervised by two magistrates and by duly qualified
Visitors of the Poor, among them being beneficed clergymen
and laymen, provided that the latter are freeholders of £50 a
year or rent houses or land worth £150 a year. The parish
meeting is to decide whether the parish unites with its neigh
bours to found such School of Industry. If not, it must itself
establish a school, to be under the control of a Warden of the
Poor, who also supervises the relief of destitution. Persons
needing succour may be instructed or employed in such schools
or at their own homes on a plan to be agreed upon, the parish
supplying hemp, flax, silk, thread, cotton, wool, iron, leather,
etc., along with the tools and implements needful for the several
trades. Parents who do not undertake to train their children at
home may send any child of more than five years of age to such
a school ; and children who cannot be maintained at home shall
be sent thither for training. During the hay and corn harvests
parents may hire out to farmers their boys of more than fourteen
years and their girls of more than twelve years for not more
than six weeks at a time. The parish pays the apprenticeship
fees of its best pupils. For the rest, the School of Industry may
be in part supported by voluntary contributions and by the
labour of the scholars. If the cost of construction exceed £100,
the Overseers of the Poor may build the school by money raised
on security of the rates.
There follows a clause which opens up a vista of beneficent
activity. After gaining the assent of the majority of parishioners,
those who control the relief of the poor may contract with the
lord of the manor for the inclosure of such parts of the " wastes,
commons, or uncultivated land as may be deemed necessary
for the better accommodation of a supply of wholesome food to
the poor at such Schools of Industry as aforesaid, or for the
purpose of building upon, or occupying, cultivating, or improving
the same for the use and benefit of such schools and the poor
persons within the parish where the same shall be or the parishes
united therewith." The remaining clauses of the Bill enable any
1 Workhouses were established by the Act of 1723, and some of them pro
vided a little elementary training. For these and similar experiments see
Dr. Cunningham, "Eng. Industry and Commerce," Part II, pp. 202, 383,
491-3.

RELIEF OF THE POOR 87
parish to turn a House of Industry (Workhouse) into a School
of Industry, and to frame contracts for the sale of its pro
ductions; they also affirm the right of beneficed clergymen to
inspect the School, and to make known any complaints of the
recipients of the parochial fund. The election of Guardians of
the Poor by the Visitors is also regulated, the property quali
fication of a guardian being fixed at a rental of £200, or a freehold
worth ^iooa year. The Bill is to come into operation on 10th
July 1797.
In the Pitt MSS. (No. 307) is a draft of these proposals,
which is minutely amended by the statesman himself, notably
at the clause which enables local authorities to turn a Workhouse
into a School of Industry. In order to submit his measure to
the judgement of practical men, he had copies of his Bill printed,
with wide margins for their written comments. Several of these
annotated copies survive, and reveal the drift of thought of
experts, while numerous letters also touch on the same topics.
It may be well to give a few typical specimens.
Ellis, Clerk of the Peace for Sussex, feared that the indoor
work provided in the School of Industry would unfit boys for
the work of ploughing, besides indisposing labourers to field work,
especially during the winter. He urged the need of placing out
boys for farm work as soon as possible, especially at the time of
ploughing, sowing, and harvest. He advised the halving of the
property qualification for Visitors. A magistrate of Morpeth
pointed out that parents should benefit by poor-relief only in the
case of legitimate children,1 and suggested that no compulsion
should be exerted to send children to the School of Industry
until a magistrate has heard the objections of the parents, if
any. Very pungent were the comments of Fenwick of Earsdon,
also in Northumberland. In a letter written to a friend, and
forwarded to Pitt, the Bill was pronounced ambitious, unwork
able, and likely to cause endless litigation. It would make for
confusion and waste by creating new local divisions, and too many
officials; the schools and the parochial funds would be ruinous
1 The evil results of laxity in relief given to bastards appears in E. Chad-
wick's "Report on the Poor Law in London and Berks" (1833) where he
shows that in some villages (e.g., Burghfield) the bastards nearly equalled
the legitimate children. These customs varied much. At Cookham, where
the magistrates refused out-relief for bastards, their number greatly
diminished.

88 PITT AND NAPOLEON
to poor villages, and, where work was plentiful, the prospect of
the allowance would tempt men away from their usual employ
ments. The pitmen would plead infirmity so as to get a lower
wage, in the assurance that their average would be made up
out of the rates. In place of the local Pension Fund there
should be a National Friendly Society. Above all, the writer
scoffed at the purchase of cows by the parish, and asked how the
loan would be recovered if the pauper ate his cow. In brief (he
says): "The Bill requires more disinterested virtue than either
the poor or the guardians are likely to possess."
Scarcely less hostile was the verdict of the Rev. R. Master, D.D.,
of Croston.near Chorley (Lanes.); for in his district, where families
of weavers were multiplying fast, one parish often contained six
new townships. Little or no grazing land was available for the
pauper cows of the future; and if all the families claimed them
at any time of short work the parishes would become bankrupt.
Further, the multiplication of officials must entail heavy burdens,
besides doubling the duties of magistrates. Other correspondents
expressed different opinions as to the wide powers entrusted to
the local clergy in the control of the schools and the parochial
funds, some condemning those proposals, while others approved
them. Thus a Rev. C. N. Michell, near Ross, invoked blessings
on the head of Pitt for enabling the clergy to lessen the con
trolling powers of brutal overseers who maltreated the poor in
very many villages. The thrifty poor, who had brought up five
or more children, deserved a pension in their old age. The
Vicar of Fordingbridge (Hants) also wrote, rejoicing that the
clergy would at last find their fit place in local government.1
Very noteworthy are the complaints of several correspondents
that Pitt did not sweep aside that source of litigation and expense,
the Acts of Settlement. The Rev. E. Robson, Curate of White-
chapel, urged him to do so, and suggested that, in order to safe
guard London and other large towns, where the poor lived in
outer suburbs, the destitute should be chargeable to the parish
where their employers lived. He warned Pitt that his Bill
would meet with formidable opposition, now organized by
Marylebone and St. Giles. Henry Palmer wrote from Dublin,
asserting that the Acts of Settlement were responsible for
one-eighth of all the cases which recently came before the
Court of King's Bench, their cost being equal to that of the
' Pitt MSS., 307, 308.

RELIEF OF THE POOR 89
maintenance of six paupers for six months. Besides the repeal
of those Acts, he advocated the control of poor relief by five
National Commissioners, supervising the work of inspectors of
workhouses, one for each county. Of a similar tenour were the
observations of L. T. Davies, of Brewer's Lane, Oxford, who
assured Pitt that he would withhold from publication a projected
work on poor relief if its proposals could be embodied in the
Bill. They were in effect these. To give new vitality to the
Act of 1 60 1 by enlarging the areas and ordaining that each
county and town should relieve its own poor; to regulate the
wages of labourers so as to enable them to contribute towards a
pension fund which would help them in case of sickness and
accident, and during old age; to educate the young in
" virtue and industry " ; to afford occasional work to the thrifty
and deserving in time of distress, and a comfortable retreat in
old age; but to imprison and punish vagrants and the per
sistently idle and profligate. This plan, it will be seen, is far
more extensive than that of Pitt ; for Davies proposed to break
down the parochial system of relief and the Acts of Settlement,
besides setting on foot educational agencies and a provident
fund of an almost national character. He also cut down or
annulled the powers of magistrates, visitors and clergy ; and, on
the ground that there was no system about Pitt's proposed
House of Industry or School of Industry, he referred him to
the excellent plan lately designed by Count Rumford on the
Munich model.1
On the other hand nothing but praise was accorded to Pitt's
plan of facilitating the transfer, or cultivation of part at least of
the wastes and commons, so as to provide sites for the School
of Industry and food for its inmates. To all appearance, it did
not include common fields, a far more difficult problem. But
public opinion warmly favoured the cultivation of waste land
as the best means of enriching the village and keeping down
the price of provisions. Probably Pitt intended, on the advent
of peace, to legislate on this great question, but the opportunity
did not come; and, as I have pointed out, he did little or nothing
to prevent the defeat of Sinclair's more thorough reform by the
Lords.2 Most searching of all were the criticisms of that able jurist,
1 Pitt MSS., 308.
2 Rose, "William Pitt and the Great War," pp. 295-7.

90 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Jeremy Bentham. His analytical powers, which dropped like
corrosive acid on so many venerable monuments, found free scope
in dealing with the new Poor Bill. His pamphlet on this topic
was private, but evidently went before one of the Ministers. It
did not see the light until 1838, and the editor then asserted
that Bentham's strictures largely conduced to the abandonment
of Pitt's proposals. Bentham, we may notice, had long studied
these questions, and in 1790 put forth a plan for Frugality
Banks on the lines of Savings Banks. Passing over his strictures
on the careless drafting and haphazard arrangement of the Bill,
we notice that he condemned Pitt's proposal for affording help
from the rates to those who were physically unable to earn the
usual wage. He declared the discrimination of the really
deserving from the lazy to be a most difficult task which the
Bill wholly evaded. Further, it would lead men of more than
middle age to relax their efforts in reliance on the dole from the
poor-box. His other objection, that this enactment would
entice men up to London, where wages far exceeded those in
the country, is hypercritical; for surely magistrates could be
trusted to stop excessive migration by the Act of Settlement.
Equally futile is his criticism on the proposal respecting the
allowance per child to the father or to the widow, which pre
sumes in the local magistrates no exceptional powers of tact and
discernment. Bentham foresaw endless trouble in the " cow-money clause."
How would the parish have any hold on the animals unless they
were lodged in a parish cow-house? How guard against fraudu
lent sales and claims for more cows? At best the cost to the
parish must be enormous, especially in view of the diminution
in the number and size of commons. A loom would be a safer
form of investment. The whole plan was too burdensome; for,
as he adds, the true system of relief is one " which shall make
the supply of means keep pace with that of wants;" and this
the Bill would not do. Similarly, he regards the clause of the
Bill which extends out-relief to those who possess property up
to the value of £30, as more remarkable for benevolence than
wisdom. Along with the other provisions facilitating out-relief,
its tendency would be to pauperize. He also found many defects
in the clause enabling the parish to pay the fees of apprentices;
for, as there were fully 10,000 parishes, it would cost the country
£100,000 a year if each parish bound over two apprentices even

RELIEF OF THE POOR 91
at the low sum of £5 apiece. He does not inquire how much
these would cost the country if they became felons. The School
of Industry then passes under his microscopic gaze; and he
loftily dismisses the whole Bill as prolix, obscure, and certain to
prove ruinously expensive. These criticisms in several cases hit
the mark ; and we can now see why Pitt dropped his Bill. Not
only did it involve an enormous outlay at a time when the
country was entering on the Bank crisis, but it contained many
defects. Bentham, Davies and others raked the measure fore and
aft, and reduced it to a waterlogged wreck before it drifted within
range of the broadsides of Fox and Whitbread, double-shotted
by the indignant magistrates of Marylebone and St. Giles.
In truth, Pitt entered upon the most elusive of all legislative
quests with more zeal than knowledge. Perhaps no one then
fully understood the extreme difficulty of helping the deserving
poor without demoralizing them and overtaxing the ratepayers.
The problem baffles us even now, when Political Economy and
Social Science have come to maturity. Can we blame Pitt for
undue hopefulness in that time of twilight? The old rural Eng
land was merging into the new industrial England ; and he, who
knew little more than the life of a prosperous village, sought to
apply to the whole land a cure suitable to the homes of Arcady.
His parochial Pension Fund was a pleasing device, workable
only where the parson and squire were actuaries in embryo. His
School of Industry further presumed that they possessed tech
nical skill and organizing powers of no mean order ; for, without
guidance from headquarters, who can cheaply and efficiently
teach diverse trades and callings to small groups of rustics? As
for the pauper cow, she is clearly an idyllic creation.
In some respects Pitt's proposals offered a promising first
draft for a generous experiment, which might have succeeded in
time of peace. Certainly it enables us to feel the warm aspira
tions that throbbed under that cold exterior. And who shall say
that England might not have derived more benefit from parts at
least of this measure than from the rigorous regime advocated
by Bentham, wherein men, women and children, clad in pauper
garb, toiled in huge polygonal workhouses under Argus-eyed
masters and matrons? The one scheme emanated from an
enthusiast, the other embodied the frigid calculations of a doc
trinaire. Nevertheless, as the final test of statesmanship is not
fertility in suggestion, but sagacity in construction, and strength

92 PITT AND NAPOLEON
in accomplishment, Pitt cannot be absolved from the charge of
weakness in not bringing forward an amended measure at a time
more favourable than the winter of 1796-7. Probably he deferred
the matter to the days of peace, to which he ever looked for
ward. But those days were never to come during his tenure of
office.

SOME NEW LETTERS OF PITT
LEISURE is essential to the formation of the best epistolary
style. The great letter-writers are they who have had
time to give full play to their gifts of insight and humour. Just
as the highest oratory demands a dignified amplitude of expres
sion, so, too, in the interchange of thought between friends the
mind should roam at ease, unchecked by considerations of time
and space. The correspondence which the world will never let
die resembles the converse of friend with friend amidst spacious
lawns or down glades that open up far vistas. Haste and con
ventionality are the two most fatal enemies to a vital corre
spondence. Letters live on only if they express a frank out
pouring of the heart, and those which are written against time,
or to conceal thought, never live at all.
For these reasons the correspondence of responsible states
men is rarely of interest, except during the intervals of leisure,
when self-suppression ceases to be the rule of life. From the
time of Cicero to that of Gladstone some have been found of in
dividuality so marked, and interests so varied, as to enrich periods
of rest with a brisk exchange of thoughts. But Pitt is scarcely
among the number. His love of the Classics was no less keen
than that of Fox; his friendships were as strong as those of
Cicero; but he left behind no literary correspondence like that
between Fox and the elder Gilbert Wakefield. True, his letters
were afterwards thinned out by his literary executor, Bishop
Tomline, who judged it right " to suppress many circumstances
or anecdotes of a more private nature." But, from what remains,
it is clear that Pitt was always more or less oppressed by his
position as Prime Minister, and, even when in retirement in
1 801-4, did not recover unofficial spontaneity. He early freed
himself from the intolerable pomposity of the epistolary style
of Chatham ; but he never shook off entirely the cautious reserve
congenial to Downing Street. 93

94 PITT AND NAPOLEON
In one respect he fell far below the traditions of that abode.
He was most careless about his papers. Lady Hester Stanhope
afterwards described to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the disorder
of Pitt's room, littered over with documents, the only clearance
being an occasional secretion under the cushions of a sofa.
These slipshod habits were accountable for another serious
defect. He often left letters unanswered, sometimes even un
read. On this topic George III, in the year 1810, made some
shrewd remarks to William Dacre Adams, formerly private
secretary to Pitt. When Adams confessed the many delinquen
cies of his master in leaving letters unnoticed, the King struck
in: I have frequently said to Mr. Pitt the next time I saw him after I
had written to him — " Mr. Pitt, I did not receive an answer to that
letter I wrote to you the other day." He then (continued Adams) de
scribed Mr. Pitt's embarrassment and " hems " and " Sirs " — " by which
it was evident he had never read my letter at all." The King talked of
Mr. Pitt's style, which he admired for its point and conciseness. He
then asked after Pitt's time of rising. — Adams : He was seldom stirring
before 12 o'clock, Sir. — The King: Ah! he ruined his health by those
late hours. I believe he was not fond of doing business after dinner. —
Adams: No, Sir, he was not, I seldom went to him in the evening,
unless there was something particular to be done. His rule was to finish
everything before dinner. '
Though Pitt's letters have not the highest merits, they are of
considerable interest as the outcome of a cultured mind and of a
noble and patriotic nature. Therefore, while reserving for
Part II those which belong to his correspondence with the
King and some of his colleagues, I propose to give here some of
a more miscellaneous description, selecting those which throw
fresh light on his mental development or his career. The
first letters display the pomposity which his father's example
ingrained in him at the age of eleven. I need only add that the
family abodes were Hayes, near Bromley, Kent, and Burton Pyn-
sent in Somerset, the nearest seaside resort to the latter being
Lyme Regis. The scholar referred to in the first letter is his
younger brother James, who became a midshipman, and to whom
Pitt's letter of 16th June 1773 was written. The play mentioned
1 Note communicated to the fifth Earl Stanhope in 1863 (Chevening
MSS.).

SOME NEW LETTERS OF PITT 95
in the P.S. was " Laurentius," which the Pitt children composed
and acted at Burton Pynsent in May 1772: Hayes, July 31, 1770.
Dear Papa,
From the weather we have had here I flatter myself that the sun
shone on your expedition, and that the views were enough enliven'd
thereby to prevent the drowsy Morpheus from taking the opportunity of
the heat to diffuse his poppies upon the eyes of any of the travellers
(whose names I mention not lest it should come to the ears of the
Attorney-General and he should file an information ex officio against
me). I have nothing to say of the scholar, who calls himself under my
direction, but that he goes on as well as his present master could wish,
and I think he will do me great honour. I have this instant receiv'd
the incomparable diary, which, as I cannot by any means defer answer
ing, I must beg you to permit me to curtail this letter. I therefore only
add that I most eagerly wish that the rest of your journey may prove
agreeable, that you may arrive at the end of your labours in perfect
health without the firing of any more wheels, and that your resting
places may afford what is wanted to allay an hungry appetite and con
tent desire of sleep. Lyme Regis, June 16, 1773.
Abundance of thanks to my Dear Brother for the most entertaining
of letters. I am in want both of matter and abilities to answer in the
same stile. I can tell you, however, that I am infinitely obliged for it,
and, what is worth infinitely more, Papa's annotation is inimitably
charming. I think it really hard that from a seaport I can scarce pick
up any news for a seaman. I wrote in my first that the Sherborne cutter
was here. She is so still. We were on board last night with the ladies.
The cabin would scarce hold the table I write upon. But it is on much
the same scale as its captain, who is quite of the seaman's size. We
have not navigated yet, and when I tell you some of the ladies are not
much inclined to venture, you will probably say we never shall. If the
midshipman was among us (which we much wish) he might perhaps be
able to join the two favourite objects of the profession, the ladies and
the sea, from which their type, Venus, sprung. I have only to add, I
rejoice in your acquisition of the sweet grey mare. May she, together
with fishing, disputing, etc. etc., afford every possible entertainment to
you and all with you. To them and yourself, all love.
P.S. If you are in want of employment allow me to hint nothing can
be done better than to take a copy of the play, which, I must not forget
to say (as it may encourage you in the laborious work) Mr. Hollis's

96 PITT AND NAPOLEON
goodness still kindly remembers. Mr. Wilson desires his affectionate
compliments to everybody. Pray remember me most kindly to Pam.
Hayes, August 16, 1773.
Dear Papa,
It is impossible to tell you what pleasure an expedition yester
day as far as Chev'ning afforded us all, and myself in particular; for,
our accustomed squire being absent, I had the honour of serving as
his deputy, and, mounting my Long Sutton, attended a noble cavalcade
there. James, I think, did gallantly, having rode a great way for him.
Nothing remarkable happen'd in our journey. ... It rained so hard
that we were not able to go out. However, the library afforded us good
entertainment till dinner. In the evening it cleared up and we returned
home in nearly the same manner. . . .
Burton Pynsent, December 30, 1773.
The violent rain, hail and wind which seem to be collecting their
forces to usher in the New Year have so much chill'd my pen, that it
wou'd be unreasonable to expect it shou'd convey any proportion of the
warm congratulations and wishes of a happy New Year which the heart
wou'd send to the dear colony at Lyme [Regis]. I must, however,
attempt to say something of my feelings, tho' in strains as frozen as the
congratulatory ode of a poet laureate. Of one thing, however, be assur'd,
my dear father, they are to the full as sincere, or, shou'd they fail of
expressing the sentiments of the breast, it will not be for a courtly
reason. In short every thought is employ'd in wishing you ever)' joy
and comfort with approaching 74. May it shortly compleat the work of
recovery 73 has so happily begun; if it is necessary, I will add, under
the same auspices. . . .
After entering at Pembroke Hall (now College), Cambridge,
early in October 1773, Pitt fell seriously ill and not until
December was able to return home. He stayed there for six
months, and became once more engrossed in family life. It was
therefore as a valetudinarian and a stranger to the men of his
year that he came back to Cambridge in July 1774, accom
panied by his private tutor, the Rev. Edward Wilson. Evidently
he was home-sick ; for in a letter to his sister, Hester, he re
proaches her for not sending news about the loved circle at
Hayes, every detail of which he desires to hear; as for himself,
he has nothing to chronicle. A similar tone pervades his first
letters at Cambridge; and only by degrees did he appreci
ate the charm of the place. The dulness of nearly all his letters
written there is surprising until we remember that he was a

SOME NEW LETTERS OF PITT 97
delicate boy of fourteen years, thrust into the University when
as yet he knew nothing of school-life. This error of judgement
of Chatham, and the illness and subsequent isolation, were irre
parable misfortunes to one who was soon to be prematurely and
continuously immersed in public affairs. The following new
letters to his mother in the years 1774-8 speak for themselves:
Hayes, Sunday, Feb. 5, 1774.
I am commission'd by my father to inform you of his state as to gout,
which is, that he has a good deal in both feet and threatening in both
hands. It is not yet of the most violent sort, but enough to confine him
to his bed. He received this morning a letter from Lord Camden, by
which he learns that the Debate on the Address to be brought up from
the Commons, cannot come on till Wednesday next, which, as it gives
him a day longer than he expected, affords some hope that he may be
able to attend. If he can be lifted into the House of Lords, he certainly
will be present that day, but whether even this will be possible, cannot
be guess'd till tomorrow. . . . Pembroke Hall, July 13, 1774.
The first thing I undertake in my new quarters is to discharge myself
of my promise by informing you that, after a dull and prosperous
journey, I am once more within the walls of Pembroke. We reach'd
Hockerill (?) the first night with great ease and found exceeding good
beds and more excessive bills. We breakfasted this morning at Chester-
ford, which when I was there last, was a day's journey from this place,
but is now diminish'd into a short drive, and follow'd the footsteps of
many gentlemen of the turf who were flying to Newmarket. To-day,
being sacred to the Grosvenor Sweepstakes, I fear I am too late to
obtain a place in the coach-and-four, so that I must defer being
initiated. On my arrival here, the first object that met my eyes was my
friend Dr. Glynn, who was walking by the college. He has lately been
very ill, but is got much better, and seems to be in his usual spirits. He
was extremely flatter'd by my father's compliments. I find that the
greatest part of the Fellows, as well as the master, are here. Mr. Turner
and Mr. Prettyman (sic) I have seen for a minute, and I believe they are
not going immediately. Most of the younger part of the University are
gone, but my acquaintance, Mr. Hamilton, is here still, and probably
will be some time longer. . . .
PS.... Pray have the goodness to give my love to Mrs. Sparry
and to assure her that the beds have been thoroughly air'd, and that we
found Christmas fires in the rooms. Dr. Glynn enquir'd kindly after her.
Mr. Wilson desires his best respects. H

98 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Pembroke Hall, Sept. 17, 1774.
Surrounded by all the noise and distraction that must naturally
attend a canvass for the important borough of Cambridge, I sit down
to offer the warmest thanks for your kind letter, which I had the pleasure
of receiving yesterday. The confusion of election business in such a
town as this, you will easily believe, is not favorable to letter-writing>
and indeed the influence of Bacchus has already been so copious that
we are almost stun'd with the effusions of gratitude pour'd from the
hearts of the inspir'd freemen. The candidates in opposition to the
present members, who are the causes of this jolly day, made a most
glorious entry early this morning, attended by a numerous crowd,
with colours flying, drums beating, etc., and drawn in their coach by
the hands of the inhabitants, who had sallied forth a couple of miles to
meet them for that purpose. One of the gentlemen was formerly of this
college, and, I learn, is in that innumerable list of my distant cousins,
whom I never had the pleasure to see. Pembroke Hall, May 22, 1775.
... I am as much pleased as ever with college life, and find the
University as yet pretty full. Upon the whole I feel nothing to regret
but that the communication from Cambridge is not more expeditious
that I might frequently have a flying glimpse of Hayes and an oppor
tunity of enquiring after its dear inhabitants. . . .
The next letter, to his elder brother, John (Lord Pitt), affords
curious proof of the lethargy of that youth, which was to cost
England so dear, and of the keen interest of the others in par
liamentary debates, especially in Burke's motion of 22nd March
1775 for conciliation with America, set forth in the famous
" thirteen propositions " : Hayes, March 23, 1775.
My dear Lord,
Excuse the eager impatience of the Hayes politicians, Harriot in
particular, to be informed of the result of yesterday's debate in the
House of Commons, which occasions my troubling you with this note;
and allow me to prefer a petition in the name of all the busy Speculatists
(sic) here that, if accidentally you should have quitted your pillow before
noon, and been able to procure any intelligence as to the nature and
fate of Mr. Burke's intended motion, you will be graciously pleased out
of your fraternal goodness to favour us with an early communication of
the same ; and your petitioner, as in duty bound, shall ever pray.
Signed by order of the Society,
Your ever affectionate Brother,
W. Pitt.

SOME NEW LETTERS OF PITT 99
The other letters of this period are to Lady Chatham :
Pembroke Hall, July 24, 1775.
My dear Mother,
[He is in good health and his steed is the admiration of all
Cambridge.] ... I went yesterday with Dr. Glynn to see Wimp[o]le,
my Lord Hardwicke's, which answer'd very well as an object for an
excursion, and in this country has pretensions to comparative beauty,
but would scarcely be thought worth looking at anywhere else.
There are, I believe, one or two good pictures, some moderate, and a
great many bad. . . . Burton Pynsent, Dec. 28, 1776.
... As far as we are able to discover, the farm is in a pretty good
condition. The shrubberies are most of them wonderfully grown, and
altogether, after so long an absence, the place charmed me even more
than I expected. We dine constantly with Mr. Speke, who is the same
cordial friend that he always has been. He has equipped us once for a
hunt, tho' almost in as ragged a stile as Butts himself. . . .
Pembroke Hall, April 3, 1777.
... It is not in my power to learn, much less to communicate any
thing like news, as the University is just at present very empty, and the
few that are left in it turn their attention from eastern and western revolu
tions to the cause (sic) of a member of their own body who has blended
the character of broker and usurer with that of Justice of the Peace and
Doctor of Laws. This being the case, I am left to the study of politics
of two thousand years ago; only glancing enough at modern times to
discover that Lord Pigot and the East Indies have almost supplanted in
the newspapers the Dictator and America.1
Hotel, King Street [London], Tuesday, Feb. 10, 1778.
[After expressing sorrow at the attack of gout of Lord Chatham, he
continues] :
" I had not thought of delaying my return to Cambridge, beyond to
morrow; but Lord Mahon2 tells me that there will probably be an
interesting debate tomorrow on the subject of all the campaigns of this
1 Lord Pigot, Governor of Madras, was arrested by his Council, and died
in confinement. The "Dictator" is Lord North, Prime Minister in 1770-
1782. 2 Lord Mahon (afterwards Earl Stanhope) married Pitt's elder sister,
Hester, in 1774.

ioo PITT AND NAPOLEON
war, which I shall hardly prevail upon myself to leave. After that I shall
resume my former intention. It is not necessary for me to apply to you
on the affair of money before I go; and I am always glad to pass it in
silence; but I believe soon after my arrival at Cambridge it will become
necessary. I shall not, I know, find demands to any considerable
amount, nor stand in need of anything more than a small sum for
current expenses. ... I am now going to Lincoln's Inn, which will
complete my term. As it is very near time, I am oblig'd to hurry these
confus'd sentences; and the thickest of fogs, in a dark house, is an addi
tional apology for such a scrawl. I hope however it will not make my
apology at Hayes in person. Adieu, my dear mother.
The reader will have noticed that Pitt had by this time rid
himself of the magniloquence of Chatham and had adopted the
simple and direct style natural to him. The death of his father
in May 1778 threw him on his own resources; and the struggle
to maintain himself at the Bar and thereafter in the parliament
ary arena further served to chasten and shorten his effusions. After
becoming Prime Minister in December 1 783, he wrote few private
letters. I select those which illustrate his treatment of friends or
critics, and afterwards others of a more general character. The
following letter opened his correspondence with his future friend
and admirer, the Earl of Mornington, afterwards the Marquis
Wellesley. Mornington, an Irish peer, having helped on the mea
sures of Government at Dublin, required some reward from the
Lord Lieutenant, the Duke of Rutland, and hoped for the Vice-
Treasurership of Ireland, then likely to fall vacant. The Duke's
representations at Whitehall seeming somewhat lukewarm,
Mornington wrote to Grenville to complain and to hint at the
alternative plan of leaving Ireland altogether.1 Pitt found out
from Grenville the annoyance of Mornington, and wrote the
following gracious letter, which, however disappointing for the
time, served to win the allegiance of the Earl:
Downing St., Janr. 12, 1785.
My dear Lord,
I had some time since a letter from the Duke of Rutland urging
very strongly His Grace's wish that on any vacancy of the office of Vice-
Treasurer, your Lordship might succeed to it. The circumstances of
his illness and a variety of pressing business since has delayed too long
my answer. Your Lordship will, I trust, do me the justice to believe
1 " Dropmore Papers," i, 241.

SOME NEW LETTERS OF PITT 101
that the Duke of Rutland could not have proposed any arrangement
which would give me more satisfaction if I could find it practicable.
Under the present circumstances I do not see any immediate prospect
of any such opening, and I fear if it were to take place there are neces
sarily expectations and pretensions here which could not leave me at
liberty. I could not content myself without troubling your Lordship
with this short explanation, and at the same time sincerely regret that
the present occasion does not allow me a better opportunity of marking
as strongly as I wish the regard and esteem with which, etc.
Equally tactful is the next letter, in which Pitt breaks to
Viscount Townshend the unwelcome news that the King does
not accord to him the wished-for marquisate: Putney Heath, May 16, 1785.
My Lord,
I am extremely ashamed in looking back at the date of the letter
with which your Lordship honored me, to find how long, from the
succession of a variety of business I have delayed obeying your com
mands. I have now taken an opportunity of laying before the King the
letter from the Duke of Grafton which your Lordship enclosed to me;
and I have His Majesty's commands to assure your Lordship that altho'
particular circumstances determined His Majesty to confine the late
promotion to the rank of Marquis to the two Peers who were the
immediate objects of it; yet His Majesty still retains the sense he has
before graciously expressed of your lordship's services as well as of the
merits and just pretensions of your family. Not having anything more
particular in charge from His Majesty at this moment, I have only to
add the personal satisfaction 1 should receive in any occasion of marking
the respect and regard with which, etc.
Serenity is perhaps the most prominent of Pitt's character
istics; and it appears in this letter to the Marquis of Bucking
ham, written during the complications on the Continent which
boded ill for England. In his judgement the prospect of estab
lishing a Sinking Fund for paying off annually a million sterling
of the National Debt outweighed the perils of the diplomatic
situation : Brighthelmstone, Nov. 8th, 1785.
My dear Lord,
. . . The state of our finance well justifies their rise [i.e., of the
stocks]. We may, I think, fairly reckon already upon an annual surplus
of ^800,000 per annum at least. . . The little that is wanting to make

102 PITT AND NAPOLEON
good the complete million may be had with ease, and even, I believe,
without much more of the unpopularity which is generally the effect of
productive taxes, especially in times of peace. This seems a sanguine
picture, but I think will be more than realized. The storm on the
Continent seems to have subsided for the present, but is not, I believe,
quite dispersed. . . .
The following letter to the Foreign Minister, the Marquis of
Carmarthen, shows the care of Pitt concerning the interests of
India. In September 1786 amidst delicate discussions with
France, he proposed to modify a treaty which Colonel Cathcart,
on behalf of the Government of Bengal, had signed at Mauritius
with the French plenipotentiary, de Souillac. Finding that the
French Minister, Vergennes, was far from unfriendly during the
Anglo-French commercial negotiations, Pitt urged that the
Indian convention should be re-opened by our special envoy at
Paris, William Eden, afterwards first Baron Auckland. To do
so might have imperilled the commercial treaty; but Pitt de
cided on this bold course. As Vergennes knew nothing whatever
of the disputes in the East Indies, they were adjusted in a way
highly favourable to England. Pitt wrote this letter at Wimble
don, in the house of Henry Dundas, Chairman of the India
Board. Colonel Cathcart, here mentioned, was not Colonel
Lord Cathcart, but a commoner in the service of the Indian
Government, who met his death in the year 1787 during a voyage
to Pekin for the purpose of opening up better trade relations
with China.1 Wimbledon, Saturday, Sept. 16 [1786].
My dear Lord,
On discussing the points relative to Colonel Cathcart's Treaty,
etc., it is the opinion of the India Board, in which I fully concur, that
no time should be lost in sending an intimation to the French Court
that we do not mean to hold that treaty as binding in all its details. At
the same time it seems right to use such a language as may prepare
them for a temperate and friendly discussion of the points in question.
With this view the accompanying heads of a dispatch have been pre
pared, which, if you concur in the opinion, I should wish to have for
warded by a messenger as soon as possible. I submit to you whether it
may not upon the whole be most advisable to adopt Mons'. de Vergennes'
[plan] of considering the chief object of this discussion to be awi-
' "Auckland Journals," i, 154, 156, 186-8, 201, 213, 216; '-Dropmore
Papers," i, 484.

SOME NEW LETTERS OF PITT 103
mercial. In this case the instructions ought, I think, to be addressed to
Mr. Eden : and the business may in its progress be involved in so much
detail that there will be an advantage in having it in his hands. More
formal instructions and perhaps new powers may be necessary before
we can regularly open a treaty on the subject. But in the mean time I
apprehend these general instructions will be sufficient to lay the ground
we wish. We may afterwards insist or relax on particular points, as we
see occasion. I believe, however, the negotiation may be so managed
as to give the French Court reasonable satisfaction, and yet regain much
of what has been improperly conceded by the Bengal Government.
P.S. I have sent to Fraser a letter to Eden to accompany this dis
patch if you send it.
The next note, to William Eden, bespeaks Pitt's desire to
reward his eminent services at Paris, yet with due regard for the
public exchequer: Downing Street, July 28, 1787.
Sir, As the important service in which you have been engaged in
negotiating the treaty of commerce with the Court of France is now
completed, and as you have received His Majesty's commands to hold
yourself in readiness to proceed as his ambassador to the Court of
Spain, I have His Majesty's orders to assure you in His name, previous
to your departure, that, from His gracious approbation of your services,
His Majesty is pleased to consider you entitled to a permanent provision
of the same amount as was given to Sir Joseph Yorke and the late
Lord Grantham, and that the same shall take effect at the close of your
Spanish mission, provided that you do not then accept or continue to
hold some office of profit from the Crown to the amount of such
provision. In the year 1787 the questions at issue between George III
and the Prince of Wales were complicated by the extravagance
of the latter. Having described them in Chapter XVII of
"William Pitt and National Revival," I here insert without com
ment the following " Draft of a Message from the King to the
Prince of Wales," which is in Pitt's writing and appears to have
been sent without alteration : [Endorsed, May 20, 1787.]
On examining the plan proposed under the inspection of the Prince
of Wales, arranging his expenses in the several departments, the King
observed many articles in which H[is] M[ajesty] thought there was room

i<H PITT AND NAPOLEON
for considerable reduction. But, in order to avoid as far as possible
entering into detail on the particulars of the estimate, H.M. directed
Mr. Pitt to express thro' the Prince's officers H.M.'s wish that it should
be revived through the Prince's direction. H.M. is sorry to find that
this has been declined, and that at a time when the Prince is so strongly
called upon to show his disposition to confine his expenses within the
most reasonable bounds, he adheres to an estimate in which most of
the articles are stated at a higher rate than can appear to H.M. on any
calculation to be necessary. This observation applies particularly to the
household expenses under the comptroller, the robes, and wardrobes,
the stables and the Privy Purse. A proper regulation under these heads
might, as H.M. is persuaded, enable the Prince to reduce his expenses
within his income, and also to support an establishment of officers and
servants such as is stated in his plan.
Under these circumstances, and at the time of calling upon Parlia
ment for their assistance to discharge so heavy a debt, it is impossible
for H.M. to propose any augmentation of income which shall bring
further expense on his subjects. But, as a proof of H.M.'s paternal
affection, and in order to remove any possible doubt respecting the
sufficiency of the Prince's income to support amply the dignity of his
situation, H.M. is ready, whenever the plan is settled for preventing
arrears in future, to allow ^10,000 per annum in addition to the sum
now paid to the Prince out of H.M.'s Civil List — a sum which exceeds
the difference between the salaries and allowance of the Prince's family
at present and his proposed establishment. H.M. approves of the order
of payment which the Prince proposes to establish; but, as H.M. must
in his application to Parliament pledge himself for every possible
security that new debts will not be contracted, H.M. desires that the
Prince will give a general order for the officers at the head of each
department to receive immediately at the end of each quarter the sums
respectively allotted to them, and that he will direct an abstract of the
total sums paid, authenticated by the proper officers and certifying what
arrears, if any, are outstanding, to be laid before H.M. within one
month after the expiration of every quarter. H.M. is also willing to
recommend it to Parliament to make a proper provision for compleating
Carlton House; but the charge on this head may probably be much
reduced; and it must be more explained than in the paper sent by the
Prince of Wales before any specifick sum can be named.
Pitt's cousin, the Marquis of Buckingham, a man of proud and
sensitive nature, was deeply wounded, first, by the neglect of the
King adequately to reward his services as Viceroy of Ireland,
and afterwards at the time of the Regencv Crisis of 1 -SS-o. He

SOME NEW LETTERS OF PITT 105
ardently desired the title of duke, and Pitt sought, but in vain,
to reverse the decision of the King to grant that honour to none
but members of the royal family. Pitt informed his kinsman of
the rebuff in the following letter, the first part of which was
omitted by Earl Stanhope : » Nov. 12, 1789.
My dear Lord,
It is with very sincere regret that I find myself obliged to inform
you that the King's decision has proved as unfavourable as I feared it
would from His Majesty's first answer which I conveyed to him, and
from the rooted determination which I apprehended him to have formed
on the subject. From the manner in which His Majesty expressed
himself, I certainly can entertain no hope that any further representa
tion will be like to change his opinion. It is but just to add that his not
complying with your request does not seem in any degree to proceed
from the want of a real and strong sense of the signal services which
you rendered during the late extraordinary crisis, but from the general
and, I fear, insurmountable objections which he has conceived to the
measure proposed.
I hope you will forgive my adding that the step which you meditate
in consequence is not only painful to me for a thousand reasons, both
public and personal, but is one which seems likely to produce effects
in the public impression the reverse of everything you would yourself
wish. Pitt then states that he desires an interview with the Marquis
at Stowe; and it seems to have produced the desired result. His
resolve to trust to an oral rather than a written communication
is characteristic and often accounts for the lack of startling
secrets in his correspondence. The next letter, to the Hon.
James Cornwallis, Bishop of Lichfield, illustrates Pitt's power of
dealing a crushing rebuke for some unjust imputation, the
nature of which I have not discovered. The second note to the
bishop is equally remarkable for its frank forgiveness on the
withdrawal of the imputation. Pitt's friend, the Bishop of Lin
coln, then held the sinecure Deanery of St. Paul's :
Downing Street, Sat* night, June ii, 1791.
My Lord,
On my return to town this afternoon I found your lordship's
letter. I am willing to hope that, on further consideration, and on
1 Stanhope, " Pitt," ii, 42. For the circumstances see Rose, " William Pitt
and National Revival," p. 153; "Dropmore Papers," i, 537-9-

106 PITT AND NAPOLEON
recollecting all the circumstances, there are parts of that letter which
you would yourself wish never to have written. My respect for your
lordship's situation, and my regard for Lord Cornwallis prevent my
saying more than that, until that letter is recalled, your lordship makes
any further intercourse between you and me impossible.
(Draft) Downing Street, June 12, 1791.
My Lord,
I have this morning received the honor of your lordship's letter,
dated the nth, and have great satisfaction in being enabled to dismiss
from my mind any impression occasioned by a paragraph in the former
letter which I received from you. With respect to any further arrange
ment, I can only say that I have no reason to believe that the Bishop
of Lincoln would wish to remove to Salisbury, but if he were, I should
certainly have no hesitation in recommending your lordship for the
Deanery of St. Paul's.
Pitt's sensitiveness as to bargaining in matters of patronage
drew forth the following dignified rejoinder:
[Endorsed— To Sir J. Honywood.] Downing Street, 5th October 1791.
Dear Sir,
I have just ' received your letter of yesterday, and you must
excuse me if I cannot help confessing myself surprized and hurt at its
contents. You cannot, I think, wonder that under the circumstances
of the application of the receivership I felt some difficulty in deciding,
and wished first to converse with the Duke of Dorset, who, as Lord
Lieutenant is naturally entitled to attention on such an occasion. A
sense of your support and personal regard were strong inducements to
me to endeavour, if I could make it practicable, to comply with your
wishes; and certainly the disposition to do so could in no case be
increased by intimations of the nature of those which seem to be con
veyed in your last letter. I still sincerely wish that you may not have
intended them in the sense in [sic] which they appear to me to carry,
and which, even if I had been able to come to any decision, would have
prevented me from entering further at present on the subject.
On the other hand, a frank recognition of the monetary value
of a pocket-borough, St. Mawes, in Cornwall, finds expression in
the following lines, addressed probably to its " owner," Lord
Hobart :

SOME NEW LETTERS OF PITT 107
Private. Downing Street, Nov. 5, 1791.
My dear Lord,
It was not till to-day that I have been able to find a person
whom I could propose to you to take Mr. Sanders's place on the terms
proposed at St. Mawes. The gentleman whom I have now heard of is
a Mr. Calvert, an East Indian of good fortune and character, and a
nephew of Calvert of Hertfordshire. He is ready, I understand, to go as
far as three thousand pounds, and I have no reason to think that any
unexceptionable person will be found who will give more. The name of
the place has of course not yet been mentioned to him. If you approve
of him, I think from what you said, you would be desirous that it should
be particularly explained to him that Sanders is the only person who
will be benefited by the transaction.
Pitt's rebuke to an official of the Treasury guilty of corrupt
conduct deserves to be placed on record, though I suppress his
name: Downing Street, November 28, 1793.
Sir, Some circumstances relative to you have recently come to my
knowledge, which I think it right to inform you of, in order to give you
an opportunity, if you wish it, of stating anything which you may think
can explain your conduct. I understand that in two instances you have
applied for and received pecuniary assistance from persons with whom
you had no particular connection but from their being employed on
commission business by Government, and who either were at the time
of the application, or recently had been, subject to examination and
control in your office. The gentlemen I allude to are Mr. Davison and
Mr. Maitland. I shall certainly feel it a duty to take into consideration
anything which you may wish to state on this subject, either in person
or by letter; but I think it fair to apprise you that the circumstances, as
represented to me, make me consider it as impossible that you should
any longer remain in the office of trust which you now hold.
To the Same
Downing Street, November 30, 1793.
Sir, The circumstance which Mr. Rose ' mentioned to me yesterday
by your desire, of your being prepar'd to repay the sums, which were
lent ypu by Mr. Davison and Mr. Maitland, does not appear to me
1 The Rt. Hon. George Rose was Secretary to the Treasury.

108 PITT AND NAPOLEON
material in judging of the transaction, and after reflecting fully on
everything which you stated when I saw you, I see no reason to
depart from my opinion that you cannot any longer continue in the
offices which you now hold. At the same time, from a consideration of
your services, I am desirous that you should retire in a way as little
disagreeable to yourself as possible. On this ground I do not mean
that the circumstances which have led to your quitting your situation
should be known, and I have no objection to its appearing, if you wish
it, to be at your own desire. I shall also be willing to recommend that
you should receive an allowance of ^750 per annum on yr estimate,
or in such other mode as on further consideration, shall be thought
most convenient.
The next letters are specimens of retorts equally courteous
and crushing. The former of them is to the Duke of Grafton:
Downing Street, January 14, 1794.
My Lord,
I have been honor'd with your Grace's letter in which you have
the goodness to communicate to me your sentiments on public affairs.
Being for my own part fully convinc'd that the system of measures
which have been pursued both at home and abroad is necessary for the
safety of the country and the preservation of the constitution, I have
only to express my regret at finding that my opinions are so opposite to
those which your Grace entertains.
[Endorsed — To Lord Elcho.] Downing Street, September 28, 1798.
My Lord,
I received yesterday from your Lordship a paper reminding me
that I had omitted to notice a former letter from you on the subject of
finance. Vou must give me leave to observe that in such cases the
right which your Lordship is pleased to state of being listened to will
always depend in my opinion more on the apparent merits of the
project than on the rank of the projector. I should certainly most
readily have acknowledged the zeal for the public service which dictated
your first letter, if, in the midst of other business, it had not inadver
tently escaped me; but I own that I have not the good fortune to enter
sufficiently into your ideas, as stated in either paper, to lead me to
trouble you further on the subject.
The letters of Pitt to his brother, the second Earl of Chatham,
are few in number, especially after his enforced resignation of
the Admiralty at the end of 1794. In the rearrangement of

SOME NEW LETTERS OF PITT 109
offices consequent on the accession of the Old Whigs in July
1794, Dundas relinquished to Portland the Secretaryship of
State for Home Affairs, but took the similar office for War, with
Windham as colleague. Apparently Chatham raised some ques
tion about the position of Dundas, which called forth from Pitt
this reply: Downing Street, Saturday, July 12 [1794].
My dear Brother,
. . . Dundas retains the same Seals of Secretary of State in virtue
of which he has acted ever since he has held the office. Whether there
are two Secretaries of State or three, each is equally the regular channel 1
to signify the King's pleasure whenever it may be necessary on all)
matters of State; and the distribution of Departments is only a matter '
of convenience, settled by mutual understanding, with the King's
approbation but without any formal authority. The mode of payment
cannot alter the nature of the office. It can concern no other Depart
ment whether Dundas receives a salary from the Civil List or holds an
additional office; and, besides all this, the office is the same which he
has held ever since he was Secretary of State. Under these circum
stances I really cannot conceive to my own mind where the difficulty
can arise. But if there be any, you will I am sure recollect that it
ought to have been stated sooner. . . . There is no assignable reason
why everything should not go on between Dundas in his present
Department and the Admiralty, exactly in the train in which it has done
hitherto. I am so convinced that on consideration you must see this
as I do, that I do not like to press it further, or to say anything of the
embarrassment which would otherwise arise, and which, both for my
sake and for the service, you must, I am sure, wish to avoid.
Several of Pitt's letters to the Bishop of Lincoln were pub
lished by Lord Ashbourne in his valuable work ; but the follow
ing, selected from the Pretyman Archives, are new. They refer
to the time of ill-health and anxiety spent in retirement, when
the Addington Ministry was unable to prevent the continued
aggressions of Bonaparte on neighbouring States to the detri
ment of British interests. Pitt's pledge of support to Adding
ton made his position one of great anxiety. After stating that
he had begun the Bath waters very gently and is the better for
them he announces his desire to go up to town for the opening
of the session. He then continues: Bath, November 5, 1802.
. . . The state of things is certainly full of difficulty. I had remained
in perfect ignorance (except from the newspapers) of all that was passing

no PITT AND NAPOLEON
during the summer. From what I learnt on my way hither I was very
glad to find that the line taken by our Government up to that time was
such as appears to me right, and their intention for the future, as far as
it could then be formed, seemed the same. But I know nothing of what
has been going on since that time. My own opinion is that, altho', with
out some support on the Continent, we have no sufficient inducement
to declare actual war in consequence of all Bonaparte's succession of
encroachments, yet we are called upon to take such steps for our own
security as, in his present disposition, he will never acquiesce in; and
therefore how war in the end and that probably very speedily is to be
avoided, I confess I do not see. My present intention is to make as
short a stay in Town as possible and to return hither about the begin
ning of December to stay till Pari' meets again. . . .
The next letter to Bishop Tomline belongs to the second
part of Pitt's stay at Bath in 1802, after a short break in London.
Mrs. (not Mr.) Trimmer's book advocated national education on
the system devised by Mr. Lancaster, which excluded religious
teaching of a dogmatic character: Johnstone Street, Bath, Dec. 9, [1802].
My dear Bishop,
. I read Mr. Trimmer's book on the road, and I am strongly
persuaded that Mr. Lancaster's project, if allowed to operate to any
great extent, is likely to produce great mischief, and that it is very
important to find some safe and effectual substitute. I am already much
better for my journey and shall begin the waters to-morrow.
Walmer Castle, March 18, 1803.
My dear Bishop,
[Glad that he is enjoying Lymington. He (Pitt) may possibly
take it on his way to Bath, though life at Walmer suits him as well as
Bath, unless Farquhar orders otherwise.] The time of my coming to
town remains rather uncertain and will be regulated a good deal by
what is now very difficult to guess, the result of the present discussions
with France. If they should end in war, I think I can hardly avoid
going up to attend Parliament, tho' perhaps only for a single day. If
on the other hand there is to be peace (or what will be called peace) I
may feel it equally necessary to state my opinions, at least on the
question of finance. But while the present undecided state continues I
shall probably think it best still to remain in the country for the same
reason that I have hitherto done so. Perhaps in a few days I may be
able to form a better conjecture on these points. . . .

SOME NEW LETTERS OF PITT in
So little is known of Pitt's organization of the military defence
of East Kent that the following undated letter from him to
Lieutenant-Colonel Dillon at Walmer will be read with interest.
It belongs probably to September 1804, when an invasion from
Boulogne seemed highly probable :
As the harvest is now nearly over, I imagine this would be a very
fitting time for proposing to assemble your battalion on permanent
duty; and there seems chance enough of the occasion arriving for
actual service to make it desirable that there should be as little delay
as possible. Lord Carrington has gone to Deal Castle to-day, and if
you can contrive to see him to-morrow, or next day, I shall be glad if
you will settle with him the necessary arrangements. I think the time
should not be less than ten weeks; and in that case, an extra allowance
will be made of a guinea per man, which, added to the usual pay, will
amount to 2s. per day for the whole period. This will enable us to
give the men full compensation for at least six or seven hours a day, on
an average; and will therefore allow of three or four long field days in
each week, and only short drills on the remaining days, and such
arrangements would, I think, answer every purpose. I should hope you
might fix the commencement of permanent duty for Monday fortnight,
very soon after which day I hope to come to Walmer to make some
stay. I shall be at Dover on Tuesday next for a day, but have some
business which will carry me from thence along the coast, and probably
back to town before I reach Walmer.
The following refers to the first reports of the Austrian disaster
at Ulm, which dealt Pitt's system of alliances so severe a blow.
The news was confirmed on the morrow: Downing St., Nov. 1, 1805.
My dear Bishop,
I will try to make a visit to Cambridge about Christmas if I can.
In the course of this month (if I can get away at all) I mean to go for
a short time to Bath. We are waiting with the utmost anxiety for
authentick accounts of military events on the Continent. The Reports
which have hitherto reached us are probably very exaggerated, and
possibly altogether false; and at all events, with the means that are still
in reserve, there is no reason to be discouraged. . . .
The effort of Pitt to form a national Administration, fit to
cope with Napoleon, is seen in the following lines, in which he
once again asks the support of the Right Honourable J. Foster,

112 PITT AND NAPOLEON
formerly Chancellor of the Exchequer in Ireland, and one of the
bitterest opponents of the Act of Union:
(Private.) Downing Street, June 29, 1805.
Dear Sir,
I have received with very great concern the communication con
tained in your letter of this morning and feel most anxious, both on
publick and personal grounds, that it may be still possible to induce
you to reconsider your determination. I trust at least that you will still
allow me to have the satisfaction of conversing fully with you on the
subject before I take any steps in consequence of your letter. I would
therefore beg the favour of seeing you at half-past twelve on Monday if
that time will be convenient to you, and I name that day, because I
have a particular engagement in the country to-day and am obliged to
attend His Majesty at Windsor to-morrow.
I conclude these miscellaneous letters by notes, drawn up at
or just after Christmas, 1805, to prove the falseness of the news
of an armistice said to have been concluded by Russia and
Austria after the defeat at Austerlitz on 2nd December. As I
have shown in "William Pitt and the Great War" (pp. 548-551)
the news of Austerlitz and of the armistice of 4th December
was long disbelieved. Tidings of the latter event, which was re
garded as far more serious than the defeat, did not reach London
till 29th December. The paper is probably in Pitt's hand
writing; and certainly it expresses the hopeful spirit which
animated him until 13th January 1806, when he received the
last fatal news. Canning, writing to him on 7th January, states
that his remarks on continental affairs comforted him much:
The observation which occurs in the " Argus " and its supplement is
that it contains nothing of a later date than what was transmitted by
the French Minister at Vienna dated the 6th, to La Foret at Berlin and
sent by him to Bourrienne at Hamburgh, where it was published the
13th. It arrived at Berlin on the 10th.
Would news of an Armistice which, sent round from Vienna the 6th
reached Hamburgh the 13th and Berlin the 10th, not reach Paris, when
sent directly, before the 16th?
Col. Brun, Buonaparte's aid-de-camp (sic) left Austerlitz the 3rd and
arrived at Paris the 1 ith.
The Armistice took place, if true, on the 4th. If the account of it
travelled as fast as the aid-de-camp, it would have been in Paris the 12th.
Yet it is not stated to be known and published till the 16th.

SOME NEW LETTERS OF PITT 113
An account of an Armistice is precisely an account for a telegraph.1
The account of the victory of the 2nd, which must have been sent off
the 3rd, arrived at Paris by telegraph the 10th, for it is published on the
nth. The account of the Armistice should have arrived at Paris by
telegraph on the nth.
In the " Argus " of the 17th an account from Stuttgard dated the 10th
is given, relating to the action of the 2nd. There is no allusion to an
Armistice. Two or three American merchants arrived to-day from Amsterdam,
which they left the 21st; and they state that no accounts had arrived or
been published in Holland from the armies of a later date than those
giving an account of the action of the 2nd.
1 There was a line of semaphore telegraphs between Strassburg and
Paris.

DID NAPOLEON INTEND TO INVADE
ENGLAND?
AT the outset it will be well to distinguish between two
questions, the confusion of which often obscures the issue.
They are these — " Were Napoleon's schemes of invasion practic
able?" And, "Did he believe them to be practicable?" The
former question would involve the discussion of technical topics
far too wide and complex to be treated in this essay, which deals
solely with the more personal issue just stated.
Obviously the decision depends largely on our estimate of the
character of Napoleon; but, as he was endowed both with a
daring imagination and with administrative powers of a high
order, we must watch closely the development of the great
flotilla at Boulogne and of the plans for convoying it to the
English coast, as well as the difficulties arising out of the atti
tude of the Continental Powers. The ventures of Napoleon
should be viewed in the light of his declaration to Talleyrand,
that the splendid results foreseen by an enthusiastic imagination
can be attained only by " the extremely cool, persevering and
accurate man." ' It is therefore important to notice his attitude
towards the great ventures of war. Then the chief facts relating
to the Boulogne flotilla and the French naval combinations
must be examined somewhat closely. The impressions of on
lookers and the assertions even of Napoleon himself may be set
aside as of little importance ; for the success of all such enter
prises depends mainly on deceiving the enemy. Falsehoods are
therefore as necessary as feints; and a letter designed to pass
under the eyes of an informer may render as good service as
a squadron. Therefore, only by keeping close watch upon
Napoleon's actions and the state of the flotilla and of the " Army
of England," shall we avoid pitfalls, and come near the truth.
Finally, from the nature of the case, the truth cannot be reached
1 "Napoleon Corresp.," iii, 371 (10th October 1797).
114

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 115
with certainty. It will be only that conclusion which best ex
plains all the ascertainable facts, due regard being also paid to
the character of the Emperor.
Eager activity, contempt of danger, and resolve to carry
through his purpose at all costs, figure prominently among
his characteristics. In childhood he was remarkable for a
sensitive pride which readily burst forth in passion and im
petuous attacks; witness that curious story, told to O'Meara
at St. Helena, of his behaviour when his schoolfellows teased
him for his fondness of a little girl. On such occasions he
would pick up stones or sticks, or use fists and feet against
his tormentors, however tall or numerous. A strongly developed
instinct, the warlike customs of Corsica, and his perception
during the course of the French Revolution that defence spelt
failure, bred in him the conviction that triumph comes only to
him who greatly dares. Among his first pronouncements on the
art of war is this, in the " Souper de Beaucaire " (September
1793): "He who stays in his entrenchments is beaten. Ex
perience and theory are at one on this point."
His first plans of campaign, those of July 1795, urge the
change of a tame defensive in the Maritime Alps into a swift
advance; and the deeds of the campaign of 1796-7 only embody
the thoughts sketched out in some obscure lodging in Paris.
Italy conquered, he turns to the East, and uses the resources of
the Venetian Republic along with those of Malta, for an eventual
attack on Britain's Indian Empire. He alone of the army of
Egypt is not daunted by Nelson's triumph at the Nile, but writes
on 2 ist August 1798 to Rear- Admirals Villeneuve and Decres,
urging the immediate resumption of the offensive at sea. He
reminds them that the British fleet must sail away to dispose
of its prizes, and orders them in its absence to collect all the
ships available in France and Italy and at Malta and Corfu in
order to form a squadron strong enough to support his army
in its further operations. The thought that the British will
capture some of Villeneuve's ships, the sole relics of Brueys' fleet,
and will blockade Malta, does not occur to him. Boundless con
fidence also appears in a sentence of his letter of the same date
to Kleber — " If the English continue to overrun the Mediterra
nean, they will compel us to do greater things than we intended."
Confidence is one of the first essentials for a great commander ;
and Napoleon never wrote a truer sentence than this in his letter

116 PITT AND NAPOLEON
of 30th April 1809 to Eugene Beauharnais: "In war one sees
one's own difficulties, and does not take into account those of the
enemy ; one must have confidence in oneself." Certainly Napo
leon never erred through diffidence. Nearly all his mistakes
can be traced to excess of daring, the most extraordinary in
stance of which is his plan, drawn up at Moscow, so late as 16th
October 1812, for an immediate march on St. Petersburg in
order to wring peace from the Czar.1
It is true that love of grandiose schemes grew on Napoleon
with advancing years and heightened prestige. But on many
occasions before the Moscow Campaign he carried daring to
the verge of foolhardiness. The Eastern Expedition of 1798
was undertaken in defiance of England's maritime supremacy,
won by the victories of Jervis and Duncan in the previous year;
but, because she had abandoned the Mediterranean at the close
of 1796, he left her sea-power virtually out of count. The Battle
of the Nile did not undeceive him. He looked on it as a tem
porary check soon to be retrieved, and set about the Syrian
campaign against the Turkish army advancing by land, as
though the British, Turkish and Russian fleets did not dominate
the Mediterranean. The capture of his battering-train off Mount
Carmel by Sidney Smith thwarted the efforts of the French for
the capture of Acre. But, even so, the young crusader always
asserted that his failure to win the Empire of the East was
due to " that mud-hole which came between me and my destiny."
If we may judge by his later statements, he never realized that
Britain's sea-power doomed to sterility his utmost efforts in
that quarter. His sternly objective nature saw the most ob%'ious
effects of naval supremacy; but its unseen yet potent influence,
of which Aboukir and Acre were but prominent manifestations,
never duly registered itself in his sense of causation.
On land his genius continued to exert an invariably triumph
ant activity. His victorious attacks on the tumultuary levies of
Turkey at Mount Tabor, and on the Isthmus of Aboukir, re
established his prestige. Similarly, after his return to France and
assumption of authority as First Consul, he shattered the Second
Coalition of the Powers by a daring initiative, meeting the
Austrian invasion of Provence, not by a defensive campaign on
the River Var, but by the incisive counterstroke at their com
munications on the line Coni-Alessandria-Milan. Thus, his
1 Fain, " Manuscrit de 1812,'' ii, 93.

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 117
daring moves from Toulon in 1793 to Marengo in 1800 brought
brilliant results, and led him to scorn the safe tactics of lesser
men. The events of the campaigns of 1805-7 are informed by
the same underlying conception. Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Fried-
land, are but the salient points of a strategy which aims at
attacking the enemy at the earliest possible opportunity, and of
profiting by the first slip. " March thirty miles a day, fight a
battle, and then bivouac in peace " — such is his motto. The
moves of the five days before Ratisbon (19th to 23rd April
1 809), whereby he changes Berthier's blundering defence into a
victorious advance against the Archduke Charles's exposed
flank, are among his finest conceptions; and no less remarkable
is his resolve after the serious reverse at Aspern-Essling to
maintain an offensive attitude in order to impose on a leader
whom he knows to be somewhat nervous and diffident. The
device is perfectly successful, and leads to the triumphant finale
at Wagram — the grandest instance in modern history of the
effects of an indomitable determination, which, even after defeat,
retains the initiative and compels the victor of a day to conform
to a greater will and more masterly combinations than his own.
These features of Napoleon's character are factors essential to a
due consideration of the problem before us. He who scoffed at
the word " impossible," and desired to blot it out from the French
dictionary, was no braggart, but a giant in action, whose soaring
imagination, unequalled power of work, inflexible will, and
unique success in inspiring enthusiasm, set at defiance all
precedent, and moved far onward the bounds of the possible.
The salient facts of the naval situation in the year 1803 were
as follows:— During the Peace of Amiens, 1802-3, the British
navy was reduced to a peace establishment. In October 1802
only 39 sail-of-the-line, 13 smaller ships, and 120 frigates were
in commission; but behind these were 134 sail-of-the-line, 10
smaller ships, and 97 frigates. By great exertions these numbers
were brought up respectively to 189, 37, and 197, ready for sea
in November 1803, that is six months after the renewal of
war. At its commencement France had ready for sea only 13
sail-of-the-line ; but she had many more in the second line, or
under repair, or building, so that her potential strength may be
set at 60 sail-of-the-line.1 She also counted on the support of
1 James, " Naval History," iii, 486.

n8 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Holland, which Napoleon's forceful policy had made a mere
appanage of France; but in May 1803 the Dutch navy com
prised only 21 sail-of-the-line, of which six were in the Indies,
and 4 needed repairs ; of 1 2 frigates, 7 were on distant service
and 3 were building. The naval resources of the Genoese or
Ligurian . Republic were also at the disposal of France, and
Spain was a probable ally. The impatience of the First Consul
in naval affairs is seen in his reiterated orders to press on con
struction and repairs at Brest and other ports. On 3rd June
1803 ne ordered that 20 sail-of-the-line must be ready at Brest
by 22nd November 1803. Despite hard work, Admiral Truguet
could get ready for sea only 8 sail with 8 smaller ships at that
port. Similarly, on 22nd August Napoleon ordered Ganteaume,
Maritime Prefect at Toulon, to have ready for sea in four months'
time 11 sail-of-the-line and all the frigates in the dockyard.
Even in January 1804 Ganteaume could muster only 6 sail and
4 frigates.1 In both cases Napoleon's orders corresponded to
his wishes, not to the facts of the situation.
As to the French flotilla of corvettes (prames), gun-brigs
(chaloupes canonnieres), gun-vessels (bateaux canonnieres), and
luggers (pe'niches), no trustworthy data are available. It seems
to have deteriorated so quickly during the Peace of Amiens that
few vessels were serviceable, though, in order to satisfy Napoleon,
its effective strength and numbers on paper were reckoned as
the same. At Dunkirk, out of 125 gun-vessels, only 10 were fit
to take the sea at Midsummer 1803; 64 could be ready in a
month, 25 were beyond repair. In the middle of August, when
Napoleon ordered 100 craft of the flotilla immediately to set
sail from Dunkirk, only 21 were ready, a fact which caused him
great annoyance.2 The first important order, that of 22nd August
1803, assumed that a flotilla of 2,008 sail would soon be avail
able; but this estimate far outran possibility. Great energy
was shown in naval construction, towards which several towns
and Departments contributed liberally. On 12th June Seine-
Inferieure offered to build a 74; and Seine-et-Oise, in presenting
1,200,000 francs for naval construction, added that, as the Alps
had not stopped the French arms, neither would the Straits of
Dover. A similar spirit prevailed through France, leading to
the offer of gifts of money or materials valued at about 25,000,000
Desbriere, " Projets . . . de Debarquement . . ." iii, 240-6.
' Ibid., iii, 93-95.

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 119
francs. In order to stimulate these patriotic offers, Napoleon
kept up, and even emphasized the threat of an invasion of
England, though the preparations were so inadequate as to
preclude that momentous enterprise in the year 1803. The
smaller boats might be hurried on to completion, but the new
prames and chaloupes could not be ready before the spring of
1804; and the enormous expenditure of materials and labour on
the flotilla necessarily told against the building of the sea-going
fleet, which all experienced men deemed a necessary condition
of success.
These and other difficulties were far from daunting Napoleon.
He pushed on the new basin at Boulogne, hoping for a time
that by 8th October 1803 it would be ready to receive 100
chaloupes and 800 or 900 smaller vessels. He even rejected the
advice of Admiral Bruix as to the insufficiency of the space on
the ground that more extensive works would require a longer
period. Even on the present cramped scale they were months
behind the stipulated time. On 26th August the First Consul
proposed to make up for the smallness of the existing harbour
by mooring a line of chaloupes, etc., in the outer road, a sugges
tion quite feasible for summer weather, but destined to entail
serious losses in the storms of the autumn and winter. The
attacks of British vessels also caused much damage, and could
not be prevented even with the help of forts recently constructed
on the shore and cliffs. As for the concentration at or near
Boulogne of the various parts of the flotilla constructed at the
Biscay, Channel, and Flemish ports, it was a sorry failure, which
showed the grave danger of opposing the chaloupes, etc., to the
sea-going vessels of Britain.1 In the autumn of 1803 Napoleon
cherished the belief that his flotilla could fight its way across
the straits. Later on, after the abandonment of the whole enter
prise, he informed Decres that the idea had never been in his
mind, and that his object in arming the flotilla heavily had been
to dupe the British Ministry, as he had completely succeeded in
doing.2 Clearly this is a piece of bluff. His arrangements in the
autumn of 1803 presume that the flotilla can, in case of need,
force a passage alone. He himself was the dupe of this notion,
which never was taken seriously by the British Admiralty or its
1 Ibid., iii, ch. x. At the end of January 1804 there were at Boulogne and
Etaples only 281 vessels of war.
2 " Napoleon Corresp.," xi, p. 192.

120 PITT AND NAPOLEON
naval officers. All their desire was that he should make such an
attempt. Other schemes came to take its place. During a stay of
eighteen days at Boulogne in the month of November 1803 his
letters breathe an unruffled confidence. He writes to General
Augereau at Brest, appointing him to command an expedition
which he designed against Ireland, adding that in a reasonable
time all will be ready at Boulogne to exact from England the
vengeance due during six centuries. On his return to Paris he
writes (23rd November) to Ganteaume at Toulon, stating that by
the middle of Nivdse (6th January 1804) the Boulogne flotilla
will probably number 1,300 craft, each carrying one or more
cannon, and in all 100,000 men. The Dutch fleet and flotilla
can take over 60,000 men. He adds — " Eight hours of night
favourable to us would decide the fate of the world."
In view of the actual state of the flotilla in November 1803,
which Colonel Desbriere terms " pitiable," it is difficult to take
these statements seriously. They imply two naval enterprises,
one against Ireland, the other against England, each of which
transcended the capacity of the naval resources of France.
Assuming that the squadrons of Brest, 1'Orient, and Rochefort
sufficed to protect the Irish expedition, could the fleets at
Toulon and the Texel be relied on to co-operate with sufficient
exactitude so as to convey to the English coast the French and
Batavian flotillas, supposing that these last had assembled in
full force at Boulogne and the Texel respectively? This seems
to have been Napoleon's plan in November 1803; but, as it
rested on the supposition that everything would go smoothly,
we may infer that he relied on the Boulogne flotilla in the last
resort to make its way across the straits with little protection
by large ships. Certainly the time allowed to the Toulon fleet
to come round to Boulogne was utterly inadequate. Only under
the most favourable conditions, such as favouring winds and the
absence of Nelson from his station near Toulon, could it be
expected before the spring. Indeed, the sketches sent to
Augereau and Ganteaume are so slight and so roseate in tints as
scarcely to warrant the name of plans. The mention of eight
hours as the time of crossing for a great flotilla, which, as was
notorious, could not get out of Boulogne harbour in one tide,
would alone suffice to condemn the scheme. The flotilla must
proceed as far as possible en masse, otherwise it would be de-

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 121
feated in detail by the English squadron and flotilla always held
ready to crush it. The words " eight hours of night" reveal what
was for a time Napoleon's leading conception; the passage of
the straits must be attempted only by night or in a fog. He
expressly stated that after April the enterprise was imprac
ticable, until of course the approach of autumn brought long
nights again. In the sequel he began to realize the immense
difficulty of keeping a great flotilla together during hours of
darkness or fog, especially in straits where the tide rarTst-rongly ;
but at the outset he either overlooked or ignored this important —
factor in the case. Accustomed in youth to the almost tfaeless
Mediterranean, he failed to realize the difficulties of navigation
in the English Channel. Certainly he never allowed the time
necessary for so vast an enterprise, undertaken by vessels of
various sizes, mostly keelless, and therefore certain to drift to
leeward if a wind arose.1
Napoleon's refusal or omission to recognize these difficulties,
so patent to all seamen acquainted with the Channel, has some
times been taken as proof that the scheme of invasion by the
flotilla was nothing more than an elaborate blind. In the case
of ordinary men this inference would be tenable; but Napoleon
was no ordinary man. His nature was eager and enthusiastic;
his will unbending and masterful beyond that of any man known
to authentic history; his mind, keen, incisive, capacious, found
its highest joy in essaying mighty tasks, in setting myriads of
men to work, and, as was seen in Syria and Russia, in defying
alike his enemies and the forces of Nature herself. The mere
mention of the word " impossible " provoked him to assert the
superiority of his will over any and every difficulty. Moreover,
like all strong-willed men, he was always prone to follow the
bent of his fundamental instincts, foremost among which were a
craving for certainty and a detestation of the vague and in
calculable. Where he had to deal only with men, the superb range
of his intellect, alike highly imaginative and sternly objective
1 See Admiral Montagu's report on the capture of one of them, due to this
defect (Rose, " Life of Napoleon," i, 485). Dumouriez in his plan of defence
drawn up for the British Government in 1804, scoffed at the notion of an
invasion by the flotilla alone (Rose and Broadley, "Dumouriez and the
Defence of England," ch. ix). Sir Neil Campbell at Elba noted Napoleon's
inability to allow for risks and delays on sea (" Sir N. Campbell's Journal,"
P- 339)- Wheeler and Broadley, " Napoleon and the Invasion of England,'
ii, ch. xiv.

122 PITT AND NAPOLEON
ensured almost unvarying success, until he failed to recognize
the strength of the new spirit which came over the nations. But
that same intellect played him false when he confronted the
elemental forces of nature amidst sandy deserts, by stormy and
tidal seas, or on the steppes of Russia.
Reviewing in a more general manner his scheme of the late
autumn of 1803 we may hazard the following conjectures. Un
doubtedly it answered one purpose of great moment, namely,
that of stimulating army, navy, and the whole nation to the
utmost exertion by holding out to view a glorious enterprise.
Again it may have served, in that time of activity of his spy,
Mehee de la Touche, to mislead or intimidate the British
Government;1 or, the First Consul may have looked on this
threatening display of naval activity, ruinously expensive though
it was, as necessary to secure and maintain the initiative in war,
which he held to be the chief secret of success. Perhaps all these
motives were operative ; for the threats of invasions of England
and Ireland were the most obvious means of assuring his own
prestige and the acquiescence of France in his rule, besides
condemning the Addington Government to persist in a de
moralizing defensive. On the whole, perhaps, this first scheme
may be dismissed as a feint, except in so far as it served to
quicken the energies of France, and, in part at least, to gain the
initiative even at sea, where France was at her weakest.
In one other respect the menace of invasion was serviceable.
It served to detain in home waters no small portion of the
British fleet, which otherwise could have operated in full force
against the Colonies and commerce of the enemy, as happened
after Trafalgar. True, even in the year 1803 the British fleets
were far from being wholly condemned to the defensive. In the
West Indies they delivered telling blows. St. Lucia, Tobago,
Demerara fell to the Union Jack in the first months of the war;
and elsewhere French coast towns and commerce were harried so
far effectively as, perhaps, to furnish an explanation of Napo
leon's change of plans in September 1804, which will appear in
due course. Meanwhile, until the maritime resources of France
and her allies provided him with a formidable navy, the threat
of an invasion by the flotilla, whether with or without convoy,
was almost the only means of securing the initiative in war on
' At St. Helena, after reading Mehee's work, he told Gourgaud that he
(Napoleon) had inspired it (Gourgaud "Journal," i, 560).

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 123
which the great warrior always laid so much stress. We can
therefore understand his efforts at all times to keep up the
appearance of preparing a formidable blow. But it is unsafe to
adduce as conclusive proof of his intentions the many stories of
his angry outbursts against Berthier and others who sought to
dissuade him from "leaping the ditch." In him passion was
always subject to the will ; and he had the best of reasons for
furiously repelling all attempts that would discredit vast pre
parations, the utility of which must vanish with the first sus
picion of their unreality.1
In this connection it is worth noting that on 16th November
181 1, when war with Russia was considered improbable, Napo
leon wrote to Decres urging him to keep in good repair some
500 vessels of the Boulogne flotilla. He adds that the flotilla
" will always be one of the most powerful means of influencing
England; and every time that our squadrons begin to move and
that we double or triple the flotilla, requisitioning fishermen and
sailors, and embarking artillery and stores, England will expect
a combination bringing squadrons to Boulogne, and will thence
forth be obliged to hold in reserve a great part of her sail-of-the-
line in the Thames and the Downs, and a fairly large body of
troops to cover London and her dockyards." 2
Turning from the doubtful sphere of assertion to the domain
of fact, we notice that the experience of the winter 1803-4 proved
the impossibility of a crossing by night, or even, for that matter,
by day, except in light airs. Bonaparte, arguing more as an
artilleryman than a sailor, had overloaded his vessels in respect
of cannon, crews, and cargoes, so that many alterations were
needed ; and the newer craft, being broader, were ill adapted to
propulsion by oars, to which, as will appear, he at that time largely
trusted. Therefore it may be inferred, that, whatever his words,
he abandoned all thought of invasion during the months
February-June 1804, when, moreover, political events of high im
portance detained him in Paris. Further, the Grand Army
encamped at and near Boulogne was far below its nominal
strength. The muster rolls of March 1804 showed heavy de
ficiencies, those of Ney's Corps amounting to 7,803 men against
1 See the interesting evidence in Desbriere, iii, ch. xiii, and the reports of
spies in England, and of a general who had commanded in Ireland, as to the
feasibility of invasion (ibid., iii, pp. 317-335)-
2 "Napoleon Corresp.," xxiii, p. 19. See, too, xvii, 114, 211.

124 PITT AND NAPOLEON
an effective total of 18,882. By the summer, however, the grand
total reached nearly 100,000 men.1 The concentration of the
flotilla in the harbours of Picardy continued to present great
difficulties, especially from the ports of Brittany and beyond.
Even the short coast voyages from Normandy or Flanders en
tailed frequent losses. At the end of March 1804 there were at
Boulogne and the three neighbouring ports only 462 vessels of
war and 474 small transports. Even so, the harbour at Boulogne
was overcrowded; and in rough weather it was found impos
sible to keep in the roadstead a large number of vessels. In the
middle of April 1804 a line of nearly 150 vessels of war was
formed outside; but a storm from the north-east broke it up and
compelled many of the boats to run for Etaples, while some of
those anchored off Wimereux made for Boulogne. The event
caused great discouragement among those who were responsible
for the flotilla, seeing that the storms from the west were still
more to be dreaded. The event also proved that not more than
100 vessels could regain the harbour in a single tide.2
On Napoleon, however, it made no impression, if we may
judge by his letters. True, he had had to face the royalist plot
and was now considering the addresses which begged him to
establish monarchy. He could, therefore, ill give way in his
naval projects; and on 21st April he ordered Decres, Minister
of Marine, to push on work on frigates, brigs, and the vessels of
the flotilla, adding that the maritime Departments, hitherto out
of sympathy with the Revolution, must be made to look forward
to a time when France will dominate the sea as well as the land.
Therefore, an additional sum of 2,000,000 francs a month must
be spent on ship-building. He adds — " I am in no hurry as to
the time [of action] but I ask that great preparations be made."
Before the time of proclamation of the imperial title (iSth May),
all decisive action in the Straits was out of the question ; but
apart from that, the flotilla was still very widely dispersed.
Even at the end of June 1804, there were at Boulogne and the
neighbouring ports only 610 vessels of war; So were at Dun
kirk; 182 at Ostend; 208 at Havre; and 254 were at ports
further west as far as Rochefort, no fewer than 55 being at that
port. No one who has noticed the stress laid by Napoleon on
1 Desbriere, iii, 429, 430.
a Ibid., iii, 542-5, 557-565. Up to the end of June 1S04, 9 vessels had been
taken by the British and 17 had been wrecked.

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 125
concentration of all available forces can believe that he seriously
intended invasion until a large proportion of these scattered
units was assembled ; and in view of the evidence now adduced
it is almost certain that he resolved to postpone the attempt at
invasion. It is worth noting that the grand total of vessels of
war ready at midsummer 1804, along the coast from Ostend to
Rochefort was 1,334, a number barely exceeding that which he
had stated to Ganteaume as ordered to be ready at Boulogne by
6th January 1804.1 So far had his soaring fancy risen above the
utmost possibilities of the situation.
In one respect these exertions achieved their aim. They
caused widespread apprehension in England except among ex
perienced seamen. Pitt rarely donned the flaming robe of the
alarmist; but in his speech of 15th March 1804 in Parliament
there were one or two flamboyant patches. He declared that
more than 1,000 transports had assembled at Boulogne by Dec
ember, 1803, a number more than double of that collected there
in March 1804. His further statement, that we were threatened
with invasion day by day, far exceeded the facts of the case.
Already it was known that the flotilla could not make the pas
sage during a high wind; and his own correspondence shows
that at such times he ran up from Walmer to London in full
confidence that he and his Volunteers would not be called upon
to oppose a landing. His speech shows that even a Lord Warden
of the Cinque Ports was ignorant of the state of things then ex
isting at Boulogne, which precluded all chance of an invasion for
several weeks. Nevertheless it was well to urge the Addington
Ministry to reassure the country by strengthening the flotilla of
gunboats along the threatened coast. In 1801 the Pitt Adminis
tration had formed such a flotilla; but during the present war
only twenty-three gun-vessels had been ordered. True, from 500
to 700 volunteer gun-boats were ready for service, but they were
not under the immediate control of the Admiralty, and had been
forced on it by the enthusiasm of the people. Pitt therefore called
for a national flotilla as well as for greater exertions in the con
struction of warships in private yards, it being proved that in time
of war the royal dockyards could do little but repairs ; out of
twenty-four sail-of-the-line built during the last war(i793-i8oi)
only two came from the royal yards.
As Pitt's speech was calculated to increase the prevailing
1 Desbriere, iii, 568, where the total is wrongly given as 1,144.

126 PITT AND NAPOLEON
alarm, Sir Edward Pellew (afterwards Lord Exmouth) declared
that the measures of defence were ample. They consisted in
squadrons acting along the enemy's coasts, another of heavier
ships stationed in the Downs, and a third, of light vessels, for
coast defence. His naval experience warranted the belief that
the enemy would never pierce this triple barrier. Pitt's remons
trance, however, did good in compelling the Addington Ministry
to strengthen the navy and the volunteer flotilla; but Pellew
was right in deprecating too great attention to gun-vessels. So
long as the navy could watch the French naval ports, close the
mouth of the English Channel, observe Boulogne, and muster
strongly in the Downs, there was no real danger, as the experi
ence of past wars had amply shown. Yet, so long as a large part
of the British public was in a state of nervous apprehension,
Napoleon attained one of his chief ends, that of ensuring the
" moral " superiority which a threatening attitude always con
fers. In this respect the alarmists in England played into his
hands. In the autumn of 1804 Dumouriez prophesied that, if
this state of things lasted, it would paralyse the energies of Eng
land. Pitt resolved to end " the benumbing influence of sus
pense " by striking at Napoleon in South Italy, as will soon
appear.' There was only one probable case in which Napoleon's flotilla
could hope unaided to force a landing, namely, in the event of a
protracted calm. Counting on this eventuality, he had ordered
all the vessels of the flotilla, even the prames (corvettes) to be
provided with oars, at which the sailors and troops were to
be exercised on all possible occasions. On 21st May 1804 he
issued orders to this effect, even for the Dutch flotilla, as
though the enthusiasm and strength of the Dutch would suffice
to row large vessels across the North Sea." It is highly ques
tionable whether any but the smallest vessels at Boulogne and
Wimereux could be propelled across the baffling tides of the
Straits of Dover; certainly the prames could not. But he seems
to have hoped that with sufficient practice sailors and troops
could row across most of the flotilla during a calm which would
' Rose and Broadley, " Dumouriez and the Defence of England against
Napoleon," p. 261.
2 " Napoleon Corresp.," ix, 369. For Napoleon's refusal of Fulton's ofier to
propel the flotilla by steam power see Desbriere, iii, 307-315 ; Wheeler and
Broadley, " Napoleon and the Invasion of England," i, ch. xi.

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 127
render useless for the time the British squadron in the Downs.
It was to meet this contingency that gun-vessels were needed on
the Kentish coast. Even by the month of October 1803 Pitt, as
Lord Warden, had ready as many as 170 between Margate and
Hastings; and the number was afterwards so far increased as to
leave scant hopes of success for the comparatively few light
vessels that could be rowed across from the coast of Picardy.
Calms rarely last more than two days in the Straits; and if
Napoleon continued to rely on the unlikely conjunction of neap
tides and three or four days' calm, he was imposing an altogether
unwarrantable risk on his weary crews who would meet a flotilla
of nearly equal strength on the shores of Kent. Whether he
realized this fact there is no evidence to prove. His seamen
never even essayed this feat of endurance. In fact, the British
cruisers off Boulogne prevented the constant practice with the
sweeps and oars which was the first condition of success.
The extreme danger of isolated action by the flotilla having
been amply shown in several brushes with small British cruisers
off Boulogne, Napoleon came to see that the problem of invasion
turned on the destruction, or at least the evasion, of England's
naval power. That fact had long been evident to British naval
experts ; and we may note that when Pitt came back to office in
May 1804 (a few days before the assumption of the imperial
title by Napoleon) no radical change took place in the balance
of our naval strength. Several gun-vessels were built ; but the
chief care was now, as always, bestowed on the navy. In reality
the chief burden of responsibility rested with Admirals Corn
wallis and Gardner, successively commanding the great fleet off
Brest and Ushant. So long as it held the chops of the Channel,
neither the squadrons nor the flotilla in the Biscay ports could
reach Boulogne. The confidence of the British Admiralty in the
effectiveness of their arrangements appears in the instructions
of 24th August 1804 to the Commander of the fleet observing
Brest:1 If the enemy put to sea with the whole of their fleet, without any.
considerable body of troops on board, the probability is that they mean
an attempt on some part of the coast of Britain, and that the object of
the fleet is to cover the disembarkation of some of the numerous assem
blages of troops now collected in the ports opposite to the coast of
1 "The Barham Papers," iii, 232 (Navy Records Society, 191 1).

128 PITT AND NAPOLEON
England. This seems a very desperate attempt, and is likely to terminate
in the destruction of their fleet, if they should be able, by any extra
ordinary unforeseen events, to elude your vigilance, and thereby to
make their way up the Channel; but if the existing government of
France is determined to risk everything on this long-menaced attempt
against this country, we are not at liberty to calculate solely on what is
rational or probable, but we must likewise keep in view such contin
gencies as may be barely possible, and such as passion and intemper
ance may give rise to. You are therefore hereby directed to continue to
watch the motions of the enemy with the fleet under your command as
closely as may be, consistently with the safety of the ships.
If, on the other hand, the French set sail from Brest with
many troops on board, their destination might be assumed to
be the West Indies, and a detachment equal in strength to that
of the enemy is to be sent in pursuit and, in the event of not
discovering its route, must return to the blockading fleet off
Brest. If the enemy sought to overpower the British squadrons
off Rochefort and Ferrol, the British commander is to proceed
to a rendezvous previously arranged with the Admirals of those
squadrons. Thus, no probable contingency was left out of count;
and, secure in the command of the central position at the mouth
of the English Channel, the blockaders of Brest could con
fidently await the development of Napoleon's plans.
Gradually he came to the conclusion that the crux of the
problem was not at Boulogne, but off Brest. To drive away
Cornwallis was essential even for the concentration of the French
flotilla, 181 vessels of which were in the Biscay ports at the end
of June 1804. With the aim of overpowering or driving off, the
blockaders of Brest, the Emperor concocted several plans, which
are of interest as showing his transference of the principles of
military strategy to the more complex and shifting problems of
oceanic warfare. It is impossible to describe them all. The
schemes which on 7th December 1803 he outlined to Ganteaume
were clearly tentative and faulty. They imply a speedy con
centration of the French fleets of Toulon and Rochefort without
hindrance from the blockaders, as well as the presence at
Boulogne of 130,000 men and 2,000 vessels by 20th February
1804. On 13th June 1804 he bade Decres prepare for a landing
in Jersey with 10,000 men, a plan which was not pressed, and
may be considered a false scent designed to deceive British or
royalist spies.

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 129
Far more important is that which he outlined on 25th May
1804 to Vice- Admiral Latouche-Treville commanding the fleet
at Toulon. Not being " hermetically sealed " by Nelson, Latouche
must as soon as possible evade the blockade and prepare to co
operate with Truguet's fleet so soon as it can escape from Brest.
A long and undated order to Latouche also instructs him to
make for Cadiz, pick up a French warship there, make a wide
sweep round Finisterre so as to avoid tbe British squadron off
Ferrol, chase away the blockaders of Rochefort and rally the
French squadron of six sail-of-the-line in that roadstead. Then,
avoiding the fleet of Cornwallis, Latouche will enter the English
Channel and touch at Cherbourg, with a view to a grand junc
tion at Boulogne.1 Of the same tenour, but implying that more
precise instructions have been given, is the Emperor's letter of
2nd July to Latouche, which enjoins the same general tactics.
It ends with the expression of a hope that Latouche will arrive
off Boulogne in September when the nights are long enough
and the weather calm enough to favour the grand enterprise.
To ensure its success, Napoleon will have there 120,000 men,
and 10,000 horses ready to embark on 1,800 vessels of the
flotilla. " Let us be masters of the Straits for six hours, and we
shall be masters of the world." „_
These three documents afford cumulative and almost conclu
sive proof that in May- July 1804 the Emperor resolved on the
invasion. True, he over-estimated the numbers of the flotilla
available at Boulogne in September; for the British blockade of
Havre detained there for many weeks 152 vessels on which he
had reckoned; and for the like cause many others could not
arrive. Worst of all was the situation of the flotilla in the Biscay
ports. Of the 231 vessels ready for sea at Brest and other ports
as far south as Rochefort, only 35 succeeded in reaching Cher
bourg by the first week of October 1 804.2
Nevertheless, everything seemed to promise a serious effort.
In the middle of July 1804 he set out for Boulogne and there
on the 19th received a magnificent reception. Along the
street re-named Rue Impiriale were erected twelve triumphal
arches, named after his chief victories; and further on was a
1 M. Desbriere thinks that this order is anterior to that of 25th May 1804,
which prescribes a junction with the French fleet at Brest. It seems to me
to resemble rather that of 2nd July 1805.
2 Desbriere, iv (1), pp. 49-51, 73"4- James, "Naval History," iii, p. 227.
K

i3o PITT AND NAPOLEON
portico leading to a Temple of Immortality. On reaching the
quay, an obelisk confronted him bearing an inscription which
bade him vindicate the liberty of the seas, soon to be assured
by the avenging thunderbolts flying forth from that estuary.
These incidents are of more than scenic interest. Among a
people sensitive to glory and to ridicule this ovation furnished
an additional incentive to a triumphant activity; and it is fairly
certain that during part at least of the five weeks spent on that
coast, he looked forward to a landing in Kent. He urged the
adoption of all possible measures for bringing up the flotilla
from the western ports; everywhere he encouraged the sailors
and troops to the utmost exertions; and we may not unreason
ably assign to the first part of this sojourn at or near Boulogne
the order for the construction of the famous medal showing him
as Hercules strangling a merman. The legend is as follows:
" Descente en Angleterre : frapp/e a Londres, 1804." The fact that
all possible copies of this medal were afterwards destroyed
affords additional proof that he had at one time cherished the
confident expectation of dictating terms of peace at London.
A spirit of boundless confidence pervaded his actions at that
time. On two occasions he disregarded the warnings of Admiral
Bruix. On the first he insisted on sailing past a fort north of
Wimereux, in defiance of British broadsides and a coming
squall, thereby running into a position of grave peril, from which
Bruix's disregard of the imperial orders alone rescued him. Un
taught by this incident, he soon after ordered a review of the
flotilla to be held in the roadstead in the teeth of a rising gale.
Again Bruix remonstrated, and finally refused to execute his
commands. A violent scene ensued, but Bruix refused to give
way. Rear-Admiral Magon thereupon ordered preparations for
the review, the result being the loss of some vessels and of about
two hundred men of their crews. The indignation aroused by this
insensate obstinacy was allayed by a distribution of money,1 but it
is doubtful whether the naval officers ever regained complete con
fidence in the Emperor's judgement. He continued to press on
the preparations with feverish energy. On 20th August, while
at Pont-de-Briques, near Boulogne, he ordered the two portions
of the Dutch flotilla to proceed to Dunkirk, the third portion
also making ready for a junction at Ostend. Eight days later
he heard news destructive of his hopes for September, namely,
' F. Nicolay, " Napoleon at the Boulogne Camp," ch. ix.

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 131
the death of Admiral Latouche, which occurred at Toulon on
20th August. This event caused much concern. To Decres he
submitted the names of Bruix, Villeneuve, and Rosily, as those
of possible successors. As Bruix was needed at Boulogne, and
Rosily had insufficient experience, his choice inclined towards
Villeneuve; and he ordered him to come to Paris for an inter
view concerning the grand aims to be set before the Toulon
fleet. For the present he seems to have given up all thought of an
immediate attempt at invasion, doubtless owing to the death of
Latouche and the unexpected difficulties that arose at Boulogne.
Whatever the cause, he set out for a tour to Mons, Aix-la-
Chapelle, and Mainz.1 It is also significant that for some time
past his language to the Czar carried defiance to the verge of
insolence. Because Alexander had protested to the German Diet
against the violation of its territory by the kidnapping of the
Due d'Enghien, Napoleon bade Talleyrand insert in an official
note to Russia a reference to the immorality of the Czar in
showing favour to a murderer of the Czar Paul, his father.
Russia was also to be informed that she could no more interfere
in the affairs of Europe than France in those of Persia. If
Alexander made a league with Austria against France, the
power of the latter State would become colossal ; for she had
vanquished them in the last Coalition. His attitude to Austria
was scarcely less provocative. The only monarch whom he
humoured was Frederick William III of Prussia, who, he sug
gested, should take the title of Emperor, as Francis of Austria
had done. These letters, dating from 7th August to the middle
of September, raise a doubt whether he was not even then
shaping his policy so as to have ready to hand a continental
war as an alternative to the maritime venture. His occupation
of Hanover was a dire affront to Prussia; and in the middle of
December 1803, Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris,
informed his Court that " a continental war would offer to the
general and the statesman chances far less doubtful than the
maritime enterprises against England." This was a belief widely
prevalent in continental capitals; and it must have had a place
in Napoleon's calculations, though, on the other hand, he may
have cherished the hope that Austria and Prussia were fully
1 " Napoleon Corresp.," vol. ix. Letters of 6th, 7th, 24th, 28th, 30th August,
3rd, 9th September.

132 PITT AND NAPOLEON
occupied in digesting the broad ecclesiastical domains absorbed
by them in the early part of 1803. In the case of any other man
than Napoleon the inference would be irresistible that he all
along desired to have a second string to his bow. But to his self-
confidence, boundless as his contempt for "the old Coalition
machines," the task of browbeating the two Emperors may not
have seemed incompatible with that of paralyzing Great Britain
either by an invasion or by the long nightmare of the dread of
invasion. In view of the elaborate preparations for the coronation of
2nd December 1804, little more than the appearance of activity
was now kept up at Boulogne and neighbouring ports. Thus,
while bidding Ganteaume, Truguet's successor at Brest, to terrify
the British by frequent sorties from that port, he summoned to
Paris several of his chief naval officers as well as those of the
Boulogne flotilla; and in a letter of 10th September to Decres
he stated significantly that, whereas the flotilla had been con
sidered as an expeditionary force, thenceforth it must be thought
of as "a fixed establishment."1 In view of these facts, and of
the impossibility of bringing to Boulogne the strong detach
ments held captive at Havre and further west, an air of mystery
hangs over the grandiose plans which he drew up at Mainz on
27th to 29th September 1804 for an expedition of 18,000 men
from Brest to Ireland, reinforced by 25,000 under Marmont
from Holland, while at the same time the Boulogne flotilla is
to set sail in order to force a landing in Kent. What were the
salient facts of the situation? At Brest there were in August
only 6,606 officers and men, while the " Irish legion" had sunk
to forty-eight officers and sixteen soldiers.2 Marmont's armada
must also have found immense difficulty in forcing the Straits
of Dover or in rounding the north of Scotland so as to effect
a junction with the expedition from Brest, which, moreover, had
to evade the grip of Cornwallis. And would the Boulogne
flotilla, for which Napoleon had of late ordered stringent econ
omies, be able to time its attack on Kent so as to draw the
blockading squadrons from the coasts of Holland and Brest?
Finally, did Napoleon really believe his own statement that,
1 " Napoleon Corresp.," ix, 9th 10th September; Desbriere, iv (1), pp. 168,
177- 2 Desbriere, iv (1), p. 180. On 29th September Napoleon ordered 29 gun-
brigs at Brest to be unmanned.

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 133
whichever of the two expeditions succeeded, the war would be
gained? It is not easy to fathom the thoughts of a man who
thus set at defiance the lessons of experience, treating the ocean
as a chess-board and fleets as pieces to be moved at will. We
shall not be far wrong in dismissing these schemes either as a
sign of the megalomania now beginning to distort his judge
ment, or as material for the consumption of spies and intended
to keep up the alarm in England. Or again, he may have
wished to lead the Irish refugees in France to foment a rising
in their native land, just as in 1798 he undoubtedly made use
of the Irish malcontents to further his oriental designs.
At this time, too, he formed vast colonial schemes, doubtless
with the aim of scattering the British navy over the oceans. On
29th September 1804 he issued orders to prepare expeditions
against the British West Indies, as well as Surinam, St. Do
mingo, St. Helena, Goree, and Senegal. These expeditionary
forces were to set out before that of Brest, destined for Ireland.
The latter was now to land troops in Ireland and then proceed
via the north of Scotland to the Texel, where 25,000 were to
be on board awaiting it. Naval history furnishes no more
ludicrous example of mechanical accuracy applied to complex
movements on the most uncertain of elements. For a long time
none of the squadrons could elude the grip of the blockaders,
and not until nth January 1805 did that of Rochefort succeed
in slipping out, whereupon it effected some damage in the West
Indies. For the present, then, it is probable that Napoleon gave up
all thought of an invasion by the flotilla, a scheme which British
naval officers had long declared to be impossible. Lord Mel
ville, First Lord of the Admiralty, summed up their opinions in
a letter to Pitt, dated 14th October 1804, declaring that the
embarkation of the Grand Army in the outer road at Boulogne
must take four, five, or perhaps even six tides, during which
time attacks by our cruisers would throw it into confusion. Ex
perience had shown, added Melville, that the cruisers suffered
little from the combined broadsides of the forts and the flotilla ;
and it would be well to assail the latter with fireships.1 Efforts
of this kind having failed, Pitt discouraged any further attempt ;
but it is clear that by this time only the alarmists looked on
the flotilla with fear. Perhaps it was a perception of the diminu-
1 Rose, "William Pitt and the Great War," p. 511.

134 PITT AND NAPOLEON
tion of " the terror " in England which led Napoleon to turn to
colonial enterprises.
In these he was to receive help from Spain. During several
months he had compelled that Power to pay him a subsidy and
to help in the repair of French warships at Cadiz and Ferrol.
Evidently he was working to bring about a rupture between
Spain and England, which occurred in December 1804. As,
however, the Spanish navy was in bad repair, no change took
place in the naval situation, British squadrons having for more
than six months closely watched those two ports. Napoleon
now urged Charles IV to throw all his energy into his fleet; and
the Emperor's plans of 12th to 23rd December 1804 counted
largely on the support of Spain; but they do not point to a
forthcoming invasion of the British Isles. In another scheme,
of 1 6th January 1805, he renounces the Irish expedition in
favour of one to India, and prophesies terrible things to Eng
land from the concentration of 23,000 French troops and 3,000
Spaniards at L'Isle de France (Mauritius) and Reunion. Prob
ably this scheme was no more than a bait for British spies, the
real aim being to effect a dissemination of England's naval
power over the West and East Indies, and a relaxation of its
grip on Brest and Toulon. Evidently Napoleon's former trust
in a crossing of the flotilla during a winter's night had dis
appeared, and he looked forward solely to an open attack by
day during average weather under the convoy of a fleet.
It is virtually certain that he renounced all thought of a land
ing in England during the period September 1804 to May 1805.
For the plans which he drew up on 12th and 23rd December
1804 for Villeneuve and Missiessy, commanding at Toulon and
Rochefort, prescribed the destruction of British commerce in
the West Indies, the succour of French garrisons, the uniting
of the two squadrons at Martinique, and a return to France,
without any hint of a further offensive. Apparently Napoleon
had not yet distinctly formulated the scheme of an advance in
force into the English Channel; but his note of 14th December
to Decres lays stress on the preparation of strong Spanish
squadrons at Cadiz and Ferrol, in order to join Villeneuve,
on his return, in a French port unnamed.1 This we may regard
as the germ of an idea soon to be greatly developed. But, at
1 " Napoleon Corresp.," x, 63-7, 70-2, 78-81. Villeneuve's sortie on 18th
January 1805 was a failure.

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 135
present, he laid stress on these colonial enterprises, which could
not possibly be carried out before the end of May 1805. Obvi
ously, then, the invasion was deferred to such time as the two
squadrons should return and unite with the as yet ill-prepared
squadrons of Spain. Another proof of postponement is the
neglect to take ordinary precautions for the upkeep of the har
bours of Boulogne and Ambleteuse, the result being that, on
resuming his earlier plans in March 1805, he had to allot
700,000 francs to making good defects.1
Political as well as naval reasons had contributed to this
delay. In November 1804 the seizure of Rumbold, British Am
bassador at Hamburg, for a time portended a rupture between
France and Prussia. In the following month the Czar sent one
of his confidantes, Novossiltzoff, on a mission to London, the
general aim of which became known to French agents.2 The
Emperor, desirous of sounding the situation, used a device — it
can scarcely be considered more — like that which he adopted
at Christmas 1799.3 He sent to George III a proposal for peace,
to which there came the reply that it could not be considered
until after consultation with friendly States, especially Russia.
The reply would have given pause to any other man than
Napoleon; but he cared little for Russia, provided that he re
mained on good terms with Austria and Prussia. After his
release of Rumbold in order to humour the Prussian King, the
Court of Berlin resumed its normally complaisant tone; and
Austria, though restive at French supremacy in Italy and
Switzerland, sent assurances of a peaceful character. Therefore
towards the end of February 1805 Napoleon, feeling sure of all
the Continental States but Russia, defined his naval policy more
clearly. On the 23rd he ordered Junot to proceed to Madrid
to reproach the King and Queen and her all-powerful favourite,
Godoy, with the languor displayed at the dockyards, and to
hold out the bait of Portugal, in case that little State refused
to comply with the French demands. Godoy was also to be
allured by the offer of a large present, conditional on the speedy
efficiency of the Spanish navy, which must also have ready on
1 " Napoleon Corresp.," x, 222, Napoleon to Soult, 13th March 1805.
2 Lefebvre, " Cabinets de l'Europe," ii, 33.
3 See his admission to Roederer on ist October 1800, that his negotiations
with the Emperor Francis after Marengo were only with the aim of putting
him in the wrong. Roederer, "Journal," p. 21.

1 36 PITT AND NAPOLEON
board provisions for six months and prepare to join a French
fleet.1 All this portended a great blow at England ; and when
news soon arrived that the Spanish ships were in a more forward
state than was thought to be the case,2 the Emperor drew up
his famous plan of 2nd March. In brief, it aimed at uniting the
Toulon and Brest squadrons with those of Cadiz and Ferrol,
making Martinique the rendezvous (it being believed that
Missiessy with the Rochefort squadron was there), and after
damaging British commerce to the utmost, effecting a return
to Boulogne in the month of June. Such was Napoleon's state
ment to General Lauriston, commanding the 4,000 troops on
board, which were finally to form part of the Grand Army at
and near Boulogne.3
It is difficult to believe that these vast preparations were a
mere blind ; and events challenged him to strike out boldly. At
that time there were few signs of the impending Coalition. So
long as his pretensions met with acquiescence or faint protests
from Prussia and Austria the feelings of the Czar might with
safety be neglected. The addition of the Russian navy to that
of England would make no serious difference; and if Spain,
Holland, and Italy continued to furnish ships and naval stores,
Napoleon might hope sooner or later to overbear Britain on her
own element. Obviously, two courses were open to him, either
to adopt a peaceful attitude on land and play a waiting game at
sea ; or to hurry on affairs to a decisive issue on one of those
elements, a course consonant with his pride and energy, his un
tarnished prestige and the eager hopes of a sensitive and critical
nation. Prudence counselled the former alternative; and of late,
up to the end of February 1805, signs of its adoption are clearly
visible in his correspondence, his neglect of the flotilla and har
bours of Picardy, and his pre-occupation in schemes for harrying
the colonies and commerce of the enemy. But at the beginning
of March the good news from Madrid and Vienna throws him
back upon the former alternative. It is characteristic that, while
abating not a jot of his claims in Germany and Italy, he pushes
on naval preparations apace. The Boulogne flotilla is strength
ened, and orders are given to send away the slowest vessels to
the depots, also to exercise the troops in embarking, disembark-
1 " Napoleon Corresp.," x, 161-4. See, too, the letter of 27th February to
Soult at Boulogne that vigorous operations would soon begin.
- Desbriere, iv (iii), 337-9. 3 " Napoleon Corresp.," x, 182-9.

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 137
ing, and firing. All ships of war are to be provided with carron-
ades, a weapon effectively used by the British. His aide-de
camp, Lauriston, who commands the troops on Villeneuve's
squadron, is urged to press on that Admiral and see to it that he
is not intimidated by the English.1 Both to Villeneuve and
Lauriston Napoleon declares that their present mission is far
more important than that which he had originally designed, a
sure proof that the colonial aims of the recent past had now
widened into a far grander enterprise.
Collateral evidence points towards the resumption of the plan
of invasion of England. On 14th March the Emperor orders the
expenditure of additional sums of money, 20,000,000 francs a
year if necessary, on the most important roads, namely, those
from Paris to Boulogne, Cherbourg, and Brest. The roads of a
second order are those from Paris to Turin, Toulon, and into
Spain. Those of the third order are from Paris to Strassburg
and to Cologne vid Brussels. The local roads between Etaples
and Dunkirk are also to be improved, and the Simplon road
finished in the current year. There is no mention of the roads
leading from Boulogne and Calais towards the middle Rhine.
These facts are significant in view of his care of the chief mili
tary routes, especially those likely to be used in war (witness his
despatch of Murat into Swabia to report on the roads, on 25th
August 1805). They throw doubt upon his later assertions to
the Council of State and to Metternich, that the army assembled
at Boulogne was always intended for action against Austria. If
that had been so, he would have assigned great importance to
the roads leading from Picardy into Champagne and the Rhine-
land.2 Evidently, then, he did not expect a Coalition in the near
future; and this explains the bold and masterful way in which
he traced out the course of events both by land and sea.
Only three days after giving orders concerning the chief roads
of France, he accepted the crown of the kingdom of Italy, an act
subversive of his treaty of Luneville with Austria (February
1 801). True, he wrote to the Emperor Francis, laying stress on
his reluctance to assume this heavy burden and the urgent need
of complying with the wishes of the Italians for protection so
1 " Napoleon Corresp.," x, letters of ioth to 16th March 1805.
2 It may. be urged that his expenditure on the roads to the three northern
ports, and his disregard of other roads was a blind. But I think this objec
tion too subtle, where the expenditure of 20,000,000 francs was concerned.

138 PITT AND NAPOLEON
long as Russia held Corfu, and England Malta. He even prom
ised to lay down the crown when those islands achieved their inde
pendence. To Frederick William of Prussia he wrote in the same
strain. To the Czar he sent not a word. Possibly he persuaded
himself that Austria would accept this further rebuff, aggravated
though it was by the gift of the Principality of Piombino, on the
coast of Tuscany, to his sister Elisa (18th March). But it is
difficult to follow the workings of a brain which set at defiance
the lessons of experience both in diplomacy and navigation. On
land he hoped to browbeat or cajole three great States while he
set aside a treaty and altered the balance of power. On sea he
dictated the order of events with the same confidence, as appears
in his letter, written at Malmaison on 22nd March to Laur
iston, ordering that the Toulon fleet must get away by 26th
March. Certainly time was pressing if the combined fleets, after
their voyage to the West Indies, were to appear before Boulogne
in the month of June. By good fortune Villeneuve managed to
slip away on 30th March. Ganteaume was held fast at Brest by
Cornwallis. Another misfortune for the Emperor was that Missiessy with
the Rochefort squadron had slipped away in the middle of Janu
ary, and, making sail for the West Indies, had enlightened the
British Admiralty, which might otherwise have been distracted
by the guerre de course planned by Napoleon in September. It
also disconcerted Napoleon, who saw that his plan of a great
naval concentration at Martinique would miscarry. At Lyons
on nth April he heard of Villeneuve's departure from Toulon
twelve days before, and now refashioned the whole scheme. As
suming that Ganteaume would detain Cornwallis off Brest, and
that Missiessy's expected return would hold another British
squadron off Rochefort, he ordered Villeneuve, along with two
more French ships now preparing for sea at Rochefort, to com
pass the grand object of his voyage by doubling the north of
Scotland on his return voyage and so making for Dunkirk.
There in the month of July he would rally the flotilla of the
Dutch and Flemish ports and prepare to convoy that of Bou
logne so as to avenge " the many centuries of insult." Two days
later, while still at Lyons, he again altered his scheme, appar
ently in the belief that there was great alarm in London at the
success of Missiessy's expedition and the defencelessness of the
British West Indies. Elated also by news from India, where he

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 139
believed that French officers would help the Mahrattas stoutly
to contest the British supremacy, he directed Villeneuve and
Lauriston to do all the harm possible in the West Indies, and
wait there a month from the time of the arrival of those orders,
in hope of joining Ganteaume's fleet in case it escaped from
Brest. Failing that, Villeneuve was forthwith to set sail for
Ferrol, there rally fifteen French and Spanish ships, and, releas
ing the Brest fleet, make straight for Boulogne, where all would
be in readiness for the final blow.
These constant changes of plans deserve the censure that has
been bestowed upon them.1 But they imply a fixed resolve to
effect a landing in Kent in the month of July. In full assurance,
then, the Emperor left Lyons, after a splendid reception, and
met with equal adulation at Chambdry and in Piedmont. The
journey was a political necessity, and by no means told against
the chances of the invasion, but rather tended to reassure the
enemy respecting the Channel and divert attention to the two
Indies. On 20th April, while staying at the castle of Stupingi,
near Turin, Napoleon hears with delight that Nelson is search
ing the central Mediterranean for the Toulon fleet, whence he
infers that he has gone to Egypt. All his letters written in
North Italy breathe complete confidence in the result. Eagerly
he awaits news of the sailing of the Brest and Rochefort squad
rons, he plans an expedition to Africa, and cherishes the hope
that 5,000 or 6,000 French troops, if sent to India, will over
throw the British Company. On the next day, 30th April, he
pictures Villeneuve reaching Martinique by 5th May (nine days
before the actual time) while Nelson is groping about the
Levant. In order to hold him there, he on 4th May orders a
feint to be made towards Egypt.
The long letters of these days to Decres and Villeneuve are
incompatible with the theory that he did not intend the invasion
of England. It was the one aim which energized all the schemes
emanating from that fertile brain. He imagined the British
Ministers to be gabbling panic-stricken in Parliament, and en
gaging in spasmodic efforts to save the East and West Indies.
Craig's expedition, which set sail on 16th April for Sicily and
1 Corbett, "Campaign of Trafalgar," ch. ix. French naval experts dis
couraged the notion that the French fleet blockaded at Brest could help
in a naval battle that might occur off that port between Cornwallis and
Villeneuve: but Napoleon held to it. Desbriere, iv (iii), 517.

i4o PITT AND NAPOLEON
Naples (Pitt's blow at the Napoleonic supremacy in the Mediter
ranean) appeared to him a despairing effort to prop up the
tottering fabric of the East India Company. As for the Medi
terranean, he wrote to Decres on nth May at Milan: "I am
sure the English have not a single ship there." They were
chasing French squadrons to the Cape of Good Hope, or round
Ireland. Plan follows plan in quick succession, until, on 25th May, he
convinces himself that after all the moves just described he will
have sixty-five sail-of-the-line united with every chance of suc
cess, a number which the English will never succeed in uniting.
On the next day a further calculation proves that they " will
never succeed in uniting forty sail-of-the-line." In order still
further to scatter their squadrons, he on the 29th proposes an
expedition to Ireland. Two days later, fathering his own
schemes on the enemy, he says the disorder of the English is
extreme and leads to nothing but orders and counter-orders.
On 22nd June he warns Decres that feints must be made so as
to weaken the blockaders off Brest, " which is the grand point."
If such was his concentration on naval problems, leading to
the destruction of Great Britain, how are we to account for his
annexation of the Genoese Republic on 4th June? That action
has been looked on as a sign that he secretly despaired of the
invasion project, and now took a step certain to lead to a con
tinental war, which without loss of prestige would disengage
him from the Boulogne enterprise. Much can be said in favour
of this view, which is antecedently probable and has the support
of Napoleon's later statements, whatever their worth may be.
But we must remember these facts ; that he himself explained to
the Arch-Chancellor of the Genoese Republic that he annexed
it solely in order to gain full command of its naval resources;
further, that his ingrained doggedness led him to carry through
to the end every cherished enterprise, even in the teeth of the
most formidable obstacles; while also he felt strongly that Italy
was his own land, on which he could work his will in complete
disregard of the barbarians north of the Alps; finally, that his
voluminous correspondence of May -June 1805 shows no expecta
tion of serious opposition to his last infraction of the Treaty
of Luneville by the other signatory, Austria. That Power
had of late acquiesced in so many fails accomplis, that, appar
ently, he believed she would make no more than a formal

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 141
protest. In these months he scarcely mentions her; and, what
is more significant, he makes no preparations for a land cam
paign. The order to improve the road from Chambery to the
Mont Cenis is the only one which bears on a possible cam
paign in Italy; * and not until 5th July does he give any order
for the strengthening of her fortresses. As for Russia, she is
referred to only once, and in very slighting terms, namely, in
his letter of 9th May to the King of Prussia. He there states
that he will not accept the mediation of the Czar Alexander
with a view to peace between France and England; for the
character of that potentate is feeble and uncertain, and France
no more owes an explanation to Russia on the affairs of Italy
than the Czar does to him on those of Turkey and Persia. He,
Napoleon, loves peace, and has no ambition; but he cannot see
his people disinherited from the world's commerce. Apparently,
then, he recked little of Russia's opposition and expected none
from Austria, so long as he had the friendship of Frederick
William of Prussia, which he seeks to assure by polite assur
ances. On 27th July, after his return to St. Cloud, he writes to
Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, making light of the rumours of hos
tilities from Austria. " What Austria is doing is probably from
fear." But, on 31st July, he hears ominous news from Italy, and
urges Talleyrand to soothe Austria. On 3rd August, while at
Boulogne, he informs Talleyrand that Austria is undoubtedly
arming ; she must therefore be warned that such conduct favours
England, against whom the French armies are embattled, from
Holland to Brest; the Emperor is at Boulogne, intent on his
maritime enterprises.
As is well known, the annexation of Genoa led Russia and
Austria to form plans for the speedy opening of the campaign ;
but there is every sign that their resolve took Napoleon by sur
prise. Up to the 3rd August, his correspondence shows him to
be bent on the concentration of the flotilla at Boulogne and the
three neighbouring ports, which was for the most part success
fully accomplished.2 There are two facts which tell against the
theory that he resolved to attempt the invasion ; namely, that
early in August 1805, the effective strength of the Grand Army
at and near Boulogne was only 93,000 men and 2,700 horses,
1 " Napoleon Corresp.," x, 331.
2 Desbriere, iv (iii), ch. iv. In all there were 1,928 vessels at those ports,
223 at Calais, 157 at Dunkirk, 35 at Ostend.

142 PITT AND NAPOLEON
whereas the flotilla and transports could carry as many as
1 5 1,940 men and 9,632 horses ; also that the order of 7th August
for the Imperial Guard to set out from Paris to Boulogne was
countermanded on the following day. These facts are held by
M. Desbriere to warrant the doubt whether Napoleon had of
late seriously intended the invasion of England. But it must be
remembered that 23,000 troops were held in readiness at Calais
and Dunkirk ; also that the roads between Paris and Boulogne,
and that port and neighbouring places, had been so much im
proved as to admit of a quick concentration of troops; further,
that a change had clearly come over Napoleon's plans on
31st July and early in August, the letter above cited proving
undoubtedly that he now began to prepare a heavy blow at
Austria.1 The shrinkage in the number of troops at Boulogne
and the countermanding of the march of the Guard support this
explanation ; and it may be taken as certain that from the first
days of August Napoleon began " to make his plans in two
ways." If Austria dissociated herself from Russia, peace would
last on the Continent, and he would still press on with the
Boulogne project. If not, the troops he had withdrawn from the
coast, and the Guard at Paris, would form the nucleus of an
army able speedily to act against the Hapsburgs. The words in
his letter of 4th August to Decres — " If we are masters of the
Straits for twelve hours, England is no more " — were probably
merely a device for keeping up activity in naval circles until he
foresaw more clearly the issue of events on land.
The days (22nd, 23rd August) were days of anxious specula
tion at the imperial headquarters at Boulogne. On the former
Napoleon heard that Villeneuve's fleet, after putting in to Ferrol
to refit, had set out again. He believed him to be making for
Brest, and therefore, to all appearance, framed once more the
desperate resolve of forcing a landing in Kent, if Villeneuve and
Ganteaume appeared in the offing. On that day he sent off six
letters to Decres, two to Ganteaume, and one to Villeneuve, all
inspired by that thought. But on the morrow he heard for the
first time of the arrival of a British expedition of 6,000 men at
1 " Napoleon Corresp.," xi, letters of 31st July and 3rd August. The letter
of 31st July to Talleyrand is the first that shows signs of alarm at Austria's
preparations. On 4th August he hears that 20 British sail-of-the-line are in
the Mediterranean, and this makes him anxious for the French troops in the
Kingdom of Naples. See too " Napoleon Corresp.," Nos. 91 17, 91 18.

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 143
Malta and coupled with it the significant fact of the demand of
the Court of Naples for the withdrawal of the French Army of
Occupation. He took these facts and the presence of a Russian
force at Corfu to imply a design of the Allies for wresting from
him the command of the Mediterranean, which he regarded as a
French lake. This offensive move of the British filled him with
astonishment, for he had believed them to be tied to a tame and
ineffective defensive.1 The imminence of a formidable Coalition
between Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Naples was now
patent; and on that day he resolved to send his favourite aide-
de-camp, Duroc, a persona grata at Berlin, to induce that Court
by the offer of Hanover to join France and redress the balance
in Central Europe. Duroc's mission can scarcely be regarded as
proof that Napoleon confidently expected to secure peace on
the Continent ; for the character of Frederick William of Prussia
was so passive and vacillating as to give little hope of speedy
and drastic action such as would intimidate Austria and Russia.
Moreover, Napoleon's letter of the same day to Talleyrand
shows that his chief aim now was to gain fifteen days on
Austria. On 28th August, in his letter to General Dejean, he
says that after a few battles he may return to Boulogne.2
This gain of time the warlike preparations on the coast of
Picardy secured, with results finally fatal to Mack's army at Ulm.
But there is no definite sign that the thought of using these
preparations as a blind entered his head before the early part of
August. While keeping up the fiction that he was awaiting the
arrival of Villeneuve off Boulogne he made alternative plans for
a campaign against Austria. On 24th August he instructed
Talleyrand to demand that she should keep only eight regiments
in her Venetian province and only one in Tyrol, demands with
which no self-respecting Power could comply. His instructions
of the same day to Duroc show that he would henceforth decline
either to guarantee the independence of Holland and Switzer
land, or to renounce the Italian crown, stipulations of the Treaty
of Luneville on which Austria had the right to insist. It is
certain, therefore, that by 24th August, if not earlier, he had
resolved on settling his quarrel with Austria. On the 25th he
ordered Murat to proceed at once from Paris to Mainz and
1 See Mr. Julian Corbett's " Campaign of Trafalgar," chs. xviii and xix on
this masterly move of Pitt.
2 "Napoleon Corresp.," xi, pp. 118, 152.

144 P!TT AND NAPOLEON
Wiirzburg and survey the roads leading to the Upper Danube
at Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Ratisbon. This is the first sign of
Napoleon's special interest in those roads, which would cer
tainly have been surveyed had Napoleon all along intended his
vast preparations on the coast of Picardy to mask his design of
a sudden blow at Austria. On 13th September, after his return
to St. Cloud, he gave out that this was an alternative aim which
he had always kept in view. The facts of the case and his
earlier correspondence alike refute this contention, which ob
viously was designed to exhibit his infallibility and the folly of
Villeneuve.1 It is worth noting that on that very day he first
heard that the Austrians had crossed the River Inn and invaded
Bavaria, a fact which disposes of the melodramatic story, that,
while still at Boulogne, he broke out into furious exclamations
against the imbecility and cowardice of Villeneuve, and then,
while still heaving with passion, dictated to Daru the arrange
ments as to provisions and depots, which provided for the daily
marches of the Grand Army from Boulogne to Ulm and even
beyond. The results of our inquiry may be thus summed up:
(1) The instincts and convictions of Napoleon always urged
him to take the offensive, and to seek to retain it by all possible
means, because, even if it did not assure success (as had nearly
always been the case hitherto), it conferred the moral advan
tage which a bold attitude gains over a tame defensive.
(2) The risks of an invasion of England were not much
greater than those which he ran in 1798-9, in virtually ignoring
her maritime supremacy. He believed that a single victory
would bring him to London, whereupon risings in Ireland, Scot
land, and even of English democrats, would compel Great
Britain to a peace.2
(3) At first the only means of attacking England, and thereby
securing the initiative in war, was by strengthening the flotilla,
in the hope of attempting an invasion, with or without the help
of French and allied warships. Even the threat of such an
1 "Napoleon Corresp.," ch. xi, 193 (13th September 1805).
2 See his words to Major Vivian, quoted later ; also " Napoleon's last
Voyages," pp. 90-8 (edit, of 1906). Thiers in 1854 told N. Senior that, if
Napoleon had landed in England, he could have marched anywhere ; but he
termed Napoleon's Egyptian Expedition rash beyond anything recorded in
history. (N. Senior, "Conversations with Thiers, etc.," i, 198, 251.)

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 145
event would be likely to iparalyse her action elsewhere, and
thereby to some extent screen the French Colonies from the full
pressure of her naval power.
(4) These reasons and the temper of the French, which is
better suited to attack than defence, justified in his eyes the
enormous expenditure and efforts on the flotilla and harbours,
which moreover tended to rally all Frenchmen to his rule.
(5) It is practically certain that in the autumn and winter of
1803-4, m July- August 1804, and in March-July 1805, he was
determined to attempt the invasion. In March-June 1804 he
desisted from the scheme owing to preoccupation in home
affairs and the inadequacy of the naval preparations. In the
months September 1804- February 1805 the harrying of British
Colonies and commerce held the first place in his thoughts ; but
thereafter the pacific assurances of Austria and the forward state
of the Spanish navy led him to evolve scheme after scheme for
assuring the command of the Channel, which for a time he
believed could become a permanent maritime ascendency.
(6) The chances of Villeneuve appearing off Boulogne late in
July or early in August 1805 were fairly good. Certainly Napo
leon believed them to be so; and, had the fleet appeared, the
Emperor must have attempted the invasion under pain of en
countering a storm of ridicule.
(7) There is no sign, apart from hearsays and his own biassed
assertions of a later date, that he believed his aggressive policy
in North Italy likely to entail war. From 2nd March to 31st
July 1805 he resolved on the invasion of England, in the belief
that the occupation of London and an Irish revolt would bring
about a collapse of British power. Thenceforth he faced the
alternative of war with Austria, and on and after 24th August
decisively chose that alternative.
(8) His later assertions and those of Meneval, Bourrienne, and
others on the subject of the projected invasion are valueless in
comparison with the contemporary evidence at first hand, which
has here been passed in review.1
(9) The fact that nearly all naval authorities pronounced his
1 For the secondary evidence, see "Meneval Mems.," i, 406-13; the
" Fouche Mems.," p. 196 (Eng. edit.); also Wheeler and Broadley, " Napo
leon and the Invasion of England," vol. i, ch. x ; also Napoleon's inter
esting conversations with Admiral Ussher, " Napoleon's Last Voyages " (edit.
of 1906), pp. 88-90, 139-142. L

146 PITT AND NAPOLEON
naval schemes impracticable and highly dangerous,1 by no
means proves that he did not seriously intend to carry them
out; for his character and his sense of the value of prestige bade
him press them on until an alternative course of action pre
sented itself. As we have seen this opportunity occurred in
August 1 805 ; and he strove thereafter to represent the ensuing
war with Austria as brought about solely by British gold, and
therefore the counterpart to his scheme of the invasion of
England. 1 See on 176 of this volume, proof that the officers of the French
Imperial Guard at Elba considered the invasion of England as likely, or
certain, to end in disaster.

THE TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF
TRAFALGAR1
NOW that the jubilation aroused by the centenary of Nel
son's great triumph has subsided, it may be well to inquire
what results accrued from the Battle of Trafalgar.
Perhaps in the case of few victories has the outcome been so
different from that which has been assigned to it in the popular
belief. The reason for this confusion of thought is not hard to
discover. The years 1803-1805 had been to our countrymen
years of " the great fear." Their thoughts turned, with tense
expectation, towards the coasts of Kent and Picardy. On the
cliffs at and near Boulogne, an army of well-nigh 120,000
veterans was encamped, led by the greatest warrior of the age,
and by captains of almost equal prowess. A huge flotilla rode
in the harbours of Etaples, Boulogne, Ambleteuse, Calais, and
thence as far as Flushing, in readiness to transport this formid
able host to the coasts of Kent or Essex, as soon as a convoy
ing fleet should appear. On the British coasts, numbers and
enthusiasm were by no means lacking. But where was the
organization, where were the leaders, that could victoriously
oppose the Grand Army led by Napoleon and his Marshals?
Few persons shared the confidence that possessed Wordsworth
during his unusually bellicose mood in the autumn of 1803.
Nor discipline nor valour can withstand
The shock, nor quell the inevitable rout,
When in some great extremity breaks out
A people, on their own beloved land
Risen, like one man, to combat in the sight
Of a just God for liberty and right.
The dearth of organizing power and military talent at home
(Sir Arthur Wellesley did not return from India until the sum
mer of 1805) caused grave searchings of heart ; and most patriots
1 From "The Independent Review," November 1905.
H7

148 PITT AND NAPOLEON
sympathized secretly with Wordsworth when, in a more subdued
mood, he gazed from the Dover valley back on France, and
saw —
— the coast of France how near !
Drawn almost into frightful neighbourhood.
At last, in the autumn of 1805, these fears died down; and
then came the news of Trafalgar. What more natural than to
connect the new sense of security that supervened, after the first
painful shock at the news of the death of Nelson had passed
away, with his last exploit? The impression that England's safety
from invasion resulted from the Battle of Trafalgar, was strength
ened when men came to read the last despatches and letters
of the hero. Everything bore eloquent witness to his determina
tion to force on a battle as decisively as possible. The evidence
which Mr. Newbolt has brought together in his work, " The Year
of Trafalgar," serves to illustrate anew the eagerness evinced by
Nelson to close with the enemy in the shortest possible time,
wholly regardless of the terrible risks in which his tactics must
involve the leading ships of both of his attacking columns.
Everything impelled him to strike with the utmost vigour. The
weary months of waiting off Toulon, the consciousness of failing
strength, the many irritations of that long baffling chase after
Villeneuve to the West Indies and back, would alone have led
him to seek to annihilate his elusive antagonists.
But there was another consideration, which has never received
due notice. Nelson, so far as we can judge from his despatches,
believed, up to the very end, that England was still in danger of
invasion from the Grand Army and its flotilla at Boulogne, pro
vided that a convoying fleet could reach that all-important
point. The evidence on this topic is not conclusive; but it is
fairly strong. First, it must be remembered that Napoleon
remained at Boulogne until 2nd September 1805, and that, while
superintending the movements of the mass of his troops away
from that town towards the Rhine in order to confront the
legions of Austria, he took all possible precautions to prevent
the new plan from becoming known to the British cruisers in the
offing. His decree of 30th August ordered that the flat-bottomed
boats which were at Etaples, Wimereux, and Ambleteuse,
should sail to Boulogne as soon as possible, and that Admiral
Lacrosse at Boulogne should seize every opportunity to attack
the British and keep them far off. This concentration of the

TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRAFALGAR 149
flotilla and these harrying tactics must have led our seamen
for several days to suppose that the great move against the
coast of Kent was about to be made. They knew not the where
abouts of Villeneuve, and therefore kept up all the old precau
tions. The result was, that the departure of the bulk of the
Grand Army from Boulogne, which actually began before 31st
August, was not known in England for many days ; and (this is
the important point) Nelson and his captains seem to have had
no knowledge of it when they went into battle at Trafalgar. In
these days of telegraphs, this may seem incredible. But the
marvel disappears if we remember that Nelson hoisted his flag
on the " Victory " at Portsmouth on 14th September, and sailed
from St. Helen's Roads on the next day. It is certain that, at
that time, no news of the departure of the Emperor and of most
of his army for the interior of France could have reached Ports
mouth. There is not a word in Nelson's letters, or in the account
of his interviews with Ministers in London, that reveals any per
ception of the real facts of the case. All that was known with
certainty was, that Villeneuve had arrived at Cadiz, on 18th
August. That piece of news was brought very quickly to Lon
don by Captain Blackwood of H.M.S. " Euryalus," on 2nd Sept
ember; and it led to the request for Nelson's services once
more. Thus, while affairs on land were as deceptive as a mirage, the
naval situation was fairly clear. The great fleet which, with that
of Ganteaume at Brest, menaced the safety of Britain, was for
the present unable to get through to Boulogne. Its objective
might be that port, or it might be the Mediterranean. Ministers
had to face the possibility of the latter alternative, with the
prospect of a long and complicated pursuit, in case Villeneuve
evaded Collingwood's blockading squadron and reached that
sea. But there was also the possibility that the retreat to Cadiz was
a feint, and that, at the first opportunity, the great fleet would
seek to resume its original mission and convoy the flotilla across.
Nelson kept an open mind on the subject. On the one hand,
there was the chance that the Emperor would adhere to his
plans with his wonted tenacity, and would not leave Boulogne
without doing something to justify his conduct in spending vast
sums of money on the ships, boats, and harbours along that
coast. As far as Nelson knew, there was nothing to tempt

150 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Napoleon away from Boulogne. On 30th September, when off
Cadiz, he wrote a letter to Sir John Acton, expressing the hope
that " both Austria and Russia have begun " the war against
Napoleon. But this was mere conjecture; and, short of that
event, scarcely anything would be likely to divert Napoleon
from his plan of invading England. In another letter of the same
date, Nelson wrote sarcastically about a small British force
destined for Naples " doing good to the common cause " ; but he
also stated that he had scarcely discussed anything but naval
matters with Ministers in London. He evidently hoped that the
Anglo-Russian expedition, then at or near Naples, would pro
tect that coast, but was concerned to hear of three French sail-
of-the-line, with as many cruisers, being ready for sea at Toulon.
This portended trouble for the allied expedition at Naples ; and
he begged the Admiralty for more ships, above all more frigates,
which he might use in the Mediterranean.
Once again, however, his thoughts swung round to the safety
of England. " Some day or other," he wrote, on 8th October,
" that Buonaparte, if he lives, will attempt the invasion and con
quest of Great Britain." But obviously he believed that the
safety of his native land rested with the fleet then watching
Cadiz, and that a crushing blow dealt to Villeneuve might com
pel the Emperor to make peace. " We can, my dear Coll[ing-
wood] have no little jealousies " he wrote on the 9th. " We have
only one great object in view, that of annihilating our Enemies,
and getting a glorious Peace for our Country."
The secret orders from the British Admiralty, dated 21st
September, which reached him on 8th October, threw little light
on the perplexities of the general situation. The Admiralty en
joined on Nelson the need of covering the operations of the
British expedition at Naples, when the blockade of Cadiz was
provided for. In his reply of 10th October, Nelson pointed out
the virtual impossibility of complying with the new instructions,
until Villeneuve should be disposed of. Amidst the distracting
gloom that surrounded him, one thing alone was clear, that the
allied fleets then in Cadiz must be not merely conquered, but
annihilated. So far as we can judge from his letters and con
versations, this was all that Nelson knew of the actual state of
European affairs when he went into battle, determined to " give
them such a shaking as they (the enemy) never yet experienced.
At least I will lay down my life in the attempt."

TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRAFALGAR 151
It is pathetic to turn from the twilight of Nelson's beliefs and
surmises, to events as they then unfolded themselves. They
were such as to vitiate every hope that peace would be the
speedy outcome of his triumph. Judging from the very imperfect
information at his command, he was justified in indulging that
hope. But even before he left "dear dear Merton," on 13th
September, events had occurred which altered the whole trend
of history. A few days previously, the Austrian army under
General Mack entered Bavaria, with the aim of compelling the
Elector to join the Austro-Russian alliance and declare against
Napoleon. The French Emperor, long aware of the storm
gathering in the east, left Boulogne on 2nd September, to be
ready to profit by any imprudence that the Hapsburgs might
commit; and when Nelson was journeying across the Surrey
hills to Portsmouth, Napoleon was drawing up the first draft of
plans at St. Cloud which led up to the brilliant triumph at Ulm
on i9-20th October.
A comparison of Napoleon's despatches with those of Nelson
at the same time is of high interest. While the admiral believed
that the solution of the European problem lay in his hands,
Napoleon, having the advantage of a far wider and more accurate
survey of events, saw that the whole interest had suddenly
shifted from the sea to the land. Sea-power, for the present, he
held in small account. Everything depended on his ability to
defeat the new Coalition. Whereas, before the days (24-30th
August) of his momentous decision to turn against Austria and
Russia, nine out of ten of his despatches turned on matters con
nected with the hoped-for invasion of England ; thenceforth, on
the contrary, naval affairs fell away into the background. True,
in his letter of 28th August to General Dejean he stated that
after a few battles there may be peace, whereupon he will
return to Boulogne. Further, in his Note of 13th September
to Decres, Minister of Marine, he ordered the maintenance
of a large naval and military force at Boulogne and neigh
bouring ports ; but, obviously, he valued the presence of 60,000
troops there, mainly because it would help to keep up the
state of alarm in England, prevent her from effectively aiding
her allies on land, and furnish an excuse for maintaining an
army in the utmost efficiency within easy stages of the Rhine.
He admitted that Villeneuve's retreat to Cadiz had unmasked
his supposed secret (which the British Admiralty had already

152 PITT AND NAPOLEON
divined) that the flotilla was not meant to cross the Channel
without a powerful convoy; and thenceforth it was to do
little more than threaten Albion until he could resume his
naval plans. As for Villeneuve, he was to use every effort
to get out from Cadiz with the allied fleets and set sail for
Carthagena, there to pick up eight Spanish sail-of-the-line.
It is worth noting that, in these instructions of 14th September
to an admittedly unlucky admiral, the Emperor did not once
face the contingency that British ships might be in the way.
The optimism, which pervaded all his geometrical calculations
for the most uncertain of elements, here again appears in most
instructive guise.
But what was to be Villeneuve's objective? The Emperor
directs him to make at once for Naples, there to help a French
army under General St. Cyr to capture, or drive away, the Anglo-
Russian expedition. That is now the Emperor's aim. The coast
of Kent has faded from his thoughts ; and he turns to a smaller
but still very desirable object, the capture of a hostile force in
Naples, and the complete subjection of that kingdom. On
17th September, he decides to replace Villeneuve by Rosily, but
always with the same objective — Naples, not London. As for the
other French squadrons, they are to adopt privateering tactics.
In a long despatch of that same date he directs the Minister of
Marine to organize four cruising squadrons. One powerful
squadron is to scour the seas between St. Helena and the Cape
of Good Hope, in order to sweep up British East Indiamen,
and thereafter re-fit at Martinique for a similar purpose around
Barbadoes. Another is to proceed to San Domingo and Jamaica
with the same aim. A third and far smaller squadron will
" ravage all the coast of Africa." Finally, two frigates will act
in the same way around Ireland, and then pick up prizes between
Cape Clear and San Domingo. The Emperor concludes with the
suggestive remark : " English commerce is everywhere. We must
try to be at as many points as possible, in order to harm it."
Now, what do these details imply? They imply that, between
24th August and 17th September, Napoleon had entirely changed
his plans. Formerly, his aim had been concentration on the all-
important points, Boulogne and the Straits of Dover. After
Villeneuve's " treason '' in retiring to Cadiz, the Emperor's aim
is entirely the opposite. Now it is dispersion, with a view to a
war against British commerce. What brought about this volte-

TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRAFALGAR 153
face} Undoubtedly the outbreak of war on the Continent.
Nelson, as we have seen, had discerned the importance of the
diversion which such an event might produce. But, even up to
the time of his death, he knew nothing as to its actual occur
rence, and the consequent change in the French plans. Happily
for him, he believed that his victory might " bring Buonaparte
on to his marrow-bones;"1 and no news came to trouble his
mind in his last hours with doubts as to the crowning efficacy
of his last great stroke.
What significance, then, are we to assign to Trafalgar? Clearly
it was very different from that which British officers and the
British public assigned to it. They could not assess its import
ance accurately, because they were ignorant of the intentions of
Napoleon, and of many of the facts of the situation. We have
now seen, from the Emperor's own despatches, that it was the
outbreak of war with Austria and Russia, along with Villeneuve's
tame retreat to Cadiz, which gave England a time of respite,
while her great foe betook himself to guerilla tactics on sea. The
Austrian army at Ulm acted, so to speak, as the lightning con
ductor for England, diverting the stroke which was to have
fallen on her. At present, she really had to fear nothing more
than a succession of pin-pricks at many points of her Empire;
and we may here observe that such a guerre de course would have
been very effective, had Napoleon been content with letting
Villeneuve remain at Cadiz and hold Nelson to that port during
the winter storms of 1805 -1806. Nelson would certainly have
clung to his task with the same indomitable resolve that marked
his twenty months' blockade of Toulon in 1803- 1805; and, with
another British force held to Brest, the French naval guerilla
might have been most galling. Napoleon, in fact, had the game
in his own hands on sea and on land, had he been content to
wait until winter had done its work on the blockaders. But he
marred his chances by his impatience. His bitter reproaches to
Villeneuve, and his appointment of Rosily as his successor, drove
the doomed fleets out of Cadiz. The consequences are well
known. Out of thirty-three French and Spanish ships that left
that harbour, only eleven returned after the battle. Four escaped
to the north, only to be captured off Cape Ortegal by a British
squadron of the same strength (4th November). Rosily took
over the five French ships that remained in Cadiz, but had to
1 Nelson's despatch of 6th October 1805.

154 PITT AND NAPOLEON
surrender to the Spanish patriots in June 1808, when Spain rose
against Napoleon.
The brilliance of the triumph must not, however, blind us to
the fact that, at the time, it made very little difference to
Napoleon's plans, and to the course of the war in Europe. Far
from being "beaten to his marrow-bones," the Emperor made
light of " ce combat de Cadiz," when he heard of it at Znaim in
Moravia (18th November). There was some reason for this
haughty attitude. After capturing some 60,000 Austrians at
and near Ulm (1 8th to 20th October), he could treat any
disaster at sea as of secondary importance. Until Russia and
Austria were overthrown, he could not in any case resume the
Boulogne enterprise; and, meanwhile, the duties which he
assigned to his navy were to chastise the Neapolitan Bourbons
and harry British commerce on the high seas. Having these
merely secondary objects in view, he might well regard Ville
neuve's defeat as a regrettable but by no means serious incident.
At that time he heard only the first details of the affair; and,
with characteristic tenacity, he directed his Minister of Marine
to push on all the cruising operations, just as if the battle had
not occurred. Of course, the French demonstration against
Naples fell through; but that was the sole immediate change
which the battle made in Napoleon's naval plans.
Probably the battle also enabled the British Admiralty to push
on with greater vigour the pursuit of the French squadrons de
signed for the destruction of our commerce. It is doubtful
whether Sir John Duckworth could otherwise have procured a
force sufficient to free the West Indies from the depredations of
the force commanded by Leissegues. As it was, Duckworth was
able to annihilate Leissegues' squadron in a brilliant engagement
off San Domingo (6th February 1806). The other French
squadron, detailed for service between St. Helena and the Cape
ought to have fallen in with the British force which effected the
conquest of Cape Town early in the year 1806. It did not, how
ever, sight that convoy, either on the outward or the homeward
voyage. Finally it sailed away to the West Indies and North
America, where its strength was shattered by a terrible storm.
The two smaller French squadrons also effected nothing of note.
Apart, then, from Duckworth's brilliant triumph at San Domingo,
the failure of the French naval guerilla seems to be traceable to
chance rather than to the results of Trafalgar. This considera-

TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRAFALGAR 155
tion, however, must not blind us to the immense advantages
conferred by the command of the sea, in the reduction succes
sively of the French and Dutch colonies in and after 1806.
It is also important to note the slow but irresistible pressure
exerted by the Sea-Power upon the Land-Power after Trafalgar.
Though the French Emperor rated its consequences but lightly
at the time, he was, nevertheless, compelled henceforth to
systematize his warfare against British commerce. So far back
as the month of February 1798, he gave it as his judgement that
France had only three ways of beating down the might of
England; (1) by a direct attack on London; (2) by depriving
her of the outlets of her trade with the Continent on the north
west of Germany; or (3) by an Eastern expedition, which would
ruin her trade with India. To the last of these alternatives he
bent all his energies during his Egyptian expedition of 1798-99.
The first plan engaged most of his energies, from the renewal of
war with England in May 1803 up to the close of August 1805.
Baffled in his efforts to strike at our heart, he then, as we have
seen by his instructions of the middle of September 1805 (as
also in those of 2yth-2gt\\ September 1804), proposed to make
war on British commerce by sea. The result of the battles of
Ulm, Trafalgar, and Austerlitz, now revived his earlier plan of
warring against it by land. Already he had designed what he
called his " coast system " for the exclusion of British goods
from Hanover and the North-Sea ports of Germany. Henceforth
he used all the resources of war and diplomacy, hermetically to
seal up the Continent against the islanders.
There is a very suggestive passage in Napoleon's letter of
14th December 1805, to Talleyrand, instructing him to protract
negotiations with the Hapsburgs, cast down as they were by
the disaster of Austerlitz twelve days previously, until he had
arranged matters with Prussia: "When I am sure of Prussia,
Austria will do exactly what I want of her. Likewise I will
make Prussia declare against England." On Prussia, then, he
concentrated all the resources of his diplomacy (Austria being
almost une quantite" ndgligeable), obviously because Prussia con
trolled the north-west and north coasts of Germany. To her he
offered fatally alluring terms, but only on condition that she
entirely excluded British goods from her new acquisition,
Hanover. Struggle as it might, the Court of Berlin could not
evade this stringent obligation, which entailed war with Great

156 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Britain, the blockade of the North-Sea coast by our cruisers, and
the Berlin Decree of November 1806. Usually we date the
definite commencement of Napoleon's Continental System from
that coup de thMtre dealt from Berlin, excluding British com
merce from the Continent. In reality, we ought to date it from
the time of Napoleon's interviews with Prussia's envoy at Schon-
brunn, soon after the staggering blow dealt to the third Coalition
at Austerlitz. The fatal gift of Hanover, which that envoy and,
later on, his master, accepted, implied the extension of Napoleon's
anti-British system to the whole of North Germany. Are we not
justified in believing that this momentous decision on the part
of the French Emperor was due to later and fuller news of
Trafalgar? Therefore, while that victory had singularly little influence on
the situation at Boulogne, Dover, and other French and British
ports; while its immediate effects may be limited to Mediter
ranean affairs and to the energetic pursuit of the French
squadrons told off for the harrying of British commerce; never
theless, its ultimate results in the sphere of European policy
were incalculably great. The Emperor was brought by stress of
circumstances, rather than by mere ambition, as we islanders
usually assert, to seek to conquer Britain on the Continent; and
his eager activity led him to adopt measure after measure — Berlin
Decree, Milan Decree, Treaty of Tilsit, occupation of Portugal,
Fontainebleau Decree and other measures of the year 1810,
Russian Expedition of 18 12 — which promised in turn to over
whelm England under the mass of Europe, but really buried
Napoleon himself under the ruins of his Continental System. In
this sense, then, Nelson's prophecy was finally fulfilled. By slow
degrees, and in ways that the great seaman could not have fore
seen, England's mighty enemy was brought to his knees; but
only after nine years of fruitless toil, which Trafalgar im
posed on him as the sole remaining method of attacking his
elusive foe.

GENERAL MARBOT AND HIS MEMOIRS.1
FORTUNE full often plays tricks with reputations. Her
wheel raises aloft the fame of many a man who, in his
lifetime, was comparatively little known, and depresses that of
celebrities who once enjoyed world-wide renown. In art, litera
ture, and politics, the caprices of the giddy jade have strangely
reversed the confident predictions of contemporaries, but per
haps her freaks have nowhere been more surprising than in the
sphere of war. To limit ourselves to the Napoleonic period,
which we now have in view, who could have believed that
Augereau, the leader of the " fighting division " of the army of
Italy, who, according to Bonaparte's own admission, " saved
France at Castiglione," who had himself strapped to his horse at
Eylau so that illness might not keep him from the fierce delight
of leading his corps against the Russians on that snowy waste —
» that Augereau would lose his hold on the thoughts of French
men and have no statue erected to his memory? What little is
known of tfyat burly Marshal, the most eager fighter and most
expert swordsman of France, comes through the Memoirs of his
young aide-de-camp, Marbot, a name rarely heard until near the
close of those great days of France. At least, that is the source
of the knowledge of ordinary people about the swaggering
Marshal and a score of his compeers. It is safe to say that
readers of Marbot's fascinating pages have there picked up as
many lifelike details about the paladins of Napoleon as they
would from reams of biographical articles and whole chapters of
scientific military works. The well-known words of Horace re
specting the power of the inspired bard to rescue the fame of
heroes from the long night of oblivion may almost hold good for
Marbot. He has made many an exploit live for us; he has lit
up the characters of men who would otherwise be mere names ;
and there is an attractive quality in his work which promises to
1 From the " Cornhill Magazine," July 1906.
157

158 PITT AND NAPOLEON
give it an abiding hold on all who admire a spirited narrative of
scenes of the camp and the field.
The question of the genuineness of the Marbot Memoirs has
sometimes been disputed, but probably on insufficient grounds.
The external evidence tells in their favour. They were well
known to several prominent Frenchmen long before the date of
publication. The Comte de Paris is known to have perused
them while in manuscript form ; and the Nouvelle Dictionnaire
de Biographie Universelle (edition of i860) refers to them as
being comparatively well known at that time, some thirty years
before publication. Marbot died at Paris in 1854. He seems to
have been rather unpopular with leading persons in the Orleanist
time (1830- 1 848); and readers of the high-flying passages in his
Memoirs will understand why; but he was enough of a public
character to have his doings and writings noticed with some pre
cision ; and this lends weight to the external evidence in favour
of the genuineness of the Memoirs which bear his name. We may
pronounce it to be satisfactory, if not altogether convincing.
But the chief test of the genuineness of writings lies, after all,
in the internal evidence: that is, in the correspondence of the
narrative with the actions, conduct, and characteristics of the
person who claims to be the author. In very few cases can the
external evidence set all doubts at rest. In order to trace the
life-history of a manuscript, we need a great number of minute
details respecting the dates of composition of its several parts
and the care taken by those who were responsible for its pre
servation. These are very rarely forthcoming in such a way
as to satisfy the sceptic, and, as a rule, he will trust to his
own independent knowledge respecting the facts set forth,
and to his perception of the agreement which the manuscript
throughout exhibits with the known peculiarities of the reputed
writer. Now, as regards the personal flavour, if I may use the term,
the Memoirs decidedly smack of Marbot. The boyish, rambling,
but high-spirited recital of the earlier parts is evidently the out
pouring of the fertile mind of a very youthful officer, who thinks
well of the world in general, still better of France, and best of
all of himself. The note of egotism sounds persistently through
every page of the Memoirs. At first it is a sharply staccato note.
Everything is going well with Marbot and the French army in
the best of all possible worlds, that of the first decade of the nine-

MARBOT AND HIS MEMOIRS 159
teenth century. He has a good word for nearly everyone — with
one prominent exception soon to be noted. Generals like
Augereau and Massena, who soon lost their early popularity,
figure well in his pages, and many of the earlier episodes, if
touched up by a skilled hand, would almost challenge com
parison with certain passages in the " Three Musketeers." But
in and after 1812 the style loses its exuberance: we notice the
growth of a certain bitterness of tone which, while it detracts
from the pleasure of reading, serves indirectly to confirm the
genuineness of the narrative as a whole. To sum up this part of
our inquiry, we may say that the personality revealed in the
Memoirs agrees with the personality of Marbot.
When we approach the question of the correctness of the
Memoirs, we come on to very different ground. Sometimes it is
assumed that, if memoirs can be proved to be untrue to fact,
therefore they may be, or even must be, spurious. This is by no
means the case. Persons who hold this opinion would seem to
base their reasoning on the assumption that correctness is the
characteristic of French memoirs. Nothing could be further
from the truth. Their characteristic is incorrectness — open,
obvious, almost ostentatious embroidering on the plain pattern
of real life. No very long time need be spent in comparing the
statements of French memoirs with ascertained facts in order
to convince historical students of the general truth of this
assertion. Memoir writers were not at all concerned with ad
vancing the cause of historical investigation. Fortunately for
their readers, they lived in pre-scientific days. Their aim was to
put together entertaining narratives for their families and friends;
and the first requisite of success was to exhibit the writer in
picturesque situations, or, in default of those, to show how he
held the fate of nations in his hands during some tortuous
intrigue. We must further remember that the French are
essentially an artistic people ; and to such a race, as to the
ancient Greeks, the one unpardonable crime was dulness and
baldness in narration. To artists possessed of creative power
the temptation to touch up, adorn, and illuminate is irresistible.
Hence comes the charm of French memoirs. Speaking gener
ally, we may venture to assert of all memoirs that their attrac
tiveness is in inverse proportion to their correctness ; and, when
the captious critic groans over some exaggeration or mis-state
ment more startling than usual, let him seek consolation in the

160 PITT AND NAPOLEON
reflection that, if the memoirs are not true to fact, they are at
least true to character.
From all that we can glean about the life and character of
Marbot, his Memoirs may find shelter under this last most com
prehensive formula. Either fortune showered on him as a youth
the most astounding favours by thrusting him forward at the
very time when, and to the very place where, great events were
occurring; or else the fickle goddess came in the guise of
memory and enabled him in his old age to view those far-off
events through the blissful mirage of romance. Which of these
explanations is correct it is not always easy to say. But cer
tainly the Memoirs show us Marbot as always participating in
the most dramatic and exciting incidents. His luck in this
respect eclipsed that even of the veriest fire-eaters of the sen
sational romance. As a child, his fondness for mimicking cats
led him to thrust his head through the cat-door, and get it fixed,
until the alarmed parents had recourse to bodily force and the
lancet. At the siege of Genoa he was present when an English
bombshell fell among his group and exploded — fortunately
harming no one. By way of revenge the French gunners planted
a shell in the middle of a British brig, which forthwith sank with
all hands ; an episode suspiciously like that which is thought to
have happened off Boulogne some four years later.
Even more remarkable are Marbot's rides with despatches.
Take, for instance, his crossing over the Spliigen Pass in order
to carry news from Massena in Italy to Augereau's corps in
the Breisgau (1805). On his journey into Italy by that same
route, he had accomplished the feat on horseback, at a time when
the pass " was almost impracticable." But on the return that
wonderful horse was not available, for it froze hard ; " horses fell
at every step"; the two guides, to whom he had paid the sum
of 600 francs, refused to go on ; and it was only Marbot's energy
and his appeal to their loyalty which made the little party
struggle on to the inn at the foot of the northern slopes. Un
fortunately, Marbot overdoes the description; for he states that
if night had overtaken them on the mountain, they must all have
perished. But did not the guides realize that same indubitable
fact? Events of the same doubtful description occur in nearly all of
Marbot's great rides ; so that one is constantly reminded of the
fact that he hailed from the district of Quercy, which is not far

MARBOT AND HIS MEMOIRS 161
from the borders of Gascony. At the end of his ride from
Madrid to Bayonne, when he bore the news of the suppression
of the heroic rising of the men of Madrid on 2nd May 1808, he
was privileged to hear not only the confidential remarks of
Napoleon himself, but even to overhear Charles IV of Spain and
his Queen taunt their son (the de facto King of Spain, Fer
dinand VII) with being the real instigator of that revolt and
the author of all the troubles in the Peninsula. Certainly this
aide-de-camp had marvellously good fortune. Napoleon called
Massena " the spoilt child of Victory." In similar phraseology
we may dub Marbot the pet of Mercury, whether as news-
hearer, news-bearer, or news-teller.
In the incidents just noticed we have had to use common
sense as guide; and that sage counsellor perforce pronounces
each of those cases " not proven." But sometimes Marbot ven
tures beyond the comparatively safe domain of personal adven
ture, and essays to describe historical events. It may be well to
examine his account of a few events on which we now have
exact information.
The first is that strange and little-known episode, " The Plot
of the Placards " of the year 1 802. M. Augustin-Thierry has
recently thrown a flood of light on that conspiracy by investi
gating the police archives of the French Government.1 Availing
ourselves of his guidance, we can now trace the course of that
military intrigue. It originated in a knot of discontented officers
of the " Army of the West," the force which had long been en
gaged in the thankless yet most dangerous task of curbing or
hunting down the royalist bands of Brittany. (We note in pass
ing that the number of the " Army of the West " was 1 5,000, and
that Marbot gives it as 80,000.) Yet, for all their hardships, the
" blues " of Brittany earned not a word of praise from the First
Consul. With rags and arrears of pay as their lot, they fell to
grumbling against Napoleon; they charged him with running
away from his army in Egypt; with coquetting openly with the
Pope — it was the time of the " Concordat " ( 1 802) — with pre
ferring the trimmers and ci-devant nobles of Paris to the men
who had saved the cause of the Republic in the fanatically
royalist West. By way of retort the First Consul ordered off
battalion after battalion of these grognards to St. Domingo,
1 " The Plot of the Placards," translated by A. G. Chater.
M

162 PITT AND NAPOLEON
despite the desertion of the men and the protests of their com
mander, Bernadotte. This diplomatic chief managed to keep the
most discontented body, the 82nd half-brigade, at Rennes, the
capital of Brittany, and with the officers there and at other large
military centres he seems to have concerted means for arranging
some movement in the army which might lead up to a demon
stration, or even a conspiracy, against the First Consul. Berna-
dotte's share in the affair is obscure, and probably will remain
so ; for he had the tact to proceed to Paris at the time when the
preparations neared completion, and left the decisive steps to
be taken by subordinates at Rennes. M. Augustin-Thierry,
however, gives reasons, far different from those advanced by
Marbot, for suspecting him. Probably Moreau, a Breton by
birth but a staunch Republican by conviction, sympathized with
the aims of the malcontents, and would have joined them
had all gone well.
But all did not go well. The subordinates at Rennes were not
the men to carry through a plot to a successful issue. Their first
task was to see to the printing of a great number of placards in
viting the French soldiery to throw off the yoke of the First
Consul. The work was done so clumsily that a prominent defect
in one of the capital letters led to the arrest and ruin of the un
lucky printer; but the disclosure of the scheme was due mainly
to the faintheartedness of a young subaltern, Auguste Rapatel,
who was to have sent off by post a large batch of these placards
from Paris. Imprudently he confided the secret to his mistress,
a girl named Felicie, who, being in an interesting condition,
stormed at him as doubly a traitor, and finally persuaded him
to make a confession of the whole affair. The revelations made
by other accessories to the plot, General Simon and the printer
Chausseblanche, soon demolished the flimsy structure. The sub
ordinates were severely punished ; the 82nd was sent off promptly
to that hotbed of yellow fever, St. Domingo; but Bernadotte
and Moreau went scot free, apparently because the power of the
latter and the marriage of the former with the sister-in-law of
Joseph Bonaparte made it undesirable to push inquiries too far.
Such is the conclusion of M. Augustin-Thierry, as well as of
other French historians, MM. Welschinger and Guillon.
Now, the narrative given by Marbot of this whole affair is un
usually full ; it abounds in striking scenes, and it aims at impli
cating Bernadotte. But nearly every important fact is either

MARBOT AND HIS MEMOIRS 163
mis-stated or passed over in silence. Marbot's spite against
Bernadotte is such that he accuses him of having cruelly made a
tool of Adolphe Marbot, aide-de-camp of that general, and elder
brother of the writer ; whereas Bernadotte can be proved to be
innocent on that count. Further, the Memoirs contain not a
word about Rapatel and his mistress, or the printer Chausse-
blanche ; the parts assigned to Simon and others are strangely
distorted, and the account of the collapse of the effort of the 82nd
at Rennes is ascribed to the fact that its colonel had forgotten to
shave, and, on going back to his room in order to carry out that
operation, had his sword promptly seized by a loyal officer and
gendarmes. So glaring are the inaccuracies in Marbot's account
that M. Augustin-Thierry, who has now pieced together the
puzzle in an altogether scholarly and convincing way, seeks, in
an Appendix, to prove the spuriousness of the Memoirs. To
this I must demur. The plot was an underground affair, in
which the subordinates, Adolphe Marbot included, knew only
what concerned them and them alone. Adolphe Marbot seems
to have misrepresented even that part of the affair which con
cerned him and Bernadotte; but he doubtless added various
details which the younger brother then proceeded to garnish
in the manner to which we are accustomed in all parts of his
racy narrative. The incident of the colonel's shaving is quite
Marbotesque. Let us now follow our author to the field of Austerlitz. There
in his description of the battle he evidently drew largely on the
account of those very historians the complexity and haziness of
whose narratives he himself decried. We find the traditional
story of the battle, and need not refer to any episode except the
dramatic finale, when the Austro-Russian left wing was " en
gulfed " in the Lake of Satschan. The ice, we read, was very
thick, and some five or six thousand men of the retreating host
had gained the middle of the lake in safety, when Napoleon
ordered the artillery of his Guard to fire at the ice. We may
now quote Marbot's words: "The ice broke at countless points,
and a mighty cracking was heard. The water, oozing through
the fissures, soon covered the floes, and we saw thousands of
Russians, with their horses, guns, and wagons, slowly settle
down into the depths. It was a horribly majestic spectacle
which I shall never forget. In an instant the surface of the lake
was covered with everything that could swim." Very majestic!

1 64 PITT AND NAPOLEON
though the effect is somewhat marred, at least for the critical
reader, by the statement that the guns and wagons settled down
slowly into the depths apparently some time after the surface
was covered with swimmers.
But let that pass, as a little incongruity resulting from
Marbot's fatal fondness for adverbial phrases. The description
of the battle is at an end, so we think. But no; Marbot remem
bers a final incident in which he played no insignificant part.
On the next day a " poor Russian non-commissioned officer "
was observed about a hundred yards away from the bank by
Napoleon and his Staff. Various clumsy efforts were made to
reach him, until it occurred to Marbot that he would strip him
self naked and swim to the floe to which the wounded man had
clung all the night. A lieutenant followed his example, and by
means of incredible exertions they brought the poor fellow
ashore on the floe, which by the end of the time was " quite
insufficient to bear his weight."
How far Marbot's account of this incident and of the catas
trophe on the ice deserves to be credited may be judged by
reference to the following facts. It has now been ascertained
from the report of the "fischmeister" who was ordered after the
battle to dredge the lake, that thirty cannon, 150 corpses of
horses, but only three human corpses were found.1 Further,
the fact that they were all found in marshy corners of the lake,
over which the fugitives had evidently tried to rush during the
rout, entirely disposes of the majestic spectacle described by
Marbot. Finally, we can account for the concoction of this
spectacular narrative. Marbot here followed the hint first given
in Napoleon's bulletin as to the terrible sensation caused by the
cries of the drowning Russians as dusk settled on the field of
Austerlitz. Where the master pointed the way several memoir-
writers pressed on with loyal eagerness. Segur and Lejeune,
among others, rushed in; but Marbot far outstripped them all
in the audacity of his invention.
As for the story of the wounded Russian brought to land on
that crumbling ice-floe, it might have passed muster had not the
writer described the incident as occurring in presence of the
Emperor. We know that Napoleon on 3rd December 1805, had
far more important matters on hand, in garnering the fruits of
victory, than to have time to spare for the superintendence of
1 " Napoleonic Studies," by J. H. Rose, pp. 383-4.

MARBOT AND HIS MEMOIRS 165
the rescue of marooned Russian officers. Marbot's vanity here
led him to crown the story by adding a detail which enables the
critical reader to demolish the picturesque little edifice.
It is impossible to follow Marbot's gasconnades in detail through
these charming pages. Two other examples of his methods of
handling facts must suffice. All students of the Peninsular War
remember the pride and presumption with which Massena in
1 8 10 made a frontal attack on Wellington's almost impregnable
position at Busaco. Marbot in his own account figures as the
would-be saviour of the French army from that mad attempt-
He describes the trick by which he spoke, within earshot of the
Marshal, of the possibility of turning the British position by the
flank march which ultimately had the desired effect. Massena —
says the writer — seemed to be convinced by those remarks, but
afterwards unaccountably recurred to the original design, with
results that were disastrous to France. The incident is plausibly
told, and cannot altogether be controverted ; but we know that
the news of the existence of the pass on Wellington's flank was
brought in by a peasant. The manner of its bringing and
further details have recently been disclosed in the Memoirs of
General Marquis d'Hautpoul, whose account serves to substanti
ate the accredited narrative, and therefore to discredit that of
Marbot. The account of this episode by Marbot is all the more
surprising when we remember that at many points he based his
narrative on that of Napier. Among several cases which migh
be cited we may notice the similarity of his account of an
episode in the Battle of Fuentes d'Ofioro to that of our great
historian of the Peninsular War. Napier, in describing the
interval that occurred in the middle of that extraordinary melee,
when Montbrun's cavalry was held at bay only by the firm
demeanour of Craufurd's Light Division, writes: "The vast
plain was covered with commissariat animals and camp-fol
lowers ... all in such confused concourse that the Light
Division squares appeared but as specks." With this compare
Marbot's words, describing the same tumult in the allied ranks:
" In the midst of it the three squares just formed by Craufurd's
infantry appeared as mere specks (points)." Indeed, it is clear
that Marbot took his account of the whole battle almost bodily
from Napier. Sometimes he imitated that historian in the
manner of his narrative while altering the matter in a sense
congenial to French predilections. An example of this occurs

166 PITT AND NAPOLEON
in his summary of the results of Massena's campaign in Portugal,
which gives a total loss to the French army of only 10,000 men;
while Napier's estimates, framed on far more trustworthy data,
imply a loss three times as great.
The note of egotism is nowhere more prominent than in
Marbot's description of the Battle of Waterloo. He was stationed
on the French right wing, which sought to hold back the Prussian
advance in the afternoon and evening; and in a letter written in
the year 1830 he claims credit for having sent news to the
Emperor's head- quarters that the column, which appeared some
distance away to the right of that wing, was a Prussian column.
He also ventures to state that he received a reply to the effect
that the force in question could only be that of Grouchy sent in
pursuit of the Prussians on 17th June, and that, if any Prussians
were thereabouts, they could only be stragglers flying before
Grouchy's advance. Marbot then states that he had to obey his
previous orders and press on as far as possible in the direction
of Wavre. Now, no despatch such as Marbot refers to was issued
from the French headquarters; also we know that about 1.30
p.m. on the day of the battle Napoleon was altogether in doubt
whether a force that began to appear some distance away on the
French right was that of Grouchy or Bliicher. Finally it is
certain that no French regiment pressed on far towards Wavre,
as Marbot leads us to suppose his did. Some squadrons of
cavalry scouted in that direction, but his account is wholly in
consistent with the known facts, and only furnishes another
example of his incurable vanity in trying always to pose as the
hero of every incident and the potential saviour of the French
army from disaster.
The conclusion of our brief inquiry would appear, then, to be
as follows : that while Marbot's Memoirs may probably be re
garded as genuine, yet they are of very little value as a contribu
tion to the history of that epoch. They are vitiated by the per
sistent efforts of the writer to represent himself as the chief
figure in events where he was little more than an insignificant
accessory. But, after all, we do not go to Marbot's Memoirs for
facts ; and if we view them in their proper relation — namely, as
illustrations of the stirring scenes of that epopfe of France — we
shall find them of no slight value, as they certainly are of enthrall
ing interest.

AN INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLEON IN ELBA
[The following account by Major I. H. Vivian of the interview with
Napoleon in Elba has long been out of print. A few copies were struck
off in 1839 for private circulation, and from one of these the following
account is printed. Mr. Vivian's companion was Mr. Wildman. They
arrived from Leghorn on 22nd January 181 5, and through Count Ber-
trand gained permission to visit Napoleon four days later. They travelled
over Elba and were courteously entertained by Count and Countess
Bertrand. The latter complained of the miserable accommodation in
Elba. The narrative acquires additional interest from having been
shown, while in manuscript, by Vivian's brother, Major-General Vivian, to
certain of the British Ministers in London, shortly before receipt of the
news of Napoleon's escape. His expressed opinion, that some day
England would lose Canada, probably accounts for their anxiety to
prevent his escape to the United States. After a short description of
Elba and of the house of the Bertrands, the narrative proceeds as
follows. The notes are by Major Vivian, except those bearing my
initials. — J. H. R.]
THE evening of the 26th [January] being appointed for our
presentation to the Emperor, we attired ourselves in our local
Militia uniform, and having taken coffee with Count Bertrand,
at a little after eight o'clock we proceeded from his apartments
to the Imperial residence, amidst a flood of rain. From the
entrance, which was situated in the left wing, we passed into an
ante-chamber containing two windows, and the walls of which
were hung with a number of good prints. Here we remained
whilst the Count went to announce our arrival, and we were
shortly after ushered into the presence of Napoleon, without any
form or ceremony whatever. We found him standing by the
fire, at the further end of a room adjoining the ante-chamber,
and into which he had come, on being informed of our arrival.
This room was about the size of that we had left, and was fitted
up with old yellow furniture, brought, as we understood, from
the palace of his sister, at Piombino. On our entrance, he ad
vanced towards us, and we took our station with our backs
against a table that stood between the windows. Whilst he was
advancing he began the conversation : 1
1 The notes of this conversation were written immediately after it had
taken place, and, therefore, their accuracy may be entirely relied on. Where
167

1 68 PITT AND NAPOLEON
"Quel uniforme est celui que vous portez? " — "Celui de la
Milice." " De quel comte? " — " De Cornouailles."
" C'est un pays bien montagneux? " — " Oui, assez."
" De quelle hauteur sont les montagnes, comme celles-ci?" —
" Elles sont plus hautes, d'une forme differente, et moins
isolees." " Sont-elles aussi hautes que celles de la Principaut£ de Galles?"
— " Pas tout-a-fait."
" Combien de toises de hauteur ont-elles; 6 a 800 toises?" —
" Elles ne sont pas si hautes ; peut-etre de 3 a 400 toises."
" Quelle est la capitale de Cornouailles? " — " Truro est une des
villes principales."
" Comment! Truro, tout pres de Falmouth?"
"Combien de temps par an etiez-vous assembles?" — " Un
mois chaque ann6e."
" Qui vous payoit, — le Gouvernement? " — " Oui, le Gouverne-
ment nous payoit, mais le Prince Regent nous habilloit."
" Quel rang avez-vous — Colonel? " — " Non — Major."
"Ah! Major." — "Nous sommes la Milice des Mineurs de
Cornouailles." "Ah! il y a des mines d'etain dans ce pays-la?" — "Oui, et
aussi de cuivre."
" Le Prince Regent a-t-il des droits sur les mines?" — "Oui,
sur l'etain, mais non pas sur le cuivre."
"Combien regoit-il par an de ces droits?" — "Deneufadix
mille livres sterling."
Then turning to my friend, Mr. Wildman, he said:
" Et vous?" — " Je suis aussi de la Milice."
" De quel comte?"—" De Kent."
" Ah! nous etions voisins."
He then addressed himself to me, and asked respecting the
route I had taken, and when I had left England? — I replied
that I had left England nearly twelve months before ; that I had
passed by Paris and Bordeaux, to Toulouse, in order to visit a
brother, a General Officer, who had been severely wounded there.
He made no remark upon this, but observed —
" Then you passed by the Garonne and Montauban ; a very
pretty little town, with excellent wine. — You drink a good deal
in England." — ( Vous buvez beaucoup en Angleterre.)
He had before, I understood, made the same observation to
some other English travellers, who had been introduced to him.
the exact expressions used by Napoleon, on any topic that appeared par
ticularly interesting, were accurately remembered, they are given in French.
In the first part of the conversation the form of the dialogue is preserved,
which will serve to give a tolerably correct notion of Bonaparte's mode of
conveying his ideas.

AN INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLEON 169
I told him, that formerly much more had been drunk in England
than at present: and that the custom of sitting very long after
dinner had, in a great measure, been done away; but that as we
still sat after the ladies had left the table, we had more time and
greater inducement to drink than other nations.
" Where did you cross the Rhone — at Lyons? "
" No, at Avignon."
"Ah! you passed then the Pont de Gard. — Is the bridge at
Avignon finished? " — " No; over one branch of the river only."
" Ah! but you passed over the Durance, where I had made a
long wooden bridge. — You visited Nice? " — " Yes."
" Did you go to Genoa?" — " No; I wished to dc so, but the
wind was not favourable."
" The road I was making is not yet finished, is it? " ] — " No;
we crossed the Maritime Alps, to Turin."
"Ah! by the Col de Tende}" — "Yes, — a very bad passage,
and very badly kept."
"That is not of my making; it was made by the King of
Sardinia. — I passed it twenty-five years ago ; but it is only over
the Col de Tende that it is so bad. — I did a little to the excava
tion, and had some idea of making a good road over it, but
I did not care much about it. — I was desirous of reigning also
over Italy — (Comme fe voulois dominer aussi sur L'ltalie.) — My
principal object was to connect that country with France, as
much as possible, by means of good roads on the side of Mont
Cenis and the Simplon."
I told him that I had passed the Simplon, and complimented
him on the greatness of the undertaking, and the excellence
of the execution; — upon which he observed, that there was a
grand road he had been making from Wesel to Hamburg, not
yet finished, which had cost a considerable sum of money. —
I remarked that we, travellers, at every step recognized his
works. With this observation he appeared to be pleased. He
then asked if the road over the Simplon was kept in good
repair. I told him, that as yet, it was in good order; but that
it was feared it would be neglected; that the Valais and the
neighbouring countries could not support the expense of main
taining it. He said :
" That must be done by a toll, which would answer very
well." He asked if I had passed by Milan — " a fine city " — and
then inquired particularly if the bridges he had laid out be
tween Turin and Milan were finished. I told him that the bridge
over the Tessino was not completed, but that the pillars were all
above water.
1 He had been making a road by the coast, from Nice to Genoa.

170 PITT AND NAPOLEON
" Those over the Sesia, at Vercelli, and over the Dora, are
they finished?"— "Yes."
From the subject of roads he touched upon that of canals,
and asked if the canal from Pavia to Milan was finished. — I
replied that I believed not; and I asked him if he had not a
project of uniting the Rhine and the Danube. — He replied that
it was very easy to do so ; that it was an affair of only twenty
millions of francs; that he had united the Rhine and the Rhone,
the German Ocean and the Mediterranean. On his asking
from whence I last came, and my answering, from Vienna, he
exclaimed, —
" A poor little city (une pauvre petite ville) with large suburbs,
unpaved; and the ramparts?" (et les remparts?)
I told him they were precisely in the situation in which he
had left them. — He said —
" Yes, Bertrand performed the kind office for them very
effectually." I observed, that at Frankfort and at Manheim, where he had
demolished the fortifications, they were laid out with taste. —
"Yes," said he, "in fine promenades." (Oui, des belles promenades.)
His next subject was politics; — he asked me how Congress
went on. I told him that there were plenty of fetes, but that
little progress was said to be made in business; and I mentioned
to him the bon mot of the Prince de Ligne, who said — " Le
Congres danse, mais ne marche pas" at which he smiled. I added,
that Poland was understood to be a stumbling-block ; that it
was said the Emperor of Russia wanted to form a kingdom
of it, but that the other powers, it was supposed, feared Russia's
becoming too formidable. He remarked that it was a power
that went on increasing; a very rising power. He then said
that the treaty of peace between himself and the Allies should
have been signed at Frankfort; separating Germany entirely
from France, and taking Holland, Italy, and Spain from him ;
but that he never could have consented to leave France less
in territory, than it was when he ascended the throne. I asked
him why he did not make peace at Dresden, when those terms
were offered to him : he said that the Allies were not sincere,1
and that besides les choses at that time were different; that
had peace been then made, England would have been saved
some thousands of men and much money ; that he considered
it very bad policy of England to appropriate Belgium to her
self; 2 that it would be a constant source of expense, and would
1 A French officer to whom I put the same question, said that there were
some articles besides those which were generally understood to have been
proposed. - By the Treaty of Vienna, Belgium went to the Kingdom of Holland.—
J. H. R.

AN INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLEON 171
probably draw her into a war; for that any other Continental
Power would be sure of France as an ally, by offering Belgium
as a bribe. " Supposing," said he, " for instance, Russia were to
say to France, ' do you take Belgium, and let me have Poland.'—
In short," added he, " England cannot maintain herself as a
power of the first rank on the Continent; Belgium must be lost
on the first coup de canon. The English Government should
have covered and fortified Holland, but Antwerp is the object ;
for a battle fought and lost before Brussels, which is close to
the gates of Paris, would open the road to Holland.1 England,
with her immense colonies, instead of being obliged to keep
up a large army to cover Belgium, should withdraw within her
Island, and act when and where she chose." He spoke of the
Dutch troops, and appeared to have but a poor opinion of
them; — their marine, he said, was much reduced. He expressed
himself with much contempt of the Austrian soldiers, who
" would not fight without a belly full." — Referring to the cam
paign in France, he said that he should have beaten the Allies,
had he not been betrayed; for that the peasants were taking
arms in their rear. I asked him by whom he had been betrayed ;
whether by Talleyrand, whom I had heard accused. — He an
swered so as to give me to understand he had been a party;
but he principally blamed Marmont and Augereau.2 The latter,
he told me, had a fine army, superior to the Austrians, and
was to have joined him (Bonaparte) in his last movement; but
that he had made his terms with the Allies a fortnight before,
and that he - had narrowly escaped being massacred by his
soldiers for his conduct. — I observed to him, that when I had
passed through Paris, I had heard there was an opinion amongst
the lower orders, that he and Paris had been sold — "que
I' Empereur et Paris e"toient vendus."
Bliicher, he said, was a brave man, but not a great general ;
and added, that he had lost two armies.3 The Prussians had
fought well.- — Of Schwartzenberg, as an officer, he expressed
himself favourably. — Upon my asking him if he did not consider
the Duke of Wellington a good general, he replied, " Oui." — I
was not satisfied with this, but repeated the question in stronger
terms, asking if he was not a very good— an excellent general.
1 It is remarkable, that within five months from the time of this conversa
tion, the battle of Waterloo was fought, and the road to Paris not that to
Holland, opened.— The expression of this opinion at this time by Bonaparte,
and his subsequent conduct in conformity with it, proves, clearly, the sin
cerity with which he was speaking.
2 Augereau commanded the army operating near Lyons, but it was in
ferior to that of the Austrians. — J. H. R.
3 A gross exaggeration. Napoleon probably referred to Bliicher's sur
render near Liibeck in November 1806, and his defeat at Vauchamps in
February 1814.— J. H. R.

172 PITT AND NAPOLEON
He answered, " Oui, oui! " with emphasis, but not another word.
— Touching on the Corunna campaign, he said, Moore was a
good general, and had saved that army. The Spaniards, as
soldiers, he held very cheap. In the mountains they had done
something, their character was obstinacy (opinidtreti) — they
wanted valour. I mentioned the gallant defence they had made
at Saragossa. This, he said, was opinidtrete; — they were 50,000
men within the walls, attacked by 15,000. I observed that, at
least, the Portuguese had proved themselves very good troops.
This he admitted. " But then," added he, " they were officered
by British, and of this the national pride (fierte) of the Spaniards
would not admit ; — besides, the Spaniards are bigots in religion,
and you know that you are heretics," (vous savez que vous ites
des he're'tiques), said he, laughing. The French soldiers, he as
serted, were, peu constans; that they wanted tenacite '; that if they
had a little more tinacite", any thing might be done with them ; —
that Csesar had well defined their character in that respect, and
that it had not changed ; l that he (Bonaparte) knew it well,
and had acted upon it in the campaign in France: that the
soldiers could not bear such a check (secousse). — He inquired
if the English soldiers, when drunk, were not ungovernable;
observing that the French, at such times, were loving (doux et
tendres). Speaking of Switzerland, he said there appeared much to be
settled in that country; that he had given them a constitution
which it should seem they wished to change. I remarked that
the Canton of Berne wanted to recover what had been separated
from it. — " Yes," replied he, " the large to domineer over the
small ; there is no yoke (joug) so severe as that of a people." —
The fate of Italy he lamented much, divided as it was into
small states. Italy, he said, should have been preserved as a
Kingdom. I agreed with him entirely in regretting the fate of
Italy, but asked, who was to be king, and who was to nominate.
"Oh! it matters little," said he, "who it is — some Italian — or
by whom appointed ; " and he instanced Murat.2 " A sovereign,"
added he, " is made for his people, and not a people for their
1 That passage in Csesar that is here referred to is doubtless that in
Book 3, Sec. 20, of Clark's Edition. " Nam ut ad bella suscipienda Gallorum
alacer et promptus est animus, sic mollis ac minime resistens ad calamitates
preferendas mens eorum est."
Livy's trait of the French soldier is equally remarkable, B. 10, Ch. 28.
" Gallorum quidem etiam corpora intolerantissima laboris atque sestus fluere :
primaque eorum prselia plusquam virorum, postrema minus quam fcemin-
aruni esse."
2 By his instancing the case of Murat, and what followed, I understood he
meant to say, that Murat was a proof, that Kings so appointed would care
but little for those by whom they were appointed, when their interest re
quired another line of conduct ; and that Murat, although owing every thing
to him, had not hesitated to join his enemies.

AN INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLEON 173
sovereign." — The Italians, he observed, were a people of strong
passions (fassionnis), and had a great deal of excellent stuff
(e'toffe) in them as soldiers, — much of the old Roman left. — He
spoke of the bad policy of the Austrian cabinet towards Italy,
and that of the Austrian officers towards the inhabitants, in not
associating with them as the French had done. — He added,
that he had done much to reform the Italian people; that he
had found them effeminate, and living for the women and with
them, all day long; — that it was a fine country. Upon this I
remarked, that by transporting to Paris the best of the paintings,
etc., he had taken considerably from the interest of Italy. To
this he made no reply, but spoke of Bologna 1 as a bonne et
folie ville. — In speaking, I think, of Turin, he mentioned a fine
street called Via Napoleon; he knew not what they called
it now. To the Pope, as the head of the church and as a sovereign, he
seemed to have a great aversion; he said that he was always
sacrificing his conscience to some miserable little piece of policy;
that the existence of a Pope was a great misfortune for Europe
(un grand malheur pour l' Europe); that we were very much in
debted to our King Henry VIII for getting rid of him; that he
had attempted to do the same, but could not succeed ; that
the government of priests was detestable, and that every
sovereign should be at the head of his own church, as in Eng
land, Prussia, etc.; that, as a man, the Pope was a very good
sort of person (un bien bon homme); that he had entertained
him very well at Fontainbleau, and made him very comfortable
there; that he (the Pope) was ignorant in the extreme; and
that amongst all his Cardinals (for he had seen them all at
Paris), there was not one he would allow to fill a fourth rank
in his (Bonaparte's) council. Ecclesiastical States, he added,
should on no account be allowed; — the empire of the church
was not of this world.
Speaking of the Americans, he said, they wanted a ten years'
war to make them a nation; that at present they had no
noblesse, which they would acquire by a war; that they were
now a nation of merchants (une nation de marchands), as was
shewn in the case of the sale of Jefferson's library to the highest
bidder;2 that had we (the English) made peace with them
before, we should have gone to Congress with more weight;
that America had carried on the war with spirit after France
had fallen (apres que la France eut succombe'e) and that the war,
1 I had heard that from another English party admitted to an audience,
he had inquired after his bonne ville de Bologna, as if he had a particular
attachment to it.
2 I did not understand the allusion, but he laughed when he made the
observation.

174 PITT AND NAPOLEON
after all, was about nothing — a few feet more or less of lake.
He then said something of a great project he had with respect
to Mexico, of which I could not catch the meaning; and ob
served, that we should one day or other lose Canada; adding —
" Of what great consequence is it to England, with her numerous
colonies? " He said, that when America became more powerful,
she would probably rival us in our marine; that he had made
the attempt to do this, but had failed. With respect to the
Right of Search, which I called a droit, he said it was no droit,
but a mere theorie; that when we were very strong we should
exercise it, but if, on the contrary, we had Russia, Sweden, and
Denmark against us, we probably should not insist on it. He
gave it as his opinion, that England and France should be allied.
On my signifying, by a shake of my head, the improbability
of such an event, he said, "Why not?- — the world is large
enough — France does not want to meddle too much with com
merce. There was a man, Fox, who could have effected it, but
unfortunately he is dead." (Mais pourquoi pas? le monde est
asses grand — la France n'a pas besoin de se meter trop du com
merce. II y avoit un homme, Fox, qui auroit pu le faire, mais
malheureusement ilest mort.) He then asked where we were going
from Elba, and on my answering, " To Rome and Naples," he
replied, "Ah! then you will see there a magnificent Lazzarone;" 1
adding, " From Naples, I suppose, you return to England by
sea." Upon my saying that it was my intention to return by
Italy and the Mont Cenis, as I had seen all the other Passes
of the Alps, having come from Vienna by the Tyrol, he ob
served, " No, there is still that over the Julian Alps." On
saying this he made us a low bow, wished us a tres bon voyage,
and retired.
We found Count Bertrand waiting for us in the ante-room,
who, looking at his watch, exclaimed, " Parbleu! you have had
a long audience." — Upon which I could not help expressing
how agreeably it had passed; and I can truly say that I never
passed an hour, or indeed an hour and a quarter — for our in
terview lasted from half-past eight o'clock until a quarter before
ten, more agreeably. We stood during the whole time, I may
say almost nez a nez; for I had my back against the table, and
he had advanced close to me, looking full in my face. — After
the first few minutes I felt most perfectly at my ease, and the
conversation never flagged; — his strain and manner were as
familiar and good-natured as possible; so very much so, that I
felt no hesitation whatever in putting any question to him. —
He had on a green coat, cut off in front, faced with the same
colour, and trimmed with red at the skirts, and wore the stars
1 Alluding to Murat.

AN INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLEON 175
of two orders.— Under his left arm he held his hat, and in his
hand a plain snuff-box, from which he every now and then
took a pinch; but as he occasionally sneezed, it appeared to
me that he was not addicted to snuff-taking. His hair was
without powder, and quite straight ; — his shape, inclined to cor
pulence. Bonaparte's manner was so unreserved, and he communicated
his ideas with so much apparent candour, that, after the interview,
I regretted much it had not occurred to me to touch upon a
point on which there has always existed much diversity of
opinion; — whether he had ever seriously contemplated the in
vasion of England. However, I took an opportunity on the
following day of introducing the subject to Count Bertrand,
during a conversation I had with him. — He reasoned for a con
siderable time, as if it had really been Bonaparte's intention to
make the attempt ; — the Emperor, he said, had forty sail of the line
collected in the Mediterranean and at Cadiz; it was intended
that the ships in these different ports should form a junction,
and then proceed to the Channel, where the fleet would have
been joined by ten sail of the line kept in readiness for that
purpose. This force, he remarked, would probably have given
them the command of the Channel for a fortnight or three
weeks, which time would, it was calculated, have elapsed before
Nelson could have discovered their real destination, and reached
the scene of action. When the combined fleet had once ob
tained the command of the Channel, a force of 100,000 men,
or more, could have been assembled on the French coast in
forty-eight hours, and might have been passed over before the
arrival of the British fleet.1 The invading army, it was conceived,
would have been sufficiently strong to overpower any opposi
tion that could have been made to its progress before it had
reached London, and taken possession of the seat of govern
ment. I replied, that supposing all these plans had succeeded
according to their wishes, their army must inevitably have
been destroyed, as they could not have obtained reinforce
ments. — He observed, that they could have kept possession of
some small ports, and could have smuggled men over; — for as
the run is so short, this could not have been wholly prevented
by any precautions on the part of the English. — I said, that the
opinion in England was, that the threat of an invasion was a
mere pretext for bringing a large force together in order to be
prepared to pounce upon one or other of the Continental Powers,
as in fact the Emperor had done in the case of Austria. — He
replied, " Cela est possible" — Here the conversation ended. My
own opinion is, that Bonaparte at first seriously contemplated
1 See my former Essay, pp. 1 14-146. — J. H. R.

176 PITT AND NAPOLEON
the invasion of this country; but that afterwards he became
better informed as to the little probability there was of success.
Had circumstances proved favourable, at an early period, to the
project of his fleet obtaining a temporary superiority in the
Channel, the attempt would probably have been made. Some
of the officers of the Imperial Guard, with whom I conversed
at Elba, were decidedly of opinion that, had the invasion of
England been attempted, the enterprise would have failed.
At one time, in conversation with Bertrand, I expostulated
on the injustice of Napoleon's conduct towards the English who
were in France when he last resolved to go to war with Great
Britain, and whom he detained so soon as war was declared,
in violation of the usage of civilized nations. The Count
said, that my countrymen had been detained as a measure of
retaliation for the capture of French vessels by the English,
immediately on the issuing of the declaration of war against
France, without allowing fixed periods for the return of vessels
from different parts of the world; — in place of which, we seized
all we could lay hands upon. The probability is that Bonaparte
ordered the detention of the English under the influence of a
temporary irritation, and that he was afterwards unwilling to
revoke the mandate he had issued.
With respect to the most material of the charges that have
been urged against Bonaparte, I understood from Captain Adye,
who had opportunities of conversing with travellers that had
been introduced to the Ex-Emperor prior to my arrival, that he
had given the following explanations respecting the points on
which he has been most strongly censured, — putting the Turkish
prisoners to death, and poisoning his own soldiers in Egypt;
the seizure and execution of the Duke d'Enghien, and the case
of Captain Wright : —
The Turks who were shot by his order, he said, had been
taken prisoners on a former occasion, and had been liberated on
their parole, not to serve against the French, unless they were
exchanged. Having, in violation of this engagement, been sub
sequently taken in arms, they were subject to military execution
by the laws of war; but that he should not have put them to
death, had he not been in absolute want of bread for the use of
the army, and therefore wholly unable to provide for so many
additional mouths. The expressions Bonaparte used on this
occasion, as repeated to me, were, — " // n'y avoit point de pain;
ou les Turcs ou les Franqois devoient se briser contre la muraille,
je ne balanqai pas!' With regard to poisoning his own soldiers,
he said, that it had never been intended to treat more than two
or three in that manner; that these men were ill of the plague,
which rendered their removal dangerous to the whole army, and
their recovery almost hopeless, and that he had recommended

AN INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLEON 177
to the surgeon to free them from their miseries by administering
opium in their food. With this recommendation the surgeon
refused to comply, and they were consequently left behind, and
were butchered by the Turks who followed the French army.1
Respecting the execution, or rather, the atrocious murder (for
I cannot apply any milder term) of the Due d'Enghien, I was
informed he had observed, that the Duke was the most restless
of all the members of his family; that he was a conspirator
against the acknowledged government of his country, and that
he had been tried by a regular military tribunal, found guilty,
and shot, — not during the night, or at an early hour in the
morning, as had been stated, but at noonday.2 When the case
of the unfortunate Captain Wright was mentioned to him, he is
said to have replied, that he had no recollection of him; but
that he thought he had heard of an Englishman who had made
away with himself in prison. I understood that whilst convers
ing on these subjects, Bonaparte had observed, that it had
frequently been proposed to him to take off the Bourbons by
assassination, and that even smugglers had been found who were
ready to undertake this atrocious project; but that he had al
ways spurned the idea. This fact was also stated to me by
Count Bertrand; who observed, that it had been asserted the
Emperor had always been surrounded by his guards, in order to
secure him from personal violence ; but that directly the contrary
was the fact. The Emperor, he said, had never adopted any
such precautions; he (Count Bertrand) had had the command
of the guard at the Thuilleries, and, including the gardens, the
duty was performed by (as well as I recollect) 117 men.
With respect to the habits of Napoleon, I heard, in the course
of conversation, that he dined at six or seven o'clock ; went to
bed early, and generally rose in the middle of the night and read
for three or four hours, after which he again lay down, and rose
about eight or nine o'clock. He slept little, and in the summer
suffered much from heat.
I remarked to Madame Bertrand that I had heard the Emperor
was writing the history of his own life. She replied, that it was
not so, and that he amused himself with reading.
I understood that Bonaparte was distressed for money, as the
pension, for the payment of which the Allied Powers had pledged
themselves, had been withheld by the French Government, who
had engaged to remit it every six months. — It was said that he
had declared he never would apply for it; but I was informed
that Madame Mere (his mother) was loud in her complaints
respecting the non-payment of the allowance which she was to
1 On these two topics, see my " Life of Napoleon," i, 204, 212. — J. H. R.
2 The Duke was not a conspirator and was shot at night. — J. H. R.
N

178 PITT AND NAPOLEON
receive. Madame Bertrand assured me that the Emperor had
not a farthing in the English funds, or in those of any foreign
country, though the contrary had been so confidently reported ;
that she fully believed he had never entertained the idea of
making such an investment, as in fact he had never conceived
it possible that he should lose his throne. She also stated, that
he had brought scarcely anything with him from France, having
left behind him his jewels and his private property, observing,
that in losing the Empire (en perdant V Empire) he had lost
everything; — and that the service of plate he had with him
was merely that which he had used in his campaigns, and in
travelling.1 It is something singular that both the Count and the Countess
Bertrand had an idea, at the time I was at Elba, that the Emperor
was to be removed to St. Helena; and they were very anxious
in their inquiries respecting the proceedings of the Congress then
sitting at Vienna.2 From the events that have since taken place,
it should really seem that such a plan was then in agitation,
although, as I told Madame Bertrand, it was not even whispered
at Vienna. In case his removal to St. Helena had, at that time,
been really intended, it was believed that Napoleon would have
resisted it to the utmost, and submitted only to force. He cer
tainly was occupied in keeping up the forts at Elba; but resist
ance on his part would have been vain, had it been determined
to carry the measure into execution ; as the place might easily
have been starved, and during the summer months there is even
a scarcity of water on the Island. The force he had at Elba
consisted of about 600 of the Imperial Guard, who were fine old
soldiers; some Corsicans, whom he had enlisted; about 120
Polish Lancers, and five or six Mamelukes. I confess I am
induced to believe, that the fear of being sent to St. Helena, and
the pecuniary difficulties under which he laboured,3 in a very
great degree, occasioned his making that apparently almost
hopeless, and certainly most desperate, but, eventually, most
successful attempt to regain the throne of France, which shortly
afterwards astonished all Europe. I know that much has been
said and written to shew, that it was a concerted measure, with
the numerous, and, assuredly, very active friends he had in
France; but I cannot satisfy myself that this was the case.4 On
1 The next paragraphs were evidently added after the original account
was drawn up. — J. H. R.
2 This report originated in the newspapers, and was not mentioned at the
Congress. — J. H. R.
3 Peyrusse in his " Memorial " shows that Napoleon took a large sum of
money from Elba to France. — J. H. R.
4 The evidence of Fleury de Chaboulon ("Mems.," i, 105-40) and Lafayette
(" Mems.," v, 355), shows Vivian to be wrong here.— J. H. R.

AN INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLEON 179
the contrary, I cannot but consider it as an attempt made with
out any general previous understanding with a party in France ;
although the possibility of it might have been contemplated by
some few persons ; but still, with a full conviction on the part of
Napoleon, that the army would gladly embrace an opportunity
of replacing him on the throne. The extraordinary and rapid
march from Antibes to Paris, without the loss of a single life,
was a circumstance so completely beyond all calculation, as to
afford a decisive proof of the enthusiasm which so generally
existed throughout France, in favour of Bonaparte. From this
enthusiasm, which was scarcely to be created by any plot, to
gether with the various observations I had an opportunity of
making from a number of little circumstances and occurrences
which took place whilst I was at Elba, as well as from what I
afterwards learned at Paris and in different parts of France, I
am persuaded that although, on the part of Napoleon, the
measure might have been contemplated, the moment at which
it was to be undertaken was undecided; and that, undertaken
almost in desperation, it succeeded solely through the ardour
excited amongst the French army and the people, by the re
appearance of him who had so often led them to victory.
An opinion prevailed on the Continent, immediately after
the escape of Bonaparte from Elba, that the British Government
had connived at his departure; and in England I have heard
that Colonel Campbell was censured for not having exercised a
proper degree of vigilance, in observing the movements of
Napoleon. Although this idea has been successfully refuted,
both in and out of Parliament, I may observe, that nothing could
be more absurd than to suppose that it was in Colonel Campbell's
power to have prevented the escape of the Ex-Emperor. It is
true that Colonel Campbell was not on the island at the time of
Napoleon's departure: but it was by no means intended that he
should have remained there constantly ; and even if he had been
on the island, he had no means of preventing the embarkation
of the troops: he was possessed of no authority whatever;
Bonaparte held the island in full sovereignty, having his army
(composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery), his navy, his
treasury — he imposed taxes; in short, no monarch could be
more absolute; — and to his credit be it related, that small as
were his means, he in one particular instance shewed an example
to other more powerful monarchs well worthy of imitation : he
declared war with the African pirates, and forbade their entering
his ports. As Sovereign of Elba, he took possession of the Island
of Pianosa, and intended to establish a colony there; — an attempt
which had formerly been made, but which had failed, as the
colony had been carried into slavery by the African marauders.
This island, which had been used only for breeding horses,

180 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Napoleon meant to cultivate, in order to supply Elba with corn.
It may be said, in reply to the foregoing observations, that we
had a sloop of war on the station, to watch the movements of
Bonaparte. This, however, was not exactly the case. The
Partridge was stationed at Leghorn, not at Elba, and her cruis
ing ground extended from Genoa to Civita Vecchia. Captain
Adye himself expressed his regret to me that he could not run
down with us to Civita Vecchia, (which was many leagues to
the south of Elba, and consequently out of the line for intercept
ing any communication with France,) as Colonel Campbell might
want to return. The French Government had also a squadron
in that part of the Mediterranean, for the purpose, as was sup
posed, of preventing Bonaparte from obtaining recruits from
Corsica. I saw this squadron off the island, during my stay at
Porto Ferrajo; it consisted of two frigates, two corvettes, and
two brigs. I confess it appears to me that there was, in the
first instance, a great mistake in selecting the Island of Elba as
the residence of Napoleon, or rather, which I believe was the
case, in allowing him to have selected it ; x its position gave him
a facility of communicating both with Italy and France, of which
his character might have afforded certain assurance he would
have taken advantage; and it was truly short-sighted policy,
and very slight knowledge of human nature, which could have
led any one to suppose that a man who had for so long a period
exercised such a degree of power in both these countries, would
not have retained in each a most powerful number of friends,
both civil and military.
Having had our audience with Napoleon, we were anxious to
proceed on our route, it being our wish to reach the Eternal
City before the conclusion of the Carnival. Accordingly, on the
27th of January, we hired a felucca to take us to Civita Vecchia:
but the wind unfortunately proved adverse during the three
following days, and our Padrone did not shew any great anxiety
to move. During our prolonged stay, we had an opportunity,
through the kind offices of Count Bertrand, of being presented
to Madame Mere, Bonaparte's mother, and to his sister, the
Princess Pauline. Madame resided in a house near that occupied
by her son ; the apartments which we saw were comfortably fitted
up; the servants wore the Imperial liveries, green and gold, and
two Dames d'Honneur were in attendance. From her appear
ance it was evident that she had been a fine woman. The Prin
cess, who occupied the large room in the centre of Bonaparte's
residence, possessed a fine figure ; her smile was fascinating, and
her manners peculiarly pleasing. She received us with great
affability; spoke much of the Empress and the young Prince,
' Elba was the choice of the Czar, Alexander I.— J. H. R.

AN INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLEON 181
whom we had seen at Vienna; observed that it was cruel not to
allow her to join the Emperor; spoke with great affection of her
brother, I'Empereur; said that he, with Maman and herself, formed
a little society, and played at cards in the evening; that the
Emperor shewed himself a perfect philosophe, not bestowing a
thought on what he had been, and frequently not reading the
newspapers for some days after he received them ; — she observed,
" qu'il travailloit beaucoup ; and even there, as he had done else
where, was exerting himself to benefit and ornament the country."
(Alluding to a new road he was making round the edge of the
bay, the sides of which were planted with trees, and to a new
garden he was forming at the back of the residence above the
cliffs.) In the course of our conversation, the Princess complained
of the gross misrepresentations which were put forth in the
public journals, respecting her brother ; their denial of the benefits
he had conferred on France, and the infamous slanders which
had been propagated, especially through the Paris papers, as to
his being deficient in personal courage. She expressed herself
in very indignant terms on these points, and appeared to feel
acutely what she conceived the unmerited calumnies that had
been heaped upon a man who had done so much for the French
people. She said, that at Rome we should see her brother Louis,
an " excellent homme," and Lucien, " qui avoit beaucoup d' esprit"
and desired us to say " bien de choses," for her, to her sister at
Naples. Our prolonged stay on this island gave us an opportunity of
seeing more of the Princess, and availing ourselves of an invita
tion to a ball which she gave on the 29th, in a temporary room
built in the garden at the back of the residence, to which we
went with a large party, composed principally of her Dames
d'Honneur and officers of Napoleon's Guard, whom we had met
at dinner at the house of a French family then resident at Porto
Ferrajo. We spent a very pleasant evening, and were highly
gratified by the attentions of all who were present ; and on taking
leave, the Princess kindly offered us letters of introduction to
her brother Lucien, at Rome, and to her sister Caroline, Queen
of Naples.
On the evening of the 31st of January we took our departure
from Porto Ferrajo in an open boat. After about an hour's sail,
we cleared the island, and in two hours more reached Piombino.
The width of the channel between this part of the Italian coast
and the island of Elba is about three leagues. We were detained
for an hour on the shingles whilst our bill of health was scrutin
ized, and on arriving at the inn our passports were taken to the
Austrian Commandant. During the time we remained on the
shingles, the post-boat from Elba arrived. A soldier who appeared
to belong to it, in a conversation I had with him, informed me

182 PITT AND NAPOLEON
that several of the Imperial Guard had quitted Elba and returned
to France: the reason he assigned was, that they (the soldiers)
found so little amusement on the island. It is, however, very
possible that this means of communication with the old army
kept alive the remembrance of Napoleon, and contributed most
materially to his subsequent success.
Piombino was formerly the residence of Napoleon's sister
Elize, the Princess Bacciochi. A building that had originally
been a convent, situated on a promontory, between the town and
the sea, had been converted into a palace, with suitable gardens
and approaches. From Piombino we proceeded to Civita Vecchia,
and from thence to Rome and Naples.
Shortly after our arrival at Naples, where Murat held his
Court in all the pomp of regal splendour, we heard of the de
parture of Napoleon from Elba; and in less than five months
from the time of my interview, was fought the memorable battle
of Waterloo, which hurled from his throne, a second time, that
most wonderful man, who in his conversation with me had con
templated, but with the anticipation of far different results, the
very battle he had now lost, and to the brilliant result of which
the distinguished valour of the British arms so gloriously
contributed.

"NAPOLEON'S CONCEPTION OF THE
BATTLE OF WATERLOO."
J'ai trop compte sur le gain de la bataille a Waterloo. — Napoleon to
Gourgaud, 8th September 1817 ("Gourgaud's Journal," ii, 295).
THE Battle of Waterloo derives its unique characteristics
from the misconceptions of the three great commanders
who took part in it. Napoleon believed that the order which he
gave to Marshal Grouchy near Ligny on the morning of 17th
June to pursue the Prussians, with a view to preventing their
junction with Wellington, must bring him on their flank or rear
during the battle. Blucher's letter, written at Wavre about mid
night of 1 7th- 1 8th June, definitely offering to Wellington that
three Prussian army corps should march at dawn towards Mont
St. Jean, led the British commander to expect their arrival on
his left about 10 a.m. ; while Gneisenau, Chief of Staff to BlUcher,
so distrusted Wellington as to arrange the march in a way which
brought the Prussian vanguard within sight of the battle-field
about 1.30 ; and not until about 4.30 did the leading corps, that
of Biilow, threaten Planchenoit and the rear of Napoleon's right
flank. Blucher's Staff, though perhaps not the Marshal himself,
suspected the Duke of a plan to draw off from Mont St. Jean,
leaving the Prussians to bear Napoleon's onset. Hence their
circumspection, which made the battle so long and sanguinary.
The French Emperor, on the other hand, unaware of the danger
threatening him on the East, believed that he would easily drive
Wellington's motley host from Mont St. Jean and that the
battle would be " the affair of a breakfast."
It may be well to examine more in detail the hopes and con
victions of the Emperor before the conflict, which owes its
interest largely to the psychological problems outlined above.
Firstly, it is well to remember the mental peculiarity which had
long led him to exaggerate his own fighting power, and under
estimate that of the enemy. It is the opinion of General Bonn al
183

1 84 PITT AND NAPOLEON
the French historian of the Danube campaign of 1809, tnat.
owing to this defect the Emperor lost good opportunities of
destroying the Archduke's Charles's army near Ratisbon. The
serious reverse encountered at Aspern-Essling was due to the
same cause. Napoleon's despatches relating to the war in Spain
reveal a strange inability to grasp the difficulties of his marshals
and the tenacious character of the British and Spanish defence.1
The same defect was even more patent in 1812. The recently
published Memoirs of Count Rambuteau show that, before the
war began, the Czar Alexander warned Count Narbonne of his
resolve to sweep the threatened districts bare of inhabitants and
supplies, leaving the invaders to the Russian winter. Narbonne,
on his return to Paris, warned Napoleon of this design; " but he
nevertheless marched on to Moscow in September. At St. Helena
he criticised his inaction in that city and stated to General
Gourgaud that he ought to have advanced further still, in order
to overthrow the Russian forces that had retreated beyond the
old capital.3 Not even the terrible losses during the advance to
Moscow taught Napoleon prudence. For him the retreat which
began on 1 8th- 19th October was merely a change of quarters to
the neighbourhood of Smolensk, whence he resolved to march
on St. Petersburg in 181 3. On 26th October, after the serious
check at Malo-jaroslavitz, he wrote to Berthier minimizing that
incident, and stating that the return northwards to the devastated
line of his own advance — the final cause of disaster — was due to
the cold and the necessity of saving the wounded ! As for the
Cossacks, they were not dangerous.4
Examples of this habit of mind might be multiplied. But it
will be more suitable to notice the way in which he regarded the
campaign of 181 5. From the standpoint of public opinion (then
a matter of the highest moment), it was designed to effect the
liberation of the Belgians from the Dutch yoke, and crush the
attempt of the Allies to appropriate the northern fortresses of
France.5 Strategically, it was an effort to surprise the Allies in
their cantonments and drive them along the Charleroi-Brussels
1 See his impossible orders to Berthier respecting General Drouet, who
was to reinforce Massena (" Nap. Corresp.," xxi, 250, 280, 3rd and 20th Nov
ember 1810. For other examples see Prof. Oman, "Peninsular War," iv, 93,
204, 205.
2 "Mems. of Count Rambuteau" (Eng. edit.), 68.
3 " Gourgaud's Journal," ii, 13.
4 " Nap. Corresp.," xxiv, 265, 292. •> Ibid., xxviii, 247.

NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO 185
and Charleroi-Namur roads towards their natural bases of opera
tion, Antwerp for Wellington, Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle for
Blucher. This general conception resembles that of the begin
ning of Napoleon's first campaign, when he drove the Austrians and
Sardinians asunder; and it is probable that the parallel exerted
on his mind a delusively inspiriting influence.
At first all went as well as in 1796. On the 15th June, attack
ing the Prussian vanguard at and near Charleroi, he drove it
back with loss towards Ligny on the Namur road, while the
whereabouts of Wellington's main force was still unknown.
On the next day he decisively beat the Prussians at Ligny. He
regarded their losses as " enormous." Certainly they were heavy ;
for Blucher had ranged his men along an exposed slope on
which the French cannon played to full effect. Gourgaud, writ
ing at St. Helena under Napoleon's inspiration, says that the
losses of the enemy were five times as great as those of the
French; and that the Prussian generals themselves admitted a
loss of 25,000 men.1 Evidently Gourgaud, and therefore probably
Napoleon, placed it higher ; for, as the French official losses were
6,950 men, Gourgaud's ratio would award 34,750 to the enemy.2
Napoleon, in a slightly later estimate made at St. Helena, fixed
the Prussian loss as 25,000 killed and wounded, and 20,000
stragglers. Whether we take the Emperor's figures, or Gour
gaud's, obviously the French Staff believed the Prussian army to be
nearly destroyed. The famous partisan leader, Liitzow, who was
captured at Ligny, flattered French pride by giving assurances
to that effect, adding, too, that Blucher had a second time com
promised the Prussian monarchy. About 8 a.m. on 17th June
Soult, the Emperor's Chief of Staff, wrote to Ney a long despatch,
containing these details, ordering him to occupy Quatre Bras
on the Brussels road, if he had not yet done so, and stating
that that operation, as well as supplying ammunition, etc., and
rallying detachments and stragglers, must be the work of the
day.3 This explains the comparative inaction of Napoleon on the
morning after the battle. He had heard nothing from Ney as
1 This was false. The official estimate was about 1 8,000 killed and wounded.
The French loss was between 11,000 and 12,000.
" Gourgaud, "Campagne de 1815," p. 65. This work was inspired by
Napoleon; see Gourgaud, "Journal," ii, 90, 107, 295, 319.
3 Ropes, " Waterloo," pp. 203, 384, 385.

1 86 PITT AND NAPOLEON
to the fighting at Quatre Bras, but, having ordered him to
occupy that important post and push Wellington back towards
Brussels, he doubtless assumed, as was his wont, that the Duke
was in retreat northwards along the Charleroi-Brussels chaussee.
That he anticipated little resistance from Wellington on the 16th
appears in the order, issued at Charleroi early on that day to Ney,
that, " if there were any scuffle (e'chauffouree) with the English, it
should fall preferably on the line regiments rather than on the
Guard." L The words imply that Ney had the game in his hands.
The Emperor did not know that Ney's rear corps was so far
behind as to be of no use during the " scuffle," which ended in
Ney retreating to Frasnes. Napoleon remained in ignorance of
the issue of this affair until near noon of the 17th, a remissness
of duty in Ney which led to the Emperor losing his chance of
catching Wellington in a trap, the British leader having also
failed to hear of the disaster at Ligny owing to a mishap to the
officer sent to his head-quarters. As it happened, the one mis
chance counterbalanced the other.
Napoleon certainly believed the Prussians to be in retreat
eastwards towards Namur and Liege ; for, firstly, their lines had
been unduly extended in that direction during the battle ; secondly,
that was the side on which their reinforcements were expected;
and thirdly, it was the natural move for a beaten army to fall
back along its line of communications, in this case, towards
Namur, Liege, and the Prussian territory around Aix-la-Chapelle.
Therefore, early on 17th June, Soult ordered a reconnaissance
of French cavalry along the Namur road, but none along the
northern road leading to Wavre. For the rest, the Emperor
pictured the Belgians as everywhere welcoming the French and
incommoding the Allies.2 Thus, in the sphere of morale, all the
omens were in his favour; while in that of strategy he seemed
to have entirely succeeded, by driving back the Allies on diver
gent lines of retreat. It is significant that in his St. Helena
narrative he describes the situation on the night of the 15th, that
is, before the battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, as highly favour
able to the tricolour. " The two hostile armies were surprised ;
their communications were already greatly compromised. All the
Emperor's manoeuvres had succeeded as he wished. Thenceforth
he could attack in detail the enemy's forces. For them to avoid
' " Nap. Corresp.," xxviii, 290. a Ibid., xxviii, 288.

NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO 187
this mishap, the greatest of all, the only thing remaining was to
retreat and to reunite at Brussels or even beyond." x
By the morning of the 17th he dismissed from his mind all
thought of the Allies reuniting at Brussels or beyond; for
Prussian prisoners had been brought in by Pajol's horsemen
from the Namur or eastern road; and, as we have seen, no
French cavalry was as yet sent out to scout along the north
road to Wavre. But, after commenting angrily on the doings
of the Chambers of Deputies, Napoleon faced the alternative,
that Blucher might have taken another road. Accordingly, about
11.30 he called Marshal Grouchy and ordered him to find out
the line of the Prussian retreat, adding that he himself was going
to fight the English if they should make a stand on the south of
the Forest of Soignes. Grouchy pointed out the difficulty and
vagueness of the task allotted to him thus late in the d^y, but
Napoleon held him to it, and dictated to Bertrand (in the absence
of Soult) the written order for Grouchy with about 33,000 men
to proceed eastwards to Gembloux, explore in the directions
of Namur and Maestricht, and find out the line of march and the
intentions of the enemy. " It is important," he added, " to find
out what the enemy is intending to do; whether they are
separating themselves from the English, or whether they are
intending still to unite, to cover Brussels and [or?] Liege, by
trying the fate of another battle."2 Obviously this important
order was hastily drawn up. The original of the phrase last
quoted is "Bruxelles et Liege," which is impossible on geo
graphical grounds. The words must have puzzled Grouchy. He
had accepted the duty with reluctance, his troops being wearied
out, besides expecting a day of rest. In these circumstances a
carelessly drafted order was a mishap of no small importance,
as tending to increase the mental cloudiness of the man charged
with its execution. On the score of seniority Napoleon selected
Grouchy to command the army operating along the Charleroi-
Ligny route. He made that choice at Charleroi early on the 16th,
when he appointed Ney to lead the army of the left towards
Brussels. Neither Ney nor Grouchy was equal to the strategic
1 " Nap. Corresp.," xxx, 168. Kelly, "The Battle of Wavre," p. 36, shows
that more energy on the French side on 15th June would have accomplished
their aim.
2 Charras, i, 241 ; Ropes, 209. Gourgaud's account (p. 67) of the instruc
tions given to Grouchy is utterly vague and misleading.

1 88 PITT AND NAPOLEON
problems which speedily arose; but the Emperor expected to
guide each leader as occasion demanded ; for he added " I will
proceed to the one or the other wing according to circum
stances ; " and he then assigned to the Prussians only 40,000
men.1 The Battle of Ligny showed them to have more than
double that number on the field. Nevertheless Napoleon persisted
in allotting to Grouchy a difficult task which was likely to remove
him beyond reach of the counsel that Ney, and doubtless Grouchy
too, had been led to expect. Ney had held independent com
mands; Grouchy, never, and to entrust to him the pursuit of an
enemy whose position and line of march were unknown, savoured
of rashness. At St. Helena Napoleon admitted the error, stating
that he ought to have recalled Suchet from Lyons and put him
in Grouchy's place. Ney, too, he said, made an unpardonable
mistake in not occupying Quatre-Bras betimes on the 16th.
Soult would have done better there. Thus, during his exile the
Emperor saw the defective allocation of duties, which went far
to wreck the campaign. He even remarked that on the 17th
he should have left only Pajol's cavalry division to follow and
observe the Prussians, while he himself threw his whole weight
on Wellington.2 The criticism is highly significant; for it implies
that the Prussians were so crushed at Ligny that they were hors
de combat during the time needful for the overthrow of Wel
lington. This leads us to inquire as to the amount of information which
Napoleon had respecting the powerful corps which Biilow was
bringing to Blucher at Wavre from the direction of Liege. The
Prussian Staff had counted on Billow's arrival at Ligny ; and the
loss of the battle was due to this miscalculation more than to the
non-arrival of succours from Wellington, which the Duke had
offered subject to the condition that he himself was not attacked
at Quatre Bras. Biilow heard of the defeat at Ligny about mid
night, and on the 17th led his corps, exceeding 31,000 men, by
cross roads to a position east of Wavre. His arrival brought the
Prussian total up to more than 90,000 men, or practically the
same as at Ligny. The prompt arrival of the reserves of ammu
nition along the new line of operations reflects high credit on
Blucher's Staff.3

1 »i

1 Nap. Corresp.," xxviii, 290-2. * Gourgaud, " Journal," i, 197, 502.
Kelly (" Battle of Wavre," pp. 71, 101, 102), who places the number of
Prussian deserters after Ligny at about 8,000 ; Ropes (p. 159) estimates them

NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO 189
Now, Napoleon seems to have known nothing about this
formidable concentration at Wavre, which brought about an
entirely new situation. He ought to have allowed for something
of the kind; for the Prussian forces had been known to be
widely spread out in cantonments, and the zeal of Blucher and
his Chief of Staff, Gneisenau, was notorious. At St. Helena the
Emperor called Blucher a hot-head, who, if he had had only two
battalions, would have flown to help Wellington.1 The state
ment is of course an after-thought, irreconcilable with the other,
that only Pajol's cavalry should have pursued the Prussians.
But, setting the one over against the other, we conclude that
Napoleon had lost his reckoning. As happened nearly always
in and after 181 2, he believed that events would take the course
which his will prescribed. Not until about 10 a.m. of 18th June
did any misgivings occur to him ; but then at his headquarters
at le Caillou, a little south of la Belle Alliance, he sent off to
Grouchy a despatch stating that all the reports represented
three bodies of Prussians as having made for Wavre. He there
fore ordered the marshal to march thither " in order to approach
us, to put yourself within the sphere of our operations, and to
keep up your communications with us, pushing before you those
bodies of Prussians which have taken this direction, and which
may have stopped at Wavre, where you ought to arrive as soon
as possible." These perfectly clear instructions were followed by
the following, that he, Grouchy, must pick up the Prussian
stragglers on his right, that is, further east, and must keep up
his communications with Napoleon. Now, Grouchy had only
33,600 men. Yet he was expected to sweep up stragglers to the
east of the Gembloux-Wavre road, and drive the Prussians from
Wavre, besides keeping in touch with Napoleon seven miles or
more to his west. The Emperor often expected the impossible
from his generals; but, if he expected Grouchy to perform all
these duties, he can scarcely have credited to Blucher a force
larger than 30,000 men. Still less did he foresee the Prussian
flank march towards Waterloo, which Blucher was intending
with three army corps. Thus, Napoleon began the battle with
at 10,000 or 12,000. It is therefore difficult to fix precisely the numbers
available for 18th June. Pflugk-Hartung, "Das erste Corps bei Belle
Alliance," gives 6,083 as missing from that corps, Ziethen's, on the
1 8th. 1 Gourgaud, " Journal," i, 502.

i go PITT AND NAPOLEON
Wellington under a complete misconception as to the strength
and the aims of the Prussians.
To Wellington, on the other hand, Napoleon assigned between
80,000 and 90,000 men ; for the Duke had had time to concentrate
by falling back on his supports. Reasoning on his own maxim
— " Bring together all available troops for a battle : one battalion
sometimes decides the day " — the Emperor could not credit the
Duke with the error which mars his Waterloo campaign, that of
leaving 18,000 troops at Hal, about seven miles to the westward.
It is therefore all the more remarkable that he expected to beat
Wellington before noon; but here again, he relied on the de
fection of the Belgians. He also had a poor opinion of Welling
ton's generalship. At Elba, when Major Vivian asked him
whether he did not consider Wellington a good general, he
answered curtly " Yes," but in a way which signified a negative;
and to Soult and Ney at his headquarters before the battle, he
said brusquely, " I tell you that Wellington is a bad general, that
the English are bad troops, and that this will be the affair of a
dejeuner!' Even at St. Helena, after the experience at Waterloo,
he never vouchsafed a word of praise to Wellington, though he
paid a tribute to the excellence of British troops. Warden, or
his alter ego, once asked the Emperor his opinion of Wellington;
but he refused to give it. To Gourgaud, however, he once said
that the Duke was " an ordinary man, prudent, and fortunate,
but not a great genius." Before Waterloo, General Reille
informed the Emperor that the British infantry was good but
not so good as the French, who would win the day by their
cavalry. This information probably accounts for the use of the
French cavalry in great masses, as will appear in due course. As
for the Prussians, Napoleon had a poor opinion of them after Jena.1
Such was the Emperor's state of mind between 10 and 11 a.m.
He did not reconnoitre. He trusted to his superiority in guns,
and the compactness of his army, to shiver in pieces one in
which five different languages were sooken. Further, he did not
pay heed to the slope of the ground northwards from the ridge
of Mont St. Jean, which enabled Wellington to conceal his
second line and reserves. At St. Helena the Emperor declared
that he could see every one of Wellington's moves ; 2 but this was
1 Gourgaud, " Journal," ii, 84, 367 ; C. Shorter, " Napoleon and his Fellow
Travellers," 278.
2 " Nap. Corresp.,'' xxxi, 187.

NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO 191
an impossibility. The concealment of part of the Duke's army,
added to the strength of the buildings at Hougomont, la Haye
Sainte, and Papelotte, ought to have made Napoleon cautious.
In such a case a prudent leader makes reconnaissances in force
so as to compel the defenders to show themselves. Nothing of
the kind was done.
There is no need to recount the details of the fighting. We
are concerned solely with the views of the Emperor. Early
in the afternoon, before the advance of d'Erlbn's corps, he was
perplexed by the appearance of a body of troops far on the
east, and believed them to be Grouchy's. The incident was
not unlike that at Ligny, when for a time d'Erlon's errant
corps was taken to be a hostile force ; and the sole sign of
caution in the Emperor on the 18th is his pause for a short
time in order to ascertain whether the new comers were friends
or foes. Finding from a Prussian prisoner that they were the
vanguard of Billow's corps, he added a postscript to a despatch
just drawn up for Grouchy, bidding that marshal march
thither and take Biilow in the rear. That despatch was in
answer to one just received from Grouchy that he was marching
upon Wavre in order to hinder the Prussians from retiring on
Brussels, where they seemed to be intending to unite with Wel
lington. The Emperor, after sending off his reply to Grouchy,
was by no means disconcerted at seeing the Prussians in the
distance. Why? Obviously because he believed them to be
only Billow's corps.1 The prisoner had spoken only of the march
of one corps, which in point of fact did not equal Grouchy's
force. As for the other Prussians, Napoleon still clung to his
assumption that they could not possibly fight so soon after the
severe defeat of Ligny. As we have seen, he estimated their
total losses at 45,000 men; and it was natural for him to assume
that the survivors could not receive fresh supplies of ammuni
tion by the night of the 17th and be ready to attack him on the
1 8th. That, however, was the case. Thus, the decisive fact of the
situation was that three Prussian corps were advancing against
Napoleon, when he expected only one, that one, in his con
ception, being doomed to be shivered between the hammer and
the anvil. In his St. Helena narrative Napoleon reckoned
1 Gourgaud (pp. 104, 105) refers only to Billow's corps; and Napoleon's
own comments show that he thought he had to deal solely with him.

192 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Bliicher's effectives after the battle of Ligny at only 40,000 men,
and stated that they, " beaten and discouraged," could not over
bear 28,000 Frenchmen under Grouchy, " well placed and
victorious." In this calculation, the Emperor reckoned Biilow
as entirely separate from Blucher, and he assigned only 28,000
men to Grouchy on the gratuitous assumption that that marshal
" must have" detached about 6,000 or 7,000 men to operate
against Billow's rear.1 If, as seems probable, this represents the
impressions implanted in that tenacious brain by the successive
incidents of the battle, the cause of disaster is obvious.
Gourgaud 2 states that, before launching d'Erlon's corps for
ward at Wellington's left, Napoleon hesitated whether to make
the chief attack by the Nivelles road against his right. Possibly
this is correct; and, if so, it would explain the slight halt before
d'Erlon's advance. But, on the whole, the story may be dis
missed as an afterthought ; for, during more than an hour, the
French had been attacking the wood and outbuildings of Hougo
mont with little effect. That solid outpost barred the way; and
success on that side would only have driven Wellington nearer
to the Prussians. Moreover, with the exception of Marengo,
Napoleon did not change his plans during a battle. He there
fore persevered with his original plan of shaking Wellington's
array by a sustained artillery fire, while solid columns wrested
from him la Haye Sainte and cut through his left centre, thereby
driving the chief mass of the Allies away from the Prussians. It
was a costly but speedy means of assuring a decisive triumph.
The repulse of d'Erlon's columns east of la Haye Sainte, and
of the French cuirassiers above that farmstead, did not alter the
Emperor's resolve. He wheeled round part of his right wing to
withstand the advance of Biilow towards the village of Planche-
noit, the capture of which would have endangered the French rear
1 " Nap. Corresp., xxxi, 190. Section ix, on page 196, is a far more correct
description of Blucher's forces and movements. It seems to me a later com
pilation than that on p. 190, which probably represents Napoleon's notions
of 18th June.
I cannot accept the views of O'Connor Morris (" Campaign of 1815,"
ch. viii) that Napoleon had ordered Grouchy to detach 7,000 men against
Billow's rear. There is no proof of this ; and surely it was an assumption.
O'Connor Morris seems to me to assign too much importance to Napoleon's
" Commentaries," vol. v ; they are admittedly very incorrect and biassed.
The same may be said of the DicUes to Montholon.
2 Gourgaud, p. 105.

NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO 193
and communications. Therefore between 4.30 and 5.30, as the
Prussian attack developed, the Emperor sent into that village
Duhesme's division of the Young Guard, thus depleting his
reserve of about 4,300 excellent troops. The move of Biilow
was on a point so far away from Wellington as to betoken the
advance of other Prussians who would fill up the interval ; and
perhaps an inkling of this truth led the Emperor then to con
centrate his attention on this part of the field. Billow's attack
was at a vital point ; and until it was repulsed, Napoleon could
not but leave to Ney the conduct of the battle against Welling
ton.1 Besides, the more Biilow pressed on against Planchenoit,
the worse would be his position when Grouchy fell upon his
rear. Gourgaud states that when Napoleon saw that Biilow was
not followed by Grouch}', he ordered Ney to " hold " la Haye
Sainte. He also says that up to 6 p.m. the Staff had no news of
Grouchy; and, again, that by 7.30, the sound of Grouchy's
cannon was heard two and a half leagues away.2
It is clear, then, that Napoleon and his Staff officers paid much
heed to developments on their right flank, doubtless with the
hope of crushing the Prussian corps or capturing it outright.
By about 6 p.m. Billow's men were beaten back from Planchenoit
by three additional battalions of the Imperial Guard; and the
Emperor thereafter gave his attention to Wellington. In the
-interval, the Emperor's knowledge of events in his front was
but partial, a fact which explains the haziness of his and
Gourgaud's accounts of this part of the battle. Thus, Napoleon
states that after a long and creditable defence, Hougomont was
taken owing to the fire of eight howitzers which he concentrated
upon it; whereas Hougomont was held by detachments of
British Guards, a Nassau battalion, and a few Hanoverians to the
end of the day. He also asserts that, after three hours' fighting,
the French took la Haye Sainte from Scottish regiments? Gour
gaud dates its capture at 4 p.m. But Major Baring, the com
mander of the detachment of the King's German Legion, which
staunchly held that post, states positively that he and the few
survivors were not driven out from the farm itself until 6.30.4
The other chief point in dispute is the responsibility for the
1 Ropes, " Campaign of Waterloo," p. 309.
2 Gourgaud, 85. 3 "Nap. Corresp.," xxxi, 188, 191.
4 Ropes (p. 307), following Gourgaud, places the time at about 4 p.m., but,
I am convinced, wrongly. O

i94 pITT AND NAPOLEON
succession of the cavalry charges whereby Ney hoped to shatter
Wellington's right centre. Had they been properly supported by
infantry, success was highly probable ; but that support was not
forthcoming. Napoleon afterwards blamed Ney severely for
beginning the cavalry charges too early. However, he believed
that they had carried the enemy's position, and therefore finally
ordered Kellermann's cuirassiers to support their comrades and
" pursue the English army." 1 Again, then, it is clear that the Em
peror failed to discern Wellington's second line and reserves, or to
notice the movements by which the Duke reinforced his line at
the points threatened by the French cavalry. Gourgaud also
states that Napoleon himself ordered Kellermann's cuirassiers to
reinforce the French cavalry, which then seemed to be in posses
sion of the plateau of Mont St. Jean.2 Thus, Napoleon, during
the attack of Billow on Planchenoit, must have believed that one
more cavalry charge against Wellington's right centre would
decide the battle. The mistake was irreparable; for it inca
pacitated the French cavalry from holding the Allies at bay
after the repulse of the Guard.
The repulse of Biilow at Planchenoit about 6 p.m. enabled
Napoleon to concentrate his thought on the battle against Wel
lington and thus to put a new face on affairs at his front. Gen
eral Foy's division and that of Bachelu in Reille's corps pressed
hard Wellington's right centre ; the capture of la Haye Sainte at
6.30 also enabled d'Erlon's corps to advance and pour a de
structive fire into the centre. On the left the Nassauers were
driven from the village of Smohain, so that Wellington lost touch
with the Prussian corps of Ziethen which slowly advanced to
wards the British left.3 Carelessly though Napoleon had fought
the battle hitherto, he came near to winning it between 6.30 and
7 p.m.; and, had not the greater part of Reille's corps been
wasted in ineffective endeavours to storm Hougomont, the
French line regiments, aided by the Imperial Guard, would
probably have carried the tricolour to victory.
Napoleon believed that the fate of a battle was determined by
1 "Nap. Corresp.," xxxi, 194, where it is stated that the 12,000 French
horsemen overthrew the superior cavalry forces of Wellington, cut up several
squares, captured 60 cannon and 6 flags, and held the plateau up to 7 p.m. !
2 Gourgaud (pp. 86, 87) says the French cavalry broke up several squares !
J For the cause of Ziethen's slow advance see Rose, " Napoleonic Studies,"
296, 297.

NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO 195
decisive encouragement imparted at the critical moment. In his
judgment the crisis arrived shortly after 7 p.m., when Wellington
was with the utmost difficulty holding his own, and the advance
of Pirch's and Ziethen's corps had not told on the French right.
The Emperor therefore ordered all the available battalions of
the Guard forward to attack the allied right centre,1 while Reille
and d'Erlon redoubled their efforts. Napoleon sent his aide-de
camp, Labedoyere along the lines with the encouraging message
that Grouchy was advancing; and, nerved by this belief, the
French, after eight hours of desperate fighting, made a final
effort.2 The repulse of the Imperial Guard need not be described
here. It occurred about the same time that the French holding
the hamlets of la Haye and Smohain gave way before the at
tack of Ziethen and the British left. Napoleon severely blamed
Durutte's division of d'Erlon's corps which bore the brunt of this
double onset; but the censure is unjust. He had encouraged all
his line by the report that Grouchy was at hand ; and, instead of
Grouchy came Ziethen's Prussians. This explains the cries of
a la trahison and sauve quipeut, which now spread from division
to division of d'Erlon's corps. What was intended to encourage
proved to be the cause of dismay and despair.
It is noteworthy that both Napoleon and Gourgaud give no
account whatever of the repulse of the Guard, excepting that the
former ascribes its retirement to the need of facing about towards
la Haye Sainte in order to restore order on that side.3 A lamer
excuse for the retreat of the Guard cannot be conceived ; and it
conflicts with the next statement, that the battle was lost owing
to the sudden charge of 2,000 British horsemen, who penetrated
between the Guard and Reille's corps. Gourgaud places their
number at 3,000, and says that they pierced the line between
Reille's corps and la Haye Sainte.4 Both accounts are wrong.
Vivian and Vandeleur were posted nearly behind Maitland's
Guards, who repulsed the first column of the Imperial Guard ;
and their brigades followed the two columns retiring in confusion
towards la Belle Alliance. Vivian, with the 10th and 18th Hus
sars, supported by several squadrons of the King's German
1 " Nap. Corresp.," xxxi, 198, where he says the advance was in order to
support " la cavalerie dikontenancee," which a little earlier he had described
as holding the plateau of Mont St. Jean up to 7 p.m.
2 Ibid., xxxi, 198 ; Gourgaud, 90. 3 Ibid.
1 Ibid., xxxi, 198, 199; Gourgaud, 92.

196 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Legion, executed most effective charges on the last reserves of
French cavalry capable of offering any resistance ; and his onset,
together with the spirited advance of Adam's infantry brigade,
including Colborne's 52nd regiment, rendered all attempt at
rallying impossible even in the heart of the enemy's position.
The British and German horsemen not only overthrew the
wrecks of the French cavalry, but also hustled back the last
square of the Imperial Guard which made a stand. Napoleon
saw these effective charges and did full justice to them, stating
that they decided the fate of the battle.1 This is largely correct ;
for, with the support of Adam's brigade and other troops they
drove back in one confused mass the two columns of the Imperial
Guard, the supporting cavalry, and Reille's corps. The retreat
of some 30,000 men towards the chaussee near la Belle Alliance
would alone have occasioned a rout.
But that rout became a stampede owing to the convergence of
d'Erlon's corps from the French right wing on the same road.
The panic which laid hold ofDurutte's division has already been
explained; and it seems to have spread to the other divisions
about the time when the bearskins of the Imperial Guard were
seen to be tailing back into the hollow. To complete the con
fusion, Billow pressed on Napoleon's right rear; and, had his
horsemen been sufficiently numerous and fresh, the battle must
have ended in a massacre, and the capture and execution of the
Emperor himself.
Singularly enough, Napoleon never fully understood why he
was beaten. The sentence quoted at the head of this essay
shows that on one occasion he discerned the fundamental cause;
but for the most part he sought refuge in the platitude, that
Waterloo was a fatality : fournie incomprehensible ; concours de
fatalith — Grouchy, Ney, d'Erlon." 2 He once declared to Gour
gaud that, even with 20,000 fewer men, he ought to have won
the day.3 He had a poor opinion of Soult as Chief of Staff.4
Several times he blamed Ney severely for sending in the cavalry
too soon and for other follies. He thought little of Friant, who
led the charge of the Guard, and longed that Bessieres could have
been there.5 Once he said that he ought to have beaten Welling
ton on 17th June.6 He also admitted that British bravery was
1 " Nap. Corresp.," xxxi, 199 ; Gourgaud, " Journal," i, 197.
* Las Cases, " Memorial," iv, 304. 3 Gourgaud, " Journal," i, 79.
4 Ibid., ii, 84. 6 Ibid, i, 150, 197, 503. e Ibid., i, 174-

NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO 197
superb, and added : " It was by their discipline especially that
the English triumphed. They could advance thirty paces, halt,
fire, retire, fire, advance thirty paces, keeping the greatest
order." 1 It is significant that at St. Helena he never mentioned
his having been in bad health during the Waterloo campaign, a
fact which disposes of the many statements that he was a mere
wreck of his former self.
The most curious feature of the whole question is the inability
of Napoleon to understand that he himself was responsible for
losing the campaign. As has now appeared, he underrated the
fighting power of the allied armies and the abilities of their
commanders. He overrated the importance of his successes
over the Prussians on 1 5th- 1 6th June; on the 17th he was too
late in moving against Wellington at Quatre Bras, and in order
ing a pursuit of Blucher. His instructions of 17th June to
Grouchy did not allow for the case of a junction of Billow's
powerful corps with Blucher, though that event, which was far
from improbable, would raise the Prussian army to a strength
far beyond the power of Grouchy to cope with. A striking proof
of Napoleon's assurance of triumph at Mont St. Jean came to light
after the battle. In his carriage, which was captured at Genappe,
were found proclamations dated "Notre Palais de Laeken " (near
Brussels).2 It was in that spirit that he fought the Battle of
Waterloo. There is little or no sign of hesitation on which
M. Houssaye has laid stress.3 On the contrary, every move up
to about 4.30 betokened absolute confidence in the result. Be
tween 4.30 and 6 p.m. he paid much attention to the advance of
the Prussians on Planchenoit, but not from apprehension so
much as from a resolve to hold them at arm's length until
Grouchy could come up and crush them. Confidence appears in
his allowing the greater part of Reille's corps to waste its
energies for hours on the walls of Hougomont ; in his acquiescing
in the advance of d'Erlon's corps in the solid masses which en
tailed disaster ; in his ordering Kellermann's cuirassiers to make
the final cavalry charge which left the French with no reserves
1 Gourgaud, "Journal," ii, 84.
2 Sir A. S. Frazer, " Letters," 567.
3 Houssaye, " Waterloo," 480, 484. Napoleon's words uttered to Las Cases
(" Memorial," vii, 179 et seq.), about his feeling that Fortune deserted him
at Waterloo, are clearly an afterthought. Napoleon's actions prove the
contrary.

198 PITT AND NAPOLEON
of horsemen; and in the onset of all but one of the remaining
battalions of the Imperial Guard. His motto had always been,
risquer le tout pour le tout, and the supreme example of that
daring which rapidly raised him to power is the battle which
brought about his headlong fall.

PART II
CORRESPONDENCE
A. The King and Pitt.
B. Pitt to the Duke of Portland.
C. Lord Grenville to Pitt.
D. Pitt and Windham.
E. Burke to Windham.
F. Pitt to Lord Harrowby.
G. Lord Harrowby to Pitt.
H. Canning to Pitt.
I. Suggestions for the Act of Union.
j Pitt's last Illness.

PART II
CORRESPONDENCE (A.) THE KING AND PITT
[N.B. The following letters have not hitherto been published. Others
between the King and Pitt are in the Appendix of Earl Stanhope's
"Life of Pitt"; but limits of space render it impossible to present
summaries of them. The following letters are all from the King to Pitt,
unless otherwise stated. Letters, or parts of them, given in precis are
enclosed in brackets. The following abbreviations have been used :
Y. M. = Your Majesty.
Y. E. = Your Excellency.
H. I. M. = His Imperial Majesty.]
"Queen's House, March 20, 1783.
" Mr. Pitt, I desire you will come here immediately.''
"Queen's House, Dec. 24, 1783.
" Mr. Pitt ought to know that Ld. Dartmouth and Mr. Greville
have resigned their staves, and Lord Jersey the Board of Pen
sioners ; Lord De Ferrars naturally should have his former office ;
I wish much, if it does not prevent other necessary arrangements,
that Lord Walsingham may get some employment and that
Lord Aylesford may be advanced; his vacancy in the bed
chamber I should willingly confer of (sic) any peer who might
be thought proper on this occasion. The Constable of the Tower
would suit any peer and more properly a military one; might it
not please Lord Effingham who must naturally have some office,
and one of that nature would be more pleasing to him than any
attendance at Court? " "Windsor, Dec. 28, 1783.
"... As to Ireland, I like the idea thrown out on Friday by
Mr. Pitt of the propriety that would attend Lord Cornwallis's
holding that office; though I doubt his accepting it, I do not

202 PITT AND NAPOLEON
think that a reason Mr. Pitt should not attempt it; Lord Sydney
is a good channel to find out whether it would succeed." 1
"Windsor, Dec. 30th, 1783.
" Mr. Pitt will give notice to Lord Effingham that he is also to
be presented to-morrow as Warden of the Mint; and if Ld.
Chesterfield likes the Spanish Embassy, I shall approve of his
appointment. I shall be glad to hear to-morrow Mr. Pitt's ideas
with regard to the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland. . . ."
"Queen's House, Jany 1, 1784.
" As the forms of this day will probably last too long for my
afterwards seeing Mr. Pitt in private, I take this method of
acquainting him that the Duke of Newcastle is in town, and as
right in his ideas on the present crisis as can be wished, and that
he will take every method to oblige his friends to an active sup
port of My Cause; nothing would, I find, hurt him so much as
any offer to his son. If Mr. Pitt would send him a note offering
to wait upon him, it would be very acceptable. Mr. Brudenell
has, I find, secured his two nephews ; some civility to him would
be very proper : I have good hopes of Sir Henry Gough."
" Windsor, Jan. 11, 1784.
" It is with infinite satisfaction I find by Mr. Pitt's letter this
morning that the proposition for arranging the East India affairs
has been carried in the Court of Proprietors by so very large a
majority, which certainly must have the effect of rendering the
plan much more palatable to Parliament than if it had not had that
sanction. The Duke of Northumberland is highly pleased. Mr.
Pitt ought this day to learn from him the title he proposes taking,
that the warrant may be prepared with the two others."
"Queen's House, Jan. 15, 1784.
" Though the length of the debate shows the House of Com
mons is not yet come to that temper which the seriousness of the
times ought to effect, the not dividing against the admittance of
the new East India Bill gives some hopes it may meet with
more support than the leaders pretend: I should hope Mr.
Yorke's notice may be of utility and bring those not quite deaf
to decency to a different conduct." "Queen's House, Jan. 17, 1784.
"The majority having fallen to 21, Mr. Drake and Sir Wm.
Dolben and others joining and speaking in the minority, besides
Lord Cornwallis (1738-1805) did not accept the Irish Viceroyalty. Lord
Sydney (1723-1800) was Home Secretary.

THE KING AND PITT 203
the strength of the resolution, which is a mark of violence not
unnatural to men finding they are losing ground, makes me look
on this last debate as a favorable one, and I trust a few days
will shew that the majority is in favour of decorum instead of
siding with anarchy." " Queen's House, Jan. 24, 1784.
" Mr. Pitt's note is but this instant arrived ; by the Minutes of
the House of Commons I see that the messenger of the Great
Seal or his deputy have orders to attend at twelve this day:
this cannot be for any common affair, yet I should suppose Mr.
Pitt, if he had known it, would have mentioned it. I own I
cannot see any reason if the thing is practicable that a dissolu
tion should not be effected, if not, I fear the constitution of this
country cannot subsist.
" P.S. I shall not stir from home, that no delays may be occa
sioned from my absence even for a couple of hours."
"Queen's House, Feb. 3, 1784.
" It appears very evident to me that the motion of Mr. Gros
venor which I can easily believe was well meant, very materially
affected the division on the second; for, as it carried no very
fixed complexion, both sides of the House could explain at
pleasure. The second is nothing but the one past (sic) some
days ago in other words. If the House should really carry an
address this day, it will highly become the House of Lords to
throw off their lethargy and also vote an address that shall show
they feel that each branch of the Legislature has its fixed
bounds and that the executive power is vested in the Crown
and not to be infringed by the Commons." Feb. 4, 1784.
" The whole conduct of Opposition confirms the opinion I gave
very early of its dangerous intentions of going step by step as
far as the House of Commons can be led, avoiding if possible
any avowed illegality of conduct, but not looking to the spirit
either of the constitution or of justice. The directing the resolu
tion of Monday to be brought to me without having proved any
charge against Administration, or indeed pretending to any,
must make every man of reflection grieve that the House can
be carried such lengths. . . ."
[For the rest see Stanhope, vol. i, App., p. vi.]
"Queen's House, Feb. 7, 1784.
"The Draught (sic) Mr. Pitt in conjunction with the other
ministers has drawn up in answer to the one in Lord Howe's

204 PITT AND NAPOLEON
hand is conformable to every idea I have ever harboured on the
subject of any communication for effecting the formation of an
Administration on the widest basis, and as such meets with my
fullest approbation." "Queen's House, Feb. ii, 1784.
" I am glad the House proceeded on the estimate of the Ord
nance, which, not being a favourite service, would more easily
have been postponed than any other. I therefore trust that it
is a sign the public services will by the more reasonable men in
that House not be suffered to be longer put off. I am not sur
prised the language of Mr. Fox on union 1 should have been less
offensive this day, the temper of London and Westminster must
make such an appearance necessary; but whilst resignation is
coupled with it, no expectation can be grounded on it nor any
propriety in asking any further questions from Opposition on
that head. The only line that can be followed is for Adminis
tration uniformly to hold the discourse that I am ever open to
any proposition that can effect the forming of an Administra
tion on a wide basis ; that one formed out of only a part of my
subjects I will never listen to ; and that there is no man so little
a friend to his country in my service as to value his own par
ticular situation in competition with so salutary a measure."
"Queen's House, Feb. 17, 1784.
" As by Mr. Pitt's letter I am to conclude that Windsor is the
most acceptable stall to Mr. Wilson, I authorize his acquainting
Doctor Buller that he may be presented to-morrow as Dean of
Exeter and Mr. Wilson as Canon of Windsor." 2
" Queen's House, Feb. 18, 1784.
"... It seems very strange that Opposition can infatuate so
many persons to neglect so long perceiving that it is impossible
for me to be so wanting to my own character as not to stand
firm, and consequently that if the Commons do not keep within
their proper line, that confusion at least for a time must ensue."
" Queen's House, Feb. 21, 1784.
" Mr. Pitt, at any other period of my reign or on similar pro
ceedings from any other House of Commons but the present,
would have received from me expressions of surprise, which is
certainly not the case at present. If it is not inconvenient to
1 I.e., a union of the parties, as recommended by the Committee at the
St. Alban's Tavern, for which see Rose, "William Pitt and National
Revival," 164-6.
2 The Rev. Edward Wilson had been Pitt's private tutor.

THE KING AND PITT 205
Mr. Pitt to call here at half-past two this day, I should willingly
hear his account of the debate; but should he wish first to
confer with the other Ministers on the words of an answer and
on the steps which the times may authorize and the safety of
the constitution require, previous to seeing me, I shall in that
case propose to see him as early to-morrow morning as it may
suit him. As the Opposition seem so fond of bringing King
William forward on all occasions, I should think his exact words
in 1 70 1, with such additional ones as the moment may call for,
would not be improper to be uttered from the Chair of State
when the whole House bring up this strange, and I may add as
an ungrounded position, this unconstitutional address."
" Queen's House, Feb. 26, 1784.
" I should not deal with that openness towards Mr. Pitt which
his conduct deserves, if I did not state my hopes that the Duke
of Portland will not come into what I may deem reasonable (sic) :
a subject requiring from his sovereign exact words, agreeable to
which he can alone enter into negotiation, is very revolting; but
as the other Ministers seem to advise that this last trial should
be made, I will not object to it, provided, in addition to the
words proposed, Mr. Powys shall explain specifically to that
Duke that his being called upon is to give him no right to any
thing above an equal share to others in the new Administration,
not to be the head of it, whatever employment he may hold."
"Windsor, March 2nd, 1784.
" I am more sorry than surprised that so small a majority in
the House [of] Commons have let passion so far get the better
of reason as to move a second address to me, and the latter part
of it in so dictatorial a style; the answer to the former having
been so ample, a short reference to that sums up all that is
requisite, unless the Cabinet should think it right for the Lords,
either from themselves or from having the two addresses and
answers communicated to them from me, ought to take notice
of a conduct which really if it could succeed, would entirely
overturn the balance of the constitution ; but, thank Heaven, I
am not of materials to act so disgracefully. I must now turn to
the pleasant part of the debate, the declaration that all negotia
tion is broken off; * this I look upon as most fortunate, as it
could never have ended advantageously for this country, must
have proved inconvenient to those employed in it, and the idea
of its subsisting certainly operating to make every man less
eager, from a doubt whether his efforts might not be frustrated
1 I.e., for the union of parties.

206 PITT AND NAPOLEON
by the introduction of his opponents. I suppose Mr. Pitt will
settle this day with the other Ministers the short answer to this
warm command." " Queen's House, March 28, 1784.
" Having learnt this day that the Duke of Grafton has met
with the repulse of his candidate, Gen1. Conway, at St. Edmonds-
bury, and that the Duke, to prevent the introduction of a
stranger, has been obliged to put up in his stead Capt. Geo.
Fitzroy, I think it may be agreeable to Mr. Pitt to know of a
certain friend instead of a determined enemy. I yesterday signed
the appointments of the Comptroller of the Household and the
Master of the Rolls; I wish Mr. Pitt would settle with the
Chancellor1 that the appointments of Attorney-General and
Solicitor, as well as the Chief Justice of Chester, be sent for my
signing as the time for elections is hourly approaching. The
accounts of York show the majority was very decided; but by
the account of Ld. Percy the management wretched, and the
Sheriff frightened by Ld. Surrey into signing not being able to
decide as to the majority. By a letter Ld. Salisbury has received
from Mr. Wilberforce I find that gentleman is to be the joint
candidate with Mr. Duncombe."

" Queen's House, March 28, 1784.
"... No candidates have yet started at Coventry against the
late members, which is the more extraordinary, as I am told two
new men might certainly, at not more than ^2,000 each, succeed,
the town is so desirous of a change of representatives."

"Windsor, March 30, 1784.
"... I am happy to find two candidates are likely to be
found to oppose the late representatives of Coventry. I under
stood Sir Jas. Pennyman declares Beverley is so offended with
Major Anderson that any fresh man would probably succeed
there. If Lieut-Gen. Robertson is so desirous of a seat in Parlia
ment, he ought to be encouraged to go on some of these
hazardous exploits. There has been a ridiculous attempt here of
Ld. Penryn (sic) ; but a few hours convinced him that he had
no chance against the late member. Mrs. Keppel has this day
sent to her few tenants that a candidate will still arrive before
the election, which is settled for nine to-morrow morning; but
should one appear, it cannot be of further mischief than obliging
the late representatives to have a poll."
1 The Lord Chancellor, Lord Thurlow (1732-1806).

THE KING AND PITT 207
" Windsor, April 6, 1784.
" The introduction of Mr. Wyndham (sic) into the House of
Commons is one of the few unexpected disasters, for undoubt
edly as yet the elections have proved beyond the hopes of the
most sanguine friends.1 I find there is little doubt of the success
of the new candidates for this county, and the report is current
here this evening that Sir Robert Clayton has declined for
Surrey. Coventry seems promising. I was in hopes some news
might have come of the poll for the city of York. By what I
have heard the people of Tamworth are so dissatisfied with
Lord. Townshend that any candidate that should have stood
forth would have succeeded." " Queen's House, April 8, 1784.
" I rejoice very sincerely at the success in the county election
of York and also in that of the city of York. Mr. Pitt will cer
tainly not require an hint that attention should be had that a
proper candidate be found for Hull." "Windsor, April 12, 1784.
" The returns of the elections just received from Mr. Pitt have
the same agreeable appearance which attended the former ones.
I find Ld. Verney declines coming into any agreement and has
produced the list of supporters he is to meet with which appears
so favourable that it is supposed Mr. Aubrey will relinquish."
"Windsor, April 13, 1784.
"Though the advance made by Mr. Fox this day can only
have been by bad votes, yet similar measures must be adopted
rather than let him get returned for Westminster. Nothing can
be more material than the account of Mr. Coke having declined
in Norfolk, as it is as strong a proof as the decision in Yorkshire
of the genuine sense of the people." "Windsor, April 17, 1784.
" The success at Coventry is a most agreeable event ; from
what I had heard this morning to be the opinion of one of the
Conways who left that place three days since, I had every
reason to expect this favourable conclusion. I am sorry to see,
though indeed slowly, that Mr. Fox gains upon Sir Cecil
Wray. ..." "Windsor, May 1, 1784.
" The poll for Westminster of this day still continues favour
able to Mr. Fox; but I have heard that the Quackers (sic),
1 Mr. Wyndham (or Windham) (1750-1810), a Whig, was elected for
Norwich in place of a Tory.

208 PITT AND NAPOLEON
though in general unwilling to take part in elections, have no
disinclination on the present state of the poll to come forward,
if properly applied to, and that their number amounts to near
three hundred, which would place Lord Hood and Sir Cecil
Wray in a very decided situation. I understand Lord Salisbury
has sent to Mr. Barklay to desire he will call on his brethren.
I think it right to acquaint Mr. Pitt that the High Bailiff is
decided in his intention of granting a scrutiny if asked for, and
gives that reason to his friends for not objecting more decidedly
to many of the votes that are now produced." " Queen's House, May 14, 1784.
" I am much pleased with the general turn of the Speech,
which Mr. Pitt will of course at a meeting communicate to the
Cabinet, and should any alterations occur, he will of course
communicate it to me. . . ." "Windsor, May 25, 1784.
" Mr. Pitt's account of the Opposition on the first question of
this new Parliament having divided but 1 36, and on the address
but 114, gives the most flattering appearance that business may
be carried on with decency instead of that violence which dis
graced the late Parliament and nearly overturned the constitu
tion. . . ." "Queen's House, June 2nd, 1784.
" I had no doubt every degree of cavil would be ransacked to
protract the progress of the Westminster Election, and therefore
am not surprized though sorry, the House of Commons has been
prevented from getting through that business, though sitting till
six this morning. I am glad the opening has been made on the
part of the High Bailiff with becoming strength, and think the
division in the course of the day shews the sense of the House
on the unwarrantable conduct of Opposition."

"Windsor, June 15, 1784.
" Had the motion of yesterday owed its existence to any other
person than the mover, it could never have been laid before the
House of Commons ; for it would have been but natural to sound
whether support would be given previous to producing it in that
assembly. I fear so long a vindication must have been prefaced
by a long speech, so that Mr. Pitt was not sooner rid of the
motion than the length of common debates. I hope now it will
be possible to proceed with the necessary business of Parliament
without more delay."

THE KING AND PITT 209
"Windsor, July 3, 1784.
" So much heat having been occasioned by the very dangerous
Bill for regulating the affairs of the East India Company abroad,
it is scarcely possible any step shall be taken concerning that
subject that shall not bring on some debate in the House of
Commons. I trust Mr. Pitt will get through the various parts
that may be necessary to be discussed this session, with that
success which ought ever to attend those who have no other
view but that of doing justice. I am not surprised Major
Cathcart met with applause on his first appearance yesterday as
a speaker, having ever heard him looked on as a sensible young
man. I am certain he cannot have said anything in favour of the
troops in India remaining in the hands of the Company, but
must have enforced that they ought to be those of the nation
but paid by the Company. Then a total stop could be put to
the shameful mode of increasing the number of officers every
hour to answer the views of particular persons: then the half
pay might be gradually diminished by obliging those on it to
fill up vacancies or be struck off of it; besides putting the military
in that country on a respectable foot (sic), which officers belong
ing to a company cannot pretend to." "St. James's, July 28, 1784.
" It is impossible to frame a more proper letter than Mr. Pitt
has in answer to the Duke of Rutland, as it in a masterly manner
contains all the difficulties in the present stage of the business
of forming a decided opinion; indeed, great as the enormity is,
as it amounts as yet only to words, the punishment, if any could
be obtained, would not be adequate to the tendency of it. Con
sequently I fully concur in the sentiments of this well drawn up
letter." ' "Windsor, July 29, 1784.
"By Mr. Pitt's I find the East India (sic) is passed without a
division, and the rest of the business of the day also concluded.
I trust now little more trouble will be given in finishing the
business of this session, as Mr. Fox's speech yesterday was, I
suppose, his last words on the occasion, and that he will retire
to his new purchased villa." "Windsor, Aug. 23, 1784.
" I am sensible of Mr. Pitt's attention in transmitting the
letter he has received from Mr. Orde, which undoubtedly must
1 For the letters of Pitt and Rutland see " Corresp. between Pitt and the
Duke of Rutland," pp. 24-36, and Lord Ashbourne, " Pitt," p. 81. They refer
to the publication by the Earl of Bristol (who was also Bishop of Derry) of
a pamphlet advocating the Catholic claims. P

210 PITT AND NAPOLEON
be more explicit than any official one that may have accom
panied it to the Secretary of State. I hope the zeal of the
servants of the Crown in Ireland will not overbalance their
prudence; for should they find that no immediate mischief is
likely to arise from not instantly seizing on the conspirators, the
letting them continue to assemble, having exact intelligence of
what passes at their meetings will be a means of being informed
of all those concerned, and consequently when it is thought
necessary to bring this plot to light, the whole scheme may be
overturned; whilst, if published too soon, only the parties in
Dublin will probably come to light; and though it may stop the
evil for some time it will in some time again break out.1 Indeed
I look upon a discovery previous to the session of Parliament in
Ireland, and the less time before it, as a most happy circum
stance, it will take off the minds of persons from delicate subjects
that can only involve that Kingdom into insurmountable diffi
culties." "Windsor, Aug. 29, 1784.
" Mr. Pitt has judged very properly in communicating the
private letter he has received from Mr. Orde.2 I agree with the
opinion that the informers greatly exaggerate, but that would
not authorize any relaxation of attention to so very serious a
subject. The opinions that have been sent from hence concur
in recommending the postponing any publication; therefore I
need not say more on that head, which certainly is the only
judicious conduct that can be pursued. The publications are
undoubtedly the most barefaced treason, which it would be
difficult for the most patriotic jury to deny ; but the taking any
step on them I think ought also to be postponed." " Sept. 10, 1784.
"... Lord Southampton dropped that the Prince [of Wales's]
debts are supposed to amount to £100,000, which in one year
and without gaming, seems hardly credible.3 I shall certainly
give no answer, should such an application be made, that can
engage me to anything. I must see the whole before I can guess
whether anything can be done, and then not without the fullest
communication with Mr. Pitt."
1 Thomas Orde (1748-1807) was Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant,
and became Baron Bolton in 1797. The affair referred to a plot supposed to
be furthered by France. For Pitt's letter to Orde embodying the King's
instructions, see Lord Ashbourne, " Pitt," pp. 82-3.
2 Ibid., pp. 83, 84.
3 Hon. George Fitzroy, 2nd Lord Southampton (1761-1810), was Groom
of the Bedchamber to the Prince of Wales. For the Prince's debts, see
Rose, " William Pitt and National Revival," p. 394.

THE KING AND PITT 211
"Queen's House, Jan. 28, 1785.
" I am the better able to give my sentiments to Mr. Pitt on
the two letters he has sent for my perusal, the one from the
Duke of Rutland, the other from Mr. Foster, as I yesterday read
the public letter the Duke wrote on this delicate subject to
Lord Sydney.1 It is impossible for the most heated Irish patriot
to deny that every attention to the trade of that kingdom has
been given in the deliberations that have been held to make a
final settlement between the two kingdoms. The justice of
Ireland contributing to the general expense of the Empire,
when by this measure she is to be greatly enriched, and what
ever she gains appears to be at the expense of Britain, cannot,
nor does not, seem to be denied : the plea now made use of is
expediency : this I take it is now taken up as the only plausible
ground, but I do not doubt has weight with the Castle as the
ease of the Session may be affected by it; but on this side of the
water the expediency, not the value to be accrued, is the main
object of expecting this contribution ; trifling and contemptible
as the Opposition appeared on the first day of the Session, Lord
North has certainly taken ground to oppose the plan unless
Britain has some assistance from it, and will undoubtedly get
the merchants of this kingdom to cry out on the occasion, and
when they make a noise they are but too generally echoed by
the manufacturers and the populace; therefore I cannot but
encourage Mr. Pitt in the idea of not receding, and am clearly
of opinion that it is expedient Britain should understand, that if
she suffers on the one hand by this arrangement, on the other a
pecuniary assistance is to be acquired towards the general defence
of the Empire." "Queen's House, March 1, 1785.
" The account Mr. Pitt gives me of the manner in which the
confidential conversation he has had with Mr. Cooke 2 strikes him
of the probability the Irish Parliament will in effect, though
perhaps not in appearance, come into the precise mode required,
is very satisfactory; and I cannot help adding that I cannot
conceive why the Duke of Rutland's dispatches have not yet
come to me, so that, had not Mr. Pitt not had the attention of
writing this evening, I should have till to-morrow morning
probably have remained ignorant of any letters having come
from Ireland."
1 The Right Hon. John Foster (1740-1828) was Chancellor of the Irish
Exchequer, but in September 1785 became Speaker of the Irish House of
Commons. 2 Edward Cooke (1755-1820) was Under Secretary of State in Ireland.

212 PITT AND NAPOLEON
[On 13th March 1785 the King sends to Pitt a draft of his reply to
the Prince of Wales on the subject of his debts, and requests that any
alterations made by Pitt may be clearly marked. On 28th March the
King approves Pitt's alterations.] "Queen's House, April 12, 1785.
" Having entirely approved of the draft of a message to the
Prince of Wales, I have this evening sent it through the usual
channel of Lord Southampton. Nothing could have given me
greater satisfaction than the intimation in the note I received
yesterday from Mr. Pitt of the great increase of the produce of
the old taxes as well as the success [of] those established the
last year; and I cannot help flattering myself Mr. Pitt will think
this gives a reasonable ground for this year establishing a Com
mission to buy stock at the market price with the surplus that
may arise of money unappropriated in the Exchequer, that by
degrees the National Debt may be diminished and the credit
of the country again restored ; the more I reflect on the subject
the more I think what I have said on this business to Mr. Pitt
will answer both those salutary purposes."
[On 6th May 1785 the King congratulates Pitt on the success of his
measures, and censures Opposition for referring the accounts of the
East India Company for investigation to a committee of the House of
Commons; this is mere meddling with private concerns, and will de
stroy commercial confidence.] "Windsor, May 31, 1785.
" It seems to me that nothing can be more abandoned than
the conduct of the opposers of the Irish Resolutions yesterday,
after having by so decided a majority been frustrated in the
attempt to have them postponed for three months, to continue
an inflammatory debate till half hour past four this morning
merely with a view to disunite the two kingdoms, without having
any prospect of preventing the measure: this proceeding de
serves every sort of execration, and I should hope that the Irish
Parliament is too well acquainted with the true interests of that
kingdom not to see through the drift of the opposition in this
country, who have changed ground so frequently during the
tedious disquisitions this difficult subject has occasioned in the
House of Commons." "Windsor, July 22, 1785.
Considering that at first there seemed some difficulty of
getting rid of some etiquette between the two Houses of Par
liament on account of some of the alterations made by the
Lords in the Irish Resolutions, I could not but see with infinite
pleasure by Mr. Pitt's note that the expedient had been adopted

\

THE KING AND PITT 213
in the House of Commons yesterday of throwing those amend
ments into fresh Resolutions and immediately communicating
them to the Lords; but I doubt there (sic) being returned in
time on Monday for the address to be moved that day and the
leave for bringing in a Bill in consequence of them, unless
Lord Stormont should fall ill or lose his propensity of publick
haranguing. By what I heard the Lord President say on Thurs
day I rather imagined that on consideration the farther steps
on the Bill would be postponed, as?the difficulty of a call of the
House seemed unavoidable, if proposed by Opposition, from
whence every kind of delay and embarrassment must naturally
be expected." "Windsor, Aug. 7, 1785.
" I have this instant received Mr. Pitt's letter enclosing the-^
one brought him by Count Woronzow's secretary and the paper
that accompanied it, which is a copy of the one given on Friday
to Lord Carmarthen. Count Woronzow also visited Lord Sydney
and insisted a Council was to be held next day to give him an
answer whether I would break the treaty I have in my Electoral
capacity finally concluded with the King of Prussia and the
Elector of Saxony to prevent all measures contrary to the Ger
manic Constitution.1 If no one has such dangerous views, this
association cannot give umbrage; but the time certainly re
quired this precaution. My only difficulty in giving an answer
to the Empress of Russia is that her declaration bears so strongly
the shape of a command that it requires a strong one.// The /
having succeeded in that kind of conduct with the Court of
Denmark has encouraged her adopting it on this occasion; but,
as what I owe in my Electoral capacity to the future stability
of the Empire has alone actuated my conduct and makes me
feel that Russia has no right to interfere. An experience of
twenty years has taught me not to expect any return for the
great assistance she has received from this country. Mr. Pitt
shall receive from me when prepared copies of the answers that
have been  (?) to the Imperial Minister and the Russian at
Hamburg, which will fully apprise him of the business. . . ."
"St. James's, Aug. 10, 1785.
" On arriving in town I have received the three papers I pro
posed transmitting to Mr. Pitt. I cannot say that the time
1 For these topics see J. H. Rose, "William Pitt and National Revival,"
pp. 311, 312. Lord Carmarthen (1751-1799) became 5th Duke of Leeds in
March 1789. He was Foreign Secretary in 1783-1791. Count Simon Wor
onzow (Vorontzoff) (1744-1832) was Russian Ambassador in London from
1784 to 1800.

214 PITT AND NAPOLEON
which has elapsed since last I wrote has diminished my surprise
or cooled my feelings on the haughty step the Empress of
Russia has taken; but I trust I have too much regard to my
own dignity to wish any heat should appear in the answer that
may next week be given to Count Woronzow, though she must
know that when steps are taken from principle they are not to
be retrograded."
[On 6th May 1786 the King approves Pitt's draft of a letter to the
Prince of Wales on the subject of his debts.] "Windsor, July 3, 1786.
[The King's family causes increasing expenditure.]
" Now three of my six daughters appear at Court and con
sequently the expense of their dress, masters and attendants
yearly exceeds £8,ooo, which the Queen cannot be called upon
to pay. She assures me every •economy is in the most rigid
manner attended to; that for the present she does not ask for
any additional attendants, but that she may receive .£2,000 per
quarter to discharge the regular expenses. . . . The Queen has
desired me to acquaint Mr. Pitt that she actually exceeds her
income £2,000 per quarter on account of the expenses of her
six daughters, consequently the estimate relating to my children
for this year must be:
To the Queen, the increased expenses of the £
six princesses ...... 8,000
Prince Frederick, Bishop of Osnabruck and
Duke of York ...... 5,000
Prince William ... . . 3,500
„ Edward  2,500
„ Ernest \
„ Augustus I  3,500
„ AdolphusJ 
£22,500
In 1737 the princesses Amelia, Caroline, Mary and Louisa had
£19,271 is. id.; so that the Queen will maintain six daughters
for less than four were 49 years ago, when every article of life
was cheaper than now. ..." "Queen's House, Sept. 22, 1786.
" The accounts from Holland yesterday have much affected
me, as the great activity of Sir James Harris,1 and his inclination
1 For the policy of Sir James Harris (1746-1820), British Ambassador at
The Hague, created Lord Malmesbury in 1788, see Rose, "William Pitt and
National Revival," chs. xiii, xv, xvi.

THE KING AND PITT 215
to commit this country must draw us into difficulties, if great
caution and some temper is not shown in the answer to him.
I therefore wish to see Mr. Pitt at St. James's a little before
one this day, for it would be unjustifiable, when this country,
if she remains some years in peace, will regain her former wealth
and consideration, by being too meddling, should be drawn into
a fresh war which must bring on ruin, be it ever so prosperous."
"Windsor, Jan. 8, 1787.
" The dispatch Sir James Harris by the last mail notified
should soon be conveyed by Mr. Bouverie is arrived this day.
I therefore think it right not to delay till I see Mr. Pitt on
Wednesday communicating to him the letter I received this
morning from Lord Carmarthen and the copy of my answer;
but a very material additional difficulty occurs in the dispatch
of this day. Sir James sets the annual money that must at
present be issued for encouraging the party in the United States x
at twelve thousand per annum, and keeps a door open to demand
further sums. Where is this sum to be obtained, if the hazard it
may occasion of involving us in a war is risqued? Certainly it
cannot come from the Civil List. I have two younger sons
already of age who must be maintained at a much larger ex
pense when they return to England, a third within two years
of manhood, and my daughters growing up; these considera
tions must, I think, make Mr. Pitt think twice before he enters
into a plan which the Foreign Secretary of State seems very
eagerly to encourage." "Windsor, Feb. 17, 1787.
" The account just received, by Mr. Pitt's attention, of the fate
of Mr. Fox's motion respecting Portugal,2 and the having by
eleven last night concluded the several resolutions on the Com
mercial Treaty with France, which secures the report on Mon
day, gives me the highest satisfaction, and the more so as it is
by the assiduity and temper shewn by Mr. Pitt that this great
business has been so rapidly and prosperously concluded."
"Windsor, April 21, 1787.
"... Mr. Pitt's manner of stating the Budget afterwards left
no room for the Opposition to alledge any point worthy of the
attention of the House ; and one cannot but with comfort reflect
that this country is now annually buying off one million of its
1 I.e., the United Provinces of the Netherlands.
2 For keeping Portugal in a position commercially superior to that pro
posed for France in the Anglo-French treaty of September 1786, which came
into effect on 10th May, 1787.

216 PITT AND NAPOLEON
debts, whilst France exceeds its peace establishment near six
millions and seems not likely soon to adopt any plan either for
diminishing its debts or even for reducing its expences within
the bounds of its income." " Windsor, May 6, 1787.
" I have just received Mr. Pitt's box and must begin with
approving of his conduct in his interview this day with the Prince
of Wales, but at the same time lamenting, if any person was
present even at the first part of it, that so long a fellow as Mr.
Sheridan should be the man pointed out as the Prince's adviser.
Mr. Pitt knows my sentiments too well to expect I can consent
to an increase of income: that can only be when the Prince of
Wales is willing to marry : besides that has ever been the sub
ject of dispute between us, and on that condition I should not
think my honour considered in any apparent reconciliation. My
idea is that, if the Prince of Wales will fairly state his debts,
that there shall be a willingness to exonerate him from them ;
but that it must be done by installments not to affect the public
too much; that if he will promise not only in future not to call
for further relief either from me or the public, but that, being
cleared of debt and consequently having his whole present
income, will re-appoint his servants and give them injunctions
and authority to keep his expences within his income, a reason
able sum may be allowed for finishing Carlton House with
oeconomy, not on the former extravagant ideas. My mind is
so agitated by the whole of this business that I cannot at pre
sent draw up the answer to the paper so neatly as I should wish,
therefore desire Mr. Pitt will do it on these heads, and if he will
send it me to-morrow, I will copy it, sign it and return it with
out loss of time. Lest Mr. Pitt should not have kept a copy of
the paper signed by the Prince of Wales, I return the original
that he may have it before him when he draws up the answer,
but desire it may be returned to me with the draught (sic). I
shall return the notes that have passed to-morrow, it being too
late for me to take copies of them this night."
" Queen's House, May 11, 1787.
" However I may be desirous if the Prince of Wales will enable
me to see him extricated of it, I must not act in a manner that
either for example as a father, or that what I owe to my subjects,
I would feel myself much to blame; I therefore desire Mr. Pitt
will to-morrow consult those of the Ministers he has already
apprised of the steps taken in this delicate business, and
acquaint me then by a line what steps had best be taken to
bring the business to some final conclusion, it must be either by
Mr. Pitt inquiring whether there is no further lights to be

THE KING AND PITT 217
gained, undoubtedly the state sent to him to-day is the most
unsatisfactory, for it shows that every article of extravagance
has been adopted ; or he must lay them before me and the
answer be framed accordingly. These are the thoughts that
occur on a hasty perusal of these papers ; indeed where there is
so much obstinacy it is difficult to expect much good."
"Windsor, May 12, 1787.
" I approve of the proposed message to the Prince of Wales,
and have therefore exactly copied it, but have not kept a copy,
to save time. ... It will be difficult for the Prince of Wales now
to break off the negotiation, if he does it will be on the worst
ground possible." "Windsor, Wednesday, May 20, 1787.
" It would be disguising the truth very grossly if I did not
mention to Mr. Pitt being very much dissatisfied with the Prince
of Wales's having declined to re-examine his very exorbitant
plan of an estimate for his future expenditure ; but as Mr. Pitt
seems to wish the .£10,000 should be offered provided the other
articles are complied [with], I have on that consideration alone
copied the message. If Mr. Pitt can have an answer from the
Prince of Wales early enough for the message to the House of
Commons to be here at latest by nine to-morrow morning, I will
then instantly sign it and return it. . . ."
[In letters of 21st and 24th May he further expresses his approbation
of Pitt's conduct in this affair.] "Windsor, Aug. 5, 1787.
" I have read with great satisfaction the two letters from
Mr. Grenville, they are written in a clear and manly style, and
shew him perfectly fit for the inquiry he is sent to procure.1 I
do not see any objection to the memorial proposed to be de
livered to the States General, but cannot say I like the Princess
of Orange's letter ; what she means of any coolness between me
and the Duke of Brunswick I am ignorant of any, for we never
were nor never can be very cordial. . . ."
[On 6th August 1787 the King states his satisfaction that the Duke
of Brunswick will command the Prussian forces in Holland, and his
hope that full satisfaction will be procured for the insult to the Prussian
Royal House.]
1 In the Dutch Netherlands. William Windham Grenville (1759-1834)
was Joint Paymaster of the Forces. He was created Lord Grenville in
1790.

218 PITT AND NAPOLEON
"Windsor, Aug. 26, 1787.
"... I cannot help just expressing that the last letter from
Sir James Harris confirms my opinion that he possesses full
intrigue enough for a negociator, but that his nerves are so easily
shaken that it is happy he never was placed in a military line."
"Windsor, Sept. 3, 1787.
"... Sir James Harris calling out for ships is most absurd,
as well as any hint of the same kind from the Duke of Brunswick.
If we keep France quiet, we enable the King of Prussia to have
nothing to attend to but the Province of Holland. If we assisted
with ships, France would have a right to oppose it and also to
send troops; but this is so obvious, that I am ashamed almost to
hint it." "Windsor, Sept. 16, 1787.
" On returning to the Secretary of State's office the dispatch
from Mr. Eden of the 13th, I cannot help accompanying it with a
few lines to Mr. Pitt; though the language of Mr de Montmorin
is so very offensive that I can scarcely mention it with temper. I
disapprove of it and consequently cannot recommend it being
retorted. We have held a fair conduct during the whole business,
and France has been double to the greatest excess. I think they
feel they cannot do much, and therefore from spleen indulge
themselves in this unjustifiable language, which any one but
Mr. Eden would have declined hearing, and still more reporting.
I trust temper may still bring things into the line of negotiation;
and while we are desirous of that, France should with politeness
be told that we must stand by the United States l against the
faction in the Province of Holland if France now persists in the
idea now communicated of supporting it with arms. I suppose
our ships, if Mr de Barthelemy's language shows France means
to act without hearing further from us, ought to appear off the
Dutch coast for a few days, which might decide measures
previous to the arrival of any material force from France. Ought
not some one instantly to go to France who might know better
how to deal with Mr de Montmorin than Mr. Eden?"2
"Windsor, Sept. 21, 1787-
" It is impossible that any political event can give me more
satisfaction than the account just received from the agent at
Helvoetsluys, as I think it gives a fair prospect of this country
escaping a war, and at the same time shew (sic) France that,
1 I.e., the United Provinces. For these events see Rose, " William Pitt
and National Revival," ch. xv.
2 Mr. Grenville was sent.

THE KING AND PITT 219
though England has no grasping ideas, that yet she is not of a
temper tamely to let her rival succeed in her ambitious projects.
I think Mr. Grenville's good judgment will make the negociation
prosper, which will add to his own character as well as to that
of his relation."
[On 8th October 1787 the King expresses regret that Amsterdam has
not yet been reduced. He hopes that the States General will engage
enough German troops to enable the Prussians to retire out of Holland.
" The moment is certainly anxious, but I trust it will end prosperously."
On 1 2th October 1787 he expresses concern at the reported plans of
France against India; he will order four regiments for the Indian
service to secure us against our "insiduous neighbours." On nth Dec
ember 1787 King again regrets Mr. Eden's weakness in listening to the
threats of France, and wishes for a change at the Paris embassy. We
need to be on our guard against France.]
[The following draft of an undated letter from Pitt to the King pro
bably is of July — August 1788. Pitt's letter of ist September 1788 to
Grenville, is very similar to this. I have not found the King's reply.
For the questions at issue, see Rose, op. cit., pp. 491-9-]
" Mr. Pitt has had the honor of receiving Y. M.'s commands,
and is extremely sorry to be under the necessity of troubling
Y. M. in business of so much importance at the present moment.
The accounts received from Berlin and the North seem to press
for an early decision, and would make Mr. Pitt desirous to have
the opportunity of personally submitting to Y. M. the ideas that
occur to him before any answer is prepared to the Court of
Berlin or any other steps proposed. He is almost afraid to
mention the circumstance at present from the fear that it may
be inconvenient before Y. M. is entirely recovered from the
effects of your late indisposition. Y. M.'s servants in the
Cabinet most of whom will probably be in town to-morrow
morning are then to meet on this business. As far as Mr. Pitt
can at present form an opinion upon it, it is that every attention
should be used to prevent a war; that an explanation with Spain
or possibly France may tend to that object ; that both Denmark
and Russia should be distinctly apprised of Y. M.'s having no
other view but preserving the Balance of Power in the North,
and of restoring peace on impartial and equitable terms ; that
at the same time the King of Prussia should be made acquainted
with these sentiments, but be assured nevertheless of full support
if it becomes necessary in consequence of the measures he has
taken and of new events ; and that provisional measures should
be taken for that purpose in the way least likely to occasion
expense or alarm. On these grounds there seems in the present
situation of Europe great reason to expect that an object very

220 PITT AND NAPOLEON
important in itself might be secured with very little inconveni
ence or hazard."
[On 1 9th October 1788, the King censures the excess of zeal shown in
the despatches of the ambassadors, Ewart and Elliott; but he hopes
that, if the Emperor makes a separate peace with the Turks, a general
pacification may result.]

Pitt to the Queen (on the Regency)
" Downing Street, Dec. 31, 1788.
" Mr. Pitt humbly presumes to entreat Her Majesty's permis
sion most respectfully to submit to Her M.the heads of the plan
which Her M.'s confidential servants think it their duty to propose
to Parliament for the administration of the Government during
the present emergency. Those parts of it which relate to the
power to be given to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, and the
limitations of that power will probably be proposed in the com
mittee of the House of Commons on the state of the nation, to
morrow. A separate resolution will, it is conceived, be necessary
on a subsequent day respecting the essential object of the care
of His M.'s royal person, which important trust cannot with
propriety or to the general satisfaction be executed under any
direction but that of Her M. For that purpose it may be
necessary that certain powers should be vested in Her M. by
Parliament for the management of His M.'s household, and the
direction of those attendant on the King's Person. It has
occurred that there might possibly be a convenience, if it should
meet with Her M.'s approbation, that a council should also be
appointed in such way as Her M. may think proper, to act
under Her M., and give this assistance and advice when Her
M. may be pleased to require it. On these points it would be a
great^ satisfaction to Mr. Pitt to be honoured with Her M.'s
gracious commands ; and, if it should not trespass improperly
on Her M.'s goodness, Mr. Pitt would humbly request Her M.'s
permission to pay his duty to Her M. at any time which Her
M. may be graciously pleased to command."
[On ist May 1789 the King expresses annoyance at the sudden
return of his third son from the West Indies station — a proof that his own
wishes will never be attended to. The Prince must now have the same
allowance as the Duke of York. " I have but too much reason to
expect no great comfort but an additional member to the opposite
faction in my own family." He would like the Queen and his daughters
secured in case he himself dies. His whole nervous system has sus
tained a great shock by the late illness.]

THE KING AND PITT 221
[On 14th, 16th, 17th January 1790 the King urgently requests Pitt's
presence. On 19th January he requests that a frigate shall convey Prince
Edward to Gibraltar. On 3rd March 1790 he expresses joy at the re
jection of Fox's measure for the Repeal of the Corporation and Test
Acts.] " St. James's, March 28, 1790.
[The King regrets that the papers of the Cte. d'Artois and M. de
Calonne contain so little real news about France.]
" Mr. Pitt's answer should be very civil, and may be very explicit
as to no money, or other means, having been used to keep up the
confusion in France, and M. de Calonne ought to convey those
assurances wherever he thinks they may be of use.1 In the
present posture of affairs with Spain, I do not see we can take
any step towards that Court, but, should that storm blow over,
there cannot be any objection to assure her of our resolution
not to prevent (sic) the French Constitution from being re
established on terms conformable to the sentiments of the
Comte d'Artois." " Queen's House, May 5, 1790.
" The proposed draft of the message to Parliament on the
depredations and claims of the Court of Spain seems very well
calculated for the unpleasant occasion ; for it is a concise and fair
narrative of what has as yet passed between the two Courts." 2
[On 1 2th June 1790 the King states that members who have posts
and offices for life do not always support Government as they should.
On 1 8th June he compliments Pitt on his return for Cambridge Uni
versity. On 30th March 1791 he expresses joy that the proposal to add
to the Navy has been passed so handsomely.] "Windsor, April 30, 1791.
" The placing Lord Grenville in the Foreign Department,
where most ability as well as diligence is required, Mr. Pitt, by
what I hinted must be certain would meet with my thorough
approbation; as to Lord Cornwallis, I do not think he will
accept of the Home Department when he returns from India, he
having uniformly declared a disinclination to civil employment
and keeping entirely to the military; but I do not mean by this
that it is not worth while to place them [the seals?] in hands that
they may without difficulty be given to his if agreeable when
he returns. I therefore consent to Mr. Dundas's holding that
Department ; I suppose Mr. Pitt has weighed the proper method
of granting a salary to Mr. Dundas when he holds only the
1 Calonne was acting in England as the agent of the French Princes.
2 For the dispute with Spain, see Rose, op. cit., ch. xxv.

222 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Indian Department. Lord Hawkesbury should certainly be
called to the Cabinet when the arrangement takes place." l
"Queen's House, May 17, 1791.
" I return the messages to the two Houses of Parliament
which I have signed, and lament extremely that the deficiency
of the Civil List should arise from the payments to the younger
branches of my family, as that expense must inevitably increase,
and indeed is at this hour kept down by four sons being in
foreign countries ; besides, the debts incurred by Edward have
never yet been satisfied, and I have at this hour a letter from
the D. of York, which I will communicate to-morrow to Mr. Pitt,
which shows he and William think with the strictest oeconomy
they cannot keep within the sum allotted them, to which I have
not yet returned any answer."
[On 6th June 1791 the King states he has received a memorial from
the Prince of Wales about his debts. It is missing.]
"Windsor, January 29, 1792.
" The copy of the statement respecting the public revenue
and commerce which I have just received from Mr. Pitt, I have
cursorily cast eyes over, but sufficiently to think it will be an
useful publication, and must prove a very agreeable information
to those who wish the prosperity of this country ; it seems to me
drawn up in a shape to suit the attention of the present age,
whose inclination does not like much discussion, and rather to
have the matter entirely digested than any part left for the
diligence of the reader to collect." "Windsor, Feb. 18, 1792.
" The Resolutions moved yesterday by Mr. Pitt, and his
account of their having passed unanimously (as they ought)
gives me much satisfaction, as also the impudent line taken by
Mr. Sheridan and Mr. Fox of shewing their disinclination, and
not daring to oppose what every impartial man must esteem
the most laudable plan that has been brought forward since
the establishment of the Public Debt, as, at the same time that
it gives ease to the poor, it looks forward to the assistance of
posterity." " Weymouth, Aug. 20, 1792.
" I cannot but think Mr. Pitt has judged right in seeing Lord
Loughborough, as that will convince however [whoever?] were
1 Henry Dundas (1742-1811), President of the Board of Control and
Treasurer of the Navy. Lord Hawkesbury (1729-1808) did not then enter the
Cabinet.

THE KING AND PITT 223
parties to the proposal brought by the Duke of Leeds that the
scheme can never succeed; that the Duke of Portland was
equally concerned with the former appeared clearly from his
letter. ..." "Weymouth, Sept. 16, 1792.
[The King has received a letter from Pitt respecting the Prince of
Wales's, which he thoroughly approves.]
[On 2 2nd January 1793 the King states that the division in the House
of Commons will show its opinion on the great question then agitating
Europe (peace or war). In a second letter of 22nd January 1793 he
states that he has given eventual orders for a Hanoverian corps to be
ready to start for Holland.] "Queen's House, Jan. 24, 1793.
" As there will be no levee at St. James's to-morrow I desire
Mr. Pitt will acquaint Mr. Dundas that the Privy Council for
the additional sea-force is to be held here to-morrow at two,
and that Lord Chatham may be apprized of it, as I wish then
to see him."
[On 24th January 1793 the King sends a note as to the Hanoverian
corps proposed for service in Holland: it is hoped half the corps may in
eight weeks after Colonel Sporken's arrival there be in a state to march.
In all there are 13,155 privates.] "Queen's House, Feb. 20, 1793.
" I have given the necessary orders for the brigade of Foot
Guards being prepared for embarkation, and hope, if Lord Chat
ham can furnish 44-gun ships to carry them from Gravesend to
Flushing, that they may leave London on Monday. . . ."
"Queen's House, March 29, 1793.
" I return to Mr. Pitt the packet he received yesterday from
the Duke of York, whose conduct since called forth into his
present arduous situation has completely answered my most
sanguine expectation, and I am most happy at perceiving his
judgement and prudence are as conspicuous as his activity and
intrepidity ; these are not the sentiments alone of an affectionate
father, but grounded on the basis of the propriety of his con
duct, 'it is easy to see that the Prince of Coburg, though deserv
ing every commendation for the activity and ability of his
military conduct, is not void of negotiating qualities, and that,
though it is impossible he should not be apprized that no con
cert as yet exists between this country and the two great
German Courts on the best mode of repelling the French, yet
he keeps calling both on the Duke of York and the Dutch as if
he was empowered to call for unlimited assistance, and also

224 PITT AND NAPOLEON
states his own situation as much more perilous than can be the
real fact.
" I think so far we may with safety concur as to authorize the
moving of the English forces and the Hannoverians to Bergen-
op-Zoom, and by that movement making a demonstration on
the right of the Austrians, from whence they may advance to
Antwerp ; but, if it can be effected, the most advantageous step
that can be taken and most conducive to shorten both the sea
and land operations of France would be the English and com
bined forces, with some addition from the Dutch, getting posses
sion of Dunkirk, as this would enable battering trains of artillery
to be embarked in Holland and landed in the most advantageous
situation for the Austrians to carry on regular sieges ; this seems
to me the real assistance that this country and Holland can give
to the two German Powers, and to which extent I am ready to
concur, but not to giving them the command of the combined
army to be employed agreeably to their own plans or views."

"Windsor, April 9, 1793.
" I have just received Mr. Pitt's note accompanying the mes
sages to the two Houses of Parliament, recommending the vote
of credit, which I have signed. I cannot omit congratulating
Mr. Pitt on the repeated providential events which, if the cause
is well supported on the side of Flanders, must end most pro
sperously. My last letters from the Duke of York are equally as
proper as the former, and show me he fully possesses my idea,
that he is a separate corps to co-operate with the Austrians, not
become a part of the Prince of Coburg's army. I therefore trust
our accounts of the interview at Antwerp will be highly
satisfactory.1 "Queen's House, June 7, 1793.
" By the note I have just received from Mr. Pitt I find the
remains of his gout will not permit him to come out this day.
I trust it has been of so regular a kind that he will find it only
an effort of nature to secure him from some other illness that
might have [been] less pleasant. ... I am certain Mr. Pitt must
agree with me in thinking that if anything was wanting to render
the Opposition contemptible, the step on Tuesday of declaring
Mr. Fox, at their meeting at the Crown and Anchor, insolvent,
and opening a subscription to raise him an annuity compleats
the career of this session."
1 The Duke of York and Lord Auckland were conferring with the Prince
of Coburg, Count Metternich, and the envoys of Prussia at Antwerp on the
proposed military operations (8th April).

THE KING AND PITT 225
"Windsor, July 14, 1793.
" I am glad to find the directions I have given for preventing
anything unpleasant, or the chance of it, at Walmer Castle will
encourage Mr. Pitt, when the situation of public business will
permit, to go there, as it is really necessary for his health that
he should have some relaxation.1 By the letter I received on
Friday from the siege of Valenciennes, I have reason to expect
in the course of very few days that further plans for the cam
paign will be communicated by the Prince of Coburg; though
they were touched upon, I thought it best to give no opinion
till the Prince should have stated them on paper and conse-
sequently till they can be thoroughly considered. The good
news of the surrender of Conde will certainly accelerate the
capture of Valenciennes." "Windsor, Sept. 14, 1793.
" The misfortune of our situation is that we have too many
objects to attend to, and our force consequently must be too
small at each place; yet it seems to me that the Hessian
infantry are the only corps we can soon get at to send to
Toulon; but I fear Mr. Pitt overrates Lieut-Gen. Beaulieu's
corps ; for it consists only of six regiments of infantry and six
of cavalry, and that he is too sanguine in supposing the fresh
Hessian corps can arrive early in October in Flanders, while I
fear it cannot reach that destination before the beginning of
November. I am clear the seven battalions intended for the
West Indies are much better in Flanders until the arrival of the
fresh corps of Hessians, and upon the whole authorize Mr. Pitt
to have the dispatches written agreeable to the plans he has sent
me this evening." "Windsor, Nov. 17, 1793.
" Having conversed the last evening with Field-Marshal
Freytag, whether any good German troops could be obtained in
addition to those at present in British pay, he has suggested
those of the Elector of Saxony, which he thinks might amount
to 12,000. I do not chuse to take any step without knowing
whether Mr. Pitt thinks the measure advisable ; if he is of that
opinion, I will through the Hannoverian Minister find out whether
the measure would be likely to succeed, previous to directing
Mr. Elliott to make any proposal to the Elector.
" Mr. Dundas sent me this morning Mr. Pitt's sentiments on
the unfavourable situation of Toulon. I quite agree that the
West India expedition, as far as offensive measures of conse
quence, must be deferred until the next autumn, provided 3,000
1 The King had ordered the strengthening of the fosse at Walmer Castle
and the stationing of a picket there. Q

226 PITT AND NAPOLEON
be sent to strengthen the forces in that part of the world, and
the rest of the force to be sent to Toulon, to defend that posi
tion; but the attempting more in that quarter I do not think
advisable unless a plan of operations can be formed which
would enable General Devins1 with the Austrians and Nea
politans to make a diversion on some other point, and the
Spaniards to take a similar line of conduct; then our army on
the center might be of utility; but on the whole, as to active
service I incline much more to Flanders as being more easily
supplied from hence, and also, if enabled to move forward, being
more able to advance to Paris." "Queen's House, Dec. 5, 1793.
" Mr. Pitt's note is just arrived. I am sorry there is any idea
of still farther lessening the force on the side of Flanders: if it
must be done, I agree to its being of British troops, but can by
no means consent that any of my Hannoverians shall be em
ployed but in Flanders. I send this directly, that any arrange
ment may be effected, without expecting from me what I on
many accounts will never consent to." "Windsor, April 1, 1794.
[News of arrival of the Emperor at headquarters of Prince of Coburg
on 15 th March. Lord Elgin is to meet him, and is to be instructed
exactly what to state, as the Emperor " is apt not to be too clear in his
relations."] "The account of Marshal Mellendorf's (sic) intention not to
detach more troops till he hears farther from Berlin is also
highly material; I own, the idea of drawing all the Prussian
troops together and acting independent of the Imperialists, I
look upon as a most fortunate measure if our treaty is con
cluded.2 Rival Powers never act well together; separate, the
successes of each will stimulate and be advantageous to the
cause." "Windsor, April 28, 1794.
"I have signed with great pleasure the messages to the two
Houses of Parliament which Mr. Pitt has sent to me to com
municate the treaty with Prussia and Convention with the
States-General, although perhaps a little more firmness in
Ld. Malmesbury's manner of treating might have in some par
ticulars rendered the terms more advantageous; but as the main
object is so essential, I think it best not to look out for any
objections." General Devins commanded the Allies operating in the Maritime Alps.
The treaty which Lord Malmesbury was negotiating with Prussia. For
these events see Rose, " William Pitt and the Great War," pp. 198-208.

THE KING AND PITT 227
"Windsor, May 18, 1794.
[The King censures the conduct of the faction in the House of
Commons for opposing the suspension of Habeas Corpus; but]
" it will put the personal behaviour of persons (sic) in so con
spicuous a light that good may come of it. Should the same
spirit be shown by those of that party in the House of Lords, I
should not be surprised if the suspension of Habeas Corpus does
not come till Wednesday for my assent." "Windsor, July 10, 1794.
" I am much pleased at finding by Mr. Pitt's letter that
Mr. Secy. Dundas's conduct is so proper; I wish the Duke of
Portland had not occasion'd this difficulty, as I think the mode
of dividing the offices as proposed by me was much better. . . ." 1
" Windsor, August 5, 1794.
" I am much pleased at Mr. Pitt's having [sent?] a copy of the
proposed distribution of the British forces, and his ideas on the
necessity of using every reasonable exertion to increase our
present numbers. I shall certainly duly consider it, and by this
assistance be able to discuss the subject fully with Lord Amherst
to-morrow, that no time may be lost in forming such a plan as
may be the least open to objections, at the same time most
likely to obtain the desired effect without material incon
venience."
Pitt to the King
[August 24, 1794?]
" On a full consideration of the state of the negotiation with
Austria, and of the urgent circumstances of the present crisis,
Y. M.'s servants have been unanimously led to an opinion, the
general grounds of which Mr. Pitt humbly begs permission to
submit to Y. M. in the accompanying paper.2
" On an occasion of so much importance he relies on Y. M.'s
accustomed goodness and indulgence to excuse his troubling
Y. M. so much at large with the sentiments which have, on the
fullest reflection, presented themselves to his mind, and he
trusts Y. M. will be sensible that the opinion which he ventures
to lay before Y. M. can arise from no other possible sentiments
but those of zeal and anxiety for Y. M.'s service in so important
1 See Rose, " William Pitt and the Great War," pp. 191, 270.
' This paper I have not found ; but probably it is of the same purport as
Pitt's letter of August 24, 1794 to the Marquis Cornwallis (see ibid., pp. 214-5,
and " Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 259). Windham was Secretary-at-War.

228 PITT AND NAPOLEON
and critical a period. If he receives Y. M.'s permission, he would
be desirous of transmitting to the Duke of York a copy of the
paper itself; and he has a full persuasion that, if he should not
appear to H.R.H. mistaken in his opinion, of the advantage
which wd. result to Y. M.'s service from the arrangement sug
gested, that consideration will ensure it H.R.H.'s cordial appro
bation. Should Y. M. not disapprove of the outlines of the
measure, supposing it to prove satisfactory to H.R.H., Mr. Pitt
would immediately take the liberty of writing to him on the
subject. And, as some personal and confidential conversation
on the points in question might be satisfactory to H.R.H. and
in every respect desirable, Mr. Windham (whom H.R.H. has
honoured with habits of intercourse) has offered, if Y. M. ap
proves of it, to go directly to H.R.H.'s headquarters for that
purpose. " Mr. Pitt is fully sensible of the delicacy and importance of
the subject, but he has felt it an indispensable duty to submit
to Y. M. all that has occurred to him upon it, feeling thoroughly
persuaded (on the best consideration he can give to the ques
tion) that the present circumstances admit of no other expedient
which will give a reasonable hope of conducting our present
arduous struggle to a safe and honourable issue."
"Weymouth, Sept. 5, 1794.
I have received Mr. Pitt's note enclosing the letter he has
received from Mr. Burke: misfortunes are the great softeners of
the human mind, and has (sic) in the instance of this distressed
man made him own what his warmth of temper would not have
allowed in other circumstances, viz., that he may have erred.
One quality I take him to be very susceptible of, that is grati
tude, which I think covers many failings and make me therefore
happy at being able to relieve him : his chusing the pension to
be settled on his wife I thoroughly approve of, and it will with
the better grace enable the other pension to be settled on him."
"Weymouth, Sept. 10, 1794.
" I have this morning received Mr. Pitt's note, accompanied
by the letters to him from the Duke of York and Mr. Wyndham;
as to the first it does honour to the head and heart of my son in
the most trying situation he could have been placed, and must
make me willing to embrace either of the propositions, either the
leaving the command to Gen'. Clairfait assisted by L'.-Genl.
Beaulieu, if he succeeds in regaining Austrian Flanders, or in (sic)
the appointment of the Archduke Charles with proper assistants,
as then my son will retain the command of the troops in British
pay. The letter of Mr. Wyndham Mr. Pitt will see, by what I

THE KING AND PITT 229
have already suggested, meets with my thorough approbation
except in one article — his supposing so absurd an idea could
have arisen here as the giving the Marquis Cornwallis a local
commission of Field Marshal, prior to knowing whether the
Emperor will accept him as Commander-in-Chief of the allied
army." "Weymouth, Sept. 19, 1794.
" My opinion perfectly coincides with the opinion transmitted
by Mr. Pitt on the letter he has received from the Prince de
Conde; the advance solicited must be advanced, and I agree in
thinking that this opening of a correspondence with him should
be kept up, if possible, to get him out of the possession of the
Austrians. He is certainly the best man we could employ at
the head of the royalists; but I fear we must have with the
British troops employed there some one less fond of making
appeals to the public in newspapers than the Irish Earl,1 now
nominally intended for that service: the Secretary-at-War's
hint is strongly confirmed by what we have since seen."
"Windsor, Oct. 12, 1794.
" Mr. Pitt's letter has been this instant received, but as the
state of public affairs, I may say, fills up every crevice of my
mind, I am able instantly to answer its contents: I entirely
agree with him in opinion that, even should the Dutch be roused
to suitable exertions, no great hope of success can be expected
unless they will consent to be directed in the mode of employing
those efforts suitably. I know I can answer for the zeal and
good sense of my son, the Duke of York, that, to obtain so de
sirable an event, he will gladly consent that the Duke of Bruns
wick should be invited to come and take the supreme command
of the allied army in the same manner the late Prince Ferdinand
of Brunswick stood in the last German war, which gave no
interference in the interior arrangements of the separate troops
that composed his army: thus my son's commission for com
manding the British and Hannoverian troops would not be in
fringed on, and the Hereditary Prince of Orange would still be
at the head of the Dutch. Should the Duke of Brunswick de
cline, I do not see any other mode of forming a Council of War
than the offering the Prince of Orange himself to be at the head
of it, which (though the natural place of the Stadtholder in time
of danger) he will decline ; then I must insist on my son holding
that situation with such men as Gen1. Walmoden, Sir Wm. Ers-
kine, LieutA-Gen1. Abercrombie, and such other foreign, as well
1 The Earl of Moira (1754-1836), who was designed for service on the coast
of Brittany or La Vendee.

230 PITT AND NAPOLEON
as national officers, as it may be thought right to place such trust
in, with perhaps the assistance of some civil man for conducting
the arrangements with the Dutch. It occurred to me that Mr.
Wyndham might be one of the properest persons for such a
commission."

The King to the Earl of Mansfield.
"Windsor, Nov. 13, 1794.
" . . . I have reason to imagine that it would be very pleasing
to the Earl Fitzwilliam to be appointed Lord Lieutenant of
Ireland; and considering the very handsome manner in which
he has come forward in the present unfavourable times, I cannot
but with pleasure gratify him in this wish, provided I can arrange
a suitable and honourable situation for the Earl of Westmore
land: it has, therefore, occurred to me to place the Earl of
Mansfield as President of the Council if he will assist in forming
such arrangement by resigning his Scotch employment."
[The King then proposed to grant the reversion of a Scotch office to
one of the Earl's sons. To this Lord Mansfield assented on 13th Nov
ember.] "Windsor, Nov. 14, 1794.
[The King refers to the Earl of Mansfield's consent, and adds :]
" This will enable Mr. Pitt to fix the Lord Lieutenancy of
Ireland with Earl Fitzwilliam, to write in consequence to the
Earl of Westmoreland my intention of appointing him Master
of the Horse when he arrives in England, and settling with the
Earl of Mansfield the reversionary office in Scotland for Mr.
George Murray." L
[Draft.] Pitt to the King.2
" Hollwood, Sunday, Nov. 23, 1794.
" Mr. Pitt trusts Y. M. will do him the justice to believe that
he can never have a more painful task to execute than when he
finds himself under the necessity of submitting any opinion to
Y. M. which is likely to create the smallest uneasiness and
anxiety in Y. M.'s mind. On the present occasion he is aware
' Son of the Earl of Mansfield. For these matters see the foregoing
essay — " Pitt and Earl Fitzwilliam.''
2 The draft of this important letter was overlooked by Stanhope (II App.,
p. xxi). For the question see Rose, "William Pitt and the Great War,"
p. 215.

THE KING AND PITT 231
that the subject to which he wishes to solicit Y. M.'s attention,
is one of the greatest delicacy, and the most interesting to
Y. M.'s feelings. But it appears to him to be at the same time
too nearly connected with Y. M.'s service to make it possible for
him to suppress his sentiments upon it without proving himself
unworthy of the confidence with which Y. M. has so long con
descended to honour him and without sacrificing his duty to
Y. M. and the Public.
" It is hardly necessary to state how much the interests of
Y. M.'s dominions and of all Europe depend upon the issue of
the present crisis in the situation of the United Provinces. It is
obvious, too, that, supposing the negotiation between the Dutch
Government and France to proceed, the chief hope of their ob
taining the terms which have been held out to them, or any
others, consistent even with their temporary safety must depend
on effectual steps being taken during the negotiation to shew
that, in case of its failure, they are prepared to defend them
selves with vigour. On the other hand, if the negotiation is
broken off, the utmost exertions are evidently indispensable both
with a view to their immediate safety, and to any plan of opera
tions in the next campaign. Nothing, therefore, can be of more
pressing necessity than to take every measure which can be
likely to encourage such exertions.
" The languor and indifference of a great part of the [Dutch]
nation, and the disaffection of others towards the subsisting
Government are obstacles which, perhaps, cannot be entirely
overcome. But their effect is certainly heightened by other
causes. It is too evident how little harmony subsists between
Y. M.'s troops and those of the Republic. The inhabitants at
large, instead of looking at the former as their protectors, have
conceived an impression of their want of discipline and order
which represented to make their approach as much dreaded in
many places as that of the enemy. These sentiments are not
confined to the lower orders of the people, but are entertained in
a greater or less degree by persons of the first weight and
consideration. It cannot be disguised (however painful it is to be under the
necessity of stating it) that these impressions with respect to the
army affect in some degree the public opinion with respect to
the commander. It is indeed impossible that the zeal and
meritorious exertions of the Duke of York should be disputed
by anyone who has the opportunity of being accurately informed
of his personal conduct. But the general impression is formed
on other grounds ; and even those who know in how many re
spects he is entitled to praise, are not without apprehension that
the want of experience and of habits of detail may have made it
impossible for him to discharge all the complicated duties of his

232 PITT AND NAPOLEON
situation, and effectually to prevent or remedy the abuses and
evils which have crept into the service. In addition to these
circumstances, which relate to the interior management of the
army, it is also evident that the relative situation of the Duke of
York and of the Prince of Orange too naturally leads to occa
sions of jealousy and misunderstanding. There exists nowhere
a sufficient confidence in the general direction of military opera
tions. This circumstance would of itself be sufficient to check
and discourage effectual exertions, and the Duke of York is left
to contend with these disadvantages, in a situation which would
of itself be difficult and arduous to the most experienced general
possessing the most unlimited confidence of those with whom
he is to act.
" Under these circumstances Mr. Pitt is reluctantly compelled
to submit to Y. M. his deliberate opinion that the continuance
of the Duke of York in the command can be attended only with
the most disadvantageous consequences to H.R.H. himself; and
that, considering the prejudices which he has to encounter,
there is little prospect of his having the benefit of that hearty
co-operation on the part of the Dutch which is so necessary at
the present crisis. On these grounds alone Mr. Pitt would
humbly implore Y.M. to put an end to the Duke of York's com
mand for the sake of H.R.H. as well as that of the country.
" But it is not in Holland only that the public impression is
to be considered. It is impossible to say how far this impression,
if it is not removed, may operate in Parliament and in the Public
(sic) to the disadvantage of Y. M.'s Government, and possibly
to the obstruction of the vigorous prosecution of the war. At
all events Mr. Pitt ought not to conceal from Y. M. that it will
be impossible to prevent this subject from being brought into
Parliamentary discussion; and he need not observe how much
that circumstance would augment the difficulty either of H.R.H.
retaining or of his relinquishing the command. Mr. Pitt has, in
one respect, the less regret in finding himself obliged to state
these considerations at the present moment, from a persuasion
that, even if they were out of the question, the course of the war
would of itself probably prevent the Duke of York's command
from being of very long duration, at least to its present extent.
" It seems every day more and more evident that the period
is approaching when a junction may be attempted with the
royalists in the maritime provinces of France, and that the only
chance of any decisive success from active operations will arise
from directing the principal exertions of Y. M.'s arms to that
quarter. If this opinion should, upon due consideration, appear
to be well founded, Mr. Pitt knows that Y. M. feels too much
the importance of all the interests which are at stake, to suffer
any considerations of a personal nature to interfere with so

THE KING AND PITT 233
essential an object; and he cannot doubt that the Duke of
York's magnanimity and his zeal for Y. M.'s service, would make
him enter warmly into the same feelings.
" Mr. Pitt trusts the importance of the occasion will be an
apology for his trespassing so long on Y. M.'s indulgence. He
is aware of the repugnance which Y. M. may naturally feel in
the first moment to a measure which nothing but a sense of
indispensible duty and the most anxious concern for Y. M.'s
service would have led him to propose. If, on considering the
reasons which he has taken the liberty of urging, Y. M. should
be pleased to approve of the Duke of York's withdrawal from
the command, it will remain to consider in what manner the
measure may be adopted with the greatest attention to the
wishes and feelings of the Duke of York. If the armies on each
side should soon take up their winter quarters, or if events
should lead to dividing Y. M.'s force according to the plan
lately transmitted by H.R.H., either of those circumstances
might naturally furnish an opening for H.R.H. coming home on
leave of absence ; in which case the command of the Hanoverians
would probably devolve upon Gen1. Walmoden, and it might
perhaps not be difficult to manage that the British should be
placed under the command of Gen1. Abercrombie, who seems to
stand higher than any other officer in general opinion.
" Mr. Pitt would have performed but in part the painful duty
which he has undertaken if he omitted to state that in this
country many persons, the most attached to Y. M.'s Government,
and the most eager for the vigorous prosecution of the war, can
not suppress their anxiety on this subject. It seems generally
felt that, when the Duke of York was originally appointed to
the command, it was under circumstances in which he would
naturally act in conjunction with officers of the first military
reputation, with whom the chief direction of operations would
naturally rest. But by the course of events he is now placed in
a situation where the chief burden rests upon himself, and where
his conduct alone may decide on the fate of Holland, and per
haps on the success of the war. Such a risk appears to be too
great to remain committed to talents, however distinguished,
which have not the benefit of long experience, and which cannot
therefore be expected at such a time to command general
confidence." [The King's reply of 24th November is quoted in part by Stanhope
(" Pitt," vol. ii, App., pp. xxi, xxii). It states that the King is much hurt
by Pitt's letter, as the Duke of York saved Holland in 1793, and the
present situation was due to " the conduct of Austria, the faithlessness
of Prussia, and the cowardice of the Dutch." Nevertheless, he will not
veto the proposal for the recall of the Duke of York, which is brought

234 PITT AND NAPOLEON
about by the " torrent of abuse " poured on him. These sentences
follow.] "... Having no longer a son at the head of the army on the
Continent, I shall certainly not confer the command of the Hanno-
verians on any other general than Gen1 Walmoden ; and if there
is any intention of drawing from the army on the Continent
troops to embark for France, Mr. Pitt must remember I from
the beginning of the war declared my Hannoverians could not
be employed on that service. They must therefore either remain
to defend Germany against the French, if this country will keep
up an army on that side, or be allowed to return home. I owne
from this hour I despair of any effectual measure against France;
for if our attention is only taken up to the North and West, or
that only on the East the appearance, not an efficient army, is
kept up, I fear no good will follow such an half measure."

Pitt to the King
" Nov. 26, 1794.
" Mr. Pitt did not trouble Y. M. this morning on the subject
on which he had so lately submitted his opinion to Y. M., con
ceiving from the answer which Y. M. honoured him with that
Y. M. did not wish to enter into any particular description of it.
Mr. Dundas now submits to Y. M. a draft of a despatch to the
Duke of York conformable to that opinion. On the subject itself
it is impossible for Mr. Pitt to add anything to what he has
already stated except to express the satisfaction he derives from
observing that Y. M. does justice to the motives which led to the
representation which he humbly submitted to Y. M."
" Queen's House, Nov. 27, 1794.
" There could have been no advantage in discussing with Mr.
Pitt yesterday the subject of his letter, as I had, though reluct
antly, assented to his proposal. I have written to my son simply
that the present complication of affairs required his presence
here, but thought it more advisable not to enter any farther as
to the end this business may take."

[Draft.] Pitt to the King " December 8, 1794.
" Mr. Pitt is persuaded that Y. M. will not be surprised if the
present situation of affairs has made [him] look with additional
anxiety to all the departments of Y. M.'s Government. This
consideration leads him to submit to Y. M. that he certainly
cannot mention without the sacrifice of personal feelings very

THE KING AND PITT 235
near his heart, but which must give way to an indispensible duty.
He has also the satisfaction to feel (after much anxiety) that
what he has to propose may with Y. M.'s approbation be ar
ranged without further difficulty or uneasiness. A variety of
circumstances has made it impossible for him on full reflection
not to feel (however reluctantly) that the intercourse between
the Admiralty and the other Departments of Government, and
even with himself, cannot be satisfactorily or usefully carried on
on its present footing, and that, notwithstanding the objections
to any change in an active Department in time of war, some new
arrangement is become indispensibly necessary. The experi
ence of Y. M.'s goodness both to Lord Chatham as well as to
himself would prevent his having any scruple in stating to Y. M.
the considerations which have led him to this opinion and of
which he is sure Y. M. will feel the force. They are such as do
not diminish the personal affection likely to subsist between
persons who have felt it so long. He makes it his humble and
most earnest request to Y. M. to permit him to propose that
Lord Spencer and Lord Chatham should exchange their present
situations.1 He has ascertained that Lord Spencer will not de
cline coming to the Admiralty if it is thought advantageous to
the public service. Lord Chatham would probably not feel it
satisfactory to him to accept the Privy Seal unless Y. M. has
the condescension and goodness to intimate a wish that he
should receive it as a mark of Y. M.'s gracious approbation of
his past conduct; and if it is not presuming too much on Y. M.'s
indulgence, Mr. Pitt would beg leave to suggest that a letter
from Y. M. to Lord Chatham, mentioning the arrangement as
having been suggested by Mr. Pitt for the convenience of Gov
ernment, and expressing a wish that he should take the Privy
Seal on those grounds, would remove every difficulty; and if
Y. M. should find it convenient to send the letter to-morrow,
Mr. Pitt would be enabled to receive Y. M.'s commands on
Wednesday and the arrangement might take effect the next
week." "Windsor, Dec. 9, 1794.
" Mr. Pitt will not be surprised that I did not expect his ap
plication for a change of Departments between the Earls of
Spencer and Chatham, as I had flattered myself the inter
course between the Admiralty and the other Departments of
Government had of late been on a more pleasant footing, and
had not been apprized that some fresh difficulties on that head
have arisen. No one is more convinced of the politeness and
1 Lord Chatham became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1788: Lord
Spencer became Lord Privy Seal in July 1794.

236 PITT AND NAPOLEON
prudence of the Earl of Chatham, and would more unwillingly
countenance what may be disagreeable to him ; but, as Mr. Pitt
assures me that he is willing to come into the proposed arrange
ment, provided he is encouraged in it by me, and as I have a
very high opinion of the Earl of Spencer being the person most
proper to succeed him, I will instantly write to the Earl of Chat
ham in a manner to make him cordially accept the proposed
change." [On 23rd December 1794 the King urges the need of the King's
Speech being such as to show the determined resolve of this country to
prosecute a war, " that every tye of Religion, Morality and Society not
only authorizes but demands." This is especially needful after the con
duct of the King of Prussia and " of the tame Dutch." On 24th Dec
ember the King warmly approves Pitt's draft of the King's Speech —
" the language runs so easy that I much wish it may not be altered."
The exertions of the yeomanry and volunteers should be noticed.]
" Windsor, Jan. 14, 1795.
[Need of great caution for plans of campaign if the rest of Holland is
to be saved. Danger to the army if moved to the right.]
" I think the only step to be taken is to permit the whole re
mains of the army to move to the left and retire to Germany,
from whence they can return to Holland if, with Austria, a
sufficient army can be formed to drive the French in the spring
from thence."
[If not, the British troops might then embark for home via. Emden or
the Weser.] "Queen's House, Jan. 29, 1795.
[First part as in Stanhope, ii, App., p. xxii. There occurs the sentence
at end:]
" I wish also to mention the great change that seems coming
forward in Ireland without the smallest attention to what was
understood on the departure of Lord Fitzwilliam."
[On 3rd March 1795 the King doubts whether in the present
temper of Parliament any subsidy could be obtained for the King of
Prussia. As to Austrian troops, they should, if possible, act on the
Dutch frontier and be commanded by Prince Hohenlohe. Clerfait was
far too cautious, as the Duke of York had often observed. He adds
a P.S.:] " I am glad the Lord Lieutenant L has taken the determination
of retiring; for his conduct from the commencement of his ar
rival in Ireland has been subversive of every principle of good
' Earl Fitzwilliam.

THE KING AND PITT 237
government, and, I believe, unwarrantable by the sound laws
both passed in this country and even by Yelverton's law passed
some few years past in Ireland."
[On 8th March 1795 the King strongly approves Pitt's sentiments
about the West of Germany, also the minute for Cabinet meeting. He
hopes that the Duke of Brunswick will command the proposed Prussian
army and the British and subsidized forces there, though the interior
direction of the latter would rest with the senior general of each of the
nations as heretofore.
On 29th March 1795 the King states he is staggered by the dis
creditable conduct of the King of Prussia. There seems a prospect that
the French will overrun all N. Germany. On 5th April 1795 he says
that Hanover will be left open unless the Prussians can be led to stand
forth, and they must be induced to do so if possible. On the 1 7th he
terms the Treaty of Basle " a highly blameable measure."
On 19th May 1795 the King informs Pitt of his interview with the
Prince of Wales; he had assured him that the whole plan for managing
the Prince of Wales's debts originated with Pitt, who would certainly
not now retract on that matter and yield " to the insiduous and demo-
cratical proposition of Mr. Fox." The proposed alienation of the
Duchy of Cornwall would be resisted by Pitt.
On 29th May 1795 the King expresses a hope that Pitt will carry
through the measure respecting the Prince of Wales's debts as nearly as
possible in the form first proposed; " but any regulation to prevent
future debt is wise and proper." On 30th May he urges Pitt to take all
possible steps to secure a favourable division on Monday next on that
question. ] " Windsor, June 6, 1795.
" I have received Mr. Pitt's on the propositions and advance
ment of the business in the House of Commons for arranging
the debts of the Prince of Wales and his future establishment;
but I am sorry with reason to observe that at times there ap
pears too much the narrow principles of a commercial country
than the elevated sentiments of a great State, and at this hour
in great affluence."
The King to Dundas
"Weymouth, Sept. 9, 1795.
" Mr. Secretary Dundas cannot be surprised at my having
read the Minute of Cabinet of the 7th this morning with some
degree of pain: the proposition of withdrawing the British
cavalry from Germany plainly shows that this Kingdom no
farther concerns itself in the fate of the Empire,, which I sup
pose will naturally drive the Emperor into such measures as
may end the contest there with France. It certainly puts my
Electoral Dominions into a most perilous situation, and must of

¦3

8 PITT AND NAPOLEON

necessity make me in my electoral capacity submit to the Prus
sian neutrality and then I cannot, with safety to the original
possessions of my forefathers, consent to leave any of my Hanno-
verian infantry in British pay, as the object is to employ them
out of Germany, where it will be my duty to keep as many
national troops as I can to withstand as long as possible the
evils that must attend the present unhappy proposition."
[On 13th September 1795, owing to the threat of the French that
they will attack Hanover unless the corps of Emigres there is dissolved,
the King orders Dundas that it shall be removed, but gives no order
regarding the British cavalry there. On 30th October 1795 he writes:
"... England is but now in a situation, if the war is prosecuted with
vigour, to place France in the predicament of suing for peace. The times
may be difficult but with energy cannot fail of success."]
"Windsor, Nov. 11, 1795.
" The House of Commons having by so handsome a majority
approved of bringing in a Bill for more effectually preventing
seditious meetings and assemblies cannot but give me the
greatest pleasure as the most convincing proof of attachment
to our happy constitution." " Queen's House, Jan. 27, 1796.
" It is but natural that I should feel much interested that
every measure of magnitude should be well weighed previous
to any decision being adopted. I have therefore put on paper
the objections that seem to me most conclusive against any
step being taken to open a negotiation of peace with France,
of which I have taken a copy, which I desire to deposit in the
hands of Mr. Pitt."
Enclosure. " Queen's House, Jan. 27, 1796.
" The allusion in the Speech at the opening of this Session of
Parliament to a desire of making peace which was renewed in
Decr by the messages to both Houses of Parliament, though
well calculated to stave off any evil impression which Opposi
tion might create in the minds of some over tender friends of Gov
ernment in the House of Commons, were perhaps useful steps
at home, though certainly of a nature to cause some uneasi
ness to our Allies on the Continent and to damp the risings
in the interior of France. I think myself compelled by the
magnitude of the subject to state my sentiments, on the supposi
tion that the idea of negotiation may again be brought forward,
without waiting the issue of the great armament which has been
sent to the West Indies under the command of Sir Ralph Aber-
cromby. This I do with the greater ease at the present moment,

THE KING AND PITT 239
when I am persuaded none of my Ministers can seriously look
on this as the proper time for entering on the consideration of
that subject, and consequently that my ideas may [be] of more
use, they having as yet not fully weighed the objections which
appear to me well grounded for rendering the present period
particularly improper for attempting to set any negotiation on
foot. The great force which has been collected and sent to the
West Indies, to which I have already alluded; the additions to
be sent on the first change of wind and in the month of March
ought to have sufficient time allowed for it to be seen what
success may be obtained in that part of the globe. I perhaps am
too sanguine, but I really expect it may secure the possession of
St. Domingo, without which acquisition I cannot think our pos
sessions in the islands secure, and that peace can be but of short
duration. " The further successes in the E. Indies, which cannot but be
expected, are additional reasons not to hamper ourselves with
a negotiation. We are trying to persuade both the Courts of
Vienna and Petersburg to come forward and commence an
early campaign. How fruitless must be the attempt if we open
any negotiation for peace; we cannot honourably move without
first giving them notice, which will be a solid cause for their
waiting the issue of the measure prior to making preparations
which cannot be effected without expense.
"In addition to these weighty reasons, the present state of
France points out that no better agent can be employed to effect
our purposes than time: the ill success of the forced loan, and
further discrediting the Assignats must soon overwhelm the
new modelled Government; the conduct of the Republican
armies both within France as well as those employed in Ger
many and Italy will then appear, as well as the increasing dis
content in the country. Every one of these disasters can alone
be averted by our proposing Peace, which would give a moment
ary weight to the Executive Government of France, and put a
stop to the various engines that seem now to threaten the down
fall of that horrid fabric, established on the avowed foundation
of the dereliction of all religious, moral, and social principles. I
wished to have stated my sentiments in fewer words, but the
subject would not admit of it."
[For Pitt's reply see Stanhope, ii, ad fin.]
[On 19th February 1795 the King forwards to Pitt a copy of his reply
to the Prince of Wales, expressing regret that he has been disturbed by
his creditors; for he is "interested in whatsoever regards you and the
dear little infant." The King advises the Prince to select a man of rank
and legal knowledge (e.g., Lord Thurlow) to examine the whole subject.]

240 PITT AND NAPOLEON
"Queen's House, Feb. 27, 1796.
" It is a fixed opinion with me that when Opposition bring
forward questions of a personal and embarrassing kind, that
they ought not to be got rid of by a previous question, but by
a direct rejection or the taking of the business out of their hands
by substituting an approbation of the measure objected." [He
therefore is glad of the recent division.] " Windsor, April 9, 1796.
" It is with pleasure I find by Mr. Pitt's Note that the motion
for a committee to inquire into the expenditure on account of
barracks has been rejected by a majority of 97 to 23. I cannot
conclude without expressing the relief to my mind occasioned
by the exorbitant demands of the enemy, which must close all
ideas of peace till brought to more rational ones; the Note itself,
I thought, went to the strangest excess, but the papers I have
just read from Mr. Wickham, explaining that Savoy and the
West India Islands have now been declared in the National
Assembly as indivisible from the rest of the Republic, convince
me that my suspicions were not exaggerated. This, when
known, must rouse the tamest in this country. What a moment
for Opposition! But, thank God, there is not wisdom enough to
be found there to make that step be adopted which would in
some degree wipe out the former ill conduct. I am not afraid to
pronounce Opposition will remain Jacobins."
[On 19th April 1796 the King warmly approves Pitt's financial state
ment, which will show the vast resources of the country.]
"Windsor, Sept. 21, 1796.
" I desire Mr. Pitt will give notice for holding a Privy Council
in the Great Room at St. James's this day, when I shall with the
utmost pleasure nominate the Earl of Chatham President, and
give such orders as are necessary, particularly the embargo on
Spanish ships, which ought most certainly not to be delayed.
The real confusion of the French in their retreat seems to give
every reason to believe the Dutch account, that the French
army is nearly destroyed, tho' I should doubt whether Jourdan
could collect his broken army to make any stand on the 8th
against the Austrians."
[On 2nd March 1797 the King gently reproves Pitt for too much
compliance with Opposition, and allowing a measure to be changed.]
" My nature is quite different. I never assent till I am con
vinced what is proposed is right, and then I keep ; then I never

THE KING AND PITT 241
allow that to be destroyed by afterthoughts, which on all sub
jects tend to weaken, never to strengthen, the original pro
posal."1 " Queen's House, March 24, 1797.
" It is highly unprincipled to be suggesting such motions as
the one produced in the House of Lords by Lord Moira and
re-echoed by Mr. Fox yesterday in the House of Commons; and
tho' the majorities on both occasions have been very creditable,
every well-wisher to the Empire must feel hurt that the minorities
were so large." " Queen's House, May 2, [1797].
" I am happy to find by Mr. Pitt's note of last night that the
Austrian loan received the sanction of the Committee of Supply
by 193 to 50, though I fear the period is too late to enable
Austria to withstand the unreasonable demands of France. The
letter from Vienna of the last part clearly shows that Buona
Parte has no power to offer terms, consequently that his plan
was, either that Vienna should offer to submit to whatever the
Directory might propose, or to trust to a disturbance in Vienna,
which might effect the same object." "Windsor, May 24, 1797.
" Every friend of the British constitution must rejoice at the
decided majority the last evening for resisting the motion of
Mr. Fox for the repeal of the two Bills respecting Treason
and Sedition, and not less to find so many country gentlemen
zealously step forward on every occasion to give a support that
shows they feel the blessings they enjoy." "Queen's House, May 27, 1797.
" After what has been repeated for some days, I had supposed
that the division against Mr. Fox's motion for a Reform of Par
liament would have been as large as stated, but the minority
less; but his art has succeeded in keeping his party together;
and, of course, some speculative men, as on former occasions,
have joined him in this vote, many of whom probably were
solely biassed from desire of a little apparent consequence ; but
I am certain every freeholder in the kingdom, as well as the
inhabitants of boroughs, must feel their consequence hurt by the
proposal." 1 It is not easy to say to what the King refers. In the debate of March 1
on the Bank Crisis, Pitt successfully resisted the motion of Fox for an " un
limited" inquiry into the relations of Government to the Bank (see Pari.
Hist., xxxii, 1524-1562). R

242 PITT AND NAPOLEON
[Copy.] Pitt to the King.
" Downing St., Friday, June 16, 1797.
" Mr. Pitt feels it his duty to submit to Y[our] M[ajesty] the
minute of Cabinet transmitted herewith and the draft of an
official note to which it refers. It is matter of no small concern
to him that the minute is, as Y. M. will observe, accompanied by a
dissent from Lord Grenville. It appeared, however, after repeated
and long discussion to the majority of Y. M.'s servants, that it
was not possible to adopt any line more conformable to what
Lord Grenville will probably state to Y. M. to have been his
sentiments on the occasion. Mr. Pitt has the firmest conviction
that, after the steps already adopted (and, as he thinks, neces
sarily and properly) of sending to Paris any measure which
might cut short the negotiation on the mere ground of form, and
did not afford the fullest opening for coming to an explanation
on points of substance, would preclude at once whatever chance
there may be of peace, and the best means of such exertions as
can alone meet the other alternative. He therefore hopes that
under the present circumstances Y. M. will approve of the note
being immediately despatched, and he knows that Y. M. will
feel that, the line of negociation having once been taken, ought
not to be hastily departed from." "Weymouth, Saturday, Sept. 9, 1797.
"Provided Mr. Pitt, by encouraging through Lord Malmes
bury that a sum of £450,000 shall be paid, if such a peace is
signed by France as is agreeable to the exact terms that have
been sent from hence, and that the Dutch agree to the whole of
our demands, and that no idea be admitted of the restitution
of the ships taken at Toulon, which must mortify the feelings
of every Englishman, I do not object to the measure, if Mr.
Pitt thinks that, the East Indies bearing a part of the expense,
he can lay the rest to the account of secret services of the war." 1
"Windsor, Sept. 23, 1797.
[The first part of the letter, not quoted by Stanhope, is as follows :]
" The contents of Mr. Pitt's letter, had they related to any
other country than France, could not have made much effect;
but I am so thoroughly convinced of the venality of that nation,
and the strange methods used by its Directors in carrying on
negociations, that I agree with him in thinking, strange as the
proposal appears, that it may be not without foundation. . . ."
1 This refers to the secret offer of Melvill and others to bribe the French
Directory. See Rose, "William Pitt and the Great War," pp. 324, 325.

THE KING AND PITT 243
[On nth January 1798 the King writes at length respecting the
effort to frame a Quadruple Alliance with Russia, Prussia, and Austria.
He suggests that the Prince of Orange and General Stampfort are the
best means of influencing the Prussian Court. Lord Minto should be
sent to Vienna for that purpose.]
"and England be, with the consent of Prussia, the kind of
guarantee of the sentiments of those Courts to each other: I
think, tho' the task is arduous, the fate of every country depends
so much on not an hour being lost, that I think it ought with
vigour to be attempted." "Windsor, April 21, 1798.
" I am much pleased with Mr. Pitt's account of the conduct of
the House of Commons yesterday, and not less so that, when
Mr. Sheridan supported the address of the necessity of exertion
and unanimity at the present crisis, he so far threw off the mask
as not to abandon his former opinions, and consequently greatly
destroy (sic) any merit his present conduct might otherwise
deserve by also objecting to the suspension of the Habeas Corpus
Act. ..." "Windsor, June 3, 1798.
" . . . I sincerely lament the necessity of sending this addi
tional force to Ireland, as it must be very likely that we shall
have them returned in the course of the present season for
active service, and that this must completely put an end to any
measures of that kind during their absence. The draft Mr. Secre
tary Dundas sent to the Duke of Portland ought to impress the
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland with the necessity of not detaining
them unnecessarily; but I trust, whilst there, that as the sword
is drawn it [will] not be returned into the sheath until the whole
country has submitted without condition ; the making any com
promise would be perfect destruction. . . ."
"Windsor, June 13, 1798.
" Mr. Pitt has in my opinion saved Ireland by engaging
Mr. Pelham in the present state of that kingdom to return there
as soon as his health will permit, which should be known there
at least when the Marquess Cornwallis arrives. That gentleman's
knowledge of the country must be of great utility to the new
Lord Lieutenant, who must not lose the present moment of
terror for frightening the supporters of the Castle into an union
with this country ; and no further indulgences must be granted
to the Roman Catholics, as no country can be governed where
there is more than one established religion ; the others may be
tolerated, but that cannot extend further [than] to leave to per
form their religious duties according to the tenets of their Church,

244 PITT AND NAPOLEON
for which indulgence they cannot have any share in the govern
ment of the State." "Queen's House, Feb. 20, 1800.
" Nothing but the desire of giving trouble could have con
duced an opposition to the continuance of the suspension of the
Habeas Corpus Act, which undoubtedly is at present a most
salutary measure, and, it cannot but be admitted, has, as it ought
to be, been exercised with the greatest moderation." " Windsor, April 22, 1800.
" It is with infinite satisfaction I learn from Mr. Pitt's note
that the three first articles of Union with Ireland was agreed to
in a committee, on a division of 236 to 31 ; and from the House
of Lords I understand an equal progress has been made and the
division 82 to 3. Therefore I think the sense of Parliament now
so clearly shown, that I hope no great trouble will arise in
getting through this most salutary measure. . . ."
[On 10th May 1800 the King approves of Mr. Ryder being Treasurer
to the Navy, and Mr. Canning Joint Paymaster. On 13th May he ex
presses annoyance at Prince Augustus having come back " by stealth."
He had seen the Prince and arranged matters for the future.]
" Queen's House, Nov. 12, 1800.
"... I suppose a committee on the high price of provisions
will be immediately assembled, and that it will as much as
possible be kept to effectuating a regular line of conduct in the
corn trade rather than a trying of experiments, which on so
delicate a subject are always hazardous, but [will] encourage the
importation of corn on the lowest bounty that can answer this
purpose, diminish the consumption of bread, unless the wheat be
mixed with barley, rye, or oats, and propose the use of rice and
potatoes in lieu of it for some days in the week. This latter
proposition I own I should prefer to the stale bread introduced
the last year."
Pitt to the King
" Downing St., Tuesday, Feb. 3, 1801.
" In addition to the letter with which Mr. Pitt has felt it his
duty to trouble Y. M. in consequence of that with which Y. M.
honored him on Sunday, he ventures, in full reliance on the
gracious indulgence and goodness which Y. M. has condescended
to express, humbly to solicit Y. M.'s attention to an object which
he confesses he has peculiarly at heart. He should have taken
the liberty of doing so some days sooner, if very soon after

THE KING AND PITT 245
forming that intention the circumstances had not intervened, on
which he has recently been under the painful necessity of sub
mitting his sentiments to Y. M., but which were not at that time
in his contemplation. The object itself relates to the situation
of Mr. Long, who has now been ten years in the laborious situa
tion of one of the secretaries of the Treasury, and has discharged
its duties not only to Mr. Pitt's entire satisfaction, but, he be
lieves, he may truly add to that of every description of persons
with whom he has had intercourse, and with great advantage to
the public service. Neither Mr. Long's private fortune, nor any
which he has reason to expect, is such as would leave him, in
the event of his at any time retiring from office, with a pro
vision at all adequate to the situation he has so long filled.
Under these circumstances Mr. Pitt had flattered himself that
Y. M. would not disapprove of his requesting the grant of a
contingent pension (with the remainder of one half of it to
Mrs. Long) to the amount of £1,500 per annum, which is not
more than was granted to a former secretary of the Treasury
above thirty years ago, and is very inferior to the value of patent
offices by which others of his predecessors have frequently been
provided for, but which no longer remain disposable. Mr. Pitt
only entreats Y. M.'s permission to add that, altho' he had
meant to submit this request under different circumstances, it is
certainly since become doubly interesting to him, and that he
should most sensibly feel Y. M.'s gracious compliance as a strong
addition to the many marks he has received of Y. M.'s kindness
and goodness to himself.1 "Queen's Palace (sic), May 13, 1804.
" The King is very much pleased with the manner in which
Mr. Pitt has managed his conversation with the Marquess of
Bath. H. M. certainly thinks it most advisable that he should
decline office, and if there is a possibility of taking the Duke
of Portland's report in that sense, the King will see it eagerly.
Nothing could have more surprised and flattered the Earl of
Dartmouth than the finding himself unexpected (sic) invested
with the key and staff of Chamberlain. To the King's utter sur
prise Lord Hobart seems to think the office of Captain of the
Yeomen of the Guard not a situation splendid enough for the
Secretary of State of the Colonies, but will take time to weigh
his objections till the Earl of Aylesford's acceptance of the staff
of Lord Steward or of Master of the Horse can be known, and
the Gold Stick in the possession of the Earl of Dartmouth, that
1 Pitt had sent in his resignation. Charles Long, afterwards Lord Farn-
borough, retired with a pension of £2,200. (Bagot, "Canning and his
Friends," i, 127.)

246 PITT AND NAPOLEON
I may confer it on some other person. Should Lord Hobart
decline it, the King wishes to know whether he can assist
Mr. Pitt's arrangements ; if not, the King thinks the services of
the Earl of Macclesfield and his having been dismissed by the
Prince of Wales give him a prior claim to that employment.
The Council will meet to-morrow at three o'clock."
" Queen's Palace, June 5, 1804.
" The King is most thoroughly gratified by Mr. Pitt's very
clear account of the debate yesterday on the Defence Bill, and
that Opposition judged it most prudent to defer a division till
in a later stage of the Bill ; but the holding back on this occasion
must add strength to the Administration, and he trusts no exer
tion will be wanting to collect as large a force as possible for
Monday. A little aid from Messrs. Rose and Long might be
advantageous, as they must understand the collecting and watch
ing the door of the House of Commons better than new men in
that necessary manoeuvre, which is not obtained without some
experience."

The King to Lord Melville
" Kew, July io, 1804.
" The King sees with infinite satisfaction the unremitting
exertions of Lord Melville's active mind in the papers he has
sent this morning, the consequence of which are (sic) most ably
stated in the Memm. which accompanies them. H.M. rests
secure in the opinion that this same spirit of examination must
in very few months put that degree of energy in every branch of
the naval service, and that effected with good humour which will
render it the more efficacious."
[He hopes Ld. Melville will visit the dockyards that summer;
and he (the King) will meet him (from Weymouth) at Ports
mouth and Plymouth.] " On board of the ' Royal Sovereign,' Oct. 6, 1804.
" The King has no doubt but that Lord Melville, at the same
time he encourages making every reasonable attempt to destroy
the gunboats of the enemy now collected at Boulogne, will
attend to the very bad effect which naturally arises if they are
unsuccessful, as it gives an idea not advantageous to the sagacity
of the planners or of the executors of these designs.1 H. M.
easily sees the propriety of Lord Melville's remaining within
reach of the Admiralty at this critical moment."
1 See Rose, " William Pitt and the Great War," p. 511.

THE KING AND PITT 247
"Windsor, Dec. 25, 1804.
" The King is most highly pleased at Mr. Pitt's account of the
result of his two conversations with Mr. Addington, whose good
heart is the best security that old affections will be cordially and
lastingly restored. H. M. will not to anyone mention the small
est hint of the arrangement to which Mr. Pitt alludes, but
intrench himself in the pleasure he feels at the reunion of
Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington. If any arrangement can be made
to include the Earl of Buckinghamshire,1 provided not in an
executive office, it would be desirable. In that line Yorke,
Bathurst, Bond, and Vansittart are the useful men connected
with Mr. Addington." " Windsor, Jan. 9, 1805.
" The King desires Mr. Pitt will give directions that a patent
be prepared creating Mr. Addington Viscount Raleigh, of
Combe Raleigh 2 in the county of Devon, for which Mr. Adding
ton may be presented on Friday previous to the Privy Council
to be held that day, when he may also be named President of
the Council. Lord Mulgrave may receive the seals of the Foreign
Department, the Earl of Buckinghamshire be appointed to the
Post Office; and, as the Duke of Portland with great propriety
declines office, perhaps Mr. Bathurst may be placed either in the
office of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, or, if that has
ever been held by a peer, some one removed there to open a
Privy Council Office for him. The King hopes on Friday to see
the sketch of the speech for opening the session." "Windsor, Jan. 9, 1805.
" The King is rather astonished that the French Usurper has
addressed himself to him; and, if he judged it necessary, that he
could not find a less objectionable manner. Mr. Pitt has put the
mode of answering it in the only possible shape that could with
any propriety be devised; and, as such, the King approves of
the proposed unsigned answer. No time ought to be lost in
transmitting a copy of it to the Court of Russia, to whom also
the Convention with Sweden should be communicated. On the
French proposal it might be right to express to the Emperor of
Russia that this proposal ought to stimulate the entering into a
thorough concert to attack France with vigour." "Kew, May 1, 1805.
" The King sincerely rejoices at the House of Commons
having rejected the motion of Mr. Whitbread yesterday for ex-
1 See Rose, "William Pitt and the Great War," p. 517.
2 The title was finally taken from Sidmouth.

248 PITT AND NAPOLEON
punging the names of Lord Castlereagh, the Master of the Rolls,
and some others, out of the list of the secret committee. H. M.
is sorry Mr. Pitt has so much fatigue, and also grudges the
waste of time that might be more advantageously employed in
forwarding the public business; but he trusts that temper will
soon effect that desirable object." "Kew, June 13, 1805.
" The King finds with the greatest satisfaction that Mr. Whit-
bread's original motion for impeaching Lord Melville has been
rejected by 272 to 192, but regrets that the criminal prosecution
has been carried by 238 to 229, as he thinks it an unnecessary
severity. If he only viewed Mr. Pitt's political situation, he
should think the division must give him ease, as the world must
see that the House of Commons put their face so strongly
against any incorrect conduct in matters of account that even
the private friendship of Ministers to any individual cannot
screen him in a matter so essential to the public."
"Windsor, June 15, 1805.
" The King is highly pleased that Mr. Whitbread's very im
proper motion was got rid of, and one stating the truth carried
without a division. The House of Commons has certainly shown
more rancour in ordering a criminal prosecution, having pre
viously censured Lord Melville without calling on him for any
justification of his conduct, which certainly is not agreeable to
any idea of the laws of this country ; but on the present occasion
the line pursued is one more to its credit." " Kew, Oct. 16, 1805.
" The King will with pleasure receive Mr. Pitt at three o'clock
this day."

(B.) PITT TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND
[N.B. All the following letters are from Pitt to the Duke of Portland,
who became Secretary of State for Home Affairs in July 1794.]

"Downing St., May 9, 1792.
" Having the satisfaction of thinking that Your Grace and
many persons of weight and consideration with whom you are
connected are disposed to manifest your concurrence in such
measures as may on due consideration be thought necessary
under the present circumstances for checking any attempts dan
gerous to public order and tranquillity, I have received His
Majesty's permission to state to Your Grace the ideas which
have occurred to His Majesty's servants and to request the com
munication of your sentiments upon them. If it is not disagree
able to Your Grace, I should be happy to have the honor of
waiting upon you for that purpose in the course of to-morrow
either between two and four, or at any hour in the evening."
"Tuesday, April 8, 1794.
" Mr. Pitt presents his compliments to the Duke of Portland.
Having had the satisfaction of hearing that the object of enabling
His Majesty to form French corps meets with His Grace's appro
bation, he takes the liberty of troubling him with the draft of
the proposed Bill which is intended to be presented to day; and
should any suggestions occur to His Grace, Mr. Pitt would be
happy to be honored with a communication of them, at any
time before the Bill is in the Committee, which will probably be
Monday or Tuesday next, Downing Street."
" Downing Street, Friday, May 23d, 1794.
" Mr. Pitt presents his compliments to the Duke of Portland,
and takes the liberty of expressing a wish to have the honor of
conversing with His Grace at any time that may be most con
venient to him on the present state of public affairs. Mr. Pitt
will be disengaged at any hour that His Grace may name either
this evening or in the course of to-morrow or Sunday."
249

250 PITT AND NAPOLEON
[Private.] " Downing Street, Wednesday, July 2nd, 1794.
" Since I had the honor of conversing with Your Grace yester
day a mode has occurred to me, by which if it should be thought
right to adopt it, the situation of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland
might be opened whenever it is agreeable to Lord Fitzwilliam to
accept it ; and in the mean time the arrangement for Sir George
Yonge, on his quitting the War Office, might take place imme
diately.1 On Lord Fitzwilliam ceasing to be Lord President,
if Lord Hawkesbury were to be appointed to that office, Lord
Westmorland might succeed Lord Hawkesbury as Chancellor
of the Duchy of Lancaster. My motive for suggesting this idea
is that it seems to furnish a facility for effecting the arrangement
in the manner most consonant to Your Grace's wishes. It would
at the same time, if you approve it, be in all respects convenient,
as the office of Chancellor of the Duchy is exactly of the de
scription which I should wish to propose to Lord Westmorland,
and the exchange would certainly be very acceptable to Lord
Hawkesbury. I have not however hinted the idea to Lord
Hawkesbury and must therefore beg Your Grace to have the
goodness to consider it as a private suggestion, to yourself or to
those to whom you may wish confidentially to communicate it."
"Downing Street, Thursday, July 3d, [1794].
Mr. Pitt presents his compliments to the Duke of Portland.
He is very sorry that it did not occur to him to mention to His
Grace yesterday that he is under the necessity of being absent
from town to-morrow to attend a meeting of the Cinque Ports
at Romney, which he cannot well defer. Mr. Pitt means to be
in town by nine on Saturday morning. As the King is prepared
to see the Duke of Portland after the Levee to-morrow, and
will be disposed to accede to any mode of arranging the differ
ent offices which have been in question, which may be most
satisfactory, Mr. Pitt hopes his necessary absence for this short
interval, will be attended with no inconvenience. Mr. Pitt will
wait for the Duke of Portland's answer before he sets out, and
can defer doing so till any hour this evening, if His Grace has
any particular commands for him." "Wimbledon, Sunday, July 6th, 1794.
" I have had an opportunity of conversing with Lord Grenville
and Mr. Dundas on the subject of the unexpected difficulty
which has arisen in the arrangement which they as well as
myself are earnestly desirous of seeing accomplished. I must
1 Sir George Yonge took the Mint. For these changes see the foregoing
Essay, " Pitt and Earl Fitzwilliam."

PITT TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND 251
begin by saying that Mr. Dundas, as far as he is concerned,
makes a point that no consideration merely personal to him
should stand in the way; but I must add that I remain myself
fully convinced that to place the War Department in any new
hands must in point of effect, and of public impression, be at
tended with great inconvenience; and I feel this sentiment so
strongly, that, even with all the anxiety which I have to promote
an arrangement which I consider as of great public importance,
it is impossible for me to recommend it. With respect to the
proposed division of the branches of business now included
under the Home Department, I am satisfied from observation
for some time past, that the different details arising out of an
extensive war, and those which relate to the internal state of the
kingdom, are both of them so important, and require separately
so much time and constant attention, as to render such a division
if not indispensible, at least highly desireable for the public serv
ice.1 It would have afforded me great satisfaction if Your Grace
had thought it right to undertake that part of the business,
which relates to internal affairs. As however I understood from
Your Grace that your objection applies to accepting a Depart
ment in a less extensive state than it has hitherto been, I flatter
myself the difficulty may possibly be removed by an expedient
which Lord Grenville enables me to suggest. He has expressed
to me his readiness, if it can afford any accommodation, to quit
the Foreign Office and to accept the Home Department in the
way in which it is proposed to be modelled, in order to leave the
Foreign Office open to Your Grace if it should be agreeable to
you to accept it.
" This circumstance will, I hope, appear to Your Grace an
additional proof of the eagerness we feel to do whatever is prac
ticable in order to remove the present embarrassment, and also
of the light in which we view the Department in question. As
the House of Commons meets to-morrow, and it is very de
sireable, if possible, to be able to fix the time of Prorogation,
I shall be very glad if Your Grace should be enabled to favor
me with your answer on this subject, or to name any time at
which you can allow me the honor of seeing you to-morrow
morning." " Walmer Castle, Septr. 3d, 1794.
" Before I left town Mr. Douglas, who is at Brighthelmstone,
sent me, together with some Treasury papers, the two enclosed
letters from the Lord Lieutenant to be transmitted to Your
Grace.2 I find by some mistake, that instead of being sent to
your office they were put in a box which I brought hither.
1 See Rose, " William Pitt and the Great War," pp. 270-2.
3 These are missing. The Lord Lieutenant was Lord Westmorland.

252 PITT AND NAPOLEON
The delay will I hope not have been material. I have received
a letter from Mr. Burke, by which I am very happy to find,
that he is extremely gratified by the proposal of the pension
at present to Mrs. Burke, and the intended recommendation to
Parliament to make a further provision for him. I have sent his
letter, as he seemed to intend I should, to the King. Mr.
Windham will, I imagine, have reached the Duke of York yes
terday or to-day, but with the wind as it is at present, it may be
some time before we hear from him."
" Downing Street, Monday, Sept. 22d [1794].
" I send Your Grace the Memm which Mr. V. Dillon left with
me this morning. You will see by it that he is brother to the
late Arthur Dillon, and he told me that he is the only brother
now left of Ld Dillon. He explained to me that by appoint
ing his officers he meant only recommending them under the
rules observed in other corps. The terms seem to me very
reasonable. The additional battalion which he proposes to raise
as well as that now at St. Domingo, would naturally make part
of the Irish Brigade."
[Endorsed 25 Septr. 1794] " Downing Street, Thursday.
" I send Your Grace a letter which I have received this morn
ing from Windham, and one which came on Tuesday evening
and which I omitted to shew you. I am sorry to add the dis
patch from the Duke of York contains the account of the
Prince of Coburg having retreated (in consequence of the enemy's
having forced some of the ports to his left on the Ourte) and
having crossed the Roer. The enemy will probably invest
Maestricht, in which there seems to be left a moderate garrison
with three months' provisions, but some doubt is expressed as
to the quantity of ammunition. I should wish to converse with
Your Grace on this subject any time to-day. There are one or
two smaller points near home, on which it would be useful that
Ld. Amherst '* should meet us for five minutes, if you will have
the goodness to fix when and where it will suit you best.
" P.S. I send the Duke of York's dispatch."
"Hollwood, Sunday, July 5th, 1795.
" . . . . The Reports from Paris give great reason to believe
that a naval action has taken place in the Mediterranean, but
Lord Amherst was Commander-in-Chief of the British army. He was
soon replaced by the Duke of York.

PITT TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND 253
are wholly silent as to the event. There are also accounts from
Col. Crauford, which look as if the Austrians were preparing
to act in earnest on the side of Franche Compte (sic), and to
make a proper use of the Prince of Conde's army."
[Endorsed Yjt 6 August 1795] " Horse Guards, Thursday.
" It has occurred to me that if (as seems clear) we must relin
quish operations on a great scale on the coast, there would be
infinite advantage in prevailing on Lord Moira to go to St.
Domingo.1 By this means, the change of plan would be con
cealed till the moment of executing it, and the enemy kept in
uneasiness at home might be prevented from detaching to the
islands. This would avoid all the inconvenience that must
otherwise arise from Lord Moira's relinquishing his command.
The only difficulty that I see arises from Williamson's situation.2
I own however that for so great an object, I think there ought
to be no ceremony in bringing him away, with the intention
of making it up to him either by command in the East Indies
(where there will be an opening) or by any other arrangement.
If Your Grace sees this in the same light, I should be inclined
to lose no time, in making the proposal to Lord Moira, who is
now here. It is on that account I give you this trouble now, in
stead of waiting till we meet.
" P.S. Ld. Cornwallis, to whom I have mentioned this idea,
strongly concurs in it."
Private. " Downing Street, Aug. 22d, 1795.
" It has occurred to some of us that it would be a handsome
and liberal measure, not to let Lord Moira quit his command
without some mark of the King's favor, as a compensation for
time, labour and expence which he has devoted to a service, in
the completion of which he has been disappointed by events,
but by no faults of his own. On this ground, and taking care
to set aside all consideration of his political conduct, it might
be thought right to offer him the Earldom of Huntingdon ; 3
and I should be inclined to write to the King to suggest the
idea, but I wished first to know your Grace's sentiments upon
[it]." 1 Lord Moira commanded a force destined for the coast of Brittany or la
Vendue. 2 General Williamson held a command in the West Indies.
3 Lord Moira refused all offers of this kind.

254 PITT AND NAPOLEON
[On 20th September 1795 Pitt writes with respect to the marquisate
for Lord Bute, which the King wished to waive.]
Private. "Downing Street, Sept. 20th, 1795.
" Since my return from Weymouth, such of us as are in town
have had a good deal of consultation, on the state of things as
affected by the recent conduct of Hanover, and by the prospect
which opens in France. Most of us are strongly inclined to think
that with a view to prevent the Emperor being alarmed into a
separate peace, or at least being deserted by most of the princes
of the Empire, as well as in order to satisfy the public mind here
at the meeting of Parliament, it would be very useful to come
immediately to such an explanation with Austria, as may put it
in our power, if things soon assume a settled shape in France, to
make use of any opening for ascertaining on what terms the new
government may be disposed to treat, and may on the other
hand establish in time a full concert for the prosecution of
the war, if necessary, next year. Every thing that is passing
seems to make it more and more evident that no higher language
can be used at the meeting of Parliament (on the supposition of
the new government ' being by that time tolerably established),
than that we shall be prepared to treat whenever we see a pro
spect of obtaining secure, honorable, and advantageous terms.
" It may perhaps be well doubted whether the moment will be
ripe for obtaining those terms till we have had the benefit of
our successes in the West Indies ; and I am persuaded we should
be fully supported in a determination not to think of accepting
terms that are not reasonably advantageous ; but on the other
hand it is possible, that if our expedition is once sailed, we may
be in a posture without waiting for its effects, in which the
enemy, considering the extreme pressure upon them, might be
inclined immediately to give us all the sacrifices we should
require; it is also to be considered that by waiting for the actual
success in the West Indies, we may run some hazard of losing
the benefit of the co-operation of Austria at least on the Rhine,
and that our relative situation may thus upon the whole become
less favourable instead of more so. We should perhaps there
fore hardly justify the not taking some steps between this and
the meeting of Parliament, to try the ground, more especially if
any overture should come from France, which the enclosed
papers and the general desire for peace which seems to prevail
there, render not impossible.2 These considerations by no means
1 That of the Directory.
2 These papers are missing at Welbeck. They are probably the letters
of M. Monneron referred to later in this letter.

PITT TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND 255
lead to taking any decisive step in the present moment, which
is indeed at all events impracticable, till things are brought more
to a point in France. But they seem to make it necessary to
open ourselves confidentially on the subject to Austria without
loss of time. On this idea Lord Grenville has prepared a dis
patch which he sends Your Grace, and which I trust you will
not disapprove of. It will, I think, tend to give us as much
chance as we ought to have of peace at any early moment, and
still more to give us if necessary the means of the further prose
cution of the war. Our meeting to-day consisted of the Chan
cellor, Lord Spencer, Lord Grenville, Mr. Dundas, Mr. Windham,
and myself. You will naturally imagine that Mr. Windham is
averse to any idea of even the possibility of negotiation ; but I
think all the rest of us fully agreed in the propriety of going
thus far, but we did not like to decide on the measure without
knowing Your Grace's opinion. Lord Mansfield was present
when the subject was discussed yesterday, but was prevented
from coming to us to-day, from the effects of an overturn by
which I am afraid he has suffered a good deal, as he seemed
yesterday in much pain. As probably on that account he
entered less on the subject, I am not quite sure of his opinion,
but I do not think he felt any material objection to the measure.
Lord Grenville will probably state to you that if this step is
taken we think it would be very desirable to prevail upon Pel-
ham to go to Vienna, as being much more likely than Sir M.
Eden, to bring the business to a good issue.
" With respect to the letters from M. Monneron, we have
thought that we could not refuse to allow him to come on the
ground he states, as far as Dover, but we do not mean, at least
in the first instance, to let him come to town. There can be
little doubt that he means some overture on the subject of
peace. If he contrives to bring forward any such proposal, the
natural answer seems to be that, till we see the issue of what is
now passing in France, there seems no ground for negotiation.
This will have the desireable effect of precluding any intercourse
with the Convention as now formed, but will not discourage the
new government from making a fresh overture, if they meet
under as pacifick a disposition as may be expected. Pelham at
all events cannot go before the time when Your Grace would be
returned to town, and we meant to fix another meeting accord
ing to the day that will suit you best, to resume this subject;.
but we wish much that the present dispatch should go in the
mean time, as the interval to the 29th Octr. is not a long one." '
1 Pitt and Grenville proposed to send Pelham to Vienna to sound the dis
position of that Court. The Duke of Portland disliked Pitt's proposal (see
"Dropmore Papers," iii, 135, 136).

(C.) LORD GRENVILLE TO PITT
[Several of the following letters are answers to those of Pitt, for
which see " Dropmore Papers," vols, iii-vi.] " Walmer, Oct. 4, 1793.
" I have considered the draft of instructions to the Toulon
commissioners with as much attention as I could give to it. I
have made some marginal notes — the most material is that
which relates to the exceptions to be made respecting such
frontier towns or districts as may become objects of indemnity
— I think it is absolutely necessary to say something on this
point. You will consider that this paper is not meant for pub
lication, but is a direction given to the King's Commissioners to
regulate their conduct. Now if Perpignan, for instance, were to
comply with the conditions required, the comm[issione]rs, as the
instructions now stand, would have no discretion, but must imme
diately give to that town such assurances as would be directly in
consistent with the ideas wh. Lord St. Helens has been directed
to hold out to Spain.1 I suppose this instruction would be con
sidered only as applicable to the south of France, and that this
limitation removes all difficulties about Flanders and Alsace,
but it surely exists with great force as applicable to the places
I have mentioned in my marginal note on that passage.
" The consideration of this point naturally leads to that of our
situation at Toulon as with respect to Spain. The place is now
held jointly by the British and Spanish forces, and in the letter
from Langara to the Spanish Minister at Turin (I think) wh.
Jackson transmits, you will see some mention is made of an
agreement with Lord Hood for perfect equality in all that relates
to Toulon. I do not know that Lord Hood has ever sent home
any account of such agreement, but if it exists you will see how
delicate our situation is in this respect. I do not mention this
as a reason for delaying the steps now taking, or even for alter
ing the principles of the instructions, but it seems to render
further communication to Madrid indispensable, and that im
mediately, and also to require something to be said in the
1 Alleyne Fitzherbert (1753-1839) created Lord St. Helens in 1791, was
British ambassador at Madrid. 256

LORD GRENVILLE TO PITT 257
instructions respecting the mode and extent of their co-operation
either with the Spanish officers, or with any person having from
the K. of Spain an authority similar to theirs.1
" Another point respecting which nothing is said in the in
structions, but which cannot well be passed over, is the question
respecting the recognizing the authority of any regent claiming
to exercise the powers of the French monarchy. If the consti
tution of 1 79 1 was re-established, purely and simply, this diffi
culty wd. not exist for the present, because as far as I recollect,
the regency is, under that constitution, elective according to a
form then laid down ; and the impossibility of complying with
that form necessarily would make a sort of interregnum during
wh. no person could claim to exercise that authority. But if
hereditary monarchy only is restored, and that in the person of
a minor and captive king,2 this seems to imply the necessity of
some immediate consideration of the mode of exercising his
authority. This point is still more likely to come in question
whenever steps are taken for forming anything like a Royalist
army which subject is also omitted in the instructions, and is
one which must, I think, be adverted to. We can never hope I
think to go forward with advantage in that part of France with
out some such support from the country itself, and the forming
such an army would in another point of view be of infinite use
in employing active and turbulent spirits who have been too
busy for five years to make it possible for them now to sit
still. " There is one point only left which I think of any very con
siderable importance, but it is the most difficult of all. In the
instructions you particularly point at re-assembling the States
General under the antient form. That Govt, can never be well
established in France except thro' the medium of some deliber
ating Assembly is I think sufficiently evident, tho' I know there
are persons who think differently, and wish a settled constitu
tion to be given in the King's name, including some such
Assembly, and giving to that body, with the consent of the Crown,
the power of immediate change as fully as it is possessed here
by the King and Parliament. But the mode of organizing, as
they call it, such deliberating Assembly, is perhaps of all points
the most difficult, and one on which I think we should rather
ask information than hazard a present opinion.
" You see how many points are at once decided, by saying
that this Assembly shall be an Assembly of the States General —
and how many more, and those involving the very first seeds of
1 For the disputes at Toulon, see Rose, "William Pitt and the Great
War," ch. vi.
2 Louis XVII, then captive at the Temple. S

258 PITT AND NAPOLEON
dissention, by saying that it shall be the States Gen1, in their
antient form. I was led to feel the more difficulty on these
points from having put Mounier ' to talk upon them in one of
our conversations. If you had heard all he said upon some of
the points I have alluded to, and how pertinaciously he adhered
to all his particular opinions about them, you would I think
have been struck, as I was, to see how little these theorists have
profited by experience, and how much danger there is in com
mitting ourselves hastily to any distinct line respecting these
discussions. " The double representation, the indiscriminate election from
amongst all the Orders, the deliberation par ordre, the veto to
be exercised by each Order or only by a majority of the three,
the King's veto, with fifty other points must all be thrown at
sea again, and I think we must voir venir respecting them rather
than attempt to make previous decisions. And all these diffi
culties would, I think, in speculation rather lead one to wish for
some Assembly of Notables, or some Convention expressly
differing from all legislative bodies than to go back to all the
antient uncertainties. But this is mere speculation, and I expect
that all I think we can now do is to collect opinions on this
subject. " This observation applies both to the article of the instruc
tions which relates expressly to the States General, and also to
that which speaks of the King's declaration in June 1789, which
besides the points of what we should call constitutional liberty,
involved also some regulations about the mode of deliberating
in the States General, and those regulations, if I recollect right,
were so absurd and incoherent as to be quite impracticable.
" The point about the Provincial States seems to me to be
properly guarded by the condition of general concurrence. I
recollect no other point except what I have marked in the mar
gin of the paper itself. If there is time I should much wish to
see it again before it goes, with your ideas on these loose sug
gestions. " The draft to Sir Jas. Murray 2 did not come this morning.
I conclude it is different from a draft I saw yesterday, which
came in circulation, and which I thought much too loose to
stand as the only paper on the subject — particularly because it
nowhere expressly stated, which I think the material point, that
we call upon them to submit a plan to us, formed in concert
with the Prince Coburg founded solely on the consideration of
1 Mounier, leader of the moderate Reformers, in 1789, was doing work for
us in Switzerland (" Dropmore Papers," ii, 427, 449).
2 Sir J. Murray acted as Quartermaster-General to the Duke of York in
Flanders.

LORD GRENVILLE TO PITT 259
the best military use to be made of the existing force, leaving to
us to modify that if necessary by political considerations.
" P.S. I have said nothing about the employment of their
ships at Toulon, tho' I continue to think that a very material
point. We have here an immense body of their naval officers,
and there were in the emigrant army of last year one or two
corps composed of nothing else. It would afford employment
for these people who are a burthen and would besides be pro
ductive of innumerable other advantages. It would, I think, be
easy to keep a proper check upon them. If you still feel diffi
culties on this subject which do not strike me, there can surely
be none in giving to the Commrs. a general power to do in this
respect as they shall find most expedient. I trust also that you
will advert to Mulgrave's personal situation which I touched
upon yesterday. He surely deserves much independent of our
wish to put him forward."
[Pitt in his reply of 5th October (see " Dropmore Papers," ii, 438, 439)
approves of Grenville's suggestions, and proposes to issue a declaration
at Toulon. He would prefer to specify " monarchy as the only system in
the re-establishment of which we are disposed to concur : " but he
would not decline to treat " with any other form of regular Government,
if, in the end, any other should be solidly established."]
"Walmer Castle, Oct. 8, 1793.
" You will receive with this letter what I have written to Lord
Yarmouth and Eden in answer to their late dispatches. The
King of Prussia's conduct announces such determined treachery
that the bringing forward the Bavarian project, to secure him,
is clearly out of the question : and the only question with respect
to that seems to be whether Lord Y[armouth] or M. Thugut are
most accurate in point of fact, as to the means wh. Bavaria might
have, with pecuniary assistance, of furnishing a useful body of
troops. To this point Switzerland seems to offer better hopes,
and we should neither run the risk of offending Austria, nor in
volve ourselves in fresh guarantys, by rather looking there than
to Bavaria for mere subsidiary troops. By encouraging Thugut's
journey here, wh. I much prefer to Mercy's, all the other points
may probably be well arranged, the mode he proposes for
securing our mutual co-operation merits attention but is primd
facie liable to the objection of subjecting to us to a possible
obligation of furnishing means to a limited extent for pursuing
objects which we may not approve.1
1 Neither Thugut, Austrian Chancellor, nor Count Mercy came to Lon
don. See Rose, " William Pitt and the Great War," p. 205.

260 PITT AND NAPOLEON
" What resolution do you take in consequence of Eden's letter
No. 56 about sending the Hessians? What Thugut says is cer
tainly true, that 5,000 more Austrians might be cheaper, easier,
and sooner sent than the Hessians. — But can we depend as much
upon them, either for their actual arrival or for their subsequent
operations? This is doubtful, and yet the chance is tempting.
When Eden says in his letter 57, that Thugut repeated that, in
dependent of the Milanese troops, Devins's Corps1 was at
H. My's. disposal does he mean those as the additional troops
referred to in 56; if so this will not answer our purpose, we
having counted on those as well as the Hessians."

Monday, 4 o'clock [probably Oct. 12, 1794].
" You will find the letters from Morris in the packet which I
send herewith, worth reading. But my particular motive for
sending this packet to you arises from the letters to Berlin
which you will find in it. I was ignorant that you and Dundas
had seen Jacobi at all, and I am well enough acquainted with
his stile (sic) of representing conversations to place no reliance
in his statement. But I have seen it with the most serious con
cern from a thorough conviction that nothing could have so
effectually tended to frustrate all our hopes in that quarter as
the arrival of that letter at Berlin. I have once or twice men
tioned at the Cabinet my ideas on that subject. They are not
lightly taken up, and I feel as confident as one can be of any
speculative opinion, that experience will confirm them. I should
be very glad to talk them over fully with you, because the sub
ject is of no light importance, and the worst thing that can
happen is that you and Dundas should be acting on one line,
and I on another, for this must defeat both chances.2 It would
be very desirable that before we have another Cabinet on the
subject we should have discussed this point a little amongst our
selves. I am going to-morrow morning to Dropmore, but I
could either see you at eleven to-morrow, or at any hour on
Thursday that would suit you, or the thing may wait to the end
of the week. . . ." Dover, ist March 1795.
"... With respect to the latter part of your note I am sure I
need not say that both on public and on private grounds the
most anxious wish of my heart must be, in taking a step which
I think unavoidable, to do it in such a manner as may be least
1 This was a corps helping to defend Piedmont.
a See Rose, "William Pitt and the Great War," pp. 212, 213.

LORD GRENVILLE TO PITT 261
injurious to the interests and credit of the Government and least
embarrassing to you.1 If it takes this shape, which I will fairly
say with your decided opinion on the subject I think it ought, I
shall most willingly converse with you about the particular mode
and time of my doing what certainly I cannot do without great
regret. I see objections to what you propose, but perhaps they
may be got over, perhaps other suggestions may occur, and at
all events they must be very strong objections indeed which can
prevent my complying with your wishes on such a point as this
at a moment like the present." " Dropmore, Feb. 5, 1797.
" The news from Italy,2 deplorable as it is, does not seem to
lead to the adoption of any new measures, at least not till we
hear again from Vienna and know the effect which these mis
fortunes have produced there. I think it may however be very
useful to send a messenger on Tuesday merely for the purpose
of giving general assurances that this event does not alter our
dispositions to take in concert the most effectual measures for
supporting the war, there being no probability that the tone of
the Directory will be lowered or their dispositions rendered more
pacific by this unexpected success. It seems particularly im
portant to give immediate assurances that we continue disposed
to make the same pecuniary sacrifices for what Austria can still
do, as we were ready to make in order to enable her to have
done much more. I will prepare dispatches to this effect to-day
and if you see no objection they may go on Tuesday; unless
anything else occurs to you there seems no necessity for any
Cabinet on this subject, as this step would only be the following
up the measures already determined on.
" I wish the succours to Puysaye and Frotte were increased
to double their amount — that is to give each separately the men
now allotted for their joint account. If Windham is left to make
the distribution of the present allowance it is to be feared his
opinions and wishes may make the division favourable to
Puisaye. Have I any chance of seeing you here? Ld. Spencer
seems to think the project about Cadiz too hazardous; his
reasoning certainly has weight, but I do not think it quite con
clusive, and surely in this state of things much may and ought
to be hazarded."
1 This refers to Grenville's resolve to resign if Pitt carried through a pro
posed treaty with Prussia. For Grenville's opposition to this see " Dropmore
Papers," iii, 26-30. The proposal was dropped and Grenville remained in
office. a Battle of Rivoli, January 14, 1797.

262 PITT AND NAPOLEON
[Endorsed Lord Grenville.] [July — August 1797 ?]
" I return you the projet you sent me, because I conclude you
wish to read it again before we meet.1
" It is hardly necessary to say that it does not meet my ideas
on any one of the 3 points; of 1, the manner of submitting to
their demand of definitive articles, which submission is I think
made more humiliating by the labour used to argue in favour of
preliminaries. 2. The explicit renunciation of all interference in
the peace of the Continent, or share in the Congress — to wh. are
now added words of reflection in that mode of treating which
seem to be nearly copied from Barthelemi's note to Wickham —
or 3, the pains taken to shew, that our objections to separate
treaty rest only on Portugal — and the manner in which the
interests of the allies of France seem to be more and more care
fully provided for than those of our ally Portugal. I sincerely
wish that on consideration the draft I sent you may appear more
reconcileable to your ideas than this is to mine, for without that,
painful as it is to me to say it, I see no hope of our bringing our
ideas to meet on a subject of so much importance as this must
be felt to be." Cleveland Row, Aug. 1, 1799.
"... I would go, not to Walmer, but to Bengal, if I thought my
doing so could prevent so fatal a measure as the letter I just re
ceive from you announces. I do not know where to begin, or
how to describe to you what I feel, in writing to you on the first
of August,2 with a fine west wind blowing in at my windows, and
being now to consider whether I can be with you three days
hence, to deliberate whether our expedition shall sail, or wait for
the arrival of an embarkation from Revel which at the very
earliest was not to sail from thence till the 27th of July. Were all
the generals on earth assembled, and unanimous in that opinion,
I am sure nothing they could say would weigh a feather in my
mind. Our secret must transpire in the interval. We shall lose
the most favourable moment that ever was offered. We give
time as if they paid us for it, to the Batavian Government to pre
pare their defence. We give to the Prussian Government out of
our hands the very means they are seeking for to thwart all our
projects. Being now far beforehand with them, we make them
as much beforehand with us. We run the risk of irrecoverably
offending the Emperor of Russia by failing in the execution of a
1 See " Dropmore Papers," pp. 322, 323, for Grenville's opposition to the
peace negotiations with France.
2 The anniversary of the Battle of the Nile. This letter refers to delays in
the expedition to the Texel,

LORD GRENVILLE TO PITT 263
plan deliberately announced to him, and earnestly pressed on
his acceptance. Being necessarily too late in the season, we wan
tonly incur a further and uncertain delay. We put out of our
hands the possibility of acting for the Netherlands this year.
And all this we do for no assignable reason that I can frame to
my own mind.
" It is now more than three months that these plans have been
in agitation. During all that time no doubt has been stated, till
now, that 10,000 men were amply sufficient to make their land
ing good in any one point of the coast. Instead of unforeseen
difficulties every thing has turned out more in our favour than
we could hope. If ten or rather twelve thousand men are not
sufficient for the first enterprize why will twenty? They would
not be sufficient to undertake on military rules the conquest of
Holland — no, nor twenty thousand men added to them. We
ought surely to have known our own mind before we proposed
these plans at Petersbg. as certain of success, which we must now
write that we abandon as hopeless. Is the country stronger or
better defended? it is less so. The French army, you are told,
instead of being reinforced is daily diminished — the Govern
ment we act against instead of being united and confident, see
that their existence hangs on a thread — France abandons them
to Prussia — they cannot be ignorant of the fact, and if they are
it is our business that they should not remain so. Their fleet was
in mutiny at the mere report of the approach of an English
force — the whole machine is breaking up, and we instead of
profiting of all this are catching from the D. of Brunswick the
contagion of all his military doubts and fears.
" It is a great responsibility that a man takes upon himself who
gives a decided opinion to undertake without delay a military
enterprize the issue of which is to decide upon the lives of the
persons engaged in it, on the reputation of our arms, and on our
ultimate success in Holland. I see it in all its extent, and, with
my eyes open to it, I do most earnestly conjure you, as you
value your own character and peace of mind, not to give way on
this occasion. If the Russians arrive soon, they will arrive in
time to support us. If they are delayed we shall lose by waiting
for them what we never can recover — I mean time, and with if
reputation and solid advantage. . . ." "Dropmore, Aug. 2, 1799.
"You will judge by my letter of this morning how happy I
am made by that which I have just received from you.1 I only
wish that I had staid in town a few hours longer, for I should
have saved myself a most melancholy ride, and perhaps I might
1 Probably that of August 2 in the " Dropmore Papers," v, 224, q.v.

264 PITT AND NAPOLEON
have found something to do to help the thing forward. I have
anticipated your wish about the Prince of Orange's address.
It is not only written but printed — and Hammond will send
you down by to-morrow's mail the printed copies both of
that and of the declaration, in order that Abercomby may take
them with him. The former is Fagel's writing and I think very
good. . . .
" I am much of your opinion about the Netherlands, and will
endeavour to put that idea into shape — but you must of course
expect to see Prussia cringing to us again. I hope you will not
relent. I thought Irish and French officers not near so good for
the Netherlands as a good Scotchman. But if the thing succeeds
there will be room for more. I will write to you again about
"Monsieur."1 I incline to put him off for four or five days
longer, as I foresee several unreasonable demands which I should
like to have your aid in resisting — and I shall not be sorry to
have a few days more to prepare a sort of note which I wish to
put into his hands, to explain what we can do for him, and
what we expect of him. Adieu — I shall sleep better to-night
than I had hoped." "Dropmore, Sept. 12, 1799.
" I will do my best to execute your plans, tho' certainly not
con amore. What we are now doing approaches nearer to
Ei/pu@a'Tov llfiayfjux than any transaction of English politics in my
remembrance. I am heartily glad my brother is out of the
scrape.2 " The scheme, besides its injustice, must fail of success, for you
will see by Whitworth's last dispt (when they are returned from
Weymouth) that while Thugut is looking to get all Piedmont,
the Emperor of Russia makes it a positive condition of con
tinuing his succour, that the K. of Sardinia shall be restored to
all his dominions. What, then, is Whitworth to have a discre
tionary power to do at Petersburgh? To negotiate for Austria,
who will not negotiate there at all, a treaty on grounds which
are the direct opposite to the intentions of Russia — and this, in
the hope of binding Austria by engagements to do what nothing
but her interest of the moment will ever make her do, and what
she is now compelled by the course of events to do without our
owing her even thanks for it.
" I do not like to urge an opinion so strongly against a plan
1 " Monsieur," [the Comte d'Artois] was to go to Dropmore to meet Pitt.
2 Mr. Thomas Grenville had now left Berlin and was at Hamburg, on his
way to Holland to which country he was deputed as commissioner (" Drop-
more Papers," v. 393). For the differences of Pitt and Grenville on Austrian
schemes, see Rose, op. cit., p. 378.

LORD GRENVILLE TO PITT 265
which you seem to have so much at heart ; and certainly your
opinion makes me distrust my own. But hitherto all I have
ventured to foretell on this subject has been confirmed by the
court, and I cannot conceal from you my fear that by what we
are now doing we shall lose our ground at Petersbg. and cer
tainly gain none at Vienna ; and which is still worse, shall
descend from the high ground of probity, and morality on which
we now stand in Europe.
" I do not want to volunteer a Quixote opposition to the
views of Austria, but I do want to be able to say in this case,
with as clear a heart as in those of Poland and Venice, that this
Government is too great to need such villainies and too proud to
share in them.1 Let Austria settle them as she can with the
court of Petersburgh, but do not afford her the pretence that
England has seduced and abetted her in them.
" I trust I shall see you before it can be necessary to write
anything more on this subject. My ideas of instruction to Mait
land2 are, that he should go no further than to raise with every
effort he can make, an insurrection against France, but that he
should say distinctly to the leaders, that their fate does and
must depend on the result of the war, and the arrangements of
the great Powers, and that England will not give a guaranty in
that respect which it may be unable to maintain. But that the
best mode of providing for their interests is, that they shall arm
themselves, and put themselves in a condition to have voix au
chapitre, and that in that we are willing to help them.
" P.S. Panin is appointed Vice Chancellor in the room of
Kotschoubey. I am afraid he will not long keep that situation,
but it puts Vienna out of the question for him. I will write to
Whitworth about our further plans of attack, but we must use
great diligence indeed, both here and in Holland, before we can
hope to be ready in time for this autumn. If we do not get
some one or more of the towns of the Generality3 I fear 20,000
men will be much too little for the defence of Holland, for a
week's frost would enable the enemy by drawing together two
of those garrisons to penetrate your line in any one point, with
a larger force than you have on the whole line. I have not yet
received Monsieur's answer — when do you come to town? I
hope you will have your militia measure ready, so as not to be
obliged to keep people in town at this time of the year."
1 I.e., the entire annexation of Piedmont.
2 General Maitland commanding in the West Indies, came to an agree
ment with the negro chiefs. See Rose, " William Pitt and the Great War,"
pp. 247-8.
3 The term "Generality" denotes the Dutch provinces outside that of
Holland.

266 PITT AND NAPOLEON

Grenville to Dundas
" Dropmore, Apr. 10, 1800.
" If I had felt at all sure that I should find you at Wimbledon
you would have seen me there instead of this letter. It would be
useless now to tell you how much I differ from the opinion you
have formed, or to discuss the grounds of your determination,
because, however strongly impressed with the conviction which
I have already stated to you, I am not vain enough to wish that
my single opinion should prevail against what appears to be the
sense of all the King's Ministers. I heartily wish I could alter
my own opinion, but certainly there is nothing in Stuart's notes
which can produce that effect.1
" I never imagined that an army could act without cavalry,
baggage, horses, and waggons, and have on the contrary re
peatedly pressed both on Mr. Pitt and you the necessity of send
ing a Commissary there long before Stuart, in order to prepare
these articles, and those of provisions. In answer to your question
whether there is any reason to think that Austria will allow us
to purchase these articles in her territory and export them from
hence in the manner Stuart points out I have no hesitation in
saying that I am convinced she will not only do that, but more
and better — for that we may if we please, obtain the same arrange
ment there as Wickham has obtained on the Rhine, and be
allowed to purchase these articles (paying only a little dearer
for them from the Austrian magazines themselves).
" If I had known or suspected a doubt upon that subject
this might easily have been made a condition of the. arrange
ment which Lord Minto is enabled to conclude, nor is it too late
to make it so still. But in truth this is not the sort of difficulty we
have to apprehend from Thugut, who, if he does not conclude
a separate peace, will certainly facilitate to us all means of acting
that do not commit the Austrian army; because by so doing
he will forward his own objects.2
" I undertake therefore confidently that if this be the only
difficulty it might already have been removed, and may still be
so before your second division can arrive; and this merely by
writing to Lord Minto. Provided always that a separate peace
is not made, in which case of course we should not want to
act in the Mediterranean.
" But I desire you to observe that the obtaining this in Italy
1 General Stuart was to be sent to concert plans for a British expedition
to the coast of Provence or Liguria. This letter is in reply to Dundas's of
9th April in " Dropmore Papers," vi, 193.
2 Thugut was Austrian Chancellor; Lord Minto, British Ambassador at
Vienna ; General Melas commanded the Austrian army in North Italy.

LORD GRENVILLE TO PITT 267
will not in the least be forwarded by Stuart's seeing Wickham
at General Kray's head quarters on the Rhine. He must there
fore proceed, not there, but to Melas's head quarters at Genoa, or
in the neighbourhood ; and when he has got them [there?] he will
find Melas uninstructed on the subject, having no authority to
consent to such an arrangement on his own part, still less to
give any orders to the Austrian Ministers, and (Political) Com
missaries, in the different parts of Lombardy and Tuscany. A
reference must then be made to Vienna, and by the present plan
we are to wait the answer either directly from Vienna, or what is
more probable if details are to be treated of and settled, cir-
cuitously again by Genoa before our troops sail.
" My last letters from Mr. Jackson at Turin, which is rather
nearer, are of the 8th March — supposing therefore that Stuart
travels as fast as a messenger, he will not be there till the
second week in May, nor receive his first answer from Vienna
till the beginning of June; nor shall we hear from him in con
sequence of it, till the beginning of July, when we are to
deliberate upon it whether we shall send troops to the Mediter
ranean who would be to arrive there at soonest the middle of
August, and then at last to begin a co-operation with Royalists
whose fate will have been decided one way or otheronany weeks
before. " I enter into this detail, not for the purpose of combating,
however I lament it, your decision not to send more than 5,000
troops now to the Mediterranean, but to intreat you not to
deceive yourself with false hopes by believing that if the plan is
delayed now, you can resume its execution in the autumn. But
rather to turn your mind with its own natural and manly
exertion, to some other real and effective plan of operation which
you can execute, and for which the total abandonment of this
plan will afford you, as I trust, abundant means. The worst that
we can do by ourselves and the country, is to waste the whole
campaign in inactivity, and to withdraw from the war the power
ful aid of our military cooperation in the only campaign in which
we can give it.
"Your attack on Bellisle will not occupy, even during the
operation, more than 10,000 men, nor afterwards more than
2 or 3,000. If after sending 15,000 to the Meda.you would have
had 27,000 disposable, you will, by sending only 5,000, have
37,000, a force sufficient not only to take Walcheren, but to
act from thence with effect under a proper direction. Or what I
should prefer, a force amply sufficient to act on Pichegru's plan
against Bordeaux, and to raise those provinces, where the
Royalist standard has not yet been reared. Do this, or any
thing else that you prefer, but for God's sake, for your own
honour, and for the cause in which we are engaged, do not let us,

268 PITT AND NAPOLEON
after having by immense exertions collected a fine army, leave
it unemployed, gaping after messengers from Genoa, Augsburg,
and Vienna, till the moment for acting is irrecoverably past by.
For this can lead to nothing but disgrace. . . ."l
Grenville to Dundas
" Dropmore, April n, 1800.
" I have sent the dispatch to Wickham in the form you re
commend, because I know no quality in business worse than
obstinacy, but I must at the same time for the discharge of my
own conscience tell you that, if I understand your plan as you
have now shaped it, the whole is utterly impracticable. I have
no wish to dispute either Sir Ch. Stuart's military opinions or
yours, but I must be a driveller if I do not after nine years'
experience know the Court of Vienna better than either of you.
It is impossible to hope that your ideas can be executed in any
other form than by Stuart going himself to Vienna — and I
cannot but say to you as I would to him that I know that if he
did go there, instead of persuading Thugut, he would quarrel
with him in the first half hour.
" As to imagining that Thugut will give to Melas (much more
that he will give to Kray, who has nothing to do with it) any
authority to enter at his own discretion with plans of co
operation with Stuart which require Austrian troops to be put
under an English general, I do not say the thing is impossible
because nothing is so after what we have seen, but I am sure the
chances are at least a thousand to one against it. And if pro
mised, the execution will still be liable to a repetition of all we
experienced at Toulon, Dunkirk, Conde, etc., etc.
" This letter however is not for the purpose of fatiguing you
with remonstrances against that to which I have already ex
pressed my utter and complete dissent, but in order to remark
to you that you have given me no answer about the Cond6
corps, the destination of which is nevertheless an essential part
of your plan, in whatever shape; and what is still more em
barrassing you desire me to write to Ld. Minto to ask, and
obtain if possible, a categorical answer about supplies, baggage
waggons, forage, etc., and even about an Austrian force to be
put under our orders, but you do not tell me what explanation
he is to give of our plans, views, numbers, objects, or time of
operation. " It would save much time and trouble if you would put down
upon paper, according to your own ideas, drafts of dispatches
(1) to Wickham about the Conde army, and (2) to Ld. Minto
1 For Dundas's reply see " Dropmore Papers," vi, 194.

LORD GRENVILLE TO PITT 269
about Stuart's expedition. Do not think I have any indisposi
tion to execute fairly whatever is determined upon, but as I
really do not understand your plan and think it (as far as I do
understand it) in contradiction to the most obvious calculations
of time, it is much better that your ideas should be stated in the
manner you wish them to be, and according to your own con
ception of them, rather than according to the imperfect view I
have of them.
" I have sent off one messenger to Wickham with your altera
tion of my draft but another must follow in two days with a letter
about the Condd army and other things, etc. Ld. Minto's servant
returns also to him in two or three days."

Grenville to Pitt
"Dropmore, Apr. n, 1800.
" I have just received the inclosed, from which I can only col
lect that Dundas is (I trust without reason) offended at me or
both of my two letters to him, in which I have stated with free
dom, but certainly without intending the smallest personal
offence, my opinion of the present decision respecting the
Mediterranean operations. It is an easy answer for him to give
me, that the Conde army must do as it can, and wait at Leghorn
the chapter of events. But I doubt whether Parlt., who are to
pay this army, or the country who expect service from them,
will be quite as well satisfied with such an answer as Dundas
seems in giving it [sic]. And he also forgets that Ld. Minto
has positively engaged to Thugut that they shall not remain
at Leghorn.
" Now all this confusion can be settled only by our coming to
a distinct understanding and resolution about the Mediterranean
expedition. I was, and am of opinion, that the sending there a
large force (15 or 20,000 men) was the most effectual way of
bringing our means to tell against the enemy. The objections
urged against this measure appeared to me to be of no weight,
and least of all those grounded on the necessity of having horses
and baggage waggons, which (I would pledge my life for it) the
Austrians would willingly let us purchase in Italy, and would
still more readily sell us from their own magazines.
" But I do not deny that the propriety of this destination of our
force is a point on which able men may sincerely differ, and I
have no desire to force my plans upon other people in opposi
tion to the opinions of the majority of those who have a right to
decide the question. But if the plan is not to be executed I am
clear it ought to be distinctly, and at once, abandoned, that we
may have the use of our force elsewhere. And that nothing can

270 PITT AND NAPOLEON
be more idle than to keep our means locked up by the discus
sion of plans of cooperation which never can be brought to
bear.
" Dundas says now that his opinion is clearly that we ought to
have more than 5,000 men in the Mediterranean in addition to
the garrison of Minorca. Now it so happens that I so far at
least agree with him, as to think clearly that if we do not now, and
without an hour's delay, send our remaining force, at least 10, if
not 1 5,000 men more, there, we ought not to think of sending any
more at a later season of the year.
" Why then with these opinions should we enter upon the farce
of an illusory negotiation at Vienna? Why should we send Stuart
to Wickham who can tell him nothing? And above all why
should we let the Condd army march to Leghorn, instead of
sending it either to reinforce the Swiss levies, or to cooperate
with Willot in Piedmont? 1 I have kept no copies of my letters
to Dundas, so little did I think of giving offence. Ask him for
them if you think it worth while, or leave it alone, but let us at
least have some fixed plan agreed upon amongst ourselves, which
we may all be endeavouring to forward to the utmost, instead of
drawing different ways.
" If I can in no other way obtain an opinion on the subject,
summon a Cabinet to consider of the answer to be given to
Wickham and Ld. Minto about the Conde army, — for I cannot
take upon myself in such a business to guess at the opinions of
my colleagues. But before we summon our numerous Cabinet,
it is much better that those who are to execute should under
stand each other upon the subject.
" If you have not seen Ld. Minto's dispatch and Wickham's on
the subject of the Conde army, ask Dundas for them. I sent
them to him, and he has not returned them to me.
" Let me know what you wish me to say or do on this subject,
and on that of the dispatch which Sir Ch. Stuart wants to have
written to Ld. Minto. If we are to ask for cooperation from
Austria, we must explain our ideas to them at least in general,
and how can I explain those ideas without knowing what they
are? But, with the present opinions, it is surely better to give
the thing up, for sanguine as I was in the hope of brilliant and
useful operations there, I am not such a novice as to expect that
success, in opposition to the opinions of the Commander in
Chief, the War Department, and the War Office."
[Enclosure. An unsigned letter dated Somerset Place, nth April
1800, to " My dear Lord," on the same subject.]
1 For General Willot's plans for the Mediterranean coast, see " Wickham
Papers," ii, 4.02-8.

LORD GRENVILLE TO PITT 271

Grenville to Pitt
"Dropmore, June 2, 1800.
" I got your letter here only this morning and some arrange
ments about horses will make it very inconvenient to me to be
in town by the hour you mention, but I shall certainly be in
Cleveland Row to dinner and can either see you in the evening
if you can call there, or I can call upon you at any time you
please to-morrow morning.1
" The delay is of less importance because I trust you will be
satisfied on consideration that, whatever decision you adopt
respecting the bulk of your force, all the late events make it
more important than ever that the Bellisle Expedition should
go on. If you send 12,000 men to the Mediterranean, you can
have no other equally good employment for the remainder of
your force as that of Bellisle, nor is it possible that anything can
so much distract Bonaparte's plans and operations in Germany
and Italy as the necessity of giving his attention to Bellisle and
the Vendue. If on the other hand you persevere in the present
determinations, the capture of Bellisle is more than ever an
indispensable preliminary to the execution of all plans on
that side.
" In either case I think by abandoning this undertaking you
will renounce the only chance of making your force tell at all,
during the real crisis of the campaign. Whereas if we take Bell
isle in a fortnight or three weeks from this time (and much more
if we had taken it as we were promised a fortnight ago) your
whole force whether really destined for the Vendee or the Medn.
would from the moment of its embarkation (and even in some
degree before it was embarked) tell exclusively on that point for
the next three weeks or month after that operation was known
at Paris, and by Bonaparte — for he must then conclude that
every thing we embark is destined for that point.
" With regard to the real destination which we shall give to
the mass of our force, that is too large a question to be discussed
by letter. If we had at this moment 12,000 or 1 5,000 men in the
Medn. there is no doubt that they would decide the campaign.
But to send them there now is a very different question. Yet
even this I should think better than keeping them here under
the colour of an expedition which is not really intended, and
actively pursued. These points, with all the various considera
tions, of persons as well as things, to which they lead, we shall
better talk over than discuss by letter.
" Have you considered what orders to give Lord Keith about
1 In answer to Pitt's of ist June, see "Dropmore Papers," vi, 242.

272 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Kleber? My own mind strongly inclines to make use of the
opportunity which the French have afforded us, and to keep the
Egyptian army in a position where it certainly does us less
harm than it would do any where else." 1

Grenville to Pitt
"Feb. i, 1801.
" I return your letter, which appears to . me to be perfectly
well drawn.2 Ld. Spencer was with me when I received it, and I
concluded you did not wish me to conceal it from him. I fully
concur in every part of it, except that I do not see in what
manner, or by what shape of argument you hope to prevent the
discussion of the subject, as all that has passed upon it is so
publickly and universally known, and is even I believe stated
in the newspapers. This we may talk over together for I must
of course wish to make my own line as nearly consonant to
yours as it is possible for me, without actually doing what I
think dishonourable.
I shall also be very anxious to know what language you mean
to hold to the numerous individuals who have a right to some
confidential communication from us on such an occasion, and
whom the public discourse on the subject will naturally lead to
wish to know what has really passed."
[On 5th February 1801 Grenville wrote to the King requesting per
mission to resign office. On 19th October 1801 he wrote to the King
deferentially offering advice as to the tone of "unnecessary and de
grading concession " shown by the Addington Government in its negotia
tions with France and Russia.]
Grenville to Pitt
"Dropmore, Nov. 28, 1803.
" Among the subjects which ought to be attended to by Parlia
ment in our present situation, and which appear to be totally
neglected by Government, there is one of peculiar importance,
to which my thoughts have lately been much turned, and on
which, if you had been in town at the opening of the Session I
should have been very desirous of conversing with you, from an
opinion that, independently of your superior knowledge of the
1 This refers to Kle'ber's capitulation of El Arish with the Turks (January
24, 1800), which the British Government declined to recognize. See " Drop-
more Papers," vi, 161, 186, 221 ; Mahan, " Sea Power," i, 331-4.
2 Pitt's letter to the King on the subject of Catholic Emancipation, which
Pitt submitted to him. See " Dropmore Papers," vi, 434.

LORD GRENVILLE TO PITT 273
subject itself, there are other circumstances which point you out
as the only person who can now propose anything relating to it
with much prospect of advantage.
" If a landing should be effected, in spite of such resistance as
we may oppose to the enemy on the coast, our troops must of
course fall back on the first maintainable position on which they
can be collected; while our fleet endeavours to destroy the
enemy's transports and cut off his communication with his own
coasts. In such a state the destruction of the enemy may be a
work of time, especially as under such circumstances it may
possibly be more advantageous for us to harass and circum
scribe his army, than to risk a general action in the hope of his
immediate defeat.
" Now let me ask you, for you must I am sure have considered
the question, what is in this state of things to be the situation of
the whole monied transactions of the country, and of the whole
mass of that paper credit by which they are carried on, and
under circumstances of peace, (or even of security tho' in war,)
very beneficially carried on? Suppose the enemy advancing
towards the capital or even pointing that way at whatever
distance? The Bank pays all demands that can be made upon it
in paper. But how will bankers, merchants, or even considerable
tradesmen answer the demands on them? If in their own paper,
who will receive it, not being by law a legal tender? Even if in
Bank paper, what security can there be that it will not suffer a
depreciation, (and if any who shall say how large a deprecia
tion?) when the issue is to be proportioned to the new demand
which a run on the Bank would occasion, and no longer restricted
by such limitations as the ordinary course of their affairs has
produced? Will it be that the exigency of such a crisis shall
justify the bankers in combining to refuse all payments? By
law, which law would neither be suspended nor superseded by
invasion, every such refusal is an act of bankruptcy. Their
credit, however, might, in case of our ultimate success, be
restored by Parliament. But in the interval what will the effect
have been? Who is there in the country that could command
one hundred pounds, if his banker's shop in London were shut
up by the alarm of an attack on London, or by the effect of
any general combination among the bankers?
" The difficulties of this subject might easily be pursued into
much more detail, but when your own mind begins to canvass
it, you will readily enough follow it farther than my suggestions
would lead you.
"If you ask me for the remedy, I should answer first, that
wherever it may lay, it certainly cannot be found in inert or
hopeless despair. The ideas which have offered themselves to
my mind would lead to two courses, to be combined with each
T

274 PITT AND NAPOLEON
other. The first would be, a previously concerted plan which,
stupendous as the undertaking may seem, I do not believe im
practicable, to remove in case of emergency, the credit, and the
most important part of the capital of the City of London to
some situation less threatened with immediate danger, and to
enable those who must, if the enemy approaches, shut their
houses in London, to open them again at Manchester, Liver
pool, or York. The other, still more gigantic, but perhaps some
thing easier in the execution, would be to make among the
whole monied and mercantile interest of the metropolis, (and I
do not see why it might not even be carried farther,) a joint and
reciprocal guaranty of paper to be issued by each other, to a
limited extent, known to the persons entering into such guaranty,
and which could not be exceeded without immediate detection,
and (I should say) bankruptcy, if not punishment.
" That these notions are crude and hitherto quite shapeless, I
very readily admit. Perhaps you may think that no farther con
sideration could make them useful. If so there is no other harm
done than that you will have had the honour of reading a long
and useless letter. If anything can be done in this matter, the
next consideration would be how? with what communication
prepared and digested, in what manner brought forward, and
how enforced upon the attention of the public? If there were
any near prospect of our meeting we could have few more in
teresting topics of conversation. If not, let me know what occurs
to you upon this view of it."

(D.) PITT AND WINDHAM
Windham to Pitt
[For earlier letters, see " Quarterly Review" for 1912. The following
refers to the Quiberon expedition (for which see ante), and the help
offered to the Vendean chief, Charette, to make a move on its behalf.]
" Hill St., Friday evg. [July] 3rd, [1795].
" I have been most unfortunate in missing you to-day, having
called upon you both just before your arrival and just after your
departure. . . . The remittance of the money which I spoke to
you about, through Paris, and which I mentioned to Lord Gren
ville yesterday at St. James's, should be made without loss of
time. It is one of those things in which four and twenty hours
may make the most important difference, and the matter
becomes more pressing, as an opportunity occurs of sending off
a letter to Paris to-morrow morning. The manner in which I
have at length proposed to arrange it is this. An engagement,
signed on the part of the Government, shall be left sealed up
with the banker here, by which we shall promise to pay all sums
(within a certain amount) for which receipts shall be produced
from Charette or whoever shall succeed him in case of his
death. A sum shall then be deposited as a sort of earnest, and
as a proof that the whole is not a dream on the part of the
person here; for which we must be content to run the risk (in
my opinion not a considerable one) which in the way first pro
posed we were to have been exposed to throughout. It is this
sum and this engagement that I want to have by 10 or 1 1 o'clock
to-morrow morning; in order that the letter, announcing these
to have been severally deposited, and putting the whole pro
ceeding in train, may be sent off by the opportunity above men
tioned. The propriety of the proceeding seems to me so clear,
and the importance of despatch so great, that, if I do not get
your answer in time, I shall from my own means deposit a sum
to as large an account as I can, trusting to you to bear me
harmless, and shall feel a great inclination to engage for the
Government, as far as I can, that, to the amount of ^20,000 they
will pay all sums vouched for in the manner above stated. Some
275

276 PITT AND NAPOLEON
step, sufficient to set the business a going, must be taken, so as
not to lose the opportunity of writing by the means that will
offer to-morrow.
" Another matter, equally requiring despatch, and making
part of the same business, occurs in the case of the vessel now
on her way down the river, for the purpose of conveying
Serent's and Ld. Grenville's letter (sic). As the business of
procuring a vessel had been put at first in the hands of Huskisson
and Nepean, and they had told me that nothing was done in it,
I was not aware, till Ld. Grenville spoke to me about it yester
day, that the measure was so far advanced. I was sorry to find
from Ld. Grenville that all that his letter contained was a
general assurance of goodwill, and a request that the person
would tell us what he wanted. Perhaps this is all that is to be
said; but in that case it may be doubted how far it is worth
while to send the letter. In fact, we know what he [Charette]
wants. He wants a body of regular troops; he wants powder;
and he wants money. The troops we have not to send. The
powder is already on its way to him. The only thing that
remains is the money ; and this I could wish to make part of the
cargo of the vessel now going out. I have for this purpose
commissioned Serent to procure, if possible, a thousand or two
louis, to be sent down to-morrow, to meet the vessel in the
Downs. He has told me the person whom he employs to go
out; and I have no scruple of trusting him. I want only your
authority, therefore, to answer for the sum, and your con
currence for sending it out by the present conveyance.1 The
enabling Charette to act, and to act speedily, is of the greatest
and most pressing importance. There are most fearful accounts
of the marching of the enemies' troops from all the northern
frontiers for the professed purpose of opposing the risings in the
interior. "This consideration would lead me to another subject, the
necessity of accelerating our preparations here, and the diffi
culties that rise in the way in consequence of the strange situa
tion in which we are placed with respect to Ld. Moira.2 He was
beginning to tell me at St. James', when I was obliged to quit
him to put myself in the way of the King, that there was a
difference in the statements of his situation made to him by
1 This probably refers to the mission of Baron de Nantiat, who sailed
from England on 4th July for Nantes to meet Charette in la Vendue. See
" Dropmore Papers," iii, 105-124. The Comte de Se"rent was agent in Eng
land for the French Princes.
2 Lord Moira commanded the force that was soon to proceed to strengthen
that which had sailed for Quiberon. He deemed the force insufficient. See
" Dropmore Papers," iii, 90.

PITT AND WINDHAM 277
you and the D. of Y[ork] which he wished to have cleared up.
In the meantime he is keeping aloof and reserving himself for
a declaration that he takes the command merely as a person
ordered, and protesting to a certain degree against the service
on which he is to be employed. One deficiency which he
complains of, I think ought instantly to be provided for — I
mean that of cavalry. As we shall have few infantry to send,
and that (sic) so large a force may probably be wanted, we
must, at least, endeavour to make it up in cavalry, which ought
to be prepared for embarkation with all possible expedition,
since it is but too likely that, even should a landing be made
good (which every hour of delay renders more doubtful), they
may be so much pressed as to make it extremely important
that a strong force should be ready to come to their aid. At
present, I fear, little or no provision is made for this, and there
fore I am anxious to mention it."

Pitt to Windham
" Hollwood, Saturday, July 4, 1795.
" I enclose a paper which I have signed containing an en
gagement in the name of the Lords of the Treasury which I
hope will answer your purpose.1 If any thing more formal is
necessary it may be supplied afterwards. I have left of necessity
a blank for the name of the banker to whom the money is to be
paid here, which you will have the goodness to fill up. I must
also trouble you to have a copy made of the paper. I do not
know whether it will be possible at so short a warning to
procure any money for the deposit you wish, but I have written
to Mr. Carthew, my secretary, to try all means at the Treasury
and let you know the result. From what you mention respect
ing the money to be sent by Sefent, I conclude there is no
difficulty in his procuring the sum wanted, and I will take care
it shall be immediately reimbursed.
" I will take an early opportunity of seeing Lord Moira to
clear up what he supposes to be a difference in the Duke of
York's statement and mine: and I very much hope it will end
in his declining to undertake the command, as I have reason
to believe that if anything material is to be done, Lord Corn
wallis would undertake it."
[On 31st July 1796 Pitt invites Windham to meet him and Dundas
at Hertford Bridge on the Southamplon road to meet and confer with
Moira as to the Vendean expedition.]
1 The money to be sent to the French Royalists, referred to in the previous
letter.

278 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Pitt to Windham
"Saty. Aug. 8, [1795].
"... The orders for selecting the regts. for Noirmoutier were
concerted last night with the Duke. of York who undertook that
they should go to-day. But the instructions cannot be sent
before Monday, as there must be a Cabinet for that purpose."
[On 2nd September 1795 Pitt refers to difficulties in the way of
coining French money for use with the French Royalists.]
Windham to Pitt
"Oct. 16, 1795.
" Though I have long seen and lamented the little dis
position that there is, to give to the Royalist cause the sort of
support, which I should think necessary; of which I cannot
but consider the late decision of the Cabinet, as a new and
unfortunate proof; 1 yet there is one species of assistance, which
I thought it was agreed to continue without abatement, during
the continuance of the war. I mean that of arms, ammunition,
and money. Are we however doing any such thing? Inde
pendent of the decision, which I have just been regretting, and
which will have the effect I fear, of lessening in an immense
proportion, the facility of our communication with Charette,
there are no less than seven large enrolments of people that may
not be improperly called armies, the lowest being 8,000, and the
highest 20 or 25 thousand, some of which are in a situation to
be supplied from the money sent from Monsieur, even if
Monsieur shd. [not?] find the means of landing and taking the
money with him. These have long represented their capacity
and disposition to act, and to make important diversions in
favour of Charette, if they could be assisted by means, and
those not very considerable ones, of assembling and putting
their people in motion. The greatest part of these are under the
conduct of people perfectly well known to us, and on whom
entire reliance can be placed for a due application of any sums
entrusted to them. Some of these persons are here; and for
the others, there [are?] agents ready, on whom an equal reliance
might be placed.
" It becomes absolutely necessary to come to some resolution
on this point. For, as it is, these persons are acting under a per-
1 This refers to the decision of the Cabinet on the Wednesday previous to
withdraw the British troops from Pile d'Yeu, and to leave the Comte
d'Artois [" Monsieur "] and the emigre's free to return. See Pitt's letter of
16th October to Grenville (" Dropmore Papers," iii, 140).

PITT AND WINDHAM 279
suasion, that no assistance which this country can give them of
the sort above described, and of which it could be sure of the
application, would be withheld. To say the truth, I feel myself
in a very unpleasant situation ; for having uniformly contributed
to give this persuasion, in some instances more directly, in others
less so, if a contrary determination is taken, or if this is not cer
tain of being acted upon, I must of necessity take the earliest
steps to undeceive them; that I may not be instrumental in
leading them into an error, so fatal as that of expecting, which
they are not likely to receive. My own case however in this re
spect is little different to that of any other member of the Gov
ernment, except inasmuch as I may have had with many of the
parties more personal communication; for nothing that I have
conveyed to them, differs from that which is to be found in effect
in various publick instruments, both written and printed. We
are all therefore interested in coming to some explicit determina
tion upon the subject; and interested likewise, that this should
be done speedily, in order that no more precious time should be
lost, of which there has been already a great deal ; if the inten
tion has been to give to the force still subsisting in Brittany all
the effect, of which I think be capable [sic]. . . ."
Pitt to Windham
"Walmer Castle, Octr. 18, 1795.
" I received your letter this morning, and tho' I cannot but
feel the impossibility under the present circumstances of risking
any further operations with our own troops on the coast of
France, I entirely agree with you in the expediency of sending
liberal supplies of money, wherever we have reasonable ground
to hope that they will not be misapplied. I have accordingly
given directions for procuring as expeditiously as possible a
further sum of ^100,000 in dollars. The precaution you suggest
of sending stores etc. for our own troops with a view to their
possible detention, is certainly highly proper; and directions
have been sent for providing the most necessary articles. I shall
certainly be in town on Tuesday."
Windham to Pitt
" Park St., March 14, 1796.
[The number of arms in store or expected is in total 116,000; the
army being fully supplied, this whole number is disposable for foreign
service. Crewe, at the Office of Ordnance, represents the number dis
posable as only 22,000] —
— " a quantity which, though possibly sufficient for such clandes
tine conveyance as has hitherto been carried on from Jersey,

280 PITT AND NAPOLEON
and such imperfect and languid attempts as we have hitherto
made upon other parts of the coast is utterly inadequate to
what the country cd. dispose of, or to what we shd. wish
to send, shd. the Royalists by any chance get possession of
a port or a post on the coast. In fact, Puisaye has uniformly
said, and repeats the offer in his last letters, that, for any such
supply of arms and powder, as will repay him for the effort, he
can come down to the coast and retain possession of it for a
week possibly or ten days; and I am actually endeavouring to
arrange with the Prince de Bouillon a plan for that purpose —
besides the attempt which I hope we shall continually be making
to throw in supplies to the Morbihan and to Charette ; even tho'
we have abandoned (unwisely as 1 think) the having a fleet
nearly stationary at Quiberon. I think therefore you will be of
opinion that, however it may be expedient to stop the further
manufacture of Trade Arms, it will clearly not be right to
refuse a contract for the purchase of 60,000 stand, many of them
second hand, I believe, but in good state from the Continent. The
question depends very much upon the portion of the 116,000
which will be ready to be produced, if called for, for any service
in the interior. But for God's sake do not let us be in the situa
tion of finding an opportunity for sending into France what
quantity of arms we please, either for the support of the Royal
ists in conjunction with us, or for their support separately, and
of not having the arms to send."
[On 30th March 1796 Windham issues instructions to officers about
to proceed to Brittany, bidding them repair to the headquarters of the
Royalist armies, find out their strength, taking as guide the paper
delivered by Lord Gr[«'c] to the D. of Har[court?]. They are to act as
British officers, and seek to mitigate the horrors of that civil war.
On 27th April 1796 Windham states at length to Pitt the difficulties
hindering his action in helping the French Royalists, and his conviction
that that work, involving close and minute attention to the news that
came over, would be transacted better as part of the official duties of
the War Department; but neither Dundas nor Huskisson singly would
have the time duly to attend to it. Unless care is at once taken, the
force under Scepeaux will go the same way as those under Stofflet,
Sapinaud, and Charette.
On 10th July 1796 Windham informs Pitt of the way in which he
was distributing 6,000 louis d'or between the French Royalist leaders,
Frotte and Puisaye. Of the ^30,000 per month promised to the French
Royalists, only £1,000 or ^2,000 has been sent, a deficiency due to
the " unfortunate ill opinion that has been entertained of that service."
Frotte, when in England, had been promised at least ^1,000 a month.
Arguing in favour of a vigorous support of the Royalists, Windham says :]
" The sum, as an article of national expense, will be nothing,
and the effects of it may go to everything that is most import-

PITT AND WINDHAM 281
ant. When the whole force of the Republic shall be turned to
the destruction of this country, as I cannot but think it will
before we shall attain the blessings of peace, we shall then
know what the difference is between having all this side of
France smooth and open to their operations, and perhaps even
willing to co-operate with them, or of having it, as it has been
hitherto, filled with bodies of people fighting with them at every
step and ready to rise upon them in a mass in case of any mis
fortune that should befal them."
[Again, on 10th July 1796 Windham informs Pitt that of the £30,000
per month promised the Royalists, only about ,£15,000 or £16,000
has been sent. At present the Prince de Bouillon has not a sou in
hand to send over. He adds:]
" The question is, not now of retaining the Royalists as a
means of effecting a counter-Revolution or of rescuing a part of
the country from the usurpers, but as a great rampart and barrier
interposed for the defence of this country. Four great provinces
filled with insurrection on the western side of France were no
bad outworks for the protection of Great Britain. ... I
cannot wish to leave a bad name in a country distinguished
by the most glorious struggle that has ever been made in sup
port of virtue and order against vice and crime."

Pitt to Windham
"Dropmore, Sunday, Aug. 28, 1796.
" I received this morning your letter of yesterday, and agree
very much with you that a communication such as you men
tion ought to be made to M. de Puisaye. As his letter of au
thority and instructions, I believe, came from Mr. Dundas, the
recal ought naturally to be from the same quarter, and I have
just written to him on the subject. I have also mentioned to
him that it seems to me adviseable to take any reasonable
chance even with some risk, of sending a moderate sum of
money, and have desired him if he concurs in this, to direct ap
plication to be made for an issue of secret service, which is the
only fund from which the money can be furnished, or to the ac
count of which it can be placed without much inconvenience. I
rather fear we may find some embarrassment with respect to
part of what has been furnished already, which however we must
arrange as well as we can. I mention it now only as the reason
for wishing the issue to be made in the first instance in this
channel." [On 5th January 1797 Windham recounts the sums sent to the
French Royalists, and states that of what was sent to the Isle d'Yeu,

282 PITT AND NAPOLEON
about £18,000 came back. The imigris discharged from the cadres
recently dissolved were in a wretched state, and should be succoured.
On 18th March 1797 he mentions a report that Pitt will soon]
" reduce all the foreign corps except a certain number of them
that are serving in the West Indies. I don't know what sort of
a war you are going to carry on, except that it cannot be one
in which troops are wanted of the first quality and capable of
being employed offensively."
[For the accounts of sums spent for the Royalists, see Windham's
letter of 2nd September 1797 in " Dropmore Papers," iii, 362-8.]

Windham to Pitt
" Fulham, Oct. 10, 1797.
" I send you because I am bound to do so, an extract of a
letter from M. de Puysaye ; tho' with no very sanguine expecta
tion that you will be disposed to give to the contents, the same
attention that I should. You are of opinion, at least so I should
collect, that amidst the endless changes of things in France,
some government may be found willing to listen to our vows for
peace, and grant us terms not utterly destructive, in the first
instance of the independence or commerce of the country — such
an event may certainly happen; and if we go lower and lower
in our terms, at least within certain limits, the probability may
very likely be increased.1 Yet you must admit, that such an
event may not happen, and in fact unless our terms should
fall faster than our means, is hardly more likely at any future
period, than at present. My own idea of the probability is that
this will not happen. But that we shall go on, and on, in this
tiding 2 system, till at last we shall be utterly aground, and lye
without resistance at the mercy of the enemy, to be disposed of
as they think fit. It seems to me that what are called safe and
prudent counsels, are often the most replete with danger, and
lead to risks the most dreadful of any, that men can resort to.
— When we threw the desperate cast of risking the last army of
the country, in a conflict with the yellow fever, we did it under
the notion of playing a safe game, and not committing ourselves
in such perilous enterprizes, as those of attempting to co-operate
with the Royalists of France. It is not necessary to point out
the consequences — we are in the whimsical situation of being
condemned to a period of indefinite war, without any means of
annoying the enemy. Let us take care that by the same line of
1 The Fructidorian Directory had haughtily rejected Pitt's terms.
Cf. W.'s phrase to Malmesbury (" Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 590).

PITT AND WINDHAM 283
prudent conduct, we do not find ourselves in a similar, and worse
situation a year or two hence.
" What I have to say, upon the immediate subject of the
letter, is, that the names there mentioned, are not persons that
I now hear of for the first time. They have been known to me
long since, as persons with whom Puysay was in correspond
ence for the object in question, and by whom probably, bating
the risks that must always attend such enterprizes, it wd. long
ago have been delivered into our hands, if the fatal determina
tion had not been taken to recall our fleet at any price, from
the station at Quiberon, a station which I have good authority
in believing the best that could be taken, even independent of
any views to the internal state of France.
" At all events, let me beg your attention, before the business
of Parliament shall call it off, to the several points mentioned
in my letter of a month or two. If you think it wise and
fitting, wholly to abandon the Royalists, at least let us do it,
in a way not to leave upon our name the reproach of false
dealing in pecuniary concerns. At least, let us pay the debts,
which are strictly and all but legally due, if not those which
are equitably so. With respect to cooperation with the in-
teriour, I shall agree with you perhaps, that unless this is done
upon system it can hardly be done with effect, or be done at all ;
and that such a change of system cannot be made without great
effort. But are we not in a situation in which nothing but great
efforts can save the country, and are we not acting like persons
who prefer to die of a mortification, rather than to submit to the
immediate pain and hazard of an operation?"

Private. Pitt to Windham " Downing Street, Feb. 13th, 1798.
" It seems hard to break in upon the enviable repose of the
secession established at Bath, by any thing like politics. But I
cannot help troubling you with a piece of intelligence, which if
you should have any thoughts of coming back in the course of
the year to the House of Commons or the Cabinet, you ought to
be previously acquainted with. You will not be surprised to
hear that it has been thought necessary not longer to delay
filling up the vacancy in the Privy Seal, lest Mr. Harrison should
discover that, we could go on as well without any such office.
On the whole, I have seen no better arrangement than that it
should be given to Lord Westmoreland, Lord Chesterfield suc
ceeding him as Master of the Horse, and Lord Auckland coming
to the Post Office. I perhaps guess that towards some of the
parties in this arrangement, you are not likely to feel any par-

284 PITT AND NAPOLEON
ticular partiality, but I hope you will not see any material
objection to it. You will be glad to hear at the same time that
Lord Fitzwilliam accepts the Lieutenancy of the West Riding.
More difficulties have been created, and much more negociation
in consequence than seemed at all to belong to so simple a trans
action, but it is finally settled."

Private. PlTT TO WlNDHAM
"Hollwood, Tuesday, June 12th, 1798.
" In consequence of repeated representations from Lord
Camden, recently and very strongly renewed, it has been
thought right to propose to Lord Cornwallis to undertake the
situation both of Lord Lieutenant and Commander-in-Chief,
which his zeal for the Public Service has induced him to accept;
and the appointment will take place immediately. I hope the
arrangement will appear to you likely to be attended with good
consequences."
Pitt to Windham
" Friday, 1 1 a.m. [July 12, 1798].
" I am just going to a Conference on our secret expedition
which will be an excuse for deferring the Minorca coals till to
morrow, and I have no thoughts of absconding this evening."
Pitt to Windham
" Downing Street, May 4, 1799.
" In consequence of the intelligence yesterday confirming the
probability that the French may be gone southward five ships
of the line have been ordered to proceed immediately from
Cawsand Bay l to join Lord St. Vincent. Six or seven more will
be in readiness at a moment's warning, either for the same
destination, or any other which fresh intelligence may point out.
With this force at our disposal, it seems to be thought better
not to send any provisional instruction to Lord Bridport, especi
ally as I find the opinion at the Admiralty is that he is not likely
to receive certain accounts from the southward as soon as we are;
and the bare knowledge of their having at first steered that way
would not be sufficient to justify his leaving Ireland and the
Channel open. Every precaution has been taken to put Ld.
St. Vincent and all our squadrons in the Mediterranean on their
1 In Plymouth Sound. This refers to the voyage of Admiral Bruix to the
Mediterranean to join the Spanish fleet. St. Vincent was blockading Cadiz

PITT AND WINDHAM 285
guard, and to apprise them of the reinforcement sent and of that
in readiness."
[On 22nd May 1799 Windham deprecates any plan of getting an
indemnity from France as she was before 1791. We cannot restore
monarchy without the help of the French Royalists, and the announce
ments of indemnities will be fatal to that. It is useless to announce that
that plan will be adopted after the expiration of a certain time. It is
also useless to suppress our opinions as to the restoration of monarchy.
On 2nd July 1799 Windham recommends that Barthelemy shall be
sent back to the Continent in a neutral vessel.]

Windham to Grenville
" Park Street, 16 July, 1799.
" The change of things, which has brought us back to the
same hopes as at the beginning of the war seems to have
brought us likewise to the same errors. We are proceeding
equally without regard to those Allies, who if not in the first
instance must in the last be the most necessary of all ; and are
letting loose upon the royalists in the interior, all those whom
the successors of the Allies have set aside from combatting upon
the frontier. The garrisons of Turin and other places are now
about to do the same thing, that the garrisons of Mayence and
Valenciennes did at the beginning of the contest. They are to
be employed in garrisoning Brest and keeping in order the
royalists of those provinces. Surely it is necessary that some
thing should be done with a view to this evil. My idea is, that
in the case of any future prisoners, taken upon capitulation, one
of the conditions should be, that they should not serve (either
against the allies) or against any party in France acting in the
name of Louis XVIII. It is perfectly possible and most likely
that such a condition will produce no effect, in the use that will
be made of any prisoners so surrendered ; and that not a man
the less will be employed against the royalists. But the same
may be said probably in the case of any conditions made in
favour of the Allies. The chief advantage will be in the impres
sion made upon the royalists ; and in its furnishing the most safe
and possibly the most efficacious of all modes of manifesting to
the well-affected in France, the sentiments with which the Allies
are actuated. . . .
" It appears by accounts from all quarters, that a considerable
tendency to insurrection is showing itself throughout the whole
extent of the royalist provinces, it is certain indeed that it must
be so. The disposition has never ceased to exist, and having
only been kept down, by the strong hand of military force, is
sure to rise the moment that pressure is removed. Do we mean

286 PITT AND NAPOLEON
to leave this spirit wholly unassisted, and while we are seeking
and relying upon insurrection every where else, to reject it in
the quarter where we are sure to find it in its highest degree of
intensity, and where it can alone prove directly and completely
effectual? If we do not, it is high time that means should be
taken to co-operate with these dispositions; and that we should
not be to seek at the moment, when some successful operation
on the part of the royalists may call upon us for immediate
assistance."
Windham to Pitt
" 24 July, 1799-
" If the design is really and seriously entertained of directing
the war to the coast of France, as soon as the Allies shall have
entered on the other side, it is very necessary that some pre
paratory measures for that purpose should be begun without loss
of time. I stated once in conversation with you, what I urged
more at large in a letter to Lord Grenville, that the notion of
keeping back the exertions of the royalists, by leaving them
without assistance or countenance was a very mistaken one;
and that the only way of preventing the insurrection from
breaking out prematurely, and of acquiring over the royalists
any useful ascendancy, was to rescue them from their present
state of distress and abandonment, and to give them reason to
think that at a proper period you meant to espouse their cause.
It is plain at least, that a contrary system has not proved
effectual; as the insurrection seems to be breaking out very
generally at this moment.
" The Duke of Harcourt by the desire of ' Monsieur ' has
made an application to send into France most of the chiefs who
have been resident for some time here; with a view to their
exerting their influence towards stopping the insurrection that
has already in many parts begun. . . .
" From all that appears respecting the state of things in France,
as well as the probable progress of the allied armies, it would
have been well that the present armament had in the first
instance been sent to the coast of France rather than to Holland.
I cannot but think that the moment for us to act on the coast
of France is the moment when the Allies shall enter on the
other side. I do not on reflection see much ground for the notion
that if the insurrection of the Royalists shd. break out before the
beginning of the next campaign, they will be liable to be crushed
during the time that the armies of the Allies must remain to a
certain degree inactive. In the first place the insurrection of the
Royalists will in a great measure break out in spite of every
thing that can be done to prevent it: it is impossible to suppose
that the armies of the Allies can be advancing towards Lyons,

PITT AND WINDHAM 287
and the Royalist provinces not be thrown into a state in which
their intentions will be clearly manifested, and the Directory be
excited to employ against them whatever means shall be in
their power. . . ."
[For Pitt's letter of 30th August 1799 to Windham see Rose, "William
Pitt and the Great War," p. 379.]
[On 7th September 1799 Windham writes to Pitt on the means to be
used for the conveyance of arms into Brittany. He adds:]
" Whether anything can be done, in case Austria should per
sist in her present foolish and scandalous policy, or should
wholly fly off, is a matter of very difficult consideration, and on
which I am far from being sanguine; much as I have been
inclined to count on the resources to be derived from the dis
contents of France, and on the alliance to be form'd, with the
well affected party there. Something however must be tried in
that way, as the only resource in fact that will be left us, for I
hope we should even then be far from hearing again, and still
further from listening to, any cry for peace.
" Ld. Grenville seems to speak very candidly and moderately
upon his favourite plan of operations in Flanders; I hope you
and Mr. Dundas are in the same dispositions. My own idea
would clearly be, whatever were the success of our operations;
to desist as soon as we had driven the enemy across the [River]
Waal, or to acquiesce in what we have already got, shd. the
Dutch not fairly declare themselves. The new government
would then, I conceive, be safe, supposing France incapable of
detaching an army against it; and except on that supposition,
I don't conceive it could be safe; though we could succeed in
getting possession of the frontier fortresses. It does not appear
to me that there is in point of fact, anything between these two
cases. I cannot but deprecate any proceedings that should
pledge us to engage further, either in Holland, or Flanders ; and
in consequence feel fearful of the effect of measures, such as
were started, when I was with you at Walmer; of sending
officers from hence to co-operate with the insurgents in Brabant.
I stated this danger soon after to Ld. Grenville. . . ."
[On 3rd October 1799 Windham strongly deprecates the despatch of
cavalry to the Duke of York in Holland.]
Windham to Pitt
" Park Str., 30 Octr. 99.
"... For God's sake let us at length exert ourselves to sup
port these people [the French Royalists] who, very contrary to

288 PITT AND NAPOLEON
other promised insurgents, rise first, and trust to support after
wards. We have refused them assistance for years upon the
plea that assistance was useless, for they were not in force ever
to venture to shew themselves. They now do shew themselves,
and what shall be said, if we refuse or neglect to support them.
I tremble for the event, but do not let it be said to be our fault.
— Delay is destruction. — The crisis is such, that we must count
by hours. Remember that the first great effort of the Royalists
for co-operation with this country, in their march to Granville,
was lost by a delay of not more than three days ; and the arrival
of the reinforcement at Quiberon, by which the whole of that
disaster might have been prevented, by a period still less.1 There
are demurs about arms, because we cannot afford to send them
any but foreign arms. I wish you to consider, in what hands
twenty thousand stand of arms can at this moment be so im
portant, as in those, who are to determine whether the Royalist
war is to subsist or not in the western provinces of France."
Pitt to Windham
" Downing Street, Friday, Nov. ist.
" I have seen Crewe from the Ordnance. We have settled to
send immediately twenty thousand arms from the Tower in
addition to seven thousand in store at Portsmouth: and there
is a good prospect of collecting speedily some thousand more
both of foreign arms and of those returned from the Militia."
[On 5th November 1799 Windham writes to Pitt urging immediate
succour in money to the Royalists ready to rise in Normandy: "It is
perfectly idle to be paying at the rate of £120,000 per month for a
Russian army in Switzerland, and to scruple any sum which can be
made effectual for the purpose of creating an army in France."
The next letter refers to offers which might come from the French
Government installed in power by the coup d'itat of Brumaire.]
Windham to Pitt
" Park St., Nov. 18th, 1799.
" It is certainly very right that upon a question such as that
which may soon arise, no decision should be taken hastily, nor
without allowing a careful consideration to objections the most
repugnant to our wishes and first impressions. But after all that
1 Windham's charge is incorrect. The succours under Sombreuil reached
Quiberon in time, but were refused admission to the fort on the isthmus by
Hervilly, the commander; and the loss of that fort through treachery caused
the disaster.

PITT AND WINDHAM 289
is done, I cannot see any difficulty in rejecting flatly and [at]
once any overtures that may be made in the present moment.
It seems to me that there would be ridicule as well as danger,
in adopting any other course. For some time to come, I should
say for a long time, a governt. such as the present, dropt from
the clouds, or rather starting from underneath the ground, is in
no state to offer anything. It cannot answer for its own exist
ence for the next four and twenty hours. Its propositions for
some time to come should be treated, in my opinion, as some
thing scarcely deserving a serious answer, and such I am per
suaded will be the publick opinion, if we do not leave it to be
formed, not by chance, but by something a great deal worse,
by the language of those whose business it is to mislead
it. . . .
" I am sorry to find that the placing the Russians at Jersey
has already had the effect which I apprehended, and has occa
sioned the marching into that neighbourhood of part of the army
of Holland."
Pitt to Windham
" Bromley Hill, Sunday, Dec. 22d, 1799.
" I most entirely agree with you that the delay of ten days (or
even much more) in sending one ship with troops to Ireland, can
be of no importance compared with risking the delay of a month
in sending 10,000 arms to the Royalists under their present cir
cumstances; and I hope you will find no difficulty in settling
that the ship in question shall be transferred to the latter service.
I shall return to town to-morrow, and expect M. de la Rosiere
at one with some farther information; after which I shall be
extremely glad to talk over the business with you, if you find
it convenient to call. The more I consider it, the more I feel
impatient to arrange a plan for giving as speedily as the
season will admit, effectual succour in troops as well as arms and
money." Private SAME TO SAME
" Downing Street, Wednesday, Jan. 15th [1800].
" It turns out that there is a 2d letter from the P. of Bouillon
of the 8th, saying positively that the 17th is the day fixed by
Monsr. Bourmont. At any rate therefore our reinforcement can
scarce be in time, and frigates there are none at this moment
disposable. Enclosed however is a note of the arrangement we
have made, and we may take the chance of any delay on the
coast which may still render it useful. We shall I think have no
tryal for our voices sooner than Monday the 27th, as the papers
U

29o PITT AND NAPOLEON
will probably not be laid till Wednesday, and cannot be con
sidered for some days. This delay will I hope give you ample
time to get rid of your hoarseness, and the west wind is come to
your aid. If anything more is wanting, my experience would
recommend common spermacetti mixture as infallible; Canning
gives the same account of malt tea."

Same to Same
"Downing Street, Monday, Jan. 20th [1800].
" The answer l has been drawn quick conformably to the ideas
we talked of, and was generally approved by the Cabinet to-day.
I think it completely keeps up to the tone of the former paper,
and without weakening in any respect the substance, recapitu
lates the leading ideas in a way to obviate all possible miscon
struction, and to help very much the impression here. I am
very glad you did not venture out to-day, and hope you will be
repaid for your prudence."
Private SAME TO SAME
" Downing Street, Thursday, April 24th, 1800.
" The King having approved of Mr. Dundas being appointed
to the office of Keeper of the Privy Seal of Scotland, he will in
consequence resign that of Treasurer of the Navy. I do not
know whether you would on the whole prefer the latter situation
to that which you now hold ; but as it is certainly in some re
spects more desirable, and is from practise equally fit to be held
with a seat in the Cabinet, I have thought it right to lay the
circumstance before you for your decision, in preference to any
other arrangement which may come under consideration. . . ."
Windham to Pitt
" Friday, April 25, 1800.
" I lose no time in thanking you for the consideration which
has led to the offer contained in your letter. Though the situa
tion would in many respects be more eligible than that which I
now hold, yet under all the circumstances I cannot hesitate in
declining it, including certainly as an insuperable objection, any
condition that would seem to deliver the office to me in a state
less complete and respectable, than that in which it has been
before held."
1 I.e., the answer to Bonaparte's offer of peace (see Rose's " William Pitt
and the Great War," p. 384).

PITT AND WINDHAM 291
Same to Same
Thursday, May 8th [1800].
" I have been just told at St. James', from what seemed to be
good authority, that, in some of the arrangements proposed for
disposing of the Treasurership of the Navy, the reserve respect
ing the House, has been no longer insisted upon. I must recall
to your recollection, that the refusal in my answer applied solely
to the offer, as coupled with that condition ; and was accom
panied with no declaration as to the judgement I should form
upon an offer of the situation free from any qualification."
Pitt to Windham
"Downing Street, Friday, May 9th, 1800.
" The information which I find had reached you on the subject
of the arrangement relative to the house at Somerset Place was
erroneous, no change having been made in the proposed allot
ment, which I before communicated to you. If any had arisen,
I would not have omitted, after the sentiment stated in your
letter, to have apprised you of it before the office of Treasurer of
the Navy had been offered to any other person."

(E.) BURKE TO WINDHAM
[For earlier letters see " Quarterly Review" for 1912.]
[N.B. The first two letters refer to the brief Viceroyalty in Ireland of
Earl Fitzwilliam (December 1794 to February 1795), who went as the
nominee of the Portland Whigs after their accession to the Pitt Cabinet
in July 1794. It is now known by a memorandum of Lord Grenville
(" Dropmore Papers," iii, pp. 35-8) that Ministers had prescribed the
policy to be followed at Dublin, and that Fitzwilliam departed from that
agreement. (See ante for a discussion of this subject.) He was therefore
recalled, to the indignation of Burke, whose letters show lack of know
ledge of the essential facts of the case. Mrs. Crewe was a prominent figure
in the Whig salons. The former of these letters is probably to her; the
latter almost certainly.] [March, 1795?]
"... I did not think it possible that, after my great domestic
blow,1 I should ever have felt pain or anxiety from any other
cause. But I did not calculate rightly. For a year past, and longer,
I have done perhaps as much as ever man did to bring and to
keep people together. But I have been unfortunate. All the
means of conciliation I have used have become so many causes
of contention. In that contention, I am certain, I have had no
intentional share — as certain as that I have had my full share
in the punishment. A great man2 may say that this, too, is
poetic justice; and it may be so. I am little disposed to attack
others, and not much more so to defend myself. I have lived,
and now I have nothing to do but to die. The gentleman you
mention to have seen at Ld. P.'s has always had a very great
share in my esteem.3 He did me the honour to call at Nerot's
Hotel in my absence. I pity him very much. I am quite sure
he always acts on principle: but it is a most unfortunate thing
when, without either personal breach or party hostility, an
opinion of duty leads a man to execute a sentence of punish
ment on a man of good character, with whom he has lived on
terms of amity, how deserved soever the punishment may be.
But every man will judge best for himself. It was in a manner
1 The death of his only son, Richard, on 2nd August, 1794.
2 Pi" (?). 3 Windham.
292

BURKE TO WINDHAM 293
but the other day before I knew that Ld. Mn. would go, that I
spoke of Pelham as the properest man in the world to go secre
tary to the illustrious culprit who is now coming hither under
an accusation ; l and, such are the revolutions of the world that
he now takes the secretary's place forfeited under that accusa
tion. The world is much above my understanding. As to the
proceedings about the [Prince of Wales's] marriage, I wish every
thing had looked more auspiciously. What delays the bride?
An hundred ardent vows are uttered for an eastern gale. Is
Pichegru's passport necessary? 2 Cannot a Prince get so much
as a wife without the leave of democracy? I suppose this dread
ful case stuns all the great men into the most serious recollection,
and the Prince is retired to Kempshott to meditate on this great
change. Has he seen the Stadholder? Dionysius is at Corinth.
Well ! They all amaze me. Princes, dukes, marquises, Chancellors
of the Exchequer, Secretaries of State! My heart is sick: my
stomach turns ; my head grows dizzy. The world seems to me
to reel and stagger. The crimes of Democracy and the madness
and folly of Aristocracy alike frighten and confound me. The
only refuge is in God, who sees thro' all these mazes. Adieu,
God bless you ever." " Saturday [March — April, 1795?].
"... I feel to the bottom of my heart for the distresses that
touch you so much to the quick for our worthy friend at Bur
lington House [the Duke of Portland]. I read the part of your
letter that regards him at Lord F[itzwilliam]'s, where I received
it. He was exceedingly affected: so was Lady Fitzwilliam. But
how either of the parties can do anything towards the alleviation
of their common sufferings I know not. Lord F. assured me
that he felt with the utmost tenderness for what his old friend
must suffer: that his heart towards him was exactly in its old
place ; that the change in their relation was a cause of great grief
to him, but not in the smallest degree, of resentment; that the
task he had to go through was one imposed upon him by the
most tyrannical necessity; and that if, for private regards and
feelings (which the world would construe into something a great
deal worse) he was to abandon his cause, he must not only for
feit his own honour, but the honour and character of his friends,
who had so nobly supported his Government, and indeed of the
whole kingdom of Ireland, that had shown uncommon marks of
confidence in him. That if he were to compromise on these
points, no Englishman after him would be trusted by the honour
able and disinterested part of that country. These things he re-
1 Earl Fitzwilliam.
" Pichegru had conquered Holland, and his troops were entering North
Germany. The Princess Caroline of Brunswick therefore had to return.

294 PITT AND NAPOLEON
iterated with great sensibility but with great temper over and
over again, as indeed he had done at several other times. It is
a woful situation of things, which time and events (that do more
to bring matters to rights than all our endeavours) can alone
rectifye. I must think that they who saw, step by step, this
excellent man led to his own suicide, for such it is truly in a
public light, must be inexpressibly hard-hearted not to have
taken some measures to prevent him from inflicting that unheard
of punishment, on his friend in the first instance, but in the end
much more surely and much more severely, upon himself.
" God bless you and forward all your wishes and labours for
the wretched.1 They are in the great hotels, in the pompous
colonnades, in the spacious Courts, in the town gardens, in the
titled heads, and the hearts covered with purple honours, in
great fortunes and in high offices — in what-not outward show of
happiness, as well as in the cottages of starving fugitives, which
your kindness led you the other day to visit — with this woful
difference, that to the unhappy of the latter you may bring some
relief — not to the former. Their sufferings are out of reach of
your charity.
" The Kings are all gone out of town. May Heaven give us
better days. Adieu. Adieu.
" Put down Lady F. for a subscriber."
[The remaining letters, with one exception, are from Burke to his old
friend William Windham, Secretary at War conjointly with Dundas in the
Pitt Ministry, who, along with Burke, warmly espoused the cause of the
French Royalists, and desired that all our military efforts should be used
in their assistance in Brittany and la Vendee. As has been shown in
the essay — "Was Pitt responsible for the Quiberon Disaster?"—
Windham had been largely concerned with the preparations for that
expedition. In a letter, probably of 27th June 1795, Burke assured
Windham of his joy at the first successes at Quiberon, and of his hope
that he might be mistaken in the character and capacity of the French
leader, the Comte de Puisaye. On hearing of the disaster at Quiberon
Burke wrote in a state of distress, which was aggravated by the news of
the death of Colonel Havilland, husband of a young lady who was
staying with Mr. and Mrs. Burke at Beaconsfield :] " 30th July, [1795].
" I am at the dregs of the vessel, and I must drink what is in
it. How I shall break this dreadful affair to the poor worthy
creature, now the only remains of my family, I cannot conceive.
She is delicate in the extreme, and far gone with child. If I
could conceal it from her by any arts of my own, her mother-in-
law would not conceal it. In other respects the times are woful
1 I.e., the French Emigre's in England.

BURKE TO WINDHAM 295
indeed. I suppose the utmost I hear is but too true. Adieu!
Thanks for your most friendly attentions. Nothing could be
more accommodating than Dundas. He is always so. But the
thing is not with him." "Nov. 17, 1795.
[Burke comments on recent debates, in which Lord Grenville behaved
handsomely, the Duke of Bedford ill, and Windham splendidly. He
thanks him and criticises Sheridan for his abusing "the privilege of
his new kindred with the Duke of Portland."]
"... The number of those gentlemen in the House is not
large, but their style seems to bespeak confidence in numbers
elsewhere, within the kingdom or in the neighbouring Republic.
It was said, I know not by what Spartan to an ambassador, I
know not of what small commonwealth : ' Friend ! your speech
supposes an army.' Their speeches certainly do. If I knew
nothing but from the paper, I should think they contrived to
keep the haut de pave"e. Mr. Pitt seems to have begun his speech
in a perfectly proper manner; but it looks as if he were beat
down by clamour and had abandoned the ground he had so
advantageously taken. This I am sure of, that it is perfectly
ridiculous, after all that has happened, to affect to consider the
present traitorous machinations, or any other of the evils of our
time, to a mob. If that were all, tho' in that case I should not
despise the danger, I should think it infinitely less than I do.
The body of the people is untainted in all ranks, and is by far
the most sound in the humblest of all. But there is no rank or
class into which the evil of Jacobinism has not penetrated; and
that disseminated contagion is infinitely more mischievous than
if it had seized upon the whole of any one description ; for then
the whole of some other would be enabled to act with union,
energy, and vigour against it. But it will happen with us, I fear,
as it has happened in France, where the crasis of the blood was
everywhere broke, curdled and in a manner dissolved, and this
led to the general dissolution. As to the Bills x you have in hand,
they are good so far as they go. Valeant quantum valere possunt.
You must make many more of them, and after all the whole
body will be ineffectual. Do you not trust too much in laws
and take men too little into your account? Your magistrates
will not be able to balance or even to stand before the great men,
who, by and by, will attend those meetings which your Bills
permit and in vain endeavour to regulate. They raise all the
clamour of the strongest measure and are imbecillity itself. They
will produce other Bills, the children not of their strength, but
of their weakness, and will multiply like those feeble animals.
1 The Bills limiting public meetings.

296 PITT AND NAPOLEON
who increase in proportion to their insignificance. 'With the
French Republic at your door, your Constitution cannot exist.'
It is too weak to protect itself. With every trial you will make
new discoveries of its impotence; and what is worse, of the
debility of the materials that compose it. If you attempt to
change it you will shake the country on which it stands to its
very center, and let in the very evil you mean to prevent. All I
have to advise at present is, that you will follow your Bills for
the safety of the King's person, etc., with an Act of Association,
like that in Queen Elizabeth's and in King William's reign, con
triving, if possible, to discriminate by some effectual test, and,
what is more effectual, by the judicious choice of some com
mittees of weight enough to call upon the other Associators
(always under the sanction of Govt, for their acts and their exist
ence too) to assist them with their whole posse} This will be
absolutely necessary towards making a regular party for the
constitution. But still remember I say all this, protestando, that,
with a fraternity with the regicide system of France, neither any
thing I can propose or that can come from wisdom ten thousand
times beyond mine, can ever adjourn our ruin for a very short
period." [He then advises caution on the affair of provisions.]
" Wednesday, Nov. 29, 1795.
"... It is coming fast to that point which you and I have long
foreseen. As we have foreseen it, it would be a shame indeed
if we were not prepared for it, both in the collectedness of our
own minds and in every precaution which in our situation be
longs to us. After what has happened in France it would be
a shame indeed if Mr. Foxe's guillotine (I mean the travelling
guillotine for me, the permanent for you) should come to our
doors, without our having a previous struggle for our necks, and
for what ought to be far more precious to us. ... If it comes
to a requisition, Beaconsfield will furnish 30 heavy horsemen
and 20 light. By this scantling judge of England."
[He then refers to the fury of the Jacobin attack in the House of
Commons, as reported in the "Sun." When a little earlier they charged
Ministers with a plot against the King in order to further their plans,
why did not the Ministry refuse to go on till that foul charge was
cleared up?]
1 The Associations were loyal. The Societies and Clubs, as a rule, mal
content.

BURKE TO WINDHAM 297
"Jany. 17, 1796.
[Burke sends Windham the pamphlet — the twin brother of the one
he has been considering.]
" The moment of peace is yet, I hope, so far distant that
chance may still do much to save us from so dreadful a cata
strophe. I mean, of course, peace with a Jacobinical republic.
Yet everything has a dreadful tendency that way: and the great
impediment is wanting — a conviction of the extent of the danger
which from that moment will begin to operate against the
country. It really does not appear to me that from the moment
such a peace is made, the shame and degradation of this country
will be any longer supportable. What would happen if a regicide
ambassador were to set up house here, with his wife ' removable
upon four days' notice'? " " Beaconsfield, March 6, 1796.
" What I was given to understand, but what I could not
believe, nor could you, has happened. The House of Commons
is condemned in costs and damages by the East India Com
pany. We have charged Hastings with robbery of the people of
India. Instead of punishing him, we reward him with a second
robbery. No account demanded of him. No reason asked why,
with an immense salary, when he might have been honestly rich,
he is, as he says, miserably poor? Why no account of the
bribes? The Lords may say — they will not convict him of them.
But they have not said, nor can they say, that he has accounted
for the money: then their judgment has the infamy to say that
bribery and forgery of bonds to cover it, is a proper way of
getting a revenue. But no account! No account of any kind!
My dear sir, I must not have it said that we have compromised
the matter by a pension to the accuser and another to the
accused. The House of Lords may say we have made a false
charge. So may the bystanders. Are we to say it ourselves?
" I hope to have my petition ready by the end of the week.
Your poor friend, Mrs. Burke, is still very ill, and cannot quit
her room or her couch. I have suspended the work on the
peace.1 It is not fit that any good should happen to this enor
mous mass of corruption, peculation, oppression, robbery, pre
varication in judgment, and direct perversion of judgment.
God's ways are unsearchable. But I think the bolt will fall;
and it is fit that it should fall on me among the rest. Adieu.
Adieu." 1 "Thoughts on a Regicide Peace" was published late in the summer
of 1796.

298 PITT AND NAPOLEON
"Bath, August I, 1796.
[Burke deplores the present state of things.]
" If you, in the full force of a youthful manhood, in an high
situation, with such virtues, talents, and acquirements as God
has disposed to very few living (if to any), can do nothing; if
from your meridian lustre the public can reflect no light, what
can be done by the expiring snuff of my farthing candle? No:
there is no one thing which we can propose that to those who
shut their eyes to the evil (and therefore cannot conceive what
remedies are to be proportioned to it) that would not be
thought monstrous, wild, and extravagant? Are we of the stuff
of those who, with Hannibal in the bowels of Italy, would think
of transporting the gross of our [their?] strength to Africk and
to Spain? I go no further. All must depend on individuals, a
very few individuals, now, as always it has done. If the Duum
virate 1 who direct all (you will pardon me if I do not call you
a minister) have not the courage to look our situation in the
face themselves, and to state it to Parliament too, if they do
not cease to consider what is to be said to their adversaries
there, as an eloquent Bar defence, grounded on the principles
of those adversaries, rather than what ought to be done against
the grand adversary — then, I say, there is not for us a ray of
hope. Their talents are great indeed; but if they are thus
directed, better half with a just direction, than the whole, than
twice the whole, in the present course."
[On 27th August 1796 he congratulates Windham on having saved
from dissolution the remains of the regiments of French imigris in
British pay. The following letters refer to the negotiations for peace
with France conducted by Lord Malmesbury at Paris.] "Bath, Sept. 11, 1796.
" We seem to me to be descending to the center of ruin
with so accelerated a motion thro' the thin medium of pusilla
nimity, disgrace, and humiliation, that it seems to be an attempt
to fight with the established laws of nature to stop the course
which things are taking. But on this we shall talk more when
we meet. . . ." " Tuesday, Nov. 1, 1796.
"... The more I think of it the more I feel astonished that
the Ministry can think of putting the whole affairs of Europe
blindfold into the hands of Lord Malmesbury : it is at this time
they are mad enough to evacuate Corsica; and is it now that
1 Pitt and Dundas.

BURKE TO WINDHAM 299
they are to look for a fleet to confront that of Spain.1 My head
and heart are ready to split at once. Adieu." "Friday, Nov. n, 1796.
" . . > This City business is curious enough. It is but a fore
taste of what Mr. Pitt is to expect from his mistaken politicks
at home and abroad. His favourite commissary,2 who left us
for Lord North and Lord North for him, contrives a triumph
for Mr. Fox over him, when he is led before the triumphal car
of his enemy covered over with obloquy and mud! Oh! But
the newspaper says, these mobs that drew the one and threw
.stones at the other, were hired mobs. Possibly it may be so.
But I am sure such hirelings would have fared but ill, if a
general sentiment, more mitigated indeed and decent, did not
go with those who committed outrages. The whole democratick
corps was there. Why was that? Ought wooden-head to have
been left to his own indiscretion?
" Indeed Mr. Pitt will daily feel the effects of his leaving
himself without a cause, and without any independent and
honourable support. He cannot hinder the world from feeling (?)
that, when he assumes Mr. Foxe's principles, that Mr. Fox had
the advantage of an earlier profession, and proposed peace
when peace might clearly be had with more advantage than it
can be made at present. The people, God knows, reason but
little. But surely our shameful flight from the Mediterranean
must be felt as the most disgraceful event, and possibly the
most fatal that has ever occurred in our history. He would
not suffer a spirit to be raised in favour of himself and his
measures. He will find a spirit raised against him and them
which he will endeavour in vain to resist. He will, by and bye,
be as ill treated in his person in London, as he is by his sub
stitute in Paris. Well! God send you all well out of this ugly
scrape." " Nov. 25, 1796.
[Burke dislikes the proposed appointment of General Stuart to help
in the defence of Portugal; for his proceedings in Corsica prove him
unfit for the work. He will quarrel with the imigri corps there.]
" We have abandoned Italy politically, commercially, morally.
Spain is become our enemy. Our negotiation at Paris will serve
no purpose but to discover the limits of what it is we propose
1 The evacuation of Corsica and Elba was mainly in order to concentrate
our naval forces in home waters in view of the recent declaration of war by
Spain. 2 I.e., Dundas. Burke next refers to the riotous reception accorded to Pitt
in the City, in consequence of the recent serious increase of taxation.

300 PITT AND NAPOLEON
for the Emperor — for the accommodation of the regicides (much
abler politicians than we are) in their scheme of opening a sepa
rate treaty with him ; and now our last hold on the Continent
Genl. Stuart is to secure it to us. It is all over. No experience
of the fatal effects of jobbs (sic) will hinder jobbers from jobbing
to the last. ..."
Burke to Woodford
" Beaconsfield, Dec. 9, 1796.
"... I have read the debate on the budget. I think Mr. Pitt
was less lofty and loud in his triumph than I expected. As to
Fox, he seemed in a perfect paroxism (sic) of rage and fury."
[He then refers at length to the proposal for an effort to induce the
Emperor to liberate Lafayette, which he strongly deprecates.]
" With what face can Mr. Fox desire a national interference
with the Emperor for this man at the very moment when he
is opposing, as all along he has opposed, the grant of any loan
or subsidy or assistance whatsoever to this our Ally, and who
in the moment of this proposition, instead of an attempt to
soothe or soften him, speaks an insulting language, such as
was never heard before, in this time, and before this time never
would have been tolerated in relation to an Ally of this country.
... In the name of God what is the meaning of this project of
Mr. Pitt concerning the further relief of the poor.1 What relief
do they want, except that which it will be difficult indeed to
give, to make them more frugal or more industrious? I see
he's running for popular plates with Mr. Fox. . . . Lord
Malmesbury fills me with despair, or rather those who have
sent him. Are they quite mad to found this treaty on a basis
of exchanges and mutual cessions? Why did Mr. Pitt conceal
the succours he gave the Emperor? Policy required they should
be as publick as possible. Why not state that he intends to give
him a further subsidy?"
Burke to Windham
" Sunday Dec. 18, 1796.2
[Burke again refers to Fox's motion on behalf of Lafayette.]
" The whole drift of this motion is subservient to the general
plan of making every Power in alliance with this country odious.
... As I should have expected, even from the report of your
1 For this subject see ante the essay, " Pitt and Relief of the Poor."
2 For Windham's reply to this letter see Burke's " Correspondence," iv, 401.

BURKE TO WINDHAM 301
speech in the ' Sun,' the impression it made on the House was
great and decisive. Laurence 1 told me that this impression did
honour both to the speaker and to the feelings of the House,
which he states to have been on both sides just what they ought
to have been. Nothing can exceed the ability of that speech;
and it was necessary it should be so, as no overabundant zeal
was shown for the general cause of sovereign Powers by those
who had spoken before you. . . . The fact is, that the minority
here must consider the mere fact of rebellion to be the most
transcendant of all merit. Be it so with them, if they please.
But is that a plea that is likely to be prevalent with sovereigns?
. . . God save me from falling into the merciful hands of those
who think the business of Foulon and Bertier (sic) no act of
cruelty. God save you from their humanity and compassion.
This has been a very bad day for me, but I have begun to
work. I see I must fortify myself on the point of the nation's
ability to prosecute the war. I would not wish, however, to call
much attention to the collection of materials I wish you [to]
procure for me. I think they may easily be had at the Excise
and Customs. . . ." "Beaconsfield, 25 Dec. 1796.2
" I received your kind letter. The return of Lord Malmes
bury is just in all its circumstances what it ought to be, and
indeed, just what might be expected. This mongrel has been
whipped back to the kennel yelping and with his tail between
his legs. This will be a great triumph of Ministry, of Opposi
tion, and of the nation at large. The Opposition only will be
true to its principles. Woeful fidelity and consistency when such
are the principles. The rest will certainly fail on the tryal.
Indeed they have so much relyed on the certainty of peace and
have provided, if for any war, only a war at home, that I do not
see how they can carry on any other with energy and effect.
However, anything is better than a Jacobin peace. In every
other posture of things there are at least chances. I am quite
sure that notwithstanding all that Ld. Malmesbury has suffered,
both as a negotiator and a gentleman, that, in order to justify
himself in his first step, kicked in as he has been and kicked out,
he will still in the House of Lords hold out some sort of hopes.
He will endeavour to keep open to himself a rode (sic) to some
such infamous employment in future. You know better than I
do, who know nothing of the subject, what is to be done with
the Interior of France, but of this I am sure, if nothing can be
1 Dr. French Laurence, M.P., an intimate friend of Burke.
1 In reply to Windham's letter of 24th December announcing the failure of
Lord Malmesbury's mission (Burke, "Correspondence," iv, 412).

302 PITT AND NAPOLEON
done there, nothing can be done with effect anywhere. Unfor
tunately we have disabled ourselves of our best means by sending
the French Royalists to Portugal, but that is no fault of yours,
who advized that measure in order to save these unhappy corps
from being broke as criminals with every sort of disgrace, or
sent with equal disgrace and with every sort of other ill con
sequence to the West Indies. God Almighty bless you and
support you in the endeavours which yet you will make use of
for the salvation of your country and of betrayed Europe. . . ."
"Jany. 5th, 1797.
[Burke still hopes to procure the accounts for his projected work, but
not so as to reveal his purpose.]
" The use that I intend to make of these accounts, if they
come up to my ideas, as I think they will, is to finish my
demonstration — that no class of the Poeple (sic) hath as yet felt
the war in any sort of privation. . . .
" If Ireland was the object of the Brest armament (and it
now looks not improbable) what handsome provision has been
made for its defence! No depot of force in any central point.no
pre-concerted arrangement. Agamemnon General in the South,
with Cooks for his Aid-de-Camps (sic), and so corpulent that I
am told he cannot go on horseback. Had Hoche landed in
Bantry Bay or in any bay more commodious for his purposes,
as many there are on that coast, nothing could have hindered
him from making himself master of Cork, of putting that place
under contribution of money and provisions, and, having routed
the weak force in that part, from marching forward and beating
all the rest in detail. The apparent want of intelligence of the
enemy's design was truly deplorable, but if intelligence was
received and credited, that the enemy's design pointed at Ire
land, how did it happen that no fleet was off Ireland to oppose
the enemy on his approach, or, on failure, to intercept him on
his return? While the Jacobin fleet was at anchor in Bantry
Bay, Lord Bridport was at Portsmouth, and Colpoys, after
going God knows where, returns himself into harbour. The
French leave Bantry on the 27th of Deer., and Ld. Bridport sails
from Portsmouth to look for them on the 3rd of this month: if
he meets any of them it is a miracle, and it must be owing to
the terrible condition which they are in. So much for intelli
gence, foresight, and precaution.
" ' For my own part I never believed that the French could have
thought of Ireland, equipped as they were in such a tempestuous
season.' l . . . But the fate of that expedition is, I trust, now
1 Burke adds here that he thought the French aimed at Nova Scotia.

BURKE TO WINDHAM 303
decided by an arm stronger than ours, and by a wisdom capable
of counteracting our folly. Yet, my dear friend, I do tremble lest
the boldness of these men in risquing everything, and our
negligence or misfortune in not providing for anything, may not
always find the Heavens so propitious. I confess, I tremble at
the clanger whilst I am rejoicing at the escape. However, I sin
cerely congratulate you upon it. I consider you so much as a
friend, to whom I am used to disburthen myself, that I forget I
am writing to a Minister with whom I ought to have manage
ments l when I discuss anything relative to the conduct of his
colleagues. The want of a steady intelligence, both from Paris
and from Brest, is a thing I cannot comprehend, because I am
sure it might have been obtained. God bless you. I am very
faint and perhaps peevish, but ever most truly yours."
"Bath, 12 Feb., 1797.
[Burke has been reading Erskine's pamphlet, which is less full of
vanity than he expected but contained] —
" all the old matter hashed up. France would have been very
good if she had not been provoked by the wickedness of Great
Britain and other Powers, who are confederates, not against her
ambition, but against her Liberty; that she was right in every
point and at all times and with all nations ; that the cure for all
disorders consists in your making your representation at home
as like hers as possible, in making peace with her by giving her
all that you offer and all that she demands. . . .
" I am to observe once for all that these gentlemen put the
case of France and America exactly upon a par, and always
have done so. I leave them to rejoice in that discovery, and in
my inconsistency and the antidote they have found in one part
of my writings against the poison that exists in another. You
will observe that this alliance with France and a change in the
Constitution are things that always go hand in hand, and, I
think, consistently enough. The only point upon which he is
strong, but on which I don't think he makes the most is Mr. Pitt
having refused to make proffers of peace whilst our affairs were
in a prosperous condition. . . . Mr, Pitt unfortunately is in the
condition of ' Paulo pugnante! He cannot make peace, and he
will not make war. 'Deus dabit his quoque finem' — which I
believe I will not live to see. I wish [I] may live to make my
final protest against the proceedings of both factions. . . ."
1 The French word managements (i.e., considerate treatment) is the
sense.

304 PITT AND NAPOLEON
"Bath, April 26, 1797.1
"... To do anything without raising a spirit (I mean a
national spirit), with all the energy and much of the conduct of
a party spirit, I hold to be a thing absolutely impossible; and
I hold it to be impossible to raise that spirit whilst the Minister
who ought to excite it and direct it, and to employ it for the
purposes of his own existence, as well as of that of his master
and of his country, is the very person who oppresses it, and
who, with double the expense and double the apparatus of every
sort with which our most vigorous wars were ever carried on, is
resolved to make no war at all. Our only hope is in a submis
sion to the enemy by taking up the principles of that enemy at
home, and by submitting to any terms which the directing body
of that enemy abroad shall think fit to prescribe. If they demand
Portsmouth as a cautionary town, it will be yielded to them ;
and as to our navy, that has already perished, with its disci
pline, for ever. I have my thoughts upon a modification, without
a departure from the terms of our late unhappy submission ;
but they are of no moment because no attention will be paid to
them. What cure for all this? What but in that spirit
' which might create a soul
Under the ribs of Death.' a
" But to this end it is absolutely necessary that no terms
within or without doors should be kept with the French party
in our Parliament, who must be treated as public enemies, else
they and the Head of the Republic abroad will infallibly over
power all the feeble force of a flying resistance."
[Burke then refers to an estimable pamphlet, " Reasons against
National Despondency," as ably written, but too tenderly towards
Ministers. We must, he adds, undertake " an active war in the territory
of France," despite the recent disbanding of some cavalry regiments.]
" Bath, 16 May, 1797.
"... There is an end of us. The Revolution is accomplished
even before the Jacobin peace."
[He prophesies the end of all discipline in the Navy owing to the
weak tolerance shown to the mutineers by Lord Howe in his mission to
ascertain grievances. He then refers despairingly to Irish affairs and the
despatch of 8,000 soldiers to support the Junto there.]
" ' to which both kingdoms are sacrificed.' ... I see they
are making a run through the most contemptible wretch on
1 In answer to Windham's letter of 25th April (Burke, " Correspondence,"
iv, 439)-
2 Milton, "Comus," 561, 562.

BURKE TO WINDHAM 305
earth, Lord Dillon, and another, not much less so, a Mr. Day,
at my friend Dr. Hussey, upon account of his zeal in strengthen
ing his flock according to his principles against the religious
persecution which, under pretence of military discipline, has
been exercised against the Roman Catholic soldiery.1
[He then refers to the Fitzwilliam affair and says Pitt's plan is to
destroy all those who will not further "a Jacobin indifference to all
religion." The common people in Ireland are Roman Catholics and will
have no other religion. He had pointed this out to Dundas, who listened
patiently, but took no heed "to the purpose I had so much at heart,
the peace of Ireland, its consolidation with this kingdom, and a direc
tion of our common force against our common enemy."]
[Burke died on 9th July 1797 at Beaconsfield.] ,
1 See Burke's letter of 12th May to Dr. Hussey in Burke's "Correspond
ence," iv, 447.

(F.) PITT TO LORD HARROWBY
[The Earl of Harrowby was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Pitt
Cabinet of 1804. In January 1805 he resigned owing to ill-health, but
in July 1805 became Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and under
took an important mission to the Court of Berlin, for which see Rose,
" Despatches relating to the Third Coalition." The first letter refers to
the expected rupture with Spain.] "Walmer Castle, Friday, Sept. 23rd, 1804.
" I entirely concur with you in thinking that permission ought
to be given to the Spanish ships now in our ports to compleat
their lading with our manufactures and produce and proceed
to Spain, and also that vessels with cargoes of grain for Spain
from foreign ports should be allowed protection from our cruisers
under the restrictions you propose. I see nothing that can be
said to Souza1 in the smallest degree different from what you
propose. We certainly can say nothing positive as to what assist
ance we can give, and nothing that implies we can give any,
without knowing what exertions they would make for them
selves. " The account you give of the information brought from Ferrol
by Mr. Brickdale (? Bircdale) seems to give some probability to
the idea that nothing more may be intended by the Spanish
preparations than to send troops to Bilboa. It seems therefore
quite right to give such an authority as you propose to Frere, if
he is satisfied with the Spanish explanation and receives assur
ances that the arming any ships to act as ships of war is sus
pended, to direct Cochrane to suffer any ships armed en flute
and fitted as transports to pass unmolested; but in that case
Cochrane must of course also take means on the spot to ascer
tain that such really is the description of the vessels.2 Might it
not also be right to send similar directions from hence imme
diately to Cochrane? I put this question doubtfully, because we
certainly are justified in stopping any ships till such explana
tion as we are entitled to expect is given by the Spanish
1 The Portuguese Ambassador in London.
2 Cochrane was watching five French sail-of-the-line which took refuge in
Ferrol in July 1803. 306

PITT TO LORD HARROWBY 307
Court ; but perhaps if it turns out that the orders were really
given under an unexpected and pressing necessity on account
of the insurrections, we might overlook the omission of
previous communication to us. I return the papers from the
Spanish merchants. I shall be happy to see you and Leveson
on Sunday.
" P.S. On the subject of the note about Wright,1 I still think
there is no room for any civil words, and that it is better not to
say anything in writing of our intention to release any French
officer in return." "Walmer Castle, Wednesday, Sept. 12, 1804.
" I return the draft which I received from you by the post
this morning, and concur entirely in the propriety of sending
them immediately. I have obeyed your orders by endeavour
ing to entiere (?), but have found nothing to suggest beyond a
few trifling verbal alterations. If you can without much incon
venience to yourself go to Weymouth about Monday, as you
propose, it would I think on every account be very desirable. I
propose being in town on Saturday, and we shall probably
either meet in Downing Street on that day, or at Putney on
Sunday morning."
[See "Stanhope Miscellanies" (1863), 26, et seq., for Pitt's letters of
1 8th September and 19th November, 1804.]
" Downing Street, Nov. 20th, 1804.
" I hope I shall have not have judged wrong in acting quite con
trary to your orders, but I think what Woronzow has to com
municate to you so satisfactory, that I cannot help flattering
myself it is likely to prove a very good auxiliary to Bath
waters ; and he seemed so much bent upon telling you his own
story that I could not at any rate have discouraged his visit.2
" It appears to me that the principles in which it is now the
great object of Russia to ascertain our concurrence are so com
pletely our own, that there cannot be the smallest hesitation in
contracting any provisional engagement with them that can but
convince them of our determination to act with them fairly and
decidedly. To reduce the French Power within its ancient
limits (if possible) at least within some; is precisely the basis
we wish to establish for any general concert. The restoration of
the monarchy may become in the course of events, an object
to be distinctly aimed at, but it certainly cannot be made itself
1 Captain Wright's ship was captured by French gun-vessels during a
calm. 2 Vorontzoff [Woronzow] was Russian ambassador in England.

308 PITT AND NAPOLEON
a substantive object in the first instance ; and it is very satis
factory to see that in this important point there is no apparent
difference in our sentiments.1 The proposal for increasing our
Hanoverian Corps, and forming one of Albanians, also tallies
very much with the projects we have had in view, and may I
think produce great facilities, by enabling them to increase the
amount of their force destined to co-operate with Austria. I
cannot help hoping too, from the manner in which one of the
dispatches refers to the amount of force which Austria has de
manded, that greater progress has been made towards some
secret provisional engagement between the two Courts than we
are apprized of. On the whole I think the communication pro
mises better than anything we have yet seen, and gives a fair
chance of our at last seeing some decided effort made adequate
to the circumstances of the times. Your draft to Jackson 2 ap
pears to be perfectly right, and I have only added a short post
script applying the principles it contains to the circumstances of
his release. I am very sorry that the advantage which you
appeared at first to derive from Bath, has been at all inter
rupted ; but that ought not to discourage you from persevering.
We shall none of us reckon that the experiment has been at all
tried in less than a compleat three weeks; and not fairly unless,
after coming up for a week when the Spanish answer arrives,
you return for three weeks more before Parliament."
"Downing Street, Wednesday, Nov. 21st, 1804.
" You will receive from Hammond the account of our nego
tiation with Spain being broken off. As this will leave nothing
to be done immediately of a diplomatic sort except preparing
a Manifesto, I hope you will determine on remaining at Bath.
But if you should think it necessary to come up (which I hope
you will not) I trust at least that you will make your arrange
ments to return again without loss of time, and compleat your
six weeks. You will have full time for this, as the state of money
allows us again to postpone Parliament till the 15th; the ap
pearance of war with Spain seems to me no reason for not
doing so, as the inconvenience of meeting so soon after Christ
mas will be readily admitted as a sufficient reason for the
delay." "Downing Street, Wednesday, Feb. 6th, 1805.
" I received your letter this morning. The statement it con
tains is perfectly clear and satisfactory, and tallies entirely with
1 This corrects Thiers' statement as to the differences between Russian
and British policy.
2 Francis J. Jackson (1770-1814), was British Minister at Berlin.

PITT TO LORD HARROWBY 309
my recollection of the particulars as you communicated them to
me by your letter to Walmer. The letter itself I am perfectly
sure I destroyed; but that circumstance is not material, as I
think without it we know exactly the state of the case, and I see
no difficulty in any part of it. It is certainly not necessary to
trouble you with any formal reference on the subject. Our
whole case taken together is I think much strengthened by each
additional volume of information which the Opposition have
been so kind as to ask for, and I have no doubt that both our de
bate and division will be very triumphant. The day of battle
however is again postponed till Monday, at the desire of Oppo
sition, as several additional papers have only been presented to
day. I am grieved not to receive a better account of your own
health, and shall be impatient to hear that it is thought prudent
for you to make a fresh trial of Bath. There is nothing new at
present and we are all going on very quietly and comfortably in
spite of the ' Morning Chronicle.'" " June 4th.
"What solution is there to the problem proposed in the
private letter; or what is to be the conduct of Russia and
G. Britain, if Austria declines the concert and a general war
becomes impossible at present? I believe that we must remain
at war, and Russia declare war, as the best chance of forcing
the other Powers to a decision."

" Downing Street, Sept. 27th, 1805.
" I had another very full conversation before I left Weymouth,
and again urged every topic that I thought could produce an
impression, but with no better success than before; and I am
convinced the resolution is fixed of running all chances, and
never agreeing to take the step proposed but in case of actual
necessity.1 I see therefore nothing to be done but to prepare to
fight the battle as well as we can. The prospect on the Con
tinent is improving every day. I have desired Hammond to
send you an account of the contents of yesterday's mail. The
answer of Austria to Duroc's proposal, and the junction of the
Bavarian force, are beyond our expectations. The next accounts
will probably bring us the decision of Prussia, which I think will
at least not be hostile.
"P.S. I do not see anything at present that should hasten
your return to town, and I rather hope to make my excursion
to Walmer in the beginning of next week."
1 See Rose, " William Pitt and the Great War," p. 530.

310 PITT AND NAPOLEON
" Downing Street, Oct. 15th, 1805.
" I came to town last night and hope to return again to Walmer
in about a week. In the interval there are so many things to be
discussed that as I know you are ready to move at a short
warning I should be very glad if you can come to town, and we
shall probably receive accounts interesting enough to make you
not repent being on the spot. Our last letters from Berlin are of
the ist Oct. The march of the Russian troops thro Prussian
territory was suspended till after an interview which was to take
place between the Emperor and the K. of P. probably at Briesh,
and about this time there is great reason to hope the result may
ensure at least the fair neutrality of Prussia. If Russia would
follow our advice, there would be some chance of co-operation.
Denmark is assembling 26,000 men in Holstein, apparently with
very favourable sentiments; and Sweden seems not unlikely to
close with our last proposal and furnish 12,000 troops for active
service. This force added to the Russians at Stralsund, and
with some chance of Hessians (if Prussia is really neutral)
affords no bad prospect of a considerable army in the North
exclusive of Prussia. In the meantime France has nearly evacu
ated Hanover, and we are sending our Hanoverian force to the
Elbe with about 5,000 British, to see whether they can be estab
lished with safety during the winter ; and if not, with orders to
return before the frost sets in, with whatever recruits in the
interval they can draw from the country which will probably be
numerous. . The combined forces of Francis and Congreve will
probably commence their operations on the opposite coast in a
few days." 1 "Downing Street, Oct. 17th, 1805.
"The accounts received last night from Berlin are so un
expectedly favourable and encouraging, that I cannot help
sending you an abstract of them by a messenger for the chance
of his meeting you on the road to town, or of following you in
your tour through Needwood, if you should have set out before
my letter of Tuesday reached you. You will not wonder that
this intelligence increases my desire to see you, as I think the
opening now given if properly improved may lead to everything
we can wish. The whole fortune of the war, and the destiny ol
Europe^ may turn upon our having a person on the spot at
Berlin in whom unlimited confidence can be placed, and who
may turn the favourable disposition at Berlin to the best advan
tage, and communicate expeditiously from thence with both
Emperors. I need not tell you who that person is. Pray re
volve in your mind in your post-chaise whether it is possible
1 An attempt on the Boulogne flotilla.

PITT TO LORD HARROWBY 311
for him to undertake it. I would not propose it if I did not
really feel it as important as I have stated. The business might
probably all be compleated in six or seven weeks."
"Downing Street, Oct. 29th, 1805.
" The credentials I find are prepared and follow you by the
messenger. I also send you the paper which Nicolai brought
me containing the proposal of the Russian Finance Minister
respecting the subsidies; and a memo, which has been sent to
Leveson l in consequence, explaining why we cannot adopt that
plan, and what are the measures we have taken. There is also a
similar memo, as to the measures taken for Austrian subsidy,
as well as a short abstract of the funds provided at Hamburg
and the demands authorized to be made upon them up to the
1 5th of January, and a comparison of the proposed actual pay
ments with the total amount of what is computed to fall due to
each of the Imperial Courts within the same period. The latter
computation must of course be uncertain until we know the
precise period when the different Russian armies quitted their
frontiers, and the actual amount of the Russian and Austrian
force. The last of these I have probably estimated beyond the
mark; but even allowing for the whole, you will see that pro
vision is made for paying within the year or at furthest by the
15th Jany. the whole of the monthly subsidies, and nearly one
half of the Russian and two thirds of the Austrian mise en
campagne — of course this latter sum could not be expected to
be paid at once. The payment I propose on account ought I
think to be deemed to be very liberal ; and the remainder may
be completed early in next year. In addition to these payments,
there may possibly be toward £100,000 for the different engage
ments to Sweden, making in the whole about £2,900,000. This
will leave about £600,000 of our vote of credit disposable, but it
may be desireable to reserve some small proportion of this for
any demands from Naples which may go beyond what may be
defrayed by secret service. On the whole I think (if absolutely
necessary) you might safely stipulate for the actual payment of
,£500,000, and without any possible difficulty at least for
£250,000 on account of Prussia and her Allies between the
middle of November and the middle of fanuary. And whatever
be the times and proportions of actual payment, there seems no
objection to agreeing that the monthly payments should be
computed as due from the signature of any treaty you may
conclude, or even (if Hardenberg should revert to that proposal
1 Granville Leveson-Gower (1773-1846) was British ambassador at St.
Petersburg. Compare this despatch with those of Mulgrave to Harrowby,
Rose, " Third Coalition," pp. 207-220.

312 PITT AND NAPOLEON
and insist upon it) from the ist Oct. I hope you give as little
implicit credit as I do to Commodore Robin's impertinent
bulletin, and form as favourable conclusions from the intel
ligence in the private letter from Amsterdam, the substance of
which was sent you by the post yesterday. We have nothing
fresh to-day. I am not a little impatient for authentic news, but
still more so for a west wind.
" P.S. I find the three first papers mentioned are sent already.
I have enclosed the remainder." " Downing Street, Oct. 30th, 1805.
" I enclose you a very gloomy account from one of our Dutch
correspondents,1 from which however I am inclined to deduct as
he proposes at least one half. And though the remainder would
be bad enough in itself, I see nothing in the consequences at all
alarming, if Austria has the courage to pursue the only policy
which is safe under such circumstances. Allowing for the great
loss the French must evidently have sustained they must probably
require some interval before they can move to the Inn, and that
march must be from 100 to 150 miles. If the Austrians and
Russians on the Inn, were to be 100,000 men by the 20th of
this month, the further reinforcements they must probably
receive from the Tirol and Salzburg, from such part of the Ulm
army as may find its way to them, and from the Austrian
reserves, must enable them to make a stout and probably an
effectual resistance in that position. And they have still to
expect a second army of fifty thousand Russians in no long time,
and, I should hope, 40,000 more of the reserve originally in
tended by Russia to have been kept on the frontier of Lithuania,
but which might surely now be converted into an active force.
Add to this that if Bonaparte advances to the Inn, he will be at
least 300 miles from his frontier, just about the time the Prussian
force will be collected at Bayreuth, and his Allies probably
advancing from Saxony and Hesse, the first of which places
seems not more than 80 miles, the second 1 50 and the third 200
miles from points that would cut off all communication with
Mentz, Manheim and Strasburg. I am only unreasonable
enough to desire that the Prussian army may move for this
object within five days from your arrival, and everything may
yet take a decisive turn in our favour before Christmas. We are
flattering ourselves that as the wind is nearly due north, you
may be able to sail, but I take the chance of this finding you
still at Yarmouth.
" P.S. It may be material to add that all we know of the writer
1 Respecting the battle at Ulm.

PITT TO LORD HARROWBY 313
of this intelligence is that he is the correspondent of a house in
the City which will not disclose his name, and which house
is known to Brooke in D. Hawkesbury's office, but the name
of which he is not at liberty to communicate. The letter is
not dated, but from the reference must be of the 26th. There is
as you see no certain reliance on its being even an accurate
statement of whatever may be the exaggerated official accounts
published at the Hague. I cannot help even thinking that there
is a very good chance of the Austrians and Russians having
passed the Inn, and attacked the advanced corps under Berna
dotte before the French army can move from Ulm."
"Downing Street, Nov. 6th, 1805.
" I cannot let Jackson1 depart without one word to congratu
late you on the glorious news of which he is the bearer. One
hardly knows how in the first moment to enjoy the triumph,
considering the sacrifice it has cost — but I trust the battle of
Trafalgar will operate in no small degree even on the Continent
to counterbalance the impression of that of Ulm, and will teach
Bonaparte what his chance is of acquiring ' the ships and com
merce and colonies ' which he wants. It will not escape you to
state how much the more we value this victory as it will enable
us to co-operate with additional vigor in every effort on the
Continent. We are still without any further intelligence from
Berlin." [On 9th November 1805 Harrowby announces to Pitt his arrival at
Hamburg after long delays caused by fog.]
"Downing Street, Nov. 12th, 1805.
" I was sorry to learn by your letter from Hamburg which
arrived this morning the accidents which retarded you, but
happily what has been passing at Berlin has made the delay
somewhat less material. We received late last night Jackson's
despatches up to the 3rd, containing an account of the Treaty
concluded between Russia and Prussia to which Austria was
about to accede. Mulgrave sends you a despatch which con
tains all that occurs to us upon it; all of which and more you will
have anticipated. I scarce think there is any prospect of Bona
parte's listening for a moment to a treaty proposed on such con
ditions and in such a manner. If however a negotiation should
be opened, our right to be included is a point of great impor-
1 Mr. Francis Jackson, British ambassador at Berlin, had been on furlough,
but now returned to his embassy, the affairs of which had been entrusted to
his younger brother, George, in the interval. (Rose, "Third Coalition," 220,
and note.)

314 PITT AND NAPOLEON
tance. I congratulate you most heartily on the progress already
made as well as on the account of the firmness shewn by Austria
since its disasters. The encouragement you are enabled to hold
out, and the knowledge of our naval victories will I trust add
all that is wanting to bring forth the full exertions of the Con
tinent. In that case the past misfortunes, and even any that
may happen in the interval of the next three weeks, will be soon
repaired ; and we shall still see Bonaparte's army either cut off
or driven back to France, and Holland recovered before Christ
mas. Our object in wishing to disembark at Embden is to
shorten our means of communication, and land whatever troops
or stores we may send so much nearer the scenes of action, sup
posing any of the Allies to move immediately forward toward
Holland. " P.S. Local circumstances seem to make an attempt on Flush
ing at this season too precarious, but it is not quite clear that we
may not find it possible if the weather proves favourable to try
some diversion on the side of Voorn, and act from thence to
wards the Hague and afterwards Amsterdam, if the Allies
should be advancing in force. We cannot, however, at all answer
for being able to do this."
[For the rest of the Pitt-Harrowby correspondence see Rose, "William
Pitt and the Great War," pp. 541-7; "Stanhope Miscellanies"
(1863), pp. 29-39.]

(G.) LORD HARROWBY TO PITT
"Berlin, Nov. 24, 1805.
" It grieves me to the soul to think that your sanguine ex
pectations of the immediate junction of Prussia are so likely to
be disappointed. Whatever happens, our naval victories give us
ample means of standing alone; and this must be our consola
tion. I cannot comprehend how our right to be joined in any
treaty can now be brought forward. In the present trembling
state of things it is impossible that our accession to the Congress
should be insisted upon ; and it would not become our dignity
to be merely proposed and rejected. Nor could this proposal
come forward in the present stage of the negotiation. A succes
sion of severe headaches have (sic) embarrassed my brain to such
a degree that my anxiety upon all that is passing really makes
me literally unfit either to do anything or to give an account of
what I have done. If this lasts, I shall not (sic).
" P.S. This horrible secret article has finished me. It stood
with its mouth open, and from mere cowardice I have run into
it, and it will devour me. I am persuaded, however, that it
would equally have caught me if I had run away. There is
something however in every view of it which agonizes me. I
am anxious beyond imagination to know what passes in Eng
land upon it, and conclude I shall by the next newspaper.
" Would it be impossible to prevail upon the King to listen to
the idea of a sort of barrier treaty for Hanover, which would
give Prussia a military frontier but not the territorial possession?
In this unaccountable state of things I have hitherto found it
impossible to communicate confidentially with Jackson, which
adds not a little to all other miseries. I expect that I shall con
sider my orders as peremptory (?) to come away for the meet
ing. Therefore, pray have a frigate in waiting off the Elbe."
" Berlin, Nov. 30, 1805.
" I fear you will find that I have taken your instructions at
any rate too much a la lettre; but, from the delay of your
promised instructions from Mulgrave I have dreaded some rub
about Hanover, and have felt such an anxiety to get some
315

316 PITT AND NAPOLEON
temporary arrangement forward before that insuperable bar in
tervenes, that I stopt at nothing.
" P.S. What can have stopt your decision on the treaty? Would
to heaven it had come before I was driven to the wall by the
fear of orders being given to Haugwitz to allow Austria to let
its a[rmy?] down to nothing. The hope that I live upon is that
you will have seen from my earliest letters home how miserable
I was and how miserably I was doing and that you have before
this time found out some way of sending for me."
"Berlin, Dec. 8, 1806 (sic).
"You will think my dispatches to-night wretchedly meagre,
and so they are ; but I have been so wretchedly ill for some days
past with nervous headaches and sickness that I have been quite
unequal to anything. I cannot yet execute that part of my in
structions which relates to the admission of England to the
treaty. They appear to me grounded upon two suppositions:
one, that the negotiation takes a serious turn — of this as yet I
know nothing. The other, that the terms will not be worse than
those of the Treaty of Potsdam. After the present disorders
they must be worse if there is any treaty at all.
" The Instructions also states (sic) that representations are to be
made to the Allies. Now, the Allies have put affairs into the
hands of a Prussian mediator and cannot act independently of
him. How can I apply to Prussia, on whom we have no claims
of present alliance, to insist upon the admission of an English
negotiator to the Congress upon such terms, previously stated?
All these embarrassments have led me hitherto (ill as I have
been) to abstain from the subject. That and every other part has
suffered even more than can be expressed from all I have
suffered. " Aulick is arrived, but does not stay many days, or perhaps
hours, which I much regret. Your communication of my Instruc
tions to W[oronzow] has also much embarrassed me. In spite
of some prosperous circumstances you must not expect any
treaty. I am persuaded that under the present gloom they will
not sign any that I can sign.
" P.S. Don't forget the ship to be ready for us at the mouth of
the Elbe, i.e., for my coffin. Oh, I am serious, quite serious, a
few more weeks must end me."
[For the letter of 12th December see Rose, "William Pitt and the
Great War," p. 545.] " Berlin, 23 Dec, 1705 (sic).
" The state of my dispatches will sufficiently show you the
state of my mind. I have had some comfort in seeing Leveson

LORD HARROWBY TO PITT 317
[Gower] for two days; but Anstruther is now going to the army
and Hammond is grown not much less nervous than myself. Do
not mention this to anybody. In this condition I only live in
hopes of a recall, or of finding some ground on which I can with
propriety be off. I feel that, if I could make up my mind as to
the propriety of subsidising all this part of the world upon my
own responsibility and without instructions, I ought to stay to
do this great good or evil ; but then I feel, on the other hand,
that in my present state of mind and body it must be so done as
to have no chance of being good and to be sure of being evil. If
I am satisfied that I cannot take this upon myself without in
structions, my stay would be utterly useless, unless I staid (sic)
long enough to receive them ; and this would both be awkward
in appearance here, and put an end to the little chance there is
of my renewing the operation. Before Leveson [Gower] goes I
shall probably have decided this question, and am glad to hear
that I shall find a frigate in the Elbe. If I am less dead on
Wednesday, another newspaper will be to go and I will write
again. Pray suggest to Mulgrave that Jackson should have full
power to treat with Prussia (or Russia) as well as other States.
"You will judge of your situation altogether by the strange con
fusion of our dispatches and inclosures, and numbers; but pray
make no observation upon it for heaven's sake at the office or
elsewhere. Do not fancy, for you would fancy it most unjustly,
that, if I can be of any use here, I will sacrifice that chance to
any present wish of being at home. If I come away, it will be
only upon a most complete conviction that I am fit only to do
harm by staying."

(H.) CANNING TO PITT
[The first letter of Canning, then Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
refers to the negotiations for peace with France conducted at Lille by Lord
Malmesbury. The coup d'itat of 18 Fructidor (4th September 1797)
brought to power at Paris violent Jacobins who were opposed to peace,
and soon broke off the negotiations. Aranjo, Portuguese envoy at Paris,
had made a separate peace with France. Later on it was disavowed at
Lisbon; but the event led Canning to suggest that we ought not to
insist upon maintaining absolutely the integrity of the Portuguese posses
sions. Compare Canning's letters and Malmesbury's despatches in
" Malmesbury Diaries," iii, pp. 461, et seq!\
"Spring Gardens, Sunday, Sept. 10, 1797.
[He states that he has stayed in town to hear the latest news of the
negotiations at Lisle (sic). He is impatient at the delay there, and still
more so at the delay here. As the situation there becomes more delicate,
we ought to send to our envoy the fullest details.]
" If it was thought right a week ago to enable Lord M[almes-
bury] to soften and qualify in some degree the tone that has
been taken about Portugal, or at least to put him in posses
sion of the disposition there to do so if the case should re
quire it, and to give him to understand that his last instruc
tions upon the subject were not unalterable at a moment when
there was known to be in part of the French government a
desire not to push everything to extremities, nor to seek specious
causes for a rupture, nor to avail themselves with eagerness of
justifiable ones — and when it was likely or possible that a contre
profet not wholly unfavourable to our views and wishes might
be obtained — and when, to say the least, the time did not press so
much, and it was not so likely as it is at this moment, that the
accounts from Lisbon should anticipate any declaration from
Ld. Malmesbury — I cannot conceive on what principle it is
thought less right or necessary now to furnish Ld. M. with the
means of explaining and conciliating (if there be room for it), or
at least of giving distinctly to be understood what are the real
sentiments and intentions of the Govt, here on the subject of
Portugal, so as to prevent a rupture on grounds that we do not
care about maintaining now, when, if the change (which we have
318

CANNING TO PITT 319
reason to believe) has taken place in France, there has succeeded
to that apparent fairness with which Ld. M. had to treat before,
a captious, and haughty and uncompromising spirit, which will
be but too happy to seize the first opportunity of converting an
amicable into an angry and hostile discussion, when all hopes of
a moderate and acceptable contre projet (such as would enable us
to go on in the negotiation, putting Portugal by as comparatively
of no consequence) are for the present wholly at an end, and
when, in point of time, if in no other, the case must necessarily
have become urgent, so much so, perhaps, as hardly to leave the
remedy any longer in our power. I cannot conceive on what
principle this is to be defended unless upon a persuasion that if
the violent party in France have got the better, there is no
chance of the negotiation succeeding or being suffered to
continue." [He then suggests that, even if the new Directors, Rewbell and
Barras, have gained all power at Paris, it is not well to facilitate the
rupture on their part on the claims about Portugal "urged in the
violent, unqualified, and indistinct manner in which Ld. M  will be
obliged to urge them." He would be in the painful and ridiculous posi
tion of not knowing his own Government's mind on that matter. Always
to have to refer matters back to London would be humiliating to him.
Canning concludes by saying that at least Malmesbury should be in
formed that the final decision about Portugal cannot yet be formed, and
that the negotiation need not break off on that subject.]
[In a letter of ist October 1797 Canning argues at length against
publishing the despatches describing the rupture of the negotiations
with France. For this purpose he puts himself in the place of a member
of the Opposition.] "Ashbourne, Thursday, Nov. 28, 1799.
[Canning refers to the possibility of another effort being made on the
Continent against France, despite the failure of the Allies in Switzerland.]
" Supposing Austria to make peace and Russia to withdraw
from the war, supposing us reduced to the limited system of
exertion and the limited scale of expense, nothing, as it appears
to me, could now be more easy than to keep up people's minds
to the continuance of the war on the simple ground that it is
neither safe nor now necessary or expedient to make peace with
Revolutionary France, be the character of the Revolution under
which she labours what it may. Do you apprehend that there is
any man in this country, do you believe even that there is any
man in France, to whom the first idea suggested by this last
Revolution [the coup d'itat of Brumaire] was any other than the
restoration of the monarchy? Is it not plain that events are in
full march towards that point? To me it seems indisputable that

320 PITT AND NAPOLEON
there is but one event (except a peace improvidently made by
us), namely, the overthrow of Bonaparte by the violent party,
and the consequent renewal of the Jacobin system, that can
prevent, or much retard this conclusion. In that case of course
there could be no peace made, and none could last that might
have been made with the Consulate. But, supposing Bonaparte
and Sieyes to consolidate their power (which is the only case in
which you seem to apprehend a cry for peace might become
troublesome), is it possible, think you, for any man, or any body
of men, to persuade themselves that such a power can be lasting?
That two persons linked together only by their common treachery
to others, should have no fear of treachery from each other, and
should not speedily find an opportunity of practising it? Which
ever succeeds — no matter — is it to be conceived that the remain
ing despot can ever hope to maintain himself in a station so
acquired without an hold upon the feelings or the prejudices of
the people, in the midst of a multitude of factions all equally
irritated against him, and all equally interested in overthrowing
him? or that he can mean to make any other use of his power,
while he holds it, than to bargain for impunity and perhaps
reward, by the restoration of the Crown to its right owner? This
is not subtlety or refinement of reasoning, God knows. It is the
obvious irresistible inference in every plain man's mind from
what he has now seen in France, compared with what he has
read in his history of England ; and this alone would be enough
to bear up the spirits of the country long enough to give the
experiment fair trial, provided (which I take for granted) there
was no necessity for heavy additional burdens. . . ."
[He then states that France will try to stir up sedition again here;
and, with Bonaparte whitewashed after gaining peace for France, the
whole struggle will soon have to be done over again.]
" Where could be the objection to saying at once ' We will
treat when monarchy is restored in the person of your lawful
sovereign,' or, 'To your lawful monarchy we will give back
everything — a cheap purchase for the peace and safety of the
world.'" "Ashbourne, Sat*. Dec. 7, 1799.
" I think we differ even less than at the conclusion of your
letter you seem to suppose as to the conduct to be pursued: the
only point in which you do not completely satisfy me ... is as
to the language to be holden. Of the only two cases upon which
you state your opinion as differing materially from what you
understand mine to be — one, upon which you lay most stress in
the beginning of your letter is proved before the end of it, by
the inclosure which you pick up on your way, to be very little

CANNING TO PITT 321
likely to take place — I mean the establishment [in France] of a
moderate American kind of government, capable of maintaining
itself in any degree of respectability for any length of time, for
any time long enough to admit of the sending a courier and
receiving him back again at Paris, tho' with all the expedition
that kicking him back could communicate to his return.
" The plan of the new [French] constitution puts all ideas of
popular representation too much out of the question to leave
any room to suppose that a mixed Govt, is seriously intended,
and reduces therefore the chances of any Govt, that Bonaparte
and Sieyes can establish for themselves to the single one of a
military despotism, of the actual and manifest instability of which
you seem to entertain no doubt, nor of the facility with which
all notion of treaty with such a Govt, may be scouted.
" But further, the Grand Elector for Life is so like a constitu
tional King that it is difficult to conceive any otherwise of this
monstrous jumble of nonsense than as of an attempt to feel the
pulse of the nation as to the restoration of MONARCHY — limited
probably for the purposes of the personal ambition of those who
are to restore it, and, with the same view, probably, to be restored
not in the person of the right heir, but of the son of the Duke of
Orleans. . . . The other point on which you state your opinion
as z/" combating mine, is one upon which I think exactly as you
do; and I must have expressed myself very confusedly if I led
you to imagine that I thought otherwise : — ' that we ought not
to commit ourselves by any declaration that the restoration of
royalty is the sine qud non condition of Peace.' — Undoubtedly
we ought not; but surely it would be a very different thing from
this to say (as I would have you in case an offer from Paris
should make it necessary for you to say something), to accom
pany your refusal to treat now with a declaration, ' that you would
treat with a monarchy; that to the monarchy restored to its
rightful owner you would give not only peace, but peace on the
most liberal terms. . . .'
" You will send away at once without a hearing the scoundrell,
whom the present scoundrells, in their present or in any probable
state of their power, may send here to propose a treaty. That
assurance is enough to keep me quiet and comfortable for a long
time to come." " Brooksby [near Leicester], Monday, Dec. 16, 1799.
" The letter which I enclose has just reached me, and I send
it to you as being the sequel of that which I sent you yesterday.
I do not feel myself to understand the subject enough to have
any opinion as to the reasonableness or policy of the suggestions
which it contains. The latter paragraph, about Nevis, reminds
me to remind you of the warrant. Nevis, if I am not much mis-
Y

C22 PITT AND NAPOLEON

j

taken, is that which was actually vacant. Dominica, that which
was expected to be so, and represented to be the more valuable
of the two. But Nevis, by this description, is quite valuable
enough, and in every respect the most desirable that could be
found. "The West Indies naturally lead me to the Slave Trade.1
And here, in thinking over the arguments which I had to state
to you in favour of the making the proposed Order in Council
immediately, I find none to which you have not already per
fectly assented, or which you have felt any reason for setting
aside except (while it lasted) the chance of success from the
expedition to Holland; and that impediment exists no longer.
" Pray tell me if there is any reason (except laziness) why the
measure should not be announced at the first Cabinet, and
executed at the first Council that meets? You have, as I under
stand you, nothing to apprehend in this instance from the tra
ditionary wisdom and ancestral examples of Lord Liverpool, or
from the sentimental and friendly opposition of Lord Westmor
land. There are reasons in abundance for the measure, even if
the Slave Trade were out of the question. Is it politic (does
Lord Liverpool think) to take the colonies of our enemies for a
a year or two, nurse them into prosperity, and restore them,
formidable rivals to our own? Is it natural to invite the invest
ment of British capital to an immense amount in foreign posses
sions in order (and for no other purpose that I can see) to make
the restoration of them at a peace matter of clamour, and to
make future wars with the Power to whom they are so restored
(however just and necessary), matter of still more clamour, from
the risque of British capital becoming exposed at once to British
arms and to foreign confiscation? If we have already West
Indian produce enough to glut the markets of Europe, is it wise
in a national point of view to erect new sugar colonies for other
countries to sell against those which shall remain to this country?
Nay if (to admit Lord Westmorland's argument) the Slave
Trade itself is a beneficial trade, is it expedient to send that
British capital, which would otherwise be employed to extend
the trade of Liverpool, the cultivation, and the slave population
of our own islands, to lay the foundation of a rival Slave Trade
from the ports of France, or Spain, or Holland? Would it not,
in short (even if we looked to no other considerations except
those of dry policy) be better to lay waste with fire and sword
every colony that we have taken (I am sure it would be more
humane), than to feed and fatten them at our own present cost
1 Canning was for total and instant abolition (Bagot, " Canning and his
Friends," i, p. 149). The Order in Council was to prohibit the import of slaves
into the enemy's colonies conquered by us.

CANNING TO PITT 323
and to our own lasting detriment, and to restore them 1,000
per cent, more valuable than when they fell into our hands?
" When to these considerations are added that of the state in
which the question of the Slave Trade now stands, the tacit
agreement which the well disposed part of the West Indians
conceive themselves to have made, to consent to the limitation
of the trade in future to a certain percentage on the existing
stock, and the pledge given by you to take care of the already
vested interests of British proprietors — does not the allowing
new investments of British interest to so enormous an amount
to be made and a new stock to be created, pending the discussion
and the interval between the announcing this principle and the
application of it, look like carelessness, if not connivance at the
increase of the evil which is to be remedied? And will not the
old proprietors, who in their admission of the principle intended
conscientiously to confine their demands to the keeping up their
old estates, have some reason to complain that estates begun to
be settled since the limitation was proposed, are considered (as
I presume they must be) entitled to the same indulgence with
those in which their interests have been vested for half a cen
tury? And when you propose to them to give the legislative
sanction to this principle, which is necessary for carrying it into
effect in our own old islands, will they not have a right to ask why,
if you thought it so salutary, you have not already acted upon
it wherever of your own mere authority you could so act? Why,
while you are calling upon them to assist you in stopping the
old Slave Trade, you have not, where you could do so without
their assistance, prevented the growth of a new one?
" I have another reason, and I am not sure that it does not
weigh with me as much as any of those which I have stated,
for wishing that when next the question comes in any shape
into discussion (in short, that as soon as possible), some step
should be taken towards effecting that very moderate species
of abolition to which all our projects are now restricted. I can
not bear to hear it gravely and pertinaciously doubted whether
you really wish the accomplishment of the object or no. It is
a doubt, in answer to which I can hardly speak with temper,
and yet I have found, especially since Lord Westmorland's
victory of last year, and the intemperate and ostentatious use
that has been made of it, many people, who I am sure mean
well, professing to entertain such a doubt, and some (which is
much the most provoking) candidly giving you credit for not
intending so rashly as you have spoken. Nay, among the
moderate West Indians (where such an opinion is most dan
gerous) I have found that, with the same professions as before
of a readiness to do their part in any practicable scheme, they
have evidently much less expectation of being speedily called

324 PITT AND NAPOLEON
upon to do it. I have eradicated this notion from the mind of
the Ellises1 (if it was harboured there) by telling them, with
and under promise of strict secrecy, what, but for such a pur
pose I would not have told to them or to any body, the fact
and the object of Smith's mission. They both approve most
cordially of it, and both sincerely wish that the step had been
taken many years ago. Charles [Ellis] has just told me that
one great difficulty they find in talking to the generality of
the West Indians upon the subject of any measure to be agreed
on with Govt, for the restriction of the Trade, is to persuade
them that Govt, has any serious intentions of that sort. Govt.,
they say, is at this moment planting new colonies, which will
for years require a much larger Slave Trade than has been
carried on for a long time back for the supply of the old islands.
The greater part of the trade now carried on is for these new
settlements, and yet we are made to bear the odium of the
whole. Very unfairly indeed, but for an obvious reason, be
cause, while the complaint is levelled against the old Slave
Trade, it appears as if the evil were one which it is not in the
power of Govt, to stop without the consent of the islands. If
it were seriously meant to stop the evil, the greater part is such
as Govt, might, without asking any one's consent, stop with a
finger? " How is this to be answered? I hope by the Order in Coun
cil. I am persuaded this measure (or something like it) must be
the preliminary to any successful attempt in Parliament upon
the question.
" And so, having disburthened my mind upon the subject, I
do not desire you to take the trouble of writing to me about
it, but I do earnestly entreat you to think it over seriously, and
I cannot find ground to doubt of your decision."
[On ist December 1803 Canning writes voluminously at his home,
South Hill, Bracknell, Berks, charging Pitt, without proof, of having
inspired statements in the " Accurate Observer " derogatory to him.]
"Whitehall, Tuesday evg., May 9, 1804.
" Upon consideration I think it much better to go out of
town, in order to be out of the way of all the questions and
conjectures that are going about and of the constructions and
misrepresentations of my answers or my silence, which I am
afraid would be not less multiplied now than they were three
years ago. I shall set out therefore, to-morrow, for South Hill.
But I shall be ready to come up at an hour's notice, if you
should want to see me again. Before I go, I think it right to
1 Canning was their guest at Brooksby. See, too, Bagot, op. cit., i, 150.

CANNING TO PITT 325
assure you, which I do upon my honour, that I have mentioned
what passed between us this morning to three persons only 
Leveson, Morpeth and Borrington, and to these with the ex
press prohibition not to communicate it further — not to Lord
Stafford— not to Sturges ; 1 which two names I specify because
the opinions of the former (such as Leveson reports them to
me a) might appear to be formed in concert with what he might
be supposed to know to be mine. Whereas this is so far from
being the case that when he put the question to me on Sunday
of what my conduct would be, under the circumstances that were
apprehended and have since occurred, I answered distinctly
' that I felt myself bound and pledged to obey any call that you
might think proper to make upon me.' And with Sturges I
have for obvious reasons cautiously abstained from dropping
the slightest hint upon the subject. I indeed have rather re
pressed than encouraged in him and others the excessive de
sponding and lamentation over the failure of the broad system,
almost, I believe, to the extent of incurring some suspicion that
I did not in truth lament it as deeply as they do.
" I tell you all this thus minutely because I am earnestly
desirous of anticipating all the attempts which (I do not say
will, but) may be made, to impress you with a notion that I am
either giving vent to ill humour (against myself — for myself only
have I to blame) or seeking comfort in ostentation, or making
myself party to any murmurs, loud or deep, of sorrow or indig
nation, against the limited scale, and especially against the rump
part of your new Arrangement. I have done no such thing.
And before you receive this to-morrow, I shall be out of the
reach of any opportunities of doing this or any other mischief.
" Allow me before I close my letter to say one word, merely
to remind you of poor Hammond. If either Ld. Grenville or
Fox had come to the Foreign Office, his situation was secure.
Whoever may come there will, I am pretty certain, find it very
inconvenient, I believe nearly impossible, to go on without him.
But they might not be aware of this. At least he thinks they
might not, and has fears about himself, which, tho' I do not
share them, I could not help promising to mention to you and
to recommend him to your protection. His colleague, Arbuth-
not, would not suffer himself to be preferred to Hammond, tho',
if turned out, he would (I have no doubt) be glad enough to be
turned into something else: but he is Hawkesbury's charge."
[Canning then recommends to Pitt's consideration Sir J. Sinclair,
Sir R. Barclay, Burroughs and Ainslie.]
1 Sturges Bourne was Secretary to the Treasury.
2 Leveson-Gower was third son of Lord Stafford.

326 PITT AND NAPOLEON
" Spring Gardens, Saty. morning, Aug. 28, 1801 [1804].1
" A night's reflection upon our conversation of yesterday has
not produced the effect which you conceived to be most natural,
of reconciling me more and more to your last proposal ; my con
sent to which, the footing on which you placed it with respect
to yourself, did extort from me at the instant, as it would to any
much more distressing sacrifice to my personal feelings. That
footing, as it is the only one, upon which I would accept, or
hear of any the most tempting offers, such as should include
the full and immediate gratification of my utmost ambition, so
it is one upon which I should have found it difficult not to
acquiesce in anything that you seemed to have so much at heart,
however dear it might cost me to do it.
" But of one thing I confidently presume I may assure my
self, that you do not value my acquiescence only in proportion
to the struggle and mortification which it costs me, but that
you would make any exertion on your part, which you yourself
thought reasonable, and such as ought on a fair view of all cir
cumstances, to be successful — to attain the same end at less
expense of credit or feeling to me. In this confidence I cannot
forbear stating to you as they now strike me — upon what I be
lieve in my conscience to be as impartial and sober a considera
tion of them as if the case were another's — the circumstances of
extreme and unnecessary unfairness to me in the last plan of
Arrangement, which I think might be done away not only with
out any injustice to anybody but with the fullest admission of
every claim that is placed in competition with mine — with yours,
I should say, on my account.
" If the question were purely about what office I should take,
I will own that your reasoning in favour of my old office imme
diately,2 and by a vacancy to be made for the express purpose
of giving it to me again — rather than the prospect of a higher
one necessarily to be waited for to an uncertain period, and with
the difficulty belonging to the interval which might elapse
before it would be created — is satisfactory. But when this Ar
rangement is considered, not by itself, but with a reference to
what is intended for Bragge,3 I do think, and I am persuaded
that any impartial man — that the Public at large — will think,
that such a distribution of the two offices is grossly partial, and
1 The date must be 1804. Canning went out of office with Pitt early in
1 801 and became (unwillingly) Treasurer of the Navy in Pitt's Administra
tion formed in May 1804.
2 Probably that of Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, which he resigned
in March 1799.
3 Charles Bragge had been Treasurer of the Navy in Addington's Adminis
tration.

CANNING TO PITT 327
that it will indicate such a disposition towards me, compared
with others, as does not promise me very fair play in any sub
sequent competition. And this applies equally, whether the two
offices are filled up precisely at the same time (as with a view to
Sturges' succession I should certainly be glad that they were),
or whether I take the Pay Office first, with the certainty that,'
as soon as the occasion offers, Bragge is to go per saltum (which
you know is so very bad and wrong a thing) over my head.
" But do I therefore want the Treasuryship of the Navy with
£4,000 a year? And is this the history of all my qualms and
hesitations? I need not answer this to you; but I shall best
answer it by showing what I think would be the best to all
parties concerned, the most equitable arrangement. Why should
not Yorke have the Treasuryship of the Navy? l Windham, you
remember, was offered it, and would have taken it but for
Dundas's reluctance to part with the House. Bragge, the Mint —
£3,000 a year, and of rank so equal that Sir G. Yonge, you
know, went from the War Office to it. And I, the Secretaryship
at War? The scale of salary would then be — Yorke (already in
possession) £4,000 a year, being a rise of £1,500, Bragge
£3,000, and I £2,500, being not more in value than the Pay
Office which is proposed to me. (And if further provision is
wanted for Bragge, is there not Barr6's office to fall within a
period that cannot now be much protracted?)
" I feel perfectly assured that you cannot object to this as unfair
or unreasonable. And I cannot but be persuaded that, if you
suggest this arrangement. ... I think it right to assure you that
this is written previous to my communication with any of those
whose opinions I know you would suspect, even more than my
own, of partiality in my favour. . . . And now I have only to add
that, whatever be the result of our meeting, in respect of this
subject, I would not but have met, as we have done, for any
consideration upon earth. Every other object of hazard or
acquisition is light in comparison of that of which I have some
times apprehended the loss, but which I do now trust that no
decision, even no mistaken decision in what purely regards my
own interest or happiness, can possibly take from me. I will say
no more upon a subject on which my heart is full, but I shall be
always in whatever situation, however separated, or however
brought together, unalterably and most affectionately, " Yours,
"G. C.
" P.S. I need not say that I shall be impatient to hear from
you, and till I have heard from you upon the subject of this
1 Charles Yorke had been Home Secretary under Addington.

328 PITT AND NAPOLEON
letter, I trust you will not think me unreasonable in requesting
that you will not act upon the decision of yesterday, even failing
that which I have suggested here." "South Hill, Nov. 7, 1805.
" I should like very much, before you take any step in the
business of which we talked last week, to have one other quarter
of an hour's conversation with you. I have great doubts, very
great doubts, upon reflection, whether I ought to take advantage
of your proposal, ought for your sake I mean, and I should not
easily forgive myself, if, for any object personal to myself, I
had suffered you, in the delicate and critical state in which your
Government stands, and must stand, for the next six months, to
do anything which might add to your difficulties or furnish
ground for blame or cavil. What has passed between us on this
occasion has left me no doubt of the fairness and kindness of
your intentions towards me, but I must not avail myself of them
at the hazard of your ease or advantage. As I shall endeavour
to see you to-morrow, I need not enter into the detail of my
reasonings and reflections here, but I write just to put you in
possession of the nature and object of what I have to say to
you. The decision shall be completely in your hands."
" Private. " South Hill, Nov. 27, 1805.
" You will always find me here. I hope you will not suffer
your Bath journey to be deferred till it is too late to do you
much good. But I cannot wonder at your lingering in town
under circumstances of so much expectation and anxiety. One
must not venture to rely upon the length of the interval, after
the intelligence with which the last suspension of arrivals from
the Continent was followed ; but the long continuance of that
suspension now, and the absence of any unfavourable rumours
do lead one to hope that the silence may this time be broken in
a more satisfactory manner. Sunday was the termination (was
it not?) of the month during which Austria was recommended to
avoid an action, and at the end of which the Prussian armies
were to be in a state to act? Or was the month given to Bona
parte to date only from the arrival at his headquarters of Haug-
witz with the propositions for peace? That would carry on the
date of the determination of Prussia so far that you could hardly
look to know it by the meeting of Parliament, as it now stands
fixed — hardly by the 21st, to which day I rather suppose you to
meditate the prorogation. ' Ten days ' would bring it to Friday
the 17th.
" Could you not arrange, before you leave town, to prepare the
way for the actual accomplishment of the business which was

CANNING TO PITT 329
settled when last I saw you? I ask, from no idle wish to have
the thing hastened, or notorious. But, as when you now go, you
will probably go to stay as long as you can; and as the time to
elapse before the meeting of Parlt, even at the most distant
supponable (sic) is not more than enough, I shall be anxious to
have as much of it as is possible to look with my own eyes at all
that has been doing — at least from the time of the beginning
of Leveson's mission — which (especially in Hammond's absence)
I cannot do comfortably, and to my full satisfaction, by suffer
ance, and while you are away still less.
"What do you do for Sir Richd. Strachan? I have been asked
that question so often that I feel ashamed not to give any
answer to it. O ! that the Rendlesham Peerage could go to him,
with promise of a dukedom, if you will, to The Worthy who is
to have it — when you make English peers hereafter. Consider
only what would be the difference of feeling to the whole Irish
peerage — the whole Irish nation — at having such a man as T.,
such a name as Strachan's enrolled amongst them at their first
vacancy — at having the fashion set (which once set will be fol
lowed) of making that order a reward of eminent merit, or a
cheaper purchase — of jobbing support! I never felt more strongly
convinced of the truth and of the importance of any proposition
in my life. Pray, pray, pray think of it.
" Private. " South Hill, Nov. 29, 1805.
"The silence has not been broken exactly in the way that
would have been most agreeable. But it is not so much the fact
of the French being at Vienna (especially as they appear to
have got there without any very material action on their road),
as their being there with a month certain of unmolested quiet
and proffered negotiation before them, that fills me with despond
ency. It is very difficult now to persuade one's self that there
is much chance of Prussia adhering to her promise of consider
ing an indecisive answer as a signal for war. Indeed, one can
hardly say that there could be any reasonable ground for her
doing so. She had plenty of grounds for going to war at once
without any negotiation at all. But to make the evacuation of
Mantua by Bonaparte a sine qua non of peace, at the moment
when he is in possession of Vienna, has something in it so
almost ridiculous, that (tho' I confess the notion did not strike
me till events brought the two things directly into contrast, yet)
reflecting that the possible occupation of Vienna must have been
in their contemplation when Haugwitz's mission was determined
upon, I cannot help entertaining more suspicion than I like, that
the project of negotiation has all along prevailed over that of

330 PITT AND NAPOLEON
war in a much greater degree than they have been willing to
confess to us. Nor can we hope (as it appears to me) that the
Emperor of Russia will be much in the way of that decision.
The leading fear which seems to occupy the mind of the Russians
at all times is that of having their dignity compromised by an
unsuccessful or ineffectual interposition. Now if he thinks it
easier (as it probably may appear to him to be, though we may
be persuaded it is not) to make a decent peace for the Continent,
than to carry through a triumphant war, I very much fear that
the Emperor of Russia will be glad enough to avoid the dangers
of an actual trial of his arms, by taking advantage of the excuse
which Bonaparte will cheerfully join in allowing him, that the
very terror of them has answered his benevolent purpose, of
imposing peace on Eqrope.
" As to Austria, though one must give full credit to her gallant
resolution to brave all extremities of war, if supported by her
allies, yet it would be idle to suppose that she could have a voice
against the opening of a negotiation on whatever basis, if those
allies concurred in recommending it.
" What then is the result? Why, I am afraid, this, that we
ought to consider the interval (be it more or less) during which
it is to continue in appearance doubtful whether a Congress shall
assemble, or the war be renewed, with Prussia in the field — as
the only opportunity remaining to us to make our own immedi
ate home situation better in a military view, than it was before
the diversion on the Continent raised the siege (sic) of invasion.
I would have something attempted without delay. Boulogne, I
suppose, is now out of the question — but I cannot think that
Walcheren is, and I would make General M[oore?] (who has
something of a Russian feeling about the compromise of his
military reputation) reconsider his opinions — not as choosing
between that expedition and some other more splendid and more
easy one in which he would equally have a distinguished share, but
as deciding between himself and some other person, which should
take the command of that and that alone. In no other way would
he come to the consideration of the subject, without prejudice.
" Surely the sending troops to Hanover cannot now be either
necessary or desirable. If the war is continued, it is nothing to
gain a month or two, or a whole winter for an object which (so
long as Prussia is friendly) is in the keeping of a friend. But in
the other alternative, can it be doubted that Prussia will have
the offer of Hanover from France? Is there the smallest doubt
of her accepting it? And then for what purpose would our troops
be there, but to be civilly desired to walk out again, or to main
tain themselves by force both against the enemy and against
our allies?' 1 The foresight evinced in this prophecy is very remarkable.

CANNING TO PITT 331
" On the other hand, if after the immense extent of the effort
which you have made, you come back to Parlt. with no other
fruits of the continental confederacy than the relief of a few
months from the threat of invasion, and with that threat renewed
at the moment when you are calling for the price of the con
federacy, I cannot help fearing that the impression in the country
and in Parliament will be very unfavourable indeed. And if, in
addition to the fact, there appears reason to believe that a smaller
expedition for objects so vital was kept back in order to accumu
late force for an expedition on a greater scale to be commanded,
as such a force would be commanded; or, that the force which was
actually detached, was sent in preference to Hanover (which,
according to these suppositions, you would be then either on the
point of abandoning again, or compelled to maintain hostilely
against Prussia), I do verily believe (what is dreadful to be
uttered) that such a state of things, and of opinions in Parlt. and
out of doors, would, in spite of your naval successes, be fatal to
the Government. It is nothing, as I apprehend, to be able to
prove, by all General M.'s arguments, that each particular object
had its risque and chances of disaster. The plain naked fact
will be. Here was an occasion, of three or four months' duration,
when the enemy had no force, absolutely none, on any part of
his coast. You had a disposable army of from 40 to 50,000 men.
Nothing is done. The enemy returns at the end of his three
months' war, and finds everything as he left it ; and the invasion
is renewed as closely as ever. What have we gained by our
continental effort? If the answer is — ' Nothing could be done ' —
only conceive what a tremendous and disheartening impression
such a statement must make upon the country. By what un
hoped-for concurrence of circumstances can a similar opportunity
for trying what might be done, be afforded again? And is it a
physical truth against which all our exertions must contend in
vain, that the whole coast of the enemy from the Texel down
wards, is absolutely unassailable, while there is scarce a point of
it from which we may not be assailed? If this were true, would
it be prudent to have it generally believed?
" The only other answer is, that our attention and our force has
been otherwise occupied. How? In taking possession of Hanover,
which (according to what has been supposed) we are not likely
'to hold — or in preparing for a grand expedition which (on the
same supposition) can never take place. I am afraid these would
not be palatable excuses. The recovery of Hanover by itself —
not interfering with other what are considered more essential
objects — would, I believe, be gratifying to the country. But the re-
coveryof it byan army which might have been otherwise employed,
and not with the consent of other Powers, but against their will,
and liable to be wrested from us again, would be far otherwise.

332 PITT AND NAPOLEON
" And, as to the other point I will not say that, supposing the
war to go on briskly on the Continent, an army under the D. of
Y[ork] might not be employed without creating dissatisfaction,
so long (that is) as the pressure of the war is kept out of our
sight and from off our own shores. But even then, if the D.
should be unsuccessful, and in the case (of which we are speak
ing) of a Continental peace, I am bound in honesty to tell you
(what I think you must hear from many other quarters) that the
employment of the D. of Y., or the imputation of an intention
to employ him on a great scale, and the keeping back or
starving other services for that purpose, would, so far as one
can judge from the language oi friends, sooner than any other
thing in the world hazard your popularity and perhaps your
power. " But this is beyond what I had in my mind when I began
writing to you. If the war goes on, well. Then the occupation
of Walcheren (or Boulogne) will not prevent your having a con
tinental army with the D. of Y. at the head of it, if you think
fit. If the war does not go on (which is the danger) there will be
no such opportunity, and then, what I grudge, and do most
earnestly hope may be avoided if possible — is the loss of this
short interval, while Bonaparte is yet at a distance, and the
failure of negotiation possible. A month — a fortnight — hence
may be too late.
"P.S. Nothing from Harrowby?" "South Hill, Jan. 4, 1806.
" If Sturges had not written to me yesterday, and I had only
my newspapers of this morning to trust to, I should have made
out a very good consolatory case from the materials which they
furnish. But they are not altogether sufficient to counteract the
impression of Sturges's first intelligence; and I must therefore
refer to you for more substantial and certain consolation.
" 1. If the Emperor of Russia has not given up the game per
sonally; and if he is still in a situation to communicate with the
Emperor of Germany, I have hopes that his influence may yet
induce the E. of G. to break the armistice, before it has led to
peace. It is obviously (upon the map) the interest of Austria
to do so.
" 2. My second hope is from the co-operation of Prussia, but
that (which was my only hope yesterday) is a good deal weak
ened by the resolution which Sturges announced to me of the
Russian army retreating through Hungary. Thro' Hungary!
Into Hungary with a view to the first object, I can understand.
But a retreat commenced thro' Hungary at the same moment
with the offer to Berlin of the use of Russian armies is more
perplexing than encouraging.

CANNING TO PITT 333
" 3. If the very worst happens that is now threatened— if
Austria does make a separate peace, and is abolished as a
Power, and if Prussia lies down and licks Bonaparte's feet, and
is forgiven and gets Hanover assigned to her for her submis
sion — still, with Russia unpledged to peace and committed in
war, we are better off than we were before the Coalition took
place. We must then, I think, set about making a new treaty
with Russia with a view to joint negotiation hereafter. But still
this is not the hopeless state of things in which (when we were
looking at the possibility of it three months ago) we thought we
should have nothing to do but to return an answer to Bona
parte's neglected letter of January last. Nothing like it.
" One of the greatest comforts that you could send me would
be the intelligence that you are going on well and getting stout.
I did not very much like the late accounts of you ; but to-day I
hear better accounts, and they, I believe, have contributed to make
me see things in a less gloomy point of view than yesterday.
" Let me know also what your plans are. I take for granted
you do not mean to attend the funeral.1 You cannot afford a
cold at this moment, either in point of health or of convenience.
Do you stay on at Bath? If you move towards town, why should
not you get here the first night.2 (It is very easy, starting at
ten, or eleven. I could have done it with my economical pair of
horses) and stay here one day, during which Sturges or Huskis-
son, or whoever else you may want to see might meet you here.
You must have a good deal to settle that would require a quiet
day, and, once in town, you can hardly keep your door
shut. ..." "South Hill, Tu. mng., Jan. 7, 1806.
"A thousand thanks for your letter, which comforts me a
little as to the Continent, but disquiets me a good deal about
yourself. . . . The account that you give me of yourself makes
me still more desirous of doing so (i.e. going to meet him at
Bath) if I thought you likely to feel it any comfort. But I should
not be at all affronted at your not wishing it — as there are
moments when one is best alone without disparagement to any
body. But again, you cannot indulge in absolute solitude very
long, and there are so many things to be thought of and talked
of that I cannot help renewing my offer. . . .
" P.S. Do not write if it is a trouble to you. Charles Stanhope '
can let me know that you will, or will not, be glad to see me."
1 Nelson's funeral, on 7th January, 1806, at St. Paul's.
2 Canning's house, " South Hill," at Bracknell, was on the road from
Reading to Putney.
3 Lord Mahon. See Stanhope, iv, 368.

334 PITT AND NAPOLEON
" South Hill, Thursday mng., Jan. 9, 1806.
" The wish which you express in your letter of yesterday
(which I have this moment received) tallies so exactly with my
proposal to Charles [Stanhope], that I hope nothing will prevent
your putting them [sic] into execution. I write a line to Sir
Walter [Farquhar] to enter into a solemn engagement with him
not to talk with you, or (so far as I can help it) allow you to
talk upon interesting subjects till you are fitter for it than you
represent yourself to be. You shall have south rooms, entirely to
yourself, and see as little, or as much of us, as you please. And
we have room for Charles and for Lady Hester, and for Sir
Walter as long as he chooses to stay, or whenever he chooses to
come back to you, and moreover for Sturges, or Huskisson, or
Castlereagh, or anybody else whom you may wish to see, when
ever it is fit that you should see them.
" So pray come and stay till you are better able to bear the
neighbourhood of town. I trust Parliament can be put off. God
bless you. I need not tell you how anxiously Mrs. C. joins in
my request."

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE ACT OF UNION
(I.) CAMDEN TO PITT
[N.B. I have not found Pitt's letter to Earl Camden (then about to
retire from the Irish Viceroyalty), to which the following is an answer.—
J. H. R.]
(Endorsed, "Recd 19 June 1798.")
"(1). It certainly will be proper that the great outlines of an
Union should be digested and detailed as much as possible before
it is attempted. This ought to be done by consultation with the
principal persons in both countries, and it appears desirable if
the English Government really look to the consideration of this
question that the opinion of those who compose the King's
Cabinet Council should forthwith be sounded, as it is not im
probable there may be those who entertain considerable doubts
upon it.
"(2). Those persons in whom confidence can be placed in
Ireland should be privately consulted, and if the result of
these deliberations should be to attempt the measure, no time
should be lost in endeavouring to carry it into execution.
"(3). The manner in which the business should be first broached
is subject to consideration by those who are better informed
than I am in these forms. If the business is to be carried on
with an intention of great liberality towards the Catholics, it
might be proper that some of that persuasion should be included
in the Commission, but it will be difficult to select the proper
persons. The higher orders— such as Ld. Fingal and Ld. Ken-
mare have not information enough, and if any of the agitators
are admitted (who really do understand the questions likely to
arise) much mischief might ensue. The Chancellor [the Earl of
Clare] should decidedly be consulted, and I can speak with con
fidence when I say that he is completely to be entrusted with
the information of this delicate question being likely to be
discussed. No man can so readily give a well founded opinion
upon points in which legal knowledge is required, and he under
stands the feelings of the country, but in points of revenue and
commerce he will not be enabled to give much information.
335

336 PITT AND NAPOLEON
" (4). The Speaker [Foster] has very extensive and correct
knowledge upon these subjects as far as Ireland is concerned,
and his assistance in this measure is most important — he has a
very great influence with commercial people, and is considered
by the trading people in Ireland as much attached to their
interests. He has also considerable weight in Parliament, and
particularly with the Orange party, and would be more useful in
matters of detail than any other person in that kingdom. Mr.
Pelham 1 has been informed by a person, much in the Speaker's
confidence, that an English peerage and a respectable provision
would make a great impression upon his opinions. His services
should forthwith be secured.
" If Lord Yelverton was disposed to take up this matter
zealously he might be very useful. I know not the effect an
Union would have on the Irish Bar, but it would lessen their
importance, as the trade of Parliament is so much their object,
and it is probable it would not therefore be relished. Mr.
Saurin 2 has a very great influence with that body of men. Mr.
Beresford could be extremely useful in matters of detail. I do
not know his present sentiments ; about a year ago they were
much in favor of the measure — Lord Waterford is decidedly so.
Lord Shannon and Lord Ely would object to the measure, as
it lessens their importance, by which their decision, if they were
not very much alarmed, would be chiefly directed, but negocia
tion with them might probably succeed. There are men of less
parliamentary weight, whose opinions in conversation are im
portant, who ought to be secured. It is not necessary to name
them here. No one understands Ireland better than Mr. Cooke.'
The person alluded to [?] is amongst the most anxious for the
measure but it is suppose[d] the idea of his alarm proceeds from
the apprehension it is imagined he may entertain from the
admission of Catholics, and most remarkable prejudice exists
there, not too strong however if Ireland remains as she is — but
it does not appear that the admission of Catholics into our Par
liament can be mischievous, and nothing can so much weaken the
Catholic cause in Ireland where alone it is to be dreaded. The
R[oman] Catholics of Scotland ought to have the same privi
leges, whilst likewise provision should be made for the clergy
of each sect. Our Establishment should receive every encour
agement. 1 Then secretary to the Lord- Lieutenant. Owing to illness he proceeded
to England. Lord Castlereagh took his place as locum tenens, and a little
later as Chief Secretary.
2 Rt. Hon. W. Saurin was captain of a yeomanry corps, and strongly
opposed the Union. ,
a Under Secretary of State.

CAMDEN TO PITT 337
" (5). The question of Reform will certainly be started ; but,
with liberal compensations to those who may be brought to give
up their boroughs and a judicious mixture of boroughs to return
members, that question does not appear very formidable at this
 [?] and revolutionists and Jacobins were never at so low
an ebb either in England or in Ireland.
"(7). Great care should be taken that Scotland should be
satisfied with the propositions which may be made to Ire
land. " (8). The French will not make peace until this country is
so weakened as to be unable to disturb them, should the present
Government continue in its present form. A new incentive to
prolong the war is not therefore necessary.
" (9). Taking it for granted that the proposed Union shall be
so arranged, as to give a decisive preponderance to the Protest
ant interest and the Establishments, it is presumed it ought to
satisfy the Dissenters and Papists. They are given the same
advantages as are bestowed upon the rest of the inhabitants of
the 3 kingdoms. The hardship they complain of will be done
away, of being governed by so comparatively small a number
of a different persuasion in their own country. The majority
will be Protestant and when it is felt that there is really a fair
interchange of interests, the pretended grievances will cease
with the real causes of discontent.
"(10). This remark is difficult to be answered. The principles
of the Union ought therefore to be as much detailed as possible
before the event actually takes place.
"(11). The expence will not be very much more considerable
than in appeals from Scotland. The city of Dublin will feel
most sensibly the removal of the Parliament and the Court from
thence; and in case of the proposed Union the Lord Lieutenant,
or by whatever name the Governor shall be called, ought to
have such a salary as to be enabled to live in great splendour.
Every inducement should be held out to persons of consequence
to reside in Ireland when they are not called to England upon
parliamentary duty. When they are so called, it is imagined the
society and manners of the English will mix with their own, and
they will return to Ireland with a desire to introduce English
manners and customs there. When an Irishman now comes oc
casionally to England, he is considered as a foreigner and is not
much taken notice of. By mixing more together and having a"|
common interest, the jealousy of the lesser country will be
eradicated and the contempt of the principal one taken off.
Every possible arrangement should be undertaken to make they
passage from one country to the other as easy and as expedi
tious as possible, and Government might provide passage boats
of the greatest convenience free of expense to the passengers.
z

338 PITT AND NAPOLEON
Many considerable offices should be left to induce the residence
of principal persons.
" P.S. I have spoken to the Chancellor and to the Speaker
upon the subject of your letter. They are so good as to lament
that I am to leave the country and express their hopes with
much anxiety that no alteration in the system to be pursued
should take place, and I think it ought to be explicitly under
stood that Lord Cornwallis should adopt the same line of con
duct I have done. Indeed all your opinions tend so much to
that end, that I suppose he would not be entrusted with the
Government unless it was perfectly understood he was to make
no alteration in the system, and if he is immediately to pursue
mild measures, my Government will be marked with much more
harshness than it deserves, and it will not be advantageous to the
country. I conclude Lord Cornwallis will very speedily take
upon himself the government of Ireland and I imagine I shall
hear forthwith upon that subject from the Duke of Portland."
Points to be Considered with a View to an Incor
porating Union of Great Britain and Ireland
(Anon. N.D. in Pretyman MSS.).
[Notes at the side are in the handwriting of Pitt. They are subjoined
as footnotes with his initials.]
"(i). The King's authority, ecclesiastical, civil, and military,
to be exercised as at present by a Lord Lieutenant resident in
Ireland. (2). The two Parliaments to be incorporated on the
plan of the Scotch Union. (3). The Courts of Justice to remain
on their present footing in Ireland, and the Great Seal to remain
there, with a Ld. Chancellor or Ld. Keeper as at present. (4). An
appeal (in all cases where it now lies to the House of Lords) to
lie to the Chancellor and three chief judges in Ireland, with
power to them to permit a further appeal in doubtful cases to
the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, and with power also
to the House of Lords on special ground shewn, and for preserv
ing uniformity in the law of the two Kingdoms, to remove the
cause before them after the decision of that Court of Appeal.
(5.) Power to the same Court to examine evidence and certify
all parliamentary and other points for private Bills. This power
might even be extended to the establishing certain provisions in
particular cases according to some general principle1 and on
1 " Particularly in divorces and exchange of lands in settlement. I appre
hend there are few or no Parliamentary Turnpike Bills. Query. How is it
as to inclosures and paving and lighting Bills? These seem to be the prin-

CAMDEN TO PITT 339
grounds to be specified in the article. The object being as much
as possible to diminish the objection of the expense and trouble
of a resort to Parliament here for such private business as is now
transacted by the Irish Parliament. (6). The greatest difficulty
seems to arise from the impossibility of equalizing the systems
of commerce, revenue and debt in the two countries. If the
duties of import and export are made the same in Ireland as in
England, it is conceived that the burthen would be intolerable
to the former. If those of import only, without Excise, are ex
tended to Ireland, still the consumer there would be burthened
in many instances much beyond his present taxes. If the port
and internal duties of both countries remain on their present
footing, it will be impossible to abolish the duties on import from
Ireland into England. The detail of the Irish Propositions [of
1785] will, if recurred to, furnish, it is apprehended, many other
points of very difficult arrangement 1 (sic). Even if the whole of
the present systems of revenue and debt could be left untouched
and subjected only to the gradual amelioration or consolidation
which an United Parliament might in the course of years pro
vide for it, still there would be great difficulty 2 as to the funds
for the interest of new loans here; since it may be doubted
whether precisely the same taxes on internal consumption or on
foreign trade, which may be necessary and easy here, would not
overburden the Irish. This therefore must require the detailed
discussion of commissioners; and the task will not only be
arduous, but it may be to be apprehended that it will draw into
length. Whereas the interest of both kingdoms and the success
of the measure itself both require that after it is once on float it
should proceed with the utmost possible expedition.
" (7). The details as to the frame of Parliament might be thus
arranged. Putting the population of Scotland at 1,500,000 and
that of Ireland at 4,000,000 of people, the scale of that propor
tion would give an addition of 40 peers and 120 commoners to
the British Parliament.3 But if the proportion be taken from
that of the present population of the two islands it would be as
4 to 10, according to the best accounts of British population.
Putting therefore the present House of Lords of Gt. Britain at
cipal classes of private bills. N.B. Query. Wharfs or Canal Bills, Parly.
bounties, Election Committees?" — W. P.
1 "Something approaching to this is indispensable to the scheme."—
W. P.
2 " Might not a certain proportion be fixed at once to be observed for a
limited number of years, leaving it to commissioners to discuss in the mean
time according to what rule the proportion should be regulated afterwards ? "
— W. P.
'That is 15 : 40 : : 16 : 40 nearly. 15 : 40 : : 45 : 120."— W. P.

1 ic

34Q PITT AND NAPOLEON
about 270 sitting members, and the House of Commons at 558,
the addition on this ground must be 108 Peers and about 223
Commoners;1 and the increase would be so great as to change
in a very considerable degree the nature of both of those assem
blies. It is presumed therefore that the former scale must be
used. The Peers might either be chosen as the Scotch now are
(and this seems the best 2 for many reasons), or the King might
name those to whom, and to their heirs male, that right should
belong, supplying vacancies as they arose from the remaining
list, but leaving them in the interim on the footing of Commoners
as to eligibility to sit in the House of Lords. The number of
Irish peers who are now peers of Great Britain is not less than
40. Many of the others are now members of the House of Com
mons here. The Irish bishops might, according as one or the
other of these two plans was adopted, choose from among them
selves a certain number for each Parliament,3 or a like number
might be named by the King for the Parliament— or for their
lives. " For the House of Commons, if it was not thought that the
addition of 150 was too large, that number, being the half of the
present Irish Parliament, might be returned precisely in the
present mode of election, only choosing one at each election,
instead of two, and giving to Catholics as well as Protestants
the right of eligibility under effective qualification laws of pro
perty in both kingdoms. The simplicity of this plan is a great
recommendation of it. If the system of election in Ireland must
be at all varied, this might still be done without altering the
present rights of election, as follows, viz.:
Plan I
32 counties, 2 members each ... ... ... ... ... 64
9 cities and towns, 2 members each  18
10 smaller towns, 1 each ...  ... ... ... 10
99 boroughs, etc., to be united into sets of 3, with alternate
casting votes, J each ... ... ... ... ... 33

Total 125

Or

1 "That is 10 : 4 : : 270 : 108. 10 : 4 : : 558 : 223."— W. P.
2 " Certainly. One of the great reasons for preferring this mode is its being
actually in use, as one of the great objections to any new system would be
the danger lest, if it were thought more advantageous to the Irish peerage
than the present mode is to the Scotch, the latter might claim to be put on
a similar footing." — W. P.
3 " I suppose from 4 to 8." — W. P.

CAMDEN TO PITT 341

Plan II
32 counties, 2 members each  64
12 cities, 2 members each  24
22 towns, 1 member each ... ... ... ... ... 22
84 boroughs, etc., to be united into sets of 3, with alternate
casting votes, at £  28
Total 138

" But then would come the question of opening the elections
in some of these places, particularly the populous towns, together
with a host of pretentions and disputes in the arrangement of
these classes. Any attempt to establish anything like a uniform
system, on theories of population, contributions, etc., must, it is
presumed, lead to confusion in both countries."

(J.) PITT'S LAST ILLNESS
" Most Private. "Downing Street, Thursday, 16th Jan. 1806.1
" Dear Courtenay,
[On private matters]
..." As to myself, I am very heavy-hearted. Mr. Pitt has
been worse ever since that abominable conversation which I told
you he had on Monday with Lords Hawkesbury and Castlereagh.
He complained to Lady Hester, after they were gone, that they
had exhausted him too much — and Tuesday he saw Lord
Wellesley, which would have been an agitating interview under
any circumstances. He was pleased with Lord W's friendly and
affectionate manner, and I rather expect, if things should go
well, that he will take office. From what I can hear, he seems to
lean to the Admiralty. Yesterday morning Mr. Pitt was still
weaker. He could not keep even the light liquid nourishment,
which he was able to swallow, upon his stomach, but grew better
towards night. . . . He has been somewhat worried about the
King's Speech. Hawkesbury and Castlereagh drew up one
which he thought in many points objectionable, and, as he was
not equal to any exertion himself, he desired Bourne and
Huskisson, whom he saw on Tuesday, to correct it conformably
to his ideas. But they found it so wrong throughout that they
were obliged to frame an entire new one, with the assistance, I
believe, of Canning; and I copied it out that it might be sub
mitted to Mr. Pitt and sent to the Cabinet in my handwriting,
as coming from himself. Bourne carried it down to Putney, but
Mr. Pitt was too ill to see him. He could not leave his bed, and
brings up everything, whether medicine or food, which he swallows,
and is so excessively weak and exhausted that they have ordered
him to see no person whatever, nor transact any business, how
ever urgent or pressing it may be. We have one comfort left,
which is, that the physicians think there is no immediate danger,
and that he is not worse than he was when they saw him last
Sunday. I trust in God this opinion is well founded, though it
1 This letter is from William Dacre Adams, Pitt's private secretary, to
his brother-in-law, J. P. Courtenay, private secretary to Mr. Long at
Dublin. 342

PITT'S LAST ILLNESS 343
contradicts one's own common sense. For my own part, I should
rejoice beyond expression could we compound for his being out
of office, if we could once more see him restored to health — and
this is the distressing situation in which we are. Things cannot
possibly remain so long. If Mr. Pitt does not get much better
within a reasonable time, I have no idea but that his Administra
tion must fall. I earnestly wish, as I have said, that that was the
greatest evil which we have to apprehend. Perhaps I am too
gloomy — I hope I am ; but every publick and private feeling of
my heart is so intimately blended with the preservation of that
most excellent of men that I cannot look at his present state
without the most trembling anxiety. You shall certainly hear
again to-morrow.
"W.D.Adams."
" Downing Street, Tuesday, 21st January, 1806.
" Dear Courtenay,
" Last night the symptoms became less unfavourable than
they were in the morning when I wrote to you. Sir Walter told
Mr. Pitt that he ought to take some nourishment, and gave
him his choice of a little jelly or an egg beat up with a spoonful
of brandy. He preferred the latter, and liked it so well that he
soon called for another, which he also eat (sic), and slept quietly
afterwards till five o'clock. To-day, however, he is not quite so
well — by no means out of danger, though certainly not in a
state to give us such immediate alarm as we experienced
yesterday. " The Opposition, I find, mean to make a grand push to-day.
Lord Henry Petty moves this amendment to the Address. They
are exerting their utmost efforts to get a full attendance, and
these circular pressing letters are signed fohn McMalion, the
Prince of Wales's secretary. You who are fond of constitutional
proceedings must admire the exertions of this kind of influence.
You will naturally expect to hear, now that we are all in such
confusion and distress, that my Lord Sidmouth could not wit
ness such a scene without endeavouring to turn it to his own
purposes. He is, I am told, by means of his emissaries, trying
to persuade the King that nothing better can now be done than
placing him again at the head of the Government. We are now
in such a situation that that only could make us worse, and I
trust we shall be delivered from it. I have no letter from you
to-day, but I hope that Anne is going on well. Do send us some
comfort from Ireland ; we have none here.
" W. D. Adams."
[Adams' third letter, describing the death of Pitt, is in Earl Stanhope's
" Miscellanies," (1863), p. 45.]

CHISWICK PRESS : CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.

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