ft •¦# £ , * 'Igivetnefe Books /or the founding of a College in Ms Colony" • iLiiiBis^israr • o-rAveb ST-m? i; r? <_• v n al^un OciWar-wj l_i_m,Pu___ie_ 1834VbjWesue$i*L!>avis Sla____x_JloiB__ THE WORKS JONATHAN EDWARDS, A.M. AN ESSAY ON HIS GENIUS AND WRITINGS, BY HENRY ROGERS. IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. L LONDON : F. WESTLEY AND A. H. DAVIS, STATIONERS' COURT. NEW YORK: DANIEL APPLETON AND CO., 200, BROADWAY. PRINTED BY J. R, AND C. CHILDS, BUNGAY. MDCCCXXXV. CONTENTS. I. Essay on the Genius and Writings of Jonathan Edwards - - - - - i II. A Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Prevailing No tions of the Freedom of Will. Part I. Wherein are explained and stated various Terms and things belonging to the subject of the ensuing Discourse - - 4 Part II. Wherein it is considered, whether there is or can be any such sort of Freedom of Will, as that wherein Arminians place the essence of the Liberty of all Moral Agents ; and whether any such thing ever was or can be conceived of - 13 Part III. Wherein is inquired, whether any such Liberty of Will as Arminians hold, be necessary to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praise and Dispraise, &c. - - 41 *Part IV. Wherein the chief grounds of the reason ings of Arminians, in support and defence of the fore-mentioned notions of Liberty, Moral Agency, &c. and against the opposite doctrine, are con sidered - - 57 Appendix - - 89 III. Dissertation on the End for which God Created the World. Chap. I. What Reason dictates concerning this affair 97 II. What may be learned from the Holy Scrip tures - - 106 IV. A Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue. Chap. I. Concerning the essence of true virtue 122 II. How love respects different beings 123 III. Concerning the secondary beauty 127 IV. Of self-love and its influence - - 130 V. Natural conscience, and the moral sense - 133 VI. Of particular instincts of nature 135 VII. The reasons of many mistakes - 137 VIII. Whether virtue be tounded in sentiment 140 V. The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin De fended. Part I. Evidences of Original Sin from Facts and Events - - I« Part II. Proofs of the Doctrine from particular parts of Scripture - - 177 Part III. Evidence of the Doctrine from Redemp tion by Christ - - - 211 Part IV. Containing Answers to Objections - 216 VI. A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections, in Three Parts. Part I. Concerning the nature of the Affections and their importance in Religion - - 236 page Part II. Showing what are no certain Signs that Re ligious Affections are truly gracious, or that they are not - - 245 Part III. Showing what are distinguishing Signs of truly gracious and holy Affections - - - 262 Appendix to the Treatise on the Affections - 330 VII. Narrative of Surprising Conversions - - 344 VIII. Thoughts on the Revival of Religion in New England. Part I. A glorious Work of God - 366 Part II. Obligations to acknowledge, rejoice in, and promote this work - - - 380 Part III. Wherein the zealous Promoters of this Work have been injuriously blamed - 390 Part IV. What things are to be corrected and avoided - 397 Part V. What ought to be done to promote this work 421 IX. Inquiry Concerning Qualifications for Communion. Part I. The Question stated and explained - 434 Part II. Reasons for the Negative of the Question 436 Part III. Objections answered - 460 X. Misrepresentations Corrected and Truth Vindicated, in Reply to the Rev. Solomon Williams. Part I. General Misrepresentations by Mr. Wil liams - 486 Part II. Examination of Mr. Williams's Scheme - 491 Part III. Remarks on Mr. Williams's Reasoning - 509 Appendix. A letter to the people of Northampton -529 XI. A History of the Work of Redemption. Period I. From the Fall to the Incarnation 536 Period II. From Christ's Incarnation to his Re surrection - 572 Period III. From Christ's Resurrection to the End of the World - 582 XII. Five Discourses on the Soul's Eternal Salvation. Disc. I. Justification by Faith alone - - 622 II. Pressing into the Kingdom of God - - 654 III. Ruth's Resolution - - 664 IV. The Justice of God in the Damnation of Sinners - - - 668 V. The Excellency of Jesus Christ- - 680 XIII. Theological Questions 690 AN ESSAY THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS JONATHAN EDWARDS. The name of Jonathan Edwards is held in pro found veneration by thinking men of all parties ; and this universal homage, when contrasted with the obscurity of his life and the peculiarities of his opinions, is one, among a thousand proofs, that real meritwill never be long overlooked, and that the rewards of fame are not so capriciously bestowed as is often imagined. Though public opinion sometimes makes preposterous attempts to elevate the mean and the little, and even leaves transcend ent merit to struggle for awhile with neglect, it is sure, sooner or later, to rectify its errors. We in variably find that those laurels with which, as if in mockery, it has graced inferior genius, begin to wither in the very hour of their bloom ; and that it has reserved its " immortal amaranth" for brows worthy of such imperishable honours. Never was a triumph of genius more decisive than that of Jonathan Edwards. By the concur rent voice of all who have perused his writings, he is assigned one of the first, if not the very first place, amongst the masters of human reason. Many of the most acute metaphysicians and accomplished divines of the past and present age, have been the most ardent of his admirers ; we refer to such men as Hume, Mackintosh, Stewart, Robert Hall, and Chalmers. All these celebrated men differed from Edwards in some of his most cherished specu lations, and some of them abhorred all the peculiar doctrines, on the explication and defence of which he concentrated the full force of his mighty intel lect ; yet they all agree in the homage they render to that intellect : like that of a few other very great minds, it was too powerful to allow even the pro verbial meanness of controversial animosity to attempt the ungracious work of depreciation. Jonathan Edwards extorted this unanimous ap plause, by the greatness of his genius in a single department. He was not favoured by any one of the many adventitious advantages which so often help genius to fame ; he was utterly destitute of those graces of imagination and of style, which have sometimes clothed abstract truth in many of the attractions of poetry, and administered the pro- foundest wisdom in the enticing vehicle of eloquence. He wrote for special purposes, and addressed him self to a narrow circle ; and he has managed to embody his profound conceptions in the most re pulsive of all possible forms. Under such circum stances, nothing but transcendent greatness could have subdued the disgust which the pride of phi losophy would necessarily feel at the peculiarities of his religious opinions, or with which a sensitive taste would recoil from the hideous deformities of his style. Yet his gigantic force of intellect, and that alone, has not merely redeemed his writings from obscurity, but attracted the attention not only of many of the wisest, but the most polished of mankind. Like Paul at Athens, he has compelled even the Stoics and Epicureans to listen to him by the depth and originality of his speculations. We shall now proceed to the objects of the pre sent essay, which are, to attempt an analysis of the chief peculiarities of Edwards's character, intel lectual and moral ; and then to make a few obser vations on his principal productions. Those minds which have in any very consider able measuredistinguished themselves, have usually been remarkable for the pre-eminent vigour in which they have possessed some particular faculty. This supremacy of certain powers of the mind is perhaps generally to be traced to the original struc ture of the mind itself, although it is sometimes the result of early application, or of a strong bent in some particular direction. There are some of the faculties, we know, (though generally such as are less immediately connected with that inspired thing we call genius,) which are capable of indefinite expansion ; just as the senses of the savage may be practised and disciplined to an almost incredible AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS degree of acuteness : or as the muscles which sus tain the pressure of daily toil, at length develop themselves in enormous disproportion to the rest of the body ; securing, it is true, a vast accession of strength, but by a sacrifice of symmetry and beauty. In some instances it is even probable that severe and unremitting application to some originally un congenial pursuit, may alter or reverse the ordi nances of nature; such may have been the urgent demand upon some one faculty, not at first pos sessed in an eminent degree, as actually to give it a supremacy over that which would, under other circumstances, have more rightfully claimed it. That naturally paramount faculty may never have been awakened from its torpor ; never exposed to any of those influences from without, which would have attracted its slumbering energies from the cloud. But whatever the degree of influence which na ture or habit, the original organization of the mind or the influence of circumstances, may exert in the formation of intellectual character, or to whatever extent the one may sometimes resist or overbear the other, it is certain, in fact, that the most highly gifted minds are generally distinguished by the gigantic strength in which they possess some one faculty. Rare, very rare indeed, is it to meet with that symmetrical structure of intellect, in which there is nothing either of excess or of defect ; in which each faculty fills its appropriate sphere, but never invades that of another ; in which each is developed just in that degree which secures the greatest perfection of all. This perfection of in tellectual beauty, like every other species of per fect beauty, is not to be found in a world like this ; it is purely ideal. Its separate elements alone are discoverable. If we wish to form a conception of such perfect beauty, we must, as in other cases, refine and exalt, by the aid of imagination, the materials which are submitted to our observation. We must roam, as it were, through the world of intellect, and selecting from many minds the ap propriate excellence of each, mould these frag ments of intellectual beauty into " an immortal feature of loveliness and perfection." If this were the proper place for it, it were easy to vindicate the wisdom which has decreed, even to the greatest minds, this inequality of structure. — . It is in harmony with that principle of compensa tion which pervades all the works of the Creator ; which, leaving the most gifted imperfect, gives the proudest no cause to glory, and conferring on the humblest something or other which the proudest wants, redeems the most insignificant from abso lute contempt. The same principle, moreover, secures the rapid progress of the human mind in every species of knowledge, by facilitating that division of labout which is the stern condition of all improvement. The concentration of the facul ties on some one object is indispensably necessary to profound investigation ; and, on the contrary, the diffusion of the faculties over a large surface is, generally speaking, absolutely inseparable from a comparatively superficial knowledge. To attain either solidity or extent of knowledge, the one or the other must in some measure be sacrificed ; the human mind cannot at once embrace every species of dimension ; and the exceptions to this, we are disposed to think, are rather apparent than real. Neither ought it to be overlooked, that the inequa lity of intellect of which we have spoken, secures that boundless variety which so conspicuously dis plays the wisdom of the Creator. Next to the beauty of such variety itself, we may admire the simplicity of the means by which it is secured. As we analyse the infinitely diversified appearances of nature, we find, to our astonishment, that every thing tends to simplicity ; is resolving itself back into a few elementary principles ; and that the complexity of the universe is the complexity not so much of distinct principles of existence, as of re lations, combinations, and modes. When the che mist subjects to his analysis the various objects of nature, he rarely finds any principle absolutely new, but elements with which he has been long familiar in new forms. He sees that the exhaust- less variety of the universe is produced by the chemical affinities between different substances, securing an infinite action and interaction of one upon another, and as many different results as these primary elements and their compounds can be mingled in different proportions. It is just so in the world of intellect; no two minds were ever exactly alike ; yet (as each dis covery of mental philosophy more strongly inclines us to believe) the original faculties which enter into the constitution of all minds are exceed ingly few and simple : but by mingling these few elements in different proportions, and subjecting each mind to the endlessly varied influences of real life, the diversities of mental character are as ex- haustless as those which are to be found in any other department of nature. These considerations, even if there were no other, would prove that the arrangement which generally secures the su premacy of some one faculty in the human mind, at once promotes the happiness and secures the harmony of the world. Jonathan Edwards, so far from being an ex ception to this general rule, was perhaps the most striking exemplification of its truth, with which the whole history of the human intellect can furnish us. So enormous is the development, so pro digious the superiority, of one particular faculty, that he might be almost said to possess but one : that one is not far to seek; it is impressed on every page he ever wrote, and lies open to the ob servation of the most casual reader. It is, indeed, so obvious as to make it almost absurd formally to mention it. The character of his mind was essentially logical ; the dominant attribute was Reason. — He possessed probably in a greater degree than was ever before vouchsafed to man, the ratiocinative faculty ; and in this respect, at least, he well deserves the emphatic admiration which Robert Hall expressed when he somewhat extravagantly said, that Edwards was " the great est of the sons of men." OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. Not only was this faculty, as we imagine, origi nally bestowed in immeasurably greater perfection than any other, and formed the characteristic fea ture of his intellectual organization ; but it was cultivated and disciplined with an assiduity, an incessant, indefatigable diligence, which again doubled the disparity between this and his other powers. His other faculties, inferior though they were by comparison, (of which we shall speak more particularly hereafter,) never reached any thing like the expansion of which they were origi nally susceptible ; they had no room to grow ; they were withered and stunted beneath the gigan tic shadow of that intellect which, shooting its roots and spreading its branches in every direc tion, filled the whole cavity of the soul, and ab sorbed to itself every particle of nutriment which the soil could supply. When we say that Jonathan Edwards was pre eminently distinguished by his logical powers, we use these words in the strictest sense, as implying a mind peculiarly adapted for deductive reasoning ; a mind, whose delight it is to draw inferences from known or supposed premises ; in other words, which has for its objects the relations between dif ferent propositions. The logical process, properly so called, has nothing to do with either the truth or the falsity of the premises, but merely with the connexion between the premises and the conclu sion. Thus we speak very intelligibly of reason ing correctly from false premises, and of reasoning falsely from sound premises. — But the precise peculiarities of Edwards's mind will be better un derstood, after we have made one or two general observations. It is obvious, that before the real truth of any proposition can be established, it is necessary both that the premises should be true, and that the con clusion should be logically deduced from them. If either of the above conditions be neglected, it is plain that the results of the whole process will be vitiated. If the premises be false, let the argu mentation be ever so unexceptionably conducted, the conclusion will be false ; or at all events can only be hypothetically established, that is, on the assumption of the premises ; while, if a fallacy has been introduced into the reasoning process, the utmost caution in the establishment of the pre mises will avail nothing. Thus, it is evident that no conclusion respecting a matter of fact, no con clusion in physical science, using those words in their widest latitude, can be established unless both the above conditions be strictly complied But it is not so with hypothetical truth ; this consists of conclusions deduced from premises, the soundness of which is already admitted, either really, or for the sake of argument. Here it is only necessary to ascertain that the argumentative process has been accurately conducted ; in other words that no fallacy lurks between the premises and tlie conclusion. The stupendous piles of mathematical demonstrations all rest upon this foundation, and require no other. Certain propo sitions, called definitions, are first laid down, and assented to, and then, all the profound and mazy truths of that enchanting science are evolved by a process as unerring as it is beautiful ; all that is required is, simply to compare the propositions which have been already conceded with one another; the conclusions thus arrived at forming new propositions, constituting by fresh comparison among themselves, or with the original propositions, the basis of an interminable series of demonstra tions. In the same manner elaborate systems of ethics or political economy, might be constructed (if hy pothetical truth were worth any thing on such subjects) by the concession of a few preliminary principles. It was this fact which led Locke into his splendid and, at first sight, perplexing paradox, that there is no reason why the science of Morals should not be made as strictly demonstrative as that of Mathematics. — Of precisely the same stamp are many of the demonstrations of the school men. It is true those writers are often given to the most frivolous verbal reasoning ; yet we also find in them trains of abstract reasoning, display ing the most prodigious subtlety and acuteness. But then they are hypothetical; and therefore generally useless. — Now it is in the purely de ductive process, that the peculiar genius of Ed wards displays its matchless vigour. From the above remarks it must be obvious, that though correct premises (that is, premises ab solutely true) and correct argumentation are ne cessary in the establishment of by far the greater part of truths which demand deductive reasoning at all, and correct argumentation in the establish ment of any truth so established, yet that the two parts of this great process, — the investigation and establishment of premises, and a logical use of them, are so different, that it by no means follows that a mind most eminently adapted to the one shall be equally fitted for the other. It is true, indeed, that we find the qualities of mind neces sary to both, generally conjoined in the same in dividuals, though it may be in very different proportions. When possessed together, in any considerable degree, they constitute conjointly the highest order of philosophic genius. Still they are not necessarily united ; so far from it, that we sometimes see them almost totally dissevered ; possessed singly by different individuals in great perfection ; and if possessed in the same degree of strength by the same individual, would have made a philosopher of the very first class. In one man we may perceive much argumentative acuteness where the premises are not very numerous or com plicated, but very inferior powers of observation, and scarcely any memory for facts ; in another, acute observation and a retentive memory, but an utter incapacity for the higher exercises of intel lect. Such a man holds not his multifarious and curious knowledge together by any of those grand and comprehensive relations, which it is the chief delight of a philosophic mind to discover and to contemplate. The facts which crowd the capa- IV AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS cious memory of such a mutilated intellect re semble the rarities in an ill-arranged museum, before science has attempted her classifications. The principal use of such mere pioneers in phi losophy, is to supply to minds of a superior order the materials for profounder speculation. We ad mit, however, that in the generality of instances, the habits of mind of which we have spoken are as sociated, at least in some degree, though they are found in very unequal proportions ; proportions so unequal, that the preponderance of the one rather than of the other shall almost uniformly give the character to the mind. To this representation the use of common language precisely corresponds. — Minds which are distinguished by that calm, enlarged, and far-sighted spirit of induction, which traverses the whole circle of a question, and views it in all its relations before it presumes to reason upon them, we designate comprehensive, however acute they may be ; while those which are pre eminently distinguished by subtilty of argument, we call acute, whatever their comprehensiveness. Those prodigies of intellect, Bacon, Butler, and Barrow, (acute as they were,) belong rather to the former class than to the latter. Descartes, Locke, and Jonathan Edwards, (comprehensive as they were,) belong rather to the latter class than to the former. We have thus endeavoured distinctly to explain what we meant when we said, that the great cha racteristic of Edwards's mind was logical subtilty. We are far from denying that it was wonderfully comprehensive as well as acute ; we only affirm that acuteness was its main characteristic. But it may, perhaps, be said, (and this we shall shortly see has been said, in our opinion incautiously, in reference to some of the most important of Ed wards's reasonings,) that if this estimate of Ed wards's intellectual character be true, we might rea sonably expect more subtilty than conclusiveness in his reasonings ; and that, however much of logical truth he may display, that is, however exact may be the correspondence between his premises and his conclusions, he would be liable, like the school men, to assume defective premises, and rest content with a too hasty induction. We acknowledge that a priori we might have anticipated some such result as this ; and it is probable that these fears might have been in some measure realized, had Edwards reasoned chiefly on certain subjects in which the premises are very various and compli cated, and demand a most patient and compre hensive induction ; as for instance, on some sub jects connected with political economy, or on some branches of physical science. We shall en deavour to show presently that this indecent haste of generalization — this precipitation of the logical process, was, in at least one instance,* the error into which he actually fell. But, in general, it may be affirmed that it forms the peculiar value of Edwards's writings, and a striking exhibition of his consummate judgment, that he has em- * See our subsequent remarks on Edwards's Theory of " True Virtue." ployed his matchless powers of argument exactly within the sphere most legitimately appropriated to their exercise. It matters not how long or how intricate a train of reasoning may be, (always supposing each conclusion in the whole series lo gically argued,) provided the premises be sound. Now it will be seen upon examination, that Ed wards's most stupendous efforts of intellect are founded upon premises exceedingly few in num ber and simple in character ; the abstract princi ples from which his argument generally takes its departure, are not more perspicuously explained than they are readily admitted. Thus, for in stance, all the purely argumentative parts of that most prodigious effort, the Treatise on the " Will," . will be found, upon analysis, to contain but this one postulate, — that " every effect must have a cause ; " and of the thousands who have denied the conclu siveness of Edwards's reasoning, perhaps scarcely one was ever absurd enough to deny his premises. As though aware of the character of his own mind ; as though conscious, that to give his intel lect its full play, he must break away from the de batable ground of dubious facts and controverted premises, and as though eager to commence his cherished employment of strict ratiocination, he takes but little for granted, and that little easily understood ; and then proceeds to unfold, step by step, from the few meagre and generally self-evi dent propositions with which he sets out, the most profound and intricate trains of reasoning ; first drawing some obvious conclusion from, the prin ciples themselves, and then making each conclu sion the basis and element of fresh arguments. It is no argument to say, (as the celebrated writer of the present day, to whom we have already ad verted, and to whose observations we shall here after make more specific reference, has almost ventured to do,) that those chains of abstract rea soning, though each link be rivetted with ada mant, are worthless, because hypothetical; that is, because they depend upon the admission of the premises ; since, as we have already said, Edwards's premises are for the most part so few and so simple, that though his opponents are often hardy enough to question the solidity of his reasoning, they rarely dare to dispute the soundness of his preliminary propositions. In conformity with what we have represented as the ruling character of his mind, his passion for pure argumentation, we may observe, that though Ed wards never flinches from the consideration of any subject that fairly comes before him, whatever the amount of investigation it demands, or however complicated the premises which must decide it, he certainly always shines most when he can first of all circumscribe the question within exceedingly narrow limits, and after requesting his adversary's assent to the apparently harmless and self-evident propositions from which he is to take his departure, abandon himself solely to his own creative powers of argument. This is his favourite employment. The merest filaments of abstract truth, fine as the " thread of gossamer," he will weave and inter- OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. weave till he has fabricated a web so close, so strong, so ingeniously fortified, as will defy both the violence and the arts of sophistry to escape from its meshes. Or (if we may change the figure) he goes forth to the field of controversy in a pano ply resembling the silken armour of some oriental chieftains ; which though composed of such slender materials, has been known to be as completely sabre proof as a coat of mail. So far as we know, there are no trains of reasoning out of the exact sciences, at all to be compared with many of those of Jonathan Edwards, in originality, continuity, and accuracy. The tendency of Edwards's intellect to fix upon a few propositions, and then, subjecting them to his tremendous powers of abstraction, to elicit a va riety of unexpected inferences from them, is most conclusively shown, where it ought to have been most carefully repressed, — in the posthumous pa pers on certain subjects connected with physical science, lately published in the admirable Life of Jonathan Edwards by his descendant Sereno Dwight. In those papers we cannot fail to observe how I ill adapted was the mind of Edwards for those ex tensive exercises of induction, that long and patient [investigation of facts, that laborious collection of [the mere materials and elements of reasoning be fore the process of reasoning and generalization ! begins, which are so absolutely necessary in every department of physical science; without which, indeed, the profoundest reasonings, being, purely hypothetical, must always, on such subjects, be worthless. As though not only conscious where I his real power lay, but irresistibly impelled to ex ercise it, we find him perpetually escaping from the field of experiment and fact ; taking his premises for granted, and consequently reasoning absurdly [from them: -or else, as if aware of the insecure 'ground on which he trod when he attempted the : induction of facts and impatient to begin his fa- ' vourite exercise of purely logical illation, he is continually retreating to those obscurest of almost all subjects, the metaphysics (if we may so speak) of natural philosophy ; to discussions on the ele mentary structure of matter, the forms of atoms, their laws of action, the genesis of motion, and the original principles of nature. Of the astound ing assurance with which he could take facts for granted, and then dogmatize upon them, the fol lowing extracts may suffice as a specimen : we have selected them, first, because they are short ; j and, secondly, because they so exactly illustrate the sentiment we have expressed. « COMETS The use of comets seems to be, by their efflu via which go off in their tails continually, but especially in 1C.W nerihllion, to feed the sun with matter, suitable to be converted into rays of light, to repair the waste of such par- ?£l« bv the vast diffusion of light which it daily emits. ThPvare sent out of the atmosphere of the comet, not as •cimr hv the weight of their circumambient ether; for it i_ « leen demonstrated to be so small, and so near to nothing that it is not supposable that it can be by any such means; but by the force or attraction of the emitted rays of the sun, which, passing through the atmosphere of the comets, by their attraction, draw after them, continually, those particles, of which the tail is made up. The rays, that pass by very near them, act upon them by their attrac tion, and set them into a motion from the sun, and parallel to the motion of the emitted rays of the sun. There is no matter, by this means, sent out of the atmosphere into the tail, but that which is most suitable to be the aliment of the sun, and to be converted into rays of light; for the rays of light attract that matter, that is of their own nature, and suitable to be turned into particles of light, or fire, im mensely more strongly than others, as appears by the ac tion of particles of light, or fire, upon natural bodies, in setting them on fire. Their action is, at first, on those par ticles in the natural body that are of ihe same kind, or fit to become particles of fire, and, by this attraction of extrin sic rays, those within are set in motion, whereby the body is set on fire. And thus, by the powerful action of those particles, one on another, there arises that most rapid and vehement motion of them in fire, and causes them to leap forth, with such immense celerity, as to come from the sun hither in a few minutes. This strong action of these par ticles, one on another, probably arises from their being im mensely denser than other particles." " ICE. COLD. Those nitrous particles, that are said to be thrust into the water, in the process of freezing, do not keep themselves immovable after the manner of wedges, by filling up the spaces between, so that they shall not have room to play and move freely among themselves ; for this hypothesis still leaves the matter inexplicable. For, 1. lt is inexplicable how these wedges should thrust themselves in so fast, into a heap of particles so exceedingly movable, that they cannot be stirred at all : how these wedges should be of so happy a shape, and should so happily, each of them, find a vacuity among the vacuities of-the water, ex actly accommodated to their shape, as to completely fill them up, so that of all these little rolling slippery particles none can stir at all, insomuch that that which was before a liquid body, shall not only be made something more solid like clay, but should be so hard, as not to give way without breaking. Let us suppose, for the easiness of conceiving, that the particles of water were as big as peas. Let the frigid particles be as big in proportion, but other wise having all the same qualities. Let a multitude of freezing particles be hovering in the air, over this heap of globules. It is very probable that many of them would get in among the globules, so that perhaps they would not slip, and roll one over another, so easily for it. But it is inconceivable how these nitrous particles, being hard, should so be accommodated to the angled vacuities, that all the vacuities should be so filled, that the heap of glo bules should be so hard as to bear a great weight, a hard shock, without any impression being made upon it. But it would be yet more strange if it was evident, that there was more vacuity, now, in the heap of globules, than be fore, and yet none of the globules should have room to stir; which yet is certainly the case in water, as all know, ice being lighter than water. But this matter of freezing may be easily solved from the certain principles foregoing &c. &c. ' These papers, displaying at once such min gled acuteness and absurdity, such vigorous logic and such inconclusive premises, remind us of no thing so strongly as the metaphysical physics (if we may be allowed such an expression) of Des cartes, who indeed possessed, perhaps in a greater degree than any other man, the very peculiarities which most strongly characterized the intellect of Jonathan Edwards. When Edwards is upon the above-mentioned uncongenial topics, their minds exactly resemble one another. The discussions in which the one indulges on the forms and mutual action of atoms and the elementary principles of nature, will very well match with the plenum and the vortices of the other. ¦ b AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS It must be remembered, however, that what were the sober speculations of Descartes's maturer age, were only the amusements of Edwards's most precocious youth. Apparently aware (as we have already hinted) of the character of his own mind and convinced that doubtful premises must necessarily vitiate the closest and strongest tissue of argument, or happily driven into another and more congenial track by the necessity of de fending his religious opinions ; Edwards has chosen, for the most stupendous exercises of his reasoning powers, subjects which gave full and lawful scope to all the peculiarities of his genius. It is said, indeed, that in early life Edwards dis played an acuteness and patience of observation which seemed indications of a genius peculiarly adapted to physical science. And hence some have argued that, had he devoted his life to natural philo sophy, he would have been nearly as great in that department as in those in which he has achieved such wonders. Yet, with all due deference to those who have expressed such an opinion, we must be per mitted to dissent from it. The reader will see in the sequel that the reasons which prompt our dis sent, so far from detracting, in any way, from the admiration due to Edwards's genius, rather enhance it. We are far, very far, from saying that Edwards was absolutely deficient in that inquisitiveness of mind, and those powers of observation, which are so essential to any considerable attainments in natural philosophy. Those very miscellanea from which we have already made a few extracts, show, in many parts, an acuteness and extent of observa tion not often equalled. But though he possessed these powers in a very considerable degree, it was in no sort of proportion to the matchless vigour in which he possessed other powers. Compared with those of the generality of men, Edwards's powers of observation might be said to be unusually strong ; compared with some other faculties of his own mind, they were of a very inferior order. Such was his passion for abstract reasoning, that we are persuaded it would, under any circum stances, have stamped the character of his mind , and overborne any other tendency of his nature which should dare to dispute its supremacy. Nor can we help thinking that the truth of these remarks is fully confirmed by those posthumous fragments to which we have already more than once referred. Some of the facts they contain are, we grant, such as could have occurred only to a very observing mind ; but, on the other hand, how often does he reason with the utmost confidence, from data not only the most doubtful, but which have no sort of evidence to sustain them ; which are neither more nor less than pure assumptions ! The simple truth is, that his uncontrollable propensity for strict ratiocination is too impatient to get into exercise. We are persuaded that no man of any thing like equal powers or equal knowledge with Jonathan Edwards, was ever betrayed into such incautious reasoning on physical subjects, since Bacon set the example of a purer style of philosophizing. What can we think for instance of such a passage as the following ? " The parts which constitute the atmosphere are two fold. (1.) The parts of the ether, drawn and pressed to gether by gravity to the earth : which is nothing but exT ceedingly minute, subtile, active particles, which parts are the most penetrating. Now it is certain, if there be any ethereal matter at all, however little, this is one part of the atmosphere. For, if there be any, that which is round about the earth, or any other celestial body, will be very much condensed and pressed together, by its tendency to such body. So that although it be almost infinitely rare, at the distance of four or five diameters of the earth ; yet it will, according to the laws of gravity, be thick enough at the surface of the earth : so that there are no proper bounds to this part of the atmosphere, inasmuch as it is nothing but the ether pressed together, according as it is nearer or further from the centre of the earth. It is in vain therefore to pretend to setting bounds to the atmosphere. (2.) An other part are the vapours and exhalations which ascend from the globe — parts of liquids rarified, so as to ascend from the earth, by means of the gravity of the rest of the atmosphere. These vapours are wholly constituted of small bubbles, as is now said by philosophers ; these bub bles being lighter than the atmosphere, not because the liquid of it, which makes the skin or wall of the bubble, is rarer than the air, but because the air or subtile matter, that is in the bubble, is, by the sunbeams or otherwise, made more rare than the circumambient air : so that take the skin of the bubble and all together, and it is lighter than a part of the air that is round about it, of the same dimensions. When we say that the air within the bubble. is rarer than that without, it must be the ethereal part of the air, or at least another part of the air that is not con stituted of these bubbles, for that which is in all the bub bles is not the bubbles. Now here, in the first place, it is certain that these exhalations do constitute a part of the atmosphere that is round about ; and, secondly, it is cer tain that they do not wholly constitute it, as has been by some thought ; for it is contrary to the supposition, viz. that these bubbles are lighter than the air, and therefore ascend in it. Than what air are these bubbles lighter ? It is not meant that these bubbles are lighter or rarer than these bubbles, and therefore ascend among them : so that these are not the primary parts of the air. Yea, it is cer tain that the matter of our atmosphere is the very same with the ether, the same with that which is in the spaces between the heavenly bodies ; arid that there is a certain subtile matter in these spaces, and that it is the same with, or at least partly constituted of, the air ; only the air is the ether much compressed. If it has been proved that the self-expanding quality of the air is so great, as has been. said by the late philosophers ; for if one inch square of it, when free and having nothing incumbent to press it toge ther, will expand itself so much, it is certain that the whole' atmosphere, being free, and having nothing incumbent^ will expand itself into all the solar system. And if one inch square of air, at the distance of a semi-diameter of the earth, will expand itself so as to fill the solar system, then there is nothing incumbent upon the atmosphere sufficient to hinder its free expansion : so that the matter of our air is abroad in the heavenly spaces," &c. &c. All the most striking peculiarities of Edwards's mind are well exhibited in one of his very earliest efforts : we refer to those extremely interesting observations (made at the age of twelve years) on the habits of a certain species of spider ; observa tions which, at the request of his father, he trans mitted to a naturalist in England.- Indications of a mind of wondrous power are blended with all the simplicity of a child, in a manner which sheds, over this singular composition, a charm ineffable. The observations are prefaced by an apologetical letter, the unfeigned humility and modesty of which afford as strong an exhibition of the chief peculiarities of OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. Edwards's moral nature, as the observations them selves furnish of the peculiarities of his intellectual character. Edwards's observations on external nature were made in his youth ; in that season, during which the solicitations of the senses are strongest, and, of course, long before those faculties which were afterwards destined to shed such lustre on his name as a philosopher, came fully into play. It was then, no doubt, that the first restless movements of those faculties, just struggling into precocious activity, inspired him with his deep passion for solitude and meditation, and he might be thus oc casionally allured to converse with nature, when his mind wearied of the conflict, as yet unequal, with subjects to him more congenial. In our opi nion, he was not attracted to this species of study by any native bias, but during his fits of so litary musing felt his attention arrested by the ob jects of nature, rather than voluntarily directed to them. This may be thought fanciful, and we do not, therefore, lay any stress on it ; nor is it ne cessary. All we wish to show is, that the dominant faculties of his nature (no matter how powerful his other faculties might be) were possessed in such superlative measure, that they necessarily subdued all others to themselves, and swayed with despotic power the sceptre of the soul. Certain it is, that when they developed themselves in all their strength, at a more advanced period of life, every symptom of a taste for physical science vanished ; external nature (if we may so speak) receded from before him, and a self-created world of abstrac tions rose within. We feel confident that if Ed wards had attempted in after-life the pursuit of physical science, his propensity for abstract rea soning, his eagerness for argument and inference, would have constantly betrayed him into unsound philosophy ; would have induced him to reason from a few facts instead of waiting for a more ample induction ; to assume as fact what was not fact at all ; in a word, to use the language of che mistry, would have spoiled every intellectual pro cess in the very moment of projection. Probably there never was a man, in whom the several elements of philosophic genius were min gled in such harmonious proportion ; in whom, as Sir James Mackintosh so justly observes, " the logical and metaphysical attributes" were con joined in such perfection " with a regard to obser- * We fear that the observations we have just made on this subject will hardly meet with the approbation of the " Essayist," to whom we have already referred. In his first note to his pre fatory Essay to a late edition of the treatise on the " Will," he has indicated a method of studying- the " science of mind," which if it does not commend itself By its soundness, can hardly fail to amuse by its novelty. Alluding to those constitutional infirmities which Edwards states as reasons for declining the proffered presidency of New Jersey College, and amongst which he enumerates, " flaccid solids ; vapid, sizy, and scarce fluids ; and a low tide of spirits, often occasioning a kind of childish weakness and contemptibleness of speech, presence, and de meanour;" our Essayist says, "This description of his mental conformation is curious physiologically, as an anatomy of a mind so remarkable for its faculty of abstraction. May we not say that this very poverty of constitution, this sluggishness and aridity, this feeble pulse of life, was the very secret of his extraordinary power of analysis* The supposition leads to speculations concern ing the physical conditions of the mind, which must not heTe be pursued ; but it may be remarked, in passing, that it must be from the copious collection and right use of facts of this sort, that pro gress will be made (if ever) in the science of mind." Here we b 2 vation and experience of nature," as Aristotle. Yet how often do we find him betrayed by the excess of the ratiocinative faculties into rash conclusions and imperfect premises ! How then could Jona than Edwards hope to escape this error ? Edwards therefore was wise (if such a direction of his mind were intentional on his part) and was fortunate (if the result of circumstances) in aban doning the field of physical science for what was so much more congenial, — abstract reasoning and controversy. There is indeed one department of physical sci ence (for it ought properly to be so called) for which he was eminently fitted ; we mean the phi losophy of the human mind. His faculty of abstraction, the very organon — the instrument of discovery in mental science, would have been, in such a pursuit, invaluable. We have said that mental philosophy ought to be called a section of physical science ; this is evident, because the process and the limits of discovery are precisely the same as in other departments of science. We derive a knowledge of those facts which con stitute physical science (commonly so called) by observation and experiment ; of those which con stitute mental science, by consciousness and re flection. Upon this supervenes the generalization and classification of the facts thus ascertained ; and this is just all we know, and all which in our present state we can know, in either depart ment. But though both are strictly inductive sciences, are founded upon the same principles, and are bounded by the same limits, it is the re verse of true, that the same mind shall be equally qualified to prosecute both, or that he who can make himself a master in the one, may not be almost wholly incapacitated for the other. In the successful pursuit of natural philosophy, there must be a preponderance of those faculties which shall turn the whole energies of the mind upon external nature ; for the successful pursuit of men tal science, an excess of those faculties which shall concentrate its attention upon itself, since the materials on which it has to operate lie within. In the one case, all the apertures of the soul, if we may so speak, must be thrown open to the full light of the outward world ; in the other, they must be darkened and shaded, that the mind may pursue in undisturbed abstraction, the analysis of its stupendous mysteries.* are informed, to our no little amazement, that "flaccid solids; vapid, sizy, and scarce fluids ; and a low tide of spirits," may have been the very secret — the Italics are our author's own-fAe very secret of Edwards's extraordinary powers of analysis/ We ac knowledge, indeed, that the words the very secret are exceedingly vague; the Italics, however, show that our author intended to lay some weighty stress on them. They afford a specimen of a very frequent fault of our author. He often manages to shroud his meaning in such felicitous ambiguities of language, that one knows not whether to reject a senfence altogether because con taining some glaring absurdity if understood according to the more obvious import of the words, or to regard it with ignorant veneration as probably containing some very profound truth, if we could but get at the esoteric meaning of the author. Thus in the instance before us, the words " very secret," though enforced with all the emphasis ofltalics, really convey no distinct idea at all. If our author means that " flaccid solids and vapid andsizy fluids" were the cause of Edwards's possessing such powers of analysis, we presume that our readers will not call upon us for a formal refutation of any such absurdity. If he means to infer " that flaccid solids and vapid and sizy fluids" are an inseparable con dition of great analytical powers, no individual peculiarities, V11I AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS We contend, then, that for this department of physical science, the genius of Edwards (if he had systematically directed it to this object) was pe culiarly adapted. Many parts of his treatise on the " Will," as well as Sect. I. Part II. of his work on the " Religious Affections," (which displays the hand of a master,) afford abundant proof of the correctness of this position. It is true, indeed, that in this as well as in every other department of physical science, a strong propensity for ab stract reasoning may induce a licentious indul gence in speculation, utterly inconsistent with the sobriety of inductive science. Since it is obvious that if mental philosophy be a branch of inductive science at all, almost every thing must depend on a correct and careful collection of facts ; it- must be equally obvious that the substitution of con jectures for facts, or of an insufficient number of facts for such as would alone justify generalization, must as necessarily vitiate any theory in those sciences which relate to mind, as any theory in those which relate to matter. Aristotle's theory of percep tion, and the idealism of Berkeley, are as vicious as the Ptolemaic system or the vortices of Descartes ; and precisely for the same reasons. Still, how ever, the danger which this passion for deductive reasoning entails is not so great in the prosecution of mental science ; and for this simple reason, that those faculties on which a talent for deductive reasoning is founded, are more akin to the sub jects of mental science, than to any other branch of inductive philosophy ; are not only more fa vourable to the successful investigation of the facts on which this science depends, but absolutely essential to such success. Without them it is vain to look for those habits of severe reflection, that intense and concentrated attention to the compli cated and illusory phenomena of thought and feeling, which constitute the best guarantees for a successful cultivation of this department of philo sophy. Here induction itself is, to such a mind, more delightful, and is more patiently carried on, than would have been the case in any other branch of science. Still we cannot help considering it, on the whole, a fortunate circumstance, that either the tendencies of Edwards's nature, or the force of peculiar circumstances, led him in general to those nothing but a " copious collection," a large number of similar in stances, would warrant even an approach to such a conclusion. But even if such, a collection were made, we cannot see how this would furnish what our author so oracularly pronounces that it would — the surest, if not the only, apparatus of discovery " in the science of mind." Surely he must have different ideas of what the science of mind is, than are usually conveyed by those words in the present age. We have always thought that the science of mind professed to be an analysis and classification of the phenomena of the mind itself, and not a discovery of the varieties of physical structure to which particular orders of mind may be united. The utmost that the most copious col lection of such facts as our author speaks of could do, would be to furnish us with a knowledge of the material e/rpressions of mind, or, as our author himself expresses it, its physical con ditions ;— an important and deeply interesting class of facts, to be sure, but, in no essential manner, aiding the pursuit of the "science of mind," in any intelligible sense of these words. If, however, qiir author's hint should be adopted, the mental philosopher must henceforth sit at the feet of the Lawrences and Majendies of our day. He must be content to grope for the secrets of mind " in flaccid solids and vapid and sizy fluids;" or repeat the profound follies of a former age, in a diligent dissection of the pineal gland. His employment may be characterized in the same language which describes the ancient rites of aruspicy : subjects in which his genius could most fully ex patiate, free, for the most part, from the dangers to which we have adverted. His works are either directly controversial ; that is, occupied with an examination of the reasonings and the detection of the fallacies of others, a task for which his genius was particularly adapted ; or (as we have al ready had occasion to observe) they consistof trains of abstract reasoning from a few comparatively sim ple and obvious premises. But to this subject we shall have occasion to return, when we come to consider the criticisms which the author of the " Natural History of Enthusiasm" has passed on some portion of the reasonings contained in the treatise on the " Will." There are three distinct orders of truths ; some (and they form immensely the larger class) con sisting of facts derived from the senses, and which are gathered from observation and experiment ; some relating to the operations of mind, and these are gained by consciousness and reflection ; while others are elicited purely by processes of deduc tive reasoning, from a comparison of any proposi tions between which any mutual relations can sub sist at all. Now, any man has a right to take any number of such propositions, and reason by infer ence from them; and if the purely ratiocinative pro cess from such propositions be correct, the reasoning will always be, at least,- hypothetically true ; that is, if you admit the premises you must also admit the conclusion . But if the premises be in fact true, the argumentation will also be in fact as well as hypothetically true. Its practical worth will therefore be measured by the actual truth of the premises. All that was requisite, therefore, to enable Edwards to give full scope to his peculiar powers, was that he should select topics in which the propositions preliminary to reasoning should be exceedingly few, simple, and for the most part, obvious ; and this, we affirm, he has generally accomplished. Thus his reasoning is seldom vi tiated by any unsoundness in the premises ; and as to any flaw in the logical process, let not his; opponents hope for it. The movements of ma chinery are hardly more unerring, than the preci sion with which — when he has once laid down the propositions, which constitute his premises — he proceeds to unfold their relations. " Inhians pectoribus, spirantia consulit exta ;" and of such philosophers, we presume, might be said what Cicero says of their prototypes, the augurs, that the wonder was that they should ever meet without laughing in each other's faces— Our author often speaks with contempt of intellectual philosophy, and we know not therefore that we ought to be much surprised at the paragraph on which we have just been commenting. But if there have been those who have overrated the importance of mental science, there are others who have fallen into an opposi te and still more pernicious extreme, that of despising it ; and of de spising it ignorantly. From the almost rabid fury with which our author sometimes assails " intellectual philosophy," " abstrac tions," " metaphysics-," and from the veryvaque and confused man ner in which he speaks on such subjects, we should feel inclined to think that he cannot mean by those terms what is generally meant by them. Sure 'we are that the " modern science of mind" deserves not such indiscriminate abuse ; that it can apply only to the metaphysics of a past age ; to an age, in fact, when the physical sciences (which our author idolafrizes so much) were as visionary as its metaphysics. Both departments of science have been purified together; though progress in the former has, we admit, been much more rapid than in the latter. OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. That faculty in which lay the secret of Edwards's intellectual strength — the faculty of abstraction — was probably bestowed upon him in greater pleni tude and perfection than to any other individual of his species. — Nothing but this could have en abled him to keep so steadily and so luminously before the mind, the propositions on which his reasoning was founded, and to call forth from the obscurity in which they dwelt, their mutual rela tions ; to pursue with such exactness and precision, and such never-tiring patience, the longest, the most subtle, and the most intricate trains of meta physical reasoning, or to unravel with such con summate skill the most complex and elaborate mazes of sophistry. All who have in any measure been accustomed to abstract reasoning, especially upon those profound and difficult subjects which throughout life absorbed the mind of Edwards, must be aware of the extreme difficulty of trans fixing before the microscopic gaze of the mind, those volatile objects of thought, which though so difficult to be retained, demand such intense concentration. These subtle ideas keep shifting and dancing before the mental vision, like the objects in a landscape as transiently seen through the rolling mists of an autumn morning ; now emerging from the vapour, and glittering in the momentary illumination of a sun-beam with an apparent definiteness of outline, and now en veloped again in obscurity, before the mind has had time to descry their exact nature, and still less their relations to one another. Quite as illusory, quite as feebly retained by minds in general, are those abstractions which Edwards delighted to contemplate. So attenuated are they, and in so thick a cloud do the imperfections and ambi guity of language often involve them, that it fre quently requires many hours of anxious and per plexing meditation before the dense mist rolls away from the mind, leaving each object of thought revealed in the pure sunshine. — All, therefore, who have ever been much engaged in such pursuits, will know how to appreciate the wondrous powers of Edwards, in the glare of whose concentrated attention the most subtle ideas seem ever vivid and unobscured. He appears to feel no difficulty in compelling them to retain the same position for any length of time, in the very focus, so to speak, of intellectual vision. When he once sets him self to the investigation of any subject, no disturb ing influences can reach him from without, or allure him from his purpose. As to the external world, the fall of the eyelid does not more com pletely shut out the intrusions of material ex istences from the mind, than he can exclude the presence of every foreign, every disturbing ob ject, whenever he chooses to drop the curtain of his abstraction over the soul. — No sooner does he enter the recesses of his own mind, than the ideas which he would make the objects of his contempla tion gleam out, with a sort of phosphoric splendour, on the walls of the chambers of imagery, — the brighter for the surrounding darkness. Nay, the perspicacity of Edwards often seems to increase with the obscurity and subtilty of the subjects of which he treats. We could point to many instances of this. In this respect his organs of intellectual vision resembled the eyesight of some classes of animals, which though they would be dazzled into blindness by the noon-day sun, can discern the minutest objects in the faintest twilight. No matter how profound those caverns of abstruse speculation into which he ventures ; no matter how dim the twilight which penetrates them ; in what would be to others "middle" or "nether darkness," his intellect seems to dilate so as to collect every wandering ray of light, and to dis cern plainly those objects, which to minds of in ferior perspicacity would be absolutely invisible. That faculty of abstraction which Edwards pos sessed from nature in such extraordinary strength and in such ample measure, was improved to the utmost extent, by incessant exercise and the most strenuous discipline. His whole life might almost be said to be spent in one continuous effort of reasoning; in grappling with all the most difficult and profound subjects, which have ever engaged the attention of the human mind. He scarcely needed, and assuredly scarcely ever indulged in, those intervals of relaxation, those holidays of intellect, which, in almost every other man, are absolutely necessary to preserve the elasticity of the mind, to enable it to repair its exhausted energies ; — without which, indeed, the ceaseless prosecution of any subject demanding concentra tion of thought, would soon goad to madness. Such was his natural adaptation to one depart ment of intellectual employment, and so rigidly had he fixed this conformation of mind by habit and discipline, that he was almost incapable of finding pleasure in any other pursuits,— r-almost destitute of taste or sensibility to any other species of intellectual excellence. Profound thought be came not only his occupation, but his delight, and that which to other men would be severest toil, was his pastime. Probably a severer penance could not have been inflicted upon him, than com pelling him to spend any very considerable portion of his time amongst poetry and belles lettres ; he would have absolutely nauseated them ; they would have been like luxuries to an anchorite, whose long years of seclusion have uprooted all the principles of nature, and transformed his very austerities into sources of pleasure. But not only was Edwards endowed by nature with a mind eminently fitted for ratiocination , and not only were these powers incessantly exercised ; — the laudable industry which he used to preserve and systematize his thoughts must have tended, in an eminent degree, to improve his natural faculties, as well as to secure his mind from retrogression either in knowledge or power ; nay, must have insured and facilitated his constant progress in both. We now allude of course to Edwards's well known practice of always carrying writing materials with him, and of setting down at the very moment in which it occurred, any new train of reasoning, or even any insulated thought, worth preserving. By AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS this means, his knowledge was rendered perma nent ; he secured himself from the necessity, which besets indolent or negligent men, of constantly traversing the same ground again. Norwas this all, he always had a fixed starting-point from which to make further incursions into unknown realms of speculation. Moreover such a practice must emi nently have favoured clear and accurate habits of thought. Not only are the particular thoughts, thus carefully set down, rendered more distinct and definite ; a fact so obvious and familiar that we need not insist upon it; but the general habits of the mind will become more severely correct, the longer such practice is continued. Many a man is satisfied with indistinct ideas, so long as they only flit before his own mind, and he is not neces sitated to give them a definite expression. But he would be ashamed to see these indistinct ideas embodied in corresponding obscurity of language. As he proceeds therefore to the actual expression of his ideas, they gradually assume a more definite appearance; the pen, like the chisel of the sculp tor working upon the rough outline of a statue, gradually throws out every lineament of thought fully and clearly. In process of time the mind will, even without writing, think far more clearly than before ; it will repudiate, it will loathe what ever is not transparent both in thought and ex pression. How happy a circumstance would it have been for mankind, if great geniuses, who, alas ! have generally been cursed with an indolence and irresolution, which have most seriously detracted from the value of their natural endowments, had adopted Edwards's admirable plan of never trusting that traitor, memory, or of never suffering thoughts to escape, which, when once gone, they may often toil in vain to recall ! — How many brilliant, how many profound conceptions might have been preserved, which have now perished for ever ! Nor is this fanciful. Those who have often listened to the conversation of genius confessedly great, will know that it is sometimes capable, under circum stances of peculiar excitement, of throwing out scintillations of thought (generally from collision with minds of a like temper with their own) which, though inimitably beautiful, are instantly extin guished. In the same manner, such men will tell you that they are sometimes conscious, for a moment, of a sudden expansion of power, for which they can not account, and which resembles nothing so much as the illapses of inspiration ; auspicious moments, in which the perplexities which had long invested some difficult subject appear suddenly cleared away, and the mind triumphs and exults in the free and facile exercise of its faculties. Yet this preternatural light lasts but for a moment ; it was a meteoric splendour which streamed athwart the firmament of the soul, and then passed away for ever. — If advantage be not taken of such felicitous moments, the mind in general labours in vain to recover what it has lost, and when it turns again, * What an immense interval, for instance, was there between the " Poems of a Minor," (which really deserved all the castiga- after an interval of perhaps only a few hours, to the subjects which but now stood revealed in so strong a light, it finds as deep a shadow as ever resting over the whole scene of thought ; all wrapped in its original darkness. Such a habit as that of Edwards's must be incalculably valuable; he probably lost fewer thoughts of any value than any man that ever lived, as his voluminous mis cellanea sufficiently show ; while the practice to which we refer wrought up to still more exquisite perfection those superlative powers of reasoning which nature had conferred. We have thus spoken of the chief, the charac teristic peculiarities of Edwards's mind ; those which made him what he was, and without which no other intellectual powers, which he possessed, would ever have raised him to more than respec tability. Probably no man ever achieved so much reputation in those departments of intellectual exertion to which he devoted himself, by the great ness of a single faculty. The irrepressible energies of that tendency to abstract reasoning which we have represented as Edwards's distinguishing endowment, is strongly evinced by two circumstances. The first is, that it gave such remarkable indications of itself in very early life. Great genius generally affords some types and prophecies of its future fame, even in childhood. But though a general, this is by no means a universal, rule. There have been men of splendid talents, who up to a certain age, seem oppressed with a species of torpor ; who require the application of some strong stimulus, or the con junction of some happy circumstances, to elicit their real power. Such men sometimes start into fame at once. One moment they are buried in the chrysalis stateofobscurityand meanness; the next, they are spreading their glittering wings to the sun, and expatiating in another sphere of existence.* Still these are the exceptions to the general rule. — Genius ordinarily betrays its existence in very early life : its irrepressible energy cannot long be concealed ; some trifling circumstance or other is sure to indicate, even through the thickest dis guise, the presence of the divinity within. Edwards manifested at a very early period both the quality and the extraordinary strength of his peculiar genius. This is the more remarkable, as those faculties for which he was afterwards distinguished are of very tardy growth, and by a wise and beneficent arrangement of Providence, generally tarry during the period of childhood and youth, for the development of the subordinate in tellectual faculties, and indeed are at these periods so feeble as to be altogether unable to struggle against the obtrusion of the material world and the solicitations of the senses. Not so, however, with Edwards : as we have already remarked, his' very earliest productions, his philosophic efforts at twelve years of age, display the leading traits of his intellectual character, marked in the strongest manner and developed in no common decree . At tion they received,] and the "English Bards and Scotch Review ers," the next publication of the same author ! review OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. XI the age of fourteen, he perused or rather devoured Locke's Essay on the Understanding, a work which, more than any other, contributed to the formation of his intellectual character. When about the same age, he penned many of those mis cellaneous observations on various philosophical subjects, which have been happily preserved in his descendant's memoir of him, and not a few of which display a depth, a subtilty, a reach of in tellect, which would have done no discredit to men who had spent their whole lives in the pursuit of metaphysical science, and are hardly surpassed by any of his own subsequent efforts. In a word, we know not the time when Edwards was not a great reasoner. The other circumstance, which, in our opinion, displayed his invincible strength of mind, is, that he achieved such wonders in defiance of all the unfa vourable circumstances under which his powers de veloped themselves. If they had not possessed an elasticity which no accumulation of difficulties could repress, we should never have heard of the name of Jonathan Edwards. His was, indeed, a singular destiny. Though far removed from the ancient seats of learning, Edwards has spoken in a voice which has echoed through the halls of European science and philosophy, and has been listened to with respect by their profoundest masters of wis dom. Born in that tumultuous state of society, in which man, having successfully struggled with the elements, and provided in some measure for security and subsistence, is just beginning to dream of luxuries beyond those which terminate in sense, but long before that auspicious era when civiliza tion and plenty let loose the chosen minds which heaven has consecrated to this work, to the systema tic pursuit of philosophy and science,— Edwards abandoned himself to a life of abstraction as un broken as though he had lived in a far different age. Restricted to an education which, however favourable to the interests of virtue and religion, could never have raised a mind, not irrepressibly vi gorous, above mediocrity, he has managed to tread with unexampled success some of the most ob scure and intricate paths of abstruse speculation. Incessantly engaged in the laborious duties of a christian pastor, and in the benevolent drudgeries of a missionary to barbarous tribes, he would seem by his writings to have spent his whole time in the seclusion of a cloister. In measuring the strength of Edwards's genius, therefore, we are not only to take into consideration what he has actual ly achieved, but the circumstances which at first sight would have appeared to render such achieve ments impossible. We may judge of the power of the winter's sun, whose beams struggle through a sky of storms, by the depth and darkness of that veil of clouds, through which, notwithstanding, it pours its splendours. Having thus pointed out the chief peculiarities of Edwards's genius, those in fact to which alone he is indebted for his fame, it is time that we should pay some attention to the other features of his intellectual character; and contemplate the relations in which they stood to the higher attri butes which held the supremacy within him. It must be interesting to see in what way and to what extent the former were subjugated or modi fied by the latter. We may safely affirm, that there never was an instance in which the inferior faculties of intellect were so completely held in subjection to the para mount one of reason ; they were its mere instru ments and ministers, scarcely employed in a single instance independently or for their own sake, but always with reference to an ulterior end. We have already had occasion to observe that the inferior faculties of Edwards's mind were such as would never have raised him beyond respect ability. To this, however, they would have raised him; and if he has been supposed (a too frequent but ill-founded observation) almost des titute of imagination and sensibility, it is owing not so much to the absolute as the relative infe riority of these qualities. They appear little by contrast; just as masses of rock of considerable magnitude may appear mere specks beneath the overshadowing bulk of a contiguous mountain. Another circumstance already adverted to, which gives an air of still greater inferiority to some of the faculties of Edwards's mind, is the perfect subserviency to reason in which they are held ; if, indeed, one of them may not almost be said to be wrought into the very substance of rea son itself; to be incorporated with it. This ob servation we shall illustrate hereafter. In the diary which Edwards kept in his youth, as well as here and there in his subsequent pro ductions, there are passages which prove that he was naturally endowed with no inconsiderable measure of imagination and sensibility. The fol lowing sentences, which were penned when only eighteen years of age, confirm this remark. They have been often quoted before, and are doubtless familiar to many of our readers ; but they will well bear another perusal. It will be observed that we quote them not as showing the depth of his devotional feelings at this period, (though they do show it,) but as displaying certain peculiarities of intellectual character, of which so faint traces remained at a more advanced age. " After this my sense of divine things gradually increased, and became more and more lively, and had more of that in ward sweetness. The appearance of every thing was altered ; there seemed to be, as it were, a calm, sweet cast, or ap pearance of divine glory, in almost every thing. God's excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love, seemed to ap pear in every thing; in the sun, moon, and stars; in the clouds, and blue sky ; in the grass, flowers, trees; in the water, and all nature ; which used greatly to fix my mind. I often used to sit and view the moon for continuance ; and in the day, spent much time in viewing the clouds and sky, to behold the sweet glory of God in these things : in the meantime, singing forth, with a low voice, my con templations of the Creator and Redeemer. And scarce any thing, among all the works of nature, was so sweet to me as thunder and lightning ; formerly, nothing had been so terrible to me. Before, I used to be uncommonly terri fied with thunder, and to be struck with terror when I saw a thunder-storm rising ; but now, on the contrary, it re joiced me. I felt God, so to speak, at the first appearance AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS of a thunder-storm ; and used to take the opportunity, at such times, to fix myself in order to view the clouds, and see the lightnings play, and hear the majestic and awful voice of God's thunder, which oftentimes was exceedingly entertaining, leading me to sweet contemplations of my , great and glorious God. While thus engaged, it always seemed natural to me to sing, or chant forth my medita- \^ tions; or, to speak my thoughts in soliloquies with a singing voice." " Holiness, as I then wrote down some of my contempla tions on it, appeared to me to be of a sweet, pleasant, charming, serene, calm nature ; which brought an inex pressible purity, brightness, peacefulness, and ravishment to the soul. In other words, that it made the soul like a field or garden of Cod, with all manner of pleasant flowers ; all pleasant, delightful, and undisturbed ; enjoy ing a sweet calm, and the gently vivifying beams of the sun. The soul of a true Christian, as I then wrote my meditations, appeared like sucli a little white flower as we see in the spring of the year ; low and humble on the ground, opening its bosom, to receive the pleasant beams of the sun's glory ; rejoicing, as it were, in a calm rap ture ; diffusing around a sweet fragrancy ; standing peace fully and lovingly, in the midst of other flowers round about ; all in like manner opening their bosoms, to drink in the light of the sun. There was no part of creature- holiness, that I had so great a sense of its loveliness, as humility, brokenness of heart, and poverty of spirit ; and there was nothing that I so earnestly longed for. My heart panted after this, — to lie low before God, as in the dust; that I might be nothing, and that God might be all, that I might become as a little child." Such was Edwards in his youth. As the more commanding faculties of his mind gradually deve loped themselves, and attained the ascendancy to which they were so evidently destined, these traits of character (never eminently strong) gradually faded away. After having said this, it may ap pear little better than paradoxical, to affirm that Edwards is constantly employing his imagination even in his severest efforts of analytical reasoning. Yet we think we can very easily evince the truth of this assertion." The fact is, that though he abounds in illustra tions even in his most argumentative works, these illustrations, when examined, are found to be purely analogical arguments ; they are never ad duced for the mere purpose of delighting the imagination ; of insinuating important truth in the forms of poetry; of enlivening an abstruse subject ; or even for the more important purpose (the purpose to which the imagination will be chiefly applied, by a judicious writer) of aiding the vividness of his readers' conceptions by im pressive metaphor or simile : Edwards never thought of such frivolity i. All his illustrations, as we just now said, are strictly analogical argu ments ; he supposes cases exactly parallel to the one he happens to be arguing ; cases which must be decided by virtually the same principles as those which at the time he is anxjous to demo lish or establish : these principles are then shown, in the illustration he adopts, obviously to lead to the alleged consequences. Many of these illustra tions are most felicitously and ingeniously ima gined. We would particularly instance those which are to be found in the piece entitled, the " Qualifications for Communion." In that work we know,by careful inspection for this very object, that we could engage to point out on an average one in almost every page. And in the treatises on " Original Sin,'" and the " Will," they are nearly equally numerous. This method of taking the measure of a particular faculty may appear to some of our readers a novel one ; it must at all events be admitted to be very decisive. But then these illustrations are scarcely in a single instance employed for their intrinsic beauty; or even to secure vividness or impres sion ; but that they may yield some direct, as well as substantial, support to the argument. It was this fact which imboldened us to use the expression, that Edwards's imagination seemed to be wrought into the very substance of reason. This latter attribute did in truth absorb, convert into itself, (if we may so speak,) for the sole purpose of intel lectual strength, all the inferior parts of the mental organization ; as in the processes of animal growth, the softer substance is transformed into muscle and sinew, and cartilage hardened into solid bone. Beneath such a process, it is true, the soft and flowing lines of intellectual beauty disappeared ; the general structure of the mind was harsh, coarse, and strongly marked ; but every thing bespoke enormous strength ; — nor need we wonder that, as the natural consequence of such a complete con centration and discipline of the faculties to attain one object, Edwards should have become, proba bly, the most perfect specimen of the intellectual athlete the world has ever seen. In the works of Edwards, a touch of poetic feeling, or a gleam of pure imagination, is as rare, and strikes the reader with as much wonder, as those faint traces of vegetation which are some times to be seen blooming between clefts of solid rock. Nor could we expect to see them oftener : when flowers shall spring in a soil of granite, then may we expect the beauties of poetry from a mind like that of Jonathan Edwards. Edwards could not be called a learned man in the ordinary sense of those words. His memory was naturally retentive and strong ; but then the very same causes which repressed his imagination prevented any very inordinate exercise of this faculty also. The memory, we all know, is chiefly valuable in the acquisition of knowledge ; for the mere purposes of accumulation. Now this with Edwards was a very secondary object; it is true his knowledge was respectable, but did not amount to a tithe of what many less gifted minds have acquired in the same term of study. The fact is, Edwards regulated his mental habits by the same stern maxims of temperance by which he regulated his diet. He never ate more than he could digest. Some men glut themselves with knowledge so greedily and so long that they produce a universal plethora of intellect ; they can neither breathe, see, nor hear as they ought to do, and become as in capacitated for the energetic exercise of their own powers as the man who has been starved by igno rance. Edwards's intense passion for reasoning prevented any such injurious indulgence : he be longed to that order of minds who are often as long in reading one volume as some men in OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. reading ten ; but then they pause over every page ; will take nothing upon trust ; will dispute with the author every doubtful position ; will pass no part lightly over, however difficult; will never put up with plausible sophistry : who read not to know what other men's opinions are, but to examine how far those opinions harmonize with universal truth. Such men can never become learned men, as that expression is generally understood, unless, indeed, they were as long-lived as the patriarchs. But then what they do learn will be well learnt ; rivetted for ever in the memory ; always ready for use ; and wielded by faculties thoroughly disciplined and inured to exertion. It would, perhaps, seem strange and almost ludicrous to some of our readers, were we to pre dicate wit of Jonathan Edwards ; and yet we do not hesitate to say that there is a species of wit (or, at all events, something which produces the same effect as wit) of which he was no mean master. There are occasional indications in his works that he could have wielded sarcasm with tremendous power ; but such was the pure love of truth and of fair reasoning with which he was animated, such his habitual effort to exclude from controversy every thing that could inflame the passions, and such the control of religious feeling and sentiment, that this was a weapon which he very rarely used.* The species of wit to which we refer (if it be lawful to apply to it the term wit) consists sim ply in the inimitable manner in which he unmasks sophistry, and drives it forth, with all its disguises torn off and its fallacies detected, to the ridicule of the world. The clear detection of a sophism, especially if that be done, as Edwards often does it, by reductio ad absurdum, itself produces the strongest emotion of the ludicrous. But when we find all this done not only in the most thorough and matchless manner, but with a certain air of quaint and imperturbable gravity towards the victims whom he is thus ruthlessly anatomizing, it is irre sistible : his manner reminds one of the disguised banter, the grave irony, for which Plato is so famed ; or what has a still greater resemblance, the style which Locke has adopted in his inimit able letters to Stillingfleet. We are inclined to think, however, that in a great majority of instances, the gravity, seriousness, and respect which Ed wards maintains, while so remorselessly bestrewing his pages with the fragments of those sophisms, which it took such pains and ingenuity to construct, were perfectly sincere; still as they have just the same effect as though they were feigned, the emotion of the ludicrous awakened in the reader is equally strong in either case, though the amount of wit in the author would of course be by no means the same. Some of those analogical illustrations, which, as we before observed, Edwards brings for ward to show the absurd consequences of a falla cious argument, have much real wit and humour. * There is but one indubitable instance of sarcasm which we happen at this moment to recollect, in the whole course of his writings. It occurs in his reply to that egregious controvertist, Solomon Williams. Williams had unwarily charged Edwards with having set up " men of straw," and then amusing himself We must quote the following specimens; and these we select, not because they are the most forcible, but because they are of convenient length. Chubb' & metaphysical monster, so happily described in the treatise on the " Will," is known to all. To this therefore it is unnecessary to refer. Our principal extracts will be from the treatise on " Original Sin," rather than from that on the " Will;" the latter we imagine must be already tolerably familiar to very many of our readers. The following is the clear method in which he refutes the absurd fallacy, that man's nature is not depraved because it is presumed he does not per form so many evil actions as good ones. Suppos ing, for the sake of argument, this representation correct, Edwards reasons thus : " The question to be considered, in order to determine whether man's nature be depraved and ruined, is not, Whether he is inclined to perform as many good deeds as bad ones ? But, to which of these two he preponderates, in the frame of his heart, and the state of his nature, a state of innocence and righteousness, and favour with God ; or a state of sin, guiltiness, and abhorrence in the sight of God? — Persevering sinless righteousness, or else the guilt of sin, is the alternative, on the decision of which de pends — according to the nature and truth of things, as they are in themselves, and according to the rule of right, and of perfect justice — man being approved and accepted of his Maker, and eternally blessed as good ; or his being rejected, and cursed as bad. And therefore the deter mination of the tendency of man's heart and nature, with respect to these terms, is that which is to be looked at, in order to determine whether his nature is good or evil, pure or coirupt, sound or ruined. If such be man's nature, and the state of his heart, that he has an infallibly effec tual propensity to the latter of those terms ; then it is wholly impertinent to talk of the innocent and kind actions, even of criminals themselves, sin-passing their crimes in numbers, and of the prevailing innocence, good nature, industry, felicity', and cheerfulness, of the greater part of mankind. ' Let never so many thousands or mil lions of acts of honesty, good nature, &c. be supposed ; yet, by the supposition, there is an unfailing propensity to such moral evil, as in its dreadful consequences infinitely outweighs all effects or consequences of any supposed good. Surely that tendency, which, in effect, is an infalli ble tendency to eternal destruction, is an infinitely dread ful and pernicious tendency ; and that nature and frame of mind, which implies such a tendency, must be an infi nitely dreadful and pernicious frame of mind. It would be much more absurd to suppose, that such a state ot nature is not bad, under a notion of men doing more honest and kind things than evil ones ; than to say, the state of that ship is good, for crossing the Atlantic ocean, though such as cannot hold together through the voyage, hut will infallibly founder and sink, under a notion that it mav probably go great part of the way before it sinks, or that it will proceed and sail above water more hours than it will be in sinking : or, to pronounce that road a good road to go to such a place, the greater part of which is plain and safe, though some parts of it are dangerous, and certainly fatal, to them that travel in it; or to call that a good propensity, which is an inflexible inclination to travel in such a way." In the same manner, after having reasoned with the utmost clearness, that as a uniformly holy con duct is man's duty, there can be no proportion be tween the guilt of transgression and the moral with demolishing them. In his reply, Edwards convicts his adver sary of having in several instances refuted himself J " Thus," says our author slilv, *' Mr Williams fights hard against himself. But I will not say that, in so doing, he fights to beat down a poor man of straw" AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS worth of obedience ; and that it must be unspeak ably absurd to suppose that any acts of obedience can atone for any one breach of duty, he concludes by the following coarse but striking illustration of his meaning. " Therefore how absurd must it be for Christians to ob ject, against the depravity of man's nature, a greater num ber of innocent and kind actions, than of crimes ; and to talk of a prevailing innocency; good nature, industry, and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind ! Infinitely more absurd, than it would be to insist, that the domestic of a prince was not a bad servant, because though some times he contemned and affronted his master to a great degree, yet he did not spit in his master's face so often as he performed acts of service. More absurd, than it would be to affirm, that his spouse was a good wife to him, be cause, although she committed adultery, and that with the slaves and scoundrels sometimes, yet she did not do this so often as she did the duties of a wife. These notions would be absurd, because the crimes are too heinous to be atoned for, bv many honest actions of the servant or spouse of the prince ; there being a vast disproportion between the merit of the one, and the ill desert of the other: but infinitelv less, than that between the demerit of our of fences against God, and the value of our acts of obedience." The following is one of the most felicitous in stances of reductio ad absurdum we ever met with. It is an exposure of the principles of his adversary — that Adam originally possessed a moral nature not a whit superior to that of any of his posterity ; that our liability to death, and all our other mise ries, are, in fact, not punishment of sin, but only instances of God's benevolence ; merely intended as a means of moral improvement additional to any that our miserably happy father Adam origi nally possessed. " But it will follow, on our author's principles, that Adam, while in innocency, was placed in far worse circum stances, than he was in after his disobedience, and infinitely worse than his posterity are in ; under unspeakably greater disadvantages for avoiding sin, and the performance of duty. For by this doctrine, Adam's posterity come into the world with their hearts as free from any propensity to sin as he, and he was made as destitute of any propensity to righteousness as they : and yet God, in favour to them, does great things to restrain them from sin, and excite them to virtue, which he never did for Adam in innocency, but laid him, in the highest degree, under contrary disad vantages. God, as an instance of his great favour, and fatherly love to man, since the fall, has denied him the ease and pleasures of paradise, which gratified and allured his senses, and bodily appetites ; that he might diminish his temptations to sin. And as a still greater means to restrain from sin, and promote virtue, has subjected him to labour, toil, and sorrow in the world : and not only so, but as a means to promote his spiritual and eternal good farbevond this, has doomed him to death. When all this was found insufficient, he, in further prosecution of the designs of his love, shortened men's lives exceedingly, made them twelve or thirteen times shorter than in the first ?.ges. And yet this, with all the innumerable calamities which God, in great favour to mankind, has brought on the world — whereby their temptations are so vastly cut short, and the inducements to virtue heaped one upon another to so great a degree— have proved insufficient, now for so many thou sand vears together, to restrain from wickedness in any considerable degree ; while innocent human nature, all along, comes into the world with the same purity and harmless dispositions that our first parents had in paradise. What vast disadvantages indeed then must Adam and Eve be in, who had no more in their nature to keep them from sin, or incline them to virtue, than their posterity, and yet were without all those additional and extraordinary means ! They were not only without such exceeding great means as we now have, when our lives are made so very short, but had vastly less advantages than their antediluvian posterity, who to prevent their being wicked, and to make them good, had so much labour and toil, sweat and sorrow, briers and thorns, with a body gradually decaying and returning to the dust. Our first parents had the extreme dis advantage of being placed amongst many and exceeding great temptalions-not onlv without toil or sorrow, pain or disease, to humble and mortify them, and a sentence of death to wean them from the world, but— in the midst of the most exquisite and alluring sensitive delights; the reverse in every respect, and the highest degree, of that most gracious state of requisite means, and great advantages, which man kind now enjoy ! If mankind now, under these vast restraints, and great advantages, are not restrained from <>eneral,and as it were universal, wickedness, how could it be expected that Adam and Eve, created with no better hearts than men bring into the world now, and destitute of all these advantages, and in the midst of all contrary disadvantages, should escape it ? "These things are not agreeable to Moses s account. That represents a happy state of peculiar favours and blessings before the fall, and the curse coming afterwards ; but according to this scheme, the curse was before the fall, and the great favours and testimonies of love followed the apostacy. And the curse before the fall must be a curse with a witness, being to so h:gh a degree the reverse of such means, means so necessary for such a creature as in nocent man, and in all their multitude and fulness proving too little. Paradise therefore must be a mere delusion ! There was indeed a great show of favour, in placing man in the midst of such delights. But this delightful garden, it seems, with all its beauty and sweetness, was in its real tendency worse than the apples of Sodom. It was but a mere bait, (God forbid the blasphemy,) the more effectually enticing by its beauty and deliciousness, to Adam's eternal ruin. Which might be the more expected to be fatal to him, seeing he was the first man, having no capacity supe rior to his posterity, and wholly without the advantage of their observations, experiences, and improvements." The following paragraph is a ludicrous exposure of Dr. Taylor's preposterous evasion, that " a curse is pronounced upon the ground, but no curse upon the woman and the man !" " He insists, that the ground only was cursed, and not the man : as though a curse could terminate on lifeless, senseless earth ! To understand this curse otherwise than as terminating upon man through the ground, would be as senseless as to suppose the meaning to be, The ground shtdl be punished and shall be miserable for thy sake. Our author interprets the curse on the ground, of its being encumbered with noxious weeds : but would these weeds have been any curse on the ground, if there had been no inhabitants, or if the inhabitants had been of such a nature, that these weeds should not have been noxious, but useful to them? It is said, Deut. xxviii. 17. 'Cursed shall be thy basket, and thy store :' and would he not be thought to talk very ridiculously, who should say, 'Here is a curse upon the basket ; but not a word of any curse upon the owner: and therefore we have no reason at all to look upon it as any punishment upon him, or any testimony of God's displeasure towards him.' How plain is it, that when lifeless things, not capable either of benefit or suffer ing, are said to be cursed or blessed with regard to sensible beings — who use or possess these things, or have con nexion with them— the meaning must be, that these sensi ble beings are cursed or blessed in the other, or with re spect to them ! In Exod. xxiii. 25. it is said, ' He shall bless thy bread and thy water.' ' And I suppose, never anv body yet proceeded to such a degree of subtilty in distinguishing, as to say, ' Here is a blessing on the bread and the water, which went into the possessor's mouth, but no blessing on him.'" Dr. Taylor attempts to show that the apostle's description (Rom. ii.) of the sad moral condition of mankind, a description which is so evidently OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. xv intended to apply to mankind universally, only refers to a part of mankind, or that, if any uni versality at all be allowed, it is only of both the two great divisions of mankind collectively, Jews and Gentiles, but not intended to apply to every individual. These miserable evasions Edwards exposes in the following vein of quaint drollery. "That this supposed sense disagrees extremely with the terms and language which the apostle here makes use of. For according to this, we must understand, either, First, That the apostle means no universality at all, but only the far greater part. But if the words which the apos tle uses, do not most fully and determinately signify an universality, no words ever used in the Bible are sufficient to do it. I might challenge any man to produce any one paragraph in the Scripture, from the beginning to the end, where there is such a repetition and accumulation of terms, so strongly, and emphatically, and carefully, to express the most perfect and absolute universality ; or any place to be compared to it. What instance is there in the Scripture, or indeed in any other writing, when the meaning is only the much greater part, where this meaning is signified in such a manner, They are all, — They ui e all, — They are all — together, — every one,— alt the world; joined to mul tiplied negative terms, to show the universality to be with out exception; saying, There is nofesh, — theie is none, — there is none, — there is none, — there is none, four times over; besides the addition of No not one, — no, not one, — once and again 1 Or, Secondly, If any universality at all be allowed, it is only of the collective bodies spoken of; and these collective bodies but two, as Dr. T. reckons them, viz. the Jewish nation, and the Gentile world ; supposing the apostle is here representing each of those parts of mankind as being wicked. But is this the way of men using language, when speaking of but two things, to express themselves in such universal terms, when they mean no more than that the thing affirmed is predicated of both of them ? If a man speaking of his two feet as both lame, should say, All my feet are lame — They are all lame — AU together are become weak — None of my ftet are strong — None of them are. sound — No, not one; would not he tie thought to be lame in his understanding, as well as his feet'! W hen the apos tle says, That evenj mimth may be stopped, must we sup pose, that he speaks only of these two great collective bodies, figuratively ascribing to each of them a mouth, and means that these two mouths are stopped ? Besides, ac cording to our author's own interpretation, the universal terms used in these texts, cited from the Old Testament, have no respect to those two great collective bodies, nor indeed to either of them ; but to some in Israel, a particu lar disaffected party in that one nation, which was made up of wicked men. So that his interpretation is every way absurd and inconsistent." We shall make but one extract more. It is an exposure of the complicated absurdities into which Dr. Taylor's interpretation of Rom. v. leads him. The words, " by one man's disobedience many were made sinners ; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned," he un derstands to mean neither more nor less than that " by one man's disobedience many were made subject to death ;" and as for the words, " all have sinned," he understands, " all men became sinners, as all mankind are brought into a state of suffer ing." After observing on the violent criticism re quisite to sustain such an hypothesis, Edwards remarks : " The case stands thus : according to his exposition, we are said to have sinned by an active verb, as though we had actively sinned ; yet this is not spoken truly ana pro perly, but it is put figuratively for our becoming sinners passively, our being made or constituted sinners. Yet again, not that we do truly become sinners passively, or are really made sinners, by any thing that God does ; this also is only a figurative or tropical representation ; and the meaninsr is only, we are condemned, and treated as if we were sinners. Not indeed that we are properly condemned, for God never truly condemns the innocent ; but this also is only a figurative representation of the thing. It is but as it were condemning ; because it is appointing to death, a terrible evil, as //' it were a punishment. But then, in reality, here is no appointment to a terrible evil, or any evil at all ; but truly to a benefit, a great benefit ; and so in representing death as a punishment, another figure is used, and an exceeding bold one ; for, as we are ap pointed to it, it is so far from being an evil or punishment, that it is really a. favour, and that of the highest nature, appointed by mere grace and love, though it seems to be a calamity. Thus we have tropes and figures multiplied, one upon another ; and all in that one word, sinned ; according to the manner, as it is supposed, in which the apostle uses it. We have a. figurative representation, not of a reality, but of a figurative representation. Neither is this a repre sentation of reality, but of another thing that still is but a figurative representation of something else : yea, even this something else is still but a figure, and one that is very harsh and far-fetched. So thait here we have a figure to represent a figure, even a figure of a figure, representing some very remote figure, which most obscurely represents the thing intended ; if the most terrible evil can indeed be said at all to represent the contrary good of the highest kind. And now, what cannot be made of any place of Scripture, in such a way as this ?" We might have cited many passages of the same character from the treatise on " Original Sin " alone ; and, at least, an equal number from his treatise on the " Qualifications for Communion," and his reply to " Solomon Williams." What we have adduced, however, will be quite sufficient to illus trate the remarks we have made on this feature of Jonathan Edwards's intellectual character. The style of Jonathan Edwards is, in general, perhaps, the most repulsive which even metaphy sics ever assumed ; it is not only utterly destitute of grace and elegance, which might be natu rally expected from a mind so constituted, but, in many at least of his productions, has not even those merits, which are always attainable by ' study and practice, even where there must still be as entire an absence of all poetic grace and beauty as the severest philosophy could wish. The only excellence that can be predicated of Jonathan Edwards's style, though we admit that it is a cardinal one, is perspicuity ; yet even this can only be predicated of it in a limited sense. The principal conditions of perspicuity, namely, that the words shall always stand for determinate ideas, and shall be always used in the same sense, are, it is true, generally complied with ; but this is all. There are none of those qualities, which, though not forming the great elements of per spicuity, so powerfully aid it. Though the words of our author always express his meaning, they are, by no means, usually those which would best express it. There is none of that felicitous precision, which singles out, as by instinct, just those only words which will exactly convey the sentiment. Neither is there any of the pregnant brevity, the energetic conciseness, in a word, the compactness, of that species of mathematical XVI AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS eloquence, (if we may use such an expression,) which so remarkably distinguish the style of some profound reasoners ; of men, almost as neg ligent of the poetic beauties of style as Jonathan Edwards. Of this class Descartes and Hobbes are amongst the most striking exemplifications. So far from possessing any such qualities, Ed wards is characterized by intolerable prolixity, by the most wearisome repetitions, by the most unnatural inversions, and when writing on subjects connected with practical or experimental religion, by the most barbarous and uncouth phraseology that can be conceived. There is one peculiarity most unbearable about the verbiage of Edwards ; it is not, as in most cases, a redundancy of lan guage, but a redundancy — a constant iteration of the same language. There is no variety, no fresh ness about it. The same words and phrases, not even at first distinguished by any peculiar force or originality, are repeated usque ad nauseam. Probably there never was a man who was charac terized by such a wide range of intellect and such a narrow range of language ; who was compelled to exhibit such rich varieties of thought in such a tediously uniform setting. One might almost imagine, from the appa rently studied, and as it were elaborate, neglect of the beauties of style which he often displays, that he was experimenting how far the vitality of vigorous thought could sustain itself in the azote of so detestable a style ; or under what mountain- loads of verbiage the Typhon of a mighty intellect could still display its invincible energies : or that he was deliberately trying how far the maternal affection of philosophy could induce her to over look the hideous deformities of these the uncouth- est of her offspring. The result, at all events, has been most decisive of his immense powers of mind. Without boundless elasticity and buoyancy of thought, his works, so fearfully laden with re dundancies of language, would long since have sunk, " like lead, in the mighty waters" of oblivion. It is but just to Edwards to state, that the de formities of his style are the most glaring in his early and posthumous works ; or when engaged on subjects which were least related to his most cherished employments of intellect. In pure rea soning, more especially in his great work the treatise on the " Will," he often approaches, and sometimes attains, the highest excellence of style which such a subject admits; — that nervous compactness and brevity, which remind one of the finest specimens of mathematical demonstra tion. As the words employed are necessarily few, their incessant iteration does not weary. But his style in narrative, or on simply didactic subjects, is truly appalling. It is tolerable only in close argumentation ; the more subtle and pro found the thought, the more perspicuous the style. It is also just to Edwards to observe, that his total negligence of style arose not in the slightest degree from affectation, or any absurd contempt of its excellencies. A man must have a very per versely constituted understanding, who can indulge in such a feeling. That same Creator who be stowed upon us reason, also bestowed upon us imagination, and all those qualities of mind in which taste and sensibility originate. He has formed us not only with a capacity for perceiving truth, but for more readily and more vividly per ceiving it when commended in one way than when commended in another. That man, therefore, who overlooks this peculiar structure of the mind ; who does not endeavour to enlist on his side every auxiliary of truth, and every instrument of con viction ; who does not endeavour to clothe wis dom " in delight," is but indifferently qualified to be a public instructor. It is his duty to write as impressively as he can. It was not, as we have said, from any absurd contempt for the beauties of style, that Edwards so completely neglected it. It was purely because he was so intensely absorbed in thinking, that he cared but little for the language which he em ployed to embody thought ! So that his reasonings were expressed, he never asked how ; and often forgot that he was writing for the specific purpose of convincing others. Thus he often expresses his thoughts with much the same slovenliness with which a man notes them down in his common place book, for his private use, in snatches of lan guage, in a broken and abbreviated form. Edwards's earliest works, as we have already remarked, are his worst in point of style. Some of his posthumous works match them, — but for every defect in these he is scarcely answerable. That he became in after-life aware of the import ance of style, and of his own deficiencies in this respect, is evident from an amusing anec dote told in Sereno D wight's Memoir of him. Richardson's " Sir Charles Grandison" happen ing to fall into Jonathan Edwards's hand, he read it through ; expressed himself enchanted with the style ! ! and what is not less wonderful for one who so strongly resembled our Puritan forefathers, and had so much of their austerity about him, declared his conviction, that the work was alto gether favourable to virtue ! Suddenly smitten with the charms of elegant composition, he re solved (incredible presumption !) himself to cul tivate the Graces ; and though it cannot be said that he was eminently successful in his efforts, yet an evident improvement in his style did incon- testably take place. Many redundancies were cut away, and greater compression and com pactness attained. And, perhaps, this was all that could be reasonably expected. It would be quite ludicrous to expect that a mind of such rigidity of muscle, such hardness of structure, could be tutored, by any discipline, into grace or flexibility Though Edwards by simple power of thought tri umphs over all the defects of his style, and not only redeems his pages from contempt, but commends them to the most respectful attention of philo sophy, who can tell how much greater he would have appeared, or how much more extensive his influence would have been, if he could have cloth- OF JONATHAN EDWARDS, ed his thoughts in language worthy of them. Many of his works, especially the treatises on the " Religious Affections," on " Virtue," and on " God's chief end in the Creation," contain thoughts, fraught with moral sublimity. What would have been the effect, had he been able to set these magnificent conceptions to the music of that eloquence with which Robert Hall ravishes his readers 1 Even his most carelessly composed ser mons often contain thoughts full of originality, sublimity, and grandeur ; his dullest and most tedious pages glitter like the sands of the Pactolus, with scattered particles of gold. It is now time that we should offer a few re marks on the moral and religious character of Edwards : the one for substantial excellence, and the other for elevated devotion, will bear compari son with those of any man on whom the benign genius of Christianity has ever exerted its trans forming power. To affirm that Edwards possessed that perfect assemblage of excellencies which it is the object of Christianity to form and cherish; which implies that all the principles of our nature are stimulated into exercise, each in its due proportion and according to its relative importance ; that all have their proper scope for action without trenching on the provinces of any, while none present the vices either of excess or defect ; would be to assert what is not true ; for it can be asserted of no merely human being. An approximation to this varied and consummate excellence is all which the pre sent state of humanity will admit. Any thing more than this would be incompatible with our present condition ; not to say, that in a world like ours the same reasons exist for inequalities of moral as of intellectual excellence, and it is probable that in the present state of things, a greater total of good may be effected by such an arrangement. It is the ultimate design of Chris tianity, however, to produce this perfect harmony of character ; and it is its direct tendency to pro duce it now. It will neither permit the positive breach of any one duty, nor the neglect of any one virtue ; no, not even in the pursuit of acknow ledged good. The varieties of religious and moral are as nu merous as those of intellectual character, and for the same reasons ; they are owing partly to diver sities of original moral structure, partly to the influence of those infinitely diversified circum stances to which the soul is subjected. We are taught by philosophy, that the glorious varieties of tints and colours which adorn nature are all owing to one simple cause, — the various disposi tion of the particles of matter, by which they re fract, in different ways, that one homogeneous light to which all are exposed. It is even so in the moral world. The source of all spiritual excel lence is ever the same, — an emanation from Deity ; but though the light from which all take their colour be but one, the colours and hues are manifold. This world never saw but one character in whom all the varieties of intellectual and moral great ness centred ; blending in that divine and ravish ing harmony which may be termed the music of the soul. There never was but one who reconciled the extremes of universal excellence ; in whom the vastest intellect and the tenderest sensibility, the calmest judgment and the keenest feelings, co-existed without disturbing oneanother; in whom magnanimity was not tinctured with pride; in whom humility was never meanness ; whose charity was never consumed by the fierce fire of zeal, nor an honest zeal damped by the excess of charity ; whose pity for the wretched never miti gated abhorrence of vice, nor the sternest regard for the majesty of truth diminished the most touch ing compassion for human frailty ; in a word, in whom greatness and lowliness, courage and forti tude, zeal and patience, incorruptible truth and more than human gentleness, and a thousand op posite virtues more, were divinely attempered ; uniting the various rays of moral excellence in one glorious emanation of wisdom and of love. That character was Jesus Christ, in whom dwelt, indeed, all the fulness of the Godhead ; and whose humanity was but a veil through which streamed, in softened radiance, the otherwise insufferable effulgence of Deity. Any merely human character approximates towards perfection, just as he ap proaches or recedes from this great example ; and by it we may safely take the measurement and pro portions ofany given specimen of human excellence. Edwards did not possess that rich variety or harmony of moral excellence which have character ized some men of equal piety. But the excellencies by which he was distinguished were possessed in transcendent degree. The peculiarities of his moral and religious character were all prominent and strongly marked, and in these respects bore a striking resemblance to those of his intellect; and, as is generally the case, the former were partly modified by the latter. One of the most impres sive features of his moral character was the para mount regard for duty which controlled all his actions. When his mind was once made up to the course he should pursue, he was distinguished by a stern fixedness of purpose, an indomitable resolve, which no consideration of interest, no strength of prejudices, no allurements of ease, no impulse of passion, could penetrate or soften. All these fell around him, light as snow-flakes on granite ; and produced about as much effect. In this the qualities of his intellect and of his heart strongly resembled one another ; he was not more distinguished for the intensity of regard with which he could bend all his faculties to the consideration of the most difficult subjects of human specula tion, and exclude every object except that upon which, for the time, he was concentrating his pro digious powers, than for that invincible energy of will with which, when once convinced of the path of duty, he persevered in maintaining it. His whole life affords a comment on this. The following resolutions, which, together with many others, were AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS OF solemnly adopted before he was of age, will be read with interest. They have often been quoted before, but so well illustrate the decision of cha racter of which we have been speaking, that we cannot refrain from citing them again. " Resolved, that I will do whatsoever I think to be most to God's glory and my own good, profit, and pleasure, on the whole ; without any consideration of the time, whe ther now, or never so many myriads of ages hence ; — to do whatever I think to be my duty, and most for the good and advantage of mankind in general, — whatever difficulties I meet with, how many and how great soever. Resolved, to be continually endeavouring to find some new contrivance to promote the fore-mentioned things. Resolved, never to do, be, or suffer, any thing, in soul or body, less or more, but what tends to the glory of God. Resolved, never to lose one moment of time ; but im prove it in the most profitable way I possibly can. Resolved, to live with all my might, while I do live. Resolved, never to do any thing which I should be afraid to do if it were the last hour of my life. Resolved, to endeavour to my utmost to act as I can think I should do, if I had already seen the happiness of heaven, and hell torments." Another feature of his moral character which re minds us of his reigning intellectual peculiarities, and flowed from them, was the minute and scru pulous conscientiousness with which he examined the grounds of duty, and analysed the motives which actuated the performance of it. With him a duty must not only be felt to be such, but must be seen to be such; it must be fairly and logically reasoned out. And then the material act of virtue (as our elder divines would call it) must not only be that to which duty points, but a close analytical survey must be made of all the motives which have led to action ; and if any were found of a suspicious character, a resolution was sure to be recorded in his diary over-night to watch more incessantly, and to pray more earnestly, against it. A few brief extracts from his diary, showing the minute ness with which he anatomized motives, and the unwearied vigilance with which he prosecuted the duties of self-examination, may suffice. " Resolved, in narrations never to speak any thing but the pure and simple verity. Resolved, to inquire every night, as I am going to bed, wherein I have been negligent, what sin I 'have com mitted, and wherein I have denied myself; also at the end of every week, month, and year. Resolved, never to do any thing that I so much question the lawfulness of, as that I intend, at the same time, to consider and examine afterwards, whether it be lawful or no : except I as much question the lawfulness of the omis sion. Resolved, to ask myself at the end of every day, week, month, and year, wherein I could possibly in any respect have done better. Resolved, never to allow the least measure of any fret ting uneasiness at my father or mother. Resolved to suffer no effects of it, so much as in the least alteration of speech, or motion of my eye : and to be especially careful of it, with respect to any of our family. I think it best not to allow myself to laugh at the faults, follies, and infirmities of others. Although I have in some measure subdued a disposi tion to chide and fret, yet I find a certain inclination which is not agreeable to christian sweetness of temper and conversation : — Too dogmatical, too much of egotism ; a disposition to be telling of my own dislike and scorn ; and freedom from those things that are innocent, or the common infirmities of men ; and many such like things. O that God would help me to discern all the flaws and defects of my temper and conversation, and help me in the difficult work of amending them ; and that he would fill me so full of Christianity, that the foundation of all these disagreeable irregularities may be destroyed, and the con trary beauties may follow. Never in the least to seek to hear sarcastical relations of others' faults. Never to give credit to any thing said against others, except there is very plain reason for it ; nor to behave in any respect otherwise for it. I think it a very good way to examine dreams every morning when I awake ; what are the nature, circum stances, principles, and ends of my imaginary actions and passions in them, to discern what are my chief inclina tions, &c. 1 observe that old men seldom have any advantaee of new discoveries; because these are beside a way of think ing they have been so long used to. Resolved, if ever I live to years, that I will be impartial to hear the reasons of all pretended discoveries, and receive them, if rational, how long soever I have been used to another way of thinking." His care to ascertain what duty was, and his watch fulness over the motives which led to the perform ance of it, were indeed as remarkable as that ada mantine firmness of soul wi_h which he pursued what he was convinced to be right. His was never the virtue of merely generous impulse. To use a strong and beautiful expression of Howe, " he never moved till the severest reason had audited the matter, and pronounced the occasion just and reasonable ;" and whenever he had performed an important duty, he descended into the very depths of the soul, and bent the full and searching light of his tremendous powers of analysis upon the dark and complex machinery of motives and passions. Are we to wonder, that beneath the influence of such habits Edwards should have been so pre-emi nently distinguished for self-knowledge and con scientiousness, or that his piety and virtue should have been in an extraordinary degree lofty and sublime ? Few men have ever attained a more complete mastery over the passions than did Jonathan Ed wards. This was partly owing to the ascendency of his intellect; partly, and in a still greater de-- gree, to the elevation of his piety. As to the pas sions of animal nature, a triumph over them seems to have been comparatively easy ; they scarcely gave him any trouble at all. For their subjugation he was no doubt very greatly indebted to his prodigious superiority of reason. Such was the command ing attitude it assumed, and such the tremendous power with which it controlled the whole man, that insurrection on the part of these subordinates appeared hopeless ; they dared not question its su premacy ; they held their tenure only by doing fealty and homage to intellect. Those other and more dangerous, because more subtle and more spiritual enemies, such as pride, vanity, wrath, and envy, which lurk in the inmost recesses of our nature, and some of which have such peculiar affi nity for a genius like that of Edwards, yield not to such exorcisms. Such more powerful kind of demons go not forth but "by prayer and fast ing:" to their complete mortification, therefore, Edwards brought incessant watchfulness and devo-. OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. tion, and seldom assuredly have they been more nearly expelled from the bosom of a depraved in telligence. A more striking or more instructive proof of the extent to which Edwards had succeeded in the subjugation of the passions can hardly be con ceived, than the spirit which pervades his contro versial writings. When entering upon those sub jects, which are of all the most exciting, and the dis cussion of which, to the disgrace of human nature, has called forth more malevolent feeling than the discussion of any other, Edwards is as calm and collected as though he was in no way interested in the result of his speculations. The spirit of the advocate scarcely ever appears : much of this is, no doubt, to be attributed to the severely logical character of his understanding. He derived the most exquisite pleasure from the discovery and per ception of truth ; and for the loss of truth, no suc cess, however signal, over an inferior disputant, would ever have consoled him. Where this is the case, a lofty disdain of all the arts of the sophist and the pleader will be necessarily engendered. Still, when we reflect how subtle those passions are which controversy inflames, how insidiously they come into play, and how they have triumphed over the judgments of many of the wisest and best of men, it is evident that nothing but the strenuous exertion of religious principle could have led to such a complete subjugation, or rather annihi lation, of them, as is manifested throughout his writings. He argues like a being without affections, a pure intelligence. No sooner does he sit down to investigate a subject, than his passions seem as completely hushed as though their breath had never ruffled the soul ; its surface looks as tran quil, as motionless, and we may add, as cold, as a sea of ice ; and the turbulence of passion seems as little likely to disturb the fixed calm of the one as the winds of heaven to raise tempests in the other. It may perhaps be affirmed, that the chief defect of Edwards's moral nature was, that this control of the emotions and passions was carried somewhat too far ; that he exercised too stern a dominion over all the springs of action ; that the empire of reason was a little too absolute. " The passions are not to be rooted up," says the great John Howe, who himself exemplified more various excel lence, a more harmonious union of all the noblest qualities of the intellect and of the heart, than almost any individual of his species ; " the pas sions are not to be rooted up, for they are of nature's planting ; but," he continues, employing an image sublimely appropriate, " care is to be taken that they grow not to that enormous tallness as to overtop a man's intellectual stature, and cast a dark shadow over his soul !" In Jona than Edwards they were not rooted up, yet they scarcely attained the growth they innocently might ; the climate was too cold and the soil too Sterile even for these hardy plants, which, like cer tain weeds, will generally grow where nothing else will. There was at all events not the slightest danger of their darkening the soul with overshadowing luxuriance. There is, on the contrary, a coldness of manner about Edwards, a want of susceptibility, which are not in themselves perfections ; they arose partly from the mere ascendency of intellect which did not allow, nay, which tended powerfully to check, the ardour of feeling, and partly from that habit of austerely scrutinizing all his emotions, to which the conjoint influence of severe reason and religious principle alike prompted. We think the proposition might be sustained, that vast analytic powers, constantly exercised, will be incompatible with a capacity for very strong emotion, or at least will always have a tendency to diminish it. If this observation be true in general, it is espe cially true where the emotions themselves are the subjects of this habitual scrutiny. The instincts and generous impulses of nature become partially paralyzed, and from falling so perpetually un der the scrutiny, and often under the frown and rebuke, of reason, exert themselves with con straint and timidity ; or emotion is naturally hushed almost as soon as it is awakened, by being subjected to the frigid process of analysis and ex amination. All this is of course only true where such habits of mind are, as in Aristotle, Locke, or Edwards, in constant exercise. The emotions of Jonathan Edwards (to judge by their expression) often seem, if we may use a somewhat fantastic image, to have been detained so long in the ante chamber of the soul, and to have been subjected while there to such a rigid and suspicious ex amination, as to be chilled by the unwelcome reception they met with, and to be divested, upon their tardy admission, of half their kindliness and ardour. Hence we very rarely meet in his writings any of that glowing sensibility, those bursts of lofty enthusiasm, those exquisite tquches of pathos, which are so often found in the writings of one whose name has been already mentioned, and who, in the attributes of reason, was scarcely in ferior to Edwards himself: we mean John Howe. To the same causes are to be traced the stern gravity of deportment, the coldness and reserve, which distinguished Edwards to a considerable degree in private life, and appeared to impart to him somewhat of an unsocial character. Let us not be misunderstood. We have the most abundant proof, that Jonathan Edwards pos sessed, substantially, the virtues of benevolence, charity, and kindness, in a degree seldom equalled, perhaps never surpassed. We are merely speaking of the manner in which these excellencies dis played themselves ; of their signs and expressions. In fact, all that we are attempting to show is, that owing to the powerful causes already specified, his virtues wanted much of that grace, softness, and flexibility, in other words, that nature, which are often displayed by men of far less intrinsic worth, but who possess a warmer temperament and more acute sensibility. Every one knows that this is a case of no very unfrequent occurrence AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS although the result may spring from other causes. Nothing is more common than to meet with men who are proved to possess excellence of very high order, but who yet manage, by certain repulsive peculiarities of manner, to detract immensely from the apparent beauty and value of such qualities, and by consequence, from the sympathy of specta tors. This peculiarity sometimes flows from one cause, sometimes from another. — What the causes were in Edwards's case we have endeavoured to specify. This warmth and sensibility, this susceptibility of strong emotion, are by no means so slight a de fect as may sometimes be imagined ; especially in the christian minister. None can have read the sermons of Edwards without feeling that there is a sad want of that pathos and feeling, which dis courses on themes so affecting as those of the gospel should not fail to inspire. In these quali ties they are very deficient, and from the structure of his mind and his habits of thought necessarily so. We cannot, by any stretch of our imagination, conceive it possible that Jonathan Edwards should ever have composed some of those passages of overwhelming tenderness which occur in the incom parable treatise of Howe, entitled, " The Redeem er's Tears wept over lost Souls." There was one class of emotions, indeed, which were indulged in most unrestrained warmth ; we mean the religious emotions. On this point of his character the remarks we have made do not apply. If in any man, in him the love of God was an all-absorbing and all-controlling affection. Here he not only feels deeply, but always speaks the language and indulges in the ardour of intense affection. Here, and here alone, he glows, he kindles into enthusiasm. Lofty intellect, so far from re pressing this class of emotions, as, alas ! has been the case with so many of the intellectually great, coexisted with them in their utmost strength. Those powerful faculties, which had discovered so much cause for regarding every other emotion with suspicion, and for jealously watching against the treachery of the passions, saw that here, on the contrary, coldness and caution might be aban doned ; that there was in God all which not only justified, but demanded, the most ardent affection ; that extravagance was impossible ; and that in this case the indulgence of feeling was as much a dictate of reason as the repression of it would be in others. There is, in consequence, a singular contrast between Edwards's usual style of writ ing, and that which he adopts in reference to religion and to God. On these themes his sensi bility keeps pace with his intellect ; the icy bonds which had fettered his feelings dissolve away ; the marble statue of abstraction starts into life; and as he passes from the cold language of reason into that of love and adoration, it seems as though a seraph's ardour were all at once infused into the cold bosom of a previously pure and passionless intelligence. If ever there was a man who prostrated himself in abject self-abasement before the throne of God; who resigned himself implicitly to the Divine will ; who was habitually ready to obey it, whatever it might enjoin, or submit to whatever it might in flict; that man was Jonathan Edwards. He was indeed a man of intense and elevated piety. Indeed so strong was his language, so impas sioned his ardour, upon this subject, that he some times almost approximates to the extravagance of some of the French mystics. We hope that none will suspect us of insinuating the thought — a thought, the blasphemy of which is only equalled by its absurdity — thatjt is possible to love God too much ! But, we do think that he sometimes seems to imagine it possible to attain a species of love to God, which is absolutely incompatible with the very conditions of existence. The passages to which we more particularly allude, are to be found in his treatise on the " Religious Affections," and some other works : the further consideration of them we shall reserve to another place. Some of the moral qualities of Edwards were possessed in such perfection, as to deserve a more specific mention. Amongst these may be enume rated, candour, humility, modesty, and simplicity of character. As to the first of these, it is in scribed on every page of his controversial works. He neyer endeavours to evade the force of an argument, or to attack only its most vulnerable points ; on the contrary, he ever comes at once up to the very breast-works of a hostile system. He never misrepresents the sentiments he controverts ; on the contrary, he uniformly gives them the fullest and strongest expression of which they were capa ble. He never resorts to the mean subterfuge of putting forward an argument manifestly weak and inconclusive, nor condescends to maintain an opinion once proved to be untenable. The part he took in the controversy on the subject of " Com munion," is perhaps one of the most astonishing triumphs over every kind and degree of prejudice which any man ever gained. This perfect candour, as has been already intimated, was partly the effect of the purely logical character of his mind, in spiring him with an habitual and absorbing love of truth, and rendering him too magnanimous to descend to the employment of any sophistry. It was, however, still more conspicuously owing to the stern dominion of religious principle. — We may remark, that this transparent honesty sheds an unspeakable charm over all his writings, and distinguishes them, by honourable contrast, from those of the generality of polemical writers. The profound humility and unaffected modesty of Edwards, formed one of the most beautiful and striking features of his moral character, and proved the deep influence which religion exerted over him. In these respects, he possessed a sublime — a melancholy superiority to most men of vast mind. In nothing is genius, more especially genius of a structure somewhat resembling that. of Edwards, so wanting as in these qualities. He had none of that insolent pride of intellect, which too often characterizes such men. He constantly speaks and feels like a little child. Nor is there OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. any thing approaching to affectation in all this ; he is evidently always sincere. To use the beau tiful language of the Essayist, to whose produc tion we have already referred, and to which we shall have occasion to advert again : " Edwards contemplated a glory, an absolute excellence, which at once checked the swellings of pride, and sickened him of the praise which his powers might have won from the world." But Edwards often displays a grace beyond even modesty ; we mean a certain artless sim plicity of nature, which suggests the idea that he is almost unconscious of his transcendent powers ; which indicates, at the very moment he is achieving such miracles of intellectual prowess, an ignorance of his doing any thing wonderful. Modesty con sists in a disposition not to over-estimate the good qualities one may possess, but implies, as a necessary condition to its exercise, a consciousness that they are possessed. In Edwards, on the other hand, we often find an apparent unconsciousness, or, at all events, a transient oblivion, of the vast talents with which he was endowed ; he appears not to dream, that as a philosopher he would ever command the homage of the world, or that his writings would be regarded in relation to philosophy at all ; he simply intended them as defences of those peculiar doc trines to which he was so ardently attached. He did not even cultivate philosophy so much for its own sake, as in reference to theology. All the great principles which he discovered, were elicited in the discussion of religious subjects ; and all the pro found reasonings into which he entered, were only incidentally introduced to illustrate and confirm his religious opinions. So much is this the case, that in the eye of soi-disant philosophers, who can admire his philosophy, but who despise the pur poses to which it was applied, he must resemble those alchymists of another age, who sometimes stumbled on valuable truths, while engaged in blind search after impossible discoveries. In a word, rarely have such genius and worth, such greatness and modesty, been united : and the reader of his pages might say, with at least as much truth as Atterbury said of Berkeley, " So much understanding, * * * * *, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had been the portion of any but angels." We shall conclude these observations, by offer ing some criticisms on the principal works of Ed wards. — Those of less moment we shall dismiss with a few general observations. The " Strict and Impartial Inquiry on the Free dom of the Will," the most stupendous pile of argumentation (out of the mathematics) which the genius of man ever constructed, is that work un doubtedly on which the fame of Edwards will chiefly rest. This is not so much on account of its intrinsic superiority to some of his other pro ductions, (for it would not be difficult to show that some of them, as specimens of reasoning, are nearly equal to it,) but on account of the interest attaching to the much-controverted subject of c which it treats, an interest which has made. it familiar to thousands, who are totally ignorant of the other writings of our author. The "Inquiry" was undertaken, for the purposeof refuting the grand doctrines of Arminianism, which, in the age of Edwards, threatened, both in his country and our own, the almost entire extinction of the fundamental principles of that religious system which he so ardently embraced. This work is therefore to be viewed in relation to the peculiarities of that system, and as far as Ed wards's intention goes, to them alone. This, by the by, is a remark applicable to all the works of Edwards. In him every faculty and every attain ment were consecrated to religion, and in this all centred. The philosopher was lost in theChristian. The " Inquiry" is divided into four parts. In the first he gives us an ample and most perspicuous explanation of his terms, and the senses in which he intends uniformly to employ them. By will, he tells us he means, " that by which the mind chooses any thing." The faculty of the will is that power or principle of the mind by which it is capable of choosing : an act of the will is the same as an act of choosing or choice. By determining the will, he tells us, he means the causing that the act of the will should be thus, and not otherwise. That which uniformly determines the will, he tells us, is " that motive which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest." By motive, he tells us, he means the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly or many things conjunctly . By philosophical necessity, he tells us, that he means nothing more than the certainty of those things of which it is predicated. In the fourth section, he enters into a most masterly discussion on the " distinction between natural and moral necessity," and the meaning of certain correlatives. In the second part he shows that Arminian no tions of the liberty of the will are absurd, incon sistent, and impossible. It is entitled, " Whether there is or can be any such sort of freedom of will, as that wherein Arminians place the essence of the liberty of all ' moral agents ;' and whether any such thing ever was or can be conceived of." In the third part he demonstrates, " that no such liberty of will as Arminians hold, is necessary to moral agency, virtue and vice, praise and dis- praise,"&c. In the fourth part, he considers the " chief grounds of the reasonings of Arminians, in sup port and defence of the forementioned notions of liberty and moral agency, against the opposite doc trine." The conclusion consists of an explication of the relations, which the great principles he has endea voured to establish hold to the whole system of Calvinistic theology. It is far from being our in tention to present a complete analysis of this astonishing work. To attempt this, indeed, would be to transcribe the whole; for though Edwards's AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS reasonings might certainly be stated with greater simplicity and elegance, they could not be brought into a much less compass, with a due regard to perspicuity. That must be a rare faculty of com pression indeed, which can translate the substance of such a treatise into a few pages, without ren dering its arguments unintelligible. Yet we flatter ourselves that the main points of the controversy may be stated, both with brevity and perspicuity. Thus much, therefore, we shall attempt; we shall conclude by pointing out those parts in which the chief merit of the performance in our opinion consists, and the extent to which the work has been decisive of the controversy. The train of reasoning, then, which a disciple of Edwards would adopt, would be this : he would maintain, (to ascend for a moment somewhat higher in the controversy than it was necessary for our author's object to go,) that man, like every other sentient being, is necessarily actuated by a love of happiness; that is, that it would be a con tradiction to suppose that he could hate happi ness, or that he could desire misery for its own sake, or with a perception that it was such ; that he is placed in circumstances in which a vast variety of objects address themselves to this desire of happiness, some promising to gratify it in a higher degree, some in a lower, some appealing to one part of his nature, some to another ; that he cannot but be attracted to those objects and those courses of conduct, which his reason or his appetites, or both conjointly, assure him are likely to gratify his desire of happiness ; that the various degrees or kinds of real and apparent good, promised by different objects or courses of conduct, constitute the motives which incline him to act in pursuance of the general desire of hap piness which is the grand impulse of his nature, and which it would be a contradiction to suppose a sentient being not to possess ; that sometimes he really sees, and sometimes he imagines he sees, (and as regards the influence on the will, they come to the same thing,) greater degrees of good in some objects, or proposed courses of conduct, than in others ; and that this constitutes prepon derance of motive ; that the faculty by which the mind may be thus inclined and attracted towards several and conflicting objects or courses of con duct, is called the will ; that to induce this faculty to act at all, theie must always be some motive ; that to induce it to decide between con flicting claims, there must be preponderance of motive, that is, a greater measure of real or ap parent good, at the time of any particular voli tion ; that this preponderance of motive will be as is the character of the moral agent and the circumstances of the objects, taken conjointly; that this preponderance of motive will be, there fore, not only different in different individuals, but different in the same individual at different times; that that which, at any particular time, is, or appears (for as it respects this argument, reality and appearance are one) to promise, the greatest good, will uniformly decide the will ; ; that this necessarily flows from the tendency of a sentient nature to seek happiness at all, and is indeed only a particular application of the same general principle ; inasmuch as it would imply as great a contradiction that a being capable of hap piness should not take that which it deems will confer, all things considered, a greater degree of happiness, rather than that which will confer a less, as it would be to imagine it not seeking hap piness rather than the contrary, or some happi ness rather than none ; and lastly, that this cer tainty of connexion between the preponderance of motive and the decisions of the will, is what is meant by necessity, as simply implying that the cause will as certainly produce the effect in this in stance, as in any instance of the mutual con nexion of cause and effect whatever. He would further maintain, that the instances which seem to contravene these statements are ap parent, and not real, and that in every act of vo lition the soul really complies with that motive which, in the present view of the mind, is the strongest. As when a man voluntarily does what is unpleasant or inconvenient, — he does it to avoid what is still more unpleasant or inconve nient, or for the ultimate attainment of a good worthy of such sacrifice. Or let it be supposed, that a man commits a sin with the consciousness that he perils eternity by it, and that the punish ment he hazards is most immeasurably dispropor tionate to the transient pleasure attending the gratification of his appetites ; yet even in such, the strongest case that can well be imagined, he still decides upon that which in the present view of the mind, and all things considered, appears the most desirable ; for, in the first place, the vehement passion by which he is for the mo ment actuated, has magnified the desired good a thousand-fold, so as to fill almost the whole field of vision, and to remove other and infinitely weightier considerations to such a distance as to be but dimly and imperfectly seen ; and, in -the second place, if the considerations of eternity in trude at all, the man hopes that his everlasting happiness may, after all, be secured without detri ment to other gratifications, — at all events, just for this once ; for he recollects that eternity is dis tant, — he will have plenty of time, he flatters him self, to 'prepare for it, — it is not probable that he will die yet, — he intends to repent of his sin as soon as he has committed it; — thus he fondly hopes to combine the felicity of heaven with the gratifi cation of present appetite ; and certainly, in the present view of the mind, it will be better that it should enjoy both than either alone. Thus in every instance the mind follows the motive or motives which in the present view of it may be the strongest^ According to the system of opinions we have thus briefly, and we are aware most imperfectly, endeavoured to develope, the only liberty which man possesses, or which such a being can possess, and which alone, Edwards contends, is necessary to constitute him a moral agent ; is not the liberty of willing as he will, — which may be demonstrated OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. to be an absurdity, — but of acting as he wills — a freedom from restraint, or, as divines technically call it, from co-action. It also follows that the knowledge of duty, — which always implies suf ficient real motives to induce compliance, or, in other words, which ought to induce it, — and liberty of action, are the great conditions of re sponsibility. We acknowledge, indeed, that the term neces sity, which has so generally been employed to designate the certain connexion between the pre ponderance of motive and the act of volition, is the most inauspicious term which could possibly have been selected; because, by strong and almost inevitable association with necessity of another kind, — the necessity between physical causes and effects, all the ideas which are attached to the latter application of the word, are transferred to the former ; it is forgotten that the word is only intend ed to designate one point of resemblance, (a very important one we admit,) between physical causes and effects and moral causes and effects ; not that the two are not immeasurably diverse in other respects. Yet this application of the word is so natural as to be almost unavoidable. This is proved by the fact, that the same class of words, or phrases equivalent to them, as " cannot but be, cannot be, unable," and their correlates, are used in reference to the will, by those who would most vehemently denounce the doctrines which we have endeavoured to unfold ; as when a libertarian, almost unconsciously, says, that this man's avarice is so inveterate, that he cannot do a generous ac tion, or that man is so addicted to drunkenness, that he cannot keep sober. We suppose, however, that all would admit that to prevent the formation of those associations to which we have adverted, or to destroy them where they have been once formed, the word certainty would be a far better term than necessity, to designate the infallible connexion between the preponderance of motive and the actions of the will. Let us now take a brief survey of the principal arguments for and against this doctrine. It is alleged in support of it, that it coincides with the most common and native impressions of the vulgar, and is confirmed by every more elabo rate attempt of the philosopher to analyse the process of volition ; that the former will tell you that they never dream of acting at all, without some reasons, and that they always act from what at the time of action appears to present the strong est reasons ; that so far from thinking it a perfec tion to have the power of acting without motives, or against those which appeared at the time of action to be the strongest, they would account it a privilege only fit for idiots or madmen ; and that sooner than be the sport of such a blind and ca pricious impulse, they would be content to be the merest machines of destiny. The philosophers who embrace the doctrine of philosophical necessity affirm, that the more they analyse the origin or the nature of voluntary actions, the more deeply are they convinced of its truth. And their reasons are c 2 these: that so longas it is true that "every effect must have a cause," so long it must be true that the de terminations of the will are caused by something ; that they in vain look for that something in the will itself ; for, 1st, that would be supposing that this determination, if caused at all, was the result of a prior determination, and that of one prior still, and so on in infinitum, which is absurd ; or, 2nd, that at best such a determination, if caused by the will itself, supposing such a thing conceivable, could be only a blind impulse, utterly unworthy of a rational creature ; nay, absolutely destructive of virtue and vice, so long as, in harmony with our most native instincts, virtue and vice are only to be predicated of those voluntary actions which flow from motives. They therefore affirm that neither from simple consciousness nor reasoning can they discern any other foundation for volun tary action than motive ; and that, as it is necessary that every such action should originate in motive, so it appears to them absurd, and little short of a contradiction, to affirm that it should not originate from the preponderating motive or motives, so long as it is true that a being who wills some happiness rather than none, will seek a greater happiness rather than a less. It is also alleged, that the certain foreknowledge of the actions of voluntary agents implies and proves the truth of this doctrine ; for that, except upon the supposition of its truth, such a foreknow ledge is absolutely inconceivable, — such an attribute only appearing possible from the certain connexion between motives and volition ; in other words, as events are seen in their causes. This, it is affirm ed, enables us to understand how such a perfection can be possessed by Deity ; a perfection, which cannot be conceived to exist in any other way ; for to say, that volitions are determined either without any cause at all, fortuitously and capri ciously, or in any way that shall imply that they are absolutely uncertain and contingent, — to say this, and yet to say that God certainly sees what those volitions will be, is just as much as to affirm that God sees that that will certainly be, which is nevertheless uncertain, or that a thing certainly will be, which notwithstanding may not be. All this is alleged in support of this doctrine ; the great, we may say the only objection, which is urged against it, is that it obliterates the distinc tion between virtue and vice ; leaves man nothing to praise, nothing to blame ; renders rewards or punishments equally ridiculous ; and (strangest of all arguments) abolishes the whole system of moral inducements. This, say its opponents, it plainly does, because moral and physical necessity are distinguishable only in name ; if our volitions are necessary, they are necessary, and what is to be, is to be. — Of all which hereafter. To turn for a moment to the opposite system. In order to escape the great difficulties we have adverted to, Arminians, and other opponents of moral necessity, have constructed several hypo theses, by which they imagine they can secure to men something more than the power of acting as XXIV AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS they will ; that is, the power of willing as they will. It is true they all maintain that this liberty of theirs is a very plain and simple thing, and boast their independence of any such profound metaphysics as they affirm the advocates of phi losophical necessity are compelled to take refuge in. Yet if it be true, as we suppose it is, that di versity of opinion about a doctrine amongst its professed advocates is a proof that it is after all not quite so clear as they would fain represent it, the advocates of liberty give us abundant cause for suspicion. While the doctrine of moral ne cessity and the arguments which are adduced to support it, remain the same, and have at least the merit of being perfectly intelligible ; the theories and modifications of theories, adopted by the ad vocates of liberty, have been numberless. While toiling in vain to adjust their philosophy to the common sense of mankind, they have, as Edwards has remarked, favoured the world with far more of dark and elaborate metaphysical refinement than was ever resorted to by the advocates of necessity. That profound reasoner and most estimable man, Dr. Clarke, affirmed, that the dictate of the understanding is in fact the same with the deter mination of the will, and cannot be distinguished from 'it.* If so, it is demonstrable that the li berty of the will which Arminians in general have accounted necessary to constitute moral agents, cannot be predicated of such liberty of will. Mr. Chubb pursued this thought a step farther ; he at tempted to combine, in one monstrous theory, those mutually destructive elements, — the paramount influence of the strongest motives and the abso lute sovereignty of the will over its determinations. He affirmed that the latter controlled the former, and yet that the former controlled the latter ; out of these chaotic conceptions he constructed that metaphysical chimera — that master-piece of contradiction! — which Edwards has so felicitously described, and classed amongst other metaphysical prodigies, in his treatise on the " Will." Of these heterogeneous systems, which encumber themselves with the difficulties of both systems without deriv ing the advantages of either, we shall not more particularly speak. The theory which has gene rally been adopted by Arminians, which is itself the most consistent, and against which Edwards more especially directed the irresistible artillery of his logic, is this ; that the will possesses a self- determining power apart from, and extraneous to, the influence of motives ; an absolute sove reignty over its own movements. This notion has been further refined into the liberty of indif ference, as essential to moral agency. And, in deed, without such liberty, the self-determining power, as we shall presently show, can never be enough to constitute that species of moral agency, which Arminians have affirmed to be absolutely necessary to equip a moral agent for the part he has to sustain in the universe. Without such » It is an approximation to that theory which very many of the modern Arminians have adopted, in order to escape the absurdity or the " self-determining power." lt is founded upon an admission of the certain influence of motives on volition and of the connec- liberty of indifference, the will (whatever its ab stract self -determining power) would be already inclined and biassed rather to one of two or more alternatives than to another. This liberty of in difference, therefore, this sublime consummation of the Arminian theory, this guardian of the sacred self-determining power, without which that power can neither perform its high functions nor exercise its indefeasible right of folly, supposes that the will is absolutely indifferent as to which of two or more alternatives, it shall adopt ; is utterly without bias or inclination, and is equally affected to use the language of this dark philosophy, ad utrumque ! Then, and not till then, is it in a state to exercise its capricious despotism ; then, and then only, is it invested with all the privileges of imperial absurd ity. When it chooses in accidental conformity with the principles which are supposed to consti tute virtue and vice, though with ineffable indiffer ence to all in which a virtuous or vicious choice has been imagined to consist, it is then alleged to be virtuous or vicious ! In no other way is it conceived to be in a condition to wield its mad prerogative. Made absolute by the dethronement of reason, this blind judge then proceeds to deliver its decisions of grave absurdity ; these decisions must be, necessarily, without reasonable motives ; and it can only be by a pure fortuity, if they be not against them. Such is that liberty of indifference which the generality of Arminians have repre sented to be essential to moral agency ; and in the manner of its exercise consists virtue or vice. It is alleged in support of this doctrine, that we are conscious of the power of choice in indifferent things, that is, where either there is no motive at all to adopt any one of several alternatives rather than another, or where the motives are equal in the case of each of them ; of which we shall say something hereafter. It is also affirmed that some such system is rendered necessary, because the scheme of necessity, under whatever modifications, absolutely obliterates the distinction between virtue and vice, and subverts all the principles of moral government. This objection forms the great and, it may be affirmed, the only argument of any im portance. Such are the principal arguments for the Arminian hypothesis. So untenable is it, in our opinion, on merely argumentative grounds, that we are persuaded nothing but a strong conviction of the disastrous moral consequences presumed to flow from the necessarian system, would ever have induced an intelligent man to adopt it. There probably never was a reasoner of any skill in ar gument who would not have greatly preferred on logical grounds the system of Jonathan Edwards. The objections against such a doctrine, it is affirmed, are almost as numerous as the forms in which they can be presented. It is affirmed that if the will possess this self-determining power, the determinations of the self-determining power must have some reason of their existence, some tion between the understanding and the will, which must be fatal to any liberty that is inconsistent with moral necessity, and in deed, conducts by an inevitable process to that doctrine ' OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. cause why they are what they are rather than the contrary or different ; that it cannot be by the su perior influence of motive, because that supposition would be destructive of the hypothesis, and the ad mission of such a cause would overthrow that hy pothesis ; that if they be caused (as is implied if caused at all) by the will itself, then the very act by which the will determines thus or thus, as much requires explanation, as the act it is adduced to explain ; that either it must be said that this act is the result of a prior act, and this of one still prior, and so on ad infinitum, which is absurd, or that such determining act is absolutely uncaused, which is also absurd ; that no idle imagination of some ineffable and transcendental self-activity or power of originating action, will explain this phe nomenon of an effect without a cause ; and that the very resort to such gratuitous and inexplicable solutions, is a virtual abandonment of the argu ment. It is moreover alleged, that such a self-deter mining power cannot be exercised in any sentient being capable of happiness ; since, by his very na ture, he will be inclined to what will promote his happiness, and for the very same reason, must feel most inclined to whatever in the present view of the mind will promote it most ; that therefore a mere act of self-determining power, in infinitely the most numerous and assuredly the most important, acts of a moral agent, — all, in fact, with which this controversy is especially concerned, is absolutely impossible. In reference to such actions it is plain, that a previous bias already exists ; and that the essential conditions on which alone such a self-de termining power can exert itself, are already vio lated in the very constitution of our sentient nature. An impossible liberty of indifference, absurd as it is, is the only expedient, by which this equal absurdity of a self-determining power can be maintained. It is also alleged, that if this self-determining power could be exercised, its acts could only be acts of quintessential folly ; that they would be the mere result of a blind and ungovernable im pulse, — the offspring of chance and a mockery of reason ; that it must follow, that the acts of the will would be more perfect as they were more com pletely exempt from the influence of motive, (which alone is commonly supposed to stamp the charac ter of moral actions,) and less perfect in proportion as they were induced by such influence ; and that the destruction of reason is the perfection of the will. It is alleged in reference to that liberty of indifference, which is a superfetation upon the monster already described, not only that the conditions necessary to it cannot be complied with, in any sentient nature, since that nature cannot but be biassed and inclined more to what it deems will promote its happiness, than to what is indif ferent to it, or will oppose it ; and that if such a thing could exist, its acts could only be the pro geny of chance or folly ; but that it requires in order to constitute virtuous or vicious actions, a state of mind which is absolutely incompatible with either, — a state of perfect indifference ! Ac cording to such a system, the amount of virtue and vice diminishes as the motives to the practice of either are strong, and increases as they are weak ; a morally irresistible bias of motive, therefore, to the one or the other would render either impos sible ; while any motive at all would diminish some what from the excellence of the one class of actions or the turpitude of the other ; those acts alone be ing of the nature of perfect virtue, or perfect vice, which are performed in that glorious state of in difference, in which the will, magnanimously re gardless of all motives whatever, and emancipated from the bondage of reason, plays its capricious tricks of drunken liberty. It follows as a conse quence from this, that a miser who has an invete rate love of gain, is quite absolved from guilt ; and that a sober man, who has an inveterate hatred of drunkenness, is innocent of virtue : the one could only be vicious by being indifferent as to whether he made gain or not, and then resolving to make it ; and a sober man would only be virtuous as he felt indifferent about liquor, and then resolved to refrain from it ; all which is very profound and metaphysical, but totally opposed to the common sense and most approved maxims of mankind. They are so far from thinking that virtue and vice increase or diminish in an inverse ratio to the force of the motives in which moral actions originate, and that such actions become perfect only when the bias of motive absolutely ceases, that they hold the very reverse ; in their opinion, moral actions take their complexion solely from the nature of the motives which produce them, while actions which spring from no motive at all, even though prompted by a self-determining power, are sufficiently dig nified by the name of folly. It is thus alleged, and it appears to us with reason, that in reality this system looks with a more malign and disastrous aspect upon the whole theory of morals, than the one whose supposed de fects on these very points it was constructed to supply ; that if liberty of indifference be essential to virtue, then, where this indifference is not felt, virtue cannot exist, or that, at all events, an ac tion is only virtuous so far as it flows from this efficacious indifference ; and that so far as the in fluence of motive is felt, in that proportion it must detract from the value of the action ; that, accord ingly, if there be a will uniformly inclined by an overpowering strength of motive, in other words, if there be such a thing at all as moral neces sity, which Arminians tell us is exactly tantamount to physical necessity, then, in such case, virtue and vice altogether cease ; that, for example, the Su preme himself is no way virtuous, for he is necessi tated to act as he does by such a perfect and eternal love of holiness and justice, that bonds of adamant could not bind him more firmly ; that, in the same manner, the volitions of the elect angels are in no degree virtuous, nor, by parity of reason, are the evil inclinations of devils, vicious. Accordingly, in reference to these two last classes of moral agents, Whitby, and other of the more XXVI AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS consistent and thorough-paced Arminians, contend that the actions of the former are neither virtuous nor rewardable, nor those of the latter vicious and punishable ; and though they dare not say that the actions of the Divine Being are not virtuous be cause necessitated, it is plain that such a conse quence follows legitimately from their principles, and that they refrain from saying so, only because they distrust their own reasonings and feel that they are trembling on the verge of impiety and blasphemy. It is alleged, moreover, that such doctrines really do — what it is pretended the opposite system does — annihilate the force of motives, inducements, promises, and threatenings, and render it absurd, nay absolutely pernicious, to employ them ; ab surd, inasmuch as that magnificent prerogative of our nature, the self-determining power, so long as it is really possessed at all, no more regards such appeals than the Hellespont minded the fetters of the Persian ; and pernicious, because if they have any effect, in that proportion do they dimi nish the freedom of our actions, and interfere with the exercise of our moral agency ; that the fewer and feebler they are, therefore, the greater is the chance (we may use this word in the widest latitude) of our acting virtuously, and the more completely we strip ourselves of the character of reasonable creatures, just in that de gree shall we be approaching the real dignity of our moral nature. Mankind in general hold, however, that virtuous action derives its whole value from motive ; that the stronger the inclina tion, that is, the further it is thus removed from a state of indifference, the greater the excellence of the action if it be virtuous, the deeper its turpi tude if it be vicious; and that if the inclination be so strong that virtuous action is absolutely certain to follow, (which is all that is meant by moral necessity,) this is just the way of describ ing consummate virtue — and not the total want of it. Lastly, it is alleged against this doctrine, that it infringes on, at least, one of the Divine perfections, and that, too, one of the most essential to him as the Sovereign and Rulerof theuniverse, — we mean, the attribute of foreknowledge. If the volitions of moral agents, as we have already remarked, be not seen in their causes — as they cannot be if they are absolutely contingent — the Divine Being cannot possess foreknowledge, unless it be affirmed that that may be certainly known, which neverthe less is uncertain, or, that to know what is not knowable is not a contradiction ; accordingly, the most consistent advocates of the libertarian scheme, have denied that there is or can be such a thing as absolute foreknowledge. Such is a brief exposition of the two systems ; and an abstract of the principal arguments and objections by which they arc severally maintained and opposed. It will be seen from these observations, that the great difficulty against which the system of moral necessity has to contend, is its alleged incompati bility with the principles of moral agency ; while that of liberty, if the reasoning of Edwards be correct, is not only equally inconsistent with those principles, but labours under the additional dis advantage of being contradictory in some points, absurd in others, and absolutely unintelligible where it cannot be proved to be contradictory or absurd. If the claims in favour of each system, therefore, are to be decided by a calculation of a balance of difficulties, it cannot surely be very doubtful which deserves our support. But of this we shall presently have an opportunity of speak ing more particularly. We must now turn our attention for a moment to the peculiar merits of Edwards's work, and to some logical defects which it has lately been affirmed are to be found in it. As to what constitutes the chief value of this treatise there is, it appears, some difference of opinion. Some Americans think that it consists principally in the clear manner in which Edwards has illus trated the distinction between natural and moral inability; and talk as though he had not only originated this distinction, but by its aid had as thoroughly solved the grand moral problem which perplexes his side of the question, as he has de molished the sophistry of his opponents. On the other hand, the talented author of the " Introduc tory Essay," prefixed to the late edition of the " Inquiry," seems to think Edwards's chief merit consists rather in the masterly way in which he has established the doctrine of necessity, than in any great novelty or originality in his attempts to re concile that doctrine with the great fact of human accountability. We do not (for reasons which we shall shortly assign) agree with the opinion ex pressed by either of these parties, but we cannot refrain from saying that the latter appears to us, on the whole, to be much nearer the truth than the former. We believe that Edwards's great and superlative merit consists, first, in the triumphant manner in which he has maintained the doctrine of philosophical necessity ; not only urging ar guments previously known with unrivalled force and perspicuity, but reinforcing them with a great variety of arguments altogether new, the subtilty and depth of which are only matched by their conclusiveness : and secondly, in the trium phant manner in which he has exploded the sophisms of the opposite theories, demonstrating that they are chargeable with precisely the same moral consequences, which its advocates charge upon the doctrines he defends. The second and third parts of the " Inquiry" are probably the most wonderful logical efforts to which the human mind ever gave birth. But if we agree with the Essayist, that Edwards lias left the controversy just where it was, as it respects the grand difficulty of showing the con- gruity of the doctrines of necessity and human responsibility, it is only because we believe with him that he has adduced nothing very new or original on this subject ; not that we think, as the Essayist appears to do, that what Edwards has said is not sufficient to show tiie inadequacy OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. of the objection. We will not even affirm that Edwards has not said all that can be said on this subject ; we mean that what he has said, whe ther much or little, has been anticipated. This, indeed, could not well be otherwise, as the answer by which the objection is met is not furnished by reasoning, but by adducing certain facts here after to be mentioned. Both doctrines, it ap pears to us, are separately demonstrable, though it may perhaps be impossible to show their con- gruity. It is sufficient to prove that they are not contradictory. As to any complete explanation of the mode, in which they harmonize, it is ab surd to expect it. It is, probably, one of those mysteries which, it may be, are destined not only to perplex the human intellect, but to baffle the efforts of all created minds ; mysteries which tend more than any thing else to rebuke the pride of human reason, and to cherish a spirit of devout humility. It would, we imagine, be a departure from that modest spirit which true philosophy in spires, to say that this great problem will never be fully solved even in the present world ; yet no one can enter extensively into a history of the con troversy, without feeling that such a solution is, at all events, eminently improbable. This, how ever, does not hinder, but that certain facts may be stated, which will be quite sufficient to show that this grand objection against moral necessity is inconclusive, and ought not, there fore, to prevent our receiving it. These facts Edwards has, it appears to us, stated with ad mirable clearness and force. We are at pre sent, however, only concerned with the com parative originality of these views. We have already remarked, that the American writers be fore mentioned seem to arrogate to Edwards the merit of having first established the distinction between moral and natural inability ; the follow ing passages, extracted from certain criticisms in serted in Dwight's Memoir, justify the representa tion we have made. " Mr. Edwards put an end to this seeming tri umph of those who were thus hostile to that system of doctrines. — This he accomplished by pointing out the difference between natural and moral necessity and inability. * * * * Thus have they (the Calvin- ists) illustrated the real and wide difference between natural and moral necessity. They have proved that this difference consists, not in the degree of previous certainty that an action will be performed — but in the fact, that natural necessity admits an entire opposition of the will, while moral ne cessity implies, and in all cases secures, the con sent of the will. * * * Now, therefore, the Cal- vinists find themselves placed upon high and firm ground. They fear not the attacks of their oppo nents ; they face them on the ground of reason as well as of Scripture. — But all this is peculiar to America ; except that a few European writers have adopted from American authors the senti ments here stated." Upon the inveterate nationality indicated in the last words, we shall of course say nothing ; we shall merely remark, that the distinction between moral and natural inability was as distinctly stated, as luminously and as copiously illustrated, and as clearly applied to this controversy, by Joseph Tru man, (an English dissenting minister of the 17th century,)in a treatise entitled, "On Moraland Na tural Impotency," as in any part of the " Inquiry." It was written at least sixty years before the " In quiry" appeared. On the controversy in general it is, of course, immeasurably inferior to the per formance of Edwards, which as a full exposition and defence of the necessarian, and a complete refutation of the opposite hypothesis, is absolutely unrivalled ; but on this particular branch of the controversy, we do not hesitate to say that Tru man left little to be said after him. In logical subtilty, in power of abstraction, and in candour, he bore no small resemblance to Edwards himself, and indeed, in these qualities was little his inferior. Had he been a philosopher, instead of an obscure divine, his name would have been more widely known in the world. For the sake of the curious in the history of metaphysical controversy, as well as for the purpose of confirming the remarks we have made, we subjoin some passages from the treatise of Truman's volume in parallel columns with certain passages of Edwards. TRUMAN. " This distinction of Natural and Moral power, or Impo tency, is not used to affirm or deny the coming or arising of one or either of them from nature : for I am not now speak ing de origine, whence they arise ; but to denote the species or kinds, and the essential difference of their Natures, come which way they will. That is a Physical or Natural habit or action, that is neither yl/eKT6v nor hiratvnrov, laudable nor vituperable in genere mo- rum, that a man can neither be counted good and honest, or bad and dishonest ; for, as agility or lameness, dulness, blockishness, or acuteness; but may be (having such power, and doing accordingly) admired though not praised ; and for the defect of such power may be pittied, but not blamed or punished: and this Impotency may be a punishment, but cannot be a sin. The Moral and Ethical act or habit is just contrary, It is that which is laudable or vituperable, and that which a man may be looked on as honest or dishonest for. Now Natural Impotency is always, in this sense, of EDWARDS. " By natural Necessity, as applied to men, I mean such Necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes ; as distinguished from what are called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements. Thus men, placed in certain circumstances, are the subjects of particular sensa tions by Necessity : they feel pain when their bodies are wounded ; they see the objects presented before them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened : so they assent to the truth of certain propositions, as soon as the terms are understood ; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another; so by a natural Necessity men's bodies move downwards, when there is nothing to support them. " Sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that Necessity of connexion and consequence, which arises from such moral causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connexion which there is in many cases between these and such certain volitions and actions. And it is in this AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS TRUMAN. something that a man cannot do if he would never so much ; or hath not the very faculty of willing it. The Moral Impotency is of something that a man hath the natural faculty to will, or can do it if he would ; but is hindered only by moral vitious habits, from willing or doing it. The Stoick Philosophers use to express this difference well, by t„ e^' wtiiv, and t_ oW hj> rj/iiV. Every man (though he know not how to express this to others, nor possibly clear it to himself) hath a notion of these things differing ; and which belong to one sort, and which to the other ; and that one is capable of a just command or prohibition, the other not." EDWARDS. sense that I use the phrase, moral necessity, in the follow ing discourse. What has been said of natural and moral Necessity, may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral Inability. We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly called nature does not allow of it, or be cause of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the Will ; either in the faculty of understanding, consti tution of body, or external objects. Moral Inability con sists not in any of these things ; but either in the want of inclination; or the strength of a contrary inclination; or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and ex cite the act of the Will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one ; and it may be said in one word, that moral Inability con sists in the opposition or want of inclination. For when a person is unatile to will or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same tning as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such circumstances, and under the influence of such " This is it, Then a man hath the natural power to do any thing, when he hath the natural faculties, and no hin- derance but that he can do the thing if he would ; And then he hath a Natural Impotency when he hath not these faculties, or cannot do the thing commanded, if he would never so much. Now I will name the Properties of it. First ; The want of this natural power, this Natural Im potency, doth excuse, as is commonly granted ; and they that deny it are not consistent with themselves, but un awares grant it. Total Natural Impotency doth excuse before God and Man : Yea all Natural Impotency doth ex cuse according to the measure and degree of it. Some little Natural Impotency doth in some measure, though not wholly ; a tanto, though not _ toto. It is some excuse if a Servant be commanded a foot journey and go not, if somthing-lame, so that he could not go it but with great difficulty ; but if quite lame (could not at all) a full excuse. If a man be hebetior, blockish, something dull, it is some excuse for his not understanding difficulties in Religion, which he might yet possibly, with great difficulty, under stand ; but if quite a Fool, so as to have no more use of Reason than a Beast, it is a total excuse from any command to learn or understand. Without doubt a man of dull In tellectuals, is not bound to understand such things in Divinity, as require great acuteness of parts to understand ; for, he cannot if he would. And doubtless a command for a man to will his own misery formally, or to nill his own happiness formally (which all agree, No man can do) would not oblige ; so as that a man should be too blame in not doing it : since a man hath not the natural faculty or power to do such things. If a man that is not much-inclined to it, give himself over to sleep in times of Religious worship, it is a great fault : If a man be very sleepy, and sleep at such a time, it is some excuse, even so far as it arose from a natural cause ; but yet it is a fault so far, as it was from carelessness to stir up himself, from want of the awe of God's presence, so far as he might if he would do otherwise ; but if it so seized on him, that his greatest desires and endeavours could not pre serve him from it, no fault : Need I prove this ? The very mention seems enough. All those Divines, consulted about it, took it for grant ed that it was not the duty of that good man, to drink wine in the Eucharist, that could not if he would, and that the general command did not oblige him. And all generally grant it as apparent, That the Heathens (that never had, nor could obtain the Revelation of it) shall never be condemned for not Believing Christ and his death, because they had not the means that were na turally necessary; And by the same Reason they must affirm (else they must say, That is no reason, and find some other) that thev shall not be condemned for not doing the things they could not do, and also that we shall not be condemned for not knowing or doing the things that we " It is abundantly affirmed and urged by Arminian writers, that it is contrary to common Sense, and the natural notions and apprehensions of mankind, to suppose other wise than that necessity (making no distinction between natural and moral necessity) is inconsistent with Virtue and Vice, Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment. And their arguments from hence have been greatly triumph ed in ; and have been not a little perplexing to many, who have been friendly to the truth, as clearly revealed in the Holy Scriptures : it has seemed to them indeed difficult, to reconcile Calvinistic doctrines with the notions men com monly have of justice and equity. The true reasons of it seem to be the following : I. It is indeed a very plain dictate of common Sense, that natural necessity ' is wholly inconsistent with just Praise or Blame. If men do things which in themselves are very good, fit to be brought to pass, and attended with very happy effects, properly against their Wills ; or do them from a necessity that is without their Wills, or with which their Wills have no concern or connexion ; then it is a plain dictate of common Sense, that such doings are none of their virtue, nor have they any moral good in them ; and that the persons are not worthy to be rewarded or praised; or at all esteemed, honoured, or loved, on that account. And, on the other hand, that if, from like necessity, they do those things which in themselves are very unhappy and pernicious, and do them because they cannot help it ; the necessity is such, that it is all one whether they will them, or no ; and the reason why they are done, is from necessity only, and not from their Wills ; it is a very plain dictate of common Sense, that they are not at all to blame ; there is no vice, fault, or moral evil at all in the effect done ; nor are they who are thus necessitated, in any wise worthy to be punished, hated, or in the least disrespected, on that account. In like manner, if things in themselves good and desir able are absolutely impossible, with a natural impossibility, the universal reason of mankind teaches, that this wholly and perfectly excuses persons in their not doing them. And' it is also a plain dictate of common Sense, that if doing things, in themselves good, or avoiding things in themselves evil, is not absolutely impossible, with such a natural impossibility, but very difficult, with a natural difficulty ; that is, a difficulty prior to, and not at all con sisting in, Will and inclination itself, and which would re main the same, let the inclination be what it will ; then a person's neglect or omission is excused in some mea sure, though not wholly; his sin is less aggravated, than if the thing to be done were easy. And if instead of difficulty and hinderance, there be a contrary natural propensity in the state of things, to the thing to be done, or effect to be brought to pass, abstracted from any con sideration of the inclination of the heart ; though the pro pensity be not so great as to amount to a natural necessity ; OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. XXIX TRUMAN. cannot know or do : else they must say, God had greater respect for the Heathen, than for us." " Now I come to speak of the Moral or Ethical Impo tency. It is a thing as quite different from Natural Impo tency as can be almost supposed, as I shall shew you. They agree in nothing, but only in the thing that is the reason of the Metaphor borrowed from Natural Impotency, to express this by; which is this, That as a lame man can not walk, a blind man see, or dead arise, without a Miracle ; so neither can these ever Repent and Believe without some wonderful help from Heaven, though upon another account it cannot be done, and not because they want the Natural power of doing it. Moral Impotency is when a man hath the Natural power, can do the thing, in respect of his Natural powers, but will not ; and not only so, but cannot obtain of himself to will it ; though yet he hath the natural power of obtain ing this of himself, else it would be a Natural Impotency ; as, a Fool hath not the Natural power to obtain of himself to will a thing, hath not the right Natural use of his faculties: So (as all agree) a man hath not the Natural power of will ing his own misery, as his misery ; or of nilling his own happiness : his soul is not framed capable of these things ; and therefore these things come not within Morality ; neither are, nor possibly can be, matter of a serious com mander serious prohibition. This Impotency is a rational thing, so far as that may be called rational which is done upon reasons, but incon siderable and slight reasons, and upon fallacious argu ments and grounds ; and such as he doth or might know to be fallacious, did he make due use of his reason : Else it would be a Natural Impotency, and a man could be no more blamed for it, than you can blame a man for his antipathy to Cheese, that is not chosen upon any argu ments. Now in this sense a Cannot and Will not are all one ; they do not differ specie, in kind ; only, in degree : It is a higher degree of volition or chusing ; you may call it Wilfulness, Stubbornness, Obstinacy, Moral Impotency, all these signifie the same. Deut. xxi. 18. If a man luive a stubborn Son that will not obey the voyce of his Father, Stub bornness is only a Will not obey, not a Cannot in the pro- perest sense as opposed to Will not ; only a higher degree of will not, but of the same species. In this sense are ap parently these and such Scriptures to be understood ; Can the blackmore change his skin ? so, He that is accustomed to evil cannot do well. The first Cannot here is Natural, and so without fault; he cannot change his skin if he would never so fain, and therefore a command to change it would not oblige : But the second is the Moral Cannot, Gen. xxxvii. 4. Joseph's Brethren hated him, and could not speak peaceably to him ; that is, through envy, not but that they could if they would. Luke xi. 7. Trouble me not, my door is shut, and my Children in bed, I cannot rise to give thee. This cannot is a will-not upon such reasons, and is so explained in the words-following ; Though he will not rise ; yet because of his Importunity he will rise and give him whatsoever he needeth. In this sense the Carnal mind is Enmity against God, and is not subject to the Law of God ; neither indeed can be, in this Moral sense. And God giveth us power in this sense (observe, I do not say only in this sense, but mostly as the chief meaning, for somthing I -could say, but I must not intermix things EDWARDS. yet being some approach to it, so that the doing of the good thing be very much from this natural tendency in the state of things, and but little from a good inclination ; then it is a dictate of common Sense, that there is so much the less virtue in what is done ; and so it is less praiseworthy and rewardable. The reason is easy, viz. because such a natural propensity or tendency is an approach to natural necessity ; and the greater the propensity, still so much the nearer is the approach to necessity. And, therefore, as natural necessity takes away or shuts out all virtue, so this propensity approaches to an abolition of virtue ; that is, it diminishes it. And on the other hand, natural difficulty, in the state of things, is an approach to natural impossibility. And as the latter, when it is complete and absolute, wholly takes away Blame ; so such difficulty takes away some Blame, or diminishes Blame ; and makes the thing done to be less worthy of punishment." " But it must be observed concerning moral Inability, in each kind of it, that the word Inability is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a natural Inability, in the proper use of it; and is ap plied to such cases only wherein a present will or inclina tion to the thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, accord ing to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be never so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbour kind ness ; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest pro priety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election : and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will. It is improperly said, that a person cannot per form those external actions, which are dependent on the act of the Will, and which would be easily performed, if the act of the Will were present. And if it be improperly said, that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions, which depend on the Will, it is in some respect more im properly said, that he is unable to exert the acts of the Will themselves ; because it is more evidently false, with re spect to these, that he cannot if he will : for to say so, is a downright contradiction ; it is to say, he cannot will, if he does will. And in this case, not only is it true, that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very will ing is the doing ; when once he has willed, the thing is performed ; and nothing else remains to be done. There fore, in these things, to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability, is not just ; because the thing wanting is not a being able, but a being willing. There are faculties of mind, and a capacity of nature, and every thing else, sufficient, but a disposition : nothing is wanting but a AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS TRUMAN. aliene) not by giving new faculties ; but by causing us to will, and do of his own good pleasure." " Now I will, according as I promised, shew you the different properties of this Moral Impotency from Natural ; and it is contrary in every tiling to Natural, which shews they are contrary indeed. First: This Moral Impotency doth not excuse from fault, or make threatnings unjust. Nay it is also in this contrary to Natural (which I would have you observe and consider well, to convince you of their great difference; ; That the Natural Impotency, the greater it is, by so much the more it doth lessen the fault in not obeying the com mand ; and the less it is, by so much the more it doth greaten the fault : But the greater it is the greater is the fault, and more blame-worthy, and further from excuse ; and the less it is, the less faulty. For any to say, I can- not-but hate the Minister that reproves me ; and any that live holy lives, I cannot but wish some great fall or mis chief to them ; for they call my sins to my remembrance, and admonish me to leave my wicked ways ; and I am re solved not to leave them ; I have so firmly chosen this way, that I am resolved not to change : This is the mean ing of [I cannot obtain of my self to leave this way] will any say, this is not a greater fault ? If a Thief should say, Once I was almost willing to have left my course of life ; but now I am resolved to stick to it, notwithstanding all Laws and dangers ; and he say true, Is he not now more to blame than formerly, and less excuseable ? Would not all humane Judicatures look upon that man as mad, that should say, This doth excuse, or not aggravate his fault ? Secondly : This Moral Impotency doth not hinder pro mises from being of Grace. This is not to mock men, to promise a reward, if they will do that which they have this Moral Impotency to do. Nay such a promise is not a jot less gracious, than if there was all readiness and will ingness of mind in us to embrace it, by performing the condition ; when only, chosen, wicked willfulness hinders. He is bound nevertheless to thank him ; and, as the Apostle saith, Mans unbelief cannot make the Faith (meaning the Faithfulness) of God of none effect ; so our wickedness and unthankfulness doth not make the Grace of God cease to be Grace, and his kindness cease to be kindness. There are many learned men, pretend with great con fidence, that this Distinguishing is to no purpose ; and that men are not too blame, if there be any present Impotency at all on men to the immediate duty, be it what it will, or call it what you will, Willingness, Wickedness, Moral Im potency, for It will excuse, say they, as well as Natural ; and therefore contend, that Except God by his grace give to men, over and beside their Natural power, some kind of equilibrium, or equal-inclination of their Will to good and bad, they would not be too blame for disobeying the Gos pel ; this they call a second power, and it is the same they mean by their Preventing and Subsequent Grace, as appears when they explain them, and they pretend that this, Grace doth work ; and this is all that Grace doth work ; for it doth not (say they) encline the Will any farther than by giving it a power to encline either way. Now I greatly dislike this Notion, and this also must either fall, or the notion of Moral Impotency, and what hath been said of it, falls ; as not standing in any stead, but excusing as well as the Natural. If an Act of Oblivion be made by the Prince (when the Rebels are in his power, and Justice saying, Shall I smite them, shall I smite them ?) provided they will ac- knowledg their offence in some humble manner and sub mit ; if some, yea if all should say, and that truly, We so hate him, notwithstanding this kindness ; and we shall be so scoffed at by those we have made great boasts of our resolvedness unto, and they will say, Where is that mouth wherewith thou said'st, Who is Abimeleck ? that we cannot through these reasons obtain of our own wilful and proud hearts to submit ; yet it was a great favour and kindness, as long as the condition was so easie to them, that they had the Natural power so easily to do it. Yea, and though they had no benefit by it, but their Condemna- EDWARDS. " Yea, if it be supposed, that good or evil dispositions are implanted in the hearts of men, by nature itself, (which it is certain, is vulgarly supposed in innumerable cases,) yet it is not commonly supposed, that men are worthy of no Praise or Dispraise for such dispositions ; although what is natural, is undoubtedly necessary, nature being prior to all acts of the Will whatsoever. Thus, for in stance, if a man appears to be of a very haughty or malicious disposition, and is supposed to be so by his natural temper, it is no vulgar notion, no dictate of the common sense and apprehension of men, that such dis positions are no vices or moral evils, or that such persons are not worthy of disesteem, or odium and dishonour; or that the proud or malicious acts which flow from such natural dispositions, are worthy of no resentment. Yea, such vile natural dispositions, and the strength of them, will commonly be mentioned rather as an aggravation of the wicked acts, that come from such a fountain, than an extenuation of them. It being natural for men to act thus, is often observed by men in the height of their in dignation : they will say, " It is his very nature : he is of a vile natural temper ; it is as natural to him to act so, as it is to breathe; he cannot help serving the devil," &c. But it is not thus with regard to hurtful mischievous things, that any are the subjects or occasions of, by natural necessity, against their inclinations. In such a case, the necessity, by the common voice of mankind, will be spoken of as a full excuse. — Thus it is very plain, that common sense makes a vast difference between these two kinds of necessity, as to the judgment it makes of their influence on the moral quality and desert of men's actions. And these dictates are so natural and necessary, that it may be very much doubted whether the Arminians them selves have ever got rid of them ; yea, their greatest doc tors, that have gone furthest in defence of their meta physical notions of liberty, and have brought their ar guments to their greatest strength, and as they suppose, to a demonstration, against the consistence of virtue and vice with any necessity : it is to be questioned, whether there is so much as one of them, but that, if he suffered very much from the injurious acts of a man, under the power of an invincible haughtiness and malignancy of temper, would not, from the forementioned natural sense of mind, resent it far otherwise, than if as great sufferings came upon him from the wind that blows and the fire that burns by natural necessity ; and otherwise than he would, if he suffered as much from the conduct of a man perfectly delirious ; yea, though he first brought his dis traction upon him some way by his own fault. Some seem to disdain the distinction that we make be tween natural and moral Necessity, as though it were alto gether impertinent in this controversy ; " that which is necessary, say they, is necessary ; it is that which must be, and cannot be prevented. And that which is impossible, is impossible, and cannot be done ; and, therefore, none can be to blame for not doing it." And such comparisons are made use of, as the commanding of a man to walk, who has lost his legs, and condemning him and punishing him for not obeying ; inviting and calling upon a man, who is shut up in a strong prison, to come forth, &c. But in these things Arminians are very unreasonable. Let common sense determine whether there be not a great dif ference between these two cases : the one, that of a man who has offended his prince, and is cast into prison ; and after he has lain there a while, the king comes to him, calls him to come forth ; and tells him, that if he will do so, and will fall down before him and humbly beg his pardon, he shall be forgiven, and set at liberty, arid also be greatly enriched, and advanced to honour : the prisoner heartily repents of the folly and wickedness of his offence against his prince, is thoroughly disposed to abase himself, and accept of the king's offer ; but is confined by strong walls, with gates of brass, and bars of iron. The other case is, that of a man who is of a very unreasonable spirit, of a OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. TRUMAN. tion was increased. So though it may truly be said of some, It was good for them if they had never been born, and Christ never been born, or dyed, and no Law of Grace ever made ; yet all this hinders it not from being of Grace, while this falling-short, was through their own wickedness." EDWARDS. haughty, ungrateful, wilful disposition ; and moreover, has been brought up in traitorous principles ; and has his heart possessed with an extreme and inveterate enmity to his lawful sovereign ; and for his rebellion is cast into prison, and lies long there, loaded with heavy chains, and in miserable circumstances. At length the compassionate prince comes to the prison, orders his chains to be knocked off, and his prison-doors to be set wide open ; calls to him, and tells him, if he will come forth to him, and fall down before him, acknowledge that he has treated him unworthily, and ask his forgiveness ; he shall be forgiven, set at liberty, and set in a place of great dignity and profit in his court. But he is so stout, and full of haughty malignity, that he cannot be willing to accept the offer ; his rooted strong pride and malice have perfect power over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his heart : the opposition of his heart has the mastery over him, having an influence on his mind far superior to the king's grace and condescension, and to all his kind offers and promises. N ow, is it agreeable to common sense, to assert and stand to it, that there is no difference between these two cases, as to any worthiness of blame in the prisoners ; because, forsooth, there is a necessity in both, and the required act in each case is impossible ? It is true, a man's evil dis positions may be as strong and immovable as the bars of a castle. But who cannot see, that when a man, in the latter case, is said to be unable to obey the command, the expression is used improperly, and not in the sense it has originally and in common speech '! and that it may pro perly be said to be in the rebel's power to come out of prison, seeing he can easily do it if he pleases ; though by reason of his vile temper of heart, which is fixed and rooted, it is impossible that it should please him V These citations, our readers will agree with us, are very curious. Some of the illustrations are exactly alike . If we agree, then, with the Essayist in thinking that Edwards has left this part of the controversy as it was, it is not because we imagine that what Ed wards has said was really insufficient, but because, whether sufficient or not, it had been said before. To us, the defence of the doctrine of necessity which Edwards, and every sound expositor of that doctrine, have put forth against its alleged sub version of the principles of moral government, is sufficient. To the Essayist it appears to be far otherwise : we say appears, because in this, as in too many other instances, we feel that it would be hazardous to pronounce on what is his real meaning. Sometimes he speaks as though he fully admit ted, in its widest latitude, all that Edwards wished to establish, namely, the doctrine of moral neces sity; and anon, as if repenting of his own ad missions, he is found abusing the doctrine he had previously admitted ; and seems as though he would dispute it,— if he dared. '• As an able critic on the Essayist's performance has said, " When ever the doctrine of philosophical necessity crosses his path, he seems hardly able to keep his tem per."* In the presence of Edwards himself he resembles some wayward spirit under the spell of a magician ; he would tear the " Inquiry" to pieces if he could ; but as often as he meets the * It was not until after we had sketched the substance of the remarks which we are now making on the " Prefatory Es say," that we had the pleasure of reading an able article on it in the second number of the Presbyterian Review ; an article, we cold, calm glance of this Prospero, he feels all his courage rebuked within him. He believes; but it is that faith which " believes and trem bles." How he can admit, indeed, that Ed wards's reasoning is so conclusive, as he does, if at the same time he believe that it contains those important errors which he affirms, and which will come hereafter under our considera tion, is to us a mystery. With this, however, we have nothing to do at present ; we are only astonished, that admitting, as it would appear, the doctrine of moral necessity, he should yet re gard it, as would also appear, with such immi tigable horror. No sooner does this abhorred phantom stalk athwart his path, than he hastily betakes himself to the most approved exorcisms, and an Arminian himself could hardly rail at it with more edifying vehemence. Now all this might soon be brought to a speedy issue. If he real ly believe that the doctrine of philosophical necessity, (as he sometimes appears to do,) is absolutely incompatible with human responsi bility, then he is simply bound to reject it, for the former cannot be more strongly established by reasoning than the other is by other evidence. But if he believe that the doctrine of philoso phical necessity is not inconsistent with human accountability, why labour to identify, or rather confound, it with "fatalism?" Why call it " a demon lie ?" Why describe it as " a dire mys- believe, generally attributed to Dr. Chalmers. We are happy to find that the strictures we have expressed on the Essayist's de fects, are, for the most part, borne out by the sanction of such an authority. xxxu AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS tery ;" as " having a natural connexion with des potism, and mysticism, and atheism, and pan theism;" as "instructing only to baffle, and to astound, and to sicken the reasoning faculty, and to create a contempt of man and the universe ?" Why be at such pains not only to slander an innocent doctrine, but to publish his own incon sistency in holding it? Surely the doctrine of moral necessity, as expounded by Truman and Edwards, is removed by an immense interval from that " fatalism," which professes that it can dis cern no moral difference in actions ; and ought not to be made the subject of this vague and vulgar declamation. If he says, he directed these fulminations not against the doctrine of philosophi cal necessity, but the abuses of that doctrine, we can only say we are very glad to hear it. But if so, the confusion of language, at any rate, is even greater than we had apprehended ; for we are not the only critics who have understood him to refer to Edwards's doctrine. But there is, in truth, throughout the whole of the Essayist's perform ance — amidst much that is beautiful, in the way of illustration — such a degree of vagueness and obscurity, whenever he gets upon topics which peculiarly demand clearness of thought and pre cision of language, as it has very rarely been our lot to see in a philosophical production . WThile we frankly confess that we have never seen any direct explanation of the manner in which the moral necessity of actions is compatible with human accountability, or, in other words, which shows how these two things may be perfectly re conciled,- it is sufficient to exhibit the inadequacy of the objection to prove, as it assuredly can be proved, that, even upon the admission of moral necessity, the mind cannot divest itself of the con viction that there is a vast difference between that and physical necessity ; that it is not the same thing to say that a man cannot because he will not, and that he cannot because he cannot, though the event in both cases may be equally certain. And if, in fact, the mind cannot divest itself of the idea, that there is a vast difference in the two cases, though it cannot explain how that difference should exist, the objection is virtually aban doned. It is thus Arminians abandon it ; for they admit that God is necessarily virtuous, yet do not strip him, as they ought to do on their principles, of all moral excellence. If this were the only fact that lay against their objection, it would be sufficient ; for as long as they admit this one fact, they admit that it is possible for actions to be necessary in the sense of moral ne cessity, and yet not to lose their moral qualities : and if this be the case in one agent, why not in another? if in some classes of moral actions, why not in all ? In other words they admit, in fact, al though they cannot explain it, that there is not that eternal repugnance between the two doctrines, which they declare insures the destruction of one or the other, and renders it impossible, without admitting a contradiction, to hold both. It will be seen that one instance to the contrary is as conclusive as a thousand, since if the objection be from the nature of the two doctrines, it must apply in every instance : — or in none. This fact alone, therefore, is sufficient to overthrow the ob jection. But this is not the only fact. It may safely be affirmed, that in ordinary life the Arminian never thinks of applying his principles. Ar minians admit that that liberty of the will for which they contend, may be totally lost by long perseverance in virtue, or long indulgence in vice ; that in such cases the soul will no longer resist the bias of its habitual inclinations. Now let us suppose a case in which such a liberty has been actually lost. Can any thing more be necessary to prove that the Arminian really sees a difference, in fact, between moral necessity and physical necessity, than to show that, in ordinary life, he never absolves a drunkard from guilt be cause habit has so enslaved the wretch to vice, that he has lost his liberty respecting that class of actions ; nor withholds his praise from a virtuous action, because he who performed it is so en amoured of virtue as to find supreme delight in the practice of it ; nor is, as his princi ples undoubtedly demand, indulgent to the vice of the former, nor detracts from the virtue of the latter, just in proportion to the strength of incli nation, the inveteracy of habit by which they were borne to their respective objects. With all the rest of mankind he would decide, that these were the very things which constituted the degree of moral guilt in the one, and of moral excellence in the other. Or, to use for a moment the argu-. mentum ad hominem, would an Arminian who should receive some deep injury from one who had so long indulged in a course of vice as to be come the prey of every evil passion, — would the Arminian deem it as absurd to blame the offender, as to blame a madman who might inflict the same injury ? Would he, according to his own princi ples, think the one as entitled to compassion and as guiltless of crime as the other, on the ground, forsooth, that what is morally necessitated is as cer tain as what is phy sically necessitated; or if he did not believe that the glorious liberty of indifference in which he finds so much mystical perfection was quite lost, would he make excuses for the offender in proportion to the degree in which that liberty was disturbed and interfered with by the . bias of vicious habits and depraved passions ? If he really hold, that moral necessity is incompati ble with liberty, and by parity of reasoning, that approaches to such necessity, proportionably de-. prive us of it ; this is the course the Arminian ought to pursue ! And yet we may safely affirm, that. there never was an instance of an Arminian who did not, like every body else, think that he was perfectly right in pronouncing men virtuous or vicious precisely in proportion to the strength and inveteracy of inclination and habit ; and in resenting injury, not a whit the less in compassion to that desperate malignity of the passions which had inflicted it. OF JONATHAN EDWARDS These facts are practical contradictions of the Arminian's own principles, and practical admis sions that the objection of the moral necessity of our volitions being incompatible with responsi bility, however plausible, however impossible to be fully resolved, will not bear the test of fact and experience, and cannot be acted on, even upon the objector's own principles. As long as our opponents dare not deny the volitions of Deity to be morally excellent, though necessary ; as long as they refuse to declare, with their absurdly con sistent champion, Whitby, that the actions of an gels are neither virtuous nor rewardable, nor those of devils vicious or punishable ; as long as they will not practically apply their principles in common life, by subtracting from the guilt of an evil action, and the merit of a good one, in proportion to the strength of habit and inclination ; that is, in either case, in proportion as the liberty of indiffer ence has been disturbed and destroyed ; as long as with the rest of mankind they act in a manner the reverse of all this ; so long will they be making so many virtual admissions, that whatever they may say, and however plausibly they may argue, there is a vast difference between natural and moral inability ; that while the one excuses, the other aggravates crime ; that while the one ex cuses in proportion as it exists, the other aggra vates in the same proportion ; and that the only conditions which we conceive necessary to moral agency, are not the imaginary liberty of indiffer ence, an absurdity and contradiction, but the knowledge of duty and a freedom from all phy sical restraint or natural inability, in the per formance of it. Where these conditions exist, though the connexion between moral causes and effects may be as strong and certain, as that be tween physical causes and effects, and both bound together by indissoluble bonds, a creature is justly accountable for his actions ; consent of will being that, in men's practical judgments, which is alone necessary to constitute the moral quality of actions. These are simple facts connected with our moral judgments which do not admit of explanation : they fully justify us in holding the doctrine of moral necessity ; because they show, that how ever unable we may be fully to reconcile the idea of moral necessity with accountability, (and we have admitted our inability to reconcilerthem by , . any process of argument,) the objection from this ... is, in fact, inconclusive, since all parties admit that there are cases in which moral necessity 'exists, 1 ' and yet will not practically deny the moral com plexion of actions performed under its control. '' ' But these facts (though in our view sufficient) are ''' ' all that can be stated directly to meet the diffi culty. And if people will not be content with such facts, there is no help for it. All that Ed- "' -wards pretends to do, is to state them, which he does with admirable strength and perspicuity. These facts are probably all that we can know aoout the matter. Nay, it is possible, that if we were more profoundly acquainted with the neces sary conditions of moral agency, it might even appear absurd to ask why a knowledge of duty and a freedom from all natural inability to the performance of it, should be the only requisites to constitute responsibility ? It might appear as ab surd to attempt to demonstrate how it is, or to ask the reason of it, as to attempt to account for any of the ultimate facts of our physical and intellec tual nature. Nay, more so, in some respects ; for though it would not imply any contradiction to suppose this latter class of facts at least other than they are, it would be something like a contradic tion, either to deny that a sentient being will cer tainly choose those objects and those courses of action, which in the present view of the mind will tend most to its happiness, (which constitutes moral necessity ; or to affirm that if it acts thus voluntarily, free from all physical restraint or compulsion, it is not to be held responsible for actions so performed. All that is rendered ne cessary on such an hypothesis, to constitute a moral agent, is a knowledge of duty; which ne cessarily presupposes the understanding to be in possession of motives, which are in themselves greater than any other that can be brought in competition with them, and do in real amount outweigh every other. Without such knowledge of duty, there can be no responsibility ; and with out freedom from physical restraint, there can be no voluntary action. To give actions, then, a moral character, it is essential that they should be voluntarily performed in conscious compliance with, or violation of, a rule of duty. However difficult it may be to solve every difficulty connect ed with the combination of such facts, there seems to be a natural repugnance to believe the facts se parately untrue ; and to ask why these should be all the conditions necessary to constitute moral agency, or why it should be the quality of volun tary actions to imply responsibility, may, to su perior intelligences, appear almost as absurd as to ask why it is impossible that a thing should be and not be at the same time, or why two and two should make four ? If, notwithstanding all that the necessarians urge on this point, persons will persist that moral necessity as much destroys moral agency, as phy sical necessity would do, the two parties holding this opinion, must pursue their course : the one, adopting the necessarian hypothesis, will, with Hobbes and fatalism, deny any moral distinction between virtue and vice ; the other, with the Ar minians, will attempt the construction of one or other of those absurd and contradictory systems, which it is the object of Edwards to confute ; subjecting themselves, at the same time, to the additional disadvantage of increasing the identical difficulties which they seek to escape. If, indeed, the objection — containing as we ac knowledge a mystery, not perhaps explicable by mortal intellect, could be demonstrated to be really insurmountable ; if it could be shown not only that we do not know any way of reconciling the two doctrines, but that there really is none, then, AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS so long as we retain (and we can never shake off) the instincts of our moral nature, we should be compelled to reject the doctrine from which such contradiction necessarily flows. Even then, how ever, we should not be justified in adopting any of the hypotheses which Edwards has refuted, so long as it can be shown that they are equally op posed to moral agency. We should simply be reduced to the necessity of holding no opinions whatever about the matter. But we deny that the objection has ever been shown to involve any thing more than a mystery, which for any thing that has yet appeared may be susceptible of a very sound solution. That we cannot demonstrate the congruity of the two doc trines we admit ; that they can be shown to be contradictory we deny. The contradiction has been assumed, it is true, but never proved. It is supposed sufficient to mention it. Thus Hobbes takes it for granted, and proceeds forthwith to infer, that there is no essential difference between virtue and vice ; and Whitby also assumes it, and then proceeds to argue that there can be no such thing as moral necessity. The declamation of which his book is full, all goes upon this assump tion ; all his illustrations are from cases of phy sical necessity, as though he never imagined that any would be so absurd as to deny the identity of that necessity, and necessity of a totally different kind. The fact is, that until the difficulty can be demonstrated to be insurmountable, and to in volve nothing short of a contradiction, it can never be philosophical to reject one fact, which seems to be established by the strictest evi dence, simply because we cannot fully show its harmony with another and totally diverse fact, at which we arrive by evidence as strong, indeed, but of a different kind. Philosophy commands us to receive both unless they be shown to be really contradictory. We gather the ideas of moral agency, and of the essential difference be tween virtue and vice, from consciousness ; they are the universal sentiments of mankind, and we cannot eradicate them even if we would : these ideas, springing out of the very nature of volun tary actions, still cling to us, as we have seen, even when it is admitted that such liberty as that for which the Arminian contends has been lost. On the other hand, we seem to be convinced by the clearest demonstration of the truth of the doctrine of moral necessity. Now shall we reject either the one or the other of these truths, merely because we cannot fully reconcile them ? If we might illustrate such an unphilosophical procedure by a parallel example, we should instance the various hypotheses which have been constructed on the subject of that profound mystery, the inter course between the soul and the material world. Upon the principle that we can conjecture the nature of substances only from their properties, and from which we reason that substances which possess not one property in common cannot be the same, it seems most rational to believe that the soul is immaterial. That there is a material world, and that the soul holds intercourse with it, seem facts established by the evidence of our senses; and what shall we believe if we reject their testimony ? To most men, therefore, it appears reasonable to admit both the above facts ; though to show how both are true be impossible. Now the idealist will tell you that these two facts not only appear incompatible, but are really so ; and therefore, to bring all within the limits of an hy pothesis, which shall be freed from these presumed impossibilities, undertakes to annihilate the mate rial universe, and presents you in its stead a " plentiful assortment" of ideas. The materialist, on the other hand, arguing upon the same prin ciples, but to different conclusions, pretends to solve the difficulty by representing thought as a modification of matter ; and he is positive, for his part, that except upon such an hypothesis the soul could never hold intercourse with a world so totally diverse from itself. In the mean time the disciple of a more modest philosophy believes both facts, without attempting to reduce them within the compass of supposed rational systems, — systems which after all leave the main difficulties of the subject just where they were. It appears to us that the conduct of different philosophers has been much the same in the necessarian con troversy. The moral necessity of our volitions seems irrefragably proved by reasoning; the cer tainty of our being moral agents, by facts. The fatalist, who may be represented by the materialist in the foregoing illustration, begs to assure you that in holding these facts together, you are labouring under a strange delusion ; that they are absolutely contradictory ; and he only refrains from demon strating them to be so, because he presumes the position nearly self-evident ; he therefore informs you, that holding as he is obliged to do, the former of the two facts, he peremptorily rejects the latter. The libertarian, on the other hand, who may be represented by the Berkleian, admits the latter fact, but assuming as well as the other, that the two cannot be held together, declares that the former is absolutely inconsistent with virtue and vice, and nothing short of blasphemy and impiety. The rational necessarian, continuing to hold both, unless it shall be demonstrated, not assumed, that they are contradictory, will neither surrender his reason, because it seems to contravene matter of fact ; nor matter of fact, because it seems at va riance with the conclusions of reason. If the opinions we have expressed are correct, it cannot be difficult to say, to which hypothesis, that of necessity or that of liberty, the balance of probability inclines; or which it becomes most reasonable to adopt. That of necessity appears to be conclusively established by reason and con* sciousness, but is encumbered by the apparent difficulty of reconciling it with moral agency. So long as this difficulty cannot be proved to be an impossibility, it ought not to prevent our receiving the hypothesis. The opposite system, on the other hand, not only appears to lead us into a labyrinth OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. xxxv of perplexities and contradictions, but is moreover apparently chargeable (and of course in our view really so) with that very same fatal bearing on moral agency, which it charges upon its rival. In other words, by adopting it we really get rid of no moral difficulty, and gratuitously burden our selves with inextricable ones of another kind. It is now generally admitted, that the doctrine of necessity may be held without relaxing, in the slightest degree, the obligations of virtue. Some of its earliest opponents, it is true, were in the habit of using the most unmeasured language on this subject; language, which would not have been justified, even if the apparent connexion between the doctrine of necessity and the sub version of morals had been stronger than it is, so long as its soundest advocates denied that they admitted any such consequences. The book of Whitby is full of vague declamation on the horrible consequences, which those who presume to hold the doctrines of necessity (and those of Calvinism generally) must admit. For one of the alleged consequences of moral necessity, at least, that it annuls all motives, and makes it absurd to employ them, it may perhaps perplex the metaphysicians of future ages to account. They will all wonder that such an objection could ever be urged j against a system, which is wholly built upon the ; supposition, that the will never acts without mo tives, and ever follows the prevailing one ! What ever difficulties, on other grounds, may attach to the system, the necessarian can consistently address motives to others, since he believes thatinproportion as they are strong, will be the probability of their producing the desired effect ; and that if they can reach a certain point, that event will necessarily follow. We rejoice, however, to perceive, that the ablest modern advocates of the opposite system (itself very much modified) have spoken a lan guage of fairness and candour, which do them in finite credit. The book of Copleston, (with some exceptions,) and the writings of Whately, are, in these qualities at least, not unworthy of comparison with the " Inquiry" of Edwards himself. By the latter of these authors, particularly, it is admitted,* that the doctrine of necessity may be explained in a manner which will leave every active principle of our nature unimpaired, and the whole system of means and motives as it was before. And, indeed, this very circumstance has been made the ground of some very ingenious, if not powerful, objections, against the utility of discussing the subject at all ! It is alleged, that if it be held in the above sense it is useless, because exerting no practical influence on the process of volitions ; while, if it be not held in that sense, it is of course pernicious. — A few words on this subject. We may remark that the Essayist is also very copious on this subject. If it be maintained that the theory of volitions adopted by the advocates of moral necessity is useless, because it leaves the process of volition practically as it was, then any attempt at any * See particularly Whately's Essays on Paul's Epistles, pages H4-120. such analysis will be useless on the same account ; if the argument be valid at all, it must be so uniformly. Sad indeed would be the state of the world, if any analysis of any of the processes of mind or of the operations of external nature, could subvert the great laws which regulate either. Such an argument, therefore, obviously applies just as much to the hypothesis of our opponents as to our own ; and, indeed, has a direct tendency to prove that any attempt to analyze a process which shall not affect the process itself, is useless ; whereas the fact, that it will not affect it, is the only thing which can render it safe to attempt such analysis at all. We quite believe, that men must will and act in harmony with the same laws they have ever obeyed, whether the doctrine of necessity or that of liberty be the true one, or neither the one nor the other. Mankind universally are content to know that they have the power to do as they will, however they come to will ; and so long as they feel that they are responsible for their actions, never ask, in ordinary life, whether the determina tions of their wills are the result of a self-determin ing power, or are certainly determined by motives. Not only therefore will any hypothesis, rationally held on this subject, have no practical effect upon the processes of volition, but if the true one, must necessarily have none ; it being simply, in fact, an analysis of laws and principles in action thousands of years before such analysis was at tempted. We live in an universe, which, in the whole and in its parts, is synthetical ; all whose wondrous mechanism has come into play long- before man's busy eye is turned upon it. He can merely be the " interpreter of nature," to use the beautiful language of Lord Bacon. Thus, for in stance, Harvey's great discovery made no difference in the circulation of the blood ; that wondrous pro cess goes on now just as it did before, and as it ever will. The subtle analyses of the chemist alter not the structure or the properties of the many sub stances, which are compelled to reveal the secrets of their nature beneath the torture of hjs crucibles and alembics. We agree therefore in all that the elegant Essayist and the more logical Whately have so powerfully said on this subject, and in all that Bishop Butler still more admirably said before them ; that the doctrine of moral necessity leaves man under precisely the same laws of volition which controlled him before any such doctrine was propounded. But any argument from thence against the utility of the doctrine of necessity can be of no avail, unless it be intended to proscribe every attempt at an analysis of the great facts of volition, facts, which every such analysis not abused, (which is the case supposed,) must leave just as they were. But let us examine a little further the alleged practical insignificance of this doctrine. In the first place, then, we are quite confident, that every real philosopher will gratefully receive any true analysis of the process of volition ; though, if true, it must necessarily leave that process as it was. Such a process is a xxxvi AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS rational object of curiosity and investigation, and he will feel grateful for an analysis of it, if it be only as an achievement of science ; equally so, in- indeed, whichever of the many rival systems be proved to be true. But further, we cannot help thinking, that in speaking of the practical inutility of this doc trine, the Essayist has overlooked the fact, that, though as an analysis of the process of volition, it cannot affect that process, it may be useful, emi nently useful, indirectly and in other ways ; just as an analysis of any complicated process in nature, though it cannot alter the relations of things, (as no analysis can,) may yet be of important service to mankind. The analysis of gold will leave that me tal just as it was, and always will be ; butwho would say that on that ground such an analysis must be useless ? The resolution of light into its primary rays cannot, it is to be hoped, alter the nature of light itself; yet is it on that account unimportant ? All these discoveries have originated other truths of the most beneficial character. It seems to us that the utility of the doctrine of moral necessity is to be tested in the same way. If held ration ally, if not abused, (the case now supposed,) it will, as its opponents affirm, be practically use less, as respects the process of volition itself ; just as will be the case with every true analysis of that process ; but are there no other, and totally di verse, respects, in which it may be useful ? Does it relieve us from no difficulties respecting the divine fore-knowledge, and an universal provi dence ? Does it throw no light upon certain dark, and to us otherwise inexplicable, passages of Scrip ture ? In this latter respect we cannot help re garding Edwards's work somewhat in the same light with Butler's Analogy. It appears to us in reading it, that we are made acquainted with another series of analogies between the disclosures of inspiration and the actual constitution of the world ; and those expressions in Scripture which the infidel had charged upon it as breathing the dark spirit of fatalism, only demonstrate, that in this, as in other instances, the Divine Author has spoken from what he knew to be our nature, and has thus necessarily anticipated the discoveries of philosophy. Again, can the doctrine of moral necessity ex ert no beneficial influence on our piety ? Upon the supposition that it has no practical effect on our conduct towards one another, (the case supposed,) it by no means follows that it shall affect in no way our sentiments towards the Supreme. On the contrary, it seems to us far better calculated to cherish humility, to subdue pride, to bring us more immediately into contact with God, to teach us more effectually our dependence on him, than the opposite doctrine. This remark, indeed, applies to all the peculiarities of Calvinism ; if abused, they will lead to more awful and terrible perversions of the gospel, than any other system ; but if not abused, if (the case still supposed) they leave us to the same ordinary rules of action as before, they are, we sincerely believe, calculated to produce the most ardent and elevated piety, by bringing the soul into more constant communion with God and with eternal verities, than the oppo site opinions. In all these respects, then, the doc trine of necessity may not be of so little practical importance as the Essayist and others imagine ; nor worthy of such summary dismissal to the " dark caverns" of speculation from whence it first issued. But we must now proceed, as we proposed, to consider those defects in the argumentation of this great work, which the Essayist to whom we have so often referred, professes to discover. In the "Introduction" to his Essay, he sums up what he deems the principal defects of Edwards in the vague charge, a charge which we shall consider more particularly hereafter, — that he " mingles purely abstract propositions — proposi tions strictly metaphysical, with facts belonging to the physiology of the human mind." This the author affirms is " fatal to the consistency of a philosophical theory ; " " that the reader will be conscious of a vague dissatisfaction, or latent sus picion that some fallacy has passed into the train of reasoning, though the linking of syllogisms seems perfect." Since these charges are of so grave a nature, since, if they really exist, these er rors must run through the whole tissue of Edwards's argumentation and reduce it to dust, one would expect that the meaning of the Essayist would have been most copiously and perspicuously ex plained, — that every particular instance in which such worthless materials had been wrought into the woof of argument, would have been pointed out, and the feeble character of the texture de monstrated by just breaking up, as our author could easily have done, the sophisms which Jona than Edwards has constructed out of such incon gruous premises. Yet, strange to say, he has ventured upon no such specification ; he seems to think it not too great a demand upon our credulity, that we should believe on his mere assurance, and in reference to such a work as the " Inquiry," that it is possible to point out such " errors of me thod," as in fact vitiate nearly the whole of the reasoning ! The only attempt which, so far as we can find, he makes to illustrate and to substantiate his for midable charges, is in his fourth " section," (in which he considers the question of necessity as one " of the physiology of man,") and in a note or two appended to that part of his performance. We do not hesitate to say, that if the charge there adduced be a fair specimen of those other in stances of defective logic, which he has concealed with such cautious mystery, the " Inquiry" may still be regarded as the same irrefragable piece of reasoning which the world has always considered it. In our opinion his attempt is a signal failure. For what is his objection to Edwards in the pas sages to which we refer ? Why, that he has not entered sufficiently into the physiological condi- , tions of volition in different classes of voluntary agents, or the same agents at different times ; he blames him that he has not taken into account OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. xxxvu •the infinite diversity of circumstances, the endlessly varying degrees and limits within which the volun tary principle may be exercised amongst different classes of voluntary agents, from the lowest ani mals to the highest orders of created intelligence ; or in the same voluntary agents at different periods of their existence, and possessed of vary ing measures of knowledge and experience. With all this, the question of the moral necessity of all volitions had nothing whatever to do. It is true, indeed, that owing to the causes the Essayist has specified, the processes of volition are endlessly complicated and varied ; and in order to supply Edwards's imagined deficiencies, he has illustrated his meaning with much vivacity, but with a some what tedious amplification, by a reference to the processes of volition in different classes of volun tary agents. Now all this is obviously quite foreign to the subject ; it has no connexion with the only aspects in which it concerned Jonathan Edwards to consider the question. Edwards's ob ject was to consider volitions in that point in which they all resembled one another, — namely, as originating in motives of some kind or other ; no matter how those motives may vary in number and complexity in different orders of voluntary agents, or in the same agents at different periods. His design did not require that he should consider the number of causes which in particular cases control volition, but whether volition is not always caused. Yet the Essayist, assuming, apparently, that Edwards ought to have done this, and that his argument is defective because it touches no inquiries of such a nature, is amusingly copious in instances of supposed similar errors in reasonings on some of the mechanical arts. In these in stances the abstract principles of mathematics are imagined to be rigorously applied to a variety of complicated problems, that can be decided only by a cautious and extensive induction of facts in several departments of science. But we think it just to cite the following sentences, which will enable our readers to judge for themselves. " That practical science which relates to the strength of materials, in like manner combines the principles of several sciences. ¦ * * * * Now, let it, in these cases, be supposed that the ma thematician, dogmatically confident of his demonstra tions, were (and this is in fact the fault of the earlier mathematicians, and not seldom of Leibnitz,) to determine the problem above mentioned, as if it were a pure abstrac tion, or, h" he referred loosely to certain vulgar facts con cerning the strength of timber, were neither to make ex periments of this physical kind, nor to swerve at aU from his mathematical processes in regard to them : — in this case all his products must be erroneous. Or, though cor rect mathematically, they would be inapplicable to the real world, and useless, or worse than useless, in practice. It is but of late that these cases of complicated princi ples have been made matters of science. We must not wonder, therefore, that within the hazy precincts of intel lectual philosophy, distinctions and separations of a pa rallel kind have scarcely at all been regarded. Now, to return to the instance before us, of the treatise on ' Free dom of Will,' the argument is, in the main, abstract, but not purely so; for, besides the admixture of scripture proofs, the physiology of the human mind is taken up, as its material or subject, and yet far too loosely and vaguely d to satisfy those who look at human nature as an object of natural philosophy. Or, to refer allusively to the illus tration above given, Edwards is an accomplished mathe matician ; but he thought little, or did not take into his calculations, the difference between oak and fir. His treatise on the ' Will' is, to a true philosophy of human nature, as the demonstrations of Leibnitz — Demonstra- tiones Nova? de. Resistentid Solidorum — are to modern me chanical science." Now, it is by no means difficult to show that there is a glaring fallacy in this quietly assum ed parallel ; that there is in reality no sort of analogy between the case of Edwards and that of these supposed dogmatists. Had Edwards, indeed, not only reasoned from one volition to all, in those points in which they all resemble one another, and in which they may all be treated as one class ; if he had not only argued that all volitions are caused by some motives, but that the same motives will always cause the same volitions in all classes of voluntary agents, or any such absur dities, then indeed the cases would have been parallel. He would have fallen precisely into the error into which the Essayist has imagined him to fall. A really parallel case would have been to show that a mechanic would have argued fallaciously in applying mechanical laws to materials in general, so far as they all resembled one another — so far as they possessed universally the common proper ties of matter. It is only so far as volitions all resemble one another that Edwards treats of them. — The Essayist has illustrated his meaning by copious examples ; let us be allowed to take one. Edwards is reasoning with those who are supposed to deny that to be a quality of all volitions which he predicates of them. Let us suppose that instead of this he was arguing with some one who denied the refrangibility of ligBt ; and suppose he were to establish the doctrine that the rays of light were refracted, more or less, no matter in what degree, whatever the medium through which it passed ; would his reasoning be thought imperfect for all the great purposes for which he used it, that he did not show that it was refracted more in passing through some media than others, or in not ascertaining, by a large induction, the phy sical conditions of light when passing through each. We imagine not. Or, suppose he were arguing that all design proved an intelligent cause ; would his argument, for the purposes to which he used it, be the less conclusive that he did not exemplify it with all the enchanting variety of detail, spread out over the pages of Paley's Natural Theology. Now in the instance before us, Edwards is proceeding on precisely the same principle. He reasons that all volitions (no matter how complex or how simple the play of motives in each particular instance) are not un caused — a fact which the Essayist does not deny. How, then, is his logic impaired by his not entering into the physiological conditions of volition in different classes of voluntary agents ? Had he at tempted any thing of this kind, we quite concur with the Essayist in thinking that he would have AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS failed ; and for reasons which we have already abundantly specified in the analysis we have given of Edwards's mind. With his characteristic judg ment he has, it appears to us, just confined his argument within those limits which were exactly adapted to the structure of his intellect. And to have gone further would have been not only enter ing upon a field for which we cannot but think he was not well qualified, but quite alien from the controversy in which he was engaged. The instance to which we have above referred, (so far as we have been able to find,) is the only one in which the Essayist has even attempted to establish his position, that Edwards has intro duced those fatal elements of dissolution into his reasoning of which he speaks. But the general charge is so grave, that we think it due to Edwards to examine this position somewhat farther. The language, indeed, in which it is couched, is so vague, that no one can tell how far he intends to urge it ; but for this very reason it may create in the minds of some readers an impression far stronger than he himself intended to convey. How easy would it have been for him to have obviated the possibility of any such misunderstanding, by letting the world know what are the particular fallacies which he has detected ! Edwards was so fair and open a reasoner himself, and so uni formly avoided any vague or indefinite charges, that such explicitness seemed peculiarly due to him from every one who professed to examine his arguments. That we may not do our author in justice, we shall beg to cite his words. " The attentive reader of Edwards will detect a confusion of another sort, less palpable indeed, but of not less fatal consequence to the consistency of a philosophical argu ment; and which, though sanctioned by the highest au thorities, in all times* and recommended by the example of the most eminent writers, even to the present moment, must, so long as it is adhered to, hold intellectual philo sophy far in the rear of the physical and mathematical sciences. For the present it is enough just to point out the error of method alluded to, remitting the further con sideration of it to a subsequent page. It is that of- mingling purely abstract propositions — propositions strictly metaphysical, with facts belonging to the physiology of the human mind. Even the reader who is scarcely at all familiar with abstruse science, will, if he follow our author attentively, be perpetually conscious of a vague dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion, that some fallacy has passed into the train of propositions, although the linking of syllogisms seems perfect. This suspicion will increase in strength as he proceeds, and will at length condense itself into the form of a protest against certain conclusions, notwithstanding their apparently necessary connexion with the premises." That we may know what value our author at taches to these " abstractions," and what valuethose reasonings must have which are founded on them in reference to a question of fact, like this of the free dom of the will, the Essayist gives us to understand that they stand parallel with " the abstractions of pure mathematics;" "that it may be said of both, that the human mind masters them, comprehends and perceives their properties and relations, and feels that the materials of its cogitation all lie within its grasp, are exposed to its inspection, and need not be gathered from observation." " These abstractions," he tells us, may be made " to pass through the process of syllogistic reasoning,"-— as though all other propositions, of any nature whatsoever, that are capable of being made to yield logical inferences from their comparison with one another, were not capable of being made to pass through that process too ; or as though the struc ture of the syllogism depended on the kind of pro positions which constitute the premises, instead of the connexion between the premises and the conclusion. Now if Edwards has employed such abstractions as our Essayist here mentions, we should be glad if he would particularize them. It is incredible how much trouble may be saved by a little specifi cation. This, however, he has not even attempted ; he has not given us a single instance of those " abstractions," of which the author predicates so close an analogy to the definitions of pure mathe matics. The simple fact is, there were none to give. In truth, if Edwards had employed any such " abstractions'^ those the Essayist describes, (just as one might employ any conceivable propositions on any subject for the mere purpose of logical il lation, modestly assuming that those preliminary " abstractions" are to be taken for granted,) he would have done a very absurd thing ; however consecutive his argumentation might be, it would have been utterly worthless, because purely hypo thetical ; depending upon a concession of the pre mises, and those, too, " abstractions." So far from its being true, as the Essayist appears to imagine, that the treatise on the "Will" would have been more complete, " more philosophically consistent," if such abstractions, instead of being " mingled with facts belonging to the physiology of thehuman mind," had been adhered to throughout, they would have crumbled the whole stupendous structure of argumentation into dust. Abstractions, in this sense, Edwards never uses. The words " abstract truths" may be taken in two senses. They may mean, proposi tions purely hypothetical, or propositions which, though they would be true if the universe were annihilated, and are, therefore, called abstract, are not the less applicable on that account (but rather the more so) to actual existence. Thus, for example, when Edwards maintains the proposition, that every " effect must have a cause," he maintains what we suppose our Essayist would call an abstract proposition ; it is so, because as soon as the mind has once comprehended the ideas of cause and effect, it perceives that it would be a contradiction to imagine such a proposition un true, and that it would not be the less true were the universe annihilated. But this universality of application dues not render the principle inap plicable to the universe as it is actually constitu ted, but rather the reverse. Thus abstractions of this nature may be em ployed in questions of fact, and in conjunction with propositions asserting facts belonging to the physiology of the human mind, without any sort OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. of impropriety; and for this simple reason, that they are employed not as purely hypothetical propositions, but for the very purpose of being ap plied, and because they are applicable, to actual existences. It is just so, in the case of that ab stract truth to which we just now referred. For precisely the same reasons the abstractions of mathematics are capable of application to ac tual existence, and enter so largely into the rea sonings of the mixed sciences. The abstract propositions, which Edwards brings forward, are so far from being merely hypothetically true, that they are actually true, and indeed are only called abstract propositions because it is supposed to imply a contradiction that they should be untrue. We may illustrate this by a reference to Ed wards's great maxim, that every " effect must have a cause." This is supposed to be true as a matter of fact ; and to be rendered available to his purpose, only because it is such. If only admitted to be hypothetically true, all the demon strations founded upon it, being hypothetical too, would to any practical purpose be worthless. But so far from this, it is only affirmed to be an ab stract proposition at all, because in distinction from ordinary matters of fact, it would be a con tradiction to suppose the contrary. If the uni verse were annihilated, it would still be true that every effect, whether actually existent or possible, must presuppose a cause. But it is for the express purpose of applying it to actual effects, (and of course it embraces these, since it embraces every possible effect,) that it is employed by Edwards. It would be true in mathematics, that every circle must possess certain properties, though no circle were in existence ; yet it would be strange to imagine, that we could not reason from such a de finition to any actually existent circle, when we have already admitted that it applies to every pos sible circle. It is as a fact, that Edwards submits his great postulate to his opponents ; a fact, which if they deny, they must deny at the peril of being driven to concessions far more appalling, than the admission of the doctrine of philosophical necessity. Now such propositions being intended to apply to actual existence, and not merely affirmed to be hypothetically true, (although they are hypothe tically true,) may certainly be conjoined with pro positions respecting mere matter of fact, (as for instance facts connected with the physiology of the mind,) and the deductive processes of reason ings, founded on such propositions, be in no de gree vitiated by such conjunction* This charge of unsound reasoning, therefore, cannot for a moment be sustained by the mere fact, which is all upon which the Essayist has • It is not imprbper to observe, that the Essayist constantly uses the words " abstractions," " metaphysics," " metaphysical science," " intellectual philosophy." &c. in the most vague and obscure manner, so as to render it quite impossible to under stand precisely what he means. To the very paragraph in which he has brought forward his great charge, that Edwards has impaired his reasoning by the union of propositions " strictly metaphysical," with " facts belonging to the physio logy of the mind," and where, if any where, his readers might expect a perspicuous and logical exposition of what he wished d 2 thought proper to rest it; that Edwards em ploys " abstract propositions," and " facts con nected with the physiology of the mind," as con joint elements of his ratiocination. This charge cannot be sustained, because Edwards never em ploys any " abstract principles," in the absurd way the Essayist imputes to him, but always with a reference to actual existences. By saying, therefore, that there is such a conjunction of different propositions, (which is all he does say,) the Essayist proves no reasoning of Edwards's to be unsound ; his duty clearly was, to have pointed out the particular instances in which such propositions are fallaciously conjoined. The charges of the Essayist are, indeed, very serious ; and must be made out, not by taking for granted the very fallacies supposed, and then by stating that such a method of inquiry must be very unsound, nor by adducing ingenious speci mens of such error, from real or imagined cases, in various branches of physical science ; but by specifying the particular instances of fallacious reasoning, in the very work which has called forth these vague criticisms ; by showing what those " abstractions," or those " facts," are, which have been unduly assumed, if the error lies in the premises, or where the inference is faulty, if it be in the logical process. This would have been conferring essential benefit on the reader of Edwards. We are far from saying, that every argument Edwards has adduced is sound ; for it would be surprising, indeed, if in a work of such magnitude, and of such subtle and pro found argumentation, no error in any particular argument had crept in. " But we presume," to use the language of Edwards to those who he knew would attempt to evade the force of his reasoning, by charging him with metaphysical refinements, " that if any argument be unsound, it may be shown to be so." The " Essayist" has not ventured upon this hard task. We have been the longer upon this subject, be cause, as we have already stated, the very vague ness and mystery of that ineffable charge which the Essayist has brought forward, may tempt many persons to suppose that he intends it to apply more extensively than perhaps is really the case. We cannot conclude these remarks without imploring the Essayist, should his Essay come to a second edition, to tell his readers distinctly what those abstractions of Edwards's are, which are hypothe tically true, but actually false ; or, what those " facts" are with which those propositions cannot be combined ; what in a word are those particu lar instances of fallacious reasoning, which have provoked a charge so serious.* It is true that this doctrine is liable to be abus- to convey, he actually appends a note, stating, that he " refers us to a subsequent page for a definition of the sense in which the writer employs the term metaphysics as distinguished from the physiology of the mind!" We can only say, we have searched in vain for even the shadow of such a definition ; there is no thing, so far as we can find, that even approximates to it. The Essayist, all along, employs this class of words in the same doubtful and ambiguous manner, and uniformly exhibits a strange antipathy to close, precise, and clear explanations. It is well known that objects seen through a mist are magnified xl AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS ed ; and so is the opposite. That system is liable to abuses peculiarly its own ; and, as we have already shown, it might, in the hands of a lover of philosophical paradox, be subject to the very same abuses as the doctrine of necessity. However, it would be uncandid to deny that the latter is infi nitely more liable to be thus abused, principally on account of those unhappy words, necessity, im possibility, and their correlates, which are so apt to exercise a pernicious influence on the associa tions of the vulgar. This, however, assuredly affords no argument for abandoning the doctrine, unless it be reasonable to abandon whatever is liable to abuse. . It is, nevertheless, a sound rea son for stating the theory of moral necessity with the utmost caution, and for vehemently protesting against its abuses. It is worthy of mention, as strongly illustrating Edwards's prodigious' powers, that the rough copy of the work on the " Will" was written in little more than four months. This fact has been clearly established by some letters he has left behind him. A full account of the matter will be found in the Memoir. The work on " Original Sin" stands next in importance to the treatise on the " Will," and is scarcely, if at all, inferior in vigour and subtilty of reasoning. It is (beyond all comparison) the ablest explication of the Calvinistic doctrine on this point, ever written. Edwards died before it was published.: he left it, however, quite ready, for the press ; indeed, several sheets had passed under his own revision. A very great part of the work is in the strictest sense controversial ; yet, as Edwards explicitly states, it is not intended to be so much a reply to any particular antagonist, as a general defence of the doctrine in question. The author whom he chiefly opposes was Dr. John Taylor of Norwich, who had published elaborately against the Cal vinistic doctrine of original sin ; both in a trea tise expressly on this subject, and incidentally, in his Commentary on Romans. This doctrine, as is the case with the controversy on the will, has been almost hopelessly perplexed by the ambiguity of certain terms, and the associ ations formed upon them. On this account we are very far from thinking either the term " original sin," or " imputation of Adam's sin," well chosen. We dislike the first, because the word " sin " is generally used to designate some act of trans gression, in thought, word, or deed, of some pre cept of the moral law ; and this ordinary use of it gives opportunity to theologians, who may be either deficient in candour or strong in prejudice, to talk of the absurdity of supposing sin in those who have never actually committed transgression. All this would be avoided, if it were always borne in mind, that what is meant by " original sin," into vast dimensions. From the almost elaborate obscurity which sometimes distinguishes the Essayist, one might almost imagine that he was trying to practise upon us this optical illusion, and experimenting whether the most slender sophisms might not appear gigantic phantoms-of logic when dimly de- is principally that depraved bias of our nature which predisposes us to sin, and which (as the Calvinists maintain) we have derived from our first parents ; a bias which, so long as it is found in us, necessarily exposes us (as we shall presently see) to suffering. We dislike the second term, " imputation of Adam's sin," because the word imputation is apt to suggest the idea of an arbi trary transfer of the guilt and consequent punish ment of one moral agent to another moral agent, whose moral condition is essentially different. But this is not what is meant by it. if we could suppose one of the descendants of Adam born without this depraved bias, and actually, when master of his own actions, persevering in unbroken obedience to the law of God, then the imputation of Adam's guilt would be considered by Calvinists quite as absurd and as unjust as our opponents profess now to consider it. All that is meant by the "imputation of Adam's sin," is that as, in the original constitution of things, Adam and his posterity were linked together by an inseparable union, as the root of a tree and its branches ; and as the moral state of the latter (as well as their state in every other respect) was affected by that of the former, so it was reasonable that Adam should be treated as the federal head of his race. They are so far one, as to warrant similarity of treatment. In this hypothesis, the moral state of his descend ants is not the consequence of the imputation of Adam's sin, but presupposed as the reason of such imputation, and as prior to it in the order of nature : they are treated as he is, because they are presup posed to be, and are really, morally like him. Thus the great, and we may say the sole difficulty, is to reconcile it with justice that the destinies of our race should be linked in a chain of mutual dependence with those of our first father ; that not only our physical condition, (a fact universally admitted,) but that our moral condition, should take its complexion from his own ; that as he was, we should be ; that if he fell, and, as a conse quence, became mortal, we should fall with him, and become mortal too. Such a constitution, however, of course, presupposes the state of Adam's descendants to correspond with his own ; and the imputation of Adam's sin means nothing more than that they are treated as Adam was, simply because they are virtually in the same condition with him. According to this doctrine, therefore, the real diffi culty is not to reconcile the imputation of sin and guilt where there is no sin and guilt at all, (for that is not the case supposed,) but to vindicate the rea sonableness of a constitution by which one being becomes depraved by his dependence on another who is so, or by which the moral condition of one. being is remotely determined by the moral condi tion of another. Such is the doctrine when freed from all theo logical technicalities. And the more we consider scried through clouds of ambiguous language. We find our selves as much perplexed as that able reviewer to whom we have above adverted, to discover what " those detested abstrac tions" are, with which the Essayist is so fearfully haunted. OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. xlr it, the more we shall perceive, that the sole diffi culty is the one we have mentioned. It will, perhaps, be said, that the circumstances of Adam and his posterity are essentially differ ent ; that similarity of moral condition would not justify similarity of treatment, inasmuch as Adam had actually sinned, whereas his posterity are only supposed to possess a depravity of nature — a proneness to sin — a deflection from the line of original rectitude. But this alters not the case, as it regards the present argument. So long as such a moral condition exists, no matter how it origi nated, so long will it be a necessary consequence, that that Being who is infinitely and unalterably holy, should regard it with abhorrence and dis- placency. We are not now, be it recollected, inquiring into the origin of the depravity, nor canvassing the justice of that constitution by which, in the first instance, the moral condition of one being is made to depend on that of another ; (the great, and, as we have already stated, the sole difficulty;) we are merely asserting, that as is the moral state of the soul, such will be the condition of happiness or misery attached to it ; and such the regards, whether of complacency or abhor rence, with which the Divine Being will necessarily contemplate it. It is this posture of the soul — this particular moral state — apart from and previous to the actual commission of sin, that determines its physical condition ; and it is this, as both reason and Scripture assure us, in which essentially consists alienation from or conformity to God. It is not the nature of any moral act, so much as the state of mind from which such an act flows, which characterizes the condition of a moral agent, and is chiefly the object of the Divine regards. The one is but an expression of the other. — It is not merely in the moment in which evil passions are active, that their slave and victim is hateful ; he is equally so, when those passions are in a state of transient and treacherous repose ; when the storm is for a mo ment hushed : for we know that the elements of evil still exist in his bosom as strongly as ever, and, when circumstances favour, will break out with renewed violence. We loathe a venomous reptile, not only when it wounds, and because it wounds, but because it can wound ; we loathe it simply because it carries about with it such a terrible ap paratus of mischief; and this too, even though it may never have been actually mischievous. Nay, we loathe it even before its pernicious energies are sufficiently developed to be injurious at all. We look simply at its nature ; we form our opinion from what that nature is in itself, and do not wait for actual displaysof it. Or, (to change the illustra tion,) who would not recoil from the spectacle of a sleeping brigand, on whose countenance were im pressed merely the traces of those stormy and de praved passions, which slumber had hushed into mo mentary repose ? We should abhor him because his nature was so depraved — because, however harmless for the moment, he still carried venom within. Now let us imagine a human being, whose faculties have never yet been employed in the actual com mission of evil, but yet are fully developed for ac tion; who, in a word, has been slumbering from infancy to manhood ; and let us suppose, that we know he will certainly employ his. faculties for evil, the moment he shall start into active life ; must not such a being, even before he has actually committed evil, or " sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression," be an object of abhorrence to every being characterized by moral rectitude, and consequently to God himself, and that in a degree proportioned to His jneffable purity ? Such a depraved being will be loathed because his nature is hateful. Neither must we forget, that where this depravity exists at all, the infinitely pure eyes of the Supreme can perceive far more of what is hateful in a soul thus morally perverted, even amidst what we are accustomed to consider the innocence of infancy, than our sin-clouded eye can see in the hardened brow and perturbed features of the sleeping murderer. Nor does it matter how long it may be, before the evil prin ciples which are lodged in the breast shall develope their energies in action ; or in what part of the boundless dominions of the Eternal. Through the varying scenes of immortality, through all worlds, throughout infinite duration, the same abhorrence on the part of the Divine Being must continue so long as the same causes operate to produce it : while he is pure and holy, so long must he hate what is the reverse of his nature. This perpetual hostility is the inevitable result of the different relations in which the two beings stand to one another ; and a change must pass upon one, before he can be brought into conformity with the other ; in other words, before this hostility can cease. It may be said, perhaps, that this represent ation bears ominously on the destinies even of those who die in infancy, inasmuch as their death only removes them, with the same depraved principles still inherent, to some other sphere of action ; to some distant world, in which those principles shall be developed, — the same relations still persisting, between them and their Creator, as though they had been permitted to live on earth. And this in our opinion would have been the case, (for death, simply considered, has no tendency to work a moral change on the soul,) were it not for that auspicious remedy which the gospel pro vides. The death of Christ has obliterated the effects of Adam's transgression, so far as that none shall be left to final depravity or final condemna tion, for that alone. Thus provision is made for the moral renovation of infants ; that renovation which must be produced in some way or other, before they can be received into communion with God. Who, then, does not exult in the glorious effects of the gospel, which has thus peopled heaven at once with unnumbered myriads of our race ? and who does not almost envy the lot of those who, dying in infancy, are subjected at once to that transformation of nature, which shall fit them for the eternal habitations of heaven ? — But, in some way or other, the change, it is obvious, xlii AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS must be produced ; since so long as God remains what he is and a depraved creature still depraved, (no matter how the depravity originated,) so long must the latter remain beneath the frown of the former. Such is the explication of the doctrine of original sin, which, it will be seen, does not, as is so often represented, imply the arbitrary imputation of the guilt of one moral agent to another, in no sense guilty ; and then an equally arbitrary infliction of punishment : but, presupposing the moral state of Adam's descendants to resemble his own, and to necessitate, therefore, the same treatment, it re presents it as just to deal with us as in our great progenitor, — as virtually one with him, as grafted on his stock, as bound up in his destinies. Now let us look, for a moment, at the great and sole difficulty with which this theory is embarrassed. It may perhaps be conceded, that when a certain moral state is once originated, a certain treatment on the part of the Supreme becomes inevitable; but then it will doubtless be objected, that it is ap parently an unjust thing, or if this representation be too strong, a perplexing thing, (as we fully ad mit it to be,) that the moral state of one being should, in the first instance, be affected by that of another. But, then, is this difficulty more insur mountable than a thousand others closely analo gous? It is apparently an unjust and perplexing thing, that one being should be born into the world with the seeds of disease and death within him ; yet, we do not permit ourselves, on the one hand, to say, that it is not true that any are so born ; for we are obliged to admit it in fact ; nor on the other, that if it be true, it contravenes all the perfections of God; for as we find the fact to be incontrovertible, we wisely determine within ourselves, that there is some way, though we know not what it is, of reconciling the fact with all the attributes of Deity. It will be seen by the defence we have just made, that we should not choose to attempt to vindicate, by direct argument, that constitution, by which the moral destinies of one being are in fact in trusted to the keeping of another. This is one of the mysteries about which, in our present state, it is in vain to reason. The difficulty is to be met, simply bv appealing, in the first instance, to the facts which prove such a constitution, and then by showing that the very same difficulty presses on any hypothesis that can be adopted on this subject ; and, indeed, may be objected to all the proceedings of God towards this lower universe : — and consequently can never be conclusive against the Calvinistic doctrine of original sin. Wh tt we have chiefly to do, is to ascertain, whether it is a fact that there is such a constitu tion ; it is impossible that we can ever give a solu tion of the reasons why the Divine Being permitted that there should be such ; or what were the su perior advantages which, notwithstanding all the evils connected with it, it possessed over others. Why evil should be permitted to exist at all under the government of a Being whose power, wisdom, and benevolence, appear to be equally unlimited, must remain an inscrutable mystery. That con stitution of things, however, of which we are now speaking, is no greater mystery. But, as we have already sdid, all that we have to do is to ascertain, whether it is a fact, that God has permitted a constitution of things, by which the moral state of one being is affected by that of another. The first proof of it is deduced from the astounding and (upon any other hypothesis) inexplicable fact, that all mankind become sinners; that they as certainly fall into the commission of evil as they are permitted to exist! This, except upon the supposition of a depraved bias, is absolutely un accountable ; it is incredible, that not one out of the many myriads of our race should have retained his moral integrity, supposing all to have been born without any predisposition to evil. But on this subject we need say nothing : in the first part of his treatise, Edwards has done (he fullest justice to this branch of the argument. We know not which most to admire, the subtilty, or the com prehensiveness, of his reasoning. It amounts to little short of demonstration. But, as we just now intimated, there are incon testable facts which form a presumptive proof of the existence of such a constitution. Such a con stitution would be in harmony with a thousand analogies, which offer themselves to our notice in every part of this lower universe. It is an ad ditional reason, why we should not reject the belief of such a constitution, merely because we cannot give an explanation of it, that many of those analogous cases (cases fully admitted on all hands) are equally difficult of explication ; and ought therefore, if the one be rejected, to be re jected too ; a conclusion which would speedily lead us to atheism. We find, in truth, tint the great law of the universe is mutual dependence. To ascend from the lower to the higher instances : — In the vegetable world , the root and the branches, the stock and the flower, flourish and wither, bloom and decay together. In the animal world, the young depend in a vast variety of ways upon their parents. In numberless cases, the most dis tressing infirmities and the most torturing dis eases, rendering the whole of life one long paroxysm of misery, are hereditary. The whole animal crea tion (our opponents themselves being judges) suffer death " for one man's sin ;" nay, numberless my riads of sensitive beings, who are in every sense guiltless and innocent, or rather, whb are incapable of crime, are subjected to an immense amount of the most cruel suffering and at last to death itself, simply because their destinies are mysteriously in terwoven with ours. " The whole creation groan- eth and travaileth," because man has played the fool. The child (to come a little nearer to the case before us) suffers for the folly or vice of its parent; nay, children's children, to remote ge nerations, shall be doomed to poverty or wretch edness, for the crime or imprudence of one an cestor ; whole nations are often the victims of one man's folly, tyranny, or ambition ; and lastly, to OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. xliit adduce a case strictly parallel, the moral con dition of myriads (especially in heathen or savage countries) is as completely dependent upon the moral condition of those who are intrusted with their early education and upon whose character their own are necessarily formed, as though they had received from them a good or evil bias with the very elements of their being. Nurtured in ignorance, vice, and folly ; trained as early and as invincibly to evil, as they could have been in any other way ; familiarized to every species of crime and deprived of every incentive to virtue ; what hope is there, what remote probability re mains, of their being any thing else than just what their moral guardians have been ? And this, be it recollected, shall be the case, not only with solitary individuals, but with whole nations, and that not only for a generation, but through a long series of ages. Now such a constitution is, in fact, as in explicable (for in truth it is identical) as the one we are now considering. Yet the former is universally admitted, not because it can be ac counted for any more than the other ; but simply because it cannot be denied. Here we cannot re frain from quoting the candid language in which Arohbishop Whately cautions the opponents of Calvinism against employing arguments which will inevitably recoil on themselves. They were originally applied to a different subject; but are strictly applicable to this. " Before I dismiss the consideration of this sub ject, I would suggest one caution relative to a class of objections, frequently urged against the Calvinistic scheme — those drawn from the conclu sions of what is called natural religion, respecting the moral attributes of the Deity ; which it is con tended, render the reprobation of a large portion of mankind an absolute impossibility. That such objections do reduce the predestinarian to a great strait, are undeniable ; and not seldom are they urged with exulting scorn, with bitter invective, and almost with anathema. But we should be very cautious how we employ such weapons as may recoil upon ourselves. Arguments of this description have often been adduced, such as, I fear, will crush beneath the ruins of the hostile structure the blind assailant who has overthrown it. It is a frightful but an undeniable truth, that multitudes, even in christian countries, are born and brought up under such circumstances, as afford them no probable, often no possible, chance of obtaining a knowledge of religious truths, or a habit of moral conduct ; but are even trained from infancy in superstitious errors and gross de pravity. -Why this should be permitted, neither Calvinist nor Arminian can explain ; nay, why the Almighty does not cause to die in the cradle every infant, whose future wickedness and misery, if suffered to grow up, he foresees, is what no system of religion, natural or revealed, will enable us sa tisfactorily to account for. in truth, these are merely branches of the one great difficulty, the existence of evil, which may almost be called the only difficulty. It assumes, indeed, various shapes ; — it is by many hardly recognised as a difficulty, and not a few have professed and be lieved themselves to have solved it : but it still meets them, though in some new disguised form, at every turn ; like a resistless stream, which, when one channel is dammed up, immediately forces its way through another. And as the dif ficulty is not one peculiar to any one hypothesis, but bears equally on all alike, whether of revealed or natural religion, it is better in point of prudence, as well as of fairness, that the consequences of it should not be pressed as an objection against any. The Scriptures do not pretend (as some have rashly imagined) to clear up this awful mystery : they give us no explanation of the original cause of evil that exists, but they teach us how to avoid its effects ; and since they leave this great and perplexing question just where they find it, it is better for us to leave it among " the secret things which belong unto the Lord our God," and to occupy ourselves with the things that are revealed, and which concern us practically, — -which " be long unto us and to our children," that we may " do all the words of God's law." Whately on the Writings of Paul, pp. 114 — 116. The simple question then is, which is the more reasonable, to admit such a constitution, borne out as it is by so many facts, and in harmony with innumerable analogies, though we cannot fully accouut for it, or to reject it merely for that cause, at the very same time that we are compelled to admit the existence of many other precisely similar facts, equally inexplicable ? May there not be reasons, though we know them not, which will justify the one, since we are obliged to admit that there must be reasons, though we are equally ignorant of them, which will justify the other? At all events, let us be consistent, and if we reject one reject all. In fact, the difficulties which encumber this sub ject, as well as those connected with the " freedom of the will," are all complicated with that great mystery, the origin of evil ; into which, it may indeed be said, all the difficulties throughout the whole science of theology ultimately re solve themselves. It may be called, in fact, the only difficulty; had there been no evil in the universe, it would never have seemed won derful, either that the volitions of moral agents should have been determined by an unalterable love of virtue and goodness, nor that the moral state of one being should be dependent on that of another. It would have seemed ridiculous for beings, thus circumstanced, to repine either that they did not possess the perilous privilege of exer cising a self-determining power, or that, necessi tated to be happy by the law of mutual depend ence, they had no control over their own destinies. This great work of Edwards is divided into four parts : Part I. contains " evidences of original sin, from facts and events." Part II. is occupied with proofs of the " doctrine from particular parts of Scripture." \liv AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS Part III. " The evidence of the doctrine from redemption by Christ." Part IV. contains " answers to several objec tions." The " Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue" is one of the most profound, and yet, on the whole, we hesitate not to say, the least satisfactory, of all Edwards's pieces. As a specimen of acute and subtle reasoning, it will bear comparison with al most any thing he ever wrote. He appears to us, however, to have failed in establishing his main point ; principally, as we intimated in a former part of this essay, in consequence of his passion for purely deductive reasoning. He was too impa tient to wait for a sufficiently large and compre hensive survey (so absolutely necessary on such a subject) of those complicated phenomena on which this very perplexing question in ethics depends for a solution. He was too anxious to ascend to some one all-comprehending principle. In this he re sembled certain analysists of beauty, who, fully persuaded that the source of the emotion was to be found in some one quality, constructed theories almost as numerous as the sources from which that emotion really flows. The analysists of virtue have in general had the like success, and possibly for similar reasons. Of those two great questions in ethics, " Whatis virtue, and what is our obligation to practise it ?" in other words, " What ought we to do, and why ?" it is only the former which Edwards proposes to treat. He undertakes to tell us what virtue is. His definition of it is, love to being in general. As this definition sacrifices perspicuity in no in considerable measure, to a sententious brevity, the definition requires further definitions to define it. Edwards therefore proceeds to explain what he means by his terms. By being, he gives us to understand that he means beings " possessed of perception and will;" as these are, he tells us, " the only beings capable objects of bene volence." The v/ords " perception and will," are however unhappily chosen ; inasmuch as they would lead many to suppose, that he did not in tend to include the lower orders of sensitive beings amongst the " capable objects of benevolence." This is actually the error into which one of the most acute and accomplished writers on ethical subjects, Sir James Mackintosh,* fell, when com menting on Edwards's system. " Surely sen tient being," says Sir James, " would have been a more reasonable limitation." This, how ever, is precisely Edwards's meaning : according to his notions of will, (decidedly the most rational,) all beings capable of happinesshave will as well as ourselves ; the voluntary principle in brutes not being, in his opinion, essentially different from that which exists in man, only operating within dif ferent limits, and controlled by motives differing in variety and complexity, in different classes of voluntary agents. For the reasons, however, « In his essay on the progress of ethical science ; Encyclopaedia Britannica, last edition, p. 340. which we have already assigned, it would have been decidedly better, had he said, " beings capa ble of happiness." He then shows what is to be understood by love to being in general. He ex plains, that he means, the desire of promoting the happiness of every being in the whole system of being, in such measure as that the greatest de- greeof happiness on the whole, shall be the result ; that every being shall be loved in proportion to his importance in the universe, and so far as such love does not prevent the attainment of the greatest. possible degree of happiness to the whole ; that at such point the love of individuals must stop ; that the love of every inferior being, or of every class of inferior beings, must give way to that of any one being, or any class of beings, which shall be proved to possess greater importance in the uni versal system ; and that to persist in a dispropor tionate attachment to them is not virtue but vice. It follows, of course, from this theory, that the Divine Being is to be loved supremely, and that every other affection is to be immeasurably sub ordinate to that which is due to him. This necessitates our author to speak of differ ent degrees of being — an obscure and improper phrase, since there cannot be different degrees of existence. If a thing exists, it exists ; and this may be affirmed equally of all classes of beings that exist at all. His meaning, therefore, by the phrase, " degrees of being," evidently is, merely the degrees in which certain faculties and powers are possessed by different beings, and their consequent relative importance in the universal system. Edwards's definition of virtue, therefore, is be nevolence to all beings capable of happiness, in such proportions, as that each shall be loved just as his relative importance in the universal system deserves, and so far as is compatible with the grand design of securing the greatest happiness of the whole : or, in his own words, of which these are the interpretation, that it consists in " love to being in general." Now this being the case, the great question is, whether Jonathan Edwards means merely to assert that such a principle of universal benevolence ought to be a general principle of action in a vir tuous man in this sense, that he should avoid whatever he perceives is incompatible with the welfare of the whole system of being, and should pursue what he perceives will promote it; or whether he intends to apply the principle to every particular act, and to assert that no such act can be virtuous, unless it flows from a conscious recog nition of such a principle at the time of action, in other words, from " love to being in general" as the motive. If he meant only the former, then there is no dispute with him ; for that in such a general benevolence of mind, predisposing it to seek the happiness of all who are capable of it, virtue eminently consists, and that a man cannot be virtuous who does not cultivate such benevo lence, is universally admitted ; but then, weare only told in what habit of mind virtue eminently consists, and are as far as ever from the great and OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. xiv ¦pvowed object of inquiry; which is, what is it which 3_enders every act of virtue, virtuous ; in other words, what is the differential quality of all virtue ? To say any thing to the purpose, therefore, Edwards must have intended (and many subse quent passages of the " Dissertation" show that this was his design) to apply his system to every par ticular act, and to affirm, that virtue cannot be predicated of any action which does not flow from a desire to promote the happiness of being in general ; from a conscious feeling at the time of action, that the action contemplated would have this effect. Consistently with this principle, Edwards dis tinctly denies that the love of gratitude, or bene volence to another being for his benevolence to us ; or even the love of moral beauty, or benevo lence to another being on account of his moral excellence, can properly be called virtuous at all. Yet he will not deny that they are in some sense virtuous, which admission (if there be any mean ing in it at all) is a virtual abandonment of his principle. If the term virtue can, in any sense in which it still retains substantially the same mean ing, and merely implies different modifications of the same thing, be applied to both the above kinds of love, as well as to that which he contends is alone properly denominated virtue, then Edwards is merely telling us, as before, in what virtue emi nently consists ; he is giving us one of the species of virtue, and that the noblest, not telling us what virtue is ; he is telling us what makes some actions virtuous, and those eminently so ; not what makes all virtuous actions such. But if the word virtue, as applied to these various emotions, does not re tain substantially the same meaning, then it is as absurd to say that it may in some sense be applied to them all, as to say that they may be characterized by the same word, if we will please to understand that word in two senses as diverse as would be conveyed by two different words. Just as if (to imagine a case) a naturalist had resolved to de fine the term " animals" by saying that they were beings possessed of the power of locomotion, but yet affirmed, that, there were other beings who might, in some sense, be termed animals, though they had not the power of locomotion. It is evi dent that if he intends to employ the term animal in these two cases in the same sense, so as that it shall retain in both its distinctive qualities, he has not, in his definition, been giving us the differential quality of all animals, but only of some, namely, of those who possess the power of locomotion ; but if he intends to employ the term animal in two totally different senses, then it is frivolous to tell us that the word animal may be applied to beings who have not locomotion, only it must be in a sense as different as would be conveyed by the term vegetable. Edwards himself seems to be aware of the diffi culty which thus presses his system, and he there fore guards his theory by speaking of " true vir tue." If by this he means not to include all virtue that is really so, but virtue in the highest sense, in other words, if he is merely giving us a species of virtue, (the noblest if you will, but still a species,) no one will have any dispute with him. That habit of mind which tends to universal be nevolence is indeed eminently virtuous ; and those acts which flow immediately from such a princi ple, are unquestionably the highest kind of virtu ous actions. But if he means, as we have before said, that it is essential to virtue, — not merely to the highest kind of it,— that its acts should flow from such a principle, then we affirm without fear of contradiction, that infinitely the larger portion of those actions which have usually been thought virtuous, and are really so in any intelligible sense, are not virtuous at all. Many of them have flowed from benevolence, indeed, but not from a benevolence which has even thought, at the mo ment of action, of the remote tendencies of action, or attempted to calculate whether it would pro duce the largest measure of happiness on the whole, or whether it was disproportioned to the relative importance of the being, the love of whom im mediately inspired it. Innumerable other acts of virtue have flowed directly from a simple sense of duty. Nay, by far the greater part of actions of obedience to God, cannot be deemed virtuous in the sense we are now considering. For though it is true, that the Divine Being is infinitely the best and the greatest of beings, and is therefore of infi nitely most value in the system of universal being ; and though we cannot possibly err in impli citly obeying his will, yet according to the system we are now combating, those actions which have a reference to him cannot be accounted virtuous, unless the whole system of being be considered too, and our actions sanctioned, not only by a sense of love and duty to him alone considered, but as compared with the whole system of being. Now we appeal to any man of piety, whether the idea of such a calculation — whether a distinct con sciousness that he was promoting the happiness of being in general, ever, or at all events often, en tered his mind, when obeying God simply because God has commanded such obedience ? It is no sort of reply to this to say, that when the mind comes to reflect on the consequences of these actions, it sees that virtuous action is ever coincident with the greatest happiness of all, or that its tendencies are always beneficial ; in other words, that when we have really acted virtuously, we shall find, that so far as regards the results of actions, we shall always have acted as though we had been actuated by " love to being in general." This indeed is true, and is what has led to the con struction of this theory of virtue ; but there is a vast difference between acting from universal benevo lence, and acting as though we had acted from it ; just as much difference, in fact, as there is between doing a thing accidentally and of design. Actions are denominated virtuous or vicious, from their motives, not from their tendencies ; tenden cies that are not perceived, or not felt at the time of action, never determine the moral character of xlvi AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS the action. If such a rule of moral judgment were for an instant admitted, many an action would become virtuous which the world had never sus pected of being such ; nay, for ought we can tell, all moral evil itself might be found in the end to be so. We have no doubt that the discovery of the sublime and beautiful truth, that all virtuous action tends, ultimately, and on the great scale, to universal happiness, in other words, uniformly tends to the same consequences as though it had origi nated purely in universal benevolence, led to the supposition not only that all is virtuous action which so originated, but that that is not virtue which does not so originate. That such a tendency may always be considered a test of virtue in this sense, that it is a sine qud non of virtuous action ; and that whatever, in the longrun,can be proved not to possess such be neficial tendency, cannot be virtue, is true enough. But not a step further than this will it carry us in the inquiry, " What is virtue?" There is undoubtedly one Being whose virtue may be said to consist in that enlarged and universal benevolence for which Edwards contends, simply because all the ultimate tendencies of actions are fully known to him. He regulates his own conduct, and determines ours, by his knowledge that such and such actions will, ultimately, and on the great scale, promote the welfare of universal being. In him benevolence and virtue can exactly coincide ; but in him only, for he alone has the infinite amplitude of mind necessary to embrace all the remote consequences of any given action, as spread out over the map of infinite ages and interwoven with the history of in numerable worlds. To man he has given other and inferior principles of action ; and though that is in man the noblest species of virtue (for this we will ingly concede to Edwards) which most resembles the boundless benevolence of the Most High, there are very many human actions, properly denominated virtuous, which must immediately spring from a lower source. By an economy full of beauty and wisdom, however, the Divine Being has ordained that the subordinate principles from which man's virtue springs, should have a tendency to promote that which is his direct end ; the wel fare of the whole system of being. If every man would only do that which he knows to be his duty, (whether the principle of benevolence, or gratitude, or any other, be immediately paramount, mat ters not,) the harmony of the universe would be secured. To use the beautiful language of Robert Hall : " It might have been worth while to re flect, that in the natural world there are two kinds of attraction ; one which holds the several parts of individual bodies in contact ; another, which main tains the union of bodies themselves with the general system : and that, though the union in the former case is much more intimate than in the latter, each is essential to the order of the world. Similar to this is the relation which the public and private affections bear to each other, and their use in the moral system." To sum up the whole : If Edwards means by " true virtue," to tell us only what is the sublimest and noblest species of virtue, then he is quite right, for cer tainly those acts of virtue deserve to be so con sidered, which spring from a distinct intention of producing the largest measure of good on the whole or in other words, from universal benevo lence.' But if he means to assert that virtue can be predicated only of such actions as spring from such a principle, then it is manifestly false ; and would go to banish virtue out of every sanctuary in the universe, except its only inviolable abode, the bosom of God. A word or two on the pernicious application, of which, without any fault of Edwards, the system he has adopted is susceptible. That man should strive to cultivate the sublime disposition of mind, which forms the basis of this theory, is indeed most true, and the more we possess it, the more we resemble God. Yet to attempt to reduce it systematically to practice in particular actions, would be to the last degree dangerous and ab surd. Even if the principle of benevolence were still retained, and were not (as it soon would be) warped by selfishness, it would lead to innumer able errors in action, from false estimates of what would produce the greatest happiness on the whole; in other words, from an ignorance of what universal benevolence, regulated by infinite intelligence, would dictate. Any thing less than such an intellect must be necessarily baffled by such calculations. — But there is another abuse to which the practical application of the theory is liable ; and by which that sublime principle of benevolence, in which the pure and ethereal spirit of Edwards exulted, and in which alone he would have virtue to originate and consist, is liable to be obscured and lost. We allude to those cold systems of ethics, (founded, as Robert Hall very justly observes, on a perversion of Edwards's theory,) which measuring virtue simply by its beneficial tendencies, fixes the mind rather upon its happy results, than upon its sublime nature and origin. According to Edwards's system, vir tue consists in universal benevolence ; according to that of some of his imitators, virtue is that which produces the largest measure of happiness on the whole. Now these two propositions are in reality identical, and it may seem to be of very little consequence which is avowedly made the basis of an ethical theory. Yet in reality they may be found, and are found, to lead, as the one or the other is chiefly contemplated, to two totally diverse classes of associations, affecting in the most serious manner our moral sentiments. The one proposition necessarily obtrudes upon the mind the ennobling principle from which virtue springs ; the other, the auspicious results in which it terminates. As the consequence, one class of moral philosophers will be admiring principally the beauty and fertility of the soil through which such a stream pours out its waters; another will be looking down into the tranquil and trans parent depths of that fountain from which those beneficent waters flow. It well accorded with the transcendental greatness and purity of a mind like OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. xlvii that of Edwards, that he regarded chiefly the principle of virtue. Neither the one or the other indeed ought to be overlooked ; but still it remains true, that the character of our views of virtue will be materially affected, according as the one or the other has the habitual ascendancy in our thoughts. But we need say little on this subject. It has been treated with uncommon force and beauty by Sir James Mackintosh, in his " Disserta tion on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy." To any practical application of this theory under any modification, the insuperable objection is — that the limitation of our faculties will not per mit us to use it. The work on the " Religious Affections" is one of the most valuable works on practical and ex perimental piety ever published. It is more de fective in point of style, as we have already had occasion to remark, than any other pieces put forth by Edwards himself. This renders its pe rusal tedious, and has perhaps detracted from its value by deterring many from its pages altogether. To those, however, whose robustness of mind or whose strength of piety, is not to be repelled by such defects, and who are never disgusted with truth, even when she comes forth divested of all her orna ments, there is no work of the same kind in the English language which will better repay a care ful perusal. This work, as well as the "Thoughts on the Re vival," were written shortly after the first of those remarkable periods of religious excitement, which are now technically called " Revivals," and which have since been so frequently witnessed in various parts of America. Edwards wrote for the two-fold purpose of vindicating them from indiscriminate censure and of guarding against their excesses. That these " revivals" have always been character ized by a vast deal of fanaticism and extrava gance, and have in a great measure contributed to produce them, is universally admitted. All this was to be expected from human nature, and can excite no surprise in those who are only tolerably acquainted with that nature. At the same time, so many sober-minded persons of all denomina tions have borne witness to the general beneficial tendencies of these revivals, without any attempt to disguise their abuses, that no man of candour can attribute them wholly to fanaticism. Of these witnesses, none, assuredly, has greater weight with us than Jonathan Edwards, and none could be better fitted to form a dispassionate opinion. His natural coolness of temperament ; his extensive opportunities of observation ; his fair and candid admission of the evils by which these revivals were necessarily attended ; all entitle his opinion to the utmost deference and respect. We have already said that his " Thoughts on the Revival" and his " Treatise on the Religious Affections" were both written with the same design. Perceiving how extensively the " revivals" were liable to abuse ; how ready multitudes were to substitute transient emotion and excitement of the passions, for the genuine feelings of religion, and, forgetting the most essential expressions of real piety, to attach importance to certain spurious signs of it, he at tempts to point out what are those proofs, which may justify an opinion that a religious change, whether in individuals or communities, is really the work of God. The treatise of the " Affections" is an application of these tests to individuals ; the " Thoughts on the Revival," to communities. The same coolness of judgment, the snme complete exemption from fanaticism, (though the author was so powerfully exposed to its influence,) charac terize both these productions. The former is im measurably the most important, and to this the few observations we are about to make will be confined. While it cannot be denied that there is a very large class of mankind, who would identify reli gion with certain emotions ; who would substitute for the only infallible indications of a moral change, animal excitement, sudden illuminations, the alter nate raptures of a presumptuous hope and the agonies of an equally unreasonable fear ; who prove their religion rather by talking of it, than by permitting it to plead silently for itself in the eloquence of conduct ; it must be confessed, that there is a still larger diss, who view with absurd suspicion every species of religious feeling, and, as though they thought men were pure intelligences and the truths which religion reveals, of no more importance to our happiness than mathematical abstractions, would school us into an almost total suppression of strong emotion and of all the na tural signs of it. The former of these two classes would be likely to abuse revivals ; the latter would eagerly lay hold of their incidental extravagances to cover them with ridicule. Now the design of Edwards is to show that those signs, which the fanatic considers exclusive proof of piety, and on which the phlegmatic formalist pours immea surable scorn, are, in reality, no conclusive sign at all, either of piety or the absence of it ; that such signs may accompany or not accompany genuine religion, and neither justify the absurd confidence which one party repose in them, nor the ridicule and suspicion with which they are treated by the other. This occupies the first part of the work. After having thus shown what are not conclusive marks of a real change of nature, or of the contrary, he enters upon a masterly description of those signs which may be con sidered almost infallible. The introductory chapter, on the nature of the affections, showing the absurdity of any religion that does not powerfully affect them — is well worthy of universal perusal. Whatever extra vagances and paradoxes, indeed, men may have indulged on this subject, none can rival the absur dities of those who too generally flatter themselves that they are perfectly free from every weakness of the kind ; we mean those who deprecate all intense feeling in religion, and view it with marked suspi cion ; who on this subject, at least, always maintain astern control overtheir affections; a control, which, xlviii AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS on any other, they would be the first to denounce, as an unnatural apathy. They themselves will tell you, when matters of present interest engage their attention, that their affections were implanted, they presume, for some purpose ; that they do not won der that the soul of man should be stirred within him in exact proportion to the magnitude and im portance of the object that excites his emotion, nay, very often, in a degree absurdly dispropor tionate ; and yet they continue to believe that in comparably the sublimest and the most overwhelm ing of all themes of contemplation, should inspire neither terror nor rapture. Edwards justly contends, that from the very constitution of our nature, religion, if felt at all, will powerfully operate on the affections ; and that by the very same constitution of our nature, such excitement of the affections will, as in every other case, show itself by appropriate external signs. " Out of the fulness of the heart the mouth speaketh." As to the degree, or the manner, in which such emotions should express themselves, care, no doubt, should be taken to repress mani fest impropriety and extravagance ; still, even in doing this, great caution must be exercised : not only charity, but an enlarged philosophy, will make considerable allowance for peculiarities of individual temperament, and for the habits and cus toms of different communities and of different ages. All signs of emotion, except those which nature has given us, vary with the changes of times and of nations, and their absurdity or propriety must be in a great degree matter of association. Edwards's great object, however, is to show that while some signs of emotion may be reason ably expected if religion be felt at all, yet that be they what they may, they form no conclusive proof , either for or against the reality of religion. Some emotion, indeed, is naturally the result of religion ; but at best is only a presumptive proof, a proof in the sense of a sine qud non ; for such emotion may spring from other causes. He who exhibits no feel ing at all, cannot be religious; but he may feel much who is any thing but religious. In order to understand exactly the position Ed wards takes, this must be distinctly borne in mind. He constantly argues that such and such signs are not conclusive of the existence of vital piety ; neither against it, because though some of them, and to some extent, are the natural, we may say necessary, accompaniment of piety, they are often also the accompaniment of something else. So far as they are sustained by other more conclu sive proof, they furnish a presumptive evidence of piety, and are the appropriate expressions of it ; if not so sustained, they proportionably incur the suspicion of spuriousness : just as when we judge of gold ; — the possession of some of the more ob vious marks is not decisive of the metal, because these marks may be imitated, or may exist natu rally in some substance not gold ; but since they are qualities of gold, they must be considered, so far as sustained by other properties, presumptive proof, that the substance in which they inhere is gold ; so far as not so sustained, the substance is suspicious. If the presence of such qualities, how ever, is no positive proof of the substance being gold, it would be infinitely absurd to suppose their presence conclusive proof against it, or their absence a presumption in its favour. Gold must at least glitter, although all that glitters is not gold. Not less absurdly do they act, who sup pose, contrary to all analogous exercises of the affections, that the proof of the existence of reli gious feeling is in inverse ratio to a suppression of its signs. There are in this masterly production, two de fects of a character too serious to permit us to pass them over in silence. One is, in the com mencement of the second part, where Edwards proposes to enumerate the signs by which an indi vidual may judge of the reality of his own religion, or manifest it to others. The first position is, "that gracious affections are the results of a divine influ ence." This is true, butsurely not to the purpose of his inquiry, which is to show what is the criterion by which we may judge that religious affections really have this divine origin. This is the thing to be proved, and cannot be the medium by which it is to be proved. This property of religious affections is the very thing either correctly or erroneously supposed to exist, and what is wanted is a sign by which its existence may be proved. As a general introduction, indeed, showing what it is which is proposed to be proved, this section is in valuable ; but not, we conceive, as affording us one of the signs of the reality of religious affection. The other defect in this treatise, to which we have adverted, is thathehas supposed the re ligious affec tions of the convert, at least in the first stage of his religious feelings, to be too pure, elevated, and lofty. We now especially refer to section 2nd, Part III. entitled, "The first objective ground of gracious affections is the transcendently excellent and amiable nature of divine things, as they are in themselves ; and not any conceived relation they bear to self, or self-interest." In this section, he explicitly contends that the love of God has for its " objective foundation, his moral perfec tions ; " and is purely disinterested. He here lays too little stress on gratitude, and those kindred emotions, which undoubtedly hold an ascendant influence in the bosom of a young convert ; nay, in our opinion, Edwards almost inverts the natural pro gress of religious feeling. The direct tendency of such representations is todepress the sincere believer. Of such perfection each is ready to say, " It is high ; I cannot attain unto it ;" and to conclude, that because he does not find such marks of piety, he has none. What is only the attainment of a mature Christianity, if, indeed, such sublimated devotion can be attained at all, Edwards represents as cha racterizing the very infancy of piety. To the super human elevation to which the Christian must be conducted (if at all) by many and toilsome steps, he tells the young convert to soar at once, as on the wings of seraphim ; and the myste ries which belong only to the fully initiated, OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. xlix he would expound at the very threshold of the temple. We might illustrate the progress of religion in the soul, by the feelings of a criminal who has un expectedly received pardon from a magnanimous and merciful sovereign. A transport of gratitude to his benefactor is the first impulse ; he is lost in amazement at his unhoped-for escape. His first emotions, therefore, naturally have a reference chiefly to the benefits he has received. After a while, and as his mind reverts again and again to the character of his sovereign, admiration of his moral worth and excellence begins gradually to attain the ascendancy : as such feelings slowly strengthen into habits, he at length becomes enamoured of these excellences for their own sake, and thinks less of them in relation to the happiness they have conferred upon him than in relation to their in trinsic beauty. It is just thus, in our opinion, with the christian convert. The approximation to a pure and disinterested love of God, (and whether such love can be ever attained, may well become a question,) must at all events be the last and most exalted attainment of piety. But we need say the less on this part of the treatise, as it has been so often and so ably treated by others. The defects we have mentioned are but slight abatements from the general excellence of this treatise, which, of its kind, we believe to be un matched eitherintheEnglishor anyother language Some of the latter sections, more especially those on " evangelical humiliation," and " the symmetry of religious affections," are full of conceptions not only profound, but exquisitely beautiful ; con ceptions, which form a striking contrast with the uncouthness and ruggedness of the style. The treatise on " God's chief End in the Crea tion" will bear comparison with any of Edwards's pieces, for vastness and comprehensiveness of thought as well as for subtilty of reasoning. It had long been a controversy amongst divines, whether benevolence or the design of fully exhi biting the divine glory, was the primary motive, which impelled the Creator to give existence to the universe. — Edwards argues that both these objects were contemplated by the Divine Being; that they are not properly distinct ; on the con trary, that they exactly coincide ; that in propor tion as the one is promoted the other must be promoted also ; and that the highest glory of God will be the greatest happiness of the universe. The common arguments which are used to prove that it is unworthy of the Supreme to suppose him actuated by the desire of promoting his own glory, are triumphantly refuted. We know few things in the writings of Edwards, more felicitous than that part of the dissertation, in which (after justly arguing that if there is any sense in which the infinite Being can be made the chief end of the creation, it is fit and reasonable that he should be so) he imagines some perfect being, called in to decide whether the Divine Glory or the happi ness of the creature possess the prior claim to attention. He then ingeniously argues, that as that imaginary deity would judge, so must the all-perfect Being, who cannot see things other wise than they really are. Any apparent harsh ness, however, in the doctrine is removed by the view which Edwards takes of it. According to him, the happiness of the creature and the promo tion of the Divine Glory are inextricably blended ; the brighter the rays which stream back upon God from every part of that mighty universe, which re flects and multiplies his image, the brighter of course, that primary effulgence, which emanates from himself on his happy creatures ; the one is necessarily the exact measure of the other. The more dazzling the reflection of the sun's light, the more powerfully must he be shining on our world. The work entitled, " The History of Redemp tion," was, as we have already said, posthumous. It is unfinished in every sense, and was, in fact, left merely in fragments, which were afterwards thrown into the form in which they are now published. The work would doubtless have been a noble production had Edwards lived to finish it, but, in its present state, is little more than a rough sketch of a magnificent design. His aim was to illustrate the progress of that great scheme which the Scriptures assure us has been the cherished project of the divine wisdom, since the dawn of time ; — the object to which all the move ments of Providence have been tending ; for which this lower world has been continued in ex istence ; to promote which angels have been sent forth as ministering spirits ; and the very prepa ration for which was carried on through a long succession of ages by typical and shadowy dispen sations, and the gradual disclosures of prophecy. Edwards justly thought that important purposes might be served in tracing the progress of a scheme so vast and so slowly developed, in watching the advancement of that glorious light which has at length burst upon the world, from its first feeble glimmering in the age of the patriarchs, through the dim twilight of the Mosaic dispensation, and the long dawning of the morn of prophecy, even to the perfect day. He justly thought that — in showing how this light increased in each particu lar age, just in that degree which would be most conducive to the grand object in view, and just in the degree, also, which the circumstances of the world would admit, much might be said to illus trate and vindicate the Divine wisdom at each stage of this wondrous history. Another object our author had in view, was to construct, on an entirely original plan, a system of theology. This work displays the most profound and fami liar knowledge of Scripture ; it shows, in a pecu liar manner, (what, indeed, all his writings show to a considerable extent,) that he had studied the whole Bible with the most indefatigable diligence, and had made it his special object to trace out the mutual relations and bearings of its various parts. If Edwards had lived to complete this work, he would doubtless have enlarged and expanded many AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS parts, and abridged and condensed others ; for it is observable, that he very often merely gives us a tedious and miraculously ill-written amplification of the Scripture narrative, instead of entering into the reasons why the events which he relates were permitted rather than others, or how they bore upon the great scheme of redemption. Now, it is in this latter employment — in deducing inferences from facts already admitted, that Edwards was exactly qualified to excel. The peculiarities of his style, as we have already remarked, could not but render his mere narrative intolerable. We need hardly say, that he could not give a worse exhi bition of these most repulsive peculiarities, than by attempting to translate the clear, simple nar ration of Scripture into his own uncouth and bar barous dialect. The style of it is far more rugged and unpleas- ing, and contains more tedious repetitions, than even the treatise on the " Religious Affections," or the " Thoughts on the Revival." This might reasonably be expected ; for if there be found such an utter absence of elegance, even in those works which were published under Edwards's own eye, and on the composition of which, he might na turally be supposed to have expended some la bour, what was to be expected from his loose papers and his more extemporaneous efforts ? Ed wards was far enough from belonging to that class of writers, whose most careless and casual pro ductions have something in them of elegance and beauty. The above remarks are equally applicable to another posthumous and unfinished work of Ed wards, entitled, " Types of the Messiah." This piece was published a short time since in America, by his descendant, Sereno Dwight, and is now republished, for the first time in England, in the present edition. This work has all the excellences of the " History of Redemption," and all its de fects. Both are abundantly rich in rough-hewn materials for thought ; and form a mine of ex- haustless wealth to the professed theologian. The treatise on " Qualifications for Com munion" was published, as we have already had occasion to say, under circumstances of a very peculiar nature ; a detail of which cannot be given here, but which will be found fully related in the Memoir prefixed to this edition. We have already observed, in a former part of the present essay, that Edwards's conduct in this controversy, when viewed in all its circumstances, affords one of the most impressive exhibitions of lofty integrity, perfect candour, and magnanimity, the world has ever seen. We may here remark, that it also furnishes an instance, not less signal, of irrepressible energy of mind. We are confident our readers will agree with us, when we tell them that the work on " Communion " was produced in the short space of two months and a half, under the most harassing and depressing circumstances that can well be conceived ! As the controversy, with which it is taken up, has now entirely passed away, owing to Edwards having convinced all America of the truth and rea sonableness of his opinions, (though he at first stood nearly alone,) it is unnecessary to enter into an analysis of the contents of the work : such detail could hardly be expected to be interesting to the generality of our readers. We have no hesitation in saying, however, that for logical acuteness and subtilty, it is scarcely matched even by the treatise on the " Will." Those who enjoy a book not merely for the truth it conveys, but as an athletic exercise of the intellect, will derive no less pleasure from it, than from the perusal of Locke's " Letters to Stilling- fleet." We know of nothing in the whole range of controversy more delightfully illustrative of perfect candour and argumentative acuteness, than the answers to the twenty objections which he supr poses his opponents might possibly oppose to his views. These objections are not such as contro- vertists too generally put into the mouths of their adversaries, — the very weakest that can be in vented. On the contrary, they arc the very strongest ; are put in the fairest and most forcible form ; and are then — utterly demolished. It is impossible to conceive any thing more acute than his reasoning on the iid, iiid, and ixth objections. All the above remarks strictly apply to a se cond piece on the same subject ; we mean his re ply to the hapless " Solomon Williams," who had had the desperate courage to attack the first. As specimens of intellectual power, both these works of Edwards are invaluable. The dissertation on " Justification by Faith alone," is one of Edwards's best pieces, though not so full or elaborate as some of them. It is, however, as acute as any, and many parts of it are scarcely inferior to the profoundest trains of reasoning in the treatise on the " Will." We would particularly instance his replies to the ob jection, that "justification is not of works" is pre dicated only of justification by the works of the ceremonial law. All may not agree in particular statements ; as for example, that of the doctrine of imputed righteousness ; yet there is very little to which by far the larger part of those attached to evangelical truth, would not readily subscribe. In reasoning on the infinite nature of all sin, Edwards appears to us to fall into his besetting vice, verbal reasoning, which he is very apt to do, when treating of infinitude. No divine ever unfolded with greater clearness the province of faith in man's justification. He, as usual, ascends at once to the fountain-head of error ; and resolves all the controversies which have taken place on this head into the ambiguities of an insignificant particle, " by " faith. The great question is, how is this particle to be understood ? He admits that faith is a condition of salvation in die sense of a sine qud non ; — yet as this is no more than is true of good works in general, he there fore argues, that this particle is to be understood in a more peculiar and emphatic sense. He regards faith not only as an universal accompaniment of justification, but as that very act by which the OF JONATHAN EDWARDS. soul accepts the Saviour, and enters into union with him. As it regards the argument that faith thus under stood is made a moral qualification for salvation, and takes the place of good works, since it is, in fact, a moral excellency of the first and highest kind, Edwards distinguishes between what faith is in its own nature, and what it is in relation to the privileges for which it is made a qualification. He distinguishes between moral and natural qualifications ; between such as entitle a man to certain privileges, and such as have merely a na tural tendency to fit him for them. It is not as possessing a moral qualification which entitles its possessor to certain privileges, that he who possesses faith is justified, but because he who possesses faith is in a condition to receive the benefits of the gospel. Without such a qualification, therefore, those blessings could not be granted. Though i faith, then, is in its own nature a moral excel lency, yet it is only as a natural qualification for partaking in the privileges of the gospel, that it avails the believer. Let us take a simple illus tration. A man designs to grant to another cer tain great benefits, not in the slightest degree de served, — in no sense the price of moral desert ; yet he may demand certain qualifications in the object of his bounty, and those qualifications may be of a moral nature, though it is only as natu ral qualifications that they are demanded. For instance, he might demand, that he shall be found honest. The blessings of the gospel all flow through the mediation and sacrifice of Christ ; they are not, in any degree, merited by those who receive them, yet they may justly be confined to those who possess such and such a natural quali fication. Faith may justly be called such, since it has in a variety of ways such a direct tendency to promote the ultimate object of the gospel, and is, indeed, the great means by which its blessings are applied. it is well worthy of mention, that the dis courses on "Justification by Faith alone" issued in the conversion of a very considerable number of persons, and was the immediate cause of that " revival" at Northampton which afterwards called forth the " Narrative." This is another proof that this is the doctrine most peculiarly character istic of the gospel ; the energetic exhibition of which will be uniformly attended with success. The large infusion of metaphysical reasoning in these discourses might perhaps, in Edwards's case, somewhat detract from their impressiveness when preached ; for the very qualities which often ren der discourses so valuable as dissertations, dimi nish their worth as " sermons." Yet, though the lustre and the keenness of this simple weapon might have been somewhat abated, in this instance, by the mixture of metaphysical speculation, it nevertheless reached the heart and produced its never-failing effects. Well said Martin Luther, that attach ment to " the doctrine of justification by faith alone " is the test of a standing or a falling church. The sermons of Jonathan Edwards, as might be supposed, are of very unequal merit. We have already had occasion to speak of two or three of them. They uniformly display more or less of the peculiar characteristics of our author's mind ; the same comprehensiveness and reach of thought; the same subtilty and vigour of argument. They will all be found highly valuable to the student and divine. The " Miscellaneous Observations," as they are called, on theological subjects, and the " Notes on the Bible," occupy not a few pages of his works : the former were published manyyearsago; thelatter were given to the world only a short time since by Sereno Dwight, and are inserted in this edition ; the first English edition that has contained them. That such a large quantity, or even a much larger, of miscellaneous remarks, should have ac cumulated under our author's hand, is surely nothing wonderful, when we consider his constant habit of immediately noting down ,eveiy thought worth preserving. These miscellanea are, by no means, the least valuable of our author's writings. They all ex hibit, though of course in different degrees, his intellectual peculiarities, and many of them con tain the germ and promise of profound theo ries, which, if Edwards had lived longer, would, in all probability, have been given to the world in a mature and systematic shape. Some of these miscellanea exhibit the substance of extensive controversies in a few pages ; and, in this respect, afford yet more conclusive proof of the vastness and subtilty of Edwards's mind and of the facility with which he at once ascended to great principles, than even his more elaborate productions. As a remarkable instance of this, we would adduce his observations on Tindal's " Christianity as old as the Creation." The work of that subtle deist is one of the most artful and dangerous eveT put forth by the champions of infidelity ; not, indeed, from its power of argument, but from the consummate sophistry with which its fallacies are constructed. When that sophistry is once unravelled, and those fallacies detected, it is seen to be one of the most contemptible books ever published ; and that, if the principles it advocates were fairly carried into effect, it would lead to the absurdest conduct in practical life that can be imagined. Neverthe less, these principles are so craftily exhibited, there is such an air of candour and plausibility in the mode of stating them, that it requires no small skill in argument to disentangle the web of sophisms. This book led to one of the most triumphant refutations which the whole range of English theology presents ; we mean the reply of Bishop Conybeare, a work which deserves to be far better known than it is, if only as affording one of the richest logical treats to which an argu mentative mind can be invited. His powers of reasoning were of the highest order, and his style possessed corresponding qualities of excel lence. It is simple, terse, concise, and perspicu ous in a very extraordinary degree. Whoever would wish to see the difference between his intel- Iii AN ESSAY ON THE GENIUS AND WRITINGS, &c. Iect and a far greater, would do well to peruse his book in connexion with the remarks of Edwards on the same subject. In a few pages, Edwards has detected and exposed Tindal's principal fallacies ; those fallacies, without which his whole Structure of sophistry falls at once to the ground. In Edwards's " Miscellaneous Observations" will be found approaches to many theories which phi losophy has since more fully established. This polarity of mind, this intellectual magnetism towards universal truth, has always been a charac teristic of the greatest minds. By a species of lofty divination, they have anticipated what it was reserved for future ages, by a slow and toilsome progress, to confirm.— From whatthey have known, they have projected a little more of the mighty sphere of truth. It was so with Bacon ; with New ton ; with Locke ; and it was so with Edwards. Such men are the prophets of a better dispensa tion of philosophy, and see, in types, and shadows, and veiled symbols, the glories of a coming age. Thus we clearly perceive in Edwards's " Miscel laneous Remarks," indications that he had already embraced the modern theory of " causation;" more fully propounded, though for the most in sidious purposes, by Hume ; and since vindicated from those pernicious consequences which Hume would fain have attached to it. Let us compare Edwards's definition of a cause with that of Dr. Brown. They are absolutely identical. " A cause," says Edwards, in his Notes on the mind, " is that, after or upon the existence of which, or the existence of it after such a manner, the ex istence of another thing follows." Dr. Brown defines it thus ; " A cause is that which imme diately precedes any change ; and which existino- at any time, in similar circumstances, has been always, and will be always, immediately followed by a similar change." We have now finished the observations we had to make on the writings of Jonathan Edwards. We cannot conclude without observing, that they will be found to possess, beyond most others, the two fold merit of at once conveying valuable and original thoughts, and of quickening and invigorat ing the intellectual powers of the reader. CAREFUL AND STRICT INQUIRY MODERN PREVAILING NOTIONS FREEDOM OF WILL, WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE ESSENTIAL TO MORAL AGENCY, VIHTUE AND VICE, REWARD AND PUNISHMENT, PRAISE AND BLAME. Rom. ix. 16. It is not of him that willkth. PREFACE. Many find much fault with calling professing Christians, that differ one from another in some matters of opinion, by distinct names ; especially calling them by the names of particular men, who have distinguished themselves as main- tainers and promoters of those opinions : as calling some professing Christians Arminians, from AitMiNrus ; others Arians, from Amus; others Socinians, from Socinus, and the like. They think it unjust in itself; as it seems to suppose and suggest, that the persons marked out by these names, received those doctrines which they enter tain, out of regard to, and reliance on, those men after whom they are named ; as though they made them their rule ; in the same manner, as the followers of Chiiist are called Christians, after his name, whom they regard and depend upon, as their great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is an unjust and groundless imputation on those that go under the forementioned denominations. Thus, say they, there is not the least ground to suppose, that the chief divines, who embrace the scheme of doctrine which is, by many, called Arminianism, believe it the more, because Arminius believed it: and that there is no reason to think any other, than that they sincerely and impartially study the Holy Scriptures, and inquire after the mind of Christ, with as much judgment and sincerity, as any of those that call them by these names ; that they seek after truth, and are not careful whether they think exactly as Arminius did ; yea, that, in some things, they actually differ from him. This practice is also esteemed actually injurious on this account, that it is sup posed naturally to lead the multitude to imagine the difference between persons thus named, and others, to be greater than it is ; so great, as if they were another species of beings. And they object against it as arising from an uncharitable, narrow, contracted spirit ; which, they say, commonly inclines persons to confine all that is good to themselves, and their own party, and to make a wide distinction between themselves and others, and stigmatize those that differ from them with odious names. They say, moreover, that the keeping up such a distinction of names, has a direct tendency to uphold distance and disaffection, and keep alive mutual hatred among Christians, who ought all to be united in friendship and charity, though they cannot, in all things, think alike. I confess, these things are very plausible ; and I will not deny, that there are some unhappy consequences of this distinction of names, and that men's infirmities and evil dispositions often make an ill improvement of it. But yet, I humbly conceive, these objections are carried far beyond reason. The generality of mankind are disposed enough, and a great deal too much, to uncharitableness, and to be censorious and bitter towards those that differ from them in reli gious opinions : which evil temper of mind will take occasion to exert itself from many things in themselves innocent, useful, and necessary. But yet there is no necessity to suppose, that our thus distinguishing persons of different opinions by different names, arises mainly from an uncharitable spirit, lt may arise from the disposition there is in mankind (whom God has distinguished with an ability and inclination for speech) to improve the benefit of language, in the proper use and design of names, given to things of which they have often occasion to speak, which is to enable them to express their ideas with ease and expedition, without being encumbered with an obscure and difficult circum locution. And our thus distinguishing persons of different opinions in religious matters may not imply any more, than that there is a difference ; a difference of which we find we have often occasion to take notice : and it is always a defect in language, in such cases, to be obliged to make use of a description, instead of a name. Thus we have often occa sion to speak of those who are the descendants of the ancient inhabitants of France, in distinction from the descend ants of the inhabitants of Spain ; and find the great convenience of those distinguishing words, French and Spaniards ; by which the signification of our minds is quick and easy, and our speech is delivered from the burden of a continual reiteration of diffuse descriptions, with which it must otherwise be embarrassed. - That there is occasion to speak often concerning the difference of those, who in their general scheme of divinity agree with these two noted men, Calvin and Arminius, is what the practice of the latter confesses ; who are often, in their discourses and writings, taking notice of the supposed absurd and pernicious opinions of the former sort. And there fore the making use of different names in this case cannot reasonably be objected against, as a thing which must come from so bad a cause as they assign. It is easy to be accounted for, without supposing it to arise from any other source, than the exigence of the case, whereby mankind express those things, which they have frequent occasion to mention, by certain distinguishing names. It is an effect, similar to what we see in cases innumerable, where the cause is not at all blameworthy. Nevertheless, at first, I had thoughts of carefully avoiding the use of the appellation, Arminian, in this Treatise. But I soon found I should be put to great difficulty by it; and that my discourse would be too much encumbered with circumlocution, instead of a name, which would better express the thing intended. And therefore I must ask the excuse of such as are apt to be offended with things of this nature, that I have so freely used the term Arminian in the following Discourse. I profess it to be without any design to stigmatize persons of any sort with a name of reproach, or at all to make them appear more odious. If, when I had occasion to speak of those divines who are commonly called by this name, I had, instead of styling them Arminians, called them " these men," as Dr. Whitby does Cal- vinistic divines, it probably would not have been taken any better, or thought to show a better temper, or more good manners. I have done as I would be done by, in this matter. However the term Calvinistic is, in these aays, among most, a term of greater reproach than the term Arminian ; yet I should not take it at all amiss, to be called a Cat- vinist, for distinction's sake : though I utterly disclaim a dependence on Calvin, or believing the doctrines which I hold, because he believed and taught them ; and cannot justly be charged with believing in every thing just as he taught. -B 2 4 PREFACE. But, lest I should really be an occasion of injury to some persons, I would here give notice, that though I generally speak of that doctrine, concerning free-will and moral agency, which I oppose, as an Arminian doctrine ; yet I would not be understood as asserting, that every divine or author, whom I have occasion to mention as maintaining that doctrine, was properly an Arminian, or one of that sort which is commonly called by that name. Some of them went far beyond the Arminians ; and I would by no means charge Arminians in general with all the corrupt doctrine which these maintained. Thus, for instance, it would be very injurious, if I should rank Arminian divines, in general, with such authors as Mr. Chubb. I doubt not, many of them have some of his doctrines in abhorrence ; though he agrees, for the most part, with Arminians, in his notion of the Freedom of the Will. And, on the other hand, though I sup pose this notion to be a leading article in the Arminian scheme, that which, if pursued in its consequences, will truly infer, or naturally lead to all the rest ; yet I do not charge all that have held this doctrine, with being Arminians. For whatever may be the consequences of the doctrine really, yet some that hold this doctrine, may not own nor see these consequences ; and it would be unjust, in many instances, to charge every author with believing and maintaining all the real consequences of his avowed doctrines. And I desire it may be particularly noted, that though I have occasion, in the following Discourse, often to mention the author of the book, entitled An Essay on the Freedom of the Will, in God and the Creature,* as holding that notion of Freedom of Will, which I oppose ; yet I do not mean to call him an Arminian : however, in that doctrine he agrees with Arminians, and departs from the current and general opinion of Calvinists. If the author of that Essay be the same as it is commonly ascribed to, he doubtless was not one that ought to bear that name. But however good a divine he was in many 'respects, yet that particular Arminian doctrine which he maintained, is never the better for being held by such an one : nor is there less need of opposing it on that account, but rather more ; as it will be likely to have the more pernicious influence, for being taught by a divine of his name and character ; supposing the doctrine to be wrong, and in itself to be of an ill tendency. I have nothing further to say by way of preface ; but only to bespeak the reader's candour, and calm attention to what I have written. The subject is of such importance, as to demand attention, and the most thorough consideration. Of all kinds of knowledge that we can ever obtain, the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of ourselves, are the' most important. As religion is the great business for which we are created, and on which our happiness depends ; and as religion consists in an intercourse between ourselves and our Maker ; and so has its foundation in God's nature and ours, and in the relation that God and we stand in to each other; therefore a true knowledge of both must be needful, in order to true religion. But the knowledge of ourselves consists chiefly in right apprehensions concerning those two chief faculties of our nature, the understanding and will. Both are very important : yet the science of the latter must be confessed to be of greatest moment ; inasmuch as all virtue and religion have their seat more immediately in the will, consisting more especially in right acts and habits of this faculty. And the grand question about the Freedom of the Will, is the main point that belongs to the science of the Will. Therefore, I say, the importance of the subject greatly demands the attention of Christians, and especially of divines. But as to my manner of handling the subject, I would be far from presuming to say, that it is such as demands the attention of the reader to what I have written. I am ready to own, that in this matter I' depend on the reader's courtesy. But only thus far I may have some colour for putting in a claim ; that if the reader be disposed to pass his censure on what I have written, I may be fully and patiently heard, and well attended to, before I am condemned. However, this is what I would humbly ask of my readers ; together with the prayers of all sincere lovers of truth, that I may have much of that Spirit which Christ promised his disciples, which guides into all truth ; and that the blessed and powerful influences of this Spirit would make truth victorious in the world. CAREFUL AND STRICT INQUIRY, &c. PART I. WHEREIN ARE EXPLAINED AND STATED VARIOUS TERMS AND THINGS BELONGING TO THE SUBJECT OP THE ENSUING DISCOURSE. SECTION I. Concerning the Nature of the Will. It may possibly be thought, that there is no great need of going about to define or describe the Will ; this word being generally as well understood as any other words we can use to explain it : and so perhaps it would be, had not philosophers, metaphysicians, and polemic divines, brought the matter into obscurity by the things they have said of it. But since it is so, I think it may be of some use, and will tend to greater clearness in the following discourse, to say a few things concerning it. And therefore I observe, that the Will (without any metaphysical refining) is, That by which the mind chooses any thing. The faculty of the Will, is that power, or principle of mind, by which it is capable of choosing : an act of the Will is the same as an act of choosing or choice. If any think it is a more perfect definition of the Will, to say, that it is that by which the soul either chooses or refuses ; I am content with it : though I think it enough to say, It is that by which the soul chooses : for in every act of Will whatsoever, the mind chooses one thing rather than another; it chooses something rather than the con trary, or rather than the want or non-existence of that thing.' So in every act of refusal, the mind chooses the absence of the thing refused ; the positive and the negative are set before the mind for its choice, and it chooses the negative ; and the mind's making its choice in that case is properly the act of the Will : the Will's determining between the two, is a voluntary determination; but that is the same * This Essay has been generally ascribed to Dr. Watte, and is included in his works.— W. Sect. I. THE NATURE OF THE WILL. thing as making a choice. So that by whatever names we call the act of the Will, choosing, refusing, approving, dis approving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, deter mining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining, or being averse, being pleased or displeased with ; all may be reduced to this of choosing. For the soul to act volun tarily, is evermore to act electively. Mr. Locke* says, " The Will signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose." And, in the fore going page, he says, " The word preferring seems best to express the act of volition ;" but adds, that " it does it not precisely ; for, though a man would prefer flying to walk ing, yet who can say he ever wilts it ?" But the instance he mentions, does not prove that there is any thing else in willing, but merely preferring : for it should be considered what Is the immediate' object of the Will, with respect to a man's walking, or any other external action ; which is not being removed from one place to another ; on the earth, or through the air ; these are remoter objects of preference ; but such or such an immediate exertion of himself. The thing next chosen, or prefen-ed, when a man wills to walk, is not his being removed to such a place where he would be, but such an exertion and motion of his legs and feet, &c. in order to it. And his willing such an alteration in his body in the present moment, is nothing else but his choosing or preferring such an alteration in his body at such a moment, or his liking it better than the forbearance of it. And God has so made and established the human nature, the soul being united to a body in proper state, that the soul preferring or choosing such an immediate exertion or alteration of the body, such an alteration in stantaneously follows. There is nothing else in the actions of my mind, that I am conscious of while I walk, but only my preferring or choosing, through successive moments, that there should be such alterations of my external sen sations and motions ; together with a concurring habitual expectation that it will be so ; having ever found by ex perience, that on such an immediate preference, such sen sations and motions do actually, instantaneously, and con stantly arise. But it is not so in the case of flying : though a man may be said remotely to choose or prefer flying; yet he does not prefer, or desire, under circum stances in view, any immediate exertion of the members of his body in order to it ; because he has no expectation that he should obtain the desired end by any such exertion ; and he does not prefer, or incline to, any bodily exertion, under this apprehended circumstance, of its being wholly in vain. So that if we carefully distinguish the proper ob jects of the several acts of the Will, it will not appear by this, and such like instances, that there is any difference between volition and preference ; or that a man's choosing, liking best, or being best pleased with a thing, are not the same with his willing that thing. Thus an act of the Will is commonly expressed by its pleasing a man to do thus or thus ; and a man doing as he wills, and doing as he pleases, are in common speech the same thing. ' Mr. Locket says, "The Will is perfectly distinguished from Desire ; which in the very same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our Wills sets us upon. A man, says he, whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. v In this case, it is plain the Will and Desire run counter." I do not suppose, that Will and Desire are words of pre cisely the same signification : Will seems to be a word of a more general signification, extending to things present and absent. Desire respects something absent. I may prefer my present situation and posture, suppose sitting still, or having my eyes open, and so may will it. But yet I cannot think they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A man never, in any instance, wills any thing contrary to his desires, or de sires any thing contrary to his Will. The forementioned instance, which Mr. Locke produces, is no proof that he ever does. He may, on some consideration or other will to utter speeches which have a tendency to persuade another, and still may desire that they may not persuade him ; but yet his Will and Desire do not run counter at » Human Understanding. Edit. 7. vol. i. p. 1ST. all : the thing which he wills, the very same he desires ; and he does not will a thing, and desire the contrary, in any particular. In this instance, it is not carefully ob served, what is the thing willed, and what is the thing de sired : if it were, it would be found, that Will and Desire do not clash in the least. The thing willed on some con sideration, is to utter such words ; and certainly, the same consideration so influences him, that he does not desire the contrary ; all things considered, he chooses to utter such words, and does not desire not to utter them. And so as to the thing which Mr. Locke speaks of as desired, viz. That the words, though they tend to persuade, should not be effectual to that end, his Will is not contrary to this ; he does not will that they should be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as he desires. In order to prove that the Will and Desire may run counter, it should be shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the same thing, or with respect to the very same object of Will or Desire : but here the objects are two ; and in each, taken by themselves, the Will and Desire agree. And it is no wonder that they should not agree in different things, though but little distinguished in their nature. The Will may not agree with the Will, nor Desire agree with De sire, in different things. As in this very instance which Mr. Locke mentions, a person may, on some consideration, desire to use persuasions, and at the same time may desire they may not prevail ; but yet nobody will say, that De sire runs counter to Desire; or that this proves that De sire is perfectly a distinct thing from Desire- — The like might be observed of the other instance Mr; Locke pro duces, of a man's desiring to be eased of pain, &c. But, not to dwell any longer on this, whether Desire and Will, and whether Preference and Volition be precisely the same things, I trust it will be allowed by all, that in every act of Will there is an act of choice ; that in every volition there is a preference, or a prevailing inclination of the soul, whereby, at that instant, it is out of a state of perfect indifference, with respect to the direct object 'of the volition. So that in every act, or going forth of the Will, there is some preponderation of the mind, one way rather than another; and the soul had rather have or do one thing, than another, or than not to have or do that thing ; and that where there is absolutely no preferring or choos ing, but a perfect, continuing equilibrium, there is no vo lition. SECT^ II. Concerning the Determination of the Will. By determining the Will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended, causing that the act of the Will or choice should be thus, and not otherwise : and the Will is said to be determined, when, in consequence of some action, or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon a particular object. As when we speak of the de termination of motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be in such a direction, rather than another. The Determination of the Will, supposes an effect, which must have a cause. If the Will be determined, there is a Determiner. This must be supposed to be in tended even by them that say, The Will determines itself. If it be so, the Will is both Determiner and determined ; it is a cause that acts and produces effects upon itself, and is the object of its own influence and action. With respect to that grand inquiry, " What determines the W ill V it would be very tedious and unnecessary, at present, to examine all the various opinions, which have been advanced concerning this matter ; nor is it needful that. I should enter into a particular discussion of all points debated in disputes on that other question, " Whe ther the Will always follows the last dictate of the under standing '!" It is sufficient to my present purpose to say, It is that motive, which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the Wilt. But it may be necessary that I should a little explain my meaning. t Hum. Und. vol. i. p. 203, 2W. ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part I; By motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, ex cites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur, and unite their strength, to induce the mind ; and when it is so, all together are as one complex motive. And when I speak of the strongest motive, I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce a particular act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together. Whatever is objectively * a motive, in this sense, must be something that is extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can in duce or invite the mind to will or act any thing, any further than it is perceived, or is some way or other in the mind's view; for what is wholly unperceived and perfectly out of the mind's view, cannot affect the mind at all. It is most evident, that nothing is in the mind, or reaches it, or takes any hold of it, any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of. And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every thing that is properly called a motive, excitement, or in ducement to a perceiving, willing agent, has some sort and degree of tendency, or advantage to move or excite the Will, previous to the effect, or to the act of the Will ex cited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I call the strength of the motive. That motive which has a less degree of previous advantage, or tendency to move the Will, or which appears less inviting, as it stands in the view of the mind, is what I call a weaker motive. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the understanding or appre hension, the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite and induce the choice, is what I call the strongest motive. And in this sense, I suppose the Will is always determined by the strongest motive. Things that exist in the view of the mind have their strength, tendency, or advantage to move, or excite its Will, from many things appertaining to the nature and circumstances of the thing viewed, the nature and circum stances of the mind that views, and the degree and manner of its view ; of which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect enumeration. But so much I think may be de termined in general, without room for controversy, that whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or viewed as good ; nor has it any tendency to engage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears such. For to say otherwise, would be to say, that things that appear, have a tendency, by the appearance they make, to engage the mind to elect them, some other way than by their appearing eligible to it ; which is absurd. And therefore it must be true, in some sense, that the Will always is, as the greatest apparent good is. But only, for the right understanding of this, two things must be well and dis tinctly observed. 1. It must be observed in what sense I use the term " good ;" namely, as of the same import with " agreeable." To appear good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable, or seem pleasing to the mind. Certainly, nothing appears inviting and eligible to the mind, or tending to engage its inclination and choice, con sidered as evil or disagreeable ; nor indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreeable nor disagreeable. But if it tends to draw the inclination, and move the Will, it must be under the notion of that which suits the mind. And there fore that must have the greatest tendency to attract and engage it, which as it stands in the mind's view, suits it best, and pleases it most ; and in that sense, is the greatest apparent good : to say otherwise, is little, if any thing, short of a direct and plain contradiction. The word " good," in this sense, includes in its signifi cation, the removal or avoiding of evil, or of that which is disagreeable and uneasy. It is agreeable and pleasing, to avoid what is disagreeable and displeasing, and to have * This appears to be the author's meaning, in order to preserve a con sistency with his professed sentiment of divine influence. He believed that a real Christian's mind is born of the Spirit; and that such a state of mind induces one choice rather than another. But he could not maintain that divine influence, which is a subjective cause of one volition rather than another, must be " in the view or apprehension of the understanding." For uneasiness removed. So that here is included what Mr. Locke supposes determines the Will. For when he speaks of " uneasiness," as determining the Will, he must be under stood as supposing that the end or aim which governs in the volition or act of preference, is the avoiding or the removal of that uneasiness ; and that is the same thing as choosing and seeking what is more easy and agreeable. 2. When I say, that the Will is as the greatest apparent good, or, (as I have explained it,) that volition has always for its object the thing which appears most agreeable ; it must be carefully observed, to avoid confusion and needless objection, that 1 speak of the direct and immediate object of the act of volition ; and not some object to which the act of Will has only an indirect and remote respect. Many acts of volition have some remote relation to an object, that is different from the thing most immediately willed and chosen. Thus, when a drunkard has his liquor before him, and he has to choose whether to drink it, or no ; the immediate objects, about which his present volition is con versant, and between which his choice now decides, are his own acts, in drinking the liquor, or letting it alone ; and this will certainly be done according to what, in the present view of his mind, taken in the whole of it, is most agree able to him. If he chooses to drink it, and not to let it alone ; then this action, as it stands in the view of his mind, with all that belongs to its appearance there, is more agreeable and pleasing than letting it alone. But the objects to which this act of volition may relate more remotely, and between which his choice may deter mine more indirectly, are the present pleasure the man expects by drinking, and the future misery which he judges will be the consequence of it : he may judge that this future misery, when it comes, will be more disagreeable and unpleasant, than refraining from drinking now would be. But these two things are not the proper objects that the act of volition spoken of is next conversant about. For the act of Will spoken of, is concerning present drink ing, or forbearing to drink. If he wills to drink, then drinking is the proper object of the act of his Will ; and drinking, on some account or other, now appears most agreeable to him, and suits him best. If he chooses to refrain, then refraining is the immediate object of his Will, and is most pleasing to him. If in the choice he makes in the case, ne prefers a present pleasure to a future advantage, which he judges will be greater when it comes; then a lesser present pleasure appears more agreeable to him than a greater advantage at a distance. If on the contrary a future advantage is preferred, then that appears most agreeable, and suits him best. And so still, the pre sent volition is, as the greatest apparent good at present is. I have rather chosen to express myself thus, " that the Will always is as the greatest apparent good," or " as what appears most agreeable," than to say " that the Will is de termined by the greatest apparent good," or " by what seems most agreeable ;" because an appearing most agreeable to the mind, and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary action, which is the immediate consequence of the mind's choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than the choice it self; but that volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say, " in or about the mind's view of the object;" because what has influence to render an object in view agreeable, is not only what appears in the object viewed, but also the manner of the view and the state and circumstances of the mind that views. Particularly to enumerate all things pertaining to the mind's view of the objects of volition, which have influence in their appearing agreeable to the mind, would be a matter of no small difficulty, and might require a treatise by itself, and is not necessary to my present purpose. I shall therefore only mention some things in general. I. One thing that makes an object proposed to choice agreeable, is the apparent nature and circumstances of the " the wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hcarest the sound thereof put canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth : so is every one that is born of the Spirit," Beside, the most proper acceptation of the term " motive " seems to plead in favour of the restriction suggested in the text by the word " objectively;" and the use of this distinction may ap pear more fully hereafter.— W. ' Sect. II. WHAT DETERMINES THE WILL. object. And there are various things of this sort, that have influence in rendering the object more or less agree able ; as, 1. That which appears in the object, rendering it beauti ful and pleasant, or deformed and irksome to the mind ; viewing it as it is in itself. 2. The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending the object, or the consequence of it. Such concomitants and consequences being viewed as circumstances of the object, are to be considered as belonging to it ; and as it were parts of it, as it stands in the mind's view a pro posed object of choice. 3. The apparent state of the pleasure or trouble that appears, with respect to distance of time; being either nearer or farther off. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind, to have pleasure speedily ; and disagreeable, to have it delayed : so that if there be two equal degrees of pleasure set in the mind's view, and all other things are equal, but one is beheld as near, and the other afar off; the nearer will appear most agreeable, and so will be chosen. Because, though the agreeableness of the objects be exactly equal, as viewed in themselves, yet not as viewed in their circumstances ; one of them having the additional agreeableness of the circumstance of nearness. II. Another thing that contributes to the agreeableness of an object of choice, as it stands in the mind's view, is the manner of the view. If the object be something which appears connected with future pleasure, not only will the degree of apparent pleasure have influence, but also the manner of the view, especially in two respects. 1 . With respect to the degree of assent, with which the mind judges the pleasure to be future. Because it is more agreeable to have a certain happiness, than an uncer tain one; and a pleasure viewed as more probable, all other things being equal, is more agreeable to the mind, than that which is viewed as less probable. 2. With respect to the degree of the idea or apprehen sion of the future pleasure. With regard to things which are the subject of our thoughts, either past, present, or future, we have much more of an idea or apprehension of some things than others ; that is, our idea is much more clear, lively, and strong. Thus the ideas we have of sen sible things by immediate sensation, are usually much more lively than those we have by mere imagination, or by contemplation of them when absent. My idea of the sun when I look upon it is more vivid, than when I only think of it. Our idea of the sweet relish of a delicious fruit is usually stronger when we taste it, than when we only imagine it. And sometimes, the idea we have of things by contemplation, are much stronger and clearer, than at other times. Thus, a man at one time has a much stronger idea of the pleasure which is to be enjoyed in eating some sort of food that he loves, than at another. Now the strength of the idea or the sense that men have of future good or evil, is one thing that has great influence on their minds to excite volition. When two kinds of future pleasure are presented for choice, though both are sup posed exactly equal by the judgment, and both equally certain, yet of one the mind has a far more lively sense, than of the other ; this last has the greatest advantage by far to affect and attract the mind, and move the Will. It is now more agreeable to the mind, to take the pleasure of which it has a strong and lively sense, than that of which it has only a faint idea. The view of the former is attended with the strongest appetite, and the greatest un easiness attends the want of it ; and it is agreeable to the mind to have uneasiness removed, and its appetite grati fied. And if several future enjoyments are presented to gether, as competitors for the choice of the mind, some of them judged to be greater, and others less ; the mind also having a more lively idea of the good of some, and of others a less ; and some are viewed as of greater certainty or probability than others ; and those enjoyments that ap pear most agreeable in one of these respects, appear least so in others : in this case, all other things being equal, the agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree of good sup posed by the judgment, the degree of apparent probability or certainty of that good, and the degree of liveliness of the idea the mind has of that good ; because all together concur to constitute the degree in which the object appears at present agreeable ; and accordingly will volition be de termined. I might further observe, that the state of the mind which views a proposed object of choice, is another thing that contributes to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of that object ; the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced and established by education, example, custom, or some other means ; or the frame or state that the mind is in on a particular occasion. That object which appears agreeable to one, does not so to another. And the same object does not always appear alike agreeable to the same person, at different times. It is most agreeable to some men, to follow their reason ; and to others, to follow their appetites : to some men, it is more agreeable to deny a vicious inclination, than to gratify it; others it suits best to gratify the vilest appetites. It is more disagreeable to some men than others, to counteract a former resolution. In these respects, and many others which might be mentioned, different things will be most agreeable to different persons ; and not only so, but to the same persons at different times. But possibly it is needless to mention the " state of the mind," as a ground of the agreeableness of objects distinct from the other two mentioned before ; viz. The apparent nature and circumstances of the objects viewed, and the manner of the view. Perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter, the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration as to the agreeableness of objects, any other way, than as it makes the objects themselves appear dif ferently beautiful or deformed, having apparent pleasure or pain attending them ; and, as it occasions the manner of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or de formity, pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively. However, I think so much is certain, that volition, in no one instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained. The choice of the mind never departs from that which, at the time, and with respect to the direct and immediate objects of decision, appears most agreeable and pleasing, all things considered. If the immediate objects of the Will are a man's own actions, then those actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills. If it be now most agreeable to him, all things considered, to walk, then he now wills to walk. If it be now, upon the whole of what at present appears to him, most agreeable to speak, then he chooses to speak ; if it suits him best to keep silence, then he chooses to keep silence. There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and ex perience of mankind, than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them. To say, that they do what pleases them, but yet not what is agreeable to them, is the same thing as to say, they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure ; and that is to say, that they do what they please, and yet do not what they please. It appears from these things, that in some sense, the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. But then the understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehen sion, and not merely what is called reason or judgment. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant what reason declares to be best, or most for the person's happiness, taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true, that the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason is quite a different matter from things appearing now most agreeable, all things being put together which pertain to the mind's present perceptions in any respect: although that dictate of reason, when it takes place, has concern in the compound influence which moves the Will ; and should be considered in estimating the degree of that appearance of good which the Will always follows ; either as having its influence added to other things, or subducted from them. When such dictate of reason concurs with other things, then its weight is added to them, as put into the same scale ; but when it is against them, it is as a weight in the opposite scale, resisting the influence of other things : yet its resistance is often over come by their greater weight, and so the act of the Will is determined in opposition to it. ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part 1. These things may serve, I hope, in some measure, to illustrate and confirm the position laid down in the be ginning of this section, viz. " That the Will is always determined by the strongest motive," or by that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous ten dency to excite volition. But whether I nave been so happy as rightly to explain the thing wherein consists the strength of motives, or not, yet my failing in this will not overthrow the position itself; which carries much of its own evidence with it, and is a point of chief importance to the purpose of the ensuing discourse : And the truth of it, I hope, will appear with great clearness, before I have finished what I have to say on the subject of human liberty. SECT. III. Concerning the meaning of the terms, Necessity, Impos sibility, Inability, eye. and of Contingence. The words necessary, impossible, eye are abundantly used in controversies about Free-Will and Moral Agency ; and therefore the sense in which they are used should be clearly understood. Here I might say, that a thing is then said to be necessary, when it must be, and cannot be otherwise. But this would not properly be a definition of Necessity, any more than if I explained the word must, by the phrase, there being a Necessity. The words must, can, and cannot, need expli cation as much as the words necessary, and impossible ; excepting that the former are words that in earliest life we more commonly use. The word necessary, as used in common speech, is a re lative term ; and relates to some supposed opposition made to the existence of a thing, which opposition is overcome, or proves insufficient to hinder or alter it. That is neces sary, in the original and proper sense of the word, which is, or will be, notwithstanding all supposable opposition. To say, that a thing is necessary, is the same thing as to say, that it is impossible it should not be. But the word impossible is manifestly a relative term, and has reference to supposed power exerted to bring a thing to pass, which is insufficient for the effect ; as the word unable is relative, and has relation to ability, or endeavour, which is insuffi cient. Also the word irresistible is relative, and has al ways reference to resistance which is made, or may be made, to some force or power tending to an effect, and is insufficient to withstand the power, or hinder the effect. The common notion of Necessity and Impossibility im plies something that frustrates endeavour or desire. Here several things are to be noted. 1 . Things are said to be necessary in general j which are or will be notwithstanding any supposable opposition from whatever quarter. But things are said to be necessary to us, which are or will be notwithstanding all opposition sup posable in the case from us. The same may be observed of the word impossible, and other such like terms. 2. These terms necessaty, impossible, irresistible, fyc. more especially belong to controversies about liberty and moral agency, as used in the latter of the two senses now men tioned, viz. as necessary or impossible to us, and with re lation to any supposable opposition or endeavour of ours. 3. As the word Necessity, in its vulgar and common use, is relative, and has always reference to some supposable insufficient opposition ; so when we speak of any thing as necessary to us, it is with relation to some supposable op position of our Wills, or some voluntary exertion or effort of ours to the contrary. For we do not properly make op position to an event, any otherwise than as we voluntarily oppose it. Things are said to be what must be, or neces sarily are, as to us, when they are, or will be, though we desire or endeavour the contrary, or try to prevent or re move their existence : but such opposition of ours always either consists in, or implies, opposition of our wills. It is manifest that all such like words and phrases, as vulgarly used, are understood in this manner. A thing is said to be necessary, when we cannot help it, let us do what we will. So any thing is said to be impossible to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought to pass, and endeavour it ; or at least may be supposed to desire and seek it; but all our desires and endeavours are, or would be, vain. And that is said to be irresistible, which overcomes all our opposition, resistance, and endeavour to the contrary. And we are said to be unable to do a thing, when our supposable desires and endeavours are insuf ficient. We are accustomed, in the common use of language, thus to apply and understand these phrases : we grow up with such a habit ; which, by the daily use of these terms from our childhood, becomes fixed and settled; so that the idea of a relation to a supposed will, desire, and endea vour of ours, is strongly connected with these terms, when ever we hear the words used. Such ideas, and these words, are so associated, that they unavoidably go together ; one suggests the other, and never can be easily separated as long as we live. And though we use the words, as terms of art, in another sense, yet, unless we are exceed ingly circumspect, we shall insensibly slide into the vulgar use of them, and so apply the words in a very inconsist ent manner, which will deceive and confound us in our reasonings and discourses, even when we pretend to use them as terms of art. 4. It follows from what has been observed, that when these terms necessary, impossible, irresistible, unable, t)c. are used in cases wherein no insufficient will is supposed, or can be supposed, but the very nature of the supposed case itself excludes any opposition, will, or endeavour, they are then not used in their proper signification. The reason is manifest ; in such cases we cannot use the words with re? ference to a supposable opposition, will, or endeavour. And therefore if any. man uses these terms in such cases, he either uses them nonsensically, or in some new sense, di verse from their original and proper meaning. ¦ As for in stance ; if any one should affirm after this manner, That it is necessary for a man, or what must be, that he should choose virtue rather than vice, during the time that he prefers virtue. to vice ; and that it is a thing impossible and irresistible, that it should be otherwise than that he should have this choice, so long as this choice continues ; such a one would use the terms must, irresistible, fyc. with either perfect in significance, or in some new sense, diverse from their com mon use ; which is with reference, as has been observed; to supposable opposition, unwillingness, and resistance; whereas, here, the very supposition excludes and denies any such thing : for the case supposed is that of being willing, and choosing. 5. It appears from what has been said, that these terms necessary, impossible, eye are often used by philosophers and metaphysicians in a sense quite diverse from their common and original signification ; for they apply them to many cases in which no opposition is supposable. Thus they use them with respect to God's existence before the creation of the world, when there was no other being ; with regard to many of the dispositions and acts of the divine Being, such as his loving himself, his loving righteousness, hating sin, &c. So they apply them to many cases of the incli nations and actions of created intelligent beings wherein all opposition of the Will is excluded in the very supposition of the case. Metaphysical or philosophical Necessity is nothing dif ferent from their certainty. I speak not now of the cer^ tainty of knowledge, but the certainty that is in things themselves, which is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge, or that wherein lies the ground of the infalli bility of the proposition which affirms them. Whatis sometimes givenas the definition of philosophical Necessity, namely, " That by which a thing cannot but be," or " whereby it cannot be otherwise," fails of being a proper explanation of it, on two accounts : First, the words can, or cannot, need explanation as much as the word Necessity; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any one asked us what we mean, when we say, a thing cannot but be, we might explain ourselves by saying, it must necessarily be so ; as well as explain Necessity, by saying, it is that 'by which a thing cannot but be. And Secondly, this definition is liable to the fore-mentioned great inconvenience ; the words can not, or unable, are properly relative, and have relation to power exerted, or that may be exerted, in order to the thing Sect. III. THE NATURE OF NECESSITY. spoken of; to which as I have now observed, the word Necessity, as used by philosophers, has no reference. Philosophical Necessity is really nothing else than the TULL AND PIXED CONNEXION BETWEEN THE THINGS SIG NIFIED BY THE SUBJECT AND PREDICATE OP A PROPOSI TION, which affirms something to be true. When there is such a connexion, then the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary, in a philosophical sense; whether any oppo sition or contrary effort be supposed, or no. When the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms the existence of any thing, either substance, quality, act, or circumstance, have a full and certain connexion, then the existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary in a metaphysical sense. And in this sense I use the ¦word necessity, in the following discourse, when I en deavour to prove that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty. The subject and predicate of a proposition, which af firms existence of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connexion several ways. (1 .) They may have a full and perfect connexion in and of themselves ; because it may imply a contradiction, or gross absurdity, to suppose them not connected. Thus many things are necessary in their own nature. So the eternal existence of being generally considered, is necessary in itself: because it would be in itself the greatest ab surdity, to deny the existence of being in general, or to ¦say there was absolute and universal nothing ; and is as it were the sum of all contradictions ; as might be shown, if this were a proper place for it. So God's infinity and other attributes are necessary. So it is necessary in its own nature, that two and two should be four ; and it is neces sary, that all right lines drawn from the centre of a circle to the circumference should be equal. It is necessary, fit, and suitable, that men should do to others, as they would that they should do to them. So innumerable metaphysi cal and mathematical truths are necessary in themselves : the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms them, are perfectly connected of themselves. (2.) The connexion of the subject and predicate of a E reposition, which affirms the existence of something, may e fixed and made certain, because the existence of that thing is already come to pass ; and either now is, or has been; and so has, as it were, made sure of existence. And therefore, the proposition which affirms present and •past existence of it, may by this means be made certain, and necessarily and unalterably true ; the past event has -fixed and decided the matter, as to its existence ; and has made it impossible but that existence should be truly pre dicated of it. Thus the existence of whatever is already come to pass, is now become necessary ; it is become im possible it should be otherwise than true, that such a thing nas been. (3.) The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be, may have a real and certain con nexion consequentially ; and so the existence of the thing may be consequentially necessary ; as it may be surely ft and firmly connected with something else, that is necessary in one oif the former respects. As it is either fully and thoroughly connected with that which is absolutely neces sary in its own nature, or with something which has already received and made sure of existence. This Necessity lies in, or may be explained by, the connexion of two or more propositions one with another. Things which are perfectly connected with other things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a Necessity of consequence. And here it may be observed, that all things whicn are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are necessary only in this last way. Their existence is not necessary in itself; for if so, they always would have existed. Nor is their existence become necessary by being already come to pass. Therefore, the only way that any thing that is to come to pass hereafter, is or can be necessary, is by a connexion with something that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already is, or has been ; so that the one being supposed, the other certainly follows.— And this also is the only way that all things past, excepting those which were from eternity, could be necessary before they come to pass ; and therefore the only way in which any effect or event, or any thing whatsoever that ever has had or will have a begin ning, has come into being necessarily, or will hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the Necessity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts of the will . It may be of some use in these controversies, further to observe concerning metaphysical Necessity, that (agreeable to the distinction before observed of Necessity, as vulgarly understood) things that exist may be said to be necessary, either with a general or particular Necessity. The exist ence of a thing may be said to be necessary with a general Necessity, when, all things considered, there is a founda tion for the certainty of their existence ; or when in the most general and universal view of things, the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms its existence, would appear with an infallible connexion. An event, or the existence of a thing, may be said to be necessary with a particular Necessity, when nothing that can be taken into consideration, in or about a person, thing, or time, alters the case at all, as to the certainty of an event, or the existence of a thing ; or can be of any ac count at all, in determining the infallibility of the connexion of the subject and predicate in the proposition which affirms the existence of the thing ; so that it is all one, as to that person, or thing, at least, at that time, as if the existence were necessary with a Necessity that is most universal and absolute. Thus there are many things that happen to particular persons, in the existence of which no will of theirs has any concern, at least, at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not, -with regard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard to any volition of theirs at that time ; as they prevent all acts of the will about the affair. 1 shall have occasion to apply this observation to particular instances in the following dis course Whether the same things that are necessary with a particular Necessity, be not also necessary with a ge- neral Necessity, may be a matter of future consideration. Let that be as it will, it alters not the case, as to the use of this distinction of the kinds of Necessity. These things may be sufficient for the explaining of the terms necessary and Necessity, as terms of art, and as often used by metaphysicians, and controversial writers in di vinity, in a sense diverse from, and more extensive than, their original meaning, in common language, which was before explained. What lias been said to show the meaning of the terms necessary and necessity, may be sufficient for the explain ing of the opposite terms, impossible and impossibility. For there is no difference, but only the latter are negative, and the former positive. Impossibility is the same as negative Necessity, or a Necessity that a thing should not be. And it is used as a term of art in a like diversity from the ori ginal and vulgar meaning, with Necessity. The same may be observed concerning the words unable and Inability. It has been observed, that these terms, in their original and common use, have relation to will and endeavour, as supposable in the case, and as insufficient for the bringing to pass the thing willed and endeavoured. But as these terms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on controversies about Free Will, they are used in a quite different and far more ex tensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will or endeavour for the bringing of the thing to pass is or can be supposed. As the words necessary, impossible, unable, Sfc. are used by polemic writers, in a sense diverse from their common signification, the like has happened to the term contin gent: Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connexion with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of things, is not dis cerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing said to be contingent, or acci dental, with regard to us, when it comes to pass without our foreknowledge, and besides our design and scope. But the word contingent is abundantly used in a very different sense; not for that whose connexion with the series of things we cannot discern, so as to foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous 10 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part I. ground or reason, with which its existence has any fixed and certain connexion. SECT. IV. Of the distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability. That Necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible connexion of the thmgs signified by the sub ject and predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is distinguished into moral and na tural Necessity. I shall not now stand to inquire whether this distinction be a proper and perfect distinction ; but shall only explain how these two sorts of Necessity are understood, as the terms are sometimes used, and as they are used in the following discourse. The phrase, moral Necessity, is used variously : some times it is used for a Necessity of moral obligation. So we say, a man is under Necessity, when he is under bonds of duty and conscience, from which he cannot be dis charged. Again, the word Necessity is often used for great obligation in point of interest. Sometimes by moral Ne cessity is meant that apparent connexion of things, which is the ground of moral evidence ; and so is distinguished from absolute Necessity, or that sure connexion of things, that is a foundation for infallible certainty. In this sense, moral Necessity signifies much the same as that high de gree of probability, which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy mankind, in their conduct and behaviour in the world, as they would consult their own safety and interest, and treat others properly as members of society. And sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that Necessity of connexion and consequence, which arises from such moral causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connexion which there is in many cases between these and such certain volitions and actions. !\nd it is in this sense, that I use the phrase, moral necessity, in the following dis course. By natural Necessity, as applied to men, I mean such Necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes ; as distinguished from what are called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements. Thus men, placed in certain circumstances, are the subjects of particular sensa tions by Necessity : they feel pain when their bodies are wounded ; they see the objects presented before them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened : so they assent to the truth of certain propositions, as soon as the terms are understood ; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another ; so by a natural Necessity men's bodies move downwards, when there is nothing to support them. But here several things may be noted concerning these two kinds of Necessity. 1 . Moral Necessity may be as absolute as natural Ne cessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural, necessary effect is with its natural cause. Whether the Will in every case is ne cessarily determined by the strongest motive, or whether the Will ever makes any resistance to such a motive, or can ever oppose the strongest present inclination, or not ; if that matter should be controverted, yet I suppose none will deny, but that, in some cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive presented, may be so powerful, that the act of the Will may be certainly and indissolubly connected therewith. When motives or previous bias are very strong, all will allow that there is some difficulty in going against them. And if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And therefore, if more were still added to their strength, to a certain degree, it would make the difficulty so great, that it would be wholly impossible to surmount it ; for this plain reason, because whatever power men may be supposed to have to sur mount difficulties, yet that power is . not infinite ; and so goes not beyond certain limits. If a man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty ; yet if the difficulty be increased to thirty, or an hundred, or a thousand degrees, and his strength not also increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty. As therefore it must be allowed, that there may be such a thing as a sure and perfect connexion between moral causes and effects; so this only is what I call by the name of moral Necessity. 2. When I use this distinction of moral and natural Necessity, I would not be understood to suppose, that if any thing come to pass by the former kind of Necessity, the nature of things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter. I do not mean to determine, that when a moral habit or motive is so strong, that the act of the Will infal libly follows, this is not owing to the nature of things. But natural and moral are the terms by which these two kinds of Necessity have usually been called ; and they must be distinguished by some names, for there is a dif ference between them, that is very important in its conse quences. This difference, however, does not lie so much in the nature of the connexion, as in the two terms con nected. The cause with which the effect is connected, is of a particular kind ; viz. that which is of a moral nature ; either some previous habitual disposition, or some motive exhibited to the understanding. And the effect is also of a particular kind; being likewise of a moral nature; con sisting in some inclination or volition of the soul, or voluntary action. I suppose, that Necessity which is called natural in dis tinction from moral Necessity, is so called, because mere nature, as the word is vulgarly used, is concerned, without any thing of choice. The word nature is often used in opposition to choice ; not because nature has indeed never any hand in our choice ; but, probably, because we first get our notion of nature from that obvious course of events, which we observe in many things where our choice has no concern ; and especially in the material world ; which, in very many parts of it, we easily perceive to be in a settled course ; the stated order, and manner of succession, being very apparent. But where we do not readily discern the rule and connexion, (though there be a connexion, accord ing to an established law, truly taking place,) we signify the manner of event by some other name. Even in many things which are seen in the material and inanimate world, which do not obviously come to pass according to any settled course, men do not call the manner of the event by the name of nature, but by such names as accident, chance, contingence, i)c. So men make a distinction between nature and choice ; as if they were completely and uni versally distinct. Whereas, I suppose none will deny but that choice, in many cases, arises from nature, as truly as other events. But the connexion between acts of choice, and their causes, according to established laws, is not so obvious. And we observe that choice is, as it were, a new principle of motion and action, different from that established order of things which is most obvious, and seen especially in corporeal things. The choice also often interposes, interrupts, and alters the chain of events in these external objects, and causes them to proceed otherwise than they would do, if let alone. Hence it is spoken of as if it were a principle of motion entirely distinct from nature, and properly set in opposition to it. Names being commonly given to things, according to what is most ob vious, and is suggested by what appears to the senses without reflection and research. 3. It must be observed, that in what has been explain ed, as signified by the name of moral Necessity, the word Necessity is not used according to the original design and meaning of the word : for, as was observed before, such terms, necessary, impossible, irresistible, ifc. in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always relative ; having reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient. But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in the case of moral Necessity ; which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd, to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself, in its present act ; or the present choice to be opposite to and resisting present choice : as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions, in the same moving body, at the same time. — Sect. IV. OF NATURAL AND MORAL INABILITY. 11 And therefore the very case supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or resisting will can overcome this Necessity. What has been said of natural and moral Necessity, may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral Inability. We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly called nature does not allow of it, or be cause of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the Will ; either in the faculty of understanding, consti tution of body, or external objects. Moral Inability con sists not in any of these things ; but either in the want of inclination ; or the strength of a contrary inclination ; or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and ex cite the act of the Will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one ; and it may be said in one word, that moral Inability con sists in the opposition or want of inclination . For when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such circumstances, and under the influence of such views. To give some instances of this moral Inability. — A woman of great honour and chastity may have a moral Inability to prostitute herself to her slave. A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be thus unable to kill his father. A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust. A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear taking strong drink. A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an enemy, or to desire his prosperity ; yea, some may be so under the power of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their esteem and affection. A strong habit of virtue, and a great degree of holiness, may cause a moral Inability to love wicked ness in general, and may render a man unable to take com placence in wicked persons or things ; or to choose a wick ed in preference to a virtuous life. And on the other hand, a great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an Inability to love and choose holiness ; and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely holy Being, or to choose and cleave to him as his chief good. Here it may be of use to observe this distinction of moral Inability, viz. of that which is general and habitual, and that which is particular and occasional. By a general and habitual moral Inability, I mean an Inability in the heart to all exercises or acts of will of that kind, through a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual and stated defect, or want of a certain kind of inclination. Thus a very ill-natured man may be unable to exert such acts of benevolence, as another, who is full of good nature, com monly exerts ; and a man whose heart is habitually void of gratitude, may be unable to exert grateful acts, through that stated defect of a grateful inclination. By particular and occasional moral Inability, I mean an Inability of the will or heart to a particular act, through the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements presented to the view of the understanding, on this occasion. — If it be so, that the Will is always determined by the strongest motive, then it must always have an Inability, in this lat ter sense, to act otherwise than it does ; it not being pos sible, in any case, that the Will should, at present, go against the motive which has now, all things considered, the greatest advantage to induce it. — The former of these kinds of moral Inability is most commonly called by the name of Inability ; because the word, in its most proper and original signification, has respect to some stated de fect. And this especially obtains the name of Inability also upon another account: — because, as before observed, the word Inability, in its original and most common use, is a relative term ; and has respect to will and endeavour, as supposable in the case, and as insufficient to bring to pass the thing desired and endeavoured. Now there may be more of an appearance and shadow of this, with respect to the acts which arise from a fixed and strong habit, than * I say not only doing, but conducting ; because a voluntary forbearing to do, sitting still, keeping silence, _c. are instances of persons' conduct, others that arise only from transient occasions and causes . Indeed will and endeavour against, or diverse from present acts of the Will are in no case supposable, whether those acts be occasional or habitual ; for that would be to sup pose the Will, at present, to be otherwise than, at present, it. is. But yet there may be will and endeavour against future acts of the Will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a distance. It is no contradiction, to suppose that the acts of the Will at one time, may be against the acts of the Will at another time ; and there may be de sires and endeavours to prevent or excite future acts of the Will ; but such desires and endeavours are, in many cases, rendered insufficient and vain, through fixedness of habit : when the occasion returns, the strength of habit overcomes and baffles all such opposition. In this respect, a man may be in miserable slavery and bondage to a strong habit. But it may be comparatively easy to make an alteration, with respect to such future acts, as are only occasional and transient ; because the occasion or transient cause, if fore seen, may often easily be prevented or avoided. On this account, the moral Inability that attends fixed habits, especially obtains the name of Inability. And then, as the Will may remotely and indirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of strong habits ; so reason may resist present acts of the Will, and its resistance be insufficient ; and this is more commonly the case also, when the acts arise from strong habit. But it must be observed concerning moral Inability, in each kind of it, that the word Inability is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a natural Inability, in the proper use of it ; and is ap plied to such cases only wherein a present will or inclina tion to the thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, accord ing to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be never so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbour kind ness ; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest pro priety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election : and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will. It is improperly said, that a person cannot per form those external actions, which are dependent on the act of the Will, and which would be easily performed, if the act of the Will were present. And if it be improperly said, that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions, which depend on the Will, it is in some respect more im properly said, that he is unable to exert the acts of the Will themselves ; because it is more evidently false, with re spect to these, that he cannot if he will : for to say so, is a downright contradiction ; it is to say, he cannot will, if he does will. And in this case, not only is it true, that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very will ing is the doing ; when once he has willed, the thing is performed ; and nothing else remains to be done. There fore, in these things, to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability, is not just ; because the thing wanting is not a being able, but a being wilting. There are faculties of mind, and a capacity of nature, and every thing else, sufficient, but a disposition : nothing is wanting but a will. SECT. V. Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency. The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty, in common speech, is The power, opportu nity, or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases. Or in other words, his being free from hinderance or im pediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect, as he wills.*- — And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise. If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the about which Liberty is exercised ; though they are not so properly called doing. 12 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part I. word Liberty, in the ordinary use of language ; as I trust that none that has ever learned to talk, and is unpreju diced, will deny ; then it will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty, power or property, as is called Will. For that which is possessed of no will, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing according to its wilt, nor be necessi tated to act contrary to its will, nor be restrained from act ing agreeably to it. And therefore to talk of Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very Will itself, is not to speak good sense; if we judge of sense, and nonsense, by the original and proper signification of words. — -For the Will itself is not an Agent that has a will : the power of choosing, itself, has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the Liberty of doing according to his will, is the Agent who is pos sessed of the Will ; and not the Will which he is possess ed of. We say with propriety, that a bird let loose has power and liberty to fly ; but not that the bird's power of flying has a power and Liberty of flying. To be free is the property of an Agent, who is possessed of powers and faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the properties of persons ; and not the properties of properties. There are two things contrary to what is called Liberty in common speech. One is constraint ; otherwise called force, compulsion, and coaction ; which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint ; which is, his being hindered, and not having power to do according to his will. But that which has no will, cannot be the subject of these things. — I need say the less on this head, Mr. Locke having set the same thing forth, with so great clearness, in his Essay on the Human Understanding. But one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called Liberty ; namely, that power and oppor tunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning of the word, any thing of the cause of that choice ; or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition ; whether it was caused by some external motive, or internal habitual bias ; whether it was deter mined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause ; whether it was necessarily con nected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his choice any how, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom. What has been said may be sufficient to show what is meant by Liberty, according to the common notions of mankind, and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word : but the word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians, and others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely different signification. — These several things belong to their notion of Liberty. 1. That it consists in a self-determining power in the Will, or a certain sovereignty the Will has over itself, and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions ; so as not to be dependent, in its determinations, on any cause without itself, nor determined by any thing prior to its own acts. 2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their notion of it, or that the mind, previous to the act of voli tion, be in equilibrio. 3. Contingence is another thing that belongs and is essential to it ; not in the common ac ceptation of the word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and certain connexion with some previous ground or reason of its existence. They suppose the essence of Liberty so much to consist in these things, that unless the will of man be free in this sense, he has no real freedom, how much soever he may be at Liberty to act according to his will. A moral Agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishments ; and a capacity which an Agent has of be ing influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty. The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and influence on the earth, in warming and causing it to bring forth its fruit; but it is not a moral agent: its action, though good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a city, and consumes great part of it, is very mischievous in its operation; but is not a moral Agent: what it does is not faulty or sinful, or deserving of any punishment. The brute creatures are not moral Agents : the actions of some of them are very profitable and pleasant ; others are very hurtful : yet seeing they have no moral faculty, or sense of desert, and do not act from choice guided by understanding, or with a capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not capable of being influenced by moral inducements, their actions are not properly sinful or virtuous , nor are they properly the subjects of any such moral treatment for what they do, as moral Agents are for their faults or good deeds. Here it may be noted, that there is a circumstantial difference between the moral Agency of a ruler and a sub ject. I call it circumstantial, because it lies only in the difference of moral inducements, by which they are capa ble of being influenced, arising from the difference of cir cumstances. A ruler, acting in that capacity only, is Dot capable of being influenced by a moral law, and its sanc tions of threatenings and promises, rewards and punish ments, as the subject is ; though both may be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil. And therefore the moral Agency of the Supreme Being, who acts only in the capacity of a ruler towards his creatures, and never as a subject, differs in that respect from the moral Agency of created intelligent beings. God's actions, and particularly those which he exerts as a moral governor, have moral qualifications, and are morally good in the highest degree: They are most perfectly holy and righteous ; and we must conceive of Him as influenced, in the highest degree, by that which, above all others, is properly a moral induce ment ; viz. the moral good which He sees in such and such things : and therefore He is, in the most proper sense, a moral Agent, the source of all moral ability and Agency; the fountain and rule of all virtue and moral good ; though by reason of his being supreme over all, it is not possible He should be under the influence of law or command, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments, counsels or warnings. The essential qualities of a moral Agent are in God, in the greatest possible perfection ; such as un derstanding to perceive the difference between moral good and evil ; a capacity of discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment ; and also a capacity of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of acting according to his choice or pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are in the highest sense praiseworthy. And herein does very much consist that image of God wherein he made man, (which we read of, Gen. i. 26, 27, and chap. ix. 6.) by which God distin guished man from the beasts, viz. in those faculties and principles of nature, whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein very much consists the natural image of God ; whereas the spiritual and moral image, wherein man was made at first, consisted in that moral excellency with which he was endowed. Sect. I. THE INCONSISTENCE OF ARMINIAN LIBERTY. 13 PART II. WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS OR CAN BE ANY SUCH SORT OF FREEDOM OF WILL, AS THAT WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OP THE LIBERTY OP ALL MORAL AGENTS ; AND WHETHER ANY SUCH THING EVER WAS OR CAN BE CONCEIVED OF. SECT. I. Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's self-de termining Power. Having taken notice of those things which may be necessary to be observed, concerning the meaning of the principal terms and phrases made use of in controversies concerning human liberty, and particularly observed what Liberty is according to the common language and general apprehension of mankind, and what it is as understood and maintained by Arminians; I proceed to consider the Ar minian notion of the Freedom of the Will, and the sup posed necessity of it in order to moral agency, or in order to any one's being capable of virtue or vice, and properly the subject of command or counsel, praise or blame, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments ; or whether that which has been described, as the thing meant by Liberty in common speech, be not sufficient, and the only Liberty, which makes or can make any one a moral agent, and so properly the subject of these things. In this Part, I shall consider whether any such thing be possible or conceivable, as that Freedom of Will which Arminians insist on; and shall inquire, whether any such sort of Liberty be necessary to moral agency, &c. in the next part. And first of all, I shall consider the notion of a self- determining Power in the Will : wherein, according to the Arminians, does most essentially consist the Will's free dom ; and shall particularly inquire, whether it be not plainly absurd, and a manifest inconsistence, to suppose that the Will itself determines all the. free acts of the Will. Here I shall not insist on the great impropriety of such ways of speaking as the Will determining itself; because actions are to be ascribed to agents, and not properly to the powers of agents ; which improper way of speaking leads to many mistakes, and much confusion, as Mr. Locke observes. But I shall suppose that the Arminians, when they speak of the Will's determining itself, do by the Will mean the soul willing. I shall take it for granted, that when they speak of the Will, as the determiner, they mean the soul in the exercise of a power of willing, or act ing voluntarily. I shall suppose this to be their meaning, because nothing else can be meant, without the grossest and plainest absurdity. In all cases when we speak of the powers or principles of acting, or doing such things, we mean that tne agents which have these Powers of act ing, do them, in the exercise of those Powers. So when we say, valour fights courageously, we mean, the man who is under the influence of valour fights courageously. When we say, love seeks the object loved, we mean, the person loving seeks that object. When we say, the understanding discerns, we mean the soul in the exercise of that faculty. So when it is said, the will decides or determines, the meaning must be, that the person, in the exercise of a Power of willing and choosing, or the soul, acting volunta rily, determines. Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free acts, the soul determines them in the exercise of a Power of willing and choosing ; or, which is the same thing, it de termines them of choice ; it determines its own acts, by choosing its own acts. If the Will determines the Will, then choice orders and determines the choice ; and acts of choice are subject to the decision, and follow the conduct of other acts of choice. And therefore if the Will deter mines all its own free acts, then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act. And if that preceding act of the Will be also a free act, then by these principles, in this act too, the Will is self- determined : that is, this, in like manner, is an act that the soul voluntarily chooses ; or, which is the same thing, it is an act determined still by a preceding act of the Will, choosing that. Which brings us directly to a contradic tion : for it supposes an act of the Will preceding the first act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest ; or a free act of the Will, before the first free act of the Will. Or else we must come at last to an act of the Will, determining the consequent acts, wherein tbe Will is not self-determined, and so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom : but if the first act in the' train, determining and fixing the rest, be not free, none of them all can be free ; as is manifest at first view, but shall be demonstrated pre sently. If the Will, which we find governs the members of the body, and determines their motions', does also govern it self, and determines its own actions, it doubtless deter mines them the same way, even by antecedent volitions. The Will determines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of choice : and there is no other way of the Will's determining, directing, or commanding any thing at all. Whatsoever the Will commands, it commands by an act of the Will. And if it has itself under its com mand, and determines itself in its own actions, it doubt less does it the same way that it determines other things which are under its command. So that if the freedom of the Will consists in this, that it has itself and its own actions under its command and direction, and its own volitions are determined by itself, it will follow, that every free volition arises from another antecedent volition, direct ing and commanding that : and if that directing volition be also free, in that also the Will is determined ; that is to say, that directing volition is determined by another going before that ; and so on, till we come to the first volition in the whole series : and if that first volition be free, and the Will self-determined in it, then that is determined by another volition preceding that. Which is a contradic tion ; because by the supposition, it can have none before it, to direct or determine it, being the first in the train. But if that first volition is not determined by any pre ceding act of the Wili, then that act is not determined by the Will, and so is not free in the Arminian notion of freedom, which consists in the Will's self-determination. And if that first act of the Will which determines and fixes the subsequent acts, be not free, none of the following acts which are determined by it can be free. — If we sup pose there are five acts in the train, the fifth and last de termined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third by the second, and the second by the first; if the first is not determined by the Will, and so not free, then none of them are truly determined by the Will : that is, that each of them are as they are, and not otherwise, is not first owing to the Will, but to the determination of the first in the series, which is not dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no hand in determining. And this being that which decides what the rest shall be, and determines their existence ; therefore the first determination of their existence is not from the Will. The case is just the same, if instead of a chain of five acts of the Will, we should suppose a succession of ten, or an hundred, or ten thousand. If the first act be not free, being determined by something out of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to itself, and that the next, and so on ; none of them are free, but all originally depend on, and are determined by, some cause out of the Will ; and so all freedom in the case is excluded, and no act of the Will can be free, according to this notion of freedom. If we should suppose a long chain of ten thousand links, so connected, that if the first link moves, it will move the next, and that the next ; and so the whole chain must be determined to motion, and in the direction of its motion, by the motion of the first link ; and that is moved by something else ; in this case, though all the links, but one, are moved by other parts of the same chain, yet it ap pears that the motion of no one, nor the direction of its 14 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part II. motion, is from any self-moving or self-determining power in the chain, any more than if every link were imme diately moved by something that did not belong to the chain. — If the Will be not free in the first act, which causes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caused by that first act ; for though indeed the Will caused it, yet it did not cause it freely ; because the preceding act, by which it was caused, was not free. And again, if the Will be not free in the second act, so neither can it be in the third, which is caused by that; because in like manner, that third was determined by an act of the Will that was not free. And so we may go on to the next act, and from that to the next ; and how long soever the succession of acts is, it is all one : if the first on which the whole chain depends, and which determines all the rest, be not a free act, the Will is not free in causing or determining any one of those acts ; because the act by which it determines them all is not a free act ; and therefore the Will is no more free in determining them, than if it did not cause them at all. — Thus, this Arminian notion of Liberty of the Will, consisting in the Will's Self-determination, is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly out of the world. SECT. II. Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning, considered. If to evade the force of what has been observed, it should be said, that when the Arminians speak of the Will determining its own acts, they do not mean that the Will determines them by any preceding act, or that one act of the Will determines another ; but only that the faculty or power of Will, or the soul in the use of that power, deter mines its own volitions ; and that it does it without any act going before the act determined ; such an evasion would be full of the most gross absurdity. — I confess, it is an evasion of my own inventing ; and 1 do not know but I should wrong the Arminians, in supposing that any of them would make use of it. But it being as good a one as 1 can invent, I would observe upon it a few things. First, If the power of the will determines an act of vo lition, or the soul in the use or exercise of that power de termines it, that is the same thing as for the soul to deter mine volition by an act of will. For an exercise of the power of will, and an act of that power, are the same thing. Therefore to say, that the power of will, or the soul in the use or exercise of that power, determines volition, without an act of will preceding the volition determined, is a con tradiction. Secondly, If a power of will determines the act of the Will, then a power of choosing determines it. For, as was before observed, in every act of will, there is choice, and a power of willing is a power of choosing. But if a power of choosing determines the act of volition, it determines it by choosing it. For it is most absurd to say, that a power of choosing determines one thing rather than another, without choosing any thing. But if a power of choosing determines volition by choosing it, then here is the act of volition determined by an antecedent choice, choosing that volition. Thirdly, To say, that the faculty, or the soul, deter mines its own volition, but not by any act, is a contradic tion. Because for the soul to direct, decide, or determine any thing, is to act ; and this is supposed : for the soul is here spoken of as being a cause in this affair, doing some thing ; or, which is the same thing, exerting itself in order to an effect, which effect is the determination of volition, or the particular kind and manner of an act of will. But certainly, this action is not the same with the effect, in order to the production of which it is exerted; but must be some thing prior to it. The advocates for this notion of the freedom of the Will, speak of a certain sovereignty in the Will, whereby it has power to determine its own volitions. And therefore the determination of volition must itself be an act of the Will ; for otherwise it can be no exercise of that supposed power and sovereignty. Again, if the Will determines itself, then either the Will is active in determining its volitions, or it is not. If active, then the determination is an act of the Will ; and so there is one act of the Will determining another. But if the Will is not active in the determination, then how does it exercise any 1 iberty in it ? These gentlemen su ppose that the thing wherein the Will exercises liberty, is in its deter mining its own acts. But how can this be, if it be not ac tive in determining ? Certainly the Will, or the soul, can not exercise any liberty in that wherein it doth not act, or wherein it doth not exercise itself. So that if either part of this dilemma be taken, this scheme of liberty, consisting in self-determining power, is overthrown. If there be an act of the Will in determining all its own free acts, then one free act of the Will is determined by another; and so we have the absurdity of every free act, even the very first, de termined by a foregoing free act. But if there be no act or exercise of the Will in determining its own acts, then no liberty is exercised in determining them. From whence it follows, that no liberty consists in the Will's power to de termine its own acts : or, which is the same thing, that there is no such thing as liberty consisting in a self-determining power of the Will. If it should be said, That although it be true, if the soul determines its own volitions, it must be active in so doing, and the determination itself must be an act ; yet there is no need of supposing this act to be prior to the volition determined ; but the Will or soul determines the act of the Will in willing ; it determines its own volition, in the very act of volition ; it directs and limits the act of the Will, causing it to be so and not otherwise, in exerting the act, without any preceding act to exert that. If any should say after this manner, they must mean one of these three things : either, (1.) That the determining act, though it be before the act determined in the order of nature, yet is not before it in order of time. Or, (2.) That the determining act is not before the act determined, either in the order of time or nature, nor is truly distinct from it ; but that the soul's determining the act of volition is the same thing with its exerting the act of volition : the mind's exerting such a particular act, is its causing and determining the act. Or, (3.) That volition has no cause, and is no effect ; but comes into existence, with such a particular determination, without any ground or reason of its existence and determi nation. — I shall consider these distinctly. (1.) If all that is meant, be, that the determining act is not before the act determined in order of time, it will not help the case at all, though it should be allowed. If it be before the determined act in the order of nature, being the cause or ground of its existence, this as much proves it to be distinct from, and independent on it, as if it were before in the order of time. As the cause of the particular mo tion of a natural body in a certain direction, may have no distance as to time, yet cannot be the same with the mo tion effected by it, but must be as distinct from it, as any other cause, that is before its effect in the order of time : as the architect is distinct from the house which he builds, or the father distinct from the son which he begets. And if the act of the Will determining be distinct from the act determined, and before it in the order of nature, then we can go back from one to another, till we come to the first in the series, which has no act of the Will before it in the order of nature, determining it ; and consequently is an act not determined by the Will, and so not a free act, in this notion of freedom. And this being the act which deter mines all the rest, none of them are free acts. As when there is a chain of many links, the first of which only is taken hold of and drawn by hand ; all the rest may follow and be moved at the same instant, without any distance of time ; but yet the motion of one link is before that of another in the order of nature; the last is moved by the next, and that by the next, and so till we come to the first; which not being moved by any other, but by something distinct from the whole chain, this as much proves that no part is moved by any self-moving power in the chain, as if the motion of one link followed that of another in the order of time. (2.) If any should say, that the determining act is not before the determined act, either in the order of time, or of nature, nor is distinct from it ; but that the exertion of the act is the determination of the act ; that for the Soul to exert a particular volition, is for it to cause and determine Sect. II. NO EVENT WITHOUT A CAUSE. 16 that act of volition : I would on this observe, that the thing in question seems to be forgotten, or kept out of sight, in a darkness and unintelligibleness of speech ; unless such an objector would mean to contradict himself. — The very act of volition itself is doubtless a determination of mind ; i. e. it is the mind's drawing up a conclusion, or coming to a choice between two or more things proposed to it. But determining among external objects of choice, is not the same with determining the act of choice itself, among various possible acts of choice. — The question is. What in fluences, directs, or determines the mind or Will to come to such a conclusion or choice as it does 1 Or what is the cause, ground, or reason, why it concludes thus, and not otherwise . Now it must be answered, according to the Arminian notion of freedom, that the Will influences, orders, and determines itself thus to act. And if it does, I say, it must be by some antecedent act. To say, it is caused, influenced, and determined by something, and yet not determined by any thing antecedent, either in order of time or nature, is a contradiction. For that is what is meant by a thing's being prior in the order of nature, that it is someway the cause or reason of the thing, with respect to which it is said to be prior. If the particular act or exertion of will, which comes into existence, be any thing properly determined at all, then it has some cause of existing, and of existing in such a parti cular determinate manner, and not another ; some cause, whose influence decides the matter : which cause is distinct from the effect, and prior to it. But to say, that the Will or mind orders, influences, and determines itself to exert an act by the very exertion itself, is to make the exertion both cause and effect ; or the exerting such an act, to be a cause of the exertion of such an act. For the question is, What is the cause and reason of the soul's exerting such an act ? To which the answer is, The soul exerts such an act, and that is the cause of it. And so, by this, the exertion must be distinct from, and in the order of nature prior to, itself. (3.) If the meaning be, that the soul's exertion of such a particular act of will, is a thing that comes to pass of itself, without any cause ; and that there is absolutely no reason of the soul being determined to exert such a voli tion, and make such a choice, rather than another ; I say, if this be the meaning of Arminians, when they contend so earnestly for the Will determining its own acts, and for liberty of Will consisting in self-determining power; they do nothing but confound themselves and others with words without a meaning. In the question, What determines the Will ? and in their answer, that the Will determines itself, and in all the dispute, it seems to be taken for granted, that something determines the Will ; and the controversy on this head is not, whether its determination has any cause or foundation at all ; but where the foundation of it is, whether in the Will itself, or somewhere else. But if the thing intended be what is above mentioned, then no thing at all determines the Will ; volition having abso lutely no cause or foundation of its existence, either with in or without. There is a great noise made about self- determining power, as the source of all free acts of the Will : but when the matter comes to be explained, the meaning is, that no power at all is the source of these acts, neither self-determining power, nor any other, but they arise from nothing; no cause, no power, no influence, being at all concerned in the matter. However, this very thing, even that the free acts of the Will are events which come to pass without a cause, is cer tainly implied in the Arminian notion of liberty of Will ; though it be very inconsistent with many other things in their scheme, and repugnant to some things implied in their notion of liberty. Their opinion implies, that the E articular determination of volition is without any cause ; ecause they hold the free acts of the Will to be contingent events ; and contingence is essential to freedom in their notion of it. But certainly, those things which have a prior ground and reason of their particular existence, a cause which antecedently determines them to be, and de termines them to be just as they are, do not happen con tingently. If something foregoing, by a casual influence and connexion, determines and fixes precisely their coming to pass, and the manner of it, then it does not remain a contingent thing whether they shall come to pass or no. And because it is a question in many respects very im portant in this controversy, Whether the free acts of the Will are events which come to pass without a cause ; 1 shall be particular in examining this point in the two following sections. SECT. III. Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its existence. Before I enter on any argument on this subject, I would explain how I would be understood, when I use the word Cause in this discourse; since, for want of a bet ter word, I shall have occasion to use it in a sense which is more extensive than that in which it is sometimes used. The word is often used in so restrained a sense as to sig nify only that which has a positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing, or bring it to pass. But there are many things which have no such positive productive influence ; which yet are Causes in this respect, that they have truly the nature of a reason why some things are, rather than others ; or why they are thus, rather than otherwise. Thus the absence of the sun in the night, is not the Cause of the fall of dew at that time, in the same manner as its beams are the cause of the ascent of vapours in the day-time; and its withdrawment in the winter, is not in the same manner the Cause of the freezing of the waters, as its approach in the spring is the cause of their thawing. But yet the withdrawment or absence of the sun is an antecedent, with which these effects in the night and winter are connected, and on which they depend ; and is one thing that belongs to the ground and reason why they come to pass at that time, rather than at other times ; though the absence of the sun is nothing positive, nor has any positive influence. It may be further observed, that when I speak of con nexion of Causes and effects, I have respect to moral Causes, as well as those that are called natural in distinc tion from them. Moral Causes may be Causes in as proper a sense as any Causes whatsoever ; may have as real an influence, and may as truly be the ground and reason of an Event's coming to pass. Therefore I sometimes use the word Cause, in this inquiry, to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an Event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than not ; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise ; or, in other words, any antecedent with which a consequent Event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which affirms that Event is true ; whether it has any positive influence, or not. And agreeably to this, I sometimes use the word effect for the consequence of another thing, which is perhaps rather an occasion than a Cause, most properly speaking. I am the more careful thus to explain my meaning, that I may cut off occasion, from any that might seek occasion to cavil and object against some things which I may say concerning the dependence of all things which come to pass, on some Cause, and their connexion with their Cause. Having thus explained what I mean by Cause, I assert, that nothing ever comes to pass without a Cause. What is self-existent must be from eternity, and must be un changeable : but as to all things that begin to be, they are not self-existent, and therefore must have some foundation of their existence without themselves. — That whatsoever begins to be, which before was not, must have a Cause why it then begins to exist, seems to be the first dictate of the common and natural sense which God hath implanted in the minds of all mankind, and the main foundation of all our reasonings about the existence of things, past, present, or to come. And this dictate of common sense equally respects sub stances and modes, or things and the manner and circum stances of things. Thus, if we see a body which has hitherto been at rest, start out of a state of rest, and begin to move, we do as naturally and necessarily suppose there is some Cause or reason of this new mode of existence, as 16 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part II. of the existence of a body itself which had hitherto not existed. And so if a body, which had hitherto moved in a certain direction, should suddenly change the direction of its motion ; or if it should put off its old figure, and take a new one ; or change its colour : the beginning of these new modes is a new Event, and the human mind neces sarily supposes that there is some Cause or reason of them. If this grand principle of common sense be taken away, all arguing from effects to causes ceaseth, and so all knowledge of any existence, besides what we have by the most direct and immediate intuition, particularly all our proof of the being of God, ceases : we argue His being from our own being, and the being of other things, which we are sensible once were not, but have begun to be ; and from the being of the world, with all its con stituent parts, and the manner of their existence; all which we see plainly are not necessary in their own na ture, and so not self-existent, and therefore must have a Cause. But if things, not in themselves necessary, may begin to be without a Cause, all this arguing is vain. Indeed, I will not affirm, that there is in the nature of things no foundation for the knowledge of the Being of God, without any evidence of it from his works. I do suppose there is a great absurdity in denying Being in general, and imagining an eternal, absolute, universal no thing : and therefore that there would be, in the nature of things, a foundation of intuitive evidence, that there must be an eternal, infinite, most perfect Being; if we had strength and comprehension of mind (sufficient, to have a clear idea of general and universal Being. But then we should not properly come to the knowledge of the Being of God by arguing ; our evidence would be intuitive : we should see it, as we see other things that are necessary in themselves, the contraries of which are in their own nature absurd and contradictory ; as we see that twice two is four ; and as we see that a circle has no angles. If we had as clear an idea of universal, infinite entity, as we have of these other things, I suppose we should most in tuitively see the absurdity of supposing such Being not to be; should immediately see there is no room for the question, whether it is possible that Being, in the most general, abstracted notion of it should not be. But we nave not that strength and extent of mind, to know this certainly in this intuitive, independent manner : but the way that mankind come to the knowledge of the Being of God, is that which the apostle speaks of, Rom. i. 20. The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen; being understood by the things that are made; even his eternal power and Godhead. We first ascend, and prove a posteriori, or from effects, that there must be an eternal Cause ; and then secondly, prove by argumentation, not intuition, that this Being must be necessarily existent ; and then thirdly, from the proved necessity of his exist ence, we may descend, and prove many of his perfections a priori.* But if once this grand principle of common sense be given up, that what is not necessary in itself, must have a Cause ; and we begin to maintain, that things which here tofore have not been, may come into existence, and begin to be of themselves, without any cause ; all our means of ascending in our arguing from the creature to the Creator, and all our evidence of the Being of God, is cut off at one blow. In this case, we cannot prove that there is a God, either from the Being of the world, and the creatures in it, or from the manner of their Being, their order, beauty, and use. For if things may come into existence without any Cause at all, then they doubtless may without any Cause answerable to the effect. Our minds do alike naturally suppose and determine both these things ; namely, that what begins to be has a Cause, and also that it has a Cause proportionable to the effect. The same principle which * To the inquirer after truth it may here be recommended, as a matter of some consequence, to keep in mind the precise difference between an argument a priori and one a posteriori, a distinction of considerable use, as well as of long standing, among divines, metaphysicians, and logical writers. An argument from either of these, when legitimately applied, may amount to a demonstration, when used, for instance, relatively to the being and perfections of God ; but the one should be confined to the exist ence of Deity, while the other is applicable to his perfections. By the ar gument a posteriori we rise from the effect to the cause, from the stream to the fountain, from what is posterior to what is prior ; in other words, from what is contingent to what is absolute, from number to unity ; that is, from the manifestation of God to his existence. By the argument a priori leads us to determine, that there cannot be any thing coming to pass without a Cause, leads us to determine that there cannot be more in the effect than in the Cause. Yea, if once it should be allowed, that things may come to pass without a Cause, we should not only have no proof of the Being of God, but we should be without evidence of the existence of any thing whatsoever, but our own im mediately present ideas and consciousness. For we have no way to prove any thing else, but by arguing from effects to Causes : from the ideas now immediately in view, we argue other things not immediately in view ; from sensa tions now excited in us, we infer the existence of things without us, as the Causes of these sensations ; and from the existence of these things, we argue other things, on which they depend, as effects on Causes. We infer the past existence of ourselves, or any thing else, by memory ; only as we argue, that the ideas, which are now in our minds, are the consequences of past ideas and sensations. We immediately perceive nothing else but the ideas which are this moment extant in our minds. We perceive or know other things only by means of these, as necessarily connected with others, and dependent on them. But if things may be without Causes, all this necessary connexion and dependence is dissolved, and so all means of our knowledge is gone. If there be no absurdity or difficulty in supposing one thing to start out of non-existence into being, of itself without a Cause ; then there is no absurdity or difficulty in supposing the same of millions of millions. For nothing, or no difficulty, multiplied, still is nothing, or no difficulty : nothing multiplied by nothing, does not in-t crease the sum. And indeed, according to the hypothesis I am opposing,, of the acts of the Will coming to pass without a Cause, it is the cause in fact, that millions of millions of Events are continually coming into existence contingently, without any Cause or reason why they do so, all over the world, every day and hour, through all ages. So it is in a con-: stant succession, in every moral agent. This contingency, this efficient nothing, this effectual No-Cause, is always ready at hand, to produce this sort of effects, as long as the agent exists, and as often as he has occasion. If it were so, that things only of one kind, viz. acts of the Will, seemed to come to pass of themselves ; and it were an Event that was continual, and that happened in a course, wherever were found subjects capable of such Events ; this very thing would demonstrate that there was some Cause of them, which made such a difference between this Event- and others, and that they did not really happen contingent ly. For contingence is blind, and does not pick and choose a particular sort of Events. Nothing has no choice. This No-Cause, which causes no existence, cannot cause the existence which comes to pass, to be of one particular sort only, distinguished from all others. Thus, that only one sort of matter drops out of the heavens, even water, and that this comes so often, so constantly and plentifully, all over the world, in all ages, shows that there is some Cause or reason of the falling of water out of the heavens; and. that something besides mere contingence has a hand in the matter. If we should suppose Non-entity to be about to bring forth ; and things were coming into existence, without any Cause or antecedent, on which the existence, or kind, or manner of existence depends ; or which could at all de termine whether the things should be stones, or stars, or beasts, or angels, or human bodies, or souls, or only some new motion or figure in natural bodies, or some new sensa tions in animals, or new ideas in the human understand ing, or new volitions in the Will ; or any thing else of all the infinite number of possibles ; then certainly it would not be expected, although many millions of millions of things were coming into existence in this manner, all over we descend from Hie cause to the effect, from the fountain to the stream. from what is prior to what is posterior ; that is, from the necessary existence of God we safely infer certain properties and perfections. To attempt a ?™?Hn!ratl0nl°Vhe ejas'en?-c. (p. 25, 26, 27.) supposes, " That there are many instances, wherein the Will is determined neither by present uneasiness, nor by the greatest apparent good, nor by the last dictate of the understanding, nor by any thing else, but merely by itself, as a sovereign self- determining power of the soul ; and that the soul does not will this or that action, in some cases, by any other influence but because it will. Thus, says he, I can turn my face to the south, or the north ; I can point with my finger upward, or downward. — And thus, in some cases, the Will determines itself in a very sovereign manner, be cause it will, without a reason borrowed from the under standing : and hereby it discovers its own perfect power of choice, rising from within itself, and free from all in fluence or restraint of any kind." And (p. 66, 70, 73, 74.) this author very expressly supposes the Will in many cases to be determined by no motive at all, and acts alto gether without motive, or ground of preference. — Here I would observe, 1. The very supposition which is here made, directly contradicts and overthrows itself. For the thing supposed, wherein this grand argument consists, is, that among several things the Will actually chooses one before ano ther, at the same time that it is perfectly indifferent ; which is the very same thing as to say, the mind has a preference, at the same time that it has no preference. What is meant cannot be, that the mind is indifferent before it comes to have a choice, or until it has a preference ; for certainly this author did not imagine he had a controversy with any person in supposing this. Besides, it appears in fact, that the thing which he supposes, is — not that the Will chooses one thing before another, concerning which it is indifferent before it chooses, but that the Will is indifferent when it chooses ; and that it being otherwise than indifferent is not until afterwards, in consequence of its choice; that the chosen thing appearing preferable, and more agreeable than another, arises from its choice already made. His words are, (p. 30.) " Where the objects which are proposed ap pear equally fit or good, the Will is left without a guide or director ;" and therefore must take its own choice, by its own determination ; it being properly a self-determining power. And in such cases the Will does as it were make a good to itself by its own choice, i. e. creates its own pleasure or delight in this self-chosen good. Even as a man by seizing upon a spot of unoccupied land, in an un inhabited country, makes it his own possession and pro perty, and as such rejoices in it. Where things were indif ferent before, the Will finds nothing to make them more agreeable, considered merely in themselves, but the plea sure it feels arising from its own choice, and its perseverance therein. We love many things which we have chosen, and purely because we chose them." This is as much as to say, that we first begin to prefer many things, purely because we have preferred and chosen them before. — These things must needs be spoken incon siderately by this author. Choice or preference cannot be before itself in the same instance, either in the order of time or nature : It cannot be the foundation of itself, or the consequence of itself. The very act of choosing one thing rather than another, is preferring that thing, and that is setting a higher value on that thing. But that the mind sets a higher value on one thing than another, is not, in the first place, the ji-uit of its setting a higher value on that thing. This author says, (p. 36.) " The Will may be perfectly indifferent, and yet the Will may determine itself to choose one or the other." And again, in the same page, " I am entirely indifferent to either ; and yet my Will may deter mine itself to choose." And again, " Which I shall choose must be determined by the mere act of my Will." If the choice is determined by a mere act of Will, then the choice is determined by a mere act of choice. And concerning this matter, viz. That the act of the Will itself is determined by act of choice, this writer is express, (p. 72.) Speaking of the case, where there is no superior fit ness in objects presented, he has these words : " There it must act by its own choice, and determine itself as it t Ibid. p. 369, 370. 20 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part II. pleases." Where it is supposed that the very determina tion, which is the ground and spring of the Will's act, is an act of choice and pleasure, wherein one act is more agreeable than another ; and this preference and superior pleasure is the ground of all it does in the case. And if so, the mind is not indifferent when it determines itself, but had rather determine itself one wav than another. And therefore the Will does not act at all in indifference; not so much as in the first step it takes. If it be possible for the understanding to act in indifference, yet surely the Will never does ; because the Will beginning to act is the very same thing as it beginning to choose or prefer. And if in the very first act of the Will, the mind prefers some thing, then the idea of that thing preferred, does at that time preponderate, or prevail in the mind : or, which is the same thing, the idea of it has a prevailing influence on the Will. So that this wholly destroys the thing supposed, viz. That the mind can by a sovereign power choose one of two or more things, which in the view of the mind are, in every respect, perfectly equal, one of which does not at all preponderate, nor has any prevailing influence on the mind above another. So that this author, in his grand argument for the ability of the Will to choose one of two or more things, concern ing which it is perfectly indifferent, does at the same time, in effect, deny the thing he supposes, even that the Will, in choosing, is subject to no prevailing influence of the view of the thing chosen. And indeed it is impossible to offer this argument without overthrowing it ; the thing sup posed in it being that which denies itself. To suppose the Will to act at all in a state of perfect indifference, is to assert that the mind chooses without choosing. To say that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleases, is to say that it can follow its pleasure, when it has no pleasure to follow. And therefore if there be any difficulty in the in stances of two cakes, or two eggs, &c. which are exactly alike, one as good as another ; concerning which this author supposes the mind in fact has a choice, and so in effect supposes that it has a preference ; it as much con cerned himself to solve the difficulty, as it does those whom he opposes. For if these instances prove any thing to his purpose, they prove that a man chooses without choice. And yet this is not to his purpose ; because if this is what he asserts, his own words are as much against him, and does as much contradict him, as the words of those he disputes against can do. 2. There is no great difficulty in showing, in such in stances as are alleged, not only that it must needs be so, that the mind must be influenced in its choice by some thing that has a preponderating influence upon it, but also how it is so. A little attention to our own experience, and a distinct consideration of the acts of our own minds, in such cases, will be sufficient to clear up the matter. Thus, supposing I have a chess-board before me ; and because I am required by a superior, or desired by a friend, or on some other consideration, I am determined to touch some one of the spots or squares on the board with my finger. Not being limited or directed, in the first pro posal, to any one in particular ; and there being nothing in the squares, in themselves considered, that recommends any one of all the sixty-four, more than another ; in this case, my mind determines to give itself up to what is vul- gularly called accident,* by determining to touch that square which happens to be most in view, which my eye is especially upon at that moment, or which happens to be then most in my mind, or which I shall be directed to by some other such like accident. Here are several steps of the mind proceeding (though all may be done, as it were, in a moment). The first step is its general determina tion that it will touch one of the squares. The next step is another general determination to give itself up to acci dent, in some certain way ; as to touch that which shall be most in the eye or mind at that time, or to some other such like accident. The third and last step is a particular * I have elsewhere observed, what that is which is vulgarly called acci dent ,- that it is nothing akin to the Arminian metaphysical notion of con tingence, or something not connected with any thing foregoing ; but that it is something that comes to pass in the course of things, unforeseen by men, and not owing to their design. t The reader is particularly requested to give due attention to these two remarks, especially the former, as being of the utmost importance in the determination to touch a certain individual spot, even that square, which, by that sort of accident the mind has pitch ed upon, has actually offered itself beyond others. Now it is apparent that in none of these several steps does the mind proceed in absolute indifference, but in each of them is influenced by a preponderating inducement. So it is in the first step, the mind's general determination to touch one of the sixty-four spots : the mind is not absolutely in different whether it does so or no ; it is induced to it, for the sake of making some experiment, or by the desire of a friend, or some other motive that prevails. So it is in the second step, the mind determining to give itself up to acci dent, by touching that which shall be most in the eye, or the idea of which shall be most prevalent in the mind, &c. The mind is not absolutely indifferent whether it proceeds, by this rule or no; but chooses it, because it appears at that time a convenient and requisite expedient in order to fulfil the general purpose. And so it is in the third and last step, which is determining to touch that individual spot which actually does prevail in the mind's view. The mind is not indifferent concerning this; but is influenced by a prevailing inducement and reason ; which is, that this is a prosecution of the preceding determination, which appear ed requisite, and was fixed before in the second step. Accident will ever serve a man, without hindering him a moment, in such a case. Among a number of objects in view, one will prevail in the eye, or in idea, beyond others. When we have our eyes open in the clear sun shine, many objects strike the eye at once, and innumera ble images may be at once painted in it by the rays of light ; but the attention of the mind is not equal to several of thern at once ; or if it be, it does not continue so for any time. And so it is with respect to the ideas of the mind in general : several ideas are not in equal strength in the mind's view and notice at once ; or at least, does not re main so for any sensible continuance. There is nothing in the world more constantly varying, than the ideas of the mind ; they do not remain precisely in the same state for the least perceivable space of time ; as is evident by this : — That all time is perceived by the mind, only by the suc cessive changes of its own ideas. Therefore while the per ceptions of the mind remain precisely in the same state, there is no perceivable length of time, because no sensible succession at all. As the acts of the Will, in each step of the foremen tioned procedure, do not come to pass without a particular cause, but every act is owing to a prevailing inducement; so the accident, as I have called it, or that which happens in the unsearchable course of things, to which the mind yields itself, and by which it is guided, is not any thing that comes to pass without a cause. The mind in determining to be guided by it, is not determined by something that has no cause ; any more than if it be determined to be guided by a lot, or the casting of a die. For though the die falling in such a manner be accidental to him that casts it, yet none will suppose that there is no cause why it falls as it does. The involuntary changes in the succes sion of our ideas, though the cause may not be observed, have as much a cause, as the changeable motions of the motes that float in the air, or the continual, infinitely various, successive changes of the unevennesses on the surface of the water. There are two things especially, which are probably the occasions of confusion in the minds of them who insist upon it, that the Will acts in a proper indifference, and without being moved by any inducement, in its determi nations in such cases as have been mentioned.f 1 . They seem to mistake the point in question, or at least not to keep it distinctly in view. The question they dispute about, is, Whether the mind be indifferent about the objects presented, one of which is to be taken, touched, pointed to, &c. as two eggs, two cakes, which appear equally good. Whereas the question to be considered, is, Whether the person be indifferent with respect to his own controversy. If he be pleased to examine, with this view, the most popular advocates for the liberty of indifference, he will find them continually con founding the objects of choice, and the acts of choice. When they have shown, with much plausibility, that there is no perceivable difference, or ground of choice, in the objects, they hastily infer the same indifference as applicable to the acts of choice. — W. Sect. VII. OF LIBERTY OF INDIFFERENCE. 21 actions ; whether he does not, on some consideration or other, prefer one act with respect to these objects before another. The mind in its determination and choice, in these cases, is not most immediately and directly conver sant about the objects presented; but the acts to be done concerning these objects. The objects may appear equal, and the mind may never properly make any choice between them ; but the next act of the Will being about the exter nal actions to be performed, taking, touching, &c. these may not appear equal, and one action may properly be chosen before another. In each step of the mind's pro gress, the determination is not about the objects, unless indirectly and improperly, but about the actions, which it chooses for other reasons than any preference of the objects, and for reasons not taken at all from the objects. There is no necessity of supposing, that the mind does ever at all properly choose one of the. objects before an other ; either before it has taken, or afterwards. Indeed the man chooses to take or touch one rather than another ; but not because it chooses the thing taken, or touched, but from foreign considerations. The case may be so, that of two things offered, a man may, for certain reasons, prefer taking that which he undervalues, and choose to neglect that which his mind prefers. In such a case, choosing the thing taken, and choosing to take, are diverse : and so they are in a case where the things presented are equal in the mind's esteem, and neither of them preferred. All that fact and experience makes evident, is, that the mind chooses one action rather than another. And therefore the arguments which they bring, in order to be to their pur pose, should be to prove that the mind chooses the action in perfect indifference, with respect to that action ; and not to prove that the mind chooses the action in perfect indif ference with respect to the object ; which is very possible, and yet the Will not act at all without prevalent induce ment, and proper preponderation. 2. Another reason of confusion and difficulty in this matter, seems to be, not distinguishing between a general indifference, or an indifference with respect to what is to be done in a more distant and general view of it, and a particular indifference, or an indifference with respect to the next immediate act, viewed with its particular and present circumstances. A man may be perfectly indiffer ent with respect to his own actions, in the former respect ; and yet not in the latter. Thus in the foregoing instance of touching one of the squares of a chess-board ; when it is first proposed that I should touch one of them, I may be perfectly indifferent which I touch ; because as yet I view the matter remotely and generally, being but in the first step of the mind's progress in the affair. But yet, when I am actually come to tbe last step, and the very next thing to be determined is which is to be touched, having already determined that 1 will touch that which happens to be most in my eye or mind, and my mind being now fixed on a particular one, the act of touching that, considered thus immediately, and in these particular present circumstances, is not what my mind is absolutely indifferent about. SECT. VII.. Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference. What has been said in the foregoing section, has a ten dency in some measure to evince the absurdity of the opinion of such as place Liberty in Indifference, or in that equilibrium whereby the Will is without all antecedent bias ; that the determination of the Will to either side may be entirely from itself, and that it may be owing only to its own power, and the sovereignty which it has over itself, that it goes this way rather than that* But inasmuch as this has been of such long standing, * Dr. Whitby, and some other Arminians, make a distinction of differ ent kinds of freedom ; one of God, and perfect spirits above ; another of persons in a state of trial. The former Dr. Whitby allows to consist with necessity ; the latter he holds to be without necessity : and this latter he supposes to be requisite to our being the subject of praise or dispraise, re wards or punishments, precepts and prohibitions, promises and threats, ex hortations and dehortahons, and a covenant treaty. And to this freedom he supposes Indifference to be requisite. In his Discourse on the five points, cp, 299, 300.) he says; "It is a freedom, (speaking of a freedom not only from co-action, but from necessity) requisite, as we conceive, to render us capa- and has been so generally received, and so much insisted on by Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, Jesuits, Socinians, Armi nians, and others, it may deserve a more full consideration. And therefore I shall now proceed to a more particular and thorough inquiry into this notion. Now lest some should suppose that I do not understand those that place Liberty in Indifference, or should charge me with misrepresenting their opinion, I would signify, that I am sensible, there are some, who, when they talk of Li berty of the Will as consisting in Indifference, express themselves as though they would not be understood to mean the Indifference of the inclination or tendency of the Will, but an Indifference of the soul's power of willing; or that the Will, with respect to its power or ability to choose, is indifferent, can go either way indifferently, either to the right hand or left, either act or forbear to act, one as well as the other. This indeed seems to be a refining of some particular writers only, and newly invented, which will by no means consist with the manner of expression used by the defenders of Liberty of Indifference in general. I wish such refiners would thoroughly consider, whether ihey dis tinctly know their own meaning, when they make a distinc tion between an Indifference of the soul as to its power or ability of choosing, and the soul's Indifference as to the preference or choice itself; and whether they do not de ceive themselves in imagining that they have any distinct meaning at all. The Indifference of the soul as to its ability or power to will, must be the same thing as the In difference of the state of the power or faculty of the Will, or the Indifference of the state which the soul itself, which has that power or faculty, hitherto remains in, as to the exercise of that power, in the choice it shall by and by make. But not to insist any longer on the inexplicable abstruse- ness of this distinction ; let what will be supposed con cerning the meaning of them that use it, thus much must at least be intended by Arminians when they talk of In difference as essential to Liberty of Will, if they intend any thing, in any respect to their purpose, viz. That it is such an Indifference as leaves the Will not determined already ; but free from actual possession, and vacant of predetermination, so far, that there may be room for the exercise of the self-determining power of the Will ; and that the Will's freedom consists in, or depends upon, this vacancy and opportunity that is left for the Will itself to be the determiner of the act that is to be the free act. And here I would observe in the first place, that to make out this scheme of Liberty, the Indifference must be per fect and absolute; there must be a perfect freedom from all antecedent preponderation or inclination. Because if the Will be already inclined, before it exerts its own sovereign power on itself, then its inclination is not wholly owing to itself: if when two opposites are proposed to the soul for its choice, the proposal does not find the soul wholly in a state of Indifference, then it is not found in a state of Liberty for mere self-determination. — The least degree of an antecedent bias must be inconsistent with their notion of Liberty. For so long as prior inclination possesses the Will, and is not removed, the former binds the latter, so that it is utterly impossible that the Will should act other wise than agreeably to it. Surely the Will cannot act or choose contrary to a remaining prevailing inclination of the Will. To suppose otherwise, would be the same thing as to suppose that the Will is inclined contrary to its present prevailing inclination, or contrary to what it is inclined to. That which the Will prefers, to that, all things considered, it preponderates and inclines. It is equally impossible for the Will to choose contrary to its own remaining and pre sent preponderating inclination, as it is to prefer contrary to its own present preference, or choose contrary to its own present choice. The Will, therefore, so long as it is under the influence of an old preponderating inclination, is not at Liberty for a new free act ; or any, that shall now be an ble of trial or probation, and to render our actions worthy of praise or dis praise, and our persons of rewards or punishments." And in the next page, speaking of the same matter, he says, " Excellent to this purpose, are the words of Mr. Thorndake : We say not, that Indifference is requisite to all freedom, but to the freedom of man alone in this state of travail andpro- ficience ,- the ground of which is God's tender of a treaty, and conditions of peace and reconcilement to fallen man, together with those precepts and prohibitions, those promises and threats, those exhortations and de- hortations, it is enforcedwith." 22 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part II. act of self-determination. That which is a self-determined free act, must be one which the Will determines in the possession and use of a peculiar sort of Liberty ; such as consists in a freedom from every thing, which, if it were there, would make it impossible that the Will, at that time, should be otherwise than that way to which it tends.* If any one should say, there is no need that the Indif ference should be perfect ; but although a former inclina tion still remains, yet, if it be not very strong, possibly the strength of the Will may oppose and overcome it : — This is grossly absurd ; for the strength of the Will, let it be never so great, gives it no such sovereignty and command, as to cause itself to prefer and not to prefer at the same time, or to choose contrary to its own present choice. Therefore, if there be the least degree of antecedent pre ponderation of the Will, it must be perfectly abolished, before the Will can be at liberty to determine itself the contrary way. And if the Will determines itself the same way, it was not a free determination, because the Will is not wholly at liberty in so doing ; its determination is not altogether from itself, but it was partly determined before, in its prior inclination : and all the freedom the Will ex ercises in the case, is in an increase of inclination, which it gives itself, added to what it had by a foregoing bias ; so much is from itself, and so much is from perfect in difference. For though the Will had a previous tendency that way, yet as to that additional degree of inclination, it had no tendency. Therefore the previous tendency is of no consideration, with respect to the act wherein the Will is free. So that it comes to the same thing which was said at first, that as to the act of the Will, wherein the Will is free, there must be perfect Indifference, or equilibrium. To illustrate this : suppose a sovereign self-moving power in a natural body ; but that the body is in motion already, by an antecedent bias ; for instance, gravitation towards the centre of the earth ; and has one. degree of mo tion by virtue of that previous tendency ; but by its self- moving power it adds one, degree more to its motion, and moves so much more swiftly towards the centre of the earth than it would do by its gravity only : it is evident, all that is owing to a self-moving power in this case, is the additional degree of motion ; and that the other degree which it had from gravity, is of no consideration in the case ; the effect is just the same, as if the body had re ceived from itself one degree of motion from a state of perfect rest. So, if we suppose a self-moving power given to the scale of a balance, which has a weight of one degree beyond the opposite scale; and if we ascribe to it an ability to add to itself another degree of force the same way, by its self-moving power; this is just the same thing as to ascribe to it a power to give itself one degree of preponderation from a perfect equilibrium ; and so much power as the scale has to give itself an over-ba lance from a perfect equipoise, so much self-moving self- preponderating power it has, and no more. So that its free power this way is always to be measured from perfect equilibrium. I need say no more to prove, that if Indifference be es sential to Liberty, it must be perfect Indifference ; and that so far as the Will is destitute of this, so far is it des titute of that freedom by which it is in a capacity of being its own determiner, without being at all passive, or subject to the power and sway of something else, in its motions and determinations. Having observed these things, let us now try whether this notion of the Liberty of Will consisting in Indifference and equilibrium, and the Will's self-determination in such a state, be not absurd and inconsistent. And here I would lay down this as an axiom of undoubt ed truth ; that every free act is done in a state of freedom, and not only after 'such a state. If an act of the Will be an act wherein the soul is free, it must be exerted in a stale of freedom, and in the time of freedom. It will not suffice, that the act immediately follows a state of Liberty ; but Liberty must yet continue, and co-exist with the act ; the soul remaining in possession of Liberty. Because that * There is a little intricacy in this mode of expression. It may be thus illustrated. Suppose it wero asserted, " That it is impossible for the Will To be otherwise at any one given time, than that way to which it tends " Such a proposition one might think, none who understood the terms would is the notion of a free act of the soul, even an act wherein the soul uses or exercises Liberty. But if the soul is not, in the very time of the act, in the possession of Liberty, it cannot at that time be in the use of it. Now the question is, whether ever the soul of man puts forth an act of Will, while it yet remains in a state of Liberty, viz. as implying a state of Indifference ; or whe ther the soul ever exerts an act of preference, while at that very time the Will is in a perfect equilibrium, not inclining one way more than another. The very putting of the question is sufficient to show the absurdity of the affirma tive answer : for how ridiculous would it be for any body to insist, that the soul chooses one thing before another, when at the very same instant it is perfectly indifferent with respect to each ! This is the same thing as to say, the soul prefers one thing to another, at the very same time that it has no preference. — Choice and preference can no more be in a state of Indifference, than motion can be in a state of rest, or than the preponderation of the scale of a balance can be in a state of equilibrium. Motion may be the next moment after rest; but cannot co-exist with it, in any, even the least, part of it. So choice may be imme diately after a state of Indifference, but cannot co-exist with it : even the very beginning of it is not in a state of Indifference. And therefore, if this be Liberty, no act of the Will, in any degree, is ever performed in a state of Liberty, or in the time of Liberty. Volition and Liberty are so far from agreeing together, and being essential one to another, that they are contrary one to another, and one excludes and destroys the other, as much as motion ant} rest, light and darkness, or life and death. So that the Will acts not at all, does not so much as begin to act, in the time of such Liberty : freedom has ceased to be, at the first moment of action ; and therefore Liberty cannot reach the action, to affect, or qualify it, or give it a denomina tion, any more than if it had ceased to be twenty years before the action began. The moment that Liberty ceases to be, it ceases to be a qualification of any thing. If light and darkness succeed one another instantaneously, light qualifies nothing after it is gone out, to make any thing lightsome or bright, at the first moment of perfect darkness, any more than months or years after. Life de nominates nothing vital, at the first moment of perfect death. So freedom, if it consists in or implies Indiffer ence, can denominate nothing free, at the first moment of preference or preponderation. Therefore it is manifest, that no Liberty which the soul is possessed of, or ever uses, in any of its acts of volition, consists in Indifference; and that the opinion of such as suppose, that Indifference be longs to the very essence of Liberty, is to the highest degree absurd and contradictory. If any one should imagine, that this manner of arguing is nothing but a trick and delusion ; and to evade the reasoning, should say, that the thing wherein the Will exercises its Liberty, is not in the act of choice or prepon deration itself, but in determining itself to a certain choice or preference ; that the act of the Will wherein it is free, and uses its own sovereignty, consists in its causing or de termining the change or transition from a state of indiffer ence to a certain preference or determining to give a certain turn to the balance, which has hitherto been even ; and that the Will exerts this act in a state of Liberty, or while the Will yet remains in equilibrium, and perfect master of itself— 1 say, if any one chooses to express his notion of Liberty after this, or some such manner, let us see if he can succeed any better than before. What is asserted is, that the Will, while it yet remains in perfect equilibrium, without preference, determines to change itself from that state, and excite in itself a certain choice or preference. Now let us see whether this does not come to the same absurdity we had before. If it be so, that the Will, while it yet remains perfectly indifferent, determines to put itself out of that state, and'to give itself a certain preponderation ; then I would inquire, whether the soul does not determine this of choice ; or whether the Will coming to a determination to do so, be not the same controvert; for it would be to controvert this proposition, " The Will is as its tendency." And yet, the advocates for a self-determining power must assert a liberty which denies this plain proposition — W Sect. VII. OF LIBERTY OF INDIFFERENCE. 2:1 thing as the soul coming to a choice to do so. If the soul does not determine this of choice, or in the exercise of choice, then it does not determine it voluntarily. And if the soul does not determine it voluntarily, or of its own Will, then in what sense does its Will determine it '! And if the Will does not determine it, then how is the Liberty of the Will exercised in the determination? What sort of Liberty is exercised by the soul in those determinations, wherein there is no exercise of choice, which are not volun tary, and wherein the Will is not concerned ? But if it be allowed, that this determination is an act of choice, and it be insisted on, that the soul, while it yet remains in a state of perfect Indifference, chooses to put itself out of that state, and to turn itself one way ; then the soul is already come to a choice ; and chooses that way. And so we have the very same absurdity which we had before. Here is the soul in a state of choice, and in a state of equilibrium, both at the same time : the soul already choosing one way, while it remains in a state of perfect Indifference, and has no choice of one way more than the other. — And indeed this manner of talking, though it may a little hide the absurdity, in the obscurity of expression, increases the in consistence. To say, the free act of the Will, or the act which the Will exerts in a state of freedom and Indiffer ence, does not imply preference in it, but is what the will does in order to cause or produce a preference, is as much as to say, the soul chooses (for to will and to choose are the same thing) without choice, and prefers without pre ference, in order to cause or produce the beginning of a preference, or the first choice. And that is, that the first choice is exerted without choice, in order to produce itself! If any, to evade these things, should own, that a state of Liberty and a state of Indifference are not the same, and that the former may be without the latter ; but should say, that Indifference is still essential to freedom, as it is neces sary to go immediately before it ; it being essential to the freedom of an act of Will that it should directly and im mediately arise out of a state of Indifference ; still this will not help the cause of Arminian Liberty, or make it con sistent with itself. For if the act springs immediately out of a state of Indifference, then it does not arise from antecedent choice or preference. But if the act arises directly out of a state of Indifference, without any inter vening choice to determine it, then the act not being deter mined by choice, is not determined by the Will ; the mind exercises no free choice in the affair, and free choice and free Will have no hand in the determination of the act. Which is entirely inconsistent with their notion of the freedom of volition. If any should suppose, that these absurdities may be avoided, by saying, that the Liberty of the mind consists in a power to suspend the act of the Will, and so to keep it in a state of Indifference, until there has been opportunity for consideration ; and so shall say, that however Indiffer ence is not essential to Liberty in such a manner, that the mind must make its choice in a state of Indifference, which is an inconsistency, or that (he act of Will must spring immediately out of Indifference ; yet Indifference may be essential to the Liberty of acts of the Will in this respect; viz. That Liberty consists in a power of the mind to for bear or suspend the act of volition, and keep the mind in a state of Indifference for the present, Until there has been opportunity for proper deliberation : I say, if any one imagines that this helps the matter, it is a great mistake : it reconciles no inconsistency, and relieves no difficulty For here the following things must be observed : 1 . That this suspending of volition, if there be properly any such thing, is itself an act of volition. If the mind determines to suspend its act, it determines it voluntarily ; it chooses, on some consideration, to suspend it. And this choice or determination, is an act of the Will : And indeed it is supposed to be so in the very hypothesis ; for it is sup posed that the Liberty of the Will consists in its power to do this, and that its doing it is the very thing wherein the Will exercises its Liberty. But how can the Will exercise Liberty in it, if it be not an act of the W ill ? The Liberty of the Will is not exercised in any thing but what the Will does. 2. This determining to suspend acting is not only an act of the Will, but it is supposed to be the only free act of the Will ; because it is said, that this is the thing wherein the Liberty of the Will consists. — If so, then this is all the act of Will that we have to consider in this controversy. And now, the former question returns upon us ; viz. Wherein consists the freedom of the will in those acts wherein it is free .' And if this act of determining a suspension be the only act in which the Will is free, then wherein consists the Will's freedom with respect to this act of suspension ? And how is Indifference essential to this act ? The answer must be, according to what is supposed in the evasion under consideration, that the Liberty of the Will in this act of suspension, consists in a power to suspend even this act, until there has been opportunity for thorough deliberation. But this will be to plunge directly into the grossest non sense : for it is the act of suspension itself that we are speaking of; and there is no room for a space of delibera tion and suspension in order to determine whether we will suspend or no. For that supposes, that even suspension itself may be deferred : which is absurd ; for the very defer ring the determination of suspension, to consider whether we will suspend or no, will be actually suspending. For dur ing the space of suspension, to consider whether to suspend, the act is, ipso facto, suspended. There is no medium between suspending to act, and immediately acting; and therefore no possibility of avoiding either the one or the other one moment. And besides, this is attended with ridiculous absurdity another way : for now, it seems, Liberty consists wholly in the mind having power to suspend its determination whether to suspend or no ; that there may be time for con sideration, whether it be best to suspend. And if Liberty consists in this only, then this is the Liberty under con sideration. We have to inquire now, how Liberty, with respect to this act of suspending a determination of sus pension, consists in Indifference, or how Indifference is essential to it. The answer, according to the hypothesis we are upon, must be, that it consists in a power of sus pending even this last-mentioned act, to have time to consider whether to suspend that. And then the same difficulties and inquiries return over again with respect to that ; and so on for ever. Which, if it would show any thing, would show only that there is no such thing as a free act. It drives the exercise of freedom back in infini tum ; and that is to drive it out of the world. And besides all this, there is a delusion, and a latent gross contradiction in the affair another way ; inasmuch as in explaining how, or in what respect, the Will is free, with regard to a particular act of volition, it is said, that its Liberty consists in a power to determine to suspend that act, which places Liberty not in that act of volition which the inquiry is about, but altogether in another ante cedent act. Which contradicts the thing supposed in both the question and answer. The question is, wherein con sists the mind's Liberty in any particular act of volition ? And the answer, in pretending to show wherein lies the mind's Liberty in that act, in effect says, it does not lie in that act at all, but in another, viz. a volition to suspend that act. And therefore the answer is both contradictory, and altogether impertinent and beside the purpose. For it does not show wherein the Liberty of the Will consists in the act in question ; instead of that, it supposes it does not consist in that act at all, but in another distinct from it, even a volition to suspend that act, and take time to consider of it. And no account is pretended to be given wherein the mind is free with respect to that act, wherein this answer supposes the Liberty of the mind indeed consists, viz. the act of suspension, or of determining the suspension. On the whole, it is exceeding manifest, that the Liberty of the mind does not consist in Indifference, and that In difference is not essential or necessary to it, or at all be longing to it, as the Arminians suppose ; that opinion being full of nothing but self-contradiction. SECT. VIII. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all Necessity. It is chiefly insisted on by Arminians, in this contro versy, as a thing most important and essential in human 24 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part II. Liberty, that volitions, or the acts of the Will, are con tingent events ; understanding contingence as opposite, not only to constraint, but to all Necessity. Therefore I would particularly consider this matter. And, First, I would inquire, whether there is or can be any such thing, as a volition which is contingent in such a sense, as not only to come to pass without any Necessity of constraint or co-action, but also without a Necessity of consequence, or an infallible connexion with any thing fore going. — Secondly, Whether, if it were so, this would at all help the cause of Liberty. I. I would consider whether volition is a thing that ever does or can come to pass, in this manner, contingently. And here it must be remembered, that it has been already shown, that nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, or a reason, why it exists in this manner rather than an other ; and the evidence of this has been particularly ap plied to the acts of the Will. Now if this be so, it will demonstrably follow, that the acts of the Will are never contingent, or without Necessity, in the sense spoken of; inasmuch as those things which have a cause, or a rea son of their existence, must be connected with their cause. This appears by the following considerations. 1 . For an event to have a cause and ground of its ex istence, and yet not to be connected with its cause, is an inconsistence. - For if the event be not connected with the cause, it is not dependent on the cause ; its existence is as it were loose from its influence, and may attend it, or may not; it being a mere contingence, whether it follows or attends the influence of the cause, or not : And that is the same thing as not to be dependent on it. And to say, the event is not dependent on its cause, is absurd ; it is the same thing as to say, it is not its cause, nor the event the effect of it ; for dependence on the influence of a cause is the very notion of an effect. If there be no such rela tion between one thing and another, consisting in the con nexion and dependence of one thing on the influence of another, then it is certain there is no such relation be tween them as is signified by the terms cause and effect. So far as an event is dependent on a cause, and connected with it, so much causality is there in the case, and no more. The cause does, or brings to pass, no more in any event, than is dependent on it. If we say, the connexion and dependence is not total, but partial, and that the effect, though it has some connexion and dependence, yet is not entirely dependent on it ; that is the same thing as to say, that not all that is in the event is an effect of that cause, but that only part of it arises from thence, and part some other way- 2. If there are some events which are not necessarily connected with their causes, then it will follow, that there are some things which come to pass without any cause, contrary to the supposition. For if there be any event which was not necessarily connected with the influence of the cause under such circumstances, then it was contingent whether it would attend or follow the influence of the cause, or no ; it might have followed, and it might not, when the cause was the same, its influence the same, and under the same circumstances. And if so, why did it follow, rather than not follow '! Of this there is no cause or reason. Therefore here is something without any cause or reason why it is, viz. the following of the effect on the influence of the cause, with which it was not necessarily connected. If there be no necessary connexion of the effect on anv thing antecedent, then we may suppose that sometimes the event will follow the cause, and sometimes not, when the cause is the same, and in every respect in the same state and circumstances. And what can be the cause and reason of this strange phenomenon, even this diversity, that in one instance, the effect should follow, in another not? It is evident by the supposition, that this is wholly without any cause or ground. Here is something in the present manner of the existence of things, and state of the world, that is absolutely without a cause. Which is contrary to the supposition, and contrary to what has been before demonstrated. 3. To suppose there are some events which have a cause and ground of their existence, that yet are not ne cessarily connected with their cause, is to suppose that they have a cause which is not their cause. Thus ; if the effect be not necessarily connected with the cause, with its influence, and influential circumstances ; then, as I ob served before, it is a thing possible and supposable, that the cause may sometimes exert the same influence, under the same circumstances, and yet the effect not follow. And if this actually happens in any instance, this instance is a proof, in fact, that the influence of the cause is not sufficient to produce the effect. For if it had been suffi cient, it would have done it. And yet, by the supposition* in another instance, the same cause, with perfectly the same influence, and when all circumstances which have any influence are the same, it was followed with the effect. By which it is manifest, that the effect in this last instance was not owing to the influence of the cause, but must come to pass some other way. For it was proved before, that the influence of the cause was not sufficient to pro duce the effect. And if it was not sufficient to produce it, then the production of it could not be owing to that influence, but must be owing to something else, or owing to nothing. And if the effect be not owing to the influ ence of the cause, then it is not the cause. Which brings us to the contradiction of a cause, and no cause, that which is the ground and reason of the existence of a thing, and at the same time is not the ground and reason of its existence. If the matter be not already so plain as to render any further reasoning upon it impertinent, I would say, that which seems to be the cause in the supposed case, can be no cause ; its power and influence having, on a full trial, proved insufficient to produce such an effect : and if it be not sufficient to produce it, then it does not produce it. To say otherwise, is to say, there is power to do that which there is not power to do. If there be in a cause sufficient power exerted, and in circumstances sufficient to produce an effect, and so the effect be actually produced at one time ; all these things concurring, will produce the effect at all times. And so we may turn it the other way ; that which proves not sufficient at one time, cannot be sufficient at another, with precisely the same influential circum-: stances. And therefore if the effect follows, it is not owing to that cause ; unless the different time be a circum^ stance which has influence : but that is contrary to the supposition ; for it is supposed that all circumstances that have influence, are the same. And besides, this would be to suppose the time to be the cause ; which is contrary to the supposition of the other thing being the cause. But if merely diversity of time has no influence, then it is evident tbat it is as much of an absurdity to say, the cause was sufficient to produce the effect at one time, and not at another ; as to say, that it is sufficient to produce the effect at a certain time, and yet not sufficient to produce the same effect at the same time. On the whole, it is clearly manifest, that every effect has a necessary connexion with its cause, or with that which is the true ground and reason of its existence. And there fore, if there be no event without a cause, as was proved before, then no event whatsoever is contingent, in the manner that Arminians suppose the free acts of the Will to be contingent. SECT. IX. Of the Connexion of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding. It is manifest, that no Acts of the Will are contingent, in such a sense as to be without all necessity, or so as not to be necessary with a necessity of consequence and Con nexion ; because every Act of the Will is some way con nected with the Understanding, and is as the greatest appar rent good is, in the manner which has already been explained ; namely, that the soul always wills or chooses that which, in the present view of the mind, considered in the whole of that view, and all that belongs to it, appears most agree able. Because, as was observed before, nothing is more evident than that, when men act voluntarily, and do whaj. they please, then they do what appears most agreeable to them ; and to say otherwise, would be as much as to af firm, that men do not choose what appears to suit them Sect. IX. WILL CONNECTED WITH UNDERSTANDING. 25 best, or what seems most pleasing to them ; or that they do not choose what they prefer. Which brings the matter to a contradiction. And as it is very evident in itself, that the Acts of the W ill have some Connexion with the Dictates or views of the Understanding, so this is allowed by some of the chief of the Arminian writers ; particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Samuel Clark. Dr. Turnbull, though a great enemy to the doctrine of necessity, allows the same thing. In his Christian Philosophy, (p. 196.) he with much approba tion cites another philosopher, as of the same mind, in these words : " No man (says an excellent philosopher) sets himself about any thing, but upon some view or other, which serves him for a reason for what he does ; and whatsoever faculties he employs, the Understanding, with such light as it has, well or ill formed, constantly leads ; and by that light, true or false, all her operative powers are directed. The Will itself, how absolute and incontrollable soever it may be thought, never fails in its obedience to the Dictates of the Understanding. Temples have their sacred images; and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind ; but in truth, the ideas and images in men's minds are the invisible powers that constantly govern them ; and to these they all Eay universally a ready submission." But whether this e in a just consistence with themselves, and their own . notions of liberty, I desire may now be impartially con sidered. Dr. Whitby plainly supposes, that the Acts and deter minations of the Will always follow the Understanding's view of the greatest good to be obtained, or evil to be avoided ; or, in other words, that the determinations of the Will constantly and infallibly follow these two things in the Understanding : 1. The degree of good to be obtain ed, and evil to be avoided, proposed to the Understanding, and apprehended, viewed, and taken notice of by it. 2. The degree of the Understanding's apprehension of that good or evil ; which is increased by attention and consideration. That this is an opinion in which he is exceeding peremptory, (as he is in every opinion which he maintains in his con troversy with the Calvinists,) with disdain of the contrary opinion, as absurd and self-contradictory, will appear by the following words, in his Discourse on the Five Points.* " Now, it is certain, that what naturally makes the Un derstanding to perceive, is evidence proposed, and appre hended, considered or adverted to : for nothing else can be requisite to make us come to the knowledge of the truth. Again, what makes the Will choose, is something approved by the Understanding ; and consequently appearing to the soul as good. And whatsoever it refuseth, is something represented by the Understanding, and so appearing to the Will, as evil. Whence all that God requires of us is and can be only this ; to refuse the evil, and choose the good. Wherefore, to say that evidence proposed, apprehended, and considered, is not sufficient to make the Understand ing approve ; or that the greatest good proposed, the great est evil threatened, when equally believed and reflected on, is not sufficient to engage the Will to choose the good and refuse the evil, is in effect to say, that which alone doth move the Will to choose or to refuse, is not sufficient to en gage it so to do ; which being contradictory to itself, must of necessity be false. Be it then so, that we naturally have an aversion to the truths proposed to us in the gospel; that only can make us indisposed to attend to them, but cannot hinder our conviction, when we do apprehend them, and attend to them. — Be it, that there is in us also a renilency to the good we are to choose ; that only can indispose us to believe it is, and to approve it as our chiefest good. Be it, that we are prone to the evil that we should decline ; that only can render it the more difficult for us to believe it is the worst of evils. But yet, what we do really believe to be our chiefest good, will still, be chosen ; and what we ap prehend to be the worst of evils, will, whilst we do continue under that conviction, be refused by us. It therefore can be only requisite, in order to these ends, that the Good Spirit should so illuminate our Understandings, that we attending to and considering what lies before us, should apprehend and be convinced of our duty ; and that the blessings of * Second Edit. p. 211, 212, 213. the gospel should be so propounded to us, as that we may discern them to be our chiefest good ; and the miseries it threateneth, so as we may be convinced that they are the worst of evils ; that we may choose the one, and refuse the other." Here let it be observed, how plainly and peremptorily it is asserted, that the greatest good proposed, and the greatest evil threatened, when equally believed and. reflected on, is sufficient to engage the Will to choose, the good, and refuse the evil, and is that alone which doth move the Will to choose or to refuse ; and that it is contradictory to itself, to suppose otherwise ; and therefore must of necessity be false ; and then what we do really believe to be our chiefest good will still, be chosen, and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils, will, whilst we continue under that conviction, be re fused by us. Nothing could have been said more to the purpose, fully to signify, that the determinations of the Will must evermore follow the illumination, conviction, and notice of the Understanding, with regard to the greatest good and evil proposed, reckoning both the degree of good and evil understood, and the degree of Understanding, no tice, and conviction of that proposed good and evil ; and that it is thus necessarily, and can be otherwise in no in stance : because it is asserted, that it implies a contradic tion, to suppose it ever to be otherwise. I am sensible, the Doctor's aim in these assertions is against the Calvinists ; to show, in opposition to them, that there is no need of any physical operation of the Spirit of God on the Will, to change and determine that to a good choice, but that God's operation and assistance is only moral, suggesting ideas to the Understanding ; which he supposes to be enough, if those ideas are attended to, in fallibly to obtain the end. But whatever his design was, nothing can more directly and fully prove, that every determination of the Will, in choosing and refusing, is necessary ; directly contrary to his own notion of the liberty of the Will. For if the determination of the Will, ever more, in this manner, follows the light, conviction, and view of the Understanding, concerning the greatest good and evil, and this be that alone which moves the Will, and it be a contradiction to suppose otherwise ; then it is necessarily so, the Will necessarily follows this light or view of the Understanding, not only in some of its acts, but in every act of choosing and refusing. So that the Will does not determine itself in any one of its own acts ; but every act of choice and refusal depends on, and is necessarily connected with, some antecedent cause ; which cause is not the Will itself, nor any act of its own,, nor any thing per taining to that faculty, but something belonging to another faculty, whose acts go before the Will, in all its acts, and govern and determine them. Here, if it should be replied, that although it be true, that according to the Doctor, the final determination of the Will always depends upon, and is infallibly connected with, the Understanding's conviction, and notice of the greatest good ; yet the Acts of the Will are not necessary ; because that conviction of the Understanding is first dependent on a preceding Act of the Will, in determining to take notice of the evidence exhibited ; by which means the mind ob tains that degree of conviction, which is sufficient and effectual to determine the consequent and ultimate choice of the Will ; and that the Will, with regard to that pre ceding act, whereby it determines whether to attend or no, is not necessary ; and that in this, the liberty of the Will consists, that when God holds forth sufficient objective light, the Will is at liberty whether to command the atten tion of the mind to it or not. Nothing can be more weak and inconsiderate than such a reply as this. For that preceding Act of the Will, in determining to attend and consider, still is an Act of the Will; if the Liberty of the Will consists in it, as is sup posed, as if it be aii Act of the Will, it is an act of choice or refusal. And therefore, if what the Doctor asserts be true, it is determined by some antecedent light in the Un derstanding concerning the greatest apparent good or evil. For he asserts, it is that light which alone doth move the Will to choose or refuse. And therefore the Will must be moved by that, in choosing to attend to the objective light 26 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part II. offered, in order to another consequent act of choice : so that this act is no less necessary than the other. And if we suppose another Act of the Will, still preceding both these mentioned, to determine both, still that also must be an Act of the Will, an act of choice ; and so must, by the same principles, be infallibly determined by some certain degree of light in the Understanding concerning the greatest good. And let us suppose as many Acts of the Will, one preceding another, as we please, yet are they every one of them necessarily determined by a certain degree of light in the Understanding, concerning the greatest and most eligible good in that case ; and so, not one of them free according to Dr. Whitby's notion of freedom. And if it be said, the reason why men do not attend to light held forth, is because of ill habits contracted by evil acts com mitted before, whereby their minds are indisposed to con sider the truth held forth to them, the difficulty is not at all avoided : still the question returns, What determined the Will in those preceding evil acts ? It must, by Dr. Whitby's principles, still be the view of the Understanding concerning the greatest good and evil. If this view of the Understanding be that alone which doth move the Will to choose or refuse, as the Doctor asserts, then every act of choice or refusal, from a man's first existence, is moved and determined by this view ; and this view of the Under standing exciting and governing the act, must be before the act. And therefore the Will is necessarily determined, in every one of its acts, from a man's first existence, by a cause beside the Will, and a cause that does not proceed from or depend on any act of the Will at all. Which at once utterly abolishes the Doctor's whole scheme of Liberty of Will; and he, at one stroke, has cut the sinews of all his arguments from the goodness, righteousness, faithfulness, and sincerity of God, in his commands, promises, threaten ings, calls, invitations, and expostulations ; which he makes use of, under the heads of reprobation, election, universal redemption, sufficient and effectual grace, and the freedom of the Will of man ; and has made vain all his exclamations against the doctrine of the Calvinists, as charging God with manifest unrighteousness, unfaithfulness, hypocrisy, fal laciousness, and cruelty. Dr. Samuel Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God* to evade the argument to prove the necessity of volition, from its necessary Connexion with the last Dictate of the Understanding, supposes the latter not to be diverse from the Act of the Will itself. But if it be so, it will not alter the case as to the necessity of the Act. If the Dictate of the Understanding be the very same with the determination of the Will, as Dr. Clark supposes, then this determination is no fruit or effect of choice ; and if so, no liberty of choice has any hand in it : it is necessary ; that is, choice cannot prevent it. If the last Dictate of the Understanding be the same with the determination of volition itself, then the existence of that determination must be necessary as to volition ; in as much as volition can have no opportunity to determine whether it shall exist or no, it having existence already before volition has opportunity to determine any thing. It is itself the very rise and existence of volition. But a thing after it exists, has no opportunity to determine as to its own existence ; it is too late for that. If liberty consists in that which Arminians suppose, viz. in the Will determining its own acts, having free oppor tunity and being without all necessity ; this is the same as to say, that liberty consists in the soul having power and opportunity to have what determinations of the Will it pleases. And if the determinations of the Will, and the last Dictates of the Understanding, be the same thing, then liberty consists in the mind having power and opportu nity to choose its own Dictates of Understanding. But this is absurd; for it is to make the determination of choice prior to the Dictate of Understanding, and the ground of it ; which cannot consist with the Dictate of the Understanding being'the determination of choice itself. Here is no alternative, but to recur to the old absurdity of one determination before another, and the cause of it ; and another before, determining that ; and so on in infi nitum. If the last Dictate of the Understanding be the * Edit. VI. p. 93. determination of the Will itself, and the soul be free with regard to that Dictate, in the Arminian notion of freedom ; then the soul, before that dictate of its Understanding exists, voluntarily and according to its own choice deter mines, in every case, what that Dictate of the Understand ing shall be ; otherwise that Dictate, as to the Will, is necessary ; and the acts determined by it must also be necessary. So that here is a determination of the mind prior to that Dictate of the Understanding, an act of choice going before it, choosing and determining what that Dictate of the Understanding shall be : and this preceding act of choice, being a free Act of Will, must also be the same with another last Dictate of the Understanding : And if the mind also be free in that Dictate of Understanding, that must be determined still by another; and so on forever. Besides, if the Dictate of the Understanding, and deter* mination of the Will be the same, this confounds the Understanding and Will, and makes them the same. Whether they be the same or no, I will not now dispute ; but only would observe, that if it be so, and the Arminian notion of liberty consists in a self-determining power in the Understanding, free of all necessity ; being indepen* dent, undetermined by any thing prior to its own acts and determinations ; and the more the Understanding is thus independent, and sovereign over its own determinations, the more free : then the freedom of the soul, as a moral agent, must consist in the independence of the Under standing on any evidence or appearance of things, or any thing whatsoever that stands forth to the view of the mind, prior to the Understanding's determination. And what a liberty is this ! consisting in an ability, freedom, and easi ness of judging, either according to evidence, or against it ; having a sovereign command over itself at all times, to judge, either agreeably or disagreeably to what is plainly exhibited to its own view. Certainly, it is no liberty that renders persons the proper subjects of persuasive reason ing, arguments, expostulations, and such like moral means and inducements. The use of which with mankind is a main argument of the Arminians, to defend their notion of liberty without all necessity. For according to this, the more free men are, the less they are under the government of such means, less subject to the power of evidence and reason, and more independent on their, influence, in theit determinations. And whether the Understanding and Will are the same or no, as Dr. Clark seems to suppose, yet in order to main tain the Arminian notion of liberty without necessity, the free Will is not determined by the Understanding, nor ne cessarily connected with the Understanding; and the furdier from such Connexion, the greater the freedom; And when the liberty is full and complete, the determinations of the Will have no Connexion at all with the Dictates of the Understanding. And if so, in vain are all the applica tions to the Understanding, in order to induce to any free virtuous act; and so in vain are all instructions, counsels, invitations, expostulations, and all arguments and persua sives whatsoever : for these are but applications to the Understanding, and a clear and lively exhibition of the objects of choice to the mind's view. But if, after all, the Will must be self-determined, and independent on the Understanding, to what purpose are things thus repre sented to the Understanding, in order to determine the choice ? SECTION X. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Mo tives : with particular observations on the great incon sistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings about the Freedom of the Will. That every act of the Will has some cause, and conse quently (by what has been already proved) has a neces sary connexion with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of connexion and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of the Will whatsoever is excited by some motive : which is manifest, because, if the mind, in willing Sect. X. ACTS CONNECTED WITH MOTIVES. 27 after the manner it does, is excited by no motive or in ducement, then it has no end which it proposes to itself, or pursues in so doing ; it aims at nothing, and seeks nothing. And if it seeks nothing, then it does not go after any thing, or exert any inclination or preference towards any thing. Which brings the matter to a contra diction ; because for the mind to will something, and for it to go after something by an act of preference and incli nation, are the same thing. But if every act of the Will is excited by a Motive, then that Motive is the cause of the act. If the acts of the Will are excited by Motives, then Motives are the causes of their being excited ; or, which is the same thing, the cause of their existence. And if so, the existence of the acts of the Will is properly the effect of their Motives. Motives do nothing, as Motives or inducements, but by their in fluence ; and so much as is done by their influence is the effect of them. For that is the notion of an effect, some thing that is brought to pass by the influence of something else. And if volitions are properly the effects of their Motives, then they are necessarily connected with their Motives. Every effect and event being, as was proved before, ne cessarily connected with that which is the proper ground and reason of its existence. Thus it is manifest, that volition is necessary, and is not from any self-determining power in the Will : the volition, which is caused by pre vious Motive and inducement, is not caused by the Will exercising a sovereign power over itself, to determine, cause, and excite volitions in itself. This is not consistent with the Will acting in a state of indifference and equilibrium, to determine itself to a preference ; for the way in which Motives operate, is by massing the Will, and giving it a certain inclination or preponderation one way. Here it may be proper to observe, that Mr. Chubb in his Collection of Tracts on Various Subjects, has advanced a scheme of liberty, which is greatly divided against itself, and thoroughly subversive of itself: and that many ways. I. He is abundant in asserting, that the Will, in all its acts, is influenced by Motive and excitement ; and that this is the previous ground and reason of all its acts, and that it is never otherwise in any instance. He says, (p. 262.) "Noaction can take place without some Motive to ex cite it." And, (p. 263.) " Volition cannot take place without some previous reason or motive to induce it." And, (p. 310.) Action would not take place without some reason or Motive to induce it ; it being absurd to suppose, that the active faculty would be exerted without some previous reason to dispose the mind to action." (So also p. 257.) And he speaks of these things, as what we may be absolutely certain of, and which are the foundation, the only foundation we have qf certainty respecting God's moral perfections, (p. 252 — 255, 261—264.) And yet, at the same time, by his scheme, the influence of Motives upon us to excite to action, and to be actually a ground of volition, is consequent on the volition or choice of the mind. For he very greatly insists upon it, that in all free actions, before the mind is the subject of those voli tions, which Motives excite, it chooses to be so. It chooses, whether it will comply with the Motive, which presents itself in view, or not ; and when various Motives are pre sented, it chooses which it will yield to, and which it will reject, (p. 256.) " Every man has power to act, or to re frain from acting, agreeably with, or contrary to, any Motive that presents." (p. 257.) " Everyman is at liberty to act, or refrain from acting, agreeably with, or contrary to, what each of these Motives, considered singly, would excite him to. — Man has power, and is as much at liberty, to reject the Motive that does prevail, as he has power, and is at liberty, to reject those Motives that do not." (And so p. 310, 311.) " In order to constitute a moral agent, it is ne cessary, that he should have power to act, or to refrain from acting, upon such moral Motives, as he pleases." And to the like purpose in many other places. According to these things, the Will acts first, and chooses or refuses to com ply with the Motive that is presented, before it falls under its prevailing influence : and it is first determined by the mind's pleasure or choice, what Motives it will be induced by, before it is induced by them. ' Now, how can these things hang together ? How can the mind first act, and by its act of volition and choice deter mine what Motives shall be the ground and reason of its volition and choice? For this supposes, the choice is already made, before the Motive has its effect ; and that the volition is already exerted, before the Motive prevails, so as actually to be the ground of the volition ; and make the prevailing of the Motive, the consequence of the volition, of which yet it is the ground. If the mind has already chosen to comply with a Motive, and to yield to its ex citement, the excitement comes in too late, and is needless afterwards. If the mind has already chosen to yield to a Motive which invites to a thing, that implies, and in fact is, a choosing of the thing invited to ; and the very act of choice is before the influence of the Motive which induces, and is the ground of the choice ; the son is before-hand with the father that begets him : the choice is supposed to be the ground of that influence of the Motive, which very influence is supposed to be the ground of the choice. And so vice versa, the choice is supposed to be the consequence of the influence of the Motive, which influence of the Motive is the consequence of that very choice. And besides, if the Will acts first towards the Motive before it falls under its influence, and the prevailing of the Motive upon it to induce it to act and choose, be the fruit and consequence of its act and choice, then how is the Motive " a previous ground and reason of the act and choice, so that in the nature of the things, volition cannot take place without some previous reason and Motive to induce it;" and that this act is consequent upon, and fol lows the Motive ? Which things Mr. Chubb often asserts, as of certain and undoubted truth. So that the very same Motive is both previous and consequent, both before and after, both the ground and fruit of the very same thing ! 'II. Agreeable to the forementioned inconsistent notion of the Will first acting towards the Motive, choosing whether it will comply with it, in order to it becoming a ground of the Will's acting, before any act of volition can take place, Mr. Chubb frequently calls Motives and ex citements to the action of the Will, " the passive ground or reason of that action." Which is a remarkable phrase ; than which I presume there is none more unintelligible, and void of distinct and consistent meaning, in all the writings of Duns Scotus, or Thomas Aquinas. When he represents the Motive volition as passive, he must mean— passive in that affair, or passive with respect to that action, which he speaks of; otherwise it is nothing to the design of his ar gument : he must mean, (if that can be called a meaning,) that the Motive to volition is first acted upon or towards by the volition, choosing to yield to it, making it a ground of action, or determining to fetch its influence from thence ; and so to make it a previous ground of its own excitation and existence. Which is the same absurdity, as if one should say, that the soul of man, previous to its existence, chose by what cause it would come into existence, and acted upon its cause, to fetch influence thence, to bring it into being ; and so its cause was a passive ground «f its existence ! Mr. Chubb very plainly supposes Motive or excitement to be the ground of the being of volition. He speaks of it as the ground or reason of the exertion of an act of the Will, (p. 391, and 392.) and expressly says, that " volition cannot take place without some previous ground or Mo tive to induce it," (p. 363.) And he speaks of the act as "from the Motive, and from the influence of the Motive," (p. 352.) " and from the influence that the Mo tive has on the man, for the production of an action," (p. 317.) Certainly there is no need of multiplying words about this ; it is easily judged, whether Motive can be the ground of volition taking place, so that the very production of it is from the influence of the Motive, and yet the Mo tive, before it becomes the ground of the volition, is pas sive, or acted upon the volition. But this I will say, that a man, who insists so much on clearness of meaning in others, and is so much in blaming their confusion and in consistence, ought, if he was able, to have explained his meaning in this phrase of " passive ground of action," so as to show it not to be confused and inconsistent. If any should suppose, that Mr. Chubb, when he speaks of Motive as a " passive ground of action," does not mean passive with regard to that volition which it is the ground 28 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part II. of, but some other antecedent volition, (though his purpose and argument, and whole discourse, will by no means al low of such a supposition,) yet it would not help the mat ter in the least. For, (1 .) If we suppose an act, by which the soul chooses to yield to the invitation of a Motive to another volition ; both these supposed volitions are in effect the very same. A volition to yield to the force of a Mo tive inviting to choose something, comes to just the same thing as choosing the thing which the Motive invites to, as I observed before. So that here can be no room to help the matter, by a distinction of two volitions. (2.) If the Motive be passive, not with respect to the same volition to which the Motive excites, but to one truly distinct and prior ; yet, by Mr. Chubb, that prior volition cannot take place without a Motive or excitement, as a previous ground of its existence. For he insists, that " it is absurd to sup pose any volition should take place without some previous Motive to induce it." So that at last it comes to just the same absurdity : for if every volition must have a previous Motive, then the very first in the whole series must be ex cited by a previous Motive ; and yet the Motive to that first volition is passive ; but cannot be passive with regard to another antecedent volition, because, by the supposition, it is the very first : therefore if it be passive with respect to any volition, it must be so with regard to that very volition of which it is the ground, and that is excited by it. III. Though Mr. Chubb asserts, as above, that every volition has some motive, and that " in the nature of the thing, no volition can take place without some Motive to induce it;" yet he asserts, that volition does not always follow the strongest Motive ; or, in other words, is not governed by any superior strength of the Motive that is followed, beyond Motives to the contrary, previous to the volition itself. His own words (p. 258.) are as follow : u Though with regard to physical causes, that which is strongest always prevails, yet it is otherwise with regard to moral causes. Of these, sometimes the stronger, some times the weaker, prevails. And the ground of this dif ference is evident, namely, that what we call moral causes, strictly speaking, are no causes at all, but barely passive reasons of or excitements to the action, or to the refrain ing from acting : which excitements we have power, or are at liberty, to comply with or reject, as I have showed above." And so throughout the paragraph, he in a va riety of phrases insists, that the Will is not always deter mined by the strongest Motive, unless by strongest we preposterously mean actually prevailing in the event; which is not in the Motive, but in the Will ; but that the Will is not always determined by the Motive which is strongest, by any strength previous to the volition itself. And he elsewhere abundantly asserts, that the Will is determined by no superior strength or advantage, that Motives have, from any constitution or state of things, or any circumstances whatsoever, previous to the actual determination of the Will. And indeed his whole dis course on human liberty implies it, his whole scheme is founded upon it. But these things cannot stand together. There is a diversity of strength in Motives to choice, previous to the choice itself. Mr. Chubb himself supposes, that they do previously invite, induce, excite, and dispose the mind to action. This implies, that they have something in them selves that is inviting, some tendency to induce and dis pose to volition previous to volition itself. And if they nave in themselves this nature and tendency, doubtless they have it in certain limited degrees, which are capable of diversity ; and some have it in greater degrees, others in less ; and they that have most of this tendency, considered with all their nature and circumstances, previous to volition, are the strongest Motives, and those that have least, are the weakest Motives. Now if volition sometimes does not follow the Motive which is strongest, or has most previous tendency or ad vantage, all things considered, to induce or excite it, but follows the weakest, or that which, as it stands previously in the mind's view, has least tendency to induce it ; herein the Will apparently acts wholly without Motive, without any previous reason to dispose the mind to it, contrary to what the same author supposes. The act, wherein the Will must proceed without a previous motive to induce it, is the act of preferring the weakest Motive. For how absurd is it to say, the mind sees previous reason in the Motive, to prefer that Motive before the other ; and at the same time to suppose, that there is nothing in the Motive, in its nature, state, or any circumstance of it whatsoever, as it stands in the previous view of the mind, that gives it any preference: but on the contrary, the other Motive that stands in competition with it, in all these respects, has most belonging to it that is inviting and moving, and has most of a tendency to choice and preference. This is cer tainly as much as to say, there is previous ground and reason in the Motive for the act of preference, and yet no previous reason for it. By the supposition, as to all that is in the two rival Motives, which tends to preference, previous to the act of preference, it is not in that which is preferred, but wholly m the other : and yet Mr. Chubb supposes, that the act of preference is from previous ground and reason in the Motive which is preferred. But are these things consistent? Can there be previous ground in a thing for an event that takes place, and yet no pre vious tendency in it to that event? If one thing follows another, without any previous tendency to its following, then I should think it very plain, that it follows it without any manner of previous reason why it should follow. Yea, in this case, Mr. Chubb supposes, that the event follows an antecedent, as the ground of its existence, which has not only no tendency to it, but a contrary ten dency. The event is the preference, which the mind gives. to that Motive, which is weaker, as it stands in the pre vious view of the mind ; the immediate antecedent is the view the mind has of the two rival Motives conjunctly; in which previous view of the mind, all the preferableness, or previous tendency to preference, is supposed to be on the other side, or in the contrary Motive ; and all the un- worthiness of preference, and so previous tendency to com parative neglect, or undervaluing, is on that side which is preferred : and yet in this view of the mind is supposed to be the previous ground or reason of this act of pre ference, exciting it, and disposing the mind to it. Which I leave the reader to judge, whether it be absurd or not. If it be not, then it is not absurd to say, that the previous tendency of an antecedent to a consequent, is the ground and reason why that consequent does not follow ; and the want of a previous tendency to an event, yea, a tendency to the contrary, is the true ground and reason why that event does follow. An act of choice or preference is a comparative act, wherein the mind acts with reference to two or more things that are compared, and stand-in competition in the mind's view. If the mind, in this comparative act, prefers that which appears inferior in the comparison, then the mind herein acts absolutely without Motive, or inducement, or any temptation whatsoever. Then, if a hungry man has the offer of two sorts of food, to both which he finds an appetite, but has a stronger appetite to one than the other; and there be no circumstances or excitements whatsoever in the case to induce him to take either the one or the other, but merely his appetite : if in the choice he makes between them, he chooses that which he has least appetite to, and refuses that to which he has the strongest appetite, this is a choice made absolutely without previous Motive, Ex citement, Reason, or Temptation, as much as if he were perfectly without all appetite to either ; because his volition in this case is a comparative act, following a comparative view of the food, which he chooses, in which view his preference has absolutely no previous ground, yea, is against all previous ground and motive. And if there be any principle in man, from whence an act of choice may arise after this manner, from the same principle volition may arise wholly without Motive on either side. If the mind in its volition can go beyond Motive, then it can go with out Motive : for when it is beyond the Motive, it is out of the reach of the Motive, out of the limits of its influence, and so without Motive. If so, this demonstrates the in dependence of volition on Motive ; and no reason can be given for what Mr. Chubb so often asserts, even that " in the nature of things volition cannot take place without a Motive to induce it." If the Most High should endow a balance with agency or activity of nature, in such a manner, that when unequal Sect. X. ACTS CONNECTED WITH MOTIVES 29 weights are put into the scales, its agency could enable it to cause that scale to descend, which has the least weight, and so to raise the greater weight ; this would clearly demonstrate, that the motion of the balance does not de pend on weights in the scales ; at least, as much as if the balance should move itself, when there is no weight in either scale. And the activity of the balance which is sufficient to move itself against the greater weight, must certainly be more than sufficient to move it when there is no weight at all. Mr. Chubb supposes, that the Will cannot stir at all without some Motive ; and also supposes, that if there be a Motive to one thing, and none to the contrary, volition will infallibly follow that Motive. This is virtually to suppose an entire dependence of the Will on Motives ; if it were not wholly dependent on them, it could surely hel p itself a little without them ; or help itself a little against a Motive, without help from the strength and weight of a contrary Motive. And yet his supposing that the Will, when it has before it various opposite Motives, can use them as it pleases, and choose its own influence from them, and neglect the strongest, and follow the weakest, supposes it to be wholly independent on Motives. It further appears, on Mr. Chubb's hypothesis, that vo lition must be without any previous ground in any Mo tive, thus : if it be, as he supposes, that the Will is not determined by any previous superior strength of the Mo tive, but determines and chooses its own Motive, then, when the rival Motives are exactly equal, in all respects, it may follow either ; and may, in such a case, sometimes follow one, sometimes the other. And if so, this diversity which appears between the acts of the Will, is plainly with out previous ground in either of the Motives ; for all that is previously in the Motives, is supposed precisely and perfectly the same, without any diversity whatsoever. Now perfect identity, as to all that is previous in the antecedent, cannot be the ground and reason of diversity in the con sequent. Perfect identity in the ground, cannot be a rea son why it is not followed with the same consequence. And therefore the source of this diversity of consequence must be sought for elsewhere. And lastly, it may be observed, that however much Mr. Chubb insists, that no volition can take place without some Motive to induce it, which previously disposes the mind to it; yet, as he also insists that the mind, without reference to any superior strength of Motives, picks and chooses for its Motive to follow ; he himself herein plainly supposes, that, with regard to the mind's preference of one Motive before another — it is not the Motive that disposes the Will, but — the Will disposes itself to follow the Motive. IV. Mr. Chubb supposes necessity to be utterly incon sistent with agency ; and that to suppose a being to be an agent in that which is necessary, is a plain contradiction, £311. and throughout his discourses on the subject of iberty, he supposes, that necessity cannot consist with agency or freedom ; and that to suppose otherwise, is to make Liberty and Necessity, Action and Passion, the same thing. And so he seems to suppose, that there is no action, strictly speaking, but volition ; and that as to the effects of volition in body or mind, in themselves consider ed, being necessary, they are said to be free, only as they are the effects of an act that is not necessary. And yet, according to him, volition itself is the effect of volition ; yea, every act of free volition ; and therefore every act of free volition must, by what has now been ob served from him, be necessary. That every act of free volition is itself the effect of volition, is abundantly sup posed by him. In p. 341. he says, " If a man is such a creature as I have proved him to be, that is, if he has in him a power of Liberty of doing either good or evil, and either of these is the subject of his own free choice, so that he might, if he had pleased, have chosen and done the contrary." — Here he supposes all that is good or evil in man is the effect of his choice ; and so that his good or evil choice itself is the effect of his pleasure or choice, in these words, " he might if he had pleased, have chosen the contrary." So in p 356. " Though it be highly reason able, that a man should always choose the greater good, — yet he may, if he please, choose otherwise." Which is the same thing as if he had said, he may if he chooses choose other-wise. And then he goes on, — " that is, he may, if he pleases, choose what is good for himself," &c. And again in the same page, " The Will is not confined by the under standing, to any particular sort of good, whether greater or less ; but it is at liberty to choose what kind of good it pleases." — If there be anv meaning in the last words, it must be this, that the Will is at liberty to choose what kind of good it chooses to choose ; supposing the act of choice itself determined by an antecedent choice. The Liberty Mr. Chubb speaks of, is not only a man's power to move his body, agreeable to an antecedent act of choice, but to use or exert the faculties of his soul. Thus, (p. 379.) speaking of the faculties of the mind, he says, " Man has power, and is at liberty to neglect these faculties, to use them aright, or to abuse them, as he pleases." And that he sup poses an act of choice or exercise of pleasure, properly distinct from, and antecedent to, those acts thus chosen, directing, commanding, and producing the chosenacts, and even the acts of choice themselves, is very plain in p. 283. " He can command his actions; and herein consists his Liberty ; he can give or deny himself that pleasure, as he pleases. And p. 377. If the actions of men — are not the produce of a free choice, or election, but spring from a necessity of nature,— he cannot in reason be the object of reward or punishment on their account. Whereas, if ac tion in man, whether good or evil, is the produce of will or free choice ; so that a man in either case, had it in his power, and was at liberty to have chosen the contrary, he is the proper object of reward or punishment, according as he chooses to behave himself." Here, in these last words, he speaks of Liberty o/choosing, according as he chooses. So that the behaviour which he speaks of as subject to his choice, is his choosing itself, as well as his external conduct consequent upon it. And therefore it is evident, he means not only external actions, but the acts of choice themselves, when he speaks of all free actions, as the produce of free choice. And this is abundantly evident in what he says elsewhere, (p. 372, 373.) Now these things imply a twofold great inconsistence. 1. To suppose, as Mr. Chubb plainly does, that every free act of choice is commanded by, and is the produce of, free choice, is to suppose the first free act of choice be longing to the case, yea, the first free act of choice that ever man exerted, to be the produce of an antecedent act of choice. But I hope I need not labour at all to convince my readers, that it is an absurdity to say, the very first act is the produce of another act that went before it. 2. If it were both possible and real, as Mr. Chubb in sists, that every free act of choice were the produce or the effect of a free act of choice ; yet even then, according to his principles, no one act of choice would be free, but every one necessary ; because, every act of choice being the effect of a foregoing act, every act would be necessarily connected with that foregoing cause. Eor Mr. Chubb himself says, (p. 389.) " When the self-moving power is exerted, it becomes the necessary cause of its effects." — So- that his notion of a free act, that is rewardable or punish able, is a heap of contradictions. It is a free act, and yet, by his own notion of freedom, is necessary ; and therefore by him it is a contradiction, to suppose it to be free. Ac cording to him, every free act is the produce of a free act ; so that there must be an infinite number of free acts in succession, without any beginning, in an agent that has a beginning. And therefore here is an infinite number of free acts, every one of them free ; and yet not any one of them free, but every act in the whole infinite chain a necesary effect. All the acts are rewardable or punish able, and yet the agent cannot, in reason, be the object of reward or punishment, on account of any one of these actions. He is active in them all, and passive in none ; yet active in none, but passive in all, &c. V. Mr. Chubb most strenuously denies, that Motives- are causes of the acts of the Will; or that the moving principle in man is moved, or earned to be exerted by Motives. His words, (p. 388 and 389.) are, " If the moving prin ciple in man is moved, or caused to be exerted, by something external to man, which all Motives are, then it would not be a self-moving principle, seeing it would be moved by a principle external to itself. And to say, that a self-moving principle is moved, or caused to be exert- 30 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part II. ed, by a cause external to itself, is absurd and a contradic tion," &c And in the next page, it is particularly and largely insisted, that Motives are causes in no case, that " they are merely passive in the production of action, and have no causality in the production of it, — no causality, to be the cause of the exertion of the Will. Now I desire it may be considered, how this can possi bly consist with what he says in other places. Let it be noted here, 1. Mr. Chubb abundantly speaks of Motives as excite ments of the acts of the Will ; and says, that Motives do excite volition, and induce it, and that they are necessary to this end ; that in the reason and nature of things, volition cannot take place without Motives to excite it. But now, if Motives excite the Will, they move it ; and yet he says, it is absurd to say, the Will is moved by Motives. Arid again, if language is of any significancy at all, if Motives ex cite volition, then they are thecause of its being excited ; and to cause volition to be excited, is to cause it to be put forth or exerted. Yea, Mr. Chubb says himself, (p. 317.) Motive is necessary to the exertion of the active faculty. To excite, is positively to do something ; and certainly that which does something, is the cause of the thing done by it. To create, is to cause to be created ; to make, is to cause to be made ; to kill, is to cause to be killed ; to quicken, is to cause to be quickened ; and to excite, is to cause to be excited. To excite, is to be a cause, in the most proper sense, not merely a negative occasion, but a ground of existence by positive influence. The notion of exciting, is exerting influence to cause the effect to arise or come forth into existence. 2. Mr. Chubb himself (p. 317.) speaks of Motives as the ground and reason of action by influence, and by prevailing influence. Now, what can be meant by a cause, but something that is the ground and reason of a thing by its influence, an influence that is prevalent and effectual ? 3. This author not only speaks of Motives as the ground and reason of action, by prevailing influence ; but expressly of their influence as prevailing for the produc tion of an action, (p. 317.) which makes the inconsistency still more palpable and notorious. The production of an effect is certainly the causing of an effect ; and productive influence is causal influence, if any thing is ; and that which has this influence prevalently, so as thereby to be come the ground of another thing, is a cause of that thing, if there be any such thing as a cause. This influence, Mr. Chubb says, Motives have to produce an action ; and yet, he says, it is absurd and a contradiction, to say they are causes. 4. In the same page, he once and again speaks of Mo tives as disposing the Agent to action, by their influence. His words are these : " As Motive, which takes place in the understanding, and is the product of intelligence, is necessary to action, that is, to the exertion of the ac tive faculty, because that faculty would not be exerted without some previous reason to dispose the mind to action ; so from hence it plainly appears, that when a man is said to be disposed to one action rather than another, this properly signifies the prevailing influence that one Motive has upon a man for the production of an action, or for the being at rest, before all other Motives, for the production of the contrary. For as motive is the ground and reason of any action, so the Motive that prevails, dis poses the agent to the performance of that action." Now, if Motives dispose the mind to action, then they cause the mind to be disposed ; and to cause the mind to be disposed is to cause it to be willing ; and to cause it to be willing is to cause it to will ; and that is the same thing as to be the cause of an act of the Will. And yet this same Mr. Chubb holds it to be absurd, to suppose Motive to be a cause of the act of the Will. And if we compare these things together, we have here again a whole heap of inconsistences. Motives are the previous ground and reason of the acts of the Will ; yea, the necessary ground and reason of their exertion, without which they will not be exerted, and cannot, in the nature of things, take place ; and they do excite these acts of the Will, and do this by a prevailing influence ; yea, an influence which prevails for the production of the act of the Will, and for the disposing of the mind to it ; and yet it is absurd, to suppose Motive to be a cause of an act of the Will, or that a principle of Will is moved or caused to be exerted by it, or that it has any causality in the production of it, or any causality to be the cause of the exertion of the Will. A due consideration of these things which Mr. Chubb has advanced, the strange incon.sistences which his notion of Liberty— consisting in the Will's power of self-determi nation void of all necessity, united with that dictate'; of common sense, that there can be no volition without a Motive— drove him into, may be sufficient to convince us, that it is utterly impossible ever to make that notion of Liberty consistent with the influence of Motives in voli tion. And as it is in a manner self-evident, that there can be no act of Will, or preference of the mind, without some Motive or inducement, something in the mind's view which it aims at, and goes after ; so it is most manifest, that there is no such Liberty in the universe as Arminians insist on ; nor any such thing possible, or conceivable. SECT. XI. The evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of the Vo litions of moral Agents. That the acts of the Wills of moral Agents are not con tingent events, in such a sense, as to be without all neces sity, appears by God'scertain Foreknowledge of such events. In handling this argument, I would in the first place prove, that God has a certain Foreknowledge of the volun tary acts of moral Agents ; and secondly, show the conse quence, or how it follows from hence, that the Volitions of moral Agents are not contingent, so as to be without ne cessity of connexion and consequence. First, I am to prove, that God has an absolute and certain Foreknowledge of the free actions of moral Agents. One would think it wholly needless .to enter on such an argument with any that profess themselves Christians : but so it is ; God's certain Foreknowledge of the free acts of moral Agents, is denied by some that pretend to believe the Scriptures to be the W ord of God ; and especially of late. I therefore shall consider the evidence of such a prescience in the Most High, as fully as the designed limits of this essay will admit ; supposing myself herein to have to do with such as own the truth of the Bible. Arg. I. My first argument shall be taken from God's prediction of such events. Here I would, in the first place, lay down these two things as axioms. 1. If God does not foreknow, He cannot foretell such events ; that is, He cannot peremptorily and certainly fore tell them. If God has no more than an uncertain guess con cerning events of this kind, then he can declare no more than an uncertain guess. Positively to foretell, is to profess to foreknow, or declare positive Foreknowledge. 2. If God does not certainly foreknow the future Voli tions of moral Agents, then neither can he certainly fore know those events which are dependent on these Volitions. The existence of the one depending on the existence of the other, the knowledge of the existence of the one depends on the knowledge of the existence of the other ; and the one cannot be more certain than the other. Therefore, how many, how great, and how extensive soever the consequences of the Volitions of moral Agents may be; though they should extend to an alteration of the state of things through the universe, and should he con tinued in a series of successive events to all eternity, and should in the progress of things branch forth into an infi nite number of series, each of them going on in an endless chain of events ; God must be as ignorant of all these con sequences, as he is of the Volition whence they first take their rise : and the whole state of things depending on them, how important, extensive, and vast soever, must be hid from him. These positions being such as, I suppose, none will deny, I now proceed to observe the following things. 1. Men's moral conduct and qualities, their virtues and vices, their wickedness and good practice, things reward- able and punishable, have often been foretold by God. — Pharaoh's moral conduct, in refusing to obey God's com- Sect. XI. GOD FOREKNOWS OUR VOLITIONS. 31 niand, in letting his people go, was foretold. God says to Moses, Exod. iii. 19. " I am sure that the king of Egypt will not let you go." Here God professes not only to guess at, but to know Pharaoh's future disobedience. In chap. vii. 4. God says, " but Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you ; that I may lay mine hand upon Egypt," &c. And chap. ix. 30. Moses says to Pharaoh, " as for thee, and thy servants, I know that ye will not fear the Lord." See also chap. xi. 9. — The moral conduct of Josiah, by name, in his zealously exerting himself to oppose idolatry, in particular acts, was foretold above three hundred years before he was born, and the prophecy sealed by a miracle, and renewed and confirmed by the words of a second prophet, as what surely would not fail, (1 Kings xiii. 1 — 6, 32.) This prophecy was also in effect a prediction of the moral conduct of the people, in upholding their schismati- cal and idolatrous worship until that time, and the idolatry of those priests of the high places, which it is foretold Josiah should offer upon that altar of Bethel. Mfcaiah foretold the foolish and sinful conduct of Ahab, in refusing to hearken to the word of the Lord by him, and choosing rather to hearken to the false prophets, in going to Hamoth- Gilead to his ruin, (1 Kings xxi. 20 — 22.) The moral conduct of Hazael was foretold, in that cruelty he should be guilty of; on which Hazael says, " What, is thy servant a dog, that he should do this thing !" The prophet speaks of the event as what he knew, and not what he conjec tured, 2 Kings viii. 12. " I know the evil that thou wilt do unto the children of Israel : Thou wilt dash their children, and rip up their women with child." The moral conduct of Cyrus is foretold, long before he had a being, in his mercy to God's people, and regard to the true God, in turning the captivity of the Jews, and promoting the build ing of the temple, (Isa. xliv. 28. and lxv. 13. compare 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22, 23. and Ezra i. 1 — 4.) How many instances of the moral conduct of the kings of the North and South, particular instances of the wicked behaviour of the kings of Syria and Egypt, are foretold in the 11th chapter of Daniel! Their corruption, violence, robberv, treachery, and lies. And particularly, how much is foretold of the horrid wickedness of Antiochus Epiphanes, called there " a vile person," instead of Epiphanes, or illustrious! In that chapter, and also in chap. viii. ver. 9, 14, 23, to the end, are foretold his flattery, deceit, and lies, his having " his heart set to do mischief," and set " against the holy covenant," his " destroying and treading under foot the holy people," in a marvellous manner, his " having indig nation against the holy covenant, setting his heart against it, and conspiring against it," his " polluting the sanctuary of strength, treading it under foot, taking away the daily sacrifice, and placing the abomination that maketh deso late ;" his great pride, " magnifying himself against God, and uttering marvellous blasphemies against Him," until God in indignation should destroy him. Withal, the moral conduct of the Jews, on occasion of his persecution, is predicted. It is foretold, that " he should corrupt many by flatteries" (chap. xi. 32—34.) But that others should "behave with a glorious constancy and fortitude, in oppo sition to him, (ver. 32.) And that some good men should fall and repent, (ver. 35.) Christ foretold Peter's sin, in denying his Lord, with its circumstances, in a peremptory manner. And so, that great sin of Judas, in betraying his master, and its dreadful and eternal punishment in hell, was foretold in the like positive manner, Matt. xxvi. 21 — 25. and parallel places in the other Evangelists. 2. Many events have been foretold by God, which are dependent on the moral conduct of particular persons, and were accomplished, either by their virtuous or vicious actions. Thus, the children of Israel's going down into Egypt to dwell there, was foretold to Abraham, (Gen. xv.) which was brought about by the wickedness of Joseph's brethren in selling him, and the wickedness of Joseph's mistress, and his own signal virtue in resisting her tempta tion. The accomplishment of the thing prefigured in Joseph's dream, depended on the same moral conduct. Jotham's parable and prophecy, (Judges ix. 15 — 20.) was accomplished by the wicked conduct of Abimehxh, and the men of Shechem. The prophecies against the house of Eli, (1 Sam. chap. ii. and iii.) were accomplished by the wickedness, of Doeg the Edomite,,m accusing the priests ; and the great impiety, and extreme cruelty of Saul in destroying the priests at Nob. (1 Sam. xxi'i.) Nathan's prophecy against David, (2 Sam. xii. 11,12.) was fulfilled by the horrible wickedness of Absalom, in rebelling against his father, seeking his life, and lying with his concubines in the sight of the sun. The prophecy against Solomon, (1 Kings xi. 11 — 13.) was fulfilled by Jeroboam's rebellion and usurpation, which are spoken of as his wickedness, (2 Chron. xiii. 5, 6. compare ver. 18.) The prophecy against Jeroboam's family, (1 Kings xiv.) was fulfilled by the conspiracy, treason, and cruel murders of Baasha, (2 Kings xv. 27, &c.) The predictions of the prophet Jehu against the house of Baasha, (1 Kings xvi. at the beginning,) were fulfilled by the treason and parricide of Zimri, (1 Kings xvi. 9— 13,' 20.) 3. How often has God foretold the future moral con duct of nations and people, of numbers, bodies, and suc cessions of men ; with God's judicial proceedings, and many other events consequent and dependent on their vir tues and vices ; which could not be foreknown, if the Volitions of men, wherein they acted as moral Agents, had not been foreseen ! The future cruelty of the Egyp tians in oppressing Israel, and God's judging and punish ing them for it, was foretold long before it came to pass, (Gen. xv. 13, 14.) The continuance of the iniquity of the Amorites, and the increase of it until it should be full, and they ripe for destruction, was foretold above four hun dred years before, (Gen. xv. 16. Acts vii. 6, 7.) The prophecies of the destruction of Jerusalem, and the land of Juduh, were absolute; (2 Kings xx. 17 — 19. chap. xxii. 15, to the end.) It was foretold in Hezekiah's time, and was abundantly insisted on in the book of the prophet Isaiah, who wrote nothing after Hezekiah's days. It was foretold in Josiah's time, in the beginning of a great re formation, (2 Kings xxii.) And it is manifest by innu merable things in the predictions of the prophets, relating to this event, its time, its circumstances, its continuance, and end ; the return from the captivity, the restoration of the temple, city, and land, &c. I say, these show plainly, that the prophecies of this great event were absolute. And- yet this event was connected with, and dependent on, two things in men's moral conduct: first, the injurious rapine and violence of the king of Babylon and his people, as the efficient cause ; which God often speaks of as what he highly resented, and would severely punish ; and second ly, the final obstinacy of the Jews. That great event is often spoken of as suspended on this, (Jer. iv. 1. and v. 1. vii. 1 — 7. xi. 1 — 6. xvii. 24, to the end, xxv. 1 — 7. xxvi. 1 — 8, 13. and xxxviii. 17, 18.) Therefore this destruction and captivity could not be foreknown, unless such a moral conduct of the Chaldeans and Jews had been foreknown. And then it was foretold, that the people should be finally obstinate, to the utter desolation of the city and land, (Isa. vi. 9—11. Jer. i. 18, 19. vii. 27—29. 'Ezek. iii. 7.' and xxiv. 13, 14.) The final obstinacy of those Jews who were left in the land of Israel, in their idolatry and rejection of the true God, was foretold by him, and the prediction confirmed with an oath, (Jer. xliv. 26, 27.) And God tells the peo ple, (Isa. xlviii. 3, 4 — 8.) that he had predicted those things which should be consequent on their treachery and obstinacy, because he knew they would be obstinate ; and that he had declared these things beforehand, for their con viction of his being the only true God, &c. The destruction of Babylon, with many of the circum stances of it, was foretold, as the judgment of God for the exceeding pride and haughtiness of the heads of that monarchy, Nebuchadnezzar and his successors, and their wickedly destroying other nations, and particularly for their exalting themselves against the true God and his people, before any of these monarchs had a being; (Isa. chap. xiii. xiv. xlvii. compare Habak. ii. 5, to the end, and Jer. chap. 1. and li.) That Babylon's destruction was to be " a recompence, according to the works of their own hands," appears by Jer. xxv. 14. — The immorality of which the people of Babylon, and particularly her princes and great men, were guilty, that very night that the city was destroyed, their revelling and drunkenness at Belshazzar's idolatrous feast, was foretold, (Jer. li. 39, 57.) The return of the Jews from the Babylonish captivity is 32 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part II. often very particularly foretold, with many circumstances, and the promises of it are very peremptory : (Jer. xxxi. 35—40. and xxxii. 6—15, 41—44. and xxxiii. 24—26.) And the very time of their return was prefixed ; (Jer. xxv. 11, 12. and xxix. 10, 11. 2 Chron. xxxvi. 21. Ezek. iv. 6. and Dan. ix. 2.) And yet the prophecies represent their return as consequent on their repentance. And their re pentance itself is very expressly and particularly foretold, (Jer. xxix. 12, 13, 14. xxxi. 8, 9, 18—31. xxxiii. 8. 1. 4, 5. Ezek. vi. 8, 9, 10. vii. 16. xiv. 22, 23. and xx. 43, 44.) It was foretold under the Old Testament, that the Mes siah should suffer greatly through the malice and cruelty of men ; as is largely and fully set forth, Psal. xxii. ap plied to Christ in the New Testament, (Matt, xxvii. 35, 43. Luke xxiii. 34. John xix. 24. Heb. ii. 12.) And like wise in Psal. lxix. which, it is also evident by the New Testament, is spoken of Christ; (John xv. 25. vii. 5, &c. and ii. 17. Rom. xv. 3. Matt, xxvii. 34, 48. Mark xv. 23. John xix. 29.) The same thing is also foretold, Isa. liii. and 1. 6. and Mic. v. 1. This cruelty of men was their sin, and what they acted as moral Agents. It was fore told, that there should be an union of heathen and Jewish rulers against Christ, (Psal. ii. 1, 2. compared with Acts iv. 25 — 28.) It was foretold, that the Jews should generally reject and despise the Messiah, (Isa. xlix. 5, 6, 7. and liii. 1—3. Psal. xxii. 6, 7. and lxix. 4, 8, 19, 20.) And it was foretold, that the body of that nation should be rejected in the Messiah's davs, from being God's people, for their ob stinacy in sin ; (Isa. xlix. 4 — 7. and viii. 14, 15, 16. com pared with Rom. x. 19. and La. lxv. at the beginning, compared with Rom. x. 20, 21.) It was foretold, that Christ should be rejected by the chief priests and rulers among the Jews, (Psal. cxviii. 22. compared with Matt. xxi. 42. Acts iv. 11. 1 Pet. ii. 4, 7.) Christ himself foretold his being delivered into the hands of the elders, chief priests, and scribes, and his being cruelly treated by them, and condemned to death ; and that he by them should be delivered to the Gentiles : and that he should be mocked and scourged, and crucified, (Matt. xvi. 21. and xx. 17 — 19. Luke ix. 22. John viii. 28.) and that the people should be concerned in and con senting to his death, (Luke xx. 13—18.) especially the in habitants of Jer-usalem ; (Luke xiii. 33 — 35.) He foretold, that the disciples should all be offended because of him, that night in which he was betrayed, and should forsake him ; (Matt. xxvi. 31. John xvi. 32.) He foretold, that he should be rejected of that generation, even the body of the people, and that they should continue obstinate to their ruin; (Matt. xii. 45. xxi. 33 — 42. and xxii. 1 — 7. Luke xiii. 16,21, 24. xvii. 25. xix. 14,27, 41—44. xx. 13—18. and xxiii. 34—39.) As it was foretold in both the Old Testament and the New that the Jews should reject the Messiah, so it was foretold that the Gentiles should receive him, and so be admitted to the privileges of God's people ; in places too many to be now particularly mentioned. It was foretold in the Old Testament, that the Jews should envy the Gentiles on this account ; (Deut. xxxii. 21. compared with Rom. x. 19.) Christ himself often foretold, that the Gentiles would embrace the true religion, and become his followers and people ; (Matt. viii. 10, 11, 12. xxi. 41—43. and xxii. 8—10. Luke xiii. 28. xiv. 16—24. and xx. 16. John x. 16.) He also foretold the Jews' envy of the Gen tiles on this occasion ; (Matt. xx. 12 — 16. Luke xv. 26, to the end.) He foretold, that they should continue in this opposition and envy, and should manifest it in the cruel persecutions of his followers, to their utter destruc tion ; (Ma... xxi. 33—42. xxii. 6. and xxiii. 34—39. Luke xi. 49 — 51.) The obstinacy of the Jews is also foretold, (Acts xxii. 18.) Christ often foretold the great persecu tions his followers should meet with, both from Jews and Gentiles; (Matt. x. 16—18, 21, 22, 34—36. and xxiv. 9. Mark xiii. 9. Luke x. 3. xii. 11, 49—53. and xxi. 12, 16, 17. John xv. 18—21. and xvi. 1—4, 20—22, 23.) He foretold the martyrdom of particular persons ; (Matt. xx. 23. John xiii. 36. and xxi. 18, 19, 22.) He foretold the great success of the gospel in the city of Samaria, as near approaching ; which afterwards was fulfilled by the preach ing of Philip, (John iv. 35 — 38.) He foretold the rising of many deceivers after his departure, (Matt. xxiv. 4, 5, 11.) and the apostasy of many of his professed followers -y (Matt. xxiv. 10, 12.) The persecutions, which the apostle Paul was to meet with in the world, were foretold; (Acts ix. 16. xx. 23, and xxi. 11.) The apostle says, to the christian Ephesians, Acts xx. 29, 30.) " I know, that after my departure shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock ; also of your ownselves shall men arise, speaking perverse things, to draw away disciples after them." The apostle says, he knew this : but he did not know it, if God did not know the future actions of moral Agents. 4. Unless God foreknows the future acts of moral Agents, all the prophecies we have in Scripture concerning the great Antichristian apostasy ; the rise, reign, wicked qualities, and deeds of " the man of sin," and his instru ments and adherents ; the extent and long continuance of his dominion, his influence on the minds of princes and others, to corrupt them, and draw them away to idolatry,. . and other foul vices ; his great and cruel persecutions; the behaviour of the saints under these great temptations, &c. &c. I say, unless the Volitions of moral Agents are foreseen, all these prophecies are uttered without knowing the things foretold. The predictions relating to this great apostasy are all of a moral nature, relating to men's virtues and vices, and their exercises, fruits, and consequences, and events de pending on them ; and are very particular ; and most of them often repeated, with many precise characteristics, de scriptions, and limitations of qualities, conduct, influence, effects, extent, duration, periods, circumstances, final issue, Sec. which it would be tedious to mention particularly. And to suppose, that all these are predicted by God, without any certain knowledge of the future moral behavi our of free Agents, would be to the utmost degree ab surd. 5. Unless God foreknows the future acts of men's Wills, and their behaviour as moral Agents, all those great things which are foretold both in the Old Testament and the New, concerning the erection, establishment, and universal extent of the kingdom of the Messiah, were predicted and pro mised while God was in ignorance whether any of these things would come to pass or no, and did but guess at them. For that kingdom is not of this world, it does not consist in things external, but is within men, and consists in the dominion of virtue in their hearts, in righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost ; and in these things made manifest in practice, to the praise and glory of God. The Messiah came " to save men from their sins, and deliver them from their spiritual enemies ; that they might serve him in righteousness and holiness before him : he gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works." And therefore nis success consists in gaining men's hearts to virtue, in their being made God's willing- people in the day of his power. His conquest of his ene mies consists in his victory over men's corruptions and vices. And such a victory, and such a dominion is often expressly foretold : that his kingdom shall fill the earth ; that all people, nations, and languages should serve and obey him ; and so that all nations should go up to the* mountain of the house of the Lord, that he might teach them his ways, and that they might walk in his paths ; and that all men should be drawn to Christ, and the earth be full of the knowledge of the Lord (true virtue and religion) as the waters cover the seas ; that God's laws should he put into men's inward parts, and written in their hearts ; and that God's people should be all righteous, &c. &c. A very great part of the Old-Testament prophecies is taken up in such predictions as these. — And here I would observe, that the prophecies of the universal prevalence of the kingdom of the Messiah, and true religion of Jesus Christ, are delivered in the most peremptory manner, and confirmed by the oath of God, Isa. xiv. 22, to the end, " Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of. the earth ; for I am God, and there is none else. I have sworn by my Self, the word is gone out of my mouth in righte ousness, and shall not return, that unto Me every knee shall bow, and every tongue shall swear. Surely, shall one say, in the Lord have I righteousness and strength : even to Him shall men come," &c. But, here, this peremptory Sect. XI. GOD FOREKNOWS OUR VOLITIONS. 33 declaration and great oath of the Most High, are delivered with such mighty solemnity, respecting things which God did not know, if he did not certainly foresee the Volitions of moral Agents. And all the predictions of Christ and his apostles, to the like purpose, must be without knowledge : as those of our Saviour comparing the kingdom of God to a grain of mus tard-seed, growing exceeding great, from a small begin ning ; and to leaven, hid in three measures of meal, until the whole was leavened, &c. — And the prophecies in the epistles concerning the restoration of the Jewish nation to the true church of God, and bringing in the fulness of the Gentiles ; and the prophecies in all the Revelation con cerning the glorious change in the moral state of the world of mankind, attending the destruction of Antichrist, " the kingdoms of the world becoming the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ;" and its being granted to the church to be " arrayed in that fine linen, white and clean, which is the righteousness of saints," &c. Carol. 1. Hence lhat great promise and oath of God to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, so much celebrated in Scrip ture, both in the Old Testament and the New, namely, " That in their seed all the nations and families of the earth should be blessed," must be made on uncertainties, if God does not certainly foreknow the Volitions of moral Agents. For the fulfilment of this promise consists in that success of Christ in the work of redemption, and that setting up of his spiritual kingdom over the nations of the world, which has been spoken of. Men are " blessed in Christ" no otherwise than as they are brought to acknow ledge him, trust in him, love and serve him, as is re presented and predicted in Psal. lxxii. 11. " All kings shall fall down before him ; all nations shall serve him." With ver. 17. " Men shall be blessed in him; all na tions shall call him blessed." This oath to Jacob and Abraham is fulfilled in subduing men's iniquities ; as is implied in that of the prophet Micab, chap. vii. 19, 20. Corot. 2. Hence also it appears, that the first gospel- promise that ever was made to mankind, that great predic tion of the salvation of the Messiah, and his victory over Satan, made to our first parents, (Gen. iii. 15.) if there be no certain Prescience of the Volitions of moral Agents, must have no better foundation than conjecture. For Christ's victory over Satan consists in men's being saved from sin, and in the victory of virtue and holiness over that vice and wickedness which Satan by his temptations has introduced, and wherein his kingdom consists. 6. If it be so, that God has not a Prescience of the future actions of moral Agents, it will follow, that the prophecies of Scripture in general are without Foreknowledge. For Scripture prophecies, almost all of them, if not universally, are either predictions of the actings and behaviour of moral Agents, or of events depending on them, or some way connected with them ; judicial dispensations, judg ments on men for their wickedness, or rewards of virtue and righteousness, remarkable manifestations of favour to the righteous, or manifestations of sovereign mercy to sinners, forgiving their iniquities, and magnifying the riches of divine grace ; or dispensations of Providence, in some respect or other, relating to the conduct of the subjects of God's moral government, wisely adapted thereto ; either providing for what should be in a future state of things, through the Volitions and voluntary actions of moral Agents, or consequent upon them, and regulated and ordered according to them. So that all events that are foretold, are either moral events, or others which are con nected with and accommodated to them. That the predictions of Scripture in general must be without knowledge, if God does not foresee the Volitions of men, will further appear, if it be considered, that almost all events belonging to the future state of the world of mankind, the changes and revolutions which come to pass in empires, kingdoms, and .nations, and all societies, de pend, in ways innumerable, on the acts of men's Wills ; yea, on an innumerable multitude of millions of Volitions. Such is the state and course of things in the world of mankind, that one. single event, which appears in itself exceeding inconsiderable, may, in the progress and series of things, occasion a succession of the greatest and most important and extensive events ; causing the state of man- VOL. I. D kind to be vastly different from what it would otherwise have been, for all succeeding generations. For instance, the coming into existence of those particu lar men, who have been the great conquerors of the world, which, under God, have had the main hand in all the consequent state of the world, in all after-ages ; such as Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander, Pompev, Julius Cae sar, &c. undoubtedly depended on many millions of acts of the Will, in their parents. And perhaps most of these Volitions depended on millions of Volitions in their con temporaries of the same generation ; and most of these on millions of millions of Volitions in preceding generations. — As we go back, still the number of Volitions, which were some way the occasion of the event, multiply as the branches of a river, until they come at last, as it were, to an infinite number. This will not seem strange to any one who well considers the matter ; if we recollect what phi losophers tell us of the innumerable multitudes of those things which are the principiu, or stamina vita, concerned in generation ; the animalcufa in semiiie masculo, and the ova in the womb of the female ; the impregnation or animating of one of these in distinction from all the rest, must depend on things infinitely minute relating to the time and cir cumstances of the act of the parents, the state of their bodies, &c. which must depend on innumerable foregoing circum stances and occurrences ; which must depend, infinite ways, on foregoing acts of their Wills; which are occasioned by innumerable things that happen in the course of their lives, in which their own and their neighbour's behaviour must have a hand, an infinite number of ways. And as the Volitions of others must be so many ways concerned in the conception and birth of such men ; so, no less, in their preservation, and circumstances of life, their particular determinations and actions, on which the great revolutions they were the occasions of, depended. As, for instance, when the conspirators in Persia, against the Magi, were consulting about a succession to the empire, it came into the mind of one of- them, to propose, that he whose horse neighed first, when they came together the next morning, should be king. Now, such a thing coming into his mind, might depend on innumerable incidents, wherein the Vo litions of mankind had been concerned. But, in conse quence of this accident, Darius, the son of Hystaspes, was king. And if this had not been, probably his successor would not have been the same, and all the circumstances of the Persian empire might have been far otherwise : Then perhaps Alexander might never have conquered that empire ; and then probably the circumstances of the world in all succeeding ages, might have been vastly otherwise. I might further instance in many other occurrences ; such as those on which depended Alexander's preservation, in the many critical junctures of his life, wherein a small trifle would have turned the scale against him ; and the preser vation and success of the Roman people, in the infancy of their kingdom and commonwealth, and afterwards ; upon which all the succeeding changes in their state, and the mighty revolutions that afterwards came to pass in the habitable world, depended. But these hints maybe suffi cient for every discerning considerate person, to convince him, that the whole state of the world of mankind, in all ages, and the very being of every person who has ever lived in it, in every age, since the times of the ancient prophets, has depended on more Volitions, or acts of the Wills of men, than there are sands on the sea-shore. And therefore, unless God does most exactly and per fectly foresee the future acts of men's Wills, all the predic tions which he ever uttered concerning David, Hezekiah, Josiah, Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander; concerning the four monarchies, and the revolutions in them ; and concerning all the wars, commotions, victories, prosperity, and calamities, of any kingdoms, nations, or communities in the world, have all been without knowledge. So that, according to this notion, God not foreseeing the Volitions and free actions of men, he could foresee nothing appertaining to the state of the world of mankind in fu ture ages ; not so much as the being of one person that should live in it ; and could foreknow no events, but only such as he would bring to pass himself by the extraordi nary interposition of his immediate power; or things which should come to pass in the natural material world, 31 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part II. by the laws of motion, and course of nature, wherein that is independent on the actions or works of mankind : that is, as he might, like a very able mathematician and astro nomer, with great exactness calculate the revolutions of the heavenlv bodies, and the greater wheels of the machine of the external creation. And if we closely consider the matter, there will ap pear reason to convince us, that he could not, with any absolute certainty, foresee even these. As to the first, namely, things done by the immediate and extraordinary interposition of God's power, these cannot be foreseen, unless it can be foreseen when there shall be occasion for such extraordinary interposition. And that cannot be fore seen, unless the state of the moral world can be foreseen. For whenever God thus interposes, it is with regard to the state of the moral world, requiring such divine interposition. Thus God could not certainly foresee the universal deluge, the calling of Abraham, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the plagues on Egypt, and Israel's redemption out of it, the expelling of the seven nations of Canaan, and the bringing Israel into that land ; for these all are represented as connected with things belonging to the state of the moral world. Nor can God foreknow the most proper and convenient time of the day of judgment and general conflagration; for that chiefly depends on the course and state of things in the moral world. Nor, Secondly, can we on this supposition reasonably think, that God can certainly foresee what things shall come to pass, in the course of things, in the natural and material world, even those which in an ordinary state of things might be calculated by a good astronomer. 1 For the moral world is the end of the natural world ; and the course of things in the former, is undoubtedly subordinate to God's designs with respect to the latter. Therefore he has seen cause, from regard to the state of things in the moral world, extraordinarily to interpose, to interrupt, and lay an arrest on the course of things in the natural world ; and unless he can foresee the Volitions of men, and so know something of the future state of the moral world, he cannot know but that he may still have as great occasion to interpose in this manner, as ever he had : nor can he fore see how, or when, he shall have occasion thus to interpose. Corol. 1. It appears from the things observed, that un less God foresees the Volitions of moral Agents, that can not be true which is observed by the apostle James, (Acts xv. 18.) " Known unto God are all his works from the be ginning of the world." Corol. 2. It appears, that unless God foreknows the Vo litions of moral Agents, all the prophecies of Scripture have no better foundation than mere conjecture ; and that, in most instances, a conjecture which must have the ut most uncertainty ; depending on an innumerable multi tude of Volitions, which are all, even to God, uncertain events : however, these prophecies are delivered as absolute predictions, and very many of them in the most positive manner, with asseverations ; and some of them with the most solemn oaths. Corol. 3. It also follows, that if this notion of God's ignorance of future Volitions be true, in vain did Christ say, after uttering many great and important predictions, depending on men's moral actions, (Matt. xxiv. 35.) " Heaven and earth shall pass away ; but my words shall not pass away." Corol. 4. From the same notion of God's ignorance, it would follow, that in vain has he himself often spoken of the predictions of his word, as evidences of Foreknow ledge ; of that which is his prerogative as GOD, and his peculiar glory, greatly distinguisbing him from all other beings; (as in Isa. xii. 22. — 26 xliii. 9, 10. xliv. 8. xiv. 21. xlvi. 10. and xlviii. 14.) Arg. II. If God does not foreknow the Volitions of moral Agents, then he did not foreknow the fall of man, nor of angels, and so could not foreknow the great things which are consequent on these events ; such as his sending his Son into the world to die for sinners, and all things pertaining to the great work of redemption ; all the things which were done for four thousand years before Christ came, to prepare the way for it ; and the incarnation, life, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ ; setting him at the head of the universe as King of heaven and earth, angels and men ; and setting up his church and kingdom in this world, and appointing him the Judge of the world ; and all that Satan should do in the world in opposition to the kino-dom of Christ: and the great transactions of the dav of ludgment, &c. And if God was thus ignorant, the following scriptures, and others like them, must be with out any meaning, or contrary to truth. (Eph. i. 4.) " Ac cording as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world." (1 Pet. i. 20.) " Who verily was foreordain ed before the foundation of the world." (2 Tim. i. 9.) " Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling ; not according to our works, but according to his own pur pose, and grace, wbich was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." - So (Eph. iii. 11.) speaking of the wis dom of God in the work of redemption, " according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus." (Tit. i. 2.) " In hope of eternal life, which God that cannot he, promised before the world began." (Rom. viii. 29.) " Wrhom he did foreknow, them he also did predestinate,'; kc. (1 Pet. i. 2.) " Elect, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father." If God did not foreknow the fall of man, nor the re demption by Jesus Christ, nor the Volitions of man since the fall ; then he did not foreknow the saints in any sense; neither as particular persons, nor as societies or nations ; either by election, or by mere foresight of their virtue or good works ; or any foresight of any thing about them re lating to their salvation ; or any benefit they have by Christ, or any manner of concern of theirs with a Redeemer. Arg. III. On the supposition of God's ignorance of the future Volitions of free Agents, it will follow, that God must in many cases truly repent what he has done, so as properly to wish he had" done otherwise: by reason that the event of things, in those affairs which are most im portant, viz. the affairs of his moral kingdom, being uncer tain and contingent, often happens quite otherwise than he was before aware of. And there would be reason to under stand that, in the most literal sense, (Gen. vi. 6.) " It re pented the Lord, that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart," (and 1 Sam. xv. 11.) contrary to Numb, xxiii. 19. " God is not the son of Man, that he should repent;" and 1 Sam.xv. 29. "Also the Strength of Israel will not lie, nor repent ; for he is not a man that he should repent." Yea, from this notion it would follow, that God is liable to repent and be grieved at his heart, in a literal sense, continuallv ; and is always exposed to an infinite number of real disappointments in governing the world ; and to manifold, constant, great perplexity and vexation : but this is not very consistent with his title of " God over all, blessed for evermore ;" which represents him as possessed of perfect, constant, and uninterrupted tranquillity and felicity, as God over the universe, and in his management of the affairs of the world, as supreme and universal ruler. (See Rom. i. 25. ix. 5. 2 Cor. xi. 31. 1 Tim. vi. 15^ Arg. IV. It will also follow from this notion, that as God is liable to be continually repenting of what he has done ; so he must be exposed to be constantly changing his mind and intentions, as to his future conduct ; altering his measures, relinquishing his old designs, and forming new schemes and projects. For his purposes, even as to the main parts of his scheme, such as belong to the state of his moral kingdom, must be always liable to be broken, through want of foresight ; and he must be continually putting his system to rights, as it gets out of order, through the contingence of the actions of moral Agents : he must be a Being, who, instead of being absolutely immutable, must necessarily be the subject of infinitely the most numerous acts of repentance, and changes of intention, of any being whatsoever; for this plain reason, that his vastly extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater number of those things which are to him contingent and uncertain. In such a situation, he must have little else to do, but to mend broken links as well as he can, and be rectifying his disjointed frame and disordered movements, in the best manner the case will allow. The Supreme Lord of all things must needs be under great and miserable disad^ vantages, in governing the world which he has made, and of which he has the care, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief importance, which hereafter shall Sect. XL GOD FOREKNOWS OUR VOLITIONS- 35 befall his system ; for which, if he did but know, he might make seasonable provision. In many cases, there may be very great necessity that he should make provision, in the manner of his ordering and disposing things, for some great events which are to happen, of vast and extensive influence, and endless consequence to the universe; which he may see afterwards, when it is too late, and may wish in vain that he had known before, that he might have or dered his affairs accordingly. And it is in the power of man, on these principles, by his devices, purposes, and actions, thus to disappoint God, break his measures, make him continually change his mind, subject him to vexation, and bring him into confusion. But how do these things consist with reason, or with the word of God ? Which represents, that all God's works, all that he has ever to do, the whole scheme and series of his operations, axe from the beginning perfectly in his view ; and declares, that whatever devices and designs are in the hearts of men, " the counsel of the Lord shall stand, and the thoughts of his heart to all generations," (Prov. xix. 21 . Psal. xxxiii. 10, 11.) And " that which the Lord of hosts hath purposed, none shall disannul," (Isa. xiv. 27.) And that he cannot be frustrated in one design or thought, (Job xiii. 2.) And " that which God doth, it shall be for ever, that nothing can be put to it, or taken from it," (Eccl. iii. 14.) The stability and perpetuity of God's counsels are expressly spoken of as connected with his foreknowledge, (Isa. xlvi. 10.) " Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done ; saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do my pleasure." — And how are these things consistent with what the Scripture says of God's immutability, which represents him as " without variableness, or shadow of turning ;" and speaks of him, most particularly, as unchangeable with re gard to his purposes, (Mai. iii. 6.) " I am the Lord ; I change not ; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed." (Exod. iii. 14.) " I am that I am." (Job xxiii. 13, 14.) " He is in one mind ; and who can turn him ? And what his soul desireth, even that he doth : for he performeth the thing that is appointed for me." Arg. V. If this notion of God's ignorance of future Vo litions of moral Agents be thoroughly considered in its consequences, it will appear to follow from it, that God, after he had made the world, was liable to be wholly frus trated of his end in the creation of it; and so has been, in like manner, liable to be frustrated of his end in all the great works he had wrought. It is manifest, the moral world is the end of the natural : the rest of the creation is but a house which God hath built, with furniture, for moral Agents : and the good or bad state of the moral world depends on the improvement they make of their natural Agency, and so depends on their Volitions. And therefore, if these cannot be foreseen by God, because they are contingent, and subject to no kind of necessity, then the affairs of the moral world are liable to go wrong, to any assignable degree ; yea, liable to be utterly ruined. As on this scheme, it may well be supposed to be literally said, when mankind, by the abuse of their moral Agency, be came very corrupt before the flood, " that the Lord repent ed that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart ;" so, when he made the universe, he did not know but that he might be so disappointed in it, that it might grieve him at his heart that he had made it. It ac tually proved, that all mankind became sinful, and a very great part of the angels apostatized : and how could God know before, that all of them would not ? And how could God know but that all mankind, notwithstanding means used to reclaim them, being still left to the freedom of their own Will, would continue in their apostasy, and grow worse and worse, as they of the old world before the flood did ? . According to the scheme I am endeavouring to confute, the fall of neither men nor angels could be foreseen, and God must be greatly disappointed in these events ; and so the grand contrivance for our redemption, and destroying the works of the devil, by the Messiah, and all the great things God has done in the prosecution of these designs, must be only the fruits of his own disappointment ; con trivances to mend, as well as he could, his system, which originally was all very good, and perfectly beautiful ; but D 2 was broken and confounded by the free Will of angels and men. And still he must be' liable to be totally disap pointed a second time : he could not know, that he should have his desired success, in the incarnation, life, death, re surrection, and exaltation of his only-begotten Son, and other great works accomplished to restore the state of things : he could not know, after all, whether there would actually be any tolerable measure of restoration ; for this depended on the free Will of man. There has been a ge neral great apostasy of almost all the Christian world, to that which was worse than heathenism ; which continued for many ages. And how could God, without foreseeing men's Volitions, know whether ever Christendom would return from this apostasy ? And which way would he foretell how soon it would begin ? The apostle says, it began to work in his time ; and how could it be known how far it would proceed in that age ? Yea, how could it be known that the gospel which was not effectual for the reformation of the Jews, would ever be effectual for the turning of the heathen nations from their heathen apostasy, which they had been confirmed in for so many ages ? It is represented often in Scripture, that God, who made the world for himself, and created it for his pleasure, would infallibly obtain his end in the creation, and in all his works ; that as all things are n/'him, so they would all be to him ; and that in the final issue of things, it would ap pear that he is " the first, and the last." (Rev. xxi. 6.) " And he said unto me, It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last." But these things are not consistent with God's liability to be disappointed in all his works, nor indeed with his failing of his end in any thing that he has undertaken. SECT. XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a Contingence of those volitions as is without all Necessity. Having proved, that GOD has a certain and infallible Prescience of the voluntary acts of moral agents, I come now, in the second place, to show the consequence ; how it follows from hence, that these events are necessary, with a Necessity of connexion or consequence. The chief Arminian divines, so far as I have had oppor tunity (o observe, deny this consequence ; and affirm, that if such Foreknowledge be allowed, it is no evidence of any Necessity of the event foreknown. Now I desire, that this matter may be particularly and thoroughly inquired into. I cannot but think, that on particular and full con sideration, it may be perfectly determined, whether it be indeed so or not. In order to a proper consideration of this matter, I would observe the following things. I. It is very evident, that, with regard to a thing whose existence is infallibly and indissolubly connected with something which already hath, or has had existence, the existence of that thing is necessary. Here may be noted the following particulars : 1. I observed before, in explaining the nature of Necessity, that in things which are past, their past exist ence is now necessary : having already made sure of exist ence, it is too late for any possibility of alteration in that respect ; it is now impossible that it should be otherwise than true, that the thing has existed. 2. If there be any such thing as a divine Fore knowledge of the volitions of free agents, that Foreknow ledge, by the supposition, is a thing which already has, and long ago had existence ; and so, now its existence is nccesr sary; it is now utterly impossible to be otherwise, than that this Foreknowledge should be or should have been. 3. It is also very manifest, that those things which are indissolubly connected with other things that are neces sary, are themselves necessary. As that proposition whose truth is necessarily connected with another, proposition, which is necessarily true, is itself necessarily true. To say otherwise would be a contradiction : it would be in effect to say, that the connexion was indissoluble, and yet was not so, but might be broken. If that, the existence 36 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part II. of which is indissolubly connected with something whose existence is now necessary, is itself not necessary, then it may possibly not exist, notwithstanding that indissoluble connexion of its existence.— Whether the absurdity be not glaring, let the reader judge. 4- It is no less evident, that if there be a full, certain, and infallible Foreknowledge of the future existence of the volitions of moral agents, then there is a certain, infallible, and indissoluble connexion between those events and that Foreknowledge ; and that therefore, by the preceding ob servations, those events are necessary events ; being in fallibly and indissolubly connected with that, whose exist ence already is, and so is now necessary, and cannot but have been. To say, the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and yet the connexion of the event with that Foreknowledge is dissoluble and fallible, is very absurd. To affirm it, would be the same thing as to affirm, that there is no necessary connexion between a proposition being infallibly known to be true, and its being true indeed. So that it is per fectly demonstrable, that if there be any infallible know ledge of future volitions, the event is necessary; or, in other words, that it is impossible but the event should come to pass. For if it be not impossible but that it may be otherwise, then it is not impossible but that the proposition which affirms its future coming to pass, may not now be true. There is this absurdity in it, that it is not impossi ble, but that there now should be no truth in that proposi tion, which is now infallibly known to be true. II. That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without all Necessity, may be proved thus ; it is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without evidence. To suppose otherwise, implies a contradiction : because for a thing to be certainly known, to any understanding, is for it to be evident to that understanding : and for a thing to be evident to any understanding is the same thing, as for that understanding to see evidence of it : but no understanding, created or uncreated, can see evidence where there is none ; for that is the same thing, as to see that to be which is not. And therefore, if there be any truth which is abso lutely without evidence, that truth is absolutely unknow able, insomuch that it implies a contradiction to suppose that it is known. But if there be any future event, whose existence is con tingent, without all Necessity, the future existence of the event is absolutely without evidence. If there be anv evi dence of it, it must be one of these two sorts, either self-evi dence or proof; an evident thing must be either evident in itself, or evident in something else : that is, evident by con nexion with something else. But a future thing, whose existence is without all Necessity, can have neither of these sorts of evidence. It cannot be self-evident : for if it be, it may be now known, by what is how to be seen in the thing itself; its present existence, or the Necessity of its nature : but both these are contrary to the supposition. It is supposed, both that the thing has no present existence to be seen ; and also that it is not of such a nature as to be necessarily existent for the future : so that its future existence is not self-evident. And secondly, neither is there any proof, or evidence in any thing eke, or evidence of connexion with something else that is evident ; for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed that there is now nothing existent, with which the future existence of the contingent event is connected. For such a connexion destroys its contingence, and supposes Necessity. Thus it is demonstrated, that there is in the nature of things ab solutely no evidence at all of the future existence of that event, which is contingent, without all Necessity, (if any such event there be,) neither self-evidence nor proof. And therefore the thing in reality is not evident ; and so cannot be seen to be evident, or, which is the same thing, cannot be known. Let us consider this in an example. Suppose that five thousand seven hundred and sixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine Being ; and then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular nature and form ; all in absolute Contingence, without any con cern of God, or any other cause, in the matter ; without any manner of ground or reason of its existence; or any dependence upon, or connexion at all with any thing fore going : I say, that if this be supposed, there was no evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be seen in the thing itself; for the thing itself, as yet, . was not. And there was no evidence of it to be seen in any thing else ; for evidence in something else, is connexion with something else : but such connexion is contrary to the supposition.- There was no evidence before, that this thing would happen ; for by the supposition, there was no reason why it should happen, rather than something else, or rather than nothing. _ And if so, then all things before were exactly equal, and the same, with respect to that and other possible things; there was no preponderation, no superior weight or value; and therefore, nothing that could be of weight or value to determine any understanding. The thing was absolutely without evidence, and absolutely unknowable. An increase of understanding, or of the capacity of discerning, has no tendency, and makes no advance, towards discerning any signs or evidences of it,- let it be increased never so much ; yea, if it be increased infinitely. The increase of the strength of sight may have a tendency to enable to discern the evidence which is far off, and very much hid, and deeply involved in clouds and darkness ; but it has no tendency to enable to discern evidence where there is none. If the sight be infinitely strong, and the capacity of discerning infinitely great, it will enable to see all that there is, and to see it perfectly, and with ease ; yet it has no tendency at all to enable a being to discern that evidence which is not ; but on the contrary, it has a tendency to enable to discern with great certainty that there is none. III. To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events ; or, which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass ; and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things; is to suppose God's know ledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God certainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so contingent, that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one thing he knows, is utterly inconsistent witb another thing he knows. It is the same as to say, he now knows a proposi tion to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth. If a future volition is so without all Necessity, that nothing hinders but it may not be, then the proposition which asserts its future existence, is so uncertain, that nothing hinders, but that the truth of it may entirely fail. And if God knows all things, he knows this proposition to be thus uncertain. And that is inconsistent with his knowing that it is infallibly true ; and so inconsistent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If the thing be indeed contingent, God views it so, and judges it to be contingent, if he views things as they are. If the event be not necessary, then it is possible it may never be : and if it be possible it may never be, God knows it may possibly never be ; and that is to know that the proposition, which affirms its existence, may possibly not be true ; and that is to know that the truth of it is un certain ; which surely is inconsistent with his knowing it as a certain truth. If volitions are in themselves con tingent events, without all Necessity, then it is no argu ment of perfection of knowledge in any being to deter mine peremptorily that they will be ; but on the contrary, an argument of ignorance and mistake ; because it would argue, that he supposes that proposition to be certain, which in its own nature, and all things considered, is un certain and contingent. To say, in such a case, that God may have ways of knowing contingent events which we' canuot conceive of, is ridiculous ; as much so, as to say, that God may know contradictions to be true, for ought we know ; or that he may know a thing to be certain, and at the same time know it not to be certain, though we cannot conceive how ; because he has ways of knowing which we cannot comprehend. Corol. 1. From what has been observed it is evident, that the absolute decrees of God are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of any Necessity of the event, which follows from such decrees, than the absolute Sect. XII. FOREKNOWLEDGE INFERS NECESSITY. 37 ¦ Foreknowledge of God. Because the connexion between the event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble, as between the event and an absolute decree. That is, it is no more impossible, that the event and decree should not agree together, than that the event and absolute Knowledge should disagree. The connexion between the event and Foreknowledge is absolutely perfect, by the sup position : because it is supposed, that the certainty and in fallibility of the Knowledge is absolutely perfect. .And it being so, the certainty cannot be increased ; and therefore the connexion, between the Knowledge and thing known, cannot be increased ; so that if a decree be added to the Foreknowledge, it does not at all increase the connexion, or make it more infallible and indissoluble. If it were not so, the certainty of Knowledge might be increased by the addition of a decree ; which is contrary to the suppo sition, which is, that the Knowledge is absolutely perfect, or perfect to the highest possible degree. There is as much impossibility but that the things which are infallibly foreknown, should be, or, wbich is the same thing, as great a Necessity of their future existence, as if the event were already written down, and was known and read by all mankind, through all preceding ages, and there -was the most indissoluble and perfect connexion possible between the writing and the thing written. In such a case, it would be as impossible the event should fail of exist ence, as if it had existed already ; and a decree cannot make an event surer or more necessary than this. And therefore, if there be any such Foreknowledge, as it has been proved there is, then Necessity of connexion and consequence is not at all inconsistent with any liberty which man, or any other creature, enjoys. And from hence it may be inferred, that absolute decrees, which do not at all increase the Necessity, are not inconsistent with the liberty which man enjoys, on any such account, as that they make the event decreed necessary, and render it utterly impossible but that it should come to pass. There fore, if absolute decrees are inconsistent with man's liberty as a moral agent, or his liberty in a state of probation, or any liberty whatsoever that he enjoys, it is not on account of any Necessity which absolute decrees infer. Dr. Whitby supposes, there is a great difference be tween God's Foreknowledge, and his decrees, with regard to Necessity of future events. In his Discourse on the five Points, (p. 474, &c.) he says, " God's Prescience has no influence at all on our actions. — Should God, says he, by immediate revelation, give me the knowledge of the event of any man's state or actions, would my knowledge of them have any influence upon his actions? Surely none at all. — Our knowledge doth not affect the things we know, to make them more certain, or more future, than they would be without it. Now, Foreknowledge in God is Knowledge. As therefore Knowledge has no influence on things that are, so neither has Foreknowledge on things that shall be. And consequently, the Foreknowledge of any action that would be otherwise free, cannot alter or # This distinction is of great importance in the present controversy ; and the want of attending to the true ground on which it stands, has been, we presume, the principal cause of Dr. Whitby's objections, and those of most, if not all, other Arminian writers. They seem to consider, in this argu ment, no other necessity but the decretive, as maintained by their oppo nents ; and therefore infer, that to allow any kind of necessity, is the same as to allow an infallible decree. From this view the transition is easy to another conclusion, viz. that if any thing is foreknown because it is de creed, every thing is foreknown on the same ground, or for the same rea son.— And then, this proving too much— the decretive appointment of all the evil in the universe, which they are sure is incompatible with the divine character, and therefore impossible — they reject the whole doctrine of ne cessity as a ground of foreknowledge ; and suppose that, though they can not clearly disprove what is advanced against them , they infer that there is somehow a sophism in the reasoning of their opponents, or some false prin ciple assumed, were they but happy enough to detect it. But our author, in this reasoning, does not maintain, that the connexion by which every event is evidently certain, and therefore necessary, is so because decreed. The truth is, that some events are foreknown to be cer tain because foreordained ; and others, because of the tendency there is in the nature of the things themselves, Should any, in the way of objec tion, assert, that the nature of things is itself derived from the divine will, or decree ; we apprehend there is no evidence to support such an assertion. For instance, is it owing to a decree that the nature of any created being is dependent on the first cause ? That a creature, however exalted, is not infinite ? That any relation should subsist between the Creator and a creature ? Or that, if equal quantities be taken from equal quantities, the remainders will be equal ? Is there any room, in thought, for a supposition of any decree in the case ? Nay more, does it appear possible for a decree to have made such things otherwise ? Let it be observed, however, that God is the Almighty Sovereign over nature — not indeed so far as to alter the nature of things, which in reality is no object of power, any more than to make spirit to be the same thing as diminish that freedom. Whereas God's decree of election is powerful and active, and comprehends the preparation and exhibition of such means, as shall unfrustrably pro duce the end. — Hence God's Prescience renders no actions necessary." And to this purpose, (p. 473.) he cites Ori- gen, where he says, " God's Prescience is not the cause of things future, but their being future is the cause of Gods Prescience that they will be:" and Le Blanc, where he says, " This is the truest resolution of this difficulty, that Prescience is not the cause that things are future; but their beingj'uture is the cause they are foreseen." In like man ner. Dr. Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, (p. 95—99.) And the Author of The Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature, speaking to the like purpose with Dr. Whitby, represents " Fore knowledge as having no more influence on things known, to make them necessary, than After-knowledge, or to that purpose. To all which I would say ; that what is said about Knowledge, its not having influence on the thing known to make it necessary, is nothing to the purpose, nor does it in the least affect the foregoing reasoning. Whether Prescience be the thing that makes the event necessary or no, it alters not the case. Infallible Foreknowledge may prove the Necessity of the event foreknown, and yet not be the thing which causes the Necessity.* If the Foreknowledge be absolute, this proves the event known to be necessary, or proves that it is impossible but that the event should be, by some means or other, either by a decree, or some other way, if there be any other way : because, as was said be fore, it is absurd to say, that a proposition is known to be certainly aud infallibly true, which yet may possibly prove not true. The whole of the seeming force of this evasion lies in. this ; that, inasmuch as certain Foreknowledge does not cause an event to be necessary, as a decree does ; therefore it does not prove it to be necessary, as a decree does. But- there is no force in this arguing : for it is built wholly on- this supposition, that nothing can prove or be an evidence of a thing being necessary, but that which has a causal in-. fluence to make it so. But this can never be maintained. If certain Foreknowledge of the future existence of an. event be not the thing which first makes it impossible that it should fail of existence ; yet it may, and certainly does demonstrate, that it is impossible it should fail of it, how ever that impossibility comes. If Foreknowledge be not the cause, but the effect of this impossibility, it may prove that there is such an impossibility, as much as if it were the causes It is as strong arguing from the effect to the cause, as from the cause to the effect. It is enough, that an existence, which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whether that impossibility arises from the Foreknow ledge, or is prior to it. It is as evident as any thing can be, that it is impossible a thing, which is infallibly known to be true, should prove not to be true ; therefore there is a Necessity that it should be otherwise ; whether the Know- matter, and vice versa, or the working of contradictions is an object of power, but— by the position of antecedents, and establishing premises. To illustrate this, let it be supposed, if God create a world, that world must depend upon him, as a necessary consequence. To deny this, is to deny the nature and identity of things. For what is it to create, but for an inde pendent cause to impart, ad extra, a dependent existence ? So that to deny dependence, is to deny creation. But ttiouph the consequence be necessary. if ihe antecedent be established ; yet the antecedent itself is not necessary, except from decree ; for there is not, in the nature of things, any antece dent necessity that a world be created. That is, to suppose its non-exist ence implies no contradiction, it being evidently the effect of sovereign pleasure. Hence to deny the consequence, on supposition of the antece dent, is to deny the nature of things, and to assert a contradiction, though the antecedent itself be not necessary. Andhence also, in the instance now specified among others innumerable, the antecedent is an object of decree* but not the consequence. It is as absurd to say, that God decreed the de pendence of the world upon himself, as it is to say, he decreed that two and two shall be equal to four, rather than to five. These remarks, duly considered in their just consequences, will abun dantly show, that some things are necessary because decreed,— as the crea tion, the preservation, and the government of the world ; the redemption, the purification, and the salvation of the church : — and that other things— as all imperfections, dependence, relations, and especially moral evils — come to be necessary, and so capable of being foreknown, only by connexion, or consequence. That is, if the antecedent, which is under the control of the Almighty Sovereign, be admitted, the consequence follows infallibly from the nature of things. But if another antecedent be established, another consequence will follow, with equal certainty, also from the nature ofthings. For instance ; if holiness be given and continued to a redeemed creature. as an antecedent ; excellence, honour, and happiness are the necessary con sequences. But if sire operate without control, as the antecedent, dis honour and misery must be the necessary consequence from the same cause. — W. 38 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part II. ledge be the cause of this Necessity, or the Necessity the cause of the Knowledge. All certain Knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or ¦After-knowledge, or concomitant Knowledge, proves the thing known now to be necessary, by some means or other ; or proves that it is impossible it should now be otherwise than true I freely allow, that Foreknowledge does not prove a thing to be necessary any more than After-know ledge : but then After-knowledge, which is certain and in fallible, proves that it is now become impossible but that the proposition known should be true. Certain After- knowledge proves that it is now, by some means or other, become impossible but that the proposition, which predi cates past existence on the'event, should be true. And so does certain Foreknowledge prove, that now, in the time of the Knowledge, it is, by some means or other, become impossible but that the proposition, which predicates future existence on the event, should be true. The neces sity of the truth of the propositions, consisting in the pre sent impossibility of the non-existence of the event affirm ed, in both cases, is the immediate ground of the certainty of the Knowledge ; there can be no certainty of Knowledge without it. There must be a certainty in things themselves, before they are certainly known, or which is the same thing, known to be certain. For certainty of Knowledge is nothing else but knowing or discerning the certainty there is in the things themselves, which are known. Therefore there must be a certainty in things to be a ground of cer tainty of Knowledge, and to render things capable of being known to be certain. And there is nothing but the neces sity of truth known, or its being impossible but that it should be true ; or, in other words, the firm and infallible connexion between the subject and predicate of the propo sition that contains that truth. All certainty of Knowledge consists in the view of the firmness of that connexion. So God's certain Foreknowledge of the future existence of any event, is his view of the firm and indissoluble con nexion of the subject and predicate of the proposition that affirms its future existence. The subject is that possible event ; the predicate is its future existence, but if future existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with that event, then the future existence of that event is necessary. If God certainly knows the future existence of an event which is wholly contingent, and may possibly never be, then, he sees a firm connexion between a subject and predicate that are not firmly connected ; which is a contra diction. I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be true, that mere Knowledge does not affect the thing known, to make it more certain or more future. But yet, I say, it supposes and proves the thing to be already, both future and certain ; i. e. necessarily future. Knowledge of futurity, supposes futurity; and a certain Knowledge of futuritv, supposes certain futurity, antecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there is no other certain futurity of a thing, antecedent to certainty of Knowledge, than a prior impossibility but that the thing should prove true ; or, which is the same thing, the Necessity of the event. I would observe one thing further ; that if it be as those forementioned writers suppose, that God's Foreknowledge is not the cause, but the effect of the existence of the event foreknown ; this is so far from showing that this Fore knowledge doth not infer the Necessity of the existence of that event, that it rather shows the contrary the more plainly. Because it shows the existence of the event to be so settled and firm, that it is as if it had already been ; in asmuch as in effect it actually exists already ; its future existence has already had actual influence and efficiency, and has produced an effect, viz. Prescience : the effect ex ists already ; and as the effect supposes the cause, and de pends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the future event, which is the cause, had existed already. The effect is firm as possible, it having already the possession of existence, and has made sure of it. But the effect cannot be more firm and stable than its cause, ground, and reason. The building cannot be firmer than the foundation. To illustrate this matter ; let us suppose the appearances and images of things in a glass, for instance, a reflecting telescope, to be the real effects of heavenly bodies (at a distance, arid out of sight) which they resemble : if it be so, then, as these images in the telescope have had a past actual existence, and it is become utterly impossible now that it should be otherwise than that they have existed ; so they being the true effects of the heavenly bodies they resemble, this proves the existence of those heavenly bodies to be as real, infallible, firm, and necessary, as the existence of these effects ; the one being connected with, and wholly depending on the other. — Now let us suppose future exist ences, some way or other, to have influence back, to produce effects beforehand, and cause exact and perfect images of themselves in a glass, a thousand years before they exist, yea, in all preceding ages ; but yet that these images are real effects of these future existences, perfectly dependent on, and connected with their cause. These effects and images having already had actual existence; render that matter of their existence perfectly firm and stable, and utterly impossible to be otherwise ; and this proves, as in the other instance, that the existence of the things, which are their causes, is also equally sure, firm, and necessary ; and that it is alike impossible but that they should be, as if they had been already, as their effects have. And if instead of images in a glass, we suppose the antecedent effects to be perfect ideas of them in the Divine Mind, which have existed there from all eternity, which are as properly effects, as truly and properly connected with their cause, the case is not altered. Another thing which has been said by some Arminians, to take off the force of what is urged from God's Prescience, against the contingence of the volitions of moral agents, is to this purpose ; " That when we talk of Foreknowledge, in God, there is no strict propriety in our so speaking; and that although it be true, that there is in God the most perfect Knowledge of all events from eternity to eternity, yet there is no such thing as before and after in God, but he sees all things by one perfect unchangeable view, with out any succession." — To this I answer, 1. It has been already shown, that all certain Knowledge proves the Necessity of the truth" known ; whether it be before, after, or at the same time. — Though it be true, that there is no succession in God's Knowledge, and the man ner of his Knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet thus much we know concerning it, that there is no event, past, pre-- sent, or to come, that God is ever uncertain of. He never is, never was, and never will be without infallible Know ledge of it: ; he always sees the existence of it to be cer tain and infallible. And as he always sees things just as they are in truth ; hence there never is in reality anything. contingent in such a sense, as that possibly it may happen never to exist. If, strictly speaking, there is no Foreknow ledge in God, it is because those things, which are future to us, are as present to God, as if they already had exist ence : and that is as much as to say, that future events are always in God's view as evident, clear,.sure, and necessary, as if they already were. If there never is a time wherein the existence of the event is not present with God, then there never is a time wherein it is not as much impossible for it to fail of existence, as if its existence were present, and were already come to pass. God viewing things so perfectly and unchangeably, as that there is no succession in his ideas or judgment, does not hinder but that there is properly now, in the mind of God, a certain and perfect Knowledge of the moral actions of men, which to us are an hundred years hence : yea the objection supposes this; and therefore it certainly does not hinder but that, by the foregoing arguments, it is now im possible these moral actions should not come to pass. W'e know, that God foreknows the future voluntary ac tions of men, in such a sense, as that he is able particu larly to foretell them, and cause them to be recorded, as he often has done ; and therefore that necessary connexion which there is between God's Knowledge and the event known, as much proves the event to be necessary before hand, as if the Divine Knowledge were in the same sense before .the event, as the prediction or writing is. If the Knowledge be infallible, then the expression of it in the written prediction is infallible ; that is, there is an infallible connexion between that written prediction and the event. And if so, then it is impossible it should ever be other wise, than that the prediction and the event should agree ; SE€T. XII. FOREKNOWLEDGE INFERS NECESSITY. 39 and this is the same thing as to say, it is impossible but that the event should come to pass*: and this is the same as to say that its coming to pass is necessary. — So that it is manifest, that there being no proper succession in God's mind, makes no alteration as to the Necessity of the ex istence of the events known. Yea, .'2. This is so far from weakening the proof, given of the impossibility of future events known, not coming to pass, as that it establishes the foregoing arguments, and snows the clearness of the evidence. For, (1.) The very reason, why God's Knowledge is without succession, is, because it is absolutely perfect, to the highest possible degree of clearness and certainty. All things, whether past, present, or to come, being viewed with equal evidence and fulness ; future things being seen with as much clearness, as if they were. present ; the view is always in absolute perfection ; and absolute constant perfection admits of no alteration, and so no succession ; the actual existence of the thing known, does not at all increase or add to the clearness or certainty of the thing known : God calls the things that are not, as though they were; they are all one to him as if they had already existed. But herein consists the strength of the demon stration before given ; that it is as impossible they should fail of existence, as if they existed already. This objec tion, instead of weakening the argument, sets it in the strongest light ; for it supposes it to be so indeed, that the existence of future events is in God's view so much as if it already had been, that when they come actually to exist, it makes not the least alteration or variation in his Know ledge of them. (2.) The objection is founded on the immutability of God's Knowledge : for it is the immutability of Know ledge that makes it to be without succession. But this most directly and plainly demonstrates the thing I insist on, vis. that it is utterly impossible the known events should fail of existence. For if that were possible, then a change in God's Knowledge and view of things, were possible. For if the known event should not come into being, as God expected, then he would see it, and so would change his mind, and see his former mistake; and thus there would be change and succession in his Know ledge. But as God is immutable, and it is infinitely impossible that his view sliould be changed; so it is, for * In these two sections our author has abundantly demonstrated, that foreknowledge infers necessity ; such a necessity as exists in the connexion of a consequent with its antecedent ; and has represented, in various lights, how the most contradictory and absurd conclusions follow from the oppo site hypothesis. But as his argument, strictly speaking, did not require a further explanation or distinction of the principles on which it rested, which yet are important, it may not be improper in this place briefly to inquire into the rationale of those principles ; by which his reasoning may appear with additional evidence, and the radical principles themselves confirmed by their connexion with others. As these remarks are presented in the form of a series analytically disposed, we shall prefix to them the corre sponding ordinal numbers. 1. Any kind of necessity is a sufficient ground of foreknowledge, in the view of omniscience ; but as is the kind of necessity, or the nature of the connexion between cause and effect, so is the nature of the foreknowledge. But this difference in the nature of the connexion affects— not the certainty of the event, but the mode of causation ; or from what cause the certainty 2. All necessity, or certainty of connexion between antecedent and con sequent, must arise from one of these two sources, viz. the nature of things, or, the decree of God. Chance is nothing ; and nothing has no properties, consequently has no causal influence. 3. The necessity which arises from the nature of things, is either ab solute or hypothetical Absolute necessity belongs only to the first cause, or God. He exists absolutely; and to suppose him not to exist, or not to have existed, is a contradiction. For the supposition itself is made by a confessedly contingent being ; but a contingent being necessarily im plies an absolute being, with as much certainty as an effect implies a cause ; and consequently a first cause. 4. The first cause excepted, every other being, or mode of being, or any event whatever, is only of hypothetical necessity. Any event is neces sary, only on account of its relation to the first cause. This relation, or necessary connexion, between an event and the first cause, is either in the way of contrast, or in the way of dependence. 5. There are two things necessarily related to the first cause by way of contrast ; passive power, which is a natural evil — if limited existence, dependence, and insufficiency, in their necessary tendency, may be so called — and sin, which is a moral evil; or something which, in point of obligation, ought not to be. 6. The other mode of necessary relation to the first cause, arising from the nature of things, is that of dependence. Every contingent being and event must necessarily depend upon God, as an effect depends upon its cause. Nor is it conceivable without involving the grossest contradiction and ab surdity, that any contingent being should continue to exist, any more than begin to exist, independent of the first cause. Sublata causa, tollitur effectus, is justly entitled to be called an axiom in metaphysical science. 7, It was before observed, that all necessity must arise either from the nature of things, or from the decree of God. What arises from the nature of things, as a consequence, has for its antecedent, either an efficient or a deficient cause. 8. A defect, no less than active efficiency, may be an antecedent, as the same reason, just so impossible that the foreknown event should not exist ; and that is to be impossible in the highest degree; and therefore the contrary is necessary. Nothing is more impossible than that the immutable God should be changed, by the succession of time ; who com prehends all things, from eternity to eternity, in one, most perfect, . and unalterable view; so that his whole eternal duration is vitm interminabilis, tota, simul et per- fecta possessio. On the whole, I need not fear to say, that there is no geometrical theorem or proposition whatsoever, more capable of strict demonstration, than' that God's certain Prescience of the volitions of moral agents is inconsistent with such a Contingence of these events, as is without all Necessity ; and so is inconsistent with the Arminian no tion of liberty. Corol. 2. Hence the doctrine of the Calvinists, concern ing the absolute decrees of God, does not all infer any more fatality in things, than will demonstrably follow from the doctrine of the most Arminian divines, who acknow ledge God's omniscience, and universal Prescience. There fore all objections they make against the doctrine of the Calvinists, as implying Hobbes's doctrine of Necessity, or the stoical doctrine of fate, lie no more against the doctrine of Calvinists, than their own doctrine : and therefore it doth not become those divines, to raise such an outcry against the Calvinists, on this account. Corol. 3. Hence all arguments of Arminians, who own God's omniscience, against the doctrine of the inability of unregenerate men to perform the conditions of salvation, and the commands of God requiring spiritual duties, and against the Calvinlstic doctrine of efficacious grace; on this ground, that those doctrines, though they do not sup pose men to be under any constraint or coaction, yet sup pose them under _Vi.cess^/,must fall to the ground. And their arguments against the Necessity of men's volitions, taken from the reasonableness of God's commands, pro mises, and threatenings, and the sincerity of his counsels and invitations ; and all objections against any doctrines of the Calvinists as being inconsistent with human liberty, because they infer Necessity; I say, all these arguments and objections must be justly esteemed vain and frivolous, as coming from them ; being levelled against their own doctrine, as well as against that of the Calviniats.* founded in the nature of things, from whence a corresponding consequence must follow ; but there is no defect in any antecedent but may be counter acted by a decree ; so far counteracted, as that the defect shall not be an operative cause. 9. The purposes of God are a series of antecedents, from whence follow, by the very nature of things, corresponding good consequences, and good only -. but the defect which is inseparable from created existence, consider ed in itself, is also a cause in the sense of an antecedent ; otherwise a created existence would be as indefectible as the creating or first cause, which involves the most absurd consequences. 10. Defect is either natvral or moral ; and each arises from the nature of things, as contradistinguished to decree, but in a different manner. Natural defect arises from the nature of things in the way of contrast to God's natural perfections ; which contrast forms the primary difference between creator and creature. 11. This natural defect is different from defectibility ; for defectibility expresses, in strictness, an effect not a cause; a liableness to defection. But the question returns, What renders a creature liable to defect? To say, Its liableness to defect, or its defectibility, assigns no true cause ; for the question returns as before, what makes it liable, what makes it defectible ? 12. Perhaps there is no term less exceptionable, in order to prevent cir cumlocution, than passive power, to express that natural defect, which exists in a created nature as a contrast to the natural (not the moral) per fections of God. 13. Passive power is as inapplicable to God, as it is applicable to a creature; for natural perfection is as applicable to him, as natural imper fection is to us. — Therefore to say, that a creature is not the subject of passive power, is the same as to say, that it is perfect and indefectible in its nature as God is ; which is the grossest pantheism — the deification of every creature, of every atom that exists. 14. All antecedents originate in either passive power or the divine de crees. From the former proceed, according to the nature of things, all evil consequents ; from the latter, all good. 15. Moral defect, is a contrast to the moral perfections, excellence, or holiness of God; and arises, as a necessary consequence— not from the divine decree as its antecedent, but— from the hypothetical nature of things; that is. passive power, if not aided by a decretive interposition, and if also united to liberty of choice in an accountable being. 16. The removal of the antecedent is the prerogative of the supreme Lord of nature ; but if the antecedent be not removed, that is, altered from what it was as to its causal influence, the consequence can no more be prevented, than the nature of things can be changed. 17. That nature of things, or that necessity of consequence, whereby the effect is infallibly connected with its cause, is nothing else but the essence ofiixms, emanating from the first cause, the God of truth, or the true God. 18. We now observe, that an event may be necessarily connected with its cause by a divine decree. If the divine will contemplate an end, and decree accordingly, it necessarily implies that the means, or the antece dents to this consequence, are decreed. 40 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part II. SECT. XIII. Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian Liberty. Every act of the Will has a cause, or it has not. If it has a cause, then, according to what has already been demonstrated, it is not contingent, but necessary ; the effect being necessarily dependent and consequent on its cause, let that cause be what it will. If the cause is the Will itself, by antecedent acts choosing and determining ; still the determined caused act must be a necessary effect. The act, that is the determined effect of the foregoing act which is its cause, cannot prevent the efficiency of its cause ; but must be wholly subject to its determination and command, as much as the motions of the hands and feet. The con sequent commanded acts of the Will are as passive and as necessary, with respect to the antecedent determining acts, as the parts of the body are to the volitions which deter mine and command them. And therefore, if all the free acts of the Will are all determined effects determined by the Will itself, that is by antecedent choice, then they are all necessary ; they are all subject to, and decisively fixed by, the foregoing act, which is their cause : yea, even the determining act itself; for that must be determined and fixed by another act preceding, if it be a free and voluntary act; and so must be necessary. So that by this, all the free acts of the Will are necessary, and cannot be free un less they are necessary : because they cannot be free, ac cording to the Arminian notion of freedom, unless they are determined by the Will ; and this is to be determined by antecedent cnoice, which being their cause, proves them necessary. And yet they say, Necessity is utterly incon sistent with Liberty. So that, by their scheme, the acts of the Will cannot be free unless they are necessary, and yet cannot be free if they be necessary ! But if the other part of the dilemma be taken, that the free acts of the Will have no cause, and are connected with nothing whatsoever that goes before and determines them, in order to maintain their proper and absolute Contingence, and this should be allowed to be possible ; still it will not serve their turn. For if the volition come to pass by per fect Contingence, and without any cause at all, then it is certain, no act of the Will, no prior act of the soul, was the cause, no determination or choice of the soul had any hand in it. The Will, or the soul, was indeed the subject of what happened to it accidentally, but was not the cause. The Will is not active in causing or determining, but purely the passive subject; at least, according to their notion of 19. Heuce, an event may be necessary, either because virtually deter- ;m'Hert by the divine will, in a series of antecedents ; or because the nature of things operates without being affected, as to their casual influence, by decretive antecedents. 20. To suppose any sort, or any degree of defect, to be decreed, is absurd iu different ways. It is contrary to an established axiom, that from good nothing but good can proceed — and it is absurd to impute that to a divine decree, which antecedently arises from the nature of things. -21. In reality, divine decrees (as before hinted) are nothing else than a wonderful chain or series of positions, which are so many antecedents, counteracting defects arising from the hypothetical nature of things. Whence it necessarily follows, that?/ there were no passive power there could be no divine decrees. For if good, and only good, arose from the nature of things ; the decree, which has good only for its object, would be superfluous, and therefore unworthy of divine volition. 22. Hence also, whatever event is in itself good, is an object of divine decree in its antecedent ; and the event itself is connected with the decre tive position by the very essence of truth. But whatever is in itself evil arises from the hypothetical nature of things not counteracted by decretive positions. 23. In God, his absolutely necessary, eternal, infinite, and unchangeable nature, is to he regarded as an antecedent ; from which all possible happi ness is the necessary consequence. Such an antecedent is not the result of mere, arbitrary, or decretive will, but of absolute necessity, but all ante cedents in a creature, or every causai influence, of which good, or happi ness, whether natural or moral, is the consequence, must be the positions of decretive will, as the only possible mode of securing a good result 24. As is the antecedent, so is the consequent ; for the connexion is formed by eternal truth. If therefore a good event — for instance, a virtuous or holy choice — be the consequent, the antecedent is a decretive position. 25. In reference to God, the proper and only ground of infallible cer tainty that bis choice is good and praiseworthy, is the ooons-Rss of his nature. Were we to admit in thought the possibility of a defectible na ture, in him. in the same proportion must we admit a possible failure in the goodness of his choice. And iu reference to a created being, the proper and only ground of certainty that his choice will be good, is the antecedent goodness of his nature or disposition. This alone is a sufficient causal in fluence : but the goodness of a creature's disposition can be secured, as a ground of certainty, only by decretive influence of a nature correspond ing with the nature of the effect. - 26. From Uiese principles and considerations, which can here be but action and passion. In this case, Contingence as much prevents the determination of the Will, as a proper cause; and as to the Will, it was necessary, and could be no other wise. For to suppose that it could have been otherwise, if the Will or soul had pleased, is to suppose that the act is dependent on some prior act of choice or pleasure, con trary to what is now supposed ; it is to suppose that it might have been otherwise, if its cause had ordered it otherwise. But this does not agree to it having no cause or orderer at all. That must be necessary as to the soul, which is dependent on no free act of the soul : but that which is without a cause, is dependent pn no free act of the soul ; because, by the supposition, it is dependent on nothing, and is connected with nothing. In such a case, the soul is necessarily subjected to what accident brings to pass, from time to time, as much as the earth that is inac tive, is necessarily subjected to what falls upon it. But this does not consist with the Arminian notion of Liberty, which is the Will's power of determining itself in its own acts, and being wholly active in it, without passiveness, and without being subject to Necessity.— Thus, Contingence belongs to the Arminian notion of Liberty, and yet is in consistent with it. I would here observe, that the author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature, (p. 76, 77.) says as follows : " The word Chance always means some thing done without design. Chance and design stand in direct opposition to each other : and Chance can never be properly applied to acts of the Will, which is the spring of all design, and which designs to choose whatsoever it doth choose, whether there be any superior fitness in the thing which it chooses, or no ; and it designs to determine itself to one thing, where two things, perfectly equal, are proposed, merely because it will." But herein appears a very great inadvertence. For if the Will be the spring of all design, as he says, then certainly it is not always the effect of design ; and the acts of the Will themselves must sometimes come to pass, when they do not spring from design ; and consequently come to pass by Chance, ac cording to his own definition of Chance. And if the Wilt designs to choose ichatsoecer it does choose, and designs to determine itself, as he says, then it designs to determine all its designs. Which carries us back from one design to a foregoing design determining' that, and to another deter mining that ; and so on in infinitum. The very first de sign must be the effect of foregoing design, or else it must be by Chance, in his notion of it. Here another alternative may be proposed, relating to the connexion of the acts of the Will with something fore- going that is their cause, not much unlike to the other ; which is this : either human liberty may well stand with briefly stated, as necessarily connected with their legitimate consequences, we infer, that God foresees all good, in every created being, in every mode, in every event, by the evidence of a decretive necessity; a ne cessity resulting from actual influx, or perpetual energy, in the position of antecedents, and the essence of truth connecting the causal influence with the effect 27. From the same principles we learn, that God foresees or foreknows all evil — however blended with the good, as the different colours in a pencil of light are blended — in every Deing, and in every event where found, by that necessity which is hypothetical only ; a necessity result ing from the nature of tilings left to their own causal influence ; wnich in fluence, in any given circumstances, will manifest itself either in the way of contrast, of dependence, or both united. 28. Again : Volitions are acts of the mind, and each voluntary act is compounded of a natural and moral quality. The natural quality of a voluntary act proceeds from decretive necessity ; for there is nothing in it but what is good, decreed, and effected by the first cause. The moral quality of a voluntary act is either good or evil. 29. A voluntary act morally good, is altogetlier of decretive necessity, both as to its physical and moral quality ; and is therefore foreknown be cause of decretive appointment and energy. But a voluntary act morally bad, is partly of decretive, and partly of hypothetical necessity, or that of conseauence. 30. The physical quality of a voluntary act inorallu bad, is of de cretive necessity, and is foreknown because foreappointed'; but the moral quality of the same act, or its badness, is foreknown only by relation, con nexion, or consequence. Thus deformity is the absence of beauty, and may be known by the standard of beauty from which it deviates. Weak ness is the absence of strength, and may be known by relation. A shadow is known by the interception of rays, and may be known in the same manner. Darkness is caused by the absence of light, and may be known by the light excluded. 3! . How the bad quality of a moral act may be foreknown by Ihe evidence of relation, will further appear from the consideration of the nature of moral evil itself. For what is moral evil, or sin, but what ought not to hk, in point of moral obligation '* Now for at all knowing, or foreknowing, what ought not to be, which is incapable of being decreed, the proper medium or evidence is the knowledge of what ought lo be. 32. If therefore what ought to be, is known to the omniscient by consti tuted relalions. or voluntary appointment; what ought not to be may be known by evident consequences. — \V. Sect. XIII. ARMINIAN LIBERTY INCONSISTENT. 4t volitions being necessarily connected with the views of the understanding, and so is consistent with Necessity ; or it is inconsistent with and contrary to such a connexion and Necessity. The former is directly subversive of the Ar minian notion of Liberty, consisting in freedom from all Necessity. And if the latter be chosen, and it be said, that liberty is inconsistent with any such necessary con nexion of volition with foregoing views of the understand ing, it consisting in freedom from any such Necessity of the Will as that would imply ; then the Liberty of the soul consists, partly at least, in freedom from restraint, limita tion, and government, in its actings, by the understand ing, and in Liberty and liableness to act contrary to the views and dictates of the understanding : and conse quently the more the soul has of this disengagedness in its acting, the more Liberty. Now let it be considered to what this brings the noble principle of human Liberty, partictt- larly when it is possessed and enjoyed in its perfection, viz. a full and perfect freedom and liableness to act alto gether at random, without the least connexion with, or restraint or government by, any dictate of reason, or any thing whatsoever apprehended, considered, or viewed by the understanding ; as being inconsistent with the full and perfect sovereignty of the Will over its own deter minations. — The notion mankind have conceived of Liber ty, is some dignity or privilege, something worth claiming. But what dignity or privilege is there, in being given up to such a wild Contingence as this, to be perfectly and constantly liable to act unreasonably, and as much with out the guidance of understanding, as if we had none, or were as destitute of perception, as the smoke that is driven by the wind ! PART III. WHEREIN IS INQUIRED, WHETHER ANY SUCH LIBERTY OF WILL AS ARMINIANS HOLD, BE NECESSARY TO MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE AND VICE, PRAISE AND DISPRAISE, &c. SECT. I. God's moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praise worthy. Having considered the first thing proposed, relating to that freedom of Will which Arminians maintain ; namely, Whether any such thing does, ever did, or ever can exist, I come now to the second thing proposed to be the subject of inquiry, viz. Whether any such kind of liberty be re quisite to moral agency, virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment, &c. . 1 shall begin with some consideration of the virtue and agency of the Supreme moral Agent, and Fountain of all Agency and Virtue. Dr. Whitby in his Discourse on the five Points, (p. 14.) says, " If all human actions are necessary, virtue and vice must be empty names ; we being capable of nothing that is blameworthy, or deserveth praise ; for who can blame a person for doing only what he could not help, or judge that ha deserveth praise only for what he could not avoid V To the like purpose he speaks in places innumerable ; especially in his Discourse on the Freedom of the Will ; constantly maintaining, that a fieedom not only from co- action, but necessity, is absolutely requisite, in order to ac tions being either worthy of blame, or deserving of praise. And to this agrees, as is well known, the current doctrine of Arminian writers, who, in general, hold, that there is no virtue or vice, reward or punishment, nothing to be cout mended or blamed, without this freedom. And yet Dr. Whitby (p. 300.) allows, that God is without this freedom ; and Arminians, so far as I have had opportunity to observe, generally acknowledge, that God is necessarily holy, and his will necessarily determined to that which is good. So that, putting these things together, the infinitely holy God — who always used to be esieemed by God's people not only virtuous, but a Being in whom is all possible virtue, in the most absolute purity and perfection, bright ness and amiableness ; the most perfect pattern of virtue, and from whom all the virtue of others is but as beams from the sun ; and who has been supposed to be, (being thus every where represented in Scripture,) on the account of his virtue and holiness, infinitely more worthy to be esteemed, loved, honoured, admired, commended, extolled, and praised, than any creature — this Being, according to this notion of Dr. Whitby, and other Arminians, has no virtue at all ; virtue, when ascribed to him, is but an empty name; and he is deserving of no commendation or praise ; because he is under necessity, he cannot avoid being holy and good as he is ; therefore no thanks to him for it. It seems, the holiness, justice, faithfulness, &c. of the Most High, must not be accounted to be of the nature of that which is virtuous and praiseworthy. They will not deny, that these tilings in God are good ; but then we must understand them, that they are no more virtuous, or of the nature of any thing commendable, than the good that is in any other being that is not a moral agent ; as the brightness of the sun, and the fertility of the earth, are good, but not virtuous, because these properties are neces sary to these bodies, and not the fruit of self-determin ing power. There needs no other confutation of this notion, to Christians acquainted with the Bible, but only stating and particularly representing it. To bring texts of Scripture, wherein God is represented, as in every respect, in the high est manner virtuous, and supremely praiseworthy, would be endless, and is altogether needless to such as have been brought up in the light of the gospel. It were to be wished, that Dr. Whitby and other di vines of the same sort, had explained themselves, when they have asserted, that that which is necessary, is not de serving of praise; at the same time that they have owned God's perfection to be necessary, and so in effect repre senting God as not deserving praise. Certainly, if their words have any meaning at all, by praise, they must mean the exercise or testimony of esteem, respect, or honourable regard. And will they then say, that men are worthy of that esteem, respect, and honour for their virtue, small and imperfect as it is, which yet God is not worthy of, for his infinite righteousness, holiness, and goodness ? If so, it must be, because of some sort of peculiar Excellency in the virtuous man, which is his prerogative, wherein he really has the preference ; some dignity, that is entirely distin guished from any Excellency or amiableness in God ; not in dependence, but in pre-eminence ; which therefore he does not receive from God, nor is God the fountain or pat tern of it ; nor can God, in that respect, stand in competi tion with him, as the object of honour and regard ; but man may claim a peculiar esteem, commendation, and glory, to which God can have no pretension. Yea, God has no right, by virtue of his necessary holiness, to intermeddle with that grateful respect and praise, due to the virtuous man, who chooses virtue, in the exercise of a freedom ad utrumque ; any more than a precious stone, which cannot avoid being hard and beautiful. And if it be so, let it be explained what that peculiar respect is, that is due to the virtuous man, which differs in nature and kind, in some way of pre-eminence, from all that is due to God. What is the name or description of that peculiar affection? Is it esteem, love, admiration, honour, praise, or gratitude ? The Scripture every where represents God as the highest object of all these : there we read of the soul magnifying the Lord, of " loving him with all the heart, with all the soul, with all the mind, and with all the 'Strength ;" admiring him, and his righteous acts, or greatly regarding them, as marvellous and wonder- 42 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part III. ful; honouring, glorifying, exalting, extolling, blessing, thanking, and praising him ; giving unto him all tlie glory of the good which is done or received, rather than unto men ; " that no flesh should glory in his presence ;" but that he should be regarded as the Being to whom all glory is due. What then is that respect ? What passion, affec tion, or exercise is it, that Arminians call praise, diverse from all these things, which men are worthy of for their virtue, and which God is not worthy of, in any degree ? If that necessity which attends God's moral perfections and actions, be as inconsistent with being worthy of praise, as a necessity of co-action ; as is plainly implied in, or in ferred from, Dr. Whitby's discourse ; then why should we thank God for his goodness, any more than if he were forced to be good, or any more than we should thank one of our fellow-creatures who did us good, not freely, and of good will, or from any kindness of heart, but from mere compulsion, or extrinsical necessity 7 Arminians suppose, that God is necessarily a good and gracious Being ; for this they make the ground of some of their main arguments against many doctrines maintained by Calvinists; they say, these are certainly false, and it is impossible they should be true, because they are not consistent with the goodness of God. This supposes, that it is impossible but that God should be good: for if it be possible that he should be otherwise, then that impossibility of the truth of these doctrines ceases according to their own argument. That virtue in God is not, in the most proper sense, re wardable, is not for want of merit in his moral perfections and actions, sufficient to deserve rewards from his crea tures ; but because he is infinitely above all capacity of receiving any reward. He is already infinitely and un changeably happy, and we cannot be profitable unto him. But still he is worthy of our supreme benevolence for his virtue : and would be worthy of our beneficence, which is the fruit and expression of benevolence, if our goodness could extend to him. If God deserves to be thanked and praised for his goodness, he would, for the same reason, deserve that we should also requite his kindness, if that were possible. " What shall I render unto the Lord for all his benefits ?" is the natural language of thankful ness : and so far as in us lies, it is our duty to render again according to benefits received. And that we might nave opportunity for so natural an expression of our gratitude to God, as beneficence, notwithstanding his being infinitely above our reach, he has appointed others to be his re ceivers, and to stand in his stead, as the objects of our beneficence; such are especially our indigent brethren. SECT. II. The Acts of the Will of the human soul of Jesus Christ, necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, ' praise-worthy, rewardable, ijc. I have already considered how Dr. Whitby insists upon it, that a freedom, not only from coaction, but necessity, is requisite either to virtue or vice, praise or dispraise, reward or punishment. He also insists on the same freedom as absolutely requisite to a person being the subject of a law, of precepts, or prohibitions ; in the book before mentioned, (p. 301, 314, 328, 339, 340, 341, 342, 347, 361, 373, 410.) And of promises and threatenings, (p. 298, 301, 305, 311, 339, 340, 363.) And as requisite to a state of trial, p. 297, &c. Now therefore, with an eye to these things, I would inquire into the moral conduct and practices of our Lord Jesus Christ, which he exhibited in his human nature, in his state of humiliation. And frst, I would show, that his holy behaviour was necessary ; or that it was impossible it should be otherwise, than tnat he should behave himself holily, and that he should be perfectly holy in each indi vidual act of his life. And. secondly, that his holy beha viour was properly of thenature of virtue, and was worthy of praise ; and that he was the subject of law, precept, or commands, promises and rewards; and that he was in a state of trial. I. It was impossible, that the Acts of the Will of Christ's human soul should, in any instance, degree, or circum stance, be otherwise than holy, and agreeable to God's nature and Will. The following things make this evident. 1. God had promised so effectually to preserve and up hold him by his Spirit, under all his temptations, that he could not fail of the end for which he came into the world ; but he would have failed, had he fallen into sin. We have such a promise, (Isa. xliii. 1—4.) " Behold my Servant, whom I uphold ; mine Elect, in whom my soul delighteth : I have put my Spirit upon him : he shall bring forth judg ment to the Gentiles : he shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street. — He shall bring forth judgment unto truth. He shall not fail, nor be dis couraged, till he have set judgment in the earth ; and the isles shall wait his law." This promise of God's Spirit put upon him, and his not crying and lifting up his voice, &c. relates to the time of Christ's appearance on earth ; as is manifest from the nature of the promise, and also the application of it in the New Testament, (Matt. xii. 18.) And the words imply a promise of his being so upheld by God's Spirit, that he should be preserved from sin ; par ticularly from pride and vain-glory ; and from being over come by any temptations he should be under to affect the glory of this world, the pomp of an earthly prince, or the applause and praise of men : and that he should be so upheld, that he should by no means fail of obtaining the end of his coming into the world, of bringing forth judg ment unto victory, and establishing his kingdom of grace in the earth. And in the following verses, this promise is confirmed, with the greatest imaginable solemnity. " Thus saith the Lord, he that created the heavens, and stretched them out ; he that spread forth the earth, and that which cometh out of it ; he that giveth breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk therein : I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand ; and will keep thee, and give thee for a Covenant of the people, for a Light of the Gentiles, to open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison-house. I am Jeho vah, that is my name," &c. Very parallel with these promises is another, (Isa. xlix. 7, 8, 9.) which also has an apparent respect to the time of Christ's humiliation on earth. — " Thus saith the Lord, the Redeemer of Israel, and his Holy One, to him whom man despiseth, to him whom the nation abhorreth, to a servant of rulers ; kings shall see and arise, princes also shall worship ; because of the Lord that is faithful, and the Holy One of Israel, and he shall choose thee. Thus saith the Lord, in an acceptable time have I heard thee; in a day of salvation have I helped thee ; and I will preserve thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, to establish the earth," &c. And in Isa. 1. 5, 6. we have the Messiah expressing his assurance, that God would help him, by so opening his ear, or inclining his heart to God's commandments, that he should not be rebellious, but should persevere, and not apostatize, or turn bis back : that through God's help, he should be immovable in obedience, under great trials of reproach and suffering ; setting his face like a flint : so that he knew he should not be ashamed, or frustrated in his design ; and finally should be approved and justified, as having done his work faithfully. " The Lord hath opened mine ear; so that I was not rebellious, neither turned away my back : I gave my back to the smiters, and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair; I hid not my face from shame and spitting. For the Lord God will help me ; therefore shall I not be confounded : therefore have I set my face as a flint, and I know that I shall not be ashamed. He is near that justified, me : who will contend with me ? Let us stand together. Who is mine adversary ? Let him come near to me. Behold the Lord God will help me:, who is he that shall condemn me? Lo, they shall all wax old as a garment, the moth shall eat them up." 2. The same thing is evident from all the promises which God made to the Messiah, of his future glory, kingdom, and success, in his office and character of a Mediator : which glory could not have been obtained, if his holiness had failed, and he had been guilty of sin. God's absolute promise makes the things promised necessary, and their failing to take place absolutely impossible : and, in like Sect. II. CHRIST'S VOLITIONS NECESSARILY HOLY, &c. manner, it makes those things necessary, on which the thing promised depends, and without which it cannot take effect. Therefore it appears, that it was utterly impossible that Christ's holiness should fail, from such absolute pro mises as these, (Psal. ex. 4.) " The Lord hath sworn, and will not repent, thou art a priest for ever, after the order of Melchizedec." And from every other promise in that psalm, contained in each verse of it. (And Psal. ii. 6, 7.) " I will declare the decree : The Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee : Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance," &c. (Psal. xiv. 3, 4, &c.) " Gird thy sword on thy thigh, O most mighty, with thy glory and thy majesty ; and in thy majesty ride prosperously." And so every thing that is said from thence to the end of the psalm. (See Isa. iii. 13 — 15. and liii. 10 — 12.) And all those promises which God makes to the Messiah, of success, dominion, and glory in the character of a Redeemer, (Isa. chap, xlix.) 3. It was often promised to the church of God of old, for their comfort, that God would give them a righteous, sinless Saviour. (Jer. xxiii. 5, 6.) " Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise up unto David a righteous branch ; and a king shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth. In his days shall Judah be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely. And this is the name whereby he shall be called, The Lord our righteousness." (So, Jer. xxxiii. 15.) " I will cause the branch of righteousness to grow up unto David, and he shall execute judgment and righteousness in the land." (Isa. xi. 6, 7.) " For unto us a child is born; — ¦ upon the throne of David and of his kingdom, to order it and to establish it with judgment and justice, from hence forth, even for ever : the zeal of the Lord of hosts will do this." (Chap. xi. 1, &c.) "There shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots; and the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, — the spirit of knowledge, and the fear of the Lord : — with righteousness shall he judge the poor, and reprove with equity : — Righteousness shall be the girdle of his loins, and faithfulness the girdle of his reins." (Chap. Iii. 13.) " My servant shall deal prudently." (Chap. liii. 9.) " Because he had done no violence, neither was guile found in his mouth." If it be impossible, that these pro mises should fail, and it be easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for one jot or tittle of them to pass away, then it was impossible that Christ should commit any sin. Christ himself signified, that it was impossi ble but that the things which were spoken concerning him, should be fulfilled. (Luke xxiv. 44.) " That all things must be fulfilled, which were written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms concerning me." (Matt. xxvi. 53, 54.) " But how then shall the scripture be fulfilled, that thus it must be?" (Mark xiv. 49.) " But the scriptures must be fulfilled." And so the apostle, (Acts i. 16, 17.) "This scripture must needs have been fulfilled." 4. All the promises, which were made to the church of old, of the Messiah as a future Saviour, from that made to our first parents in paradise, to that which was delivered by the prophet Malachi show it to be impossible that Christ should not have persevered in perfect holiness. The ancient predictions given to God's church, of the Messiah as a Saviour, were of the nature of promises ; as is evident by the predictions themselves, and the man ner of delivering them. But thev are expressly and very often called promises in the New Testament ; (as in Luke i. 54, 55, 72, 73. Acts xiii. 32, 33. Rom. i. 1—3. and chap. xv. 8. Heb. vi. 13, &c.) These promises were often made with great solemnity, and confirmed with an oath ; as, (Gen. xxii. 16, 17.) "By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord, that in blessing I will bless thee, and in multi plying I will multiply thy seed, as the stars of heaven, and as the sand which is upon the sea-shore : And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." (Compare Luke i. 72, 73. and Gal. iii. 8, 15, 16.) The apostle in Heb. vi. 17, 18. speaking of this promise to Abraham, says, " Wherein God willing more abundantly to show to the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath ; that by two immuta ble things, in which it was impossible for God to lie, 43 we might have strong consolation." In which words, the necessity of the accomplishment, or (which is the same thing^ the impossibility of the contrary, is fully declared. So God confirmed the promise of the Messiah's great sal vation, made to David, by an oath ; (Psal. lxxxix. 3, 4.) " I have made a covenant with my chosen, I have sworn unto David my servant; thy seed will I establish for ever, and build up thy throne to all generations." There is nothing so abundantly set forth in Scripture, as sure and irrefragable, as this promise and oath to David. (See Psal. lxxxix. 34—36. 2 Sam. xxiii. 5. Isa. Iv. 4. Acts ii. 29, 30. and xiii. 34.) The Scripture expressly speaks of it as utterly impossible that this promise and oath to David, concerning the everlasting dominion of the Messiah, should fail. (Jer. xxxiii. 15, &c.) "In those days, and at that time, I will cause the Branch of righteousness to grow up unto David. — For thus saith the Lord, David shall never want a man to sit upon the throne of the house of Israel." (Ver. 20, 21.) " If you can break my covenant of the day, and my covenant of the night, and that there should not be day and night in their season ; then may also my covenant be broken with David my servant, that he should not have a son to reign upon his throne." (So in ver. 25, 26.) Thus abundant is the Scripture in repre senting how impossible it was, that the promises made of old concerning the great salvation and kingdom of the Messiah should fail : which implies, that it was impos sible that this Messiah, the second Adam, the promised seed of Abraham, and of David, should fall from his inte grity, as the first Adam did. 5. All the promises that were made to the church of God under the Old Testament, of the great enlargement of the church, and advancement of her glory, in the days of the gospel, after the coming of the Messiah ; the increase of her light, liberty, holiness, joy, triumph over her enemies, &c. of which so great a part of the Old Testament con sists ; which are repeated so often, are so variously ex hibited, so frequently introduced with great pomp and solemnity, and are so abundantly sealed with typical and symbolical representations ; I say, all these promises imply, that the Messiah should perfect the work of redemption : and this implies, that he should persevere in the work, which the lather had appointed him, being in all things conformed to his Will. These promises were often con firmed by an oath. (See Isa. liv. 9. with the context; chap. lxii. 18.) And it is represented as utterly impossible that these promises should fail. (Isa. xlix. 15. with the context, chap. liv. 10. with the context; chap. li. 4 — 8. chap. xl. 8. with the context.) And therefore it was im possible that the Messiah should fail, or commit sin. 6. It was impossible that the Messiah should fail of per severing in integrity and holiness, as the first Adam did, because this would have been inconsistent with the promises, which God made to the blessed Virgin, his mother, and to her husband; implying, that he should " save his people from their sins," that God would " give him the throne of his father David," that he should " reign over the house of Jacob for ever ;" and that " of his kingdom there shall be no end." These promises were sure, and it was impossible they should fail, and therefore the Virgin Mary, in trusting fully to them, acted reason ably, having an immovable foundation of her faith ; as Elizabeth observes, (ver. 45.) " And blessed is she that believeth ; for there shall be a performance of those things which were told her from the Lord." 7. That it should have been possible that Christ should sin, and so fail in the work of our redemption, does not consist with the eternal purpose and decree of God, re vealed in the Scriptures, that he would provide salvation for fallen man in and by Jesus Christ, and that salvation should be offered to sinners through the preaching of the gospel. Thus much is implied in many scriptures, (as 1 Cor. ii. 7.— Eph. i. 4, 5. and chap. iii. 9—11 1 Pet. i. 19, 20.) Such an absolute decree as this, Arminians allow to be signified in many texts ; their election of nations and societies, and general election of the christian church, and conditional election of particular persons, imply this. God could not decree before the foundation of the world, to save all that should believe in and obey Christ, unless he had absolutely decreed, that salvation should be provided, 44 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part III. and effectually wrought out by Christ. And since (as the Arminians themselves strenuously maintain) a decree of God infers necessity ; hence it became necessary, that Christ should persevere and actually work out salvation for us, and that he should not fail by the commission of sin. 8. That it should have been possible for Christ's holi ness to fail, is not consistent with what God promised to his Son, before all ages. For that salvation should be offered to men, through Christ, and bestowed on all his faithful followers, is at least implied in that certain and in fallible promise spoken of by the apostle, (Tit. i. 2.) " In hope of eternal life ; which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began." This does not seem to be contro verted by Arminians.* 9. That it should be possible for Christ to fail of doing his Father's Will, is inconsistent with the promise made to the Father by the Son, the Logos that was with the Father from the beginning, before he took the human nature : as may be seen in Ps. xl. 6 — 8. (compared with the apostle's interpretation, Heb. x. 5 — 9.) " Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire : mine ears hast thou opened, (or bored ;) burnt-offering and sin-offering thou hast not required. Then said I, Lb, I come ; in the volume of the book it is written of me, I delight to do thy Will, O my God, yea, thy law is within my heart." Where is a manifest allusion to the covenant, which the willing servant, who loved his master's service, made with his master, to be his servant for ever, on the day wherein he had his ear bored ; which covenant was probably inserted in the public records, called the Volume of the Book, by the judges, who were called to take cognizance of the transaction ; (Exod. xxi.) If the Logos, who was with the Father before the world, and who made the world, thus engaged in covenant to do the Will of the Father in the human nature, and the promise was as it were recorded, that it might be made sure, doubtless it was impossible that it should fail ; and so it was impossible that Christ should fail of doing the Will of the Father in the human nature. 10. If it was possible for Christ to have failed of doing the Will of his Father, and so to have failed of effectually working out redemption for sinners, then the salvation of all the saints, who were saved from the beginning of the world, to the death of Christ, was not built on a firm foundation. The Messiah, and the redemption which he was to work out by his obedience unto death, was the saving foundation of all that ever were saved. Therefore, if when the Old-Testament saints had the pardon of their sins and the favour of God promised them, and salvation bestowed upon them, still it was possible that the Messiah, when he came, might commit sin, then all this was on a foundation that was not firm and stable, but liable to fail; something which it was possible might never be. God did as it were trust to what his Son had engaged and promised to do in future time, and depended so much upon it, that he proceeded actually to save men on the account of it, though it had been already done. But this trust and de pendence of God, on the supposition of Christ's being liable to fail of doing his Will, was leaning on a staff that was weak, and might possibly break. The saints of old trusted on the promises of a future redemption to be wrought out and completed by the Messiah, and built their comfort upon it : Abraham saw Christ's day, and rejoiced; and he and the other Patriarchs died in the faith of the promise of it, (Heb. xi. 13.) But on this sup- Eosition, their faith, their comfort, and their salvation, was uilt on a fallible foundation ; Christ was not to them " a tried stone, a sure foundation ;" (Isa. xxviii. 16.) David entirely rested on the covenant of God with him, concern ing the future glorious dominion and salvation of the Mes siah ; and said it was all his salvation, and all his desire ; and comforts himself that this covenant was an " everlasting covenant, ordered in all things and sure," (2 Sam. xxiii. 5.) But if Christ's virtue might fail, he was mistaken : his great comfort was not built so " sure" as he thought it was, being founded entirely on the determinations of the Free Will of Christ's human soul ; which was subject to no necessity, and might bedetermined either one way or the other. Also the dependence of those, who " looked for redemption in * See Dr. Whitby on the five Points, p. 48, 49, 50. Jerusalem, and waited for the consolation of Israel," (Luke ii. 25, and 38.) and the confidence of the disciples of Jesus, who forsook all and followed him, that they might enjoy the benefits of his future kingdom, were built on a sandy foundation. . 11. The man Christ Jesus, before he had finished his course of obedience, and while in the midst of temptations and trials, was abundant in positively predicting his own future glory in his kingdom, and the enlargement of his church, the salvation of the Gentiles through him, &o. and in promises of blessings he would bestow on his true dis ciples in his future kingdom ; on which promises he re quired the full dependence of his disciples, (John xiv.) But the disciples would have no ground for such de pendence, if Christ had been liable to fail in his work : and Christ himself would have been guilty of presumption, in so abounding in peremptory promises of great things, which depended on a mere contingence ; viz. the determinations of his Free Will, consisting in a freedom ad utrumque, to either sin or holiness, standing in indifference, and inci dent, in thousands of future instances, to go either one way or the other. Thus it is evident, that it was impossible that the Acts of the Will of the human soul of Christ should be otherwise than holy, and conformed to the Will of the Father; or, in other words, they were necessarily so conformed. I have been the longer in the proof of this matter, it be ing a thing denied by some of tne greatest Arminians, by Episcopius in particular ; and because I look upon it as a point clearly and absolutely determining the controversy between Calvinists and Arminians, concerning the neces sity of such a freedom of Will as is insisted on by the latter, in order to moral agency, virtue, command or pro hibition, promise or threatening, reward or punishment, praise or dispraise, merit or demerit. I now therefore proceed, II. To consider whether Christ, in his holy behaviour on earth, was not thus a moral agent, subject to commands, promises, fyc. Dr. Whitby very often speaks of what he calls a freedom ad utrumlibet, without necessity, as requisite to law and commands : and speaks of necessity as entirely incon sistent with injunctions and prohibitions. But yet we read of Christ being the subject of his Father's commands, (John x. 18. and xv. 10.) And Christ tells us, that every thing that he said, or did, was in compliance with " com mandments he had received of the Father ;" (John xii. 49, 50. and xiv. 31.) And we often read of Christ's obtdiy dience to his Father's commands, (Rom. v. 19. Phil. ii. 18. Heb. v. 8.) The forementioned writer represents promises offered as motives to persons to do their duty, or a being moved and induced by promises, as utterly inconsistent with a state wherein persons have not a liberty ad utrumlibet, but are necessarily determined to one. (See particularly, p. 298, and 311.) But the thing which this writer asserts, is de monstrably false, if the christian religion be true. Ifthere be any truth in Christianity or the Holy Scriptures, the man Christ Jesus had his Will infallibly and unalterably de termined to good, and that alone ; but yet he had promises of glorious rewards made to him, on condition of his perse vering in and perfecting the work which God had ap pointed him ; (Isa. liii. 10, 11,12. Psal. ii. and ex. Isa. xlix. 7, 8, 9.) In Luke xxii. 28, 29. Christ says to his disciples, "Ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations ; and I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me/' The word most properly signifies to appoint by covenant, or promise. The plain meaning of Christ's words is this : " As you have partaken of my temptations and trials, and have been sted- fast, and have overcome ; I promise to make you par takers of my reward, and to give you a kingdom; as the Father has promised me a kingdom for continuing sted- fast and overcoming in those trials." And the words are well explained by those in Rev. iii. 21. " To him that overcometh, will I grant to sit with me on my throne ; even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father in his throne." And Christ had not only promises of glorious Sect. II. CHRIST'S VOLITIONS NECESSARILY HOLY, &c. 45 success and rewards made to his obedience and sufferings, but the Scriptures plainly represent him as using these pro mises for motives and inducements to obey and suffer ; and particularly that promise of a kingdom which the Father had appointed him, or sitting with the Father on his throne; (as in Heb. xii. 1, 2.) " Let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus the author and finisher of our faith ; who for the joy that was set before him, endured the cross, despis ing the shame, and is set down on the right hand of the throne of God." And how strange would it be to hear any Christian assert, that the holy and excellent temper and behaviour of Jesus Christ, and that obedience which he performed under such great trials, was not virtuous or praiseworthy ; because his Will was not free ad utrumque, to either holi ness or sin, but was unalterably determined to one ; that upon this account, there is no virtue at all in all Christ's humility, meekness, patience, charity, forgiveness of ene mies, contempt of the world, heavenly-mindedness, sub mission to the Will of God, perfect obedience to his com mands unto death, even the death of the cross, his great compassion to the afflicted, his unparalleled love to man kind, his faithfulness to God and man, under such great trials ; his praying for his enemies, even when nailing him to the cross ; that virtue, when applied to these things, is but an empty name; that there was no merit in any of these things ; that is, that Christ was worthy of nothing at all on account of them, worthy of no reward, no praise, no honour or respect from God or man ; because his Will was not indifferent, and free either to these things, or the contrary ; but under such a strong inclination or bias to the things that were excellent, as made it impossible that he should choose the contrary ; that upon this account, to use Dr. Whitby's language, it would be sensibly unreasonable that the human nature should be rewarded for any of these things. According to this doctrine, that creature who is evi dently set forth in Scripture as the first-born of every creature, as having in all things the pre-eminence, and as the highest of all creatures in virtue, honour, and worthi ness of esteem, praise, and glory, on account of his virtue, is less worthy of reward or praise, than the very least of saints ; yea, no more worthy than a clock or mere machine, that is purely passive, and moved by natural necessity. If we judge by scriptural representations of things, we have reason to suppose, that Christ took on him our na ture, and dwelt with us in this world, in a suffering state, not only to satisfy for our sins ; but that he, being in our nature and circumstances, and under our trials, might be our most fit and proper example, leader, and captain, in the exercise of glorious and victorious virtue, and might be a visible instance of the glorious end and reward of it ; that we might see in him the beauty, amiableness, and true honour and glory, and exceeding benefit, of that virtue, which it is proper for us human beings to practise ; and might thereby learn, and be animated, to seek the like glory and honour, and to obtain the like glorious reward. (See Heb. ii. 9—14. with v. 8, 9. and xii. 1, 2, 3. John xv. 10. Rom. viii. 17. 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12. 1 Pet. ii. 19, 20. and iv. 13.) But if there was nothing of any virtue or merit, or worthiness of any reward, glory, praise, or com mendation at all, in all that he did, because it was all necessary, and he could not help it ; then how is here any thing so proper to animate and incite us, free creatures, by patient continuance in well-doing, to seek for honour glory, and virtue ? God speaks of himself as peculiarly well pleased with the righteousness of this distinguished servant. (Isa. xiii. 21.) " The Lord is well pleased for his righteousness' sake." The sacrifices of old are spoken of as a- sweet sa vour to God, but the obedience of Christ as far more acceptable than they. (Psal. xl. 6, 7.) " Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire : mine ear hast thou opened [as thy servant performing willing obedience;] burnt- offering and sin-offering hast thou not required. Then said I, I.o, I come, [as a servant that cheerfully answers the calls of his master :] I delight to do thy will, O my God, and thy law is within mine heart." (Matt. xvii. 5.) " This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well-pleased." And Christ tells us expressly, that the Father loves him for that wonderful instance of his obedience, his voluntary yielding himself to death, in compliance with the Father's com mand, (John x. 17, 18.) " Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life : — No man taketh it from me ; but I lay it down of myself— This commandment received I of my Father." And if there was no merit in Christ's obedience unto death, if it was not worthy of praise, and of the most glo rious rewards, the heavenly hosts were exceedingly mis taken, by the account that is given of them, (Rev. v. 8 — 12.) " The four beasts, and the four and twenty elders, fell down before the Lamb, having every one of (hem harps, and golden vials full of odours ; — and they sung a new, song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou wast slain And I be held, and I heard the voice of many angels round about the throne, and the beasts, and the elders, and the number of them was ten thousand times ten thousand, and thou sands of thousands, saying with a loud voice, Worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and bless ing." Christ speaks of the eternal life which he was to receive, as the reward of his obedience to the Father's command ments. (John xii. 49, 50.) " 1 have not spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me, he gave me a commandment what I should say, and what I should speak : and I know that his commandment is life everlasting : whatsoever I speak therefore, even as the Father said unto me, so I speak." — God promises to divide him a portion with the great, &c. for his being his righteous servant, for his glori ous virtue under such great trials and afflictions. (Isa. liii. 11, 12.) " He shall see the travail of his soul and be satis fied : by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many ; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong, because he hath poured out his soul unto death." The Scriptures represent God as re warding him far above all his other servants. (Phil. ii. 7 — 9.) "He took on him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men : and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross : wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every name." (Psal. xiv. 7.) " Thou lovest righteousness, and hatest wickedness ; therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows." There is no room to pretend, that the glorious benefits bestowed in consequence of Christ's obedience, are not properly of the nature of a reward. What is a reward, in the most proper sense, but a benefit bestowed in conse quence of something morally excellent in quality or be haviour, in testimony of well-pleasedness in that moral excellency, and of respect and favour on that account ? If we consider the nature of a reward most strictly, and make the utmost of it, and add to the things contained in this description proper merit or worthiness, and the be- stowment of the benefit in consequence of a promise ; still it will be found, there is nothing belonging to it, but what the Scripture most expressly ascribes to the glory be stowed on Christ, after his sufferings ; as appears from what has been already observed : there was a glorious benefit bestowed in consequence of something morally ex cellent, being called Righteousness and Obedience; there was great favour, love, and well-pleasedness, for this righteousness and obedience, in the bestower; there was proper merit, or worthiness of the benefit, in the obedience ; it was bestowed in fulfilment of promises, made to that obedience ; and was bestowed therefore, or because he had performed that obedience. I may add to all these things, that Jesus Christ, while here in the flesh, was manifestly in a state of trial. The last Adam, as Christ is called, (1 Cor. xv. 45. Rom. v. 14.) taking on him the human nature, and so the form of a servant, and being under the law, to stand and act for us, was put into a state of trial, as the first Adam was. — Dr. Whitby mentions these three things as evidences of persons being in a state of trial, (on the five Points, p. 46 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part III. 298, 299.) namely, their afflictions being spoken of as their . trials or temptations, their being the subjects of promises, and their being exposed to Satan's temptations. But Christ was apparently the subject of each of these. Concerning promises made to him, I have spoken already. The difficulties and afflictions he met with in the course of his obedience, are called his temptations or trials, (Luke xxii. 28.) " Ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations or trials." (Heb. ii. 18.) " For in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted [or tried,] he is able to succour them that are tempted." And, (chap. iv. 15.) " We have not an high-priest, which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities ; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." And as to his being tempted by Satan it is what none will dispute. SECT. III. The case of such as are given up of God to sin, and. of fallen man in general, proves moral Necessity and Inability to be consistent with Blameworthiness. Dr. Whitby asserts freedom, not only from coaction, but Necessity, to be essential to any thing deserving the name of sin, and to an action being culpable ; in these words, (Discourse on five Points, edit. 3. p. 348.) " If they be thus necessitated, then neither their sins of omission or commission could deserve that name : it being essential to the nature of sin, according to St. Austin's definition, that it be an action a quo liberum est abstinere. Three things seem plainly necessary to make an action or omis sion culpable; 1. That it be in our power to perform or forbear it : for, as Origen, and all the fathers, say, no man is blameworthy for not doing what he could not do." And elsewhere the Doctor insists, that " when any do evil of Necessity, what they do is no vice, that they are guilty of no fault,* are worthy of no blame, dispraise,f or disho- nourj but are unblamable."§ If these things are true, in Dr. Whitby's sense of Ne cessity, they will prove all such to be blameless, who are given up of God to sin, in what they commit after they are thus given up. — That there is such a thing as men being judicially given up to sin, is certain, if the Scripture rightly informs us ; such a thing being often there spoken of: as in Psal. lxxxi. 12. "So I gave them up to their own hearts' lust, and they walked in their own counsels." (Acts vii. 42.) " Then God turned, and gave them un to worship the host of heaven." (Rom. i. 24.) " Wherefore, God also gave them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves." (Ver. 26.) " For this cause God gave them up to vile affections." (Ver. 28.) " And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things that are not convenient.' It is needless to stand particularly to inquire, what God's " giving men up to their own hearts' lusts signifies : it is sufficient to observe, that hereby is certainly meant God so ordering or disposing things, in some respect or other, either by doing or forbearing to do, as that the con sequence should be men continuing in their sins. So much as men are given up to, so much is the consequence of their being given up, whether that be less or more. If God does not order things so, by action or permission, that sin will be the consequence, then the ' wait proves that they are not given up to that consequence. If good be the consequence, instead of evil, then God's mercy is to be acknowledged in that good ; which mercy must be con trary to God's judgment in giving up to evil. If the event must prove, that they are given up to evil as the conse quence, then the persons, who are the subjects of this judgment, must be the subjects of such an event, and so the event is necessary. If not only coaction, but all Necessity, will prove men blameless, then Judas was blameless, after Christ had given him over, and had already declared his certain damnation, and that he should verily betray him. He was guilty of « Discourse on the five Points, p. Mt, 360, 361, 377 t 303, 326, 329, no sin in betraying his Master, on this supposition ; though his so doing is spoken of by Christ as the most aggravated sin, more heinous than the sin of Pilate in crucifying him. And the Jcvs in Egypt, in Jeremiah's time, were guilty of no sin, in their not worshipping the true God, after God had " sworn by his great name, that his name should be no more named in the mouth of any man of Judah, in all the land of Egypt," (Jer. xliv. 26.) Dr. Whitby (Disc, on five Points, p. 302, 303.) de nies, that men, in this world, are ever so given up by God to sin, that their Wills should be necessarily determined to evil ; though he owns, that hereby it may become ex ceeding difficult for men to do good, having a strong bent and powerful inclination to what is evil — But if we should allow the case to be just as he represents, the judgment of giving up to sin will no better agree with his notions of that liberty, which is essential to praise or blame, than if we should suppose it to render the avoiding of sin impos sible. For if an impossibility of avoiding sin whollv ex cuses a man ; then for the same reason, its being difficult to avoid it, excuses him in part; and this just in propor tion to the degree of difficulty. — If the influence of moral impossibility or inability be the same, to excuse persons in not doing or not avoiding any thing, as that of natural in ability, (which is supposed,) then undoubtedly, in like manner, moral difficulty has the same influence to excuse with natural difficulty. But all allow, that natural impos sibility wholly excuses, and also that natural difficulty excuses in part, and makes the act or omission less blame- able in proportion to the difficulty. All natural difficulty, according to the plainest dictates of the light of nature, excuses in some degree, so that the neglect is not so blamable, as if there had been no difficulty in the case : and so the greater the difficulty is, still the more excuse- able, in proportion to the increase of the difficulty. And as natural impossibility wholly excuses, and excludes all blame, so the nearer the difficulty approaches to impossi bility, still the nearer a person is to blamelessness in proj portion to that approach. And if the case of moral impos sibility or Necessity, be just the same with natural Necessity or coaction, as to its influence to excuse a neglect, then also, for the same reason, the case of natural difficulty does not differ in influence, to excuse a neglect,' from moral difficulty, arising from a strong bias or bent to evil, such as Dr. W'hitby owns in the case of those that are given up to their own hearts' lusts. So that the fault of such persons must be lessened, in proportion to the difficulty, and approach to impossibility.. If ten degrees of moral difficulty make the action quite impossible, and so wholly excuse, then if there be nine degrees of diffi culty, the person is in great part excused, and is nine de grees in ten less blameworthy, than if there had been no difficulty at all ; and he has but one degree of blame worthiness. The reason is plain, on Arminian principles ; viz. because as difficulty, by antecedent bent and bias on the Will, is increased, liberty of indifference, and self-de termination in the Wili, is diminished ; so much hinderance, impediment is there, in the way of the Will acting freely, by mere self-determination. And if ten degrees of such hinderance take away all such liberty, then nine degrees take away nine parts in ten, and leave but one degree of liberty. And therefore there is but one degree of blame- ableness, ceteris paribus, in the neglect ; the man being no further blamable in what he does, or neglects, than he has liberty in that affair : for blame or praise (say they) arises wholly from a good use or abuse of liberty. From all which it follows, that a strong bent and bias one way, and difficulty of going the contrary, never causes a person to be at all more exposed to sin, or any thing blamable : because, as the difficulty is increased, so much the less is required and expected. Though in one respect, exposedness to sin is increased, viz. by an increase of exposedness to the evil action or omission ; yet it is diminished in another respect, to balance it ; namely, as the sinfulness or blamableness of the action or omission is diminished in the same proportion. So that, on the whole, the affair, as to exposedness to guilt or blame, is left just as it was. and many other places. I 371. § 304, 361. Sect. III. MORAL NECESSITY AND INABILITY, CONSISTENT. To illustrate this, let us suppose a scale of a balance to be intelligent, and a free agent, and indued with a self- moving power, by virtue of which it could act and pro duce effects to a certain degree, ex. sr. to move itself up or down with a force equal to a weight of ten pounds ; and that it might therefore be required of it, in ordinary cir cumstances, to move itself down with that force ; for which it has power and full liberty, and therefore would be blameworthy if it failed of it. But then let us suppose a weight of ten pounds to be put in the opposite scale, which in force entirely counterbalances its self-moving power, and so renders it impossible for it to move down at all ; and therefore wholly excuses it from any such motion. But if we suppose there to be only nine pounds in the opposite scale, this renders its motion not impossible, but yet more difficult ; so that it can now only move down with the force of one pound : but however, this is all that is required of it under these circumstances ; it is wholly excused from nine parts of its motion : and if the scale, under these circumstances, neglect to move, and remain at rest, all that it will be blamed for, will be its neglect of that one tenth part of its motion ; for which it had as much liberty and advantage, as in usual circumstances it has for the greater motion, which in such a case would be re quired. So that this new difficulty does not at all increase its exposedness to any thing blameworthy. And thus the very supposition of difficulty in the way of a man's duty, or proclivity to sin, through a being given up to hardness of heart, or indeed by any other means whatsoever, is an inconsistence, according to Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, virtue and vice, blame and praise. The avoiding of sin and blame, and the doing of what is vir tuous and praiseworthy, must be always equally easy. Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, obligation, virtue, sin, &c. led him into another great inconsistence. He abun dantly insists, that necessity is inconsistent with the na ture of sin or fault. He says, in the forementioned trea tise, (p. 14.) Who can blame a person for doing what he could not help ? And, (p. 15.) It being sensibly unjust, to punish any man for doing that which was never in his power to avoid. And, (p. 341.) to confirm his opinion, he quotes one of the fathers, saying, Why doth God command, if man hath not free will and power to obey ? And again, in the same and the next page, Who will not cry out, that it is folly to command him, that hath not liberty to do what is commanded; and that it is unjust to condemn him, that has it not in his power to do what is required? And, (p. 373.) he cites another saying, A law is given to him that can turn to both parts; i. e. obey or transgress it ; but no law can be against him who is bound by nature. And yet the same Dr. Whitby asserts, that fallen man is not able to perform perfect obedience. In p. 165, he has these words : " The nature of Adam had power to continue innocent, and without sin ; whereas, it is certain our na ture never had." But if we have not power to continue innocent and without sin, then sin is not inconsistent with Necessity, and we may be sinful in that which we have not power to avoid ; and those things cannot be true, which he asserts elsewhere, namely, " That if we be necessitated, neither sins of omission nor commission, would deserve that name," (p. 348.) - If we have it not in our power to be innocent, then we have it not in our power to be blame less; and if so, we are under a Necessity of being blame worthy. And how does this consist with what he so often asserts, that Necessity is inconsistent with blame or praise ? If we have it not in our power to perform perfect obedience to all the commands of God, then we are under a Neces sity of breaking some commands, in some degree ; having no power to perform so much as is commanded. And if so, why does he cry out of the unreasonableness and folly of commanding beyond what men have power to do ? Arminians in general are very inconsistent with them selves, in what they say of the Inability of fallen man in this respect. They strenuously maintain, that it would be unjust in God, to require any thing of us beyond our pre sent power and ability to perform ; and also hold that we are now unable to perform perfect obedience, and that Christ died to satisfy for the imperfections of our obedience, * Treatiseofthe Operations of the Spirit 2 edit p. 112, 113. 47 and has made way, that our imperfect obedience might be accepted instead of perfect ; wherein they seem insensibly to run themselves into the grossest inconsistence. For (as I have observed elsewhere) " they hold that God, in mercy to mankind, has abolished that rigorous constitution or law, that they were under originally, and instead of it, has in troduced a more mild constitution, and put us under a new law, which requires no more than imperfect sincere obe dience, in compliance with our poor infirm impotent cir cumstances since the fall." Now how can these things be made consistent? I would ask, of what law are these imperfections of our obedience a breach ? If they are a breach of no law that we were ever under, then they are not sins. And if they be not sins, what need of Christ dying to satisfy for them ? But if they are sins, and the breach of some law, what law is it ? They cannot be a breach of their new law, for that requires no other than imperfect obedience, or obedience with imper fections: and therefore to have obedience attended with imperfections, is no breach of it ; for it is as much as it requires. And they cannot be a breach of their old law : for that, they say, is entirely abolished ; and we never were under it. — They say, it would not be just in God to re quire of us perfect obedience, because it would not be just to require more than we can perform, or to punish us for failing of it. And, therefore, by their own scheme, the imperfections of our obedience do not deserve to be punish ed. What need therefore of Christ dying, to satisfy for them ? What need of his suffering, to satisfy for that which is no fault, and in its own nature deserves no suffering? What need of Christ dying, to purchase, that our imperfect obedience should be accepted, when, according to their scheme, it would be unjust in itself, that any other obe dience than imperfect should be required 7 What need of Christ dying to make way for God's accepting of such obe dience, as it would be unjust in him not to accept ? Is there any need of Christ dying to prevail with God not to do unrighteously ? — If it be said, that Christ died to satisfy that old law for us, that so we might not be under it, but that there might be room for our being under a more mild law ; still I would inquire, what need of Christ dying, that we might not be under a law, which (by their prin ciples) it would be in itself unjust that we should be un der, whether Christ had died or no, because, in our present state, we are not able to keep it ? So the Arminians are inconsistent with themselves, not only, in what they say of the need of Christ's satisfaction to atone for those imperfections, which we cannot avoid, but also in what they say of the grace of God, granted to enable men to perform the sincere obedience of the new law. " I grant indeed, (says Dr. Stebbing,*) that by origi nal sin, we are utterly disabled for the performance of the condition, without new grace from God. But I say then, that he gives such a grace to all of us, by which the per formance of the condition, is truly possible ; and upon this ground he may and doth most righteously require it." If Dr. Stebbing intends to speak properly, by grace he must mean, that assistance which is of grace, or of free favour and kindness. But yet in the same place he speaks of it as very unreasonable, unjust, and cruel, for God to require that, as the condition of pardon, that is become impossible by original sin. If it be so, what grace is there in giving assistance and ability to perform the condition of pardon 7 Or why is that called by the name of grace, that is an ab solute debt, which God is bound to bestow, and which it would be unjust and cruel in him to withhold, seeing he requires that, as the condition of pardon, which he cannot perforin without it ? SECT. IV. Command and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral Inability to obey.f It being so much insisted on by Arminian writers, that necessity is inconsistent with law or command, and parti cularly, that it is absurd to suppose God by his command t The subject of " obligation to obedience," or mobal obligation, though 48 ON THE FREEDOM OP THE WILL. Part III. should require that of men which they are unable to do ; not allowing in this case for any difference between na tural and moral Inability ; I would therefore now particu larly consider this matter. — And for greater clearness I would distinctly lay down the following things. I. The Will itself, and not only those actions which are the effects of the Will, is the "proper object of Precept or Command. That is, such a state or acts of men's Wills, are in many cases properly required of them by Com mands ; and not only those alterations in the state of their bodies or minds that are the consequences of volition. This is most manifest ; for it is the soul only that is pro perly and directly the subject of Precepts or Commands ; that only being capable of receiving or perceiving Com mands. The motions or state of the body are matter of Command, only as they are subject to the soul, and con nected with its acts. But now the soul has no other faculty whereby it can. in the most direct and proper sense, consent, yield to, or comply with any Command, but the faculty of the Will ; and it is by this "faculty only, that the soul can directly disobey, or refuse compliance : for the very notions of consenting, yielding, accepting, complying, refusing, rejecting, fyc. are, according to the meaning of trie terms, nothing but certain acts of the Will. Obedience, expressed in the title of this section, is not professedly handled by our au thor, either here or in any other part of the work. His professed object in this place is to prove that obligation to obey commands is not weakened by moral inability. But though this conclusion is established by many con siderations, yet the nature and grounds of obligation are not pointed out, which might afford evidence why moral obligation is consistent with moral inability ? The subject is confessedly profound ; but, perhaps, the follow ing series of remarks may contribute in some degree to assist our inquiries and to bring them to a satisfactory conclusion. 1. Obligation, if we regard the term, is a binding power, or an irresistible force ; but, in reference to morality and voluntary actions, obligation is ex pressive of a hypothetical indispensable connexion between an antecedent and a consequent ; or between an end proposed, and the means of obtaining it Thus, if a moral agent would attain the end, he is obliged or bound in dispensably, to use the required means. And, on the contrary, if a moral agent adopt a different antecedent from what is required, not only he shall not attain to the proposed consequent, but another consequent is to follow, indispensably connected with the antecedent actually adopted, by a necessity of consequence. Therefore, 2. The conseqven for the end, which is proposed by the moral Governor, is always a supposed good ; for it would be unworthy of a governor wise and good to propose any other, especially as the antecedent prescribed and re quired is indispensably connected with it But if the connexion be broken by the free agent, by the adoption of an antecedent naturally connected with a different consequent, he then becomes naturally obliged, or forced, to sustain a proportionable evil _ 3. In the system of moral government, it is the prerogative of the supreme Governor to propose the consequent of the indispensable connexion; and it is the part of the moral agent, who in the act of choice is left free, to choose the antecedent, which the governor has objectively furnished, and indispen sably required. To this choice he is morally or hypothetically bound, yet is naturally free ; and if the required choice be made, the good follows; but if not, the corresponding evil follows. For instance; if the forgiveness of sin be the consequent proposed, and repentance the antecedent required : the agent is moraltybound to repent, but naturally free. If, however, he break through the moral bond, which is done by abusing his natural free dom, or continuing his wrong choice, forgiveness does not follow, but he stands exposed to the natural and threatened consequence of that wrong choice, or impenitence. _ 4. Hence it is obvious, that in the system of Providence, and the execu tion of all decretive designs, it is the prerogative of the Sovereign of the universe to establish the chain of all antecedents, and the consequents fol low from the nature of things : but in the system of moral government, it is equally obvious, the reverse takes place ; for here the supreme Governor proposes, and establishes objectively, the chain of consequents, while the moral agent, or the obligee, establishes optionally the antecedents; and as the actual choice of an antecedent is, such will be the actual consequence. When the moral agent chooses that antecedent which is required, or wbich is conformable to rectitude, tbe proposed consequent is obtained by the nature of things ; but when that which is not required, or is not conformable to rectitude, is chosen for an antecedent, the evil consequence flows from the same nature of things, that is, from the essence of eternal truth. 5. Required antecedents are either a state of mind, or voluntary ac tions ; according as the particular consequent proposed may be. For ex ample, if happiness be the end or consequent proposed, holiness, or a holy state of mind, is the mean, or antecedent required. If we would see the Lord, we must be holy, or pure in heart, by a new birth unto righteous ness, li justification be the end proposed, believing is a mean required. For to us righteousness shall be imputed, if we believe. If a subsequent favourable treatment of the obligee be the end proposed ; obedience, or conformity to rule, is the mean required. 6. When an agent is said to be obhged in or by any thing or consideration, that thing or consideration in or by which he is obliged, is to be considered as the consequent proposed ; and the state or act leading to it is the antece dent required. To be obliged in conscience, in duty, in law, in honour, &c. expresses the end to be obtained by a certain state or conduct as the mean or antecedent required. Thus, for instance, if conscience be satisfied, if duty be discharged, if law be conformed to, or if honour be secured, the required antecedent means must be adopted, or such acts must be performed. 7. If the required antecedents be not performed, it is manifest that the free agent has voluntarily established other antecedents, and the injurious consequents of these last flow (as before observed) from the nature of things; which consequents will be similar or dissimilar to those proposed by the supreme Governor, in proportion, as the antecedent established voluntarily by the agent, is similar or dissimilar to what was required. Hence we may see the true standard and measure of guilt, and of the dif- ferent gradations of praise or blame. 8. rfaving considered the naturk of moral obligation, let us now advert to the subject of it This inquiry has more immediately for its object tbe qualifications of the moral agent, or those considerations whereby he in the primary nature of it, is the submitting and yielding of the Will of one, to the Will of another. Disobedience is the not consenting, not complying of the Will of the commanded, to the manifested Will of the commander. Other acts that are not the acts of the Will, as certain motions of the body and alterations in the soul, are Obe dience or Disobedience only indirectly, as they are con nected with the state or actions of the Will, according to an established law of nature. So that it is manifest, the Will itself may be required : and the being of a good Will is the most proper, direct, and immediate subject of Com mand; and if this cannot be prescribed or required by Command or Precept, nothing can; for other things can be required no otherwise than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of a good Will. Corol. 1. If there be several acts of the Will, or a series of acts, one following another, and one the effect of an other, the first and determining act is properly the subject of Command, and not only the consequent acts, which are dependent upon it. Yea, this more especially is that to which Command or Precept has a proper respect ; because it is this act that determines the whole affair : in this act the Obedience or Disobedience lies, in a peculiar manner; the consequent acts being all governed and determined by stands obliged, in contradistinction to those beings in the universe that are not moral agents. An attentive and long-continued investigation of the sub ject has taught us, that they are included in these three particulars: (1.) A natural capacity of moral enjoyment f2.) A sufficiency of suitable means. And (3.) A. freedom from compulsion in the choice of means.— Whatever being is possessed of these qualifications is morally obliged; for he has a suitable ability to establish his own antecedents as required, in order that the proposed consequents may follow. 9. Theirs, qualification is a natural capacity of moral enjoyments. This belongs to no being that is not a free agent ; but to every being who is so, it inseparably belongs. This, more than any superior degree of reason, (however great, and however forcible the influence from that superiority.) constitutes the chief and most essential difference between men and brutes. That such a capacity is an indispensably requisite quali fication, is clear. For free agency necessarily implies, a consequent moral advantage, or a natural good to be morally enjoyed, either explicitly pro posed by the moral Governor, or fairly implied iu the system of moral government; but this could not be proposed if there were no capacity of enjoyment as now stated. And this consequent advantage may properly be called the perpetual enjoyment of God, the chief good; because the chief end of all subordinate enjoyments, as well as of all obedience, and the sum total of all happiness, is the conscious enjoyment of divine favour and excellence. 10. The second qualification is a sufficiency of suitable means. This is indispensably requisite; for to require an end while the means are out of the agent's reach, or physically out of his power, and that under the for feiture of the governor's displeasure, is of the very essence of injustice. But the divine Governor is " a God of truth, and without iniquity ; just and right is he/' And that these means ought to be sufficient and suitable in their own nature to attain the end, in other words, that the antecedents re". quired to be adopted by the agent, are infallibly connected with the pro posed consequent, is equally plain, for the same reason that there should be any means at all. For means in themselves insufficient and unsuitable have no true connexion with the end proposed ; even as a law in itself 'bad, has morally no obliging power. 11. The third qualification is a frkedom from constraint and compul sion in the choice of means, or in the voluntary establishment of antece dents. By " constraint" and " compulsion,1' we mean a physical interference with the free agent in his act of choice, in such a sense, as that the choice would not be the genuine effect of the motive ; or, that tbe nature of the fruit should not correspond with the nature of the tree ; but some extra neous force interposing would make the nature of the volition to be different from the nature of the mind or disposition, which otherwise would be its immediate cause. 12. Divine influence is admitted to be requisite, in order to prepare the state of the mind for a right choice, even as a good tree is requisite for good fruit; but this is no interference with the act of choice itself, nor has it the least tendency to break the connexion between motive and choice, or between the mind and its volition. — Such influence, indeed, forms one glo rious link of the decretive chain, which the sovereign Governor has esta blished as so many antecedents ; and a right choice, in a free agent thus divinely influenced, or formed anew, is the unrestrained and ummpeHed effect which follows by a necessity of consequence. In other words, no bad choice can possibly follow, but by a failure in the cause, the mind or disposition itself. 13. On thisprinciple it is, that the sovereign Being himself never errs in his choice. The source from which the act of choice proceeds is perfectly good, fan infinitely holy nature,) and the connexion between this cause and the effect, wbich is a right choice, is infallibly and in the nature of things necessarily secure. Hence it is that we never admit, or suspect, an error in his choice, however great his freedom ; and hence we have a firm ground of confidence, that the Judge of the whole earth will do right. 14. The three qualifications mentioned belong to man as a free agent; but we must not confound this idea with that of a subject of moral govern ment. An infant may be the subject of government, both human and divine ; but cannot be, properly speaking, a free agent. Hence it follows that the first of the qualifications mentioned alone is essential to constitute a subject of moral government, in the most extensive sense of the term; but in order to constitute that class oi subjects who are a /so free agents, the other two are essential. 15. When these three qualifications are found in any free agent, nothing more is requisite to constitute moral obligation. An end is proposed— meant firmly connected with that end are afforded, and required to be used —these means are physically in the power of the agent— who is also free from all constraint and compulsion in his act of choice. If these qualifications are not sufficient morally to oblige, we are fully persuaded nothing can be sufficient— As to the notion, that moral ability is necessary to constitute moral obligation, wbich is maintained alike by many Arminians and most Antinomians, (for extremes will sometimes meet,) our author abundantly demonstrates its futility and absurd contradictions. — W. Sect. IV, •COMMANDS CONSISTENT WITH MORAL INABILITY. 49 it. This governing act fnust be the proper object of Pre cept, or none. Corol. 2. It also follows, from what has been observed, that if there be any act, or exertion of the soul, prior to all free acts of choice in the case, directing and determining what the acts of the Will shall be; that act of the soul cannot properly be subject to any Comrsand or Precept, in any respect whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely. Such acts cannot be subject to Commands directly, because they are no acts of the Will ; being by the supposition prior to all acts of the Will, deter mining and giving rise to all its acts : they not being acts Of the Will, there can be in them no consent to or com pliance with any Command. Neither can they be subject to Command or Precept indirectly or remotely ; for they are not so much as the effects or consequences of the Will, being prior to all its acts. So that if there be any Obedi ence in that original act of the soul, determining all voli tions, it is an act of Obedience wherein the Will has no concern at all j it preceding every act of Will. And there fore, if the soul either obeys or disobeys in this act, it is wholly involuntarily ; there is no willing Obedience or rebellion, no compliance or opposition of the Will in the affair : and what sort of Obedience or rebellion is this? And thus the Arminian notion of the freedom of the Will consisting in the soul's determining its own acts of Will, instead of being essential to moral agency, and to men being the subjects of moral government, is utterly incon sistent with it. For if the soul determines all its acts of Will, it is therein subject to no Command or moral govern ment, as has been now observed ; because its original determining act is no act of Will or choice, it being prior, by the supposition, to every act of Will. And the soul cannot be the subject of Command in the act of the Will itself, which depends on the foregoing determining act, and is determined by it ; inasmuch as this is necessary, being the necessary consequence and effect of that prior deter mining act, which is not voluntary. Nor can the man be the subject of Command or government in his external actions ; because these are all necessary, being the neces sary effects of the acts of the Will themselves. So that mankind, according to this scheme, are subjects of Com mand or moral government in nothing at all ; and all their moral agency is entirely excluded, and no room is left for virtue or vice in the world. So that the Arminian scheme, and not that of the Cal vinists, is utterly inconsistent with moral government, and with all use of laws, precepts, prohibitions, promises, or threatenings. Neither is there any way whatsoever to make their principles consist with these things. For if it be said, that there is no prior determining act of the soul, preced ing the acts of the Will, but that volitions are events that come to pass by pure accident, without any determining cause, this is most palpably inconsistent with all use of laws and precepts ; for nothing is more plain than that laws can be of no use to direct and regulate perfect acci dent : which, by the supposition of its being pure accident, is in no case regulated by any thing preceding ; but hap pens, this way or that, perfectly by chance, without any cause or rule. The perfect uselessness of laws and pre cepts also follows from the Arminian notion of indifference, as essential to that liberty, which is requisite to virtue or vice. For the end of laws is to bind to one side ; and the end of Commands is to turn the Will one way : and there fore they are of no use, unless they turn or bias the Will that way. But if liberty consists in indifference, then their biassing the Will one way only, destroys liberty ; as it puts * Our author does. not mean by "motive," the object presented to the mind according to its' intrinsic worth ; but he takes into the account also the state of the mind itself, in reference to that object, according to which will be the appearance of it. Therefore, strictly speaking, the motive, as he has intimated at the commencement of this work, denotes the object as it stands in the view of the mind. If we do not maintain this distinction, the dispute will soon degenerate into a confused logomachy ; and we should be forced, in defending this position— that the will is " necessarily deter mined by the strongest motive" — to adopt this, the most absurd of all con clusions, that the will of every man in the present state always chooses what is really best, or never errs in its elections. Whereas the world is full of errors and delusions; things the most excellent in themselves, are com- ¦monly rejected, andothersthemostworthlessarepreferred. Butthiscould not happen, except on this principle, that the reality of worth differs, in those instances, from the appearance of it. In such cases, the difference is not in the object, but in the mind, when the choice takes place. For instance ; VOL. I. E the Will out of equilibrium. So that the will, having a bias, through the influence of binding law, laid upon it, is not wholly left to itself, to determine itself which way it will, without influence from without. II. Having shown that the Will itself, especially in those acts which are original, leading and determining in any case, is the proper subject of Precept and Command — and not only those alterations in the body, &c. which are the effects of the Will — I now proceed, in the second place, to observe, that the very opposition or defect of the Will itself, in its original and determining uct in the case, to a thing proposed or commanded, or its failing of compliance, im plies a moral inability to that thing : or, in other words, whenever a Command requires a certain state or act of the Will, and the person commanded, notwithstanding the Command and the circumstances under which it is ex hibited, still finds his Will opposite or wanting, in that, belonging to its state or acts, which is original and deter mining in the affair, that man is morally unable to obey that Command. This is manifest from what was observed in the first part concerning the nature of moral Inability, as distin guished from natural : where it was observed, that a man may then be said to be morally unable to do a tiling, when he is under the influence or prevalence of a contrary in clination, or has a want of inclination, under such circum stances and views. It is also evident, from what has been before proved, that the Will is always, and in every in dividual act, necessarily determined by the strongest motive ; * and so is always unable to go against the motive, which, all things considered, has now the greatest strength and advantage to move the Will But not further to insist on these things, the truth of the position now laid down, viz. that when the Will is opposite to, or failing of a compliance with, a thing, in its original determination or act, it is not able to comply, appears by the consideration of these two things. 1. The Will in the time of that diverse or opposite leading act or inclination, and when actually under its influence, is not able to exert itself to the contrary, to make an alteration, in order to a compliance. The inclination is unable to change itself; and that for this plain reason, that it is unable to incline to change itself. Present choice cannot at present choose to be otherwise : for that would be at present to choose something diverse from what is at present chosen. If the Will, all things now considered, inclines or chooses to go that way, then it cannot choose, all things now considered, to go the other way, and so cannot choose to be made to go the other way. To suppose that the mind is now sincerely inclined to change itself to a different inclination, is to suppose the mind is now truly inclined otherwise than it is now inclined. The Will may oppose some future remote act that it is exposed to, but not its own present act. 2. As it is impossible that the Will should comply with the thing commanded, with respect to its leading act, by any act of its own, in the time of that diverse or opposite leading and original act, or after it has actually come under the influence of that determining choice or inclina tion ; so it is impossible it should be determined to a compliance by any foregoing act ; for, by the very sup position, there is no foregoing act ; the opposite or non- complying act being that act which is original and deter mining in the case. Therefore it must be so, that if this first determining act be found non-complying, on the proposal of the command, the mind is morally unable to obey. For to suppose it to be able to obey, is to suppose it to be able to determine and cause its first determining suppose the blessed God in his true character as revealed in the Scriptures, the chief and an unchangeable good, be proposed to the contemplation of a wicked man, and his will rejects that good. Now, as the mind is in capable of rejecting a good, or of choosing an evil, as such ; it is plain, that the proper and immediate cause of difference between the reality and the appearance of good, is in the state of the mind. Here lies the essence of an erroneous choice, — the will preferring an object which is apparently but not really preferable. Hence it follows irrefragably, that the state of the mind is the true and proper source of a right and wrong choice. This is it that influences the appearance of an object, so as to stand in the ap prehension and practical judgment of the mind as worse or better than it really i3. Therefore, the true state of the mind and the real state of the object of choice, united, are the genuine parents of the objective appearance in the mind, morally considered, or according to the qualities of good and evil; and this offspring— objective appearance— is what our author calls " the strongest motive." — W. 50 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part III. act to be otherwise, and that it has power better to govern and regulate its first governing and regulating act, which is absurd ; for it is to suppose a prior act of the Will, de termining its first determining act ; that is, an act prior to the first, and leading and governing the original and governing act of all ; which is a contradiction. Here if it should ba said, that although the mind has not any ability to will contrary to what it does will, in the original and leading act of the Will, because there is sup posed to be no prior act to determine and order it otherwise, and the Will cannot immediately change itself, because it cannot at present incline to a change ; yet the mind has an ability for the present to forbear to proceed to action, and taking time for deliberation ; which may be an occasion of the change of the inclination. I answer, (1.) In this objection, that seems to be for gotten which was observed before, viz. that the determining to take the matter into consideration, is itself an act of the Will : and if this be all the act wherein the mind exercises ability and freedom, then this, by the supposition, must be all that can be commanded or required by pre cept. And if this act be the commanding act, then all that has been observed concerning the commanding act of the Will remains true, that the very want of it is a moral Inability to exert it, &c. (2.) We are speaking concerning the first and leading act of the Will about the affair; and if determining to deliberate, or, on the contrary, to proceed immediately without deliberating, be the first and leading act ; or whether it be or no, if there be another act before it, which determines that ; or whatever be the original and leading act ; still the foregoing proof stands good, that the non-compliance of the leading act implies moral Inability to comply. If it should be objected, that these things make all moral Inability equal, and suppose men morally unable to will otherwise than they actually do will, in all cases, and equally so in every instance. — In answer to this ob jection, I desire two things may be observed. First, That if by being equally unable, be meant, as really unable ; then, so far as the Inability is merely moral, it is true; the Will, in every instance, acts by moral ne cessity, and is morally unable to act otherwise, as truly and properly in one case as another ; as, I humbly con ceive, has been perfectly and abundantly demonstrated by what has been said in the preceding part of this essay. But yet, in some respect, the Inability may be said to be greater in some instances than others : though the man may be truly unable, (if moral Inability can truly be called Inability,) yet he may be further from being able to do some things than others. As it is in things, which men are naturally unable to do. A person, whose strength is no more than sufficient to lift the weight of one nuudred pounds, is as truly and really unable to lift one hundred and one pounds, as ten thousand pounds; but yet he is further from being able to lift the latter weight than the former; and so, according to the common use of speech, has a greater Inability for it. So it is in moral Inability. A man is truly morally unable to choose contrary to a present inclination, which in the least degree prevails ; or, contrary to that motive, which, all things considered, has strength and advantage now to move the Will, in the least degree, superior to all other motives in view : but yet he is further from ability to resist a very strong habit, and a violent and deeply rooted inclination, or a motive vastly exceeding all others in strength. And again, the Inability may, in some respects, be called greater in some instances than others, as it may be more general and ex tensive to all acts of that kind. So men may be said to be unable in a different sense, and to be further from moral ability, who have that moral Inability which is general and habitual, than they who have only that Inability which is occasional and particular.* Thus in cases of natural Inability ; he that is born blind may be said to be unable to see, in a different manner, and is, in some respects, further from being able to see, than he whose sight is hindered by a transient cloud or mist. And besides, that which was observed in the first part of this discourse, concerning the Inability which attends a * Seo this distinction of moral Inability explained in Tart I. Sect. IV. strong and settled habit, should be here remembered ; viz. that a fixed habit is attended with this peculiar moral Inability, by which it is distinguished from occasional vo lition, n'amelv, that endeavours to avoid future volitions of that kind, which are agreeable to such a habit, much more frequently and commonly prove vain and insufficient. For though it is impossible there should be any sincere endea vours against a present choice, yet there may be against volitions of that kind, when viewed at a distance. A person may desire and use means to prevent future exer cises of a certain inclination ; and, in order to it, may wish the habit might be removed ; but his desires and endea vours may be ineffectual. The man may be said in some sense to be unable ; yea, even as the word unable is a rela tive term, and has relation to ineffectual endeavours ; yet not with regard to present, but remote endeavours. Secondly, It must be borne in mind, according to what was observed before, that indeed no Inability whatsoever, which is merely moral, is properly called by the name of Inability ; and that in the strictest propriety of speech, a man may be said to have a thing in his power, if' he has it at his election, and he cannot be said to be unable to do a thing, when he can, if he now pleases, or whenever he has a proper, direct, and immediate desire for it. As to those desires and endeavours, that may be against the exercises of a strong habit, with regard to which men may be said to be unable to avoid those exercises, they are remote de sires and endeavours in two respects. First, as to time; they are never against present volitions, but only against volitions of such a kind, when viewed at a distance. Secondly, as to their nature ; these opposite desires are not directly and properly against the habit and inclination it self, or the volitions in which it is exercised ; for these, in themselves considered, are agreeable : but against some-- thing else that attends them, or is their consequence ; the opposition of the mind is levelled entirely against this ; the volitions themselves are not at all opposed directly, and for their own sake ; but only indirectly and remotely, on the account of something foreign. III. Though the opposition of the Will itself, or the very want of Will to a thing commanded, implies a moral Inability to that thing ; yet, if it be, as has been already shown, that the being of a good state or act of Will, is a thing most properly required by Command ; then, in some cases, such a state or act of Will may properly be required, which at present is not, and which may also be wanting after it is commanded. And therefore those things may properly be commanded, for which men have a moral Inability. Such a state or act of the Will, may be required by Command, as does not already exist. For if that volition only may be commanded to be, which already is, there could be no use of precept : Commands in all cases would be perfectly vain and impertinent. And not only may such a Will be required, as is wanting before the Command is given, but also such as may possibly be wanting afterwards ; such as the exhibition of the Com mand may not be effectual to produce or excite. Other wise, no such thing as disobedience to a proper and right ful Command is possible in any case ; and there is no • case possible, wherein there can be a faulty disobedience. Which Arminians cannot affirm, consistently with their principle : for this makes obedience to just and proper Commands always necessary, and disobedience impossi ble. And so the Arminian would overthrow himself, yielding the very point we are upon, which he so strenu ously denies, viz. that Law and Command are consistent with necessity. If merely that Inability will excuse disobedience, which is implied in the opposition or defect of inclination, remain ing after the Command is exhibited, then wickedness always carries that in it which excuses it. By how much the more wickedness there is in a man's heart, by so much is his inclination to evil the stronger, and by so much the more, therefore, has he of moral Inability to the good re quired. His moral Inability consisting in the strength of his evil inclination, is the very thing wherein his wicked ness consists ; and yet, according to Arminian principles, Sect. IV. COMMANDS CONSISTENT WITH MORAL INABILITY. 51 it must be a thing inconsistent with wickedness ; and by how much the more he has of it, by so much is he the fur ther from wickedness. Therefore, on the whole, it is manifest, that moral Ina bility alone (which consists in disinclination) never ren ders any thing improperly the subject matter of Precept or Command, and never can excuse any person in disobe dience, or want of conformity to a command. Natural Inability, arising from the want of natural capa city, or external hinderance, (which alone is properly called Inability,) without doubt wholly excuses, or makes a thing improperly the matter of Command. If men are excused from doing or acting any good thing, supposed to be com manded, it must be through some defect or obstacle that is not in the Will itself, but either in the capacity of under standing, or body, or outward circumstances. — Here two or three things may be observed, 1. As to spiritual acts, or any good thing in the state or imminent acts of the Will itself, or of the affections, (which are only certain modes of the exercise of the Will,) if persons are justly excused, it must be through want of capacity in the natural ¦ faculty of understanding. Thus the same spiritual duties, or holy affections and exercises of heart, cannot be required of men, as may be of angels ; the ca pacity of understanding being so much inferior. So men cannot be required to love those amiable persons, whom they have had no opportunity to see, or hear of, or know in any way agreeable to the natural state and capacity of the human understanding. But the insufficiency of mo tives will not excuse ; unless their being insufficient arises not from the moral state of the Will or inclination it self, but from the state of the natural understanding. The great kindness and generosity of another may be a motive insufficient to excite gratitude in the person that receives the kindness, through his vile and ungrateful temper : in this case, the insufficiency of the motive arises from the state of the Will or inclination of heart, and does not at all excuse. But if this generosity is not sufficient to excite gratitude, being unknown, there being no means of in formation adequate to the state and measure of the person's faculties, this insufficiency is attended with a natural Ina bility, which entirely excuses it. 2. As to such motions of body, or exercises and altera tions of mind, which do not consist in the imminent acts or state of the Will itself— but are supposed to be required as effects of the Will, in cases wherein there is no want of a capacity of understanding — that Inability, and that only, excuses, which consists in want of connexion between them and the Will. If the Will fully complies, and the proposed effect does not prove, according to the laws of nature, to be connected with his volition, the man is per fectly excused ; he has a natural Inability to the thing re quired. For the Will itself, as has been observed, is all that can be directly and immediately required by Com mand ; and other things only indirectly, as connected with the Will. If therefore, there be a full compliance of Will, the person has done his duty ; and if other things do not prove to be connected with his volition, that is not crimi nally owing to him. 3. Both these kinds of natural Inability, and all Ina bility that excuses, may be resolved into one thing ; namely, want of natural capacity or strength ; either capacity of un derstanding, or external strength. For when there are ex ternal defects and obstacles, they would be no obstacles, * On the subject of Sincerity or Insincerity in prohibitions, commands, counsels, invitations, and the like, in cases where God foreknows that the event will not take place by the compliance of the moral agent addressed, we may remark a few particulars in addition to our author's reasoning ; 1. The sincerity of prohibitions and commands, counsels and invitations, and the like, is founded — not in the event of things as good or bad, or the knowledge of events, or the purpose that secures some, or the necessity of consequence from which others flow, nor in the moral ability of the agent, but — in the very nature and tendency of the things themselves which are prohibited, commanded, or proposed, as good or evil, either intrinsically, if of a moral nature, or else relatively, if of positive appointment Therefore. 2. Whether the event be compliance or non-compliance, the command, or invitation, &c. is perfectly sincere. For, in truth, these are neither more nor less than testimonies respecting the goodness or badnessof the things in question, in the sense before mentioned, and the consequent obligations of the agent respecting them, under a forfeiture either declared or implied. Consequently, 31 Insincerity can attach to a command only on supposition that the goodness or badness of the event were the ground of the signified will, while at tho same time another event, diverse from that which actually takes place, was purposed by the same will. But, E 2 were it not for the imperfection and limitations of under-. standing and strength. Corol. If things for which men have a moral Inability may properly be the matter of Precept or Command, then they may also of invitation and counsel. Commands and invitations come very much to the same thing ; the differ ence is only circumstantial : Commands are as much a manifestation of the Will of him that speaks, as invita tions, and as much testimonies of expectation of compli ance. The difference between them lies in nothing that touches the affair in hand. The main difference between Command and invitation consists in the enforcement of the Will of him who commands or invites. In the latter it is his kindness, the goodness from which his Will arises : in the former it is his authority. But whatever be the ground of Will in him that speaks, or the enforcement of what he says, yet, seeing neither his Will, nor his expectation, is any more testified in the one case than the other ; therefore, a person being directed by invitation, is no more an evi dence of insincerity in him that directs — in manifesting either a Will or expectation which he has not — than a per son being known to be morally unable to do what he is di rected by command is an evidence of insincerity. So that all this grand objection of Arminians against the Inability of fallen men to exert faith in Christ, or to perform other spiritual duties, from the sincerity of God's counsels and invitations, must be without force.* SECT. V. That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours, which is sup posed to excuse in the non-performance of things in themselves good, particularly considered. It is much insisted on by many, that some men, though they are not able to perform spiritual duties, such as re pentance of sin, love to God, a cordial acceptance of Christ as exhibited and offered in the gospel, &.c. yet may sincerely desire and endeavour after these things ; and therefore must be excused ; it being unreasonable to blame them for the omission of those things, which they sincerely desire and endeavour to do, but cannot. Concerning this matter, the following things may be observed. 1. What is here supposed, is a great mistake, and gross absurdity ; even that men may sincerely choose and desire those spiritual duties of love, acceptance, choice, rejection, &c. consisting in the exercise of the Will itself, or in the disposition and inclination of the heart ; and yet not able to perform or exert them. This is absurd, because it is absurd to suppose that a man should directly, properly, and sincerely incline to have an inclination, which at the same time is contrary to his inclination : for that is to suppose him not to be inclined to that which he is inclined to. If a man, in the state and acts of his Will and inclination, properly and directly falls in with those duties, he therein performs them : for the duties themselves consist in that very thing ; they consist in the state and acts of the Will being so formed and directed. If the soul properly and sincerely falls in with a certain proposed act of Will or choice, the soul therein makes that choice its own5'"Even as when a moving body falls in with a proposed direction of its motion, that is the same thing as to move in that direction. 4. Strictly speaking, no events, as such, are the objects of purpose ; but rather, the purpose respects the good antecedents, whereby good events, following by necessity of consequence, are infallibly secured. Besides, 5. It is highly absurd, as must appear from the nature of law and obliga tion, to suppose that the sincerity of legislative or inviting will should de pend on the event of compliance or non-compliance. Surely the sincerity of a lawgiver is not affected, whether all obey, or only some, or even none. Legislation is a testimony with sanctions, that the thing prohibited is evil, or the thing commanded is good, to the party. Hence, 6. The consequent, whether good or bad, is objectively established, or hypothetically proposed, by the legislator : and the antecedent is supposed to be within the reach, or, physically considered, placed within the power, of the agent Therefore, 7. The agent's abuse of his physical power, in reference to the antece dent, constitutes the criminality, and the right use of it constitutes the virtue, of an action. And then alone is physical power, in fact, used aright when it is the instrument of moral rectitude, or a right state of mind. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles ? Even so, every good tree briugeth forth good fruit ; but a corrupt tree bringefh forth evil fruit. A good tree (as such) cannot bring forth evil fruit ; neither can a corrupt tree (as such) bring forth good fruit — W. 5_ ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part III. 2. That which is called a Desire and Willingness for those inward duties, in such as do not perform them, has respect to these duties only indirectly and remotely, and is im properly so called ; not only because (as was observed be fore) it respects those good volitions only in a distant view, and with respect to future time ; but also because ever more, not these things themselves, but something else that is foreign, is the object that terminates these volitions and Desires. A drunkard, who continues in his drunkenness, being under the power of a violent appetite to strong drink, and without any love to virtue ; but being also extremely covetous and close, and very much exercised and grieved at the diminution of his estate, and prospect of poverty, may in a sort desire the virtue of temperance ; and though his present Will is to gratify his extravagant appetite, yet he may wish he had a heart to forbear future acts of in temperance, and forsake his excesses, through an unwill ingness to part with his money : but still he goes on with his drunkenness ; his wishes and endeavours are insuffi cient and ineffectual : such a man has no proper, direct, sincere Willingness to forsake this vice, and tne vicious deeds which belong to it ; for he acts voluntarily in con tinuing to drink to excess : his Desire is very improperly called a Willingness to be temperate ; it is no true Desire of that virtue ; for it is not that virtue, that terminates his wishes ; nor have they any direct respect at all to it. It is only the saving of his money, or the avoiding of poverty, that terminates and exhausts the whole strength of his De sire. The virtue of temperance is regarded only very in directly and improperly, even as a necessary means of gra tifying the vice of covetousness. So, a man of an exceedingly corrupt and wicked heart, who has no love to God and Jesus Christ, but, on the con trary, being very profanely and carnally inclined, has the greatest distaste of the things of religion, and enmity against them ; yet being of a family, that, from one generation to another, have most of them died, in youth, of an here ditary consumption ; and so having little hope of living long ; and having been instructed in the necessity of a supreme love to Christ, and gratitude for his death and sufferings, in order to his salvation from eternal misery ; if under these circumstances he should, through fear of eter nal torments, wish he had such a disposition ; but his pro fane and carnal heart remaining, he continues still in his habitual distaste of, and enmity to God and religion, and wholly without any exercise of that love and gratitude, (as doubtless the very devils themselves, notwithstanding all the devilishness of their temper, would wish for a holy heart, if by that means they could get out of hell :) in this case, there is no sincere Willingness to love Christ and choose him as his chief good : these holy dispositions and exercises are not at all the direct object of the Will : they truly share no part of the inclination or desire of the soul ; but all is terminated on deliverance from torment : and these graces and pious volitions, notwithstanding this forced consent, are looked upon as in themselves unde sirable ; as when a sick man desires a dose he greatly abhors, in order to save his life. From these things it appears, 3. That this indirect Willingness is not that exercise of the Will which the command requires ; but is entirely a different one ; being a volition of a different nature, and terminated altogether on different objects ; wholly falling short of that virtue of Will, to which the command has respect. 4. This other volition, which has only some indirect concern with the duty required, cannot excuse for the want of that good will itself, which is commanded ; being not the thing which answers and fulfils the command, and being wholly destitute of the virtue which the command seeks. Further to illustrate this matter. If a child has a most excellent father that has ever treated him with fatherly kindness and tenderness, and has every way, in the highest degree, merited his love and dutiful regard, and is withal very wealthy ; but the son is of so vile a disposition, that he inveterately hates his father; and yet, apprehending that his hatred of him is like to prove his ruin, by bringing him finally to those abject circumstances, which are ex ceedingly adverse to his avarice and ambition ; he, there fore, wishes it were otherwise : but yet remaining under the invincible power of his vile and malignant disposition, he continues still in his settled hatred of his father. Now, if such a son's indirect Willingness to love and honour his father, at all acquits or excuses before God, for his lading of actually exercising these dispositions towards him, which God requires, it must be on one of these accounts. (1.) Either, That it answers and fulfils the command. But this it does not by the supposition ; because the thing commanded is love and honour to his worthy parent. If the command be proper and just, as is supposed, then it obliges to the thing commanded ; and so nothing else but that can answer the obligation. Or, (2.) It must be at least, because there is that virtue or goodness in his in direct Willingness, that is equivalent to the virtue required; and so balances or countervails it, and makes up for the want of it. But that also is contrary to the supposition. The Willingness the son has merely from a regard to money and honour, has no goodness in it, to countervail the want of the pious filial respect required. Sincerity and reality, in that indirect Willingness, which has been spoken of, does not make it the better. That which is real and hearty is often called sincere ; whether it be in virtue or vice. Some persons are sincerely bad; others are sincerely good; and others may be sincere and hearty in things, which are in their own nature indifferent ; as a man may be sincerely desirous of eating when he is hungry. But being sincere, hearty, and in good earnest, is no virtue, unless it be in a thing that is virtuous. A man may be sincere and hearty in joining a crew of pirates, or a gang of robbers. When the devils cried out, and besought Christ not to torment them, it was no mere pre tence ; they were very hearty in their desires not to be tor mented : but this did not make their Will or Desire vir tuous. And if men have sincere Desires, which are in their kind and nature no better, it can be no excuse for the want of any required virtue. And as a man's Sincerity in such an indirect Desire or willingness to do his duty, as has been mentioned, cannot excuse for the want of performance ; so it is with Endea vours arising from such a Willingness. The Endeavours can have no more goodness in them, than the Will of which they are the effect and expression. And, therefore,, how ever sincere and real, and however great a person's En deavours are ; yea, though they should be to the. utmost of his ability ; unless the Will from which they proceed be truly good and virtuous, they can be of no avail or weight whatsoever in a moral respect. That which is not truly virtuous is, in God's sight, good for nothing: and so can be of no value, or influence, in his account, to makeup for any moral defect. For nothing can counterbalance evil, but good. If evil be in one scale, and we put a great deai into the other of sincere and earnest Desires, and many and great Endeavours ; yet, if there be no real goodness in all, there is no weight in it ; and so it does nothing towards balancing the real weight, which is in the opposite scale. It is only like substracting a thousand noughts from before a real number, which leaves the sum just as it was. Indeed such Endeavours may have a negatively good influence. Those things, which have no positive virtue, have no positive mora, influence ; yet they may be an occasion of persons avoiding some positive evils. As if a man were in the water with a neighbour to whom he had ill will, and who could not swim, holding him by his hand ; this neighbour was much in debt to him, — the man is tempted to let him sink and drown — but refuses to comply with the temptation ; not from love to his neighbour, but from the love of money, and because by his drowning he should lose his debt ; that which he does in preserving his neighbour from drowning, is nothing good in the sight of God : yet hereby he avoids the greater guilt that would have been contracted, if he had designedly let his neigh bour sink and perish. But when Arminians, in their dis putes with Calvinists, insist so much on sincere Desires and Endeavours, as what must excuse men, must be ac cepted of God, &c. it is manifest they have respect to some positive moral weight or influence "of those Desires and Endeavours. Accepting, justifying, or excusing on the account of sincere Endeavours, (as they are called,) and Sect. V. SINCERITY OF DESIRES AND ENDEAVOURS. 53 men doing what they can, &c. has relation to some moral value, something that is accepted as good, and as such, countervailing some defect. But there is a great and unknown deceit, arising from the'ambiguity of the phrase, sincere Endeavours. Indeed there is a vast indistinctness and unfixedness in most, or at least very many of the terms used to express things pertaining to moral and spiritual matters. Whence arise innumerable mistakes, strong prejudices, inextricable con fusion, and endless controversy. — The word sincere is most commonly used to signify something that is good : men are habituated to understand by it the same as honest and up right ; which terms excite an idea of something good in the strictest and highest sense ; good in the sight of him, who sees not only the outward appearance, but the heart. And, therefore, men think that if a person be sincere, he will certainly be accepted. If it be said that any one is sincere in his Endeavours, this suggests, that his heart is good, that there is no defect of duty, as to virtuous incli nation ; he honestly and uprightly desires and endeavours to do as he is required ; and this leads them to suppose, that it would be very hard and unreasonable to punish him, only because he is unsuccessful in his Endeavours, the thing endeavoured after being beyond his power. — Whereas it ought to be observed, that the word sincere has these differ ent significations. 1. Sincerity, as the word is sometimes used, signifies no more than reality of Will and Endeavour, with respect to any thing that is professed or pretended ; without any consideration of the nature of the principle or air_7 whence this real Will and true Endeavour arises. If a man has some real Desire either direct or indirect to obtain a thing, or does really endeavour after it, he is said sincerely to de sire or endeavour, without any consideration of the goodness of the principle from which he acts, or any excellency or worthiness of the end for which he acts. Thus a man who is kind to his neighbour's wife, who is sick and languish ing, and very helpful in her case, makes a show of desiring and endeavouring her restoration to health and vigour ; and not only makes such a show, but there is a reality in his Eretence, he does heartily and earnestly desire to have her ealth restored, and uses his true and utmost Endeavours for it : he is said sincerely to desire and endeavour after it, because he does so truly or really ; though perhaps the principle he acts from, is no other than a vile and scandal ous passion ; having lived in adultery with her, he earnestly desires to have her health and vigour restored, that he may return to his criminal pleasures. Or, 2. By Sincerity is meant, not merely a reality of Will and Endeavour of some sort, and from some consideration or other, but a virtuous Sincerity. That is, that in the per formance of those particular acts, that are the matter of virtue or duty, there be not only the matter, but the form and essence 6f virtue, consisting in the aim that governs the act, and the principle exercised in it. There is not only the reality of the act, that is as it were the body of the duty ; but also the soul, which should properly belong to such a body. In this sense, a man is said to be sincere, when he acts with a pure intention ; not from sinister views : he not only in reality desires and seeks the thing to be done, or qualification to be obtained, for some end or other ; but he wills the thing directly and properly, as neither forced nor bribed ; the virtue of the thing is properly the object of the In the former sense, a man is said to be sincere, in op position to a mere pretence, and show of the particular thing to be done or exhibited, without any real Desire or Endeavour at all. In the latter sense, a man is said to be sincere, in opposition to that show of virtue there is in merely doing the matter of duty, without the reality of the virtue itself in the soul. A man may be sincere in the former sense, and yet in the latter be in the sight of God, who searches the heart, a vile hypocrite. . In the latter kind of sincerity, only, is there any thing truly valuable or acceptable in the sight of God. And this is what in Scripture is called Sincerity, uprightness, integrity, "truth in the inward parts," and "being of a perfect heart." And if there be such a Sincerity, and such a degree of it as there ought to be, and there be any thing further that the man is not able to perform, or which does not prove to be connected with his sincere Desires and Endeavours, the man is wholly excused and acquitted in the sight of God ; his Will shall surely be accepted for his deed : and such a sincere Will and Endeavour is all that in strictness is required of him, by any command of God. But as to the other kind of Sincerity of Desires and En deavours, having no virtue in it, (as was observed before,) it can be of no avail before God, in any case, to recom mend, satisfy, or excuse, and has no positive moral weight or influence whatsoever. Corol. 1 . Hence it may be inferred, that nothing in the reason and nature of things appears from the consideration of any moral weight in the former kind of Sincerity, leading us to suppose, that God has made any positive promises of salvation, or grace, or any saving assistance, or any spiritual benefit whatsoever, to any Desires, prayers, Endeavours, striving, or obedience of those, who hitherto have no true virtue or holiness in their hearts ; though we should suppose all the Sincerity, and the utmost degree of Endeavour, that is possible to be in a person without holiness. Some object against God requiring, as the condition of salvation, those holy exercises, which are the result of a supernatural renovation; such as a supreme respect to Christ, love to God, loving holiness for its own sake, &c. that these inward dispositions and exercises are above men's power, as they are by nature ; and therefore that we may conclude, that when men are brought to be sincere in their Endeavours, and do as well as they can, they are accepted ; and that this must be all that God requires, in order to their being received as the objects of his favour, and must be what God has appointed as the condition of salvation. Concerning this, I would observe, that in such, manner of speaking as "men being accepted because they are sincere, and do as well as they can," there is evidently a supposition of some virtue, some degree of that which is truly good ; though it does not go so far as were to be wished. For if men do what they can, unless their so doing be from some good principle, disposition, or exercise of heart, some virtuous inclination or act of the Will ; their so doing what they can, is in some respect not a whit better than if they did nothing at all. In such a case, there is no more positive moral goodness in a man doing what he can, than in a windmill doing what it can; because the action does no more proceed from virtue l and there is nothing in such Sincerity of Endeavour, or doing what we can, that should render it any more a fit recommendation to positive favour and acceptance, or the condition of any reward or actual benefit, than doing no thing ; for both the one and the other are alike nothing, as to any true moral weight or value. Corol. 2. Hence also it follows, there is nothing that appears in the reason and nature of things, which can justly lead us to determine, that God will certainly give the necessary means of salvation, or some way or other bestow true holiness and eternal life on those heathens, who are sincere (in the sense above explained) in their Endeavours to find out the Will of the Deity, and to please him, according to their light, that they may escape his future displeasure and wrath, and obtain happiness in the future state, through his favour. SECT. VI. Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it ; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, inconsistent with Ar minian notions of Liberty and moral Agency. . To suppose such a freedom of Will, as Arminians talk of, to be requisite to Virtue and Vice, is many ways con trary to common sense. If Indifference belong to Liberty of Will, as Arminians suppose, and it be essential to a virtuous action, that it be performed in a state of Liberty, as they also suppose ; it will follow, that it is essential to a virtuous action, that it be performed in a state of Indifference : and if it be per formed in a state of Indifference, then doubtless it must be performed in the time of Indifference. And so it will fol- 54 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part III. low, that in order to the Virtue of an act, the heart must be indifferent in the time of the performance of that act, and the more indifferent and cold the heart is with relation to the act performed, so much the better; because the act is performed with so much the greater Liberty. But is this agreeable to the light of nature ? Is it agreeable to the notions which mankind in all ages have of Virtue, that it lies in what is contrary to Indifference, even in the ten dency and inclination of the heart to virtuous action ; and that the stronger the inclination, and so the further from Indifference, the more virtuous the heart, and so much the more praiseworthy the act which proceeds from it ? If we should suppose (contrary to what has been before demonstrated) that there may be an act of Will in a state of Indifference ; for instance, this act, viz. The Will deter mining to put itself out of a state of Indifference, and to give itself a preponderation one way ; then it would follow, on Arminian principles, that this act or determination of the Will is that alone wherein Virtue consists, because this only is performed, while the mind remains in a state of Indifference, and so in a state of Liberty : for when once the mind is put out of its equilibrium, it is no longer in such a state ; and therefore all the acts, which follow after wards, proceeding from bias, can have the nature neither of Virtue nor Vice. Or if the thing which the Will can do, while yet in a state of Indifference, and so of Liberty, be only to suspend acting, and determine to take the mat ter into consideration ; then this determination is that alone wherein Virtue consists, and not proceeding to action after the scale is turned by consideration. So that it will follow, from these principles, that whatever is done after the mind, by any means, is once out of its equilibrium, and arises from an inclination, has nothing of the nature of Virtue or Vice, and is worthy of neither blame nor praise. But how plainly contrary is this to the universal sense of mankind, and to the notion they have of sincerely vir tuous actions ! Which is, that they proceed from a heart well disposed and well inclined ; and the stronger, the more fixed and determined, the good disposition of the heart, the greater the sincerity of Virtue, and so the more of its truth and reality. But if there be any acts, which are done in a state of equilibrium, or spring immediately from perfect Indifference and coldness of heart, they cannot arise from any good principle or disposition in the heart ; and, con sequently, according to common sense, have no sincere goodness in them, having no Virtue of heart in them. To have a virtuous heart, is to have a heart that favours Virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfectly cold and indif ferent about it. And besides, the actions that are done in a state of In difference, or that arise immediately out of such a state, cannot be virtuous, because, by the supposition, thev are not determined by any preceding choice. For if there be preceding choice, then choice intervenes between the act and the state of Indifference ; which is contrary to the supposition of the act arising immediately out of Indiffer ence. But those acts which are not determined by pre ceding choice, cannot be virtuous or vicious, by Arminian principles, because they are not determined by the Will. So that neither one way, nor the other, can any actions be virtuous or vicious, according to those principles. If the action be determined by a preceding act of choice, it cannot be virtuous ; because the action is not done in a state of Indifference, nor does immediately arise from such a state ; and so is not done in a state of Liberty. If the action be not determined by a preceding act of choice, then it cannot be virtuous ; because then the Will is not self-determined in it. So that it is made certain, that neither Virtue nor Vice can ever find any place in the universe ! Moreover, that it is necessary to a virtuous action that it be performed in a state of Indifference, under a notion of that being a state of Liberty, is contrary to common sense; as it is a dictate of common sense, that Indiffer ence itself, in many cases, is vicious, and so to a high de gree. As if when I see my neighbour or near friend, and one who has in the highest degree merited of me, in ex treme distress, and ready to perish, I find an Indifference in my heart with respect to any thing proposed to be done, which I can easily do, for his relief. So if it should be proposed to me to blaspheme God, or kill my father, or do numberless other things, which might be mentioned ; the being indifferent, for a moment, would be highly vicious and vile. And it may be further observed, that to suppose this Liberty of Indifference is essential to Virtue and Vice, de stroys the great difference of degrees of the guilt of dif ferent crimes, and takes away the heinousness of the most flagitious, horrid iniquities ;' such as adultery, bestiality, murder, perjury, blasphemy, &c. For, according to these principles, there is no harm at all in having the mind in a state of perfect Indifference with respect to these crimes ; nay, it is absolutely necessary in order to any Virtue in avoiding them, or Vice in doing them. But for the mind to be in a state of Indifference with respect to them, is to be next door to doing them : it is then infinitely near to choosing, and so committing the fact : for equilibrium is the next step to a degree of preponderation ; and one, even the least degree of preponderation (all things consi dered) is choice. And not only so, but for the Will to be in a state of perfect equilibrium with respect to such crimes, is for the mind to be in such a state, as to be full as likely to choose them as to refuse them, to do them as to omit them. And if our minds must be in such a state, wherein it is as near to choosing as refusing, and wherein it must of necessity, according to the nature of things, be as likely to commit them, as to refrain from them ; where is the exceeding heinousness of choosing and committing them ? If there be no harm in often being in such a state, wherein the probability of doing and forbearing are exactly equal, there being an equilibrium, and no more tendency to one than the other ; then, according to the nature and laws of such a contingence, it may be expected, as an in evitable consequence of such a disposition of things, that we should choose them as often as reject them : that it should generally so fall out is necessary, as equality in the effect is the natural consequence of the equal tendency of the cause, or of the antecedent state of things from which the effect arises. Why then should we be so exceedingly to blame, if it does so fall out? It is many ways apparent, that the Arminian scheme of Liberty is utterly inconsistent with the being of any such things as either virtuous or vicious habits or dispositions. If Liberty of Indifference be essential to moral Agency, then there can be no Virtue in any habitual inclinations of the heart ; which are contrary to Indifference, and im ply in their nature the very destruction and exclusion of it. They suppose nothing can be virtuous in which no Liberty is exercised ; but how absurd is it to talk of exer cising Indifference under bias and preponderation ! And if self-determining power in the Will be necessary to moral Agency, praise, rilame, &c. then nothing done by the Will can be any further praiseworthy or blamewor thy, than so far as the Will is moved, swayed, and deter mined by itself, and the scales turned bv the sovereign power the Will has over itself. And therefore the Will must not be out of its balance, preponderation must not be determined and effected before-hand ; and so the self- determining act anticipated. Thus it appears another way, that habitual bias is inconsistent with that Liberty, which Arminians suppose to be necessary to Virtue or Vice ; and so it follows, that habitual bias itself cannot be either virtuous or vicious. The same thing follows from their doctrine concerning the Inconsistence of Necessity with Liberty, praise, dis praise, &c. None will deny, that bias and inclination may be so strong as to be invincible, and leave no possi bility of the Will determining contrary to it; and so be attended with Necessity. This Dr. Whitby allows con cerning the Will of God, angels, and glorified saints, with respect to good ; and the Will of devils, with respect to evil. Therefore, if Necessity be inconsistent with Liberty ; then, when fixed inclination is to such a degree of strength, it utterly excludes all Virtue, Vice, praise, or blame. And, if so, then the nearer habits are to this strength, the more do they impede Liberty, and so diminish praise and blame. If very strong habits destroy Liberty, the lesser ones proportionably hinder it, according to their decree of strength. And therefore it will follow, that then is the act most virtuous or vicious, when performed without any in- Sect. VI. INDIFFERENCE INCONSISTENT WITH VIRTUE. 55 clirration or habitual bias at all ; because it is then per formed with most Liberty. Every prepossessing fixed bias on the mind brings a degree of moral inability for the contrary; because so far as the mind is biassed and prepossessed, so much hinder ance is there of the contrary. And therefore if moral inability be inconsistent with moral Agency, or the nature of Virtue and Vice, then, so far as there is any such thing as evil disposition of heart, or habitual depravity of incli nation ; whether covetousness, pride, malice, cruelty, or whatever else ; so much the more excusable persons are ; so much the less have their evil acts of this kind the nature of Vice. And on the contrary, whatever excellent dispo sitions and inclinations they have, so much are they the less virtuous. It is evident, that no habitual disposition of heart can be in any degree virtuous or vicious, or the actions which proceed from them at all praiseworthy or blameworthy. Because, though we should suppose the habit not to be of such strength, as wholly to take away all moral ability and self-determining power ; or may be partly from bias, and in part from self-determination ; yet in this case, all that is from antecedent bias must be set aside, as of no consi deration ; and in estimating the degree of Virtue or Vice, no more must be considered than what arises from self- determining power, without any influence of that bias, be cause Liberty is exercised in no more : so that all that is the exercise of habitual inclination is thrown away, as not belonging to the morality of the action. By which it appears, that no exercise of these habits, let them be stronger or weaker, can ever have any thing of the nature of either Virtue or Vice. Here if any one should say, that notwithstanding all these things, there may be the nature of Virtue and Vice in the habits of the mind ; because these habits may be the effects of those acts, wherein the mind exercised Li berty ; that however the forementioned reasons will prove that no habits, which are natural, or that are born or cre ated with us, can be either virtuous or vicious ; yet they will not prove this of habits, which have been acquired and established by repeated free acts. To such an objector I would say, that this evasion will not at all help the matter. For if freedom of Will be essential to the very nature of Virtue and Vice, then there is no Virtue or Vice but only in that very thing, wherein this Liberty is exercised. If a man in one or more things, that he does, exercises Liberty, and then by those acts is brought into such circumstances, that his Liberty ceases, and there follows a long series of acts or events that come to pass necessarily ; those consequent acts are not virtuous or vicious, rewardable or punishable ; but only the free acts that established this necessity ; for in them alone was the man free. The following effects, that are necessary, have no more of the nature of Virtue or Vice, than health or sickness of body have properly the nature of Virtue or Vice, being the effects of a course of free acts of temper ance or intemperance ; or than the good qualities of a clock are of the nature of Virtue, which are the effects of free acts of the artificer; or the goodness and sweetness of the fruits of a garden are moral Virtues, being the effects of the free and faithful acts of the gardener. If Liberty be absolutely requisite to the morality of actions, and necessity wholly inconsistent with it, as Arminians greatly insist ; then no nccessari/ effects whatsoever, let the cause he never so good or bad, can be virtuous or vicious ; but the Virtue or Vice must be only in the free cause. Agreeably to this, Dr. Whitby supposes, the necessity that attends the good and evil habits of the saints in heaven, and damned in hell, which are the consequence of their free acts in their state of probation, are not rewardable or punishable. ;: On the whole, it appears, that if the notions of Arminians concerning Liberty and moral Agency be true, it will follow, that there is no virtue in any such habits or qualities as humility, meekness, patience, mercy, gratitude, generosity, heavenly-mindedness ; nothing at ail praiseworthy in loving Christ above father and mother, wife and children, or our own lives ; or in delight in holiness, hungering and thirst ing after righteousness, love to enemies, universal benevo lence to mankind : and, on the other hand, there is nothing at all vicious, or worthy of dispraise, in the most sordid, "beastly, malignant, devilish dispositions ; in being ungrate ful, profane, habitually hating God, and things sacred and holy ; or in being most treacherous, envious, and cruel to wards men. For all these things are dispositions and in clinations of the heart. And in short, there is no such thing as any virtuous or vicious quality of mind ; no such thing as inherent virtue and holiness, or vice and sin : and the stronger those habits or dispositions are, which used to be called virtuous and vicious, the further they are from being so indeed ; the more violent men's lusts are, the more fixed their pride, envy, ingratitude, and maliciousness, still the further are they from being blameworthy. If there be a man that by his own repeated acts, or by any other means, is come to be of the most hellish disposition, desperately inclined to treat his neighbours with injurious- ness, contempt, and malignity ; the further they should be from any disposition to be angry with him, or in the least to blame him. So, on the other hand, if there be a person, who is of a most excellent spirit, strongly inclining him to the most amiable actions, admirably meek, benevolent, &x. so much is he further from any thing rewardable or com mendable. On which principles, the man Jesus Christ was very far from being praiseworthy for those acts of holiness and kindness which he performed, these propensities being strong in his heart. And above all, the infinitely holy and gracious God is infinitely remote from any thing commend able, his good inclinations being infinitely strong, and he, therefore, at the utmost possible distance from being at Liberty. And in all cases, the stronger the inclinations of any are to Virtue, and the more they love it, the less vir tuous, and the more they love wickedness, the less vicious they are. Whether these things are agreeable to Scrip ture, let every Christian, and every man who has read the Bible, judge : and whether they are agreeable to common sense, let every one judge, that has human understanding in exercise. And, if we pursue these principles, we shall find that Virtue and Vice are wholly excluded out of the world ; and that there never was, nor ever can be, any such thing as one or the other; either in God, angels, or men. No propensity, disposition, or habit can be virtuous or vicious, as has been shown ; because they, so far as they take place, de stroy the freedom of the Will, the foundation of all moral Agency, and. exclude all capacity of either Virtue or Vice. — And if habits and dispositions themselves be not vir tuous nor vicious, neither can the exercise of these dis positions be so : for the exercise of bias is not the exercise of free self-determining Will, and so there is no exercise of Liberty in it. Consequently, no man is virtuous or vi cious, either in being well or ill disposed, nor in acting from a good or bad disposition. And whether this bias or dis position be habitual or not, if it exists but a moment before the act of Will which is the effect of it, it alters not the case, as to the necessity of the effect. Or if there be no previ ous disposition at all, either habitual or occasional, that determines the act, then it is not choice that determines it ; it is therefore a contingence, that happens to the man, arising from nothing in him ; and is necessary, as to any inclination or choice of his ; and, therefore, cannot make him either the better or worse ; any more than a tree is better than other trees, because it oftener happens to be lighted upon by a nightingale ; or a rock more vicious than other rocks, because rattle-snakes have happened oftener to crawl over it. So, that there is no Virtue nor Vice in good or bad dispositions, either fixed or transient ; nor any Virtue or Vice in acting from any good or bad previous inclina tion ; nor yet any Virtue or Vice in acting wholly without any previous inclination. Where then shall we find room for Virtue or Vice ? SECT. VII. Arminian notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all Influence of Motive and Inducement, in either virtuous Or vicious actions. As Arminian notions of that liberty which is essential to virtue or vice, are inconsistent with common sense, in their being inconsistent with all virtuous or vicious habits 56 and dispositions ; So they are no less inconsistent with all influence of Motives in moral actions — Such influence equally against those notions of liberty, whether there be, previous to the act of choice, a preponderancy of the incli nation, or a preponderancy of those circumstances, which have a tendency to move the inclination. And, indeed, it comes to just the same thing : to say, the circumstances of the mind are such as tend to sway and turn its inclination one way, is the same thing, as to say, the inclination of the mind, as under such circumstances, tends that way. Or if any think it most proper to say, that Motives do alter the inclination, and give a new bias to the mind, it will not alter the case, as to the present argument. For if Motives operate by giving the mind an inclination, then they operate by destroying the mind's indifference, and lay ing it under a bias. But to do this, is to destroy the Arminian freedom : it is not to leave the Will to its own self-determination, but to bring it into subjection to the power of something extrinsic, which operates upon it, sways and determines it, previous to its own determination. So that what is done from Motive, cannot be either virtuous or vicious. Besides, if the acts of the Will are excited by Motives, those Motives are the causes of those acts of the Will ; which makes the acts of the Will necessary ; as effects necessarily follow the efficiency of the cause. And if the influence and power of the Motive causes the volition, then the influence of the Motive determines volition, and voli tion does not determine itself; and so is not free, in the sense of Arminians, (as has beea largely shown already,) and consequently can be neither virtuous nor vicious. The supposition which has already been taken notice of as an insufficient evasion in other cases, would be, in like manner, impertinently alleged in this case; namely, the supposition that liberty consists in a power of suspending action for the present, in order to deliberation. If it should be said, Though it be true, that the Will is under a neces sity of finally following the strongest Motive ; yet it may, for the present, forbear to act upon the Motive presented, till there has been opportunity thoroughly to consider it, and compare its real weight with the merit of other Motives. I answer as follows : Here again, it must be remembered, that if determining thus to suspend and consider, be that act of the Wili, wherein alone liberty is exercised, then in this all virtue and vice must consist ; and the acts that follow this consi deration, and are the effects of it, being necessary, are no more virtuous or vicious than some good or bad events, which happen when they are fast asleep, and are the conse quences of what they did when they were awake. There fore, I would here observe two things : 1. To suppose, that all virtue and vice, in every case, consists in determining, whether to take time for consider ation or not, is not agreeable to common sense. For, ac cording to such a supposition, the most horrid crimes, adultery, murder, sodomy, blasphemy, &c. do not at all consist in the horrid nature of the things themselves, but only in the neglect of thorough consideration before they were perpetrated, which brings their viciousness to a small matter, and makes all crimes equal. If it be said, that neglect of consideration, when such heinous evils are pro posed to choice, is worse than in other cases : I answer, this is inconsistent, as it supposes the very thing to be, which, at the same time, is supposed not to be ; it sup poses all moral evil, all viciousness and heinousness, does * The true reason why counsels, exhortations, &c. commonly called motives, are consistent with the doctrine of necessity held by Calvinists, may be here noticed, in addition to some hints before given. In order to this, we must guard .against ambiguity in the word " motive," which at one time is intended for the object exhibited, abstractedly considered; at another, the object concretively, as it stands in the view of the mind. The opposers of that necessity for which our author pleads must in order to make even a show of consistency, understand the word " motive" in the first of these acceptations. And if so. it is nothing marvellous that they should maintain the existence of a power in the human mind which can, on the one hand, successfully oppose the strongest possible motive ; and on the other, be determined by a weaker, and even sometimes by the weakest motive. For how often is the most insignificant bawble preferred to in finite excellence ! But consistent Calvinists do not understand the term in any such manner, but rather as an effect compounded of the state of the mind and tbe real object. And, seeing the object, in itself considered, is not changed by mental perception, the difference of the effect, or change of mental view, must arise from the mind itself. Hence one motive, in the Arminian sense, may produce, in the other acceptation of the term, a thou sand different motives, according to the different mental states to which the object is presented. Therefore counsels, exhortations, invitations, &c. are most rationally ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Paet IIL not consist merely in the want of consideration. It sup- poses some crimes in themselves, in their own nature,lo be more heinous than others, antecedent to consideration, or inconsideration, which lays the person under a previous obligation to consider in some cases more than others. 2 If it were so, that all virtue and vice, in every case, consisted only in the act of the Will, whereby it deter mines whether to consider or no, it would not alter the case in the least, as to the present argument. For still m this act of the Will on this determination, it is induced by some Motive, and necessarily follows the strongest Mo tive ; and so is necessarily, even in that act wherein alone it is either virtuous or vicious. ¦ , ¦ One thing more I would observe, concerning the incon sistence of Arminian notions of moral Agency with the In fluence of Motives.— I suppose none will deny, that it is possible for such powerful Motives to be set before the mind, exhibited in so strong a light, and under such ad vantageous circumstances, as to be invincible ; and such as the mind cannot but yield to. In this case, Arminians will doubtless say, liberty is destroyed. And if so, then if Motives are exhibited with half so much power, they hinder liberty in proportion to their strength, and go half way towards destroying it. If a thousand degrees of Motive abolish all liberty, then five hundred take it half away. If one degree of "the influence of Motive does not at all infringe or diminish liberty, then no more do two degrees ; for nothing doubled, is still nothing. And if two degrees do not diminish the Will's liberty, no more do four, eight, sixteen, or six thousand. For nothing how ever multiplied comes to but nothing, if there be nothing in the nature of Motive or moral suasion, that is at all op posite to liberty, then the greatest degree of it cannot hurt liberty. But if there be somewhat, in the nature of the thing, against liberty, then the least degree of it hurts in some degree ; and consequently diminishes virtue. If in vincible Motives to that action which is good, take away all the freedom of the act, and so all the virtue of it; then the more forcible the Motives are, so much the worse, so much the less virtue ; and the weaker the Motives are, the better for the cause of virtue ; and none is best of all. Now let it be considered, whether these things are agree able to common sense. If it should be allowed, that there are some instances wherein the soul chooses without any Motive, what virtue can there be in such a choice ? lam sure there is no prudence or wisdom in it. Such a choice is made for no good end ; being made for no end at all. If it were for any end, the view of the end would be the Motive exciting to the act ; and if the act be for no good end, and so from no good aim, then there is no good in tention in it: and, therefore, according to all our natural notions of virtue, no more virtue in it than in the motion of the smoke, which is driven to and fro by the wind, with out any aim or end in the thing moved, and which knows not whither, nor wherefore, it is moved. Corol. 1. By these things it appears, that the argument against the Calvinists, taken from the use of counsels, ex^ hortations, invitations, expostulations, &c. so much insisted on by Arminians, is truly against themselves. For these things can operate no other way to any good effect, than as in them is exhibited Motive and Inducement, tending to excite and determine the acts of the Will* But it follows, on their principles, that the acts of Will excited by such causes, cannot be virtuous ; because, so far as they are employed by Calvinists ; for that which determines the human will to action, is the motive as it is perceived, or that which results from an ap plication of the object to the mind. According to them, without an object presented there can be no motive, any more than there can be a motive without a mind to wbich it is presented. Without evangelical truth, and an evangelical mind, or disposition, there can be no evangelical determin ing motive. Consequently, if the mind be at all roused from ignorance and apathy, determining motives must he produced in it by a representation of objects, by counsels, exhortations, invitations, expostulations, &.C These will succeed, or fail of success, morally, according to the state of the mind. But as the agent is free from co-action, constraint, and compulsion, in the act of choosing, the true inference is — not that such use of the means is un suitable or inconsistent, but — that here is clearly implied the great neces sity, the rationality, and tbe perfect consistency of prayer to the God of grace, for success on the use of means. Paul may plant, and Apollos may water, but God giveth the increase. To influence the mind toitnout moral motives, is the prerogative of God. .All hearts are in his hand to form them as he pleases. If the tree be good by sovereign influence, or a new birth, the fruit of love to God and hatred to sin, holy fear, unfeigned faith, humble hope, _.c. will follow, according to the objects presented. A crop will not follow without the union of two things, seed and soil. If both be good, the crop will be good, but not otherwise. That motive which determines the Sect. V_T. ARMINIAN NOTIONS OF MORAL AGENCY, &c. 57 from these, they are not from the Wall's self-determining power. Hence it will follow, that it is not worth while to offer any arguments to persuade men to any virtuous voli tion or voluntary action ; it is in vain to set before them the wisdom and amiableness of ways of virtue, or the odiousness and folly of ways of vice. This notion of liberty and moral Agency frustrates all endeavours to draw men to virtue by instruction or persuasion, precept or ex ample : for though these things may induce them to what is materially virtuous, yet at the same time they take away the./i)m of virtue, because thev destroy liberty ; as they, by their own power, put the Will out of its equilibrium, determine and turn the scale, and take the work of self- determining power out of its hands. And the clearer the instructions given, the more powerful the arguments used, and the more moving the persuasions or examples, the more likely they are to frustrate their own design; because they have so much the greater tendency to put the Will out of its balance, to hinder its freedom of self-determination ; and so to exclude the very form of virtue, and the essence of whatsoever is praiseworthy. So it clearly follows, from these principles, that God has no hand in any man's virtue, nor does at all promote it, either by a physical or moral influence ; that none of the moral methods he uses with men to promote virtue in the world, have any tendency to the attainment of that end ; that all the instructions he has given men, from the begin ning of the world to this day, by prophets or apostles, or by his Son Jesus Christ ; that all his counsels, invitations, promises, threatenings, warnings, and expostulations ; that all means he has used with men, in ordinances, or provi dences ; yea, all influences of his Spirit, ordinary and ex traordinary, have had no tendency at all to excite any one virtuous act of the mind, or to promote any thing morally good and commendable, in any respect. — For there is no way that these or any other means can promote virtue, but one of these three. Either, (1.) By a physical opera tion on the heart. But all effects that are wrought in men in this way, have no virtue in them, by the concurring voice of all Arminians. Or, (2.) Morally, by exhibiting Motives to the understanding, to excite good acts in the Will. But it has been demonstrated, that volitions ex cited by Motives, are necessary, and not excited by a self- moving power ; and therefore, by their principles, there is no virtue in them. Or, (3.) By merely giving the Will an opportunity to determine itself concerning the objects proposed, either to choose or reject, by its own uncaused, unmoved, uninfluenced self-determination. And if this be all, then all those means do no more to promote virtue than vice : for they do nothing but give the Will oppor tunity to determine itself either way, either to good or bad, without laying it under any bias to either: and so there is really as much of an opportunity given to determine in fa vour of evil, as of good. Thus that horrid blasphemous consequence will cer tainly follow from the Arminian doctrine, which they charge on others ; namely, that God acts an inconsistent part in using so many counsels, warnings, invitations, en treaties, &c. with sinners, to induce them to forsake sin, and turn to the ways of virtue ; and that all are insincere and fallacious. It will follow, from their doctrine, that God does these things when he knows, at the same time, that they have no manner of tendency to promote the effect he seems to aim at ; yea, knows that if they have any influence, this very influence will be inconsistent with such an effect, and will prevent it. But what an imputa tion of insincerity would this fix on him, who is infinitely holy and true ! — So that theirs is the doctrine which, if pursued in its consequences, does horribly reflect on the Most High, and fix on him the charge of hypocrisy ; and not the doctrine of the Calvinist, according to their fre quent and vehement exclamations and invectives. Corol. 2. From what has been observed in this section, it again appears, that Arminian principles and notions, when fairly examined and pursued in their demonstrable consequences, do evidently shut all virtue out of the world, and make it impossible that there should ever be any such thing, in any case ; or that any such thing should ever be conceived of. For^by these principles, the very notion of virtue or vice implies absurdity and contradic tion. For it is absurd in itself, and contrary to common sense, to suppose a virtuous act of mind without any good- intention or aim; and, by their principles, it is absurd to suppose a virtuous act with a good intention or aim ; for to act for an end, is to act from a Motive. So that if we rely on these principles, there can be no virtuous act with a good design and end ; and it is self-evident, there can be none without : consequently there can be no virtuous act at all. Corol. 3. It is manifest, that Arminian notions of moral Agency, and the being of a faculty of Will, cannot consist together ; and that if there can be any such thing as either a virtuous or vicious act, it cannot be an act of the Will ; no Will can be at all concerned in it. For that act which is performed without inclination, without Motive, without end, must be performed without any concern of the Will. To suppose an act of the Will without these, implies a contradiction. If the soul in its act has no motive or end ; then, in that act (as was observed before) it seeks nothing, goes after nothing, exerts no inclination to any thing ; and this implies, that in that act it desires nothing, and chooses nothing ; so that there is no act of choice in the case : and that is as much as to say, there is no act of Will in the case. Which very effectually shuts all vicious and vir tuous acts out of the universe ; inasmuch as, according to this, there can be no vicious or virtuous act wherein the Will is concerned : and according to the plainest dic tates of reason, and the light of nature, and also the princi ples of Arminians themselves, there can be no virtuous or vicious act wherein the Will is not concerned. And there fore there is no room for any virtuous or vicious acts at all. Corol. 4. If none of the moral actions of intelligent beings are influenced by either previous inclination or Motive, another strange thing will follow ; and this is, that God not only cannot foreknow any of the future moral actions of his creatures, but he can make no conjecture, can give no probable guess concerning them. For all conjecture in things of this nature must depend on some discerning or apprehension of these two things, previous Disposition and Motive, which, as has been observed, Arminian notions of moral Agency, in their real conse quence, altogether exclude. PART IV. WHEREIN THE CHIEF GROUNDS OF THE REASONINGS OF ARMINIANS, IN SUPPORT AND DEFENCE OF THE FORE-MEN TIONED NOTIONS OF LIBERTY, MORAL AGENCY, _c. AND AGAINST THE OPPOSITE DOCTRINE, ARE CONSIDERED. SECT. I. The Essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and acts of the Will, ties not in their Cause, but their Nature* One main foundation of the reasons, which are brought to establish the forementioned notions of liberty, virtue, will, cannot arise from any other cause than the object and the disposition united. And then only can the determining motive be good, when it re sults from a good object applied to a good disposition, or state of mind. vice, &c. is a supposition, that the virtuousness of the dis positions, or acts of the Will, consists not in the nature of these dispositions, or acts of the Will, but wholly in the Origin or Cause of them : so that if the disposition of the mind, or acts of the Will, be never so good, yet if the Cause of the disposition or act be not our virtue, there is nothing virtuous or praiseworthy in it ; and, on the contrary, if the These things duly considered will sufficiently prove why Calvinists use counsels, exhortations, invitations, &tc. — W. * This may appear to some to be an identical proposition -" The essence 58 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part IV. Will, in its inclination or acts, be never so bad, yet, unless it arises from something that is our vice or fault, there of a thing lies in its nature ;" but it is not wholly so, and the whole of the firoposition is exceedingly important, on account of the negative part, or the ncidental proposition it contains, viz. The essence of virtue and vice lies not in their cause. A single consideration may be sufficient to show the truth and importance of one part of this last proposition. If the essence of virtue lay in its cause, how could the first cause, or the uncaused nature, be virtuous? If therefore the first cause be virtuous, or have the essence of virtue, as all atheists will allow, it is plain, that essence must lie in the nature of that cause itself. Hence, as God is the standard of all moral excellence, created natures are morally excellent in proportion as they re semble him. And as virtue is an imitable excellence, and as good reason can be assigned why the resemblance should not hold in this particular, it is highly probable, a priori, that, in reference to created natures, the essence of their virtue lies not in its cause. To demonstrate this last, is the design of the present section. Again, as the essence of virtue lies not in its cause, so neither does the essence of vice Me in its cause. But the philosophical ground of this part of the general proposition demands more particular attention. And as this proposition — " the essence of vice lies not in its cause," affects the whole system of morals, and indeed of theology, we beg leave to propose a series of remarks wbich, it is hoped, will cast some light on the subject. 1. Causes are of two kinds, and of two only, either positive or negative. Positive causes produce positive effects, from the first cause through all secondary causes ; and these positive secondary causes are nothing else but so many decretive antecedents, which act physically, and their conse quences follow from the nature of things; even as number follows the repetition of units, or happiness results from true virtue. 2. The term " cause " is applied less properly to express a negative idea ; for it expresses merely an antecedent of a consequent For instance, if we say that a man cannot read because he is blind, or cannot walk because he has no legs, or cannot go to heaven because he does not love God, and the like ; it is manifest that blindness, want of legs, and want of love to God, are " causes " only as antecedents are causes to their consequents, without positive influence. 3. Negative causes, though they have no positive operation in producing their consequents, are no less the ground of certainty than those causes, properly so called, which exist in physical operations. For the consequent follows the antecedent with equal certainty, whether the connexion be formed by decretive will and energy, as in all positive causes, or by the nature of things only, which is essential truth, as in all negative causes. 4. The cause of vicious acts, is a vicious disposition ; in other words, it is the icant, or the absence of a virtuous disposition. The essence of the vicious act, however, is not in the cause, or disposition. The vice of the dis position is one thing, and the vice of the act is another. For as the nature of the disposition, and the nature of the act, are different; so the vice, or moral badness of the one, is a differeot badness from that of the other. Tbe one and the other is a bad thing whatever be the cause, and irrespective of any. Hence, 5. Evil dispositions or acts should he denominated such, not from their cause, but from their nature. Were it otherwise, personal fault, or blame, could never exist ; for the vicious act would transfer the blame to the dispo sition, and the disposition to the cause of that ; whereby persons would be free from blame, and this would attach to principles only. But to suppose a moral agent incapable of blameworthiness, which on the supposition would be the case, is a gross absurdity. It would be to suppose an accountable being, who at the same time can be accountable for nothing ; and it would be to impute blame to principles, or a principle, which is incapable of moral agency. 6. lhe cause of virtuous acts, or, if we may so speak, the soil in which they grow, is a previous inclination or disposition to good, before any actual choice takes place. This may be called a virtuous inclination, or disposi tion. But the original and predisposing cause of that, is divine energy, in flux, or influence ; in other words, an assimilating emanation from the holy nature and decretive will of God. 7. Nevertheless, this is not a good, or a virtue, attributable to man, until he is actually possessed of it, or it becomes his, as a quality of his nature. God, the Father of lights, from whom every good and perfect gift proceed ed, is the cause of that virtuous disposition ; but while the virtue remained in the cause, and not in the man, it was no human virtue. Nor does the essence of human virtue lie in the communication itself, for this was the effect of divine will ; but no will can alter the nature of virtue : therefore, the essence of virtue consists not in the cause, whether we understand by *' cause," the Will that communicates the virtuous disposition, or the com munication itself. Consequently, the absence of virtue is so completely confined to the disposition of the agent, and the consequent acts, as to ex clude every thing else that may be termed its cause. 8. The cause of vicious acts, whatever it be, is opposite to the cause of virtuous acts ; for these acts have diametrically opposite effects. That vi cious acts have a cause, as well as virtuous ones, cannot be denied by any reflecting person, for this plain reason, that there is nothing in the univer sality of things, beings, qualities, &c. but has a cause, either positive or negative, as before explained. Neither agency, liberty, nor anything else, considered as an effect, or a consequent, can exist without a cause, or an tecedent. The denial of this, and universal scepticism, are the same thing. Then all reasoning, and all common sense, vanish. Then body and spirit, cause and effects, good and evil, &c. are huddled up in endless confusion, without either first or last, great or small, order or proportion. 9. The original, predisposing cause of a vicious disposition, is the very op posite of the original, predisposing cause of a virtuous disposition. This last, it has been shown, is divine energy, wbich is a positive cause ; the other, the opposite of this, is a negative cause. The cause of good, as before ob served, is a cause properly so called, in the way of physical influence ; but the cause of evil is called " a cause" improperly, as it implies no physical influence, but only stands as an antecedent to a consequent; from which however the consequent may be inferred with as much certainty as if the influence were physical ana mechanical. Whether you suppose positive quantities, or negative quantities, consequences are equally certain, it is no less true that 5—2=3, than-|-33=6. Whether you say, If the sum. ere not, it would cause darkness ; or say, If the sun shine, it will cause light; the difference is only in the nature of the cause, as either positive or negative, not in the certainty of the consequence. 10. It would be very absurd and contradictory to say that the cause of vice is vicious. For that would be the same as to say, that a thing was be fore it existed. To be vicious is to hare vice ; and for this to be the cause of vice, is for it to be the cause of itself, or self-caused, which is absurd. It is therefore impossible that the cause of vice should be vicious ; conse quently the essence of vice is no where but in its own proper nature, to the exclusion of every cause whatever. And yet, as it is an effect, it must have a cause. 11. The principal question to be determined, in this investigation, is, What is precisely the original, predisposing, negative cause of a vicious dis position ? The answer is plain and short; it is that property of a creature which renders it absolutely dependent for its being and well-being. Or, it is nothing vicious or blameworthy in it. Hence their grand objection and pretended demonstration, or self-evidence, is that property which is the very opposite to independence, self-sufficiency, and immutability : and therefore is a property peculiar to a creature, and cannot belong to God. 12. Nor can_this be said to be an actually existing property from eternity ; since it cannot belong to God, and nothing, the only alternative, has no pro perty. It is not therefore the Manichean eternal evil principle, ifby thisbe meant any thing actually existing, as coeval with a good principle. Good is a principle positively eternal; but what we speak of is a mere negative principle, and owes its existence as a property to a created nature ; and were every creature annihilated, this property would also cease to be. 13. But what shall we call this principle, property, or predisposing cause of vice ? Shall we call it defectibility, defect, limitation, or imperfection of existence ? Not the first: for the question would return, What makes a creature defectible ? Not the second ; for the term is ambiguous, as there are several kinds of defect, natural and moral, and therefore, as the word is of common use, and of frequent occurrence, it would require perpetual ex-- Slanations. Not the third, or the fourth; for the same reason. A term lerefore not ambiguous, and sufficiently expressive, should be employed; as we employ technical terms to express a specific object. For this purpose, no term, perhaps, is less exceptionable, or more suitable, than passivj power; for it is free from ambiguity, and is sufficiently expressive of the idea already explained. The idea of passivity is clearly implied in the name, as in the thing ; and the term pomer seems preferable to property, or quality, because less ambiguous, and yet more expressive to convey the intended idea of metaphysical influence of cause and effect. 14. To which wemay add, That " passive power" is by no meansanew coined expression ; but has often been used to express the very idea to which it is here applied. Thus, above a century and a half ago, that eminently pious and profoundly learned divine, Theophilus Gale, in his " Court of tbe Gentiles," says : " The root and origin of all creatural dependence, is the creature's passive power, and God's absolute dominion over it— Now all limits as to nature and essence speak a mixture of nihility, passive power and dependence resulting therefrom ; whence Damascene adds, ' Mown yap to ft (or araBe? eet what the mind has no power to prevent, precluding all previous choice in the affair. So that an act according to their metaphysical notion of it, is something of which there is no idea; it is nothing but a confusion of the mind, excited by words without any distinct meaning, and is an absolute non-entity ; and that in two respects : (1.) There is nothing in the world that ever was, is, or can be, to answer the things which must belong to its description, according to what they suppose to be essential to it. And, (2.) There neither is, nor ever was, nor can be, any notion or idea to answer the word, as they use and explain it. For if we should suppose any such notion, it would many ways destroy itself. But it is impossible any idea or notion should subsist in the mind, whose very nature and essence, which constitutes it, de stroys it. — If some learned philosopher, who had been abroad, in giving an account of the curious observations he had made in his travels, should say, " He had been in Terra del Fuego, and there had seen an animal, which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth it self, and yet had a sire and dam distinct from itself ; that it had an appetite, and was hungry before it had a being ; that his master, who led him, and governed him at his pleasure, was always governed by him, and driven by him where he pleased ; that when he moved, he always took a step before the first step ; that he went with his head first, and yet always went tail foremost ; and this, though he had neither head nor tail :" it would be no impudence at all, to tell such a traveller, though a learned man, that he himself had no idea of such an animal as he gave an ac count of, and never had, nor ever would have. As the forementioned notion of Action is very incon sistent, so it is wholly diverse from the original meaning of the word. The more usual signification of it, in vulgar speech, seems to be some motion or exertion of power, that is voluntary, or that is the effect of the Will'; and is used in the same sense as doing : and most commonly it is used to signify outward Actions. So thinking is often distin guished from acting; and desiring and willing, from doing. Besides this more usual and proper signification of the word Action, there are other ways in which the word is used, that are less proper, which yet have place in com mon speech. Oftentimes it is used to signify some mo tion or alteration in inanimate things, with relation to some object and effect. So the spring of a watch is said to act upon the chain and wheels ; the sun-beams, to act upon plants and trees : and the fire, to act upon wood. Some times, the word is used to signify motions, alterations, and exertions of power, which are seen in corporeal things, con sidered absolutely ; especially when these motions seem to arise from some internal cause which is hidden; so that they have a greater resemblance of those motions of our bodies, which are the effects of natural volition, or invisible exertions of Will. So the fermentation of liquor, the opera tions of the loadstone, and of electrical bodies, are called the Action of these things. And sometimes the word Ac tion is used to signify the exercise of thought, or of Will and inclination : so meditating, loving, hating, inclining, disinclining, choosing, and refusing, may be sometimes called acting ; though more rarely (unless it be by philo sophers and metaphysicians) than in any of the other senses. But the word is never used in vulgar speech for the self-determinate exercise of the Will, or an exertion of the soul that arises without any necessary connexion with any thing foregoing. If a man does something voluntarily, or as the effect of his choice, then in the most proper sense, and as the word is most originally and commonly used, he is said to act ; but whether that choice or volition be self- determined, or no, whether it be connected with a fore going habitual bias, whether it be the certain effect of the strongest motive, or some intrinsic cause, never comes into consideration in the meaning of the word. * This distinction is of considerable moment. The soul is passive, for instance, in reference to that necessity of dependence which is inseparable from a created nature ; and when the subject of providential energy in natural acts ; and also when the subject of that divine influence which pu rifies and enables the mind, and whereby holy effects are secured ; and in all these respects it is passive at the very time that i t is ac live in i ts choice And if the word Action is arbitrarily used by some men otherwise, to suit some scheme of metaphysics or morality, no argument can reasonably^be founded on such an use of this term, to prove any thing but their own pleasure. For divines and philosophers strenuously to urge such argu ments, as though they were sufficient to support and de monstrate a whole scheme of moral philosophy and di vinity, is certainly to erect a mighty edifice on the sand, or rather on a shadow. And though it may now perhaps, through custom, have become natural for them to use the word in this sense, (if that may be called a sense or mean ing, which is inconsistent with itself,) yet this does not prove, that it is agreeable to the natural notions men have of things, or that there can be any thing in the creation that should answer such a meaning. And though they appeal to experience, yet the truth is, that men are so far from ex periencing any such thing, that it is impossible for them to have any conception of it. If it should be objected, that Action and Passion are doubtless words of a contrary signification ; but to suppose that the agent, in its Action, is under the power and influ ence of something intrinsic, is to confound Action and passion, and make them the same thing. I answer, that Action and Passion are doubtless, as they are sometimes used, words of opposite signification; but not as signifying opposite existences, but only opposite re lations. The words cause and effect are terms of opposite signification ; but, nevertheless, if I assert, that the same thing may, at the same time, in different respects and re lations, be both cause and effect, this will not prove that I confound the terms. The soul may be both active and passive in the same thing in different respects ; active with relation to one thing, and passive with relation to another.* The word Passion, when set in opposition to Action, or rather activeness, is merely a relative : it signifies no effector cause, nor any proper existence; but is the same with Passiveness, or a being passive, or a being acted upon by some thing. Which is a mere relation of a thing to some power or force exerted by some cause, producing some effect in it, or upon it. And Action, when set properly in opposition to Passitm, or Passiveness, is no real existence ; it is not the same with AN Action, but is a mere relation : it is the activeness of something on another thing, being the opposite relation to the other, viz. a relation of power, or force, exerted by some cause, towards another thing, which is the subject of the effect of that power. Indeed, the word Action is frequently used to signify something not merely relative, but more absolute, and a real existence ; as when we say an Action; when the word is not used transitively, but absolutely, for some motion or exercise of body or mind, without any relation to any object or effect: and as used thus, it is not properly the opposite of Pas sion ; which ordinarily signifies nothing absolute, but merely the relation of being acted upon. And therefore if the word Action be used in the like relative sense, then Action and Passion are only two contrary relations. And it is no absurdity to suppose, that contrary relations may belong to the same thing at the same time, with respect to different things. So to suppose, that there are acts of the soul by which a man voluntarily moves, and acts upon ob jects, and produces effects, which yet themselves are effects of something else, and wherein the soul itself is the object of something acting upon, and influencing that, do not at all confound Action and Passion. The words may never- less be properly of opposite signification : there mav be as true and real a difference between acting and being' caused to act, though we should suppose the soul to be both in the same volition, as there is between living and being quickened, or made to live. It is no more a contradiction, to suppose that Action may be the effect of some other cause, besides the agent, or being that acts, than to sup pose, that life may be the effect of some other cause, be sides the being that lives. What has led men into this inconsistent notion of Action, when applied to volition— as though it were essen- or preference. In other words, the mind is necessitated in some respects ; as, to exist, to think, to will, to suffer, or to enjoy ; at the same instant that ltis/reein other respects, as, from contingence, (understandins therebvad event without any cause,) and from compulsion, at physical necessity in its acts as moral. ~— w . Sect. III. CALVINISM NOT AGAINST COMMON SENSE. 63 tial to this internal Action, that the agent should be self- determined in it, and that the Will should be the cause of it — was probably this ; that according to the sense of man kind, and the common use of language, it is so, with respect to men's external Actions ; which originally, and according to the vulgar use and most proper sense of the word, are called Actions. Men in these are self-directed, self-determined, and their Wills are the cause of the mo tions of their bodies, and external things done ; so that unless men do them voluntarily, and of choice, and the Action be determined by their antecedent volition, it is no Action or doing of theirs. Hence some metaphysicians have been led unwarily, but exceeding absurdly, to sup pose the same concerning volition itself, that that also must be determined by the Will ; which is to be determined by antecedent volition, as the motion of the body is ; not con sidering the contradiction it implies. But it is very evident, that in the metaphysical distinc tion between Action and passion (though long since be come common and in general vogue) due care has not been taken to conform language to the nature of things, or to any distinct clear ideas. As it is in innumerable other philo sophical metaphysical terms, used in these disputes; which has occasioned inexpressible difficulty, contention, error, and confusion. And thus probably it came to be thought, that necessity was inconsistent with Action, as these terms are applied to volition. First, these terms Action and necessity are changed from their original meaning, as signifying external voluntary Action and constraint (in which meaning they are evidently inconsistent) to signify quite other things, viz. volition itself, and certainty of existence. And when the change of signification is made, care is not taken to make proper allowances and abatements for the difference of sense ; but still the same things are unwarily attributed to Action and necessity, in the new meaning of the words, which plainly belonged to them in their first sense ; and on this ground, maxims are established without any real foundation, as though they were the most certain truths, and the most evident dictates of reason. But however strenuously it is maintained, that what is necessary cannot be properly called Action, and that a necessary Action is a contradiction, yet it is probable there are few Arminian divines, who thoroughly tried, would stand to these principles. They will allow, that God is, in the highest sense, an active Being, and the highest Fountain of life and Action ; and they would not pro bably deny, that what are called God's acts of righteous ness, holiness, and faithfulness, are truly and properly God's acts, and God is really a holy Agent in them ; and yet, I trust, they will not deny, that God necessarily acts justly and faithfully, and that it is impossible for him to act unrighteously and unholily. SECT. III. The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose those things which are necessary to be worthy of either Praise or Blame. It is abundantly affirmed and urged by Arminian writers, that it is contrary to common Sense, and the natural notions and apprehensions of mankind, to suppose other wise than that necessity (making no distinction between natural and moral necessity) is inconsistent with Virtue and Vice, Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment. And their arguments from hence have been greatly triumph ed in ; and nave been not a little perplexing to many, who have been friendly to the truth, as clearly revealed in the Holy Scriptures : it has seemed to them indeed difficult, to reconcile Calvinistic doctrines with the notions men com monly have of justice and equity. The true reasons of it seem to be the following : I. It is indeed a very plain dictate of common Sense, that natural necessity is wholly inconsistent with just Praise or Blame. If men do tilings which in themselves are very good, fit to be brought to pass, and attended with very happy effects, properlv against their Wills; or do them from a necessity that is without their Wills, or with which their Wills have no concern or connexion ; then it is a plain dictate of common Sense, that such doings are none of their virtue, nor have they any moral good'_n them; and that the persons are not worthy to be rewarded or praised ; or at all esteemed, honoured, or loved, on that account. And, on the other hand, that if, from like necessity, they do those things which in themselves are very unhappy and pernicious, and do them because they cannot help it ; the necessity is such, that it is all one whether they will them, or no ; and the reason why they are done, is from necessity only, and not from their Wills ; it is a very plain dictate of common Sense, that they are not at all to blame ; there is no vice, fault, or moral evil at all in the effect done ; nor are they, who are thus necessitated, in any wise worthy to be punished, hated, or in the least disrespected, on that account. In like manner, if things in themselves good and desir able are absolutely impossible, with a natural impossibility, the universal reason of mankind teaches, that this wholly and perfectly excuses persons in their not doing them. And it is also a plain dictate of common Sense, that if doing things, in themselves good, or avoiding things in themselves evil, is not absolutely impossible, with such a natural impossibility, but very difficult, with a natural difficulty ; that is, a difficulty prior to, and not at all con sisting in, Will and inclination itself, and which would re main the same, let the inclination be what it will ; then a person's neglect or omission is excused in some mea sure, though not wholly; his sin is less aggravated, than if the thing to be done were easy. And if instead of difficulty and hinderance, there be a contrary natural propensity in the state of things, to the thing to be done, or effect to be brought to pass, abstracted from any con sideration of the inclination of the heart ; though the pro pensity be not so great as to amount to a natural necessity ; yet being some approach to it, so that the doing of the good thing be very much from this natural tendency in the state of things, and but little from a good inclination ; then it is a dictate of common Sense, that there is so much the less virtue in what is done ; and so it is less praiseworthy and rewardable. The reason is easy, viz. because such a natural propensity or tendency is an approach to natural necessity; and the greater the propensity, still so much the nearer is the approach to necessity. And, therefore, as natural necessity takes away or shuts out all virtue, so this propensity approaches to an abolition of virtue ; that is, it diminishes it. And on the other hand, natural difficulty, in the state of things, is an approach to natural impossibility. And as the latter, when it is complete and absolute, wholly takes away Blame; so such difficulty takes away some Blame, or diminishes Blame; and makes the thing done to be less worthy of punishment. II. Men, in their first use of such phrases as these, must, cannot, cannot help it, cannot avoid it, necessary, unable, impossible, unavoidable, irresistible, Sfc. use them to signify a necessity of constraint or restraint, a natural necessity or impossibility ; or some necessity that the Will has nothing to do in ; which may be, whether men will or no ; and which may be supposed to be just the same, let men's in clinations and desires be what they will. Such kind of terms in their original use, I suppose among all nations, are relative ; carrying in their signification (as was before observed) a reference or respect to some contrary Will, desire, or endeavour, which, it is supposed, is, or may be, in the case. All men find, and begin to find in early child hood, that there are innumerable things that cannot be done, which they desire to do ; and innumerable things, which they are averse to, that must be, they cannot avoid them, they will be, whether they choose them or no. It is to express this necessity, which men so soon and so often find, and which so greatly and early affects them in in numerable cases, that such terms and phrases are first formed ; and it is to signify such a necessity, that they are first used, and that they are most constantly used, in the common affairs of life ; and not to signify any such meta physical, speculative, and abstract notion, as that connexion in the nature or course of things, which is between the subject and predicative of a proposition, and which is the foundation of the certain truth of that proposition; to signify which, they who employ themselves in philosophi- 64 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part IV. cal inquiries into the first origin and metaphysical relations and dependences of things, have borrowed these terms, for want of otherl. But we grow up from our cradles in the use of terms and phrases entirely different from this, and carrying a sense exceeding diverse from that in which they are commonly used in the controversy between Arminians and Calvinists. And it being, as was said before, a dictate of the universal sense of mankind, evident to us as soon as we begin to think, that the necessity signified by these terms, in the sense in which we first learn them, does ex cuse persons, and free them from all Fault or Blame ; hence our ideas of excusableness or faultlessness is tied to these terms and phrases by a strong habit, which is begun in childhood, as soon as we begin to speak, and grows up with us, and is strengthened by constant use and custom, the connexion growing stronger and stronger. The habitual connexion, which is in men's minds be tween Blamelessness and those forementioned terms, must, cannot, unable, necessary, impossible, unavoidable, fyc. be comes very strong, because, as soon as ever men begin to use reason and speech, they have occasion to excuse them selves, from the natural necessity signified by these terms, in numerous instances. — I cannot do it — I could not help it — And all mankind have constant and daily occasion to use such phrases in this sense, to excuse themselves and others, in almost all the concerns of life, with respect to disappointments, and things that happen, which concern and affect ourselves and others, that are hurtful, or dis agreeable to us or them, or things desirable, that we or others fail to obtain. That our being accustomed to an union of different ideas, from early childhood, makes the habitual connexion exceeding strong, as though such connexion were owing to nature, is manifest in innumerable instances. It is alto gether by such an habitual connexion of ideas, that men judge of the bigness or distance of the objects of sight, from their appearance. Thus it is owing to such a con nexion early established, and growing up with a person, that he judges a mountain, which he sees at ten miles dis tance, to be bigger than his nose, or further off than the end of it. Having been used so long to join a consider able distance and magnitude with such an appearance, men imagine it is by a dictate of natural sense : whereas, it would be quite otherwise with one that had his eyes newly opened, who had been born blind : he would have the same visible appearance, but natural sense would dic tate no such thing, concerning the magnitude or distance of what appeared. III. When men, after they had been so habituated to connect ideas of Innocency or Blamelessness with such terms, that the union seems to be the effect of mere na ture, come to hear the same terms used, and learn to use them in the forementioned new and metaphysical sense, to signify quite another sort of necessity, which has no such kind of relation to a contrary supposable Will and endeavour ; the notion of plain and manifest Blameless ness, by this means, is, by a strong prejudice, insensibly and unwarily transferred to a case to which it by no means belongs : the change of the use of the terms, to a significa tion which is very diverse, not being taken notice of, or adverted to. And there are several reasons why it is not. 1. The terms, as used by philosophers, are not very distinct and clear in their meaning : few use them in a fixed determinate sense. On the contrary, their meaning is very vague and confused. Which commonly happens to the words used to signify things intellectual and moral, and to express what Mr. Locke calls mixt modes. If men had a clear and distinct understanding of what is intended by these metaphysical terms, they would be able more easily to compare them with their original and common sense; and so would not be easily led into delusion by words of this sort. 2. The change of the signification of terms is the more insensible, because the things signified, though indeed very different, yet do in some generals agree. In necessity, that which is vulgarly so called, there is a strong con nexion between the thing said to be necessary, and some thing antecedent to it, in the order of nature ; so there is also a philosophical necessity. And though in both kinds of necessity, the connexion cannot be called by that name, with relation to an opposite Will or endeavour, to which it is superior ; which is the case in vulgar necessity ; yet in both, the connexion is prior to Will and endeavour, and so, in some respect, superior. In both kinds of ne cessity, there is a foundation for some certainty of the proposition, that affirms the event The terms used being the same, and the things signified agreeing in these and some other general circumstances, and the expressions as used by philosophers being not well defined, and so of obscure and loose signification; hence persons are not aware of the great difference ; the notions of innocence or faultiness, which were so strongly associated with them, and were strictly united in their minds, ever since they can remember, remain united with them still, as if the union were altogether natural and necessary ; and they that go about to make a separation, seem to them to do great violence even to nature itself. IV. Another reason why it appears difficult to reconcile it with reason, that men should be blamed for that which is necessary, with a moral necessity, (which, as was ob served before, is a species of philosophical necessity) is, that for want of due consideration, men inwardly entertain that apprehension, that this necessity may be against men's Wills and sincere endeavours. They go away with that no'ion, that men may truly will, and wish, and strive that it may be otherwise ; but that invincible necessity stands in the way. And many think thus concerning themselves : some wicked men think they wish that they were good, and that they loved God and holiness ; but yet do not find that their wishes produce the effect. — The reasons why men think thus, are as follow : 1. They find what may be called an indirect willingness to have a better Will, in the manner before observed. For it is impossible, and a contradiction to suppose the Will to be directly and properly against itself. And they do not consider that this indirect willingness is entirely a "different thing from properly willing what is the duty and virtue required ; and that there is no virtue in that sort of willing ness which they have. They do not consider, that the volitions, which a wicked man may have that he loved God, are no acts of the Will at all against the moral evil of not loving God; but only some disagreeable conse quences. But the making of the requisite distinction re quires more care of reflection and thought, than most men are used to. And men, through a prejudice in their own favour, are disposed to think well of their own desires and dispositions, and to account them good and virtuous, though their respect to virtue be only indirect and remote, and it is nothing at all virtuous that truly excites or ter minates their inclinations. 2. Another thing that insensibly leads and beguiles men into a supposition that this moral necessity or impossibility is, or may be, against men's Wills and true endeavours,: is the derivation of the terms often used to express it. Such words for instance, as unable, unavoidable, impossible, irre sistible; which carry a plain reference to a supposable power exerted, endeavours used, resistance made, in oppo sition to the necessity : and the persons that hear them, not considering, nor suspecting, but that they are used in their proper sense : that sense being therefore understood, there does naturally, and as it were necessarily, arise in their minds a supposition, that it may be so indeed, that true desires and endeavours may take place, but that invincible necessity stands in the way, and renders them vain and to no effect. V. Another thing which makes persons more ready to suppose it to be contrary to reason, that men should be exposed to the punishments threatened to sin, for doing those things which are morally necessary, or not doing those things which are morally impossible, is, that imagi nation strengthens the argument, and adds greatly to the power and influence of the seeming reasons against it, from the greatness of that punishment. To allow that, they may be justly exposed to a small punishment, would not be so difficult. Whereas, if there were any good reason in the case, if it were truly a dictate of reason, that such ne cessity was inconsistent with faultiness, or just punish ment, the demonstration would be equally certain with respect to a small punishment, or any punishment at all, as a very great one : but it is not equally easy to the Sect. IV. NECESSARY VIRTUE AGREEABLE TO COMMON SENSE. imagination. They that argue against the justice of damn ing men for those things that are thus necessary, seem to make their argument the stronger, by setting forth the greatness of the punishment in strong expressions : — " That a man should be cast into eternal burnings, that he should be made to fry in hell to all eternity, for those things which he had no power to avoid, and was under a fatal, unfrustrable, invincible necessity of doing," &c. SECT. IV. It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of mankind, to suppose moral Necessity to be consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment. Whether the reasons, that have been given, why it ap pears difficult to some persons, to reconcile with common sense the praising or blaming, rewarding or punishing, those things which are morally necessary, are thought satis factory, or not ; yet it most evidently appears, by the fol lowing things, that if this matter be rightly understood, setting aside all delusion arising from the impropriety and ambiguity of terms, this is not at all inconsistent with the natural apprehensions of mankind, and that sense of things which is found every where in the common people ; who are furthest from having their thoughts perverted from their natural channel, by metaphysical and philosophical subtil- ties ; but, on the contrary, altogether agreeable to, and the very voice and dictate of, this natural and vulgar sense. I. This will appear, if we consider what the vulgar no tion of blameworthiness is. The idea which the common people, through all ages and nations, have of faultiness, I suppose to be plainly this ; a person being or doing wrong, with his own will and pleasure ; containing these two things : 1. His doing wrong, when he does as he pleases. 2. His pleasure being wrong. Or, in other words, perhaps more intelligibly expressing their notion ; a person having his heart wrong, and doing wrong from his lieart. And this is the sum total of the matter. The common people do not ascend up in their reflections and abstractions to the metaphysical sources, relations, and dependences of things, in order to form their notion of faultiness or blameworthiness. They do not wait till they have decided by their refinings, what first determines the Will ; whether it be determined by something extrinsic, or intrinsic ; whether volition determines volition, or whether the understanding determines the Will ; whether there be any such thing as metaphysicians mean by contingence (if they have any meaning); whether there be a sort of a strange unaccountable sovereignty in the Will, in the ex ercise of which, by its own sovereign acts, it brings to pass all its own sovereign acts. They do not take any part of their notion of Fault or Blame from the resolution of any such questions. If this were the case, there are multitudes, yea the far greater part of mankind, nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand, would live and die, with out having any such notion, as that of Fault, ever entering into their heads, or without so much as once having any conception that any body was to be either blamed or com mended for any thing. If this were the case, it would be a long time before men came to have such notions. Where as it is manifest, they are in fact some of the first notions that appear in children ; who discover, as soon as they can think, or speak, or act at all as rational creatures, a sense of desert. And, certainly, in forming their notion of it, they make no use of metaphysics. All the ground they go upon, consists in these two things : experience and a natural sensation of a certain fitness or agreeableness, which there is in uniting such moral evil as is above described, viz. a being or doing wrong with the Will, and resentment in others, and pain inflicted on the person in whom this moral evil is. Which natural sense is what we call by the name of conscience- It is true, the common people and children, in their notion of any faulty act or deed, of any person, do sup pose that it is the person's own act and deed. But this is * It is here argued, on supposition that not all propensity implies moral VOL. I. !•' all that belongs to what they understand by a thing being a person's own deed or action ; even that it is something done by him of choice. That some exercise or motion should begin of itself, does not belong to their notion of an action, or doing. If so, it would belong to their notion of it, that it is the cause of its own beginning : and that is as much as to say, that it is before it begins to be. Nor is their notion of an action some motion or exercise, that begins accidentally, without any cause or reason ; for that is contrary to one of the prime dictates of common sense, namely, that every thing that begins to be, has some cause or reason why it is. The common people, in their notion of a faulty or praise worthy work done by any one, do suppose, that the man does it in the exercise of liberty.. But then their notion of liberty is only a person having opportunity of doing as he pleases. They have no notion of liberty consisting in the Will first acting, and so causing its own acts ; determin ing, and so causing its own determinations ; or choosing, and so causing its own choice. Such a notion of liberty is what none have, but those that have darkened their own minds with confused metaphysical speculation, and ab struse and ambiguous terms, if a man is not restrained from acting as his Will determines, or constrained to act otherwise ; then he has liberty, according to common no tions of liberty, without taking into the idea that grand contradiction of all, the determinations of a man's free Will being the effects of the determinations of his free Will. — Nor have men commonly any notion of freedom consist ing in indifference. For if so, then it would be agreeable to their notion, that the greater indifference men act with, the more freedom they act with ; whereas, the reverse is true. He that in acting proceeds with the fullest inclina tion, does what he does with the greatest freedom, accord ing to common sense. And so far is it from being agree able to common sense, that such liberty as consists in indifference is requisite to Praise or Blame, that, on the contrary, the dictate of every man's natural sense through the world is, that the further he is from being indifferent in his acting good or evil, and the more he does either with full and strong inclination, the more is he esteemed or ab horred, commended or condemned. II. If it were inconsistent with the common sense of mankind, that men should be either blamed or commended in any volitions, in case of moral Necessitv or impossi bility ; then it would surely also be agreeable to the same sense and reason of mankind, that the nearer the case ap proaches to such a moral Necessity or impossibility — either through a strong antecedent moral propensity, on tho one hand,* or a great antecedent opposition and difficulty, on the other — the nearer does it approach to a person being neither blamable nor commendable ; so that acts exerted with such preceding propensity, would be worthy of pro portionably less Praise ; and when omitted, the act being attended with such difficulty, the omission would be worthy of the less Blame. It is so, as was observed be fore, with natural Necessitv and impossibility, propensity and difficulty : as it is a plain dictate of the sense of all mankind, that natural Necessity and impossibility take away all Blame and Praise ; and therefore, that the nearer the approach is to these, through previous propensity or difficulty, so Praise and Blame are proportionably dimin ished. And if it were as much a dictate of common sense, that moral Necessity of doing, or impossibility of avoiding, takes away all Praise and Blame, as that natural Necessity or impossibility does ; then, by a perfect parity of reason, it would be as much the dictate of common sense, that an approach of moral Necessity of doing, or impossibility of avoiding, diminishes Praise and Blame, as that an approach to natural Necessity and impossibility does so. It is equally the voice of common sense, that persons are ex cusable in part, in neglecting things difficult against their Wills, as that they are excusable wholly in neglecting things impossible against their Wills. And if it made no differ ence, whether the impossibility were natural and against the Will, or moral, lying in the Will, with regard to excus- ableness ; so neither would it make any difference, whether the difficulty, or approach to Necessity, be natural, necessity, but only some very tiigh degree; which none will deny. 66 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part IV. against the Will, or moral, lying in the propensity of the Will. But it is apparent, that the reverse of these things is true. If there be an approach to a moral Necessity in a man's exertion of good acts of Will, they being the exercise of a strong propensity to good, and a very powerful love to virtue; it is so far from being the dictate of common sense, that he is less virtuous, and the less to be esteemed, loved, and praised ; that it is agreeable to the natural notions of all mankind, that he is so much the better man, worthy of greater respect, and higher commendation. And the stronger the inclination is, and the nearer it ap proaches to Necessity in that respect ; or to impossibility of neglecting the virtuous act, or of doing a vicious one ; still the more virtuous, and worthy of higher commenda tion. And, on the other hand, if a man exerts evil acts of mind ; as, for instance, acts of pride or malice from a rooted and strong habit or principle of haughtiness and maliciousness, and a violent propensity of heart to such acts ; according to the natural sense of men, he is so far from being the less hateful and blamable on that account, that he is so much the more worthy to be detested and condemned, by all that observe him. Moreover, it is manifest that it is no part of the notion, which mankind commonly have of a blamable or praise worthy act of the Will, that it is an act which is not de termined by an antecedent bias or motive, but by the sovereign power of the Will itself; because, if so, the greater hand such causes have in determining any acts of the Will, so much the less virtuous or vicious would they be accounted ; and the less hand, the more virtuous or vicious. Whereas, the reverse is true ; men do not think a good act to be the less praiseworthy, for the agent being much determined in it by a good inclination or a good motive, but the more. And if good inclination, or motive, has but little influence in determining the agent, they do not think his act so much the more virtuous, but the less. And so concerning evil acts, which are determined by evil motives or inclinations. Yea, if it be supposed, that good or evil dispositions are implanted in the hearts of men, by nature itself, (which, it is certain, is vulgarly supposed in innumerable cases,) yet it is not commonly supposed, that men are worthy of no Praise or Dispraise for such dispositions ; although what is natural, is undoubtedly necessary, nature being prior to all acts of the Will whatsoever. Thus, for in stance, if a man appears to be of a very haughty or malicious disposition, and is supposed to be so by his natural temper, it is no vulgar notion, no dictate of the common sense and apprehension of men, that such dis positions are no vices or moral evils, or that such persons are not worthy of disesteem, or odium and dishonour ; or that the proud or malicious acts which flow from such natural dispositions, are worthy of no resentment. Yea, such vile natural dispositions, and the strength of them, will commonly be mentioned rather as an aggravation of the wicked acts, that^ome from such a fountain, than an extenuation of them. It being natural for men to act thus, is often observed by men in the height of their in dignation : they will say, "It is his very nature : he is of a vile natural temper ; it is as natural to him to act so, as it is to breathe ; he cannot help serving the devil," &c. But it is not thus with regard to hurtful mischievous things, that any are the subjects or occasions of, by natural necessity, against their inclinations. In such a case, the necessity, by the common voice of mankind, will be spoken of as a full excuse. — Thus it is very plain, that common sense makes a vast difference between these two kinds of necessity, as to the judgment it makes of their influence on the moral quality and desert of men's actions. And these dictates are so natural and necessary, that it may be very much doubted whether the Arminians them selves have ever got rid of them ; yea, their greatest doc tors, that have gone furthest in defence of their meta physical notions of liberty, and have brought their arguments to their greatest strength, and as they suppose, to a demonstration, against the consistence of virtue and vice with any necessity : it is to be questioned, whether there is so much as one of them, but that, if he suffered very much from the injurious acts of a man, under the power of an invincible haughtiness and malignancy of temper, would not. from the forementioned natural sense of mind, resent it far otherwise, than if as great sufferings came upon him from the wind that blows and the fire that burns by natural necessity ; and otherwise than he would, if he suffered as much from the conduct of a man perfectly delirious ; yea, though he first brought his dis traction upon him some way by his own fault. Some seem to disdain the distinction that we make be tween natural and moral Necessity, as though it were alto gether impertinent in this controversy ; " that which is necessary, say they, is necessary ; it is that which must be, and cannot be prevented. And that which is impossible, is impossible, and cannot be done ; and, therefore, none can be to blame for not doing it." And such comparisons are made use of, as the commanding of a man to walk, who has lost his legs, and condemning him and punishing him for not obeying ; inviting and calling upon a man, who is shut up in a strong prison, to come forth, &c. But in these things Arminians are very unreasonable. Let common sense determine whether there be not a great dif ference between these two cases : the one, that of a man who has offended his prince, and is cast into prison; and after he has lain there a while, the king comes to him, calls him to come forth; and tells him, that if he will do so, and will fall down before him and humbly beg his pardon, he shall be forgiven, and set at liberty, and also be greatly enriched, and advanced to honour : the prisoner heartily repents of the folly and wickedness of his offence against his prince, is thoroughly disposed to abase himself, and accept of the king's offer ; but is confined by strong walls, with gates of brass, and bars of iron. The other case is, that of a man who is of a very unreasonable spirit, of a haughty, ungrateful, wilful disposition ; and moreover, has been brought up in traitorous principles ; and has his heart possessed with an extreme and inveterate enmity to his lawful sovereign ; and for his rebellion is cast into prison, and lies long there, loaded with heavy chains, and in miserable circumstances. At length the compassionate prince comes to the prison, orders his chains to be knocked off, and his prison-doors to be set wide open ; calls to him, and tells him, if he will come forth to him, and fall down before him, acknowledge that he has treated him unworthily, and ask his forgiveness ; he shall be forgiven, set at liberty, and set in a place of great dignity and profit in his court. But he is so stout, and full of haughty malignity, that he cannot be willing to accept the offer ; his rooted strong pride and malice have perfect power over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his heart: the opposition of his heart has the mastery over him, having an influence on his mind far superior to the king's grace and condescension, and to all his kind offers and promises. Now, is it agreeable to common sense, to assert and stand to it, that there is no difference between these two cases, as to any worthiness of blame in the prisoners ; because, forsooth, there is a necessity in both, and the required act in each case is impossible ? It is true, a man's evil dis positions may be as strong and immovable as the bars of a castle. But who cannot see, that when a man, in the latter case, is said to be unable to obey the command, the expression is used improperly, and not in the sense it has originally and in common speech ? and that it may pro perly be said to be in the rebel's pmver to come out of prison, seeing he can easily do it if he pleases ; though by reason of his vile temper of heart, which is fixed and rooted, it is impossible that it should please him ? Upon the whole, I presume there is no person of good understanding, who impartially considers these things, but will allow, that it is not evident, from the dictates of com mon sense, or natural notions, that moral Necessity is inconsistent with Praise and Blame. And, therefore, if the Arminians would prove any such inconsistency, it must be by some philosophical and metaphysical arguments, and not common sense. There is a grand illusion in the pretended demonstration of Arminians from common sense. The main strength of all these demonstrations lies in that prejudice, that arises through the insensible change of the use and meaning of such terms as liberty, able, unable, necessary, impossible, unavoidable, invincible, action, i}c. from their original and Sect. V ENDEAVOURS CONSISTENT WITH CALVINISM. 67 vulgar sense, to a metaphysical sense, entirely diverse ; and the strong connexion of the ideas of blamelessness, &c. with some of these terms, by a habit contracted and established, while these terms were used in their first mean ing. This prejudice and delusion, is the foundation of all those positions they lay down as maxims, by which most of the scriptures they allege in this controversy, are inter preted, and on which all their pompous demonstrations from Scripture and reason depend. From this secret delu sion and prejudice they have almost all their advantages : it is the strength of their bulwarks, and the edge of their weapons. And this is the main ground of all the right they have to treat their neighbours in so assuming a manner, and to insult others, perhaps as wise and good as them selves, as " weak bigots, men that dwell in the dark caves of superstition, perversely set, obstinately shutting their eyes against the noon-day light, enemies to common sense, maintaining the first-born of absurdities," &c. &c. But perhaps, an impartial consideration of the things which have been observed in the preceding parts of this inquiry, may enable the lovers of truth better to judge, whose doc trine is indeed absurd, abstruse, self-contradictory, and in consistent with common sense, and many ways repugnant to the universal dictates of the reason of mankind. Corol. From the things which have been observed, it will follow, that it is agreeable to common sense to sup pose, that the glorified saints have not their freedom at all diminished, in any respect ; and that God himself has the highest possible freedom, according to the true and proper meaning of the term ; and that he is, in the highest possi ble respect, an agent, and active in the exercise of his infinite holiness ; though he acts therein, in the highest degree, necessarily : and his actions of this kind are in the highest,most absolutely perfect, manner virtuous and praise worthy ; and are so, for that very reason, because they are most perfectly necessary. SECT. V. Objections, that this scheme of Necessity renders all Means and Endeavours for avoiding Sin, or obtaining Virtue and Holiness, vain, and to no purpose ; and that it makes men no more than mere machines, in affairs of morality and religion, answered. Arminians say, If sin and virtue come to pass by a Necessity consisting in a sure connexion of causes and effects, antecedents and consequents, it can never be worth while to use any Means or Endeavours to obtain the one, and avoid the other ; seeing no Endeavours can alter the futurity of the event, which is become necessary by a con nexion already established. But I desire, that this matter may be fully considered ; and that it may be examined with a thorough strictness, whether it will follow that Endeavours and Means, in order to avoid or obtain any future thing, must be more in vain, on the supposition of such a connexion of antecedents and consequents, than if the contrary be supposed. For Endeavours to be in vain, is for them not to be suc cessful ; that is to say, for them not eventually to be the Means of the thing aimed at, which cannot be, but in one of these two ways ; either, first, That although the Means are used, yet the event aimed at does not follow ; or, secondly, If the event does follow, it is not because of the Means, or from any connexion or dependence of the event on the Means, the event would have come to pass as well without the Means as with them. If either of these two things are the case, then the Means are not properly suc cessful, and are truly in vain. The success or non-suc cess of Means, in order to an effect, or their being in vain or not in vain, consists in those Means being connected, or not connected, with the effect, in such a manner as this, viz. That the effect' is with the Means, and not without. them ; or, that the being of the effect is, on the one hand, connected with Means, and the want of the effect, on the other hand, is connected with the want of the Means. If there be such a connexion as this between Means and end, the Means are not in vain : the more there is of such a connexion, the further they are from being in vain; f 2 and the less of such a connexion, the more they are in vain. Now, therefore, the question to be answered — in order to determine, whether it follows from this doctrine of the necessary connexion between foregoing things, and conse quent ones, that Means used in order to any effect, are more in vain than they would be otherwise — is, whether it follows from it, that there is less of the forementioned con nexion between Means and effect ; that is, whether on the supposition of there being a real and true connexion be tween antecedent things and consequent ones, there must be less of a connexion between Means and effect, than on the supposition of there being no fixed connexion be tween antecedent things and consequent ones : and the very stating of this question is sufficient to answer it. It must appear to every one that will open his eyes, that this question cannot be affirmed, without the grossest absurdity and inconsistence. Means are foregoing things, and effects are following things : And if there were no connexion be tween foregoing things and following ones, there could be no connexion between Means and end ; and so all Means would be wholly vain and fruitless. For it is only by virtue of some connexion, that they become successful : It is some connexion observed, or revealed, or otherwise known, between antecedent things and following ones, that directs in the choice of Means. And if there were no such thing as an established connexion, there could be no choice, as to Means ; one thing would have no more tendency to an effect, than another ; there would be no such thing as tendency in the case. All those things, which are successful Means of other things, do therein prove connected antecedents of them : and therefore to assert, that a fixed connexion between antecedents and consequents makes Means vain and useless, or stands in the way to hinder the connexion between Means and end, is just so ridiculous, as to say, that a connexion between antecedents and consequents stands in the way to hinder a connexion between antecedents and consequents. Nor can any supposed connexion of the succession or train of antecedents and consequents, from the very be ginning of all things, the connexion being made already sure and necessary, either by established laws of nature, or by these together with a decree of sovereign immediate interpositions of divine power, on such and such occasions, or any other way (if any other there be) ; I say, no such necessary connexion of a series of antecedents and conse quents can in the least tend to hinder, but that the Means we use may belong to the series ; and so may be some of those antecedents which are connected with the conse quents we aim at, in the established course of things. Endeavours which we use, are things that exist; and, therefore, they belong to the general chain of events ; all the parts of which chain are supposed to be connected : and so Endeavours are supposed to be connected with some effects, or some consequent things or other. And certainly this does not hinder but that the events they are connected with, may be those which we aim at, and which we choose, because we judge them most likely to have a connexion with those events, from the established order and course of things which we observe, or from something in divine revelation. Let us suppose a real and sure connexion between a man having his eyes open in the clear day-light, with good organs of sight, and seeing ; so that seeing is connected with his opening his eyes, and not seeing with his not opening his eyes; and also the like connexion between such a man attempting to open his eyes, and his actually doing it : the supposed established connexion between these antecedents and consequents, let the connexion be never so sure and necessary, certainly does not prove that it is in vain, for a man in such circumstances to attempt to open his eyes, in order to seeing : his aiming at that event, and the use of the Means, being the effect of his Will, does not break the connexion, or hinder the success. So that the objection we are upon does not lie against the doctrine of the Necessity of events by a certainty of connexion and consequence : On the contrary, it is truly forcible against the Arminian doctrine of contingence and self-determination ; which is inconsistent with such a con nexion. If there be no connexion between those events, 68 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part IV. wherein virtue and vice consist, and any thing antecedent ; then, there is no connexion between these events and any Means or Endeavours used in order to them : and if so, then those means must be in vain. The less there is of connexion between foregoing things and following ones, so much the less there is between Means and end, Endea vours and success ; and in the same proportion are Means and Endeavours ineffectual and in vain. It will follow from Arminian principles, that there is no degree of connexion between virtue or vice, and any fore going event or thing : or, in other words, that the deter mination of the existence of virtue or vice does not in the least depend on the influence of any thing that comes to pass antecedently, as its cause, Means, or ground; be cause, so far as it is so, it is not from self-determination : and, therefore, so far there is nothing of the nature of virtue or vice. And so it follows, that virtue and vice are not at all, in any degree, dependent upon, or connected with, as, any foregoing event or existence, its cause, ground, or Means. And if so, then all foregoing Means must be totally in vain. Hence it follows, that there cannot, in any consistence with the Arminian scheme, be any reasonable ground of so much as a conjecture concerning the consequence of any Means and Endeavours, in order to escaping vice or obtaining virtue, or any choice or preference of Means, as having a greater probability of success by some than others ; either from any natural connexion or dependence of the end on the Means, or through any divine constitution, or revealed way of God, bestowing or bringing to pass these things, in consequence of any Means, Endeavours, Prayers, or Deeds. Conjectures, in this latter case, depend on a supposition, that God himself is the Giver or determining Cause of the events sought : but if they depend on self-de termination, then God is not the determining or disposing Author of them : and if these things are not of his disposal, then no conjecture can be made, from any revelation he has given, concerning any method of his disposal of them. Yea, on these principles, it will not only follow, that men cannot have any reasonable ground of judgment or conjecture, that their Means and Endeavours to obtain virtue or avoid vice will be successful, but they may be sure, they will not ; they may be certain, that they will be in vain ; and that if ever the thing, which they seek, comes to pass, it will not be at all owing to the Means they use. For Means and Endeavours can have no effect at all, in order to obtain the end, but in one of these two ways : either, (1.) Through a natural tendency and influence, to Erepare and dispose the mind more to virtuous acts, either y causing the disposition of the heart to be more in favour of such acts, or by bringing the mind more into the view of powerful motives and inducements ; or, (2.) By putting persons more in the way of God's bestowment of the bene fit. ¦. But neither of these can be the case. Not the latter ; for, as has been just now observed, it does not consist with the Arminian notion of self-determination, which they suppose essential to virtue, that God should be the be- stower, or (which is the same thing) the determining, dis posing author of virtue. Not the former ; for natural influence and tendency suppose causality, connexion, and necessity of event, which are inconsistent with Arminian liberty. A tendency of Means, by biassing the heart in favour of virtue, or by bringing the Will under the influ ence and power of motives in its determinations, are both inconsistent with Arminian liberty of Will, consisting in indifference, and sovereign self-determination, as has been largely demonstrated. But for the more full removal of this prejudice against the doctrine of necessity, which has been maintained, as though it tended to encourage a total neglect of all En deavours as vain, the following things may be considered. The question is not, Whether men may not thus im prove this doctrine : we know that many true and whole some doctrines are abused : but, whether the doctrine gives any just occasion for such an improvement ; or whe ther, on the supposition of the truth of the doctrine, such a use of it would not be unreasonable '! ¦'' If any shall affirm, that it would not, but that the very nature of the doctrine is such as gives just occasion for it, it must be on this supposition ; namely, that such an invariable necessity of all things already settled, must render the interposition of all Means, Endeavours, Conclusions or Actions, of ours, in order to the obtaining any future end whatsoever, per fectly insignificant ; because they cannot in the least alter or vary the course and series of things, in any event or circumstance; all being already fixed unalterably by ne cessity : and that therefore it is folly, for men to use any Means for any end ; but their wisdom, to save themselves the trouble of Endeavours, and take their ease. No per son can draw such an inference from this doctrine, and come to such a conclusion, without contradicting himself, and going counter to the very principles he pretends to act upon : for he comes to a conclusion, and takes a course, in order to an end, even his ease, or saving himself from trouble ; he seeks something future, and uses Means in order to a future thing, even in his drawing up that con clusion, that he will seek nothing, and use no Means in order to any thing in future ; he seeks his future ease, and the benefit and comfort of indolence. If prior neces sity, that determines all things, makes vain all actions or conclusions of ours, in order to any thing future ; then it makes vain all conclusions and conduct of ours, in order to our future ease. The measure of our ease, with the time, manner, and every circumstance of it, is already fixed, by all-determining necessity, as much as any thing else. If he says within himself, '" What future happiness or misery I shall have, is already, in effect, determined by the necessary course and connexion of things ; therefore, 1 will save myself the trouble of labour and diligence, which cannot add to my determined degree of happiness, or di minish my misery ; but will take my ease, and will enjoy the comfort of sloth and negligence." Such a man con tradicts himself: he says, the measure of his future hap piness and misery is already fixed, and he will not try to diminish the one, nor add to the other : but yet, in his very conclusion, he contradicts this ; for, he takes up this conclusion, to add to his future happiness, by the ease and comfort of his negligence; and to diminish his future trouble and misery, by saving himself the trouble of using Means and taking Pains. Therefore persons cannot reasonably make this improve ment of the doctrine of necessity, that they will go into a voluntary negligence of Means for their own happiness. For the principles they must go upon, in order to this, are inconsistent with their making any improvement at all of the doctrine : for to make some improvement of it, is to be influenced by it, to come to some voluntary conclusion, in regard to their own conduct, with some view or aim : but this, as has been shown, is inconsistent with the prin ciples they pretend to act upon. In short, the principles are such as cannot be acted upon at all, or, in any respect, consistently. And, therefore, in every pretence of acting upon them, or making any improvement at all of them, there is a self-contradiction. As to that objection against the doctrine, which I have endeavoured to prove, that it makes men no more than mere machines ; I would say, that notwithstanding this doctrine, man is entirely, perfectly, and unspeakably dif ferent from a mere machine, in that he has reason and understanding, with a faculty of Will, and so is capable of volition and choice; in that his Will is guided by the dictates or views of his understanding ; and in that his external actions and behaviour, and in many respects also his thoughts, and the exercises of his mind, are subject to his Will ; so that he has liberty to act according to his choice, and do what he pleases ; and by means of these things, is capable of moral habits and moral acts, such inclinations and actions as, according to the common sense of mankind, are worthy of praise, esteem, love, and reward ; or, on the contrary, of disesteem, detestation, indignation, and punishment. In these things is all the difference from mere machines, as to liberty and agency, that would be any perfection, dignity, or privilege, in any respect : all the difference that can be desired, and all that can be conceived of; and in deed all that the pretensions of the Arminians themselves come to, as they are forced often to explain themselves ; though their explications overthrow and abolish the things asserted, and pretended to be explained. For they are forced to explain a self-determining power of Will,' by a Sect VI. THE CHARGE OF STOICISM, &c. ANSWERED. 69 power in the soul, to determine as it chooses or wills ; which comes to no more than this, that a man has a power of choosing, and, in many instances, can do as he chooses. Which is quite a different thing from that con tradiction, his having power of choosing his first act of choice in the case. Or, if their scheme make any other difference than this, between men and machines, it is for the worse : it is so far from supposing men to have a dignity and privilege above machines, that it makes the manner of their being determined still more unhappy. Whereas, machines are guided by an intelligent cause, by the skilful hand of the workman or owner ; the will of man is left to the guidance of nothing, but absolute blind contingence ! SECT. VI. Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it agrees with the Stoical doctrine of Fate, and the opinions of Mr. Hobbes. When Calvinists oppose the Arminian notion of the freedom of Will, and contingence of volition, and insist that there are no acts of the Will, nor any other events whatsoever, but what are attended with some kind of necessity ; their opposers exclaim against them, as agree ing with the ancient Stoics in their doctrine of Fate, and with Mr. Hobbes in his opinion of Necessity. It would not be worth while to take notice of so im pertinent an objection, had it not been urged by some of the chief Arminian writers. — There were many important truths maintained by the ancient Greek and Roman phi losophers, and especially the Stoics, that are never the worse for being held by them. The Stoic philosophers, by the general agreement of Christian divines, and even Arminian divines, were the greatest, wisest, and most virtuous of all the heathen philosophers ; and, in their doctrine and practice, came the nearest to Christianity of any of their sects. How frequently are the sayings of these philosophers, in many of the writings and sermons, even of Arminian divines, produced, not as arguments for the falseness of the doctrines which they delivered, but as a confirmation of some of the greatest truths of the christian religion, relating to the unity and perfections of the Godhead, a future state, the duty and happiness of mankind, &c. and how the light of nature and reason, in the wisest and best of tbe heathen, harmonized with and confirms the gospel of Jesus Christ. And it is very remarkable, concerning Dr. Whitby, that although he alleges the agreement of the Stoics with us, wherein he supposes they maintained the like doctrine, as an argument against the truth of ours ; yet, this very Dr. Whitby alleges the agreement of the Stoics with the Arminians, wherein he supposes they taught the same doctrine with them, as an argument for the truth of their doctrine.* So that, when the Stoics agree with them, it is a confirmation of their doctrine, and a confutation of ours, as showing that our opinions are contrary to the na tural sense and common reason of mankind : nevertheless, when the Stoics agree with us, it argues no such thing in our favour ; but, on the contrary, is a great argument against us, and shows our doctrine to be heathenish ! It is -observed by some Catvinistic writers, that the Arminians symbolize with the Stoics, in some of those doctrines wherein they are opposed by the Calvinists; particularly in their denying an original, innate, total cor ruption and depravity of heart; and in what they held of man's ability to make himself truly virtuous and conformed to God, and in some other doctrines. lt may be further observed, that certainly it is no better objection against our doctrine, that it agrees, in some respects, with the doctrine of the ancient Stoic philoso phers ; than it is against theirs, wherein they differ from us, that it agrees, in some respects, with the opinion of the very worst of the heathen philosophers, the followers of Epicurus, the father of atheism and licentiousness, and with the doctrine of the Sadduaes and Jesuits. * Whilby on the five Points, Edit. 3. p. 325, 326, 327. I am not much concerned to know precisely, what the ancient Stoic philosophers held concerning Fate, in order to determine what is truth ; as though it were a sure way to be in the right, to take good heed to differ from them. It seems, that they differed among themselves ; and pro bably the doctrine of Fate, as maintained by most of them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But whatever their doctrine was, if any of them held such a Fate, as is repug nant to any liberty, consisting in our doing as we please, I utterly deny such a Fate. If they held any such Fate, as is not consistent with the common and universal notions that mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue and vice ; I disclaim any such thing, and think I have demonstrated, that the scheme I maintain is no such scheme. If the Stoics, by Fate, meant any thing of such a nature, as can be supposed to stand in the way of advan tage and benefit of in use of means and endeavours, or would make it less worth while for men to desire and seek after any thing wherein their virtue and happiness consists ; I hold no doctrine that is clogged with any such inconvenience, any more than any other scheme what soever ; and by no means so much as the Arminian scheme of contingence ; as has been shown. If they held any such doctrine of universal fatality, as is inconsistent with any kind of liberty, that is or can be any perfection, dig nity, privilege, or benefit, or any thing desirable, in any respect, for any intelligent creature, or indeed with any liberty that is possible or conceivable ; I embrace no such doctrine. If they held any such doctrine of Fate, as is inconsistent with the world being in all things subject to the disposal of an intelligent, wise agent, that presides — not as the soul of the world, but — as the Sovereign Lord of the Universe, governing all things by proper will, choice, and design, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable, without subjection to any constraint, or being properly under the power or influence of any thing before, above, or without himself; I wholly renounce any such doctrine. As to Mr. Hobbes maintaining the same doctrine con cerning necessity ; I confess, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes. Let his opinion be what it will, we need not reject all truth which is demonstrated by clear evidence, merely because it was once held by some bad man. This great truth, "that Jesus is the Son of God," was not spoiled because it was once and again proclaimed with a loud voice by the devil. If truth is so defiled, because it is spoken by the mouth, or written by the pen, of some ill minded, mischievous man, that it must never be received, we shall never know, when we hold any of the most pre cious and evident truths by a sure tenure. And if Mr. Hobbes has made a bad use of this truth, that is to be lamented ; but the truth is not to be thought worthy of rejection on that account. It is common for the corrupt hearts of evil men to abuse the best things to vile pur poses. I might also take notice of its having been observed, that the Arminians agree with Mr. Hobbes f in many more things than the Calvinists. As, in what he is said to hold concerning original sin, in denying the necessity of supernatural illumination, in denying infused grace, in denying the doctrine of justification by faith alone ; and other things. SECT. VII. Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will. Some may, possibly, object aeainst what has been sup posed of the absurdity and inconsistence of a self-deter mining power in the Will, and the impossibility of its being otherwise, than that the Will should be determined in every case by some motive, and by a motive which (as it stands in the view of the understanding) is of superior strength to any appearing on the other side ; that if these things are true, it will follow, that not only the Will of created minds, but the Will of God himself, is necessary in all its determinations. Concerning which the author T Dr. Gill, in his Answer to Dr. Whitby, Vol. III. p 1B3, _c . 70 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part IV. of the Essai/ on the Freedom of Will in God and in the Creature, (pag. 85, 86.) says : " What strange doctrine is this, contrary to all our ideas of the dominion of God ? does it not destroy the glory of his liberty of choice, and take away from the Creator and Governor and Benefactor of the world, that most free and Sovereign Agent, all the glory of this sort of freedom ? does it not seem to make him a kind of mechanical medium of fate, and introduce Mr. Hobbes's doctrine of fatality and Necessity, into all things that God hath to do with ? Does it not seem to represent the blessed God, as a Being of vast understand ing, as well as power, and efficiency, but still to leave him without a Will to choose among all the objects within his view ? In short, it seems to make the blessed God a sort of Almighty Minister of Fate, under its universal and supreme influence ; as it was the professed sentiment of some of the ancients, that Fate was above the gods. This is declaiming, rather than arguing ; and an appli cation to men's imaginations and prejudices, rather than to mere reason. I would now calmly endeavour to consider, whether there be any reason in this frightful representation. But, before I enter upon a particular consideration of the matter, I would observe ; that it is reasonable to suppose, it should be much more difficult to express or conceive things according to exact metaphysical truth, relating to the nature and manner of the existence of things in the Divine Understanding and Will, and the operation of these facul ties (if I may so call them) of the Divine Mind, than in the human mind ; which is infinitely more within our view, more proportionate to the measure of our comprehension, and more commensurate to the use and import of human speech. Language is indeed very deficient, in regard of terms to express precise truth concerning our own minds, and their faculties and operations. Words were first form ed to express external things ; and those that are applied to express things internal and spiritual, are almost all bor rowed, and used in a sort of figurative sense. Whence they are, most of them, attended with a great deal of am biguity and unfixedness in their signification, occasioning innumerable doubts, difficulties, and confusions, in inquiries and controversies about things of this nature. But lan guage is much less adapted to express things existing in the mind of the incomprehensible Deity, precisely as they are. We find a great deal of difficulty in conceiving exactly of the nature of our own souls. And notwithstanding all the progress which has been made, in past ages, and the present, in this kind of knowledge, whereby our metaphy sics, as it relates to these things, is brought to greater per- * " It might have been objected, with more plausibleness, that the Su preme Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is best in the whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza's purpose ; for this is a necessity, notofnatureandoffate.but of fitness and wisdom: a necessity consistent with the greatest freedom, and most perfect choice. For the only foundation of this necessity is such an unalterable rectitude of will, and lerfection of wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise being to act foolish- y." Clark's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of-God. Edit. 6. p. 64. " Though God is a most perfect free Agent, yet he cannot but do always what is best and wisest intbewhole. The reason is evident; becauseper- fect wisdom and goodness are as steady and certain principles of action, as necessity itself ; and an infinitely wise and good Being, indued with the most perfect liberty, can no more choose to act in contradiction to wisdom and goodness, than a necessary agent can act contrary to the necessity by which it is acted ; it being as great an absurdity and impossibility in choice, for Infinite Wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or Infinite Goodness to choose what is not good, as it would be in nature, for absolute necessity to fail of producing its necessary effect. There was, indeed, no necessity in nature, that God should at first create such beings as he has created, or indeed any being at all ; because he is, in himself, infinitely happy and all-sufficient. There was, also, no necessity in nature, that he should preserve and con tinue things in being, after they were created ; because he would be self- sufficient without their continuance, as he was before their creation. Butit was fit and wise and good, that Infinite Wisdom should manifest, and Infi nite Goodness communicate itself: and therefore it was necessary, in the sense of necessity I am now speaking of, that things should be made at such a lime, and continued so long, and indeed with various perfections in such degrees, as Infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it wisest and best that they should." Ibid. p. 112, 113. " It is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according to the last result of a fair examination. — This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and be nefit of it : it is not an abridgment, it is the end and use of our liberty ; and the further we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifference in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment, of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side. — It is as much a perfection, that desire or the power of preferring should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should bo determined by the will : and the certainer such determination is, the greater the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the last result of onr own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free. This very end of our freedom being, that we might attain the good . fection than once it was ; yet, here is still work enough left for future inquiries and researches, and room for pro gress still to be made, for many ages and generations. But we had need to be infinitely able metaphysicians, to con ceive with clearness, according to strict, proper, and perfect truth, concerning the nature of the Divine Essence, and the modes of action and operation in the powers of the Divine Mind. And it may be noted particularly, that though we are obliged to conceive of some things in God as consequent and dependent on others, and of some things pertaining to the Divine Nature and Will as the foundation of others, and so before others in the order of nature: as, we must conceive of the knowledge and holiness of God as prior, in the order of nature, to his happiness ; the perfection of his understanding, as the foundation of his wise purposes and decrees ; the holiness of his nature, as the cause and reason of his holy determinations. And yet, when we speak of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, fun damental and dependent, determining and determined, in the first Being, who is self-existent, independent, of per fect and absolute simplicity and immutability, and the first cause of all things : doubtless there must be less propriety in such representations, than when we speak of derived dependent beings, who are compounded, and liable to per petual mutation and succession. Having premised this, I proceed to observe concerning the forementioned author's exclamation, about the neces sary determination of God's Will, in all things, by what he sees to be fittest and best ; That all the seeming force of such objections and ex clamations must arise from an imagination, that there is some sort of privilege or dignity in being without such a moral Necessity, as will make it impossible to do any other, than always choose what is wisest and best ; as though there were some disadvantage, meanness, and sub jection, in such a Necessity ; a thing by which the Will was confined, kept under, and held in servitude by some thing, which, as it were, maintained a strong and invincible power and dominion over it, by bonds that held him fast, and from which he could, by no means, deliver himself. Whereas, this must be all mere imagination and delusion. It is no disadvantage or dishonour to a being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy manner, from the necessary perfection of his own nature. This argues no imperfection, inferiority, or dependence, nor any want of dignity, privilege, or ascendency* It is not inconsistent with the absolute and most perfect sovereignty of God. we choose ; and, therefore, every man is brought under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment, what is best for him to do ; else he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the same time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present thoughts, before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other ; unless he can have and not have it, will and not will it, at the same time ; a contradiction too manifest to be admitted.— If we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge, that they are more steadily determined iu their choice of good than we ; and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are, to pronounce what Infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not good. The freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is be St.— But to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty, let me ask. Would any one be a changeling, because he is less determined by wise determination, than a wise man ? Is it worth the name of freedom, to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man's self? If to break loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment, that keeps us from doing or choosing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, mad men and fools are the only free men. Yet, I think, nobody would choose to be mad, for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already.'' Locke Hum. Und. Vol. I. Edit 7. p. 215. 216. " This Being, having all things always necessarily in view, must always and eternally will, according to his infinite comprehension of things; that is, must will all things that are wisest and best to be done. There is no getting free of this consequence. If it can will at all, it must will this way. To be capable of knowing, and not capable of wiUing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of willing otherwise than what is wisest and best, con tradicts that knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge must direct the will without error. Here then, is the origin of moral Necessity ; and that is, really, of freedom — Perhaps it may be said, when the Divine Will is determined, from the consideration of the eternal aptitudes of things, it is as necessarily determined, as if it were physically impelled, if that were possible. But it is unskilfulness, to suppose "this an objection. The great principle is once established, viz. That the Divine Will is determined by the eternal reason and aptitudes of things, instead of being physically im pelled ; and after that, the more strong and necessary this determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be: it is this that makes him an amiable and adorable Being, whose will and power are constantly, im mutably determined, by the consideration of what is wisest and best; in stead of a surd Being, with power, but without discerning and reason. It Sect. VII. NECESSITY OF DIVINE VOLITION. 71 The sovereignty of God is his ability and authority to do whatever pleases him ; whereby " he doth according to his will in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or sav unto him, what dost thou ?" — The following things belong to the sovereignty of God; viz. (1.) Supreme, universal, and infinite Power ; whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without control, without any confinement of that power, without any subjection, in the least measure, to any other power; and so without any hinderance or restraint, that it should be either impossible, or at all difficult, for him to accomplish his Will ; and without any dependence of his power on any other power, from whence it should be de rived, or of which it should stand in any need : so far from this, that all other power is derived from him, and is abso lutely dependent on him. (2.) That he has supreme authority ; absolute and most perfect right to do what he wills, without subjection to any superior authority, or any derivation of authority from any other, or limitation by any distinct independent authority, either superior, equal, or inferior ; he being the head of all dominion, and foun tain of all authority; and also without restraint by any obligation, implying either subjection, derivation, or de pendence, or proper limitation. (3.) That his Will is supreme, underived, and independent on any thing with out himself; being in every thing determined by his own counsel, having no other rule but his own wisdom ; his Will not being subject to or restrained by the Will of any other, and other Wills being perfectly subject to his. (4.) That his Wisdom, which determines his Will, is supreme, perfect, underived, self-sufficient, and independ ent; so that it may be said, as in Isa. xl. 14. " With whom took he counsel r And who instructed him and taught him in the path of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and showed him the way of understanding '!" There is no other Divine Sovereignty but this ; and this is properly absolute sovereignty : no other is desirable ; nor would any other be honourable, or happy : and indeed, there is no other conceivable or possible. It is the glory and greatness of the Divine Sovereign, that his Will is determined by his own infinite, all-sufficient wisdom in every thing ; and is in nothing at all directed either by inferior wisdom, or by no wisdom ; whereby it would be come senseless arbitrariness, determining and acting without reason, design, or end. If God's Will is steadily and surely determined in every thing by supreme wisdom, then it is in every thing neces sarily determined to that which is most wise. And, cer tainly, it would be a disadvantage and indignity, to be otherwise. For if the Divine Will was not necessarily determined to what in every case is wisest and best, it must be subject to some degree of undesigning contin gence; and so in the same degree liable to evil. To suppose the Divine Will liable to be carried hither and thither at random, by the uncertain wind of blind contin gence, which is guided by no wisdom, no motive, no in telligent dictate whatsoever, (if any such thing were possible,) would certainly argue a great degree of imperfec tion and meanness, infinitely unworthy of the Deity. If it be a disadvantage, for the Divine Will to be attended with this moral Necessity, then the more free from it, and the more left at random, the greater dignity and advantage. And, consequently, to be perfectly free from the direction of understanding, and universally and entirely left to sense less unmeaning contingence, to act absolutely at random, would be the supreme glory ! It no more argues any dependence of God's Will, that his supremely wise volition is necessary, than it argues a dependence of his being, that his existence is necessary. If it be something too low, for the Supreme Being to have his W ill determined by moral Necessity, so as necessarily, in every case, to Will in the highest degree holily and happily ; then why is it not also something too low, for him to have his existence, and the infinite perfection of his nature, and his infinite happiness, determined by Necessity? It is no more to God's dishonour, to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily holy. And, if neither of them be is the beauty of this Necessity, that it is strong as fate itself, with all the advantage of reason and goodness. — It is strange, to see men contend, that the Deity is not free, because he is necessarily rational, immutably good to his dishonour, then it is not to his dishonour necessarily to act holily and wisely. And if it be not dishonourable to be necessarily holy and wise, in the highest possible degree, no more is it mean and dishonourable, necessarily to act holily and wisely in the highest possible degree ; or which is the same thing, to do that, in every case, which, above all other things, is wisest and best. The reason why it is not dishonourable to be neces sarily most holy is, because holiness in itself is an excel lent and honourable thing. For the same reason, it is no dishonour to be necessarily most wise, and, in every case, to act most wisely, or do the thing which is the wisest of all ; for wisdom is also in itself excellent and honourable. The forementioned author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will, i}c. as has been observed, represents that doctrine of the Divine Will being in every thing necessarily deter mined by superior fitness, as making the blessed God a kind of Almighty Minister and mechanical medium of fate : he insists, (p. 93, 94.) that this moral Necessity and impossibility is, in effect, the same thing with physical and natural Necessity, and impossibility : and says, (p. 54, 55.) " The scheme which determines the Will always and certainly by the understanding, and the understanding by the appearance of things, seems to take away the true nature of vice and virtue. For the sublimest of virtues, and the vilest of vices, seem rather to be matters of fate and Necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily from the existence, the circumstances, and present situation of persons and things ; for this existence and situation neces sarily makes such an appearance to the mind ; from this appearance flows a necessary perception and judgment, concerning these things ; this judgment necessarily deter mines the Will ; and thus, by this chain of necessary causes, virtue and vice would lose their nature, and be come natural ideas, and necessary things, instead of moral and free actions." And yet this same author allows, (p. 30, 31.) That a perfectly wise being will constantly and certainly choose" what is most fit; and says, (p. 102, 103.) "I grant, and always have granted, that wheresoever there is such ante cedent superior fitness of things, God acts according to it, so as never to contradict it ; and, particularly, in all his judicial proceedings as a Governor and Distributer of re wards and punishments." Yea, he says expressly, (p. 42.) : " That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than ac cording to this fitness and goodness in things." So that, according to this author, putting these several passages of his Essay together, there is no virtue, nor any thing of a moral nature, in the most sublime and glorious acts arid exercises of God's holiness, justice, and faithful ness ; and he never does any thing which is in itself su premely worthy, and, above all other things, fit and excel lent, but only as a kind of mechanical medium of fate ; and in what he does as the Judge, and moral Governor of the world, he exercises no moral excellency ; exercising no freedom in these things, because he acts by moral Neces sity, which is, in effect, the same with physical or natural Necessity ; and therefore, he only acts by an Hobbistical fatality ; " as a Being indeed of vast understanding, as well as power and efficiency, (as he said before,) but without _ will to choose, being a kind of Almighty Minister of fate, acting under its supreme influence." For he allows, that in all these things, God's Will is determined constantly and certainly by a superior fitness, and that it is not pos sible for him to act otherwise. And if these things are so, what glory or praise belongs to God for doing holily and justly, or taking the most .fit, holy, wise, and ex cellent course, in any one instance '! Whereas, according to the Scriptures, and also the common sense of mankind, it does not, in the least, derogate from the honour of any being, that through the moral perfection of his nature, he necessarily acts with supreme wisdom and holiness ; but on the contrary, his praise is the greater : herein consists the height of his glory. The same author (p. 56.) supposes, that herein appears the excellent " character of a wise and good man, that though be can choose contrary to the fitness of things, yet and wise ; when a man is allowed still the perfecter being, the more fixedly and constantly his Will is determined bv reason and truth." Inquiry into the Nature of the Hum. Soul. Edit. 3. Vol. II. p. 403, 401. 72 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part IV. he does not; but suffers himself to be directed by fitness;" and that, in this conduct, " he imitates the blessed God." And yet, he supposes it is contrarywise with the blessed God ;" not that he suffers himself to" be directed by fitness, when "-he can choose, contrary to the fitness of things;" but that " he cannot choose contrary to the fitness of things ;" as he says, p. 42. " That it is not possible for God" to act otherwise than according to this fitness, where there is any fitness or goodness in things :" Yea, he sup poses, (p. 31.) That if~a man "were perfectly wise and good, he could not do otherwise than be constantly and cer tainly determined by the fitness of things." One thing more I would observe, before I conclude this section ; and that is, that if it derogate nothing from the glory of God, to be necessarily determined by superior fitness in some things, then neither does it to be thus de termined in all things ; from any thing in the nature of such Necessity, as at all detracting from God's freedom, independence, absolute supremacy, or any dignity or glory of his nature, state, or manner of acting ; or as implying any infirmity, restraint, or subjection. And if the thing be such as well consists with God's glory, and has nothing tending at all to detract from it ; then we need not be afraid of ascribing it to God in too many things, lest thereby we should detract from God's glory too much. SECT. VIII. Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God's Volitions considered. The author last cited, as has been observed, owns that God, being perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly choose what appears most fit, where there is a superior fitness and goodness in things ; and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in effect confessed, that in those things where there is any real preferableness, it is no dishonour, nothing in any respect unworthy of God, for him to act from Necessity ; notwithstanding all that can be objected from the agreement of such a Necessity with the fate of the Stoics, and the Necessity maintained by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if in all the different things, among which God chooses, there were evermore a superior fitness or preferableness on one side, then it would be no dishonour, or any thing unbecoming, for God's Will to be necessarily determined in every thing. And if this be allowed, it is giving up entirely the argu ment, from the unsuitableness of such a Necessity to the liberty, supremacy, independence, and glory of the Divine Being ; and resting the whole weight of the affair on the decision of another point wholly diverse ; viz. Whether it be so inrlced, that in all the various possible things, which are in God's view, and may be considered as capable ob jects of his choice, there is not evermore a preferableness in one thing above another. This is denied by this author ; who supposes, that in many instances, between two or more Sossible things, which come within the view of the Divine Iind, there is a perfect indifference and inequality, as to fitness or tendency, to attain any good end which God can have in view, or to answer any of his designs. Now, therefore, I would consider whether this be evident. The arguments brought to prove this, are of two kinds. (1.) It is urged, that, in many instances, we must suppose there is absolutely no difference between various possible objects of choice, which God' has in view : and, (2.) that the difference between many things is so inconsiderable, or of such a nature, that it would be unreasonable to sup pose it to be of any consequence ; or to suppose that any * " If all created beings were taken away, all possibility of any mutation or succession of one thing to another, would appear to be also removed. Abstract succession in eternity is scarce to be understood. What is it that succeeds ? One minute to another, perhaps, velut unda supervenit undam. But when we imagine this, we fancy that the minutes are things separately existing. This is the common notion ; and yet it is a manifest prejudice. Time is untliine: but the existence of created successive beings, and eternity the necessury existence of the Deity.— Therefore, if this necessary Being hath no change or succession in his nature, his existence must of course be unsuccessive. We seem to commit a double oversight in this case; first, we find succession in the necessary nature and existence of the Deity him self: which is wrong, if the reasoning above be conclusive. And then we ascribe this succession to eternity, considered abstractedly from the Eternal Being ; and suppose it, one knows not what, a thing subsisting by itself, and flowing, one minute after another. This is the work of pure imagination, of God's wise designs would not be answered in any one way as well as the other. Therefore,I. The first thing to be considered is, whether there are any instances wherein there is a perfect likeness, and ab solutely no difference, between different objects of choice, that are proposed to the Divine Understanding ? And here, in the first place, it may be worthy to be con sidered, whether the contradiction there is in the terms of the question proposed, does not give reason to suspect, that there is an inconsistence in the thing supposed. It is inquired whether different objects of choice may not be absolutely without difference? If they are absolutely without difference, then how are they different objects of choice ? If there be absolutely no difference, in any re spect, then there is no variety or distinction : for distinction is only by some difference. And if there be no variety among proposed objects of choice, then there is no oppor tunity for variety of choice, or difference of determination.! For that determination of a thing, which is not different in any respect, is not a different determination, but the same. That this is no quibble, may appear more fully in a short time. The arguments, to prove that the Most High, in some instances, chooses to do one thing rather than another, where the things themselves are perfectly without differ ence, are two. 1. That the various parts of infinite time and space, absolutely considered, are perfectly alike, and do not differ at all one from another : and that therefore, when God determined to create the world in such a part of infinite duration and space, rather than others, he determined and preferred, among various objects, between which there was no preferableness, and absolutely no difference. Answ. This objection supposes an infinite length of time before the world was created, distinguished by successive parts, properly and truly so; or a succession of limited and unmeasurable periods of time, following one another, in an infinitely long series : which must needs be a groundless imagination. The eternal duration which was before the world, being only the eternity of God's existence ; which is nothing else but his immediate, perfect, and invariable possession of the whole of his unlimited life, together and at once ; Vita interminabilis, tota, simul et perfecta pos- sessio. Which is so generally allowed, that I need not stand to demonstrate it.* So this objection supposes an extent of space beyond the limits of the creation, of an infinite length, breadth, and depth, truly and properly distinguished into different measurable parts, limited at certain stages, one beyond another, in au infinite series. Which notion of absolute and infinite space is doubtless as unreasonable, as that now mentioned, of absolute and infinite duration. It is as im proper, to imagine that the immensity and omnipresence of God is distinguished by a series of miles and leagues, one beyond another ; as that the infinite duration of God is distinguished by months and years, one after another. A diversity and order of distinct parts, limited by certain periods, is as conceivable, and does as naturally obtrude it self on our imagination, in one case as the other ; and there is equal reason in each case, to suppose that our imagination deceives us. It is equally improper to talk of months and years of the Divine Existence, as of square miles of Deity : and we equally deceive ourselves, when we talk of the world being differently fixed, with respect to either of these sorts of measures, j think, we know not what we mean, if we say, the world might have been differ ently placed from what it is, in the broad expanse of infinity ; or, that it might have been differently fixed in the long line and contrary to the reality of things. Hence the common metaphorical expressions: Ttme runs apace, let us lay hold on the present minute and the like. The philosophers themselves mislead us by their illustration They compare eternity to the motion of a point running on for ever and making a traceless infinite line. Here the point is supposed a thing actually subsisting, representing the present minute ; and then they ascribe motion or succession to it : that is, they ascribe motion to a mere nonentity to illustrate to us a successive eternity, made up of finite successive parte —If once we allow an all-perfect mind, which hath an eternal, immutable and infinite comprehension of all things, always (and allow it we must) the distinction of past and future vanishes with respect to such a mind —In a word, if we proceed step by step, as above, the eternity or existence of the Deity will appear to be Vitce interminabilis, tola, simul et perfecta vos- sessio; how much soever this may have been a paradox hitherto" In quiry wtothe Nature of llt$ Human Soul. Vol. ii. 409,410, 411 Edil 3 Sect. VIII. NECESSITY OF DIVINE VOLITION, CONTINUED. 73 of eternity : and all arguments and objections, which are built on the imaginations we are apt to have of infinite extension or duration, are buildings founded on shadows, or castles in the air. 2. The second argument, to prove that the' Most High wills one thing rather than another, without any superior fitness or preferableness in the thing preferred, is God's actually placing in different parts of the world, particles, or atoms of matter, that are perfectly equal and alike. The forementioned author says, (p. 78, &c.) " If one would descend to the minute specific particles, of which different bodies are composed, we should see abundant reason to believe, that there are thousands of such little particles, or atoms of matter, which are perfectly equal and alike, and could give no distinct determination to the Will of God, where to place them." He there instances in particles of water, of which there are such immense numbers, which compose the rivers and oceans of this world ; and the in finite myriads of the luminous and fiery particles, which compose the body of the sun ; so many, tnat it would be very unreasonable to suppose no two of them should be exactly equal and alike. _insu>. (1 .) To this I answer : that as we must suppose matter to be infinitely divisible, it is very unlikely, that any two of all these particles are exactly equal and alike ; so unlikely, that it is a thousand to one, yea, an infinite number to one, but it is otherwise : and that although we should allow a great similarity between the different par ticles of water and fire, as to their general nature and figure ; and however small we suppose those particles to be, it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of them should be exactly equal in dimensions and quantity of matter. — If we should suppose a great many globes of the same nature with the globe of the earth, it would be very strange, if there were any two of them that had exactly the same number of par ticles of dust and water in them. But infinitely less strange, than that two particles of light should have just the same quantity of matter. For a particle of light, ac cording to the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter, is composed of infinitely more assignable parts, than there are particles of dust and water in the globe of the earth. And as it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of these particles should be equal ; so it is, that they should be alike in other respects : to instance in the configuration of their surfaces. If there were very many globes, of the nature of the earth, it would be very unlikely that any two should have exactly the same number of particles of dust, water, and stone, in their surfaces, and all posited exactly alike, one with re spect to another, without any difference, in any part dis cernible either by the naked eye or microscope ; but infi nitely less strange, than that two particles of light should be perfectly of the same figure. For there are infinitely more assignable real parts on the surface of a particle of light, than there are particles of dust, water, and stone, on the surface of the terrestrial globe. Answ. (2.) But then, supposing that there are two parti cles, or atoms of matter, perfectly equal and alike, which God has placed in different parts of the creation ; as I will not deny it to be possible for God to make two bodies perfectly alike, and put them in different places ; yet it will not follow, that two different or distinct acts or effects of the Divine Power have exactly the same fitness for the same ends. For these two different bodies are not differ ent or distinct, in any other respects than those wherein they differ : they are two in no other respects than those wherein there is a difference. If they are perfectly equal and alike in themselves, then they can be distinguished, or be distinct, only in those things which are called circum stances ; as place, time, rest, motion, or some other present or past circumstances or relations. For it is difference only that constitutes distinction. If God makes two bodies, in themselves every way equal and alike, and agree ing perfectly in all other circumstances and relations, but only their place ; then in this only is there any distinction or duplicity. The figure is the same, the measure is the same, the solidity and resistance are the same, and every thing the same but only the place. Therefore what the Will of God determines is this, that there should be the same figure, the same extension, the same resistance, &c. in two different places. And for this determination he has some reason. There is some end, for which such a deter mination and act has a peculiar fitness, above all other acts. _ Here is no one thing determined without an end, and no one thing without a fitness for that end, superior to any thing else. If it be the pleasure of God to cause the same resistance, and the same figure, to be in two different places and situations, we can no more justly argue from it, that here must be some determination or act of God's Will that is wholly without motive or end, than we can argue, that whenever, in any case, it is a man's Will to speak the same words, or make the same sounds, at two different times, there must be some determination or act of his Will, without any motive or end. The difference of place, in the former case, proves no more than the difference of time does in the other. If any one should say, with regard to the former case, that there must be something de termined without an end ; viz. that of those two similar bodies, this in particular should be made in this place, and the other in the other, and should inquire, why the Creator did not make them in a transposition, when both are alike, and each would equally have suited either place ? The inquiry supposes something that is not true ; namely, that the two bodies differ and are distinct in other respects be sides their place. So that with this distinction inherent in them, they might, in their first creation, have been trans posed, and each might have begun its existence in the place of the other. Let us, for clearness sake, suppose, that God had, at the beginning, made two globes, each of an inch diameter, both perfect spheres, and perfectly solid, without pores, and perfectly alike in every respect, and placed them near one to another, one towards the right hand, and the other towards the left, without any difference as to time, motion, or rest, past or present, or any circumstance, but only their place; and the question should be asked, why God in their creation placed them so ? why that which is made on the right hand, was not made on the left, and vice versa ? Let it be well considered, whether there be any sense in such a question ; and whether the inquiry does not suppose something false and absurd. Let it be con sidered, what the Creator must have done otherwise than he did, what different act of Will or power he must have exerted, in order to the thing proposed. All that could have been done, would have been to have made two spheres, perfectly alike, in the same places where he has made them, without any difference of the things made, either in themselves or in any circumstance ; so that the whole effect would have been without any difference, and, therefore, just the same. By the supposition, the two spheres are different in no other respect but their place ; and therefore in other respects they are the same. Each has the same roundness ; it is not a distinct rotundity, in any other respect but its situation. There are, also, the same dimensions, differing in nothing but their place. And so of their resistance, and every thing else that be longs to them. Here, if any chooses to say, " that there is a difference in another respect, viz. that they are not numerically the same : that it is thus with all the qualities that belong to them : that it is confessed, they are, in some respects, the same ; that is, they are both exactly alike ; but yet nu merically they differ. Thus the roundness of one is not the same numerical, individual roundness with that of the other." Let this be supposed ; then the question about the determination of the Divine Will in the affair, is, why did God will, that this individual roundness should be at the right hand, and the other individual roundness at the left ? why did not he make them in a contrary position ? Let any rational person consider, whether such questions be not words without a meaning ; as much as if God should see fit for some ends, to cause the same sounds to be repeated, or made at two different times ; the sounds being perfectly the same in every other respect, but only one was a minute after the other ; and it should be asked, upon it, why God caused these sounds, numerically dif ferent, to succeed one the other in such a manner ? why he did not make that individual sound, which was in the first minute, to be in the second, and the individual sound of the last minute to be in the first ? which inquiries would be even ridiculous ; as, I think, every person must 74 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part IV. see, in the case proposed of two sounds, being only the same repeated, absolutely without any difference, but that one circumstance of time. If the Most High sees it will answer some good end, that the same sound be made thunder at two distinct times, and therefore wills that it should be so, must it needs therefore be, that herein there is some act of God's Will without any motive or end ? God saw fit often, at distinct times, and on different occa sions, to say the very same words to Moses ; namely, those, I am Jehovah. And would it not be unreasonable to infer, as a certain consequence, from this, that here must be some act or acts of the Divine Will, in determining and disposing the words exactly alike, at different times, wholly without aim or inducement? But it would be no more unreasonable than to say, that there must be an act of God without any inducement, if he sees it best, and, for some reasons, determines that there shall be the same resistance, the same dimensions, and the same figure, in several distinct places. If, in the instance of the two spheres, perfectly alike, it be supposed possible that God might have made them in a contrary position ; that which is made at the right hand, being made at the left; then I ask, Whether it is not evi dently equally possible, if God had made but one of them, and that in the place of the right hand globe, that he might have made that numerically different from what it is, and numerically different from what he did make it ; though perfectly alike, and in the same place ; and at the same time, and in every respect, in the same circumstances and relations ? Namely, Whether he might not have made it numerically the same with that which he has now made at the left hand; and so have left that which is now created at the right hand, in a state of non-existence ? And, if so, whether it would not have been possible to have made one in that place, perfectly like these, and yet numerically differing from both ? And let it be considered, whether, from this notion of a numerical difference in bodies, perfectly equal and alike, which numerical difference is something inherent in the bodies themselves, and diverse from the difference of place or time, or any circumstance whatsoever ; it will not follow, that there is an infinite num ber of numerically different possible bodies, perfectly alike, among which God chooses, by a self-determining power, when he goes about to create bodies. Therefore let us put the case thus : Supposing that God, in the beginning, had created but one perfectly solid sphere, in a certain place : and it should be inquired, W hy God created that individual sphere, in that place, at that time ? and why he did not create another sphere perfectly like it, but numerically different, in the same place, at the same time ? Or why he: chose to bring into being there, that very body, rather than any of the infinite number of other bodies, perfectly like it; either of which he could have made there as well, and would have answered his end as well 1 Why he caused to exist, at that place and time, that individual roundness, rather than any other of the in finite number of individual rotundities, just like it 1 Why that individual resistance, rather than any other of the in finite number of possible resistances, just like it ? And it might as reasonably be asked, Why, when God first caused it to thunder, he caused that individual sound then to be made, and not another just like it ? Why did he make choice of this very sound, and reject all the infinite number of other possible sounds just like it, but numeri cally differing from it, and all differing one from another ? I think, every body must be sensible of the absurdity and nonsense of what is supposed in such inquiries. And, if we calmly attend to the matter, we shall be convinced, that all such kind of objections as I am answering, are founded on nothing but the imperfection of our manner of conceiving things, and the obscureness of language, and great want of clearness and precision in the signification of terms. If any should find fault with this reasoning, that it is going a great length into metaphysical niceties and subtil- ties ; I answer, the objection to which they are a reply, is a metaphysical subtilty, and must be treated according to the nature of it.* * " For men to have recourse to suhtilties, in raising difficulties, and then complain, that they should be taken off by minutely examining these subtil- II. Another thing alleged is, that innumerable things which are determined by the Divine Will, and chosen and done by God rather than others, differ from those that are not chosen in so inconsiderable a manner, that it would be unreasonable to suppose the difference to be of any conse quence, or that there is any superior fitness or goodness, that God can have respect to in the determination. To which I answer ; it is impossible for us to deter mine, with any certainty or evidence, that because the difference is very small, and appears to us of no considera tion, therefore there is absolutely no superior goodness, and no valuable end, which can be proposed by the Creator and Governor of the world, in ordering such a difference. The forementioned author mentions many instances. One is, there being one atom in the whole universe more, or less. But, I think, it would be unreasonable to suppose, that God made one atom in vain, or without any end or motive. He made not one atom, but what was a work of his Almighty Power, as much as the whole globe of the earth, and requires as much of a constant exertion of Al mighty Power to uphold it; and was made and is upheld with understanding and design, as much as if no other had been made but that. And it would be as unreasonable to suppose, that he made it without any thing really aimed at in so doing, as much as to suppose, that he made the planet Jupiter without aim or design. It is possible, that the most minute effects of the Crea tor's power, the smallest assignable difference between the things which God has made, may be attended, in the whole series of events, and the whole compass and extent of their influence, with very great and important consequences. If the laws of motion, and gravitation, laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, hold universally, there is not one atom, nor the least assignable part of an atom, but what has influence, every moment, throughout the whole material universe, to cause every part to be otherwise than it would be, if it were not for that particular corporeal existence. And how ever the effect is insensible for the present, yet it may, in length of time, become great and important. To illustrate this, let us suppose two bodies moving the same way, in straight lines, perfectly parallel one to another; but to be diverted from this parallel course, and drawn one from another, as much as might be, by the attraction of an atom, at the distance of one of the furthest of the fixed stars from the earth ; these bodies being turned out of the lines of their parallel motion, will, by degrees, get further and further distant, one from the other; and though the distance may be imperceptible for a long time, yet at length it may become very great. So tbe revolution of a planet round the sun being retarded or accelerated, and the orbit of its revolution made greater or less, and more or less elliptical, and so its periodical time longer or shorter, no more than may be by the influence of the least atom, might, in length of time, perform a whole revolution sooner or later than otherwise it would have done ; which might make a vast alteration with regard to millions of important events. So the influence of the least particle may, for ought we know, have such effect on something in the constitution of some human body, as to cause another thought to arise in the mind at a certain time, than otherwise would have been ; which, in length of time, (yea, and that not very great,) might occasion a vast alteration through the whole world of mankind. And so innumerable other ways might be mentioned, wherein the least assignable alteration may possibly be attended with great consequences.* Another argument, which the fore-mentioned author brings against a necessary determination of the Divine Will, by a superior fitness, is, that such doctrine derogates from the freeness of God's grace and goodness, in choosing the objects of his favour and bounty, and from the obliga tion upon men to thankfulness for special benefits, (p. 89, &c.) In answer to this objection, I would observe, 1. That it derogates no more from the goodness of God, to suppose the exercise of the benevolence of his nature to be determined by wisdom, than to suppose it determined by chance, and that his favours are bestowed altogether at random, his Will being determined by nothing but perfect accident, without any end or design whatsoever ; which ties, is a strange kind of procedure." Nature of the Human Soul, vol. .2. Sect. VIII. OF THE EXISTENCE OF SIN, &c. 75 must be the case, as has been demonstrated, if Volition be not determined by a prevailing motive. That which is owing to perfect contingence, wherein neither previous in ducement nor antecedent choice has any hand, is not ow ing more to goodness or benevolence, than that which is owing to the influence of a wise end. 2. It is acknowledged, that if the motive that deter mines the Will of God, in the choice of the objects of his favours, be any moral quality in the object, recommending that object to his benevolence above others, his choosing that object is not so great a manifestation of the freeness and sovereignty of his grace, as if it were otherwise. But there is no necessity for supposing this, in order to our supposing that he has some wise end in view, in determin ing to bestow his favours on one person rather than another. We are to distinguish between the merit of the object of God's favour, or a moral qualification of the ob ject attracting tnat favour and recommending to it, and the natural fitness of such a determination of the act of God's goodness, to answer some wise design of his own, some end in the view of God's omniscience. — It is God's own act, that is the proper and immediate object of his Vo lition. 3. I suppose that none will deny, but that, in some in stances, God acts from wise design in determining the particular subjects of his favours : none will say, I pre sume, that when God distinguishes, by his bounty, par ticular societies or persons, he never, in any instance, ex ercises any wisdom in so doing, aiming at some happy consequence. And, if it be not denied to be so in some instances, then I would inquire, whether in these in stances God's goodness is less manifested, than in those wherein God has no aim or end at all ? And whether the subiects have less cause of thankfulness ? And if so, who shall be thankful for the bestowment of distinguishing mercy, with that enhancing circumstance of the distinction being made without an end? How shall it be known when God is influenced by some wise aim, and when not ? It is very manifest, with respect to the apostle Paul, that God had wise ends in choosing him to be a Christian and an apostle, who had been a persecutor, &c. The apostle himself mentions one end. (1 Tim. i. 15, 16.) " Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom I am chief. Howbeit, for this cause I obtained mercy, that in me first, Jesus Christ might show forth all long-suffering, for a pattern to them who should hereafter believe on him to life everlasting." But yet the apostle never looked on it as a diminution of the freedom and riches of divine grace in his election, which he so often and so greatly magnifies. This brings me to observe, 4. Our supposing such a moral Necessity in the acts of God's Will, as has been spoken of, is so far from necessarily derogating from the riches of God's grace to such as are the chosen objects of his favour, that, in many instances, this moral necessity may arise from goodness, and from the great degree of it. God may choose this object rather than another, as having a superior fitness to answer the ends, designs, and inclinations of his goodness ; being more sin ful, and so more miserable and necessitous than others, the inclinations of infinite mercy and benevolence may be more gratified, and the gracious design of God in sending his Son into the world, may be more abundantly answered, in the exercises of mercy towards such an object, rather than another. One thing more I would observe, before I finish what I have to say on the head of the Necessity of the acts of God's Will ; and that is, that something much more like a servile subjection of the Divine Being to fatal Necessity, will follow from Arminian principles, than from the doc trines which they oppose. For they (at least most of them) suppose, with respect to all events that happen in the moral world, depending on the Volitions of moral agents, which are the most important events of the universe, to which all others are subordinate ; I say, they suppose, with respect to these, that God has a certain foreknowledge of them, antecedent to any purposes or decrees of his about them. And if so, they have a fixed certain futurity, prior to any designs or Volitions of his, and independent » Oh the live Points, p. 361 on them, and to which his Volitions must be Subject, as he would wisely accommodate his affairs to this fixed futurity of the state of things in the moral world. So that here, instead of a moral Necessity of God's Will, arising from, or consisting in, the infinite perfection and blessed ness of the Divine Being, we have a fixed unalterable state of things, properly distinct from the perfect nature of the Divine Mind, and the state of the Divine Will and Design, and entirely independent on these things, and which they have no hand in, because they are prior to them ; and to which God's Will is truly subject, being obliged to con form or accommodate himself to it, in all his purposes and decrees, and in every thing he does in his disposals and government of the world ; the moral world being the end of the natural ; so that all is in vain, that is not accom modated to that state of the moral world, which consists in, or depends upon, the acts and state of the Wills of moral agents, which had a fixed futurition from eternity. Such a subjection to Necessity as this, would truly argue an inferiority and servitude, that would be unworthy of the Supreme Being ; and is much more agreeable to the notion which many of the heathen had of fate, as above the gods, than that moral Necessity of fitness and wisdom which has been spoken of; and is truly repugnant to the absolute sovereignty of God, and inconsistent with the supremacy of his Will ; and really subjects the Will of the Most High to the Will of his creatures, and brings him into dependence upon them. SECT. IX. Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it makes God the Author of Sin. It is urged by Arminians, that the doctrine of the Neces sity of men's Volitions, or their necessary connexion with antecedentevents and circumstances, makes the FirstCause, and Supreme Orderer of all things, the Author of Sin ; in that he has so constituied the state and course of things, that sinful Volitions become necessary, in conse quence of his disposal. Dr. Whitby, in his Discourse on the Freedom of the Will, * cites one of the ancients, as on his side, declaring that this opinion of the Necessity of the Will " absolves sinners, as doing nothing of their own accord which was evil, and would cast all the blame of all the wickedness committed in the world, upon God, and upon his providence, if that were admitted by the asser- tors of this fate ; whether he himself did necessitate them to do these things, or ordered matters so, that they should be constrained to do them by some other cause." And the Doctor says, in another place, f "In the nature of the thing, and in the opinion of philosophers, causa deficiens, in rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientem reducenda est. In things necessary, the deficient cause must be re duced to the efficient. And in this case the reason is evident ; because the not doing what is required, or not avoiding what is forbidden, being a defect, must follow from the position of the necessary cause of that deficiency." — Concerning this, I would observe the following things. I. If there be any difficulty in this matter, it is nothing peculiar to this scheme ; it is no difficulty or disadvan tage wherein it is distinguished from the scheme of Armini ans ; and, therefore, not reasonably objected by them. Dr. Whitby supposes that if sin necessarily follows from God withholding assistance, or if that assistance be not given, which is absolutely necessary to the avoiding of evil ; then, in the nature of the thing, God must be as properly the author of that evil, as if he were the efficient cause of it. From whence, according to what he himself says of the devils and damned spirits, God must be the proper author of their perfect unrestrained wickedness: he must be the efficient cause of the great pride of the devils, and of their perfect malignity against God, Christ, his saints, and all that is good, and of the insatiable cruelty of their disposition. For he allows, that God has so for saken them, and does so withhold his assistance from them, that they are incapacitated from doing good, and deter- t Ibid. p. 4S6. 76 ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Part IV. mined only to evil.* Our doctrine, in its consequence, makes God the author of men's sin in this world, no more, and in no other sense, than his doctrine, in its consequence, makes God the author of the hellish pride and malice of the devils. And doubtless the latter is as odious an effect as the former. Again, if it will follow at all, that God is the Author of Sin, from what has been supposed of a sure and infallible connexion between antecedents and consequents, it will follow because of this, viz. that for God to be the author or orderer of those things which, he knows beforehand, will infallibly be attended with such a consequence, is the same thing, in effect, as for him to be the author of that consequence. But, if this be so, this is a difficulty which equally attends the doctrine of Arminians themselves ; at least, of those of them who allow God's certain foreknow ledge of all events. For, on the supposition of such a foreknowledge, this is the case with respect to every sin that is committed : God knew, that if he ordered and brought to pass such and such events, such sins would infallibly follow. As for instance, God certainly foreknew, long before Jiuias was born, that if he ordered things so, that there should be such a man born, at such a time, and at such a place, and that his life should be preserved, and that he should, in Divine Providence, be led into acquaint ance with Jesus ; and that his heart should be so influenced by God's Spirit or providence, as to be inclined to be a follower of Christ ; and that he should be one of those twelve, which should be chosen constantly to attend him as his family ; and that his health should be pre served, so that he should go up to Jerusalem, at the last passover in Christ's life ; and it should be so ordered, that Judas should see Christ's kind treatment of the woman which anointed him at Bethany, and have that reproof from Christ which he had at that time, and see and hear other things which excited his enmity against his Master, and other circumstances should be ordered, as they were ordered ; it would most certainly and infallibly follow, that Judas would betray his Lord, and would soon after hang himself, and die impenitent, and be sent to hell, for his horrid wickedness. Therefore, this supposed difficulty ought not to be brought as an objection against the scheme which has been maintained, as disagreeing with the Arminian scheme, seeing it is no difficulty owing to such a disagreement, but a difficulty wherein the Arminians share with us. That must be unreasonably made an objection against our differing from them, which we should not escape or avoid atallbyagreeing with them. — And therefore I would observe, II. They who object, that this doctrine makes God the Author of Sin, ought distinctly to explain what they mean by that phrase, The Author of Sin. I know the phrase, as it is commonly used, signifies something very ill. If by the Author of Sin, be meant the Sinner, the Agent, or Actor of Sin, or the Doer of a wicked thing ; so it would be a reproach and blasphemy, to suppose God to be the Au thor of Sin. In this sense, I utterly deny God to be the Author of Sin ; rejecting such an imputation on the Most High, as what is infinitely to be abhorred ; and deny any such thing to be the consequence of what I have laid down. But if, by the Author of Sin, is meant the per- mitter, or not a hinderer of Sin ; and, at the same time, a disposer of the state of events, in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that Sin, if it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and in fallibly follow : I say, if this be all that is meant, by being the Author of Sin, I do not deny that God is the Author of Sin, (though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense,) it is no reproach for the Most High to be thus the Author of Sin. This is not to be the Acto- of Sin, but, on the contrary, of holiness. What God doth herein, is holy ; and a glorious exercise of the infinite excellency of his na ture. And, I do not deny, that God being thus the Author of Sin, follows from what I have laid down; and, I assert, that it equally follows from the doctrine which is maintained by most of the Arminian divines. That it is most certainly so, that God is in such a man ner the Disposer and Orderer of Sin, is evident, if any »' On V..c live Points, p. 302, 305. credit is to be given to the Scripture ; as well as because it is impossible, in the nature of things, to be otherwise. In such a manner God ordered the obstinacy of Pltar-aoh, in his refusing to obey God's commands, to let the people go. (Exod. iv. 21.) " I will harden his heart, and he shall not let the people go." (Chap. vii. 2 — 5.) " Aaron thy brother shall speak unto Pharaoh, that he send the chil dren of Israel out of his land. And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and my wonders in the land of Egypt. But Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you; that I may lay mine hand upon Egypt, by great judgments," &c. (Chap. ix. 12.) " And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto them, as the Lord had spoken unto Moses." (Chap. x. 1, 2.) " And the Lord said unto Moses, Go in unto Pha raoh ; for I have hardened his heart, and the heart of his servants, that I might show these my signs before him, and that thou mayest tell it in the ears of thy son, and thy son's son, what things I have wrought in Egypt, and my signs which I have done amongst them, that ye may know that I am the Lord." (Chap. xiv. 4.) " And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, that he shall follow after them : and I will be honoured upon Pharaoh, and upon all his host." (Ver. 8.) " And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh king of Egypt, and he pursued after the children of Israel." And it is certain, that in such a maiumr God, for wise and good ends, ordered that event, Joseph being sold into Egypt by his brethren. (Gen. xiv. 5.) " Now, therefore, be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you to preserve life." (Ver. 7, 8.) " God did send me before you to preserve a posterity in the earth, and to save your lives by a great deliverance : so that now it was not you that sent me hither, but God." (Psal. cvii. 17.) " He sent a man before them, even Joseph, who was sold for a servant." It is certain, that thus God ordered the Sin and folly of Sihon king of the Amorites, in refusing to let the people of Israel pass by him peaceably. (Deut. ii. 30.) " But Sihon king of Heshbon would not let us pass by him ; for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thine hand." It is certain, that God thus ordered the Sin and folly of the kings of Canaan, that they attempted not to make peace with Israel, but, with a stupid boldness and obstinacy, set themselves violently to oppose them and their God. (Josh. xi. 20.) " For it was of the Lord, to harden their hearts, that they should come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no favour ; but that he might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses." It is evident, that thus God ordered the treacherous rebellion of Zedekiah against the king of Babylon. (Jer. Hi. 3.) " For through the anger of the Lord it came to pass in Jerusalem, and Judah, until he had cast them out from his presence, that Zedekiah rebelled against the king of Babylon." (So 2 Kings xxiv. 20.) And it is exceeding manifest, that God thus ordered the rapine and unrighteous ravages of Nebuchadnezzar, in spoiling and ruining the nations round about. (Jer. xxv. 9.) " Behold, I will send and take all the families of the north, saith the Lord, and Nebuchadnezzar my servant, and will bring them against this land, and against all the nations round about; and will utterly destroy them, and make them an astonishment, and an hissing, and perpetual desolations." (Chap, xliii. 10, 11.) " I will send and take Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon, my servant : and I will set his throne upon these stones that I have hid, and he shall spread his royal pavilion over them. And when he cometh, he shall smite the land of Egypt, and deliver such as are for death to death, and such as are for captivity to captivity, and such as are for the sword to the sword.'' Thus God represents himself as sending for Nebuchad nezzar, and taking him and his armies, and bringing him against the nations, which were to be destroyed by him, to that very end, that he might utterly destroy them, and make them desolate ; and as appointing the work that he should do so particularly, that the very persons were de signed that he should kill with the sword, and those that should be killed with famine and pestilence, and those that should be carried into captivity ; and that in doing all these Sect. IX. OF THE EXISTENCE OF SIN, &c. 77 things, he should act as his servant ; by which, less cannot be intended, than that he should serve his purposes and de signs. And in Jer. xxvii. 4 — 6. God declares, how he would cause him thus to serve his designs, viz. by bringing this to pass in his sovereign disposals, as the great Possessor and Governor of the universe, that disposes all things just as pleases him. " Thus saith the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel ; I have made the earth, the man and the beast that are upon the ground, by my great power, and my stretched out arm, and have given it unlo whom it seemed meet unto me ; and now I have given all these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar my servant, and the beasts of the field have I given also to serve him." And Nebu chadnezzar is spoken of as doing these things, by having his arms strengthened by God, and having God s sword put into his hands, for this end. (Ezek. xxx. 24, 25, 26.) Yea, God speaks of' his terribly ravaging and wasting the nations, and cruelly destroying all sorts, without distinction of sex or age, as the weapon in God's hand, and the instrument of his indignation, which God makes use of to fulfil his own purposes, and execute his own vengeance. (Jer. li. 20, &c.) " Thou art my battle-axe, and weapons of war. For with thee will I break in pieces the nations, and with thee I will destroy kingdoms, and with thee I will break in pieces the horse and his rider, and with thee I will break in pieces the chariot and his rider ; with thee also will I break in pieces man and woman ; and with thee I will break in pieces old and young ; and with thee will I break in pieces the young man and the maid," ike. It is represented, that the designs of Nebuchadnezzar and those that destroyed Jerusalem, never could have been accom plished, had not God determined them. (Lam. iii. 37.) " Who is he that saith, and it cometh to pass, and the Lord commandeth it not?" And yet the king of Babylon thus destroying the nations, and especially the Jews, is spoken of as his great wickedness, for which God finally destroyed him. (Isa. xiv. 4 — 6, 12. Hab. ii. 5 — 12. and Jer. chap. 1. and li.) It is most manifest, that God, to serve his own designs, providentially ordered Shimei's cursing of David. (2 Sam. xvi. 10, li.) "The Lord hath said unto him, Curse David. — Let him curse, for the Lord hath bidden him." It is certain, that God thus, for excellent, holy, gracious ends, ordered the fact which they committed, who were concerned in Christ's death ; and that therein they did but fulfil God's designs. As, I trust, no Christian will deny it was the design of God, that Christ should be crucified, and that for this end he came into the world. It is very manifest by many scriptures, that the whole affair of Christ's crucifixion, with its circumstances, and the treachery of Judas, that made way for it, was ordered in God's providence, in pursuance of his purpose ; notwith standing the violence that is used with those plain scrip tures, to obscure and pervert the sense of them. (Acts ii. 23.) " Him being delivered, by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God * ye have taken, and with wicked hands have crucified and slain." Luke xxii. 21, 22.f " But behold the hand of him that betrayeth me, is with me on the table : and truly the Son of man goeth, as it was determined." (Acts iv. 27, 28.) " For of a truth, against the holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do what soever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done." (Acts iii. 17, _8.) "And now, brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers ; but these things, which God before had showed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled." So that what these murderers of Christ did, is spoken of as what God brought to pass or ordered, and that by which he fulfilled his own word. In Rev', xvii. 17. " The agreeing of the kings of the earth to give their kingdom to the beast ;" though it was a very wicked thing in them, is spoken of as " fulfilling God's will," and what " God had put into their hearts to * " Grotius, as well as Bexa, observes, 7rpo7v_* P. 178, 213, 214. t P. 188, 189, &c. Sect. XV. APPENDIX. 93 it is in view, the better. More particularly, that the clear and full knowledge of that, which is the true system of the universe, in these respects, would greatly establish the doctrines which teach the true christian scheme of divine administration in the city of God, and the gospel of Jesus Christ, in its most important articles. Indeed these things never can be well established, and the opposite errors — so subversive of the whole gospel, which at this day so greatly and generally prevail — be well confuted, or the arguments by which they are maintained, answered, till these points are settled. While this is not done, it is, to me, beyond doubt, that the friends of those great gospel truths, will but poorly maintain their controversy with the adversaries of those truths : they will be obliged often to snuffle, hide, and turn their backs ; and the latter will have a strong fort, from whence they never can be driven, and weapons to use, from which those whom they oppose will find no shield to screen themselves ; and they will always puzzle, confound, and keep under the friends of sound doctrine ; and glory, and vaunt themselves in their advan tage over them ; and carry their affairs with a high hand, as they have done already for a long time past. I conclude, Sir, with asking your pardon for troubling you with so much in vindication of myself from the impu tation of advancing a scheme of necessity, like that of the author of the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion.' Considering that what I have said is not only in vindication of myself, but, as I think, of the most important articles of moral philosophy and religion ; I trust in what I know of your candour, that you will ex cuse, Your obliged friend and brother, J. EDWARDS. Stockbridge, July 25th, 1757. DISSERTATION CONCERNING THE END FOR WHICH GOD CREATED THE WORLD. PREFACE BY THE FIRST EDITOR. The Author had designed these Dissertations* for the public view ; and wrote them out as they now appear : though it is probable, that if his life had been spared, he would have revised them, and rendered them in some respects more complete. Some new sentiments, here and there, might probably have been added ; and some passages brightened with farther illustrations. This may be conjectured from some brief hints or sentiments minuted down on loose papers, found in the manuscripts. But those sentiments concisely sketched out, which, it is thought, the author intended to enlarge, and digest into the body of the work, cannot be so amplified by any other hand, as to do justice to the author : it is therefore probably best that nothing of this kind should be attempted. As these Dissertations were more especially designed for the learned and inquisitive, it is expected that the judicious and candid will not be disposed to object, that the manner in which these subjects are treated is something above the level of common readers. For though a superficial way of discourse and loose harangues may well enough suit some subjects, and answer some valuable purposes ; yet other subjects demand more closeness and accuracy. And if an author should neglect to do justice to a subject, for fear that the simpler sort should not fully understand him, he might expect to be deemed a trifler by the more intelligent. Our author had a rare talent to penetrate deep in search of truth ; to take an extensive survey of a subject, and look through it into remote consequences. Hence many theorems, that appeared hard and barren to others, were to him pleasant and fruitful fields, where his mind would expatiate with peculiar ease, profit, and entertainment. Those studies, which to some are too fatiguing to the mind, and wearying to the constitution, were to him but a natural play of genius, and which his mind without labour would freely and spontaneously perform. A close and conclusive way of reasoning upon a controversial point was easy and natural to him. This may serve, it is conceived, to account for his usual manner of treating abstruse and controverted subjects, which some have thought has been too metaphysical. But the truth is, that his critical method of looking .through the nature of his subject,- — his accuracy and precision in canvassing truth, comparing ideas, drawing consequences, pointing out and exposing absurdities, — naturally led him to reduce the evidence in favour of truth into the form of demon stration ; which, doubtless, where it can be obtained, is the most eligible, and by far the most satisfying to great and noble minds. And though some readers may find the labour hard to keep pace with the writer, in the advances he makes, where the ascent is arduous ; yet in general all was easy to him : such was his peculiar love and discernment of truth, and natural propensity to search after it. His own ideas were clear to him, where some readers have thought them obscure. Thus many things in the works of Newton and Locke, which appear either quite unintelligible, or very obscure, to the illiterate, were clear and bright to those illustrious authors, and their learned readers. The subjects here handled are sublime and important. The end which God had in view in creating the world, was doubtless worthy of him ; and consequently the most excellent and glorious possible. This therefore must be worthy to be known by all the intelligent creation, as excellent in itself, and worthy of their pursuit. And as true virtue dis tinguishes the inhabitants of heaven, and all the happy candidates for that world of glory, from all others ; there can not surely be a more interesting subject. The notions which some men entertain concerning God's end in creating the world, and concerning true virtue, in our late author's opinion, have a natural tendency to corrupt Christianity, and to destroy the gospel of our divine Redeemer. It was therefore, no doubt, in the exercise of a pious concern for the honour and glory of God, and a tender respect to the best interests of his fellow-men, that this devout and learned writer undertook the following work. — May the Father of lights smile upon the pious and benevolent aims and labours of his servant, and crown them with his blessing ! * This preface was originally prefixed to the two following Dissertations, " concerning the End for which God created the World, and the Nature of True Virtue," in one volume. — W. DISSERTATION, &c INTRODUCTION. Containing explanations of terms and general positions. To avoid all confusion in our inquiries concerning the end for which God created the world, a distinction should be observed between the chief end for which an agent per forms any work, and the ultimate end. These two phrases are not always precisely of the same signification : and though the chief end be always an ultimate end, yet every ultimate end is not always a chief end. A chief end is opposite to an inferior end : an ultimate end is opposite to a subordinate end. A subordinate end is what an agent aims at, not at all upon its own account, but wholly on the account of a further end, of which it is considered as a means. Thus when a man goes a journey to obtain a medicine to restore his health, the obtaining of that medicine is his subordi nate end ; because it is not an end that he values at all upon its own account, but wholly as a means of a further end, viz. his health. Separate the medicine from that further end, and it is not at all desired. An ultimate end is that which the agent seeks, in what he does, for its own sake ; what he loves, values, and takes pleasure in on its own account, and not merely as a means of a further end. As when a man loves the taste of some particular sort of fruit, and is at pains and cost to obtain it, for the sake of the pleasure of that taste which he values upon its own account, as he loves his own pleasure ; and not merely for the sake of any other good, which he supposes his enjoying that pleasure will be the means of. Some ends are subordinate, not only as they are subor dinated to an ultimate end ; but also to another end that is itself but subordinate. Yea, there may be a succession or chain of many subordinate ends, one dependent on an other, one sought for another ; before you come to any thing that the agent aims at, and seeks for its own sake. As when a man sells a garment to get money — to buy tools— to till his land — to obtain a crop — to supply him with food — to gratify the appetite. And he seeks to gratify his appetite, on its own account, as what is grateful in itself. Here the end of his selling his garment to get money, is only a subordinate end ; and it is not only subordinate to the ultimate end — gratifying his appetite — but to a nearer end — buying husbandry tools ; and his obtaining these is only a subordinate end, being only for the sake of tilling land. And the tillage of land is an end not sought on its own account, but for the sake of the crop to be produced ; and the crop produced is an end sought only for the sake of making bread ; and bread is sought for the sake of gratifying the appetite. Here gratifying the appetite is called the ultimate end ; because it is the last in the chain where a man's aim rests, obtaining in that the thing finally aimed at. So whenever a man comes to that in which his desire terminates and rests, it being something valued on its own account, then he comes to an ultimate end, let the chain be longer or shorter; yea, if there be but one link or one step that he takes before he comes to this end. As when a man that loves honey puts it into his mouth, for the sake of the pleasure of the taste, without aiming at any thing further. So that an end which an agent has in view, may be both his immediate and his ultimate end ; his next and his lust end. That end which is sought for the sake of itself, and not for the sake of a further end, is an ultimate end ; there the aim of the agent stops and rests. A thing sought may have the nature of an ultimate, and also of a subordinate end ; as it may be sought partly on its own account, and partly for the sake of a further end. Thus a man, in what he does, may seek the love and respect of a particular person, partly on its own account, because it is in itself agreeable to men to be the objects of others' esteem and love ; and partly, because he hopes, through the friendship of that person, to have his assist ance in other affairs ; and so to be put under advantage for obtaining further ends. A chief end, which is opposite to an inferior end, is something diverse from an ultimate end ; it is most valued, and therefore most sought after by the agent in what he does. It is evident, that to be an end more valued than another end, is not exactly the same thing as to be an end valued ultimately, or for its own sake. This will ap pear, if it be considered, 1. That two different ends may be both ultimate, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their own sake, and both sought in the same work or acts ; and yet one valued more highly, and sought more than another. Thus a man may go a journey to obtain two different benefits or enjoyments, both which may be agreeable to him in themselves considered ; and yet one may be much more agreeable than the other; and so be what he sets his heart chiefly upon. Thus a man may go a. journey, partly to obtain the possession and enjoyment of a bride that is very dear to him; and partly to gratify his curiosity in looking in a telescope, or some new-invented and extraor dinary optic glass ; and the one not properly subordinate to the other ; and therefore both may be ultimate ends. But yet obtaining his beloved bride may be his chief end ; and the benefit of the optic glass his inferior end. 2. An ultimate end is not always the chief end, because some subordinate ends may be more valued and sought after than some ultimate ends. Thus, for instance, a man may aim at two things in his journey ; one, to visit his friends, and another, to receive a large sum of money. The latter may be but a subordinate end ; he may not value the silver and gold on their own account, but only for pleasure, gratification, and honour ; the money is valued only as a means of the other. But yet, obtaining the money may be more valued, and so is a higher end of his journey than the pleasure of seeing his friends; though the latter is valued on its own account, and so is an ulti mate end. But here several things may be noted : First, When it is said, that some subordinate ends may be more valued than some ultimate ends, it is not supposed that ever a subordinate end is more valued than that to which it is subordinate. For that reason it is called a 96 GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION. subordinate end, because it is valued and sought not for its own sake, but only in subordination to a. further end. But yet a subordinate end may be valued more than some other ultimate end that it is not subordinate to. Thus, for instance, a man goes a journey to receive a sum of money, only for the value of the pleasure and honour that the money may be a means of. In this case it is impossible that the subordinate end, viz. his having the money, should be more valued by him than the pleasure and honour for which he values it. It would be absurd to suppose that he values the means more than the end, when he has no value for the means, but for the sake of the end of which it is the means. But yet he may value the money, though but a subordinate end, more than some other ultimate end to which it is not subordinate, and with which it has no connexion. For instance, more than the comfort of a friendly visit, which was one ultimate end of his journey. Secondly, The ultimate end is always superior to its subordinate end, and more valued by the agent, unless it be when the ultimate end entirely depends on the subor dinate. If he has no other means by which to obtain his last end, then the subordinate may be as much valued as the last end; because the last end, in such a case, alto gether depends upon, and is wholly and certainly conveyed by it. As for instance, if a pregnant woman has a peculiar appetite to a certain rare fruit that is to be found only in the garden of a particular friend of hers, at a distance — and she goes a journey to her friend's house or garden, to ob tain that fruit — the ultimate end of her journey is to gratify that strong appetite ; the obtaining that fruit, is the subor dinate end otit. If she looks upon it, that the appetite can be gratified by no other means than the obtaining of that fruit ; and that it will certainly be gratified if she obtain it, then she will value the fruit as much as she values the gratification of her appetite. But otherwise, it will not be so. If she be doubtful whether that fruit will satisfy her craving, then she will not value it equally with the gratifi cation of her appetite itself. Or if there be some other fruit that she knows of, that will gratify her desire, at least in part, which she can obtain without such trouble as shall countervail the gratification — or if her appetite cannot be gratified without this fruit, nor yet with it alone, without something else to be compounded with it — then her value for her last end will be divided between these several in gredients, as so many subordinate ends, and no one atone will be equally valued with the last end. Hence it rarely happens, that a subordinate end is equally valued with its last end ; because the obtaining of a last end rarely de pends on one single, uncompounded means, and infallibly connected with it. Therefore, men's last ends are com monly their highest ends. Thirdly, Ii any being has but one. ultimate end, in all that he does, and there be a great variety of operations, his last end may justly be looked upon as his supreme end. For in such a case, every other end but that one, is in order to that end ; and therefore no other can be superior to it. Because, as was observed before, a subordinate end is never more valued than the end to which it is subordinate. Moreover, the subordinate effects, or events, brought to pass, as means of this end, all uniting to contribute their share towards obtaining the one last end, are very various; and therefore, by what has been now observed, the ulti mate end of all must be valued more than any one of the particular means. This seems to be the case with the works of God, as may more fully appear in the sequel. Fourthly, Whatsoever any agent has in view in any thing he does, which is agreeable to him in itself, and not merely for the sake of something else, is regarded by that agent as his last end. The same may be said of avoiding that which is in itself painful or disagreeable ; for the avoiding of what is disagreeable is agreeable. This will be evident to any bearing in mind the meaning of the terms. By last end being meant, that which is regarded and sought by an agent, as agreeable or desirable for its own sake ; a subordinate, that which is sought only for the sake of some thing else. Fifthly, From hence it will follow, that, if an agent has in view more things than one that will be brought to pass by what he does, which he loves and delights in on their own account, then he must have more things than one that he regards as his last ends in what he does. But if there be but one thing that an agent seeks, on its own account, then there can De but one last end which he has in all his actions and operations. But only here a distinction must be observed of things which may be said to be agreeable to an agent, in them selves considered: (1.) What is in itself grateful to an agent, and valued on its own account, simply and absolutely con sidered ; antecedent to, and independent of all conditions, or any supposition of particular cases and circumstances. And, (2.) What may be said to be in itself agreeable to an agent, hypothetically and consequentially ; or, on supposi tion of such and such circumstances, or on the happening of such a particular case. Thus, for instance, a man may originally love society. An inclination to society may be implanted in his very na ture ; and society may be agreeable to him antecedent to all pre-supposed cases and circumstances ; and this may cause him to seek a family. And the comfort of society may be originally his lust end, in seeking a family. But after he has a family, peace, good order, and mutual justice and friendship in his family, may be agreeable to him, and what he delights in for their own sake ; and therefore these things may be his last end in many things he does in the government and regulation of his family. But they were not his original end with respect to his family. The justice and the peace of a family was not properly his last end before he had a family, that induced him to seek a family, but consequentially. And the case being put of his having a family, then these things wherein the good order and beauty of a family consist, become his last end in many things he does in such circumstances. In like manner we must suppose that God, before he created the world, had some good in view, as a consequence of the world's existence, that was originally agreeable to him in itself considered, that inclined him to bring the universe into existence, in such a manner as he created it. But after the world was created, and such and such in telligent creatures actually had existence, in such and such circumstances, then a wise, just regulation of them was agreeable to God, in itself considered. And God's love of justice, and hatred of injustice, would be sufficient in such a case to induce God to deal justly with his creatures, and to prevent all injustice in him towards them. But yet there is no necessity of supposing, that God's love of doing justly to intelligent beings, and hatred of the contrary, was what originally induced God to create the world, and make intelligent beings; and so to order the occasion of doing either justly or unjustly. The justice of God's nature makes a just regulation agreeable, and the contrary dis agreeable, as there is occasion ; the subject being supposed, and the occasion given. But we must suppose something else that should incline him to create the subjects, or order the occasion. So that perfection of God which we call his faithfulness, or his inclination to fulfil his promises to his creatures, could not properly be what moved him to create the world ; nor could such a fulfilment of his promises to his creatures be his last end in giving the creatures being. But yet after the world is created, after intelligent creatures are made, and God has bound himself by promise to them, then that disposition, which is called his faithfulness, may move him in his providential disposals towards them ; and this may be the end of many of God's works of providence,! even the exercise of his faithfulness in fulfilling his pro mises, and may be in the lower sense his last end ; be cause faithfulness and truth must be supposed to be what is in itself amiable to God, and what he delights in for its own sake. Thus God may have ends of particular works of providence, which are ultimate ends in a lower sense, which were not ultimate ends of the creation. So that here we have two sorts of ultimate ends ; one of which may be called, original and independent, the other, consequential and dependent ; for it is evident, the latter sort are truly of the nature of ultimate ends ; because though their being agreeable to the agent, be consequential on the existence, yet the subject and occasion being supposed, they are agreeable and amiable in themselves. We may suppose, that, to a righteous Being, doing justice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreeable in Sect. 1. THE GENERAL DICTATES OF REASON. 07 itself, and not merely for the sake of some other end : And yet we may suppose, that a desire of doing justice be tween two parties, may be consequential on the being of those parties, and the occasion given. — It may be observed, that when I speak of God's ultimate end in the creation of the world, in the following discourse, I commonly mean in that highest sense, viz. the original ultimate end. Sixthly, It may be further observed, that the original ultimate end or ends of the creation of the world is alone- thai which induces God to give the occasion for conse quential ends, by the first creation of the world, and the original disposal of it. And the more original the end is, the more extensive and universal it is. That which God had primarily in view in creating, and the original ordina tion of the world, must be constantly kept in view, and have a governing influence in all God's works, or with respect to every thing he does towards his creatures. And therefore, Seventhly, If we use the phrase ultimate end in this highest sense, then the same that is God's ultimate end in creating the world, if we suppose but one such end, must be what he makes his ultimate aim in all his works, in every thing he does either in creation or providence. But we must suppose, that, in the use to which God puts his creatures, he must evermore have a - regard to the end for which he has made them. But if we take ultimate end in the other lower sense, God may sometimes have regard to those things as ultimate ends, in particular works of provi dence, which could not in any proper sense be his last end in creating the world. Eighthly, On the other hand, whatever appears to be God^ ultimate end, in any sense, of his works of provi dence in general ; that must be the ultimate end of the work of creation itself. For though God may act for an end that is ultimate in a lower sense, in some of his works of providence, which is not the ultimate end of the crea tion of the world, yet this doth not take place with regard to the works of providence in general ; for God's works of providence in general, are the same with the general use to which he puts the world he has made. And we may well argue from what we see of the general use which God makes of the world, to the general end for which he de signed the world. Though there may be some ends of particular works of providence, that were not the last end of the creation, which are in themselves grateful to God in such particular emergent circumstances, and so are last ends in an inferior sense ; yet this is only in certain cases, or particular occasions. But if they are last ends of God's proceedings in the use of the world in general, this shows that his making them last ends does not depend on particular cases and circumstances, but the nature of things in gene ral, and his general design in the being and constitution of the universe. Ninthly, If there be but one thing that is originally, and independent on any future supposed cases, agreeable to God, to be obtained by the creation of the world, then there can be but one last end of God's work, in this highest sense. But if there are various things, properly diverse one from another, that are absolutely and independently agreeable to the Divine Being, which are actually obtained by the creation of the world, then there were several ulti mate ends of the creation in that highest sense. CHAP. I. WHEREIN IS CONSIDERED, .WHAT REASON TEACHES CON CERNING THIS AFFAIR. Sect. I. Seme things observed in general,which reason dictates. Having observed these things, to prevent confusion, I now proceed to consider what may, and what may not, be supposed to be God's ultimate end in the creation of the world. Indeed this affair seems properly to be an affair of di vine revelation. In order to be determined what was designed, in the creating of the astonishing fabric of the universe we behold, it becomes us to attend to, and rely on, what he has told us, who was the architect. He best knows his own heart, and what his own ends and designs were, in the wonderful works which he has wrought. Nor is it to be supposed that mankind — who, while destitute of revelation, by the utmost improvements of their own reason, and advances in science and philosophy, could come to no clear and established determination who the author of the world was — would ever have obtained any tolerable settled judgment of the end which the author of it proposed to himself in so vast, complicated, and won derful a work of his hands. And though it be true, that the revelation which God has given to men, as a light shining in a dark place, has been the occasion of great improvement of their faculties, and has taught men how to use their reason ; and though mankind now, through the long-continued assistance they have had by this divine light, have come to great attainments in the habitual ex ercise of reason ; yet I confess it would be relying too much on reason, to determine the affair of God's last end in the creation of the world, without being herein princi pally guided by divine revelation, since God has given a revelation containing instructions concerning this very matter. Nevertheless, as objections have chiefly been , made, against what I think the Scriptures have truly re vealed, from the pretended dictates of reason, I would, in the first place, soberly consider in a few things, what seems rational to be supposed concerning this affair ;— and then proceed to consider what light divine revelation gives us in it. . . As to the first of these, I think the following things ap pear to be the dictates of reason : 1. That no notion of God's last end in the creation of the world, is agreeable to reason, which would truly imply any indigence, insufficiency, and mutability in God ; or any dependence of the Creator on the creature, for any part of his perfection or happiness. Because it is evident, by both Scripture and reason, that God is infinitely, eternally, unchangeably, and independently glorious and happy : that he cannot be profited by, or receive any thing from, the creature ; or be the subject of any sufferings, or dimi nution of his glory and felicity, from any other being. The notion of God creating the world, in order to receive anv thing properly from the creature, is not only contrary to "the nature of God, but inconsistent with the notion of creation ; which implies a being receiving its existence, and all that belongs to it, out of nothing. And this im plies the most perfect, absolute, and universal derivation and dependence. Now, if the creature receives its all from God, entirely and perfectly, how is it possible that it ) should have any thing to add to God, to make him in any respect more than he was before, and so the Creator be come dependent on the creature ? 2. Whatsoever is good and valuable in itself, is worthy that God should value it with an ultimate respect. It is therefore worthy to be made the last end of his operation ; if it be properly capable of being attained. For it may be supposed that some things, valuable and excellent in them selves, are not properly capable of being attained in any divine operation ; because their existence, in all possible respects, must be conceived of as prior to any divine operation. Thus God's existence and infinite perfection, though infinitely valuable in themselves, cannot be sup posed to be the end of any divine operation ; for we cannot conceive of them as, in any respect, consequent on any works of God. But whatever is in itself valuable, abso lutely so, and is capable of being sought and attained, is worthy to be made a last end of the divine operation.— Therefore, ,„ ... 3. Whatever that be which is in itself most valuable, and was so originallv, prior to the creation of the world, and which is attainable by the creation, if there be any thing which was superior in value to all others, Mai must be worthy to be God's last end in the creation ; and also worthy to be his highest end.— In consequence of this it will follow, 4. Thai if God himself be, in any respect, properly ca- 98 GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION Chap. I. ; of being his own end in the creation of the world, then it is reasonable to suppose that he had respect to himself, as his last and highest end, in this work ; because he is 'worthy in himself to be so, being infinitely the great est and best of beings. All things else, with regard to worthiness, importance, and excellence, are perfectly as nothing in comparison of him. And therefore, if God has respect to things according to their nature and proportions, he must necessarily have the greatest respect to himself. It would be against the perfection of his nature, his wis dom, holiness, and perfect rectitude, whereby he is dis posed to do every thing that is fit to be done, to suppose otherwise. At least, a great part of the moral rectitude of God, whereby he is disposed to every thing that is fit, suitable, and amiable in itself, consists in his having the highest regard to that which is in itself highest and best. The moral rectitude of God must consist in a due respect to things that are objects of moral respect ; that is, to intelligent beings capable of moral actions and relations. And therefore it must chiefly consist in giving due respect to that Being to whom most is due ; for God is infinitely the most worthy of regard. The worthiness of others is as nothing to his ; so that to him belongs all possible respect. To him belongs the whole of the respect that any intelli gent being is capable of. To him belongs all the heart. Therefore, if moral rectitude of heart consists in paying the respect of the heart which is due, or which fitness and suitableness requires, fitness requires infinitely the greatest regard to be paid to God ; and the denying of supreme regard here would be a conduct infinitely the most unfit. Hence it will follow, that the moral rectitude of the dis position, inclination, or affection of God chiefly consists in a regard to himself, infinitely above his regard to all other beings ; or, in other words, his holiness consists in this. And if it be thus fit that God should have a supreme regard to himself, then it is fit that this supreme regard should appear in those things by which he makes himself known, or by his word and works, i. e. in what he says, and in what he does. If it be an infinitely amiable thing in God, that he should have a supreme regard to himself, then it is an amiable thing that he should act as having a chief regard to himself; or act in such a manner, as to sAow that he has such a regard : that what is highest in God's heart, may be highest in his actions and conduct. And if it was God's intention, as there is great reason to think it was, that tis works should exhibit an image of himself their author, that it might brightly appear by his works what manner of being he is, and afford a proper re presentation of his divine excellencies, and especially his moral excellence, consisting in the disposition of his heart; then it is reasonable to suppose that his works are so wrought as to show this supreme respect to himself, wherein his moral excellence primarily consists. When we are considering what would be most fit for God chiefly to respect, with regard to the universality of things, it may help us to judge with greater ease and satis faction, to consider, what we can suppose would be deter mined by some third being of perfect wisdom and rectitude, that should be perfectly indifferent and disinterested. Or if we make the supposition, that infinitely wise justice and rectitude were a distinct disinterested person, whose office it was to determine how things shall be most properly or dered in the whole kingdom of existence, including king and subjects, God and his creatures; and, upon a view of the whole, to decide what regard should prevail in all proceedings. Now such a judge, in adjusting the proper measures and kinds of regard, would weigh things in an ¦even balance ; taking care, that a greater part of the whole should be more respected, than the lesser, in pro portion (other things being equal) to the measure of exist ence. So that the degree of regard should always be in a proportion compounded of the proportion of existence, and proportion of excellence, or according to the degree of great ness and goodness, considered conjunctly. Such an arbiter, in considering the system of created intelligent beings by itself, would determine, that the system in general, consist ing of many millions, was of greater importance, and worthy of a greater share of regard, than only one individual. For, however considerable some of the individuals might be, no one exceeds others so much as to countervail all the system. And if this judge consider not only the system of created beings, but the system of being in general, compre hending the sum total of universal existence, both Creator and creature ; still every part must be considered accord ing to its importance, or the measure it has of existence and excellence. To determine then, what proportion of regard is to be allotted to the Creator, and all his creatures taken together, both must be as it were put in the balance; the Supreme Being, with all in him that is great and excel lent, is to be compared with all that is to be found in the whole creation : and according as the former is found to outweigh, in such proportion is he to have a greater share of regard. And in this case, as the whole system of created beings, in comparison of the Creator, would be found as the light dust of the balance, or even as nothing and vanity ; so the arbiter must determine accordingly with respect to the degree in which God should be regard ed, by all intelligent existence, in all actions and proceed ings, determinations and effects whatever, whether creating, preserving, using, disposing, changing, or destroying. And as the Creator is infinite, and has all possible existence, perfection, and excellence, so he must have all possible regard. As he is every way the first and supreme, and as his excellency is, in all respects the supreme beauty and glory, the original good, and fountain of all good ; so he must have in all respects the supreme regard. And as he is God over all, to whom all are properly subordinate, and on whom all depend, worthy to reign as supreme Head, with absolute and universal dominion; so it is Jit that he should be so regarded by all, and in all proceedings and effects through the whole system : The universality of things, in their whole compass and series, should look to him, in such a manner, as that respect to him should reign over all respect to other things, and regard to creatures should, universally, be subordinate and subject. When I speak of regard to be thus adjusted in the universal system, I mean the regard of the sum total; all intelligent existence, created and uncreated. For it is fit, that the regard of the Creator should be proportioned to the worthiness of objects, as well as the regard of creatures. Thus, we must conclude, that such an arbiter as I have supposed, would determine, that the whole universe, in all its actings, proceedings, revolutions, and entire series of events, should proceed with a view to God, as the su preme and last end ; that every wheel, in all its rotations, should move with a constant invariable regard to him as, the ultimate end of all ; as perfectly and uniformly, as if the whole system were animated and directed by one common soul. Or, as if such an arbiter as I have before supposed, possessed of perfect wisdom and rectitude, be came the common soul of the universe, and actuated and governed it in all its motions. Thus I have gone upon the supposition of a third dis interested person. The thing supposed is impossible; but the case is, nevertheless, just the same, as to what is most fit and suitable in itself. For it is most certainly proper for God to act, according to the greatest fitness, and he knows what the greatest fitness is, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person to direct him. God him self is possessed of that perfect discernment and rectitude which have, been supposed. It belongs to him as supreme arbiter, and to his infinite wisdom and rectitude, to state all rules and measures of proceedings. And seeing these attributes of God are infinite, and most absolutely perfect, they are not the less fit to order and dispose, because they are in him, who is a being concerned, and not a third person that is disinterested. For being interested unfits a person to be an arbiter or judge, no otherwise, than as interest tends to mislead his judgment, or incline him to act con trary to it. But that God should be in danger of either, is contrary to the supposition of his being absolutely perfect. And as there must be some supreme judge of fitness and propriety in the universality of things, or otherwise there could be no order, it therefore belongs to God, whose are all things, who is perfectly fit for this office, and who alone is so, to state all things according to the most perfect fitness and rectitude, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person. We may therefore be sure it is and will be done. Sect. II. WHAT REASON SUPPOSES. 99 I should think that these things might incline us to suppose, that God has not forgot himself, in the ends which he proposed in the creation of the world ; but that he has so stated these ends, (however self-sufficient, im mutable, and independent,) as therein plainly to show a supreme regard to himself. Whether this can be, or whe ther God has done thus, must be considered afterwards, as also what may be objected against this view of things. 5. Whatsoever is good, amiable, and valuable in itself, absolutely and originally, (which facts and events show that God aimed at in the creation of the world,) must be sup posed to be regarded or aimed at by God ultimately, or as an ultimate end of creation. For we must suppose, from the perfection of God's nature, that whatsoever is valuable and amiable in itself, simply and absolutely considered, God values simply for itself; because God's judgment and esteem are according to truth. But if God values a thing simply and absolutely on its own account, then it is the ultimate object of his value. For to suppose that he values it only for some farther end, is in direct contradiction to the present supposition, which is, that he values it abso lutely, and for itself. Hence it most clearly follows, that if that which God values/or itself, appears, in fact and ex perience, to be what he seeks by any thing he does, he must regard it as an ultimate end. And, therefore, if he seeks it in creating the world, or any part of the world, it is an ultimate end of the work of creation. Having got thus far, we may now proceed a step farther, and assert, 6. Whatsoever thing is actually the effect of the creation of the world, which is simply and absolutely valuable in itself, that thing is an ultimate end of God's creating the world. We see that it is a good which God aimed at by the creation of the world ; because he has actually attained it by that means. For we may justly infer what God in tends, by what he actually does ; because he does nothing inadvertently, or without design. But whatever God in tends to attain, from a value for it, in his actions and works, that he seeks in those acts and works. Because, for an agent to intend to attain something he values by the means he uses, is the same thing as to seek it by those means. And this is the same as to make that thing his end in those means. Now, it being, by the supposition, what God values ultimately, it must therefore, by the pre ceding position, be aimed at by God, as an ultimate end of creating the world. SECT. II. Some further observations concerning these things which reason leads us to suppose God aimed at in the creation of the world. From what was last observed, it seems to be the most proper way of proceeding — as we would see what light reason will give us, respecting the particular end or ends God had ultimately in view in the creation of the world — to consider, what thing or things are actually the effect or consequence of the creation of the world, that are simply and originally valuable in themselves. And this is what I would directly proceed to, without entering on any tedious metaphysical inquiries, wherein fitness, or amiable ness, consists ; referring what I say to the dictates of the reader's mind, on sedate and calm reflection. 1. It seems a thing in itself proper and desirable, that the glorious attributes of God, which consist in a sufficiency to certain acts and effects, should be exerted in the produc tion of such effects as might manifest his infinite power, wisdom, righteousness, goodness, &c. If the world had not been created, these attributes never would have had any exercise. The power of God, which is a sufficiency in him to produce great effects, must for ever have been dor mant and useless as to any effect. The divine wisdom and prudence would have had no exercise in any wise contri vance, any prudent proceeding, or disposal of things ; for there would have been no objects of contrivance or disposal. * " The end of wisdom (says Mr. G. Tennent, in his sermon at the open ing of the preshyterian church of Philadelphia) is design ; the end of power is action ; the end of goodness is doing good. To suppose these perfections not to be exerted would be to represent tjiem as insignificant. Of what use H 2 The same might be observed of God's justice, goodness, and truth. Indeed God might have known as perfectly that he possessed these attributes, if they never had been exerted or expressed in any effect. But then, if the attri butes which consist in a sufficiency for correspondent effects, are in themselves excellent, the exercises of them must like wise be excellent. If it be an excellent thing, that there should be a sufficiency for a certain kind of action or operation, the excellency of such a sufficiency must consist in its relation to this kind of operation or effect ; but that could not be, unless the operation itself were excellent. A sufficiency for any work is no further valuable, than the work itself is valuable.* As God therefore esteems these attributes themselves valuable, and delights in them ; so it is natural to suppose that he delights in their proper ex ercise and expression. For the same reason that he esteems his own sufficiency wisely to contrive and dispose effects, he also will esteem the wise contrivance and disposition itself. And for the same reason, as he delights in his own disposition to do justly, and to dispose of things according to truth and just proportion ; so he must delight in such a righteous disposal itself. 2. It seems to be a thing in itself fit and desirable, that the glorious perfections of God should be known, and the operations and expressions of them seen, by other beings besides himself. If it be fit that God's power and wisdom, &c. should be exercised and expressed in some effects, and not lie eternally dormant, then it seems proper that these exercises should appear, and not be totally hidden and un known. For if they are, it will be just the same, as to the above purpose, as if they were not. God as perfectly knew himself and his perfections, had as perfect an idea of the exercises and effects they were sufficient for, antecedently to any such actual operations of them, and since. If, there fore, it be nevertheless a thing in itself valuable, and wor thy to be desired, that these glorious perfections be actually exhibited in their correspondent effects ; then it seems also, that the knowledge of these perfections and discoveries is valuable in itself absolutely considered; and that it is de sirable that this knowledge should exist. It is a thing in finitely good in itself, that God's glory should be known by a glorious society of created beings. And that there should be in them an increasing knowledge of God to all eternity, is worthy to be regarded by him, to whom it be longs to order what is fittest and best. If existence is more worthy than defect and non-entity, and if any created ex istence is in itself worthy to be, then knowledge is ; and if any knowledge, then the most excellent sort of knowledge, viz. that of God and his glory. This knowledge is one of the highest, most real, and substantial parts of all created existence, most remote from non-entity and defect. 3. As it is desirable in itself that God's glory should be known, so when known it seems equally reasonable it should be esteemed and delighted in, answerably to its dignity. There is no more reason to esteem it a suitable thing, that there should be an idea in the understanding corresponding unto the glorious object, than that there should be a corresponding affection in the will. If the per fection itself be excellent, the knowledge of it is excellent, and so is the esteem and love of it excellent. And as it is fit that God should love and esteem his own excel lence, it is also fit that he should value and esteem the love of his excellency. And if it becomes a being highly to value himself, it is fit that he should love to have himself valued and esteemed. If the idea of God's perfection in the understanding be valuable, then the love of the heart seems to be more especially valuable,as moral beauty espe cially consists in the disposition and affection of the heart. 4. As there is an infinite fulness of all possible good in God — a fulness of every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of infinite happiness — and as this fulness is capable of communication, or emanation ad extra ; so it seems a thing amiable and valuable in itself 'that this in finite fountain of good should send forth abundant streams. And as this is in itself excellent, so a disposition to this in the Divine Being, must be looked upon as an excellent dis- would God's wisdom be, if it had nothing to design or direct ? To what purpose his almightiness, if it never brought any thing to pass ? And of what avail his goodness, if it never did any good ?" 100 GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION. Chap. I. position. Such an emanation of good is, in some sense, a multiplication of it. So far as the stream may be looked upon as any thing besides the fountain, so far it may be looked on as an increase of good. And if the fulness of good that is in the fountain, is in itself excellent, then the emanation, which is as it were an increase, repetition, or multiplication of it, is excellent. Thus it is fit, since there is an infinite fountain of light and knowledge, that this light should shine forth in beams of communicated know ledge and understanding ; and, as there is an infinite foun tain of holiness, moral excellence, and beauty, that so it should flow out in communicated holiness. And that, as there is an infinite fulness of joy and happiness, so these should have an emanation, and become a fountain flowing out in abundant streams, as beams from the sun. Thus it appears reasonable to suppose, that it was God's last end, that there might be a glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fulness of good ad extra, or with out himself; and that the disposition to communicate him self, or diffuse his own fulness,* was what moved him to create the world. But here I observe, that there would be some impropriety in saying, that a disposition in God to communicate himself to the creature, moved him to create the world. For an inclination in God to communi cate himself to an object, seems to presuppose the exist ence of the object, at least in idea. But the diffusive disposition that excited God to give creatures existence, was rather a communicative disposition in general, pr a dis position in the fulness of the divinity to flow out and diffuse itself. Thus the disposition there is in the root and stock of a tree to diffuse sap and life, is doubtless the reason of their communication to its buds, leaves, and fruits, after these exist. But a disposition to communi cate of its life and sap to its fruits, is not so properly the cause of its producing those fruits, as its disposition to diffuse its sap and life in general. Therefore, to speak strictly according to truth, we may suppose, that a dispo sition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fulness, was what excited him to create the world ; and so, that the emanation itself was aimed at by him as a last end of the creation. SECT. III. Wherein it is considered how, on the supposition of God's making the forementioned things his last end, he mani fests a supreme and ultimate regard to himself in all his works.In the last section I observed some things which are actually the consequence of the creation of the world, which seem absolutely valuable in themselves, and so worthy to be made God's last end in his work. I now proceed to inquire, how God's making such things as these his last end, is consistent with his making himself his last end, or his manifesting an ultimate respect to himself in his acts and works. Because it is agreeable to the dictates of reason, that in all his proceedings he should set himself- highest ; therefore, I would endeavour to show, how his infinite love to and delight in himself, will naturally cause him to value and delight in these things : or rather, how a value to these things is implied in his value of that infinite fulness of good that is in himself. Now, with regard to the first of the particulars mention ed above — God's regard to the exercise of those attributes of his nature, in their proper operations and effects, which consist in a sufficiency for these operations — it is not hard to conceive that God's regard to himself, and value for his own perfections, should cause him to value these exercises and expressions of his perfections ; inasmuch as their ex cellency consists in their relation to use, exercise, and ope ration. God's love to himself, and his own attributes, will therefore make him delight in that which is the use, end, and operation of these attributes. If one highly esteem and delight in the virtues of a friend, as wisdom, justice, &c. that have relation to action, this will make him delight * I shall often use the phrase God's fulness, as signifying and compre hending all the good which is in God natural and moral, either excellence or happiness: partly, because I know of no better phrase'to be used in in the exercise and genuine effects of these virtues. So if God both esteem and delight in his own perfections and virtues, he cannot but value and delight in the expressions and genuine effects of them. So that in delighting in the expressions of his perfections, he manifests a delight in him self; and in making these expressions of his own perfec tions his end, he makes himself his end. . And with respect to the second and third particulars, the matter is no less plain. For he that loves any being, and has a disposition highly to prize and greatly to de light in his virtues and perfections, must from the same disposition be well pleased to have his excellencies known, acknowledged, esteemed, and prized by others. He that loves any thing, naturally loves the approbation of that thing, and is opposite to the disapprobation of it. Thus it is when one loves the virtues of a friend. And thus it will necessarily be, if a being loves himself and highly prizes his own excellencies ; and thus it is fit it should be, if it be fit he should thus love himself, and prize his own valuable qualities ; that is, it is fit that he should take delight in his own excellencies being seen, acknow ledged, esteemed, and delighted in. This is implied in a love to himself and his own perfections ; and in making this his end, he makes himself his end. And with respect to the fourth and last particular, viz. God's being disposed to an abundant communication, and glorious emanation, of that infinite fulness of good which he possesses, as of his own knowledge, excellency, and happiness, in the manner he does ; if we thoroughly con sider the matter, it will appear, that herein also God makes himself his end, in such a sense, as plainly to manifest and testify a supreme and ultimate regard to himself. Merely in this disposition to cause an emanation of his glory and fulness— which is prior to the existence of any other being, and is to be considered as the inciting cause of giving existence to other beings — God cannot so pro perly be said to make the creature his end, as himself. For the creature is not as yet considered as existing. This dis position or desire in God, must be prior to the existence of the creature, even in foresight. For it is a disposition that is the original ground even of the future, intended, and. foreseen existence of the creature. God's benevolence, as it respects the creature, may be taken either in a larger or stricter sense. In a larger sense, it may signify nothing diverse from that good disposition in his nature to commu nicate of his own fulness in general ; as his knowledge, his holiness, and happiness ; and to give creatures exist ence in order to it. This may be called benevolence, or love, because it is the same good disposition that is exer cised in love. It is the very fountain from whence love originally proceeds, when taken in the most, proper sense; and it has the same general tendency and effect in the crea ture's well-being. But yet this cannot have any particular present or future created existence for its object ; because it is prior to any such object, and the very source of the futurition of its existence. Nor is it really diverse from God's love to himself; as will more clearly appear after wards. But God's love may be taken more strictly, for this general disposition to communicate good, as directed to particular objects. ' Love, in the most strict and proper sense, presupposes the existence of the object beloved, at least in idea and expectation, and represented to the mind as future. God did not love angels in the strictest sense, but in consequence of his intending to create them, and so having an idea of future existing angels. Therefore his love to them was not properly what excited him to intend to create them. Love or benevolence, strictly taken, pre supposes an existing object, as much as pity a miserable suffering object. This propensity in God to diffuse himself, may be con sidered as a propensity to himself diffused ; or to his own glory existing in its emanation. A respect to himself, or an infinite propensity to and delight in his own glory, is that which causes him to incline to its being abundantly diffused, and to delight in the emanation of it. Thus, that this general meaning ; and partly, because I am led hereto by some of the inspired writers, particularly the apostle Paul, who often useth the phrase in tins sense. Sect. III. HOW GOD REGARDS HIMSELF. 101 nature in a tree, by which it puts forth buds, shoots out branches, and brings forth leaves and fruit, is a disposition that terminates in its own complete self. And so the dis position in the sun to shine, or abundantly to diffuse its fulness, warmth, and brightness, is only a tendency to its own most glorious and complete state. So God looks on the communication of himself, and the emanation of his infinite glory, to belong to the fulness and completeness of himself; as though he were not in his most glorious state without it. Thus the church of Christ, (toward whom and in whom are the emanations of his glory, and the communication of his fulness,) is called the fulness of Christ ; as though he were not in his complete state with out her; like Adam without Eve. And the church is called the glory of Christ, as the woman is the glory of the man, 1 Cor. xi. 7. Isa. xlvi. 13. I will place salvation in Zion,for Israel my glory.*— Indeed, after the creatures are intended to be created, God may be conceived of as being moved by benevolence to them, in the strictest sense, in his dealings with them. His exercising his good ness, and gratifying his benevolence to them in particular, may be the spring of all God's proceedings through the universe ; as being now the determined way of gratifying his general inclination to diffuse himself. Here God act ing for himself, or making himself his last end, and his acting for their sake, are not to be set in opposition ; they are rather to be considered as coinciding one with the other, and implied one in the other. But yet God is to be considered as first and original in his regard ; and the creature is the object of God's regard, consequently, and by implication, as being as it were comprehended in God; as it shall be more particularly observed presently. But how God's value for, and delight in, the emanations of his fulness in the work of creation, argues his delight in the infinite fulness of good in himself, and the supreme regard he has for himself; and that in making these emanations, he ultimately makes himself his end in crea tion ; will more clearly appear by considering more par ticularly the nature and circumstances of these communi cations of God's fulness. One part of that divine fulness which is communicated, is the divine knowledge. That communicated knowledge, which must be supposed to pertain to God's last end in creating the world, is the creature's knowledge of him. For this is the end of all other knowledge ; and even the faculty of. understanding would be vain without it. And this knowledge is most properly a communication of God's infinite knowledge, wbich primarily consists in the know ledge of himself. God, in making this his end, makes himself his end. This knowledge in the creature, is but a conformity to God. It is the image of God's own know ledge of himself. It is a participation of the same ; though infinitely less in degree : as particular beams of the sun communicated are the light and glory of the sun itself, in part. Besides, God's glory is the object of this knowledge, or the thing known ; so that God is glorified in it, as herebv his excellency is seen. As therefore God values himself, as he delights in his own knowledge, he must delight in every thing of that nature : as he delights in his own light, he must delight in every beam of that light; and as he highly values his own excellency, he must be well pleased in having it manifested, and so glorified. Another emanation of divine fulness, is the communica tion of virtue and holiness to the creature : this is a com munication of God's holiness ; so that hereby the creature partakes of God's own moral excellency ; which is properly the beauty of the divine nature. And as God delights in his own beauty, he must necessarily delight in the creature's holiness ; which is a conformity to and participation of it, as truly as a brightness of a jewel, held in the sun's beams, is a participation or derivation of the sun's brightness, though immensely less in degree. And then it must be * Very remarkable is that place, John xii. 23, 24. And Jesus answered them, saying. The hour is come, that the Son of man should be glorified. Verily, I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground, and die, it abidelh alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit. Christ had respect herein to the blessed fruits of his death, in the conversion, salvation, and eternal happiness of those that should be redeemed by him. This consequence of his death, he calls his glory ; and his obtaining this fruit, he calls his being glorified; as the flourishing, beautiful produce of a considered wherein this holiness in the creature consists, viz. in love, which is the comprehension of all true virtue ; and primarily in love to God, which is exercised in a high esteem of God, admiration of his perfections, com placency in them, and praise of them. All which things are nothing else but the heart exalting, magnifying, or glorifying God; which, as I showed before, God neces sarily approves of, and is pleased with, as he loves him self, and values the glory of his own nature. Another part of God's fulness which he communicates, is his happiness. This happiness consists in enjoying and rejoicing in himself; and so does also the creature's hap piness. It is a participation of what is in God ; and God and his glory are the objective ground of it. The happi ness of the creature consists in rejoicing in God ; by which also God is magnified and exalted. Joy, or the exulting of the heart in God's glory, is one thing that belongs to praise. So that God is all in all, with respect to each part of that communication of the divine fulness which is made to the creature, What is communicated is divine, or something of God ; and each communication is of that nature, that the creature to whom it is made, is thereby conformed to God, and united to him : and that in pro portion as the communication is greater or less. And the communication itself is no other, in the very nature of it, than that wherein the very honour, exaltation, and praise of God consists. And it is farther to be considered, that what God aimed at in the creation of the world, as the end which he had ultimately in view, was that communication of himself which he intended through all eternity. And if we attend to the nature and circumstances of this eternal emanation of divine good, it will more clearly show how, in making this his end, God testifies a supreme respect to himself, and makes himself his end. There are many reasons to think that what God has in view, in an increasing communica tion of himself through eternity, is an increasing knowledge of God, love to him, and joy in him. And it is to be con sidered, that the more those divine communications increase in the creature, the more it becomes one with God : for so much the more is it united to God in love, the heart is drawn nearer and nearer to God, and the union with him becomes more firm and elose : and, at the same time, the creature becomes more and more conformed to God. The image is more and more perfect, and so the good that is in the creature comes for ever nearer and nearer to an identity with that which is in God. In the view therefore of God, who has a comprehensive prospect of the increas ing union and conformity through eternity, it must be an infinitelv strict and perfect nearness, conformity, and one ness. For it will for ever come nearer and nearer to that strictness and perfection of union which there is between the Father and the Son. So that in the eyes of God, who perfectly sees the whole of it, in its infinite progress and increase, it must come to an eminent fulfilment of Christ's request, in John xvii. 21, 23. That they all may be one, as thou Father art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us ; I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one. In this view, those elect creatures, which must be looked upon as the end of all the rest of the creation, considered with respect to the uhole of their eternal duration, and as such made God's end, must be viewed as being, as it were, one with God. They were respected as brought hotne to him, united with him, center ing most perfectly, as it were swallowed up in hirn : so that his respect to them finally coincides, and becomes one and the same, with respect to himself. The interest of the creature is, as it were, God's own interest, in propor tion to the degree of their relation and union to God. Thus .the interest of a man's, family is looked upon as the same with his own interest ; because of the relation they stand in to him, his propriety in them, and their strict union with him. But God's elect creatures, with respect corn of wheat sown in the ground is its glory. Without this he is alone, as Adam was before Eve was created. But from him, by his death, proceeds a glorious offspring; in which are communicated his fulness and glory ; As from Adam, in his deep sleep, proceeds the woman, a beautiful companion to fill his emptiness, and relieve his solitariness; by Christ's death, his ful ness is abundantly diffused in many streams ; and expressed in the beauty; and glory of a great multitude of __ spiritual offspring. 102 GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION. Chap. I. to their eternal duration, are infinitely dearer to God, than a man's family is to him. What has been said shows, that as all things are from. God, as their first cause and fountain ; so all things tend to him, and in their progress come nearer and nearer to him through all eternity : wbich argues, that he who is their first cause is their last end* SECT. IV. Some objections considered, which may be made against the reasonableness of what has been said of God making him self his last end. Object. I. Some may object against what has been said as being inconsistent with God's absolute independence and immutability : particularly, as though God were in clined to a communication of his fulness, and emanations of his own glory, as being his own most glorious and com plete state. . It may be thought that this does not well consist with God, being self-existent from all eternity; absolutely perfect in himself, in the possession of infinite and independent good. And that, in general, to suppose that God makes himself his end, in the creation of the world, seems to suppose that he aims at some interest or happiness of his own, not easily reconcilable with his being perfectly and infinitely happy in himself. If it could be supposed that God needed any thing ; or that the good ness of his creatures could extend to him ; or that they could be profitable to him ; it might be fit, that God should make himself, and his own interest, his highest and last end in creating the world. But seeing that God is above all need, and all capacity of being made better or happier in any respect; to what purpose should God make himself his end, or seek to advance himself in any respect by any of his works ? How absurd is it to suppose that God should do such great things, with a view to obtain what he is already most perfectly possessed of, and was so from all eternity ; and therefore cannot now possibly need, nor with any colour of reason be supposed to seek ! Ans. 1. Many have wrong notions of God's happi ness, as resulting from his absolute self-sufficience, inde pendence, and immutability. Though it be true, that God's : glory and happiness are in and of himself, are infinite and v cannot be added to, and unchangeable, for the whole and ;, every part of which he is perfectly independent of the rcreature ; yet it does not hence follow, nor is it true, that God has no real and proper delight, pleasure, or happiness, in any of his acts or communications relative to the crea ture, or effects he produces in them ; or in any thing he sees in the creature's qualifications, dispositions, actions and state. God may have a real and proper pleasure or happiness in seeing the happy state of the creature ; yet this may not be different from his delight in himself; being a delight in his own infinite goodness ; or the exercise of that glorious propensity of his nature to diffuse and communicate him self, and so gratifying this inclination of his own heart. This delight which God has in his creature's happiness, , cannot properly be said to be what God receives from the ' creature. For it is only the effect of his own work in and communications to the creature ; in making it, and admit ting it to a participation of his fulness. As the sun receives nothing from the jewel that receives its light, and shines only by a participation of its brightness. i With respect also to the creature's holiness ; God may have a proper delight and joy in imparting this to the creature, as gratifying hereby his inclination to communi cate of his own excellent fulness. God may delight, with true and great pleasure, in beholding that beauty which is an image and communication of his own beauty, an expres sion and manifestation of his own loveliness. And this is so far from being an instance of his happiness not being in and from himself, that it is an evidence that he is happy in himself, or delights and has pleasure in his own beauty." If he did not take pleasure in the expression of his own beauty, it would rather be an evidence that he does not delight in his own beauty ; that he hath not his happiness and enjoy- * This remark must be understood with limitation ; as expressing the effect ment in his own beauty and perfection. So that if we sup pose God has real pleasure and happiness in the holy love and praise of his saints, as the image and communication of his own holiness, it is not properly any pleasure distinct from the pleasure he has in himself; but it is truly an in stance of it. And with respect to God's being glorified in those per fections wherein his glory consists, expressed in their cor responding effects, — as his wisdom, in wise designs and well-contrived works, his power, in great effects, his justice, in acts of righteousness, his goodness, in communicating happiness, — this does not argue that his pleasure is not in himself, and his own glory ; but the contrary. It is the necessary consequence of his delighting in the glory of his nature, that he delights in the emanation and effulgence of it. Nor do these things argue any dependence in God on the creature for happiness. Though he has real pleasure in the creature's holiness and happiness, yet this is not properly any pleasure which he receives from the creature. For these things are what he gives the creature. They are wholly and entirely from, hirm . H|s rejeicinetfierein is rather a rejoicing in hisjiyvnjfeti, anil nis <_wn*glory ex- s pressed in those acts, than a joy derived from 'h&^ature. God's joy is dependent on nothing besides his Wn8^ which he exerts with an absolute and indepenHSu^iowerti* And yet, in some sense, it can be truly said, that God has the more delight and pleasure for the holiness and happi ness of his creatures. Because God would be less happy, if he were less good : or if he had not that perfection of na ture which consists in a propensity of nature to diffuse his own fulness. And he would be less happy, if it were pos sible for him to be hindered in the exercise of his goodness, and his other perfections, in their proper effects. But he has complete happiness, because he has these perfections, and cannot be hindered in exercising and displaying them in their proper effects. And this surely is not, because he is dependent ; but because he is independent on any other that should hinder him. From this view, it appears, that nothing which has been said, is in the least inconsistent with those expressions in Scripture, that signify, " man cannot be profitable to God," &c. For these expressions plainly mean no more, than that God is absolutely independent of us ; that we have nothing of our own, no stock from whence we can give to God ; and that no part of his happiness originates from man. From what has been said, it appears, that the pleasure God hath in those things which have been mentioned, is rather a pleasure in diffusing and communicating to, than in receiving from, the creature. Surely, it is no argument of indigence in God, that he is inclined to communicate of his infinite fulness. It is no argument of the emptiness or deficiency of a fountain, that it is inclined to overflow. Nothing from the crenture alters God's happiness, as though it were changeable either by increase or diminution. For though these communications of God — these exercises, operations, and expressions of his glorious perfections, which God rejoices in — are in time ; yet his joy in them is without beginning or change. They were always equally present in the divine mind. He beheld them with equal clearness, certainty, and fulness, in every respect, as he doth now. They were always equally present ; as with him there is no variableness or succession. He ever beheld and enjoyed them perfectly in his own independent and im mutable power and will. Ans. 2. If any are not satisfied with the preceding an swer, but still insist on the ohjection, let them consider whether they can devise any other scheme of God's last end in creating the world, but what will be equally obnoxious to this objection in its full force, if there be any force in it. For if God had any last end in creating the world, then there was something in some respect future, that he aimed at, and designed to bring to pass by creating the world ; something that was agreeable to his inclination or will ; let that be his own glory, or the happiness of his creatures, or what it will. Now, if there be something that God seeks as agreeable, or grateful to him, then, in the accomplish- of benevolent influence, but not the effect of justice on a moral system.— W Sect. IV. SOME OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED. 103 ment of it, he is gratified. If the last end which he seeks in the creation of the world be truly a thing grateful to him, (as certainly it is, if it be truly his end, and truly the ob ject of his will,) then it is what he takes a real delight and pleasure in. But then, according to the argument of the objection, how can he have any thing future to desire or seek, who is already perfectly, eternally, and immutably satisfied in himself : What can remain for him to take any delight in, or to be further gratified by, whose eternal and unchangeable delight is in himself, as his own com plete object of enjoyment. Thus the objector will be press ed with his own objection, let him embrace what notion he will of God's end in the creation. And I think he has no way left to answer but that which has been taken above. It may therefore be proper here to observe, that let what will be God's last end, that he must have a real and proper pleasure in. Whatever be the proper object of his will, he is gratified in. And the thing is either grateful to him in itself, or for something else for which he wills it ; and so is his further end. But whatever is God's last end, that he wills for its own sake; as grateful to him in itself, or in which he has some degree of true and proper pleasure. Otherwise we must deny any such thing as will in God with respect to any thing brought to pass in time ; and so must deny his work of creation, or any work of his provi dence, to be truly voluntary. But we have as much reason to suppose, that God's works in creating and governing the world, are properly the fruits of his will, as of his under standing. And if there be any such thing at all, as what we mean by acts of will in God ; then he is not indiffer ent Whether his will be fulfilled or not. And if he is not indifferent, then he is truly gratified and pleased in the fulfilment of his will. And if he has a real pleasure in at taining his end, then the attainment of it belongs to his happiness; that in which God's delight or pleasure in any measure consists. To suppose that God has pleasure in things that are brought to pass in time, only figuratively and metaphorically ; is to suppose that he exercises will about these things, and makes them his end only meta phorically. Ans. 3. The doctrine that makes God's creatures and not himself to be his last end, is a doctrine the furthest from having a favourable aspect on God's absolute self- sufficience and independence. It far less agrees therewith than the doctrine against which this is objected. For we must conceive of the efficient as depending on his ultimate end. He depends on this end, in his desires, aims, actions, and pursuits ; so that he fails in all his desires, actions, and Eursuits, if he fails of his end. Now if God himself be is last end, then in his dependence on his end, he depends on nothing but himself. If all things be of him, and to him, and he the first and the last, this shows him to be all in all. He is all to himself. He goes not out of himself in what he seeks ; but his desires and pursuits as they originate from, so they terminate in, himself; and he is de pendent on none but himself in the beginning or end of any of his exercises or operations. But if not himself, but the creature, were his last end, then as he depends on his last end, he would be in some sort dependent on the creature. Object. II. Some may object, that to suppose God makes himself his highest and last end, is dishonourable to him ; as it in effect supposes, that God does every thing from a selfish spirit. Selfishness is looked upon as mean and sordid in the creature ; unbecoming and even hateful in such a worm of the dust as man. We should look upon a man as of a base and contemptible character, who should in every thing he did, be governed by selfish prin ciples ; should make his private interest his governing aim in all his conduct in life. How far then should we be from attributing any such thing to the Supreme Being, the blessed and only Potentate ! Does it not become us to ascribe to him the most noble and generous dispositions, and qualities the most remote from every thing private, narrow, and sord id ? Ans. 1. Such an objection must arise from a very ig norant or inconsiderate notion of the vice of selfishness, and the virtue of generosity.*) If by selfishness be meant, a disposition in any being "to regard himself; this is no otherwise vicious or unbecoming, than as one is less than a multitude ; and so the public weal is of greater value than his particular interest. Among created beings one single person is inconsiderable in comparison of the generality ; and so his interest is of little importance compared with the interest of the whole system. Therefore in them, a dispo sition to prefer self, as if it were more than all, is exceed ing vicious. But it is vicious on no other account, than as it is a disposition that does not agree with the nature of things ; and that which is indeed the greatest good. And a disposition in any one to forego his own interest for the sake of others, is no further excellent, no further worthy the name of generosity, than it is treating things according to their true value ; prosecuting something most worthy to be prosecuted ; an expression of a disposition to prefer something to self-interest, that is indeed preferable in itself. But if God be indeed so great, and so excellent, that all other beings are as nothing to him, and all other excellency be as nothing, and less than nothing and vanity, in com parison of his ; and God be omniscient and infallible, and perfectly knows that he is infinitely the most valuable being ; then it is fit that his heart should be agreeable to this — which is indeed the true nature and proportion of things, and agreeable to this infallible and all-comprehend ing understanding which he has of them, and that perfectly clear light in which he views them— and that he should value himself infinitely more than his creatures. Ans. 2. In created beings, a regard to self-interest may properly be set in opposition to the public welfare ; be cause the private interest of one person may be inconsist ent with the public good ; at least it may be so in the ap prehension of that person. That which this person looks upon as his interest, may interfere with or oppose the general good. Hence his private interest may be regarded and pursued in opposition to the public. But this cannot be with respect to the Supreme Being, the author and head of the whole system ; on whom all absolutely depend ; who is the fountain of being and good to the whole. It is more absurd to suppose that his interest should be oppo site to the interest of the universal system, than that the welfare of the head, heart, and vitals of the natural body, should be opposite to the welfare of the body. And it is impossible that God, who is omniscient, should apprehend his interest, as being inconsistent with the good and in terest of the whole. Ans. 3. God seeking himself in the creation of the world, in the manner which has been supposed, is so far from being inconsistent with the good of his creatures, that it is a kind of regard to himself that inclines him to seek the good of his creature. It is a regard to himself that dis poses him to diffuse and communicate himself. It is such a delight in his own internal fulness and glory, that dis poses him to an abundant effusion and emanation of that glory. The same disposition, that inclines him to delight in his glory, causes him to delight in the exhibitions, ex pressions, and communications of it. If there were any person of such a taste and disposition of mind, that the brightness and light of the sun seemed unlovely to him, he would be willing that the sun's brightness and light should be retained within itself. But they that delight in it, to whom it appears lovely and glorious, will esteem it an amiable and glorious thing to have it diffused and com municated through the world. Here, by the way, it may be properly considered, whether some writers are not chargeable with inconsistence in this respect. They speak against the doctrine of Gon making himself his own highest and last end, as though this were an ignoble selfishness — when indeed he only is fit to be made the highest end, by himself and all other beings ; inasmuch as he is infinitely greater and more worthy than all others — yet with regard to creatures, who are infinitely less worthy of supreme and ultimate regard, they suppose, that they necessarily, at all times, seek their own happiness, and make it their ultimate end in all, even their most virtuous actions ; and that this principle, regu lated by wisdom and prudence, as leading to that which is their true and highest happiness, is the foundation of all virtue, and every thing that is morally good and excellent in them. Object. III. To what has been supposed, that God 104 GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION. Chap. I. makes himself his end— in seeking that his glory and ex cellent perfections should be known, esteemed, loved, and delighted in by his creatures— it may be objected, that this seems unworthv of God. It is considered as below a truly great man, to be much influenced in his conduct by a desire of popular applause. The notice and admiration of a gazing multitude, would be esteemed but a low end, to be aimed at by a prince or philosopher, in any great and noble enterprise. How much more is it unworthy the great God, to perform his magnificent works, e. g. the creation of the vast universe, out of regard to the notice and admiration of worms of the dust, that the displays of his magnificence may be gazed at, and applauded by those who are infinitely more beneath him, than the meanest rabble are beneath the greatest prince or philo sopher. This objection is specious. It hath a show of argument ; but it will appear to be nothing but a show, if we consider, 1. Whether it be not worthy of God, to regard and value what is excellent and valuable in itself; and so to take pleasure in its existence. It seems not liable to any doubt, that there could be no future existence worthy to be desired or sought by God, and so worthy to be made his end, if no future existence was valuable and worthy to be brought to effect. If, when the world was not, there was any possible future thing fit and valuable in itself, I think the knowledge of God's glory, and the esteem and love of it, must be so. Under standing and will are the highest kind of created existence. And if they be valuable, it must be in their exercise. But the highest' and most excellent kind of their exercise, is in some actual knowledge, and exercise of will. And, cer tainly, the most excellent actual knowledge and will that can be in the creature, is the knowledge and the love of God. And the most true excellent knowledge of God, is the knowledge of his glory or moral excellence ; and the most excellent exercise of the will consists in esteem and love, and a delight in his glory. — If any created existence is in itself worthy to be, or any thing that ever was future is worthy of existence, such a communication of divine fulness, such an emanation and expression of the divine glory, is worthy of existence. But if nothing that ever was future was worthy to exist, then no future thing was worthv to be aimed at by God in creating the world. And if nothing was worthy to be aimed at in creation, then nothing was worthy to be God's end in creation. If God's own excellency and glory is worthy to be highly valued and delighted in by him, then the value and esteem hereof by others, is worthy to be regarded by him : for this is a necessary consequence. To make this plain let it be considered, how it is with regard to the excellent qualities of another. If we highly value the virtues and excellencies of a. friend, in proportion, we shall approve of others' esteem of them ; and shall disap prove the contempt of them. If these virtues are truly valuable, they are worthy that we should thus approve others' esteem, and disapprove their contempt of them. And the case is the same with respect to any being's own qualities or attributes. If he highly esteems them, and greatly delights in them, he will naturally and necessarily love to see esteem of them in others, and dislike their dis- esteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly esteemed by the being who hath them, so is the esteem of them in others worthy to be proportionably approved and regarded. I desire it may be considered, whether it be unfit that God should be displeased with contempt of himself? If not, but on the contrary it be fit and suitable that he should be displeased with this, there is the same reason that he should be pleased with the proper love, esteem, and honour of himself. The matter may be also cleared, by considering what it would become us to approve of and value with respect to any public society we belong to, e. g. our nation or coun try. It becomes us to love our country ; and therefore it becomes us to value the just honour of our country. But the same that it becomes us to value and desire for a friend, and the same that it becomes us to desire and seek for the community, the same does it become God to value and seek for himself; that is, on supposition, that it be comes God to love himself as it does men to love a friend or the public ; which I think has been before proved. Here are two things that ought particularly to be ad verted to. (1.) That in God, the love of himself and the love of the public are not to be distinguished, as in man : because God's being, as it were, comprehends all. His existence, being infinite, must be equivalent to universal existence. And for the same reason that public affection in the creature is fit and beautiful, God's regard to him self must be so likewise.— (2.) In God, the love of what is fit and decent, cannot be a distinct thing from the love of himself; because the love of God is that wherein all holi ness primarily and chiefly consists, and God's own holi ness must primarily consist in the love of himself. And if God's holiness consists in love to himself, then it will imply an approbation of the esteem and love of him in others. For a being that loves himself, necessarily loves love to himself. If holiness in God consist chiefly in love to himself, holiness in the creature must chiefly con sist in love to him. And if God loves holiness in himself, he must love it in the creature. Virtue, by such of the late philosophers as seem to be in chief repute, is placed in public affection, or general benevolence. And if the essence of virtue lies primarily in this, then the love of virtue itself is virtuous no other wise, than as it is implied in, or arises from, this public affection, or extensive benevolence of mind. Because if a man truly loves the public, he necessarily loves love to the public. Now therefore, for the same reason, if universal benevo lence in tbe highest sense, be the same thing with benevo lence to the Divine Being, who is in effect universal Being, it will follow, that love to virtue itself is no otherwise vir tuous, than as it is implied in, or arises from, love to the Divine Being. Consequently, God's own love to virtue is implied in love to himself: and is virtuous no otherwise than as it arises from love to himself. So that God's vir tuous disposition, appearing in love to holiness in the creature, is to be resolved into the same thing with love to himself. And consequently, whereinsoever he makes vir tue his end, he makes himself his end. In fine, God being as it were an all-comprehending Being, all his moral per fections — his holiness, justice, grace, and benevolence — are some way or other to be resolved into a supreme and infinite regard to himself; and if so, it will be easy to suppose that it becomes him to make himself his supreme and last end in his works. I would here observe, by the wav, that if any insist that it becomes God to love and take delight in the virtue of his creatures for its own sake, in such a manner as not to love it from regard to himself; this will contradict a former ob jection against God taking pleasure in communications of himself; viz. that inasmuch as God is perfectly independ ent and self-sufficient, therefore all his happiness and plea sure consists in the enjoyment of himself. So that if the same persons make both objections, they must be incon sistent with themselves. 2. I would observe, that it is not unworthy of God to take pleasure in that which is in itself fit and amiable, even in those that are infinitely below him. If there be infinite grace and condescension in it, yet these are not un worthy of God ; but infinitely to his honour and glory. They who insist, that God's own glory was not an ulti mate end of his creation of the world ; but the happiness of his creatures ; do it under a colour of exalting God's benevolence to his creatures. But if his love to them be so great, and he so highly values them as to look upon them worthy to be his end in all his great works, as they suppose ; they are not consistent with themselves, m sup posing that God has so little value for their love and esteem. For as the nature of love, especially great love, causes him that loves to value the esteem of the person beloved ; so, that God should take pleasure in the crea ture's just love and esteem, will follow from God's love both to himself and to his creatures. If he esteem and love himself, he must approve of esteem and love to him self, and disapprove the contrary. And if he loves and values the creature, he must value and take delight in their mutual love and esteem. 3 As to what is alleged, that it is unworthy of great Sect. IV. SOME OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED. 105 men to be governed in their conduct and achievements by a regard to the applause of the populace ; I would observe, What makes their applause worthy of so little regard, is their ignorance, giddiness, and injustice. The applause of the multitude very frequently is not founded on any just view of things, but on humour, mistake, folly, and un reasonable affections. Such applause deserves to be dis regarded. — But it is not beneath a man of the greatest dignity and wisdom, to value the wise and just esteem of others, however inferior to him. The contrary, instead of being an expression of greatness of mind, would show a haughty and mean spirit. It is such an esteem in his crea tures, that God regards ; for, such an esteem only is fit and amiable in itself. Object. IV. To suppose that God makes himself his ultimate end in the creation of the world, derogates from the freeness of his goodness, in his beneficence to his crea tures ; and from their obligations to gratitude for the good communicated. For if God, in communicating his ful ness, makes himself, and not the creatures, his end ; then what good he' does, he does for himself, and not for them ; for his sake, and not theirs. Answer. God and the creature, in the emanation of the divine fulness, are not properly set in opposition ; or made the opposite parts. of a disjunction. Nor ought God's glory and the creature's good, to be viewed as if they were properly and entirely distinct, in the objection. This sup posed!, that God having respect to his glory, and the com munication of good to his creatures, are things altogether different : that God communicating his fulness for himself, and his doing it for them, are things standing in a prooer disjunction and opposition. Whereas, if we were capable of more perfect views of God and divine things, which are so much above us, it probably would appear very clear, that the matter is quite otherwise : and that these things, instead of appearing entirely distinct, are implied one in the other. God in seeking his glory, seeks the good of his creatures ; because the emanation of his glory (which he seeks and delights in, as he delights in himself and his own eternal glory) implies the communicated excellency and happiness of his creatures. And in communicating his fulness for them, he does it for himself; because their good, which he seeks, is so much in union and communion with himself. God is their good. Their excellency and happiness is nothing, but the emanation and expression of God's glory : God, in seeking their glory and happiness, seeks himself: and in seeking himself, i. e. himself dif fused and expressed, (which he delights in, as he delights in his own beauty and fulness,) he seeks their glory and happiness. . This will the better appear, if we consider the degree and manner in which he aimed at the creature's excellency and happiness in creating the world ; viz. during the whole of its designed eternal duration ; in greater and greater nearness, and strictness of union with himself, in his own glory and happiness, in constant progression, through all eternity. As the creature's good was viewed, when God made the world, with respect to its whole duration, and eternally progressive union to, and communion with him : so the creature must be viewed as in infinitely strict union with himself. In this view it appears, that God's respect to the creature, in the whole, unites with his respect to himself. Both regards are like two lines which at the be ginning appear separate, but finally meet in one, both being directed to the same centre. And as to the good of the creature itself, in its whole duration and infinite pro gression, it must be viewed as infinite ; and as coming nearer and nearer to the same thing in its infinite fulness. The nearer any thing comes to infinite, the nearer it comes to an identity with God. And if any good, as viewed by God, is beheld as infinite, it cannot be viewed as a dis tinct thing from God's own infinite glory. The apostle's discourse of the great love of Christ to men, (Eph. v. 25, &c.) leads us thus to think of the love of Christ to his church; as coinciding with his love to himself, by virtue of the strict union of the church with him. " Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it — that he might present it to himself a glorious church. So ought men to love their wives, as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself— even as the Lord the church ; for we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones." Now I appre hend, that ihere is nothing in God's disposition to com municate of his own fulness to the creatures, that at all derogates from the excellence of it, or the creature's obli gation. God's disposition to cause his own infinite fulness to flow forth, is pot the less properly called his goodness, be cause the good he communicates is what he delights in, as he delights in his own glory. The creature has no less benefit by it ; neither has such a disposition less of a direct tendency to the creature's benefit. Nor is this disposition in God, to diffuse his own good, the less excellent, because it is implied in his love to himself. For his love to him self does not imply it any otherwise, but as it implies a love to whatever is worthy and excellent. The emanation of God's glory is in itself worthy and excellent, and so God delights in it ; and this delight is implied in his love to his own fulness ; because that is the fountain, the sum and comprehension of every thing that is excellent. Nor does God's inclination to communicate good from regard to himself, or delight in his own glory, at all diminish the freeness of his beneficence. This will appear, if we con sider particularly, in what ways doing good to others from self-love, may be inconsistent with the freeness of benefi cence. And I conceive there are only these two ways, 1. When any does good to another from confined self- love, which is opposite to a general benevolence. This kind of self-love is properly called selfishness. In some sense, the most benevolent, generous person in the world, seeks his own happiness in doing good to others ; because he filaces his happiness in their good. His mind is so en- arged as to take them, as it were, into himself. Thus when they are happy, he feels it ; he partakes with them, and is happy in their happiness. This is so far from being inconsistent with the freeness of beneficence, that, on the contrary, free benevolence and kindness consists in it. The most free beneficence that can be in men, is doing good, not from a confined selfishness, but from a disposition to general benevolence, or love to being in general. But now, with respect to the Divine Being, there is no such thing as confined selfishness in him, or a love to himself opposite to general benevolence. It is impossible, because he comprehends all entity, and all excellence, in his own essence. The eternal and infinite Being, is in effect, being in general; and comprehends universal exist ence. God, in his benevolence to his creatures, cannot have his heart enlarged, in such a manner as to take in beings who are originally out of himself, distinct and in dependent. This cannot be in an infinite Being, who exists alone from eternity. But he, from his goodness, as it were enlarges himself in a more excellent and divine manner. This is bv communicating and diffusing himself ; and so, instead of find ing, he makes objects of his benevo lence — not by taking what he finds distinct from himself, and so partaking of their good, and being happy in them, but — by flowing forth, and expressing himself in them, and making them to partake of him, and then rejoicing in himself expressed in them, and communicated to them. 2. Another thing, in doing good to others from self-love, that derogates from the freeness of the goodness, is acting from dependence on them for the good we need or desire. So that, in our beneficence, we are not self-moved, but as it were constrained by something without ourselves. But it has been particularly shown already, that God making himself his end, argues no dependence ; but is consistent with absolute independence and self-sufficiency. And 1 would here observe, that there is somethiug in that disposition to communicate goodness, that shows God to be independent and self-moved in it, in a manner that is peculiar, and above the beneficence of creatures. Creatures, even the most excellent, are not independent and self-moved in their goodness ; but in all its exercises, they are excited by some object they find : something appear ing good, or in some respect worthy of regard, presents itself, and moves their kindness. But God, being all, and alone, is absolutely self-moved. The exercises of his communicative disposition are absolutelv from within him self ; all that is good and worthy in the object, and its very being, proceeding from the overflowing of his fulness. 106 GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION. Chap. II. These things show that the supposition of God making himself his ultimate end, does not at all diminish the crea ture's obligation to gratitude for communications of good received. For if it lessen its obligation, it must be on one of the following accounts. Either, that the creature has not so much benefit by it ; or, that the disposition it flows from, is not proper goodness, not having so direct a ten dency to the creature's benefit ; or, that the disposition is not so virtuous and excellent in its kind ; or, that the be neficence is not so free. But it has been observed, that none of these things take place, with regard to that dis position, which has been supposed to have excited God to create the world. I confess there is a degree of indistinctness and obscurity in the close consideration of such subjects, and a great imperfection in the expressions we use concerning them ; arising unavoidably from the infinite sublimity of the sub ject, and the incomprehensibleness of those things that are divine. Hence revelation is the surest guide in these matters : and what that teaches shall in the next place be considered. Nevertheless, the endeavours used to dis cover what the voice of reason is, so far as it can go, may serve to prepare the way, by obviating cavils insisted on by many ; and to satisfy us, that what the word of God says of the matter is not unreasonable. CHAP. II. WHEREIN IT IS INQUIRED. WHAT IS TO HE LEARNED FROM HOLY SCRIPTURES, CONCERNING GOD'S LAST END IN THE CREATION OP THE WORLD. Sect. I. The Scriptures represent God as making himself his own last end in the creation of the world. It is manifest, that the Scriptures speak, on all occasions, as though God made himself his end in all his works ; and as though the same being, who is the first cause of all things, were the supreme and last end of all things. Thus in Isa. xliv. 6. " Thus saith the Lord, the king of Israel, and his Redeemer the Lord of hosts, I am the first, I also am the last, and besides me there is no God." Chap. xlviii. 12. " I am the first and I am the last." Rev. i. 8. " I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and was, and which is to come, the Almighty." Ver. 1 1 . " I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last." Ver. 17. " I am the first and the last." Chap. xxi. 6. " And he said unto me, it is done ; I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end." Chap. xxii. 13. " I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last." When God is so often spoken of as the last as well as the first, the end as well as the beginning, it is implied, that as he is the first, efficient cause and fountain, from whence all things originate ; so, he is the last, final cause for which they are made ; the final term to which they all tend in their ultimate issue. This seems to be the most natural import of these expressions ; and is confirmed by other parallel passages ; as Rom. xi. 36. " For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things." Col. i. 16. " For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers ; all things were created by him, and for him." Heb. ii. 10. " For it became him, by whom are all things, and for whom are all things." And in Prov. xvi. 4. it is said ex pressly, " The Lord hath made all things for himself." And the manner is observable, in which God is said to be the last, to whom, and for whom, are all things. It is" evidently spoken of as a meet and suitable thing, a branch of his glory ; a meet prerogative of the great, infinite, and eternal Being ; a thing becoming the dignity of him who is infinitely above all other beings ; from whom all things are, and by whom they consist; and in comparison with whom all other things are as nothing. SECT. II. Wherein some positions are advanced concerning a just method of arguing in this affair, from what we find in the Holy Scriptures. We have seen, that the Scriptures speak of the creation of the world as being for God, as its end. What remains therefore to be inquired into, is, which way do the Scrip tures represent God as making himself his end? It is evident, that God does not make his existence or being the end of the creation ; which cannot be supposed without great absurdity. His existence cannot be conceived of but as prior to any of God's designs. Therefore he cannot create the world to the end that he may have existence ; or may have certain attributes and perfections. Nor do the Scriptures give the least intimation of any such thing. Therefore, what divine effect, or what in relation to God, is that which the Scripture teacheth us to be the end he aimed at, in his works of creation, and in designing which he makes himself his end ? In order to a right understanding of the Scripture doc trine, and drawing just inferences from what we find said in the word of God, relative to this matter ; and so to open the way to a true and definite answer to the above inquiry, I would lay down the following positions. Position 1 . That which appears to be God's ultimate end in his works of providence in general, we may justly suppose to be his last end in the work of creation. This appears from what was observed before, under the fifth particular of the introduction, which I need not now repeat. Pos. 2. When any thing appears, by the Scripture, to be the last end of some of the works of God, that thing appears to be the result of God's works in general. And although it be not mentioned as the end of those works, but only of some of them ; yet as nothing appears peculiar in the nature of the case, that renders it a fit, beautiful, and valuable result of those particular works, more than of the rest ; we may justly infer that thing to be the last end of those other works also. For we must suppose it to be on account of the value of the effect, that it is made the end of those works of which it is expressly spoken as the end ; and this effect, by the supposition, being equally, and in like manner, the result of the work, and of the same value, it is but reasonable to suppose, that it is the end of the work, of which it is naturally the consequence, in one case as well as in another. Pos. 3. The ultimate end of God in creating the world being also the last end of all his works of providence, we may well presume that, if there be any particular thing, more frequently mentioned in Scripture, as God's ultimate aim in his works of providence, than any thing else, this is the ultimate end of God's works in general, and so the end of the work of creation. Pos. 4. That which appears*, from the word of God, to be his ultimate end with respect to the moral world, or the intelligent part of the system, that is God's last end in the work of creation in general. Because it is evident, from the constitution of the world itself, as well as from the word of God, that themoral part is the end of all the rest of the creation. The inanimate, unintelligent part, is made for the rational, as much as a house is prepared for the inhabitant. And it is evident also from reason and the word of God, that it is for the sake of some moral good in them, that moral agents are made, and the world made for them. But it is further evident, that whatsoever is the last end of that part of creation, which is the end of all the rest, and for which all the rest of the world was made, must be the last end of the whole. If all the other parts of a watch are made for the hand of the watch, in order to move that aright, then it will follow, that the last end of the hand is the last end of the whole machine. Pus. 5. That which appears from the Scripture to be God's ultimate end in the chief works of his providence, we may well determine is God's last end in creating the world. For, as observed, we may justlv infer the end of a thing from the use of it. We must justly infer the end of a clock, a chariot, a ship, or water-engine, from the main use to which it is applied. But God's providence is Sect. II. PARTICULAR TEXTS OF SCRIPTURE*. • 107 his use of the world he has made. And if there be any works of providence which are evidently God's main works, herein appears and consists the main use that God makes of the creation. — From these two last positions we may infer the next, viz. Pos. 6. Whatever appears, by the Scriptures, to be God's ultimate end in his mam works of Providence towards the moral world, that we may justly infer to be the last end of the creation of the world. Because, as was just now ob served, the moral world is the chief part of the creation, and the end of the rest; and God's'last end in creating that part of the world, must be his last end in the creation of the whole. And it appears, by the last position, that the end of God's main works of Providence towards moral beings, or the main use to which he puts them, shews the last end for which he has made them ; and consequently the main end for which he has made the whole world. . Pos. 7. That which divine revelation shows to be God's ultimate end with respect to that part of the moral world which are good, in their being, and in their being good, this we must suppose to be the last end of God's creating the world. For it has been already shown, that God's last end in the moral part of creation must be the end of the whole. But his end in that part of the moral world that are good, must be the last end for which he has made the moral world in general. For therein consists the goodness of a thing, its fitness to answer its end ; at least this must be goodness in the eyes of its author. For goodness in his eyes, is its agreeableness to his mind. But an agree ableness to his mind, in what he makes for some end or use, must be an agreeableness or fitness to that end. For his end in this case is his mind. That which he chiefly aims at in that thing, is chiefly his mind with respect to that thing. And therefore, they are good moral agents who are fitted for the end for which God has made moral agents. And consequently, that which is the chief end to which good created moral agents, in being good, are fitted, this is the chief end of the moral part of the creation; and con sequently of the creation in general. Pos. 8. That which the word of God requires the intel ligent and moral part of the world to seek, as their ultimate and highest end, that we have reason to suppose is the last end for which God has made them ; and consequently, by position fourth, the last end for which he has made the whole world. A main difference between tbe intelligent and moral parts, and the rest of the world, lies in this, that the former are capable of knowing their Creator, and the end for which he made them; and capable of actively com plying with his design in their creation, and promoting it ; while other creatures cannot promote the design of their creation, only passively and eventually. And seeing they are capable of knowing the end for which their author has made them, it is doubtless their duty to fell in with it. Their wills ought to comply with the will of the Creator in this respect, in mainly seeking the same, as their last end, which God mainly seeks as their last end. This must be the law of nature and reason with respect to them. And we must suppose that God's revealed law, and the law of nature, agree ; and that his will, as a lawgiver, must agree with his will as a Creator. Therefore we justly infer, that the same thing which God's revealed law requires intelli gent creatures to seek, as their last and greatest end, that God their Creator had made their last end, and so the end of the creation of the world. Pos. 9. We may well suppose, that what is in Holy Scripture, stated as the main end of the goodness of the moral world — so that the respect and relation their good ness has to that end, is what chiefly makes it valuable and desirable — is God's ultimate end in the creation of the moral world ; and so, by position the fourth, of the whole world. For the end of the goodness of a thing, is the end of the thing. Pos. 10. That which persons who are described in Scripture as approved saints, and set forth as examples of piety, sought as their last and highest end, in the instances of their good and approved behaviour; that, we must sup pose, was what they ought to seek as their last end : and consequently by the preceding position, was the same with God's last end in the creation of the world. Pos. 11. What appears by the word of God to be that end, in the desires of which the souls of the best, and in their best frames, most naturally and directly exercise their goodness, and in expressing their desire of this end, they do most properly and directly express their respect to God ; we may well suppose that end to be the chief and ultimate end of a spirit of piety and goodness, and God's chief end in making the moral world, and so the whole world. For, doubtless, the most direct tendency of a spirit of true goodness, in the best part of the moral world, is to the chief end of goodness, and so the chief end of the creation of the moral world. And in what else can the spirit of the true respect and friendship to God be expressed by way of desire, than in desires of the same end which God himself chiefly and ultimately desires in making them and alt other things. Pos. 12. Since the Holy Scriptures teach us that Jesus Christ is the Head of the moral world, and especially of all the good part of it; the chief of God's servants, appoint ed to be the Head of his saints and angels, and set forth as the chief and most perfect pattern and example of good ness ; we may well suppose, by the foregoing positions, that what he sought as his last end, was God's last end in the creation of the world. SECT. III. Particular texts of Scripture, that show that God's glory is an ultimate end of the creation. 1. What God says in his word, naturally leads us to suppose, that the way in which he makes himself his end in his work or works, which he does for his own sake, is in making his glory his end. Thus Isa. xlviii. 11. " For my own sake, even for my own sake, will 1 do it. For how should my name be pol luted ; and I will not give my glory to another." Which is as much as to say, I will obtain my end ; I will not fore go my glory ; another shall not take this prize from me. It is pretty evident here, that God's name and his glory, which seem to intend the same thing, as shall be observed more particularly afterwards, are spoken of as his last end in the great work mentioned ; not as an inferior, subordi nate end, subservient to the interest of others. The words are emphatical. The emphasis and repetition constrain us to understand, that what God does is ultimately for his own sake : " For my own sake, even for my own sake will I do it." So the words of the apostle, in Rom. xi. 36. naturally lead us to suppose, that the way in which all things are to God, is in being for his glory. " For of him, and through him, and to him are all things, to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen." In the preceding context, the apostle observes the marvellous disposals of divine wisdom, for causing all things to be to him, in their final issue and re sult, as they are from him at first, and governed by him. His discourse shows how God contrived this and brought it to pass, by setting up the kingdom of Christ in the world ; leaving the Jews, and calling the Gentiles ; including what he would hereafter do in bringing in the Jews, with the fulness of the Gentiles ; with the circumstances of these wonderful works, so as greatly to show his justice and his goodness, to magnify his grace, and manifest the sovereignty and freeness of it, and the absolute depend ence of all on him. And then, in the four last verses, he breaks out into a most pathetic exclamation, expressing his great admiration of the depth of divine wisdom, in the steps he takes for attaining his end, and causing all things to be to him : and finally, he expresses a joyful consent to God's excellent design in all to glorify himself, in saying, " to him be glory for ever ;" as much as to say, as all things are so wonderfully ordered for his glory, so let him have Ihe glory of all, for evermore. 2. The glory of God is spoken of in Holy Scripture as the last end for which those parts of the moral world that are good were made. Thus in Isa. xliii. 6, 7. " I will say to the north, Give up, and to the south, Keep not back ; bring my sons from afar, and my daughters from the ends of the earth, even every one that is called by my name ; for I have created him for 108 GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION. Chap. II. my glory, I have formed him, yea I have made him." Again, Isa. Ix. 21. " Thy people also shall be all righteous. They shall inherit the land for ever, the branch of my plant ing, the work of my hand, that I may be glorified." Also chap. lxi. 3. " That they may be called trees of righteous ness, the planting of the Lord, that he might be glorified." In these places we see, that the glory of God is spoken of as the end of God's saints, the end for which he makes them, i. e. either gives them being, or gives them a being as saints, or both. It is said, that God has made and formed them to be his sons and daughters, for his own glory : That they are trees of his planting, the work of his hands, as trees of righteousness, that he might be glorified. And if we consider the words, especially as taken with the con text in each of the places, it will appear quite natural to suppose, that God's glory is here spoken of only as an end inferior and subordinate to the happiness of God's people. On the contrary, they will appear rather as promises of making God's people happy, that God therein might be glorified. So is that in Isa. xliii. as we shall see plainly, if we take the whole that is said from the beginning of the chapter, ver. 1 — 7. It is wholly a promise of a future, great, and wonderful work of God's power and grace, delivering his people from all misery, and making them exceeding happy ; and then the end of all, or the sum of God's design in all, is declared to be God's own glory. " I have redeemed thee, I have called thee by thy name, thou art mine. — I will be with thee. — When thou walkest through the fire, thou shalt not be burnt, neither shall the flame kindle upon thee. — Thou art precious and honourable in my sight. I will give men for thee, and people for thy life. Fear not, I am with thee. — I will bring my sons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth ; every one that is called by my name : for I have created him for my glory." So Isa. Ix. 21. The whole chapter is made up of no thing but promises of future, exceeding happiness to God's church ; but, for brevity's sake, let us take only the two preceding verses 19, 20. " The sun shall be no more thy light by day, neither for brightness shall the moon give light unto thee : but the Lord shall be unto thee an ever lasting light, and thy God thy glory. Thy sun shall no more go down, neither shall thy moon withdraw itself; for the Lord shall be thine everlasting light, and the davs of thy -mouming shall be ended. Thy people also shall be all righteous ; they shall inherit the land for ever, the branch of my planting, the work of my hands ;" and then the end of all is added, " that I might be glorified." All the preceding promises are plainly mentioned as so many parts, or constituents, of the great and exceeding happiness of God's people ; and God's glory is mentioned, as the sum of his design in this happiness. In like manner is the promise in chap. lxi. 3. " To ap point unto them that mourn in Zion, to give unto them beauty for ashes, the oil of joy for mouming, the garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness, that they mighi be called trees of righteousness, the planting of the Lord, that he might be glorified." The work of God promised to be effecled, is plainly an accomplishment of the jov, gladness, and happiness of God's people, instead of their mourning and sorrow ; and the end in which God's design in this work is obtained and summed up, is his glory. This proves, by the seventh position, that God's glory is the end of the creation. The same thing may be argued from Jer. xiii. 11. " For as a girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, so have I caused to cleave unto me the whole house of Israel, and the whole house of Judah, saith the Lord : that they might be unto me for a people, and for a name, and for a praise, and for a glory : but they would not hear." That is, God sought to make them to be his own holy people ; or, as the apostle expresses it, his peculiar people, zealous of good works ; that so they might be a glory to him ; as girdles were used in those days for ornament and beauty, and as badges of dignity and honour.* Now when God speaks of himself, as seeking a peculiar and holy people for himself, to be for his glory and honour, as a man that seeks an ornament and badge of honour for * See ver. 9, and also Isa. iii. 24. and xxii. 21. and xxiii. 10. 2 Sam. xviii. his glory, it is not natural to understand it merely of a subordinate end, as though God had no respect to himself in it ; but only the good of others. If so, the comparison would not be natural ; for men are commonly wont to seek their own glory and honour in adorning themselves, and dignifying themselves with badges of honour. The same doctrine seems to be taught, Eph. i. 5. " Having predestinated us to the adoption of children by Jesus Christ, unto himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory if his grace."— And the same may be argued from Isa. xliv. 23. " For the Lord hath redeem ed Jacob, he hath glorified himself in Israel." And chap. xlix. 3. "Thou art my servant Jacob, in whom I will, he glorified." John xvii. 10. " And all mine are thine, and thine are mine, and I am glorified in them." 2 Thess. i. 10. " When he shall come to be glorified in his saints." Ver. 11,12." Wherefore also we pray always for you, that our God would count you worthy of his calling, and fulfil all the good pleasure of his goodness, and the work of faith with power : that the name of our Lord Jesus may be glo rified in you, and ye in him, according to the grace of God and our Lord Jesus Christ." • 3. The Scripture speaks of God's glory, as his ultimate end of the goodness of the moral part of the creation ; and that end, in relation to wbich chiefly the value of their vir tue consists. As in Phil. i. 10, 11. " That ye may approve things that are excellent, that ye may be sincere, and without offence, till the day of Christ : being filled with the fruits of right eousness, which are by Jesus Christ, unto the glory and praise of God." Here the apostle shows how the fruits of righteousness in them are valuable, and how they answer their end, viz. in being " by Jesus Christ to the praise and J lory of God." John xv. 8. " Herein is my Father glori ed, that ye bear much fruit." Signifying, that by this means it is that the great end of religion is to be answered. And in 1 Pet. iv. 11. the apostle directs the Christians to regulate all their religious performances with reference to that one end. " If any man speak, let him speak as the oracles of God : if any man minister, let him do it as of the ability which God giveth, that God in all things mat/ be glorified ; to whom be praise and dominion for ever and ever. Amen." And, from time to time, embracing and practising true religion, and repenting of sin, and turning to holiness, is expressed by glorifying God, as though that were the sum and end of the whole matter. Rev. xi. 13. " And in the earthquake were slain of men seven thousand ; and the remnant were affrighted, and gave glory to the God of heaven." So Rev. xiv. 6, 7. " And 1 saw another angel fly in the midst of heaven, having the everlasting gospel to preach to them that dwell on the earth ; saying with a loud voice, Fear God, and give glory to him." As though this were the sum and end of that virtue and religion, which was the grand design of preaching the gospel, every where through the world. Rev. xvi. 9. " And repented not to give him glory." Which is as much as to say, they did not forsake their sins and turn to true religion, that God might receive that which is the great end he seeks, in the religion he requires of men. (See to the same pur pose, Psal. xxii. 21—23. Isa. Ixvi. 19. xxiv. 15. xxv. 3. Jer. xiii. 15, 16. Dan. v. 23. Rom. xv. 5, 6.) And as the exercise of true religion and virtue in Chris tians is summarily expressed by their glorifying God, so, when the good influence of this on others' is" spoken of, it is expressed in the same manner. Matt. v. 16. " Let your light so shine before men, that others seeing your good works, may glorify your Father which is in heaven." 1 Pet. ii. 12. " Having your conversation honest among the Gentiles, that whereas they speak evil against you as evil doers, they may, by your good works which they, behold, glorify God in the day of visitation." That the ultimate end of moral goodness, or righteous ness, is answered in God's glory being attained, is sup posed in tbe objection which the apostle makes, or supposes some will make, Rom. iii. 7. " For if the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory, why am I judged as a sinner?" i.e. seeing the great end'of righteous- 11. Exod. xxvili. 8. Sect. III. ON PARTICULAR TEXTS OF SCRIPTURE. 109 ness is answered by my sin, in God being glorified, why is my sin condemned and punished '! and why is not my vice equivalent to virtue ( And the glory of God is spoken of as that wherein con sists the value and end of particular graces. As of faith. Rom. iv. 20. " He staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief: but was strong in faith, giving glory to God." Phil. ii. 11. " That every tongue should confess that Jesus is the Lord, to the glory of God the Father." Of repentance. Josh. vi. 19. " Give, 1 pray thee, glory to the Lord God of Israel, and make confession unto him." Of charity. 2 Cor. viii. 19." With this grace, which is ad ministered by us, to the glory of the same Lord, and declaration of your ready mind. Thanksgiving and praise. Luke vii. 18. " There are not found that returned to give glory to God, save this stranger." Psal. 1. 23. " Whoso offereth praise glorifieth me ; and to him that ordereth his conversation aright, will I show the salvation of God." Concerning which last place may be observed, that God seems to say this to such as supposed, in their religious performances, that the end of all religion was to glorify God. They supposed they did this in the best manner, in offer ing a multitude of sacrifices ; but God corrects their mis take, and informs them, that this grand end of religion is not attained this way, but in offering the more spiritual sa crifices of praise and a holy conversation. In fine, the words of the apostle in 1 Cor. vi. 20. are worthy of particular notice. " Ye are not your own ; for ye are bought with a price : therefore glorifv God in your body and in your spirit, which are his." Here, not only is glorifying God spoken of, as what summarily comprehends the end of religion, and of Christ redeeming us ; but the apostle urges, that inasmuch as we are not our own, we ought not to act as if we were our own, but as God's ; and should not use the members of our bodies, or facul ties of our souls, for ourselves, but for God, as making him our end. And he expresses the way in which we are to make God our end, viz. in making his glory our end. " Therefore glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are his." Here it cannot be pretended, that though Christians are indeed required to make God's glory their end ; yet it is but as a subordinate end, as subservient to their own happiness ; for then, in acting chiefly and ulti mately for their ownselves, they would use themselves more as their own than as God's ; which is directly con trary to the design of the apostle's exhortation, and the argument he is upon ; which is, that we should give our selves as it were away from ourselves to God, and use our selves as his, and not bur own, acting for his sake, and not our own sakes. Thus it is evident, by position the ninth, that the glory of God is the last end for which he created the world. 4. There are some things in the word of God which lead us to suppose, that it requires of men that they should desire and seek God's glory, as their highest and last end in what they do. As particularly, from 1 Cor. x. 30. " Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." And 1 Pet. iv. 11.—" That God in all things may be glorified." And this may be argued, that Christ re quires his followers should desire and seek God's glory in the first place, and above all things else, from that prayer which he gave his disciples, as the pattern and rule for the direction of his followers in their prayers. The first petition of which is, Hallowed be thy name. Which in scripture language is the same with glorified be thy name ; as is manifest from Lev. x. 3. Ezek. xxviii. 22. and many other places. Now our last and highest end is doubtless what should, be first in our desires, and consequently first in our prayers ; and therefore, we may argue, that since Christ directs that God's glory should be first in our pray ers, that therefore this is our last end. This is further con firmed by the conclusion of the Lord's prayer, For thine is the kingdom., the power, and the glory. Which, as it stands in connexion with the rest of the prayer, implies, that we desire and ask all the things mentioned in each petition, with a subordination, and in subservience, to the dominion and glory of God ; in which all our desires ultimately terminate, as their' last end. God's glory and dominion are the two first things mentioned in the prayer, and are the subject of the first half of the prayer ; and they are the two last things mentioned in the same prayer, in its conclusion. God's glory is the Alpha and Omega in the prayer. From these things we may argue, according to position the eighth, that God's glory is the last end if the creation. 5. The glory of God appears, by the account given in Scripture, to be that event, in the earnest desires of which, and in their delight in which, the best part of the moral world, and when in their best frames, most naturally ex press the direct tendency of the spirit of true goodness, the virtuous and pious affections of their heart. This is the way in which the holy apostles, from time to time, gave vent to the ardent exercises of their piety, and breathed forth their regard to the Supreme Being. Rom. xi. 36. " To whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen." Chap. xvi. 27. " To God only wise, be glory, through Jesus Christ, forever. Amen." Gal. i. 4, 5. " Who gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us from this present evil world, according to the will of God and our Father, to whom be flory for ever and ever. Amen." 2 Tim. iv. 18. " And the ,ord shall deliver me from every evil work, and will pre serve me to his heavenly kingdom : to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen." Eph. iii. 21. " Unto him be glory in the church by Christ Jesus, throughout all ages, world without end." Heb. xiii. 21. — " Through Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen." Phil. iv. 20. " Now unto God and our Father be glory for ever and ever. Amen." 2 Pet. iii. 18. " To him be glory both now and for ever. Amen." Jude 25. "To the only wise God our Saviour, be glory and majesty, dominion and power, both now and ever. Amen." Rev. i. 5, 6. " Unto him that loved us, &c. — to him be glory and dominion for ever and ever. Amen." It was in this way that holy David, the sweet psalmist of Israel, vented the ardent tendencies and desires of his pious heart. 1 Chron. xvi. 28, 29. " Give unto the Lord, ye kindreds of the people, give unto the Lord glory and strength : give unto the Lord the glory due unto his name." We have much the same expressions again, Psal. xxix. 1, 2. and lxix. 7, 8. See also, Psal. lvii. 5. ixxii. 18, 19. cxv. 1. So the whole church of God through all parts of the earth, Isa. xiii. 10 — 12. In like manner the saints and angels in heaven express the piety of their hearts, Rev. iv. 9, 11 — 14. and vii. 12. This is the event that the hearts of the seraphim especially exult in, as appears by Isa. vi. 2, 3. " Above it stood the seraphim — And one cried unto another, and said,Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory." So at the birth of Christ, Luke ii. 14. " Glory to God in the highest," &c. It is manifest that these holy persons in earth and heaven, in thus expressing their desires of the glory of God, have respect to it, not merely as a subordinate end, but as that which is in itself valuable in the highest degree. It would be absurd to say, that in these ardent exclamations, they are only giving vent to their vehement benevolence to their fellow-creatures, and expressing their earnest desire that God might be glorified, that so his subjects may be made happy by that means. It is evident, it is not so much their love, either to themselves, or their fellow-creatures, which they express, as their exalted and supreme regard to the most high and infinitely glorious Being. When the church says, Not unto us, not unto us, O Jehovah, but to thy name give glory, it would be absurd to say, that she only desires that God may have glory, as a necessary or convenient means of their own advancement and felicity. From these things it appeal's by the eleventh position, that God's glory is the end of the creation. 6. The Scripture leads us to suppose, that Christ sought God's glory, as his highest and last end. Johnvii. 18." Hethat speaketh of himself, seekethhisown glory ; but he that seeketn his glory that sent him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in him." When Christ says, he did not seek his own glory, we cannot reasonably understand him, that he had no regard to his own glory, even the glory of the human nature ; for the glory of that nature was part of the reward promised him, and of the joy set before him. But we must understand him, that this was not his ultimate aim ; it was not the end that chiefly governed his conduct : and therefore, when in opposition to this,. in the latter part of the sentence, he says, " But he 110 GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION. Chap. II. that seeketh his glory that sent him, the same is true," &c. It is natural from the antithesis to understand him, that this was his ultimate aim, his supreme governing end. John xii. 27, 28. " Now is my soul troubled, and what shall I say ? Father, save me from this hour : but for this cause came I unto this hour, Father, glorify thy name" Christ was now going to Jerusalem, and expected in a few days there to be crucified : and the prospect of his last sufferings, in this near approach, was very terrible to him. Under this distress of mind, he supports himself with a prospect of what would be the consequence of his sufferings, viz. God's glory. Now, it is the end that sup ports the agent in any difficult work that he undertakes, and above all others, his ultimate and supreme end ; for this is above all others valuable in his eyes; and so, suffi cient to countervail the difficulty of the means. That end, which is in itself agreeable and sweet to him, and which ultimately terminates his desires, is the centre of rest and support; and so must be the fountain and sum of all the delight and comfort he has in his prospects, with respect to his work. Now Christ has his soul straitened and dis tressed with a view of that which was infinitely the most difficult part of his work, and which was just at hand. Now certainly, if his mind seeks support in the conflict from a view of his end, it must most naturally repair to the highest end, which is the proper fountain of all sup port in this case. We may well suppose, that when his soul conflicts with the most extreme difficulties, it would resort to the idea of his supreme and ultimate end, the fountain of all the support and comfort he has in the work. The same thing, Christ seeking the glory of God as his ultimate end, is manifest by what he says, when he comes yet nearer to the hour of his last sufferings, in that remark able prayer, the last he ever made with his disciples, on the evening before his crucifixion ; wherein he expresses the sum of his aims and desires. His first words are, " Father, the hour is come, glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee." As this is his first request, we may suppose it to be his supreme request and desire, and what he ultimately aimed at in all. If we consider what follows to the end, all the rest that is said in the prayer, seems to be but an amplification of this great request. — On the whole, I think it is pretty manifest, that Jesus Christ sought the glory of God as his highest and last end ; and that therefore, by position twelfth, this was God's last end in the creation of the world. 7. It is manifest from Scripture, that God's glory is the last end of that great work of providence, the work of redemption by Jesus Christ. This is manifest from what is just now observed, of its being the end ultimately sought by Jesus Christ the Re deemer. And if we further consider the texts mentioned in the proof of that, and take notice of the context, it will be very evident, that it was what Christ sought as his last end, in that great work which he came into the world upon, viz. to procure redemption for his people. It is manifest, that Christ professes in John vii. 18. that he did not seek his own glory in what he did, but the glory of him that sent him. He means, in the work of his ministry; the work he performed, and which he came into the world to perform, which is the work of redemption. And with respect to that text, John xii. 27, 28. it has been already observed, that Christ comforted himself in the view of the extreme difficulty of his work, in the prospect of the highest, ultimate, and most excellent end of that work, which he set his heart most upon, and delighted most in. And in the answer that the Father made him from heaven at that time, in the latter part of the same verse, John xii. 28. " I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again." The meaning plainly is, that God had glorified his name in what Christ had done, in the work he sent him upon ; and would glorify it again, and to a greater degree, in what he should further do, and in the success thereof. Christ shows that he understood it thus in what he says upon it, when the people took notice of it, wondering at the voice ; some saying, that it thundered, others, that an angel spake to him. Christ says, " This voice came not because of me, but for your sak'es." And then he says, (exulling in the prospect of this glorious end and success,) " Now is the judgment of this world ; now is the prince of this world cast out ; and I, if I be lift up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." In the success of the same work of redemption, he places his own glory, as was observed be fore. John xii. 23, 24. " The hour is come that the Son of man should be glorified. Verily, verily, I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground, it abideth alone ; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." So it is manifest, that when he seeks his own and his Father's glory, in that prayer, John xvii. he seeks it as the end of that great work he came into the world upon, and which he is about to finish in his death. What follows through the whole prayer, plainly shows this ; particularly the 4th and 5th verses. " I have glorified thee on earth : I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do. And now, 0 Father, glorify thou me with thine own self." Here it is pretty plain, that declaring to his Father he had glori fied him on earth, and finished the work given him to do, meant that he had finished the work which God gave him to do for this end, that he might be glorified. He had now finished that foundation that he came into the world to lay for his glory. He had laid a foundation for his Father s obtaining his will, and the utmost that he designed. By which it is manifest, that God's glory was the utmost of his design, or his ultimate end in this great work. And it is manifest, by John xiii. 31, 32. that the glory of the Father, and his own glory, are what Christ exulted in, in the prospect of his approaching sufferings, when Ju das was gone out to betray him, as the end his heart was mainly set upon, and supremely delighted in. "Therefore, when he was gone out, Jesus said, Now is the Son of man glorified, and God is glorified in him. If God be glorified in him, God shall also glorify him in himself, and shall straightway glorify him." That the glory of God is the highest and last end of the work of redemption, is confirmed by the song of the an gels at Christ's birth. Luke ii. 14. " Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, and good will toward men." It must be supposed that they knew what was God's last end in sending Christ into the world : and that in their rejoicing on the occasion, their minds would most rejoice in that which was most valuable and glorious in it; which must consist in its relation to that which was its chief and ultimate end. And we may further suppose, that the thing which chiefly engaged their minds was most glorious and joyful in the affair ; and would be first in that song which was to express the sentiments of their minds, and exulta tion of their hearts. The glory of the Father and the Son is spoken of as the end of the work of redemption, in Phil. ii. 6 — 11. (very much in the same manner as in John xii. 23, 28. and xiii. 31, 32, and xvii. 1, 4, 5.) " Who being in the form of God, — made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men : and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross : wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name, &c. that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, — and every tongue confess, that Jesus is the Lord, to the glory of God the Father." So God's glory, or the praise of his glory, is spoken of as the end of the work of redemption, in Eph. i. 3, &c. " Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ : according as he hath chosen us in him. Having predestinated us to the adoption of children, to the praise of the glory of his grace." And in the continuance of the same discourse, concerning the redemption of Christ, God's glory is once and again mentioned as the great end of all. Several things belonging to that great redemption, are mentioned in the following verses : Such as God's great wisdom in it, ver. 8. The clearness of light granted through Christ, ver. 9. God's gathering together in one, all things in heaven and earth in Christ, ver. 10. God's giving the Christians that were first converted to the Chris tian faith from among the Jews, an interest in this great redemption, ver. 11. Then the great end is added, ver. 12. " That we should be to the praise of his glory, who first trusted in Christ." And then is mentioned" the be stowing of the same great salvation on the Gentiles, in its Sect. III. PARTICULAR TEXTS OF SCRIPTURE. Ill beginning or first fruits in the world, and in completing it in another world, in the two next verses. And then the same great end is added again. " In whom ye also trust ed, after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation : In whom also, after that ye believed, ye were sealed with the holy spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance, until the redemption of the purchased possession, unto the praise of his glory" The same thing is expressed much in the same manner, in 2 Cor. iv. 14, 15. — " He which raised up the Lord Jesus, shall raise us up also by Jesus, and shall present us with you. For all things are for your sakes, that the abundance of grace might, through the thanksgiving of many, redound to the glory of God. The same is spoken of as the end of the work of re demption in the Old Testament, Psal. lxxix. 9. " Help us, O God of our salvation, for the glory of thy name ; deliver us and purge away our sins, for thy name's sake." So in the prophecies of the redemption of Jesus Christ. Isa. xliv. 23. " Sing, O ye heavens ; for the Lord hath done it : shout, ye lower parts of the earth : break forth into singing, ye mountains : O forest, and every tree there in: for the Lord hath redeemed Jacob, and glorified himself in Israel !" Thus the works of creation are called upon to rejoice at the attaining of the same end, by the redemption of God's people, that the angels rejoiced at when Christ was born. See also Isa. xlviii. 10, 11. and xlix. 3. Thus it is evident, that the glory of God is the ultimate end of the work of redemption ; which is the chief work of providence towards the moral world, as is abundantly manifest from Scripture. For the whole universe is put in subjection to Jesus Christ ; all heaven and earth, angels and men, are subject to him, as executing this office ; and are put under him to that end, that all things may be or dered by him, in subservience to the great designs of his redemption. AH power, as he says, is given to him, in heaven and in earth, that he may give eternal life to as many as the Father has given him ; and he is exalted far above all principality and power, and might and dominion, and made head over all things to the church. The angels are put in subjection to him, that he may employ them all as ministering spirits, for the good of them that shall be the heirs of salvation : and all things are so governed by their Redeemer, that all things are theirs, whether things pre sent or things to come : and all God's works of providence in the moral government of the world, which we have an account of in scripture history, or that are foretold in scripture prophecy, are evidently subordinate to the great purposes and ends of this great work. And besides, the work of redemption is that, by which good men are, as it were, brought into being, as good men, or as restored to holiness and happiness. The work of redemption is a new crea tion, according to Scripture, whereby men are brought into a new existence, or are made new creatures. From these things it follows, according to the 5th, 6th, and 7th positions, that the glory of God is the last end of the creation of the world. 8. The Scripture leads us to suppose that God's glory is his last end in his moral government of the world in general. This has been already shown concerning several things that belong to God's moral government of the world. As particularly in the work of redemption, the chief of all his dispensations in his moral government of the world. And I have also observed it, with respect to the duty which God requires of the subjects of his moral government, in requiring them to seek his glory as their last end. And this is actually the last end of the moral goodness required of them, the end which gives their moral goodness its chief value. And also, that it is what that person which God has set at the head of the moral world, as its chief governor, even Jesus Christ, seeks as his chief end. And it has been shown, that it is the chief end for which that part of the moral world which are good are ¦made, or have their existence as good. I now further observe, that this is the end of the estab lishment of the public worship and ordinances of God among mankind. Hag. i. 8. " Go up to the mountain, and bring wood, and build the house ; and I will take pleasure in it, and I will be glorified, saith the Lord." This is spoken of as the end of God's promises of rewards, and of their fulfilment. 2 Cor. i. 20. " For all the promises of God in him are yea, and in him Amen, to the glory of God by us." And this is spoken of as the end of the exe cution of God's threatenings, in the punishment of sin. Numb. xiv. 20, 21, 22, 23. " And the Lord said, I have pardoned according to thy word. But, as truly as I live, all the earth shall be filled with the glory of Jehovah." The glory of Jehovah is evidently here spoken of, as that to which he had regard, as his highest and ultimate end, which therefore he could not fail of; but must take place every where, and in every case, through all parts of his dominion, whatever became of men. And whatever abatements might be made, as to judgments deserved ; and whatever changes might be made in the course of God's proceedings from compassion to sinners ; yet the attaining of God s glory was an end, which, being ultimate and supreme, must in no case whatsoever give place. This is spoken of as the end of God executing judgments on his enemies in this world. Exod. xiv. 17, 18. " And I will get me honour (rra-Si I will be glorified) upon Pharaoh, and upon all his host," &c. Ezek.' xxviii. 22. " Thus saith the Lord God, Behold, I am against thee, O Zidon, and I will be florified in the midst of thee : And they shall know that am the Lord, when I shall have executed judgments in her, and shall be sanctified in her." So Ezek. xxxix. 13. " Yea, all the people of the land shall bury them ; and it shall be to them a renown, the day that I shall be glorified, saith the Lord God;" And this is spoken of as the end, both of the executions of wrath, and in the glorious exer cises of mercy, in the misery and happiness of another world. Rom. ix. 22, 23. " What if God, willing to show his wrath, and make his power known, endured with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction ; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore ' prepared unto glory." And this is spoken of as the end of the day of judgment, which is the time appointed for the highest ex ercises of God's authority as moral Governor of tbe world ; and is as it were the day of the consummation of God's moral government, with respect to all his subjects in heaven, earth, and hell. 2 Thess. i. 9, 10. " Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power ; when he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe." Then his glory shall be obtained, with respect both to saints and sinners From these things it is manifest, by the fourth position, that God's glory is the ultimate end of the creation of the world. 9. It appears, from what has been already observed, that the glory of God is spoken of in Scripture as the last end of many of his works : and it is plain that this is in fact the result of the works of God's common providence, and of the creation of the world. Let us take God's glory in what sense soever, consistent with its being a good at tained by any work of God, certainly it is the consequence of these works : and besides, it is expressly so spoken of in Scripture. This is implied in the eighth psalm, wherein are cele brated the works of creation : the heavens, the work of God's fingers ; the moon and the stars, ordained by him ; and man, made a little lower than the angels, &c. The first verse is — " O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth ! who hast set thy glory above the heavens," or upon the heavens. By name and glory, very much the same thing is intended here, as in many other places, as shall be particularly shown afterwards. The psalm con cludes as it began. " O Lord, our Lord, bow excellent is thy name in all the earth !" So, in the 148th psalm, after a particular mention of most of the works of creation, enumerating them in order, the psalmist says, ver. 13. " Let them praise the name of the Lord, for his name alone is excellent, his glory is above the earth and the heaven." And in the 104th psalm, after a very particular, orderlv, and magnificent representation of God's works of creation and common providence, it is said in the 31st verse, "The glory of the Lord shall endure for ever : the Lord shall rejoice'in his works." Here God's glory is spoken of as the grand result and blessed consequence, on account of which he rejoices in these works. And this is one thing doubtless 112 GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION. Chap. II. implied in the song of the seraphim, Isa.vi. 3. " Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory." The glory of God, in being the result and consequence of those works of providence that have been mentioned, is in fact the consequence of the creation. The good attained in the use of a thing, made for use, is the result of the making of that thing; as signifying the time of day, when actually attained by the use of a watch, is the consequence of mak ing the watch. So it is apparent, that the glory of God is actually the result and consequence of the creation of the world. And from what has been already observed, it ap pears, that it is what God seeks as good, valuable, and ex cellent in itself. And I presume none will pretend, that there is any thing peculiar in the nature of the case, ren dering it a thing valuable in some of the instances wherein it takes place, and not in others : or that the. glory of God, though indeed an effect of all God's works, is an exceeding desirable effect of some of them ; but of others, a worthless and insignificant effect. God's glory therefore must be a desirable, valuable consequence of the work of creation. Therefore it is manifest, by position the third, that the glory of God is an ultimate end in the creation of the world. SECT. IV. Places of Scripture that lead us to suppose, that God created the world for his name, to make his perfections known ; and that he made it for his praise. 1. Here I shall first take notice of some passages of Scripture that speak of God's name as being the object of his regard, and the regard of his virtuous and holy intelli gent creatures, much in the same manner as has been ob served of God's glory. God's name is, in like manner, spoken of as the end of his acts of goodness towards the good part of the moral world, and of his works of mercy and salvation towards his people. As 1 Sam. xii. 22. " The Lord will not for sake his people, for his great name's sake." Psal. xxiii. 3. " He restoreth my soul, he leadeth me in the paths of righteousness, for his name's sake." Psal. xxxi. 3. " For thy name's sake, lead me, and guide me." Psal. cix. 21. "But do thou for me, for thy name's sake." The for giveness of sin in particular, is often spoken of as being for God's name's sake. 1 John ii. 12. " I write unto you, little children, because your sins are forgiven you for his name's sake." Psal. xxv. 11. " For thy name's 'sake, O Lord, pardon mine iniquity, for it is great." Psal. lxxix. 9. "Help us, O God of our salvation, for the glory of thy name; and deliver us, and purge away our sins, for thy name's sake" Jer. xiv. 7. " O Lord, though our iniquities testify against us, do thou it for thy name's sake." These things seem to show, that the salvation of Christ is for God's name's sake. Leading and guiding in the way of safety and happiness, restoring the soul, the forgiveness of sin ; and that help, deliverance, and salvation, that is consequent therein, is for God's name. And here it is ob servable, that those two great temporal salvations of God's people, the redemption from Egypt, and that from Baby lon, often represented as figures and similitudes of the re demption of Christ, are frequently spoken of as being wrought for God's name's sake. Thus that great work of God, in delivering his people from Egypt, and conducting them to Canaan. 2 Sam. vii. 23. " And what one nation in the earth is like thy people, evetfhke Israel, whom God went to redeem for a people to himself, and to make him a name." Psal. cvi. 8. " Nevertheless he saved them for his name's sake." Isa! lxiii. 12. "That led them by the' right hand of Moses, with his glorious arm, dividing the waters before them, to make himself an everlasting name." In the 20th chap, of Ezekiel, God, rehearsing the various parts of this wonderful work, adds, from time -to time, " I wrought for my name's sake, that it should not be polluted before 'the heathen," as in ver. 9, 14, 22. (See also Josh. vii. 8,9. Dan. ix. 15.) So is the redemption from the Babylonish captivity. Isa. xlviii. 9, 10. " For my name's sake will I defer mine anger. For mine own sake, even for mine own sake, will I do it ; for how should my name be polluted?" In Ezek. xxxvi. 21, 22, 23. the reason is given for God's mercy in restor ing Israel. " But I had pity for my holy name. Thus saith the Lord, I do not this for your sakes, O house of Israel, hut for my holy name's sake ; — And I will sanctify my great name, which was profaned among the heathen. And chap, xxxix. 25. "Therefore, thus saith the Lord God, now will I bring again the captivity of Jacob, and have mercy upon the whole house of Israel, and will be jealous for my holy name." Daniel prays, that God would forgive his people, and show them mercy for his own sake. Dan. ix. 19. When God, from time to time, speaks of showing mercy, and exercising goodness, and promoting his people's hap piness for his name's sake, we cannot understand it as of a merely subordinate end. How absurd would it be to say, that he promotes their happiness for his name's sake, in subordination to their good ; and that his name may be exalted only for their sakes, as a means of promoting their happiness ! especially when such expressions as these are used, " For mine own sake, even for mine own sake will I do it ; for how should my name be polluted 1" and " Not for your sakes do I this, but for my holy name's sake." Again, it is represented as though God's people had their existence, at least as God's people, for God's name's sake. God's redeeming or purchasing them, that they might be his people, for his name, implies this. As in that passage mentioned before, 2 Sam. vii. 23. " Thy people Israel, whom God went to redeem for a people to himself, and to make him a name." So God making them a people for his name, is implied in Jer. xiii. 11. " For as the girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, so have I caused to cleave unto me the whole house of Israel, &c. — that they may be unto me for a people, and for a name." Acts xv. 14. " Simeon hath declared how God at the first did visit the Gentiles, to take out of them a people for his name." This also is spoken of as the end of the virtue, religion, and holy behaviour of the saints. Rom. i. 5. " By whom we have received grace and apostleship, for obedience to the faith among all nations for hisname." Matt. xix. 29. " Every one .that forsaketh' houses, or brethren, kc.—for my name's s_te,.shall receive an hundred fold, and shall' in herit everlastin{;\hfe." 3 John 7. " Because, that for his name's sake, they went forth, taking nothing of the Gentiles." Rev. ii. 3. " And hast borne, and hast patience, and for my name's sake hast laboured and hast not fainted." And we find that holy persons express their desire of this, and their Joy in it, in the same mariner as in the glory of God. 2 Sam. vii. 26. " Let thy name be magnified for ever." Psal. lxxvi. 1. "In Judah is God known, his name is great in Israel." Psal. cxlviii. 13. " Let them praise the name of the Lord ; for his name alone is excel lent, his glory is above the earth and heaven." Psal. cxxxv. 13. "Thy name, O Lord, endureth for ever, and thy me morial throughout all generations." Isa. xii. 4. " Declare his doings among the people, make mention that his name is exalted." The judgments God executes on the wicked, are spoken of as being for the sake of his name, in like manner as for his glory. Exod. ix. 16. "And in very deed, for this cause have I raised thee up, for to show in thee my power; and that my name may be declared throughout all the 6 ' 'ra.Neh' ix- 10- " And sh°wedst signs and wonders upon Pharaoh, and on all his servants, and on all the people of his- land; for thou knewedst that they dealt proudly against them : so didst thou get thee a name, as at this day." And this is spoken of as a consequence of the works of creation, in like manner as God's glory. Psal. viii. 1 . " O Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth! who hast set thy glory above the heavens." And then, at the conclusion of the observations on the works of creation, the psalm ends thus, ver. 9. " O Lord our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth !" So Psal. cxlviii. 13. after a particular mention of the various works of creation. , -Let them praise the name of the Lord, for his name alone is excellent in all the earth, his glory is above the earth and the heaven." 2. So we find the manifestation of God's perfect ions, his Sect. IV GOD CREATED THE WORLD FOR HIS NAME, &c. 113 greatness, and excellency, is spoken of very much in the same manner as God's glory. There are several scriptures which would lead us to suppose this to be the great thing that God sought of the moral world, and the end aimed at in moral agents, wherein they are to be active in answering their end. This seems implied in that argument God's people sometimes made use of, in deprecating a state of death and destruction : that, in such a state, they cannot know, or make known, the glorious excellency of God. Psal. lxxxviii. 18, 19. " Shall thy loving-kindness be declared in the grave, or thy faithfulness m destruction? Shall thy wonders be known in the dark, and thy righteousness in the land of forgetfulness ? " So Psal. xxx. 9. Isa.xxxviii. 18,19. The argument seems to be this : Why should we perish ? and how shall thine end, for which thou hast made us, be ob tained in a state of destruction, in which thy glory cannot be known or declared ? This is the end of the good part of the moral world, or the end of God's people in the same manner as the glory of God. Isa. xliii. 21. "This people have I formed for myself, they shall show forth my praise." 1 Pet. ii. 9. "But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people, that ye should show forth the praises of him who hath called you out of darkness into marvellous light." And this seems to be represented as the thing wherein the value, the proper fruit and end of their virtue appears. Isa. Ix. 6. speaking of the conversion of the Gentile nations to true religion, "They shall come and show forth the praises of the Lord." Isa. lxvi. 19. " I will send unto the nations — —and to the isles afar off, that have not heard my fame, neither have seen my glory; and they shall declare my glory among the Gentiles." — To which we may add, the proper tendency and rest of true virtue, and holy dispositions. 1 Chron. xvii. 8. "Make known his deeds among the people." Verse 23, 24. "Show forth from day to day thy salvation. Declare his glory among the heathen."*' This seems to be spoken of as a great end of the acts of God's moral government ; particularly, the great judgments he executes for sin. Exod. ix. 16. "And in very deed, for this cause have I raised thee up, to show in thee my power ; and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth." Dan. iv. 17. "This matter is by the decree of the watchers, &c. To the intent, that the living may know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will ; and setteth up over it the basest of men." But places to this purpose are too numerous to be particularly recited. See them in the margin .-f- This is also a great end of God's works of favour and mercy to his people. 2 Kings xix. 19. "Now, therefore, O Lord our God, I beseech thee, save thou us out of his hand, that all the kingdoms of the earth may know that thou art the Lord God, even thou only." 1 Kings viii. 59, 60. — "That he maintain the cause of his servant, and the cause of his people Israel, at all times, as the matter shall require, that all the people of the earth may know that the Lord is God, and that there is none else." See other pas sages to the same purpose referred to in the margin.]: This is spoken of as the end of the eternal damnation of the wicked, and also the eternal happiness of the righteous. Rom. ix. 22, 23. " What if God, willing to show his wrath, and make his power known, endured with much long-suffer ing the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction : and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he hath afore prepared unto glory ?" This is spoken of, from time to time, as a great end of the miracles which God wrought. (See Exod. vii. 17. and viii. JO. and x. 2. Deut. xxix. 5, 6. Ezek. xxiv. 17.) And of the ordinances he has established. Exod. xxix. 44, 45, 46. " And I will sanctify also both Aaron and his sons, to minister to me in the priests' office. And I will dwell w See also, Psal. ix. 1, 11, 14, and xix. 1. and xxvi. 7. and lxxi. 18. and Ixxv. 9. and lxxvi. 1. andlxxix. 13, and xcvi. 2, 3. andci. 1. andcvii.22. and cxviii. 17. andcxlv. 6, 11,12. Isa. xiii. 12. and lxiv. 1 , 2. Jer. Ii. 10. t Exod. xiv. 17, 18. 1 Sam. xvii, 46. Psal. lxxxiii. 18. Isa. xiv. 3. Ezek. vi. 7, 10, 13, 14. and vii. 4, 9, 27. and xi. 10, 1 1, 12. and iii. 15, 16, 20. and xiii. 9. 14, 21, 23. and xiv. 8 and xv. 7. and xxi. 5. and xxii/16. and xxv. 7, II, 17. and xxvi. 6. and xxviii. 22, 23, 24. and xxix. 9, 16. and xxx. 8, 19, 25, 26. and VOL. I. I among the children of Israel, and will be their God. And they shall know that I am the Lord their God," &c. Chap. xxxi. 1 3. " Verily, my sabbaths shall ye keep ; for it is a sign between me and you, throughout your genera tions ; that ye may know that I am the Lord that doth sanctify you." We have again almost the same words, Ezek. xx. 12. and ver. 20. This was a great end of the redemption out of Egypt. Psal. cvi. 8. " Nevertheless he saved them for his name's sake, that he might make his mighty power to be known." (See also Exod. vii. 5. and Deut. iv. 34, 35.) And also of the redemption from the Babylonish captivity. Ezek. xx. 34 — 38. " And 1 will bring you out from the people, and will gather you out of the countries whither ye are scatter ed. And I will bring you into the wilderness of the people ; and there I will plead with you, as I pleaded with your fathers in the wilderness of the land of Egypt. — And I will bring you into the bond of the covenant. And I will purge out the rebels. — And ye shall know that I am the Lord." Verse 42. " And ye shall know that I am the Lord, when I shall bring you into the land of Israel." Verse 44. " And ye shall know that I am the Lord, when I have wrought with you for my name's sake." (See also chap, xxviii. 25, 26. and xxxvi. 11. and xxxvii. 6. 13.) Ihis is also declared to be a great end of the work of redemption by Jesus Christ : both of its purchase, and its application. Rom. iii. 25, 26. " Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness. — To declare, I say, at this time, his righteousness : that he might be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." Eph. ii. 4 — 7. " But God, who is rich in mercy, &c. That he might show the exceeding riches of his grace, in his kindness towards us through Jesus Christ.'" Chap. iii. 8, 9, 10. " To preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to make all men see, what is the fellowship of that mystery which, from the beginning of the world, hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ : To the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places, might be known by the church the manifold wisdom of God." Psal. xxii. 21, 22. " Save me from the lion's mouth. I will declare thy name unto my brethren ; in the midst of the congregation will 1 praise thee." (Compared with Heb. ii. 12. and John xvii. 26.) Isa. lxiv. 4. " O that thou wouldest rend the heavens — to make thy name known to thine adversaries." And it is pronounced to be the end of that great, actual salvation, which should follow Christ's purchase of salva tion, both among Jews and Gentiles. Isa. xlix. 22, 23. " I will lift up my hand to the Gentiles, — and they shall bring thy sons in their arms — and kings shall be thy nurs ing-fathers — and thou shalt know that I am the Lord." § This appears to be the end of God's common providence, Job xxxvii. 6, 7. " For he saith to the snow, Be thou on the earth. Likewise to the small rain, and to the great rain of his strength. He sealeth up the hand of every man, that all men may know his work." And of the day of judg ment, that grand consummation of God's moral government of the world, and the day for bringing all things to their de signed ultimate issue. It is called, " The day of the reve lation of the righteous judgment of God." Rom. ii. 5. And the declaration, or openly manifesting of God's ex cellency, is spoken of as the actual, happy consequence and effect of the work of creation. Psal. xix. 1, &c. " The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament show- eth his handy-work. Day unto day uttereth speech, night unto night showeth knowledge. — In them hath he placed a tabernacle for the sun, which is as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run his race," &c. 3. In like manner, there are many scriptures that speak of God's praise, in many of the forementioned respects, just in the same manner as of his name and glory. This is spoken of as the end of the very being of God's xxxii. 15. and xxxiii. 29. and xxxv. 4, 12, 15. and xxxviii. 23. and xxxix. 6, 7, 21, 22. j Exod. vi. 7. and viii. 22. and xvi. 12. 1 Kings viii. 43. and xx. 28. Psal cii. 21. Ezek. xxiii. 49. and xxiv. 21. and xxv. 5. and xxxv. 9. and xxxix. 21, 22. § See also, Ezek. xvi. 62. and xxix. 21. and xxxiv. 27. and xxxvi. 38. and xxxix. 28, 29. Joel iii. 17. 11-1 GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION. Chap. II. people, in the same manner as before, Jer. xiii. 11. " For as the girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, so have I caused to cleave unto me the whole house of Israel, and the whole house of Judah, saith the Lord : that they might be unto me for a name, and for a praise, and a glory." It is spoken of as the end of the moral world. Matt. xxi. 16. " Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings hast thou perfected praise." That is, so hast thou in thy sovereignty and wisdom ordered it, that thou shouldest obtain the great end for which intelligent creatures are made, more especially from some of them that are in them selves weak, inferior, and more insufficient. (Compare Psal. viii. 1, 2.) And the same thing that was observed before concern ing the making known God's excellency, may also be ob served concerning God's praise. That it is made use of as an argument in deprecating a state of destruction ; that, in such a state, this end cannot be answered, in such a man ner as seems to imply its being an ultimate end, for which God had made man. Psal. lxxxviii. 10. " Shall the dead arise and praise thee ? Shall thy loving-kindness be declared in the grave ? — Shall thy wonders be known in the dark ?" Psal. xxx. 9. " What profit is there in my blood ? When I go down to the pit, shall the dust praise thee ? Shall it de clare thy truth ? Psal. cxv. 17, 18. " The dead praise not the Lord, neither any that go down into silence : but we will bless the Lord, from this time forth and for evermore. Praise ye the Lord." Isa. xxxviii. 18, 19. "For the grave cannot praise thee, death cannot celebrate thee ; they that go down into the pit cannot hope for thy truth. The living, the living, he shall praise thee." And God's praise is spoken of as the end of the virtue of God's people, in like manner as his glory. Phil. i. 11. " Being filled with the fruits of righteousness, which are by Jesus Christ to the praise and glory of God." God's praise is the end of the work of redemption. In Eph. i. where that work in its various parts is particularly insisted on, and set forth in its exceeding glory, this is mentioned, from time to time, as the great end of all, that it should be " to the praise of his glory." As in ver. 6, 12, 14. By which we may doubtless understand much the same thing with what in Phil. i. 11. is expressed, " his praise and glory." Agreeably to this, Jacob's fourth son, from whom the great Redeemer was to proceed, by the special direction of God's providence, was called Praise. This happy consequence, and glorious end of that great redemption, Messiah, one of his posterity, was to work out. In the Old Testament this praise is spoken of as the end of the forgiveness of God's people, and their salvation, in the same manner as God's name and glory. Isa. xlviii. 9, 10, 11. " For my name's sake will Idefer mine anger, and for my praise will I refrain for thee, that I cut thee not off. Behold I have refined thee — for mine own sake, even for mine own sake will I do it ; for how should my name be polluted ? and my glory will I not give to another." Jer. xxxiii. 8, 9. " And I will cleanse them from all their iniquity — and I will pardon all their iniquities. And it shall be to me a name of joy, a praise and an honour." And that the holy part of the moral world express de sires of this, and delight in it, as the end which holy principles in them tend to, reach after, and rest in, in their highest exercises— just in the same manner as the glory of God, is abundantly manifest. It would be endless to enumerate particular places wherein this appears ; wherein the saints declare this, by expressing their earnest desires of God's praise ; calling on all nations, and all beings in heaven and earth, to praise him ; in a rapturous manner calling on one another, crying " Hallelujah ; praise ye the Lord, praise him for ever." Expressing their resolutions to praise him as long as they live through all generations, and for ever; declaring how good, how pleasant and comely the praise of God is, &c. And it is manifest, that God's praise is the desirable and glorious consequence and effect of all the works of creation, by such places as these. Psal. cxlv. 5 — 10. and cxlviii. throughout, and ciii. 19 — 22. SECT. V. Places of Scripture from whence it may be argued, that communication of good to the creature, was one thing which God had in view, as an ultimate end of the creation of the world. 1 . According to the Scripture, communicating good to the creatures is what is in itself pleasing to God. And this is not merely subordinately agreeable, and esteemed valuable on account of its relation to a further end, as it is in executing justice in punishing the sins of men ; but what God is inclined to on its own account, and what he delights in simply and ultimately. For though God is sometimes in Scripture spoken of as taking pleasure in punishing men's sins, Deut. xxviii. 63. " The Lord will rejoice over you, to destroy you." Ezek. v. 13. " Then shall mine anger be accomplished, and I will cause my fury to rest upon them, and I will be comforted." Yet God is often spoken of as exercising goodness and show ing mercy, with delight, in a manner quite different, and opposite to that of his executing wrath. For the latter is spoken of as what God proceeds to with backwardness and reluctance; the misery of the creature being not agreeable to him on its own account. Neh. ix. 17. " Thou art a God ready to pardon, gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness." Psal. ciii. 8. " The Lord is merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy." Psal. cxlv. 8. " The Lord is gracious and full of compassion, -slow to anger, and of great mercy." We have again almost the same words, Jonah iv. 2. Mic. vii. 18. "Who is a God like unto thee, that pardoneth iniquity, &c. — He retaineth not his anger for ever, because he delighteth in mercy." Ezek. xviii. 32. " I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God ; wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye." Lam. iii. 33. " He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men." Ezek. xxxiii. 11. "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live : turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways ; for why will ye die, O house of Israel !" 2 Pet. iii. 9. " Not 'willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance." 2. The work of redemption wrought out by Jesus Christ, is spoken of in such a manner as, being from the grace and love of God to men, does not well consist with his seeking a communication of good to them, only subordi nately. Such expressions as that in John iii. 16. cany another idea. " God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish, but have everlasting life." And 1 John iv. 9, 10. " In this was manifested the love of God towards us, because that God sent his only-begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him. Herein is love; not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." So Eph. ii. 4. " But God who is rich in mercy, for his great love where with he loved us," &c. But if indeed this was only from a regard to a further end, entirely diverse from our good ; then all the love is truly terminated in that, its ultimate object, and therein is his love manifested, strictly and pro perly speaking, and not in that he loved us, or exercised such high regard towards us. For if our good be not at all regarded ultimately, but only subordinately, then our good or interest is, in itself considered, nothing in God's regard. The Scripture every where represents it, as though the great things Christ did and suffered, were in the most direct and proper sense from exceeding love to us. Thus the apostle Paul represents the matter, Gal. ii. 20. " Who loved me, and gave himself for me." Eph. v» 25. " Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ loved the church, and gave himself for it." And Christ himself, John xvii. 19. " For their sakes I sanctify myself." And the scripture represents Christ as resting in the salvation and glory of his people, when obtained as in what he ultimately sought, as having therein reached the goal, obtained the prize he aimed at, enjoying the travail of his soul in which he is satisfied, as the recompence of his labours and extreme agonies, Isa. liii. 10, 11. " When Sect. V. COMMUNICATION OF GOOD TO THE CREATURE. 115 thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the tra vail of his soul, and shall be satisfied ; by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities." He sees the travail of his soul, in seeing his seed, the children brought forth as the result of his travail. This implies, that Christ has his delight, most truly and properly, in obtaining the salvation of his church, not merely as a means, but as what he rejoices and is satisfied in, most directly and properly. This is proved by those scriptures which represent him as re joicing in his obtaining this fruit of his labour and pur chase, as the bridegroom, when he obtains his bride, Isa. lxii. 5. "As the bridegroom rejoices over the bride, so shall thy God rejoice over thee." And how emphatical and strong to the purpose, are the expressions in Zeph. iii. 17. "The Lord toy God in the midst of thee is mighty ; he will save, he will rejoice over thee with joy ; he will rest in his love, he will rejoice over thee with singing." The same thing may be argued from Prov. viii. 30, 31. " Then was I by him, as one brought up with him : and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him : re joicing in the habitable part of his earth, and my delights were with the sons of men." And from those places, that speak of the saints as God's portion, his jewels and pecu liar treasure, these things are abundantly confirmed, John xii. 23 — 32. But the particular consideration of what may be observed to the present purpose, in that passage of Scripture, may be referred to the next section. 3. The communications of divine goodness, particularly forgiveness of sin, and salvation, are spoken of, from time to time, as being for God's goodness' sake, and for his mer cies' sake, just in the same manner as they are spoken of as being for God's name's sake, in the places observed be fore. Psal. xxv. 7. " Remember not the sins of my youth, nor my transgressions : according to thy mercy remember thou me, for thy goodness' sake, O Lord." In the 1 1 th verse, the psalmist says, " For thy name's sake, O Lord, pardon mine iniquity." Neh. ix. 31. " Never theless,./^ thy great mercies' sake, thou hast not utterly consumed them, nor forsaken them ; for thou art a gra cious and a merciful God." Psal. vi. 4. " Return, O Lord, deliver my soul : O save me for thy mercies' sake." Psal. xxxi. 16. "Make thy face to shine upon thy ser vant : save me for thy mercies' sake" Psal. xliv. 26. " Arise for our help ; redeem us for thy mercies' sake." And here it may be observed, after what a remarkable manner God speaks of his love to the children of Israel in the wilderness, as though his love were for love's sake, and his goodness were its own end and motive. Deut. vii. 7, 8. " The Lord did not set his love upon you, nor choose you, because ye were more in number than any people, for ye were the fewest of all people : but because the Lord loved.you." 4. That the government of the world in all its parts, is for the good of such as are to be the eternal subjects of God's goodness, is implied in what the Scripture teaches us of Christ being set at God's right hand, made king of angels and men ; set at the head of the universe, having all power given him in heaven and earth, to that end that he may promote their happiness ; being made head over all things to the church, and having the government of the whole creation for their good.* Christ mentions it, Mark ii. 28. as the reason why the Son of man is made Lord of the sabbath, because " the sabbath was made for man." And if so, we may in like manner argue, that all things were made for man, because the Son of man is made Lord of all things. 5. That God uses the whole creation, in his government of itf for the good of his people, is most elegantly repre sented in Deut. xxxiii. 26. "There is none like unto the God of Jeshurun, who rideth upon the heaven." The whole universe is a machine, or chariot, which God hath made for his own use, as is represented in Ezekiel's vision. God's seat is heaven, where he sits and governs, Ezek. i. 22, 26 — 28. The inferior part of the creation, this visible universe, subject to such continual changes and revolu- • Eph. i. 20- , John xvii. 2. Matt. xi. 27. and xxviii. 18, 19. John iii. 35. I 2 tions, are the wheels of the chariot. God's providence, in the constant revolutions, alterations, and successive events, is represented by the motion of the wheels of the chariot, by the spirit of him who sits on his throne on the heavens, or above the firmament. Moses tells us for whose sake it is, that God moves the wheels of this chariot, or rides in it, sitting in his heavenly seat; and to what end he is making his progress, or goes his appointed journey in it, viz. the salvation of his people. 6. God's judgments on the wicked in this world, and also their eternal damnation in the world to come, are spoken of, as being for the happiness of God's people. So are his judgments on them in this world. Isa. xhii. 3, 4. " For I am the Lord thy God, the Holy One of Israel, thy Saviour. I gave Egypt for thy ransom, Ethiopia and Seba for thee. Since thou hast been precious in my sight, thou hast been honourable, and I have loved thee ; therefore will I give men for thee, and people for thy life." So the works of God's vindictive justice and wrath are spoken of as works of mercy to his people, Psal. cxxxvi. 10, 15, 17 — 20. And so is their eternal damnation in another world. Rom. ix. 22, 23. " What if God, willing to show his wrath and make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction : ana that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory." Here it is evident the last verse comes in, in con nexion with the foregoing, as giving another reason of the destruction of the wicked, viz. showing the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy : higher degrees of their glory and happiness, in a relish of their own enjoyments, and a greater sense of their value, and of God's free grace in be stowing them. 7. It seems to argue, that God's goodness to them who are to be the eternal subjects of his goodness, is the end of the creation ; since the whole creation, in all its parts, is spoken of as theirs. 1 Cor. iii. 22, 23. " All things are yours, whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come, all are yours." The terms are very universal ; and both works of creation and providence are mentioned ; and it is mani festly the design of the apostle to be understood of everv work of God whatsoever. Now, how can we understand this any otherwise, than that all things are for their benefit ; and that God made and uses all for their good ? 8. All God's works, both of creation and providence, are represented as works of goodness er mercy to his people ; as in the 136th psalm. His wonderful works in general. Ver. 4. " To him who alone doth great wonders; for his mercy endureth for ever." The works of creation in all its parts. Ver. 5—9. " To him that by wisdom made the heavens ; for his mercy endureth for ever. To him that stretched out the earth above the waters ; for his mercy endureth for ever. To him that made great lights; for his mercy endureth for ever. The sun to rule by day ; for his mercy endureth for ever. The moon and stars to rule by night ; for his mercy endureth for ever." And God's works of providence, in the following part of the psalm. 9. That expression in the blessed sentence pronounced on the righteous at the day of judgment, " Inherit the king dom prepared for you from the foundation of the world," seems to hold forth thus much, that the fruits of God's goodness to them, was his end in creating the world, and in his providential disposals : that God in all his works, in laying the foundation of the world, and ever since the foundation of it, had been preparing this kingdom and glory for them. 10. Agreeable to this, the good of men is spoken of as an ultimate end of the virtue of the moral world. Rom. xiii. 8, 9, 10. " He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, &c— And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neigh bour; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law" Gal. v. 14. " All the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Jam. ii. 8. " If ye fulfil the royal law, according to the scripture, 116 GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION. Chap. II, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, thou shalt do well." If the good of the aeature be one end of God in all he does ; and in all he requires moral agents to do ; an end by which they should regulate _11 their conduct ; these things may be easily explained : but otherwise, it seems dif ficult to be accounted for, that the Holy Ghost should thus express himself. The Scripture represents it to be the spirit of all true saints, to prefer the welfare of God's people to their chief joy. This was the spirit of Moses and the pro phets of old : the good of God's church was an end by which they regulated all their conduct. And so it was with the apostles. 2 Cor.iv. 15. " For all things are for your sakes." 2 Tim. ii. 10. " I endured all things for the elect's sake, that they may also obtain the salvation which is in Christ Jesus, with eternal glory." And the Scriptures represent it, as though every Christian should, in all he does, be em ployed for the good of the church, as each particular mem ber is employed for the good of the body ; Rom. xii. 4, 5, &c. Eph. iv. 15, 16. 1 Cor. xii. 12, 25, &c. To this end, the Scripture teaches us, the angels are continually em ployed, Heb. i. 14. SECT. VI. Wherein is considered what is meant by the glory of God and the name of God in Scripture, when spoken of as God's end in his works. Having thus considered, what are spoken of in the Holy Scriptures, as theends which God had ultimately in view in the creation of the world, I now proceed particularly to inquire what they are, and how the terms are to be understood ? I. Let us begin with the phrase, the glory of God — And here I might observe, that it is sometimes used to sig nify the second person in the Trinity ; but it is not neces sary, at this time, to prove it from particular passages of Scripture. Omitting this, I proceed to observe some things concerning the Hebrew word (t__) which is most com monly used in the Old Testamenl, where we have the word glory in the English Bible. The root it comes from, is either the verb, (-no) which signifies to be heavy, or make heavy, or from the adjective (-n._) which signifies heavy or weighty. These, as seems pretty manifest, are the primary signification of these words, though they have also other meanings, which seem to be derivative. The noun (lira) signifies gravity, heaviness, greatness, and abundance. Of very many places it will be sufficient to specify a few. Prov. xxvii. 3. 2 Sam. xiv. 26. 1 Kings xii. 11. Psal. xxxviii. 4. Isa. xxx. 27. And as the weight of bodies arises from two things, density and magnitude ; so we find the word used to signify dense, Exod. xix. 16. ("no ]3» nubes gravis, Vulg. densissima,) a dense cloud ; and is very often used for great. Isa. xxxii. 2. Gen. v. 9. 1 Kings x. 2. 2 Kings vi. 14. and xviii. 17. Isa. xxxvi. 2. &c. The Hebrew word (Tt_>) which is commonly translated glory, is used in such a manner as might be expected from this signification of the words from whence it comes. Sometimes it is used to signify what is internal, inherent, or in the possession of the person : and sometimes for emanation, exhibition, or communication of this internal glory : and sometimes for the knowledge, or sense of these, in those to whom the exhibition or communication is made ; or an expression of this knowledge, sense, or effect. And here I would note, that agreeable to the use of this word in the Old Testament, is the Greek word (3of_) in the New. For as the word (f^.) is generally translated by the just mentioned Greek word (Sofa) in the Septuagint ; so it is apparent, that this word is designed to be used to signify the same thing In the New Testament with the other in the Old. This might be abundantly proved, by com- Earing particular places of the Old Testament ; but pro- ably it will not be denied. I therefore proceed particu larly to consider these words, with regard to their use in Scripture, in each of the fore-mentioned ways. * Exod. xvi. 7. and xxviii. 2, 40. and iii. 8. Numb. xvi. 19. Deut. v. 24. and xxviii. 58. 2 Sam. 6, 20. 1 Chron. xvi. 24. Esth. i. 4. Job xxix. 20. Psal. xix. I. and xiv. 13. and Ixiii. 3. and lxvi. 3. and lxvii. 6. and lxxxvii. 3. and cii. 16. and cxlv. 5, 12, 13. Isa. iv. 2. and x. 18. and xvi. 40. and xxxv. 21. and xl. 5. and Ix. 13. and Ixii. 2. Ezek. xxxi. 18. Hab. ii. 14. Hag. ii. 3, 9. Matt \i. 29. and xvi. 27. and xxiv. 30. Luke ix. 31, 32. John i. 14. and ii. 11. and 1. The word glory denotes sometimes what is internal. When the word is used to signify what is within, or in the possession of the subject, it very commonly signifies ex cellency, dignity, or worthiness of regard. This, according to the Hebrew idiom, is, as it were, the weight of a thing, as that by which it is heavy ; as to be tight, is to be worthless, without value, contemptible. Numb. xxi. 5. " This light bread." 1 Sam. xviii. 23. " Seemeth it a light thing." Judg. ix. 4. " Light persons," i. e. worthless, vain, vile persons. So Zeph. iii. 4. To set light by is to de spise, 2 Sam. xix. 43. Belshazzar's vileness in the sight of God, is represented by his being Tekel, weighed in the balances and found light, Dan. v. 27. And as the weight of a thing arises from its magnitude, and its specific gravity conjunctly ; so the word glory is very commonly used to signify the excellency of a person or a thing, as consisting either in greatness, or in beauty, or in both conjunctly ; as will abundantly appear by considering the places referred to in the margin.* Sometimes that internal, great and excellent good, which is called glory, is rather in possession, than inherent. Any one may be called heavy, that possesses an abundance ; and he that is empty and destitute, may be called light. Thus we find riches are sometimes called glory. Gen. xxxi. 1. "And of that which was our fathers' hath he gotten all this glory." Esth. v. 11. "Haman told them of the glory of his riches." Psal. xlix. 16, 17. "Be not afraid when one is made rich, when the glory of his house is increased. For when he dieth, he shall carry nothing away, his glory shall not descend after him." Nah. ii. 9. "Take ye the spoil of silver, take the spoil of gold; for there is none end of the store and glory out of the pleasant furniture." And it is often put for a great height of prosperity, and fulness of good in general. Gen. xiv. 13. "You shall tell my father of all my glory in Egypt." Job xix. 9. " He hath stripped me of my glory." Isa. x. 3. " Where will you leave your glory." Ver. 16. "Therefore shall the Lord of hosts send among his fat ones leanness, and under his glory shall he kindle a burning, like the burning of a fire." Isa. xvii. 3,4. "The kingdom shall cease from Damascus, and the remnant of Syria ; they shall be as the glory of the children of Israel. And in that day, it shall come to pass, that the glory of Jacob shall be made thin, and the fatness of his flesh shall be made lean." Isa. xxi. 16. "And all the glory of Kedar shall fail." Isa. lxi. 6. "Ye shall eat the riches of the Gentiles, and in their glory shall ye boast yourselves." Chap. lxvi. 11, 12. "That ye may milk out, and be delighted with the abundance of her glory.- — I will extend peace to her, like a river, and the glory of the Gentiles like a flowing stream." Hos. ix. 11. "As for Ephraim, their glory shall fly away as a bird." Matt. iv. 8. "Showeth him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them." Luke xxiv. 26. " Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory?" John xvii. 22. "And the glory which thou gayest me, have I given them." Rom. v. 2. "And rejoice in hope of the glon/ of God." Chap. viii. 18. "The sufferings of this present time, are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be re vealed in us." (See also chap. ii. 7, 10. and iii. 23. and ix. 23.) 1 Cor. ii. 7. "The hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world, unto our glory." 2 Cor. iv. 17. " Worketh out for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." Eph. i. 18. "And what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints." 1 Pet. iv. 13. "But rejoice, inasmuch as ye are made partakers of Christ's sufferings ; that when his glory shall be revealed, ye may be glad also with exceeding joy." Chap. i. 8. "Ye rejoice, with joy unspeakable and full of glory." f 2. The word glory is used in Scripture often to express the exhibition, emanation, or communication of the infernal glory. Hence it often signifies an effulgence, or shining brightness, by an emanation of beams of light. Thus the brightness of the sun, and moon, and stars, is called their xi. 40. Rom. vi. 4. 1 Cor. ii. 8. and xv. 40. 2 Cor. iii. 10. Eph. iii. 21. CoL i. 11.2 Thess. i. 9. Tit. ii. 13. 1 Pet. i. 24. 2 Pet. i. 17. . t See also. Colos. i. 27. and iii. 4. 1 Thess. ii. 12. 2Thess. ii. 14. 1 Tim. iii. 16. 2 Tim. ii. 10. Heb. ii. 10. 1 Pet. i. 11, 21. and v. 10. 2 Pet i 3 Rev xxi. 24, 26. Psal. lxxiii. 24. and cxlix. 5. Isa. vi. 10. Sect. VI. WHAT MEANT BY THE GLORY OF GOD, &c. 117 glory, in 1 Cor. xv. 41. But in particular, the word is very often thus used, when applied to God and Christ. As in Ezek. i. 28. " As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain, so was the appearance of the .brightness round about. This was the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord." And chap. x. 4. " Then the glory of the Lord went up from the cherub, and stood • over the threshold of the house, and the house was filled with the cloud, and the court was full of the brightness of the Lord's glory." Isa. vi. 1, 2, 3. " I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the seraphim — And one cried to another and said, Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glort/." Compared with John xii. 41. " These things said Esaias, when he saw his glory and spake of him." Ezek. xliii. 2. " And behold the glory of the God of Israel came from the way of the east. And the earth shined with his glory." Isa. xxiv. 23. " Then the moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts shall reign in mount Zion, and in Jerusalem, and before his ancients gloriously. " Isa. Ix. 1, 2. " Arise, shine, for thy light is come, and the tlory of the Lord is risen upon thee. For behold the arkness shall cover the earth, and gross darkness the people ; but the Lord shall arise upon thee, and his glory shall be seen upon thee." Together with verse 19. "The sun shall be no more thy light by day, neither for brightness shall the moon give light unto thee: but the Lord shall be unto thee an everlasting light, and thy God thy glory." Luke ii. 9. " The glory of the Lord shone round about them." Acts xxii. 11. "And when I could not see for the glory of that light." In 2 Cor. iii. 7. The shining of Moses's face is called the glory of his countenance. And to this Christ's glory is compared, verse 18. "But we all with open face, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory." And so chap. iv. 4. " Lest the light of the glori ous gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them." Ver. 6. "For God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of 'the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." Heb. i. 3. " Who is the bright ness of his glory." The apostle Peter, speaking of that emanation of exceeding brightness, from the bright cloud that overshadowed the disciples in the mount of trans figuration, and of the shining of Christ's face at that time, says, 2 Pet. i. 17. " For he received from God the Father honour and story, when there came such a voice to him from the excellent glory, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." Rev. xviii. 1. " Another angel came down from heaven, having great power, and the earth was lightened with his glory.'' Rev. xxi. 11. " Having the glory of God, and her light was like unto a stone most precious, like a jasper stone, clear as crystal." Ver. 23. " And the city had no need of the sun nor of the moon to shine in it ; for the glory of God did lighten it." See the word for a visible, effulgence or emanation of light in the places to be seen in the margin.'5 The word glory, as applied to God or Christ, sometimes evidently signifies the communications of God's fulness, and means much the same thing with God's abundant good ness and grace. So Eph. iii. 16. " That he would grant you, according to the riclies of his glory, to be strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man." The expres sion, " According to the riches of his glory," is apparent ly equivalent to that in the same epistle, chap. i. 7. " Ac cording to the riches of his grace." And chap, ii., 7. " The exceeding riches of his grace in his kindness towards us, through Christ Jesus." In like manner is the word glory used in Phil. iv. 19. " But my God shall supply all your need, according to his riches in glory, by Christ Je sus." And Rom. ix. 23. " And that he might make known the riches of his glory, on the vessels of his mercy." In * Exod. xvi. 12. and xxiv. 16, 17, 23. and xl. 34, 35. Lev. ix. 6. 23. Num. xiv. 10. and xvi. 19. 1 Kings viii. II. 2 Chron. v. 14. and vii. 1, 2, 3. Isa. lviii. 8. Ezek. iii. 23. and viii. 4. and ix. 3. and x. 18, 19, and xi. 22, 23. and xliii. 4, 5. and xliv. 4. Acts vii. 55. Rev. xv. 8. t Dr. Goodwin observes, (Vol I. of his works, part 2d, page 166.) that riches of grace are called riches of glory in Scripture. " The Scripture," says he, " speaks of riches of glory in Eph. iii. 6. That lie would grant you according to the riches of his glory ; yet eminently mercy is there in tended : for it is that which God bestows, and which the apostle there this and the foregoing verse, the apostle speaks of God's making known two things, his great wrath, and his rich grace. The former on the vessels of wrath, ver. 22. The latter, which he calls the riches of his glory, on the vessels of mercy, ver. 23. So when Moses says, " I beseech thee show me thy glory ;" God granting his request, makes answer, " 1 will make all my goodness to pass before thee." Exod. xxxiii. 18, 19.+ What we find in John xii. 23 — 32. is worthy of parti cular notice in this place. The words and behaviour of Christ, of which we have here an account, argue two things. (1.) That the happiness and salvation of men, was an end that Christ ultimately aimed at in his labours and suf ferings. The very same things which were observed before, (chapter second, section third,) concerning God's glory, are in the same manner observable, concerning the salvation of men. Christ, in the near approach of the most extreme difficulties which attended his undertaking, comforts him self in a certain prospect of obtaining the glory of God, as his great end. And at the same time, and exactly in the same manner, is the salvation of men mentioned, as the end of these great labours and sufferings, which satisfied his soul in the prospect of undergoing them. (Compare the 23rd and 24th verses ; and also the 28th and 29th verses ; ver. 31 and 32.) (2.) The glory of God, and the emanations and fruits of his grace in man's salvation, are so spoken of by Christ on this occasion in just the same manner, that it would be quite unnatural to understand him as speaking of two dis tinct things. Such is the connexion, that what he says of the latter, must most naturally be understood as exegetical of the former. He first speaks of his own glory, and the glory of his Father, as the great end that should be ob tained by what he was about to suffer ; and then explains and amplifies this, in what he expresses of the salvation of men that shall be obtained by it. Thus, in the 23d verse, he says, " The hour is come that the Son of man should be glorified." And in what next follows, he evidently shows how he was to be glorified, or wherein his glory con sisted : " Verily, verily, I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground, and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." As much fruit is the gloiy of the seed, so is the multitude of redeemed ones, which should spring from his death, his glory. J So concerning the glory of his Father, in the 27th and follow ing verses. " Now is my soul troubled, and what shall 1 say ? Father, save me from this hour ! But for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name. Then came there a voice from heaven, saying, I have both glori fied it, and will glorify it again." In an assurance of this, which this voice declared, Christ was greatly comforted, and his soul even exulted under the view of his approach ing sufferings. And what this glory was, in which Christ's soul was so comforted on this occasion, his own words plainly show. When the people said, it thundered ; and others said, an angel spake to him ; then Christ tells them what this voice meant. Ver. 30 — 32. " Jesus answered and said, This voice came not because of me, but for your sakes. Now is the judgment of this world ; now shall the prince of this world be cast out. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." By this be haviour and these speeches of our Redeemer, it appears, that the expressions of divine grace, in the sanctification and happiness of the redeemed, are especially that glory of his, and his Father, which was the joy that was set before him, for which he endured the cross, and despised the shame: and that this glory especially was the end of the travail of his soul, in obtaining which end he was satisfied. (Isa. liii. 10, 11.) This is agreeable to what has been just observed, of God's glory being so often represented by an effulgence, or emanation, or communication of light, from a luminary or fountain of light. What can so naturally and aptly repre- prayeth for. And he calls his mercy there his glory, as elsewhere he doth, as being the most eminent excellency in God.— That in Rom. ix. 22, 23. compared, is observable. In the 22d verse, where the apostle speaks of God's making known the power of his wrath, saith he, Bod willing to show his wrath, and make his power known. But in verse 3d, when he comes to speak of mercy, he saith, That he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy." J Here may be remembered what was before observed of the church. being so often spoken of as the glory and fulness of Christ. 118 GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION. Chap. II. sent the emanation of the internal glory of God; or the flowing forth and abundant communication of that infinite fulness of good that is in God 1 Light is very often in Scripture,put for comfort, joy, happiness, and for good in general.* 3. Again, the word g lory, as applied to God in Scripture, implies" the view or knowledge of God's excellency. The exhibition of glory is to the view of beholders. The mani festation of glory, the emanation or effulgence of brightness, has relation to the eye. Light or brightness is a quality that has relation to the sense of seeing ; we see the luminary by its light. And knowledge is often expressed in Scripture by light. The word glory very often in Scripture signifies, or implies, honour, as any one may soon see by casting his eye on a concordance.-)- But honour implies the knowledge of the dignity and excellency of him who hath the honour ; and this is often more especially signified by the word glory, when applied to God. Num. xiv. 21 . " But as truly as 1 live, all the earth shall be filled with the glory of the Lord," i. e. All the inhabitants of the earth shall see the manifestations I will make of my perfect holiness and hatred of sin, and so of my infinite excellence. This appears by the context. So Ezek. xxxix. 21,22, 23. "And I will set my glory among the heathen, and all the heathen shall see my judgment that I have executed, and my hand that I have laid upon them. So the house of Israel shall know that I am the Lord their God. And the heathen shall know that the house of Israel Went into captivity for their iniquity." And it is manifest in many places, where we read of God glorifying himself, or of his being glorified, that one thing, directly intended, is making known his divine greatness and excellency. 4.. Again, glory, as the word is used in Scripture, often signifies or implies praise. This appears from what was observed before, that glory very often signifies honour, which is much the same thing with praise, viz. high esteem and the expression of it in words and actions. And it is manifest that the words glory and praise, are often used as equivalent expressions in Scripture. Psal. 1. 23. " Whoso offereth praise, glorifieth me." Psal. xxii. 23. " Ye that fear the Lord, praise him ; all ye seed of Israel, glorify him." Isa. xiii. 8. " My glory I will not give unto another, nor my praise to graven images." Ver. 12. " Let them give glory unto the Lord, and declare his praise in the islands." Isa. xl viii. 9—11. " For my name's sake will I defer mine anger ; for my praise will I refrain for thee. — For mine own sake will I do it ; for 1 will not give my glory unto another." Jer. xiii. 11. " That they might be unto me for a people, and for a name, and for a praise, and for a glory." Eph. i. 6. " To the praise of the glory of his grace." Ver. 12. "To the praise of his glory." So ver. 14. The phrase is apparently equivalent to this, Phil. i. 11. " Which are by Jesus Christ unto the praise and glory of God." 2 Cor. iv. 15. " That the abundant grace might, through the thanksgiving of many, redound to the glory of It is manifest the praise of God, as the phrase is used in Scripture, implies the high esteem and love of the heart, exalting thoughts of God, and complacence in his excel lence and perfection. This is manifest to every one ac quainted with the Scripture. However, if any need satis faction, they may, among innumerable other places which might be mentioned, turn to those in the margin.J It also implies joy in God, or rejoicing in his perfections, as is manifest by Psal. xxxiii. 2. " Rejoice in the Lord, O ye righteous, for praise is comely for the upright." Other passages to the same purpose, see in the margin. § How often do we read of singing praise ! But singing is com monly an expression of joy. It is called, making a joyful noise. ||. And as it is often used, it implies gratitude orlove to God for his benefits to us.^T * Isa. vi. 3. — " Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory." In the original, His glory is the fulness of the whole earth: which signifies much more than the words of the translation. God's glory, consisting especially in his holiness, is that, in the sight or communi cations of which man's fulness, i. e. bis holiness and happiness, consists. By God,s glory here, there seems to be respect to those effulgent beams that filled the temple : these beams signifying God's glory shining forth and com municated. This effulgence or communication, is the fulness of all intelli gent creatures, who have no fulness of their own. t See particularly, Heb. iii. 3 J Psal cxlv. 1.— 12. and xxxiv. 1, 2,3, and xliv. 8. and xxi 14, 15. and II. Having thus considered what is implied in the phrase, the gurry of God, as we find it used in Scripture ; I proceed to inquire what is meant by the name of God. God's name sad his glory, at least very often, signify the same thing in Scripture. As it has been observed concern ing the glory of God, that it sometimes signifies the second person in the Trinity ; the same might be shown of thename of God, if it were needful in this place. But that the name and glory of God are often equipollent expressions, is ma nifest by Exod. xxxiii. 18, 19. When Moses says, " I beseech thee, show me thy glory," and God grants his re quest, he says, " I will proclaim the name of the Lord be fore thee." Psal. viii. 1. " O Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth ! who hast set thy glory above the heavens," Psal. lxxix. 9. " Help us ! O God of our salva tion, for the glory of thy name ; and deliver us, and purge away our sins for thy name's sake." Psal. cii. 15. " So the heathen shall fear the name of the Lord ; and all the kings of the earth thy glory." Psal. cxlviii. 13. " His name alone is excellent, and his glory is above the earth and heaven." Isa. xlviii. 9. " For my name's sake will I defer mine anger, and for my praise will I refrain for thee." Ver. 11." For mine own sake, even for mine own sake will I do it : for how should my name be polluted ? And I will not give my glory unto another." Isa. lix. 19. " They shall fear the name of the Lord from the west, and his glory from the rising of the sun." Jer. xiii. 11." That they might be unto me for a name, and for a praise, and for a glory." As glory often implies the manifestation, publication, and knowledge of excellency, and the honour that any one has in the world ; so does name. Gen. xi. 4. " Let us make us a name." Deut. xxvi. 19. " And to make thee high above all nations, in praise, in name, and in honour." ** So it is evident, that by name is sometimes meant much the same thing as praise, by several places which have been just mentioned, (as Isa. xlviii. 9. Jer. xiii. 11. Deut. xxvi. 19.) And also by Jer. xxxiii. 9. " And it shall be unto me for a name, a praise, and an honour, before all the nations of the earth, which shall hear of all the good I do unto them." Zeph. iii. 20. " I will make you a name and a praise among all people of the earth.*' And it seems that the expression or exhibition of God's goodness is especially called his name, in Exod. xxxiii. 19. " I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I will proclaim the name of the Lord before thee." And chap. xxxiv. 5, 6, 7. "And the Lord descended in the cloud, and stood with him there, and proclaimed the name of the Lord. And the Lord passed by before him, and pro claimed, The Lord, the Lord God, gracious and merciful, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth ; keep ing mercy for thousands," &c. And the same illustrious brightness and effulgence in the pillar of cloud that appeared in the wilderness, and dwelt above the mercy-seat in the tabernacle and temple, (or rather the spiritual, divine brightness and effulgence repre sented by it,) so often called the glory of the Lord, is also often called the name of the Lord. Because God's glory was to dwell in the tabernacle, therefore he promises, Exod. xxix. 43. " There will I meet with the children of Israel, and the tabernacle shall be sanctified by my glory." And the temple was called the house of God's glory, Isa. Ix. 7. In like manner, the name of God is said to dwell in the sanctuary. Thus we often read of the place that God chose, to put his name there : or, as it is in the Hebrew, to cause his name to inhabit there. So it is sometimes ren dered by our translators. As Deut. xii. 11. " Then there shall be a place which the Lord your God shall choose to cause his name to dwell there." And the temple is often spoken of as built for God's name. And in Psal. lxxiv. 7. the temple is called the dwelling-place of God's name. The mercy-seat in the temple was called the throne of God's xcix. 2,3. and cvii. 31,32. and cviii. 3, 4, 5. and cxix. 164. and cxlviii. 13. and cl. 2. Rev. xix. 1.2.3. § Psal. ix. 1, 2, 14. and xxviii. 7. and xxxv. 27, 28. and xiii. 4. and lxiii. 5. and Ixvii. 3, 4, 5. and Ixxi. 22, 23. and civ. 33, 34. and cvi. 47. and exxxv. 3. and cxlvii. 1. and cxlix. 1, 2,5,6. Acts ii. 46, 47. and iii. 8. Rev. xix. 6,7. II Psal. lxvi. 1, 2. and xcvi. 4, 5. IF Psal. xxx. 12. and xxxv. 18. and lxiii. 3, 4. and lxvi. 8, 9. and lxxi. 6, 7,8. and lxxix. 13. and xcviii. 4, 5. and c. 4. and cvii. 21,22. and exxxviii. & And many other places. * * See also, 2 Sam. vii. 9. and viii. 13. and xxiii. 18. Neh. ix. 10. Job xxx. & Prov. xxii. 1 . Many other places import the same thing. Sect. VII. GOD'S LAST END IS BUT ONE. 119 name or glory, Jer. xiv. 21. "Do not abhor us, for thy name's sake do not disgrace the throne of thy glory." Here God's name and his glory seem to be spoken of as the same. SECT. VII, Showing that the ultimate end of the creation of the world is but one, and what that one end is. From what has been observed in the last section, it ap pears, if the whole of what is said relating to this affair be duly weighed, and one part compared with another, we shall have reason to think, that the design of the Spirit of God is not to represent God's ultimate end as manifold, but as one. For though it be signified by various names, yet they appear not to be names of different things, but various names involving each other in their meaning; either different names of the same thing, or names of several parts of one whole ; or of the same whole viewed in various lights or in its different respects and relations. For it ap pears, that all that is ever spoken of in the Scripture as an ultimate end of God's works, is included in that one phrase, the glory of God ; which is the name by which the ultimate end of God's works is most commonly called in Scripture ; and seems most aptly to signify the thing. The thing signified by that name, the glory of God, when spoken of as the supreme and ultimate end of all God's works, is the emanation and true external expression of God's internal glory and fulness ; meaning by his ful ness what has already been explained ; or, in other words, God's internal glory, in a true and just exhibition, or ex ternal existence of it. It is confessed, that there is a de gree of obscurity in these definitions ; but perhaps an ob scurity which is unavoidable, through the imperfection of language to express things of so sublime a nature. And therefore the thing may possibly be better understood, by using a variety of expressions, by a particular consideration of it, as it were, by parts, than by any short definition. It includes the exercise of God's perfections to produce a proper effect, in opposition to their lying eternally dor mant and ineffectual : as his power being eternally with out any act or fruit of that power ; his wisdom eternally ineffectual in any wise production, or prudent disposal of any thing, &c. The manifestation of his internal glory to created understandings. The communication of the in finite fulness of God to the creature. The creature's high esteem of God, love to him, and complacence and joy in him ; and the proper exercises and expressions of these. These at first view may appear to be entirely distinct things : but if we more closely consider the matter, they will all appear to be one thing, in a variety of views and relations. They are all but the emanation of God's glory ; or the excellent brightness and fulness of the divinity dif fused, overflowing, and as it were enlarged; or in one word, existing ad extra. God exercising his perfection to produce a proper effect, is not distinct from the emanation or communication of his fulness: for this is the effect, viz. his fulness communicated, and the producing of this effect is the communication of his fulness ; and there is nothing in this effectual exerting of God's perfection, but the emana tion of God's internal glory. Now God's internal glory, is either in his understand ing or will. The glory or fulness of his understanding, is his knowledge. The internal glory and fulness of God, having its special seat in his will, is his holiness and hap piness. The whole of God's internal good or glory, is in these three things, viz. his infinite knowledge, his infinite virtue or holiness, and his infinite joy and happiness. In deed there are a great many attributes in God, according to our way of conceiving them : but all may be reduced to these; or to their degree, circumstances, and relations. We have no conception of God's power, different from the degree of these things, with a certain relation of them to effects. God's infinity is not properly a distinct kind of * It is used to signify knowledge, or that manifestation and evidence by wbich knowledge is received. Psal. xix. 8. and cxix. 105, 130. Prov. vi. 23. Isa. viii. 20. and ix. 2. and xxix. 18. Dan. v. 11. Eph. v. 13. " But all things that are reproved, are made manifest by the light ; for whatsoever doth make manifest, is light," _c. , It is used to signify virtue, or moral good. Job xxv. 5. Eccl. viii. 1. Isa. good, but only expresses the degree of good there is in him. So God's eternity is not a distinct good ; but is the dura tion of good. His immutability is still the same good, with a negation of change. So that, as I said, the ftlness of the Godhead is the fulness of his understanding, consist ing in his knowledge ; and the fulness of his will consist ing in his virtue and happiness. And therefore, the external glory of God consists in the communication of these. The communication of his know ledge is chiefly in giving the knowledge of himself: for this is the knowledge in which the fulness of God's un derstanding chiefly consists. And thus we see how the manifestation of God's glory to created understandings, and their seeing and knowing it, is not distinct from an emanation or communication of God's fulness, but clearly implied in it. Again, the communication of God's virtue or holiness, is principally in communicating the love of himself. And thus we see how, not only the creature s seeing and knowing God's excellence, but also supremely esteeming and loving him, belongs to the communication of God's fulness. And the communication of God's joy and happiness, consists chiefly in communicating to the creature that happiness and joy which consists in rejoicing in God, and in his glorious excellency ; for in such joy God's own happiness does principally consist. And in these things, knowing God's excellency, loving God for it, and rejoicing in it, and in the exercise and expression of these, consists God's honour and praise ; so that these are clearly implied in that glory of God, which consists in the emanation of his internal glory. And though all these things, which seem to be so various, are signified by that glory, which the Scripture speaks of as the ultimate end of all God's works ; yet it is manifest there is no greater, and no other variety in it, than in the internal and essential glory of God itself. God's internal glory is partly in his understanding, and partly in his will. And this internal glory, as seated in the will of God, im plies both his holiness and his happiness : both are evi dently God's glory, according to the use of the phrase. So that as God's external glory is only the emanation of his internal, this variety necessarily follows. And again, it hence appears that here is no other variety or distinction, but what necessarily arises from the distinct faculties of the creature, to which the communication is made, as created in the image of God : even as having these two faculties of understanding and will. God communicates himself to the understanding of the creature, in giving him the knowledge of his glory ; and to the will of the crea ture, in giving him holiness, consisting primarily in the love of God : and in giving the creature happiness, chiefly con sisting in joy in God. These are the sum of that emana tion of divine fulness called in Scripture, the glory of God. The first part of this glory is called truth, the latter, grace, John i. 14. " We beheld his story, the glory of the only- begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." Thus we see that the great end of God's works, which is so variously expressed in Scripture, is indeed but one ; and this one end is most properly and comprehensively called, the glory of god ; by which name it is most commonly called in Scripture ; and is fitly compared to an effulgence or emanation of light from a luminary. Light is the ex ternal expression, exhibition, and manifestation of the ex cellency of the luminary, of the sun for instance : It is the abundant, extensive emanation and communication of the fulness of the sun to innumerable beings that partake of it. It is by this that the sun itself is seen, and his glory be held, and all other things are discovered : it is by a par ticipation of this communication from the sun, that sur rounding objects receive all their lustre, beauty, and bright ness. It is by this that all nature receives life, comfort, and joy. Light is abundantly used in Scripture to repre sent and signify these three things, knowledge, holiness, and happiness.* What has been said may be sufficient to show, how those things, which are spoken of in Scripture as ultimate v. 20. and xxiv. 23. and lxii. I. Ezek. xxviii. 7, 17. Dan. ii. 31. 1 John. i. 5, &c. And it is abundantly used to signify comfort, .joy, and happiness. Esth.viii. 16. Job xviii. 8. and xxii. 28. and xxix, 3. and xxx. 26. Psal. xxvii. 1. and xcvii. 11. and cxviii. 27. and cxii. 4. Isa. xliii. 16. and 1. 10. and lix. 9. Jer. xiii. 16. Lam. iii. Ezek. xxxii. 8. Amos v. 18. Mic. vii. 8, 9, _c. 120 GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION. Chap. II. ends of God's works, though they may seem at first view to be distinct, are all plainly to be reduced to this one thing, viz. God's internal glory or fulness existing in its emanation. And though God, in seeking this end, seeks the creature's good ; yet therein appears his supreme re gard to himself. The emanation or communication of the divine fulness, consisting in the knowledge of God, love to him, and joy in him, has relation indeed both to God and the creature : but it has relation to God as its fountain, as the thing com municated is something of its internal fulness. The water in the stream is something of the fountain ; and the beams of the sun are something of the sun. And again, they have relation to God as their object : for the knowledge communicated, is the knowledge of God ; and the love communicated, is the love of God; and the happiness communicated, is joy in God. In the creature's knowing, esteeming, loving, rejoicing in, and praising God, the glory of God is both exhibited and acknowledged; his fulness is received and returned. Here is both an emanation and re- manution. The refulgence shines upon and into the crea ture, and is reflected back to the luminary. The beams of glory come from God, are something of God, and are refunded back again to their original. So that the whole is of God, and in God, and to God ; and he is the begin ning, and the middle, and the end. And though it be true that God has respect to the creature in these things ; yet his respect to himself, and to the creature, are not properly a double and divided respect. What has been said, (chap. I. sect. 3, 4.) may be sufficient to show this. Nevertheless, it may not be amiss here briefly to say a few things ; though mostly implied in what has been said already. When God was about to create the world, he had respect to that emanation of his glory, which is actually the conse quence of the creation, both with regard to himself and the creature. He had regard to it as an emanation from him self, a communication of himself, and, as the thing com municated, in its nature returned to himself, as its final term. And he had regard to it also as the emanation was to the creature, and as the thing communicated was in the creature, as its subject. And God had regard to it in this manner, as he had a supreme regard to himself, and value for his own infinite, internal glory. It was this value for himself that caused him to value and seek that his internal glory should_?o«i forth from himself. It was from his value for his glorious perfections of wisdom, righteousness, &c. that he valued the proper exercise and effect of these perfections, in wise and righteous acts and effects. -It was from his infinite value for his internal glory and fulness, that he valued the thing ifscZ/'communicated, which is something of the same, extant in the creature. Thus, because he infinitely values his own glory, consisting in the knowledge of himself, love to himself, and complacence and joy in himself; he there fore valued the image, communication, or participation of these in the creature. And it is because he values himself, that he delights in the knowledge, and love, and joy of the creature ; as being himself the object of this knowledge, love, and complacence. For it is the necessary conse quence of true esteem and love, that we value others' esteem of the same object, and dislike the contrary. For the same reason, God approves of others' esteem and love of himself. Thus it is easy to conceive, how God should seek the good of the creature, consisting in the creature's know ledge and holiness, and even his happiness, from a su preme regard to himself; as his happiness arises from that which is an image and participation of God's own beauty ; and consists in the creature's exercising a supreme regard to God, and complacence in him ; in beholding God's glory, in esteeming and loving it, and rejoicing in it, and in his exercising and testifying love and supreme respect to God : which is the same thing with the creature's ex alting God as his chief good, and making him his supreme end. And though the emanation of God's fulness, intended in the creation, is to the creature as its object ; and though the creature is the subject of the fulness communicated, which is the creature's good ; yet it does not necessarily follow, that even in so doing, God did not make himself. his end. It comes to the sarpe thing. God's respect to the creature's good, and his respect to himself, is not a divided respect ; but both are united in one, as the happi ness of the creature aimed at is happiness in union with himself. The creature is no further happy with this hap piness which God makes his ultimate end, than he becomes one with God. The more happiness the greater union : when the happiness is perfect, the union is perfect. And as the happiness will be increasing to eternity, the union will become more and more strict and perfect ; nearer and more like to that between God the Father and the Son ; who are so united, that their interest is perfectly one. If the happiness of the creature be considered in the whole of the creature's eternal duration, with all the infinity of its progress, and infinite increase of nearness and union to God ; in this view, the creature must be looked upon as united to God in an infinite strictness. If God has respect to something in the creature, which he views as of everlasting duration, and as rising higher and higher through that infinite duration, and that not with constantly diminishing (but perhaps an increasing) celerity ; then he has respect to it, as, in the whole, of infinite height ; though there never will be any particular time when it can be said already to have come to such a height. Let the most perfect union with God be represented by something at an infinite height above us ; and the eternally increasing union of the saints with God, by something that is ascending constantly towards that infinite height, moving upwards with a given velocity ; and that is to continue thus to move to all eternity. God, who views the whole of this eternally increasing height, views it as an infinite height. And if he has respect to it, and makes it his end, as in the whole of it, he has respect to it as an infinite height, though the time will never come when it can be said it has already arrived at this infinite height. God aims at that which the motion or progression which he causes, aims at, or tends to. If there be many things supposed to be so made and appointed, that, by a constant eternal motion, they all tend to a certain centre ; then it appears that he who made them, and is the cause of their motion, aimed at that centre ; that term of their motion, to which they eternally tend, and are eternally, as it were, striving after. And if God be this centre, then God aimed at himself. And herein it appears, that as he is the first author of their being and motion, so he is the last end, the final term, to which is their ultimate tendency and aim. We may judge of the end that the Creator aimed at, in the being, nature, and tendency he gives the creature, by the mark or term which they constantly aim at in their tendency and eternal progress ; though the time will never come, when it can be said it is attained to, in the most absolutely perfect manner. But if strictness of union to God be viewed as thus in finitely exalted ; then the creature must be regarded as nearly and closely united to God. . And viewed thus, their interest must be viewed as one with God's interest ; and so is not regarded properly with a disjunct and sepa rate, but an undivided respect. And as to any -difficulty of reconciling God's not making the creature his ultimate end, with a respect properly distinct from a respect to himself; with his benevolence and free grace, and the creature's obligation to gratitude, the reader must be re ferred to chap. I. sect. 4. obj. 4. where this objection has been considered and answered at large. If by reason of the strictness of the union of a man and his family, their interest may be looked upon as one, how much more so is the interest of Christ and his church,— whose first union in heaven is unspeakably more perfect and exalted, than that of an earthly father and his family if they be considered with regard to their eternal and increasing union ? Doubtless it may justly be esteemed so much one, that it may be sought, not with a distinct and separate, but an undivided respect. It is certain that what God aimed at in the creation of the world, was the good that would be the consequence of the creation, in the whole continuance of the thing created. It is no solid otjjection against God aiming at an in finitely perfect union of the creature with himself, that the Sect. VII. GOD'S LAST END IS BUT ONE. 121 particular time will never come when it can be said, the union is now infinitely perfect. God aims at satisfying justice in the eternal damnation of sinners ; which will be satisfied by their damnation, considered no otherwise than with regard to its eternal duration. But yet there never will come that particular moment, when it can be said, that now justice is satisfied. But if this does not satisfy our modern free-thinkers who do not like the talk about * Our author has produced, from the purest principles of reason, and the fountain of revealed truth, abundant evidence, that God's ultimate and chief end in the creation of the universe, in the operations of providence, and' in the methods of salvation, is his own glory. But we do not think it superfluous to add a few observations on this important subject. 1. A clear and comprehensive view of the universe, or what our author calls " the world," will lead us to observe two grand divisions, which may be termed physical and moral. And though in both the glory of Ood is the chief end, yet this end is not attained by the same means in the moral as in the physical department 2.' By the creation and disposal of the physical part of the universe, the glory of God's natural perfections, as of sovereign wisdom, power, and goodness, is chiefly displayed. But by the creation and government of the moral part, the glory of the moral perfections of Deity, that is, of infinite moral rectitude, or equity, and of sovereign benevolence and mercy, is made to appear. 3. God being an infinite sovereign, controlled by no consideration but in finite rectitude, or a regard to the consistency of his own character ; and a created universe being capable of two forms, and it should seem, for ought that appears to the contrary, of two only, physical and moral ; a full emanation and display ad extra of the moral perfections of Deity could not be made without a moral system in all its capabilities of relation. 4. The physical part of the universe, even including the physical opera tions of intelligent beings, may subsist, it is evident, without requiring any other display of gloky than what is included in sovereign wisdom, power, and goodness; and it is equally plain, that there would De no opportunity of manifesting strict equity, much less mercy, to existent beings, without a moral system. Therefore, 5. If strict or absolute equity, and sovereign mercy, be manifested, a moral system was necessary. To exercise strict, unmixed, or absolute equity, whereby is given to its object what is due to it, (a capacity for moral agency being supposed,) and yet to preserve that object, that is, a moral agent, from being liable to sin, involves a contradiction. For it is the same as to say, a free agent is not free to sin, though fully permitted to follow his own tendencies. And this is the same thing as to say, an accountable creature is not liable to fail; in other words, a moral agent is no moral agent, and a moral system is no moral system. Man would be impeccable, and the very existence of sin impossible. 6. If it be asked, might not the whole of the moral part of the universe have been preserved from sin ? We reply, undoubtedly it might ; if sovereign benevolence had thought proper to interpose, in order to coun teract the exercise of strict, unmixed, and absolute rectitude or equity ; but then it must have been at the expense of eternally concealing the glory of this divine perfection, — absolute rectitude. 7. To permit the creature to sin, and to exercise absolute equity, is the same thing ; in other words, to exercise this glorious perfection, and not to permit the creature to sin, are incompatible ideas. If this perfection be exercised, there is, there can be, no principle belonging to a moral system, which preserves it from being liable to sin. Nor is there any principle be longing to it independent of sovereign benevolence, which is adequate to preserve that liability to sin from actual defection. But to appeal, in the way of objection, to the alternative of sovereign benevolence, which alone can preserve from sin, is the same as to concede what the proposition asserts. 8. Equity, in one view of it, is indeed compatible with the exercise of sovereign benevolence towards the same object, and at the same time. To question this, would be to question God's proper sovereignty, and therefore his right of creating and preserving the universe, and of beatifying any creatures he hath made. For neither of these effects could take place but by sovereign benevolence as a cause. But if sovereign benevolence were not compatible with justice, or equity, in one view of it, God could not be benevolent without being unjust, which is absurd. 9. Yet equity, in another view, stands as a contrast to benevolence. Strict or absolute equity, is that which excludes all sovereign, benevolent influence ; and when moral agents are its object, (their being and natural capacities, or their moral capabilities, being supposed,) the exercise of ab solute equity must necessarily exclude benevolent, sovereign influence. Thus among men we find some resemblance of this abstract but momentous truth. In one view, justice and generosity are compatible ; while one deals justly with another, he may also be additionally generous. But in another view, these are incompatible ; for strict, absolute justice, is the same as justice and nothing more, and therefore must exclude generosity. • 10. Therefore, equity, in the one view, implies the exclusion of i?ijustice ,* and in the other, the exclusion of undeserved favour, or sovereign benevo lent influence. The exercise of rectitude in the former sense, might have been without the permission of sin ; but not so in the latter sense. If per fect absolute rectitude towards a moral system, be made to emanate ad extra, to the full developement of the capabilities of such a system, the permission of sin is not only eqiiitable, but even metaphysically necessary. That is, it involves a contradiction to say, that such a divine perfection satisfying justice with an infinite punishment ; I suppose it will not be denied by any, that God, in glorifying the saints in heaven with eternal felicity, aims to satisfy his, infinite grace or benevolence, by the bestowment of a good infinitely valuable, because eternal : and yet there^ never will come the moment, when it can be said, that now this infinitely valuable good has been actually bestowed.* may be so displayed, or its glory made to appear ad extra, and yet not to permit the existence of moral defect, or, in other words, to actually hinder its existence. 11. The very idea of a moral system, in which the permission of defect is excluded by equity, is one of the most absurd that can be conceived. For it is the same as to say that God was bound in equity not to permit sin, while at the same time he constituted the agent free, and accountable for the exercise of his freedom; and as he has \n fact permitted the introduc tion of sin into the world, such an idea would be the same as to charge infinite perfection with want of equity. 12. We may therefore safely conclude, that the glory of the divine rectitude, towards the intelligent and moral part of the universe, considered as accountable, and to the full extent of its moral capabilities, could not be manifested without the permission of sin. The full exercise of equity must necessarily leave the moral system to its own tendencies and operations. 13. To permit the event of sin, or not to hinder it, implies, that the cause of defection is not in the permitter, but in the permitted ; not in the governor, but the governed. There is in the moral part of the universe a cause, why an event which ought not to take place, will take place, if not hindered. If there be no such cause in the system, how could the event take place on permission 'f If it be said. There is a chance it may not ake place, and there is a chance of the contrary— it is but fair to ask. Is this chance something which has a cause, or has it no cause ? If the latter, the concession itself reduces chance to a mere nothing. For a contingent event, as the operation of chance is supposed to be, without any en use, is a meta physical impossibility. If the former ; what is the cause of what the ob jector calls chance ? 'is it something external, or internal ? What is its nature and character? To say that liberty of indifference, or a self-determining power, is the chance which requires no preceding cause to produce the event, is to contradict absolute demonstration, if ever there was a meta physical demonstration of any subject ; as our author has abundantly shown m his " Essay on the Freedom of the Will." 14. It is therefore inaccurate and unintelligible language to say, that either chance, liberty of indifference, or a self-determining power, independent of any antecedent cause, is adequate to account for the event of sin, or a deterioration of a moral system. God, therefore, permitting, there is an inherent adequate cause of failure, distinct from divine causation. What this cause is, and what is its nature, has been shown and proved in a former note. 15. Permission is an act of equity ; or, it is the exercise of rectitude, to the exclusion of benevolent influence ; whether we regard that influence as preventing the event of sin, or as delivering from its power. Sovereign benevolence prevents the fall of angels; and it delivers, restores, and eternally saves a goodly number of the human fallen race. Without the permission of sin, restoring benevolence, or the exercise of mercy, would have been impossible ; and consequently, the glory of that perfection, which can be fully displayed only by its exercise towards the miserable, would have been eternally concealed. 16. If, therefore, equity be a glorious attribute of God, its emanation and exercise must be glorious. But the exercise of equity, in the strict sense, includes the permission of sin, as before proved. And, here we may add, if not to hinder be an exercise of strict rectitude, the continued exist ence of sin is not inconsistent with it. 17. It will be allowed by every one, that, as mercy itself is a glorious attribute, so is the exercise of it a glorious thing. But this would have been impossible, if sin had no existence ; nor could sin have had existence, if not permitted to exist ; and sin could not have been permitted, if strict equity had not been exercised ; nor could strict equity have been exercised, if the exercise of preventing sovereign benevolence had not been excluded, in those instances wherein moral defect actually took place. COROLLARIES. 18. The ultimate and chief end of God in the creation and government of the moral part of the universe, is the glory of his moral perfections ; which are virtually included in strict rectitude and sovereign benevolence. 19. If strict rectitude be exercised towards the degenerate part of the system, the restoration of those who are the objects of it is not possible; that is, to suppose it possible involves a contradiction. Therefore, 20. Ik any degenerate moral agent be rest ored.it must necessarily be by the exercise of that sovereign benevolence which we call mercy. 21. " Behold therefore the goodness and severity of God! onthemwho fell, severity ; but toward thee goodness, if thou continue in his goodness; otherwise thou also shalt be cutoff." Goodness and severity are but other words for sovereign benevolence and strict equity, the glory of which is abundantly conspicuous in the various divine dispensations towards tbe children of men, even in this life; but will appear still more transcendent in the day when God shall judge the world in righteousness, and in the day Of ETERNITY. — W. DISSERTATION CONCERNING THE NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE. CHAP. I. Showing wherein the essence of true virtue consists. Whatever controversies and variety of opinions there are about the nature of virtue, yet all excepting, some sceptics, who deny any real difference between virtue and vice, mean by it something beautiful, or rather some kind of beauty, or excellency. It is not all beauty that is called virtue ; for instance, not the beauty of a building, of a flower, or of the rainbow ; but some beauty belonging to beings that have perception and will. It is not all beauty of mankind that is called virtue; for instance, not the external beauty of the countenance, or shape, gracefulness of motion, or harmony of voice : but it is a beauty that has its original seat in the mind. But yet perhaps not every thing that may be called a beauty of mind, is properly called virtue. There is a beauty of understanding and speculation ; there is something in the ideas and concep tions of great philosophers and. statesmen, that may be called beautiful ; which is a different thing from what is most commonly meant by virtue. But virtue is the beauty of those qualities and acts of the mind, that are of a moral nature, i. e. such as are at tended with desert or worthiness of praise or blame. Things of this sort, it is generally agreed, so far as I know, do not belong merely to speculation ; but to the disposition and will, or (to use a general word, I suppose commonly well understood) to the heart. Therefore, I suppose, I shall not depart from the common opinion, when I say, that virtue is the beauty of the qualities and exercises of the heart, or those actions which proceed from them. So that when it is inquired, what is the nature of true virtue? this is the same as to inquire, what that is, which renders any habit, disposition, or exercise of the heart truly beautiful? I use the phrase true virtue, and speak of things truly beautiful, because I suppose it will generally be allowed, that there is a distinction to be made between some things which are truly virtuous, and others which only seem to be so, through a partial and imperfect view of things : that some actions and dispositions appear beautiful, if con sidered partially and superficially, or with regard to some things belonging to them, and in some of their circum stances and tendencies, which would appear otherwise in a more extensive and comprehensive view, wherein they are seen clearly in their whole nature, and the extent of their connexions in the universality of things. There is a general and particular beauty. By a particu lar beauty, I mean that by which a thing appears beautiful when considered only with regard to its connexion with, and tendency to, some particular things within a limited, and as it were a private, sphere. And a general beauty is that by which a thing appears beautiful when viewed most perfectly, comprehensively, and universally, with regard to all its tendencies, and its connexions with every thing to which it stands related. The former may be without and against the latter. As a few notes in a tune, taken only by themselves, and in their relation to one another, may be harmonious ; which, when considered with respect to all the notes in the tune, or the entire series of sounds they are connected with, may be very discordant, and disagree able. That only, therefore, is what I mean by true virtue, which, belonging to the heart of an intelligent being, is beautiful by a general beauty, or beautiful in a compre hensive view, as it is in itself, and as related to every thing with which it stands connected. And therefore, when we are inquiring concerning the nature of true virtue — wherein this true and general beauty of the heart does most essentially consist — this is my answer to the in quiry : True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to being in general. Or perhaps, to speak more accurately, it is that consent, propensity, and union of heart to being in general, which is immediately exercised in a general good will. The things before observed respecting the nature of true virtue, naturally lead us to such a notion of it. If it has its seat in the heart, and is the general goodness and beauty of the disposition and its exercise, in the most compre hensive view, considered with regard to its universal tendency, and as related to every thing with which it stands connected ; what can it consist in, but a consent and good will to being in general '( Beauty does not consist in dis cord and dissent, but in consent and agreement. And if every intelligent being is some way related to being in general, and is a part of the universal system of existence; and so stands in connexion with the whole ; what can its general and true beauty be, but its union and consent with the great whole ? If any such thing can be supposed as a union of heart to some particular being, or number of beings, disposing it to benevolence to a private circle or system of beings, which are but a small part of the whole ; not implying a tendency to an union with the great system, and not at all inconsistent with enmity towards being in general ; this I suppose not to be of the nature of true virtue ; although it may in some respects be good, and may appear beautiful in a confined and contracted view of things. — But of this more afterwards. It is abundantly plain by the Holy Scriptures, and gene rally allowed, not only by christian divines, but by the more considerable Deists, that virtue most essentially con sists in love. And I suppose, it is owned by the" most considerable writers, to consist in general love of benevo lence, or kind affection : though it seems to me the mean- Chap. I. CONCERNING THE ESSENCE OF TRUE VIRTUE. 123 ing of some in this affair is not sufficiently explained ; which perhaps occasions some error or confusion in dis courses on this subject. When I say, true virtue consists in love to being in general, I shall not be likely to be understood, that no one act of the mind or exercise of love is of the nature of true virtue, but what has being in general, or the great system of universal existence, for its direct and immediate object : so that no exercise of love, or kind affection, to any one par ticular being, that is but a small part of this whole, has any thing of the nature of true virtue. But, that the na ture of true virtue consists in a disposition to benevolence towards being in general ; though from such a disposition may arise exercises of love to particular beings, as objects are presented, and occasions arise. No wonder, that he who is of a generally benevolent disposition, should be more disposed than another to have his heart moved with benevolent affection to particular persons, with whom he is acquainted and conversant, and from whom arise the greatest and most frequent occasions for exciting his be nevolent temper. But my meaning is, that no affections towards particular persons or beings are of the nature of true virtue, but such as arise from a generally benevolent temper, or from that habit or frame of mind, wherein con sists a disposition to love being in general. And perhaps it is needless for ine to give notice to my readers, that when I speak of an intelligent being having a heart united and benevolently disposed to being in general, I thereby mean intelligent being in general. Not inanimate things, or beings that have no perception or will ; which are not properly capable objects of benevolence. Love is commonly distinguished into love of benevo lence, and love of complacence. Love of benevolence is that affection or propensity of the heart to any being, which causes it to incline to its well-being, or disposes it to desire and take pleasure in its happiness. And if I mistake not, it is agreeable to the common opinion, that beauty in the object is not always the ground of this propensity ; but that there may be a disposition to the welfare of those that are not considered as beautiful, unless mere existence be accounted a beauty. And benevolence or goodness in the Divine Being is generally supposed, not only to be prior to the beauty of many of its objects, but to their existence; so as to be the ground both of their existence and their beauty, rather than the foundation of God's benevolence ; as it is supposed that it is God's goodness which moved him to give them both being and beauty. So that if all virtue primarily consists in that affection of heart to being, which is exercised in benevolence, or an inclination to its good, then God's virtue is so extended as to include a propensity not only to being actually existing, and actually beautiful, but to possible being, so as to incline him to give a being beauty and happiness. What is commonly called love of complacence, presup poses beauty. For it is no other than delight in beauty ; or complacence in the person or being beloved for his beauty. If virtue be the beauty of an intelligent being, and virtue consists in love, then it is plain inconsistence, to suppose that virtue primarily consists in any love to its object for its beauty ; either in a love of complacence, which is delight in a being for its beauty, or in a love of be nevolence, that has the beauty of its object for its founda tion. For that would be to suppose, that the beauty of in telligent beings primarily consists in love to beauty; or that their virtue first of all consists in their love to virtue. Which is an inconsistence, and going in a circle. Because it makes virtue, or beauty of mind, the foundation or first motive of that love wherein virtue originally consists, or wherein the very first virtue consists ; or, it supposes the first virtue to be the consequence and effect of virtue. Which rqakes the first virtue both the ground and the con sequence, both cause and effect of itself. Doubtless virtue primarily consists in something else besides any effect or consequence of virtue. If virtue consises primarily in love to virtue, then virtue, the thing loved, is the love of virtue : so that virtue must consist in the love of the love of virtue 9 I say, " in proportion to the degree of existence," because one being may have more existence than another, as he may be greater than another. That which is great, has more existence, and is further from nothing, than that which is little. One being may have every thing positive belonging to it. or every thing which goes to its positive existence (in opposition to — and so on in infinitum. For there is no end of going back in a circle. We never come to any beginning or foundation ; it is without beginning, and hangs on nothing. —Therefore, if the essence of virtue, or beauty of mind, lies in love, or a disposition to love, it must primarily con sist in something different both from complacence, which is a delight in beauty, and also from any benevolence that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. Because it is absurd to say, that virtue is primarily and first of all the consequence of itself; which makes virtue primarily prior to itself. Nor can virtue primarily consist in gratitude ; or one being's benevolence to another for his benevolence to him. Because this implies the same inconsistence. For it sup poses a benevolence prior to gratitude, which is the cause of gratitude. The first benevolence cannot be gratitude. Therefore there is room left for no other conclusion, than that the primary object of virtuous love is being, simply considered ; or that true virtue primarily consists, not in love to any particular beings, because of their virtue or beauty, nor in gratitude, because they love us ; but in a propensity and union of heart to being simply considered ; exciting absolute benevolence, if I may so cail it, to being in general. I say, true virtue primarily consists in this. For I am far from asserting, that there is no true virtue in any other love than this absolute benevolence. But I would express what appears to me to be the truth, on this subject, in the following particulars. The first object of a virtuous benevolence is being, simply considered : and if being, simply considered, be its object, then being in general is its object ; and what it has an ultimate propensity to, is the highest good of being in general. And it will seek the good of every individual being unless it be conceived as not consistent with the highest good of being in general. In which case the good of a particular being, or some beings, may be given up for the sake of the highest good of being in general. And particularly, if there be any being statedly and irreclaim- ably opposite, and an enemy to being in general, then consent and adherence to being in general will induce the truly virtuous hdart to forsake that enemy, and to op pose it. Further, if being, simply considered, be the first object of a truly virtuous benevolence, then that object who has most of being, or has the greatest share of existence, other things being equal, so far as such a being is exhibited to our faculties, will have the greatest share of the propensity and benevolent affections ofthe heart. I say, " other things being equal," especially because there is a secondary object of virtuous benevolence, that I shall take notice of pre sently, which must be considered as the ground or motive to a purely virtuous benevolence. Pure benevolence in its first exercise is nothing else but being's uniting con sent, or propensity to being ; and inclining to the general highest good, and to each being, whose welfare is consistent with the highest general good, in proportion to the degree of existence,* understand, " other things being equal." The second object of a virtuous propensity of heart is be nevolent being. A secondary ground of pure benevolence is virtuous benevolence itself in its object. When any one under the influence of general benevolence, sees another being possessed of the like general benevolence, this at taches his heart to him, and draws forth greater love to him, than merely his having existence : because so far as the being beloved has love to the being in general, so far his own being is, as it were, enlarged ; extends to, and in some sort comprehends, being in general : and therefore, he that is governed by love to being in general, must of ne cessity have complacence in him, and the greater degree of benevolence to him, as it were out of gratitude to him for his love to general existence, that his own heart is extended and united to, and so looks on its interest as its own. It is because his heart is thus united to being in general, that he looks on a benevolent propensity to being in general, wherever he sees it, as the beauty of the being in whom it defect) in a higher degree than another; or a greater capacity and power, greater understanding, every faculty and every positive quality in a higher degree. An arch-angel must be supposed to have more existence, and to be every way further removed from non-entity, than a worm. 124 THE NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE. is ; an excellency that renders him worthy of esteem, com placence, and the greater good will.— But several things may be noted more particularly concerning this secondary ground of a truly virtuous love. 1. That loving a being on this ground necessarily arises from pure benevolence to being in general, and comes to the same thing. For he that has a simple and pure good will to general existence, must love that temper in others, that agrees and conspires with itself. A spirit of consent to being must agree with consent to being. That which truly and sincerely seeks the good of others, must approve of and love that which joins with him in seeking the good of others. 2. This secondary ground of virtuous love, is the thing wherein true moral or spiritual beauty primarily consists. Yea, spiritual beauty consists wholly in this, and in the various qualities and exercises of mind which proceed from it, and the external actions which proceed from these internal qualities and exercises. And in these things con sists all true virtue, viz. in this love of being, and the qualities and acts which arise from it. 3. As all spiritual beauty lies in these virtuous prin ciples and acts, so it is primarily on this account they are beautiful, viz. that they imply consent and union with being in general. This is the primary and most essential beauty of every thing that can justly be called by the name of virtue, or is any moral excellency in the eye of one that has a perfect view of things. I say, "the •primary and most essential beauty," because there is a secondary and inferior sort of beauty ; which I shall take notice of afterwards. 4. This spiritual beauty, which is but a secondary ground of virtuous benevolence, is the ground, not only of benevolence, but complacence, and is the primary ground of the latter ; that is, when the complacence is truly vir tuous. Love to us in particular, and kindness received, * In this masterly Dissertation on the nature of virtue, our author enters at once on his oton definition of the term, and explains very clearly what he means by true virtue. His views, in some respects, are consider ably different from those which are most current among ethical writers; and, probably, for want of some explanations, whereby the different defi nitions adopted by others may be accounted for, his invaluable treatise has not only been underrated, but even, by some, unreasonably opposed. We shall here offer a few remarks, which, perhaps, may tend to cast some light on the subject in general, as well as to relieve our author's definition from unfair imputations. 1. Virtue, if we regard the use of the term Cape-rn) among the Greeks, seems to have been appropriated as much to the idea of martial courage, as the English term is appropriated to that of female chastity. Not that it was used exclusively in the former case, any more than in the latter. It often signifies power, energy, efficacy, and excellence. But by moral writers both ancient and modern, it has been unanimously adopted to represent a very general moral idea. — It would be easy to produce a great number of definitions from moralists and divines; but this is neither necessary, nor does it comport with our present purpose. 2. If we mistake not, there is no just definition of virtue, wbich is not reducible to this general one : Virtue is a laudable mean of real hap piness. Cicero, indeed, says of it, that it is " affectio animi eonstans, con- veniensque, laudabiles efficiens eos, in quibus est, ct ipsa per se, sua sponte, separata etiam utilitate, laudabihs." (Tuscul. Quaest Lib. iv. § 15.) But virtue being laudable from its very nature, independently of any advantageous result, does not hinder it from "being " a laudable meanot real happiness." 3. Now happiness being the uniform and voluntary end of intellectual existence, a desire of it being inseparable from our nature ; we become liable to err, not only by adopting wrong means for accomplishing the end we propose to ourselves, hut also by forming a false estimate of the nature of happiness, or the end itself If the happiness be not real but imaginery, in the contemplation ofthe agent, however well adapted the means may be in order to attain it, they deserve not the epithet virtuous. 4. To discover the nature of true happiness, the light of wisdom is requi site ; and while desire is blind, false estimates will be made. But every one thinks himself wise and prudent enough to prescribe his own happiness, till such folly be shown him by the wisdom which is from above ; and he who supposes himself adequate to fix the end, cannot be very diffident about the means to be employed. 5. Hence there is room for as many representations of virtue, as there are kinds of happiness which men think to be real ; in addition to as many means employed to accomplish their proposed end, as they judge to be laudable. 6. From these preliminary remarks, it appears, that the nature and real character of virtue, must arise from the nature of the end proposed, and of the means employed for securing it We shall now attempt to illustrate the ground of numerous representations of virtue, by comparison. 7. Let the different kinds of happiness which we propose to ourselves, whether those which have been classified by moral writers, or any others, be represented by so many concentric circles. For instance, let happiness be considered as personal and relative, private and public, domestic and national, temporal and eternal, or the like ; and for every species of hap piness let there be a corresponding circle drawn. Let the filling up of that circle express the virtue requisite to attain the happiness thus represented. 8. Suppose, for example, that health, friendship, domestic unanimity, national prosperity, the welfare of the "human race, and our individual conformity to God in his moral excellence through eternal ages, or the happiness implied in these respectively, be represented by the concentric circles above mentioned. Then, the happiness implied in health, a small circle, will be filled by corresponding virtues, when the end is sought by laudable means ; such as temperance, moderation, chastity, government of tbe passions, &c. The circle representing the happiness implied in friend- but this is the primary ob- may be a secondary ground : jective foundation of it. 5. It must be noted, that the degree of the amiableness of true virtue, primarily consisting in consent, and a be nevolent propensity of heart to being in general, is not in the simple proportion of the degree of benevolent affection seen, but in a proportion compounded of the greatness of the benevolent being, or the degree of being and the de gree of benevolence. One that loves being in general, will necessarily value good will to being in general, wherever he sees it. But if he sees the same benevolence in two beings, he will value it more in two, than in one only. Because it is a greater thing, more favourable to being in general, to have two beings to favour it, than only one of them. For there is more being that favours being: both together having more being than one alone. So, if one being be as great as two, has as much existence as both together, and has the same degree of general benevolence, it is more favourable to being in general, than if there were general benevolence in a being that had but half that share of existence. As a large quantity of gold, with the same quality, is more valuable than a small quantity of the same metal. 6. It is impossible that any one should truly relish this beauty, consisting in general benevolence, who has not that temper himself. I have observed, that if any being is possessed of such a temper, he will unavoidably be pleased with the same temper in another. And it may in like manner be demonstrated, that it is such a spirit, and no thing else, which will relish such a spirit. For if a being, destitute of benevolence, should love benevolence to being in general, it would prize and seek that for which it had no value. For how should one love and value a disposition to a thing, or a tendency to promote it, and for that very reason, when the thing itself is what he is regardless of, and has no value for, nor desires to have promoted.* ship will be filled by corresponding virtues, when the end is sought, as before, by laudable means ; such as benevolence, fidelity, prudence, sym pathy, &c. The circle of domestic happiness is filled with the virtues of kindness, meekness, patience, industry, economy, &c. That ef national prosperity by diligence in business, honesty, justice, truth, liberality, con scientious submission, fortitude, real patriotism, &c. The circle represent ing the welfare of the human race, as the common offspring of one pro genitor, and who are regarded by the Supreme Parent as the children of one family, is filled by the virtues of philanthropy, expansive benevolent zeal, self-denial, public spirit, passive courage, &tc And the circle of that happiness which is implied in our individual conformity to God's moral excellence ; in other words, that happiness which is ultimate and supreme, is filled by nothing short of supreme love to God, or, in language more philosophically accurate, consent of will to being in general — benevolent attachment to universal being. 9. Now who can question whether temperance, fidelity, meekness, honesty and liberality, philanthropy and public spirit, should be ranked among the virtues ? And who can doubt that they are calculated to secure the happiness implied in health, friendship, national prosperity, and the welfare of the human race, respectively ? And yet, if we exclude the dis- position which is required to fill the largest circle — benevolent attachment to universal being — which of these virtues may not an atlieist actually possess? Nay, may not an atheist possess them all? For may he not promote his health by temperance, moderation, chastity, and the like ? May he not exercise friendly benevolence, fidelity, prudence, sympathy, and similar virtues ? Have not atheists been great patriots, if by pa triotism we mean a supreme regard for the prosperity and glory of the nation to which they belonged, manifested by severe studies, by the light ning and thunder of their eloquence, the fatigues of war, and a willingness to shed the last drop of their blood in defence of their country ? Nay more, may not an atheist possess the virtues of generous philanthropy, and, to a certain extent, of benevolent zeal for the welfare of mankind in general, expressed by an attempt to remove their ignominious chains, to promote the civilization of savage nations whom he has never seen, to alleviate the sufferings and to enhance the comforts of all mankind ? 10. Far be it from us to suppose that atheists are favourable to virtue, even in these inferior acceptations of the term. The reverse is abundantly evident. But this is what we assert, that such virtues as those above mentioned, when exclusive of what our author contends for, are what an atheist may possess, without inconsistency ; and that they have no moral worth, no direct connexion, either with the complacency of God in them, or with the ultimate happiness of the agent. However attentive a man may be to practise virtues in subservience to his health, while he repels those of ; friendship ; or however observant of the virtues of friendship, while he repels others which are conducive to domestic, national, and universal happiness ; his virtues, if the name be retained, are those of a bad character. Some have been conspicuous and zealous patriots, while determined foes to philanthropy and general good will to mankind as such. And bow many have fought with the most patriotic zeal and courage in the field of honour, though tyrants at home, and in private life trampling on those virtues which constitute a good husband, a good father, a good master, a good neighbour, a good friend, or a good any thing. In short, were a man to " give all his goods to feed the poor, and his body to be burned," out of zeal to promote some public good, yet without love to God, without benevolent attachment to universal being, he is morally nothing or worse than nothing. 11. What are called virtues, without a disposition to embrace uni versal being and excellence, are, morally considered, but lifeless images. To compare them to a series of decimal figures, which, however increased, will never amount to an unit of moral worth, is to place them in too favour able a view ; they are more like cyphers. But let these unmeaning cyphers be preceded by a figure, let these images have an informing and invigorat ing principle, let these dry bones have the spirit of life in them, and they Chap. II. HOW LOVE RESPECTS DIFFERENT BEINGS. 125 CHAP. II. Showing how that love, wherein true virtue consists, respects the Divine Being and created beings. From what has been said, it is evident, that true virtue must chiefly consist in love to God ; the Being of beings, infinitely the greatest and best. This appears, whether we consider the primary or secondary ground of virtuous love. It was observed, that the first objective ground of that love, wherein true virtue consists, is being simply considered : and, as a necessary consequence of this, that being who has the greatest share of universal existence has proportionably the greatest share of virtuous benevolence, so far as such a being is exhibited to the faculties of our minds, other things being equal. But God has infinitely the greatest share of existence. So that all other being, even the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison of the Divine Being. And if we consider the secondary ground of love, or moral excellency, the same thing will appear. For as God is in finitely the greatest Being, so he is allowed to be infinitely the most beautiful and excellent : and all the beauty to be found throughout the whole creation, is but the reflection of the diffused beams of that Being who hath an infinite fulness of brightness and glory. God's beauty is infinitely more valuable than that of all other beings upon both those accounts mentioned, viz. the degree of his virtue, and the greatness of his being, possessed of this virtue. And God has sufficiently exhibited himself, both in his being, and his infinite greatness and excellency : and has given us faculties, whereby we are capable of plainly discovering bis immense superiority to all other beings, in these respects. Therefore, he that has true virtue, consisting in benevolence to being in general, and in benevolence to virtuous being, must necessarily have a supreme love to God, both of benevolence and complacence. And all true virtue must radically and essentially, and, as it were, summarily, con sist in this. Because God is not only infinitely greater and more excellent than all other being,'but he is the head of the universal system of existence ; the foundation and fountain of all being and all beauty ; from whom all is perfectly derived, and on whom all is most absolutely and perfectly dependent; of whom, and through whom, and to whom is all being and all perfection ; and whose being and beauty are, as it were, the sum and comprehension of all existence and excellence : much more than the sun is .the fountain and summary. comprehension of all the light and brightness of the day. if it should be objected, that virtue consists primarily in will acquire a moral excellence ; they will deserve the name of real VIRTUES. 12. Some have defined virtue, by calling it, "a tendency to ultimate hap piness." If the meaning of this definition be, " a tendency to God, in whom our ultimate happiness is found," it may be admitted; otherwise, it seems not admissible on many accounts. Tendency may be considered as either voluntary or involuntary. In the first place, let us suppose it to be volun tary. We then observe, that it is not rational, nor even compatible with common sense, to say, that virtue is a voluntary tendency to a quality of our own minds, as happiness evidently is. For happiness, from its very nature, is a relative state, or quality of mind, which is the result of enjoy ing an object suited to our wants. And to desire ultimate happiness, with out including the object of choice from whence happiness results, is the same as to seek happiness in nothing. If it be said, that happiness itself is the object sought; then virtue consists in a voluntary tendency to seek happiness in happiness, which is absurd. 13. Ultimate happiness has been defined, " the durable possession of per fect good." If this be a just statement, which few or none will question, what*is the perfect good possessed? If it be answered, The Supreme Being ; to this there is no objection. But if it be said, tbe ultimate happi ness itself is the perfect good enjoyed ; then the happiness to which the choice is directed is both cause and effect at the same time. Both the thing enjoyed and the enjoyment itself are the same thing. Which is no less ab surd than for a man to assert, that the stock of a tree and tbe fruit on its branches, are the same thing; or that his relish of food is the same as the food itself. A tendency to happiness resulting from no object of that ten dency, is the same thing as a tendency to no nappiness. In other words, according to this definition, supposing the tendency to be voluntary, virtue is a desire of ultimate happiness. And this will reduce it to another ab surdity ; for, as a desire of ultimate happiness is an inseparable property of intelligent beings, the most vicious being in existence is virtuous. These consequences, however just, will not be thought very extraordinary, when compared with the following declarations. " The following seems to be at present the true moral state ofthe world : In every moral agent the number of virtuous actions greatly exceed that of vicious ones. — In by far the greater number of moral agents, and even amongst those who are considered as most vicious and profligate, the number of virtuous affections and habits greatly preponderates over the vicious ones. A character in which there is a preponderance of vice, is very rarely, if ever, to be met with." (Belsham's Elements, p. 400. J And, to advance one step further in this hopeful way, as this desire belongs to all intelligent beings alike, all intelligent beings are alike virtuous / benevolence, but that our fellow-creatures, and not God, seem to be the most proper objects of our benevolence ; inasmuch as our goodness extendelh not to God, and we cannot be profitable to him.— To this I answer, 1. A benevolent propensity of heart is exercised, not only in seeking to promote the happiness of the being towards whom it is exercised, but also in rejoicing in his happiness. Even as gratitude for benefits received will not only excite endeavours to requite the kindness we receive, by equally benefiting our benefactor, but also if he be above any need of us, or we have nothing to bestow, and are unable to repay his kindness, it will dispose us to rejoice in his prosperity. 2. Though we are not able to give any thing to God, which we have of our own, independently ; yet we may be the instruments of promoting his glori/, in which he takes a true and proper delight.*— 'Whatever influence such an objection may seem to have on the minds of some, yet is there any that owns the being of a God, who will deny that any benevolent affection is due lo God, and proper to be exercised towards him ? If no benevolence is to be ex ercised towards God, because we cannot profit him, then, for the same reason, neither is gratitude to be exercised to wards him for his benefits to us ; because we cannot re quite him. But where is the man, who believes a God and a providence, that will say this ? There seems to be an inconsistence in some writers on morality, in this respect, that they do not wholly exclude a regard to the Deity out of their schemes of morality, but yet mention it so slightly, that they leave me room and reason to suspect they esteem it a less important and sub ordinate part of true morality ; and insist on benevolence to the created system, in such a manner as would naturally lead one to suppose they look upon that as by far the most important and essential thing in their scheme. But why should this be ? If true virtue consists partly in a respect to God, then doubtless it consists chiefly in it. If true morality requires that we should have some regard, some benevolent affection to our Creator, as well as to his crea tures, then doubtless it requires the first regard to be paid to him ; and that he be every way the supreme object ot our benevolence. If his being above our reach, and be yond all capacity of being profited by us, does not hinder, but that nevertheless he is the proper object of our love, then it does not hinder that he should be loved according to his dignity, or according to the degree in which he has those things wherein worthiness of regard consists, so far as we are capable of it. But this worthiness, none will deny, consists in these two things, greatness and moral goodness. And those that own a God, do not deny that he 14. In reality, a mere desire of ultimate happiness is no virtue, has nothing laudable in it, but is a mere instinct of intellectual nature, and be longs alike to the best and the worst of intelligent beings. But virtue con sists in the choice of, or a disposition to choose, laudable means in order to arrive at this end. A bad man in his choice of objects, or a vicious choice itself, aims at ultimate happiness ; but the means are not laudable, and this wrong choice of means constitutes the very essence of his vice. 15. If it be said, that virtue is a tendency to ultimate self-enjoyment, as constituting happiness ; then it follows that self is the perfect good desired. And then every one is himself all-sufficient to constitute his own happiness. Let any rational person judge, whether this be not a definition of sordid vice, rather than of virtue ; and whether such a disposition would not be a ten dency to insubordination, anarchy, and confusion, rather than to happiness — the very temper of an apostate spirit. 16. If it be said, moreover, that " a tendency to ultimate happiness," does not refer to the will, desire, or choice ; but expresses any thing which in fact tends to ultimate happiness. This leads us to suppose secondly, that tbe tendency is involuntary. It seems, then, on this supposition, that the means employed to acquire ultimate happiness need not be laudable. This is the genuine result of that account of virtue which is here animad verted upon ; and which the abettors of it are forced to admit The doc trine of " intrinsic merit or demerit of actions, independent on their conse quences," they call an " absurd supposition." (Belsham's Elements, p. $19, 372, 373.) 17. It seems, then, we are all bound to be virtuous at our peril, and yet we must wait the result of all our actions, before we can know what is vir tuous and what is not For if virtue and vice have no intrinsic character of good or evil, but actions, affections, habits, or characters, are either good or bad from their ultimate consequences ; then we must wait for those con sequences, as the only expositors of virtue and vice. 18. Can any thing more be necessary, in order to show the absurdity of such a notion of virtue ? Happiness, it is allowed, is a consequent, of which virtue is the antecedent. But what is the moralnature of this antecedent r Is it any thing good, beautiful, or laudable per se? No, say they ; it has no nature beside tendency ; wbich has no intrinsic merit or demerit ; and consequently, that which has no moral nature is a moral nothing ; that is, virtue is a moral nothing, or nothing moral. And whether this character of virtue be not totally distinctfrom the distant of right reason, philosophic accuracy, common sense, and christian piety, let the reader judge. — w. * As was shown at large in the former treatise, on God's end in creating the world, Chap. I. sect 4. whither I must refer the reader for a more full answer to this objection. 12G THE NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE. infinitely exceeds all other beings in these. If the Deity is to be looked upon as within that system of beings which properly terminates our benevolence, or belonging to that whole, certainly he is to be regarded as the head of the sys tem, and the chief o^xt of it : if it be proper to call him a vart, who is infinitely more than all the rest, and in com parison of whom, and without whom, all the rest are no thing, either as to beauty or existence. And therefore cer tainly, unless we will be atheists, we must allow that true virtue does primarily and most essentially consist in a supreme love to God ; and that where this is wanting, there can be no true virtue. But this being a matter of the highest importance, I shall say something further to make it plain, that love to God is most essential to true virtue; and that no benevolence whatsoever to other beings can be of the nature of true virtue without it. And therefore, let it be supposed, that some beings, by natural instinct, or by some other means, have a deter mination of mind to union and benevolence to a particu lar person, or private system,* which is but a small part of the universal system of being : and that this disposition or determination of mind is independent on, or not subordi nate to, benevolence to being m general. Such a deter mination, disposition, or affection of mind is not of the na ture of true virtue. This is allowed by all with regard to self-love ; in which good will is confined to one single person only. And there are the same reasons why any other private affection or good will, though extending to a society of persons in dependent of, and unsubordinate to, benevolence to the universality, should not be esteemed truly virtuous. For, notwithstanding it extends to a number of persons, which taken together are more than a single person, yet the whole falls infinitely short of the universality of existence ; and if put in the scales with it, has no greater proportion to it than a single person. However, it may not be amiss more particularly to con sider the reasons why private affections, or good will limited to a particular circle of beings, falling infinitely short of the whole existence, and not dependent upon it, nor subordinate to general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue. 1. Such a private affection, detached from general bene volence, and independent on it, as the case may be, will be against general benevolence, or of a contrary tendency ; and will set a person against general existence, and make him an enemy to it. As it is with selfishness, or when a man is governed by a regard to his own private interest, independent of regard to the public good, such a temper exposes a man to act the part of an enemy to the public. As, in every case wherein his private interest seems to clash with the public ; or in all those cases wherein such things are presented to his view, that suit his personal ap petites or private inclinations, but are inconsistent with the good ofthe public. On which account, a selfish, con- tracted,'tnarrow spirit is generally abhorred, and is esteem ed base and sordid. • But if a man'." affection takes in half a dozen more, and his regards extend so far beyond his own single person as to take in his children and family ; or if it reaches further still to a larger circle, but falls in finitely short of the universal system, and is exclusive of being in general ; his private affection exposes him to the same thing, viz. to pursue the interest of its particular ob ject in opposition to general existence : which is certainly contrary to the tendency of true virtue ; yea, directly con trary to the main and most essential thing in its nature, the thing on account of which chiefly its nature and tendency is good. For the chief and most essential good that is in virtue, is its favouring being in general. Now certainly, if private affection to a limited system had in itself the essential nature of virtue, it would' be impossible that it should, in any circumstance whatsoever, have a tendency and inclination directly contrary to that wherein the essence of virtue chiefly consists. 2. Private affection, if not subordinate to general affec- * It may be here noted, that when hereafter I use such a phrase as pri vate system of being, or others similar, I thereby intend any system or society of beings that contains but a small part of the great system, com prehending the universality of existence. I think that may well be called tion, is not only liable, as the case may he, to issue in enmity to being in general, but has a terutency to it as the case certainly is, and must necessarily be. For he that is influenced by private affection, not subordinate to a regard to being in general, sets up its particular or limited object above being in general ; and this most naturally tends to enmity against the latter, which is by right the great supreme, ruling, and absolutely sovereign object of our regard. Even as the setting up another prince as supreme in any kingdom, distinct from the lawful sovereign, natu rally tends to enmity against the lawful sovereign. Wherever it is sufficiently published, that the supreme, in finite, and all-comprehending Being requires a supreme regard to himself; and insists upon it, that our respect to him should universally rule in our hearts, and every other affection be subordinate to it, and this under the pain of his displeasure, (as we must suppose it is in the world of intelligent creatures, if God maintains a moral kingdom in the world,) then a consciousness of our having chosen and set up another prince to rule over us, and subjected our hearts to him, and continuing in such an act, must un avoidably excite enmity, and fix us in a stated opposition to the Supreme Being. This demonstrates, that affection to a private society or system, independent on general be nevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For this would be absurd, that it has the nature and essence of true virtue, and yet at the same time has a tendency oppo site to true virtue. 3. Not only would affection to a private system, un subordinate to a regard to being in general, have a ten dency to oppose the supreme object of virtuous affection, as its effect and consequence, but would become itself an opposition to that object. Considered by itself in its na ture, detached from its effects, it is an instance of great opposition to the rightful supreme object of our respect. For it exalts its private object above the other greajt.and infinite object ; and sets that up as supreme, in opposition to this. It puts down being in general, which is infinitely superior in itself, and infinitely more ijnportant, in an in ferior place ; yea, subjects the supreme general object to this private infinitely inferior object : which is to treat it with great contempt, and truly to act in opposition to it, and to act iu opposition to the true order of things, and in opposition to that which is infinitely the supreme interest ; making this supreme and infinitely important interest, as far as in us lies, to be subject to, and dependent on, an in terest infinitely inferior. This is to act the part of an enemy to it. He that takes a subject, and exalts him above his prince, sets him as supreme instead of the prince, and treats his prince wholly as a subject, therein acts the part of an enemy to his prince. From these things, I think, it is manifest, that no affec tion limited to any private system, not depending on nor subordinate to being in general, can be of the nature of true virtue ; and this, whatever the private system be, let it be more or less extensive, consisting of a greater or smaller number of individuals, so long as it contains an infinitely little part of universal existence, and so bears no proportion to the great all-comprehending system. And consequently, that no affection whatsoever to any creature, or any system of created Beings, which is not dependent on, nor subordinate to, a propensity or union of the heart to God, the supreme and infinite Being, can be of the nature of true virtue. From hence also it is evident, that the divine virtue, or the virtue of the divine mind, must consist primarily in love to himself, or in the mutual love and friendship which subsists eternally and necessarily between the several per sons in the Godhead, or that infinitely strong propensity there is in these divine persons one to another. Tnere is no need of multiplying words, to prove that it must be thus, on a supposition that virtue, in its most essential nature, consists in benevolent affection or propensity of heart towards being in general ; and so flowing out to par ticular beings, in a greater or lesser degree, according to the measure of existence and beauty which they are pos- a private system, which is but an infinitely small part of this great whole we stand related to. I therefore also call that affection private affection, which is limited to so narrow a circle : and that general affection or bene volence, which has being in general for its object. Chap. II. CONCERNING THE SECONDARY BEAUTY. 127 sessed of. It will also follow, from the foregoing things, that God's goodness and love to created beings, is derived from and subordinate to his love to himself.* With respect to the manner in which a virtuous love in created beings, one to another, is dependent on, and derived from love to God, this will appear by a proper consider ation of what has been said ; that it is sufficient to render love to any created being, virtuous, if it arise from the temper of mind wherein consists a disposition to love God supremely. Because it appears from what has been already observed, all that love to particular beings, which is the fruit of a benevolent propensity of heart to being in feneral, is virtuous love. But, as has been remarked, a enevolent propensity of heart to being in general, and a temper or disposition to love God supremely, are in effect the same thing. Therefore, if love to a created being comes from that temper, or propensity of the heart, it is virtuous. However, every particular exercise of love to a creature may not sensibly arise from any exercise of love to God, or an explicit consideration of any similitude, con formity, union, or relation to God, in the creature beloved. The most proper evidence of love to a created being, arising from that temper of mind wherein consists a su preme propensity of heart to God, seems to be the agree ableness of the kind and degree of our love to God's end in our creation, and in the creation of all things, and the coincidence of the exercise of our love, in their manner, order, and measure, with the manner in which God himself exercises love to the creature in the creation and govern ment of the world, and the way in which God, as the first cause and supreme disposer of all things, has respect to the creature's happiness, in subordination to himself as his own supreme end. For the true virtue of created beings is doubtless their highest excellency, and their true good ness, and that by which they are especially agreeable to the mind of their Creator. But the true goodness of a thing, must be its agreeableness to its end, or its fitness to answer the design for which it was made. Therefore, they are good moral agents, whose temper of mind, or propen sity of heart, is agreeable to the end for which God made moral agents. But, as has been shown, the last end for which God has made moral agents, must be the last end for which God has made all things : it being evident, that the moral world is the end of the rest of the world ; the inanimate and unintelligent world being made for the rational and moral world, as much as a house is prepared for the inhabitants. By these things, it appears, that a truly virtuous mind, being as it were under the sovereign dominion of love to God, above all things, seeks the glory of God, and makes this his supreme, governing, and ultimate end. This con sists in the expression of God's perfections in their proper effects, — the manifestation of God's glory to created under standings, — the communications of the infinite fulness of God to the creature, — the creature's highest esteem of God, love to, and joy in him, — and in the proper exercises and expressions of these. And so far as a virtuous mind exer cises true virtue in benevolence to created beings, it chiefly seeks the good of the creature; consisting in its knowledge or view of God's glory and beauty, its union with Goo1, conformity and love to him, and joy in him. And that disposition of heart, that consent, union, or propensity of mind to being in general, which appears chiefly in such exercises, is vrRTUE, truly so called ; or in other words, true grace and real holiness. And no other disposition or affection but this is of the nature of true virtue. Corollary. Hence it appears, that those schemes of reli gion or moral philosophy, which — however well in some respects they may treat of benevolence to mankind, and other virtues depending on it, yet — have not a supreme regard to God, and love to him, laid as the foundation, and all other virtues handled in a connexion with this, and in subordination to it, are not true schemes of philosophy, but are fundamentally and essentially defective. And whatever other benevolence or generosity towards man kind, and other virtues, or moral qualifications which go by that name, any are possessed of, that are not attended with a love to God, which is altogether above them, and * In what manner it is so, I have endeavoured in some measure to ex- to which they are subordinate, and on which they are dependent, there is nothing of the nature of true virtue or religion in them. And it may be asserted in general, that nothing is of the nature of true virtue, in which God is not the first and the last ; or which, with regard to their exer cises in general, have not their first foundation and source in apprehensions of God's supreme dignity and glory, and in answerable esteem and love of him, and have not respect to God as the supreme end. CHAP. III. Concerning the secondary and inferior kind of beauty. Though what has been spoken of is, alone, justly- esteemed the true beauty of moral agents, or spiritua. beings ; this alone being what would appear beautiful in them upon a clear and comprehensive view of things ; and therefore alone is the moral amiableness of beings that have understanding and will, in the eyes of him that per fectly sees all things as they are ; yet there are other qualities, other sensations, propensities, and affections of mind, and principles of action, that often obtain the epithet of virtuous, and by many are supposed to have the nature of true virtue ; which are entirely of a distinct nature from this, and have nothing of that kind ; and therefore are erroneously confounded with real virtue. That consent, agreement, or union of being to being, which has been spoken of, viz. the union or propensity of minds to mental or spiritual existence, may be called the highest and primary beauty ; being the proper and peculiar beauty of spiritual and moral beings, which are the highest and first part of the universal system, for whose sake all the rest has existence. Yet there is another, inferior, se condary beauty, which is some image of this, and which is not peculiar to spiritual beings, but is found even in in animate things ; which consists in => mutual consent and agreement of different things, in form, manner, quantity, and visible end or design ; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, &c. Such is the mutual agreement of the various sides of a square, or equilateral triangle, or of a regular polygon. Such is, as it were, the mutual consent of the different parts of the periphery of a circle, or surface of a sphere, and of the corresponding parts of an ellipsis. Such is the agreement ofthe colours, figures, dimensions, and distances of the different spots on a chess board. Such is the beauty of the figures on a piece of chintz or bro cade. Such is the beautiful proportion of the various parts of a human body, or countenance. And such is the sweet mutual consent and agreement of the various notes of a melodious tune. This is the same that Mr. Hutchin son, in his Treatise on Beauty, expresses by uniformity in the midst of variety. Which is no other than the consent or agreement of different things, in form, quantity, &c. He observes, that the greater the variety is in equal uni formity the greater the beauty. Which is no more than to say, the more there are of different mutually agreeing things, the greater is the beauty. And the reason of that is, because it is more considerable to have many things consent one with another, than a few only. The beauty which consists in the visible fitness of a thing to its use, and unity of design, is not a distinct sort of beauty from this. For it is to be observed, that one thing which contributes to the beauty of the agreement and proportion of various things, is their relation one to an other ; which connects them, and introduces them toge ther into view and consideration, and whereby one sug gests the other to the mind, and the mind is led to com pare them, and so to expect and desire agreement. Thus the uniformity of two or more pillars, as they may happen to be found in different places, is not an equal degree of beauty, as that uniformity in so many pillars in the cor responding parts of the same building. So means and an intended effect are related one to another. The answer- ableness of a thing to its use is only the proportion and fitness of a cause, or means, to a visibly designed effect, plain in the preceding discourse of God's end in creating the world. 128 THE NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE. and so an effect suggested to the mind by the idea of the means. This kind of beauty is not entirely different from that beauty which there is in fitting a mortise to its tenon. Only when the beauty consists in unity of design, or the adaptedness of a variety of things to promote one intended effect, in which all conspire, as the various parts of an ingenious complicated machine, there is a double beauty, as there is a twofold agreement and conformity. First, there is the agreement of the various parts to the designed end. Secondly, through this designed end or effect, ail the various particulars agree one with another as the general medium of their union, whereby they, being united in this third, are all united one to another. The reason, or at least one reason, why God has made this kind of mutual agreement of things beautiful and grateful to those intelligent beings that perceive it, probably is, that there is in it some image of the true, spiritual, original beauty, which has been spoken of; consisting in being's consent to being, or the union of spiritual beings in a mutual propensity and affection of heart. The other is an image of this, because by that uniformity diverse things become as it were one, as it is in this cordial union. And it pleases God to observe analogy in his works, as is mani fest in fact, in innumerable instances ; and especially to establish inferior things with analogy to superior. Thus, in how many instances has he formed brutes in analogy to the nature of mankind ! and plants, in analogy to animals, with respect to the manner of their generation, nutrition, &c. And so he has constituted the external world in analogy to the spiritual world, in numberless instances ; as might be shown, if it were necessary, and here were a proper place for it Why such analogy in God's works pleases him, it is not needful now to inquire. It is suf ficient that he makes an agreement of different things, in their form, manner, measure, &c. to appear beautiful, be cause here is some image of a higher kind of agreement and consent of spiritual beings. It has pleased him to establish a law of nature, by virtue of which the uniformity and mutual correspondence of a beautiful plant, and the respect which the various pails of a regular building seem to have one to another, and their agreement and union, and the consent or concord of the various notes of a melodious tune, should appear beautiful ; because therein is some image of the consent of mind, of the different members of a society or system of intelligent beings, sweetly united in a benevolent agreement of heart. And here by the way, I would further observe, probably it is with regard to this image or resemblance, which secondary beauty has of true spiritual beauty, that God has so constituted nature, that the presenting of this in ferior beauty, especially in those kinds of it which have the greatest resemblance of the primary beauty, as the harmony of sounds, and the. beauties of nature, have a tendency to assist those whose hearts are under the influ ence of a truly virtuous temper, to dispose them to the exercises of divine love, and enliven in them a sense of spiritual beauty. From what has been said we may see, that there are two sorts of a_reement or consent of one thing to another. (1.) There is a cordial agreement ; that consists in concord and union of mind and heart : which, if not attended (viewing things in general) with more discord than concord, is true virtue, and the original or primary beauty, which is the only true moral beauty. (2.) There is a natural union or agreement ; which, though some image of the other, is entirely a distinct thing ; the will, disposition, or affection of the heart having no concern in it, but consisting only in uniformity and consent of nature, form, quantity, &c. (as before described,) wherein lies an inferior secondary sort of beauty, which may in distinction from the other, be called natural beauty. This may be sufficient to let the reader know how I shall hereafter use the phrases cordial and natural agreement ; and moral, spiritual, divine, and primary original beauty, and secondary or natural beauty. Concerning this latter, the inferior kind of beauty, the fol lowing things may be observed : 1. The rau.se why secondary beauty is grateful to men, is only a law of nature, which God has fixed, or an instinct he has. given to mankind ; and not their perception of the same thing which God is pleased to regard as the ground or rule by which he has established such a law of nature, This appears in two things. (1.) That which God respects, as the ground of this law of nature, whereby things having a secondary beauty are made grateful to men, is their mutual agreement and pro portion, in measure, form, &c. But, in many instances, persons that are gratified and affected with this beauty, do not reflect on that particular agreement and proportion, which, according to the law of nature, is the ground and rule of beauty in the case, yea, are ignorant of it. Thus, a man may be pleased with the harmony of the notes in a tune, and yet know nothing of that proportion or adjust ment of the notes, which, by the law of nature, is the ground of the melody. He knows not, that the vibrations in one note regularly coincide with the vibrations in an other ; that the vibrations of a note coincide in time with two vibrations of its octave ; and that two vibrations of a note coincide with three of its fifth, &c. — Yea, he may not know, that there are vibrations of the air in the case, or any corresponding motions in the organs of hearing, in the auditory nerve, or animal spirits. — —So a man may be affected and pleased with a beautiful proportion of the fea tures in a face, and yet not know what that proportion is, or in what measures, quantities, and distances it consists. In this, therefore, a sensation of secondary beauty differs from a sensation of primary and spiritual beauty, consist ing in a spiritual union and agreement. What makes the latter grateful, is perceiving the union itself. It is the im mediate view of that wherein the beauty fundamentally lies, that is pleasing to the virtuous mind. (2.) God, in establishing such a law- — that mutual na tural agreement of different things, in form, quantity, &c. should appear beautiful or grateful to men — seems to have had regard to the resemblance there is in such a na tural agreement, to that spiritual, cordial agreement, wherein original beauty consists. But it is not any re flection upon, or perception of, such a resemblance, that is the reason why such a form or state of objects appear beautiful to men : but their sensation of pleasure, on a view of this secondary beauty, is immediately owing to the law God has established, or the instinct he has given. 2. Another thing observable concerning this kind of beauty, is, that it affects the mind more (other things being equal) when taken notice of in objects which are of considerable importance, than in little trivial matters. Thus, the symmetry of the parts of a human body, or countenance, affects the mind more than the beauty of a flower. So the beauty of the solar system, more than as great and as manifold an order and uniformity in a tree. And the proportions of the parts of a church, or a palace, more than the same proportions in some little slight com positions, made to please children. 3. Not only uniformity and proportion, &c. of different things, is requisite, in order to this inferior beauty ; but also some relation or connexion of the things thus agree ing one with another. As the uniformity or likeness of a number of pillars, scattered hither and thither, does not constitute beauty, or at least by no means in an equal de gree, as uniformity in pillars connected in the same build ing, in parts that have relation one to another. So, if we see things unlike, and very disproportioned, in distant places, which have no relation to each other, this excites no such idea of deformity, as disagreement, inequality, or disproportion in things related and connected ; and the nearer the relation, and the stricter the connexion, so much the greater and more disgustful is the deformity, consisting in their disagreement. 4. This secondary kind of beauty, consisting in uni formity and proportion, not only takes place in material and external things, but also in things immaterial ; and is, in very many things, plain and sensible in the latter, as well as the former. And when it is so, there is no reason why it should not be grateful to them that behold it, in these as well as the other, by virtue of the same sense, or the same determination of mind, to be gratified with uni formity and proportion. If uniformity and proportion be the things that affect and appear agreeable to this sense of beauty, then why should not uniformity and proportion affect the same sense in immaterial things as well as ma terial, if there be equal capacity of discerning it in both ? Chap. III. CONCERNING THE SECONDARY BEAUTY. 129 and indeed more in spiritual things (ceteris paribus) as these are more important than things merely external and material ? This is not only reasonable to be supposed, but is evi dent in fact, in numberless instances. There is a beauty of order in society, besides what consists in benevolence, or can be referred to it, which is of the secondary kind. As, when the different members of society have all their appointed office, place, and station, according to their several capacities and talents, and every one keeps his place, and continues in his proper business. In this there is a beauty, not of a different Kind from the regularity of a beautiful building, or piece of skilful architecture, where the strong pillars are set in their proper place, the pilasters in a place fit for them, the square pieces of marble in the pavement, the pannels, partitions, and cornices, &c. in places proper for them. As the agreement of a variety of things in one common design, — as of the parts of a build ing, or complicated machine, — is one instance of that regu larity which belongs to the secondary kind of beauty, so there is the same kind of beauty in what is called wisdom, consisting in the united tendency of thoughts, ideas, and particular volitions, to one general purpose : which is a distinct thing from the goodness of that general purpose, as being useful and benevolent. There is a beauty in the virtue called just ice, which con sists in the agreement of different things, that have rela tion to one another, in nature, manner, and measure ; and therefore is the very same sort of beautv with that uni formity and proportion, which, is observable in those ex ternal and material things that are esteemed beautiful. There is a natural agreement and adaptedness of things that have relation one to another, and an harmonious cor responding of one thing with another. He who from his will does evil to others, should receive evil from the will of him or them whose business it is to take care of the in jured, and to act in their behalf, in proportion to the evil of his doings. Things are in natural regularity and mutual agreement, in a literal sense, when he whose heart opposes the general system, should have the hearts of that system, or the heart of the ruler of the system, against him ; and, in consequence, should receive evil, in proportion to the evil tendency of the opposition of his heart. So, there is an agreement in nature and measure, when he that loves has the proper returns of love; when he that from his heart promotes the good of another, has his good promoted by the other; for there is a kind of justice in becoming gratitude. Indeed most of the duties incumbent onus, if well con sidered, will be found to partake of the nature of justice. There is some natural agreement of one thing to another ; some adaptedness of the agent to the object ; some answer- ableness of the act to the occasion ; some equality and proportion in things of a similar nature, and of a direct relation one to another. So it is in relative duties ; duties of children to parents, and of parents to children; duties of husbands and wives ; duties of rulers and subjects ; duties of friendship and good neighbourhood ; and all duties that we owe to God, our creator, preserver, and benefactor; and all duties whatsoever, considered as re quired by God, and as what are to be performed with a regard to Christ. It is this secondary kind of beauty, which Mr. Wollas- ton seems to have had in his eye, when he resolved all virtue into an agreement of inclinations, volitions, and ac tions with truth. He evidently has respect to the justice there is in virtues and duties ; which consists in one being expressing such affections, and using such a conduct, towards another, as hath a natural agreement and propor tion to what is in them, and what we receive from them : which is as much a natural conformity of affection and action with its ground, object, and occasion, as that which is between a true proposition and the thing spoken of in it. But there is another and higher beauty in true vjrtue, and in all truly virtuous dispositions and exercises, than what consists in any uniformity or similarity of various things ; viz. the union of heart to being in general, or to God, the Being of beings, which appears in those virtues; and of which those virtues, when true, are the various ex pressions or effects. Benevolence to being in general, or to being simply considered, is entirely a distinct thing vol. I. K from uniformity in the midst of variety, and is a superior kind of beauty. It is true, that benevolence to being in general, will naturally incline to justice, or proportion in the exercises of it. He that loves being, simply considered, will na turally, other things being equal, love particular beings, in a proportion compounded of the degree of being, and the degree of virtue, or benevolence to being, which they have. And that is to love beings in proportion to their dignity. For the dignity of any being consists in those two things. Respect to being, in this proportion, is the first and most general kind of justice ; which will produce all the subor dinate kinds. So that, after benevolence to being in general exists, the proportion which is observed in objects may be the cause of the proportion of benevolence to those objects : but no proportion is the cause or ground of the existence of such a thing as benevolence to being. The tendency of objects to excite that degree of benevolence, which is proportionable to the degree of being, &c. is the consequence of the existence of benevolence, and not the ground of it. Even as a tendency of bodies one to an other, by mutual attraction, in proportion to the quantity of matter, is the consequence of the being of such a thing as mutual attraction ; and not attraction the effect of pro portion. By this it appears, that just affections and acts have a beauty in them, distinct from and superior to the uniformity and equality there is in them : for which, he that has a truly virtuous temper, relishes and delights in them. And that is the expression and manifestation there is in them of benevolence to being in general. And besides this, there is the agreement of justice to the will and command of God ; and also something in the tendency and conse quences of justice, agreeable to general benevolence, as the glory of God, and the general good. Which tendency also makes it beautiful to a truly virtuous mind. So that the tendency of general benevolence to produce justice, also the tendency of justice to produce effects agreeable to general benevolence, both render justice pleasing to a virtuous mind. And it is on these accounts chiefly, that justice is grateful to a virtuous taste, or a truly benevolent heart. But though it be true, that the uniformity and Eroportion there is in justice, is grateful to a benevolent eart, as this uniformity and proportion tends to the general good ; yet that is no argument that there "is no other beauty m it but its agreeing with benevolence. For so the ex ternal regularity and order of the natural world gratifies benevolence, as it is profitable, and tends to the general good ; but that is no argument that there is no other sort of beauty in external uniformity and proportion, but only its suiting benevolence, by tending to the general good. 5. From all that has been observed concerning this secondary kind of beauty, it appears, that the disposition, which consists in a determination of mind to approve and be pleased with this beauty, considered simply and by itself, has nothing of the nature of true virtue, and is en tirely a different thing from a truly virtuous taste. For it has been shown, that this kind of beauty is entirely diverse from the beauty of true virtue, whether it takes place in material or immaterial things ; and therefore it will follow, that a taste of this kind of beauty is entirely a different thing from a taste of true virtue. Who will affirm, that a disposition to approve of the harmony of good music, or the beauty of a square, or equilateral triangle, is the same with true holiness, or a truly virtuous disposition of mind ? It is a relish of uniformity and proportion that determines the mind to approve these things. And there is no need of any thing higher, or of any thing in any respect diverse, to determine the mind to approve and be pleased with equal uniformity and proportion among spiritual things which are equally discerned. It is virtuous to love true virtue, as that denotes an agreement of the heart with virtue. But it argues no virtue for the heart to be pleased with that which is entirely distinct from it. Though it be true, that there is some analogy in it to spiritual and virtuous beauty — as far as material things can have analogy to things spiritual, of which they can have no more than a shadow — yet, as has been observed, men do not approve it because of any such analogy per ceived. And not only reason but experience plainly shows, 130 THE NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE. that men's approbation of tms sort of beauty does not spring from any virtuous temper, and has no connexion with virtue. For otherwise their delight in the beauty of squares, and cubes, and regular polygons, in the regularity of buildings, and the beautiful figures in a piece of em broidery, would increase in proportion to men's virtue ; and would be raised to a great height in some eminently virtuous or holy men ; but would be almost wholly lost in some others that are very vicious and lewd. It is evident in fact, that a relish of these things does not depend on general benevolence, or any benevolence at all to any being whatsoever, any more than a man's loving the taste of honey, or his being pleased with the smell of a rose. A taste of this inferior beauty in things immaterial, is one thing which has been mistaken by some moralists, for a true virtuous principle, supposed to be implanted naturally in the hearts of all mankind. CHAP. IV. Of self-love, and its various influence, to cause love to others, or the contrary. Many assert, that all love arises from self-love. In order to determine this point, it should be clearly deter mined what is meant by self-love. Self-love, I think, is generally defined " a man's love of his own happiness ;" which is short, and may be thought very plain : but in reality is an ambiguous definition, as the expression his own, is equivocal, and liable to be taken in two very dif ferent senses. For a man's own happiness may either be taken universally, for all the happiness or pleasure of which the mind is in any regard the subject, or whatever is grateful and pleasing to men ; or it may be taken for the pleasure a man takes in his own proper, private, and sepa rate good. And so self-love may be taken two ways. 1. It may be taken' for the same as his loving whatso ever is pleasing to him. Which comes only to this, that self-love is a man's liking, and being suited and pleased in that which he likes, and which pleases him ; or, that it is a man's loving what he loves. For whatever a man loves, that thing is grateful and pleasing to him, whether that be his own peculiar happiness, or the happiness of others. And if this be all that they mean by self-love, no wonder they suppose that all love may be resolved into self-love. For it is undoubtedly true, that whatever a man loves, his love may be resolved into his loving what he loves. If by self-love is meant nothing else but a man's loving what is grateful or pleasing to him, and being averse to what is disagreeable, this is calling that self-love, wbich is only a general capacity of loving or hating ; or a capacity of being either pleased or displeased ; which is the same thing as a man's having a faculty of will. For if nothing could be either pleasing or displeasing, agreeable or dis agreeable, to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and will nothing. But if he is capable of having inclination, will and choice, then what he inclines to, and chooses, is grateful to him, whatever that be ; whether it be his own private good, the good of his neighbours, or the glory of God. And so far as it is grateful or pleasing to him, so far it is a part of his pleasure, good, or happiness. But if this be what is meant by self-love, there is an im propriety and absurdity even in the putting of the question, Whether all our love, or our love to each particular object of our love, does not arise from self-love ? For that would be the same as to inquire, Whether the reason why our love is fixed on such and such particular objects, is not, that we have a capacity of loving some things ? This may be a general reason why men love or hate any thing at all ; and therein differ from stones and trees, which love no thing, and hate nothing. But it can never be a reason why men s love is placed on such and such objects. That a man in general loves, and is pleased with happiness, or has a capacity of enjoying happiness, cannot be the reason why such and such things become his happiness : as for in stance, why the good of his neighbour, or the happiness and glory of God, is grateful and pleasing to him, and so becomes a part of his happiness. Or if what they mean, who say that all love comes from self-love, be not, that our loving such and such particular persons and things arises from our love to happiness in general, but from a love to our own happiness, which con sists in these objects ; so, the reason why we love benevo lence to our friends, or neighbours, is, because we love our happiness, consisting in their happiness, which we take pleasure in:— still the notion is absurd. For here the effect is made the cause of that of which it is the effect : our happiness, consisting in the happiness of the person beloved, is made the cause of our love to that person. Whereas the truth plainly is, that our love to the person is the cause of our delighting or being happy in his happi ness. How comes our happiness to consist in the happi ness of such as we love, but by our hearts being first united to them in affection, so that we as it were look on them as ourselves, and so on their happiness as our own? Men who have benevolence to others have pleasure when they see others' happiness, because seeing their happiness grati fies some inclination that was in their hearts before. They before inclined to their happiness ; which was by benevo lence or good-will ; and therefore, when they see their happiness, their inclination is suited, and they are pleased. But the being of inclinations and appetites is prior to any pleasure in gratifying these appetites. 2. Self-love, as the phrase is used in common speech, most commonly signifies a man's regard to his confined private self, or love to himself with respect to his private interest. By private interest I mean that which most immediately consists in those pleasures, or pains, that are personal. For there is a comfort, and a grief, that some have in others' pleasures, or pains ; which are in others originally, but are derived to them, or in some measure become theirs, by virtue of a benevolent union of heart with others. And there are other pleasures and pains that are originally our own, and not what we have by such a participation with others. Which consist in perceptions agreeable, or contrary, to certain personal inclinations implanted in our nature; such as the sensitive appetites and aversions. Such also is the disposition or the determination of the mind to be pleased with external beauty, and with all in ferior, secondary beauty, consisting in uniformity, propor tion, &c. whether in things external or internal, and to dislike the contrary deformity. Such also is the natural disposition in men to be pleased in a perception of their being the objects of the honour and love of others, and displeased with others' hatred and contempt. For plea sures and uneasiness of this 1cind are doubtless as much owing to an immediate determination of the mind by a fixed law of our nature, as any of the pleasures or paius of external sense. And these pleasures are properly of the private and personal kind ; being not by any participation of the happiness or sorrow of others, through benevolence. It is evidently mere self-love that appears in this dispo sition. It is easy to see, that a man's love to himself will make him love lore to himself, and hate hatred to himself. And as God has constituted our nature, self-love is exer cised in no one disposition more than in this. Men, pro bably, are capable of much more pleasure and pain through this determination of the mind, than by any other per sonal inclination or aversion whatsoever. Though per haps we do not so very often see instances of extreme suffering by this means, as by some others, yet we often see evidences of men's dreading the contempt of others more than death ; and by such instances may conceive something what men would suffer, if universally hated and despised ; and may reasonably infer something of the greatness of the misery, that would arise under a sense of universal abhorrence, in a great view of intelligent being in general, or in a clear view of the Deity, as incompre hensibly and immensely great, so that all other beings are as nothing and vanity — together with a sense of his imme diate continual presence, and an infinite concern with him and dependence upon him — and living constantly in the midst of most clear and strong evidences and manifesta tions of his hatred and contempt. These things may be sufficient to explain what I mean by private interest ; in regard to which, self-love, most properly so called, is im mediately exercised. And here I would observe, that if we talte self-love in Chap. IV. OF SELF-LOVE AND ITS INFLUENCE. 131 this sense, so love to some others may truly be the effect of self-love ; i. e. according to the common method and order which is maintained in the laws of nature. For no created thing has power to produce an effect any otherwise than by virtue of the laws of nature. Thus, that a man should love those who are of his party, and who are warmly engaged on his side, and promote his interest, is the na tural consequence of a private self-love. Indeed there is no metaphysical necessity, in the nature of things, that because a man loves himself, and regards his own in terest, he therefore should love those that love him, and promote his interest, i. e. to suppose it to be otherwise im plies no contradiction. It will not follow from any abso lute metaphysical necessity, that because bodies have solidity, cohesion, and gravitation towards the centre of the earth, therefore a weight suspended on the beam of a balance should have greater power to counterbalance a weight on the other side, when at a distance from the ful crum, than when it is near. It implies no contradiction that it should be otherwise ; but only as it contradicts that beautiful proportion and harmony, which the Author of nature observes in the laws of nature he has establish ed. Neither is there any absolute necessity, that because there is an internal mutual attraction of the parts of the earth, or any other sphere, whereby the whole becomes one solid coherent body, therefore other bodies that are around it, should also be attracted by it, and those that are nearest, be attracted most. But according to the order and proportion generally observed in the laws of nature, one of these effects is connected with the other, so that it is justly looked upon as the same power of attraction in the globe ofthe earth, which draws bodies about the earth towards its centre, with that which attracts the parts of the earth themselves one to another ; only exerted under dif ferent circumstances. By a like order of nature, a man's love to those that love him, is no more than a certain ex pression or effect of self-love. No other principle is need ful in order to the effect, if nothing intervenes to counter vail the natural tendency of self-love. Therefore there is no more true virtue in a man thus loving his friends mere ly from self-love, than there is in self-love itself, the prin ciple from whence it proceeds. So, a man being disposed to hate those that hate him, or to resent injuries done him, arises from self-love, in like manner as loving those thai love us, and being thankful for kindness shown us. But it is said by some, that it is apparent there is some other principle concerned in exciting the passions of grati tude and anger besides self-love, viz. moral sense, or sense of moral beauty and deformity, determining the minds of all mankind to approve of, anil be pleased with virtue, and to disapprove of vice, and behold it with displicence ; and that their seeing or supposing this moral beauty or de formity, in the kindness of a benefactor, or opposition of an adversary, is the occasion of these affections of gratitude or anger. Otherwise, why are not these affections excited in us towards inanimate things that do us good or hurt ? Why do not we experience gratitude to a garden, or fruit ful field ? And why are we not angry with a tempest, or blasting mildew, or an overflowing stream ? We are very differently affected towards those that do us good from the virtue of generosity, or hurt us from the vice of envy and malice, than towards things that hurt or help us, which are destitute of reason and will. Concerning this, I would make several remarks. 1 . Those who thus argue, that gratitude and anger can not proceed from self-love, might argue in the same way, and with equal reason, that neither can these affections arise from love to others : which is contrary to their own scheme. They say, that the reason why we are affected with gratitude and anger towards men, rather than things without life, is moral sense : which they say is the effect of that principle of benevolence or love to others, or love to the public, which is naturally in the hearts of all man kind. But now I might say, according to their own way of arguing, gratitude and anger cannot arise from love to others, or love to the public, or any sense of mind that is the fruit of public affection. For how differently are we affected towards those that do good or hurt to the public from understanding and will, and public motive, from what we are towards such inanimate things as the sun and the k 2 clouds, that do good to the public, by enlightening and en livening beams and refreshing showers ; or mildew, and an overflowing stream, that does hurt to the public, by de stroying the fruits of the earth ! Yea, if such a kind of argument be good, it will prove that gratitude and anger cannot arise from the united influence of self-love, and public love, or moral sense arising from public affection. For, if so, why are we not affected towards inanimate things, that are beneficial or injurious both to us and the public, in the same manner as to them that are profitable or hurtful to both on choice and design, and from benevo lence or malice ? 2. On the supposition, that men love those who love them, and are angry with those who hate them, from the natural influence of self-love ; it is not at all strange that the Author of nature, who observes order, uniformity, and harmony in establishing its laws, should so order, that it should be natural for self-love to cause the mind to be affected differently towards exceedingly different objects ; and that it should cause our heart to extend itself in one manner towards inanimate things, which gratify self-love, without sense or will, and in another manner towards beings which we look upon as having understanding and will, like ourselves, and exerting these faculties in our fa vour, and promoting our interest from love to us. No wonder, seeing we love ourselves, that it should be natural to us to extend something of that same kind of love which we have for ourselves, to them who are the same kind of beings as ourselves, and comply with the inclinations of our self-love, by expressing the same sort of love to wards us. 3. If we should allow that to be universal, that in grati tude and anger there is the exercise of some kind of moral sense— as it is granted there is something that may be so called — all the moral sense that is essential to those affec tions, is a sense of desert ; which is to be referred to that sense of justice, before spoken of, consisting in an appre hension of that secondary kind of beauty that lies in uni formity and proportion ; which solves all the difficulty in the objection. Others' love and kindness to us, or their ill-will and injuriousness, appear to us to deserve our love or our resentment. Or, in other words, it seems to us no other than just, that as they love us and do us good, we also should love them and do them good. And so it seems just, that when others' hearts oppose us, and they from their hearts do us hurt, our hearts should oppose them, and that we should desire themselves may suffer in like manner as we have suffered, i. e. there appears to us to be a natural agreement, proportion, and adjustment be tween these things; which is indeed a kind of moral sense, or sense of beauty in moral things. But, as was before shown, it is a moral sense of a secondary kind, and is en tirely different from a sense or relish ofthe original essen tial beauty of true virtue ; and may be without any prin ciple of true virtue in the heart. Therefore, doubtless, it is a great mistake in any to suppose, that the moral sense which appears and is exercised in a sense of desert, is the same thing as a love of virtue, or a disposition and deter mination of mind to be pleased with true virtuous beauty, consisting in public benevolence. Which may be further confirmed, if it be considered, that even with respect to a sense of justice or desert, consisting in uniformity, and agreement between others' actions, towards us, and our actions towards them, in a way of well-doing, or of ill- doing, it is not absolutely necessary to the being of these passions of gratitude and anger, that there should be any notion of justice in them, in any public or general view of things : as will appear by what shall be next observed. 4. Those authors who hold, that the moral sense, which is natural to all mankind, consists in a natural relish of the beauty of virtue, and so arises from a principle of true vir tue implanted by nature in the hearts of all, hold that true virtue consists in public benevolence. Therefore, if the affections of gratitude and anger necessarily imply such a moral sense as they suppose, then these affections imply some delight in the public good, and an aversion of the mind to public evil. And if so, then every time a man feels anger for opposition, or gratitude for any favour, there must be at least a supposition of a tendency to public injury in that opposition, and a tendency to public benefit 132 THE NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE. in the favour that excites his gratitude. But how far is this from being true ! For instance ; a ship's crew enter into a conspiracy against the master, to murder him, and run away with the ship, and turn pirates : but before they bring their matters to ripeness for execution, one of them repents, and opens the whole design ; whereupon the rest are apprehended and brought to justice. The crew are en raged with him that has betrayed them, and earnestly seek opportunity to revenge themselves upon him. And for an instance of gratitude ; a gang of robbers that have long in fested the neighbouring country, have a particular house whither they resort, and where they meet from time to time, to divide their booty, and hold their consultations for carrying on their pernicious designs. The magistrates and officers of the country, after many fruitless endeavours to discover their secret place of resort, at length are well-in formed where it is, and are prepared with sufficient force to surprise them, and seize them all, at the place of rendez vous, at an hour appointed, when they understand they will all be there. A little before the arrival of the appoint ed hour, while the officers with their bands are approaching, some person is so kind to these robbers, as to give them notice of their danger, so as just to give them opportunity to escape. They are than'j'ul to him, and give him a handful of money for his kindness. Now, in such instances, I think it is plain, that there is no supposition of a public injury in that which is the occasion of their anger ; yea, they know the contrary. Nor is there any supposition of public -good in that which excites their gratitude; neither has public benevolence, or moral sense, consisting in a determination to approve of what is for the public good, any influence at all in the affair. And though there be some affection, besides a sense of uniformity and propor tion, that has influence in such anger and gratitude, it is not public affection or benevolence, but private affection ; yea, that affection which is to the highest degree private, consisting in a man's love of his own person. 5. The passion of anger, in particular, seems to have been unluckily chosen as a medium to prove a sense and determination to delight in virtue, consisting in benevo lence natural to all mankind. For if that moral sense which is exercised in anger, were that which arose from a benevolent temper of heart, being no other than a sense or relish of the beauty of benevolence, one would think, a disposition to anger should increase, at least in some pro portion, as a man had more of a sweet, benign, and be nevolent temper : which seems contrary to experience, which shows that the less men have of benevolence, and the more they have of a contrary temper, the more are they disposed to anger and deep resentment of injuries. And though gratitude be that which many speak of as a certain noble principle of virtue, which God has im planted in the hearts of all mankind ; and though it be true there is a gratitude that is truly virtuous ; and the want of gratitude, or an ungrateful temper, is truly vicious, and argues an abominable depravity of heart ; yet I think, what has been observed may serve to convince such as impartially consider it, not only that not all anger, or hating those which hate us, but also that not all gratitude, or loving those which love us, arises from a truly virtuous benevolence of heart. Another sort of affections, which may be properly re ferred to self-love, as its source, and which might be ex pected to be the fruit of it, according to the general analogy of nature's laws, is that of affections to such as are near to us by the ties of nature. Such are those of whose beings we have been the occasion, in whom we have a very peculiar propriety, and whose circumstances, even from the beginning of their existence, many ways lead them to a high esteem of us, and to treat us with great dependence, submission, and compliance. These the con stitution of the world makes to be united in interest, and accordingly to act as one, in innumerable affairs, with a communion in each other's affections, desires, cares, friend ships, enmities, and pursuits. As to the opinion of those who ascribe the natural affection there is between parents and children to a particular instinct of nature, I shall take notice of it afterwards. And as men may love persons and things from self-love, so may theirlove to qualities and characters arise from the same source. Some represent this, as though there were need of a great degree of metaphysical refining to make it out, that men approve of others from self-love, whom they hear of at a distance, or read of in history, or see represented on the stage, from whom they expect no profit or advantage. But perhaps it is not considered, that what we approve of in the first place is the character; and from the character we approve the person. And is it a strange thing, that men should from self-love like a temper or character, which, in its nature and tendency, falls in with the nature and tendency of self-love ; and which we know by experience and self-evidence, without meta physical refining, in the general tends to men's pleasure and benefit ? And on the contrary, is it strange that any should dislike what they see tends to men's pain and misery ? Is there need of a great degree of subtilty and abstraction, to make it out, that a child, who has heard and seen much of what is calculated strongly to fix an idea of the pernicious, deadly nature of the rattlesnake, should have an aversion to that species from self-love ; so as to have a degree of this aversion and disgust excited by seeing even the picture of that animal ? And that from the same self-love it should be pleased with a lively representation of some pleasant fruit of which it has often tasted the sweetness ? Or, with the image of some bird, which it has always been told is innocent, and with whose pleasant singing it has often been entertained ? Yet the child neither fears being bitten by the picture of the snake, nor expects to eat of the painted fruit, or to hear the figure of the bird sing. I suppose none will think it difficult to allow, that such an approbation or disgust of a child may be accounted for from its natural delight in the pleasures of taste and hearing, and its aversion to pain and death, through self- love, together with the habitual connexion of these agree able or terrible ideas with the form and qualities of these objects, the ideas of which are impressed on the mind of the child by their images. And where is the difficulty of allowing, that a person may hate the general character of a spiteful and malicious man, for the like reason as he hates the general nature of a serpent ; knowing, from reason, instruction, and expe rience, that malice in men is pernicious to mankind, as well as spite or poison in a serpent? And if a man may from self-love disapprove the vices of malice, envy, and others of that sort, which naturally tend to the hurt of mankind, why may he not from the same principle approve the contrary virtues of meekness, peaceableness, benevo lence, charity, generosity, justice, and the social virtues in general ; which, he as easily and clearly knows, naturally tend to the good of mankind ? — It is undoubtedly true, that some have a love to these virtues from a higher prin ciple. But yet I think it as certainly true, that there is generally in mankind a sort of approbation of them, which arises from self-love. Besides what has been already said, tbe same thing further appears from this ; that men commonly are most affected towards, and most highly approve, those virtues which agree with their interest most, according to their various conditions in life. We see that persons of low condition are especially enamoured with a condescending, accessible, affable temper in the great ; ' not only in those whose condescension has been exercised towards themselves ; but they will be peculiarly taken with such a character when they have accounts of it from others, or when they meet with it in history, or even in romance. The poor will most highly approve and commend liberality. The weaker sex, who especially need assistance and protection, will peculiarly esteem and applaud fortitude and gene rosity in those ofthe other sex, of whom they read or hear, or which they have represented to them on a stage. I think it plain from what has been observed, that as men may approve, and be disposed to commend, a benevo lent temper from self-love ; so the higher the degree of benevolence is, the more may they approve of it. This will account for some kind of approbation, from this prin ciple, even of love to enemies, viz. as a man loving his enemies is an evidence of a high degree of benevolence of temper ; the degree of it appearing from the obstacles it overcomes. And it may be here observed, that the con sideration of the tendency and influence of self-love may Chap. V NATURAL CONSCIENCE, AND THE MORAL SENSE. show, how men in general may approve of justice from another ground, besides that approbation of the secondary beauty there is in uniformity and proportion, which is natural to all. Men, from their infancy, see the necessity of it, not only that it is necessary for others, or for human society ; but they find the necessity of it for themselves, in instances that continually occur ; which tends to pre judice them in its favour, and to fix an habitual approba tion of it from self-love. Again, that forementioned approbation of justice and desert, arising from a sense of the beauty of natural agree ment and proportion, will have a kind of reflex and indirect influence to cause men to approve benevolence, and dis approve malice ; as men see that he who hates and injures others deserves to be hated and punished, and that he who is benevolent and loves others, and does them good, deserves himself also to be loved and rewarded by others, as they see the natural congruity or agreement, and mutual adapt edness, of these things. And having always seen this, malevolence becomes habitually connected in the mind with the idea of being hated and punished, which is dis agreeable to self-love ; and ihe idea of benevolence is habitually connected and associated with the idea of being loved and rewarded by others, which is grateful to self- love. And by virtue of this association of ideas, benevo lence itself becomes grateful, and the contrary displeasing. Some vices may become in a degree odious by the in fluence of self-love, through an habitual connexion of ideas of contempt with it ; contempt being what self-love ab hors. So it may often be with drunkenness, gluttony, sottishness, cowardice, sloth, niggardliness. The idea of contempt becomes associated with the idea of such vices, both because we are used to observe, that these things are commonly objects of contempt, and also find, that they excite contempt in ourselves. Some of them appear marks of littleness, i. e. of small abilities, and weakness of mind, and insufficiency for any considerable effects among man kind. By others, men's influence is contracted into a narrow sphere, and by such means persons become of less importance, and more insignificant. And things of little importance are naturally little accounted of. And some of these ill qualities are such as mankind find it their interest to treat with contempt, as they are very hurtful to human society. — There are no particular moral virtues whatsoever, but what in some or other of these ways, and most of them in several, come to have some kind of approbation from self-love, without the influence of a truly virtuous principle ; nor any particular vices, but what, by the same means, meet with some disapprobation. This kind of approbation and dislike, through the joint influence of self-love and association of ideas, is in many vastly heightened by education. This is the means of a strong, close, and almost irrefragable association, in innu merable instances of ideas, which have no connexion any other way than by education; and is the means of greatly strengthening that association, or connexion, which persons are led into by other means : as any one would be con vinced, perhaps more effectually than in most other ways, if they had opportunity of any considerable acquaintance with American savages and their children. CHAP. V. Of natural conscience, and the moral sense. There is yet another disposition or principle, of great importance, natural to mankind ; which, if we consider the consistence and harmony of nature's laws, may also be looked upon as, in some sort, arising from self-love, or self-union ; and that is, a disposition in man to be uneasy in a consciousness of being inconsistent with himself, and as it were against himself in his own actions. This ap pears particularly in the inclination of the mind to be uneasy in the consciousness of doing that to others, which he should be angry with them for doing to him, if they were in his case, and he in theirs ; or of forbearing to do that to them, which he would be displeased with them for neglecting to do to him. I have observed, from time to time, that in pure love to 133 others, i. e. love not arising from self-love, there is an union of the heart with others; a kind of enlargement of the mind, whereby it so extends itself as to take others into a man's self: and therefore it implies a disposition to feel, to de sire, and to act as though others were one with ourselves. So, self-love implies an inclination to feel and act as one with ourselves ; which naturally renders a sensible incon sistence with ourselves, and self-opposition in what we ourselves choose and do, to be uneasy to the mind : which will cause uneasiness of mind to be the consequence of a malevolent and unjust behaviour towards others, and a kind of disapprobation of acts of this nature, and an ap probation of the contrary. To do that to another, which we should be angry with him for doing to us, and to hate a person for doing that to us, which we should incline to and insist on doing to him, if we were exactly in the same case, is to disagree with ourselves, and contradict our selves. It would be for ourselves both to choose and adhere to, and yet to refuse and utterly reject, the very same thing. No wonder this is contrary to nature. No wonder, that such a self-opposition, and inward war with a man's self, naturally begets unquietness, and raises dis turbance in his mind. Thus approving of actions, because we therein act as in agreement with ourselves ; and thus disapproving, and being uneasy in the consciousness of disagreeing with our selves, in what we do, is quite a different thing from ap proving or disapproving actions because in them we are united with being in general : which is loving or hating actions from a sense of the primary beauty of true virtue, and of the odiousness of sin. The former of these prin ciples is private ; the latter is public, and truly benevolent in the highest sense. The former — an inclination to agree with ourselves — is a natural principle : but the latter — an agreement or union of heart to the great system, and to God the head of it, who is all and all in it — is a divine principle. In that uneasiness now mentioned, consists very much of that inward trouble men have from reflections of con science : and when they are free from this uneasiness, and are conscious to themselves, that in what they have acted towards others, they have done the same which they should have expected from them in the same case, then they have what is called peace of conscience, with respect to these actions. And there is also an approbation of conscience, respecting the conduct of others towards ourselves. As when we are blamed, condemned, or punished by them, and are conscious to ourselves that if we were in their case, and they in ours, we should in like manner blame, con demn, and punish them. And thus men's consciences may justify God's anger and condemnation. When they have the ideas of God's greatness, their relation to him, the benefits they have received from him, the manifest ations he has made of his will to them, &c. strongly impressed on their minds, a consciousness is excited within them of those resentments, which would be occasioned in themselves by an injurious treatment in any wise parallel. There certainly is such a consciousness as this often times within men, implied in the thoughts and views of the mind, of which, perhaps on reflection, they could hardly give an account. Unless men's consciences are greatly stupified, it is naturally and necessarily suggested ; and habitually, spontaneously, instantaneously, and, as it were, insensibly, arises in the mind. And the more so for this reason, that we have no other way to conceive of any thing which other persons act or suffer, but by recalling and exciting the ideas of what we ourselves are conscious we have found in our own minds ; and by putting the ideas which we obtain by this means in the place of an other; or, as it were, substituting ourselves in their place. Thus we have no conception, what understanding, per ception, love, pleasure, pain, or desire are in others ; but by putting ourselves as it were in their stead, or transfer ring the ideas we obtain of such things in our own minds by consciousness into their place; making such an alter ation, as to degree and circumstances, as what we observe of them requires. It is thus in all moral things that we conceive of in others ; and indeed in every thing we con ceive of, belonging to others, more than shape, size, com plexion, situation, and motion of their bodies. And this 134 THE NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE. is the only way that we come to be capable of having ideas of any perception or act even of the Godhead. We never could have any notion what understanding or volition, love or hatred are, either in created spirits or in God, if we had never experienced what understanding and volition, love and hatred, are in our own minds. Knowing what they are by consciousness, we can deny limits, and remove changeableness and other imperfections, and ascribe them to God. But though men in thinking of others do as it were put themselves in their place, they do it so habitually, instan taneously, and without set purpose, that they can scarce give any account of it, and many would think it strange if they were told of it. In all a man's thoughts of another person, in whatever he apprehends of his moral conduct to others or to himself, if it be in loving or hating him, ap proving or condemning him, rewarding or punishing him, he necessarily, as it were, puts himself in his stead ; and therefore the more naturally, easily, and quietly sees whether he, being in his place, should approve or condemn, be angry or pleased as he is. Natural conscience consists in these two things. 1 . In that disposition to approve or disapprove the moral treatment which passes between us and others, from a de termination of the mind to be easy or uneasy, in a con sciousness of our being consistent or inconsistent with ourselves. Hereby we have a disposition to approve our own treatment of another, when we are conscious to our selves that we treat him so as we should expect to be treated by him, were he in our case and we in his ; and to disapprove of our own treatment of another, when we are conscious that we should be displeased with the like treat ment from him, if we were in his case. So we in our con sciences approve of another's treatment of us, if we are conscious to ourselves, that if we were in his case, and he in ours, we should think it just to treat him as he treats us ; and disapprove his treatment of us, when we are con scious that we should think it unjust, if we were in his case. Thus men's consciences approve or disapprove the sentence of their judge, by which they are acquitted or condemned. But this is not all that is in natural con science. Besides this approving or disapproving from un easiness as being inconsistent with ourselves, there is another thing that must precede it, and be the foundation of it. As for instance, when my conscience disapproves my own treatment of another, being conscious to myself, that were I in his case, I should be displeased and angry with him for so treating me ; the question might be asked, What would be the ground of th_t supposed disapproba tion, displeasure, and anger, which I am conscious would be in me in that case ? Therefore, 2. The other thing which belongs to the approbation or disapprobation of natural conscience, is the sense of desert which was spoken of before ; consisting, as was observed, in a natural agreement, proportion, and harmony, between malevolence or injury, and resentment and punishment ; or between loving and being loved, between showing kind ness and being rewarded, &c. Both these kinds of ap proving or disapproving, concur in the approbation or dis approbation of conscience : the one founded on the other. Thus, when a man's conscience disapproves of his treat ment of his neighbour, in the first place, he is conscious, that if he were in his neighbour's stead, he should resent such treatment from a sense of justice, or from a sense of uniformity and equality between such treatment, and re sentment, and punishment; as before explained. And then, in the next place, he perceives, that therefore he is not consistent with himself, in doing what he himself should resent in that case ; and hence disapproves it, as being naturally averse to opposition to himself. Approbation and disapprobation of conscience, in the sense now explained, will extend to all virtue and vice ; to every thing whatsoever that is morally good or evil, in a mind which does not confine its view to a private sphere, but will take things in general into its consideration, and is free from speculative error. For, as all virtue or moral good may be resolved into love to others, either God or creatures ; so, men easily see the uniformity and natural agreement there is between loving others, and being accept ed and favoured by others. And all vice, sin, or moral evil summarily consisting in the want of this love to others, or in malevolence ; so, men easily seethe natural agreement there is between hating and doing ill to others, and being hated by them, and suffering ill from them, or from him that acts for all, and has the care of the whole system. And as this sense of equality and natural agreement ex tends to all moral good and evil ; so, this lays a foundation of an equal extent with the other kind of approbation and disapprobation which is grounded upon it, arising from an aversion to self-inconsistence and opposition. For in all cases of benevolence, or the contrary, towards others, we are capable of putting ourselves in the place of others, and are naturally led to do it ; and so of being conscious to ourselves, how we should like or dislike such treatment from others. Thus natural conscience, if the understand ing be properly enlightened, and stupifying prejudices are removed, concurs with the law of God, is of equal extent with it, and joins its voice with it in every article. And thus, in particular, we may see in what respect this natural conscience extends to true virtue, consisting in union of heart to being in general, and supreme love to God. For, although it sees not, or rather does not taste, its primary and essential beauty, i. e. it tastes no sweetness in benevolence to being in general, simply considered, for no thing but general benevolence itself can do that, yet, this natural conscience, common to mankind, may approve of it from that uniformity, equality, and justice, which there is in it ; and the demerit which is seen in the contrary, con sisting in the natural agreement between the contrary, and being hated of being in general. Men, by natural con science, may see the justice, or natural agreement, there is in yielding all to God, as we receive all from him ; and the justice there is in being his that made us, and willingly so, which is the same as being dependent on his will, and conformed to it in the manner of our being ; as we are for our being itself, and in the conformity of our will to his, on whose will we are universally and most perfectly de pendent. There is also justice in our supreme love to God; a natural agreement in our having a supreme respect to him who exercises infinite goodness to us, and from whom we receive all well-being. Besides, disagreement and dis cord appears worse to natural sense in things nearly re lated, and of great importance : and therefore it must ap pear very ill, as it respects the infinite Being, and that infinitely great relation which there is between the Creator and his creatures. And it is easy to conceive how natural conscience should see the desert of punishment, in the contrary of true virtue, viz. opposition and enmity to being in general. For, this is only to see the natural agreement there is between opposing being in general, and being op posed by being in general ; with a consciousness how, if we were infinitely great, we should expect to be regarded according to our greatness, and should proportionably re sent contempt. This natural conscience, if well-informed, will approve of true virtue, and will disapprove and con demn the want of it, and opposition to it; and yet with out seeing the true beauty of it. Yea, if men's consciences were fully enlightened, if they were delivered from being confined to a private sphere, and brought to view, and con sider things in general, and delivered from being stupified by sensual objects and appetites, as they will be at the day of judgment, they would approve nothing but true virtue, nothing but general benevolence, and those affections and actions that are consistent with it, and subordinate to it. For they must see, that consent to being in general, and supreme respect to the Being of beings, is most just; and that every thing which is inconsistent with it, and interferes with it, or flows from the want of it, is unjust, and deserves the opposition of universal existence. Thus has God established and ordered that this principle of natural conscience, which, though it implies no such thing as actual benevolence to being in general, nor any delight in such a principle, simply considered, and so im plies no truly spiritual sense or virtuous taste, yet should approve and condemn the same things that are approved and condemned by a spiritual sense or virtuous taste. And that moral sense which is natural to mankind, so far as it is disinterested, and not founded in association of ideas, is the same with this natural conscience. The sense of moral good and evil, and that disposition Chap. V. NATURAL CONSCIENCE, AND THE MORAL SENSE. 135 to approve virtue, and disapprove vice, which men have by natural conscience, is that moral sense so much insisted on in the writings of many of late. A misunderstanding of this, seems to have misled those moralists who have insisted on a disinterested moral sense, universal in the world of mankind, as an evidence of a disposition to true virtue, consisting in a benevolent temper, naturally im planted in the minds of all men. Some of the arguments used by these writers, indeed prove, that there is a moral sense or taste, universal among men, distinct from what arises from self-love. Though I humbly conceive, there is some confusion in their discourses on the subject, and not a proper distinction observed in the instances of men's approbation of virtue, which they produce. Some of which are not to their purpose, being instances of that ap probation of virtue which arises from self-love. But other instances prove, that there is a moral taste, or sense of moral good and evil, natural to all, which do not properly arise from self-love. Yet I conceive there are no instances of this kind which may not be referred to natural con science, and particularly to that which 1 have observed to be primary in the approbation of natural conscience, viz. a sense of desert, and approbation of that natural agree ment there is, in manner and measure, in justice. But I think it is plain from what has been said, that neither this, nor any thing else wherein consists the sense of moral good and evil, which there is in natural conscience, is of the nature of a truly virtuous taste, or determination of mind to relish and delight in the essential beauty of true virtue, arising from a virtuous benevolence of heart. But it further appears from this; if the approbation of conscience were the same with the approbation of the incli nation of the heart, or the natural disposition and deter mination of the mind to love and be pleased with virtue, then approbation and condemnation of conscience would always be in proportion to the virtuous temper of the mind ; or rather, the degree would be just the same. In that person who had a high degree of a virtuous temper, therefore, the testimony of conscience in favour of virtue would be equally full : But he who had but little, would have as little a degree of the testimony of conscience for virtue, and against vice. But I think the case is evident ly otherwise. Some men, through the strength of vice in their hearts, will go on and sin against clearer light and stronger convictions of conscience than others. If consci ence, approving duty and disapproving sin, were the same thing as the exercise of a virtuous principle of the heart, in loving duty and hating sin, then remorse of conscience will be the same thing as repentance ; and just in the same degree as the sinner feels remorse of conscience for sin, in the same degree is the heart turned from the love of sin to the hatred of it, inasmuch as they are the very same thing. Christians have the greatest reason to believe, from the Scriptures, that in the future day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God, when sinners shall be called to answer before their judge, and all their wickedness, in all its aggravations, brought forth, arjd clearly manifested in the perfect light of that day, and God will reprove them, and set their sins in order before them, their con sciences will be greatly awakened and convinced, their mouths will be stopped, all stupidity of conscience will be at an end, and conscience will have its full exercise ; and therefore their consciences will approve the dreadful sentence of the judge against them ; and seeing that they have deserved so great a punishment, will join with the judge in condemning them. And this, according to the notion I am opposing, would be the same thing as their being brought to the fullest repentance ; their hearts being perfectly changed to hate sin and love holiness ; and virtue or holiness of heart in them will be brought to the most full and perfect exercise. But how much otherwise have we reason to suppose it will then be ! Then the sin and wickedness of their heart will come to its highest do minion and completest exercise ; they shall be wholly left of God, and given up to their wickedness, even as the devils are ! When God has done waiting on sinners, and his Spirit done striving with them, he will not restrain their wickedness, as he does now. But sin shall then rage in their hearts, as a fire no longer restrained or kept under. It is proper for a judge when he condemns a criminal, to endeavour so to set his guilt before him as to convince his conscience of the justice of the sentence. This the Almighty will do effectually, and do to perfection, so as most thoroughly to awaken and convince the conscience. But if natural conscience, and the disposition of the heart to be pleased with virtue, were the same, then at the same time that the conscience was brought to its perfect exercise, the heart would be made perfectly holy ; or, would have the exercise of true virtue and holiness in perfect benevo lence of temper. But instead of this, their wickedness will then be brought to perfection, and wicked men will become very devils, and accordingly will be sent away as cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels. But supposing natural conscience to be what has been described, all these difficulties and absurdities are wholly avoided. Sinners when they see the greatness of the Being in contempt of whom they have lived with rebellion and opposition, and have clearly set before them their obliga tions to him, as their Creator, Preserver, Benefactor, &c. together with the degree in which they have acted as enemies to him, may have a clear sense of the desert of their sin, consisting in the natural agreement there is be tween such contempt and opposition of such a Being, and his despising and opposing them ; between their being and acting as so great enemies to such a God, and their suffer ing the dreadful consequences of his being and acting as their great enemy ; and dieir being conscious within them selves of the degree of anger, which would naturally arise in their own hearts in such a case, if they were in the place and state of their judge. In order to these things, there is no need of a virtuous benevolent temper, relishing and delighting in benevolence, and loathing the contrary. The conscience may see the natural agreement between oppos ing and being opposed, between hating and being hated, without abhorring malevolence from a benevolent temper of mind, or without loving God from a view ofthe beauty of his holiness. These things have no necessary depend ence one on the other. CHAP. VI. Of particular instincts of nature, which in some respects resemble virtue. There are various dispositions and inclinations natural to men, which depend on particular laws of nature, deter mining their minds to certain affections and actions towards particular objects; which laws seem to be established chiefly for the preservation of mankind, and their comfortably subsisting in the world. These dispositions may be called instincts. Some of these instincts respect only ourselves personally : such are many of our natural appetites and aversions. Some of them are more social, and extend to others : such are the mutual inclinations between the sexes, &c. — Some of these dispositions are more external and sensitive : such are those that relate to meat and drink, and the more sen sitive inclinations of the sexes towards each other. Others are more internal and mental : consisting in affections which mankind naturally exercise towards some of their fellow-creatures, and in come cases towards men in general. Some of these may be called kind affections ; as having something in them of benevolence, or a resemblance of it : and others are of an angry appearance ; such as the pas sion of jealousy between the sexes, especially in the male towards the female. It is only the former of these two last mentioned sorts that it is to my purpose to consider in this place, viz. those natural instincts which have the appearance of be nevolence, and so in some respects resemble virtue. These I shall therefore consider ; and shall endeavour to show, that none of them can be ofthe nature of true virtue. That kind affection which is exercised one towards another in natural relation, particularly the love of parents to their children, called natural affection, is by many re ferred to instinct. I have already considered this sort of love as an affection that arises from self-love ; and in that view, have shown it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. 136 THE NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE. But if any think, that natural affection is more properly to be referred to a particular instinct of nature than to self-love, as its cause, I shall not think it a point worthy of any controversy or dispute. In my opinion both are true ; viz. that natural affection is owing to natural instinct, and also that it arises from self-love. It may be said to arise from instinct, as it depends on a law of nature. But yet it may be truly reckoned as an affection arising from self-love ; because, though it arises from a law of nature, yet that is such a law as according to the order and harmony every where observed among the laws of nature, is connected with and follows from self-love; as was shown before. However, it is not necessary to my present purpose to in sist on this. For if natural affection to a man's children, or near relations, is an affection arising from a particular in dependent instinct of nature — which the Creator in his wisdom has implanted in men for the preservation and well-being of the world of mankind : yet it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For it has been observed, and, I humbly conceive, proved before, (Chap. II.) that if any being or beings have by natural instinct, or any other means, a determination of mind to benevolence, extend ing only to some particular persons or private system, however large that system may be — or however great a number of individuals it may contain, so long as it con tains but an infinitely small part of universal existence, and so bears no proportion to this great and universal sys tem — such limited private benevolence, not arising from, not being subordinate to, benevolence to being in general, cannot have the nature of true virtue. However, it may not be amiss briefly to observe now, that it is evident to a demonstration, those affections cannot be of the nature of true virtue, from these two things. First, That they do not arise from a principle of virtue. A principle of virtue, I think, is owned by the most con siderable of late writers on morality to be general bene volence or public affection : and I think it has been proved to be union of heart to being simply considered ; which implies a disposition to benevolence to being in general. Now, by the supposition, the affections we are speaking of do not arise from this principle ; and that, whether we suppose they arise from self-love, or from par ticular instincts : because either of those sources is diverse from a principle of general benevolence. And, Secondly, These private affections, if they do not arise from general benevolence, and they are not connected with it in their first existence, have no tendency to produce it. This appears from what has been observed : for being not dependent on it, their detached and unsubordinate operation rather implies opposition to being in general, than general benevolence ; as every one sees and owns with respect to self-love. And there are the very same reasons why any other private affection, confined to limits infinitely short of universal existence, should have that influence, as well as love that is confined to a single person. Now upon the whole, nothing can be plainer than that affections which do not arise from a virtuous principle, and have no ten dency to true virtue, as their effect, cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For the reasons which have been given, it is undeniably true, that if persons have a benevolent affection limited to a party, or to the nation in general, of which they are a part, or the public community to which they belong, though it be as large as tbe Roman empire was of old ; yea, if there could be a cause determining a person to benevo lence towards the whole world of mankind, or even all created sensible natures throughout the universe, exclusive of union of heart to general existence and of love to God — not derived from that temper of mind which disposes to a supreme regard to him, nor subordinate to such divine love — it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. If what is called natural affection, arises from a particu lar natural instinct, much more indisputably does that mutual affection which naturally arises between the sexes. I agree with Hutchison and Hume in this, that there is a foundation laid in nature for kind affections between the sexes, diverse from all inclinations to sensitive pleasure, and which do not properly arise from any such inclination. There is doubtless a disposition both to a mutual benevo lence and mutual complacence, that are not naturally and necessarily connected with any sensitive desires. But yet it is manifest such affections as are limited to opposite sexes, are from a particular instinct thus directing and limiting them ; and not arising from a principle of general benevolence ; for this has no tendency to any such limitation. And though these affections do not properly arise from the sensitive desires which are between the sexes, yet they are implanted by the Author of nature chiefly for the "same purpose, viz. the preservation or con tinuation of the world of mankind. Hereby persons be come willing to forsake father and mother, and all their natural relations in the families where they were born and brought up; for the sake of a stated union with a com panion of the other sex, in bearing and going through that series of labours, anxieties, and pains, requisite to the being, support, and education of a family of children ; and partly also for the comfort of mankind as united in a mar riage-relation. But I suppose few, if any, will deny, that the peculiar natural dispositions there are to mutual affec tion between the sexes, arise from an instinct or particular law of nature. And therefore it is manifest, from what has been said already, that those natural dispositions cannot be of the nature of true virtue. Another affection which is owing to a particular instinct, is that pity which is natural to mankind when they see others in great distress. It is acknowledged, that such an affection is natural to mankind. But I think it evident, that the pity which is general and natural, is owing to a particular instinct, and is not of the nature of true virtue. I am far from saying, that there is no such thing as a truly virtuous pity among mankind ; or, that none is to be found, which arises from that truly virtuous divine principle of general benevolence to sensitive beings. Yet at the same time I think, this is not the case with all pity, or with that disposition to pity which is natural to mankind in common. I think I may be bold to say, this does not arise from benevolence, nor is it properly called by that name. If all that uneasiness on the sight of others' extreme distress, which we call pity, were properly of tbe nature of benevolence, then they who are the subjects of this pas sion, must needs be in a degree of uneasiness in being sensible of the total want of happiness, of all such as they would be disposed to pity in extreme distress. For that certainly is the most direct tendency and operation of be nevolence or good will, to desire the happiness of its object. But now this is not the case universally, where men are disposed to exercise pity. There are many who would not be sensibly affected with any uneasiness to know that others were dead — yea men, who are not influenced by the consideration of a future state, but view death as only a cessation of all sensibility, and consequently an end of all happiness — who yet would have been moved with pity towards the same persons, if they had seen them under some very extreme anguish. Some would be moved with pity by seeing a brute-creature under extreme and long torments, who yet suffer no uneasiness in knowing that many thousands of them every day cease to live, and so have an end put to all their pleasure. It is the nature of true benevolence to desire and rejoice in the prosperity and pleasure of its object ; and that, in some proportion to its degree of prevalence. But persons may greatly pity those that are in extreme pain, whose positive pleasure they may still be very indifferent about. In this case, a man may be much moved and affected with uneasiness, who yet would be affected with no sensible joy in seeing signs of the same person's enjoyment of very high degrees of pleasure. Yea, pity may not only be without benevolence, but may consist with true malevolence, or with such ill will as shall cause men not only not to desire the positive happiness of another, but even to desire his calamity. They may pity such an one when his calamity goes beyond their hatred. A man may have true malevolence towards another, desir ing no positive good for him, but evil ; and yet his hatred not be infinite, but only to a certain degree". And when he sees the person whom he thus hates in misery far be yond his ill will, he may then pity him : because then the natural instinct begins to operate. For malevolence will not overcome the natural instinct, inclining to pity others Chap. VII. THE REASONS OF MANY MISTAKES. 137 in extreme calamity, any further than it goes, or to the limits of the degree of misery it wishes to its object. Men may pity others under exquisite torment, when yet they would have been grieved if they had seen their prosperity. And some have such a grudge against another, that they would be far from uneasy at their very death, nay, would even be glad of it. And when this is the case, it is mani fest that their heart is void of benevolence towards such persons, and under the power of malevolence. Yet at the same time, they are capable of pitying even these very persons, if they should see them under a degree of misery very much disproportioned to their ill will. These things may convince us, that natural pity is of a nature very different from true virtue, and not arising from a disposition of heart to general benevolence ; but is owing to a particular instinct, which the Creator has implanted, chiefly for. the preservation of mankind, though not ex clusive of their well being. The giving of this instinct is the fruit of God's mercy, and an instance of his love to the world of mankind, and an evidence, that though the world be so sinful, it is not God's design to make it a world of punishment ; and therefore has many ways made a merciful provision of relief in extreme calamities. The natural exercises of pity extend beyond those with whom we are nearly connected, especially in cases of great calamity ; because, commonly in such cases, men stand in need of the help of others besides their near friends, and because commonly those calamities which are extreme, without relief, tend to their destruction. This may be given as the reason why men are so made by the Author of nature, that they have no instinct inclining as much to rejoice at the sight of others' great prosperity and pleasure, as to be grieved at their extreme calamity, viz. because they do not stand in equal necessity of such an instinct as that in order to their preservation. But if pure benevolence were the source of natural pity, doubtless it would operate to as great a degree in congratulation, in cases of others' great prosperity, as in compassion towards them in great misery. Tne instincts which in some respects resemble a virtuous benevolence, are agreeable to the state that God designed mankind for here, where he intends their preservation and comfortable subsistence. But in the world of punishment — where the state of the wicked inhabitants will be exceeding different, and God will have none of these merciful de signs to answer — we have great reason to think, there will be no such thing as a disposition to pity, in any case ; as also no natural affection toward near relations, and no mutual affection between opposite sexes. To conclude, natural instinct, disposing men to pity others in misery, is also a source of a kind of abhorrence in men of some vices, as cruelty and oppression ; and so of a sort of approbation of the contrary virtues, humanity, mercy, &c. which aversion and approbation, however, so far as they arise from this cause only, are not from a prin ciple of true virtue. CHAP. VII. The reasons why those things that have been mentioned, which have not the essence of virtue, have yet by many been mistaken for true virtue. The first reason may be this, that although they have not the specific and distinguishing nature and essence of virtue, yet they have something that belongs to the general nature of virtue. The general nature of true virtue is love. It is expressed both in love of benevolence and complacence ; but primarily in benevolence to persons and beings, and consequently and secondarily in compla cence in virtue, as has been shown. There is something of the general nature of virtue in those natural affections and principles that have been mentioned, in both those re spects. In many of these natural affections there appears the tendency and effect of benevolence, in part. Others have truly a sort of private benevolence, but which in several respects falls short of the extent of true virtuous benevo lence, both in its nature and object. Pity to others in dis tress, though not properly of the nature of love, as has been demonstrated, yet has partly the same influence and effect with benevolence. One effect of true benevolence is for persons to be uneasy when the objects of it are in dis tress, and to desire their relief. And natural pity has the same effect. Natural gratitude, though not properly called love — be cause persons may be moved with a degree of gratitude towards others on certain occasions for whom they have no real and proper friendship ; as in the instance of Saul to wards David, once and again, after David's sparing his life, when he had so fair opportunity to kill him — yet has the like operation and effect with friendship, in part, for a season, and with regard to so much of the welfare of its object, as appears a deserved requital of kindness received. And in other instances, it may have a more general and abiding influence, so as more properly to be called by the name of love. So that many times men, from natural gratitude, do really with a sort of benevolence, love those who love them. From this, together with some other natural principles, men may love their near friends, their own party, their country, &c. The natural disposition there is to mutual affection between the sexes, often oper ates by what may properly be called love. There is often times truly a kind both of benevolence and complacence. As there also is between parents and children. Thus these things have something of the general nature of virtue. What they are essentially defective in, is, that the\ are private in their nature ; they do not arise from any temper of benevolence to being in general, nor have they a tendency to any such effect in their operation. But yet agreeing with virtue in its general nature, they are beautiful within their own private sphere, i. e. they appear beautiful if we confine our views to that private system, and while we shut out all other things to which they stand related from our consideration. If that private system contained the sum of universal existence, their benevolence would have true beauty ; or, in other words, would be beautiful, all things considered ; but now it is not so. These private systems are so far from containing the sum of universal being, or comprehending all existence to which we stand related, that it contains but an infinitely small part of it. The reason why men are so ready to take these private af fections for true virtue, is the narrowness of their views ; and above all, that they are so ready to leave the Divine Being out of their view, and to neglect him in their con sideration, or to regard him in their thoughts, as though he did not properly belong to the system of real existence, but was a kind of shadowy, imaginary being. And though most men allow that there is a God, yet, in their ordinary view of things, his being is not apt to come into the ac count, and to have the influence and effect of real existence, as it is with other heings which they see, and are conver sant with, by their external senses. In their views of beauty and deformity, and in their inward sensations of displicence and approbation, it is not natural to them to view the Deity as part of the system, and as the head of it, in comparison of whom all other things are to be viewed with corresponding impressions. Yea, we are apt, through the narrowness of our views, in judging of the beauty of affections and actions, to limit our consideration to only a small part of the created sys tem. When private affections extend themselves to a con siderable number, we are ready to look upon them as truly virtuous, and accordingly to applaud them highly. Thus it is with respect to a man's love to a large party, or a country. For though his private system contains but a small part even of the world of mankind, yet, being a con siderable number, they — through the contracted limits of his mind, and the narrowness of his views — are ready to engross his sight, and to seem as if they were all. Hence, among the Romans, love to their country was the highest virtue ; though this affection of theirs, so much extolled, was employed as it were for the destruction of the rest of mankind. The larger the number is, to which that private affection extends, the more apt men are, through the nar rowness of their sight, to mistake it for true virtue ; because then the private system appears to have more of the image of the universal. And this is the reason why self-love is not mistaken for true virtue. For though there be something of the 138 THE NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE. general nature of virtue in it, as love and good wi'l, yet the object is so private, the limits so narrow, that it by no means engrosses the view ; unless it be of the person him self, who through the greatness of his pride may imagine himself as it were all. The minds of men are large enough to take in a vastly greater extent. And though self-love is far from being useless in the world, yea, it is exceeding necessary to society ; yet every body sees that if it be not subordinate to, and regulated' by, another more extensive principle, it may make a man a common enemy to the general system. And this is as true of any other private affection, notwithstanding its extent may be to a system that contains millions of individuals. And though private systems bear no greater proportion to the whole of univer sal existence, than one alone ; yet, they bear a greater pro portion to the view and comprehension of men's minds, and are more apt to be regarded as if they were all, or at least as some resemblance of the universal system. Thus I have observed how many of these natural princi ples resemble virtue in its primary operation, which is benevolence. Many of them also have a resemblance of it in its secondary operation, which is its approbation of and complacence in virtue itself. Several kinds of approba tion of virtue, are not of the nature of a truly virtuous approbation, consisting in a sense and relish ofthe essential beauty of virtue. As particularly, the approbation of con science, from a sense of the inferior and secondary beauty which there is in virtue, consisting in uniformity ; and from a sense of desert, consisting in a sense ofthe natural agreement of loving and being beloved, showing kindness and receiving kindness. So, from the same principle, there is a disapprobation of vice, from a natural opposition to deformity and disproportion ; and a sense of evil desert, or the natural agreement there is between hating and being hated, opposing and being opposed, &c. together with a painful sensation naturally arising from a sense of self- opposition and inconsistence. Approbation of conscience is the more readily mistaken for a truly virtuous approba tion, because by the wise constitution of the great Governor of the world, when conscience is well informed, and thoroughly awakened, it agrees with him fully and exactly, as to the object approved, though not as to the ground and reason of approving. It approves all virtue, and condemns all vice, ft approves true virtue, and indeed approves nothing that is against it, or that falls short of it ; as was shown before. Natural conscience is implanted in all mankind, to be as it were in God's stead, as an internal judge or rule, whereby to distinguish right and wrong. It has also been observed, how that virtue, consisting in benevolence, is approved ; and vice, consisting in ill will, is disliked ; from the influence of self-love, together with the association of ideas. In the same manner, men dislike those qualities in things without life or reason, with which they have always connected the ideas of hurtfulness, ma lignancy, pemiciousness ; but approve those things with which they habitually connect the ideas of profit, pleasant ness, &c. This approbation of virtue, and dislike of vice, is easily mistaken for true virtue, not only because those things are approved by it that have the nature of virtue, and the things disliked have the nature of vice; but be cause here is a great resemblance of virtuous approbation, it being complacence from love ; the difference only lying in this, that it is not from love to being in general, but from self-love. There is also, as before shown, a liking of some virtues, and a dislike of some vices, from the influence of the natural instinct of pity. This we are apt to mistake for the exer cise of true virtue on many accounts. Here is not only a kind of complacence, and the objects of complacence have the nature of virtue, and the virtues themselves are verv amiable, such as humanity, mercy, tenderness of heart, Ike. and the contrary very odious ; but besides, the approbation is not merely from self-love, but from compassion ; an af fection that respects others, and resembles benevolence, as before explained. Another reason why the things mentioned are mistaken for true virtue, is, that there is indeed a true negative moral goodness in them. By a negative moral goodness, 1 mean the negation or absence of true moral evil. They have this negative moral goodness, because being without them would be an evidence of a much greater moral evil. Thus the exercise of natural conscience in such and such de grees, wherein appears such a measure of sensibility, though it be not of the nature of real positive virtue, or true mora! goodness, yet has a negative moral goodness ; because in the present state of things, it is an evidence of the absence of that higher degree of wickedness, which causes great insensibility, or stupidity of conscience. For sin is not only against a spiritual and divine sense of virtue, but is also against the dictates of that moral sense which is in natural conscience. No wonder, that this sense, being long op posed and often conquered, grows weaker. AU sin has its source from selfishness, or from self-love, not subordinate to a regard to being in general. And natural conscience chiefly consists in a sense of desert, or the natural agree ment between sin and misery. But if self were indeed all, and so more considerable than all the world besides, there would be no ill desert in a man regarding himself above all, and making all other interests give place to private in terest. And no wonder that men, by long acting from the selfish principle, and by being habituated to treat them selves as if they were all, increase in pride, and come to look on themselves as all, and so to lose entirely the sense of ill desert in their making all other interests give place to their own. And no wonder that any, by often repeating acts of sin without punishment, or visible appearance of approaching punishment, have less and less present sense of the connexion of sin with punishment. That sense which an awakened conscience has of the desert of sin, consists chiefly in a sense of its desert of re sentment from the Deity, the fountain and head of univer sal existence. But no wonder that, by a long continued worldly and sensual life, men more and more lose all sense of the Deity, who is a spiritual and invisible Being. The mind being long involved in, and engrossed by, sensitive objects, becomes sensual in all its operations, and excludes all views and impressions of spiritual objects, and is unfit for their contemplation. Thus conscience and general be nevolence, are entirely different principles; and thus a sense of conscience differs from the holy complacence of a benevolent and truly virtuous heart. Yet wickedness may by long habitual exercise greatly diminish a sense of con science. So that there may be negative moral goodness, in sensibility of conscience, as it may be an argument of the absence of that higher degree of wickedness, which causeth stupidity of conscience. So with respect to natural gratitude ; though there may be no virtue merely in loving them that love us, yet the contrary may be an evidence of a great degree of depravity, as it may argue a higher degree of selfishness, so that a man is come to look upon himself as all, and others as nothing, and so their respect and kindness as nothing. Thus an increase of pride diminishes gratitude. So doth sensu ality, or the increase of sensual appetites ; which, coming more and more under the power and impression of sensible objects, tends by degrees to make the mind insensible to any thing else. Those appetites take up the whole soul ; and, through habit and custom, the water is all drawn out of other channels, in which it naturally flows, and is all carried as it were into one channel. In like manner, natural affection, and natural pity, though not of the nature of virtue, may be diminished greatly by the increase of pride and sensuality ; and, as the consequence of this, be habitually disposed to envy, ma lice, &c. These lusts, when they prevail to a high degree, may overcome and diminish the exercise of those natural principles; even as they often overcome and diminish common prudence in a man, who seeks his own private interest in point of health, wealth, or honour ; and yet no one will think it proves that a man being cunning in seek ing his own personal and temporal interest, has any thing of the nature and essence of true virtue. Another reason why these natural principles and affec tions are mistaken for true virtue, is, that in several re spects they have the same effect which true virtue tends to ; especially in these two ways : 1. The present state of the world is so constituted by the wisdom and goodness of its supreme Ruler, that these natural principles, for the most part, tend to the good of mankind. So do natural pity, gratitude, parental affec- Chap. VII. THE REASONS OF MANY MISTAKES. 139 tion, &c. Herein they agree with the tendency of general benevolence, which seeks and tends to the general good. But this is no proof that these natural principles have the nature of true virtue. For self-love is exceeding useful and necessary ; and so are the natural appetites of hunger, thirst, &c. Yet nobody will assert that these have the nature of true virtue. 2. These principles have a like effect with true virtue in this respect, that they tend several ways to restrain vice, and prevent many acts of wickedness. So natural affec tion, love to our party, or to particular friends, tends to keep us from acts of injustice towards these persons ; which would be real wickedness. Pity preserves from cruelty, which would be real and great moral evil. Na tural conscience tends to restrain sin in general. But this cannot prove these principles themselves to be ofthe na ture of true virtue. For so is this present state ordered by a merciful God, that even self-love often restrains from acts of true wickedness ; and not only so, but puts men upon seeking true virtue ; yet is not itself true virtue, but is the source of all the wickedness that is in the world. Another reason why these inferior affections, especially some of them, are accounted virtuous, is, that there are affections of the same denomination which are truly virtu ous. Thus, for instance, there is a truly virtuous pity> or a compassion to others, under affliction or misery, from general benevolence. Pure benevolence would be suf ficient to excite pity to another in calamity, if there were no particular instinct, or any other principle determining the mind thereto. It is easy to see how benevolence, which seeks another's good, should cause us to desire his deliver ance from evil. And this is a source of pity far more ex tensive than the other. It excites compassion in cases that are overlooked by natural instinct ; and even in those cases to which instinct extends, it mixes its influence with the natural principle, and guides and regulates its operations. And when this is the case, the pity which is exercised, # In this chapter our very ingenious and judicious author has assigned several reasons why many things are commonly thought to be virtuous which in reality are not so, or have no claim to moral goodness in the pro per acceptation of these words. It is with some reluctance that we notice in this place a writer, who by his masterly attack on modern infidelity and atheism, has rendered such important service to the cause of truth and virtue; but who seems either to have been dissatisfied with these reasons, or to have omitted a strict ex amination of them when duty required it. Wo shall not here inquire into the candour of Mr. Robert Hall's remarks, in associating President Ed wards with modern infidels on the subject of virtue ; nor on the congruity of the business, whereby a definition implying, and an explication declar ing, the love of God to be essential to true virtue, is made to coincide with a definition adopted by infidels, and consistent with atheism itself. These are his words : " It is somewhat singular, that many of the fashionable infidels have hit upon a definition of virtue which perfectly coincides with that of certain metaphysical divines in America, first invented and defended by that most acute reasoner, Jonathan Edwards. They both place virtue exclusively in a passion for the general good; or, as Mr. Edwards expresses it, love to being in general : so that our love is always to be proportioned to the mag nitude of its object in the scale of being ; which is liable to the objections I have already stated, as well as to many others which the limits of this note will not permit me to enumerate. Let it suffice to remark, (1) That vir tue, on these principles, is an utter impossibility : for the system of being, comprehending the great Supreme, is infinite ; and therefore, to maintain the proper proportion, the force of particular attachment must be infinitely less than the passion for the general good: but the limits of the human mind are not capable of any emotions so infinitely different in degree. (2) Since our views of the extent of the universe are capable of perpetual en largement, admitting the sum of existence is ever the same, we must re turn back at each step to diminish the strength of particular affections, or they will become disproportionate ; and consequently, on these principles, vicious: so that the balance must be continually fluctuating, by the weights being taken out of one scale and put one into the other. (3) If vir tue consist exclusively in love to being in general, or attachment to the general good, the particular affections are, to every purpose of virtue, use less, ana even pernicious ; for their immediate, nay, their necessary ten dency is to attract to their objects a proportion of attention which far ex ceeds their comparative value in the general scale. To allege that tbe general good is promoted by them, will be of no advantage to the defence of this system, but the contrary, by confessing that a greater sum of happi ness is attained by a deviation from, than an adherence to, its principles; unless its advocates mean by the love of being in general, the same thing as the private affections, which is to confound all the distinctions of lan guage, as well as all the operations of mind. Let it be remembered we have no dispute respecting what is the ultimate end of virtue, which is al lowed on both sides to be the greatest sum of happiness in the universe. The question is merely what is virtue itself; or, m other words, what are the means appointed for the attainment of that end ? There is little doubt, from some parts of Mr. Godwin's work, entitled ' Political Justice,'' as well as from his early habits of reading, that he was indebted to Mr. Edwards for his principal arguments against the pri vate affections ; though, with a daring consistence, he has pursued his prin ciples to an extreme from which that most excellent man would have re volted with horror. —The fundamental error of the whole system arose, as I conceive, from a mistaken pursuit of simplicity ; from a wish to construct a moral system, without leaving sufficient scope for the infinite variety of moral phenomena and mental combination ; in consequence of which its advocates were induced to place virtue exclusively in some one disposition of mind ; and, since the passion for the general good is undeniably the may be called a virtuous compassion. So there is a virtu ous gratitude; or a gratitude that arises not only from self-love, but from a superior principle of disinterested general benevolence. As, when we receive kindness from such as we love already, we are more disposed to gratitude, and disposed to greater degrees of it, than when the mind is destitute of any such friendly prepossession. Therefore, when the superior principle of virtuous love has a govern ing hand, and regulates the affair, it may be called a virtu ous gratitude. There is also a virtuous love of justice, arising from pure benevolence to being in general ; as that naturally ana necessarily inclines the heart, that every par ticular being should have such a share of benevolence as is proportioned to its dignity, consisting in the degree of its being, and the degree of its virtue. And thus it is easy to see, how there may be a virtuous sense of desert different from what is natural and common; and a virtuous con scientiousness^ or a sanctified conscience. And as, when natural affections have their operations mixed with the in fluence of virtuous benevolence, and are directed and de- termmed thereby, they may be called virtuous ; so there may be a virtuous love of parents to children, and between other near relatives ; a virtuous love of our town, or coun try, or nation. Yea, and a virtuousr\ove between the sexes, as there may be the influence of virtue mingled with instinct ; and virtue may govern with regard to the par ticular manner of its operation, and may guide it to such ends as are agreeable to the great purposes of true virtue. * Genuine virtue prevents that increase of the habits of pride and sensuality, which tend to diminish the exercises of the useful and necessary principles of nature. And a principle of general benevojence softens and sweetens the mind, makes it more susceptible of the proper influence of the gentler natural instincts, directs every one into its proper channel, determines the exercise to the proper manner and measure, and guides all to the best purposes * noblest and most extensive of all others, when it was once resolved to place- virtue in any one thing, there remained little room to hesitate which should: be preferred. It might have been worth while to reflect, that in the na tural world there are two kinds of attraction ; one, which holds several parts of individual bodies in contact ; another, which maintains the union of bodies themselves with the general system : and that, though the union in the former case is much more intimate than in the latter, each is. equally essential to the order of the world. Similar to this is the relation which the public and private affections bear to each other, and their use in, the moral system." (Modern Infidelity considered, p. 62, &c. Note, sixth edition.) On this note, so very uncongenial with the body of the work ; we were going to say, as unseemly, when connected with the discourse, as a deform ing wart on a fair countenance, justice constrains us to make a few re marks. 1. " Singular" indeed would it be to find an Atheist, or an infidel, who should even approve of Edwards's definition, and still more " singular" to find them maintaining, in conformity with his explanation of that defini tion, that supreme love to God is of the essence of true virtue. But so far are their definitions from " coinciding," that they differ toto cmlo. A pas sionate attachment for the wolfare of a country, or " a passion for tbe ge neral good," in any sense wherein this expression can be ascribed to infi dels, is a representation not more different from that of President Edwards, than Mr. Hall is different from Voltaire or D'Alembert. Our author's meaning, as explained by himself, is as truly sublime as theirs is truly selfish and contracted. For their definition had no regard to the Being of beings ; but this adorable Being is necessarily included in Mr. E's definition, and essential to it. We say, is " included," because the Supreme Being, toge ther with every derived existence, is contained in "being in general." 2. If by " a metaphysical divine" be meant " a most acute reasoner," we feel no objection in having the term " metaphysical" applied to our au thor, for few, if any, have deserved it better. If error and absurdity ap peal to metaphysical discussions, and involve the truth in a labyrinth of sophisms, surely hard would be the case of a man who should be called by an opprobrious name, for venturing into that labyrinth by the light of es sential principles, in order to detect and expose false reasoning. 3. Mr. H. objects to the sentiment, " that our love is always to be propor tioned to the magnitude of its object in the scale of being." We presume, however, he will allow, that the whole system of being is in itself the most worthy of being prized, other things being equal. But if so, the nature of true virtue requires this regard to the whole system of being, compared with its parts. Nor does it follow from this, that the same principle, in the Progress of its operations, disregards the smaller circle of attachments. urely a virtuous person, loving God supremely, is not, on that account, less 'qualified for personal and domestic duties. Besides, Mr. E. does not maintain that our love is always to be proportioned to the magnitude of its object in the scale of being, except where other things are equal. This he expressly and repeatedly mentions — " other things being equal." To this important distinction Mr. H. does not appear to have adverted ; his re presentation of the case, therefore, is defective, and calculated to mislead the unwary. 4. Mr. H's statement in the first objection, does not distinguish between the nature of the attachment and its force or degree. A uttle reflection will fully show, that these are entirely distinct considerations. The great est force, or the highest degree of attachment, may exist, when the nature of it is not at all virtuous. If, indeed, attachment be made to include ac curate knowledge, a divine relish, and deliberate estee?n in appreciating the worth of any object, then the degree of attachment may be justly con sidered as proportionate to the " magnitude of the object in the scale of being," but not otherwise. A truly virtuous mother, for instance, may have a great force of affection for her child, or husband, and be more conscious of 140 THE NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE. CHAP. VIII. In what respects virtue or moral good is founded in senti ment ; and how far it is founded in the reason and nature of things. Virtue is a certain kind of beautiful nature, form or quality. That form or quality is called beautiful, which appears in itself agreeable or comely, or the view of which it than of her love to God ; but let her be put to the test of deliberate esteem, and she would sooner part with child, husband, or life itself, than renounce her supreme love to God. 5. Our author's representation of true virtue, by no means implies, as Mr. H. supposes, that the degree or force of attachment, in its operation, should bear an exact proportion to the magnitude of its object The nature of virtue indeed is to be denominated according to its object, but its degree must necessarily be measured pro captu agentis. The nature of love to God may be the same in the heart of a child, as in that of an angel, because the object of it is the same ; but the degree of it will be as differently varied as the views and capacities of the subjects. It is not a little surprising how Mr. H. came to imagine, that our author held the sentiment he is pleased to ascribe to him, a sentiment so absurd as to be held, we apprehend, by no person in the world ; a sentiment which requires an infinite force of affec tion from a finite being, an affection equal in degree to that of his Maker. 6. So far is the exercise of virtue, according to Mr. E's definition, from being an impossibility, that we think he has fully proved, there can be no true virtue on any other principle. To illustrate this, suppose a man has a strong attachment to himsiljf but none to his family ; will that force of af fection constitute him virtuous? Again, suppose his affection, with any as signable force, be extended to his family, but repels the well-founded claims of a whole nation, can that be virtuous ? Or if he extend his force of affec tion to a whole nation, if it repels all the human race beside, can it be vir tuous ? Moreover, suppose tus ardent affection embrace the whole human kind, can it be virtuous while it repels all other created beings ? Or if, to gether with himself, he feels an affectionate attachment, in different and proportionate degrees, to every created being, but repels the Creator of all, can that forcible and orderly affection be denominated truly virtuous ? If the reply be in the affirmative, then an atheist may be virtuous, which is absurd. Therefore, attachment to the Supreme Being, or to being in ge neral, is essential to the very nature of true virtue. 7. No one yet denied, except those who deny the being of a God, that su preme love to him is virtuous, if any thing be so. The great Supreme is infinite, and if he ought not to be loved according to his greatness, what constitutes the crime of Idolatry ? And if supreme love to an infinite being were inconsistent with subordinate attachments, we ought to extinguish the supremacy of our love to God, before we could discharge our duty to our fellow-creatures, which every one must allow to be preposterous. 8. As the second objection is founded on the same principle which was assumed in the first, it has been already virtually answered. But it may be controverted on another account That *' extended views" diminish the strength of particular affections, does not appear consonant with expe rience. Is it consistent with experience, that the acquisition of a second friend must rob the first of a moiety of his friendly affection ? Does a pa rent experience any diminution of affection to a first child, in proportion to a subsequent increase of number ? Has a tenth child but a tenth part of a mother's former affection to her first ? Does a man love his neighbour the less because his views are extended to an infinite object ? Or when the heart, or supremacy of affection, is fixed on God, is virtuous affection to man diminished? 9. Besides, this objection proceeds on another gratuitous principle, viz. that there may be true virtue, or virtuous affection, when our views of existence do not include God. For if we vieto him, we view an object in finite and unchangeable, who is all in all, and the sum of existence. That our views of the extent of the created universe are capable of perpetual enlargement is no good reason why " particular affections" should fluc tuate, become disproportionate, or vicious ; any more than the love of God should constitute the love of our neighbour criminal. So that there is no necessity for " the balance to be continually fluctuating by the weights being taken out of one scale and put into the other ;" except it be by cor recting past mistakes, as those do, who, when grown up to manhood, put away childish things. 10. Virtuous love, however forcible to oneself, to relatives, to a nation, to mankind, or to the whole created universe, is not virtuous because of this particular, private, or limited attachment, but because of its tendency to God, except we prostitute the term virtue to signify something claimed equally by the worst and the best of men. And this general attachment, or love to God and universal being, does not at all counteract, or even lessen, the commendable force of private ones, any more than the force of general gravity tends to destroy the force of cohesion. 11. Mr. H's third ana last objection, like the preceding ones, rests on a mistaken apprehension of Mr. E's real sentiment Mr. H. still confounds the nature of attachment with its degree. If virtue, according to Mr. E. consists exclusively in love to being in general, his meaning is, that no force of affection which has not universal being for its ultimate object, can be virtuous, in the most proper sense of the word. He cannot mean that there is no virtuous love to particular beings; for, in perfect consistency with his views, even a love of ourselves may be virtuous, as well as a love of our neighbour. What he maintains, then, is, that the love of ourselves, of our neighbour, our nation, or any private system whatever, if detached from a tendency of affection to universal being, is not truly virtuous. And what is this, more or less, than what all judicious divines have maintained, that he who does not really love God, does not truly love his neighbour ? If Mr. E. uses language more philosophically exact, and investigates the principle ou which a commonly received truth is founded, he certainly deserves commendation, rather than blame. 12. On Mr. E's principles, the particular affections are so far from being " useless," that their operations are not at all affected by those principles, except in being more exalted and refined. When the heart is enlarged to the love of being in general, it includes all particular objects; ana then the attachment to them is for the sake of the whole system of being. Thus a truly virtuous Jove of our neighbour, springs from our love to God : or without a supreme regard to God, there is no genuine, or, in the highest sense, praiseworthy, love to our neighbour. And so far are particular affec tions from being " pernicious," on Mr. E's principles, that they are highly useful Those objects which contain, or are apprehended to contain, only a secondary beauty, attract a particular affection which is useful in various respects, as explained by our author ; and those which contain the primary beauty, attract affections still more useful. For governors, and subjects, and friends, and relatives to feel attachment to their subjects, governors, friends, and relatives, must be useful, even when not virtuous; but when these attachments are animated, regulated, and ennobled by the love of is immediately pleasant to the mind. I say, agreeable in itself, and immediately pleasant, to distinguish it from things which in themselves are not so, but either indifferent or dis agreeable ; which yet appear eligible, and agreeable m- directly, for something else with which they are connected. Such indirect agreeableness, or eligibleness in things not for themselves, but for something else, is not beauty. But when a form or quality appears lovely, pleasing, and de lightful in itself, then it is called beautiful; and this agree- God, or benevolence to universal being, they must be still more so. Be nevolent affections are like a pleasant flame ; a flame which is not lessened by an addition of fuel. Zeal at home is not found in fact to be weakened by the extension of zealous and benevolent affections abroad. National reform, and religious revival, will not be impeded by a truly benevolent missionary spirit Neither will the love of God, or of universal being, prove detrimental to " particular affections." 13. Respecting the "particular affections," Mr. H. remarks, that " their immediate, nay their necessary tendency is, to attract to their object a pro portion of attention, which far exceeds their comparative value in the general scale." But surely " attention" is a very different thing from "attachment" A man who is about to buy ahorse, has his attention at tracted very forcibly to the size, the shape, the age, and the action of the animal; but does this imply attachment. Tbe word Satan may attract our " attention" to the malevolent being signified by it ; but does this prove that the " immediate, nay the necessary tendency" ofthe word is to attract to this object any degree of " attachment ?" It would be difficult to find either man, woman, or child, but has much " attention attracted" to what he does not esteem, and to which he feels no attachment If a person feels an attachment to any object not founded on the " comparative value" of that object, let the " particular affection" be denominated as we please, but let us not attach to it the idea of true virtue. For why should we be tempted to call that truly virtuous which has no relation to God, the object and fountain of all excellence ? 14. It is but justice to our author to say, that his definition of virtue, against which Mr. H. objects, by no means countenances that perversion of our powers wliich is but too justly ascribed to modern infidels. No one acting on the principles of this Dissertation, will be less amiable in private life, than when acting on any others which Mr. H. might point out This hypothesis, which we oelieve is the scriptural one, and which, in substance, has been maintained by theological writers and holy men of every age, pours no shilling influence on the affections, encourages no unscriptural dis regards or antipathies in society, nor does it countenance any neglect of private duties under pretence of public utility. We are assured, by an authority from which, in the views of Christians, there lies no appeal, that " to love God with all our heart," is tbe first and great commandment We would fain know, if knowable, wherein this requisition differs from that which is implied in Mr. E's notion of true virtue? Moreover, whether loving God with all our heart is calculated to render " the particular affections, to every purpose of virtue, useless, and even pernicious ?" And, once more, whether that act of the mind which is compatible with a rejec tion of what the divine oracle thus requires, cau in any propriety of lan guage, among Christians, be termed virtuous ? 15. " To allege," Mr. H. observes, " that the general good is promoted by them will be no advantage to the defence of tins system." We apprehend he means, that some may be disposed to allow, that the private affections, though not virtuous, may yet promote the general good, on some other ac count But the objector is under a mistake, if he suppose, as he apparently does, that Mr. E. held any notion of true virtue which will admit no private or "particular affections to be virtuous. In fact, the system explained iu this Dissertation excludes no particular affection : but fully admits that any, yea, that all of them ma if be virtuous, by a proper direction. Supreme love to God, or attachment to universal being, is virtue per se ; but any other affection, however public or private, particular or general, is a virtue ouly relatively ; that is, only so far as it is a tendency to universal being. When the affection terminates on any particular object witbout any relation in its tendency to universal existence, it is not a mean of ultimate happiness iu itself commendable, and therefore is not virtuous. 16. " We have no dispute," says Mr. H. " respecting what is the ulti mate end of virtue — the question is. What is virtue itself?" Very true; what is it ? We say, a love, an attachment, or a tendency of mind, to ge neral or universal existence ; whatever be the immediate object of the will or affections. If the affection be, for instance, that of parent to a child, however strong in its operation, it is no further truly virtuous, than there is a regard to God in it : or, a tendency to general being. But what is virtue itself, according to Mr H. ? The answer is not given. Had Mr. H. thought proper to give us a definition of virtue, we might compare notes, and form an estimate. It is much easier to find fault than to amend it ; but this we feel disposed to promise, that if the objector produce what he thinks abet ter definition than what he opposes, we will endeavour to examine it with impartiality. 17. Mr. H. supposes that the author of the work entitled " Political Jus tice" was " indebted to Mr. Edwards for his principal arguments against the private affections." Surely that author must possess a most perverse kind of ingenuity, who could deduce any thing from the works of President. Edwards against the private affections. Such ingenuity as an infidel some times employs, when he is indebted to the writers of the Old er New Testa ment for bis principal arguments against religion, and in favour of infidelity. IS. "A mistaken pursuit of simplicity," Mr. H. supposes, attaches to this system, whereby its advocates " place virtue exclusively in some one dis position of mind." We conceive, there is just as much propriety in this remark, as in the following : A mistaken pursuit of simplicity led a certain writer to place conformity to law " exclusively" in some one disposition of mind, where he says, that the law is fulfilled in one word, lovk. We are not aware that it is a matter of doubt, whether morai acts, and conse quently virtue, proceed from the will, or the heart ? and, as every exercise of will or affection is not virtuous, it requires no long "pursuit of simplicity" to determine that the virtuous character of the affection must arise from its nature, rather than its degree ; and from its being directed to a worthy, rather than an unworthy object 19. Mr. H. illustrates his meaning by two kinds of attraction; andsodoes Mr. E. illustrate his. Private affections, or instincts, irrespective of their virtuous quality, may be represented by the attraction of cohesion, where by the several parts of individual bodies are held in contact A truly vir tuous affection may be represented by the attraction of gravitation, which maintains the union of bodies themselves with the general system. And, " though the union in the former case is much more intimate than in the latter," and " each is equally essential to the order of the worid:" yet private affections, irrespective of their tendency to God, can with no more propriety be respected as virtues, than cohesion can be termed gravita tion.— W. Chap. VIII. WHETHER VIRTUE BE EOUNDED IN SENTIMENT. 141 ableness or gratefulness of the idea is beauty. It is evident, that the way we come by the idea of beauty, is by immediate sensation of the gratefulness of the idea called beautiful; and not by finding out by argumentation any consequences, or other things with which it stands con nected ; any more than tasting the sweetness of honey, or perceiving the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on connexions and consequences. The manner of being af fected with the immediate presence of the beautiful idea, depends not on any reasonings about the idea, after we have it, before we can find out whether it be beautiful or not ; but on the frame of our minds, whereby they are so made, that such' an idea, as soon as we have it, is grateful, or appears beautiful. Therefore, if this be all that is meant by them who affirm that virtue is founded in sentiment, and not in reason, that they who see the beauty of true virtue do not perceive it by argumentation on its connexions and consequences, but by the frame of their own minds, or a certain spiritual sense given them of God — whereby they immediately perceive pleasure in the presence of the idea of true virtue in their minds, or are directly gratified in the view or contempla tion of this object — this is certainly true. But if thereby be meant, that the frame of mind, or inward sense given them by God, whereby the mind is disposed to delight in the idea of true virtue, is given arbitrarily, so that if he had pleased he might have given a contrary sense and determination of mind, which would have agreed as well with the necessary nature of things, this I think is not true. Virtue, as I have observed, consists in the cordial con sent or union of being to being in general. And that frame of mind, whereby it is disposed to relish and be pleased with the view of this, is benevolence, or union of heart, to being in general ; or it is an universally benevo lent frame of mind. Because, he whose temper is to love being in general, must therein have a disposition to approve and be pleased with love to being in general. Therefore, now the question is, whether God, in giving this temper to a created mind, acts so arbitrarily, that there is nothing in the necessary nature of things to hinder, but that a con trary temper might have agreed or consisted as well with that nature of things as this ? And in the first place, to assert this would be a plain absurdity, and contrary to the very supposition. For here it is supposed, that virtue in its very essence consists in agreement or consent of being to being. Now certainly agreement itself to being in general must necessarily agree better with general existence, than opposition and contra riety to it. I observe, secondly, that God in giving to the creature such a temper of mind, gives that which is agreeable to what is by absolute necessity his own temper and, nature. For, as observed, God himseif is in effect being in general; and without all doubt it is in itself necessary, that God should agree with himself, be united with himself, or love himself: and therefore, when he gives the same temper to his creatures, this is more agreeable to his necessary nature, than the opposite temper : yea, the latter would be infinitely contrary to his nature. Let it be noted, thirdly, that by this temper only can created beings be united to and agree with one another. This appears, because it consists in consent and union to being in general ; which implies agreement and union with every particular being, except in such cases wherein union with them is by some means inconsistent with union to general existence. But certainly, if any particular created being were of a temper to oppose being in general, that would infer the most universal and greatest possible dis cord, not only of creatures with their Creator, but of created beings one with another. Fourthly, There is no other temper but this, whereby a man can agree with himself, or be without self-inconsistence, i. e. without having some inclinations and relishes repug nant to others ; and that for these reasons. Every being that has understanding and will necessarily loves happiness. For, to suppose any being not to love happiness, would be to suppose he did not love what was agreeable to him ; which is a contradiction : or at least would imply, that nothing was agreeable or eligible to him, which is the same as to say that he has no such thing as choice, or any faculty of will. So that every being who has a faculty of will, must of necessity have an inclination to happiness. And therefore, if he be consistent with himself, and has not some inclinations repugnant to others, he must approve of those inclinations whereby beings desire the happiness of being in general, and must be against a disposition to the misery of being in general : because otherwise he would approve of opposition to his own happiness. For if a temper in clined to the misery of being in general prevailed univer sally, it is apparent, it would tend to universal misery. But he that loves a tendency to universal misery, in effect loves a tendency to his own misery : and as he necessarily hates his own misery, he has then one inclination repug nant to another. And besides, it necessarily follows from self-love, that men love to be loved by others ; because in this others' love agrees with their own love. But if men loved hatred to being in general, they would in effect love the hatred of themselves ; and so would be inconsistent with themselves, having one natural inclination contrary to another. These things may help us to understand why that spiritual and divine sense, by which those who are truly virtuous and holy perceive the excellency of true virtue, is in the sacred Scriptures called by the name of light, know ledge, understanding, &c. If this divine sense were a thing arbitrarily given, without any foundation in the nature of things, it would not properly be called by such names. For if there were no correspondence, or agreement, in such a sense with the nature of things, any more than there would have been in a contrary sense, the idea we obtain by this spiritual sense could in no respect be said to be a knowledge or perception of any thine besides what was in our own minds. For this idea would be no representation of any thing without. But since it is agreeable, in the re spects above mentioned, to the nature of things; and especially since it is the representation of the moral per fection and excellency of the Divine Being ; hereby we have a perception of that moral excellency, of which we could have no true idea without it. And hereby persons have that true knowledge of God, which greatly enlightens the mind in the knowledge of divine things in general, and which, as might be shown, if it were necessary to the main purpose of this discourse, in many respects, assists persons to a right understanding of things in general; viz. to see the nature and truth of them, in their proper evidence. Whereas, the want of this spiritual sense, and the preva lence of those dispositions which are contrary to it, tends to darken and distract the mind, and dreadfully to delude and confound men's understandings. Nor can that moral sense, common to mankind, which there is in natural conscience, be truly said to be no more than a sentiment arbitrarily given by the Creator, without any relation to the necessary nature of things : but rather, this is established in agreement with the nature of things ; so established, as no sense of mind that can be supposed of a contrary nature and tendency could be. This will ap pear by these two things : 1. This moral sense — if the understanding be well in formed, exercised at liberty, and in an extensive manner, without being restrained to a private sphere — approves the very same things which a spiritual and divine sense ap proves ; and those things only ; though not on the same grounds, nor with the same kind of approbation. There fore, as that divine sense is agreeable to the necessary na ture of things, as already shown ; so this inferior moral sense, being so far correspondent to that, must also so far agree with the nature of things. 2. It has been shown, that this moral sense consists in approving the uniformity and natural agreement there is be tween one thing and another. So that, by the supposition, it is agreeable to the nature of things. For therein it con sists, viz. a disposition of mind to consent to, or like, the agreement of the nature of things, or the agreement of the nature and form of one thing with another. And certainly, such a temper of mind is more agreeable to the nature of things than an opposite temper. The use of language is to express our sentiments, or ideas, to each other ; so that those terms by which things of a moral nature are signified, express those moral senti ments which are common to mankind. Therefore, that 142 THE NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE. mokal sense which is in natural conscience, chiefly governs the use of language, and is the mind's rule of lan guage in these matters. It is indeed the general natural rule which God has given to all men, whereby to judge of moral good and evil. By such words, right and wrong, good and evil, when used in a moral sense, is meant m common speech, that which deserves praise or blame, re spect or resentment ; and mankind in general have a sense of desert, by this natural moral sense- Therefore, here is a question which may deserve to be considered : seeing sentiment is the rule of language, as to what is called good and evil, worthy and unworthy ; and it is apparent that sentiment, at least as to many particulars, is different, in different persons, especially in different na tions — that being thought to deserve praise by one, which by others is thought to be worthy of blame — how there fore can virtue and vice be any other than arbitrary ; not at all determined by the nature of things, but by the senti ments of men with relation to the nature of things ? In order to the answering of this question with clear ness, it may be divided into two : viz. Whether men's sen timents of moral good and evil are casual and accidental ? And, whether their way of using words in what they call good and evil, is not arbitrary, without respect to any common sentiment conformed to the nature of things ? As to the_.rs., I would observe, that the general dispo sition or sense of mind, exercised in a sense of desert of esteem or resentment, may be the same in all : though as to particular objects and occasions with regard to which it is exercised, it may be very various in different men, or bodies of men, through the partiality or error that may at tend the view or attention of the mind. In all, a notion of desert of love or resentment, may consist in the same thing, in general — a suitableness, or natural uniformity and agree ment, between the affections and acts of the agent, and the affections and treatment of others some way concerned and yet occasions and objects, through a variety of appre hensions about them, and the various manner in which they are viewed, by reason of the partial attention of the mind, may be extremely various. Besides, example, custom, education, and association, may contribute to this, in ways innumerable. But it is needless to enlarge here, since what has been said by others, Mr. Hutchison in particular, may abundantly show, that the differences which are to be found among different persons and nations, concerning moral good and evil, are not inconsistent with a general moral sense, common to all mankind. Nor, secondly, is the use of the words, good and evil, right and wrong, when used in a moral sense, altogether unfixed and arbitrary, according to the variety of notions, opinions, and views, that occasion the forementioned va riety of sentiment. For though the signification of words is determined by particular use, yet that which governs in the use of terms, is general or common use. And man kind, in what they would signify by terms, are obliged to aim at a consistent use : because it is easily found that the end of language, which is to be a common medium of manifesting ideas and sentiments, cannot be obtained any other way than by a consistent use of words ; both that men should be consistent with themselves, and one with another, in the use of them. But men cannot call any thing right or wrong, worthy or ill-deserving, consistently, any other way than by calling things so, which truly de serve praise or blame, i. e. things, wherein all things con sidered there is most uniformity in connecting with them praise or blame. There is no other way in which they can use these terms consistently with themselves. Thus if thieves or traitors may be angry with informers that bring them to justice, and call their behaviour by odious names; yet herein they are inconsistent with themselves ; be cause, when they put themselves in the place of those who have injured them, they approve the same things they con demn. And therefore, such are capable of being con vinced, that they apply these odious terms in an abusive manner. So, a nation that prosecutes an ambitious de sign of universal empire, by subduing other nations with fire and sword, may affix terms, that signify the highest degrees of virtue, to the conduct of such as show the most engaged, stable, resolute spirit in this affair, and do most of this bloody work. But yet they are capable of being convinced, that they use these terms inconsistently, and abuse language in it, and so having their mouths stopped. And not only will men use such words inconsistently with themselves, but also with one another, by using them any otherwise than to signify true merit or ill deserving, as be fore explained. For there is no way else wherein men have any notion of good or ill desert, in which mankind in general can agree. Mankind in general seem to suppose some general standard, or foundation in nature, for an uni versal consistence in the use of the terms whereby they express moral good and evil ; which none can depart from but through error and mistake. This is evidently sup posed in all their disputes about right and wrong; and in all endeavours used to prove that any thing is either good or evil, in a moral sense. THE GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN DEFENDED ; EVIDENCES OF ITS TRUTH PRODUCED, AND ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY ANSWERED, CONTAINING, IN PARTICULAR, A REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS OF DR. JOHN TAYLOR, IN HIS BOOK, ENTITLED, " THE SCRIPTORE-DOC TRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN PROPOSED TO FREE AND CANDID EXAMINATION, &C." Matt ix. 12. They that be whole, need not a physician ; but they that are sick. — Et haec non tantum ad peccatores referenda est ; quia in omnibus maledictionibus primi hominis, omnes ejus generationes conveniunt. — R- Sal. Jarchi. Propter concupiscentiam, innatam cordi humano, dicituf, In iniquitate genitus sum ; atque sensu est, quod & nativitate implantatum cordi sit humano Jetzer harang, tegmentum malum. — Aben-Ezra, — Ad mores natura recurrit Damnatos, tixa et mutari nescia. — — Dociles imitandis Turpibus et pravis omnes sumus. Juv. ADVERTISEMENT, CONTAINING A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THIS BOOK AND ITS AUTHOR, BY THE FIRST EDITOR. The Reverend Author of the following piece, was removed by death before its publication. But, ere his decease, the copy was finished and brought to the press ; and a number of sheets passed his own review. They who were ac quainted with the author, or know his just character, and have any taste for the serious theme, will want nothing to be said in recommendation of the ensuing tract, but only that Mr. Edwards wrote it. Several valuable pieces on this subject have lately been published, upon the same side of the question. But he had no notice of so much as the very first of them, till he had wholly concluded what he had in view : nor has it been thought, that any thing already printed should supersede this work; being designed on a more extensive plan — com prising a variety of arguments, and answers to many objections, that fell not in the way of the other worthy writers — and the whole done with a care of familiar method and language, as well as clear reasoning, accommodated very much to common capacities. It must tie a sensible pleasure to every friend of truth, that so masterly a hand undertook a reply to Dr. Taylor ; notwithstanding the various answers already given him, both at home and abroad. Since it has been thought unfit, that this posthumous book should go unattended with _ respectful memorial of the author, it is hoped, the reader will candidly accept the following :* As he lived cheerfully resigned in all things to the will of Heaven, so he died, or rather, as the Scripture emphati cally expresses it, in relation to the saint in Christ Jesus, he fell asleep, without the least appearance of pain, and with great calm of mind. Indeed, when he first perceived the symptoms upon him to be mortal, he is said to have been a little perplexed for a while, about the meaning of this mysterious conduct of Providence, in calling him out from his beloved privacy/to a public scene of action and influence ; and then so suddenly, just upon his entrance into it, trans lating him from thence, in such a way, by mortality ! However, he quickly got believing and composing views of the wisdom and goodness of God in this surprising event : and readily yielded to the sovereign disposal of Heaven, with * As we have given a full Memoir in the first volume, those particulars which were contained in this brief account, and which are more fully and ac curately narrated there, are omitted, in order to avoid needless repetitions. 144 ADVERTISEMENT. the most placid submission. Amidst the joy of faith, he departed this world, to go and see Jesus, whom his soul loved ; to be with him, to behold his glory, and rejoice in his kingdom. In person, he was tall of stature, and of a slender make. There was something extremely delicate in his constitu tion • which always obliged him to observe the exactest rules of temperance, and every method of cautious and pru dent' living. By such means he was helped to go through incessant labours, and to bear up under much study, which, Solomon observes, is a weariness to the flesh. Perhaps, never was a man more constantly retired from the world ; giving himself to reading, and contemplation. And a wonder it was, that his feeble frame could subsist under such fatigues, daily repeated and so long continued. Yet upon occasion of some remark upon it by a friend, which was only a few months before his death, he told him, "He did not find but he was then as well able to bear the closest study, as he was thirty years before ; and could go through, the exercises ofthe pulpit with as little weariness or diffi culty." In his youth he appeared healthy, and with a good degree of vivacity ; but was never robust. In middle life, he appeared very much emaciated (I had almost said, mortified) by severe studies, and intense applications of thought. Hence his voice was a little languid, and too low for a large assembly ; though much relieved and advantaged by a proper emphasis, just cadence, well-placed pauses, and great distinctness in pronunciation. He had a piercing eye, the truest index of the mind. His aspect and mien had a mixture of severity and pleasantry. He had a natural turn for gravity and sedateness ; ever contemplative ; and in conversation usually reserved, but always observant of a genuine decorum in his deportment ; free from sullen, supercilious, and contemptuous airs, and without any appearance of ostentation, levity, or vanity. As to imagination, he had enough of it for a great and good man : but the gaieties of a luxuriant fancy, so captivating to many, were what he neither affected himself, nor was much delighted with in others. He had a natural steadiness of temper, and fortitude of mind ; which being sanctified by the Spirit of God, was ever of vast advantage to him, to carry him through difficult services, and support him under trying afflictions, in the course of his life. Personal injuries he bore with a becoming meekness and patience, and a disposition to for giveness. The humility, modesty, and serenity of his behaviour, much endeared him to his acquaintance ; and made him appear amiable in the eyes of such as had the privilege of conversing with him. He was a true and faithful friend ; and showed much of a disinterested benevolence to his neighbour. The several relations sustained by him, he adorned with an exemplary conduct; and was solicitous to fill every station with its proper duty. He kept up an extensive correspondence, with ministers and others, in various parts ; and his letters always contained some significant and valuable communications. In his private walk, as a Christian, he appeared an example of truly rational, consistent, uniform religion and virtue : a shining instance of the power and efficacy of that holy faith, to which he was so firmly attached, and of which he was so strenuous a defender. He exhibited much of spirituality, and a heavenly bent of soul. In him one saw the loveliest appearance, a rare assemblage of christian graces, united with the richest gifts, and mutually subserving and recommending one another. As a scholar, his intellectual furniture exceeded what is common, considering the disadvantages we labour under in this remote corner ofthe world. He very early discovered a genius above the ordinary size; which gradually ripened and expanded, by daily exertion and application. He was remarkable for the penetration and extent of his understand ing, for his powers of criticism and accurate distinction, quickness of thought, solidity of judgment, and force of reason ing; which made him an acute and strong disputant. By nature he was formed for a logician, and a metaphysician; but by speculation, observation, and converse, greatly improved. He had a good insight into the whole circle of liberal arts and sciences ; possessed a very valuable stock of classic learning, philosophy, mathematics, history, chronology, &c. By the blessing of God on his indefatigable studiousness, to the last, he was constantly treasuring up useful knowledge, both human and divine. Thus he appears uncommonly accomplished for the arduous and momentous province to which he was finally called. And had Heaven indulged us with the continuance of his precious life, we have reason to think, he would have graced his new station, and been a signal blessing to the college, and therein extensively served his generation, according to the will of God. After all, it must be owned, divinity was his favourite study ; and the ministry, his most delightful empldyment. Among the luminaries of the church, in these American regions, he was justly reputed a star of the first magnitude ; thoroughly versed in all the branches of theology, didactic, polemic, casuistic, experimental, and practical. In point of divine knowledge and skill, he had few equals, and perhaps no superior, at least in these parts. On the maturest ex amination of the different schemes of principles, obtaining in the world, and on comparing them with the sacred Scrip tures, the oracles of God and the great standard of truth, he was a Protestant and a Calvinist in judgment ; adhering to the main articles of the reformed religion with an unshaken firmness, and with a fervent zeal, but tempered with charity and candour, and governed by discretion. He seemed as little as most men under the bias of education, or the influ ence of bigotry. As to practical and vital Christianity, no man appeared to have a better acquaintance with its nature and importance ; or to understand true religion, and feel its power, more than he ; which made him an excellently fit guide to inquiring souls, and qualified him to guard them against all false religion. His internal sense of the inter course between God and souls, being brought by him to the severe test of reason and revelation, preserved him, both in sentiment and conduct, from the least tincture of enthusiasm. The accomplished divine enters deep into his character. As a preacher, he was judicious, solid, and instructive. Seldom was he known to bring controversy into the pulpit ; or to handle any subject in the nicer modes and forms of scholastic dissertation. His sermons, in general, seemed to vary exceedingly from his controversial compositions. In his preaching, usually, all was plain, familiar, sententious, practical ; and very distant from any affectation of appearing the great man, or displaying his extraordinary abilities as a scholar. But still he ever preserved the character of a skilful and thorough divine. The common themes of his ministry were the most weighty and profitable ; and especially, the great truths of the gospel of Christ, in which he himself lived by faith. His method in preaching was, first to apply to the understanding and judgment, labouring to enlighten and convince them ; and then to persuade the will, engage the affections, and excite the active powers of the soui. His language was with propriety and purity, but with a noble negligence ; nothing ornamented. Florid diction was not the beauty he preferred. His talents were of a superior kind. He regarded thoughts, rather than words. Pre cision of sentiment and clearness of expression are the principal characteristics of his pulpit style. Neither quick nor slow of speech, there was a certain pathos in his utterance, and such skill of address, as seldom failed to draw the atten tion, warm the hearts, and stimulate the consciences of the auditory. He studied to show himself approved unto God, a workman that needed not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth. And he was one who gave himself to prayer, as well as to the ministry of the word. Agreeably it pleased God to put great honour upon him, by crowning nis labours with surprising successes, in the conversion of sinners, and the edification of saints, to the advancement of the kingdom and glory of God our Saviour Jesus Christ. As a writer, Mr. Edwards distinguished himself in controversy, to which he was called on a variety of occasions. Here the superiority of his genius eminently appeared. He knew to arrange his ideas in an exact method : and close application of mind, .with the uncommon strength of his intellectual powers, enabled him in a manner to exhaust every subject he took under consideration. He diligently employed the latter part of his life in defending Christianity, both in its doctrinal and practical views, against the errors of the times. Besides his excellent writings in behalf of the power ADVERTISEMENT. 145 of godliness, which some years ago happily prevailed in many parts of the British America, he made a noble stand against enthusiasm and false religion, when it threatened to spread, by his incomparable treatise upon religious affec tions. And more lately in opposition to Pelagian, Arminian, and other false principles, he published a very elaborate Treatise upon the Liberty of the human Will. A volume, that has procured him the elogy of eminent divines abroad. Several professors of divinity in the Dutch universities very lately sent him their thanks, for the assistance he had given them in their inquiry into some controverted points ; having carried his own further than any author they had ever seen. And now this volume of his, on the great christian doctrine of original sin, is presented to public view ; which, though studiously adapted to lower capacities, yet carries in it the evident traces of his great genius, and seems with superior force of argument to have entirely baffled the opponent. His writings will perpetuate his memory, and make his name blossom in the dust. The blessing of Heaven attend ing the perusal of them, will make them effectually conducive to the glory of God, and the good of souls ; which will brighten the author's crown, and add to his joy, in the day of future retribution. THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE. The following Discourse is intended, not merely as an answer to any particular book written against the doctrine of Original Sin, but as a general defence of that great important doctrine. Nevertheless, I have in this defence taken notice of the main things said against this doctine, by such of the more noted opposers of it as I have had opportunity to read : particularly those two late writers, Dr. Turnbull and Dr. Taylor, of Norwich ; but especially the latter, in what he has published in those two books of his, the first entitled, The Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin proposed to free and candid Examination ; the other, his Key to the Apostolic Writings, with a Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistle to the Romans. I have closely attended to Dr. Taylor's Piece on Original Sin, in all its parts, and have en deavoured that no one thing there said, of any consequence in this controversy, should pass unnoticed, or that any thing which has the appearance of an argument, in opposition to this doctrine, should be left unanswered. I look on the doctrine as of great importance ; which every body will doubtless own it is, if it be true. For, if the case be such indeed, that all mankind are by nature in a state of total ruin, both with respect to the moral evil of which they are the subjects, and the afflictive evil to which they are exposed, the one as the consequence and punishment of the other ; then, doubtless, the great salvation by Christ stands in direct relation to this ruin, as the remedy to the disease ; and the whole gospel, or doctrine of salvation, must suppose it; and all real belief, or true notion of that gospel, must be built upon it. Therefore, as I think the doctrine is most certainly both true and important, I hope, my attempting a vindication of it, will be candidly interpreted ; and that what I have done towards its defence, will be impartially con sidered, by all that will give themselves the trouble to read the ensuing discourse : in which it is designed to examine every thing material throughout the Doctor's whole book, and many things in that other book, containing his Key and Exposition on Romans ; as also many things written in opposition to this doctrine by some other modern authors. Moreover, my discourse being not only intended for an answer to Dr. Taylor, and other opposers of the doctrine of original sin, but for a general defence of that doctrine ; producing the evidence of the truth of the doctrine, as well as answering objections made against it; I hope this attempt of mine will not be thought needless, nor be altogether use less, notwithstanding other publications on the subject. I would also hope, that the extensiveness of the plan of the following treatise will excuse the length of it. And that when it is considered, how much was absolutely requisite to the full executing of a design formed on such a plan ; how much has been written against the doctrine of original sin, and with what plausibility ; how strong the prejudices of many are in favour of what is said in opposition to this doctrine — and that it cannot be expected, any thing short of a full consideration of almost every argument advanced by the main opposers, especially by this late and specious writer, Dr. Taylor, will satisfy many readers — how much must unavoidably be said in order to a full handling of the arguments in defence of the doctrine ; and how important the doctrine must be, if true ; I trust, the length of the following dis course will not be thought to exceed what the case really required. However, this must be left to the judgment of the intelligent and candid reader. Stockbridge, May 26, 1757. Note. — When the page is referred to in this manner, p. 40. p. 50. without mentioning the book, thereby is to be understood such a page in Dr. Taylor's Scriptnre-Doctrine of Original Sin. S. intends the Supplement. When the word Key is used to signify the book referred to, thereby is to be under stood Dr. Taylor's Key to the Apostolic Writings. This mark [§] with figures or a number annexed, signifies such a section or paragraph in his Key. When after mentioning Preface to Par. on Epist. to Romans, there is subjoined p. 145. 47. or the like, thereby is intended page and paragraph, page 145. paragraph 47. The letter T. alone, is used to signify Dr. Taylor's name, and no other. Vol. i. THE GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE ORIGINAL SIN DEFENDED. PART I. WHEREIN ARE CONSIDERED SOME EVIDENCES OF ORIGINAL SIN FROM FACTS AND EVENTS, AS FOUNDED BY OBSERVA TION AND EXPERIENCE, TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIONS AND TESTIMONIES OF HOLY SCRIPTURE, AND THE CONFESSION AND ASSERTION OF OPPOSERS. CHAP. I. THE EVIDENCE OF ORIGINAL SIN FROM WHAT APPEARS IN FACT OF THE SINFULNESS OF MANKIND. Sect. I. All mankind constantly, in all ages, without fail in any one instance, run into that moral evil, which is in effect their own utter and eternal perdition in a total privation of GOD'S favour, and suffering of his vengeance and wrath. By Original Sin, as the phrase has been most commonly used by divines, is meant the innate sinful depravity of the heart. But yet when the doctrine of original sin is spoken of, it is vulgarly understood in that latitude, which in cludes not only the depravity of nature,hut the imputation of Adam's first sin ; or, in other words, the liableness or exposedness of Adam's posterity, in the divine judgment, to partake of the punishment of that sin. So far as I know, most of those who have held one of these, have maintained the other ; and most of those who have op posed one, have opposed the other ; both are opposed by the author chiefly attended to in the following discourse, in his book against original sin : and it may perhaps ap peal- in our future consideration of the subject, that they are closely connected ; that the arguments which prove the one establish the other, and that there are no more diffi culties attending the allowing of one, than the other. I shall, in the first place, consider this doctrine more especially with regard to the corruption of nature ; and as we treat of this, the other will naturally' come into consi deration, in the prosecution of the discourse, as connected with it. As all moral qualities, all principles either of virtue or vice, lie in the disposition of the heart, I shall consider whether we have any evidence, that the heart of man is naturally of a corrupt and evil disposition. This is strenuously denied by many late writers, who are enemies to the doctrine of original sin ; and particularly by Dr. Taylor. The way we come by the idea of any such thing as dis position or tendency, is by observing what is constant or general in event ; especially under a great variety of circum stances ; and above all, when the effect or event continues the same through great and various opposition, much and manifold force and means used to the contrary not prevail ing to hinder the effect. I do not know, that such a pre valence of effects is denied to be an evidence of prevailing tendency in causes and agents ; or that it is expressly de- » Moral Philos. p. 289, 290. nied by the opposers of the doctrine of original sin, that if, in the course of events, it universally or generally proves that mankind are actually corrupt, this would be an evi dence of a prior corrupt propensity in the world of man kind ; whatever may be said by some, which, if taken with its plain consequences, may seem to imply a denial of this ; which may be considered afterwards. But by many the fact is denied ; that is, it is denied, that corruption and moral evil are commonly prevalent in the world : on the contrary, it is insisted on, that good preponderates, and that virtue has the ascendant. To this purpose, Dr. Turnbull says* " With regard to the prevalence of vice in the world, men are apt to let their imagination run out upon all the robberies, piracies, mur ders, perjuries, frauds, massacres, assassinations they have either heard of, or read in history ; thence concluding all mankind to be very wicked. As if a court of justice were a proper place to make an estimate of the morals of man kind, or an hospital of the healthfulness of a climate. But ought they not to consider, that the number of honest citizens and farmers far surpasses that of all sorts of crimi nals in any state, and that the innocent and kind actions of even criminals themselves surpass their crimes in numbers; that it is the rarity of crimes, in comparison of innocent or good actions, which engages our attention to them, and makes them to be recorded in history, while honest, gene rous domestic actions are overlooked, only because they are so common ? as one great danger, or one month's sick ness, shall become a frequently repeated story during a long life of health and safety. — Let not the vices of man kind be multiplied or magnified. Let us make a fair es timate of human life, and set over against the shocking, the astonishing instances of barbarity and wickedness that have been perpetrated in any age, not only the exceeding generous and brave actions with which history shines, but the prevailing innocency, good-nature, industry, felicity, and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind at all times ; and we shall not find reason to cry out, as objectors against Providence do on this occasion, that all men are vastly oorrupt, and that there is hardly any such thing as virtue in the world. Upon a fair computation, the fact does indeed come out, that very great villanies have been very uncommon in all ages, and looked upon as monstrous ; so general is the sense and esteem of virtue." — It seems to be with a like view that Dr. Taylor says, " We must not take the measure of our health and enjoyments from a lazar-house, nor of our understanding from Bedlam, nor of our morals from a gaol." (P. 77. S.) With respect to the propriety and pertinence of such a representation of things, and its force as to the consequence Sect. I. ALL MEN TEND TO SIN AND RUIN. designed, I hope we shall be better able to judge, and in some measure to determine, whether the natural disposition of the hearts of mankind be corrupt or not, when the things which follow have been considered. But for the greater clearness, it may be proper here to premise one consideration, that is of great importance in this con troversy, and is very much overlooked by the opposers of the doctrine of original sin in'their disputing against it. That it is to be looked upon as the true tendency of the innate disposition of man's heart, which appears to be its tendency, when we consider things as they are in them selves, or in their own nature, without the interposition of divine grace. Thus, that state of man's nature, that dispo sition of the mind, is to be looked upon as evil and perni cious, which, as it is in itself, tends to extremely pernicious consequences, and would certainly end therein, were it not that the free mercy and kindness of God interposes to pre vent that issue. It would be very strange if any should argue, that there is no evil tendency in the case, because the mere favour and compassion of the Most High may step in and oppose the tendency, and prevent the sad ef fect. Particularly, if there be any thing in the nature of man, whereby he has an universal unfailing tendency to that moral evil, which, according to the real nature and true demerit of things, as they are in themselves, implies his utter ruin, that must be looked upon as an evil ten dency or propensity ; however divine grace may interpose, to save him from deserved ruin, and to overrule things to an issue contrary to that which they tend to of themselves. Grace is sovereign, exercised according to the good plea sure of God, bringing good out of evil. The effect of it belongs not to the nature of things themselves, that other wise have an ill tendency, any more than the remedy be longs to the disease ; but is something altogether inde pendent on it, introduced to oppose the natural tendency, and reverse the course of things. But the event to which things tend, according to their own demerit, and according to divine justice, is the event to which they tend in their own nature ; as Dr. T.'s own words fully imply, (Prof, to Par. on Rom. p. 131.) " God alone (says he) can de clare whether he will pardon or punish the ungodliness and unrighteousness of mankind, which is in its own nature punishable." Nothing is more precisely according to the truth of things, than divine justice : it weighs things in an even balance ; it views and estimates things no otherwise than they are truly in their own nature. Therefore un doubtedly that which implies a tendency to ruin, according to the estimate of divine just ice, does indeed imply such a tendency in its own nature. And then it must be remembered, that it is a moral de pravity we are speaking of ; and therefore when we are considering whether such depravity do not appear by a tendency to a bad effect or issue, it is a moral tendency to such an issue, that is the thing to be taken into the account. A moral tendency or influence is by desert. Then -may it be said, man's nature or state is attended with a pernicious or destructive tendency, in a moral sense, when it tends to that which deserves misery and destruction. And therefore it equally shows the moral depravity of the nature of man- ' He often speaks of death and affliction as coming on Adam's posterity in consequence of his sin ; and in p. 20, 21. and many other places, he sup poses, that these things come in consequence of his sin, not as a punishment or a calamity, but as a benefit. But in p. 23. he supposes, those things would be a great calamity and misery, if it were not for the resurrection ; which resurrection he there, and in the following pages, and in many other places, speaks of as being by Christ ; and often speaks of it as being by the grace of God in Christ P. 63, 64. Speaking of our being subjected to sorrow, labour, and death, in consequence of Adam's sin, he represents these as evils that are reversed and turned into advantages, and from which we are delivered through grace in Christ And p. 60, 66, 67. he speaks of God thus turning death into an advantage through grace in Christ, as what vindicates tbe justice of God in bringing death by Adam. P. 152, 156. One thing he alleges against this proposition of the Assembly of Divines — That we are by nature bond-slaves to Satan —That God hath been providing, from the beginning ofthe world to this day, various means and dispensations, to preserve ana rescue mankind from tlte devil. P. 168, 169, 170. In answer to that objection against his doctrine. That we are in worse circumstances than Adam, he alleges the happy circum stances we are under by the provision and means furnished through free grace in Christ. P. 228. In answering that argument against his doctrine — That there is a law in our members, bringing us into captivity to the law of sin and death, Rom. vii. — He allows, that the case of those who are under a law threaten ing death for every sin, (which law he elsewhere says, shows us lite natural and proper demerit of sin, and is perfectly consonant to everlasting truth and righteousness.) mv3t be quite deplorable, if they have no relief from the mercy of the lawgiver. h 2 147 kind in their present state, whether that nature be univer sally attended with an effectual tendency to destructive vengeance actually executed, or to their deserving misery and ruin, or their just exposedness, to destruction, however that fatal consequence may be prevented by grace or whatever the actual event be. , One thing more is to be observed here, that the topic mainly insisted on by the opposers of the doctrine of origi nal sin, is the justice of God ; both in their objections against the imputation of Adam's sin, and also against its being so ordered, that men should come into the world with a corrupt and ruined nature, without having merited the displeasure of their Creator by any personal fault. But the latter is not repugnant to God's justice, if men actually are born into the world with a tendency to sin, and to misery and ruin for their sin, which actually will be the consequence, unless mere grace steps in and prevents it. If this be allowed, the argument from justice is given up : For it is to suppose, that their liableness to misery and ruin comes in a way of justice ; otherwise there would be no need of the interposition of divine grace to save them. Justice alone would be sufficient security, if exercised, without grace. It is all one in this dispute about what is just and righteous, whether men are born in a miserable state, by a tendency to ruin, which actually follows, and that justly ; or whether they are born in such a state as tends to a desert of ruin, which might justly follow, and would actually follow, did not grace prevent. For the controversy is not, what grace will do, but what justice might do. I have been the more particular on this head, because it enervates many of the reasonings and conclusions by which Dr. T. makes out his scheme ; in which he argues from that state which mankind are in by divine grace, yea, which he himself supposes to be by divine grace ; and yet not making any allowance for this, he from hence draws conclusions against what others suppose of the deplorable and ruined state mankind are in by the fall.* Some of his arguments and conclusions to this effect, in order to be made good, must depend on such a supposition as this ; — that God's dispensations of grace, are rectifications or amendments of his foregoing constitutions and proceed ings, which were merely legal ; as though the dispensa tions of grace, which succeed those of mere law, implied an acknowledgment, that the preceding legal constitution would be unjust, if left as it was, or at least very hard dealing with mankind ; and that the other were of the na ture of a satisfaction to his creatures, for former injuries, or hard treatment. So that, put together the injury with the satisfaction, the legal and injurious dispensation, taken with the following good dispensation, which our author calls grace, and the unfairness or improper severity of the former, amended by the goodness of the latter, both together made up one righteous dispensation! The reader is desired to bear in mind what I have said concerning the interposition of divine grace not altering the nature of things, as they are in themselves. Accordingly, when I speak of such and such an evil tendency of things, belonging to the present nature and state of mankind, un derstand me to mean their tendency as they are in them- P. 90 — 93. S. In opposition to what is supposed of the miserable state mankind are brought into by Adam's sin, he alleges, The noble designs of love, manifested by advancing a new and happy dispensation, founded on the obedience and righteousness of the Son of God; and that, although by Adam we are subjected to death, yet in this dispensation a resurrection is provided; and that Adam's posterity are under a mild dispensation of Grace, SfC. P. 112. S. He vindicates God's dealings with Adam, in placing him at first under the rigour of law, transgress and die, (which, as he expresses it, was putting his happiness on afoot extremely dangerous,) by saying, that as God had before determined in his otm breast, so he immediately esta blished his covenant upon a quite different bottom, namely, upon grace. P. 122, 123. S. Against what R. R. says. That God forsook man when he fell, and that mankind after Adam's sin were born without the divine favour, _c. he alleges, among other things, ChrisVs coming to be the pro pitiation for the sins of the whole world— And the riches of God's mercy in giving the promise of a Redeemer to destroy tlie works of the devil — That he caught his sinning falling creature in the arms of his grace. In his note on Rom. v. 20. p. 297, 298. he says as follows : " The law I conceive, is not a dispensation suitable to the infirmity of the human nature in our present state ; or it doth not seem congruous to the goodness of God, to afford us no other way of salvation but by a law, which, if we once transgress, we are ruined for ever. For who then from the beginning of the world could be saved? And therefore it 3eems to me, that the law was not absolutely intended to be a rule for obtaining life, even to Adam in para dise : Grace was the dispensation God intended mankind should be under; and therefore Christ was fore-ordained before the foundation ofthe world." ¦ —There are various other passages in this author's writings of the like kind 148 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. I. Ch. I. selves, abstracted from any consideration of that remedy the sovereign and infinite grace of God has provided.— Having premised these things, I now assert, that mankind are all naturally in such a state, as is attended, without fail, with this consequence or issue ; that they universally run THEMSELVES INTO THAT WHICH IS, IN EFFECT, THEIR OWN utter eternal perdition, _s being finally accursed of God, and the subjects of his remediless wrath through sin. — From which I infer, that the natural state of the mind of man is attended with a propensity of nature, which is prevalent and effectual, to such an issue ; and that therefore their nature is corrupt and depraved with a moral depravity, that amounts to and implies their utter un doing. Here I would first consider the truth of the proposition ; and then would show the certainty of the consequences which I infer from it. If both can be clearly and certainly proved, then I trust, none will deny but that the doctrine of original depravity is evident, and so the falseness of Dr. T.'s scheme demonstrated ; the greatest part of whose book, called the Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin, i}c. is against the doctrine of innate depravity, in p. 107. S. he speaks ofthe conveyance of a corrupt and sinful nature to Adam's posterity as the gmnd point to be proved by the maintainers ofthe doctrine of original sin. In order to demonstrate what is asserted in the proposi tion laid down, there is need only that these two things should be made manifest : one is this fact, that all man kind come into the world in such a state, as without fail comes to this issue , namely, the universal commission of sin ; or that every one who comes to act in the world as a moral agent, is, in a greater or less degree, guilty of sin. The other is, that all sin deserves and exposes to utter and eternal destruction, unto God's wrath and curse ; and would end in it, were it not for the interposition of divine grace to prevent the effect. Both which can be abundantly demonstrated to be agreeable to the word of God, and to Dr. T's own doctrine. That every one of mankind, at least such as are capable of acting as moral agents, are guilty of sin, (not now taking- it for granted that they come guilty into the world,) is most clearly and abundantly evident from the Holy Scriptures : 1 Kings viii. 46. " If any man sin against thee; for there is no man that sinneth not." Eccl. vii. 20. " There is not a just man upon earth that doeth good, and sinneth not." Job ix. 2, 3. " I know it is so of a truth, (i. e. as Bildad had just before said, that God would not cast away a per fect man, &c.) but how should man be just with God 7 If he will contend with him, he cannot answer him one of a thousand." To the like purpose, Psal. cxliii. 2. " Enter not into judgment with thy servant ; for in thy sight shall no man living be justified." So the words of the apostle, (in which he has apparent reference to those of the Psalmist,) Rom. iii. 19, 20. "That every moutli may be stopped, and all the world become guilty before God. Therefore hy the deeds of the law there shall no, flesh be justified in his sight : for by the law is the knowledge of sin." So, Gal. ii. 16. 1 John i. 7—10. " If we walk in the light, the blood of Christ cleanseth us from all sin. If we say that lie have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all un righteousness. If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not in us." In this and innumerable other places, confession and repentance of sin are spoken of as duties proper for all; as also prayer to God for pardon of sin ; also forgiveness of those that injure us, from that motive, that we hope to be forgiven of God. Universal guilt of sin might also be demonstrated from the appointment, and the declared use and end ofthe ancient sacrifices ; and also from the ransom, which every one that was numbered in Israel, was directed to pay, to make atonement for his soul. (Exod. xxx. 11 — 16.) All are represented, not only as being sinful, but as having great and manifold iniquity. (Job ix. 2, 3. James iii. 1, 2.) There are many scriptures which both declare the uni versal sinfulness of mankind, and also that all sin deserves and justly exposes to everlasting destruction, under the wrath and curse of God ; and so demonstrate both parts ofthe proposition I have laid down. To which purpose that passage in Gal. iii. 10. is exceeding full ". " For as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse ; for it is wiitten, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law, to do them ." How manifestly is it implied in the apostle's mean ing here, that there is no man but what fails in some in stances of doing all things that are wiitten in the book of the law, and therefore as many as have their dependence on their fulfilling the law, are under that curse which is pronounced on them that fail of it ! And hence the apostle infers in the next verse, " that no man is justified by the law in the sight of God :" as he had said before in the preceding chapter, ver. 16." By the works of the law shall no flesh be justified." The apostle shows us he under stands, that by this place which he cites from Deutero nomy, " the Scripture hath concluded, or shut up, all under sin.'' (Gal. iii. 22.) So that here we are plainly taught, both that every one of mankind is a sinner, and that every sinner is under the curse of God. To the like purpose is Rom. iv. 14. also 2 Cor. iii. 6, 7, 9. where the law is called " the letter that kills, the ministration of death, and the ministration of condemna tion." The wrath, condemnation, and death, which is threatened in the law to all its transgressors, is final per dition, the second death, eternal ruin ; as is very plain, and indeed is confessed. And this punishment which the law threatens for every sin, is a just punishment ; being what every sin truly deserves ; God's law being a righteous. law, and the sentence of it a righteous sentence. All these things are what Dr. Taylor himself confesses and asserts. He says, that the law of God requires perfect obedience. {Note on Rom. vii. 6. p. 308.) " God can never require imperfect obedience, or by his holy law allow us to be guilty of any one sin, how small soever. And if the law, as a rule of duty, were in any respect abolished, then we might in some respects transgress the law, and yet not be guilty of sin. The moral law, or law of nature, is tbe truth, everlasting, unchangeable; and therefore, as such, can never be abrogated. On the contrary, our Lord Jesus Christ has promulgated it anew under the gospel, fuller and clearer than it was in the mosaical constitution, or any where else : — having added to its precepts the sanc tion of his own divine authority." And many things which he says imply, that all mankind do in some degree transgress trie law. In p. 228. speaking of what may be gathered from Rom. vii. and viii. he says, " We are very apt, in a world full of temptation, to be deceived, and drawn into sin by bodily appetites, &e. And the case of those who are under a law threatening death to every sin, must be quite deplorable, if they have no relief from the mercy of the lawgiver." But this is very fully declared in what he says in his note on Rom. v. 20. p. 297. His words are as follows : " Indeed, as a rule of action prescribing our duty, it (the law) always was and always must be a rule ordained for obtaining life ; but not as a rule of justification, not as it subjects to death for every transgression. For if it could in its utmost rigour have given us life, then, as the apostle argues, it would have been against the promises of God. For if there had been a law, in the strict and rigorous sense of law, which could have made us live, verily jus tification should have been by the law. But he supposes, no such law was ever given : and therefore there is need and room enough for the promises of grace; or as he argues, Gal. ii. 21. it would have frustrated, or rendered useless,-the grace of God. For if justification came by the law, then truly Christ is dead in vain, then he died to accomplish what was, or might have been, effected by law itself without his death. Certainly the law was not brought in among the Jews to be a rule of justification, or to recover them out of a state of death, and to procure life by their sinless obedience to it : For in this, as well as in another respect, it was weak ; not in itself, but through the weakness of our flesh, Rom. viii. 3. The law, I con ceive, is not a dispensation suitable to the infirmity of the human nature in our present state ; or it cloth not seem congruous to the goodness of God to afford us no other way of salvation, but by law ; which if we once trans gress, WE ARE RUINED FOR EVER. FOR WHO THEN, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD, COULD BE SAVED?" Sect. I. ALL MEN TEND TO SIN AND RUIN. 149 How clear and express are these things, that no one of mankind, from the beginning of the world, can ever be justified by law, because every one transgresses it 1* And here also we see, Dr. T. declares, that by the law" men are sentenced to everlasting ruin for one transgression. To the like purpose he often expresses himself. So p. 207. " The law requireth the most extensive obedience, dis covering sin in all its branches.— It gives sin a deadly force, subjecting every transgression to the penalty of death; and yet supplieth neither help nor hope to the sinner, but leaving him under the power of sin and sentence of death." In p. 213. he speaks of the law as extending to lust and irregular desires, and to every branch und principle of sin ; and even to its latent principles, and minutest branches ; again (Note on Rom. vii. 6. p. 308.) to every sin, how small soever. And when he speaks of the law subjecting every transgression to the penalty of death, he means eternal fieath, as he from time to time ex plains the matter. In p. 212. he speaks ofthe law in the condemning power of it, as binding us in everlasting chains. In p. 120. S. he says, that death which is the wages of sin, is the second death ; and this, p. 78. he explains of final perdition. In his Key, p. 107. § 296. he says, "The curse of the law subjected men for every transgression to eternal death." So in Note on Rom. v. 20. p. 291. " The law of Moses subjected those who were under it to death, mean ing by death, eternal death." These are his words. He also supposes, that this sentence of the law, thus subjecting men for every, even the least, sin, and every minutest branch and latent principle of sin, to so dreadful a punishment, is just and rrghteous, agreeable to truth and the nature of things, or to the natural and proper demerits of sin. In this he is very full. Thus in p. 186. P. " It was sin (says he) which subjected us to death by the law, justly threatening, sin with death. Which law was given us, that sin might appear ; might be set forth in its proper colours ; when we saw it subjected us to death by a law perfectly holy, just, and good; that sin by the commandment, by the law, might be represented what it really is, an exceeding great and deadly evil." So in note on Rom. v. 20. p. 299.. " The law or ministration of death, as it subjects to death for every transgression, is still of use to show the natural and proper demerit of sin." Ibid. p. 292. " The language of the law, dying thou shalt die, is to be understood of the demerit of the transgression, that which it deserves." Ibid. p. 298. " The law was added, saith Mr. Locke on the place, because the Israelites, the posterity of Abraham, were transgressors as well as other men, to show them their sins, and the punish ment and death, which in strict justice they incurred by them. And this appears to be a true comment on Rom. vii. 13. — Sin, by virtue of the law, subjected you to death for this end, that sin, working death in us, by that which is holy, just, and good, perfectly consonant to ever lasting truth and righteousness Consequently every sin is in strict justice deserving of wrath and punishment ; and the law in its rigour was given to the Jews, to set borne this awful truth upon their consciences, to show them the evil and pernicious nature of sin ; and that being conscious they had broke the law of God, this might convince them- of the great need they had of the favour of the lawgiver, and oblige them, by faith in his goodness, to fly to his mercy, for pardon and salvation." If the law be holy, just, and good, a constitution per fectly agreeable to God's holiness, justice, and goodness ; then he might have put it exactly in execution, agreeably to all these his perfections. Our author himself says, p. 133. S. " How that constitution, which establishes a law, the making of which is inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God, and the executing of it inconsistent with his holiness, can be a righteous constitution, I confess, is quite beyond my comprehension." Now the reader is left to judge, whether it be not most plainly and fully agreeable to Dr. T.'s own doctrine, that there never was any one person from the beginning of the world, who came to act in the world as a moral agent, and that it is not to be hoped there ever will be any, but what * I am sensible, these things are quite inconsistent with what he says else where, of sufficient power in all mankind constantly to do the whole duty which God requires of them without a necessity of breaking God's law in is a sinner or transgressor of the law of God ; and that therefore this proves to be the issue and event of things, with respect to all mankind in all ages, that, by the natural and proper demerit of their own sinfulness, and in the judgment ofthe law of God, which is perfectly consonant to truth, and exhibits things in their true colours, they are the proper subjects of the curse of God, eternal death, and everlasting ruin ; which must be the actual consequence, unless the grace or favour of the lawgiver interpose, and mercy prevail for their pardon and salvation. The reader has seen also how agreeable this is to the doctrine of the Holy Scripture. If so, and if the interposition of divine grace alters not the nature of things as they are in them selves, and that it does not in the least affect the state of the controversy we are upon — concerning the true nature and tendency of the state in which mankind come into the world — whether grace prevents the fatal effect or no; I trust, none will deny, that the proposition laid down, is fully proved, as agreeable to the word of God, and Dr. T.'s own words ; viz. That mankind are all naturally in such a state, as is attended, without fail, with this consequence or issue, that they universally are the subjects of that guilt and sinfulness, which is, in effect, their utter and eternal ruin, being cast wholly out of the favour of God, and Subjected to his everlasting wrath and curse. SECT. II. It follows from the proposition proved, in the foregoing section, that all mankind are under the influence of a prevailing effectual tendency in their nature, to thai sin and wickedness, which implies their utter and eternal ruin. The proposition laid down being proved, the conseouence of it remains to be made out, viz. That the mind of man has a natural tendency or propensity to that event, which has been shown universally and infallibly to take place ; and that this is a corrupt or depraved propensity. — I shall here consider the former part of this consequence, namely, Whether such an universal, constant, infallible event is truly a proof of any tendency or propensity to that event ; leaving the evil and corrupt nature of such a propensity to be considered afterwards. If any should say, they do not think that its being a thing universal and infallible in event, that mankind com mit some sin, is a proof of a prevailing tendency to sin ; because they do good, and perhaps more good than evil : Let them remember, that tne question at present is not, How much sin there is a tendency to ; but whether there be a prevailing propensity to that issue, which it is allowed all men do actually come to — that all fail of keeping the law perfectly — whether there be not a tendency to such imper fection of obedience, as always without fail comes to pass ; to that degree of sinfulness, at least, which all fall into ; and so to that utter ruin, which that sinfulness implies and infers. Whether an effectual propensity to this be worth the name of depravity, because the good, that may be sup» posed to balance it, shall be considered by and by. If all mankind in all nations and ages, were at least one day in their lives deprived of the use of their reason, and raving mad ; or that all, even every individual person, once cut their own throats, or put out their own eyes ; it might be an evidence of some tendency in the nature or natural state of mankind to such an event; though they might ex ercise reason many more days than they were distracted, and were kind to and tender of themselves oftener than they mortally and cruelly wounded themselves. To determine whether the unfailing constancy of the above-named event be an evidence of tendency, iet it be considered, What can be meant by tendency, but a pre vailing liableness or exposedness to such or such an event? Wherein consists the notion of any such thing, but some stated prevalence or preponderation in the nature or state of causes or occasions, that is followed by, and so proves to be effectual to, a stated prevalence or commonness of any particular kind of effect ? Or something in the per- any degree, (p. 63—68. S.) But, I hope, the reader wilt not think me ac countable for his inconsistences. 150 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. I. Ch. I. manent state of things, concerned in bringing a certain sort of event to pass, which is a foundation for the con stancy, or strongly prevailing probability, of such an event ! If we mean this Dy tendency, (and I know not what else can be meant by it, but- this, or something like,) then it is manifest, that where we see a stated prevalence of any effect there is a tendency to that effect m the nature and state of its causes. A common and steady effect shows, that there is somewhere a preponderation, a prevailing ex posedness or liableness in the state of things, to what comes so steadily to pass. The natural dictate of reason shows, that where there is an effect, there is a cause, and a cause sufficient for the effect ; because, if it were not sufficient, it would not be effectual ; and that therefore, where there is a stated prevalence of the effect, there is a stated prevalence in the cause. A steady effect argues a steady cause. We obtain a notion of tendency, no other way than by observation : and we can observe nothing but events : and it is the commonness or constancy of events, that gives us a notion of tendency in all cases. Thus we judge of tendencies in the natural world. Thus we judge of the tendencies or propensities of nature in minerals, vegetables, animals, rational and irrational crea tures. A notion of a stated tendency, or fixed propensity, is not obtained by observing only a single event. A stated preponderation in the cause or occasion, is argued only by a stated prevalence of the effect. If a die be once thrown, and it falls on a particular side, we do not argue from hence, that that side is the heaviest ; but if it be thrown without skill or care, many thousands or millions of times, and it constantly falls on the same side, we have not the least doubt in our minds, but that there is something of propensity in the case, by superior weight of that side, or in some other respect. How ridiculous would he make himself, who should earnestly dispute against any tendency in the state of things to cold in the winter, or heat in the summer ; or should stand to it, that although it often happened that water quenched fire, yet there was no ten dency in it to such an effect ! In the case we are upon, human nature, as existing in such an immense diversity of persons and circumstances, and never failing in any one instance of coming to that issue— that sinfulness, which implies extreme misery and eternal ruin — is as the die often cast. For it alters not the case in the least, as to the evidence of tendency, whether the subject of the constant event be an individual, or a nature and kind. Thus, if there be a succession of trees of the same sort, proceeding one from another, from the beginning of the world, growing in all countries, soils, and climates, all bearing ill fruit ; it as much proves the nature and tendency of the kind, as if it were only one individual tree, that had remained from the beginning of the world, often transplanted into different soils, and had continued to bear only bad fruit. So, if there were a particular family, which, from generation to generation, and through every remove to innumerable different countries, and places of abode, all died of a consumption, or all run distracted, or all murdered themselves, it would be as much an evi dence of the tendency of something in the nature or con stitution of that race, as it would be of the tendency of something in the nature or state of an individual, if some one person had lived all that time, and some remarkable event had often appeared in him, which he had been the agent or subject of from year to year, and from age to age, continually and without fail.* Thus a propensity, attending the present nature or na tural state of mankind, eternally to ruin themselves by sin, may certainly be inferred from apparent and acknow ledged fact. — And I would now observe further, that not only does this follow from facts acknowledged by Dr. T. but the things he asserts, and the expressions which he uses, plainly imply that all mankind have such a propensity ; yea, one ofthe highest kind, a propensity that is invincible, * Here may be observed the weakness of that objection, made against the validity of the argument for a fixed propensity to sin, from the con stancy and universality of the event, that Adam sinned in one instance, without a fixed propensity Without doubt a single event is an evidence, that there was some cause or occasion of that event But the thing we are speaking of, is a fixed cause : propensity is a stated continued thing. We i ustly agree, that a stated effect must have a stated cause, and truly ob serve, that we obtain the notion of tendency, or stated preponderation in causes, no other way than by observing a staled prevalence of a particular or a tendency which really amounts to a fixed, constant, unfailing necessittj. There is a plain confession of a pro pensity or proneness to sin, p. 143.—" Man, who drinketh in iniquity like water; who-is attended with*so many sensual appetites, and so apt to indulge them." — And again, p. 228. " We are very apt, in a world full of temptation, to be deceived, and drawn into sin by bodily appetites."— If we are very apt or prone to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites, and sinfully to indulge them, and very apt or. prone to yield to temptation to sin, then we are prone to sin ; for to yield to temptation to sin is sinful. —In the same page he shows, that on this account, and its consequences, the case of those who are under a law, threatening death for every' sin, must be quite deplorable, if they have no relief from the mercy of the lawgiver. Which implies, that their case is hopeless, as to an escape from death, the punishment of sin, by any other means than God's mercy. And that implies such an aptness to yield to temptation, as renders it hopeless that any of man kind should wholly avoid it. But he speaks of it else where, over and over, as truly impossible, or What cannot be; as in the words before cited in the last section, from his note on Rom. v. 20. where he repeatedly speaks ofthe law, which subjects us to death for every transgression, as what cannot give life ; and states, that if God offered us no other way of salvation, no man from the beginning of the world could be saved. In the same place he cites with approbation Mr. Locke's words, in which, speaking of the Israelites, he says, "All endeavours after righteousness was lost labour, since any one slip forfeited life, and it was impossible for them to expect ought but death." Our author speaks of it as impossible for the law requiring sinless obedience to give life, not that the law was weak in itself, but through the weakness of our flesh. Therefore he says, he conceives the law not to be a dispensation suit able to the infirmity of the human nature in its present state. These things amount to a full confession, that the proneness in men to sin, and to a demerit of and just ex posedness to eternal ruin, is universally invincible ; or, which is the same thing, amounts to invincible necessity ; which surely is the highest kind of tendency, or propensity : and that not the less, for his laying this propensity to our infirmity or weakness, which may seem to intimate some defect, rather than any thing positive : and it is agreeable to the sentiments of the best divines, that all sin originally comes from a defective or privative cause. But sin does not cease to be sin, justly exposing to eternal ruin, (as implied in Dr. T.'s own words,) for arising from infir mity or defect ; nor does an invincible propensity to sin cease to be a propensity to such demerit of eternal ruin, because the proneness arises from such a cause. It is manifest, that this tendency, which has been proved, does not consist in any particular external circumstances that persons are in, peculiarly influencing their minds ; hut is inherent, and is seated in that nature which is common to all mankind, which they carry with them wherever they go, and still remains the same, however circumstances may differ. For it is implied in what has been proved, and shown to be confessed, that the same event comes to pass in all circumstances. In God's sight no man living can be justified ; but all are sinners, and exposed to condemnation. This is true of persons of all constitutions, capacities, conditions, manners, opinions, and educations ; in- all countries, climates, nations, and ages ; and through all the mighty changes and revolutions, which have come to pass in the habitable world. We have the same evidence, that the propensity in this case lies in the nature of the subject— and does not arise from any particular circumstances — as we have in any case whatsoever ; which is only by the effects appearing to be the same in all changes of time and place, and under all varieties of circumstances. It is in this way only we judge, that any propensities, which we observe in man kind of effect. But who ever argues a fixed propensity from a single event ? And is it not strange arguing, that because an event which once comes to pass, does not prove any stated tendency, therefore the unfailing constancy of an event is an evidence of no such thing ? But because Dr. T. makes so much of this objection from Adam sinning without a propensity, I shall hereafter consider it more particularly, in the beginning of the 9th section of this chapter ; where will also be considered what is objected from the fall of the angels. Sect. II. UNIVERSAL SIN PROVES A SINFUL PROPENSITY. 151 kind, are seated in their nature, in all other cases. It is thus we judge of the mutual propensity betwixt the sexes, or of the dispositions which are exercised in any of the natural passions or appetites, that they truly belong to the nature of man; because they are observed in mankind in general, through all countries, nations, and ages, and in all conditions. If any should say, Though it be evident that there is a tendency in the state of things to this general event— that all mankind should fail of perfect obedience, and should sin, and incur a demerit of eternal ruin ; and also that this tendency does not lie in any distinguishing circumstances of any particular people, person, or age — yet it may not lie in mans nature, but in the general constitution and frame of this world. Though the nature of man may be good, without any evil' propensity inherent in it; yet the nature and universal state of this world may be full of so many and strong temptations, and of such powerful influence on such a creature as man, dwelling in so infirm a body, &c. that the result ofthe whole may be a strong and infallible tendency in such a state of things, to the sin and eternal ruin of every one of mankind. To this I would reply, that such an evasion will not at all avail to the purpose of those whom I oppose in this controversy. It alters not the case as to this question, Whether man, in his present state, is depraved and ruined by propensities to sin. If any creature be of such a na ture that it proves evil in its proper place, or in the situa tion which God has assigned it in the universe, it is of an evil nature. That part of the system is not good, which is not good in its place in the system ; and those inherent qualities of that part of the system, which are not good, but corrupt, in that place, are justly looked upon as evil inherent qualities. That propensity is truly esteemed to belong to the nature of any being, or to be inherent in it, that is the necessary consequence of its nature, considered together with its proper situation in the universal system of existence, whether that propensity be good or bad. It is the nature of a stone to be heavy ; but yet, if it were placed, as it might be, at a distance from this world, it would have no such quality. But being a stone, is of such a nature, that it will have this quality or tendency, in its proper place, in this world, where God has made it, it is properly looked upon as a propensity belonging to its nature. And if it be a good propensity here, in its proper place, then it is a good quality of its nature ; but if it be contrariwise, it is an evil natural quality. So, if mankind are of such a nature, that they have an universal effectual tendency to sin and ruin in this world, where God has made and placed them, this is to be looked upon as a pernicious tendency belonging to their nature. There is, perhaps, scarce any such thing, in beings not independent and self-existent, as any power or tendency, but what has some dependence on other beings, with which thev stand connected in the universal system of existence. Propen sities are no propensities, any (Otherwise, than as taken with their objects. Thus it is with the tendencies observed in natural bodies, such as gravity, magnetism, electricity, &c. And thus it is with the propensities observed in the various kinds of animals ; and thus it is with most of the propen sities in created spirits. It may further be observed, that it is exactly the same thing, as to the controversy concerning an agreeableness with God's moral perfections of such a disposal of things — that man should come into the world in a depraved and ruined state, by a propensity to sin and ruin — whether God has so ordered it, that this propensity should lie in his nature considered alone, or with relation to its situa tion in the universe, and its connexion with other parts of the system to which the Creator has united it ; which is as much of God's ordering, as man's nature itself, most sim ply considered. Dr. T. (p. 188, 189.) speaking of the attempt of some to solve the difficulty of God being the author of our na ture, and yet that our nature is polluted, by supposing that God makes the soul pure, but unites it to a polluted body, (or a body so made, as tends to pollute the soul,) he cries out of it as weak and insufficient, and too gross to be admitted : For, says he, who infused the soul into the body? And if it is polluted by being infused into the body, who is the author and cause of its pollution? And who created the body? fyc. — But is not the case just the same, as to those who suppose that God made the soul pure, and places it in a polluted world, or a world tending, by its natural state in which it is made, to pollute the soul, or to have such an influence upon it, that it shall without fail be polluted with sin, and eternally ruined ? Here may not I also cry out, on as good grounds as Dr. T. — Who placed the soul here in this world ? And if the world be polluted, or so constituted as naturally and infallibly to pollute the soul with sin, who is the cause of this pollu tion 7 And, who created the world 7 Though in the place now cited, Dr. T. so insists upon it, that God must be answerable for the pollution of the soul, if he has infused or put the soul into a body that tends to pollute it ; yet this is the very thing which he himself supposes to be fact, with respect to the soul being created by God, in such a body, and in such a world ; where he says, " We are apt, in a world full of temptation, to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites." And if so, ac cording to his way of reasoning, God must be the author and cause of this aptness to be drawn into sin. Again, p. 143. we have these words, " Who drinketh in iniquity like water ? Who is attended with so many sensual appe tites, and so apt to indulge them?" In these words our author in effect says the individual things that he ex claims against as so gross, viz. The tendency of the body, as God has made it, to pollute the soul, which he has in fused into it. These sensual appetites, which incline the soul, or make it apt, to a sinful indulgence, are either from the body which God hath made, or otherwise a prone ness to sinful indulgence is immediately and originally seated in the soul itself, which will not mend the matter. I would lastly observe, that our author insists upon it, p. 42. S. That this lower world, in its present state, " Is as it was, when, upon a review, God pronounced it, and all its furniture, very good.— And that the present form and furniture of the earth is full of God's riches, mercy, and goodness, and of the most evident tokens of his love and bounty to the inhabitants." If so, there can be no room for evading the evidences from fact, of the universal infallible tendency of man's nature to sin and eternal perdition ; since, on the supposition, the tendency to this issue does not lie in the general constitution and frame of this world, which God hath made to be the habitation of mankind. SECT. III. That propensity, which has been proved to be in the nature of all mankind, must be a very evil, depraved, and per nicious propensity; making it manifest, that the soul of man, as it is by nature, is in a corrupt, fallen, and ruined state; which is the other part of the conse quence, drawn from the proposition laid down in the first section. The question to be considered, in order to determine whether man's nature be depraved and ruined, is not, Whether he is inclined to perform as many good deeds as bad ones ? But, to which of these two he preponderates, in the frame of his heart, and the state of his nature, a state of innocence and righteousness, and favour with God ; or a state of sin, guiltiness, and abhorrence in the sight of God? — Persevering sinless righteousness, or else the guilt of sin, is the alternative, on the decision of which de pends — according to the nature and truth of things, as they are in themselves, and according to the rule of right, and of perfect justice — man being approved and accepted of his Maker, and eternally blessed as good ; or his being rejected, and cursed as bad. And therefore the deter mination of the tendency of man's heart and nature, with respect to these terms, is that which is to be looked at, in order to determine whether his nature is good or evil, pure or corrupt, sound or ruined. If such be man's nature, and the state of his heart, that he.has an infallibly effec tual propensity to the latter of those terms ; then it is wholly impertinent to talk of the innocent and kind actions, even of criminals themselves, surpassing their 152 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. I. Cii. I. crimes in numbers, and of the prevailing innocence, good nature, industry, felicity, and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind. Let never so many thousands or mil lions of acts of honesty, good nature, &c. be supposed ; yet, by the supposition, there is an unfailing propensity to such moral evil, as in its dreadful consequences infinitely outweighs all effects or consequences of any supposed good. Surely that tendency, which, in effect, is an infalli ble tendency to eternal destruction, is an infinitely dread ful and pernicious tendency : and that nature and frame of mind, which implies such a tendency, must be an infi nitely dreadful and pernicious frame of mind. It would be much more absurd to suppose, that such a state of nature is not bad, under a notion of men doing more honest and kind things than evil ones ; than to say, the state of that ship is good, for crossing the Atlantic ocean, though such as cannot hold together through the voyage, but will infallibly founder and sink, under a notion that it may probably go great part of the way before it sinks, or that it will proceed and sail above water more hours than it will be in sinking : or, to pronounce that road a good road to go to such a place, the greater part of which is plain and safe, though some parts of it are dangerous, and certainly fatal, to them that travel in it ; or to call that a good propensity, which is an inflexible inclination to travel in such a way. A propensity to that sin which brings God's eternal wrath and curse (which has been proved to belong to the nature of man) is evil, not only as it is calamitous and sor rowful, ending in great natural evil ; but as it is odious and detestable; for by the supposition, it tends to that moral evil, by which the subject becomes odious in the sight of God, and liable, as such, to be condemned, and utterly rejected, and cursed by him. This also makes it evident, that the state which it has been proved mankind are in, is a corrupt state in a moral sense, that it is incon sistent with the fulfilment of the law of God, which is the rule of moral rectitude and goodness. That tendency, which is opposite to what the moral law requires, and prone to that which the moral law utterly forbids, and eternally condemns, is doubtless a corrupt tendency, in a moral sense. So that this depravity is both odious, and also pernicious, fatal and destructive, in the highest sense ; as inevitably tending to that which implies man's eternal ruin. It shows, that man, as he is by nature, is in a deplorable state, in the highest sense. And this proves that men do not come- into the world perfectly innocent in the sight of God, and without any just exposedness to his displeasure. For the being by nature in a lost and ruined state, in the highest sense, is not consistent with being by nature in a state of favour with God. But if any should still insist on a notion of men's good deeds exceeding their bad ones, and that, seeing the good more than countervails the evil, they cannot be properly denominated evil ; all persons and things being most pro perly denominated from that which prevails, and has the ascendant in them ; I would say further, That if there is in man's nature a tendency to guilt and ill desert, in a vast overbalance to virtue and merit ; or a propensity to sin, the demerit of which is so great, that the value and merit of all the virtuous acts that ever he performs, are as nothing to it ; then truly the nature of man may be said to be corrupt and evil. That this is the true case, may be demonstrated by what is evident of the infinite heinousness of sin against God, from the nature of things. The heinousness of this must rise in some proportion to the obligation we are under to regard the Divine Being ; and that must be in some pro portion to his worthiness of regard ; which doubtless is infinitely beyond the worthiness of any of our fellow-crea tures. But the merit of our respect or obedience to God is not infinite. The merit of respect to any being does not increase, but is rather diminished, in proportion to the obligations we are under in strict justice to pay him that respect. There is no great merit in paying a debt we owe, and by the highest possible obligations in strict justice are obliged to pay ; but there is great demerit in refusing to pay it. That on such accounts as these, there is an infinite demerit in all sin against God, which must therefore im mensely outweigh all the merit which can be supposed to be in our virtue, I think, is capable of full demonstration ; and that the futility of the objections which some- have made against the argument, might most plainly be de monstrated. But I shall omit a particular consideration of the evidence of this matter from the nature of things, as I study brevity, and lest any should cry out, metaphysics:' as ths- manner of some is, when any argument is handled against a tenet they are fond of, with a close and exact consideration of the nature of things. And this is not so necessary in the present case, inasmuch as the point asserted — that he who commits any one sin,-has guilt and ill desert so great, that the value and merit of all the good which it is possible he should do in his whole life, is as nothing to it — is not only evident by metaphysics, but is plainly demonstrated by what has been shown to be fact, with respect to God's own constitutions and dispensations towards mankind. Thus, whatever acts of virtue and obedience a man perforins, yet if he trespasses in one point, is guilty of any the least sin, he — according to the law of God, and so according to the exact truth of things, and the proper demerit of sin — is exposed to be wholly cast out of favour with God, and subjected to his curse, to be utterly and eternally destroyed. This has been proved; and shown to be the doctrine which Dr. T. abundantly teaches. But how can it be agreeable to the nature of things, and exactly consonant to everlasting truth and righteousness, thus to deal with a creature for the least sinful act, though he should perform ever so many thousands of honest and virtuous acts, to countervail the evil of that sin ? Or how can it be agreeable to the exact truth and real demerit of things, thus wholly to cast off the deficient creature, with out any regard to the merit of all his good deeds, unless that be in truth the case, that the value and merit of all those good actions, bear no proportion to the heinousness of the least sin ? If it were not so, one would think, that however the offending person might have some proper punishment, yet seeing there is so much virtue to lay in the balance against the guilt, it would be agreeable to the nature of things, that he should find some favour, and not be altogether rejected, and made the subject of perfect and eternal destruction ; and thus no account at all be made of all his virtue, so much as to procure him the least re lief or hope. How can such a constitution represent sin in its proper colours, and according to its true nature and desert, (as Dr. T. says it does,) unless this be its true nature, that it is so bad, that even in the least instance it perfectly swallows up all the value of the sinner's supposed good deeds, let them be ever so many. So that this matter is not left to our metaphysics, or philosophy ; the great lawgiver, and infallible judge of the universe, has clearly decided it, in the revelation he has made of what is agree able to exact truth, justice, and the nature of things, in his revealed law, or rule of righteousness. He that in any respect or degree is a transgressor of God's law, is a wicked man, yea, whollv wicked in the eye of the law ; all his goodness being esteemed nothing, having no account made of it, when taken together with his wickedness. And therefore, without any regard to his righteousness, he is, by the sentence of the law, and so by the voice of truth and justice, to be treated as worthy to be rejected, abhorred, and cursed for ever; and must be so, unless grace interpose, to cover his transgression. But men are really, in themselves, what they are in the eye of the law, and by the voice of strict equity and justice; however they may be looked upon, and treated by infinite and unmerited mercy. So that, on the whole, it appears, all mankind have an infallibly effectual propensity to that moral evil, which infinitely outweighs the value of all the good that can be in them ; and have such a disposition of heart, that the certain consequence of it is, their being, in the eye of per fect truth and righteousness, wicked men. And I leave all to judge, whether such a disposition be not in the eye of truth a depraved disposition 7 Agreeable to these things, the Scripture represents all mankind, not only as having guilt, but immense guilt, which they can have no merit or worthiness to countervail. Such is the representation we have in Matt, xviii. 21, to Sect. IV. ALL MEN SIN IMMEDIATELY, &c, the end. There, on Peter's inquiring, How often his brother should trespass against him, and he for give him, whether until seven times? Christ replies, I say not unto thee, until seven times, but until seventy times seven ; apparently meaning, that he should esteem no number of offences too many, and no degree of injury it is possible our neighbour should be guilty of towards us too great, to be forgiven. For which this reason is given in the parable following, that if ever we obtain forgiveness and favour with God, he must pardon that guilt and injury towards his majesty, which is immensely greater than the greatest injuries that ever men are guilty of one towards another ; yea, than the sum of all their injuries put together, let them be ever so many, and ever so great ; so that the latter would be but as an hundred pence to ten thousand talents, which im mense debt we owe to God, and have nothing to pay ; which implies, that we have no merit to countervail any part of our guilt. And this must be, because if all that may be called virtue in us, be compared with our ill desert, it is in the sight of God as nothing to it. The parable is not to represent Peter's case in particular, but that of all who then were, or ever should be, Christ's disciples ; as appears by the conclusion ofthe discourse, (ver. 3.5.) " So likewise shall my heavenly Father do, if ye, from your hearts, forgive not every one his brother their trespasses." Therefore how absurd must it be for Christians to ob ject, against the depravity of man's nature, a greater num ber of innocent and "kind actions, than of crimes ; and to talk of a prevailing innocency, good nature, industry, and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind ! Infinitely more absurd, than it would be to insist, that the domestic of a prince was not a bad servant, because though some times he contemned and affronted his master to a great degree, yet he did not spit in his master's face so often as he performed acts of service. More absurd, than it would be to affirm, that his spouse was a good wife to him, be cause, although she committed adultery, and that with the slaves and scoundrels sometimes, yet she did not do this so often as she did the duties of a wife. These notions would be absurd, because the crimes are too heinous to be atoned for, by many honest actions of the servant or spouse of the prince ; there being a vast disproportion between the merit of the one, and the ill desert of the other : but infinitely less, than that between the demerit of our of fences against God, and the value of our acts of obedience. Thus I have gone through with my first argument; having shown the evidence of the truth of the proposition laid down at first, and proved its consequence. But there are many other things, that manifest a very corrupt ten dency or disposition in man's nature, in his present state, which I shall take notice of in the following sections. SECT. IV. The depravity of nature appears by a propensity in all to sin immediately, us soon as they are capable of it, and to sin continually and progressively ; and also by the remains of sin in the best of men. The great depravity of man's nature appears, not only in that they universally commit sin, who spend any long time in the world ; but in that men are naturally so prone to sin, that none ever fail of immediately transgressing God's law, and so of bringing infinite guilt on themselves, and exposing themselves to eternal perdition, as soon as they are capable of it. The Scriptures are so verv express upon it, that all man kind, all flesh, all the world, every man living, are guilty of sin; that it must at least be understood, every one * If any should object, that this is an overstraining of things ; and that it supposes a greater mceness and exactness than is observed in scripture re presentations, to infer from these expressions, that all men sin immediately as soon as ever they are capable of it. To this I would say, that I think the arguments used are truly solid, and do really and justly conclude, either that men are born guilty, and so are chargeable with sin before they come to act for themselves, or else commit sin immediately, without the least time intervening, after they are capable of understanding their obligations to God, and reflecting on themselves; and that the Scripture clearly determines, there is not one such person in the world, free from sin. But whether this be straining things to too great an exactness, or not ; yet I suppose, none that do not entirely set aside the sense of such scriptures as have been men tioned, and deny those propositions which Dr. T. himself allows to be con- 153 capable of active duty to God, or of sin against him. There are multitudes in the world, who have but very lately be gun to exert their faculties, as moral agents ; and so have but just entered on their state trial, as acting for them selves : many thousands constantly, who have not lived one month, or week, or day, since they have arrived at any period that can be assigned (for the commencement of their agency) from their birth to twenty years of age. Now — if there be not a strong propensity in men's nature to sin, that should, as it were, hurry them on to speedy transgression, and if they have no guilt previous to their personal sinning— what should hinder, but that there might always be a great number, who have hitherto kept them selves free from sin, and have perfectly obeyed God's law, and so are righteous in his sight, with'the righteousness of the law 7 And who, if they should be called out of the world without any longer trial, as great numbers die at all periods of life, would be justified by the deeds of the law 7 And how then can it be true, that in God's sight no man living can be justified, that no man can be just with God, and that by the deeds of the law no flesh can be justified, because by the law is the knowledge of sin ? And what should hinder but that there may always be many in the world — who are capable subjects of instruction and coun sel, and of prayer to God — for whom the calls of God's word to repentance, to seek pardon through the blood of Christ, ana to forgive others their injuries because they need that God should forgive them, would not be proper ; and for whom the Lord's prayer is not suitable, wherein Christ directs all his followers to pray, that God would forgive their sins, as they forgive those that trespass against them 7 If there are any in the world — though but lately become capable of acting for themselves, as subjects of God's law — who are perfectly free from sin ; such are most likely to be found among the children of Christian parents, who give them the most pious education, and set them the best ex amples. And therefore, such would never be so likely to be found in any part or age of the world, as in the primitive Christian church, in the first age of Christianity, (the age of the church's greatest purity,) so long after Christianity had been established, that there had been time for great num bers of children to be born, and educated by those primi tive Christians, lt was in that age, and in such a part of that age, that the apostle John wrote his first epistle to the Christians. But if there was then a number of them come to understanding, who were perfectly free from sin, why should he write as he does 7 1 John i. 8, 9, 10. " If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all un righteousness. If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and the truth is not in us."* Again, the reality and greatness of the depravity of man's nature appears in this, That he has a prevailing pro- - pensity to be continually sinning against God. What has been observed above, will clearly prove this. That same disposition of nature, which is an effectual propensity to immediate sin, amounts to a propensity to continual sin. For a being prone to continual sinning, is nothing but a proneness to immediate sin continued. Such appears to be the tendency of nature to sin, that as soon as ever man is capable, it causes him immediately to sin, without suffer ing any considerable time to pass without sin. And there fore, if the same propensity be continued undiminished, there will be an equal tendency to immediate sinning again, without any considerable time passing. And so the same will always be a disposition still immediately to sin, with as little time passing without sin afterwards, as at first. The only reason that can be given why sinning must be tained in some of them, will deny they prove, that no considerable time passes after men are capable of acting for themselves, as the subjects of God's law, before they are guilty of sin ; because if the time were con siderable, it would be great enough to deserve to be taken notice of, as an exception to such universal propositions, as, in thy sight shall no man living be justified, &c. And if this be allowed, that men are so prone to sin, that in fact all mankind do sin, as it were, immediately after they come to be capable of it, or fail not to sin so soon, that no considerable time passes before they run into transgression against God ; it does not much alter the case, as to the present argument. If the time of freedom from sin be so small, as not to be worthy of notice in the forementioned universal propo sitions of Scripture, it is also so small, as not to be worthy of notice in the present argument. 154 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. I. Ch. I. immediate at first, is that the disposition is so great, that it will not suffer any considerable time to pass without sin : and therefore, the same disposition being continued in equal degree, without some new restraint, or contrary tendency, it will still equally tend to the same effect. And though it is true, the propensity may be diminished, or have restraints laid upon it, by the gracious disposals of Provi dence, or the merciful influences of God's Spirit ; yet this is not owing to nature. That strong propensity of nature, by which men are so prone to immediate sinning at first, has no tendency in itself to a diminution ; but rather to an in crease ; as the continued exercise of an evil disposition, in repeated actual sins, tends to strengthen it more and more : agreeable to that observation of Dr. T.'s, p. 228. " We are apt to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites, and when once we are under the government of these appetites, it is at least exceeding difficult, if not impracticable, to recover ourselves, by the mere force of reason." The increase of strength of disposition in such a case, is as in a falling body, the strength of its tendency to descend is continually increased, so long as its motion is continued. Not only a constant commission of sin, but a constant increase in the habits and practice of wickedness, is the true tendency of man's depraved nature, if unrestrained by divine grace ; as the true tendency of the nature of a heavy body, if ob stacles are removed, is not only to fall with a continual motion, but with a constantly increasing motion. And we see, that increasing iniquity is actually the consequence of natural depravity, in most men, notwithstanding all the re straints they have. Dispositions to evil are commonly much stronger in adult persons, than in children, when they first begin to act in the world as rational creatures. If sin be such a thing as Dr. T. himself represents it, p. 69. " a thing of an odious and destructive nature, the cor ruption and ruin of our nature, and infinitely hateful to God ;" then such a propensity to continual and increasing sin, must be a very evil disposition. And if we may judge of the perniciousness of an inclination of nature, by the evil of the effect it naturally tends to, the propensity of man's nature must be evil indeed : for the soul beingim- mortal, as Dr. T. acknowledges, p. 94. S. it will follow from what has been observed above, that man has a natural disposition to one of these two things ; either to an increase of wickedness without end, or till wickedness comes to be so great, that the capacity of his nature will not allow it to be greater. This being what his wickedness will come to by its natural tendency, if divine grace does not prevent, it may as truly be said to be the effect which man's natural corruption tends to, as that an acorn in a proper soil, truly tends by its nature to become a great tree. Again, That sin which is remaining in the hearts of the best men on earth, makes it evident, that man's nature is corrupt, as he comes into the world. A remaining depravity of heart in the greatest saints, may be argued from the sins of most of those who are set forth' in Scripture as the most eminent instances and examples of virtue and piety : and is also manifest from this, that the Scripture represents all God's children as standing in need of chastisement. Heb. xii. 6, 7, 8. " For whom the Lord loveth, he chasteneth ; and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth. — What son is he, whom the father chasteneth not? — If ye are without chastisement, then are ye bastards, and not sons." But this is directly and fully asserted in some places ; as in Eccles. vii. 20. " There is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not." Which is as much as to say, there is no man on earth, that is so just, as to have attained to such a degree of righteousness, as not to com mit any sin. Yea, the apostle James speaks of all Chris tians as often sinning, or committing many sins ; even in that primitive age of the christian church, an age distin guished from all others by eminent attainments in holi ness : Jam. iii. 2. " In many things we all offend." And that there is pollution in the hearts of all antecedent to all means for purification, is very plainly declared in Prov. xx. 9. " Who can say, I have made my heart clean, I am pure from my sin 7" According to Dr. T. men come into the world wholly free from sinful propensities. And if so, it appears from what has been already said, there would be nothing to hinder, but that many, without being better than they are by nature, might perfectly avoid the commission of sin But much more might this be the case with men after they had, by care, diligence, and good practice, attained those positive habits of virtue, whereby they are at a much greater distance from sin, than they were naturally : — which this writer supposes to be the case with many good men. But since the Scripture teaches us, that the best men in the world do often commit sin, and have remaining pollution of heart, this makes it abundantly evident, that men, when they are no otherwise than they were by nature, without any of those virtuous attainments, have a sinful depravity ; yea, must have great corruption of nature. SECT. V. The depravity of nature appears, in that the general con sequence of the state and tendency of man's nature is a much greater degree of sin, than righteousness; not only with respect to value and demerit, but matter and quantity.I have before shown, that there is a propensity in man's nature to that sin, which in heinousness and ill desert im mensely outweighs all the value and merit of any supposed good, that may be in him, or that he can do. I now pro ceed to say further, that such is man's nature, in his pre sent state, that it tends to this lamentable effect, that there should at all times, through the course of his life, be at least much more sin, than righteousness ; not only as to weight and value, but as to matter and measure; more dis agreement of heart and practice from the law of God, and from the law of nature and reason, than agreement and conformity. The law of God is the rule of right, as Dr. T. often calls it : It is the measure of virtue and sin : so much agreement as there is with this rule, so much is there of rectitude, righteousness, or true virtue, and no more ; and so much disagreement as there is with this rule, so much sin is there. Having premised this, the following things may be here observed . I. The degree of disagreement from this rule of right is to be determined, not only by the degree of distance from it iu excess, but also in defect ; or in other words, not only in positive transgression, or doing what is forbidden, but * also in withholding what is required. The divine Lawgiver does as much prohibit the one as the other, and does as much charge the latter as a sinful breach of his law, expos ing to his eternal wrath and curse, as the former. Thus at the day of judgment, as described Matt. xxv. The wicked are condemned as cursed, to everlasting fire, for their sin in defect and omission i I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat, Stc. And the case is thus, not only when the defect is in word or behaviour, but in the inward tem per and exercise of the mind. 1 Cor. xvi. 22. " If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be Anathema Maranatha." Dr. T. speaking of the sentence and punish ment ofthe wicked, (Matt. xxv. 41,46.) says, p. 159. " It was manifestly for want of benevolence, love, and compassion to their fellow-creatures, that they were con demned." And elsewhere, as was observed before, he says, that the law of God extends to the latent principles of sin to forbid them, and to condemn to eternal destruction for them. And if so, it doubtless also extends to the in ward principles of holiness, to require them, and in like manner to condemn for the want of them. II. The sum of our duty to God, required in his law, is love ; taking love in a large sense, for the true regard of our hearts to God, implying esteem, honour, benevolence; gratitude, complacence, &c. This is not only very plain by the Scripture, but it is evident in itself. The sum of what the law of God requires, is doubtless obedience to that law : no law can require more than that it be obeyed. But it is manifest, that obedience is nothing, any otherwise than as a testimony of the respect of our hearts to God : without the heart, man's external acts are no more than the motions of the limbs of a wooden image ; have no more of the nature of either sin or righteousness. It must there fore needs be, that love to God, the respect of the heart, must be the sum ofthe duty required in his law. III. It therefore appears from the premises, that whoso- Sect. V. ALL HAVE MORE SIN THAN VIRTUE. 155 ever withholds more of that love or respect of heart from God, which his law requires, than he affords, has more sin than righteousness. Not only he that has less divine love, than passions and affections which are opposite ; but also he that does not love God half so much as he ought, or has reason to do, has justly more wrong than right imputed to him, according to the law of God, and the law of reason ; he has more irregularity than rectitude, with regard to the law of love. The sinful disrespect of his heart towards God, is greater than his respect to him. But what considerate person is there, even among the more virtuous part of mankind, but would be ashamed to say, and profess before God or men, that he loves God half so much as he ought to do ; or that he exercises one half of that esteem, honour, and gratitude towards God, which would be altogether becoming him ; considering what God is, and what great manifestations he has made of his transcendent excellency and goodness, and what benefits he receives from him ? And if few or none of the best of men can with reason and truth make even such a profession, how far from it must the generality of man kind be 7 The chief and most fundamental of all the commands of the moral law, requires us to love the Lord our God with all our hearts, and with all our souls, with all our strength, and all our mind : that is, plainly, with all that is within us, or to the utmost capacity of our nature. God is in himself wort hy of infinitely greater love, than any creature can exercise towards him ; love equal to his perfections, which are infinite. God loves himself with no greater love than he is worthy of, when he loves himself infinitely ; but we can give God no more than we have. Therefore, if we give him so much, if we love him to the utmost extent of the faculties of our nature, we are excused. But when what is proposed, is only that we should love him as much as our capacity will allow, all excuse of want of capacity ceases, and obligation takes hold of us ; and we are doubt less obliged to love God to the utmost of what is possible for us, with such faculties, and such opportunities and ad vantages to know God, as we have. And it is evidently implied in this great commandment of the law, that our love to God should be so great, as to have the most abso lute possession of all the soul, and the perfect govern ment of all the principles and springs of action that are in our nature. Though it is not easy, precisely to fix the limits of man's capacity, as to love to God ; yet in general we may deter mine, that his capacity of love is coextended with his ca pacity of knowledge : the exercise of the understanding opens the way for the exercise of the other faculty. Now, though we cannot have any proper positive understanding of God's infinite excellency ; yet the capacity of the hu man understanding is very great, and may be extended far. It is needless to dispute, how far man's knowledge may be said to be strictly comprehensive of things that are very great, as of the extent of the expanse of the heavens, &c. The word comprehensive, seems to be ambiguous. But doubtless we are capable of some proper positive under standing of the greatness of these things, in comparison of other things that we know. We are capable of some clear understanding of the greatness or considerableness of a whole nation ; or of the whole world of mankind, as vastly exceeding that of a particular person or family. We can positively understand, that the whole globe of the earth is vastly greater than a particular hill or mountain. And can have some good positive apprehension ofthe starry heavens, as so greatly exceeding the globe of the earth, that the lat ter is as it were nothing to it. So the human faculties are capable of a real and clear understanding of the greatness, glory, and goodness of God, and of our dependence upon him, from the manifestations which God has made of him self to mankind, as being beyond all expression above that of the most excellent human friend, or earthly object. And so we are capable of esteem and love to God, which shall be proportionable, much exceeding that which we have to any creature. These things may help us to form some judgment, how vastly the generality of mankind fall below their duty, with respect to love to God ; yea, how far they are from coming half way to that height of love, which is agreeable to the rule of right. Surely if our esteem of God, desires after him, and delight in him, were such as become us, con sidering the things forementioned, they would exceed our regard to other things, as the heavens are high above the earth, and would swallow up all other affections like a deluge. But how far, how exceeding far, are the gener ality of the world from any appearance of being influenced and governed by such a degree of divine love as this ! If we consider the love of God, with respect to one ex ercise of it, gratitude, how far indeed do the generality of mankind come short of the rule of right and reason in this ! If we consider how various, innumerable, and vast the benefits we receive from God, how infinitely great and wonderful that grace, which is revealed and offered to them who live under the gospel — in that eternal salvation which is procured by God giving his only-begotten Son to die for sinners — and also how unworthy we are all, deserv ing (as Dr. T. confesses) eternal perdition under God's wrath and curse — how great is the gratitude that would become us, who are the subjects of so many and great benefits ! What grace is this towards poor sinful lost mankind, set before us in So affecting a manner, as in the extreme sufferings of the Son of God ; who was carried through those pains by a love stronger than death, a love that conquered those mighty agonies, a love whose length and breadth, and depth and height, passes knowledge ? But oh ! what poor returns !— How little the gratitude ! How low, how cold and inconstant, the affection in the best, compared with the obligation 1 And what then shall be said of the gratitude of the generality ? Or rather, who can express the ingratitude ? If the greater part of them who are called Christians, were no enemies to Christ in heart and practice, were not governed by principles opposite to him and his gospel, but had some real love and gratitude ; yet if their love falls vastly short of the obligation, or occasion given, they are guilty of shameful and odious ingratitude. As, when a man has been the subject of some instance of transcendent generosity, whereby he has been relieved from the most extreme calamity, and brought into very opulent, honour able, and happy circumstances, by a benefactor of excel lent character; and yet expresses no more gratitude on such an occasion, than would be requisite for some kind ness comparatively infinitely small, he may justly fall under the imputation of vile unlhankfulness, and of much more ingratitude than gratitude ; though he may have no ill will to his benefactor, or no positive affection of mind contrary to thankfulness and benevolence. What is odi ous in him is his defect, whereby he falls so vastly below his duty. Dr. Turnbull abundantly insists, that the forces of the affections naturally in man are well proportioned ; and often puts a question to this purpose, — How man's nature could nave been better constituted in this respect? How the affections of his heart could have been better proportion ed ? — I will now mention one instance, out of many that might be mentioned. Man, if his heart were not de praved, might have had a disposition to gratitude to God for his goodness, in proportion to his disposition to anger towards men for their injuries. When I say, in propor tion, I mean considering the greatness and number of fa vours and injuries, and the degree in which the one and the other are unmerited, and the benefit received by the former, and the damage sustained by the latter. Is there not an apparent and vast difference and inequality in the dispositions to these two kinds of affection, in the gene rality of both old and young, adult persons and little chil dren 7 How ready is resentment for injuries received from men ! And how easily is it raised in most, at least to an equality with the desert ! And is it so with respect to gratitude for benefits received from God, in any degree of comparison? Dr. Turnbull pleads for the natural disposi tion to anger for injuries, as being good and useful : but surely gratitude to God, if we were inclined to it, would be at least as good and useful as the other. How far the generality of mankind are from their duty, with respect to love to God, will further appear, if we con sider that we are obliged not only to love him with a love of gratitude for benefits received ; but true love to God primarily consists in a supreme regard to him for what he 156 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. I. Ch. I. is in himself. The tendency of true virtue is to treat every tiling as it is, and according to its nature. And if we re gard the Most High according to the infinite dignity and glory of his nature, we shall esteem and love him with all our heart and soul, and to the utmost of the capacity of our nature, on this account ; and not primarily because he has promoted our interest. If God be infinitely excellent in himself, then he is infinitely lovely on that account ; or in other words, infinitely worthy to be loved. And doubtless, if he be worthy to be loved for this, then he ought to be loved for it. And it is manifest, there can be no true love to him, if he be not loved for what he is in himself. For if we love him not for his own sake, but for something else, then our love is not terminated on him, but on something else, as its ultimate object. That is no true value for infinite worth, which implies no value for that worthiness in itself considered, but only on the account of something foreign. Our esteem of God is fundamen tally defective, if it be not primarily for the excellency of his nature, which is the foundation of all that is valuable in him in any respect. If we love not Ood because he is what he is, but only because he is profitable to us, in truth we love him not at all : if we seem to love him, our love is not to him, but to something else. And now I must leave it to every one to judge for him self, from his own opportunities of observation and infor mation concerning mankind, how little there is of this disinterested love to God, this pure divine affection, in the world. How very little indeed in comparison of other af fections altogether diverse, which perpetually urge, actuate, and govern mankind, and keep the world, through all nations and ages, in a continual agitation and commotion ! This is an evidence of a horrid contempt of God. It would justly be esteemed a great instance of disrespect and contempt of a prince, if one of his subjects, when he came into his house, should set him below his meanest slave. But in setting the infinite Jehovah below earthly objects and enjoyments, men degrade him below those things, between which and him there is an infinitely greater distance, than between the highest earthly potentate and the most abject of mortals. Such a conduct as the gene rality of men are guilty of towards God, continually and through all ages, in innumerable respects, would be ac counted the most vile contemptuous treatment of a fellow- creature, of distinguished dignity. Particularly men's treatment of the offers God make's of himself to" them as their friend, their father, their God, and everlasting por tion ; their treatment of" the exhibitions he has made of his unmeasurable love, and the boundless riches of his grace in Christ, attended with earnest repeated calls, counsels, expostulations, and entreaties ; as also of the most dreadful threatenings of his eternal displeasure a-id ven geance. Before I finish this section, it may be proper to say something in reply to an objection, some may be ready to make, against the' force of this argument— that men do' not come half-way to that degree of love to God, which be comes them, and is their duty. The objection is this : That the argument seems to prove too much, in that it will prove, that even good men themselves have more sin than holiness ; which also has been supposed. But if this were true, it would follow, that sin is the prevalent prin ciple even in good men, and that it is the principle which has the predominancy in the heart and practice of the truly pious; which is plainly contrary to the word of -God. I answer, If it be indeed so, that there is more sin, con sisting in defect of required holiness, than there is of holiness, in good men in this world ; yet it will not follow, that sin has the chief government of their heart and prac tice, for two reasons. 1 . They may love God more than other things, and yet there may not be so much love, as there is want of due love ; or in other words, they may love God more than the world, and therefore the love of God may be predominant, and yet may not love God near half "so much as they ought to do. This need not be esteemed a paradox : A . person may love a father, or some great friend and bene factor, of a very excellent character, more than some other . object, a thousand times less worthy of his esteem and affection, and yet love him ten times less than he ought ; and so be chargeable, all things considered, with a defi ciency in respect and gratitude, that is very unbecoming and hateful. If love to God prevails above the love of other things, then virtue will prevail above evil affections, or positive principles of sin ; by which principles it is, _iat sin has a positive power and influence. For evil affec tions radically consist in inordinate love to other things besides God : and therefore, virtue prevailing beyond these, will have the governing influence. The predomi nance of the love of God in the hearts of good men, is more from the nature of the object loved, and the nature ofthe principle of true love, than the degree of the principle. The object is one of supreme loveliness ; immensely above all other objects in worthiness of regard ; and it is by such a transcendent excellency, that he is God, and worthy to be regarded and adored as God : and he that truly loves God, loves him as God. True love acknowledges him to be divinely and supremely excellent ; and must arise from some knowledge, sense, and conviction of his worthiness of supreme respect : and though the sense and view of it may be very imperfect, and. the love that arises from it in like manner imperfect; yet if there be any realizing view of such divine excellency, it must cause the heart to respect God above all. 2. Another reason, why a principle of holiness main tains the dominion in the hearts of good men, is the nature of the covenant of grace, and the promises of that cove nant, on which true christian virtue relies, and which engage God's strength and assistance to be on its side, and to help it against its enemy, that it may not b& overcome. The just live by faith. Holiness in the Christian, or his spiritual life, is maintained, as it has respect by faith to its author and finisher, and derives strength and efficacy from the divine fountain, and by this means overcomes. For, as the apostle says, This is the victory that overcomes the world, even our faith. It is our faith in him who has promised never to leave nor forsake his people ; not to forsake the works of his own hands, nor suffer his people to be tempted above their ability ; that his grace shall be sufficient for them, his strength be made perfect in weakness ; and that where he has begun a good work he will carry it on to the day of Christ. SECT. VI. The corruption of man's nature appears by its tendency, in its present state, to an extreme degree of Jolly and stupidity in matters of religion. It appears, that man's nature is greatly depraved, by an apparent proneness to an exceeding stupidity and sottish- ness in those things wherein his duty and main interest are chiefly concerned. I shall instance in two things, viz. men's proneness to idolatry ; and a general, great disre gard of eternal things, in them who live under the light of the gospel. It is manifest, in the first instance, that man's nature in its present state is attended with a great propensity to for sake the acknowledgment and worship of the true God, and to fall into the most stupid idolatry. This has been sufficiently proved by known fact, on abundant trial : in somuch as the world of mankind in general (excepting one small people, miraculously delivered and preserved) through all nations, in all parts of the world, ages after ages, continued without the knowledge and worship of the true God, and overwhelmed in gross idolatry, without the least appearance or prospect of its recovering" itself from so great blindness, or returning from its brutish principles and customs, till delivered by divine grace. In order to the most just arguing from fact, concerning the tendency of man's nature, as that is in itself, it should be inquired what the event has been, where nature has been left to itself, to operate according to its own tendency, with least opposition made to it by any thing supernatural'; rather than in exempt places, where the infinite power and grace of God have interposed, and extraordinary means have been used to stem the current, and bring men to true religion and virtue. As to the means by which God's people of old, in the line of Abraham, were delivered and Sect. VI. MEN'S PRONENESS TO EXTREME STUPIDITY, &c. 157 preserved from idolatry, they were miraculous, and of mere grace. Notwithstanding which, they were often re lapsing into the notions and ways of the heathen ; and when they had backslidden, never were recovered, but by divine gracious interposition. And as to the means by which many gentile nations have been delivered since the days of the gospel, they are such as have been wholly owing to the most wonderful, miraculous, and infinite grace. . God was under no obligation to bestow on the heathen world greater advantages than they had in the ages of their gross darkness ; as appears by the fact, that God actually did not, for so long a time, "bestow greater advantages. ' Dr. T. himself observes, (Key, p. 1.) That in about four hundred years after the flood, the generality of mankind were fallen into idolatry. Arid thus it was every where through the world, excepting among that people that was saved and preserved by a constant series of miracles, through a variety of countries, nations, and climates, great enough — and through successive changes, revolutions, and ages, numerous enough — to be a sufficient trial of what man kind are prone to, if there be any such thing/ as a suf ficient trial. That men should forsake the true God for idols, is an evidence of the most astonishing folly and stupidity, by God's own testimony, Jer. ii. 12, 13. " Be astonished, 0 ye heavens, at this, and be ye horribly afraid, be ye very desolate, saith the Lord : for my people have committed two evils ; they have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters, and have hewed out to themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water." And that mankind in general did thus, so soon after the flood, was from the evil propensity of their hearts, and because they did not like to retain God in their knowledge ; as is evident by Rom. i. 28. And the universality of the effect shows that the cause was universal, and not any thing belonging to the particular circumstances of one, or only some nations or ages, but something belonging to that nature, which is common to all nations, and which remains the same through all ages. And what other cause could this great effect possibly arise from, but a depraved disposition, natural to all mankind 7 It could not arise from want of a sufficient capacity or means of knowledge. This is in effect confessed on all hands. Dr. Turnbull (Chris. Phil. p. 21.) says : " The existence of one infinitely powerful, wise, and good mind, the Author, Creator, Upholder, and Governor of all things, is a truth that lies plain and obvi ous to all that will but think." And (ibid. p. 245.) " Moral knowledge, which is the most important of all knowledge, may easily be acquired by all men." And again, (ibid. p. 292.) " livery man by himself, if he would duly employ his mind in the contemplation of the works of God about him, or in the examination of his own frame, — might make very great progress in the knowledge of the wisdom and goodness of God. This all men, generally speaking, might do, with very little assistance; for they have all sufficient abilities for thus employing their minds, and have all sufficient time for it." Mr. Locke says, (Hum. Und. p. iv. chap. iv. p. 242. edit. 11.) " Our own exist ence, and the sensible parts of the universe, offer the proofs of a Deity so clearly and cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considerate man to with stand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth, as can any where be delivered, that the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead." And Dr. T. himself (in p. 78>) says, " The light given to all ages and nations of the world, is sufficient for the knowledge and practice of their duty." And (p. Ill, 112.) citing those words of the apostle, Rom. ii. 14, 15. he says, " This clearly supposes that the Gentiles, who were then in the world, might have done the things contained in the law by nature, or their natural power." And in one of the next sentences he says, " The apostle,' in Rom. i. 19, 20, 21. affirms that the Gentiles had light sufficient to have seen God's eternal power and godhead, in the works of creation ; and that the reason why they did not glorify him as God, was be cause they became vain in their imaginations, and had darkened their foolish heart; so that they were without excuse. And in his paraphrase on those verses in the 1st of Rom. he speaks of the very heathens, that were with out a written revelation, as having that clear and evident discovery of God's being and perfections, that they are inexcusable in not glorifying him suitably to his excellent nature, and as the author of their being and enjoyments." And (p. 146. S.) he says, " God affords every man suf ficient light to know his duty." If all ages and nations of the world have sufficient light for the knowledge of God, and their duty to him, then even such nations and ages, in which the most brutish ignorance and barbarity prevailed, had sufficient light, if they had but a disposition to improve it ; and then much more those of the heathen, which were more knowing and polished, and in ages wherein arts and learning had made greatest advances. But even in such nations and ages, there was no advance made towards true religion ; as Dr. Winder observes, (Hist, of Knowl. vol. ii. p. 3 3 6.) 'in the following words ; " The pagan religion degenerated into greater absurdity, the further it proceeded ; and it prevailed in all its height of absurdity, when the pagan nations were polished to the height. Though they set out with the talents of reason, and had solid foundations of information to build upon, it in fact proved, that with all their strengthened faculties, and growing powers of reason, the edifice of religion rose in the most absurd deformities and disproportions, and gradually went on in the most irrational, disproportioned, incongruous systems, of which the most easy dictates of reason would have demonstrated the absurdity. They were contrary to all just calculations in moral mathe matics." He observes, " that their grossest abominations first began in Egypt, where was an ostentation of the greatest progress in learning and science : and they never renounced clearly any of their abominations, or openly returned to the worship of the one true God, the Creator of all things, and to the original, genuine sentiments of the highest and most venerable antiquity. The pagan re ligion continued in this deep state of corruption to the last. The pagan philosophers, and inquisitive men, made great improvements in many sciences, and even in mo rality itself; yet the inveterate absurdities of pagan idolatry remained without remedy. Every temple smoked with incense to the sun and moon, and other inanimate material luminaries, and earthly elements, to Jupiter, Juno, Mars, and Venus, &c. the patrons and examples of almost every vice. Hecatombs bled on the altars of a thousand gods ; as mad superstition inspired. And this was not the disgrace of our ignorant untaught northern countries only; but even at Athens itself, the infamy reigned, and circu lated through all Greece ; and finally prevailed, amidst all their learning and politeness, under the Ptolemies in Egypt, and the Ctesars at Rome. Now if the knowledge of the pagan world, in religion, proceeded no further than this ; if they retained all their deities, even the most absurd of them all, their deified beasts, and deified men, even to the last breath of pagan power : we may justly ascribe the great improvements in the world, on the subject of religion, to divine revelation, either vouchsafed in the be ginning, when this knowledge was competently clear and copious ; or at the death of paganism, when this light shone forth in its consummate lustre at the coming of Christ." Dr. T. often speaks of the idolatry of the heathen world, as great wickedness, in which they were wholly inexcus able ; and yet often speaks of their case as remediless, and of them as being dead in sin, and unable to recover themselves. If so, and yet, according to his own doc trine, every age, every nation, and every man, had sufficient light afforded, to know God, and their whole duty to him ; then their inability to deliver themselves must be a moral inability, consisting in a desperate depravity, and most evil disposition of heart. And if there had not been sufficient trial of the pro pensity of the hearts of mankind, through all those ages that passed from Abraham to Christ, the trial has been continued down to this day, in all those vast regions of the face of the earth, that have remained without any effects of the light of the gospel ; and the dismal effect continues every where unvaried. How was it with that multitude of nations inhabiting South and North America? 158 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. I. Cii. I. What appearance was there, when the Europeans first came hither, of their being recovered, or recovering, in any degree, from the grossest ignorance, delusions, and most stupid paganism? And how is it at this day, in those parts of Africa and Asia, into which the light of the gospefhas not penetrated 7 This strong and universally prevalent disposition of mankind to idolatry, of which there has been such great trial, and so notorious and vast proof, in fact, is a most glaring evidence of the exceeding depravity of the human nature ; as it is a propensity, in the utmost degree, con trary to the highest end, the main business, and chief hap piness of mankind— consisting in the knowledge, service, and enjoyment of the living God, the Creator and Governor of the world— in the highest degree contrary to that for which mainly God gave mankind more understanding than the beasts of the earth, and made them wiser than the fowls of heaven ; which was, that they might be capable of the knowledge of God. It is also in the highest degree contrary to the first and greatest commandment of the moral law, That we slvould have no other gods before Je hovah, and that we should love and adore him with all our heart, soul, mind, and strength. The Scriptures are abundant in representing the idolatry of the heathen world, as their exceeding wickedness, and their most brutish stu pidity. They who worship and trust in idols, are said themselves to be like the lifeless statues they worship, like mere senseless stocks and stones. (Psalm cxv. 4—8. and cxxxv. 15 — 18.) A second instance of the natural stupidity of mankind, is that great disregard of their own eternal interest, which appears so remarkably, so generally among them who live under the gospel. Mr. Locke observes, (Hum. Und. vol. i. p. 207.) "Were the will determined by the views of good, as it appears in contemplation, greater or less to the understanding, it could never get loose from the infinite eternal joys of heaven, once proposed, and considered as possible ; the eternal condition of a future state infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches or honour, or any other worldly pleasure, which we can propose to ourselves ; though we should grant these the more probable to be obtained." Again, (p. 228, 229.) "He that will not be so far a rational creature, as to reflect seriously upon infinite happiness and misery, must needs condemn himself, as not making that use of his understanding he should. The rewards and punishments of another life, which the Almighty has es tablished, as the enforcements of his laws, are of weight enough to determine the choice, against whatsoever plea sure or pain this life can show. When the eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility, which nobody can make any doubt of, he that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here, and the contrary state the possible reward of a bad one, must own himself to judge very much amiss, if he does not conclude that a virtuous life, with the certain expectation of everlasting bliss, which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one; with the fear of that dreadful state of misery, which it is very possible may overtake the guilty, or at least the terrible uncertain hope of annihila tion. This is evidently so ; though the virtuous life here had nothing but pain, and the vicious continual pleasure ; which yet is for the most part quite otherwise, and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their present possession : nay, all things rightly considered, have I think even the worst part here. But when infinite happiness is put in one scale, against infinite misery in the other ; if the worst that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes, be the best that the wicked man can attain to, if he be in the right ; who can, without madness, run the venture ? Who in his wits would choose to come within a possibility of infinite misery 7 which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard : whereas, on the other side, the sober man ventures nothing, against infinite nappiness to be got, if his expectation comes to pass." That disposition of mind which is a propensity to act contrary to reason, is a depraved disposition. It is not because the faculty of reason, which God has given to mankind, is not sufficient fully to discover to them, that forty, sixty, or an hundred years, is as nothing in com parison of eternity— infinitely less than a second of time to an hundred years— that the greatest worldly prosperity is not treated with the most perfect disregard, in all cases where there is any degree of competition of earthly things, with salvation from exquisite, eternal misery, and the en joyment of everlasting glory and felicity. But is it a matter of controversy, whether men ip general show a strong disposition to act far otherwise, from their infancy, tin death sensibly approaches ? In things that concern their temporal interest, they easily discern the difference between things of a long and short continuance. It is no hard matter to convince men of the difference between being admitted to the accommodations and entertainments of a convenient, beautiful, well-furnished habitation, and to partake of the provisions and produce of a plentiful estate for a day, or a night ; and having all given them, and settled upon them, as their own, to possess as long as they live, and to be theirs and their heirs' for ever. There would be no need of preaching sermons, and spending strength and life, to convince them of the difference. Men know how to adjust things in their dealings and contracts one with another, according to the length of time in which anything agreed for is to be used or enjoyed. In temporal affairs, they are sensible, that it concerns them to provide for future time, as well as for the present. Thus common prudence teaches them to take care in summer to lay up for winter ; yea, to provide a fund, or an estate, whence they may be supplied for a long time to come. And not only so, but they are forward to spend and be spent, in order to provide for their children after they are dead ; though it be quite uncertain, who shall enjoy what they lay up, after they have left the world. And if their chil dren should have the comfort of it, as they desire, they will not partake with them in that comfort, or have any portion in any thing under the sun. In things which re late to men's temporal interest, they seem very sensible of the uncertainty of life, especially of the lives of others ; and to make answerable provision for the security of their worldly interest, that no considerable part of it may rest only on so uncertain a foundation, as the life of a neighbour or friend. Common discretion leads them to take good care, that their outward possessions be well secured, by a good and firm title. In worldly concerns, men discern their opportunities, and are careful to improve them before they are past. The husbandman is careful to plough his ground, and sow his seed, in the proper season ; otherwise he knows he cannot expect a crop : and when the harvest is come, he will not sleep away the time ; for he knows, if he does so, the crop will soon be lost. How careful and eagle-eyed is the merchant to improve opportunities to enrich himself! How apt are men to be alarmed at the appearance of danger to their worldly estate, or any thing that remarkably threatens great damage to their outward interest ! And how will they bestir themselves in such a case, if possible, to avoid the threatened calamity ! In things purely secular, and not of a moral or spiritual nature, they easily receive conviction by past experience, when any thing, on repeated trial, proves unprofitable or Erejudicial ; and are ready to take warning by what they ave found themselves, and also by the experience of then neighbours and forefathers. But if we consider how men generally conduct them selves in things on which their well-being infinitely more depends, how vast is the diversity ! In these things how cold, lifeless, and dilatory 1 With what difficulty are a few, out of multitudes, excited to any tolerable degree of care and diligence, by the innumerable means used, in order to make them-wise for themselves ! And when some vigilance and activity is excited, how apt is it to die away, like a mere force against a natural tendency ! What need of a constant repetition of admonitions" and counsels, to keep the heart from -falling asleep ! How many objections are made ! How are difficulties magnified f And how soon is the mind discouraged ! How many arguments, often renewed, variously and elaborately enforced, do men stand in need of, to convince them of things that are almost self-evident ! As that things which are eternal, are infinitely more important than things temporal, and the like. And after all, how very few are convinced effectually, or in such a manner as to induce them to a practical pre- Sect. VI. MEN'S PRONENESS TO EXTREME STUPIDITY, &c. 159 ference of eternal things ! How senseless are men of the necessity of improving their time, as to their spiritual in terest, and their welfare in another world ! Though it be an endless futurity, and though it be their own personal, infinitely important good, that is to be cared for. Though men are so sensible of the uncertainty of their neighbours' lives, when any considerable part of their own estates de- f lends on the continuance of them ; how stupidly sense- ess do they seem to be of the uncertainty of their own lives, when their preservation from immensely great, re mediless, and endless misery, is risked by a present delay, through a dependence on future opportunity ! What a dreadful venture will men carelessly and boldly run, re peat, and multiply, with regard to their eternal salvation ; who yet are very careful to have every thing in a deed or bond, firm, and without a flaw ! How negligent are they of their special advantages and opportunities for their soul's good ! How hardly awakened by the most evident and imminent dangers, threatening eternal destruction, yea, though put in mind of them, and much pains taken to point them forth, show them plainly, and fully to re present them, if possible to engage their attention ! How are they like the horse, that boldly rushes into the battle ! How hardly are men convinced by their own frequent and abundant experience, of the unsatisfactory nature of earthly things, and the instability of their own hearts in their good frames and intentions f And how hardly con vinced by their own observation, and the experience of all past generations, of the uncertainty of life and its enjoy ments ! Psal. xlix. 11, &c. " Their inward thought is, that their houses shall continue for ever.— Nevertheless, man being in honour, abideth not ; he is like the beasts that perish. This their way is their folly ; yet their pos terity approve their sayings. Like sheep are they laid in the grave." In these things, men who are prudent for their temporal interest, act as if they were bereft of reason : " They have eyes, and see not; ears, and hear not; neither do they understand : they are like the horse and mule, that have no understanding." — Jer. viii. 7. " The stork in the heaven knoweth her appointed times ; and the turtle, and the crane, and the swallow, observe the time of their coming : but my people know not the judgment of the Lord." These things are often mentioned in Scripture, as evi dences of extreme folly and stupidity, wherein men act as great enemies to themselves, as though they loved their own ruin; Prov. viii. 36. Laying wait for their own blood, Prov. i. 18. And how can these things be ac counted for, but by supposing a most wretched depravity of nature 7 Why otherwise should not men be as wise for themselves in spiritual and eternal things, as in temporal 7 All Christians will confess, that man's faculty of reason was given him chiefly to enable him to understand the former, wherein his main interest and true happiness consist. This faculty would therefore undoubtedly be every way as fit for understanding them, as the latter, if not depraved. The reason why these are understood, and not the other, is not that such things as have been men tioned, belonging to men's spiritual and eternal interest, are more obscure and abstruse in their own nature. For instance, the difference between long and short, the need of providing for futurity, the importance of improving proper opportunities, and of having good security, and a sure foundation, in affairs wherein our interest is greatly concerned, &c. these things are as plain in themselves in religious, as in other matters. And we have far greater means to assist us to be wise for ourselves in eternal than in temporal things. We have the abundant instruction of perfect and infinite wisdom itself, to lead and conduct us in the paths of righteousness, so that we may not err. And the reasons of things are most clearly, variously, and abundantly set before us in the word of God ; which is adapted to the faculties of mankind, tending greatly to en lighten and convince the mind : whereas, we have no such excellent and perfect rules to instruct and direct us in things pertaining to our temporal interest, nor any thing to be compared to it. If any should say, It is true, if men gave full credit to what they are told concerning eternal things, and these appeared to them as real and certain things, it would be an evidence of a sort of madness in them, that they show no greater regard to them in practice : but there is reason to think, this is not the case ; the things of another world being unseen, appear to men as things of a very doubtful nature, and attended with great uncertainty In answer, 1 would observe, agreeable to what has been cited from Mr. Locke, though eternal things were considered in their bare possibility, if men acted rationally, they would infi nitely outweigh all temporal things in their influence on their hearts. And I would also observe, that to suppose eternal things not to be fully believed, at least by them who enjoy the light of the gospel, does not weaken, but rather strengthen, the argument for the depravity of na ture. For the eternal world being what God had chiefly in view in the creation of men, this world was made wholly subordinate to the other, man's state here being only a state of probation, preparation, and progression, with respect to the future state. Eternal things are in effect their all, their whole concern ; to understand and know which, it chiefly was, that they had understanding given them ; therefore we may undoubtedly conclude, that if men have not respect to them as real and certain things, it cannot be for want of sufficient evidence of their truth : but it must be from a dreadful stupidity of mind, occa sioning a sottish insensibility of their truth and importance, when manifested by the clearest evidence. SECT. VII. That man's nature is corrupt, appears, in that by far the greater part of mankind, in all ages, have been wicked men. The depravity of man's nature appears, not only in its propensity to sin in some degree, which renders a man an evil or wicked man in the eye ofthe law, and strict jus tice, as was before shown ; but it is so corrupt, that its depravity either shows that men are, or tends to make them to be, of such an evil character, as shall denominate them wicked men, according to the tenor of the covenant of grace. This may be argued from several things which have been already observed : as from a tendency to continual sin ; a tendency to much greater degrees of sin than righteousness, and from the general extreme stupidity of mankind. But yet the present state of man's nature, as implying, or tending to, a wicked character, may deserve to be more particularly considered, and directly proved. And in general, this appears, in that there have been so very few in the world, from age to age, ever since the world has stood, that have been of any other character. It is abundantly evident in Scripture, and is what I suppose none that call themselves Christians will deny, that the whole world is divided into good and bad, and that all mankind at the day of judgment will either be approved as righteous, or condemned as wicked : either glorified, as children ofthe kingdom, or cast into a furnace of fire, as children of the wicked one. I need not stand to show what things belong to the character of such as shall hereafter be accepted as right eous, according to the word of God. It may be sufficient for my present purpose, to observe what Dr. T. himself speaks of, as belonging essentially to the character of such. In p. 203. he says, " This is infallibly the character of true Christians, and what is essential to such, that they have really mortified the flesh with its lusts ; — they are dead to sin, and live no longer therein ; the old man is crucified, and the body of sin destroyed : they yield themselves to God, as those that are alive from the dead, and their members as instruments of righteousness to God, and as servants of righteousness to holiness." — There is more to the like purpose in the two next pages. In p. 228. he says, " Whatsoever is evil and corrupt in us, we ought to condemn ; not so, as it shall still remain in us, that we may always be condemning it, but that we may speedily reform, and be effectually delivered from it; other wise certainly we do not come up to the character of the true disciples of Christ." In p. 248. he says, " Unless God's favour be preferred 160 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. I. Cn. I. before all other enjoyments whatsoever, unless there be a delight in the worship of God, and in converse with him, unless every appetite be brought into subjection to reason and truth, and unless there be a kind and benevolent dis position towards our fellow-creatures, how can the mind be fit to dwell with God, in his house and family, to do him service in his kingdom, and to promote the happiness of any part of his creation." — And in his Key, § 286. p. 101, 102, &c. showing there, what it is to be a true Chris tian, he says, among other things, " That he is one who has such a sense and persuasion of the love of God in Christ, that he devotes his life to the honour and service of God, in hope of eternal glory. And that to the character of a true Christian, it is absolutely necessary, that he dili gently study the things that are freely given him of God, viz. his election, regeneration, &c. that he may gain a just knowledge of those inestimable privileges, may taste that the Lord is gracious, and rejoice in the gospel-salvation, as his greatest happiness and glory. — It is necessary, that he work these blessings on his heart, till they become a vital principle, producing in him the love of God, engaging him to all cheerful obedience to his will, giving him a proper dignity and elevation of soul, raising him above the best and worst of this world, carrying his heart into heaven, and fixing his affections and regards upon his everlasting inheritance, and the crown of glory laid up for him there Thus he is armed against all the temptations and trials resulting from any pleasure or pain, hopes or fears, gain or loss, in the present world. None of these things move him from a faithful discharge of any part of his duty, or from a firm attachment to truth and righteousness ; neither counts he his very life dear to him, that he may do the will of God, and finish his course with joy. In a sense of the love of God in Christ, he maintains daily commu nion with God, by reading and meditating on his word. In a sense of his own infirmity, and the readiness of the divine favour to succour him, he daily addresses the throne of grace, for the renewal of spiritual strength, in assurance of obtaining it, through the one Mediator Christ Jesus. Enlightened and directed by the heavenly doctrine of the gospel," &c* Now I leave every one that has any degree of impar tiality, to judge, whether there be not sufficient grounds to think, that it is but a very small part indeed, of the many myriads and millions which overspread this globe, who are of a character that in any wise answers these descrip tions. However Dr. T. insists, that all nations, and every man on the face of the earth, have light and means suffi cient to do the whole will of God, even they that live in the grossest darkness of paganism. Dr. T. in answer to arguments of this kind, very imper tinently from time to time objects, that we are no judges of the viciousness of men's characters, nor are able to de cide in what degree they are virtuous or vicious. As though we could have no good grounds to judge, that any thing appertaining to the qualities or properties of the mind, which is invisible, is general or prevailing among a multitude or collective body, unless we can determine how it is with each individual. I think I have sufficient rea son, from what I know and have heard of the American Indians, to judge, that there are not many good philoso phers among them ; though the thoughts of their hearts, and the ideas and knowledge they have in their minds, are things invisible ; and though I have never seen so much as a thousandth part of the Indians; and with respect to most of them, should not be able to pronounce perempto rily concerning any one, that he was not very knowing in the nature of things, if all should singly pass before me. And Dr. T. himself seems to be sensible of the falseness of his own conclusions, that he so often urges against others ; if we may judge by his practice, and the liberties he takes^ in judging of a multitude himself. He, it seems, is sensi ble that a man may have good grounds to judge, that wickedness of character is general in a collective body ; because he openly does it himself. (Key, p. 102.) After de claring the things which belong to the character of a true Christian, he judges of the generality of Christians, that they have cast off these things, that they are a people that • What Dr. Turnbull says of the character of a good man, is also worthy do err in their hearts, and liave not known God's ways, p. 259. he judges, that the generality of Christians are the most wicked of all mankind, when he thinks it will throw some disgrace on the opinion of such as he opposes. The like we have from time to time in other places, (as p. 168. p. 258. Key, p. 127, 128.) But if men are not sufficient judges, whether there are few of the world of mankind but what are wicked, yet doubtless God is sufficient, and his judgment, often de clared in his word, determines the matter. Matt. vii. 13, 14. " Enter ye in at the strait gate : for wide is the gate and broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and manv there be that go in thereat : because strait is the gate and narrow is the way that leadeth to life, and few there be that find it." It is manifest, that here Christ is not only describing the state of things, as it was at that day, and does not mention the comparative smallness of the number of them that are saved, as a consequence of the peculiar perverseness of that people, and of that generation ; but as a consequence of the general circumstances of the way to life, and the way to destruction, the broadness of the one, and the narrowness of the other. In the straitness of the gate, &c. I suppose none will deny, that Christ has re spect to the strictness of those rules, which he had insisted on in the preceding sermon, and which render the way to life very difficult. But certainly these amiable rules would not be difficult, were they not contrary to the natural in clinations of men's hearts ; and they would not be contrary to those inclinations, were these not depraved. Conse quently the wideness of the gate, and broadness of the way, that leads to destruction, in consequence of which many go in thereat, must imply the agreeableness of this way to men's natural inclinations. The like reason is given by Christ, why few are saved. Luke xiii. 23, 24. " Then said one unto him, Lord, are there few saved ? •And he said unto them, Strive to enter in at the strait gate : for many I say unto you, shall seek to enter in, and shall not be able." That there are generally but few good men in the world, even among them who have the most dis tinguishing and glorious advantages for it, is evident by that saying of our Lord, " Many are called, but few are chosen." And if there are but few among these, how few, how very few indeed, must persons of this character be, compared with the whole world of mankind ! The ex ceeding smallness of the number of the saints, compared with the whole world, appears by the representations often made of them as distinguished from the world ; in which they are spoken of as called and chosen out ofthe world, redeemed from the earth, redeemed from among men ; as being those that are of God, while the whole world lieth in wickedness, and the like. And if we look into the Old Testament, we shall find the same testimony given. Prov. xx. 6. " Most men will proclaim every man his own goodness : but a faithful man who can find ?" By the faithful man, as the phrase is used in Scripture, is intended much the same as a sincere, upright, or truly good man; as in Psal. xii. 1. and xxxi. 23. and ci. 6. and other places. Again, Eccl. vii. 25—29. " I applied mine heart to know, and to search, and to find out wisdom, and the reason of things, and to know the wickedness of folly, even of foolishness and madness : and I find more bitter than death, the woman whose heart is snares, &c. Behold, this have I found, saith the preacher, counting one by one, to find out the account, which yet my soulseeketh, but I find not : one man among a thou sand have I found : but a woman among all these have I not found. Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright ; but they have sought out many inventions." Solomon here signifies, that when he set himself diligently to find out the account or proportion of true wisdom, or thorough uprightness among men, the result was, that be found it to be but as one to a thousand, &c. Dr. T. on this place, p. 184. says, " The wise man in the context, is inquiring into the corruption and depravity of mankind, of the men and women, that lived in his time." As though what he said represented nothing of the state of things in the world in general, but only in his time. But does Dr. T. or any body else, suppose this only to be the to be observed, Chris. Phil. p. 86, 858, 259, 288, 375, 376, 409, 410. Sect. VII. GENERALITY OF MANKIND, WICKED. design of that book, to represent the vanity and evil of the world in that time, and to show that all was vanity and vexation of spirit in Solomon's day ? That day truly, we have reason to think, was a day of the greatest smiles of Heaven on that nation, that ever had been on any nation from the foundation ofthe world. Not only does the sub ject and argument of the whole book show it to be other wise ; but also the declared design of the book in the first chapter ; where the world is represented as very much the same, as to its vanity and evil, from age to age. It makes little or no progress, after all its revolutions and restless motions, labours, and pursuits ; like the sea, that has all the rivers constantly emptying themselves into it, from age to age, and yet is never the fuller. As to that place, Prov. xx. 6. " A faithful man who can find 7" there is no more reason to suppose that the wise man has respect only to his time, in these words, than in those immediately pre ceding, " Counsel in the heart of a man is like deep waters ; but a man of understanding will draw it out." Or in the words next following, " The just man walketh in his integrity : his children are blessed after him." Or in any other proverb in the whole book. And if it were so, that Solomon in these things meant only to describe his own times, it would not at all weaken the argument. For, if we observe the history of the Old Testament, there is reason to think there never was any time from Joshua to the captivity, wherein wickedness was more restrained, and virtue and religion more encouraged and promoted, than in David's and Solomon's times. And if there was so little true piety in that nation, the only people of God under heaven, even in their best times, what may we sup pose, concerning the world in general, take one time with another 7 Notwithstanding what some authors advance concern ing the prevalence of virtue, honesty, good neighbourhood, cheerfulness, &c. in the world ; Solomon, whom we may justly esteem as wise and just an observer of human na ture, and the state of the world of mankind, as most in these days (besides, Christians ought to remember, that he wrote by divine inspiration)— judged the world to be so full of wickedness, that it was better never to be born, than to be born to live only in such a world. Eccl. iv. 1 — 3. " So I returned and considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun ; and behold, the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter : and on the side of their oppressors there was power ; but they had no comforter. Wherefore, I praised the dead, which were already dead, more than the living, which are yet alive. Yea, better is he than both they, which hath not yet been ; who hath not seen the evil work that is done under the sun." Surely it will not be said that Solomon has only respect to his time here too, when he speaks of the oppressions of them that were in power ; since he himself, and others ap pointed by him, and wholly under his control, were the men that were in power in that land, and in almost all the neighbouring countries. The same inspired writer says, Eccles. ix. 3. " The heart of the sons of men is full of evil ; and madness is in their heart while they live ; and after that they go to the dead." If these general expressions are to be understood only of some, and those the smaller part, when in general, truth, honesty, good-nature, &}c. govern the world, why are such general expressions from time to time used 7 "Why does not this wise and noble prince express himself in a more generous and benevolent strain, and say, wisdom is in the hearts of the sons of men while they live, i}c. — instead of leaving in his writings so many sly, ill-natured suggestions, which pour such contempt on human nature, and tend so much to excite mutual jealousy and malevolence, to taint the minds of mankind through all generations after him ? If we consider the various successive parts and periods of the duration of the world, it will, if possible, be yet more evident, that by far the greater part of mankind have, in all ages, been of a wicked character. The short ac counts we have of Adam and his family are such as lead us to suppose, that the greater part of his posterity in his life-time, yea, in the former part of his life, were wicked. It appears, that his eldest son Cain, was a very wicked * Levit. xvii. 7. Josh. v. 9. and xxiv. 14. Ezek. xx. 7. 8. and xxii. 3. VOL. I. M 161 man, who slew his righteous brother Abel. And Adam lived an hundred and thirty years before Seth was born : and by that time, we may suppose, his posterity began to be considerably numerous : when he was born, his mother called his name Seth ; for God, said she, hath appointed me another seed instead of' Abel. Which naturally suggests this to our thoughts ; that of all her seed then existing, none were of any such note for religion and virtue, as that their parents could have any great comfort in them, or ex pectation from them, on that account. And by the brief history we have, it looks as if— however there might be some intervals of a revival of religion, yet— in the general, mankind grew more and more corrupt till the flood. It is signified that when men began to multiply on the face of the earth, wickedness prevailed exceedingly, Gen. vi'. 1, &c. And that before God appeared to Noah, to command him to build the ark, one hundred and twenty years before the flood, the world had long continued obstinate in great and general wickedness, and the disease was become inveterate. The expressions (ver. 3, 5, 6.) suggest as much : "And the Lord said, my spirit shall not always strive with man. — ¦ And God saw that the wickedness of man was great on the earth, and that every imagination of the thought of his heart was evil, only evil continually ; and it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart." And by that time, " all flesh had corrupted his way upon the earth," (v. 12.) And as Dr. T. himself observes, (p. 122.) " Mankind were universally debauched into lust, sensuality, rapine, and injustice." And with respect to the period after the flood, to the calling of Abraham; Dr. T. says, as already observed, that in about four hundred years after the flood, the gene rality of mankind were fallen into idolatry ; which was before all they were dead who came out of the ark . And it cannot be thought, the world went suddenly into that general and extreme degree of corruption, but that they had been gradually growing more and more corrupt ; though it is true, it must be by very swift degrees — however soon we may suppose they began — to get to that pass in one age. And as to the period from the calling of Abraham to the coming of Christ, Dr. T. justly observes ss follows : (Key, p. 133.) "If we reckon from the call of Abraham to the coming of Christ, the Jewish dispensation continued one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one years; during which period, the other families and nations of the earth, not only lay out of God's peculiar kingdom, but also lived in idolatry, great ignorance, and wickedness." And with regard to the Israelites, it is evident that wickedness was the generally prevailing character among them, from age to age. If we consider how it was with Jacob's family, the behaviour of Reuben with his father's concubine, the beha viour of Judah with Tamar, the conduct of Jacob's sons towards the Sliechemites, and the behaviour of Joseph's ten brethren in their cruel treatment of him ; we cannot think, that the character of true piety belonged to many of them, according to Dr. T.'s own notion of such a character; though it be true, they might afterwards repent. And with respect to the time the children of Israel were in Egypt ; the Scripture, speaking of them in general, or as a collec tive bodv, often represents them as complying with the abominable idolatries of the country.* And as to that generation which went out of Egypt, and wandered in the wilderness, they are abundantly represented as extremely and almost universally wicked, perverse, and children of divine wrath. And after Joshuas death, the Scripture is very express, that wickedness was the prevailing character in the nation, from age to age. So it was till Samuel's time. (1 Sam. viii. 7, 8.) " They have rejected me, that I should not reign over them ; according to all their works which they have done, since the day that I brought them out of Egypt, unto this day." Yea, so it was till Jere miah's and Ezekiel's time. (Jer. xxxii. 30, 31.) " For the children of Israel, and the children of Judah, have only done evil before me from their youth ; for the children of Israel have only provoked me to anger with the work of their hands, saith the Lord : for this city hath been to me a provocation of mine anger, and of my fury, from the day 162 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. I. Cii. I. they built it, even unto this day." (Compare chap. v. 21, 23. and chap. vii. 25, 26, 27.) So Ezek. ii. 3, 4. " I send thee to the children of Israel, to a rebellious nation, that hath rebelled against me, they and their fathers have trans gressed against me, ecen unto this very day : for they are impudent children, and stiff-hearted." And it appears by the discourse of Stephen, (Acts vii.) that this was generally the case with that nation, from their first rise, even to the days of the apostles. After this summary rehearsal of the instances of their perverseness from the very time of their selling Joseph into Egypt, he concludes, (ver. 51 — 53.) " Ye stiff-necked, and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost. As your fathers did, so do ye. Which of the prophets have not your fathers per secuted 7 And they have slain them which showed be fore ofthe coming of that just One, of whom ye have been now the betrayers and murderers : who have received the law by the disposition of angels, and have not kept it." Thus it appears, that wickedness was the generally pre vailing character in all nations, till Christ' came. And so also it appears to have been since his coming to this day. So in the age of apostles. There was a great number of persons of a truly pious character in the latter part of the apostolic age, when multitudes of converts had been made, and Christianity was as yet in its primitive purity; but what says the apostle John of the church of God at that time, as compared with the rest of the world 7 (1 John v. 19.) " We know that we are of God, and the whole world lieth in wickedness." And after that Christianity came to prevail to that degree, that Christians had the upper hand m nations and civil communities, still the greater part of mankind remained in their old heathen state; which Dr. T. speaks of as a state of great ignorance and wickedness. And besides, this is noted in all ecclesiastical history, that as the Christians gained in power and secular advantages, true piety declined, and corruption and wickedness pre vailed among them. — And as to the state of the Christian world, since Christianity began to be established by human laws, wickedness for the most part has greatly prevailed ; as is very notorious, and is implied in what Dr. T. himself says : In giving an account how the doctrine of original sin came to prevail among Christians, he observes, (p. 167. S.) " That the christian religion was very early and griev ously corrupted, by dreaming, ignorant, superstitious monks." In p. 259. he says, " The generality of Chris tians have embraced this persuasion concerning original sin ; and the consequence has been, that the generality of Christians have been the most wicked, lewd, bloody, and treacherous of all mankind." Thus, a view of the several successive periods of the past duration of the world, from the.beginning to this day, shows, that wickedness has ever been exceeding prevalent, and has had vastly the superiority in the world. And Dr. T. himself in effect owns, that it has been so ever since Adam first turned into the way of transgression. " It is certain (says he, p. 168.) the moral circumstances of mankind, since the time Adam first turned into the way of transgression, have been very different from a state of innocence. So far as we can judge from history, or what we know at pre sent, the greatest part of mankind have been, and still are, very corrupt ; though not equally so in every age and place." And lower 1h the same page, he speaks of Adam's pos terity, as having sunk themselves into the most lamentable degrees of ignorance, superstition, idolatry, injustice, de bauchery, eye. These things clearly determine the point, concerning the tendency of man's nature to wickedness, if we may be al lowed to proceed according to such rules and methods of reasoning, as are never denied or doubted to be good and sure, in experimental philosophy ;* or may reason from ex perience and facts, in that manner which common sense leads all mankind to in other cases. If experience and trial will evince any thing at all concerning the natural disposition of the human heart, one would think the ex perience of so many ages, as have elapsed since the be ginning of the world, and the trial made by hundreds of different nations together, for so long a time, should be * Dr. Turnbull, though so great an enemy to the doctrine of the de pravity of nature, yet greatly insists upon it. that the experimental method of reasoning ought to be adopted in moral matters, and things pertaining to sufficient to convince all, that wickedness is agreeable to the nature of mankind in its present state. Here, to strengthen the argument, if there were any need of it, I might observe, not only the extent and generality of the prevalence of wickedness in the world, but the height to which it has risen, and the degree in which it has reigned. Among innumerable things which confirm this, I shall now only observe, The degree in which mankind have from age to age been hurtful one to another. Many kinds of brute animals are esteemed very noxious and de structive, many of them very fierce, voracious, and many very poisonous, and the destroying of them has always been looked upon as a public benefit : but have not man kind been a thousand times as hurtful and destructive as any one of them, yea, as all the noxious beasts, birds, fishes, and reptiles in the earth, air, and water, put together, at least of all kinds of animals that are visible? And no creature can be found any where so destructive of its own kind as man is. All others, for the most part, are harm less and peaceable, with regard to their own species. Where one wolf is destroyed by another wolf, one viper by another, probably a thousand men are destroyed by those of their own species. Well therefore might our blessed Lord say, when sending forth his disciples into the world, (Matt. x. 16, 17.) " Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves ; — but, beware of men." Why do I say wolves? I send you forth into the wide world of men, that are far more hurtful and pernicious, and of whom you had much more need to beware, than of wolves. It would be strange indeed, that this should be the state of mankind, distinguished by reason, for that very end, that they might be capable of religion, which summarily consists in love, if men, as they come into the world, are in their nature innocent and harmless, undepraved, and per fectly free from all evil propensities. SECT. VIII. The native depravity of mankind appears, in that there has been so little good effect of so manifold and great means, used to promote virtue in the world. The evidence of the native corruption of mankind, ap pears much more glaring, when it is considered that the world has been so generally, so constantly, and so exceed ingly corrupt, notwithstanding the various, great, and con tinual means that have been used to restrain men from sin, and promote virtue and true religion among them. Dr. T. supposes, that sorrow and death, which come on mankind in consequence of Adam's sin, was brought on them in great favour ; as a benevolent father, exercising an wholesome discipline towards his children ; to restrain them from sin, by increasing the vanity of all earthly things, to abate their force to tempt and delude ; to induce them to be moderate in gratifying the appetites of the body; to mortify pride and ambition ; and that men might always have before their eyes a striking demonstration that sin is infinitely hateful to God, by a sight of that, than which nothing is more proper to give them the utmost abhorrence of iniquity, and to fix in their minds a sense of the dreadful consequences of sin, Sec. dominion. Like a heavy body, which may by some great power be caused to ascend, against its nature, a little while, but soon goes back again towards the centre, to which it naturally and constantly tends. So that evil example will in no wise account for the corruption of mankind, without supposing a natural prone ness to sin. The tendency of example alone will not ac count for general wicked practice, as consequent on good example. And if the influence of bad example is a reason of some of the wickedness, that alone will not account for 4. Hos. xi. I. and ix. 10. Judg.ii. 7, 17, 22. and many other places. Sect. IX. SEVERAL EVASIONS CONSIDERED. 171 men becoming worse than the example set, degenerating more and more, and growing worse and worse, which has been their manner. 2. There has been given to the world an example of vir tue, which, were it not for a dreadful depravity of nature, would have influence on them who live under the gospel, far beyond all other examples ; that is, the example of Jesus Christ. God, who knew the human nature, and how apt men are to be influenced by example, has made answerable provision. His infinite wisdom has contrived that we should have set before us the most amiable and perfect example, in such circumstances, as should have the great est tendency to influence all the principles of man's na ture, but his corruption. Men are apt to be moved by the example of others like themselves, or in their own nature : therefore this example was given in our nature. Men are ready to follow the example of the great and honourable; and this — though that of one in our nature, yet— was the example of one infinitely higher and move honourable than kings or angels. A people are apt to follow the example of their prince. This is the example of that glorious per son, who stands in a peculiar relation to Christians as their Lord and King, the supreme head of the church ; and not only so, but the King of kings, supreme head of the uni verse, and head over all things to the church. Children are apt to follow the example of their parents; this is the example of the Author of our being, and of our holy and happy being ; the Creator of the world, and everlasting Father of the universe. Men are very apt to follow the example of their friends : the example of Christ is that of one who is infinitely our greatest friend, standing in the most endearing relations of brother, redeemer, spiritual head and husband ; whose grace and love expressed to us, transcends all other love and friendship, as much as heaven is higher than the earth. The virtues and acts of his ex ample were exhibited to us in the most endearing and en gaging circumstances that can possibly be conceived of. — His obedience and submission to God, his humility, meek ness, patience, charity, self-denial, Sec. being exercised and expressed in a work of infinite grace, love, condescension, and beneficence to us — and had all their highest expres sions in his laying down his life, and meekly, patiently, and cheerfully undergoing unutterable suffering for our eternal salvation. Men are peculiarly apt to follow the example of those from whom they have great benefits : but it is utterly impossible to conceive of greater benefits, that we could have by the virtues of any person, than we have by the virtuous acts of Christ ; we, who depend upon being thereby saved from eternal destruction, and brought to inconceivable, immortal glory at God's right hand. Surely if it were not for an extreme corruption of the human heart, such an example would have that strong in fluence on it, which would as it were swallow up the power of all the evil and hateful examples of a generation of vipers. 3. The influence of bad example, without corruption of nature, will not account for children universally committing sin as soon as capable of it ; which, I think, is a fact that has been made evident by the Scripture. It will not ac count for it in the children of eminently pious parents ; the first example set in their view being very good ; which was especially the case of many children in christian families in the apostolic days, when the apostle John sup poses that every individual person had sin to repent of, and confess to God. 4. What Dr. T. supposes to have been fact, with respect to a great part of mankind — the state of the heathen world, which he supposes, considered as a collective body, was helpless, dead in sin, and unable to recover itself— cannot consistently be. accounted for from the influence of bad ex ample. Not evil example alone, no, nor as united with evil instruction, can be supposed a sufficient reason why every new generation that arose among them, should not be able to emerge from the idolatry and wickedness of their ancestors, in any consistence with his scheme. The ill example of ancestors could have no power to oblige them to sin, any other way than as a strong temptation. But * See Mor. Phil. p. 279. and Chris. Phil. p. 274. Dr. T. himself says, (p. 72. S.) " To suppose men's tempt ations to be superior to their powers, will impeach the goodness and justice of God, who appoints every man's trial." And as to bad instructions, as he supposes that they all, yea every individual person, had light sufficient to know God, and do their whole duty. And if each one could do this for himself, then surely they might all be agreed in it through the power of free will, as well as the whole world be agreed in corruption by the same power. Evasion IV. Some modern opposers of the doctrine of original sin, thus account for the general prevalence of wickedness, viz. that in the course of nature our senses grow up first, and the animal passions get the start of reason. So Dr. Turnbull,* " Sensitive objects first affect us, and inasmuch as reason is a principle, which, in the nature of things, must be advanced to strength and vigour, by gradual cultivation, and these objects are continually assailing and soliciting us; so, unless a very happy educa tion prevents, our sensitive appetites must have become very strong, before reason can have force enough to call them to an account, and assume authority over them." From hence Dr. Turnbull supposes it comes to pass,f " That though some few may, through the influence of virtuous example, be said to be sanctified from the womb, so liberal, so generous, so virtuous, so truly noble is their cast of mind ; yet generally speaking, the whole world lieth in such wickedness, that, with respect to the far greater part of mankind, the study of virtue is beginning to reform, and is a severe struggle against bad habits, early contracted, and deeply rooted ; it is therefore putting off an old inveterate corrupt nature, and putting on a new form and temper ; it is moulding ourselves anew ; it is a being born again, and becoming as children.— And how few are there in the world who escape its pollutions, so as not to be early in that class, or to be among the righteous that need no repentance !'' Dr. Taylor, though not so explicit, seems to hint at the same thing, (p. 192.) " It is by slow degrees that children come to the use of understanding; the animal passions being for some years the governing part of their constitu tion. And therefore, though they may be froward and apt. to displease us, yet how far this is sin in them, we are not capable of judging. But it may suffice to say, that it is the will of God that children should have appetites and passions to regulate and "restrain, that he hath given parents instructions and commands to discipline and inform their minds, that if parents first learned true wisdom for them selves, and then endeavoured to bring up their children in the way of virtue, there would be less wickedness in the world." Concerning these things I would observe, that such a scheme is attended with the very same difficulties, which they who advance it would avoid by it; liable to the same objections, which they make against God's ordering it so, that men should be brought into being with a prevailing propensity to sin. For this scheme supposes, the Author of nature has so ordered things, that men should come into being as moral agents, that is, should first have existence in a state and capacity of moral agency, under a prevailing propensity to sin. For that strength, which sensitive ap petites and animal passions come to by their habitual ex ercise, before persons come to the exercise of their rational powers, amounts to a strong propensity to sin, when they first come to the exercise of those rational powers, by the supposition : because this is given as a reason why the scale is turned for sin, and why, generally speaking, the whole world lies in wickedness, and the study of virtue is a severe struggle against bad habits, early contracted, and deeply rooted. These deeply rooted habits must imply a tendency to sin ; otherwise they could not account for that which they are brought to account for, namely, prevailing wickedness in the world : for that cause cannot account for an effect, which is supposed to have no tendency to that effect. And this tendency which is supposed, is altogether equivalent to a natural tendency, being as necessary to the subject. For it is supposed to be brought on the per son, who is the subject of it, when he has no power to oppose it; the habit, as Dr. Turnbull says, becoming very t Chris. Phil. p. 282, 283, 172 ON ORIGINAL SIN. p, I. Ch. I. strong, before reason can have force enough to call the passions to account, or assume authority over them. And it is supposed, that this necessity, by which men become subject to this propensity to sin, is from the ordering and disposal of the Author of nature ; and therefore must be as much from his hand, and as much without the hand of the person himself, as if he were first brought into being with such a propensity. Moreover, it is supposed that the effect is truly wickedness. For it is alleged as a cause why the whole world lies in wickedness, and why all but a very few are first in the class of the wicked, and not among the righteous, that need no repentance. If they need repentance, what they are guilty of is truly and pro perly wickedness, or moral evil ; for certainly men need no repentance for that which is no sin, or blamable evil. If, as a consequence of this propensity, the world lies in wickedness, and the far greater part are of a wicked character, without doubt the far greater part go to eternal perdition : for death does not pick and choose, only for men of a righteous character. And certainly that is an evil, corrupt state of things, which naturally tends to and issues in this consequence, that as it were the whole world lies and lives in wickedness, dies in wickedness, and perishes eternally. And this by the supposition, is a state of things, wholly ordered by the Author of nature, before mankind are capable of having any hand in the affair. And is this any relief to the difficulties, which these writers object against the doctrine of natural de pravity 7 And I might here also observe, that this way of ac counting for the wickedness of the world amounts to just the same thing with that solution of man's depravity, mentioned before, against which Dr. T. cries out, as too gross to be admitted, (p. 188, 189.) viz. God creating the soul pure, and putting it into such a body, as naturally tends to pollute it. For this scheme supposes, that God creates the soul pure, and puts it into a body, and into such a state in that body, that the natural consequence is a strong propensity to sin, as soon as the soul is capable of sinning. Dr. Turnbull seems to suppose, that the matter could not have been ordered otherwise, consistent with the nature of things, than that animal passions should be so aforehand with reason, as that the consequence should be that which has been mentioned ; because reason is a faculty of such a nature, that it can have strength and vigour no otherwise than by exercise and culture.* But can there be any force in this ? Is there any thing in nature, to make it impossible, but that the superior prin ciples of man's nature should be so proportioned to the inferior, as to prevent such a dreadful consequence, as the moral and natural ruin, and eternal perdition of the far greater part of mankind ? Could not those superior prin ciples be in much greater strength at first, and yet be capable of endless improvement 7 And what should hinder its being so ordered by the Creator, that they should improve by vastly swifter degrees than they do 7 If we are Christians, we must be forced to allow it to be possible in the nature of things, that the principles of human nature should be so balanced, that the consequence should be no propensity to sin, in the very beginning of a capacity for moral agency ; because we must own, that it was so in fact in Adam, when first created, and also in the man Christ Jesus ; though the faculties of the latter were such as grew by culture and improvement, so that he increased in wisdom as he grew in stature. Evasion V. Seeing men in this world are in a state of trial, it is fit that their virtue should meet with trials, and consequently that it should have opposition and tempta tion to overcome ; not only from without, but from within, in the animal passions and appetites ; that by the conflict and victory our virtue may be refined and established.f Agreeably to this Dr. T. (p. 253.) says, " Without a right use and application of our powers, were they naturally ever so perfect, we could not be judged fit to enter into the kingdom of God. — This gives a good reason why we » Mm: Phil. p. 311. t Belsham. are now in a state of trial and temptation, viz. to prove and discipline our minds, to season our virtue, and to fit us for the kingdom of God ; for which, in the judgment of infinite wisdom, we cannot be qualified, but by over coming our present temptations." And, (p. 78. S.) " We are upon trial, and it is the will of our Father that our constitution should be attended with various passions and appetites, as well as our outward condition with various temptations." He says the like in several other places. To the same purpose very often Dr. Turnbull, particu larly Chris. Phil. p. 310. "What merit (he says) except from combat 7 What virtue without the encounter of such enemies, such temptations, as arise both from within and from abroad 7 To be virtuous, is to prefer the pleasures of virtue to those which come into competition with it, and vice holds forth to tempt us ; and to dare to adhere to truth and goodness, whatever pains and hardships it may cost. There must therefore, in order to the formation and trial, in order to the very being of virtue, be pleasures of a certain kind to make temptations to vice." In reply to these things I would say, either the state of temptation^ which is supposed to be ordered for men's trial, amounts on the whole to a prevailing tendency to that state of general wickedness and rain, which has been proved to take place, or it does not. If it does not amount to a tendency to such an effect, then how does it account for it 7 When it is inquired, by what cause such an effect should come to pass, is it not absurd to allege a cause, which is owned at the same time to have no tendency to such an effect ? Which is as much as to confess, that it will not account for it. I think it has been demonstrated, that this effect must be owing to some prevailing tendency — But if the other part of the dilemma be taken, and it be said, that this state of things does imply a prevailing tendency to that effect, which has been proved, viz. that all mankind, without one exception, sin against God, to their own deserved eternal ruin— and not only so, but sin thus immediately, as soon as capable of it, and con tinually, have more sin than virtue, and have guilt that infinitely outweighs the value of all the goodness any ever have, and that the generality of the world in all ages are extremely stupid and foolish, of a wicked character, and actually perish for ever — then I say, if the state of tempta tion implies a natural tendency to such an effect as this, it is a very evil, corrupt, and dreadful state of things, as has been already largely shown. Besides, such a state has a tendency to defeat its own supposed end, which is to refine, ripen, and perfect virtue, and so to fit men for the greater eternal happiness and glory : whereas, the effect it tends to, is the reverse of this, viz. general, eternal infamy and ruin, in all generations. It is supposed, that men's" virtue must have passions and appetites to struggle with, in order to have the glory and reward of victory : but the consequence is, a prevailing, continual, and generally effectual tendency — not to men s victory over evil appetites and passions, and the glorious reward of that victory, but — to the victory of evil appetites and lusts over men, utterly and eternally destroying them. If a trial of virtue be requisite, vet the question is, Whence comes so general a failing in the trial, if there be no de pravity of nature 7 If conflict and war be necessary, whence the necessity that there should be more cowards than good soldiers ? and whence is it necessary that the whole world as it were should lie in wickedness, and die in cowardice 7 I might also here observe, that Dr. Turnbull is not very consistent, in supposing, that combat with temptation is requisite to the very being of virtue. For I think it clearly follows from his own notion of virtue, that it must have a being prior to any virtuous or praiseworthy combat with temptation. For by his principles, all virtue lies in good affection, and no actions can be virtuous, but what pro ceed from good affection.j Therefore, surely the combat itself can nave no virtue in it, unless it proceeds from virtuous affection : and therefore virtue must have an ex istence before the combat, and be the cause of it. t Chris. Phil. p. 113, 111, 115. Chap. II. ARGUMENT FROM UNIVERSAL MORTALITY. 173 CHAP. II. UNIVERSAL MORTALITY PROVES ORIGINAL SIN; PARTICU LARLY THE DEATH OF INFANTS, WITH ITS VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. The universal reign of death over persons of all ages indiscriminately, with the awful circumstances and at tendants of death, prove that men come sinful into the world. — It is needless here particularly to inquire, Whe ther God has not a sovereign right to set bounds to the lives of his own creatures, be they sinful or not ; and as he gives life, so to take it away when he pleases 7 Or how far God has a right to bring extreme suffering and calamity on an innocent moral agent 7 For death, with the pains and agonies with which it is usually brought on, is not merely a limiting of existence, but is a most terrible cala mity ; and to such a creature as man — capable of con ceiving of immortality, made with an earnest desire after it, capable of foresight and reflection on approaching death, and having an extreme dread of it — is a calamity above all others terrible. I say, it is needless elaborately to consider, whether God may not, consistent with his per fections by absolute sovereignty, bring so great a calamity on mankind when perfectly innocent. It is sufficient, if we have good evidence from Scripture, that it is not agreeable to God's manner of dealing with mankind so to do. It is manifest, that mankind were not originally subject ed to this calamity : God brought it on them afterwards, on occasion of man's sin, when manifesting his great displeasure, and by a sentence pronounced by him as a judge; which Dr. T. often confesses. Sin entered into the world, as the apostle says, and death by sin. Which certainly ieads us to suppose, that this affair was ordered, not merely by the sovereignty of a creator, but by the righteousness of ajudge. And the Scripture every where speaks of all great afflictions and calamities, which God in his providence brings on mankind, as testimonies of his displeasure for sin, in the subjects of those calamities ; excepting those sufferings which are to atone for the sins of others. He ever taught his people to look on such cala mities as his rod, the rod of his anger, his frown, the hidings of his face in displeasure. Hence such calamities are in Scripture so often called by the name of judgments, being what God brings on men as ajudge, executing a righteous sentence for transgression. Yea, they are often called by the name of wrath, especially calamities consisting or issuing in death.* And hence also is that which Dr. T. wouldnave us take so much notice of, that sometimes, in the Scripture, calamity and suffering is called by such names as sin, iniquity, being guilty, eye. which is evidently by a metonymy of the cause for the effect. It is not likely that, in the language used of old among God's peo ple, calamity or suffering would have been called by the names of sin and guilt, if it had been so far from having any connexion with sin, that even death itself, which is always spoken of as the most terrible of calamities, is not so much as any sign of the sinfulness of the subject, or any testimony of God's displeasure for his guilt, as Dr. T. supposes. Death is spoken of in Scripture as the chief of calami ties, the most extreme and terrible of all natural evils in this world. Deadly destruction is spoken of as the most terrible destruction". (1 Sam. v. 11.) Deadly sorrmv, as the most extreme sorrow. (Isa. xvii. 11. Matt. xxvi. 38.) And deadly enemies, as the most bitter and terrible ene mies. (Psal. xvii. 9.) The extremity of Christ's sufferings is represented by his suffering unto death. (Philip, ii. 8. and other places.) Hence the greatest testimonies of God's anger for the sins of men in this world, have been by inflicting death ; as on the sinners of the old world ; on the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah ; on Onan, Pharaoh, and the Egyptians ; on Nadub and Abihu, Korah. and his company, and the rest of the rebels in the wilderness ; on the wicked inhabitants of Canaan ; on Hophni and Phinehas, Ananias and Sapphira, and the * See Lev. x. 6. Num. i. 53. and xviii. 5. Josh. ix. 20. 2 Chron. xxiv. 18. and xix. 2, JO. and xxviii. 13. and xxxii. 25. Ezra vii. 23. Neh. xiii. 18. unbelieving Jews, upon whom wrath came to the utter most, in the time of the last destruction of Jerusalem. This calamity is often spoken of as in a peculiar manner the fruit of guilt. Exod. xxviii. 43. " That they bear not iniquity and die." Levit. xxii. 9. " Lest they bear sin for it and die." (So Num. xviii. 22. compared with Levit. x. 1, 2.) The very light of nature, or tradition from .ancient revelation, led the heathen to conceive of death as in a peculiar manner an evidence of divine ven geance. Thus we have an account, (Acts xxviii. 4.) That " when the barbarians saw the venomous beast hang on Paul's hand, they said among themselves, no doubt this man is a murderer, whom though he hath escaped the seas, yet vengeance suffereth not to live." Calamities, very small in comparison of the universal temporal destruction of mankind by death, are spoken of as manifest indications of God's great displeasure for the sinfulness of the subject ; such as the destruction of par ticular cities, countries, or numbers of men, by war or pestilence. Deut. xxix. 24. " All nations shall say, Wherefore hath the Lord done thus unto this land 7 what meaneth the heat of this great anger?" (Compare Deut. xxxii. 30. 1 Kings ix. 8. and Jer. xxii. 8, 9.) These cala mities, thus spoken of as plain testimonies of God's great anger, consisted only in hastening on that death, which otherwise, by God's disposal, would most certainly have come in a short time. Now to take off thirty or forty years from seventy or eighty, supposing it to be so much, one with another, in the time of these extraordinary judg ments, is but a small matter, in comparison of God first making man mortal, cutting off his hope of immortality, subjecting him to inevitable death, which his nature so ex ceedingly dreads ; and afterwards shortening his life fur ther, by cutting off more than eight hundred years of it : so bringing it to be less than a twelfth part of what it was in the first ages of the world. Besides that innumerable multitudes in the common course of things, without any extraordinary judgment, die in youth, in childhood, and infancy. Therefore how inconsiderable a thing is the ad ditional or hastened destruction, that is sometimes brought on a particular city or country by war, compared with that universal havoc which death makes of the whole human race, from generation to generation, without distinction of sex, age, quality, or condition ; with all the infinitely various dismal circumstances, torments, and agonies, which at tend the death of old and young, adult persons and little infants ! If those particular and comparatively trivial ca lamities, extending perhaps not to more than the thou sandth part of one generation, are clear evidences of God's great anger ; certainly this universal destruction — by which the whole world, in all generations, is swallowed up, as by a flood that nothing can resist — must be a most glaring manifestation of Goofs anger for the sinfulness of mankind. Yea, the Scripture is express, that it is so : (Psal. xc. 3, &c.) " Thou turnest man to destruction, and sayest, Return, ye children of men. — Thou earnest them away as with a flood : they are as a sleep : in the morning they are like grass, which groweth up ; in the morning it flourisheth and groweth up ; in the evening it is cut down and withereth. For we are consumed by thine anger, and by thy wrath are we troubled. Thou hast set our iniqui ties before thee, our secret sins in the light of thy counte nance. For all our days are passed awayin thy wrath : we spend our years as a tale that is told. The days of our years are threescore years and ten : and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labour and sorrow ; for it is soon cut off, and we fly away. Who knoweth the power of thine anger 7 According to thy fear, so is thy wrath. So teach us to number our days that we may apply our hearts unto wisdom." How plain and full is this testimony, that the general mortality of mankind is an evidence of God's anger for the sin of those who are the subjects of such a dispensation ! Abime/ech speaks of it as what he had reason to con clude from God's nature and perfection, that he would not slay a righteous nation. Gen. xx. 4. By righteous evidently meaning innocent. And if so, much less will God slay a righteous world— consisting of so many nations, repeating Zech. vii. 12. and many other places, 17-1 ON ORIGINAL SIN. Part I. the great slaughter in every generation — or subject the whole world of mankind to death, when they are con sidered as innocent, as Dr. T. supposes. We have from time to time in Scripture such phrases as — worthy of death, and guilty of death : but certainly the righteous Judge of all the earth will not bring death on thousands of millions, not only that are not worthy of death, but are worthy of no punishment at all. Dr. T. from time to time speaks of affliction and death as a great benefit, as they increase the vanity of all earthly things, and tend to excite sober reflections, and to induce us to be moderate in gratifying the appetites of the body, and to mortify pride and ambition, &c* To this I would say, 1 . It is not denied but God may see it needful for man kind in their present state, that they should be mortal, and subject to outward afflictions, to restrain their lusts, mortify their pride, &:c. But then is it not an evidence of man's depravity, that it is so ? Is it not an evidence of distemper of mind, yea, strong disease, when man stands in need of such sharp medicines, such severe and terrible means to restrain his lusts, keep down his pride, and to make him willing, and obedient to God? It must be owing to a corrupt and ungrateful heart, if the riches of divine bounty, in bestowing life and prosperity, things comfortable and pleasant, will not engage the heart to God and virtue, love and obedience. Whereas he must always have the rod held over him, be often chastised, and held under the apprehensions of death, to keep him from running wild in pride, contempt, and rebellion ; ungrate fully using the blessings dealt forth from God's hand, in sinning against him, and serving his enemies. If man has no natural disingenuity of heart, it must be a mysterious thing indeed, that the sweet blessings of God's bounty have not as powerful an influence to restrain him from sinning against God, as terrible afflictions. If any thing can be a proof of a perverse and vile disposition, this must be a proof of it, that men should be most apt to forget and despise God, when his providence is most kind ; and that they should need to have God chastising them with great severity, and even killing them, to keep them in order. If we were as much disposed to gratitude to God for his benefits, as we are to anger at our fellow- creatures for injuries, as we must be (so far as I can see) if we are not of a depraved heart ; then the sweetness of divine bounty, and the height of every enjoyment pleasing to innocent human nature, would be as powerful incentives to a proper regard for God — tending as much to promote religion and virtue — as to have the world filled with calamities, and to have God (to use the language of Hezekiah, Isaiah xxviii. 13. describing death and its agonies) as a lion, breaking all our bones, and from day even to night, making an end of us. Dr. T. himself (p. 252.) says, " that our first parents before the fall were placed in a condition proper to engage their gratitude, love, and obedience." Which is as much as to say, a condition proper to engage them to the exer cise and practice of all religion. And if the paradisaical state was proper to engage to all religion and duty, and men still come into the world with hearts as good as the two first of the species, why is it not proper to engage them to it still ? What need of so vastly changing man's state, depriving him of all those blessings, and instead of them allotting to him a world full of briers and thorns, affliction, calamity, and death, to engage him to it? The taking away of life, and all those pleasant enjoyments man had at first, by a permanent constitution, would be no stated benefit to mankind, unless there was in them a stated disposition to abuse such blessings. The taking of them away, is supposed to be a benefit, under the notion of their tending to lead men to sin : but they would have no such tendency, at least in a stated manner, unless there was in men a fixed tendency to make that unreasonable misimprovemeht of them. Such a temper of mind, as amounts to a disposition to make such a misimprovement of blessings, is often spoken of in Scripture as most astonishingly vile and perverse. So concerning Israel abusing the blessings of Canaan, that land flowing with » P. 21, 67, and other places. milk and honey ; their ingratitude in it is spoken of by the prophets, as enough to astonish all heaven and earth, and as more than brutish stupidity and vileness. Jer. ii. 7. " I brought them into a plentiful country, to eat the fruit there of, and the goodness thereof. But when ye entered, ye defiled my land," &c. See the following verses, especially ver. 12. " Be astonished, O ye heavens, at this." So Isa. i. 2 — 4. " Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth ; I have nourished and brought up children, and they have rebelled against me. The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib ; but my people doth not know, Israel doth not consider. Ah, sinful nation ! a people laden with iniquity, a seed of evil-doers, children that are corrupters." (Compare Deut. xxxii. 6 — 19.) If to be disposed thus to abuse the blessings of so fruitful and pleasant a land as Canaan, showed so great depravity, surely it would be an evidence of a corruption no less astonishing, to be inclined to abuse the blessings of Eden, and the garden of God. 2. If death be brought on mankind only as a benefit, and in that manner which Dr. T. mentions, — to mortify or moderate their carnal appetites and affections, wean them from the world, excite them to sober reflections, and lead them to the fear and obedience of God, &c. — is it not strange that it should fall so heavily on infants, who are not capable of making any such improvement of it ; so that many more of mankind suffer death in infancy, than in any other equal part of the age of man 7 Our author sometimes hints, that the death of infants may be for the correction and punishment of parents. But hath God any need of such methods to add to parents' afflictions? Are there not other ways for increasing their trouble, with out destroying the lives of such multitudes of those who are perfectly innocent, and who, on the supposition, have in no respect any sin belonging to them ? On whom death comes at an age, when not only the subjects are not capa ble of reflection, or making any improvement of it, either in suffering, or the expectation of it : but also at an age, when parents and friends — who alone can improve, and whom Dr. T. supposes alone to be punished by it — suffer least by being bereaved of them ; though the infants them selves sometimes suffer to great extremity 7 3. To suppose, as Dr. T. does, that death is brought on mankind in consequence of Adam's sin, not at all as a calamity but only as a favour and benefit, is contrary to the gospel ; which teaches, that when Christ, as the second Adam, comes to remove and destroy that death, which came by the first Adam, he finds it not as a friend, but an enemy. 1 Cor. xv. 22. " For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive ;" (with ver. 25, and 26.) " For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed, is death." Dr. T- urges, that the afflictions to which mankind are subjected, and particularly their common mortality, are represented in Scripture as the chastisements of our heavenly Father; and therefore are designed for our spiritual good, and consequently are not of the nature of punishments. (So in p. 68, 69. 38, 39. S.) Though I think the thing asserted far from being true, viz. that the Scripture represents die afflictions of man kind in general, and particularly their common mortality, as the chastisement of a heavenly Father ; vet it is need less to stand to dispute that matter. For if it be so, it will be no argument that the afflictions and death of man kind are not evidences of their, sinfulness. Those would be strange chastisements from the hand of a wise and good Father, which are wholly for nothing; especially such severe chastisements, as to break the child's bones, when at the same time the father does not suppose any guilt, fault, or offence, in any respect, belonging to the child ; but it is chastised in this terrible manner, only for fear that it will be faulty hereafter. I say, these would be a strange sort of chastisements ; yea, though he should be able to make it up to the child afterwards. Dr. T. speaks of representations made by the whole current of Scrip ture ; I am certain, it is not agreeable to the current of Scripture, to represent divine fatherly chastisements after this manner. It is true, the Scripture supposes such chastenings to be the fruit of God's goodness ; yet at the Chap. II. ARGUMENT FROM UNIVERSAL MORTALITY. 175 same time it evermore represents them as being for the sin of the subject, and as evidences of the divine displeasure for its sinfulness. Thus the apostle (1 Cor. xi. 30 — 32.) speaks of God chastening his people by mortal sickness, for their good, that, they might not be condemned with the world, and yet signifies that it was for their sin; for this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep : that is, for the profaneness and sinful disorder be fore mentioned. So Elihu, (Job xxxiii. 16, &c.) speaks of the same chastening by sickness, as for men's good ; to withdraw man from nis sinful purpose, and to hide pride from man, and keep back his soul from the pit ; that there fore God chastens man with pain on his bed, and the multi tude of his bones with strong pain. But these chastenings are for his sins, as appears by what follows ; (ver. 28.) Where it is observed, that when God by this means has brought men to repent, and humbly corif'ess their sins, he delivers them. Again, the same Elihu, speaking of the unfailing love of God to the righteous, even when he chastens them, and they are bound in fetters, and holden in cords of 'affliction, (chap, xxxvi. 7, &'c.) yet speaks of these chastenings as being for their sins, (ver. 9.) "Then he showeth them their work, and their transgressions, that they have exceeded." So David. (Psal. xxx.) speaks of God s chastening by some afflictions, as being for his good, and issuing joyfully ; and yet being the fruit of God's anger for his sin, (ver. ¦ 5.) God's anger endureth but for a moment, &c. (compare Psal. cxix. 67, 71, 75.) God's fatherly chastisements are spoken of as being for sin. (2 Sam. vii. 14, 15.) " I will be his father, and he shall be my son. If he commit iniquity, I will chasten him with the rod of men, and with the stripes of the children of men ; but my mercy shall not depart away from him." So the prophet Jeremiah speaks of the great affliction that God's people suffered in the time of the captivity, as being for their good. (Lam. iii. 25, &c.) But yet these chastise ments are spoken of as being for their sin, (see especially ver. 39, 40.") -So Christ says, Rev. iii. 19. "As many as I love, I rebuke and chasten." But the words following show, that these chastenings from love are for sin that should be repented of : " Be zealous therefore, and repent." And though Christ tells us, they, are blessed that are persecuted for righteousness' sake, and have reason to rejoice and be exceeding glad ; yet even the persecutions of God's people, as ordered in divine providence, are spoken of as divine chastenings for sin, like the just cor rections of a father, when the children deserve them, Heb. xii. The apostle there speaking to the Christians concerning the persecutions which they suffered, calls their sufferings by the name of divine rebukes; which implies testifying against a fault : and that they may not be discouraged, puts them in mind, that whom the Lord loves he chastens, and scourgeth every son that he receiveth. It is also very plain, that the persecutions of God's people, as they are from the disposing hand of God, are chastise ments for sin.* If divine chastisements in general are certain evidences that the subjects are not wholly without sin, some way belonging to them, then in a peculiar maimer is death so ; for these reasons : (l.j Because slaying, or delivering to death, is often spoken of as, in general, a more awful thing than the chastisements which are endured in this life. Thus, Psal. cxviii. 17, 18. " I shall not die, but live, and declare the works of the Lord. The Lord hath chastened me sore ; but he hath not given me over unto death." So the Psalmist, (Psal. lxxxviii. 15.) setting forth the extremity of his affliction, represents it as what was next to death. " I am afflicted, and ready to die,— while I suffer thy ter rors, I am distracted." (See 1 Sam. xx. 3.) And so God's tenderness towards persons under chastisement, is, from time to time, set forth, that he did not proceed so far, as to make an end of them by death.t God's people often pray, when under great affliction, that God would not proceed to this, as 'the greatest extremity. Psal. xiii. 3. " Consider, and hear me, O Lord, my God ; lighten mine eyes, lest I sleep the sleep of death."! * See I Pet. iv. 17, 18, compared with Prov. xi. 31. See also Psal. lxix. 4-9. t As in Psal. lxxviiL 38, 39. Psal. ciii. 9, with ver. 14, 15. Psal. xxx. 2, Especially may death be looked upon as the most ex treme of all temporal sufferings, when attended with such dreadful circumstances, and extreme pains, as those with which Providence sometimes brings it on infants ; as on the children that were offered up to Moloch, and some other idols, who were tormented to death in burning brass. Dr. T. says, (p. 83, 128. S.) "The Lord of all being can never want time, and place, and power, to compensate abundantly any sufferings infants now undergo in subser viency to his good providence." But there are no bounds to such a licence, in evading evidences from fact. It might as well be said, that there is not and cannot be any such thing as evidence, from events of God's displeasure ; which is most contrary to the whole current of Scripture, as may appear in part from what has been observed. This gentleman might as well go further still, and say, that God may cast guiltless persons into hell fire, to remain there in the most unutterable torments for ages of ages, (which bear no greater proportion to eternity than a quarter of an hour,) and if he does so, it is no evidence of God's dis pleasure ; because he can never want time, place, and power, abundantly to compensate their sufferings after wards. If it be so, it is not to the purpose, as long as the Scripture so abundantly teaches us to look on great cala mities and sufferings which God brings on men, especially death, as marks of his displeasure for sin, and for sin be longing to them who suffer. (2.) Another thing — which may well lead us to suppose death, in a peculiar manner, above other temporal suffer ings, to be intended as a testimony of God's displeasure for sin — is, that death is attended with that awful appear ance, that gloomy and terrible aspect, which naturally suggests to our minds God's awful displeasure. Of this Dr. T. himself takes particular notice, when (p. 69.) speak ing of death ; " Herein (says he) have we before our eyes a striking demonstration, that sin is infinitely hateful to God, and the corruption and ruin of our nature. Nothing is more proper than such a sight to give us the utmost abhorrence of all iniquity," &c. Now, if death be no testimony of God's displeasure for sin — no evidence that the subject is looked upon, by him who inflicts it, as any other than perfectly innocent, free from all imputation of guilt, and treated only as an object of favour — is it not strange, that God should annex to it such affecting appear ances of his hatred and anger for sin, more than to other chastisements 7 Which yet the Scripture teaches us are always for sin. These gloomy and striking manifestations of God's hatred of sin attending death, are equivalent to the awful frowns of God attending the stroke of his hand. If we should see a wise and just father chastising his child, mixing terrible frowns with severe strokes, we should justly argue, that the father considered his child as having in him something displeasing, and that he did not thus treat his child only under a notion of mortifying him, and prevent ing his being faulty hereafter, and making it up to him afterwards, when he had been perfectly innocent, and without fault, either of action or disposition. We may well argue from these tilings, that infants are not sinless, but are by nature children of wrath, seeing this terrible evil comes so heavily on mankind at this early period. But, besides the mortality of infants in general, there are some particular cases of their death at tended with circumstances, which, in a peculiar manner^ give evidence of their sinfulness, and of their just exposed ness to divine wrath. Particularly, The destroying of the infants in Sodom and the neigh bouring cities, may be pleaded in evidence; for these cities destroyed in so miraculous and awful a manner, are set forth as a signal example of God's dreadful vengeance for sin. (Jude, ver. 7.) God did not reprove, but mani festly countenanced, Abraham, when he said, with respect to the destruction of Sodom, (Gen. xviii. 23, 25.) " Wilt thou destroy the righteous with the wicked ? That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from thee. Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right 7" Abraham's words imply that God 3, 9. and Job xxxiii. 22- 11. and cxliii. 7. t So Job x. 9. Psal. vi. 1—5. lxxxviii 9, 10, 176 ON ORIGINAL SIN. Part I. would not destroy the innocent with theguilty. We may well understand innocent as included in the word righteous, according to the language usual in Scripture, in speaking of such cases of judgment and punishment.* Eliphaz says, Job iv. 7. "Who ever perished, being innocent? or where were the righteous cut off?" We see what great care God took that Lot should not be involved in that destruction. He was miraculously rescued by angels, sent on purpose ; who laid hold on him, brought him, set him without the gates of the city, and told him that they could do nothing till he was out of the way. (Gen. xix. 22.) And not only was he thus miraculously delivered, but his two wicked daughters for his sake. The whole affair, both the destruction and the rescue, was miraculous ; and God could as easily have delivered the infants which were in those cities. And if they had been without sin, their perfect innocency, one should think, would have pleaded much more strongly for them, than those lewd women's relation to Lot pleaded for them. When in such a case, we must suppose these infants much further from deserving to be involved in that destruction, than even Lot himself. To say, that God could make it up to those infants in another world, must be an insufficient reply. For so he could as easily have made it up to Lot, or to ten or fifty righteous, if they had been destroyed in the same fire. Nevertheless, it is plainly signified, that this would not have been agreeable to the wise and holy pro ceedings of the judge of all the earth. Since God declared, that if there had been found but ten righteous in Sodom, he would have spared the whole city for their sakes, may we not well suppose, if infants are perfectly innocent, that he would have spared the old world, in which there were, without doubt, many hundred thousand infants, and in general, one in every family, whose perfect innocence pleaded for its preservation 7 Es pecially when such vast care was taken to save Noah and his family, (some of whom, one at least, seem to have been none of the best,) that they might not be involved in that destruction. If the perfect sinlessness of infants had been a notion entertained among the people of God, in the ages next following the flood — handed down from Noah and his children, who well knew that vast multitudes of infants perished in the flood — is it likely that Eliphaz, who lived within a few generations of Shem and Noah, would have said to Job, (Job iv. 7.) " Who ever perished, being innocent ? and when were the righteous cut off? Especially, since in the same discourse (chap. v. 1 .) he appeals to the tradition of the ancients for a confirmation of this very point, (also in chap. xv. 7 — 10. and xxii. 15, 16.) and he mentions the destruction of the wicked by the flood, as an instance of that perishing of the wicked, which he supposes to be peculiar to them, for Jo6's conviction ; in which the wicked were cut down out of time, their foun dation being overflown with a flood. Where it is also observable, that he speaks of such an un timeliness of death as they suffered by the flood, as one evidence of guilt ; as he also does, chap. xv. 32, 33. "It shall be accom plished before his time ; and his branch shall not be green." But those who were destroyed by the flood in infancy, above all the rest, were cut down out of lime ; when in stead of living above nine hundred years, according to the common period of man's life, at that time, many were cut down before they were one year old. When God executed vengeance on the ancient inhabit ants of Canaan, he not only did not spare their cities and families for the sake of their infants, nor took care that they should not be involved in the destruction ; but he often repeated his express commands, that their infants should not be spared, but should be utterly destroyed, without any pity ; while Rahab the harlot (who had been far from innocence, though she expressed her faith in en tertaining and safely dismissing the spies) was preserved, and all her friends for her sake. And when God executed his wrath on the Egyptians, by slaying their first-born — though the children of Israeli, who were most of them wicked men, as was before shown, were wonderfully spared by the destroying angel, yet — the Egyptian infants were not spared. They not only were not rescued by the • Gen. xx. 4. Exod. xxiii. 7. Deut. xxv. 1. 2 Sam. iv. 11. 2 Chron. angel, and no miracle wrought to save them, (as was ob served in the case of the infants of Sodom,) but the angel destroyed them by his own immediate hand, and a miracle was wrought to kill them. Not to be particular, concerning the command by Moses, respecting die destruction of the infants of the Midianites ; (Numb. xxxi. 17.) and that given to Saul to destroy all the infants of the Amalekites ; (1 Sam. xv. 3.) and what is said concerning Edom, (Psal. cxxxvii. 9.) "Happy shall he be, that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones ;" I proceed to take notice of something remark able concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, represented in Ezek. ix. when command was given to destroy the in habitants, ver. 1 — 8. And this reason is given for it, that their iniquity required it, and it was a just recompence of their sin, (ver. 9, 10.) God, at the same time, was most E articular and exact in his care, that such as had proved y their behaviour, that they were not partakers in the abominations of the city, should by no means be involved in the slaughter. Command was given to the angel to go through the city, and set a mark upon their foreheads, and the destroying angel had a strict charge not to come near any man, on whom was the mark ; yet the infants were not marked, nor ' a word said of sparing them : on the contrary, infants were expressly mentioned as those that should be utterly destroyed, 'without pity, (ver. 5, 6.) " Go through the city and smite : let not your eye spare, neither have ye pity. Slay utterly old and young, both maids and little children : but come not near any man upon whom is the mark." And if any should suspect, that such instances as these were peculiar to a more severe dispensation, under the Old Testament, let us consider a remarkabls instance in the days of the glorious gospel of the grace of God; even the last destruction of Jerusalem. This was far more terrible, and with greater testimonies of God's wrath and indignation, than the destruction of Sodom, or of Jeru salem in Nebuchadnezzar's time, or any thing that ever had happened to any city, or people, from the beginning of the world to that "time. (Agreeable to Matt. xxiv. 21. and Luke xxi. 22, 23.) At that time particular care was taken to distinguish and to deliver God's people ; as foretold, Dan. xii. 1. And we have in the New Testament a par ticular account of the care Christ took for the preservation of his followers : he gave them a sign, by which they might know when the desolation of the city was nigh, that they who were in Jerusalem might flee to the moun tains, and escape. And, as history relates, the Christians followed the directions given, and escaped to a place in the mountains called Pella, and were preserved. Yet no care was taken to preserve the infants of the city, in general ; but according to the predictions of that event, they were involved with others m that great destruction. So heavily did the calamity fall upon them, that those words were verified, Luke xxiii. 29. "Behold the days are coming, in which they shall say, Blessed are the barren, and the womb that never bare, and the paps which never gave suck : " and that prophecy in Deut. xxxii. 21 — 25. which has undoubtedly a special respect to this very time, and is so applied by the best commentators ; — " I will provoke them to jealousy with) those that are not a people : for a fire is kindled in mine anger, — and it shall burn to the lowest hell. I will heap mischiefs upon them : I will spend mine arrows upon them. They shall be burnt with hunger, and devoured with burning heat, and bitter destruction. The sword without, and terror within, shall destroy both the young man, and the virgin, the suckling also, with the man of grey hairs." And, by the history of that destruction appears, that then it was a remarkable fulfilment of Deut. xxviii. 53 — 57. concerning parents eating their children in the siege,— and the tender and delicate woman eating her new-born child. And here it must be remembered, that these very destructions of that city and land are spoken of as clear evidences of God's wrath, to all nations who shall behold them. And if so, they were evidences of God's wrath towards infants ; who, equally with the rest, were the subject of the destruc tion. If a particular kind or rank of persons, which made vi. 23. and Prov. xviii. 5. Chap. II. ARGUMENT FROM UNIVERSAL MORALITY. 177 made a very considerable part of the inhabitants, were from time to time partakers of the overthrow, without any distinction made in Divine Providence, and yet this was no evidence at all of God's displeasure with any of them; then being the subjects of such a calamity could not be an evidence of God's wrath against any of the in habitants, to the reason of all nations, or any nation, or so much as one person. PART IT. CONTAINING OBSERVATIONS ON PARTICULAR PARTS OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURE, WHICH PROVE THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN. CHAP. I. OBSERVATIONS RELATING TO THINGS CONTAINED IN THE THREE FIRST CHAPTERS OF GENESIS, WITH REFERENCE TO THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN. Sect. I. Concerning original righteousness ; and whether our first parents were created with righteousness, or moral recti tude of heart ? The doctrine of Original Righteousness, or the creation of our first parents with holy principles and dispositions, has a close connexion, in several respects, with the doctrine of original sin. Dr. T. was sensible of this ; and accord ingly he strenuously opposes this doctrine, in his book against original sin. And therefore in handling the sub ject, 1 would in the first place remove this author's main objection against this doctrine, and then show how it may be inferred from the account which Moses gives us, in the three first chapters of Genesis. Dr. T.'s grand objection against this doctrine, which he abundantly insists on, is this : that it is utterly inconsis tent with the nature of virtue, that it should be concre- ated with any person ; because, if so, it must be by an act of God's absolute power, without our knowledge or concurrence ; and that moral virtue, in its very nature, implieth the choice and consent of the moral agent, with out which it cannot be virtue and holiness : that a neces sary holiness is no holiness. So p. 180. where he ob serves, " That Adam must exist, he must be created, yea he must exercise thought and reflection, before he was righteous." (See also p. 250, 251.) In p. 161. S. he says, " To say, that God not only endowed Adam with a capacity of being righteous, but moreover that righteous ness and true holiness were created with him, or wrought into his nature, at the same time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what is inconsistent with the very nature of righteousness." And in like manner Dr. Turnbull in many places insists upon it, that it is necessary to the very being of virtue, that it be owing to our own choice, and di ligent culture. With respect to this, I would observe, that it consists in a notion of virtue quite inconsistent with the nature of things, and the common notions of mankind; and also inconsistent with Dr. T.'s own notions of virtue. There fore, if to affirm that to be virtue or holiness, which is not the fruit of preceding thought, reflection, and choice, is to affirm a contradiction, I shall show plainly, that for him to affirm otherwise, is a contradiction to himself. In the first place, I think it a contradiction to the na ture of things, as judged of by the common sense of man kind. It is agreeable to the sense of men, in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but that the good choice itself, from whence that effect proceeds, is so ; yea, also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous. This is the general notion— not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but — that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed ; so that the act of choos ing what is good, is no further virtuous, than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind. • Mor. Phil. p. 112—115. p. 142. et alibi passim. VOL. I. N Which supposes, that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice ; and that, therefore, it is not necessary there should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of a good dis position of heart, what is the character of that choice 7 There can, according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love, ambition, or some animal appetites ; therefore, a virtuous temper of mind may be before a good act of choice, as a tree may be before the fruit, and the fountain before the stream which proceeds from it. The following things, in Mr. Hutcheson's inquiry con cerning moral good and evil, are evidently agreeable to the nature of things, and the voice of human sense and reason. (Sect. II. p. 132, 133.) " Every action wbich we apprehend as either morally good or evil, is always sup posed to flow from some affections towards sensitive natures. And whatever we call virtue or vice, is either some such affection, or some action consequent upon it. — All the actions counted religious iu any country, are sup posed by those who count them so, to flow from some affections towards the Deity : and whatever we call social virtue, we still suppose to flow from affections towards our fellow-creatures. — Prudence, if it is only employed in promoting private interest, is never imagined to be a vir tue." In these things Dr. Turnbull expressly agrees with Mr. Hutcbeson, his admired author.* If a virtuous disposition or affection is before its acts, then they are before those virtuous acts of choice which proceed from it. Therefore, there is no necessity that all virtuous dispositions or affections should be the effect of choice : and so, no such supposed necessity can be a good objection against such a disposition being natural, or from a kind of instinct, implanted in the mind in its creation. Agreeably to this Mr. Hutcheson says, (Ibid. sect. III. p. 196, 197.) " I know not for what reason some will not allow that to be virtue, which flows from instinct or pas sions. But how do they help themselves 7 They say, virtue arises from reason. What is reason, but the saga city we have in prosecuting any end 7 The ultimate end proposed by common moralists, is the happiness of the agent himself. And this certainly he is determined to pursue from instinct. Now may not another instinct to wards the public, or the good of others, be as proper a principle of virtue as the instinct towards private happi ness 7 If it be said, that actions from instinct are not the effect of prudence and choice, this objection will hold full as strongly against the actions which flow from self- love." And if we consider what Dr. T. declares, as his own notion of the essence of virtue, and which he so confi dently and often affirms, that it should follow choice, and proceed from it, we shall find it is no less repugnant to that sentiment, than it is to the nature of things, and the general notions of mankind. For it is his notion, as well as Mr. Hutcheson's, that the essence of virtue lies in good affection, and particularly in benevolence or love : as he very fully declares in these words in his Key,f " That the word that signifies goodness and mercy should also sig nify moral rectitude in general, will not seem strange, if we consider that love is the fulfilling of the law. Good ness, according to the sense of Scripture, and the nature of things, includes all moral rectitude ; which, I reckon, t Marginal Note, annexed to § 35a 178 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. II. Ch. I. may everv part of it, where it is true and genuine, be re solved into this single principle." If it be so indeed, then certainly no act whatsoever can have moral rectitude, but what proceeds from this principle. And consequently no act of volition or choice can have any moral rectitude, that takes place before this principle exists. And yet he most confidently affirms, that thought, reflection, and choice must go before virtue, and that all virtue or righteousness must be the fruit of preceding choice. This brings his scheme to an evident contradiction. For no act of choice can be virtuous but what proceeds from a principle of benevolence, or love ; for he insists that all genuine moral rectitude, in every part of it, is resolved into this single principle. And yet the principle of benevolence itself cannot be virtuous, unless it proceeds from choice ; for he affirms, that nothing can have the nature of virtue but what comes from choice. So that virtuous love, as the principle of all virtue, must go before virtuous choice, and be the principle or spring of it ; and yet virtuous choice must go before virtuous benevolence, and be the spring of that, if a virtuous act of choice goes before a principle of benevo lence, and produces it, then this virtuous act is something distinct from that principle which follows it, and is its effect. So that here is at least one part of virtue, yea the spring and source of all virtue, viz. a virtuous choice, that cannot be resolved into that single principle of love. Here also it is worthy to be observed, that Dr. T. (p. 128.) says, the cause of every effect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth or which proceedeth from it . and so he argues, that if the effect be bad, the cause alone is sinful. According to which reasoning, when the effect is good, the cause alone is righteous or virtuous. To the cause is to be ascribed all the praise of the good effect it produceth. And by the same reasoning it wili follow, that if, as Dr. Taylor says, Adam must choose to be righteous, before he was righteous, and if it be essential to the nature of righteousness, or moral rectitude, that it be the effect of choice, and hence a principle of benevolence cannot have moral rectitude, unless it proceeds from choice ; then not the principle of benevolence, which is the effect, but to the foregoing choice alone is to be ascribed all the virtue or righteousness that is in the case. And so, instead of all moral rectitude, in every part of it, being resolved into that single principle of benevolence, no moral rectitude, in any part of it, is to be resolved into that principle ; but all is to be resolved into the foregoing choice, which is the cause. But yet it follows from these inconsistent principles, that there is no moral rectitude or virtue in that first act of choice, that is the cause of all consequent virtue. This follows two ways ; 1. Because every part of virtue lies in the benevolent principle, which is the effect ; and therefore no part of it can lie in the cause. 2. The choice of virtue, as to the first act at least, can have no virtue or righteous ness at all ; because it does not proceed from any forego ing choice. For Dr. T. insists, that a man must first have reflection and choice, before he can have righteousness ; and that it is essential to holiness that it proceed from choice. So that the first choice from which holiness pro ceeds, can have no virtue at all, because, by the supposi tion, it does not proceed from choice, being the first choice. Hence, if it be essential to holiness that it proceeds from choice, it must proceed from an unholy choice ; unless the first holy choice can be before itself. And with respect to Adam, let us consider how upon Dr. T.'s principles, it was possible he ever should have any such thing as righteousness, by any means at all. In the state wherein God created him, he could have no such thing as love to God, or any benevolence in his heart. For if.so, there would have been original righteousness ; there would have been genuine moral rectitude ; nothing would have heen wanting : for our author says, True genuine moral rectitude, in every part of it, is to be resolved into this single principle. But if he were wholly without any such thing as love to God, or any virtuous love, how should he come by virtue? The answer doubtless will be, by act of choice : he must first choose to be virtuous. But what if he did choose to be virtuous ? It could not t This is doubtless true : for although there was no natural sinful incli nation in Adam, yet an inclination to that sin of eating the forbidden fruit, be from love to God, or anv virtuous principle, that he chose it ; for, by the supposition, he has no such principle in his heart. And if he chooses it without such a prin ciple, still, according to this author, there is no virtue in his choice ; for all virtue, he says, is to be resolved into that single principle of love. Or will he say, there may be produced in the heart a virtuous benevolence by an act or acts of choice, that are not virtuous ? But this does not consist with what he implicitly asserts, that to the cause alone is to be ascribed what is in the effect. So that there is no way that can possibly be devised, in consistence with Dr. T.'s scheme, in which Adam ever could have any righteousness, or could ever either obtain any principle of virtue, or perform any one virtuous act. These confused inconsistent assertions, concerning virtue and moral rectitude, arise from the absurd notions in vogue, concerning/ree-OOT of will, as if it consisted in the will's self-determining power, supposed to be necessary to moral agency, virtue, and vice. The absurdities of which, with the grounds of these errors, and what the truth is respecting these matters, with its evidences, I have, ac cording to my ability, fully and largely considered, in my " Inquiry" on that subject; to which I must refer the reader, who desires further satisfaction, and is willing to give himself the trouble of reading that discourse. Having considered this great argument, and pretended demonstration of Dr. T. against original righteousness ; I proceed to the proofs of the doctrine. And, in the first place, I would consider, whether there be not evidence of it in the three first chapters of Genesis : or, whether the history there delivered does not lead us to suppose, that our first parents were created in a state of moral rectitude and holiness. I. This history leads us to suppose, that Adam's sin, with relation to the forbidden fruit, was the first sin he com mitted. Which could not have been, had he not always, till then, been perfectly righteous, righteous from the first moment of his existence ; and consequently, created or brought into existence righteous. In a moral agent, sub ject to moral obligations, it is the same thing, to be per fectly innocent, as to be perfectly righteous. It must be the same, because there can no more be any medium be tween sin and righteousness, or between being right and being wrong, in a moral sense, than there can be a medium between straight and crooked, in a natural sense. Adam was brought into existence capable of acting immediately, as a moral agent; and therefore he was immediately under a rule of right action. He was obliged as soon as he existed to act aright. And if he was obliged to act aright as soon as he existed, he was obliged even then to be in clined to act right. Dr. T. says, (p. 166. S.) " Adam could not sin without a sinful inclination :"* and, just for the same reason, he could not do aright, without an inclina tion to right action. And as he was obliged to act rightly from the first moment of his existence, and did so, till he sinned in reference to the forbidden fruit, he must have had a disposition of heart to do rightly the first moment of his existence ; and that is the same as to be created, or brought into existence, with an inclination to right action, or, which is the same thing, a virtuous and holy disposition of heart. Here it will be in vain to say, " It is true, that it was Adam's duty to have a good disposition or inclination, as soon as it was possible to be obtained, in the nature of things ; but as it could not be without time to establish such a habit, which requires antecedent thought, reflection, and repeated right action ; therefore all that Adam could be obliged to, in the first place, was to reflect, and con sider things in a right manner, and apply himself to right action, in order to obtain a right disposition :" for this supposes, that even the reflection and consideration to which he was obliged, was right action. Surely he was obliged to it no otherwise than as a thing that was right: and therefore he must have an inclination to this right ac tion immediately, before he could perform those first right actions. And as the inclination to them should be right, the principle, or disposition from which he performed even those actions, must be good : otherwise the actions would was begotten in him by the delusion and error he was led into- and this inclination to eat the forbidden fruit, must precede his actual eating. Sect I. CONCERNING ADAM'S Or.IGINAL RIGHTEOUSNESS. 179 not be right in the sight of him who looks at the heart; nor would they answer his obligations, if he had done them for some sinister end, and not from a regard to God and his duty. Therefore there must have been a regard to God and his duty implanted in him at his first existence : otherwise it is certain, he would have done nothing from a regard to God and his duty ; no, not so much as to reflect and consider, and try to obtain such a disposition. The very supposition of a disposition to right action being first obtained by repeated right action, is grossly inconsistent with itself: for it supposes a course of right action, before there is a disposition to perform any right action. These are no invented quibbles or sophisms. If God expected from Adam any obedience, or duty to him at all, when he first made him — whether it was in reflecting, con sidering, or any way exerting his faculties — then he was expected immediately to exercise love to God. For how could it be expected, that Adam should have a strict and perfect regard to God's commands and authority, and his duty to him, when he had no love nor regard to him in his heart, nor could it be expected he should have any 7 If Adam from the beginning did his duty to God, and had more respect to the will of his Creator, than to other things, and as much respect to him as he ought to have ; then from the beginning he had a supreme and perfect respect and love to God : and if so, he was created with such a principle. There is no avoiding the consequence. Not only external duties, but internal ones, such as summarily consist in love, must be immediately required of Adam, as soon as he existed, if any duty at all was required. For it is most apparently absurd, to talk of a spiritual being, with the faculties of understanding and will, being required to perform external duties, without internal. Dr. T. himself observes, that love is the fulfilling of the law, and that all moral rectitude, even every part of it, must be resolved into that single principle. Therefore, if any morally right act at all, reflection, consideration, or any thing else, was required of Adam immediately, on his first existence, and was per formed as required ; then he must, the first moment of his existence, have his heart possessed of that principle of di vine love ; which implies the whole of moral rectitude in every part of it, according to our author's own doctrine ; and so the whole of moral rectitude or righteousness must begin with his existence : which is the thing taught in the doctrine of original righteousness. Let us consider how it could be otherwise, than that Adam was always, in every moment of his existence, obliged to exercise such respect of heart towards every ob- fct, as was agreeable to the apparent merit of that object. or instance, would it not at any time have become Adam, on the exhibition of God's infinite goodness to him, to have exercised answerable gratitude ; and would not the con trary have been unbecoming and odious? And if some thing had been presented to Adam's view, transcendently amiable in itself, for .nstance, the glorious perfection of the divine nature, would it not have become him to love, relish, and delight in it 7 Would not such an object have merited this ? And if the view of an object so amiable in itself did not affect his mind with complacence, would it not, according to the plain dictates of our understanding, have shown an unbecoming temper of mind? Time, by culture, to form and establish a good disposition, would not have taken off the odiousness of the temper. And if there had been never so much time, I do not see how it could be expected he should improve it aright, in order to obtain a good disposition, if he had not already some good disposition to engage him to it. That belonging to the will, and disposition ofthe heart, which is in itself either odious or amiable, unbecoming or decent, always would have been Adam's virtue or sin, in any moment of his existence ; if there be any such thing as virtue or vice ; by which terms nothing can be meant, but something in our moral disposition and behaviour, which is becoming or unbecoming, amiable or odious. Human nature must be created with sorhe dispositions ; a disposition to relish some things as good and amiable, and to be averse to other things as odious and disagree able : otherwise, it must be without any such thing as in clination or will; perfectly indifferent, without preference, without choice, or aversion, towards any thing as agree- N 2 able or disagreeable. But if it had any concreated disposi tions at all, they must be either right or wrong, either agreeable or disagreeable to the nature of things. If man had at first the highest relish of things excellent and beau tiful, a disposition to have the quickest and highest delight in those things which were most worthy of it, then his dispositions were morally right and amiable, and never can be excellent in a higher sense. But if he had a disposition to love most those things that were inferior and less worthy, then his dispositions were vicious. And it is evident there can be no medium between these. II. This notion of Adam being created without a prin ciple of holiness in his heart, taken with the rest of Dr. T.'s scheme, is inconsistent with what the history in the beginning of Genesis leads us to suppose of the great fa vours and smiles of Heaven, which Adam enjoyed while he remained in innocency. The Mosaic account suggests to us, that till Adam sinned, he was in happy circumstances, surrounded with testimonies and fruits of God's favour. This is implicitly owned by Dr. T. when he says, (p. 252.) " That in the dispensation our first parents were under be fore the fall, they were placed in a condition proper to en gage their gratitude, love, and obedience." But it will follow, on our author's principles, that Adam, while in innocency, was placed in far worse circumstances, than he was in after his disobedience, and infinitely worse than his posterity are in ; under unspeakably greater disadvantages for avoiding sin, and the performance of duty. For by this doctrine, Adam's posterity come into the world with their hearts as free from any propensity to sin as he, and he was made as destitute of any propensity to righteousness as they : and yet God, in favour to them, does great things to re strain them from sin, and excite them to virtue, which he never did for Adam in innocency, but laid him, in the highest degree, under contrary disadvantages. God, as an instance of his great favour, and fatherly love to man, since the fall, has denied him the ease and pleasures of paradise, which gratified and allured his senses, and bodily appe tites ; that he might diminish his temptations to sin. And as a still greater means to restrain from sin, and promote virtue, has subjected him to labour, toil, and sorrow in the world : and not only so, but as a means to promote his spiritual and eternal good far beyond this, has doomed him to death. When all this was found insufficient, he, in further prosecution of the designs of his love, shortened men's lives exceedingly, made them twelve or thirteen times shorter than in the first ages. And yet this, with all the innumerable calamities which God, in great favour fo mankind, has brought on the world — whereby their tempta tions are so vastly cut short, and the inducements to virtue heaped one upon another to so great a degree— have proved insufficient, now for so many thousand years together, to restrain from wickedness in any considerable degree ; while innocent human nature, all along, comes into the world with the same purity and harmless dispositions that our first parents had in paradise. What vast disadvantages indeed then must Adam and Eve be in, who had no more in their nature to keep them from sin, or incline them to virtue, than their posterity, and yet were without all those additional and extraordinary means ! They were not only without such exceeding great means as we now have, when our lives are made so very short, but had vastly less ad vantages than their antediluvian posterity, who to prevent their being wicked, and to make them good, had so much labour and toil, sweat and sorrow, briers and thorns, with a body gradually decaying and returning to the dust. Our first parents had the extreme disadvantage of being placed amongst many and exceeding great temptations — not only without toil or sorrow, pain or disease, to humble and mortify them, and a sentence of death to wean them from the world, but — in the midst of the most exquisite and al luring sensitive delights ; the reverse in every respect, and the highest degree, of that most gracious state of requisite means, and great advantages, which mankind now enjoy ! If mankind now, under these vast restraints, and great ad vantages, are not restrained from general, and as it were universal wickedness, how could it be expected that Adam and Eve, created with no better hearts than men bring into the world now, and destitute of all these advantages, and in the midst of all contrary disadvantages, should escape it 7 180 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. II. Ch. I. These things are not agreeable to Moses's account. That represents a happy state of peculiar favours and blessings before the fall, and the curse coming afterwards ; but according to this scheme, the curse was before the fall, and the great favours and testimonies of love followed the apostacy. And the curse before the fall must be a curse with a witness, being to so high a degree the reverse of such means, means so necessary fop such a creature as in nocent man, and in all their multitude and fulness proving too little. Paradise therefore must be a mere delusion ! There was indeed a great show of favour, in placing man in the midst of such delights. But this delightful garden, it seems, with all its beauty and sweetness, was in its real tendency worse than the apples of Sodom. It was but a mere bait, (God forbid the blasphemy,) the more effectually enticing by its beauty and deliciousness, to Adam's eternal ruin. Which might be the more expected to be fatal to him, seeing he was the first man, having no capacity supe rior to his posterity, and wholly without the advantage of their observations, experiences, and improvements. I proceed now to take notice of an additional proof of the doctrine we are upon, from another part of the Holy Scripture. A very clear text for original righteousness we have in Eccles. vii. 29. " Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright ; but they have sought out many inventions." It is an observation of no weight which Dr. T. makes on this text, that the word man is commonly used to signify mankind in general, or mankind collectively taken. It is true, it often signifies the species of mankind; but then it is used to signify the species, with regard to its duration and succession from its beginning, as well as with regard to its extent. The English word mankind is used to signify the species : but what then 7 Would it be an improper way of speaking, to say, that when God first made man kind, he placed them in a pleasant paradise, (meaning in their first parents,) but now they live in the midst of briers and thorns 7 And it is certain, that to speak thus of God making mankind — his giving the species an existence in their first parents, at the creation— is agreeable to the scripture use of such an expression. As m Deut. iv. 32. " Since the day that God created man upon the earth." Job xx. 4. " Knowest thou not this of old, since man was placed upon the earth." Isa. xiv. 12. "1 have made the earth, and created man upon it : I, even my hands, have stretched out the heavens." Jer. xxvii. 5. '" I have mode the earth, the man and the beast that are upon the ground, by my great power." All these texts speak of God mak ing man, signifying the species of mankind ; and yet they all plainly have respect to God making man at first, when he made the earth, and stretched out the heavens. In all these places the same word, Adam, is used as in Eccle- siastes ; and in the last of them, used with (he emphaticum) the emphatic sign, as here ; though Dr. T. omits it, when he tells us he gives us a catalogue of all the places in Scripture where the word is used. And it argues nothing to the Doctor's purpose, that the pronoun they is used ; — they have sought out many inventions. This is properly applied to the species, which God made at first upright ; the species begun with more than one, and continued in a multitude. As Christ speaks of the two sexes, in the rela tion of man and wife, continued in successive generations ; Matt. xix. 4. " He that made, them at the beginning, made them male and female ;" having reference to Adam and Eve. No less impertinent, and also very unfair, is his criticism ori the word (*w») translated upright. Because the word sometimes signifies right, he would from thence infer, that it does not properly signify moral rectitude, even when used to express the character of moral agents. He might as well insist, that the English word upright, sometimes, and in its most original meaning, signifies right up, or in an erect posture, therefore it does not properly signify any moral character, when applied to moral agents. And in deed less unreasonably ; for it is known, that in the He brew language, in a peculiar manner, most words used to signify moral and spiritual things, are taken from external and natural objects. The word (nw Jashar) is used, as applied to moral agents, or to the words and actions of * Making use of Buxtorf s Concordance, which, according to the author's such, (if I have not misreckoned,*) about an hundred and ten times in Scripture; and about an hundred of them, without all dispute, to signify virtue, or moral rectitude, (though Dr. T. is pleased to say, the word does not generally signify a moral character),) and for the most part it signifies true virtue, or virtue in such a sense, as distinguishes it from all false appearances of virtue, or what is only virtue in some respects, but not truly so in the sight of God. It is used at least eighty times in this sense : and scarce any word can be found in the Hebrew language more significant of this. It is thus used constantly in Solomon's writings, (where it is often found) when used to express a character or property of moral agents. And it is beyond all controversy, that he uses it in this place, (the 7th of Eccles.) to signify moral rectitude, or a character of real virtue and integrity. For the wise man is speaking of persons with respect to their moral character, inquiring into the corruption and depravity of mankind, (as is con fessed, p. 184.) and he here declares, he had not found more than one among a thousand of the right stamp, truly and thoroughly virtuous and upright : which appeared a , strange thing ! But in this text he clears God, and lays the blame on man : >man was not made thus at first. He was made of the right stamp, altogether good in his kind, (as all other things were,) truly and thoroughly virtuous, as he ought to be; but they have sought out many inventions. Which last expression signifies things sinful, or morally evil ; (as is confessed, p. 185.) And this expression, used to signify those moral evils he found in man, which he sets in opposition to the uprightness man was made in, shows, that by uprightness he means the most true and sincere goodness. The word rendered inventions, most naturally and aptly signifies the subtile devices, and crooked deceit ful ways, of hypocrites, wherein they are of a character con trary to men of simplicity and godly sincerity ; who, though wise in that which is good, are simple concerning evil. Thus the same wise man, in Prov. xii. 2. sets a truly good man in opposition to a man of wicked devices, whom God will condemn. Solomon had occasion to observe many who put on an artful disguise and fair show of goodness; but on searching thoroughly, he found very few truly up right. As he says, Prov. xx. 6. " Most men will proclaim every one his own goodness : but a faithful man who can find 7" So that it is exceeding plain, that by uprightness, in this place, (Eccles. vii.) Solomon means true moral goodness. What our author urges concerning many inventions, whereas Adam's eating of the forbidden fruit was but one invention, is of as little weight as the rest of what he says on this text. For the many lusts and corruptions of man kind, appearing in innumerable ways of sinning, are all the consequence of that sin. The great corruption men are fallen into by the original apostacy, appears in the multi tude of the wicked ways to which they are inclined. And therefore these are properly mentioned as the fruits and evidences of the greatness of that apostacy and corruption. SECT. II. Concerning the kind of death, threatened to our first parents, if they should eat of the forbidden fruit. Dr. T. in his observations on the three first chapters of Genesis says, (p. 7.) " The threatening to man in case of transgression was, that he should surely die. — Death is the losing of life. Death is opposed to life, and must be understood according to the nature of that life, to which it is opposed. Now the death here threatened can, with any certainty, be opposed only to the life God gave Adam, when he created him, (ver. 7.) Any thing besides this must be pure conjecture, without solid foundation." To this I would say ; it is true, Death is opposed to life, and must be understood according to the nature of that life, to which it is opposed. But does it therefore follow, that nothing can be .meant by it but the loss of life 1 Misery is opposed to happiness, and sorrow is in Scripture often opposed to joy ; but can we conclude from thence, that nothing is meant in Scripture by sorrow, but the loss of joy? or that there is no more in misery, than the hss or professed design, directs to all the places where the word is used. Sect. II. DEATH THREATENED TO OUR FIRST PARENTS. 181 absence of happiness 7 And if the death threatened to Adam can, with certainty, be opposed only to the life given to Adam, when God created him; I think, a state of perfect, perpetual, and hopeless misery is properly op- fosed to that state Adam was in, when God created him. 'or I suppose it will pot be denied, that the life Adam had, was truly a happy life ; happy in perfect innocency, in the favour of his Maker, surrounded with the happy fruits and testimonies of his love. And I think it has been proved, that he also was happy in a state of perfect righteousness. Nothing is more manifest, than that it is agreeable to a' very common acceptation of the word life, in Scripture, that it be understood as signifying a state' of excellent and happy existence. Now that which is most opposite to that life and state in which Adam was created, is a state of total, "confirmed wickedness, and perfect hope less misery, under the divine displeasure and curse ; not excluding' temporal death, or the destruction of the body, as an introduction to it. Besides, that which is much more evident, than any thing Dr. T. says on this head, is, that the death which was to come on Adam, as the punishment of his disobedi ence, was opposed to that life, which he would have had ' as the reward of his obedience in case he had not sinned. Obedience and disobedience are contraries ; the threaten ings and promises which are sanctions of a law, are set in direct opposition ; and the promises, rewards, and threat ened punishments, are most properly taken as each others' opposites. But none will deny, that the life which would have been Adam's reward, if he had persisted in obedience, was eternal life. And therefore we argue justly that the death which stands opposed to that life, (Dr. T. himself being judge, p. 120. S.) is manifestly eternal death, a death widely different from the death we now die — to use his own words'. If Adam, for his persevering obedience, was to have had everlasting life and happiness, in perfect holiness, union with his Maker, and enjoyment of his fa vour, and this was the life which was to be confirmed by the tree of life ; then, doubtless, the death threatened in case of disobedience, which stands in direct opposition to this, was an exposure to everlasting wickedness and misery, in separation from God, and in enduring his wrath. When God first made mankind, and made known to them the methods of his moral government towards them, in the revelation he made of himself to the natural head of the whole species — and letting him know, that obedience to him was expected, and enforcing his duty with the sanction of a threatened punishment, called by the name of death — we may with the greatest reason sup pose, in such a case, that by death was meant the most proper punishment of the sin of mankind, and which he speaks of under that name throughout the Scripture, as the proper wages of sin ; and this was always, from the beginning, understood to be so in the church of God. It would be strange indeed, if it should be otherwise. It would have been strange, if, when the law of God was first given, and enforced by the threatening of a punish ment, nothing at all had been mentioned of that great punishment, ever spoken of under the name of death — in the revelations which he has given to mankind from age to age — as the proper punishment of the sin of mankind. And it would be no less strange, if when the punishment which was mentioned and threatened on that occasion, was called by the same name, even death, yet we must not understand it to mean the same thing, but something infinitely diverse, and infinitely more inconsiderable. But now let us consider what that death is, which the Scripture ever speaks of as the proper wages of sin, and is spoken of as such by God's saints in all ages of the church. I will begin with the New Testament. When the ap&stle Paul says, (Rom. vi. 23.} " The wages of sin is death," Dr. T. tells us, (p. 120. S.)that this means eter nal death, the second death, a death widely different from the death we now die. The same apostle speaks of death as the proper punishment due for sin, Rom. vii. 5. and chap. viii. 13. 2 Cor. iii. 7. 1 Cor. xv. 56. In all * See p. 78. note on Rom. vii. 5. and note on ver. 6. Note on Rom. v. 20. Note on Rom. vii. 8. t By comparing what he says, p. 126. with what he often says of that death and destruction which is the demerit and eira of personal sin, which lie says is the second death or eterna^ destruction. which places, Dr. T. himself supposes the apostle to in tend eternal death.* And when the apostle James speaks of death, as the proper reward, fruit, and end ot" sin, (James i. 15.) " Sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death ;" it is manifest, that our author supposes eternal destruction to be meant.f And the apostle John, agree ably to Dr. T.'s sense, speaks of the second death as that which sin unrepented of will bring all men to at last. Rev. ii. 11. xx. 6, 14. and xxi. 8. In the same sense the apostle John uses the word in his first epistle, chap. iii. 14. " We know that we have passed from death to life, be cause we love the brethren. He that hateth his brother, abideth in death." In the same manner Christ used the word from time to time, when he was on earth, and spake concerning the punishment of sin. John v. 24. " He that heareth my word, and believeth, &c. hath everlasting life ; and shall not come into condemnation ; but is passed from death to life." Where, according to Dr. T.'s own way of arguing, it cannot be the death which we now die, that Christ speaks of, but eternal death, because it is set in opposition to everlasting life. John vi. 50. " This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die." Chap. viii. 51. " Verily, verily, I say unto you, if a man keep my saying, he shall never see death." Chap. xi. 26. " And whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die." In which places it is plain Christ does not mean that believers shall never see temporal death. (See also Matt. x. 28. and Luke x. 28.) In like manner, the word was commonly used by the pro phets of old, when they spake of death as the proper end and recompence of sin. So, abundantly by the prophet Ezekiel. Ezek. iii. 18. " When I say unto the wicked man, thou shalt surely die." In the original it is, Dying thou shalt die : the same form of expression, which God used in the threatening to Adam. We have the same words again, chap, xxxiii. 18. — In chap, xviii. 4. it is said, " The soul that sinneth it shall die."\ And that temporal death is not meant in these places is plain, because it is pro mised most absolutely, that the righteous shall not die the .death spoken of. Chap, xviii. 21. " He shall surely live, he shall not die." (So ver. 9, 17, 19, and 22. and chap. iii. 21.) And it is evident the prophet Jeremiah uses the word in the same sense. Jer. xxxi. 30. " Every one shall die for his own iniquity." And the same death is spoken of by the prophet Isaiah. Isa. xi. 4. " With the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked." (See also chap. lxvi. 16. with ver. 24.) Solomon, who we must suppose was thoroughly acquainted with the sense in which the word was used by the wise, and by the ancients, continually speaks of death as the proper fruit, issue, and recompence of sin, using the world only in this sense. Prov. xi. 19. " As righteousness tendeth to life, so he that pursueth evil pursueth it to his own death." §' He cannot mean temporal death, for he often speaks of it as a punishment of the wicked, wherein the righteous shall certainly be distin guished from them : as in Prov. xii. 28. " In the way of righteousness is life, and in the path-way thereof is no death." (So in chap. x. 2. xi. 4. xiii. 14. xiv. 27. and many other places) But we find this same wise man ob serves, that as to temporal death, and temporal events in general, there is no distinction, but that they happen alike to good and bad. (Eccl. ii. 4—16. viii. 14". and ix. 2, 3.) His words are remarkable in Eccl. vii. 15. "There is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness ; and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life, in his wickedness." So we find, David in the book of Psalms uses the word death in the same sense, when he speaks of it as the pro per wages and issue of sin, Psal. xxxiv. 21. " Evil shall slay the wicked." He speaks of it as a certain thing, Psal. cxxxix. 19. " Surely thou wilt slay the wicked, O God." And he speaks of it as a thing wherein the wicked are distinguished from the righteous, Psal. lxix. 28. " Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and not be written with the righteous."— And thus we find the word death used in the Pentateuch, where we have the account of the threatening of death to Adam. When, in these t To the like purpose are chap. iii. 19, 20. and xviii. 4, 9, 13, 17—21, 24, 26.28. chap, xxxiii. 8, 9, 12— 14, 19. . § So chap. v. 5. 6, 23. vii. 27. viii. 36. ix. 18. x. 21. xi. 19. xiv. 12. xv. IS xviii. 2J. xix. 16, 21. and xxiii. 13, 14. 182 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. II. Ch. 1. books, it is spoken of as the proper fruit, and appointed reward of sin, it is to be understood of eternal death. Thus, Deut. xxx. 15. " See, I have set before thee this day life, and good, and death, and evil." Ver. 19. " I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that 1 have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing." The life that is spoken of here, is doubtless the same that is spoken of in Lev. xviii. 5. " Ye shall therefore keep my statutes and my judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them." This the apostle understands of eternal life ; as is plain by Rom. x. 5. and Gal. iii. 12. But that the death threatened for sin in the law of Moses meant eternal death, is what Dr. T. abundantly declares. So in his note on Rom. v. 20. (Par. p. 291.) " Such a constitution the law of Moses was, subjecting those who were under it to death for every transgression : meaning by death eternal death." These are his words. The like he asserts in many other places. When it is said, in the place now mentioned, J have set before thee life and death, blessing and cursing, without doubt, the same blessing and cursing is meant which God had already set before tfiem with such solemnity, in the 27th and 28th chapters ; where we have the sum of the curses in those last words of the 27th chapter, Cursed is every one, which confirmeth not all the words of this law to do them. Which the apostle speaks of as a threatening of eternal death ; and with him Dr. T. himself;* In this sense also Job and his friends spake of death, as the wages and end of sin, who lived before any written revelation, and had their religion, and their phraseology about religion, from the ancients. If any should insist upon it as an objection — against supposing that death was intended to signify eternal death in the threatening to Adam — that this use of the word is figurative : I reply, that though this should be allowed, yet it is by no means so figurative as many other phrases used in the history contained in these three chapters : as when it is said, God said, Let there be light; God said, Let there be a firmament, fyc. as though God spake such words with a voice. So when it is said, God called the light, day : God called the firmament, heaven, t)-c. God rested on the seventh day ; as though he had been weary, and then rested. And when it is said, They heard the voice of God walking ; as though the Deity had feet, and took steps on the ground. Dr. T. supposes, that when it is said of Adam and Eve, Their eyes were opened, and they saw that they were naked; by the word naked is meant 'a state of guilt. (P. 12.) Which sense of the word, naked, is much further from the common use of the word, than the supposed sense of the word death. So this author supposes the promise concerning the seed of the woman bruising the serpent's head, while the serpent should bruise his heel, is to be understood of the Messiah destroying the power and sovereignty of the devil, and receiving some slight hurt from him. (P. 15, 16.) Which makes the sentence full of figures. And why might not God deliver threat enings to our first parents in figurative expressions, as well as promises ? But indeed, there is no necessity of supposing the word death, or the Hebrew word so translated, if used in the manner that has been supposed, to have been figurative at all. It does not appear but that this word, in it's true and proper meaning, might signify perfect misery, and sensible destruction ; though the word was also applied to signify something more external and visible. There are many words in our language, such as heart, sense, view, dis covery, conception, light, and many others, which are ap plied to signify external things ; as that muscular part of the body called heart ; external feeling, called sense ; the sight of the bodily eye, called view ; the finding of a thing by its being uncovered, called discovery ; the first begin ning of the foetus in the womb, called conception ; and the rays ofthe sun, called light. Yet these words do as truly and properly signify other things of a more spiritual inter nal nature ; such as the disposition, affection, perception, and thought of the mind, and manifestation and evidence to the soul. Common use, which governs the propriety of - language, makes the latter things to be as much signified by those words, in their proper meaning, as the former. It * Note on Rom. v. 20. Par. p. 291 —299. is especially common in the Hebrew, and I suppose, other Oriental languages, that the same word that signifies some thing external, does no less properly and usually signify something more spiritual. So the Hebrew words used for breath, have such a double signification ; (nniPj) Neshama signifies both breath and the soul ; and the latter as com monly as the former : (mi) Ruach is used for breath or wind, but yet more commonly signifies spirit. (y)ti) Nephesh is used for breath, but yet more commonly sig nifies soul. So the word (3_S or oS) Libh, heart, no less properly signifies the soul, especially with regard to the will and affections, than that part of the body so called. The word (n"w ) Shalom, which we render peace, no less properly signifies prosperity and happiness, than mutual agreement. The word translated life, signifies the natural life ofthe body, and also the perfect and happy state of sen sible active being ; and the latter as properly as the former. So the word death, signifies destruction, as to outward sensi bility, activity, and enjoyment : but it has most evidently another signification, which in the Hebrew tongue is no less proper, viz. perfect, sensible, hopeless ruin ana misery. It is therefore wholly without reason urged, that death properly signifies only the loss of this present life ; and that therefore nothing else was meant by that death which was threatened for eating the forbidden fruit. Nor does it at all appear but that Adam — who, from what God said concerning the seed of the woman, could understand that relief was promised as to the death which was threatened, as Dr. T. himself supposes — understood the death which was threatened, in the more important sense. Especially seeing temporal death, considered originally and in itself, is evermore, excepting as changed by divine grace, an entrance into that dismal state of misery which is shadowed forth by the awful circumstances of this death ; circum stances naturally suggesting to the mind the most dread ful state of hopeless, sensible ruin. As to the objection, that the phrase, Dying thou shalt die, is several times used in the books of Moses, to signify temporal death, it can be of no force. For it has been shown already, that the same phrase is sometimes used in Scripture to signify eternal death, in instances much more parallel with this. But indeed nothing can be certainly argued concerning the nature of the thing intended, from its being expressed in such a manner. For it is evident, that such repetitions of a word in the Hebrew language, are no more than an emphasis upon a word in the more modern languages, to signify the great degree of a thing, the importance or certainty of it, &c. When we would signify and impress these, we commonly put an emphasis on our words. Instead of this, the Hebrews, when they would express a thing strongly, repeated or doubled the word, the more to impress the mind of the hearer ; as may be plain to every one in the least conversant with the Hebrew Bible. The repetition in the threatening to Adam, therefore, only implies the solemnity and importance of the threatening. But God may denounce either eternal or temporal death with perempto'riness and solemnity, and nothing can certiinly be inferred concerning the nature of the thing threatened, because it is threatened with emphasis, more than this, that the threatening is much to be regarded. Though it be true, that it might in an especial manner .be expected that a threatening of eternal death would be de nounced with great emphasis, such a threatening being in finitely important, and to be regarded above all others. SECT. III. Wherein it is inquired, whether there be any thing in the history of thi. three first chapters of Genesis, which should lead us to suppose, that God, in his constitution with Adam, dealt with mankind in general, as included in their first father, and that the threatening of death, in case he should eat the forbidden fruit, had respect not only to him, but his posterity ? Dr. T. rehearsing that threatening to Adam, Thou shalt surely die, and giving us his paraphrase of it, (p. 7, 8.) Sect. III. ADAM A FEDERAL HEAD, &c. concludes thus ; " Observe, here is not one word relating to Adam's posterity." But it may be observed, in opposi tion to this, that there is scarcely one word that we have an account of, which God ever said to Adam or Eve, but what does manifestly include their posterity in the meaning and design of it. There is as much of a word said about Adam's posterity in that threatening, as there is in those words of God to Adam and Eve, Gen. i. 28. " Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it ;" and as much in events, to lead us to suppose Adam's posterity to be included. There is as much of a word of his posterity in that threatening, as in those words, (ver. 29.) " Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, — and every tree in which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed," &c. Even when God was about to Create Adam, what he said on that occasion, had not respect only to Adam, but to his posterity. Gen. i. 26. " Let us make man in our image, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea," &c. And, what is more remarkable, there is as much of a word said about Adam's posterity in the threatening of death, as there is in that sentence, (Gen. iii. 19.) " Unto dust shalt thou return." Which Dr. T. himself supposes to be a sentence pronounced for the execution of that very threat ening, Thou shalt surely die. This sentence he himself also often speaks of as including Adam's posterity : and, what is much more remarkable still, is a sentence which Dr. T. himself often speaks of, as including his posterity, as a sentence of condemnation, as a judicial sentence, and a sentence which God pronounced with regard to Adam's posterity, acting the part of a judge, and as such condemning them to temporal death. — Though he is therein utterly inconsistent with himself, inasmuch as he at the same time abundantly insists, that death is not brought on Adam's posterity in consequence of his sin, at all as a punishment ; but merely by the gracious disposal of a father, bestowing a benefit of the highest nature upon him.* But I shall show, that I do not in any of these things falsely charge or misrepresent Dr. T. — He speaks of the sentence in chap. iii. 19. as pronounced in pursuance of the threatening in the former chapter, in these words, (p. 17, 18.) " The sentence upon the man, ver. 17, 18, 1 9. first affects the earth, upon which he was to subsist : the ground should be encumbered with many noxious weeds, and the tillage of it more toilsome : which would oblige the man to procure a sustenance by hard labour, till he should die, and drop into the ground, from whence he was taken. Thus death entered by sin into the world, and man became morta],-t/ according to the threatening in the former chapter." Now, if mankind became mortal, and must die, according to the threatening in the former chapter, then doubtless the threatening in the former chapter, Thou shalt die, had respect not only to Adam, but to mankind, and included Adam's posterity. Yea, and Dr. T. is express in it, and very often so, that the sentence concerning dropping into the ground, or returning to the dust, did include Adam's posterity. So, p. 20. speaking there of that sen tence, " Observe (says he) that we their posterity are in fact subjected to the same affliction and mortality, here by sentence inflicted upon our first parents." — P. 42. Note. " But yet men through that long tract, were all subject to death, therefore they must be included in the sentence." The same he affirms in innumerable other places, some of which I shall have occasion to mention presently. The sentence which is founded on the threatening, and (as Dr. T. says) according to the threatening, extends to as many as were included in the threatening, and to no more. If the sentence be upon a collective subject, indefinitely, the greatest part of which were not included in the threat ening, nor were ever threatened at all, then certainly this sentence is not according to the threatening, nor built upon it. If the sentence be according to the threatening, then we may justly explain the threatening by the sentence. And if we find the sentence spoken to the same person whom the threatening was spoken, and spoken in the second person singular in like manner with the threatening, found ed on the threatening, and according to it ;.. and if we find the sentence includes Adam's posterity, then we may cer tainly infer, that so did the threatening. And hence, that « Page 27. S. 1G3 both the threatening and sentence were delivered to Adam as the public head and representative of his posterity. And we may also further infer from it, in another re spect, directly contrary to Dr. T.'s doctrine,, that the sentence which included Adam's posterity, was to death, as a punishment to that posterity, as well as to Adam him self. For a sentence pronounced in execution of a threat ening, is for a punishment. Threatenings are of punish ments. Neither God nor man are wont to threaten others with favours and benefits. But lest any of this author's admirers should stand to it, that it may very properly be said, God threatened man kind with bestowing great kindness upon them, I would observe, that Dr. T. himself often speaks of this sentence as pronounced by God on all mankind, as condemning them ; as a sentence of condemnation judicially pronounced, or a sentence which God pronounced on all mankind acting as their judge, and in a judicial proceeding. This he af firms in multitudes of places. In p. 20. speaking of this sentence, which, he there says, subjects us, Adam's and Eve's posterity, to affliction and mortality, he calls it a judicial act of condemnation. " The judicial act of con demnation (says he) clearly implies, a taking him to pieces, and turning him to the ground from whence he was taken." And (p. 28, 29. Note.) ' In all the Scripture from one end to the other, there is recorded but one judgment to con demnation, which came upon all men, and that is, Gen. iii. 17 — 19. Dust thou art," Sec. P. 40. speaking of the same, he says, " All men are brought under condemnation." In p. 27, 28. " By judgment, judgment to condemnation, it appeareth evidently to me, he (Paul) means the being adjudged to the forementioned death ; he means the sentence of death, of a general mortality, pronounced upon mankind, in consequence of Adam's first transgression. And the condemnation inflicted by the judgment of God, answereth to, and is in effect the same thing with, being dead." P. 30. " The many, that is mankind, were subject to death by the judicial act of God." P. 31. " Being made sinners, may very well signify, being adjudged, or condemned to death. — For the Hebrew word, fkc. signifies to make one a sinner by a judicial sentence, or to condemn." — P. 178. Par. on Rom.' v. 19. " Upon the account of one man's dis obedience, mankind were judicially constituted sinners; that is, subjected to death, by the sentence of God the Judge." — And there are many other places where he repeats the same thing. And it is pretty remarkable, that (page 48, 49.) immediately after citing Prov. xvii. 15. " He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, are both an abomination to the Lord" — and when he is careful in citing these words, to put us in mind, that it is meant of a. judicial act — yet, in the very next words, he supposes that God himself does so, since he constantly supposes that Adam's posterity, whom God condemns, are innocent. His words are these, " From all this it followeth, that as the judgment, that passed upon all men to con demnation, is death's coming upon all men, by the judicial act of God, upon occasion of Adam's transgression : so," &c. — And it is very remarkable, that (p. 3, 4, 7. S.) he in sists, " That in Scripture no action is said to be imputed, reckoned, or accounted to any person for righteousness or condemnation, but the proper act and deed' of that per son." — And yet he thus continually affirms, that all man kind are made sinners by a judicial act of God the Judge, even to condemnation, and judicially constituted sinners, and so subjected to a. judicial sentence of condemnation, on occasion of Adam's sin ; and all according to the threat ening denounced to Adam, " Thou shalt surely die :" though he supposes Adam's posterity were not included' in the threatening, and are looked upon as perfectly inno cent, and treated wholly as such. I am sensible Dr. T. does not run into all this incon sistence, only through oversight and blundering ; but that he is driven to it, to make out his matters in his evasion of that noted paragraph in the fifth chapter of Romans ; especially those three sentences; (ver. 16.) "The judg ment was by one to condemnation." (ver. 18.) " By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condem nation ;" and (ver. 19.) "By one man's disobedience 1 The subsequent part of the quotation the reader will not meet with in the third edition of Dr. T. but the second, of 1741. 184 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. II. Ch. I. many were made sinners." And I am also sensible of what he offers to salve the inconvenience, viz. " That if the threatening had immediately been executed on Adam, he would have had no posterity ; and that so far the pos sible existence of Adam's posterity fell under the threaten ing of the law, and into the hands of the judge, to be disposed of as he should think fit : and that this is the ground of the judgment to condemnation, coming upon all men."* But this is trifling, to a great degree : for, 1. Suffering death, and failing of possible existence, are entirely different things. If there had never been any such thing as sin committed, there would have been in finite numbers of possible beings, which would have failed of existence, by God's appointment. God has appointed (if the phiase be allowable) not to bring into existence numberless possible worlds, each replenished with innu merable possible inhabitants. But is this equivalent to God's appointing them all to suffer death 7 2. Our author represents, that by Adam's sin, the possi ble existence of his posterity fell into the hands of the Judge, to be disposed of as he should think fit. But there was no need of any sin of Adam, or of any body else, in order to their being brought into God's hands, in this re spect. The future possible existence of all created beings is in God's hands, antecedently to the existence of any sin. And therefore, infinite numbers of possible beings, without any relation to Adam, or any other sinning being, fail of their possible existence. And if Adam had never sinned, yet it would be unreasonable to suppose, but that innumerable multitudes of his possible posterity would have failed of existence by God's disposal. For will any be so unreasonable as to imagine, that God would and must have brought into existence as many of his posterity as it was possible should be, if he had not sinned 7 Or, that then it would not have been possible, that any other persons of his posterity should ever have existed, than those individual persons who now actually suffer death, and re turn to the dust 7 3. We have many accounts in Scripture, which imply the actual failing of the possible existence of innumerable multitudes of Adam's posterity, vea, of many more than ever come into existence. As, of the possible posterity of Abel, the possible posterity of all them that were destroy ed by the flood, and the possible posterity of the innu merable multitudes, which we read of in Scripture, de stroyed by sword, pestilence, &c. And if the threatening to Adam reached his posterity, in no other respect than this, that they were liable to be deprived by it of their possible existence, then these instances are much more properly a fulfilment of that threatening, than the suffering of death by such as actually come into existence ; and so is that which is most properly the judgment to condemna tion, executed by the sentence of the Judge, proceeding on the ground of that threatening. But where do we ever find this so represented in Scripture ? We read of multi tudes cut off for their personal sins, who thereby failed of their possible posterity. And these are mentioned as God's judgments on them, and effects of God's condem nation of them : but when are they ever spoken of as God judicially proceeding against, and condemning their possible posterity 7 4. Dr. T. in what he says concerning this matter, speaks of the threatening of the law delivered to Adam, which the possible existence of his posteritv fell under, as the ground of the judgment to condemnation coming upon all men. But herein he is exceeding inconsistent with him self: for he affirms in a place forecited, that the Scripture never speaks of any sentence of condemnation coming upon all men, but that sentence in the third of Genesis, concerning man turning to dust. But, according to him, the threatening of the law delivered to Adam, could not be the ground of that sentence; for he greatly insists upon it, that that law was entirely abrogated before that sentence was pronounced, hud no existence to have any such influence as might procure a sentence of death ; and therefore this sentence was introduced entirely on another footing, a new dispensation of grace. The reader may see this matter strenuously urged, and particularly argued » Page 95. 90, 91. S. by him, p. 113—120. S. So that this sentence could not, according to him, have the threatening of that law for its ground, as he supposes ; for it never stood upon that ground, lt could not be called a judgment of condemna tion, under any such view ; for it could not be viewed in circumstances where it never existed. 5. If, as our author supposes, that the sentence of death on all men comes under the notion of a judgment to con demnation by this means, viz. that the threatening to Adam was in some respect the ground of it ; then it also comes under the notion of a punishment : for threatenings annexed to breaches of laws, are to punishments ; and a judgment of condemnation to the thing threatened, must be to punishment; and the thing condemned to, must have as much the notion of a punishment, as the sen tence has the notion of a judgment to condemnation. But this Dr. T. wholly denies : he denies that death comes as any punishment at all ; but insists that it comes only as a favour and benefit, and a fruit of fatherly love to Adam's posterity, respected not as guilty, but wholly innocent. So that his scheme will not admit of its coming under the notion of a sentence to condemnation in any respect what soever. Our author's supposition, that the possible ex istence of Adam's posterity comes under the threatening of the law, and into the hands of the Judge, and is the ground of the condemnation of all men to death, implies, that death by this sentence is appointed to mankind as an evil, at least negatively so ; as it is a privation of good : for he manifestly speaks of a non-existence as a negative evil. But herein he is inconsistent with himself: for he continually insists, that mankind are subjected to death only as a benefit, as has been before shown. According to him, death is not appointed to mankind, as a negative evil, as any cessation of existence, or even diminution of good; but on the contrary, as a means of a more happy existence, and a great increase of good. So that this evasion of Dr. T. is so far from helping the matter, that it increases and multiplies the inconsistence. And that the law, with the threatening of death annexed, was given to Adam, as the head of mankind, and to his posterity as included in him, not only follow from some of our author's own assertions — and the plain, full declara tions of the apostle in the fifth of Romans, which drove Dr. T. into such gross inconsistencies — but the account given in the three first chapters of Genesis, directly and inevitably lead us to such a conclusion. Though the sentence, Gen. iii. 19. "Unto dust thou shalt return," be not of equal extent with the threatening in the foregoing chapter, or an execution of the main curse of the law therein denounced — for, that it should have been so, would have been inconsistent with the intima tions of mercy just before given — yet it is plain, this sentence is in pursuance of that threatening, being to something that was included in it. The words ofthe sen tence were delivered to the same person with the words of the threatening, and in the same manner, in like singular terms, and as much without any express mention of his posterity. Yet it manifestly appears by the consequence, as well as all circumstances, that his posterity were in cluded in the words of the sentence ; as is confessed on all hands. And as the words were apparently delivered in the form of the sentence of a judge, condemning for something that he was displeased with, and ought to be condemned, viz. sin ; and as the sentence to him and his posterity was but one, dooming to the same suffering, un der the same circumstances, both the one and the other sentenced in the same words, spoken but once, and imme diately to but one person, we hence justlv infer, that it was the same thing to both ; and not as Dr. T. suggests, (p. 67.) a sentence to a proper punishment to Adam, but a mere promise of favour to his posterity. Indeed, sometimes our author seems to suppose, that God meant the thing denounced in this sentence, as a fa vour both to Adam and his posteritv.f But to his pos terity, or mankind in general, who are the main subject, he ever insists, that it was purely intended as a favour. And therefore, one would have thought, the sentence should have been delivered, with manifestations and appearances t Page 25, 45, 46. S. Sect. III. ADAM A FEDERAL HEAD, &c 185 \ of favour, and not of anger. How could Adam under stand it as a promise of great favour, considering the man- >. i, ner and circumstances ofthe denunciation 7 How could he \ \ think, that God would go about to delude him, by cloth ing himself with garments of vengeance, using words of \displeasure and rebuke, setting forth the heinousness of his crime, attended with cherubims and a flaming sword ; when all that he meant was only higher testimonies of favour than he had before in a state of innocence, and to manifest fatherly love and kindness, in promises of great blessings ? If this was the case, God's words to Adam must be understood thus : " Because thou hast done so wickedly, hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying, thou shalt not eat of it ; therefore I will be more kind to thee than I was in thy state of innocence, and do now appoint for thee the following great favours : Cursed be the ground for thy sake," i]-c. And thus Adam must under stand what was said, unless any will say, (and God forbid that any should be so blasphemous,) that God clothed himself with appearances of displeasure, to deceive Adam, and make him believe the contrary of what he intended, and lead him to expect a dismal train of evils on his pos terity, contrary to all reason and justice, implying the most horribly unrighteous treatment of millions of perfectly in nocent creatures. It is certain, there is not the least ap pearance in what God said, or the manner of it, as Moses gives us the account, of any other, than that God was now testifying displeasure, condemning the subject of the sen tence he was pronouncing, as justly exposed to punish ment for sin, and for that sin which he mentions. When God was pronouncing this sentence, Adam doubt less understood, that God had respect to his posterity, as well as himself; though God spake wholly in the second person singular, Because thou hast eaten, — In sorrow thou shalt (at, — Unto the dust shalt thou return. But he had as much reason to understand God as having respect to his posterity, when he directed his speech to him in like manner in the threatening, Thou shalt surely die. The sen tence plainly refers to the threatening, and results from it. The threatening says, If thou eat, thou shalt die : the sen tence says, Because thou hast eaten thou shalt die. And Moses, who wrote the account, had no reason to doubt but that the affair would be thus understood by his read ers ; for such a way of speaking was well understood in those days : the history he gives us of the origin of things, abounds with it. Such a manner of speaking to the heads of the race, having respect to the progeny, is not only used in almost every thing that God said to Adam and Eve, but even in what he said to the very birds and fishes, Gen. i. 22. And also in what he said afterwards to Noah, Gen. ix. to Shem, Ham, and Japheth, and Canaan, Gen. ix. 25 — 27. So in promises made to Abraham, God directed his speech to him, and spake in the second person singular, from time to time, but meant chiefly his posterity : To thee will I giro this land. In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed, &c. &c. And in what is said of Isfi- mael, as of his person, but meant chiefly of his posterity, Gen. xvi. 12. and xvii. 20. Thus in what Isaac said to Esau and Jacob, in his blessing he spake to them in the second person singular; but meant chiefly their posterity. And so for the most part in the promises made to Isaac and Jacob ; and in Jacob blessing Ephraim and Manas- seh, and his twelve sons. But I shall take notice of one or two things further, showing that Adam's posterity were included in God's establishment with him, and the threatening denounced for his sin ; and that the calamities which come upon them in consequence of his sin, are brought on them as punishments. This is evident from the curse on the ground ; which if it be any curse at all, comes equally on Adam's posterity with himself. And if it be a curse, then against whomso ever it is designed, and on whomsoever it terminates, it comes as a punishment, and not as a blessing, so far as it comes in consequence of that sentence. Dr. T. (p. 19.) says, " A curse is pronounced upon the ground, but no curse upon the woman and the man." And (p. 45, 46. S.) he insists, that the ground only was cursed, and not the man : as though a curse could terminate on lifeless, senseless earth ! To understand this curse other wise than as terminating upon man through the ground, would be as senseless as to suppose the meaning to be, The ground shall be punished and shall be miserable for thy sake. Our author interprets the curse on the ground) of its being encumbered with noxious weeds : but would these weeds have been any curse on the ground, if there had been no inhabitants, or if the inhabitants had been of such a nature, that these weeds should not have been noxious, but useful to them ? It is said, Deut. xxviii. 17. " Cursed shall be thy basket, and thy store :" and would he not be thought to talk very ridiculously, who should say, " Here is a curse upon the basket ; but not a word of any curse upon the owner : and therefore we have no reason at all to look upon it as any punishment upon him, or any testimony of God's displeasure towards him." How plain is it, that when lifeless things, not capable either of benefit or suffer ing, are said to be cursed or blessed with regard to sensible beings — who use or possess these things, or have con nexion with them — the meaning must be, that these sensi ble beings are cursed or blessed in the other, or with re spect to them ! In Exod. xxiii. 25. it is said, " He shall bless thy bread and thy water." And I suppose, never any body yet proceeded to such a degree of subtilty in distinguishing, as to say, " Here is a blessing on the bread and the water, which went into the possessor's mouth, but no blessing on him." To make such a distinction, with regard to the curse God pronounced on the ground, would in some respects be more unreasonable ; because God is express in explaining the matter, declaring that it was for man's soke, expressly referring this curse to him, as being for the sake of his guilt ; and as consisting in the sorrow and suffering he should have from it : " In sorrow shalt thou eat of it. — Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee." So that God's own words tell us where the curse terminates. The words are parallel with those in Deut. xxviii. 16. but only more plain and explicit, " Cursed shalt thou be in the field, or in the ground." If this part of the sentence was pronounced under no notion of any curse or punishment at all upon mankind, but, on the contrary, as making an alteration for the better, as to them — that instead of the sweet, but tempting, per nicious fruit of paradise, it might produce wholesome fruits, more for the health of the soul ; that it might bring forth thorns and thistles, as excellent medicines, to prevent or cure moral distempers, diseases which would issue in eternal death — then it was a blessing on the ground, and not a curse ; and it might more properly have been said, " Blessed shall the ground be for thy sake. — I will make a happy change in it, that it may be a habitation more fit for a creature so infirm, and so apt to be overcome with temptation, as thou art." The event makes it evident, that in pronouncing this curse, God had as much respect to Adam's posterity, as to himself. And so it was understood by his pious pos terity before the flood ; as appears by what Lamech, the father of Noah, says, Gen. v. 29. " And he called his name Noah; saying, This same shall comfort us concerning our work, and the toil of our hands, because of the ground which the Lord hath cursed." Another thing which argues, that Adam's posterity were included in the threatening of death — and that our first parents understood, when fallen, that the tempter, in per suading them to eat the forbidden fruit, had aimed at the punishment and ruin of both them and their posterity, and had procured it — is Adam immediately giving his wife that new name, Eve or Life, on the promise or intimation of the disappointment and overthrow of the tempter in that matter, by her seed. This Adam understood to be by his procuring life; not only for themselves, but for many of their posterity ; and thereby delivering them from that death and ruin which the serpent bad brought upon them. Those that should be thus delivered, and obtain life, Adam calls the living. And because he observed, by what God had said, that deliverance, or life, was to be by the seed of the woman, he therefore remarks, that she is the mot/ier of all living, and thereupon gives her a new name, nin life. Gen. iii. 20. There is a great deal of evidence, that this is the occa sion of Adam giving his wife her new name. This was her new honour, and the greatest honour, at least in her pre- 186 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. II. Ch. I. sent state, that the Redeemer was to be of her seed. New names were wont to be given for something that was the person's peculiar honour. So it was with regard to the new names of Abraham, Sarah, and Israel. Dr. T. him self observes,* that they who are saved by Christ, are called, (o< f-vrer, 2 Cor. iv. 11.) the living or they that live. Thus we find in the Old Testament, the righteous are called by the name of the living, Psal. lxix. 28. " Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and not be written with the righteous." If what Adam meant by her being the mother of all living, was only her being the mother of mankind ; and gave her the name life upon that account; it were much the most likely that he would have given her this name at first ; when God first united them, under that blessing, be fruitful and multiply, and when he had a prospect of her being the mother of mankind in a state of immortality, living indeed, living and never dying. But that Adam should at that time give her only the name of (nv>ci) Isha, and then immediately on that melancholy change, by their coming under the sentence of death, with all their posterity — having now a new awful prospect of her being the mother of nothing but a dying race, all from generation to generation turning to dust, through her folly — he should change her name into life, calling her now the mother of all living, is (on that supposition) perfectly un accountable. Besides, it is manifest, that it was not her being the mother of all mankind— or her relation, as a mother, to her posterity — but the quality of those of whom she was to be the mother, Adam had in view, in giving his wife this new name ; as appears by the name itself, which signifies Vfe. And if it had been only a natural and mortal life he had in view, this was nothing to dis tinguish her posterity from the brutes ; for the very same name of living ones, or living things, is given from time to time to-i/iem.-f Besides, if by life the quality of her pos terity was not meant, there was nothing in it to distinguish her from Adam ; for thus she was no more the mother of all living, than he was the father of all living; and she could no more properly be called by the name of life on any such account, than he : but names are given for dis tinction. Doubtless Adam took notice of something dis tinguishing concerning her, that occasioned his giving her this new name. And 1 think it is exceeding natural to suppose, that as Adam had given her the first name from the manner of her creation, so he gave her the new name from redemption, and as it were new creation, through a Redeemer, of her seed. And, it is equally probable, that he should give her this name from that which comforted him, with respect to the curse that God had pronounced on him and the earth, as Lamech named Noah, Gen. v. 29. " Saying, this same shall comfort us concerning our work, and toil of our hands, because of the ground which the Lord hath cursed." Accordingly he gave her this new name, not at her first creation, but immediately after the promise of a Redeemer. (See Gen. iii. 15— 20.) Now, as to the consequence which I infer from Adam iving his wife this name, on the intimation which God ad given — that Satan should by her seed be overthrown and disappointed, as to his malicious design in tempting the woman — it is, that great numbers of mankind should be saved, whom he calls the living ; they should be saved from the effects of this malicious design of the old serpent, and from that ruin which he had brought upon them by tempting their first parents to sin ; and so the serpent would be, with respect to them, disappointed and over thrown in his design. But how is any death, or indeed any calamity at all, brought upon their posterity by Satan's malice in that temptation, if instead of that, all the conse quent death and sorrow was the fruit of God's fatherly love ? an instance of his free and sovereign favour 7 And if multitudes of Eve's posterity are saved from either spi ritual or temporal death, by a Redeemer, one of her seed, how is that any disappointment of Satan's design, in tempt ing our first parents r How came he to have any such thing in view, as the death of Adam's and Eve's posterity, by tempting them to sin, or any expectation that their death would be the consequence, unless he knew that they were included in the threatening 7 • Note annexed to § 287. I Some have objected, against his posterity being included in the threatening delivered to Adam, that the threatening itself was inconsistent with his having ant/ posterity : it being that he should die on the day that he sinned. To this I answer, that the threatening- was not inconsistent with his having posterity, on two accounts : I. Those words, In the day thou eatest thereof thou shall, surely die, according to the use of such like expressions among the Hebrews, do not signify immediate death, or that the execution shall be within twenty-four hours from the commission of the fact ; nor did God by those words limit himself as to the time of executing the threatened punishment ; but that was still left to God's pleasure. Such a phrase, according to the idiom of the Hebrew tongue, signifies no more than these two things : 1 . A real connexion between the sin and the punish ment. So Ezek. xxxiii. 12, 13. " The righteousness of the righteous shall not deliver him in the day of his trans gression. As for the wickedness of the wicked, he shall not fall thereby in the day that he turneth from his wicked ness : neither shall the righteous be able to live in the day that he sinneth : but for his iniquity that he hath commit ted, he shall die for it." Here it is said, that in the day he sinneth, he shall not be able to live, but he shall die ; not signifying the time when death shall be executed upon him, but the connexion between his sin and death ; such a connexion as in our present common use of language is signified by the adverb of time, when ; as if one should say, " According to the laws of our nation, so long as a man behaves himself as a good subject, he may live; but when he turns rebel, he must die :" not signifying the hour, day, or month, in which he must be executed, but only the connexion between his crime and death. 2. Another thing which seems to be signified by such an expression, is, that Adam should be exposed to death by one transgression, without waiting to try him the second time. If he eat of that tree, he should immediately fall under condemnation, though afterwards he might abstain ever so strictly. In this respect the words are much of the same force with those words of Solomon to Shimei; 1 Kings ii. 37. " For it shall be that on the day that thou goest out, and passest over the brook Kidron, thou shalt know for certain, that thou shalt surely die." Not mean ing, that he should certainly be executed on that day, but that he should be assuredly liable to death for the first offence, and that he should not have another trial to see whether he would go over the brook Kidron a second time. — Besides, II. If the words had implied, that Adam should die that very day (within twenty-four or twelve hours) or that moment in which he transgressed, yet it will by no means follow, that God obliged himself to execute the punish ment in its utmost extent on that day. The sentence was in great part executed immediately ; he then died spiritu ally ; he lost his innocence and original righteousness, and the favour of God ; a dismal alteration was made in his soul, by the loss of that holy divine principle, which was in the highest sense the life of the soul. In this he was truly ruined and undone that very day ; becoming corrupt, miserable, and helpless. And I think it has been shown, that, such a spiritual death was one great thing implied in the threatening. And the alteration then made in his body and external state, was the beginning of tem poral death. Grievous external calamity is called by the name of death in Scripture, Exod. x. 17. — " Entreat the Lord that he may take away this death." Not only was Adam's soul ruined that day, but his body was ruined ; it lost its beauty and vigour, and became a poor, dull, decaying, dying thing. And besides all this, Adam was that day undone in a more dreadful sense ; he immediately fell under the curse of the law, and condemnation to eternal perdition. In the language of Scripture, he is dead, that is, in a state of con demnation to death; even as our author often explains this language in his exposition upon Romans. In scrip ture language, he that believes in Christ, immediately receives life. He passes at that time from death to life, and thenceforward (to use the apostle John's phrase) " has t As in Gen. i. 21, 24, 28. Chap. ii. 19. Chap. vi. 19. vii. 23. and viii. 1. and many other places in the Bible. Sect. III. ADAM A FEDERAL HEAD, &c. 187. eternal life abiding in him." But yet, he does not then receive eternal life in its highest completion ; he has but the beginning of it ; and receives it in a vastly greater de gree at death. The proper time for the complete fulness, is not till the day of judgment. When the angels sinned, their punishment was immediately executed in a degree ; but their full punishment is not till the end of the world. And there is nothing in God's threatening to Adam that bound him to execute his full punishment at once; nor any thing which determines, that he should have no pos terity. The constitution which God established and de clared, determined, that if he sinned, and had posterity, he and they should die. But there was no constitution determining the actual being of his posterity in this case ; what posterity he should have, how many, or whether any at all. All these things God had reserved in his own power : the law and its sanction intermeddled not with the matter. It may be proper in this place also to take some notice of that objection of Dr. T. against Adam being supposed to be a federal head for his posterity, that it gives him greater honour than Christ, as it supposes that all his pos terity would have had eternal life by his obedience, if he had stood ; and so a greater number would have had the benefit of his obedience, than are saved by Christ.* — I think, a very little consideration is sufficient to show, that there is no weight in this objection. For the benefit of Christ's merit may nevertheless be vastly beyond that which would have been by the obedience of Adam. For those that are saved by Christ, are not merely advanced to happiness by his merits, but saved from the infinitely dreadful effects of Adam's sin, and many from immense gujlt, pollution, and misery, by personal sins. They are also brought to a holy and happy state through infinite ob stacles; and exalted to a far greater degree of dignity, felicity, and glory, than would have been due for Adam's obedience ; for aught I know, many thousand times so great. And there is enough in the gospel-dispensation, clearly to manifest the sufficiency of Christ's merits for such effects in all mankind. And how great the number will be, that shall actually be the subjects of them, or how great a proportion of the whole race, considering the vast success of the gospel that shall be in that future, extraor dinary, and glorious season, often spoken of, none can tell. And the honour of these two federal heads arises not so much from what was proposed to each for his trial, as from their success, and the good actually obtained ; and also the manner of obtaining. Christ obtains the benefits men have through him by proper merit of condignity, and a true purchase by an equivalent ; which would not have been the case with Adam if he had obeyed. I have now particularly considered ths account which Moses gives us, in the beginning of the Bible, of our first parents, and God's dealings with them ; the constitution he established with them, their transgression, and what fol lowed. And on the whole, if we consider the manner in which God apparently speaks to Adam from time to time; and particularly, if we consider how plainly and undeniably his posterity are included in the sentence of death pro nounced on him after his fall, founded on the foregoing threatening; and consider the curse denounced on the ground for his sake, for his sorrow, and that of his posterity ; and also consider, what is evidently the occasion of his giving his wife the new name of Eve, and his meaning in it — and withal consider apparent fact in constant and universal events, with relation to the state of our first parents and their posterity from that time forward, through all ages of the world — I cannot but think, it must appear to every im partial person, that Moses's account does, with sufficient evidence, lead all mankind, to whom his account is com municated, to understand, that God, in his constitution with Adam, dealt with him as a public person — as the head ofthe human species — and had respect to his posterity, as included in him. And it must appear, that this history is given by divine direction, in the beginning of the first writ ten revelation, in order to exhibit to our view the origin of the present sinful, miserable state of mankind, that we might see what that was, which first gave occasion for all those * Page 120, &c. S. consequent wonderful dispensations of divine mercy and grace towards mankind, which are the great subject of the Scriptures, both of the Old and New Testament ; and that these things are not obscurely and doubtfully pointed forth, but delivered in a plain account of things, which easily and naturally exhibits them to our understandings. CHAP. II. OBSERVATIONS ON OTHER PARTS OF THE HOLY SCRIP TURES, CHIEFLY IN THE OLD TESTAMENT, THAT PROVE THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN. Original depravity may well be argued, from wicked ness being often spoken of in Scripture, as a thing belong ing to the race of mankind, and as if it were a property of the species. So in' Psal. xiv. 2, 3. " The Lord looked down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if there were any that did understand, and seek God. They are all gone aside ; they are altogether become filthy : there is none that doeth good ; no, not one." The like we have again, Psal. liii. 2, 3.— Dr. T. says, (p. 104, 105.) " The Holy Spirit does not mean this of every individual ; because in the very same psalm, he speaks of some that were righteous, ver. 5. God is in the generation of the righteous." But how little is this observation to the purpose 7 For who ever supposed, that no unrighteous men were ever changed by divine grace, and afterwards made righteous 7 The psalmist is speaking of what men are as they are the children of men, born ofthe corrupt human race; and not as born of God, whereby they come to be the children of God, and of the generation of the righteous. The apostle Paul cites this place in Rom. iii. 10 — 12. to prove the universal corruption of mankind ; but yet in the same chapter he supposes the same persons spoken of as wicked, may become righteous, through the righteousness and grace of God. Wickedness is spoken of in other places in the book of Psalms, as a thing that belongs to men, as of the human race, as sons of men. Thus, in Psal. iv. 2. " O ye sons of men, how long will ye turn my glory into shame ? How long will ye love vanity ? " &c. Psal. lvii. 4. " I lie among them that are set on fire, even the sons of men, whose teeth are spears and arrows, and their tongue a sharp sword." Psal. lviii. 1, 2. " Do ye indeed speak righteousness, O congregation ? Do ye judge uprightly, 0 ye sons of men ? Yea, in heart ye work wickedness ; ye weigh out the violence of your hands in the earth." Our author men tioning these places, says, (p. 105. note,) " There was a strong party in Israel disaffected to David's person and government, and sometimes he chooseth to denote them by the sons or children of men." But it would have been worth his while to have inquired, Why the psalmist should choose to denote the worst men in Israel by this name? Why he should choose thus to disgrace mankind, as if the compellation of sons of men most properly belonged to such as were of the vilest character, and as if all the sons of men, even every one of them, were of such a character, and none of them did good ; no, not one 7 Is it not strange, that the righteous should not be thought worthy to be call ed sons of men, and ranked with that noble race of beings, who are born into the world wholly right and innocent 7 It is a good, easy, and natural reason, why he chooseth to call the wicked, sons of men, as a proper name for them, That by being of the sons of men, or of the corrupt, ruined race of mankind, they come by their depravity. And the psalmist himself leads us to this very reason, Psal. lviii. " Do ye judge uprightly, O ye sons of men ? yea, in heart ye work wickedness, ye weigh out the violence of your hands. The wicked are estranged from the womb," &c. Of which I shall speak more by and by. Agreeable to these places is Prov. xxi. 8. " The way of man is froward and strange ; but as for the pure, his work is right." He that is perverse in his walk, is here called by the name of man, as distinguished from the pure : 188 ON ORIGINAL SIN. Part II. which I think is absolutely unaccountable, if all mankind by nature are pure, and perfectly innocent, and all such as are froward and strange in their ways, therein depart from the native purity of all mankind. The words naturally lead us to suppose the contrary ; that depravity and per- verseness properly belong to mankind as they are naturally, and that a being "made pure, is by an after-work, by which some are delivered from native pollution, and distinguished from mankind in general : which is perfectly agreeable to the representation in Rev. xiv. 4. where we have an account of a number that were not defiled, but were pure, and followed the Lamb ; of whom it is said, " These were re deemed from among men." To these things agree Jer. xvii. 5, 9. In ver. 5. it is said, " Cursed is he that trusteth in man." And in ver. 9. this reason is given, " The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked; who can know it?" What heart is this so wicked and deceitful ? Why, evi dently the heart of him, who, it was said before, we must not trust ; and that is man. It alters not the case as to the present argument, whether the deceitfulness of the heart here spoken of, be its deceitfulness to the man him self, or to others. So Eccl. ix. 3. " Madness is in the heart of the sons of men, while they live." And those words of Christ to Peter, Matt. xvi. 23. " Get thee behind me, Satan — for thou savourest not the things that be of God, but the things that be of men. Signifying plainly, that to be carnal and vain, and opposite to what is spiritual and divine, is what properly belongs to men in their present state. The same thing is supposed in that of the apostle, 1 Cor. iii. 3. " For ye are yet carnal. For whereas there is among you envying and strife, are ye not carnal, and walk as men?" And that in Hos. vi. 7. " But they, like men, have transgressed the covenant." To these places may be added Matt. vii. 11. " If ye being evil, know how to give good gifts." Jam. iv. 5. " Do ye think that the scripture saith in vain, the spirit that dwelteth in us, lusteth to envy?" — 1 Pet. iv. 2. " That he no longer should live the rest of his time in the lusts of men, but to the will of God." — Yet above all, that in Job xv. 16. " Hov, much more abominable and filthy is man, who drinketh iniquity like water ?" Of which .more presently. Now what account can be given of these things, on Dr. T.'s scheme ? How strange is it, that we should have such descriptions, all over the Bible, of max, and the sons of men I Why should man be so continually spoken of as evil, carnal, perverse, deceitful, and desperately wicked, if all men are by nature as perfectly innocent, and free from any propensity to evil, as Adam was the first moment of his creation, all made right, as our author would have us understand Eccl. vii. 29. ? Why, on the contrary, is it not said, at least as often, and with equal reason, that the heart of man is right and pure ; that the way of man is innocent and holy ; and that he who savours true virtue Yind wisdom, savours the things that be of men? Yea, and why might it not as well have been said, the Lord looked down from heaven on the sons of men, to see if there were any that did understand, and did seek after God; and they were all right, altogether pure, there was none inclined to do wicked ness, no, not one T Of the like import with the texts mentioned are those which represent wickedness as what properly belongs to the world ; and that they who are otherwise, are saved from the world, and called out of it. As John vii. 7. " The world cannot hate you ; but me it hateth ; because I testify of it, that the works thereof are evil." Chap. viii. 23. " Ye are of this world: I am not of this world." Chap. xiv. 17. " The spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive ; because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him: but ye know him." Chap. xv. 18, 19. "If the world hate you, ye know that it hated me before it hated you. If ye were of the world, the world would love its own : but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you." Rev. xiv. 3, 4. " These are they which were re deemed from the earth, — redeemed from among men." * To the like purpose is chap. iii. 3. and Deut. xi. 18. where this word is used. t A word of the same root is used to signify a young child, or a little child, in the following places ; 1 Sam. i. 24, 25, "27. 1 Kings iii. 7. and xi. 17. John xvii. 9. " I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me." Ver. 14. " I have given them thy word ; and the world hath hated them, because they are not of the world, even as I am not of the world. 1 John iii. 13- " Marvel not, my brethren, if the world hate you." Chap. iv. 5. " They are of the world, therefore speak they of the world, and the world heareth them." Chap. v. 19. " We are of God, and the whole world lieth in wickedness." It is evident, that in these places, by the world is meant the world of mankind ; not the habitation, but the inhabitants : for, it is the world spoken of as loving, hating, doing evil works, speaking, hearing, &c. The same thing is shown, when wickedness is often spoken of as being man's own, in contradistinction from virtue and holiness. So men's lusts are often called their own hearts' lusts, and their practising wickedness is called walking in their own ways, walking in their own coun sels, in the imagination of their own heart, and in the sight of their own eyes, according to their own devices, &c. These things denote wickedness to be a quality be longing properly to the character and nature of mankind in their present state : as, when Christ would represent that lying is remarkably the character and the very nature of the devil in his present state, he expresses it thus, John viii. 44. " When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own : for he is a liar, and the father of it." And that wickedness belongs to the very nature of men in their present state, may be argued from those places which speak of mankind as being wicked in their child hood, or from their childhood. So Prov. xxii. 15. " Fool ishness is bound in the heart of a child ; but the rod of correction shall drive it far from him." Nothing is more manifest, than that the wise man in this book continually uses the word folly, or foolishness, for wickedness ; and that this is what he means in this place, the words them selves explain. For the rod of correction is proper to drive away no other foolishness, but that which is of a moral nature. The word rendered bound, signifies (as ob served in Pool's Synopsis) a close and firm union. The same word is used in chap. vi. 21. " Bind them continu ally upon thine heart." And chap. vii. 3. " Bind them upon thy fingers, write them upon the table of thine heart."* The same verb is used, 1 Sam. xviii. 1. " The soul of Jonathan was knit, or bound, to the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul." — But how comes wickedness to be so firmly bound, and strongly fixed, in the hearts of children, if it be not there naturally ? They have had no time firmly to fix habits of sin, by long custom in actual wickedness, as those who have lived many years in the world. The same thing is signified in that noted place, Gen. viii. 21. " For the imagination of man's heart is evil, from his youth." It alters not the case, whether it be translated for or though the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth, as Dr. T. would have it. The word translated youth, signifies the whole of the former part of the age of man, which commences from the beginning of life. The word in its derivation, has reference to the birth or begin ning of existence. It comes from (1JH) a word to shake off, as a tree shakes off its ripe fruit, or a plant its seed ; the birth of children being commonly represented by a tree yielding fruit, or a plant yielding seed. So that the word here translated youth, comprehends not only what we in English most commonly call the time of youth, but also childhood and infancy, and is very often used to signify these latter.f Dr. T. says, (p. 124. note,) that he " conceives,./rom the youth, is a phrase signifying the greatness or long duration of a thing. But if by long duration he means any thing else than what is literally expressed, viz. from the begin ning of life, he has no reason to conceive so, neither has what he offers so much as the shadow of a reason for his conception. There is no appearance in the words of the two or three texts he mentions, of their meaning any thing else than what is most literally signified. And it is cer tain, that what he suggests is not the ordinary import of 2 Kings ii. 23. Job xxxiii. 25. Prov. xxii. 6. xxiii. 13. and xxix. 21. Isa. x. 19. xi. 6. and lxv. 20. Hos. xi. 1. The same word is used to signify an in fant, in Exod. ii. 6. and x. 9. Judg. xiii. 5, 7, 8, 24. 1 Sam. i. 22. and iv. 21, 2 Kings v. 14. Isa. vii. 16. and viii. 4. Chap. II. TEXTS CHIEFLY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, &c. 189 such a phrase among the Hebrervs ; but that thereby is meant from tlie beginning, or the early time of life, or ex istence ; as may be seen in the places following, where the same word in the Hebrew is used, as in the eighth of Genesis. 1 Sam. xii. 2. " I am old and grey-headed— and I have walked before you from my childhood unto this day." Ps. lxxi. 5, 6. "Thou art my trust from my youth : by thee have I been holden up from the womb. Thou art he that took me out of my mother's bowels." (Ver. 17, 18.) " O God, thou hast taught me from my youth; and hitherto have I declared thy wondrous works : now also, when I am old and grey-headed, forsake me not." Ps. cxxix. 1, 2. " Many a time have they afflicted me from my youth, may Israel now say : many a time have they afflicted me from my youth ; yet have they not pre vailed against me." Isa- xlvii. 12. " Stand now with the multitude of thy sorceries, wherein thou hast laboured from thy youth." (So also ver. 15.) 2 Sam. xix. 7. "That will be worse unto thee, than all the evil that befell thee./iwfl thy youth until now." Jer. iii. 24, 25. " Shame hath devoured the labour of our fathers, from our youth. — We have sinned against the Lord our God from our youth,-even to this day."* And it is to be observed, that according to the man ner of the Hebrew language, when it is said, such a thing has been from youth, or the first part of existence, the phrase is to be understood as including that first time of existence. So Josh. vi. 21. " They utterly destroyed all, from the young to the old," (so in the Hebrew,) i. e. in cluding both. (So Gen. xix. 4. and Esther iii. 13.) And as mankind are represented in Scripture, as being of a wicked heart from their youth, so in other places they are spoken of as being thus from the womb. Psal. lviii. 3. " The wicked are estranged from the womb : they go astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies." It is ob servable, that the psalmist mentions this as what belongs to the wicked, as the sons of men : for, these are the pre ceding words ; " Do ye judge uprightly, O ye sons of men? Yea, in heart ye work wickedness."f Then it follows, the wicked are estranged from the womb, &c. The next verse is, their poison is like the poison of a serpent. Serpents are poisonous as soon as they come into the world ; they derive a poisonous nature by their genera tion. Dr. T. fp. 134, 135.) says, " It is evident that this is a scriptural figurative way of aggravating wickedness on the one hand, and of signifying early and settled habits of virtue on the other, to speak of it as being from the womb." And as a probable instance of the latter, he cites that in Isa. xlix. 1 . " The Lord hath called me from the Womb ; from the bowels of my mother hath he made mention of my name" But I apprehend, that in order to seeing this to be either evident or probable, a man must have eyes peculiarly affected. I humbly conceive that such phrases as that in the 49th of Isaiah, of God's calling the prophet from the womb, are evidently not of the im port which hie supposes ; but mean truly from the begin ning of existence, and are manifestly of like signification with that which is said ofthe prophet Jeremiah, Jer. i. 5. " Before I formed thee in the belly, I knew thee : before thou earnest out of the womb, I sanctified thee, and ordain ed thee a prophet unto the nations." Which surely means something else besides a high degree of virtue : it plainly signifies that he was, from his first existence, set apart by God for a prophet. And it would be as unreasonable to understand it otherwise, as to suppose the angel meant any other than that Samson was set apart to be a Nazarite from the beginning of his life, when he says to his mother, " Behold, thou shalt conceive and bear a son : and now drink no wine, nor strong drink, &c. For the child shall be a Nazarite to God], from the womb, to the day of his death." By these instances it is plain, that the phrase, from the womb, as the otiose, from the youth, as used in Scripture, properly signifies from the beginning of life. Very remarkable is that place, Job xv. 14 — 16. " What is man, that he should be clean ? And he that is born of a woman, that he should be righteous ? Behold, he putteth no trust in his saints ; yea, the heavens are not clean in his sight : how much more abominable and filthy is man, * So Gen. xlvi. 34. Job xxxi. 18. Jer. xxxii. 30. and xlviii 11. Ezek. iv. 14. Zech. xiii. 5. which drinketh iniquity like water !" And no less re markable is our author's method of managing it. The 16th verse expresses an exceeding degree of wickedness, in as plain and emphatical terms, almost, as can be invented ; every word representing this in the strongest manner : " How much more abominable and filthy is man, that drinketh iniquity like water I" I cannot now recollect, where we have a sentence equal to it in the whole Bible, for an emphatical, lively, and strong representation of great wickedness of heart. Any one of the words, as such words are used in Scripture, would represent gi'eat wickedness : if it had been only said, " How much more abominable is man ! Or, how much more filthy is man ! Or, man that drink eth iniquity." But all these are accumulated with the addition of— like water, — the further to represent the bold ness or greediness of men in wickedness. Though iniquity be the most deadly poison, yet men drink it as boldly as they drink water, are as familiar with it as with their common drink, and drink it with like greediness, as he that is thirsty drinks water. That boldness and eagerness in persecuting the saints, by which the great degree of the depravity of man's heart often appears, as thus represented, Psal. xiv. 4. " Have the workers of iniquity no knowledge, who eat up my people as they eat bread 7" And the greatest eager ness of thirst is represented by thirsting as an animal thirsts after water, Psal. xiii. 1 . Now let us see the soft, easy, light manner, in which Dr. T. treats this place, (p. 143.) " How much more abominable and filthy is man, in comparison of the divine purity, who drinketh iniquity like water ! who is attended with so many sensual appetites, and so apt to indulge them. You see the argument, man in his present weak and fleshly state, cannot be clean before God. Why so ? Because he is conceived and born in sin, by reason of Adam's sin 7 No such thing. But because, if the purest creatures are not pure, in comparison of God, much less a being subject to so many infirmities as a mortal man. Which is a demonstration to me, not only that Job and his friends did not intend to establish the doctrine we are now examining, but that they were wholly strangers to it." Thus he en deavours to reconcile this text with his doctrine of the perfect native innocence of mankind ; in which we have a notable specimen of his demonstrations, as well as of that great impartiality and fairness in examining and expound ing the Scripture, of which he so often makes a profession ! In this place we are not only told, how wicked man's heart is, but also how men come by such wickedness ; even by being of the race of mankind, by ordinary gene- tion : What is man, that he should be clean ? and he that is born of a woman, that he should he righteous ? Our author (p. 141, 142.) represents man being born of a woman, as a periphrasis, to signify man ; and that there is no design in the words to give a reason, why man is not clean and righteous. But the case is most evidently otherwise, if we may interpret the book of Job by itself. It is most plain, that man's being born of a woman is given as a reason of his not being clean; chap. xiv. 4. " Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean 7" Job is speaking there expressly of man's being born of a woman, as appears in ver. 1 . And here how plain is it, that this is given as a reason of man's not being clean ! Concerning this Dr. T. says, Thut this has no respect to any moral uncleanness, but only common frailty, cfc. But how evidently is this also otherwise ! when that unclean ness, which a man has by being born of a woman, is expressly explained of unrighteousness, in the next chapter at the 14th verse, " What is man that he should be clean 7 and he that is born of a woman, that he should be righte ous 7" Also in chap. xxv. 4. " How then can man be justified with God ? And how can he be clean that is born of a woman ?'} It is a moral cleanness Bildad is speaking of, which a man needs in order to his being jus tified. His design is, to convince Job of his moral impurity, and from thence of God's righteousness in his severe judg ments upon him ; and not of his n atural frailty. And, without doubt, David has respect to this way of derived wickedness of heart, when he says, Psal. li. 5. " Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my t A phrase of the like import with that in Gen. viii. 21. The imagina tion, or, as it might have been rendered, the operation, of his heart is evil. 190 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. II. Ch. III. mother conceive me." It alters not the case, as to the argument we are upon, whether the word ('.non') conceive me, signifies to conceive, or to nurse ; which latter, our author takes so much pains to prove : for, when he has done all, he speaks of it as a just translation of the words to render them thus, I was born in iniquity, and in sin did my mother nurse me. (p. 135.) If it is owned that man is born in sin, it is not worth the while to dispute, whether it is expressly asserted, that he is conceived in sin. But Dr. T. after his manner, insists, that such expressions, as being bom in sin, being transgressors from the womb, and the like, are only phrases figuratively to denote aggrava tion, and a high degree of wickedness. But the contrary has been already demonstrated, from many plain scripture instances. Nor is one instance produced, in which there is any evidence that such a phrase is used in such a man ner. A poetical sentence out of Virgil's JEneid, has here been produced, and made much of by some, as parallel with this, in what Dido says to Mneas, in these lines : Nee tibi diva parens, generis nee dardanus auctor, Perfide ; Sed duris genuit re cautious horrens Caucasus, hyrcanasque admorunt ubera tygres. In which she tells Mneas, that not a goddess was his mo ther, nor Anchises his father ; but that he had been brought forth by a horrid rocky mountain, and nursed at the dugs of tigers, to represent the greatness of his cruelty to her. But now unlike and unparallel is this ! Nothing could be more natural, than for a woman overpowered with the passion of love, and distracted with raging jealousy and disappointment, thinking herself treated with brutish per fidy and cruelty, by a lover whose highest fame had been his being the son of a goddess, to aggravate his inhumanity and hard-heartedness with this, that his behaviour was not worthy the son of a goddess, nor becoming one whose fa ther was an illustrious prince : and that he acted more as if he had been brought forth by hard unrelenting rocks, and had sucked the dugs of tigers. But what is there in the case of David parallel, or at all in like manner lead ing him to speak of himself as born in sin, in any such figurative sense ? He is not speaking himself, nor any one speaking to him, of any excellent and divine father and mother, of whom he was born : nor is there any appear ance of his aggravating his sin, by its being unworthy of his high birth? There is nothing" else visible in David's case to lead him to take notice of his being born in sin, but only his having such experience of the continuance and power of indwelling sin, after so long a time, and so many and great means to engage him to holiness ; which showed that sin was inbred, and in his very nature. Dr. T. often objects to these and other texts, brought by divines to prove original sin, that there is no mention made in them of Adam, nor of his sin. He cries out, Here is not the least mention, or intimation of Adam, or any ill effects of his sin upon us. — Here is not one word, nor the least hint of Adam, or any consequences of his sin, fyc. <§-c* He say's,f " If Job and his friends had known and believed the doctrine of a corrupt nature, derived from Adam's sin only, they ought in reason and truth to have given this as the true and only reason of the human im perfection and uncleanness they mention." But these ob jections and exclamations are made no less impertinently, than frequently. It is no more a proof, that corruption of nature did not come by Adam's sin, because many times when it is mentioned, his sin is not expressly mentioned as the cause of it ; than that death did not come by Adam's sin, as Dr. T. says it did. For though death, as incident to mankind, is mentioned so often in the Old Testament, and by our Saviour in his discourses, yet Adam's sin is not once expressly mentioned, after the three first chapters of Genesis, any where in all the Old Testament, or the four Evangelists, as the occasion of it. What Christian has there ever been, that believed the moral corruption of human nature, who ever doubted that it came in the way, of which the apostle speaks, when he says, " By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin 7" Nor indeed have they any more reason to doubt of it, than to doubt of the whole history of our first parents, because Adam's name is so rarely mentioned, on any * Page 5, 64, 96, 97, 98, 102, 108, 112, 118, 120, 122, 127, 128, 136, 142, 143, occasion in Scripture, after that first account of him, and Eve's never at all ; and because we have no more any ex press mention of the particular manner, in which mankind were first brought into being, either with respect to the creation of Adam or Eve. It is sufficient, that the abiding, most visible effects of these things, remain in the view of mankind in all ages, and are often spoken of in Scripture ; and that the particular manner of their being introduced, is once plainly set forth in the beginning of the Bible, in that history which gives us an account of the origin of all things. Arid doubtless it was expected, by the great author of the Bible, that the account in the three first chapters of Genesis should be taken as a plain account of the introduction of both natural and moral evil into the world. The history of Adam's sin, with its circumstances, God's threatening, the sentence pronounced upon him after his transgression and the immediate consequences, consisting in so vast an alteration in his state — and the state of the world, with respect to all his posterity— most directly and sufficiently lead us to understand the rise of calamity, sin, and death, in this sinful, miserable world. It is fit we all should know, that it does not become us to tell the Most High, how often he shall particularly ex plain and give the reason of any doctrine which he teaches, in order to our believing what he says. If he has at all given us evidence that it is a doctrine agreeable to his mind, it becomes us to receive it with full credit and sub mission ; and not sullenly to reject it, because our notions and humours are not suited in the manner, and number of times, of his particularly explaining it. How often is pardon of sins promised in the Old Testament to repenting and returning sinners ! How many hundred times is God's special favour there promised to the sincerely right eous, without any express mention of these benefits being through Christ ! Would it therefore become us to say, that inasmuch as our dependence on Christ for these benefits is a doctrine, which, if true, is of such importance, God ought expressly to have mentioned Christ's merits as the reason and ground of the benefits, if he knew they were the ground of them ; and should have plainly declared it sooner, and more frequently, if ever he expected we should believe him, when he did tell us of it? How oft is vengeance and misery threatened in the Old Testament to the wicked, without any clear and express signification of any such thing intended, as that everlasting fire, where there is wailing and gnashing of teeth, in another world, which Christ so often speaks of as the punishment ap pointed for all the wicked ! Would it now become a Christian, to object and say, that if God really meant any such thing, he ought in reason and truth to have declared it plainly and fully ; and not to have been so silent about a matter of such vast importance to all mankind, for four thousand years together ? CHAP. III. OBSERVATIONS ON VARIOUS OTHER PLACES OF SCRIP TURE, PRINCIPALLY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, PROVING THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN. Sect. I. Observations on John iii. 6. in connexion with some other passages in the New Testament. Those words of Christ, giving a reason to Nicodemus, why we must be born again, John iii. 6. " That which is born of the flesh, is flesh, and that which is bom of the Spirit is spirit," have not without good reason been pro duced by divines, as a proof of the doctrine of original sin : supposing, that by flesh here is meant the human nature in a debased and corrupt state. Yet Dr. T. (p. 1 44.) thus explains these words, that which is born ofthe flesh, is flesh ; " that which is born by natural descent and propa gation, is a man consisting of body and soul, or the mere constitution and powers of a man in their natural state." But the constant use of these terms,i7.esA and spirit, in 149, 152, 155, 229. t 142. Sect. I PROOFS FROM JOHN III 6, &c. 191 other parts of the New Testament, when thus set in op position, and the latter said to be produced by the Spirit of God, as here — and when expressive of the same thing, which Christ is here speaking of to Nicodemus, viz. the requisite qualifications to salvation— will fully vindicate the sense, of our divines. Thus in the 7th and 8th chap ters of Romans, where these terms flesh and spirit (uapf and irveutia) are abundantly repeated, and set in opposition, as here. So chap. vii. 14. The law is (»mihu_tu__) spiritual, but I am (-apK«ot) carnal, sold under sin. He cannot only mean, " I am a man consisting of body and soul, and having the powers of a man." Ver. 18. " I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing." He does not mean to condemn his frame, as consisting of body and soul ; and to assert, that in his human constitu tion, with the powers of a man, dwells no good thing. And when he says in the last verse of the chapter, " With the mind, I myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of sin ;" he cannot mean, " I myself serve the law of God; but with my innocent human constitution, as having the powers of a man, I serve the law of sin." And when he says in the next words, the beginning of the 8th chapter, " there is no condemnation to them, — that walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit;" and ver. 4. "The righteousness of the law is fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh;" he cannot mean, "there is no condem nation to them that walk not according to the powers of a man," kc. And when he says, (ver. 5 and 6.) "They that are after the flesh, do mind the things of the flesh ; and to be carnally minded is death ;" he does not intend, "they that are according to the human constitution, and the powers of a man, do mind the things of the human constitution and powers; and to mind these is death." And when he says, (ver. 7 and 8.) "The carnal (or fleshly) mind is enmity against God, and is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be : so that they that are in the flesh, cannot please God ;" he cannot mean, that to mind the things which are agreeable to "the powers and constitution of a man," who as our author says, is constituted or made right, is enmity against God ; and that a mind which is agreeable to this right human constitution, as God hath made it, is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can be ; and that they who are according to such a constitution, cannot please God. And when it is said, (ver. 9.) "Ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit;" the apostle cannot mean, "ye are not in the human nature, as constituted of body and soul, and with the powers of a man." It is most manifest, that by the flesh here the apostle means a nature that is corrupt, of an evil tendency, and directly opposite to the law and holy nature of God ; so that to walk ac cording to it, and to have a mind so conformed, is to be an utter enemy to God and his law ; in a state of perfect inconsistence with subjection to God, and of being pleasing to him ; and in a sure and infallible tendency to death, and utter destruction. And it is plain, that here by walking after, or according to, the flesh, is meant the same thing as walking according to a corrupt and sinful nature ; and to walk according to the spirit, is to walk according to a holy and divine nature, or principle : and to be carnally minded, is the same as beings viciouslyand corruptly minded ; and to be spjrj.„_%minded,istobeof a virtuous and holy disposition. When Christ says, John iii. 6. " That which is born of the flesh, is flesh," he represents the flesh not merely as a quality ; for it would be incongruous to speak of a quality as a thing born. Therefore man, as in his whole nature corrupt, is called flesh ; which is agreeable to other scripture representations, where the corrupt nature is called the old man, the body of sin, and the body of death. Agreeable to this are those representations in the 7th and 8th chapters of Romans. There, flesh is figuratively repre sented as a person, according to the apostle's manner. This is observed by Mr. Locke, and after him by Dr. T. who takes notice, that the apostle, in the 6th and 7th of Romans, represents sin as a person ; and that he figura tively distinguishes in himself two persons, speaking of flesh as his person. For I know that m me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing. And it may be observed, that in the 8th chapter he stillcontinues this representation, speaking of the flesh as a person. Accordingly, in the Cth and 7th verses, he speaks of the mind of the flesh, (ppovnua o-upKor,) and of tne mind of the spirit, (Qoovn/ia irveKMOTot,) as if the flesh and spirit were two opposite persons, each having a mind contrary to that of the other. Dr. T. interprets this mind of the flesh, and mind of the spirit, as though the flesh and the spirit were the different objects, about which the mind is conversant. But this is plainly beside the apostle's meaning; who speaks of the flesh and spirit as the subjects in which the mind is ; and in a sense the agents, but not the objects, about which it acts. We have the same phrase again, ver. 27. " He that searcheth the hearts, knoweth what is the mind of the spirit" (0p»vnua 7n/ei/M»rot). The mind of the spiritual nature in the saints is the same with the mind of the Spirit of God himself, who imparts and actuates that spiritual nature ; and here the spirit is the subject and agent ; but not the object. The same apostle, in a similar manner, uses the word, (¦>»?,) mind. Col. ii. 18. "Vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind, (awo m vox m __pnor avm,) by the mmd of his flesh." And this agent so often called flesh, represented by the apostle as altogether evil, without any good thing dwelling in it, or belonging to it — yea per fectly contrary to God and his law, and tending only to death and ruin, and directly opposite to the spirit — is what Christ speaks of to Nicodemus as born in the first birth, and furnishing a reason why there is a necessity of a new birth, in order to a better production. One thing is particularly observable in that discourse of the apostle — in which he so often uses the term flesh, as opposite to spirit — that he expressly calls it sinful flesh, Rom. viii. 3. It is manifest, that by sinful flesh he means the same thing with that flesh spoken of in all the context : and that when it is said, Christ was made in the likeness of sinful flesh, the expression is equipollent with those that speak of Christ as made sin, and made a curse for us. Flesh and spirit are opposed to one another in Gal. v. in the same manner as in the 8th of Romans. And there, assuredly, by flesh cannot be meant only the human nature of body and soul, or the mere constitution and powers of a man, as in its natural state, innocent and right. In the 16th ver. the apostle says, "Walk in the spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh : " the flesh, is some thing of an evil inclination, desire, or lust. But this is more strongly signified in the next words ; " For the flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh ; and these are contrary the one to the other." What could have been said more plainly, to show that what the apostle means by flesh, is something very evil in its nature, and an irreconcilable enemy to all goodness 7 And it may be observed, that in these words, and those that follow, the apostle still figuratively represents the flesh as a person or agent, desiring, acting, having lusts, and performing works. And by works of the flesh, and fruits of the spirit, which are opposed to each other, (from ver. 19, to the end,) are plainly meant the same as works of a sinful nature, and fruits of a holy renewed nature. " Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these : adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies," &c. " But the fruit of the spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentle ness, goodness," &c. The apostle, by flesh, does not mean any thing that is innocent and good in itself, which only needs to be restrained, and kept in proper bounds ; but something altogether evil, which is to be destroyed. 1 Cor. v. 5. "To deliver such an one to Satan, for the destruction of the flesh." We must have no mercy on it ; we cannot be too cruel to it ; it must even be crucified. Gal. v. 24. " They that are Christ's, have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts." The apostle John — the same apostle that writes the ac count of what Christ said to Nicodemus — by the spirit means the same thing as a new, divine, and holy nature, exerting itself in a principle of divine love, which is the sum of all christian holiness. 1 John iii. 23, 24. "And that we should love one another, as he gave us command ment ; and he that keepeth his commandments, dwelleth in him, and he in him : and hereby we know that he abideth in us, by the spirit that he hath given us. Chap. iv. 12,13. " If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in us : hereby know we, that we dwell in him, because he hath given us of his Spirit." 192 ON ORIGINAL SIN. p. II. Ch. III. The spiritual principle in us being as it were a commu nication of the Spirit of God to us. And as by (tthth/ju) spirit, is meant a holy nature, so by the epithet, (*»euM<«TiKoi,) spiritual, is meant the same as truly virtuous and holy. Gal. vi. 1 . " Ye that are spiritual, restore such an one in the spirit of meekness." The apostle refers to what he had just said at the end of the foregoing chapter, where he had mentioned meekness as a fruit of the spirit. And so by carnal, or fleshly, (aapmnor,) is meant the same as sinful. Rom. vii. 14. "The law is spiritual, (i. e. holy,) but I am carnal, sold under sin." And it is evident, that by flesh, as the word is used in the New Testament, and opposed to spirit, when speaking of the qualifications for eternal salvation, is meant — not only what is now vulgarly called the sins of the flesh, con sisting in inordinate appetites of the body, and their in dulgence ; but— the whole body of sin, implying those lusts that are most subtle, and farthest from any relation to the body ; such as pride, malice, envy, &c. When the works of the flesh are enumerated, Gal. v. 19 — 21. they are vices of the latter kind chiefly that are mentioned ; " idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings." So, pride of heart is the effect or operation of the flesh. Col. ii. 18. "Vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind :" in the Greek, (as before observed,) by the mind of the flesh. So, pride, envying, and strife, and division, are spoken of as works of the flesh, 1 Cor. iii. 3, 4. " For ye are yet carnal (-opkikoi, fleshly). For whereas there is envying, and strife, and division, "are ye not carnal, and walk as men ? For while one saith, I am of Paul, and another, I am of Apollos, are ye not carnal?" Such kind of lusts do not depend on the body, or external senses ; for the devil himself has them in the highest degree, who has not, nor ever had, any body or external senses to gratify. Here, if it should be inquired, how corruption or de pravity in general, or the nature of man as corrupt and sinful, came to be called flesh, and not only that cor ruption which consists in inordinate bodily appetites ? I think, what the apostle says in the last cited place, " Are ye not carnal, and walk as men ?" leads us to the true reason. It is because a corrupt and sinful nature is what properly belongs to mankind, or the race of Adam, as they are in themselves, and as they are by nature, the word flesh is often used in both the Old and the New Testa ment to signify mankind in their present state. To enume rate all the places, would be very tedious ; I shall there fore only mention a few in the New Testament. Matt. xxiv. 22. "Except those days should be shortened, no flesh should" be saved." Luke iii. 6. " All flesh shall see the salvation of God." John xvii. 2. " Thou hast given him power over all flesh."* Man's nature, being left to itself, forsaken of the Spirit of God, as it was when man fell, and consequently forsaken of divine and holy prin ciples, of itself became exceeding corrupt, utterly depraved and rained : and so the word flesh, which signifies man, came to be used to signify man as he is in himself, in his natural state, debased, corrupt, and ruined. On the other hand, the word spirit came to be used to signify a divine and holy principle, or new nature ; because that is not of man, but of God, by the indwelling and vital influence of his Spirit. And thus to be corrupt, and to be carnal, or fleshly, and to walk as men, are the same thing. And so in other parts of Scripture, to savour the things that be of man, and to savour things which are corrupt, are the same ; and, sons of men, and wicked men, also are the same, as observed before. And on the other. hand, to savour the things that be of God, and to receive the things of the Spirit of God, are phrases that signify as much as relish ing and embracing true holiness or divine virtue. All these things confirm what we have supposed to be Christ's meaning, in saying, " That which is born of the flesh, is flesh; and that which is bom of the Spirit, is spirit." His speech implies, that what is born in the first birth of man, is nothing but man as he is of himself, with out any thing divine in him ; depraved, debased', sinful, ruined man, utterly unfit to enter into the kingdom of God, and incapable of the spiritual divine happiness of • See also Acts ii. 17. Rom. iii. 20. 1 Cor. i. 29. Gal. ii 16. that kingdom. But that which is bom, in the new birth, of the Spirit of God, is a spiritual principle, a holy and divine nature, meet for the heavenly kingdom- It is no small confirmation of this being the true meaning, that the words understood in this sense, contain the proper and true reason, why a man must be born again, m order to enter into the kingdom of God ; the reason given every where in other parts of Scripture for the necessity of a renovation, a change of mind, a new heart, &c. in order to salvation: to give a reason of which to Nicodemus, is plainly Christ's design in the words which have been in sisted on. Before I proceed, I would observe one thing as a corollary from what has been said. Corol. If by flesh and spirit, when spoken of in the New Testament, and opposed to each other, in discourses on the necessary qualifications for salvation, we are to un derstand what has been now supposed, it will not only follow, that men by nature are corrupt, but wholly corrupt, without any good thing. If by flesh is meant man's nature, as he receives it in his first birth, then therein dwelleth no good thing ; as appears by Rom. vii. 18. It is wholly opposite to God, and to subjection to his law, as appears by Rom. viii. 7, 8. It is directly contrary to true holiness, and wholly opposes it, as appears by Gal. v. 17. So long as men are in their natural state, they not only have no good thing, but it is impossible they should have or do any good tiling ; as appears by Rom. viii. 8. There is nothing in their nature, as they have it by the first birth, whence should arise any true subjection to God ; as appears by Rom. viii. 7. If there were any thing truly good in the flesh, or in man's nature, or natural disposition, under a moral view, then it should only be amended ; but the Scrip ture represents as though we were to be enemies to it, and were to seek nothing short of its entire destruction, as be fore observed . And elsewhere the apostle directs not to the amending ofthe oldman, butputting it off, and putting on the new man ; and seeks not to have the body of death made bet ter, but to be delivered from it ; and says, " that if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature, (which doubtless means the same as a man new born,) old things are (not amended, but) passed away, and all things are become new." But this will be further evident, if we particularly con sider the apostle's discourse in 1 Cor. the latter part of the second chapter and the beginning of the third. There the apostle speaks of the natural man, and the spiritual man ; where natural and spiritual are opposed just in the same manner as carnal and spiritual often are. In chap. ii. 14, 15. he says, " the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God : for they are foolishness unto him ; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual, judgeth all things.'' And not only does the apostle here oppose natural and spiritual, just as he elsewhere does carnal and spiritual, but his following discourse evidently shows, that he means the very same distinction, the same two distinct and op posite things. For immediately on his thus speaking of the difference between the natural and the spiritual man, he says, " And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal." Referring manifestly to what he had been saying, in the immediately preceding discourse, about spiritual and natural men, anil evidently using the word, carnal, as synonymous with natural. By which it is put out of all reasonable dispute, that th'e apostle by natural men means the same as men in that carnal, sinful state, that they are in by their first birth ;— notwithstanding all the glosses and criticisms, by which modern writers have endeavoured to palm upon us another sense of this phrase ; and so to deprive us of the clear in struction the apostle gives in that 14th verse, concerning the sinful miserable state of man by nature. Dr. T. says, by iiruxiMir, is meant the animal man, the man who maketh sense and appetite the law of his action. If he aims to limit the meaning of the word to external sense, and bodily appetite, his meaning is certainly not the apostle's. For the apostle in his sense includes the more spiritual vices of envy, strife, &c. as appears by the four first verses of the next chapter ; where, as I have observed, he sub stitutes the word carnal in the place of m>> °p7«v,) We were by nature children of wrath, Dr. T. says, p. 112— 114.) " The apostle mean's no more by this, than truly or really children of wrath. ; using a metaphorical expression, borrowed from the word that is used to signify a true and genuine child of a family, in distinction from one that is a child only by adoption?' In which it is owned, that the proper sense of the phrase is, being a child by nature, in the same sense as a child by birth or natural generation ; but only he supposes, that here the word is used metapho rically. The instance he produces as parellel, to confirm his supposed metaphorical sense of the phrase, as mean ing only truly, really, or properly children of wrath, viz. the apostle Paul's calling Timothy his own son in faith, [tnaiov renvoi,,) is so far from confirming his sense, that it is rather directly against it. For doubtless the apostle uses the word here (tvh-iov) in its original signification, meaning his begotten son ; -yvn-ior being the adjective from ¦y°i"i, offspring, or the verb, -ye^a-, to beget; as much as to say, Timothy my begotten son in the faith. For as there are two ways of being begotten, one natural, and the other spiritual ; the first generation, and regeneration ; so the apostle expressly signifies which of these he means m this place, Timothy my begotten son in the faith, in the same manner as he says to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. iv. 15. "In Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the gospel, lo sav,the apostle uses the word, *.,«., in Eph. n. 3. only as 198 ON ORIGINAL SIN. P. II. Ch. III. signifying real, true, and proper, is a most arbitrary inter pretation, having nothing to warrant it in the whole Bible. The word ^ii is no where used in this sense in the New Testament.* Another thing which our author alleges to evade the force of this, is, that the word rendered nature, sometimes signifies habit contracted by custom, or an acquired nature. But this is not its proper meaning. And it is plain, the word in its common use, in the New Testament, signifies what we properly express in English by the word nature. There is but one place where there can be the least pretext for supposing it to be used otherwise ; and that is 1 Cor. xi. 14. " Doth not even nature itself teach you, that if a man have long hair, it is a shame unto him ?" And even here there is, I think, no manner of reason for understanding nature otherwise than in the proper sense. The emphasis used, (av-n n cwir,) nature itself, shows that the apostle does not mean custom, but nature in the proper sense. It is true, it was long custom which made having the head covered a token of subjec tion, and a feminine appearance; as it is custom that makes any outward action or word a sign or signification of any thing. But nature itself, nature in its proper sense, teaches, that it is a shame for a man to appear with the established signs of the female sex, and with significations of inferiority, &c. As nature itself shows it to be a shame for a father to bow down or kneel to his own child or servaut, or for men to bow to an idol, because bowing down is by custom an established token or sign of subjec tion and submission. Such a sight therefore would be unnatural, shocking to a man's very nature. So nature would teach, that it is a shame for a woman to use such and such lascivious words or gestures, though it be custom that establishes the unclean signification of those gestures and sounds. It is particularly unnatural and unreasonable, to under stand the phrase, (tck.q $>u_ei,) in this place, any otherwise than in the proper sense, on the following accounts. 1 . It may be observed, that both the words, t«„_ and ^o.u, in their original signification, have reference to birth or gene ration. So the word (pvaK, from *._, wbich signifies to beget or bring forth young, or to bud forth, as a plant, that brings forth young buds and branches. And so the word t<*to* comes from ti«t_, which signifies to bring forth chil dren. — 2. As though the apostle took care by the word used here, to signify what we are by birth, he changes the word he used before for children. In the preceding verse he used woi, speaking of the children of disobedience ; but here teki.., which is a word derived, as observed, from tikt_, to bring forth a child, and more properly signifies a be gotten or born child. — 3. It is natural to suppose that the apostle here speaks in opposition to the pride of some, especially the Jews, (for the church in Ephesus was made up partly of Jews, as well as the church in Rome,) who exalted themselves in the privileges they had by birth, be cause they were born the children of Abraham, and were Jews by nature, tpu