YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

ESSAYS

ON SOME OP THE FIRST PRINCIPLES

METAPBVSICKS, ETHICHS, AND THEOLOGY.

*#****#»##

By ASA BURTON, B. D.
frASTOB OF THE CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THETFORD, VERMONT

PORTLAND :
PEIKTED Bit ARTHUR SHIRLEy.
1824.

pistrict of Vermont, To wit ;
gftJMTOB' BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the twenty-third day of February,
in the forty-eighth year of the Independence of the United States of
L.S. i Ameriea,.the
REV. ASA BURTON, '

pf the said District, hath deposited in this office, the title pf a book, the right where
of he claims as author, in the words follqwing, to wit :
" Essays on some of the first principles of Metaphy sicks. Ethicks, and Theology.
" By Asa Burton, D. D. Pastor of the Church in Thetford, Vermont."
In conformity to the. act of the Congress of the United States, entitled " An act\
for the encou ragement oflear nin g, by securing the copies of maps', charts, and books
to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned."
JESSE GOVE,
>.'' v ; . V; ' Clerk of ike District Cm/art of Vermont^
A true copy of record, examined and sealed by me,
' ' J. GOVE, Cleric,

INTRODUCTION:
Containing preliminary Ob&ervdtidhS.
THE author of the follbWing essays, when lie first entered on the
study of theology, felt the importance of forming a just arid true the*
ory of the human mind. This feeling prompted him to read with.
attention all the most noted and distinguished authors-, he could find)
on the subject of pneumatology. — He expected, by studying them,
to digest a true system. This course he pursued for several years.
Wheri he had carefully attended to English, Scotch„French and Ger^
man authors, Instead of finding increased light, Ms mind was more
darkened and perplexed With respect to Several-parts of this very im*
portant subject. Failing of success in this wayj he determined to lay
aside reading authors, except occasionally, atid make an attempt by
an exertion of his own powers, to arrange his thoughts systematically
6h the principles and operations of the/human mind. In this wa'y^
he has succeeded, in some good irie'asiire, to his own satisfaction. —
That theory of the niind, which wa/the result of much' study, and
which he had taught students in divinity under his care ? which was"
generally approved by themj anci Which they frequently urged him td
publish, it is the object of ihesjs essays to illustrate and explain. Irt
doing this, he determined no/to adopt the plan' or theory of any au
thor he had ever read, for tins reason ; he does not agree, except iii
part, with the system or pfe'ri of any preceding author. He, howev
er, approves many things they have advanced, and views them as*
having reflected much light on this Science. He feels hmtsfctf much-
indebted to them, for a number of important suggestions,- which have
afforded him much assistance in the work before him.
As it is not his design to follow others by adopting their theories- $>
so he does not write in opposition to them, any further than is necessa-

ry to support his own opinions. His object is to illustrate, as far as
he proceeds, the true theory of the human mind ; and avoid all dispu
tation, as far as can be done consistently.
In the essays on the mind, he means to take facts, experience, and
common sense for his guides. He does not design to form a system
on any other principles, than those which are self-evident, or capable
of demonstration. Whatever opinions respecting the mind he may
advance, which do not agree with experience, with facts, and the
ward of God, are to be rejected. For principles, which contradict
daily experience, cannot be ' true. Principles, which do 'not agree
with the lives, and conduct of mankind, are not to be received. And
if they do not accord with what the word of God teaches us concern
ing the characters of sinners and saints, they are false. All the ex
ternal, visible actions of mankind, whether virtuous or vicious, may
be traced back to first principles in the mind. By these principles
we can account for the conduct of all men, or for the events which
take place in the moral world, as well as we can explain the phenom
ena of nature, by' the first principles in natural philosophy. Hence
no hypothesis is to be admitted as true, which does not agree with
experience, with facts respecting our visible conduct, arid with the
word of Jehovah.
Again. As every science is founded on what may be justly term
ed first principles j so this is especially true with respect to the science
of theology. And no person can be considered as understanding
systematically any science, if he is unacquainted with its first princi
ples. And whosoever will examine the subject carefully, and can
didly, will find, that intelligent existence contains the first principles
of divinity. It is generally granted, that if a person does not under
stand the subjects of moral agency, and liberty, there are many otto,*
er subjects connected with these, of which he cannot have a consist
ent view, and which he cannot satisfactorily explain. Of course he is
not a systematic, or good divine. But a knowledge of moral agency
and liberty involves a knowledge of the principles and operations of
the mi()d. Hence these principles and operations are \lae foundation
of divinity. Without a knowledge of these, a person is not acquaint
ed with fhe foundation on which divinity, considered as a superstruc
ture, rests. This shows the importance of a thorough acquaintance
with the first principles, and the operations of the mind.

5
These essays therefore, are designed as ah introduction to divinity*
The author's great object, in explaining 'fyhat appears to him to be
«he true theory of the mind, is, to assist the student in acquiring a sys
tematic and consistent knowledge of divinity. He does not purpose
to attend to any questions, or disquisitions relative to the mind, which
are not necessary to answer this end. Whatsoever will not, in his
view, serve to reflect light on sabjects in theology, does not comte
within the compass and design of his plan.
It has been found by experience, that the classing of objects assists
the memory, and fenders the acquisition of knowledge more easy, and
rapid. This is the plan the author designs to adopt with respect to
operations of the mind. If certain qualities are found to belong to a
number of individual existences, they are classed together, and de
nominated by some general name. For instance : We find many
individuals are endued with life and motion; they are formed into a
class, and called animals. Though these properties are common to
them all, yet some of these individuals possess properties, which oth
ers do not ; for this reason a general class is divided into a number,
called species. Man is one species of animals ; beast, bird, and so
on, are other species. Hence, among individual existences, according
to the various qualities with which they are endued, there is a generic
and a specific difference. In like manner, the operations of the mind
are not all of one kind, but they differ from each other ; for which
reason they ought to be formed into distinct, getieral classes ; and
these general classes may be divided, according to their specific dif
ferences. This method will give a systematic arrangement to the sev- '
eral divisions of mental operations. It will greatly assist the memo
ry ; and help the student in acquiring a clear, and distinct knowledge
of the principles and operations of spiritual substances.
Authors have pursued different plans in the study of the human
mind. Some have not only attended to its faculties and operations^
but have in connexion with them attended toall the objects with which
the mind is ever conversant. This leads them into a very extensive
field, in which a student is in danger of being lost. In these essays,
the author has pursued a different course. He has attended, as far
as possible consistent with perspicuity, to the faculties of the mind,
and their operations, without describing the numerous objects of per
ception and choice.

6
Others have not only attended to all the materials of knowledge1
with which the mind is furnished ; but have considered particularly
the connexion, relation, similitude, and association of objects or ideas,
and shown how one suggests and leads to another in a regular train or
series. And on the principle of suggestion, resemblance, or associa
tion, have formed their system of classification. This view of objects
has not been attempted in the following essays. ,
Again. In forming distinct classes in the views taken of the mind,
different methods may be adopted. For instance, we may classify
the operations of our faculties, and also the objects of the mind. This
is a double classification, which serves to confuse, instead of elucidating
the subject of the mind. It is also needless. For the objects with
which we are acquainted are already formed into distinct classes, in
cluding both the genus arid species. Hence, to give a systematic
view of the mind nothing more is requisite, than to form its operations
under each faculty into distinct classes; The plan adopted in these
essays, of confining the attention to the faculties and operations of the
mind itself, excluding a consideration of the objects of perception,
feeling, and volition, as far as could be done witli perspicuity, presents
the mind with all its operations to view in a much narrower compass.
And the more concisely any subject is discussed, if it is done perspicu
ously, the more easily, and distinctly will it be understood by the rea
der. If it be admitted, that the animal, vegetable, and inanimate creation
are three general classes, which include all the individuals of the ma
terial creation with which we are acquainted ; the addition of anoth
er general class would be needless, and serve to confuse and lead the
mind away from the truth. When these are divided into species, the
work is done, and all material existences are clearly and systemati
cally arranged. In doing this, there is no need of considering the
faculties or operations of the mind.
So in relation to the mind, when the number of faculties with which
it is endued, and the operations of each faculty with the real differ
ence between them are known, the way is then prepared to form them
into general and specific classes. And in doing this, there is no need
of attending to the several classes into which the material world is di
vided. — And if perceptions, sensations and affections, and volitions,
include all the operations of the mind ; these three general classes are

sufficient. Form these three general classes into their specific divi
sions ; then the work of classifying is finished, and a systematic
view of the mind is formed. And this seems to be the only rational
plan for accomplishing that end.
The existence of an eternal, independent, absolutely perfect being,
is the first principle in divinity, and the foundation on which the
whole superstructure rests. Every doctrine, then, in theology, must
be explained in consistency with his character. But how can this be
done, by any person, unless he has- just, clear, and distinct views of
the character of God ? Hence, generally, all, who teach divinity,
begin with proving the existence of God, and giving a description of
his character. . If any err concerning the character of Jehovah, errors
will prevail through their whole system of sentiments, in a greater
or less degree. And all we know of God is by the revelations, or dis
plays he has made of himself in his ivories and word ; or by actions
and declarations. These are the signs by which he is made known.
All existences produced by him are either material, or immaterial, or
what we call spiritual. The material creation contains but a com
paratively faint display of his character. Here we see no communi
cations of his nature, or moral attributes. We behold goodness dis
played, but see np inherent principle of goodness in any material
being. We discern no inherent principles of action ; nothing, which
constitutes intelligent agency. Hence material existences, however
great, are not viewed as rational agents, or as rewardable for any of
their operations.
But God is an agent worthy of love, service, and praise, on account
of the various operations of his agency. And no where do we find,
through the vast extent of his works, a real resemblance of himself,
but in immaterial, spiritual beings. Such beings are rational agents.
And the mind or soul of man is the most perfect agent in kind or na
ture, to be found in this world. Man sustains the highest rank among
all creatures on earth, which have life in themselves, from the lowest,
smallest insect, through every rising grade. In him, then, we may
expect to find the most perfect, and entire resemblance, in kind, of
Jehovah. It must, therefore, be evident to every reflecting mind, that
we cannot have just, and correct views of God, as the first, eternal,
and infinite agent, any farther than we form just, and correct ideas of
nian, as an agent. Hence the study of man is the most important,

8
and interesting, and useful study. He, who knows himself correctly,
may have just conceptions of God.
Man is an agent. He is endued with such powers, and is capable
of such operations, as to be considered a moral agent ; a being, who
isa proper subject of praise and blame, and of future and endless re
wards. Hence arises, the interesting, and important inquiry, what
powers, qualities, or faculties, are necessary to render a moral agent
worthy of praise or blame, and of final rewards ? — This inquiry will
lead to the discussion of many very interesting subjects ; such as the
following : In what does agency properly consist ? Is it some iny
herent, abiding, primary principle of action ; or no more than a sim
ple exercise ? Can all our actions be traced back to some primaiy
active principle in us, from which they all proceed ? What is the
difference between the natural and moral powers, of the mind ? What
powers, or faculties are necessary to constitute a complete moral
agent ? And when these are ascertained, then the question arises,
why are they requ isite to make such an agent ? This is a question
which I have, as yet,, never found answered, in any systematic, or
satisfactory manner, by any author, who has published on this subject.
Yet it is one of the most important subjects to be clearly understood
in the whole range of subjects, which relate to mora} agency ; and
one which reflects by far the most light on this inquiry. In what does:
that liberty consist, which is considered necessary in a moral agent ;
and why, for what reasons, is. it requisite ?
When questions of this complexion are answered correctly, then a
person knows what things are needful to constitute a perfect, moral
agent ; and he also cleariy discerns the reasons why they are neces
sary. A person may then, and not before, be said to understand the
subject of moral agency ; and the ground, on which praise and blame
may be predicated of man ; and why final rewards suited to his char
acter are perfectly just and proper. This knowledge will enable him
to form just views of, the being and character of Jehovah. He can
then explain and unfold to view the divine character ; and describe in
a consistent, and systematic manner all the doctrines and precepts of
the Bible. But, until he is acquainted more or less distinctly with the
subject of moral agency in the light above exhibited, his mind must
be full of darkness, confusion and uncertainty respecting the leading,
and fundamental doctrines of the gospel.
These observations are sufficient to show, and impress on every

mind, the importance of1 commencing the study at theology with a dis*
cussion of leading ideas, which relate to the subject of moral agencv.
This is the first subject with which the student's mind ought to be oc
cupied ; and his attention to it should be continued, until he clearly
understands it. He is then prepared, and not before, to understand
systematically the doctrines of divinity ; and he cannot well fail of
forming consistent views of the doctrines of the gospel from the begin
ning to the end ; in case his powers of mind are sufficient to - qualify
him for a teacher.
It will be granted that every sentiment, when explained, which
does not agree with moral agency and liberty, ought not to be admit
ted ag a doctrine of the gospel ; for every doctrine actually taught in
the bible is consistent with moral agency and liberty. But how is it
possible for any divine to know the doctrines he believes do agree with
the true theory of moral agency and liberty, unless he is previously
acquainted with that theory ? Does not this clearly show, that correct
views of moral agency lay the foundation for a consistent explanation
of gospel doctrines ? Of course, in digesting a system of divinity, he
ought to begin with the study of this subject.
Again. It is well known that the systems of divinity embraced by
Calvinists and Arminiaris differ Widely. This difference arises in part
from different views of the subject of moral agency and liberty. The1
latter say, that necessity destroys the liberty essential to a moral
agent. Hence they reject, as far as they can consistent with them
selves, every doctrine, which implies necessity. But Calvinists admit
that one kind of necessity not only agrees with liberty, but is' necessa
ry to its existence. Hence they can believe in those doctrines, plain
ly taught in the Bible, which imply this necessity. This shows that
divines do in fact differ in their sentiments, according to their ideas of
that liberty, which is consistent with mpral agency, or praise and
blame. They must then begin with the study of moral agericy and
liberty, and fix their principles on this subject, before they are pre
pared to explain the word of God, and adopt, or reject the doctrines
it inculcates. These and many other considerations show, that we'
ought to begin the study of divinity with forming consistent views of
the subject of moral agency. But to ' have consistent views of this
subject, we must attend to the faculties and operations of the mind;
When every thing is considered, which might and ought to be, it is ve*

rVevTdent, that we oughYfo Degm'thesfudyof divinity Vvlfhthe'stuay
of the human niiiid. If we agree Here, and are consistent, 'we shall
agree in all the leading doctrines of the' bible.
The author is aware that many, at this day, are' greatly prejudiced
against all kinds of metaphysical reasoning and investigation ; arid are
disinclined to read discussions of1 that "character. It is not expected
that persons of this Class will 'attend "to the following eksays. Yet
some subjects a're'so abstruse, and the truth so difficult to'be ekpfalh-
ed, that a close metaphysical investigation is necessary, 'and hi "no
other way can light be reflected orfthem. "And this 'is especially the
case with all subjects, which respect the mind,'moral agency, liberty,
necessity, and worthiness "of praise and blame. Must we remain ig
norant of air these subjects, which are ?nfact the foundation on which
a whole system of divinity rest's, because what Is called a metaphysi
cal "investigation is necessary to 'understand ihem ? If we proceed
on this ground, and attend 'to no subject which requires patient, arid
accurate reasoning ; the course of mankind will soon f>eretfBgrade.
Instead of making new discoveries arid advances in the1 field of science,
each succeeding generation wiirbVles's informed ; :rnetital'irnbecility
will ensue ; and the most important arid'practical truths will be involv
ed in darkness.
Metaphysical reasoning strengthens the rational powers of the
mind ; and begets a habit of close attention, arid patient'irivestigatichi.
But those, who content themselves with superficial views, anil are
willing to remain ignorant of every thing, which requires mental 'ex
ertion to understand, will soon find their -powers- weykehed^ arid
mere declamation will constitute all their 'excellence and worth.
But the author hopes' we have many in our nation' yet, who are wffiirig
to give every subject, and especially the human'iiiirid,' that laborious
and thorough investigation, which is requisite to the attainment of a
competent*knowledge. And he flatters himself, that these essays1 will
afford them some light arid assistance in their study bfthe'mirid ; and
serve as a clue to further inquiries ; and thus' enable them t'o'explain
and defend those doctrines of our holy religion, which at this day'are
attacked with great zeal, by men who have' not neglected mental dis
cipline. If these essays should be useful' to any' in these respects, he
will feel himself repaid for all his' trouble and labor.
The author "has nothing to' say in defence of his stile. 'He confes-

11
ses he has always attended more to ideas and matter, than to the or
naments of speech ; and is willing to acknowledge he has been too
negligent in this particular. He has made it his aim to avoid all vul
gar expressions ; and to use words, which shall not offend, if they do
not please. The main character of stile at which he has carefully
aimed is perspicuity. If he has failed in this, he w;ill lamer.t it ;
though he trusts there will not be much complaint arising from this
source. A desire to be well understood, is the only excuse he has to
make for repeating so frequently the same word in a sentence, and the
same idea in different words. On abstruse subjects, perhaps any per
son would find it difficult to use what is called an eloquent style. An
argumentative style must differ in its character from others.
Some of the essays too were written in too much haste, owing to nu
merous avocations & interruptions, incident to the care of a large church
& society. He begs the candor and patience of the reader, hoping his
attention will be so occupied with the sentiments advanced, as to
make every allowance for imperfections of style, as far as, the most
liberal candor will admit. Nothing but diffidence, and a backward
ness to appear in print on subjects so often discussed by learned men,
has kept these sheets from the public eye for several years. But he
has finally yielded to the judgment & importunity of particular friends.
He expects various opinions will be embraced concerning what is here
written, and different feelings excited. But he hopes no one will form
a hasty opinion, or condemn any sentiment advanced, unless he can
detect the fallacy of the reasoning by which it is supported. The au
thor is advanced in age, and has no expectation of living to hear what
may be said for or against the system he espouses. He believes
however, there are those, who, if they agree in opinion with the author,
will be able to defend him, and repel the attacks which may be made.
He has, therefore, nothing more to say, but to leave the work with
God, to bless and give it success, as far as what is published may be
agreeable to his mind and will. What is written was with a view of
affording assistance to candidates for the ministry of the gospel, and to
defend in general that system of doctrines called the reformed, or Cal-
vinistic creed. The author earnestly prays it may not in any respect
prove injurious to gospel orthodoxy ; but rather a means of increasing
the true light, and of diffusing it through the world.

ESSAY X.
On the Faculties of the Mind.
All existence, as far as human knowledge extends, is either
material, or immaterial ; corporeal, or spiritual. And though
it is generally granted, that certain properties, aside from their
operations, are essential to matter, yet this is not acknowledg
ed to be true, by some, with respect to the mind. It becomes,
therefore, necessary to inquire whether the mind has properties,
or faculties, antecedent to the operations of thinking, feeling,
and willing, and distinct from them. However, what is meant
by a faculty of the mind ought to be, in the first place, explain
ed. There was a. time, when the word faculty was first used.
It was then used to express some idea which the speaker then
had. What was it ? If the original meaning of the word is
retained in our language, it was at first used to signify a pre
paredness in the mind for certain operations. It communicates
no more than a simple idea. Hence it does not admit of a lo
gical definition.
The way many have taken to evade truth, and silence an
antagonist, has been to request a definition of words ; and if
they cannot be defined, thejf are said to be used without any
meaning. Many do not consider, that some words are incapa
ble of any definition, and yet may be. well understood. This
is true of every word which conveys only one simple idea.
Would it not be impertinent for any person to ask another, to
define the terms pain and pleasure ? , The reason is, they are
terms, which convey simple ideas. All such terms are incapa
ble of any logical definition. There is but one way to explain
them, which is to use some other terms, of the same meaning,
which are better understood, if there are any of this class. The
word faculty is a term, which1 conveys a simple idea, and can
no more be defined, than we can define the word pain. Yet
it no more follows from this, that no such property, which is,
called a faculty, exists, than it follows, that there is no such
thing as pain, because it cannot be defined. And there is no

14
propriety in asking for a definition of simple terms. If all per
sons would keep in view the difference between simple and com
plex terms, they would never ask for a definition of the former,
nor deny the reality of a thing merely because it cannot be ex
plained by a definition. There is reason to think, that some
reject certain truths because the words, which convey truth,
cannot be defined. This, appears to be one reason, why some
disbelieve the existence of faculties, as antecedent to exer
cises, because the word: is undefinable,. Some do not believe
in the existence of faculties, because they have not, what they
call, a consciousness of their existence. They are conscious of
their fruits, or operations, and this k sufficient. Will any. per
son affirm that pain ha^np cause, has n,athing which occasions
it, when he has no consciousness or knowledge of that caus,e,
or antecedent ? No ; he infers, from the pain he feels, the ex
istence of something which produced it. And he may as
safely infer the existence of faculties, from their operations or
exercises. Hence, candor will admit the existence of faculties
or properties of the mind, though they cannot he defined, and
though we have no consciousness of them except by their oper
ations. By a faculty, then, I mean a preparedness, a fitness, a
capacity, or an adapte*dness of the mind; for those various op
erations, of which we are daily conscious. And I would here
give notice, that I. shall use the term operations in these essays,
to denote all the thoughts, feelings or affections, and volitions
of the mind. Every thought is an operation ; every affection,
and every volition, is an operation qf the human mind* I shall
generally use the word in this expensive sense. And now the
inquiry is, whether there is in the mind a faculty or prepared
ness for thinking, a preparedness for feeling, and a prepared
ness for willing ; or whether there is not j and whether these
faculties are antecedent to every operation of the mind, and
objects pf distinct consideration. Some believe that faculties
and operations are as distinct objects, as motion and the body
moving ; and that the former are antecedent to the latter.
Others, in philosophical discussions, deny thi& distinction.
Some arguments will now be adduced to show, that such a dis
tinction ought tp be admitted.
1 . This distinction is so obvious to common sense, that it has
been admitted by all nations, in every age of the world. This
is evident from the general construction of languages. In ev"

ib
et-y language, Verbs ate used, "which always have a nominative
case, expressed or implied. A nominative case denotes an
agent, or .'something capable of action. And a verb expresses
the act of the agent. Accordingly we say, the understanding
thinks, the 'heart feels, the will chooses and refuges. This
mode of expression is common to all languages, and is found
ed on this distinction, that (he 'faculties of the mind are dbjecfc
as distinct frpm their acts or operations, as matter is from mo
tion. If we d^ny this distinction, and say the mind is nothing
more than a cbmppsition of thoughts or ideas, feelings and vo
litions, or as soirie have said, a bundle or union of exercises,
then, to be understood, we must alter our mode of conversation
and writing, 'instead of saying the understanding thinks, the
heart feels, the will chooses, we nlujt say, thoughts think ; feel
ings feel Jove, and hate ; volitions choose and refuse. And this
destroys all distinction between verbs arid their nominatives ;
an action is the nominative and the "Verb at the same tirh'e.
Some to avoid this difficulty say, theproper1 mode of expres
sion is this ; the iriiriB thinks, feels, chooses. Actions ought to
be predicated, of the mind, instead offaculties. This supposes
the mind and its exercises ate not syhbiiirnbUs ideas ; that the
mind is one thing and its' exercises another. This 'solution of
the dinTcultyimplies the same distinction between :the mind and
its actions, as hasTieen made between faculties and their respec
tive operations. Here it riiay be asked, What is the mind ? Is
it a number of faculties or properties, united ? This will not
begraiitedby those who deriythe' existence offaculties. Is the
mind nothing but various exercises united ? Then to say, the
mind thinks and acts, is only saying, that exercises think, and
act, or that exercises exercise, and acts act; arid thus the ob
jector involves the very dirficulty'heis-attemptirig to-avoid. It
may be still -asked, what is the mind? 'Will it "be said it is an
essence? Then it is an essence that thinks arid acts. Is it
agreeable to common sense/ arid the commonxtse of words, Ho
predicate actions, exercises, or operations of an esserice ? An
essence is often supposed to be the substratum or supporter of
properties ; but to predicate actions of it, is anew thought,
and an improper use of words. 'But has' any one a clear
and distinct idea of the meaning of the Word essence ?
Can he tell what it is ? Has he a consciousness of any such
thing ? If notj'howdoes he knPW, tbatthings which exist' have
atj essence ? Does' he infer itia this way, that properties must

16
have an essence, or something to support them ? Then he be-1
lieves some things, of which he has no knowledge by conscious
ness. Hence it does not become such a person to deny the ex
istence of faculties, for the want of a knowledge of any such
properties of the mind by consciousness. We may as consist
ently infer the existence offaculties, from those operations of
which we are conscious, as we can infer an essence from the ex
istence of properties.
Again ; it may be said, it is not the mind, or any particular fac
ulties which operate ; but it is the person, who acts.; — Here
it may be asked, what is a person ? Is he a being ? Is his be
ing a union of properties, or of exercises ? If the former be
admitted, then the thing contended for is granted. If the latter
be affirmed, then ail the absurdities, which attend the theory
that exercises act, return upon us. Objections of this kind,
when fairly examined, have no weight. Hence, notwithstand
ing the evasions which have been noticed, the argument retains
its full force, which is this, that we must admit the difference, on
which the distinction is founded, between faculties and their
respective operations ; or believe an opinon, which has pre
vailed in all ages without any particular bias in its favor, is
false ; and also alter the general construction of all languages.
This opinion, which has so generally prevailed in all nations,
of a difference between faculties and their operations, has been
proved from the construction of every language among men.
And mankind have not been led to embrace this opinion by
any particular bias or prejudice ; for, it is presuhied, no such
general bias can be named.
2. From our actions and operations we may safely infer the
existence of faculties.
That we think, feci, love, hate, choose arid refuse, is certain.
What is it, which thinks, which loves, which chooses ; some
thing, or nothing '? It must be one or the other. Will any one
boldly say,nothing acts? Nothing operates ? If this is too absurd
to be admitted, it must be granted that where there are opera
tions, there is something which operates. By what particu
lar name shall it be called ? If it be said it is the mind, or the?
person, which acts ; it has been made evident these evasions, .
instead of invalidating the argument under consideration, in
volve absurdities too gross to gain belief! That property of
the mind which is employed in thinking, has been generally
called the understanding. And it is by the will the mind choos
es and refuses. As it is absurd to predict actions of nothing ;

17
and equally absurd to predicate actions of themselves, or of ac
tions ; and as they must be predicated of something, from
them we infer the existence offaculties. From our thoughts,
we infer the faculty called the understanding, which thinks, or
perceives objects ; and from our feelings or affections, we in
fer a feeling faculty ; and from our volitions, we infer the fac
ulty termed the will, which chooses and rejects. And there is
no way to avoid this inference, unless we say there may be op
erations without an ©perator ; which is as inconsistent, as to
assert there may be design without a designer.
3. If we have no faculties, mankind are not agents. Agents
act, or operate. But agency exists, antecedent to actions.
Now if men have no faculties, what constitutes that agency
which is employed in thinking and choosing, and which by its
operations becomes visible ? Is it actions, operations, or ex
ercises ? Is perception, or volition the agent which perceives,
Or wills ? Then agency and action are the same thing ; and
we return to the former absurdity, that actions act. If it be
granted that men are agents in thinking, in choosing^ in all
their operations, then something exists antecedent to all our
exercises. If we say it is the mind, still what is the mind ?
We have seen where interrogations of this kind lead us.
If we say men are not agents in thinking or willing, and are
to be considered only as the subjects of such operations, how
can this afford any strength to an objector? If we are not
agents, Who act, and nothing more than subjects acted upon,
what in this sense constitutes us subjects? Whatever it be, it
must exist before it can be acted upon. It must be a substance
of some kind or other, wholly distinct from the operations of
some other agent upon it. Indeedy let us view this subject in
whatever light we may, a being must exist-before he can think)
feel, or will. The operations of thinking, loving, hating, and
choosing are objects, as distinct from the Being of whom they
are predicated, as any two objects in existence. This is so ev
ident, that no person can deny it, who has given a proper atten
tion to the subject. This is certain, that neither actions, nor;
exercises, nor operations, constitute this being. What then is
this being ? Nothing but a mere essence, or substratum?
This will not be pretended, if what was said respecting it un
der the first argument receive proper attention. What are
called the understanding, heart, and will, constitute the human
mind. Whether these properties have an essence, or substra-

18
turn, for their support ; and whether this substratum is the di
vine agency, or something else, are questions, which do not in
the least affect the subjects considered in these essays. I there
fore leave them to the decision of others. That to our being
do belong such faculties as have been mentioned, the arguments
which have been used, fully evince. However, if any persons
wish, for further proof, I refer them,
4. To the word of God. This corresponds with the reasons
which have been offered. God is the author of our being.
He is perfectly acquainted with the nature and properties, of our
minds. He can give us a just description of men. Accord-"
ing to his word, men possess three distinct properties or facul
ties. An understanding, which is the seat of knowledge ; the
heart, which is the fountain of depravity ; and the will, as the
cause of all the visible effects wrought by us.
The last time Christ appeared to his disciples after the resur-
rection,it is said," then opened he their understanding, that they
might understand the scriptures." Here the understanding is
that faculty, by which his disciples were to obtain a knowledge
of the great doctrines of the gospel. By this they would per
ceive the truth ; and become acquainted with the gospel scheme
of salvation, and be able to teach it toothers. Also Eph. 1.
18. " The eyes of your understanding being enlightened, that
ye may know what is the hope of his calling, and what the
riches of the glory of his inberitence in the saints." The eyes
of the understanding were enlightened, for this purpose, that
saints might know, or clearly and distinctly perceive the objects
of their hope and desire. Many passages might be cited of
the same import, which teach us, that the understanding is that
faculty of the mind, by which we perceive or obtain a knowl
edge of divine truth.
And the scriptures teach us that the heart is another distinct
faculty of die wind, and the source of all moral good and evil.
Christ says, -** A good man, out of the good* treasure of his
heart, bringeth forth that which is good ; and an evil man, out
of the evil treasure of his heart, bringeth forth that which is
evil ; for of the abundance of the heart his mouth speaketh."
Here the heart is represented as either a good, or evil treasure,
fountain or source, from which good and evil, as streams, pro
ceed. And there is a plain distinction made between the heart,
and the good or evil which proceeds from it. Iu another place
Christ says, " For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, mur-

19
ders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, falsewitness, blasphemies.'1
Our Lord taught, if a man look bn a woman, and lust after
her, he hath committed adultery with her in his heart already ;
by the sins mentioned in this passage, not only external acts,
but the internal motions or desires of the heart are included.
Here an evident distinction is made between the heart, and the
evil affections, or desires which proceed from it. They are as
distinct, as a fountain, and the streams which flow from it ;
and are so represented by our Lord. These passages,and ma
ny others which might be adduced, do not represent the heart
as the seat of knowledge, but as the source of moral good and
evil. Hence they make a plain distinction between the under
standing and heart, and between them and their operations.
Perceptions of truth are the operations of the understanding;
and the affections are the operations of the heart. These things
are clearly taught by the passages to which we have given at
tention. And the will is represented in scripture as another distinct
faculty of the mind. " Which were born, not of blood, nor
of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God."
Regeneration is a great change, wrought in man. This effect
is produced in the heart, but the will of man is not the cause of
it. The will of man produces many effects ; some it cannot
produce. And this change in the heart is one of the latter.
Here the will is mentioned as a cause in man, which produces
effects ; and is clearly distinguished from the heart, in which
regeneration is wrought. Again we read, " For prophecy
cairie not in old time by the will of man ; but holy men spake
as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." Whether men shall
sit or walk, keep silence, or speak, and many other actions,
depend upon the will. But foretelling the events of future ages
does not depend on their will. Here, according to the repre
sentation of the Spirit, the will is a cause of many effects ; and
the will and its operations are no more one and the same, than
a cause and its effect are the same thing. The will by its vo
litions or exertions produces effects. This is its office.
Hence the scriptures teach us Jhat the mind is created with
three distinct faculties, whose operations are very different from
each other. Perceptions of objects are the operations of the
understanding. The affections are the operations of the heart.
And volitions are the operations of the will. These distinc
tions are founded on a real difference, and are taught and sup-

20
ported by the holy scriptures. To view the human mind as
possessed, or, if any prefer it, composed of three distinct fac
ulties,, which are to be considered as- existing antecedent te
their operations, and to which very different operations are
severally ascribed, are truths supported both by reason and
scripture.

**********

ESSAY XI.
Of the Understanding.
Matter is a general name given to all corporeal beings, or to
all kinds of existence which are inert ; which never act,, except
when acted upon. Mind, or spirit, is the general name, by
which all intelligent, active beings are distinguished. What
the essence of matter is, we know not. We are acquainted
with its properties, and their pper ations and effects. This com
prises all our knowledge of matter. And we know not what
the essence of mind, or spirit is. It is endued with certain pro
perties. This we are obliged to believe, or renounce our
claim to. common sense. We are also acquainted with the op
erations of the mind, and the effects they produce ; and this
comprises all our knowledge, at present, of spiritual existence.
The faculties of the mind are its essential properties* By
these the mind acts, arid produces effect?. Its operations are
generically different. ; For this reason they cannot all b,e> con
sidered as operations of the same faculty. Hence, philoso
phers have been led to consider the mind possessed of two fac
ulties or properties, called the understanding and will.
Whether it is endued with any other faculties or not, will be
determined in subsequent essays. At present, I shall confine
myself to the understanding. This faculty is undefinable ; for
two reasons. 1., It is an individual property. 2. It is simple
iu its nature. And of individual, simple existences, no one can
give a logical definition. If a person does not know what is
meant by the terms solidity, extension, perception, pain, and

21
volition, it is not possible to give him a knowledge of them by
any definition whatsoever. An attempt to define such words,
has occasioned darkness and confusion, instead of clearer
knowledge. Where such words are not understood, all that
can be none is to explain them by other words, with the mean
ing of which persons are better acquainted. By the under
standing, then, I mean a preparedness, or an adaptedness, or
a fitness in the mind, if these words are better understood, for
a certain class of operations. Many are apt to conclude,
if they cannot define a word, it has no meaning. Hence they
infer, there is no such faculty as the understanding, because it
cannot be defined. And they might as well conclude there is
no such thing as pain, because it cannot be defined. Hence,
though the understanding cannot be defined, yet this is no ob
jection against its being considered a faculty, nor any evidence
against a belief of its existence.
Perceptions are the operations of this faculty. By apercep-
tion, a thought, an idea, I mean the same thing, the same oper
ation of the mind. A perception must have an object ; and
the same is true with respect to thoughts and ideas. When
we perceive, there is something perceived ; when we think, we
think of something ; and when we have an idea, we have an
idea of something. Whether, when material objects are per
ceived, we see the objects themselves, or only their images, as
some suppose, is a question which it is not the design of these
essays to determine. In whatever way it be determined, the
design which lies before me will not be materially affected.. I
would, however, give notice that, by the objects of perception,
I mean the objects themselves, and not any image or represen
tation of them. I shall take it for granted, that a material
world really exists ; that when I see a tree, it is the tree itself,
and not its image, which I perceive.
Different theories have been adopted and supported concern
ing our perceptions, thoughts,or conceptions. Some of the an
cient philosophers believed; that men do not see the objects
created, but their forms, which they called phantasms, or ima
ges. And' modern philosophers have advanced various other
theories on this subject. Of late there has been much dispute
concerning the sense in which Locke used the term idea.
Whether he meant the real object existing, or some image of
it in the eye. Some have denied the existence of a material
world ; and such various opinions have given rise to skepticism,

22
which has been carried to a great length. It is not my object
to attend to any of these various theories, either to state, ex
plain, defend, or confute them. But as I have observed, it
will be taken for granted through these essays, that a material
world does exist, distinct from the mind ; and that alrobjects,
of which we obtain a knowledge through the medium of our
bodily senses, are real existences. It is objects as they exist,
which we see, whether properties or modes ; and not images,
or representations of them.
It may now be observed,thatin all the operations of the under
standing three things are to be noticed ; an agent,an operation,
and an object. These are the things meant in the construc
tion of all languages, by nouns when in the nominative case ;
by verbs ; and nouns in the accusative or objective case. I
perceive a man. lis the agent, in the nominative case ; per
ceive denotes its action or operation ; arid man is the object in
the objective case. There cannot be a perception without an
agent, and an object. And the mind is so formed by its Crea
tor, it can perceive objects ; it can be pleased, or disgusted
with them ; it can make exertions to produce external, visible
effects. This preparedness in its formation to perceive, is the
Understanding. Can the same simple faculty be the subject of
operations so different, as perceiving, feeling, and willing are ?
This is so unphilosophical, that but few have ever admitted
it. Writers have, therefore, generally adopted the division of
the mind into the faculties of the understanding and will. And
according to this division, all the operations of the understand
ing are perceptions. Hence any operation, which is not a
perception, does not belong to this faculty. But feeling is not
a perception ; and volition is not a perception ; they are not,
therefore, operations of the understanding. Every perception
has an object. But a mere feeling of pleasure or pain has a
cause, but not an object. And a volition is not a perception,
but the cause of some effect. All these operations of the mind
differ from each other, and ought to be distinguished. By
confounding them, our views of the mind are darkened to such
a degree, we know not what to affirm or deny consistently with
truth. One perception does not differ frorri another in any re
spect whatsoever, unless in such particulars as these, that one
is more distinct and clear, and another more confused and ob
scure, But whether clear or confused, they are perceptioris.
The objects of perception may widely differ from each other ;

23
yet this difference is in the objects seen, and not in the percep
tions. And as all those operations of the mind called percep
tions, thoughts, or ideas, are in their simple nature alike, they
form one distinct class. Hence by perceptions, I mean one dis
tinct class of operations, as by animals, is meant a distinct class
of beings. These operations belong to the understanding,
and to no other faculty. Every one will see there is no pro
priety in classing them with volitions, or sensations of pleasure
and pain. Whatever operations, therefore, may be properly
called perceptions,belong to the understanding. They cannot,
without confounding things which widely differ from each oth
er, be classed with any other operations, such as sensations
and volitions ; nor be referred to any other faculty. I trust
it is now made evident, as far as I have proceeded, that percep
tions are the only operations of the understanding : that it is
the office of this faculty to think and perceive : and that we
can no more account for perceptions without a faculty to per
ceive,, than we can account for actions without an agent.

4*********

ESSAY III.
Of the Objects of Perception.
The individual objects of perception are almost innumera
ble. However, most, if not all of them, may be arranged un
der the following heads.
1. Simple existence. When we see an object, we perceive
a thing which is a real being or existence. For if there were
no existences around us, there would be no objects of percep
tion. We must have a conception of existences, before we can
analyse or. combine them. We may and do perceive objects
as real existences, without taking into consideration their pro
perties, relations, -or connexions with other things. And
viewing an object as having nothing more or less belonging to
it, than barely its being, is what I mean by a perception of
existence. Some may say we have a perception of some ob-

24
jects which have no real existence, arid are nothing but crea
tures of the imagination ; as a horse, for instance, with wings.
But we have an idea of a horse and of wings, things f which
really exist, before wte place wings on a horse. So that this
Creature of" the imagination is a combination of things which
have a real existence, in such a manner as they are no where
found to exist. The things, horse and wings, have an ^exist-;
ence, but not united in the manner they are in this particular
instance. All combinations of objects are formed of things
which have a real existence. Those objects of perception,
which are only mere existences, are very numerous.
2. The properties of which all existences are possessed,iare
objects of perception. All primary, 8t what some call second*
ary, and others occult, qualities, whether of matter or spirit,
are objects of perception. These, also, are very numerous.
4. Relations are objects of perception. The relations of
cause and effect, of things with respect to time and :plaee,;and
all other relations, come under this head. A relation is an
object of perception. We see the relation one thing bears to
another. And there is no other way by which we can obtain
a knowledge of relations, but by perception.
Relations, such as cause and effect, time and place, resem
blance, contrast, contiguity, or any other which can be named ;
these relations, as well as the things, are objects of perception.
This is all, which is necessary to my purpose ; for it is not
designed to discuss these several relations ; or show how one
suggests another in a train of thoughts, or to attend to the
laws of association or suggestion. This Would lead into a
wide field, far beyond the limits proposed. All which is re
quisite, to answer the end herein aimed at, is, for the reader to
notice, that however numerous and various the objects of
perception are, yet the perceptions of them are alike. Wheth-*
er we see a being, or its properties, or relations, our percep
tions are as similar in their nature, as numerous drops of wa
ter are similar. Hence perceptions of the relations of objects
form One generic class of operations of the understanding.
4. Truth and falsehood are objects of perception. We per
ceive the agreement or disagreement between the subject and
predicate of a proposition. When it is affirmed that snow is
white, we clearly perceive this quality belongs to snow. This
is a perception of truth. But if it be affirmed, that snow is
black, as we perceive no such quality belonging to snow, we

See the affirmation is a falsehood. — Every affirmation, and ev
ery denial, is true or false. Forwhatev* is affirmed^ of any
subject, is true or false. Whether it be true or fajse, we lejurp
by perception. Hence truth or falsehood are objects of per
ception. 5. The right and wrong of auctions are objects of perception.
The right and wrong of Actions imply spme prescribed rule of
duty. Those actions of moral agents, whether internal or ex
ternal, which agree With the rule of duty, are right ; and thosej,
which dp not agree with it, are Wrong. When actions are com
pared with the rule of duty,, we perceive they agree or disagree
with it ; and this is a perception pf right and wrong. The
rule of duty, the action, and their agreement or contrariety,
are each of them objects of perception.
6. Good and evil, both natural and moral, are objects pfper-
ception; Our ideas pf good and evil are relative. Whatever,
in the natural and nibral world, tends to happipess ultimately,
is good. — 'Now all things, which can be viewed.in relation to
happiness or misery ultimately, tend to on= or the other ; and
may therefore, with propriety, be termed good or eviL When
we say a thing.is good or evil, the meaning is, it tends j;o happi
ness, or misery. Hence a perception of the tendencies of
things, is a perception pf good and evil.
tarn not certain, that all the objects pf perception are in
dued under these general divisipns. But F think pf top others
at present. Some, perhaps, will say, the objects mentioned
under pne head, are included in another J there was, therefore,
no need of so many divisions. This may be true. Yet, per
haps, on more mature consideration, these divisions will riot be
thought too numerous.
Whether our knowledge of all objects is obtained by sensa
tion and reflection, or not, is not my design to determine. Be
cause it is riot necessary to elucidate the subjects principally
aimed at in tfiese essays. — ^Mankind frequently say, they have
a knowledge of such and such objects. ' Now what is intended
by.the knowledge of an, pbjgGt? Any tiling morethan a per
ception of jt ? Feeling or sensation is not knowledge. By
sensation we may acquire a knpwjedge pf many objects. T(et
Sensation is one thing, and knowledge anptjhei?- &wi up one
willpretend that apts of the will constitute any part of our Juwwfc
edge. Acfs of the will may be .pbjepi? of kripwleojge, but npt
knowledge itself. — Of course a perception of objects comprises

26
all our knowledge. Whatever, then, is known, is perceived 4,
and whatever is an, object of knowledge, is an object of percep
tion. We have a knowledge of existence, of the properties of
beings, of their relations, of truth and falsehood, of right and
wrong, of good and evil. And are there any other objects of
knowledge, which are not included under one or the other of
these divisions ? If not, then these contain all the objects of
perception. But if there be other things, which are not in
cluded under either of these general heads, yet if they are
known, they are only objects of perception.
This essay may now be concluded with a brief recapitulation
of a few ideas. Perceptions, we have seen, form one general
class of the operations of the mind. These belong to the unr
derstanding, & to no other faculty. The understanding acts,
or operates. Perceptions are its operations. And the objects
on which they terminate, or which are perceived, have been
briefly arranged under several heads. When I say the under
standing acts, I do not mean, it produces its own exercises.
But I speak in this manner, to conform to the common use of
Words. It is hoped the reader will carefully observe, that it is not
designed in this .work to show how external objects affect the
bodily senses of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and feel
ing ; or in what way by these senses the mind is impressed or
affected ; or in what manner sensations are produced in the
mind, by the operation of objects on the bodily organs. That
sensations are produced, we know is a fact by experience.
But the manner in which objects affect the mind, is an inquiry
foreign from my present design.

**********

ESSAY IV.
Of the Memory,
Some consider memory as a distinct faculty. Whether it is
or not, depends on the nature of its operations. No one will
suppose, that sensations, or affections, or volitions, are acts or
operations of the memory. But the latter are perceptions ; &
on that account may be called operations of the understanding.
They either have only a specific difference from other opera-

27
tions of the understanding, and so belong to that faculty ; or
they have a generic difference, and ought to form a distinct
class of operations. Whether they differ generically, or only
specifically, from the operations of the understanding, is the
inquiry to Which I shall give immediate attention.
A few days since, as I paSsed along, I saw a house of a cer
tain form, dimensions, colour and situation. No one will sup
pose the«ye can see. It is only an organ, or medium, through
which the mind sees external objects. It was, therefore, my
mind, which perceived the house at that time. What other
name, beside seeing, or perceiving, shall we give to this act of
the mind ? Whether we call it seeing, perceiving, conceiving,
or by any other name, yet the act or operation is the same.
Names do not alter things. This operation of the mind, I
have hitherto called a perception. I give it this name, because
I know of no other word, by which it can be more properly
designated. At this moment I remember that I saw the above
house. I recollect its form, dimensions, colour, and situation.
It will be granted, that remembering is an operation of the
mind. What is the difference between this operation of the
mind, and the one I had, when I first saw, and had a direct
view of the house ? The object is the same. The house was
the object, when I saw it ; it is the object now, when I remem
ber it. Then I saw it ; and now, when I remember it, I see
it. Remembering, then, when considered as an act of the
mind, is seeing or perceiving. Here are two operations of the
mind ; one respects a present, the other, a past object. Where
in do they differ ? It is believed it is not in the power of any
man, to show any difference between these two operations, un
less it be this ; one is more clear, the other more indistinct.
Each is a perception of a house. And this is true respecting
all the operations of the memory. There is a difference with
respect to the objects. The object I now perceive before me,
is present. When remembered, it is past. An interval of time
has passed, between the first and the second perception of the
same object. And when an object is recollected, it may be
attended with a full persuasion, that it is the same object I
once saw ; that I am the same person now I was then ; and
that a period of time has intervened. Yet that operation,called
reinembering,is the same in kind with the one I had, when the ob
ject was present to the mind. Both are perceptions of the same
object. But with relation to the object,and the two perceptions

28
of it, there is the difference of pats,t and present. Though an'
interval of time4 a day, a month, a yestf, ha.s passed, between
my first seeing an object and remembering it, yet the. object id ..
the same, and each perception of it is the same in kind. Also
there may be. this difference,, that wheii the object is present^
the perception pf it is more clear and distinct, than when it is
remembered. But a perception is the same operation gp kind*
whether it be clear, and distinct, or obscure and indistinct.
This, however, may be true of perceptions of present objects^
as Well as; those which are past. AgainjI now see a house.
A year hence I travel the sUi&e way and see. it again*,
Would any suppose there is any difference between the first and
second perception, j. have of that hpuse, because an interval of,
ajye&r has intervened ? Safely npt. Yet there is no more
diflerence between my seeing a. hpuse yesterday, and refcOlleetr
ingit to day, than between seeing it a year since when I passed
it, and, again to day, when I pass it again. For in .both cases
a portion of duration has succeeded, between the first and se
cond perception pf the same house. Indeed, the more this
subject may be examined, the more obyipris .it will appear, that:
remembering, Considered as ari operation of the mind, is, a per
ception of > art ibbject. And this; perception differs Ub more
from any; other perceptibn, thari any two perceptions differ
from eatih other.. They are. individual operations of the same
kind, and may be numbered first, second, and third, as thejr
succeed each other. Two of more individual things maybe
similar;, and for this reason be called by ,the same name, as is
th&c'ase wMh ,thg satrie sort Pf rays of light.
Though all the operations of the mind are perceptions of
objects, arid being alike Ought to he clasjsed together ; yet on
account of a difftrehte' attending the PfojectS, they are subdi
vided into several distinct 'species of operations. And to each
division, a name is given,, by which it may be ever after de
signated apd knoWn.— Present and past constitutes a difference
between objects noVv seen, and those remembered. This is one
difference. An objects which is now seen,, is present to the
ijbincl. , I look, npt back, nor forward^ but directly at it.
When I recollect, I look back ; the object is riot present before
fee. An object renlembfered is attended with a belief of per sefl-
alr identity ; a present object is hot. On account of these
differences, between the objects Remembered and those which
are hot,- all these pe!reeptioh& of Jsast objefets afe formed into, a

29
distinct class, and t6 this class or division the name memory is
given. Hence it is as unphilosophical to say remembering is not
perceiving objects, as to assert that ahorse is not an animal.
Arid we may as consistently say, that horse is not the name
of one class of aniriials, as say that metaiory is not the name of
one class of the operati oris of the understanding. And hence
it is not philosophical to consider memory a distinct faculty.
For there is no ground to believe there are afiy more faculties
befonging to the mind, than there arfe classes of operations of
difierent Mndsi It is agreed, that loving, hating, choosing,
refusing, arfe Pperatiohs of different kinds — so different, that
the faculty, which perceives, cannot love artd hate. This is the
reason, which has induced philosophers to admit the existence
of two, if no more, distinct faculties, which they call under
standing & will. But is it not as easy for the Same faculty to
perceive p ast, as present objects ? If it is, what necessity is
there uf supposing two faculties, Understanding and memoryj
to account for a perception of present and past objects ? Even
such a ¦supposition will not account for it. It is a fact , that
we perceive the objects which are before us, and those which
are past. But how we perceive either, no person can tell.
We may, therij conclude, there is no sufficient reason, nor any
necessity,for considering memory to be a distinct faculty. Wp
ought to view memory only as a name given to one class of
the operations of the understanding. If any, however, choose
to consider the memory as a power of the understanding, I have
no objection to it. For by it nothing more can be meant, as
far as I can conceive, than the ability of the understanding to
perceive, or recal past objects. That it has a power, or abil
ity, or can recall or remember them, is granted. For it is a
fact, it does recollect them ; and what it in fact does, it can or
has power to do.
It may be inquired, if remembering is perceiving, what is the
object ? I answer, the object recollected is the same object
perceived, when first presented to the mind. If it be asked,
where is the object, when remembered? Answer, where it
was, Wheii we first obtained a knowledge of it. If any ask,
how We remember Pr refcallpast objects? Answer, I. know
not. I know it is a fiict, but cannot describe the. manner of it.
I cannot tell how we perceive present objects. These are in
quiries beyond my teach.

30
Having made it evident, that the operations of memory are
only perceptions^ and the difference between them and other
perceptions are such circumstances as present 8e past, and not
the perceptions themselves except the relation of time ; hav
ing shown the dissimilarity of the circumstances attending the
objects, as the reason why they form a distinct class to which
the name memory is given ; &thatthis class of operations are
operations of the understanding, and of course there is no rea
son or necessity for considering and calling the memory a dis
tinct faculty, the principal objects of this essay are answered.
Many other things which might be observed respecting the
memory, as they do not come within the design of these essays,
receive here no particular attention.
It is granted, that several relations between objects afford
great aid to the memory. One object suggests another ; and a
present object, by a relation of resemblance, or place, or some-
other relation, suggests a past object, or revives in the mind a
perception of an object, which had been previously received.
Hence it is granted, that the various relations of objects are of
great use in recollecting, or reviving past objects, or objects
which had been previously seen. But when we consider the
perception of a present, and, the perception of the same object
at another time, those perceptions or operations of the mind are
similar ; and for this reason are operations of the same faculty.

**********
ESSAY V.
Of Judgment and Reason.
Judgment and reason are distinguished by some writers,
and considered as different operations of the mind. It is ap
prehended that the difference, if any, is very small. Judgment
is agreed to be an act of the mind. It is that act by which one
thing is affirmed or denied of another ; or it is an assent to the
truth of a proposition. And this assent to the truth or false
hood of a proposition is an act of the mind.

31
But what act or operation- of the mind is it ? Is it a sensa
tion, or a volition ? This is never pretended. It must then
be a perception. For we experience no other operations than
perceptions, sensations, and volitions. All our operations
may be included in one or the other of these general classes.
That the act of the mind, which is called judgment, is only
a perception, will be evident from a further attention to the sub
ject. Man is a rational being. This is a proposition. For
it has a subject, copula, and predicate. Man, which is^the sub
ject, is an object of perception. And rationality, which is the
predicate, is an object of perception. I perceive that the affir
mation is true ; which is only perceiving the agreement between
the subject 81 predicate of this proposition. If we were to at
tend to a hundred propositions, we should find an assent to their
truth or falsehood is only a perception of the agreement or dis
agreement between their subjects and predicates. Hence,
judgment is nothing more or less, than the perception of the
truth or falsehood of a proposition.
In the next place, what is reason ? It is a power of the un
derstanding to infer one proposition from another. This pro
cess of inferring one thing from another is called reasonings
There is no necessity of adducing proof of this, because it is
granted. The only question is, what acts of the mind are em
ployed in reasoning ? I think. From this I infer another
proposition, which is, I exist. For I clearly see non-entity
cannot think or operate. But as I do in fact think, it is cer
tain, the being intended by the pronoun Jin the proposition has
existence. The operations of the mind are limited. From
this I infer, that mankind do not know or comprehend all
things. For if men knew all things, as God does, their minds
would not be limited. This inferring one proposition from
another, is reasoning. In this process of the mind none of
its operations are employed, but perceptions. As perceiving
the agreement or disagreement of the predicate of a proposition
with its subject, is termed judgment ; so perceiving the agree
ment or disagreement of one proposition with another is rea
soning. When I percpive the truth of this proposition, Ithink,
or the mind of man is limited, I clearly perceive other propo
sitions must be true ; that I do exist, and that mankind do not
know all things. Of course, reasoning is perceiving the agree
ment or disagreement of one proposition with another.
With a self evident proposition another is. connected. All

propositions, which are true, are connected as links in a chain.
And when we attend to a self evident proposition, we perceive
the connexion between it and another, and between this last and
another 5 and so on in a regular progression. The mind acts
by perceiving the connexion between one proposition and
another, is all that can be meant by inferring or deducing one
truth from another. And it must be evident to any attentive
mind, that in this process, which is called reasoning, there is
only a perception of the agreement, relation, or connexion of
one truth with another. Perceiving these agreements, relations,
or connexions, is reasoning. By perceiving these agreements,
the mind is advancing in knowledge, and there is room for it to
pfbeeed in discovering truth iti an endless progression. For
the field of science is unlimited. And frorii this view of the
subject it is obvious, if there were no self eviderit propositions,
there would be an end to all reasoning. The mind would have
no where to begirt- If it could not directly, and intuitively per
ceive the truth of one proposition, it could never perceive any
t6 be true, and must forever remain in a state of doubt and un
certainty. AH conclusive reasoning is founded on self evident
propositions, of the truth of which We are convinced by intui
tion or direct perception.
The way is now prepared for us to attend to those things,
which constitute an agreement and a difference between judgr
ment and reason. For in some respects they agree, and in
ethers they differ. They agree with respect to their object.
Truth and falsehood are their objects. When one thing is af
firmed of another, the affirmation is true or false. Perceiving
the truth or falsehood bf the affirmation, is that act of the mind
called judgment. For, judging a proposition to be true, is
perceiving the agreement of the predicate with the subject, or
the truth of the proposition. And judging a proposition to be
false, is nothing but a perception of its falsehood.
Judgment respects particular propositions, and the agreement,
of a predicate with its subject, or its disagreement. But in
reasoning, two propositions are taken into view. By compar
ing them we perceive, that if this proposition be true, I think,
the other must be true, that I exist. Perceiving the agreement
between one and another proposition, is reasoning. This is in
ferring one truth from another. In this process there are twd
acts ofthe judgment. We perceive the truth of the first and
•f the second proposition. Hence in reasoning, two, three, ot

33
Bflore judgments are united. The difference between judg
ment and reason is this. Judgment is an individual act of tbg
mind ; it respects the truth of one proposition only. But in rea
soning, several acts of the mind are connected. One judg
ment or perception of the truth of a proposition, is a necessary
help to discern the truth of another. In reasoning, there is a suc
cession of perceptions. The mind, from viewing one,passes to
the contemplation of another proposition ; and in its progress
perceives the truth of the several propositions, and their con
nexion and agreement with each other. Yet in judging and
reasoning, no acts of the mind are employed, but those per
ceptions, or those operations which belong to the understand
ing. It is true, other operations are connected with our percep
tions. For instance, the will confines the attention to a sub
ject ; jand when truth is perceived, and new discoveries made,
the heart is pleased, and emotions are excited. Yet every
person must know, that those Volitions arid the pleasure we
experience, are not perceptions of truth or fa) sehood. A pleas
ant or painful sensation is not a perception ; and volitions are
not perceptions. This is evident to every person, who has
given attention to the operations of his own mind. Thotfgh
affections and volitions may accompany perceptions, yet it' is
by the latter we obtain a knowledge of truth and falsehood.'
Whether or not all truths are contingent or necessary," ac
cording to the division made by some, is not my object to de
termine. It is the great object of these essays to describe the
difference between the operations of the human mind, and class
them according to their differences, and present them in a
systematic order to the reader's view. In order to this, it is
not necessary to attend to the objects of perceptiori,ahy further
than to dhow the ground and reason of the several classes into
which the operations of the mind ought to be divided. And
though there may be a difference between contingent and ne
cessary truths, yeteach of them is an object of perception. In
a proposition, where there is no necessary connexion between
its subject and predicate, still the latter may agree with the
former ; and when this is perceived, we judge the affirmation
to be true. And when I affirm that two and two are equal t@
four, though this is necessarily true, yet it is the understand
ing which perceives it. Hence contingent as well as necessa
ry truths, are objects of perception only.

u
Now objects of perception differ in certain respects ftapi
each other. This difference is the reason of forming them u>
to distinct, specific classes. Accordingly, those operations of
the understanding which havefpr, their object the truth or false-r
hood of particular propositions, ought to be classed together ;
and this class ought to have a name, which is, commonly
known by the term judgment. And those operations, of the
understanding, which are employed in deducing one truth
from another, form another class, which is called reason. So
the terms judgment and reason ought to be used, as the names
by which those, perceptions are designated, which have the
truth and falsehood of propositions for their object.
Hence judgment and reason are not faculties of the mind.
They ought not to be considered as faculties,, unless, their oper
ations generically differ frpm perceptions. But we have^seen
there is no such difference. Forjudging isonly perceiving the-
truth of a proposition ; and reasoning is only inferring one
proposition frpm another. In this process, when the truth of
one proposition is perceived, the truth pf another immediately
connected witii it, is perceived. Each act of the mind in judg-»
ing and reasoning is a perception. And between one percep
tion and another, there is no difference. As life, or motion, is
the same, though it be predicated of a thousand individuals
called animals ; so perceptions, however numerous, belong to
the understanding- For this is the only faculty which perceives.
Yet, a? the objects of perception differ in particularrespects,
they are divided;, into several classes, to designate, and remind
us of this difference. When the word remembering is used, I
knpw the objects recollected have been seen, but now are past*
And the words, judgment and reason, remind me, that thetruth,
and falsehood of propositions are contemplated. Hence th^
reason, why different names, are given tp the, same operations
of the understanding, is, not because they differ ; in- their, kind
or. nature ; but because the objects of those operations differ
from each other.
Having said sufficient to make this subject plain, we may
now proceed to another class of operations,, which belong t«
the understanding.

ESSAY VI.
On Conscience.
Various are the opinions respecting conscience. Some met-
lafmysicians term it a moral faculty, a moral sense ; while oth
ers consider it synonymous with the dictates of reason, or the
judgment we forfri of our moral conduct. Amidst such a cori-
flict of bpinions, it becomes us to examine this subject with
candor and impartiality.
And I.. It is not the immediate and direct office of conscience
to teach us truth, or falsehood. Truth and falsehood are not
the objects of conscience, any farther than is necessary to as
certain their riidral qualities. Conscience is not employed in
determining what propositions are true, or false ; this belongs
to the province of reason.
But 2. Conscience judges of the moral qualities of actions.
Our actions are either right or wrorig, good or bad. And it
is the office of conscience to distinguish these qualities. But
to determine the qualities of our actions, we are to compare
them with some general rule or principle. Self evident propo
sitions of the moral kind, are general principles, by which we
determine mbral qualities. Some actions ought, and others
ought not, to be performed. When we do what ought to be
done, our conduct is right ; but when we do what ought not
to be done, our conduct is evil. It is a self evident proposi
tion, that I ought to do by another, as he ought to do by me, in
similar circumstances. Frorii this I infer, that if my neighbor
ought to love me, I pUght to love him. Although, from self
evident principles, we may draw many just conclusions, yet in
many tilings we are liable to err. Through the strength of
corrupt inclinations, the influence of prejudice, and the want of
light, We may judge amiss, respecting what we ought, or ought
not to perform. We, therefore, need some infallible rule for
our guide. The moral law supplies an infallible rule, .This
is prescribed by our Maker, who cannot err. The moral law
makes nothing right or wrorig ; but is founded on eternal prin
ciples ©fright. Our hearts and actions are either right or
wrong, antecedent to the consideratipn of the written law of
God. God knows, without the possibility of error, how we
ought to feel in all cases, and how we ought to live in all the
relations we sustain. And whatever we ought to do, that God
requires of us ; and whatever we ought not to do, that God
prohibits. The moral law, considered as a rule of conduct,
contains nothing but requirements and prohibitions. As these

36
are given us by our Maker, who cannot err, the moral law I*
an infallible rule, or guide, conformably to which we ought al
ways to feel and live. This is our teacher. This is the rule,
with which we ought to compare our hearts and our lives. If
our hearts and our actions agree with this rule, they are right ;
but if they disagree, they are wrong. If any thing is wanting
in the heart, which ought to be there, as love to God, there is
a defect, which is a transgression of the law. And if any thing
be found in the heart, which ought not to exist there, as hatred
to Gpd, there is an excess, which the law prohibits. Then the
moral law is an infallible rule, by which we are to judge of our
conduct. 3. Conscience compares our hearts and actions with this
rule, and judges of them according to their agreement or disa
greement with it. This comparing implies two things ; first
a perception of the rule ; 2, A perception of the things to be
compared with it. Or in other words, it implies a knowl
edge of each. We must have a knowledge of those things sev-r
prally, which we compare together. A knpwledge of the law
as a rule of duty, is neither more nor less than a clear and dis
tinct perception of its requirements and prohibitions. The
law then, as a rule of duty, is an object of perception. The
heart and its actions are to be compared with this rule. And
a knowledge of these, is a perception of them. So far as we
have a distinct perception of the heart and its exerpises, or af
fections, we have a knowledge of them,-
Now, when we clearly see what; the law requires and forbids,
and distinctly perceive the objects to be compared with the law,
then we can compare the latter with the former. When the
comparison is made,we cannotavoid perceiving an agreement or
disagreement. For our hearts and their operations do agree or
disagree with the rule of duty . And this agreement or disagree-
mefft*can be known by perception only. And it is the office
of conscience to judge, whether our hearts and actions are
right or wrong, good or evil. In this case conscience judges.
But what is intended by the judgment of conscience ? This
judgment is certainly an act of the mind, and it is that act by
which we affirm or deny. By which we say, our characters
and conduct do, or do not, agree with the rule of duty, and
thus pronounce them right or wrong. But this act of con
science, which is styled its judgment, is nothing but a distinct
perception of the agreement, or disagreement pf our hearts,

37
and lives with the rule of duty. Supreme love to God is a
right, a holy affection ; and supreme love to the world is idol
atry, a sinful affection, This is the judgment of conscience.
But this judgment of conscience is no more, than a clear per
ception, that supreme love to God is a holy affection, and su
preme love to the world is a sinful affection. If any person
will attend carefully to this judging of right and wrong, he will
find he can make nothing more of it, than perceiving right and
wrong. The terms right and wrong, good and evil, holy and
sinful, are adjectives, which denote the qualities of our hearts
and actions. Two or three propositions may convince us, that
conscience is nothing, but the judgment we pass upon our
conduct ; and this judgment is nothing, but a perception of the
agreement, or disagreement of a predicate with its subject.
Solomon was wise. I perceive the affirmation agrees with
the subject. This is judging the proposition to be true. Sol-
mon was benevolent. God is good. Nothing- is affirmed of
these subjects, but what I perceive to be true. This percep
tion is judging the proposition to be a truth. But when we
perceive, or judge, that Solomon was benevolent, and that God '
is good, we only see or judge, that their characters are right
or holy. The qualities affirmed of them are right and holy,
consequently they are worthy of approbation. Satan hates
God. Here I perceive what is affirmed of Satan to be true.
This is judging him to be a sinful being. Then perceiving the
wickedness of any being, axid judging him to be wicked, is one
and the same thing. And perceiving the righteousness of any
being, is the same thing with judging him to be a good, a holy
being. There has ever been a distinction maintained between
natural and moral attributes. God is powerful. In this pro
position, power, a natural attribute, is ascribed to Deity. God
is benevolent. Here a moral attribute is ascribed to him.
Then we may distinguish propositions into two kinds, natural
and moral. In propositions, where nothing but a natural at
tribute is ascribed to the subject, all we have to do is to judge,
whether the affirmative be true, or false. But this determines
nothing respecting the moral character of the subject. When
I say, God is powerful, and perceive what is affirmed to be
true, yet this does not determine his moral character. A pow
erful being may be either . sinful or holy. But when I say
God is benevolent, a perception of the truth of this proposition,
determines his moral character. Natural propositions are true

38
Pr false ; but determine nothing respecting the moral charac
ter of the subject. Moral propositions are true or false.
They also determine the moral character, whether it be right
or wrong, holy or sinful. In each of these two kinds of prop
ositions, it is the business of the mind to judge, whether they
are true or false. Judging, we hav€ already seen, is nothing
but a perception of the agreement or disagreement of the pre
dicate with its subject. Then those acts, which are called our
judgments, and those acts, which are termed conscience, are
the same kind of acts. For they are nothing more, nor less,
than perceptions of the truth or falsehood of propositions.
Wherein then, does conscience differ from judgment, or rea
son ? When we consider the operations of conscience, judg
ment, and reason, as acts of the mind, they do not differ. But
the objects perceived differ. Truth and falsehood are the ob
jects of reason. Right and wrong are the objects of con*
Science. They also differ with respect to the sensations they
produce in the heart. A perception of truth affords pleasure.
A perception of right conduct gives greater pleasure. From
the consideration, that a perception of right and wrong is at
tended with a more strong and lively sensation of heart, than a
perception of truth and falsehood, many, probably, have been
led to believe that conscience is a sense ; and that its operations,
considered as acts of the mind, are different in their kind from
the operations of reason. It is generally agreed, that the of
fice of conscience is to teach us what is right, and what is
wrong; what we ought to do, and what we ought not to do.
By what acts of the mind, beside those called perceptions, can
we determine what is right, or what is wrong in our characters
and conduct ? Can we determine by our feelings or affec
tions ? A pleasant or painful sensation is a feeling. If a per
son's conduct pleases me, is it certainly right ? If we make
our feelings the standard by which to judge of the characters
and conduct of moral agents, we shall find the same character
and conduct, at the same time, both right and wrong. For it
is not unfrequent, the same character and conduct please one
person, and disgust another. The divine character affords
pleasure to saints, but pain to sinners. If feelings be the cri
teria, saints will say, the character of God is holy and good.
But sinners will say, it is evil, and hateful. Both cannot be
true. Our feelings, then, are no correct standard by which
we can determine what is right, and what is wrong. Can we

39
ascertain what i&jright, and what is wrong, by our affections ?
Love and hatred are affections.
Is it certain, because I love a character, that that character is
worthy, hply and good; ? Or because I hate a character, dpes
that determine the character to be evil, sinful, and hateful ?
Good characters are often hated, and evil characters are often
Ipvjed. We, therefore, can determine nothing concerning the
goodness, or wickedness of characters or conduct, by our af
fections. And no one will pretend, that by willing or choos
ing, we pan ascertain what is right, or what is wrong. Surely
our refusing any thing does not determine that thing to be
evil ; nor does our choosing a thing determine it to be good.
Forbad characters are often preferred to good. Sinners pre
fer; wicked characters to that of Christ. Perceptions, feelings,
affections and volitions, are operations of the mind, of which
we are conscious. We know we have them. And those in
clude all the operations of which we have any consciousness.
But neither feelings, affections, nor volitions constitute what
wfeterm conscience. We do not, by these, judge one thing to
he right, and another wrong, as we have already seen. It
then follows, that perceptions constitute conscience. Indeed,
ajsiev^iof right andiwrong, good andevil,is antecedent to any
feeling, affection, or volition, excited by a conviction of right or
wifong. Good qualities can neither please, or disgust ; be
loved or hated ; chosen or rejected, until they are perceived,
er we have a knowledge of them. When we learn by the dic
tates of conscience, that the character and conduct of a moral
agerit are very evil, then we may feel a disgust and hate them*
And when we are informed by conscience that a character is
holy and good, then we may be pleased, and love it. Then
every person must see, that conscience performs its office, and
informs «s what is right, and what is wrong in characters, he-
foveji&ey give us any pleasure, or pain, or excite any love, or
hatred, or preference. Then perceptions must constitute con
science. Because its operations are antecedent, in the order
of nature, if not of time, to all our feelings, affections and voli
tions ; and must be distinct from them.
Here, it is well to observe* that conscience, respects our con
duct, and not the conduct or; characters of others. When we
say we cannot in conscience do certain things, we do not mean,
that others cannot m conscience' do- them. For the dictate of
their conscience m$y greatly differ from ours, respecting the

40
same thing. , When we see wickedness in others and condemn
them, it is not common to say our conscience condemns them ;
but our reason. Though in approving or condemning otherS,
the same operations of the mind are implied, as in approving
or condemning ourselves ; yet with relation to the former we
say, our reason condemns them ; but with respect to the latter
it is common to say, our conscience condemns us. This shows
that conscience and reason contain the same operations of the
mind. But to these operations we do not give the name of
conscience, only when our conduct is approved or condemned.
Hence the operations of the mind,or of the understanding, when
our conduct is to be judged, approved or condemned, are call
ed our conscience ; but when the conduct of others is approv
ed, or disapproved they are stiled reason. Hence conscience
in judging of moral conduct is restricted to our actions, and
does not extend to the actions of others.
But it may be said, that conscience is a moral sense. If it
be a sense, what are its operations ? Do we by this sense per
ceive the qualities, which are denominated right and wrong,
good and evil ? Then its operations are perfectly similar to
those of the understanding. Why then is it not precisely the
same, to say and believe that the understanding perceives mor
al qualities, as to say, a moral sense perceives them ? If the
operations of the understanding, and bfthis moral sense, are the
same ; are nothing but perceptions of moral qualities ; then
the understanding and this moral sense do not differ, but are
perfectly similar. If by a moral sense, some persons would
imply a faculty different in its nature from the understanding,
they use the term without any meaning. If the operations of
this moral sense are perceptions, then the moral sense and the
understanding are the same faculty. The question then returns,
what are the operations of this moral sense ? Are they feel
ings of pleasure and pain ? Are they affections or volitions ?
We have already seen, that by operations of this kind, we can
never ascertain the nature of moral qualities. If these are the
operations of a moral sense, this sense is wholly inadequate to
the purposes, for which its inventors designed it. But as all
the operations of the mind, of which we have any -knowledge,
are included either in the class of perceptions, or in the class of
feelings and affections, or in the class, of volitions ; and as the
two latter classes do not contain the operations of this moral
sense ; it follows, that perceptions must be the operations of

41
this moral sense. Then this moral sense and the understand
ing are the same faculty ; or the word has no meaning in our
language. The word sense denotes feeling. To have a sense of right
and wrong, and a feeling of them, are the same, considered as
operations of the mind. A feeling is either a pleasant or pain
ful sensation. Surely where there is no pleasure orpain, there
is no feeling. So that feeling is a pleasant or painful, sensa
tion. If a moral sense is a feeling, it is either a pleasant or
painful sensation. And if such feelings judge what is right
and wrong, then we shall pronounce our conduct to be right,
if it is agreeable ; and wrong, if disagreeable to us. In this way
we shall often reverse the decisions of the divine law. This
is one reason why men so often err in judging their moral con
duct ; they are influenced by their feelings to approve what is
agreeable to them, and to disapprove what is unpleasant. If,
then, by a moral sense is meant a feeling, it is the most unsafe,
erroneous standard of moral conduct, which can be invented.
For this plain reason, that nothing is more commonly wrong
in man, than his feelings.
If a moral sense is not a feeling, which very few will pretend
on a close examination, what do the advocates for it mean by
the terms ? Do they mean by it an intuitive perception of
right and wrong in moral conduct ? So that without com
paring our conduct with any rule, we perceive intuitively the
moral quality of every action, as we suppose is the case with
God in judging of moral conduct ? We suppose he sees intui
tively what is right and wrong. Now suppose he has given to
men the same faculty, which some call conscience ; some call
it a moral sense, and many say it is his vicegerent in men, teach
ing them intuitively the moral qualities of their acts. Concern-
ingthis, I remark, 1. If it be true, mankind would never err, or
differ in their judgment of moral conduct. But this is not the
fact. The same person has judged differently, concerning the
same conduct in himself at different times. Numerous facts
might be mentioned to verify this. How often has the same
person one day judged certain amusements to be innocent,
right and lawful; and the next day utterly condemned them.
And mankind often, in fact, differ in their judgment of the same
conduct, one pronouncing it right, and the other wrong.
These are facts. And they prove that men often err, iri their
judgment of moral conduct in themselves and others. This is

42
sufficient topiove, that mankind have no faculty by which they
can, in all cases, judge intuitively what is right and wrong.
There is no such vicegerent implanted in them. 2. Judging1
intuitively always respects self evident propositions ; and no
other. I am not against granting, that some moral actions are
self-evidently sinful,and others holy. All who admit there is a
God, who ought to be the supreme ruler of the universe, must see
rebellion against him is wrOtlg,& obedience right,as soon as they
hear the terms pronounced. No process of reasoning is neces
sary, to produce 'CPnViction of such moral truths. And with
respect to a great part of bur moral conduct, the moral pro
perties of our actions are so nearly self evident,that a very short
process of "reasoning is sufficient to convince. With respect
to some parts of moral conduct a regular process of reasoning
is necessary. Seeing that, in some cases, a very brief process
is sufficient, itt&ny persons have embraced the notion of a moral
sense, or power of judging in all cases instantly and intuitively.
3. Whether we judge intuitively or not concerning moral con*
duct, we Ought to inquire what operations of the mind are con
cerned or employed in judging. If any proposition, whether
natural or moral, is self evident, we know it by perception.
We immediately perceive the truth or falsehood of the natural,
or the, right or wrong of the moral proposition. In this case
we do not judge by our feelings, bat by perzehfiing the fact.
If any riieral propositions are not self evident, but a shorter or
longer process of reasoning is necessary to come to a final
judgment ; through the whole process vfreasomaigperaiptions
only are concerned. We perceive the mticmto be jadged ; the
intermediate propositions by which we at last (perceive its
agreement or disagreement with *he rule of (duly. The oper
ations of the mind employed ia the Train or series are percep
tions ; perceptions of the rule^of duty, of the actions to be
judged, and their agreement or disagreement with ithe rule.
Hence, when this moral sense is examined, we see, in this last
sense of the terms, they contain «o otha- operations ofthe mind,
but the perceptions of the understanding.
We have noW considered -this moral sense as & feeling ; also
as a faculty by which it is Said we perceive intuitively what is
wrong or right. We have seen ia the first sense of the terans,
;it cannot be true ; and in the last sense, they amply no opera
tions but perceptions. And I cannot invent any third sense,
in which -the terms, mwal setee,can be used. And as the tef iras,

43
In the sense in which they are perhaps generally used, contain
no operations of the mind but perceptions ; it follows that a
moral sense has the same meaning with the term conscience.
It is another name denoting the same operations with con
science, or signifying the same thing. Hence a moral sense,
if it mean anything, is synonimous with conscience as I use it.
We will now return and give some further attention to the
operations of conscience. When a person has a clear pcrcep.
tion of the excellency of Gad's character, he distinctly sees
why he ought to love him supremely. He clearly perceives
that supreme affection is due from him to his Maker. A per
ception of what is due from him to God, is the same thing with
a dictate of conscience. Conscience dictates such love, which
is perceiving such love is due to God. He, also, at the same
time, clearly perceives, that hating God is a sinful affection.
Perceiving this, and remonstrating against it, is the same thing.
When a person hates God, perceiving this hatred is condemn
ing, censuring, and blaming himself. And perceiving that he
loves God, is justifying, approving and assenting to his wor
thiness of love. Then condemning, censuring, remonstrating,
considered as acts of the mind, are only perceptions of wrong
affections and conduct in a moral agent.
Again, the law saith, thou shalt not commit adultery ; and
Christ saith, if a man lust after a woman in his heart, he hath
in his heart committed adultery with her already. Now when
I compare the lust or desire with the law, I clearly perceive
lust is prohibited, and that our Lord's assertion is true. If a
person commits adultery, and perceives his sin, he condemns,
censures and blames himself. Thus conscience operates.
But blaming, condemning, censuring, and the like, are acts of
the mind. And when considered as acts of the mind they are
only perceptions of a wrong heart and conduct in the moral
agent, who has committed the sin.
It must now appear abundantly evident, that the operations
of conscience are perceptions, and do not differ in their nature
from other perceptions, which are operations of the understand
ing. But the objects perceived, are different. Right and
wrong, good and evil,, or moral qualities, are the objects of
those perceptions called conscience. Now these perceptions,
which have moral qualities for their object, are classed togeth
er. And this class of operations of the understanding are
called conscience-

44
As terms are used to express the views of the mind in rela
tion to moral actions, of a different meaning from those in
cqpimon use with respect to truth or falsehood, it may reflect
further light on the subject to notice them. Because different
terms are used, many judge they express different operations
of the mind, and in this way deceive themselves.
With respect to conscience, we say it approves and disap
proves, accuses and condemns. Reason we say perceives, judg
es, determines, and pronounces one proposition to be true and
another false. As such different terms are used, we conceive
they express very different operations of the mind. Let us
now examine the meaning of the terms.
When reason judges and pronounces one proposition true
and another false, it is generally agreed, that this means no
more, than perceiving the agreernent or disagreement of one
proposition with another, or of the predicate with its subject.
And this perception is an operation of the understanding. -In
judging what is true or false,we compare the subject predicate
of propositions, and one proposition with another. And per
ceiving their agreement or disagreement is judging them to be
true or false.
But moral actions are compared with the law, the rule of
right and wrorig. Perceiving the agreement of our actions
with the rule, is approving them \ they are judged to be good,
or right. Perceiving the disagreement of our actions with the
rule,is disapproving, and condemning them, or judging them to
be wrong. It is believed a person cannot affix any other mean
ing to the terms approving, acquitting, or disapproving, accus
ing and condemning. These terms then, mean no more than
^perception of the agreement or disagreement of our actions
with the rule of duty. I know there are other operations con
nected with this perception, to which attention will be soon
given. We also read of apure conscience. The conscience is pure,
when it does not accuse arid condemn, but acquit and justify
us. A pure conscience then, implies no more than a clear
perception that our conduct is right. And a defiled conscience
Is a clear perception of actions as wrong. — A conscience void
of offence is the same ; it does not condemn ; it perceives
nothing wrong. A good and evil conscience is nothing more
than, a perception of good or evil in our conduct. And other
expressions of a similar meaning in relation to conscience

45
ought to have the same meaning affixed to them. Of this
every one may be convinced by. giving proper attention to two
things. — 1. That all the operations of the mind, which we ever
1 experience, are included in three general classes — as percep
tions of objects, feelings or affections, and volitions. Every
operation belongs to one or the other of these classes. As
there are three distinct clases of operatioris, it is evident the
mind is composed of three distinct properties, or faculties.
The understanding perceives, or sees ; the heart or taste feels,
or has affections ; the will chooses, or has volitions. — And cer
tainly there is no occasion for more faculties, than there are
distinct classes of operations,operations different in their nature.
Hence, 2. Conscience is not a faculty. If we consider it a
faculty, we must predicate of it operations different from oth
ers in their nature. But we must say it perceives. For we
cannot have a knowledge of right and wrong, but by compar
ing our conduct with the known rule of duty. This compar
ing certainly implies a perception of the rule, and a. perception
pf actions ; and when actions are compared with the rule, then
there is a perception of their agreement or disagreement with it.
Thus far the, operations of conscience are the same with those
of the understanding. Then if we say, that conscience also
feels ; has affections, which are sinful or holy ; we attribute
to it operations different in their nature from perceptions. In
this way we make the same faculty capable of operations dis
tinct, and different in their nature. But we know a faculty is
a simple property, so cannot be defined. Now can a simple
property have operations so different in their nature as percep
tions, and feelings or affections ? Can the same simple pro
perty see and feel ? To suppose this is irrational, and unphi-
losophical. For if its simple nature is to perceive, it cannot
feel ; and if its simple nature is to feel, it cannot perceive.
For a simple property cannot be the foundation of operations
different in their nature.
Now we see, that conscience does perceive ; it therefore does
not feel. As it perceives, if we call it a. faculty, it is the same
with the understanding. But of what use is it to have two
perceiving faculties ? So if we say, it is the nature of con
science to feel, to love and hate ; then it cannot perceive.
And if its nature is to feel, it is, if a faculty, the same with the
heart or taste. And of what use is it to attribute to the mind
two feeling faculties ? These observations, I hope, are suffi-

46
tient to satisfy every one, that there is no propriety in viewing
conscience as a distinct faculty. As it is not a distinct faculty ;
then the terms approve,disapprove,pure,defiled,& those of a sim
ilar import, mean no more than a clear perception of the agree
ment or disagreement of our actions with the rule of duty. When
we perceive that our actions agree with the rule, we say con
science is pure, uttdefiled, without offerice ; it approves, in
stead of accusing and condemning us as polluted, guilty crea
tures. This approving is also peace of conscience. When
conscience accuses and condemns, there is no peace.
Having shown what conscience is, we shall now attend,
4. To the feelings it excites in the heart. This is necessary, in
Order to show, that the operations of conscience and the feel
ings they excite are operations of a different kind, and ought
never to be blended. We may now give attention to a class of
feelings, which always attend on the operations of conscience.
— These are feelings, which are either pleasant, or painful.
When a person has committed theft, and reflects on his con
duct, he clearly perceive* he has transgressed the laws of God,
and of men. He then sees he is exposed to disgrace, shame,
and punishment ; that he may in this world be detected, and
punished ; and will certainly have his guilt exposed to the
view of an assembled universe at the judgment day, and re
ceive the punishment his crime deserves. His conscience
condemns him as a transgressor ; the crime, the disgrace, the
danger of punishment, all combine to wound him deeply, and
excite strong wishes that he had never done the deed.
Such pains and desires are the operations of the heart or taste.
And these feelings are expressed by different terms ; such as
remorse, regret, compunction, and stings of conscience. If he
is so hardened, that his conduct does not give him much pain,
his conscience is said to be deceived, blinded, stupified, seared,
or dead. Such expressions are figurative ; they ascribe to
conscience the feelings of the heart ; or the feelings conscience
produces in the heart are predicated of conscience itself. As
when we say, reason loves the truth, and hates deception and
error ; we dp not mean, that love and hatred are operations of
reason ; but they are connected with it, and produced by it in
the heart. When reason discovers truth, the heart loves it ;
and hates error, when detected by reason. The feelings con
nected with reason, though they belong to the taste, are figura
tively ascribed to reason. — So the painful feelings excited in

47
the heart on account of sin, are ever connected with a perception
of wrong conductin ourselves. And because they are connected
with the operations of conscience, they are figuratively attri
buted to conscience.
Hence, when a person's conduct agrees with the law of God
and he perceives it, pleasant feelings are excited in the heart.
Thus he has peace of conscience ; it not only approves of his
conduct, but his conscience is said to rejoice, to have joy in the
holy Ghost.
Hence, to understand the operations of the mind distinctly,
we must attend to them carefully, and refer each operation to
its proper faculty. And though operations follow each other,
and are connected in a train ; yet we ought not to view all those
thus connected as operations of the same faculty. But we
ought to distinguish them according to their natures, and re
fer them to the classes and faculties to which they belong ; and
not suffer ourselves to be imposed upon by figures of speech.
When we say reason delights in demonstrating truth, and loves
the truth, and hates deception ; here we ought to distinguish
tetween the operations of reason, and the feelings connected
with it. Reason itself is nothing but a train of perceptions,
which have for their object the truth or falsehood of proposi
tions. But those perceptions are attended with pleasant feel
ings, which do not belong to reason, but the heart.
So the proper operations of conscience are only perceptions,
which have for their object a rtde of duty, actions, and their
agreement or disagreement with the rule. These perceptions
are always followed by pleasant or pmnful feelings in the heart,
with their attendant desires. And these feelings, sometimes
the strongest we ever experience, belong properly to the
heart, though we often ascribe them figuratively to the con
science. In strict propriety of speech, therefore, we should
say conscience includes operations both of the understanding
and the heart. It cannot, however, be considered a distinct
faculty. Benevolence is a most amiable quality. When we perceive,
or have a knowledge of this quality in another, if our hearts
are right, they are pleased. They delight in such a charac
ter, approve it, and commend it. Such feelings are excited,
TvliEnever we perceive amiable and virtuous qualities in any
anoral agent. But those feelings constitute mo part of con
science ; for a perception of those qualities is antecedent to
those feelings, and is the cause which produces them. And

48
those feelings are as different in their nature from the percep
tions of moral qualities, as any other operations whatever ;
yet they attend all the operations of conscience. But this is
no evidence that they constitute any part of conscience, For
operations, totally different in their nature, may accompany
each other, and be closely connected in point of time;
Vices are hateful qualities. When a person has committed
murder, and we obtain a perception or knowledge of his crim
inality, displeasure and indignation are immediately excited.
These feelings, which accompany our knowledge of crimes
committed by others, have their seat in the heart. There is
no similarity between them and perceptions of moral qualities ;
consequently they are not operations of conscience, but strong
feelings, produced by a perception of criminal conduct in oth
ers. Thus distinguishing, as we ought, between the opera
tions of conscience, and the strong and lively feelings or affec
tions they produce, whether pleasant or painful, sinful or holy,
is of great importance to a correct notion of conscience.
That we may have accurate views of conscience, we pro
ceed to consider three things, the objects of conscience ; its
operations, considered as acts of the mind ; and the effects
they produce. Right and wrong, good and evil, are predicat
ed of our hearts and conduct. The heart is an object; its
affections are objects ; and our actions are , objects. When
these objetts are viewed as subjects, right and wrong, good
and evil, are predicated of them.
These words, good and evil, denote the nature or qualities
of these objects. And these qualities too are objects. For
the predicate, as well as the subject of a proposition, is an ob
ject of perception. Then our hearts with their operations,
and all our actions, with their qualities, are the objects which
conscience regards. These objects constitute what we term
duty. The word ought implies the idea of duty. We say,
we ought to have a right heart, right affections, and right ac
tions. And so far as our hearts, affections and actions are right,
duty is performed. And our hearts and conduct ought not to
be wrong, evil or sinful. But if they are wrong, duty is not
performed, we are transgressors. As it is the office of con
science to inform us of our duty, it must inform us what is right
and what is wrong. And it is evident, we cannot ascertain
what is duty, when it is not self evident, but by comparing our
hearts and conduct with self evident truths, or some infallible

49
rule pf right and wrong* By comparing our affections and
actions with a self evident duty, or with the moral law, we as
certain what is duty. Then duty, or our hearts and conduct
With their qualities, are the objects Which conscience takes into
view. This will clearly show, that the operations of conscience
are perceptions. For there are no other operations of the mind,
by which objects can be seen, or known. We do not leattithe
nature of hearts and conduct by feelings, or affections, or voli
tions. It is solely by our perceptions. A perception of an object
& its moral quality, is a knowledge of what ought,or ought not,
to be. Then perceptions are the operations of conscience. These
perceptions produce pleasure or pain. These sensations are
the effects of conscience on the heart ; and they are as differ
ent from perceptions, as effects are from their causes. For we
have already shown, that sensations are not the operations, but
the effects, of conscience. And they ought to be viewed wholly
different in their nature, and to be carefully distinguished from
them.
r Then our conclusion is this : that those perceptions of the
understanding, which have the right or wrong of our hearts
and conduct, or in a word our duty, for their object, are class
ed together, and called conscience. Or conscience may be
thus defined : it is the understanding itself, when it takes cog
nizance of our own motives and actions, compares them with
the standard of duty, and then acquits or condemns.

•##****#*#»

Essay vix.
Recapitulation.
The object of this essay is to recapitulate the principal ideas
contained in the preceding essays, in a brief manner, that the
reader may see them in a narrow compass. And
1 . The understanding is a faculty of the mind. This facul*
ty is a property of the mind. Understanding, heart, will, are
words, which express different properties of the mind.
G

50
S. A faculty is a preparedness, a fitness, an adaptedness ef
the mind, to be the subject of definite operations. The same
property does not prepare the mind to see, feel, and choose,
There is no way to account for operations so different in their
nature, but by supposing the mind to be possessed of differej*
properties, or faculties. — Hence the different operations of the
riiirid have led philosophers to consider it as having distinct
faculties, or properties.
3. A faculty is as distinet from its operations, as a body ig
distinct from its motions. Hence a faculty is antecedent to kit
operations, and the foundation of them.
4. The construction of all languages is a direct proof of ih«
existence offaculties. All languages have verbs; and every
Verb has a nominative case. The nominative ease is the
agent ; and the verb expresses the action of the agent. I per"
cewe. It is certain the mind does not perceive objects by die
same faculty, by which it feels ; nor by that, by Which it pre
fers one thing to another, It is by the understanding only that
the mind perceives. Accordingly we say, the understanding is
a perceiving faeulty. That mankind have ,from time immemo
rial, considered the mind possessed of this faculty, is evident
from the construction of all languages. Indeed it is a truths*
evident, the Words We use in talking and writing prove we have
ideas of faculties, and believe in the real existence of suehp*®*
perties. It is a self-evident truth. If any deny it, they must
be left to themselves. For it is vain to reason with persons,
to convince them of the truth of self-evident propositions.
5. The word perception is used to signify all the operations
of the understanding. I use this word in this sense, because, I
know of no other, which will more aptly express the operations
of this faculty. Perception is an act of the understanding.
The acts of the understanding may be, and often are, called
ideas, thoughts, notions,, and the like j, but perception appears
to me to be as proper a name of every act or operation of this
faculty, as any that can be used. And perception is the name
I give to every operation of the understanding.
&. Perceptions, which are operations of the understanding,
are very numerous. Simple apprehension as an act of the
mind, or the perception of an Pfejeet, Conception is an aet of
the understanding. Memory, reason, judgment, and con
science, as we have shown, are operations of this faculty. This
is true with respect to imagination j which is a perception of

51
objects combined in such a manner as to answer the design of
the agent. Apprehension, conception, judgment, reason,
memory, conscience, imagination, fancy, which are words
abundantly used by philosophers who treat upon the intellec
tual powers of the mind, are names by which the acts or oper
ations of the understanding are designated. For the under
standing is the only intellectual faculty belonging to the mind.
And when we attend to the meaning of these words, as appli
ed to acts of the mind, it is obvious they cannot designate any
other operations,th n those which I call perceptions. If persons
will take the trouble of attending to the meaning of the above
words, he will find they differ very much from the Words feel
ings, sensations, affections, or volitions. They are, theninoth-
ing more or less, than those acts called perceptions, thoughts,
or ideas. An act of the mind is a simple operation. It cannot be
defined. Seeing, thinking, apprehending, conceiving, remem
bering, reasoning, judging and the like, express aGts of the
understanding. These acts are not affections, desires, or vo
litions. These acts are perceptions. Seeing an object, con
ceiving of an object, remembering an object, and so an, is per
ceiving it. When perceptions are considered as acts of the
mind, though called by different names, yet they are alike. It
is not possible to point out any' difference between one percep
tion and another, considered as acts or operations of the mind.
Being similar, of the same kind, they constitute one general
class of operations. As all creatures, who have life,, are classed
together and called animals, so all those individual operations
of the same kind are classed together, arid called perceptions.
But 7. This general class is subdivided into several distinct clas
ses, to each of which a name is given. Though all the opera
tions of the understanding are of the same kind, for which
reason they constitute but one class ; yet their objects differ.
Where there is a perception, there is, something perceived.
This something, whether it be a substance, a property, a qual
ity, a mode, or relation, is the object of perception. And the
individual objects are as numerous as the perceptions. The
objects are riot of the same kind ; they differ from each othe£
in a variety of respects and circumstances. These differences
among the objects, is the ground and reason of dividing our
perceptions into several classes. Some objects have been seen^
attd are past ; when see^again,, thejr are recollected. These

52
perceptions constitute a class by themselves ; and this class of
perceptions is called memory.
Truth and falsehood constitute another class of objects.
These are objects of perception. For we know what truth is,
when we perceive it. Those perceptions, therefore, which
have truth and falsehood for their object, constitute another
class, which is known by the name of reason, and judgment.
Right and wrong, good and evil, form another class of ob
jects. And those perceptions, which have the right and wrong
of our own conduct for their object, constitute another class,
which is called conscience. , :»i
All the operations of the understanding form one generals;
class called perceptions. This general class Of operations is
divided into several specific classes. And each specific class
has some name given it, by which it is known ; as simple per
ception, memory, judgment, reason and conscience. And the
difference among the objects of perception, is the reason why
our perceptions are formed into distinct classes. As those di
visions are necessary in order to have a clear, distinct, and
systematic view of the mind, so to facilitate the communication
of our knowledge of the mind to others, it is necessary to give
those several classes distinct names.
This mode of attending to the operations of the mind, ap
pears to me far preferable to that generally adopted by meta- .
physicians. They generally begin by dividing the mind into
two faculties, understanding and will ; and say, those are^ the
only faculties belonging to it. Then they proceed to talk
about the memory, judgment, reason, and conscience ; and
frequently call each of these a faculty. Then the reader is
confused ; he asks himself, does the writer mean, as he first
said,. that the mind has but two faculties ; or that it has six or
seven? For he calls judgment, reason, memory, conscience,
imagination, and the like, faculties also. What does he mean ?
Then when they write concerning the operations of these facul
ties, are these only one kind, or very different kinds of opera
tions ? This he cannot determine from their manner of writ
ing. Of course, he is left in the dark respecting the nature of
the operations of these several faculties, as they are pleased to
call them.
And after he has gone through a long treatise of philosophy
on the human mind, though he has acquired many useful ideas,
yet he has obtained no systematic knowledge of the mind. The

53
ideas he has acquired have no proper arrangement ; neither
does he see their connexion with first principles. Hence the
reader has acquired only an indistinct and confused notion of
the mind, and its operations. One great object here is, to give
the reader a clear, and systematic view of the mind. Whether
I have done it, as far as I have proceeded, he must judge.
I would observe one thing more, and close this essay. If any
one should prefer considering memory, reason and conscience
different powers of the understanding,- 1 will not contend with
him. If he says the understanding has a power of perceiving,
or recollecting past objects ; and a power of perceiving truth,
and inferring one truth from another ; and a power of perceiving
the right and wrong of actions ; still all the operations of these
powers are perceptions. And of course, these several powers
only designate the several classes into which the operations of
the understanding. are divided. One power denotes one class,
and another power another class of operations. Hence, wheth
er we consider memory, for instance,, as a power of the under
standing, or as the name given to one class of perceptions ;
still it is either the perception of past objects, or the power of
perceiving them. So we consider all the operations of the un
derstanding as similar in their nature ; and divisible into as
many classes, if no more, as are above enumerated and specifr-
ed,

#*******#*

ESSAY vm.
Of Taste.
Taste is another faculty of the mind, distinct from the under
standing, and also from the will. There are several consider
ations, to which our attention must be directed for the elucida
tion of this subject. The reader who wishes to examine it
impartially, is requested to suspend his judgment, till he has
weighed the considerations here presented, and seen the relation
and connexion of the several parts with each other.

54
I. Taste, like the understanding, is undefinable, being 4
simple property. It can be explained only by Using other terms
of nearly the same import. It is that preparedness, adapted-
ness, or disposition of the mind, by which the mind is affected
agreeably or disagreeably when objects are presented to it.
We knowitis a fact, that some objects please,and others disgust
us. It is a fact, that we are conscious of sensations or emotions,
Which are sometimes agreeable, sometimes painful. These
emotions belong to the mind. They must have a cause.
Those things which produce pleasure or pain, whether they are
material or immaterial, are the objects that affect us. These
objects operate, and thus occasion sensations or emotions.
[Their operation necessarily implies a subject. Taste is the
I subject operated upon, when objects afford us either pleasure
or pain. The understanding is not the subject on which they
operate : for that has perceptions, but not emotions ; it is a
perceiving, but not a feelirig faculty — -To say the mind is the
subject, is not satisfactory. What is the mind ? Is it a simple
existence without properties ? An existence simple in its na
ture cannot be the subject of operations so different in their
kind, as perceptions, pleasant and painful sensations, and voli
tions. How the same simple nature can.see,/eeZ and produce effects,
is to us unaccountable. Philosophers have, therefore, been
led to view the mind, like all other substances, as possessed of
different, distinct properties, or faculties. Operations of differ
ent kinds, which we experience, have led them generally to
make two faculties, called understanding and will. The same
reason which induces them to admit two faculties, will require
them to acknowledge three ; which we design to make evident
in its proper place. It will appear further on, that we have as
much reason to view the taste as a faculty, as we have either
the understanding or the will. And taste is that faculty by
which the mind is pleased or disgusted by the objects which
affect it. This faculty is the subject on which they operate,
when we experience agreeable or painful sensations or emo
tions. These sensations do not belong to the understanding,
nor to the will ;" as I shall show hereafter. Taste is the facul
ty to which all operations of this kind belong. If we had not
the bodily sense, which is called taste, food would neither
please or disgust us.
By a mental taste, the mind is pleased or displeased with

55
siM objects with which it is conversant. There is a great simi
larity between that bodily sense, called taste,, and this mental
fejeulty, by means of which all objects affect us in an agreea*
ble or disagreeable manner. On account of this similarity,
this mental faculty is called the taste. I know of no other
word, Which Will, according to its common acception, more
fully express the nature of this faculty. , And for this reason I
use it. The word of jGod ealta this"facultyr-the JieasiL^ And i
whenever I may uie the word heart to signify a faculty of the
mind, I^mgan^the. °amp thtng hg? if, I do by fh? «"q»4"t-ft«rty,
Cafi the mind perceive ? Then its nature and construction
are s-ufeh, that it is prepared for this kind of operations. Can it
feel, or be the subject of painful and pleasant sensations?
Theri its nature is such, that it is prepared to be the subject of
this kind of operations. Ho we infer, &ovn our perceptions,
the faculty which is called the understanding ? Then, from
our feelings, we as safely infer the faculty we call taste,
or the heart. And to suppose there may be perception® and
sensations, without any subject to which they belong, is ab
surd. And to suppose a subject, which has net different pro
perties, but is simple in its nature, can perceive objects, and also
be pleased or disgusted with them, is equally absurd. The
different faculties, which belong to the mind, prepare it for
operations of different kinds. This is as evident, as it is that
the different construction of material bodies prepares them for
different operations.
2. T^gJaste^^orjhe heart, i& a feeling faculty.  Although
this has been noticed already^~yeTit~ieserves a further and"
distinct consideration. Both pleasant and painful sensations
aXejhelings. Every one knows what pain is, and what plea
sure is-, by experience'. Pain is a sensation, and pleasure is a
sensation ; pain is also a feeling, and pleasure is a feeling.
Pain and pleasure are simple operations, which cannot be de- '
fined. Yet all persons are acquainted by experience with the
meaning of these terms. The terms pleasure and pain, sensa
tion arid feeling, when applied to acts of the mind, are applied
to the same class pf operations. When I am pleased or dis*-
gusted, I feel ) I have a sensation oj> emotion excited?. Aadthe
taste is the onlv feeling faculty, Which belongs to the mugL.,
AndiiHa^rliiFobjects, when perceived through the medium* of i
on* senses ; and all the operations of the mind, when they are I
objects of perception- or reflection, either please or disgust us. j
The heart is never in a perfect state of indifference. Objects,

56
when seen, always affect it, more or less. Yet the feelings of
pleasure and pain excited by objects are often so faint, so fee
ble, that we do not observe them, In this state we say we are
indifferent. It is true that we may be very nigh to a state of
indifference ; yet, at the same time, we have some feeling.
This faculty is in the highest degree sensible. Its nature is so
tender, so lively, so susceptible, that every object we perceive
must affect it. And our being in such a state, that we do not
know we have any feeling, is no certain evidence we do not
feel. It is pleasant to behold the light. But ask a person,
whether the light of the sun excites in him an agreeable sensa
tion ; and he will often be at a loss for an answer. Yet reason
informs him, if his senses are not disordered, that it is always
a source of more or less pleasure. We seldom reflect on the
pleasure we receive from those objects which are the most con
stantly in view ; and for this reason are apt to say, we are in
different towards them. We are apt to think we are indifferent
towards all objects, which do not excite so lively sensations of
pleasure or pain, as to gain our particular attention. Yet there
are sufficient reasons to conclude, that mankind are never in a
state of -perfect indifference, or totally without any feeling. If
not, then all objects affect us more or less.
Again ; all our sensations of pleasure and pain, however dif
ferent the objects are which excite them, are operations of the
saftie faculty. Many seem to suppose, that the mind has as
many feeling faculties or powers, as- there are differences in the
kinds of objects which affect us. But there is< no ground for
such an hypothesis. The reason why objects of different kinds
may and do affect the same faculty, will be attended to in the
next essay. Here I shall attempt to show we have but one
faculty which is capable of feeling. It will be agreed by all;
that our bodily senses neither perceive, or feel any thing. The
eye does not see the light ; the ear dpes not hear sounds ; but
the understanding, through the medium of the senses, perceives
Jight, sound, and every other object of sense. It is true, we
f often ascribe to our senses, those operations which belong only
to the mind. We, say the eye sees, the ear hears, the palate
tastes. JElut these are figurative expressions. Seeing, hearing.
smelling, and the4iker^Eejagerations of die mind, Tiqt ~oF~the
senggs^ The bodily senses are mediums through which the un
derstanding becomes acquainted with external objects. They
are necessary mediums, in the present state, to the perception-

5*
of material, external objects. Hence the deaf have no percep
tion of sounds ; and the blind have no perception of light, Of
of colours. Does it follow, because different senses are neces
sary to a knowledge of external objects, that we must have as
many perceiving mental faculties as there are bodily senses ?
Is it by one faculty of the mind that we perceive light and col
ours, by another sound, by another odours ? This is not pre
tended by any philosophic writer, with whom I am acquainted.
Seeing, hearing, and the like, are operations of the same fac
ulty. Through the eye, the Understanding perceives light
and colours ; through the ear, sounds ; and through the
other senses, all the other objects of the senses.
In like manner, neither the eye, or ear, or any other bodily
sense, is the subject of pleasant, or painful sensations. It is
the faculty of taste, which is pleased with light, with colours,
with sounds, and other objects of sense ; or which is disgust
ed with them. The senses are only mediums, through which
external objects excite agreeable and disagreeable sensations.
And to suppose we have as many feeling faculties, as there are
different kinds of objects which affect us, is an hypothesis with
out evidence to support it, or end to be answered by it. Most
philosophers treat of a power of the mind, they call taste ; ¦' the
objects of which are beauty, novelty, and grandeur. These
objects produce agreeable sensations. So, also, light and col
ours, melodious sounds, honey, and a thousand other objects,
produce agreeable sensations. And what is the difference be
tween one agreeable sensation and another, or one painful sen
sation and another, when we view them as acts or operations
of the mind ? There is evidently no difference in their nature.
One may be more lively, strong, or greater in degree, than
another. Still, each operation of this kind is a sensation.
Though the objects may be of various and different kinds, yet
the pleasure or disgust they give us, considered as operations
of the mind, are nothing but sensations. An excellent charac
ter pleases us ; a bad character may disgust us. Natural
beauty, and moral beauty, may each afford us much pleasure.
And every operation of the mind, wheri it is an object of per
ception, or reflection as some call it, will please or offend us.
But as every emotion excited is either a pleasing or painful
sensation, they are all operations of a similar nature.
And when nothing is taken into view but the sensations them
selves, we can discern no difference in their natures. In der
H

58
gree they may differ. One is a more pleasing, or more painful
sensation, than another. — When we attend to the objects,
which please or offend us, we see a great difference among
them. Yet we know it is a fact, that objects, however difier
ent, have the same effect on the mind ; they either please or
disgust us, in a greater or less degree.
Also, by attending to the objects which affect us, we learn,
that some of our sensations will have a good, and others a bad
tendency. And when we attend to our feelings with a view to
ascertain their moral quality, we are not contemplating the
feelings themselves, but their tendency. The feelings, and
their tendency, are distinct objects of consideration. When
the feelings of pleasure or pain are the only objects considered,
we can view them in no other light, than merely as operations
of the same kind. Every drop of liquid is in its essence a li
quid. There is no difference between the essence of one drop
and another, when considered merely as a liquid. Yet liquids '
produce very different effects. And from the effects they pro
duce we learn how differently they operate.. Yet liquids have
the same construction. And sensations, however different the
objects which excite them, or however different their tendencies,
are nothing more" nor less than sensations, when viewed only
as acts of the mind. To account, then, for those numerous
feelings of pleasure and pain which we all experience, it is not
necessary to, suppose we have a number of distinct, individual
feeling faculties. For that faculty, which can be pleased or
disgusted with one object, can be affected in the same manner
by millions. Enough has been said, I trust, to make it evi
dent, that all our pleasures and pains are operations of the same
faculty, which is called the taste, or heart. The manner in "
which objects affect this faculty, is beyond my ability to des
cribe. I profess not to be acquainted with the modus, opera.ni-
di of any thirig. I shall, therefore, say nothing respecting it;
but
— -4L-Show thai^a&te4sthe^pnnjrof acjion in-ati-mornl-ngonts.
-r-Feeling is the spring of action7~TTainoral agent were de
prived of the faculty of taste, and were as incapable of pleasure
andjrfpain_.as materiaLJbpdie^jtre, he would be as inert as
they Ofthis every candid person mustijexo^vincBdr" It is
a~fruth so obvious, but little can be said to make it plainer.
In case persons could perceive objects as clearly and distinctly
as they now do, yet were not in the least degree either pleas-

59
ingly or disgustfuUy affected by them, they would remain in a
state of rest, or inaction. For, in this case, they have no in
citement to action ; no motive to influence them in the least de
gree. There is no object, which pleases them, to be sought ;
nor any, which disgusts them, to be avoided. For they are
totally destitute of any feelings ; nothing affects them, they
are in a state of perfect indifference. If they could perceive
the good and evil qualities of objects, as they now do, yet
they would have no idea that they could profit or harm them,
in any possible way. If they are crushed under the weight
of mountains, they suffer no harm, because they feel no pain.
As it is evident, if we were as incapable of pleasure and pain
as stones are, that we should be inactive beings ; it follows,
that feelings give rise to all the actions of moral agents. It
follows,jhaJJhetaste4s-the^prw>ra»!y-2w«^ them.
For tfils_.is.Jthe only_._feeJing. faculty theypossess~ Pleasure"
stimulates to action, to obtainthe~^greea^lFoirjeictT^m1clpain
excites actions, to avoid disgustful objects. And it is impossi-
blefbr— morar~ageiHs to experience daily pleasure and pain,
and continue in a state of inactivity. Where there is feeling,
there will be action. When there is no feeling in bodies, they
are inert ; they never move, only when acted upon by some
foreign agent. The feelings of pleasure and pain constitute
the only active principle, of which we have any knowledge, in
any beings in the universe. Hence theraeulty of taste is not an
inactive, dormant principle. It is the most operative, ener
getic, active principle in the universe, that has ever come with
in our knowledge. This is the primary principle of action in
God, and all intelligent creatures. HiS feelings gave rise to
the grand fabric of the universe ; they give rise to all the
works of providence. For we are expressly informed, that all
things were created for his pleasure ; that is to gratify the
feelings of his heart. — Hence, then, in this faculty we find the
primary spring of action. This principle is always operating ;
hence the reason why moral agents are always acting.
4. Tastp ia _% ffiftgvi/fariilfy. Here is the fountain of all
vice and virtue. EveryTnund ag'enl IsT"sinful, crTiolypae--
cording to his character ; and his character is good or bad
according to the nature and temper of his heart. If the heart
be good, the fruit will be good ; but if the heart be evil, the
fruit will be of the same nature. This truth is taught by our
Saviour. " The good man, out of the good treasure of the

60
heart, bringeth forth good things ; and the evil man, out ol the
evil treasure of his heart, bringeth forth evil things." It is
generally agreed that action is necessary to vice and virtue ;
that any existence, destitute of active principles, is not an agent,
of course vice and virtue cannot be attributed to him. Nei
ther is he a proper subject of praise and, blame. But if an ac
tive principle is necessary to constitute a being a proper agent,
and a proper subject of praise and blame, then this principle
is either vicious or virtuous. All the moral good and evil, be
longing to a moral agent, must consist in the active principles
which govern him. Otherwise, the power of action is not es
sential to viee and virtue. A ball, when in motion, is operat
ing or acting. For in its course it produces many effects ; and
among others, puts an end to a man's life. Yet we do not
consider it a proper agent, or guilty of murder, or deserving
of blame. And why ? Orie reason is, it has no inherent prin
ciple of action, and did not put itself in motion. Hence we
attribute the evil it produced, to the agent who put it in motion.
This makes it evident, that in order for any being to be vi
cious or virtuous, he must be an agent ; and to be an agent,
tie must possess an active principle; andfrorii this principle
all the good or evil he evet does proceeds. This active prin
ciple, then, is either a good or evil fountain, Which contains in
itself all the streams, whether sinful or holy, which flow from
it. This principle, tnerefore, comprises all vice and virtue.
But -we" have shown,- that the -.heart, orfaoulty-of taste, is the
primary principle of action in moralagents^.andjs^tiierefbre,
either :vicie^s~oTVirtuous_^ or, in one word, a moral faculty.
But this is a particular, to which it is not my design to give
much attention in this place ; as it will come under considera
tion, when I treat of moral good and evil.-^-The particulars to
which we have attended in this essay show us clearly, that
there is a wide difference betweeri this faculty and the under
standing. The understanding is a perceiving faculty, but is
never the subject of sensations, Itnever^/eeZs any thing. The
faculty of taste is a feeling faculty. It never perceives any
object. Perception does not belong to it ; but it is very sus
ceptible of feeling. It is the subject of all our pleasures and
pains. The understanding is not a moral faculty ; because it
is not the spring or principle of action. But the heart is a
moral faculty. It is active in its nature, and the primary prin
ciple of action in moral agents. It comprises in itself all vice

61
and virtue. These are evident and essential differences be
tween the understanding and the taste ; and show us that they
are totally distinct faculties, from which operations of a differ
ent nature proceed.

***** * **#*.

ESSAY IX.
Of Appetites.
The appetites constitute a subject as difficult to understand
and explain as any one, perhaps, that appertains to the human
mind. A patient, and careful attention is necessary in the
reader, while examining this intricate and important subject.
With it is connected several interesting truths. And an un
derstanding of it is requisite to a knowledge of human nature.
For the appetites ccmirnis^jay^ixprinciple °f aetipn^ancLcQaz-.
stituteTfi&iaculty.o^aste of which we have takenonly a gen-
erafyiew. When we attend to the numerous objects, which either please,
or disgust us, we find great differences among them. Light,
and colours, food, and drink, sounds of every tone, odours of
every species, solidity, extension, and all the 'objects of the
senses, are very dissimilar. Though they may have a simili
tude to each other in some respects, yet in many others they
widely differ. , Truth and falsehood, good and evil, beauty
and deformity, amiable and odious characters, are objects,
which differ from each other,and from the objects of sense. Yet
such varieties of objects please or displease us. How can we
account for this ?
We know the blind never experience any sensations from
light and colours,nor the deaf from sounds. By the eye we can
not distinguish sounds, nor by the ear light. From this, if
from no other source, we may safely infer, that the senses are
differently constructed, and suited to the nature of the objects
from which the mind derives- different sensations. All the sen
ses are necessary to the existence of those internal feelings,

62
which we experience. By one sense only we become acquaint
ed with but few objects. All the five senses are necessary to
the knowledge we now have of external things, and the sensa
tions they produce in our hearts. Something similar to our
bodily senses must belong to the heart, or we can never ac
count for the numerous sensations we experience from objects
dissimilar in their kind and nature. Will the same internal
sense, which is pleased with light, and colours, delight also
in sounds, both grave, acute, lively, and solemn ? Will the
same internal sense be pleased with both vice and virtue ? If
all mankind have but one internal, feeling sense, how comes it
to pass, that object's, which please one, disgust another ? How
can this phenomenon in the moral world- be accounted for?
It is a known fact, that objects which are agreeable to one per
son, displease another. This is not owing to the bodily sen
ses. For these senses are not the subjects of either pleasure or
pain. The heart is the only subject of agreeable and painful
sensations. The bodily senses are only mediums, through
which the heart is affected.
God has so constructed the heart, or the faculty of taste,
there is a preparedness or adaptedriess in it to be pleased with
objects of one kind, and a preparedness to be pleased with ob
jects of a different kind. That objects very different from
each other do please us, is a fact. From this fact we may
safely infer, the heart is adapted in its nature to be pleased with
objects of different kinds, as different as vice and virtue, sounds
and colours. A preparedness to be pleased with a definite class
of objects, is what I mean by an appetite.^One peTsrn>- is
preparedlo~be pleased with virtue. This is an appetite for
virtue. Another has not this adaptedness in his heart, he has
not, therefore, an appetite for virtue. This is the reason,
one person is delighted with virtue, and another is not. This
particular preparedness of the heart to be pleased with a defi
nite class of objects, is the sense in which I shall use the word
appetite. Using it in this sense, I give it a more extensive
meaning, I grant, than writers commonly do. For this reason
it is conceived necessary to be somewhat particular ,in explain
ing the meaning I affix to the term. Attention to the opera
tions of the heart leads us necessarily to view it as endued with
such distinct fitnesses to be pleased with objects of different
kinds. To this particular fitness I give the name appetite,
because I know of no other word in the English language by

63
which it can with greater propriety be called. If any would
prefer the word sense, or relish, if they use them to mean the
same thing, I have no objection. I may sometimes use them
to avoid a frequent repetition of the same word. But when I
do,I shall mean by them the same thing the word appetite sig
nifies? When I have attended to an enumeration and illustration of
some of our appetites, I will then attempt to show the differ
ence, between them and the faculty of taste. Our appetites
are either natural, or acquired. Some of those with which we
are born are the following.
1. An appetite for food. When born, we are prepared to
take more or less satisfaction in the different kinds of food,
which are suited to nourish the body. An appetite for food is
called hunger, and an appetite for water is termed thirst.
When we analyze hunger, we find an uneasy sensation, with a
desire for food, that it may be removed, ever attends* it, This
sensation and desire are the operations of this appetite. The ,
appetite, and its operations, are distinct objects of considera
tion. Care ought to be taken never to confound them. Be
tween all our appetites and their operations, this distinction
ought to be made. If the taste was not prepared to be pleas
ed with food, we might use it, yet we should never experience
the sensation of pleasure in eating, nor a desire to enjoy it.
An appetite is antecedent to all its operations, and is the sub
ject of them. It has a being, when its operations are not ex
perienced. The heart, therefore, is always prepared to be the
subject of those operations,'* which belong to the appetite of
hunger. For this preparedness is the appetite itself.
This appetite is attended with an uneasy sensation, what
some would call a hankering, and a desire for something to
remove it. Food is the object, which will remove the uneasy
sensation. As soon as we have learned this fact, then food is
the particular object of desire. When we eat, food not only
removes the uneasiness, but affords us pleasure. This appe
tite, then, is attended with three distinct operations ; uneasiness,
desire, and pleasure.
This uneasy sensation is a feeling of the appetite. When
this exists, it feels, it hankers, it desires food, it longs for it.
Its desires are strong or weak,in proportion to the degree of the
uneasy sensation. This feeling will produce all the actions
necessary to obtain food. It is, therefore, an active principle,

64
an original spring to those actions necessary to get food, which
is the only object that Can afford gratification. In like man
ner, each individual appetite belonging to the heart is a prin
ciple of action. They are the primary, self-moving, exciting
causes to all the actions requisite to the attainment of those
objects, which will gratify them. When an appetite is gratifi
ed, it ceases to operate, until uneasiness begins again to arise.
The great design of God,in implanting in the heart this ap
petite of hunger,is very obvious. The design of it is the pres
ervation of life. Food is necessary to the life of the body.
And this appetite is the only active principle, which will move
us to get and eat the food necessary to the preservation of life.
In this view it is an important principle, and answers a most
valuable purpose.
What has been said respecting hunger, is true in relation to
thirst. These. are distinct appetites. For we may be hun
gry, without thirst; and be thirsty, without hunger. Hence an
appetite for food will not prompt us to seek for water.
Though they are distinct, yet the same operations belong to
each of them, and each of them is a principle of action. I
need, therefore, givp no further attention to the appetite of
thirst. 2, The natural affections constitute a distinct appetite.
These include the parental, filial, and fraternal affections- The
propensity to exercise them may be called a particular and
distinct appetite.
It is a fact, that all parents have a feeling for their offspring,
which they never experience towards the children of other pa
rents. Their own children afford them pleasant sensations.
From this feeling arise desires and exertions to preserve their
lives, their health, and to providP for them, and promote their
prosperity and happiness. These are facts.— And those we
consider and call our offspring, include that class of objects,
with which this appetite is pleased. This, like the other, is a
feeling appetite ; it is an internal, active principle ; and anPth-
er law of our nature by which we are daily governed. And
those possess it, who are not as yet parents ; and it will oper
ate as soon as they have any offspring.
And the design of God iti giving to men this appetite is ob
vious. It is the principle, which will stimulate them to take
a watPhful care of their children in infancy, and to do all they
can to render them useful, and respectable in this world-

65
Mence it is a necessary, and very useful, active principle, as
long as our race is to inhabit the earth.— "The same general re
marks will apply to the other natural affections.
3. The prospensity'of the different sexes for social inter
course is another appetite ; an active principle, a law of our
nature, implanted in man forathe propagation arid continuance
of the human race, until time shall be no more. What has
been said concerning the other appetites, is applicable tothis
law of our nature. •'"
4. Another appetite implanted in the heart is generally call
ed pity. We find it is a fact, which all experience more or less,
that when We See any of our fellow mortals in a state of pain
arid distress, and unable to help themselves, an uneasy sensation
is excited] Their, distress, misery, and helpless condition, ex
cite in us a painful sensation. We find the ready way to re
move the pairi we feel, is to afford them help arid relief." De
sires arise at once to afford them assistance, and exertions are
made for this purpose. And as sbon as they are relieved, and
freed from the miseries they suffered, the pain We felt is remov
ed. Then we have no more feeling for them, than for others,
Who need not our help.
The Object of this appetite is the distress and misery of man
kind. Experience teaches, that it is a very active principle,
arid a law of our nature, like other appetites. And the design
Of God in giying it, is evidetat '; to stimulate us to afford help to
the helpless. Were it not for jthis, many would die in extreme
misery, who now are preserved alive.
5. An appetite to be pleased with novelty, is implanted in us.
Mankind are much pleased With new things ; with new discove
ries and improvements in the arts and sciences. This disposi
tion to be pleased with objects which are new to us, is an active
principle in us, exciting us to every exertion of mind and body
necessary to make new discoveries. This is the principle,
which stimulates mankind to exertion to improve the mind, to
acquire knowledge, and make advances in the fields of art and
science.. = Deprive men of this stimulus, they would sink down
into a state of ignorance, and mental darkness, and remain con
tented in it. So far as a mind improves, new objects are dis
covered. These new discoveries are one source of our enter
tainment and happiness in this world.
6. Another appetite with which Adam was created is termed

66
benevolent. The character of God, the happiness of intelli
gent beings, divine truths and doctrines, holiness, the law and
service of God, are the class of objects with which this appetite
is pleased. This is lost by our apostasy from God. Hence
the reason why men in a natural state are not pleased with this
class of objects.
If all men had this appetite, perfect both in kind and degree,,
so as to be always under its influence ; then all the other appe
tites mentioned would be innocent, and would require indul
gence only in agreement with the divine commands. But it
was the pleasure of pur Maker that the others, should remain,
even after this was lost ; for the preservation^ our race, and
for our sustenance and comfort. In all thosf" persons, who are
born again, to whom the love of holiness is restored, the other
appetites are again brought into subjection ; though they have
a warfare while they remain on earth. In heaven, the use of
their animal appetites having ceased, the appetites themselves
will cease also. Their benevolence will be perfect, and will
forever be their only active principle, as it is in Jehovah, • God is
loVe ; and all his ransomed; will become like him.
Whether these are all the appetites implanted in us by our
Maker, or not, I will not affirr|| These appear to be the prim*
cipal, if not the whole. — There are some appetites which ajje
acquired, commonly called habits ; as the love of labPur, intem
perance, and the like ; but as those are not natural, I shall give
no further attention tothem.
All the appetites, which have been enumerated, may by use
and cultivation, be increased ; they may also in certain ways
be diminished. For instance the appetite for novelty, by use
and cultivation, may be increased, and become more vigorous ;
and it may be almost eradicated by certain indulgences ; and
it may prompt men more to one kind of discoveries, than anoth
er. And here we mjght go into a discussion of numerous
things, which would iri many ways reflect more light on thi£
subject. Still, however strongs a propensity may be felt to
explore a field so widely extended, it must be restrained and
deriied. Because the design of these essays is only to give a
general view of the faculties and operations of the mind, with
out following any one main branch in its various ramifications
to their extremities. The general view proposed will occupy
sufficient time ; and present a clearer description of human

67
powers and exertions, than would be obtained by attending to
almost innumerable particulars.
B. I shall now adduceproo/' of the theory advanced.
1. It is a tact, tha appetites may be lost and restored, with
out affecting, in the least, those which remain. This proves that
the appetites are distinct from each other, like the bodily senses.
For instance : Adam was created with a benevolent appetite
or relish. This prepared him to delight in that class of objects
Galled holy and divine. The character of God, of Christ, of
saints and angels; the holy law of God, his service, the doc
trines of the gospel ; these objects form one class, which afford
delight and satisfaction to a benevolent relish. They are not
a source of pleasure to any other appetite of the heart. Adam
lost this appetite at the fall ; and his posterity are born without
it. This is the reason why this class of objects are not relish
ed or loved by men.
Still, the loss of it did not affect, impair, or destroy the other
appetites with which Adain was created, and with which his pos
terity are born. In regeneration, this is again restored ; yet
thisidoes not alter the nature of the other appetites ; anymore
than giving eyes to the blind alters the nature of the other bod
ily senses.
Aggin ; our offspring affords pleasure and gratification, to
the appetite knowri by the narrie of parental affection.. This
may be lost. The word of God informs us, there are some pa
rents without natural affection ; and there are some, who in
fact appear to be wholly destitute of it. Yet when this is lost,
all the appetites and their operations remain the same. '
As persons iriay be, and in fact have been, deprived of one
and another appetite, without affecting or altering the nature
and operations of those which remain ; we have sufficietit evi
dence that they are as distinct from each other, as our bodily
senses are. Were not this the fact, the loss of one would des
troy the others.
2. It is evident that different and distinct appetites belong to
the heart, from this consideration : that if this were not a fact,
tfyeloss of an appetite would be the destruction or annihilation,
of the faculty of taste.
To illustrate this truth, it may be observed : Solidity is an
essential property of matter ; and so connected with other pro
perties, that deprive matter of this property, extension, form,
andjmpenetrability are destroyed ; in a word matter is an-

68
nihilated. Also feeling is essential to every bodily sense. And
if the senses were not so distinct and different, that the loss of
one sense would not affect the others ; depriving a person of
one sense would destroy all bodily feeling ; the body would
have no more feeling, than lifeless matter has.
To apply these remarks-; we are to remember the heart is
a feeling faculty, the subject of pleasant and painful sensations.
And if the appetites were not so different and distinct, that the
loss of one would not impair another, the loss of one would an
nihilate all feelingin us ; we should not be the subjects of plea
sure and pain, any more than dead matter is.
Observe further ; animal is a generic term ; it includes all
beings which have life and a principle of actipn, or loco-motion.
Life and motion are common to all the individuals belonging
to each species. Now, if the several species were not so differ,- .
ent and distinct, that destroying one species would not be des
troying another ; the annihilation. of one species would anni
hilate every other, or destroy the genus. But the fact is, by
the loss of an appetite we sustain no injury, only this ; that the
class of pbjects, which had been a source of pleasure, no longer
delight us. As when a person loses his sight, light and colours L
are.no more objects of pleasure ; but his hearing and other sen
ses remain the same. (. > ,.;
One appetite prepares us to be pleased with one particular*
class of objects ; as benevolence, for instance, prepares us to be
delighted with that class of objects called divine ; hunger is an
appetite which prepares us to be pleased with food ; parental
affection is an appetite, which prepares Us to be gratified with
our offspring ; an appetite for novelty prepares us to.be de
lighted with new discoveries ; and so with respect to each of
our appetites. Accordingly, divide all the objects, which have
ever pleased or disgusted mankind, irito distinct classes ; we
shall then find that mankind have implanted in them distinct
appetites, which prepare them to be affected pleasantly or pain
fully with all objects, which ever come within the range of
their perceptions or knowledge. And these appetites, con
jointly viewed, constitute the faculty termed taste or the heart.
3. As further proof of this theory it may be observed, it is
the only theory which agrees with the word of God.
God is perfectly acquainted with the human mind, with its
faculties and operations. For he is the Creator of the soul.
And though it is not his design in his word to give us a theo-

69
retic description of it ; yet he has not revealed any thing,
which does not perfectly agree with its real and true theory.
Hence, when any sentiment is advanced concerning the mind,
which does not agree with what the bible teaches, it ought to
be rejected as false.— This is the case with the greater part of
all the theories, which have been hitherto published. They
contain sentiments, which can never be reconciled with bible
doctrines ; and especially the sentiments advanced concerning
the heart, or will, or active powers, as they are commonly call
ed, are most at variance generally with the word of God, and
for this reason should be rejected.
According to what God teaches in his word, it must be ad
mitted as a fact, that appetites may be lost, and restored, with
out any infringement of moral agency. If the loss of any appe
tite would destroy our agency and accountability, it would be
the loss of a benevolent appetite; For the loss of this affects
us more than the loss of any other could do. Yet God
informs us that'Adam lost it ; all his posterity are born desti
tute of it ; and when any person is born again, this appetite is
created in him. Still, under .these changes we are the same
moral accountable agents, and are so treated by our Maker. —
The theory, then, advanced in these sheets agrees with the
word of God. And it is the only theory, it is believed, which
can be made to agree with it. v s
According to the theory, man at the fall did not sustain the
loss of any faculty ; and when born again, no new faculty is
created. Nothing, but an appetite, is lost and restored.— But
according to the theories generally advanced, the mind has but
two faculties, the understanding and the will ; and the. latter- is
simple in its nature, without any appetite belonging to it. It
is considered as simple as volition itself. Hence those who say
the will and its operations are distinct, to be consistent, must
say that Adam at the fall lost the faculty called the will ; and
that when a man is born again, that faculty is again created.
For that which is simple in its nature, if any part, of it is des
troyed, is wholly destroyed., And if the will is nothing but a
succession of volitions, as some say ; then if holiness .is lost,
and total depravity ensue, Adam after the fall had a will en
tirely different in its nature from the will he had in a state of
innocence. But not to dwell on this here, the view which
has been given of the faculty of taste agrees with the word of
God, with facts, and with the daily experience of mankind. —

70
For they find they have such appetites as have been described.
All know they have hunger, and thirst, natural affection, a
relish for novelty, and all the other appetites named..
The understanding perceives, but never feels ; the heart feels,
but never perceives any thing. Seeing objects, and the feelings
of pleasure and pain, are' very different operations. These
appetites are active principles, and the laws of our nature by
which all men are governed. Go through the world, and you
will find every person actively employed, in pursuit of the ob
jects which are most agreeable to his, appetites ; and there is
no way to produce a change in the conduct of mankind, but by
effecting an alteration in those active principles. Hence,
though the motives to live a holy life far outweigh the motives
to idolize the world ; yet no person will lead a holy life until
a new and benevolent appetite is created in him. And though
mankind can never alter the nature of their appetites ; yet they
may be improved and corrected, by education and proper cul
tivation. The more the taste for beauty, novelty and gran
deur, is improved in correctness and delicacy, so much the more
all the appetites are refined from those vulgar, immoral, and
degrading acts, and keep men within the limits of decency and
propriety. Here, did it comport with my design, much might.
be said on the subject of cultivating, restraining, and improving
the taste and its appetites ; in order to adorn a character as far
as it can be without the ornaments of grace. But this pertains
rather tQ rhetoric than metaphysics.
It is much more important to form correct views of this fac
ulty, than of any other belonging, to the mind!' Because this
governs, in many respects, the understanding and will, and puts
all the wheels of active life in motion ; it is the primary cause
of all the happiness and misery, of which men are the authors ;
and when viewed in the deity, it is the fir^t, efficient cause,
which has given being to every thing which exists through the
universe. It is also the fountain of all moral good and evil ;
and the endless felicity or misery of intelligent creatures de
pends ons its nature. Hence too much attention cannot be
given to it- Thus far we have only attended to the taste as a
faculty of the mind, to give a general view of its nature ; as
the only faculty capable of pleasant and painful sensations ;
the only active and moral principle in man, with a general des
cription of its appetites or propensities. I have said nothing

7i
concerning its operations. This will be the subject of the next
essay.

**********
ESSAY X.
Of the Operations of Tasfe.
Having given a general description of the taste as a faculty,
with the several appetites which belong to it ; its operations
now claim our attention. The method proposed is to explain
and give a distinct view of them ; and then divide them into
their several classes.
I. Explain the operations of this faculty.
The affections and passions comprise all the operations of this
faculty. The affections and passions do' not differ in their na
ture. The real difference is circumstantial. When any emo
tion is suddenly excited, and is strong and vivid, and is soon
moderated, it is called a passion. And those sensations, which
grdduully increase, which continue and abide, are termed affec
tions.' For example ; anger is commonly called a passion.
This is suddenly excited, operates with greater or less violence,
and soon subsides. If it continues a long time, it is then gen
erally designated by another name.
Love is generally viewed as an affection. -• This emotion be
gins, and increases gradually. It seldom becomes very violent
$r strong ;*and is commonly lasting. But if it is ever sud
denly excited, and is very strong and violent in its operation,
it is then considered a passion ; and is very apt, after a short
time, to subside, or cool down into a moderate flame. A simi
lar difference between other emotions would be evident on a
particular examination. A sudden excitement; strength or
violence of operation ; and short continuance ; and sudden' a-
batement of an emotion, are the particular circumstances" at
tending a passion. And this difference between some eftiotioris
of taste and others, is distinguished by the words, affection and
passion. As the nature of each is the same, it is not very ink-

72
portant to spend much time on these particular differences'.
We may now proceed to an analysis of the affections.
Love is an affection. It implies two distinct operations.
The first is a pleasant sensation, and then a desire for the en
joyment of the object, or for its prosperity and happiness, if
capable of it. This every person knows by experience. Se-'
Ject any Object you love, and then attend to yoUr own feelings ;
and you will say, there is something in it pleasing and agreea
ble, and you feel a desire to possess and enjoy it. This desire
will be fervent, or faint, in proportion to the degree of pleasure
it affords. Hatred, the opposite, of lpve, is an affection. . Here the sen-1
sation excited is painful. The object is unpleasant and disa
greeable. The feeling is often expressed, by saying of the ob
ject it is deformed, and odious. Then arises a desire to- shun
the object, to have it removed from your sight. •> The only dif
ference, therefore, between love and hatred as operations of
taste is, the sensation implied in the former is pleasant, in the
latter it is painful ; in the former the desire is to enjoy the ob
ject ; in the latter to avoid it. These definitions include' all our
affections and passions. The operations they imply are either
pleasant sensations, with a desire to enjoy the object, and oth
er desires friendly to it ; or painful uneasy sensations, with a
desire to shun the object^ that the pain it occasions may be re
moved. So sensation' and desire belong to every affection. On
particular examination, every one will find that anger, envy,
revenge, joy, delight, sorrow, grief, or any other affection?
contains nothing more or less than pleasant or painful, sensa
tions, with correspondent desires. It is, then, an object of in
quiry, why all the,operations called affections are not designa
ted by the same name. Why are not all .the affections, in
Which the sensations are pleasant, termed Jove ; and those
where the sensations are painful, hatred ? If sensations and"
desires are the ingredients in every affection and passion, why
do wecall them by so many different names ; as hatred, anger,
envy, pve, joy and delight ?
Th^ reasons are two. One is, to distinguish the difference'
in the! objects of the affections. The other is, to mark the dif
ferent circumstances attending them. This will be best explain
ed by examples.
Envy and revenge, whether called affections or passions, are
uneasy, painful sensations with their attendent desires. The

73
object of envy is superiority in a rival. The object of revenge
is recompense for some injury received. Their operation is
different. The design of one is to retaliate, and of the other
to deprive a person of his superior merit. To mark such dif
ferences, one is called revenge, and the other envy. Then if
we understand their meaning, we see the difference between
them. Take anger and revenge for another example. Anger is a
painful sensation, with a desire to injure its object. And re
venge is the same. The painful sensations of each are excit
ed by some injury ; and the desire of each is to retaliate, or
repay the injury. The difference between them is this ; anger
is an emotion suddenly excited, operates openly and violently,
and is soon spent and subsides. Revenge continues, perhaps
for months and years, operates more slowly and privately, and
cannot be satisfied, until the injury is repaid. When sudden
anger becomes rooted, abiding, and inveterate, it is then called
malice or revenge. As there are these differences between them,
they are designated by different names.
So when we hear a person is very angry, we expect he will
soon become cool and calm. When we are informed a person
is full of revenge towards another, we expect it will continue
until retaliation is effected. Anger is like a violent storm,
which is soon over ; revenge like a slow, but sure poison, which
sooner or later destroys life.
Love and hatred are sensations, with their attendant desires*
In one the sensation is pleasant ; in the other, painful. The
desire of one is the good of the object ; the aim of the other is
to injure it. In such respects they differ ; and to mark the dif
ference, one is called love, the other hatred. Yet, viewed
as operations of the heart, love is a sensation and desire ; and
hatred is the same.
Pride is a pleasant sensation. Elevation or distinction is
the object, which excites it. Desire attends it, which is to rise
to the pleasant, exalted station. Humility is a pleasant sensa
tion. The object which excites it, is self-abasement. Its de
sire is, to take a low place. But no person knows by experi
ence what humility is, unless he is born again. To the unre
newed this definition will appear strange ; because their abase
ment ever excites painful sensations. In them it is merely the
mortification of pride.
Grief, sorrow, repentance, are painful sensations, attended

74
with desires for the removal of their causes. Sin,, now hated,
is the cause of these sensations in real christians ; and they are
commonly attended with other sensations, which are agreea
ble. Joy is a pleasant emotion, united with a desire for its in
crease and continuance.
But enough has been said, to give every one a clear and
distinct view of the operations of taste. And all know by ex
perience, that some affections operate with more strength or
Vivacity, than others ; and that the same affection is more live
ly at one time than another. Here, also, it is proper to ob
serve, that the affection's are not under the control of 4he will.
My meaning is, it does not depend on a person's will, whether
objects shall please or disgust him ; whether the taste of hon
ey shall be sweet, or bitter, The sensations which objects will
excite, depend on the nature of our appetites, and of the ob
jects which surround us. Though the first emotions produced
are not under the control of the will ; yet both reason and the
will may enable us to regulate, restrain, and govern them.
But as it is not the design of these essays to attend to the re
straint and government of the affections, we may observe, that
they differ much in their strength and vivacity. Sometimes the
affections are very cool and calm ; and sometimes towards obr
jects of great importance mankind seem to be almost indiffer
ent. At other times, they operate with great force and activi
ty. This variation is produced by different circumstances, as
they occur from time to time, which will be passed by without
investigation. It may here be observed, that mankind are always governed
by their feelings, or affections. The appetites are , the only
principles of action implanted inour nature ; and by these ac
tive principles our conductmust add will be governed. Hence
the affections, which are the operations of the taste, will regu
late the conduct of men. it is as impossible for -mankind to
act in opposition "to their strongest feelings at the time, as for
matter to move in opposition to the laws of attraction and grav
itation. Again, all the affections tend to eith&rgood or evil. Active
principles always have a tendency to some end.; and -this ten
dency must be, either to promote or destroy happiness ; and
istherefore, to either good or evil. — These observations give
a general view of the affections, which are the operations of
the faculty called -taste. — The next object, whieh claims atten
tion, is a division of the affections into their distinct classes.

75
It will be remembered, that the affections contain two parts ;
sensations, either pleasant or painful in different degrees, and
desires for the enjoyment of the agreeable, or avoidance of the
disagreeable objects. As all the affections are composed of
the same operations, sensations and desires, they form one gen
eral class. Being entirely distinct in their nature from percep
tions, they cannot be operations of the same faculty. The
general class called perceptions, are the operations of the un
derstanding. But the affections are so different in their nature,
they must belong to some other faculty or property of the
mind, which is called taste. Hence there is as much reason to
believe the mind is endued with this faculty, as the one termed
the understanding. — In order to see clearly the ground of di
viding this general class, the affections, into several distinct,
specific classes, it is necessary to observe,
1. The operations of the heart in infancy.
If we proceed on the belief that to the taste belong the several
appetites,which have been illustrated,we are led to notice in the
first place the one called hunger. An infant is born with this
appetite. We might, then, expect to find the infant pleased
with food, and manifest a desire after it. And this we find is
the fact. The infant is evidently pleased with food, and espe
cially such as is best suited to its nature. Its desire for it is
evident from its crying for it, and being immediately pacified
on receiving it. These operations of hunger are some of the
first visible in an infant ; and thus far verify the theory which
has been advanced.
The appetite also, called filial affection, operates, and mani
fests itself in an infant ; and becomes more evident as it in
creases in years. A child is more pleased with its parents,
than with other persons ; and manifests a strong desire after
them, when they are absent. Such feelings are some of the
first, visible in children. They become more evident through
infancy and childhood, for several years ; but commonly de
crease, when they arrive to the age in which they become pa
rents themselves.
The appetite for novelty operates in infants. Those objects
which are new to them gain their attention, and excite strong
desires to obtain them. As new objects are sources of plea
sure to them, they are fond of hearing and reading stories,
novels, and plays. As such pursuits are generally hurtful, it
is desirable that their attention be early turned to the study of

76
the arts and sciences, where new objects will be daily unfold- ;
ing to their view. This study strengthens the mind, stores it
with useful knowledge, and good habits are formed, instead
of bad. And whenever the young and tender mind is highly
pleased with new discoveries, and manifests so strong desires
after them, as to occupy its powers in a close investigation of
subjects, we may expect such persons will make great advan
ces in the field of knowledge, and becoihe eminent, respectable,
and useful.
The operations of the appetite of pity will not be visible
so early in life ; because more or less knowledge and expe
rience are necessary to give opportunity for its exercise. But
young children will suffer pain, when they see others in dis
tress ; if they do not so early in life exert themselves to relieve
.them. They do not yet know by experience, that this is the
ready way to remove the pain, which the distress pf others ex
cited. — And according to the theory advanced, we shall not
discover any of the operations of a benevolent appetite in in
fants, or children, or any others, until born again; because
they are born without this appetite. Hence they never mani
fest any pleasure in religion, or divine objects, or in any acts
of spiritual devotion ; or any sincere desires after communion
with their Maker. On the contrary, they show an aversion to
religious exercises ; the reason of which will appeal1 in its pro
per place.
Enough has now been said to show, that the first operations
of taste in infants and children, are those of the appetites above
mentioned. — And to understand this part of the subject more
clearly, it is needful to remark, that the several classes of the
objects, which are presented to the appetites, afford pleasure
on their own account. To illustrate this observe, that food is
in itself agreeable. No reason can be given, why it gives us
pleasure. To say, it is because food suits us, is no reason.
For the words agreeable and suitable, have the same meaning.
So we may say an object is agreeable, because it suits our na
ture ; and it suits our nature, because it is agreeable. We
find it is a, fact, that some objects are so suited in their nature
to our nature, that they please us ; and we can assign no oth
er reason, why they do please. Hence we say of all such ob
jects, that they are in themselves, on their own account or na
ture, sources of pleasure to us. And in the same sense some
objects are in their nature disagreeable, sources of pain- And

77
we can give no reason why it is thus, but that God has so or
dained it. And were it not thus, we could never arrive at any
first principles, and could never attain any real knowledge.
If there were no self-evident truths, there would be no point at
which to begin to reason ; it would be no matter where we be
gan, or whether we traced things backward or forward ; we
should never arrive at a first cause, or final end. So if there
were nothing in itself good or evil, we could never arrive at
any first source of good or evil ; or at any final end pr state of
enjoyment or suffering. But God has so formed us, and objects
around us, that some of them are in their very nature agreea
ble, and others disagreeable. We here learn by experience,
as well as the word of God, how we must conduct to obtain,
happiness and avoid misery.
And the first sensations, experienced by persPns in their ear
ly infancy, are produced by objects in themselves agreeable,
or disagreeable. Hence mankind soon learn what will render
them comfortable in this life, and what will make them unhappy.
This we could never know, were not some objects in their na
ture agreeable, and others disagreeable. This being the case,
we seek the one, and avoid the other. These sensations, and
the desires we have to enjoy the objects which produce them,
are the first operations of taste mankind experience. These op
erations, to distinguish them from others, form a class, which
are properly styled primary affections ; because they are the
first affections mankind have after they are born. If you now
have a distinct view of this class of affections, you see they are
affections produced in us by objects in their nature agreeable
or disagreeable. And the objects, which produce this class of
affections, are not so numerous, as those which belong to^he
next class to be considered.
Even young children learn, that they can purchase such
articles as they love, with money. Then money is an object,
which gives them pleasure ; but not for its own sake, or as an
object in itself agreeable. They can give a good reason why
they love it ; because they can buy with it food and other plea
sant things. This shows more clearly what is meant by ob
jects in themselves agreeable, and those which are not. With
respect to the former, no reason can be given why they please ;
in relation to the latter, we can always give good reasons why
they please us.
In like manner, as persons advance in life, they find that with

78
lands, and flocks, and labour, they can raise and procure food^
and other objects in themselves agreeable. Then those ob
jects become sources of pleasure, and objects of desire. They
are pleased with them and desire them, because they can with
them obtain other objects in themselves agreeable. Here is
another class of affections. Those affections we have for ob
jects which are not in themselves agreeable, but which are val
ued as means of obtaining those in their nature pleasant, may
be called our secondary affections. They are a second class
of affections, which mankind have, after the first class. — The
objects, which produee this class of affections, are very numer
ous. They include all the objects, which are properly the
means by which we purchase or obtain things in themselves
agreeable. — To these there is scarcely any end. — If we had
not the first, we should never have the second class-of affections
just named. We should never love money or land, if we
could not obtain with it some object in itself agreeable. Hence
they are really a secondary class of affections. There is only
one other class, which claims attention.
We often see children, as well as men, manifest anger, hatred,
revenge, envy and malice. — If a child has any' thing in its pos
session, with which it is much pleased, whether in itself agree
able Or not ; if another child should take it away, and refuse
to return it, anger rises in the breast of the injured child. In
tiiis case, one child opposes the other in the gratification of his
primary or secondary affections, no matter which. For op
position to any of our primary or secondary affections, will
produce the affections or passions called anger, hatred,revenge,
&c— These passions ought to be formed into a distinct class,
which may be called malignant. These passions are malig
nant in their nature, the sources of some of the great
est crimes ever committed by man. This class may then be
said to comprise the malignant affections, or passions. I will
now show, that these passions are always produced by opposi
tion made to our primary or secondary affections.
Whatever objects are sources of pleasure to a man while
in a natural state, if we supply him with them, he will not ex
perience any dislike to us. Onr conduct towards him harmo
nises with all the feelings of his heart ; we act precisely as he
would have us. He has no ground ofuneasiness with us ; and
cannot be offended, while we thus treat him. He views us as
friends to his feelings &l happiness. And he will feel the same

79
kind of affection for us he does for food, or money, or any
other objects of his primary or secondary affections.
But if we alter our conduct, take from him objects which he
loves, or oppose him in his plans to obtain them ; and are dai
ly crossing, disappointing, and opposing his feelings and pur
suits ; he will then view us as his^nemies, and anger, and other
malignant passions will begin to operate. All this is verified
by innumerable facts from day to day. And these facts fully
prove, that malignant passions are excited by opposition in.
some way made to our primary or secondary affections.— -
Hence the reason why mankind live together in peace, so long
as they treat each other in a friendly manner, and their inter
ests do not clash together. -But when they thwart, cross, and
Oppose each other in their feelings , and pursuits, anger, feutUi,
quarrels, and wars ensue.
While God gives men fruitful seasons, and his providences
are gratifying to their feelings, they speak well of their Maker,
and extol him for his goodness and mercy. 'But when his pro
vidences are crossing and afflictive, they begin to murmur,
and view him as a ihard disaster. Hence the reason why »tbe
Jews sang praises to God in such .sublime and animated strains
at the red sea, and in a few days defter murmured, and com
plained, and rebelled against his authority. rHenee ithe reason
•why sinners, in a -state of .security, do not feel any opposition
riseimtheir hearts against God ; butsunder oonsvietions of truth,
often have their enmity strongly excited. In security, they
seldom reflect'enough on his character, or law, or government,
to realise that they are -all arrayed against them as sinners.
Of course no apposition arises in 'their hearts. But under
•real convictions of truth, tthey clearly see his character, law,
and government are such, that they must reform or perish.
They often feel as -a ¦stubborn criminal does, when the law
condemns himfor ;his of imes. He is ,angry-with ithe law, with
¦his judges, .and iwithiall who take:thp side of order and justice.
-He is angry, because they are ,<s©>o,pposed to him ; becauseihe
istnotiSufferBdto live,pefpetrating-crimes with impunity, as. he
wishes. '
This fis a sentimentjtowhich Ohristlsministers ought to, give
a .careful attention. Some from the saered desk will teach the
unrenewed, that their hearts are /dll of hatred and opposition
(to God .; and this they apply to allrsinners, bothithe stupid,
secure,and unawakenedjas well as those, who are under strong

80
conviction. The careless, secure sinner says, this preaching
is not true. I do not hate and oppose, and fight against God.
He knows this, because* he has never felt or experienced any
such hatred and opposition.
The truth is this. Sinners are born wholly destitute of love
to God ; and of this they may be convinced. But they may
not, for many years, have any positive hatred and opposition
to him. They have the seeds from which hatred,' murmuring,
and opposition will spring up, whenever events favor their
growth. ~ Till such events take place as excite opposition,
they pursue the objects which suit their appetites, and treat
God with indifference and neglect. They seldom reflect on
his character or governrrient, and have very erroneous ideas of
his real character. God is not in all their thoughts: And
they are willing He should do his pleasure, if he will permit
them to do as they please with impunity, and grant them' the
prosperity they desire. Thus they live without feeling any
opposition in their hearts to God. So far are they from this,
that if they prosper in worldly blessings, & meet with no cross
ing events, they experience what is called : -natural gratitude;
and will speak of God as a very good and kind being, worthy
of love, and thankfulness and service. Indeed they will talk
in a way which, as far as professions go, manifests much love
and gratitude^ as though they were his real friends. And
from this flow of feelings and affections within, which are ex
cited entirely by their prosperity, they often make themselves
believe they do love God, and are real christians.
At the same time, if providential events cross and oppose
their desires, and hedge up their way, then a complaining,
murmuring and rebellious disposition is excited. Also if their
consciences are enlightened, and they have so much convic
tion of truth as to see that the holy character of God. his law
and government, are directly against them as sinners, arid that,
if they do not repent, and turn to God, they must be forever
miserable ; then all their inward desires are opposed, and cross
ed. For their desire is, to live as they wish with impunity.
And when they see this cannot be, that if they live in sin they
must suffer eternal death ; then their opposition will rise a-
gainst God. And when by conviction they further see they
are wholly dependant on God for that new heart, which is ne
cessary to life ; and of course their eternal state is suspended
on his holy, and sovereign pleasure 5 they then have views,

whieh are in all respects against them arid opposed to every
desire of their hearts. With this light theit hearts rise, ofteh,
to a fearful height of opposition. They look on God as a
hard master, a cruel tyrant ; and they would in their rage de
throne Him, if they had power. Arid abundant experience
teaches, that there is nothing which will excite so great enmi
ty and opposition to God, as his absolute sovereignty. When
this is held up to view in the doctrines of decrees and election ;
and when seen and realized by a sinner^ his heart swell* With
enmity and rage. The reason is, there is nothing so perfectly
Opposed to a sinner's heart, as his entire dependance on the
pleasure of God, to be lost as a transgressor, or be saved by
grace. Hence there are but two conditions, in Which real hatred and
Opposition of heart to God will arise. One is, When providen
tial events cross and oppose their primary or secondary desires.
The Pther is, when sinners are under a real conviction of truth.
But so long as all providential events harmonize with a sinner's
desires ; and so long as they do not see, or realize the opposi
tion of the divine character and government to their selfish
arid perverse inclinations ; so longthey are free from the oper
ations of positive hatred to God ; although the seeds of enmi
ty are latent in their hearts, and only wait for occasions of be
ing elicited, and manifested to themselves and their fellow men,
as they are now manifest to the eye of God.
Our primary affections form one class of the operations of
pur taste ; secondary affections, a second ; and our malignant
passions, a third. These three classes include all the operatioris
of this faculty. It is presumed no one can name any affection
or passion, which is not clearly contained in one or another of
the classes I have named.
These are the active principles, the laws of our nature, which
put every wheel in motion ; and from which have proceeded
all the evils, and crimes, Which have been committed in this
world. In scripture they are called lusts. So when the ques
tion is asked, from whence come Wars and fightings ; the an
swer is, from the lusts which war in our members.
These principles are sufficient to explain the conduct pf
men. By them it is easy to account for all the actions of
moral agents, and assign tfae reasons, of their conduct in eve
ry condition of life. If a person makes the accumulation of
property, or high stations of honor, or scenes of pleasure, his
K

82
great and principal object ; if he defrauds, commits thfeft, er
murder ; or if he is moral, kind, liberal, and performs acts of
charity and benevolence ; it is easy to show, that such and all
his other actions proceed from :these principles or affections.
The' principles here advanced agree with facts, and with the
observation and experience of all men. Is not every one sure
and certain, that he perceives objects, not only their existence,
but their properties, modes, and relations ? Is he not sure,
that he perceives truth and falsehood, good and evil, right
and wrong i Can he doubt whether he is a feeling being, a.
subject of pleasure and pain; or whether he has desires to obtain
some objects,,and to shun others ; .or that he has affections and
passions ? Can he doubt whether his feelings excite him to
action ? And if he, were to make it an object of inquiry, what
principles and motives governed him in any of his particular
pursuits in life, could he npt ascertain them • And , he would
always find that his actions proceeded from these inward, ac
tive principles, which , he knows operate wifhiri him- Upon
these principles, we may reason as correctly and safely concern
ing phenomena in morals, as we can on the first principles in
natural philosophy concerning the phenomena in the material
world. We should find some facts more difficult to account
for, than others ; and some, perhaps, inexplicable. . This is to
be expected in every science. With respect to, men, I see no
great difficulty in accounting, on the principles advanced, for
their actions and conductin the several grades, and stations of
life. And the profession of a -minister is such, it is one part
of his study to account for the conduct of mankind. In this
way he explains their characters, shows them what they are,
and opens to their view the inward springs of action, and the
external effects they will produce, so clearly, that persons often
think that some one has informed him of their feelings and
conduct. To me it appears impossible for a minister to ex
plain the character and conduct of man in the most convincing
manner, unless he is acquainted with those internal, active prin
ciples, which govern all men* Before I had any clear, dis
tinct view of them, many things appeared dark, and mysterious,
which now are as obvious as day light. On the application of
those principles, in explaining and accounting for the actions
and conduct of mankind, I will detain you no longer at this
time. For their truth and application will appear more clear
and evident, as we pass on to other subjects, and especially, to

83
explain the operations of the will, and the nature of liberty,
and the motives by which all are influenced. For the sake
of assisting the memory, I shall conclude this essay by a brief
repetition of the leading ideas, and those most important to
be remembered, which have been explained concerning taste.
The taste or heart is a distinct property or faculty of the
mind, which prepares it for those Operations called the affec
tions and passions. To this faculty belong several distinct ap
petites, such as hunger, pity, natural propensities or affections,
and love of novelty, implanted in us by God for our preserva
tion, comfort, improvement, and well being, while in the pres
ent state of existence. This is a feeling faculty, the subject of
all our pleasant and painful sensations ; the primary spring, or
principle of action. It constitutes agency ; is the seat of
all vice and virtue ; and is of course a moral faculty.—
Without it, mankind would be inactive beings, like all existen
ces incapable of feeling.
Each affection and passion contains two operations ; a sen
sation either pleasant or painful ; and a desire to obtain the
object, if agreeable, or to avoid it, if disagreeable. These two
operations, sensation & desire, combine to form every affection
and passion. Hence all the affections, in their nature simply,
are similar ; though they differ much in vivacity and strength.
Sensations and desires are the only operations of this faculty j
& being perfectly similar, they form another moral class of op
erations of the mind, termed the affections and passions. And
as this class is totally different in its nature from the class call
ed perceptions, there is no way to account for them but on this
ground, that the mind is endued with the property denominat
ed taste.
The general class of operations called the affections is di
vided into three distinct classes. The first operations experi
enced by a human being in infancy and childhood, are for ob
jects in their nature agreeable or disagreeable. These being
the first experienced, are classed together, and called our pri
mary affections. When affections are excited by objects which
are indifferent in themselves, but which are regarded as neces
sary means of gratifying other desires, they form another class,
denominated secondary affections. They are the second oper
ations which we feel, andarise from the preceding or primary
class. And when men have their primary or secondary affec
tions crossed and disappointed, either by God or man, the

84
sensations of hatred, anger, malice, envy, or revenge, are ex
cited. These form a third class, called the malignant passions.
The appetites, from which these classes of operations arise,
are distinct laws of our nature by which all men are invariably
governed- And by a proper application of them, all the ac
tions a»d branches of conduct in men, in their various pur
suits, may be accounted for and explained. When these are
understood aright, then we have a knowledge of human nature,
and npt till thpn ; I mean a knowledge of the principles, which
govern men.

**********
ESSAY XII.
Of the Will, and its Operations.
Scarcely-any writer, that I now recollect, has consideredVthe
heart and will to be distinct faculties, Th ty have generally
Dper* treated as one and the same. Yet I hope to make it api*
pear that they are distinct faculties, and ought not to be blend
ed with the understanding. — The want of this distinction has
occasioned much confusion in the discussions of this subject,
The will anditsraptsaTe-as difiacenLas-tbe suhjectarid pre
dicate of a proposition,^ Accordingly " tlnTwilliscQn!s!a'$red
as a subject^ jind volitions are the operations predicated of it.
We therefore say, the will chooTes-and-refosos, — And volun
tary exertions are the only operations, which properly belong
to the will. There is certainly a preparedness or adaptedness
in the mind, for operations of this particular kind. If there
were not, it never could choose or refuse. For the mind can
not have those operations, to which it has no, adaptedness. A
square body is not adapted to that kind of motion called roll
ing. There is no adaptedness in matter for the operations of
thinking, and feeling. And if the mind were not prepared tp
be the subject of those operations termed perceptions, feelings,
and volitions, it could no more perceive, feel, and choose, than
matter itself can. But the mind does think, feel, and choose.

85
These are facts, which prove undeniably, that it is prepared
for these several operations. And a particular preparedness,
fitness, or adaptedness for that kind of operations called voli
tions, is what I mean and understand by the term will, consid
ered as a faculty of the mind. Some will say, this is no defini
tion. I grant it is not. It is impossible to define simple ideas.
Can any one define pain, or pleasure ? If I were to say, the
will is a power to choose and refuse, or a capacity for volun
tary exertions, as many do ; yet I might be requested to define
power, and capacity. For these as really need defining, as
the term will itself. The truth is, no one can give a logical
definition of any simple thought, or existence. They can be
illustrated by other words, which are better understood, if such
words can be found. The will, then, is a preparedness of the
mind for voluntary exertions.
We may now take into consideration the operations of this
faculty. Those I call volitions. Every volition has an ob
ject. When we choose, there is something chosen. And the
thing chosen, is what I mean by the object of volition. The
immediate object of volition, is generally the motion of the
whole body, or some one of its members. When I make a
voluntary exertion to move my hand, the motion of the hand
is the immediate object of this exertion. I move my hand to
take my pen. I keep it in motion, that my pen may continue
to move in making letters, and words. This is done to answer
further purposes and ends., I may move my hand to take a
swordt to put it in motion for my defence, or to produce some
other effect. If an end is to be obtained, and a number of ef
fects are necessary to obtain it, these are produced by volitions,
or voluntary exertions. The first effeet produced is some bod
ily motion. This is necessary, in order to produce the next
effect in the arrangement ; and this in order to the next in
succession, until the desired end is attained. The motion of
the body, or some of its members, is the first effect produced
by the exertions of the will. Then the other effects, necessary
to the end, follow each other in a regular Succession. This
motion of the body, or first effect produced, is what I mean by
the immediate object of volition. Other effectsproduced, inter
vene between the first and the last, which puts us in possession
of the object or end sought. The last effect is the ultimate ob
ject of volition. And those effects, which intervene between
thefrrst and the last, are its intermediate objects.

86
Whenever the will makes exertions to produce bodily motion,
the motion follows, unless prevented by superior force.' And
all the effects willed follow, unless superior strength, or resist
ance of some kind, prevent them. And all these effects which
God has connected with our voluntary exertions, are in our
power ; and no others. If God had established the same con
nexion between voluntary exertions and flying, as he has be
tween them and walking, we could move from one place to
another by flying, as easily as we now can by walking. Arid ten
thousand effects, such as stopping the earth in its orbit, or over
turning the Chinese empire, are effects, which we could as ea
sily produce by one single exertion, if Gopl had connected
them with it, as we can now walk or speak. When the con
nexion between the will and the motion of the hand, is destroy
ed by a paralytic stroke, we can no more move the hand, than
create a world, Hence those effects, and those only, which are
connected with our volitions, are in our power. Whatever is
connected with the will, we can do ; and whatever is not, is
beyond our reach. The body and its members are, in general,
under the controul of the will ; and every other thing, as far
as is necessary to answer all the purposes of moral agency.
Not only the body, but the understanding, is more or less
in the power of the will. We find by experience we can turn
our thoughts from one object or subject to another. We can
confine our attention to any particular subject'; and, if it wan
der, call it back again. Our thoughts are evidently under the
control of the will. The will can turn them in any direction ;
recal them, when they wander ; and confine them to the inves
tigation of subjects, whenever necessary. If our thoughts
were not in our power, we should make very slow,, if any ad
vances, in scientific knowledge. We should also be, in a great
measure, incapable of acting, and attaining the objects of our
desire. At best, we should be very imperfect agents. But
this will be more particularly considered in another place.
This we know is true by experience, that the direction of our
thoughts, and the motions of the body, as far as is necessary,
are connected with the will ; each of them is subjected to its
power. Yet it must be acknowledged, that human power is
very limited. There are many things to which we are utterly
incompetent. God has, however, given us as much power as
is necessary for us, in the grade of existence which we occupy.
We have sufficient power, if the heart were rightly inclined,

87
to avoid every thing which is prohibited, and dp every thing
required of us, by our Lord and master. We have sufficient
power to be good and faithful servants unto the death. And
more power than this we do not need.
I shall now proceed to show the difference between the op
erations of the heart, and those of the will. Here let it be re-f
membered,that pleasant and painful sensations, and the desires
which accompany them, are the operations of the heart. And!
volitions are the exertions of the will, to produce the effectsj
necessary to gratify the feelings of the heart. Hence, \
I. It must be evident to any reflecting, candid mind, that N
neither a pleasant or painful sensation is a volition. Is the
exertion a person makes to move his hand to take an Orange,
the same thing with the pleasure it gives him ? Is the pain a
person has, when his teeth ache, the same operation in kind
with the exertion he makes to extract them ? Every person's
experience teaches him, that sensations, and exertions to move
the body, are operations generically different. He must know,
if unbiassed, that volitions, which have the motion of some
part of the body for their object, are neither agreeable or pain
ful sensations. He must know it to be a fact, that pleasure
, and pain produce no visible, external effects. A person may
contemplate distant objects with great pleasure, for days and
weeks, without one motion towards them. But if he makes
exertions to attain such agreeable objects, bodily motion, and
other effects immediately follow. He cannot make an exertion
, to move his hand, and at the same time keep it. at rest. But
objects may please, and displease him, yet he remain at rest.
This is a fact. Hence bodily motions and other effects,, which
are connected with the will, have no immediate connexion with
our sensations, either pleasant or painful. If sensations and
volitions were operatipns of the same kind ; if a sensation were
a volition, the former would produce the same effects the latter
produces. But this we know is not a fact. We know, that
an exertion to move the hand is followed by its motion. But
an object may please me, and no motion or effort to attain it,
follow. Experience then teaches, that sensations and volitions
are totally different operations,
2. Volitions and desires are not operations of the same facul
ty. I have already observed, that the immediate object of vo
lition is bodily motion, some action, to produce some effect.
Now, though desire has an object, yet its object is not an ac-

88
tion, or an effect. Therefore the objects of volition and desire
are not the same. I desire meat, or drink. But meat and
drink are not actions. To obtain those objects many effects
may be necessary. These, if connected with the will, are the
objects of volition. Now if desire and volition were the same,
their objects would be the same. But we know it is a fact that
they are different. I may desire meat or drink, and yet not
one effect follow necessary to obtain them* But when I will
these eftects, they follow, they are produced.
We may desire what we do not will. A man, who is thirs
ty, desires drink ; yet, for certain reasons, may not make one
exertion to obtain it. The^lrinkmay, at the same time, be be
fore him, and within his reach. If he makes an exertion to
take it, the motion necessary follows, arid the drink is brought
to his mouth. If desire and volition ware the same thing, if a
desire is a volition, his desire for the drink would bring it to
his mouth. We might proceed to notice this difference in a
hundred other particular instances. But it is not necessary.
For every person, who is intimately acquainted with the oper
ations of his own mind, mus*t know, that many objects may
be desired, yet no exertions may be made to obtain them.
Hence a desire is not a volition. If it Were, the effects neces
sary to obtain the objects of desire would follow, as soon as it
existed. For the moment we make exertions to move the hand
or foot, and produce other effects, these motions and effects
follow. This is a decisive proof that a desire is not a volition*.
And every person's experience daily decides this dispute. Do
not all persons know they frequently have desires to visit
friends and neighbors, yet make no exertions to accomplish
the object ? Yet if a desire is a volition, the moment they have
such a desire the exertion is made, and the visit would soon
be accomplished. It appears then that those persons, who
consider desires to be volitions, have never given much atten
tion to the operations of their own minds.
- 3. Whether objects shall please or disgust us, does not de
pend on any thing in us, except our nature ; but whether they
shall be chosen or riot, depends on our pleasure. Our nature,
and the nature of objects, are such, they will please or displease
us. Does it depend on our pleasure to say, whether beautiful
colors, and melodious sounds shall give us pleasure ? Orwhe-
ther discordant sounds, and fetid scents shall offend us, or not?
Pleasure and paia are not produced by choice ; neither cart.

£9
choice prevent them. Whether we will or not, some objects
will please us, and .others will disgust us. But whether they
are chosen or rejected, depends on our pleasure. Many ob
jects, which are agreeable, are rejected; and many,, which are
disgustful, are chosen. For instance, sometimes food, which
is agreeable to the taste, is refused, and disgustful medicines
are chosen and received. Though these things, and many
others, will be agreeable or disgustful to oar taste, anpV it is
not possible for us to prevent it ', yet we can choose, or reject
them. This shows, that our voluntary exertions depend on our
pleasure ; but our pleasures, pains, .and desires do not depend
on the will. Or in other worths, the operations of the will are
Under the government of the heart, but the operations of the
heart are not under the government of the will. But if our
feelings of pleasure andpain, and desires, (w.hich are the oper
ations of the heart, or taste,) are volitions, then our volitions
are governed by our volitions ; which is absurd.
The will is influenced arid governed by the heart. Our de
sires give rise to volitions. When I come to a right and left
hand path, for certain reasons I may desire to take one, and
for other reasons desire to travel the other ; & the strongest de
sire will finally prevail. My choice, which moves my body in
either path, is .determined by my strongest. desire. And as the
will never determines itself, St is influenced by the.strongest de
sire, desire is not an operation of the w. ,1 For that,* which deter
mines the will,is no tan act of _tjie will. And as our feelings &£ de
sires govern and determine the Will, they are not acts of the
will, but antecedent to them. But this argument will be set
in a more clear and forcible light, when we attend to the influ
ence of motives, and consider what it is that determines the
will. The evidence of its truth will appear with increasing
strength from several subjects, which will be discussed in their
proper place. I shall now
4. fjbserve, that vice and virtue have their seat in the heart,
hot in the will. This constitutes an essential difference be
tween these two faculties.
When the divine character is clearly exhibited to the view
of an attentive mifid, arid a person has a consistent knowledge
of it, apd is .filled. with joy, is not this a holy joy ? What is
holy joy, but a true delight in the character of God ? When, ¦
he contemplates. the government of God, and rejoices that the
Lord reigns, is not this a holy rejoicing ? This joy is attend
ed with ardent desire for tile increasing displays of the glory

90
of God. He may have an ardent desire, that sinners might
submit to the will and government of God. Are not these ho
ly desires ? But this joy is Only an emotion of pleasure, ex
cited by the character and government of Jehovah. These
holy desires are those which attend such agreeable sensations.
And this delight in God, and this desire for the glory of his
name, are the ingredients of that affection called love to him,
and his government.
When a person of this character has a knowledge of himself,
and sees that he has sinned against a holy God, his heart is
broken and contrite for sin. He has what the scriptures call
repentance, and godly sorrow. These feelings of his heart
are attended with earnest desires to overcome all remaining
wickedness, to be delivered from the dominion arid pollution
of sin, and be holy as God is holy. Is not this sorrow for sin
a holy sorrow, and these desires holy desires ?
Another person, when he has a clear view of God's charac
ter and government, is filled with pain. He has strong desires
to dethrone God, or rise above him, that he may sin
with impunity. Are not these operations sinful affections ?
Who can deny it ? Have not these two persons hearts totally
different in their nature ? Are not their feelings as different
as sin and holiness ? But their feelings are nothing but affec
tions ; which are, as I have shown, the operations of the taste
or heart. These affections exist, antecedently to those vol
untary exertions, which they make in order to gratify their
desires. Hence holy and sinful affections exist antecedently
to volitions, which are the only operations of the will. For
persons may have all these affections, without making one exer
tion to move the body or tp produce any other effects. Such
exertions, by which I mean volitions, are not necessary to the
existence of these affections. And if voluntary exertioiis Were
made to produce such affections, it would avail nothing ;
for the heart is not under the power of the will. A person
by willing can no more produce love to God in his heart, than
he can produce a world by willing it. If any reader is not
convinced of this truth, he may convince himself by making
the trial.
A person injures his neighbor. The injury the latter has
received excites revenge in his heart. It gives him pain,
which is attended with a desire to be revenged, the first oppor
tunity, by taking his neighbor's life. I ask, does not this feelw

91
ing, called revenge, constitute the crime termed murder ? Our
Lord says, if a man look on a woman, and lust after her, he
hath committed adultery with her in his heart already. What
is this lust, but a desire for the commission of the sinful act ?
This our Lord calls adultery. Indeed, the more any person
attends to this subject, the more he will be convinced, that no
operations of the mind are sinful or holy, but those which are
termed the affections and passions. And these, it has been
shown, are the operations of the heart. They have a full and
complete existerice, antecedent to those operations which I call
volitions. Of course our volitions cannot be considered as vicious or
virtuous, any more than the operations of the understanding
can be viewed in this light.
There are two reasons, why vice and virtue are seated in the
heart or affections, and not in volitions. ,1. The heart or
taste with its affections are the primary principle of action.
All the actions may be traced back to the heart, as the prima
ry fountain from which they proceed ; and they cannot be tra
ced back any further, or to any antecedent principle of action
in a moral agent. From the heart all good and evil proceed.
The moral character of man, then, is just what his heart is.
2. The will is only an executive faculty. It is no more than a
servant to the heart, to execute its pleasure. The will is no
primary principle of action ; its office is to obey the commands
of the heart. Accordingly, for all the good or evil produced
by the will,the heart only is praise or blafne worthy ; or every
moral agent is to be blamed or praised, on account of the good
or evil heart in him.
Hence no one need be surprised at the sentiment advanced.
For the more he reflects upon it, the more he will be convinced
it is correct, and accords with the word of God.
This will appear more evident to any candid person, if he
duly considers the end to be answered by our voluntary exer
tions. These exertions are made to gratify the feelings, or
affections of the heart. The man, who has revenge or murder
in his heart, makes exertions, and employs his bodily powers,
to put an end to the life of his victim. What is the design of
all those motions and effects, produced by the will, but to grat
ify his revenge ? This is the great design of all our volitions,
to produce those external effects necessary to gratify our affec
tions and passions.

92
Now is there riot a generic difference, between those opera
tions which are sinful or holy, and those which are neither vi
cious or virtuous ? There can be no operations of the mind,
between which there is a more essential difference in their very
nature Pr kind. And it is perfectly unphilosophical, and serves
only to confuse us in our investigations, to class those operar
tions together, which have a, generic difference, Our voli
tions then are operations, which cannot be classed with the
affections, nor he considered as, operations of the heart. They,
therefore, form a third general class of operations. They are
not operations of the understanding ; for there is no likeness
between! them antj perceptions. And for the same reason,. they
cannot be considered as the opferatiops of the taste or heart.
They must, therefore,, he referred tp the will. Vqlitiqns are
the operatipns of this faculty, and of no other. This general
class does not admit of any subdivisions into specific classes.
For every volition is designed to answer the sariie purpose}
which is, the production qf those effects, which f,r& necessary
to., obtain the objects of the, affections. The will is a servant
toi the heart. It is given to execute its wishes, arid put it in
possession of those objects, which gratify and satiate its-feel-;
ings. As every voluntary exertion answers the same purpose,
one volition does not specifically differ from; another. Of
cpurse this general class of operations is not divisible into any
specific classes.
Some have attempted to account' for the manifest difference,
which exists between pur affections and volitions,; by making a
distinction between immanent and imperate, acts of the will.
By immanent acts theymean^ if I understand them, what 1 call
the affections and passions. And by impprate. acts, those qper-~
afions which I call volitions. They therefore consider those
immanent and imperate acts to be operations, of the same facul-
ty,„called the will. But from what has been said, it, is evident,
tins is classing those, operations together, whichgenericaily dif
fer from each other. t
Why do not philosophers consider all the. operations of the
understanding, and the affections, as constituting but one gen
eral class of operations, and as belonging to. one faculty ? The
reason is, they see no similarity betweeni intellectual percep-s
tipns and affections- A perception is not a feeling either, of
pleasure or pain, nor a desire. And pleasure, and pain, and de
sires, they clearly see, are not perceptions. Hence classing

93
them together would be imprdper, and create confusion. It
would be confounding things which differ, and destroying all
those distinctions which are necessary to the acquirement of
"scientific knowledge. For a person has no more than a con
fused notion of things, who does not make distinctions, where
there are differences ; or point out the difference between one
thing and another. As perceptions and affections generically
differ, philosophers have distinguished them, and formed them
into distinct classes ; and so they have admitted the existence
of two faculties. And for the same reason they admit two,
they ought to grant there are three faculties. For when we at
tend to the affections and to volitions, it is evident there is a
generic difference between them. It is evident that pain, plea
sure, and desires, are not volitions ; and have no similarity to
those voluntary exertions, which produce effects on the body,
and in other things around us. For these affections do not
immediately produce any external effects ; they are effects
themselves produced by the heart, and are either virtuous or
vicious. For it has been shown, that vice and virtue belong
to the heart only, and its operations, or affections. There is,
therefore, no more propriety in classing the affections and vo
litions together, than in making but one class of the affections
& perceptions. The affections & volitions so widely differ, that
they naturally divide themselves into two distinct, general clas
ses. Of course, they cannot belong to the same faculty ; and
the distinction concerning immanent and imperate -acts, is in
consistent and useless. Those who make this distinction, di
vide the affections and volitions into two general classes ; for
the difference between them is so great, they cannot avoid ad
mitting it. But to grant it, and then refer both classes to the
same faculty, is unphilosophical, and creates confusion of ideas.
But the importance of admitting that the mind has three
faculties, will appear more clearly and fully in some of the
subsequent essays. I have now finished what I intended to
say on the faculties, of the mind, and their respective opera
tions. The numerous operations of the understanding I have
called by one general name, perceptions. I think I have made
it evident, that every operation of this faculty is a perception.
Those perceptions are divided into distinct, specific classes,
termed reason, memory, conscience, judgment, imagination.
And the numerous operations of the taste or heart, are known
by the name of affections. This general class is divided into

94
several specific classes, termed primary, secondary, and malig
nant affections. And the numerous operations of the will are
known by the term volitions. This class does not admit of any
divisions. These three general classes, perceptions, affections,
and volitions, include all the operations of the mind. It is
presumed no person can name an operation,which is notinclud-
ed in one or the other of these classes;" As these several clas
ses generically differ, for the same reasons that two faculties
have been admitted to belong to the human mind, it is ne
cessary to admit a third.

»*#*******

ESSAY XIII.
General Observations on Moral Agency.
Very different opinions concerning moral agency and liber
ty, have prevailed among the learned. This has occasioned
very warm disputes, and numerous treatises. Of the different
theories which have been advanced, very few, if any, agree
wholly with facts and experience. The different opinions
which have been embraced are included, I believe, either in
the Armirtian scheme, or the Calvinistic. Each of these
schemes has been warmly defended by the ablest pens. Though
the parties have widely differed, yet on some points they have
been agreed. In this essay it is my design to show how far
they are agreed, and in what particulars they differ ; which
will prepare the way for a more distinct discussion of the sub
ject in the next essay. — The great dispute has been, and is still,
what is necessary to constitute a being a real agent, and prop
er object of praise and blame, and a proper subject of rewards.
To constitute such a being it is agreed,
1. That he must be an agent. It is agreed on both sides,
that a being, who is not an agerit, is not a proper object of
praise or blame. But what is agency ? Respecting this,
different opinions have prevailed. And here is the proper
place to discuss this subject. The words cdhise, agency, effr

95
aiency, action, are used in so many difierent senses, and their
meaning is so ambiguous, that it is very difficult to explain
their meaning. This, however, I shall attempt, so far as is
necessary to understand the subject under consideration.
Whatever begins to exist is an effect, and must have a cause.
And in things, which do exist, many changes and alterations
take place. All such changes are effects, which must have a
cause. And the causes must be adequate to the production of
such effects, or they could not have an existence. These are
first principles, which no candid person will deny. To the
production of an effect a cause must operate, must act. For
it does not appear to be possible for an inoperative, inactive
cause, if it may be called a cause, to produce any effect. A
proper cause then is something, which is in its nature operative
and active. The operation of a cause is what we mean by
action, and by activity, energy and efficiency. This implies a
distinction between the thing, which is a cause, and its action,
or operation. If the nature of a thing is such, that it will op
erate and act, and produce effects, whenever there is an oppor
tunity for it, it is a proper cause; it is an active, efficient cause.
If any being has a principle in him of this nature, a princi
ple which is active and operative, he is an agent. This active
principle constitutes agency. In this active principle his agen
cy consists. All things which exist either act, or are acted up
on ; they are either active agents, or passive subjects. And
perhaps there is nothing in existence, of which both action and
passion may not be predicated. A ball, when put in motion
by some impulse, is acted upon. It is passive, or suffers the
force of the impulse. But when we view it in motion, and in
relation to some effect it produces, it acts and is the cause of
effects. Motion is the action of the ball. And the effect it
produces is greater or less, in proportion to its weight, magni
tude, and velocity. In receiving an impulse, it is passive ; in
moving and producing effects, it is active. These observations
are true with respect to all inanimate existences. But though
such kinds of existence, viewed in one relation, maybe consid
ered as acting, and as causes of effects ; yet they are riot agents,
according to the sense in which this word ought to be Used,
when we treat on the subject of moral agency. Because their
motion does not proceed from any operative principle inherent
in them.
Some say a cause is only an antecedent, and, an effect the con-

96
sequence of this antecedent ; and that this is all we know con
cerning what we call causes and effects. They seem to ex
clude all idea of energy, activity, or efficiency, as belonging
to the nature of a cause. If they would admit, that energy,
activity, or something of this nature, is inherent in soriie
causes, there would be no ground of objection to their view pf
causes and effects. But if all energy or efficiency is denied,
as existing in any cause, if is difficult to see how we can ac
count for the existence of any effect, or what they call a con
sequence. And if it is granted, that God is an efficient cause j
thajt in him is energy, activity, which constitutes Him an ac
tive agent ; why may not man be endued with the same prin
ciple, so as tp make him an active agent ? His being depend
ent, and his powers hmited, are no objection of any weight
against viewing him an active agent. If God can create a de
pendent, limited being, why can he not endue him with an ac
tive, dependent, limited, principle of action ? I see no objection
of weight against this, and of course prefer viewing a moral
agent as really having in his heart the same active, energetic
principle, as we suppose God possesses. It is granted this ac
tive principle in man, which renders him an agent, is depend
ent and limited. So is bis being ; yet he is a real being, dis
tinct from God.
Mankind possess an internal principle of action. They
have one property, which is active in its nature. This proper
ty or quality we call the heart, or the faculty of taste. Its
nature is such that all objects will please or disgust it, in a
greater or less degree. It is true, the pleasure and pain are
often so feeble as to be wholly unnoticed, and we are prone
to say, that we feel nothing. ' We pay no attention to feel
ings, which are very feeble and faint. When they are strong
and lively, they gain our attention. Yet there is no reason to
believe we are perfectly indifferent, or without any feeling iri-
the view of .objects, at any time. But we are not apt to con
sider any feeling a real pleasure, or pain, unless so lively and
strong as to gain our attention. Feelings, which pass unno
ticed, we are apt to say are no feelings ; and pf course are
indifferent towards objects, which make such slight impres
sions. But we have reason to conclude from the nature of the
heart, that every object makes some impression,though perhaps
feeble. It must be obvious to any person of reflection, that an
existence, which ihas no feeling quality, or is incapable of

97
pleasure and pain, has no internal principle of action. And
this is one essential difference between active, and inactive be
ings. The former are endued with feeling, the latter are not.
This constitutes one essential difference between material and
spiritual substances. It is presumed that if matter, which is
now inert, were endued with feeling, it would immediately
discover appearances of activity. If it were the subject of
pleasure and pain, it could not remain in a state of rest. Such
feelings would put it in motion. Mankind, when their feelings
of pleasure or pain are very faint, find no difficulty in contin
uing in a state of almost total rest, and inactivity. But when
their feelings are very acute and strong, they find it is impos
sible to remain inactive. How animated apd active a person is
when filled with joy. How active and spirited, when he is an
gry. With what zeal and life the avaricious, the proud, the
ambitious, the voluptuous, pursue their respective objects.
But whence arises all this activity ? From the pleasure they
feel, in view of the objects of their pursuit, or expect to derive
from them, when attained. With what speed persons flee from
danger, when they apprehend it ; and with what zeal they use
means, when in distress, to gain relief. What is the cause,,
which excites them to action in such cases ? It is pain.
Hence pleasure and pain are the springs of action in moral
agents. Deprive mankind of this feeling principle ; let them
become as incapable of pleasure and pain, as rocks are, and
they would be as inactive. Motives would have no influence
upon them. There would be no spring to action in them ;
nothing to excite them to seek one thing, or avoid another.
We might multiply facts to prove, that a quality, or faculty,
susceptible of pleasure and pain, is the only-active principle in
the universe. It is the primary, original cause of all existen
ces, and of all the changes which they undergo. And the
more any person attends to this subject, the more he will be
convinced of its truth.
Hence the heart, or the faculty of taste, being the only pro
perty of the mind which is susceptible of pleasure and pain, is
the principle of action in moral agents. We have once distin
guished between a cause, and its operations or actions. The
heart is a cause ; its operations, such as pleasure and pain, and
their attendant desires, are its actions. The heart, when it is
pleased or displeased, and has desires to avoid disgustful ob
jects, or to enjoy those which are pleasing, is operating, and
M

98
produces the effects designed. The first and immediate effects
it produces are volitions ; and by means of these and bodily
motions, it produces all the effects necessary to reach the ends
desired. This, then, isin man the primary and original cause
of all his actions, and motions, the source from which they all
proceed. The heart constitutes human agency, and efficien
cy. This is the only primary, active, operative cause belong
ing to his nature, The will, it is granted, operates aiid acts.
But it is not a primary principle of action. Its operations and
acts are effects produced by the heart. This brings more
clearly into view, what I aimed to prove in the preceding es
say, a generic difference between the heart and the will.
The actions of the will do, not proceed. from any activity in it
self. They are the effects of a prior cause, which is the heart.
The hearty then, is an active principle ; the will is not, any
more than ia ball, when in motion. Like the ball, it is put in
motion, or derives its activity from the heart, the preceding
cause. This is true, if a being incapable of feeling would' be
inactive. For if , men did not feel, the will would never act.
Hence feelings are antecedent to volitions, and the cause of
them. This shows, that the heart and will are distinct facul
ties ; so .different, that one is an active principle, and the oth
er is not.
And beings, who are endued with an active principle, are
agents ,; but those destitute of any such principle, are not, in
the proper , sense of the word, agents ; they are only the in
struments, which agents use in the accomplishment of their
wishes. Objects impress, or act on the heart. And while objects
are impressing it, the heart is constantly operating, and pro
ducing effects, If objects could not, and did not, impress the
heart, ;Biotiyes would have no influence. For their influence
consists wholly in the impressions they make. When they
please or displease, they impress us. If they did not have this ,
effect, we should be neither pleased nor offended ; and of
course, should never act at all. But objects, or motives, are
not agents ; they .are only a means of action. They are not
endued with any principle of action. They are not the sub
jects of pleasure or pain. But they are necessary means, or
pccasions of action, or of the operation of what we call active
causes. In the sense explained it appears, that the Deity is acted up-

99
on. The ultimate end of all his operations,, is something in
itself agreeable to his berievolent heart. This end gives him
pleasure. By pleasing him it acts upon his heart, or impress
es it, and by thus impressing it influences him to pursue the
plan necessary to attain his ultimate end. But the e.id, which
influences him, is not an agent ; is not the cause, which gave
existence to this world, and the events of providence. His
heart is the primary, original cause of the existence of all
things. As I observed in the beginning of this essay, it is agreed on
all sides, that man must be an agent to be a proper object of
praise and blame ; yet they differ with respect to the thing in
which agency consists. Some say it consists in a self-deter
mining power. Different persons have entertained different
notions concerning that kind of agency, which is requisite to
praise and blame-worthiness. I grant that if man is not an
agent, he is not a proper object of praise and blame. Because
nothing could be imputed to him as his act. For no actions
are properly his, but those which proceed from an active prin
ciple inherent in him. What this active principle is, which
constitutes the agency, and efficiency of man, as well as of
God, I have laboured to prove artd illustrate under this first
particular head. I now hope it is evident to every unbiassed
mind, that the heart, which is the only feeling facility, is the
primary original cause in man of all his actions. This con
stitutes him an agent; an active being. If also appears, that
he has the same kind of agency, that his Maker possesses.
The difference between the divine and human agency is this ;
one is derived, the other is not j one is dependent, the other is
independent ; one is finite, the other is infinite. Yet men are
complete agents ; for they are endued with a principle of ac
tion. And many of those, who say the will is the only active
principle in, man, 'grant, that if men had not a capacity for plea
sure and pain, they could not be moral agents ; because hav
ing nothing to influence them to act, they would not act at all.
If they had not this capacity, no object Would ever please or
1 displease them. We should, therefore, be forever in a state of
indifference, in which state it would be impossible to act. This
is the manner in which many Calvinistic divines reason, who
at the same time say, that the will constitutes human agency.
But when they say this capacity is necessary to action, is it
not the same as to allow it is the primary original principle of

100
action, and that principle which constitutes agency ? If they
do not mean this, their words, in my view, have no meaning.
For saying, without this capacity men would never act, or be
riioral agents, is thesame as to assert, that this capacity is the
primary spring of action, and constitutes human agency.
Their capacity, therefore, for pleasure and pain, is, as far as I
can see ariy meaning in the thing, the very same thing with
what I call the heart, or faculty of taste. Hence persons of
this sentiment have no ground to object against the scherrie
advanced in these essays, if they will be consistent with them
selves. Again. If by a self-determining power Arminians mean
some cause in man which determines the will, or produces voli
tions, they have no ground to object against what has been
advanced in this essay. And furthermore, if they will be con
sistent with themselves, they must embrace the scheme hitherto
illustrated. For I have endeavoured lo prove, that there is a
cause in man, which determines the will, and gives rise to eve
ry voluntary exertion. Though motives have influence, yet
they are not the causes, or agents, which produce volition,
So that when we say motives determine the will, we do not
mean they are agents ; or have any active principle ; or do
any thing more, than merely as means influence us to act, or
give an opportunity for the active principle in man to operate.
The real, active cause, which determines the will, or gives rise
to volition, is in man, and a property of his nature. In this sense
a person may be truly said to determine his own will. His
heart has power over the will, and does determine all its acts.
If this, then, is all that is meant by a self-determining power,
mankind truly possess it. Of course in this particular Armini
ans and Calvinists may be agre ;d.
We may now inquire, why that agency, which is granted ta
be necessary to praise and blame, is called moral. It may be
observed here, that many other beings, as well as men, are rep
resented as acting. Hence we say, the sun sets and rises ; the
moon changes ; the water runs ; the wind blows ; and of al
most every thing which exists, action is predicated. They are
represented, in the construction of all languages, as possessing
principles of action. What original notions gave rise to such
modes of expression, is foreign to my design to inquire. Such
expressions are common in all languages. Yet we know, in
animate existences have no inherent principles of action,
'1-

101
Hence, when they are called, or represented as agents, it is in
a figurative sense only. Beings, which are not agents, in the
literal and proper sense of the word, we know are not objects
of either praiSe or blame. Hence the modes of expression in
all languages direct us to two different kinds of agents. One
kind is worthy of praise, and blame; the other kind is not.
To distinguish one from the other, we call one a moral, the
other a natural agent. When those words are used to qualify
the term agent, they mean, that the moral agent is a proper ob
ject of praise or blame ; the natural agent is not. They there
fore are used to denote what beings are, and what .beings are
not, deserving of praise or blame. To communicate my idea
readily to another, that man is worthy of praise or blame, I
only say, he is a moral agent ; and for the same purpose I say
of another beirig, it is a .natural agent, neither deserving of
praise nor of blame. I grant, when I call any thing, which
has no principle of action, an agent, the word is used in a figur
ative sense.
Having now shown, what agency in man is, and why he is
called a moral agent, I proceed to add,
2. That it is agreed on all sides, that a moral agent is a
proper object of praise and blame.
Few, if ariy, deny that men are agents. The dispute is not,
whether men are agents ; but as it respects this point, in what
Joes their agency consist ? To this we have already attended.
It is, also, generally granted, that men are proper objects of
praise and blame ; deserving of approbation, or disapproba
tion, according to their good or bad condcct. Still it is a
matter of some debate, what is necessary to render man a prop
er object of praise and blame ? What kind of agency is ne
cessary ? Whether an understanding and knowledge are requi
site ? Then, if they, agree that certain properties are necessa
ry to constitute a proper moral agent, it is disputed, why they
are necessary. Some assign one reason, and some another.
3. It is in general agreed, that a moral agent is a proper
-subject of rewards. This but few deny. But the inquiry is,
what is necessary to constitute a beirig a proper subject of re
wards ? Some assert one thing, and some another. Respect
ing this question they dispute with great warmth.
4. Also, it is agreed generally, that liberty is necessary to
render man a complete moral agent. But what is liberty ? Is
it consistent with necessity, and why is it requisite ? These
several subjects have riot been settled tp universal satisfaction.

102
It is a matter of some importance to learn, with respect- to a
subject which has caused almost endless disputes, how far the
parties are agreed, and in w^it views they disagree. One
great object of this essay has been to show how far parties are
agreed. It appears on examination, that they generally admit, that
man is an agent, a proper object of praise and blame, and a
proper subject of rewards. And it also appears, that the fol
lowing points are yet subjects of debate — what is agency ?
Why is it necessary, and what other properties are requisite,
and why, to constitute a person a fit object of praise and blame
and a fit subject of rewards ? Ascertaining the points of agree
ment and disagreement, prepares the way for terminating sucli
uncomfortable disputes. In the next essay, I shall prosecute
the inquiry, with a hope of contributing to such a result.

**********

ESSAY XIV.
Particular reasons given, u)hy certain properties are
necessary, to constitute a being a proper, and com-'
plete moral agent.
It is agreed, 1. That agency is necessary to constitute a
moral agent. 2. That a moral agent is a proper object of
praise arid blame. 3. That he is a proper subject of rewardf.
The great inquiry is, what is requisite tP constitute such a be
ing ? And when we see, why the different properties in sue
cession are necessary, we can answer the general question ;
can determine what is needful to render a being a complete
and entire moral agent. For a being, who has every quality
requisite to action, and to make him a fit object of praise and
blame, and a proper subject of rewards, is a complete moral
agent. I shall, therefore,
I. Show why the faculty called the understanding is necessa
ry, to constitute a being of the above description. When we
see why, then we shall see it is necessary,

103
i. The understanding is necessary to agency. The under
standing is not an active principle, yet it is necessary to action.
Some things are necessary to the operation of active powers
or principles, so that without them they cannot act.
The heart is an active principle, and the understanding is
necessary to its operation generally, if not universally. — Plea
sure, pain, and desires, are the operations of the heart. By
these every effect is produced, which is attributable to the
agency of man. But in order for objects to please or offend
us, they must be perceived or known. Objects of which we
have no knowledge, do not affect us. And so long as we re
main ignorant of them, they are not objects of our desire or
pursuit. The only way objects, considered as motives, influ
ence us to act, is by pleasing or disgusting us. But they can
not in this manner influence us to act, unless they are seen.
Objects, which might have a powerful influence, can have none,
so long as we have no knowledge of them. We hence see,
that a perception, or knowledge of objects, is necessary to ex
cite desireS in us ; and this is requisite to action. For we shall
never act, only when there is something influencing us. And
the only way by which they influence us to aet, is by pleasing
or offending us ; and as they do npt give us either pleasure or
pain unless they are seen or known, it is evident knowledge is
necessary to the operation of the heart.
Knowledge of every kind belongs to the understanding.
Hence, without this faculty, man would not be a complete
agent ; because his active principles would have no opportu
nity to operate. This, then, is one reason why the under
standing is necessary to an entire agent. For to this end, man
must not only be an agent; but there must be opportunity
for the operation of his active powers.
2. Without the faculty of understanding mankind could not,
generally, obtain the objects which please them, or avoid (hose
which disgust them.
To the attainment of ends, plans of operation are requisite.
The means necessary to any particular end must be discover
ed, arranged, and connected. When this is done, a plan of
operation is formed. The way is then prepared, for the heart
to obtain the object of its desire. -
But what faculty of the mind devises means and ways to ac
complish our ends, and forms plans of operation ? None,
certainly, but a perceiving faculty. It is the office of the un-

104
derstanding to show the heart, how it can attain the ends it
wishes. It is the eye of the mind to guide the heart in the
way, which will lead it to the end or object it wishes to enjoy,
and from the object it wishes to avoid. Suppose a man had a
heart, but no understanding. He could feel, if an object were
presented ; but he could see nothing. Suppose it possible
that an object could affect hini ; he could see no way to at
tain what he lovpd, or to avoid what he hated. He could not
act by aim cr design ; for he would see nothing to aim at.
He could not devise means for accomplishing any purpose ;
he would grope in uncertainty and darkness.
If a man can perceive objects, and in this way be affected
and influenced by them to act ; if he can perceive and devise
the means requisite, to direct his actions to the end desired ;
he is thus far a perfect and complete agent. For this purpose,
the faculty of understanding is necessary. If man could act
without an understanding, yet he would be a very imperfect
agent. These reasons show, why the understanding is neces
sary to constitute man a complete and proper agent.
3. The understanding is necessary to render man an object
worthy of praise and blame, and a proper subject of reward.#
If we had not this faculty, we should have no knowledge of
vice, or virtue ; nor any conception of the meaning of the
words, censure, blame, approbation, praise, and rewards. If
blamed or praised, we should not know why, or for what cause.
If we were rewarded with good, or with evil, we could not
know why we were thus treated ; nor have any idea of the
righteousness of our judge, from whose hand we receive re
wards. For, if we had not an intellectual faculty, we should
have no conception or knowledge of any thing whatever. But
is a being a proper object of censure, or approbation, for any
of his actions, who has no idea of vice and virtue ; and who
consequently cannot know what is intended by censure and
praise ? Is a being a fit subject of rewards, whp has no con
ception of good and ill desert, or of the justice and propriety
of his conduct who distributes rewards ? Earthquakes, tem
pests, pestilential disorders, are great evils in the natural world.
But we never think of blaming and punishing them. The sun,
rain, and fruitful seasons, are great blessings in the natural
world. But we have no thought of praising and rewarding
them. One reason why we do not is, we know they can have
no understanding of the things implied in Censuring, praising,

105
and rewarding them. Hence no end would be answered by
treating them in such a manner.
It is then very evident, that beings which have no intellect,
and are incapable of acquiring knowledge, are not proper ob
jects of either praise or blame ; or fit subjects to be rewarded
with good or evil. Beings, which have not the faculty of un
derstanding, are incapable of knowledge ; and therefore they
are not suitable objects to be censured or praised, or fit subjects
to be rewarded. Hence they are not proper and complete
moral agents. Accordingly, this faculty is necessary, for the
reasons given, to constitute any being such an agerit as is in
tended by the terms moral agent,
I now proceed to show,
II. Why the faculty of taste, or the heart, is necessaay tcf
forrii a complete moral agent.
1. It is necessary to constitute an intelligent being an agent.
Agency, and the primary spring of action, are the same thing.
It will be generally, if not universally, agreed, that our intellec
tual faculty is never the subject of either pleasure or pain ; or
it is not a feeling faculty. But as we are in fact the subjects
of pleasure and pain, it follows, that the heart is the only feel
ing faculty belonging to the human mind. Suppose a person
had an intellectual faculty, but had no heart, or faculty of feel
ing ; would he ever aet ? Those, who have ever given much
attention to this question, are ready to answer, he would remain
inactive, unless moved by some external force. And any one
may be convinced of this truth, by a little attention. For
though this person might perceive objects, yet they would not
affect him ; he would be and continue in- a slate of perfect indif
ference. And the impossibility of acting in such a state, has
been so clearly, and demonstratively shown by several authors,
it is needless for me to spend time in proving it. On the other
hand, it is impossible for a being, who is pleased or displeased
with objects, to remairi in a state of rest, or inaction. When
his pleasures and pains are faint and feeble, he will not act
with much force. Yet the nature of man is such, he cannot con
tinue long in a state of feeble effort. For inaction begets un
easiness ; and action becomes necessary for the removal of the
pain, occasioned by inaction. Also, if he did not act, his ap
petites must remain ungratified. In this state, their cravings
and hankerings would increase, and render his condition very
painful. By creating this., uneasiness, they ever incite man t©/
N

106
action tP obtain the Objects, which, by satisfying their cravings,
remove their uneasiness. Even when the body is at rest, the
heart of man Will keep his mind employed, and devising means
to gratify his desires. And the activity of the heart is as real
ly displayed, in turning the attention of the mind from one ob
ject to another, arid in ponfining it to the investigation of sub
jects, as in moving the body, and producing external, visible
effects. When ail these things are drily considered, it is evi
dent the heart is always acting, either on the mind, or the body ;
rind producing effects of some kind or other. The heart,
¦fhen, is the primary principle of action in moral agents. In
this the agency of man consists. It is an inherent principleef
actioii in man ; a property and law of his nature. Hence all
the actions of men are vkeit actions ; the operations of a prin
ciple of action, which is a property of-their nature, and constit
uent part of their being. So that the actions of men cannot
be attributed to any being, but themselves.
As this faculty constitutes agency, if man were destitute of
it, be would not be an agent.
2. This faculty is necessary to constitute man worthy of
praise and blame. It is granted, that vice and virtue are not
predicable of the understanding. It will also be granted, that
a being, who is neither virtuous nor vicious, is not deserving
of censure or praise. He is not a proper object of approbation
or disapprobation. It has also been shown, iri the essays oil
taste and its operations, that vice and virtue are not predicafefe
of any faculty of the mind, but the heart. And the reason is,
BO other faculty is a principle of action. It is not, therefore,
necessary here to prove, that vice and virtue have their seat in
the heart, this having already been dene. It therefore follows,
that as vice and virtue belong to the heart, and are essentially
mbessay to render a being Worthy of praise and blame, if men
did not possess this faculty, they would not be proper objecfe
of either Censure, or approbation. This faculty then is essen
tially requisite, for the reason flow assigned, to constitute a
-mail agent.
3, This faculty is necessary to render men rewdrddbhi-^-Fn-
tare misery is the reward of -the wicked, and happiness the re
ward of the righteous. Wickedness of heart prepares the for
mer for eternal death ; hbliness fits the latter for eternal] life-
Beings, therefore, incapable of pleasure and pain, cannPt he
rewarded. They cannot he made either miserable or happy.

107
We never think of rewarding or punishing inanimate things,
however useful, or hurtful. We know they are incapable of
rewards, because they are incapable of pleasure and pain.
And as the heart is the only feeling faculty belonging to man,
deprive him of this, he is then incapable of receiving rewards.
With this faculty, he can be rewarded with good or evil, ac
cording to the defect of his character. But without it, he is no
more reward able, than any part of the inanimate creation.
But a being incapable of rewards, is not a complete moral
agent. This faculty, then, is necessary to constitute a man a proper
moral agent. For the first reason assigned, it is requisite to
make him an agent. For the second reason givea* it is necesr
sary to render him a fit object of praise and blame. And for
the third reason, it is, needful to render him capable of future' re*
wards. It is, therefore, absolutely requisite to constitute him
a proper moral agent. This is the most essential, and impor
tant faculty belonging to the subject of moral agency ; and the
most difficult of any to be understood clearly and distinctly,
III. The will is a necessary faculty in moral agency. If
a wheel is wanting in a clock, it is unpejjfect. It is not prepar
ed to answer the end for which it was made. It was the (Jesigh
of God in the formation of man, to make him capable of ae*
complishing his wishes, of manifesting his real character, and
serving his Maker. That he might be qualified for these ends,
thatfaculty termed the will was necessary. The will is, there
fore, necessary,
I. To render us capable of gratifying our appetites, and de
sires. Here let it be remembered, that volitions are the opera
tions of the will ; and by volitions, I mean, those voluntary
exertions with which bodily motions, and the direction of the
understanding are immediately connected ; and by which those
other external, and visible effects are produced, which are ne?
cessary to obtain or avoid the objects at which we aim. These
are necessary, to gratify our wishes and appetites. When the
heart desires the enjoyment pf an object, anil the understanding
has formed a plan for its attainment ; unless the plan is carried
into execution, the hea$| cannot be gratified, or accomplish its
wishes. For instance, a person wishes to visit a friend at a distance.
Tp effect th|s, measures must be concerted and pursued. Tp
concert a scheme agreeable to the desires of the heart, is the

108
office of the understanding. When the plan is formed, the un
derstanding has done its duty ; for it is only a servant to the
heart. To execute the plan, many things must be put in motion,
and a train of effects must be produced. It is the office of the
will to produce them. And by exertions, which are called voli
tions, they are produced. The plan is executed ; the heart
obtains its end, and is gratified. When the plan is executed, the
will has performed its duty ; for it is only a servant to the heart.
Thus the will is an executive power. By this power, the heart
gratifies its appetites and desires, obtains whatever it esteems
good, and avoids whatever it esteems evil, as far as God sees it
best to prosper our exertions. Is man a complete agent, is he
such an agent as he would wish to be, unless he is able to reach
his desired ends ? If he had not this faculty, he would be inca
pable of performing any external actions. However strong his
desires might be, he must remain in a state of rest, and never
Obtain the ends desired. To constitute a perfect agent, two '
things are necessary. First, a principle of action ; a primary,
Operative cause, inherent in his nature. Secondly, this ac
tive principle must be able to produce all the effects, necessary
to obtain its desired ends, and the ends for which it is created.'
Such a principle constitutes complete agency. And in order for
this agent to be thus efficient, two other things are necessary.
First, an understanding, to form plans of operation ; and sec
ondly, a will to execute them. And each of these faculties must
be under the command, control, and direction of the heart.
If they are, then the heart, which is an active principle, is able,
its agency is sufficient, to accomplish all its desires and ends* as
far as God sees best, on whom all created beings are de
pendent. Hence we see, that unless man had a will, and unless
his will had been Subjected to the command of the heart, he
would not have been a perfect agent. He would not have been
able to carry any plan into execution, or to gratify any of his
appetites and desires. And, unless he had been able to do this,
his agency would riot have been complete. So the will is ne
cessary to a perfect agent. Some may here ask, why God, in
forming-men, did not immediately connect bodily motions, and
other external actions and effects, with the desires of the heart ?
Why was it necessary, that this power, called the will, should
interfere, between the heart and external visible actions ? An
swer, why men were not made differently, does not belong to
us to determine, God knew what was necessary, to constitute

109
such a being as man perfect in his kind. Such a being
he has made him. To say he might have been made different
ly, and answer the end of his being as well, is dictating to our
Maker, and exalting ourselves above him. Our only business
in our investigations is, to get a clear knowledge of man, as
he is made ; and the perfect adaptedness of his being to the
end for which he was created. It does not belong to a child to
dictate to a clock maker. But when the machine is finished,
he may examine it, and learn its perfect adaptedness to the end
for which it was designed. And we find the will is a necessary
faculty, in beings formed as we are.
2. The will is necessary, to a full performance of all the
duties enjoined us by our Maker.
We are servants of God. And if we have every thing neces
sary to perform faithfully the services required of us, in case
the heart is right, we are qualified for the station we fill. The
divine commands, in general, respect two things ; the temper of
the heart we ought to have, arid the actions we ought to per
form. The temper of the heart they require is that, which is
implied in love to God and our neighbour. These two com
mands comprise all the divine requirements and prohibitions, as
far as they respect the heart. But external actions, as well as a
right internal temper, are required of us. For instance, we
are required to remember the sabbath, to keep it holy. All the
external actions implied in this command, we are bound to per
form. We are also required to clothe the naked, and feed the
hungry. And all the external actions, necessary to the per-
forriiance of this duty, are implied in the command. So that
commands, generally speaking, respect the heart and our out
ward actious. So far as outward actions are required, the will
is necessary to the performance of them. For it is by the will
only, that these actions are performed. Hence, without this
faculty, we could not obey the commands of God so far as they
respect our outward conduct. We might have the temper of
heart required ; but could not, without the help of the will, per
form the external part enjoined. The will, therefore, is a neces
sary qualification to the performance in full of the duties requir
ed. Without this, we should labour under a natural inability.
And without an understanding to learn and know the will of
God, we should be under a natural inability, to obey his com
mands. But an understanding sufficient to know his pleasure,

110
and a will to perform every external duty required, constitute
a natural ability to serve the Lord.
3. The will is necessary to manifest the nature and character of
the heart. A person, who has a holy character, ought to be
praised by his fellows, and treated well by his Maker. If his
character be bad, he deserves the censure of his fellow men,
and the disapprobation of his Judge. Now the heart of man con
stitutes his moral character. Every person's heart is virtuous
or vicious.; and therefore, in a moral sense, is good or evil, de?
serving of approbation or censure. But men cannot be ac
quainted with each other's hearts, or characters, only by exter
nal signs or actions. These are the indices of the heart, the
signs and interpreters of its nature. As by the fruit a tree
bears, we learn its nature ; so by these external fruits, we ob
tain a knowledge of each Other's characters. Without tbi»
knowledge, we could not make proper distinctions hi our treat
ment of men. But it is the will, which produces those extern
al fruits from which we learn the characters of men. Hence,
without this faculty we could have no knowledge of men's char*
acters, and could npt see the righteousness of God in the final
distribution of rewards. For a knowledge of every person's de*
sert is necessary, to see his righteousness in rewarding.
These are the faculties requisite to constitute a moral agent.
I have also assigned the reasons, why they are necessary ; and
have made it evident, I trust, that if either of them were want
ing, man would be an imperfect agent. But these properties;
render him a complete agent. He has all the agency and ef
ficiency needful; to all the purposes of a finite, 4ependent be
ing. They render him also a proper object of praise and
blame, and a rightful subject of rewards. For a being of the
description I have given, will forever appear to us to deserve
praise or blame, and a good or evil reward, according itp the
nature of his character.
An infant, when born, has the faculty called the understand
ing, which qualifies him for an endless improvement in knowl*
edge. He has, also, the faculty termed the taste, or heart,
which prepares him to be the subject of agreeable and painful
sensations, and all those desires which attend them. He is en
dued with a principle of action, which will never cease to act
through interminable ages. He has, moreover,thefaculty call*
ed the will, which prepares him to perform any actions, and
produce any effects, necessary to gratify his appetites and de-

Ill
sires, as far as infinite wisdom may see best. He has die faculty
necessary to devise means and form plans for the accomplish
ment of his desires. He has the faculty requisite to carry
them into execution. He has the faculty or principle of action,
Which puts every thing in motion. It can turn the under
standing from object to object; and confine its attention, when
and where it will. It can employ the will in executing its wish
es and purposes. Such an infant, then, is thusfer an entire and
perfect moral agent. It is prepared for action and improve
ment. But one thing more is wanting to render man a finished, com
plete and perfect agent; that is liberty. What that liberty is,
which is considered as essential to moral agency, and why itis
necessary, and other inquiries connected with these, will be the
Subject of the next essay.

VJf********

ESSAY XV.
Of Liberty ; and the reasons why it is necessary to
form a complete, perfect, moral agxnt.
This essay will comprise a discussion of two questions :
What is liberty ? — and, Why is it necessary to a perfect mor
al agency ? To prepare the way, I shaU inquire, Whether
any power or operation Of the mind is liberty ?
1. It will be granted, that our intellectual faculty does not
conStitute'Iiberty. Liberty is never, unless figuratively, predica
ted of the understanding, or of any of its operations. No au
thor, that I recollect, considers perception, or reason, or mem
ory, or judgment, or conscience, as constituting liberty. It
Will be granted, that liberty does not belong to the under-stand
ing, or any -of its operations.
2. Is the pleasure or the pain, which in a greater or less de
gree we derive from objects, liberty ? Is liberty the same
thing as being pleased, or disgusted ? Is any person at liber
ty to say, whether objects shall please or disgust him ? If so,

112
then we have powef to create our own happiness and misery.,
And if men have this power, why do they groan under exquis
ite pains for days, for months and for years ? Is any person at
liberty to determine,, whether a bodily disease shall give him
pain or not ; or whether natural objects, or divine objects,
shall please, or disgust him ? When we consider how averse
all mankind are to pain, and how ardently they seek happi
ness, if it depended on their determinations whether they should
be happy or miserable, we have reason to conclude that all
misery would immediately be banished from this world. But
mankind know that happiness and misery do not depend on
their determinations. , Or it does not depend on their determi
nations, whether objects shall please or displease them. It is
true, they can by prudent conduct avoid many causes of pain,
and render their circumstances more comfortable. Still, wheth
er the object they have shunned, or the one they have attained,'
shall give them pleasure or pain, does not depend on their
determinations. When I have purchased an orange, it does.,
not depend on me to say, whether I shall relish or disrelish uV
Our pleasures and pains depend on our nature, and the nature
of objects with which we are conversant. All we can do is to
avoid those, which we know are disgustful, and get possessipn
of those, which we learn by experience are agreeable, as far as
our power extends. Therefore, a pleasant feeling is not liberty,
neither is a painful sensation liberty ; nor are we, in any sense*';
free to determine whether objects shall please or offend us. -
3. Do our desires constitute liberty,? If a desire to obtain
or shun an object, is liberty; then, so far as we have desires, we
have liberty. * But it no more depends on us to say, whether
we shall desire to obtain, or avoid objects, than to say, wheth
er they shall please or disgust us. If an object disgust us, a
desire will arise to avoid it ; and if it please us, and is attaina
ble, we shall desire the enjoyment of it. Desires will attend
our sensations. We cannot prevent it.
Again, if a desire of the heart is liberty, then, when persons
have desires, they are free.* But when a person is bound with
chains, he may desire to walk. But is he at liberty to walk,
when his feet are bound with fetters ? It will be granted that,
in this situation, he has not liberty to walk. Yet he may, and
persons often have, in such a condition, desires to walk. And
if desires are liberty, then persons have liberty to walk, when
their feet are bound with cords \ or they have liberty, and at

IIS
tiie same time, have none. This is adirect contradiction ; and
makes it evident, that a desire is not liberty." Whatever liber
ty is, it is something totally distinct from sensations and desires.
And hence Kberfy does not corisist in any of the operations of
the heart, or taste.
4. Does liberty consist in volitions? Are volition and lib
erty synoninjous terms ? If so, then a person1 is free, as far as
he has voluntary exertions. But in the case just mentioned,
where a person has his feet bound- with fetters, he has at that
time no liberty to walk ? Yet he may make, and persons in
such a condition often do make, powerful and voluntary exer
tions to walk. If such exertions Constitute liberty, persons have
it, and exercise it. But I believe it will be granted, that in
this condition they have no liberty to walk; Hence volitions
are not liberty, unless contradictions may be true.
It may be said, though volition is not liberty,* yet persons
may have liberty to will, or make voluntary exertions. They
may be free to make Such exertions, even when bound. This
is readily granted ; but it does not determine what freedom is.
It is not volition, nar any antecedent sensation or desire. What
then is rrieant by this liberty to .will, to choose, or refuse ? .
Though very few, if any, expressly say that volitions. are lib
erty ; yet many assert, that liberty is as essential to volition, as1
fluidity is to water; What is the meaning pf such an express
siori? We say, water is a fluid. Do they mean, then', that*
volition is liberty ? We have seen, this idea implies aeoritra-
diction, as soon as we view it in relation to some given effect.
By the fluidity of Water, 'may be meant its adaptedness to run;
or move towards the- centre., Do they mean,' then, when they.
say volitions are free, there is an adaptedness in them, to some
effect? Is an adaptedness in volition to move the harids or
feet, the thing intended by liberty ? , I believe few will assert
tins- Do. they mean by the expression, that volitions are free,;
as we say, water is fluid ? What are they free to do ? When
hperspn is bound, are hisvplitioris free to produce wafkirig?
No... For this" would imply a contradiction. Do they mean,
persons are free to choose, to will ? This iriakes liberty consist
in. something antecedent to volition, arid fairly gives up the idea,
that volitions are free. For to say, volitions are, free, and tp
say we are' free to choose, are very different things.
When I am bound with fetters of iron, am I at liberty fo.make
voluntary exertions to break my- fetters ? I am. No ma»
O

114
can deprive me of this liberty. No man can prevent my will
ing, or choosing. Men cannot bind the will. ^But are my vol
untary exertions at liberty to loosen the chains on my feet ?
They certainly are not. I do notenjoy the liberty necesssary,
to produce the effect aimed at. It is agreed, that in this con
dition I am not at liberty to walk. Hence it may be said, I am
at liberty to make exertions to walk ; but I am notat liberty to
walk, or 'to produce this effect. All that is contained in the,
last sentence, the distinction it presents to view, it is presumed,
will be readily granted. And according to this distinction, I
am frep, antecedent to willing. I am at liberty, to choose ; to^
make voluntary exertions. I am in this state of liberty ante; l
cedent to choosing. Were this not true, it would be as impps- *
sible for me to make these exertionsj as itis to arise, arid walk.
I cannot walk ; because 1 do not enjoy the liberty necessaryS
to this event. And, if I did not enjoy liberty tp choose, I couJ|l
riot make one exertion with a view to walking. ¦ ' ** $
Now everyone may see, liberty and walking are not thesame*|
thing. For a liberty to walk is antecedent tp the event. And*
volition and liberty are not convertible terms. For a liberty'to„
make exertions to walk is, antecedent to making them, Hetice^
it is obviotts, that liberty and volition are not the same thin&j^;:
5. Is liberty some power, which, the mind possesses ? ^ Spnie.-i
say, liberty is a power to act or not to act, ,- This notioriof lib- *
erty many have labored to support. I'. <
In this definition of liberty it is important to know whatis
meant by action. Choice is an action, or. exercise. It is an
act of the will. And bodily motions are called actions. '" AIl^,
those visible, external effects, which moral agents producefare^
stiled their actions. While they are talking, travellings labor-*
ing, they are acting. Every volition, and all the effects which)
volitions produce, are the actions of moral agents. The action^
they intend, is to be understood in one or both of these senses..
Hence, when they say liberty is a power to act dr not to act,
they mean it is a power to will or not to will ; or a power to
perform, or. not perform external actions. They, therefore,
make the same distinction between power arid action, as is com
monly made between a cause and effect. Their power is a cause,
and action is the effect it produces. Having explained what
appears to be their meaning of the phrase, " liberty is a pow
er to act or not to act," let us examine it with respect to external
actions.

115
External, visible actions are effects, and must have, a cause.
But what is the cause of these external actions? Volitions cer
tainly. Willing to walk, produces walking. In like manner,
willing, or voluntary exertion, produces every other external ef
fect, which can be attributed to us as agents. Their power, then,
to perform or not perform these external actions, is volition.
For Volition is the power, that produces those effects or ac
tions. Hence, as liberty is a power to act, or produce such exter
nal effects, and it is bur volitions which produce them, then vo
lition is liberty. For we see, this power is volition ; and they
say, this power is liberty. Of course, liberty and volition are
the same thing. That this is not a just notion of liberty, we
have already shown.
We may now examine their power in relation to the acts of
the will,. Here we are to view volitions as, effects, and the
power of which they speak is the cause of them. Here the
difficulty is, to learn what they mean by power. We will grant
there is such a power as they contend for ; and our object now
is, . to ascertain what it ; is. ' A power, and its operations,
are objects of distinct ^iconsideratiori. For a power, if it
do not operate, if it remain in a dormant state, will never pro
duce any, effect. It is by operating that it produces effects.
Now the question is, what will put this power in operation ?
Some antecedent power ? What will put-that in operation ?
Some other antecedent power ? We see this is only running
back ad infinitum, without ever arriving at a first power. To
ascertain what 'hey must mean by this power, if they mean any
thing, the following self-evident propositions demand attention.
1. If mankind were as incapable of the feelings of pleasure
and pain, 'as rocks are, they would be as inactive. And if
they have a capacity for pleasure and pain, yet — 2. If there
were no objects in existence, they would still remain inactive.
And, 3. If objects did exist,! yet if they were never in the least
degree to give them any pleasure, or pain, they would still re
main inactive. Three things, then, are absolutely necessary to
action. 1 . A capacity for pleasure and pain. 2. Objects to
please and disgust us. 3. Beal pleasure, or pain, excited by
those objects. E?ch of these is so essential to action, if either
is wanting, no action will exist ; the universe would never have
had any existence. And these propositions appear to me to be
Self-evident. The first is certainly a self-evident truth. An*

116
if any should say the other two are not, they must admit, they
are necessary inferences from the first proposition. If men had
no capacity for pleasure andpain^ they would be as Inactive
as rocks. For they wpujd be as destitute of any active princi
ple as inanimate matter. Tbpre tj) no excitement to action, in '
a being whidh has no feeling. For feeling is the only internal
expitement. Hence if no objectsto affect him existed, he would
not feel, or be the subject of pleasure and pain.- And if ob
jects doexist, yet do not impress him, as those do notwhiph
are not seen, or come in contact with our bodily senses,. pr be
presented in some other'way to the mind, still he has no feel- ;
ing. And w^ere there is no feeling, there js no excitement to
action ; and where there is no excitement, actions can never
have existence. ..Whether these remarks render the three first
propositions above stated any more evident, is a doubt in my.
mirtd. If they have been made more evident, it is because!
have seated them in different words ; and not because the illiis-,
trations are Clearer than the propositions themselves.
This conclusion now follows ; that if a power to act or nPf
to act means any thing, a capacityfor.pieasure and pain must
be the thing intended by it. Because, Without such a capaci
ty existing some wherefcther§ would be no such thing as action ,
in the universe. For powers incapable Pf pleasure and pain,
will never act. They have no excitement in their nature to ac
tion. They are incapable of beirig put ip operation, by any
quality inherent in them.
Hence, according to the definition of liberty we are now ex-r
amining, it is a capacity for pleasure and pain. But is this tii6
true idea of liberty ? Is any man at liberty to say, whether*;
objects 'Shall please or disgust him or not ? This notion of
liberty has been already refuted.
From the whole that has been said in this essay, it appears,
that'liberty does not consist in any power, or operation of the
mind. Neither a capacity for pleasure and a£lu, nor sensation*
of pleasure ahd pain, nor desires, nor volitions, constitute lib
erty. Hence' liberty is not alquality of the mind, or of a mor
al agent ; unless we consider a privilege a quality. We may
now-proteeed to Show what liberty is.
The urilearned define liberty in differen||i#:Prds ; yet their
definitions amount to the sa*ie: thing. And their definition is
Jhe result of their feelings and experience ; and of course is as
just -as any given'by thelearnecl. T**ey commonly -say,'to act

117
as they please is liberty. So far and so long as they can act
as they please, or as they have a mind to act, they enjoy all the
liberty they can conceive of, and all they desire. Perhaps a
better definition than this cannot be given of liberty. Let us
now attend to the things implied in it.
,J. What do they mean by action ? By this they undoubt
edly mean two things ; willing, and the effects Which are con
nected with the will. Tlfey, therefore} would distinguish be
tween liberty of will, and liberty of action. For they might
enjoy the one, and not the other.
2. What do they mean by pleasure ? They say they are
free, when they can act according to , their pleasure. They
mean their wishes, or desires.. If objects please them, it is
their wish to obtain them ; if they disgust them, they wish to
avoid them. It is their pleasure to obtain whatever pleases,
and shun whatever offends them ; which is no more than say-
ing,it is their desire to enjoy the former,vand avoid the pain the
latter gives them. These are the only ideas of importance to
be attended to, in their definition of liberty. Accordingly,
when they have desires to get possession of an object,
which pleases them, they wish to have every act exist necessa
ry to their end. The first act is volition. Their desire prompts
them to a voluntary exertion, which is the first thing necessary to
their end. If any thing should restrain, or prevent their putting
forth the voluntary exertion to which their desires prompt them,
they would say they are not free, 'their liberty of choosing ac
cording to their pleasure is abridged. And if any thing should
constrain, or oblige them, .to choose or will any thing contrary
to their desire, they would view their liberty of choice detroy-
ed. If two objects were beforesa person, one of which was very
pleasing, and the other very disgustful to him ; if he was effec
tually restrained from choosing the agreeable, &i was constrained
to choose the disagreeable object, I ask, would he not feel and
say, that his liberty of will waS abridged, and destroyed ? In this
case a person is: restrained from choosing agreeably to his de
sire, and constrained to will in opposition to it. If this were a
law of our nature, obliging us to will in direct opposition' to our
feelings and desires, would not mankind be in a most unhappy
condition? Let any one reflect,; how he must feel in such a
state, to have his will always crossing and opposing his desires .;
he must at .once be convinced, such a conditio^' would be most
unhappy and afflictive. •'"¦-. :? <

' 118
On the other hand, if hfe never finds any thing preventing or
hindering his choosing objects according to his wish, does he
not enjoy all the Hberty of will he can deSsire ? With respect
to liberty of will, what more can a person desire, than to< will
according to his wishes ? Or, than to have the acts of his will
subject to his pleasure ? This' is the highest liberty of will/of
which it is possible to form any conception. The will oper
ates, or acts, free from the influence of any restraint, or con
straint. There is no ppWer, which does or can restrain men
from willing as they desire, or constrain them to will contrary
to it, except the divine power. Between the strongest desire of
the heart, and choosing the object of that desire, God has es
tablished an infallible connexion. He certainly will not exert
his power in opposition to his own -appointment. Hence he
will never oblige men to exert their wills in opposition to their
desires. And no other power in the universe can destroy a
connexion, which he has established. Accordingly the liberty,
of the will iiever will, and riever, can, be abridged. Hence
mankind do, and ever will, enjoy the privilege of willing agree
ably to their desires, or pleasure. This privilege is liberty. And
this privilege is,made sure and certain to men, by the unaltera
ble determination of Jehovah./ ,
When I say, we are at liberty to will according tp our desires,
my meaning is, according to the Strongest desire, at the time we
make our choice. Mankind often have desires, each of which
cannot be gratified at the same time. When desires contend,
the strongest will prevail, and determine the will. We have now
explained what is interided by liberty of will. Our state and
conditipriis such, that we enjoy uninterruptedly the privilege of
choosing according to our strongest desires. No power, which
operates as a restraint or constraint, can deprive us of this priv
ilege, i
Liberty of action is a privilege of acting* externally, agreea
bly to our voluntary exertions. When a pers'lli's feet are bound
with cords, he is not at liberty to walk. If he exerts himself
for this purpose, a superior force operates against him, and de
prives him of the privilege of acting agreeably to his exertions.,
This force is a restraint ; it prevents the existence of the action
Willed, And when a person is carried by a superipr force to
prison, contrary to his will, his liberty is destroyed. This con
straining force produces effects contrary to what he wills, and
deprives him of the privilege of acting according to'his choice,,

119
Thus liberty of action may be, and sometimes is, abridged.
God has established a general, but not a universal connexion
between voluntary exertion, and the action, or effect, willed^ Ac
cordingly mankind generally,, though they do not always, aet
according to their choice. This liberty may be destroyed by re
straining and constraining forces, And when we are made to act
contrary to our wills, the actions are not ours ; as agents, we
donotproduce.them,and of course arenot'ansWerable for theim
Can any person desire any other or greater liberty, than
to act as he wills ? When those actions follow, which his will is
exerted to produce, what more can he desire ? But this privilege
God has granted to mankind, and made the enjoyment, of it,
- generally, sure to them by his unalterable determination. Hence
he has given to man all the liberty, which it is best for him to
enjoy. \ . * ' •
That I have given a just idea of liberty,' may appear more
evident by attending to first principles in relation to action,
i 1. If we were as incapable of pleasure and pain as inanimate
matter is, we should never be the subjects of desires. In this
unfeeling state, we should not have any idea of good or evil.
No person can, at first, get an idea of pleasure and pain, with
out knowing them by experience. And till he knows what
pleasure and pain are, he cannot have a notion of relative good
and evil. If men could perceive, as they now do, and at the same
time had no more feeling than lifeless matter, they would not
know what ideas the, terms pleasure and pain, good and evil,
convey. As well might a man born blind know what is meant
by light and colors ; or a deaf man, what is meant by sounds.
" This is too evident to be denied. But if mankind had no feel
ings, and no idea of good and evil, desires could not possibly
have an existence. For good and evil are the only objects of
desire. Whatever is agreeable, we desire to attain ; and what
ever is disgustful, we wish to avoid. But are objects ever de
sired by us, however good or evil in reality, if they are un
known to us? When wp have once felt pleasure and pain,
whatever we apprehend will give us pleasure is desired ; and
whatever in our view will give us pain, we feel an aversion to
it. Hence if we had no feelings, we should have no idea of
good and evil, and no desire for one object or aversion to anoth
er. Accordingly, that the feeliftgs of pleasure and pain are ne
cessary to the operations of desire, is a first principle, which alf
ought to admit. ,

120
2. If mankind had no feelings and desires, they would hei
fer act ; or, in other words, they wouldoever seek one thing, or
avoid another. FPr they would exist in a state of perfect in
difference. If no objects are desired, none Will he sought.
This is a truth so evident, nothing can make it plainer.
3. Ih a state in which mankind haVe nothing to seek, voli
tions and external actions are needless. For in every volition
and external action, the attainment or avoidance of some object,
is aimed at. But in a state of perfect indifference, we should
never aim at any thing. Ofeourse, there Would be no occasion
or use for- voluntary exertions, and external actions.
4. Liberty, therefore, would be a useless privilege. Is it a
privilege to be at liberty to act according to Pur pleasure, when*
actions are needless, and when we have no pleasure to gratify?
Is a freedom to act as o'nr pleasures, desires, or inclinations,
would dictate, of any worth, where such operations have noex-
istence ?
Keeping these thingsin view, we may easily See what liberty
is, and how the idea of it is first acquired. Children are very
fond of play things. A top affords them much pleasure. They
have strong desires to amuse themselves with iff. Whilst play
ing with it, without the least hindrance or opposition from any
quarter, they enjoy liberty. They follow their inclinations,
will and act as- their' desires prompt them, without any opposir;
tion. But if a restraint could be laid on their minds, so as to
prevettt those voluntary exertipns which are necessary to put
their bodies in motion, they would theft, experience aji opposi
tion to willing. This would give them uneasiness, and excite!
complaints. Because they cannot will as they wish. There
are hindrances and obstacles in the way. If, also, they should
will to run, and some person were to* hold them and rirevent the
actions willed, then-fhey experience opposition. This would
give them uneasiness, and excite complairits.
Now they have experienced two very different conditions.-.
The first in which they acted agi oeably to their wishes, without
Opposition or hindrance ; the ;>;her, in which they experience4
such opposition as wholly prevents their acting as their inclina-,
tions prompt them. These* two conditions they will compare;
together, and discern a great difference in them. The ideas
they have of this difference they cannot communicate without
words: That condition in which they act without any hin
drance, is called a state of freedom or liberty ; a state in whicn

121
they act freely. In this state they enjoy what is called liberty
or freedom. And what is this, but the privilege of willing and
acting according to their wishes and inclinations ; or pursuing
the objects of their desire without any hindrance ? They
might call the other condition, in which opposition prevents
their acting as they wish, a state of bondage ; a state in which
they do not follow their own inclinations, but are obliged to
act contrary to their desires, and as other agents dictate. Hence
liberty implies a state or condition, in which moral agents act
as they please : a state in which they experience no hindrance,
no opposition, and meet no obstacle to prevent their going the
way their hearts lead them-
This teaches, that all our sensations of pleasure and pain, and
our desires, are antecedent to the need or use of liberty. For
if we did not experience these operations, there would be noth
ing to prompt us to will, or act, in any sense. There
would be^ no end for us to answer by any exertion, because
there is nothing Which we have the least inclination to seek.
But when we experience these desires, then we wish to act
without any hindrance. The privilege of gratifying the feel
ings of the heart, without any hindrance, without meeting any
opposition toprevent the actions which are necessary, is an ob
ject earnestly desired. This privilege, or liberty of acting,
is highly valued by every moral agent. Sp that liberty is a
precious privilege, rather than a quality or property, or any
operation of the mind. Liberty does not consist in any action
or operation of the mind ; but is a privilege of acting without
any obstacle to prevent. It is an absurdity, to say that liber
ty and voluntary action are the same thing. If voluntary ex
ertion is an action, and this action is liberty, then liberty is ac
tion of action. Liberty of action is a Very common phrase.
And if liberty and voluntary exertion are the same thing, and
voluntary exertion is also an action, then liberty arid action are
convertible terms. Use the word action instead of liberty, then-
the liberty of action is nothing but the action of action. Those
who assert that liberty is nothing but voluntary exertion, have
no way to avoid this absurdity. But if liberty is the privil
ege of acting according to our wishes and inclinations, without
any thing to , restrain us, this absurdity is avoided. When
mankind will and act agreeably to their wishes and desires,
without experiencing any restraint or constraint, do they not

122
;act freely ? Do they notenjoy perfect liberty ? Can they
conceive of any greater liberty than this ? Is there any other
¦kind, which they would prefer to it ?
I know many hi answer to these interrogations would say,
they wish for liberty to fly, to create, to gratify all their desires
by a single act of the will. This, they might say, is a higher
and more desirable kind of liberty, than any which mankind
now enjoy. This statement, I would observe in reply, con
tains a fallacy. The thing, which they call liberty, is power.' And
by giving the thing a wrong name,, they deceive themselves.
By liberty to fly, to create, and the like, a power is the thing in
tended. If by power is meant volition, then a liberty to fly, for
instance, is only willing this event. This is making an act of
the will and liberty the same thing ; which we have already seen
cannot be true. And if by power is intended aconnexion between
an act of the will and the thing willed, so that the latter shall
follow the former, theu by a liberty to fly they mean no more
than this connexion.' Whether power is an act of the will, or a
connexion between willing and the thing willed, still liberty and
power are not the same thing. This has already heen proved.
But to illustrate this fallacy more fully, let it be observed,
1. A m°ral agent aims at some end in every action. When
he is sick, health is an object pr end desired.
2. To the attainment of ends, means are necessary. Means
must he used to recover health ; for this is the appointment of
Jehovah. God works by means in the attainment of hjs ends.
And according to his ordination men cannot obtain their ends,
only by using the means adapted to them. If God had seen fit,
ends might have been connected immediately with the will.
Then nothing would have been necessary to obtain health,
when we are sick, but to will it. But the determination of God
is such, we cannot attain our ends, except hy the intervention
and use of means,
Now a person, when sick, is at liberty to use means to re
cover his health. He is at liberty to will, and to act, He en
joys this liberty, this privilege, and is using it. He has not
power to recover health by a single act of his will, nor to give
efficacy to the means he. uses. Hence mankind enjoy liberty,
and use it in pursuit of their ends ; when at the same time they
have not power to attain them. Does a person's inability to
/ecover his health abridge his liberty ? Surely not ; he may
apt with perfect freedom, as long as he has life. Do not man-

123
kind act freely, as their inclinations lead them, when laboring
iri the field, and attending to other pursuits of life ? Yet it is
not in their power, in innumerable iristances, to obtain their ends.
This shows there is a plain and obvious distinction between lftV
erty and power. Men may act freely in pursuit of their ends,
yet not have power to obtain thern. If liberty and power were
the same thirig, and if men have riot power to arrive at the ends
they seek, they have no liberty. This notion of liberty contra
dicts facts. Because we know by experience it is a fact, that
we are acting freely in numerous instances, where we have not
power to attain what we seek, and so finally fail of it. Hence
to say, a power to attain our ends is liberty, is to assert we are
riot free, while acting freely ; which is a manifest absurdity.
To bring these remarks to a point, attention to the following1
things is necessary. I have a strong desire to visit a friend, who
lives west from this place. A volition, which would riiove my
body westerly, would accord with my desire. If some pow
er' should constrain me to will an opposite motion of the body,
the will would act contrary to my desire. In this case I do not
enjoy liberty of will. For liberty of will is a privilege of willing
as my desires dictate. And if I will to have my body move to
the west, yet some force carries it to the east, theri liberty of ac
tion, in this instance, is destroyed. For actions directly cpn-
trary to those willed take place. But so long as the will obeys
the heart, and actions are obedient to the will, I am free. I will
and act agreeably to my desire. I enjoy the liberty "Of willing
as I Wish, and of acting as I wish, and in the exercise of this
liberty I visit my friend. At the same time I have riot power
to visit him by flying over the distance he is from me'. Hence
our object, when we wish for liberty to fly, is power, riot liberty.,
We may wish to have liberty extended ; to have a thousand
events connected with the will, which are not. To have this
wish gratified, our power must be enlarged. If God had con
nected flying, or the creation of a world, with an act of the wilL
as he has the motion of our hands, we could as easily fly, and
create, as we now can move our hands. This enlargement of
our power is an object ardently desired by many. By an in
crease or enlargement of our power in this way, our liberty
would be extended beyond its present limits. But if our liber
ty W'as extended by an increase of power, it is still the same
kind of liberty— a liberty to will and to act as we please. Our
liberty is not greater, unless its extension is the thing meant.

124
If it be extended, this does not alter its nature. And it is by us
ing the words power and liberty as synonimous, that men de
ceive themselves, when they plead for a different kind of liberty.
And this fallacy is now detected by distinguishing, as we ever
ought, between liberty and power.
Liberty of action is extended, as far as external actions or
events are connected with the will. A greater number of events
might have been connected with the will, than now are, if God
had seen fit. But connecting other events with the will, is not
altering the nature of the liberty of action ; it is only extending
it further, or rendering it less limited. We may therefore say,
that mankind cannot conceive of any kind of liberty, preferable
to that which they enjoy ; nor can they have any greater liber
ty, unless the extension of it is greater liberty. But they may
desire more power ; and no degree of power short of omnipo*
tence will satisfy the unrenewed heart.
6. We may now inquire, whether liberty is consistent with ne
cessity. It is the opinion of many, that every kind of necessity
is inconsistent with liberty. For a clear elucidation of this
part ofthe present subject, the word necessity must be defined.
It is not my design, however, to explain all the senses in which
the words necessary, necessity, impossible, unable, and the other
like terms, are used. I shall define the word necessity, so far as
is requisite to a conclusion, whether any kind of necessity is
inconsistent with liberty.
A certain and infallible connexion between causes and their
effects is one thing meant by necessity. If a cause might oper
ate, and its effect might be prevented at one time, and be pro
duced at another, the effeGt is not necessary. And in this case,
there is no certain connexion between the cause and the effect.
For the connexion is not infallible, it may be destroyed. But
where the connexion between causes and effects is certain, there
the effect is necessary. Water will run towards the centre.
Between this motion of water towards the centre, and the cause
which produces this motion, there is an infallible connexion.
This motion of water is a necessary effect. When force is used
to destroy this connexion, ineffectually, wp say it is impossible
to overcome it. The meaning is, no force applied, in this in
stance, is equal to the foree ofthe cause. In this sense the word
finable, and many others ofthe same import, are used. In such
instances, causes operate without producing the intended effect
We may, therefore, to prevent a needless circumlocution in con-

125
veying our ideas, divide necessity^into natural and moral. This
distinction is not founded on any difference there is in the con
nexion between causes and effects, where the connexion is cer
tain and infallible ; but on the difference there is in the terms
related, or connected. Hence thp certain connexion between
moral causes and their effects, is what I mean by a moral ne
cessity. And the infallible connexion there is between natural
causes and effects, is what I mean by a natural necessity. These
are the only kinds of necessity which come into consideration,
when it is to be determined, whether necessity is inconsistent
with liberty. We may inquire,
1 . Whether natural necessity is inconsistent with liberty. —
Nothing, as I have already observed, can destroy liberty of will;
as will appear plearly, when we attend to moral necessity. I shall
therefore, under this particular, consider natural necessity in re
lation to liberty of action, Here it is granted, that natural ne
cessity is inconsistent with liberty of action. For instance, if a
person wills the motion of his hands or feet, and the motion
does not follow, liberty of action is destroyed at this time. Some
cause in this particular instance operates, which is more power
ful than the exertion ofthe will ; and produces rest, an effect op
posite to the one intended. Here the connexion between the
will and the effect willed, is destroyed ; and the effect, which
the opposing cause produces, is necessary. Here it may be
said, that the person was unable to move his hands or feet. It
was impossible for him to do it. The operating cause, whatev
er it be, which renders the act of the will ineffectual, restrains
him. And all restricts, which prevent the existence of the ef
fect willed, destroy liberty of action. Restraints do not des
troy liberty of action, unless they prevent the effects willed.
Again. If a person's will is exerted to move his body west
ward, and it is moved eastward, here the connexion between the
actofthe will and the effect willed is destroyed. In this partic
ular instance, some cause or other operates with more force than
the will, and renders its exertion ineffectual. Here the person
experiences what is called a constraint. An effect contrary to
the one willed takes place. When a constraning cause is suffi
cient to produce an effect opposite to the one willed, liberty of
action, at that particular time, is destroyed.
When effects, different or opposite to those willed, take place,
liberty of action is destroyed. The causes, which operate in
such cases, are more powerful than the will, and overcome it.

126
Arid such causes are the things intended by restraints, and coil*
straints. All restraints and constraints, which are sufficient td
produce effects opposite tP those willed, destroy liberty of ac
tion. This, however, is but seldorri the case^ Generally, the
effects willed take place. But when those effects exist, which
are opposite to those willed and intended, we are not accountable
for them. They are not our actions, but the effects ofthe cause
which produced them. And we do not act according to our^
pleasure, Unless the effects follow which are necessary to grati
fy our desires.
2. Inquire, whether mortal necessity destroys liberty.
Mankind are the' causes of many effects. Thousands of
events are attributed to them as the cause. They are agents*
They act, and produce effects. Yet it may be well to observe,
they are not the independent, efficient cause of one effect. They
are dependent on God, and cannot produce any effect without
the concurrence of his agency, or contrary to his determination.
Having observed this to preveht mistakes, I riiay now say, that
the feelings and desires of the heart are the cause of every vo-1
lition. The taste, which is the only feeling faculty ofthe mind;
constitutes agency. It is the primary cause in man of all his actions.
Those which do not proceed from this cause, are not our ac
tions, but the actions of some other agent. This internal cause,
by its operations, produces every volition. It puts the will in
motion. And volitions are the first and immediate effects it
produces. Between this cause and volition, God has establish
ed an infallible connexion. No power but his own, is suffi
cient to destroy this connexion ; and he will not destroy, what
he has determined shall exist. Hehce the reason, why liberty
of will can never be abridged. When there is nothing to pre
vent our willing according to our desires or inclinations, we en
joy liberty of will. Nothing can prevent. this, because God has'
established a certain connexion between the strongest desire of
the heart, and volition. This connexion is moral necessity.
And this necessity renders liberty of will absolutely sure and
certain. Were it not for this moral necessity, liberty of will would rest
on an uncertain foundatiori. For sometimes we might will as
we wish, and sometimes we might not. It would be altogether
uncertain, whether such volitions would follow as we might wish.
The will might act in opposition to our inclinations. If it did,
we could never carry our desires into effect. Not only so, but

127
the will might prPduce effects in opposition to our desires. But
now it must be obedient to the heart. It must will the effects
we wish to have exist.
Would any man feel contented to be in a state, in which he
could neither will nor act according to his wishes, nor gratify
any of his desires ? But if there were no connexion between
the heart and the will, no person would be able to will events,
which it was his desire to have exist. He would not be able to
act according to his inclinations and wishes. His condition
would be very unhappy. And if there were a connexion, but not
certain, then it woulp1 be a matter of uncertainty when he should
and when he should not act as his inclinations dictated. This
would be a very undesirable condition for such an agent as
man. But the connexion between the heart and the will is certain
and infallible. It cannot be destroyed. It, therefore, infallibly
secures liberty of will to every moral agent. This necessity or
connexion, let it be remembered, is not liberty. Liberty is the
privilege ef willing as we wish. And this necessity secures this
privilege to us. Our liberty of will, therefore, is certain, as
this necessity is infallible. Hence moral necessity is so far from
destroying liberty, that it is the foundation on which it rests.
'Take away the foundation, and our liberty is effectually destroy
ed. In the next place, are liberty of action and moral necessity
consistent with each other ?
The immediate design of volition is, to put the body or some
particular member of it, in motion; and by this means to pro
duce other external effects, which are necessary to obtain the
objects desired. If 1 have a desire to eat an apple lying on the
table before me, by an exertion of the will my hand is moved
directly to it, and from thence to my mouth. It it be growing'
on a tree, and I wish to enjoy it, the body must move to it, and
by a stroke of my staff the stem must be broken, that it may
fall to the ground. Here not only bodily motions, but the mo
tion of other things, as the staff, for instance, are produced.
These are the effects of volition. And as it is by the instru
mentality ofthe body, that we produce alterations and effects in
other things around us, the immediate operation of the will is
on the body And by means of the body every other effect is
produced, requisite to the attainment of the objects of our de
sire. And it is often the case, that a series of external effects

128
are necessary to reach our desired ends. Accordingly, all the
effects contained in such a series are the objects of volition, and
are produced by it ; and the last effect in the series is the ulti
mate object ofthe will.
It is therefore easy to see, when there is nothing to
prevent the existence of the effects willed, that we enjoy liberty
of action without any interruption. If I make exertions to walk
directly east, and nothing prevents my moving in this course, I
certainly enjoy all the liberty of walking in this direction which
can be conceived of, or desired. But if by the operation of
some cause I am restrained, or prevented from walking in this
direction ; and at the same time am constrained by some supe
rior power to move in a western course, mj' liberty of walking
easterly is destroyed. Causes, which prevent my acting as I
chose, are restraints ; and those, which make me act, as I would
not, are constraints. Of course, both restraints and constraints,
so far as they operate, abridge liberty of action. And those
effects which are produced by extrinsic causes or agents, wheth*
er restraining or constraining, are not our actions. Because
they are not the effects of our will, but of some foreign cause or
agent, external to us, which we have not power to resist ; and
we are not accountable for them. But if restraining or con
straining causes operate in opposition to the will, yet the will
overcomes them, and produces the actions intended ; then the
actions are our own, and we are responsible for them. Because
they are such as were intended, and are produced by the oper- '
ations ofthe will. And so far as constraints and restraints op
pose the will, liberty of action is impeded, but not destroyed,
if the will at last overcomes. We always act freely, when we
do the thing intended. And when the thing intended is done
without any impediment, we enjoy the most perfect liberty of
action. But so far as the will is opposed, liberty is abridged ;
or we do not act so easily and freely. It is now evident, that
when we act as we choose, we enjoy liberty of action. We are
now to inquire, whether necessity destroys liberty of action.
Such a connexion between causes and effects, as renders the
existence of the latter absolutely certain, is necessity. Such ef
fects are always necessary. Accordingly a certain, and infalli
ble connexion between volition, and the effect or action willed,
is necessity. If we act freely; they certainly follow the exertions
of the will. Does this necessity destroy liberty of action ? So
far from it, that without it we should be wholly deprived of lib-

129
erty. If such an infallible connexion, between the will and the
action willed, were not established, the will might exert itself,
but no effect would follpw. But does a person enjoy
liberty of action, if the effects intended and willed cannot be
produced ? But if the actions chosen pertainly follow, he en
joys liberty in the highest perfection. So far then as the pon-
Uexion between volition and the action willed is certain, liberty
is secured. Accordingly, if any external cause by its operation
destroys this connexion, it takes our liberty of acting as we wish
entirely from us. God has not established an absolute infalli
ble connexion, between every volition and its intended effect.
Had he seen fit to do this, liberty of action could never be de
stroyed, in any one instance, any more than liberty of will. As
this connexion is not. universal, does not extend at all times to
every volition, this is the reason why liberty of action may be,
and sometimes is, destroyed. For sometimes external causes,
and other agents, by their operations' prevent the existence of
the actions which we will. Or, in other words, by the influence
of constraints or restraints this connexion is destroyed, and the
actions chosen do not follow. When this is the case, in every
Such particular instance ws are deprived of oUr liberty. Ac
cordingly this infallible connexion between the thing willed arid
the will, or what is here called necessity, is essentia! to the enjoy
ment of liberty. So far as this prevails, our liberty is secured ;
and as often as it isdestroyed, we are deprived of liberty. Every
one must therefore see, if he attends candidly to the subject,
that this necessity is so far from destroying our liberty, that' it
is essential to^he preservation and enjoyment of it.
Let us suppose a person to have strorig desires to visit a friend.
Volitioris are necessary, we know, to accomplish his wishes j
and also external actions. By the operation pf his desires, vo
litions are produced; andby the operation of volitions, external
actions are effected. If there was no connexion between die
desires of the heart and volitions, desires would operate in vain.
For no volitions would follow. And if there were no connex
ion between the will and external actions, the operations ofthe
will would be ineftectual. Of course the person could never
visit his friend. But if a connexion is established, between his
desires and. volitions, and between his volitions and external ac
tions, .then he can act as he pleases, and gratify his heart in vis
iting his friend.
If the matter was left wholly t» man, which would he prefer,

130
tnat condition in which no such connexions are established, Pf
that in which they are ? He would certainly choose the latter.
And if the latter, then the necessity by which he acts, corres
ponds with his own feelings. And it is obvious, from what has
been said, if no such connexion had been established by our
Maker, his creatures never would have enjoyed any liberty of
will, or liberty of action. So that the necessity of choosing as
we feel, or according to our pleasure, and acting as we choose,
is essential to the existence and enjoyment of liberty. And our
Maker has granted and secured this privilege to us, by estab
lishing an infallible or necessary connexion between our de
sires arid volitions, and between our volitions and. actions.
There is, therefore, no ground to object against this kind of ne
cessity, as being inconsistent with liberty.
One great reason, why so many consider necessity as incon
sistent with liberty, arises from their using words without any
definite meaning. Another reason isj they indulge themselves
in a careless, indefinite mode of reasoning. Because necessity
sometimes destroys liberty of action, they infer itis always, and
in every sense, inconsistent with'liberty. This, all will see, is
false reasoning. If all would affix a definite meaning to their
terms, and reason correctly, they would not so often reject the
truth, and embrace errors, as they now do. But this requires
so much attention, mental exertion, and labor, they are not
willing to submit to it. And to justify themselves in the indul
gence of this mental indolence, they are always declaiming a-
gairist metaphysicks as a fruitful source of error. Yet it is be
lieved, that if all men should neglect that correct mode of think
ing and reasoning, Which at this, day is called metaphysicks, it
Would not be many ages before truth on moral subjects would
be generally banished from the world, and errors universally
prevail. When a person asserts, that necessity destroys liberty,
would he wish to have it made certain that he should choose
and act according to his pleasure, or not ? If all men desire
the privilege of choosing and acting according to their pleasure,
and to have this made infallibly certain, why do they declaim
against necessity ?
Furthermore, if our pleasure is what Armiriians mean by a
self determining power, we surely have it. For our pleasure "is,
to act according to the desires ofthe heart. And all our voli
tions and actions proeeed from the heart. If objects please lis,

131
desires arise to enjoy them ; and those desires give rise to all
the volitions and actions necessary to have possession of them ;
and in obtaining them we act according to our pleasure ; and when,
we enjoy them, our pleasure is done. If acting in this sense
according to our pleasure is what they mean by a self deter
mining power, (viz.) that our pleasure produces our volitions J
it is granted that we have this power. But this power destroys
indifference, and is consistent with necessity. To say we have.
a power to produce, and govern our pleasure, is false ; but to
say we are governed by our pleasure is true, and corresponds
with our wishes. If then they admit our pleasure, in the sense
explained, is a self determining power, to be consistent they
must also admit our ideas of liberty. If they would do this,
the dispute between them and us would be ended.

ESSAY XVI.
Whether liberty is necessary to vice and virtue; and,
if not, for what purposes is it requisite,in moral
agents I
It is, I believe, a general opinion, that liberty is necessary to
the existence of vice and virtue. But the truth of this, sentiment
may be questioned. And if, when examined, it should not ap
pear to be well founded, the inquiry' will be, why is liberty re
quisite in a moral agent ? For all will grant, that without it
mankind would be very imperfect moral agents. I shall, there
fore, inquire,
1. Whether liberty is necessary to the existence of Vice and
virtue. According to the description given of liberty in the
preceding essay, any person will clearly perceive, it is not essen
tial either to vice, or virtue. For vice and virtue must exist
antecedent to the need, or use of liberty. For an illustration
ofthe truth in relation to this subject, let the following supposi
tions be carefully examined.
Suppose a person to have an inveterate hatred against his

132
neighbor, which will lead him to take his life on the first favor* ,
able opportunity ; I ask, is he not a murderer ? Does, not this
hatred, or as the law defines it, this, malice prepense, constitute
the sin, or crime, denominated murder ? From the time this
hatred exists in his heart, is he not amutderer fy thesight of God?
He says, in his word, he that hateth his* brother fca murderer.
And if we had a knowledge of his heart, should not we view him
in the same light ? If vice and virtue belong to the heart, itis
certain that this person is guilty of the .prime palled murder.
For taking the life of ^neighbor, is only the fruit or effect of a
murderous disposition. Let us suppose further, that this person**
is born with this hatred, not only to his neighbPr but to.allmansS
kind, which will prompt him to take the lives of his fellow^ men,:
as often as he judges he can do it with impunity. Is he not
born with a murderous heart ? If mankind knew he had this
disposition, would they not have the same view of his heart, they
have ofthe heart of one who has committed a murderous deed ?
Would they not stand in fear of him ? Would they not watch
him, and guard themselves against his assaults ? I may now
ask, is liberty necessary to the existence of this murderous dis
position ? The person, according to the supposition, is born
With it. Is his birth an effect of his choice ? Is this disposition
a voluntary action, or the fruit and effect of his will ? Is it an
effect , which was produced by the operation of this person's a*
gency? Surely not. And if not, the liberty of this person was
not necessary to the existence of this murderous disposition.
Again. Suppose a person is born with a benevolent disposi
tion of heart. And such a supposition is not impossible, ; for
many believe, that some persons are sanctified from the womb.,
Is not this benevolent innate disposition a moral virtue ? Does
it not lay a foundation in him ,tp be pleased, wijth the divine
character and government ? Will it not, as an internal active
principle, influence him to serve God with fidelity and delight?
But was the liberty of this person, in any sense, necessary to
the existence of .this, benevolent disposition ? Wp may as well
suppose the exercise of liberty in an agent is necessary to his
very existence. .. .. , . , ¦•.-., , . , . ¦. ,
Furthermore. Calvinistic divines, believe, that ajl mankind
are born with depraved, corrupt hearts. And, it is; presumed,
they will not assert^ .that the depravity of heart with which they
are born is produced by their own voluntary exertions. Afl4
if they say, this depravity consists in voluntary exertions, yet

138
they will not believe,- that the agent produced them* For this"
would represent him as acting voluntarily, before he had any vo
lition. It implies the same absurdity, which is implied in.say-
ing that a person creates himself, it is obvious, that, with
respect to those appetites or dispositions with which we are born,
they are not produced by our agency. We are no more the
cause of them, than we are of our own existence. It is as in-
consistent to suppose, that we produce our own faculties, as our
own existence. And if it be said, we have no faculties, and the
mind is nothing but our various mental operations united, still
our first pperations are not produced by us. For if operations
constitute the mind, till they exist, there is no mind in being to
operate. Accordingly the first operations, which constitute the
mind, the mind could not produce ; unless it can act before it
exists. To suppose the mind is nothing but operations united,
does not relieve any difficulty. For then the first operations,
which according to this scheme must be called the heart, con
stitute that depravity with which we are born. It therefore
clearly follows, that all, who believe we are born with deprav
ed hearts, must admit, that this depravity is no more our pro
duction, than our own existence is. Of course liberty is no
more necessary to the existence of original depravity than it is
to our having a being in this world. Neither is it necessary to
original holiness of heart.
Adam was created in the iinage of God. And Calvinists be
lieve- he. was created in the moral, as well as in the natural, im
age of his Maker. Accordingly he was created with a benev
olent heart. And this bPnevofence of heart was no more the
effect of his agency, than his own existence. Was his liberty
necessary to his own existence ? Could no tsuch an agent, as Ad
am was, be created, unles she exercised liberty in his creation ? If
not, it was impossible for such an agent to be produced. For he
could not exercise liberty, before he existed. And the exercise
of liberty was not necessary to the existence of a benevolent
heart. For this was a quality given him in his creation. And
he could not act freely in its production. For agents cannot
act at all, much less freely, before they have existence. His
liberty, therefore, considered as an agent, was not necessary to
the existence of a benevolent heart.
These observations will apply with equal force to prove, that
men do not act freely in that change wrought in them, termed

134
teegeneration. If in this change something'is Created, as Calvin
ists believe there is, it is not produced by the agency of man . For
it is granted, he has not power to create any thing. As the vir
tuous disposition, or exercise, or whatever it may be called, is
not produced by man as the agent, but by the power of God; the
sinner exercises no liberty n the production of it.
Liberty is the privilege of a moral agent; a privilege of act
ing according to his pleasure, or as his feelings dictate. Such
an agent must exist, antecedently to the need, or use of liberty.
And if he is a complete moral agent, he has moral as well at nat
ural faculties. And his moral faculty must be vicious or virtu- '
ous, the moment it has existence, as has been made evident in'
a previous essay. If this cannot be denied, it is certain
that liberty is not necessary to the existence of either vice or
virtue/in the heart of moral agents. This is not Only evident
from the description given of liberty in the fourteenth Essay ;
but itis true, if we adopt the opinion generally received respect
ing it. Orthodox divines have commonly said, that liberty is
a power of willing. If the will, or a power of willing, be a just
definition of liberty, then the terms will and liberty mean the
same thing. According to the definition, it is asked, whether'
the will is vicious, or virtuous, or neither ? If it be answered,
that the will is either virtuous, or vici6us, then nothing is pre
dicated of the will, but what may be affirmed of liberty, if liber-'
ty and will are the same thing. It therefore follows, that the
liberty of moral agents is either virtuous or vicious. But the
will did not produce itself. It was not created by man, but by
his Creator. And as man, considered as an agent, did not exer
cise any liberty in the production of his will, because he did not
create it, yet the moment it exists, it is either vicious or virtuous;
it is therefore evident, that liberty is not necessary to the exis
tence of vice and virtue in a moral agent. For no agent can
exercise liberty, before it exists. It is said by many, that the
faculty, or power of willing, is liberty. And it is created with
the quality of vice, or virtue. But the will, with either of these
qualities, is not produced by man, but by his Creator. And the
will, the moment it exists, with the quality of vice or virtue, con
stitutes the depravity with which we are born. And as men do
not exercise any liberty in the production of this depraved will,
their liberty is not necessary to its existence ; and of course it
is not essential to the existence of vice and virtue.
Some however say, that liberty consists in spontaneous, vol-

135
' uatary exertion. They also assert, that all vice and virtue con-'
Sist in voluntary exertions, or exercises. This makes liberty, vo
lition, vice and virtue, the same thing. According to this rep
resentation, the first volition of a moral agent constitutes his
orignal depravity. But who is the agent that produces this
first, depraved, vicious volition ? Is man the agent ? If not,
then there is no liberty exercised by him in the existence of that,
which constitutes his original depravity. But if it be said, that
man is the agent, in this case, because voluntary exercises con
stitutes agency, this involves on absurdity. For it makes a-
gency, and the effect it produces, the same thing. Because it
is said, that volition is agency ; and volition, at the same time,
is the effect it produces. This cannot be true with respect to
the first original volition in man, whatever it may be in relation
. to those which are subsequent to it. Therefore, according to
this definition of liberty, it is not necessary to the existence of
that original depravity with which men are born. For with
respect to this first volition, which constitutes their original de
pravity, and from which all subsequent vicious exercises pro
ceed, they were not at liberty to have it, or not to have it.
Furthermore; what is meant by the phrase, liberty is neces
sary to the existence of vice and virtue ? Does it mean, that
the original fountain of either vice or virtue in man, is produced
by himself, and he is at liberty to produce it, or not ? Wheth
er the original depravity of. man consists in taste, or will, or the
first voluntary operation of the will, will any say, we create or
produce them ? We might with as much propriety say, we
create ourselves. For no man can create a taste, or a will, or
the first exercise of his will, any more than he can create himself.
If not, he certainly is not at liberty to be either vicious, or vir
tuous, any more than he is at liberty to exist, or not exist. In
deed, in whatever light we may view the subject, it is apparent,
that liberty is not necessary to the existence of either vice or
virtue. Fot whether we shall be created with either a vicious
or virtuous character, does not depend oil our pleasure, any
more than our being.
Some are often objecting to this representation, saying, if a
sinful inclination does not depend on our exertions, we are not
blameable. This will be attended to, under the subject ofpraise
and blameworthiness. Here it may be observed, that all who
believe the doctrine of total depravity, grant we are born with.

136
cowupt hearts. These will admit, that liberty is not necessary
to the existence of vice or virtue.
Whether the dealings of God with Adam, as especially his es
tablishing a connexion between his' 'moral character and that of
his posterity, was inconsistent with wisdom and justice, is a
subject distinct from the present. We know it is a fact, that
Adam's posterity derive a depraved heart from hini. And all,
who believe God is holy, wise, and just, will admit that the con
nexion he did establish between our first parents and their pos
terity was consistent with his attributes, whether they can clear
ly see the consistency, or not. The author has written on this
subject, and advanced a theory which was new to him, never
having seen any part of it in print ; but whether he will ever
publish it is uncertain. Itis in his view a theory that avoids the
difficulties, which have hitherto attended it, and which agrees
with reason and facts.
But though liberty is riot necessary to the existence of vice
or virtue, yet is it essential to render us worthy of praise and
blame? It would appear, on examination, that it is no more
necessary to praise and blame, than it is to the existence of Vice
or virtue. But.as the subject of praise and blame is discussed
in a subsequent essay, tp prevent repetitions, the reader is refer
red to that for satisfaction on this point. We may now con
sider, II. Forivhat ends„or purposes, liberty is necessary in a mor
al agent. Though it is not essential to one thing, yet it may
be for another. Arid it is requisite for the following purposes.
1. If we did not enjoy the privilege of choosing as we wjsh,
and acting as we choose, wp should notbe complete agents. A
complete agent ;is capable of choosing and acting agreeably to
the dpsires of the heart. So that, if he has desires for objects,
yet is not at liberty to put for.th those volitions, and produce
those external actions necessary to obtain the objects of his de
sire, and avoid the, objects pfhis aversion, he is not a complete
agent. For a complete agent is able to attain, generally, what
ever he loves, ;apd shun whatever he hates. If God had not es
tablished a connexion between our desires and volitions, and
external actions, we might have desires, but they would never
produce any effects, nor be able to reach the objects which
Wpuld gratify them. In this case the agency of man would be
very imperfect, and incomplete. Accordingly 'a liberty to cbofise

137
.. - - * ... - . ' ¦ ¦" ^
agreeably to his wishes, and to act as he chooses, is essential
ly necessary to complete agency.
2. It is necessary for us, in order that we may act out the in
ternal inclinations ofthe heart. The desires ofthe heart would,
never appear in any external acts, if we had not the liberty of
choosing and acting. ( Of course .moral agents could never have
any knowledge of eacr)t other's characters. As we have no in
tuitive view of each other's hearts; andbecotrie acquainted with
Pach other's characters only try external, visible signs; or ac
tions, if the heart was incapable of manifesting itself in this
way, we must forever remain ignorant of each other's de
serts. But it is necessary, to answer many purposes in the
moral government ofthe world, for creatures to havp a knowl
edge of each other's characters. And in order tri this, liberty
of choosing and acting is" f-eqtiisite.
3; It is necessary id social intercourse. We might have
strong desires, yet if we could not1 express them, we could not
have any social intercourse' with each other, nor with our Maker.
For if he" did not enjoy the Same liberty, the desires of his'heart
would not be manifested. And without a knowledge of his
character, we could never enjoy him. As true happiness con
sists in tlieenjPyfflehtofGod,anathe social intercourse of holy
Creatures wittr each other, liberty is essentially necessary to our
present and future felicity. \
4. It is riecessary,- in order for us to render unto God all that
Service, ivhich he requires of us. Generally, to do the things
required of us, external actions are necessary,' as m teaching.
reproving, exhorting, and many other duties. . But if we had?
not the liberty of choosing and acting, the most benevolent heart
could not perform all those duties, which are enjoined.
I now ask, is a person a complete agent, who' is not at liber
ty to attain the objects he desires, or to manifest the internal feel
ings of the hearty or to have social intercourse with men, or per-"
form the diitieS required of him ? If not, then liberty is neces
sary to answer end's unspeakably interesting arid important.
If we did not enjoy the liberty of choosing and acting agree-'
ably to our inclinations and desfreS, we should be Very imper
fect, and incomplete agents. But our Maker has established a
connexion between our original appetites, or primary principles
of action, and all our subsequent, actions ; which are necessary
to the accomplishment of our pleasure,ahdthe gratifipdfidirbfou'r
desires. This established connexion-secures to as the privilege
R

138

called liberty, and enables us to act as we please', and renders
:<s complete agents, as far as this connexion extends.

**+*******

ESSA7 ZVSI,
On Motives, with their influence in determining th*
will.
By a motive, t mean any thing which moves, excites, or in
duces an agent to act ; to choose one thing, and refuse another;
Motives are causes of action. I do not mean, that they are ef
ficient, independent causes ; but they are, what are commonly
called secondary causes. They are as really the causes of our
voluntary actions, as rain, heat, and the earth, are causes of vege
tation. They are the ground and reason of our acting, at all
times, as we do act. Motives may, therefore, be divided into
two general classes, internal and external.
1 . By internal motives, I mean, every thing in the heart or
taste, which stimulates to action. The appetite of hunger im
pels, or excites, to action. The same is true with respect to all
the appetites with which we are born.
Our affections and passions excite to action. They operate
as causes, which put the will in motion. They produce, or>
give rise to voluntary exertions. This agrees with the experi
ence of all men ; for all experience the operation of these inter
nal principles, and find they are stimulated by them to every ac
tion they perform.
Every language also is constructed on a belief, that we are
governed by our internal appetites, and our desires to obtain
that which is agreeable, and avoid whatever is painful. , Hence
arise the phrases, in every language, of being impelled by hun
ger, thirst, and the passions. Indeed deprive moral agents of
those internal principles of action, their agency would be de
stroyed, and all action would cease.
These internal principles are antecedent to all our voluntary
exertions. They move us to ast. They are the internal causes;

139
which produce volitions. These internal motives govern, and
determine the will. Hence it is wholly improper to say, that
these internal principles are governed by motives. They are
the primary principles of action in moral agents, and of course
are not governed by antecedent principles within us ; for there
are none, which are antecedent to them. Being primary, they
are not governed by any principles we possess ; but they gov
ern, direct and determine the will. This faculty is entirely un
der the influence of the heart ; but the heart is never directly
under the influence ofthe will. Having explained what I mean
by internal motives, I shall attend,
2. To the influence of external motives. External motives
include all objects, which either please or disgust us. Every indi
vidual object which pleases, excites us to those actions, which are
necessary to obtain the agreeable object. And all those objects,
which displease, excite us to those actions, which are necessary
to avoid them, that we may shun the pain they might occasion.
All objects, therefore, of every kind, whether agreeable or dis
agreeable, when in view ofthe mind, are motives to action. I
say, in view of the mind ; because objects, which are not per
ceived, or of which we are wholly ignorant, can never please
or disgust. Of course, till they are perceived, they have no in
fluence. This will lead us to consider the influence of motives.
How do external objects operate on the mind, and influence,'
it to action ? It is wholly by affecting it. And they never af
fect it any farther, than they excite painful, or pleasant sensa
tions. Agreeable and painful sensations are feelings ; and the
only feelings we ever experience. It is by exciting such sensa
tions, that external objects affect us. If we could perceive ex
ternal objects without experiencing either pleasure or pain, they
would not affect us. In relation to all such objects, the mind
would be in a state of perfect indifference. For to be in a state
of indifference in relation to any object, is to be unaffected by
it. But we are unaffected, if the object is neither agreeable, nor
disagreeable. But when objects either please or disgust us,-
we are then no longer in a state of indifference ; we are affect
ed either for or against them. Objects, so far as they please
or displease, impress us ; and when they do neither, they make
no impression. Hence they act upon the mind by exciting
pleasant or painful sensations. And the whole influence of ex
ternal motives consists iff the impression they make on the mind.
So far as they affect er impress the mind, they influence us to ae,.

140
tion ; and 'no farther. Here, it is well to observe, that as the
heart, or taste, is the only feeling faculty of the mind, or the,
only faculty which is the subject of pleasure and pain, it is the
only faculty, which is affected and impressed by external ob
jects. And when objects are perceived by the understanding,
they always affect the heart agreeably or disagreeably, in a
greater or less degree ; though they often affect us so slightly,
that we take no notice of it. But the heart is neypr in a state
of indifference in relation to any object, when in view ofthe
mind. When external objects impress the heart, tbey excite it
,to action ; and it is in this way only, that motives have influence.
This may be moreclearly explained by observing, that tijree things
are always necessary to action. These are, as observed in a for
mer essay, a faculty which can be the subject pf pleasure and
pain ; objects to make an impression upon it ; and an ifipresj
sion actually made, through the medium of the understanding.
This shows in what sense motives, both internal and external,
are necessary to give rise to volitions ; or, in other words, to
determine the will. Every volition i§ an effect, which must
have a cause. And our internal principles of action, together.
with external objects, are the secondary causes, which produce
volitions. Arid unless these causes operate conjointly, the will
would never be determined. External objects, by pleasing or
(displeasing, excite internal principles to action, and by their ac
tions or operations,, volitions are produced j the will is put in.
motion, and exerts itself to give existence to pyery subsequent
act, requisite to attain the objects at which an agent aims.
Having explained in what sense I use the word motive, as in
cluding both the internal and external cause of volitions, and
the manner in which external objects have influence in determin
ing the will ; we nuiy proceed tp cpnsid.er the strength, of mo
tives. These appetites or propensities of the heart, with which we
are born, are the primary principles of action in moral agents.
Our pleasures, pains, and desires are the affections, or opera
tions of our appetites. They are the cause of our voluntary
exercises. Andour desires are weak or strong, in proportion
to the strength or weakness of bur appetites. The keener our
stppetite of hunger is, the stronger is our desire for food. And
this is true with respect to all our appetites and desires. The
strength of an appetite is not always the same ; it may be one
hour strong, and the next weak and faint. Hence the reason

141
why our desires for the same object are one day warm, and the
next cool and languid: And the strongest appetite, while it re-^
mains the strongest, has the governing influence. They are
often operating also in opposition to each other. The drunk
ard, for instance, has a desire to gratify his appetite with spirit-:
uous liquor, and a desire to keep the money he must part with
to purchase it. Both these desires cannot be gratified, at the
same time. There is a struggle, a warfare between them. In
this warfare the strongest will prevail, and the weaker will be
denied. Within a short period, the weakest may become the
strongest; aud when this is the case it will prevail, and the oth
er must be denied. Thus the desires ofthe heart are constant
ly opposing each other, with less or greater strength ; and by
the strongest desire we are always governed. Between the
strongest desire, and a choice of ths object desired, there is ari
infallible connexion. Hence the strongest desire determines the,
will, and the will determines our external conduct. According
ly the strongest desire is what I mean by the strongest inter
nal motive. And the strongest desire is always strong, in pro
portion to the strength of its appetite. It is therefore of no con
sequence, whether we say the strongest appetite, or the strongest
desire, determines the will ; because both assertions are true.
This shews the reason, why the conduct of mankind in this
world is so changeable. It is because our appetites and desires
are daily gaining the ascendancy of each other. And when
an appetite becomes stronger^ than the one which had previously
governed, there will be an immediate change in the agent's con
duct. If the same appetites and desires governed us uniformly,
our conduct would not be variable. This is one reason why
there is no change in the divine conduct. God is forever influ
enced by the same benevolent desire. He is therefore ever pur-i
suing the same measures, and seeking the same end. And as
gaints andangels in heaven, are always governed by benevolent
desires, their conduct will be uniformly and eternally consistent.
But it is time to show what external motive is the strongest.
By external motives I mean all those objects, which, by affecting
the heart, influence the will.
It has been shewn, that external objects determine the will, by
affecting the heart. When several objects are in the mind's view,
the object which is the most agreeable, and from which, the most
pleasure is expected, is the strongest motive. For the object,
which is the most agreeable, will excite the strongest desire in,

142
the heart, with which the determination ofthe will is connected.
Because we always have the warmest desire for that object,
which is, all things considered, the most agreeable. Hence the
most agreeable object is the strongest motive ; and will have
the most influence, so long as it affords the most satisfaction^
This is the object, which makes the deepest impression on the
heart, and excites the strongest desires. Of course this object
will be chosen, or preferred to others which are less pleasing*
at the time the will is determined.
Furthermore, objects which are disgustful, the will rejects.
It chooses to avoid them. Hence that object, among many,,
which is the most disagreeable, has the greatest strength or most
influence in determining the will. It must be obvious to any
one, that when two objects are disgustful, if both cannot be re-1
jected, the one most disagreeable will be avoided by voluntary
exertions. On the whole, those external objects are the strong--^
est motives, and have the most influence, which are the most
agreeable, or the most disgustful ; the former to determine our
choice in favor ofthe object, and the latter against it.
From the above illustrations it is evident, that internal and
'external motives perfectly harmonize in determining the will.
For between the strongest desire and choice, there is an infallible
connexion ; so, also, between the most agreeable object, all
things considered, and choice. To see, therefore, their united
and harmonious influence, let it be carefully observed, that the
most agreeable object excites a stronger desire, than an object
less agreeable ; and the strongest desire always determines the
will ; and the most agreeable object is uniformly chosen. If,
then, we consider motives as secondary causes of volition ; thesp
internal and external motives or causes, of which an explanation
has been given, jointly operate in producing the same effect, or
determining the will for or against the same object;
It is foreign from my object at this time, to inquire whatthings,
or how many, are taken into consideration, to render one object;
more agreeable than another. For whatever they may be, still
it remains true, that the most eligible or agreeable object deter
mines the will. And to ascertain what determines the will, is ,
the great object of this Essay. I may not use words according
to their more common sense, when I call an internal principle
of action a motive ; yet these internal principles do as really
have influence in determining the will, as external objects. And
I have wished to bring into view every thing, which in fact has

148
influence in the determinations ofthe will. If I have succeeded,
in this respect, my end is answered. From what has been of
fered on this subject it follows —
1 . That the heart is a faculty antecedent to, and the founda
tion of a particular class of exercises or operations.
The design of external objects, considered in the light of mo
tives, is, to excite action. They can have no influence in an
swering this end, but by exciting painful, and pleasant sensa
tions. This is the first effect they produce ; and unless this ef
fect is produced, no exercises will follow. When these sensa
tions are produced, desires, and other exercises follow. If mo
tives excite pleasure and pain, they act ; not as agents, but as
means, or secondary causes. And there must be a subject for
them to operate upon. For to suppose operations without a
subject, implies the greatest absurdity. It implies, that they
operate on nothing. But that subject is not the understanding ;
for that is incapable of either pleasure or pain. Their first and
immediate operation is not on the wilL For the pleasure and
pain they produce are not volitions, but the cause of volition.
There must be, therefore, another faculty, which is the subject
on which they operate. And this faculty we call the taste, or
heart. Thus by considering external objects as motives, which
excite us to act, such a faculty as the heart is proved to
to exist, which is antecedent to, and the foundation of all its ex
ercises. 2. It follows, if there be no such faculty as the heart, distinct
from the will, motives have no influence in determining the will.
When we have clear, just arid distinct views of objects," if they
afford neither pleasure nor pain, we are in relation to them in a
state of absolute indifference. In this state, we have no feeling,
no inclination, no desires, for or against the objects we perceive.
It is self-evident, that a being in this state can never act. He
is totally without any inducement to action. It is impossible
for him to prefer one object to another ; or to choose or refuse.
Volitions, or acts of the will, never can have existence. This
has been demonstrated by writers, more than once or twice.
They accordingly insist, there must be a bias, preponderancy,
or inclination, for or agairist an pbject, before it is possible for it
to be chosen. The moment an object pleases, or appears agree
able, there is a bias, or inclination in its favor ; and when an ob
ject appears disgustful, there is a bias against it. Then the
mind is no longer in a state of indifference. Hence the pleasure

144
We feel in view of an object; is a.bias in faVor of it ; and the
pain we feel is a bias against it. If such a bias, or inclination
towards or against an object be necessary ; or, in other wordsj
if we must feel either pleasure or pain, in view of objects, before
choice can exist, then it clearly follows, firsts that pleasure and
pain are not volitions, because these sensations must exist ante
cedent to choice ; and secondly^ that this bias, tor pleasure and
pain, are not operations of the will, but of some Other faculty.
But it is agreed on all hands, they are not operations ofthe under
standing ; because this is a perceiving, not a feeling faculty: If
it be said, they are operations ofthe conscience, or a moral sense;
then it must be granted, that conscience, or a mpral sense is a
¦feeling faculty ; and if a feeling faculty, it is the heart, or what
I mean by taste ; for this is a feeling faculty. If it be said , these
operations belong to a capacity of pleasure and pain, which is es
sential to moral agency ; then it is obvious this is a feeling ca
pacity, and of course the very thing I mean by the faculty of
taste. It is therefore certain, that the faculty which I call the
heart or taste, though by other s it may be termed the conscience
or a moral sense, or a capacity of pleasure and pain, is the
subject of that bias, that pleasure or pain, which is necessarily
antecedent to the existence or possibility of choice, or the oper>(
ations of the will. And there is no way to account for the ex
istence of volitions, only on the ground of the existence of a
feeling faculty, distinct from the will. Those, therefore, whd
will not admit the existence of a faculty susceptible of pleasure
Und pain, distinct from the will, can never account for the exis
tence Of voluntary exercises. And those who deny the exist
ence Of faculties, antecedent to the exercises, are in the sami
predicament. And to be consistent with themselves, they must
deny the influence of motives wholly ; or agree with Arminians;
that we can act in a state of perfect indifference ; or say, that
Volitions are prbduced by the immediate agency of Deity, with
out the influence of motives. Then the warnings, admonitions,
threatnings, and promises, presented to view in the word of God<
are wholly useless, and never can have the least influence.
Every candid mind must be convinced by its own reflections;
that motives have no influence, any further than they affect, or
are agreeable or disagreeable to the agent. We may judgd
many things to be good, useful and excellent, which are not a-
greeable to the heart. Of course they are not chosen, howevetf
strongly judgment may determine in their favor; Our judg-

115
ment informs us that the character of God is infinitely excellent \
but it is not agreeable to the natural heart ; and therefore, iri
opposition to judgment, the will rejects him. The will never
follows the dictates of the understanding, any farther than they
are agreeable to the heart. This is evident from daily facts.
Hence objects must be agrce:*.Me to the heart, to attract the
will. And agents never choose objects, unless they are agreea
ble ; nor reject them, unless they are disagreeable. Their a-
greeableness is the reason why they are chosen ; andtiieir dis-
agreeableness the reason Why they are rejected. But the rea
son of choice is always antecedent to choice. After volition
exists, no reason, no motive can a^fer it. The influence of mo'-;
tivesis antecedenttor choice. So far as objects please, they in
cline us to choose them ; and so far as they disgust, they in
cline us to reject them. This is the manner in which they in
fluence and govern us. Hence there must be something in aff
agent, to be pleased or disgusted,previous to choice ; or motives
have not, neither can have, the least degree of influence. And
if motives do not influence in this way, what reason can be given,
why any object is chosen ; or why one thing is preferred to an
other ? Those therefore who deny the existence of such a fac
ulty as the heart, distinct from the Will, to be consistent, must
admit the Arminian doctrine of indifference ; and assert, that
we Ghoose and refuse objects iri a state of perfect indifference.
For if they admit, that the influence of motives is previous to
choice, and is the reason of course of our jphoosing them, they
grarit the very thing for which we contend. And if we choose
and refuse in a state of indifference, theri motives have no influ
ence ; we are never governed by them- And we act very incon
sistently to present objects to the view of an agent, with a design
to induce him to act. And if We admit the influence of motives,
we must grant the existence of that feeling faculty, which I call
the heart. But grant that a moral agent is possessed of the
faculties of understanding, taste, and will, and the influence of
motives is easily discerned. For then, when external objects
are in view of the mind, the agent's heart is affected by them ;
itis pleased or disgusted, arid desires are excited. Those de
sires, thus excited, govern and determine the will. And this
shows what we all find to be true, that the heart is never con
trolled by the will ; but the will is always under the government
and influence ofthe heart. Objeets will please or disgust us,
and it is not in the power ofthe will to prevent it. It is not iri

146,
the power ofthe will to cause us to love and hate ; or to pre-
verit it. But the will is always obedient to the command ofthe
heart. It is always exerted to produce those effects, which are
necessary to gratify the cravings and desires ofthe heart. And
as by motive is intended every thing Which is a secondary cause,
Pr a means of volition ; motives are properly divided into two
classes, internal and external.
Whether we say the will is determined by the greatest appar
ent good, or greatest uneasiness, or any other motive, what is
contained in this Essay does not disagree with such opinions.,:,
For if objects of choice are painful, there , is; uneasiness ; if a-
greeable, there will be uneasiness until the objects are obtained.
And to choose according to the greatest apparent good, is in
fact to be governed by sensations excited, which are the most
agreeable, or painful. For it is ever most agreeable to reject
and shun objects which are painful, if this can be done. We are
then always governed by motives, according to what is written,
in this Essay.

**********
ESSAY XVXIX.
On the JYature of Good and Evil.
The division of good and evil into natural and moral is prop
er. Under these two divisions, every kind of good and evil is-
included. And the difference there is among things called good,
and evil, is the ground of this distinction. To ascertain j this
difference, and thereby show the propriety of this division, is
the object of this Essay. It is necessary first, to get clear and
distinct ideas ofthe nature of good and evil in general ; and
then proceed to investigate the ground on which they are distin^
guished, into natural and moral. Hence my present design is,
to obtain clear conceptions ofthe nature of good and evil, both
natural and moral. -
Good and evil may be divided into absolute and relative^
Whatever is good in itself, ,or in its own nature, is an absolute

147
good. An absolute good is self-evident, No reason can be
given, why we esteem it a good.
Happiness is an absolute good. Every one knows what hap-,
piness is ; what an agreeable feeling or sensation is. This all
know by experience. And every moral agentwho has expe
rienced agreeable sensations, is certain that happiness is a good
thing. It is impossible to convince any one to the contrary.
Neither can any moral agent give any reajson, why he accounts
it a good thing. He is not convinced of this fact, by reason
ing ; but by feeling, or possession. No proposition is more
self evident than this, that happiness is a good feeling. We
say, it is self-evident, that whatever is, is ; and that a whole is
greater than a part. It is equally self-evident, that whatever
is good, is good; or that good is good. But to say, that hap
piness is a good thing, is only saying, that this good, called
happiness, is a good. For a pleasant or good feeling, is happi
ness ; and happiness is a pleasant or good feeling.
Some make a distinction between pleasure and happiness,
Can we mean by pleasure any thing less or more, than pleasant
sensations ; and do not the same sensations constitute happiness ?
It is granted the pleasures of mankind, derived from worldly
objects, are vain and unsatisfying ; and that there is no happi
ness or pleasures, but in God, which are durable, and perfectly
satisfying. There is no other happiness .worthy ofthe pursuit
of rational beings. And I can see no ground for any distinc
tion between them, but the one here admitted.
Not only is happiness an absolute good ; but thegreatest sum
of happiness is the highest possible good. For it is evident, by
attending to the ideas the terms express, that an absolute good,
increased to the greatest possible measure, is the highest possi
ble good. Greater good than this cannot have existence. For
it is absurd to say, there can be greater good than the greatest.
And as every moral agent esteems happiness a good thing ;
increase it to as high a degree as his capacity will admit, he
then will possess as great a sum of happiness as his nature will
contain. Or, in other words, he possesses all the good his ca
pacities will admit ; the greatest good to which an individual
can arrive, unless his capacities are enlarged. Hence the high
est happiness of which an agent is capable, is his highest good.
And that, which is the highest good of an individual, is the
highest good of society. Societies are composed of individu
als j and the collective good of all the individuals, constitutes

148
theabsolute good of the Society. Accordingly, the sumofal!
the happiness the individuals possess, is the sum' of happiness
existing in that Society, And if the individuals possess as much
happiness, as their natures will admit ; the happiness of all
added- together, constitutes the highest good that society can
have, unless the capacities of the individuals are enlarged.
Hence the greatest happiness a society can possess,, is its
highest good. The greatest possible sum of happiness, there
fore, is the highest good of the universe. For a greater good
than the greatest, cannot exist.
I may now say, that the greatest possible sum of happiness,
is not only the highest good of the universe, but the only; ab
solute good in it.
Some have supposed, and professed to believe, that holiness
is an absolute good ; and of course, the highest good of the
universe. If it fee an absolute good, it is the highest good.
And as this position is believed by many, it is necessary to say
something to evince that it is an error
I will suppose a society of beings, each of whom is perfectly
holy ; yet happiness is a feeling they have never experienced,
arid never will. Is their holiness any benefit to them ? If they
were devested of holiness, in case pain were not tobe theeoro-
sequence, would their condition be rendered worse ? No ;
for their condition is precisely the same. For whether they are
holy, or not hply, they have existence without feeling either
pleasure or pain. Some may say, this is not a supposable
case ; because, if beings are holy, they will be happy. Mthis
were granted, still it is a supposable case ; hecause holiness
and happiness are distinct thipgs. As they are not the same,
but objects of separate, distinct consideration, we may suppose
one to exist without the other. Furthermore, holiness andhap»
piness are not inseparably connected. Perfectly holy beirigs
may suffer paim ; as was in fact die case with our Savior, who
was perfectly holy. The above supposition is, therefore, ad
missible ; and clearly shows, that holiness in the universe! with
out happiness, would never be esteemed as a valuable property
or benefit. And this makes it evident, that holiness is not ap
absolute good.
Again ; suppose a moral agent to continue in existence with
out experiencing any pleasure or pain, yet capable of improve
ments in many branches of science ; I ask, could he ever have
any idea of good and evil ? Gould you communicate to bins

149
an idea of pain, or pleasure ? No ; if he were born blind, you
could as easily give him an idea of light and colours. For we
do not obtain a knowledge of pleasure and pain, by reasoning ;
any more than we do of light and colours. To have an idea
of pleasure and pain, a person must be the subject of them.
And without an idea of pleasure and pain, the words good and
evil would be perfectly unintelligible to him. You might tell
him, that holiness is a good, and sin an evil ; but he would not
apprehend the meaning of the terms good and evil. This I
think every one must grant. This proves, that holiness is not
an absolute, but a relative good. Indeed, without happiness, "
why not as well to be without holiness, as to have it ; to be
stones, as men ? Of what value is a universe, however holy,
if there be no happiness ? But I need not spend timein show
ing, that holiness is not an absolute good. This is so evident, that
every one must be convinced, of it, who is not under an undue
bias in favor of some beloved system.
Prom what has been said; it is evident, that happiness is an
absolute good, and the only absolute good ; and that the high
est possible sum of happiness, is, the greatest good of the uni
verse. I now add,
2. Thatpain is an absolute evil. This is self evident. Every
person knows by experience, that pain is an evil. It is thus
viewed, and dreaded, by every one. Yet no one can give a
reason, why he views it to be an evil, or why he dreads it. If
pain, or misery, is an evil, in itself ; then the greatest sum of
misery, is the greatest evil which can exist. That being, who
is perfectly miserable, suffers the greatest possible evil. Now
every one will grant, that pain is an absolute evil. And, as it
is the direct opposite of happiness, to be consistent, every one
must grant also, that happiness is an absolute good.
3. Every thing, except happiness and misery, is good or
evil in a relative sense only. When a reason can be given, why
one thing is good, and another evil, they are relatively good
and evil. We consider them good or evil, on account of their
relation to absolute good and evil. When we view things in
this relation, if their tendency isto happiness, we pronounce them
good ; but if their tendency is to destroy happiness, or produce
misery, we pronounce them evil. But to prevent mistakes, itis
necessary to observe,
1. That to judge aright respecting the nature and tendency
of things, we must take into consideration their ultimate tendency.

15§
Por many things afford present aud immediate pleasure, which
tend ultimately to destroy happiness. This is true with respect
to many sinful courses and practices. They often afford those
who follow them much present satisfaction and pleasure ; yet
they" tend ultimately to misery. In like manner, a godly life," .
such as the apostles and primitive christians lived, exposed
them to persecution, and brought upon them in this life many
extreme sufferings and tortures. Yet the ultimate tendency of ho
liness is to happiness However much present pain holiness may
occasion ; yet, as its ultimate tendency is to happiness, it is a
good thing. And however much present pleasure sin may afford J
yet, as its ultimate tendency is to misery,, it is an evil.
We cannot, therefore, judge correctly concerning the good
or evil nature of things, by the immediate effects they produce.
To judge aright, we must take into view their ultimate effects j
and pronounce them good or evil according to their ultimate
tendency. 2. It is necessary, also, to explain, in what sense the word ten
dency is here used. We say, the tendency of all bodies on the
surface of our earth is towards its centre ; yet we know many
things may be made to move in a direction from the centre.
We say, however, their tendency is not to ascend, but to de
scend towards the centre ofthe earth. By tendency, therefore;
in this instance, we mean, that according to established laws
in the natural world, bodies meeting with no obstruction will
move directly towards the centre, and will never rest till they
reach that point. This direct course of water for instance, in its
motion to the centre, is what we mean by its tendency to the cen
tre. We say, the tendency of poison, arsenic for instance, is to de
stroy life. Yet it may be used in such a manner, as to remove
disorders, and restore health. According to the laws which
prevail and govern, arsenic in its direct course will produce one
effect after another, till its operation finally puts an end to life.
Its direct course, in its operation, is to the extinction of human
life. This direct course is what we mean by its tendency.
Things in this world are, by their Maker, connected one with
another, intermediately, and with some ultimate end. Accord
ing to this establishment, things produce effects one after anoth
er, in a regular train, till they reach their final term or end.
According to the connexions God has established, their direct
course, in their operation, is towards their ultimate end ; and in

151
such end they will terminate, unless, by some means or other,
this established connexion is broken, or interrupted. This di
rect course of things to some ultimate end or point, according
to established connexions, is their tendency. Now, according
to established connexions in the moral world, the direct tenden
cy of holiness, in all its operations, is ultimately to happiness.
This is what I mean by its tendency. And the direct course
of sin is, in all its operations, to the destruction of happiness ul
timately . And this is what i mean by its tendency. And there
is no way, of which we have any knpwledge, by which a sinner
can avoid being ultimately miserable, except by becoming holy.
And a holy character, continuing holy, cannot be finally mis
erable ; unless a different order of things should be established
in the moral world.
Also, though arsenic may be a means of restoring health
to the sick ; yet, in order to this, its direct course or operation
must be destroyed, or interrupted. Hence, though it may, by
interrupting its course, or compounding it with certain other
things, be a means of health ; yet, we do not view this to be its
natural tendency. So, although sin may occasion good to the
universe, yet its direct course or operation is to make the sin
ner finally miserable. So all will say, Us tendency is to evil,
and not to good, ultimately. Having explained what I mean
by the tendency of things ultimately, whatever their present
immediate effects are ; it may be said, that the reason why we
call some things good is, because they tend tp absolute good
ultimately ; and the reason why we term some things evil is,
because they tend to the destruction ofabsolute good ultimate
ly, or to absolute evil. Or, we call some things good, because
their ultimate tendency is to happiness ; and we call things evil,
because they tend . ultimately to misery. Here I would just ob
serve, that whatever tends to misery, tends to destroy happi
ness ; and whatever tends to happiness, tends to prevent mis
ery, Hence to say, that a thing tends to destrpy happiness, is
the same as saying it tends to misery ; and to say, it tends to
destroy misery, is the same thing with saying it tends to happi
ness. The preceding illustrations lead to the following impor
tant conclusions;
1. We judge all relative good, whether natural or moral, to
be a good, for one and the same reason.
Why do we consider the sun, the rain of heaven, a good con
stitution, and health, to be blessings ? Because they conduce

152
to happiness. For the same reason we view every thing in tJh&
natural world to be be a good thing, or a blessing.
Why do we consider holiness, with all its operations and ex-.
ercises, to be good ? Because they promote happiness. This
is their motive and tendency. If the question were asked re
specting everyindividual thing, -whether natural or moral, why
we consider it to be a good thing, or a blessing; in answer, we
must assign one and die same reason. We should say,:because
it tended ultimately to the promotion and increase of happiness.
It is presumed no1 other reason but this can be given, -why we
judge' things to be good, whether natural or moral.
If we should say, we consider one thing good on account of
of its utility ; another on account of its excellency ; another for
its beauty, or on any other account ; still this is only saying, in
other words, that we esteem things good, because they tendto
happiness ultimately. Forcan any thing wkhpropriety of speech
be called useful, excellent, amiable, beneficial, or profitable,
Which does not tend to happiness ? It must be granted, that
every thing has a tendency, either to happiness or misery. Ac
cordingly, things Which do not tend to happiness, tend to mis
ery. Can we with any propriety apply to such things the terms
useful, or excellent, or amiable, or any other epithet of similar
import? If not, then they are 'designated by such qualifying
epithets, because they tend to the happiness ofthe universe; 3
mean, to the greatest sum of happiness. Indeed it must be ob
vious to every person, who reflects candidly on the subject, that
things are called good on account of their tendency. And if
ori account of their tendency, it must be for their tendency to
happiness. For no one will call any thing good, which tends to
misery, unless he views it in some other, very different relation.
The same thing, it is grarited, may be viewed in different rela
tions ; and be called good or evil, according to the relation iri
which it is viewed ; still it will be termed good or evil according
to its tendency, in that relation, in which it is viewed. That is
a good, which does good; and that does good, which promotes
happiness, or absolute good. And nothing else can be termed
good, without an abuse of words.
As every thing is called good for the same reason, on account
of its tendency to happiness; ; natural and moral good are riot
distinguished by the terms natural and moral because they have
different tendencies. If however all things are viewed good for
the same reason, it may be asked, why are they divided into

153
two classes, and marked with the words natural and moral >*
There must be a difference, which is the ground and reason of
this distinction. To this I purpose to attend in the next Essay ;
but now proceed to add,
" 2. That for the same reason one thing is termed evil, every
thing is so called, whether it be a natural or moral evil.
Why are earthquakes, wars, famines, pestilences, and all bodily
diseases, viewed as evils ? Because they destroy happiness^
This is their tendency. If these evils were to prevail constant
ly, universally, and eternally, could created beings be happy ?
Could a holy being, if always tortured with an acute disease,
be considered a happy being ? Natural evils, if they were to
prevail universally,* would destroy happiness as certainly as
moral. So far as they do prevail, happiness is destroyed. Why
is sin considered an evil ? For the same reason ; because it
destroys happiness. This is its invariable tendency. And so
far as it prevails in this world, misery abounds. In hell, where
sin reigns uncontrolled, the inhabitants are perfectly miserable.
It is then true, that natural and moral evils, are evils for the same
reason ; because they tend to misery, or absolute , evil. Ac
cordingly, the reason, why evils are distinguished by the epi
thets natural and moral, is not on account of their different ten
dencies; for their tendency is precisely the same.
Some may object and say, according to the above reasoning,
the same thing may be both good and evil. For instance,
moral evil tends to misery, and for this reason is an evil ; it is
also an occasion of happiness, and for this reason it may be
termed good. Hence the above reasoning proves too much; and
therefore proves nothing.
Answer. 1. We say, poison tends to destroy life ; and is,
therefore, an evil thing ; yet it is sometimes the means or occa
sion of preserving life ; and when viewed in this relation, it is
a good thing. Still, is it the tendency of poison to preserve
life ? Does it not naturally destroy life ? Whenever it is the
occasion of preserving life, its tendency is counteracted, by be
irig connected with other ingredients. Let a person feed upon
it constantly, and it will soon put an end to his life. We say,
the tendency of sin is to the misery ofthe sinner ; yet we say it
is the occasion of good to the universe. But is it not true, that
its tendency is to misery ; and is it not for this reason called an
evil ? But,
2. The words occasion andHeridency have different mean-
T

154
ings. When we say sin is the occasion of good, what do w»
mean ? We mean ; that it is not the cause of good ; it is not
its nature to produce good ; it is not owing to sin, but to the wis
dom of God, that it is ever the means of good. God makes use
of it to promote an end, which it tends to destroy. Hence its
tendency is counteracted. A man in anger makes use of his-
hand, or some other instrument, to put an end to. a person's life.
Here the instrument is not the cause, but the occasion of death.
The person, who used it, is the cause of the death. When'
therefore we say, sin or any other evil is the occasion' -of good;
we mean, some agent has made it a means of good, contrary to
its nature and tendency, Hence, though evil may be made the
occasion of much good ; yetits proper tendency and nature is
to evil. And we do not judge ofthe nature or tendency of any
thing, by the good or evil it may occasion ; but by the good or
evil it will produce in its' operation, if not counteracted.— Reli
gion has been, not the cause, but the occasion of many sore
persecutions ; and sin is, not the cause, but occasion of much
good ; yet the tendency of religion is to happiness, and the ten
dency of sin to misery. And we judge things to be good or
evil according to their tendency, but not by the good or evil
which tkey may occasion. Hence the objection has no force,
to invalidate what has been said to show, that we denominate
all things good or evil for precisely the same reason.
3. It follows, that all kinds of good and evil, natural and mor
al, have the same nature ; which is either good or evil. Nat
ural and moral good have the same nature ; natural and moral
evil have the same nature. We learn the nature and tendency
of things by the effects they produce. If misery is the awful"
effect air created beings would suffer, in case nothing but nat^
ural evil universally prevailed, then its nature and tenden
cy is to produce misery. But if every created being was
to be constantly afflicted with the excruciating pains of an acute
disease, then it is the nature of that disease to produce nothing
but misery. Th%same will hold true with respect to every
other natural evil. - Ik <
The nature of ski is to produce misery. If every being in the
universe was to live forever under the entire dominion of sin,
universal misery would prevail ; this is the effect it would pro
duce. Hence it is the nature and tendency of both natural and
moral evil to produce misery, or absolute evil* Their natures
then are precisely the same.

155
• In like manner,, If nothing but natural good universally pre
vailed, universal happiness would be the result ^ and if every
being were perfectly holy, universal happiness would be the re
sult. So that natural and moral good, if they universally pre
vailed to the exclusion of all evil, would produce the same ef
fect. Of course, their nature is the same. It cannot be denied,
therefore, that natural and moral evil have the same nature j
also, that natural and moral good have the same nature.
Whether the nature of moral evil is not more destructive, than
that of natural evil ; and whether moral good is not more con
ducive to happiness than natural, are questions which do not in
the least affect the above reasoning. For two things may have
the same nature, although one may be more destructive, or sal»
Jutary in its operation, than the other.
I have been more particular on this head, than I otherwise
should have been, with a view to detect an error which many
have embraced ; which is, that evils and goods are distinguish-
. ed by the terms natural and moral, because their natures and
tendencies are totally different. But, I apprehend it has been
fully proved, that their natures and tendencies are the same ; and
that natural and moral evils, are evils for the same reason ; and
that natural and moral goods, are good also, for the same r<a-
son. We must, therefore, search for other differences, as the
ground ofthe division of good and evil into natural and moral
This will be the subject of the next Essay.

.- ;t****#**«

ESSAY XIX.
Of the Reasons, why good and evii are distinguish
ed by the terms natural and moral.
Where there is np difference, there is no ground for a dis
tinction. The distinction therefore, which is under considera
tion, and has long prevailed, implies a difference.
The person, who first made this distinction, had in. his-wn.

156
view, sufficient ground for it. And mankind, for many ages,
have considered the distinction well founded. It has been
shown, in the preceding essay, that the difference in the nature
of moral and natural good and evil is not the reason of the dis
tinction. With a view to elucidate this subject, I will divide all things
which exist, into natural and moral agents. Some may say,
there are no natural agents. For all things which exist, except
moral agents,are no more than means, and instruments; &it is im
proper to denominate them agents. Though this will be grant
ed, yet for the sake of elucidation, the distinction may, for the
present, be admitted. According to this distinction, many will
say, that things are called good and evil according to the na
ture of the agents tp which they belong. Good and evil qual
ities, belonging to a natural agent, are denominated natural ;
and similar qualities, belonging to a moral agent, are called
moral. And this account ofthe matter may satisfy many. But
inquisitive minds will ask, what is the difference between a nat
ural and moral agent ? It is as necessary to know the ground
of this distinction, as of that under consideration ? In answer
to this inquiry, it is well to observe, that the difference between
a natural and moral agent is very obvious. A natural agent is
destitute of all the properties, which are necessary to constitute
a moral agent. Moral agents are beings, who have the proper
ties, or faculties of understanding, heart, and will. But all oth
er agents are totally devoid of these properties. All beings pos
sessed of these properties are proper objects of praise and blame.
But there is no propriety in praising or blaming those existences,
which are destitute of these, properties. Every quality, there
fore, whether good or evil, is denominated natural,, which be
longs to a being that is not a proper object of praise and blame ;
and qualities, whether good or evil, are called moral, if they be
long to beings who are proper objects of praise and blame. In
other words, by natural good and natural evil is meant, that
which belongs to a being, which has not the properties necessary
to render it a fit object ofpraiseand blame; and by moral good
and moral evil, is intended that which belongs to a being, who
has the properties necessary to constitute such an object. Ac- :
cordingly, when we say, the light of the sun is a natural good ;
we mean, however great a blessing the sun is, it deserves no
praige. But why not ? Because it has not the properties,
which are requisite to render it a fit object of praise or blame.

157
For it has no intelligence, no voluntary exertions, no feeling,
or principle of action. In like manner, when we say all af
fections or desires are morally good or evil, we mean, they be
long to beings who are proper objects of praise and blame.
But why are they proper objects of praise and blame ? because
they have all the properties necessary for that purpose. But
what are those properties ?• Understanding, Taste and Will.
This shows that there is a wide difference between natural
and moral agents. And the distinction of good and evil into
natural and moral, is designed to teach us this difference, with
out usihg circumlocution. Now, when we say the light ofthe
sun is a natural good, we know the idea intended to1 be com
municated is, that the sun, by its light, promotes happiness,
but deserves no praise. But by moral good is meant, that the
subject of it is an object, which deserves praise. So that by
this distinction, we do, in a short and easy waj', give each oth
er to understand that one being is, and another is not, a proper
object of praise and blame. Hence, when we say diseases,
earthquakes and tempests, are natural evils, the meaning is ob- •
vious ; these are not proper objects to be blamed. And when
we say, that wars, thefts, murders, frauds, and the like, are
moral evils, we know the meaning is, that the authors of these
evils are deserving of blame and censure. The same holds
true with respect to moral and natural good.
This distinction and division being once made and under
stood, our meaning is obvious, when we use the terms natural
and moral. These terms include a train of ideas, which all
understand, who understand the ground ofthe distinction. All
those evil qualities and events, which do not imply a desert of'
praise or blame in the agents, are classed together and called
natural evils ; and those evils, which imply a desert of blame,
are classed together and called moral. So all things, which
are good, are divided into classes, called natural and moral.
This classification renders the communication of our ideas short
and easy. And if this distinction were not made, and its ap
propriate terms were not adopted, we should be compelled to
use many more words than we now do, on almost every topic.
It is necessary, however, to observe, that every thing belong
ing to a moral agent, which may be termed either good or e-
vil, is not of a moral nature. The understanding is not con
sidered a moral faculty, nor its operations moral exercises;
because mere intellect is not a pririciple of action. If mankind

.158
were endued with no other faculty than the understanding, they
might reason correctly^ and increase in, a knowledge of truth ;
but they would never do any thing, which is either good or e-
vil ; they would be totally inactive beings. Nothing but m
active principle will ever prove Useful, or hurtful. And as
mere intellect is not in its nature active, and for this reason wjll
never promote or destroy happiness, it is not a moral faculty,
nor its operations of a moral nature. .
The understanding may err, and errors may be the occasion,
but not the cause of evil. If errors are considered as evil, be
cause they are the occasion of evil, they Come under the class
ef natural evils. So also, if correct reasonings and acts of
judgment are termed good, because they may be the occasion
of good; they are merely a natural good. The understanding
is under the command of the heart. It is employed, as the
heart is pleased to direct, in devising means and ways to do
good or hurt. It is employed in concerting wise and benevo
lent, or wicked and pernicious schemes, according to the pleas-.
ure and direction of the heart. The heart of Paul employed
his intellectual powers, before his conversion, in devising means
and ways to eradicate the christian religion from the earth ;
but when he became a good man, his heart employed his un
derstanding in concerting plans to spread it through the world.
According to this example, all mankind make use of their un
derstandings to do good or hurt, as their hearts please to direct.
So the understanding is as really under the power and influence
of the heart, as our hands or feet. And the operatioris of the
former are no more of a moral nature, than the motions ofthe
latter. The same is. true with respect to the will. This faculty is
under the entire influence ofthe heart. Mankind never choose
or refuse, contrary to the pleasure if the heart ; but all their
voluntary exercises are according to its highest pleasure. It
has been shown, that the pleasure of the heart is antecedent to
all voluntary exercises ; and mankind always act freely, be
cause they always act according to their pleasure. But if the
will was not under the influence of the heart, men could not act
according to their pleasure ; and of course could not be free
agents. Previous to his being renewed, Paul's heart employed
his will to carry into execution the schemes, which his under
standing had formed, to destroy Christianity. But after his
Conversion, his heart employed his will in executing plans, to

159
extend the knowledge ofthe Saviour through the world- In
like manner, the will of every man is under the direction and in
fluence Ofthe heart. Now as the will is under the influence of
the heart, its exercises are not of a moral nature. The opera
tions of the will produce every external effect, and always prove
Useful or hurtful. For this reason they are termed good, or
evil. But they are not in a moral sense good or evil, for the
same reason that the operations of the understanding are not.
All our voluntary exercises therefore, belong to the class of nat
ural good or evil.
The motions of the hands, and other members, sometimes
do good, and sometimes mischief ; and for this reason such
actions are termed good and evil. But no one supposes the-
actions of the hands and other members are, in a moral sense,
either good or evil, And why not ? Because the good and
evil they produce do not proceed from them as the cause ; but
from the heart, which uses them to do good or hurt, according
to its pleasure. Such external actions are viewed as good or
evil, in a natural sense only. And for the same reason, we must
consider all operations of the understanding and will in the same
light. From these remarks it follows, that all the operations ofthe
understanding and will, and all our bodily actions, so far as
good and evil may be predicated of them, belong to the class of
natural goods and evils, It also follows, that nothing but the
heart and its operations is of a moral nature, belonging to the
class of moral good and evil. And one reason why the heart
only is to be denominated morally good or evil is, this is the
only primary principle of action in moral agents.
As we can trace streams back to their original fountain ; so
we can trace all the actions of men back to their original foun
tain ; and this is the heart. And we ean go back no farther.
We find nothing in man antecedent to the heart, which is active,
or the cause of any actions. The heart then is the primary and
original cause of all the moral good and evil, which can be pre
dicated of men as agents. This is the cause, source, or foun
tain of all moral good and evil in man.
The affections and passions are the operations of the heart.
They flow as directly from it as streams from a fountain. They
are the operations of the heart, as perceptions are ofthe under
standing, or volitions ofthe will. And as streams are ofthe
same nature with the fountain from which they proceed j so the

160
affections and passions are of the same nature with the heart.
The heart is a moral faculty ; and its operations are of a moral
nature- These only belong to the class of moral good and
evil. The understanding and will are not moral faculties, be
cause they are not primary, active principles. Of course the
operations of these faculties are not moral. So far as it is
proper to call them good and evil, they are to be referred to the
class of natural good and evil.
It may by some be said, that as the operations of the will
are connected with the heart, they ought to be viewed as moral
exercises. But this does not follow. Things of different na
tures are connected. There is a connexion between the under
standing and the heart ; yet it does not follow that the opera-.
tions of the understanding proceed from the heart, or are ofthe
same moral nature with the operations ofthe heart. There is
as real a difference between volitions and affections, as between
affections and perceptions. This has been made evident iri those
essays, which treat on thefaculties ofthe mind. Hence, though
the will is connected with the heart, yet its operations are nor
the operations ofthe heart, anj" more than perceptions are ; and
of course, are not of a moral nature.
To bring this essay to a close, let the following things be
considered. A tree has fallen, and killed a man. Does it de
serve blame ? No ; because it is not a proper object of blame.
Why is it not ? Because it has not the faculties necessary to
render it a designing agent.
One man kills another. Does he deserve blame ? We will
answer, yes ; But why ? Because he has all the faculties,
which are necessary to constitute him a designing agent, or a
complete moral agent. But does blame belong to the under
standing, which devised the means by which life was taken away?
No. To his will, which executed the scheme devised ? No.
To the hand and dagger by which the victim was stabbed ? No.
But why are not these deserving of blame ? Because they
were not active principles ; they were only the instruments or
means, by which the murderous purpose was effected. What
then renders the murderer deserving of censure and condemna
tion ? His heart. But why ? Because it is an active princi
ple and the primary cause of all the actions, which terminated
in the death of his fellow mortal. Here lies that malice pre
pense, which is called murder This is termed a moral evil, be
cause it exists in a being who is a complete moral agent ; and

161
because it is the taust ofthe death of his neighbor. To sUm
up the whole ; mpral good and evil belong to moral agents \
arid natural good and evil to natural \ agents But what
is the difference between these two agents ? One has all the
properties necessary tq render it a proper object of praise arid
blame, or a designing agent; and the other is destitute of
them. But why is not every thing- in a moral agent, wjftich
may be denominated good and evil, to be considered a moral
good pr evil ,:? Because they do hot proceed from a primary,
active, principle of action. Accordingly, no good tor evil is to
be considered moral, but that Which proceeds from the heart of
man;, because, thi§ is the only primary principle of action.
The heart then, and its various operatioris, constitute the only
class of moral good and evil. Every other good arid evil be
longs to the class of natural good and evil.
It is a general opinion, that exercise, diction, Activity, Sic. are
essential to vice and virtue. Hence voluntary exercises have
by. many been considered as holy or sinful, because they have
been viewed as being exclusively, active. Since it is proVPdi
that the mind is endowed with that faculty called the taste or
heart; and that this is the only prirriary, active, principle in
men or moral agents; all, whp; consider activity essential to Vice
arid virtue^ will now see why the heart is the only moral faculty $
and why it with its operationsinclude all holy and sinful exer
cises, by considering the subject in connexion with what is ad
vanced in this Essay. Such are, hence, desired here to give
the subject a reconsideration*

^*********

ESSAY X2.
On ihenatvbre of moral evil, or sin.
i. Jolin, §,' 4. WHoabever committeth sin transgresseth also the law ; Tor sin id the
tfonSgWsStdii of»he law."
Thp' moral lawis the rule of duty, given by God to man. It
is a perfect rule-; and binding on afl intelligent, created beings.
It never can be repealedor disannulled* any more than either
moral good Or evil can cease to exist; or their natures, in the
V

162
-present system, be so altered, that virtue may become vice, and
vice virtue. Hence the moral law is immutable, and will be
eternal in all itsrequireriients and prohibitions. In this passage^
sin is expressly declared to be a transgression of the law. Of
course, every transgression of this law is a sin; And the moral
law, according to scripture, exterids to the heart, as well as life
and conduct. It will be natural then;
I. To inquire what may be considered as a transgression!; of
the moral law.
This law contains two general branches. 1 . Requirements;
And — 2. Prohibitions. The first respects what We ought to
do ; and the second what we Ought to omit doing; Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy' neighbor as
^thyself. This contains the sum of all that is required of men.
Thou shalt not- do any evil. This contains all that is prohibited.
These two constitute the whole rule of duty given to men.
Here it is proper to consider how this rule may be transgressed.
And, '
1. HoW may the requirements of the law be transgressed,
So long as men have in their hearts and lives all that is requir
ed of them, they certainly do not transgress this branch of the
divine rule. If they love God with the whole heart, and their
neighbor as themselves, they fulfil all that is required in their*
hearts. They have the heart andthe affections required of them.
On this ground they cannot be blamed. For they do not trans
gress. The only way then by which men can transgress di
vine requirements is by defetts, by omitting to do what is requir
ed. When the heart is destitute of love to God, that temper
and affection are wanting, which are required. Here is a defi
ciency, a want of the thing required ; a defect. The person
does not come up to the rule of duty, but falls short of it. Is
not a total want of love to God a great imperfection' ? Is it not
a transgression of the law ? Who can deny it ? It is then
evident, that this defect, this privation, this want in the heart of
what is required, is a sin, a transgression of the law. Hence
any deficiency in this particular is a sin. We are required to
love God with the whole heart. Nothing short of this comes
perfectly up to what is required. Accordingly, if a person has
16ve in his heart to God, so far as he comes short of the,measure
required, or" of loving with the whole heart, there isa wantia
him ofthe affection required. This want is a sin. And so fat
as any holy affection, whether it be love, repentance, humility,

163
•r any other grace, is wanting in strength or in equalling the
power we have for such affections, it is deficient ; there is a
want of more life, and a greater measure. And this defect of
strength in any holy affection, is a sin, a transgression of what
is required. So far as this want prevails, the christian charac
ter is deficient, or imperfect. Hence a total want or deficiency,
in any holy affection, is a sin. And this is the primary imperfec
tion in every moral character. Did not this in the first place
exist, there would be no irregularity, no sin in the heart or life
of any moral agent. This will be proved in its proper place.
But as many deny there is any sin- in a mere want, deficien
cy, or defect in the moral character of man, it will be necessary
to attend some further to this subject. '
Suppose the heart andlife of a person is perfectly what it
ought to be, in all respects but one; and that is a warn of holy
affection. Would not this want be considered, a'. great imper
fection in his character ? Would it not be viewed as sinful ?
Could he be considered as keeping the law perfectly ? Would
not the divine law condemn him;? Could he, without any love
in his heart to God, supposing every thing else be right, be ad
mitted into heaven ? And when he stands at the bar of God
for trial, destitute of any love, would riot his Maker blame and
condemn him ? The answer to these questions is easy ; and
proves that this want is a sin. '
Again. Do not all Christians feel worthy of blame, so far as
they know there is a deficiericy in them ?¦ Do they not Consid
er the want of more love, more humility, greater conformity to,
God, and more intense desires after holiness, 'a sin in them", a
moral imperfection ? Do they ever expect to be perfect, until
every grace arrives to perfection in its measure ? And is hot '
this want a grief and burden to them daily ? Does not this
accord with the experiences of all christians ? And fully prove
that this want, in their view, is a sin ? This want is the very
thing intended by stupidity, and barrenness. And for this want
of more lovej zeal, fervency, engagednessy and fruitfulness, they
are condemned in the sacred oracles. Why do they cry, my
leanness, my leanness ; why are they condemned for their stu
pidity in scripture, if such a want be not a siri ? Holy affec
tions are the fruits ofthe spirit. And so far as these are want
ing, there is a want of fruit ; and so far as christians are want
ing in fruit, they are barren. And so far as their affections are
wanting, they are wanting in life, zeal, and fruitfulness. And

164
so far as they are wanting in life, and^zeal, they are stupid. And
for such stupidity and barrenness, which we now seeiis only a
want-of a greater measure pf holy affection, they blame and
condemn themselves ; and also the word of God blames them,
Why elseare they condemned for their.barren&ess, stupidity, and
deadness? This folly proves, that this want or deficiency of
holy affection is a sin, ip the view of christians, and according
fo the word af God.
•Further, ' Jnwhat way cari divine requirements be transgress
ed, but by a deficiency ? Nothingbut a want of what is requir;
ed, can be a.Jrarisgressipn of requirements, JNeed any thing
more.be said to make it evident, that this want pf right affec
tion is a sin ?¦ In like manner, all external neglects of- duty are
sinful. We are required, to pray. If this be neglected, the,
thing, required. is, notdone. This neglect, which is -nothing
but an external deficiency, is sinful j is so considered by men
generally, and is: thus' represented every wherein ihe word of
God. The' same is true of all external neglects of duty. A
rjeglecf of any duty, is a; deficiency in a person's life, a want,,
a defect. And there is'no wayby which a person can live con
trary to divine requirements, only to neglect to do what js re
quired. If apier&pn neglect to give to the poor, when it is his
4»ty togive, heMs omitted a duty, and has done no more ; fo
hgLibas not stolen from the poor, Hence 'a neglect of duty
implies iio more than a mere wapt. But if he steals from the
poor, when it was his duty to give, he has both omitted-his duty
to them., and done what is prohibited. Hence all acts, which
are forbidden, imply a breach of -the whole law hi its require
ments, and prohibitions. But omitting a duty is a transgres
sion oqly of what is; required ; it does not imply a transgression
of what js.forbidden. It is now evident, that a want or deficien
cy in the heart, arid a neglect externally of what is required, are
each of them sinful, a breach of what the law requires. But
as love is the sum of .all die law requires, it may afford some
light to reflect on ftrhat-the term implies. Love certainly implies
apleasedness with the object beloved. To say we love an; ob
ject, \s saying we are pleased with it. Pleasure is an agreea
ble sensation. But what is the foundation of this pleasure ; or
what is it, which is pleased ? It must he something. For we
caano more conceive how pleasure, or any affectipn, can exist
without a subject, than we can conceive of an action without an
agent. If it be said the agent is the subject ofthe pleasure, arid

165
i»f every affection; still this, is not sufficiently definite. For
every moral agent has faculties, different in their nature. Ths
Understanding is one fapulty. And all agree it is not a feeling
faculty ; therefore, it is not the subject1 of pleasure. And the
taste, or heart is another faculty ; and the only feeling one,
whichbelongs to the human mind. And the sensations of this
faculty are always antecedent to voluntary exercises. This fac
ulty thep is the subject of that pleasure, which is ever implied
in love. As we are required to love God, and this love implies
S pleasedness with his character, and such pleasedness cannot
exist without a disposition or heart to be pleased, God requires
us to have this disposition. Indeed, that we ought to have a
disposition or heart to be pleased with the divine character, is
a truth so evident, it is presumed np one will deny it.
Another thing implied in love, is a rfesire for the hpnpr and
happiness of the person beloved, and a desire tp enjoy his soci
ety. This all knpw to be a fact by experience. Do not all
wish well to the object beloyed, and wish to possess and enjoy
it ? Now, When Gpd requires us to love him with aU the heart,
he requires us to have a disposition at all times tp be pleased
with his character; and he requires us to be pleased with it, and
tp have desires for the glory and honor of his name, and tp en
joy him forever. For as God requires love, he requires every
thing implied in it. But a disposition to be pleased with him,
and to desire his glory, and the 'enjoyment of him, is love. This
shows how much is implied in the command, to love God with
all the heart. And I here make no other distinction, than what
is made in the command itself, by him who knows all things.
He considers the heart a distinct thing frpm love, and antece,-.
dent to it. Thou shalt love, with what? With thy heart. The
heart then, or what I mean by disposition, is distinguished frpm
loVe, which is only an operation of the heart. Hence, to re
quire us to love with the heart, is requiring us to have a heart
or disposition to love, if we have it not,
And if men have not a. disposition to love God, the most es
sential thing in the requirement is wanting. And if this is want
ing, the coihmand is violated ; and the person never will love,
his Maker,' till this disppsitipn is created in him. Anid this
want of a disppsitipn fo love, pr be pleased with the. character of
God, is the primary imperfection .in tpemoral charapter of mep,
I am now ready to attend,
'2, To the prohibitions of. the moral law.

166
There are many affections of heart, which we never ought t»
indulge or gratify ; and many external actions, which we ought
never to perform. Such as anger, revenge, lying, stealing, and
hating Gpd or »an. If we have and indulge those passions,
which the law forbids, or perform those actions, which are sin
ful, we transgress the prohibitions of the law. In doing this,
we go beyond the rule of duty, there is excess in us, as well as
defects. It appears, then, that we transgress the rule of duty in
two ways, 1. By notcomingup to it, or notdoing and having
all that is required ; and 2. By going beyond it, or having and
doing what is expressly forbidden. And is it not as great a sin,
not to live up to the rule of duty, as to go beyond it ? Are
not defects as really sinful as excesses ?
Why are positive acts of transgression sinful ? If it be an
swered, because they tend to destroy the happiness ofthe moral
system; fop the same reason such defects are sinful. For noth
ing tends more to destroy the system. For if all the mem
bers were destitute of that love the law requires, the system is.
ruined. Nothing but wars, contentions, disorders, and deso
lations would prevail in it. But this consideration belongs to
another part of the subject, where it will be attended to more at
large. I have now shown what a transgression ofthe law is, and
of course what sin is. To elucidate this subject more fully, a
number of other things must be taken into consideration., I
proceed therefore to attend,
II. To the principles of action in the human heart.
Every agent possesses a principle pf action. There must be
something inherent, abiding in him, which will move and ex
cite him to action, or he is not an agent, and will never act. He
may be a subject to be actep) upon, and used as an instrument
in the accomplishment of many things ; but he is nothing more
than a passive subject or instrument. As every^ being. must have
a principle of action in himself, to be an agent, it is a matter of
importance to attend to this in particular,
One thing is self-evident, that a principle of action must be
something susceptible of feeling. And as nothing is a feeling
but sensations and emotions, which are pleasant or painful,
something must exist in man, which is susceptible of pleasure
and pain. And it will be granted, that the faculties of under
standing and will are not the subjects of sensations. The heart-
is the subject of all our pleasant and painful sensations. The
heart is the only principle of action in moral agents, as has been.

w
already proved. The next inquiry is, whether it be a simple,
Or complex principle of action. On examination it will be ev
ident it is a complex principle.
Here let us attend to facts and experience. Is not benevo
lence a principle of action ? Is it not pleased with divine things,
and disgusted at sin ? Does it not excite to action, and move lis
to keep the law iri all its parts, and make us active and zealous
in the service of God ? It in fact operates in this manner, in all
Who possess it. Then it is a principle of action.
Do riot hunger and thirst excite to action ? Is not the ap^
petite pleased with food and drink ? Does it not move men, to
use all the means, necessary to a supply of bodily wants ?
Then it is a principle of action.
Are not natural affections, such as the parental, filial, and
conjugal, principles of action ? Do they not operate as power
ful principles, and excite to innumerable actiPns ? Then it is a
fact, which agrees with experience, that in the heart there are
several distinct principles of action ; principles, which excite
rrien to pursue very different objects. Benevolence will lead to
seek the glory of God ; hunger, to seek food; thirst, to seek
drink ; and Other principles, to seek their respective objects.
These principles are so many distinct, appetites. Benevo
lence, hunger, thirst, natural affections, are so many distinct
appetites. And these, collectively considered, constitute the
heart. Hence the heart is a complex faculty, composed of a
number of appetites linked; which prepare us to be, the subjects
of all the sensations we evei1 experience, and to perform all the
actions which ever belong to us as agents. This point has
heen clearly established iri the essay on the appetites. Inquire,
III. Why all vice and virtue must have their seat iri the
heart. The reason is, because this is the primary fouritain from
which all good and evil proceed. The appetites of the heart
are the principles of action, which set all the wheels in motion.
They govern the understanding, and the will, and all our ex
ternal actions. Take these away, and men would not be agents,
and good and evil could not be imputed to them.
When we see in men external conduct, good or bad, we are
to trace back, and find from whence it all proceeds. In run
ning back, we find the external actions proceed from the will ;
and the will fromthe heart. Here we come to the original foun
tain, from Which all good and evil proceed. Here then, is the
seat of all vice and virtue. Here are the principles of action,

168
which are the causes of all the good or evil ever done by rriefi,
considered as agents. Their moral character, then, is according
to the nature pf the heart* The heart is either virtuous or vi
cious ; and all its operations, or affections; are of the same ria-
ture with itself. For streams are like their fountains; and
fruit, take the nature of the tree which bears it. For the
reasons now given, nothing can be more evident than this ; that
vice arid virtue must consist in principles of action, arid must
have their seat in the heart of all inoral agerifs.
Here it may be Well to observe, that as the appetites of men,
In the sense explained, are the principles of action » so some of
them may be lost, and then again restored. This is in fact tha
case, with respect to benevolence. Adam tost "his disposition
to love God, at the fall; and if he became a good man, it was
again restored. And all men are born destitute of it } arid
when any are regenerated, it is implanted in their hearts. Arid
"Other appetites, as well as this, may be lost and restorectV And
tins often in fact appears to be the case. Still this does not
affect the subject of moral agency. For when an appetite is
lost, others, which are principles of action, still remain ; arid
men are as active agents as ever. Though it doe? riot affect
'agency, yet it will cause a great alteration in men's eonducfo,
That appetites may be lost arid restored, is one thing of im1
portance to be considered in relation to this subject. I shall now,
IV. ShPw that vice and virtue are not intheniselves good or
evil, butonly in a relative sense. This has beeri proved in the
essay on good and evil. This point beirig rriade plain arid es±
tablished, we may now observe, that the sariie thing maybe good
af one time, and evil at ariother, just according to its circum
stances and connexions. For instaftce, when poison is taken
in such quantity as to destroy life, .it must be considered as
an evil thirig ; but when taken mixed with pthelr ingredients,"
or alone in a proper quantity, it produces health, arid is esteerii-
ed a good medicine. Fire, when Under bur govermrierit, is a
great blessing. But When it rages uncontrolled, it is a very]
great evil. The sun is a very great blessing, when corinecfea
With a supply of rain. But without rain, it proves the great
est evil; for then its tendency is to destroy life. If the earth
should lose its projectile force, it would directly be swallowed
Up in the suri ';. arid every thing on its surface would be destroy
ed. We riiigh't multiply instances to show/that a great blessing ..
iri one state, might prove a great curse or evil iri a, different "
condition.

169
These remarks may serve to show, that the same principles
of action in the heart of men in different circumstances may
have a "Very different tendency. I shall therefore now con
sider, V. How some principles of action in the heart may and will
tend to produce happiness iri one state, arid misery in a differ-,
enf state. Adam, we are informed, was created in the image of
God, both natural and moral. He was therefore created with
a heart to love his Maker supremely. And this was the gov
erning principle of his heart. It was an active principle. Hfi
had also other principles of action implanted in his heart. Such
as hunger, thirst, a lpve for his wife and children, a desire fo*
knowledge, a principle of self preservation, and others enu
merated in.Essay 9tfi.
Now as long as Adam was governed by love to his Maker, all
the principles of action in his heart would be subordinated io
thje gjpry of God, arid kept in due regulation- If he ate, or
djank, or gratified any other appetite, it Was with a vie^v to the
glory of God, He would not neglect any duty, the law requir
ed of hjm J nor perform one action, which the law forbade.
There would be no defect, or excess, in his heart or life. He
would not fall short of the rule of duty, or go, beyond it ; but
live according fo it. Arid" so long as he did this, he was ppr-
feet. All the feelings pfhis heart, and' the actions of bis life
harmonized, and centered ultimately in the same end. Noth
ing but obedience, order, regularity, and harinony prevailed id
paradise. Both natural and moral evil was unknown: And
in this: perfect mariner every thing would have proceeded, had
he hot* been deceived by his adversary the devil, and then viola
ted. the divine command. Under this deception he believed,
that good, and riot evil, would result from his eatjrig the forbid
den fr.ri.it. Being deceived he ate. And then, according to
tlie diyioe appointment, he forfeited and lost bis benevolent
principle. The moment this was done, he Was' in a state pf
Spiritqajf, death. One of the greatest changes took place in his
riforal character. He was no longer a saint, but a sinner. He
feadiost.the mpral image of his Maker. Every thing the law
required of him was wanting. He had no benevolent disposi
tion to govern him, or to be gratified. He had no love for the
happiness of others ; no foye for the law of God, apd nothing to
prompt him to seek his glory, or the, good of his kingdom. He
Was^jji the view qf the law a sinner,. Because everything the

170
law required of him was wanting ; and by the law he was con*
demned. Now all this is true, considering only what was wanting iri
Adam. Is not that character morally imperfect, which is des
titute of all holiness both in principle and action ? Is it not a
sinful character ; Such as the law condemns ? Then a mere
want, and privation of holiness is a moral imperfection ; it is a
sin, or a transgression ofthe law.
This sentiment demands the careful attention of the reader.
It will surely be granted, that as long as a moral agent is per
fectly benevolent, or loves God with the whole heart, and this
principle governs him, it will be impossible for him to do any
thing in a moral sense wrong, or to commit sin. It is evident,
then, the first sin in a moral agent must consist in the entire, or par
tial want of benevolence. For so long as benevolence is perfect,
and he is governed by it, he cannot sin. There is no way, then, by
which he can become a sinner, but by the loss of benevolence
wholly, or in part. If entirely lost, he has no moral goodness
remaining. If it is diminished, and he should not love God half
so much as he might and ought ; then there is a partial defect.
Hence the first sin in a moral agent must be an entire, or partial
Want of benevolence. The first sin must be a deficiency, priva
tion, or imperfection. There is no other way conceivable by
which a perfect, moral agent, can become imperfect or sinful ;
or by which sin can enter, or begin to exist. Could saints in
heaven, whose benevolence is now perfect, become imperfect or
sinful, unless by a perfect or partial want of benevolence ? Of
course the primary existence of moral evil must consist in a de
ficiency, or want of benevolence, in whole or in part.
This benevolence is all that Adam lost at the fall. All his
other principles of action remained the same. He had the same
appetites of hunger, thirst, self preservation, conjugal and filial
affection, and desire for knowledge. This fact is undeniable.
But now the great inquiry is, how will these principles of action
operate, where there is no love in the heart to God ?; One
thing is certain ; these principles of action will have the sole
and entire government of the man. For he has no other prin
ciples to govern him. Now these principles will never lead a
person to seek any objects, but those he loves. And he loves
no objects, but those of a worldly nature. Hence the world, in
some shape or other, will be the only object of pursuit. The
world now is his idol, and only portion. These principles of

171
action, where there is no love to God to regulate and govera
them, will lead men astray from God. Instead of serving him,
they will serve only the creature and themselves. These prin
ciples are all ofthe same nature, and will produce nothing but
evil. They fix on the world with supreme affection, lead men
astray from God, and keep them travelling the road to death ;
and thus tend ultimately to a state of misery. This is their on
ly tendency. They must then be viewed as sinful, or morally
evil. The primary fault, however, is not in these principles, but
in the want of benevolence. This is the primary, original fault
in the character of men. The consequence of this fault is, that
all the other principles will have no tendency, but to misery.
Just as the tendency ofthe sun is to destroy life, when there is
no rain ; or of the earth to fall into the sun, if it has lost its pro
jectile force. But this will appear more fully, by attending
particularly to their operations.
Let us suppose pride to be a principle of action, which we
bring into the world with us. Honor, or applause is its object.
Then some honorary office or station is the object it will seek.
How will this principle operate, in a person who has no love for
God or man ? Its first operation will be, desires to obtain the
object, the honor which is pleasing. Secondly, desires will?
' arise for all the means necessary to possess and enjoy the ob
ject. If other persons aid him in his pursuit, he will be much
pleased with their conduct, and appear to be very friendly to
them. But if they oppose him in his schemes to reach his end,
and thwart and disappoint him, from his pride will arise hatred,
malice, anger, revenge, or a desire to retaliate on them
for the injuries he receives. If others rise above him in honor,
he will envy them ; and if he encounters great and continued
opposition, his envy and revenge will become a rooted hatred
and malice. This is the worst passion, which can exist in the
human heart; and when excessive, it seems to exclude the com
mon affections and passions. And as he has no other love for
God or man, he will use any means which promise to secure his
end, whether they are lawful or unlawful, good or bad. Noth
ing restrains him but the fear of punishment or disgrace in this
world. This is the way in which pride operates in every nat
ural heart ; although it does not always reach this enormous
degree. Let us now attend to the operations of some other appetite,
as hunger for Instance, in a person who has no love to God or

in
¦man. The object of this appetite -rs'food. From -this -appetite
Will arise desires for" the object ; arid also desires "for-' all the
means, which are 'necessary to obtalh food in variety and plenty.
Then wilFfollp^desireS for landj mboe'y, and many Othe* things
useful in procuring 'food. Petfsoris;'wiio favor his wishes wiM
he regarded as friends ; and opposition will lead to the same
results as in the former ease. ,
We Wffl nest attend to selfishness. This many suppose is<a
principle, by W*hieh all hten are governed,, and the root of all
sin) indeed the only sinful principle ipfhebuman-henrt. Wew$H
grant, for the present, this opinion is true. Let us see'boW this
wiH operate in men, who have no love to ; God or their1 fellow
creatures. Selfis the objector end of selfishness. To please
self, is the end ultimately sought. From this principle- will a-
risC desires 'for every-ebjecf, which- is pleasing to- ft- ; arid also
for all the means by which those objects Can beobtawed. And
the person will use allltheraeansneCessary to thisend, as far as
he is able ; whether they "are lawful and just, or unlawful arid
unrighteous, as 'for -as is eorisister£ with safety. 'He -aUo
will be gratified with such persons as>foveT -his plans ; and will
iiave'his malignant passions excited agaiflstfooseWfeP'BppOSfe
him. ' ¦" •
Let us now attend to theoperatiPn Ofthe sariie principles of
action in the heart of a person, Who has a benevolent principle,
invariably governing him in all he does, The end or^ofejetjt
of benevolence is the~bappiness of others, iot theJhigbest good-of
'God's kingdom. If he is govehred^^bienevPleHeo invariably,
lie will do every thingwifh a'vFew'to tfris'erid. Let us see then
how the Pther appetites implanted in him will operate.
They will certainly be subordinated to the object he ultimate
ly seeks. He will never suffer them to lead him astray. , He
will never dp one wrong thing to gratify them. And in soriie
of his pursuits these will ; harmonize with 'benevolence, and
prompt him to do the same thing. Benevolence will prompt
Trim to feed the poor ; and naturalpity will move-Mm:to'dotne
same thing. Here, and in other instances, they will harmonise.
This nran- Will -seek' his end hy no other/than lawful means. If
"others aid him, he will be pleased. If they oppose him artdhis
great object, Jhe will viewthem'enemiesto Gedandman. But
he will not be angry with them ; no hatred, or revenge, or'envy,
or malice, will arise in his heart. But he will pity, aodpfray
fortiiem; and labor tp bring them to repentance. ^br<fce"I©T"fS

178
tbem as he does himself. And he will sacredly uegard tlie < rule
of duty in all he does ; and never go beyond it, or fall short of
it. In this man," who is -invariably governed by benevolence,
his other appetites do no hurt ; and sometimes aid:him in his
pursuits. They produce no evil, but are perfectly under the
government of benevolence. While he is governed entirely by
benevolence, no principle of action in his heart can ever lead
him one step astray. He will act as. perfectly, as Adam did in
a state of innocence. No principle of action can ever lead him
astray, Or harm him, unless it becomes stronger, and operates
with more force; which can never be, so long as benevolence lis
entire and governs.
I have now given a just view of tiie operations of all the prin
ciples of action in the human heart. These principles, are the
laws of ournature, by Which all men are as: invariably govern-
¦ed, as'tbe planetary system is i by the laws of attraction and
gravitation. And did we understand this subject, and know
What •principles of actipn Would govern a man at any given time,
and thoexact circumstances in which a person would* feeplaced,
we could ascertain how he'Woufld act, as accurately as we can
calculate an eclipse. We must now admit the 'following con
clusions. 1 . A benevolent appetite is the only principle, which
Will lead men to seek thegoodof God's kingdom, or tiie happi
ness of others. 2. AH ' other prioeiples of action are implanted
in us, With a view to have them stimulate us to seek those things
which are1 necessary to the life >and comfort pf the body,-and of
society, -while- iri this life. And as they will not be needed by
saints- in heaven, and' there cannot >¦ he of any benefit to them,
they wlfl either' be eradicated^ or cease to operate fprever. 3.
That if men in this life were always goverrted^by benevolence,
other principles of action in the 'heart would never do any- hurt,
or produce any evil. 4. That where ^benevolence is totally
wanting, all the other principles of aetion'Willin -their operations
iead-men astray from Godjto -transgress-his law, andto perpe
trate all theerimes, towhieh circumstances and temptations-lead
them. 5. That all the principles of action in a natural heart
areequally sinful. One •iri its tendency- is- no worse 'than anoth
er. Hunger, thirst, pride, natural affection, and selfishness will
equally dead natural men astray, and, their tendency is equally
to final misery. >6. That if those principles of action were
never opposed 4>y- God or man, and shouldnieetwifih-no •obsta
cles in their operation, but were assisted, we-shouhl never see

174
the passions of hatred, anger, envy, revenge, or malice rise ia,
the human heart. For these passioris are always excited by op
position made to such principles of action, in their operation, by
God or man. 7. That principles of action are not good or evil
in themselves considered ; but are good or evil according to
their tendency to produce happiness or misery ultimately, 8,
That the primary fault, or imperfection in the character of mor
al agents is a want of a principle of benevolence. Where this
is totally wanting, all other principles of action tend to misery
ultimately ; and when this is in the heart, and has the entire gov
ernment, they do no hurt, and their tendency is not to misery.
Hence — 9. A benevolent appetite is the only law of our nature,
which will cause all other principles to operate regularly, and
preventconfusiori, disorder, and evil. It is therefore in this case
similar to other things governed by uniform laws. — Things are
so planned and ordered, both iri the natural and moral worlds,
that they operate in connexion with each other. Of course, if
one important thing should cease tp operate, the operation of
other things would, in consequence of this, produce nothing but
disorder, confusion, evil, and misery. The system is perfect^if"
all the parts operate in harmony together, as they were first
created. But if one part should be destroyed and be wanting,
and the other part continue to operate, disorder, evil, and. mis--
ery are the consequence. Hence the most fatal consequenpes
may follow from a mere want or privation; As I have already
observed with respect to the operations ofthe sun, if there was
to be no rain ; and of fire, when it is not under a master ; and
of the earth, if it should lose its projectile force ; and also of
the whole planetary system, if one planet should be annihilat
ed ; or in case they should be deprived of their gravitation. A
privation of one thing in such cases would be followed with the
njost fatal consequences.
So when all the laws of our nature operate in connexion
with each other, as they did in Adam before the fall, their ten
dency was to nothing but happiness. AU was order, and har
mony. But at the fall, one of these laws, that of a benevolent ap
petite, was entirely lost. In consequence of this, all the other
laws of our nature in their operation tend only to disorder, evil,
and misery. This world became the supreme object, the idol
of the heart. And this will be their operation, until a benevo
lent appetite is restored, or again implanted in the heart. Where
Jhis is done, as it always is in regeneration, then every thing be*

m
gins to operate regularly ;' arid when this appetite iri saints
shall have the entire government constantly, perfect order, obe
dience, and regularity in their conduct will prevail ; and the
tendency of every thing in them, Arid their conduct will
produce nothing but happiness. It must then be plain,
that the want of a benevolent principle is the great, and
primary fault, or imperfection, iri the moral character of moral
agents. It is the want of this, which turned holy, angels in
to devils, and our holy progenitors into sinners.
We now see what sin is. It is a transgression ofthe law.
And the law is transgressed by defects, and by excesses. As it
is a rule, which extends to the heart, as well as the life ; every
thing wanting in the heart and conduct of man, which the law
requires, is a transgression of its requirements. And every
thing in theheart and life, which the law forbids, is a transgres
sion of its prohibitions. And these two classes of transgres
sions, of the requirements and the prohibitions of the law, are
innumerable. Let it be granted for a moment, that there is an individual
principle of selfishness in men, which is the root of all sin in them,
and the only fountain from which all wickedness proceeds, as
some contend ; and now let us attend to its operations. We
may first ask, what is selfishness ? Is it self love, a lpve to self;
arid love for our private, individual interest ? In whatever way
defined, I suppose it will be granted, that such a degree of love
to self, or to our private interest, as we ought to have for others,
is right. To love our neighbor as ourselves, implies, that a
degree of love to self is a duty. And if we love ourselves no
more in proportion, than we do others, we are not guilty. Such
a degree of love to self is not sinful. Hence, it is not sinful,
until we love ourselves more than we ought. This principle,
then, is not sinful in itself. It is no sin to love self as much as
we ought to love others. The sinfulness of it,then, conists, not
in a degree of love to self, but in loving self top much. Its sin
fulness we see consists in an excess of love to self. This is pre
cisely the case with hunger, considered as an appetite, and prin
ciple of action. There is no sin in loving food. But it- is
a sin to love it more than we do God. This must be granted.
But all unrenewed men love food, more than they love God.
So the sinfulness of this appetite consists, npt in loving food,
but in loving it too much; it consists in an excess of Jave to food.

176
Here the case is parallel with that of selfishness ; and for the
same reason we must view selfishness. sinful, we must consider
the appetiite- of hunger smful.
Agaiti,:to indulge on gratify; self to a certain degree, is a duty.
But to indulge selfbeyofld a certaindegree,,is sinful; it is indulg
ing self too much. Here its sinfulness consists in an excess of in
dulgence. So it is no sin, to indulge hunger to a certain de
gree. But to- indulge it beyond tiiisdegree,,,is sinful. Audits
sinfulness consists in an excess of indulgence. Here the cases
are parallel. And for the same reason we view selfishness sin
ful, we must consider the appetite of hunger sinful.
Agahtf.> When a principle of selfishness is indulged, in using
unlawful rrieansHo obtain the objectswhich are agreeable to self,
it is sinful. Here its sinfulness does not consist in using lawful
means to obtain its desired objects, or ends ; but in. using un
lawful, unjust-means. So it is not sinful, for hunger to use law
ful means to get food: ; but when it uses unlawful means, it-is
sinful. Here the cases are parellel.
Again. Will selfishness give rise to a thousand desires,, such
as a desire formoney, cattle, land, elegant houses and furniture?
And? will a multiplicity of such desires take off the attention too
much from religion, and place it too much on the world ;. and
is tins sinful ? In like manner, hunger will give rise to a, train
of such secondary desires for money, land, cattle, and every
thing-necessary to proeuringfood, and enjoying it in an elegant
manner. These desires will perplex, take off the1 attention too
much from religion, and place it too much on the worldi Here
again the cases are parallel.
Again. If a selfish man is opposed iri his pursuits by othere,
this will produce in i him anger, hatred, revenge, arid- such ma
lignant passions ; a principle, which will give rise to such-ma-
KgriaWS passions, is sinful. In like manner, if others oppose a
'inari in his pursuits to gratify his hunger, the same malig»ant
passions Will rise iii his heart. And if selfishness is sinful, be
cause it will give rise, if opposed, to such malignant passions ;
then1 the appetite of hunger is sinful ; for it will openate in the
same* manner, and give rise, if opposed, to the same passions.
And this1 is what we daily see in fact. So-that here the cases
are parallel!
And there is nP light in which this subject can be viewed; I
believe, but we sha11'>nnd that every reason, which can be as-

177
signed* to prove selfishness to be sinful, but what will' equally
prove the appetite of hunger to be sMuT; and eVery otheV ap-
petitei or natural affection, with Which we are borri.
I have Under this particular granted, for the sake of light,
that there is such a principle of selfishness in all men, as many
eoHtendifor, which is the root of all sin. — At the same time, I
do not believe in such a principle. I suppose every appetite
withwhich we are born is selfish. The man, for instance, who
iS governed by the appetite of hunger, has no other or higher
end in view, than the gratification of this personal appetite. In
doing this, he has no regard to the happiness of other person's,
Unless near relatives whom he- considers as part of hithself.
Whether others are benefitted or injured, he will gratify hirii-
,«elf by indulging (this appetite. And can we conceive of any
thing more highly selfish -than this ? In like manner, every
other appetite in men is selfish. So that selfishness does Pot
consist in one single individual principle of action. It may be
predicated of every appetite, with which we are bbrn. They
are all iri this sense selfish, .that men under the influence of them
Wilt riot seek any higher good than the gratification of'their ap
petites1; andin doing this they have no. regard to the happiriess-df
Others; and will, by unlawful means, injure them to gratify their
appetites. Arid this- is proved by daily and numerous facts.
Furthermore. If k man had a principle of seir-leve iri him,
according to the opinion of many ; at the sairie time was con
stantly governed by a principle of benevolence, his selfish prin
ciple Would never be gratified in any of the above cases to an ex-
vess^ and no further than it ought to be indulged. This is cer
tain, if he is governed in all he does by benevolence. In this
Case hi§ self-love would not do any hurt, or produce any evil
effects. And the same is true of all PUr appetites, so long as we
ate goVerjued by berievPlence. Hence, no appetite Will produce
ritty evil effects in ariy man, Until benevolence is wanting wholly,
or in Snfeh a degree as not to be all the tithe the governing prin
ciple. So that the privation of holiness- wholly, or in part, must
Sake place, before any principles in men will produce any evil
effects ; except iri cases Where they are so far deceived as to be
lieve that is right, which is wrong.
It appearfe to me that enough: has been said to show7 what sin
H ; or in what total depravityfcqnsists. Anduccording to the
doctrine advanced in this essay it is evident, that the- depravity
Sf the heart consists— -1. In the efttlie want of a principle of
W

178
benevolence,- or holiness. .And this want is the primary defi
ciency, or, imperfection in the moral character of man- And
this privation of holiness must take place, previous to the exis
tence pf any positive acts of sin, except in, cases of deception.
And —
%. In the existence and operation of those appetites with, which
we are born. The tendency of these is to sin, to excesses in all
, the ways, described, w:here there is no principle of holiness.
Then these appetites prefer this world to God and heavenly
things ; lead men to indulge them to an excess in the objects
they love ; and to the useof unlawful means to obtain such ob
jects. ' And these two principles, the, want of holiness, and the
appetites implanted in us, will account for all the. sins and crimes
ever perpetrated in this world. . And this scheme is fully taught
and supported by the word of God. Why will not men come
to Christ? Because they ,see no, beauty in. him to attract them;
and because, they loye this world, and prefer it to Christ and to
heaven. Why will they not come to the gospel supper, when
so often invited ? Because that supper contains nothing which
is agreeable to any other, than a holy heart. They refuse to
come, and, go after , die world, their, farms and merchandize;
because those objects please and gratify their appetites. They
serve the creature, and not the Creator, for the same reasons.
And with this representation the whole word of God harmonizes.
So that we have both scripture and reason, to vindicate the
sentiments advanced in these sheets. ,
This manner of accounting for the passions and actions of
men, is more satisfactory to my, mind than the scheme whichim-
putes to man a principle of positive malignity. Disinterested
malevolence ; or that disposition which takes pleasure in the
misery of others, independently of our own interest, is too diar
bolical to be admitted as existing in the human breast. It is the
perfect opposite of the spirit of holy and disinterested benevo
lence. And when theloye of God, and man is wanting, all the
other principles of 'our nature become deyoted to transgression,
and arrange us on the side of rebellion, and lay us under wrath
.with the devils themselves, , But it is not necessary to, suppose,
that a cruel and fiend-like disposition is the ruling principle of
fallen man. Departing from God, he becomes selfish ,; and all
his affections are indulged for, the,gratification of selfishness, and
contrary to the divine prohibitions and requirements, . Meeting
with opposition in his favorite pursuits, both, from his fellow

179
men, and from the providence and word of God, his passions
become malignant, and he indulges in deeds of injustice, cruel
ty, and revenge. This mode of accounting for such malignan
cy appears to me to agree with faCts'that pass under our obser
vation, even including the deliberate cruelties of savages and of
despots.

**********

ESSAY XXI.
On the subject of praise and blameworthiness.
We ought, in the first place, to have clear and distinct ideas
of what is implied in praising and blaming perSoris.
If a person sustains a good character, we say he is worthy of
praise. 'What does praising him imply ? It implies — 1. That
we judge his character to be what it is, really good. This is
an act of the understanding. This is the faculty, which judges
concerning truth and falsehood, right arid Wrong, good and bad
characters. 2. That we approve of a good Character, justify
it, are pleased with it. This is ari act of the heart. It is the
heart, which likes, or dislike's, is pleased, or displeased. So
it comes to pass often, from the influence of a bad heart, that
goddcharacters are disliked. 3. That we treat the person well;
sp that our conduct corresponds with his real character.' To
treat him well, is to make him happy as far as we are able.
This is not always done; good characters are often treated very
ill. But this is a great inconsistency. If we judge a character
to be good, which really is ; and approve it ; and treat the per
son accordingly, we do every thing implied in praising him.
In this sense God the Judge will praise good men at the judg
ment day. He Will judge their characters to be what they are,
really good. He will approve them, and love them. And he
will treat them well, or make them happy. This is praising
and honoringthem before an assembled universe ; greater hon
or cannot be done them.

18»;
Blaming is the reverse of this. If a. character is really, bad,
a sinful character, it deserves blame. And judging it to bp what
it really is, disapproving, or hating it, andtreating it according
to what it is, is blaming the perspn. In this, sense Gpd. will
blame, the wicked at the judgment day, Thpirrchafacters are
bad ; he will judge them bad; he will disapprove and,hatp
them ; he will make them miserable. This will be blaming '
them in the highest sense. Greater eensure cannot be shown a
person, than to pronounce him wicked, hate him, and treat him
accordingly. These are the things implied in praising and j
blaming men.
And now the question arises, what properties are requisite, to,
render a being a proper object of praise and blame, in this sense ?
For we do not consider all beings, or existences, worthy of
praise and blame. The sun may be termed a good being. It
is daily doing good in many ways, and diffusing happiness
through the:w,orld. But we. dp not consider the sun a, proper
object of praise. We consider a pestilence, or plague as a
grfijafoevil, Yet we do, not consider.it a'prppejrohjecjt of blaniP^pr
censure. Butfwpcol^si4er1goodmen,a;s! proper objects of praise;,
and -bad men as objects, of blame or. censure, Why, do, we
make: this. distinctipn ? Because, we, vjew-,nian la.iendtred .with*.
every property, necessary to renderliimra properobject pfpEajsfs,
or blamef Bptihe sjep, and th^plagne, we consider .as'idevftfl,
of all tbese„properties,; and hence, they are not,proper, objects
of7pra^eand.>bjl#ifflp, T^hefuwe oughjt to (inquire, what propert^esriare necessary ,to
render a,.being aproper, object, of praise^and blame,; and why
they , are, requisite ? This, we,- haverdone in previous, lecture^
In order to hayethem iipwdistinctlyi hit view, it may>n©,tibe,a- ,
miss to enumerate thera. These properties are; thpfaeuitie'S/of
the amder&tanding,. taste and will. It has, been shpwn-why each
one of tihem is requisite, and the reasons have been assigned^,
Tobe<bri£finarecapjtulatipn; the understanding is necessar,
ryt bepatuse itis^the on'y, perceiving faculty, tbeieye of 'thpmimd,
arwj i^s only eye. This, faculty , can see,e^ds, and. means,; . it.can
arrange,, and cpnnept means, in the best manner, adapted,}
tostbe, end ;we wish to seek. ; or, it , can for*? plans of operatipnjf ,
show usAthe. rigbit.and wrong way,;, and .thus prepare us.,to.act-
witii aim and, design in all' we. do ; and it. can discern the wis
dom, or folly.of. every ; being/ s conduct.
The taste is a faculty which feels ; is the subject ©falloni;

181
seiisatioiiB,,whether pleasant or painful; so it must be actfufe.iri
its nature ; and is the only primary principle of action in men.
It governs the whole man ; is the seat of all virtue and vice;
and. is the only faculty, which, renders us capable of rewards,
whether good or evil. Hence without it man would not, be. an
agent ; nor virtuous, or vicious ; nor capable of any reward-
Hence it is the most essential, property, to constitute a being
worthy of praise or blame.
The will is, an executive, faculty ; by this all the effects are
produced, needful to, execute any plan, and obtain the ends we,
seek ; it thus renders visible the characters of men, that, all may,
know them, and see what they deserve. When we see.anybe-
ing endued with those properties, we cannot so much as. form
a. conception of any other faculty, as necessary to constitute
him a proper object ofpraise or blame.* For it has beens shown
that those faculties, in their several operations, include every
thing: meant by conscience, ora moral sense ; by a. capacity for
pleasure and pain ; and; by immanent arid imperate acts.
Accordingly when any creature exists, & we find he has each
of these% faculties sound & entire, we say he isa perfect, complete
moral agent ; aproper object of praise1 or. blame. Suppose a
person, when born, is: possessed, of. all these properties, .though
they, have, not as yet begun to operate ; we should say he; is
prepared for all the operations or exercises of the understand
ing, taste, and wilj, when they shall be developed. As we say.
of a cloekrwhen, finished, before it is put in motion, it is a com
plete machine. of its kind ; it has every wheel, and part, neces
sary to-a clock- Sorherp we -say .of this being, ,, who has all,
tlieseprpper.ti.es; he has every thing necessary, to constitute him
a •completej.-.nioral agent.
The rflext inquiry is, whether, he deserves praise, or blame,
TO'deternjinerthis-wehave4o examine, what, his characterise is
it good; or badS If we , find he. has a good, .benevolent heart,
we pronounce hi nir worthy of praise ; if his heart is bad, wholly
depraved, we. declare him worthy of blame, or censure- We
view him! worthy of every, thing implied in praising or, blaming.
anyone, as soon as we know, what) hisi character is. We have
nohO^easipn, pf making any further inquiry ; and men generally,
with -respect to them* never, do, make any, farther inquiry. As
soon as we, fiadrany persou .i%^enevoJeBi,tin.Jiis heart, we pro
nounce him, good ; if he is proved guilty, of malice prepense, he
is pronounced a murderer.

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But however useful the sun hiay be in diffusing happiness, or
however destructive the plague ; as each of them is'des'titute of
all the properties which'constitute moral agency, we never think
of praising the one, or blaming the other, or of rewarding them
with any thing good or evil.
And whereever we find any being endued With the properties
or facilities men possess, we only wish to learn their moral char
acter, whether they have benevolent, or depraved hearts, in or
der to pronounce them worthy of praise or blame, arid of re
wards, good or evil. And here, in relation to this subject, our
inquiries ought to terminate ; and here, after all a fruitful im
agination canSay, they mnst and will forever end. And here
they would without any doubt have terminated, with full convic-
tiPri and satisfaction, had man continued holy. But his de
praved heart is ever searching for some plfca, to justify him in
his' rebellion -against God. Hence, here arise the various rea
sonings on this subject,1 which, instead of reflecting light, have
only served to involve it in greater darkness. Either with a
view to justify of condemn the fallen race, some have invented
a self determining power ; some have made a distinction be
tween natural and moral inability ; and some have contended
for'' a creating power in man, in order for them to be considered
aS worthy of either praise or blame. And all the different opin
ions, which have been adopted and warmly defended on this
subject, appear to me to involve only one question, which is
this ¦; how much power is necessary to render men worthy of
praise or blame ? ' Concerning this, I have already given my
views .in these essays. I have shown that men are agents, ;
have a primary principle of action implanted in them ; and are
able to carry all their plans of operation into full execution ;
and in this way to obtain their ends at which they aim, and to
gratify the desires of their hearts. And more power than this
is not requisite, to render men proper objects of praise and
blame. But many contend that more power is necessary.' Of
course it becomes us to pay some attention to the power they
contend for; and show that such a powerdoes not relieve'any
difficulty, nor reflect any further real light on this subject.
They contend -'for a creating power . They seem to suppose,
that for men to be worthy of praise or blame, they must have a
power to alter the nature or temper of their- hearts, as readily
and easily as we can move our hands or feet. So that they
can change a good heart into a bad one ; and a wicked heart

183
into a benevolent one. If this be a fact, that such a creating
power is necessary, it will effectually exclude all /praise and
blame from the universe*
Let us view this idea in relation to God. All grant he is an
eternal, self-existent being. His existence had no beginning;
was never produced or created. It is also granted he is a per
fectly holy being, worthy of praise. , Hence his holiness is as
necessary as his being. And he cannot change his heart from
holiness to sin ; for this plain reason, that he lias no disposition
to exert his omnipotence for such a purpose. And let power
be defined as it may, it is an attribute which in all beings will
be exercised, according to their prevailing and governing wish
or temper. Now then God did not create his own holiness, Or
that benevolent heart which he possesses; and he cannot alter,
or change it. He is necessarily holy, and by the same necessi
ty will forever remain the same. Hence, according to the sentiment
we are combatting, God is not holy, or he is not worthy of praise.
Arid according to this opinion, no created beings can be con
sidered as holy, or worthy of praise. For it is> absurd to sup
pose any being ever created himself. For this implies that he
existed before he did exist. He is created by some other agent,
by Jehovah. When God created man, heimust create him
with all thefaculties we now have, or he would not be man in
his image. Of course he must create in him a heart, or the fac
ulty of taste. As this is an active principle in man, it must have
a nature, either to be pleased with the character of God, or dis
pleased. It must therefore be holy or sinful. An active prin
ciple cannot be created, which is neither sinful nor holy. Be
cause, as an active principle or faculty, it is, and must, be, ca
pable of feeling, capable of pleasant or painful sensations ; it
cannot be in a state of indifference ; it must be either pleased,
or displeased, with the character of God, and divine objects.
In that case it is either sinful or holy. And at first, Adam, and
all other rational beings were, created with holy hearts. They
came from the hand of their Creator, perfectly pure. , Adam
and the fallen, angels became sinners after their creation, and
in consequence of some act of their own.
Now men could not create themselves ; they are produced
by God ; and to be moral agents they must have the faculty of
taste, as we have sepn ; and this faculty must be sinful or holy.
This we see is a fact. And Adam was created with a holy
heart. Bat, according to the sentiment we are confuting, he

184
was not worthy of praise ; because he did not create his own
heart, and because his holiness was necessary. And if he and
,his posterity had continued holy to this day, men would not be
worthy of any, praise, for the reasons just assigned. And the
holy angels in (heaven are not praise worthy ; for they are ne
cessarily holy 5 they are what God made, and continues them
to be. Hence, if the sentimentibe true, that a poWer to create,
alter and, change the nature of the heart, inherent in mety or
aiiy other being, is necessary to praise and blame ; then all
praise and blame worthiness, both in God and all rational be
ings, is forever excluded from the universe. This^ I think, is
(sufficient to convince all-, that such a power is not needftiil to ren
der beings worthy of praise and blame.
But let us look at die subject in another light. The power
they contend for does not consist in the nature or disposition
ofthe heart. For it is a power of changing the heart from holy
to sinful, and from sinful to holy, which they contend for. So
the powW, and the subject to be cbamgedi must be as distinct as
a cause and an effect are. For they make their power a cause,
and the alteration of the heart from good to bad, or from bad
to good, the effect it is to produce. Hence their power they1
contend for is an attribute, which a person can use or exert, as
he pleases, to alter the nature of the heart. As they can exer
cise it as they please) it is in fact under the control and govern
ment of the heart. Now a perfectly holy heart would
never exert this power, if possessed of it, to change the heart
into a sinfol nature. Fork would never be its pleasure to change
the heart, that is, to change itself, from holiness to sin. And if
the heart is perfectly sinful, as satan's is, it would never be die
pleasure of the heart to exert this supposed power to make it
holy. For it loves sin, and hates holiness ; so it could never
be its pleasure to exert this power to produce an effect it hated,
and to destroy a present temper in which it delights. Hence,
on the supposition men had such a power, they Would never
exert it to change their heart from holiness to sin, or from sin
to holiness. Accordingly this power, if titty had it, would be of
po use to them. They would still remain what they are, wheth
er holy or sinful. — Also, how can any feeing, in the exertion of
his power with a good design, produce a sinful effect j or, widi
a bad design, produce a holy effect ? It is absurd to suppose
ft. For it implies that a person, with a good design, exerts his
power to change it into a wicked design. Tl|e design of hi*

185
heart is good, and he exerts his power to change this good de
sign into a bad, one. This is acting directly against his design,
which is impossible. Hence it would not be possible, if men
had this supposed power, for them to exert it in changing the
heart from what its nature is, whether sinful or holy.
To look at this subject in one more light ; we shall find, if
men had such a power, still they would be sinful or holy for the
same reasons they are without it. That this may be clearly
seen, keep in view the reason why every thing is called good or
evil. Every thing is good or evil according to its nature, or
ultimate tendency. Hence to determine whether any thing is
good or evil, sinful or holy, we never search for its cause, but
for its nature. , If "the sun had created itself, still it would be
considered a great blessing, not because it produced itself, but
because it promoted happiness. If any particular poison pro
duced itself, it would be viewed as an evil thing, for the same
reason it now is ; not because it created itself, but on account
of its nature or tendency. . ,
Hence, to determine whether any thing is good or evil, we
have no occasion of searching after its cause, or the power
which produced it. By whateyer power or cause any effect is
produced, whether by a pow>er inherent in itself, or by some for-
- eign agent, yet if its ultimate tendency is to promote happiness,
it is good ; and if to produce misery, it is evil. By the cause,
which produces an effect, we can never ascertain the nature of
the effect ; this we learn only by its ultimate tendency. It is
therefore futile, and needless, to inquire after the power, or cause,
by which any thing is produced, to determine what its nature
is. Hence if men had the power supposed, and should in fact of
ten change their hearts from holiness to sin, and from sin to ho
liness.; they would not be viewed as worthy of praise or blame,
because they produced these changes ; but for the same reason
theynow are — because the effects, which they did produce, tend
ed ultimately to promote or destroy happiness. Accordingly,
their having, or not having, such supposed power, would make
no alteration in the nature of their character. They would be
viewed and treated according to their moral character, whether
holy or sinful, as they now are. Such supposed power would
effect no change in the subject of praise and blame. All the
good it could do. them would be only this, that they would be
able to do many things which now they cannot do. If men

18G
were able to fly, or create Worlds, Still their character would be
estimated according to its nature, and not according to the de
gree of their power.
God is holy, because his heart is benevolent, arid not because
he is almighty. And whether men are weak or strong* depth*
dent or independent, they must be viewed as worthy of praise or
blame,, according as their hearts are, Whether sinful or holy. If
they were omnipotent, they would still be viewed as Worthy of
praise or blame, according to the nature of their hearts.
There is one idea to which mankind are not apt to give much
attention. It is this ; that every thing, which has existence,
must have a nature, or a tendency to good or evil. And when
we take a review of individual existences, we cannot find orie sin
gle thing Which has no nature. Every thing, the moment it
exists, has a nature ; and its natPre must he good Pr evil ; it
must tend to promote or destroy happihess, uttiriiately.
God is an eternal being ; had no beginning, and is uncaused,
or self existent. And his nature is eternal. It is love, or infi
nite benevolence. And angels in heaven, as soon as created,
had a nature, or a heart, or taste ; and their nature Was holy.
So Adam when creatpd had a nature, or the faculty of taste,
and it was holy. If he had not been created with this faculty,
he Would ndt have been a moral agpnt. But the nature Pf this
faculty must be good or evil, sinful or holy. Herice, a moral
agent, as soon as he exists, must have a heart either sinful or
holy. And all moral agents created by Jehovah have had a
holy heart or taste. They come from his hand holy, pure and
upright. The sentiment then which Some have ehibraced; must
be false. The sentiment is this, that moral agents, when they
first exist,are neither holy nor sinful, and have no nature iri them,
either good or evil. Herice in this state they deserve neither
praise nor blame. And they suppose Such agents make them
selves holy or 'sinful. Accordingly, when angels were created,
some of them produced a holy nature in themselves, and others
produced a "sinful nature ; and then they deserved, praise dr
blame, according to the nature they gaVe themselves. This seh-
tiriient is certainly errPneous,Sf mPral agents must have a nature
either sinful or holy, as soon as they have a being. And Such
a nature they must have the moment they exist, as eVery one
Will see, who has riny just views of the properties ©r faculties
necessary to constitute a moral agent. It is therefore very ev
ident, that a power in amoral agent "to create in 'himself a ^hoiy

187
or sinful nature or heart, is not necessary to render him an ob
ject of praise or blame ; or, if such a power is necessary, then
there is no being in the universe, who is worthy of either praise
or blame. For no being, in fact, has this power for whicfc
many so earnestly contend. The holiness ofthe Deity is un-
produced ; the holiness of angels, and of Adam before his fall,
were not produced by them, hut by their Maker. Yet all view
their Maker as worthy of infinite praise. They view angels
also, who are hPly, worthy of praise. And indeed all holy be?
ings are worthy of praise. Hence it is not considered by any
one as essential to praise worthiness, that an agent should hayo
power to make himself holy.
-If any being has all the faculties which constitute a moral a*
gent, arid is holy, he is, viewed worthy of praise. Whether he
created his own holiness, or whether it was produced in him by
some other agent, never comes into consideration in determin
ing whether he is worthy of praise. All that need be known
is, whether he has the faculties of wider standing, taste, and will j
and then whether his heart is holy. If he has these faculties
and i» holy, he is worthy of praise.
But we ought to remember, nothing more is needful to ren
der a being worthy of blamp, than to render him worthy of
praise. If any being has all these faculties, and is sinful, be de
serves blame. And as no other faculties or powers are neces
sary, to render beings proper objects of blame, than are need
ful to render them worthy of praise, how shall we account for
the existence of the opinion, that something more is requisite to
render a being, worthy of blame, than to make him deserying of
praise ? This sentiment, .without any doubt, is the fruit of a
disposition in man to justify :himself.
Mankind are a fallen depraved race of beings, and deserve
censure. But we do not love to admit this. ' Hence their in
vention has been exercised, to .find some way to justify them
selves ; and if they can, to render themselves so far indepen
dent of God, that their, fiance state shaU be determined by their
own pleasure, and not by .the pleasure of Gpd. Hence men
havelabored to make -themselves believe, that a power to create
in them either a sinfol or holy temper, is necessary to render
them proper objects of praise or blame. For they feel thus5;
if we have such a power, then we are not dependent on God for
a moral character ; we can make ourselves holy or sinful, at
any time, just as we please. But we have seen, men do not pos*

! '188
sess such a power ; they have no power to create any thing.
We have also seen it is not necessary to render men proper ob
jects of praise or blame. And this is further evident from this
consideration ; that after all their reasonings, such persons can
not wholly divest themselves of a consciousness of blame. Their
consciences, at times, accuse and condemn them. This they
cannot prevent : because it is so evident that they are, even
without this power, proper objects of blame. They cannot rea
son themselves out of it ; the conviction still abides.
And if mankind had never sinned, but had continued perfect
ly holy to this day ; suph a power as is now contended for,
would never have been demanded.- There would have been no
use for it. We should have seen, with the greatest clearness*
that beings endued with the properties we have, being holy, are
proper objects of praise. Concerning this there would have
been no doubt. And being holy, and free from blame, there
would have been no occasion to invent a way to justify them
selves, and free themselves from censure and punishment. But
as men are sinners, they now wish for power to gratify all their
desires with impunity ; or to render themselves independent of
God. Hence they have labored to make themselves believe,
that they have such power ; or, if they have not, that they are
not worthy of blame.
That this sentiment is true, is evident from this ; that we are
ever ready to hlame and condemn others, for the very things we
allow in ourselves. If our fellow men injure us in any way, we
blame, censure, and condemn them. Apd their plea, that they
could not help doing as they did, has no weight ; we still blame
them. Mankind never make the plea of inability to justify any
but themselves. If a person's disposition to rob, steal, and
murder, is so strong that he cannot resist it ; he is so much the
more depraved in our view, and deserving of censure. As we
do not admit the plea of inability to have any force to justify*
others, it is evident it would never have been made, if men had
not beCome depraved. It would sound harsh indeed, if any
person should plead that he was not worthy of praise, because
his nature was so benevolent, he could not help being benevolent.
And we have never heard such a plea made. And the stronger
a person's benevolence is, so much the more worthy of praise
we view him. And the more strongly we find persons inclined
tp evil, we blame them so much the more.
Qq the whole, when we find any being endued with the fac-

189
ulties of the understanding, taste, and will, we consider him a
complete moral agent; a proper object of praise and blame, and
of future rewards. Then, if we find such a being is holy,' we
praise him ; if sinful, we blame him ; and are ready to justify
God, in distributing rewards according to persons' characters.
And though we have sinned, yet a way for our recovery is
revealed in the sacred volume. Now instead of spending our
time in inventing some plea for ourjustification, which serves no
other end than to blind and deceive us, and in this way keep us
in a state of fatal security ; it is our wisdom to "spend our days
in securing an interest in the great salvation. We should cry
unto God to renew our hearts, and in this way raise us from the
ruins ofthe fall to a state of purity and bliss. For though de-
praved .and justly condemned, we are capable of being reclaim
ed, and sanctified, and exalted to the highest seats of felicity
in heaven.
To give conviction to gainsayers and cavillers, so as to sat
isfy them on this subject, is impossible. No more can be done,
than to exhibit the truth in the most convincing light. Noth
ing short of a power, sufficient to change their own hearts at
their pleasure independent of divine control, will satisfy them.
For all power short of this, it is granted they possess. They
have all the faculties necessary'to repent and love God supreme
ly, and nothing is wanting, but a heart or disposition to love
and obey/ A power to produce this disposition, is what they
contend for earnestly. This would be to endue them with cre
ating power ; a power to do as they please, independent of God.
And still they will not see nor feel the absurdity this implies. A
power of this kind is always used by an agent, according to his
prevailing inclination. If he has an inclination to use his pow
er to renew his heart, that he might serve and glorify God; his
virtue in this case is in this inclination, which is distinct from
the new heart he creates, and antecedent to it. And it must
ever be holy or sinful, according to the end he aims at in using
liis power to change his heart. There is no virtue in the exer
tion of his power to change his heart, unless the effect produced
is of a holy nature. If the effect produced is of a sinful nature. ;
then the inclination, which moved him to use his power in pro
ducing this effect, is sinful. This clearly proves that his incli
nation, which excites him to create something new in his heart,
is holy or sinful, according to the nature ofthe effect produced.
But how came he by this inclination ? According to his own

190
scheme, it cannot be praise or blameworthy in him, unless he
produced it. To account for this he must have another inch*
nation distinct from this, and prior to it, which led him to exert
his power in producing it. And in this manner he must, on his
principles, run back forever, and never arrive to a first cause of
all the changes he has produced. This all grant is the greatest
absurdity. But there is no way for him to avoid it, unless he
grants there is a first inclination or cause, which is unproduced,
self existent. But to grant this, is overturning his whole sysr
tem. It would be granting the heart is holy or sinful accord
ing to its nature, whatever be its cause.

**********

ESSAY XXIX.
On the first principles, upon which the Arminiaw
and Calvinistic systems of divinity are founded :
and the primary difference between them.
Rom. 9, 19. Thou wilt say then unto me, why doth he yet 6nd fault t For who
hath resisted his will ?
Paul, in the preceding part of this chapter, had brought
very clearly and expressly into view the holy and absolute sov
ereignty of God. To his doctrine the objection stated in the
text was made. If God does according to his pleasure, then .his
own will is done ; and if done, how are men blarrieable ? They are
not ; forno one hath resisted, or can resist his will. The meaning
of the objection is this. If God is an absolute sovereign, as
Paul preached, mankind are no more than machines ; and of
course not subject to blame.
Paul was what is called at this day a Calvinist ; and [the ob
jector is what js now termed an Arminian. The same objection
was then made to the Calvinistic scheme, which is now, and ever
has been made to it by Arminians. The Calvinistic and Ar
minian schemes have ever been at variance. All schemes or
systems are founded on some first principles. And a difference
in opinion concerning first principles, is the foundation of dif-

191
fefeht systetns of divinity. This difference is the primary cause
ofthe existence and prevalence of these two systems.
My object is, to examine the primary- difference between
the Calvinistic and Arminian systems of divinity, and then attend
to such remarks arid inferences as the subject affords.
Arminians and Calvinists have ever been agreed with respect
to some things. They believe there is a God, and divine prov
idence, and that men are moral agents, accountable for their
conduct. They agree that all men enjoy liberty ; but with re
spect to the nature of that liberty, which is considered as essen
tial to vice and Virtue, praise and blame, they widely differ.
This difference is the primary ground of their respective schemes
of divinity. This, 1 think, may be made very evident by stating
their sentiments concerning liberty.
And, I. I shall consider the Arminian system.
1 . Arminians say that necessity, both natural and moral, is
inconsistent with liberty and destroys it. Their notion of liber
ty is such, that freedom from necessity is essential to liberty*
So far as men act Under the influence of necessity of any kind,
so far they are not free. They are not governed by liberty ©f
choice, and of course are not free. Hence they say, to be free,
men rnust never act under the influence ofthe least degree of
necessity. 2. They say, perfect indifference is essential to liberty. By
this they mean, that men must not have any inclination, for or
against any object of choice, previous to choice. If an object
is pleasing and agreeable to a person, antecedent to choice, if
he has any inclination towards it, this impels him to choose it.
This impelling force is necessity ; and he does not choose free
ly. For the same reason he must not be disinclined, an object
must not be disgustful to him, before choosing it. For this
would impel him to reject it. Herice, to act freely, a person
must be in a state of perfect indiffel-enee. If he has a thousand
objects of choice presented to his view, they must never please
or offerid him, they must not give him any pleasure or pain,
previous to choice. He must be destitute of any feeling what
soever, as much so as a stone is, till^ie -has made his choiee.
Such is the indifference they contend for. And if the least ne
cessity is inconsistent with liberty, they are right. -For so far
as persons choose under the influence 6f any previous inclina-*
tirin, for or against any object, -so for they:*re gev^Mjed-byaie?-
cessity.

192
But as this wholly excludes motives and their influence, tp be
free, persons must not be governed b)' motives. If a person is
in a state of perfect indifference when he chooses, he can give
no reason, why he prefers one object to another. He must not
say one is agreeable, and another disgustful ; for if this be true,
he is not in a state of perfect indifference. If objects of choice
neither please nor offend ; no reason can be given why one is
chosen, and another rejected ; and there is no room for objects,
considered as motives, to have the least influence. And indeed
they must not have the least influence, before choice. For if they
have, so far they operate as necessity operates ; so far there is
a reason and necessity, of choosing one and rejecting' another.
Hence the doctrine of indifference wholly excludes the influence
of motives. — How then can any one account for the existence
of choice ?, To do this —
, 3. Arminians say men have a self determining power.
By this power they determine their wills, or produce volitions.
Then ask them why they choose one object and reject another'
they answer, because it is- their pleasure. This is the way by
which they account for the existence of volitions in a state of
perfect indifference. So Arminians do every thing by a self
determining power. Ask them to define this power, or to de
scribe it, or in any way give others an idea of it; and they are
non-plussed. For there is no such power in existence ; hence
no one can give another any idea of it. For that which has no
existence, cannot be defined or described. It is not volition ;
one volition does not produce another ; for this would run us
back, in an endless train of volitions, and lead us into obscurity.
And if it be not this, it can be nothing, unless a previous incli
nation. But this would destroy indifference ; of course it can
not be any such inclination. And hence it can be nothing, itis
a word without any meaning.
We now have a cjear view of that liberty, which is essential
to the existence of vice and virtue, praise and blame. Liberty,
according to their idea, must not be under thp influence of any
necessity, natural or moral. In order to this, a person must be
in a state of perfect indifference, when he chooses, uninfluenced
bj' motives ; and have, a s;If determining power, that in this
state he can choose and it-fuse. Hence Arminians commonly^
define liberty, to be a po,»?r to act, or not to act. When persons
are in that state of indifference described, and have a power to .
choose or not to choose, to act or not to act, then they are free.

193
Then they consider such beings moral agents, possessing gen
uine liberty, and accountable for their conduct.
It will now be easy to see what that system of divinity must
be, which is founded upon, and is consistent with this theory of
moral agency and liberty. And all that will be necessary to
keep in view, as we proceed, is their notion of liberty, a free
dom from necessity, and a state of indifference.
1 . To be consistent, they must deny original depravity, or
Original sin. For if an infant is borriwith any corrupt or ho
ly principle in his heart, he is not in a state Pf perfect indiffer
ence. If a man Pr an infant is perfectly holy, he is inclined to
walk in the way of holiness ; or if whPlly corrupt, he will choose
nothing but for Bidden paths. So far as he is influenced by holy
or sinful inclinations, so far he is necessitated to pursue the
course to which his inclination leads. HenCe to be indifferent,
and free from the influence of necessity, a person's heart must
not have any holy or sinful propensity; His heart must be like
clean paper, on which there isno impression, no mark whatever.
And this is what all consistent Arminians believe. They say
Adam, when created, had a heart which was neither vicious nor
holy. He was in a state in which, by his self determining pow
er, he could make himself holy or sinful. Also infants are born!
in the same state, with hearts clean as paper, neither virtuous
nor vicious. To allow that men are created holy, is as incon
sistent With their scheme, as for them to be created sinful.'
For if men are holy, they are no more indifferent, nor free from
necessity; than they are if made sinful. Hence, to be a consis
tent Arminian, a person must believe that Adam and all his pos
terity are created with hearts, which are neither holy nor sinful.
This and this only is consistent Arniiriianism. Accordingly,
all moral agents make themselves holy dr sinful, by a self deter
mining power. *
2; To be consistent, they must deny total depravity. For
if men are totally depraved, they are not in a state of indifference
br freedom from necessity. This is Very easy for any one to
perceive. Hence all consistent Arminians do deny total deprav
ity. They Say, when men niake themselves sinful, yet there re
mains in them a good, and holy principle. And if this were
properly cultivated, it would become a ruling principle, arid
then a person might be called a good man. This however is'
their belief, that eVen the most vicious men have soriie moral-

194
goodness remaining in their hearts, and therefore are not totally
depraved. Still they are not consistent with their first princi
ples. For when a moral agent has made himself sinful, he is
no longer in a state of perfect indifference ; and the same is true,
if he makes himself holy. Neither are they in that case free
from the influence of necessity. For so far as they are sinful
or holy, they are nnder a necessity of acting as a holy or sinful
inclination leads. To be perfectly consistent with the Armin
ian notion of liberty, a moral agent must never become sinful
or holy. To be in a state of indifference, he must forever live
without any inclination to vice or virtue. And as soon as he i9
either holy or sinful, his liberty is then destroyed, and he is not
a moral agent ;¦ he is not accountable for his conduct,, or re-
wardable. However, not to dwell on this absurdity here, I on
ly add ; that to be consistent, Arminians must deny total de
pravity. This they do deny without any hesitation, if they un
derstand themselves. And we see why they must deny it,to be con
sistent with their notions of liberty. So they hold, that all
men have some moral goodness in their hearts ; and are inclin
ed to good as well as to evil.
3. To be consistent, they must deny regeneration by thepow-
er of God. For if God by his power creates in the heart a ho
ly principle, man cannot prevent it. He is the subject of an
absolute necessity, which destroys liberty. In regeneration he
is not free, and exercises no liberty ; he is what God is pleased
to make him. Accordingly we find they do deny regeneration
by the power of God.
They hold to regeneration ; but it is iri this sense. All men
have some moral goodness remaining in them. This moral
principle they ought to cultivate. If they cultivate it properly,
it will increase ; and when it becomes stronger, than the re
maining corruptions ofthe heart, so as to govern men in their
conduct, and make them act like good men, then they are re
generated. According to their scheme regeneration is a pro
gressive Work, and effected by themselves, and not by the al
mighty power of God. In the sense in which Calvinists ex
plain the doctrine of regeneration, they utterly deny it ; and
must deny it, to be consistent with their notions of liberty. This
is so plain, that any attentive person may see jt.
4. To be consistent, Arminians must deny the saints' persever
ance. Calvinists say, the perseverance of saints does not depend on
themselves. If left to themselves, they would immediately fall into

195
sin. It depends on God. He has promised to keep them by
his power unto salvation. He will therefore work within them
both to will and do, and promote the work of sanctification till
they arrive at perfection. According to this, the Arminian
says they cannot help being holy ; they are constantly under the
influence of necessity, which destroys liberty. For this reason,
to be consistent with their ideas of liberty, they must deny the
perseverance of saints. They do deny it ; and labor to prove
that saints may, and often do, fall from grace. Hence every
one may see why they deny saints' perseverance.
5. To be consistent, they must deny divine decrees.
The doctrine of divine decrees implies the highest degree of
necessity ; and is perfectly opposed to the Arminian notion of
liberty. Hence they deny it ; and also, for the same reason,
they deny the doctrine of personal election to eternal life. There
are no doctrines which they abhor more than these $ or to which
they manifest a greater opposition. Because no doctrines. im
ply a greater necessity, or more effectually destroy their liberty ;
and because no doctrines so fully manifest the divine sovereign
ty, which they violently oppose. The absolute sovereignty
of God is perfectly inconsistent with their notions of liberty, as
well as opposite to the pride ofthe human heart.
6. To be consistent, Arminians must deny divine fore-knowl
edge. If God fore-knows what will be, the events fore-known
are certain. They will and must take place. To say a being
knows an event will be, and yet it may not take place, is a con
tradiction ; it is saying it will exist, yet it may not exist ; it is
certain, yet uncertain. There is the same necessity that events
fore known should take place, as there is for the existence of
events decreed. Fore-knowledge implies the same, and as great
necessity, as decrees imply. Hence to be consistent, Armini
ans must not only deny divine decrees, but also divine fore
knowledge. If they do not, they destroy their own system of
liberty. This is so bold, and so contrary to scripture, and the
character of God, but few of them dare deny it. But every
Arminian, who means to be consistent, does deny the foreknowl
edge of God ; and those, who do not, are inconsistent with
themselves. — We now see what Arminians must deny, to be con
sistent with their notions of liberty. They must deny original
sin, total depravity, regeneration, saints' perseverance, divine
decrees, the doctrine of election, and the foreknowledge of God,
For the same reasons they deny one of these doctrines they

196
must deny them all. This any person may see with great ease,
as soon as he understands the Arminian notions of liberty and
moral agency. On the other hand, consistency requires them
to believe, that Adam and all his posterity' are created with
hearts, which are neither sinful nor holy ; and have in them as
they grow up a principle of moral goodness, which men can and
ought to cultivate, till they become perfectly hply and fit for
heaven ; and then their salvation is effected by themselves,
They must believe that men act independently of God. All he
has to do is to preserve men in existence, and leave them to the
exercise of their liberty, and the powers they have as moral a-
gents, to fit themselves for heaven or for hell ; and he can nev
er interpose, without destroying their liberty. And when men
have produced events which tend to destroy the universe, he
must prevent it as well as he can, and overrule their evil con
duct for good as. far as he is able. But after all that God can
do, men by their rebellion produce so much evil, that in the
fipal result there will not be so much happiness by a great a-
mount in the universe, as there would have been if mankind had
riot abused their liberty. And there is no way by which God
can, consistently with human liberty, prevent this great dimin
ution of happiness in the moral world, or in the universe. God,
does not reign as an absolute sovereign, doing according to his
pleasure ; but men reign, and by their self determining power
destroy all order, peace, regularity and happiness to an awful
amount, and it is not possible for God to prevent it. All he
can do is to patch up the system as well as he can, after men
have destroyed it. He must not interpose, by a general or parties
ular providence, to order and direct all events ; because this
would destroy liberty and moral agency.
He is not a holy, absolute sovereign, doing according to his
pleasure ; but is dependent on the will of men ; and cannot de
termine what to do, till men have first accomplished their will
and pleasure. Such, is and must be the Arminian scheme, as
far as men will be consistent with their first principles concern
ing liberty and moral agency. I will now,
II. Define, state, or describe the Calvinistic ideas of liberty.
To show what that liberty is, which all mankind experience, and
with which tliey are satisfied, does not require any deep meta-.
physical investigation. It consists wholly, according to the
common opinion, in a person's choosing and acting as his pleas
ure js,— When a person has been long sitting, and feels the need

197
of exercise, the question with him is, what kind of exercise he
shall use. Among the various kinds contemplated, no one is
so pleasing to him on every account, as -walking the room.
Here then it is his pleasnre to walk the room. This, every
thing considered, he prefers to any other exercise. He chooses
to rise and walk, He finds he is at liberty to choose according
to his pleasure. His will is not bound ; there is nothing to pre
vent his making a choice, which corresponds with his pleasure.
Therefore he enjoys perfect liberty of choice. In case he
found any thing opposing, and preventing his choosing as he wish
ed, he would say liberty of will is destroyed. But if no hindrance
is in the way of choosing according to his pleasure, he enjoys
all the liberty of will he desires. When the choice or exertion
is made to rise and walk, he finds nothing to prevent his walk
ing, he then enjoys liberty of action. If any thing, at that time,
restrained him from walking ; or any thing constrained him to
walk in directions contrary to his choice, he would say that
his liberty of action was abridged and destroyed. But if he
found no impediment in the way, and walked according to the
exertions he had made, and of course according to his pleasure,
he would confess he enjoyed all the liberty of action he desired.
In the case now stated a person enjoys perfect liberty of choice
and of action, as great as he desires ; and so great, he cannot
conceive of more perfect liberty, than what he experiences.
And what is liberty here ? It is the total absence of every thing,
which might prevent his choosing and acting according to his
pleasure. According to this description of liberty, there is a connexion
between a person's^jZeasure and choice ; and between his choos^
ing to act, and his actions. Pleasure is first, choice next, and
actions are the result. If an object is disgustful, and we
wish to avoid it — with this disgust choice is connected, and with
choice actions are connected, the actions necessary to shun the
disagreeable object. And here also a person acts according to
his pleasure. And one thing here to be carefully noticed is,
that the greater, or more certain the connexion is between our
plpasure and volition, and our volitions and actions, the more
certain, and the greater is human liberty. In the case above
stated, it is a person's pleasure to walk. I will now suppose
there is no connexion between his pleasure, choice, and walking.
Suppose choice will not follow his pleasure ; and if volitions ex
ist, and actions or walking do not follow these ; or suppose va-<

198
litions and actions to follow, which are directly opposed to his
pleasure, would a person feel himself in the possession of liber
ty ; would he wish to exist in such a condition ? Again ; sup
pose a person knew he might have his wishes gratified, concern
ing the liberty he should desireto enjoy. Would not any wise
man say, let me have liberty to choose and act as I please, or
according to my pleasure — let volitions be connected with 'my
pleasure, and let actions be connected with my volitions, so that
I can have my pleasure done? This, he would say, is the lib
erty I wish. And let this connexion be so firm, so certain, that
nothing can ever dissolve or destroy it ; then I am sure of act
ing according to my pleasure at all times. Such liberty I de
sire, and I desire no other kind, or greater liberty. For I can
not form a conceptiou of any liberty greater than this.
It is now evident that such a connexion as the above is es
sential to liberty. For without this there is no certainty that
any volitions or actions will ever follow our pleasure ; or if any
follow, there is uo certainty .they will be of that kind, which
will gratify our pleasure. Hence without it, there cannot be
any such liberty enjoyed, as a wise man would wish ; and with
this certain connexion established, a person enjoys liberty in
the highest perfection. Accordingly, such a certain connexion
is not inconsistent with liberty, but essential to its existence.
This connexion between our pleasure and volition, and between
volition and thosj actions which accomplish our pleasure, is
what is meant by necessity. Whether this be a natural or moral
necessity, will make no difference, as it respects liberty. Every
one, therefore, is at liberty to call it natural, or moral, as he
pleases. This shows that this necessity, all the necessity I contend for
here, does not destroy liberty ; but is essential to its existence.
So that liberty and this necessity agree, they are consistent
with each, other. This is the Calvinistic idea of liberty.
Though they may explain it in different ways, yet all their ex
planations will be found to be contained in the description here
given ; so far as they differ from the Arminian notion of liber
ty. For all consistent Calvinists agree, however they may ex
plain themselves, that liberty and this necessity are consistent
with each other. And it will in the end appear, that those, who
essentially differ from this description of liberty, are not consist-
tent with themselves, if they profess to be Calvinists ; and that
in fact, they are neither consistent Calvinists, nor consistent

199
Arminians, but partly both, and inconsistent with themselves.
The only material fault any Calvinist can find with this de
scription of liberty is, that it makes a distinction between our
pleasure and volitions. It does not grant, that the pleasure or
disgust which objects afford us, is nothing more or less than a
Volition ; but maintains, that they are antecedent to all volition.
This dispute has been attended to in other essays, to which I
refer the reader at this time. Here I shall only observe two
things ; first, that those, who consider this pleasure as a volition,
must admit the Arminian doctrine of perfect indifference, as has
been proved in previous essays, or be inconsistent ; and second
ly, that on the Arminian plan there can be no such thing as
liberty, only in theory. For let a person be in a state of per*
feet indifference, a state in which he has no inclinations, no
feelings, no desires, any more than a stone or block. Ask
him what kind of liberty do you wish to enjoy ? His answer1
must be, that he does not know ; for he has no idea what you
mean by the term liberty. He does not prefer one thing to
another, for he has no preference. He is indifferent. And one
thing is as agreeable to him as another ; because nothing
pleases or disgusts him. He must answer, it is all one to him
what kind of liberty he has, or whether he has any at all. In
this state it is impossible for a person to choose or to act. For
there is nothing in the universe exciting him to action. And
without excitement there can be no such thing as choice, or ac
tion of any kind. And if he could choose in that state of indif
ference, and by this choice destroy his indifference, and now
have a preference of one thing to another in future, he would
by this devest himself of all liberty forever. For he would np
more be in a state of perfect indifference ; and as indifference is
considered essential to liberty, he can no more enjoy any lib
erty, after he has, by making one choice, overcome this indiffer
ence. Being overcome by the choice he made, he is no longer
indifferent ; he prefers in future one object to another, and there
fore has no liberty.
I have now described the idea of liberty, which is entertain
ed by Calvinists. On this ground it appears, that liberty and
necessity agree ; that the latter is essential to the existence of
the former ; and that the greater the necessity is, or the more
certain the connexion is established between desires and voli
tions, and between volitions and actions, so much the more per
fect is our liberty. God has established this connexion, and

200
thus has endued moral agents with hberty. This connexion he
will continue to preserve, and thus grant his creatures all the
liberty they can desire.
If it be their pleasure to rebel against him, they are at liber
ty to do it ; and they do abuse their liberty for that puipose.
If it be their pleasure to serve him, they are at liberty to do this ;
and all, whb have this pleasure, do serve him.
We may now easily see, that if any ofthe doctrines contain
ed in the bible imply a necessity, however great, they are not
pn this account inconsistent with the Calvinistic idea of liberty.
Any doctrine revealed, however great the necessity it implies,
Calvinists can consistently admit and believe with their ideas of
liberty. All therefore they have to do is, to gO to the word of
God, and there learn what are the doctrines which God has re
vealed and taught. Has he there revealed that Adam was cre
ated holy ; and was not indifferent, whfether he served the Lord
or not ? He was strongly inclined to obey his Maker ,; and,
so far as inclined, he was under a moral necessity of doing his
will ; it was his pleasure to serve the Lord only, and according
to his pleasure he acted, till he sinned. All this the Calvinist
can consistently believe ; but the Arminian cannot admit it. It
is revealed that infants are born with corrupt hearts, inclined to
evil only ; and that all men are totally depraved, inclined to
forsake God and live in rebellion^ So it is their pleasure to
serve satan, and disobey their Maker. And according to their
pleasure they live, till they are renewed. These doctrines
Calvinists can consistently believe ; for they harmonize with
their ideas of liberty ; but Arminiaris, to be consistent, must
reject these doctrines. It is revealed that men, who; are saved,
are born again ; have a relish of heart given them, which in
clines them to forsake sin and serve the Lord, and according to
their pleasure they live. Calvinists can cdnsisteritly believe
this doctrine; but consistent Arminians must reject it.
Calvinists can consistently believe all that is revealed coUM
cerning the christian warfare. According to which they have
the old and new mail in their hearts, and sometiriies do the
pleasure of one, and sometimes of the other, just as one or the
other has the ascendancy. This agrees with the Calvinistid-
idea of liberty ; but not with the Arminian notions on that sub
ject. It is revealed that God has decreed all things, and has chos-
fcn some from the fallen race to be the heirs of life, and has de-

201
termined to renew & sanctify them and bring them home to heav
en. All these decrees perfectly harmonize with liberty. For
the first in the train is, that men shall always act according to
their pleasure. Hence to have men act freely, and divine de
crees be accomplished consistently therewith, all God has to do
is to produce such alterations in the feelings of men, that it shall
always be their pleasure to act as he has decreed. ,
Hence Calvinists can, consistently with their ideas of liberty,
believe in the doctrines of divine decrees and personal election,
as they find them revealed, But Arminians are obliged, to be
consistent, to expunge froth their creed all doctrines which im
ply any necessity. Hence Calvinists can admit into their creed
every doctrine revealed in the bible, however great the neces
sity which it may imply. Arid Arminians, to be consistent,
are obliged to reject all such doctrines.
This shows us the fundamental and primary difference be
tween Calvinists and Arminians. They first differ in their sen
timents concerning human liberty ; that liberty, which is sup-
ppsed to be essential to vice and virtue. This lays the founda
tion of their different systems of divinity, as has been shown-
And if the several parties are consistent with their own ideas of
liberty, they must form opposite systems, which are subversive
of each other. All this must now be as evident to an attentive
mind, as noon day light. And both systems maybe understood
readily, as soon as a person has clear ideas ofthe Arminian and
Calvinistic ideas of liberty. . '
And when we take a view ofthe two systems, can any one be
at a loss, to determine which is most agreeable to the word of
God, arid to common sense ? The Arminian has to explain
scripture to support his system. To do this, he has to put for
ced, unnatural, and false constructions on the word of God. If
he construes scripture according to its plain, and most obvious
import, it confutes his system. He is obliged therefore to be
constantly forcing, and wresting the meaning of scripture, and
to go contrary to common sense and the experience of mankind.
But the Calvinist has formed such ideas of liberty, as harmo
nise with the word of God. Hence he gpes to the bible and
reads the word, and jbecomes acquainted with the doctrines there
taught, and finds they agree with his sentiments concerning
liberty and moral agency ; and has no preconceived opinions
to bias his judgment. He only has to construe the word ac
cording to its plain import, and the dictates of sober, unbiassed

202
reason ; and every page adds to his knowledge, till he forms a
system from the word of Jehovah, which is of course supported
by it. He can therefore with ease, with the bible in his hand,
support his system. These things are evident from the writings
of Arminians and Calvinists. It is now clear, that the prima
ry difference between these two denominations, consists in dif
ferent opinions concerning liberty and moral agency. Here
they differ so widely, that, if each is consistent with himself, they
must form systems of divinity, which are ever at variance with
each other ; systems so essentially different, that they never can
harmonize. Hence every person must bean Arminian in length
and breadth ; or a Calvinist, with respect to all the essential
doctrines of the gospel ; or be inconsistent with himself. What
I have further to say will beincluded in remarks and inferences.
1 . Remark. There are but two systems of divinity in Chris
tendom, which are consistent with the fundamental principles on
which they are founded. These two Systems, which include
all others, are the Arminian and Calvinistic systems.
There are, it is true, a great variety of sects and different de
nominations in Christendom. Let any one take pains to exam
ine them candidly, and he will find they are either purely Ar
minian ; or Calvinistic ; or composed partly of the one, and
partly of the other, and of course are full of 'contradictions, in
consistencies, and absurdities. To be fully convinced of this,
let any one be at the trouble of examining the systems, which
are now embraced by different sectaries. For instance, a per
son believes in the Arminian notion of liberty, yet believes in the
doctrines of original and total depravity. If he does believe the
latter, he is perfectly inconsistent with his first principle con
cerning liberty. For the fact is, if the Arminian notion of lib
erty is true, his whole system founded on this is true. And if
the Calvinistic idea of liberty is just, his system founded upon
it, if consistent, is true. And these two sects can never agree,
unless they can agree in their ideas concerning liberty. Were
they agreed here, and consistent with themselves, they would
have but one system of divinity. For the primary dispute be
tween Arminians and Calvinists respects liberty and moral a-
gency. Did they agree in this, and were they consistent, they
would/agree in every thing essential. But withrespecttoliberty,
their views are essentially different ; and this is the foundation
of their different systems. And the reason why Calvinists in
their system agree with the word of God is, because their ideas

203
»f liberty are such as the bible teaches. Hence if these parties
ever do agree, and dismiss their disputes, they must believe a-
like concerning human liberty.
And as every essential doctrine must harmonize with that
idea of liberty which is consistent with necessity, or destroy it ;
all men must, if consistent, embrace the doctrines of Calvinists,
or Arminians. And all the essential doctrines of every denom
ination must therefore agree with the Calvinistic, or the Ar
minian system, or a person must be very inconsistent with him
self. Hence there are but two systems, which agree with first
principles, the Arminian and Calvinistic; and these two include
all other systems, by whatever name they are called ; or else
some embrace a system, whose parts are forever at variance
with each other.
2. We learn the importance of understanding the subjects of
moral agency and liberty, in order to be correct and consistent
divines. Moral agency and' liberty, are the foundation of ev
ery system 6f divinity. The ideas men form of divine and hu
man agency, and liberty, lay the broad foundation on which sys
tems of divinity are formed. And as no man can form a con
sistent system, unless he clearly understands the foundation on
which it rests ; it is evident -the first principles must be under
stood. And it is owing to the want of a knowledge of moral agency
and liberty, that there are so many divines in our land, whose
minds.are inconsistent and confused. Here then is the place,
where the study of divinity ought to begin. Every candidate
ought to begin with the study of moral agency and liberty, in
God and in his creatures. And if he understands these subjects,
and is capable of founding a system upon them, the parts of
which agree with each other, he will have a consistent scheme,
and one which will agree with the word of God. But if he is
unacquainted with these fundamental subjects, he may have
what he calls a system ; but it will be composed of heterogene
ous materials, partly Arminian and partly Calvinistic, without
any consistency. And this is the lamentable state, in which
many^divines are at this day involved.
Aud now the cry against metaphysics is, so great, that the
first principles of divinity are overlooked, neglected and never
brought into a candidate's view. Hence the reason why we
have so many candidates at this day, who are so inconsistent,
so unable to defend their systems, and unable to make any pro-

204
greSs in divinity. They have no foundation laid, and, of Course
have nothing pn which to build ; and know not when they are
consistent, or inconsistent with the word of God. Hence it is
the duty pf all, who teach students divinity, to begin with the
subject of moral agency and liberty. This would lead to the
discussion of a number pf distinct questions. The first
in order would be this; what properties must a being pos
sess to be a proper subject of vice and virtue, praise and blame,
and future rewards? And then inquire whether men have these
properties ; and reasons ought to be given why each particular
property is necessary, to constitute. Such a moral agent. By
such a method, a candidate would obtain a clear and consistent
knowledge ofthe subject, of moral agency and liberty ; and see
not only the several parts of this subject, but their agreement
with each other, and the reasons why each property of the mind
is necessaryl Then he has a- foundation laid to form consistent
views of all the dpctrines, and parts, which constitute a com-
i plete system of divinity. And in this way only, will any person
ever see clearly the consistency of all the parts, which compose
a systems of divinity. This shows the importance of the previ
ous essays on the faculties and operations pf the mind.
3. On supposition the heart is not a faculty, and is nothing
but those exercises, which many call immanent and imperate
in succession, it is very evident on this ground, that men must
be in a state of indifferpnpe previous to choice, and the influ
ence of motives is excluded. To be convinced of this, we have
only to go back to the first exercise of the heart. Previous to-
this there is no heart. For the idea of a faculty, antecedent to,
ap exercise, is denied- Hence there is nothing on which mo
tives can operate, or have influence. There is no such thing as
pleasure or pain, experienced by a man. AH objects are alike
to.hirn. And on supposition he has a clear perception of ob
jects, of truth and falsehood, and sees their adaptednesss to their
respective ends ; yet, antecedent to the first exercise, they do
not, affect, him agreeably or disagreeably ; they excite no sen
sation, no feeling of any kind. He is in a state of perfect in
difference towards every object. In this, state the first exercise
hMexisteqee. Whether this exercise be an agreeable or pain-
fulsensation, or an immanent or imperate act, still it is a voli
tion according to the defenders of this scheme. This first exer
cise is an effect, and must, have a cause. And it is produced
in a moral agent at the time, when he is in a state of perfect in*

205
difference. And if choice can exist in such a state of mind, it
is agreed by all opposed to Arminians, that motives cannot have
any influence.
Hence the defenders of the exercise scheme and Arminians
must agree in two particulars. First, that voluntary exercises
may exist, when the mind is in a state of perfect indifference ;
and secondly, that motives have no influence in choosing ; or
that the influence of motives is wholly excluded. And of course
the only difference in this particular, between Arminians and
those on the exercise scheme, respects the cause of voluntary
exercise. The former sa3r, it is produced by a self determining
power in man ; the latter say, it is produced by the immediate
agency of God ; (and which of them is most consistent, I leave
for others to determine. But to make this subject more evi
dent, it may be observed,
That by indifference is meant a state of mind, in which a per
son has no inclination for or against an object of choice,; or is
totally destitute of any feeling for or against an object. He is
then in a state, in which objects of choice make no impression,
excite neither agreeable or disgustful sensations, He has no
sensations, no feelings of pleasure or pain.
By the influence of motives is meant, that the object of choice
moves or excites a person to choose or reject it. If motives
do not this, it is hard to conceive how they have any influence.
To say a motive is nothing, but the object Pr end chosen, or on
which choice terminates ; and to say this object is neither a-
greeable nor disagreeable, antecedent to choice, is to deny the
influence of a motive entirely. To objects of choice the term
motive is applied. And why ? Because some objects are sup
posed to move, incline, or excite the will to choose one object
rather than another. And so far as an object pleases or dis
gusts a person, so far it moves him to choose one object, in pre
ference to another. But if it does not excite in him any feeling
of pleasure or of pain, it does not move him. For this is the
only way, by which an object can move or incline the will to.
choose or reject. Hence to say, antecedent to choice objects ,
excite neither pleasing nor painful sensations, is denying the in
fluence of motives, and defending the doctrine of indifference.
And if, antecedent to choice, there is nothing in the mind or
heart which objects of choice can affect, please or disgust; then
certainly, at the time choice does exist, the person is in a state
qf perfect indifference ; and the object chosen did not move or

20©
create in him that choice ; it had no influence. It is then very
clear, that the exercise scheme-agrees with the Arminian notions
of liberty, in two important particulars. It suppprts their doc
trine of perfect indifference, and wholly denies the influence of
motives. And to evade this reasoning by saying, that motives
have influence after the first choice exists, is very futile. For
how can they have influence then ? Certainly they had no in
fluence in the production of the first choice. For the influence
of a motive is too late, after the choice has existence. And it
can have no influence in any future choice, any more than in the
first. For the first choice, as soon as it exists, is past. It is fu
gitive ; it is gone, as much as an exercise a person had ten
years since ; and can no more be a something on which mo
tives can have influence, than exercises a person had ten years
before. Herice every future succeeding choice mustexist, when •
the mind is in a state of perfect indifference ; and of course,
motives cannot have any influence.
And to say there is in every moral agent a capacity for pleas
ure and 'pain, antecedent to choice, and must be, or the exist
ence of choice can never be accounted for, is giving up the ex
ercise scheme wholly ; and granting all those contend for, who
are opposers of the scheme. For this is granting that a capa
city exists, which is a feeling capacity, and the foundation of all
our pleasures and pains ; that the mind is never in a state of in
difference antecedent to choice : and that motives have influ
ence, by exciting in this capacity pleasing or painful sensations.
And this capacity must in its nature be moral ; either vicious,
or virtuous. For when the divine character and divine truths
are exhibited to view, they must please or offend this capacity.
If they please it, does not this prove it is virtuous or holy in its
nature ? And if they offend it, does not this prove it is vicious
or sinful in its nature ? Certainly no one in his senses can de
ny this. This capacity then for pleasure and pain is the very
thing, which we call a faculty, or by the name of taste. Its na
ture and operations are the same. Hence they yield all we
contend for. How a person on the exercise scheme can grant
this and be consistent, is hard to conceive. /On the whole, the
exercise scheme, to be consistent, must agree with the Armini
an scheme in two fundamental points; by admitting the doctrine
of indifference, and by excluding the influence of motives. And
how such can be consistent Calvinists, is beyond my power
of conception. This shows more folly, how important his for aU

207
candidates to study the subject of moral agency. For it is the
foundation on which every consistent scheme of divinjty must
rest. 4. The Arminian notion of liberty destroys vice and virtue,
accountability and future rewards. Because, if moral agents
are either sinful or holy, they are not in a state of perfect in
difference.. And if not in a state of perfect indifference, they
are not free, but governed by necessity, which Arminians say
destroys liberty. And if they are not free^they say they are
not moral agents, any more than clocks or other machines.
And if not moral agents, they are no more virtuous or vicious,
or accountable, or proper subjects of future rewards, than mere
machines are. Hence, according to the Arminian notions of
liberty,' there cannot be any such thing as vice or virtue, praise
or blame, accountability or rewards, in the universe. Thus
the Arminian notion of liberty, with one bold stroke, excludes all
vice and virtue, and rewards and punishments, from the moral
system. 5. If any persons contend for the Arminian notion of liberty,
yet admit the doctrines of total depravity, and regeneration by
divine power, they are perfectly inconsistent with themselves.
A person totally depraved is inclined to sin only. This in
clination is a strong, moral necessity, causing him to depart
from the living God. And as this necessity is inconsistent with
liberty, how is he free ? And if a person is renewed by divine
power, how can he help being holy, and inclined to virtue ? But
as he is thus inclined, he cannot be free. So that all, who ad
mit these doctrines, must either relinquish their notions of lib
erty, or be forever inconsistent with themselves.
Indeed there are but two schemes of divinity, the parts of
which can agree with each other. These are the Arminian and
Calvinistic. Hence all divines, and all other men, to be consis
tent, must be entire Arminians or Calvinists. And if they ad
mit some Arminian, and some Calvinistic doctrines into their
systems, they are always inconsistent. For these two schemes
are forever at variance ; there neither is or can be any agree
ment between them, because their first principles are contradic
tory to each other. We now see the reason why there are but
few divines, in any land, who are consistent. There are but
few, who do not admit into their systems some Arminian, & some
Calvinistic sentiments. So far as they do this, they are incon
sistent With themselves. It requires much study and close in-

208
vestigatiori, to understand clearly the foundation, the first prin
ciples of Arminianism, and Calvinism. And but few, on either
side, clearly Understand the first principles on which these two
schemes are founded. Hence the reason why tiiey are so apt
to be inconsistent. This shows the vast importance of having
the first principles, or the subjects of moral agency and liberty,
taught to theological students. With this study they ought to
begin, and lay the foundation right ; and then they may erect
consistent schemes thereon. And if what is here written shall
awake attention to this subject, one great end aimed at in this
Essay, will be obtained : that all may see the reason, why so
many contend they are not to blame, saying, who hath resisted
^his will ?

**********

ESSAY xxm.
On the decrees and prescience of God, and their con-1
sistency with each other.
Acts 2, 23. Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel, and foreknowledge of
God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain.
These words assert the crucifixion and death of Christ.
They contain three propositions, wl.ich respect this event. I.
That the death of Christ was determined- or decreed by God.
2. That it was foreknown by him. And — 3. That his enemies
acted freety in putting him to death. Each of these proposi
tions is true ; and, Pf course, they do not destroy, but are con
sistent with each, other. They teach, that divine decrees, fore
knowledge, and human liberty consistently harmonize. This
many deny, and say they destroy each other, and hence they
cannot all be true. And many grant they arP truths, which a-
gree ; but to show their consistency is beyond the powers ofthe
human mind. Others believe that their agreement and consis
tency may be seen and demonstrated. Such diversity of opin
ions prevails concerning this subject. There can be no harm
in attending to it, and the light and evidence which may be re-

209
fleeted upon it. This is my object rit this time.
I. Let us see what reason teaches concerning the decrees
and foreknowledge of Go'd.
It is certain that all created things had a beginning. Herice
there waS a time, when nothing existed; but that being who is
eternal, and acknowledged to be the uncreated, and infinite Je
hovah. As he was the only being in existence, before any
thing was created. He was the only beirig, who could create.
He must b ; the firsts efficient cause of all things. But can any
being act, Pr create, without determination ? If God was nei
ther determined to create, or to forbear, he was indifferent, wheth
er any thing should exist, or not, except himself. If God had
deterrriiried never to create any thing, then certainly nothing
would ever have existed. For he could riot exert his power tP
do what he was determined never to do. He would never el-
ert his power contrary to his will. Hence he must be determin
ed to create, previously to giving existence to any thing. This
is only saying, that determination must precede action; and
must precede the exertion of power.
Whatever definition may be given of power, this iriuch is cer
tain, it is an attribute of a moral agent, which is exercised to
accomplish his determinations, Herice it will not be exerted,
till there is a determination to exert it. And it will always be
exercised according to the determination of the agent; A man
may form in his mind a complete plan of a house. He may
have a clear view of all its parts, with all their arrangements
and connexions. Such an entire plan of a building may exist
in his mind. He may then determine to erect, or not to erect,
SUch a builditig. If he determines not to erect such a buildirig,
and never alters his mind, such a building will never be erected
by him. But if he determines, and does not alter, to erect such
a building, then his power will be exerted for such a purpose.
And his power will be exerted to prepare all the materials, to
brirtg therii to the spot, to arrange arid connect them together
just as he had determined, till the building is finished according
to the plan he had formed. And if he has power to do any'
thing he determines, and is certain his mind Will never change,
and knows there is no beirig able to prevent his Carrying all
his deterniinatiPns into exec'utibh ; theri, when he has formed the
plah of a btiildirig, and has deteririined to erect it according to
his pjan, he knows perfectly before hand, what kind of building
will finally be erected.— For as the whole depends on his deter*
a2

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mination, and he has determined what to do from step to Step,-
till the building is finished ; and knows what his own determi
nations are, which no being can frustrate ; he from that moment
knows what will be done, and can tell, before he does one thing,
what he can, and what he shall do. All this is true respecting
any plan, and every thing done by moraK agents, supposing
them to be able to accomplish their determinations, and that
they will never change their mind. These observations lead us
to several important and interesting conclusions.
1. That a wise agent, such as God is, wjll form a plan of
operation, before he acts, or dogs any thing. Indeed we can
not conceive it to be possible for a being to act, without a plan
previously formed. Because, without a plan, he could not
know what tp do. Could any being form such a creature as a
man, or create a world, or a vegetable, or a fly, or any thing
else, without any plan of it previously formed in his mind ? Ev
eryone sees it is impossible, and what a wise agent would nev
er attempt. This shows undeniably, that a plan of every thing
existed in the divine mind, previously to his creating any thing
whatever. Also, that when God does create or accomplish any
purpose, he acts according to the plan he had previously form
ed. In this sense, God might have a knowledge of a thousand
different plans, and know which among the whole is the best to
attain the end he designs ultimately to reach. This knowledge
of plans is a knowledge of what might be, or of what is possible.
For he knows he is able to carry any plan, among ever so great
a number, into execution. But this is only knowing what
might be done, or is possible ; it-is not a knowledge of what
will be, only of what might be. This forming of plans, and hav
ing a perfect knowledge of them, which is necessary previous
to action, is only a knowledge of what is possible, but not a
knowledge of what will have existence.
2;.By what has been said we see, that a determination to act
must precede action. .If God has formed a plan of creating the
world, and of governing it when created ; still nothing will be
done, till he has determined to carry his plan into execution. A
man may form the plan of a house ; but he will not build, until
he comes to a determination to execute the plan he had formed.
And when any being has formed a plan, and has determined to
execute it in all its parts, then he knows what he shall do. And
if an agent has determined to carry such a part of a plan into
execution, at such a time, and knows no one can hinder his act-

211
ing as he has determined ; he could tell beforehand particular*
ly every thing he should do,* and every thing which would be
done. He could sit down and write a history beforehand of
what would be done frorii day to day, even to the smallest mi
nutiae, till his whole plan should be perfected. God formed a
plan of the creation, a plan of government, and had a perfect'
view existing in his mind of every part of his plan, from the
greatest part to the least, even the falling of a hair to the ground.
And forming a plan, we see, was necessary previous to action.
Then he determined to execute it, in all its parts, according as
it existed in his mind. And such determination we see is neces
sary, previous to action. Then the divine being could foretel
every thing which would be done, from the beginning of time
to the final conclusion of all things. Because he knew what his
plan was, and what his determinations were ; and that all things
depended upon him, and that no being could frustrate his de-
sighs. God is an eternal being, and all his determinatipns are eternal.
So that one thing is not before another, in the order of time.
But in the order of nature one thing is before another. Though
a sun and light may, and must exist at the same instant, yet we
must conceive of a sun as being previous to light ;v and a cause
as being previous to an effect, though an effect may exist instan
taneously with the cause. In forming clear and just concep
tions of the divine being, we must view one thing as being
previous to another in the order of nature.
Hence we must conceive concerning God, that he forms a
plan of every thing he means to do, in his own mind, previous
to his effecting any thing. This plan formed is a knowledge of,
what may be. Then he determines to carry the plan in all its parts.
into execution. This determination is also previous to action.
Then, as all things depend on his determination, he knows
what he shall do-; and can predict every event that will take
place, if he pleases, from the beginning to the end of time.
This is a knowledge of what will be.
Now a knowledge of what may be is previous to his deter
minations. Butthis is not foreknowledge. For foreknowledge
is a knowledge of what will be, whereas this is only a knowl
edge of what might be. But when he has determined what he
will do, then he knows before hand what will have existence.
This is foreknowledge. This is subsequent to his determinations^
and founded upon them.

212
It is like this. A man forms the pjap of a building in his ow$
mind, whjch he knows might be erected. But he does not know
that it ever will be built, because he has not as yet determined
to erect suck a house. Thp plan then he has formed, is only a
knowledge pf what might be done. When he has determined to
builcl a house, exactly according tp the plan he has formed,, and
as the erection of it depends solely pn him, he then knows what
will be done. And all this he knows before he does any thing.
Now a foreknowledge of a, house exists in his own mind. This
foreknowledge is ifburided on his determinations.
We now now see what reason teaches concerning the divine
being. 1- That divine determinations or dpcrees must precede action.
God neither did nor can do any thing, but what he has decreed
to do ; because no being can act without determination. Tins
establishes the doctrine o,f divine decrees, which is taught in the
bible. It proves that he did decree to make such a world, in
all its parts, a,s we see exists ; and to. govern the universe, ac
cording to his plSft ; anpl that np events pan or will take place,
but as he has decreed. As every thing depends on him., and a§
he cannot act without determination, nor otherwise than he has
decreed, so the existence of this world, and every event which
takes place, must be according to, and an effect of his, deterroin-
tipn. 2. We see that two kinds, of knowledge exist in, the divine
mind ; one is a knowledge of plaps,, or what might be, and is an
tecedent to bis determinations ; the other is a knowledge of
wiat will be, apd is foreknowledge.
3, That foreknowledge is different from a dejcree, apd found?-
ed, uppn it, and, subsequent to it. Heiupe if God had never de
creed any thing, he could, never haye foreknown, any thing.
This is a most obvious truth. For if any thing depends wholly,
On my determination, it is impossible for me to know wha,t "I
shall do, till I have determined what to do. When I have de
termined what to do, as all dep,end,s op me, then \ know what
I shsdl do, or what will be dope. Hence if any deny divine de
crees, they must, to be consistent, deny also the divine fore^
knpwledge. Thus much reason teaches, concerning the divine
character, and proves the decrees and foreknowledge of God,
as clearly taught in the text. Now let us see what the bible
teaches concerning the decrees, and prescience of God,
\. Both are expressly asserted ip tfee text, Also the bjbje-

213
says, he worketh all things according to the counsel of his
own will ; that he doeth according to his pleasure in heaven a-
bpve, and on the earth beneath ; that he is of one mind, and
none can turn him ; that the counsel ofthe Lord shall stand ; and
that all the counsels formed against him shall be frustrated, turn
ed into foplishness, and be carried headlong ; that all things
are his, and he hath a right to do according to his pleasure ;
and many other passages, too numerous to be mentioned. The
evident language of scripture is, that God has decreed all things ;
so that a sparrow is not sold, and a hair does not fall to the
ground, without his notice. And every one will admit this to
be the language of scripture, when they reflect, that it is impos
sible for God, or any agent, to act without a previous determi
nation ; or that the determination of an agent is the cause of
every thing done by him.
2. The predictions in the bible prove the decrees and pre
science of God. The present state of the Jews was predicted
by Moses ; that they should be scattered, and he a by-word, and
a proverb, among all nations. The ruin of Babylon and Tyre
wa,s predicted by Josiah and Jeremiah ; the coming, the birth,
the life, sufferings, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ,
were ail predicted hy the prophets, long before he made his
appearance on earth. No ope can deny, that the bible con
tains many important predictions ; and that the book of revela
tion contains predictions of all the, leading and important events
and revolutions, which are to take place from the days of John
to trio end of the world.
And it is granted by every one, that no being can look into
futurity and predict events, but Jehovah. The predictions
then, contained in the bible, are a standing proof of the divine
foreknowledge. But how does this prove his decrees ? Only
keep in view what hath already been said, and every one will
readily see, his foreknowledge, proves his decrees,. His fore
knowledge is founded Pn his decrees. If future events depend
ed solely on any of us, we could not tell what we should do, un
til we had determined what we would do. We must determine
then what we will do, before we can tell what will be done. If
then we infallibly foretold any event, this proves we had deter
mined, or decreed, that such an event should exist.
The existence and downfal of such a nation as the Jews, and
of such a city as Babylon, depended wholly on God. How
then could he know such a nation would rise and fall, and such

214
a city, if he had never determined such events ? His foretelling
their rise and fall, proves he had decreed it. Thus we see the
bible proves, what reason dictates, concerning the decrees and
prescience ofthe great Jehovah.
Now only go on this plan, that God never has decreed any
thing, deny this doctrine wholly, and then look at events which
have taken place, and see how the divine character must ap
pear. Angels did rebel, and there was war and confusion in
heaven. Men have rebelled. Shv disorder, and confusion
have prevailed in this world. Satan has reigned as the god of
this world, and done unspeakable mischief. The Son of God
has come into this world to destroy the works of the devil ; he
has Suffered reproach, shame and a cruel death on the cross.
His followers have been persecuted, tortured, and cruelly slain.
These, and many other such events, have taken place in God's
dominions. Was he determined they should take place ? No.
Was he determined they should not have existence ? No : say
those who deny divine decrees. What then ? He was perfect
ly indifferent concerning them. What character was that,
which was perfectly indifferent concerning such events in his
kingdom? Can any king sustain a more odious character ?
Opponents may say, he was determined against their taking
place ? Why then did he not prevent them ? Because he
could not, consistently with the liberty he had given to his crea
tures. But is that being wise, who makes creatures, and endues'
them with such liberty that he cannot govern them ; creatures
who will perpetrate the most horrid crimes, and destroy all the
order, peace, and happiness ofthe world he had created, yethe
cannot prevent it ? Would it not argue the greatest folly in a
man, to make such a clock as would destrriy the peace, govern
ment, and happiness of his family, aud he knew it would, and
yet knew he could not prevent it? Would he make such a clock?
And would God make such creatures, whp would do so much
unspeakable mischief, and he knew it, yet knew he could not
prevent it ? Thus, they who deny the decrees, either make God an
indifferent being concerning the most interesting events that ev
er existed, or make him so weak, or so unwise, that enemies
may destroy his kingdom, and it is not in his power to prevent
it. But,
II. Let us attend to human liberty^ the other proposition
contained in the text.
Every person knows by experience what liberty is. It is the

215
privilege of acting as we please, without restraint, or constraint,
This supposes that we have inclinatioris or desires, which .we
wish to gratify. If we had no feelings, objects would neither
please nor disgust us ; they would not affect us, any more than
they do stones. For without feeling, we should be insensible
as stones. But mankind have feelings ; they have appetites,
inclinations, and desires. Many objects are agreeable, and oth
ers are disgustful to us. , We wish to obtain and enjoy those
things, which are agreeable to us. It is our will or pleasure
to possess and enjoy them. And if there is nothing to prevent
or hinder our obtaining and enjoying the objects, which are a-;
greeable, we enjoy liberty ; we feel that we act freely. If a
person has a strong inclination to take a journey, to visit a
dear friend, it is his will or pleasure to take it. If nothing pre
vents his making such preparation as he wishes, and nothing
hinders his journeying as he wishes ; or if nothing hinders the
obtainment of his end, which is making the intended visit; he
acts according to his pleasure, and enjoys all the liberty he
wishes. But if he is by some power restrained from taking the
journey he wishes, or is constrained to go another way contrary
to his desires, in this case his liberty is infringed and destroyed ;
for he does not act according to his pleasure. In all that man
kind ever do, they always have some object or end, which they
wish tp attain. And to act as they please, and to act freely, is
to pursue and obtain their object or end, without any thing to
hinder or prevent. In such cases they act freely ; and they
cannot conceive of any greater liberty than they enjoy. For
no one can conceive of any greater liberty, than, to act free from
all restraint and constraint. Then men always act as thev
please, and follow their inclinations whithersoever they lead
them. Now do mankind wish to live in a condition, in which it is
very uncertain whether they shall enjoy liberty ? And to have
it very uncertain, whether, if they act,, they shall obtain the end
thpy seek ? No person would wish to. live in such a state.
Then there are twp things, which men desire. One is, to have
it made certain, that they shall always act freely, or enjoy lib
erty ; and the other is, to have it made certain, that when they
act, they shall always reach the end they seek. And if it is
made absolutely certain, that they shall always enjoy liberty,
and always succeed in reaching the ends they seek, the more
pleased they are. They wish to have it certain that they shalt

216
act freely, in the management of all their temporal and spiritu
al concerns ; and they wish to have it certain, that if they sow,
they shall reap. Mankind then are friendly to the idea of ne
cessity, when it agrees with their Wishes ; and never oppose it,
only when contrary to their wishes. Now all see what liberty
is ; it is to act as we please, or as our inclinations lead us to
act, free from all restrairit and constraint from any external a-
gent. Can you conceive of any greater liberty ? Are yPtt
not conscious that you enjoy this liberty ? Do you not daily
act as you please ? Do you not rise in the mornirig, and thro'
the day follow your inclinations and deSires ? Is there any ex
ternal agent, who restrains you from acting as ybu Wish ; or
who constrains you to act contrary to your wishes ? If not, you
are perfectly free.
III. Inquire whether divine decrees are inconsistent with hu
man liberty. Some say they are, and destroy it. Spme say,
they agree, but it is beyond the power of mortals to show their
consistency with each other. All I shall attempt is, to show
what the decrees of God are with respect to human liberty;
This perhaps will show clearly their consistency.
Previous to the creation of man, God formed the plan of such
a being in his own mind, as he intended to create. Then he
created him, according to the plan he had formed. Hence he
formed a plan of a human body, of all its parts, and connexions.
He also formed a plan of the soul, or imniortal part, he meant
to create. He formed a plan in his mindto agree with his own
image. The model formed was this ; that the soul should be
endued with certain faculties ; such as an understanding, to per*
ceive Pbjects, to reason, to judge, to remember, and to refleCti:
Also man was to have that faculty given him, which in scripture
is called the heart ; the philosophical name for it is taste. This
was a fac'ulty capable of pleasure arid pain, of lovirig, hating,
desiring, and of all the affections and passions we ever experi-
erice. He was to have given him a will, to enable him to
choose and refuse, and to carry the wishes of the heart into ex
ecution. According to the plan formed^ man was to be a free
agerit ; and always act as he pleased, Pr to follow and gratify
the inclinations and desire's of his heart, without any thing to
hinder or preverit. Such soul Would resemble God, and be iri
his likene'SS and image. This soul, when riiade, was to be unit
ed to the bbdy ; arid this union was to continue until death.
This is the plan formed. And we have shown that a plan of

217
operation must be formed, previous to determination ; because
determination respects the plan. For the determination is, to
accomplish the plan formed, in all its parts. And this determin
ation must precede action, or the exertion of power to execute
the plan. Now when God had formed a plan of a man in his
mind, as we do of a building, such a being as man would never
exist, if God did not determiue to give him existence ; as we
should never erect a house, till we determine to do it. God
did determine to make such a being as man, and to create him
exactly according to the plan he had formed in his mind. Man
is created according to the plan-formed, and according to the
determination, or decree of God. And we find it is a fact, that
all men have bodies, and souls, which are alike. They all have
an understanding, a heart to feel, and a will to choose. They
do in fact enjoy liberty. Here observe, every part of a man is
the effect of the decrees of God. God said, that is, decreed, let
there be light, and light was ; the existence ofthe light was the
effect his decree produced. God said, or decreed, let a man
exist, with the faculties of understanding, heart, and Will, and
with the privilege of always acting freely, or as he pleases.
Such a man exists. And every part of his existence, all his
qualities, properties, and powers, and his liberty are the effects
ofthe decrees of God. And if God had not decreed to make
such a being as man, such a being would have never existed.
Now all you have to do is, to inquire whether the decrees of
God destroy the liberty of man. So far from it, they are the
cause of his existing, and acting as a free, moral agent. Did
God's decreeing the existence of light, destroy, impede, or hin
der its existence ? Did his decreeing to make a man, who
should always act as he pleased, or freely, destroy the idea of
liberty ? Why does man exist ? Because God decreed it.
Why does he reason, feel, will and act? Because God decreed
he should. Why does he follow his inclinations, and act as he
pleases, and free from restraint and constraint ? Because God
decreed he should always thus act. Then the decrees of
God, so far from infringing, or destroying the liberty of
moral agents, are the cause of all the liberty enjoyed.
The perfect liberty of man is the effect of his decree.
And it is as certain that man will always act freely, as it
is that the decrees of God will never alter. Take away this
decree, and man, together with his liberty, would immediately

218
cease to exist. The decrees of God are the foundation and
cause ofthe existence of moral agents, and of perfect freedom,
and of the continuance of their existence and liberty. Now
every one may judge, whether decrees are inconsistent with
human liberty. And it seems all must see, that so far from in
fringing liberty, the decrees of God are the foundation, on which
the liberty of moral agents wholly rests for its support.
Remarks. 1. Did not Joseph's brethren act freely in selling
him ? Did they not act as they pleased ; did they not follow
their own inclinations ? At one time it was their aim to kill
him ? After that it was more their pleasure to sell him ; and
this they did. Why did they act thus freely ? Because God
decreed they should act freely in all they did. While acting
thus freely, they did what God had decreed, and were fulfilling
his decrees. But did they mean this ? No, they meant to
gratify their revenge, &. did it ; & God meant by whatthey did,
to promote the glorious ends, which were accomplished by Jo
seph's living in Egypt. Did net the Jews act freely in crucify
ing Christ? Why did they? Because God decreed they
shouldfollow their inclinations. And they gratified theirhatred-
and revenge, in putting him to death ; & in doing it they fulfil
led the decrees of God. It was not their object to fulfil his de
crees, or to do his will ; but to please their own hearts. But
God's object was to promote his own glory in the salvation of
men. Here we see men may act freely, and in so doing perform
what God has decreed ; and in the same events men and God-
have totally different ends ; and men may be wicked, and God
righteous. In this manner all men act. They always act freely ; yet
are always doing what God has decreed. What men aim at is,
to do their will, to gratify and please their own lusts, , While
they thus live, they do the will of God, contrary to their inten
tion. Herice men act just as though nothing wasdecreed. Be
cause they act just as they would, if nothing ever bad been de
creed. Hence it is easy to see how men may do their own will,
and be very wicked, and yet without meaning it, do the will
of God. A person's inclination may lead him to do something
you wish to. have done. He does it to please himself, not you ;
yet he has done the very thing you wished. In this case you
easily see he is as deserving of blame, as he would have been,
if the thing he did had been something contrary to your wishes ;
because his end is the same in both cases. Men never act with

219
a view to fulfil the decrees of God ; they are never influenced
by his decrees, neither can be ; because they never know be
fore hand what they are. Yet while they are doing their own
will freely, without meaning it, they are fulfilling the decrees.
And their wickedness, and blameworthiness are the same they
would be, if no decree had ever existed.
2. Sinners travel the road freely, which leads to hell, and
saints walk the path freely, which' leads to heaven. The very
life the wicked live, is the road to death. Why do they live
this life ? Because it is their pleasure, agreeable to their incli
nations. And they complain, when they are so restrained that
they cannot gratify their feelings. As you prefer this road,
how can you justly complain, if you land in hell ? Has a man
any reason to complain, when he reaps the same seed he freely
sowed ? Eternal death is the wages, the fruit of sin. While
you -sow the seeds of corruption freely, have you any ground
to complain, that you reap corruption and death ? Saints also
act freely. It is their pleasure to serve God ; their inclinations
lead them to it. And they never serve God any further, than
their hearts prompt them to do it. All who come to Christ,
come freely. For they never do come, till their inclination
leads them to him. Hence all men act freely, and all act as
their inclination leads them ; and all do their pleasure, as far
as their power extends.
3. Men never find fault with the divine decrees, only when
they cross their feelings. God has decreed that men shall al
ways act as they please. This decree they approve. He has
decreed that the truly virtuous and benevolent shall be forever
blessed. This they like. He has decreed that the husband
man shall reap what he sows, that all seeds shall produce their
own kind ; that seed time and harvest, summer and winter shall
succeed each other. Such decrees they approve, and a thous
and others, which accord with their own feelings. God has al
so decreed, that the wicked shall lie down in hell. This they
dislike ; for they wish to live a wicked life, and yet be saved.
They wish to serve satan while they live, and at death be admit
ted into heaven. And because God has decreed they shall,
after death, live and suffer with the master they served through
life, they are provoked. They do not find fault with this de
cree, because it is unreasonable ; but merely because it is con
trary to their wishes.
But it is the nature of fallen man, to find fault with every

220
thing which is opposed to his wishes and feelings. Men are of
ten angry with themselves, because they cannot gratify all their
desires. One loves money, and loves a life of intemperance ;
loves honor, and hates poverty and disgrace. His feelings
are so opposite to each other, that he cannot gratify them all.
His love for spirits is his strongest inclination ; and he freely
indulges it, till poverty like an armed man comes upon him, and
he is covered with shame and disgrace, and his family is ruin
ed. Then he murmurs, frets, and finds fault with himself for
his folly, and with every one around him. Go where he will,
it appears to him every one dislikes him ;' this he cannot endure.
Ifhe enters the sanctuary, and hears the word preached, it seems
to him that all he hears is aimed at him ; because he is in such
a state, that almost every truth is against him. Now he leaves
the house of God, provoked, and angry with his Maker. How
many besides drunkards often by their own misconduct plunge
themselves into such a state, tljat they cannot please themselves,
or gain a reputation with the virtuous and pious. In this state
they are peevish, turbulent, and do nothing but make themselves
and others around them unhappy.
What would men have, if they could ? They would have
power to gratify all the inclinations of their hearts ; and they
would do all this with impunity, without ever being called to an
account, or punished for any of their deeds. In order, to this they
must be omnipotent, and exalted above God himself, so as to be
independent of him and all other beings. In this they never
will.be indulged. Hence they never will, or can be gratified,
while they remain enemies to God.
4. What is meant, when persons say, they cannot help act
ing as they do, because every thing is decreed, and that they
cannot counteract the decrees of God ? The thing meant is,
they cannot help acting as they please ; for this is what is de
creed. And it is true that persons cannot act contrary to their
pleasure. Are they any the less worthy of blame for this? This
is the very reason why they are blameable when they do wrong,
because they have acted as they pleased. It was their pleas
ure to do wfrong, and they do it. And who can shew a worse
spirit than a person does when he says, in murdering a man, I
did my pleasure. So all sinners act, and in all their wickedness
they only do their pleasure ? It is their pleasure to act wicked
ly ; and they cannot help it while they remain wicked, for they
must act according to their pleasure. That is the vilest heart,

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whose pleasure itis to be always living in rebellion against God,
rejecting his Son, and refusing offered mercy.
5. To be happy, men must submit to the will of God.
When their hearts are united to the happiness and glory of
God's kingdom, then it will be their desire that all things should
promote these ends, and terminate in the highest felicity of God's
friends. When they learn from the word of God, that no events
shall take place ultimately to injure his cause ; and that every
event necessary to advance it shall take place ; and are assur
ed that all this is made certain by the unalterable decrees of
God, then they feel safe and happy. The accomplishment of
his decrees is doing his will, which is the highest glory of his
kingdom. As his decrees assure them ofthe accomplishment of
all their desires, they are the foundation of their peace, safety
and joy. Whatever may take place, thej' rejoice that God
reigns. They submit to his will. Take away his decrees, their
foundation of joy and safety is removed. Hence no subject is
more pleasing to the christian, than the divine decrees. And
no subject is more disgustful to the wicked. Can any charac
ters then be more opposite, than those who love, and those who
hate the decrees ? And if those who love them are saints, how
can those be saints who hate them ? This is a test, by which
to try and know the hearts of men.

:&&%*****,"*

ESSAY XXXV.
Containing arguments from scripture, that the sen
timents advanced in the preceding essays are true.
Here^it is necessary for the reader to recal to mind the senti
ments which have been advanced, and which I propose to sub
stantiate by scripture. Otherwise he will not see the relation
of arguments to the points to be established, nor feel their force.
Thejleading sentiments advanced in the essays written are these;
that the taste, or heart, is a faculty of the mind, separate and
distinct from the understanding and will : that it is a moral

222
faculty, containing all the primary principles of action in moral
agents ; and is the' seat, or fountain of all vice and virtue. So
that when we trace back all the actions ever performed by men,
with a view to ascertain their original and primary source from
which they all proceed, we shall find, that according to scrip
ture, the heart is this fountain. If this be a truth taught in the
bible, then the sentiments advanced in these essays are true,
bible sentiments ; otherwise they are not. For the whole sys
tem these essays contain is founded on this principle, that the
heart or taste is a distinct faculty.
All the operations of the human mind, of which we are con
scious, or of which we see indications in others, are included in
three general classes. First, perceptions. And the more any
person examines the subject, the more he will be convinced, I
am confident, that all the operations of what are called reason,
memory, judgment, conscience, imagination, or simple appre
hension, are nothing more or less than perceptions of objeets,
differing from each other in the manner which has been describ
ed ; which difference is the reason of dividing them into several
specific classes.
Secondly, affections form another general class of operations.
An affection or passion is a compound of either painful or agree
able sensations, with desires to avoid the painful, or obtain the
agreeable object. These have the same generic, or general na
ture.. The more they are examined, the more evident this will
appear. These affections have a specific difference, and ought
accordingly to be divided into specific classes as has been at
tempted. Thirdly, volitions constitute another general class of opera
tions. A volition is an exertion made by an agent, with a view
to produce external effects^ for the purpose of gratifying the af
fections or desires, or doing our pleasure. These have the
same general nature, without ,any specific difference ; and are
not divisible into specific classes.
The first class are the operations of the understanding ; the
second class, operations ofthe heart or taste ; , the third class,
operations ofthe will. These three classes contain all the op
erations of the mind of man. We experience no other, we see
no other ; of course we never hear any person say or write
any thing concerning any other operations. And I believe ev
ery person, who has candidly read the essays on the operations
ofthe mind, must be convinced, that there is as real a generic

223
difference between the affections and volitions, as there is be
tween either of them and the operations of the understanding.
Hence, for the same reason that all correct writers have consid
ered the mind as having two distinct faculties termed the under
standing and the will, they must admit a third called the heart
or the taste. Perceptions and volitions are so different, it is
agreed, that they cannot be operations ofthe same faculty. And
the sensations and desires, or the affections and passions, are a
class of operations so different from perceptions, they cannot be
long to the understanding ; and they are so different from voli
tions, that they cannot belong to the will ; of course, they must
be the operations of another faculty, which is properly called
the heart.
Now if the bible teaches that all moral good and evil proceed
from the heart ; that the affections are operations antecedent to
volitions, and contain all vice and virtue ; then it proves that
the heart ought to be considered a distinct faculty, of which
the affections are. its operations. If the bible establishes this
sentiment, it proves the system explained in these essays to b,e
according to the mind of God. This is the point to be proved,
to which I shall now attend.
I will begin with our Saviour's answer to the question ofthe
scribe. He answered, thou shalt love the Lord thy God with
all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself. Here Christ makes
a plain distinction between the heart, and love ; the former is a
faculty, and the latter an operation of it. Here he brings into
view the person, the agent, thou ; and the faculty, which is to
be exercised to its utmost strength, the heart ; and the exercise,
or operation of it, called love. Thus viewed, the language is
correct, and makes good sense. If a person was commanded to
reason with all his understanding, the ideas we should receive
Would be these ; the person as an agent. is to reason, not with
the heart, but understanding ; this is to be exercispd to its ut
most strength, and reasoning is its operation. Such modes of
expression make good sense, and agree with our common un
derstanding. But to construe the passage to agree with the
opinions of some, would be nonsense, and vain tautolog}'.
They say the heart and love are the same thing ; love is the
heart ; we know of nothing antecedent to love. To construe
the passage to agree with this sentiment, we must read it thus,
thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy love. If love is
the heart, this is its sense, and proper reading. But who can

224
agree to this sense, if free from prej udice ? Here then our Lord
plainly distinguishes between the heart as a faculty, and its oper
ations. On this ground and no other, the words are intelligi
ble. Again ; Math. 7. 15 — 21, Christ teaches that aS we
know trees by their fruit, so we are' to know men by their fruit.
This passage exhibits the same sentiment with the former.
What do we learn from the fruit a tree brings forth ? We
learn its nature, whether it be good or corrupt. It is an opin
ion universally prevalent, that every being has a nature peculiar
to 'itself ; and its fruit will be good or bad, according to its na
ture. Hence by its fruit we learn its nature. It is on this
ground our Lord uses the similitude in this passage. If men
have not a nature, different from their fruit, by their fruit we
learn nothing. To say men have no nature distinct from and
antecedent to their fruit, is destroying the force of our Savior's
reasoning in this passage entirely.
Here then we must inquire, what that fruit is by which men
are to be known. He is speaking of false teachers, and Says
they come to men in sheep's clothing, but inwardly are raven
ing wolves. ¦ By their fruits ye shall know them. But their
external actions, words, and conduct are good. These consti
tute the sheepskin, with which they externally clothe and adorn
themselves. They outwardly manifest great love, humility, and
zeal in the cause of Christ. To judge them by this fruit, we
should say they are what they appear to be, real sheep, friends
of Christ. But when we look farther, we find that their inward
feelings are against the truth. They show a hatred of truth,
a proud, self-conceited spirit, a self-righteous temper. They
manifest a want of humility,, of love to Christ, and to the self-
denying doctrines of the cross. These internal affections seen
in them are the fruit, by which we learri their nature, and de
tect their hypocrisy ; and by it are convinced they have the
nature of a wolf, though they have on externally sheep's cloth
ing. It is by the affections ofthe heart we learn what men are.
If we wish to know whether a person is renewed or not, we la
bor to learn what his inward feelings or affections are. If we
discover love to God, repentance for sin, a humble, and teach
able spirit, faith in Christ, lpve to the truth, resignation to the
will of God ; if we see evidence of these inward affections, we
infer from them that he has a new heart. Indeed, such internal
affections are the fruits by which we know men. These are the
fruits of the Spirit, as they are enumerated by the Apostle in

225
Gal. U. 22, 23, and iri many other passages. If we do riot dis
cover such affections in a person, we have no evidence that he
is born again ; though outwardly his life may be regular and
inoffensive, and though he may manifest much joy, fervency,
and zeal in the cause of Christ. Itis by such fruit false teach
ers are detected. It is by our internal feelings or affections,
we judge ourselves as well as others. And these are the fruits
of the Spirit, and the fruits by which our Lord would have us
judge of men in the passage under consideration.
But what are we to learn by this fruit ? We learn the moral
nature or character of men. . Every being has a nature. Of
this we have no intuitive view, we cannot see it as God does.
We learn it by their fruit. From the fruit which we see, we
infer what the nature of any being is. Where we see rational
operations and exercises, we infer from them that the person
has a rational faculty, called the understanding. From volun
tary operations or exertions, we infer the man' has a will, a
willing faculty. And from those operatioris which we call af
fections, desires, or passions, we infer that men have a heart, the
faculty called by this name. And from these fruits, when
we see them, we infer what the nature, the temper of the heart
is, whether it be good or bad. In this way we tearri there is a
great difference between the hearts of different persons, and be
tween the heart of man at one time, and the heart he has at an
other time*
But on supppsition man has not such a faculty as we call the
heart, which is antecedent to its operations, and distinct from
them, then from the affections or fruits we see in man nothing
can be inferred, and the whole force of our Savior's reasoning
is destroyed. But in the ground I have taken, his,reasoning
is full to the point, and conclusive.
A Jl men believe trees have a nature* something in their con
stitution which prepares them to bear different kinds of fruit.
What the nature of the tree is, when they approach it, they
know not. Nature is something beyond the direct view of men ;
and something which we cannot ascertain, only by its fruit.
And if we admit this principle as just, that every tree will bear
fruit according to its nature, then from its fruit we safely infer
its nature. It was on this principle Christ at all times reasoned),
when the nature of any thing was to be learned. HenceHf men
have no such thing a"s a nature, no faculties distinct from, and
antecedent to their operations, from their fruits nothing is to be
4

226
inferred, and the reasoning of our Lord has no force. But if
there are faculties belongirig to the mind, which are antecedent
to their operations, and which are known to men only by their
operations or fruits ; then our Lord's reasoning is conclusive.
Hence, when we see what kind of affections men have, whether
they are holy or sinful, the fruits of the Spirit or of the flesh,.
then we know what the heart of man is. From their fruit we
infer two things — 1 . That they have the faculty called the heart,
which is antecedent to all affections, the foundation or fountain
from which they rise. 2. We infer the moral nature of this fac
ulty. In some we find it is altogether corrupt. In others we
learn it is holy in part, though not perfect as yet. Such are the
sentiments taught by Christ in this passage. • And when the
temper ofthe heart is known, then we know what a person's mor
al character is, whether good or bad. For not his fruit, but
his nature, constitutes his moral character. And if we could
have an intuitive view of the heart as God has, we should know
what every persons nature or moral character is, and what
fruit he would bring forth, without having first seen the fruit.
We should know certainly, by an intuitive view, what their na
ture is ; but to judge by their fruit, we may form an erroneous
opinion. This passage, then, proves the sentiments it is brought
to establish, conclusively. There is no fair way to evade the
force of the argument.
Another passage of the same import isin Math. 15. 19. For
oat of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries,
fornication, thefts, falsewitness, blasphemies. The sins,, here
mentioned are internal, such as sinful desires, affections, and
passions. If it be admitted, that those external actions called
by those names are included, yet the internal desires of the
heart are also intended by our Savior. And he undoubtedly
had his eye expecially fixed on such evil desires within. For
Christ has taught that the desires ofthe heart are sinful. If*
man look on a woman, to lust after her, he hath committed aj
dultery with her already in his heart. Lust is a desire. This
desire to commit the unlawful act, is adultery ; and this is a
sin of the heart. The heart here is the fountain, fron* which
such evil desires proceed. Also John saith, he that hateth his
brother is a murderer. Hence hatred is expressly called mur
der. And the moral law extends to the heart, and condemns all
sinful desires or affections. Indeed, when desires exist to inurr
der, to steal, to commit adultery, or perpetrate any crime, the

227
person is then in the sight of God guilty of these crimes. This
the word and law of God clearly teach.
Such evil desires, our Lord says, proceed from the heart. He
makes here a clear distinction between the heart and its opera
tions, or desires. Such desires defile the man. He represents
the heart here as a fountain, and desires as the streams proceed
ing from it. And by these streams, or desires, every person
may know what his heart is, whether holy or sinful. This pas
sage, with the former which has been explained, expressly leads
us to view the heart as existing antecedent to its desires or op
erations, and as constituting the moral character of man.
Another text spoken by Christ, ofthe same import, is in Luke
6. 45. A good man out of the good treasure of the heart,
bringeth forth that which 4s- good ; and an evil man out of the
evil treasure of the heart, bringeth forth that which is evil. This
passage is in connexion with what Christ said concerning trees,
that they are known by their fruit, and that men are known by
their fruit. Hence the good treasure ofthe heart, or the heart
itself, which is the same thing, is the nature which is known by
the good or evil things which proceed from it.
Every person has what is here called a good, or an evil treas
ure ; and from this all good or evil, both internal arid external,
proceed. If we see in false teachers or any other persons, such
evil desires or affections prevailing, as hatred of God, envy, re
venge, pride, anger, selfconceit, and the like, we should pro
nounce them wicked men, and say their hearts are full of evil.
Mankind do not consider such affections as constituting the
primary, and real character of man ; but as evidences of his real
character. That every man has a heart, either sinful or holy,
which is antecedent to its operations ; and that every person's
moral character is what this heart is, is evident from the manner
in which persons uniformly express themselves, in conversation
and writing in relation to this subject. Their manner is to say
that the heart hates, loves, and so on. They never say, that
hatred hates, and love loves ; which they ought to' do, in case
love and hatred, or the affections, constitute all that is ever
meant by the heart. To say the heart loves, when in fact love
is the heart, is ever calculated to convey erroneous ideas. Hence
if there is no heart intecedent to affections, a radical change
ought to take place in the use of language. It is needless to
multiply passages, which are ofthe same import with these al
ready explained. Every one may now easily see that every

228
passage in the bible, where a distinction is made between the
heart and its operations, the heart and the affections and fruits
which proceed from it, are direct proofs of the sentiment they
are adduced to establish. Such passages are very numerous,
and need not here be quoted.
One method is taken to evade the force of such passages. Wri
ters make a distinction between immanent and imperate acts of
the will, They then say, by the heart with which we love, from
which good and evil proceed, and the good treasure of which
Christ speaks, are meant immanent acts ; k, the imperate acts are
the fruits which proceed from them. In their view immanent acts
constitue the heart, &s imperate acts are the things which proceed
from it. Hence they say, there is nothing, no faculty, no heart,
antecedent to immanent affections; and these and imperate acts
are both of them exercises of the will; or infect, their immanent
acts constitute the will, and imperate acts are the operations of it.
In answer to this objection, several things may be observed.
1. Their immanent acts are what are called the affections and-
passions. These are called immanent, because they do not im
mediately produce any external actions. Love may exist, yet
not appear outwardly in any actions. Still it remains there,
and never will become visible, till imperate acts are exerted.
According to this distinction and this scheme, immanent acts
give rise to imperate- acts ; and imperate acts produce external
and visible fruit. Imperate acts proceed from the immanent,
as streams from the fountain ; and from the imperate acts pro
ceed external actions ana1 fruits. This is their-scheme, if I can
understand it. Hence when it is' is said that out of the heart
proceed evil. thoughts, and froin the good treasure men bring
forth good things, they say immanent affections are the heart,
and imperate acts and external fruits proceed from them. Oil
this sentiment it is proper to remark.
1 . That all virtue and vice must consist in these immanent af-
fectipns. If love to God may exist in any degree antecedent to
any imperate acts, it may exist in a perfect measure. A person
may be said to love God with the whole heart, and in this re
spect be as perfect as any saint in heaven. This love may exist
and remain in his heart an hour, without any other acts pro
ceeding from it ; and if an hour, it may remain there a month,
or a year, without producing any imperate or external actions.
This is certainly possible. In this case the person may be, and
\si all this time, aperfect character, perfectly holy and beneve-i

229
lent in the sight of God. Hence his virtue primarily and es
sentially consists in this immanent affection. And as this may,
so other immanent holy affections may exist, in perfection for
days, months, and years, without giving rise to any imperate
acts, or producing any external fruit. This also is possible.
In like manner, immanent sinful affections may exist in their
full strength for days and months, without producing any im
perate acts or external fruits. This is also certainly possible.
According to this scheme a person may be a perfectly holy, or
a perfectly sinful character, for days and months, without hav
ing one imperate act, or performing one external action. This
shows to a demonstration, that on this scheme immanent affec
tions constitute the moral character of every person. Those
affections comprise all virtue, or vice, which ever exist in men.
This I think is now evident ; and I wish it to be carefully no
ticed and kept in view.
2. From the preceding demonstration it follows, that imper
ate acts are no more of a moral nature than external actions,
are not considered as criminal, and constituting any part of mur
der. These imperate acts, or voluntary exertions, which im
mediately produced these effects, are not murder, nor do they
constitute any part of it. They are only the fruit of a murder
ous heart. The person's hand, which holds the dagger, and
thrusts it, is not an active principle, nor the primary cause in
the agent of this murder. This hand acted, as it was moved by
the agent. This is the reason why, the hand is not blamed.
And those imperate acts which produced those effects, are not
a primary principle of action in this case. They are such as
the heart, or immanent act, produced ; they obeyed the com
mand of the heart, just as the hand obeyed these imperate acts.
And for the same reason the hand is not worthy of blame, these
imperate acts are not worthy of it. Again, murder had a com
plete and full existence, previous to those imperate and exter
nal acts. Hatred, or what is-called malice prepense, constitutes
the agent a murderer ; and this hatred is an immanent .affect,
tion, and the primary principle of action in the agent, w hich
gave rise to those imperate and external actions. Hence, there
is the same difference between immanent and imperate acts, as
there is between acts which are virtuous or vicious, and those
which are not ; or between virtuous or vicious actions, and ex
ternal, actions.
§. It follows, that imperate acts are not affections. The§!

230
are mere voluo^ary exertions, to produce some hodily motion
and some external action or .effect. The immanent acts are the
affections. Love and hatred, and every other affection, has
complete existence before imperate acts arise, or any exertions
are made to produce external effects. A voluntary exertion,
therefore, is not an affection, nor an affection continued, any
more than the motion of the hand is an affection continued.
And it seems to me that every person is conscious of a difference
between lpve when he feels it, and voluntary exertions. If a
person experiences a warm love for an absent person, and then
by a voluntary exertion puts his body in motion to go and visit
the beloved object, is he not conscious of a difference in those
operations ? Does he not perceive as real a difference, as he
experiences between an affection and the exertion of strength
tp raise or move a heavy body ? Imperate acts, or voluntary
exertions, are mental strength, exercised to obtain the object of
an affection, or to avoid it. This voluntary exertion is not a
sensation of pleasure or pain, nor a desire ; but both of these
together constitute an affection. Volition is a mere simple ex?
ertion ofthe mind, or rather of the will, to gratify an affection
in obtaining possession of its object. It does not, therefore, par
take ofthe nature of an affection.
Imperate acts are internal operations ofthe mind, as really as
immanent acts are. They ar# internal and invisible, until seen
in the external fruits they produce. Hence they are not called
imperate acts, to distinguish therii from those which are inter
nal. Why then are they thus termed ? Jt is, as I suppose, be
cause they command the existence of external actions; they reg
ulate and govern the external conduct of all men. But they
are inferior commanders. And whence do they receive their
orders ? From the immanent affections, as the abettors of this
distinction allege. Hence they are the only servants to their
master, who in fact governs the whole man.
These observations are sufficient to show, that there is a wide
moral difference between1 immanent and imperate acts. Im
manent acts comprise all vice and virtue, and are the primary
principle of action in moral agents. But imperate acts are
neither virtuous nor vicious ; are not of a moral nature in any
other sense, than external actions are ;- nor are they primary
principles of action. They are in fact only servants to the im
manent affections ; they are not affections, and nothing more
than simple exertions, whose end is to gratify the affections.

231
No operations ofthe human mind differ in their nature more
widely. Can any candid person then say, that they are opera
tions ofthe same faculty ; and differ from each other in no oth
er sense, than the first and all successive acts ofthe same series
differ from each other ? We might with as much reason say,
that our perceptions or rational operations, and affections, are
of the same nature, and differ in no other sense than the first
and successive acts of'the same series differ. They so widely
differ in their nature, that they must be the operations of differ
ent faculties, And as the advocates, of this scheme say, that
imperate acts are operations ofthe wM ; the immanent acts, or1
affections, must be the operations of some third faculty. They
cannot be the operations ofthe understanding, and for the same
reason they are not the operations of the will ; of course they
belong to some other faculty, and we say the heart is this fac
ulty. And if there must be a third faculty, to which the affec
tions belong, our opponents would not object against attribut
ing them to the heart.
Though they sometimes, admit the existence offaculties, yet
atothertimes they deny it. Ifwe meet them on this ground, they
must acknowledge the existence of three distinct classes of oper
ations, belonging to the mind. One class includes all our per
ceptions or rational operations. A second class includes all the
affections and passions. And a third class comprises all our
Volitions, or exertions to produce external actions. And we!
may reduce these classes to one, with as much ' reason, as to
reduce them to two. Therefore, when this distinction of our
opponents is fairly examined, it makes nothing in their favor,
nor in the least evades the force of the texts adduced to support
our system.
For now, to be consistent,; they must grant, that by heart in
these texts is meant that faculty called in these essays the heart.;
or if they deny the existence offaculties, they must grant, that
the second class of operations, called the affections, constitutes
the heart. Then this heart, which we call a faculty, and- which
on their scheme must be considered a distinct class of opera
tions, is the heart intended in scripture ; which includes all
moral operations, all vice and virtue, and frpm which as a foun
tain all good and evil fruit proceeds. And this is; the pointffor
which we contend ; and the sentiment they mean to undermine
by their distinction between immanent and imperate acts. But
their distinction fails them am examination, and- is devested of

232
all its force. Hence the scriptures adduced retain all the CVfe
dence contended for, to prove the sentiment for which they were,
adduced.

ESSAY XXV.
Objections against this system, stated, and answered.
Objection I . It is said this scheme represents vice and vir
tue, as consisting in principles which are inactive and dormant ;
which is contrary to all our ideas of vice and virtue ; and ac
cording to which we may as well suppose, that sin and holiness
may be as rationally predicated of inactive matter. No prin
ciple, say they objectors, can be holy or sinful, unless it is ac
tive. Activity is essential to their existence. And as there is
no actiori, or activity but in volitions, or such exercises ; vice
and. virtue cannot have existence in any thing else. This is one
objection in its full force, so far as my knowledge extends.
Answer. It is evident the person, who makes this ob
jection, for some reason or other, has not understood the sen-1
timentsto which he objects. I have labored to prove there are,,
and must be, different and distinct principles of action in thehu--
man heart. There is no other way to account for the effects it
produces, and to accord with facts, and the experience of all
mankind. But I have no where said, thattheseprinciples are in
active, and dormant. If I have, it is a great oversight. Again,,
the scheme advanced in these essays, is fully proved by the
scripture account of the christian warfare. According to the
word of God, saints have in their hearts what are termed the flesh
and spirit ; the law ofthe members, and the law ofthe mind ;
the old and 'new man ; so that when they would do good evil is
present with them. *
These opposite principles abide and remain in them. Tliey
do not succeed each other, as volitions do, but are permanent.
They arein the same man, at the same time. According to the
word, they, are very active, operative principles ; and the affec-

233
tions proceeding from them are as different from each other,
as sin and holiness. Also they oppose each other at the same
time. The flesh lusteth against (he spirit ; and the spirit lust-
eth against the flesh. The law in the members wars against
the law of the mind ; and the law of the mind wars against the
- law in the members. From one of these fountains proceed
sweet, and from the other bitter waters ; and the old and the
new man are constantly at variance. In the opposition of these
two active principles to each other, consists the christian warfare ;
that inward war, which all real saints experience. This is the
scripture account of this warfare ; and it is perfectly similar to
the description of the heart givpn in these essays. It has been
shown that the heart of man is composed of several distinct ap
petites, from which proceed different and opposing affections,
both in saints and sinners ; so that sinners experience a warfare
at times, as well as saints, thapgh of a different moral complex
ion. For the warfare of the sinner is between one sinful and
another sinful affection, which arise from distinct appetites, or
inclinations. But the war of the christian is in the opposition
of holy, and sinful affections. And this, it is believed, is the
only scriptural and rational description, which can be given of
the christian warfare. And as this is agreeable to these essays, the
word of God, by giving the same view ofthe subject, fully es
tablishes the ieading sentiments advanced in them.
If we take the ground of some, that all vice and virtue con
sist in voluntary exercises ; and that two of these do not exist
in the mind at the same time, but are constantly succeeding
each other ; a warfare seems to be impossible. For a war ne
cessarily supposes two parties, opposed, and contending, at the
same time. Though holy and sinful volitions are different and
opposite in their nature ; yet they cannot in that case contend
or fight with each other, because they are never on the ground,
or in die mind, at the same time. How can- two armies fight,
if not opposed to each other in the field at the same time ? If
they come into the field in succession, so that one has left the
ground before the other Occupies it, there cannot be any actual
fighting between them. Also, on theschemethat men have but
one volition at a time, and that all vice and virtue consist in vo
litions, saints must be perfectly holy, or perfectly sinful, through
every moment of their existence in this world. For the same
simple volition cannot be partly holy, and partly sinful ; and
this is granted by them. Hence, when they have holy volitiens
5'

234
they are perfectly holy, and when they have sinful volitions,
they are perfectly sinful. : Hence they fall from grace, and are
renewed agairi,perhapsathousandtimesevery day. Such ideas
are too absurd to be admitted. Yet they necessarily follow
from the sentiment now opposed. If it be admitted, to avoid
such absurdities, that the heart is a faculty, which exists antece
dent to any of its operations, and is the seat of all vice and vir
tue ; yet if it is a simple faculty, how is it possible to account
for the christian warfare ? It is very inconsistent to suppose
• that a simple faculty, or the same simple principle of action,
should contain in itself two different and opposite moral natures.
Yet it must, in order to account for its spn ding forth both sweet
water and bitter, at the same time, or to account for the existence of
sinful and holy affections at the same time. Of course, on this
ground a Warfare cannot exist. This simple faculty must be
perfectly holy, or sinful. And if samts have both sinful and ho
ly exercises, this faculty must be changed in its nature from ho
liness to sinfulness, aud then back again, as often as they have
sinful and holy affections. This is as absurd, as to suppose sin
ful and holy volitions succeed each other, and of course that
persons may be perfectly holy and perfectly sinful many times,
in a day. And there does not appear to be any way to avoid,
these absurdities, and tp account for the christian warfare of
which the scriptures inform us, except on the ground taken
in these essays.
Hence the sentiments advanced concerning the heart or taste,
as a compound faculty, containing different, active principles,
which may and often do oppose each other, are rational and
scriptural. It agrees with theexperience of Paul, arid all chris
tians in every age, who have ever found one law in them war
ring against another, the, flesh and spirit contending, so that
when they would do good evil was present to oppose them.
For it has been my design to show, that they are in their na
ture the most active, principles in existence ; and the primary
cause in moral agents of all the effects ever produced in the uni
verse. — Hence I see no way but one, by which any persons
could have received such ideas, as are contained in the objec
tion. These principles, have been considered as existing in the
order ofnature, or of time,: antecedent to their operations. So
from this, the Objector might say, if they exist prior, to any op
erations one second, they might a year, and during that time re
main inactive and dormant. But does this prove they are in-

235
active in their nature ? It is thought not. The objector, it is
supposed, will grant there are such things as causes in existence,
and causes which are active in their: nature, and which exist in
some sense antecedent to the effects which they produce. Will
it follow from this, that all causes are in their nature inactive,
and dormant, and of course that there are no active causes exist
ing in the universe ? He may as well draw this inference, as
the former. Suppose the objector should say, that active causes
are always operating. Grant it. Does this prove they did
not exist in some sense, previous to the eflect they produce ? If
it be said, they exist previous to their effects in the order of na
ture, but not of time : and may not active principles, which
are in reality causes, exist in the order of nature previous to
their operations ? This he must grant, or boldly say, the op
erations ofthe human mind have no cause, but are accidental.
For if these causes do not exist in the human mind, they must
exist some where. If it be said that God is the immediate cause
of all mental exercises ; still this cause existed previous to the
operations of the mind, or the operations it produces.
Hence the existence of effects, and all operations ofthe hu
man mind, prove the existence of active causes .and principles;
and4hat these exist previous to the effects and operations, which
they produce. If this be not true,- then effects and operations
have no cause. But this is the principal thing, which I labored
to prove; that active principles do exist in the mind, antecedent
to the operations .which proceed from them ; antecedent in the
order of nature, or of time, or both. And now is the objector
prepared to say, that active causes or principles are always op
erating from the instant they exist, and never cease to- operate
for one second ? He may assert this ; but can he prove it ?
Perhaps he would find he has a task to perform, greater than he
supposed, or will be able to accomplish. It is the nature of wa
ter to run to the centre. But is it always rnnning ? It is the
nature of lightning to deprive man Pf life. But is it always
lightning ? Is this fluid always in operation ? It has been
proved, and the objector must grant, or deny the existence
of any causes, that active principles do exist previous to their
operations. They do produce love, hatred, anger, and a great
variety of affections and passions. Is the same person always
hating, alwaj-s loving, always angry ? If not, where is the
principle, which produced anger, but is not now producing it ?
Is it always operating, or producing its proper effect ? If so,

236
why is not the same person always angry ? And the saint, wh»
has an active principle in him, operating in love to God ; is he
always loving God, and to the same degree ? The objector is
a person who is apt to say, that man cannot have but one exer
cise at a time ; also that he has some sinful exercises; of course,
he is not always loving God. Hence, the principle which pro
duces love is not always in operation, producing the same affec
tion. If the objector says, when it is not operating in love, it is
operating in hatred, aiidin this sense isalways operating : but
can the same principle produce both love and hatred ? This
the scriptures expressly deny. Hence the principle, which op
erates in love to God, is not operating in the same person, while
hatred or some other affection is there. Perhaps it is not easy,
or possible, to prove that active causes are always in operation.
To say a cause is active in its nature, does not prove this, nor
necessarily imply it. If not, then causes or principles may be
active in their nature, yet not always be in operation. And to
say they are so, a person would involve himself in difficulties,
from which he could never extricate himself. By an active
cause, active in its nature, no more 1 believe is generally meant
than this, that it produces an effect by its own energy ; or, that
it is the primary and only cause, in a person, of a given effect.
Love, and all the affections of men,- proceed from some prima
ry principle implanted in them. We do not mean by it, that
the cause or principle of action is, or is not, always in operation.
But when an effect exists, we search for the cause ; when we
have traced it to a primary principle in man, so that we find
in him nothing antecedent as a cause, we consider this the pro
per, primary, and real cause in him ofthe effect. And we call
it active, because we cannot conceive it possible for any thing to
be the real, only cause of an effect, unless it is in its nature ener
getic, active, capable of operating. This we call an active
cause. Some of them may be always operating, as we may
suppose the benevolence of Gpd has been ; and some of them
may not be always in operation. For this idea is not necessa
rily implied in causes or principles, which we say are operative
or active in their nature. However, by primary active causes
in man, I do not msan causes which operate independently of
God, any more than other secondary causes do.
The appetites or principles of action, which constitute the
heart, are not dormant, and inactive. Some of them, at certain
times, may not be iri operation. Whether this is the fact, it may

237
be impossible to ascertain. But granting they do not all oper
ate at the same time, this no more proves that they are inactive
principles, like inert matter, than that causes are not energetic
in their nature,' when they are not producing their respective
effects. These principles ofthe heart are the only principles
in the universe, of which we have any knowledge, which are ac
tive in their nature. And they are the primary cause of all ef
fects which exist ; at least this is- my belief. Being active in
their nature, and the primary cause in men of all the good and
evil of which we as agents are the authors, they must be virtu
ous or vicious. To view them in this light, it is not necessary
every principle should be considered as constantly operating.
To determine whether any thing is good or evil, we wish to
know two things ; what the nature of a thing is, and what the
¦ tendency of its nature is. Mankind believe all things have a
nature. Yet many carp at the word, and ask, what is nature ?
By it is generally meant the internal form or construction of a
thing. By the nature of a clock, a vegetable, a tree, is meant
its internal structure, or organization. As these structures are
different from each other, therefore, things, are viewed as having
different natures. And we learn what the different natures of
things are, by the various fruits and effects they produce. If
any ask what is meant by the nature of an active principle in
the heart ; the answer is, a particular something, of such a con
struction, by whatever name it may be called, which is suscepti
ble of pleasure and pain; and when either of these is felt, the
principle operates and produces effects. If the fruits or effects
it produces tend, or in their direct course and connexion, if not
prevented, will ultimately destroy happiness, or promote it, it is
good or evil. This is the way, by which we learn what the na
ture of a thing is. When the divine character is seen by two
persons, if one is pleased with it, and the other displeased, we
are sure they have different hearts. If one is good, the other is
evil. But which of them has the good heart, and which the
evil ? This we learn from the ultimate tendency of their op
erations. If the operations ofthe heart, which is pleased with
the divine character, promote happiness ultimately, it is good,
or virtuous ; and if the operations of the other destroy hap
piness, it is evil, or sinful. It is in this way that we learn, that
hatred is an evil, and love to God, a good, . affection ; or that
the former is sinful, the latter holy. If love should produce the
effects of hatred, and hatred those of love, ultimately ; then

338
hatred would have been viewed as hply, and love a sinful affec
tion. When an object of choice is presented to view, one person
chooses it, and another rejects it. We then know their voli
tions are not the same in their nature ; and if we say the voli
tion of one is holy, and the other sinful ; yet we cannot deter
mine which of them is holy, and which sinful, till we learn what
is the ultimate tendency of each volition. Hence it is evident,
that those volitions are not sinful or holy, merely because they
are exercises, or what is called action and 'activity. If they
were, each of them would.be sinful or holy ; for eat.h of them
is an exercise. The only reason, why exercises, action, activi
ty, energy, is considered essential to vice and virtue, is this ;
nothing else can ever produce effects, and ultimately promote,
or destroy happiness.
If, then, what we call principles or appetites are operative,
active, and will produce effects, which will.ultimately destroy
or promote happiness, they have the quality which is necessary
to denominate them sinful or holy. It is said vice and virtue
must consist in exercise, and cannot consist in any thing else.
And why ? Plainly, because nothing else will produce effects,
and ultimately promote or destroy happiness. Volitions are
exercises of this kind ; hence they only are sinful or holy, But
it has been proved, that there is, and must be, something ante
cedent to volitions, which in fact produce or give rise to them ;
or there never would nor could exist such an exercise as a voli
tion. And this something, which we call the heart,, composed
of principles of action, is antecedent, to voluntary exercises.
And these principles, appetites, or inclinations, are operative, ac
tive, and do produce volitions, and by this, medium external ef
fects and fruits, which ultimately promote or destroy happiness ;
and of course are virtuous or vicious. And whether they are
sinful or holy, we must determine in the same way by which
we ascertauMhe moral nature of volitions ; and that is, by their
ultimate tendency. Seeing such principles do exist in the heart,
whether each of them is operating constantly or not, they are
with the same propriety termed sinfol or holy, that the advocates
for the exercise scheme say that all volitions are sinful or holy.
And as those principles, whether called principles or immanent
exercises, are antecedent to volitions, or what they denomin
ate imperate exercises, vice and virtue must be primarily seated
in these principles ; these are the fountain, from which all good

239
and evil in men flow or proceed. And what has now been said
is a sufficient answer to the objection.
Here I will put a case, and then proceed. Acertain treepro-
duces excellent fruit. From this We infer it has an excellent'
nature. And by nature here we mean it's particular structure,
which is the cause or foundation of its producing such good'
fruit ; whether this nature be active or not. We find this fruit'
puts an end to misery, wherever it is eaten, and produces no
thing but pure constant happiness. Hence its nature is to de
stroy misery, arid promote happiness forever. We therefore
call it a good tree ; arid its goodness consists primarily in its
nature. But we say, it is good in a natural, but not in a moral
sense. Suppose this tree should be endued with a faculty of
uriderstariding,' and could perceive, reason, judge, remember,
accuse and condemn. Also had a heart given it, which would
be pleased or disgusted with every Object seen; and should now
become very active and operative in affections ; then in voli
tions, by being endued with a Will ; and in this Way p'roduces
daily innumerable fruits, which will forever destroy pain and
prombte happiness. InoW ask", would not its nature be good,
for the same reason it was before called good ? Would not its
nature be good in a moral sense ? Arid would it not be a mor
al agent, and a proper object of praise; arid of a blessed reward?
You answer, yes ; but say, it is no longer a tree ; it is formed
into' a irioral agerit. Very well; but do you not now see all
that is riecessary to constitute any being a moral agent ; and
do you not see that the moral character of such an agerit is just
what the nature of the tree or the heart is ? That his heart, or
nature, constitutes his moral character ; arid not those voli
tions, which you call imperate ? And why does the heart con
stitute his rnoral character ? Because here are the primary
principles of action ; the fountain, from which all good and
evil proceed. Iri this his agency consists. Without such a
heart, he could not with propriety be termed an agerit, and es
pecially a moral agerit, any more than a tree.
Objection second. Some say this Scheme is Arminianisiri :
that it represents men as acting without motives, governed by a
self determining principle, and as being morally good or evil
according to their work ; and that it is directly opposed to
Calvinism. Answer, How this objection can arise from the principles
advanced ip these essays, is beyottd my power to conceive. It

240
is not possible for any sentiments to oppose others more
directly, than these do the Arminian scheme, if 1 know what
that scheme is. And whether I do understand either the Cal
vinistic or Arminian scheme of divinity, every one may judge
for himself after he has read the essays, and particularly the es
say in which the two schemes are stated, and the difference be
tween them illustrated. The essays themselves contain as full
an answer to this objection as can be given ; and I will not tire
the patience of a reader by adding any thing more, than mere
ly this ; that the person who makes this objection, I am confi
dent, does not understand my sentiments ; and he is advised to.
study them till he does understand them ; then he will no more
make this objection.
Objection third. Some say this scheme tends directly to
fatalism ; representing that the universe is governed by an invin
cible necessity, and liberty is forever excluded.
Answer. It is taken for granted, that the Arminian scheme,
and that of the fatalists, are directly opposed to each other.
How then can it be accounted for, that when persons read those
essays, some should saj', it is Arminianism ; and others, it is
fatalism ? Can this be accounted for, if all who read them un
derstand the sentiments advanced ? , It is thought not. Would
it not be well for every person to understand what he reads,,be-
fore he makes objections against it ?
In these essays it is said, that men are agents ; that their a-
gency consists in the active principles of the heart ; that by
these principles all men are invariably governed ; that mankind
are endued with liberty of will and of action ; and with all the
liberty they can conceive of or desire '; and it is shown why
such liberty is necessary and for what purpose ; also that men
are not only agents, but moral agents. It is shown what pro
perties are necessary to constitute complete moral agents, and
why they are requisite ; and that men are proper subjects of
praise or blame, and of future rewards, according to their mor
al characters. Is this fatalism ? If so, I have never known
what fatalism is. I have always supposed that fatalism ex
cludes all the ideas above stated ; inculcating that men are not
moral agents, are not free, are not deserving ofpraise or blame,
or future rewards of any kind ; indeed, that there is no real
difference between men and trees.
On the whole, if any person clearly knows what fatalism is,
and understands the sentiments I have defended, he will confess

241
that the latter are opposed to fatalism as directly as light to
darkness. Objection fourth. . Some say, the scheme advanced in these
essays is perfect selfishnesss. That all men seek objects and
ends for the same reason, because they please them ; and they
seek them to gratify their desires, sp that all their pursuits ter
minate in personal or self gratification ; that men seek the glory
of God, because it pleases them ; just as men seek their own
honor, because it pleases them ; and this is pure arid perfect
selfishness. Answer. According to this objection, to avoid selfishness,
and be benevolent, a person must choose and act without mo
tives. He must not prefer one object to another, because it is
agreeable to him. If he chooses any object, because it is a-
greeable, he is selfish. Now when objects are presented to the
view ofthe mind, they must please or disgust us before they are
chosen, or in this way affect us subsequent to choice ; or, on
the other hand, must neither please nor displease us, before pr
after they are chosen. One or the other of these hypotheses
must be true.
^ 1. If objects dri not please ordisgust us'beforethey are chos
en, then, if they are ever agreeable Pr the contrary, it is subse
quent to choice. This necessarily implies three things — 1.
That no reason can be given why an object is chosen ; or, in
preferring one object to another, motives have no influence.
When objects of choice are before us, and they are not, and
must not be, either pleasing or painful, we shall feel in a state
of perfect indifference towards them ; and it is in this, state we
are to make our choice, according, to this scheme. When one
object is preferred to another, no reason can be given why we
preferred it. . We cannot say, because it was more pleasing to
us. If we say we preferred it because it was our duty, or be
cause it was more valuable than the object rejected, still we are
-not influenced by any motive. For we are in a state of perfect
indifference ; neither the object,-ttor duty,nor the worth ofthe ob-<
ject Can have any influence. For no object can' influence an
. agent, if it do not affect, please, or pain him. For if we are in
fluenced by either of these considerations, we are inclined towards
the object previous to choice,; and this the objector calls self
ishness.- And surely if no considerations move or incline us to
prefer one object to another, we are in a state of perfect indif
ference; and in this state motives have no influence. If we
are governed and influenced by motives, objects must
6

242
-affect us previous to choice ; if they do affect us, we are
either pleased or disgusted by them. Because, if they neither
please nor offend us, they do not affect us. Hence, according
to this scheme, previous to choice we must be in a state of per
fect indifference, wholly unaffected by any consideration what
ever. And then, if we are pleased,
2. Our pleasures must be subsequent to our choice. One of
two things must be true, if objects ever please or displease us ;
they must have this effect previous, or subsequent to choice ;
unless we say that pleasure and pain are volitions, which is ab
surd. If they do not excite agreeable or painful sensations
previous to choice, they must subsequent to it. If this be true,
then our happiness and misery depend on our pleasure ; we can
produce either pleasure or pain at any time. For all we have
to do is, merely to choose or reject an object. All men love
pleasure, and hate pain. Why is it, then, that any suffer them
selves to remain in a state of pain one moment, when by a sin
gle choice they can render themselves happy? Do any believe
that Pur happiness or misery are produced by us ; that they
depend on our pleasure ? -If this were true, would persons
continue to suffer the pains of disease ; or would sinners remain
in a state of torment in hell ? This, however, is the very es
sence ofthe Arminian scheme. Bishop King, on the origin
of evil, says, that pleasure and pain are subsequent to choice,
and we create our own happiness and misery. And he is a
consistent Arminian. For objects must please before or after
they are chosen, if ever ; the former he denies, as every con
sistent Arminian must ; and the latter he defends. And all on
this ground have embraced the.essence of Arminianism. And
objects must forever please us, before or after they are chosen,
or 3.» They will never afford us any pleasure. This is so evident, it
is impossible for any one to deny it. Which, then, of the three
hypotheses is true ? If we say, that objects previous to choice
never affect us, never excite any pleasing or painful sensations,
no not in the least degree ; and this is not, and ought not to be,
the reason why wp choose one and reject another object ; then
we must say, that pleasure and pain are subsequent to choice,
and created by it ; or that we never experience either of them.
The latter is contrary to daily facts and experience. If we
embrace the pther hypothesis, we are always in a state of per
fect indifference,, when we make a choice, and are never influ-

243
uenced by motives ; and to be consistent, ought to be Armini
ans in length and breadth. Also, seeing all men hate pain and
love pleasure, why is it that there is any pain, in this world or
a future, since it depends wholly on our pleasure ? Is it not
now evident to every Pne, that objects must and do affect us, da
please or displease us, previous to choice ; and that this is
the reason why we prefer one to another, because it is more
agreeable to us ? And if this be true, then motives govern and
influence us. So far as an object affects, pleases or disgusts us,
so far it moves, inclines and Induces us to choose one and reject
another. — But it is said, this is selfishness. According to this,
saints and sinners are influenced by the same motives, govern-r
ed by the same reasons.
, , But I ask, is it wrong, is it sinful in rrie, to hepleased withthe di
vine character ; with the character ofChrist ; with the glory Sthap-
piness of his holy eternal kingdom ; with the law and service of
God ; & with praising and exalting his name ? If not ; is it sinful
in me, for this reason, to choose God for my portion ; Christ
for my savior ; his law for my rule of duty ; ¦ his service to be
my yoke ; and his holy kingdom to be my eternal residence ?
Is this selfishness ? If it is, it is surely a glorious thing to be
selfish. — This objection evidently arises from erroneous ideas
concerning selfishness and benevolence. Every being, whd is
destitute of a heart to be pleased with the happiness of other be-
. ingS, is selfish in all he does,. Hunger, and every other appe
tite in him, is selfish. He seeks every objectto gratify his ap
petite ; and if he destroys the happiness ofthe universe by feed
ing this personal desire, he cares not ; because he has- no love,
no feeling for the happiness of any but himself.
But if a person rejoices in the happiness of other beings, or
the happiness of God's holy kingdom, this will be the object of
his ultimate pursuit, and he will sacrifice and subordinate every
thing to it. And this is benevolence. To determine whether
persons are selfish or benevolent, we have to learn what is the
ultimate object in which their hearts delight, and Which they
seek. Is the happiness of God's holy kingdom, or his glory in
which their hearts delight, is this their ultimate end ? Then
this is the end which they will seek, and to it they will subor
dinate every thing, and for it they will labor, and patiently suf
fer every thing necessary to it, even death itself. Can any thing
be more benevolent than this ? Is it a sin for them to rejoice
in the happiness of others, or the glory of God ? No, it proves

244
a benevolent heart. Isit sinful fo» them to choose and prefer
this as their ultimate end, because it is more delightsome to them,
than any other ? Who, if he -understands, can see any selfish
ness or sinfulness in this ? How is it possible for any moral
agent to possess a heart ntore benevolent, or more friendly to
God, and the universe ?
On the other hand, if a moral agent has no appetite or re
lish for the happiness of others, or the glory of God ; if such
objects afford him no delight, and he has no love for them, he
certainly will never seek them. If at the'same time he has 'a
relish for worldly objects, for riches, or for worldly honors, or
for any sensual pleasures and amusements ; if such objects
please and delight him, be will prefer them, and seek them'to
gratify the relish and desires he has for them- And. to such,
pursuits he will subordinate every thing, and sacrifice the hap
piness of riiilliops to please his heart. He will commit any
crime, if he dare, to gratify his desires. This I call selfishness,
and wickedness. For it is sinful in him to delight in; such ob
jects supremely, and sinful to prefer them to the glory of God,
and good of his kingdom ; sinful to seek them as his portion,
and subordinate every thing to them.
But it may be objected, what harm is there in loving bread,
or riches ? I answer, -as I haver labored to -prove, that the pri
mary fault, or imperfection, or sin, in the character of men,
does rtot eonsist in a love to these .objects ; but in a want of all
love to God, and his kingdom ; or in the total want of all
benevolent feelings, or relish for God and his glory. "In this
want his" imperfection primarily consists. If he loves God su
premely, if he has far greater delight in his glory and the hap
piness ofhis kingdom, than in any worldly objects, he will sub
ordinate all bis desires to this supreme delight ofhis heart ; if
he then love food he will seek it no further, nor by any other
means,, than are consistent with the glory of God,, his supreme
delight. Deprive rbim of this love, of this relish 'for God and
¦his kingdom ; and at the same time let his love of food remain
the same, neither increased, nor diminished1; bis greatest, >su-
'preme delight is in food. Now his heart loves and prefers this
object, above God and his kingdom. This is certain ; for he
has no love for God, and has a love for food* ' -Hence- this ob
ject is preferred by his heart to every thing divine and heavenly;
and his conduct will comport with it. And then let his heart
'he-renewed, arida>refeh.for the glory of God be restored, arid

345
yet he delights in food as he ever had clone. He has now an
abject in which he experiences far greater pleasure than in food,
and therefore will never gratify his love for food in any way
inconsistent with the glory of God. All this is plain and evir
dent ; and clearly shows, that the moral characters of men are
affected, or changed from holy to sinful, and from sinful to ho
ly, as often as they loose all relish for God, or have it again
restored,J.hough all their other appetites or inclinations, im
planted iu them by their Maker, remain the same through all
the changes.*" * A--
The fact is this, there is in man something, ^by whatever
name it may be called, which is antecedent to, and distinctfrom,,
all our volitions ; or there is not. If there is not, then moral
agents must necessarily be in a state of perfect indifference, at
the same time they make a choice. It can benpthing but a vo
lition, which puts an end to their indifference, respecting any
particular object of choice. And if in a state of indifference,
then motives do not, neither can, have any influence, as has
been clearly shown by many. This plan, then, wholly excludes
motives ; and of course wholly destroys moral agency and lib
erty. It is taking Arminian ground in length and breadth. If
they do not, they are inconsistent with themsplves.
On the other hand, if it be admitted that the heart is a dis
tinct faculty from the will, and the subject of all the pleasures
and pains we experience ; then, to be consistent, a person must
adopt the system advanced in these essays. Hence the great
question to be decided is this; whether the heart or taste is a
distinct faculty from the, will ? Those who deny this must be
Arminians, or be inconsistent with themselves ; and those who
believe this, must embrace the sentiments advanced, or the Cal
vinistic scheme and system ; or else be inconsistent with them
selves. It is the primary ground concerning which, in reality,
Arminians and Calvinists differ ; and where they take their de
parture from each other, and embrace different systems of theol
ogy- And all who mean to be Calvinists, and deny the heart to be
a faculty, are inconsistent with themselves. They have but two
ways to maintain apparent consistency. . One is, by admitting
whatthey call a capacity for pleasure and pain. Thishasbeen
shown to be the same thing with the heart or taste. Hence
they have ^to admit, under another name, the very thing thay
4eny. For, their capacity for pleasure and pain is the very

246
thing we mean by the heart or taste. If there be this capacity,
not only pleasure and pain, but all the affections or desires,
must be its operations, distinct from, and antecedent to, voli
tions. Their other way to support an apparent consistency is, by
making their distinction between immanent and imperate acts.
According to this distinction, all the operations of the mind are
formed into three distinct classes— perceptions, affections, and
volitions. Then, if <jhey deny the existence of faculties, yet
they are obliged to admit three distinct classes of operations or
exercises. And these are so different from each other, that the
class, which they call immanent acts, which includes all our
affections or desires, includes also all vice and virtue, and all the
principles and springs of action. Henee, on their own ground,
they make all vice and virtue, and the moral character of man,
to consist in operations or exercises, which are antecedent to
that class, which they call imperate acts. In this way the only
grand difference between them and us is this ; we admit facul
ties, to which these classes of operations belong ; and they de
ny their existence. For if they admit faculties, they must em
brace our system ; or refer classes of operatipns, very difierent
from each other even in their moral nature, as well as in other
respects, to the same faculty. ' This is very unphilosophical,
and creates confusion in the study of the human mind. In fact
they have no way to maintain a plausible consistency, only in
some form or other to admit the very fundamental sentiments,
for which we contend ; yet, while they in fact admit them, they
in words deny them. Whereas, if they only granted the exist
ence of such a faculty as the heart, distinct from the will, they
might then with ease and consistency be on Calvinistic ground.
Objection 5th. Some may say. the system advanced in these
essays represents the appetite of hunger, and all the appetites
with which we are born, as being, in their nature sinful, in all
who are unrenewed, and even in christians. But this cannot
be true. For almost eveiy person, in every age,has considered
' such natural appetites as innocent and harmless. Hence the
system advanced must be radically erroneous.
Answer. The particular ends and purposes, for which these
appetites were created and implanted in us, has been already
shown. Hence there is no need of repeating here any thing to
answer the objection. Something also has been said^ which is
Connected with this subject, in the essay on the nature of sinv

247
Accordingly, but few observations more are needful, to answer
the present objection. '
It will be necessary for the reader to keep steadily in view
the idea often expressed, what constitutes the primary imperfec
tion in moral characters. That is, the total privation of the
moral Image of God, or of all supreme love to God, and that
love to our neighbor which the law requires. A character,
perfectly destitute of that love to God and man which the law
requires, is an imperfect, sinful, character. In this sinprimarily
consists. For, until there is a want of this love, in whole or in
part, it is impossible for sin in any sense to exist in the heart of
man ; unless we consider as sinful those seeds or principles,
which may become corrupt, when the moral image of God is
lost. It will be well also to reflect, that every thing is* good or evil
in its nature, according to its tendency. Hence, although a
particular-principle, in one condition, does not by its tendency
produce any evil ; yet in a different condition, and under dif
ferent circumstances, its tendency is to evil: daily* When this is
the case, if we judge correctly concerning the nature of things
by their tendency, we must corisider that principle to be sinful,
which tends daily to a transgression ofthe law. If no rain
were to fall and water the earth, and the sun should continue
shining with all itS burning rays, would you predicate good of
it ? Would you say, a sun in this condition was a great bless
ing, or a great evil ?¦ If no water replenished the earth, heat
would tend to theproduction of evil. Here, the primary fault
consists in the want of rain.
Before Adam sinned, his appetite of hunger was under the
influence of benevolence, or love to God. It would, then, nev
er be indulged tP excess'in eating or drinking, nor in using ariy
unlawful means to obtain food. Hence its operation would be
harmless, and harmonize with the influence of benevolence.
But when he was wholly deprived ofthe moral image of God,
then food was onp pf the supreme objects of his heart's desire.
Food now occupied the same place in his heart, which God had
filledywhen his supreme affection was set on him. Now hunger has
the entire government; He seeks food for no other end or pur
pose, than to remove the pain of hunger, preserve his life, and
enjoy the pleasure which eating affords. He has nothing to
restrain him from eating and drinking to excess, or from using
unlawful' means to obtain food. For, however much he may

248
dishonor God, or injure men, in gratifying this appetite ; yet
this does not restrain him, or give him any uneasiness, in case
he can do it with impunity. For he has no love for God or
man ; and hence no desire to honor his Maker, and do good to
men. So far as other appetites do not interfere, and fear of
future punishment in this world do not restrain him, there is
nothing to prevent his eating to excess, and using any means
however unlawful or injurious' to others in obtaining food, which
fs now the supreme object of his heart, and his god. And
while men continue in this condition, with hearts unrenewed,
the tendency of this appetite is to evil only, to excess in eating,
and the use of unlawful means to obtain food. And how often
has it, in fact, prompted one to steal ; another to rob men on
the highway ; another to commit murder to get money ; and
another to lie, defraud, and oppress, when the end has been no
other than to obtain food to eat, and fea,st this appetite. So
long as he lives within the bounds of temperance, and uses only
lawful means to acquire food, this appetite in its operatipns is in
nocent and lawful. But the appetite itself will never keep men,
long at a time, within such limits. Its tendency is to exceed
them, and indulge itself in riotous living. As it does in fact
operate in this manner, where there is no love for God or men,
who can say it is not Sinful, but always innocent in its nature?
And the observations now made, with regard to this appetite, will
apply to all the other appetites with which we are born. They
all seek their respective objects as their supreme good, and seek
them often to great excess, and by unlawful means ; so they
are daily transgressing the divine law, and disturbing the peace
and happiness of society.
These sentiments must be received as true ;• or we must admit,
that when Adam lost the moral image of God, He created in him
a positive, sinful principle, such as some* term selfishness. Let
it be admitted this was the fact, for the present. What will be
the tendency and operations of this selfishness? Will it love
and regard self supremely, and place its affections supremely
on this world ? This is the very fact with respect to our oth
er appetites. Will it seek this world as its only portion ? This
is true of our appetites. Will it seek the world to excess, and
by- unlawful means ? Thus our appetites in fact operate.
Will it riiove a man to commit crimes, crimes of the deepest
stain ? This our appetites move us in fact to do. View this
selfishness in what light we may, its tendency, nature, and op-

249
erations are the very same with the tendency, nature, and op
eration of our appetites, as has been represented. Its nature
then is the same ; and there is no difference between the two,
only in words. Call then our appetites principles of selfishness,
as they really are ; and then these appetites constitute the only
selfishness we are in fact acquainted with, or any where see in
operation. Hence the only difference between the systems
advanced, and a principle of selfishness for which some contend,
is merely concerning the nature of selfishness. And concern
ing this, from what has been said, we see there is in reality no
difference. And is it not more consistent with the moral char
acter of God, to believe he created in Adam all the principles of
action he would need, and all he ever designed to create in him,
when he first gave him being; than to suppose, that when the
image of God was lost, He then created in him a sinful, active
principle? Our system supposes no alteration. took place in
Adam, but the loss of the divine image ; in consequence of
which, all his other appetites were placed supremely on this
world, and led him and his posterity away from God the living
fountain of waters. If this be admitted, then the objection be
fore us is fully answered. I have now replied to all the objec
tions, worthy of particular notice, which have come to my
knowledge.

**********

ESSAY XXVI.
Jin Examination of the ideas of Rhetoricians, con
cerning a Taste for beauty, novelty, 8p grandeur.
Rhetoricians commonly define Taste, to be a power of de
riving pleasure or pain from objects of nature and art ; and con
sider beauty aud sublimity to be sources of the greatest pleas
ures afforded to it.
I belipve they have never considered this power, as they call
it, a distinct faculty of the mind ; nor attended to its operations
in this light. When we read what authors have said on this
7

250
subject, their taste, and what we call taste or the heart, are ev
idently the same property of the mind. Pleasure arid pain,
emotions, affections, passions, desires, are the operations of what
they call taste. In this they agree with us. To me it appears
very clear, that their taste, and what is called by the same name
in these essays, are the same power, property or faculty. They
have reflected great light on this branch of intellectual philoso
phy. But they have treated the subject, as it appears to me,
in a too restricted and limited sense. The deficiencies of wri
ters on the subject of taste, as far as my reading has extended,
it is proposed here to point out.
1 . They have not attended to it as a distinct faculty of the
mind, with sufficient precision. Hence a reader, after he has
perused all they have to say, is ready to ask such important
questions as the following ; do they consider taste to be one of
the faculties of the mind, as they do the understanding, or not ?,
Do they consider it a power belonging to some faculty ? If
they do, to. what faculty do they view this power as belonging?
The reader might say, I find no answer to these 'questions so
definite as to afford conviction, and still have doubts concern
ing the answers they would now give to them. This deficien
cy clouds the subject with greater or less obscurity. They ex
hibit a train of thoughts connected with each other, but to what
Lgeneral system do they belong? How can I connect them with
other branches or parts of intellectual philosophy, so as to re
tain them, and see the place they occupy in a system ?
The several parts or branches of any particular science, form
one general system. And when all the pafts are so arranged,
that the place eaCh part occupies, with their relation to, and
connexions with each other from the beginning to the end, are
easily and clearly seen, then the whole appears more plain and
convincing, is far more easily remembered and reviewed, when
occasion requires it, and lays a foundation for a further im
provement of the system. Taste is one branch ofthe philoso
phy of the mind. 'In order for us to see its connexion with
the other branches of this subject, soas to have our ideas sys
tematically arranged, it seeriis to be neCeSsary to determine
clearly, whether taste is, or is not, a faculty ofthe mind. This
point not being fully settled, presents a deficiency, which must
render all that is said by writers, in certain respects, very ob
scure. And this will appear more evident, as we pass along
in our observations.

251
2. Another great deficiency, in writings on the subject of
itaste, is this ; they leave it uncertain, whether they consider all
our pleasures and pains, and all our affections and passions, to
belong to it or not. This is left, as far as my knowledge ex
tends, in a state of great doubt.
Itis true all the pleasures and pains afforded us, and all the af
fections excited in us, by objects of beauty and sublimity, and
many others, do belong to this power or faculty. But with re
spect to many of our pleasures, and pains, and affections, wheth
er they are the operations of this taste, or not, is uncertain.
Our pleasures and pains, affections and passions, are more
or less acute, lively, strong, and powerful. In this respect
they differ, frpm the very least and faintest, to the greatest or
most lively, and sensible. Some objects affect us so little, we
are unable to say whether they give us any pleasure or pairi ;
we feel almost indifferent in view of them. Others affect us
more sensibly. And some objects make very deep impressions,
please or disgust us in the highest degree ; and excite in us the
warmest affections. Though they differ in all these respects ;
yet they have one general, or generic nature. Pleasure is
pleasure, and pain is pain, every affection is an affection, wheth
er little or great, faint or lively ; almost insensible, or very dis
cernible. Having the same generic nature, they ought to be
viewed as forming one general class of operations or exercises ;•
and as belonging to the same faculty. If they have npt the
same generic nature, it ought to be proved ; if they ought to
be formed into several generic classes, this ought to be done ;
and if there are several powers or faculties belonging tp the
mind, to which such generic classes of operations belong, they
ought to be distinguished, and their different natures illustrated,
so that their differences from each other may be perceived.
This is certainly necessary to a perspicuous, sysfematic view of
the mind, and of its faculties and operations. And so* far as
this is wanting, intellectual philosophy remains in a state of ob
scurity and darkness.
Whether only one, or several powers of receiving pleasure
and pain from objects, belong to the mind or not, we are not in
formed ; and whether all our emotions, affections, or passions,
are operations of one faculty or of several, we are not told. At
least the reader is at a loss to know, iri what light writers in
tend to consider those things in these respects. This deficiency
leaves the subject of the mind in a state of great obscurity.

252
To me it appears plain that the mind has but one feeling fac-
culty. To this faculty all our pleasures, and pains, and affec
tions, belong ; or are its operations from the most faint to the
strongest. Though these operations form but one general class,
because they all have the same generic nature, yet such differ
ences are discernible among them, that they ought to be divid
ed into several specific classes. This renders the subject of
mind more clear and systematic. This is wahting, in all the
writers I have read, on the subject of taste. Hence, though
they have said many excellent things, and reflected much light
in relation to many subjects, and especially the subject of crit-
icisrn, yet great obscurity prevails. — To dispel this darkness,
is one thing greatly needed.
3. Another deficiency, in writers on taste, is this ; whether
they mean to consider their taste a moral power or faculty, the
primary seat of all vice and virtue. This, as ?ar as my reading
extends, is left in a state of uncertainty. And so far as they
say any thing, Which might determine what their opinion was ;
yet by comparing what they have written in different pages,
there seem to be inconsistencies.
Taste is, or is not, a moral faculty. If moral, it is, in its na
ture, either vicious or virtuous ; or it partakes partly of the na
ture of each, so that sometimes its operations are virtuous, and
at other times vicious. If all vice and virtue have not their pri-
rhary seat in this taste, then there must be other moral faculties
belonging to the mind. But whether they consider their taste
as the only moral faculty, the only primary seat of all vice and
virtue ; or as the fountain of some vices and virtues, while oth
er moral acts belong to some other faculty, are points which I
do riot find clearly decided.
But is it not very necessary, in order to present the subject
of intellectual philosophy in a perspicuous systematic light, to
determine and show distinctly, that taste is, or is not a moral
faculty ? To show to what faculty all vice arid virtue are to be
referred as their fountain ? Arid if the mind has more than one
moral faculty, should it not be made evident ? '
If the mind has only one moral faculty, and is the primary
seat or fountain of all vise and virtue, and this is proved, we
shall certainly have a far more clear understanding of its oper
ations. Or if it have several such moral powers ; and some
virtues and vices belong to one, and some to another ; if this
were proved, and illustrated clearly, we should on this ground

253
have more distinct views of its operations. My view of this
subject, I have endeavoured to give in previous essays.
4. Another deficiency in their writings on this subject is this ;
they do not determine distinctly, whether taste is a simple, or
compound power, or faculty. Some things written would iead
us to conclude, they considered it simple in its nature ; and oth
er things would lead us to a different conclusion. This is a
point, which ought to be clearly and fully decided. For if two
persons should agree, that taste is the only feeling and moral
faculty ofthe mind ; yet one should view it as simple in its na
ture, and the other as compounded, they must differ in their opin
ions in some things connected with the subject, and take differ
ent methods to account for some facts. It is a fact that some
objects, which are highly pleasing and entertaining to some, are
very disgusting to others. This is a fact with respect to the
idolatries and superstitions of the heathen ; and also, with re
spect to the doctrines ofthe gospel. Many of these doctrine%
which the apostles pf Christ loved, the Jews hated. How can
such facts be accounted for, if taste is a simple faculty ? It is
certain that two persons, who embraced different opinions con
cerning taste, whether it is a simple or compound faculty, would
take different ways to account for such facts. And both of
them cannot be in the, right.
This is sufficient to show that it is a matter of importance, tp
have this point decided, whether taste is a simple or compound
faculty. Such deficiencies as have been mentioned, without
adding more, are sufficient to show, that the philosophy of the
mind must be in a state of less or greater obscurity, until those
deficiencies are removed. They can be removed only by the
reflection of greater light, and by giving a more systematic view
ofthe mind.
The subject of taste has generally been investigated no farth
er, than it respects objects of nature and art. Its operations,
with respect to the wide field of objects which theology opens to
view, have not been much attended toby writers. Yet this is
the field in which we shall see the operations of taste, and their
nature, and be able to reflect more light, and to better advan
tage, than we now do by confining our investigations to subjects
of nature and art.
The faculty of taste is. the most important property of the
mind. Tit is the seat of all our pleasures and pains ; contains
all the principles of action, which govern men ; it is the foun-

254
tain of vicp and vjr|np • and according to its nature such is the
moral character of men amToTJjajOiteliigyjl beings; and ac-
cording^toritsTiaTuTfewTien we bid farewell to life, such will be
our endless state beyond the grave. Hence our usefulness, our
happiness, here and forever, the honor, and respectability of our
characters, our friendship with God, our enjoyment of him, the
Society of aU holy beings, and all good, depend on the temper
of heart which we cultivate. If its sinful lusts and desires are
gratified, cultivated, and nourished till death, we must then as
sociate with the shameful, degraded, characters of the wicked,
and sink deeper forever into disgrace and misery. But if ho
liness of heart is cultivated on earth, and we die conformed to
God, we shall rise, and associate with holy, dignified, exalted,
and glorious characters, and with them triumph over all evil,
and sing the song of victory over every foe with enraptured de
light forever. ThaUadiich will distinguish men, finally, is not
riches, or honors, or djgj3Jfied^4ii3£Sjj)r the greatest acquired
knowjedjg?x3iEdSiij^ Hence the rich man in the gospel, if he had with his riches been
an emperor, ancl swayed the sceptre ofthe world, and had ac
quired a knowledge of all the arts and sciences in the greatest
perfection, and had died as he did with an evil heart, he would
have sunk in endless infamy, disgrace and misery ; while the
beggar, notwithstanding his poverty, the neglects with which
he was treated, and the disgrace in which he was held, and the
misery he suffered here, would be exalted, to the highest honors,
glories, and felicities in heaven. Heece-everyjhing good, great,
honorable, glorious, and blessed ;aTidevery-ASgtBvily-despic-
able, degraded, shameful, and miserable, dependpn the nature,
and-cultiyation ofthe tastejjvhitA-is inrpiarited in every man.
Had writers*"oriTaste considered the subject in this interesting
light, would they have Confined their observation chiefly to the
effects produced on it by the works of nature and art ? ' The
moral world contains objects of beauty, grandeur, and sublimi
ty' infinitely exceeding any thing of this kind in the natural
world, or the arts in which men have excelled. Had they ex
tended their criticism to the moral world, as they have, to the
natural, and to the arts, they would have rendered far greater
service to the best interests of men. Their defects do not per
tain to what they have done"; but to their neglepts. They have
done well, as far as they have proceeded in the path of truth,
observation, and experience; and they would have done far bet-

255
ter, and more for the happiness of men, if they had proceeded
to examine critically all the beauties and sublimities in the mor
al world, and shown the effects they would produce on a cor
rect and delicate taste ; or on one destitute of these qualities.
When this truth is established, that all men have that facul
ty called taste, which is the subject of all our pleasures and
pains ; then it is easy to see, that all objects, natural and moral,
and works of art, would produce in the taste pleasant, or painful
sensations, whether we call them emotions, affections, or pas
sions. They, would also find, that no objects in the natural
world afford so much pleasure and pain, as the most beautiful
and sublime. This they have found is a fact. Then had they
proceeded to the moral world, they would have seen objects of
greater beauty and sublimity, and objects of greater deformity.
What objects in the universe are so beautiful and sublime, as the
character of God, that love displayed in the work of redemption,
the holiness the gospel enjoins; the love, the zeal, the fortitude,
the useful services, the exalted praises, and fervent prayers, of
,the apostles and all saints ? • What objects in the natural world
are so beautiful and sublime, as the character Christ displayed
on the earth, the doctrines he taught, the wonders he wrought,
and the fortitude and love he manifested on the cross ? What
deformities can be found in the natural world so great, as the
deformity of a sinful, rebellious character, such as the proud
Pharisees displayed in the days of our Lord ? Let the beauti
ful and sublime, the hateful, degraded, and depraved characters
in the moral world be examined ; also the sensations, emotions,
and affections they produce ; and all would be convinced that
the -tastes of men, as to their moral nature, are very different.
The result of an examination of these objects, and the affections
they produce; would have been a full conviction, that taste is a
moral faculty, the primary principle of action, the seat of vice
and virtue, and the foundation of endless felicity or misery.
This must have impressed on the mind the importance and ne
cessity, of cultivating a holy taste.
It has been one great object of these essays, to convince men
that they have the faculty called taste by many writers, to des
cribe its nature and operations, and to shew what part it occu
pies in a correct system ofthe mind, and its connexion with the
ofoer parts the understanding and will ; and to show that these
properties of the mind constitute men complete moral agents,
who are worthy of praise or blame, and endless rewards. And

256

as they are virtuous or vicious, and must De forever hapj
miserabXe_accoxdingJathe nature ofTheJr-t-ftate^j^iiclris c

ppy or
i capa
ble of changes ; that thelrVhief, great and daily attention ought
to be given to the cultivation of a holy taste : a taste, which
will not only be pleased with the beauties and sublimities, dis
cernible in the works of nature and art ; but also with the far
more beautiful and sublime objects, which exist in the moral
world. And in writing these essays, it has been the determination of
the author to admit no speculations as true, but those which a-
gree with facts, observation, and the experience of men. The
design has been, to advance no sentiment, which is not founded
on facts and experience.

***>!******

ESSAY XXVII.
On total Depravity.
Admitting the views which have been given of the human
mind to be true, the doctrine of total depravity, as explained by
the orthodox, is a just inference. And one reason, why the ad
vocates and the opponents of this doctrine have not agreed, is,
because they have not begun with first principles, nor reasoned
from them, in relation to the mind. \ If any person is well ac
quainted with the first principles relating to moral agency, he
cannot, if consistent, deny this doctrine. But to prove this
doctrine, we must in the first place explain it, that all may know
how much it contains, as we understand it.
By total depravity is meant, a heart destitute of moral virtue
or holiness. No trace ofthe moral image of God, or true be
nevolence, remains in the heart. Real holiness is wholly want
ing. In consequence of this, all the operations, or affections
ofthe heart, are sinful. Yet it is granted, that the totally de
praved have all the. facuTfieVwitlnwhictrAdam was created,.
still remaining. They have all the faculties^ and the liberty,
which are necessary to constitute a complete moral agent.

257
They have the same faculties of the understanding, heart, and
will, which Adam had before the fall. By his sinning, no direct
alteration took place in him, or his posterity, except inthejafc.
ulty ofTtij£jieartior taste. WJienJie_ale-Q£jhQpjrJb^
he was deprivedoi*~maTmoral image, or benevolent appetite,
with which he was created. He was then spiritually dead, des
titute of all moral goodness, or totally depraved. Then all
the other appetites with which he was created became sinful.
Hence, when we say man is totally depraved, the meaning is,
he has no moral goodness, remaining ; and every operation
and desire ofhis heart is sinful, in a moral sense evil. Yet all
the faculties he ever had, or which constitute a moral agent, re
main entire ; and are not, except in a moral sense, in the least
impaired. This explains my view of this subject. • But a few
things are necessary to establish the truth of this doctrine.
J. The faculty termed the taste or heart is essential to moral
agency. To avoid repetition, the reader is desired to peruse
carefully and candidly the description given of this faculty in
the 8th and 9th essays, on taste and the appetites. — According
to the description there given,' the heart is the only faculty
which feels, or is the subject of pleasant or painful sensations.
It is the only primary, active, principle, in moral agents ; and
is, also, the only moral faculty. And it is so essential to moraj
agency, that without it, men would not be agents ; could not
be virtuous or vicious, or subjects of final rewards^ Also this
faculty is always in its nature sinful, or holy. — For the divine
character, and all mpral objects, must afford it pleasure or pain.
Or in view of divine objects, every person's heart will experi
ence delight, or disgust, in a greater or less degree. Being
pleased with divine objects, proves the heart to be holy ; and if
displeased, this equally shows, that it is in its nature sinful, de
praved. These are truths, which have been proved in the es
says to Which we have referred.
This shows with a moral certainty, that a moral agent cannot
exist, and at the ¦samejjine be neithersint'ul nor holvv If,a~
moraiTrgentrhe has the faculty called tnTheart ; aTicTthlsis, in
its nature, always sinful, or holy. It cannot exist in any oth
er condition., Hence the sentiment which some advance, that
the hearts of men_wheji_bprn are like clean paper, without any
marks pT^vicejir-sdr-toerisTertainly false." And"if anyTeel in
clined 'to view this as a whim, or an absurdity ; they are desired
to undertake to show, how it is possible for aHy person to ex-
8

258
1st, and be neither sinful, nor holy, yet be amoral agent.s_J£he
is a m^JSMtSSStsiie^has the faculty of taste. ,AjHiifjuiy.,per-
son shflu,ld Jabor to show, ^Ifiis faculty" rnay exist, ancTbe clean
as paper, in its nature neither sinful nor holy, he will soon find
his labor is in vain.
He may deny the existence of this faculty.. If he does, he
must admit the existence of a faculty similar to it, or grant men
are not moral agents. If he should say, we have not the facul
ty of taste ; but we have a capacity for pleasure and pain, and
this constitutes us moral agents; this is only another name for
what is termed taste ; and the nature of this capacity must be
such, that the character of God will please, or offend it ; and in
either case, this proves it to be sinful or holy. Call it by what
ever name they may, they must admit it is susceptible of pleas
ure and pain ; or grant we have no active power or principle
in us ; and of course are not moral agents.
If it be granted, that men are moral, agents, it must be admit
ted, that we have that faculty, which I call the taste or heart j
and if any give it a different name, yet this does not alter its na
ture. It will, therefore, remain an eternal truth, that as men
are moral agents, they have a faculty, the nature of which is
similar to the description given of it, in the essays on taste and
its appetites. Hence the sentiment, which some advance, that
we are born with hearts as clean as white, paper, neither sinful .
nor holy, is a dangerous falsehood ; a sentiment, which can nev
er be supported, and men, at the same time, be moral agents.
2. Adam, when created by his Maker, was perfectly holy.
The moral image of God was instamped on bis heart, perfect
and entire. He came from the handof his God perfectly holy.
He was made in, a moral sense upright, created with knowledge
and holiness. God created in his heart the same benevolent
appetite, which in Himself is termed lave or holiness. In this
respect he perfectly resembled his Maker ; having the same be
nevolence in kind, though not in degree.
God, also, created him with all the other appetites, which
are enumerated in the 9th essay, on the appetites. These pre
pared him to live in this world, to preserve his life, propagate
his race, support them in. infancy, relieve them in distress ; and
for every other purpose needful to hjis comfort in this life,, in
case he should lose his benevolent appetite, as Gpd knew he
would. Thus Adam, as first created, was endued with all the
faculties necessary to make him, a complete, moral agent ) and

259
being perfectly holy, he was prepared to serve and enjoy his
Maker, here and forever; and he endowed' him with every other
appetite requisite to answer the ends for which*they were given,
if he should be deprived ofhis moral image, which at last prov
ed to be the fact. This shows what our first parents were, when
they came from the hands of their Creator. Accordingly, when
they were deprived of the moral image of God, they still had
all the other appetites remaining, which were necessary to. an
swer the ends for which they were implanted in them. Such
were our first parents, when created. They were moral agents ;
being perfectly holy, they were prepared for the enjoyment of
God ; and their other appetites qualified them to live in this
world, even when sin should enter it.
3. When they ate the forbidden fruit, they were deprived of
the moral image of God ; of that benevolent appetite, with
which they were at first created. They were now in a moral
sense dead, and had no holy principle remaining in them ; and
were in a moral sense also, imperfect, and sinful. In one word,
they were in a state of total depravity. For by total depravity
is meant, an entire want of a holy principle of action. No
trace of holiness remained in them, after they ate, unless their
other appetites were, some of them, holy ; which it- will be
shown was not the fact. — There are only two ways at present
conceivable, by which this truth can be evaded.
1. It may be said by some, that Adam, after he had eaten,
was not wholly, and only in a partial sense, deprived ofthe holy
image of his Creator. It may be said, he had some supreme
love for his Maker still' remaining ; and of course was not toi
tally depraved.
All this may be aSserted. But assertions, without proof,
have no weight. What evidence can be adduced, to prqye
that Adam was but partially deprived of God's moral image ?
The word of God is directly against this opinion. If Adam by
the fall Was only in part, and npt wholly, destitute of love to
God ; then all his posterity have some love to him, when born.
If this be true, why does the bible represent all men as going
astray from'the womb, and as by nature children of wrath, con
demned already ; conceived in sin, and born in iniquity ? Will
God condemn, and send to hell, those who love him supreme
ly ? There is not one passage in the whole bible, which rep
resents unrenewed men as having some supreme love to God,
•remaining in the heart. But they are repeatedly said to be his

26©
enemies, as hating both the Father and the Son ; and in a state
of rebellion, robbing their Creator. Till proof from the bible
is produced in 'support ofthe assertion, that all men have some
supreme love remaining in their hearts, since the fall, or until
renewed by grace ; the assertion ought to be rejected as a dan
gerous error.
Again. The assertion we reject as unfounded is contradicted
by facts, and the experience of meii in all ages. If men, sirice
the lapse of Adarh, have some supreme love for God remaining,
there is no special difference between them, and those called
christians, or saints. For christians do not love God with the
whole heart ; in this respect they are deficient, and imperfect ;
and complain daily ofthe want of more love. Unrenewed men,
then, are really saints, holy in part, and having the same char
acter in reality, with those who are called by the pen of inspira
tion the friends of God. If this be true, why does the word of
God divide mankind into two classes, saints and sinners ; the
unrenewed, and renewed ? Also, if this be true, mankind do
not need the change called regeneration. They are renewed.,
as really as saints are. For when they are born again, they
have a heart given to love God ; but this love is imperfect. In
deed, if the assertion is true, there is no difference among men,
in a moral sense,but this ; some may love God more than oth
ers ; but all love him, and all will be saved; For God will send
none to hell, who have some supreme love to him.
But does the assertion we oppose agree with facts ? Do all
men, in fact, appear to haye some supreme regard for their Ma
ker ? Did the body of the Jews, in the days of Christ and his
Apostles, manifest any true love for-God, and the religion then
taught ? Do the heathen appear to know aftd lave the true God ?
Or do all men, in our day, manifest a supreme love to Him ?
If, for an example, we select those men at this day, who are the
most moral, honest, and upright, yet unrenewed,; what spirit
do they manifest, when sorely afflicted ? If they were to be
stripped naked, as Job was, would .they say as he did, with a
sincere heart, the Lord hath given, and taken away, arid blessed
be his name ? Would they not ratlier display the temper of
Job's wife ? Is there not reason to believe this from the fretful,
murmuring, and complaining spirit, which they frequently mani
fest, when providences are crossing and afflictive ? We know
men will manifest much of what is called good nature, wheri all
events agree and harmonise with their desires. But whatspir-

261
it would they show, if afflicted, and treated as Job was, and per
secuted like Paul ? Would they sincerely adopt Paul's words,
these light afflictions shall work out for us a" far more exceeding
and eternal weight of glory ?
Again. Can all men say sincerely, that they daily experience
that spirit, described in the beatitudes of Christ, Math. 5th
chapter? Can all among us say, they experience daily, that
poverty of spirit, that mourning for sin, that purity of heart,
that hungering and thirsting after righteousness, that meek and
lowly spirit, that love of peace, and that hlessedness in their
souls, which, is given to those who have such a heart ? Do
they know by experience, what the spirit and blessedness are,
described by Christ ? If they have some supreme love in then-
hearts for God, they certainly know by experience the nature of
that spirit, and the blessedness held up to view in that chapter,
and in other passages of the new testament. But those who
converse much with unrenewed men on experimental subjects of
religion, will always find, that, instead of their being acquaint-.
ed experimentally with such subjects, they are perfect strangers
to them. • Inform them that those, who love God in some meas
ure, groan daily under the weight of remaining sin; that they
never lie so low before God as they ought, and wish ; that noth
ing they see, in this or any other world, is so lovely as holiness ;
that they long more earnestly to be freed from sin, and made
perfectly holy, than for their daily food; that they, pant after
God as their only portion, and that it is their Chief concern to
grow in grace, and ripen for heaven. Such feelings are so dis- .
tant from any thing they experience, that they would say, if all
who love God feel thus daily, we have no love for Him. And
such language would appear so strange to them, they would be
ready to say, that persons of this descriptiPn were superstitious,.
fanatical, hypocritical, blind, and deceived. Yet this is the lan
guage of all who love God, according to the bible ; and those
who love God understand such language, their own experience
accords with it. Indeed the" bible, facts, and experience, united
ly testify, that unrenewed men have no love in their hearts for
God; And to say, they have some love remaining, or are not
totally depraved, contradicts the scriptures, and is opposed to
facts, experience, and observation. And this is so evident, but
very few pretend to say, that Adam's posterity have any of that.
supreme love to God, which he had before his fall. Instead of

262
saying all men have some supreme love to God, to evade th«
truth, they generally take other ground, and say,
2. That all men have remaining in them some natural pity,
and gratitude,' and other natural affections, which they call vir
tuous or holy ; hence men are not totally depraved. And it
is true, if any ofthe appetites implanted in Adam, when creat
ed, and which «emaiued in him after he ate, are virtuous and
holy, men are not totally depraved. For if men haveany thing
remaining in their hearts of a holy nature, the doctrine of total
depravity must be rejected.
Here the reader is desired to attend carefully to a few obser
vations,. One is; that when God created Adam, he not only im
planted in his heart a benevolent appetite, or a disposition to
love him supremely ; but he created in him every other appe
tite, which he had and manifested after his fall. Another re
mark is this, that at the time Adam ate the forbidden fruit,
and was deprived of his benevolent appetite, there was nothing
created in him, which he had not before his fall. Some have
seemed to think, that when Adam ate, and lost the moral im
age of God, that then God produced in him an evil, sinful dis
position, which they call a principle of selfishness ; that he nev
er had this, till after he ate. If this be true, then there was a
new something-, very sinful, created in him,, at the time he fell.
This sentiment is without any, foundation. There is not so
much as a hint, given in the bible, which I could ever find, that
something new, and sinful, was then created in him. And such
a supposition answers no purpose ; it will not. help to account
for the sins, which have prevailed in the world, which may not
be as easily accounted for without it; nor does it shun any
difficulty ; but it produces one hard, to be solved, or reconciled
with the moral character of God. Let it, then, be carefully
-noticed, that at the fall there was nothing new created, in Adam,
unless a new heart ; and none suppose this took place at the
time he ate, and lost the moral image of God. The truth is
this, according to scripture representation, that when God gave
Adam existence, he created him with all the faculties he ever
had ; created in his heart all the appetites he ever had ; creat
ed him perfect in his own likeness, both natural and moral.
And his moral likeness consisted of that benevolent appetite,
which the word calls a spirit of righteousness and true holiness.
This is all he lost, when he ate. AU the other appetites or
propensities, with which he was at first created, remained in

263
him entire, after Iris fall. And now, to avoid repetition as
much as possible, the reader is requested to peruse carefully
what is written concerning the appetites and their operation, in
the essays on the appetites, and on moral good and evil, and
particularly on sin. — Then but few remarks here will be ne
cessary, to establissh the doctrine of total depravity.
Now let the reader take a careful survey of»Adam, after he
had eaten the forbidden fruit. He has lost the moral image
of his Maker. He has no benevolent appetite left, no love for
God. His glory is departed. He has none of that love for
God, and men, which the moral law requires. But all his oth
er appetites remain unimpaired. Here consider, what are the
objects, which these appetites respectively love and seek ? For
whatpurposes and ends were they implanted in him ? When
you have read those essays to which you have been referred,
you will see they were implanted in him to be active principles,
stimulating to all those exertions necessary to preserve life,
propagate his own species, to support and nurse men in infan
cy, to relieve the distressed, in a word to promote the good of
society, and the happiness of our race as long as we continue
inhabitants of this world. — There you will find, that his ap
atites are not placed on any other, or higher, or better objects,
lan those of a worldly nature. They will never move him to
seek any other or higher good, than worldly -good, till fear of
eternal death is excited. Hence they are sinful.
For, let me say, his appetite or love of property is idolatrous.
He has no love for God, but he loves property, or riches. This
love for riches is supreme ; it prompts him to seek this object
with an ultimate regard to his personal gratification, without
any regard for the happiness of the human family. For re
member, he has no lovefor the happiness of others. In pursuit
of riches, if he injures others^ defrauds them, and transgresses
the law, he will not care, if he personally suffers no evil by it.
Is not that love, which is placed supremely on this world, when
there is no love for God, sinful ? Is it not loving and serving
the Creature, and not the Creator ? Does not this world stand
higher in a person's heart, than God, when it loves the world,
and at the same time has no love for the Creator? Is not this
idolking the world, having another god and portion, distinct
from the true God ? Will not this love for this world,;where
there is none for God, lead him to seek it as his portion ; to
forsake the fountain of living waters, and go after a broken

264
pistern ? Will it not lead him to reject Christ, and turn his"
back upon the gospel supper, when" he finds to embrace the
Savior, and come to the supper, he must give up, and deny all
the supreme regard he has had for this world ? And is not
this, in fact, the way in which mankind do treat gospel provi
sions ? Now what I have observed concerning this appetite
, for property, is true with respect to all other appetites. They
move men as active principles to seek their respective objects,
to gratify them without any regard for God, and the happiness
of men. But as those, who deny total depravity, have much
to say concerning the virtues of natural pity, gratitude, and
some ' other natural affections, it may be well to give some
more particular attention to these appetites.;
Natural pity claims our first attention. This affection is
a compound of a painful sensation, and a desire to remove its
cause. It is excited by objects of pain and distress. God
has so formed us, that the distress, and calamities of our fellow-
men shall excite in us a painful sensation. The appetite, which
we call pity, is given to all men ; and its nature is such, that
the calamities, which befall men, shall give us pain. The rea
son of this is apparent, when we consider the aim and design of
pity. -It moves us to relieve others in their distresses. And
the end obtained by offering help to objects' of distress, is the
removal ofthe pain in us excited by the evils others suffer.
This presents to our view the cause of the pain we feel. It is
the evil, calamity, or affliction, which we see others are suffer
ing. It, also, presents to our view the object of pity, this is
the entire relief of the sufferer. And the reason why we afford
them relief is, that the pain we feel, when they suffer, may be
removed. As soon as we are relieved of the pain excited by
distress, pity ceases to operate. Our desire to help, and do
them good, subsides. This is pity, and such are its operations.
And it is easy to see Why God has implanted this appetite in
us. Many in a distressed, helpless state, would die, if no one
assisted, them. And as men in a fallen state have no benevo
lence to influence them to afford relief to sufferers, and God
knew this, he implanted this appetite to answer the end of be
nevolence in this particular way; Still it is very unlike benev
olence in its nature. For benevolence delights in the happi
ness of others, and desires to remove pain in others, because it
is inconsistent with their happiness ; and at the same time to
promote their positive happiness, and especially that which is

265
durable and eternal, or which consists indie enjoyment of God.
Hence its operations are wholly different from those pf natural
pity, except in one particular, which is the mitigation and re
moval! of pain in a sufferer.
Natural pity moyes us to afford relief to a sufferer, and re
move his pain and distress. As, soon as this is dppe w-e feel re
lieved, our pain is removed, which his calamity excited. Here,
then, we stop, and are now satisfied. And then probably we
shall invite him to some place of merriment and vanity, to
drinking and feasting, that he may forget his sufferings. This
is certainly eiiticing him to spend his time and money in un
lawful ways. And if we have business to transact with him,
some bargain to make, we shall, if possible, take the advantage,
and defraud him. It is certain there is nothing in natural pity,
which will prevept our enticing him into sin in many ways, or
which will keep us from injuring him in his character,proper-
ty, or person. This is proved by facts. For if we see others,
towards whom we have always been inimical, in a distressed,
helpless, dying state, natural pity will excite us to relieve them.
And as soon . as they are relieved, and our pain e.xcked by
their sufferings is removed ; we pursue our former course pf
hostility towards them. Hence it is not their happiness, whiph
pity aims at ; it aims at nothing further, or better, than a re
moval ofthe pain we fepl, when we see others in a calamitous,
helpless state. When pain is removed we shall treat them as
we do ourselves, after we have recovered from a state of dan
gerous sickness. Then how often it is, that men proceed intije
same sinfol courses, they had followed previous .to their sick
ness. So we shall treat men, whom we have assisted. in distress,
as we always had done, previous to their calamity. Jf ^ve had
always been, enemies to them, we shaill continue to injure them,
as soon as the pain is gone, which their distress excited iiji us.
A thousand facts might be adduced to prove this truth-
But heuevplence, which ever aims at the happiness of others,
will act only remove calamities others suffer ; but when they
are remold, will seek to promote and increase the person's
happiness in every consistent, possible way. Benevolence is .
not satisfied with a mere removal of distress in another ; and
Will never be satisfied with anything short pf their entire hap
piness. This shows, that the object and aim of benevolence
and natural pity, are as different as light and darkness, except
in one particular. Qne.aipos at the happiness pf others jin.af-
9

266
fording them relief, when in distress ; the other aims at nothing
higher, than its own relief from the pain which the sufferings
of others excite. As they cannot mitigate their own pain only
by affording assistance to sufferers., they assist them. And as
soon as their pain is removed, they will treat the person they
had helped as they always had before done.
Again. It is a known fapt, that natural pity may be almost
wholly eradicated from the human breast, by a very frequent re
petition of calamity and suflering. Hence soldiers, by daily
beholding death and carnage, and hearing the cries and groans
ofthe wounaed and dying, become so hardened, that such
scenes of suffering excite scarcely any emotion or pity. They
see the wounded and dying, hear them cry for help, yet pass
on without affording them any relief. So when epidemical
diseases prevail in a place, and many die every day, in a short
time the living are so hardened they pursue their own ways,
free in a great measure from eyery painful emotion. This is
a fact, though it is not my design to enlarge upon it, or show
why it is thus ordered.
But the more frequently instances of calamity occur, and the
greater they are, benevolence, instead of being hardened at the
sight, becomes more engaged to remove distress, assuage grief,
and listetrto the cries of sufferers. Every thing will be done,
which can be done, to remove every evil, and promote hap
piness. Is it not now evident, that there is a wide difference
between benevolence, and natural pity ? As they differ so ma
terially in their nature, all, who, will grant that benevolence is
a moral virtue, or holy appetite, will say that natural pity is not.
They will grant it is a selfish appetite. And that the person,
Who is-possessed of it, aims at his own freedom from pain, the
peace and quietness of his own breast, in relieving distress ;
just as he aims at removing the painful cravings of hunger,
and his own personal happines in seeking and eating food. In
this he does not aim at the happiness of others ; and whether
they are happy or not is a matter of indifference to him, if he
can remove his own pains, and promote his own good by eating.
So a person influenced by natural pity, feels no concern for an
other's future good and happiness, if he can by assisting him in
his present distress remove all the pain he feels, and, quiet his
own breast. , As soon as this is done, be has no feeling for the
future happiness of his fellow mortal ; and instead of promot
ing it, in many ways he injures him, as facts prove many, .b^vv

267
done. Hence natural pity, where there is no benevolence, is
selfish in all its operations ; yet it answers the end in many
cases for which it was created in the heart. And as soon as
any one has a clear view of the human mind, and is acquaint
ed with the laws of our nature by which we are invariably gov
erned, and sees for what end they were created in us ; he will
then see readily, that natural pity is wholly unlike benevolence,
and is selfish in its operations.
We may next attend to natural gratitude. What is it? A
pleasant sensation is experienced ; and a desire which corres
ponds with it, according to the nature of the object which ex
cites the pleasant emotion within.^-A pleasant, agreeable sen
sation, with an attendent desire, constitutes the affection of grat
itude. The difference between natpral gratitude and benevo
lence niayjje easily seen. The object of benevolent gratitude
is the divine goodness. This is the object, which excites in the
heart of the benevolent man pleasant and delightful emotions.
His desire is to enjoy the divine goodness more sensibly, to have
his pleasant emotions continued and increased ; and to have
the goodness of God displayed, and diffused to the highest pos
sible degree. This is desiring the glory of God.
In natural gratitude, delightful emotions are excited by the
temporal blessings enjoyed. Worldly prosperity is the object
and source of the pleasure felt in this case by the selfish man.
And his desires, which arise from his pleasant emotions, have
for their object the continuance, and increase of worldly pros
perity ; that the pleasure this affords him may be continued
and increased. Here we clearly see, that the objects which
excite agreeable sensations, and the desires attending them, are
very different in their nature. Worldly prosperity is the ob
ject which pleases in natural gratitude, and divine goodness
the pleasing object in benevolent gratitude ; and the desires of
the former are for the continuance and increase of temporal
blessings ; and in the latter the desire is for the display and great
est diffusion of divine goodness. Hence these affections are
very different in their nature. One is benevolent, and the oth
er is selfish. What is explained and asserted as truth shall now
be proved.
1. The vilest men have natural gratitude. •» They common
ly have the most of it ; and all have it in proportion to the
love they have for this world. The more they love the world,
*he greater will be their delight when their goods increase. Yet

26®
the more they love this world, so much more they transgress the
law of God in a'tnasring wealth; They are in the same pro
portion forgetful of God, and their duty, and engaged after the
world as their portion. All this is Verified by facts daily. Who
idolise this world ? Who are most apt to forget God, restrain
prayer, defraud, and oppress ? Surely those, who love this
this world most, and are most pleased with earthly good. Now
can that gratitude, which is most delighted with worldly bles
sings, and has the strongest desires after them ; and which in
variably forgets God, and seeks things below as a portion ;
have ahy thing morally good in it ? Is not such gratitude ev
idently selfish and sinful ?
2. Compare the man mentioned iri the gospel, who pulled
down his granaries to build greater to contain his goods, with the
apostle Paul, who relinquished all earthly good, and laid down
his life, for the sake of diffusing the goodness and love of God
through this world in the salvation of souls. And remember
the rich man had a great share of natural, and Paul of benev
olent gratitude. Then ask, was the gratitude of these. two men
similar in its nature ? Did it not operate in Paul as different
ly from the operations in the rich man, as -light is from dark*
ness ? If in Paul it was holy, such as the rich man had was
unholy and s,elfish. But it may be said, that we have not giv
en a right definition of natural gratitude. It may be said',
that the object, which excites a delightful sensation, ever im
plied in gratitude, is not worldly good, but divine goodness.
If this be true, then therp is no difference in nature between nat
ural and benevolent gratitude, they are entirely similar. Why
then do those, who deny total depravity, go on the ground, that
natural gratitude is distinct from benevolent,; so that, if men
naturally have no benevolence, yet they have natural gratitude^
which is holy, so they are not wholly depraved ? In my illus
tration I have endeavored to show what gratitude implies, give
it what name we may. And if natural and beiievolentgratitude
are not the same, but are distinct affections ; the definitions
given of them are just. And if just, then natural gratitude is
an unholy, sinful affection, as proved.
But those who deny depravity, to maintain their ground, will
say natural gratitude does delight in God. The evidetice they
bring for this is,, that when a person takes a view of the nu
merous blessings he enjoys, and reflects they are given him by his
Maker, he cries, oh how good God is, how kind to me ; blessed

269
be bis name for such displays of his love. They say, is not
this the feeling and language of gratitude ,; and are not such
feelings holy? Answer. Any perspn, who takes it for grant
ed, that all such feelings when expressed are surely holy, has
no just views of human nature, and may in many ways be im
posed on and deceived. Let us put a case. A certain neigh
bor has ever been a bitter enemy to you. To let him know
that you indulge no ill will towards him, and as you know he
is a great lover of money, you make him a present of thousands
of dollars. In that case how will he feel, and express himself?
Will he not be highly pleased with the gift ? Wi"! he not
thank you for it, in language which will express much friend
ship for you ? Would this be inconsistent with his feelings of
hatred towards you ? For he expresses no more, than a high
pleasedness with the gift. All this he might do, yet to morrow
curse you, if you should in any way oppose him. Not only
so, but watch an opportunity to steal money from you, whjch,
he knows you have by you. I have shown in the essay where
the affections are formed into distinct classes, that if you gratify
a person's primary, and secondary feelings, he will appear to
love you, and view you as a friend ; yet if you oppose him in
his pursuits, he will hate you. So it is with men in their con
duct towards God. If he bestows plentifully on them those
blessings, which they love, they will manifest many feelings,
which appear like love and gratitude ; yet if in his providence
he should sorely afflict them, as he did Job ; they would mur
mur, complain, and act like bullocks unaccustomed to the yoke,
as the Jews did ip the wilderness. They would give full evi
dence, that at the time they expressed so much gratitude, it was
not God with whom they were pleased, but solely on account
of the blessings given them. Then their seeming gratitude all
disappear*. Hence when the definitions giyen of natural and
benevolent gratitude are attended to, and die argument brought
to prove the difference there is in their nature, every person
will grant, that natural gratitude is a sinful, selfish affection.
For if this gratitude has the nature of benevolence in it, it does
delight in the goodness of God, in his character as just, as well
as merciful, and will delight in the happiness of others. If this
be a fact, why do not all men, who have it as our opponents
say, seek- the glory of God, obey and serve him, and do all in
their power to promote the happiness of man, and have their
whole conduct harmonise with the nature of an affection, which

270
is placed supremely op God? Instead of living according to
the nature ofthe gratitude contended for ; they live in opposi
tion to it, and just as all men would, if they highly valued the
blessings given them, yet had no love for God, or their fellow
men. Those, then, who assert that natural gratitude is a holy
affection, ought to prove it does delight in the whole character
-f God, and in the happiness of others, whether friends or
foes ; and that the conduct of all men does correspond, in some
measure, with this love tp God and man. Till they have prov
ed all this, their assertions have no weight, and this gratitude is
only a love for self, and the blessings necessary to its gratifica
tion. , It is also contended, that natural affections are holy, such as
the mutual love of husbands and wives, parents and children,
brothers and sisters.
If any persons had a clear view ofthe nature of holiness, or
benevolence, how could they assert, that natural affections are
holy in their nature, and so men are not totally depraved,?
The nature of holiness has been described in the essay on that
subject ; I shall, therefore, repeat no more than what is really
necessary in this place. It has been shown that benevolence,
which comprises all holiness, delights ultimately in the happi
ness of others, Pr in the greatest felicity of God's kingdom :
and that this is the ultimate object of all its desires : and that
foe lives of all who have benevolence, will: agree more or less
with that good, which is ultimately loved and desired fpr its own
sake. It wjll) therefore, as readily incline such to seek the hap
piness of enemies, as of friends ; and the happiness of all men,
as well as that of relations. This is the nature of holiness ;
and no affection is holy, unless it has this nature, and will op
erate in this manner. ' •
But have natural affections this nature ; dp they operate, in
this manner? Do such appear to regard, and seek the hap
piness of all men ; of enemies as well as friends, and of all those,
who are not by blood or descent related to them? No. Natur
al affection does not embrace all men ; and extends no further,
than to the circle of a few relatives. Beyond this circle natu
ral affection manifests nothing of the nature of real benevolence.
It is a known fact, that husbands and wives may love each oth
er with ardent affection, yet live at enmity with all around them,
for years, yea their whole lives ; and instead of desiring and
seeking their happiness, may, and often do, act a part hostile

271
to them, and calculated to lead them on in (he ways of sin, and
to final perdition. Is this benevolence ? God has created in
all men natural affections ; or an appetite, which is an active
principle, and which operates in love to all near relatives. His
design in this is very evident. It is a principle, which inclines
men to propagate their own species, to nurse persons in infan
cy ; to seek each other's comfort and happiness, and promote
harmony and peace among relatives. If all men were perfect
ly benevolent, that principle would incline them, to promote
these objects ; and then there would be no need of natural af
fections. But God knew that man would, after the fall, be
born without any benevolence ; and that some other active
principle would be necessary to propagate, and promote the
peace and happiness ofthe human species, so far as to render
their existence here somewhat comfortable. The principles,
called natural affections, were created to answer these purposes,
and no others. Hence they never move men to seek the good
of any, but their relatives and, particular connexions. How
can any consistently view natural affections as holy in their na
ture, which are so limited ; which never incline them to pro
mote the happiness of more than one in ten thousand ofthe hu
man family ?
This is not all. Natural affection does not oppose the reign
of sin, which is the final ruin of our race. It does not oppose
the prevalence of sin in relatives, any further, than it militates
against their worldly prosperity. Hence the reason parents
in fact do, in a thousand in.stances, set an evil example before
their children ; justify them in those vain amusements, which
lead to their final ruin ; aud exhort them to follow the customs
and fashions of this world, as far as is consistent with their tem
poral support ; and say, or do, little or nothing to turn them
from sin to holiness, or from the service of satan to the service
of God. Indeed, notwithstanding the influence of natural af
fection, it is a fact, that thousands, of parents travel the broad
road to final ruin, and by their example lead their children af
ter them in the same way, without any remorse or compunction.
And if all the parents in this world were to live and die desti
tute of that benevolence, which loves God supremely, and ulti
mately seeks the highest happiness ofhis kingdom, it is certain
they would perish forever, and their childreri with them, if they
followed their example. How can there be any thing ofthe
nature of holiness, or benevolence, in those affections which

272
will incline men to travel the road, even to death, which will
land them in hell ? This would be a new and strange kind of
holiness. It is a fact, that natural affection is not hostile to the reign
of sin in our own hearts and lives, or in those of our relatives,
and iri the rest of the world, in any instances in which it does
not oppose worldly prosperity. Hence natural affection in
clines no person to listen to gospel invitations, to renounce the
world as a portion, and come and put their trust'in Christ for
eternal life. It does not incline any person to do this himself,
or to persuade his relatives and others to do it. Hence, al
though all men have natural affections, yet the world is filled
with sin and misery. Wpuld this be the fact, if all men had
real holiness, or benevolence ; and were influenced as much by
it, as they now are by their natural affections ? No, if this
were the fact, we should sPe the fruits of love, friendship, and
righteousness every where prevail. Mankind would lead lives
as different from those they now live, as light is from darkness.
"Indeed we cannot view this subject in any true light, in which
it will not appear very evident, that natural affection has noth
ing of the real nature of holiness in it. And all that can be
said is this, that in one or two particulars it has the resemblance
of it ; but not its nature. If all would,' with candid and unbi
assed minds with the light they have, form a just opinion con
cerning natural pity, gratitude, conjugal, parental, filial, and
fraternal affections ; they would say, these active principles are
necessary to the temporal happiness and prosperity of man, in
a World destitute ofthe principle of holiness,' and in some good
degree answer the end for which they were implanted ; yet they
have not, in their nature and operation, any thing ofthe real
nature of holiness or benevolence. Hence these natural appe
tites or principles are no arguments, disproving the doctrine
of total depravity. Men may have these principles, yet be to
tally depraved. In fact these principles are so far from beirig
holy in their nature,'they are sinful, arid do in thousands, of in
stances influence men to commit sin. How often has the love
parents have for their children led them to defraud, arid oppress
their fellow men, for the sake of acquiring' property to bequeath
to their children when they die. The nature of their love is such,
it will lead them to do any thing however sinful to promote
the credit, the honor, and the wealth and worldly prosperity of

273
their children, as far as is consistent with their own honor and-
safety ; and in fact have done it.
It was the love Jehu had for his children, which, as one prin
ciple, led him to commit all the sins he did commit to gain the
crown of Israel, and secure it to his posterity. Love to child
ren was one principle, which led Jewish parents to persuade
their children to live in idolatry. The love the Pharisees had
for their children was one principle, that led them to entice and
persuade them to reject Christ as the true Messiah. The love
heathen parents have for their children, leads them to initiate
them into all the superstitions of heathenish idolatry. And love
to children is one principle, which induces parents to lead their
children into all the errors and sins in which they have indul
ged themselves. Would real benevolence lead men to embrace
errors, and live in a course of wickedness and rebellion against
Gpd, and persuade their children to do the same ? No, benev
olence enlightens the mind, hates every error and sin ; and
leads all governed by it to shun errors, fight against sin ; and
persuade, if possible, their children to do the same. It appears,'
then, that natural affections are so far from being'holy; that
their operation is sinful in all, in whom benevolence is wanting.
Hence, as Adam when he ate. lost the holy moral image ofhis
Maker, and had no principles of action remaining in him, but
those appetites which were necessary to his well being in this
life, and of which mention has been made ; and as it now ap
pears, that these have nothing ofthe nature of real holiness in
them, but are sinful in their operation in all destitute of holiness ;
the doctrine of total depravity is proved, and established on a
permanent foundation.
Those who deny the doctrine under consideration, proceed
on this ground, that men are endued with several distinct, holy
principles of action. According to their reasoning, natural
pity is one ; gratitude, another ; natural affection, another ;
and the harmless good nature, which children manifest, another;
And according to this we possess several distinct, individual
principles of action, each ofwhich is holy. This mode of rea
soning clearly proves, that such persons have not a distinct,
and just view of the true theory of the mind. For if they had
they would be convinced, that no beings with whom we are ac
quainted have more than one individual, holy principle of ac
tion. Holiness is comprised in one, simple, uncompounded
principle of action. An appetite, ©r disposition to be pleased
10

274
with happiness as an absolute good, is holiness. Happiness is
the only absolute good in the universe, which is delighted in,
and sought for its own sake. And a disposition of heart to be
pleased with it, and seek it, arid desire it, for its own sake, is
holiness. This is the ultimate end Pf real benevolence. This
will incline all beings, who have it, to seek the highest possible
measure of happiness iri God's hoiy kingdom.
This is the only principle of holiness in God. He is love.
He rejoices in the happiness of other beings. He esteems hap
piness as a good in itself, an absolute good. His love to it in
clined him to create beings capable of happiness ; and to give
his Son to redeem sinners. In a word, it is this love, which .
moved Him to display all his attributes, and diffuse arid com
municate all his fulness perfectly and entirely; for the sake of
producing ultimately the greatest possible measure of happiness,
in that holy kingdom which is to exist forever in heaven. And
let it be remembered, there is every reason to believe, that the
happiness of this kingdom will be eternally increasing ; and in
this view we may consider, his attributes in the highest degree
displayed, and his fulness perfectly diffused, or coirimunicated.
This love, or simple uncompounded disposition in God, viewed
as an eternally active principle, is sufficient to account for all
the actions of Deity, appearing in his works, or his Word. All
he ever did, or said, may be traced back to this active, self-mov
ing principle. Hence every thing is from him as the self-mov
ing cause. And we do not read in the word of God of any
other principle, which influences and governs Him in all he
does. God is love ; he so loved the world .; 'he first loved us ;
herein is love ; so every where love is the first, moving cause ;
all things are ascribed to it as the eternal fouritain of good.
And there was no necessity for the existence of any other-holy
principle. in God. This one is sufficient to account for every
thing' he ever said, or did. This moved him- to employ his wis
dom in forming a platf of operation, and his power, or will, -in
carrying it into full execution ; which plari includes all his
works, and words.
Holiness in angels is a disposition, of the same nature. "Arid
they need only this one, simple, active principle, to incline
them to seek the greatest happiness, and serve God with all
their might. And holiness in men, in saints, is the same love,
or disposition which delights ultimately in happiness, and in
clines them to desire and seek it as the greatest good. Hence

275
all holy beings have the same holy appetite,' or disposition ;
they all seek the same object as their ultimate end ; and of
course they will agree, and harmonise, in all they say and do,
which proceeds from this principle. According then to Christ's
prayer, they are and will be forever one ; one with each other,
one with God, and with Christ ; they will be perfect in one.
Now one simple, uncompounded, holy principle of actipn is
sufficient. No being needs another to render him perfect.
For there is but one absolute good in the universe ; but one ul
timate end, which ought to be sought ; which is the greatest
happiness of God's holy kingdom. Accordingly, no being we
ever heard of has any more, than one holy principle in him.
This is all the law of God requires. Thou shalt love the Lord
with all thy heart, aud thy neighbor as thyself. This love, if
perfect, is all the holiness the law requires. And the word of
God uniformly speaks the same language. Hence all holiness
consists in one simple, uncompounded, active principle, which
I have for the sake of perspicuity called a holy appetite, to dis
tinguish it from all other appetites with which men are evident
ly endued.
, All the appetites of men, holiness excepted, are created in
them to answer particular distinct ends, or purposes, while they
live in this world, and are destitute of holiness. Thus the ap
petite of hunger was created in us, to prompt us to seek food for
the nourishment ofthe body, and to relish it while eating it. As
far as food is obtained, this appetite is gratified, and its end is
answered. It never moves man to seek any thing else as an
end. It inclines him to use all the means necessary to his end.
The sexual appetite is created in men for the propagation
of our species. As far as this end is obtained by it, its end is
answered. Hunger does not incline us to seek this end ; nor
does the sexual appetite incline men to obtain food. They are
appetites, which incline men to seek different, and distinct ends.
Natural affection, or an appetite in parents to be more pleas
ed with their own children than with others, is given to move
them to nurse and provide for their children in infancy, and
through life*; And the love children have for their parents in
clines them to obey them, and support them when old ; and
their love for each other is necessary to unite their exertions in
promoting the peace, prosperity, and happiness of the family.
As far as these ends are obtained, natural affection is gratified.
Such affection never moves them to geek the. good of any but

276
i ¦
their relatives, unless the good of others is necessary to their
own. And natural pity is an appetite created in us, to incline
us to help and relieve each other in calamity and distress. And
this is requisite to the preservation and comfort of the human
race. But when persons in an afflicted, helpless state are re
lieved, then this appetite is gratified, and its end obtained ; and
it seeks nothing further, and will cease to operate, until anoth
er object pf distress meets the eye, and excites pain in the be
holder. And all the appetites created in man, however. many, are
designed to move us to seek these particular distinct ends, ne
cessary to our being and, happiness ip this world. But not one
of them delights in happiness as an absolute good, or seeks it
as an ultimate end. And if the human family were all as per
fectly holy as Adam was at first, or as saints are irt heaven,
these appetites would not have been needful, nor have been
created in us. ' For benevolence would have inclined all men
to seek all the ends, which these appetites incline us to seek.
But as God knew that holiness would be '"lost, he created those
appetites in Adam and all his posterity, to supply the Want of
benevolence in some measure, while we live on this earth.
Hence they vyill not be needed in heaven, where all are perfect
ly holy ; and there they will never operate, if they exist. — It is
very evident, then, that not one of these appetites partakes of
the nature of holiness or benevolence. Hence our having them
is no evidence of holiness in us, pr any objection to the doctrine
of total depravity. While Adam was perfectly holy, and gov
erned entirely by his benevolent appetite, those other appetites
would be regulated by it ¦; and never be indulged to excess in
any thing, or in the pursuit of their respective objects in any
unlawful way, or in any manner inconsistent with the end and
desires of benevolence. They would be so regulated and gov
erned, as never to lead him to do any thing contrary to his be
nevolent designs and desires. Hence theywould do no harm.
Such OEder, and harmony prevailed in Paradise previous to the,
fall. ,
But when Adam ate the forbidden fruit, he forfeited the con
tinuance of his benevolent appetite, and was deprived of it.
Then -he had no holiness existing in his heart, and was a sinner,
spiritually dead, and totally depraved. For as holiness is the
only holy principle existing in any being, as we have seen, the
moment this was lost, he was perfectly destitute of every trace,

277
and operation of a holy principle. And this is the principal
thing intended by total depravity.
.But his other appetites all remained in full vigor, not lessen
ed, or impaired in the least degree. And all his posterity are
born destitute of holiness, with the same appetites which Adam
had. For he begat a son in his own likeness, the likeness he
had after he sinned.— -Now these appetites remaining in him,
sound and unimpaired, were the only active principles in his
heart. By them he would be governed in all his conduct.
They were the laws ofhis nature, by which he would be as in
variably governed, as he previously had been by his benevolent
appetite. These appetites would lead him to seek the respec
tive ends, which were pleasing to him. And as these appetites
were not pleased, or had any feeling or desire for any other
objects or ends, than those of a worldly nature, the world was
now his supreme pbject, his god, and only portion. They in
clined him to seek every object which pleased the appetites cre
ated in him, and still remaining.
Is it not easy then to see, that Adam- and his posterity would
love the world, its riches, honors, and pleasures ; and seek them
as their only, and highest portion and good ; as we see in fact
they have done ever since the fall? Will not every one go af
ter the objects which please his appetites, without any regard to
God's glory, or the happiness of their fellow men, any further
than might be requisite to their own personal gratification ; just
as we see they have in fact lived from age to age ?¦— Indeed
Adam, or any of his posterity, if they had understood-clearly
the principles and laws of our nature by which we are invaria
bly governed, might have foretold, then, how all men would
in general .conduct through the whole of their lives, in- case no
renovation or alteration should take place in the laws, of their
nature. Adam might have said, my posterity will never seek
each ,other's happiness, or the glory of God ; they will never
aim at any other, or higher, or greater good, than what the
objects of this world will afford them. The world now is, and
will be their god, their portion ; and as such they will seek it.
They .will' disregard the authority of God, his law, and gov
ernment; and livein rebellion, robbing him of his. due, and of
every thing they owe to him. And if God send a deliverer to
save them, according to what is implied in the promise thai, the
seed, of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head, they will re
ject him. For they cannot embrace and serve this Savior,' un-

278
less they renounce the world as a portion, and deny self, and
keep his benevolent precepts. They will, therefore, unitedly
say, we will not have this man to reign over us. And thus they
will live and conduct, each one through his life, and perish.
They will never any more return to their allegiance to the king
of heaven, unless God should again restore to them that benev
olent appetite, whiGh we haye lost by eating the forbidden
fruit. All this any one, who understood the laws which govern
moral agents, might have predicted. And, all that is said in the
bible, of men in their natural state, harmonises with the gener
al representation.
And now those who deny total depravity are desired to ob
serve carefully, -that after Adam had lost the moral image
of God, all his other appetites were placed supremely on this
world ; and the same is true of all his posterity. And if can
did, will they not own that a supreme regard for this world is
idolatry ? And of course that all the operations, all the desires
of their appetites, are sinful ? They are represented in this
light in the word of God ; that mankind serve and worship the
creature and not the Creator. It is true, that men love food,
and all the means necessary to it. But this leads them to seek
the world as their only portion. Parents love their children,
and this leads them to seek their worldly prosperity only, and
as their highest good. And all their seeming gratitude is no
more, than their delight in worldly prosperity ; and the pity
they manifest towards objects of distress, aims at nothing more
than freedom from the pain they themselves feel, when they be
hold distress ; so that as soon as they are relieved, they mani
fest no more concern for their happiness. And as men have no
love for God, or for the everlasting happiness of each other,
they never aim at these ends in any of their, conduct ; and aim
at nothing higher, than to gratify their personal desires. AU
their aims terminate in self gratification ; and will, until a be
nevolent appetite is again restored.
Hence no holy principle is to be found in any unrenewed per
son. And all his appetites prompt him to seek the world as his
portion without any regard for God or the happiness of his
race ; and of course are wholly sinful in all their operations
and .desires. If such characters are not totally depraved, such
depravity« cannot exist. And there is noway to evade this
reasoning, unless we deny the first principles upon which it is
founded. It must be denied, that mankind have that feeling

279
faculty, and those appetites, which have been described in these
essays. If this be denied, then men are not agents, and of
course not moral agents ; our accountability is all a dream,
and all vice and virtue, praise and blame, are banished from
the world. But if it be admitted, that men have this feeling
faculty, and such appetites, which constant experience and facts
prove to be true; then the consequence inevitably follows, that
men, in the sense explained, are totally depraved.
In discussing this subject, I have not quoted those texts
which prove this doctrine. The reasons are, this has been of
ten done by others ; and my design was, to establish the doc
trine as a true inference from a just theory ofthe human mind.
I feel, that this end is now answered. The subject is, therefore,
left to the judgment of all candid readers.

**********
ESSAY XXVIII.
On benevolence or holiness.
" Without holiness no man shall see the Lord."
Various and different opinions, bave been entertained concern
ing the nature of benevolence ; and each one cannot be true in
all its branches. On this subject, as well as others, truth and
error are frequently blended together. Seeing opinions are so
various, a candid examination ofthe subject is necessary. And
the subject is very interesting and important ; for holiness is a
requisite qualification for eternal life. Persons may embrace
false views of the nature of holiness and they may have
that disposition in which they suppose it consists, and on
this ground believe they are the heirsof heaven and with a false
hope feel safe and secure. But at death they meet with an
awful disappointment. For all men will be rewarded hereafter
according to their real character, and not according to their
opinions. -Hence, as holiness is a requisite qualification for
endless bliss, it is all important to have clear, distinct and just
views of its nature.

280
In discussing this subject, I shall aim at truth, and endeavor
to expose spme errors concerning holiness, which have been ad
vanced by great names. — I design to consider the subject ex
tensively, and in its several relations. And,
I. Attempt to describe the nature of benevolence. — To urn
derstand the nature of benevolence, two things are necessary —
a distinct view of its seat in man, and of its ultimate end. —The
mind is endued with several faculties. To which of them does
benevolence belong ? And ultimate ends may be numerous ;
which, then, is the final end of holiness ? To ascertain this is
of the last importance. Because we cannot learn the nature of
any active principle, until we know in what end it ultimately
terrhi nates.
By an ultimate end is meant that object, which is sought for
its own sake ; which is in itself a real, absolute good. — When
we seek any object for the sake of another, it is not an ultimate,
but subordinate object. An- ultimate object is never sought ,
for the sake of another beyond it ; but for its own sake. On/
views and affections centre in it ; with it we rest satisfied ;. arM
they never extend.beyond it, after some other or better object.
When a person has attained bis ultimate object, he has reached
the end in which all his desires terminate ; here he' rests, with
this he is satisfied ; ' and this is the great source of his happiness.
And every moral agent, in this sense, must have an ultimate
object or end." If he had not, he would seek one object for the
sake of another, and the last for the sake of another further on ;
and in this manner would he proceed forever, and never arrive
at any final end. This is not, and cannot be the case. There
must be some object, which is final, and for the sake of which
all other objects are sought. That every moral agent must
have an ultimate end in view, which he seeks for its own sake,
in which his happiness is placed, is a truth so obvious it is need
less to spend any more time in proving it.
The next inquiry then is, what is the ultimate object or end
of benev«lence ? If this can be certainly understood, the na
ture of benevolence will appear' clear and distinct, — All will
agree that whatever is the final end of benevolence, it must be
an object which can be sought consistently with the glory of
God, and the highest good of his kingdom. For all profess
to believe that benevolence is friendly to God, and, his holy"
kingdom'; that it is not hi its' nature or operations hostile toth©
highest good in the least degree. ..

281
Then what object can be sought oh its.own account, which
is consistent with, and in all respects friendly to the divine glory,
and highest good ofhis kingdom ? — It is believed, there is but
one object in the universe, which can be sought as an ultimate
end, which is friendly to the highest good ; and this is happi
ness. But that this may be clearly understood it is necessary
to observe, that the happiness intended is an object or end, which
is sought for its own sake; also, it is not our own personal hap
piness ; but happiness existing in others, distinct from our
selves. The hungry love food, not because it is their property,
but because it is suited in its nature to satisfy hunger, whenev
er, and wherever it can be founds — So the benevolent delight
in happiness, wherever they see it, because it is in its nature a-
greeable to their feelings. Happiness in the abstract is the ul
timate object of benevolence. Herice they delight in it wherev-
1 er they see it, whether in young or old, rich or poor, honora
ble or abased. And happiness cannot exist but in a feeling;
sensible being ; and no where is it ever seen, except in ration
al beings, or beings capable of pleasure and paip. Hence it is ¦
the happiness of such intelligent beings, which is the ultimate
objpct of benevolence. Hence, when it is asserted, that happi
ness is the ultimate object or end of benevolence, it is not our
own which is sought ; but the happiness of others, of God's
holy kingdorii.
Opr personal happiness can never be our ultimate object.
This implies an absurdity. For in this case we must be hap
py in order to, or before we can be happy. We derive our
happiness frorii our ultimate end; this is the object which pleases
and gratifies our desires. Hence the object or source of hap
piness, and happiness, are two distinct objects. And it is ob
vious, that the object or source of happiness must exist in the
order of nature, and of time, previously to our deriving pleas
ure from it. It must exist, and be seen, before it can afford
pleasure, or gratify our feelings. Hence if our happiness is
our ultimate object, our happiness must exist as an object be
fore we can derive any satisfaction from it. Does not every
one see, that according to this theory we must be happy before
we can be happy. If I am now happy, and this is the ultimate
object of my pursuit ; from whenCe do I derive this happiness?
From what object or source ? Surely from nothing. For to
say I derive it from previous happiness as an object, is running
back in a circle forever. — It is plain to all, who reflect, that our
H

282
&wn happiness is not the .ultimate object of any moral agent.
Some may ask, then, why is it so often said, that all men
seek their own happiness ? The meaning of this expression is
this; that all men seek objects, and especially an ultimate ob-
jecti. for the sake of the pleasure they derive from it, or take in
it. For example ; honey is sweet. It is an object of pursuit.
It may be sought for its own sake, and not for the sake of some
further object beyond it. If sought for its own sake, it is an
ultimate objector end. Why is it sought ? What influences,
and prompts a person to seek it? It is the pleasure he expects to
derive from it. He expects it will satisfy his appetite, and gra
tify the desires he has for it. And by doing this, it is to him
a source of happiness ; a source, good in its nature, and on its
own account. Hence the proper use of language in this case
is, to say, honey is his ultimate object or end ; no end beyond
if exists, for the sake of which he seeks it. And the satisfac
tion he expects to derive from it is the reason why he seeks it.
It is this, which gives it the influence of a motive. In this sense
we seek our own happiness. - If we say honey is sought, not
because it is agreeable, then it is an object of indifference ;
and on this ground we act without the influence of motives.
For no object has the influence of a motive, unless it is in ttself
pleasing. ¦*• A person who has a taste for honey, yet has never
tasted it, does npt know itis^ sweet. Hence he may see it, and
pass by it, and never seek .;: and never will, until in seme way
he belieyes it will afford him pleasure. Then the pleasure
expected gives the object the force and influence of a motive.
The truth then is this — the object, )vhich is in itself agreeable
is an ultimate end ; and the reason why we seek it as ultimate,
and not for the sake of some further object, is,' because itis a-
greeable, and suits the relish of the heart. It is in this sense
that all men, good and bad, seek ultimate objects. All seek
them for the same reason, because they are agreeable. This
is the sense in which the happiness of others, or of God's king
dom, is the ultimate object or end of benevolence.
We now ought to inquire, whether the greatest sum of hap
piness is not the highest good, which all ought to seek. It is
generally granted; that the greatest good is the ultimate object
of benevolence. Concerning what constitutes the highest good,
various- opinions have been embraced. Here, I mean to show,
in what the greatest good consists ; and then confute erroneous
opinions.

288
What is the highest good ? If we can clearly show what
constitutes the highest good of an individual, rational, being,
we shall clearly see what the highest good of the universe is. <
For the greatest good of the universe, is the sum of all the good
enjoyed bj' the friends of God. Suppose one thousand to be
the whole number of rational beings existing. Add the high
est goods of these individuals together, and the sum total is the
highest good of this society. This is very evident. Hehce,
as soon as we learn what is the highest good of an individual,
we see at once what is the greatest good of the universe,
And it is so evident, that the greatest measure of happiness
any person is capable of enjoying, is his highest good, nothing
scarcely can make it plainer. It is nearly, if not really, a self
evident proposition. A rational being never does, and never
can, set a value on any object whatever, which does not, and
cannot afford him the least degree of pleasure, or pleasing grat
ification. Happiness is in itself, on its own account, a good.
It is the only absolute good existing. If, then, we are sur
rounded with objects, and behold them, yet they neither please
nor disgust us in the least degree, we view them with as perfect
indifference, and without any emotion, as stones which are in
capable of feeling. In this state we should Apt view objects as
good, or as evil ; or possessing any real worth. But, if ihey
excite in us painful sensations, we view them as evil, as hostile
to ,us. If they give us pleasure, we pronounce them good ; we
set a value on them according to the degree of pleasure they
do, or pan afford. If a person possessed all the riche.s of this
world, and its highest honors ; yet if they did not, and could
not, excite in him any sensation of pleasure, they in fact do him
no griod ; he would be as well without them, as he is with thf-rn;
and he would treat them as perfectly useless things. If he
were perfectly holy, yet this did riot, and he knew never Would,
afford him any pleasure, it does him no good, and is of no val
ue to him. Indeed, to exist, yet feel nopleasure in any thing,
any more than stones do, is no better tthan non-existence. It
is of no service to have existence, unless happiness attends if.
And to exist and be perfectly miserable, is worse than non-ex
istence. For as- happiness is an absolute good, so misery or
pain is an absolute evil. And when any person reflects candid
ly on this subject he must grant, that happiness is an absolute
good, and the greatest happiness of which a rational being is
capable is his highest good. — This cannot be denied with any
consistency.

284
From this it follows, that the greatest sum of happiness ig
the highest good of the universe.— Here it is well to observe,
that rational beings cannot be finally happy, unless they are
holy. For it. is holiness which prepares them to enjoy God,
the only fountain of good. And as all holy, created beings,
are finally to live together in heaven ; it is in this society orily
that happiness will be enjoyed. These holy characters are the
subjects of God, and constitute his heavenly, divine kingdom.
And it is the design of God, that in this kingdom, with Christ
as the head or king, tbe greatest possible sum of happiness
shall exist. And this greatest sum of felicity, existing in this
kingdom, is the highest good of the universe. And the sum
total of the happiness of each individual is the highest good of
this kingdom, and the ultimate end of benevolence.
I say, the greatest sum of happiness is What benevolence
seeks. Some have made it a question, whether benevolence
aims ultimately at the greatest sum, or at making the grpatest
number happy. If the greatest number is the object sought,
then benevolence would be constantly creating beings capable
of pleasure, and making them happy. But we see in fact this
is not the ultimate end of divine benevolence. For God might
create millions more than he really does, and might make all
of them happy ; yet he assures us some will be finally misera
ble ; and misery in a great degree does in fact prevail in this
world, which is wholly inconsistent with this supposition, that he
aims at making the greatest possible number happy. If this
were his end, there would be no need of any misery in this,
any more than ip the world to come. We may then safely
conclude, that it is not the greatest number, but the greatest
sum of happiness, at which benevolence aims. And this is con
sistent with the nature of benevolence, according to the dictates
of reason. When the happiness of an individual is the object,
it is his greatest happiness, which is soiight. For if happiness
itself is agreeable, and for this reason it is sought, then the
greatest sum will afford the most pleasure, and will be aimed
at. Hencewhatever would destroy, or lessen happiness on the
wrfiole, would be avoided ; and whatever,ever3' thingconsidered,
will promote this greatest happiness, will be pursued. Accord
ingly, if suffering a degree of pain for a time will increase a
person's happiness, beyond what it could have been if no pain
had been endured, he would choose to suffer this degree of evil.
On this ground it is, that men daily suffer more or less pain ;

285
they do it for the sake of greater happiness. Hence in a per
fect system of means, when the greatest sum of happiness is
the end, so much evil will be permitted as is really necessnry
to the greatest sum of good finally, and no more. It is in this
view only, that evil can be permitted in the universe, consist
ently with the nature of benevolence ; and it is on this ground
that the final punishment ofthe wicked is justifiable. And as
this is the plan God is in fact executing, we may rest assur
ed that infinite perfection knows it is necessary to the greatest
sum of happiness, that evil should prevail ; and the degree and
duration of its prevalence are determined by Jehovah. It is
now evident, that the greatest sum of happiness is that highest
good, which benevolence seeks as its ultimate end. And that
it is not our personal happiness, but the happiness of God's
holy kingdom-, which is the object of benevolence. This be
ing the end, a holy being will invariably avoid and oppose every
thing, which is inconsistent with the greatest sum of happiness;
and diligently pursue objects, and use all the means necessary
to this greatest sum. As far as benevolence governs, the
means necessary to the greatest happiness will be invariably
and constantly used.
Having ascertained the ultimate end of benevolence, it will
be easy to see what benevolence is, and where seated in the
mind. Benevolence must consist in a disposition to seek the
happiness of God's holy kingdom. It is then a disposition or
an appetite, to be pleased with happiness wherever it is seen ;
and a disposition to seek the increase of it. And it must be
an active disposition. By this is meant, it must be ' a disposi
tion which will excite, prompt, or move a person to seek the
happiness of God's kingdom. And if it is a disposition,
which is pleased, or which takes delight in the happiness ofhis
kingdom on its own account, it will excite, and move a person
to seek this end with all his powers. For the ultimate plear
sure an object affords is the motive, which influences and govr
erns ; it is the spring of action, which puts every wheel in mo
tion. It is then in its nature an active disposition. Its seat
must be in the heart. For this faculty is the seat of all dispo
sitions or appetites, good or bad, and of all the affections. I
call it a disposition. If it be called a taste, or a relish, or ail
inclination, or a preparedness, or more properly an appetite
for seeking happiness ultimately, still it is the same thing in its
nature. It is a simple something in the hejai-t, by whatever
particular name called, which prepares a person to be delight-

286
ed with the happiness of others, or of God's kingdom on its
own account as an ultimate end. And as it prepares him to be
pleased with this object, it will prompt or move him to use all
his powers in seeking and promoting this end. Because there
is no other way by which he can gratify his own feelings and
desires. And every agent will seek the gratification of his de
sires. This is too evident to be denied. And it is self-evident,
that where there is no feeling there is no^principle of action.
And where neither pleasure nor pain is -experienced, there is no
feeling. Painful or pleasant sensations are feelings, and our
only primary, original feelings. Hence they are the primary,
and original principles of action. And where there are sensa
tions, they must have a subject or something which feels. -This
same thing, by whatever name called, is what I mean by a be
nevolent disposition. And this disposition must be antecedent
to action, to every desire, and affection ; it must be the foun
dation or fountain, from which all actions and affections pro
ceed or take their rise ; as a primary cause must be antecedent
to all the effects it produces. So that every effect can be traced
back to this primary principle. This is agreeable to all sound
philosophy. Hence this disposition is not a volition, or an
exercise ; but the foundation, the fountain of them ; or the pri
mary, original cause in moral agents, from which all their de
sires, affections and volitions proceed.
We have now ascertained two things — the ultimate object of
benevolence, and what benevolence is, and where seated ; and
we see it is the primary, original cause or active principle iri
moral agents from which all their holy affections and actions
proceed. We may now attend to some objections to what is here ad
vanced. '
1. Sorne1 say, it is not the happiness of God's kingdom, but
his glory, which is the ultimate object of benevolence. They
say the scriptures make the glory of God his ultimate end.
Answer. The truth of this affirmation is acknowledged.
For, itis believed, the glory of God, and the greatest sum of
happiness or highest good, are one and the same. No one
supposes an increase of God's essential glory is his end ; but
his declarative glory is his final object. And bis highest de
clarative glory is no more, than a perfect display of his attri
butes. Here it ought to be observed, that there is a difference
between a display, and a communication, ofthe essential fulness
or glory of God.

287 7
In this display of the attributes of God in the material crea
tion, there is no image of him instamped on every thing. But
in the moral world the image or the likeness of God exists.
Man was made in his likeness, both natural and moral. Here
a communication ofthe essential fulness is made ; and also here
is a display of his attributes. But in the material heavens and
earth there is a display of his perfections, but no communica
tion is made ; we no where see his image existing, either riat-
ural or moral. Hence the greatest communication of the di
vine fulness is the highest and brightest possible display of
his glory ; far exceeding any displays made, where there is no
communication. It is therefore certain, that the greatest
communication ofthe divine fulness is the brighest possible dis
play of his fulness ; and this is the same with the highest good,
or greatest happiness.
To illustrate this, we may observe, that an unrenewed mag
bears the natural image of his Maker, but not his moral. In
this state he does not enjoy the highest good. In order to this
he must have the moral image of God instamped on hi,m. This
teaches, that the attributes of knowledge, of power, and of holi-
ness,are necessary to happiness. And men are endued with these
properties, that they may be happy. This is the end. And
this is the reason why regeneration is necessary. God has
communicated bis natural likeness to unrenewed men. And
to saints he has communicateo his moral image. And the glory
of God is displayed with far greater brightness in saints than
in sinners. This clearly shows, that the existence of the natur
al &s moral image of God in man, is necessary to th'e greatest dis
play ofhis glory. It is also evident, that the brighest display
ofthe moral image of God constitutes his greatest declarative
glory ; and the greatest display ofhis goodness or benevolence
is the brightest display of his glory. It is so represented in the
sacred oracles. But surely the greatest display of divine
goodness is seen in the enjoyment ofthe, greatest happiness.
Now every one may distinctly see, what is necessary to the
existence of the greatest created, happiness. 1. The natural
image of God, and 2. His moral image ; Or an understanding
to perceive truth, a, will, or power, to perform actions, and a
heart to feel, and enjoy the sources of endless bliss. A created
being with those properties, perfectly happy, enjoys the highest
good of which he is capable ; especially when in view of those
properties, and. the attendant happiness eternally increasing.
And the greatest communication, and the brightest display of

288
the essential fulness of God, are not made, until the society ex
ists in which his image natural and moral, or the greatest hap
piness, are possessed. This Society must be perfectly blessed,
"in order to the greatest display of his goodness. Hence a so
ciety, in which the greatest sum of happiness exists, is the
brightest display of the glory of God. In this society we be
hold the greatest display of God's benevolence, in the sum of
happiness enjoyed by it. If this society was ever so knowing,
arid perfectly holy, yet not happy ; the displays of God
would be faint and obscure, no greater than what we behold in
the material creation. For the benevolence of God is the
beauty, glory, and 'excellency of his character ; accordingly
the greatest display of his love is a display of his chief glory,
of his excellency, yea the brightest emanation of the Godhead.
Hence in whatever light the subject is viewed, in the existence
ofthe greatest sum of happiness we behold the brightest possi
ble display of the essential glory of God.
Suppose a vessel to contain the most excellent liquid, and a
communication of it to be its highest glory 5 then when com
municated to another vessel, its greatest glory is displayed.
Here the liquid, which is in the vessel, is the highest glory of
the vessel from which it was communicated. The liquid com
municated, and the glory ofthe vessel from which the commu
nication was made, is one and the same object.
God has an infinite fulness of knowledge, of power, of good
ness, and of happiness. This is communicated to the heavenly
-society, in as large a measure as it can receive ; knowledge,
power, goodness, and felicity, are communicated ; they exist
iri this society. And this communication is the brightest pos
sible display of God's essential glory. *\nd as knowledge,,
poWer, and goodness are necessary to happiness, and have no
value only when considered in relation to happiness ; it is evi
dent, that the happiness of this society is especially the bright
est ray of his glory. In the enjoyment of this happiness by
tills society, he is glorified. And when we consider this hap
piness as forever increasing, we see his glory more and more
displayed, until it reaches the highest possible splendor. Ac
cordingly the perfect and increasing happiness ofthe heaven
ly society, and the declarative gl6ry of God, are notdistinct, but
one and the same object. In harmony with this we find, when
the bible speaks ofthe glory of God as his end, it considers his
his glory as displayed and perfected in the felicity of heaven.

289
So that the brightest glory of God consists, in making sinful
men perfectly and increasingly happy in heaven. Herein is
love, the richest displays of his love, which is the sum of all his
glory. In no way is God so much glorified as in the displays
Pf his love or grace ; and in no way i« his love so brightly dis
played as in the final happiness of all the elect in heaven. So
his glory, and the highest good, or bliss, are the same object,
or final end. In the possession ofthe greatest sum of happi
ness, the greatest declarative glory of God consists.
2. Some object and say, that holiness is the supreme good,
and the ultimate end of God in all his works.
Answer. If it is the supreme, highest good, it is his last
end. But it has been already shown, that holiness is not the
highest good. And there is no way to make this more evident,
unless by some illustrations, which will lead persons to look
more candidly at the subject. Those, who consider holiness
the supreme good, generally consider holiness and happiness
the same, and especially to view them inseparably connected;
But facts prove they arenotinseparably connected. For Christ
was perfectly holy, yet endured much suffering and pain. And
any one cannot but see, that if events would finally destroy the
highest good, this would give the most pain to a perfectly holy
being; he would be filled with painful grief, while this would
occasion no pain to the enemies of God. Nothing would af
ford satan more satisfaction,- than the destruction of all good.
Hence they are not inseparably connected. Again. If the
perfectly holy inhabitants of heaven wer^, never to enjoy any
happiness, why would their condition be better, than a state of
non-existence ? Without the enjoyment of happiness, it is as
well not to be, as to have existence. This shows that holiness
without happiness is not desirable, because it could not- be a
benefit to any one. And though in heaven the holy will be
forever happy, yet it is plain they are not the same, and that
holiness is not the highest good. And it is needless to spend
more time in proving a point so- plain. For more evidence
would not convince those, who are now unconvinced. This
-has been proved in other essays.
3. Some object and say, that being in general is the ultimate
erid of benevolence. They view being, simply considered, as the
object of benevolence. This opinion has been supported by
many. Answer. What is implied in love to being in general,
12

290
by those whp embrace this sentiment, I dp not know certainly,
and hence cannot say their opinion is not just.
To determine this point, we must attend to the exercises of
benevolence. These are two. — 1. A delight in the object ;
and 2, desires for its highest good. When we contemplate
simple being, we may view it as incapable, or capable of holi
ness and happiness. Mere matter is being, for it has an exis
tence. But it is incapable of eitbei holiness or happiness.
Hence itis no proper object of benevolent affection. Ration
al beings are capable of both holiness and happiness. When
they are considered as being in general, if love to them means
a delight in their happiness, and desires that they may be per
fectly and forever happy ; if this is what is meant by love to
being in gpneral, the sentiment is just ; or the very same with
that ofthe author. For here the happiness of being in general,
is the object of benevolence. Loving in this sense is only de
siring the greatest happiness to exist, and delighting in it. If
this be noi the meaning of those, who advance this opinion, 1
know not what they do mean ; and can give no further answer,
until they explain themselves so as to be understood.
In connexion with this opinion the advocates of it say, that we
ought to love men in proportion to their quantity of existence.
They say, if another person has a capacity as large again as
mine, and one or the other must die, benevolence will lead me
to surrender life voluntarily, that his life may be spared. And
they use many similitudes to illustrate this sentiment. — Hence
they insist, that if others contain a greater quantity of being
than we do, we oug^$ to love them more than we do ourselves j
and we ought in practice to prefer them to ourselves, to die
that they may live. This sentiment does not seem to accord
either with the laws of God, or his government of the world.
The law says, thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. Now,
allowing this to mean that we shall love our neighbor with the
same kind and degree of love, which we ought to have for our
selves ; yet no one can construe it to mean, that we shall love
him more than ourselves. Also God, in the government ofthe
world, does not exercise love to men in proportion to their
quantity of existence. For some of the greatest capacities are
taken away by death, and, according to the lives they have led,
are made forever miserable ; while others of far less capacity
are permitted to live, and are renewed, and made happy. Ac
cording, to this sentiment Paul should have said, for yon see

291
your calling, brethren, that not many poor, or despised, or
things that are not, are called ; but God has chosen the great,
the noble, and those of the greatest capacities.
There is one sense, in which we may be said to love others
more than ourselves. Suppose one person out often to con
tain as great a capacity or quantity of being, as all the other
nine ; if we wish each of them as much happiness as their ca
pacities will admit, or wish each of them perfectly happy, which
is the same, the sum of happiness enjoyed by one is equal to
the sum of the other nine ; and we have wished so much more
good to one, than to the other. Here we are to observe two
things — 1, the sum of good we wish a person to enjoy — and 2,
the wish or desire itself. We may desire the happiness often ;
and the desire for the happiness of each one may be the same
in fervency ; that is, we have no stronger desire for the happi
ness of one, than we have for the others. In this sense we have
the same degree of love or desire for each one. One is loved
no more than the other. Our desire for the happiness of one is
no greater or stronger, than for another. Yet if one is capable
of far greater happiness, than others, the quantity of good, we
wish him to enjoy is far more, than the quantity we wish to the
other ; keeping in view that we wish all to enjoy as much hap
piness as their capacities will contain. Here the quantity of
good we wish to one is greater, than the quantity we wish to
others ; and m this sense we may love one more than others.
But when we consider the desire ofthe heart, or of benevolence,
we love one no more than others. FPr our desire for the hap
piness of each one is equally strong. But I suspect the advo
cates for loving beings in proportion to their existence mean,
that our desires for the happiness of some ought to be stronger,
than for the happiness of others. If this be their meaning, their
sentiment is erroneous. To make this evident, I will state a
case. Twenty persons are in the same room, and their happi
ness consists in eating oranges. One of the number has oran
ges with him, and proposes to distribute them according' to the
rules of benevolence. He has then iii the first place to ascer
tain the quantity of each person's existence, and finds on inqui
ry, that himself contains more quantity of existence than the
other nineteen. He accordingly says, the oranges ought all to
be enjoyed by me ; and they all must acquiesce in his decision.
He eats and is happy. The others having none, sit without

292
any thing to afford then? any satisfaction. Does this looklike
benevolence ?
Let us now proceed on the ground, that the happiness of
others is the object of benevolence!. Then the persort-who has
the oranges, hands them round to one k. another ; and each one
is more desirous that others should eat them, than to eat them
hi-nself. And why ? Because each one says, I take more de
light in seeing you happy in eating them, than I experience in
eating them myself. Here, then, each one is for giving to
others. In the first statement, the disposition called benevo
lence leads a person to monopolise, to possess every source of en
joyment, if he can make himself believe he has a much greater.
quautity of existence than others. And according to the last
statement, benevolence is of a diffusive nature; it prompts per
sons to give away, and distribute sources of happiness far and
wide as they are able. Because what he aims at is to make
others happy. And his greatest happiness consists in seeing
others happy. Does not this last disposition look far more
like benevolence, than the first ?
Again. The sentiment, that we OHght to love and seek the
good of men in proportion to their existence, or quantity, of be
ing, is impracticable. To be convinced of this, let it be kept
in view, that benevolence aims ultimately at the highest good,
or greatest sum of created happiness. Now, according to the
sentiment we are opposing, to promote the highest good, a per
son must be able to determine two things — 1, who has the great
est quanity of being, and, 2, that to seek the good of those
most, who have the most, oeing, is necessary to the highest good
ultimately. — But in many cases it will be impossible for us to
judge truly, who has the greatest quantity of existence; and
where we cannot determine this point, we cannot know what
duty is, and therefore cannot act. And if we could always de
termine, who did possess the greatest capacities ; yet we could
not know it would be most for the general good, to seek and
promote their good, more than we do the good of those offer
less capacities. For we have reason to believe, that God sees
it is necessary to the highest good, that some men of the great
est abilities should be miserable. It is impossible for us to de
termine with certainty What is, or is not, for the greatest good.
Hence we cannot know it would be most for the general good,
that we should always in practice seek the good of the great
est, more than the good of others. For aught we know we

may promote the greatest sum of happiness ultimately, by seek
ing here the good of the least, more than we do the good of the
greatest mert.
We here see this sentiment cannot be reduced to practice.
And an impracticable sentiment is certainly erroneous. But
if We delight in the happiness of others, and .ultimately seek the
highest good ; then it will be our object to promote the happi
ness of every individual, as far as we have opportunity and a-
bility ; and leave it with God to determine, who shall finally
be the heirs of endless life. This is practicable. And in this
way we keep the law. For we do in this way with the same,
and With as strong a desire, seek the good of others, as we do
our own good ; and love our neighbor as ourselves. This is
certain. Because our happiness consists in the happiness of oth
ers. In order then to our own greatest gratification, we must seek
and increase the happiness of others. Henceour desire to make
others happy is the same, and as strong, as the desire we have
for our oWn gratification. Hence a benevolent man in reality
always has just as much love for others, as he lias for himself.
So that when he is cold and stupid, and but little engaged to
make others happy, he is but little engaged to make himself
happy. This must he the case, so long as benevolence places
its own happiness or gratification in the happiness, of others.
Hence I think this objection is now fully answered.
4. Some object and saj', that all love is resolvable into self
love. They will not admit, that any other kind of love has
existence, and say every species pf love is nothing more or less,
than self love ; and some distinguish between selfishness and
self love ; they admit the former is not benevolence, but contend
that the latter is.
Answer. It is impossible here to affirm or deny, until we
distinctly understand the term Self love. Every species of love
has an object ; in loving there is always something . loved.
And love must always have some ultimate object, or objects,
which are loved on their own account. — What then is the ulti
mate "object of self love? Is the happiness of others, or '.of God's
kingdom, its ultimate object ? If it is, then all other objects
are sought in Subordination to this end. For all agents sub
ordinate every thing to their ultimate end ; every thing in lov
ed and sought with a view to the end, which is agreeable in its
own nature. Here then, self love, if it has the greatest happi
ness for its ultimate object, is the Same as benevolence.

294
And if this is not the ultimate object of self love, what is ? If
it be said, that worldly property, honors, and the pleasures of
time and sense, are sought for their own sake ; then other ob
jects are sought for the sake of attaining these ends. Here
suppose the authority and law of God, and the good ofhis king
dom should be in the way of attaining these worldly objects, in
the view ofthe agent. In this case he will certainly disregard
and oppose the law of God, and the interest of his spiritual
kingdom. For it is the uniform practice of moral agents to
seek whateyer is necessary, to their ultimate end, and oppose
whatever is inconsistent with it. This is the reason why the
divine law is so often transgressed ; because obedience is in
consistent with the ultimate pursuits of men. On the same
ground civil law is transgressed. Hence if worldly objects,
whether riches, honors, or pleasures, are the ultimate object Pf
self love, the agent must oppose the law of God, his cause and
kingdom, whenever they interfere with his ultimate pursuits.
And the law of God is always opposed to an agent, who makes
any worldly object his final end. An ultimate object is always
chosen as a portion, is supremely loved, and the highest source
of happiness. The law of God, therefore, does not allow any
person to make any worldly object his ultimate end ; or any
object, but the highest good of his kingdom. And to make
any object, except the highest good of God's kingdom, an ulti
mate end, is idolatry ; it is making that supreme, and a por
tion, which ought not to be thus regarded. Indeed there are
but a few objects, which are ever sought as ultimate ends by
any agent. Riches, worldly honors, and pleasures, and the
glory of God, the greatest happiness or good, may be sought as
ultimate ends. The glory of God, the greatest sum of happi
ness, and the good ofthe universe, I suppose, are one and the
same. Now then there are four objects, worldly riches, honors,
pleasures, and the greatest happiness, which may be sought as
ultimate ends. Can any one name a fifth, which is not in
cluded in one of these ? He cannot. If an agent seeks the
riches, honors, or pleasures, of this world, either one or all of
them, as his ultimate end, then those constitute his portion ;
they are the objects ofhis supreme affection, and of course they
are his god ; and he is an idolater. This is directly contrary
to the law of God. And while seeking those objects he is con
stantly transgressing that law. And if these are the ultimate

295
objects of self love, it is evidently the same with selfishness ; it
is a principle in the human heart, which is, in its nature and op
erations, contrary to the law of God ; and so far from being of
a benevolent nature, it is directly opposed to benevolence.
But if it is said*, that the greatest happiness, or the glory of
God, is the ultimate object of self love ; then its nature is the
same with benevolence ; yea it is benevolence itself ; and it
will subordinate every wordly pursuit to its ultimate object.
But in this case, why is it called self love ? The advocates of
this sentiment may say, because the highest good, or happiness,
is sought for the same reasons that we seek every other object,
or final end. This is, the pleasure or satisfaction taken in the
object. The satisfaction, or delight in au object on its own
account, is the reason, or motive, which excites all moral agents
to seek any object ultimately. All men, they say, are govern
ed by the same ultimate motives, which are the gratification of
our desires by the object sought. So they say it is proper to
term all kinds of love by the same name ; and to call it self
love, because our personal desires are gratified.
Here we ought to observe, that, although all ultimate ends
are sought for the same reason, because they please ; yet the
ends are very different in their nature. Worldly riches, and
happiness, are very different objects. If we seek the former as
our end, it will lead us to lessen the property of others to in
crease our own. For if one possesses all the property in this
world, others must be deprived of it, and left to live and die in
poverty and misery. Hence in seeking this end we are daily
robbing others ; and while increasing our own happiness, we
are lessening the felicity of others. But if the happiness of an
other is our ultimate end, the only way to promote our happi
ness is by increasing his ; and the more the happiness of God's
kingdom is increased, so much the more our own is augmented.
Hence if all men possessed this principle, to love arid seek the
happiness of others, all would be united in mutually promoting
each others' felicity or highest good. And this is the only end,
which can be sought as an ultimate object, and which can be
pursued consistently with the highest good of rational beings ;
and this is the reason why it ought to be the ultimate end of all
moral agents. — Hence when we view worldly property, and
the happiness of others, as two distinct ultimate ends, we clear
ly see the wide difference between the nature and operations
of these principles in4the heart, from which love to them respec-

296
tVely proceeds. And there is no other way to learn the na*
tore of any iOctive principle, but by considering the nature of its
ultimate end. So, though all men seek ultimate ends for the
same reason, or from the same motive ; yet .we see the active
governing principles within, are Very different in their nature .
and operation, and ought of course to be called by distinct
names. And hence self love is either the same principle with
benevolence, or it is ofthe same nature as selfishness. And as
all beings are governed by selfishness or benevolence, those
different active principles ought to be distinguished by distinct
names. Having answered the principal objections, which might arise
against the description given of the nature of benevolence, which
occurred ; I now proceed,
II. To attend to the operations of benevolence.
The ultimate end of benevolence is the greatest sum of Cre
ated happiness ; or, which is the same, the highest possible
good. Andevery thing which exists, whether works, creatures,
or events, will be hostile to tins end, or friendly to it. It can
not be said of any thing, this will never promote nor oppose the ,
general good. For all things, which have existence, have a
tendency to this end, either for it, or against it. It is granted,
that every thing has a nature, which is good, or evil ; and the
nature of all things is according to their ultimate tendency. If
their tendency is to the highest good ultimately, they are good ;
if their tendency is ultimately hostile to the general good, they
are evil.
Now benevolence will always love or hate every thing* ac
cording to its nature. It. will be friendly to every thing, which
is in its nature friendly to the greatest happiness ; and oppose
every thing, which is in its nature hostile to it. Let it also be
kept in view, that benevolence is a disposition, appetite, or rel
ish, to be pleased with the happiness of Pthers, or of God's holy
kingdom. It is an abiding, permanent, active principle in the
heart. It is not strictly speaking an exercise, desire, or affec
tion ; but a foundation for affections. As it is in its nature
exquisitely sensible, every object seen affords a pleasant or
painful sensation, from which desires or affections proceed.
Accordingly desires, or what are generally called affections,
are the operations of benevolence. Desires are what we call
affections. And every affection has an object. Where there
i's a desire, there is some object desired ; where there are love

297
and hatred, there are objects which are loved or hated. Hence
to have a clear and distinct view of the operations of benevo
lence, we may now attend to their several objects. — The ultimate
object of benevolence is the happiness ofGod's kingdom. Hence,
God will be the first, and supreme object of a benevolentheart. •
He will be loved with supreme affection. He will have the
first and highest regard or place in the heart ; for this obvious
reason, that he is the source, fountain, and original efficient
cause of all good. All happiness is from him, and produced
by him. And being infinite, he is the greatest and best being
in the universe ; and accordingly merits the supreme regard
and affection of all rational creatures. As he is a being of in
finite greatness and majesty, he will be feared, and /reverenced.
Being infinitely holy, and excellent, he will be loved ; will be
an object ofthe highest delight and 'affection. As he is the
Ruler of the universe, who cannot err, or do wrong, the
benevolent soul will put all his confidence and trust in God ;
feel safe in his hand, and rejoice that he reigns. — He will be
the object of all religious worship, and adoration. Such in
brief are the feelings or affections of a benevolent heart towards
God. Next, Christ will be regarded, and honored^equally with the
Father. Every affection exercised towards the Father, will be
also given to the Son. And here the benevolent person will
deny self, renounce all self righteousness, and sufficiency ; and
as a sinful, ruined, helpless creature, come and put all its trust
and dependence on the merits ofthe Savior, for the pardon of
sin, for deliverance, and salvation ; and rely alone on his al
mighty arm to be preserved by faith to endless life. In this
way the saint will come up from the wilderness, leaning on his
beloved. Next in order is the Holy Spirit. All the supreme regard
paid to. the Father will be given to the Spirit, as equal with God.
And as the Holy Spirit, in his office, renews and sanctifies the '
heart, the saint will look to the Spirit for all spiritual light, '
peace, comfort and joy, and for the perfection of sanctification.
Such affections will be exercised towards the holy Trinity by
the benevolent soul.
Another object of benevolent affection is man. According to
thp requirement of the law, saints will love all men as their
neighbors. They will have the same love, in kind and degree,
they have for themselves. For it will be their desire, if Con-"
13

298
sistent, that all may be perfectly happy.. And they can have
no more love for themselves, than a desire for their own perfect,
happiness. And as they have this desire for all men, if God
could consistently save all, they have the same kind and degree
of love for their neighbor they have for themselves. But for
real christians they have a brotherly affection. They not on
ly wish them happy, as they do others, but they also love their
characters, delight in the holy image God has instamped on
them. When men are the objects, such are the affections of
benevolence towards them. And here it may be added, that
they will have the same affection for holy angels they have for
saints; The moral law, also, will be an object of their love. This
law, in all its requirements and prohibitions, tends directly to
the highest good. This is evident. For if all men obeyed it,
perfectly, and never in one instance transgressed it, all would *
be perfectly happy. Hence it may be pronounced to be holy,
just and good ; and^all saints with David will delight in it, and
esteem it more precious than silver or gold, and sweeter than
honey. Thus the law will be loved and regarded by the be- ,
nevolent. And all the doctrines ofthe gospel, as well as its precepts,
will be the objects of love, Because they all tend to exalt
God, and humble- sinful men, and advance the happiness of
God's kingdom. They are holy doctrines ; aud as food will
delight the heart, and nourish the new man. Hence the reason
why saints delight in a preached gospel, and are edified, and
strengthened, and ripened for heaven.
Again. The service of God is an object of benevolent affec
tion. And why ? Became its tendency is to the greatest hap
piness. It is a holy service, and reasonable ; a service due to
God, and the way by which saints actively promote the highest
good of God's kingdom. Hence saints will delight in the ser
vice of God, and esteem it as their meat and drink to do his
will, as Christ did ; yea they will account this yoke of service.
easy, and this burden light. Such are the feelings the benevo
lent have for that service and obedience which are required of
them. We have now exhibited to view the principal objects of
holy affections, in which saints take peculiar delight.
Some objects they will hate: and sin is one. The tendency
of every sin is to destroy that happiness, in which benevolence
ultimately delights. Hence sin must be an object »f their

299
hatred and abhorrehee. All remaining sin, the old man in their
own heart, they hate. They loath and abhor themselves, and
will repent .; will have broken hearts for sin, and be humble,
and lie in the dust, ever crying, God be merciful to us sinners.
They will also hate sin in others, as they do in themselves.
Hence they will be employed in fighting against sin, and sa-
tan ; and strive with all their might to have the kingdom of
darkness demolished. They will therefore, while in this life,
ever experience a warfare within, between the new and the old
man ; and carry on a war against all the^'orks of darkness.
This is sufficient to show, in general at least, what objects
benevolence wi'l love, and hate; and to show what are the op
erations or affections of a holy disposition or relish. By these
operations or affections of benevolence, we may know what
our own characters are, and those of. others. For these are
the fruits of the spirit ; those fruits by which all men are to be
known. As the fruits of holiness and sin are very different in
their nature ; wherever the fruits of holiness prevail and abound,
it is easy to distinguish between saints and sinners. But if the
fruits of holiness are few, faint and imperfect, it is difficult to
discern between the clean and unclean.
III. Describe the difference between benevolence and selfish-
Tiess. The nature of benevolence has been already delineated.
When selfishness is described, the difference between them- will
at once be evident. The selfish man has appetites, inclinations,
and desires. And he daily seeks to gratify and satiate them. In
this his whole happiness consists. The objects he seeks are
those which are agreeable, which please and gratify his desires.
Whatever they are, he will wish to possess them in such abun
dance as to gratify every desire; not only for a day, but through
life ; he will wish for power to obtain, and to increase the sup
ply constantly ; he will wish for power to defend himself in
the- possession of his treasures ; arid for power to enjoy them
with impunity, even if they were unrighteously obtained. Men,
who are daily accumulating property, and use unlawful means
to obtain it, are never willing to be called to an account, and
punished for their crimes. And they never would suffer them
selves to be thus treated, if it were in their power to prevent it.
Hence it is very evident, they not only wish for power to obtain
whatever they love, but to have-power also to possess and, en
joy it with impunity. To be in a state or condition, in which
they can possess and enjoy every object they love with impuni-

300
ty, they must render themselves independent of all beings, and
pqssess power unlimited. This serves to show to what a state
selfish men would exalt themselves, if they could do it. And
we find all such men hate a state of dependence; ; are ever
striving tp render themselves independent of men ; and the more
independent they are, the more they are suited. And they
wpuld render themselves independent of God, if it were possi
ble. They hate as much to be dependent on him, as on their
felipwmen. Hence if they could attain unto that state or em
inence, wfiich is most desired by them, they would, render
themselves independent of all beings both created aud uncreat
ed. Then they could, enjoy all the objects of their pleasure
and delight, without any fear of being deprived of them, or
punished for apy crimes they had committed.
They have no principle within to restrain them from seeking
tiiis state of independence. For they have no benevolence ;
no love for G°d or for men ; nothing.to excite them to seek
the glory of God, or happiness of any of their fellow men, ex
cept those for whom they have a natural affection, and view as
a part of themselves. Being totally destitute of benevolence,
they pursue the objects of their pleasure without any regard to
God, or the happiness of men ; they care not how often they
transgress the divine law, or how much they injure their fellow
men, if they can do it so as to avoid punishment. Nothing
but a fear of disgrace and punishment restrains them. And
they would, if possible, reach a state of such eminence and in
dependence, as to be above all fear of punishment.
Now our inquiry is, of what nature are the objects, which
please and gratify the desires of selfish men ? Daily facts-
prove what it is they love and seek. One object is property.
They wish for food to eat and raiment to wear ; and for every
other object necessary to their convenience, ease, and comfort.
They wish to have property sufficient to satiate ewery desire ;
and to haye a lasting, store, which, will not be, expended while
they live. Hence they are earnest in their pursuit of riches.
And, however rich they are, they never have too much; yea they
never have enough. Hence there is no end to- their pursuit of
riches. Property is not only agreeable to their natural, appe
tites and desires, and is sought for this reason .; but-property is
power; the more they, have, the more able they are to
acquire more, and also to gratify every desire. As property is.
in one sense power, they love it for this reason, and seek it. As

301
with property they gratify their appetites, their bodily crav ings,
it is agreeable to their primary feelings ; and as it enables them
to acquire more with greater ease, it is agreeable to their sec
ondary desires; This shows at once why riches are so agreea
ble to selfish men, and\are sought by them with so much assidu
ity and zeal.
Another object highly pleasing to them is honor, or the es
teem of men, and high, eminent stations of office. Why is
honor so agreeable to a selfish man ? If pride is a primary
appetite or principle of action ; the reason is obvious. Be
cause honor gratifies pride. Then, again, an office is power.
A man in office is invested with authority ; he has power to'
rule ; and with the help of this- poWer he can more readily in
crease his wealth ; and especially when we consider, that profit
is annexed to his office, and is the fruit of it. Again. The
higher they are exalted by any office, the more independent of
men they feel themselves to be. Now when we consider these
facts, it is not strange that honor is an object so pleasing, and
sought with so much zeal. And the more a man is esteemed by
his fellow men, if hp has no office, the more poWer be has to
gratify his desires. For if esteemed, all around him will
strive to please hiiDi and aid him in his pursuits. Hence he en
joys a more favorable opportunity to acquire property, than a
man does, who is hated by his fellows. This men find is a
factv Hence they love to be esteemed ; because this enables
them, with more ease and greater success, to obtain every ob
ject agreeable to their desires. Hence we see why worldly
honors and greatness are so pleasing to men. And especially
why they are pleased with supreme power in any state or king
dom. If a person has authority and power to command, to
rule, and act according to his pleasure with impunity ; he is
sofarabove, and independent of men. No wonder, then, that
men are so ambitious, and have such a thirst for kingly author
ity, and to possess absolute power. For he, who enjoys abso
lute power in a kingdom, can gratify all bis desires, and can
live and act according to his pleasure, with impunity. He has
so far attained to that state of independence which all seek, in
which he can gratify all his- desires with impunity, as long as
he possesses this power. — As such absolute power is the most
favorable to all the desires of natural men, and enables them to
live as they please ; no wonder mankind have sought it with so
much zeal ; and have spilt the blood of millions, arid filled the
world with misery, to obtain it.

302
Another object highly pleasing to man, is the enjoyment of
Sensual pleasures or gratifications. The end pf a selfish man
is the constant gratification of all his desires. In this his hap
piness consists. So the constant enjoyment of every pleasure
is his end ; in this his desires are gratified. Every object he
seeks is with a view to this end. And he wishes to live in the
enjoyment of every pleasure unmolested, free from all fear of
being deprived of them, or punished for any of his unlawful
deeds. And if he can possess the riches of this world, and its
honors, and rise to such authority as to rule and reign accord- -*
ing to his pleasure ; then he has reached the highest pinnacle
of greatness,, grandeur and felicity, this world affortis.-^These
observations show us; what is the end of a selfish man, what ob
jects are most pleasing to him, and what his life and conduct
will be as far as he has power.
All we now have to do, is to compare selfishness and benev-
olerice with each other, and then we shall see the difference be
tween them. The primary operations of selfishness are covet- '
ous. CovetousneSs may, with great propriety, be considered
the first operations or exercises of selfishness. If a person is
hungry, he covets food ; this is only a desire for it to satiate
his appetite. He Will also coVet or desire a sufficient quantity
to satisfy him, not only for a day, but through life. When he
obtains it, he will covet power to defend his possession, that
others may not rob him of it. And if any should think he had
obtained any Pf it by fraud, and pursue measures to have him
punished, he will covet or desire power to defend himself, and
to ward off the stroke of justice, and to enjoy his food and all
his possessions with impuriity,' and without fear of being de-'
prived of them. Such are the operation's of selfishness. And
then" as far as any assist him, and appear friendly to him iri the
pursuit of the objects of his desires ; he will call them friends,'
and treat them in a friendly manner, as far as is consistent with
his own schemes and desires,&; no further. And if any appear
unfriendly, and oppose him in the pursuit ofhis dearest objects,'-.-
or embarrass him in executing his schemes, this opposition will
excite in his heart hatred, anger, revenge, and such malignant
passions ; which will lead him to injure them as far as he can
with safety, and his own honor.
Hence the selfish man has a disposition, which leads him to
accumulate property, and become very rich. He never has
enough. The accumulation of wealth only increases his desire

303
after more. His desire is to engross and monopolise all the
wealth of this world, and reduce all his fellow men to the con
dition of tenants, except a few who are his-children or near rel
atives, and whom he views as a part of himself. And if he
succeeds in acquiring riches, and multiplying the number of his
tenants ; then his cjesire is to usurp power and authority suffi-"
cient to defend his possessions, and to enjoy them with impuni-
- ty, and free from all danger or fear of being dispossessed and
punished. So he will covet power, and monopplise to him all
authority, that he may rule and reign ; and have all around
him revere his name,and submit to his will & pleasure. In such
a state of independence he views himself able to indulge himself,
and to gratify every desire ofhis heart ; or in one wterd, to
live, and swim in an ocean of worldly pleasure. And so far
he feels himself happy, and enjoying all the felicity this world
can afford. In this state of independence he would wish to live
foreyer ; for he has no relish for any other, or higher pleasures,
than those he enjoys. To, rule and reign independently, and
enjoy his pleasures free from all danger and fear, is that high
pinnacle of glory and bliss to which his heart has aspired.
Hence we see what the nature of selfishness is, in all its op
erations. The selfish man is for engrossing, monopolising, all
the wealth of this world, and usurping all power, and authori
ty ; and enjoying all the pleasures this world can afford, with
out any feeling or regard for the happiness of any ofhis fellow
men, except those relative^ whom he views as parts of himself.
This description of selfishness and its operations agrees with
facts, and the word of God. It is evident from the history of
men, and what we daily opserve, that all natural men pursue
riches, honors, power, and earthly pleasures. It is evident,
that all men are naturally ! tyrants ; possessed of a disposition
to act /according, to their pleasure with impunity ; 01; to live
independent, and above all controul. This disposition is ap
parent in children, and is manifested by their lives, unless they
are renewed. And the bible testifies that men have forsaken
God the fountain of all gopd, and have gone after broken cis
terns ; that they go astray from the womb speaking lies, and
have worshipped and served the creature, and not their Crea
tor. |
But benevolence is very different in its nature and operations.
The happiness of others or 0f God's kingdom is its Ultimate end.
The happiness of God's kingdom is the first, and greatest spurcfe

304
of happiness to the benevolent heart. Hence the goad man
cannot promote his own happiness, only by promoting and in
creasing that of his fellow men. Hence he will avoid every
thing, which tends to the misery of men, and seek every thing,
which tends to their happiness. It is the nature of benevo
lence, instead of monopolising, to give and diffuse the means
of happiness among his fellow mortals. Because the more
they rejoice, or the greater their happiness, so much greater is
his own joy. Selfishness and benevolence resemble each oth
er only in one particular, which is this ; all men seek, the ob
jects of their puiisuit for the same reason, because they are
pleasing and agreeable to their hearts. This is the primary
spring of action, or motisvie, which governs all men, good or bad,
and which puts every wheel in morion in the moral world. —
But as the objects which are ultimately pleasing to them are
very different in their nature, their motives differ in their na
ture, and excite them to different pursuits, and conduct in life,
which, manifest widely .different characters. Their motives
lead them to bring forth very different fruit, by which they are
known and distinguished. The benevolent man delights in
the, happiness; of others. This affords no delight to the selfish
man- The, latter is for- engrossing and monopolising every
thing to himself". The former is for giving away and diffusing
the. sources of happiness, among all men, as far as can bp con
sistent with the, greatest sum of felicity. The selfish man sub
ordinate^ religion to his worldly pursuits ; the benevolent sub
ordinates the world to religion. On e loves God and all men ;
the, other has no love for either. On e hates sin as the greatest
enemy to happiness ; the other loves, it, and rolls it as a sweet
morsel under his tongue. One seeks heaven as his home ; the
other wishes to live here forever. Oi le believes God is perfect,
and- will govern the worldj in the wise st and best manner, to ob
tain ,at; last the greatest sum of happ iness ; hence he rejoices
that, the. Lord reigns. The other opposes the character and
gp,verjunjen&pfiGod, because he knot vs, he will call him to an
account, andipmush>him for abVhis e ,vils deeds. One submits
to.tljg will of God vf^itb pleasure. T he other opposes his will,
and would, jender himself independc mt of God, were it in his
power. One chooses to be in the ha nd of God, and at his dis
posal, and every thing he possesses ; because God knows, and
he.dpps not, hPV?, every thing should be ordered for the gener
al (good*. The other cannot endure , the thought of being at the.

805
disposal off Jehovah. One chooses to be dependent, and
receive every gift from God. The other hates dependence,
and to be under obligations tp his Maker. One delights tin
prayer, <and the service of God ; the other hates to pray, and
rejects (the service of God, and serves sin and satan, the enemy
of God. Thus selfishness and benevolence differ in their rae-
tum and operations. This difference originates from the nature
of those objects, which they love and seek an their own account,
and as their ultimate iends. According to the riature of the ul
timate end of a moral agent, will his character and conduct be.
Wehaveseen what is tiae.ultimateendof the benevolent man,-& of
the selfish ; and what of course must be their desires, pursuits,
and conduct in life; that they will pursue courses as widea-
part as the east and west, and as difierent from each other, as
light and darkness, sin and holiness ; which proves that ,the
primary, active principles which govern them, are differeint in
their nature and tendency.
IV. Attend to the excellency and glory of benevolence. —
-The nature of every .tiding is such, that it will tend ultimately
either to good or evil, .to promote happiness or destroy it.
There iSinothing .concerning which it can be said, that it exists
in vain. Nothing is in its nature indifferent, of which it may
be said, this will never, do any good, or any hurti If any thing
in its nature tends ultimately to destroy happiness and produce
imiserj',jis such a thing useful, ;beautiful, and excellent ? No,
we -cannot conceive of any thing, which is morehatefidand de-
fommsd.— -And if any .thing .tends directly and ultimately to
banish imsery;frorm the universe,. and promote the .greatest-hap
piness, what shall we .say of it ? Would it nQtbe,an affront
to common sense, to affirm it was a hateful, deformed thing ?
Must not all with one voice pronounce it good, both ibeautiful
and excellent ?
.And notwithstanding various. opinions and disputes concern
ing what )Gonsti.ttites:beatity and excellency ;. all will at least
)have.tOfacknowledge,thatw&7ity,is6eaMfy ; or, 'in otherwords,
that every thing which tends in its nature to produce the.great-
; est happiness, is beautiful and f excellent ; and every thing,
-which in its.nature tends ultimately to. produce,misery only,is
deformed and hateful,
Benevoleace tends ultimately to the greatest, possible, sum of
happiness. This is its nature. And as it is the primary, effi-
tfierii &W&e ofj happiness inexistence, and the cause, which con-
14

306
tinues constantly increasing it, and renders every thing subser
vient to it, and will eternally preserve and increase it; it is ev
idently the most useful, beautiful, good, excellent, and glorious
quality or attribute in being. Nothing else can equal it in
glory ; and without it, the universe would be full of darkness
and misery. And -this, it is believed will appear more and more
evident in describing the beauty and excellence of benevolence.
Having now shown why it is fit and proper topredicate beauty
of benevolence, and shown in what, it consists, we may attend
to a particular description of it.
1. It is the primary, efficient cause, of all the happiness ex
isting in the universe. All will grant there must be a first cause,
which gives existence to every thing ; and this cause must be
in its nature active ; or it must be a primary, efficient cause,
from which the existence of all things must proceed. This first
cause must have an ultimate end. For every agent must have
an ultimate end, as we have seen. And this ultimate end must
be happiness or misery. For there is nothing else, which is in
its nature, or on its own account, either good or evil,,. This
has been proved. Now as all grant, that God is the firstt, effi-,
dent cause of all things, he as an agent must have an ultimate end \
and this end must be the greatest sum of created happiness or
misery. And with one or the other of these ends he must bp,
ultimately pleased. Such a disposition or relish he must have^,
For nothing else, in any moral agent, can be the subject of
pleasure or pain. Where there is no disposition, no feeling,
nothing can either please or displease. A feeling disposition -,
then he must possess. And he must be pleased ultimately with,
either happiness or misery. As it is not the object here to
prove the moral perfection of God, I shall take it for granted,
that God is pleased with the greatest sum of created happiness; this
is his ultimate end in all his works and operations. And when
we consider how much happiness he has already produced, hpw
every thing is adapted in its nature to this end ; and consider
the great work of redemption, no one can have a doubt, but
that God ultimately seeks the greatest happiness. .
From eternity God saw that the greatest sum of created
happiness was possible, and might be produced. This in its
own nature was an infinite and sublime source of happiness.
Nothing which he could create would^afford him so-much grat-.
ificaction and delight, as the existence of such a sum of happi
ness. To please himself, to giatify to .the; full this disposition.

307
ofhis heart, 'isv what moved and excited Him to produce every
thing which has existence. This disposition, in scripture call- -
ed love; is active in its nature ; is the primary, efficient cause
of all things. Why does he create, or produce any event ?
To please, or gratify this love, this disposition. This disposi
tion, then, moved him as an agent to employ his knowledge,
or infinite Wisdom, to devise and form a plan for the final at
tainment ofhis end. This plan is as extensive as the works of
God, both of creation and providence. It includes all the
Works of creation, and all the events of providence ; and no
work will exist, or event be produced, which is not necessary to
the production ofthe greatest happiness ultimately. All things
are made by him, and (or his pleasure they are and were created.
The disposition ofhis heart moved Him to employ his infi
nite power, m carrying this plan forrned by wisdom into final
execution. Hence by his will every thing is produced. He
said, let there be light, and light was. In like manner, his will
produces every event, and creates every world. He wills, and
it is done. In this way his will is operating, and will continue
to operate, until his plan is fully executed in all its numerous
parts. And this disposition of Jehovah subordinates all things,
through the universe, to the greatest happiness. In producing
and increasing this, his pleasure is done ; his heart is gratified,
and his happiness is infinite.
Hence this love or disposition of God is the primary spring
of action, the first, efficient cause of all things. By it all his
natural attributes, 'his wisdom, his power, are exercised and dis
played in forming, and executing the best possible plan. His
understanding and will, considered as faculties or attributes,
are controlled, directed, and governed by his heart, or his love
for the general good. The attributes of God are all comprised
in three ; benevolence, knowledge, and power, answering to the
faculties in men called the heart, the understanding, and will ;
and they constitute a fulness sufficient for the accomplishment;
of any thing which is possible, or which implies no contradic
tion or inconsistency. They constitute an infinite fountain of
good. In order to the existence ofthe greatest sum of created
happiness, this 'fountain must flow forth in streams ; it must be
diffused, and communicated. And it is this disposition, which
we call benevolence, which puts it in motion ; which diffuses
and communicates itself in streams innumerable. .This foun
tain contains in itself an active principle, which diffuses the

308'
fountain in the displays of wisdom, power, goodness,, and hap
piness ; so that the perfect diffusion or communication of it is
the highest good, or greatest sum of happiness existing ab extra,
or out of itself. The sun is able to emit rays y and this
emission is the light and glory ofthe sun, which emanation ex
ists external to itself, or ab extra, as some phrase it. So the in
finite, eternal fountain of all good contains in itself a self mov
ing, active principle, which emanates, arid diffuses the fountain.
Arid this greatest difl'usion is the highest possible declarative
glory of God; and exists in that holy society of beings in heav
en, who constitute the kingdom of God. In this society will
be forever seen this eternal fountain, diffused perfectly, and ia
its endless increasing happiness, the brightest display of all the
attributes of Jehovah. So that, as has been shown, the great
est sum of created happiness existing externally in this society,
and the greatest declarative glory of God, are one and the same.
Here then we see, that benevolence is the primary, etertial,
active, efficient cause of all good, of aU the happiness, which
does exist, and of all the increasing happiness, which will exist
through endless ages. The constantly increasing happiness of
heaven through an endless duration, is the end at which benev
olence rjtimately aimed. Hence its utility is infinite ; its
beauty, excellency, and glory are unparallelled. If this active
benevolence bad not existed in God, no happiness would finally
have had existence. If, instead of this, his heart had been ma
levolent, had delighted in misery, as satan does, all his attri
butes would have been employed in producing misery, attd the
universe would have been filled with it. But now We are as
sured from the benevolence of God, that the greatest happiness
will be enjoyed in heaven forever. Thus glorious is benevolence.
2. It prepares created intelligent beings for happiness,
and prompts them to seek it. — Until the heart is renewed by
the agency of the Spirit, men are totally depraved. They
have no moral goodness in their hearts. For benevolence
comprises all moral goodness ; but they have a love for this
world; Having no love for God, and a love for this world, they
forsake God, and live in rebellion. They have no principle
within to move them to serve God. Hence they never serve
hihi until born again. In regeneration, a benevolent disposi
tion or relish is created in the heart ; and the sinner becomes a
partaker of Uie divine nature. Then objects which he hated he
loves ; and those evil ways, which he loved, he hates. Now

309
his heart delights in Gpd, loves the Savior as his best friend ;
he rejoices in the happiness of others, and takes complacency
in the holy characters of saints ; he loves God supremely, and
his neighbor as himself.
Thus benevolence prepares him to serve God. Now he es
teems his yoke easy, and his burden light ; and it is as pleasant
to him to serve God, as it is to eat and drink. He is a member
ofthe family of God ; his heart is united to the interest ofthe
family ; and the highest good of God's holy kingdom is the ul
timate object ofhis pursuit. He therefore renounces the ser
vice of sin and satan forever ; and devotes himself, soul and
body, with all his talents, and all die blessings and privileges
granted him, to the service of God his Father, and Christ his
Savior and friend. Thus benevolence prepares a person to
serve God ; and it is the only quality, which disposes men to
serve their Maker acceptably.
Again. It is benevolence alone, which prepares persons to
enjoy God. It is this divine relish, which qualifies them to de
light in the sources of heavenly felicity. Without it, if in heav
en, persons could not be happy. Benevolence only delights in
benevolence, in the service and praise of God. Except a man
be born again, he cannot see, that is enjoy, the kingdom of God.
And without holiness no man shall see the Lord. — The unholy
will be forever excluded from the kingdom of glory. No un
clean thing is to enter there.
When we see clearly, that holiness is the only quality which
prepares persons to serve and enjoy God, we must be convinced
of its utility, excellency and beauty. It exceeds diamonds, ru
bies, yea all the riches and most precious things the world af
fords. Its Value is equal to a state of endless, increasing hap
piness. Its worth equals the eternal blessedness to which it is
necessary. — Next to happiness, it exceeds in value every attri
bute and blessing.
3. Benevolence is moral beauty. Without it no being has
any moral, beauty, but is clothed with the deformity of sin. —
Knowledge is always used to do good or hurt, according to the
nature ofthe active principles ofthe heart.' A benevolent rel
ish will govern, and improve all the information a person pos
sesses, in devising means and waj's to promote happiness. And
the will is equally under the influence of the heart. Every
choice, or exertion, is made with a view of gratifying the heart.
Hence , from facts and daily experience we find men using

310
their knowledge, and exerting their power, to gratify the pre
vailing inclinations of the heart. The covetous improve all
their knowledge and power in amassing wealth ; and theproud
and ambitious, in usurping authority, extending their dominion,
and reducing the world to a state of subjection. While tte fal
len angels were holy, every power was exerted to serve their
king. But as soon as they were deprived of this disposition,
and hatred governed, all their knowledge, 'subtlety and power
have been used in opposing God, defacing the beauty of his
kingdom, and destroying its peace and harmony.
¦ Before they sinned they were bright, amiable, glorious
spirits ; reflecting divine rays, and shining with the splendors
of holiness around the divine throne. But the moment they
lost a benevolent disposition, they were stripped of all their
glory and beauty, were clothed with deformity, and have been
to this day hateful demons. As soon as Adam sinned, his glory
departed ; and the divine beauty with which he was adorned
is. never restored, until benevolence is reinstamped on the heart.
Benevolence is the beauty, the excellency, and the only crown
of glory, with which intelligent beings are adorned. Without
it they are deformed, loathsome, and hateful characters ; and
can never be, admitted into that world where every member re
flects the glorious rays of divinity.
4. Benevolence is the only bond of union and harmony in
the moral world. Those who are adorned with this spirit aim
at the same ultimate end. They rejoice in each other's joy.
Their hearts ultimately centre in the same object. They iove
Gf>d- supremely, and are loved by him ; they love their Savior,
and he rejoices iri his bride ; their love to each other is mutual
and strong. Thus by love they are connected with their king
and head, and perfectly united to each other.
In heaven, where benevolence is perfect, all are one. As
Christ prayed, they are one with the Father, one with Christ,
and oneness is perfect among the members. There is ne dis
cord there. They are one in sentiment, one in pursuit and ac
tion, and one in affection. All hatred, envy, revenge, malice,
and every disuniting and jarring passion, is eradicated. Be
nevolence is the only active governing principle in that worldi
Though, the members of the heavenly society are innumerable ;
yet they will eternally appear as one united body. Actuated'
by one and the same spirit, they will move around the throne
of God their centre, with perfect harmony and regularity. As

311
•tie they will bow before the throne, and confess all they have
is from God ; as one they cast their crowns at his feet, aud ac
knowledge their allegiance ; as one they will unite in the new
song of praise ; and as one will ascribe dominion, power and
glory to G°d, and exalt him forever.
How useful, beautiful, and glorious is that principle of heart,
which thus unites millions of millions in perfect bonds of end
less affection. Its beauty and glory are so bright, that there is
no need of sun or moon in heaven ; and all the hosts above
shine as stars ofthe brightest splendor around the throne, with
increasing lustre forever. To have a clear view of the glory of
any thing, we ought to survey it in a perfect state. For this
reason I have represented benevolence as operating in heaven.
When we consider that benevolence is the eternal, primary,
and only efficient cause, of all good existing in the universe ;
the only principle, which prepares intelligent creatures to set ve
and enjoy God, and all good ; the only quality which constitutes
the moral beauty of rational agents ; the only uniting principle
in heaven ; as the light and glory ofthe universe ; we must pro
nounce its utility, glory and excellency to surpass all other
things in worth and value. Oh how excellent, how glorious is
this divine attribute. It is the divinity, beauty and 'glory of
the Godhead. It is the beauty, glory and brightness of all in
telligent beings. With it, in a perfect state, endlessly increas
ing happiness is inseparably connected. It is the glory of the
universe, and infinitely exceeds the sun in its meridian splendor,
in brightness, and in vivifying, blissful, joyful rays.
Objection. If benevolence is a moral virtue, a holy affection,
because it is useful ; then every thing which is useful is a mor
al virtue. The light and heat ofthe sun. health, food, and
raiment, and a thousand similar blessings are useful, and tend
ultimately to happiness. And if utility constitute the nature of
moral virtue ; every thing, which has a final tendency to happi
ness, is of course a moral virtue.
Answer. This objection seems to arise either from igno
rance, or negligence, or a wish to conceal and pervert the truth..
For by making one plain and obvious distinction, which any
one might see, the force of the objection disappears at once.
It is only necessary to make a distinction between natural, and
moral good ; a distinction which is made by every one. And
why has not the objector made this distinction in this case, as
he-does in a thousand other instances ? I can give no reason

312
for this omission, but one or the other of the above causes.
It is granted, that utility, or the tendency of any thing to pro
mote happiness ultimately, does constitute the nature of good.
For the same reason one thing ought to be called good, every
thing ofthe same nature ought to be thus stiled. There is no
difference, in their nature, between natural and moral good.
They are both good, because their ultimate tendency is to hap-
iness. And every thing is evil for the same reason ; because
its iiUimatehndmcy is to misery. Natural good is not so call
ed for one reason, and moral good for a very different reason.
This is not the ground of the distinction between natural and
moral good. Moral good is predicated of no action or exer
cise, but those -of moral agents. The light and heat of the sun
are not actions of a moral agent ; yet being in their nature
good, they are stiled a natural good, to distinguish them from
the actions-of moral agents. Indeed every thing belonging to
a moral iagent is not a metal good or evil. (Knowledge, or the
understanding with numerous operations, are tnot in a moral
sense good ; they are not moral virtues. Neither is power, or,
the will and its operations. Divines have always made a dis
tinction between the natural and moral attributes of Deity.
And the same distiuction is applicable to created moral agents.
Moral good and evil arenotpredicable of every thing in exis-
istence, but of active principles and their operations. Nor of
active principles, uhless they exist in a being, who is a proper
moral agent. The reason of it is obvious.
Now benevolence is an active principle, and belongs to the
heart, and is ithe primary efficient causeof all the. good or hap
piness which exists in the universe. This has been made evi
dent. It is then a moral principle ; and all its exercises or op
erations, which are commonly calledthe affections and passions,
•are also moral. And to distinguish all other actions, exercises
&, operatioHs which are good, they are called natural ; good in a
natural sense. • Hence, although all things are, good fpr j the
same reason, because they tend in tbeirnature to produce hap
piness ultimately, or are useful.; yet is it proper for the reasons
assigned to distinguish between them, and call some of them a .
natural, and others a moral good. This fully and fairly meets
;and answers the objection. So that we may now say, thatibe-
^nevolenee is amoral virtue, Ibecause it , is useful, i or tends ;tO
^happiness ultimately, And that the light and heat ofthe sun,
and other things similar in their nature, are good, because they

m
tend to happiness ultimately; but they are only a natural good,
or natural virtues, if so caUed. And the ground of this dis
tinction has been made clear and evident ; and the objection,
is answered.
t have now exhibited my sentiments on this all important,
subject. And if any understand what has been written, they
will Consider benevolencetaconsistina disposition or relish, of
die heart; and view the happiness of others, or the greatest
happiness of God's holy kingdom, as its ultimate end, which is
sought for its own sake, and not with an aim to any other ob
ject beyond it more excellent., In this light they will see,. it is
the most beautiful,, excellent, and glorious disposition, which,
can exist in any mora) agent. They will see it is the original*.
eternal, efficient cause of all the good in, existence ; as the only,
active, efficient cause, which has put every wheel in motion,
arid continues them till its ultimate end is obtained- BenCvp-,
lence is the cause of all the happiness existing forever in heav
en ; and also the source ofthe perfect gratification of every,
benevolent desire. It is the first cause of all things, and its.
last end is the highest possible pleasure of benevolence. It is
the alpha and omega in causing and attaining the greatest
sum of happiness.

.***i ******
ESSAY XXIX.
Oras Regeneration.
What PurSavior terms being born again, and generally by
theologians is stiled regeneration, is essential to future happi
ness. It is a subject very interesting and important. The'
doctrine is very differently explained by the ministers of Christ.,.
Arid no wonder, when we consider that each one describes it aCr-
cording to the views he ha« of the mind and heart of man.
Regeneration is a change which takes place in the mind, and
the heart is especially the subject of it. And if any persons.,
have^erroneous views of the heart, they will 'err in their expla-
15

314
nation of this change. This, as well as almost every othei
doctrine pf the gospel, requires a distinct, consistent, and sys
tematic view of thefaculties and operations of the mind, in or*
der to explain and illustrate it according to facts, and experi
ence. And to give an explanation of the new birth, which
will agree with the Word, with facts, and experience, requires
just views of the hutnan heart. No doctrine requires such
knowledge more than this. And this, will appear more and
more evident, as we prbceed in adiScussiori of the subject. .> ,
A full and just view ofthe new birth requires an attention to
three distinct propositions. . These are the following : Why is
this change necessary ? In what does it consist ,.? And what
are its fruits ? If a person embrace false views concerning eith'-
er of these heads, he lays a foundation for a final deception,
and endless disappointment. Feeling the necessity of clear
arid just views of this subject, and how fatal an error here may
prove, I enter upon it with trembling and caution.
I. Why is regeneration necessary f, Christ says, except a
man be born again, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heav-
en. ,, ,-,.,,- .... ,-
That change is amazingly interesting and important, which
is necessary to eternal life. And a distinct understanding of
hs necessity, will prepare the way to a just view of its nature.
In a natural state men are unprepared for a heavenly state of
existence. The heart is such, if a person were in heaven, he
could behold no object which would afford him any delight, or
gratify one de*sire. Regeneration then is necessary, to pre
pare persons for the enjoyment ofthe objects and employments
of that world. To this end a new creation is necessary. This
will be evident, when the necessity of this change is clearly exr

The word of Gpd represents unrenewed persons asdead, btindt
and deaf ; and without one sense to- delight in divine objects.
They have eyes, ears, and life, and all the senses necessary to
relish and enjoy worldly objects ; but not one sense to delight
iri. heavenly sources of enjoyment. Being spiritually dead, if
they were in heaven, they could not enjoy any object there,,
any more than a dead man can enjoy the objects of sense in
this world, And if the happiness of heaven consisted in her
holding the light of the sun, and the, numerous colors its rays
reflect, and in hearing melodious strains of music, it is evident
the blind and deaf would find no object, which could afford

315
them any pleasure. HenCe, the enjoyments of heaven are of
such a nature, that sinners could no more be happy tberp, than
a dead person could experience pleasure frorn earthly objects,
or the blind from the fight, Pr the deaf in the most harmonious
music. Natural men have not one sense, which is a necessary
preparation for the enjoyment of heavenly objects. Here then
is the inquiry, what has man lost; and what is the nature of
his heart, Which disqualifies him entirely for the enjoyments of
a heavenly state ? '
The word of God teaches us, that Adam was made upright j
created in the image of God, natural and moral. As benevo
lence, or holiness, or love, is the only moral attribute'in the di
vine character ; Adam, to he created in the m°ral image of
Grid, "must be endued with the same love, the same benevolent,
holy principle- And as an attribute in God is not simply an
exercise, but a principle, or relish for the existence of happiness
as the only absolute goad ; so men, to be holy, must have a
Similar attribute. They must have an appetite, or relish, to
delight in happiness as an absolute good, and rejoice in it
wherever they see it. Accordingly, Adam was created with
this holy appetite or relish. Those who are born with eyes^
are prepared to rejoice in light and colors ; and those who
have ears, to delight in melodious sound's. And We know the
five senses of the body are necessary, to prepare us to enjoy all
the objects of time and sense. And if we d'vide all objects of
enjoyment in the universe into two general classes, and call one
natural or temporal, and the other moral or spiritual ; then, as
our bodily senses are requisite to enjoy the former^ so some
attribute, or sense must exist in the heart to prepare us to en
joy the latter. All men do or may know, that our bodily sen
ses do not prepare us to enjoy spiritual objects. The otily
sense, which prepares us to enjoy moral objects, is seated in the
heart. It is the heart only, which loves, and delights in spirit
ual things. And Adam was created with a heart to love God,
arid rejoice in him as his supreme good.
' He was created wjth-a-hely^Jbienev.Qjent appetite, relish, or
disposition? Arid" this prepared him to love and delight in ev
ery divine object,; in every Object, which is a source of happi
ness to holy beings in heaven." He had other appetites created
iri his heart, to prepare him to love worldly objects, and seek
them as far as would be necessary to his preservation arid com
fort in this life. But not one of those appetites ever loves er

316
delights in spiritual things. Thus Adam was created. Jw>ly»
pure and upright; endued with every appetite, necessary to enr
joy God as his supreme fountain, and take comfort in wprldly
objects. But when he ate the forbidden fruit, he forfeited the moral
image of God, and was deprived of it. In that day, in a mor
al sense he -died. And we see a great change had taken place
in his feelings. Instead of delighting in God, and running to
meet him when he heard his voice in the garden, he now runs
from him, and endeavor? to hide himself frpm bis sight. He
fears his Make'r, and trembles before him. Now nothing re
mained in his heart to love and delight in God. He was as,
fully disqualified for the enjoyment of spiritual objects, as a
perspn in a natural sense dead, is ip that state unprepared for
the enjoyment of worldly objects. And as all his posterity are
born destitute ofthe moral image of God, they have nothing in
their hearts which prepares them for the enjoyment of spiritual
objects. They are as really disqualified for the enjoyment of
heavenly objects, as the blind, dpaf, or dead, are for the enjoy
ment of light, colors, and melodious sounds. Hence the rea
son why they are in scripture represented as blind, deaf, and
dead. They have no taste or relish for any objects, but those
of a worldly nature, such as property, honor, and sensual de
lights. Hence wefind it is a fact, that when a door of mercy isopeuT
ed to sinners by the death of Christ, and provision is made for
their entertainment and salvation, and all are invited to come
unto the supper prepared for them, and not one wilt come ; all
wish to be excused, and make light of the invitation, and go
their ways, one to his farm and another to his merchandise.
Why are men guilty of such almost unaccountable conduct ?
Reason teaches, that when perishing sinners are dying, they
would hear the invitation, ' Come, for all things are ready,'
with joy ; and that all would flock to the marriage supper pf the
Son of God, in haste, and with gladness. But no, they prefer
this world to the gospel feast, and will not come to Christ for
life. And the reasons are, they have no appetite, no relish,
for earthly, perishing objects. Apd as all men are governed,
not by reason, but by their hearts, so they will forever act ac
cording to the nature ofthe appetites which goyerntbeni,
This is the reason, why we see God the fountain of all good
forsaken, Christ slighted and rejected, apjl the gospel supper

317
neglected, This is the reason, why we see mankind so earnest in
their pursuits after worldly good. They have no love for God,
but they love this world. Hence they worship and serve the
creature, and not the Creator.
The supper prepared for sinners in this world is the marriage
supper ofthe Lamb in heaven, upon which saints and angels
feast. • Itincludes every source of happiness enjoyed in heaven.
And for the reason sinners do not delight in it on this earth,
for the same reason they would not enjoj' it in heaven. Hence
if they were admitted into that blessed state, they would not
find one object there to afford them the least satisfaction. They
would take no delight in the marriage supper of the Lamb ;
and they would find no earthly, objects there to feast and -eijteit-
tain them. So that heaven would not afford them one object
of pleasure. But as there they would clearly see, that God
was against them, that saints and angels hated their characters,
and every thing was opposed to their pride, and self exalting
dispositions ; and that they were really only fit tb be despised,
and treated as enemies to, all good; every thing would be a
source of pain to them. Instead of being happy, they would
be exceedingly miserable. The reason is, the}? have no relish
for the pleasures of that world. And they will find there no
earthly riches, honors, or pleasures, to afford them any delight.
As they cannot be happy there they will be excluded, and con
fined in the prison of darkness, the only place for which their
hearts are prepased. There in confinement they can no more
disturb the peace and happiness of God's kingdom. .We now
see,' why a change of heart is necessary to heavenly felicity ;
we see why a persou, unless born again,, cannot enter the
kingdom of heaven. The reason is, men in their natural state
have no appetite, no relish, for any of those objects which Con
stitute the marriage feast ofthe Lamb, and which are the only
sources of felicity after death.
II. Attend to the nature of that change, which is effected in
regeneration. Regeneration is a new creation. There is some
thing created in the heart, which had never before had any ex
istence in it. This is a truth taught in many passages of scrip
ture. The apostle saith, If any man be in Christ, he is a new
creature. Neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncir-
cumcision, but a new creature. And that which is created in
the heart, is called the new man, the inner man. So we are
epmhianded to put off the old rcan, and put on the new riian.

318
And as in regeneration something new is created, hence all who
are bora again are -stiled 'new creatures, and are said to-be cre
ated, to be the subjects of a creation. " We are his workman
ship, created in Christ Jesus." This workmanship is a creation.
Saints are new men, created after God in righteousness and
holiness. And have put on the new man, which is renew
ed in knowledge after the image of him that created him. So
they are called new born babes. •
As regeneration is evidently, according to scripture, a crea
tion; we may ask, what is created ? An appetite, relish, or
disposition to be pleased with divine objects, is what is created
in the heart. By creating this relish, the lost morai image of
God, is restored ; the holy image with which Adam wus crea
ted. "Put on the new man, which after< God is created in
righteousness and true holiness." Here the new man created
is after God, a likeness of God, which consists in righteous
ness and true holiness. And the new man is said to be after'
the image of him that ..created him. Such texts make it evi
dent, that in regeneration the moral image of God, which was
lost by the, fall, is restored. The moral character of God is
love, or benevolence. God is love. His moral image in men
is the same disposition, appetite, or relish, which is styled love;
that love to God arid man, which the law requires.
By this we see what the new creation is. It is the creation
of that relish, which prepares a person to be pleased and de
lighted with that class of objects, called moral, or spiritual, or
divine. It is an appetite or disposition to be pleased and de
lighted with the character of God, -of Christ, with the law and
government of God, with the truths or doctrines of the gospel,
with- the service of God, with the characters of saints and an
gels; and all those objects, which are the sources of all the
joys and felicity in heaven. Objects of this class infinitely ex
ceed in value, beauty, glory, and excellence, that class which
is generally styled earthly, worldly, temporal, and fading.
We have shown that no one, antecedent to regeneration, has
any delight in this divine class of objects. So far from it, that
as they.are opposed to the desires and pursuits of men, they
excite in the hearts of the unrenewed hatred and opposition,
But when born again, with this new relish they are prepared to
he pleased with them, to love, and desire them as their portion.
This new appetite created in the heart is a spiritual, holy life ;
it is the eye ofthe heart by which it discerns the beausy of di»

319
Vine objects; the ear by which they hear with pleasure the
voice of God in all his doctrines and precepts ; the sense of
smelling, by which they smell the sweet odor of divine things ;
the relish,, or palate, by which they taste superlative sweetness
}n spiritual objects ; and the feeling or sense, by which they re
joice in God with joy unspeakable. This new appetite creat
ed in the heart comprises every sense, which is ascribed to
saints in the word of God, and which is peculiar to them.
Hence, when a person is born again, he is said to have-eyes to see,
ears to hear, and a heart to realize and love all the beauties and
glories of divine objects. He is no longer in a state of perfect
Spiritual death, darkness, deafness, and brutish stupidity. The
creation of this new appetite is bringing persons from darkness
into marvellous light. This new relish, created in the heart, is
light infused into it. This is the way by which God shines
into the heart. And this new appetite is a principle of light in
the heart, by which christians shine as lights in the world;
They emit rays of light ; and these rays are a reflexion of di
vine light, as the moon reflects the rays ofthe sun. And by
this light they glorify their Father, who is in heaven.
Hence saints are called children ofthe light, and ofthe day.
They are said to come to the light, and walk in it. They
love the light, and hate the darkness in which they once liv
ed.; And if they live as they ought, their light shines more
and more unto the perfect day. And like stars they will shine
around the throne ofthe Lamb forever, reflecting the light of
the sun of righteousness.
When persons are born again they are brought into a new
world ; as really so as a person born blind, and afterward has
eyes giyen him ; or as one born deaf has ears given him to
hear ; or as one raised to life from actual death, will appear to
himself to be in a new world. Now they see beauties, which
they never saw before ; they hear the melody of God's voice,
which they never heard before ; and they have new iews, new
feelings,. affections and desires, and will live a new life. With
them according to scripture, old things are done away ; they
no longer place their affections on this world, nor seek it as
their portion ; behold all things are become new. They view
divine objects in a new light, and experience now views, feel
ings, affections, and joys, to which they had always been stran
gers. We hence see, that creating this new holy relish in th&
heart, according to representations in the bible, makes them

329
new creatures ; it is giving them eyes to see, Cars to hear, life
from the dead •; bringing them into a new world, in which the
beauties and glories of divine objects excite' in them new views,
affections, and new feelings of joy and delight. NoW they.
walk in the light, love it, become lights themselves, and shine
to the praise of divine grace. This is a great, and blessed',
wonderful, and glorious' change ; and it consists primarily iri
creating in the heart this new appetite, restoring the lost linage '
of God. They hereby become the children of God, sustain a
new relation to him ; and are now prepared to love, servp, arid
enjoy him here and forever.
Again. Creating this holy relish in the heart, in which this
great change consists, is effected by the agency ofthe Holy
Spirit. It is the office work of the spirit to renew the heart,
and then carry on the glorious work of sanetifieutiori, till
saints arrive to the stature of perfect men in Christ. Hence
we are said to be born of the Spirit. And We find the great;
Work of renewing and sanctifying the heart, is generally in
scripture ascribed to the Spirit, the third person in the God
head. Hence the reason why saints are called spiritual ; why
they are red By the Spirit, arid' by 'him quickened, purified, and
assisted.'1 The sanctification ofthe Spirit begins in regenera
tion, and is carried on by his influences to the perfect day.
By the Spirit we are renewed, created anew, purified, ehlight-
ened, quickened, and filled with joy and consolation. This is
a most glorious work of the Spirit, a work absolutely necessa
ry to eternal life. How great, then, is the promise and gift of
the Spirit. And as far as any oppose this work of the Spirit,
they are said to resist the Holy Ghost, to quench, and grieve
the Spirit. And this is one of the gredtest,arid most dangerous
sins ; because there iS danger of blaspheming the Spirit, and
committing the sin which will never Be forgiven.
And this workof the Spirit is instantaneous. Creation frorii
nothing, or producing something new, is always an instanta
neous work. It is absurd to suppose a thing to be only in part
brought into existence. God said; let there be light, and light
was. It was not some time rising into real being, it existed in
stantly. Every person, in a Spiritual sense; is either dead or
alive. He is not a day, or one moment, passing from death
to life. By the agency ofthe Spirit' this new appetite is in
stantly created. Although regeneration is an instantaneous
work, yet the work of' sanctification is progressive. This

321
Work begins in regeneration, and in an instant ; and others it
progresses through life. Saints begin to live in a moment ;
but this life is increased, and invigorated all their days, till
they; reach heaven. >
It, will be well also to observe here, a few things more in re
lation to this change. It appears evident, when all the passa
ges of scripture are carefully compared, and their import is
understood, that the only thing immediately done in regenera
tion, is thp creation of this holy appetite in the heart. This
is creating anew, and restoring the moral image of God, which
was lost at the fall of Adam. If this be true, then some ideas,
which many bring into view, are erroneous. Some treat the
subject as though they believed the change consisted in alter
ing the nature of sin. As though pride was changed into hu
mility, selfishness into benevolence, and love for this world in
a love for heavenly things ; opposition to God into love to
him, hatred to men into love for them, and so in relation to
other sinful affections ; as though their nature is so altered,
that from being sinful they now become holy. But this senti
ment appears to be contrary to scripture, to reason, and to all
sound philosophy of the mind. Sin may be subdued, and
eradicated from the heart ; but its nature cannot be changed.
To suppose, that pride can be changed into humility, or any
sinful affection can be made holy, is very absurd. Not only
so, but this would 'effectually destroy that warfare, which all
christians experience. F01' to make a. warfare on this ground,
the same affection, as pride for example, must be partly pride,'
and partly .humility, or partly holy, and partly sinful ; and
then the .contest would consist in having the same sinful
affection fight against itself. The proud or sinful*' part, fight
ing against the holy or humble part. This is representing the
same affection as having two natures opposed to each other.
Every affection is no more than a feeling and desire, simple in
their nature. And to represent an affection as having two na
tures, and opposed to itself, is as absurd as to suppose the
same drop of water as having two natures ; one part a fluid,
and the other a solid. This is so absurd every one will reject
the sentiment, as soon as the inconsistency of it is fairly stated.
Some speak in such a manner as would lead one to suppose,
they considered sin as wholly subdued and eradicated in regen
eration. In this sense they seem to understand the passage;, in
which God says, I will take away their heart of stone and give
16

322
them a heart of flesh. Whatever may be the meaning of thil
passage, it cannot mean, that all sin is eradicated. For if this
were the fact, christians would never experience any warfare
within. For this warfare consists in the Opposition of the flesh
to the spirit, or of the old man to the new man. But according'
to this sentiment, when a person is born again, the flesh, the
old man, is subdued, eradicated, no longer has any being in the
heart. The scripture every where represents christians as hav
ing a body of sin and death remaining in them ; as having
flesh, and spirit, an old arid new ma*n, fighting against each oth
er. Hence taking away the stony heart, and giving a heart
of flesh cannot mean, that sin is all eradicated, and the person
is now perfectly holy. To construe it consistently with other
passages, its meaning must be, that the power of the stony
heart is lessened, has received a deadly wound, will no more
reign without opposition, and will finally be wholly subdued,
and eradicated. If, then, we make the word of God our guide,
we must still view a person who is born again as having every
sin, the old man, as still remaining in him. Not one sin is erad
icated. And all the change is this ; a new, holy, principle is
created in the heart, which will ever fight against all remain
ing sin, and daily weaken its power, and keep it in subjection,
pntil the day arrives, when the new man will gain the victory,
and all remaining sin will be wholly and forever subdued or
eradicated. Then the person is perfect, -perfectly holy, and
has no sin remaining to pollute him, or disturb his peace and
happiness. There are also some, who consider regeneration as immedi
ately affecting all the faculties of the, mind. They say, that
this change consists in enlightening the understanding, renew
ing the heart, and subduing the will. Hence regeneration
does not respect directly one faculty, any more than another.
This is confounding things, which ought to be distinguished;
rind surrounds the subject with mist and darkness. It is true,
that this great change affects all the faculties indirectly ; hut
the immediate effect produced is in one faculty only. The
heart is the subject wrought upon, and affected, as has been
shown in all that has been said on this subject. In the heart
a new appetite is created. When this isdone, a pei;son is pre
pared to be pleased with a divine class of objects: Light-in
the understanding, and the obedience ofthe will, are consequent
Ves, -Which follow this change in the heart. The understand-

323
-ing and the wil) are ever under the influence and government
of the heart. Hence as long as the heart continues totally cor
rupt, all the other faculties will have a wrong direction. But
as far, as the heart is renewed and right, the other faculties
will then have a right direction. A reformation in every per
son must begin in the heart. And creating this new relish in
the heart will incline every person to lead a new life ; and sp
far as he is governed by this holy relish, all the exercises and
operations oi the mind will be directed to the glory of God.
- When the hpartis renewed as explained, a person then de
lights in the character of God, and in all that class of objects
called mora1 or divine. Now the person will delight in con
templating and studying, them. He will, therefore, confine the
attention of the understanding to them. Now the understand
ing beholds new beauties, perceives new sensations and desires,
^ains clear aad distinct views of every gospel doctrine, and will
improve in knowledge daily. Previous to this change in the
heart, and While secure,, he seldom attended to divine objects ;
arid when he did, the disrelish ofthe heart to the truth blinded,
and prejudiced him to such a degree, he was more likely to
eriibrace errors than the truth. The heart blinded the under-
standing, and by. its influence led him to judge of every thing
go as to please the heart. Under conviction, previous to re
generation, persons through the influence of fear turn their at- '
tention to divine objects ; and the truth is so obvious, they soon
perceive they are great sinners, justly deserve hell, are depen
dent, arid if saved, it must be by grace. This light prepares
the way forachange ofthe heart. Yet they see no beauty in di
vine objects ; and instead of being pleased with them, opposi
tion is excited ; fear, and the distress which attends it, is a load
too heavy to be borne long. at a time. But as soon as the
heart is renewed, then divine objects please him ; his fears and
distress of mind are gone ; he is relieved of his load and bur
den. And these objects, which before gave him. pain, now
please him, and afford him great satisfaction. The new sen
sations, joys, and desires, which he experiences, are new objects
of perception. He now knows what the feelings and joys of
religion are. In this respect the understanding has new light,
which is attained by experience, as the greater part of our
knowledge is... Now he will attend to thp truth,' will make it a
subject of study, and will be daily growing in light and knowl
edge. And bis understanding will be more enlightened often,

324
in one month, than it had previously been in many years.
But all this light or knowledge is the consequence, the fruit, of
the change produced in the heart. Before his heart is changed,
a person's understanding is unimpaired, is sound and good. A
pPrson in a dungeon with good eyes cannot see objects. But
the fault is riot in his eyes. So a person in an unrenewed state
is kepi by his evil heart in darkness ; and many are surprising
ly ignorant of divine truth. But the fault is not in the under
standing ; its eyes are sound and good. Removes,, every ob
stacle which had perverted the understanding, and kept its eyes
Closed ; then it will perform its office, and judge of divine things
according to truth, As the understanding is not impaired by
the fall, but is blinded by the heart as our natural eyes are by
a thick vail ; so remove this vail, and the aversion ofthe heart
to truth, the. understanding will then see objects as they are,
arid improve in light and knowledge. Hence as the under
standing is' not impaired by the fall, aud, considered as an eye,
is in a sound healthy state, it needs no change or alteration.
All that is wanting is, to remove the vail which blinds it, which
ihtprcepts its sight. This vail is the heart. Renewing or cre
ating this holy relish in the heart, is removing this vail, as far
as a person is governed by this new appetite. As sin still re
mains in the heart, so far as this governs, his understanding
Will be still blinded ; but so far as his new taste governs, it will
see, and judge of things as they are. Hence the light of the
understanding is the consequence and fruit of regeneration. So
that this Change makes no alteration in the understanding ; it
respects the heart solely and primarily, and light in the intellec
tual part is a consequence of it, '
With respect to- the will, it is always obedient to the heart.
Itis always exerted according to the pleasure ofthe heart. The
design of every volition is to obtain the object, which is pleas-:
ing and gratifying to the heart. Hence the way to subdue the
will is to renew the heart. It is said, " Thy people . shall be
wijling in the day of thy power. v When that day arrives, in
which the power of God is exerted to renew the heart, then the
will is obedient. As 'the heart has a new pleasure, so now
there will be a new train of volitions. It is also said;, his ar
rows shall be sharp in the heart of the king's enemies. When
the enemies of God see their wickedness and danger, this light
in the understanding excites painful sensations in the heart ;
sensations keen as those produced by arrows, when they wound

325
and pierce the heart of the body. When Christ says, Ye will
not come unto me, every one would be ready to ask, why will
they not come ? The reason is, the character of Christ does
not please the natural heart, but is offensive to it. So the will,
ever obedient to the heart, rejects him. Renew the heart, then
the will readily chooses him as a Savior. Creating a new rej,-
ish in the heart is the way by which persons are drawn to Christ,
and made willing to come unto him for life.
The will viewed as a faculty is not impaired, nor its nature
altered, by the fall. After Adam sinned he wasjust as capable
of choosing and refusing objects, as he was previous to his fall.
But a very great change took place in his heart. He lost his
holy relish, and was no more-pleased, as he had been, with mor
al and divine objects. Now his heart was imperfect, sinful, and
corrupt. It now, like a vail, blinded the understanding, and
commanded the will to reject God, and choose this world for a
portion. But when the heart is renewed, it is again pleased
with divine objects ;' the vail being rfmoved, the understandr
ing is filled with light, and the will is directed to reject the
world, and seek God as the best portion and fountain of living
waters. The motion of every faculty will be towards God as
its centre, as far as' a person is influenced and governed by this
new and holy appetite. This is the way in which the underr
standingand will are affected, in regeneration. The heart or
taste is the subject ofthe operations of the Holy Spirit, and the
only subject directly and immediately affected. In this facul
ty a great arid glorious change, is effected by creating in jt, a
new and benevolent appetite. In consequence of which tbeup-
derstanding is greatly enlightened, and the will is obedient to
the heart, and conformable to the law of God ; and the life and
conduct ofthe person, from that day he is renewed, will har
monise with the- doctrines and precepts of the gospel, as far as
he i>> governed by this new relish created in him.
Again. 'Some stappose regeneration is effected by light,
and moral persuasion. They suppose that light and proper
motives are Sufficient to change the heart, and produce an en
tire reformation in any person.
But surely such persons have no correct views ofthe human
mind, or ofthe nature of moral depravity. If they had, they
would' -agree with the scriptures in viewing regeneration ,tp be
a new' creation ; so that all, Who ai-e born again,may with
propriety be styled new creatures. But has light in the intellect

326
power to create something from nothirig ? Have any motives,
power to create something new ? If any can believe this, they
betray gresit ignorance respecting the nature of light, and the
influence of motives, and the faculties and operations of the
mind of man. Facts and experience both prove that light, in
stead of rectifying the corrupt heart, excites its opposition to
God and toe truth. This is the effect of light on a depraVedy
corrupt heart, as is daily proved by facts and experience. And
no motives will ever influence a person to choose or reject ob
jects of volition, contrary to the pleasure of the heart. The
will has rto power over the heart. The Will does not govern
the heart, but is governed and influenced by it. This also is
evident, from facts and experience. We may, therefore, as
soon expect water will run from the centre of gravitation, as
expect light and motives will change the heart, or produce any
radical change in the feelings and desires of men. As the will
is governed by the heart, motives will iiever influence the will
to choose contrary to the pleasure of the heart. And' light will
here, as it forever will in hell, excite opposition against God, in
stead of producing any friendly 'feelings,- as long as the pleasure
of the heart remains unrenewed.
If all that has beeri suggested on this subject is true, and
harmonizes with the word of God, and agrees with facts and
experience, as has been made evident ; every one must be con
vinced, that the Holy Spirit in regenerating men does, immedi
ately and directly, no more than create in the heart that holy
relish or moral image of God lost by the fall. And this crea
tion iS sufficient to account for all the new views, feelings', de
sires, and joys, which the regenerate experience ; arid for the
new life, which they live. Arid this will be further confirmed
and illustrated, by what will be said under the next general
branch of this subject.
HI. Describe the fruits of regeneration.
These fruits are internal and external. When internal
fruits appears in the life, actions, and conduct of persons, they
are then external and visible. It will be most instructive to at
tend in the first place to those internal fruits, which all renew
ed persons experience. It has been made evident, that all the
change effected immediately in regeneration Consists in the cre
ation of that new, holy appetite, which was lost by the fall of
our first parents.
This was created iri Adam; when God gave him being. - It

327
constituted one part of his being. This, and the other appe
tites created in his heart, were active principles, and prepared
him for all the exercises and actions necessary to his being and
happiness in this life, and the life to succeed. When this was
lost, he had no relish for the class pf objects styled moral or dir-
vine. But when it is appw created in the heart of any pf his
posterity, then such person is prepared to relish and feed on di
vine objects. — As the appetite of hunger prepares persons to
relish food, and all the different species of it ; so this holy ap
petite prepares a perspn to relish and delight in divine objects.
And in attending to the operations or exercises pf this appetite,
we must carefully observe its primary, its secondary, and its
third class of affections. For its operations are divisible into
these three distinct classes. And by attending to. thesp classes
every one will be better able to judge, whether he has ever pass
ed from death unto life. And,
1. Attention will be given to the primary operations of this
holy appetite.
Every reader will readily see, that no object cap affect the
heart, unless seen" or known ; or unless it is in view ofthe mind.
When a person is renewed, and divine objects pass in review
of the mind, he will have feelings and affections correspondent
to their nature. When his attention \s fixed; on the character
of God, of Christ, or of saints, he will feel an inward $el}ght,
what some call joy. They appear tp him beautiful, and he
never saw them in this light before. And such persons often
.say, that every thing they see appears tnew tp them ; they seem
-to be in a new world- This is o&casipned entirely by anew
sensation. They never before experienced that kind of die-
light, joy, or satisfaction in viewing divipe objects, which they
now feel. As they have a new an<J most pleasant sensation
.within, and as they do pot reflect that this is caused by a change
;ui their hearts, tbejr first thought is apt tp be, that the things
they see are altered ; and they are of course ip a new world.
It may be ,compared to tins. A perspn, who never delighted
'm music, but had painful sensations when he heard it, we will
-suppose has his ear so altered as to relish music. He hears it,
and experiences delightful and transporting sensations. f(e
would be apt to say, the music he heard was a new kind, such
as he never heard before. And this is the occasipp of his new
sensations. Yet on reflectiqn he wquld soon be convinced, tiiat
his new .sensations arose fijpni a change 'm his ear. When a

328
person is born again, the first alteration he experiences is a
new sensation, which he considers very pleasant ; and so sweet,
and different from any he had ever felt, he wishes to have it
continued. His pleasure is such, he cannot conceive it possi
ble for him or any one to experience any which would be sweet
er in their nature. Now it seems to him that he has found
true happiness, which he had been always seeking, but had
never found. Now, as Christ said, he Will thirst no more ; he
will no more thirst after any other species of happiness, or any
other water than that which affords him such delight.
But he will desire the continuance and increase of his pres
ent pleasure. As he has a new sensation, so divine objects
appear new to him. The divine character, the character of
Christ, the law and government of God, saints, and gospel
doctrines, appear new, beautiful and glorious. ' Some experi
ence this new and pleasant sensation, in a greater measure than
others do. But all feel it in a greater or less degree. — This
inward, delightful, satisfying sensation, is the first primary op
eration of this holy appetite. In an active sense the person
may say, his heart delights in God, in Christ,' in divine objects,
as they- Succeed each other in view ofthe mind.
From this new sensation a new class of desires or affections
will arise. e will desire the continuance and increase ofthe
satisfaction he then feels. He will desire to have daily com
munion with God, to have increasing and clearer views of his
glory, to serve and glorify him. It will be his desire to put
all his trust in Christ, to have a greater sense of his beauty and
preciousness, to be one with him, and enjoy him as his belov
ed. He will desire to enjoy the society and conversation of
saints, and to unite with them' in acts of worship. He will de
sire their growth in grace, and the increase of their happiness.
He will desire the salvation of all men, as far as is consistent.
It will be his desire to have all come to Christ, and feel what
he feels. But it is not necessary to be any more particular.
Suffice it to say here, that for every divine object, which af
fords him inward delight, he will have a desire corresponding
with the nature of his sensation. And these desires will be
numerous ; and will constitute what is called in scripture, pant
ing after God, hungering aud thirsting after righteousness. —
And this new sensation, with the desires which immediately
arise from it, and are connected with it, are intended by love ;
love to God, to Christ, to saints, to enemies, and to the truth.

32&
Such sensations, with their attendant desires, constitute that
love which the law requires towards God and man ; that gos
pel charity, w'lthout which nothing can profit us. What other
sense can any one affix to the term love to God and men ? Do
not those, who have that love for God the law requires, delight
in' his character, and desire to have hiin glorified ? Do they
not desire to be conformed to God, to enjby him daily, and with
increasing satisfaction ? And can any person be said to love
God, who does not delight in him ; and who has no desires for
his glory, or to be like him, and serve him ? If not, it is cer
tain that by love to God is meant, delight in his character,
With every desire correspondent with it. And the same exer
cises or Operations are included iu the term love, when any di
vine things are the objects of it. Hence, in the sense now ex
plained, love to God, to Christ, to saints, to all men, and to the
doctrines and precepts of the gospel, and the service of Jeho
vah, is the first, primary operation of this holy appetite. And
of any, persons find they have not those primary exercises, they
may rely on it, they have not any of the fruits of regeneration ;
and are not renewed in spirit. For they must have the prima
ry, before they can have any of the secondary fruits of the
Spirit. It is proper now to observe, that some objects; which belong
to the class of moral objects, instead'of affording pleasant
Sensations, excite directly the contrary. This is true with re
spect to every species of sin. W'hCn a person is born again,
When1 he has a view of sin in others, especially in himself, it ex
cites in him a disagreeable sensation, a sensation more or
less painful. A desire immediately arises to have sin sub
dued, and eradicated from his heart. It appears to him in
a new tight ; as odious, hateful, and one of the greatest or most
awftl evils that has existence. He feels a decided opposition
against it. It is his most formidable enemy, and he views it iri
this light, and hates it. The reasons why sin is thus hateful to
him are many, and it may be he has never reflected on them.
He hates it iri reality, because it separates between him and
God; is an obstacle in the way, which prevents his serving and
enjoying Him as he wishes ; renders him unlike his Maker ; re
moves him to a great moral distance from the fountain of all
good ; and hardens, blinds and stupifies his heart, and unfits
him for the services and enjoyments of heaven. These are the
reasons why, sin is so painful and hateful. And though' he
17

330
cannot perhaps tell why he hates it, yet he feels this aversion
t© it. And the more he becomes acquainted with its pernicious
nature, on his journey through the world, the more he will hate
it, groan under it as the greatest burden, and more fervently
desire its destruction. Now the painful sensations sin occasions,
and the desires he immediately has to be delivered from its pow
er, and to be washed from its pollution, are the primary opera
tions of this holy appetite towards it. These primary exercises
are in scripture denominated sorrow, grief, hatred and repent
ance. By these terms is meant, that to the new born soul
sin is a painful, hateful object; the destruction of which he
desires more fervently than the ruin of any other enemy. And
it is thus painful and hateful to him, and an object of his great
est aversion, for the reasons which have been given. Hence,
if he knew be shoujdnevpr be punished for sin, yet his aversion
to it would be the same, and of the same nature that has been
represented. We now see what the primary operations of this
holy appetite are. This appetite delights primarily in no ob
jects, but those included in the class of moral objects. These,
especially God, it regards with supreme affection. They are
to the renewed the sweetest sources of their happiness. They
esteem them as their portion ; and are ready now to renounce
every other objec't, for the sake of enjoying forever these wells
of salvation. Under the influence ofthe pleasant sensations they
feel, and the desires which attend them, they do and will turn
about, and tread the narrow path, and seek heaven as their
home. Having given this view ofthe primary fruits of regene
ration, we may
2. Attend to the operations of this new appetite.
As every person v when renewed, Tvill delight in divine ob
jects, he will experience a desire for the continuance and in
crease of the happiness he now experiences. And as these de
pend on the increase of his appetite for such objects, he will
desire to grow in grace. And as the growth of every thing,
and the performance of every work, is effected by means, so he
finds means are requisite to his growth in grace and happiness.
Hence from his pleasure in divine objects will arise a seconda
ry class of affections or desires. And these desires have for
their object all those things which are the means of their ad
vancement in knowledge and grace. Accordingly, every thing
which is really a means of a christian's growth in grace, from
infancy to manhood, will be an object of his desire. In such

331
means he takes satisfaction, and desires them, not on their own
account, but for the sake of those objects which are in them
selves pleasant, and are the primary sources of his happiness.
A person loves food for the body for two reasons. One is, he
finds it is necessary to preserve life, health, the increase of
strength, and vigor. Another is, the food suits his taste, and
he takes satisfaction in eating; it is one source of his happiness.
Then when he finds certain means are necessary to obtain food,
and preserve a sufficient supply,' he will delight in using them;
he will desire them, and attend to them. Hence the reason
why men love land, cattle, labor, money, and every other ob
ject needful to preserve life and promote their comfort. But
these meaus are not desired on their own account, but merely
for the sake of procuring food, and other gratifications for the
bodily appetites.
So when persons are raised from moral death to life, they
experience a new kind of pleasure, and delight exceedingly in
the character of God, the living fountain of waters, in Christ,
and in the happiness of all in his kingdom. These objects are
in themselves very pleasant and delightful. They know these
objects are a fountain of bliss ; they know that their essential
excellencies cannot be increased ; but they very soon learn
that their glories may be displayed, and that their happiness
in them may be increased ; and they find the increase of their
happiness depends on the appetite, the relish they have for
them. Hence the increase of this relish, their growth in grace,
and conformity to God, is by them fervently desired. And as
means are appointed by God for them to use, and to promote
their growth in grace, these means are objects of their desire
and love, not on their own account, but for the, sake of pro
moting their conformity to God, and happiness in Him.
The means which God has appointed for the growth in grace
ofhis children, are, the doctrines and precepts ofthe gospel; a
preached gospel, by which doctrines and precepts are explain- '
ed and enforced ; the holy Sabbath ; all divine prdinances ; re
ligious conference and society; meditation on divine subjects ;
prayer ; watching ; self-denial ; maintaining the christian war
fare. These, and similar things are the means by which the
growth of grace is promoted, till we reach a perfect stature in
Christ These means afford satisfaction, are objects of fervent
desire, ', for the sake of attaining unto perfection in holi
ness and bliss. And till persons love God, they have no

132
love or desire for these means of grace, which are holy.
But as soon as they Jove arid delight ip God, then we
find these secondary desires operate. Now they love'the
word of "God, its doctrines and precepts. Now they love the
preaching of .the word. They love prayer, have fervent desires
to come before Gpd and supplicate for mercy. They earnestly
desire religious conference and society. _ The Sabbath is their
delight. They love all ordinances, and all the means of grace,
and desire the enjoyment of these means and privileges, and
will diligently use them, and cry to God for a blessing- to. attend
them, that they may promote their growth in grace, and de
light in God, and prepare thein for a -heavenly state. Before
persons are renewed, they have no real love for the Bible.
Hence they seldom read the word, seldom pray, or use Other
means. And as far as they do use them, they are Cither influ
enced by fear, or custom, or some other selfish and unhallowed
motive. But as soon as persons are born again, and have once
tasted that the Lord is good, and experienced new and ravish
ing delight in Him, they then have a new class of feelings, and
of desires for all ithe appointed, means of grace.' Now they love
to read and meditate on the word of God, it is more precioUs
to them than silver or gold, sweeter than honey ; they delight
in the Sabbath, in hearing the word preached ; oiieday in God's
courts is better than a thousand spent in sin and Worldly pur
suits. Now they love their closets, and enter them to converse
and commune With God. Now they love to meet with the
saints of God, for religious conference, society and prayer.
They love to draw near to God in all his prdinances. They love
to watch, deny self, fight against sin, and press forward towards
perfection. This love for the means of. instruction and grace,
and their desires to enjoy and use them diligently, are fruits of
the Spirit. "They are properly secondary fruits ; because if they
had not the primary fruits, such'.as delight in God, they would
riot have this secondary class of desires and affections. The
secondary are inseparably connected with the primary; and so
united, that their satisfaction in the use of means will ncver.be
greater than this delight in God. And, indeed, in proportion
as a person's relish for the living fouritain of waters and his
delight in it varies, at one time strong and fervent, and at
another weak and faint; in the same proportion hewill find his
satisfaction and diligence in using means will vary ; andinhis

333
attendance on means, he will be afiye and engaged, or cold and
formal, just as his relish is, either strong, or faint.
Hence these secondary fruits of the Spirit are real. evidences
Of grace, as well as the primary fruits. If then persons find
they do not delight in reading and meditating on the word of
God, nor in hearing it preached, nor in prayer, nor in divine
ordinances, nor in.religious conference and society, nor any of
the appointed means of their salvation ; they may rest assured
they .have never passed from death to life. If they say they
have tasted, all things have appeared new to them, they have
been greatly elated with joy, and felt more happiness in an
hpur, than in all their life before ; yet after this do not fervently
desire the means of their growth, and do not take satisfaction
in themj and are not-careful to use them with diligence; they
may conclude all the pleasures they have experienced, and con
cerning which they have so much to say, is no more than the
experience of stony ground hearers, or of those mentioned
Hebrews vi, who fell away, and drew back unto perdition. AH
may rely. on it, that if they do not experience the secondary
fruits of the Spirit, they have never had the primary fruits ; and
if they still retain this hope, they are deceived, and will hear
Christ at last say, I never '.knew you. Hence it is all import
ant to be we'll acquainted with the secondary, as well as the
primary fruits ofthe Spirit, in o^der to judge correctly con
cerning our spiritual state. .If persons have the secondary
fruits ofthe Spirit, they will labor as earnestly for the bread of
life, as men of the world do for bread for the body. For their
whole work' in this life consists in their using th.e means God
has- appointed for their growth in knowledge and grace, and
ripeness for heavenly mansions. And their desires for these
means, that they may ,grow, are so fervent, they will prompt
them to use them diligently. It will be their daily work. Hence
they persevere, hold on and hold out to the end, and finally
conquer, and receive a crown oflife. But those who have not
these. secondary fruits, soon lose their first .counterfeit relish ;
and then, though various motives ma}' induce them to lead a
moral life like the Pharisees, yet they will be formal, cold and
barren in religion, without.ever manifesting the life or power
of it. And some will not persevere in this cold, moral, formal
course, but return again to their former mode of living, and
wallowing in the filth of sin. Wherefore, let all examine whe
ther they have these secondary fruits ofthe Spirit.

334
3. There is one more class of holy desires and affections to
be considered, as the fruits of the Spirit, or new birth.
To understand this part of our subject distinctly, itis neces
sary to remark, that Christ the King in Zion has enemies,
and these are enemies to his kingdom, and to all his subjects
and friends. They are determined, violent, numerous an/1 pow-
erful enemies. Their aim is, to dethrone Christ if possible,
destroy his kingdom, all his subjects and disciples. These
enemies are satan with all his legions, all remaining sin in the
heart, all infidels and unrenewed persons, the charms and flat
teries of this world, powerful temptations, all errors in doctrine
and practice. These are inimical to Christ, to his cau.se,and
to his real friends and followers. They are constantly oppo
sing Christians, fighting against them, and aiming at their de
struction. Can real Christians view these enemies with indif
ference? Will not their opposition to every, thing which the
saint loves, highly prizes, and seeks as his treasure, excite
feelings and desires in their hearts of some kind or other ? But
what are the feelings and affecions which opposition from such
enemies Will excite ? The word of God teaches how we shall
feel towards them. We should hate them,feel a holy indignation
against them, experience strong desires to have them defeated,
destroyed, bound and confined, that they may not injure the
blessed cause in which we are engaged.
We shall hate sin in our own hearts, as well as iu others; and
feel a decided opposition to it. We shall fight against it ; never
feed or indulge it; nor make peace with it, or ever rest content
ed with any' thing short of its perfect eradication from the
heart. We shall be opposed to Satan, to all his works, and all
his temptations. We shall resist him, and fight against him,
and never give place tohini. We shall desire the day to come,
when he shall be bound, and confined forever, and wholly de
feated. We shall desire, that even- enemies to God may be
renewed and become his- friends. And if they continue ene
mies, we shall desire to have them defeated and confined with
devils, that they may no more disturb the peace of God's king
dom. We shall resist every temptation, and guard against the
allurements of riches, honors and vain pleasures. We shall
oppose every error in doctrine and practice, arid contend ear-;
nestly for the truth. We shall fervently desire the day to ar
rive, when Christ will triumph pver his and his people's ene
mies, when we shall gain an endless victory, when death will

335
be destroyed ; and all enemies, and evils of every kind, shall be
forever banished from the holy kingdom of Christ; when peace,
and love, and harmony, shall forever prevail ; and all the friends
of G°d enjoy perfect good, without any enemy to disturb or
interrupt their enjoyments. Such feelings and affections the
opposition of enemies will excite in the hearts of all who are
born again.
Those who make a portion of this world, if they are oppos
ed in their pursuits, view their opponents as their enemies.
Their opposition to them in the pursuit of objects which they
love, produces in them hatred, anger, revenge, and such pas
sions, towards their opposers or enemies.
So in this case, all beings and things which are opposed to
the happiness, glory, purity, and peace of God's kingdom, will
be considered by saints or enemies, opposed to the objects of
their supreme delight. And such opposition to all their pri
mary and secondary feelings and desires, and to their pursuit
ofthe highest good of Christ's kingdom, will excite in their
hearts a decided opposition to such enemies. And these are
holy desires, such as we ought to have, and are the fruits ofthe
Spirit, or the effect of regeneration. — If we do not experience
them, we have no ground to hope we are born again. If we do
not feel a hatred to sin, and strong desires to overcome it ; if
we do not hate and fight against satan, and resist his tempta
tions ; if we do not hate sin in others, artd desire to reclaim
them ; if we do not hate every error, and guard against the
allurements of this world ; if we do not fight against such ene
mies, desire to overcome, and be crowned with victory ; what
evidence have we that we are born again ? If remaining sin is
not a grief to us, and our greatest burden in life ; if we are not-
warmly engaged in the christian warfare ; if the' abounding of
sin, and the success of satan on the earth, are not hateful ; if
our desires for a final victory over all evil are faint ; we have
little or no ground to hope we are christians.
Here then is another class of affections, which all will experi
ence who are born again. By them we may try and examine
ourselves. I have now described the fruits of regeneration, or ofthe Spir
it ; and have divided these fruits into three distinct classes, to
help all to form a correct judgment of their real character. In
the first class is included a new, holy, spiritual appetite ; which
delights in the character of God, of Christ, in the happiness of

336
his kingdom, and deft"f I f°r thoicontiriuanoetatSdi irifei'ease'dt*
those pleasures. The first pleasures andjoys of reriewed'per-*
sons, with their immediate desires;, when every thing- appeal
new to them, form the first 'class of holy affections. From^tM*
will arise desires for the continuance and increase of-gAfcejand
fo? all the means God has- appointed for our' improvement* in
knpwledge and growth in grace, i Those desires constitrite'tbe'
second,clas|» of holy desires- or fruits of the Spirits, And from
these will' arise a hatred of sin, of every spiritual enemy ; and
desires for .them? to hj subduedj and a final victory gained.
These desires , to overcome all -spiritual enemies form a third*
class of holy affections. All these; are those fruits ofthe Spir5-'
it, by which we mayknowr what.our >dfaraetei'Sirare. Biit»onef
fh»g more remains under ,this.faeadvwhiptt is to show,' - '*
''•%".¦ That those-who have these fruits >will manifest theffi, in d\
life ai]rd conduct agreeing wifh their nature; „~
Every person's external and visible- conduct, is under the*
influence and government of the heart, or affections'. The
heart is; the only primatry active principle; iri man;- which prti1-
duces all the visible fruits in person's actions* and cota'drictv
The heart is every pers@ps? moral nature ; and^ his external*
conduct is t the fruit this nature brings1 forth. Hence the rea*!
son why Christ, compares men- to trees.'- He says trees bring"
forth fruit, according to. thejr nature ; and he says, that men
will db the same. This is the way by which welearn what the '
nature or moral character -of man is.' We infer'bis' nature,
from his fruit, a&wegudge ofthe nature'of a tree by'-its fruitv
In this way every »perspj[' must learn his own nature or charate''
ter. Here we tgfceijjnto yiewfc person's internal, as wel^asex^
ternai, or visible fruit. We. may then adopt this* as a trtie
maxim, that if our external fruit does no* ag^efetwith' the word
of 6od,.we are not christiansr., }:':
A p^sbafs external- Hcprad'B(et.; may exhibit negative' arid'p&s^'
iti^e evidence, that he jf a saint. - By negative' evidendi fe-iW-
tend^ mere morality. Ka person?s life is immoral, it gives
positive evidence that he was*neyer born again;* If hefestrict-
ly moral, he gives negative evidence of piety. ; His actions arid
woisSs a^ree'with the rule of duty. And^we may have' no evi
dence'' torsjipport us, in, saying he>is not a reaS sajnt.
By positive externa;! evidence, is, meaiHthose actions1 and
coridnct,' whiph manifest a.real benevolent-spirit. He not only
abstains. from evilj and avoids immoral conduct --j but«he gops

33?
farther, tad manifests love, kindness, and other holy auctions,
by bis actions and conduct iri life. — So Christ represents the
final trial. I was sick, .and ye visited me ; to another;he says,
I was sick and ye visited me not. Here one gave positive evi
dence of love to Christ ; the other gave, only negative evidence**
And we learn, that negative evidence is not sufficient, if posi
tive evidence is wanting* For one is by Christ blessed, and
the other condemned. Yet the one condemned is not accused
of any immoral conduct.
When a contribution is proposed to send the gospel to the
heathen, one professor says nothing against, and does nothing
to prevent it ; but though able he win not give any thing to
promote the object. Another, no more able to give, encour
ages all to give, and gives freely and liberally himself. One
gives only a negative, but the other positive evidence of piety*
This shows us that those who give no jiiore than negative evi
dence of piety, do not bring forth the fruit which gains the char
ity of others. Any person unrenewed may do all this } he
may live a moral life, so that no person can have any reason
to speak evil of him, or charge him with any crime. But chris
tians are to do more than others ; and, must, in order to' gain
charity. They must npt only avoid sinful courses, be careful
not to cast stumbling blocks in the way, or do any thing to
hinder the salvation of souls, and the advancement of Christ's
kingdom ; but they must be actively engaged in affording as*
sistance to fellow travellers, and in promoting the kingdom of
Christ. A christian must not only avojd every thing, which
may prevent his brother's rising, when he falls or. stumbles ;
but he ought to help him rise.. He should not Pnly refrain
from everything which may prevent his return, when he goes
astray j but go after him, find him arid bring him back to the
fold, if it be possible. He must not only refrain from evil, but
do good ; not only avoid works of darkness, but shine as a
light in the world. Some trees afC full of leaves, and bear evil
fruit ; others have leaves, but no fruit ; and others are full of
leaves and laden with good fruit., , Bo a good profession is like
a tree .with leaves ; and if such are only negatively good, they
are as trees full of leaves, which bear no fruit. But a real saint
is not only beautiful with the leaves of a profession, but is more
or less iaden With goodfrUit.. This may show what of external
visible fruit we must bring forth, to give evidence of real friend
ship to God. If professors are not negatively holy, are not
18

33*
ftoral, feut immoral, k is very certain they are riot (%|siianjsy
however good their story of experiences riiaybe. If they are
moral, and thus negatively goodr and profess a change of heart,
"we have not sufficient ground to* say they are not saints. But
if they exhibit only this Begative evidence, our charity foi? their*
will be faint. ~ , ' ,,
But if their relation is good and they bear fhrit positively
good, they gain our charity at once ; and we shall have warm
and full confidence that they are what they profess, according
to the measure of good fruit which they bear. NoW Whatever
we have felt inwardly, even though we have been elated seenr-
ihgly to heaven with good feelings, yet if our visible life and!
conduct do not harmonise herewith ; if we have only; a nega
tive, but rio positive evidence ; we have not ground to Support
#at hope whicfe purifies the heart. Hence, t& have that fruit
which the word of God describes as good fruit, we must expe
rience all those internal affections, which have been illustrated j
and our external conduct and life mast agree herewith; other
wise we have not the fruits1 of the Spirit, which we- may rest on
with safety.
After all, persons may be deceived. They may exhibit
much positive good fruit externally, yet not be christians. Be
cause all those external! good things may be performed from
bad motives ; from; pride^ or a desire to appear welf, and gain
ah honorable name in the world. This is clearly taught by
Christ and his apostles.
Our Lord says, that some at the- great day will |Mead, they
have wrought miracles iri his name, and eateh and drunk in his
presehce,to whom he will declare that he neverknew them. And
Paul signifies, that persons may speak with the eloquence df an
gels, feedf the poor, work miracles, and give their bodies to be
feurned,yet not have charity ; and if they have not charity*
they are nothing. And this agree* with his description of cer
tain characters in the 6tft of Hebrews, and with whutdirist ob
serves concerning stony -ground bearers. - And it agrees with
the dictates of reafson. For however good, and useful' acfifons
and words are, if they are not performed with right riiotives,
and do not proceed fr&tit a benevolent principle of 'heart, they
cannot be pleasing in tne sight of that God, who looketh at th*
heart, and requires sincerity in the inward part.
I have now exhibited to view those fruits ofthe Spirit, or of
the new birth, Which all will bring forth, snore or less, who arfe'

339
feovn again. It is by these fruits we are to form our «pWpB.«#
others, and judge cPnceraing our own characters. , For Christ
has given the same rule, by which we are to judge ourselves
and our felfow men, whether we and they are indeed the child
ren of God. By their fruits ye shall ktiow them ; and by our
fruit we must know ourselves. For we have no intuitive view
of our nature, any more than we have of 'the nature of other
persons. Arid of course we have no way to know" ourselves,
only by our fruits. How important, then, that we should form
consistent, views ofthe nature of gospel fruit. For if we are
. wrong in, this particular, we may form false opinions of our own
hearts and moral characters.
Reflections. 1. No person can tell the minute, or hour, or
day in which he was born again.
Regeneration is the creation of a new riature, or a holy, be
nevolent, active principle of action, or lappetite. And there
are but three ways, by which we can know whether such a prin
ciple is created in us. One is by intuition ; another by feeling
the operation of divine power; at the instant the creation is per
formed ;; and the last is, by the fruits which will follow. , We
certainly cannot tell this by intuition. To have a naked view
of the heart, is the prerogative of God only. And it is as cer
tain, that no person can know this by feeling the agency of fhe
Spirit. The agency of God is -constantly operating upon
christians, in preserving life, in sanctifying the heart, and in
many ways- But no person feels this agency ; no one has a
conscious feeling of thatpower, which causes his Jungs to heave,
and his blood to flow in his veins. It is then only by the fruits,
which the new nature will bear, that we can have a knowledge
of this great change. To learn by the fruit, there must be
rijore or less time intervene, before we can infer that we are re
newed. Itis granted, persons may know the hour and place in which'
they experienced a change in their feeliogs ; wheii things ap-
pearednewto them ; when they felt other joys, and. sensations,
apd desires. But those feelings are not the change itself ; they
are only the .fruits of it. A new nature or appetite must pre
cede these sensations and desirPs. And from them we may in
fer, that a change has been produced in us, if those feelings are
genuine. But we cannot infer from them that we were, at that
instant born again. It might be at that instant, and it might
have been an hour or day previous. How long the heart may

340
have beeri created anew, before we experience any of the fruits,
no person can tell. It is probable, that some experience those
fruits more immediately than others ; according to the nature
ofthe objects in view of .the mind,at the time the change is ef-;
fected, As it is by the fruit only a person can know he is born
again ; and as no one can infer from the fruit the instant when>
the new Creation was produced ; so no one can tell the day, or
hour, when his heart was 'renewed. He can tell when he ex
perienced new sensations, desires, and pleasures ; but cannot
tell, when that new principle was produced, which brings forth
those fruits. And it may be that the fruit is realized very soon
after the change is produced ; but not certain.— This corrects
and confutes Un error, which is often attended with dangerous
consequences. . ¦ : \
Some persons believe they can tell with certainty the very
instant, or moment, when they were born again. And on this
ground it is, that they are positive and certain that they are
new creatures. Hence, whatever their feeling and fruits are
afterwards, they ire still confident they are saints. They will
say, Iknow I am renewed ; for I know the moment, whenthis
was done ; and if grace cannot be lost, I am still a renewed
man. So they maintain their hope, though their1 present fruit'
condemns them. While a person, who says he cannot tell
whether he is born again only by his fruit, will doubt concern
ing his state sp far as his, fruit will not warrant him to hope.
He can say, I know the very hour when a great change took
place iri my feelings, and I had some hope then that I was anew
creature. But as au< my feelings then may have been spurious,
and falsp J" *° it may be I was not then renewed, or have been
since, seeing I do not bring forth the genuine fruits of a new
heart. If my feelings were genuine on which I first built my
hope, I should still bring forth good fruit. .As my fruit is not
such as the bible represents christians as bringing forth daily,
I have reason tp fear my first fruits were false, only such as
stony gVound hearers experience ; and hence the reason why I
havle generally been so barren. Thus different Will be the
reasoning of persons, when one is certain he knew the moment
when he was born again, and. the other relies not on this, but on
the' fruit he bears,, as the only sure evidence of a change of
heart. '"'; ¦•'¦•
Persons pf the former class are generally antinominians ;
(hey maintain their hope firiri, when their "daily" fruit condemns

841
them; How can they do-this, only on the principle that. pet-
sons may have a saving faith, yet not bring forth good fruit f
There is reason to fear many have been deceived to their final
ruin,whohave imbibedthe erroneous idea of which I am speak
ing. While those who depend on their fruit as an evidence of
a real change, according to the direction of Christ, will doubt,
examine themselves, and feel assured no further than their fruit
witnesses in their favor. And they will make it a business to
live holy lives every day ; while those of the other sentiment
will give very little attention to the fruit they bear. For their
hope from day to day is not founded on their fruit, but on the
certainty that at such a moment they were renewed.
2. Great transports of joy are no certain evidence of a change'
of heart. Some lay great stress on such joyful sensations. As
soon as they feel themj they are sure of a change of heart. Yet
perhaps there, is no feeling, no affection, which satan can more
easily counterfeit, than this. For according to the known faws
of our nature, by which we are always governed, it is certain
that joy will attend a deliverance from danger or distress,:
whether it be real, or existing only in the belief of the mind.
For if a person believes he is delivered from the danger, the en
emy, or the evil, which he greatly dreaded, his deliverance is
in his view real; and will be attended with the same joyful
feelings as a real salvation, though in fact be is deceived, be
lieving he is safewhen he is not.
Satan is a cunning and subtle adversary. His object is the
ruin of souls. To effect this he will, if ppssible, keep sinners
in a state of peace and security all their days. If at any time
they are alarmed with a sense of their danger, he will try every
method he can to lull thpir fears asleep again. If he cannot
effect this, his next step is to deceive thein- ; and make them be
lieve they are real /saints, when they are not. And this is the.
mpstj dangerous ground, upon which he can bring them to rest*.
For it is seldom any person is brought to renounce his hope,
though it befalse. Many secure souls are alarmed and renew
ed, while not one hypocrite is brought to see, his deception, re
ject his bopey and build anew. Itis by deception satan brought
sin into this world at first ; and it is by deception he has ever
since maintained his kingdom. This is the grand means by
which be ruins so many souls. To this end, we a^e informed,
hi' .may and often does transform himself into an angel of light.
And when be does this, there is no angel in heaven, who ,mani-,

342
Jests a greater zeal for religion than he. He then labors to
have sinners attend to religion, with great assiduity. .For a
proof of this we may produce as witnesses the Heathen, the
Jews, and Mahometans. How zealous they are in religion.
But their systems are such as satan has invented for, them to
embrace. Satan finds that mankind in general cannot rest
easy, unless they have what they call religion. He according
ly forms systemsfor them, and persuades them to embrace/them;
and the more engaged they are in supporting their, religious
rites, the more safe and secure they feel, and so much the more
satan is pleased. For if by such ways he can blind, apd de
ceive, and ruin, souls, be is satisfied. He then is their gpd, andis
full of religious zeal himself.
Now in a christian land satan has to take a different course,
ia many respects. While men admit the; bible, he persuades
them to embrace damnable errors, and support them with all
the zeal, and false learning and reasoning in their power. . If
any remain orthodox in head, and he cannot ruin them by dan
gerous errors in sentiment, he will bring them to believe they
are christians when they are not, and so rest on a false hope.
Hence, when sinners are alarmed and exercised in mind, arid
even have a genuine conviction of sin, he will persuade them to
believe, that remarkable dreams, visions, bodily agitations, texts
of scripture occuring suddenly, and in a way unaccountable to
the mind, and suchlike things, are sure evidences of a change
of heart. He sets them to reason in this way. 'This dream,
this vision, this bodily feeling, this text of scripture, is no part
©f my agency. I cannot, produce such things, nor prevent
them. They are produced by some invisible agent, and this
agent is the Spirit of God. For satan cannot, and if he could,
he would not, do these things. .They must be from the holy
Spirit, Jand by them the, Spirit informs us we are born again.'
Now it is easy for satan, if permitted, to produce such strange
dreams, visions, and bodily affections ; and whisper texts of
scripture to their minds. He quoted scripture to Cljrjst ; he
had great power over men's bodies in that day ; and he can
raise Storms, as in the case of Job, and do many such wonder
ful things, when permitted. When, therefore, men are perSiiad-
«d to believe, that such wonders are always produced by the
Holy Spirit, and are sure signs of a change of heart, he has
them in his power, and cantdeceive them atjjis pleasure. And

348
persons who believe thus may rely on it, they will have visions,
and revelations, more or less.
And sortie; who profess to be ministers, know so little concern
ing human nature, and the deceitful workings ofsatan, that they
do, by laying much weight on such appearances themselves,
persuade many to believe in them, and rely on them. Hence
iri places where such things are preached and believed, if there
is any revival, persons experience these things very often. One
has had a dream ';' another a vision ; another a text occuring he
cannot tell how ; others have felt great weakness of body, so-
as to lose their Strength, and apparently their life. Converts
are multiplied very fast ; almost every one has a dream or vi
sion, or some such wonder to relate, and then is pronounced
converted. Thus satan deceives many. While in other places
where there are revivals, and persons are taught differently,
and do not believe in such things as signs of conversion, it is very
rare that they occur among the converts. Why not ? Because
satan knows, that he cannot deceive such persons in this way.
Such works therefore do not answer his end ; and of course he
does not produce them. Hence the reason why the weak, the
ignorant, and those most likely to believe in such strange things,
are most apt to experience them. Because in such persons sa
tan is more likely to succeed in deceiving.
Now when persons are under serious impressions, and have
a sense and conviction of sin, satan will deceive them, if possi
ble. He will lead them to settle down on a false hope. And
if, in this state of mind, they have an idea that they are born a-
gain, whether they obtain this by dreams, visions, or any other
way, they will experience an alteration in their feelings. As
soon as they believe they are renewed, whatever may occasion
this belief, they will feel joyful ; their burden will leave them,
and their mind will become in some degree tranquil. And those
feelings are occasioned by the idea, or the belief they have,
that their heart is renewed. And the joy they feel, their relief
of the burden they had experienced, and the consequent peace
of mind, confirm their belief ; and this again increases their joy,
and this increase satisfies them still more fully that tbey have
passed from death to life. So in this way they soon have a
settled and confirmed hope. Yet their hearts remain unrenew
ed ;» and this great change in, their feelings was occasioned
wholly by their being led to entertain a belief that they had be
come new creatures. If a person views himself, as he really h,

344
rv - "* '¦
in the greatest danger, and even exposed lo eternal death ; if"
this view excites fear, anxiety, and distress, and sinks him under
. the burden ; if, by any means, he, gains belief that he is deliver
ed from danger, and the death he feared, his fears, and distress,
and burden, will leave him. And this deliverance, which he
considers as real, will excite in him greater or Jess joy and glad
ness of heart. Yet he . is. deceived,; no such deliverance has
been wrought -for him, as he believes. But with him it is a re
ality' and produces the same effect it would in case it had been
.real.. And his relief of his burden, and joy of heart, he will
view as evidences of a real deliverance ; and of course will in
crease and strengthen his previous belief or hope.
Thus howeasy it isfor satan to deceive persons, when they
embrace such erroneous ideas of evidence of convention. It
was in a way similar to this, the stony ground hearers were
filled with joy, and their joy confirmed their hope. Similar to
this was the joy the Jews experienced at the Red sea. The
day before they were burdened with fears and distress, occa
sioned by their enemies. As soon as they had safely crossed'
and saw their enemies overwhelmed in the mighty deep, theitf
burden left them ; and their hearts were filled with joy, which
they expressed in songs of praise to God their Savior. Yet
their hearts were full of rebellipn, which they manifested a few
days after, in murmurs and complaints,
Hence joy is no sure evidence of a, change of heart. And
false joy is commpnly greater, than tha,t which is genuine.
And it is dangerous for persons tp place much dependance up
on it, especially when they first obtain a hope. And general
ly, if not always, if persons find on examination, that a hope
they had met with a change preceded their joy, they may con
clude that this hope is thp cause of their, joy and the relief they
feel, and not the. fruit of any real change of heart. Where
there is a real change of heart, attended with, joy and a release
from foeir burdens of mind, it is commonly some time before
persons do or can consider tins a warrantable evidence of a sav
ing change. Hence if : their hope precedes their joy, they
ought not tp rely on it as an evidence of grace in the heart.
Jt may alsp be -well tp observe, that gospel ministers, instead
of teaching people to pay attention to dreams and visipns, bod
ily, feejings, or the remarkable occurrence of scripture texts to
%the mind,. ought, to show them the great danger of laying any
weight on such things, and warn them to guard against being

S43
deceived by such delusions. This particular maybe closed
with the following observations.
Within the course of my ministry, which is now forty-three
years, I. have been particularly acquainted with a number of
revivals among my own people, and' also in towns adjacent ;
and have frequently noticed two kinds of converts, whose first
experiences have been difierent. , One class is composed of those,
who have manifested a great and sudden alteration in their
feelings. They have suddenly experienced great joy, and en
tire relief of their burden, and manifested much warmth of af
fection, great zeal in the cause of Christ, and almost a full and
spre confidence of a saving change free from doubts and fears^
Tjhe other class have manifested a lively sense of the great de
pravity and sinfulness of their hearts-; after a season theiif
burden, as they call it, has left them ; they have felt a pleas'-
edness with the character of God, inward satisfaction in his
sovereignty, a willingness to be in his hand and at' his disposal ;
but, on account ofthe great sinfulness of their hearts, cannot
for a considerable time persuade themselves, that they are new
crpatures. They begin at last to entertain a hope, with feai»
and trembling ; yet at no time have they been much elated with
jojjt.t, This class of converts have generally persevered in the.
christian course, and given increasing evidence of real, and gen
uine piety, shining with greater light from year to year ; and
it is seldom, that one of them finally proves to be a hypocrite.
While numbers of the other class, after a' few days, begin to
decline, grow cold, artd finally, like Stony ground hearers, un-
derjtrials. fall away, and embrace dangCrous errors of some
kind, or return to their former course of life ; many of them
give decided proof of hypocrisy. And those of this class^ who
do persevere and support a christian life, after a few days or
weej|Sjfrom thelime of their change, manifest but little ofthe
joy they first felt, >lose' their confidence, and begin tp doubt,
whether all they have experienced is net a delusion. They
begin to become more and more acquainted with their remain
ing corruptions, and complain of their depravity, coldness, au&,,
stupidity j and then, with humility and trembling, they perse*
vere jn working out their salvation. Hence converts, who are
elat^dj vrith joy at first and on this account have great confi-
dencfiaud assurance, who are warm, forward, and full of zeal,
are not very-promising, arid there is much reason to fear they
will prove tip better than stony ground hearers. But those,
19

346
who have a deep sense of their depravity, and obtain a hope
by slow degrees, and" with many fears : whp show, great ten
derness of heart, lest they should wound, the cause, apdtmany
fears that they are deceived ; these are persons, who shine
brightest on their journey to the heavenly land. And with
this representation, it is believed, ministers who , have been
much acquainted with revivals, will agree. Let uslhen learp
not to Consider great and sudden joy, confidence, and boldness,
so great evidences of piety, as many seem to do, and especial
ly those, who are less acquainted with the operations of the
Holy Spirit.
3. All persons, who believe the eptire depravity of the heart,
and the necessity of a change by the agency of the Spirit, to
be consistent; must embrace the doctrine of particular, person
al election. , ,( .-> ,,-.¦.<-,(,'
, It is the depravity ofthe heart, which leads men away from
God, to travel the broad road to death. This path they will
continue to travel, till they are renewed. And if not renewed,
all will perish. And regeneration is a change wrought by the
creating, agency pf God. Also itis a plain truth, that no be
ing can act without determination. A determination to do ja
thing, to produce an event, must precede,, in the -order of na
ture, the event to be produced. Indeed the heart of every mor
al agent must be in a state of perfect^ indifference, with respect
to any action to be performed, or must be determined against
it, or for it. For we cannot conceive of any other. state in
which the heart can.be. If God is perfectly indifferent wheth
er any one is renewed or not, he will not exert his agency to
renew any heart. If determined not to renew one, £pul, then
he never will save one. It follows then, that he is determined
to renew a person's heart, previous to effecting the change, and
then his agency is employed in producing it. It is plain a. de
termination to do any particular thing must precede, in the
order of nature, the performance of it. , ,(',
Again. As we see, that a divine determination to, renew and
save a soul, must precede the exertion of power for this pur
pose ; so it is as obvious, that' Gpd is determined to renew the
hearts of all men j; or not to renew, the heart of one ; or to re
new the hearts of a part only. No other supposition can be
admitted. It is certain from his .word,, that he will not* save all
men ; andas certain, that he willrenew and save some. . Then-
the determination of Gpd is to renew and save some, apart,

347
ofthe fallen race of men; and leave the others to act their
pleasure, and-embrace or reject Chirst. And we know they
Will reject him forever. Suppose God is determined to exert
his agericyto renew some heart, the present hour ; must he
not have in view some particular person; whom he designs to
renew ? Or will his agency be exerted to renew a heart at
_ random, or as chance may direct ?
Is such a view of God's agency consistent with wisdom, and
loVe ? God never acts in this manner. If he is to renew some
heart this day, he knows whose heart it is, and where he lives.
Hence itis evident, that as God is' determined to renew the
hearts of some only of the human race, he must and does know
the particular persons to be renewed. And this Christ teach
es. He says be knows his sheep by name, and can call them
byname ; this 3'ou will learn by reading the 10th chapter of
John. If God must know, who the individual persons are,
whose hearts he is determined to renew and save, he knows
them by name, where they reside, and in what age of the world
they live. These are truths, which all must admit to be con
sistent, who grant men are totally depraved, and must be re
newed by the creating agency of God. And' if they believe
these truths, they embrace the doctrine of particular, person
al election of individuals to eternal l.'fe. For by the doctrine
of election all that is intended is, that God-is determined to re
new and save some of the fallen race ^ and he knows who the
individual persons are, whom he will save, and when and where
they live. These are all the ideaS contained in the doctrine of
election, with this belief that this determination of his is eter
nal. Those then who -deny this doctrine, yet believe in total
depravity, and the -need: of creating power to renew the heart,
are very inconsistent. Rtit if persons only see clearly the
truths expressed under this' particular, and arecapable of com
paring, and seeing their agreement, they must admit the doc
trine of election. And if a person has not a knowledge of these
truths, or is not capable of comparing them, and seeing their
agreement and consistency, he is either so deficient in knowl
edge, or weak in intellect, as to be unfit to teacb others the
doctrines ofthe gospel,- and the way of salvation.
4. Is it by our fruits only we can know what our moral char
acters, and the characters of others, are ? Then, if we would
avoid deception, and form a correct judgment, we must have
dear and distinct views of gospel fruit. If we err in this, we

34$
may judge a tree to be good, which is evil ; arjd a tree evil,
which is good. How important then it is for all, and especial
ly teachers, to study the scriptures, and acquire a clear and
consistent knowledge of all the fruits ofthe holy Spirit, or of a
new heart. To pbtain this knowledge, let all with prayer for
light and instruction read the beatitudes of our Savior, Math.
5th, and what the apostle says in Galatians, where the fruits of
the Spirit and of the flesh are enumerated, and other passages
in all of the epistles. And every professor is not on!}' request
ed to obtain right views of gospel fruit ; but compare himself
with the truth, and candidty examine himself. Deception is
ruinous to the soul. And itis with fear and trembling, we are
to work out our salvation. • We cannot give too much atten
tion, to make our calling and election sure. And to attain
unto assurance, is one great privilege and blessing. Let us
then examine daily, with candor and impartiality, to learn
whether we are trees of righteousness, which are laden with the
glorious fruits of the gospel.
5? The children of God are under the greatest obligations to
bless and serve God,, in, return for his infinite love to them.
God not only so loved you, as to give his Son to die for you ;
but when you despised the offers of life, and setChrist at nought,
and were in the road to final ruin, he so loved yon that he in
terfered, renewed your hearts, and saved you from eternal
death, You are born of God, are his sons and daughters,
heirs of God, and jointlieirs with Christ to all the riches, glo
ries, and joys of his heavenly kingdom. In this God has man
ifested far greater love to ypu, than he would, had he given
you all the kingdoms, crowns, riches, and glories of this world.
His love to you is inconceivably great, precious, and unmer
ited. For, instead of deserving such gracious treatment, you
justly merited his endless displeasure. You have been the ob
jects of nnmerited, and unlimited love, and grace. You are
infinitely indebted to your gracious sovereign. You owe him
nil the love, gratitude, praise, and serviee youare able to ren
der him. And you can never repay fully the debt of < love,
praise, and service.
Do you feel these truths ? Is it your constant and earnest
desire,; to render to God according to benefits received ? Is
your life daily devoted to God ? Do you daih' glorify him, by
reflecting the rays pfhis glory ? Oh make it your studious, watch
ful ai»d prayerful endeavor to shun every sin, to grow in

349
g^ace, and ripen for heaven,,,* You are, born from abov«; are
the sons of God, members of h\s family. Then place your af
fections on things above, seek heaven as your home,, arid earnr
estly desire tojoin the general assembly above in then' songs qf
praise for such boundless love and grace. IJray for, and assist
each other on your journey ; with zeal seek the salvation .p^f
souls, and die, extension of Christ's kingdom through this
world. Live in actual readiness to meet death, to stand before
your Judge, to be acquitted there, and welcomed forever into
the joy of ypur Lord. Then, as a star among innumerable
stars, you will shine around the throne ofthe Lamb, and as one
body with perfect harmony tune your voices, and loud.as thun
der shout his praise for redeeming love.  ,., ,
6. What madness reigns in the hearts of all,, who, yet reject
the Savior of sinners., . v
The impenitent are desired to reflect, and consider hpw vile
their hearts are ; how rebellious their lives, and how inconceiv
ably stupid, blind, and mad they are. ,, You are deaf, naked,
blind, and dead in trespasses and sins. You travel the road to
hell" with pleasure, and every day are treasuring up wrath, a-
gainst the day of wrath. Christ has died for you, is able and
ready to save you, and calls unto you. Come unto me,.j[.w,ijty
not rejectyori ; turn ye, for why will you dip ?,- But you turn
a deaf ear.. When your danger is setbefpre, you, you remain
unmoved, and stupid as beasts that perish. Why do you thus
despise Christ and his blood, and pursue a course which. you
know will ruin you ? Why do you act this part of folly and
madness? To excuse, and justify yourselves, you often say
you cannot help it. Ypt nothing, but, attention is wapting, in
order foryou to see your vileness, your danger7lyour,just desert
of death, and your dependence on sovereign , mercy. And if you
saw all this, could you live a secure, quiet fife ? If a, person
found himself in a pit,, into which he had plunged himself, and
saw that there he must die, if he remained, would he feel easy in
that condition ? If he knew he was unable to deliver himself*,
would this quiet his fears, ? Would not this dependence on an?
other for help, and the uncertainty of being assisted and saved,
increase his fears, and cause him to cry alpudfor mercy ? L°ok
then, and learn that you are,. deaf, blind, naked, dead .and, lost ;
and are dependent on Christ for help. , Then you will begin, to
beg and cry for mercy, and not till then,, , Then, like tile sick,
the lame, the deaf and blind, U} Christ's day,you will come and

350
«ry to him, as they did, Lprd Jesus, have mercy on us. And
till you do thus see your ruined state, your dependence on un
merited grace, and do come and cry for mercy, there is no hope
you will escape death.

**********

ESSA,? XXX.
%fl Summary View of the system, advanced and il
lustrated in these Essays.
Every science is founded on what are generally called' first
principles. And as far as' persons differ in their views of these,
they will embrace different systems. And yet first principles
are commonly self evident propositions.
Mathematicks is a science founded on first, self evident pro-
ppsitipns or axioms. And all, who reason correctly from them;
agree in their results and conclusions.
Theology and Ethics are founded on first principles. And
so far as persons distinctly perceive and understand the first
principles, if they reason correctly and consistently, they will
be agreed in the system of sentiments resulting from them. For
the process of reasoning is only inferring one proposition from
another; ¦ How then is it possible to forma true system of sen
timents, unless we are acquainted with the self evident proposi
tions on which the}' are founded ?
Every science has a beginning. To understand and teach it
correctly, we must start from the beginning, of self evident
propositions. When we trace sentiments back, to learn wheth
er the}' are well founded,. we shall conie to first principles from
which they follow as inferences ; or continue to run back ad
infinitum. And in reasoning- and proceeding forward, we must
begin with a self evident proposition from which we infer a sec
ond, from that a third, and in this way progress in the field of
science. Unless we reason in this manner we proceed in the
dark, or reason in a circle-.— -When truths are thus inferred one
of another from self evident propositions, every step in the pro-

351;
cess is denjpustrated. By this mode ef reasoning, a unites
mind in the boundless field of knowledge may progress forev
er and ever. And how transporting is the thought, th'at our
limited minds may improve in knowledge through an endless
duration ; and especially in the science of Theology, which ex
ceeds all others in sublimity, to which other sciences are only
hand-maids, if rightly improved, and which contains the most
refreshing, delightful, and joyful food for an immortal spirit. —
If we can ascertain the first principles of Theology and Ethics,
and reason correctly from them, different persons will harmo
nize in sentiments. To proceed directly to the subject before
us, it may be asserted,
1. That happiness, is an absolute good, and this is one first
principle in Ethics. As happiness is considered a good in it
self by all rational beings ; and as no one can give a reason,
why he thus esteems it, the proposition is self evident. And,
2. That pain or misery is an absolute evil, is another self ev
ident truth. All fear and dread pain, and no one can give a
reason why he does. These are >two ofthe self evident propo
sitions, on which the whole system is founded. It is well known
that self evident propositions admit of no proof. As soon a S
they are distinctly stated, and perceived, if a person does not
give his assent, he must be left to wonder ; for conviction can
not be produced in him by any thing more evident ; for nothing
can be more evident, than a Self evident truth. Such truths
may be illustrated and explained by other propositions with
which persons may be acquainted, but can never be proved.
Some pretend to make a distinction between pleasure, and
happiness. But when nothing more is taken into view, than
their simple nature, who can show a difference between them- ?
Happiness, pleasure, in their simple nature, are nothing, but a-
greeab'e, pleasant sensations. A pleasant sensation, emotion,
or feeling, is happiness, and it is pleasure. Though all pleas
ant sensations are alike in their simple nature ; yet they may
diffei in degree, and intenseness, and may be excited by objects
differing much from each other. The objects which please are
very different from each other in ttiahy respects. And it is
granted, that no objects or sources of enjoyment can afford as
durable, satisfying happiness, as full as our capacities will ad
mit, but those which are infinite and eternal. The happiness
derived from such objects may be styled true, real, and substaiir

352
tiril ; while pleasures given us by fading, fleeting, and uncertain
objects, tan never fill or satisfy the mind. ,
If we ask any persons whether they esteem happiness a good
thing ? All will answer in the affirmative. Ask them to assign
reasons, why they thus esteem it ; they can give none. Do
you wish to enjoy any greater good, than perfect, uninterrupt
ed happiness ? They must answer, no ; for they cannot con
ceive of any greater good to be enjoyed than this. — Hence the
greatest snrn of happiness, which rational beings can enjoy, is
the highest good any individual, or society can possess. As
societies are composed of individuals, and as the greatest hap
piness an individual can enjoy, is his highest good ; so the sum
total ofthe perfect happiness ofthe individuals constituting a
society, is the highest, the greatest good, which can exist in hi
This is so evident, no one can consistently deny it.
Let us ¦ then reason Correctly from the propositions, which
have been stated as self evident, and we cannot err respecting1
the nature of right and wrong, good and evil, both natural and
moral, or concerning praise ;;nd blame. This will be clearly
seen very soon. But here let it be observed, that to the ex
istence of happiness a
3. Proposition must be admitted as self evident, which is this,
that a feeling faculty capable of pleasant, and painful sensatidns
existing in a rational mind, is absolutely necessary.
This cannot be proved, because it is self evident. But it can
be explained and illustrated, and made clear to every person.
Can a stone, a tree, or any part ofthe inanimate creation, enjOyr
or be the subjects of happiness ? And why not ? Because
they are not endued with a feeling faculty, are incapable of all
pleasant and painful emotions. And as such a faculty is neces
sary to happiness, to the existence ofthe greatest good, so but
one faculty of this nature is necessary in the same individual*
We therefore find, that rnan is endued with only one feeling
feculfy. The understanding can see, or perceive objects, their
properties, qualities, relations, and connexions ; and the will
can choose, and execute the pleasure ofthe heart ; but neither
of them is the subject of pleasant or painful emotions. All pleas
ant and painful sensations must exist antecedent to volition.
Were not this a fact, volitions could never have any existence
in the mind, as it is hoped has been fully proved. These expla
nations show, it is self evident that a feeling faculty is requisite
to the existence of happiness.

353
And if* the other faculties of the mind and liberty are not
ftoisidered truths in relation to happiness, yet it must be grant
ed they are essential to it, when all things are, considered, which
are needful to its existence. .No one will deny, but what the
existence of objects, not only to please, but to afford the great
est satisfaction, is necessary to the highest good. To be hap
py there must be objects of enjoyment, each of which may be
termed a source of happiness. And the faculty of the under
standing to perceive objects is requisite. For objects cannot
please unless seen or known. As our bodily palate never sees
the food it relishes ; sb' our mental taste is not a perceiving, but
a feeling and relishing faculty. And as objects unknown can-
riot please, they must exist in view ofthe mind by perception,
to affect the heart. Hence without this faculty objects could
never be enjoyed, and happiness could have no existence.
Again. The will, if not requisite to the being of happiness,
is surely necessary to the increase of it. For objects,when per
ceived, may please, or appear agreeable ; yet to a full enjoy
ment of them we must have have possession of them. By the
will, producing external actions, we get possession of the bb-
jeCts of bur desire: and byit we select the pleasing, and reject
the painful. By this faculty we use the means adapted to the
attainment of sources of happiness. All will readily see, that
when we have a view of future and distant objects, and wish
to enjoy them, and form our plans to obtain them, it is by the
will onr plans are executed, and desires are gratified. Also, if
We did not enjoy liberty we could never accomplish our pleasure.
If we acted continually under restraint or constraint, we might
riot be able at any time to follow and gratify our desires. We
might be made, by some foreign power, to go directly against
our pleasure and inclinations. Liberty, freedom frorii restraint
and Constraint, to follow the way our desires lead us, and per
form the actions conducing to bur pleasure, it willbe acknowl
edged, is necessary to our highest good or happiness.
Do not these remarks make it evident, that not only a facul
ty for pleasure and pain, but also a faculty to perceLe objects,
and a faculty to choose and refuse, and perform actions, and
liberty, or freedom from restraint, are each of them, essential to
the existence of happiness ? And a being, endued with these
faculties, is an entire moral agent. Such a being man is ; for
he is possessed , of these faculties. And do we know, or can we
invent, 'any other or rnore properties, necessary to constitute a-
20

354
©omplete moral agent, or requisite to as great a measure of hap
piness as our nature will admit ? We now see what things
are essential to the highest felicity, or misery of man, accord
ing to the nature or inclination of his.heart. And these truths
are so evident that when clearly stated, and explained, who can
deny them, or withold his assent from them ?, Now,
4. Another' proposition may be advanced as self evident ; or
if not, the nearest akin to it ; which is, that happiness, being
the only absolute good, ought to be the ultimate end of every
moral agent. — This does not need proof, so much as it does
explanation. Indeed, when distinctly illustrated, enough will
be said to gain the assent of candid minds.
Can any one see any difference between existence and non
existence, in relation to good enjoyed, if no happiness is experi
enced ? Though a society might be formed of innumerable
.individuals, and each of them be perfectly holy, yet if they
should never feel one pleasant sensation, experience no pleas
ure, no happiness ; would existence on this supposition be de
sirable, or preferable to annihilation ? It must be granted, that
happiness is the only final good, which renders existence de
sirable. This being granted, there is no greater goodj which
can be sought. And when happiness is obtained, we have
then arrived at an ultimate end, to the last exertion in our pur
suit ; and here, in the enjoyment of this good, we rest satisfied.
And as this is an absolute good, and the greatest good, we
ought to delight and rejoice in it, wherever we see it existing.
But here an important inquiry presents itself ; whether our
own personal happiness, or the happiness of other rational be
ings, ought to be our ultimate end of pursuit. In attempting to
reflect some light on this subject,a distinction ought to be made
between an end and the reason or motive, which influences us
in seeking it. Every one does not at once discern this distinc- '
tion. Yet it is very important to distinguish properly between
the nature of selfishness, and that of benevolence.
Here then it may be observed, that our personal individual
happiness ought not to, neither can be, the ultimate object off
end of our pursuit.
For the reader to apprehend this aright, let us suppose a be
ing created with all the faculties or powers requisite to consti
tute him a complete moral agent, as was in fact the case with
Adam. Suppose for a time his faculties are not in operation,
no exercises are excited. He does not feel one pleasant Pr

355
painful sensation. In this condition it is not possible for him,
on supposition his understanding were in operation, to have
any idea of happiness, or of good, or of evil, in any sense. In
this state his own happiness cannot be an object pf his pursuit ;
because it has no existence, and he knows not what it is. At
this momept, let it be supposed his understanding has a clear
perception of some object ; and in view of it he experiences, for
the first time, a very pleasant sensation. This puts all the fac
ulties of his mind in operation. Now he begins to act, and
aim at some end ? The object, which is the source ofhis pleas
ure, or the pleasant sensation itself, one or the other, must be
considered as his end ultimately. The pleasant sensation, or his
happiness,cannot be his end. Because the pleasure felt must ex
ist before it can be sought as an end. And when it has existence,
it is already possessed? And what propriety is there in seeking
that as an object or end, which is already attained, is now in
our possession. "The truth then is this ; the object which af
fords the pleasure experienced is his end ; and the pleasure it
gives him is the reason or motive, by which he is influenced or
excited to seek that object. He aims at it as an end, and strives
by proper means to obtain possession of it, that the pleasure it
gave him may be increased and continued. And the increase
and continuance of the happiness he enjoys, is what gives the
object its influence, considered as a motive. The moment he
felt pleasure in view of the object, a desire arose to possess
and enjoy it. And when it is obtained, and all the pleasure is
realized which it is capable of affording, so far his desire is
gratified, and his end obtained.
It is in this manner that all mankind are influenced and gov
erned, in all their actions and pursuits. The object which is in
itself, and for its own sake, agreeable, is sought as an ultimate-
end ; no object beyond it is in view ; here the mind rests in the
pleasant gratification experienced. And the expected satisfac
tion it will give invests the object with the influence of a motive.
As all will grant, if the object did not please, it would not nave
any influence as a motive, and would not be an object of at
tention or pursuit in its own nature considered.
According to this view of the subject, all objects, which are
on their own account agreeable, are always sought ,as ultimate
ends ; and those, which are riot in themselves pleasant, are used
as means to the attainment of ends, Which on 'their own account
are agreeable. Hence, if a person's heart is wholly destitute pf

356
every- benevolent feeKng -, if the happiness of other beings is-
not any source of pleasure to him, he will never seek their fe
licity. He will never aim at any higher objects, than those
which gratify his personal, individual desires. AH his pursuits
will ultimately centre in personal self gratification. This is
the true idea of s Ifishness. , Hence the objects on their own
account agreeable, and those he uses as means to his ends, he
will engross and monopolize to himself as far as he is able. He
wouldpossess all the riches and honpr of this world, were it in
his power. If other beings are by this means deprived of hap
piness, and rendered unhappy, this will give him no uneasiness,
unless their misery should in some way lessen his happiness.
Because he has no feeling for their happiness on its own ac
count, and because their pains will afford him np uneasiness, if
his own pleasure is not affected or lessened by it. — In unrenew
ed men, each individual appetite ofthe heart never aims at any
other or higher end, than its pwn gratification. The appetite
of hunger desires food ; when the food is enjoyed and his ap
petite fully gratified, his end is answered. He aims at no high
er end, t.ban the satisfaction of the appetite. If natural affec
tion governs, and he desires the happiness of his wife, or his
children, in the enjoyment of worid'y prosperity and greatness,
as far as they enjoy those blessings Jris desires are gratified, and
he aims at no higher end. If be covets riches and honors, as
far as he is able, to attain them, bis desires are satisfied. In
pursuit pf such objects be never ai>ms. at any other, or higher
ends, than those objects which , afford personal- gratification,.
Selfishness then is predicable of each appetite, helonrgng to the
heart df unrenewed men, For under the government of each
appetite his end is to obtain tjje object or objects, which on
their own account afford'tp each full gratification. This gives,
in few words, a general idea of the nature of selfishness ; and
it is not designed in this essay to enlarge any farther on this
subject. And this representation, it appears to me, agrees with
facts, experience, observation, and what the word of God says
concerning human depravity.
But benevolence delights in, the happiness of others, or of ra
tional beings. And as the greatest sum of happiness is the
highest good of the universe, this is the end in which a benevo
lent heart delights on its own account, and which it seeks. as its
iiltimate end. , And from this it is evident that the only direct
way for a benevolent person to promote his own happiness, is.

357
to increase the felicity of intelligent beings. Their happiness
is an object of pursuit, and of delight. This object is his ulti
mate end, and the pleasure it affords gives the influence of a
motive, which stimulates him to promote the blessedness of God's
hojy kingdom to his utmost ability. Hence while a benevolent
person is promoting and increasing the happiness of others, he
is augmenting his own. For he rejoices in their joy, and the
more they rejoice the greater is his joy. This shows that be
nevolence is a most excellent and amiable appetite. This view
makes it evident, that the greatest measure of happiness will,
and ought to be, the ultimate end of benevolence. This ex
plains and establishes the proposition advanced, that the great
est happiness of rational existence ought to be the ultimate end
of m *ral agents.
This will afford conviction respecting the origin of moral ob
ligation. For the sake of brevity and perspicuity, permit me
here to personify the general good, and represent her as address
ing moral agents.
" Happiness is the only absolute good enjoyed by individ
uals, and by societies composed pf them. And the greatest
measure of enjoyment is the highest good of intelligent agents.
This ought to be sought on its own account, as ap ultimate
end. And until moral agents learn what this blessing is by ex
periencing or feeling it, they can form no idea of what the
terms good and evil ought, and ought not, to mean. The hour
in which they feel internal and joyful sensations, they will say,
to be filled with this bliss, is the highest good our nature will
admit. And to seek and promote the highest blessedness of ra
tional existence, is promoting the highest good. Then they
wiU know, that every thing, tending in its nature to lessen or
destroy this good, is evil ; and all things tending ultimately to
promote and increase it, are- properly termed good. Then
they will clearly perceive what is thP meaning of the terms
ought and ought not ; one means, it is a duty or an obligation
of every agent, to seek and increase happiness to the highest
possible degree as their ultimate end, and opposition to this is
doing what they ought not, or what duty forbids. I therefore
command all moral agents to aim at me, as their ultimate ob
ject or end, in all their actions and pursuits. If any oppose
and transgress this command, they are enemies to me, and as
such will deserve to be banished from my presence forever.

355
For there is no authority above mine to control me, because I
am the highest possible good, which ran have existence."
Is it not clear from this address, that the greatest sum of
happiness being the highest possible good, this is the end, which
all are under obligations to aim at and seek ultimately ; yes
ultimately, because there is no greater good, which can be aim
ed at or sought ? ,
The propositions advanced are so evident, as to gain the as
sent of all as soon as they understand them. They are these:
1. Enduing a being or beings with a feeling faculty, is ne
cessary to the very existence of hapiness and misery.
2. That happiness is an absolute good, and the greatest sum
of it the highest possible good.
3. That pain or misery is an absolute evil.
4. That the greatest sum of created happiness, which can
have existence in God's holy kingdom, (where alone it can exist,)
ought to be the ultimate aim and end of moral agents.
With these propositions many other truths are so evidently
connected, they will gain assent, as soon as the}' are distinctly
perceived. A few of them will row be stated.
1. That every thing which tends directly in its nature to pro
mote the greatest sum of created happiness, may and ought to
be called good. . And as all things, which have this tendency
are means, by which happiness is promoted, that may and ought
to be termed relative goods. And all relative good possesses
greater or less value, in proportion to its influence in promoting
happiness. 2. Holiness or benevolence is a relative good, and the great
est good except happiness, because none can be truly and for
ever happy without it ; and because it has the greatest influence
in promoting and increasing happiness. No relative good can
exist, which is so excellent, beautiful, sweet, and inviting, as a
holy disposition.
n 3. That all things, which tend directly and ultimately to de
stroy or lessen the sum of happiness, and to produce misery,
are relative evils. And those evils are greater and less, in pro
portion to the influence they have in diminishing or, destroying
happiness. 4. Sin is the greatest relative evil, because its influence is
greater in lessening happiness and producing misery, than any
©thery in being.
From the propositions advanced, many other inferences or

359
truths will follow. But the farther we proceed in drawing in
ferences from self-evident propositions,the less evident they are,
and require more proofs & arguments to trace (heir connexion
with self-evident truths. But if any person will trace the in
ferences, which follow from the propositions here stated, in all
their branches from the nearest to the most remote, he will in
this way form a system of Ethics, and also of Theology. For
by following them in their, connexions and relations, he will be
' led to embrace all the leading doctrines contained in the Bible,
andin the stupendous work of man's redemption by Christ
Jesus. Here is a proper place in connexion with what precedes to
observe, that in God all good, both absolute and relative, exists
in an infinite fulness.
God is an uncreated, infinite, eternal being. As he is infi
nite in knowledge, goodness, and power, it is evident he is
possessed of the same powers or faculties with which he has
endued moral agents. These attributes constitute his essential
glory and fulness. He has an ultimate end in view in all his
operations. Th's, as may soon appear, is the greatest mea
sure of created happiness. This in itself is pleasant to his heart.
This end, by affording him the greatest delight, has the influ
ence of a motive, which induced him to employ his underr
standing in forming the best plan to reach his end, and his
will in executing it ; in the accomplishment of this, his good
ness, or benevolence, is infinitely displayed and diffused.
Hence, as an infinite moral agent, he is influenced as created
moral agents are. The difference between divine moral agen
cy, and created, is this. God is an uncreated, infinite, inde-:
pendent, eternal agent. Men are created, finite, dependent
agents. But the agency of each is similar in its nature or kind,
differing only iii degree. If God then, is a moral agerit, men
are. God is infinitely happy and blessed. He accordingly en
joys absolute good, in an infinite measure. His essential ful
ness, being infinite, cannot be increased. But his fulness cai|
be communicated and diffused. The only sense in which his
infinite happiness can be increased, is by diffusing it. By a
diffusion, emanation, or communication of absolute good, or
of his happiness, is meant one and the same. He can diffuse
his own infinite blessedness,' by creating beings capable of hap
piness, and by rendering them perfectly holy and happy, Ijn

this way he is continually doing good, and displaying, Of,
which is the Same thing, diffusing or communicating his own
esseritial glory and fulness. It seems that Jehovah cannot ef
fect and produce any greater good, than to make a perfect dif
fusion of his own infinite fulness. Hence the highest possible
diffusion ofhis infinite fulness,is the "ultimate end of God in all
his works arid operations. He not only aims at a display or
diffusion of his fulness, but at a perfect, and infinite diffusion. .
Then his fulness exists ab extra, as some express it. By this
infinite diffusion ofhis fulness, when made,'the greatest created
good or happiness will be produced, and all his attributes Will
fee perfectly displayed ; which is his highest, declarative glory.
When the greatest possible surti of created happiness exists, it
will be seen that the highest possible diffusion of his fulness,
arid the brightest display of his perfections are made ; and
this is his greatest declarative glory. Hence the greatest sum
of created happiness, or infinite diffusion of the divine fulness,
fand the brighest display ofhis attributes, which all consider his
declarative glory, are one and the same, vieWed as an ultimate
end. As light diffused by the natural suri is its glory, so a
full and perfect diffusion of its light would be its brightest pps-
sible glory. As God is light, its highest possible diffusion
would be its greatest glory, and this glory would be seen in the
light diffused. So we 'behold, in the greatest sum of created
happiness, the highest diffusion and glory of God. According
ly, When we say the greatest siihi of created happiness, or the
highest diffusion ofhis fulness, or the brighest display of his
essential glory, is his ultimate end in all his operations, the
meaning is precisely the same. And as the greatest stirii of
happiness is Grid's Ultimate end, and as all rational, created be
ings are finite, we may safely conclude their happiness Will be
foreVer mcreasirig. For in no given period can it be said, that
the greatest good, or an infinite diffusion, or disply of God's
essential glory, has an actual real existence. It follows from
this, that God will be foreVer diffusing his fulness, and display
ing his perfections more and more, by the constant increase of
created bliss. Hence his glory will shine with an increasing
brightness through eternity, in view of which saints and angels
will have their blessedness aUgriiented. The greatest sum of
happiness, is the phrase which has, been used. Because it is
not certain, that in order for the greatest suin of happiness to
exist, it will fre^neeessary to make the greatest number of indi-

361
'riduals happy. Also the word of God assures us, that many
ofthe. fallen race of Adam will- be forever lost. We may there
fore safely conclude, that the happiness of the greatest number
is not necessary to the greatest sum of created felicity.
To bring what has been advanced under this bead distinctly
to view, let it be carefully observed, that the infinite blessed-
ness-pf God is an infinite nieasure of absolute, godd, existing in
his fulness. And the greatest sum of created happiness is an
absolute, good, and the highest good of created beings, and pfhis
holy kingdom. And this greatest sum of happiness, enjoyed
by holy created beings, is the absolute good in God ; or hi*
blesseHriess, diffused or communicated. And. when we view
the attributes of God in relation to this end, they constitute a
sufficient ability in him to devise and execute a plan of operation
however great and extensive, to reach and obtain his ultimate
end. When viewed in this light his attributes, and, all, the
means included in his plan, however many, , are in a relative
sense good. This explains what is intended and implied in say
ing that the being or fulness of Gpd includes all good, both ab
solute and relative. He is then the infinite and eternal source of
all good. And all the created good, both absolute and rela
tive, which has, or ever will have, existence, is no more than a
diffusion, emanation, or communication of this infinite, eternal
fountain. Hence, God is a being of infinite majesty, excellen
cy, greatness, and glory. He ought, therefore, to be loved
•supremely, worshipped, and served perfectly, by all his intelli
gent-subjects, for bis intrinsic excellency and beauty. , .
From the propositions which have been advanced, it follows,
that the. moral law is holy, just, and good. That it neither
requires or forbids any thing, which the highest good does not
either require or prohibit. Also it follows, that the work of
redemption, which Christ is accomplishing, is, in all its parts,
glorious and excellent. For its, ultimate tendency, in all its
parts, is to produce the greatest sum of happiness. And the
sum of all the gospel requires, is love to God and our neigh
bor. Hence it harmonizes with the moral law, and tends ulti
mately to the same end. The gospel contains a glorious sys
tem of relative good ; and is a ministration of life. .
The propositions explained teach us also, in what sense we
ought to -understand the terms fitness and unfitness, on which
some place great weight. Some embrace the opinion, that
there is a fitness and ah unfitness, existing independent of the
21

362
will of God. And as far as fhpy can be understood, they seen*
to consider it as the rule or ultimate standard, by which we are
to judge what is good and evil, right and wrong. They make
it the standard, or origin, of moral obligation. By their rea
soning they seem to consider it an eternal, independent, immu
table standard, existing antecedent to the will of God, by which
he, and all his rational creatures, ought to be. governed. On
this foundation they erect a system of Metaphysics and Ethics,
if they are rightly understood.
Do they mean by it, that happiness is an absolute good, and
misery an absolute evil; and tiiatall things are fit, or unfit,
according as they tend ultimately to prompte or destroy happi
ness ? If this be their meaning, then they agree with the Scheme
advanced and explained in the preceding essays. , For it hag
been made sufficiently evident, that on supposition no happi
ness had ever been experienced, by creatures, they could .no
more have any idea of good and evil, or pf the terms fit and
unfit, than a person born blind could have a clear/idea of light
and colors. If then they mean something entirely different
from what has been termed absolute and relative, good and
evil ; their language either has no definite, sense, or their views
and system are erroneous, and built on the sand. . HeUce if
the terms fitand unfithaye any clear and definite meaning) then-
sense is, that all things are fit or unfit according to their ulti
mate tendency m promoting or destroying the happiness of
God's kingdom.
Again. Some make utility the standard, by which wp are to
determine what is good,, and evil. This is a foundation on
which some have erected a system of Ethics, if understood
aright. Does not the term utility, as^commonly used, have
reference to some ultimate end ? And do we not calf things
useful or hurtful, according to their ultimate tendency ? Sp it
seems. For those who proceed on the plan of utility' seem to
consider the public gopd as the ultimate end to be sought, ac
cording to their system ;• and hence consider every thing as
useful or hurtful, as it tends lo promote or destroy this end, the
public good, If by the public good they mean the greatest
happiness of a community, or society pf beings ; and if in such
society they mean to include God as the. supreme head, and
all created beings as his subjects, forming one entire whole, or
society of beings ; and then, say the greatest sum of happiness
they can enjoy is their highest good ; and all things are use-

363
ful or hurtful, as they tend to this end ultimately ; then they
agree with the system, which has been exhibited. Then the
real difference between us, would consist in the use of different
terms. By the terms utility and inutility they would mean,
what has been called all along relative good and evil. And if
this be not their' meaning, and their system is essentially differ
ent from ours, as has been explained ; then it must be consid
ered as erroneous, like the system of the fitness and unfitness of
things'. Before this essay is closed, a few further reflections appear to
be necessary. On& sentiment, which has already been advan
ced respecting moral agency, ought to be deeply impressed on
every mind. BeCause it might silence some objections often
made against the Calvinistic views of depravity. To bring it
distinctly into view, this question may be stated. Did infinite
wisdom and benevolence require the creation of moral agents ?
All created beings had a beginning. And as the Creator is
perfectly wise and good, he would give existence to as many
things, as are necessary to, the highest good, and no more. On
this principle, it is generally granted, it was requisite to the
general good a race of beings should be created, endued with
all the properties essential to moral agency. In order to the
existence of such a Class of creatures, they must be endued with
a feeling faculty, or capacity for pleasure and pain. For, ifm
they have not this property, they are not, neither can be,
agents. It has been made evident, that such a faculty constitutes
agency ; and is the primary, and only active principle in mor
al agents. Divest them of it, and mankind would remain as
inactive as the inanimate creation is. Hence, if moral agents
are created, they must be endued with that faculty, which is
denominated taste. And this faculty must have a nature ; by
which I mean, it must be pleased, or the contrary, with the di
vine' character, and with the whole System- of moral or divine
objects, whenever they are" distinctly perceived and known.
As it is a feeling faculty, it cannot be in a state of indifference
when objects are in view, and especially such impressive ob
jects as the divine character, and the system of truths God has
revealed. Will not this be granted ? Surely it must ; and of
course, if a moral agent is created, he must have this faculty,
and in view ofthe divine character he must experience pleasure
or pain in a greater or less degree. If the character of God,-

364
and revealed doctrines, please him, are agreeable to his feel
ings, he will have a desire to honor Him, defend the truth, and
promote the good ofhis kingdom. If his character is disagree
able to him, his heart or taste is opposed to God, and will
lead him to act the part of an enemy. 'This feeling faculty, if
it exists, will be pleased or disgusted in vieW of God's charac
ter and will influence man to pursue a line of conduct, which
will ultimately tend to promote or destroy the happiness of
God's kingdom ; and this tendency is what is meant by its na
ture. And if created, it must have such a nature, and its nature
must bp holy or sivful. For such a'natifre as described, is ne
cessarily good or pvil, sinful or holy, according to its tenden
cy. .....
Can a tree be created to bring forth a particular species of
fruit, without-giving it a nature to produce it ? Milst not all
created things be adapted to the end for which they were made,
or have a nature given them to answer their designed end ?
Here, is a wide field open for en'largenient, and illustration of
the subject before* us. But "I. stop with this request to all, to
consider whether any thing can be created without a nature, "
which will have a good or evil tendency, if nothing' prevents
its operating according to its nature ; and whether We cari
name one thing, which, in this sense, is not' endowed With a'
nature?' If not,: then, if a moral agent is created,' he must have
a feeling faculty given him, and this must have a nature, which1
is good or evil, or. which will tend to promote or destroy hap
piness ultimately.
These observations' are made, because some suppose moral
agents may be created without any nature, either good or evil,
and may have objects in view,' and even contemplate the di
vine character, and remain in a state of perfect indifference ;'
and be inclined no Way, to good or evil, or even to remain as
theyare. In this state they are like inert matter, and have no
more feeling.. Are such beings agents? No ; attd as'tiitey" are
now indifferent towards all divine objects, on this ground they
must remain so forever, and never act. They'rriay be acted
upon by some foreign agent, as the earth is, but they cari nev
er act as agents. Such a view of a' moral agent is inconsistent
with analogy, with experience, with facts, and the word of God ;
and itisias unphilo'sophical as to say, God has created trees to
bring forth particular kinds of fruit, but he has not given them
a nature tp bear any kind of fruit- It is a matter of indifference

365
with them what kind of fruit Jhey bear, or whether they bring
forth fruit of any kind ;, and of course they never will or can be-
frujt trees.
As it is now evident, if moral agents are created, they
must be endued with a feeling, active faculty, and this, faculty
riiu'st have a nature good or evil ; so we find from revelation,
that when God created Adam, he did endue, him with this ac
tive faculty, which made him an agent; and this faculty had a
good, a holy nature. He was made in the likeness of God, nat-
ur'al'and moral; and was as completely a. moral agent as Je
hovah himself. And .we read of no moral agents, but such as
were at first endued with a holy, nature. This was the fact with
respect to all created angels, apd with respect to Adam- With
this, it is supposed, no one will find any fault. They are willr
ing God should create in oral agents with a holy, nature. At
least all 'are willing for this, except those who wish to have a
race of moral, indifferent agents created ; t^at is to have beings
created, who are agents, yet without agency, or active princi
ples. They would have them, active, yet all the time ina state
of perfect indifference.- They wish to have God do what is
morally impossible. Many are pleasep!, witi^, Gpd's creating
Adam with a holy nature ; yet lh,ey cannot peaceably, endure
the idea of necessary holiness, or sin. Though they are more
satisfied with the former, than with the, latter. Yet the nature
of every thing, if i\ exist, must be, good or evil. As. np. fault
can be fpund with God, in creating, Adam, at first as he did, un^
less itis because hefwas necessarily hpjy,; the, next inquiry is,:
whether blame can be imputed to Him, for suffering, or permit
ting Adam to eat ofthe forbidden fruit ? And, then in conse
quence of this to take from him fhe, hpjy nature, or benevolent;!
appetite, with which he had be^en, created? That,such a change
did- take, place, that holy Adam became, a sinner, is generally
granted. As God might have prevented it, the question is,
whether it was wise and holy for H'm. tpperm.it this change to
take place. As this is a question,, which, the scheme, advanced ,
in these essays does npt require me.,tp answer,, any more than
others whatever their system is, no further attention will be giv
en to it. The author will here only observe, that, be has adis7
sertatlop on the fall, or introduction of sin, which aims at a so
lution of the difficulties, which have ever attended this subject.
But whether it will ever be laid before the public eye,, depends

366
much on the approbation or disapprobation these essays may
receive frorii the community in general, " *
Furthermore. Some consider the doctrine of total depravi
ty, as explained and defended by reputed and orthodox divines,.
to hephysical. And being physical in its nature, the opponents
consider it as destroying agency and blameworthiness. View
ing the doctrine in this light, they pronounce it very alarming.
and appalling. It isriot designed hereto inquire, whether some
have, or have not, so explained it as to imply a physical defect;
or in what precise sense opponents use the word physical. They
scorn to consider any defect in the soul, which incapacitates it
for holy exercises, to be a physical defect. They" therefore, in
opposition to this, represent our race as born with capacities, '
which are inclined neither to vice nor virtue, oras destitute of
any moral nature; and are, like clean paper, liable to receive
impressions, which are holy or sinful according to the influence
motives have upon them. In connexion with, this sentiment,
they affirm men are the efficient causes of all their exercises and
actions of a moral class. Is the doctrine, of depravity, which
has been expressly or implicitly exhibited in these essaySj so
appalling as represented ? According to the system advanced,
it is admitted that Aoam was created in the moral image of his
Maker, or perfectly holy. When first created, he was endued
with several distinct appetites or propensities. Each of these
was a primary, active principle in his' constitution, and consti
tuted him an agent. One of those appetites was benevolent in
its nature, in which the moral image of God consisted. And
his other appetites or propensities were given and implanted in
him, as active principles, which prepared' him to propagaje the
human race, nourish and protect them in infancy, to provide
means for the support and comfort of the body or the whole
man, while he remains an inhabitant of the earth. And wnile
these appetites, inferior in their nature, were under the control
and direction of his benevolent propensity, or love to God,
their operations would harriionizein a regular course of conduct,
and no sin or disorder could prevail in paradise.
But Adam, by eating the prohibited fruit, forfeited into the
hand ofhis benefactor that moral image in which he was creat
ed, and which was his glory, and it was taken from him. From
that day he had no propensity or love in his heart towards his
Maker. All his other appetites remained unaffected and unal
tered, as principles of action. Here it may be asked, was he

367
not as really a moral agent after his fall as before ? Had he
not active principle* in his heart, which constituted him a com
plete agerit for action ? And when this moral image or benev
olent .appetite is restored to man in regeneration, is he any
more an agent for action, than he was previous to this change ?
If any mau is born blind, or' after his birth becomes blind, is
he npt still a. man, as really" as.those who have eyes ? And if
eyes are given him, is he on this account any more a man, than
before ? All .that can' be said ofthe blind man he is, not in all
respects so perfect/as those who have all their senses entire.
He labors' under a defect or imperfection ; still he is a man.
Adam by eating was deprived of one sense, or appetite, with
Which his' Maker had adorned him ; yet he was an agent, and
had all the properties or capacities,, which constitute a complete
moral agent. . Hence he had all the qualifications, necessary
to render him a proper object of praise or blame, according to
the moral nature or state of his heart. If opponents consider
this loss in Adam a physical defect, incapacitating him for holy
exercises ; yet it does not in the least destroy, or impair the
powers requisite to moral. agency, or to render him a proper
object of blame. Hence what is there alarming or appalling
in this, description of total depravity ? Though man in all re-1
spects is not so perfect a moral agent, as before this defect ex
isted ;! yet he is asbcomplete a moral agent as ever. He has
the faculty of understanding, and of will ; he has a faculty to
Which active principles belong, and which constitute agency ;
and he, may and will.be influenced and governed by motives,
and act with aim and design, as Adam did before his fall, and
as men do after,, they are regenerated, and have this moral de
fect repaired. This defect, which opponents call physical, is in
fact no more thas a moral defect. Hence they give it a Wrong
name. And it is presumed, that orthodox divines in general
Will, contend for no other defect in man, than the one here de
scribed. .While this defect continues, man is totally depraved ;
or he is destitute of every holy principle of action, in conse
quence of which all his other active principles will lead him a-
way from God the living fountain, after broken cisterns or earth
ly enjoyments, which never satisfy the soul. Hence orthodox
divines have nothing to fear from the attack, by which they are
represented as imputing to man a physical defect, which is in
truth no more than a moral defect.
ff mankind are born with an efficient power, which is not in-

36B
cliried either to vice or virtue, but is in fact indifferent, to both ;
itis believed to be impossible to show how this efficient power
ca'ri exercise itself, without implying' the pre.vious.ex-istence of a
disposition either to siri or holiness. And if a previous disposi
tion must exist, to put this power into exercise, then all .the ends
supposed to be answered by it are defeated. But concerning
what taigh't have'been said' to show the absurdity of this scheme,
the reader for farther light is referred to ,essay twenty, first.
But if, by a self determining power, and an efficient ppw|?r to pro-.
diice all our exercises arid' actions, no more is intended than
this, that iri order for mankind to be agerits>,tiiey ought tobe eri-
diied with a feeling, active faculty, by which the, whole man is
governed, arid from which all his exercises^ and actions proceed,
it must be granted^ that men do possess this faculty or power.
Then all the actions and exercises of men may be traced back to
this faculty, as the primary active principle frpm which they
proceed, or flow as streams from a fountain. And as they can
not be traced back any farther, or to any previous actiye prin
ciple in men, this faculty, which has been denominated the. taste,
is the primary active power, which constitutes agency, and gives
rise to all our voluntary exertions and actions. I say, if> such
a faculty is what others mean by a self determining, efficient
power, itis granted ; and some pains have been taken toprove,
that mankind are in fact endued with it ; and that without it
they would not be agents, and could not be considered as moral
agerits. If opponents admit this, then the dispute is ended, concerning
the nature arid degree of power requisite to constitute a moral
agent, and nothirig further need be~ said on either side. ,
But if they advance an idea of an efficient pow;er, which has
no nature, inclined to neither good nor evil, and is in itself in
different, they are laboring, it is fully believed, to establish, and*
prove the existence of an impossibility. For an active power,
or "efficiency, must necessarily have a nature tobe influenced by
motives, to' be pleased or the contrary with moral objects. And
if it have not such a nature, it is no active power, and can nev-
eroperate in any other way, than an instrument used by some
other external and foreign agent. .This, it is thought, has been
proved in the previPus essays. — Before this esSay is cpncluded
a few thirigS/triay be suggested for the notice of the public.
The author is is not so vain as to expect the sentiments ad
vanced willmeet with universal', or perhaps with general appro-

360
bafion. Some' may tlriak the leading sentiments exhibited are
erroneous arid dangerous. With this belief some opponent may
attempt ananswer, and confutation. If any should judge this
to be his duty, it is hoped his attention will be confined exclu
sively tp the sentiments, which are considered dangerous. Fo*
it is often the case when an answer is written against a book,
inasmuch time'and labpf are spent ip searching after, and riOr
ticirig inconsistencies. And there are hut few hooks of much
magnitude, which are entirely free' from inconsistencies less or
greater. Pointing out these, is not confuting an author. For
his leading sentiments may be true, although inconsistencies
iriaydiave escaped his notice. Showing a writer is inconsistent,
is proving his mind to Ije finite, liable to err, and unable to
comprehend a whole system so as to see at one view the agree
ment of all the parts. But does this show his leading sentij-
ments to be erroneous ? By no means. Hence time and labpr,
spent in noticing inconsistencies, are in a great measure lost.
A writer may be consistent with himself in propagating errors,
though inconsistent wi.th truth. Therefore, until the sentiments
advanced are confuted, a book is not answered.
Every .attentive reader will see, that the system exhibited in
these essays rests on a few plain propositions, or obvious truths.
If these are shown to be false and dangerous, the book is an
swered. If then, an opponent can make it evident, that a feel
ing faculty, or a capacity for pleasure and pain, denominated
, taste, jipes not constitute agency, but something else distinct
from it ; if he can prove that such agency has no nature, no in
clination or tendency to good or evil, but is indifferent as any
unfeeling property ; if he can show that happiness is not an ab-
Solute goo'd, nor misery an absolute evil ; and that means or
things are-not called goad and evil. according to their ultimate
tendency to- promote or destrpy happiness ; if he can prove,
that benevolence is not an appetite or love for the greatest good
of God's kingdom, and this is not its ultimate end ; also, that
those desires of the heart, which tend ultimately to diminish
and destroy happiness, are not evil or sinful ; then it is
granted he has shaken the foundation on which the system ad
vanced rests. And if he should accomplish this, it is fully be
lieved he will make it evident, that men are not moral agents, or
proper objects of praise arid blame, and future rewards ; in, a
word, that they are not accountable beings, any more than in-
22

370
animate things!. Doing all this, would effectually serve the
cause of infidelity. > vi -
But if after all his labor these truths shall remain firm, that
a primary active principle does constitute agency ; and that no
property or faculty can be active in its nature, if incapable of
feeling, or of pleasure and pain ; and of course that the faculty
of taste, as it has been explained, has a feeling nature, is the-sub-
ject of pleasant and painful sensations, and does constitute that
agency which is a primary active principle by which men are
governed in all their actions ; if after all it does remain true,
that happiness is an absolute good, and misery an absolute evil ;
and that other things are denominated relatively good or evil,
according to their ultimate tendency in prompting pr destroying
happiness ; and accordingly that benevolence aims ultimately
at this highest good, and all the desires ofthe heart of unrenew
ed men tend ultimately to misery ; if these truths remain un
shaken, and unconfuted ; then the main pillars of the system
remain entire and firm, and the building, which rests upon
them, is not demolished.
This will be a fact, although an opponent may -show some
small errors, and some inconsistencies, interspersed here and
there in different parts ofthe book. It is then the earnest re
quest of the author, if it, is judged reasonable, that an opponent
who may attempt an answer would confine himself to these
leading, fundamental truths, on which the whole system rests.
This would be keeping tp the point, and would sooner bring the
dispute to a close. When persons suffer themselves to wander
from the real questions disputed, a controversy may be protract
ed without any conclusion.
The book is now committed tp the public, whose property it
is- Let it be read with candor, free from every prejudice. If
jt should reflect any light on the first and leading and fundamen
tal principles of Ethics and Theology, and should give a
lead to further investigations, and the enlargement of our knowl
edge of these important sciences, and the good and prosperity of
the Redeemer's kingdom, the prayers ofthe author will be thus
fat answered.

ESSAY XSSI.
*On the happiness of heaven, showing in what it
consists.
' - - . - - .
Hebrews, 4. 9. There remaineth, therefore, a rest unto the people of God.——
¦ This rest is heaven, a state of perfect felicity.
This is a subject very interesting. For unless we know
what heaven is, we can never determine whether we are real
Saints or not. Theelysium ofthe heathen, and the paradise
ofthe Mahometans, are places of great happiness, as they be
lieve. Still the sources of happiness are such, as described
by them, that no change of heart is necessary to enjoy them.
Indeed the most voluptuous, and carnal, those most fond of ev
ery "rind of animal pleasure, may be happy in the heavens,
they describe.
If a person should form an idea of a country on this earth,
where all the inhabitants are perfectly happy ; yet, if he had
no knowledge of the particular sources of their felicity, he
might conclude, if he lived there he should also enjoy all the
bliss ofthe inhabitants. And from a belief that all in that
country are happy, he might have a very ardent desire to re
move to it. Yet, when he arrives there, he finds the particular
sources of their happiness are very disgustful to him. To him,
instead of happiness, it is a place of misery. Had he inquired,
and obtained a distinct knowledge ofthe particular sources of
happiness in that land, he might have convinced himself, that
he pould not delight in such objects. And he would have no
desire to remove there, unless his relish could be suited to those
particular sources of happiness.
Many by reading the bible learn that heaven is a land of
perfect bliss. Being convinced it is a place of happiness, they
inquire no further; but conclude, if they were admitted there
they should certainly be happy. As they have no distinct idea
ofthe sources of happiness in that world, or of the relish ne
cessary to enjoy them, it is impossible for them to say whether
they, could or could not be happy if admitted there. And if
they conclude they are saints, merely from the idea that they
wish to live there, they may be deceived.
'This essay has no necessary connexion with these which precede, to elucidate
the author's philosophical system. It shews, however, the practical application of
his principles ; and as it relates to an important subject, it is here subjoined to make
the volume Hi ore complete.

372
All men wish to be,"ha1ppy. And because heaven is a land
of pure bliss, many conclude they should be happy, if admitted
to livp there. But this is false reasoning. To be happy in
Heaven we must have a relish for the particular sources of hap
piness in that world. And we cannot determine with any cer
tainty, whether we are prepared for that country, only by as
certaining in the first place clear, distinct arid just ideas ofthe
particular sources from Whence all derive their happiness ; and
then by inquiring, whether we have Such a relish for therit, as
to prefer thetn to all other objects of delight. Hence it is a mat
ter ofthe la^t importance, to dbtai'n a distinct knowledge ofthe
sources of heavenly bliss. A mistake here may prove fatal.
And aiM^Puf knowledge Of heaven must be from the word of
God, Mo' one has lived there, and retained, to give us a de
scription of that world. God in his word has described it. If
we can clearly understand the description he has given, we may
know what heaven is.
And it is rhore or le'sS difficfllt to Understand the description
he has given. Itis given generally in figurative language.
One question of importance is. Whether We are to understand
His description in a literal, of- figt&atHJe sense. Many things
serve to show they are to be understood in a figurative sense.
Theri the next difficulty is, to explain the figures according to
their true sense.
In order to remove, in some measure, these difficulties, sev
eral preliminary remarks are necessary, before we proceed to
a particular description of trie heavenly sources of felicity.
As the terms, sources of happiness, will be frequently ttsed in
this essay, itis requisite to show what is meamby them. Three
thingsare requisite to the existence of happiness. First, a rel
ish of heart to feel arid enjoy ; or a relish to be pleased and~<~e-
tighted With objects. 2. Objects to please and delight us.
3. The objects must exist in the view ofthe mind.
For example. J'f a person has an ardent thirst for water, he
cannot have it gratified, unless he can find water to drink.
Water may exist in great plenty, yet he not know where to find
it. Hence he may thirst, and there may be water to gratify it,
yet he may not have his thirst quenched, lie must have a
knowledge of it. Then he can drink and be satisfied.' Here
the water, which satisfies his' thirst, is what I mean by a source
of happiness.
Of course all the objects iu heaven, which afford .joy to fhf

373
inhabitants, are what I mean by sources of happiness. On
jects of pleasure, and sources of pleasure are nseo to mean the
same thing. Hence, to enjoy the pleasures of heaven, a per
son must have a relish for heavenly objects ; he must see themj
then While in view his relish is gratified, and in this his happi
ness consists.
The preliminary remarks to be made are the following.
1. All our animal appetites and natural affections will ceasp
at death, we shall have none of them in heaven.
Our bodily appetites are many. So, also, are our natural
affections, such as those termed parental, conjugal, filial, and
fraternal. These were implanted, in its for certain purposes,
such as the preservation of life, the propagation of our species,
the relief of persons in distress, and our comfort and well-being
jn this life.
If we had not conjugal affections, there would be nothing to
prompt us to propagate our species ; without parental afiec-
tioni infants would suffer and die ; without filial affection,
there would he nothing to excite to obedierice of parents or
support of the aged ; without the affection Children have for
each other, there would benP peace in families ; and without
natural pity, there would be nothing to move us to relieve and
afford help to the weak, infirm, and objects of affliction and dis
tress. All these natural principles of action are absolutely ne
cessary to tlie being and comfort of the human race. For
mankind naturally have no benevolence, to stimulate them to
seek each others' good. These affections are requisite to sup
ply the want of benevolence, while this earth is to be our
abode. ;
These natural principles: of action are . the fountain, from
which all the other affections we have flow. But they will
cease at death ; because there will be no iise for them, or need
of them, in the other world. That they will be eradicated at
death in the saints, (and I speak only of them,) is evident
from several considerations.
1. After death, saints will be as the arigels<of heaven. Not
equal, but like them. They have none of these natural affec
tions ; if we are like them,, we shall not have them. This
(teaches, -that these natural feelings then-1 cease to exist.
2. It is necessary they should be eradicated, otherwise saints
would not be perfectly happy. In that world we are inform
ed they never many., If the same inclinations prevailed there

374
as here, as they would not be gratified, they would render
saints unhappy. Uneasiness would be excited, without any
means of removing it. If they have the same afi'ection there
as here, the misery of wives, husbands, and children, would
excite more or less painful feelings. It seems, then, to he re
quisite to perfect happiness, that these feelings should be erad
icated at death.
3. The nature ofthe body, when raised, teaches the same
truth. At the resurrection, the body will be raised immortal,
incorruptible, and spiritual. Hence it will never hunger or
thirst, or be diseased, or weary. Of course, it will never need
food, clothing, sleep, rest, or medicine. Hence there will be
no use for those natural affections we have here. Also this
world will be destroyed. And there will be "an end to all la
bor for food and clothing.
These. considerations teach us clearly, that all our natural
and bodily affections will be eradicated at death ; or at least
that they will never operate, or be felt in heaven. Because
there will be need of them there ; and if they were to remain
and operate in that world, they would lessen and interrupt the
happiness of saints, and render that state imperfect.
And if these natural affections all cease to exist at death, it
follows, that in heaven there will not be any worldly sources
of happiness. Theie will be no bread, water, or food of any
kind ; because none will be needed. There will be no natural
pity, because there will be no objects of distress to relieve.
There will be no houses, or lands ; because none of these
things will be needed thereT No part of the happiness of hea
ven will be derived from the gratification of such natural affec
tions ; because such affections will riot exist there. Hence,
from the consideration that all these natural principles of ac
tion, which operate here, will cease at death, it is evident the
descriptions of heaven in the bible are not to be construed liter-
¦ally but figuratively. To be convinced of this, is one thing
necessary to form just views of a heavenly state ; and to un-
derstandithe word of God according to its true import and
meaning. How can we form right and just ideas of the happiness of
heaven, so long as we know not whether the descriptions given
us of that world, are to be construed literally, or figuratively ?
We must first knowin what sense to understand the description
given us of heaven, before we can form any true conceptions of

375
tiiat world. This remark therefore is made, to show that the
description of heaven in the word of God must be understood
figuratively. ¦
2. If the descriptions given us of heaven are to be under
stood literally ,~" why may. -not sinners, without any change of
heart, be happy there ? If in heaven there will be cities, with
walls and gates made of the precious stones ; streets paved
with gold ; houses rich and elegant ; rivers of water, and all
manner of fruits ; and every thing, which suits the taste and
relish of natural men here, why may they not be happy there,
as they now are here ? If the descriptions given us of heaven
are to be understood in a literal sense, it is a place every way
suited to the relish of men of this world who love nothing else.
It would suit their pride and ambition, to be made kings and
priests ; to possess riches, and inherit a kingdom in the literal
sense. Those objects in this world, which are the most valuable,
precious, beautiful, and delightful, are represented as being in
heaven in a great abundance, and in a perfect state. Those
things in this world, which in the most perfect manner, suit
their relish, and gratify their love of riches, the pride, and am
bition of men here, are to be enjoyed in heaven in a far more
perfect, uninterrupted manner, than they are here ; if we are
te construe the description literally. If wicked men in heaven
should find some things disagreeable ; they would experience
many other things, which would afford them great satisfaction.
So that if they would not be perfectly happy there, they would
be far more happy and contented, than they are here.
But we are given to understand, that the unrenewed would
not be happy in heaven, if admitted to live there. Christ says
except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of
heaven. He does not mean that they would not have any
knowledge of that world, or ofthe objects existing in it. This
is not what he means by seeing. For the unrenewed are capa
ble of this speculative knowledge, and in fact have it in a great
er or less degree. He means then, that they cannot enjoy the
objects of that world, because they are not suited to their relish.
But if the descriptions of heaven are to be understood literally.
they may enjoy them there, as well as they do here.
And why is not the description Mahomet has given of hea
ven in general just, if the descriptions of the bible are to be
construed literally, as some contend ; and why may not sinners
enjoy it, and be happy there, without any change ?

376
Hence the bible, by teaching us that a change of heart i*s
necessary to the happiness of heaven, and that the unrenewed!
would not enjoy heavenly objects if admitted there, assures ub
that the description given us of that world must be understood,
not in a literal, but a figurative sense.
3. Saints in heaven will be perfectly holy, as God is holy!
This will teach tts, that the descriptions of heaven are figura
tive, and not literal. By the fall of man all have lost the mor
al image of God. No trace ofhis moral likeness remains in
man. ,•-.¦<.
We are assured that this moral image is restored in regener
ation. We are born ofthe Spirit. And that which is born of
the Spirit is spirit. That which is created in the heart when
men are renewed, is spiritual in its nature. The nature of the
Holy Spirit is produced in the heart. So we become partak
ers ofthe divine nature, as we are taught. That is, the moral
image of God is restored. But God is love. Love, or benev
olence, is the moral perfection of God. This is the sum of all
his moral attributes
When the same benevolent disposition is created in our heart;
then his moral image is restored. This is the new man which
is to grow until we arrive to the stature of a perfect man in
Christ. Saints in heaven are perfectly holy — this moral im
age will be perfected ia them. '
Hence in heaven the ortly principle of action needed, and the
only one which will operate, is benevolence, or love. By
this only Saints are governed, or influenced, as God is. But
the nature of benevolence is such, it does not delight in any
worldly sources of felicity. The only objects of its delight
are divine, heavenly, and 'Spiritual in their nature. It has no
delight in worldly riches, or honors, or pleasure, (which are
the only objects of sinners' love,) except as means to obtain
the^e divine objects, which are its source of felicity. But in
heaven the riches and honors pf this world Will not be needed,
as means to obtain -spiritual objects and enjoyments. Hence
benevolenee inheaven has no delight in such worldly objects.
It is pleased and gratified with the same divine objects, which
are the sources of God's blessedness ; or in which his benevo
lence delights.
Accordingly the verj* nature of benevolence "s such, which
will be theonly governing principle in heaven, that no objects
will afford it delight there, but those, which are spiritual and

8FZ
d^Tne ;. such asi those in-which divinfe low" or' benevolence
delights. This serves to show, that thebar'.pmess'off heaven is-
nbti derived from any worldly objects, but r wholly from those
which are divine: And henceno worldlyobjects Will be need
ed; or be enjoyed there. And if nod then the description of1
heaven must be construed in a figurative;. and not in a literal
sense:. Are not these remarks- sufficieht to Convince every one, that'
Whemweifihd heaven represented in the bible by terms whichr
belong t& worldly objects, we arenot'tounderstandsuch d£srJ
cripitibrisnn a literal seriise'"?'
, Amdis- it not evident, that' we: can never 'haVe ahy true and'
just crinBeptionrofaheavenly-statej ofthat'reSt which remain" •
etHunto\the?people!of God, until we know whether the descript**
lions given; us ofheaven are to-be understood in a literal or*
figarativessense .-*?-. And if not; then everyone cannot but see'
that the remarks made are pertinent, and'nficessaTy'in order to'
a JHstvieWofithe heavenly world. For they- serve to cbnvitice
us weimustconstrue'such passages; generally, iriafigutative
senses. If we can ascertain the^true meaitittg of such figures,;
we shall then form just conceptions of heavenv It' is granted"
giseatrcare ought to be used in-'consfohirigfigures; We' must
notfollbwia lively imagination, i but' attend carefully to their
obvious import and meaning; Afldas benevolence is the only
governing principle ii* heaven: ; and of ^coursei as the happi
ness of that world must consist in gratifying^ this benevolent
disposition ; just views of the nature of benevolence will ¦ serve;
to: guide us, and teach us, what the sources of happiness in
heaven: are; It isthen idesigried
Hi To -attend to the nature of benevolence, as faf- as is' ne*:
cessary. tounderstand the sources of heavenly ' felicity;
This being, the foundation of the happiness of heaven, under-
stamhng>its nature! will lead us toa correct krioW'ledge of hea
venly blessedness.1 We may- rely ;on itr, thatt whatever suitsy
deligbtsj, and gratifies a benevolent relish,' is a 'source of bap*
pinessin heaven. Every object in the world/: which delights
arid igratififesUhis divine lovfe or taste, is a source of happiness.
So far as^iany person's happiness 'in'this world' is deriveirf
from food land drink, we cannot -tell 'what will make him ihap-
p$y until we learn-'whatkindoffood will suit his taster Theil
we know-in what fhiss happiness consists, and how to suit and-
please hkn. So when we learn in what beneVohJilce delights,-
23

378
Hjre learn in what heavenly felicity consists. Hence it is \etg
important to learn the nature of divine benevolence.
To do this we may proceed to observe, that every moral
agent must have some ultimate end in view in all his actions*-
That ultimate end must be some object, on its own account
agreeable ; andin which the highest good of the universe con
sists. For all will agree, that benevolence is friendly to the
highest good, will seek it, and rejoice in it. Happiness, not-
his own but that of others, is the highest good of a benevolent
individual ;. and the greatest sum of happiness in God's king-,
dom is that greatest good- which he will seek as his ultimate
end. And it is the nature of benevolence, whether in God or
in men, to seek the highest happiness of the universe as its ul
timate end. This truth is made evident in the essay on the
nature of holiness or benevolence ; and the remarks need not
be here repeated. , This prepares the way for us to see clear
ly and distinctly what must be
III. The positive sources of happiness enjoyed in heaven.
If the greatest sum of happiness is the greatest good ; and
the nature of benevolence is such as to seek and delight in it,
as its ultimate end, as has been shown, then,
1. The happiness of God's heavenly kingdom, is the first
and greatest source of felicity: to all who surround his throne.
A saint in heaven, when ne contemplates the happiness of
that society, beholds each one perfectly blessed ; his own heart
will have a feast, and he will experience joys' which are un
speakable. .'
Nothing in this world fills the heart of a benevolent king
with so great joy, as to see all his subjects prosperous and
happy. And nothing affords benevolent parents so much pure
delight, as the happiness of all the members -of- the family-
And children, if benevolent, rejoice in no object in this world
so much, as in beholding their parents and all around them com
pletely happy. And what in this world ever gives such pure
and great joy to a saint, as to see a sinner, when renewed, re
joicing in God ?
And Paul, when Titris returned, and informed him of the
happiness of the church at Corinth, rejoiced greatly. He re
joiced in their joy. Their joy was the source of his joy.
And when the prodigal returned, and was joyful in his father's
house, the whole family were feasted with joy and gladness,
except his elder brother.

379
"^"Bvery person,; who is a real saint, can testify by experience^
that the spiritual joys and comforts ofhis brethren, is the
sweetest source of happiness to himself. Reason, experience,
and scripture all unite in saying, that the happiness of others-
is the greatest source of joy. No other object the saints be
hold, affords them so great and pure delight.
Let us then in this light take a view of heaven. There saints
surround the throne of Gpd and the Lamb. When they con
template the infinite blessedness of their heavenly Father, what
joy they must experience. They love him with all their heart,
and to behold the object of their love, and the fountain of all
the good they possess, infinitely happy, will fill their souls with
joy. Suppose he appeared to them unhappy ; this would fill
them with grief and pain. If so, then his perfect bliss must
afford them great joy.
When they contemplate the infinite happiness of Christ their
friend and beloved, will not this excite in them the sweetest de
light ? The joys of heaven, which he was to experience, was
the prize set before him here on earth. When they behold
him, who for the joy set before him, endured the cross, now
receiving his reward in the infinite bliss he experiences, this
will fill every heart with joys unspeakable.
All the saints in heaven are the sons and daughters of God,
and the bride ofthe Lamb. And their happiness is the great
end God sought, and an object of his delight ; and the Son
will rejoice in his bride ; nothing will, afford him more satisfac
tion, than her happiness. In her happiness he sees the fruit of
the travail of his soul for her. If the Father and Son rejoice
in the happiness of saints ; saints, who have the same heart,
will rejoice in the infinite blessedness of the Trinity. To see
the Holy Spirit, who sanctified k, prepared them for heaven, infi
nitely blessed, will afford them the greatest satisfaction.
Hence the boundless happiness of all the persons in the Trini
ty, will feast the hearts of saints with joy unspeakable and full
•f glory.
Again. When saints in heaven behold each other's happi
ness ; when they see all around them perfectly blessed, enjoy
ing that bliss, which wijl continnc apd increase forever, what
inward satisfaction they will experience. And the feelings and
desires of their hearts will be perfectly gratified. ' They will
rejoice in each other's joy. And the happiness of angels, who
ministered to them here, will also be a source of joy to them.

m
^i.eay^n, there is ;bnt,one spc :jgjtyr composed ,p£a. tujudjjmfl
jmembersT God isithe head(; paints anjd angels vthe members,
They are perfectly unifefl , to their, hpad, arid to^£ach,pfhet, by
nmtual love and ^ffpc^pn. The.^greatest.good, A^liich can. be
obtained, they possess andepjoy ; whic,h is perfoct, .enduring,
and increasing felicity. WJum they see each, ptiier. in the. full
possession of this highest gfipd, they will experience the uiost
pure, refined, and sweet delight.
Oh now blessed is. diat, society, where (the happiness ofqthr
ers, instead of jexcitiqgeuvyaud opposition, as is often tbjp
case ip this world, ip a source „of .pxjcuiis^p joy. This ,is bliss,
hi the highest possible degree.
2. The holiness of others will be anofhgr sourpe^of happi
ness in heaven.
When saints enter heaven, they will be perfectly holy. For
no sin, or any thing ^hieh defijfith, is ever 40 ,en;ter there.
And holiness is the , moral image of -God ¦} the beauty and glo
ry of every character. There ^s no other object w the unir
iPerse, which equa's hc-Uness in beauty, glory, and utility ; and
no one equalsitin worth bn% happiness $^his;exe,ejedsjt,in va^e.
Holiness, tho so jexcellentj, js not a gpofj jn itself; it-is nctt
loved for its own sake, £utjbi\the sake, ojtbapppess, |0f whicji ;
if is the .greatest means. If jit be as^ed, why is hpj'ness so
beautifol and valuable ? ^t is .answered-
1. Because if prepays persons for everlasting felicity,
Without holiness np man shall see God. fieaven isa,. pefr
fect-ly holy state. None cap enter there, hut jthe perfectly pe*
nevolenl. Hepce, withopt ,it no person is prepared in the
temper pfhis heai't forijeaven, or to enjoy holy objects, pr to
spend his time in holy employments. Wi$iput hphness no ra
tional being £ap be happy. Benevolence, which is l^plipess,
is the only quality, .which prepares for a sjate of endless bliss.
Is not that of infinite worfb, which prepares a perspn :>for eter
nal felicity ? What else, in this view, can equal it in value ?
If we were infinite iri knowledge and power, yet had np bg-
neypleiuie, jve should be fit for no place, but helj. It is, holi
ness, and this only, »hicfi prepares a person for heaven, and
|he enjoyment of holy objects. Hence |t exceeds invalue gold,
diamonds, apd rubies. Nothing can purchase it, but the pre
cious bipod pf Chri?t.
It is holiness only, which prepares and inclines persons to.
pe useful, to peek and promote the happiness pi, God's ,kjpg«
, dom. '

381
• When any'have;this temper ofheart created in them, Ijhey
Relight in the happiness of others, and of^God's kingdom.
This then will incline and prompt them to promote and in
crease the bliss of heaven. It inclines them to exert all tbehr
.powers and faculties, to improve their time, and everysblessing
of God, in promoting happiness. Paul, before his conversion,
did all he could to destroy the souls of men. But when a be
nevolent disposition was given him, then with a zealous em
ployment of all his powers, he 'labored to promote the salva
tion pf souls. In like manner it ihclines all to devote them
selves wholly to the-service of God, and the promotion ofthe.
happiness ofhis kingdom, lathis view, what is there, which
can equal it in worth ? It is the most active principle which
can exist, and which will forever exert itself in making men
happy, and increasing Che felicity of heaven. For these two
reasons, tho holiness is not excellent on its own account, but
merely as a means of happiness, we see its value and glory
are infinite. Happiness excepted there is nothirig else, which
equals it in valtte. Itis *his, which inclines God to employ all
his attributes m -promoting iraffoiute and eternal happiness. Jit
prepares persons for a state of endless bliss ; and to exert - all
tiieir powers in promoting the eternal felicity of heaven.
Therefore its beauty, glory, loneliness, and excellency, exceed
all description,, and conception.
In heaven, the individuals who compose an arintomeirable
host, are perfectly holy. Hence they are perfect hiJbeaiityj
perfectly resemble their Maker ; and as stars shine with the
brighest possible rays.
When a saint beholds the infinite holiness of God, sees he
js love itself, what joy this will diffuse through his soul. Whelp
he contemplates the holiness of Christ, he beholds a sun shin-.
ing with infinite brightness. Thisjs the glory ofthe godhead,
which is the light Of heaven ; and which far exceeds the sun
in brightness, so that there is no need of sun or moon there.
Saints will dwell forever in the rays of this glory.— The rays ,
of divine, infinite holiness, will warm, soften, and quicken their
hearts, and fill then with joys pure, sweet, and extatic.
And how. beautiful and glorious will saints and angels appear
to each other. When one saint beholds another, he sees a
star, which shines with a golden lustre, whose rays are mild,
pleasant, and joyful. They are beautiful in each other's sights.
yea perfect in beauty. '

Here on earth, nothirig affords greater joy, than to see iii
another this benevolent spirit. This excites the mutual love
«f saints, and unites them together by the strong ! bonds of
brotherly affection; They are near, and dear,' and precious to
each other ; delighting in each other's society and conversa
tion. How much greater will be their joy in each other in
heaven, where holiness is made perfect. .
Wherever they turn their eyes, they behold the holiness ef
the Trinity, of saints, of angels, shiring with such beauty,
mildness, brightness and glory, as diffuses life and joy through
their souls, and fills thehv with divine pleasures. Here art
joys flowing forevermore at the right hand of God, of which
they drink their full draughts. Behold what glories fill hea
ven. Beauties innumerable, perfect, and infinite, employ their
eyes, and feasts their hearts, day and night forever.
3. The glory of God, will be another source of felicity ill
heaven. This is included in part in what has been already said ; but
needs some enlargement in one particular. For other attri
butes, beside holiness, and this in its various operations, will be
a source of pleasure. — Indeed, the glor3' of God,' and the high
est good of his kingdom, are one and the same. The highest
good obtained is the greatest declarative glory of God For
in the attainment of this end, all his attributes are displayed,
and his fulness communicated ; and the holy society of heaven
enjoy this communicated fulness. But here a more particular
attention is necessary; to the glory displayed in producing the
greatest sum of happiness, which is the highest good.
In heaven all the works of God will be the study of saints.
As they delight iri studying bis works here, which are a glass
in which he is seen ; much more will they delight in survey
ing them in heaven. The works of God are a boundless field
for saints to explore, in doing which their knowledge will in
crease, and their capacities enlarge and expand.
In the works of creation they will see the' wonderful displays
of infinite knowledge and power. They will see clearly the
end of all these works. They will see clearly how all the
parts, from the least atom to the greatest world, have unitedly
promoted the ultimate end of God. For when all the elect of
Christ are assembled in heaven,his ultimate end is then attain
ed. Now saints have only to look back, and learn how all his
Works have been perfectly adapted to his enil. They wjll

398
8fee the manner in which they have been arranged and con
nected, and with united influence have in the best way promote
ed the happiness ofhis kingdom. In this way they will have
clear views of his infinite knowledge, power, goodness, and all
his, glorious attributes.
When a mechanic is making a clock, we may view the partsj
and see much ingenuity displayed. But when he has finished
it, then we clearly see the end and use of it ; we see how all
foe parts are arranged; connected, and adapted to their end*
We then see, if one cog in the wheel were wanting, it would
render the whole imperfect. But now'we behold and admire
the great ingenuity of the artist.'
The created universe is a grand and sublime machine. The
worlds and particles which compose it, are innumerable. God
is now making and putting the parts together ; arranging and
connecting them, with a view to the greatest happiness ulti
mately. In heaven saints Will view them in a finished state.
•And the more their knowledge ofthe parts increases, of their
arrangement and connection, and perfect adaptedness to their
end, the more distinct their views will be of all his attributes.
Now they clearly see, that his boundless knowledge, wisdom,
power, goodness, arid every attribute, have been employed in
promoting the greatest possible happiness of his holy kingdom.
They see every part has contributed to this end ; and if one
small thing had been either added or diminished, his works
Would have been imperfect. As we see in a clock, if one wheel
had one more or less number of cogs, it would have injured the
whole machine. In thus studying the. works of creation, the^
will have enlarged and exalted views pf the greatness of God;
and will be filled with wonder, and joy, and ascribe greatness
-to him forever. Thus the study of the works of creation will
be a constant source of delightful entertainment, arid contribute
to the increase of the happiness of saints.
Then the study of the works of providence will afford them
still greater delight. These works are like a building. God
has been collecting the materials, arranging and connecting
them, from the beginning of time, and will finish it at the
close. Then saints can survey the building in a finished state.
It will be one part of their delightful study, to examine all
the parts, their order, and connection, and adaptedness to their
end. Here they will see the work of redemption is the prin,-
cjfisdl. part in tins building ; that %U the other, parts havere'fs

erence to; this,, and are subordinated toit; They will dearly
see, the attributes of Qod: displayed in these- works.
When Godiwas executing the part ofhis plan, which relat
ed to Jacob and his family; every thing; appeared dark and
mysterious to Jacob ; which made him say, all these things
are against- me. But now, when that partis; finished} we look
at it, and behold its perfections; and the wonderful! displays of
*4sd©iB, power and igooduessi. From tbis: we leiarn, that we-
•annotiform correct views o£the> character of a workman, while5
he is making; his work ; but when- it is finished;, then we can
s«e; his design^ and the perfection and wisdom ofhis plan. So
it is with respect to the works of providence!-; now- many
events appear dark and: mysteripus, which gives occasion to
lbe> wicked <to murmur, toicensurefthe works of God, and pro*
¦ounce .theniiunwisej and thus ^blaspheme their Makers
But; when viewed fey saints in heaven, in their finished: state?
they, will tseflj.as; in a, glass, thel glorious and, astonishing! dis-»
plays of his attributes; especially in *th© -work- of- redemption'.
They will haveincreasings views ofhisvboiuridless* greatness,
majesty, .gJary •and' benevolence'; and; see that he- alone ; is.
qualified tofill'theitbroneeo&the universe^ to rale- and: govern,
all worlds according to his pleasure* In the same ¦¦ proportion
they, will _see their, owacomparativenothingness, weakness and
ilapendence ; and fdrevei' when they fall at his . feet^ will as^r
acibe .wisdom,, honor, powei?,~ dominion, and greatness to God;
sayingowonderfol are thyo works;, Lord Godalmighty ; and to
the, Lambithey iwiiHiisay^ .worthy art thou to receive' the: same
ascriptions; of 'glory <; :fam. them bast - redeemed us-witb thy
WoodY. In heaven,ahey; will- seetha*>alli tries works oft GoaV
bothofjcreationiand'provideriiefi, are parts ofvoneplan, perfect
ly. haifmonteilag sire; pirois»fflti]i^/:fo^ same end ;. and: perfectly
agreeingowith.eyery things-revealedin ,the word :of God;
In heaven, they haveithe three;greatvolumes;.of! creation/
jwoviaencevaridflthewoBdp open before' them.v Here they: see
the same character -displayed in actions and in words. His
wocks are-hifi .. actions,-! and the bible contains his wordsi, by*
which -he ihas revealed land displayed himselfai
TheseivolaniesicontaiHiiianinfiiiite fund ofi> knowledge, and
•pen to view a boundless.fifild. Readipgandr, stHdyingithemi
witt-beoneof, the employments of- heaven ; an employment,)
which will afford them continual,, and increasing joy-; and here
is one source of the happiness, of that World;^Tliisi«ttiidj5 .will

385
be a source pf delight, because they see more and more dis.-
tinctly the displays ofthe divine glory in them.
Hence the reason why John, when in vision he saw a part of
the works of God completed, as the ruin of the beast^and his
power, he and the heavenly hosts in chorus ascribe greatness,
fower, dominion and glory to God. Here they saw his attri-
utes displayed, and his benevolence in -promoting the happi
ness of heaven, and defeating all opposition made to it.
- -' 4. Another source of happiness in heaven will consist in
Raising God.
Mankind here delight in praising those, whom they love
and highly esteem. And it is especially a joyful work to
saints, here to give praise to God for his benefits. Much great!-
er satisfaction this employment will afford them in heaven.
Let any one read the revelation of John, especially the 4th,
5tb, and 19th chapters, there he will find the heavenly hosts
united in praise to God and the Lamb, for his wonderfulworks
.and still more wonderful love.
We have seen that one source of pleasure will consist in
studying the works of God, the volumes he has written ; be
cause in these works they behold the glory of God. His glo
ry clearly seen is the great source of their joy. They will be
continually making new diseoveries in their studies ofhis glo
ry ; and those will be followed with songs and anthems of
praise. — So it is represented by John in his visions. For
example ; when John in vision saw anti-christ destroyed, he
then Saw and heard all the heavenly hosts praising God, for.
the glorious attributes displayed in the overthrow of enemies,
for the happiness ofhis friends.
These predicted events are not all as yet accomplished.
When they are fulfilled, and all the elect assembled in heaven
studying the works of God, they will see step by step the way
•in which he has defeated and destroyed anti-christ, and all en
emies ; and how in this way he has advanced foe happiness
of heaven. Thrpugh the whole his glorious attributes of pow
er, wisdom, justice, and benevolence, shine with amazing lus
tre and brightness. They will see the greatness and majesty
of God, his unerring perfection ; that he alone is worthy to
fill the throne, and sway the sceptre of universal government.
Clearly discerning all this in studying his works, they will
then unite in one general anthem of praise ; and fall at his* feet,
24

sm
and ascribe to him all the glory, which is his due. This em--
ploymeut of praise will fill them with unspeakable pleasure.
As they are constantly studying, and making new discove
ries of' his glory and greatness ; this will afford increasing
matter for praise ; and add fresh, and augmented delight to
all their songs and anthems of praise to Jehovah and the
Lamb. This shows us that the stvdy of God's works, and their an
thems of praise are connected ; that the latter follows the for
mer. And as the field of study is boundless, there is room
for finite minds tobe making new discoveries forever'; apd of
course therp will be new matter of course for ascription of
power, dominion, and glory to God and the Lamb. Here stu
dy and prajs'e will be forever united ; and these will be dis
tinct employments,, and sources of joy to them. And in this
way; their happiness will be forever increasing,
5. Performing special commissions and mandates will be
another source of joy.
There is much reason to believe, that saints will be emplpy
ed on messages to the other worlds; as many departed saints
have been thus employed to this world.
A messenger. from heaven is generally called an angel. If
departed saints were employed in any business to this world,
•tiipy would be styled angels. We accordingly find they, are.
so called. One being, employed in relating to John the events
which were to take place in this world, is called an angel, in
19th and 22d, chapters. When John was about ito worship
him he said, do it not- — for I am thy fellow servant, and of thy
brethren the prophets ; worship G°d. He thus acknowledg
es be was one ofthe ancient prophets. And Moses and Elias
appeared and conversed with Christ on mount Tabor.
It is evident from scripture that angels are. the ministers
and servants of God, who wait upon him continually, and hp
employs them often on special messages to this, or any other
world. And why should not saints in heaven be, thus employ
ed, as well as those spirits commonly meant hy the term angels ?
They may and have been thus employed as messengers, who
are styled angels. Hence we have reason to conclude that
God employs any of the holy spirits around his throne as mes
sengers to this, and other worlds, according to his pleasure.
And as the worlds created are very numerous, and without
any doubt are all inhabited by different orders of beings, to"*

387
Wards whom God exercises the same benevolent attention, as
he does towards this world, according to their various charac
ters and wants ; we may conclude safely, that holy spirits are
sent on special errands to them, as they have been to us; and
that saints will be thus employed.
This will be one part of their employment as servants in his
kingdom, togo, when commanded, on messages of love or ven
geance to other worlds, as events may require. These errands
to other worlds they will perform with great! delight. For
this is one way by which they may enlarge their knowledge
ofthe works and ways of God.
Undoubtedly angels, who visit this world, and minister to
the heirs of salvation, learn much concerning the work of re
demption, and works of providence. And by this knowledge
are greatly benefitted by God's dealings with men; They are
so much benefitted, and interested in what God is doing for
meii, that the great work of redemption is a subject of their
constant study. So it is said, which things the angels desire
to look into. And these desires are very strong.
Saints in heaven, when they go on messages from God to
other worlds, become acquainted W'ith the characters ofthe in
habitants ; their conduct, and the dealings o, Jehovah with
them. And while thus extending their knowledge in this Way,
their happiness is increasing. And serving their king in this
way, will be a source of delight to them.
We are informed that spirits are vpry active, like fire ; his
ministers are like a flame of fire. Also, they serve him in this
active manner day and night, and never rest. When We con
sider that the host of heaven is innumerable, and each servant
is thus actively employed, what-an amazing amount of service
they render every day. What are the services, which this in
numerable host perform? They praise God, we are told.
But there are many, ways of praising him. One is in doing
his will. While employed on errands from world to world,
.they serve and praise him. And this will be one of their em
ployments. We love to serve our friends, whom we love in
this world. We delight in activity when our work is agreea
ble. . So in heaven the active services performed for God will
be one source of their happiness, and one great source ; espe
cially when we consider how much knowledge they obtain of
(Sod's ways and character in such employments.
What joy it gave the angels to announce to the shepherd"5

388'.

/-

the birth of Christ. With what pleasure they ministered ,M
him in this world, and do minister unto saints on their journey
home. With similar pleasure will saints in heaven obey and
serve their God. In whatever service they may be em
ployed, it will be a source of pleasure and happiness to them.
£. The: society of heaven will be another source of happi
ness to saints.
We know that mutual acts of kindness, conversation, giving;
and receiving information, and mutual intercourse, are in this
world one great source of our daily felicity. The society of a
family, of parents and children, and of friends, is one of our
sweetest joys.' Arid the society of perfectly holy beings will
be unspeakably pleasant. This is represented in scripture by
the metaphor of a feast, at which the bridegroom and bride re
gale thefnselves. The society of husband and wife is a source
of great consolation. Far more delightful will be the commu
nion and social intercourse of the bride with Christ in heaven*
The sweetest joys on earth flow from communion with the
Father and Son. Christ rejoices in his bride, and his bride,
in him. They will be one. This intercourse and intimacy
will be blissful, and dear ; like that of husband and wife, in a
spiritual, not carnal sense. Their joys will be mutual. And
this proves a social intercourse in heaven. For persons afford*
each other no. joy or comfort, if they have no social intercourse.
In that case, they would be like persons who live alone', without
any connexion or intercourse. Such persons never afford each
other any comfort.
Bat the union and intercourse of Christ with his bride in.
heaven, is represented by the union of husband and wife. here.
And when saints are called the children of God, brethren and
sisters, composing a family, and enjoying family blessings, ;
such descriptions clearly teach, that in heaven they will enjoy
intimate intercourse, which will afford them the greatest de
light. Only consider how much comfort parents and children,
husbands and wives, brethren arid sisters, enjoy in each oth»
er's society.
In heaven saints are the children of God, the bride of Christ,
brethren and -sisters. Such are the relations subsisting there,
in a state of perfection. And their society will be as much
more intimate and dear, as their union is more close and per
fect, than on the earth.
How great then will be the happiness ofthe children of Go d,,
arising from intercourse with him ; and ofthe bride in her in-

389
lePcourse with Christ ; arid ofthe brethren and sisters with eacfa
other. ' From these relations, and the mutual intercourse and
sofaety connected with them, will flow the sWeetest joys forev
er, in ways almost innumerable, and concerning which we have
but a faint conception here.
Paul teaches us, that in heaveii some will shine brighter
than others ; they will differ in this respect, as one star differs
in glory from another. HenCe some will be greater and wiser
than others,* and be teachers to those of less knowledge. With
What pleasure they will communicate, and others hear and re
ceive instruction ; and in this way assist each other in making
progress in knowledge.
Indeed, when we reflect that in heaven a love of benevolence
will be perfect, and perfectly unite all to Christ their head?
and to each other, so that their harmony will be complete
without one jarring note ; that they Will be all one ; their inter
course and society miist be inconceivably pleasant and sweet,
Bnt one soul and spirit will animate apd govern that innumer
able host. So that we may well say with Paul, that eye hath
npt seen, nor ear heard, nor heart conceived the things God
hath prepared for those who love him.
Not to enlarge, those mentioned are so many positive sour
ces of happiness to saints and arigels in heaven. And these
show that the happiness and glory of that world are so great,
blessed and sublime, that in describing them the boldest fig
ures must be used. The description must be taken from ob
jects in this world most highly esteemed for their value, rich
ness, beauty, sweetness, greatness, and sublimity. Such
figures are used, which we have endeavored to explain under
the several particulars of this essay. Yet they come so far
short of a full description, that Paul says eye hath not seen, &c.
We now See the description given us of heaven is not to be
understood literally, but figuratively ; and these figures we
have attempted to explain ; and I would add only one or two
more particulars to complete the description.
7. In heaven saints will love each other as themselves1, and be
united in perfect bonds of friendship.
This coiwnahd, thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, has
never been perfectly obeyed pri earth. But in heaven saints:
will love each other as themselves. This love will render
them true, sincere, and faithful friends. Such friendship rare
ly exists in this world. A faithful man, who can find, Was the
complaint of one of the greatest of men- Here men are de-

390
ceitful, unfaithful, insinsere ; so that they seldom put much
trust or confidence in each other. But in heaven it will be
very different. No deceit, insincerity, anger, envy, or re
venge, nr any evil passion, will ever be exercised there. Their
words and actions will flow from perfect love to each other..
They will have no design. to deceive or injure each other, but
to increase each others' felicity* Of this they will give full
evidence. < Hence they will, pitt entire and perfect trust and
confidence in each other, and without disapppintment. They
will' believe every word spoken to be true, every action de
signed to do>good. Hence a fear Of being deceived, and in
jured by some ill design, will never be realized. , They will
live together in perfect friendship, striving to contribute to
each others' felicity. The sweet pleasures and joys, flowing
from such love and friendship, was never experienced in this
world. But in heaven, when nothing but perfect love and
friendship are seen, when the ties of kindred souls make them
one, their intercourse will produce the most refined pleasures.
All the pleasures and joys of friendship will be experienced in
perfection, without any thing to embitter them. This friend
ship, consisting in mutual, perfect love to each other, is one
blessing Christ often prayed for, and promised to his disci
ples; He prayed they might be one, one in him, one in the
Father, one together, as he and the Father are oue. This is
only praying that their love and friendship might become per
fect. Hence Christ called them his friends. He considered
this love and friendship to be one source of the most sublime
happiness. 8. In heaven, mutual conversation will be a source of great
and constant pleasure.
The mode by which saints will communicatetheir thoughts,
views, and feelings to each other, is not revealed.- Whether
by words, or some other signs, we know not. But as to the-
fact, that they will converse, there can be no doubt.
Abraham and the rich man conversed. And bodies are not
necessary to conversation, For it is a fact that Moses and
Elias talked with Christ, and created angels have conversed
with man, as with Daniel, John, and Manoah and his wife.
They have a way to articulate, and use words as signs of their
ideas. .
We know that conversation here is one means of, the in
crease of knowledge, one source of happiness, and necessary

391
to the intercourse of society, and our highest good. If we
could have no intercourse by conversation, our condition would
be very unhappy, ¦ As mutual conversation is necessary to the
pleasures and perfection of society, there can be no doubt but
that this privilege will be enjoyed in heaven, in the highest
perfection. And when we consider, that our minds are capable of im
provement in knowledge and bliss, and are daily expanding
& enlarging ; that heaven is a place where the mind will grow
and enlarge with greater rapidity than it does here ; we may
conclude, that Abraham and Moses and others now greatly ex
ceed us in knowledge. They have been for several thousand
years studying, and improving their minds, in a knowledge of
the woi'ks pf God.
When a saint enters heaven,by conversation with such char
acters very important information is soon acquired. The
themes of discourse will be innumerable. And it will be the de
light of all to give, as well as receive, information. As the
works of creation, of providence, of the word of God, and
spiritual, intelligent beings, will be the subjects of study ; so,
concerning these they will mutually convey instruction. In
these works God is manifested, and »een ; and the better they
are understood in all their parts, tlie clearer, and more enlarg
ed, will be the views all will have ofthe character of Jehovah,
and hereby their happiness will be greatly increased.
Suppose a rational, benevolent being should arrive iri hea
ven from some other wprld, who had never had any knowledge
ofthe earth ;' and by conversation with saints from this world
should obtain a knowledge of this material globe, ofthe works"
of providence, of the plan of redemption, and the wonderful
things God has done for our ra>e ; would he not have, at once,
far more exalted views of God ; and b*- filled with wonder and
joy, and with great delight join with the redeemed in their an*
them of praise ? And he might give us a knpwledge ofthe
works of God, and the wonders he had wrought for his race;'
in the woi-ld from which he came,which would fill us with won
der and joy, and excite us to unite with him in hymns of praise
to the great Eternal, Such suppositions will without doubt
be realised in that glorious state.
For there is but one heaven ; and in that the greatest sum
pf created happiness is to exist. And Christ is to gather to
gether in heaven all things in one. This and similar passages

392
seem to signify, that as he is exalted above every name in hea
ven and in the universe, and is riiade head over all things to
the Church, the blessed society above ; so he will collect to
gether in heaven all holy beings from all the worlds they in
habit, and there make them one ; unite them by the bonds pf
perfect benevolence. Beings from different worlds, when they
meet in heaven, animated by the same spirit and soul, will by
their conversation and intercourse, afford each other great de
light and satisfaction. By such conversation among pure
friends, what information, what new wonders, what exalted
views of God, what refined and sublime joys, they will afford
each other. As the divine plan of operations is infinite, in-
eluding all worlds and beings in existence, composed pf innu
merable parts, all unitedly aiming at the same ultimate end,
the happiness of heaven ; the inhabitants above will afford
each other amazing assistance in studying, and acquiring a
knowledge of it. By their intercourse and mutual help, each
mind will make rapid improvements in a knowledge of the di
vine plan in all its parts, arrangements, and connexions.
When inhabitants frorii other worlds learn from saints here
what wonders God has wrought in every age, especially by the
work of redemption ; and whert they see that all the parts of
this plan operating here have terminated in the increasing feli
city of the heavenly society ; what exalted views they must
have of God ; what pleasure will his character afford, when
^eenin so many new lights, and displayed in such variety of
ways. And equal dejight must saints . from this world fe»I,
when they see the new and numerous ways by which he has
displayed himself in works and words to other worlds ; and
when they see all these displays are parts ofthe same plan, and
that all terms note in the same end. SuCh information ac
quired by conversation will fill every mind iwith exalted, arid
reverential views of God, and with wonder and joy.
0. In heaven benevolence,with all its affections and operations,
will be in perfect exercise.
In that world there will be no darkness to obscure the sight ;
no stupidity to cool, and blunt enjoyment ; no sluggish inac-'
tivity to interrupt pleasure. The views of every mind will he
clear and bright ; they will not see through a veil, but face to
face ; their feelings will be acute and strong ; their activity
.equal to their powers ; every affection will glow like a flame.
This prepares them to experience the greatest pleasure from
every object and employment.

393
Their love to Gpd,to Christ, to each other,will be in aflame ;,
their gratitude glow like fire; /their reverence will be pro
found ; their joys exquisitely sweet ; yes, the whole heart will
display the most lively and active exercises, and prepare them
to drink pleasures from every stream, and from the eternal
souree of bliss. Here the heart is so cold, stupid, and insensi
ble, as to render great enjoyments next to impossible. And
in proportion to the lively glow of holy affections,- our happi
ness is increased. How then will the fervid glow and heat of
holy affections in heaven, prepare all the inhabitants to enjoy
every source in full perfection, and to as high a degree as the
powers of the mind will admit. With a heart- hungering and
thirsting with intense desires, the sublime feast of heaven will
afford them perfect bliss and joy.
10. To form, so me adequate and just views ofthe blessed
ness of the heavenly society, we must consider, who is the au
thor, with his design of that world.
The greatest sum of created happiness, including its endless
increase, is the ultimate end of God in all his operations. And
this sum of happiness, with its endless increase, is to exist in
heaven. And God is the author and cause of all this blessed*
ness. He has but one plan, and this is the end at which it
ultimately aims. This plan includes all worlds and beings in
existence. And all the innumerable parts of it are unitedly
promoting this end, and will terminate iri it.
Hence it is the design of God to makeheaveri a state of such
blessedness, glory, sublimity, and joy, as is worthy of himself.
So that in the happiness and glory of that world, all the di
vine attributes of power, knowledge, and love, will be displayed,
to the highest possible degree. There will be seen the esseii'-
tial? infinite, and eternal fulness of God, perfectly communi
cated. So that all will say, here as great happiness and glory,
exist, as the infinite Jehovah was able to produce. There God
will be seen displayed ; his. infinite fulness displayed and com
municated. In the blessedness and glory of that state he has
. glorified himself perfectly, in the highest possible degree.
When all these things are considered, what must heaven be.
What astonishing bliss, what inconceivable glory, what sub
limity, what consummate perfection of all things, will there ex
ist, and be forever, increasing. In that world, every being will
behold all the happiness and glory of the universe concentrat
ed ; and the sight will fill each one with wonder and joy ; and
2Z>

394
this delightful wonder and joy will increase as the glories of
that state will forever shine with greater and greater bright
ness and splendor; '
No wonder then, that the images and figures used in scrip
ture to describe this state, are so various, numerous, rich, and
sublime ; and then they fall short of giving an adequate view of
it ; so that after all that is revealed, it may be said, that here,
eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, what will be realized by all
in that paradise of glory and pleasure.
We may now attend to the negative description given us of
heaven. We are assured that the body will finally rise, be
re-united to the soul, and partake in union with it ofthe feli
city of that world. It will be raised immortal, incorruptible,
spiritual, and made like unto Christ's glorious body. Hence
it will never be subject to any disease, pain, decay, weariness*
or death. It will ever remain the same glorious body ; ever
/ fresh, beautiful, young and blooming. It will be capable of
the most refined, and sublime sensations. And by this union
it is agreed the happiness of saints will be increased. Other
wise, no reason can be assigned for the resurrection of the bo
dy. But if it will add to their felicity, this is reason sufficient
We are also assured, that there will not any evil, natural or
moral, enter heaven. All who defile, or make a lie, are to be
excluded. NNone but perfectly holy characters will be admit
ted to live there. And if evil, both natural and moral, are to
be forever excluded, then no evil or suffering of any kind will
ever be there experienced. For "the terms natural and moral
include all kinds of evil.
But to give us the highest assurance, God informs that there
Will be no sickness, pain, sorrow, crying, or death in heaven.
All kinds of particular evils are mentioned, and declared to be
excluded from that world.
There will be no darkness, no night there ; no gloominess
or fear, or any thing to excite fear. By the rays of the sun of
righteousness, saints will enjoy one bright eternal day. How
^glorious and perfect is that state, in which no evil is felt ; from
which every thing, which creatures dread, hate, and fear, will
be forever excluded.
This homever, is only giving us a negative view ofthe glory
of heaven. For if saints there, though freed from every evil,
could find no objects in existence to afford them pleasure, they
would not be happy. Where there is no evil, there is-no mise-

395
^y. So in heaven they would not be miserable, er feel any
pain ; yet they would nut be happy, unless they found posi
tive spurces pf good, or of pleasure. Such sources they will
find, and we have shown what they are ; and from these all
their happiness is derived. If they enjoyed these sources, yet
suffered many evils as they do here, their happiness would be
greatly interrupted ; it would not be complete and perfect.
To perfect, uninterrupted happiness, positive sources of plea
sure must be enjoyed, free from evil to interrupt and lessen it.
Hence, though freedom from all evil will not render any be
ing happy, yet this exemption is necessary to perfect felicity.
According to the description here given of heaven ; which
accords with the description John gives in the 20th, 21st, and
22d, chapters of his revelation; how glorious is that state t
that world, which is to be the eternal habitation of God, and
his people. Aecording to this description, there shall in no
•wise enter it, any thing that defileth, or worketh abomination^
or maketh a lie.
In that world there will be no deception, no pollution, noth
ing to excite disgust, fear, or abhorrence. Every sinner, and
every sin will be forever excluded. Bebellion will be forever
subdued, the trumpet having blown its-last blast, and the shoui
pf battle ceased, and destructions come to a perpetual end. In
heaven saints will never be assaulted with temptations ; lusts
will never operate to disturb internal peace ; there will be no
enemies to seduce them. Private interests will be known no
more ; the general good will allure every eye, engross every
heart, and move every hand.
Peace of minds, harmony of views, union of affections, will
jje enjoyed by the innumerable host above ; and diffuse an uni-
¦versal and eternal serenity within and around the whole soul.
Here all will, in the most perfect sense, live. Death and
sorrow, disease and pain, crying and tears, will be felt no more.
There will be nothing to destroy, nothing to impair, nothing
to disturb. Every being will live the most happy life ; and
Hot merely live, but grow, flourish, and bloom forever.
Life in the sublimest sense, life vernal and immortal, will
impregnate every source of happiness, and animate the bodies
and souls of the children of God.
What an amazing difference there will be, between heaven
and our present state of being. This world is a vale of tears.
Evils await and beset us here, in a thousand forms. Without

396
are fightings ; within are fears. Here we have a thousand un-
gratified desires ; experience daily disappointments, reproach
es of conscience, and distressing apprehensions ofthe wrath of
God. We are subject to hunger and thirst, to cold and heat,
to weariness and languor, sickness and pain, decay and death.
Our friends and relatives suffer, with us ; they sicken and die ;
their sins disgrace them, and wound us ; and awaken painful
apprehensions concerning their destiny beyond the grave.
Wars also spread far and wide the miseries of dismay, plunder,,
slaughter, and destruction. Fires, famine, and pestilence of
ten desolate cities, and depopulate kingdoms.
To beings, who suffer here so many great and distressing
evils, how great and wonderful the change they experience,
when the ransomed ofthe Lord shall return, and come to the
heavenly Zion, with songs ; when they shall obtain joy and
gladness, and sorrow and sighing shall flee away ; when they
enter heaven, the seat of unalloyed happiness ; where beauty,
grandeur, sublimity and glory meet the eye ; where harmony;
salutes the ear, and raptures of joy fill the soul ; raptures un
mixed, increasing, and endless.-
Thus far it has been designed to give a clear and distinct
view of heaven, so far as it is revealed in the bible. We see
accordingly, heaven is a world of- perfection ; every beauty,
glory, and excellency reigu there in perfection. Every char
acter is perfect, -beautiful and divine. The ' employments of
that world are study, obedience, and praise. And endless, in
creasing happiness, without any interruption from evil of any
kind, will dwell there, and render all the inhabitants inconceiv
ably blessed. It will be a state as glorious as an infinite au
thor can make it.
I shall, therefore, conclude with an exhortation to all to pre
pare for that world without delay. You now see clearly the
prize which is set before you. All you can acquire or enjoy,
in your pursuit after worldly good, is vanity compared with
heaven. And all are running, wrestling, and striving to obtain
a prize. And the prize sought is either such enjoyments as this
world affords, or the enjoyments of heaven. And heaven, in
dm able riches, in unfading honors and glories, and in refined
pleasures, as far exceeds all the riches, honors, and pleasure
of this world, as light exceeds darkness, or happiness misery.
To spend our days here in pursuit of worldly good, to the
neglect of running for the prize in heaven, is the greatest wick-

397
edness and folly. And when the uncertainly of life is consider-
ed,to delay preparation for heaven, is the height of folly. And
that depravity of heart must be great, which causes men to
pursue a course to their own ruin, when they might win a
prize so glorious as heavenly and endless felicity.
From this day, let all turn into the narrow way, run the
christian race, and so run as to secure success. Delay not.
If you do, and ruin overtakes you, how must you lament your
conduct, as you make your eternal bed in outer darkness ;
when you behold afar off the bliss of heaven, lost to you by
your folly and madness, forever lost by your own perverse-
ness.

wotes
fteferring tp different parts ofthe work.

A Page SI.
The term/«fl"own< is often used in an indefinite and popular
sense, without any regard to metaphysical accuracy. Estimat
ing articles of daily traffic and commerce, or giving an opinion
concerning their, value, is called judging. Yet here two objects
are perceived, and when compared with some standard, it is dis
tinctly seen that one is of more value than the other. Perceiv
ing this difference in their worth, when compared with the stand
ard, is the judgment formed, or conclusion of the person con
cerning their value. Again. Judicial officers and referees
give judgment in cases submitted to their decision. Here the
understanding is employed, in investigating the real truth in the-
cases before them. And when every witness is heard, and ev
ery fact or truth is perceived, in relation to the cause pending,
the judge comes to a conclusion ; and perceiving what is true or
false, right or wrong in the case, he pronounces a decision up
on it to the parties concerned. In this process, the final per
ception of the real truth in the cause before him, and declaring^
this in words, is called his judgment. Hence in every sense in
which the word judgment may be used, it is the understanding
which is exercised, in perceiving or taking a view of all the ob
jects necessary to come to a final conclusion and result, which
is his judgment. And this is nothing more than a clear percep
tion of the value of an article compared with its standard, or
the truth of a cause referred to him. And no generic, and no
more than a specific difference is discernible, between the numer
ous operations of the understanding. All its operations are no
more or less, than perceptions of objects, whether the objects
are things, or properties, or qualities, or relations, or connex
ions between antecedents and consequents.
B Page 46.
The word of God informs us, it is the office of conscience to
accuse and condemn, or to excuse, approve, and justify, accord
ing as our hearts, actions and lives, agree or disagree with the
moral law, our rule of conduct. And it must beobvionsto cafr-

400
did minds, that no other than specific operations of the under
standing are employed, in accusing and condemning, or in ap
proving and justifying. And it will be granted, that the tari--
ous operatioris ofthe mind; when brought into view in the scrip
tures, are not presented in an accurate and systematic manner,
as metaphysicians in examining the operations of the mind
arrange them methodically.
Hence it is sometimes the case, that in the word of God we
find one faculty ofthe mind used for another, as the understand
ing for the "heart, and heart for the understanding. And some
times what is in the word predicated of one faculty, in strict
truth belongs to another. By observing these things, we may
readily see that every thing, which is affirmed of conscience in
the word, will agree with tiie view given of it in this essay. We
read of a pure, a good, a peaceable, an inoffensive conscience ;
and of an evil, defiled, and seared conscience. When conscieiice
does not condemn, but justify lis, it is called good, and without
offence. This is what Paul means, when he said he had lived
in all good conscience ; had maintained a conscience, not only
good, but. without offence. Whatever the reason was, his con
science indifferent periods ofhis life did not condemn but justi
fy him. A conscience is pure, when free from error in its deci
sions. When conscience is said to be purged from dead works,
tobe alive, and washed, it is then awake to perform its office
faithfully ; to condemn or justify, according to a person's reaf
conduct or deserts. And when persons have for a long time
stifled and silenced the voice of conscience, and refused to re
gard its decisions and remonstrances ; vvhen it is silent, and
ceases to perform its effice in accusing and condemning, it is then
styled a seared conscience. As when the warnings, admonitions,
and counsel's, we give to persons for evil conduct, have been
long disregarded, we become silent, cease to warn them any
longer, but give them up to ruin. So conscience ceases to
warn, and the person is left to the dominion of an evil heart, to
effect his own destruction. Here the fact is, the heart is become
so hardened in a ccurse pf sin and rebellien, that the voice of
conscience produces no effect, and makes no impression upon it.
Then this hardness of heart is predicated of conscience, which
is expressed by the term seared. When the true meaning is,
conscience is silent, no longer performs its office towards a per
son so hardened in sin. This is the awful case, it is feared, with
many persons.

401
It is certain that conscience may err and misjudge, through
the blinding influence of the heart. Paul, while a pharisee,
lived in all good conscience ; during this time it did not con
demn, butjustify him, in persecuting the church. All this time
his conscience erred, or pronounced a false sentence. But when
he was converted, it condemned him for the very deeds fpr
which it had before justified him. When it thus errs it is blind
ed, evil, and polluted, precisely as a judge is, when he is led to
wrong decisions, through the influence of bribes, or prejudices
of heart. Here the fault is not in the conscience, but the heart,
which binds it to give erroneous decisions. In all instances
where moral good and evil seem to be predicated of conscience,
these and similar terms are used figuratively for the heart.
And if the term heart, in such instances, had been used instead
of conscience, the sense would have been clear and oBvious.
If conscience always enjoyed sufficient light, and judged entirely-
free from the influence of a wicked heart, it would always judge
correctly. If it errs, and its decisions are wrong, it is owing to
the deficiency of light, or the influence of an evil heart. Ajudge
on the bench, if he has sufficient light on every cause, and is
wholly free from the influence of bribes, and of an evil heart,
will render a just sentence. When the judgment he renders
is unjust, it is imputed to the want of sufficient light, and then he
is not censured ; or to an evil heart, which has prejudiced and
blinded him, in which case he is always blamed and condemned
by public opinion. Yet the fault for which he is condemned, is
not the erroneous judgment pronounced ; but the wickedness
ofhis heart, which led him to it. If we say his sentence is un
just, we yet consider the real crime for which we blame him to
be an evil heart, which led to this decision. Error of judgment
is not cpnsidered a crime. For criminality in the case, we
search for the exciting cause of this error ; and for this ajudge
is blamed. This applies to conscience, when it judges of moral
conduct. Hence nothing said in this essay on conscience, will
be found inconsistent with the wprd of God, if we keep ail the
illustrations here given clearly in view;

C. Page 70.
Some may find it difficult to perceive a difference between
an appetite, and the faculty called taste. The real difference
isthe same, as between a species and genus.
26

402
A genus includes all the specieg under it. The faculty 01
taste is a genus, which includes all the appetites. Hence an
appetite differs from the taste, as a species does from its genus.
If all objects' of perception were separated into distinct classes,
then one appetite is suited to one class of objects, and another
appetite to another class, and all the appetites prepare the mind
to be affected with pleasure or pain by all objects, which are
objects of perception. Hence the taste is a fitness to feel plea
sure or pain in view of all objects ; and a single appetite is.
suited to be affected with only one class of objects.
This distinction is verified by experience and facts. All
men by experience know their feelings vary, alter, and change,
very frequently. Such changes are produced by the ascen
dancy, which one appetite gains, oyer another. And it is a
fact, that 'mankind are very changeable in their pursuits. . One
hour a love for their offspring governs ; then they are frugal.
The next hour their love or appetite for pleasure in excessive
indulgence governs ; then they waste their prpperty, though
it reduce their children to poverty. This also agrees with the
word of God. When the guests were invited by Christ to the
gospel supper, why did they not all make the same excuse ."*
Because different appetites predominated in themj and each
went away in pursuit of that object, which was then most val
ued. Another day their excuses might have been reversed.
If the taste, or what some call a capacity for pleasure and pain,
were a simple faculty, why are not all mankind pleased or dis
gusted with the same objects ; why are not their pursuits the
same without any change ? It has always been a mystery,
why men are so differently affected in view ofthe same objects.
But admitting the existence of different appetites, it is very ear
sy to account for the various feelings excited by the same ob
jects, and the changes in the conduct of the same person from
time totime ; and especially, when we consider that the appe
tites are capable of different cultivation and improvement, for
the better or the worse ; and more especially when we consid
er the secondary affections, which arise from those primarjf in
the heart. The attachment of the heathen to the same idol is
a secondary feeling, which arises from their primary love to
created objects, and the direction given to this primary appe
tite by education.
Again. Admit that distinct appetites are implanted in us by
«ur Creator for wise ends, we may then see, that the appetites

403
constitute the faculty of taste or heart, as several species con
stitute a genus. Also the loss of an appetite, and the restora
tion of it, rid more affect the taste as a faculty, than the des
truction nf pne species of animals or vegetables -afl'ects the
genus under which they are included ; or than the loss of an
appetite for one article of food, destroys the palate. The
genus remains the same, though one species belonging to it is
annihilated ; and the bodily taste would remain, though one
appetite, for instance an appetite for honey, should be lost.
And if an appetite to be pleased with the character of God is
lost, the taste as a faculty remains, and governs the man accord
ing to the ascendancy ofthe remaining appetites, which were
implanted in him at his creation. The more candidly and at
tentively any person considers this subject in all its relations,
the more he will be convinced of its truth, and its agreement
with experience, facts, and the word of God. If a person is
deprived of any particular appetite, the others which remain
will govern ; and as the person is endued with all the faculties
and powers, which are necessary to render him a fit object of
praise or blame, he will be worthy of one or the other accord
ing to the nature and operation of those appetites, still remain
ing in his heart. This will remain true as long as he is pos
sessed of appetites, which as active principles govern, whether
their number is greater Or less ; whether any one is lost or re
stored, he is still a moral agent.

D. Page 106.
Spme readers may think it is a new idea, and very erroneous,
to assert that the faculty of taste is of a moral nature, the seat
of all vice and virtue.
But if they had that intuitive view pf the heart of an infant,
which God hath, and clearly saw it had a heart or taste of such
a nature as would prompt it, if unrestrained, as it advanced in
life, to deceive men, oppress, steal, rob, and murder; would they
not consider the heart of this infant morally depraved, and very
wicked ?
Now, facts prove that mankind are born with such hearts,
and do Commit such crimes, if not restrained. Their lives dai
ly manifest this depravity. And such characters are deemed
Very Vile, whether knowing or ignorant, whether the powers
of their minds are very strong or weak. This proves that we

404
estimate their moral character according to, .the nature of tiieir
hearts, and not according to their knowledge or ignorance,
their power or weakness ; though it is granted, that fight and
power may aggravate their guilt. And the reason why all
men do not, until renewed, daily perpetrate such crimes, is not
any difference in the malignity of their hearts; but the nu
merous restraints laid on some, which are npt on others. This
is true according to scripture declarations ; and if we had a
clear view of sinners in hell, Where alf restraints on the wicked
heart are taken off", we should see no difference ip their moral
characters. And did we see the heart as God does, we should
be convinced, that all vice and virtue do belong to this feeling
faculty, which is the primary principle of action in all moral
agents.

E. Page 146.
It may be readily perceived, from what has been said, on
supposition man is endued with only two faculties, the under
standing and the will, that no one can act with design, or under
the influence of motives. For aim arid design imply, that an
agent has an end in view, and means to attain it. If the end
is pleasing to his heart, by this he is influenced and excited to
use the means necessary to reach the end, and while acting, his
aim and design is the end he seeks. He keeps the end steadi
ly in view. And the end, by its agreeableness to his heart, is
the motive by which he is governed.
Hence, if he has only thefaculties of the understanding and
will, there is nothing existing in him on which motives can
have any influence. Motives cannot affect past volitions, for
they are past and gone, like fleeting moments ; and have no
continued existence. They cannot have influence on the voli
tion to be exercised, for that is future, arid has no existence,
until it-is exercised; and surely motives cannot affect that,,
which has no being ; and when it exists, then it is too late for
the influence of motives.
Proceeding on the supposition we have only the two fac
ulties named, it is impossible for us to be governed by motives.
And if we are not influenced by them, we must act without de
sign. And a being, who is npt governed by motives, and
does not act by design, is not an agent, and surely he is not a
moral agent ; for a moral agent acts with aim and design, and

405
is influenced by motives in all his voluntary actions, as all will
grant. Hence, whatever theory of the mind is admitted, if a
third faculty, the taste, is rejected, the theory followed in its
consequences destroys moral agency, and contradicts experi
ence. For our experience testifies, that we do act by design,
and under the influence of motives. The ideas of acting by
design, and being governed by motives, are inseparably con
nected. If one is denied, the other must be rejected. And as
it is now evident that mankind cannot be influenced by motives,
unless they are endued with something capable of pleasure and
pain, whether it is called taste, or by any other particular
name ; excluding from the theory of the mind this something,
or feeling faculty, it will follow that we are not moral agents.
Such a feeling, governing faculty is -the most essential proper
ty, in constituting man a moral agent. Without this he is
not a moral agent.

F. Page 178.
While in this world, we have bodies, which we have to sup
port. And the appetites, which have been enumerated and
described, are active principles, prompting us to seek the
things and pursue the ends, requisite to the life and comfort of
our bodies, and of our posterity.
We have also souls, for which we ought to make everlasting
provisipn, that we may be happy after death. A benevplent
appetite is necessary, to excite us to use the means appointed
for the good ofthe soul, here and forever. As Adam at liis
creatiou was endued with all the appetites, needful to seek the
good of the body and soul here and hereafter, he was perfect ;
no other active principles were necessary, in order to his sub
sistence in time, and his endless bliss beyond the grave.
When he ate the forbidden fruit, he was deprived of his be
nevolent appetite, which constituted the moral image of God ;
but his other appetites remained entire, and unaltered, as facts
prove. While he remained holy, his love to God was the gov
erning principle ofhis heart ; and all his other appetites op
erated in subordination to the ends and designs ofhis supreme
regard for God ; and all the distinct faculties of his mind har
moniously aimed at the glory of his Maker. But when de
prived ofthe moral image of God, his remaining appetites had
the entire government. As these were given him, to move

406
him to make provision for the body while in this World, it is
evident, as facts prove, that he would forsake God, and seek
happiness in broken cisterns; or created worldly objects.
Bat philosophers, through mistaken views of the nature of
sin, and not distinguishing as they ought between absolute and
relative good and evil, have made tfiernselvCs believe that our
natural appetites and propensities are not, neither can be con
sidered as evil ; so are ready to exclaim, what, is hunger a
sinful appetite ? Here let every one carididly consider what
sin is. Now all Will grant, that a propensity to evil is an evil
propensity ; and if this is an active principle, inherent in a be
ing who is a proper moral agent, it is a moral evil ; and mor
al evil is sin. It, is generally granted, that our appetites may
be gratified either lawfully or unlawfully.
When a person eats no more than is necessary to the life
and support of the body, lie gratifies his hunger no more than
God allows. But if he eats to excesses intemperate, all say he
is wrong, and has done what the law forbids. And it is as
wrong to gratify any other appetite to excess.
Again. Every agent, in all he does, aims at some ultimate
end ; otherwise he aims at no end in any thing done. He
must aim at some end ultimately, or do one thing for the sake
of another, ad infinitum ;'. which is aiming at nothing ; and is
a thing impossible in a moral agent. And if an agent's ulti
mate end is evil, it must be granted all he does with sUch an
aim is wrong1. What then is the ultimate end of all men, while
unrenewed ? Let any person give a full attention to this sub
ject, and he will say, no unrenewed man aims at anything
higher, than the 'gratification ofhis own personal desires ; self
gratification is his end as far as he is able, Without any regard
for the glory of God, or the happiness of his kingdom.
Now then, what is the ultimate end of unrenewed persons in
eating ? On examination, every one must come to this conclu
sion ; that he eats for the sake of the pleasure food affords, or
to gain strength and preserve life with a view to further ends ;
and his last end is to gratify some personal desire, without any
regard to God or the happiness of man. Is not his aim then
in eating sinful ? Do not the desires of this appetite lead him
to pursue a course, which is hostile* to God, and the general
good,? And as this appetite will operate in all unrenewed
men ; in the same manner all his other appetites will operate ;
and whether he gratifies them to excess or not,, his ultimate

407
aim is the gratification of some personal desire, without any
regard to the authority or honor of God ; and hence in all he
does, while such is his end, he is committing sin.
But to represent our appetites, such as hunger, thirst, and
what are termed natural affections, as sinful or evil in their ten
dency and operation, appears so shocking to many, that they
discard the sentiment at once ; and scarcely any will give the
subject a candid, examination. Yet, as the word of God and
facts prove that mankind are governed by corrupt principles,
they adopt some other theory to account for the prevalence of
sin. Hence some, have believed, that when Adam ate the for
bidden fruit, he not only lost the moral image of his Maker,
but had produced in him a principle of selfishness, which is the
root or fountain from which all sinful acts proceed in moral
agents. ; This selfishness has been defined and described in different
ways. Some say it is self-love, or a love for self; or. setting
up a private interest in opposition to public good. However
it may be defined, we ought to inquire what ideas the terms
communicate. Is this selfishness an active principle distinct,
and difierent in its nature, from the« appetites we have considr
ered ?
All must grant selfishness, has some ultimate end ; this end
must be agreeable to the feelings of this principle ; desires
must arise from it to obtain its end ; and those will govern the
person in all his pursuits and actions. What then is its ulti
mate end ? Is it the glory of God, or happiness of, mankind,
or good of God's kingdom." No. What then ? It maybe
answered, it is the person's own individual good or interest.
And what is this, only the gratification ofhis own desires ?*
Suppose riches be his end. What good occurs to him from
them ; except the gratification of his numerous desires ? In
this all the happiness he enjoys consists. And as far as his
desires are gratified, he has obtained all he does, or in fact,
can desire. So far he has arrived to his ultimate end.
Here this selfishness aims at the gratification of its desires
as its final end. The same is true ofthe appetites, as they have
been described. Selfishness may be gratified, as is necessary
for the support and comfort of the body, and no further ; and as
its ultimate end is sinful in all its operations, it is itself sinful.
Whattbenis the difference between this selfishness, in its na
ture and operations, and the nature and operations of tiie ap-

408
petites, as they have been represented ? According to. each*
theory, it is wrpng to gratify these active principles to an ex~
cess ; and to aim, in all that is done, at a wrong or bad end
ultimately. Of course, there is no difference in their nature
and operation. And no one can conceive of any selfishness
more ruinous to the general good, than those appetites are,
when they operate without any regard to the authority, and
glory, or happiness of God's kingdom, as they always do, when
there is no benevolent principle to govern and regulate them.
And if we consult experience, we shall find it testifies- in favor
ofthe sentiments' advanced.
Are mankind conscious of any active principle in them, en
tirely distinct in its nature and operations, from the appetites
which have been described ? When they eat, is it hunger
which prompts them, or some selfish principle distinct frpm it ?
When parental affection moves parents to promote the "good of
their children, are they conscious of some other principle as
governing them, distinct from the affection they have for their
offspring? And the same question may be asked in relation
to all their other appetites. Experience does not teach men,
that they are governed by any other active principles, than
these appetites. We know it is hunger, which prompts us to
eat ; if is a feeling of love parents have for their children,
which leads them to seek what they view as necessary to their
good. We know it is a natural propensity, which inclines the
different sexes to unite in matrimony. And neither experi
ence nor observation teaches, that mankind are governed by
any other principles, than these several appetites. These are
selfish in all their operations ; and aim ultimately at nothing
higher or better, than the gratification of the desires arising
from them, as far as men are able. And no principle can be
conceived, more ruirious to happiness finally, than the effects
these appetites have produced, and will continue to produce.
Hence as soon as Adam lost the moral image of God, the
appetites, created in him with a view to his good in this world,
were the only active, governing principles remaining in him.
From that day he loved the objects of this world supremely.
He at once experienced a desire to accumulate property, to be
esteemed by men ; and he pursued the means necessary in his
view to these ends ; and as he had no love for God, his heart
was in fact placed supremely on this world. He served the
oreature, and not the Creator; he forsook God, the living

409
fountain, and soiight broken cisterns to satisfy his thirst. In
like manner his posterity have lived. These appetites
were now, in their operation, positively wrong or sinful. But
this did not constitute his primary depravity. A total want
of lpve to God was that, in which his imperfection, or moral
depravity, primarily consisted. As long as love to his Maker
governed, all he did was in harmony with the law, authority,
and honor of his God. And as soon as this love ceased, all he
did terminated in self gratification ultimately, and was sinful.
I know many ridicule the idea of placing any part of our de
pravity in a mere privation. But is the body perfect, if eyes
are wanting ? Does not the privation of this sense constitute
a great imperfection ? If a man as long as he has eyes, would
walk in the right way, and would Certainly deviate from it, as
deprived of this sense, would not all consider eyes to see a
great blessing, and the want of them a great evil ?. So the want
of a benevolent appetite is a great moral imperfection and
evil ; in consequence of which, all the other senses or appetites
lead us astray from God, as both facts and experience have
abundantly proved, from the day in which man revolted from
God.

G. Page 184.
The kind and degree of power, necessary to constitute a
moral agent, or fit object of praise and blame, has long been a
subject of dispute 5 arid there is not much hope of bringing it
soon to a satisfactory conclusion.' With a view, however, to
this end, this note is added. Two ideas are implied in all the
actions of a moral agent. One is, that he is goverried by mo
tives ; and the other, that in all his actions he has some aim
and' design. That he is a designing agent, and is influenced
by motives, all will grant. This implies, that in all his actions
he aims at the attainment of some object or end, by such means
as, in his view, are adapted to" it. The end operates as a mo
tive. If the end is pleasing to his feelings, he is influenced to
use every exertion to attain it. If an object is disagreeable or
painful, he will be influenced to avoid if. This necessarily
implies, that his mind is endued with some property, which is
pleased or disgusted by all objects within his view; a proper
ty, which is affected antecedent to action, and which gives rise
21

410
to every exertion. This is requisite, in order for him to be in
fluenced by motives, and to act with design.
Some contend for a self-determining power ; and some, for
an efficiency in men to produce all their voluntary exercises,
as essential to praise and blame. According to these theories,
man is endued with a power antecedent to volition, a power
which is to produce volitions. In order for this power to op
erate, or exert itself to produce volitions, some object must
please or disgust if, and in this way influence it to act.. If this
be not the fact, the agent, in exerting his power, is riot gov
erned by any motive. And if objects are neither pleasant nor
painful to this power, it is in a state of indifference ; and if a
rnan can exercise his power in this state, he must act without
design. For his supposed power is not inclined towards any
object, and of course he cannot aim at one. object more than
another ; or, in such a state, he aims at no object, or acts
Without any design. I see no way to avoid this conclusion.
Hence, if moral agents are influenced by motives, and act with
design, then this supposed poWer is of such a nature, that in
view of objects it is pleased or disgusted, and in this way in
fluenced to obtain the object, if agreeable, and to avoid it, if
painful. Then what is the difference between this poWer,
Whether self-determining, or efficient, and what is called by
me the faculty of taste, or the heart ? The taste, and this sup
posed power, are each of them pleased Pr the contrary with all
objects in view ; and by this means are influenced to act, to
seek, Pr avoid the object, and in the pursuit aim at the posses
sion, or avoidance of it, according to the pleasure or pain the
object or end affords.
If this self-determining arid efficient power is totally desti
tute of any feeling, than how is it to be put in motion, or excit
ed to exertions ? It certainly cannot be influenced by motives,
nor act with design. Power, which has no feeling, dops not
differ in its nature from those powers we call a lever, or a
screw. And if it ever exerts itself, it must be put in motion by
some antecedent power. The agCnt must have iri view some
pleasing object, arid have a desire to obtairi it. Then the
agreeable object operates as a motive, and influences him to
exert this supposed power to reach it, just as we use a screw
to raise a weight. And for this antecedent to act, its nature
must be the same with the nature of the faculty termed taste.
Hence, whatever power may be considered as essential to praise

411
and blame, on examination it will appear insufficient to answer
the end for which it is invented ; or else it will be found not to
differ in its nature from the faculty of taste, or the heart, as
-described in these essays. — We must then come to this conclu
sion, that wherever we behold a created being, who is endued
with the faculties of the understanding, taste, and will, and also
with liberty, he has all the powers necessary to render him a
moral agent, or proper object of praise and blame, and future
rewards, Then, to determine whether he is praise or blame
worthy, we only have to ascertain his moral character, or the
nature of his heart, whether it be holy or sinful. Here we
must rest satisfied. For, by the most careful examination we
shall find, there is no rational being in the universe, created or
uncreated, who is possessed of any other powers, than thefac
ulties which have been described. We know of no others.
And we are not conscious of any more, than three distinct
classes of opeiations j perceptions, affections, and volitions.
And as the operations of these differ from each other, they ne
cessarily imply three distinct faculties, to one of which they are
to be referred,.

IlffDEX.
Introouctipn ; Containing preliminary observations, Page 3
Essay 1, On the faculties of the mind, 13
Essay 2, Of the Understanding, 20
Essay 3, Of the Objects of Perception, - - - 23
Essay 4, Ofthe Memory, - ... _ 26
Essay 5, Of Judgment and Reason, 30
Essay 6, On Conscience, ----- 35
Essay 7, Recapitulation, - - - - 49
Essay 8, Of Taste,. - - - - -~~ - 53
Essay 9, Of Appetites, - - - - - 61
Essay 10, Ofthe Operations of Taste, - - 71
Essay 11, (Omitted in numbering.)
Essay 12, Of the Will, and its Operations, - - 84
Essay 13, General Observations on Moral Agency, - 94
Essay 14, Particular reasons given, why certain proper
ties are necessary, to constitute a being a proper and
complete moral agent, ' - - - 102
Essay 15, Of Liberty ; and the reasons why it is necessa
ry to form a ccmplete, perfect, moral agent, - 1 1 1
Essay 16, Whether hberty is necessary to vice and virtue ;
and, if not, for what purposes is it requisite, in mor
al agents ? - - - 131
Essay 17, On Motives, with their influence in determin
ing the will, - - - - 138
Essay 18, On the Nature of Good and Evil, - 146
Essay 19, Ofthe Reasons, why good and evil are distin
guished by the terms natural and moral, - 155
Essay 20, On the nature of moral evil, or sin, - 161
Essay 21, On the subject of praise and blameworthiness, 179

414
Essay 22, On the first principles, upon which the Arme
nian and Calvinistic systems of divinity are founded ;
and the primary difference.between them, - *"•
Essay 23, On the decrees and prescience of God, and
their consistency with each other, - - *0*
Essay 24, Containing arguments from Scripture, that the
sentiments advanced in the preceding essays are
true ----- - - 221
Essay 25, Objections against this system, stated, and an
swered, ' - - - - 232 '
Essay 26, An Examination of the ideas of Rhetoricians,
concerning a Taste for beauty, novelty, and gran
deur, - -. - - - 249
Essay 27, On total Depravity, - - - - 256
Essay 28, On benevolence or holiness, - - 279
Essay 29, On Regeneration, - 313
Essay 30, A summary View of the system, advaneed and
illustrated in these essays, - - - 350
Essay 31, On the nature of the happiness of heaven, 371
Notes, Referring to different parts of this work, 399

EBBATA.
Page 44, line IS from top, insert and between subject and predicaU.
Page 127, line 11 from bottom, for ii, read if.
Page 168, line 6 from top, for tc&e, read like,.
Page 198, title of the essay, for Arminians, read Arminian.
Page 213, line 20 from top, for Josiah, read Isaiah.
Page 224, line 13 from top, for different, read distinct.
Page 225, line 13 from bottom, for in, read on.
Page 232, line 6 from beginning ofthe essay, for they, read the.
Page 287, line 2 from top, for every, read any.
Page 288, bottom line, dele his.
Page -316, line 5 from bottom, tjefore/or, add except.
Page 321, top line, for others, read then ; line 15 from top, for ia, read into.
Page 335, line 15 from top, far or, read as.
Page 341, line 6 from bottom, for is, read was.
Page 358, line S from bottom , dele the letter y.
Page 366, line 11 from top, for scorn, read seem.
Page 367, line 9 from top, after man, insert is, and dele the comma.
,Rage 386, line 12 from top, dele of course.
Page 392, line 13 from bottom, for term note, read terminate.

YALE UNIVERSITY

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