THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
LITTLE ROUND TOP
GETTYSBURG, JULY S,l§63 f

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The Attack and Defense
of Little Round Top,
Gettysburg, July 2, 1863

Frontispiece

The Attack and Defense
of Little Round Top,
Gettysburg, July 2, 1863

By
Oliver Willcox Norton
Private Three Months Volunteers April 21 to July 24,
1861. Private Eighty-third Penn. Vol. Inf. Aug. 28, 1861
to Nov. 10, 1863. First Lieutenant 8th TJ. S. C. Inf. Nov.
10, 1863, to Nov. 10, 1865. Post Q. M. Ringgold Barracks,
Texas, June to Nov., 1865. Chief Q. M. Jackson's Div,
25th A. C. June to Nov., 1865. Member Geo. H. Thomas
Post No. 5, G. A. B. Dept. of 111. Member and Ex-Com-
mander of Illinois Commandery and Member of the Com-
mandery in Chief of the Military Order of the Loyal
Legion of the United States.

New York
The Neale Publishing Company
1913

Copyright, 1913, by
Oliver Willcox Norton
Cc If. 60:

\

CONTENTS
chapter page
I Introduction  .,,,11
II The Historians  15
III The Official Reports —
Confederate  141
Union  181
IV Attack and Defense of Little Round Top . 253
V Biographical  276
VI Letters and Papers  292
VII The Warren Letters  307
VIII Appomattox  -. 333
IX Index  345

ILLUSTRATIONS

Portrait of O. W. Norton  Frontispiece
facing page

Portrait of Capt. Porter Farley .
Brigade Headquarters Flag ....
Position of Vincent's Brigade . .
Portrait of Gen. Strong Vincent .
Portrait of Col. Patrick H. O'Rorke
Portrait of Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren
Portrait of Gen. Joshua L. Chamberlain

126
262274
282288 308
332

FOREWORD
The author and compiler of this book has been blind
for many years. This infirmity has obliged him to depend
very much upon the assistance of others in the preparation
of the volume. It doubtless contains many faults, for
which he craves the reader's indulgence.
He acknowledges with gratitude his indebtedness to Cap
tain Porter Farley for the loan of his admirable paper on
the part taken by the One Hundred and Fortieth New York
Volunteers on Little Round Top, the loan of personal let
ters to him from General Warren, General Sykes, the
Comte de Paris, and Lieutenant Roebling, with permission
to publish them, and for many other courtesies.
To Captain Simeon H. Crane, for much valuable assist
ance in research work among the numerous books and
documents relating to this battle.
To my secretary, Mr. Otis P. Swift, for constant, in
telligent assistance to me during all the time which I have
spent in writing this book.
To Miss Henrietta Hyde, who has been my personal
stenographer for more than twenty-five years, for her care
ful and painstaking work in taking my dictation of the
book. To Miss May Sturdevant, typewriter, for preparing the
copy for the publisher.
To The Neale Publishing Company and Mr. William C.

lo FOREWORD
Oates, Jr., for permission to publish that part of General
William C. Oates' book, " The War Between the Union and
the Confederacy," which relates to the attack on Little
Round Top.
To General Joshua L. Chamberlain, for permission to
publish his address on " The Third Brigade at Appomat
tox."

Chicago, September, 1912.

INTRODUCTION
This is not a history of the Battle of Gettysburg, but
an attempt to describe more fully and accurately than has
heretofore been done that part of the battle which was
fought on one corner of the field, where, more than in any
other place, the fate of the contest between the two armies
was decided. On July i, 1863, the battle was between
portions of each army only. On July 2 both armies had
arrived on the field. The main attack of the Confederates
was directed against the left of the Union line. Much has
been written in regard to the battle on and about Little
Round Top, with more contradictory statements by both
Union and Confederate writers than about almost any other
part of the battle.
The author, who was an eye-witness of the attack and
took part in the defense on this part of the line, believes
that it will serve to give a better idea of the fight on Lit
tle Round Top if in connection with what he saw and
heard he presents the official reports of the Union and Con
federate officers and extracts from the accounts of the
leading historians which relate to this part of the battle,
with his comparison and criticism of these documents, to
gether with some important letters and papers not hereto
fore published.
It is nearly half a century since the battle was fought.
The greater part of the armies which contended in this,
the greatest battle of the war, have passed over the river.
It should be possible for those who remain, and to whom
this battle is a memory only, to recognize the sincerity and
the valor of their foes, to put aside all hatred and prej-
11

12 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
udice, and, recognizing that we are all Americans, proud
of our country, treat all with fairness and impartiality.
In what the author has to say he hopes to do this.
This attitude will not oblige him, in cases where writers
have in his opinion deliberately misrepresented the facts
to cover their own misconduct, to refrain from pointing
this out. On the other hand, he believes that where
writers make statements with which he cannot agree, but
which have no relation to their own conduct, these state
ments have been made in good faith as the result of the
best information obtainable at the time they were writ
ten. One reason why such incorrect accounts appear is prob
ably that the commanders of the two brigades and the bat
tery which fought the battle for the defense of Little
Round Top, — Vincent, Weed and Hazlett, — were killed
or mortally wounded; O'Rorke, who commanded the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York, was killed, and Rice,
who succeeded Vincent in his command of the brigade, was
killed in battle a few months later. Had any of these
lived until they had time to write their reminiscences after
the war the accounts might have been very different.
General Warren played a most important part in this
battle. The historians have credited to him much that he
never claimed for himself. He made no official report,
and died in 1882, before any of the histories referred to in
this book were published. A few months ago the author
was permitted to see and copy a number of personal let
ters from General Warren relating mostly to the battle on
Little Round Top, which the officer to whom they were
written has kindly permitted the author to publish. These
letters were never intended for publication, but it is from
just such letters that true history is written. They reveal
so much of the character of General Warren, his patriot
ism and his love for the men who died on Little Round

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 13
Top, that as a contribution to the history of that day they
should be given to the public.
There is no part of the battle of Gettysburg, the great
est battle of the Civil War, the facts in regard to which
have been less understood, because more misrepresented,
than the struggle for the possession of Little Round Top.
Its capture by the Confederates during the battle of the
second day would have forced Meade to abandon his
strong position in disorderly retreat. Its retention by the
Union army made that position secure. There is a gen
eral agreement among historians and writers that this state
ment is true; but here the agreement ends. No two
writers agree in their statements of what actually took
place. In order to give the reader a basis for a better under
standing of the facts, I purpose to give all the official re
ports of the Union and Confederate officers engaged on
this part of the field, extracts from the writings of leading
historians and others, with my own account and some hith
erto unpublished letters and papers, which I think will
convince a careful reader that in many respects the gen
erally accepted accounts are erroneous.
I have no doubt that it will seem presumptuous in a
private soldier to come forward nearly half a century after
the battle and contradict the statements of so many writers
much abler than himself. There is some justification for
this attempt in the fact that these writers contradict one an
other. Although a private soldier, I was at the time of
the battle of Gettysburg, and for some time before and
after, on detached service at the Headquarters of the
Third Brigade, First Division, Fifth Army Corps, com
manded when the battle began by Colonel Strong Vincent.
I was brigade bugler, mounted, and bearer of the brigade
headquarters flag. As such, it was my duty to keep
near the brigade commander, following him closely where-

14 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
ever he went, when the army was on the march or moving
about a battlefield.
Each brigade in the army had a distinctive headquar
ters flag, bearing the corps badge, and by a different ar
rangement of its red, white, and blue colors enabling a
staff officer or any other person familiar with the system
to tell from any distance at which it could be clearly seen
the organization to which it belonged and where he could
find its commander. This duty gave me a better oppor
tunity than even the officers of the brigade staff enjoyed, to
see what occurred and hear verbal orders given or re
ceived. The officers of the staff were frequently absent
at intervals, conveying orders or seeking information,
while I remained constantly with the brigade commander.
My recollection of what I saw and heard that day is as
clear and distinct as that of any event in my life. Since
the discovery by me, about a year since, of a large num
ber of letters from General Warren, General Sykes, the
Comte de Paris, and others never before published, throw
ing a new light on the subject, which the recipient has
kindly given me permission to publish, I have been making
a careful examination of all the literature which I have
been able to find relating to this part of the battle, with the
purpose of collecting and presenting these various accounts
to the public in convenient form for comparison and refer
ence, in connection with my own recollections. The of
ficial reports are necessarily fragmentary. This is es
pecially true of the Confederate reports. I have not been
able to find any reports made at the time by the division
commanders of either Hood's or McLaws' divisions. In
my account of their movements it is necessary to depend
on the few brigade and regimental reports which are avail
able.

II
THE HISTORIANS
In addition to my own account, with the official reports
of the commanders of Union and Confederate troops which
were engaged in this part of the battle, and letters and
papers not heretofore published, I have made extracts from
the following books:
William Swinton, " Campaigns of the Army of the Po
tomac " ; Abner Doubleday, " Chancellorsville and Gettys
burg " ; Comte de Paris, " The Civil War in America " ;
Francis A. Walker, " History of the Second Army Corps " ;
Henry J. Hunt, in " Battles and Leaders of the Civil
War " ; Regis de Trobriand, " Four Years with the Army
of the Potomac " ; William H. Powell, " The Fifth Army
Corps " ; J. M. Vanderslice, " Gettysburg Then and Now " ;
J. H. Stine, " History of the Army of the Potomac " ; R.
K. Beecham, " Gettysburg, the Pivotal Battle of the Civil
War " ; William C. Oates, " The War Between the Union
and the Confederacy " ; Edward M. Law, C. S. A., in " Bat
tles and Leaders of the Civil War."
A comparison of the accounts in these books shows that
no two of them agree in their description of what took
place on Little Round Top. With such differences they
cannot all be right. With due deference and crediting
the authors with the intention to state the facts, I think that
in important particulars not one has succeeded. No one
can deny the importance of the part which General War
ren performed in the emergency, but nearly all the writers,
excluding, of course, the Confederates, have attributed to
him things which he did not do and which he never claimed
to have done, as I will show later by direct statements
15

1 6 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
from Warren himself. Not one of them credits Colonel
Vincent with his action in taking the responsibility —
when he knew that General Sykes had ordered a brigade of
Barnes' division to be sent to Little Round Top — of tak
ing his brigade there without waiting for an order from
his division commander, who was not present. Had Vin
cent waited to be detached, or to receive his order through
the usual channel, he would have arrived at his position
on Little Round Top too late. The enemy would have
been in possession and the men who arrived almost as soon
as Vincent was in position could not have been driven off.
However, let the historians speak for themselves.
William Swinton, " Campaigns of the Army of the
Potomac," pp. 346-348
" Fortunately, at the time Hood made his attack, Gen
eral Warren, chief engineer, happened to reach Little
Round Top. The summit of this hill had been used as a
signal station, and at the moment of his arrival the signal
officers suddenly seeing that the enemy had penetrated be
tween Round Top and the left of Sickles' line, and was
approaching their position, were folding up their flags to
leave; but Warren, commanding them to continue waving
them so as to make at least a show on the hill, hastened to
seek some force wherewith to occupy this important point.
It happened at this pregnant moment that the head of
Sykes' column, which had been ordered over to the left,
reached this vicinity, and the leading division of this corps
under General Barnes was then passing out to reinforce
Sickles. General Warren assumed the responsibility of de
taching from this force the brigade of Vincent, and this
he hurried up to hold the position, while Hazlett's battery
was by enormous labor dragged and lifted by hand up the
rocky brow of the hill and planted on its summit. As

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 17
these events followed in quick succession, it resulted that
while that part of Hood's force that had penetrated to the
left of the line was approaching the front slope of the Lit
tle Round Top, which in a few moments would have been
seized by it, other claimants were hurrying up its rear.
Vincent's men, thrown forward at the pas de course, and
without time to load, reached the crest just as Hood's
Texans, advancing in column and without skirmishers,
were running to gain it.
" Little Round Top — the prize so eagerly coveted by
both combatants — is a bold and rocky spur of the lofty
and peaked hill Round Top. It is impossible to conceive
a scene of greater wildness and desolation than is presented
by its bare and mottled figure, up-piled with granite ledges
and masses of rock and strewn with mighty boulders that
might be the debris of some antique combat of the Titans.
" Here there ensued one of those mortal struggles rare
in war, when the hostile forces, clenching in close contest,
illustrate whatever there is of savage and terrible in bat
tle. Vincent's brigade, composed of the Sixteenth Michi
gan (Lieutenant-Colonel Welsh), the Forty- fourth New
York (Colonel Rice), the Eighty-third Pennsylvania,
(Captain Woodward), and the Twentieth Maine (Colonel
Chamberlain), coming quickly into position, engaged Hood's
troops in a hand-to-hand conflict, in which bayonets were
crossed and muskets clubbed ; and officers, seizing the rifles
dropped from dead hands, joined in the fray. After half
an hour of this desperate work the position was secured.
Meantime, Weed's brigade of Ayres' division of the Fifth
corps took part on Vincent's right on Little Round Top.
The One Hundred and Fortieth New York of this brigade
had gone up simultaneously with Hazlett's battery and par
ticipated in the engagement. Hood's men, however, clung
fast to the rocky glen at the base of the hill, and, working
their way up the ravine between the Round Tops, sue-

1 8 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
ceeded in turning the left flank. The ammunition of Vin
cent's troops was already exhausted. It therefore became
necessary to use the steel, and the enemy was driven from
this point by a charge with the bayonet by Colonel Cham
berlain's Maine regiment. Yet this rocky bulwark was
not secured without a heavy sacrifice. Colonel Vincent,
who had so heroically met the first shock, laid down his
life in defense of the position; O'Rorke and the much-be
loved General Weed were killed; Hazlett, who commanded
the battery, also fell at his perilous post; and among the
ledges of rocks lay many hundred dead soldiers in blue.
" The onset of Hood and McLaws upon Birney's front
was made with great vigor, compelling General Sickles
immediately to call for reinforcements; and it was in re
sponse to this request that General Barnes' division of the
Fifth corps had been thrown out in support at the time
General Warren detached from this division the brigade
of Vincent to hold Little Round Top. Its other two bri
gades, under Colonels Tilton and Sweitzer, hastened to the
support of Birney's hard-pressed troops on the advanced
line; and General Humphreys, who held the right of the
Third corps, but had not yet been attacked, sent one of his
own brigades under Colonel Burling to still further help."
Swinton appears to have obtained his account of this
part of the battle from various sources. He has con
fused the time and order of events and the movements of
troops, so much as to give a wrong impression. He at
tributes to Vincent's brigade the timely arrival on the
crest of the hill and the charge down the western slope
which drove the Confederates from this part of the line.
This was the work of Colonel O'Rorke and his regiment,
the One Hundred and Fortieth New York. This was not
the first attack on the Union position, but was the last.
The first attack was made by the Fourth and Forty-eighth

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 19
Alabama of Law's brigade and the Fourth and Fifth Texas
of Robertson's brigade, which came up the swale on the
north side of Big Round Top and attacked the center of
Vincent's brigade posted on the southern slope of the hill.
A desperate fight had taken place there, lasting half an
hour. During this time the other brigades of Hood's di
vision had been assaulting Ward's brigade and Smith's
battery at the Devil's Den. Ward maintained his position
for some time, and it was not until he had been forced
back that the way was open for the Confederates, who had
been driven back by Vincent, to make their way north
ward along the Plum Run valley east of the Devil's Den
to a point from which they could ascend the west front
of Little Round Top, outflanking the Sixteenth Michigan
on Vincent's right and driving it in. The timely arrival
of O'Rorke and his men repelled this attack and saved the
day on that part of our line. Meantime the Fifteenth
and Forty-seventh Alabama, which had come over the top
of Big Round Top, attacked Vincent's left flank, held by
the Twentieth Maine under Chamberlain.
Warren did not arrive on Little Round Top at the time
Hood's division made this attack. He arrived at least an
hour before this. When he arrived the enemy was not
in sight. Warren, having been informed by the signal of
ficer that he thought he had seen the enemy in the woods
between Plum Run and the Emmittsburg road, directed
Smith's battery to fire a shot in that direction. The invol
untary movement of the men concealed in the woods as
this shot whistled over them, and the reflection of the sun
light on their bright bayonets and gun barrels, revealed to
Warren a long line of the enemy in position far outflank
ing Birney's line. Soon after this the batteries of Hood's
and McLaws' divisions opened fire on Birney, whose bat
teries responded, and this cannonade continued, according
to different accounts, for from fifteen minutes to half an

20 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
hour before the infantry advanced. Warren did not leave
the hill, but sent Lieutenant Mackenzie, one of the three
young engineer officers on his staff, asking for a brigade
to occupy Little Round Top. Sickles replied that he could
not spare any, but Sykes promised to send a brigade. A
long time after Barnes' division went to the front Weed's
brigade of Ayres' division came along. Seeing the im
minent danger, Warren left the hill and, detaching the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York from the rear of this
brigade, sent it to the crest of Little Round Top under the
guidance of Lieutenant Roebling, another one of his staff.
Warren did not return to the hill, but rode away to report
to General Meade.
The reader of Swinton's account cannot gather from it
the proper sequence of events. It would appear that Weed's
brigade took part in this engagement. Except the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York, it did not get into posi
tion on the hill until all the close fighting was done. Weed
and Hazlett were killed by sharpshooters firing at long
range after the Confederates had abandoned the hill, to
return no more. For confirmation of my statements, see
letters 1 of Warren, Roebling, and Mackenzie, and Sykes'
official report.
General Abner Doubleday : " Chancellorsville
and Gettysburg," p. 168
" General Warren, who was on Meade's staff as chief
engineer, had ridden ... to the signal station on
Little Round Top to get a better view of the field. He
saw the long line of the enemy approaching and about to
overlap Ward's left, and perceived that unless prompt suc
cor arrived Little Round Top would fall into their hands.
1 For these letters— to which frequent mention will be made in this
work— see pp. 292, 307-329. 33°- Sykes' report will be found on pp.
•*Sl-i8*?,

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 21
Once in their possession they would flank our whole line
and post guns there to drive our troops from the ridge;
so that this eminence was in reality the key of the battle
field and must be held at all hazards. He saw Barnes' di
vision, which Sykes had ordered forward, formed for a
charge and about to go to the relief of De Trobriand, who
held the center of Birney's line and who was sorely beset.
Without losing a moment he rode down the slope, over to
Barnes, took the responsibility of detaching Vincent's bri
gade, and hurried it back to take post on Little Round Top.
He then sent a staff officer to inform General Meade of
what he had done and to represent the immense importance
of holding this commanding point.
" The victorious column of the enemy was subjected to
the fire of a battery on Little Round Top and to another
farther to the right, but it kept on, went around Ward's
brigade and rushed eagerly up the ravine between the two
Round Tops to seize Little Round Top, which seemed to
be defenseless. Vincent's brigade rapidly formed on the
crest of a small spur which juts out from the hill, and, not
having time to load, advanced with the bayonets in time
to save the height. The contest soon became furious and
the rocks were alive with musketry. General Vincent sent
word to Barnes that the enemy were on him in overwhelm
ing numbers, and Hazlett's regular battery, supported by
the One Hundred and Fortieth New York, under Colonel
O'Rorke of Weed's brigade, was sent as a reinforcement.
The battery was dragged with great labor to the crest of
Little Round Top, and the One Hundred and Fortieth were
posted on the slope on Vincent's right. They came upon the
field just as the rebels, after failing to penetrate the center,
had driven back the right. In advancing to this exposed
position Colonel O'Rorke, a brilliant young officer who
had just graduated at the head of his class at West
Point, was killed and his men thrown into some confusion;

22 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
but Vincent rallied the line and repulsed the assault. In
doing so he exposed himself very much, and was soon
killed by a rebel sharpshooter. General Weed, who was
on the crest with the battery, was mortally wounded in the
same way, and as Hazlett leaned over to hear his last
message a fatal bullet struck him also, and he dropped dead
on the body of his chief. Colonel Rice, of the Forty-
fourth New York, now took command in place of Vincent.
The enemy, having been foiled at the center and right,
stole around through the woods and turned the left of the
line, but Chamberlain's regiment, the Twentieth Maine,
was folded back by him around the rear of the mountain
to resist the attack. The rebels came on like wolves, with
deafening yells and forced Chamberlain's men over the
crest, but they rallied and drove their assailants back in
their turn. This was twice repeated, and then a brigade
of the Pennsylvania Reserves and one of the Fifth corps
dashed over the hill. The Twentieth Maine made a grand
final charge and drove the rebels from the valley between
the Round Tops, capturing a large number of prisoners.
Not a moment too soon, for Chamberlain had lost a third
of his command and was entirely out of ammunition.
Vincent's men in this affair took two colonels, fifteen of
ficers, and five hundred men prisoners, and a thousand
stand of arms. Hill in his official report says, ' Hood's
right was held as in a vise.' "
Doubleday's account is more nearly correct than some of
the others, but he makes one error, when he says that " Gen
eral Warren, who was on Meade's staff as chief engineer,
had ridden about this time to the signal station on Little
Round Top to get a better view of the field. He saw the
long line of the enemy approaching and about to overlap
Ward's left, and perceived that unless prompt succor ar
rived Little Round Top would fall into their hands. Once

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 23
in their possession, they would flank our whole line and
post guns there to drive our troops from the ridge; so
that this eminence was in reality the key of the battlefield
and must be held at all hazards. He saw Barnes' division,
which Sykes had ordered forward, formed for a charge
and about to go to the relief of De Trobriand, who held
the center of Birney's line and who was sorely beset.
Without losing a moment he rode down the slope, over to
Barnes, took the responsibility of detaching Vincent's bri
gade and hurried it back to take post on Little Round Top.
He then sent a staff officer to inform General Meade of
what he had done and to represent the immense importance
of holding this commanding point."
This statement about his taking the responsibility of de
taching Vincent's brigade and hurrying it back to take post
on Little Round Top is imaginary. (See Warren's let
ters to Captain Farley,1 and Lieutenant Mackenzie's letter
to General Meade.2) Doubleday may have been well in
formed about the first day's battle, but he makes no claim
to have been with the troops on the left during the second
day, and apparently got his information of what took place
there, at least to some extent, from rumors sent in by what
was called in the war time " the grapevine telegraph."
Comte de Paris : " The Civil War in America,"
Vol. iii, pp. 615-632
" About a quarter to four o'clock Warren, following
Meade's instructions, had reached this hill [Little Round
Top], and was climbing it for the purpose of surveying
the country. The officers of the signal corps stationed on
the top having informed him that they thought they had
seen the enemy's lines in the woods between Plum Run
and the Emmittsburg road, he had ordered Smith's bat
tery to fire a shot in that direction. Just as the projectile
1 Pp. 307-329 infra. 2 P. 292 infra.

24 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
passed whistling above the trees all the Confederate sol
diers had instinctively raised their heads, and this simul
taneous movement being communicated to the polished
arms they held in their hands, Warren had caught their
reflection like a streak of lightning, winding with a long
trail among the leaves. This momentary apparition had
been a revelation to him ; he had divined the danger which
menaced Little Round Top, and understood by the same
token the importance of this position.
" It was necessary to hasten in order to find defenders
for it. Following in the wake of Sykes, who had just
crossed the hill on foot with Barnes' division, he had found
him near the wheat-field completing the reconnoissance of
which we have spoken. The commander of the Fifth corps
had immediately ordered Colonel Vincent, who was in com
mand of Barnes' Third brigade, to proceed to occupy the
foot of Little Round Top; Hazlett's battery was to co-op
erate with him. Warren, going in advance of them, had
reached his post of observation to witness the first attack
of Law against the four regiments which alone are defend
ing the gorge of Plum Run. One moment later the bulk
of these troops was falling back upon the flank of the
Devil's Den hill, while a party of sharpshooters was trying
to find shelter among the rocks scattered along the western
flank of Little Round Top. The Confederates were has
tening in pursuit of them; their projectiles already reached
the elevated post whence Warren was watching this excit
ing scene. He could not, however, see Vincent's brigade,
which, encompassing the hill at the west, had disappeared
in the woods.
" This position, easy to defend and impossible to recap
ture, whose importance Warren alone seems to have then
understood, was therefore about to fall into the hands of
the enemy, without striking a blow. The young general
of engineers makes a last effort to save it. He directs the

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 25
officers of the signal corps, who are preparing to abandon
a post without defenders, to continue waving their flags,
in spite of the enemy's fire, in order to deceive him and de
tain him for a few moments while he is going to ask for
assistance from a body of troops whose column he sees
moving along the road followed a short time since by
Barnes. It is the Third brigade of Ayres' division of the
Fifth corps, under command of General Weed, and is pre
ceding the rest of the division at a considerable distance.
Weed has gone forward in advance to ask for instructions
from Sickles; but the first regiment that Warren en
counters is commanded by Colonel O'Rorke, his friend and
during a certain period of time his subordinate, who does
not hesitate to respond to the pressing demands of his
former chief. While the rest of the brigade is continuing
its march, O'Rorke causes the column of the One Hundred
and Fortieth New York, which, fortunately, is of consider
able strength, to scale directly the acclivities of Little
Round Top.
" During this time Vincent, hastening the pace of his
soldiers, has reached the southern extremity of this same
hill. On this side it is not so steep as on the other sides,
being prolonged by a ridge which about halfway presents
a horizontal stretch of nearly one hundred yards in length,
descending thence by gentle gradations as far as the foot
of the large Round Top. This ridge affords an excellent
position to Vincent for barring the passage to Law's sol
diers, who are rapidly advancing in his direction. He
posts himself along the western slope, with the Sixteenth
Michigan on the right, below the very summit of the hill,
the Forty-fourth New York and the Eighty-third Penn
sylvania in the center, and the Twentieth Maine, under
Colonel Chamberlain, on the left, along the extremity of
the ridge. These troops could not have arrived more op
portunely.

26 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
" Hood, after being for some time held stationary by
the difficulty of keeping his soldiers in the ranks under the
fire of a Federal battery posted at the bottom of the gorge,
has at last reached the foot of Little Round Top, which he
points out to them as a prey thenceforth easily captured.
A great yell goes up from the ranks of the assailants, who
rush with impetuosity upon the center of Vincent's bri
gade. But upon this ground all the advantages are in
favor of the defense, while the fire of the Unionists, shel
tered among its inaccessible recesses, stops the Confeder
ates, who stumble at every step they take in their efforts
to reach them. They do not turn back on that account,
but, posting themselves in their turn behind the rocks, en
gage in a murderous encounter with Vincent's brigade,
which defends itself almost at the point of the muzzle.
" Law, seeing the resistance which this small band
makes in front of him, determines to turn it. He extends
his left for the purpose of outflanking the Sixteenth Michi
gan, and attacks it with so much vigor that it cannot re
sist the onslaught. The situation is becoming serious for
the Federals; Vincent is entirely isolated from the rest of
the army, and no longer protects the principal point of the
position, the summit of Little Round Top, on which the
officers of the signal corps are bravely continuing to wave
their colors.
" At the very moment when the Sixteenth Michigan is
succumbing, O'Rorke's soldiers, by a really providential
coincidence, reach at a full run this summit which Warren
points out to them as the citadel to be preserved at any
cost. At their feet lies the vast battlefield, whence are
heard vague noises and savage cries, the rattling of mus
ketry, the cannon's roar, and where all the incidents of the
combat are seen through a cloud of smoke; but they have
no leisure to contemplate this spectacle, for they find them-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 27
selves face to face with Law's soldiers, who are climbing
the hill on the opposite side. A few minutes' delay among
the Federals would have sufficed to put the Confederates in
possession of the summit. Never perhaps was seen the
winner of a race secure such a prize at so little cost. The
Unionists, although surprised, do not, however, hesitate.
They have time neither to form in line of battle nor even
to load their guns or fix bayonets. O'Rorke calls them
and pushes them forward. A large number of them fall
at the fire of the enemy; the rest rush down upon the lat
ter at a run, brandishing their muskets aloft; and this
movement suffices to stop the Confederates. The Federals
take prisoners those among the assailants who had been
foremost in the race, and open a brisk fire of musketry
upon the others. Vincent's right, having recovered from
its check, comes to their assistance. Hazlett's battery has
scaled Little Round Top, with the One Hundred and For
tieth New York; the most extraordinary efforts, together
with the co-operation of a portion of the regiment, have
been required to haul the pieces of artillery as far as the
summit. " Although the position is very dangerous, for showers
of bullets are falling around the guns, which cannot be de
pressed enough to reach the enemy along the slope which
he is scaling, Hazlett boldly takes his position and directs
his fire against the Confederate reserve in the valley; he
knows that the presence of his guns encourages the Union
infantry. The Federal line, thus strengthened, presents an
impregnable front to Hood's assaults; the position of Lit
tle Round Top is safe for the present. But this advantage
has been dearly bought; in a few minutes the One Hun
dred and Fortieth New York has lost more than one hun
dred men, a large number of officers being wounded. The
valiant O'Rorke has paid with his life for the example of
bravery which he set to his soldiers. Having left West

28 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Point two years previously with the highest honors, he had
been destined, in the judgment of all his comrades, for
the most elevated positions in the army.
" A personal and desperate struggle takes place along
the whole front of the two bodies of troops. They watch
each other, and aim from behind the rocks and bushes;
some of the combatants are seen here and there climbing
trees in order to secure a better shot; the balls whistle in
every direction ; two pieces of Smith's Federal battery take
the line of the assailants obliquely, throwing shells into
their midst. The dead and wounded disappear among the
rocks. On both sides the officers perform prodigies of
valor, for they feel the importance of the disputed posi
tion. Law is not satisfied with musketry-fire, which may
be prolonged without any decisive success; he wishes to
pierce the enemy's line, and brings back against the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York the soldiers of his com
mand who had been stopped by the unexpected arrival
of this regiment; but Vincent, who had assumed com
mand of the whole line, hastens with a few reinforcements
and the attack is repulsed.
" The combatants are beginning to be exhausted on
both sides; the Federals have seen Vincent fall gloriously
with a large number of his men; the losses of the Confed
erates are also heavy ; the most serious one is that of Hood,
who, being always at the post of danger, has been badly
wounded in the arm. . . .
" Reinforcements, equally needful, arrive about the same
time on the extreme Federal left, in front of Little
Round Top. Before the combat had begun at this point
Sykes had directed Ayres' division toward this position;
Weed's brigade, which preceded the other two at a con
siderable distance, had been turned aside, without the
knowledge of the commander of the Fifth corps, by a
pressing call from Sickles, and it was going to the assist
ance of the Third corps when Warren went to seek

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 29
O'Rorke and his regiment. As soon as Sykes was in
formed of this fact, he ordered Weed, who had not yet
fallen into line, to return with all possible haste to take
the position already occupied by the One Hundred and
Fortieth New York. This order was promptly executed.
" Weed reached Little Round Top at the moment when
Vincent was mortally wounded and when both sides were
preparing to renew the struggle which had been tempo
rarily suspended. He takes position on the right of Vin
cent's brigade, of which Colonel Rice has assumed the
command, thus enabling him to reinforce his left. Cham
berlain, on his part, in order to keep the enemy in check,
has been obliged to place a portion of the Twentieth Maine
en potence above the defile which separates the two sum
mits. It is, in fact, against this point that Law directs all
his efforts, and the combat is resumed with fresh vigor,
without allowing Weed time to deploy his battalions. His
soldiers, having speedily recovered, rush to the assault with
the earnestness of men who have never encountered an ob
stacle without breaking it down. He strives to outflank
the Federal line in order to reach Little Round Top by
way of the eastern side of the ridge; his troops have been
under less fire on this side, but they have to do with the
Twentieth Maine, which defends its position with all the
vigor of the strong race of backwoodsmen among whom it
has been recruited; again they fight hand to hand, the
assailants still trying to turn their adversaries during the
combat, the latter prolonging their line and bringing it more
and more to the rear, in order to frustrate this maneu
ver. . . .
" About an hour since we left the two parties in conflict
along the flank opposite to this elevated position, and
Law's soldiers, in spite of their reduced number, rushing
against the Twentieth Maine. The firing of musketry is
again heard along the whole line. Weed, who sets an ex
ample to all around him, is mortally wounded near Haz-

30 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
left's battery, whose commander, stooping to receive his
last words, is struck in his turn, and falls lifeless upon the
body of his chief ; nearly all the superior officers are either
killed or wounded. But the enemy is also exhausted: in
order to surround the left of the Federals he has pro
longed his line to too great an extent. Colonel Chamber
lain takes advantage of it to charge the enemy in his turn.
The Confederates, surprised by this attack, are repulsed,
leaving behind them more than three hundred wounded
and prisoners. . . .
" Chamberlain has scaled the slopes of the Great Round
Top with a few soldiers and captured a squad of the en
emy which had come to reconnoiter. Fisher's brigade
joins him in occupying this commanding position, thus
closing all access to the Confederates at this point."
" The Civil War in America," by the Comte de Paris,
is generally conceded to be one of the best, if not the best
history yet written. It was written in French, apparently
as a study for military students. It has the merit of being
impartial. Other histories, whether Union or Confeder
ate, almost invariably show a preference for one side or
the other in the conflict. The Comte de Paris and two
other French noblemen, the Prince de Joinville and the
Due de Chartres, came to the United States and tendered
their services to the Government. The Due de Chartres
was a younger brother of the Comte de Paris. They were
grandsons of Louis Philippe. These three served as vol
unteer aides-de-camp on the staff of General McClellan in
1862. The Comte de Paris was the legitimate heir to the
French throne as next in succession in the Bourbon dy
nasty. He was a trained soldier, and gave many years
of careful and painstaking work to this history, but died
before he had finished it. While he was writing our Gov
ernment gave him or his authorized agent every facility

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 31
for inspecting and copying official records and documents.
He had many acquaintances among military men, especially
Union officers, who gladly gave him all the assistance in
their power. (See the Warren letters and the letters to
Captain Farley,1 which will give an idea of his earnest de
sire to ascertain the facts and his method of obtaining in
formation.) The work in French was published in six
volumes, which are consolidated into four volumes in the
English translation. The work ends with the close of the
campaigns of 1863. In view of its importance and gen
eral accuracy I have quoted at greater length from his ac
count of the battle at Little Round Top than I have from
some other writers. With some hesitation I venture to
question a few of his statements which I think are not quite
in accordance with the facts. They are very few, and the
wonder is that, writing on the other side of the Atlantic, he
could have written an account so free from faults. He
has done better than some of our own historians who were
officers of high rank and present in the battle.
He says that Warren, following Meade's instructions,
reached Little Round Top about a quarter to four o'clock,
and by a shot which he ordered Smith's battery to fire into
the woods between Plum Run and the Emmittsburg road,
he discovered a long line of the enemy concealed in those
woods. I think the time of Warren's arrival on Little
Round Top was somewhat earlier. There is a general
agreement among the Confederate authorities that the di
visions of Hood and McLaws were in position by 3 p. m.,
or shortly after, each with four batteries of artillery
massed on its left. At 3 130 p. m. these batteries had
opened a heavy cannonade on the Union line, which was
replied to by the Union batteries between Little Round Top
and the Peach Orchard.
The Comte de Paris says, as quoted above : " Following
in the wake of Sykes, who had just crossed the hill on foot
lPp. 304-306; 307-329 infra.

32 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
with Barnes' division, he [Warren] had found him near
the wheat-field completing the reconnaissance of which we
have spoken. The commander of the Fifth corps had
immediately ordered Colonel Vincent, who was in com
mand of Barnes' Third brigade, to proceed to occupy the
foot of Little Round Top."
This statement is . incredible in some respects; part of
it has been repeated by another writer, who says that Sykes
and Barnes preceded on foot Barnes' division. No pri
vate soldier in the Fifth corps, knowing the distances that
Sykes and Barnes had to traverse that day, would believe
that they went about on foot. My own recollection is
that both were well mounted and accompanied by the
mounted officers of their respective staffs and a number of
mounted orderlies. A corps or division commander in the
immediate presence of the enemy, wishing to get a better
view, might temporarily dismount to be less conspicuous;
but he could not properly handle his corps or division by
going about on foot. This erroneous statement is trace
able to one of the few incorrect translations of the French
edition of Comte de Paris' book. The original reads that
Sykes had just crossed " au pied de la colline," meaning
the foot of the hill, referring to the ridge extending north
from Little Round Top.
I believe that Warren did not leave the hill after he
reached the signal station until he went down and detached
O'Rorke's regiment. (See Warren's letters and Sykes'
letter to Captain Farley.1) Warren had with him that day
three lieutenants of engineers serving on his staff, Mac
kenzie, Reese, and Roebling, also some mounted orderlies.
Meade sent Warren to Little Round Top to observe the battle
from that elevation and keep him, Meade, informed of its
progress. Warren used these officers of his staff to keep in
touch with Meade and take such measures as in his judg
ment seemed necessary. He sent Mackenzie to Sickles and
1 Pp. 300-306; 307-329-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 33
Sykes asking for troops to be sent to Little Round Top, ex
plaining the necessity. Sickles refused, but Sykes promised
a brigade. (See Mackenzie's letter to Meade, March, 1864,
p. 292.)
I believe that neither Sykes nor Barnes detached Vin
cent's brigade and directed it to take position on the foot
of Little Round Top. I find no evidence that Sykes saw
the position where Vincent's brigade fought, at any time
during the battle. What actually happened in this con
nection I relate in my own statement.
The Comte de Paris' narration then continues : " Warren,
going in advance of them [Vincent's brigade] , had reached
his post of observation to witness the first attack of Law
against the four regiments which alone are defending
the gorge of Plum Run. One moment later the bulk of
these troops are falling back upon the flank of the Devil's
Den hill, while a party of sharpshooters was trying to
find shelter among the rocks scattered along the western
flank of Little Round Top. The Confederates were hasten
ing in pursuit of them; their projectiles already reached
the elevated post whence Warren was watching this ex
citing scene. He could not, however, see Vincent's brigade,
which, encompassing the hill at the west, had disappeared
in the woods."
This implies that Warren did not wait to conduct Vin
cent to his position on the south foot of Little Round Top,
but returned to his place at the signal station. I think, as
previously stated, that Warren had not left the hill. If,
by the first attack of Law on the four regiments (Ward's
brigade) defending the gorge of Plum Run is meant Law's
brigade, it is a mistake. The Comte de Paris seems to
have thought, as appears later in his account, that Hood
was still in command of his division; but Hood was
wounded near his batteries during the cannonading which
preceded the advance of the infantry, and was carried off

34 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
the field, leaving Law, the senior brigade commander, in
command of the four brigades of Hood's division. No
regiment of Law's brigade, with the possible exception of
the Forty-fourth Alabama, took part in this attack on
Ward. Ward's brigade was not driven back in a moment,
but held its position for nearly an hour. The first attack
on Ward was made by the First Texas and Third Ar
kansas of Robertson's brigade. They were not strong
enough to drive back Ward's men. They were soon joined
by Benning's Georgia brigade, and later by Anderson's
Georgia brigade, on the left of Robertson and Benning.
The Fourth and Fifth Texas of Robertson's brigade went
with Law's regiments up the swale on the north side of
Big Round Top to attack Vincent. They did not rejoin
the other regiments of Robertson's brigade until night,
when the brigade was reassembled near the western foot
of Big Round Top. (See Confederate official reports.)
The statement that Warren could not see Vincent's bri
gade " which, encompassing the hill on the west, disap
peared in the woods," is a surprising error. If Vincent
had tried to reach his position by passing along the west
front of Little Round Top, he would have been in full
view from Warren's post at the signal station; but would
have been stopped by the Confederates then swarming
around Devil's Den. This is the statement of the English
translation; but examining the original French, I find that
it reads encompassing the hill " a Vest," meaning on the
east. This is in accordance with the facts. (See War
ren's letters.1) Vincent's brigade reached its position with
out serious interference from the enemy. A few shells burst
near the column as it crossed the Plum Run valley. It
passed the northern end of Little Round Top, then, turning
to the right, made its way through the woods along the
eastern slope until it passed the high rock, and was formed
on the lower ground between the two Round Tops. The
1 Pp. 307-329'

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 35
brigade was all in position there and had thrown out
skirmishers toward the southeast and the west before a
single Confederate made his appearance.
Comte de Paris continues : " During this time, Vincent,
hastening the pace of his soldiers, has reached the south
ern extremity of this same hill. On this side it is not so
steep as on the other sides, being prolonged by a ridge
which about halfway presents a horizontal stretch of nearly
one hundred yards in length, descending thence by gentle
gradations as far as the foot of the large Round Top.
This ridge affords an excellent position to Vincent for
barring the passage to Law's soldiers, who are rapidly ad
vancing in his direction."
I think that " during this time " refers to the time in
which Warren was watching the fight at the Devil's Den
and not to the time which Vincent took in reaching his
position after leaving Barnes' division. Some have
thought that Warren, as soon as he returned to the hill
and saw the probability of Confederate success in driving
Ward back, — thus opening a way for the enemy to reach
the summit of the hill, — also saw Weed's brigade ap
proaching, and rode to meet it to secure reinforcements
for this part of the hill. Vincent had been fighting in his
position at least half an hour before the Confederates
drove Ward back and opened the way for their advance
to the summit. After Vincent left the division, Sykes
spent some time in posting the other two brigades in the
position which he had selected for them, and then rode
back to the vicinity of Rock Creek to bring up the other
two divisions of the corps. On the way he met Weed's
brigade, and ordered Weed to place it on Little Round Top.
It must have been at least half an hour after Vincent
got into position before Weed's brigade arrived where
Warren could see them. During this half hour Vincent
had been fighting Law's brigade and the Fourth and Fifth

36 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Texas regiments. These troops did not abandon their at
tempt to break the center of Vincent's brigade without a
desperate struggle. They did not make the movement to
turn Vincent's right flank until their assaults on the center
seemed hopeless. So long as Ward held his position at
the Devil's Den they could not have made this flank move
ment by the Plum Run valley; but when Ward was driven
back the way was open and they took advantage of it.
Then, Warren, seeing the danger, left the hill for the first
time and, detaching O'Rorke's regiment from Weed's bri
gade, sent his aide — Lieutenant Roebling — to conduct it
to the crest of the hill, where it arrived just in time to drive
back the Confederates. Warren did not return to the hill,
but rode away to meet General Meade. (For Sykes'
movement see his official report.)
Narrative continues: "Hood, after being for sometime
held stationary by the difficulty of keeping his soldiers in
the ranks under the fire of a Federal battery posted at the
bottom of the gorge, has at last reached the foot of Lit
tle Round Top, which he points out to them as a prey
thenceforth easily captured." Later, in speaking of the
losses at this point, the relation says : " The losses of the
Confederates are also heavy; the most serious one is that
of Hood, who, being always at the post of danger, has
been badly wounded in the arm."
Neither Law nor Hood made any official report of his
part in the battle of Gettysburg. Several years after the
battle Law explains why, in a paper contributed to the
Century Magazine, and published in " Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War." There is no evidence that Hood was
present with his division at any time after the infantry ad
vanced to the attack. He was wounded by a shell while
near the batteries of his division soon after the artillery
opened fire, and was carried from the field. Law, as senior
brigade commander, assumed command of the division,

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 37
leaving the command of the brigade to Colonel Sheffield, of
the Forty-eighth Alabama. Sheffield's official report men
tions the fact, but has nothing to say of what he did as
brigade commander, confining his statement to the action
of his own regiment. ( See Law's paper, quoted elsewhere,1
and Hood's letter to Longstreet, quoted in Oates' book,
" The War Between the Union and the Confederacy." 2)
The statement that Law brought back his soldiers for a
second assault on the One Hundred and Fortieth New
York, and that Vincent assumed command of the whole
line, is incorrect. The Confederates who made the flank
movement against the right of the Sixteenth Michigan, and
succeeded in driving back the greater part of three com
panies on the right of this regiment, with the regimental
colors, were right among the Union men. Vincent fell
while endeavoring to rally the men of the Sixteenth. Just
at this moment O'Rorke with his men came over the
crest of the hill and, charging down the hill, drove back
the enemy, capturing some and killing and wounding many
others. They formed on the right of the remainder of
the Michigan regiment, and remained there, sheltering
themselves as well as they could among the rocks on the
western slope, and no further advance was made by the
Confederates against this position. Weed did not arrive
with the other regiments of his brigade until some time
after Vincent fell, and after the Confederate assault had
been repulsed.
In this account too little credit is given to O'Rorke and
his regiment. Vincent had fallen, and the Confederates,
who had been baffled in all their previous attempts to
break his line, had succeeded at last in driving in the right
flank. Those of the enemy who had already entered our
line were followed closely by a crowd of their comrades
swarming up the hill. Nothing could have stopped them
from doubling up our broken line except the timely ar-
** Pp. 114-123. 2 Pp. 77-iio-

38 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
rival of O'Rorke and his men. It was a hand-to-hand con
flict, but the Confederates were forced to yield. It lasted
only a short time, but in that time more than a hundred
men of the One Hundred and Fortieth had fallen. This
regiment alone bore the brunt of the attack. Their gal
lant young colonel was instantly killed, within a few feet
of where Vincent lay. The other regiments of Weed's
brigade did not arrive until the close fighting at that point
was finished. The losses of these three regiments com
bined were much less than those of the One Hundred and
Fortieth alone.
General Francis A. Walker : " History of the Second
Army Corps," pp. 277-278
" The position of Little Round Top, not less important
upon the left than Cemetery Hill upon the center, or Culp's
Hill upon the right, had been strangely neglected ever since
Geary, sent thither by Hancock upon his first arrival on
the field, had been withdrawn to join the Twelfth corps
at Culp's. The vast extension involved in Sickles' advance
had left no troops available to occupy the hill, and thou
sands of Confederates, fierce and eager, were advancing
to seize it while defended solely by a signal officer and his
two assistants. No, not by these alone. One other was
there — a slender, graceful young officer of engineers,
Warren, who had climbed the slope to scan the western
horizon, where his prescient mind had descried the signs
of danger. Perceiving the yet distant approach of Law's
brigade, Warren commands the signal officers to continue
their work to the last moment, in order to create the im
pression that the hill is occupied, and darting northward
seeks some casual force that may anticipate the fatal occu
pation of Little Round Top by the enemy.
" It is the head of the column of the Fifth corps which

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 39
he meets, hastening to the support of De Trobriand. He
takes the responsibility of detaching the foremost troops,
and hurries them forward to anticipate the arrival of the
Confederate line of battle. There is not a minute to spare.
The opposing forces meet on the crest; the contest is close,
fierce, and deadly. The rocky slopes and narrow wooded
passes resound with infernal clamor. Vincent falls at the
head of his men. Weed also is struck down with a mor
tal wound, and as Hazlett bends over him to catch the last
message, he, too, is thrown lifeless upon the body of his
friend. But our line is now complete, and the valor of the
men of Maine, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania
has made it secure. Well did General Abbott say that but
for the wonderful coup d'oeil of Warren and his prompt
acceptance of responsibility the name of Gettysburg might
only have been known in history as that of the place where
the Union cause made its grave."
One wonders where General Walker obtained this in
formation about Warren detaching Vincent's brigade. He
certainly did not get it from Warren. His opportunities
for learning the facts about the Second corps were ample,
and his history of that corps is an admirable book. But
Warren's statements in his own letters show that for
once Walker was mistaken.
General Henry J. Hunt : " Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War," Vol. hi, pp. 307-309
" As soon as Longstreet's attack commenced, General
Warren was sent by General Meade to see to the condition
of the extreme left. The duty could not have been in
trusted to better hands. Passing along the lines, he found
Little Round Top, the key of the position, unoccupied ex
cept by a signal station. The enemy at the time lay con
cealed, awaiting the signal for assault, when a shot fired

40 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
in their direction caused a sudden movement on their part
which, by the gleam of reflected sunlight from their bay
onets, revealed their long lines outflanking the position.
Fully comprehending the imminent danger, Warren sent to
General Meade for a division. The enemy was already
advancing when, noticing the approach of the Fifth corps,
Warren rode to meet it, caused Weed's and Vincent's bri
gades and Hazlett's battery to be detached from the latter,
and hurried them to the summit. The passage of the six
guns through the roadless woods and amongst the rocks
was marvelous. Under ordinary circumstances .it would
have been considered an impossible feat, but the eagerness
of the men to get into action with their comrades of the
infantry, and the skillful driving, brought them without
delay to the very summit, where they went immediately
into battle. They were barely in time, for the enemy were
also climbing the hill. A close and bloody hand-to-hand
struggle ensued, which left both Round Tops in our
possession. Weed and Hazlett were killed, and Vincent
was mortally wounded — all young men of great promise.
Weed had served with much distinction as an artillerist in
the Peninsular, Second Bull Run, and Antietam campaigns,
had become chief of artillery of his army corps, and at
Chancellorsville showed such special aptitude and fitness
for large artillery commands that he was immediately pro
moted from captain to brigadier-general and transferred to
the infantry. Hazlett was killed whilst bending over his
former chief to receive his last message. Lieutenant Rit-
tenhouse efficiently commanded the battery during the re
mainder of the battle."
One would infer from the order of the names that
Weed's brigade came first, followed by Vincent, and that
Warren detached or caused to be detached both brigades
and hurried them to the summit of Round Top with Haz-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 41
left's battery. This is a mistake. Vincent's brigade did
not go to the summit, and Weed's brigade, except the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York, did not reach there until
the infantry fighting was finished, except the desultory,
long-distance firing of the sharpshooters.
General Hunt was chief of artillery, and his statements
about the batteries are made with authority ; but he had no
direct connection with the movements of the infantry.
General Regis De Trobriand : " Four Years With
the Army of the Potomac," pp. 501-502
" When the enemy had turned Ward's left, that was
but the first step towards getting possession of Little Round
Top. He pushed his forces on rapidly from that point,
and began to climb the steep hill with so much the greater
impunity that the summit had not as yet been occupied by
us except by a squad of the signal service. Fortune willed,
at that moment, that Warren, chief engineer on the staff,
should arrive on this point, whence the view embraced the
attack in its whole extent. A glance told him the im
minence of the danger, and he ran to Barnes' division of
the Fifth corps, on its way to reinforce us. He took upon
himself to detach from it a brigade commanded by Colonel
Vincent, and to hurry it, on the run, to the summit of Lit
tle Round Top, which Hood's Texans were also endeavor
ing to reach from the other side.
" Both of the parties arrived at the crest at nearly the
same time. They both understood the vital importance of
the position. So, without stopping to fire, they rushed upon
each other with the bayonet. In that hand-to-hand con
test, with equal courage, the solid muscles of the North
prevailed over the hot blood of the South. Our men were
victorious, and the position was saved; not without, how
ever, a continuation of a deadly fire from the assailants

42 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
against General Weed's brigade, which had joined that of
Colonel Vincent, and on Hazlett's battery, which the men
had succeeded, with unheard-of efforts, in dragging up to
the top, through woods and over rocks. Finally, a bay
onet charge of the Twentieth Maine, under the lead of
Colonel Chamberlain, swept the ground of the enemy.
The possession of Little Round Top cost us dearly. Weed,
Vincent, and Hazlett paid their lives for it. And how
many more! "
This is another example of erroneous statements by a
writer who was not present. Warren arrived at the sig
nal station some time before any attack was made on Ward.
The first attack on Little Round Top was made on Vin
cent's brigade, which was not on the summit, but was
posted on the southern slope in front of Big Round Top.
The attack from the Plum Run Valley was directed
against Vincent's right flank. It was the last of several
assaults on Vincent, and was repulsed by the One Hundred
and Fortieth New York. Warren did not detach Vincent,
and Vincent did not go to the summit.
Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Powell : " The
Fifth Army Corps," pp. 517-531
" Soon after 6 a. m., July 2, General Meade directed
his son and aide, Captain George Meade, to ride down to
General Sickles, explain where headquarters of the army
were located, find out if his troops were in position, and
ask if he had anything to report. Captain Meade, return
ing, reported that his mission had been made known to
General Sickles, who was resting in his tent, by Captain
Randolph, chief of artillery, Third Army Corps, who had
brought in reply the statement that his troops were not yet
in position, and that he was in some doubt as to where he

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 43
was to go. General Meade directed his son to ride back
to General Sickles as quickly as possible and urge on him
the necessity of getting his troops in position immediately.
Captain Meade returned at once to Third corps headquar
ters, where he found the tent previously occupied by Gen
eral Sickles struck, the staff mounted and on duty, and
General Sickles himself about to mount. In reply to Gen
eral Meade's message, General Sickles reported that his
troops were then moving and would soon be in position.
General Meade sent no order by his son with regard to the
line to be occupied. It could not have been far from 7
a. m. when Captain Meade found General Sickles prepar

ing to mount.

" In his official report General Geary says :
'At 5 a. m. on the second, having been relieved by the
Third Army Corps, in obedience to orders from Major-Gen
eral Slocum, the division was placed on the right of the
center of the main line of battle east of the turnpike.'
" General Geary afterward explained to General Meade
that, upon receiving notice that he would be relieved by
General Sickles, he sent to him a staff officer instructed to
explain the importance of the position he held, and to ask
that, if troops could not be sent at once to relieve him, at
least a staff officer might be sent to acquaint himself with
the position and be ready to post the troops when they
arrived. He received for answer that ' General Sickles
would attend to it in due time,' and after waiting some time
in vain for either troops or officers, he withdrew, consider
ing himself relieved.
" In his official report General D. B. Birney says :
" ' At 7 a. m., under orders from Major-General Sickles,
I relieved Geary's division and formed a line, resting its
left on the Sugar-Loaf Mountain (Little Round Top),
and the right thrown in a direct line toward the cemetery,
connecting on the right with the Second division of this

44 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
corps. My picket line was in the Emmittsburg road, with
sharpshooters some three hundred yards in advance.'
" General A. A. Humphreys, in his report, says :
" ' At an early hour of the morning my division was
massed in the vicinity of its bivouac, facing the Emmitts
burg road, near the crest of the ridge running from the
cemetery of Gettysburg in a southerly direction to a rug
ged, conical-shaped hill, which I find goes by the name of
Round Top, about two miles from Gettysburg.'
" Manifestly, General Sickles at or about 7 a. m. formed
his line where General Meade, upon reaching the field,
had instructed him to post it. If further proof could be
needed, it is amply furnished by General Sickles' criticisms
of the line. The order, however, was repeated to General
Sickles by General Meade in person, just before noon of
July 2.
" General Humphreys reports :
" ' Shortly after midday I was ordered to form my di
vision in line of battle, my left joining the right of the
First division of the Third corps, Major-General Birney
commanding, and my right resting opposite the left of
General Caldwell's division of the Second corps, which was
massed on the crest near my place of bivouac. The line
I was directed to occupy was near the foot of the westerly
slope of the ridge I have already mentioned.
" ' Shortly after midday ' was shortly after General
Meade had repeated his order to General Sickles, and the
line occupied in disregard of that order was that styled by
General Hunt ' the Plum Run line,' and declared by him
' not an eligible line to occupy.' It was some five hundred
yards in front of the position assigned to the Third corps
by General Meade.
" The Sixth Army Corps reached Gettysburg about 2 p.m.,
July 2. Upon its arrival being reported to him, General
Meade directed the Fifth corps to move at once to the left

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 45
of his line, and the Sixth to occupy the position vacated
by the Fifth. Shortly after 2 p. m. he rode to the left
to await the arrival of the troops. He then found that
General Sickles had advanced his line still farther, taking
a position with his First division in front of Little Round
Top, from the Devil's Den to the peach orchard, and was
about advancing his Second division up to the Emmitts
burg road. Up to this time, with the exception of a recon
naissance sent out at General Hunt's suggestion, just be
fore noon, little more than picket firing had occurred along
the Third corps front; but now the brief discussion of the
situation by the army and corps commanders was inter
rupted by the advance of the Confederate lines in force.
To General Meade's remark that he had moved out too
far, General Sickles had just rejoined : ' Very well, sir,
I'll withdraw then,' when Longstreet's artillery opened.
Saying, ' I wish to God you could, sir, but you see those
people do not intend to let you,' General Meade left him
and rode out upon the line.
" General Sickles then ordered his Second division, Gen
eral A. A. Humphreys commanding, to advance to the
Emmittsburg road. As this movement was commencing,
General Humphreys received an order directly from Gen
eral Meade, instructing him to move his division at once
to Little Round Top. The division was immediately
started by the left flank toward that point, but had only
started when the order was recalled by General Meade;
the troops retraced the steps taken and moved out to the
Emmittsburg road.
"At General Warren's suggestion, General Meade had
previously sent that officer to ascertain the exact condi
tion of affairs upon the extreme left, and beyond doubt it
was his confidence in General Warren, and his knowledge
that the Fifth corps must soon appear upon the ground,
and would be aided by Caldwell's division of the Second

46 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
corps, which he had ordered to report to General Sykes at
Little Round Top, that induced the recall of his order to
General Humphreys, which would have left the right of
the Third corps temporarily unguarded, while securing the
far more important and more imperiled left.
" Attended by Lieutenants W. A. Roebling and Ranald
S. Mackenzie, General Warren reached the summit of Lit
tle Round Top and found it held only by a signal officer
and his assistants. It is an injustice to General Warren
to assert that he discovered Little Round Top to be the
key to the Federal position when he reached the lookout on
its summit on July 2. It is not to be supposed that the
fact escaped his quick eye on July 1, when General Han
cock noted it and took possession. General Geary had
not failed to recognize the importance of the position as
signed to him that night, and General Meade, in ordering
the Third corps into position, relieving Geary's division on
July 2, or in directing the movement of Humphreys' di
vision from the right of the Third corps line to the un
guarded point, had not acted ignorantly. General Hum
phreys was not blind, and General Sykes' dispositions as
the Fifth corps reached the field evince his comprehension
of the evident facts, and even General Sickles admits
knowledge of the importance of the trust he disregarded.
While Warren, standing upon the rocky summit, undoubt
edly realized better than any other officer on the field the
full importance of the position, his notable service lay in
his instant comprehension of how utterly it had been
abandoned, and in his characteristic promptness in secur
ing the dispositions that held it safe. He was the savior,
not the discoverer, of Little Round Top.
" General Warren at once sent Lieutenant Mackenzie
to General Sickles with a request that troops should be
sent to occupy it. General Sickles refused, saying that his
whole command was necessary to defend his front. Gen-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 47
eral Warren sent, by the same messenger, a note to Gen
eral Meade requesting him to send at least a division to
him. But the emergency grew more urgent with every
moment. The whole Confederate line was sweeping from
out the woods in which it had formed, far outflanking the
left of the Third corps line where Smith's battery, in air
and almost unsupported on the rocks of the Devil's Den,
gallantly waited its doom, — and between that left and
Round Top the way to the death of the nation lay invit
ingly open to the confidently advancing enemy. To War
ren's quick eye and clear mind the fate of the Third corps
line was manifest, and at that moment this was the only
eye that saw, the only mind that comprehended, the full
gravity of the situation. But with him to see and know
was to act. Noticing troops moving out the Peach Or
chard road to join in the hopeless struggle in front, bid
ding the signal officer to continue waving his flags in de
fiance, he spurred down the steep hillside.
" In the meantime General Meade had sent orders to
Sykes to send a brigade to report to Sickles. The corps
was then waiting orders on the bank of Pipe Creek. Weed
started promptly, and after going a little distance, he
turned to Colonel O'Rorke and said that he would go on
and find General Sickles, and would leave O'Rorke in com
mand of the brigade. He left all the brigade staff — ex
cept Lieutenant E. N. Warren — and brigade flag with
O'Rorke. Weed and his aide rode forward at a rapid
gait and found General Sickles, and then sent Lieutenant
Warren back to pilot the brigade to him. The lieutenant
rode back rapidly, and when he got to Little Round Top
found the brigade going up the slope. He told O'Rorke
that the brigade was expected to go to General Sickles.
General Warren was there also, and he said he would keep
O'Rorke's regiment.
" General Warren, in descending from Little Round

48 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Top, where he had been scanning the field, having observed
the approach of Weed's brigade, rode straight toward the
head of the column. He called out to O'Rorke, beginning
to speak while some eight or ten rods from him, that he
wanted him to go up there; that the enemy was advancing
unopposed up the opposite side of the hill down which he
had come, and he wanted one regiment to meet him. He
was apparently greatly excited, and spoke in his usually
impulsive style. O'Rorke told him that General Weed
was ahead and expected the brigade to follow him.
' Never mind that,' said General Warren. ' Bring your
regiment up here, and I will take the responsibility.' It
was at this time that Lieutenant Warren put in an appear
ance. " O'Rorke, without hesitation, turned to the left and fol
lowed the officer who had accompanied General Warren,
while Warren himself rode rapidly down the hillside. The
remainder of the brigade started to join General Weed,
under the guidance of Lieutenant Warren. It had gone
but a short distance before General Sykes sent a staff of
ficer to know where the brigade was going. Being told,
' To report to General Sickles,' and although the brigade
was not stopped, the staff officer requested Lieutenant
Warren to go with him to General Weed. They rode as
fast as they could, — the distance was not great, — and he
told General Weed that he would have to return, as no
troops could be spared by General Sykes, and that he
would have to return and rejoin his brigade. General
Weed informed General Sickles of the message and hur
ried back to the troops, and on rejoining was ordered to
double-quick them and hurry to Little Round Top, where
the One Hundred and Fortieth was hotly engaged. Gen
eral Warren had ridden to the head of the column in quest
of General Weed, and, finding that he was still absent,
halted the brigade to await his return. In the meantime

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 49
he had met Hazlett's battery and started it after the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York. Upon Weed's return,
he having received the orders from General Sykes, the bri
gade countermarched and followed the One Hundred and
Fortieth into position.
" Guided by Lieutenant Roebling, O'Rorke had dashed
up the eastern slope of Little Round Top to gain the face
beyond the summit; some of the guns of Hazlett's battery
plunging through his line, as, with horses urged to frantic
efforts and cannoneers aiding at the wheels, it made for
the pinnacle it gained — and holds in history. As they
reached the crest the very jaws of hell yawned before them.
Upon their right the Third corps line was completely out
flanked by Longstreet's impetuous advance, and up the
ravine at their feet in front Hood's brigades were panting
in their effort to gain the vantage ground that would en
able them to add the ignominy of a rout to the disaster of
the day. The One Hundred and Fortieth was moving
right in front, and not a musket was loaded or a bayonet
fixed. The emergency, however, called for action far
more than for tactics or precaution. Springing from his
horse, with a shout, " Down this way, men ! " O'Rorke,
followed by his command, rushed down the rocky slope,
with at least the impetus of a charge. It took such order
as was possible and opened fire upon the enemy. The
firing for a few moments was rapid and deadly on both
sides, and, standing erect and unsheltered to urge on and
encourage his men, O'Rorke, shot through the neck, fell
dead without a word. But the Confederate rush was
checked, and before it could be urged on again Weed had
closed the Ninety-first Pennsylvania upon the One Hun
dred and Fortieth New York, while the One Hundred and
Forty-sixth New York and the One Hundred and Fifty-
fifth Pennsylvania had formed line upon the right of Haz
lett's battery, which now crowned the crest. Then Weed

50 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
and Hazlett fell upon that rocky crest, martyrs to the cause
of the Union.
" Immediately after starting Weed's brigade from where
the corps was lying at Pipe Creek, General Sykes received
General Meade's order to take position upon the left.
Sykes started his corps upon the road, and, accompanied
by General Barnes, commanding the First division, pre
ceded it for the purpose of examining the position he was
to occupy. Discovering the undefended left of the Third
corps line and the inadequacy of the support given to
Smith's battery, he suggested to General Birney to close
his division line upon the battery, while he (Sykes) would
fill the gap which would be made by the movement with
troops from the Fifth corps. Barnes was about being
placed in position when General Warren rode rapidly up to
General Sykes, with whom Barnes was riding, and, point
ing out the position of Round Top, urged the importance
of assistance in that direction. General Sykes yielded to
his urgent request, and General Barnes directed Colonel
Vincent, commanding the Third brigade, to proceed to
that point with his brigade, consisting of the Sixteenth
Michigan, Colonel Vincent; Forty-fourth New York, Col
onel Rice; Eighty-third Pennsylvania, Captain Woodward;
and Twentieth Maine, Colonel Chamberlain. Vincent
moved with great promptness to the post assigned him.
Passing an open field in the hollow ground, in which some
Union batteries were going into position, Vincent reached
the skirt of a piece of woods, in the farther edge of which
there was a heavy musketry fire (O'Rorke's), and when
about to go forward into line Colonel Chamberlain re
ceived from Colonel Vincent orders to move to the left
at the double-quick, taking a farm road crossing Plum
Run, in order to gain a rugged mountain spur, called
Granite Spur, or Little Round Top.
" The enemy's artillery got range of the column as it

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 51
was climbing the spur, and the crashing of the shells among
the rocks and tree-tops made the men move lively along
the crest. One or two shells burst in the ranks. Passing
to the southern slope of Little Round Top, Colonel Vin
cent indicated to Colonel Chamberlain the ground his regi
ment was to occupy, informing him that this was the ex
treme left of the general line, which he was to hold at all
hazards. These were the last words Chamberlain ever
heard from Vincent, as it was only a few moments after
wards the latter met his death.
" The line faced generally toward a more conspicuous
eminence to the southwest, which is known as Sugar Loaf,
or Round Top. Between this and Chamberlain's position
intervened a smooth and thinly wooded hollow. His line
formed, he immediately detached Company B, Captain
Morrill commanding, to extend from the left flank across
this hollow as a line of skirmishers, with directions to act
as occasion might dictate, to prevent a surprise in the
exposed flank and rear.
" The artillery fire on the position had meanwhile been
constant and heavy, but his formation was scarcely com
plete when the artillery was replaced by a vigorous in
fantry assault upon the center of the brigade to Chamber
lain's right. This very soon involved the right of the
Twentieth Maine, and gradually extended along its entire
front. The action was quite sharp and at close quarters.
In the midst of this, an officer from the center informed
Chamberlain that some important movement of the enemy
was going on in his front, beyond that of the line with
which they were engaged. Mounting a large rock, Cham
berlain saw a considerable body of the enemy moving by the
flank in rear of their engaged line and passing from the di
rection of the foot of Great Round Top through the valley
toward the front of his left. The close engagement not per
mitting any change of front, he immediately stretched his

52 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
regiment to the left, by taking intervals, at the same time
refusing his left wing, so that it was nearly at right angles
with his right, thus occupying about twice the extent of
his ordinary front, some of the companies being brought
into single rank when the nature of the ground gave suf
ficient strength or shelter. The officers and men under
stood Chamberlain's wishes so well that this movement
was executed under fire, the right wing keeping up fire
without giving the enemy any occasion to seize or suspect
their advantage. But they were not a moment too soon;
the enemy's flanking column, having gained its desired di
rection, burst upon the left with great demonstration,
where they evidently had expected an unguarded flank.
" A brisk fire was opened at close range, which was so
sudden and effective that the Confederates soon fell back
among the rocks and low trees in the valley, only to burst
forth again with a shout, and rapidly advanced, firing as
they came. They pushed up to within a dozen yards of the
Union line before the terrible effectiveness of its fire com
pelled them to break and take shelter.
" They renewed the assault on the whole front, and for
an hour the fighting was severe. Squads of the enemy
broke through the line in several places, and the fight was
literally hand-to-hand. The edge of the fight rolled back
ward and forward like a wave. The dead and wounded
were now in front and then in rear. Forced from its posi
tion, the regiment desperately recovered it and pushed the
enemy down to the foot of the slope. The intervals of
the struggle were seized to remove the wounded of both
sides, to gather ammunition from the cartridge-boxes of
disabled friend or foe on the field, and even to secure bet
ter muskets than the Enfields, which were found not to
stand service so well. Rude shelters were thrown up of
the loose rocks that covered the ground.
" The Confederates gathered all their energies for a final

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 53
assault. Chamberlain had gotten his thin line into as good
shape as possible, when a strong force emerged from the
scrub-wood in the valley, in two lines in echelon by the
right, and, opening a heavy fire, the first line pressed for
ward as if it meant to sweep everything before it. Fire
was opened on it as well as could be with the scant am
munition snatched from the fallen. It did not seem pos
sible to withstand another shock like the one coming on.
The loss had been severe. One-half of Chamberlain's left
wing had fallen, and a third of the regiment lay just be
hind it dead or badly wounded. At this moment the anx
iety was increased by a great roar of musketry in the rear,
on the. farther or northerly slope of Little Round Top, ap
parently on the flank of Weed's brigade, then on the crest,
in support of Hazlett's battery. The bullets from this at
tack struck in the left rear of the Twentieth Maine, and
it was feared that the enemy had nearly surrounded Little
Round Top, and therefore only a desperate chance was
left for the small force in the valley. Chamberlain's am
munition was soon exhausted. His men were firing their
last shots, and getting ready to club their muskets.
" Chamberlain deemed it imperative to strike before he
was struck by the overwhelming force in a hand-to-hand
fight, which he could not possibly have withstood or sur
vived. At that crisis he ordered the bayonet. The word
was enough. It ran like fire along the line from man to
man, and rose into a shout, with which they sprang for
ward upon the enemy, now not thirty yards distant. Like
greyhounds they bounded over shelter, from rock to rock,
and launched their fury on the advancing foe. It was
veritably 'a forlorn hope.' The effect was surprising;
many of the enemy's first line threw down their arms and
surrendered. An officer fired his pistol at Chamberlain's
head with one hand, while he handed him his sword with
the other. Holding fast by the right and swinging toward

54 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
the left, the Twentieth Maine made an extended right
wheel before which the enemy's second line broke and fell
back, fighting from tree to tree, many being captured, until
the devoted little Union band had swept the valley of the
enemy and cleared the front of nearly the entire brigade.
Four hundred prisoners, including two> field and several
line officers from the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Ala
bama, with some of the Fourth and Fifth Texas, were sent
to the rear, while one hundred and fifty Confederates were
found killed and wounded in the front. These troops
could not be reinforced at the critical period, as Ayres had
been thrown to the front and Crawford was only arriving.
" Historians have exhausted themselves in describing
the actions of the ' Peach Orchard ' and the events of
the third day at Gettysburg. Great stress has been laid
upon the results of Pickett's charge, while famous pictures
have presented that scene to the gaze of the American pub
lic; but the truth of history is, that the little brigade of
Vincent's, with the self-sacrificing valor of the Twentieth
Maine, under the gallant leadership of Joshua L. Cham
berlain, fighting amidst the scrub-oak and rocks in that
vale between the Round Tops on the second of July, 1863,
saved to the Union arms the historic field of Gettysburg.
Had they faltered for one instant — had they not ex
ceeded their actual duty — while the left of the Third corps
was swung in the air half a mile to the right and front of
Little Round Top, there would have been no' grand charge
of Pickett, and ' Gettysburg ' would have been the mau
soleum of departed hopes for the national cause ; for Long-
street would have enveloped Little Round Top, captured
all on its crest from the rear, and held the key of the whole
position. In view of such possibilities, it is no wonder
that General Meade said to General Sickles, ' I wish to
God you could, sir, but you see those people do not intend
to let you,' when that officer desired to withdraw his line."

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 55
Lieutenant-Colonel Powell at the battle of Gettysburg
was a first lieutenant and aide-de-camp on the staff of Gen
eral Romeyn B. Ayres, commanding the Second division
of the Fifth corps. His duty kept him near his chief ex
cept for short absences in conveying orders or reporting
movements. Ayres makes no mention in his official re
port of having been on Little Round Top at any time dur
ing the battle. Sykes had commanded this division pre
vious to June 28, when Meade was assigned to the com
mand of the army and Sykes succeeded him in the com
mand of the corps. Sykes in his official report says that
after posting the two brigades of Barnes' division he re
turned to order up the remainder of the corps from the
vicinity of the Baltimore Pike near the Rock Creek bridge.
On the way he met Weed's brigade, and ordered it to take
position on Little Round Top, then continued on his way
to the brigades of Ayres' division. Having started these,
he returned to the front, found Weed's brigade, which had
not stopped at Little Round Top, moving out to reinforce
Sickles. He ordered it to return to the post which he had
previously assigned to it. Ayres came up with the other
brigades and took position on the ridge north of Little
Round Top. Later these brigades under Ayres went for
ward to a position near the Devil's Den. In all probability
Powell accompanied his chief and had no personal knowl
edge of the fight on Little Round Top. His book was
published in 1896, thirty-three years after the battle.
One would think that an officer of the regular army who
served in one of the divisions which participated in the
battle on and near Little Round Top, to whom the official
records were open, might have been able, in the lapse of a
third of a century, to get nearer the facts. He states that
Weed's brigade was the first organization of the Fifth
corps to leave the corps near Pipe Creek and proceed to
the left under an order to reinforce Sickles. He gets first

56 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
O'Rorke's regiment, then the remainder of Weed's brigade
under Warren's direction posted on Little Round Top and
receiving the Confederate assault on the crest of the hill,
as the beginning of operations on that part of the field.
When this is well started, Warren rides down the hill
again and, intercepting Barnes' division, detaches Vincent's
brigade and hurries it off to the south slope of the hill
where it fought. A perusal of the official report of his
corps commander would have shown him that Barnes' di
vision was the first of the corps to arrive, that Vincent's
brigade had gone to its position on Little Round Top be
fore Sykes posted the First and Second brigades on
Birney's line; that Sykes then rode to the rear and, meet
ing Weed's brigade, ordered it to take position on Little
Round Top, and continued until he met the other two bri
gades of Ayres' division; after starting them to the front
he returned and found Weed's brigade, except the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York, moving out to reinforce
Sickles, recalled it, and finally got it in position on Little
Round Top after all the close fighting was done. (See
Sykes' official report, p. 293 ; Captain Farley's " Number
Nine," p. 125 ; and the Warren letters, p. 307.)
Powell says that Vincent, while en route, reached the
skirt of a piece of woods, in the farther edge of which
there was a heavy musketry fire (O'Rorke's). This in
dicates that Powell supposed that O'Rorke was already en
gaged before Vincent reached his position. The fact is,
that Vincent had been engaged for half an hour before
Warren left the hill and detached O'Rorke. Vincent,
commanding the brigade, was colonel of the Eighty-third
Pennsylvania, not of the Sixteenth Michigan, as stated by
Powell. Vincent's brigade did not move along the crest
of the hill, but through the woods in rear of it. A few
shells burst in the midst of them as they were crossing Plum
Run Valley, but once behind the hill they were screened

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 57
from observation and their line was formed, guns loaded,
and everything ready before they were discovered by the
enemy. Powell speaks twice of Pipe Creek, meaning Rock
Creek ; but this is evidently a slip of the pen, as Pipe Creek
was in Maryland, miles away from Gettysburg.
Notwithstanding the many inaccuracies in this account,
I can forgive him in consideration of his splendid tribute
to the gallantry of Vincent's brigade and its decisive effect
on the result of the battle. I would have made the praise
include O'Rorke and the One Hundred and Fortieth New
York.
J. M. Vanderslice : " Gettysburg Then and
Now," pp. 147-156
• • • In the meantime, Law's brigade, — Fifteenth,
Forty-seventh, Fourth, Forty-fourth, and Forty-eighth
Alabama Infantry, — with the Fourth and Fifth Texas, of
Robertson's brigade, the two latter regiments following
Law by a misunderstanding of orders, moved forward over
as rough ground as was ever passed over by troops, to
seize Round Top, and were, after skirmishing with the Sec
ond United States Sharpshooters, met by the Fourth
Maine, Fortieth New York, and Sixth New Jersey In
fantry, the latter being of Burling's brigade, which had
been hurried into position to oppose them. Though mak
ing brave resistance, these regiments were forced back, and
the position of Round Top and Ward's left endangered.
" During this time, General Warren, chief engineer on
Meade's staff, had ascended Little Round Top, and not
only saw the importance of holding it, but saw the col
umns of the enemy under Law, of Hood's division, ad
vancing to seize it, driving before them the regiments at its
base. He hastened to the road where Ayres' division of

58 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
the Fifth corps was passing to the front, detached the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York Infantry from Weed's
brigade and hurried it up the steep hill.
" Before the One Hundred and Fortieth reached its
position, Vincent's brigade of Barnes' division, which had
been sent to hold Round Top, arrived upon the summit
and went into position upon a ledge just below, the Six
teenth Michigan Infantry on the right, the Forty-fourth
New York and Eighty-third Pennsylvania in the center,
and the Twentieth Maine on the left. Hood's troops were
already charging up the hill, and a desperate encounter
ensued. At last Law, believing he could not force the
front, attempted a flank movement upon the Sixteenth
Michigan with the Forty-eighth and the Forty-fourth Ala
bama Infantry, while the Fourth Alabama, Fifth and
Fourth Texas attacked the Sixteenth Michigan, Forty-
fourth New York, and Eighty-third Pennsylvania in front.
At the same time the Forty-seventh Alabama engaged the
Twentieth Maine farther to the left in front, and the Fif
teenth Alabama endeavored to turn its left. The move
ment upon the flank of the Sixteenth Michigan was prov
ing successful when O'Rorke reached the right of the Six
teenth with his One Hundred and Fortieth New York.
The enemy were within a few feet of the top, and O'Rorke
had no time to form, but charged his regiment down the
opposite slope. Hazlett's Battery D, Fifth United States,
had by great effort scaled the heights and opened upon the
Confederates. " The youthful O'Rorke, who had but two years before
left West Point, was among the killed.
" For nearly an hour the terrible conflict went on upon
the crest of Little Round Top, the fighting continuing des
perate (especially on the front of the Eighty-third Penn
sylvania and the Twentieth Maine), where at times the
enemy broke through, and hand-to-hand encounters oc-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 59
curred. At last a charge of the Twentieth, when its am
munition was exhausted, led by Colonel Chamberlain,
drove the enemy from the hill with a loss of many pris
oners. The balance of Weed's brigade — ¦ Ninety-first
and One Hundred and Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania, and One
Hundred and Forty-sixth New York — had taken position
on Vincent's right, and the rocky summit of the Federal
left was secured, but at the cost of the lives of Generals
Vincent and Weed, Colonel O'Rorke, Lieutenant Hazlett,
and many others. General Vincent was killed while urg
ing on his men. He had just been promoted from the
colonelcy of the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, by which regi
ment, and by his whole brigade, he was greatly beloved,
being a cultured and gallant young officer.
" General Weed was slain at his former battery, Haz
lett's, on the summit of Little Round Top. Seeing his
commander fall, Lieutenant Hazlett hastened to his side.
The general seemed desirous of telling something, and
while Hazlett was bending over him the bullet of a sharp
shooter killed the lieutenant, and he fell upon the body of
his dead comrade. The Confederate General Hood was
also wounded here."
The statement that the five Alabama regiments of Law's
brigade and the Fourth and Fifth Texas of Robertson's
attacked Ward's brigade at the Devil's Den is not corrob
orated by any evidence that I have been able to find.
The Confederate official reports show that all these regi
ments, with the exception of the Forty-fourth Alabama,
went up the swale on the north side of Big Round Top,
two of them going over the top of the mountain, and their
attack was directed against Vincent's brigade and the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York on Little Round Top.
The attack on the Devil's Den was made, according to the
official reports, by the Forty-fourth Alabama, the other two

6o THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
regiments of Robertson's brigade, Benning's and Ander
son's Georgia brigades, all of Hood's division.
Vincent's brigade did not go to the summit of Little
Round Top, but passed behind the ridge its whole length
and to a position on the slope south of it. (See Union
and Confederate official reports, pp. 141-252.)
General Hood was not wounded here. According to his
own statement, he was wounded while standing near the
batteries of his division before the infantry advanced.
He was carried off the field and General Law assumed
command of Hood's division, and retained it during the
battle and until Hood's recovery and return to duty, some
time later. (See Law's paper on the " Struggle for
Round Top " and Hood's letter to Longstreet, quoted in
Oates' book, " The War Between the Union and the Con
federacy.")
J. H. Stine : " History of the Army of the
Potomac," pp. 500-5 12.1
" But another reason other than his concealed move
ment influenced the delay of the attack by Longstreet,
namely, Law's brigade of Hood's division, for which he
was waiting, had not yet arrived. Law arrived a little
before twelve o'clock, and was at once directed to move to
the extreme right of the Confederate line, which was to
sweep up Plum Run. When Law moved to the place as
signed him his right rested at the base of Big Round Top.
1 The reader should understand that in this paper where " Law " is
mentioned the reference is to Hood's division, after Hood was wounded
at the beginning of the artillery battle and before the infantry was
engaged. When Hood was disabled Law assumed command of the
division, leaving the immediate command of his brigade to Colonel
Sheffield, of the Forty-eighth Alabama regiment. Law directed the
early movements of his brigade, including their advance up the valley
to attack the position held by Vincent, but later took charge of
Robertson's, Benning's, and Anderson's brigades. — O. W. N.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 61
Taking a hasty survey of the country around him, he saw
no cavalry occupying the country south of that bold moun
tain and wondered at its absence, and then queried if the
Union soldiers occupied that great natural fortification;
but as none were visible he decided to send a scouting party
up its steep side to discover, if possible, the location and
strength of the Union force there, if any. In a short time
one of them returned to him with the information that
they had ascended to the summit and found that it was not
held by the Federals.
" Law made haste to communicate this important in
formation to Hood, who speedily sent it to Longstreet.
As no attention was paid to it, Law again called Hood's
attention to the fact, and added that he (Law) had cap
tured some Union soldiers, who claimed to be going to the
rear in the direction of Emmittsburg on surgeon's certifi
cates. Law questioned them as to the position of the re
serve hospital and reserve artillery, which they located,
and said a road east of Round Top led there. Again
Longstreet was urged to move farther to the right and at
least occupy Big Round Top, but he sent word to Hood
that Lee's orders were positive to make an attack where
he (Longstreet) had posted the two divisions, and that
they must be obeyed.
" On the receipt of that order from Longstreet, Hood
directed his division to prepare for action and directed
his artillery to open on the Union left at the Devil's Den
and to the right of it. The cannonading did not continue
long before Hood was wounded in the arm, when Law suc
ceeded to the command of the division. Law commanded
an Alabama brigade, composed of the Fourth, Fifteenth,
Forty-fourth, Forty-seventh, and Forty-eighth Alabama.
Colonel Sheffield, of the latter regiment, assumed command
of the brigade when Law was assigned to the division.
On the left of the Alabama brigade was Robertson's Texas

62 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
brigade. This line was supported by the Georgia bri
gades commanded by Benning and G. T. Anderson.
McLaws' line on the left was formed with Kershaw on the
left of Robertson, and Barksdale on Kershaw's left, sup
ported by Semmes and Wofford. Thus the Confederate
line was prepared to advance on Sickles, who was await
ing the assault. Each division had four batteries. Law
says he had twenty guns in action. If this is true, it is
fair to presume that McLaws had twenty, and thus Long-
street opened the battle on the afternoon of the 2d with at
least forty guns.
" Law advanced up the Valley of Death, through which
Plum Run flows, with his brigade on the right, which, in
stead of following in the valley, veered to the right to avoid
the heavy and well-aimed fire of Smith's battery, stationed
on the rocks of Devil's Den. An interval was thus left be
tween that brigade and the right of Robertson's Texas
brigade. Benning's brigade was ordered forward to fill
the interval. At the same time Anderson's brigade was
directed to move to the left of Robertson, and Law hurled
his whole division on the left of Birney's division with
great force.
" Captain Smith had posted four of his guns at Devil's
Den while he left the other section 150 yards in the rear.
The Fourth Maine supported his battery. General Hunt,
chief of artillery, had just ridden along inspecting es
pecially the position of batteries. As he passed Smith,
and saw his cannon on that advanced position, he re
marked that the guns were well posted, but would be dif
ficult to remove in case the enemy forced back our in
fantry. Smith knew it was a desperate fight, and worked
his guns with great effect.
" In the council of war, held about three o'clock, Meade
directed Sykes to Little Round Top, with the Fifth corps.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 63
Longstreet began his attack while it was in session, and
Sickles merely reported, and immediately returned to the
front. When Sykes arrived at the base of Little Round
Top he had been preceded by Warren, for the council had
been speedily closed, and the generals prepared for action.
" When Warren arrived on the summit of Little Round
Top the soldiers of the signal station were rolling up their
flags to retire, as the enemy under Law were pressing so
closely that their lives were already in great danger, and
it was always understood that the signal stations were not
to be exposed to the enemy's fire. Warren directed them
to unfurl their flags and continue their work of signaling
with Meade's headquarters. Seeing Vincent's brigade, of
Barnes' division, of the Fifth corps, approaching, Warren
rode up to Sykes and Barnes and requested that Vincent
be moved on Little Round Top and hold it, as the Alabama
brigade was hurrying up its side from the direction of
Plum Run to take possession of the summit. Vincent's
men seized two guns of Hazlett's battery and dragged
them to the crest, where they were placed in position to
bear on Law near the Devil's Den. . . .
" While the Union forces had been compelled to yield
ground under Ayres and Caldwell, yet Law saw that he
could not get possession of Little Round Top by following
these two generals, as he would have to advance over an
open space where he would be exposed to a fire that would
greatly deplete his ranks before he could arrive where
Ayres and Caldwell were posted, who would then in turn
charge him back over the wheat-field, and perhaps break
his weakened lines. Before the action began, he wanted
to take possession of Big Round Top, but was compelled
to follow up the Valley of Death according to Lee's orders.
He then thought he saw a chance to drive our troops from
Little Round Top by sending a force up the secluded de
pression between the Round Tops, which was only a few

64 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
rods wide and covered with woods, which would shield his
movements ; but again his efforts were foiled, for Vincent
had formed his brigade in a semicircle, with the right of
the Sixteenth Michigan resting not far from Hazlett's
battery; the Forty-fourth New York, on its left, tracing
along the side of the mountain; the Eighty-third Penn
sylvania, on its left, stretching down to the depression be
tween the two mountains ; and the Twentieth Maine, under
Colonel Chamberlain, was on the left of the brigade, and
occupying a position between the two mountains. Law at
tacked vigorously the whole front of Vincent. The
Forty-fourth New York and Eighty-third Pennsylvania
repulsed several assaults; when the Sixteenth Michigan
on the right was attacked a part of that regiment gave
way; but Patrick H. O'Rorke, commanding the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York, at once threw his regi
ment in and saved that point.
" General Weed had been mortally wounded and Lieu
tenant Hazlett, while stooping over him to receive what
he supposed was his last command, was shot and died with
his arms around him. As O'Rorke charged, Vincent was
mortally wounded, and soon Patrick O'Rorke heroically
surrendered up his life. Thus Weed, Vincent, O'Rorke,
and Hazlett lay near each other, silent in death, on Little
Round Top. The battle still waged with great ferocity,
for as yet the enemy had not given up the hope of carrying
Little Round Top, the key to the situation. Failing in the
effort to break through the right and capture Hazlett's
guns, and possess the summit, Law moved his troops back
and again attacked the center and the left. While the as
sault on Vincent's center was made with great determina
tion, the left, under Chamberlain, was assailed with des
peration. " Vincent having fallen mortally wounded, Colonel

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 65
James C. Rice, of the Forty-fourth New York, assumed
command of the brigade. Of the last attack he says:
Now occurred the most critical time of the action.
For above half an hour the struggle was desperate. At
length the enemy pressed so strongly upon the left flank of
Colonel Chamberlain's regiment that he wisely determined
to change the order of battle, and commanded his left
wing to fall back at right angles to his right. He then
ordered a charge, and repulsed the enemy at every point.'
" General Crawford having arrived with two brigades
of the Pennsylvania Reserves, Fisher's brigade was
directed to support Vincent's brigade on Round Top, and
was posted in the rear. At dusk Colonels Rice, Chamber
lain, and Fisher held a consultation and decided that it
would be unwise to permit the enemy to hold the crest
of Big Round Top, as it would be fortified during the
night and would compel Little Round Top to be evacuated
in the morning, if artillery were posted on it. It was
therefore decided that Fisher, with two of his regiments,
and Chamberlain, with his regiment, should charge up the
mountain at once and dislodge Law's force there. Ac-'
cordingly these two officers, with the Twentieth Maine and
Fifth and Twelfth Pennsylvania Reserves, ascended the
mountain and drove the enemy before them, capturing
some thirty prisoners, including one of General Law's
staff. Chamberlain in the darkness was unable to tell
whether he was near a heavy body of the enemy or not,
and sent back for the Eighty-third Pennsylvania and
Forty-fourth New York. Fisher had moved to the right
of Chamberlain and occupied a position on the side of Big
Round Top, but in the night sent two regiments to Cham
berlain's left. Thus ended the conflict on the Round Tops,
leaving both in possession of the Union troops, but which
had cost so many precious lives."

66 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
This is an interesting account, but differs in some re
spects from all the others. There are some statements
not corroborated by any evidence which I have been able
to find, either in official reports or elsewhere. Stine ig
nores the fact made clear by Robertson's report, that two
of his regiments, the Fourth and Fifth Texas, became
separated from the other two on their left and did not at
tack the Devil's Den, but went up the swale with Law's
brigade to attack Vincent. He states that Warren ar
rived on Little Round Top at the time when the enemy's
infantry was attacking Ward's brigade at the Devil's Den.
Warren arrived before any advance of the Confederate in
fantry was made. He directed Smith's battery at the
Devil's Den to fire a shot into the woods to the south, be
tween Plum Run and the Emmittsburg road, and dis
covered a long line of the enemy's infantry there. The
Confederate batteries had not yet opened fire on Birney's
line. Warren did not go to Sykes and Barnes to ask for
Vincent's brigade. Vincent did not assist in getting Haz
lett's guns up the hill. Warren says that he, with some
stragglers from the Third corps, assisted in getting up the
first two of Hazlett's guns. The other two sections came
up later, breaking through the column of the One Hun
dred and Fortieth New York. The reader should bear in
mind the distinction between Law as brigade commander
and division commander. Law assumed command of the
division before the infantry became engaged. I find no
record that he gave any orders to his own brigade after
starting it up the swale on the north side of Big Round
Top. He was fully occupied in directing the attack
against Birney's line. The reports of regimental com
manders making the attack on Little Round Top contain
no mention of receiving any orders from Law or Shef
field. The statement about the action of Fisher and his
brigade will be noticed in another place.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 67
Captain R. K. Beecham : " Gettysburg, The Pivotal
Battle of the Civil War."
" The Third corps, commanded by General Sickles,
2,000 strong, also arrived on the field at an early hour in
the morning. This gave Meade a force of 46,000 men all
fxild, to meet Lee's army, very early on the morning of
July 2. Thus it appeared that General Meade had em
ployed the night to great advantage, and had made every
effort in his power to unite his army so that he might in
his first battle meet his great antagonist on somewhere near
equal terms. Still the Fifth corps, commanded by General
Sykes, 12,500 strong, and the Sixth corps, commanded by
General Sedgwick, 15,500 (28,000 in all, or more than
one-third of Meade's whole army), were many weary miles
away." (P. 137.)
" General Meade was extremely cautious, too cautious
to be apt to win a great victory like the capture or an
nihilation of the army opposed to him, and in this instance
he had every reason to be cautious, from the fact that a
third of his army was still far away from the field.
Meade reasoned that as Lee had marched his army far
from his base, and had actually carried the war into a lo
cality unknown to him, it would be the proper thing to en
courage him to fight a truly offensive battle on grounds
of Meade's own choosing; and certainly he did not wish to
assume a position, if he could possibly avoid it, that would
occasion the renewal of the contest before the arrival of
the Fifth and Sixth corps. The longer Lee delayed his
attack, assuming that he would certainly attack Meade's
chosen position, the more advantageous the situation be
came. " By extending Hancock's line southward along Ceme
tery Ridge to Round Top, Meade would have a strong,
compact position, with his left absolutely secure. The

68 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Fifth corps was approaching the field by the Taneytown
Road, and would arrive in the exact locality to reinforce
readily any part of his west front, as the Taneytown Roac
runs the whole length of Cemetery Ridge and only three :
or four hundred yards in rear of the crest. Sickles' corps
nearly 12,000 strong, was ample to form an invincible bat
tle-line from Hancock's left to that impregnable bastion tq>
the southward.
" Because of the absence of the Fifth and Sixth corps^
but for no other reason, was Meade justified in placing his
army in such a purely defensive position; for, to abandon
the Emmittsburg Road to Longstreet was in itself a vic
tory for Lee." (P. 144.)
" But the Fifth and Sixth corps were not there, and the
preparation for battle was obliged to go on without them.
Therefore, in the absence of twenty-eight thousand in
fantry and artillery, and until they should arrive, it may
have been good generalship on Meade's part to assume the
strongest defensive position possible and maneuver to de
lay rather than facilitate and invite attack. Meade's idea
was to watch the enemy, and retreat hastily if he started
to move away from his front. Sickles' idea was to shove
his lines into the enemy's teeth." (P. 148.)
" At twenty minutes past six o'clock the situation of
the Union army was desperate. If Lee did not support
Longstreet with reinforcements from his center and left,
as Longstreet complained bitterly that he did not, what
can be said of Meade? What did the commander-in-chief
of the Union army do to relieve the tension? If it is true
that Lee was asleep, or had forgotten his ' old war horse,'
as he sometimes called Longstreet, in the stress of the
mightiest effort of his life, is it not also true that Meade
came very near forgetting Hancock in his desperate strug
gle to maintain his position? To the right of Hancock's
line many batteries, and three divisions, or seven brigades

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 69
of Union infantry defended the west front of Ceme
tery Hill; and two of those brigades had hardly pulled a
trigger in the battle of the previous day. They were not
under Hancock's command, and Meade did not feel war
ranted in weakening the line by a single regiment, al
though the position was naturally so rugged and strong
jthat a skirmish line could have held it against a line of
battle. At least he did not. It was not Longstreet
against the Army of the Potomac; but up to that moment
and until half an hour later, it was Longstreet's three di
visions, comprising thirteen brigades, against Hancock's
and Birney's three divisions, comprising eleven brigades,
so that the weight of the battalia was with Longstreet.
" But now the time had arrived when it became neces
sary for Meade, the commanding general of the Union
army, to make some movement on the chessboard of war;
for surely and certainly it was the danger hour, not alone
for the Army of the Potomac, but for the American Re
public as well. Since the birth of the nation there was
never an hour fraught with danger more imminent. The
life of the nation was in the balance. Two hours before,
Meade had received a despatch from Sedgwick informing
him that the Sixth corps was on the march and doing its
utmost to reach the field. About the same time a despatch
from Sykes informed him that the Fifth corps was nearer
by several miles than the Sixth ; the men of the Fifth corps
were not made of asbestos, but what humanity could they
would do. It is not recorded of Meade that, as he
watched and waited during those anxious hours, he was
heard to murmur, ' Sykes or night ! ' but more than likely
that prayer was in his heart.
" At twenty minutes past six o'clock the vanguard of
the Fifth corps was not yet in sight, and Meade could
wait no longer for their coming. Then he sent a de
spatch to Slocum that imperiled the right, but did not re-

70 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
lieve the left. It showed Meade's good intentions, how
ever, which were worth something, and if he did more
than mean well, history has failed to make a record of it
The despatch to Slocum called for reinforcements. Sio- ;-
cum sent him Lockwood's brigade of his First division},
but as the call was most urgent, Slocum concluded to take|;
some chances; so, hastily turning his whole line over tcf-
the care of General Greene and his Third brigade of the*
Second division, with instructions to extend a skirmish).
line to replace his line of battle from the crest of Culp's
Hill to Rock Creek, and, if attacked, to hold the whole line
as long as possible, and when the battle became too heavyi
to retire to the crest and hold that citadel forever, Slocum
marched away to the left with the balance of the Twelfth
corps, leaving one brigade — a mere skirmish line — to
hold Culp's Hill and its important slopes against Johnson's
division of four brigades. It was a daring and perilous
movement, one of the mighty risks of war that sometimes
must be taken.
" General G. K. Warren, chief of engineers on General
Meade's staff, may truthfully be called the saviour of Lit
tle Round Top; and for his work that day he earned the
everlasting gratitude of his country; but without a heroic
effort on the part of others, no man could have saved it;
and the key to our left, as Little Round Top certainly
was, would have fallen into the hands of the Confederates.
" Along in the afternoon, when the battle was raging
fiercely to the westward, General Warren rode far down
Cemetery Ridge ascended that knob of boulders, and es
tablished on the summit thereof a signal station. The
eastern and northern faces of Little Round Top, though
steep and rocky, are not nearly so high and difficult of
ascent as the western face from Death Valley. Warren
soon made the discovery that the bold knob on which he
stood was a most important position — not for the Union

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 71
army while it remained unoccupied by the Confederates, as
it then was; but if it were once in their possession and
crowned with their artillery, they could enfilade the entire
length of Cemetery Ridge and take Meade's position in re
verse from Cemetery Hill to Rock Creek. Yet there was
not a Union soldier there to defend it, except Warren and
two or three men of the signal corps. Then, as the after
noon wore away and the battle drew nearer, increasing in
fury around the wheat-field, Warren made the further
discovery that Law had his eye on Little Round Top;
and as he looked he saw a flanking column moving out
from Devil's Den across Plum Run valley, headed directly
for the knob of boulders on which he stood. A message
to signal headquarters at Cemetery Hill could bring no
timely relief, even if a regiment could be spared for that
purpose, as the distance was more than two miles, and
within half an hour the advancing Confederates would be
in possession without firing a gun. But there were de
fenders nearer; at that moment Warren's ears caught the
sound of marching troops, and the vanguard of the Fifth
corps, so anxiously looked for by Meade and Hancock,
appeared on the Taneytown Road not four hundred yards
in rear of the threatened position.
" Never in the history of war was arrival more timely.
The advent of Blucher's army on the field of Waterloo
was not more opportune to the exhausted English than
was Sykes' corps to Warren and the exhausted troops of
Hancock and Birney. A further delay of half an hour
for any cause and Sykes would have found Little Round
Top in Law's possession and Cemetery Ridge occupied by
Longstreet and his Confederates. The Army of the Po
tomac would have been split into two fragments, the Fifth
and Sixth corps out of the battle, and Lee master of the
situation. " Had Longstreet begun his battle two hours earlier, —

72 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
at two rather than at four o'clock, — it would have been
over before Sykes' arrival, and the battle of Gettysburg
would have been counted as the most terrible defeat of the
Union cause. Lee's unaccountable hesitation and unread
iness in the morning; Sickles' daring and defiant salient,
that puzzled Longstreet and delayed his attack; the stub
born resistance and endurance of the Third corps — all
combined to bring a far-reaching victory to the Union
cause at the bloody sunset hour. Warren hurried down
over the rocks to the point where he had left his horse, and
rode in haste to the marching column, detaching Vincent's
brigade of the First division, which he hurried to the sum
mit of Little Round Top just in time to meet Law's bri
gade of Alabamans climbing its western face, and they
drove back the Southern men into the valley. In this
struggle the valiant Vincent was mortally wounded. Til-
ton's and Sweitzer's brigades of Sykes' corps were hur
ried to the front to reinforce the Second and Third corps.
Then out of the former chaos the battle along the eastern
verge of the wheat-field began to assume form and
regularity. The First and Second brigades of the Sec
ond division, and also the Third division of two brigades
of the Fifth corps, followed in support of the main battle,
meeting with a withering fire Longstreet's temporarily vic
torious brigades that had won the wheat-field and were ad
vancing toward the crest of Cemetery Ridge.
" But Law had not yet abandoned his design on Little
Round Top; and Benning's brigade of Georgians having
reinforced the Alabamans, they tried again to carry the
hill of boulders. General Weed, with the Third brigade
of the Second division of the Fifth, was then ordered to
reinforce and hold Little Round Top. Colonel O'Rorke,
with the One Hundred and Fortieth New York Infantry,
was the first to reach the firing line in support of Vincent's
brigade, and a hand-to-hand conflict raged again on the

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 73
slippery rocks and declivities. By order of Weed, Haz
lett's battery (D of the Fifth United States Artillery) was
by hand and with ropes dragged to the summit; but the
Confederate sharpshooters, located behind the boulders of
Devil's Den, picked off the Union artillerymen so rapidly
as to render their guns of little or no service for a time.
General Weed was mortally wounded, and while Hazlett
was leaning over him, receiving his dying message, he also
was hit, and fell dead across Weed's body.
" We have had occasion heretofore to speak of the ex
pert marksmanship of the Confederate soldiers, but on no
field of the war did they exhibit greater skill in that ca
pacity than at this time and place. The rocks of Devil's
Den are certainly five hundred yards, and probably more,
from the summit of Little Round Top; but across the
yawning chasm of Plum Run they made life uncertain for
the Union soldiers who guarded it. The Confederates,
however, had one great advantage over their opponents.
They were shooting upward, and the boulders of Little
Round Top were aglow with the rays of the setting sun.
The Union soldiers stood out against the sky clear and dis
tinct to their eyes, a shining mark for their dexterity;
while the superior quality of their powder must also be
taken into consideration.
" On the other hand, the Union soldiers were looking
downward into an abyss, as it were, with the dazzling sun
shine in their eyes, and the marks at which they directed
their shots indistinct, within the shadow of overhang
ing rocks. Nevertheless, a company or two of Berdan's
sharpshooters were hastily distributed among the rocks
and crevices, and they soon returned the Confederate fire
with satisfactory effect; and as the sun went down be
hind the South mountain, giving to each party of distant
combatants a fair and equal chance, the Union artillery
was brought into play upon their rocky stronghold, with

74 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
the result that, when the battle was over, many a Geor
gian and many an Alabaman was found among the rocks
of Devil's Den who never retreated, not a few bearing
no mark of ball or shell, but killed by the concussion of
shell or solid-shot against the rocks upon which they de
pended for protection.
" So Little Round Top was held and made secure, but
the battle did not cease with the going down of the sun;
for half an hour later it was raging terrifically in Death
Valley and along the wheat-field plateau. The stone walls
and rocky defenses on the east side of the wheat-field were
recaptured, as was also Devil's Den, and held by the Union
forces. At eight o'clock the battle ceased. Longstreet
says : ' While Meade's lines were growing, my men were
dropping; we had no others to call to their aid, and the
weight against us was too heavy to carry. The sun was
down, and with it went down the severe battle.' That
statement is true. During the sunset hour the weight of
battalia was against Longstreet.
" The Fifth corps entered the arena at about seven
o'clock. It comprised eight brigades and numbered twelve
thousand five hundred men; but as the afternoon was ter
ribly hot and the corps had marched steadily and rapidly,
if it went into the battle with twelve thousand men it made
a splendid record. A reinforcement of twelve thousand
fresh soldiers (for although weary enough with marching
and nearly exhausted with excessive heat, they were fresh
in comparison with the men who had been hours in battle)
to a battle-line originally but eighteen thousand strong, and
that had lost thousands, is a great addition to its battle
strength. Thus the Union army, starting in with Sickles'
corps of twelve thousand, was reinforced after the first
hour with six thousand, and again at seven o'clock with
twelve thousand, making its battle strength at the finish
nineteen brigades and thirty thousand men, less the loss

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 75
of the day; while Longstreet made the battle without re
inforcements, but from start to finish with thirteen bri
gades and twenty-six thousand.
" On the whole it was not so very unequal. Longstreet
says : ' My loss was about six thousand ; Meade's between
twelve and fourteen thousand.' It is useless at this point
to discuss the Confederate losses; but Longstreet's esti
mate of the Union losses is greatly exaggerated. As
suming that the Third corps' entire loss of four thousand
one hundred and ninety-eight was sustained on the second
of July, and also the Fifth corps' entire loss of two thou
sand one hundred and eighty-six, to the sum of which we
add half the entire loss of the Second corps, which cannot
be far from a correct estimate, and it brings the aggregate
loss of the Union army on July 2 up to about nine thou
sand, which is more than forty per cent, in excess of Long-
street's loss as he estimates it.
" But whatever the battle losses of the second of July
may have been, it was the decisive battle of the series, and
bloody enough to satisfy any votary of war and carnage.
" It must have been about seven o'clock when the first
shots were fired by Vincent's brigade of the Fifth corps
on Little Round Top. Within a few minutes thereafter
every brigade and every regiment of that twelve thousand
men were in the fire and fury of battle, where they re
mained to the end of the struggle. One hour only, one
hour at the going down of the sun, and until darkness
overshadowed the earth, and yet in that short space of
time the Fifth corps sustained a loss of more than two
thousand men. Was there ever a bloodier sunset hour?
" After dark Meade ordered the withdrawal of his lines
from all points westward to the ridge, extending an un
broken line from Cemetery Hill to Round Top; and
Sickles made no objection, being content to let his * salient '
go with his leg.

76 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
" Before seeking his couch that night, it is said that Lee
on bended knees offered up thanks to God on high for
what Longstreet had so dearly won; and Meade returned
thanks to the same wise Providence for what Longstreet
had failed to win; while the whole Army of the Potomac
thanked God indeed for the timely arrival of the Fifth
corps; and all the people of the United States thanked
Him, and the boys of the Third, Second, and Fifth corps
for their heroic fighting, done all along the line." (Pp.
181-195.) Beecham's "Gettysburg," etc., published in 191 1, is not
worthy of serious consideration. My reason for introduc
ing extracts from it is, that as the latest account of the bat
tle of Gettysburg, it will be read by many readers who
have never seen the earlier accounts, who may accept it
as a truthful history of the battle. It is no more history
than is Victor Hugo's account of the battle of Waterloo.
It may be poetry or romance, but cannot have any stand
ing as a relation of facts, especially in regard to the bat
tle of the second day. It is amazing that a writer who has
access to the official records, and the many valuable books
which have been published on the subject* could have
invented such a tale. He does not hesitate to reveal the
most secret thoughts and purposes of both Meade and
Lee, which are here made known for the first time. He
gives no heed to what these officers have said for them
selves. The Fifth corps came from Hanover. By midnight of
July 1 the advance of the corps halted within two or three
miles of the battlefield. At daylight it was again on the
march, and by seven o'clock in the morning was (with the
exception of two brigades of Crawford's division, which
arrived a little later) in position on the right of the
Twelfth corps. By two o'clock in the afternoon the Sixth

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 77
corps began to arrive by the Baltimore Pike. By Meade's
order it relieved the Fifth corps on the right. Sykes then
massed his corps near the crossing of the Baltimore Pike
over Rock Creek, in rear of the center of the Union line
of battle, where it was in good position to move to any
part of the line which needed reinforcements.
What shall we say of the historian who says that at 6 :2o
p. m. the Fifth and Sixth corps were many weary miles
away, and that at 7 p. m. the head of the Fifth corps began
to arrive by the Taneytown road, and who makes no fur
ther mention of the presence of the Sixth corps on the
field that day? Further comment is unnecessary. If the
reader will compare the extracts which I have quoted with
the official reports and the accounts of other writers, it will
not be difficult to form a correct opinion of the value of
this book as history.
" The War Between the Union and the Confed
eracy," By William C. Oates, Colonel Fifteenth
Alabama Infantry.
" When we arrived Generals Lee and Longstreet were
together on an eminence in our front, on Seminary Ridge,
and appeared to be inspecting with field-glasses the position
of the Federals. We were allowed but a few minutes'
rest, when the divisions of McLaws and Hood were moved
in line by the right flank around to the south of the Fed
eral position. There was a good deal of delay on the
march, which was quite circuitous, for the purpose of
covering the movement from the enemy. Finally Hood
marched across the rear of McLaws and went into line on
the crest of the little ridge across the Emmittsburg road,
with Benning's brigade in rear of his center, constituting a
second line, his battalion of artillery, sixteen pieces, in
position on his left. McLaws then formed his division of

78 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
four brigades in two lines of battle on Hood's left, with
sixteen pieces of artillery in position on McLaws' left.
" This line crossed the Emmittsburg road and was par
tially parallel with it. The extreme right of Hood's line
was considerably in advance and north of that road, and
its right directly opposite to the center of the Great Round
Top Mountain. Law's brigade constituted the right of
Hood's line, and was formed at first in single line, as fol
lows :
" My regiment, the Fifteenth Alabama, in the center, the
Forty-fourth and Forty-eighth Alabama regiments to my
right, and the Forty-seventh and Fourth Alabama regi
ments to my left. Thus formed, about J. 'JO o'clock p. m.1
both battalions of artillery opened fire. The Federals
replied from their guns on and near Little Round Top,
and within a few minutes our line advanced in quick
time under the fire of our guns, through an open field
about three or four hundred yards and then down a gentle
slope for a quarter of a mile, through the open valley of
Plum Run, a small, muddy, meandering stream running
through it near the base of the mountains.2
1 Italics are mine. — O. W. N.
2 The advance was not skillfully made in all respects. Five compa
nies from two of the regiments of the brigade covered its front as
skirmishers. The two from the Forty-eighth on the right were under
the command of a captain, the three front the Forty-seventh likewise
commanded by a captain, and in the advance were soon disconnected
from each other, but all moved directly toward the center, and bore
to the right of the southern front of Great Round Top, and passed
around it to the right on the eastern side. Captain A. O. Dickson,
then first lieutenant of Company A, one of the skirmish companies
of the Forty-eighth regiment, now lives in Brooksville, Blount County,
Alabama, and is an intelligent, reliable man. He says that these com
panies passed entirely around to the northern side of the mountain
without encountering any Union troops, and in this way these com
panies were not in the battle of July 2. Captain J. Q. Burton, of the
Forty-seventh, who lives at Opelika, and is a reliable gentleman, says
that three companies from that regiment went the same way, never
encountered the enemy, and were not in the battle. Had these five

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 79
" Law's brigade was the first to move, but the two regi
ments to my right were dropped back a short distance,
and as we entered the valley the Forty-fourth Alabama
was directed to the left to attack the Devil's Den, and the
Forty-eighth continued as a reserve or second line, which
made the Fifteenth a little in advance and on the extreme
right of Longstreet's column of attack. Benning's — the
Texas — and Anderson's brigades moved in echelon into
the action, so that our division was spread out like the
outer edge of a half-open fan, and as the right drove the
enemy from the base of the mountain each brigade in suc
cession would strike the enemy's line on the flank or quar
tering, so that as we drove them our line would shorten
and hence strengthen; but General Sickles had changed his
line after the first formation, so that Birney's division, with
Ward's brigade on its left at the Devil's Den and extend
ing along a ridge to the Emmittsburg road, was facing us,
instead of the other way, as General Lee thought. Sickles
thus gave us an unexpected and very warm reception. He
companies gone farther and joined my column on the north side of
Great Round Top, I could have captured the ordnance train, and it
would have enabled me, in all probability, to have captured Little
Round Top. The Forty-eighth regiment was ordered across the rear
to the left early in the advance. The attack, instead of being straight
forward, as the skirmishers doubtless believed it would be, was a
left half-wheel, but of which the skirmishers were not informed, so
they went to the right and the line of battle to the left. On such an
occasion a competent field officer should have been in command of
the skirmish line of the brigade and before he begun the advance
have received definite instructions from the brigade commander.
There was no such arrangement on this occasion, and as a consequence
five companies of the brigade were not in the battle.
"No communication as to what was intended to be done was made
tc. the regimental commanders until after the advance began. This
Was a common practice in those days ; but it was wrong. The colonels
Of the regiments about to engage in battle should always be informed
/of what is to be done before the advance begins, and it is the duty
/of the staff officers to see the orders carried out. — Footnote to Oates'
work. p. 207.

80 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
constantly received reinforcements, which made his line
hard to drive.
" Sickles' apprehension of another flank movement
on Lee's part, as at Chancellorsville, was well founded;
but the same man was not there to conduct it as
at that place two months before. To guard against a
similar surprise, Sickles changed his first formation and
placed Birney's fine division, well supported, on his flank
and facing to the rear, which thwarted Lee's plan of attack
made two hours before, which was a masterly piece of
strategy when made. Rapid change of conditions in all
human affairs bring unexpected results. As the most
authentic account of Longstreet's attack and the spirit in
which he made it, I quote from Major-General Hood's
report to him long after the battle, as follows :
" ' General Lee was, seemingly, anxious you should at
tack that morning. He remarked to me, " The enemy is
here, and if we do not whip him, he will whip us." You
thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett's division,
at that time still in the rear, in order to make the attack;
and you said to me, subsequently, whilst we were seated
together near the trunk of a tree: " The General is a lit
tle nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not
wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into
battle with one boot off." '
" ' Thus passed the forenoon of that eventful day, when
in the afternoon, about three o'clock, it was decided to
await no longer Pickett's division, but to proceed to our
extreme right and attack up the Emmittsburg road.
McLaws moved off, and I followed with my division. In
a short time I was ordered to quicken the march of my
troops and to pass to the front of McLaws.
" ' This movement was accomplished by throwing out
an advanced force to tear down fences and clear the way.
The instructions I received were to place my division across

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 81
Ithe Emmittsburg road, form line of battle, and attack.
Before reaching this road, however, I had sent forward
some of my picked Texas scouts to ascertain the position
of the enemy's extreme left flank. They soon reported to
me that it rested upon Round Top Mountain [meaning
Little Round Top] ; that the country was open, and that
I could march through an open woodland pasture around
Round Top [meaning Great Round Top], and assault the
enemy in flank and rear; that their wagon trains were
parked in rear of their lines and were badly exposed to
our attack in that direction. As soon as I arrived upon
the Emmittsburg road I placed one or two batteries in
position and opened fire. A reply from the enemy's guns
soon developed his lines. His left rested on or near Round
Top [meaning Little Round Top] with line bending back
and again forward, forming, as it were, a concave line, as
approached by the Emmittsburg road. A considerable
body of troops was posted in front of their main line, be
tween the Emmittsburg Road and Round Top Mountain.
This force was in line of battle upon an eminence near a
peach orchard. [This was Birney's division of Sickles'
corps. ]
" ' I found that in making the attack according to or
ders, viz., up the Emmittsburg road, I should have first to
encounter and drive off this advanced line of battle; sec
ondly, at the base and along the slope of the mountain, to
confront immense boulders of stone so massed together as
to form narrow openings, which would break our ranks
and cause the men to scatter whilst climbing up the rocky
precipice. " ' I found, moreover, that my division would be ex
posed to a heavy fire from the main line of the enemy
in position on the crest of the high range, of which Round
Top was the extreme left; and, by reason of the concavity
of the enemy's line, that we would be subject to a de-

82 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
structive fire in flank and rear, as well as in front; and.
deemed it almost an impossibility to clamber along thep
boulders up this steep and rugged mountain, and, unden
this number of crossfires, put the enemy to flight. I knevf
that if the feat was accomplished, it must be at a fearful
sacrifice of as brave and gallant soldiers as ever engaged
in battle.
" ' The reconnaissance of my Texas scouts and the de
velopment of the Federal lines were effected in a very
short space of time; in truth, shorter than I have taken to
recall and jot down these facts, although the scenes and
events of that day are as clear to my mind as if the great
battle had been fought yesterday. I was in possession of
these important facts so shortly after reaching the Em
mittsburg road, as ordered, and to urge that you allow me
to turn Round Top, and attack the enemy in flank and rear.
Accordingly I despatched a staff officer, bearing to you my
request to be allowed to make the proposed movement on
account of the above-stated reasons. Your reply was
quickly received : " General Lee's orders are to attack up
the Emmittsburg road." I sent another officer, saying I
feared nothing could be accomplished by such an attack,
and renewed my request to turn Round Top. Again your
answer was, " General Lee's orders are to attack up the
Emmittsburg road." During this interim I had continued
the use of the batteries upon the enemy, and had become
more and more convinced that the Federal line extended to
Round Top, and that I could not reasonably hope to ac
complish much by the attack as ordered. In fact, it
seemed to me that the enemy occupied a position by na
ture so strong, — I may say impregnable, — that, inde
pendently of their flank fire, they could easily repel our attack
by merely throwing and rolling stones down the mountain
side as we approached.
" ' A third time I despatched one of my staff to explain

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 83
fully in regard to the situation and suggest that you had
better come and look for yourself. I selected, in this in
stance, my adjutant-general, Colonel Harry Sellers, whom
you know to be not only an officer of great courage, but
also of marked ability. Colonel Sellers returned with the
same message : " General Lee's orders are to attack up
the Emmittsburg road." Almost simultaneously, Colonel
Fairfax, of your staff, rode up and repeated the above or
ders. " ' After this urgent protest against entering the battle
at Gettysburg according to instructions, which protest is
the first and only one I ever made during my entire mili
tary career, I ordered my line to advance and make the as
sault. " ' As my troops were moving forward you rode up in
person; a brief conversation passed between us, during
which I again expressed the fears above mentioned, and re
gret at not being allowed to attack in flank around Round
Top. You answered to this effect : " We must obey the
orders of General Lee." I then rode forward with my line
under a heavy fire. In about twenty minutes, after reach
ing the peach orchard, I was severely wounded in the arm,
and borne from the field.
" ' With this wound terminated my participation in this
great battle. As I was borne off on a litter to the rear I
could but experience deep distress of mind and heart at the
thought of the inevitable fate of my brave fellow-soldiers,
who formed one of the grandest divisions of that world- '
renowned army; and I shall ever believe had I been per
mitted to turn Round Top Mountain, we would not only
have gained that position, but have been able finally to rout
the enemy.'
" Skirmishers from Law's brigade, who passed around
Great Round Top on its east side, confirm the statement
Qf Hood's scouts, that no Union troops were tliere.

84 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
" General Law rode up to me as we were advancing,
and informed me that I was then on the extreme right of
our line and for me to hug the base of Great Round Top
and go up the valley between the two mountains,1 until I
found the left of the Union line, to turn it and do all
the damage I could, and that Lieutenant-Colonel Bulger
would be instructed to keep the Forty-seventh closed to my
regiment, and if separated from the brigade he would act
under my orders. Just after we crossed Plum Run we
received the first fire from the enemy's infantry. It was
Stoughton's Second Regiment United States Sharpshooters,
posted behind a fence at or near the southern foot of Great
Round Top. They reached that position as we advanced
through the old field. No other troops were there, nor
on that mountain at that time. I did not halt at the first
fire, but looked to the rear for the Forty-eighth Alabama,
and saw it going, under General Law's order, across the
rear of our line to the left, it was said, to reinforce the
Texas brigade, which was hotly engaged. That left no
one in my rear or on my right to meet this foe. They
were in the woods, and I did not know the number of
them. I received the second fire. Lieutenant-Colonel
Feagin and one or two of the men fell. I knew it would
not do to go on and leave that force, I knew not how
strong, in our rear with no troops of ours to take care of
them; so I gave the command to change direction to the
right. The seven companies of the Forty-seventh swung
around with the Fifteenth and kept in line with it. The
other three companies of that regiment were sent forward
as skirmishers before the advance began. The sharp
shooters retreated up the south front of the mountain, pur
sued by my command.
" In places the men had to climb up, catching to the rocks
and bushes and crawling over the boulders in the face of
the fire of the enemy, who kept retreating, taking shelter
1 Italics are mine. — O. W. N,

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 85
and firing down on us from behind the rocks and crags
which covered the side of the mountain thicker than grave
stones in a city cemetery. Fortunately they usually over
shot us. We could see our foe only as they dodged back
from one boulder to another, hence our fire was scattering.
As we advanced up the mountain they .ceased firing about
halfway up, divided, and a battalion went around the
mountain on each side. Those who went up to the right
fired a few shots at my flank. To meet this I deployed
Company A, and moved it by the left flank to protect my
right, and continued my rugged ascent until we reached
the top. Some of my men fainted from heat, exhaustion,
and thirst. I halted and let them lie down and rest a few
minutes. My right lay exactly where the observatory now
stands, and the line extended down the slope westward. I
saw Gettysburg through the foliage of the trees. Saw the
smoke and heard the roar of battle which was then raging
at the Devil's Den, in the peach orchard, up the Emmitts
burg road, and on the west and south of the Little Round
Top. I saw from the highest point of rocks that we were
then on the most commanding elevation in that neighbor
hood. I knew that my men were too much exhausted to
make a good fight without a few minutes' rest.
" To show their condition, I quote from General Long-
street, who says in his book (page 365) :
" ' Law completed his march of twenty-eight miles in
eleven hours, the best marching in either army, to reach
the field of Gettysburg.'
" In addition to this, we had ascended that mountain in
pursuit of the sharpshooters, which but few men at this
day are able to climb without the accouterments, rifles, and
knapsacks carried by those heroic men. Greater heroes
never shouldered muskets than those Alabamans.
" When we formed line of battle before the advance be
gan, a detail was made of two men from each of the eleven

86 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF /
companies of my regiment to take all the canteens to a well
about one hundred yards in our rear and fill them with
cool water before we went into the fight. Before this de
tail could fill the canteens the advance was ordered. It
would have been infinitely better to have waited five min
utes for those twenty-two men and the canteens of water,
but generals never ask a colonel if his regiment is ready
fo move. The order was given and away we went. The
water detail followed with the canteens of water, but when
they got into the woods they missed us, walked right into
the Yankee lines, and were captured, canteens and all. My
men in the ranks, in the intense heat, suffered greatly for
water. The loss of those twenty-two men and lack of
water contributed largely to our failure to take Little
Round Top a few minutes later. About five minutes after
I halted, Captain Terrell, assistant adjutant-general to Gen
eral Law, rode up by the only pathway on the southeast
side of the mountain, and inquired why I had halted. I
told him. He then informed me that General Hood was
wounded, Law was in command of the division, and sent
me his compliments, said for me to press on, turn the
Union left, and capture Little Round Top, if possible, and
to lose no time.
" I then called his attention to my position. A precipice
on the east and north, right at my feet ; a very steep, stony,
and wooded mountain-side on the west. The only ap
proach to it by our enemy, a long wooded slope on the
northwest, where the pathway to the observatory now is.
Within half an hour I could convert it into a Gibraltar that
I could hold against ten times the number of men that I
had, hence in my judgment it should be held and occupied
by artillery as soon as possible, as it was higher than the
other mountain and would command the entire field. Ter
rell replied that probably I was right, but that he had no
authority to change or originate orders, which I very well

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 87
knew; but with his sanction I would have remained at that
point until I could have heard from Law or some superior
in rank. I inquired for Law. Terrell said that as senior
brigadier he was commanding the division, and along the
line to the left. He then repeated that General Law had
sent him to tell me to lose no time, but to press forward
and drive everything before me as far as possible. Gen
eral Meade did not then know the importance of the Round
Tops. He admitted before the Committee of Congress on
the Conduct of the War that it was the key-point to his
position. He soon discovered its importance, and at the
very moment we occupied it he sent couriers to General
Sykes to occupy it with his division as speedily as possible.
I felt confident that Law did not know my position, or he
would not order me from it. I had not seen him or any
other general officer after I received Stoughton's fire, and
did not see any general or staff officer, other than Terrell,
until the morning of July 3 ; and I am confident that no
general and but the one staff officer ascended Great Round
Top. " From an examination of the reports of the generals on
each side and the testimony taken by the joint committee
of Congress, there appears to have been confusion and in
accuracy of statement about Round Top Mountain, and a
failure to discriminate between them. There are two
mountains, Great, or Big Round Top, and Little Round
Top. They are from apex to apex 1,000 yards apart, and
Big Round Top is southeast of Little Round Top and 120
feet higher. Many of the generals in their reports speak
of ' Round Top,' without indicating which. A reader
who is familiar with the field or was in the fight can under
stand pretty well which is referred to, but one unac
quainted with the topography of the field will find some
difficulty in understanding which of these twin mountains
is meant. For the benefit of such, I will say from my

88 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
knowledge of it that Little Round Top is in most cases the
one referred to in reports. Notwithstanding my convic
tion of the importance of holding and occupying Big
Round Top with artillery, which I endeavored to communi
cate to Law through Terrell (he never reached General
Law until near the close of the battle) , I considered it my
duty to obey the order communicated to me by Terrell,
whom I knew to be a trustworthy and gallant officer, but
it was against my judgment to leave that strong position.
It looked to me to be the key-point of the field, as artillery
on it would have commanded the other Round Top and
the Federal line toward Gettysburg as far as it extended
along Cemetery Ridge; but the order was to find and turn
the left of the Union line, and that was on Little Round
Top ; the battle was raging below. I therefore caused both
regiments to face to the left and moved to the left, so as to
avoid the precipice in our front, and then ordered the line
by the right flank forward and passed to the left-oblique
entirely down the northern side of the mountain without
encountering any opposition whatever.
" While descending in rear of Vincent's Spur, in plain
view was the Federal wagon-trains, and less than three
hundred yards distant was an extensive park of Federal
ordnance wagons, which satisfied me that we were then in
their rear. I ordered Captain Shaaf to deploy his Com
pany A, surround and capture the ordnance wagons, have
them driven in under a spur of the mountain, and de
tached his company for the purpose. Advancing rapidly,
without any skirmishers in front, the woods being open
without undergrowth, I saw no enemy until within forty
or fifty steps of an irregular ledge of rocks, a splendid line
of natural breastworks running about parallel with the
front of the Forty-seventh regiment and my four left com
panies, and then sloping back in front of my center and
right at an angle of about thirty-five or forty degrees.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 89
Vincent's brigade, consisting of the Sixteenth Michigan on
the right, Forty-fourth New York, Eighty-third Pennsyl
vania, and Twentieth Maine regiments, reached this posi
tion ten minutes before my arrival, and they piled a few
rocks from boulder to boulder, making the zigzag line
more complete, and were concealed behind it ready to re
ceive us. From behind this ledge, unexpectedly to us,
because concealed, they poured into us the most destruc
tive fire I ever saw. Our line halted, but did not break.
The enemy were formed in line as named from their right
to left. We received the fire of the three left regiments.
As men fell their comrades closed the gap, returning the
fire most spiritedly. I could see through the smoke men
of the Twentieth Maine in front of my right wing run
ning from tree to tree back westward toward the main
body, and I advanced my right, swinging it around, over
lapping and turning their left.
" At the dedication of the monument on Little Round
Top to the Forty-fourth New York regiment on July 3,
1893, in delivering the oration, Captain Nash, describing
the assaults made upon Vincent's brigade, which held that
spur of the mountain during the battle of the afternoon of
July 2, 1863, among other things said:
" ' In the meantime the enemy sent a strong flanking
column to envelop and turn the left of the brigade held by
the Twentieth Maine. Success there opened to him van
tage ground from which to operate on the flank and rear
of our entire army. While his regiment was under a
heavy fire, with great presence of mind Colonel Chamber
lain changed direction of his left wing and took intervals
to the left to meet the new emergency. For an hour the
terrible contest at this point ensued, the edge of the fight
rolling backward and forward like a wave.'
" The flanking column referred to by Captain Nash was
mine.

qo THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
" At the erection of monuments to the Twentieth Maine
regiment on Little Round Top, October 3, 1889, Captain
Howard L. Prince, the historian of that regiment, said in
his oration, among other things, that:
" ' Again and again was this mad rush repeated, each
time to be beaten off by the ever-thinning line that desper
ately clung to its ledge of rock, refusing to yield except
as it involuntarily shrunk for a pace or two at a time from
the storm of lead which swept its front. Colonel Oates
himself advanced close to our line at the head of his men,
and at times the hostile forces were actually at hand-to-
hand distance. Twice the rebels were followed down the
slope so sharply that they were obliged to use ithe bayonet,
and in places small squads of their men in their charges
reached our actual front. The reports of both com
manders are authority for these statements. The front
surged backward and forward like a wave. At times our
dead and wounded were in front of our line, and then by
a superhuman effort our gallant lads would carry the com
bat forward beyond their prostrate forms. Continually
the gray lines crept up by squads under protecting trees
and boulders, and the firing became at closer and closer
range. And even the enemy's line essayed to reach around
the then front of blue that stretched out in places in single
rank and could not go much farther without breaking. So
far had they extended, that their bullets passed beyond and
into the ranks of the other regiments farther up the hill,
and Captain Woodward, commanding the Eighty-third,
sent his adjutant to ask if the Twentieth had been turned.
Colonel Chamberlain assured him that he was holding his
ground, but would like a company, if possible, to extend
his line. Captain Woodward was unable to do this, but
by shortening his line somewhat he was able to cover the
right of the Twentieth and enable it to take a little more
ground to the left. Meanwhile the brigade in front of the

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 91
hill was hard pushed to hold its own, and the heavy roar
of musketry in the fitful lulls of our guns came to the anx
ious ears of our commander and told too plainly what
would be the result if our line gave way. Not a man in
that devoted band but knew that the safety of the bri
gade, and perhaps of the army, depended on the steadfast
ness with which that point was held, and so fought on
and on, with no hope of assistance, but not a thought of
giving up. Already nearly half of the little force is pros
trate. The dead and the wounded clog the footsteps of the
living.' " General Chamberlain, who was colonel of the Twentieth
Maine, afterwards made general for his conduct on that
occasion, and after the war Governor of Maine, in his ad
dress, delivered on the same occasion, said:
" ' All can see what would have become of our brigade
swallowed up; of Weed's struck in the rear; of Hazlett's
guns taken in the flank and turned to launch their thunder
bolts upon our troops, already sore pressed in the gorge at
our feet, and the fields upon the great front and right.
Round Top lost, the day lost, Gettysburg lost, who can tell
what for loss thence would follow ! '
" Captain Prince of the Twentieth Maine, in his ora
tion above referred to, claims that ' fifty dead bodies of the
Fifteenth Alabama men were buried in the front of his
regiment and about one hundred of the badly wounded
were left behind to become prisoners.' His is an over
estimate of the number of the dead from the Fifteenth
Alabama. There were present in the seven companies of
the Forty-seventh, as shown by the muster roll, an aggre
gate of but 154 men. Only four or five of these were
killed and about twenty wounded. If they buried fifty
dead, that included those from the Forty-seventh com
panies with the Fifteenth dead. He was certainly mis
taken as to the number badly wounded, including both regi-

92 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
ments, for several of these, fully one-half, went to the
Confederate rear.
" Prince also said : ' Four hundred prisoners, mostly
from the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama, were sent
to the rear.' This is an egregiously mistaken statement. I
have examined the muster rolls of the companies of the
Fifteenth, made soon after the battle, in which the names
were given of the captured without wounds, and there was
a total of but 84, most of them being with Adjutant Wad
dell when the retreat was ordered, which they did not
hear. If every man in the seven companies of the Forty-
seventh which went into the action (only 154) were in
cluded, it would make but 238, and we know that at least
one hundred and twenty-odd of the Forty-seventh es
caped and were afterwards in line all night. Deduct the
killed and wounded from those companies, and Captain
Prince has but little over half the number of prisoners
which he says were taken from those regiments and sent
to the rear. General Chamberlain fell into the same error.
All of us, on both sides, who were in such hot places as
that were made to see double, and are disposed to exag
gerate in favor of our respective sides, and do it honestly
in most cases.
" If I had had one more regiment we would have com
pletely turned the flank and have won Little Round Top,
which would have forced Meade's whole left wing to re
tire. Had the Forty-eighth Alabama not been transferred
to the left it would have driven the sharpshooters, and then
following my advance we would have gotten in the rear
of the Federal line and have completely turned the tide
of battle in favor of the Confederates. With the five
companies of skirmishers which had gone to the east of
the mountain, they might have made my assault success
ful. Another lost opportunity.
" I knew that the left of the Forty-seventh was disconV
nected, I knew not how far from the right of the FourtH

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 93
Alabama, and consequently was outflanked on its left and
without support. The seven companies of that regiment
present confronted the Eighty-third Pennsylvania and was
enfiladed by the left-oblique fire of the left wing of the
Forty-fourth New York, which was very destructive, and
drove the men from the obstructions behind which they
were sheltering. Lieutenant-Colonel Bulger, in command
of the Forty-seventh Alabama companies, a most gallant
old gentleman over sixty years of age, fell severely
wounded, and soon afterward his seven companies, after
behaving most gallantly, broke, and in confusion retreated
southward toward the position of the other regiments of
the brigade and reached their right.
" I aided their gallant Major Campbell in his efforts to
hold them, but, having no support on the left, they could
not be rallied and held to the position. When the Fif
teenth was driven back, Colonel Bulger was left sitting by
a tree, sword in hand, shot through one lung and bleeding
profusely. A captain in the Forty-fourth New York ap
proached and demanded his sword. The old Colonel said,
' What is your rank? ' The reply was, 'lama captain.'
Bulger said, ' Well, I am a lieutenant-colonel, and I will
not surrender my sword except to an officer of equal rank.'
The captain then said, ' Surrender your sword, or I will
kill you.' Colonel Bulger promptly replied, ' You may
kill and be d  d! I shall never surrender my sword to
an officer of lower rank.' The captain was so amused at
the old colonel's high notions of military etiquette that he
went for his colonel, Rice, to whom the sword was grace
fully surrendered. Rice's statement of the circumstance
caused Colonel Bulger to be better cared for than he would
otherwise have been, which probably saved his life.1
1 General Chamberlain denies this statement, and says that Bulger
surrendered to him. Rice and Bulger are both dead and there is now
no living witness to verify the statement, The writer derived his
information from Colonel Bulger. — Footnote to Oaths' work, p. 217.

94 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
" When exchanged in the summer of 1864 he was pro
moted to the colonelcy of his regiment, went to the front,
and served with it for a short time, and was then honor
ably retired. He was not made a brigadier-general, as re
ported in vol. vii of ' Confederate Military History,' but
returned to his home in Dadeville, Alabama, and was
elected to the State Senate in August, 1864, where he
served until the surrender. He was in the Secession Con
vention in 1 86 1, voted against secession, and refused to
sign the ordinance. But when the war came as a conse
quence, he raised a company and fought heroically through
the struggle. He was unskilled in tactics and lacking in
disciplinary power, but he possessed such a high order of
courage that he was greatly respected by his men, who
stood bravely with him until he fell. He died in 1900,
about ninety-five years of age.
" Just as the Forty-seventh companies were being driven
back, I ordered my regiment to change direction to the
left, swing around, and drive the Federals from the ledge
of rocks, for the purpose of enfilading their line, relieving
the Forty-seventh, gain the enemy's rear, and drive him
from the hill. My men obeyed and advanced about half
way to the enemy's position, but the fire was so destructive
that my line wavered like a man trying to walk against a
strong wind, and then slowly, doggedly, gave back a little;
then with no one upon the left or right of me, my regi
ment exposed, while the enemy was still under cover, to
stand there and die was sheer folly; either to retreat or
advance became a necessity. The Lieutenant-Colonel, I.
B. Feagin, had lost his leg at Plum Run; the heroic Cap
tain Ellison had fallen; while Captain Brainard, one of the
bravest and best officers in the regiment, in leading his
company forward, fell, exclaiming, ' Oh, God ! that I could
see my mother ! ' and instantly expired. Lieutenant John
A- Oates, my dear brother, succeeded to the conimand of

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 95
sthe company, but was pierced through by a number of
bullets, and fell mortally wounded. Lieutenant Cody fell
mortally wounded, Captain Bethune and several other of
ficers were seriously wounded, while the carnage in the
ranks was appalling.
' " I again ordered the advance, and, knowing the officers
and men of that gallant old regiment, I felt sure that they
would follow their commander anywhere in the line of
duty. I passed through the line waving my sword, shout
ing, ' Forward, men, to the ledge! ' and was promptly fol
io ived by the command in splendid style. We drove the
Federals from their strong defensive position; five times
they rallied and charged us, twice coming so near that some
of my men had to use the bayonet, but in vain was their
effort. It was our time now to deal death and destruction
to a gallant foe, and the account was speedily settled. I
led this charge and sprang upon the ledge of rock, using
my pistol within musket length, when the rush of my men
drove the Maine men from the ledge along the line now
indicated by stone markers on the east end of Vincent's
Spur. " I have seen a statement from General Chamberlain
that his right was not forced back beyond the point or angle
of the rocky ledge where the right marker of his regiment
stands. My recollection is quite different. At this angle
and to the southwest of it is where I lost the greatest
number of my men. The Twentieth Maine was driven
back from this ledge, but not farther than to the next
ledge on the mountain-side. I recall a circumstance which
I recollect. I, with my regiment, made a rush forward
from the ledge. About forty steps up the slope there is a
large boulder about midway the Spur. The Maine regi
ment charged my line, coming right up in a hand-to-hand
encounter. My regimental colors were just a step or two
to the right of that boulder, and I was within ten feet. A

96 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Maine man reached to grasp the staff of the colors when/
Ensign Archibald stepped back and Sergeant Pat O'Con/-
nor stove his bayonet through the head of the Yankee^,
who fell dead. I witnessed that incident, which impresseyd
me beyond the point of being forgotten. There nevfer
were harder fighters than the Twentieth Maine men arid
their gallant colonel. His skill and persistency and tie
great bravery of his men saved Little Round Top and
the Army of the Potomac from defeat.
" Great events sometimes turn on comparatively small
affairs. My position rapidly became untenable. The Fed
eral infantry were reported to be coming down on my
right, and certainly were closing in on my rear, while some
dismounted cavalry were closing the only avenue of es
cape on my left rear. I sent my sergeant-major with a
request to Colonel Bowles, of the Fourth Alabama, the
next in line to the left, to come to my relief. He re
turned within a minute and reported that none of our
troops were in sight, the enemy to be between us and the
Fourth Alabama, and swarming in the woods south of
Little Round Top. The lamented Captain Park, who was
afterwards killed at Knoxville, and Captain Hill, killed
near Richmond in 1864, came and informed me that the
enemy were closing in on our rear.
" I sent Park to ascertain their number. He soon re
turned and reported that two regiments were coming up
behind us, and just then I saw them halt behind a fence,
some two hundred yards distant, from which they opened
fire on us. These, I have since learned from him, were
the battalions of Stoughton's sharpshooters, each of which
carried a flag, hence the impression that there were two
regiments. They had been lost in the woods, but, guided
by the firing, came up in our rear. At Balaklava Captain
Nolan's six hundred had cannon to the right of them,
cannon to the left of them, cannon in front of them, which

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG '97
volleyed and thundered. But at this moment the Fif
teenth Alabama had infantry in front of them, to the right
of them, dismounted cavalry to the left of them, and in
fantry in the rear of them. With a withering and deadly
fire pouring in upon us from every direction, it seemed
that the regiment was doomed to destruction. While one
man was shot in the face, his right-hand or left-hand com
rade was shot in the side or back. Some were struck
simultaneously with two or three balls from different di
rections. " Captains Hill and Park suggested that I should order
a retreat; but this seemed impracticable. My dead and
wounded were then nearly as great in number as those still
on duty. They literally covered the ground. The blood
stood in puddles in some places on the rocks; the ground
was soaked with the blood of as brave men as ever fell on
the red field of battle. I still hoped for reinforcements or
for the tide of success to turn my way. It seemed impos
sible to retreat, and I therefore replied to my captains, ' Re
turn to your companies; we will sell out as dearly as pos
sible.' Hill made no reply, but Park smiled pleasantly,
gave me the military salute, and said, ' All right, sir.' On
reflection a few moments later I saw no hope of success,
and did order a retreat, but did not undertake to retire in
order. I sent Sergeant-Ma jor Norris (who is now a phy
sician residing in Brazil) and had the officers and men ad
vised the best I could that when the signal was given that
we would not try to retreat in order, but every one should
run in the direction from whence we came, and halt on
the top of the Big Round Top Mountain. I found the
undertaking to capture Little Round Top too great for my
regiment unsupported. I waited until the next charge of
the Twentieth Maine was repulsed, as it would give my
men a better chance to get out unhurt, and then ordered
the retreat. The historian of that regiment claims that

98 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
its charge drove us from the field. This is not true; I
ordered the retreat.1 He was, I believe, the chaplain, and
not present to see it. Doubtless he was at prayer a safe dis
tance in the rear. Colonel Chamberlain also reported it,
and doubtless believed it; but it was just as I state, I or
dered the retreat.
" When the signal was given we ran like a herd of wild
cattle, right through the line of dismounted cavalrymen.
Some of the men as they ran through seized three of the
cavalrymen by the collars and carried them out prisoners.
As we ran, a man named Keils, of Company H, from
Henry County, who was to my right and rear, had his
throat cut by a bullet, and he ran past me breathing at his
throat and the blood spattering. His windpipe was en
tirely severed, but notwithstanding he crossed the mountain
and died in the field hospital that night or the next morn
ing. " Captain De B. Waddell, who was then adjutant of the
regiment, when we had reached our most advanced posi
tion, about one hundred and fifty yards from the top of
Little Round Top, where the New York monument now
stands, came and asked me to let him take forty or fifty
men from the right wing of the regiment and advance to
some rocks from which to enfilade the Union line, the
Twentieth Maine and Eighty-third Pennsylvania. I au
thorized it, and he had about fifty men behind a ledge of
rocks or ridge of ground, and doing effective work when
I ordered the retreat. The firing was so heavy that he did
not hear the order, but said he saw me and the men near
me start, and knew that it was a retreat. Sergeant-
Major Norris, when communicating to commanders of
companies that I would order a retreat, did not so inform
Waddell. He gave the order and broke to run. He saw
two of his men fall. He escaped, but his men were cap
tured. 1 Italics are Oates'.— O. W. N. ...

LIT1 LE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 99
" When he reached the foot of the mountain he there
met Company A coming out of the woods to the east of
the position from which we had just retreated. This was
the company whose captain I had ordered, as we advanced
down the north side of Great Round Top, to deploy his
company in open order to surround and capture the train
of ordnance wagons. Captain Shaaf claimed that there
were Union troops in the woods east of the wagons and
he feared capture of his company if he attempted to cap
ture the wagons, and desisted in consequence. He should
then have rejoined the regiment at once, but did not. The
troops in the woods were Stoughton's sharpshooters, and
perhaps Morrell's company of the Twentieth Maine.
Waddell caused the company to take a stand a short dis
tance up the mountain-side, where by their fire they checked
and turned back the Maine men who were pursuing my
regiment. When I visited the battlefield after the war, I
could not understand how the trees on that side of Round
Top near its base were scarred on each side by bullets, and
why monuments or markers were set up there, as I thought
no battle occurred there. Afterwards Captain Waddell
(now an Episcopal clergyman at Meridian, Mississippi)
explained it.
" The absence of Company A from the assault on Lit
tle Round Top, the capture of the water detail, and the
number overcome by heat who had fallen out on scaling
the rugged mountain, reduced my regiment to less than
four hundred officers and men who made that assault.
All these facts I did not know when I made my report,
nor when I wrote the article for the Southern Historical
Society papers in 1878, but close investigation since the
war revealed them to me. In the hasty manner of writ
ing my report, I took as a basis of the strength of my regi
ment its last muster before we began the march to Penn
sylvania. I also wrote the article after the war on the

ioo THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE £>F
same basis, which was a mistake. When approaching the
top of the mountain in retreat, I made an attempt to halt
and re-form the regiment; but the men were helping
wounded and disabled comrades, and scattered in the woods
and among the rocks, so that it could not then be done. I
was so overcome by heat and exertion that I fainted and
fell, and would have been captured but for two> stalwart,
powerful men of the regiment, who carried me to the top
of the mountain, where Dr. Reeves, the assistant surgeon,
poured water on my head from a canteen, until it revived
me. I never can forget those two men, for I dreaded a
prison more than death. When I revived I turned over
the command of the regiment to Captain Hill temporarily,
with directions to retire to the open field at the foot of
the mountain on the line of our advance. This was be
tween sunset and dark; the fighting along our line had
pretty well ceased. It had been terrific all along Long-
street's front. His seventeen thousand men had done the
best fighting of any equal number of troops during the
war, but had not accomplished anything in the way of
substantial results.
" Lee's plan for Longstreet's attack was up the Em
mittsburg road, beginning with the right brigade, which
was Law's, where I was. Had General Longstreet been
where the attack began, he would have seen the necessity
of protecting my flank from the assault of United States
sharpshooters. Had that been done, I would, with the six
hundred veterans I had, have reached Little Round Top
before Vincent's brigade did, and would easily have cap
tured that place, which would have won the battle. Or
had he seen the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh regiments
when they reached the top of Great Round Top, and or
dered a battery and another regiment to aid me in holding
that mountain, it would have been held — which Meade
admitted, in his testimony on the conduct of the war, was

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 101
the key to his position. With that in our possession he
could not have held any of the ground which he subse
quently held to the last, for it was the key-point of his
position. Instead of this, General Longstreet was near the
other end of his line, more than a mile away from his
right, and never knew that those regiments passed over
the top of Big Round Top until years after the battle,
when he saw it in print.
" Though he may not have approved Lee's plan, it was
his duty to have loyally and to the best of his ability exe
cuted that plan. Had he done so, I have no doubt of the
success of the attack. General Lee was at fault for fail
ing to have Longstreet's two divisions, then on the field
(except Law's brigade), seize the Round Tops in the fore
noon, when there were no Union troops on them. When
the assault was made at 3 :30 p. m. neither of these moun
tains was occupied in force, but Sickles' corps was ad
vanced beyond and obstructed a direct attack on Little
Round Top. Longstreet was responsible and at fault for
the negligent and bungling manner in which it was done.
The change made in his line by General Sickles, which
was unknown to General Lee, greatly impaired his plan;
but notwithstanding his shrewd change and its tendency to
thwart the plan, yet had Longstreet skillfully and loyally,
instead of sullenly and disapprovingly, executed it, he
would have won the battle. When he found the change
in Sickles' lines — ¦ of which he knew that General Lee was
not aware — he should have adopted General Hood's sug
gestion to turn the flank and attack in the rear; but be
cause Lee had ordered him to attack in a particular way,
he would not change, though he knew that if Lee himself
had been present he would have changed the order of at
tack when he discovered the change in Sickles' line which
made it necessary.
" General Longstreet in his book (p. 408) throws all the

102 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
blame on Lee for not riding with him and personally di
recting his attack, as follows :
" ' We were left to our own resources in finding ground
upon which to organize for battle. The enemy had
changed position somewhat after the march was ordered,
but, as we were not informed of his position before the
march, we could not know of the change. The Confeder
ate commander did not care to ride near us, to give in
formation of a change to assist in preparing for attack,
nor to inquire if new and better combinations might be
made.' " General Lee mistakenly supposed that Longstreet un
derstood the situation, position of the enemy, etc., and
possessed the ability and patriotism sufficient to make that
attack wisely without his presence.
" General Longstreet disapproved the plan of attack be
cause Lee was departing from the policy, declared by him
before he moved from Virginia, of an aggressive defen
sive campaign, which Longstreet approved. He may have
been right; it may have been best for Lee to have flanked
Meade out of his strong position and have forced him to
attack and thus to have acted on the defensive. Lee gave
his reasons why he did not pursue that course, which were
well-nigh conclusive. Longstreet had no right to sulk be
cause of this change of policy. Sulking was disloyalty to
his chief. If his conduct was not half-hearted and will
ful, then the only explanation of it is that he was a failure
as a general, and no one believes that. Hood saw the
necessity, and insisted on a change of the plan of attack,
but because Lee had ordered it, without a knowledge of
Sickles' change of lines, Longstreet obeyed Lee's order
literally, although Hood showed him the necessity of a
change, and by his mulishness lost the greatest battle of
the war. General Law fully concurred in Hood's views.
A supposition that Hood's request would be granted may

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 103
account for Law's skirmishers passing around Big Round
Top to the east and thus missing the battle.
" Early on the morning of the 2d General Meade ex
pected Lee to attack him on his right, and determined to
attack Lee before the latter moved against him. At 9 :30
a. m. he ordered Slocum, who commanded the Twelfth
and Fifth corps, constituting the right wing of the Union
army, to get ready to attack, and that he would give the
signal as soon as the Sixth corps arrived within supporting
distance. Slocum, whom General Sherman afterwards
said was as capable of commanding 80,000 men as he was,
carefully examined the ground in his front, with its un
even surface, woods, hills, and streams, and reported to
Meade adversely and advised against making the attack.
General Meade then surveyed the field with the view of at
tacking by his front, or left, and then summoned his corps
commanders to a conference. Sickles did not come, but
sent word that his corps, on the extreme left, was threat
ened with an attack and that he could not leave. There
upon Meade sent him a peremptory order to attend the
conference at once. Sickles then went, and as he rode up
Longstreet's guns opened upon his line. Meade told him
not to dismount, but return to his command. Meade re
inforced him heavily and saved him from utter rout.
" The assault of Longstreet was the opening of the bat
tle of that day. Slocum's decision and advice were wise.
Had Slocum made that attack it would have been on
Ewell's corps, which would have allowed Longstreet's and
Hill's corps to advance against the Third and Second,
Sickles' and Hancock's corps, which were inferior numeri
cally, and they would have been driven back against
Meade's attacking column, which Ewell could have held at
bay for a time. Lee would have thus gained the advan
tage of position and Meade would inevitably have lost the
battle. Slocum's advice and Sickles' wise disposition of

104 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
his corps saved Meade from dishonor and the Army of the
Potomac from defeat — two New York Union Democrats.
" Inasmuch as General Lee did not have Longstreet
seize the Round Tops in the forenoon, he had better have
awaited the results of that conference; and had it been to
attack him it would have been to his advantage, for, as
Stonewall Jackson said on his deathbed, ' My troops some
times fail to drive the enemy from their position, but theirs
always fail to drive my men from their position.' But of.
course Lee was not aware of that conference.
" The Yankees did not occupy the top of Big Round
Top until after dark. It was dark when my regiment
reached the valley, and here we bivouacked for the night.
After all had gotten up, I ordered the roll of the companies
to be called. When the battle commenced, four hours
previously, mine was the strongest and finest regiment in
Hood's division. Its effectives numbered about five hun
dred officers and men. Now two hundred and twenty-
three enlisted men answered at roll-call, and more than
one-half of the officers had been left on the field, only
nineteen answering to their names ; but some of the of
ficers and men came up in the course of the night and next
morning, who had been overcome by the heat during the
advance the previous evening.
" Some of the men that night voluntarily went back
across the mountain, and in the darkness penetrated the
Federal lines for the purpose of removing some of our
wounded. They reached the scene and started out with
some of the wounded officers, but were discovered and shot
at by the Federal pickets, and had in consequence to leave
the wounded, but succeeded in getting back to the regi
ment, and brought to me Lieutenant Cody's knife and
pocketbook. These men reported to me that Big Round
Top was, even at that late hour, occupied by only a thin
skirmish line. I am sorry that I do not remember the

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 105
names of those brave men who voluntarily went within
the enemy's lines to relieve and save from capture wounded
comrades. " Soon after the advance began the gallant Lieutenant-
Colonel Isaac B. Feagin was shot through the knee, which
necessitated amputation of the limb. The major was vol
untarily with the wagon-train, and consequently I had no
field officer to assist me. I discovered some time before
we reached Gettysburg that my brother, Lieutenant John
A. Oates, had fallen behind some distance, and was re
ported sick. I sent back a horse for him and he came up.
Just before we advanced I went to him where he was ly
ing on the ground in rear of his company, and saw at
once that he was sick. I thereupon told him not to go
into the action, but when we advanced to remain where he
was, because he was unable to bear the fatigue. He re
plied, with the most dogged and fiery determination,
' Brother, I will not do it. If I were to remain here peo
ple would say that I did it through cowardice. No, sir, I
am an officer, and will never disgrace the uniform I wear;
I shall go through, unless I am killed, which I think is
quite likely.' These were the last words ever passed be
tween us. When he fell, struck by several balls, Lieu
tenant Isaac H. Parks, who' had been his schoolfellow, ran
to him and dragged him behind a large stone, and just as
Parks let him down another ball struck one of his hands
and carried away his little finger. Parks was for many
years after the war a prominent lawyer at Rutledge, Cren
shaw County, Alabama, and represented his county in both
branches of the legislature, and in the Constitutional Con
vention of 1875, and died in 1900. Lieutenant Cody, a
boy about eighteen years old, the best officer I ever saw of
his age, except Major Latimer of the artillery, fell near
my brother, mortally wounded.
" When we retreated, they, with most of our wounded

106 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
and eighty- four men who were not, were taken prisoners,
and the wounded were removed to the Federal field hos
pital, where they were as well cared for as wounded sol
diers in the hands of an enemy ever are. Cody lived
twenty-one and my brother twenty-three days. A Miss
Lightner, a Virginia lady and Southern sympathizer,
nursed them to the last, and Doctor Reid, of the One Hun
dred and Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania Regiment, did all that
he could for them and had them decently buried when they
died. He sent to me by flag of truce my brother's old
gold watch, his pocketbook and money. I endeavored for
years after the war to find Doctor Reid, without success,
but finally obtained his address, Lancaster, Pennsylvania,
and had a very pleasant and satisfactory correspondence
with him. I had theretofore never had an opportunity of
expressing to him the full measure of my gratitude for his
attention to my brother and Lieutenant Cody. The dear,
good ministering angel, Miss Lightner, has long since
passed beyond the arena of bloody battles and grim death,
to reap that priceless reward which is promised to the
charitable and the good. Some of our wounded were not
treated so well. Some were not removed from the places
where they fell for two or three days. Sergeant Johns,
of Company B, had one of his thighs broken, and lay
where he fell, in all the hard rain of the third and fourth
days of July, and was not removed until the battle was
over and Lee on his way back to Virginia. He lay on his
back, could not turn, and kept from drowning by putting
his hat over his face. He recovered, and was alive sev
eral years after the war, and living in Texas.
" Captain J. Henry Ellison was a son of the Rev. Dr.
Ellison, a distinguished Methodist divine. When I gave
the order to change direction to the left to drive the
Twentieth Maine Regiment, he did not hear it with dis
tinctness. He stepped toward me, and placing his hand

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 107
behind his ear inquired, ' What is the order, Colonel ? ' I
repeated it. He turned to his company and cried out,
' Forward, my men, forward ! ' and fell shot through the
head. I saw the ball strike him ; that is, I was looking at
him when it did. He fell upon his left shoulder, turned
upon his back, raised his arms, clenched his fists, gave one
shudder, his arms fell, and he was dead. He wore that
day a very fine captain's uniform which I had presented to
him after my promotion, and I thought at the moment of
his death that he was the handsomest and finest specimen
of manhood that ever went down upon a field of carnage.
" There was no better regiment in the Confederate
Army than the Fifteenth Alabama, and when properly
commanded, if it failed to carry any point against which
it was thrown, no other single regiment need try it. The
long and rapid march, the climb of Great Round Top's
rugged front without water, impaired its power of endur
ance, but it fought hard and persistently until ordered to
retreat. The other regiments of the brigade did their
duty at Gettysburg, but the Fifteenth struck the hardest
knot. " The following from the pen of Colonel W. F. Perry
describes ' The Devil's Den ' and the assault of his regi
ment, the Forty- fourth Alabama, upon it:
" ' Large rocks, from six to fifteen feet high, are thrown
together in confusion over a considerable area, and yet so
disposed as to leave everywhere among them winding pas
sages carpeted with moss. Many of its recesses are never
visited by the sunshine, and a cavernous coolness pervades
the air within it.
" ' A short distance to the east the frowning bastions of
Little Round Top rise two hundred feet above the level
of the plain. An abrupt elevation, thirty or forty feet
high, itself buttressed with rocks, constitutes the western
boundary of this strange formation.

108 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
" ' The view was imposing. Little Round Top, crowned
with artillery, resembled a volcano in eruption; while
the hillock near the Devil's Den resembled a small one.
The distance between them, diminished by the view in
perspective, appeared as a secondary crater near its base.
It was evident that a formidable task was before us.
" ' The enemy was as invisible to us as we were to them.
The presence of a battery of artillery of course implied
the presence of a strong supporting force of infantry.
Of its strength, its position, and the nature of its defenses
we were in total ignorance. We were soon to learn. As
the line emerged from the woods into the open space men
tioned above, a sheet of flame burst from the rocks less
than fifty yards away. A few scattering shots in the be
ginning gave warning in time for my men to fall down,
and thus largely to escape the effect of the main volley.
They doubtless seemed to the enemy to be all dead, but
the volley of the fire which they immediately returned
proved that they were very much alive.
" ' No language can express the intensity of the solici
tude with which I surveyed the strange, wild situation
which had suddenly burst upon my view. Upon the de
cision of a moment depended the honor of my command,
and perhaps the lives of many brave men. I knew that, if
called upon, they would follow me, and felt confident that
the place could be carried by an impetuous charge. But
then what? There were no supporting troops in sight.
A heavy force of the enemy might envelop and overpower
us. It was certain that we should be exposed to a plung
ing, enfilading fire from Little Round Top. And yet the
demoralization and shame of a retreat, and an exposure
to be shot in the back, were not to be thought of.
" ' Before the enemy had time to load their guns a de
cision was made. Leaping over the prostrate line before

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 109
me, I shouted the order, " Forward ! " and started for the
rocks. The response was a bound, a yell, and a rush, and
in ten seconds my men were pouring into the Den, and
the enemy were escaping from the opposite side. A few
prisoners were taken. Two soldiers of the Fourth Maine
regiment surrendered to me in person at the edge of the
rocks as my line overtook and passed me.
" ' In the charge the left wing of the regiment struck
the hill on which the artillery were stationed, and the center
and the right swept into the rocks east of it. Maj. George
W. Carey led the left wing up the hill and, bounding over
the rocks on its crest, landed among the artillerymen ahead
of the line, and received their surrender. One of the of
ficers of the battery whom I met soon after complimented
his gallantry and that of his men in the highest terms. The
major a few moments later found me near the foot of the
hill, completely prostrated by heat and excessive exertion.
He exhibited several swords as an evidence that the artil
lery had surrendered, and complained that guns from both
sides were playing upon the position. This I knew to be
true as to the Federal side. At the very entrance of the
labyrinth a spherical case-shot from Round Top had ex
ploded very near my head and thrown its deadly contents
against a rock almost within my reach. He was ordered
to hurry back and withdraw the men from the crest so that
they could find shelter on the side of the hill.
" ' In a very short time he came back in great haste and
informed me that a force of the enemy large enough to en
velop our position was moving down upon us. I sprang to
my feet with the intention of climbing the hill to see the sit
uation and determine what to do; but found myself un
able to stand without support. While we were anxiously
discussing the situation, a line of battle, moving in splen
did style, swept in from Seminary Ridge upon the left, and

no THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
met the threatening force. One of us remarked, " There is
Benning; we are all right now." Benning's march was so
directed that his right lapped upon my left, and poured over
the hill upon which were the abandoned guns.
" ' A furious battle now began along his entire line, as
well as my own, which had pressed through to the north
side of the rocks. It has always been to me a source of
sincere regret that my disability, which continued until after
nightfall, prevented me from seeing anything that occurred
after the arrival of Benning's line.
" ' My loss was comparatively light, considering the des
perate character of the fighting. This was due to three
causes: The happy dodge given the first volley of the
enemy, the rush made upon them before they had time to
reload, and the protection afterwards afforded by the rocks.
The killed and wounded numbered ninety-two, a little over
one-fourth of those who went into action.'
" Thus ended the second day's fighting."
Many books about the Civil War have been published,
histories of the armies, of corps, divisions, brigades, and
regiments, enough to make a large library. Compara
tively few are from the Confederate side. " The War
Between the Union and the Confederacy," by General
Oates, is the only one which I have found which treats of
the battle for the possession of Little Round Top; for this
reason I have quoted from it at greater length than I have
from any other publication. Its author was a gallant Con
federate soldier, who fought through the war, and after
ward was prominent in his State in politics, having re
ceived the highest honors at the disposal of its grateful
people. At the battle of Gettysburg he was the colonel of
the Fifteenth Alabama regiment in Law's brigade. He
says that at this time his regiment was the largest and best
in Hood's division. His book was published in 1905,

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG in
forty-two years after the battle of Gettysburg. He seems
to have been well acquainted with all the officers and en
listed men of his regiment, and throughout the book says
more about its individual members than I have seen in any
other regimental history, for while he criticises freely the
conduct of the Confederate generals and their campaigns,
it is essentially the history of Colonel Oates and his men.
There are many statements in his account of their part in
the attack on Little Round Top which do not agree with
statements of others, both Union and Confederate officers,
which I do not feel competent to criticise, but I must men
tion a few of a different character.
Military etiquette requires that official reports shall be
confined to the part taken by the organization under the
command of the officer reporting, without alluding to the
other organizations unless the action of the latter modifies
that of his own. Colonel Oates' report of the Fifteenth
Alabama, dated August 8, 1863, complies with this require
ment ; but it differs materially from the account in his book.
He and his regiment, with the Forty-seventh Alabama,
which, according to his account, was temporarily under his
command, did as much to break up Vincent's brigade as
any equal number of well trained and disciplined soldiers
either Union or Confederate could have done under the
circumstances. It seems ungenerous, to say the least, that
he should claim that parts of these two regiments alone
comprised all of the Confederates engaged on this part of
the field. He ignores the presence of the Fourth and Fifth
Texas of Robertson's brigade, and the remaining regiments
of Law's brigade. If, as he states, the force which at
tacked Vincent consisted of 154 men of the Forty-seventh
Alabama, and less than 400 of the Fifteenth Alabama,
it reflects very little credit on Vincent's brigade, which en
tered the fight with about 1,100 men, that any of the Con
federates escaped death or capture.

112 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
I have found no evidence anywhere confirming his state
ment that just before his retreat there were two battalions
of sharpshooters on his right, dismounted cavalry on his
left, and infantry in his rear. Stoughton's battalion of the
Second United States Sharpshooters consisted of eight
small companies. The First battalion, under Colonel Ber-
dan, which also belonged to Ward's brigade, was sent out
to the west of the Peach Orchard early in the day and
did not return to Ward's brigade that day. The Second
battalion was sent out by Ward as a skirmish line to cover
his front. Stoughton says that the five companies on his
right were outflanked and, being forced to retire, fell back
to the main line of the brigade. The other three com
panies retreated before the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh
Alabama, going up the western slope of Big Round Top
before these regiments, and divided before reaching the
summit. The greater part of them went around the left
of the Forty-seventh, and after they passed made their way
down the slope to the northwest and rejoined their bri
gade. The remainder of this line, about a dozen men,
kept to the right of the Fifteenth Alabama. Oates de
ployed his Company A, and they followed these few sharp
shooters until they drove them off the hill at the eastern
end; there they joined with Captain Morrill's company
of the Twentieth Maine, which Chamberlain had sent out
as skirmishers in that direction. When Chamberlain made
his final charge, Morrill's company, with this dozen sharp
shooters, came up and joined in the charge. If there
were any dismounted cavalry in that vicinity it is a mys
tery where they came from. All accounts except this
agree that there were no Union cavalry on the left dur
ing the engagement on July 2. Law says that he sent out
scouts in every direction and failed to discover even a
cavalry picket. It seems incredible that there could have
been any Union infantry in the rear of Oates' line while

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 113
his attack on the Twentieth Maine and Eighty-third Penn
sylvania was in progress.
The incident of the surrender of the punctilious Lieu
tenant-Colonel Bulger is not of great importance. I no
tice it only because of Oates' discredit of Chamberlain's
account. It seems to have taken place while Chamber
lain was conducting the charge of the Twentieth Maine,
which cleared the valley of the Confederates. Colonel
Rice did not go forward with this charge. The other
regiments of the brigade remained in position and Rice
properly remained with them. Chamberlain's report is
dated July 6, and was in the hands of Rice within a day
or two. If Rice had received this surrender he would
naturally have asked Chamberlain to modify his report. I
was at brigade headquarters until some time after Colonel '
Rice received his commission as brigadier-general, and was
transferred to the command of a brigade in another corps.
The incidents of the battle were the subject of frequent
conversation among the men and officers at brigade head
quarters, and if Bulger's surrender had been made as
Oates describes it I am sure I should have heard of it.
In questioning the accuracy of the statement of Captain
Prince about the number of prisoners taken, he is not quite
fair. Captain Prince says the prisoners were mostly from
the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama. As these regi
ments made the fight against the Twentieth Maine, and the
fighting there was long continued and very desperate,
Prince's attention was naturally directed there. He says
that the four hundred prisoners were " mostly " from the
Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama; but many prisoners
belonging to the Fourth and Forty-eighth Alabama and
the Fourth and Fifth Texas were also taken. Vincent's
other regiments took their full share, and a total of four
hundred for the brigade does not seem excessive,

114 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
General E. M. Law, C. S. A. : " The Struggle for
Round Top," " Battles and Leaders of the Civil
War," Vol. hi, p. 318.
" More has been written concerning the battle of Gettys
burg than any other ' passage of arms ' between the Fed
eral and Confederate troops during the Civil War. The
engagement of the first of July, brought on by accident,
on the part of the Confederates at least, in which two corps
of the Federal army under General Reynolds were de
feated and driven through Gettysburg by portions of Hill's
and Ewell's corps, has been often and fully described by
the officers on both sides. Ewell's attack on the Federal
right in the vicinity of Culp's Hill on the second of July,
and Longstreet's advance upon the Federal left on the
same day, so far as relates to one division of the latter's
command (McLaws'), have been detailed with equal mi
nuteness by those engaged. The magnificent charge of
Pickett's division on the third day has been the theme of
a host of writers who deemed it an honor to have stood
in the lines of blue by which that charge was repelled, and
those who, on the other hand, thought it no less an honor
to have shared the fortunes of the torn and shattered col
umns of gray which only failed to accomplish impossi
bilities. " But concerning the operations of Lee's extreme right
wing, extending to the foot of Round Top, little or noth
ing has been written on the Confederate side. This part
of the line was held by Hood's division of Longstreet's
corps, and was really the key to the whole position of
Gettysburg. Here some of the most stubborn fighting of
that desperate battle was done, and here a determined ef
fort of the Federal cavalry to reach the right rear of the
Confederate army on the third of July was frustrated —
an attempt which, if successful, must have resulted dis
astrously to that army.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 115
" The meagerness of the details of the operations re
ferred to may be accounted for by the fact that General
Longstreet personally superintended the left of his line,
consisting of McLaws' division of his own corps, supported
by B. H. Anderson's division of Hill's corps, and hence
knew comparatively little from personal observation of the
movements of Hood's division; and, also, that General
Hood was wounded early in the engagement on the second
of July, and, relinquishing the command of the division,
could not report its subsequent operations. As senior brig
adier, I succeeded to the command of Hood's division,
and directed its movements during the engagements of
the second and third of July. But owing to the active and
constant movements of our army for some weeks after
the battle, I was able to obtain the reports of brigade com
manders only a very short time previous to being ordered
to the army of General Bragg at Chickamauga. This
prevented me from making a report at the time, and it was
afterward neglected.
" The facts stated in this paper are therefore many of
them published for the first time. It remains for the im
partial reader to decide whether they do not constitute an
important part of the history of the most memorable bat
tle of the war; for Gettysburg was the turning-point in the
great struggle. Together with the fall of Vicksburg,
which occurred simultaneously with the retreat of Lee's
army toward the Potomac, it inspired the armies and peo
ple of the North with fresh courage and stimulated anew
the hopes of ultimate success, which were visibly flagging
under an almost uninterrupted series of reverses to the
Federal armies in Virginia, extending over a period of
nearly two years. On the other hand, it was at Gettys
burg that the right arm of the South was broken, and it
must always stand out in Confederate annals as in the
history of a brave and kindred people stands

116 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
"'Flodden's fatal field,
Where shivered was fair Scotland's spear,
And broken was her shield.'

" It was now past four o'clock in the afternoon, and our
troops were in position for the attack. The flank move
ment by which they came into position is referred to in the
following dispatch from the Federal signal station on Lit
tle Round Top : ' To General Meade — four o'clock p. m.
The only infantry of the enemy visible is on the extreme
(Federal) left; it has been moving toward Emmittsburg.'
It will thus be seen that the movement, in spite of our pre
cautions, was not unobserved.
" The Confederate line of battle occupied a ridge, partly
wooded, with a valley intervening between it and the
heights held by the Federal troops in front. The position
occupied by the Federal left wing in front of us was now
fully disclosed to view, and it was certainly one of the
most formidable it had ever been the fortune of any troops
to confront. Round Top rose like a huge sentinel guard
ing the Federal left flank, while the spurs and ridges trend
ing off to the north of it afforded unrivaled positions for
the use of artillery. The puffs of smoke rising at intervals
along the line of hills, as the Federal batteries fired upon
such portions of our line as became exposed to view, clearly
showed that these advantages had not been neglected.
The thick woods that in great part covered the sides of
Round Top and the adjacent hills concealed from view the
rugged nature of the ground, which increased fourfold the
difficulties of the attack.
" How far up the slope of Round Top the Federal left
extended we could not tell, as the woods effectually con
cealed from view everything in that quarter.
" In order to gain information upon this important point,
I sent out a detail of six picked men as scouts, with instruc-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 117
tions to move as rapidly as possible to the summit of
Round Top, making a detour to their right, and ' feeling '
down from that point, to locate the left of the Federal
line. The entire absence of Federal cavalry on our right,
as well as other indications leading to the same conclusion,
convinced me that the Federals, relying upon the protec
tion of the mountain, considered their flank secure; and it
was therefore their most vulnerable point. Impressed with
this view, I further instructed the scouts when they reached
the summit to observe carefully the state of affairs on the
other side, and to send a ' runner ' back to me with such
intelligence as they might be able to gain. They moved
off at a trot.
" A few moments after they had started I saw in the
valley, some distance to our right, several dark figures
moving across the fields from the rear of Round Top in
the direction of the Emmittsburg road. These, on being
captured, proved to be Federal soldiers, who seemed sur
prised at our sudden appearance in that quarter, and who,
on being questioned, stated that they had surgeon's certifi
cates and were going ' to the rear.' They indicated ' the
rear ' by pointing toward Emmittsburg, and in reply to the
question where they came from, they said from the ' medi
cal train behind the mountain ' — referring to Round Top.
They also stated that the medical and ordnance trains
' around the mountain ' were insecurely guarded, no at
tack being expected at that point; and that the other side
of the mountain could be easily reached by a good farm
road, along which they had just traveled, the distance being
little more than a mile. On my way to convey this infor
mation to General Hood, I met a messenger from my
scouts, who had reached the crest of Round Top. He re
ported that there was no Federal force on the summit, and
confirmed in every particular the statements of the pris
oners I had just captured. If there/ had previously been

118 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
any question in regard to the policy of _\ front attack,
there now remained not a shadow of a doubt that our true
point d'appui was Round Top, from which the Confeder
ate right wing could be extended toward the1 Taneytown
and Baltimore roads on the Federal left and rear.
" I found General Hood on the ridge where h is line had
been formed, communicated to him the information I had
obtained, and pointed out the ease with which a rnovement
by the right flank might be made. He coincided fully with
my views, but said that his orders were positive to attack
in front, as soon as the left of the corps should get into
position. I therefore entered a formal protest against a
direct attack, on the grounds: i. That the great natural
strength of the enemy's position in our front rendered the
result of a direct assault extremely uncertain. 2. That,
even if successful, the victory would be purchased at too
great a sacrifice of life, and our troops would be in no con
dition to improve it. 3. That a front attack was unneces
sary — the occupation of Round Top during the night by
moving upon it from the south, and the extension of our
right wing from that point across the enemy's left and
rear, being not only practicable, but easy. 4. That such
a movement would compel a change of front on the part
of the enemy, the abandonment of his strong position on
the heights, and force him to attack us in position.
" General Hood called up Captain Hamilton, of his staff,
and requested me to repeat the protest to him, and the
grounds on which it was made. He then directed Cap
tain Hamilton to find General Longstreet as quickly as pos
sible and deliver the protest, and to say to him that he
(Hood) indorsed it fully. Hamilton rode off at once,
but in about ten minutes returned, accompanied by a staff
officer of General Longstreet, who said to General Hood,
in my hearing, ' General Longstreet orders that you begin
the attack at once.' Hood turned to me and merely said,

LITTLE nTJNTND TOP, GETTYSBURG 119
' You hear the order : i^I at once moved my brigade to
the assault. ... ..
" Our order of attack — issued a? -.soon as the two di
visions of Longstreet's corps came into^pDsition on the line
already described — was, that the movement sTieuld begin
on the right, my brigade on that flank leading, the other
commands taking it up successively toward the left. It
was near 5 o'clock p. m. when we advanced to the attack.
The artillery on both sides had been warmly engaged for
about fifteen minutes, and continued to fire heavily until
we became engaged with the Federal infantry, when the
Confederate batteries ceased firing to avoid injury to our
own troops, who were then, for the most part, concealed
by the woods about the base of Round Top and the spurs
to the north of it. General Hood was severely wounded
<n the arm by a shot from the Federal artillery as we
loved into action.
" Advancing rapidly across the valley which separated
he opposing lines, — all the time under a heavy fire from
:he batteries, — ¦ our front line struck the enemy's skir-
hiishers posted along the farther edge of the valley. Brush
ing these quickly away, we soon came upon their first line
'of battle, running along the lower slopes of the hills known
I as Devil's Den, to our left of Round Top, and separated
' from the latter by Plum Run valley. The fighting soon
became close and severe. Exposed to the artillery fire
from the heights in front and on our left, as well as to
the musketry of the infantry, it required all the courage
and steadiness of the veterans who composed the army of
Northern Virginia — whose spirit was never higher than
then — to face the storm. Not one moment was lost.
With rapidly thinning ranks the gray line swept on, until
the blue line in front wavered, broke, and seemed to dis
solve in the woods and rocks on the mountain-side. The
advance continued steadily, the center of the division mov-

120 THE ATTACK AND L- ¦gpp-T.-aE OF
ing directly upon the guns on tJjT .
Den on the north, from wi^^ hlU a<ij°»»ng Devils
severely. In order tf>^-^cn we had been suffering so
well up on tb&S**stcure my ri&ht flank' 1 extended it
closing- \nj^^^& °^ R°und Top, and my brigade, in
the right, left a considerable interval between
left and the right of the Texas brigade of Robertson.
Into this interval I threw Benning's Georgia brigade,
which had up to that time occupied the second line. At
the same time, seeing a heavy Federal force on Robertson's
left, and no Confederate troops having come up to extend
our line in that direction, Anderson's Georgia brigade,
till then also in the second line, was thrown out on that
flank. " Thus disposed, the division continued to move for
ward, encountering, as it ascended the heights around the
battery on the spur and to the right and left of it, a most
determined resistance from the Federal troops, who
seemed to be continually reinforced. The ground was
rough and difficult, broken by rocks and boulders, which
rendered an orderly advance impossible. Sometimes the
Federals would hold one side of the huge boulders on the
slope until the Confederates occupied the other. In some
cases my men with reckless daring mounted to the top of
the large rocks in order to get a better view and to deliver
their fire with greater effect. One of these, Sergeant Bar
ber of the Texas brigade, having reached a rock a little in
advance of the line, stood erect on the top of it, loading
and firing as coolly as if unconscious of danger, while the
air around him was fairly swarming with bullets. He
soon fell helpless from several wounds; but he held his
rock, lying upon the top of it until the litter-bearers car
ried him off.
" In less than an hour from the time we advanced to
the attack the hill by Devil's Den opposite our center was
taken, with three pieces of the artillery that had occupied

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 121
it. The remaining piece was run down the opposite slope
by the gunners, and escaped capture.
" In the meantime my brigade, on the right, had swept
over the northern slope of Round Top, cleared it of the
enemy, and then, making a partial change of front to the
left, advanced upon Little Round Top, which lay in rear
of the spur on which the battery had been taken. This
change of direction soon exposed it to a flank attack on
the right by fresh troops (Vincent's brigade), rendering
it necessary to retire it to the general line.
" While our center and right wing were engaged as I
have described, Anderson's brigade, on the left, was sub
jected to great annoyance and loss by movements of the
enemy upon its left flank, being frequently compelled to
change the front of the regiments on that flank to repel
attacks from that direction.
" Up to this time I had seen nothing of McLaws' di
vision, which was to have extended our left and to have
moved to the attack at the same time. I therefore halted
my line, which had become broken and disorganized by
the roughness of the ground over which it had been fight
ing, and, placing it in as advantageous a position as pos
sible for receiving any attack that the Federals might be
disposed to make, I hurried back to the ridge from which
we had originally advanced. I found McLaws still in posi
tion there, his troops suffering considerably from a severe
fire of artillery from the opposite hills. I was informed
by General Kershaw, who held the right of this division,
that although he understood the general instructions that
the forward movement was to be taken up from the right,
he had not yet received the order to move, from his di
vision commander. I pointed out the position of Hood's
division, and urged the necessity of immediate support on
its left. General Kershaw requested me to designate the
point on which his right flank should be directed, and

122 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
promptly moved to the attack, the movement being taken
up by the whole division.
" When Hood's division first attacked, General Meade,
alarmed for the safety of his left wing, and doubtless fully
alive to the importance of holding so vital a point as
Round Top and its adjacent spurs, commenced sending
reinforcements to the threatened points. We encountered
some of these in our first advance, and others were arriv
ing as McLaws came up on our left. In its advance this
division extended from the ' Peach Orchard ' near the Em
mittsburg road, on its left, to the ' wheat-field ' north of
the hill on which we had captured the Federal battery,
where its right wing connected with my left. As McLaws
advanced, we again moved forward on his right, and the
fighting continued in ' see-saw ' style — first one side and
then the other gaining ground or losing it, with small ad
vantage to either, until dark.
" At the close of the engagement Hood's division held
the hill where the battery had been taken and the ridge
to its left — our right extending across Devil's Den and
well up on the northwestern slope of Round Top. During
the night this line was strengthened by the construction
of a breastwork of the loose stones that abounded all along
the positions occupied by the troops, and the light of the
next morning disclosed the fact that the Federal troops
in front of us had improved their time in the same way.
In fact, all through the night we could hear them at work
as the rocks were dropped in place on the works, and no
doubt they heard us Just as distinctly while we were en
gaged in the same life-preserving operation.
" Though the losses had been severe on both sides, com
paratively few prisoners had been taken. But early in the
night, in the confusion resulting from the fight over such
rugged ground, and the darkness of the wooded mountain
side, men of both armies, in search of their commands, oc-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 123
casionally wandered into the opposing picket-lines and
were captured. Many of the Federal wounded were left
in our lines, on the ground from which their troops had
been forced back, and some of ours remained in their
hands in the most advanced positions which we had
reached and had been compelled to abandon. Among these
latter was Colonel Powell of the Fifth Texas regiment,
who was shot through the body and afterward died.
Powell was a stout, portly man, with a full beard, resem
bling, in many respects, General Longstreet, and the first
impression of his captors was that they had taken that
officer. Indeed, it was asserted positively by some of the
prisoners we picked up during the night that Longstreet
was badly wounded and a prisoner in their hands, and they
obstinately refused to credit our statements to the con
trary. . . ."
This paper by General Law, written for the Century
Magazine many years after the battle, is an able , discus
sion of the strategy of Meade and Lee, and is well worth
reading whether or not one agrees with his opinion of the
reasons for the defeat of the Confederates. I have made
extracts of the portions which relate to the fight for the
possession of Little Round Top. As Hood was wounded
before the Confederate infantry reached the Union lines,
and Law succeeded him in the command of the division,
it appears that, after starting his brigade on its way to
attack Vincent, he devoted his time to the direction of the
other brigades of the division in their attack on Birney's
line. We are obliged to depend for information from
Confederate sources on the reports of their regimental com
manders, with an explanation in Robertson's report of his
brigade, of the reason for the participation by two of his
regiments — the Fourth and Fifth Texas — in the attack
on Little Round Top. These Alabama and Texas men

124 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
were magnificent soldiers, and they made desperate at
tempts to gain the coveted position. Whether they would
have succeeded had Hood or Law been present to direct
them is a question which we need not raise, since they
have not. The regimental commanders, according to their
reports, acted generally on their own initiative. Colonel
Sheffield, who assumed command of Law's brigade when
Law took the division, merely mentions the fact in his re
port, but says nothing of any orders given by him to any
regiments except his own.
The scouts which Law sent to the top of Round Top
evidently examined the ground to the north of it, and saw
no Union troops in position. They must have seen the
narrow valley leading up from Plum Run along the north
side of Round Top, and reported that. Law was prepared
by this information to start his brigade up this valley as
soon as he had cleared the western slope of Round Top.
Whether he had reported this to Hood and was directed
by him to send a part of his forces in that direction, is not
stated ; but believing the way was clear to reach and occupy
or turn little Round Top, we must suppose that experi
enced officers like Hood or Law would not neglect to take
advantage of it. If Vincent had not reached that point
and prepared to receive them, the attempt would have suc
ceeded; but Vincent was there first, and it failed.
It is evident from this statement by Law, and Hood's
letter to Longstreet written some time after the war
(quoted in Oates' book), that both of these officers pro
tested against making a direct attack on the front of Bir
ney's line. Longstreet also had pleaded with Lee to be
allowed to move around the east end of Big Round Top to
get in the rear of Meade's left, threatening his communi
cations and forcing him to abandon his strong position on
the right. It may be that the hope that Longstreet would
yield to their repeated importunities caused Hood's di-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 125
vision to go so far to the east that when it faced to the
front Law's brigade so far over-lapped Big Round Top
that it was necessary to move the two regiments on its
right to its left, and even to the left of the Fourth and
Fifth Texas, which under orders had kept closed on the
Fourth Alabama, the left of Law's brigade. For some
reason not explained by Law, his brigade in advancing
obliqued to the right. After moving two regiments to
the left, the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama were
still so far to the east that they struck the south side of
the western slope and, following the sharpshooters of
Stoughton's skirmish line, wheeled to the right and went
up over the top of the mountain. (See Oates' account in
his book, Robertson's official report, and reports of regi
mental commanders in Law's and Robertson's brigades.)
Captain Farley's " Number Nine " x
Reminiscences by Porter Farley.
" On Wednesday July 1, 1863, the Fifth corps, of which
our regiment formed a part, having that morning crossed
the line dividing the States of Maryland and Pennsyl-
1 This paper, although not published in book form, belongs with the
accounts by other historians. It is one of a series of papers written
by Captain Farley describing the history of the One Hundred and
Fortieth New York Volunteers, published at intervals in a Rochester
newspaper, and is Number Nine of that series. This regiment was
raised in Rochester, New York, and was commanded by Colonel Pat
rick H. O'Rorke from its organization until his death in the battle of
Gettysburg.! As shown by the Warren letters, Captain Farley's Num
ber Nine had been submitted to General Warren and, after some
suggestions made by him, the final revised draft met Warren's ap
proval. Warren was so impressed with its value that he requested
that a copy of it should be sent to the Comte de Paris, who was then
writing his " History of the Civil War in America." This request
was complied with, and the information obtained from this paper may
be plainly seen in the chapter on Gettysburg in the Comte de Paris'
work. Captain Farley has kindly permitted me to publish1 the paper
in this book.

126 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
vania, halted about the middle of the afternoon within
sight of the town of Hanover.
" All the country through which we that day passed had
been overrun by the rebel cavalry. The inhabitants hailed
the army of the Potomac as their deliverers from a threat
ened wholesale desolation. The day before our arrival
there had been quite a lively cavalry fight at Hanover. We
came in sight of the town at about 3 p. m. and halted in
an open field just beyond its suburbs. Our rest, however,
was but short. News soon reached us of heavy fighting
which had that day taken place some fourteen miles to the
westward, at the town then insignificant, but now known
to fame as Gettysburg. The only particulars of the action
which we could learn were that the First corps had been
engaged and that General Reynolds, its commander, had
been killed.
" At six o'clock that evening we were in motion again,
making all possible speed toward Gettysburg, the point
upon which the entire army was then concentrating.
" This was campaigning under circumstances entirely
different from any of our former experiences. We were
on the soil of a loyal State and were hastening to meet a
presumptuous foe who had audaciously invaded it. The
kindly anxious interest with which the country women and
children gazed upon us as they stood at their gates while
we marched by, and the alacrity with which they furnished
water and food to those who needed it, were incentives to
better feelings than those engendered by the sulky faces
and contemptuous treatment with which we had been so
familiar in our Virginia marches. I have heard and read
many stories of the meanness with which the Pennsylva-
nians treated the Union soldiers during the Gettysburg cam
paign, of the parsimony which prompted them to charge
and take money for water and outrageous prices for food
furnished to men whose wants were extreme, but justice

CAPTAIN PORTF.R FARLKY

Faring Page 126

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 127
compels me to say that I never saw anything of it. On
the contrary, I witnessed the exhibition of a great deal of
liberality and was the recipient of it in my own person.
Doubtless some of the shameful stories we have heard were
true, but I feel very certain that the miscreants who were
guilty of such meanness were exceptions among the many,
and that a few poor, shriveled souls were able by thus
abusing common decency to bring a reproach upon a kind-
hearted and grateful community.
" We pushed on till one o'clock in the morning of Thurs
day, July 2, and then halted and lay down to rest in the
road. Overcome by fatigue, the men were asleep almost
as soon as they touched the ground. To how many of the
poor fellows did this prove the last sleep from which they
were ever to arise !
" At about four o'clock we were roused again, and shak
ing off as best we could the terrible drowsiness which op
pressed us, moved still further westward. After march
ing about two hours we halted and the regiments of our
brigade formed in column by divisions in the rear of
other troops that were deployed in lines of battle, with all
dispositions made as if in the presence of the enemy.
" It was while waiting here that an orderly brought to
Colonel O'Rorke a circular addressed by General Meade to
the army. O'Rorke and I were both mounted and stand
ing in front of the column. He glanced over the paper,
handed it to me and told me to read it to the regiment.
It was as follows : " CIRCULAR.
: "Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
" June 30, 1863.
" The commanding general requests that previous to the engagement
soon expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding offi
cers will address their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense
issues involved in this struggle. The enemy are on our soil. The
whole country now looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from
the presence of the foe. Our failure to do so will leave us no such

128 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
welcome as the swelling of millions of hearts with pride and joy
at our success would give to every soldier in the army. Homes, fire
sides, and domestic altars are involved. The army has fought well
heretofore. It is believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely
than ever if it is addressed in fitting terms.
" Corps and other commanders are authorized to order the instant
death of any soldier who fails in his duty at this hour.
"By command of Major-General Meade.
" S. Williams, Ass't Adj't Gen'l.
" West Pointers are not habitual speechmakers, and our
colonel was no exception to the rule; but the order just
read explicitly directed all commanding officers to ' address
their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense issues
involved in this struggle,' and in obedience to it, then and
there, sitting on his little brown horse in front of the regi
mental colors, dressed as we all so well remember him in
his soft felt hat, long white leather gloves, and military
cape, Pat O'Rorke made the first and only speech which he
ever addressed to his regiment. It was short and to the
point, and I regret that I cannot repeat the whole of it,
but his closing words I remember very well, when he said,
' I call on the file-closers to do their duty, and if there is a
man this day base enough to leave his company, let him
die in his tracks — shoot him down like a dog.' Those
were the words of a man who meant to do his duty, and
was resolved that everyone under his command should do
the same. The episode was dramatic to the highest de
gree. The sentiment and the occasion were not such as to
elicit boisterous applause; but a low murmur of approval
throughout his audience showed that as a body they were
ready to follow wherever a brave man would lead.
" The whole army, with the exception of the Sixth corps,
had by this time arrived upon the field. In the disposi
tion of the troops our corps was held as a reserve within
the curved range of hills whose crests formed our chosen
line of battle. During the day we were moved from place

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 129
to place, according as different parts of the grand line
seemed more exposed or threatened. Thus early in the
morning we were behind the extreme right; later in the
day we were massed on Rock Creek, near the point where
it is crossed by the Baltimore pike. This position was in
rear of our main line, which has generally been described as
shaped like a' horseshoe, with its convexity turned toward
the enemy, but which may more properly be compared to
a fish-hook, its shank beginning on the northern slope of
Round Top and running almost due north along the crests
of Little Round Top and Cemetery Ridge, its curve begin
ning at the cemetery and its barb and point represented by
Culp's Hill.
" Late in the afternoon we were ordered to move to the
left of the line where the booming of artillery admonished
us that the bloody work of the day had begun in right
earnest. " We soon reached the sloping ground where the ascent
began on our side up the ridge, beyond which the battle at
that time was raging. I have said that we could hear the
artillery, though it still had a distant sound; but now the
rifle balls coming over the hill began to whistle through the
air high above us, and in the woods to our left on the hill
side we saw the surgeons at work over the wounded; and
yet, strange to say, we could but very indistinctly hear the
sound of musketry. It must have been owing to the in
tervening hill or the direction of the wind, or both causes
combined, for we were even then upon the very verge of
the battle, and when we mounted the ridge two or three
minutes later its full fury burst upon us.
" The First division of our corps, commanded by Brig
adier-General Barnes, had preceded us. Our division,
the Second, under Brigadier-General R. B. Ayres, followed
it. Our brigade, under Brigadier-General Stephen H.
Weed, led the division, and though my recollection of the

130 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
order in which the regiments were marching does not agree
with that of other officers present, I think that our regi
ment was the rear one of the brigade, and that the leading
regiments of our brigade were just passing over that
slightly elevated ground north of Little Round Top when
down its slope on our left, accompanied by a single mounted
officer and an orderly, rode General G. K. Warren, our
former brigade commander, then acting as General Meade's
chief engineer. Warren came straight toward the head
of the regiment, where I was riding with the colonel. He
called out to O'Rorke, beginning to speak while still some
eight or ten rods from us, that he wanted us to come up
there; that the enemy were advancing unopposed up the
opposite side of the hill, down which he had just come,
and he wanted our regiment to meet them. He was evi
dently greatly excited and spoke in his usual impulsive
style. O'Rorke answered, ' General Weed is ahead and
expects me to follow him.' ' Never mind that,' said War
ren, ' bring your regiment up here and I will take the re
sponsibility.' It was a perplexing situation, but without
hesitating O'Rorke turned to the left and followed the of
ficer who had been riding with Warren, while Warren
himself rode rapidly down the stony hill, whether in the
direction from which we had just come or to overtake the
rest of our brigade, I cannot say, but evidently to find and
order up more troops. The cause for this haste is graph
ically described by General Warren himself in a letter which
he kindly wrote me under date of July 13, 1872, from
which I here take the liberty to quote. He says :
" ' Just before the action began in earnest on July 2, I
was with General Meade near General Sickles, whose
troops seemed very badly disposed on that part of the field.
At my suggestion, General Meade sent me to the left to
examine the condition of affairs, and I continued on till I
reached Little Round Top. There were no troops on it,

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 131
and it was used as a signal station. I saw that this was
the key of the whole position, and that our troops in the
woods in front of it could not see the ground in front of
them, so that the enemy would come upon them before
they would be aware of it. The long line of woods on
the west side of the Emmittsburg road (which road was
along a ridge) furnished an excellent place for the enemy
to form out of sight, so I requested the captain of a rifle
battery just in front of Little Round Top to fire a shot into
these woods. He did so, and as the shot went whistling
through the air the sound of it reached the enemy's troops
and caused everyone to look in the direction of it. This
motion revealed to me the glistening of gun barrels and
bayonets of the enemy's line of battle, already formed and
far outflanking the position of any of our troops, so that
the line of his advance from his right to Little Round Top
was unopposed.
" ' I have been particular in telling this, as the discovery
was intensely thrilling to my feelings and almost appalling.
I immediately sent a hastily written dispatch to General
Meade, to send a division at least to me, and General
Meade directed the Fifth Army Corps to take position
there. The battle was already beginning to rage at the
peach orchard, and before a single man reached Round
Top the whole line of the enemy moved on us in splendid
array, shouting in the most confident tones. While I was
still all alone with the signal officer, the musket balls began
to fly around us, and he was about to fold up his flags
and withdraw, but remained at my request and kept wav
ing them in defiance. Seeing troops going out on the
peach orchard road, I rode down the hill and fortunately
met my old brigade. General Weed, commanding it, had
already passed the point, and I took the responsibility to
detach Colonel O'Rorke, the head of whose regiment I
struck, who on hearing my few words of explanation about

132 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
the position moved at once to the hilltop. About this time
First-Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett, of the Fifth Artillery,
with his battery of rifled cannon arrived. He compre
hended the situation instantly, and planted a gun on the
summit of the hill. He spoke to the effect that though he
could do little execution on the enemy with his guns, he
could aid in giving confidence to the infantry, and that his
battery was of no consequence whatever compared with
holding the position. He stayed there till he was killed.
" ' I did not see Vincent's brigade come up, but I sup
pose it was about this time they did, and, coming up be
hind me through the woods and taking post to the left,
their proper place, I did not see them. The full force of
the enemy was now sweeping the Third Army Corps from
its untenable position, and no troops nor any reinforce
ments could maintain it. It was the dreadful misfortune
of the day that any reinforcements went to that line, for
all alike, Third corps, Second corps, and Fifth corps, were
driven from it with great loss. The earnest appeals for
support drew, I suppose, the troops of the Fifth corps
away from their intended position, that is, Little Round
Top, out on the road to the peach orchard, and so it was
that the Fifth corps reached this vital point in such small
detachments. " ' I was wounded with a musket ball while talking with
Lieutenant Hazlett on the hill, but not seriously, and seeing
the position saved, while the whole line to' the right and
front of us was yielding and melting away under the
enemy's fire and advance, I left the hill to rejoin General
Meade, near the center of the field, where a new crisis
was at hand.'
" So much as explaining what Warren had seen when he
came riding down on the head of our regiment and de
tached us so unexpectedly from the rest of our brigade,
and now to resume the narrative of the part we took in

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 133
the struggle which ensued for the possession of Little
Round Top.
" We turned off the road to our left and rushed along
the wooded, rocky eastern slope of Little Round Top, as
cending it while at the same time moving toward its
southern extremity. It was just here that some of the
guns of Hazlett's battery came rapidly up and plunged di
rectly through our ranks, the horses being urged to frantic
efforts by the whips of their drivers and the cannoneers as
sisting at the wheels, so great was the effort necessary to
drag the guns and caissons up the ragged hillside.
" As we reached the crest a never to be forgotten scene^
burst upon us. A great basin lay before us full of smoke
and fire, and literally swarming with riderless horses and
fighting, fleeing, and pursuing men. The air was saturated
with the sulphurous fumes of battle and was ringing with
the shouts and groans of the combatants. The wild cries
of charging lines, the rattle of musketry, the booming of
artillery, and the shrieks of the wounded were the orches
tral accompaniments of a scene like very hell itself — as
terrific as the warring of Milton's fiends in Pande
monium. The whole of Sickles' corps, and many other
troops which had been sent to its support in that ill-chosen
hollow, were being slaughtered and driven before the im
petuous advance of Longstreet. But fascinating as was
this terrible scene, we had no time to spend upon it.
Bloody work was ready for us at our very feet.
" Round Top, a conical hill several hundred feet in height,
lay just to the south of us, and was separated from Little
Round Top, on whose crest we were now moving, by a
broad ravine leading down into the basin where the great
fight was raging. Right up this ravine, which offered the
easiest place of ascent, a rebel force, outflanking all our
troops in the plain below, was advancing at the very mo
ment when we reached the crest of the hill. Vincent's

134 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
brigade of the First division of our corps had come up
through the woods on the eastern slope of the hill, had de
ployed and taken position on its southern slope, and were
at the moment of our arrival hotly engaged with a superior
and aggressive force of the enemy. As soon as we reached
the crest bullets came flying in among us. We were mov
ing with the right in front and not a musket was loaded,
a fact which Warren of course knew nothing about when
he rushed us up there.
" The enemy were coming from our right, and to face
them would bring our file-closers in front. The order,
' On the right, by file into line,' would have brought us
into proper position; but there was no time to execute it,
not even time to allow the natural impulse which mani
fested itself on the part of the men to halt and load the in
stant we received the enemy's fire. O'Rorke did not hesi
tate a moment. ' Dismount,' said he to me, for the ground
before us was too rough to ride over. We sprang from
our horses and gave them to the sergeant-major. O'Rorke
shouted, ' Down this way, boys ! ' and following him we
rushed down the rocky slope with all the same moral ef
fect upon the rebels, who saw us coming, as if our bay
onets had been fixed and we ready to charge upon them.
Coming abreast of Vincent's brigade, and taking advantage
of such shelter as the huge rocks lying about there af
forded, the men loaded and fired, and in less time than it
takes to write it the onslaught of the rebels was fairly
checked, and in a few minutes the woods in front of us
were cleared except of the dead and wounded. Such of
the rebels as had approached so near as to make escape
almost impossible dropped their guns, threw up their
hands, and upon a slight slackening of our fire rushed in
upon us and gave themselves up as prisoners, while those
not so near took advantage of the chance left them and re
treated in disorder.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG' 135
" The firing for a few minutes was very rapid, and the
execution on both sides was fearful. Captain Starks, of
the leading company, received four wounds, but with
splendid pluck stayed by his men till the affair was over.
Captain Sibley, of the second company, was shot through
both legs and lay perfectly helpless till carried off.
O'Rorke exposed himself with the greatest gallantry, not
taking the least advantage of the partial" shelter which the
rocks afforded. He was shot in the neck and dropped in
stantly dead without a word. Captain Spies, of Company
B, was shot through the body and desperately hurt. Lieu
tenant Charles Klein, of the same company, and Lieutenant
Hugh McGraw, of Company K, were both wounded in
the leg, and both died in consequence. Of the enlisted
men there were twenty-five killed and about eighty-four
wounded. Klein and McGraw died, Spies and Sibley were
so badly hurt that they never could rejoin us, and Starks
with his four wounds, all of which were slight, fully re
covered, and after a few weeks rejoined us, to meet a sol
dier's death the following spring in the fight near Spott
sylvania Court-House.
" Our losses were much more severe than they would
have been if our muskets had been loaded and if the regi
ment had been formed in proper line of battle before it
rushed over the crest of the hill. This remark must not
be construed as reflecting on any one. Warren did not
know that our guns were empty, and if he had known it, or
if he or O'Rorke had halted the column for the purpose
of loading, it would have caused a delay which might, and
probably would, have been disastrous beyond all calcula
tion. " In a word, Gettysburg might have been the greatest
disaster of the war, and might have turned the scales in
favor of the rebellion. This may seem an extravagant
statement; but everyone who was there will corroborate

136 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
the assertion that the One Hundred and Fortieth regiment
reached the crest of Little Round Top in the very nick
of time, and before any other troops were there except a
part of Hazlett's rifled battery, and that if we had not
reached it first, thirty or sixty seconds later Hood's Texas
brigade, which was the force we met, would have seized
the hill which was the key to the whole Union line. The
disorganized remnant of Sickles' routed corps would have
been surrounded on three sides. Hazlett's battery would
have been taken and its guns turned upon the Union troops
in the field below. The principal ammunition train, which
was parked about half a mile in the rear, would have been
lost, the general line of battle would have been doubled up,
and a disastrous defeat would have been almost inevitable.
Vincent's brigade of the First division of our corps might
have done something to avert this disaster; but to do it
they would have had to change their front under fire and
on ground the most unsuitable for such an evolution. We
of the One Hundred and Fortieth regiment are so self-
gratulatory as to think that the arrival of the Monitor in
Hampton Roads just when and as she did, was a circum
stance no more fortunate for the Union cause than was our
timely arrival to fill the gap just when and as we did on
Little Round Top at Gettysburg.
" That was our first really bloody engagement, and in
all the subsequent experiences of the regiment upon many
other desperate fields, the service there rendered upon Lit
tle Round Top must be regarded as the supreme event
in its existence.
" Vincent's brigade on our left fought splendidly and
lost heavily. Vincent himself was killed. Hazlett's bat
tery, which was stationed on the crest above and behind
us, had not been able to do any execution upon the force
which actually assailed us, but it played upon the rebel
masses who were driving Sickles' corps in the plain below,

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 137
and after our engagement was over it still kept firing upon
any considerable body of rebels that remained in sight.
What their losses had been during the heat of the engage
ment I cannot say, but after our fight was over and we
had secured pretty good shelter behind the rocks on the
western slope, their cannoneers were much exposed, and
many fell by the bullets of the sharpshooters, who seemed
swarming in the tree-tops and behind the rocks over in the
direction of the peach orchard. Man after man fell under
this murderous sharpshooting while those thus exposed
were serving their guns directed upon an enemy not en
gaged in an attack upon our immediate front. For the
better understanding of the part which this battery took
in the action of that afternoon, it may be remarked that
they did little or nothing in repelling the assault of the
Texan brigade which fell upon us. Our men and the
enemy were at too close quarters for that, and the nature
of the ground did not permit the artillery to be of any im
mediate service to us. But Hazlett got his guns into posi
tion just at the time when Sickles' corps was falling back
in great disorder before an overwhelming force, and it was
against these advancing and for the moment victorious
lines that he poured in an effective fire. Here, too, he met
his death in a manner dramatic to the last degree, and yet
to be described.
" When Warren detached and sent us up the hill, word
was sent to our brigade commander, General Stephen H.
Weed, notifying him of the fact, he having gone at the
head of the brigade directly to the front to the support of
Sickles' corps. Upon receiving this word, Weed brought
back the regiments with him as hastily as possible and
put them in position to our right along the crest of Little
Round Top, not, however, arriving till our bloody affair
was over. But the sharpshooters were still doing their
best against Hazlett's gunners, and it was while standing

138 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
among them that Weed received a mortal wound. Be
lieving that he was about to die, he was in the very act of
committing his last messages to his friend Hazlett, who
stooped over him, when there came the whiz and thud of
another bullet as it sunk into Hazlett's brain, and that
brave artilleryman fell a corpse across the body of his dy
ing friend.
" Thus had fallen our brigadier, the commander of the
battery which we supported, and our gallant young col
onel. " The general was carried at once behind the shelter
of a rock, and was soon taken in an ambulance to the farm
house of Louis A. Bushman, which, as well as his barns
and outhouses, had been taken possession of and was being
used as our division hospital. Weed suffered intensely,
but for some time after he was hurt was entirely conscious
and able to communicate the messages which he had begun
to give to Hazlett. This he did to Lieutenant William H.
Crennell, quartermaster of our regiment, who, with the
other quartermasters of our brigade, had served during
this campaign as Weed's aides. Among other things,
Weed asked that when he was dead the ring which he wore
might be taken from his finger and, with the pocketbook
containing his private letters, be carried to the young lady
to whom he was engaged to be married. As the father of
that young lady has for many years been a public char
acter, it may not be inappropriate to state that she was the
daughter of Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania.
" Weed's bravery even unto death, and his bluff, out
spoken manner, were well exemplified by the clearness
with which he made his dying requests, well knowing they
were such, and by the emphasis with which he spoke, par
ticularly in a reply which almost epitomizes the character
of the man, made to Crennell when he said to him, ' Gen
eral, I hope you are not so very badly hurt.' Said Weed,

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 139
' I'm as dead a man as Julius Csesar.' He soon became de
lirious, and died at about nine o'clock that evening.
" During the fight our surgeons, Drs. Dean and Lord,
had been stationed but a few rods in rear of the regiment,
just over the crest of the hill. Here they gave the
wounded such immediate attention as they needed before
being sent to the division hospital at Bushman's farm. To
this place, when the fight was over, Sergeant Wright and
three other men of Company A carried our young colonel,
and there laid him on the ground. I went with them.
He had fallen instantly dead. A bloody froth on each
side of his neck showed the fatal track of the bullet.
" Up to that time in my life I had never felt a grief so
sharply, nor realized the significance of death so well, as
then, when the wild excitement of our fight was over and
I saw O'Rorke lying there so pale and peaceful. To me
and all of us he had seemed so near the beau ideal of a
soldier and a gentleman, all that he had been and the
bright promise of what he was to be, was so fresh in our
minds, and now, in an instant, the fatal bullet had cut
short the chapter of that fair life. I choked with grief as
I stood beside his lifeless form. I had known and loved
him well, and in these last few weeks better than ever, my
position as his adjutant naturally leading to intercourse of
the most familiar kind, as day by day we ate our soldier's
fare together and often at night slept with the same blanket
covering us. For him to die was to me like losing a
brother, and that brother almost the perfection of the
manly graces. What a blow was such a death to the
young wife and loving family who far away waited for
the news from Gettysburg; what was it to us of that regi
ment whose fortunes he had shared, whose wants and wel
fare he had watched over, and who had been the witnesses
of the last gallant effort of his life when inspiring every
one who heard him with an enthusiasm which only master

140 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
minds can impart, he started his men with their empty
muskets full in the face of a withering fire and springing
to their front in the wild ' rapture of the strife ' fell dead
among them.
" It was only natural that his so sudden death should
most deeply affect us. But time and place alike forbade
the comfort which comes to the heart when it yields to its
grief. " I took from his pockets his watch and some trifles,
pulled from his hands the long gloves which he had worn
and slipped them in his belt, helped compose his supple
form in fitting way, collected the men who had brought
him and others to the surgeon's station, and taking a last
look at poor O'Rorke went back to the regiment."
At the battle of Gettysburg Captain Farley was a first
lieutenant and acting as the adjutant of the regiment. I
see nothing to criticise in his account. It was written be
fore any of the histories from which I have quoted were
published, and was not influenced by any of the statements
contained in them. It is the simple story of an intelligent
soldier who was present in the battle, and related what he
saw and heard. There is no attempt at fine writing ; there
was no need for that. I have read it many times, and
never without emotion. His grief at O'Rorke's death was
like mine for Vincent's. Many other heroes in blue and
gray died on Little Round Top that day, and the grief
over their loss was felt in many homes from Maine to
Texas. Let us believe that the men on both sides who died
there did not die in vain.

Ill
THE OFFICIAL REPORTS— CONFEDERATE **
Law's Brigade
Report of Col. James L. Sheffield, Forty-eighth Alabama
Infantry. {Commanding Law's Alabama Brigade after
Gen. Hood was wounded.) " August 7, 1863.
" I have the honor herewith to give a statement of the
part taken by the Forty-eighth Alabama in the battle of
Gettysburg, on July 2 and 3.
" On the morning of the 2d ultimo this regiment, with
the brigade, marched from New Guilford to the field, a
distance of 20 miles, where we were placed in line of bat
tle in the open field, where Companies A and H were or
dered on picket. After lying in line of battle a half hour
we were ordered forward, and advanced a distance of 1
mile over a very rough and rugged road, the worst cliffs
of rocks there could have been traveled over.
" On reaching the enemy's lines, where they were well
and strongly situated, I ordered my regiment forward,
which was gallantly obeyed until within about 20 paces
of their line. Here the fire of the enemy was severe.
Here the men opened fire on the enemy, and for some time
continued, until the left, from the loss of men and their
exposed position to a fire from the front and from the
mountain on the right, were forced to fall back. The
right steadily maintained its position for some time, forc
ing the enemy to withdraw from their first line and estat>
lish their line a short distance to their rear, where they
"¦"Rebellion Records," Series 1, Vol. xxvii, part 2, pp. 391-416.
141

142 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
continued their fire. After the contest had continued for
an hour and a half, and my whole regiment had been
brought to the front the third time, only to be driven back,
I ordered them to re-form in the rear of their advanced
position. While doing this, I was ordered to take com
mand of the brigade. After this, the regiment was com
manded by Capt. T. J. Eubanks, who re-formed and car
ried it to the front, where the battleground was held during
the night, bringing off our wounded.
" In this battle the regiment had 275 men engaged.
There were 102 killed, wounded, and missing.
" On the 3d ultimo the regiment was withdrawn a short
distance, where we remained during the day, excepting
while engaged in a short fight with cavalry.
" At night we were still farther withdrawn to the rear.
The men and officers acted very well.
" I cannot close without speaking of those who acted
most conspicuously during the hottest of the conflict.
Lieutenants [F. M.] Burk and [R. T.] Ewing and Cap
tains Eubanks and [Jeremiah] Edwards are especially no
ticed for their gallantry in leading their men forward and
remaining in front of their commands, encouraging their
men. "Lieutenant-Colonel [W. M.J Hardwick and Major
[C. B.] St. John were very efficient in performing their
part until wounded.
" It is proper to state that in the account of missing, 24
men were taken prisoners, with Captain Edwards and
Lieutenant [T. L.] Christian (of General Law's staff),
while posting pickets after night on the 2d ultimo."
Report of Lieut.-Col. L. H. Scruggs, Fourth Alabama
Infantry. " August 8, 1863.
" In accordance with orders of the 6th instant, I have

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 143
the honor to submit the following report of the opera
tions of the regiment during the engagement of July 2 and
3, at Gettysburg, Pa.
" On the morning of the 2d we took up the line of
march from New Guilford in the direction of Gettysburg.
After a rapid and fatiguing march of about 24 miles, ar
rived at the scene of action at 3 :30 p. m., immediately
taking our assigned position on the left of the brigade.
" The order was then given to move forward, which we
did at a double-quick across a plowed field for half a mile,
the enemy's batteries playing upon us with great effect un
til we arrived at a stone fence, behind which the enemy's
first line of infantry was posted, which position we soon
succeeded in carrying with the bayonet. Then, having
reached the foot of the mountain, the command halted a
few minutes to re-form the line. We advanced up the
mountain under a galling fire, driving the enemy before us
until we arrived at a second line, where a strong force was
posted behind another stone fence. Owing to> the ex
hausted condition of the men and the roughness of the
mountain-side, we found it impossible to carry this posi
tion. We retired in good order, though not until we had
expended our ammunition. Having received a fresh sup
ply of cartridges about dark, we remained in the enemy's
front, some 200 yards distant, during the night.
" Early on the next morning we threw up a line of
breastworks composed of rock, and assumed the defen
sive, which position we held during the day until late in the
afternoon, when the regiment was ordered some distance
to the right, to meet the enemy's cavalry, which we soon
dispersed. Then we remained in position until dark, when
the remainder of the brigade moved to our rear, and were
ordered to connect with it on the right, where we remained
until the morning of the 4th.
" Both officers and men behaved with much, coolness and

144 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
gallantry, and many brave and good soldiers fell, a noble
sacrifice to their country's cause. The official list of cas
ualties handed in will show the total of our casualties
to be 87."
Report of Col. William C. Oates, Fifteenth Alabama In
fantry. " August 8, 1863.
" I have the honor to report, in obedience to orders from
brigade headquarters, the participation of my regiment in
the battle near Gettysburg on the 2d ultimo.
" My regiment occupied the center of the brigade when
the line of battle was formed. During the advance, the
two regiments on my right [Forty-eighth and Forty-fourth
Alabama. — O. W. N.J were moved by the left flank across
my rear, which threw me on the extreme right of the whole
line. I encountered the enemy's sharpshooters posted be
hind a stone fence, and sustained some loss thereby. It was
here that Lieut.-Col. Isaac B. Feagin, a most excellent and
gallant officer, received a severe wound in the right knee,
which caused him to lose his leg. Privates [A.J Kennedy,
of Company B, and [William] Trimmer, of Company G,
were killed at this point and Private [G. E.J Spencer,
Company D, severely wounded.
" After crossing the fence I received an order from Brig
adier-General Law to left-wheel my regiment and move
in the direction of the heights upon my left, which order
I failed to obey, for the reason that when I received it I
was rapidly advancing up the mountain, and in my front
I discovered a heavy force of the enemy. Besides this,
there was great difficulty in accomplishing the maneuver
at that moment, as the regiment on my left (Forty-seventh
Alabama) was crowding me on the left and running into
my regiment, which had already created considerable con
fusion. In the event that I had obeyed the order I should

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 145
have come in contact with the regiment on my left, and
also have exposed my right flank to an enfilading fire from
the enemy. I therefore continued to press forward, my
right passing over the top of the mountain, on the right
of the line.
" On reaching the foot of the mountain below I found
the enemy in heavy force, posted in rear of large rocks
upon a slight elevation beyond a depression of some 300
yards in width between the base of the mountain and the
open plain beyond. I engaged them, my right meeting
the left of their line exactly. Here I lost several gallant
officers and men.
" After firing two or three rounds, I discovered that the
enemy were giving way in my front. I ordered a charge,
and the enemy in my front fled ; but that portion of his line
confronting the two companies on my left held their
ground, and continued a most galling fire upon my left.
" Just at this moment I discovered the regiment on my
left (Forty-seventh Alabama) retiring. I halted my regi
ment as its left reached a very large rock, and ordered a
left-wheel of the regiment, which was executed in good
order under fire, thus taking advantage of a ledge of rocks
running off in a line perpendicular to the one I had just
abandoned, and affording very good protection to my men.
This position enabled me to keep up a constant flank and
cross fire upon the enemy, which in less than five minutes
caused him to change front. Receiving reinforcements, he
charged me five times, and was as often repulsed with
heavy loss. Finally I discovered that the enemy had
flanked me on the right, and two regiments were moving
rapidly upon my rear and not 200 yards distant, when, to
save my regiment from capture or destruction, I ordered a
retreat. " Having become exhausted from fatigue and the ex
cessive heat of the day, I turned the command of the regi-

146 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
ment over to Capt. B. A. Hill, and instructed him to take
the men off the field and re-form the regiment and report
to the brigade.
" My loss was, as near as can now be ascertained, as
follows, to-wit: 17 killed upon the field, 54 wounded and
brought off the field, and 90 missing, most of whom are
either killed or wounded. Among the killed and wounded
are 8 officers, most of whom were very gallant and ef
ficient men.
"Recapitulation: Killed, 17; wounded, 54; missing, 90;
total, 161."
Report of Col. WUliam F. Perry, Forty-fourth Alabama
Infantry. " Near Fredericksburg, Va.,
"August 8, 1863.
" I have the honor to submit the following report of
the part taken by the regiment under my command in the
battle of Gettysburg, Pa., on July 2 :
" It occupied the place of the second battalion in the
line formed by the brigade on the heights, which ran paral
lel with and fronting the enemy's position. Having ad
vanced with the brigade down the long slope and through
the intervening meadow, it was detached from its place in
the line by order of General Law, and by a flank move
ment was brought to the extreme left of the brigade.
" When at a short distance from the stone fence near
the base of the mountain, General Law informed me that
he expected my regiment to take a battery which had been
playing on our line from the moment the advance began.
This battery was situated, not on the mountain itself, but
on a rugged cliff which formed the abrupt termination of a
ridge that proceeded from the mountain, and ran in a di
rection somewhat parallel with it, leaving a valley desti
tute of trees and filled with immense boulders between

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 147
them. This valley, not more than 300 paces in breadth,
and the cliff on which their artillery was stationed were oc
cupied by two regiments of the enemy's infantry.
" The direction of the regiment after crossing the stone
fence was such that a march to the front would have car
ried it to the right of the enemy's position. It was there
fore wheeled to the left, so as to confront that position,
its left opposite the battery, and its right extending toward
the base of the mountain. This movement was executed
under fire, and within 200 yards of the enemy. The for
ward movement was immediately ordered, and was re
sponded to with an alacrity and courage seldom, if ever,
excelled on the battlefield. As the men emerged from the
forest into the valley before mentioned, they received a
deadly volley at short range, which in a few seconds killed
or disabled one-fourth their number. Halting without an
order from me, and availing themselves of the shelter which
the rocks afforded, they returned the fire. Such was their
extreme exhaustion, having marched without interruption
24 miles to reach the battlefield, and advanced at a double-
quick step fully a mile to engage the enemy, that I hesi
tated for an instant to order them immediately forward.
Perceiving very soon, however, that the enemy were giving
way, I rushed forward, shouting to them to advance. It
was with the greatest difficulty that I could make myself
heard or understood above the din of battle. The order
was, however, extended along the line, and was promptly
obeyed. The men sprang forward over the rocks, swept
the position, and took possession of the heights, capturing
40 or 50 prisoners around the battery and among the cliffs.
" Meanwhile the enemy had put a battery in position
on a terrace of the mountain to our right, which opened
upon us an enfilading fire of grape and spherical case-shot.
A sharp fire of small-arms was also opened from the same
4irection. This was not destructive, however, owing to

148 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
the protection afforded by the rocks. Soon the enemy ap
peared moving down upon our front in heavy force. At
this critical moment General Benning's brigade of Geor
gians advanced gallantly into action. His extreme right,
lapping upon my left, swarmed over the cliffs and mingled
with my men. It was now past 5 p. m. The conflict con
tinued to rage with great fury until dark. Again and
again the enemy in great force attempted to dislodge us
from the position and retake the battery, in each case with
signal failure and heavy loss.
"Lieutenant-Colonel [John A.J Jones, Major [George
W.J Cary, and Lieutenant [W. P.] Becker, acting adju
tant, behaved with great coolness and courage. I abstain
from mentioning by name others who deserve special
commendation, because the list would be so long as to
confer little distinction on any single individual, and be
cause injustice might be done to others whose good con
duct escaped my observation.,
"The regiment lost: Killed, 24; wounded, 66; miss
ing, 4-"
Report of Maj. James M. Campbell, Forty-seventh Ala
bama Infantry. " August 7, 1863.
" A report of the part my regiment took in the fight
at Gettysburg:
" Before our line was formed three companies were de
tached from my regiment and placed in rear of our right,
to guard a road. These companies remained on this part
of the field, almost constantly skirmishing with the enemy,
until we fell back on the morning of the 4th, when they
rejoined their command. The other seven companies
went into the fight in line with the brigade. There was
some confusion in these companies, owing to the fact that
in the charge the lieutenant-colonel expected the colonel

LITTLE ROUND' TOP, GETTYSBURG 149
to give all the necessary commands, and the colonel re
mained so far behind that his presence on the field was but
a trammel on the lieutenant-colonel.
" The colonel having been left behind, and the lieutenant-
colonel (fighting most nobly) killed,1 I took command of
the regiment, and, after the first repulse of the brigade,
in obedience to orders I deployed a part of my men on the
right of the brigade, where they remained until the close
of the fight.
" After the firing ceased, in obedience to orders from
Colonel [James L.] Sheffield, commanding brigade, I
threw my regiment out as skirmishers on our right, where
they remained until morning.
" Out of the 21 officers, 4 were killed on the field. All
of these (the 21) acted well. The colonel and adjutant
are not included in this number.
" About one-third of the whole number of men were
killed and wounded." Robertson's Brigade
Report of Brig.-Gen. J. B. Robertson, C. S. Army, Com
manding Brigade.
" Headquarters Texas Brigade,
" Near Bunker Hill, Va., July 17, 1863.
" I have the honor to submit through you my report of
the action of my brigade in the battle of Gettysburg, on
July 2 and 3. I have been too much occupied with the
duties imposed by the marches and maneuvers we have
gone through to allow me to make this report at an earlier
time. " The division arrived on the ground in front of the po-
1 Lieut. Col. M. J. Bulger was not killed. On July 16, 1863, he
became colonel, vice James W. Jackson, resigned. — Footnote in "Re
bellion Records."

ISO THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
sition of the enemy that we were to attack but a few min
utes before we were ordered to advance. I therefore got
but a glance at the field on which we had to operate before
we entered upon it. I was ordered to keep my right well
closed on Brigadier-General Law's left, and to let my left
rest on the Emmittsburg pike. I had advanced but a short
distance when I discovered that my brigade would not fill the
space between General Law's left and the pike named, and
that I must leave the pike, or disconnect myself from Gen
eral Law, on my right. Understanding before the action
commenced that the attack on our part was to be general,
and that the force of General McLaws was to advance
simultaneously with us on my immediate left, and seeing
at once that a mountain held by the enemy in heavy force
with artillery to the right of General Law's center was the
key to the enemy's left, I abandoned the pike and closed on
General Law's left. This caused some separation of my
regiments, which was remedied as promptly as the numerous
stone and rail fences that intersected the field through which
we were advancing would allow.
"As we advanced through this field, for half a mile we
were exposed to a heavy and destructive fire of canister,
grape, and shell from six pieces of their artillery on the
mountain alluded to, and the same number on a command
ing hill but a short distance to the left of the mountain,
and from the enemy's sharpshooters from behind the nu
merous rocks, fences, and houses in the field.
"As we approached the base of the mountain General
Law moved to the right, and I was moving obliquely to
the right to close on him when my whole line encountered
the fire of the enemy's main line, posted behind rocks and
a stone fence. The Fourth and Fifth Texas regiments,
under the direction of their gallant commanders (Col
onels Powell and Key) , while returning the fire and driving
the enemy before them, continued to close on General Law,

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 151
to their right. At the same time the First Texas and
Third Arkansas, under their gallant commanders (Lieu
tenant-Colonel [P. A.] Work and Colonel Manning) were
hotly engaged with a greatly superior force, while at the
same time a heavy force appeared and opened fire on Col
onel Manning's left, seriously threatening his left flank,
to meet which he threw two or three companies with their
front to his left flank, and protected his left.
" On discovering this heavy force on my left flank, and
seeing that no attack was being made by any of our forces
on my left, I at once sent a courier to Major-General
Hood, stating that I was hard pressed on my left; that
General McLaws' forces were not engaging the enemy to
my left (which enabled him to move fresh troops from
that part of his line down on me), and that I must have re
inforcements. " Lieutenant-Colonel Work, with the First Texas regi
ment, having pressed forward to the crest of the hill and
driven the enemy from his battery, I ordered him to the
left, to the relief and support of Colonel Manning, di
recting Major [F. S.J Bass with two companies to hold
the hill, while Colonel Work with the rest of the regiment
went to Colonel Manning's relief. With this assistance
Colonel Manning drove the enemy back and entered the
woods after him, when the enemy reoccupied the hill and
his batteries in Colonel Work's front, from which Colonel
Work again drove him.
" For an hour and upward these two regiments main
tained one of the hottest contests, against five or six times
their number, that I have witnessed. The moving of Col
onel Work to the left, to relieve Colonel Manning while
the Fourth and Fifth Texas were closing to the right on
General Law's brigade, separated these two regiments from
the others. They were steadily moving to the right and
front, driving the enemy before them, when they passed

152 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
the woods or ravine to my right. After finding that I
could not move the First and Third to the right to join
them, I sent to recall them, ordering them to move to the
left until the left of the Fourth should rest on the right of
the First; but my messenger found two of General Law's
regiments on the left of my two (the Fourth and Fifth
Texas), and did not find these regiments at all.
" About this time my aide, Lieutenant Scott, reported
my two regiments (the Fourth and Fifth Texas) in the
center of General Law's brigade, and that they could not
be moved without greatly injuring his line. I sent a re
quest to General Law to look to them.
" At this point my assistant adjutant and inspector-gen
eral reported from the Fourth and Fifth that they were
hotly engaged, and wanted reinforcements. My courier,
sent to General Hood, returned, and reported him wounded
and carried from the field. I sent a messenger to Lieu
tenant-General Longstreet for reinforcements, and at the
same time sent to Generals [George T.J Anderson and
Benning, urging them to hurry up to my support. They
came up, joined us, and fought gallantly; but as fast as
we would break one line of the enemy another fresh one
would present itself, the enemy reinforcing his lines in
our front from his reserves at the base of the mountain
to our right and front, and from his lines to our left.
Having no attack from us in his front, he threw his forces
from there, on us.
" Before the arrival of Generals Anderson and Benning,
Col. J. C. G. Key, who gallantly led the Fourth Texas regi
ment in, up to the time of receiving a severe wound,
passed me, being led to the rear. About the same time I
learned of the fall and dangerous wounding of Col. R.
M. Powell, of the Fifth, who fell while gallantly leading
his regiment in one of the impetuous charges of the Fourth
and Fifth Texas on the strongly fortified mountain.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 153
" Just after the arrival of General Anderson on my left
I learned that the gallant Col. Van. H. Manning, of the
Third Arkansas, had been wounded and carried from the
field, and about the same time I received intelligence of
the wounding and being carried from the field of those two
able and efficient officers, Lieut. Cols. K. Bryan, of the
Fifth, and B. F. Carter, of the Fourth, both of whom were
wounded while bravely discharging their duty. Captain
[J. R.J Woodward, acting major of the First Texas, was
wounded near me, while gallantly discharging his duty.
" The Fourth and Fifth Texas, under the command of
Majors [J. P.J Bane and [J. C] Rogers, continued to
hold the ground of their original line, leaving the space
over which they had made their successive charges strewn
with their wounded and dead comrades, many of whom
could not be removed, and were left upon the field. The
First Texas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Work, with a por
tion of Benning's brigade, held the field and the batteries
taken by the First Texas. Three of the guns were brought
off the field and secured; the other three, from the nature
of the ground and their proximity to the enemy, were left.
The Third Arkansas, under the command of Lieutenant-
Colonel [R. S.J Taylor, ably assisted by Major [J. W.]
Reedy, after Colonel Manning was borne from the field,
sustained well the high character it made in the earlier
part of the action.
" When night closed the conflict, late in the evening, I
was struck above the knee, which deprived me of the use
of my leg, and prevented me from getting about the field.
I retired some 200 yards to the rear, leaving the immediate
command with Lieutenant-Colonel Work, the senior of
ficer present, under whose supervision our wounded were
brought out and guns secured, and our dead on that part
of the field were buried the next day.
" About two o'clock that night the First Texas and

iS4 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Third Arkansas were moved by the right to the position
occupied by the Fourth and Fifth, and formed on their
left, where the brigade remained during the day of the 3d,
keeping up a continuous skirmishing with the enemy's
sharpshooters, in which we had a number of our men se
verely wounded. I sent my assistant adjutant-general,
Capt. F. L. Price, at daybreak to examine the position
of the brigade and report to me as soon as he could, and,
while in the discharge of that duty, was either killed or fell
into the hands of the enemy, as he has not been seen or
heard of since.
" About dark on the evening of the 3d the brigade, with
the division, fell back to the hill and formed in line, where
it remained during the 4th.
" Lieutenant [J. R.] Loughridge, commanding Com
pany I, Fourth Texas, who commanded the skirmishers
in front of the Fourth, and who was left when that regi
ment moved to the right, joined the First Texas, and did
gallant service during the engagement.
" In this, the hardest fought battle of the war in which
I have been engaged, all, both officers and men, as far as
my observation extended, fully sustained the high char
acter they have heretofore made. Where all behaved so
nobly individual distinction cannot with propriety be made.
" I cannot close this report without expressing my
thanks to my personal staff for the able and satisfactory
manner in which they discharged their duties. The
wounding of so many commanding officers, among them
the division commander, rendered their duties peculiarly
arduous. They were discharged with zeal and prompt
ness. Capt. F. L. Price, my assistant adjutant-general,
whose loss on the morning of the 3d I have to deplore, was
an active, efficient officer, and did his duty nobly. My
aide-de-camp, Lieut. John G. Scott, my assistant ad
jutant and inspector general, Lieut. John W. Kerr, and

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 155
Lieut. John Grace, volunteer aide, discharged their duties
with a promptness and ability that merit special notice.
" A list of the casualties in the several regiments, to
gether with the reports from each of the regimental com
manders is herewith submitted."
Report of Col. Van H. Manning, Third Arkansas In-
fantry- "Near Hagerstown, Md.,
" July 8, 1863.
" I have the honor to report the part taken by this com
mand in the recent battle near Gettysburg, Pa.
" About four o'clock in the evening of July 2 I was or
dered to move against the enemy, keeping my right well
connected with the left of the First Texas regiment, and
hold my left on the Emmittsburg road, then some 200
yards in my front and out of view.
" Upon reaching this road I discovered, from the di
rection the directing regiment was taking, that I could not
with the length of my line carry out the latter order ; hence
I decided to keep my command on a prolongation of the
line formed by the troops on my right. After marching
in line of battle at a brisk gait (part of the way at a double-
quick) for about 1,000 yards, all the time exposed to a
destructive fire from artillery, we engaged the enemy at
short range, strongly posted behind a rock fence at the
edge of woods. We drove him back with but little loss
for a distance of 150 yards, when I ascertained that I was
suffering from a fire to my left and rear. Thereupon I
ordered a change of front to the rear on first company,
but the noise consequent upon the heavy firing then going
on swallowed up my command, and I contented myself with
the irregular drawing back of the left wing, giving it an
excellent fire, which pressed the enemy back in a very
short while, whereupon the whole line advanced, the
enemy fighting stubbornly, but retiring.

156 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
" Soon I was again admonished that my left was seri
ously threatened, when I ordered the command back 50 or
75 yards to meet this contingency. He was again driven
back, and I stretched out my front twice its legitimate
length, guarding well my left, and advanced to the ledge
of rocks from which we had previously been dislodged by
the enemy's movement upon my flank. I experienced
some annoyance from the exposure of this flank up to this
moment; when Colonel [F. H.J Little, of the Eleventh
Georgia regiment, joined to my left. The Fifty-ninth
Georgia regiment, coming also at this time, occupied the
line with my command. Some little time after this I was
disabled by concussion and wound on my nose and fore
head. The command then devolved upon Lieutenant-Col
onel Taylor, who will report its operations subsequent to
this time.
" It would be invidious to make special mention of gal
lantry with either officers or men when all did so well,
fighting greatly superior numbers and at great disadvan
tage. I might safely assume that the bearing of the entire
command was of the highest creditable character.
" No guns or colors were captured, and but few (some
25) prisoners, a number of whom were sent to the rear
with -wounded men.
" Below I submit a list of killed, wounded, and missing.
The wounded include only those disabled indefinitely.
Quite a number were temporarily disabled by slight
wounds, but resumed their duties in a few days; hence I
make no mention of them in this report."
Report of Lieut. Col. P. A. Work, First Texas In-
fm*ry- "July 9, 1863."
" The following is submitted as a report of the part sus
tained by the First Texas regiment in the engagement of
Thursday, July 2, near Gettysburg, Pa., to-wit :

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 157
" The regiment, together with the brigade, having been
ordered forward to the attack about 4 p. m., continued to
advance by the front for a distance exceeding half a mile,
the Fourth Texas upon the right and the Third Arkansas
upon the left, when Company I, commanded by Lieut. J.
H. Woofers, and thrown out as skirmishers, engaged the
skirmishers of the enemy, driving them back upon a regi
ment supporting the enemy's battery, and then, aided by
volunteers from this (First Texas) regiment, engaging the
regiment and artillery, succeeded in driving back the regi
ment and silencing the enemy's guns, taking and holding
possession of the latter.
" While this regiment was closely following our skir
mishers, and had reached to within about 125 yards of the
enemy's artillery, the Third Arkansas regiment, upon my
left, became hotly engaged with a strong force of the
enemy upon its front and left, and, to preserve and pro
tect its left flank, was forced to retire to a point some 75
or 100 yards to my rear and left, thus leaving my left
flank uncovered and exposed, to protect which I halted and
threw out upon my left and rear Company G, commanded
by Lieut. B. A. Campbell (some 40 men), which soon en
gaged the enemy and drove them from their threatening
position to my left and the front of the Third Arkansas.
It was while in the execution of this order that Lieutenant
Campbell, a brave and gallant officer, fell, pierced through
the heart.
" Owing to the failure (as informed by Brigadier-Gen
eral Robertson) of the troops that were assigned to the
position on the left of this (Robertson's) brigade to ar
rive promptly, neither this nor the Third Arkansas regi
ment was able to advance, without advancing against a
vastly superior force and with the left flank of the Third
Arkansas (protecting my left) exposed to attack.
" After the lapse of several minutes Benning's brigade

158 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
made its appearance, but instead of occupying the ground
to the left of Robertson's brigade so as to enable the lat
ter to move forward with its left flank secured from at
tack, it occupied the ground still occupied by a portion,
at least, of this brigade, the Fifteenth Georgia regiment
falling in and remaining with the First Texas regiment.
After several ineffectual efforts upon the part of both the
commanders of the Fifteenth Georgia and myself to sepa
rate the men of the two regiments, we gave the order to
move forward, when both regiments, thus commingled,
moved forward and occupied the crest of the hill, some ioo
yards or more to the front, and where the enemy's artil
lery was stationed, where we remained until the close of
the day and until two o'clock on Friday morning.
" During the evening of the 2d an incessant fire was kept
up by this regiment, and the enemy was several times re
pulsed in their efforts to retake the hill. My position was
such that I was enabled to pour a deadly enfilading fire
into the enemy as they advanced through a wheat-field to
attack the troops in position on my left, and I have not a
doubt that this fire contributed greatly to the repulse of
the forces of the enemy attacking our forces some 300
to 500 yards on my left.
" Once during the evening the troops upon my left
were driven back, and my left was exposed, when, direct
ing Capt. H. E. Moss, Company D, to take charge of the
colors, and retaining them there with a few men to hold
the hill until the regiment could safely retire, I ordered the
regiment to fall back to a stone fence about 100 yards in
rear. The major portion of the regiment and the Fif
teenth Georgia fell back as ordered ; but quite a large num
ber, having noticed that the colors were not moving to the
rear, refused to withdraw, and, remaining upon the crest
of the hill, succeeded in holding the enemy in check in
their immediate front, and obliquely upon their front ?Wid

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 159
left, until the troops upon my left had been re-formed and
were again advanced, when I directed Maj. F. S. Bass to
return to the crest of the hill with the body of the regi
ment, and, with Capt. D. K. Rice, of Company C, pro
ceeded myself to collect together all fugitives, slightly
wounded, and exhausted men, and placed them so as to
protect my right and rear from an attack from that quarter,
one of my advanced scouts in that direction having re
ported to me that a column of the enemy was moving down
a ravine or hollow and threatening me> in that quarter.
" Having made every disposition to guard my right and
rear, I placed Capt. D. K. Rice in charge of such defense,
and proceeded to the Third Arkansas regiment, of which
General Robertson had ordered me to take charge. After
the loss of some half hour in searching for the Third Ar
kansas. I found Lieut.-Col. Taylor and Major Reedy, of
that regiment, both alive and uninjured, and in charge of the
regiment, which was doing its duty nobly and well.
" Late in the evening a terrific fire of artillery was con
centrated against the hill occupied by this (the First) regi
ment, and many were killed and wounded, some losing
their heads and others so horribly mutilated and mangled
that their identity could scarcely be established; but, not
withstanding this, all the men continued heroically and un
flinchingly to maintain their position.
" Immediately after dark, having detailed Companies
E and I for the purpose, I sent three pieces of the artillery
captured to the rear. There were three other pieces, two
at one point and one at another, that I was unable to re
move, for the reason that they were located between the
lines of the enemy and our own, and were so much ex
posed that they could not be approached excepting under
a murderous fire. While they could not be removed by
me, neither could they be approached by the enemy, for
the same fire that drove the artillerists from their guns and

i6o THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
the infantry from their support was ever in readiness to
keep them in check and drive them back.
" With but two exceptions, to-wit, Private [Richard]
Childers, of Company E, and Private [W. F.J Brooks,
Company K, each and every man of the regiment proved
himself a hero. Hundreds might be mentioned, each of
whom with reason and propriety might point to his gal
lant acts and daring deeds, and the lieutenant-colonel com
manding feels that he cannot call attention to the bearing
of a few only of these without doing some share of in
justice to those not mentioned; and though he is urged to
mention the names of Privates [W. Y.J Salter, Company
I, [J. N] Kirksey and [G.J Barfield, Company B, and
[W. J.] Barbee, Company L, for great and striking gal
lantry, and does mention them, he feels that he is neglect
ing others of equal merit. Private Barbee, though a
mounted courier, acting for Major-General Hood, entered
the ranks of his Company (L), and fought through the en
gagement. At one time he mounted a rock upon the high
est pinnacle of the hill, and there, exposed to a raking,
deadly fire from artillery and musketry, stood until he had
fired twenty-five shots, when he received a minie ball
wound in the right thigh, and fell.
" Having exhausted their original supply of ammuni
tion, the men supplied themselves from the cartridge-boxes
of their dead and disabled comrades and from the dead
and wounded of the enemy, frequently going in front of
the hill to secure a cartridge-box. Many of the officers
threw aside their swords, seized a rifle, and, going into
the ranks, fought bravely and nobly.
" The regiment lost in killed, 25 ; in wounded, 48 ; and
missing, 20; a list of the names of whom, giving the com
pany and character of wound of those wounded, is hereto
annexed as part of this report.
" I would state that Capt. John R. Woodward, of

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 161
Company G, entered the engagement as acting major in
charge of the left wing early in the engagement. He was
wounded in the head by the fragment of a shell, and was
bome from the field.
" In addition to the above report I have the following to
submit : During the evening of Friday, July 2, Company I,
commanded by Lieutenant [J. R.] Loughridge, having be
come separated from the Fourth Texas regiment, of which
it was a part, attached itself to the First Texas regiment,
and remained with it throughout the evening and night,
until the latter was moved to the position occupied by the
brigade on July 3, doing its full duty and battling bravely."
Report of Major John P. Bane, Fourth Texas Infantry.
"July 9, 1863.
" I have the honor to submit the following report of the
part taken by my regiment in the action near Gettysburg,
Pa., July 2 and 3 :
" About 4 :30 p. m. the 2d instant we were ordered to
advance on the enemy, who occupied the heights about 1 1-4
miles distant, the Fifth Texas, the directing battalion, on
my right, and the First Texas on my left. Advancing
at double-quick, we soon met the enemy's skirmishers, who
occupied a skirt of thick undergrowth about one-quarter
of a mile from the base of the cliffs, upon which the enemy
had a battery playing upon us with the most deadly effect.
" After a short pause while repelling his skirmishers, I
was ordered by General Robertson to move by the right
flank, so as to cover all the ground between us and the di
recting battalion. Moving about 200 yards, I met the
enemy in full force in a heavy, wooded ground, sheltering
themselves behind rocks, from which, after a sharp con
test, he was driven to the heights beyond in our front and
in close proximity to the mountain, and there I was pained

162 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
to learn that the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel B. F. Carter
was severely wounded while crossing a stone wall near
the base of the mountain. I was also informed that Col.
John C. G. Key, while gallantly urging the men to the
front, was severely wounded. The command then de
volved upon me. Many of the officers and men had been
killed and wounded up to this time.
" Finding it impossible to carry the heights by assault
with my thinned ranks, I ordered my command to fall
back in the skirt of timber, the position then occupied being
enfiladed by the batteries on the left and exposed to heavy
fire of musketry in my immediate front. Being joined by
the Fifth Texas on my right, I again attempted to drive
the enemy from the heights by assaults, but with like re
sults. Again, being reinforced by the Forty-eighth Ala
bama, commanded by the gallant Colonel [James L.] Shef
field, and the Forty-fourth Alabama, whose commander I
did not learn, we again charged their works, but were re
pulsed, and then, under the order of General Law, I or
dered my command to fall back under cover of the timber,
on a slight elevation within short range of the enemy. I
formed my regiment in line of battle, leaving the battle
field contested ground.
" At the dawn of day I had a stone wall about two feet
high thrown up, which afforded some protection to the men
occupying the position from which we had driven the
enemy, until sunset of the 3d instant, at which time I was
ordered to move my command, in conjunction with the re
mainder of the brigade, by the right flank, to occupy the
ground from which we first advanced upon the enemy.
" I accord to each and all of my officers and men my
warmest congratulations for their continued and unceasing
gallantry during the entire engagement.
" The following list of casualties is appended.
" All of which is respectfully submitted."

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 163
Report of Lieut. Col. K. Bryan, Fifth Texas Infantry.
" Near Hagerstown, Md.,
" July 8, 1863.
" Col. R. M. Powell having fallen into the hands of the
enemy, it devolves upon me, as lieutenant-colonel of the
regiment, to report the part taken by it as far as came
under my observation in the action of [July] 2 and 3, near
Gettysburg, Pa.
" About 4 p. m. on the 2d instant General Hood's di
vision was drawn up in line of battle fronting the heights
occupied by the enemy. The Fifth Texas regiment occu
pied the right of the brigade, resting on General Law's
left, whose brigade was the one of direction. At the word
' Forward ! ' the regiment moved forward in good order.
The enemy had a line of sharpshooters at the foot of the
first height, behind a stone fence, about three-fourths of a
mile from our starting point, which distance was passed
over by our line at a double-quick and a run.
" At our approach the enemy retired to the top of the
first height, protected by a ledge of rocks. A short halt
was made at the stone fence, to enable those who had fallen
behind to regain their places. When the command ' For
ward ! ' again fell from the lips of our gallant colonel,
every man leaped the fence and advanced rapidly up the
hillside. The enemy again fled at our approach, shel
tering himself behind his fortified position on the top
of the second height, about 200 yards distant from the
first. " From this position we failed to drive them. Our
failure was owing to the rocky nature of the ground over
which we had to pass, the huge rocks forming defiles
through which not more than 3 or 4 men could pass
abreast, thus breaking up our alignment and rendering its
re-formation impossible. Notwithstanding the difficulties
to overcome, the men pressed on to the pass of the precipi-

1 64 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
tous stronghold, forming and securing the enemy's second
position, many of our officers and men falling in passing
the open space between the heights. Here we halted, there
being small clusters of rocks far below the elevated posi
tion of the enemy, which gave us partial protection. From
this position we were enabled to deliver our fire for the
first time with accuracy.
" Seeing that the men were in the best obtainable posi
tion and deeming a farther advance without reinforce
ments impracticable (a great many of the regiment having
been already disabled), I looked for Colonel Powell, to
know his next order. Failing to see him, I concluded at
once that he, like many of his gallant officers and men, had
fallen a victim to the deadly missiles of the enemy, which
were being showered like hail upon us. I moved toward
the center, passing many officers and men who had fallen,
having discharged their whole duty like true soldiers. I
had not proceeded far when I discovered the prostrate
form of our noble colonel, who had fallen at his post, his
face to the foe. I hastened toward him, when I received
a wound in my left arm. On reaching the colonel, I
found that he was not dead ; but seeing the rent in his coat
where the ball had passed out, my fears were excited that
his wound would prove mortal. The hemorrhage from
my own wound forced me from the field, leaving the com
mand upon Major Rogers.
" The officers and men of my wing of the regiment con
tinued to discharge their duties in a manner worthy of our
cause so long as I remained upon the field, and from their
conduct heretofore I would not hesitate to vouch for them
during the remainder of the battle.
" Captain [John S.J Cleveland, of Company H, was
on the right. His skillful management of his own com
pany aided me vastly in the direction of my wing."

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 165
Report of Maj. J. C. Rogers, Fifth Texas Infantry.
" Near Hagerstown, Md.,
" July 8, 1863.
" I have the honor to forward a continuation of the re
port of the part taken by the Fifth Texas regiment in the
action of the 2d and 3d instant, after the wounding of
Colonels Powell and Bryan, when the command devolved
upon me, the regiment still holding the position as left by
Colonel Bryan, firing with accuracy and deadly effect.
" The order to fall back came from some unknown
source, and, finding that the regiments on our right and
left had retired, it became necessary to follow. I there
fore gave the order for the regiment to about-face and re
tire to the rear, which they did in good order until they
reached the position mentioned in Colonel Bryan's report
as the second position of the enemy, and here we halted
and re-formed, in connection with the other regiments.
From the exhausted condition of the men it was deemed
necessary to remain here for a few moments.
" The regiments were again ordered forward, which
they did in the most gallant manner, and regained their
first position, which they held as long as it was tenable;
and a farther advance being impracticable, owing to the
nature of the ground, as expressed in Colonel Bryan's re
port, they again retired in good order to an open space
about 50 yards in rear, when here it was discovered for
the first time that nearly two-thirds of our officers and
men had been killed and wounded.
" Only a few moments were here consumed to allow
the men to recover their breath, when, in obedience to or
ders, I again moved the regiment forward to attack the
enemy in their impregnable position. The coolness and de
termination of the men and officers were equal to the oc
casion. They advanced boldly over the ground strewn

166 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
with the bodies of their dead and dying comrades to the
base of what they knew to be an impregnable fortification.
We held this position until it was discovered that we had
no supports either on the right or left and were about to
be flanked, and therefore were again compelled to retire,
which the regiment did in good order to the point men
tioned in Colonel Bryan's report as the second position of
the enemy, which place we were ordered to hold at all haz
ards, which we did.
" Just before day on the morning of the 3d orders
reached me that breastworks must be thrown up, and the
position held. The order was obeyed. During the day
constant skirmishing was kept up with the enemy, which
resulted in the loss to us of many of our best scouts. Late
in the evening, in obedience to orders, I about-faced my
regiment and marched three-quarters of a mile to the crest
of the ridge from which the charge of the day previous
commenced. Here we threw up breastworks, behind
which we remained during the night.
" I would respectfully beg leave to call attention to the
valuable assistance I received from Capt. John S. Cleve
land in the management of the right wing of my regiment,
and Capt. T. T. Clay on the left; also to the heroic con
duct of T. W. Fitzgerald, of Company A, who was color-
bearer. He pressed gallantly forward, and was badly
wounded far in front. J. A. Howard, of Company B,
color corporal, then took the flag and remained firmly at
his post. He was almost instantly killed. The colors
were then taken by Sergeant W. S. Evans, of Company F,
who planted them defiantly in the face of the foe during
the remainder of the fight, always advancing promptly to
the front when the order was given.
" The general conduct of officers and men was beyond
all praise."

LITTLE ROUND' TOP, GETTYSBURG 167
Benning's Brigade
Report of Brig-Gen. Henry L. Benning, C. S. Army,
Commanding Brigade.
" Headquarters Benning's Brigade,
" August 3, 1863.
" In obedience to an order from the headquarters of this
division, I have the honor to submit to you the following
report of the operations of this brigade since it left Cul-
peper Court House for the other side of the Potomac:
" About 2 or 3 p. m. on July 2, ultimo, I was informed
by Major-General Hood that his division, as the right of
Lieutenant-General Longstreet's corps, was about to at
tack the left of the enemy's line, and that in the attack
my brigade would follow Law's brigade at the distance of
about 400 yards. In order to get to the place they as
signed me, in the rear of General Law, it was necessary
to move the brigade 500 or 600 yards farther to the right.
Having done this, I advanced in line of battle. A wood
intervened between us and the enemy, which, though it did
not prevent their shells from reaching us and producing
some casualties, yet completely hid them from our view.
On emerging from the woods their position became visible.
Before us, at the distance of 600 or 800 yards, was an ob
long mountain peak, or spur, presenting to us a steep face,
much roughened by rocks. To the right, 400 or 500 yards
from the peak, was the main mountain itself, with a side
that looked almost perpendicular. Its summit overlooked
the peak just sufficiently to command it well. On the sum
mit of the peak were three pieces of artillery, and a little
in advance of them, on a sort of uneven, irregular shelf,
were three others. To the right and left of the battery,
as well as immediately in its rear, were lines of infantry,
as we afterward ascertained. This formed the enemy's
first line of battle.

1 68 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
" On the top of the mountain itself, and a little to the
right of the peak, were five other guns. These commanded
our approaches to the peak for nearly the whole way. To
the right and left of these guns extended the enemy's sec
ond line of infantry. Where that line crossed the gorge
running between the peak and the mountain, a point 500 or
600 yards in the rear of the peak, were two other guns.
This we ascertained when the right of the brigade reached
the gorge, by the terrible fire from them which swept down
the gorge.
" Thus, what we had to encounter were thirteen guns,
and two, if not more, lines of infantry posted on mountain
heights. The intervening spur over which we had to
march to reach the first line was nearly all open. Our
own first line also became visible, advancing about 400
yards in our front. The part of it in our front I took to
be Law's brigade, and so I followed it. In truth it was
Robertson's, Law's being farther to the right. This I did
not discover until late in the fight, a wood on the right
concealing from me most of Law's brigade. My line con
tinued to follow the first line, halting once or twice to pre
serve its interval. At length I saw that the first line
would not be able alone to carry the peak, so I advanced
without halting again.
" When my line reached the foot of the peak I found
there a part of the First Texas, struggling to make the
ascent, the rest of the brigade having gone to the right
and left, the Fourth and Fifth Texas to the right, and the
Third Arkansas to the left. The part of the First Texas
referred to falling in with my brigade, the whole line com
menced ascending the rugged steep and (on the right)
crossing the gorge. The ground was difficult, rocks in
many places presenting, by their precipitous sides, insur
mountable obstacles, while the fire of the enemy was very
heavy and very deadly. The progress was therefore not

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 169
very rapid; but it was regular and uninterrupted. After
a while the enemy were driven from their three front
guns. The advance continued, and at length they were
driven completely from the peak, but they carried with
them the three rear guns on its summit, its sudden descent
on the other side favoring the operation, so that we cap
tured only the three front guns. These were 10-pounder
Parrotts. A number of prisoners also were taken —
more, I suppose, than 100.
" The peak being thus taken and the enemy's first line
driven behind his second, I made my dispositions to hold
the ground gained, which was all that I could do, as I was
then much in advance of every other part of our line of
battle, and the second line of the enemy on the mountain
itself was in a position which seemed to me almost impreg
nable to any merely front attack, even with fresh men.
Indeed, to hold the ground we had, appeared a difficult
task. The shells of the enemy from the adjacent moun
tain were incessantly bursting along the summit of the
peak, and every head that showed itself was the target of
a minie ball. Several attempts by flank movements were
made to dislodge us, but by the gallantry of the regiments
on the right and left they all failed. We held the position
until late next day, when we were ordered back to the crest
of the wooded hill from which we first saw the enemy on
the day before.
" Our loss was heavy, not less than 400 in killed,
wounded, and missing. Of this number an unusually large
proportion were killed and badly wounded. Among the
killed were Col. John A. Jones, of the Twentieth Georgia,
and Lieut.-Col. William T. Harris, commanding the Sec
ond Georgia. Colonel Jones was killed late in the action,
not far from the captured guns, after the enemy's forces
were driven from the position and they had themselves
opened upon it with shell from their other batteries, a

i TO THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
fragment of one of which, glancing from a rock, passed
through his brain. He had behaved with great coolness
and gallantry. He fell just as success came in sight. Col
onel Harris was farther to the right, where he and his
regiment were exposed to the terrible fire of the two pieces
which swept the gorge, as well as to the infantry fire of the
enemy's left. A ball passed through his heart, killing him
instantly. His gallantry had been most conspicuous.
" I had no means of ascertaining the precise loss of the
enemy. In killed and wounded it must have been large.
Dead and wounded lay scattered over the ground of the
conflict and of the retreat. From the latter they were
removed by the enemy during the night. We took about
300 prisoners in all.
" The conduct of both officers and men was generally,
as far as I could observe it, excellent. Under a fire from
so many cannon and toward the last from so much mus
ketry, they advanced steadily over ground for the most
part open, mounted a difficult height, drove back from it
the enemy, occupied his line, took three guns, captured a
number of prisoners, and against his utmost efforts held all
they had gained. The captured guns were taken by the
Twentieth Georgia (Colonel Jones and, after his death,
Lieutenant-Colonel Waddell), the part of the First Texas
above referred to (Colonel Work), and the Seventeenth
Georgia (Colonel Hodges) ; but the honor of the capture
was not exclusively theirs. They could not have taken
• — certainly could not have held — ¦ the guns if Lieutenant-
Colonel Harris and, after his death, Major [William S.]
Shepherd, on the left with the Second Georgia, and Col
onel Du Bose, with the Fifteenth Georgia, on the right,
had not by the hardest kind of fighting and at great loss
protected their flanks. Colonel Du Bose not only drove
back the enemy's line, but repulsed repeated attacks made
to recover it, taking over 100 prisoners. The same may

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 171
be said of the Second, excepting that it did not take so
many prisoners."
General Hood was severely wounded during the can
nonade which preceded the advance of the infantry and
was carried to the rear. General Law was not informed
of this until the infantry was in close proximity to the
Union line, when as senior brigade commander he assumed
command of the four brigades of Hood's division. For
reasons explained in Law's admirable paper published
many years after the war, in the Century Magazine, from
which I have quoted extracts, no report of the part taken
by Hood's division was made, either by Hood or Law.
As Anderson's brigade was too far to the left to have had
any influence in the attack on Little Round Top, I have
omitted its report. Benning's report of his brigade, which
attacked Ward at the Devil's Den, is so complete that I
have omitted the regimental reports. I have given in
full the regimental reports of Law's and Robertson's bri
gades and the brigade report by Robertson. The Confed
erates left the scene of their attack almost immediately.
At the time of writing these reports they knew nothing of
the nomenclature of this part of the battlefield, which
since has become so familiar. The names Devil's Den,
Little Round Top, and Big Round Top do not appear; in
stead, they speak of high peaks, rocky ridges, mountains,
gorges, and valleys in a way which makes it difficult in
some cases to trace their movements exactly. However,
from other indications I think I have been able to locate
them correctly in stating that the attack on the Devil's
Den was made by the First Texas and Third Arkansas of
Robertson's brigade, the four regiments of Benning's and
Law's Forty- fourth Alabama, and that the attack on Lit
tle Round Top was made by Robertson's Fourth and Fifth
Texas, Law's Fourth, Fifteenth, Forty-seventh, and Forty-

172 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
eighth Alabama, with a possibility that the Forty-fourth
Alabama joined on the left of the Forty-eighth Alabama
in the last assault on Little Round Top, as shown on the
Government map mentioned elsewhere.
Forty-eighth Alabama
I have placed this report out of its numerical order be
cause there is no other report of Law's brigade, and Shef
field states that, having learned that Hood was wounded
and Law had assumed command of the division, he was
ordered to assume command of the brigade. He did not
learn this fact, however, until his regiment had been fight
ing one hour and a half and been three times repulsed. So
far as this part of the battle is concerned, it is in no sense
a report of the brigade. He makes no mention of having
given any orders to any other regiments during the attack
on Vincent, and none of the regimental reports mention
the receipt of any orders from him. He says that when
he took command of the brigade Captain T. J. Eubanks
took command of the regiment and re-formed it, and gal
lantly led it to the front. This change of commanders ap
pears to have taken place after the brigade had been three
times repulsed and had retired in some disorder out of
range. I have been unable to find any record of the order which
moved the Forty-eighth Alabama and the Fourth and
Fifth Texas to the Confederate left to make the attack
on Vincent's right flank. As soon as I could get a musket
after the first attack on Vincent's center began, I took my
place in the line between the right of the Forty- fourth New
York and the left of the Sixteenth Michigan, and remained
there until the last assault was repulsed. I am sure that
these three Confederate regiments did not move to the left
directly in front of our line. Marching by the flank im
mediately in front of our position, without opportunity to

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 173
make any resistance, they would have been cut to pieces
before they had covered half the ground necessary to
reach the place from which they made the assault. They
must have gone north in the Plum Run valley behind the
big rocks which separated that valley from the western foot
of Little Round Top. By this time Ward's brigade had
been driven back from its position at the Devil's Den and
the way was open in that direction. May it not be pos
sible that Colonel Sheffield ordered this movement after
the troops of his brigade had recovered from the disorder
of their last repulse and had got into reasonable order
again ? The officers and men were plucky and determined.
Having failed in a direct assault on Vincent's front, they
evidently hoped for better results from a flank attack on
Vincent's right, while the Fifteenth, Forty-seventh and
Fourth Alabama were attacking Vincent's left. Sheffield's
report, like the others, leaves many gaps to be filled. If
the above explanation is not correct, a better one will be
gladly received.
Fourth Alabama
This report is certainly not a history of the battle of
Gettysburg. Without violating the military rule which re
quires official reports to be confined to the operations of
the organization reported, it might with propriety have
given a more extended account of the operations of this
regiment. On the first reading one would suppose that
this regiment did not participate in the attack on Vincent,
but was engaged on the western front of Big Round Top.
Its first position in line was the left one of the five Ala
bama regiments of Law's brigade. Robertson's brigade of
one Arkansas and three Texas regiments was ordered to
keep in connection with the left of Law's brigade.
In advancing, Law's men obliqued to the right and Rob
ertson's Fourth and Fifth Texas followed this movement.

174 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Ward's brigade at the Devil's Den was the objective.
Seeing that his brigade had gone too far to the right and
was facing the south side of Big Round Top, Law directed
the two regiments on his right, the Forty-eighth and
Forty- fourth Alabama, to halt and then move by the flank
to the left of his brigade. While the Fourth and Fifth
Texas had followed this oblique movement, Robertson's
other two regiments had gone straight on to the Devil's
Den, leaving a considerable interval between the two parts
of his brigade. The Forty-eighth and Forty-fourth Ala
bama continued their flank movement to the left until they
had passed the Fourth and Fifth Texas, then came to the
front with the Forty-eighth on the left of the Fourth Texas
and the Forty-fourth on the extreme left of Law's line.
Near the foot of the hill from which they advanced they
struck the left of Stoughton's sharpshooters stationed be
hind a stone wall facing south near the west front of Big
Round Top. After a stubborn resistance the sharpshooters
retired, three companies of them going up the west front
of Big Round Top in the woods, closely followed by the
right two regiments of Law's brigade, the Fifteenth and
Forty-seventh Alabama. The remainder of Law's men
crossed the western slope and the low ground to the west
of it until they came to the narrow valley which runs along
the north side of Big Round Top. Here by Law's orders
the Forty- fourth Alabama wheeled to the left and ad
vanced against Smith's battery on the Devil's Den.
The Fourth and Forty-eighth Alabama, with the Fourth
and Fifth Texas, marched in columns up this valley to
seize the Little Round Top or turn it. The Fourth Ala
bama was one of these regiments. Meeting Vincent's
skirmishers, they quickly formed in line of battle in the
following order from right to left : Fourth Alabama, Fifth
Texas, Fourth Texas, and Forty-eighth Alabama. The
Fourth Alabama swung around to attack the Eighty-third

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 175
Pennsylvania from the south. The other regiments faced
the right wing of the Eighty-third, Forty-fourth, and the
left of the Sixteenth Michigan. After a few minutes of
desperate fighting this line retired a short distance and took
shelter behind the rocks, but soon re-formed the line and
advanced again. I think the Fourth Alabama retired and
returned with the others. In any event, they were there
when Oates' column, consisting of the Fifteenth and Forty-
seventh Alabama, was seen advancing along the foot of
Big Round Top in rear of the Fourth Alabama, which re
mained there until some time after Oates' men had come
to close quarters with the Twentieth Maine. When the
Fourth Alabama finally retired, with the troops which it
had accompanied, it took shelter on the western slope of
Big Round Top and did no more fighting that day.
Fifteenth Alabama
As Colonel Oates has made a long and elaborate account
in his book, " The War Between the Union and the Con
federacy," which I have quoted elsewhere, with my com
ments, I have nothing further to add here. The reader
is referred to this paper among my extracts from the his
tories (pp. 77-110). Forty-fourth Alabama
This regiment appears to have advanced into the Plum
Run valley on the flank of the battery on the Devil's Den
and to have fought the infantry posted in the rear of the
battery to support it. When Benning's brigade advanced,
its line more than covered the front of the Devil's Den,
one regiment at least being in the Plum Run valley, and
joining the left of the Forty-fourth Alabama. The Union
line retreated from the three front guns of the battery.
The remaining three were taken to the rear. With Ben-

176 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
ning's brigade and part of Robertson's holding this posi
tion, the Forty-fourth was left free to join the Forty-
eighth in the advance against the crest of Little Round Top
if it wished to do so. Colonel Perry does not mention
any such movement. In a letter written to Colonel Oates
by Colonel Perry several years after the war, which I
have quoted in my extracts from Oates' book, Perry speaks
of his exhaustion and of his having been stunned by the
explosion of a shell near him. He was not in condition
to know much about what happened at the end of the fight
about the Devil's Den. He makes no mention in his re
port of the withdrawal of his regiment nor where it went
when withdrawn. Forty-seventh Alabama
This report is very incomplete. It makes no mention
of the fact that the regiment went with the Fifteenth Ala
bama to the summit of Big Round Top. From Major
Campbell's statement in commendation of the conduct of
the officers of the regiment, not including the colonel and
adjutant, and from Oates' statement that Law told him
that in case the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh were separated
from the brigade, the Forty-seventh would be under his
command, it is evident there was considerable demoraliza
tion among the field and staff of the Forty-seventh. The
resignation of the colonel and the promotion of the lieu
tenant-colonel, Bulger, to be colonel to date from July 16,
is conclusive. Oates' statement that the lieutenant-col
onel, although very courageous, was unfitted to command
the regiment by reason of his age and his inexperience and
ignorance of tactics, may explain Law's reason for placing
the direction of the regiment under certain contingencies
in the hands of Colonel Oates. The note in the official re
port which states that Bulger was not killed in the action

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 177
was made by the editor or compiler of the " Rebellion Rec
ords." * Bulger was the officer who surrendered to Col
onel Chamberlain by handing him his sword with one hand
and firing his pistol at him with the other. He was well
cared for by the Union surgeons and lived for many years
after the war. Major Campbell's statement that after the
first repulse of the brigade he deployed a part of his men
on the right of the brigade, where they remained until the
close of the fight, is not very probable, if it refers to the
repulse by Vincent's brigade. The Fifteenth Alabama was
on the right of the Forty-seventh, and under the circum
stances it is not likely that a detachment of the Forty-sev
enth would have been sent to the right of the Fifteenth.
Possibly he refers to a movement made after his regi
ment had returned to the woods on the western foot of
Big Round Top. The first repulse of the brigade occurred
before the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama came
down from the mountain.
Robertson's Brigade Report
This is an excellent report. If all the official reports
were like it in careful and intelligible description there
would be little trouble in forming a correct idea of the
movements. It explains clearly how two of his regiments,
the Fourth and Fifth Texas, became separated from the
other two regiments of his brigade and fought with Law's
brigade in the attack on Little Round Top. His regimen
tal reports give more details.
Third Arkansas
As the attack of this regiment in connection with An
derson's brigade was made against De Trobriand's line on
the west of the Devil's Den, and it had little if any effect
1 See footnote, p. 149.

178 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
on the fight for possession of Little Round Top, I see no
occasion for comment. I mention it only as a part of
Robertson's brigade. First Texas
This regiment was principally engaged on the left of
the line in front of Smith's battery at the Devil's Den.
One company of the Fourth Texas which had been thrown
out as skirmishers in the advance went straight forward
while its regiment moved to the right to maintain its con
nection with Law's brigade. This company fought
through the day with the First Texas. Benning's bri
gade, following closely Robertson's advance, came up and
its left mingled with the First Texas in the assault and
capture of three guns of this battery.
Fourth Texas
This report, like that of the Fifth Texas and some
others, is wanting in definiteness of detail about positions.
What he calls the first position of the enemy is evidently
the stone wall behind which Stoughton's sharpshooters
were posted. One might suppose from his statement that
Stoughton retreated and was followed to his second posi
tion at the base of the mountain, but he evidently means
the position of Vincent's brigade, against which repeated
assaults were made and repulsed. The lieutenant-col
onel, Carter, was severely wounded in the fight with Stough
ton at the stone wall. This was followed by the
wounding of Colonel Key in the assault on Vincent,
leaving Major Bane in command. Colonel Key was able
to walk, as Robertson in his report mentions seeing him as
he was led to the rear. In addition to the fight with
Stoughton at the stone wall, he speaks of three assaults, in

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 179
the first of which the enemy was driven to the heights be
yond, in close proximity to the mountain. This evidently
refers to the falling back of Vincent's skirmishers to the
main line, followed by the Confederates, who retreated
after a few minutes of close fighting. The second assault
was made in connection with the Fifth Texas, with like
results. He does not mention the Fourth Alabama on the
right of the Fifth Texas, nor the Forty-eighth Alabama
on the left of the Fourth Texas, but I think the four regi
ments were there and continued their desperate fighting
for some time. I think the third assault was that made
against Vincent's right flank which was repulsed by the
One Hundred and Fortieth New York. This is the only
instance in which the Forty-fourth Alabama is mentioned
as participating in the assaults on Little Round Top.
During the first part of the battle the Forty-fourth Ala
bama was, according to the report of its commander, fight
ing at the Devil's Den. As I have stated elsewhere, this
position was carried by the Confederates before the assault
on Vincent's right flank, and the Forty-fourth may have
joined in this assault with the Texas regiments and the
Forty-eighth Alabama on the left of the latter, as repre
sented in the Government map showing the position of
troops. In this assault the Forty-eighth was commanded
by Captain Eubanks, not by Colonel Sheffield, as stated
by Major Bane.
Fifth Texas
This report is in two parts, the first by Lieutenant-Col
onel K. Bryan, who took command when Colonel Powell
was wounded in front of Vincent's brigade, the second by
Major J. C. Rogers, who succeeded to the command when
Lieutenant-Colonel Bryan was wounded. Like the report
of the Fourth Texas by Major Bane, it is very difficult to
follow; but there is no doubt the place mentioned in both.

180 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
as the second position of the enemy is the position of Vin
cent's brigade, as Colonel Powell was wounded in front of
Vincent's line and was made a prisoner there. As they
speak about following the enemy to their second position,
about two hundred yards distant, from which they drove
them, they appear to have supposed that their first en
counter at the stone wall was with Vincent's men, who re
treated to their second position near the base of the moun
tain. This cannot be true, for two reasons: Vincent's
men were not at the stone wall where the first encounter
occurred. They did not follow Stoughton, because three
regiments of Law's brigade on their right took care of
Stoughton, who retreated up the west front of Big Round
Top. Their statement that they drove the enemy from
their second position into their fortified line near the base
of the mountain, from which they failed to drive them,
must refer to the falling back of Vincent's skirmishers.
This would not be so clear if it were not certain that their
main attack was against Vincent. There Colonel Powell
was wounded and made prisoner by the Eighty-third
Pennsylvania, as were a large number of his men. I think
there is no question that after driving the sharpshooters
from the stone fence, the Fourth Alabama, Fifth Texas,
Fourth Texas, and Forty-eighth Alabama kept straight on
in more or less regular line of battle until they reached
the little valley extending along the north side of Big
Round Top, and then, by Law's direction, moved by the
right flank up this valley until they reached and attacked
Vincent. Benning's Brigade Report
As Benning did not attack Little Round Top, but fought
his battle against Ward's brigade, Smith's battery, and the
reinforcements sent to their support, I have not thought
it necessary to include his regimental reports. As there

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 181
were several claimants for the honor of the capture of the
three guns of Smith's battery, I shall not attempt to decide
between them. There was glory enough for all.

THE OFFICIAL REPORTS— UNION **
Report of Maj.-Gen. George Sykes, U. S. Army, com
manding Fifth Army Corps.
" Headquarters Fifth Army Corps,
" Camp Near Warrenton, Va., July 31, 1863.
" On the 28th ultimo, by the assignment of General
Meade to the command of the Army of the Potomac, I be
came the senior general of this corps.
" On June 29 and 30 and on July 1 and 2 I made long,
rapid, and fatiguing marches, starting at Frederick, Md.,
and reaching the field of Gettysburg, via Liberty, Union
Mills, Hanover, etc., about 8 a. m., on the latter date. My
troops took position on the right of our line, but it being
thought too extended, they were subsequently massed near
the bridge over Rock Creek, on the Baltimore and Gettys
burg pike and within reach of the Twelfth Army Corps.
While thus situated, I was directed to support the Third
corps, General Sickles commanding, with a brigade^ should
it be required.
" At 3 p. m. General Meade sent for me, and while my
self and other corps commanders were conversing with
him, the enemy formed, opened the battle, and developed
his attack on our left. I was at once ordered to throw my
whole corps to that point and hold it at all hazards. This,
of course, relieved my troops from any call from the com
mander of the Third corps. En route to the position thus
assigned the Fifth corps, various staff officers from Gen-
1M Rebellion Records,"7 Series 1, Vol. xxvii, part 1, pp. 592-658.

182 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
eral Sickles met me, and, in the name of that officer, asked
for assistance. I explained to them that it was impossible
for me to give it; the key of the battlefield was intrusted
to my keeping, and I could not and would not jeopardize
it by a division of my forces.
" A rocky ridge, commanding almost an entire view of
the plateau held by our army, was on our extreme left.
Between it and the position occupied by Birney's division,
Third corps, was a narrow gorge filled with immense
boulders and flanked on either side by dense woods. It
afforded excellent cover and an excellent approach for the
enemy, both of which he promptly made use of. The
rocky ridge commanded and controlled this gorge. In ex
amining it and the ground adjacent previous to posting my
troops, I found a battery at its outer edge and without
adequate support. I galloped to General Birney, whose
troops were nearest, explained to him the necessity of pro
tecting the guns, and suggested that he should close his
division on the battery, and hold the edge of the woods
on its right. I promised to fill the gap he opened, which
I did with Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades, of my First
division, posting them myself.
" In the meantime Vincent's brigade, of this division,
had seized the rocky height, closely followed by Weed's
brigade, Second division. These troops were posted under
the direction of General Warren, chief engineer of this
army. After closing the interval made by Birney with
the brigades of General Barnes, I rode rapidly to the
Taneytown pike to bring up the remaining troops of the
corps, and on my return with them found the greater part
of Weed's brigade moving away from the height where it
had been stationed, and where its presence was vital. I
dispatched a staff officer to know of the general why he
had vacated the ground assigned him. His reply was,
' By order of General Sickles.' I at once directed him to

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 183
re-occupy it, which was done at the double-quick step.
Hardly had he reached it before the enemy came on in
tremendous force. Vincent's brigade and O'Rorke's regi
ment (Weed's brigade) were and had been sorely pressed.
Both those heroic commanders had fallen ; but Weed again
in position, Hazlett working his guns superbly, and the
timely arrival of Ayres' brigades of Regulars, who were
at once ordered to attack, stemmed the tide, and rolled
away the foe in our front.
" At a later hour, by the withdrawal or retreat of the
troops on his right, first, a division of the Third corps, and
next, Caldwell's command, of the Second corps, a large
body of the enemy gained his right and rear, and Ayres
was compelled to fight his way, front and flank, to the heel
of the gorge. This he did steadily, in excellent order, and
connected with his left brigade (Weed's) on the general
line of battle. But his loss was fearful; some of the regi
ments left sixty per cent, of their number on the ground.
As Ayres assumed this new position, General Crawford's
command (my Third division) was ordered to the front,
and, entering the woods, became briskly engaged with the
enemy. This combat lasted till dusk, and resulted in Gen
eral Crawford's gaining considerable ground, capturing
many prisoners, and a flag of a Georgia regiment.
" Night closed the fight. The key of the battlefield was
in our possession intact. Vincent, Weed, and Hazlett,
chiefs lamented throughout the corps and army, sealed
with their lives the spot intrusted to their keeping, and on
which so much depended. The general line of battle on
the left was shortened, strengthened, firm. Pickets were
established, and the troops slept on their arms. Sedgwick
(Sixth corps) had moved up to my aid.
" On the 3d Crawford held his ground in front, sus
tained by Bartlett's division of Sedgwick's corps. The
troops remained as the day before. Desultory firing from

184 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
the pickets continued along our front. At I p. m. the
enemy commenced a furious cannonade from more than
one hundred guns, and occasionally a part of it was be
stowed on the Fifth and Sixth corps. It was the prelude
to his attack, which soon followed and raged to our right;
but, beaten, baffled, and discomfited, he returned to the
shelter of the forests west of the Emmittsburg and Gettys
burg pike. My artillery on the rocky ridge helped to shat
ter and disorganize his troops.
" On the 4th reconnaissances were made, but developed
nothing save a line of skirmishers covering his troops, and
artillery on the slope falling away from the turnpike to
the west.
" On the 5th I began the march to Williamsport.
" I respectfully call the attention of the major-general
commanding, to the services of the artillery of this corps,
under its chief, Capt. A. P. Martin, and the subordinate
battery commanders, as detailed in his report.
" The regular batteries were the greatest sufferers.
Hazlett's battery (D, Fifth U. S. Artillery) was especially
distinguished, and Watson's battery (I, same regiment)
though unfortunately taken away by General Sickles, with
out my consent or knowledge, after falling into the hands
of the enemy, was recaptured by Lieutenant Peeples, of the
battery, heading the Garibaldi Guard, in the most heroic
and gallant manner. Lieutenant Peeples richly deserves
promotion for his conduct, and I trust the Government
will not withhold it.
" I am happy to say the Fifth corps sustained its repu
tation. An important duty was confided to it, which was
faithfully and gallantly performed. Other brave men
helped them in its execution, among whom the Sixth corps
was the most prominent.
" I respectfully beg leave to call attention to the reports
of division and brigade commanders, herewith inclosed.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 185
" The division commanders, Generals Barnes, Ayres,
and Crawford, aided me in every particular with the ut
most zeal and heartiness. I most urgently unite in their
recommendations of the various gentlemen who dis
tinguished themselves in and around the field of Gettys
burg. " Colonel Rice, who succeeded to the command of the
Third brigade, First division, on the fall of Colonel Vin
cent, deserves great credit for the management of his
troops. His position on our extreme left was one of the
most important held by the corps, and the unflinching
tenacity with which he maintained it, and his subsequent
forcible occupation of the ground possessed by the enemy,
with Chamberlain's regiment (Twentieth Maine) and two
regiments of Fisher's brigade, Third division, are worthy
of the highest praise.
" The medical department, under Surgeon J. J. Milhau
and Asst. Surg. C. P. Russell, was organized in the most
effective and satisfactory manner.
" My personal staff and the chiefs of departments were
zealous, indefatigable, and ready for any emergency. I
name them in the order of rank, and respectfully recom
mend them to the notice of the Department of War : Lieut-
Col. Fred. T. Locke, assistant adjutant-general; Lieut.-
Col. William H. Owen, chief quartermaster; Capt. D. L.
Smith, acting chief commissary of subsistence; Surg. J. J.
Milhau, U. S. Army, medical director; Asst. Surg. C. P.
Russell, U. S. Army, medical inspector; Capt. John W.
Williams, assistant adjutant-general and acting aide-de
camp; Capt. William Jay, aide-de-camp, and First Lieut.
George T. Ingham, Eleventh U. S. Infantry, aide-de-camp.
" The signal officers, Capt. W. H. Hill and Lieut. I. S.
Lyon, performed their duties creditably.
" General Weed and Colonel Vincent, officers of rare
promise, gave their lives to their country. The former

1 86 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
had been conspicuous during the war, won and adorned
his promotion, and surrendered it and his life on the spot
he was called upon to defend.
" In this campaign of the Army of the Potomac, conse
quent upon Lee's second invasion of Maryland, troops
never endured more, marched more in the same length of
time, suffered more, deserved more, or fought better than
they. Prompt response and obedience to all orders char
acterized them. Their record up to July 24, with its in
calculable results, is a study, and has few parallels in this
history of the rebellion.
" Tabular and nominal lists have preceded this report.
" I inclose the reports of division and other commanders,
and with them a list of casualties in the corps."
Report of Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin, U. S. Army, com
manding First Division.
" Hdqrs. First Division, Fifth Army Corps,
" Near Beverly Ford, Va., August 14, 1863.
" In compliance with circular from headquarters Army
of the Potomac, dated August 12, 1863, I have the honor
to report that I arrived at Gettysburg on July 3 last, and
relieved General Barnes, in command of the Division, on
the 4th.1 . . ."
Report of Brig.-Gen. James Barnes, U. S. Army, com
manding First Division.
" Headquarters First Division, Fifth Corps,
" Beverly Ford, Va., August 24, 1863.
" I have the honor to submit the following report of the
operations of the First division of the Fifth corps from
1 As the remainder of thi9 report relates to movements of the
division after the battle of Gettysburg, it is omitted.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 187
June 28 to July 9, including the battle of Gettysburg and
the movements of the command during the few days pre
vious and subsequent thereto, in conformity with instruc
tions from headquarters:
" On June 28, after a succession of rapid marches from
Virginia, the division encamped about two miles south
of Frederick City, Md.
" On the 29th, the command of the Army of the Po
tomac having devolved upon Major-General Meade, until
then commanding the Fifth corps, Major-General Sykes,
who had succeeded to the command of the corps, directed
an early movement forward. The First division, under
my command, moved accordingly through Frederick City
toward the town of Liberty, and, passing beyond that
place about two miles, bivouacked for the night.
" On the 30th, at 4 a. m., the march was resumed and
continued toward Union Mills, approaching the place with
proper precautions, on account of a heavy body of cavalry
of the enemy, some 8,000 or 10,000 in number, as re
ported, then occupying it. Upon reaching the town, we
found that this cavalry force had left it some three or four
hours before our arrival, and had gone in the direction of
Hanover. " The division halted here for the night, and on the fol
lowing morning, July 1, left at an early hour for Hanover,
where it arrived at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Or
ders were here received to halt for the night, but scarcely
had arms been stacked when news was received that an
engagement had that day taken place between the enemy
and a portion of the army at Gettysburg. Orders were
received for an immediate resumption of the march to
ward Gettysburg, and, notwithstanding a long march had
already been accomplished, the orders were received by the
troops with the utmost enthusiasm. The division was
soon on the road, and continued its march toward Gettys-

1 88 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
burg, halting after midnight about 2 miles from that place.
Resuming its march, after a brief rest of two or three
hours, the division reached Gettysburg at about 7 o'clock
in the morning of July 2.
" The Eighteenth Massachusetts, Colonel Hayes com
manding, was immediately detached to support a battery
upon the left of the road, and the remaining portion of the
command was placed in position, by direction of General
Sykes, on the right of the Second division of the corps,
south of and facing toward the village.
" The Ninth Massachusetts, Colonel Guiney command
ing, was here detailed from the Second brigade, as skir
mishers, and deployed at some distance in front of the
line. " The command here rested for further instructions.
After the lapse of an hour or more the division received
orders to change its position, moving some distance to the
rear and toward the left of this first line, but it remained
in this new position for a short period only. Orders were
again received to move still farther to the left, and, subse
quently crossing the creek over a small bridge, we were
held in reserve in an orchard on the left of the road, with
instructions to wait there for further orders. Here the
Eighteenth Massachusetts, detached as above stated early
in the morning, rejoined the command, and was posted on
the opposite side of the road. These various movements
occupied the time until long after midday. The sound of
the enemy's artillery still indicated a movement toward the
left of the point where we were then halted.
" Between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon orders were
received from General Sykes to move toward the left and
to the front. The column was immediately formed, and
moved rapidly up by the Taneytown road to the ground
assigned to the division. General Sykes and myself, pre
ceding the advance of the column upon the ground upon

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 189
which it was to take position, reconnoitered the field, and
the position to be held by the command was determined
upon by him.
" Soon after, the head of the column entered upon the
field. At the same time General Warren, of the staff of
General Meade, came up, riding rapidly from the left, and,
pointing out the position of the elevation known as the
Round Top, not far off and toward the left, urged the im
portance of assistance in that direction. General Sykes
yielded to his earnest request, and I immediately directed
Colonel Vincent, commanding the Third brigade, to proceed
to that point with his brigade. Colonel Vincent moved with
great promptness to the post assigned to him. The brigade
consisted of the Sixteenth Michigan, the Forty-fourth New
York, the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, and the Twentieth
Maine regiments.
" The Second brigade, commanded by Colonel Sweitzer,
arrived next upon the ground. This brigade consisted of
the Fourth Michigan, the Sixty-second Pennsylvania, the
Ninth Massachusetts, and the Thirty-second Massachusetts.
The Ninth Massachusetts, however, was absent, being upon
the special duty for which it had been detailed in the morn
ing. Upon receiving his instructions Colonel Sweitzer
placed his command promptly in position.
" The First brigade, under the command of Colonel Til
ton, arrived next. This brigade was composed of the
Eighteenth Massachusetts, the Twenty-second Massachu
setts, the One Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania, and
the First Michigan regiments. The position assigned to
it was on the right of the ground occupied by the Second
brigade, and was immediately placed by Colonel Tilton,
in conformity with the instruction given to him.
" The division thus in position constituted the right of
the Fifth corps, and its place in line was on the left of
the ground assigned to the Third corps. The line was

190 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
on the edge of a thick wood, the ground to the front
being cleared of timber, but interspersed with rocks and
some straggling trees. As the two brigades entered the
wood they passed over a line of troops, understood to be a
portion of a brigade of the Third corps; they were lying
down upon the ground.
" Upon the right of our position an open space, appar
ently unprotected, extended to some distance. Upon call
ing the attention of General Sykes to it, he remarked, re
ferring to the part of the Third corps over which we had
passed and then lying down in our rear, that those troops
were to be removed. The remaining portion of the Third
corps was understood to be at some distance to the right,
and much in advance of what seemed to be their natural
and true position. This unguarded space was watched
with great anxiety. There was little time, however, for
deliberation. General Sykes, called by his duty to the
left of the line, went toward that portion of his command.
The attack of the enemy commenced almost immediately
along my front. It was very severe, but was gallantly
withstood. " After some time, during which the firing was very
heavy, the enemy showed itself in great force upon our
right flank. He had penetrated through the unguarded
space there, and commenced pouring in a destructive fire
from the advantageous position he had gained, and with
out changing my front there were no means of checking
his advance toward my rear. Colonel Tilton, command
ing the First brigade, which was on the right, was im
mediately directed to change his front to the right, and
the order was at once executed, deliberately, yet promptly,
and in good order. Colonel Sweitzer, commanding the
Second brigade, on the left of the First, was immediately
notified of this change upon his right, and directed to fall

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 191
back in good order, and to take up a new position a short
distance in his rear, for the purpose of co-operating in op
posing this heavy attack upon the flank. This brigade,
consisting at that time of only three regiments, numbering
in all, officers and men, 1,010, was placed promptly and in
good order as directed. The First brigade numbered in
all, officers and men, 654.
" Affairs being in this position, General Caldwell, com
manding a brigade of the Second corps, came up in great
haste and stated to me that his brigade, then in the woods
a short distance to the left, was driving the enemy in his
front, and urgently requested assistance. I immediately
directed Colonel Sweitzer to go to his relief. He moved
his brigade forward in line, to the front and left, his men
giving cheers as they advanced across an open field to the
edge of the wood ; but the progress of the enemy upon our
flank still continued, and this brigade was compelled again
to change its front to repel his advance, and soon found
itself in close conflict with him. The Fourth Michigan
and the Sixty-second Pennsylvania were in actual contact
with him. Colonel Jeffords, commanding the Fourth
Michigan, was thrust through with a bayonet while gal
lantly attempting to rescue his colors from the grasp of
the enemy.
" Finding himself unable to compete with numbers far
superior to his own, and that the enemy was gaining
ground to his rear, Colonel Sweitzer directed his command
to retire slowly, but orderly, halting and firing as they re
tired, and took position on elevated ground a short distance
to his rear, and succeeded in preventing the enemy from
making any further progress in that direction.
" In the meantime the movements of the First brigade,
under similar circumstances, corresponded with those of
the Second, This brigade, small in numbers, fired, and

192 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
retired in good order, and succeeded in reaching the
ground on the opposite side of the open field toward the
left, and there halted. The darkness put an end to the
conflict, and the enemy was foiled in his effort to get in
the rear of the command. The Ninth Massachusetts
shortly afterward rejoined the Second brigade, having
been relieved from the duty upon which it had been de
tailed early in the morning. In this position the two bri
gades remained during the night.
" On the following day the First brigade was directed
to relieve the Third brigade at Little Round Top, where it
also had succeeded in maintaining the position assigned
to it, as will appear in the sequel.
" I cannot speak in terms too commendatory of the
bearing of the officers and men of these two brigades during
the progress of this conflict. Skillfully directed by the two
brigade commanders, they obeyed with cool intrepidity
every order issued to them, under the most trying circum
stances, and long resisted superior numbers with firmness.
Partly surrounded by the enemy, they succeeded in pre
venting the left of the line from being taken in reverse,
resisting an attack not exceeded, I am sure, in violence in
any contest hitherto occurring. The exposure of their
flank, arising from whatever cause, placed them in a most
dangerous position, and their heroic conduct alone saved
the command, at least, if not the entire left of the army,
from disaster. The statement of the casualties of the
contest is sufficient evidence of their gallant resistance,
and it is alike due to those who have survived and to the
memory of the gallant dead that this record should be
made of their valor and devotion.
" The Third brigade, as above related, was detached
from the division upon its arrival upon the ground and
was consequently removed from my immediate oversight.
The record of its service, however, drawn principally from

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 193
the report of its commander, belongs to this record of the
service of the division.
" Colonel Vincent, commanding the brigade, upon being
detached, as above mentioned, proceeded promptly to the
position assigned him. It was upon an elevated and rocky
hill known as the Little Round Top. It was situated at
some distance to our left, and near the extreme left of the
line of battle. Its defense was of the utmost importance.
When the brigade was placed in position the Twentieth
Maine occupied the left of the line, the Sixteenth Michi
gan the right, the Eighty-third Pennsylvania and the
Forty-fourth New York the center. The Third division
of the Fifth corps was posted on the right of the brigade.
The enemy had concentrated a heavy force in front of the
line, and began a fierce attack immediately after the
troops were in position. Repeated charges were made
upon the center of the brigade, but the line was unbroken.
A vigorous attack upon the right caused a temporary wav
ering there, but, the One Hundred and Fortieth New York
coming promptly to its support, it was re-established at
once. " It was at this time that Colonel Vincent, command
ing the brigade, while rallying this part of his command,
fell mortally wounded. He was a gallant officer, beloved
and respected by his command and by all who knew him.
His death is a serious loss to the army and the country.
" Upon the removal of Colonel Vincent from the field,
the command of the brigade devolved upon Colonel Rice,
of the Forty-fourth New York Volunteers. The enemy,
as stated, having in vain attempted to break the right of
the brigade, renewed his attack upon the center and left.
The Twentieth Maine, Colonel Chamberlain commanding,-.
was posted on the left. It consisted of 380 men and of
ficers. W'hile the enemy in its front was making a fierce
attack, a brigade was observed in the rear of their lines

194 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
moving by its right flank and passing through a slight ra
vine on our left, with the evident purpose of gaining a
position on the left flank of this regiment.
" Colonel Chamberlain at once threw back his left wing,
and extended his right wing by intervals toward the left,
in order to avoid diminishing the extent of his front. The
brigade of the enemy alluded to reaching a proper position,
attacked him furiously on the left flank, advancing within
io paces and rapidly firing. They were first checked and
then repulsed by the left wing of the regiment, thrown
back for that purpose.
" A second, third, and fourth time the enemy renewed
their attempt to break this line, and each time they were
successfully repelled by that handful of men. Four times
that little interval of io paces was the scene of a desperate
conflict. The ground was strewed with dead and wounded
men of both sides, promiscuously mingled. Their am
munition was exhausted; they replenished it from the
cartridge-boxes of the men lying around them, whether
friends or foes, but even this resource soon failed them;
the enemy in greatly superior numbers pressed hard; men
and officers began to look to the rear for safety, but the
gallant commander of the regiment ordered the bayonets
to be fixed, and, at the command, * Forward ! ' that wearied
and worn body of men rushed onward with a shout. The
enemy fell back. Pressing on and wheeling to the right
in open intervals, the left wing came again in line with the
right wing, and then the whole regiment deployed at in
tervals of 5 paces, followed up the advantage they had
gained. The enemy threw down their arms and surren
dered in large numbers; the others fled rapidly from the
contest; 368 prisoners, including 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-
colonel, and a dozen other officers of lesser rank, were sent
to the rear; 50 of their dead lay upon the field, and large
numbers of their wounded; 30 of this gallant regiment

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 195
were killed, over 100 were wounded, but not one was taken
a prisoner, and none were missing.
" It was now nearly dark. A portion of the enemy
appeared to have occupied the summit of the rocky hill to
the left. The men of this brave regiment, exhausted by
their labors, had thrown themselves upon the ground, and
many of them sunk at once in sleep. Colonel Rice, now
in command of the brigade, directed Colonel Chamberlain
to drive the enemy from this height. The order was at
once given. Roused again to action, and advancing with
fixed bayonets and without firing, lest the smallness of their
numbers might be suspected, they rushed up the hill.
" Twenty-five more prisoners, including some staff of
ficers, were added to the number previously taken, with a
loss to the regiment of 1 officer mortally wounded and 1
man taken prisoner by the enemy. It was ascertained
that these troops occupying the hill had been sent from
Hood's division, which was then massed a few hundred
yards distant, and that their object was to reconnoiter the
position, as a preliminary to taking possession of the height.
" In addition to the prisoners above mentioned as taken
by this regiment, 300 stand of arms were also captured
by them. It is due to this regiment and to its commander
that their service should be thus recorded in some detail.
" Upon receiving a reinforcement of five regiments of
the Third division, under command of Colonel Fisher,
Colonel Rice detached two of them to the aid of Colonel
Chamberlain, in order to maintain the position he had
gained, and he was thus enabled to hold it, and the enemy,
having been repelled upon every point of his attack and
night coming on, withdrew from the conflict.
" Colonel Rice directed the Forty-fourth New York and
the Eighty-third Pennsylvania to move to the front and
gather up the wounded, who, including those of the enemy
who had been left upon the field, were carefully brought

196 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
in. The total results of the service of this brigade are
stated by Colonel Rice to be 500 prisoners captured, in
cluding 2 colonels and 15 other commissioned officers, and
1,000 stand of arms. The brigade numbered about 1,000
men. " The following day was principally occupied in burying
the dead. The Third brigade was relieved by the First
brigade, and held the position occupied by it.
" It would be a grateful task to relate in detail the serv
ices of many who deserve a more particular mention, but
the limits of this report will not permit. No one failed
in his duty.
" A tribute is due to the memory of Colonel Vincent,
who fell, mortally wounded, early in the engagement. He
lingered a few days after the engagement. His promotion
as a brigadier-general was sent to him at once as an
appreciation of his services by the Government, but it
reached him too late for his own recognition. He expired
soon after its receipt.
" A special mention should also be made of Colonel
Jeffords, of the Fourth Michigan Volunteers, who sealed
his devotion to his country with his blood while contend
ing hand-to-hand with overpowering numbers, in endeav
oring to rescue the colors of his regiment from the hands
of the enemy.
" To Colonels Tilton, Sweitzer, and Rice, the com
manders of brigades, great credit is due for the successful
and skillful management of their commands under the
very trying circumstances in which they were placed. Col
onel Chamberlain, of the Twentieth Maine Volunteers,
whose service I have endeavored briefly to describe, de
serves especial mention.
" To the officers of my staff I am indebted for efficient
and prompt attention to their arduous duties, namely:
Captain [Catharinus B.J Mervine, assistant adjutant-gen-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 197
eral; Lieuts. [Charles H.] Ross and [T. Corwin] Case,
aides; Captain [George M.] Barnard, assistant inspector-
general of the division, and Dr. [Charles] Shippen, the
medical director of the division.
" The command remained in the same position the two
following days.
" Being disabled for further actual command of the di
vision, the opportune arrival of General Griffin enabled me
to relinquish it to him, and the division moved toward
Middletown, where it arrived on July 8.
" A tabular and a nominal return of casualties have
been duly forwarded. The total strength of the division
upon entering the engagement was, in the three brigades,
2664, and the aggregate of killed, wounded, and miss
ing 897."
Report of Col. William S. Tilton, Twenty-second Mas
sachusetts, commanding First Brigade.
" Hdqrs. First Brig., First Div., Fifth Army Corps,
" Middletown, Md., July 9, 1863.
" I have the honor to report the part taken by this bri
gade in the battles of the 2d and 3d instant.
" At 4 130 p. m., on July 2, the brigade under my command
advanced to the front, and was placed, by order of Gen
eral Barnes, in order of battle in a piece of woods at the
south of Mr. Rose's house. The Second brigade was on
our left, but there being no infantry upon our right I
made a crotchet by refusing the right- wing of my right
battalion (One Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania
Volunteers, Colonel Gwyn).
" No sooner was the line formed than the foe attacked
our front. The onslaught was terrible and my losses
heavy, so much so that I was somewhat doubtful if our
line could withstand it. This fact I communicated to the

198 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
general commanding division, who ordered me to fall
back in good order if unable to hold the position; but my
men behaved nobly, and twice repulsed the assailants.
My colonels wished to advance. Being anxious about my
right, however, I reconnoitered in person, and discovered
the enemy in large force coming from the direction of
Rose's house, with the evident design of outflanking me.
I immediately retired and took up a new position (in two
lines) at the left and rear of a battery which had been
posted about three hundred yards to my right and rear.
The battery soon commenced to retreat, firing, followed by
the rebels, who were now again upon my right flank. To
avoid this flank movement I retired, firing, a short distance
in the timber, and then moved across an open field, took
up a new position upon the right of the Second division,
and reported to General Sykes. In this last movement I
was greatly embarrassed by squads of men and parts of
regiments who, hurrying from the front, broke into and
through my line. I think, however, that I saved my bri
gade from great disaster after it could no longer do any
good in front, and succeeded in forming a new line, which
was retained through the night.
" All of my officers and men did their duty, their whole
duty, and showed the greatest coolness and courage, and
where all did so well it were invidious to mention names.
" On the 3d we relieved the Third brigade, on duty,
holding the rocky hill upon the extreme left.
" On the 4th I advanced the brigade to the edge of the
woods in our front, and sent out a strong line of skir
mishers to feel the enemy. The report of this reconnais
sance has been made by order directly to Major-General
Sykes. " My loss on the 2d instant was 12 killed, 80 wounded,
and 17 missing; total, 109.
" Owing to forced marches we had remaining on the

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 199
2d only 474 men, and as part of these were not actually
engaged, it will be seen that the percentage of loss is very
great." Report of Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer, Sixty-second Penn
sylvania, commanding Second Brigade.
" Headquarters Second Brigade,
" Camp Near Warrenton, Va., July 31, 1863.
" In obedience to orders I respectfully submit the fol
lowing report of the operations of this brigade during the
recent battle of Gettysburg:
" After a hard march on the day previous, July 1, from
Unionville, Md., by way of Hanover, the brigade bivou
acked after 12 p. m., with the division in the woods by the
roadside, 4 or 5 miles distant from the battlefield.
" Next morning by daylight we were on the march
again, the Second brigade leading. Having arrived near
what I supposed to be the right of our line, and near a
farmhouse and barn, the division was massed, the bri
gades occupying positions in the order of their numbers
from right to left, General Sykes' division being on our
left. Here a call was made for a regiment from this bri
gade for picket duty by General Barnes, and Colonel
Guiney, with the Ninth Massachusetts, was directed to
report to him for instructions, and did so.
" Shortly after this the division changed front to the
left, at nearly a right angle with its former position, and
formed in line of battalions in close column by division.
" We had been in this position but a few moments be
fore we were again moved a considerable distance to the
left; then moved by the front across the creek, and massed
in an orchard on the hill above the bridge on the Gettys
burg turnpike. There we remained until late in the after
noon (the precise time I do not remember), and the com
mand had a few hours quiet and rest.

200 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
" Meanwhile there had been very little firing along the
line, and I came to the conclusion the day would pass with
out the division being called into action. But soon after
cannonading was heard on the left, and we were moved
quite a distance farther to the left, and diagonally to the
front skirting in our march the woods in rear of or in
which our lines were formed. When we moved off from
the orchard, the Third brigade, being on the left of the di
vision, moved first, the Second and First brigades follow
ing in the inverted order.
" The Second brigade was placed in position in a wood
fronting an open field, the woods bordering two sides of
the field, the side in which we were and also that extend
ing at right angles from our left toward the enemy, and
in the last-mentioned wood the First brigade was posted,
connecting with our left. Having formed the three regi
ments of this brigade in line of battle (the Ninth Massa
chusetts being still absent on picket duty) in their regular
order from right to left, and finding this formation threw
the Thirty-second Massachusetts, which was on the left,
into an exposed position beyond the woods in low, cleared
ground, I directed Colonel Prescott to change his front to
the rear, so as to give him the benefit of the elevated
ground and the cover of the woods, which movement he
executed. " We had not remained long in this position before an
attack commenced by the enemy in front of the First bri
gade and Thirty-second Massachusetts. As there was no
appearance of the enemy in front of the line formed by the
Sixty-second Pennsylvania and Fourth Michigan, I di
rected them to change front to the left, and form lines in
rear of the Thirty-second Massachusetts, to strengthen
that position. During the execution of this order the at
tack continued; the firing was very severe, and we lost
many brave officers and men. Here fell Major Lowry,

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 201
second to none in all the attributes of a soldier and a gentle
man. " When the attack commenced word was sent by Gen
eral Barnes that when we retired we should fall back under
cover of the woods. This order was communicated to
Colonel Prescott, whose regiment was then under the
hottest fire. Understanding it to be a peremptory order
to retire then, he replied, ' I don't want to retire ; I am not
ready to retire; I can hold this place,' and he made good
his assertion. Being informed that he misunderstood the
order, which was only intended to inform him how to re
tire when it became necessary, he was satisfied, and he
and his command held their ground manfully.
" Some time after that word was sent that the First
brigade was retiring, and General Barnes sent me word to
fall back also, which I did in perfect good order, the regi
ments retaining their alignments and halting and firing as
they came back. Having arrived at the road leading along
the rear of the wheat-field, the brigade was formed in line
in the woods in rear of the road, and parallel to it, the
right resting at the corner of the woods toward the front.
We had not remained here more than, say, fifteen minutes,
when a general officer I had never seen before rode up to
me, and said his command was driving the enemy in the
woods in front of the wheat-field; that he needed the sup
port of a brigade, and desired to know if I would give him
mine. " I referred him to General Barnes, and said I would
obey his directions with pleasure. He spoke to the Gen
eral, who was not far off. General Barnes came and
stated to me what had been said to him by General Cald
well (this I learned was the officer who had lately spoken
to me), and asked me if I would take the brigade in. I
told him I would if he wished me to do so. He said he
did. The command was then called to attention. General

202 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Barnes got out in front of them and made a few patriotic
remarks, to which they responded with a cheer, and we
started off across the wheat-field in a line parallel to the
road, our right flank resting on the woods. We advanced"
to the stone fence beyond the wheat-field next to the
woods, and took position behind it to support, as we sup
posed, our friends in the woods in front. The Fourth
Michigan, being on the right of the brigade, extended be
yond the stone fence, and was, consequently, most ex
posed. " We had scarcely got to this position before I noticed
regiments retiring from the woods on our right, which I
supposed were relieved by others who had taken their
places, and would protect us in that direction. I observed
also that there was considerable firing diagonally toward
our rear from these woods, which I then thought were
shots from our troops aimed over us at the enemy in the
woods beyond and falling short. They were, however,
much too frequent to be pleasant, and my color-bearer,
Ed. Martin, remarked, ' Colonel, I'll be  if I don't
think we are faced the wrong way; the rebs are up there
in the woods behind us, on the right.'
" About this time, too, word was brought me from the
Fourth Michigan and Sixty-second Pennsylvania that the
enemy was getting into our rear in the woods on the right.
I directed these regiments to change front, to face in that
direction and meet them, which they did, the firing in the
meanwhile being rapid and severe. I at the same time dis
patched Lieutenant Seitz, aide-de-camp, to communicate
to General Barnes our situation. He reached the point
where he had last seen General Barnes. He was not there.
Lieutenant Seitz found the enemy had reached that point,
and he came near falling into their hands himself; his
horse was killed, and he made his way back to me on foot ;
reported that General Barnes was not to be found; that

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 203
the enemy was in the woods on our right as far back as
where we had started from, and along the road in rear
of the wheat-field.
" Finding that we were surrounded; that our enemy was
under cover, while we were in the open field exposed to
their fire, I directed the command to fall back. This was
done in order, the command halting and firing as it re
tired. The Fourth Michigan and Sixty-second Pennsyl
vania had become mixed up with the enemy, and many
hand-to-hand conflicts occurred. Colonel Jeffords, the
gallant commander of the Fourth Michigan, was thrust
through with a bayonet in a contest over his colors, and
Sergt. William McFairman, Company I, and Private Wil
liam McCarter, Company A, Sixty-second Pennsylvania,
receive honorable mention by Colonel Hull in his report,
for their conduct during this part of the engagement.
" Finding as we retired in the direction from which we
advanced that the fire of the enemy grew more severe on
our right, I took a diagonal direction toward the corner
of the wheat-field on our left and rear. We crossed the
stone fence on this side of the field, and retired to the rear
of the battery on the elevation beyond, where the com
mand was halted.
" We had lost heavily in our passage across the field.
The Fourth Michigan and Sixty-second Pennsylvania had
been surrounded, and a large proportion of those regiments
were missing, either killed, wounded, or prisoners. What
remained of the command formed in the rear of the bat
tery and we were shortly afterward joined by the Ninth
Massachusetts, which had been absent all day on detached
duty. " It is difficult to conceive of a more trying situation
than that in which three regiments of this command had
lately found themselves, and from which they had just ef
fected their escape; in fact, I have since understood that

204 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
one of General Barnes' aides remarked to him shortly
after we had advanced, when it was discovered the enemy
was behind us on the flank, that he might bid good-bye to
the Second brigade. I was also informed by General
Barnes that, learning soon after we had advanced the sit
uation on our right, he had dispatched an orderly to me
with the information and a verbal order to withdraw, but
the orderly never reached me.
" Every officer and man in the command, so far as I am
informed, did his whole duty. All stood their ground and
fought unflinchingly until they were ordered by me to re
tire, and in falling back behaved with coolness and delib
eration. We lost many of our best officers and men.
" I subjoin a field report of the regiments engaged on
the morning of July 2, and also a report of the same regi
ments on July 4. A nominal and tabular report of casual
ties in the command has already been forwarded.
" About dark on the evening of the 2d the acting assist
ant adjutant-general of the First brigade came to me and
inquired for General Barnes ; said he was directed by Gen
eral Sykes to tell him to have the Second brigade form on
the right of the First in the position they then were. As
General Barnes was not present, I received the order, and
put the Second brigade in the position indicated, where we
remained until the evening of the 5th, when the division
advanced toward Emmittsburg.
" In conclusion, I desire to express my gratification at
the conduct of my staff during the engagement; Captain
[George] Monteith, acting assistant adjutant-general;
Captain [Alvan C] Lamson, acting assistant inspector-
general; Captain [John S.J Burdett, acting commissary of
subsistence, and Lieutenant [John A. M.J Seitz, acting
aide-de-camp. They were prompt and fearless in the dis
charge of their duty. We were all fortunate enough to
escape being hit, though a number of horses in the party

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 205
were shot, two of the orderlies', the bugler's, Lieutenant
Seitz's, and my own."
Report of Colonel James C. Rie?, Forty-fourth New
York, commanding Third Brigade. "July 31, 1863.
" In compliance with orders from division headquarters,
I have the honor to report the operations of this brigade
during the battle near Gettysburg on the 2nd and 3rd inst.
" The brigade, under the command of the late Colonel
Vincent, was detached from the division and ordered into
position at about 4 p. m. of the 2d instant, on the extreme
left of our line of battle. The Twentieth Maine occu
pied the extreme left of the brigade line, the Sixteenth
Michigan the extreme right, connecting with the Third
Division, under General Crawford, while the Eighty-third
Pennsylvania and Forty- fourth New York occupied the
center. The muskets taken into action by the brigade
numbered about one thousand.
" The ground occupied by the brigade in line of battle
was nearly that of a quarter circle, composed mostly of
high rocks and cliffs in the center and becoming more
wooded and less rugged as you approached to the left.
The right was thrown forward somewhat to the front of
the ledge of rocks, and was much more exposed than other
parts of the line. A comparatively smooth ravine ex
tended along the entire front, perhaps 50 yards from our
line, while on the left and beyond a high and jagged moun
tain rises, called Round Top hill. That the disposition of
the forces and the nature of the ground may be better
understood by the general commanding, I send with this
report a diagram of the same.
" The brigade had scarcely formed in line of battle and
pushed forward its skirmishers when a division of the
enemy's forces, under General Hood, made a desperate at-

206 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
tack along the entire line of the brigade. He approached
in three columns, with no skirmishers in advance. The
object of the enemy was evident. If he could gain the
vantage ground occupied by this brigade, the left flank of
our line must give way, opening to him a vast field for
successful operations in the rear of our entire army.
" To effect this object the enemy made every effort.
Massing two or three brigades of his force, he tried for an
hour in vain to break the lines of the Forty-fourth New
York and Eighty-third Pennsylvania, charging again and
again within a few yards of these unflinching troops. At
every charge he was repulsed with terrible slaughter. De
spairing of success at this point, he made a desperate at
tack upon the extreme right of the brigade, forcing back
a part of the Sixteenth Michigan. This regiment was
broken, and, through some misunderstanding of orders, ex
plained in the official report of the commanding officer, it
was thrown into confusion; but being immediately sup
ported by the One Hundred and Fortieth New York Vol
unteers, the line became again firm and unbroken.
" It was at this point of time that Colonel Vincent, com
manding the brigade, fell mortally wounded. Of the
character of this gallant and accomplished officer I will
speak before I close this report.
" The enemy again attacked the center with great vigor,
and the extreme left with desperation. Passing one bri
gade of his forces by the right flank in three columns, he
pushed through the ravine toward the left of our brigade,
came immediately to a ' front,' and charged upon the
Twentieth Maine. Now occurred the most critical time of
the action. For above half an hour the struggle was des
perate. At length the enemy pressed so strongly upon the
left flank of Colonel Chamberlain's regiment that he wisely
determined to change the order of battle, and commanded
his left wing to fall back at right angles to his right. He

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 207
then ordered a charge and repulsed the enemy at every
point. " On assuming the command of the brigade during this
attack upon the center and left, I at once passed along the
line, and notified the officers and men of my own regiment
that I was about to take command of the brigade and that
they must hold their position to the last. I did this that no
panic might arise. I then notified all the commanders of
the regiments in person, and assured them of my deter
mination to hold the line to the last. Colonel Chamberlain
and other officers immediately informed me that their
commands were out of ammunition. I had at this time
neither an aide nor an orderly even to bear a message.
(See P. S.) The enemy was still pressing heavily upon
the line. I immediately pressed into service every of
ficer and man in the rear not engaged in the action,
whether known or unknown, and made them pledge their
honor that they would deliver in person every order that
I should send by them. I sent four of them, one after
another, with orders for ammunition. The ammunition
came promptly, was distributed at once, and the fight went
on. " The enemy was now attempting to take possession of
Round Top hill, a commanding position overlooking our left.
It was evident no time was to be lost, and I sent at once
other officers, whom I pressed into my service, with mes
sages to the general commanding the corps, asking for rein
forcements to support the brigade. The messages were
promptly delivered, and five regiments were at once sent
to my support from the Third division, General Crawford,
under command of Colonel Fisher.
" Having, with the aid of this officer, properly disposed
of three regiments of this force, I ordered Colonel Cham
berlain, of the Twentieth Maine, to advance and take
possession of the mountain. This order was promptly and

208 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
gallantly executed by this brave and accomplished officer,
who rapidly drove the enemy over the mountain, captur
ing many prisoners. Colonel Fisher at once ordered two
regiments of his command to support Colonel Chamber
lain, and the hill remained permanently in our possession.
" The forces • of the enemy being now repulsed on our
left and front, I ordered a detachment from the Forty-
fourth New York Volunteers and the Eighty-third Penn
sylvania to push forward and secure all the fruits of this
hard-earned victory.
" It was now eight o'clock in the evening, and before
nine o'clock we had entire possession of the enemy's
ground, had gathered up and brought in all of our own
wounded and those of the enemy, and had taken and sent
to the rear over five hundred prisoners, including two col
onels and fifteen commissioned officers, together with over
one thousand stand of arms belonging to the enemy.
" The following morning the prisoners of the brigade
buried all of our own dead and a large number of those of
the enemy.
" The fearful loss of the enemy during this struggle may
be estimated from the fact that over fifty of his dead were
counted in front of the Twentieth Maine regiment, and his
loss was nearly in that proportion along our entire line.
" Although this brigade has been engaged in nearly all
of the great battles of the Army of the Potomac, and has
always greatly distinguished itself for gallant behavior, yet
in none has it fought so desperately or achieved for itself
such imperishable honors as in this severe conflict of the
2d instant.
" A nominal and tabular list of the casualties of this bri
gade has already been forwarded to the major-general
commanding, but it is fitting again to mention the names
of the brave and faithful officers of the command who fell
in this desperate struggle. Of the Forty-fourth New York

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 209
Volunteers, Captain L. S. Larrabee and Lieutenants Dun
ham and Thomas; of the Twentieth Maine, Lieutenant
Kendall, and of the Sixteenth Michigan, Lieutenants
Browne, Jewett, and Borden were killed.
" The brigade was relieved during the forenoon of the
3d instant by the First brigade, and ordered to the center
of the line, where it remained in reserve the balance of the
day, exposed to a severe cannonading, but with no loss,
from the security of its position.
" The colonel commanding would commend to the fa
vorable notice of the general commanding the following-
named officers, for their gallant conduct in battle on the
2d instant: Colonel Chamberlain and Adjutant Chamber
lain, of the Twentieth Maine; Lieutenant-Colonel Connor
and Major Knox, of the Forty-fourth New York Volun
teers; Captain Woodward and Adjutant Gifford, of the
Eighty- third Pennsylvania, and Captain Elliott and Adju
tant Jacklin, of the Sixteenth Michigan.
" Especially would I call the attention of the general
commanding to the distinguished services rendered by Col
onel Chamberlain throughout the entire struggle.
" To the loss sustained by this command in the death of
Colonel Vincent I can refer in no more appropriate lan
guage than that used in the general order announcing it to
this brigade, a copy of which I herewith annex.
" P. S. — In justice to the officers composing the staff,
it gives me satisfaction to state, in explanation of my re
port, that at the time I took command, Captain (Eugene
A.) Nash, inspector-general of the brigade, was, in obe
dience to orders received from Colonel Vincent, at the front
watching the movements of the enemy, to report the same
if he should attempt a flank movement; that Captain (John
M.) Clark, assistant adjutant-general, in obedience to or
ders, was absent for ammunition, and that Captain (Amos
M.) Judson, by orders, was absent for reinforcements.

210 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
During the night these officers rendered me the greatest
service, and I desire to commend each of them to the most
favorable notice of the commanding general for their gal
lant conduct both under Colonel Vincent's command as
well as my own." "General Orders No. 5.
" Headquarters Third Brigade, First Division, Fifth Corps,
"July 12, 1863.
" The colonel commanding hereby announces to the brigade the death
of Brig-Gen. Strong Vincent. He died near Gettysburg, Pa., July 7,
1863, from the effects of a wound received on the 2d instant, and within
sight of that field which his bravery had so greatly assisted to win.
A day hallowed with all the glory of success is thus sombered by the
sorrow of our loss. Wreaths of victory give way to chaplets of mourn
ing, hearts exultant to feelings of grief. A soldier, a scholar, a friend,
has fallen. For his country, struggling for its life, he willingly gave
his own. Grateful for his services, the State which proudly claims
him as her own will give him an honored grave and a costly monument,
but he ever will remain buried in our hearts, and our love for his
memory will outlast the stone which shall bear the inscription of his
bravery, his virtues, and his patriotism.
" While we deplore his death, and remember with sorrow our loss,
let us emulate the example of his fidelity and patriotism, feeling that
he lives but in vain who lives not for his God and his country."
Report of Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain, Twentieth Maine
Infantry. " Field Near Emmittsburg, July 6, 1863.
" In compliance with the request of the colonel com
manding the brigade, I have the honor to submit a some
what detailed report of the operations of the Twentieth
Regiment Maine Volunteers in the battle of Gettysburg,
on the 2d and 3d instant.
" Having acted as the advance guard, made necessary
by the proximity of the enemy's cavalry, on the march of
the day before, my command on reaching ¦ Hanover, Pa.,
just before sunset on that day, were much worn, and lost
no time in getting ready for an expected bivouac. Rations

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 211
were scarcely issued, and the men about preparing supper,
when rumors that the enemy had been encountered that
day near Gettysburg absorbed every other interest, and
very soon orders came to march forthwith to Gettysburg.
" My men moved out with a promptitude and spirit ex
traordinary, the cheers and welcome they received on the
road adding to their enthusiasm. After an hour or two
of sleep by the roadside just before daybreak we reached
the heights southeasterly of Gettysburg at about 7 a. m.,
July 2.
" Massed at first with the rest of the division on the
right of the road, we were moved several times farther
toward the left. Although expecting every moment to be
put into action, and held strictly in line of battle, yet the
men were able to take some rest and make the most of their
rations. " Somewhere near 4 p. m. a sharp cannonade, at some
distance to our left and front, was the signal for a sudden
and rapid movement of our whole division in the direc
tion of this firing, which grew warmer as we approached.
Passing an open field in the hollow ground in which some
of our batteries were going into position, our brigade
reached the skirt of a piece of woods, in the farther edge
of which there was a heavy musketry fire, and when about
to go forward into line we received from Colonel Vincent,
commanding the brigade, orders to move to the left at the
double-quick, when we took a farm road crossing Plum
Run in order to gain a rugged mountain spur called Gran
ite Spur, or Little Round Top.
" The enemy's artillery got range of our column as we
were climbing the spur, and the crashing of the shells
among the rocks and the tree tops made us move lively
along the crest. One or two shells burst in our ranks.
Passing to the southern slope of Little Round Top, Col-

212 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
onel Vincent indicated to me the ground my regiment was
to occupy, informing me that this was the extreme left
of our general line, and that a desperate attack was ex
pected in order to turn that position, concluding by telling
me I was to ' hold that ground at all hazards.' This was
the last word I heard from him.
" In order to commence by making my right firm, I
formed my regiment on the right into line, giving such di
rection to the line as should best secure the advantage of
the rough, rocky, and stragglingly wooded ground.
" The line faced generally toward a more conspicuous
eminence southwest of ours, which is known as Sugar
Loaf, or Round Top. Between this and my position in
tervened a smooth and thinly wooded hollow. My line
formed, I immediately detached Company B, Captain Mor
rill commanding, to extend from my left flank across this
hollow as a line of skirmishers, with directions to act as
occasion might dictate, to prevent a surprise on my ex
posed flank and rear.
" The artillery fire on our position had meanwhile been
constant and heavy, but my formation was scarcely com
plete when the artillery was replaced by a vigorous in
fantry assault upon the center of our brigade to my right,
but it very soon involved the right of my regiment and
gradually extended along my entire front. The action
was quite sharp and at close quarters.
" In the midst of this an officer from my center in
formed me that some important movement of the enemy
was going on in his front, beyond that of the line with
which we were engaged. Mounting a large rock, I was
able lo see a considerable body of the enemy moving by
the flank in rear of their line engaged, and passing from
the direction of the foot of Great Round Top through the
valley toward the front of my left. The close engage
ment not allowing any change of front, I immediately

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 213
stretched my regiment to the left, by taking intervals by
the left flank, and at the same time ' refusing ' my left
wing, so that it was nearly at right angles with my right,
thus occupying about twice the extent of our ordinary
front, some of the companies being brought into single
rank when the nature of the ground gave sufficient strength
or shelter. My officers and men understood my wishes
so well that this movement was executed under fire, the
right wing keeping up fire, without giving the enemy any
occasion to seize or even to suspect their advantage. But
we were not a moment too soon ; the enemy's flanking col
umn having gained their desired direction, burst upon my
left, where they evidently had expected an unguarded
flank, with great demonstration.
" We opened a brisk fire at close range, which was so
sudden and effective that they soon fell back among the
rocks and low trees in the valley, only to burst forth again
with a shout, and rapidly advanced, firing as they came.
They pushed up to within a dozen yards of us before the
terrible effectiveness of our fire compelled them to break
and take shelter.
" They renewed the assault on our whole front, and for
an hour the fighting was severe. Squads of the enemy
broke through our line in several places, and the fight was
literally hand-to-hand. The edge of the fight rolled back
ward and forward like a wave. The dead and wounded
were now in front and then in our rear. Forced from our
position, we desperately recovered it, and pushed the enemy
down to the foot of the slope. The intervals of the strug
gle were seized to remove our wounded (and those of the
enemy also), to gather ammunition from the cartridge-
boxes of disabled friend or foe on the field, and even to
secure better muskets than the Enfields, which we found
did not stand service well. Rude shelters were thrown up
of the loose rocks that covered the ground.

214 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
" Captain Woodward, commanding the Eighty-third
Pennsylvania Volunteers, on my right, gallantly maintain
ing his fight, judiciously and with hearty co-operation made
his movements conform to my necessities, so that my right
was at no time exposed to a flank attack.
" The enemy seemed to have gathered all their energies
for their final assault. We had gotten our thin line into
as good a shape as possible, when a strong force emerged
from the scrub wood in the valley, as well as I could judge,
in two lines in echelon by the right, and, opening a heavy
fire, the first line came on as if they meant to sweep every
thing before them. We opened on them as well as we
could with our scanty ammunition snatched from the field.
" It did not seem possible to withstand another shock
like this now coming on. Our loss had been severe.
One-half of my left wing had fallen and a third of my
regiment lay just behind us dead or badly wounded. At
this moment my anxiety was increased by a great roar of
musketry in my rear, on the farther or northerly slope of
Little Round Top, apparently on the flank of the regular
brigade, which was in support of Hazlett's battery on the
crest behind us. The bullets from this attack struck into
my left rear, and I feared that the enemy might have
nearly surrounded the Little Round Top, and only a des
perate chance was left for us. My ammunition was soon
exhausted. My men were firing their last shot and getting
ready to ' club ' their muskets.
" It was imperative to strike before we were struck by
this overwhelming force in a hand-to-hand fight, which we
could not probably have withstood or survived. At that
crisis I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough. It
ran like fire along the line from man to man, and rose into
a shout, with which they sprang forward upon the enemy,
now not thirty yards away. The effect was surprising;
many of the enemy's first line threw down their arms and

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 215
surrendered. An officer fired his pistol at my head with
one hand while he handed me his sword with the other.
Holding fast by our right, and swinging forward our left,
we made an extended " right wheel,' before the enemy's
second line broke, and fell back, fighting from tree to tree,
many being captured, until we had swept the valley and
cleared the front of nearly our entire brigade.
" Meantime, Captain Morrill with his skirmishers (sent
out from my left flank), with some dozen or fifteen of
the U. S. Sharpshooters who had put themselves under
his direction, fell upon the enemy as they were breaking,
and by his demonstrations, as well as his well-directed fire,
added much to the effect of the charge.
" Having thus cleared the valley and driven the enemy
up the western slope of the Great Round Top, not wishing
to press so far out as to hazard the ground I was to hold
by leaving it exposed to a sudden rush of the enemy, I
succeeded (although with some effort to stop my men, who
declared they were ' on the road to Richmond ') in getting
the regiment into good order and resuming our original
position. " Four hundred prisoners, including two field and sev
eral line officers, were sent to the rear. These were mainly
from the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama regiments,
with some of the Fourth and Fifth Texas. One hundred
and fifty of the enemy were found killed and wounded in
our front.
" At dusk Colonel Rice informed me of the fall of Col
onel Vincent, which had devolved the command of the
brigade on him, and that Colonel Fisher had come up with
a brigade to our support. These troops were massed in
our rear. It was the understanding, as Colonel Rice in
formed me, that Colonel Fisher's brigade was to advance
and seize the western slope of Great Round Top, where
the enemy had shortly before been driven. But after con-

216 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
siderable delay this intention for some reason was not car
ried into execution.
" We were apprehensive that if the enemy were allowed
to strengthen himself in that position he would have a
great advantage in renewing the attack on us at daylight
or before. Colonel Rice then directed me to make the
movement to seize that crest.
" It was now 9 p. m. Without waiting to get ammuni
tion, but trusting in part to the very circumstance of not
exposing our movement or our small front by firing, and
with bayonets fixed, the little handful of 200 men pressed
up the mountain side in every extended order, as the steep
and jagged surface of the ground compelled. We heard
squads of the enemy falling back before us, and, when
near the crest, we met a scattering and uncertain fire,
which caused us the great loss of the gallant Lieutenant
Linscott, who fell, mortally wounded. In the silent ad
vance in the darkness we laid hold of 25 prisoners, among
them a staff officer of General (E. M.) Law, command
ing the brigade immediately opposed to us during the
fight. Reaching the crest, and reconnoitering the ground,
I placed the men in a strong position among the rocks,
and informed Colonel Rice, requesting also ammunition
and some support to our right, which was very near the
enemy, their movements and words even being now dis
tinctly heard by us.
" Some confusion soon after resulted from the attempt
of some regiment of Colonel Fisher's brigade to come to
our support. They had found a wood road up the moun
tain, which brought them on my right flank, and also in
proximity to the enemy, massed a little before. Hearing
their approach, and thinking a movement from that quarter
could only be from the enemy, I made disposition to re
ceive them as such. In the confusion which attended the
attempt to form them in support of my right, the enemy

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 217
opened a brisk fire, which disconcerted my efforts to form
them and disheartened the supports themselves, so that I
saw no more of them that night.
" Feeling somewhat insecure in this isolated position, I
sent in for the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, which came
speedily, followed by the Forty-fourth New York, and,
having seen these well posted, I sent a strong picket to the
front, with instructions to report to me every half hour
during the night and allowed the rest of my men to sleep
on their arms.
" At some time about midnight two regiments of Col
onel Fisher's brigade came up the mountain beyond my
left, and took position near the summit; but as the enemy
did not threaten from that direction I made no effort to
connect with them.
" We went into the fight with 386, all told — 358 guns.
Every pioneer and musician who could carry a musket
went into the ranks. Even the sick and footsore, who could
not keep up in the march, came up as soon as they could
find their regiments and took their places in line of battle,
while it was battle, indeed. Some prisoners I had under
guard under sentence of court-martial, I was obliged to
put into the fight, and they bore their part well, for which
I shall recommend a commutation of their sentence.
"The loss, so far as I can ascertain it, is 136 — 30 of
whom were killed, and among the wounded are many
mortally. " Captain Billings, Lieutenant Kendall, and Lieutenant
Linscott are officers whose loss we deeply mourn — ef
ficient soldiers and pure and high-minded men.,
" In such an engagement there were many incidents of
heroism and noble character which should have place even
in an official report; but, under present circumstances, I
am unable to do justice to them. I will say of that regi
ment that the resolution, courage, and heroic fortitude

218 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
which enabled us to withstand so formidable an attack
have happily led to so conspicuous a result, that they may
safely trust to history to record their merits.
" About noon on the 3d of July we were withdrawn,
and formed on the right of the brigade, in the front edge
of a piece of woods near the left center of our main line
of battle, where we were held in readiness to support our
troops, then receiving the severe attack of the afternoon
of that day.
" On the 4th we made a reconnaissance to the front, to
ascertain the movements of the enemy, but finding that
they had retired, at least beyond Willoughby's Run, we
returned to Little Round Top, where we buried our dead
in the place where we had laid them during the fight, mark
ing each grave by a head-board made of ammunition
boxes, with each soldier's name cut upon it. We also
buried 50 of the enemy's dead in front of our position of
July 2. We then looked after our wounded, whom I had
taken the responsibility of putting into the houses of citi
zens in the vicinity of Little Round Top, and on the morn
ing of the 5th took up our march on the Emmittsburg
road." Report of Lieut.-Col. N orval E. Welch, Sixteenth Michi- *
gan Infantry. " Near Emmittsburg, Md., July 6, 1863.
" In reply to circular of this date from brigade head
quarters as to the part this regiment sustained in the action
of July 2 and 3, I have the honor to report:
" The regiment, under my command, lay with the Third
brigade, First division, Fifth corps, closed in mass, near
and in rear of Gettysburg, to the left of the main road,
during most of the day. The brigade was commanded by
Col. Strong Vincent, Eighty-third Regiment, Pennsyl
vania Volunteers.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 219
" About 4 p. m. we moved rapidly to the extreme left of
our line of battle, and went into position on the left of the
brigade, at that time circling the crest of a high, rocky
hill. After deploying two of my largest companies as
skirmishers — Brady's Sharpshooters from the left and
Company A from the right — I was ordered at double-
quick to the right of the brigade, and to take my position
on the right of the Forty-fourth New York. Before this
could be accomplished, however, we were under a heavy
fire of the enemy's infantry. We succeeded, however, in
securing our places after some loss.
" We remained in this position nearly half an hour,
when someone (supposed to be General Weed or Major-
General Sykes) called from the extreme crest of the hill
to fall back nearer the top, where a much less exposed line
could be taken up. This order was not obeyed, except
by single individuals. From some misconstruction of or
ders, and entirely unwarrantable assumption of authority,
Lieutenant Kydd ordered the colors back. None left with
them, however, but three of the color-guard. They fol
lowed the brigade colors to where Colonel Vincent, after
being wounded, had been carried, where they remained all
night, joining the regiment in the morning with 45 men
who had left the field during and after the fight. All the
remainder of the regiment retained their position until re
lieved. " The two companies sent out as skirmishers num
bered about 50. The number of muskets taken in line was
about 150; the number killed and wounded 59 — 21 killed.
Several wounded have since died.
" On the 3d we took up a new line farther to the right,
at the left of the brigade, and remained on our arms for
twenty-four hours.
" Captain Elliott and Adjutant Jacklin behaved with
their usual gallantry. Captain Partridge, Lieutenants

220 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Borgman (wounded), Woodruff, Forsyth, Cameron
(wounded, with arm amputated), Swart, Graham, Salter,
and Captain Chandler behaved nobly and handled their
men with coolness and valor. Lieutenants Browne, Com
pany E, Jewett, Company K, and Borden, Company F,
died bravely defending the flag they had sworn to support
and that they loved in their hearts, and emulating the
bravest. I had no truer or purer officers, and their loss
cannot be replaced."
Report of Lieut.-Col. Freeman Connor, Forty-fourth
New York Infantry. <¦ jULY e> l86s
" I have the honor to submit the following report of the
action taken by this regiment in the engagement of July 2 :
" About 4 p. m. our regiment, Col. J. C. Rice command
ing, was placed in position on Round Top Hill, with the
Eighty-third Pennsylvania on our left and the Sixteenth
Michigan on our right. Company B was immediately
thrown out as skirmishers. When they had advanced
about 200 yards they met the enemy advancing in
three lines of battle.
" Orders were immediately given by Capt. L. S. Lar-
rabee, commanding the company, to fall back upon the bat
talion. It was while executing this order that that faith
ful and brave officer was shot through the body and in
stantly killed, being the first officer that this regiment had
ever had killed in battle.
" The enemy continued to advance until the first line
came within about 40 yards of our line. Upon their
first appearance we opened a heavy fire upon them, which
was continued until they were compelled to retreat. After
they had disappeared in our immediate front we turned
our fire upon those who had advanced in the hollow to our
right, and continued it until we were out of ammunition.
" After we had been engaged about one hour Colonel
Vincent, commanding brigade, was wounded, and the com-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 221
mand fell upon Col. J. C. Rice, and the command of
the regiment upon myself.
" We remained in our position until the next morning
about 8 a. m., when we were relieved by Colonel Hayes,
Eighteenth Massachusetts. We were then moved to the
right about three-eighths of a mile, and formed in line of
battle, the Sixteenth Michigan on our left and the Twen
tieth Maine on our right.
" I regret to add that in addition to Captain Larrabee,
whose death I have already noted, the officers are called
upon to mourn the loss of First Lieutenant Eugene L.
Dunham, Company D, a brave and efficient officer, who
was instantly killed during the heavy firing from the enemy
in our front ; Capt. William R. Bourne, Company K ; Capt.
Bennett Munger, Company C; Adjt. George B. Heren-
deen; First Lieut. Charles H. Zeilman, commanding Com
pany F, and Second Lieut. Benjamin N. Thomas, Com
pany K, were wounded, the latter, it is feared, mortally.
" It affords me great pleasure to be able to state that
both officers and men behaved with the greatest coolness
and bravery, not a single case of cowardice having come
to my ear."
Report of Capt. Orpheus S. Woodward, Eighty-third
Pennsylvania Infantry. "Near Emmittsburg, Md., July 6, 1863.
" In compliance with orders from headquarters Third
brigade, First division, Fifth corps, I have the honor to
report the following as the operations of my command
during the battle of the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th instant.
" On the morning of the 2d instant, moved to the front.
At about 2 :30 p. m. was ordered into position on our ex
treme left, the Forty-fourth New York on my right, the
Twentieth Maine on my left. At 3:15 p. m. the enemy
advanced and engaged my skirmishers, pressing on in
force, with bayonets fixed. They soon drove in my skir-

222 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
mishers and engaged my regiment, posted behind rocks
and stones hastily thrown up for defense. The contest
continued lively until nearly 6 p. m., when the enemy fell
back. I instantly threw forward a strong line of skir
mishers, who captured between 50 and 60 prisoners and
200 stand of arms.
" My men and officers acted splendidly. Where all did
so well, I cannot discriminate.
" My loss amounted to 10 killed and 45 wounded.
" At 1 :30 a. m. on the 3d moved to the support of the
Twentieth Maine, which had succeeded in taking a high
hill a little to the left of my former position. Remained
here until 10 a. m., when, being relieved by a regiment of
the Pennsylvania Reserves, rejoined my brigade, massed
in the woods just at the right of General Sykes' headquar
ters. Here I remained until 12 m., the 4th, when the
brigade was thrown forward on a reconnaissance. We
moved out and occupied the position occupied by the enemy
the previous day; threw forward skirmishers, but found
no opposing force within two miles. I deem it but proper
to state that but for the prompt and skillful disposition
made by Colonel Vincent of the troops under his command
(the Third brigade), the enemy would have succeeded in
turning our left.
" I regret to state that Colonel Vincent was severely
wounded. My command (his regiment) esteemed him
highly as a gentleman, scholar, and soldier, and bitterly
avenged his injury."
Report of Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayers, U. S. Army,
commanding Second Division.
" Hdqrs. Second Division, Fifth Army Corps,
" July 28, 1863.
" I have the honor to submit a report of the operations
of this division in the battle of Gettysburg, Pa,

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 223
" The division was marched forward on the night of
July 1 and 2 on the Gettysburg and Hanover road, and
was formed in line of battle in rear of and facing that
road, the First division on its right. Later in the day it
was marched to the left and center, and massed there. In
the afternoon the enemy's attack on the left of our posi
tion being developed, the division, preceded by the First
division, was marched to the support of our troops en
gaged, the Third brigade being placed in position on the
general line of battle upon a rocky hill (usually called
Round Top Hill) of great importance, facing the Em
mittsburg and Gettysburg pike. This brigade was ordered
to hold this hill, which duty it performed well and ef
fectually.1 " In the death of Brig. Gen. Stephen H. Weed, volun
teers, and captain Fifth U. S. Artillery, the service lost a
distinguished and gallant soldier. Col. P. H. O'Rorke, One
Hundred and Fortieth New York Volunteers and First
Lieutenant U. S. Engineers, was a brave and valuable officer.
" I inclose reports of brigade commanders. The list of
casualties is now in your hands."
Report of Col. Kenner Garrard, One Hundred and
Forty-sixth New York Infantry, commanding Third Bri
gade.
" Hdqrs. Third Brigade, Second Division,
Fifth Army Corps,
" Camp near Berlin, Md., July 16, 1863.
" I have the honor to make the following report of the
part taken by the Third brigade in the late battle near
Gettysburg :
" On the 2d instant, after changing position several times
iThe succeeding paragraphs relating to the action of the First and
Second brigades, and the commendation of staff and other officers,
are omitted.

224 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
in the early part of the morning, the brigade with the di
vision remained idle, lying by their arms until about 4 p. m.
At this time the brigade was moved rapidly forward (most
of the time at the double-quick) nearly i_$ miles, when it
came under the fire of the enemy's musketry.
" At this point the leading regiment, under the direction
of General Warren, chief engineer Army of the Potomac,
was led to the left, up on what is known as Round Top
ridge. Hazlett's battery ascended the ridge immediately
in rear of this regiment (the One Hundred and Fortieth
New York Volunteers, Col. P. H. O'Rorke commanding),
and went into battery on the summit. The One Hundred
and Fortieth was formed in line and was immediately closely
engaged with the enemy at short musket-range on the left
slope of the ridge.
" A portion of the First division, Fifth Army corps, was
engaged to the left of the ridge, and this regiment and
Hazlett's battery were brought up to assist the First division
in repelling a heavy assault of the enemy, with the evident
design of gaining this ridge. Colonel O'Rorke was mortally
wounded at the head of his regiment while leading it into
action. " The other regiments, One Hundred and Forty-sixth
New York Volunteers and the Ninety-first and the One
Hundred and Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, were
led to the right and front some distance, and formed in line
in a narrow valley to support a portion of the Third corps
and Watson's battery, then severely pressed by the enemy.
Before becoming engaged, however, orders were received
for these regiments to return > at double-quick to Round
Top Ridge, and secure and hold that position. The Ninety-
first was posted on the left of the battery, connecting with
the One Hundred and Fortieth. The One Hundred and
Forty-sixth and One Hundred and Fifty-fifth were posted

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 225
on the right, extending from the battery on the summit,
along the crest of the ridge, to the gorge on the right.
" As soon as the regiments had their positions, men from
each regiment were advanced down the slope to the front,
in among the rocks, and, together with those in line on the
crest, actively engaged the enemy during the rest of that
day. At night this ridge, naturally strong, was strength
ened by building a stone wall about halfway down the slope,
wherever the rocks offered no protection to the men.
" The next day the brigade remained in the same posi
tion, and, though under the shells of the enemy and ex
posed to their sharpshooters, it was not engaged to any ex
tent. " When the brigade and Hazlett's battery seized this
ridge, it was done under a heavy musketry fire, and was en
tirely unoccupied, excepting by a part of the First division,
on the extreme left, and I am gratified to report to the
general commanding the division that the order to secure
and hold this ridge was faithfully executed. At no time
during July 2, 3, and 4, after its position was assigned it,
did any regiment of the brigade leave its place, excepting
at the time of heavy assault a portion of some of the regi
ments advanced to the front down the slope of the ridge,
in order to have a better fire at the enemy.
" A few moments after General Weed, the brigade com
mander, had placed his command in position on this ridge,
he was mortally wounded, on the summit, near the battery.
Lieutenant Hazlett, commanding the battery, while offer
ing his assistance to General Weed, fell, mortally wounded.
" I am pleased to report that all the regiments performed
their duty well, and that during the two days' battle the of
ficers and men conducted themselves in the most praise
worthy manner.
" A report of the casualties has already been furnished."

226 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford, U, S. Army,
commanding Third Division.
" Hdqrs. Pa. Reserves, Third Div., Fifth Corps,
" July io, 1863.
" I have the honor to submit the following report of the
operations of this division in the recent battle near Gettys
burg, Pa. :
" At daylight on the 2d instant, while resting my com
mand near McSherrystown, having marched nearly all the
previous night, I received an order from the major-gen
eral commanding the corps to march immediately toward
Gettysburg. The column was put in motion at once, and
by noon had arrived at the position occupied by the First
and Second divisions of the corps, near the Gettysburg
and Hanover turnpike.
" At 2 o'clock an order reached me to form my command
at once and proceed toward the left flank of our line,
when my position would be indicated by a staff officer.
The First division of the corps, which I had been directed
to follow, had taken a different road from that indicated
to me. Under the guidance, however, of Captain Moore,
an aide of the general commanding the army, who had
come from the field for fresh troops, I pushed rapidly for
ward, and arrived in a short time upon the field, and re
ported to Major-General Sykes. I received orders at once
to mass my troops upon the right of a road running
through our line, near our left flank, and which, descend
ing a rocky slope, crossed a low marshy ground in front
to a wheat-field lying between two thick belts of woods
beyond. " The position occupied by our troops on the left was
naturally a strong one. A rocky ridge, wooded at the
top, extended along the left of our position, ending in a
high hill, called the Round Top, whose sides covered with

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 227
timber terminated abruptly in the plain below, while the
entire ridge sloped toward a small stream that traversed
the marshy ground in front. Beyond this lay two thick
masses of timber, separated by a large wheat-field, and
skirting this timber a low stone wall ran from right to left.
" The movement indicated had not been completed when
I received a subsequent order to cross the road to the slope
of the rocky ridge opposite the woods, and to cover the
troops then engaged in front, should it become necessary
for them to fall back. In carrying out this order I re
ceived instructions to detach one brigade of my command,
to go to the left of Barnes' division, on the crest of the
ridge. The Third brigade, under Col. J. W. Fisher, was
detailed, and moved at once. The firing in front was
heavy and incessant. The enemy, concentrating his forces
opposite the left of our line, was throwing them in heavy
masses upon our troops, and was steadily advancing.
" Our troops in front, after a determined resistance,
unable to withstand the force of the enemy, fell back, and
some finally gave way. The plain to my front was cov
ered with fugitives from all divisions, who rushed through
my lines and along the road to the rear. Fragments of
regiments came back in disorder, and without their arms,
and for a moment all seemed lost. The enemy's skir
mishers had reached the foot of the rocky ridge; his col
umns were following rapidly.
" My command was formed in two lines, the second
massed on the first. The Sixth regiment, Lieutenant-Col
onel Ent, on the right, the First regiment, Colonel Talley,
on the left, and the Eleventh regiment, of Fisher's brigade,
under Colonel Jackson, in the center. The second line
consisted of the First Rifles (Bucktails), Colonel Taylor,
and the Second regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Woodward.
Colonel McCandless, the brigade commander, commanded
the whole.

228 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
" Not a moment was to be lost. Uncovering our front,
I ordered an immediate advance. The command advanced
gallantly with loud cheers. Two well-directed volleys
were delivered upon the advancing masses of the enemy,
when the whole column charged at a run down the slope,
driving the enemy back across the space beyond and across
the stone wall, for the possession of which there was a
short but determined struggle. The enemy retired to the
wheat-field and the woods.
" The second line was immediately deployed to the left,
the First Rifles (Bucktails), under their gallant leader,
Colonel Taylor, gaining the flank and dashing upon the
enemy, who, endeavoring for a moment to make a stand,
finally broke and fled in disorder across the field, leaving
his dead and wounded in our hands. As night was ap
proaching and my flanks were unprotected, I directed Col
onel McCandless to hold the line of the stone wall and the
woods on the right. Heavy lines of skirmishers were
thrown out, and the ground firmly and permanently held.
" I then rode to the left, toward Fisher's brigade. Upon
ascending the crest of the ridge I found, from the report
of that officer, as well as from Colonel Rice, of Barnes'
division, that the Round Top was still in possession of the
enemy's skirmishers, who were firing upon our men.
" It was important to hold this hill, as from its position
it commanded that part of our line. I directed Colonel
Fisher to occupy it at once. He immediately detached the
Twelfth regiment, under Colonel Hardin, the Fifth, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Dare, and the Twentieth Maine regi
ment, under Colonel Chamberlain, who advanced promptly,
driving the enemy before them, capturing over 30 pris
oners. " During the night the division commanded by Brig
adier-General Bartlett, of the Sixth corps, was moved up
to my support. At five o'clock on the 3d I received orders

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 229
from General Sykes, commanding the corps, to advance
that portion of my command which was holding the ground
retaken on the left, and which still held the line of the
stone wall in front, to enter the woods, and, if possible,
drive out the enemy. It was supposed that the enemy had
evacuated the position.
" I proceeded at once to the spot, and directed the move
ment to be made. McCandless' brigade, with the Eleventh
regiment, under Colonel Jackson, was ordered to advance,
throwing out skirmishers toward the right in the direction
of a battery established by the enemy at noon, and which
was plainly visible. I requested Brigadier-General Bart
lett to move up one of his regiments to the stone wall from
which I advanced, and also to throw a force toward my
right, to protect that flank. The men of his command
moved promptly into position, and rendered efficient serv
ice. The movement had hardly begun before this battery
opened with grape and canister. The woods on the right
were soon cleared; as soon as the skirmishers approached
the battery it ceased firing and fled.
" The line was then formed, and, under the immediate
direction of Colonel McCandless, dashed across the wheat-
field and into the upper end of the woods. The enemy's
skirmishers were driven back as he advanced, and the
upper end of the woods was now cleared. The command
then changed front to rear, and charged through the en
tire length of woods. One brigade of the enemy, com
manded by Brigadier-General [George T.J Anderson and
composed of Georgia troops, was encountered. It had
taken position behind a stone wall running through the
woods, and which they had made stronger by rails and
logs. We fell upon their flank, completely routing them,
taking over 200 prisoners, one stand of colors belonging
to the Fifteenth Georgia, and many arms. The colors
were taken by Sergt. John B. Thompson, Company G,

230 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
First Rifles. Another brigade, under General Robertson,
and composed of Texas troops, which lay concealed be
yond the woods and near the foot of the ridge, ran, as re
ported by the prisoners, without firing a shot.
" The enemy's force at this point (his extreme right)
consisted of the division of Major-General Hood, and was
composed of three brigades, under the rebel Generals An
derson, [J. B.J Robertson, and [H. L.] Benning. They
very greatly outnumbered us, but the rapidity of the move
ment and the gallant dash of my men completely surprised
and routed them. They fell back nearly a mile to a sec
ond ridge, and intrenched themselves. By this charge of
McCandless' brigade and the Eleventh regiment, Colonel
Jackson, the whole of the ground lost the previous day
was retaken, together with all of our wounded, who,
mingled with those of the rebels, were lying uncared for.
" The dead of both sides lay in lines in every direction,
and the large number of our own men showed how fierce
had been the struggle and how faithfully and how persist
ently they had contested for the field against the superior
masses of the enemy.
" The result of this movement was the recovery of all
the ground lost by our troops, one 12-pounder Napoleon
gun and three caissons, and upward of 7000 stand of arms.
Large piles of these arms were found on brush heaps ready
to be burned.
" Our wounded were at once cared for, and, under the
able and prompt management of Surg. L. W. Read, sur
geon-in-chief of this division, who came promptly upon
the field, they were moved to hospitals in the rear and
carefully provided for.
" On the 4th the large number of arms were collected,
under the immediate direction of Lieutenant Harding, the
ordnance officer of the division, and the brigade, which
had been on incessant duty for forty-eight hours, under

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 231
an annoying picket fire for a great period of the time, was
withdrawn to the rear.
" My list in killed and wounded was 20 officers and 190
men, 3 only missing.
" The nominal and tabular list is inclosed.
" Col. Charles Fred. Taylor, the gallant and brave
leader of the Bucktail Regiment, fell while leading his regi
ment to the charge. No braver soldier and patriot has
given his life to the cause.
" The gallant men of this division fought upon their own
soil, some of them at their very homes ; and there was not
an officer or private soldier who did not realize that the
very contingency to meet which the division was formed
had now arisen. The result is evinced in the gallantry
displayed by those who were fortunate enough to enter the
field when our left was overpowered and the enemy was
boldly advancing upon the key of our position.
" Great credit is due to Col. William McCandless,
commanding the First brigade, for his management of
his brigade and the prompt and faithful execution of the
order given to him in the face of a galling fire on the 2d,
and for the rapid and successful dash upon the enemy on
the 3d, and I recommended him especially to the notice of
the major-general commanding the corps.
" To Colonel Fisher, commanding the Third brigade,
great credit is also due in early realizing the importance of
the occupation of the Round Top and in promptly and suc
cessfully occupying it. The enemy would undoubtedly
have occupied it during the night.
" The prompt and efficient support given to me by Brig
adier-General Bartlett, commanding division, Sixth corps,
I desire here to acknowledge.
" The officers of my staff accompanied me throughout
the action. Captain [Louis] Livingston, my senior aide;
Captain [Richard T.J Auchmuty, assistant adjutant-gen-

232 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
eral; Major [James P.] Speer, inspector-general, and
Lieutenant [Richard P.J Henderson, aide-de-camp, ac
companied the command on the charge and were among
the foremost.
" Captain Livingston and Lieutenant Henderson are de
serving of especial commendation for the prompt and
fearless conveyance of orders intrusted to them on the 3d,
under the immediate fire of the enemy's battery.
" Lieutenant [William] Harding, the ordnance officer,
managed his department with great credit, and promptly
moved from the field a large proportion of the small-arms
secured. His report has already been submitted."
Report of Col. Joseph W. Fisher, Fifth Pennsylvania
Reserves, Commanding Third Brigade.
" Hdqrs. Third Brigade, Pennsylvania Reserve Corps,
"July 9, 1863. '
" I have the honor to report that at the recent battle of
Gettysburg I marched my brigade to the left of General
Sykes' corps, being the extreme left of the Army of the
Potomac, and at once engaged the enemy, although very
shortly afterward he retired, leaving large numbers of his
killed and wounded on the field.
" Soon after the close of the fight of the 2d I discov
ered in my immediate front a hill called Round Top, from
the summit of which the enemy was doing us great dam
age. I thought it highly important that we should at once
occupy it. I accordingly took two regiments of my bri
gade, viz., the Fifth, Lieutenant-Colonel Dare, and the
Twelfth, Colonel Hardin, and the Twentieth Maine, com
manded by Colonel Chamberlain, and at 10 p. m. ascended
the hill, which was occupied by a full brigade of the enemy.
We went up steadily in line of battle, taking over 30 pris
oners in our ascent.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 233
" In the morning I discovered that the hill was of im
mense importance to us, inasmuch as that, if we had not
taken it, the enemy most undoubtedly would have done so,
and in that event our left would have suffered very much,
if, indeed, it could have held its position at all. I also
discovered that our troops were not well posted for de
fense, so I changed my position, throwing the left flank
of the two regiments which had not gone up the hill
around so as to completely cover the ravine between the
two hills, and at once threw up a stone wall across the en
tire ravine and up the hill, thus giving my men a sure
protection against any advance which could possibly have
been made by the enemy.
" My officers and men behaved throughout with great
coolness and bravery. Among others equally worthy of
and deserving special mention, I beg leave to call your at
tention to the conduct of Colonel Hardin, of the Twelfth
regiment, who, still suffering from wounds received at
Bull Run, went gallantly up the mountain, leading his
regiment to where hot work was expected; Lieutenant-
Colonel Dare, of the Fifth regiment, who was also
wounded at Fredericksburg, led his regiment up the hill,
over rocks and ravines; Colonel Warner, of the Tenth
regiment, who is still so lame from wounds received at
Antietam as to be unable to walk without support, went
into the engagement against my wishes, and behaved with
great coolness and courage; Lieutenant-Colonel Snodgrass,
of the Ninth, evinced all the elements of a soldier in his
calm and dignified demeanor, while all the subordinate field
officers are deserving of special mention, especially Maj.
James H. Larrimer, of the Fifth regiment, who, suffering
from acute rheumatism, refused to remain out of the bat
tle, although, in my judgment, unfit for duty.
" The members of my staff, Lieutenant [John L.J
Wright, acting assistant adjutant-general; Captain [Hart-

234 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
ley J Howard, brigade inspector; Lieutenants [Charles K.]
Chamberlain and [William H. H.] Kerns, aides, all ren
dered me efficient support. Sergt. Thomas M. Fisher,
acting as one of my orderlies, deserves special mention as
exhibiting most remarkable coolness and bravery.
" My brigade captured and turned in to the proper of
ficer over iooo stand of arms, brought off over 200
wounded rebels, and buried 80 of their dead. Taking it
all in all, I have no hesitation in saying that my brigade
fulfilled their mission to Gettysburg."
Report of Maj. Homer R. Stoughton, Second U. S.
Sharpshooters, Third Army Corps}
" Hdqrs. Second Regiment U. S. Sharpshooters,
" July 27, 1863.
" I have the honor to report the operations of the Sec
ond U. S. Sharpshooters at Gettysburg, Pa., as follows:
" On the morning of July 2 I was placed in line on the
extreme left of the Third corps, remaining there for nearly
one hour, when the colonel commanding instructed me to
place my command in a position to cover a ravine near
Sugar Loaf hill, which I did by putting Company H on
the brow of the hill, with vedettes overlooking the ravine,
and Company D in the ravine near the woods, to watch
the enemy's movements in that direction. Companies A,
E, G, and C formed a line perpendicular to the cross-road
that intersects with the Emmittsburg pike. Companies B
and F I held in reserve.
" I remained in this position until about 2 p. m., when
General Ward directed that I should deploy my regiment
across the ravine and through the woods on the right, and
advance. I moved forward to a brook some 200 yards
beyond a second cross-road running perpendicular to the
Emmittsburg pike, and intersecting with it in front of
1 " Rebellion Records," Vol. xxvii, part 1, page 518.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 235
Sugar Loaf hill. I sent forward scouts to reconnoiter the
ground. I then rode out perhaps the distance of half a
mile, and discovered the enemy's skirmishers advancing on
my right, which, being unsupported by any connection with
skirmishers on my right, I was compelled to withdraw to
protect my flank. In this position we had but little time
to wait. The enemy's skirmishers advanced to the top of
the hill in our front, and immediately after they placed a
battery directly in our front, and, being too far for our
range, I sent forward a few men under cover of woods on
the left, and silenced one piece nearest us.
" The enemy then advanced a line of battle covering our
entire front and flank. While they were advancing, the
Second regiment did splendid execution, killing and
wounding a great many. One regiment broke three times,
and rallied, before it would advance. I held my position
until their line of battle was within 100 yards of me and
their skirmishers were pushing my right flank, when I or
dered my men to fall back, firing as they retired. My
left wing retreated up the hill and allowed the enemy to
pass up the ravine, when they poured a destructive fire into
his flank and rear.
" Here Adjutant Norton, with about a dozen men, cap
tured and sent to the rear 22 prisoners. Special mention
should be made of this officer for his coolness and bravery
during this day's engagement.
" The right wing fell back gradually until they mingled
with the regiments composing the Second brigade, and re
mained till night, when the brigade was relieved.
" In this day's action were wounded Capts. E. T. Rowell,
(acting major), J. McClure, and A. Buxton. Our loss
was 28 killed, wounded, and missing. Among the miss
ing was Lieut. D. B. Petti John, Company A.
" On the 3d instant the Second regiment was not en
gaged, with the exception of about a dozen volunteers,

22,6 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
who went out to the front of the breastworks of the First
Army corps, to silence one of the enemy's guns, which was
accomplished, losing i killed and i wounded.
" On the 4th instant I was ordered to move forward to
the Emmittsburg pike, a few hundred yards to the left of
the cemetery, and to deploy four companies to skirmish
through the field to the woods in front. The enemy was
driven back to his earthworks, about 150 or 200 yards
from his first position. We held this position through the
day, under a sharp fire from his sharpshooters.
" The regiment sustained a loss this day of 3 killed and 8
wounded. Among the wounded was Lieutenant Law,
Company E.
" At 7 =30 p. m. I was relieved by a New Jersey regi
ment, of the Sixth corps, and rejoined the brigade."
The reader will find in these reports, as well as in those
of the Confederate officers, some omissions, discrepancies,
and contradictory statements; but they are exact copies
of the original documents published by authority of the
War Department as the official records of the War of the
Rebellion. In my comments I shall assume that in gen
eral they present the facts according to the best knowledge
and belief of the officers who made the reports at the time
they were made, except in a few cases where I have good rea
son to believe that they contain deliberate misstatements
made with the purpose of concealing misconduct or of un
duly magnifying the importance of the service of the or
ganization under the command of the officer who makes
the report. In justice to the truth of history, I think such
misstatements should be exposed.
Sykes** Report of the Fifth Army Corps
General Sykes had been a soldier all his life since his
boyhood. He entered the Military Academy as a cadet

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 237
in 1838, was graduated in 1842, and continued in the army
until his death, in 1880, passing through all the grades
from second lieutenant to major-general of Volunteers and
brevet major-general in the Regular Army. He served in
the war with Mexico, and was brevetted for gallant and
meritorious conduct in the battle of Cerro Gordo. He
was made a brigadier-general of Volunteers September 28,
1861, and major-general of Volunteers November 29,
1862, and placed in command of the Second division of
the Fifth Army Corps, which contained the two brigades
of the Regular Army. On June 28, 1863, when General
Meade, who had been in command of the Fifth Army
Corps, was assigned to the command of the Army of the
Potomac, Sykes succeeded him in command of the corps.
General Barnes, who commanded the First division of
Sykes' corps, was graduated from the Military Academy
in 1829 as second lieutenant. Having served in this grade
about seven years, he was promoted to be first lieutenant,
and within a month resigned and left the army. July 26,
1861, he was commissioned colonel of the Eighteenth
Massachusetts, which became part of Porter's division,
later the First division of the Fifth corps. The same day
that Sykes was made major general of Volunteers, No
vember 29, 1862, Barnes was made brigadier-general of
Volunteers and assigned to the command of this brigade.
In the changes which occurred, General Griffin became
commander of this First division. After the battle of
Chancellorsville General Griffin was absent temporarily on
account of illness, and Barnes as senior brigadier assumed
command of the division. He was one of the oldest of
ficers in the army. If he entered the Academy at sixteen
years of age, the lowest limit for cadets, he must have been
born in 1809, or earlier. Although Sykes speaks kindly
of him in his report, it is evident from his statement that
he posted Barnes' brigades himself, that he had no great

238 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
confidence in him as an officer to be trusted, on this day at
least, to act on his own responsibility. This is confirmed
by the statements of Tilton and Sweitzer, commanders of
two brigades of which Barnes had charge during the bat
tle, that when they reached their last position at the close
of the action they reported to the corps commander and
received orders from him, as Barnes was not present.
Griffin arrived on the field July 3, and relieved Barnes in
the command of the division July 4. We hear no more
of Barnes during the war, except as commander in charge
of a camp of Confederate prisoners. I give these facts
as the reason for my opinion that Barnes' statement can
not be received as entitled to full credence.
The reader will note that in Sykes' report there is no
confirmation of Barnes' statement that while he and Sykes
were together, Warren came to them asking for troops for
Little Round Top; that Sykes yielded to his importunity
and that he, Barnes, sent Vincent's brigade. The state
ment so often made that Barnes' division, preceded by
Sykes and Barnes, moved out by the road which crosses
the ridge at the north foot of Little Round Top and runs
to the Emmittsburg road north of the wheat-field and the
peach orchard is not correct. My recollection is that
Barnes' division moved by the road which runs from the
Baltimore Pike to the Taneytown road south of Cemetery
hill, then turned south on the Taneytown road until they
were in rear of the position which had been occupied by
Humphreys' division in the morning, then left the road
and marched across the fields to a point a little northeast
of the wheat-field, where they halted, and Sykes and
Barnes went forward into the woods west of the wheat-
field. When Vincent's brigade moved to its position be
tween Round Top and Little Round Top, it came by this
road crossing the Plum Run valley just west of the north
front of Little Round Top.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 239
I think Sykes is mistaken in the statement that Vincent's
and Weed's brigades were posted under the direction of
Warren. Sykes had ordered Weed, when he met him be
fore his brigade reached Little Round Top, to take posi
tion there. He knew that Warren was there at that time,
and evidently supposed that he would take charge of troops
sent there. Sykes says that when he returned he saw the
greater part of Weed's brigade moving away from the
position which he had assigned to it, and sent a staff of
ficer to inquire why he had vacated the position. Learning
that Weed's brigade was moving to the front by order of
Sickles, he ordered him to return and reoccupy it. He
could not reoccupy a position which he had not previously
occupied. All other accounts agree that no part of Weed's
brigade except the One Hundred and Fortieth New York
had previously been on Little Round Top, and when it
finally arrived Warren was not there. When Warren de
tached the One Hundred and Fortieth New York and sent
it to the crest of Little Round Top, he left Lieutenant
Roebling, of his staff, to conduct it there and rode away to
meet General Meade. He did not return to the hill, did
not see Vincent's brigade come up, and had nothing to do
with posting it. For confirmation of this statement see
Warren's letters to Captain Farley, quoted Ch. vn., pp. 307-
329 infra.
Sykes' statement that Crawford's division moved to the
front across the Plum Run Valley is only partly correct.
Only two brigades of Crawford's division were present in
the battle. One of Crawford's brigades under McCandless,
with the Eleventh Pennsylvania Reserves, made this at
tack under Crawford's personal direction. The remaining
four regiments of Fisher's brigade remained in reserve.
About dusk Fisher was sent with these four regiments to
support Vincent, but they did not arrive in time to take any
part in the repulse of the enemy on that part of the field.

240 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Barnes' Report First Division
This report was not made until August 24, nearly two
months after the battle, and then only in conformity to
instructions from headquarters. It is made up in great
part by copying from the reports of his brigade com
manders. This is excusable, so far as the report of Vin
cent's brigade is concerned, because it was removed from
his personal observation. I wish to treat Barnes fairly.
Concerning his statement that he detached Vincent's bri
gade and sent it to Little Round Top, I give him the bene
fit of supposing that the officer of Sykes' staff who told
Vincent that Sykes had sent him to direct Barnes to send
one of his brigades to that hill yonder, pointing to Little
Round Top, found Barnes after Vincent had gone, and
Barnes sent the order to Vincent. Barnes was not with
his division, and did not return to the other two brigades
until after Vincent had gone. If he had been with Sykes,
as he states, Sykes would not have sent one of his staff
with an order for him, but would have given it to him in
person. Barnes' statement that Warren came to them,
when he and Sykes were together, has no confirmation
either from Warren, Sykes, or any other person entitled
to know, so far as I have been able to ascertain. On the
contrary, the letter from Lieutenant Mackenzie to General
Meade, which I have quoted elsewhere,1 shows clearly that
Warren sent Mackenzie to Sickles and Sykes to ask for
troops on Little Round Top. Sickles refused, but Sykes
granted his request. This letter is short and formal, and
is evidently in reply to an inquiry from General Meade;
it should settle that question. I think Warren did not
leave the vicinity of the signal station, after he arrived
there some time before half past three o'clock, until Ward
was driven back from the Devil's Den, when he went
down to Weed's brigade, detached O'Rorke's regiment, and
1 P. 292 infra.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 241
then rode away to find General Meade and report. By
this time Vincent's brigade had been fighting for half an
hour. It is evident from Sykes' statement that he posted the
brigades of Tilton and Sweitzer himself, and, from the
reports of both these brigade commanders, that Barnes did
not give them much assistance, and that when their stub
born fight ended by their occupation of the position which
they held during the night, Barnes had disappeared; but
Sykes was looking after them; he gave them orders and
they reported to him. Where Barnes was at this time is
not stated by himself or either of his brigade commanders.
Tilton's First Brigade
This report, as before stated, indicates very little as
sistance received from Barnes. The only order of Barnes
which he mentions is one to fall back in good order if
unable to hold the position. When he was flanked by over
whelming numbers he retired in as good order as the cir
cumstances permitted and secured a position on a ridge
not far from the Devil's Den, which he held during the
night. He reported to General Sykes.
Sweitzer's Second Brigade
This report and that of the First Brigade show splendid
fighting by the men and skillful management by the brigade
commanders under trying circumstances. I think that
nearly every division commander in the Army of the Po
tomac would have prevented the surprise which over
whelmed these brigades. The reader will note Sweitzer's
statement that when his brigade reached its last position
Barnes was not present, and he received and obeyed the
order which Sykes had sent to Barnes,

242 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Vincent, Third Brigade
This report was made by Colonel James C. Rice, who
succeeded to the command when Vincent fell. As I have
so fully described elsewhere the part taken by this brigade
in the battle, I make no further comment on this report.
Twentieth Maine
Colonel Chamberlain wrote this report July 6, while the
events were distinctly remembered. It was carefully pre
pared by an officer who knew the facts. His commenda
tion of the character of his men is not, in my opinion,
stronger than they deserve. His subsequent career in
later campaigns, concluding with the surrender at Appo
mattox, shows his ability and the esteem and regard of his
superior officers. I have accepted his statements in this re
port as substantially correct. When he succeeded to the
command of the brigade the officers and men of this or
ganization looked upon him as a worthy successor to But-
terfield, Vincent, and Rice.
Sixteenth Michigan
It is with the deepest regret that I feel obliged to con
demn this report as unworthy of its author and his gallant
regiment, which formed a part of the Third brigade from
Hall's Hill in front of Washington in the fall of 1861 to
the surrender of the Confederate army at Appomattox,
April 9, 1865, and on all other occasions I believe it per
formed its full duty with great credit. The greater part
of the regiment fought with its usual valor at Gettysburg.
The report is an effort to explain the misconduct of Lieu
tenant-Colonel Welch and a large portion of three com
panies on the right of the regiment. It is full of mis-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 243
statements which were not accepted at the time by the bri
gade commander nor the commanders of the other regi
ments. It is not true that when the brigade reached its
position the Sixteenth was on the left of the line, and that
there two of its companies were thrown out as skir
mishers. No skirmishers were thrown out by this regi
ment. The Twentieth Maine was the left of the line when
the brigade took its position and remained there. The
Sixteenth came on the ground between the Forty-fourth
and Eighty-third; and at Colonel Rice's request that these
two regiments might fight side by side, as they had done in
all their previous battles, Vincent ordered the Sixteenth
to pass the Forty-fourth, and placed it on the right of the
line. The brigade was all in position and ready for the
enemy before a shot was fired. There was no loss in the
regiment before it reached its place in line. General Weed
was not on the top of the high rock in rear of the regi
ment at any time during the battle; in fact, he did not
reach Little Round Top until after the last assault of the
enemy was repulsed. I have found no evidence that Gen
eral Sykes was on that part of the field where Vincent's
brigade fought during the battle of July 2. The fact is
that Welch was not in his proper place in rear of his regi
ment, where a competent officer, encouraging and sustain
ing his men, might have prevented the break which oc
curred. Vincent went up there and tried to restore order,
but fell before he could do so. It is true that the enemy
in great force had reached that part of the line, but the
men of the Sixteenth had maintained their ground before,
in face of determined assaults, and might have done so at
this time if properly commanded ; but they were seized with
panic and ran for shelter behind the rocks. Colonel Rice
in his report commends the commanders of each of the
other regiments and some of their subordinate officers, but
does not mention Lieutenant-Colonel Welch, commending

244 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
only Captain Elliott and Adjutant Jacklin of the Sixteenth
Michigan. These officers remained with that part of the
regiment which held fast.
About dusk, after the fighting there had ceased, Colonel
Rice directed me to take my flag, ride to the rear, and
try to get some ambulances and stretcher bearers to care
for our wounded. I found the whole country to the
northeast of Little Round Top filled with field hospital
tents, and ambulances coming and going, but all the am
bulance officers that I appealed to replied that they were
under orders and could not go where I asked without an
order from the surgeon in charge. I was unable to find
this officer, and continued on down the road running east
from Little Round Top until I reached the last field hos
pital. Returning, I saw Colonel Welch sitting on his horse
near the Bushman house, with his regimental colors and
near him some forty or fifty of his men. I asked him
where the brigade was. He replied that he did not know;
that they had been driven from their position and he had
followed my brigade flag, thinking they had gone in that
direction. I think Welch and these men had been skulk
ing behind the high rocks and followed my flag when they
saw me go down the hill. Welch told me that Colonel
Vincent was in that house. This was the Bushman farm
house, where Vincent had been carried after receiving
his fatal wound. Dismounting, I left my horse and flag
with one of the men of the Sixteenth. This man told me
that he did not believe the brigade had left its position;
neither did I. I entered the house, which was full of
wounded men. I found Colonel Vincent in a room on the
first floor. He was very pale and unable to speak, but he
held out his hand to me. When I said to him, " The boys
are still there, Colonel," his face lighted up with pleasure
and he pressed my hand. I tried to say a few words ex
pressing my grief, but was too much overcome by the pa-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 245
thetic scene. He died in that house five days later. I hur
riedly left the room and the house and returned to my
post. I found the brigade there, as I expected. Some
ambulances and stretchers had arrived and the surgeons
were there. The men were gathering up the wounded
men, Union and Confederate, and bringing them to the
surgeons near the ambulances. The Confederate pris
oners able to walk had been gathered in a squad under
guard, and were soon sent to the rear.
Lieutenant-Colonel Welch in later campaigns and bat
tles redeemed his reputation. He was made colonel of
the regiment and was killed in one of the minor engage
ments on the lines south of Petersburg. He was leading
a charge on the enemy's intrenchments and received a shot
at close range from one of the Confederates, which killed
him instantly.
Forty-fourth New York
In view of the important part taken by the regiment in
this battle, Lieutenant-Colonel Conner's report is very
modest. One would suppose from reading it that the Con
federates made only one attack on the front of this regi
ment, and that this lasted about an hour. This does not
agree with the reports of the Confederate regiments which
made this attack; but as a part of these men took shelter
behind the large rocks within short range and continued
firing, it seemed like a continuous battle. His remark
about firing on the enemy in the hollow on the right evi
dently refers to the attack on the right of the brigade.
Until Colonel Vincent fell Colonel Rice was in command
of this regiment. He describes the attack in his brigade
report. He overestimates the force of the enemy, as two
or three brigades, but as prisoners taken were from Rob
ertson's and Law's brigades, he is perhaps excusable. He
says the enemy charged again and again within a few yards

246 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
of these unflinching troops. As Connor did not take com
mand until the last of the assaults on the Forty-fourth was
repulsed, Colonel Rice's statement, in my opinion, is pref
erable. Eighty-third Pennsylvania
Captain Woodward is mistaken about the time of the
engagement. The Fifth corps did not move from its posi
tion on the Baltimore Pike until some time after three
o'clock. The Confederate infantry was a mile distant
from the Devil's Den when at four o'clock they began
their advance against our line. The attack on Vincent's
brigade must have commenced at some time between 4:30
and 5 p. m. Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General Wood
ward is still living, or was a few months ago, at Neosho
Falls, Kansas. He is seventy-seven years old, and, al
though minus one leg which he lost in battle in 1864, still
enjoys fairly good health. In a letter which I received
from him, dated January 12, 1912, he admits his mistake
in regard to the time, and authorizes me to correct that
statement to accord with the facts.

General Romeyn B. Ayres, Second Division
As the First and Second brigades did not participate in
the battle on Little Round Top, I make no comment on
their gallant service elsewhere. The statement about the
Third brigade (Weed's), that they were placed on Little
Round Top and ordered to hold the hill, — which duty it
performed well and effectually, — is technically true, al
though, with the exception of the One Hundred and
Fortieth New York regiment, commanded by Colonel
O'Rorke, it did not arrive on the hill until the last as
sault on that position had been repulsed.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 247
Third Brigade, — Weed's
As General Weed was mortally wounded in the battle
and died a few hours later, the report is made by Colonel
Kenner Garrard, of the One Hundred and Forty-sixth
New York, who assumed command when Weed fell.
There are no regimental reports of this brigade. Col
onel Garrard makes no distinction between the different
regiments of this brigade in regard to the importance of
the part which each took in the action. The brigade was
composed of good men, well officered. If they had been
given the opportunity I have no doubt the other regiments
would have maintained their reputation by the side of the
One Hundred and Fortieth New York, but unfortunately
they did not arrive until this regiment had been fighting
nearly or quite half an hour, had repulsed the last Confed
erate charge, and had lost a large number of its men and
officers, including Colonel O'Rorke. During this time the
remainder of the brigade, which Sykes had ordered to Lit
tle Round Top, had marched by that position and under
an order from Sickles had moved out toward the Emmitts
burg road, to support the Third corps. By the time
Sykes discovered this movement and ordered it back to
Little Round Top, the attack by the Confederates had
been repulsed by the One Hundred and Fortieth New
York, and the battle had dwindled to long distance firing
between the sharpshooters and individuals of both sides.
When Warren from his position near the signal corps
saw the preparations for this attack, he rode down the
hill and detaching the One Hundred and Fortieth New
York from the rear of Weed's brigade, which was then
moving out to the front, sent it up to the crest of the ridge,
where it arrived just in time to prevent the success of the
movement against the right flank of Vincent's brigade.
I regret that no regimental reports of this brigade in re-

248 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
gard to the battle of Gettysburg are to be found in the
" Official Records." In the absence of these, for the part
taken by the One Hundred and Fortieth New York I re
fer the reader to the admirable paper entitled Captain Far
ley's " Number Nine," which will be found in another
part of this book (p. 125). Captain Farley was acting as
adjutant of the regiment at this time, and had an excellent
opportunity to know what occurred.
It had been a mystery to me why Warren knew so little
about the fight which Vincent was making on the southern
slope of the ridge. In a visit to Little Round Top which
I made last spring in company with Captain Farley and
some other gentlemen, I discovered the reason. Near the
middle of the ridge from north to south is its highest
point; from there the crest slopes both to the north and
to the south. There is also a more or less pronounced
ridge running from this point toward the west, separating
into two parts the western slope. With reference to the
surroundings Vincent's position may be said to be almost
in a hole. From this position the ground ascends sharply
to the top of this ridge on the western slope, then de
scends quite rapidly from that point to the vicinity of the
signal station where Warren stood. There was no artil
lery with Vincent, the wind was blowing toward the south,
and, with the noise of the battle at the Devil's Den and be
yond and the firing of Hazlett's battery near him, the mus
ketry firing of Vincent's men and the Confederates at
tacking them could not be heard.
Crawford, Third Division
This division was composed exclusively of the " Penn
sylvania Reserves." Only two brigades commanded by
McCandless and Fisher were present at Gettysburg. As
McCandless' brigade, with one regiment of Fisher's, was

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 249
engaged on another part of the field, and this force with
Bartlett's brigade of the Sixth corps, all under command
of General Crawford, made the last attack which drove the
Confederates from that part of the field, and this accord
ing to McCandless under the direct supervision of Craw
ford in the dusk after sunset, it is difficult to see how Craw
ford found time to visit Fisher's brigade, as stated by him.
The reader will notice that Rice, Fisher, and Chamber
lain make no mention of orders received from Crawford,
or of his presence in that part of the field. Crawford's at
tack continued until dark, and finished the battle of July
2 on the left of our line. It was well planned and well
executed. It was the first and last permanent success on
the advanced position of Sickles' corps. There is glory
enough for Crawford and his men without his claiming a
share in the deeds of the officers and men of Vincent's and
Fisher's brigades.
Fisher, Third Brigade
This brigade was composed of as good material — of
ficers and men — as McCandless' brigade, which distin
guished itself in its fight near the wheat-field. If given the
opportunity, I have no doubt they would have done as well ;
but unfortunately they did not arrive until the fight on
that part of the field was done. The brigade was massed
in the rear of Vincent's position. The last sentence in
Fisher's report, is, " Taking it all in all, I have no hesita
tion in saying that my brigade fulfilled their mission to
Gettysburg." The report appears to have been written
with the purpose of preparing a way for this conclusion,
but with too little regard for the facts. On his arrival
he did not engage the enemy, because that part of the
enemy's force not killed, wounded, or prisoners was al
ready out of sight. He says that soon after the close of
the fight of the 2d he discovered a hill in his front, from

250 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
the summit of which the enemy was doing us great dam
age, and at io p. m. he took two regiments of his brigade
and the Twentieth Maine and ascended the hill, which was
occupied by a full brigade of the enemy. He went up in
line of battle, taking about thirty prisoners during the
ascent. The fight against Vincent's brigade finished be
tween 6 and 7 p. m. If he sustained the fire from this
full brigade on the summit of Big Round Top for three
or four hours without reply, his equanimity is surprising.
He does not give the name of the full brigade of the enemy
which he encountered. There was no Confederate brigade
on the right of their line not fully accounted for else
where. The only soldiers of the enemy which could pos
sibly have been in that location were one small company
of Oates' Fifteenth Alabama, which followed a few of
Stoughton's sharpshooters, drove them off the east end
of the hill, and, as Oates says, did not return to the regi
ment until some time during the night. The thirty pris
oners which Fisher claims to have captured during the as
cent may have belonged to this company, with possibly
the addition of some men from the Fifteenth Alabama
who left their places in line and climbed the hill while the
Fifteenth Alabama was fighting the Twentieth Maine.
The appearance of this full Confederate brigade, which
somehow melted away, resembles Falstaff 's " men in buck
ram." Fisher certainly did not take the Twentieth Maine with
his two regiments and ascend the hill. He had no juris
diction over the regiments of Vincent's brigade. Rice
would not have turned over to him the regiment of his bri
gade if asked for by Fisher. If a brigade commander had
been needed for this expedition, Rice himself would have
gone. He was satisfied, however, to send Colonel Chamber
lain, with the Twentieth Maine, which he did an hour before
the time when Fisher's men started. Chamberlain says

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 251
that about midnight two regiments of Fisher's brigade
came up the mountain beyond his left and took position
near the summit ; but as the enemy did not threaten in that
direction he made no effort to connect with them.
The other two regiments of Fisher's brigade some time
during the night passed Vincent's brigade going down the
valley on the north side of Big Round Top, and halted at
the foot of the trail which runs up the mountain-side to the
place where the observatory now stands and formed a line
across the valley, which they slightly fortified during the
night by piling up a wall of loose stones. A portion of
these men went up this trail to a point near Chamberlain's
right. Hearing the noise they made, Chamberlain sup
posed the enemy was coming from that direction, and made
preparation to receive them. The Confederates had es
tablished a strong skirmish and picket line from north to
south near the top of the western slope. The north end
of this line was not far from the trail up which Fisher's
men had come. The Confederates opened a brisk fire
on them, and they soon returned to the valley.
The losses of Fisher's brigade at Gettysburg, as re
ported, were three killed and eleven wounded. It is
probable that these losses occurred on the trail, although
the fire of that full brigade of the enemy on the summit of
Big Round Top may have been responsible for some of
them. In the publication entitled " Pennsylvania at Gettys
burg," near the close of the second volume is a list of the
inscriptions on each of the Pennsylvania monuments on
the Gettysburg battlefield. These inscriptions state the
casualties of each of the regiments engaged in this battle.
The following is the list of casualties in the four regiments
of Fisher's brigade:
Fifth Pennsylvania Reserves, two men wounded. Ninth
Pennsylvania Reserves, five men wounded. Tenth Penn-

252 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
sylvania Reserves, two men killed, three men wounded.
Twelfth Pennsylvania Reserves, one man killed, one man
wounded. Total casualties in the brigade, three men
killed, eleven men wounded.
Above does not include the casualties in the Eleventh
Pennsylvania Reserves, which fought with McCandless'
brigade near the wheat-field.

IV
ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF LITTLE ROUND TOP
Gettysburg, July 2, 1863.
The Attack
On the morning of July 2 General Lee, after carefully
examining the position on and about Cemetery and Culp's
hills, which the Union army had taken up at the close of
the previous day's battle, decided to make his attack on the
left of the Union line. Longstreet's corps had not been
present during the battle of July 1, but McLaws' and
Hood's divisions, with the exception of Law's brigade of
the latter, arrived during the morning and were placed on
Lee's right. Pickett's division had not yet arrived.
Law's brigade came up later, and was placed on the right
of Hood's division. After much marching and counter
marching in the attempt to conceal their movements from
the signal station on Little Round Top, they arrived about
three o'clock at the Emmittsburg road at a point a con
siderable distance south of the Peach Orchard. Mean
time Sickles had posted the two divisions of his corps,
Humphreys' on the right along the Emmittsburg road with
his left near the Peach Orchard, his line facing Seminary
ridge; Birney's division occupied a line facing south, with
Graham's brigade at the Peach Orchard, De Trobriand in
the center, and Ward on the left among the rocks of the
Devil's Den near the Plum Run valley, which separated
his position from the western front of Little Round Top.
Hood crossed the Emmittsburg road and formed his di
vision in the woods on a ridge facing Birney's line. The
division of four brigades was formed in these woods in
253

254 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
two lines, Law's brigade on the right, Robertson's on the
left in the first line, Benning's Georgia brigade on the
right and Anderson's Georgia brigade on the left in the
second line. The four batteries of the division were
massed on its left. McLaws' division, consisting of the
brigades of Kershaw, Semmes, Barkesdale, and Wofford,
was formed in the same order, with the division artillery
of four batteries on its left. Law's brigade consisted of
five Alabama regiments in the following order from right
to left: Forty-eighth, Forty-fourth, Fifteenth, Forty-sev
enth and Fourth. Robertson's brigade consisted of one
Arkansas and three Texas regiments, arranged in the fol
lowing order from right to left: Fifth, Fourth, and First
Texas and Third Arkansas. Benning was in rear of Law
and Anderson in rear of Robertson. As McLaws' division
directed its attack on Graham and De Trobriand, and did
not participate directly in the struggle for Little Round
Top, we need not follow its movements.
Before crossing the Emmittsburg road Hood and Law
had sent out trained scouts to the south and east to look
for the Union cavalry. They found no sign of cavalry
in that part of the field. Longstreet in the morning had
urged Lee not to make a direct attack, but to move by his
right around Meade's left to his rear, threatening his com
munications and forcing him to leave his strong position
and attack the Confederates on ground of their own choos
ing; but Lee refused. Law's scouts had gone to the top
of Big Round Top without encountering so much as a
picket of the Union army. They reported to Law that the
Union trains of commissary and ordnance wagons were
in plain view from Big Round Top, there were no troops
on Little Round Top, and only a few wagon guards near
the train. Law reported this to Hood, and the latter
urged Longstreet to permit his division to move around
the east of Big Round Top and attack from that direction ;

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 255
but Longstreet replied to Hood's importunities, that Lee's
order was to attack up the Emmittsburg road, and it must
be obeyed. Hood had discovered the strong position of
Birney's line, and made a formal protest against an attack
in that direction, but finally yielded reluctantly and gave
his orders for the attack. According to Longstreet's in
structions the attack was to be made by the right en eche
lon, and taken up by the brigades in succession from right
to left. The attack opened about half past three o'clock
by a furious cannonade on Birney's line from Hood's and
McLaws' batteries, which was answered by all the Union
batteries which were in position to reply. After this
bombardment had lasted about half an hour Hood's in
fantry advanced. During this artillery battle Hood was
badly wounded by a shell while standing near his batteries,
and was carried to the rear. It was not until the infantry
had arrived near the Union lines that Law was informed
that Hood was disabled. Upon receiving this informa
tion, as senior brigadier he assumed command of the di
vision. The ground over which the Confederates advanced was
rocky and very rough, divided by numerous stone fences
and other obstructions. As soon as their advance was
seen, the Union artillery turned its fire on them, at first
with shell, followed by canister as they came nearer. This
made it impossible to maintain very good order in the ad
vancing line. Robertson had been directed to keep his
brigade closed on Law's left. For some reason not ex
plained by Law, his brigade in advancing obliqued to the
right. This movement was followed by the Fourth and
Fifth Texas obliquing to the right, to keep closed on the
Fourth Alabama. Robertson's other two regiments, the
First Texas and Third Arkansas, with Robertson himself,
went straight on to the Devil's Den. Law's brigade had
gone so far to the east that for more than half its length

256 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
it faced the southern side of Big Round Top. To remedy
this, instead of moving the whole brigade to the left, he
directed the two regiments on his right to halt and then
move to the left of the brigade. This was done ; but they
went so far that they came up on the left of the Fourth
and Fifth Texas, thus leaving them in the middle of Law's
brigade. This left the regiments in the following order
from right to left: Fifteenth, Forty-seventh, and Fourth
Alabama, Fifth and Fourth Texas, Forty-eighth and Forty-
fourth Alabama.
Ward, after getting his brigade into position at the
Devil's Den on the left of Birney's line, had sent out the
Second battalion of United States Sharpshooters under
Major Stoughton as skirmishers to cover his front. This
battalion consisted of eight small companies, not more than
half an ordinary regiment; but the superiority of their
arms and their skill in using them made them a formidable
force. Stoughton crossed the little valley in front of
Ward and deployed his men behind a stone wall covering
Ward's front and flank. The right was in the air, but the
left had a good position at the foot of the wooded western
slope of the Big Round Top. The well-directed fire of
this line from their position behind the stone wall checked
the Confederates for a time, but their courage and su
perior numbers forced the sharpshooters to retire. The
five companies on the right being outflanked and in danger
of capture fell back to the main line of the brigade. The
other three companies with Major Stoughton retired into
the woods and up the western slope of Big Round Top,
closely followed by the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Ala
bama. Colonel Oates says that after he got in the woods he
was ordered to wheel his line to the left, but he disre
garded the order because the right of the Forty-seventh
was crowding in on the left of his regiment and he could

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 257
not execute the movement without increasing the con
fusion. He did not dare to make a movement which
would place his line in a position to be enfiladed by the
sharpshooters on the mountain, so, straightening his line
and that of the Forty-seventh, which by direction of Gen
eral Law was temporarily under his command, he advanced
toward the top of the mountain. When part way up the
sharpshooters divided, the greater part of them going to
the left around the Forty-seventh, which, continuing, passed
them. Another part of the sharpshooters moved to the
right, menacing his right flank. He deployed Company
A of his regiment as flankers, and with the Forty-seventh
pressed on to the top of the mountain. His Company A
followed the sharpshooters until they drove them down the
eastern end of the mountain, and he saw no more of this
company until after the battle. Having reached the top
of the mountain, he halted for a time to give his men oppor
tunity to recover from the heat and from the fatigue caused
by their exertions in climbing over the rocks.
Meantime the other regiments of Law's brigade, with
the Fourth and Fifth Texas, had cleared the western slope
of Big Round Top, and reached the narrow valley which
runs along the northern side of Big Round Top and far
ther east separates it from Little Round Top. Colonel
Perry, of the Forty-fourth Alabama, which was then the
left of the line, says that Law rode up and told him that
he was expected to take that battery (Smith's battery on
the Devil's Den) which had played such havoc with their
line in its advance. He wheeled his regiment to the left
until it faced the battery and then advanced directly
against it. The other regiments of Law's brigade — the
Fourth and Forty-eighth Alabama and Robertson's Fourth
and Fifth Texas — advanced up this narrow valley toward
the east in columns of fours, without skirmishers, hoping
tc arrive before any Union troops reached that part of the

258 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
field. But Vincent's brigade had already got into position
on the southern slope of Little Round Top and thrown
out two or three companies in their front as skirmishers.
The skirmishers of the Forty-fourth New York and
Eighty-third Pennsylvania advanced down this valley to
ward the west. Captain Morrill's company of the Twen
tieth Maine went to the left to the east of Big Round Top.
The skirmishers of the Forty-fourth New York and
Eighty-third Pennsylvania had not gone far before they
met the heads of the Confederate columns. The latter
were surprised, and both sides began firing. Captain Lar-
rabee, in command of the skirmishers of the Forty-fourth
New York, was instantly killed and several of the men
were killed or badly wounded. These skirmishers fell
back to their regiments.
The Confederates quickly formed in line of battle, with
the Fourth Alabama on the right, the Fifth and Fourth
Texas in the center, and the Forty-eighth Alabama on the
left. They advanced against Vincent, with the Fourth
Alabama extending around toward Vincent's left, the
other regiments in front of the western side of Vincent's
position. Vincent's men were well protected by the rocks
and boulders behind which they had sheltered themselves.
Finding that they could not be driven from their position,
tlie Confederate line wavered and fell back a short dis
tance, sheltering themselves behind the rocks, which were
numerous in that vicinity. After a time they advanced
again, this time moving a little further to their right and
covering some of the companies on the right of the Twen
tieth Maine.
Meantime the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama,
under Colonel Oates, came down from the top of Big
Round Top by the trail which leads to where the observa
tory now stands. They were discovered moving to the
right in column along the foot of Big Round Top in the

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 259
effort to extend the Confederate line and turn the left
flank of the Twentieth Maine. They passed so far in this
direction that Chamberlain was obliged to throw back the
left wing of his regiment to a line nearly at right angles
with his right wing. The Texas regiments and the Forty-
eighth Alabama finding they could not break Vincent's
center, determined to attack the right flank while Oates
was fighting Chamberlain. They could not safely move
to the left directly in Vincent's front; instead, they re
tired to the Plum Run valley. By this time the other bri
gades of Hood's division had succeeded in driving back
Ward's brigade from the Devil's Den and capturing three
of the guns of Smith's battery. The other three guns
which had been placed on a ledge further to the rear were
drawn back. This opened the way for the two Texas
regiments and the Forty-eighth Alabama to advance north
ward under shelter of the large rocks between Plum Run
and the western slope of Little Round Top, until they
passed beyond Vincent's right flank, held by the Sixteenth
Michigan. The Fourth Alabama did not fall back with
the others. It continued fighting until its ammunition was
exhausted, then retreated to the western foot of Big
Round Top, and remained there during the night.
The Forty-eighth Alabama and Fourth and Fifth Texas
having passed beyond the right of the Sixteenth Michigan,
turned and, climbing the western slope of Little Round
Top in a southeasterly direction, made a fierce assault on
the right three companies of that regiment. The line of
these companies was refused, so that they faced in a north
erly direction with their right resting at the foot of the
large rocks which formed the crest of the ridge. The
steepness of the ascent and the loose stones which covered
its surface made it impossible to maintain any orderly for
mation. They came up in a mass with great courage,
without stopping to fire until they reached the Union line;

260 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
here they engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict with the
Michigan men, firing and using the bayonet. Their in
creasing numbers and the fury of the assault caused these
three companies to fall back in disorder. Vincent has
tened to the spot, urging the men to stand fast, but he fell
among them mortally wounded by a shot from one of the
assailants, without succeeding in stopping the retreat.
The greater part of these companies which survived the
attack retired behind the large rocks, taking with them
Lieutenant-Colonel Welch and the regimental colors. The
remainder of the regiment stood fast and, although not
well placed to resist such an attack on their right and rear,
did good service in repelling the assault.
It was just at this moment that Colonel O'Rorke, with
the One Hundred and Fortieth New York, came over the
crest of the hill to the right of the Sixteenth Michigan.
They charged down the hill against the Confederates, who
were swarming up the slope, and drove them back to the
valley. This unexpected reinforcement disheartened the
Confederates, whose success in the first onset inspired the
hope of being able at last to drive back Vincent's brigade.
Many of them dropped their arms and surrendered, others
were shot in their attempt to retreat. The fighting was
severe for a few moments, but the hillside was soon cleared
of the enemy, who retired to the valley and, sheltering
themselves behind the rocks, there continued a desultory
fire on the Union line. O'Rorke, who led his men so gal
lantly in this charge, was almost instantly killed within a
few feet of where Vincent lay. The One Hundred and
Fortieth New York formed an irregular line among the
rocks, extending northward from the remaining com
panies of the Sixteenth Michigan, where they remained
until the end of the battle.
In a map published by the authority of the Secretary of
War, in 1876, revised in 1883, made from a survey con-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 261
ducted by Brevet Major General G. K. Warren, Major of
Engineers, by order of Brevet Major General A. A. Hum
phreys, Chief of Engineers, showing the position of the
Union and Confederate troops in the battle of Gettysburg,
the Forty-fourth Alabama is shown on the left of the
Forty-eighth Alabama, in front of the position of the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York. Whether the Forty-
fourth joined the Forty-eighth in this flank movement is
an open question. The official report of the Forty-fourth
Alabama, made by Colonel Perry, contains no mention of
any fighting by this regiment, except the attack on the
Devil's Den.
While this assault was in progress on Vincent's right,
the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama moved in col
umn along the foot of Big Round Top until they had
passed to the right of the Fourth Alabama, when they
came into line and advanced against the Twentieth Maine.
Adjutant Waddell, of the Fifteenth, with about fifty men
of that regiment, continued further to the right, passing
the Twentieth Maine, then advanced to a position from
which he could enfilade Chamberlain's regiment and the
left wing of the Eighty-third Pennsylvania. To meet this
attack Chamberlain refused his left wing to a position
nearly at right angles with the remainder of his regiment.
The Alabama men rushed upon Chamberlain in a furious
assault. There was desperate fighting for some time.
The Confederates made repeated charges, which were met
with countercharges by Chamberlain's men. The Fourth
Alabama by this time had retired, followed by what was
left of the Forty-seventh. Chamberlain's ammunition
was nearly exhausted. Taking advantage of the apparent
reluctance of the Confederates to advance again, Cham
berlain fixed bayonets and ordered a charge. His left
wing came forward into line with his right; then, rein
forced by Morrill's company, which returned about this

262 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
time with twelve or fifteen of the sharpshooters, he made
a right wheel with his line, which cleared the valley of the
Confederates. Some of the latter went back to the top
of Big Round Top; others went down the valley in the di
rection of the Devil's Den. The force under Adjutant
Waddell, which had been cut off by this movement, sur
rendered, although the adjutant made his escape. This
was the last of the direct assaults on Little Round Top.
The Defense
The Fifth Army Corps, which came by the Hanover
road, began to arrive on the field about 7 a. m. on July 2.
The First and Second divisions were placed on the right
of the Twelfth corps in the vicinity of Rock Creek.
When the head of the Sixth corps arrived, about 2 p. m.,
it was ordered to the right to relieve the two divisions of
the Fifth. These two divisions, with two brigades of the
Third division under Crawford, which arrived about this
time, were massed in rear of the center near the point where
the Baltimore Pike crosses Rock Creek. About 3 p. m.
General Meade directed General Sykes to move his corps
to the left and occupy that part of the line. General
Sickles had been ordered in the morning to form his
corps on the low ridge between Cemetery Hill and the
northern foot of Little Round Top, relieving General
Geary's division of the Twelfth corps, which had spent the
night on the northern foot of Little Round Top, and which
was ordered to rejoin its corps on Culp's hill.
In the middle of the day, being dissatisfied with his posi
tion, Sickles moved forward to the Emmittsburg road,
where he placed Humphreys' division along that road fac
ing Seminary Ridge, and Birney's division facing south,
with his right at the Peach Orchard and his left at the
Devil's Den near the Plum Run valley, which separates

brigadk headquarters flag
Third Brigade, First Division, Fifth Army Corps

Facing Page 262

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 263
it from the western front of Little Round Top. About
three o'clock Meade rode to the left to examine his line.
He rode out to Sickles' position, and from there sent Gen
eral Warren to examine the left and report the situation.
Warren continued on until he reached the signal station
near the north end of Little Round Top. This must have
been a little before half past three o'clock. No enemy was
in sight from that position, but the signal officer told
him he thought he had seen troops in the woods between
Plum Run and the Emmittsburg road.
Warren had with him as aides three young lieutenants
of engineers, Mackenzie, Reese, and Roebling, and some
mounted orderlies. He sent an orderly to the commander
of Smith's battery at the Devil's Den, directing him to
fire a shot into the woods where the signal officer thought
he had seen the Confederates. This shot, whistling over
the heads of these men, caused them to make involuntary
movements. The sunlight reflected from their glistening
bayonets and gun barrels revealed a long line of infantry,
far outflanking the left of Birney's line and in position
ready to advance. At this time no troops except Birney's
division were in place to resist them. He sent a note
by one of his aides, Reese or Roebling, to General Meade,
with a request that a division, at least, be sent to occupy
Little Round Top. He then sent Lieutenant Mackenzie
with a request to General Sickles to send a brigade, but
Sickles declined, saying that he could not spare a man.
While Mackenzie was interviewing Sickles, Sykes and
Barnes arrived near the wheat-field with Barnes' division.
The division was halted while Sykes rode forward with
Barnes to select a position. Having found it, Sykes di
rected Barnes to bring on the division, and rode on to
find General Birney and suggest to him to move some
of his troops to the left, promising to fill the place vacated
by them with Barnes' men. Mackenzie met Sykes while

264 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
he was looking for Birney. Having explained to him
the need for troops on Little Round Top, Sykes agreed
to send one of Barnes' brigades. Mackenzie then returned
to Warren and reported. Sykes immediately sent one of
his staff to direct Barnes to send one of his brigades.
Barnes had not returned to the division. Vincent was sit
ting on his horse at the head of the column, waiting orders.
Seeing Sykes' aide approaching, he rode forward to meet
him. I followed with the flag, and distinctly heard the
following conversation : " Captain, what are your orders ? "
The captain replied, " Where is General Barnes ? " Vin
cent said, " What are your orders ? Give me your orders."
The captain answered, " General Sykes told me to direct
General Barnes to send one of his brigades to occupy that
hill yonder," pointing to Little Round Top. Vincent said,
" I will take the responsibility of taking my brigade there."
Returning to the brigade, he directed Colonel Rice, the sen
ior colonel, to bring the brigade to the hill as rapidly as
possible, then rode away toward the northwest face of
the hill. I followed him. Reaching the foot of the hill
and finding it impossible to ride up to the top in that di
rection, owing to the steepness of the ascent and the loose
stones which covered the surface, he turned to the left and,
skirting the northern foot of the ridge, turned into the woods
behind the ridge on the eastern side. He rode on until we
reached the south end, where the line of great rocks which
form the summit suddenly terminates by an abrupt de
scent of perhaps fifty feet. From the foot of this rock
the ground slopes to the east, south, and west on a spur
which is partly covered by scattered boulders and smaller
rocks. At the southern extremity of this spur is a ridge
running east and west for a distance of- about three hun
dred feet. From this ridge southward toward Big Round
Top extends a sparsely wooded valley which runs along
the northern side of the mountain its whole length. There

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 265
are many rocks and boulders scattered over the surface of
this valley, far enough apart, however, to afford room be
tween them for the passage of troops.
Vincent rode around this big rock and halted a few paces
to the west of it, at the place which was occupied a few
minutes later by the Sixteenth Michigan. I sat on my
horse behind him with the flag. Almost immediately a
shell exploded to our right, followed by another just to
our left. Vincent said to me, " They are firing at the
flag, go behind the rocks with it." I rode behind the rock
and stopped. Almost immediately he came and, dismount
ing, gave me the bridle of his horse. He then went down
among the rocks, selecting a. position for the brigade. In
a few moments the brigade arrived, with the regiments in
the following order: Forty- fourth New York, Sixteenth
Michigan, Eighty-third Pennsylvania, and Twentieth
Maine. The field officers dismounted, leaving their horses
with the mounted orderlies behind the rock. Vincent said
to Colonel Rice, " Form your regiment here, Colonel, with
the right against the rock." Rice replied, " In every
battle in wliich we have been engaged the Eighty-third
and Forty-fourth have fought side by side. I wish it
might be so to-day." Vincent understood and sym
pathized with this feeling. He replied, " All right, let
the Sixteenth pass you." The Sixteenth came forward
and was placed in the position which Vincent had desig
nated for the Forty-fourth. The ground was too rough
for much precision in movements, but the men came for
ward in as good order as possible. The Forty-fourth
formed along the western edge of this spur, with its right
joining the left of the Sixteenth Michigan, the Eighty-
third next, with part of its line facing west, and the re
mainder facing south on the east and west ridge. The
Twentieth Maine continued this line toward the east.
Skirmishers were sent out by the Forty-fourth and Eighty-

266 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
third down the valley toward the west, and a company
from the Twentieth Maine toward the southeast to guard
against an approach from that quarter. I think no skir
mishers were sent out from the Sixteenth. The ground
in their front was open to the foot of the hill, and an
advance of the enemy from that direction could be plainly
seen from the main line.
The position chosen by Vincent for his brigade was the
best possible for preventing the Confederates from turning
or capturing the hill. Had he placed his men on the crest
of the ridge the enemy could have turned his flank and
attacked from the rear. Or having opened the way, they
could have held it for Hood's whole division to follow,
cutting Meade's communications, capturing his trains, and
forcing him to leave his strong position and attack the
Confederates in the open. Not all the troops that could
have been placed on the crest of Little Round Top could
have prevented this if the spur occupied by Vincent's bri
gade and the valley along the north side of Big Round
Top had been left open.
In two respects justice has never been done to Vincent.
He would have gone with his brigade wherever he was
ordered. He was thoroughly alive that day. A glance
at Little Round Top was enough for him to realize its
importance in relation to the field of battle and the neces
sity of occupying it without delay. Minutes were precious.
In spite of all that Warren, Sykes, and Barnes did, it would
have been too late had not Vincent moved without wait
ing for an order from his immediate superior. The in
stant he knew that Sykes had sent an order to Barnes to
send one of his brigades, without designating any special
brigade, he took the responsibility of taking his brigade
there without waiting for the order to reach him through
the ordinary channel. Had he waited for that, it would
have been too late. He gave the order to Rice to bring

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 267
on the brigade as rapidly as possible. He did not march
at the head of the brigade, but preceded it, and when it
arrived he had already selected its position.
The second respect is in not giving him the credit due
for his knowledge and skill in the choice of a position.
No general or staff officer directed or accompanied him.
He knew only that Sykes had sent an order to Barnes to
send one of his brigades to occupy that hill. Half the
brigade commanders in the Army of the Potomac, if they
received such an order, would have construed it as a direc
tion to place their troops on the hill, where at that moment
they would have been useless. Vincent used his discretion
as to the manner of its occupation. The event proved that
his instinct for the point of vantage was of the highest
order. The historians have vied with one another in tell
ing how it was not done. Nearly all of them have cred
ited Warren with taking the responsibility of detaching
Vincent's brigade and placing it where it fought. In doing
this they have relegated Vincent to the place of an officer
who obeyed orders and stayed where he was put. Warren
performed most important services that day. I yield to
no man in my admiration and gratitude for what he did,
but that is no reason for others to claim for him acts which
he disclaims for himself, as I will show later by his own
words. If I can show that the retention by the Union
army of this key to the battlefield on July 2, 1863, is due
primarily to Strong Vincent and his gallant brigade, aided
at the supreme moment by O'Rorke and his regiment, I
shall feel that Vincent, O'Rorke, and the men of their
commands who gave up their lives in that supreme effort
did not die in vain.
In describing the Confederate attack it has been impos
sible to separate from it the action of the Union troops
in repelling it. After the Union skirmishers retired to
their line, followed by the advance of the Confederates

268 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
in line of battle, Vincent's brigade, with the exception of
the charge by the Twentieth Maine at the close of the
fight, confined itself until after dark to maintaining its
strong position. It was there to hold Little Round Top,
and it held it. It is doubtful whether any good could
have been accomplished by following up the Confederate
retreat. The failure of the repeated Confederate assaults,
and their ultimate withdrawal, is sufficient justification, if
any is needed. The time soon came for taking the offen
sive. The attack against the left of the brigade, under
Chamberlain, had been vigorous and persistent.
Time and again the Confederates had succeeded in driv
ing back Chamberlain's men a few paces, only to be forced
to retire in their turn. The rocks where the Twentieth
Maine was posted were smaller and less numerous than
those behind which the Forty- fourth New York and Eigh
ty-third Pennsylvania fought. At one time Chamberlain
asked Captain Woodward if he could spare a company to
enable him to close up toward the left his depleted ranks.
Woodward could not do this; but, by taking advantage of
the rocks and thinning his line in places where it was safe
to do so, he extended it to the left enough to give material
assistance to Chamberlain. Finally, with his ammunition
exhausted and with no prospect of reinforcements, the psy
chological moment arrived, and Chamberlain seized the op
portunity. He ordered a charge with the bayonet. I have
described this in my statement of the attack. Its success
put the finishing touch to the Union victory.
Colonel Rice, who assumed command when Vincent fell,
had not been idle. After the temporary break on the right
had been checked by the arrival of the One Hundred and
Fortieth New York, order was restored on that part of
the line. Realizing the perilous situation of the Twentieth
Maine, and the impossibility of sparing any men from
other parts of the line, Rice sent an officer (not named

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 269
in his report) to the corps commander to ask for rein
forcements. Vincent had previously sent Captain Judson
of his staff for the same purpose. While Vincent's bri
gade was fighting in this isolated position, the remainder
of the Fifth corps had come up. The brigades of Sweitzer
and Tilton, of Barnes' division, had been fighting along
Birney's line. The two brigades of Regulars in Ayres' di
vision had been sent to the vicinity of the Devil's Den.
Weed's brigade of this division had been ordered by Sykes
to Little Round Top, but by some misunderstanding of
orders it went to the front to reinforce Sickles, except
the One Hundred and Fortieth New York, which Warren
detached as the brigade was passing.
When Sykes returned from the rear, where he had been
to order up more troops, and found that Weed had gone to
the front, he ordered him back to Little Round Top. The
three regiments of this brigade, Ninety-first Pennsylvania,
One Hundred and Forty-sixth New York, and One Hun
dred and Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania, finally got into position
along the crest of the ridge on the right of the One Hun
dred and Fortieth New York, but they did not arrive until
all the close fighting on that part of the line was done.
Following Ayres, General Crawford, commanding the
Third division, came up with two brigades of the Penn
sylvania Reserves under McCandless and Fisher. Mc
Candless' brigade, with one regiment of Fisher's, the Elev
enth Pennsylvania Reserves, was sent to the front in the
vicinity of the wheat-field. Fisher had five regiments in
his brigade. He was sent with the remaining regiments to
the support of Vincent, but did not arrive until the fighting
was all done and the Confederates had disappeared from
that vicinity.
About nine o'clock in the evening Rice sent Chamberlain
with the Twentieth Maine to the summit of Big Round
Top. They climbed the steep ascent directly south of the

270 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
position of the brigade. On the way up the mountain they
drove before them some Confederate stragglers, capturing
on the way and at the top twenty-five prisoners, including
an officer of General Law's staff. Chamberlain placed his
men in a very strong position among the rocks, facing the
western slope of the mountain, which was occupied by
the enemy. He then sent back to Rice for ammunition
and reinforcements. Meantime two regiments of Fisher's
brigade advanced down the valley toward the west and
formed line across the valley near the trail down which
the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama had come. Part
of their force ascended this trail to a point near the right
of Chamberlain's line. They were in close proximity to
the enemy and some confusion occurred, as Chamberlain
mistook them for the enemy and made disposition to re
ceive them. The Confederates opened fire on them and
they retired to their line in the valley, where they piled up
a breastwork of stone in their front. The entire loss of
these four regiments of Fisher's brigade during the battle,
as reported, was three killed and eleven wounded. This
probably occurred in the ranks of the men who went up
the trail in the direction of Chamberlain's right and en
countered the strong picket line of the Confederates on
the western slope of the mountain. After this encounter
they retired to the valley.
Later in the night the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, with
a portion of the Forty-fourth New York, went up the
mountain and formed in line on Chamberlain's right, where
they remained until the brigade was relieved in the fore
noon of July 3, by the first brigade of Barnes' division.
About midnight Colonel Fisher went up the mountain near
the eastern end with the other two regiments of his bri
gade, the Fifth and Twelfth Pennsylvania Reserves.
It may be proper to say at this point a few words about
the regiments which composed Vincent's brigade at Gettys-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 271
burg. The Sixteenth Michigan was a good regiment, with
a most honorable record. It entered the service at the
beginning of the war and served to the end. With two
other regiments of the brigade, the Eighty-third Pennsyl
vania and the Twentieth Maine, it formed part of the line
which, under command of General Chamberlain, received
the formal surrender of the Confederate army at Appo
mattox. Its first commander was Colonel T. B. W. Stock
ton, a graduate of the Military Academy and commander
of a regiment in the war with Mexico. He entered the
Academy in 1823, was graduated in 1827, remaining in
the regular army until 1836, when he resigned, with rank
of first lieutenant. He was commissioned colonel of the
First Regiment Michigan Volunteers, December 9, 1847,
and was honorably mustered out July 9, 1848. Commis
sioned as colonel Sixteenth Michigan September 8, 1861.
Resigned May 18, 1863. As senior colonel he commanded
the brigade at the battles of Fredericksburg and Chan
cellorsville. Lieutenant-Colonel Norval E. Welch suc
ceeded him in command of the regiment. Welch's conduct
at Gettysburg in leaving the brigade with a portion of his
regiment was not creditable, but he was a good officer, and
redeemed his reputation in all the battles of later cam
paigns. He was killed in action in one of the battles south
of Petersburg while leading a charge of his regiment against
the enemy's intrenchments.
The Sixteenth Michigan, Eighty-third Pennsylvania,
and Forty-fourth New York entered the service at about
the same time, in September, 1861. A brigade was be
ing organized under command of General Daniel Butter-
field. When the Eighty-third crossed the Potomac and
went into camp at Hall's Hill, in front of Washington, it
found the Sixteenth Michigan already there and pitched its
camp in line with the Sixteenth. A few days later the
Forty- fourth New York arrived, about dusk, tired and

272 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
hungry at the end of its first march into the enemy's coun
try. The Eighty-third had its camp in order and its cook
fires burning brightly.
Colonel McLane had been informed during the after
noon of the approach of a new regiment to join the bri
gade. He called his officers together and suggested the
propriety of inviting the officers and men of the new regi
ment to partake of our hospitality. The Forty-fourth
marched by our camp and, halting on the right, broke into
column of companies and stacked arms. McLane with his
field and staff officers called at the headquarters of the
Forty-fourth and invited all the officers of that regiment
to take supper with the officers of the Eighty-third. A
deputation from the enlisted men of the Eighty-third,
headed by the first sergeant of each company, went over
to the new regiment and invited the company with the same
letter to come to the camp of the Eighty-third and be their
guests. The invitation was gladly accepted, and there be
gan a friendship between the officers and men of those two
regiments which has not yet ceased and will not cease until
the last survivors have passed over the river. These regi
ments were called " Butterfield's Twins." A generous ri
valry sprang up, each regiment striving to outdo the other
in drill, discipline, and all the manifold duties of a soldier's
life. Although under different officers, the two organiza
tions were like one great regiment. This explains Rice's
request and Vincent's quick response that brought the two
regiments side by side at Little Round Top.
The Twentieth Maine was organized in 1862. It joined
the brigade during the Antietam campaign, after the army
returned to Washington from the battlefield of the second
Bull Run. Its first colonel was Adelbert Ames. He was
graduated from the Military Academy July 1, i860, and
was second lieutenant and first lieutenant of artillery, serv
ing part of the time with Griffin's, afterward Hazlett's,

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 273
battery of the Fifth Artillery. He was commissioned col
onel of the Twentieth Maine August 20, 1862. He was
promoted to be brigadier-general of Volunteers May 20,
1863. At the battle of Gettysburg he commanded a di
vision in the Eleventh corps. Joshua L. Chamberlain, who
had much to do with the organization of the regiment, was
commissioned lieutenant-colonel of the, Twentieth Maine
August 8, 1862. When Colonel Ames was promoted,
Chamberlain succeeded him as colonel of the regiment,
May 20, 1863. When Colonel Rice was made brigadier-
general of Volunteers, August 17, 1863, and transferred
to another corps, Chamberlain succeeded him in the com
mand of the brigade. June 18, 1864, Chamberlain was
commissioned brigadier-general of Volunteers.1 On March
29, 1865, he was made brevet major-general of Volun
teers for conspicuous gallantry and meritorious service
in action on the Quaker Road, Virginia. He was hon
orably mustered out of the service January 15, 1866.
August 11, 1893, he was given a medal of honor by Con
gress for daring heroism and great tenacity in holding his
position on the Little Round Top, and carrying the ad
vance position on the Great Round Top at the battle of
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, July 2, 1863.
1 The following is a copy of the special order of General Grant pro
moting Chamberlain to brigadier general, the verbal order having been
given on the evening of June 18:
Headquarters Army of the United States,
Special Order No. 39. June 20, 1864.
Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, Twentieth Maine Infantry Volunteers,
for meritorious and efficient services on the field of battle, and espe
cially for gallant conduct in leading his brigade against the enemy at
Petersburg on the 18th instant, in which he was dangerously wounded,
is hereby, in pursuance of authority of the Secretary of War, ap
pointed Brigadier General United States Volunteers, to rank as such
from the 18th of June, 1864, subject to the approval of the President.
U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General.

274 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Although the Twentieth Maine entered the service a
year later than the other regiments of the brigade, the abil
ity of its commanders, with the character and intelligence
of its subordinate officers and men, soon placed it on an
equality with the best.
Captain Woodward, who commanded the Eighty-third
Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, was made colonel of the regi
ment March 28, 1864. He lost a leg in the campaign of
1864, and was honorably mustered out September 20, 1864.
He was given the brevet of brigadier-general of Volun
teers March 13, 1865, for gallant and meritorious service
during the war. General Rice was killed May 10, 1864,
at the battle of Laurel Hill, Virginia.
Freeman Connor was a member of the famous " Ells
worth Zouaves." He was a captain in the Chicago Zouave
Regiment, April 22, 1861, and a first lieutenant in the Elev
enth New York Volunteer Infantry, in which regiment he
fought at the first battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861; re
signed his commission and enlisted as a private in the
Forty-fourth New York Volunteer Infantry, August 8,
1861. He was commissioned captain of Company D, in
this regiment, and in succession its major, lieutenant-col
onel, and colonel. He served in this regiment until it was
mustered out, October 11, 1864., He died in Chicago
March 28, 1906.
Of the regimental monuments which have been erected
on the battlefield of Gettysburg, those of the Sixteenth
Michigan and the Twentieth Maine are located on the lines
where these regiments fought. That of the Eighty-third
Pennsylvania stands in rear of the center of the brigade,
and is surmounted by a bronze statue of Colonel Vincent.
The monument of the Forty- fourth New York stands on
the summit of the large rock which forms the crest of the
hill, a little to the right of the position occupied by the
Sixteenth Michigan. It is a large circular granite tower

c

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 275
forty-four feet high, with a spiral stairway in the interior
leading to a platform at the top, which affords a fine view
of nearly the whole of the battlefield. On the inside are
bronze tablets giving the names of the members of the
regiment.

V
BIOGRAPHICAL
General Gouverneur Kemble Warren
General Warren was an excellent officer, a great en
gineer, an educated and polished gentleman of the old
school. In the last years of the war he served as com
mander of an army corps, the highest rank obtainable ex
cept that of the commander of the army. He was greatly
loved and admired by the officers and men of his command.
After the war he continued in the army until his death,
using his knowledge as an engineer in the service of the
country in many important works. His death was an
nounced to the army in the following memorial notice re
counting his career and services.
" Headquarters Corps of Engineers,
" United States Army,
" Washington, D. C, August 9, 1882.
" General Orders
" No. 5.
" It has become the painful duty of the Brigadier-Gen
eral Commanding to announce to the Corps of Engineers
the death of a brother officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gouver
neur K. Warren, Brevet Major General, United States
Army, who died at Newport, R. I., yesterday.
" General Warren was graduated from the Military
Academy and promoted to the rank of Brevet Second Lieu
tenant in the Corps of Topographical Engineers, July 1,
1850. He served as Assistant Engineer on the topograph-
276

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 277
ical and hydrographical Survey of the Delta of the Missis
sippi, i85o-'52, and to the Board for the improvement of
canal around the Falls of the Ohio, i852-'53; in charge of
Surveys for the improvement of Rock Island and Des
Moines Rapids, Mississippi River, i853-'54; in compiling
the General Map and Reports (conjointly with Captain,
now General, A. A. Humphreys) of Pacific Railroad Ex
plorations, 1854; as Chief Topographical Engineer on
Sioux Expedition, 1855, being engaged in the action of
Blue Water, September 3, 1855; in charge of reconnais
sances in Dakota Territory, and maHng Map and Report
of same, i855-'56, and in Nebraska Territory, i8s6-'57,
and preparing Maps and Reports thereof, i857-'59.
" He was Assistant Professor of Mathematics at the
Military Academy, 1859, and Principal Assistant Profes
sor, i859-'6i.
" He entered upon his distinguished service in the late
civil war (i86i-'66) in the Department of Virginia, as
Lieutenant Colonel of the Fifth New York Volunteers,
being engaged in the action at Big Bethel Church, June
10, 1861. He was engaged on the defenses of Baltimore,
and constructing Fort on Federal Hill, i86i-'62, being
temporarily detached on expedition to Northampton and
Accomac counties, Va„ 1861; in the Virginia Peninsular
Campaign (Army of the Potomac), 1862, being engaged
in the siege of Yorktown, April 11-May 4, 1862, and in
command of Brigade, May 24, 1862; skirmish on Pamun
key River, May 26, 1862; capture of Hanover Court
House, May 27, 1862; battle of Gaines' Mill, June 27,
1862, where he was wounded; repulse of Wise's Division
at Malvern Hill (in command), June 29, 1862; battle of
Malvern Hill, July 1, 1862, and skirmish at Harrison's
Landing, July 2, 1862.
" In the Northern Virginia Campaign, 1862, he was
engaged in the battle of Manassas, August 30, 1862, and

278 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
skirmish near Centreville, September i, 1862. He was in
command of Brigade (Army of the Potomac) in the Mary
land Campaign, 1862, being engaged in skirmishes and bat
tle of Antietam, September 15-17, 1862; skirmish with the
enemy's rear-guard on the Potomac, September 19, 1862;
and march to Falmouth, Va., 1862. In the Rappahannock
Campaign, i862-'63, he was in command of Brigade till
February 4, 1863. He then became Chief Topographical
Engineer of the Army of the Potomac, and was engaged
in the battle of Fredericksburg, December 13-16, 1863;
making reconnaissances, i862-'63; action on Orange Pike,
May 1, 1863; storming of Marye Heights, May 3, 1863,
and battle of Salem, May 3-4, 1863, and as Chief Engineer
of the Army of the Potomac, June 8- August 12, 1863.
" In the Pennsylvania Campaign he was engaged in
charge of the re-embarkation of stores at Aquia Creek,
1863; reconnaissance and battle of Gettysburg, July 1-3,
1863, where he was wounded; and construction of
bridges, and making reconnaissances while pursuing the
enemy, July- August, 1863.
" He was in command of Second Corps (Army of the
Potomac), from August 12, 1863, to March 24, 1864.
" In the operations in Central Virginia, he was en
gaged in movement to Culpeper and the Rapidan, Septem
ber 13-16, 1863; combat at Auburn and Bristoe Station
(in command), October 14, 1863; skirmish at Bull Run,
October 15, 1863, and at Kelly's Ford, November 8, 1863;
movement to Mine Run, with heavy skirmishing, Novem
ber 26-30, 1863, and demonstration upon the enemy across
Morton's Ford, February 6, 1864.
" He was in command of Fifth Corps (Army of the
Potomac), from March 24, 1864, to April 1, 1865.
" In the Richmond Campaign he was engaged in the
battle of the Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864; battles about
Spottsylvania, May 8-20, 1864; battles of North Anna,

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 279
May 23-25, 1864; skirmish on Tolopotomy Creek, May
29, 1864; battle of Bethesda Church, May 30, 1864; bat
tles of Cold Harbor, June 1-4, 1864; skirmish on White
Oak Swamp, June 13, 1864; assaults on Petersburg, June
17-18, 1864; siege of Petersburg, June 18, 1864-April 2,
1865; Petersburg Mine assault, July 30, 1864; actions for
the occupation of the Weldon Railroad, August 18-25,
1864; combat of Peebles' Farm, September 30, 1864; action
at Chapel House, October 1, 1864; skirmishes near
Hatcher's Run, October 27-28, 1864; destruction of Wel
don Railroad to Meherrin River, December 7-10, 1864;
combat near Dabney's Mill (in command), February 6-7,
1865; actions and movement to White Oak Ridge, March
29-31, 1865; battle of Five Forks, April 1, 1865.
" He was in command of the defenses of Petersburg and
Southside Railroad, April 3-May 1, 1865; in command of
the Department of Mississippi, May 14-30, 1865, and was
at New York City preparing Maps and Reports of his cam
paigns, June 20, 1865, to July 31, 1866.
" General Warren was promoted successively from the
grade of Lieutenant to that of Lieutenant Colonel, Corps
of Engineers, and Major General, U. S. Volunteers. He
received the brevets of Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army,
' for gallant and meritorious services at the battle of
Gaines' Mill,' Va., 1862; Colonel U. S. Army, 'for gal
lant and meritorious services at the battle of Gettysburg,'
Pa., 1863 ; Brigadier General, U. S. Army, ' for gallant
and meritorious services at the battle of Bristoe Station,'
1863, and Major General, U. S. Army, ' for gallant and
meritorious services in the field during the Rebellion,'
1865. " Since the close of the war he has been Superintending
Engineer of surveys and improvements of the Upper
Mississippi and its Tributaries, i866-'7o; of survey of the
Battlefield of Gettysburg, Pa., i868-'69, and survey of the

280 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Battlefield of Manassas, 1878; of Rock Island Bridge
across the Mississippi, 1870, of the fortifications of New
London and New Haven, Conn., i870-'74; of the improve
ment of certain rivers and harbors on Long Island, 1870-
'74; of construction of Block Island Breakwater, R. I.,
i870-'82. " He was a member of Commission to examine Union
Pacific Railroad and Telegraphic Lines, i868-'69, and Mem
ber of many important Boards of Officers of the Corps of
Engineers organized for the consideration of the plans and
the execution of the works of the Corps, among which
were the Board on Improvement of the Des Moines
Rapids, 1867; Board on Bridge across Niagara River, at
Buffalo, N. Y., i870-'7i ; on Bridging the Ohio River,
i870-'7i, and i878-'82; on plan for docks constructed for
Breakwater at Chicago Harbor, 111., 1871 ; on the comple
tion of Cincinnati and Newport Bridge over the Ohio,
1871 ; on the harbors of St. Louis, Mo., and Alton, 111.,
and Banks of the Mississippi, 1872; on Bridging the chan
nel between Lake Huron and Lake Erie, 1873 ; on Ship
Canal from the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico, 1873-
'74; to examine the St. Louis Bridge across the Mississippi,
1873; on the reclamation of the Alluvial Basin of the
Mississippi, i874-'75; on Mississippi Bridges between St.
Paul, Minn., and St. Louis, Mo., 1876, and on the improve
ment of the Mississippi River, from the Falls of St. An
thony to Rock Island Rapids, 1878. He was engaged in
the survey of the Battlefield of Groveton, Va., and in the
preparation of campaign maps of certain operations in
i862-'63 of the Army of the Potomac in Virginia.
" He was appointed a Member of the Advisory Coun
cil of the Harbor Commissioners of the State of Rhode
Island, 1878.
" In 1870 General Warren was assigned to the charge
of the surveys and improvements of various rivers and har-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 281
bors in southeastern Massachusetts; and in Rhode Island
and Connecticut, on which duty and in the supervision of
the construction and repair of the fortifications of New
Bedford, Mass., of Narragansett Bay and of Newport,
R. I., he remained until the time of his death.
" In scientific investigations General Warren had few
superiors; and his elaborate reports on some of the most
important works which have been confided to the Corps of
Engineers are among the most valuable contributions to its
literature. " In the field, in the late civil war, he was a brave and
energetic officer, and in the high command to which he at
tained by his patriotic valor and skill he merited the ad
miration of the army and the applause of his country.
" He was kind and considerate in all the relations of life,
and his family in its affliction will have the hearty sympathy
of the Corps of Engineers.
" As a testimonial of respect for the deceased, the officers
of the Corps will wear the usual badge of mourning for
thirty days. " George H. Eliot,
" Major of Engineers.
" By command of Brig.-Gen. Wright."
Strong Vincent, Brigadier-General Volunteers
Strong Vincent was born at Waterford, Erie County,
Pennsylvania, June 17, 1837. He was the son of B. B.
Vincent and Sarah Ann Strong Vincent. As the name in
dicates, Strong Vincent was of English Puritan and French
Huguenot ancestry. During his childhood his father re
moved from Waterford to Erie, Pennsylvania, engaging
in business there as an iron-founder and banker. He was
also largely interested in grain elevators in Chicago.
Strong Vincent entered the Erie Academy in 1843, re
maining there until 1850; learned the trade of iron-moulder

282 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
in his father's foundry 1850-1852; was a clerk in the
foundry office 1852- 1854; entered Trinity College, Hart
ford, Connecticut, 1854; entered Harvard College 1856,
and was graduated at Harvard in 1859. He read law in
Erie 1859- 1860, with W. S. Lane, Esquire; was admited to
the Erie Bar in December, i860, and practiced law until he
entered the Army in 1861.
In April, 1861, he married Elizabeth H. Carter of New
ark, New Jersey, to whom he had been engaged since his
college days.
Military Record. — Upon the call of the President in
April, 1 86 1, for volunteers for three months' service, he
enlisted in Colonel John W. McLane's Erie Regiment of
Volunteers; was elected second lieutenant of his company;
was promoted to first lieutenant and adjutant of the regi
ment, serving as such until the muster out of the regiment
at the close of its service in July, 1861.
Colonel McLane received an order from the Secretary
of War, dated July 24, 1861, authorizing him to raise a
regiment of volunteers to serve for three years or during
the war. About half the three months regiment re-enlisted
and by the end of August the full complement of men and
officers had been secured. The regiment was mustered
into the service of the United States, September 14, 1861,
as the Eighty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers,
with John W. McLane as colonel and Strong Vincent as
lieutenant-colonel, to rank as such from July 24, 1861.
Colonel McLane was killed at the battle of Gaines' Mill,
Virginia, June 27, 1862. Vincent was promoted to be
colonel of the regiment, ranking as such from June 27,
1862. When Colonel Stockton (who as senior colonel had
commanded the brigade after General Butterfield's promo
tion) resigned, soon after the battle of Chancellorsville,
Vincent, who was next in rank, was assigned to the com
mand of the brigade and continued in command until he

BRIGADIER-GENERAL STRONG VINCENT

Facing Page 38

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 283
was wounded at the battle of Gettysburg July 2, 1863.
In consideration of his distinguished service at this battle
General Meade telegraphed that night to President Lin
coln, requesting that he be promoted to be brigadier-gen
eral. The President sent the commission at once by special
messenger, but Vincent's wound was fatal, and he died a
few days later.
Vincent without previous military training showed at
the outset an appreciation of the need of discipline, pre
cision, and accuracy in all military matters. My first recol
lection of him is his appearance as adjutant in forming the
line of the regiment for its first dress parade. As I
stood, a private in the ranks, and heard his command on
the right, " To the rear open order, March ! " and saw the
line officers step to the front in an irregular line and heard
him correct their faults, then saw him march to the center,
halt, turn on his heel, face the colonel, who stood like a
statue at some distance with his arms folded, gauntlets
reaching near to his elbows, salute with his sword and re
port, " Sir, the parade is formed," I confess my first im
pression of him was not favorable. I thought him a dude
and an upstart. I soon came to know that he wished to
impress on that mob of green country boys, by example as
well as precept, the proper way for a soldier to stand and
to move. It was the beginning for that regiment of its
military education. By the end of its three months' service
spent in continual drill and practice in all the duties of a
soldier, that part of this regiment which re-enlisted for
three years formed a trained nucleus for the Eighty-third
Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers, which placed it in
the front rank of volunteers for the war, and kept it there.
Vincent had demonstrated his fitness for a higher position.
McLane had seen service in the Mexican war and had kept
up his training by the command of a militia company for
several years in Erie. He was a tall, commanding figure,

284 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
with a strong voice, and was glad to have Vincent as his
second in command. McLane was a fine officer, and had
he lived would have been worthy of, and no doubt received,
higher rank; but he was instantly killed in the first great
battle in which the regiment participated — Gaines' Mill.
The long and weary months of the fall and winter of
1861-1862 were not spent' in idleness. The men and of
ficers of this regiment, like those of the other regiments of
the Army of the Potomac, were drilled and disciplined into
a thorough familiarity with their duties. The company
officers were as ignorant as their men. An officers' school
was established, of which Vincent was the schoolmaster.
He made a good one. What he did not know about tactics
and army regulations he learned, and forced the junior of
ficers to learn and practice. The result was that General
McClellan, late in the fall, pronounced the Eighty-third
Pennsylvania the best drilled regiment in Fitz John Por
ter's division, if not the best in the army. Of course this
result cannot be attributed entirely to Vincent, although his
quiet, persistent work had much to do with it. The regi
ment was fortunate in having McLane as its colonel and
General Daniel Butterfield as its brigade commander, and
from Hall's Hill to Appomattox the Eighty-third Pennsyl
vania showed the effect of this early training.
Vincent was of medium stature, but well formed. He
was a fine horseman, and when mounted looked much
larger than when on foot. He was a gentleman by nature,
quiet and considerate in his demeanor, deserving and re
ceiving the respect of his men and officers, as well as that
of his superiors in rank. Severe in discipline when sever
ity was needed, no officer in the army was more thought
ful and considerate of the comfort and health of his men.
Without the schooling of West Point, by the help of his
trained mind, quickness of perception, and constant study,
stimulated by his intense patriotism, his knowledge of the

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 285
art of war made him equal to any emergency in which he
was placed.
He was generally of a cheerful disposition, but during
his last campaign he seemed to have a presentiment that it
might be his last. On July 1, when after a long march
the brigade went into bivouac just before reaching Han
over, expecting to spend the night there, news came of the
battle at Gettysburg, with the order to continue the march
in that direction. The brigade was quickly formed and
in the road. Just before reaching Hanover Vincent sent
back for the drum corps and the color guard of the Eighty-
third to come to the front of the brigade with their flag.
As the flag was unfurled and rippled in the breeze, he rev
erently bared his head, and said to Captain Clark, his ad
jutant-general, " What death more glorious can any man
desire than to die on the soil of old Pennsylvania fighting
for that flag?"
Just before leaving for the war, in April, 1861, he mar
ried Elizabeth Carter and left her with his father and
mother in Erie. While the army was in permanent camps
at Hall's Hill, Virginia, in 1 861- 1862, and in front of
Fredericksburg, Virginia, 1862- 1863, Mrs. Vincent joined
her husband, and remained with him in the winter quar
ters until the army started on its campaigns, when she re
turned to Erie. She was a very handsome young woman,
tall, graceful, and a superb horsewoman. When his du
ties permitted, Vincent loved to ride with her through the
camps of the army and about the surrounding country.
They were followed with looks of admiration wherever
they appeared. Their love was ideal. She knew the
risks of the service, but she always encouraged him to do his
full duty. It was not military glory, but the purest patri
otism which actuated both. At this writing Mrs. Vincent
still survives him, one of the noblest of the noble women
of our country.

286 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Letters About Vincent and His Brigade at
Gettysburg
In 190 1 the compiler of this book, in response to his in
quiry as to the character of General Vincent, his conduct
at Gettysburg, and its effect in determining the result of
the battle, received letters from the following gentlemen,
with permission to publish them. Extracts from which
are subjoined.
(From Major-General Daniel Butterfield, Chief of Staff, Army of
the Potomac at Gettysburg.)
" Hotel Royal Palm, Miami, Florida,
February 19, 1901.
" No man who lived and fought in the battle of Gettys
burg did more for his country than Vincent. I knew the
whole matter from beginning to end. He was a mag
nificent soldier, a gentleman of high education and great
ability. " General Tremain brought messages to General Meade
and to me from the field, describing the exigency and great
need for the immediate occupation of Round Top, and au
thority was given him to send the troops there. In my
judgment there was not another command on the field
which could have been more effective in the matter of time
and rapidity of movement in getting to the spot in time to
have saved the day, owing to its wonderful efficiency, drill,
and discipline under Vincent, who had been trained and
educated with it."
(From Joshua L. Chamberlain, Brevet Major-General U. S. V.,
Colonel Commanding Twentieth Maine Volunteers at Gettysburg.)
" Portland, Maine, November 18, 1901.
" Colonel Vincent's conduct in taking his brigade tp

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 287
Little Round Top and placing it in position, and in throw
ing his great personal energy and determination into the
fight there, are personally well known to me. I regard the
timely occupation of that position, which was at that stage
of the battle the key of the Union defense, as due to the
energy and skill of Colonel Vincent."
(From Charles W. Eliot, President of Harvard University.)
" Cambridge, Mass., November 27, 1901.
" I am, of course, incompetent to express an opinion
about the precise value of Colonel Vincent's energetic ac
tion at Gettysburg; but I remember him as a student in
Harvard College with perfect distinctness, and I should
like to testify to anybody who wants to know what man
ner of man he was — that he was one of the manliest and
most attractive persons that I ever saw. I remember
thinking that his death was an unspeakable loss to the army
on which the hopes of the country rested at the time, and
to the country which he would have greatly served if his
life had been spared."
(From General Ellis Spear, Major Twentieth Maine Volunteers at
Gettysburg.)
"Washington, D. C, November 23, 1901.
"I have read carefully the foregoing statement in re
gard to General Vincent's services at Gettysburg. As to
the greater part of the statement, I know of my own knowl
edge that it is strictly accurate. What happened on the
right of the brigade when Vincent was mortally wounded
I did not see, being then with the Twentieth Maine closely
engaged on the left, but it was a matter of common report
at the time, and beyond question the statement is strictly
accurate. I had seen General Vincent in battle before and
knew what he would do then. He was a very valuable of-

288 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
ficer and of great promise, and his death was a great loss
to the army ; but the success he achieved in averting the im
minent and great danger on the left at Gettysburg on the
second day of the battle, was worth what it cost, though
the price was great."
(From General James Longstreet, C S. A.)
" Washington, D. C, December 6, 1901.
" It gives me pleasure to state in reference to the worth
of Little Round Top to the Union Army at Gettysburg,
it was everything to the success of the Union battle. Gen
eral Vincent's prompt action in moving to save that point
held it, and was the means of getting the battle to his side.
Many minutes' delay would have given the Confederates
the field."
Sketch of Colonel Patrick H. O'Rorke
By Captain Porter Farley
Colonel O'Rorke was born in County Cavan, Ireland, on
March 28, 1836. He was brought to America when he
was only one year old. His parents settled for a year or
so in Montreal, Canada, then moved to Ogdensburg, New
York, where they remained about two years, when they
moved to Rochester, New York, where they established
their permanent home and where the survivors of the fam
ily still abide. Young O'Rorke attended No. 9 public
school, and therein obtained such schooling as he had en
joyed previous to his entrance at the Military Academy at
West Point.
About the year 1855 the University of Rochester estab
lished two free scholarships open on competition to the boys
of the public schools of the city. O'Rorke competed with
others, and stood first on the list at the close of the exam
ination. His parents were devoted Roman Catholics, and

COLONEL PATRICK H. O'RORKE

Facing Page SSS

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 289
objected to the denominational control of the Rochester
College. On this account he had to forego the educational
advantages which were thus open to him. Soon after
graduating from the public school he began to learn the
trade of his father, which was that of marble cutter.
His general ability had by this time become well recog
nized and had attracted the attention of the congressman
from the Rochester district, who obtained for him an ap
pointment to a cadetship at West Point. He entered the
Military Academy in June, 1857, with the class which was
graduated in June, 1861. From the first O'Rorke took a
high stand in his class and finally was graduated at its
head, in a class of thirty- four. Among his classmates the
two best known for distinguished services during the Civil
War were Lieutenant Alonzo H. Cushing, killed on July
3 at Gettysburg, and General George A. Custer, who fell
in the massacre on the Little Big Horn in 1876.
Immediately upon his graduation O'Rorke was com
missioned as second lieutenant of Engineers. He served
on the staff of General Tyler at the Battle of Bull Run,
July 21, 1 86 1. Later he acted as assistant engineer on the
defenses of Washington and at Fortress Monroe. In Oc
tober, 1861, he went to Port Royal as one of the staff of
General W. T. Sherman. For his services on this occasion
he received the brevet of captain. In September, 1862, he
was commissioned colonel of the One Hundred and For
tieth New York Volunteers. During all the service of
Colonel O'Rorke as commander of this regiment it formed
a part of the Third Brigade, Second Division, Fifth Army
Corps. It was due to O'Rorke's devotion and skill that this
regiment attained an efficiency which was a source of pride
to him and to the men who served under him.
During the Chancellorsville campaign O'Rorke was in
command of the brigade, as our brigade commander, Gen
eral Warren, had been assigned to duty as chief engineer

290 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
of the army under Hooker. During the Gettysburg cam
paign, which closed his admirable and promising career, he
was again in command of his regiment. He fell, instantly
killed/ on July 2, 1863, near the foot of the southern slope
of Little Round Top. The last effort of his life was the
gallant leadership displayed as he headed the successful
charge down the slope up which Hood's impetuous men
were already pushing their way. He died in the actual dis
charge of a service of the most vital importance to his
country. Colonel O'Rorke had been married to Miss Clara W.
Bishop in July, 1862, only a few weeks before his appoint
ment as colonel. He left no children. About a year and
a half after his death his widow entered the religious or
der of the Sacred Heart. She died only a few years ago,
being then Lady Superior in the convent of her order in
Providence, Rhode Island.
Colonel O'Rorke's body was buried on the Bushman
farm near Gettysburg. As soon as possible his wife came
to the spot and caused its removal to Rochester, where it
was buried in the cemetery on Pinnacle hill. It was later
removed to a more eligible spot in the same cemetery, and
still again some years later, when the old Pinnacle ceme
tery was abandoned, it was removed to the new cemetery
of the Holy Sepulchre, north of Rochester. All this is
mentioned to lead up to the interesting and remarkable fact
that the body of Colonel George Ryan, who succeeded
O'Rorke in command of the One Hundred and Fortieth
New York, and who was killed at Spottsylvania, has also
been four times buried, and now lies beside that of Col
onel O'Rorke in his family burial lot.
Captain Porter Farley
Military Record — Extracts from the report of the
Adjutant General of the State of New York.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 291
" Porter Farley. — Age at enlistment, 22 years. En
rolled at Rochester to serve three years, and mustered in
as Second Lieutenant Company G, One Hundred and For
tieth New York Volunteers, August 30, 1862. As First
Lieutenant January 1, 18631. As First Lieutenant and
Quartermaster, October 28, 1863. As Captain of Com
pany B, January 16, 1864. Discharged for disability,
August 4, 1864."
Lieutenant Farley served as acting adjutant of the regi
ment from the day the regiment left Falmouth for the Get
tysburg campaign until October 28, 1863, when he was
commissioned regimental quartermaster. He served in this
capacity until he was commissioned captain of Company B.

VI
LETTERS AND PAPERS
Lieutenant Mackenzie to General Meade **
" Brandy Station, Va., March 22, 1864.
" Major-General Meade :
" Sir : I have the honor to submit the following state
ment of facts relative to the battle of July 2, at Gettysburg:
" At the opening of the battle of July 2 there were no
troops belonging to General Sickles' corps on Round Top
ridge. " General Sickles, when called upon by General War
ren through me, to furnish troops for the defense of that
position, refused to do so, stating that his whole command
was necessary to defend his front, or words to that ef
fect. " General Sykes furnished troops for the object stated
above as soon as called upon to do so.
" I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient
servant, " Ranald S. Mackenzie,
" First Lieutenant, Corps of Engineers."
Lieutenant Mackenzie was one of three lieutenants of
engineers serving on the staff of General Warren, chief
engineer of the Army of the Potomac at the battle of Get
tysburg. This letter is evidently a reply to one from Gen
eral Meade, which the writer has not been able to find in
the " Official Records." It is a link in the chain of evi
dence that Warren did not leave Little Round Top before
the arrival of Weed's brigade, but remained there with the
officers at the signal station, sending his requests for troops
1 " Rebellion Records," Vol. xxvii, part 1, p. 138.
292

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 293
to occupy this position through the officers of his staff.
He sent Lieutenant Mackenzie to General Sickles first. If
it be objected that Lieutenant Mackenzie does not say that
Warren's request to Sykes was sent " through me," the in
ference is fair that it was, and that he would not repeat
these words in a brief formal letter to General Meade.
A letter from the Adjutant General's office, War Depart
ment, informs me that, with one exception, all the officers
of General Sykes' staff at Gettysburg mentioned in his offi
cial report are dead. Correspondence with the only sur
vivor satisfies me that he is not the officer who carried the
order from Sykes to Barnes, to send one of his brigades to
Little Round Top, which was intercepted by Vincent and
acted upon before it reached Barnes.
It is possible that when Mackenzie delivered to Sykes the
request of Warren that a brigade should be sent to Little
Round Top, Sykes agreed and sent the order to Barnes by
Mackenzie and that, supposing that Barnes would be found
with his division, Mackenzie rode there; and not finding
Barnes, told Vincent of the order which Sykes had au
thorized him to deliver to Barnes.
General Sykes** Letter **
"Dear Sir: Your letter has just reached me through
the War Department, and it gives me pleasure to answer
such of the questions it asks as I can. I enclose a copy of
my Report of the Battle of Gettysburg, which is confined
exclusively to what I knew of events then taking place.
The only error in it I have ever discovered, is that Birney
did not close the gap I asked him to, near the battery on
the left of his line. Through that gap the enemy in part
forced his way. The Divisions of the Fifth Corps moved
1 Copy of letter from General George Sykes, commanding Fifth
Army Corps at Gettysburg, to Captain Porter Farley, Rochester, New
York, dated Fort Snelling, Minnesota, August 5, 1872.

294 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
from the Baltimore pike where it crossed Rock Creek, as
follows: First Division, Second Division, Third Division.
About 3 p. m. on the 2d of July the Corps Commanders
were at the headquarters of General Meade. After con
sultation, I was directed by him to establish the Fifth Corps
on the left of the general line of the army, terminating at
Little Round Top, and hold that part of the field. The
crest of the valley sweeping from Cemetery Ridge around
to the left and embracing Little Round Top was the gen
eral line of battle adopted by the commanding General.
The position of the Third Corps was not known to me, and
no staff officer was given me to find it out. In looking for
it, I found the gap spoken of in my Report, in consequence
of which, I sought the commander of the troops nearest
it, and asked that it be closed, promising to fill the interval
he might make with my own troops. To accomplish this,
I hastened to the leading Brigades, Sweitzer and Tilton,
First Division, and posted them on the edge of a wood in
front of part of Birney's line, to cover the interval I ex
pected him to make. How Vincent got to Round Top I
do not know, unless hearing my aide-de-camp deliver the
order for the Corps to take the left of the line, he made
his way there of his own soldierly instinct. As I con
ducted the two leading brigades across the Taneytown pike
to the position I gave them, I do not remember to have
seen Vincent's troops. I was at the head, and he at the
rear of the column, and a sputtering fire having com
menced, I was anxious to get the foremost brigades in their
place. The interference with orders given by me to my
troops occurred only in Warren's hurrying up Weed's
Brigade to Round Top, which was very judicious, and an
interference of General Sickles by which General Weed
was withdrawn in part from Round Top, and placed en
route towards the right, until I met him, and at once re-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 295
turned him to his place. Watson's Battery of regular ar
tillery was likewise appropriated by Sickles without my
knowledge, in consequence of which it was for a time lost.
General Ayres took position to the right of Little Round
Top until I ordered him to attack in the direction of the
' Den,' and Crawford was to be the right rear of Ayres
until I moved him to the attack at a later hour. You are
right about two Brigades of the First Division being out
towards the peach orchard; I placed them there myself,
and for the reason given. The rocky glen did not admit
of troops being posted across it. If the left of the line of
the Third Corps had not been thrust out into the valley,
there would have been no interval near the glen, and I do
not believe the enemy would have made the headway he
did, but, being there, the glen enabled Longstreet to use
it as a cover, and gave him power to turn the flank of the
Third Corps. Had not the Fifth Corps held Round Top
and the ground adjacent, nothing would have stopped him
from reaching the Baltimore turnpike. Our Corps never
got the credit it deserved that day. It simply saved de
feat, and every fair-minded soldier knows it. The mili
tary politicians did not want one of their pets to suffer,
and were strong enough to uphold ' their own.'
" I have thus, Captain, replied to your letter as far as
I am able. I cannot tell you much not known to you be
fore. I am, Captain, " Yours Very Respectfully,
" Geo. Sykes."
This letter was written nine years after the battle. In
a measure it confirms my statement. Warren sent Cap
tain Mackenzie of his staff to Sykes, asking for troops
for the hill. Sykes sent one of his staff to direct General
Barnes to send one of his brigades. Vincent, learning of

296 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
the order, in the absence of Barnes assumed the responsi
bility of taking his brigade. He would not have left the
column except in anticipation of an order which he knew
had been issued by Sykes to send one brigade. Macken
zie, in a letter to be found in Vol. xxvii, " Rebellion Rec
ords," says that Sykes responded promptly to Warren's
request. As Sykes did not designate which of Barnes'
brigades should be sent, he may well be pardoned for not
knowing how Vincent got to Little Round Top. What
he says in this respect shows a very high regard for Vin
cent. Apparently he thinks Vincent's brigade was the
rear of the column, as he says he posted the two leading
brigades himself. In fact, Vincent led the division with
the third brigade, Sweitzer came next with the second,
followed by Tilton with the first. Barnes' statement in
his official report, that Warren in person came to Sykes
is pure fiction. Warren remained on the hill at the signal
station until Weed's brigade arrived and passed to the
front to reinforce Sickles. Warren rode down the hill
at this time and, detaching the rear regiment of the bri
gade, the One Hundred and Fortieth New York, sent it to
the crest of Little Round Top, under the guidance of
Lieutenant Roebling. Later the remaining regiments of
Weed's brigade were ordered back by General Sykes and
took position on Little Round Top, on the right of the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York.
Notes on the Taking and Holding of
Little Round Top, Gettysburg.1
" This regiment, known as the Halleck Infantry, was
commanded by Colonel Kenner Garrard of the regular army,
1 Prepared for the New York State Commissioners of Gettysburg
Monuments by Lieutenant A. P. Case, of the One Hundred and
Forty-sixth New York, acting as aid on the staff of General Weed,
and after his death on the staff of Colonel Garrard.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 297
who left the post of Commandant at West Point by re
quest of General Halleck for that purpose. The regiment
first joined General Warren's Third brigade, Second divi
sion, Fifth corps. This brigade was then composed of the
Fifth New York, Colonel Winslow (Duryea's Zouaves),
the One Hundred and Fortieth New York, Colonel
O'Rorke, and the One Hundred and Forty-sixth New
York. Warren, O'Rorke, and Garrard were together at
West Point. The two other brigades of Sykes' Second
division were all Regulars. But at the time of the Gettys
burg campaign the brigade was commanded by General
Stephen H. Weed of the regular army, and was composed
of the One Hundred and Fortieth New York, the One
Hundred and Forty-sixth New York, and the Ninety-first
and One Hundred and Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania.
"The Fifth corps, after marching nearly all night,
reached the Gettysburg field about 6 a. m. July 2, and was
stationed on the west side of Rock Creek, near the bridge
of the Baltimore Pike, on the extreme right on the Union
line. It was so posted, as we understood, because Gen
eral Meade that morning contemplated an attack by the
Fifth and Twelfth corps on Ewell's position at Benner's
Hill. Soon after our arrival General Meade sent for Gen
eral Weed, who had an excellent reputation as an artillery
officer in the regular army, to visit the battery positions in
this part of the line, including Culp's Hill. The writer,
an extra aide on General Weed's staff, was ordered to ac
company him. Several batteries were changed at General
Weed's suggestion. But no attack was made on Ewell.
" About 3 p. m. the Fifth corps was ordered in to support
General Sickles, who held the extreme left of the Union
line. At this time the Union line made nearly a horseshoe
shape, so that the corps was marched from the right heel
of the shoe across to the left heel. General Sykes himself
took in Barnes' First division, going by the Peach Orchard

298 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
cross-road. General Ayres' Second division followed, Gen
eral Weed's Third brigade leading, the other two brigades
following at quite a distance. The Peach Orchard cross
road connects the Taneytown and the Emmittsburg roads,
and as it leaves the former it crosses over the north foot
of Little Round Top. When the head of General Weed's
column had reached the woods south of Trostles' house and
near where the Third Massachusetts battery was placed,
the smoke of the battle was so dense that General Weed
rode ahead to see where he was wanted, and told his staff
to bring the column along very slowly until he returned.
" At this time the rear of the column, the One Hundred
and Fortieth New York, had just passed the foot of Lit
tle Round Top, which was then bare of troops, and was
occupied only by General Warren and the signal corps.
They had just discovered a movement of rebel troops from
the southwest, to occupy this hill, from which the whole
left of the Union army could be enfiladed. Realizing the
vital necessity of holding this point, and seeing the troops
passing through the valley at its north foot, General War
ren hastened down to them and found them to be his old
brigade. The men greeted him with repeated cheers, for
he was greatly beloved and respected by his old regiments.
Detaching the One Hundred and Fortieth, he sent it up the
hill, and then rode forward to the head of the column and,
finding General Weed gone, ordered it halted for Weed's
return. Weed soon came back with Sykes' order to take
his brigade on to Little Round Top. He at once moved
up the hill by a countermarch. The writer never learned
whether he saw General Sykes or got the order from a
messenger. A short time before this General Sykes had
detached Vincent's brigade from Barnes' division and sent
it to occupy the level gap south of Little Round Top and
lying between it and Big Round Top, as that passage of
fered an easy route for the rebel troops to the rear of the

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 299
Union left. I do not think that the occupancy or defense
of Little Round Top was then thought of, for it appeared
almost inaccessible. But the rebel troops that Warren had
seen advancing towards the hill met Vincent's troops in the
gap and at the south slope of Little Round Top, and had
there a hard fight, in which Vincent was killed. His right
was gradually driven back, and Hood's Texas brigade
reached the southern summit of the hill, where they were
met by the One Hundred and Fortieth New York, which
had been rushed up from the opposite side. Never was
there a more opportune arrival. A rebel occupancy of the
hill would probably have been fatal to the success of the
Union army.
" The hill is sparsely covered with trees, and the ground
thickly strewn with huge rocks, so that no deployment of
troops could be made. A desperate hand-to-hand conflict
ensued, the men loading and firing as they passed around
the rocks. Colonel O'Rorke, two of his officers, and
twenty-five privates were killed at the first onset. The
Texans were driven down, Vincent's lines re-formed, with
his right touching the left of Weed's brigade, now all on
the hill. The attack was renewed, and again repulsed.
The regiments then took the positions they remained in un
til they left the Gettysburg field on the 5th of July. Their
line, facing west, occupied the whole west crest of the hill
in a north and south line, the One Hundred and Fortieth
at the left, next the Ninety-first Pennsylvania, then the
One Hundred and Forty-sixth, with the One Hundred and
Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania on the right. The One Hundred
and Fortieth lay partly down the south slope, and the One
Hundred and Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania partly down *the
north slope.
" There is some uncertainty as to which of the regiments
first followed the One Hundred and Fortieth, but the
writer thinks it was the One Hundred and Forty-sixth.

300 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
While the regiments were ascending the hill, Captain Haz
lett's U. S. battery of four guns was also taken up, the
horses being lashed to their utmost exertions, and the in
fantry assisting at the wheels. It was a terrible place for
horses or guns, but the emergency had to be met. The
ground on the west front of the hill was covered by the
rocks of the Devil's Den, which were occupied by hundreds
of rebel sharpshooters. This fight on Little Round Top
took place between 4 p. m. and 5 p. M. The rebel sharp
shooters were a great annoyance to both infantry and ar
tillery. The guns of the battery could not be enough de
pressed to dislodge them. Soon after 5 p. m. General
Weed was instantly killed by a bullet, and as he sank to
the ground Captain Hazlett, of the battery, who had been
standing by his side, leaned over to speak to him, when he
too was shot and fell by Weed's side, neither of them
speaking a word, except that Colonel Jenkins of the One
Hundred and Forty-sixth thought he heard General Weed
say ' My sister.'
" During the whole of the next day, July 3, the rebel
sharpshooters killed all who showed themselves on the hill.
The men protected themselves as well as they could, the
One Hundred and Forty-sixth piling up loose stones, which
I am told still remain as they left them. As the hill made
an excellent outlook over the field of the third day's fight,
General Meade and his staff, with the signal corps, were
there all day, occupying a rocky pen directly in the line
held by the One Hundred and Forty-sixth. A company
of Berdan's sharpshooters was brought up and afforded
some protection. It was here that General Warren
thought he could use one of the heavy rifles better than the
man who had it. After firing it a few times, with what
effect no one could tell, his own neck was grazed by a rebel
bullet. He bound it up with his handkerchief and relin
quished the rifle. The writer, on going over that Devil's

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 301
Den on the morning of July 4 to relieve the wounded Union
soldiers who had lain there since the afternoon of July 2,
found those rocky crevices full of dead rebel sharpshooters,
most of them still grasping their rifles. Behind one short
low ridge of rock lay a row of eighteen dead who had been
tallied out one by one by our sharpshooters. One of the
One Hundred and Forty-sixth brought in the sword of
General Barksdale, of Mississippi, which was found by
the side of his dead body. Colonel Garrard sent it to
General Sykes.
" During Lee's great charge on the afternoon of July 3,
Hazlett's battery (commanded by Lieutenant Rittenhouse
after Hazlett was killed) had a terrible raking fire on the
rebel line, which was made with great effect. This caused
a concentration of the fire of many rebel batteries upon
Hazlett's position, their shell and shot crashing among
the rocks as if the world was coming to an end. The
Fifth corps hospital had been made at the house and barns
of J. Weikart on the Taneytown road at the foot of the
east front of Little Round Top, and during this cannonade
many of the rebel shells came over the hill and struck our
hospital, wounding some a second time. It was then
moved to Lewis Bushman's, about a mile to the southeast.
The losses of Weed's brigade were as follows : Staff, one ;
One Hundred and Fortieth New York, one hundred and
thirty-three; One Hundred and Forty-sixth New York,
twenty-eight; Ninety-first Pennsylvania, nineteen; One
Hundred and Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania, nineteen; total, two
hundred. " It was a curious coincidence that while the First and
Second brigades of the First and Second divisions, respec
tively,, of the Fifth corps were supporting General Sickles,
the Third brigades of those divisions should have been
separately detached and sent by different routes to the de
fense of Little Round Top, these two brigades containing

302 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
the only three New York regiments in the Fifth corps.
Thus the Forty-fourth New York, Colonel Cross, of Vin
cent's brigade came shoulder to shoulder with Colonel
O'Rorke's One Hundred and Fortieth New York and Col
onel Garrard's One Hundred and Forty-sixth New York
in one of the most critical moments of the Gettysburg fight.
So the New York men of the Fifth corps made a most
gallant fight, and made it side by side. And as General
Weed's death left Colonel Garrard in command of one bri
gade, so did Colonel Vincent's death bring Colonel Cross in
command of the other brigade. Colonel David T. Jenkins,
afterwards killed in the Wilderness fight, succeeded Col
onel Garrard in the command of the One Hundred and
Forty-sixth. The Fifth corps left the Gettysburg field on
the afternoon of July 5. Death has come to most of the
leaders of the One Hundred and Forty-sixth — Meade and
Sykes of the corps ; Warren, Weed and Garrard of the bri
gade ; Jenkins and Curran of the regiment. The One Hun
dred and Forty-sixth had other ties which united it closely
to General Warren, as one of his brothers was quarter
master of the brigade, and his youngest brother, Robert
P. Warren, was a captain in the regiment, and he too is
dead." [Hazlett did not speak after he was shot in the brain,
but Weed lived some time, long enough to give to Lieu
tenant W. H. Crennell, One Hundred and Fortieth New
York, acting on his staff, minute directions as to disposi
tion of his effects and messages to his family and to others.
I believe the above account of movements of the brigade,
and particularly of the One Hundred and Fortieth New
York, is substantially correct." — Captain Porter Farley.]
" A short time before this," says Lieutenant Case in the
preceding paper, " General Sykes had detached Vincent's

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 303
brigade from Barnes' division and sent it to occupy the
level gap south of Little Round Top and lying between it
and Big Round Top, as that passage offered an easy route
for the rebel troops to the rear of the Union left." Con
tinuing, he says :
" Thus the Forty-fourth New York, Colonel Cross, of
Vincent's brigade came shoulder to shoulder with Colonel
O'Rorke's One Hundred and Fortieth New York and Col
onel Garrard's One Hundred and Forty-sixth New York
in one of the most critical moments of the Gettysburg fight.
So the New York men of the Fifth corps made a most gal
lant fight, and made it side by side. And as General
Weed's death left Colonel Garrard in command of one bri
gade, so did Colonel Vincent's death bring Colonel Cross
in command of the other brigade." And again: .
" Death has come to most of the leaders of the One Hun
dred and Forty-sixth — Meade and Sykes of the corps ;
Warren, Weed, and Garrard of the brigade; Jenkins and
Curran of the regiment. The One Hundred and Forty-
sixth had other ties which united it closely to General
Warren, as one of his brothers was quartermaster of the
brigade and his youngest brother, Robert P. Warren, was
a captain in the regiment, and he too is dead."
The greater part of the foregoing paper may be found
in " New York at Gettysburg," having been read at the
dedication of the monument of the One Hundred and
Forty-sixth New York on Little Round Top.
The paper contains much that is true, and some sur
prising errors. The statement that Sykes detached Vin
cent's brigade and sent it to occupy the level ground south
of Little Round Top is an error, if it is to be interpreted
that Sykes in person detached Vincent's brigade. If it
means that the movement was made by Sykes' order, it
confirms rather than disproves my statement. The ground
on which Vincent's brigade fought is not level, but is the

304 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
southern slope of Little Round Top. Vincent selected his
own ground without direction or assistance. There is no
record that Sykes saw this position at any time during the
battle. The statement that the three New York regiments
fought side by side, and that Colonel Cross of the Forty-
fourth New York succeeded Colonel Vincent in command
of the brigade, is contrary to all the records. The Six
teenth Michigan was between the Forty-fourth and the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York, and the Ninety-first
Pennsylvania between the One Hundred and Fortieth and
One Hundred and Forty-sixth New York. Colonel Cross
commanded a brigade of Caldwell's division, Second corps,
and was killed on Birney's line near the wheat-field.
In his account of the movements of the divisions and
brigades of the Fifth Corps, he sets the time of the arrival
of General Weed, with three regiments of his brigade on
Little Round Top, an hour earlier than I would.
Letters From the Comte de Paris to
Captain Porter Farley
Chateau d'Eu, Seine Inferieure,
December 22, 1877.
Dear Sir: I thank you very much for your letter and
the first installment of your account of the campaigns of the
One Hundred and Fortieth New York Volunteers, which
I read with great pleasure. I am very grateful to General
Warren for having suggested to you to send me that ac
count, as especially the next part concerning the battle of
Gettysburg will be most valuable for me in the task I have •
undertaken — to give an accurate narrative of that great
fight. I have read already a great deal about the splendid
achievements of the One Hundred and Fortieth New York
on Little Round Top, but an account by a member of that

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 305
regiment will be still more interesting for me. Believe
me, Dear Sir, Yours truly,
L. P. Orleans,
Comte de Paris.
Madrid, January 24, 1878.
Dear Sir: Your letters dated December 7th and 28th
were duly received, and I beg you to accept my best thanks
for the very interesting and valuable information which
you have taken the trouble to supply me with in addition
to your excellent account of the campaigns of the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York Volunteers. The letter
of Mr. Roebling is a striking and unexpected confirmation
of your account, although, as you remark, he must have
made a mistake about the position of the remainder of
Weed's Brigade at the time he rode from Round Top to
the Peach Orchard. If I wrote a monograph of the bat
tle of Gettysburg it would afford me great pleasure to give
a detailed account of all the incidents which are so graph
ically described by yourself and some other eye-witnesses.
But my space is limited; the whole battle must be con
densed into some fifty or sixty pages, and therefore every
sentence must be reduced to its minimum. An act of hero
ism worthy of the admiration of the world must be
quoted in a single word. The documents which are in
my hands will enable me to give to each word a real value,
but I feel it is a pity not to be able to do more out of these.
Nevertheless, my task is already large enough and I can
not alter it. Believe me, Dear Sir,
Yours truly,
L. P. Orleans,
Address Chateau d'Eu, Comte de Paris.
Seine Inferieure, France.

306 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF !
Chateau d'Eu, Seine Inferieure,
April 20, 1878.
Dear Sir: I thank you very much for your letter of
March ioth, and for the way in which you point out to me
some serious blemishes in the translation of the first part of
my history of the Civil War. The transposition of the
word "only," occurring so frequently, must be especially
annoying to the reader. The translator, Mr. Tasistro, is,
I believe, a Pole, but the last correction ought to have been
made by a native hand.
Having declined to revise the translation and to correct
its mistakes, in order not to take the responsibility of every
blunder which might remain, I did not take the trouble to
read more than a few pages. But any blemish pointed out
to me will be noted down for the next edition which Messrs.
Porter & Coates may issue. Believe me, Dear Sir,
Yours truly,
L. P. Orleans,
Comte de Paris.

VII
THE WARREN LETTERS
The following letters from General G. K. Warren to
Captain Porter Farley are copied from the original manu
script, and with the exception of part of the letter of July
13, 1872, have never before been published. This 1872
letter, omitting some paragraphs at the beginning and at
the end, appeared as a note to General Hunt's paper on the
Battle of Gettysburg in the " Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War." It is also printed in full in the History of the
One Hundred and Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers.
The letter from Lieutenant Roebling to Captain Farley is
inserted in this collection, because it is referred to by
General Warren in subsequent letters.
These letters were not written for publication, but it is
from just such letters that true history is made. It seems
eminently proper that in the interest of the truth these let
ters should be taken from the files where they have slum
bered for nearly half a century and be given to the public.
They may contradict the statements of some historians who
have attributed to General Warren deeds which he never
claimed for himself. It was not possible for any one man
to have seen all of the battle of Gettysburg. The most
careful writers made use of such material as they had, to
make their accounts correspond with the facts as nearly as
possible. The differences between the various accounts
show conclusively that some of them must be erroneous.
The compiler of this book believes that the writers of ac
counts which he feels obliged to criticise would, in the light
of later evidence, admit their errors. Some passages in
General Warren's letters show the way in which these
307

308 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
differences should be treated by fair-minded persons. This
spirit does not oblige the treatment with tolerance of de
liberate misrepresentation. Newport, R. I., July 13, 1872.
To Captain Porter Farley,
One Hundred and Fortieth Regiment New York
Volunteers, Rochester, N. Y.
Dear Captain: I have received your letter of the 8th
inst. in relation to certain events at Little Round Top hill
at Gettysburg on July 2, 1863. As nearly as I remember,
" the light, almost yellow haired " officer that rode up the
hill with your regiment, was Captain Chauncey B. Reese,
of the Engineer Corps, U. S. Army. He and First Lieu
tenant Ranald S. Mackenzie of the Engineer Corps, U. S.
Army, were serving with me at the time and it was like
either of them to have done it. Both afterwards were pro
moted to the rank of Brigadier General for gallant and ef
ficient services. General Reese (then Captain) went from
Gettysburg to Charleston, S. C, and conducted the siege
operations by which Ft. Wagner was reduced. He was
one of the very best officers of the army. He died of yel
low fever Sept. 22, 1870, at Mobile. General R. S. Mac
kenzie may be able to give you some interesting items
about the matter, and you can address him care of the Ad
jutant General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.
Mr. John B. Bachelder has collected a vast deal of in
formation about the order of occurrences at Gettysburg
and you should write to him. I am getting engraved a
Map of the Battlefield of Gettysburg, under direction of
General Humphreys, and I will try to procure you transfer
impressions to print with your book, if you desire it.
Your second question I will now answer as well as I
can: Just before the action began in earnest on July 2nd, I

GENERAL GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN

Facing Page 30S

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 309
was with General Meade near General Sickles, whose
troops seemed very badly disposed on that part of the field.
At my suggestion General Meade sent me to the left to ex
amine the condition of affairs and I continued on till I
reached Little Round Top. There were no troops on it
and it was used as a Signal Station. I saw that this was
the key of the whole position and that our troops in the
woods in front of it could not see the ground in front of
them, so that the enemy would come upon them before
they would be aware of it. The long line of woods on the
west [east *] side of the Emmittsburg road, which road was
along a ridge, furnished an excellent place for the enemy
to form out of sight, so I requested the Captain of a rifle
battery just in front of Little Round Top to fire a shot into
these woods. He did so, and as the shot went whistling
through the air the sound of it reached the enemies' troops
and caused every one to look in the direction of it. The
motion revealed to me the glistening of gun barrels and
bayonets of the enemy's line of battle already formed and
far outflanking the position of any of our troops, so that
the line of his advance from his right to Little Round Top
was unopposed. I have been particular in telling this, as
the discovery was intensely thrilling to my feelings and al
most appalling. I immediately sent a hastily written dis
patch to General Meade to send a division at least to me,
and General Meade directed the Fifth Army Corps to take
position there. The battle was already beginning to rage
at the Peach Orchard and before a single man reached
Round Top the whole line of the enemy moved on us in
splendid array, shouting in the most confident tones.
While I was still all alone with the signal officer, the mus-
1 1 think this word " west " is a slip of the pen, in a hastily written
letter, for the word ''east." The shot fired by Smith's battery, by
Warren's order, was directed against Hood's division, then concealed
in the woods east of the Emmittsburg road, between it and Plum Run,
facing the Devil's Den. — O. W. N.

310 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
ket balls began to fly around us and he was about to fold
up his flags and withdraw, but remained at my request and
kept waving them in defiance. The first arrival I remem
ber seeing was First Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett, of
the Fifth Artillery, with his battery of rifled cannon. He
comprehended the situation instantly and planted a gun on
the summit of the hill. He spoke to the effect that though
he could do little execution on the enemy with his guns,
he could aid in giving confidence to the infantry, and that
his battery was of no consequence whatever compared with
holding the position. He stayed there, you know, till he
was killed.
I did not see Vincent's brigade come up, but I suppose it
was about this time they did, and coming up behind me
through the woods and taking post to the left (their proper
place) I did not see them. The full force of the enemy
was now sweeping the Third Army Corps from its unten
able position, and no troops nor any reinforcements could
maintain it. It was the dreadful misfortune of the day
that any reinforcements went to that line, for all alike,
Third Corps, Second Corps, and Fifth Corps, were driven
from it with great loss. The earnest appeals for support
drew, I suppose, the troops of the Fifth Corps away from
where they were intended (that is, Little Round Top) out
on the road to the Peach Orchard, and so it was that the
Fifth Corps reached the vital point in such small detach
ments. As soon as Hazlett was in position I rode down to the
troops going out on the Peach Orchard road, and fortu
nately met my old brigade. General Weed, commanding
it, had already passed the point with part of the command
and I took the responsibility to detach Colonel O'Rorke,
the head of whose regiment I struck, who, on hearing my
few words of explanation about the position, moved at
once to the hill top. I sent word to General Weed, or Col-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 311
onel O'Rorke did, and he soon joined his command on the
hill. I did not see General Weed, for soon after Colonel
O'Rorke went into action General Sidney Burbank arrived
with his brigade, and from that moment I felt confident
the hill could be held by us. I was wounded with a musket
ball while talking with Lieutenant Hazlett on the hill, but
not seriously, and seeing the position saved while the whole
line on the right and front of us was yielding and melting
away under the enemy's fire and advance, I left the hill to
rejoin General Meade near the center of the field, where
another crisis was at hand. This was finally settled in our
favor by the determined bravery and gallantry of the troops
posted there.
I am too much occupied now to make you a fair copy
of this letter, but hope as it is it will do for your purpose.
I think General Vincent's brigade as well as your own,
were, as you say, rushed up to Little Round Top after the
enemy were seen making for that point.
Yours respectfully,
G. K. Warren.
Newport, R. I., July 24, 1872.
Captain Porter Farley,
Rochester, N. Y.
Captain: I have received your letter of July 21. I
wrote my letter to you without consulting any notes, and
I may not have given the strict order of occurrences in it.
If you should wish to publish anything from me, I wish
you would let me have time to revise it first. It was a time
of most intense importance, while we were on Little
Round Top, and it seems to me I can see everything now
with the same distinctness, as if it were again before my
eyes. Nevertheless, some important matters may have es
caped my attention. I will not be sure that Hazlett's bat
tery got up before I went down to Colonel O'Rorke. It

312 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
may be that it was afterward, and that he, Hazlett, passed
you, or it may be that only a section of the battery got
there first. There was not room for more than two can
non on the hill top, and I and some stragglers from the
Third Corps took hold of the gun carriage of one gun and
lifted it bodily over the rocks where it was caught by a
projecting piece on the summit. If I detached Vincent's
brigade I don't recollect it. General Barnes' report to
General Sykes I think says something of the sort was done
by me, which was Swinton's authority. Perhaps it was
Reese or Mackenzie acting under my orders who did it.
In fact, the whole Fifth Corps, I believe, was ordered to
join me, and it was only by a miscomprehension of the sit
uation or of orders, that any went to any other place.
The authority I assumed was on the responsibility of my
judgment, and I would not have hesitated to take any
troops I could get hold of, to maintain ourselves on the
hill. Yours respectfully, G. K. Warren.
Newport, R. I., Oct. 12, 1877.
Captain Porter Farley,
Dear Sir: I have received yours of the 8th inst. I
shall be very glad to receive the publications you proffer,
and hope there will be no delay in the publication. I am
specially interested about the fight at Gettysburg on July
2nd and the death of O'Rorke. If I had that part now
I would at once send it to the Comte de Paris at Chateau
d'Eu, Seine Inferieure, France. He is at present writing
the account of the battle for his history, and I know he will
give O'Rorke and your regiment the high credit they won
there. You can send anything to him also, to the care of
Theodore Lyman, Brookline, Mass.
Yours very truly,
G. K. Warren.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 313
Newport, R. L, October 17, 1877.
Captain Porter Farley,
Rochester, N. Y.
Dear Friend: I have received your letter of the 15th
and am glad you are going to send your account to the
Comte de Paris. It will, I think, be in good season if you
can send it before long.
I am very much interested in your two articles (which I
have received) of the history of the One Hundred and
Fortieth New York Volunteers. I shall grow very im
patient for it from week to week. Such accounts faith
fully written are the most important contributions to his
tory. I remember Snicker's Gap that first night well
enough, and my bones ached again with sympathetic cold,
as they did at that time, in reading your account of it.
Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
Newport, R. I., October 23, 1877.
Captain Porter Farley,
No. 9 Rochester Savings Bank.
Dear Friend: I have received yours of the 21st inst.
and the inclosure to the Comte de Paris. I venture to hold
it till I can write to you about the order of march. You
say, " When we reached the beginning of the rising ground
at the northern extremity of Little Round Top, we being
the rear regiment of our brigade, and our brigade the rear
brigade of the division, General Warren," etc. This or
der of movement does not agree with my impression, nor
with that of my brother, who was there and on General
Weed's staff. I am making further inquiries about it.
Are you sure of what you say, or do you derive it from
someone else?
I do not know who was Swinton's informant, in par-

314 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
ticulars, if he had one. I did not furnish him any detailed
information, first, because it would have been necessarily
too personal, and I did not know what the greater part of
the Fifth Corps did; nor have I seen any of the detailed
official reports. You may be sure if I had given the ac
count of my taking the responsibility of detaching troops
and hurrying them at the last moment to the hill top, I
should have said it was O'Rorke and his regiment that I
detached. My recollections agree exactly with yours as to
that matter after I met O'Rorke. General Sykes had or
dered Vincent's brigade up, at my urgent request made
some time before, but I did not see it come up, as it must
have passed behind me in the woods. But then I think
this brigade did essential service in holding the hill, be
cause the troops they met and beat back would otherwise
have turned the position.
I don't think Swinton's account does justice to the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York and Weed's brigade; al
though I am willing to award all the praise to the brigade
of Vincent that has been given it. O'Rorke and Hazlett,
however, I saw, and I know they deserve all the praise that
could be given them. I have so written to the Comte de
Paris. He will not fail to divide the honors more evenly
I am sure.
The battery that I directed to fire, which you inquire fur
ther about, was a battery of the Third Corps, Smith's
Fourth New York, I believe, on Bachelder's map of posi
tions. The word " requested " used by me seems to have
misled you. I sent word by an orderly, I think, written
on a slip of paper.
Your questions :
ist. I was Chief Engineer at Gettysburg. General
Meade offered me the place of Chief of Staff, but I was
not suited with it. It always kept a man away from the
front in battle and the other took him there. My ex-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 315
perience that was valuable, was in the fighting I had seen
or taken part in.
2nd. The corps badge system originated with General
Kearney, who had his men tuck a little piece of red flan
nel on their hats, cut diamond shape. When Hooker came
in command he, through Butterfield, his Chief of Staff,
took up the idea Of making it general. I was asked, as I
had many draughtsmen under me, to get up specimens of
badges. I am not sure that some part of the Fifth Army
Corps had not already adopted the Maltese Cross.
I made a lot of rude designs for badges, of simple forms,
from which those adopted were selected. I have the orig
inals yet. Such credit as attaches to the matter belongs to
General Hooker and General Butterfield.
Swinton, I think, is in New York City. I have not seen
him for many years nor written to him. Probably the
editor of the New York Times would be a good address to
send a letter to him to the care of.
I do not think the Comte de Paris will get through his
history of Gettysburg very soon. I learn he is carefully
investigating points in all directions, so there will be time
to give him your account with all the distinctness that is
attainable. Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
P. S. — When the point I have raised is settled I will
send your letter to the Army and Navy Journal. — G. K. W.
Newport, R. I., October 26, 1877.
Captain Porter Farley,
Rochester, N. Y.
Dear Captain: I have a letter from Bachelder which
states that Weed's brigade was leading, as shown by his
notes made in the winter following, but that your regiment
was in rear of the brigade. It is not an important matter
in itself, but becomes interesting as illustrative of the dif-

3 1 6. THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
ferent impressions preserved by different persons, of oc
currences in exciting moments of battles, when there could
be no motive for differing. Have you consulted official
reports for your order of march?. Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
Newport, R. I., October 31, 1877.
Doctor Porter Farley,
Rochester, N. Y.
Dear Friend: I have received this morning yours of
the 26th, and at the same time one from Captain Marvin,
who was, as you know, Adjutant of the Brigade. He wrote
to me : "I recollect the circumstances of our brigade's ap
proach to Gettysburg. General Weed and one of his
staff had gone ahead towards Sickles' Corps leaving orders
with me to have the brigade follow him. The One Hun
dred and Fortieth New York Volunteers was in front with
Colonel O'Rorke in charge of the brigade, Ninety-first
Pennsylvania Volunteers next, and One Hundred and
Forty-sixth New York and One Hundred and Fifty-fifth
Pennsylvania. I well remember your riding rapidly down
from Little Round Top as we approached it and inquiring
of us what troops ours were and where General Weed was.
You assumed the responsibility of taking away the One
Hundred and Fortieth New York. I went with the others
and met General Weed," etc.
My brother was the staff officer that went with General
Weed, and his recollection is the same as Marvin's. Mar
vin kept a journal. This recollection corresponds exactly
with mine.
In view of all this, do you think still that you were the
rear regiment of the brigade? I was in such anxiety to
get troops that it seems to me impossible that I would have
allowed a regiment even to pass me.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 317
I would be very glad to get letters such as you refer to,
when you have time to make copies.
I note what you say about your letter to the Comte, only
waiting to hear from you about this final route of order
of march. Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
P. S. — I sent the Gettysburg map to you from this place,
but it is well to acknowledge its receipt to the Chief of
Engineers U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
[Marvin is all wrong in stating that the One Hundred
and Fortieth Regiment led the brigade, and that O'Rorke
was in temporary command of the same. On the face of
it he is mistaken. If O'Rorke had been in command he
would have been at the head of the brigade and would conse
quently have gone out to or near the Trostle House ; whereas
he and his regiment never crossed the northern end of Lit
tle Round Top by the roadway, but were deflected from it
by Warren in person (to my certain knowledge), who then
followed the balance of the brigade till he reached its head
and halted it. Warren left Lieutenant Roebling with us,
who accompanied our regiment to the crest at southern end
of Little Round Top. See Lieutenant Roebling's letter.1
See statement by Lieutenant A. P. Case, of One Hundred
and Forty-sixth New York.2 If O'Rorke had been at the
head of the brigade, and in command of it, would Warren,
when he met him as he did on the eastern slope, have ever
allowed the balance of the brigade to pass out in the road to
the Trostle House? — Porter Farley.]
Newport, R. I., November 17, 1877.
Doctor Porter Farley,
Rochester, N. Y.
Dear Friend: Yours of the 8th inst. was received
during my absence. I hope my " query " did not disturb
*¦ P. 330 infra. 2 P. 296-302.

318 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
your energies in the political battle you were engaged in,
which must have been a very close contest, judging by the
small margin of victory which you report. Your county
must be a splendid field for fair play, with parties so evenly
balanced. I think your remarks about Marvin's statement are
reasonable, but of course not conclusive. According to my
ideas, Marvin's expression, " leaving O'Rorke in charge,"
expresses more than he meant. You know a General often
leaves his command and goes ahead to learn about the use
he is to make of his command, leaving some staff officer
like Marvin to represent him, with the instruction that if
any important emergency arises in his absence, to con
sider the next ranking officer in command. Such an idea
of " in charge " might exist in Marvin's mind at the time
without his communicating it to Colonel O'Rorke, and even
if he did communicate it it was of such a temporary nature
that O'Rorke would not disarrange his regimental organiza
tion on account of it, preferring, as I always did, to hold
the double charge until permanently assigned to the higher.
There is no reliance, however, to be placed on our mem
ories, when their record is made to tally with our reason,
based upon collateral experience; for instance, as when I
wrote to you, as you quote, that my anxiety was too great
for me to have allowed any troops to pass me. That is
my impression now, and I was filled with restless activity
at that time, so that I think no accidents of ground would
have prevented my seeing, as your last letter suggests.
Let all those things go. My memory is supported by
Marvin's statement and my brother's, both on Weed's
staff. Your memory is sustained by General Garrard's
and Mr. Bachelder's notes, so I see no reason why you
should not hold to your own impressions, but give them
the weight of the doubt which other memories cause. That
is what I do. There is no special importance attached to

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 319
the matter, that I know of, and it is a curious instance of
the uncertainties of memory, for all were actors in the
scene, and all truthful and disinterested.
General Garrard thinks I met General Weed, and that he
consented to let O'Rorke's regiment go. But I did not
meet Weed, I am sure. And to back that up with an in
ference which I feel it is due to General Weed to use, I am
sure that if I had met him he would have taken his whole
brigade at once where I asked him. I have stood by him in
trying places in battle, so that I know he would have done
it at once, just as O'Rorke did, and just as I think General
Garrard would have done, or any other man who knew me
as well as they did.
I cannot tell you how grieved I was at O'Rorke's death.
My earnest appeal appreciated and responded to was his
knell. I would have died to save him if I could. If any
honor attaches to what I did, it should all be given to him,
for what I did would have been nothing but for him.
Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
Newport, R. I., November 20, 1877.
Captain Porter Farley,
Rochester, N. Y.
Dear Friend: I have to-day received galley proofs of
Article IX, Gettysburg. I admire it very much and sug
gest several minor changes, which I make on the enclosed
copy.
First: I correct the spelling of O'Rorke's name. It is
thus on all the army registers.
Then, in " two " I have changed " pell-mell " to " rap
idly." You can make it " excitedly," " furiously," or any
other word you think proper; but not that.
Then, I have struck out six lines before the quotation
from my letter, the words, "the discovery he had just

320 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
made was the." I wish this done because many think I had
just found the importance of the position, whereas I had
been there and perceived it before it was attacked, as my
letter shows.
Next, I have altered and a little shortened the quotation
you made from my letter. I wrote that in a hurry, but I
have lately looked over all the evidence I have and wish in
it now, not to assert anything positively about points in
which I differ from you. The point of difference is not
great, and the change enables you to make your own state
ment without the necessity of reconciling an apparent in
consistency between us. I have thus struck out your ex
planation too. All this shortens and strengthens your ar
ticles. Immediately after the quotation I strike out the word
" just " again.
In the last paragraph I strike out " entirely unknown
to Warren," which may be a little too strong, and it does not
weaken your narration to do so.
In the last paragraph of " four " I query the word
" poor." 1 It is often used in the sense you use it, but as he
was a hero " mort dans le champ de bataille," you better
use a more exalted term of qualification. " Dulce et de
corum est pro patria." Dickens makes little Paul Dombey
wonder why they called him " poor little Dombey," and
he felt hurt at the word even as a term of endearment.
Your article is very stirring and I don't think it will be
injured by the changes I suggest. Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
P. S. — ¦ I think his classmates always called him Paddy
O'Rorke. He was a man of noble character, and had noth
ing of the wild Irishman about him. — G. K. W.
Please send me another proof. — G. K. W.
[This letter was written commenting on, criticising, and
1 1 had used the phrase " poor O'Rorke,"— P. F.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 321
correcting my first draft of the account of our going up
on to Little Round Top. I sent him first galley proof, and
after receiving this letter I sent him a corrected proof, and
the article was not printed until after I got that back. So
my story had Warren's complete approval, and he ordered
one hundred and fifty copies of it for distribution among
officers of the Engineer corps. — P. F.]
{O'Rorke's Death)
Newport, R. I., November 23, 1877.
Captain Porter Farley,
Rochester, N. Y.
Dear Friend: I have added a phrase accidentally left
off in my change of my letter, and struck out an unneces
sary " was," so that I think it now reads straight. The
copy I kept was arranged this way.
I am such a poor writer myself that no one should feel
hurt at my effort to call attention to the propriety of using
certain words in certain places. On this particular matter
of O'Rorke's death I feel perhaps too much to be a good
judge of the proper use of words. To me he was not
poor, he was glorious. What was dear, became heroic.
I love to think of him as Carthon in Ossian, when he ex
claims, " Carthon dies unknown." " But thou shalt not
die unknown," replied the king of woody Morven ; " my
bards are many, O Carthon! their songs descend to future
times. The children of years to come shall hear the fame
of Carthon." — " The beam of Heaven delights to shine on
the grave of Carthon." " Happy are they who die in their
youth when their renown is around them."
The subject you are treating of is, I consider, a very
grand one; the simplest words of truth make it exalting.
It requires some art in the narrator to bring us back to
the consideration of the ordinary affairs of the campaign.

322 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Your last paragraph I think does this very handsomely,
and is not bad just as it stands. The last three lines I
think you may improve. I have indicated some changes
for your consideration, although I am by no means certain
that they would be improvements, and would not have done
it if you had not requested it. I think the simple words
" last look " will be understood by everyone to convey more
than can be expressed. Poetry is full of illustrations of it.
" Slowly and sadly we laid him down
On the field of his fame, fresh and gory," etc.
i " He who hath bent him o'er the dead
E'er yet the day of death has fled
Before decay's effacing fingers
Have swept the lines where beauty lingers,
The first, last look by death revealed."
Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
P. S.— I don't like the phrase " whiff of a bullet " as
you use it. It was the bullet itself, and not the whiff, that
was fatal. You see Shakespeare's use of it was to denote
the feebleness of the " unnerved father." Hamlet, act ii,
scene ii. You and I treat the subject differently. I
would grieve as you do, but I would make the last act
round up a perfect life. A great achievement by the great
est sacrifice. As the biographer of Nelson says, " If the
phaeton and horses of fire had been designed for his trans
lation, he could not have departed in a brighter blaze of
glory."— G. K W. Newport, R. I., November 24, 1877.
Doctor Porter Farley,
Rochester, N. Y.
Dear Doctor: Your letter card of the 22nd is just re-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 323
ceived. I think there is no objection to putting the matter
as you suggest. I have sent you answers to all your ref
erences heretofore, and if they do not accord with your
ideas, use your judgment as to what to do, for I think it
will be quite as good.
Be careful in statements of facts, for I see Longstreet,
like everyone in the South, always gets whipped with over
whelming numbers, according to his own statement, which
I know were quite as often just the reverse.
Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
Newport, R. I., November 28, 1877.
Doctor Porter Farley,
Rochester, N. Y.
Dear Friend: I have read your revised proof, and
think it very good indeed.
I would like to have you strike out the words " with part
of the command " in my letter. It may have been so, but
that is not according to the best of my recollection and be
lief. I would rather leave that an open question. My let
ter to you was written in great haste, without careful think
ing over minute points, to give you a general idea of the
situation as I comprehended it, and in which your regiment
took such an important part. You must have overlooked
my striking these words out before, or else I did not do
what I meant to. Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
P. S. — Order for me one hundred and fifty copies of
the papers containing No. IX. I want to send one to every
officer of Engineers. — G. K. W.
Newport, R. I., December 2, 1877.
Dear Friend: I have received yours of the 30th, and
note your kind offer to mail the papers for me, which

324 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
would save some trouble and expense. But I want to send
them in bulk to Washington, D. C, to be sent out from
there. By doing this each officer will see that they are sent
to all, and may take more special notice of them than if
sent like newspapers ordinarily are. Moreover, I will
write a short note and have it printed to accompany them.
If I can get time I shall soon write up my report of Get
tysburg, and I shall do all I can to see that such a noble
sacrifice as O'Rorke made is appreciated and his name hon
ored. What has ever been done about his memory? Where is
he buried? What kind of stone marks the spot? Where
are his family? How many children did he leave? What
circumstances are they in? I would like to know all about
them. Please send the one hundred and fifty papers by ex
press, to William J. Warren, Esq., Office of Chief of En
gineers U. S. A., Washington, D. C, and send me the bill
for expenses, including expressage prepaid.
Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
Newport, R. I., December 5, 1877.
Dear Friend: Article IX came to-day, and I have
sent a copy to the Comte de Paris. I thought perhaps you
would like your own letter to go somewhat modified, so I
return it to you. I believe I told you Swinton got his ac
count very much from Bachelder, and he got it from Col
onel Rice (afterwards General and killed at Spottsylvania
in May, 1864), and from General Chamberlain.
I send you back also the reserved copy I had of the first
proof, of which you sent me two. Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 325
Newport, R. I., December 6, 1877.
Doctor Farley,
Dear Friend: I have just received your interesting
letter giving me an account of the O'Rorkes. I remember
Ryan well.
I enclose you a check for $5.50 for the papers.
In regard to the question you raise in the attached slip,
I know nothing. I heard something of it at the time, but
did not heed it. My brother recollects no special failure
wait on the occasion. He was on his staff.
O'Rorke was about twenty-one years old when he en
tered the Military Academy, twenty-five years old when he
graduated in 1861. Twenty-seven years old when he died
at Gettysburg.
I was thirty-three years, six months old at that time.
Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
Newport, R. I., December 16, 1877.
Dear Friend: I have received yours of the 14th, and
enclosed letter from Colonel Roebling.1 If I said the staff
officer was Captain Reese, it was only a surmise, for I have
no personal recollection. I had Reese, Mackenzie, and
Roebling with me that day at different times, and they were
all such bright, gallant men, proved on hundreds of trying
occasions, that I might not recollect the special service of
either of them. Roebling, however, was on my staff, and
I think performed more able and brave service than any
one I knew.
It is singular that you should have received this infor
mation and sent it to me, for he is my brother-in-law, and I
see him quite frequently, and this letter is written by my
sister at his dictation. When we are together we never
talk about the war, because it is an exciting subject. Col
onel Roebling's health was very much injured by the air
1 Colonel Roebling's letter is reproduced on p. 330 infra.

326 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
pressure in the caissons of the Brooklyn Bridge, and it re
quires all his strength to keep up with the management of
the great bridge he now has charge of. So all of us spare
him from every exciting topic in conversation. He has a
wonderful mind and memory, and as he says, " a slight hint
sometimes brings up a whole chain of forgotten events."
I sent my sister a copy of your article, and they have
very properly sent their acknowledgments of its merits to
you. I am very glad this matter has come out as it has, because
it makes Roebling's recollections and mine free from any
charges of collusion. Colonel Roebling married my sister
in January, 1865.
I wish Colonel Roebling would write a narrative of the
war, and perhaps when the bridge is finished he may do so.
That bridge itself is as sad as a battlefield to us. Colonel
Roebling's father lost his life in beginning it, and he is
wearing himself out in finishing it, and all for the glory of
the thing, for he has plenty of means and money, and bril
liant education, so that " knowledge with her ample page
rich with the spoils of time " is all unfolded to him.
I am very glad you received his letter, which I return to
you. Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
P. S. — Are you not going to publish your articles in book
form?— G. K. W.
(Relating to Battle of the Wilderness)
Newport, R. I., December 22, 1877.
Doctor Farley,
Dear Friend: I have yours of the 20th. I cannot re
call the number or designation of the section of the battery
you refer to, nor the name of the officer in command of it.
I well remember, however, that he was a gallant, brave

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 327
fellow. I am very anxious to get time to write an account
of this battle, which is so little understood and is so con
fused. I do not know whether you propose to comment on
the matter or not, but I will tell you that it was my order
that these two pieces should accompany the attacking force.
Under orders I had moved every man that was up, in the
assault, and I thought that when the enemy's line was taken
these guns would give steadiness to the men by its firing,
which would be heard all along it, and have a demoralizing
effect upon the enemy. If General Grant would only have
accepted my suggestion to let me deploy my whole corps,
and wait till Sedgwick with one division could reach and
assault the enemy's left flank, towards which I knew he was
moving, then my advance would certainly, I think, have
been a great success, and Ewell's corps alone and unsup
ported must have been driven from the field. Hill's corps
could then have been beaten in its isolated position. I saw
that, that day, and I was so astonished at General Lee's
temerity in offering us such an opportunity. I think it is
wrong to say the Wilderness did not allow of such grand
tactics. We had become familiar with it by that time — at
least I had. But all my suggestions were received with
contumely and scorn that was positively insulting.
The guns were left on the road under the fire of both
lines, so that neither could draw them off, and when we
left the position we abandoned them. The officer in com
mand, I think, was killed.
Write to General H. J. Hunt, U. S. Army, Charleston,
S. C, for any information about the artillery. It is be
cause I knew he kept so exact an account of everything re
lating to artillery that I have not more notes about it.
My sister, Mrs. Roebling, has sent me your letter to Col-
enel R., so that that cycle of correspondence seems com
plete. She says her first impression of Roebling was the
same as yours, but singularly he never made that impres-

328 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
sion upon me. In fact, I got my impressions of men in the
war very much from what they did and not from personal
appearance. Every now and then I meet some small-sized,
modest fellow in citizen's clothes, that I knew only on
horseback in the field, where he appeared to me almost like
a Centaur, and grand in physical strength. Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
Newport, R. I., January 16, 1878.
Doctor Farley,
Dear Friend: I write to thank you for your considerate
mention of me at Mine Run. I believe you spoke the gen
eral sentiment of the army about that matter. I never at
tend an army gathering that numbers of officers and men
do not come forward and personally thank me for taking
the stand I then did.
I have sent your Gettysburg number around, and one of
ficer of Engineers writes me : " O'Rorke was two years my
junior at West Point, but I remember him as a ' pleb '
[name for new cadet], a noble, true, manly fellow, who
wore a watch and chain presented to him by the Humane
Society for heroism in saving a boy's life when he was
drowning, at the peril of his own."
Such an act seems so to forecast his conduct at Gettys
burg that I hope it is a true story, and would like to know
all the details of it. Yours truly,
G. K. Warren.
No. 218 East Seventeenth Street,
New York, April 10, 1878.
Doctor Porter Farley,
Dear Sir: I was pleased to receive your letter of the
24th ult., and especially to learn your personal reasons for
leaving the service when you did. There were a great

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 329
many heart-breaking troubles which men in our war had to
bear that few ever thought of, outside of it. But I knew
them well in several instances, and I could often imagine
them when I did not know the circumstances.
Separation from those dear to me, at that period in my
life, was the greatest hardship I had to endure. I hope to
hear from you occasionally at least. Yours truly, G. K. Warren.
Newport, R. I., May 15, 1878.
Doctor Porter Farley,
Rochester, N. Y.
Dear Friend: I have just returned here after two
months' absence, and find your translation of Schweigger's
" Ophthalmology," which you have so kindly sent me with
your compliments. I shall read it with much interest if it
is not too technical for my understanding. I hope you will
be rewarded for your labor pecuniarily, but think you can
not fail to add to your reputation.
I hear your articles on Gettysburg and the whole series
very flatteringly spoken of. It is a great pity that circum
stances of ill health prevented your continuing them all the
way through, and it makes us all regret with you that you
could not have continued on to the end.
In talking with my sisters about O'Rorke's watch, they
both say it was given to him for saving the life of another,
though they do not know certainly whether it was his
schoolmates or others who did it. What his classmate,
Major Wilson, says, is therefore correct. Mrs. Roebling
says she often had the watch in her hand and heard the
whole matter talked over.
Hoping to hear from you now and then, I remain,
Very truly yours,
G. K. Warren.

330 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
Lieutenant Roebling's Letter
No. no Columbia Heights,
Brooklyn, December 13, 1877.
Porter Farley, Esq.,
Rochester, N. Y.
Dear Sir: I have read with much interest in the Roch
ester Democrat and Chronicle of December 3rd your
graphic description of the critical episode on Round Top
Mountain at the Battle of Gettysburg. ,
I was the mounted officer who accompanied General
Warren on that occasion. I went with Colonel O'Rorke
and your regiment to the top of the hill, where you at
once became engaged with the enemy, who had almost
reached the crest of the hill during the short interval
which elapsed before we met your regiment, after we came
down from the hill where the signal officer was. I had
been on the summit of Little Round Top for half an hour
with the signal officer, before we rushed down to call on
you for help.
I left Colonel O'Rorke as soon as he went into battle,
and started with a message to General Meade, to inform
him of what had been done. I passed through the re
mainder of Weed's brigade and along the line of troops
lying on the Peach Orchard road, who were already en
gaged with the enemy, and it seemed to me, before I had
passed from one end of the line to the other, they had lost
half their members, showing the severity of this onset and
also the shortness of its duration, because it was all over in
half an hour.
Vincent's brigade was to the back and left of the One
Hundred and Fortieth regiment. They were marching
through the woods, and arrived just in time to check the
head of the rebel advance, which was coming up the ravine
between the two Round Tops, but they did not become gen-

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 331
erally engaged until after your regiment had made its on
slaught on the rebels.
So far as my memory serves me, your account is accurate
in every respect, even down to very minute details which
could only have been seen by two or three persons.
The tugging of the horses and men to get those guns up
the hill, I remember as if it were yesterday.
If there are any points on which your memory may have
failed you, I shall be happy to help you if I can. A slight
hint sometimes brings up a whole chain of forgotten
events. Yours very truly,
W. A. Roebling.
The statements by the historians about the battle for the
possession of Little Round Top are so contradictory that
their inaccuracy is evident. The discovery by me, a few
months ago, of these letters from General Warren, and
Captain Farley's consent to their publication, led to the
preparation of this book. If any further evidence is needed
to show that the historians were misinformed, these let
ters furnish the proof. They were not written in any
spirit of controversy. They were not written with any
thought of their publication. Had Warren lived until some
or all of these histories were published he might have had
something to say about the matter; but he died in 1882.
It is nearly half a century since the battle of Gettysburg
was fought. An earnest effort to relate the true story of
Little Round Top justifies the publication of these letters.
They prove by direct statement, or by fair inference :
First: That Warren was at the signal station on Lit
tle Round Top before the Confederate infantry or artillery
made its appearance in front of Birney's line, and that he
remained there until the arrival of Weed's brigade, which
was then passing over the low ridge at the north end of
Little Round Top into the Plum Run valley, on its way to

332 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
reinforce Sickles, when he left the hill and detached from
that brigade the One Hundred and Fortieth New York,
which was the rear regiment of the brigade, sent it to the
crest of the hill with one of his staff, Lieutenant Roebling,
to conduct it to its position, while the remainder of the
brigade continued its march to the front. Warren did not
return to the hill, but rode away to join General Meade.
Second: That he did not go to Sykes and Barnes; that
he did not detach Vincent's brigade and conduct it to its
position on the southern slope of Little Round Top; that
he did not see Vincent's brigade come up; that he used his
aides, Lieutenants Mackenzie and Reese, in sending for
troops to occupy the hill.
Third : That Warren, being unable to see the location of
Vincent's brigade from his point of observation, knew very
little, at the time, of the fight which Vincent's men made
there, but later recognized its importance and gave full
credit to Vincent.
The reader will find in these letters abundant evidence of
Warren's generous spirit, with no attempt to claim for him
self all the glory.
The statement in Lieutenant Roebling's letter that Vin
cent's brigade did not become generally engaged until after
O'Rorke's regiment had made its onslaught on the rebels,
is a mistake. The attack on Vincent's right flank was not
made until the troops which made it had been repulsed sev
eral times in assaults on Vincent's front and left. Roebling
was with Warren near the signal station, and neither of
them heard the noise of the fighting about Vincent's posi
tion, for reasons which I have stated elsewhere.

GENERAL JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN

Facing Page 332

VIII
APPOMATTOX
It seems fitting to close this account of a portion of the
battle of Gettysburg, the high tide of the conflict for the
preservation of the Union, with a description of the last
scene between the Army of the Potomac and the Army of
Northern Virginia, written by one of the regimental com
manders at Little Round Top, who served to the end of the
war and had the honor of commanding the parade which
received the formal surrender of Lee's army.
This paper was read by General Chamberlain several
years ago at a reunion of the survivors of the old brigade,
and is published by the kind permission of its author. It
is entitled,
The Third Brigade At Appomattox
At two o'clock on the morning of April 9, 1865, the
Third brigade, after a feverish march of twenty-nine miles,
came to a halt, the rear brigade of the division column,
which on such occasions has the hardest place of all. Worn
out, body and spirit, by the vexations of a forced march
over a course blocked every half hour by the nondescript
and unaccountable obstacles of a lagging column in the
road ahead, men made few preliminaries about " going
!into camp." That peculiar ingredient of humanity called
the nervous system held an imperious precedence, not only
over mind and matter, but over army regulations and disci
pline. There was no voice and ear for roll-calls, and even
the command of empty stomachs did not avail with habit
or instinct to grope among the jumbled remnants of the
333

334 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
too familiar haversacks. Officers and men alike flung
themselves right and left along the roadside, whether it
were bank or ditch, in whatever order or disorder the col
umn had halted. Horses and riders exchanged positions,
the patient animals, with slackened girths, dozing with
drooping head just over the faces of their masters. In an
instant, as it were, the struggling, straggling hosts were
wrapped in misty darkness and silence.
But suddenly and soon the bugles rang out " The Gen
eral ! " Orders came to march within an hour's time.
Word had come from Sheridan that he was at Appomattox
Station, and that if we could hurry up he could cut the
head of Lee's column, then near Appomattox Court House.
Such a summons itself gave something of the strength it
demanded. Spirit triumphed over body, and seemed to be
on the alert before the latter could fully recover its senses.
The time given was intended to provide for a meal, but
that required also material, which indeed was now so simple
as to quality and quantity as to make choice no task. Some
of the younger regiments of the division were seen light
ing dismal little fires to fry salt pork or steep some musty,
sodden coffee. The Third brigade, made up of veterans,
spared their strength until the last for severer exercises.
But this time patience did not attain to its perfect work.
While sitting on their heels munching crumbs of hard tack
and watching the coffee gradually " taking water," so as
to produce a black liquid which could be sipped from the
black tin dipper, word suddenly came that the Third bri
gade was to take the head of the column, and must pull out
at once. The glimmering daybreak made still more weird
the scenes and sounds which betokened that untimely de
parture, and the glimmering breakfasts must have evoked
similar wild sensations for the benighted stomachs of the
Third brigade. But a brisk march with a fight at the end
was the best medicine for such a mood.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 335
In three hours we were at Appomattox Station, and then
learned that Sheridan, with the cavalry, had pushed on to
Appomattox Court House, leaving word for us to follow
with all possible dispatch. Indeed, there was no need of
orders to this effect, for we now began to hear the boom
of cannon ahead, and we knew that Sheridan and our glo
rious cavalry had cut across Lee's last line of retreat.
Every heart beat high. No " obstacles " hindered that
march. The head of the Fifth corps ran past the rear of
the Twenty-fourth, which had had the advance in the or
der of march. It was a triple column. The roads were
taken mostly by whatever was to go on wheels, the men of
both corps pressing along the fields on each side. We
were evidently so near the " front " that General Bartlett
thought it time to throw forward a " division " skirmish
line, which he and General Griffin followed with character
istic eagerness. I was following with my own brigade and
the Second (Gregory's), when there dashed out of a farm
road on our right an officer of General Sheridan's staff,
who gave me a hurried order to break off from the column
at once, without waiting for communication with any im
mediate superiors, and hasten to the support of Sheri
dan, who was that moment forced to fall back somewhat
before the desperate onset of Gordon's old " Stonewall
Corps." Now it was the " double-quick," indeed. This move
ment, of course, brought me on the ground our cavalry
occupied, and on the enemy's left flank, at nearly the same
time at which our skirmish line had struck them in their
proper front, the direction of the Lynchburg Pike. Reach
ing the ground, I wheeled into double line of battle and
gradually replaced our cavalry, which galloped off to our
right, while the Third brigade still poured in upon my left.
In this way we pressed the enemy steadily back upon Ap
pomattox Court House. There was gallant and wild work

336 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
done there by the Third brigade, as well as by the rest of
the division.
Gordon had hoped to force his way through our cavalry
before our infantry could get up, and reach Lynchburg with
the resolute remnant of his famous old corps. But when
there burst upon his front and flank these lines of ours they
knew so well, that had so unexpectedly kept pace with the
cavalry and marched around his retreating front, desper
ately as he had pressed his march, the veterans of Lee's
army took in the situation as by instinct. Their resist
ance was mechanical and by force of habit or discipline.
Their old dash and daring were gone. When our ad
vance struck them at close quarters, they fell back in dis
order or rendered themselves up as prisoners. As an ex
ample of this feeling, all that was left of an entire brigade
surrendered to a single staff officer of the Third brigade,
who dashed up to them with the demand. It may well be
believed that our men also were responsive to the logic
of the situation. The end was now so near they could see
through to it, and they were bound to " be there " them
selves. Action there was of the most stirring kind, but of
passion nothing. No man wantonly or in excitement struck
at the life of his antagonist. It was an example of what is
so strangely, and for want of an adequate word, called a
" moral " effect.
When in the heat of the onset the flag of truce was seen
coming in on our right, some deeper, inner sense seemed to
stifle all the others. All was moving with such momen
tum, that when the order came at length to cease firing and
to halt, it was next to impossible to stop the men. They
saw well that we held the rebel army at bay, and what the
consequence must soon be they did not need to be told ; only
whatever was to be done, they wanted to be there and have
a hand in it. If there was anything to be seen, they had
earned the right to front seats at the spectacle. But when

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 337
at about four o'clock in the afternoon the brief, thrilling
message was passed along the lines, " Lee surrenders ! "
there was a tumult as of an ocean let loose. Men went
wild with the sweeping energies of that assurance, which
answered so much of long-cherished hope and of long-en
dured suffering that had marked their loyal and brave
career. Now that they were no longer allowed to go forward
and did not know how to go backward, there was no direc
tion left but to go upward, and that way they took — to the
top of fences, haystacks, roofs, and chimneys, that they
might send their hallelujahs and toss their old caps higher
toward heaven. The rebels over across the slender rivulets
of the Appomattox were shouting their side of the jubila
tion, from whatever cause, whether cheering Lee as he rode
over to speak a last word to them, or whether in deep truth
they were heartily sick of the war and felt that their loyal
spirit and manly energies were wasted in a hopeless and
perhaps mistaken cause. There is reason to believe the lat
ter feeling was the motive of their exuberant demonstra
tion, whose echoes rolled along the hillsides long after all
was silent in our bivouac. For toward evening some of
the rations that had been promised us for distribution at
nine o'clock that morning, and from which we had double-
quicked away, had now got up, and we could finish our
breakfasts before lying down in peace at the close of that
eventful day; and a certain deeper peace was ours, in that
learning now of the starving condition of our surrender
ing foes, twenty thousand rations were sent over just as
the day was done, into that camp of fellow-countrymen
we had restored to brotherhood. Fitting token and em
blem of the spirit in which that victory was won and that
day ended! Here too was possibly one reason for the
cheering that echoed in our ears as we fell asleep on that
Palm Sunday evening.

338 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
All the next day, and the day after, measures were being
determined as to the actual breaking up of Lee's army, and
the return of ours. Grant and Lee had not lingered, after
the main points were settled, nor indeed was Sheridan seen
again on the field. Generals Griffin, Gibbon, and Merritt
were appointed commissioners to arrange the final details.
All this while the visiting fever and the exchanging of
tokens and souvenirs ran wild through both armies.
Stringent measures had to be taken to prevent utter con
fusion in both camps, especially in ours, as it seemed to be
understood that we were the hosts, and it was our " at
home " reception. This spirit of exchange shortly passed
into the spirit of trade; for our rations, after the best was
done, were very short, and for three days afterwards it be
came necessary to forage the country far and wide to get
even raw corn enough for man and beast. So the market
" went up " decidedly on all sorts of farm produce. Hard
tack was a luxury, and coffee and sugar at a high pre
mium. How or why it came about, I do not know, but on the
evening of the ioth of April I was summoned to headquar
ters, and informed that I was to command the parade which
was to receive the formal surrender of the arms and colors
of the rebel army the next morning. This was an order,
and to be received and obeyed without question. One re
quest only I ventured to make of my corps commander. It
was that, considering this occasion, I might resume com
mand of my old brigade, the Third, from which I had been
transferred in June, 1864, with which I had served up to
that time since my entrance into the service. My request
was granted, and on that evening I yielded the command of
my gallant First brigade, and went back to my veterans.
General Grant was a magnanimous man, great-minded
and large-minded. He would have nothing done for show
and no vain ceremony. He granted to officers the high

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 339
privilege of retaining their swords, and all men who owned
their horses were made welcome to keep them, as they
would need them to plow their land.- The rebels had
begged to be spared the pain of actually laying down their
arms and colors in the presence of our troops, and to be
permitted to stack them in front of their own camps and
march off, and let us go and pick them up after they had
gone. But this would be to err too far on the side of
mildness. So it was insisted that, while the surrendering
army should be spared all that could humiliate their man
hood, yet the insignia of the rebellion and the tokens of the
power and will to hurt, lifted against the country's honor
and life, must be laid down in due military form in pres
ence of a designated portion of our army.
This latter office fell to our lot. It gave us, no doubt,
a grateful satisfaction and permitted a modest pride, but it
was not accepted as a token that we surpassed our com
rades in merit of any kind.
We formed our line of battle on the southern margin of
the principal street in Appomattox Court House. Massa
chusetts on the right — her Thirty-second regiment, with
all that was left to us of her Ninth, Eighteenth, and
Twenty-second ; then Maine — her Twentieth regiment,
with the delivered remnant of her Second and her First
Sharpshooters ; Michigan next — her Sixteenth, with inter-
minglings of her First and Fourth. On the left Pennsyl
vania' — her One Hundred and Fifty-fifth holding also
filaments which bound us with the Sixty-second, Eighty-
third, Ninety-first, and One Hundred and Eighteenth, an
immortal band, which held in it the soul of the famous
" Light Brigade," and of the stern old First division, Por
ter's, which was nucleus of the Fifth corps, men among
them who had fired the first shot at Yorktown, and others
that had fired the last at Appomattox, and who thus bore
upon their banners all the battles of that army.

340 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
By the courtesy of General Bartlett the First brigade,
which I had so long commanded, and the Second, which
had been with me in this last campaign, were sent to me
and held part in the parade, being formed on another line
across the street and facing us. These were, with the ex
ception of the One Hundred and Ninety-eighth Pennsyl
vania, composed of New York regiments, — the One Hun
dred and Eighty-fifth, One Hundred and Eighty-seventh,
One Hundred and Eighty-eighth, and One Hundred and
Eighty-ninth, — which in severe service had made them
selves veterans worthy the fellowship of those sterling old
New York regiments that had fulfilled their time and fame.
Names and figures, all of these, dear to every heart that
had shared their eventful and glorious history.
As we stood there in the morning mist, straining our eyes
toward that camp about to break up for the last march, a
feeling came over our hearts which led us to make some ap
propriate recognition of this great, last meeting.
We could not content ourselves with simply standing in
line and witnessing this crowning scene. So instructions
were sent to the several commanders that at the given sig
nals, as the head of each division of the surrendering col
umn approached their right, they should in succession bring
their men to " attention " and arms to the " carry," then re
suming the " ordered arms " and the " parade rest." And
now we see the little shelter tents on the opposite slope melt
ing away and carefully folded, being things which were
needed by men as men and not as tokens of rebellion.
Soon the gray masses are in motion — once more toward
us — as in the days that were gone. A thrilling sight.
First, Gordon, with the " Stonewall Corps " ; then their
First corps, — Longstreet's, — no less familiar to us and to
fame; then Anderson, with his new Fourth corps; and
lastly, A. P. Hill's corps, commanded now by Heth, since
Hill had fallen at one of the river fights a few days before.

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 341
On they come with careless, swinging route step, the col
umn thick with battle flags, disproportionate to their de
pleted numbers. As they come opposite our right our
bugle sounds the signal, repeated along our line. Each
organization comes to " attention," and thereupon takes up
successively the " carry." The gallant General Gordon, at
the head of the marching column, outdoes us in courtesy.
He was riding with downcast eyes and more than pensive
look; but at this clatter of arms he raises his eyes and, in
stantly catching the significance, wheels his horse with that
superb grace of which he is master, drops the point of his
sword to his stirrup, gives a command, at which the great
Confederate ensign following him is dipped, and his deci
mated brigades, as they reach our right, respond to the
" carry." All the while on our part not a sound of
trumpet or drum, not a cheer, nor word nor motion of man,
but awful stillness, as if it were the passing of the dead.
Now and then a gust of wind would spring up from the
south with strange greeting; our starry ensigns stiffen and
fly out as if to welcome back the returning brothers. The
ensigns of rebellion seem to shrink back and strain away
from the fated farewell.
So a division at a time covers our front. They halt,
face inward, some ten paces from us ; carefully " dress "
their lines, each captain as careful of his alignment as if at
a dress parade. Then they fix bayonets, stack arms, then
wearily remove their cartridge-boxes and hang them on the
pile; lastly, reluctantly, painfully, they furl their battle-
stained flags and lay them down; some, unable to restrain
themselves, rushing from the ranks, clinging to them,
kneeling over them and kissing them with burning tears.
And then the Flag of the Union floats alone upon the
field. Then, stripped of every sign of the rebellion and token
of its hate and will to hurt, they march off to give their

342 THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF
word of honor never to lift arms against the old flag again,
and are free to go where they will in the broad Republic.
Thus division after division passes, and it takes the whole
day long to complete this deliverance. Twenty-seven thou
sand men paroled, one hundred and forty cannon and near
that number of battle flags surrendered, but only about
seventeen thousand stand of small arms. For sometimes
a whole brigade, or what was left of it, had scarcely a
score of arms to surrender, having thrown them away by
roadside and riverside in weariness of flight or hopelessness
of heart, or disdaining to carry them longer, only to be
taken from them in token of a lost cause. After this it
remained only to gather up what was serviceable of this
material of war and to destroy the rest. Nothing was left
which could be turned to use against the Union armies.
The cartridge-boxes were emptied on the ground for the
most part, burned, and after the troops had withdrawn,
at the first dusk of evening, it was a weird and almost sad
sight to see the running flame with frequent bursts of lurid
explosion along the lines where the surrendering army had
stood ; then only bits of leather writhing in the gray ashes.
All was over. With the dawn of morning the hillsides
were alive with men, in groups or singly, on foot or horse,
making their way as by the instinct of an ant, each with his
own little burden, each for his own little harbor or home.
And we were left alone and lonesome! The familiar
forms that had long so firmly held our eyes, until they al
most demanded the sight of them for their daily satisfac
tion, had vanished like a dream. The very reason of our
existence seemed to have been taken away. And when on
the morrow we took up our march again, though home
ward, something was lacking in the spring and spice which
had enlivened us through even the dreariest times. To be
sure, the war was not over yet, but we felt that the dis
tinctive work of the old Third brigade was over. We were

LITTLE ROUND TOP, GETTYSBURG 343
soon to be mustered out; but never to be again as if the
Third brigade had not become a part of our lives ; a part of
our souls. There were " thoughts that ran before and
after," memories of things that cannot be told, and new
purposes of manly living and hopes of useful service yet, in
visions of a broader citizenship and the career of an en
franchised country.

INDEX

INDEX

Appomattox— Third Brigade at,
333-343-
Army of the Potomac, History
of," see Stine.
Ayres, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B.,
Second Division, see, Re
ports, Official.
Barnes, Brig.-Gen. James, see Re
ports, Official.
"Battles and Leaders of the Civil
War," see Hunt, General
Henry J.
Beecham, Captain R. K., "Gettys
burg, the Pivotal Battle
of the Civil War," 67-76.
— commentary on, 76-77.
Benning's Brigade, see Reports,
Official.
Birney, General D. B., official re
port quoted, 43-44.
Bulger, Colonel, surrender of, 93,
H3, 149.
"Campaigns op the Army of the
Potomac," see Swinton.
Case, Lieutenant A. P., Notes on
Taking and Holding Lit
tle Round Top, 296-302.
— commentary on, 302.
— Farley, Captain Porter on, 302*-
3<H.
Chamberlain, Col. Joshua L.,
Twentieth Maine In
fantry, see Reports, Offi
cial.
— General Grant's Appointment of,
as brigadier general, 273,
note.
— on the Third Brigade at Ap
pomattox, 333, 343.
— quoted, 91.
"Chancellorsville and Gettysburg,"
see Doubleday, General
Abner. 347

"Civil War in America, The," see
Paris, Comte de.
Confederate Official Reports, see
Reports, Official.
Connor, Lieut-Col. Freeman,
Forty-fourth New York
Infantry, see Reports,
Official.
Crawford, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W.,
Third Division, see Re-
ports, Official.
Doubleday, General Abner "Chan
cellorsville and Gettys
burg," 20-22.
— commentary on, 22-23.
Eighty-Third Pennsylvania In
fantry, see Woodward,
Reports, Official.
Farley, Captain Porter, Letters of
Comte de Paris to, 304-
306.
— Military record, 290-291.
— "Number Nine," 125-140.
— commentary on, 140.
Fifteenth Alabama Infantry, see
Reports, Official.
"Fifth Army Corps, The," see
Powell, Lieutenant Colo
nel William H.
Fifth Texas Infantry, see Reports,
Official.
First Brigade, see Tilton, Reports,
Official.
— Texas Infantry, see Reports,
Official.
Fisher, Col. Joseph W., Third
Brigade, see Reports,
Official.
Forty-fourth Alabama Infantry,
see Reports, Official.
— New York Infantry, see Con
nor, Reports, Official.

348

INDEX

Forty-seventh Alabama Infantry,
see Reports, Official.
Forty-eighth Alabama Infantry,
official report, 141-142.
Fourth Alabama Infantry, see Re
ports, Official.
— Texas Infantry, see Reports,
Official.
"Four Years with the Army of
the Potomac," see Tro
briand, General Regis de.
Garrard, Col. Kenner, Third Bri
gade, see Reports, Official.
Geary, General, official report
quoted, 43.
"Gettysburg, the Pivotal Battle of
the Civil War," see
Beecham.
"Gettysburg Then and Now," see
Vanderslice.
Griffin, Brig.-Gen. Charles, see Re
ports, Official.
Hood, Major-General, report
quoted, 80-83.
Humphreys, General A. A., official
report quoted, 44.
Hunt, General Henry j, Battles
and Leaders of the Civil
War," 39-40.
— commentary on, 40.
Introduction, ii.
Law, General E. M., "The Strug
gle for Round Top,"—
"Battles and Leaders in
the Civil War," 1 14-123.
—commentary on, 123-12*5.
Law's Brigade, see Reports, Offi
cial.
Letters and Papers —
— Mackenzie, Lieutenant, to Gen
eral Meade, 292.
— Notes on Taking and Holding
Little Round Top, 296-302.
—commentary on, 302.
 Farley, Captain Porter on, 302.
— Paris, Comte de, to Captain
Porter Farley, 304-306.
— Roebling, Lieutenant W. A., 330.

Letters and Papers —
— Sykes, General, 293-295.
 commentary on, 295-296.
—Warren, 307-329*
Little Round Top, Notes on Tak
ing and Holding, 296-302.
— commentary on, 302-304.
— Farley, Captain Porter on, 302.
Longstreet, General, quoted, 85,
102.
Mackenzie, Lieutenant, letter of
to General Meade, 292.
Meade, General, Circular to Army,
127-128.
— letter of Lieutenant Mackenzie
to, 292.
Nash, Captain, quoted, 89.
"Number Nine," see Farley.
Oates, Colonel William C, "The
War Between the Union
and the Confederacy," 77-
110.
—commentary on, 110-113.
Official Reports, see Reports, Offi
cial.
O'Rorke, Colonel Patrick H.,
Sketch of, 288-290.
— Death, Warren letter on, 321.
Paris, Comte de, Letters of to
Captain Porter Farley,
304-306.
— "The Civil War in America,"
23-30.
 commentary on, 30-38.
Perry, Colonel W. F., quoted, 107-
110.
Powell, Lieutenant-Colonel Wil
liam H., "The Fifth Army
Corps," 42-54.
— commentary on, 55-57.
Prince, Captain Howard L.,
quoted, 90.
Reports, Official, Confederate—
— Benning's Brigade, 167-171.
 Benning, Brig.-Gen. Henry L.,
167-171.
 commentary on, 180-181.
— Law's Brigade, 141-149.
 commentary on, 171 et seq.

INDEX

349

Reports, Official, Confederate—
 'Fifteenth Alabama Infantry,
144-146.
—  commentary on, 175.
—¦—Fourth Alabama Infantry, 14Z-
144.
 commentary on, 173.
—4— Forty-fourth Alabama Infan
try, 146-148.
 commentary on, 175.
 Forty-seventh Alabama
fan try, 148- 149.
 commentary on, 176.
— — Forty-eighth Alabama
fantry, 141-142.

In-

In-

-commentary on, 172.

— Robertson's Brigade, 149-166.
— i — Robertson, Brig.-Gen. J. B.,
I49-I5S-
—  commentary on, 177.
 Fifth Texas Infantry, 163-166.
 ^commentary on, 179.
 First Texas Infantry, 156-161.
•commentary on, 178.

-Fourth Texas Infantry, 161
162.
-commentary on, 178.

 Third Arkansas Infantry, 155-
156.
—  commentary on, 177-178.
Reports, Official, Union —
 commentary on, 236.
— Ayres, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B.,
Second Division, 222-223.
 commentary on, 246.
 .Barnes, Brig.-Gen. James, 186-
197.
 commentary on, 240-241.
— Chamberlain, Col. Joshua L.,
Twentieth Maine Infan
try, 210-2-18.
 commentary on, 242.
— Connor, Lieut. Col. Freeman,
Forty-fourth New York
Infantry, 220-221.
 commentary on, 245-246.
— Crawford, Brig.-Gen. Samuel
W., Third Division, 226-7,
232.
 commentary on, 2*48-249.
— Fisher, Col. Joseph W., Third
Brigade, 232-234.

Reports, Official, Union —
 commentary on, 249-252.
— Garrard, Col. Kenner, Third
Brigade (Weed's), 223-
225.
 commentary on, 247-248.
— Griffin, Brig.-Gen. Charles, 186.
— Rice, Col. James C, Third Bri
gade, 205-210.
 commentary on, 242*.
— Stoughton, Maj. Homer R.,
Third Army Corps, 234-
236.
— Sweitzer, Col. Jacob B., Second
Brigade, 199-205.
 commentary on, 241.
— Sykes, Maj.-Gen. George, 181-
186.
 commentary on, 236.
—Tilton, Col. William S., First
Brigade, 197-199.
 commentary on, 241.
— Weed's Brigade, see Garrard.
—Welch, Lieut-Col. Norval E.,
Sixteenth Michigan, 218-
220.
 commentary on, 242.
— Woodward, Capt. Orpheus S.,
Eighty-third Pennsylvania
Infantry, 221-222.
— — commentary on, 246.
Rice, Col. James G, Third Bri
gade, see Reports, Official.
Robertson, Brigade, see Re
ports, Official.
Roebling, Lieutenant W. A., letter
of, 330.
Round Top, Attack and Defense
of, 253-275.
— Attack, the, 253-262.
—Defense, the, 262-275.
"Round Top, The Struggle for,"
see Law.
"Second Army Corps, History
of," see Walker, General
Francis A.
Second Brigade, see Sweitzer, Re
ports, Official.
Sixteenth Michigan, see Welch,
Reports, Official.

35°

INDEX

Stine, J. H., "History of the Army
of the Potomac," 60-65.
— commentary on, 65-66.
Stoughton, Maj. Homer R., Third
Army Corps, see Reports,
Official.
Sweitzer, Col. James B., Second
Brigade, see Reports,
Official.
Swinton, William, "Campaigns of
the Army of the Po
tomac," 16-18.
— commentary on, 18-20.
Sykes, Maj. Gen. George, see Re
ports, Official.
— letter of, 293-295.
— commentary on, 29<:-2g6.
Third Army Brigade, see Rice
and Stoughton, Reports,
Official.
— Arkansas Infantry, see Reports,
Official.
 at Appomattox, 333-343-
— Brigade, see Garrard, Reports,
Official.
Tilton, Col. William S., see Re
ports, Official.
Trobriand, General Regis de,
"Four years with the
Army of the Potomac,"
41-42.
— commentary on, 42.
Twentieth Maine Infantry, see
Chamberlain, Reports, Of
ficial.
Union Official Reports, see Re
ports, official.
Vanderslice, J. M., "Gettysburg
Then and Now," 57-59.
— commentary on, 59-60.

Vincent, Brigadier-General Strong,
281-285.
— Letters concerning, and his Bri
gade at Gettysburg, 285-
288.
 Butterfield, Major General
Daniel, 286.
 Chamberlain, Major-General
Joshua L., 286.
 Eliot, Charles W., Harvard
University, 287.
 Longstreet, General James,
288.
 Spear, General Ellis, 287.
Vincent's Brigade, see Rice, Re
ports, Official.

Walker, General Francis A.,
"History of the Second
Army Corps," 38-39.
— commentary on, 39.
"War Between the Union and the
Confederacy," see Oates.
Warren, General Gouverneur
Kemble, 276-281.
—letters, 307-329-
— commentary on, 331-332.
— ¦ — Farley, Captain Porter on,
317, 321.
 quoted, 130-132.
Weed's Brigade, see Garrard, Re
ports, Official.
Welch, Lieut.-Col. Norval E., Six
teenth Michigan, see Re
ports, Official.
Wilderness, Battle of, Warren let
ter on, 326.
Woodward, Capt. Orpheus S.,
Third Pennsylvania In
fantry, see Reports, Offi
cial.

YALE UNIVERSITY

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