YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 21 $t0tor£ BY JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY, D.C.L., LL.D CORRESPONDINO MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, ETC. IN THREE VOLUMES Vol. III. NEW YORK HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS FRANKLIN SQUARE Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, by John Lothrop Motlet, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts. Copyright, 1883, by Elizabeth Cabot Vernon Harcourt, Mart Lothrop Sheridan, Susan Margaret Stackpole Motlet. THE EISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. CHAPTEE III. Latter days of the Blood Council — Informal and insincere negotiations for peace — Characteristics of the negotiators and of their diplomatic correspondence — Dr. Junius — Secret conferences between Dr. Leoninus and Orange — Steadfastness of the Prince — Changes in the internal government of the northern provinces — Generosity and increasing power of the municipali ties — Incipient jealousy in regard to Orange rebuked — His offer of resig nation refused by the Estates — His elevation to almost unlimited power — Renewed mediation of Maximilian — Views and positions of the par ties — Advice of Orange — Opening of negotiations at Breda — Propositions and counter-propositions — Adroitness of the plenipotentiaries on both sides — Insincere diplomacy and unsatisfactory results — Union of Holland and Zealand under the Prince of Orange — Act defining his powers — Charlotte de Bourbon — Character, fortunes, and fate of Anna of Saxony — Marriage of Orange with Mademoiselle de Bourbon — Indignation thereby excited — Horrible tortures inflicted upon Papists by Sonoy in North Hol land — Oudewater and Schoonoven taken by Hierges — The isles of Zealand — A submarine expedition projected — Details of the adventure — Its entire success — Death of Chiappin Titelli — Deliberations in Holland and Zealand concerning the renunciation of Philip's authority — Declaration at Delft — Doubts as to which of the Great Powers the sovereignty should be offered — Secret international relations — Mission to England — Unsatisfactory nego tiations with Elizabeth — Position of the Grand Commander — Siege of Zie- rickzee — Generosity of Count John — Desperate project of the Prince — Death and character of Requesens. The Council of Troubles, or, as it will he for ever denomi nated in history, the Council of Blood, still existed, although the Grand Commander, upon his arrival in the Netherlands, vol. ni. 1 2 THE KISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1574, had advised his sovereign to consent to the immediate aboh tion of so odious an institution.* Phihp accepting the advice of his governor and his cabinet, had accordingly authorized him by a letter of the 10th of March, 1574, to take that step if he continued to beheve it advisable.f Requesens had made use of this permission to extort money from the obedient portion of the provinces. An assembly of deputies was held at Brussels on the 7th of June, 1574, and there was a tedious interchange of protocols, reports, and re monstrances. + The estates, not satisfied with the extinction of a tribunal which had at last worn itself out by its own violence, and had become inactive through lack of victims, insisted on greater concessions. They demanded the departure of the Spanish troops, the establishment of ' a council of Netherlanders in Spain for Netherland affairs, the restoration to offices in the provinces, of natives and natives only ;§ for these drawers of documents thought it possible, at that epoch, to recover by pedantry what their brethren of HoUand and Zealand were maintaining with the sword. It was not the moment for historical disquisition, citations from Solomon, nor chopping of logic ; yet with such lucubrations were reams of paper filled, and days and weeks occupied. || The result was what might have been expected. The Grand Commander. obtained but little money ; the estates obtained none of their demands ; and the Blood Council remained, as it were, sus pended in mid-air. It continued to transact business at in tervals during the administration of Requesens,^" and at last, after nine years of existence, was destroyed by the violent imprisonment of the Council of State at Brussels. This event, however, belongs to a subsequent page of this history. Noircarrnes had argued, from the tenor of Saint Aldegonde's letters, that the Prince would be ready to accept his pardon * Lettre de Requesens a Philippe II., Dec. 30, 1613, apud Gachard, Notice, etc., 24. f Gachard, Notice, etc., 24, 26. \ Bor, viii. 517-523, seq. § Ibid. J Vide Bor, vii. 517-523, seq. % Gachard, Notice, etc., 21, 28, and note, p. 21. 1574.] NEGOTIATIONS. 3 upon almost any terms.* Noircarmes was now dead,f but Saint Aldegonde still remained in prison, very anxious for his release, and as well disposed as ever to render services in any secret negotiation. It will be recoUected that, at the capitulation of Middelburg, it had been distinctly stipulated by the Prince that Colonel Mondragon should at once effect the liberation of Saint Aldegonde, with certain other pri soners, or himself return into confinement. He had done neither the one nor the other. The patriots still languished in prison, some of them being subjected to exceedingly harsh treatment, but Mondragon, although repeatedly summoned as an officer and a gentleman, by the Prince, to return to captivity, had been forbidden by the Grand Commander to redeem his pledge.J Saint Aldegonde was now released from prison upon parole, and despatched on a secret mission to the Prince and estates.§ As before, he was instructed that two points were to be left un touched — -the authority of the King and the question of reli gion. || Nothing could be more preposterous than to commence a negotiation from which the two important points were thus carefuUy eliminated. The King's authority and the question of rehgion covered the whole ground upon which the Spaniards and the HoUanders had been battling for six years, and were destined to battle for three-quarters of a century longer. Yet, although other affairs might be discussed, those two points were to be reserved for the more conclusive arbitration of gun powder. The result of negotiations upon such a basis was easily to be foreseen. Breath, time, and paper were pro fusely wasted and nothing gained. The Prince assured his friend, as he had done secret agents previously sent to him, * Correspondance de Guillaume le Tacit., iii. 369-373. f He died March 4th, 1574, at Utrecht, of poison, according to suspicion. — Bor, vii. 492. % Vide Gachard, Correspondance de Guillaume le Tacit, iii. DXLnr. dxlit. dlxv. — Compare Groen van Prinst., Archives, etc., v. 71, 72. § Bor, vii. 634. Gachard, Correspondance de Guillaume le Tacit., iii. 400, seq. [ Ibid. Ibid. 4 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1574. that he was himself ready to leave the land, if by so doing he could confer upon it the blessing of peace ;* but that all hopes of reaching a reasonable conclusion from the premises established was futile. The envoy treated also with the estates, and received from them in return an elaborate report, which was addressed immediately to the King.f The style of this paper was bold and blunt, its substance bitter and indigestible. It informed Philip what he had heard often enough before, that the Spaniards must go and the exiles come back, the in quisition be abolished and the ancient privileges restored, the Roman Catholic religion renounce its supremacy, and the Re formed religion receive permission to exist unmolested, before he could call himself master of that little hook of sand in the North Sea. With this paper, which was entrusted to Saint Aldegonde, by him to be delivered to the Grand Commander, who was, after reading it, to forward it to its destination, the negotiator returned to his prison.^ Thence he did not emerge again tiU the course of events released him, upon the 15th of October, 1574.§ This report was far from agreeable to the Governor, and it became the object of a fresh correspondence between his confidential agent, Champagny, and the learned and astute Junius de Jonge, representative of the Prince of Orange and Governor of Veere,|| The communication of De Jonge con sisted of a brief note and a long discourse. The note was sharp and stinging, the discourse elaborate and somewhat pedantic. Unnecessarily historical and unmercifully extended, it was yet bold, bitter, and eloquent. The presence of foreigners was proved to have been, from the beginning of Philip's reign, the curse of the country. Doctor Sonnius, with * "Quant a luy il e'toit content, si ceulx la le treuvoient bon de se retirer du pays, afin que tant mieulx ilz puissent parvenir a ce que dessus," etc.— Gachard, Guillaume le Tacit., iii. 400. f Bor, vii. 635. % See the " Vertooning" in Bor, vii. 535, seq. § Gachard, Guillaume le Tacit., iii. 101. Bor, vii. J See the Correspondence in Bor, vii. 535, 536. 1574.] SECRET CONFERENCES. 5 his batch of bishops, had sowed the seed of the first disorder. A prince, ruling in the Netherlands, had no right to turn a deaf ear to the petitions of his subjects. If he did eo, the Hollanders would tell him, as the old woman had told the Emperor Adrian, that the potentate who had no time to attend to the interests of his subjects, had not leisure enough to be a sovereign. WhUe HoUand refused to bow its neck to the Inquisition, the King of Spain dreaded the thunder and Ughtning of the Pope. The Hollanders would, with pleasure, emancipate Philip from his own thraldom, but it was absurd that he, who was himself a slave to another potentate, should affect unlimited control over a free people. It was PhUip's councillors, not the Hollanders, who were his real enemies ; for it was they who held him in the- subjection by which his power was neutralized and his crown degraded.* It may be supposed that many long pages, conceived in this spirit and expressed with great vigor, would hardly smooth the way for the more official negotiations which were soon to take place, yet Doctor Junius fairly and faithfully represented the sentiment of his nation. ' Towards the close of the year, Doctor Elbertus Leoninus, professor of Louvain, together with Hugo Bonte, ex-pensionary of Middelburg, was commissioned by the Grand Commander to treat secretly with the Prince.f He was, however, not found very tractable when the commissioners opened the sub ject of his own pardon and reconciliation with the King, and he absolutely refused to treat at aU except with the co operation of the estates.^ He, moreover, objected to the use of the word " pardon " on the ground that he had never done anything requiring his Majesty's forgiveness. If adversity should visit him, he cared but httle for it ; he had lived long enough, he said, and should die with some glory, regretting * See the discourse of Junius in Bor, vii. 536-544. f The letters and documents concerning this secret negotiation are published in Gachard, Guillaume le Tacit, iii. 403 — 430. See also Bor, vii. 585. X See the account by Bonte, in Gachard. Correspondance de Guillaume le Tacit, iii. 378, 379. 6 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1574 the disorders and oppressions which had taken place, but con scious that it had not been in his power to remedy them. When reminded by the commissioners of the King's power, he replied that he knew his Majesty to be very mighty, but that there was a King more powerful stdl — even God the Creator, who, as he humbly hoped, was upon his side.* At a subsequent interview with Hugo Bonte, the Prince declared it almost impossible for himself or the estates to hold any formal communication with the Spanish government, as such communications were not safe. No trust could be re posed either in safe conducts or hostages. Faith had been too often broken by the administration. The promise made by the Duchess of Parma to the nobles, and afterwards violated, the recent treachery of** Mondragon, the return of three ex changed prisoners from the Hague, who died next day of poison administered before their release, the frequent attempts upon his own Ufe — all such constantly recurring crimes made it doubtful, in the opinion of the Prince, whether it would be possible to find commissioners to treat with his Majesty's government. All would fear assassination, afterwards to be disavowed by the King and pardoned by the Pope.f After much conversation in this vein, the Prince gave the Spanish agents warning that he might eventuaUy be obliged to seek the protection of some foreign power for the provinces. In this connection he made use of the memorable metaphor, so often repeated afterwards, that "the country was a beautiful damsel, who certainly did not lack suitors able and willing to accept her and defend her against the world."£ As to the matter of religion, he said he was willing to leave it to be settled by the estates-general ; but doubted whether anything short of entire liberty of worship would ever satisfy the people.§ Subsequently there were held other conferences, between the * See the account by Bonte, in Gachard.— Correspondance de Guillaume le Tacit, iii. 378, 379, 380. f jbid., 383 X Ibid., 387. — Compare Bor, viii. 613. § Correspondance de Guillaume lo Tacit, iii. 387.— Compare Bor, viii. 61& 1574.] INTERNAL POLITICS. 7 Prince and Doctor Leoninus, with a similar result, all at tempts proving fruitless to induce him to abandon his position upon the subject of religion, or to accept a pardon on any terms save the departure of the foreign troops, the assembling of the estates-general, and entire freedom of rehgion. Even if he were willing to concede the religious question himself, he observed that it was idle to hope either from the estates or people a hand's-breadth of concession upon that point. Leoninus was subsequently admitted to a secret conference with the estates of Holland, where his representations were firmly met by the same arguments as those already used by the Prince.* These proceedings on the part of Saint Aldegonde, Cham- pagny, Junius, and Elbertus Leoninus extended through the whole summer and autumn of 1574, and were not terminated until January of the following year. Changes fast becoming necessary in the internal government of the provinces, were also undertaken during this year. Hitherto the Prince had exercised his power under the con venient fiction of the King's authority, systematically con ducting the rebeUion in the name of his Majesty, and as his Majesty's stadholder. By this process an immense power was lodged in his hands ; nothing less, indeed, than the supreme executive and legislative functions of the land ; while since the revolt had become, as it were, perpetual, ample but * Gachard, Correspondance de Guillaume le Tacit, iii. 403-430. Bor, vii. 565, seq. — Compare Hoofd, ix. 400, 401 ; Wagenaer, d. vii. 25-27. See also a very ample memoir of the distinguished scholar and diplomatist, Albert de Leeuw (or Elbertus Leoninus), by J. P. Van Cappelle. Bijdragen tot de Ges. d. Nederl., 1-204. He.began his active life as law professor at Louvain, in which city he married Barbara de Haze, with whom he lived more than fifty-two years. The lady, however, seems not to have pined away after the termination of this wedlock of more than half a century; for she survived her husband thirty-six years. The biographer shrewdly suspects, therefore, that she must have been a "very young miss when she was married.''' " Dit meisje moet nog seer jong zijn geweest, toen Leoninus zich met haar in het huwelijk begaf." — V. d. Cappelle, 93, note 8. He was born at Bommel, in 1519 or 1520, and died in 1598, full of years and honours. His public services, on various im portant occasions, will be often alluded to in subsequent pages. 8 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1574 anomalous functions had been additionaUy thrust upon him by the estates and by the general voice of the people. The two provinces, even while deprived of Harlem and Amsterdam, now raised two hundred and ten thousand florins monthly,* whereas Alva had never been able to extract from Holland more than two hundred and seventy-one thousand flo rins yearly. They paid aU rather than pay a tenth. In conse quence of this liberality, the cities insensibly acquired a greater influence in the government. The coming contest between the centrifugal aristocratic principle, represented by these cor porations, and the central popular authority of the stad- holder, was aheady foreshadowed, but at first the estates were in perfect harmony with the Prince. They even urged upon him more power than he desired, and declined functions which he wished them to exercise. On the 7th of September, 1573, it had been formally proposed by the general council to confer a regular and unhmited dictatorship upon him,y but in the course of a year from that time, the cities had begun to feel their increasing importance.^ Moreover, whUe growing more ambitious, they became less hberal. The Prince, dissatisfied with the conduct of the cities, brought the whole subject before an assembly of the estates of HoUand on the 20th October, 1574. He stated the incon veniences produced by the anomalous condition of the govern ment. He complained that the common people had often faUen into the error that the money raised for pubhc purposes had been levied for his benefit only, and that they had, there fore, been less wiUing to contribute to the taxes. As the only remedy for these evils, he tendered his resignation of all the powers with which he was clothed, so that the estates might then take the government, which they could exercise without conflict or control. For himself, he had never desired power, except as a means of being useful to his country, and he did not * Resol. Holl., Mar. 15 und 17, 1576, bl. 16, 19, f Kluit, Hist. Holl. Staatsreg., dl. i. 86. X Kluit, i. 78, et seq. Wagenaer, vii. 6, 6. 1574.] discussions. 9 offer his resignation from unwillingness to stand by the cause, but from a hearty desire to save it from disputes among its friends. He was ready, now as ever, to shed the last drop of his blood to maintain the freedom of the land.* This straightforward language produced an instantaneous effect. The estates knew that they were dealing with a man whose Ufe was governed by lofty principles, and they felt that they were in danger of losing him through their own selfishness and low ambition. They were embarrassed, for they did not like to relinquish the authority which they had begun to relish, nor to accept the resignation of a man who was indispensable. They felt that to give up WiUiam of Orange at that time was to accept the Spanish yoke for ever. At an assembly held at Delft on the 12th of November, 1574, they accordingly requested him " to continue in his blessed government, with the council estabhshed near him,"f and for this end, they formally offered to him, " under the name of Governor or Regent," absolute power, authority, and sove reign command. In particular, they conferred on him the entire control of aU the ships of war, hitherto reserved to the different cities, together with the right to dispose of all prizes and all monies raised for the support of fleets. They gave him also unlimited power over the domains ; they agreed that all magistracies, miUtia bands, guilds, and communities, should make solemn oath to contribute taxes and to receive garrisons, exactly as the Prince, with his councU, should ordain ; but they made it a condition that the estates should be convened and consulted upon requests, impositions, and upon aU changes in the governing body. It was also stipulated that the judges of the supreme court and of the exchequer, with other high officers, should be appointed by and with tne consent of the estates.;}; * Resol. Holl., Oct. 20, Nov. 1, bl. 148-176. Kluit, d. i. 96, 97. Wagenaer, vii. 10, 11. f Resol. HolL, Nov., 1574, bl. 178. "Wagenaer, vii. 11, 12, 13. Kluit, 97, 98, d. i. X Resol. Holl. Kluit, Wagenaer, ubi sup. Groen v. Prinst., Archives, eta, V 90-94. 10 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1574 The Prince expressed himself wiUing to accept the govern ment upon these terms. He, however, demanded an allow ance of forty-five thousand florins monthly for the army expenses and other current outlays.* Here, however, the estates refused their consent. In a mercantile spirit, unworthy the occasion and the man with whom they were dealing, they endeavoured to chaffer where they should have been only too willing to comply, and they attempted to reduce the reason able demand of the Prince to thirty thousand florins.f The Prince, who had poured out his own wealth so lavishly in the cause — who, together with his brothers, particularly the generous John of Nassau, had contributed all which they could raise by mortgage, sales of jewellery and furniture, and by extensive loans, subjecting themselves to constant em barrassment, and almost to penury, felt himself outraged by the paltriness of this conduct. He expressed his indignation, and denounced the niggardliness of the estates in the strongest language, and declared that he would rather leave the country for ever, with the maintenance of his own honor, than accept the government upon such disgraceful terms.J The estates, disturbed by his vehemence, and struck with its justice, instantly, and without further deliberation, consented to his demand. They granted the forty-five thousand florins monthly, and the Prince assumed the government, thus re modelled^ During the autumn and early winter of the year 1574, the Emperor Maximilian had been actively exerting himself to bring about a pacification of the Netherlands. He was certainly sincere, for an exceUent reason. "The Emperor * Resol. Holl., Nov. 13 und 25, 1574, bl. 196, 207, 208. Kluit, i. 101, 102. f Resol. Holl., Nov. 25, 1574, bl. 207, 208. X Resol. Holl., Nov. 25, 1574, bl. 208. § They made the offer of thirty thousand in the morning, and granted the whole demand in the afternoon of the 25th Nov. — Resol. Holl., Nov. 25, 1574 bl. 196-208. Kluit, Holl. Staatsreg., i. 102. Wagenaer, vii. 13, 14. Groen v Prinst, Archives, etc., v. 90-94. 1574.] MEDIATION. 11 maintains," said Saint Goard, French ambassador at Madrid, " that if peace is not made with the Beggars, the Empire wUl depart from the house of Austria, and that such is the determination of the electors."* On the other hand, if Philip were not weary of the war, at any rate his means for carrying it on were diminishing daily. Requesens could raise no money in the Netherlands ;f his secretary wrote to Spain, that the exchequer was at its last gasp, and the cabinet of Madrid was at its wits' end, and almost incapable of raising ways and means. The peace party was obtaining the upper hand ; the fierce policy of Alva regarded with increasing disfavor. " The people here," wrote Saint Goard from Madrid, "are com- pletely desperate, whatever pains they take to put a good face on the matter. They desire most earnestly to treat, without losing their character." It seemed, nevertheless, impossible for PhiUp to bend his neck. The hope of wearing the Imperial crown had alone made his bigotry feasible. To less potent influences it was adamant ; and even now, with an impoverished exchequer, and, after seven years of unsuccessful warfare, his purpose was not less rigid than at first. " The HoUanders demand liberty of conscience," said Saint Goard, "to which the King wiU never consent, or I am much mistaken."* As for Orange, he was sincerely in favor of peace — but not a dishonorable peace, in which should be renounced all the objects of the war. He was far from sanguine on the subject, for he read the signs of the times and the character of Philip too accurately to believe much more in the success of the present than in that of the past efforts of Maximilian. He was pleased that his brother-in-law, Count Schwartzburg, had been selected as the Emperor's agent in the affair, but expressed his doubts whether much good would come of the proposed negotiations. Remembering the many traps which * Archives et Correspondance, v. 81. ¦)•- Ibid., v. 28-32. X Ibid, v. 83. 12 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1574. in times past had been set by Phdip and his father, he feared that the present transaction might Ukewise prove a snare. "We have not forgotten the words 'ewig' and 'einig' in the treaty with Landgrave Phdip," he wrote ; " at the same time we beg to assure his Imperial Majesty that we desire nothing more than a good peace, tending to the glory of God, the service of the King of Spain, and the prosperity of his subjects."* This was his language to his brother, in a letter which was meant to be shown to the Emperor. In another, written on the same day, he explained himself with more clearness, and stated his distrust with more energy. There were no papists left, except a few ecclesiastics, he said, so much had the number of the Reformers been augmented, through the sin gular grace of God. It was out of the question to suppose, therefore, that a measure, dooming all who were not Catholics to exile, could be entertained. None would change their religion, and none would consent, voluntarUy, to abandon for ever their homes, friends, and property. " Such a peace," he said, " would be poor and pitiable indeed."f These, then, were the sentiments of the party now about to negotiate. The mediator was anxious for a settlement, because the interests of the Imperial house required it. The King of Spain was desirous of peace, but was unwilling to concede a hair. The Prince of Orange was equaUy anxious to terminate the war, but was determined not to abandon the objects for which it had been undertaken. A favorable result, therefore, seemed hardly possible. A whole people claimed the hberty to stay at home and practice the Protestant rehgion, while their King asserted the right to banish them for ever, or to burn them if they remained. The parties seemed too far apart to be brought together by the most elastic compromise. The Prince addressed an earnest appeal * Archives et Correspondance, v. 61-65. j Ibid., v. 73, 74. 1575.] ASSEMBLY AT DORT. 13 to the assembly of Holland, then in session at Dort, remind ing them that, although peace was desirable, it might be more dangerous than war, and entreating them, therefore, to con clude no treaty which should be inconsistent with the privi leges of the country and their duty to God.* It was now resolved that aU the votes of the assembly should consist of five : one for the nobles and large cities of Holland, one for the estates of Zealand, one for the smaU cities of Hol land, one for the cities Bommel and Buren, and the fifth for WUham of Orangey The Prince thus effectually held in his hands three votes : his own, that of the small cities, which through his means only had been admitted to the assembly, and thirdly, that of Buren, the capital of his son's earldom. He thus exercised a controlling influence over the coming de liberations. The ten commissioners, who were appointed by the estates for the peace negotiations, were all his friends. Among them were Saint Aldegonde, Paul Buis, Charles Boisot, and Doctor Junius. The plenipotentiaries of the Spanish gov ernment were Leoninus, the Seigneur de Rassinghem, Corne lius Suis, and Arnold Sasbout.J The proceedings were opened at Breda upon the 3rd of March, 1575.§ The royal commissioners took the initiative, requesting to be informed what complaints the estates had to make, and offering to remove, if possible, all grievances which they might be suffering. The states' commissioners replied that they desired nothing, in the first place, but an answer to the petition which they had aheady presented to the King. This was the paper placed in the hands of Saint Aldegonde during the informal negotiations of the preceding year. An answer was accord ingly given, but couched in such vague and general language as to be quite without meaning. The estates then demanded a categorical reply to the two principal demands in the peti- * Bor, viii. 595, 596. Resol Holl., Feb. 6, 1575. f Resol. Holl., Feb. 5, 6, 7, 1575, bl. 47, 51, 52. Wagenaer, vii 29. X ResoL HoD., Feb. 12, 1575, bl. 49-59. § Bor, viii. 597. 14 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. tion, namely, the departure of the foreign troops and the as sembhng of the states-general. They were asked what they understood by foreigners and by the assembly of states-general. They rephed that by foreigners they meant those who were not natives, and particularly the Spaniards. By the estates- general they meant the same body before which, in 1555, Charles had resigned his sovereignty to Phihp. The royal commissioners made an extremely unsatisfactory answer, con cluding with a request that aU cities, fortresses, and castles, then in the power of the estates, together with aU their artil lery and vessels of war, should be delivered to the King. The Roman Cathohc worship, it was also distinctly stated, was to be re-estabhshed at once exclusively throughout the Nether lands ; those of the Reformed religion receiving permission,/or that time only, to convert their property into cash within a certain time, and to depart the country.* Orange and the estates made answer on the 21st March. It could not be caUed hard, they said, to require the withdrawal of the Spanish troops, for this had been granted in 1559, for less imperious reasons. The estates had, indeed, themselves made use of foreigners, but those foreigners had never been allowed to participate in the government. With regard to the assembly of the states-general, that body had always enjoyed the right of advising with the Sovereign on the condi tion of the country, and on general measures of government. Now it was only thought necessary to summon them, in order that they might give their consent to the King's " requests." Touching the delivery of cities and citadels, artiUery and ships, the proposition was pronounced to resemble that made by the wolves to the sheep, in the fable — that the dogs should be delivered up, as a preliminary to a lasting peace. It was unreasonable to request the HoUanders to abandon their rehgion or their country. The reproach of heresy was unjust, * Resol. Holl., Maart 7, 1575, bl. 121, 122, 123, 125. Maart 17, 1575, bl 158, ot seq. Bor, viii. 597, sqq. Wagenaer, vii. 31. 1575.] BREDA CONFERENCES. 15 for they still held to the Catholic Apostolic Church, wishing only to purify it of its abuses. Moreover, it was certainly more cruel to expel a whole population than to dismiss three or four thousand Spaniards who for seven long years had been eating their fiU at the expense of the provinces. It would be impos sible for the exiles to dispose of their property, for aU would, by the proposed measure, be seUers, while there would be no purchasers.* The royal plenipotentiaries, making answer to this commu nication upon the 1st of April, signified a willingness that the Spanish soldiers should depart, if the states would consent to disband their own foreign troops. They were likewise in favor of assembling the states-general, but could not permit any change in the religion of the country. His Majesty had sworn to maintain the true worship at the moment of assum ing the sovereignty. The dissenters might, however, be aUowed a period of six months in which to leave the land, and eight or ten years for the sale of their property. After the heretics had all departed, his Majesty did not doubt that trade and manufactures would flourish again, along with the old rehgion. As for the Spanish inquisition, there was not, and there never had been, any intention of establishing it in the Netherlands.f No doubt there was something specious in this paper. It appeared to contain considerable concessions. The Prince and estates had claimed the departure of the Spaniards. It was now promised that they should depart. They had demanded the assembhng of the states-general. It was now promised that they should assemble. They had denounced the inquisi tion. It was now averred that the Spanish inquisition was not to be established. Nevertheless, the commissioners of the Prince were not * Resol. Holl., Maart 21, 1575, bl. 166. Bor, viii. 599. Wagenau, vii 34-39. + Resol. Holl., Apl. 1575, bl. 202. Bor, viii. 602. 16 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. deceived by such artifices. There was no parity between the cases of the Spanish soldiery and of the troops in service of the estates. To assemble the estates-general was idle, if they were to be forbidden the settlement of the great question at issue. With regard to the Spanish inquisition, it mattered httle whether the slaughter-house were caUed Spanish or Flemish, or . simply the Blood-CouncU. It was, however, necessary for the states' commissioners to consider their reply very carefully ; for the royal plenipotentiaries had placed them selves upon specious grounds. It was not enough to feel that the King's government was paltering with them ; it was like wise necessary for the states' agents to impress this fact upon the people. There was a pause in the dehberations. Meantime, Count Schwartzburg, reluctantly accepting the conviction that the religious question was an insurmountable obstacle to a peace, left the provinces for Germany.* The last propositions of the government plenipotentiaries had been discussed in the coun- cUs of the various cities, f so that the reply of the Prince, and estates was delayed until the 1st of June. They admitted, in this communication, that the offer to restore ancient privileges had an agreeable sound ; but regretted that if the whole popu lation were to be banished, there would be but few to derive advantage from the restoration. If the King would put an end to rehgious persecution, he would find as much loyalty in the provinces as his forefathers had found. It was out of the question, they said, for the states to disarm and to deliver up their strong places, before the Spanish soldiery had retired, and before peace had been established. It was their wish to leave the question of religion, together with aU other disputed matters, to the decision of the assembly. Were it possible, in the meantime, to devise any effectual method for restraining hostilities, it would gladly be embraced.^ * Bor, viii. 604, 506. f Wagenaer, vii. 43. X Resol. Holl., Apl. 19, 1575, bl. 240 ; May 20, 23, 1575 ; Jun. 5. 1575, bL 240, 305, 314, 316, 355. Bor, viii. 605-608. 1575.] END OF NEGOTIATIONS. 17 On the 8th of July, the royal commissioners inquired what guarantee the states would be wilhng to give, that the decision of the general assembly, whatever it might be, should be obeyed. The demand was answered by another, in which the King's agents were questioned as to their own guarantees. Hereupon it was stated that his Majesty would give his word and sign manual, together with the word and signature of the Emperor into the bargain. In exchange for these promises, the Prince and estates were expected to give their own oaths and seals, together with a number of hostages. Over and above this, they were requested to dehver up the cities of BriU and Enkhuizen, Flushing and Arnemuyde.* The disparity of such guarantees was ridiculous. The royal word, even when strengthened by the imperial promise, and confirmed by the autographs of Philip and Maximilian, was not so solid a security, in the opinion of Netherlanders, as to outweigh four cities in HoUand and Zealand, with all their population and wealth. To give collateral pledges and hostages upon one side, while the King offered none, was to assign a superiority to the royal word, over that of the Prince and the estates which there was no disposition to recognize. Moreover, it was very cogently urged that to give up the cities was to give as security for the contract, some of the principal contracting parties.^ This closed the negotiations. The provincial plenipoten tiaries took their leave by a paper dated 13th July, 1575, which recapitulated the main incidents of the conference. They expressed their deep regret that his Majesty should insist so firmly on the banishment of the Reformers, for it was unjust to reserve the provinces to the sole use of a smaU number of Cathohcs. They lamented that the proposition which had been made, to refer the religious question to the estates, had neither been loyally accepted, nor candidly refused. They inferred, therefore, that the object of the royal government * ResoL Holl., July 8, 1575, bL 47. f Resol. HolL, July 8, 16, 1575, bL 478, 506. Wagenaer, vii. 49. VOL. in. 2 18 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. had been to amuse the states, while time was thus gained for reducing the country into a slavery more abject than any which had yet existed.* On the other hand, the royal com missioners as solemnly averred that the whole responsibUity for the failure of the negotiations belonged to the estates.f It was the general opinion in the insurgent provinces that the government had been insincere from the beginning, and had neither expected nor desired to conclude a peace. It is probable, however, that Philip was sincere ; so far as it could be called sincerity to be willing to conclude a peace, if the provinces would abandon the main objects of the war.J With his impoverished exchequer, and ruin threatening his whole empire, if this mortal combat should be continued many years longer, he could have no motive for further bloodshed, pro vided aU heretics should consent to abandon the country. As usual, however, he left his agents in the dark as to his real intentions. Even Requesens was as much in doubt as to the King's secret purposes as Margaret of Parma had ever been in former times.§ Moreover, the Grand Commander and the * Resol. Holl. July 16, bl. 506. Wagenaer, vii. 49, 50. Bor, viii. 610. f Resol. Holl. July 16, 1575, bl. 512. Bor, viii. 612. X See Kluit, Hist, der Holl. Staatsreg., i. 90, 91, note 34. — Compare the remarks of Groen v. Pnnst, Archives, etc., v. 259-262; Bor, viii. 606, 615; Meteren, v. 100 ; Hoofd, x. 410. — Count John of Nassau was distrustful and disdainful from the beginning. Against his brother's loyalty and the straight forward intentions of the estates, he felt that the whole force of the Macchiavelli system of policy would be brought to bear with great effect. He felt that the object of the King's party was to temporize, to confuse, and to deceive. He did not believe them capable of conceding the real object in dispute, but he feared lest they might obscure the judgment of the plain and well meaning people with whom they had to deal. Alluding to the constant attempts made to poison himself and his brother, he likens the pretended negotiations to Venetian drugs, by which eyesight, hearing, feeling, and intellect were de stroyed. Under this pernicious influence, the luckless people would not per ceive the fire burning around them, but would shrink at a rustling leaf. Not comprehending then the tendency of their own acte, they would " lay bare their own backs to the rod, and bring faggots for their own funeral pile." — Archives, etc., v. 131-137. § Vigl. ad Hopp., ep. 253. 1575.] UNION OF HOLLAND AND ZEALAND. 19 government had, after aU, made a great mistake in their diplo macy. The estates of Brabant, although strongly desirous that the Spanish troops should be withdrawn, were equaUy stanch for the maintenance of the Catholic religion, and many of the southern provinces entertained the same sentiments. Had the Governor, therefore, taken the states' commissioners at their word, and left the decision of the religious question to the general assembly, he might perhaps have found the vote in his favor.* In this case, it is certain that the Prince of Orange and his party would have been placed in a very awkward position.f The internal government of the insurgent provinces had remained upon the footing which we have seen estabhshed in the autumn of 1574, but in the course of this summer (1575), however, the foundation was laid for the union of HoUand and Zealand, under the authority of Orange. The selfish principle of municipal aristocracy, which had tended to keep asunder these various groups of cities, was now repressed by the energy of the Prince and the strong determination of the people. In April, 1575, certain articles of union between Holland and Zealand were proposed, and six commissioners appointed to draw up an ordinance for the government of the two prov inces. This ordinance was accepted in general assembly of both.J It was in twenty articles. It declared that, during the war, the Prince, as sovereign, should have absolute power in aU matters concerning the defence of the country. He was to appoint mihtary officers, high and low, establish and remove garrisons, punish offenders against the laws of war. He was to regulate the expenditure of all money voted by the * See Wagenaer, vii. 52. f Besides the Resolutions of the estates of Holland, already cited, see for the history of these negotiations; Meteren, v. 96-100; Bor, viii. 595-615. Groen v. Prinst, Archives, v. 69, et seq.; Hoofd, x. 400, 411. — Compare Ben tivogho, ib. ix. 157-161 ; Mendoza, xiii. 269, 270. X Resol. Holl., May 17, 18, 1575, bl. 291, 294. Wagenaer vii. 15-18. 20 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. estates. He was to maintain the law, in the King's name, as Count of HoUand, and to appoint all judicial officers upon nominations by the estates. He was, at the usual times, to appoint and renew the magistracies of the cities, according to their constitutions. He was to protect the exercise of the Evangelical Reformed religion, and to suppress the exercise of the Boman religion/'' without permitting, however, that search should be made into the creed of any person. A deliberative and executive councU, by which the jealousy of the corpora tions had intended to hamper his government, did not come into more than nominal existence.-)" The articles of union having been agreed upon, the Prince, desiring an unfettered expression of the national wiU, wished the ordinance to be laid before the people in their primary assemblies. The estates, however, were opposed to this democratic proceeding. They represented that it had been customary to consult, after the city magistracies, only the captains of companies and the deans of guilds on matters of government. The Prince, yielding the point, the captains of companies and deans of guilds accordingly alone united with the aristocratic boards in ratifying the instrument by which his authority over the two united provinces was estabhshed. On the 4th of June this first union was solemnized. £ Upon the 11th of July, the Prince formally accepted the government^ He, however, made an essential change in a very important clause of the ordinance. In place of the words, the "Roman rehgion," he insisted that the words, " religion at variance with the Gospel," should be substituted * Ook de oefening der Evangelische Gereformeerde Religie handhaaven, doende de oefeninge derRomische Religie ophouden."— Resol. Holl., ubi sup. f Wagenaer, vii. 19, 22, 23, 25.— Compare Groen v. Prinst, Archives, v. 268-272.— See Resol. HoIL, June 10, 21, 23, 1575, bl. 381, 414, 420. X Wagenaer, vii. 19. Resol. Holl., May 21, 1575, bl. 311, 313. June 4, 1575, bl. 359.— Compare Groen v. Prinst., Archives, etc., v. 271, 272. § ResoL Holl., July 12, 15, 18, 19, 20, 1575, bl. 487, 501, 514, 516, 520. Bor, viii. 641-643. Hoofd, x. 420, 421. 1575.] CHARLOTTE OF BOURBON. 21 in the article by which he was enjoined to prohibit the exer cise of such religion.* This alteration rebuked the bigotry which had aheady grown out of the successful resistance to bigotry, and left the door open for a general rehgious tole ration. Early in this year the Prince had despatched Saint Alde gonde on a private mission to the Elector Palatine. During some of his visits to that potentate he had seen at Heidelberg the Princess Charlotte of Bourbon. That lady was daughter of the Duc de Montpensier, the most ardent of the Catholic Princes of France, and the one who at the conferences of Bayonne had been most indignant at the Queen Dowager's hesitation to unite heartily with the schemes of Alva and PhUip for the extermination of the Huguenots. His daughter, a woman of beauty, inteUigence, and virtue, forced before the canonical age to take the rehgious vows, had been placed in the convent of Joiiarrs, of which she had become Abbess. Always secretly inclined to the Reformed rehgion, she had fled secretly from her cloister, in the year of horrors 1572, and had found refuge at the court of the Elector Palatine, after which step her father refused to receive her letters, to contribute a far thing to her support, or even to acknowledge her claims upon him by a single line or message of affection, t Under these circumstances the outcast princess, who had arrived at years of maturity, might be considered her own mistress, and she was neither morally nor legaUy bound, when her hand was sought in marriage by the great champion of the Reformation, to ask the consent of a parent who loathed her rehgion and denied her existence. The legality of the divorce from Anne of Saxony had been settled by a fuU expres sion of the ecclesiastical authority which- she most respected ;% * Resol. Holl., July 22, 30, 1575, bL 528, 542. Wagenaer, vii. 22.— Compare Groen v. Prinst, Archives, v. 272; Kluit, HolL Staatsreg., i. 116, 117, note 55. \ Archives et Corresp., v. 113. X Acte de cinq Ministres du St. Evangile par lequel ils declarent le mariage du Prince d'Orange etre legitime." — Archives, etc., v. 216-226. 22 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. the facts upon which the divorce had been founded having been proved beyond peradventure. Nothing, in truth, could weU be more unfortunate in its results than the famous Saxon marriage, the arrangements for which had occasioned so much pondering to Philip, and so much diplomatic correspondence on the part of high personages iu Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain. Cer tainly, it was of but little consequence to what church the unhappy Princess belonged, and they must be shghtly versed in history or in human nature who can imagine these nuptials to have exercised any effect upon the rehgious or political sentiments of Orange. The Princess was of a stormy, iU-regulated nature ; almost a lunatic from the beginning. The dislike which succeeded to her fantastic fondness for the Prince, as weU as her general eccentricity, had soon become the taUc of aU the court at Brussels. She would pass week after week without emerging from her chamber, keeping the shutters closed and candles burning, day and night.* She quarreUed violently with Countess Egmont for precedence, so that the ludicrous contentions of the two ladies in ante chambers and doorways were the theme and the amusement of society, f Her insolence, not only in private but in pubhc, towards her husband became intolerable. " I could not do otherwise than bear it with sadness and patience," said the Prince, with great magnanimity, " hoping that with age would come improvement." Nevertheless, upon one occasion, at a supper party, she had used such language in the presence of Count Horn and many other nobles, "that aU wondered that he could endure the abusive terms which she appUed to him."$ When the clouds gathered about him, when he had become an exile and a wanderer, her reproaches and her violence in creased. The sacrifice of their wealth, the mortgages and sales * Groen v. Prinst, Archives, i. 386. f Papiers d'Etat, vii. 452. X Letter to the Elector Augustus. — Groen v. Prinst, Archives, ii. 31, 32. 1575.] ANNE OF SAXONY. 23 which he effected of his estates, plate, jewels, and furniture, to raise money for the struggling country, excited her bitter re sentment. She separated herself from him by degrees, and at last abandoned him altogether. Her temper became violent to ferocity. She beat her servants with her hands and with clubs ; she threatened the lives of herself, of her attendants, of Count John of Nassau, with knives and daggers, and in dulged in habitual profanity and blasphemy, uttering frightful curses upon aU around. Her original tendency to intemper ance had so much increased, that she was often unable to stand on her feet. A bottle of wine, holding more than a quart, in the morning, and another in the evening, together with a pound of sugar, was her usual aUowance. She addressed letters to Alva, complaining that her husband had impoverished himself " in his good-for-nothing Beggar war," and begging the Duke to furnish her with a little ready money and with the means of arriving at the possession of her dower.* * " Derhalben auch die Princessin sich dermassen ertzurnedt, das sie ihr der frawen man und die fraw midt einem scheidtholltz gleichfalls auch mit feusten geschlagen und sehr ubel gescholten hab," etc. — Summarische Verreichmsz und Protocolle der Abgesandten, 85-129. Act. der Fr. Princessin zu Uranien vorge- fliche vorhandlung belangnt, A". 1572. — MS., Dresden Archives. " Habe darnach des Abends, als sie gahr und also beweindt gewesen das sie nicht stehen konnen, ein scbreibmesserlein m den rechten ermel zu sich gestegkt, vorhabens Graf Johann wan er zu ihr kumen wehre, sollchs in den halsz zu stossen gleichfolls habe sie ein bnefstecher bekhumen und sollchen, alls sie auch etwas zuviel getrunken, zu ihrem Haupt ins bedt gelegt, etc., etc. Es las ihr auch die Fr. Prinzessin offtmals eyer gahr hardt im salltz sieden, darauf. tringkt sie dan edtwan zuvil und werde ungedultig, fluche alle bosze flueche, und werfe die speisze und schussel und allem von tisch von sich," etc., etc. — MS, Dresden Archives, diet act. > "Und die Fr. Prinzessin, wie sie es genant, den iollen man, nemlich ein guedte flasche weins morgens und abermals ein guedte flasche zu abendtszeidt mehr dan ein masz haltend bekumen, welches ir sambt einem Pfundt Zugkers bei sich zu nemen nicht zu vii sey," etc., etc. — Ibid. "Der man sich verweigert hat einen brief so sie au den Duca de Alba geschrieben gen Colin zu tragen und daselbst ferner zu uberschigken. Der Innhalt solches Briefs sei ungeverlieh gewesen, das sie sich beclagdt, wie man sie alhie so gahr ubel tractir — das guedt, so ihr auf des Konings anordnung gehandtraicht habo sollen werden, entwendt und es ihrem herrn zu seinem un- 24 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. An illicit connexion with a certain John Rubens, an exUed magistrate of Antwerp, and father of the celebrated painter, completed the list of her delinquencies, and justified the mar riage of the Prince with Charlotte de Bourbon.* It was therefore determined by the Elector of Saxony and the Land grave WiUiam to remove her from the custody of the Nassaus. This took place with infinite difficulty, at the close of the year 1575. Already, in 1572, Augustus had proposed to the Landgrave that she should be kept in solitary confinement, and that a minister should preach to her daily through the grated aperture by which her food was to be admitted. The Landgrave remonstrated at so inhuman a proposition, which was, however, carried into effect. The wretched Princess, now completely a lunatic, was imprisoned in the electoral palace, in a chamber where the windows were waUed up and a smaU grating let into the upper part of the door. Through this wicket came her food, as weU as the words of the holy man appointed to preach daily for her edification.^ Two years long, she endured this terrible punishment, and died mad, J on the 18th of December, 1577. On the following nutzen Goesen Kriegk zu gebrauchen zugestellt haben. Bidte das der Duca de Alba while vor sie schreiben an das Cammergericht umb Mandat, das sie von Gf. Johanns gefengknisz ledig unnd zu Spier vor recht gestellt werden moge. Auch das er, der von Alba, ir die necliste Afesz etwas von geldt und dabei einen gesandten mit mundlicher werbung zuschigken wolle. Sey der Brief zwei Bogen lank," etc. — MS., Dresden Archives, diet. act. * Acta: Der. Fran Princessin zu Uranien, etc. — Abschriften von F. Annen, Ehestifftung, etc. — Schickung an Joh. G. tzu Nass. Abholung der Princessin und todtlichen Abgang. — MS., Dresd. Arch., 1575-1579, passim. Bakhuyzen v. d. Brinck. Het Huwelijk van W. v. Oranje, 133, sqq. ¦f " Seindt auch der endlichen meinung, wan sie also in geheim vorwahre' und ein Predicant verordnet, der sie teglich durch ein fensterlein do ir die speys und tranck gericht werde Irer begangenen sunde mit Vleisa erinnere." — Letter of Elector Augustus to Landgrave William, July 9, 1572. — MS., Dresd. Arch. " Ganz gestoalen Geistes." — Ibid. § " Desgleichen, habe ich auch angeordnet," writes Secretary Hans Jenitz immediately after the decease of the Princess, " dasz die Fenster durch die Maurer, welche sie zwvor zugemauert, wiederum ausgebrochen werden und sol der Bettmeister mit Reinigung derselben Stube und Kammer sich E. F. G. befehl nach verhalten. E. F. G. kann ich auch unterthanigst nicht verhalten, dasz keine neue Thiir vor solche stube gemaecht worden sondern map hat 1575.] MARRIAGE OF THE PRINCE. 25 day, she was buried in the electoral tomb at Meissen ; a pompous procession of " school children, clergy, magistrates, nobUity, and citizens" conducting her to that rest of which she could no longer be deprived by the cruelty of man nor her own violent temperament.* So far, therefore, as the character of Mademoiselle de Bourbon and the legitimacy of her future offspring were concerned, she received ample guarantees. For the rest, the Prince, in i simple letter, informed her that he was already past his prime, having reached his forty-second year, and that his fortune was encumbered not only with settlements for his chUdren by previous marriages, but by debts contracted in the cause of his oppressed country, j A convention of doctors and bishops of France, summoned by the Duc de Montpensier, afterwards confirmed the opinion that the conventual vows of the Princess Charlotte had been conformable neither to the laws of France nor to the canons of the Trent CouncU.J She was conducted to Brill by Saint Aldegonde, where she was durch dio alte Thure in dem obern Felde nur ein vier eckicht Loch ausgesch- nitten und von starkem eisernen Blech ein enges Gitter dafur gemacht dasz man auswendig auf dem Saal auch verschliessen kan'n. Es steht auch zu E. F. G. Gefallen, ob man die grosse eiserne bands mit den Vorlege schlossern, damit die Thuere von aussen verwart gewesen, also daran bleiben lagsen, oder wieder aus dem stein aushauen und abfeilen lassen wolle, aber die gegitter vor den Fenstern konnen meines Bediinckens wohl bleiben. Hans Jenitz an Churfiirstin Anna Acta : Inventarium uber F. Annen, p. 3. Uranien Vorlassenschaft, etc., A". 1577. — MS., Dresden Archives. 6 Diet Act. — MS., Dresden Archives. It can certainly be considered no violation of the sanctity of archives to make these slender allusions to a tale, the main features of which have already been published, not only by MM. Groen v. Prinsterer and Bakhuyzen, in Hol land, but by the Saxon Professor Bottiger, in Germany. It is impossible to understand the character and career of Orange, and his relations with Germany, without a complete view of the Saxon marriage. Tha extracts from the " geo- mantic letters" of Elector Augustus, however, given in Bottiger (Hist. Taschenb. 1836, p. 169-173), with their furious attacks upon the Prince and upon Charlotte of Bourbon, seem to us too obscene to be admitted, even in a note to these pages, and in a foreign language. f " Memoire pour le Comte de Hohenlo allant de la part du Prince d'Orange vers le Comte J. de Nassau, l'Electeur Palatin, et son epouse, Mile, de Bourbon.'' —Arch, etc., v. 189-192. X Apologie du Prince d'Orange. — Ed. Sylvius, 37, 38, 26 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. received by her bridegroom, to whom she was united on the 12th of June. The wedding festival was held at Dort with much revelry and holiday making, "but without dancing."* In this connexion, no doubt the Prince consulted his incli nation only. Eminently domestic in his habits, he required the relief of companionship at home to the exhausting affairs which made up his life abroad. For years he had never enjoyed social converse, except at long intervals, with man or woman ; it was natural, therefore, that he should contract this marriage. It was equally natural that he should make many enemies by so impohtic a match. The Elector Palatine, who was in place of guardian to the bride, decidedly disap proved, although he was suspected of favoring the alliance, f The Landgrave of Hesse for a time was furious ; the Elector of Saxony absolutely delirious with rage.J The Diet of the Empire was to be held within a few weeks at Frankfort, where it was very certain that the outraged and influential Elector would make his appearance, overflowing with anger, and determined to revenge upon the cause of the Netherland Reformation the injury which he had personaUy received. Even the wise, considerate, affectionate brother, John of Nassau, considered the marriage an act of madness. He did what he could, by argument and entreaty, to dissuade the Prince from its completion ;§ although he afterwards volun tarUy confessed that the Princess Charlotte had been deeply calumniated, and was an inestimable treasure to his brother.|| The French government made use of the circumstance to jus tify itself in a stUl further alienation from the cause of the Prince than it had hitherto manifested, but this was rather pretence than reahty. It was not in the nature of things, however, that the Saxon and Hessian indignation could be easily allayed. The Land- * Archives et Corresp., v. 226. Bor, viii. 644. Meteren, v. 100. f Archives et Correspondance, v. 300. J ibid. g Ibid., v. 203, 204. j Ibid., T. 3i2j 313. 1575.] WRATH OF ELECTOR AND LANDGRAVE. 27 grave was extremely violent. " Truly, I cannot imagine," he wrote to the Elector of Saxony, " quo consilio that wiseacre of an Aldegonde, and whosoever else has been aiding and abetting, have undertaken this affair. Nam si pietatem respicias, it is to be feared that, considering she is a Frenchwoman, a nun, and moreover a fugitive nun, about whose chastity there has been considerable question, the Prince has got out of the frying-pan into the fire. Siformam it is not to be supposed that it was her beauty which charmed him, since, without doubt, he must be rather frightened than delighted, when he looks upon her. Si spem prolis, the Prince has certainly only too many heirs already, and ought to wish that he had neither wife nor chUdren. Si amicitiam, it is not to be supposed, while her father expresses himself in such threatening language with regard to her, that there wiU be much cordiality of friendship on his part. Let them look to it, then, lest it fare with them no better than with the Admiral, at his Paris wedding ; for those gentlemen can hardly forgive such injuries, sine mer curio et arsenico sub- Mmato."** The Elector of Saxony was frantic with choler, and almost ludicrous in the vehemence of its expression. Count John was unceasing in his exhortations to his brother to respect the sensitiveness of these important personages, and to remember how much good and how much evil it was in their power to compass, with regard to himself and to the great cause of the Protestant rehgion. He reminded him, too, that the divorce had not been, and would not be considered impregnable as to form, and that much discomfort and detriment was likely to grow out of the whole proceeding, for himself and his family, f The Prince, however, was immovable in his resolution, and from the whole tone of his correspondence and deportment it was obvious that his marriage was one rather of inclination than of * Archives et Correspondance, v. 227, 228. f See the letter of Count John to Prince of Orange, Archives, v. 208-213. 28 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. pohcy. " I can assure you, my brother," he wrote to Count John, " that my character has always tended to this — to care neither for words nor menaces in any matter where I can act with a clear conscience, and without doing injury to my neighbour. Truly, if I had paid regard to the threats of princes, I should never have embarked in so many dangerous affairs, contrary to the wUl of the King, mymaster, in times past, and even to the advice of many of my relatives and friends."* The evU consequences which had been foreseen were not slow to manifest themselves. There was much discussion of the Prince's marriage at the Diet of Frankfort, and there was even a proposition, formally to declare the Calvinists ex cluded in Germany from the benefits of the Peace of Passau. The Archduke Rudolph was soon afterwards elected King of the Romans and of Bohemia, although hitherto, according to the policy of the Prince of Orange, and in the expecta tion of benefit to the cause of the Reformation in Germany and the Netherlands, there has been a strong disposition to hold out hopes to Henry the Third, and to excite the fears of Maximilian, f While these important affairs, public and private, had been occurring in the south of Holland and in Germany,, a very nefarious transaction had disgraced the cause of the patriot party in the northern quarter. Diedrich Sonoy. governor of that portion of Holland, a man of great bravery but of extreme ferocity of character, had discovered an extensive con spiracy among certain of the inhabitants, in aid of an approach ing Spanish invasion. Bands of land-loupers had been em ployed, according to the intimation which he had received or affected to have received, to set fire to villages and towns in every direction, to set up beacons, and to conduct a series of signals by which the expeditions about to be organized were to be furthered in their objects.! The Governor, determined * See the letter, Archives, etc., 244-252. f Vide Groen v. Prinst, Archives, v. 299, 300. X Bor, viii. 623, sqq. Hoofd, x. 411, 412. Wagenaer, vii. 54, et seq. 1575.] BARBARITIES OF SONOT. 29 to show that the Duke of Alva could not be more prompt nor more terrible than himself, improvised, of his own authority, a tribunal in imitation of the infamous Blood-Council. Fortu nately for the character of the country, Sonoy was not a Hol lander, nor was the jurisdiction of this newly estabhshed court allowed to extend beyond very narrow limits. Eight vaga bonds were, however, arrested and doomed to tortures the most horrible, in order to extort from them confessions implicating persons of higher position in the land than themselves. Seven, after a few turns of the pulley and the screw, confessed aU which they were expected to confess, and accused all whom they were requested to accuse. The eighth was firmer, and refused to testify to the guilt of certain respectable house holders, whose names he had, perhaps, never heard, and against whom there was no shadow of evidence. He was, however, reduced by three hours and a half of sharp torture to confess, entirely according to their orders, so that accusations and evi dence were thus obtained against certain influential gentlemen of the province, whose only crime was a secret adherence to the Catholic Faith.* The eight wretches who had been induced by promises of unconditional pardon upon one hand, and by savage torture on the other, to bear this false witness, were con demned to be burned alive, and on their way to the stake, they all retracted the statements which had only been extorted from them by the rack. Nevertheless, the indi viduals who had been thus designated, were arrested. Charged with plotting a general conflagration of the villages and farm houses, in conjunction with an invasion by Hierges and other Papist generals, they indignantly protested their innocence ; but two of them, a certain Kopp Corneliszoon, and his son, Nanning Koppezoon, were selected to undergo the most cruel torture which had yet been practised in the NethCrlands.f Sonoy, to his eternal shame, was disposed to prove that human * Bor, viii. 623, seq. Hoofd, x. 412. f Bor, viii. 626, seq. Hoofd, x. 413, seq. 30 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. ingenuity to inflict human misery had not been exhausted in the chambers of the Blood Council, for it was to be shown that Reformers were capable of giving a lesson even to inquisitors in this diabolical science. Kopp, a man advanced in years, was tortured during a whole day. On the foUowing morning he was again brought to the rack, but the old man was too weak to endure all the agony which his tormentors had pro vided for him. Hardly had he been placed upon the bed of torture than he calmly expired, to the great indignation of the tribunal.* " The Devil has broken his neck and carried him off to hell," cried they ferociously. " Nevertheless, that shall not prevent him from being hung and quartered." This decree of impotent vengeance was accordingly executed.y The son of Kopp, however, Nanning Koppezoon, was a man in the fuU vigor of his years. He bore with perfect fortitude a series of incredible tortures, after which, with his body singed from head to heel, and his feet almost entirely flayed, he was left for six weeks to crawl about his dungeon on his knees. He was then brought back to the torture-room, and again stretched upon the rack, while a large earthen vessel, made for the purpose, was placed, inverted, upon his naked body. A number of rats were introduced under this cover, and hot coals were heaped upon the vessel, thl the rats, rendered furious by the heat, gnawed into the very bowels of the victim, in their agony to escape. + The holes thus torn in his ° Bor, viii. 627, 628. Hoofd, x. 413. f Hoofd, x. 413. X Bor (viii. 628) conscientiously furnishes diagrams of the machinery by aid of which this devilish cruelty was inflicted. The rats were sent by the Governor .:imself. — Vide Letter of the Commissioners to Sonoy, apud Bor, viii. 640, 641. The whole letter is a wonderful monument of barbarity. The incredible tortures eo which, the poor creatures had been subjected are detailed in a business-like manner, as though the transactions were quite regular and laudable. The Com missioners conclude with pious wishes for the Governor's welfare : " Noble, wise virtuous, and very discreet sir," they say, " we have wished to apprise you of the foregoing, and we now pray that God Almighty may spare you in a happy, healthy and long-continued government "—It will be seen, however, that the •wise, virtuous, and very discreet" Governor, who thus caused his fellow-citi zen's bowels to be gnawed by rats, was not allowed to remain much longer in his "happy and healthy government." 1575.] NANNING KOPPEZOON. 31 bleeding flesh were filled with red-hot coals. He was after wards subjected to other tortures too foul to relate ; nor was it till he had endured all this agony, with a fortitude which seemed supernatural, that he was at last discovered to be human. Scorched, bitten, dislocated in every joint, sleepless, starving, perishing with thirst, he was at last crushed into a false confession, by a promise of absolute forgiveness. He admitted everything which was brought to his charge, con fessing a catalogue of contemplated burnings and beacon firings of which he had never dreamed, and avowing himself in league with other desperate Papists, stUl more dangerous than himself. Notwithstanding the promises of pardon, Nanning was then condemned to death. The sentence ordained that his heart should be torn from his living bosom, and thrown in his face, after which his head was to be taken off and exposed on the church- steeple of his native village. His body was then to be cut in four, and a quarter fastened upon different towers of the city of Alkmaar, for it was that city, recently so famous for its heroic resistance to the Spanish army, which was now suUied by all this cold-blooded atrocity. When led to execu tion, the victim recanted indignantly the confessions forced from him by weakness of body, and exonerated the persons whom he had falsely accused. A certain clergyman, named Jurian Epeszoon, endeavored by loud praying to drown his voice, that the people might not rise with indignation, and the dying prisoner with his last breath solemnly summoned this unworthy pastor of Christ to meet him within three days before the judgment-seat of God. It is a remarkable and authentic fact, that the clergyman thus summoned, went home pensively from the place of execution, sickened immediately and died upon the appointed day.* Notwithstanding this solemn recantation, the persons ac cused were arrested, and in their turn subjected to torture, * Bor, viii. 628, et seq. Hoofd, x. 414. Wagenaer, vii. 68. Brandt, Hist ReC i. 563. Velius Horn, bl 440. 32 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. but the affair now reached the ears of Orange. His peremp tory orders, with the universal excitement produced in the neighbourhood, at last checked the course of the outrage, and the accused persons were remanded to prison, where they re mained till liberated by the Pacification of Ghent. After their release they commenced legal proceedings against Sonoy, with a view of establishing their own innocence, and of bringing the inhuman functionary to justice. The process anguished, however, and was finally abandoned, for the powerful Governor had rendered such eminent service in the cause of liberty, that it was thought unwise to push him to extremity. It is no impeachment upon the character of the Prince that these horrible crimes were not prevented. It was impossible for him to be omnipresent. Neither is it just to consider the tortures and death thus inflicted upon innocent men an indehble stain upon the cause of liberty. They were the crimes of an individual who had been useful, but who like the Count De la Marck, had now contaminated his hand with the blood of the guiltless. The new tribunal never took root, and was abohshed as soon as its initiatory horrors were known.* On the 19th of July, Oudewater, entirely unprepared for such an event, was besieged by Hierges, but the garrison and the population, although weak, were brave. The town resisted eighteen days, and on the 7th of August was car ried by assault,f after which the usual horrors were fully practised, after which the garrison was put to the sword, and the townspeople fared little better. Men, women, and children were murdered in cold blood, or obliged to purchase their hves by heavy ransoms, while matrons and maids were sold by auc tion to the soldiers at two or three dollars each.+ Almost every house in the city was burned to the ground, and these horrible but very customary scenes having been enacted, the army of * Bor, vin. 628-641. Hoofd, x. 415-419. t Bor, viii. 646. Meteren, v. 100. X Bor, viii. 646. Hoofd, x. 424, 425. 1575.] A SUBMARINE PROJECT. 33 Hierges took its way to Schoonhoven. That city, not defend ing itself, secured tolerable terms of capitulation, and sur rendered on the 24th of August.* The Grand Commander had not yet given up the hope of naval assistance from Spain, notwithstanding the abrupt ter mination to the last expedition which had been organized. It was, however, necessary that a foothold should be recovered upon the seaboard, before a descent from without could be met with proper co-operation from the land forces within, and he was most anxious, therefore, to effect the reconquest of some portion of Zealand. The island of Tholen was still Spanish, and had been so since the memorable expedition of Mon dragon to South Beveland. From this interior portion of the archipelago the Governor now determined to attempt an expedition against the outer and more important territory. The three principal islands were Tholen, Duiveland, and Schouwen. Tholen was the first which detached itself from the continent. Next, and separated from it by a bay two leagues in width, was Duiveland, or the Isle of Doves. Be yond, and parted by a narrower frith, was Schouwen, fronting dhectly upon the ocean, fortified by its strong capital city, Zierickzee, and containing other villages of inferior con- sequence.f Requesens had been long revolving in his mind the means of possessing himself of this important island. He had caused to be constructed a numerous armada of boats and light vessels of various dimensions, and he now came to Tholen to organize the expedition. His prospects were at first not flattering, for the gulfs and estuaries swarmed with Zealand vessels, manned by crews celebrated for their skUl and audacity. Traitors, however, from Zealand itself now came forward to teach the Spanish Commander how to strike at the heart of their own country. These refugees explained * Bor, viii. 447. Meteren, v. 100. f Bor, viii. 648-650. Hoofd, x. 426, 427. Meterei. v. 101, 102. Mendoza, xiv. 281. Bentivoglio, ix. 164, et seq. VOL. III. 3 34 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. to Requesens that a narrow flat extended under the sea from PhUipsland, a small and uninhabited islet situate close to Tholen, as far as the shore of Duiveland. Upon this submerged tongue of land the water, during ebb-tide, was sufficiently shallow to be waded, and it would therefore be possible for a determined band, under cover of the night, to make the perilous passage. Once arrived at Duiveland, they could more easily cross the intervening creek to Schouwen, which was not so deep and only half as wide, so that a force thus sent through these dangerous shallows, might take pos session of Duiveland and lay siege to Zierickzee, in the very teeth of the Zealand fleet, wliich would be unable to sail near enough to intercept their passage.* The Commander determined that the enterprise should be attempted. It was not a novelty, because Mondragon, as we have seen, had aheady most brUliantly conducted a very similar expedition. The present was, however, a much more daring scheme. The other exploit, although sufficiently hazardous, and entirely successful, had been a victory gained over the sea alone. It had been a surprise, and had been effected without any opposition from human enemies. Here, however, they were to deal, not only with the ocean and dark ness, but with a watchful and determined foe. The Zealanders were aware that the enterprise was in contemplation, and their vessels lay about the contiguous waters in considerable force.f Nevertheless, the determination of the Grand Commander was haUed with enthusiasm by his troops. Having satisfied himself by personal experiment that the enterprise was possible, and that therefore his brave soldiers could accomplish it, he decided that the glory of the achievement should be fairly shared, as before, among the different nations which served the King. After completing his preparations, Requesens came to 0 Bor> ubi sup. Hoofd, x. 426. Mendoza, xiv. 282. Bentivoglio, ix. 165. f Bentivoglio, ix. 165. Hoofd, x. 428. Bor, viii. 648-650. Mendoza. xiv. 283. 1575.] EXPEDITION TO DUIVELAND AND SCHOUWEN. 35 Tholen, at which rendezvous were assembled three thousand infantry, partly Spaniards, partly Germans, partly Walloons. Besides these, a picked corps of two hundred sappers and miners was to accompany the expedition, in order that no time might be lost in fortifying themselves as soon as they had seized possession of Schouwen. Four hundred mounted troopers were, moreover, stationed in the town of Tholen, while the httle fleet, which had been prepared at Antwerp, lay near that city ready to co-operate with the land force as soon as they should complete their enterprise. The Grand Com mander now divided the whole force into two parts. One half was to remain in the boats, under the command of Mondragon ; the other half, accompanied by the two hundred pioneers, were to wade through the sea from PhUipsland to Duiveland and Schouwen. Each soldier of this detachment was pro vided with a pair of shoes, two pounds of powder, and rations for three days in a canvas bag suspended at his neck. The leader of this expedition was Don Osorio d'UUoa, an officer distinguished for his experience and bravery.* ,On the night selected for the enterprise, that of the 27th September, the moon was a day old in its fourth quarter, and rose a httle before twelve. It was low water at between four and five in the morning. The Grand Commander, at the appointed hour of midnight, crossed to PhUipsland, and stood on the shore to watch the setting forth of the Uttle army. He addressed a short harangue to them, in which he skil fully struck the chords of Spanish chivalry and the national love of glory, y and was answered with loud and enthusiastic cheers. Don Osorio d'Ulloa then stripped and plunged into the sea immediately after the guides. He was fol lowed by the Spaniards, after whom came the Germans and then the Walloons. The two hundred sappers and miners came next, and Don Gabriel Peralta, with his Spanish com- * Bentivoglio, ix. 166. Hoofd, x. 427, 428. Mendoza, xiv. 283. f Hoofd, x. 428. Bor, viii. 648-650. Mendoza, xiv. 283, 284. 36 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. pany, brought up the rear. It was a wUd night. Incessant lightning alternately revealed and obscured the progress of the midnight march through the black waters, as the anxious Commander watched the expedition from the shore, but the soldiers were quickly swallowed up in the gloom.* As they advanced cautiously, two by two, the daring adventurers found themselves soon nearly up to their necks in the waves, while so narrow was the submerged bank along which they were marching, that a misstep to the right or left was fatal. Luckless individuals repeatedly sank to rise no more. Meantime, as the sickly light of the waning moon came forth at intervals through the stormy clouds, the soldiers could plainly perceive the files of Zealand vessels through which they were to march, and which were anchored as close to the flat as the water would allow. Some had recklessly stranded themselves, in their eagerness to interrupt the passage of the troops, and the artil lery played unceasingly from the larger vessels. Discharges of musketry came continuaUy from all, but the fitful lightning rendered the aim difficult and the fire comparatively harmless, y while the Spaniards were, moreover, protected, as to a large part of their bodies, by the water in which they were immersed. At times, they halted for breath, or to engage in fierce skirmishes with their nearest assailants. Standing breast- high in the waves, and surrounded at intervals by total darkness, they were yet able to pour an occasional weU- directed volley into the hostfle ranks. The Zealanders, * Bor, viii. 648-650. Hoofd, x. 428. Bentivoglio, ix. 167.— According to Mendoza, the sky was full of preternatural appearances on that memorable night; literally, " The exhalations whizzing through the air Gave so much light that one might read by them." Julius Caesar. "Viendose en aqual punio cometas y senates en el cielo de grande claridad y tanta qua se leian cartas como si Juera de dia, quo ponia admiracion el verlas • juzgando los mas ser cosa fuera del curso natural," etc.: xiv. 284.— Compare Strada, viii. 398. f Bentivoglio, ix. 167. Hoofd, x. 429. Wagenaer, vii. 71. 1575.] A NIGHT'S ADVENTURE. 37 however, did not assail them with fire-arms alone. They transfixed some with their fatal harpoons ; they dragged others from the path with boathooks ; they beat out the brains of others with heavy flails.* Many were the mortal duels thus fought in the darkness, and, as it were, in the bottom of the sea ; many were the deeds of audacity which no eye was to mark save those by whom they were achieved. Still, in spite of all impediments and losses, the Spaniards steadUy advanced. If other arms proved less available, they were attacked by the fierce taunts and invectives of their often invisible foes, who revUed them as water-dogs, fetching and carrying for a master who despised them ; as mercenaries who coined their blood for gold, and were employed by tyrants for the basest uses. If stung by these mocking voices, they turned in the darkness to chastise their unseen tormentors, they were certain to te trampled upon by their comrades, and to be pushed from their narrow pathway into the depths of the sea. Thus many perished. The night wore on, and the adventurers stUl fought it out manfuUy, but very slowly, the main body of Spaniards, Germans, and WaUoons, soon after daylight, reaching the opposite shore, having sustained considerable losses, but in perfect order. The pioneers were not so fortunate. The tide rose over them before they could effect their passage, and swept nearly every one away.y The rear-guard, under Peralta, not surprised, like the pioneers, in the middle of their passage, by the rising tide, but prevented, before it was too late, from advancing far beyond the shore from which they had departed, were fortunately enabled to retrace their steps.J * " No bastara » nemici di travagliargli solamente co i moschetti, e con gli archibugi, ma piu d'appresso con uncini di ferro, con legni maneggiabili a rnolti doppi, e con altsi istromenti," etc. — Bentivoglio, ix. 167. "Llegavana herir a los nuestros con unos instrumentos de lamanera que los con que bateren el trigo para sacar el grano de la ^aja." — Mendoza, xiv. 285. f Hoofd, x. 429. — " Donde vays malaventurados, que os haren ser perros de agua," etc., etc. — Mendoza, ubi sup. Bentivoglio, ix. 168. Hoofd, x. 429. Mendoza, xiv. 285. X Mendoza, xiv. 285. Bentivoglio, Hoofd, Bor, ubi sup. 88 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. Don Osorio, at the head of the successful adventurers, now effected his landing upon Duiveland. Reposing themselves but for an instant after this unparalleled march through the water, of more than six hours, they took a shght refresh ment, prayed to the Virgin Mary and to Saint James, and then prepared to meet their new enemies on land. Ten companies of French, Scotch, and English auxiliaries lay in Duiveland, under the command of Charles Van Boisot. Strange to relate, by an inexphcable accident, or by treason, that general was slain by his own soldiers, at the moment when the royal troops landed. The panic created by this event became intense, as the enemy rose suddenly, as it were, out of the depths of the ocean to attack them. They magnified the numbers of their assailants, and fled terror-stricken in every direction. Some swam to the Zealand vessels which lay in the neighbourhood ; others took refuge in the forts which had been constructed on the island, but these were soon carried by the Spaniards, and the conquest of Duiveland was effected.* The enterprise was not yet completed, but the remainder was less difficult and not nearly so hazardous, for the creek which separated Duiveland from Schouwen was much narrower than the estuary which they had just traversed. It was less than a league in width, but so encumbered by rushes and briers that, although difficult to wade, it was not navigable for vessels of any kind.y This part of the expe dition was accomplished with equal resolution, so that, after a few hours' delay, the soldiers stood upon the much-coveted island of Schouwen. Five companies of states' troops, placed to oppose their landing, fled in the most cowardly manner at the firct discharge of the Spanish muskets,J and took refuse * Hoofd, x. 429. Bor, viii. 649. Mendoza, xiv. 286.— The officer, whose career was thus unfortunately closed, was u, brother of the famous Admiral Boisot, had himself rendered good service to the cause of his country, and was Governor of Walcheren at the time of his death. — Archives et Corresp. v. 283. f Mendoza, xiv. 286. Bentivoglio (ix. 168) says, " poco men d'una lengua." — Compare Bor, viii. 649. Hoofd, x. 429. X Mendoza, xiv. 287. Hoofd, x 429. Bentivogho, ix. 168. 1575.] SUCCESSFUL ISSUE. 39 in the city of Zierickzee, which was soon afterwards be leaguered. The troops had been disembarked upon Duiveland from the armada, which had made its way to the scene of action, after having received, by signal, information that the expedition through the water had been successful. Brouwershaven, on the northern side of Schouwen, was immediately reduced, but Bommenede resisted tiU the 25th of October, when it was at last carried by assault, and dehvered over to fire and sword. Of the whole population and garrison not twenty were left alive. Siege was then laid to Zierickzee, and Colonel Mon dragon was left in charge of the operations. Requesens himself came to Schouwen to give directions concerning this important enterprise.* Chiapin ViteUi also came thither in the middle of the winter, and was so much injured by a faU from his litter, whUe making the tour of the island, that he died on ship board during his return to Antwerp, f This officer had gained his laurels upon more than one occasion, his conduct in the important action near Mons, in which the Huguenot force under Genlis was defeated, having been particularly credit able. He was of a distinguished Umbrian family, and had passed his life in camps, few of the generals who had accom panied Alva to the Netherlands being better known or more odious to the inhabitants. He was equaUy distinguished for his courage, his cruelty, and his corpulence. The last characteristic was so remarkable that he was almost monstrous in his personal appearance. His protuberant stomach was always supported in a bandage suspended from his neck, yet in spite of this enormous impediment, he was personaUy active on the battle-field, and performed more service, not only as a commander but as a subaltern, than many a younger and Ughter man.J * Mendoza, xiv. 287-293, seq. Bentivoglio, ix. 169, 170. Bor, viii, 652. seq. Hoofd, x. 431. t Meteren, v. 103. Strada, viii. 403. X Strada, viii 404. — Vitelli seems to have been unpopular with the Span- 40 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. The siege of Zierickzee was protracted tiU the foUowing June, the city holding out with firmness. Want of funds caused the operations to be conducted with languor, but the same cause prevented the Prince from accomplishing its rehef. Thus the expedition from PhUipsland, the most brilliant mUitary exploit of the whole war, was attended with important results. The communication between Walcheren and the rest of Zealand was interrupted , the provmce cut in two ; a foot hold on the ocean, for a brief interval at least, acquired by Spain. The Prince was inexpressibly chagrined by these circumstances, and felt that the moment had arrived when aU honorable means were to be employed to obtain foreign assist ance. The Hollanders and Zealanders had fought the battles of freedom alone hitherto, and had fought them well, but poverty was fast rendering them incapable of sustaining much longer the unequal conflict. Offers of men, whose wages the states were to furnish, were refused, as worse than fruitless. Henry of Navarre, who perhaps deemed it possible to acquire the sovereignty of the provinces by so barren a benefit, was willing to send two or three thousand men, but not at his own expense. The proposition was respectfully declined.* The Prince and his Uttle country were all alone. " Even if we should not only see ourselves deserted by aU the world, but also aU the world against us," he said, " we should not cease to defend ourselves even to the last man. Knowing the iards also, and Mendoza does not even allude to his death. The Netherlanders hated him cordially. His name, which afforded tho materials for a pun, was, of course, a whetstone for their wits. They improved his death by perpetrat ing a multitude of epigrams, of which the following may serve as a sample : — EPITAPHIUM CHIAP. VTTELLI, MARCHIOOTS CBTONIS, ETC. " 0 Deus omnipotens crassi miserere Vitelli, Quem mors proveniens non sinit esse bovem. Corpus in Italia est, tenet intestina Brabantus, Ast animam nemo, cur ? quia non habuit. — Vide Meteren, v. 103b. His death occurred towards the end of February (1576), a few days before that of the Grand Commander. o Wagenaer, vii. 88. Resol. Holl., Mart 15, 1576. 1575.] POLITICAL SCHEMES OF ORANGE. 41 justice of our cause, we repose entirely in the mercy of God."* He determined, however, once more to have recourse to the powerful of the earth, being disposed to test the truth of his celebrated observation, that " there would be no lack of suitors for the bride that he had to bestow." It was necessary, in short, to look the great question of formally renouncing Philip directly in the face. Hitherto the fiction of allegiance had been preserved, and, even by the enemies of the Prince, it was admitted that it had been retained with no disloyal intent. 7 The time, how ever, had come when it was necessary to throw off allegiance, provided another could be found strong enough and frank enough to accept the authority which Philip had forfeited. The question was, naturally, between France and England, unless the provinces could effect their re-admission into the body of the Germanic Empire. Already in June the Prince had laid the proposition formally before the states, " whether they should not negotiate with the Empire on the subject of their admission, with maintenance of their own constitutions," but it was understood that this plan was not to be carried out, if the protection of the Empire could be obtained under easier conditions.;}; Nothing came of the proposition at that time. The nobles and the deputies of South HoUand now voted, in the beginning of the ensuing month, "that it was their duty to abandon the King, as a tyrant who sought to oppress and destroy his subjects ; and that it behoved them to seek another pro tector." This was whUe the Breda negotiations were stiU pending, but when their inevitable result was very visible. There was still a reluctance at taking the last and decisive step in the rebeUion, so that the semblance of loyalty was stfll * Archives de la Maison d'Orange, v. 281. Letter to Count John. •f See the remarks of Groen v. Prinsterer on a passage in a letter of the Council o.f State to Requesens. — Archives, etc., v. 273. See also the letter in Bor, viii. 6'°. X Resol. Holl, June 6, 1575, bl. 363. Wagenaer, vii. 78. 42 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. retained ; that ancient scabbard, in which the sword might yet one day be sheathed. The proposition was not adopted at the diet. A committee of nine was merely appointed to deliberate with the Prince upon the " means of obtaining foreign assistance, without accepting foreign authority, or severing their connexion with his Majesty." The estates were, however, summoned a few months later, by the Prince, to dehberate on this important matter at Rotterdam. On the 1st of October he then fbrmaUy proposed, either to make terms with their enemy, and that the sooner the better, or else, once for aU, to separate entirely from the King of Spain, and to change their sovereign, in order, with the assistance and under protection of another Christian potentate, to maintain the provinces against their enemies. Orange, moreover, expressed the opinion that upon so important a subject it was decidedly incumbent upon them aU to take the sense of the city governments. The members for the various munici palities acquiesced in the propriety of this suggestion, and resolved to consult their constituents, whUe the deputies of the nobility also desired to consult with their whole body. After an adjournment of a few days, the diet again assembled at Delft, and it was then unanimously resolved by the nobles and the cities, " that they would forsake the King and seek foreign assistance ; referring the choice to the Prince, who, in regard to the government, was to take the opinion of the estates."* Thus, the great step was taken, by which two little provinces declared themselves independent of their ancient master. That declaration, although taken in the midst of doubt and dark ness, was not destined to be canceUed, and the germ of a new and powerful commonwealth was planted. So little, however, did these republican fathers foresee their coming repubhc, that the resolution to renounce one king was combined with a proposition to ask for the authority of another. It was not * Resol. Holl., Jul. 7, 1575, bl. 474. Jul. 9, 1575, bl. 482. Oct. 3, 1575, bL 668, 669. Oct. 13, 1575, bl. 692. Bor, viii. 651. Wagenaer, vii. 81. 1575.] FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 43 imagined that those two slender columns, which were all that- had yet been raised of the future stately peristyle, would be strong enough to stand alone. The question now arose, to what foreign power application should be made. But Uttle hope was to be entertained from Germany, a state which existed only in name, and France was still in a condition of religious and intestine discord. The attitude of revolt main tained by the Duc d'Alencon seemed to make it difficult and dangerous to enter into negotiations with a country where the civil wars had assumed so complicated a character, that a loyal and useful aUiance could hardly be made with any party. The Queen of England, on the other hand, dreaded the wrath of PhUip, by which her perpetual dangers from the side of Scotland would be aggravated, while she feared equaUy the extension of French authority in the Netherlands, by which increase her neighbour would acquire an overshadowing power. She was also ashamed openly to abandon the provinces to their fate, for her realm was supposed to be a bulwark of the Protestant rehgion. Afraid to affront Philip, afraid to refuse the suit of the Netherlands, afraid to concede a a aggrandizement to France, what course was open to the Enghsh Queen ? That which, politically and personally, she loved the best — a course of barren coquetry. This the Prince of Orange foresaw ; and although not disposed to leave a stone unturned in his efforts to find assistance for his country, he on the whole rather inclined for France. He, however, better than any man, knew how little cause there was for sanguine expectation from either source.* It was determined, in the name of his Highness and the estates, first' to send a mission to England, but there had already been negotiations this year of an unpleasant character with that power. At the request of the Spanish envoy, the fore most Netherland rebels, in number about fifty, including by De Thou, torn. vii. liv. 61. See Wagenaer, vii. 8L 44 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1575. name the Prince of Orange, the Counts of Berg and Culem- burg, with Saint Aldegonde, Boisot, Junius, and others, had been formally forbidden by Queen Elizabeth to enter her realm.* The Prince had, in consequence, sent Aldegonde and Junius on a secret mission to France,f and the Queen, jealous and anxious, had thereupon sent Daniel Rogers secretly to the Prince.J At the same time she had sent an envoy to the Grand Commander, counseUing conciliatory measures, and promising to send a special mission to Spain with the offer of her mediation, but it was suspected by those most in the confidence of the Spanish government at Brussels, that there was a great deal of deception in these proceedings.§ A truce for six months having now been established between the Duc d'Alencon and his brother, it was supposed, that an aUiance between France and England, and perhaps be tween Alencon and Elizabeth, was on the carpet, and that a kingdom of the Netherlands was to be the wedding present of the bride to her husband. These fantasies derived additional color from the fact that, while the Queen was expressing the most amicable intentions towards Spain, and the greatest jealousy of France, the English residents at Antwerp and other cities of the Netherlands had received private instruc tions to seU out their property as fast as possible, and to retire from the country. || On the whole, there was Uttle prospect either of a final answer, or of substantial assistance from the Queen. The envoys to England were Advocate Buis and Doctor Francis Maalzon, nominated by the estates, and Saint Alde gonde, chief of the mission, appointed by the Prince. Thev arrived in England at Christmas-tide. Having represented to the Queen the result of the Breda negotiations, they stated f Resol. Holl., Jul. 13, 1575, bl. 492. Meteren, v. 100, 101. j Bor, viii. 641. f Wagenaer, vii. 83. § Letter from Morillon to Cardinal Granvelle, of date Dec. 11, 1575. Archives et Corresp., v. 325, 326. | Letter of Morillon, ubi sup. 1575.] MISSION TO ENGLAND. 45 that the Prince and the estates, in despair of a secure peace, had addressed themselves to her as an upright protector of the Faith, and as a princess descended from the blood of Holland. This allusion to the intermarriage of Edward III. of England with Philippa, daughter of Count William III. of Hainault and Holland, would not, it was hoped, be in vain. They furthermore offered to her Majesty, in case she were wihing powerfuUy to assist the states, the sovereignty over HoUand and Zealand, under certain conditions.* The Queen Ustened graciously to the envoys, and appointed commissioners to treat with them on the subject. Meantime, Requesens. sent Champagny to England, to counteract the effect of this embassy of the estates, and to beg the Queen to give no heed to the prayers of the rebels, to enter into no negotiations with them, and to expel them at once from her kingdom.f The Queen gravely assured Champagny " that the envoys were no rebels, but faithful subjects of his Majesty."! There was certainly some effrontery in such a statement, con sidering the solemn offer which had just been made by the envoys. If to renounce allegiance to Philip and to propose the sovereignty to Elizabeth did not constitute rebeUion, it would be difficult to define or to discover rebelUon anywhere. The statement was as honest, however, as the diplomatic grimace with which Champagny had reminded Ehzabeth of the ancient and unbroken friendship which had always existed between herself and his Catholic Majesty. The attempt of Philip to procure her dethronement and assassination but a few years before was, no doubt, thought too trifling a circum stance to have for a moment interrupted those harmonious relations. Nothing came of the negotiations on either side. The Queen coquetted, as was her custom. She could not * Bor, viii. 660, 661. Resol. Holl., Nov. 14, 1575, bl. 730. f Bor, vin. 661. Vigl. Epist Select. No. 177, p. 407. X Bor, viii. 661. 46 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. I15"6 accept the offer of the estates ; she could not say them nay. She would not offend Philip ; she would not abandon the pro vinces ; she would therefore negotiate— thus there was an in finite deal of diplomatic nothing spun and unraveUed, but the result was both to abandon the provinces and to offend Phdip. In the first answer given by her commissioners to the states' envoys, it was declared, " that her Majesty considered it too expensive to assume the protection of both provinces. She was willing to protect them in name, but she should con fer the advantage exclusively on Walcheren in reahty. The defence of HoUand must be maintained at the expense of the Prince and the estates.* This was certainly not munificent, and the envoys insisted upon more ample and liberal terms. The Queen declined, however, committing herself beyond this niggardly and inad missible offer. The states were not willing to exchange the sovereignty over their country for so paltry a concession. The Queen declared herself indisposed to go further, at least before consulting parliament.f The commissioners waited for the assembling of parliament. She then refused to lay the matter before that body, and forbade the Hollanders taking any steps for that purpose.^ It was evident that she was disposed to trifle with the provinces, and had no idea of encountering the open hostUity of PhUip. The envoys accordingly begged for their passports. These were granted in April, 1576, with the assurance on the part of her Majesty that " she would think more of the offer made to her after she had done aU in her power to bring about an arrangement between the provinces and Philip."§ After the result of the negotiations of Breda, it is difficult to imagine what method she was likely to devise for accom plishing such a purpose. The King was not more disposed than during the preceding summer to grant liberty of religi non. * Bor, viii. 661-663. Wagenaer, vii. 85. f Wagenaer, vii. 85, 86. Bor, ubi sup. ¦ X Wagei.aer, ubi sup. § Bor, viii. 663. Wagenaer, vii. 86. 1576.] MEAGRE RESULTS. 4T nor were the HoUanders more ready than they had been before to renounce either their faith or their fatherland. The envoys, on parting, made a strenuous effort to negotiate a loan, but the frugal Queen considered the proposition quite inadmissi ble. She granted them liberty to purchase arms and am munition, and to levy a few soldiers with their own money, and this was accordingly done to a limited extent. As it was not difficult to hire soldiers or to buy gunpowder anywhere, in that warlike age, provided the money were ready, the states had hardly reason to consider themselves under deep obligation for this concession. Yet this was the whole result of the embassy. Plenty of fine words had been bestowed, which might or might not have meaning, according to the turns taken by coming events. Besides these cheap and empty civilities, they received permission to defend Holland at their own expense, with the privilege of surrendering its sovereignty, if they liked, to Queen Elizabeth — and this was all. On the 19th of April, the envoys returned to their country, and laid before the estates the meagre result of their negotia tions.* Very soon afterwards, upon an informal suggestion from Henry III. and the Queen Mother, that a more favorable result might be expected, if the same applications were made to the Duc d'Alencon which had been received in so unsatis factory a manner by Elizabeth, commissioners were appointed to France. y It proved impossible, however, at that juncture, to proceed with the negotiations, in consequence of the troubles occasioned by the attitude of the Duke. The pro vinces were stiU, even as they had been from the beginning, entirely alone. Requesens was more than ever straitened for funds, wring ing, with increasing difficulty, a slender subsidy, from time to time, out of the reluctant estates of Brabant, Flanders, and the other obedient provinces. While he was still at * Bor, viii. 661-663. Hoofd, x. 434, 435. Meteren, v. 101. Resol. HolL, Apr. 19, 1576, bl. 42. t Ever. Reid. Ann., lib. i. 18. 48 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. Duiveland, the estates-general sent him a long remonstrance against the misconduct of the soldiery, in answer to his de mand for supplies. " Oh, these estates ! these estates !" cried the Grand Commander, on receiving such vehement reproaches instead of his money ; " may the Lord deliver me from these estates !"* Meantime, the important siege of Zierickzee con tinued, and it was evident that the city must fall. There was no money at the disposal of the Prince. Count John, who was seriously embarrassed by reason of the great obligations in money which he, with the rest of his family, had incurred on behalf of the estates, had recently made application to the Prince for his influence towards procuring him relief. He had forwarded an account of the great advances made by himself and his brethren in money, plate, furniture, and endorsements of various kinds, for which a partial reimbursement was almost indispensable to save him from serious difficulties. 7 The Prince, however, unable to procure him any assistance, had been obhged once more to entreat him to display the generosity and the self-denial which the country had never found wanting at his hands or at those of his kindred. The appeal had not been in vain ; but the Count was obviously not in a condition to effect anything more at that moment to relieve the financial distress of the states. The exchequer was crippled. + HoUand and Zealand were cut in twain by the occupation of Schouwen and the approaching fall of its capital. Germany, England, France, all refused to stretch out their hands to save the heroic but exhaustless little provinces. It was at this moment that "Dios nos libera de estos Estados." — Meteren, v. 1031'. f Archives et Correspondance, v. 301-304. X The contributions of Holland and Zealand for war expenses amounted to one hundred and fifty thousand florins monthly. The pay of a captain was eighty florins monthly; that of a heutenant, forty; that of a, corporal, fifteen; that of a drummer, fifer, or minister, twelve ; that of a common soldier, seven and a half. A captain had also one hundred and fifty florins each month to dis tribute among the most meritorious of his company. Each soldier was likewisa furnished with food, bedding, fire, light, and washing.— Renom de France MS., vol. ii. c. 46. 1576.] DESPERATE SCHEMES. 49 a desperate but sublime resolution took possession of the Prince's mind. There seemed but one way left to exclude the Spaniards for ever from Holland and Zealand, and to rescue the inhabitants from impending ruin. The Prince had long brooded over the scheme, and the hour seemed to have struck for its fulfilment. His project was to coUect all the vessels, of every description, which could be obtained throughout the Netherlands. The whole population of the two provinces, men, women, and chUdren, together with all the moveable property of the country, were then to be embarked on board this numerous fleet, and to seek a new home beyond the seas. The windmills were then to be burned, the dykes pierced, tho sluices opened in every direction, and the country restored for ever to the ocean, from which it had sprung.* It is difficult to say whether the resolution, if Providence had permitted its fulfilment, would have been, on the whole, better or worse for humanity and civUization. The ships which would have borne the heroic Prince and his fortunes might have taken the direction of the newly-discovered Western hemisphere. A rehgious colony, planted by a commercial and liberty-loving race, in a virgin soU, and directed by patrician but self- denying hands, might have preceded, by half a century, the colony which a kindred race, impelled by similar motives, and under somewhat similar circumstances and conditions, was destined to plant upon the stern shores of New England. Had they directed their course to the warm and fragrant islands of the East, an independent Christian commonwealth * Bor relates that this plan had been definitely formed by the Prince. His authority is "a credible gentleman of quality" (een geloofswaerdig edelmann van qualiteit) who, at the time, was a member of the estates and government of Holland. — viii. 664. Groen v. Prinsterer, however, rejects the tale as fabulous ; or believes, at any rate, that the personage alluded to by Bor took the Prince's words too literally. It is probable that the thought was often in tho Prince's mind, and found occasional expression, although it had never been actually re duced to a scheme. It is difficult to see that it was not consistent with his char acter, supposing that there had been no longer any room for hope. Hoofd, x. 443, adopts the story without hesitation. Wagenaer, vii. 88, 89, alludes to it as a matter of current report. — Compare Van Wyn op Wagen. vii. 33-35. vol. m. 4 50 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. might have arisen among those prolific regions, superior in im portance to any subsequent colony of Holland, cramped from its birth by absolute subjection to a far distant metropolis. The unexpected death of Requesens suddenly dispeUed these schemes. The siege of Zierickzee had occupied much of the Governor's attention, but he had recently written to his sovereign, that its reduction was now certain. He had added an urgent request for money, with a sufficient supply of which he assured Phihp that he should be able to bring the war to an immediate conclusion. While waiting for these sup pUes, he had, contrary to aU law or reason, made an unsuccessful attempt to conquer the post of Embden, in Germany. A mutiny had, at about the same time, broken out among his troops in Harlem, and he had furnished the citizens with arms to defend themselves, giving free permission to use them against the insurgent troops. By this means the mutiny had been quelled, but a dangerous precedent estabhshed. Anxiety concerning this rebeUion is supposed to have hastened the Grand Commander's death. A violent fever seized him on the 1st, and terminated his existence on the 5th of March, in the fifty-first year of his Ufe.* It is not necessary to review elaborately his career, the chief incidents of which have been sufficiently described. Requesens was a man of high position by birth and office, but a thoroughly commonplace personage. His talents either for war or for civU employments were not above mediocrity. His friends disputed whether he were greater in the field or in the council, but it is certain that he was great in neither. His bigotry was equal to that of Alva, but it was impossible to rival the Duke in cruelty. Moreover, the condition of the country, after seven years of torture under his predecessor, made it difficult for him, at the time of his arrival, to imitate the severity which had made the name of Alva infamous. The Blood CouncU had been re- * Bor, viii. 663, 665. Hoofd, x. 436-137. Vigl. Epist Select, Ep. Card. Granv., No. 178, p. 408. 1576.] CHARACTER OF REQUESENS. 51 tained throughout his administration, but its occupation was gone, for want of food for its ferocity. The obedient provinces had been purged of Protestants ; while crippled, too, by con fiscation, they offered no field for further extortion. From Hol land and Zealand, whence Catholicism had been nearly excluded, the King of Spain was nearly excluded also. The Blood CouncU which, if set up in that country, would have executed every hving creature of its population, could only gaze from a distance at those who would have been its victims. Requesens had been previously distmguished in two fields of action : the Granada massacres and the carnage of Lepanto. Upon both occasions he had been the mUitary tutor of Don John of Austria, by whom he was soon to be succeeded in the government of the Netherlands. To the imperial bastard had been assigned the pre-eminence, but it was thought that the Grand Commander had been entitled to a more than equal share of the glory. We have seen how much additional reputation was acquired by Requesens in the provinces. The expedition against Duive land and Schouwen, was, on the whole, the most brilliant feat of arms during the war, and its success reflects an undying lustre on the hardihood and discipline of the Spanish, German, and Walloon soldiery. As an act of individual audacity in a bad cause, it has rarely been equaUed. It can hardly be said, however, that the Grand Commander was entitled to any large measure of praise for the success of the expedition. The plan was laid by Zealand traitors. It was carried into execu tion by the devotion of the Spanish, WaUoon, and German troops, whUe Requesens was only a spectator of the transaction. His sudden death arrested, for a moment, the ebb-tide in the affairs of the Netherlands, which was fast leaving the country bare and desolate, and was followed by a train of unforeseen transactions; which it is now our duty to describe. CHAPTER IT. Assumption of affairs by the state council at Brussels— Hesitation at Madrid-= Joachim Hopper— Mal-administration— Vigilance of Orange — The pro vinces drawn more closely together— Inequality of the conflict— Physi cal condition of Holland— New act of Union between Holland and Zea land—Authority of the Prince defined and enlarged— Provincial polity characterized— Generous sentiments of the Prince— Hia tolerant spirit- Letters from the King— Attitude of the great powers towards the Ne therlands — Correspondence and policy of Elizabeth — Secret negotiations with France and Alenjon — Confused and menacing aspect of Germany — Responsible and laborious position of Orange — Attempt to relieve Zierick zee Death of Admiral Boisot — Capitulation of the city upon honourable terms — Mutiny of the Spanish troops in Schouwen — General causes of discontent — Alarming increase of the mutiny — The rebel regiments enter Brabant — Fruitless attempts to pacify them — They take possession of A Inst, — Edicts, denouncing them, from the state council — Intense excite ment in Brussels and Antwerp-n-Letters from Philip brought by Marquis Havre — The King's continued procrastination — Ruinous royal confirma tion of the authority assumed by the state council — United and genera* resistance to foreign military oppression — The German troops and the Ant werp garrison, under Avila, join the revolt — Letter of Verdugo — A crisis approaching — Jerome de Roda in the citadel — The mutiny universal. The death of Requesens, notwithstanding his four days' iUness, occurred so suddenly, that he had not had time to appoint his successor. Had he exercised this privdege, which his patent conferred upon him, it was supposed that he would have nominated Count Mansfeld to exercise the functions of Governor-General, untU the King should otherwise ordain.* * Bor, viii. 663. Meteren, v. 104*. 1576.] INDECISION. 53 In the absence of any definite arrangement, the Council of State, according to a right which that body claimed from custom, assumed the reins of government. Of the old board, there were none left but the Duke of Aerschot, Count Berlaymont, and Vighus. To these were soon added, how ever, by royal diploma, the Spaniard, Jerome de Roda, and the Netherlanders, AssonleviUe, Baron Rassenghiem and Arnold Sasbout. Thus, aU the members, save one, of what had now become the executive body, were natives of the country. Roda was accordingly looked askance upon by his colleagues. He was regarded by VigUus as a man who desired to repeat the part which had been played by Juan Vargas in the Blood CouncU, whUe the other members, although stanch Cathohcs, were aU of them well-disposed to vindicate tho claim of Netherland nobles to a share in the government of the Netherlands. For a time, therefore, the transfer of authority seemed to have been smoothly accomplished. The Council of State con ducted the administration of the country. Peter Ernest Mans- feld was entrusted with the supreme mihtary command, including the government of Brussels ; and the Spanish com manders, although dissatisfied that any but a Spaniard should be thus honored, were for a time quiescent.* When the news reached Madrid, Philip was extremely disconcerted. The death of Requesens excited his indignation. He was angry with him, not for dying, but for dying at so very inconvenient a moment. He had not yet fully decided either upon his successor, or upon the pohcy to be enforced by his successor. There were several candidates for the vacant post ; there was a variety of opinions in the cabinet as to the course of conduct to be adopted.f In the impossibihty of * Bor, Meteren, ubi sup. Viglii Epist. Select, ad Diversos, No. 179, p. 409. VigL Epist, ubi sup. Hoofd, xi. 438. Bor, ix. 663. Wagenaer (vii. 91), however, states that Mansfeld was entrusted simply with the government of Brussels, and that it is an error to describe him as invested with the su preme military command. f Letter of Philip (March 24, 1576) to states general, in Bor, ix. 663. 54 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. instantly making up. his mind upon this unexpected emer gency, PhUip feU, as it were, into a long reverie, than which nothing could be more inopportune. With a country in a state of revolution and exasperation, the trance, which now seemed to come over the government, was hke to be foUowed by deadly effects. The stationary policy, which the death of Requesens had occasioned, was aUowed to prolong itself inde finitely,* and almost for the first time in his life, Joachim Hopper was reaUy consulted about the affairs of that depart ment over which he imagined himself, and was generally sup posed by others, to preside at Madrid. The creature of Vighus, having all the subserviency, with none of the acute ness of his patron, he had been long employed as chief of the Netherland bureau, whUe kept in profound ignorance of the affairs which were transacted in his office. He was a privy councillor, whose counsels were never heeded, a confidential servant in whom the King reposed confidence, only on the ground that no man could reveal secrets which he did not know. This deportment of the King's showed that he had accurately measured the man, for Hopper was hardly competent for the place of a chief clerk. He was unable to write clearly in any language, because incapable of a fuUy developed thought upon any subject. It may be supposed that nothing but an abortive policy, therefore, would be produced upon the occasion thus suddenly offered. " 'Tis a devout man, that poor Master Hopper," said GranveUe, " but rather fitted for platonic researches than for affahs of state."y It was a proof of this incompetency, that now, when reaUy caUed upon for advice in an emergency, he should recommend a continuance of the interim. Certainly nothing worse could be devised. GranveUe recommended a reappointment of the Duchess Margaret. J Others suggested Duke Eric of Brunswick, or an Archduke of the Austrian house ; although the opinion * Strada, viii. 407, 408. Hoofd, xi. 438. Bor, viii. 663, sqq. V. d. Vynckt; ii. 176, et sqq., etc. | Archives et Correspondance, v. 874. X MS. cited by Groen v. Prinst. v. 331. 1576.] AN INTERIM. 55 held by most of the influential counciUors was in favor of Don John of Austria.* In the interests of Phihp and his despotism, nothing, at any rate, could be more fatal than delay. In the condition of affairs which then existed, the worst or feeblest governor would have been better than none at all. To leave a vacancy was to play directly into the hands of Orange, for it was impossible that so skilful an adversary should not at once perceive the fault, and profit by it to the utmost. It was strange that Phihp did not see the danger of inactivity at such a crisis. Assuredly, indolence was never his vice, but on this occasion indecision did the work of indolence. Unwittingly, the despot was assisting the efforts of the libe rator. Viglius saw the position of matters with his customary keenness, and wondered at the blindness of Hopper and Philip. At the last gasp of a life, which neither learning nor the accumulation of worldly prizes and worldly pelf could redeem from intrinsic baseness, the sagacious but not venerable old man saw that a chasm was daUy widening, in which the rehgion and the despotism which he loved might soon be hopelessly swaUowed. " The Prince of Orange and his Beggars do not sleep," he cried, almost in anguish ; " nor wiU they be quiet tUl they have made use of this interregnum to do us some immense grievance."f Certainly the Prince of Orange did not sleep upon this nor any other great occasion of his life. In his own vigorous language, used to stimulate his friends in various parts of the country, he seized the swift occasion by the forelock. He opened a fresh correspondence with many leading gentlemen in Brussels and other places in the Netherlands ; persons of influence, who now, for the first time, showed a disposition to side with their country agamst its tyrants.^ Hitherto the land had been * MS. cited by Groen v. Prmst. v. 331.— Compare Bor, viii. 663, and the letters of Phihp to State Council, in Bor, ubi sup; letters which Cabrera characterizes as "amorosas, suaves enlas razones fraternales," and in which "dezia los amaba como a hijos ! I" These letters distinctly indicated Don John as the probable successor of Bequesens— Cabrera, Vita de Felipe II., xi. 845. f Vigl. Epist. ad Joach. Hopperum, ep. 265, p. 863. X De Thou, liv. 62, t. vii. 368, 369. Wagenaer, vii. 104, 105, sqq. 56 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. divided into two very unequal portions. HoUand and Zealand were devoted to the Prince ; their whole population, with hardly an individual exception, converted to the Reformed rehgion. The other fifteen provinces were, on the whole, loyal to the King ; while the old religion had, of late years, taken root so rapidly again, that perhaps a moiety of their popula tion might be considered as Catholic* At the same time, the reign of terror under Alva, the paler, but not less distinct tyranny of Requesens, and the intolerable excesses of the foreign soldiery, by which the government of foreigners was supported, had at last maddened all the inhabitants of the seventeen provinces. Notwithstanding, therefore, the fata] difference of religious opinion, they were all drawn into closer relations with each other ; to regain their ancient privileges, and to expel the detested foreigners from the soil, being ob jects common to all. The provinces were united in one great hatred and one great hope. The Hollanders and Zealanders, under their heroic leader, had well nigh accompUshed both tasks, so far as those Uttle provinces were concerned. Never had a contest, however, seemed more hopeless at its commencement. Cast a glance at the map. Look at Holland — not the Repubhc, with its sister provinces beyond the Zuyder Zee — but HoUand only, with the Zealand archipelago. Look at that narrow tongue of half-submerged earth. Who could suppose that upon that slender sand-bank, one hundred and twenty miles in length, and varying in breadth from four mUes to forty, one man, backed by the population of a handful of cities, could do battle nine years long with the master of two worlds, the " Dominatoi of Asia, Africa, and America " — the despot of the fairest realms of Europe — and conquer him at last. Nor was WiUiam even entirely master of that narrow shoal where clung the survivors of a great national shipwreck. North and South Holland were cut in two by the loss of Harlem, while the enemy was in possession of the natural capital of the little country, * Groen v. Prinst, Archives, v. 381-385. — Compare de Thou, liv. 62. 1576.] STATE OF THE COUNTRY. 57 Amsterdam. The Prince affirmed that the cause had suffered more from the disloyalty of Amsterdam than from aU the efforts of the enemy. Moreover, the country was in a most desolate condition. It was almost literally a sinking ship. The destruction of the bulwarks against the ocean had been so extensive, in con sequence of the voluntary inundations which have been described in previous pages, and by reason of the general neglect which more vital occupations had necessitated that an enormous outlay, both of labor and money, was now indispensable to save the physical existence of the country. The labor and the money, notwithstanding the crippled and impoverished condition of the nation, were, however, freely contributed ; a wonderful example of energy and patient hero ism was again exhibited. The dykes which had been swept away in every direction were renewed at a vast expense.* Moreover, the country, in the course of recent events, had become almost swept bare of its cattle, and it was necessary to pass a law forbidding, for a considerable period, the slaughter of any animals, " oxen, cows, calves, sheep, or poultry."f It was, unfortunately, not possible to provide by law against that extermination of the human population which had been decreed by Philip and the Pope. Such was the physical and moral condition of the provinces of Holland and Zealand. The political constitution of both assumed, at this epoch, a somewhat altered aspect. The union between the two states, effected in June, 1575, required improvement. The administration of justice, the conflicts of laws, and more particularly the levying of monies and troops in equitable proportions, had not been adjusted with perfect smoothness. The estates of the two provinces, assembled in congress at Delft, concluded, therefore, a new act of union, which was duly signed upon the 25th of April, 1576+ Those * The work was, however, not fairly taken in hand until the spring of 1577.— Wagenaer, vii. 158, sqq. Bor, x. 819. f Resol. Holl. Feb. 28, 1575, bl. 97. Van Wyn op Wagenaer, vii. 26. X Bor, ix. 668. Kluit, Hist Holl. Reg., i. 115, et sqq. Wagenaer, vii. 94. 58 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. estates, consisting of the knights and nobles of HoUand, with the deputies from the cities and countships of HoUand and Zealand, had been duly summoned by the Prince of Orange.* They as fairly included aU the pohtical capacities, and furnished as copious a representation of the national wUl, as could be expected, for it is apparent upon every page of his history, that the Prince, upon aU occasions, chose to refer his policy to the approval and confirmation of as large a portion of the people as any man in those days considered capable or desirous of exercising poUtical functions. The new union consisted of eighteen articles. It was established that deputies from aU the estates should meet, when summoned by the Prince of Orange or otherwise, on penalty of fine, and at the risk of measures binding upon them being passed by the rest of the Congress, f Freshly arising causes of litigation were to be referred to the Prince.*. Free intercourse and traffic through the united provinces was gua- ranteed.§ The confederates were mutually to assist each other in preventing all injustice, wrong, or violence, even towards an enemy.|| The authority of law and the pure administration of justice were mutuaUy promised by the con tracting states.^]" The common expenses were to be appor tioned among the different provinces, " as if they were all included in the repubhc of a single city."** Nine commis sioners, appointed by the Prince on nomination by the estates, were to sit permanently, as his advisers, and as assessors and collectors of the taxes.ff The tenure of the union was from six months to six months, with six weeks' notice.*.*. The framers of this compact having thus defined the general outlines of the confederacy, declared that the government, thus constituted, should be placed under a single head. They * Bor, ix. 668. Wagenaer, vii. 93. Kluit, i. 115, sqq. f Art. 3. The document is given in full by Bor, ix. 668, sqq. X Article 4. § Article 5. | " Hoewel ook vijand." — Article 7. ^ Article 7. ** Article 10. ft Article 11. +4 Article 17, 18. 1576.] THE NEW UNION. 59 accordingly conferred supreme authority on the Prince,* de fining his powers in eighteen articles. He was declared chief commander by land and sea. He was to appoint all officers, from generals to subalterns, and to pay them at his discretion.! The whole protection of the land was devolved upon him. He was to send garrisons or troops into every city and viUage at his pleasure, without advice or consent of the estates, magistrates of the cities, or any other persons whatsoever.*. He was, in behalf of the King as Count of Holland and Zealand, to cause justice to be administered by the supreme court. § In the same capacity he was to provide for vacancies in aU poUtical and judicial offices of importance,|| choosing, with the advice of the estates, one officer for each vacant post out of three candidates nominated to him by that body.^f He was to appoint and renew, at the usual times, the magistracies in the cities, according to the ancient constitu tions. He was to make changes in those boards, if necessary, at unusual times, with consent of the majority of those repre senting the great councU and corpus of the said cities.** He was to uphold the authority and pre-eminence of all civU functionaries, and to prevent governors and mihtary officers from taking any cognizance of pohtical or judicial affairs. With regard to religion, he was to maintain the practice of the Reformed Evangelical religion, and to cause to surcease the exercise of all other religions contrary to ihe Gospel. He was, however, not to permit that inquisition should be made into any man's belief or conscience, or that any man by cause thereof should suffer trouble, injury, or hindrance.^ The league thus concluded was a confederation between a * Articles of Union, Bor, ix. 620. t Articles 1 and 2. X Articles 3-7. § Article 8. ] Compare Kluit, HoU. Staatsreg., i. 121, 122. T Article 10. — See Kluit's Commentary on this article. — Holl. Staatsreg., i. 121, 122. ** Article 13. tt Article 15. — "Sonder dat syne E. sal toelaten dat men op jemands geloof op conscientie sal inquireren of dat jemand ter cause van die eenige moeyenis, injurie, of letsel angedaen sal worden, etc., etc. 60 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. group of virtuaUy independent little republics. Each munici pality, was, as it were, a little sovereign, sending envoys to a congress to vote and to sign as plenipotentiaries. The vote of each city was, therefore, indivisible, and it mattered little, practically, whether there were one deputy or several. Tho nobles represented not only their own order, but were sup posed to act also in behalf of the rural population. On the whole, there was a tolerably fair representation of the whole nation. The people were weU and worthily represented in the government of each city, and therefore equaUy so in the assembly of the estates.* It was not tiU later that the cor porations, by the extinction of the popular element, and by the usurpation of the right of self-election, were thoroughly stiffened into fictitious personages which never died, and which were never thoroughly alive. At this epoch the provincial hberties, so far as they could maintain themselves against Spanish despotism, were practical and substantial. The government was a representative one,y in which all those who had the inclination possessed, in one mode or another, a voice. Although the various members of the confederacy were locally and practicaUy repubhcs or self- governed little commonwealths, the general government which they established was, in form, monarchical. The powers con ferred upon Orange constituted him a sovereign ad interim, for while the authority of the Spanish monarch remained sus pended, the Prince was invested, not only with the whole executive and appointing power, but even with a very large share in the legislative functions of the state.* The whole system was rather practical than theoretical, without any accurate distribution of political powers. In living, energetic communities, where the blood of the body pohtic circulates swiftly, there is an inevitable tendency of the dif ferent organs to sympathize and commingle more closely than * Compare Kluit, Holl., Staatsreg., i. 130. t Kluit, 129, 130. j K!^ L 125 1576.] THE PRINCE'S TASK. 61 a priori phUosophy would aUow. It is usuaUy more desirable than practicable to keep the executive, legislative, and judicial departments entirely independent of each other.* Certainly, the Prince of Orange did not at that moment indulge in speculations concerning the nature and origin of government. The Congress of Delft had just clothed him with almost regal authority. In his hands were the powers of war and peace, joint control of the magistracies and courts of justice, absolute supremacy over the army and the fleets. It is true that these attributes had been conferred upon him ad interim, but it depended only upon himself to make the sovereignty personal and permanent. y He was so thoroughly absorbed in his work, however, that he did not even see the diadem which he put aside. It was small matter to him whether they caUed him stadholder or guardian, prince or king. He was the father of his country and its defender. The people, from highest to lowest, caUed him " Father WUham," and the title was enough for him. The question with him was, not what men should caU him, but how he should best accom-" plish his task. So little was he inspired by the sentiment of self-elevation,, that he was anxiously seeking for a fitting person — strong,, wise, and willing enough — to exercise the sovereignty which was thrust upon himself, but which he desired to exchange against an increased power to be actively useful to his country. To expel the foreign oppressor ; to strangle the Inquisition ; to maintain the ancient liberties of the nation ; — here was labor enough for his. own hands. The vulgar thought of carving a throne out of the misfortunes of his country seemc not to have entered his mind. Upon one point, however, the Prince had been peremptory. He would have no persecution of the opposite creed. He was requested to suppress the Cathohc rehgion, in terms. As we have seen, he caused the expression to be exchanged for the words, " rehgion at vari- * Compare Guizot, du Systeme Representatif; t. i. t Compare Groen v. Prinst., Archives et Correspondance, v. 340-342. 62 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. ance with the Gospel." He resolutely stood out against aU meddling with men's consciences, or inquiring into their thoughts. While smiting the Spanish Inquisition into the dust, he would have no Calvinist inquisition set up in its place. Earnestly a convert to the Reformed religion, but hating and denouncing only what was corrupt in the ancient Church, he would not force men, with fire and sword, to travel to heaven upon his own road. Thought should be toU-free. Neither monk nor minister should burn, drown, or hang his feUow-creatures, when argument or expostulation faUed to redeem them from error. It was no smaU virtue, in that age, to rise to such a height. We know what Calvinists, Zwing- hans, Lutherans, have done in the Netherlands, in Germany, in Switzerland, and almost a century later in New England. It is, therefore, with increased veneration that we regard this large and truly catholic mind. His tolerance proceeded from no indifference. No man can read his private writings, or form a thorough acquaintance with his interior life, without recognizing him as a deeply religious man. He had faith unfaltering in God. He had also faith in man and love for his brethren. It was no wonder that in that age of rehgious bigotry he should have been assaulted on both sides. While the Pope excommunicated him as a heretic, and the King set a price upon his head as a rebel, the fanatics of the new religion denounced him as a godless man. Peter Dathenus, the unfrocked monk of Poperingen, shrieked out in his pulpit that the " Prince of Orange cared nothing either for God or for religion."* The death of Requesens had offered the first opening through which the watchful Prince could hope to inflict a wound in the vital part of Spanish authority in the Nether lands. The languor of PhUip and the procrastinating counsel of the dull Hopper unexpectedly widened the opening. On the 24th of March letters were written by his Majesty to the states-general, to the provincial estates, and to the courts of * Brandt, Hist, der Ref., t. i. b. xi. 607. 1576.] ATTITUDE OF ELIZABETH. 63 justice, instructing them that, untU further orders, they were aU to obey the Council of State. The King was confident that aU would do their utmost to assist that body in securing the holy Catholic Faith and the imphcit obedience of the country to its sovereign. He would, in the meantime, occupy himself with the selection of a new -Governor-General, who should be of his family and blood. This uncertain and perUous condition of things was watched with painful interest in neigh bouring countries. The fate of aU nations was more or less involved in th6 development of the great rehgious contest now waging in the Netherlands. England and France watched each other's movements in the direction of the provinces with intense jealousy. The Protestant Queen was the natural ally of the struggling Reformers, but her despotic sentiments were averse to the fostering of rebeUion against the Lord's anointed. The thrifty Queen looked with alarm at the prospect of large subsidies which would undoubtedly be demanded of her. The jealous Queen could as ill brook the presence of the French in the Netherlands as that of the Spaniards whom they were to expel. She therefore embarrassed, as usual, the operations of the Prince by a course of stale poUtical coquetry. She wrote to him, on the 18th of March, soon after the news of the Grand Commander's death,* saying that she could not yet accept the offer which had been made to her, to take the provinces of HoUand and Zealand under her safe keeping, to assume, as Countess, the sovereignty over them, and to protect the inhabitants against the alleged tyranny of the King of Spain. She was unwilling to do so untU she had made every effort to reconcile them with that sovereign. Before the death of Requesens she had been intending to send him an envoy, proposing a truce, for the purpose of negotiation. This pur pose she stfll retained. She should send commissioners to the Council of State and to the new Governor, when he should arrive. She should also send a special envoy to the King of * Bor, ix. 667. 64 THE RISE OF THE BUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. Spain. She doubted not that the King would take her advice, when he heard her speak in such straightforward language. In the meantime, she hoped that they would negotiate with no other powers.* This was not very satisfactory. The Queen rejected the offers to herself, but begged that they might, by no means, be made to her rivals. The expressed intention of softening the heart of Philip by the use of straightforward language seemed but a sorry sarcasm. It was hardly worth whfle to wait long for so improbable a result. Thus much for England at that juncture. Not inimical, certainly ; but over-cautious, un generous, teasing, and perplexing, was the policy of the maiden Queen. With regard to France, events there seemed to favor the hopes of Orange. On the 14th of May, the " Peace of Monsieur," the treaty by which so ample but so short-lived a triumph was achieved by the Huguenots, was signed at Paris.f Everything was conceded, but nothing was secured. Rights of worship, rights of office, political and civil, religious en franchisement, were recovered, but not guaranteed.* It seemed scarcely possible that the King could be in earnest then, even if a Medicean Valois could ever be otherwise than treacherous. It was almost, certain, therefore, that a reaction would take place ; but it is easier for us, three centuries after the event, to mark the precise moment of reaction, than it was for the most far-seeing contemporary to foreteU how soon it would occur. In the meantime, it was the Prince's cue to make use of this sunshine while it lasted. Already, so soon as the union of 25th of April had been concluded between Holland and Zealand, he had forced the estates to open negotiations with France.§ The provinces, although desirous to confer sovereignty upon him, were indisposed to renounce their old aUegiance to their King in order to place it at the disposal of * Letter of Queen Elizabeth, March 16, 1576, in Bor, ix. 667.— Compare Groen r. Prinst, v. 332, 333. t De Thou, t. vii. 1. lxii. 418. X De Thou, vii. 413-418.— Compare Groen v. Prinst., v. 349-351. § Resol. v. Holl., 64, 65. Groen v. Prinst., v. 341. 1576.] GERMANY. 65 a foreigner. Nevertheless, a resolution, at the reiterated de mands of Orange, was passed by the estates, to proceed to the change of master, and, for that purpose, to treat with the King of France, his brother, or any other foreign potentate, who would receive these provinces of HoUand and Zealand under his government and protection.* Negotiations were accordingly opened with the Duke of Anjou, the dilettante leader of the Huguenots at that remarkable juncture. It was a pity that no better champion could be looked for among the anointed of the earth than the false, fickle, foolish Alencon, whose career, everywhere contemptible, was nowhere so flagi tious as in the Netherlands. By the fourteenth article of the Peace of Paris, the Prince was reinstated and secured in his principality of Orange, and his other possessions in France.f The best feeling, for the time being, was manifested between the French court and the Reformation.*. Thus much for England and France. As for Germany, the prospects of the Netherlands were not flattering. The Re forming spirit had grown languid, from various causes. The self-seeking motives of many Protestant princes had disgusted the nobles. Was that the object of the bloody wars of reh gion, that a few potentates should be enabled to enrich them selves by confiscating the broad lands and accumulated treasures of the Church ? Had the creed of Luther been embraced only for such unworthy ends ? These suspicions chiUed the ardor of thousands, particularly among the greater ones of the land. Moreover, the discord among the Reformers themselves waxed daUy, and became more and more mis chievous. Neither the people nor their leaders could learn that, not a new doctrine, but a wise toleration for all Christian doctrines was wanted. Of new doctrines there was no lack. Lutherans, Calvinists, Flaccianists, Majorists, Adiaphorists, • Resol. v. Holl., 64, 65. Groen v. Prinst, v. 341. t Bor, ix. 684. X The Edict, or Peace of Paris, in sixty-three articles, is published at length, by Bor, ix. 683-690.— Compare Groen v. Prinst, v. 349-351. De Thou, t. v. I vii. 413-418. VOL. ill. 5 66 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. Brantianists, Ubiquitists, swarmed and contended pell-mell.* In this there would have been small harm, if tho Reformers had known what reformation meant. But they could not invent or imagine toleration. AU claimed the privilege of persecuting. There were sagacious and honest men among the great ones of the country, but they were but few. Wise William of Hesse strove hard to effect a concordia among the jarring sects ; Count John of Nassau, though a passionate Cal vinist, did no less ; whUe the Elector of Saxony, on the other hand, raging and roaring like a bull of Bashan, was for sacrificing the interest of millions on the altar of his personal spite. Cursed was his tribe if he forgave the Prince. Ho had done what he could at the Diet of Ratisbon to exclude aU Calvinists from a participation in the rehgious peace of Ger many^ and he redoubled his efforts to prevent the extension of any benefits to the Calvinists of the Netherlands. These de terminations had remained constant and intense. On the whole, the political appearance of Germany was as menacing as that of France seemed for a time favorable to the schemes of Orange. The quarrels of the princes, and the daUy widening schism between Lutherans and Calvinists, seemed to bode little good to the cause of religious freedom. The potentates were perplexed and at variance, the nobles lukewarm and discontented. Among the people, although subdivided into hostUe factions, there was more life. Here, at least, were heartiness of love and hate, enthusiastic convic tion, earnestness and agitation. " The true rehgion," wrote Count John, "is spreading daily among the common men. Among the powerful, who think themselves highly learned, and who sit in roses, it grows, alas, little. Here and there a Nicodemus or two may be found, but things will hardly go better here than in France or the Netherlands."*. Thus, then, stood affairs in the neighbouring countries. The * See in particular a letter of Count John of Nassau to the Prince of Orange, dated DiUemberg, May 9, 1576.— Archives de la Maison d'Orange, v. 349-358 t Groen v. Prinst, Archives, etc., v. 229, 230. X Archives, etc., de la Maison d'Orange, v. 346, 347. 1576.] FATE OF BOISOT. 67 prospect was black in Germany, more encouraging in France dubious, or worse, in England. More work, more anxiety, more desperate struggles than ever, devolved upon the Prince. Secretary Brunynck wrote that his illustrious chief was tolerably well in health, but so loaded with affairs, sorrows, and travaUs, that, from morning till night, he had scarcely leisure to breathe.* Besides his multitudinous correspondence with the public bodies, whose labors he habituaUy directed ; with the various estates of the provinces, which he was graduaUy moulding into an organised and general resistance to the Spanish power ; with public envoys and with secret agents to foreign cabinets, all of whom received their instructions from him alone ; with individuals of eminence and influence, whom he was eloquently urging to abandon their hostile position to their fatherland, and to assist him in the great work which he was doing ; besides these numerous avocations, he was ac tively and anxiously engaged during the spring of 1576, with the attempt to reheve the city of Zierickzee.f That important place, the capital of Schouwen, and the key to half Zealand, had remained closely invested since the memorable expedition to Duiveland. The Prince had passed much of his time in the neighbourhood, during the month of May, in order to attend personally to the contemplated relief, and to correspond daUy with the beleaguered garrison.*. At last, on the 25th of May, a vigorous effort was made to throw in succor by sea. The brave Admiral Boisot, hero of the memorable rehef of Leyden, had charge of the expedition. Mondragon had surrounded the shallow harbor with hulks and chains, and with a loose submerged dyke of pfles and rubbish. Against this obstacle Boisot drove his ship, the ' Red Lion,' with his customary audacity, but did not suc ceed in cutting it through. His vessel, the largest of the fleet, became entangled : he was, at the same time, attacked * Archives, etc., de la Maison d'Orange, v. 365. t Bor, ix. 667, sqq. Meteren, v. 102, 103. X Archives, etc., de la Maison d'Orange, v. 358, 359, 68 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. from a distance by the besiegers. The tide ebbed and left his ship aground, while the other vessels had been beaten back by the enemy. Night approached, and there was no possibility of accomplishing the enterprise. His ship was hopelessly stranded. With the morning's sun his captivity was certain. Rather than fall into the hands of his enemy, he sprang into the sea, followed by three hundred of his companions, some of whom were fortunate enough to effect their escape. The gaUant Admiral swam a long time, sustained by a broken spar. Night and darkness came on before assistance could be rendered, and he perished.* Thus died Louis Boisot, one of the most enter prising of the early champions of Netherland freedom — one of the bravest precursors of that race of heroes, the com manders of the Holland navy. The Prince deplored his loss deeply as that of a " valiant gentleman, and one well affec- tioned to the common cause."y His brother, Charles Boisot, as will be remembered, had perished by treachery at the first landing of the Spanish troops, after their perUous passage from Duiveland. Thus both the brethren had laid down their lives for their country, on this its outer barrier, and in the hour of its utmost need. The fall of the beleaguered town could no longer be deferred. The Spaniards were, at last, to receive the prize of that romantic valor which had led them across the bottom of the sea to attack the city. Nearly nine months had, however, elapsed since that achieve ment ; and the Grand Commander, by whose orders it had been undertaken, had been four months in his grave. He was permitted to see neither the long-delayed success which crowned the enterprise, nor the procession of disasters and crimes which were to mark it as a most fatal success. On the 21st of June, 1576, Zierickzee, instructed by the * Bor, ix. 678. Hoofd, x. 440. Archives de la Maison d'Orange, v. 364- 368. Meteren, v. 102. — The last historian erroneously gives the 12th of June instead of the 25th of May as the date of the unfortunate adventure. Cabrera, xi. 846, who states the loss of the Orangists at eight hundred and upwards. '.¦ Archives, etc. v. 367. 1576.] FALL OF ZIERICKZEE. 69 Prince of Orange to accept honorable terms, if offered, agreed to surrender. Mondragon, whose soldiers were in a state of suffering, and ready to break out in mutiny, was but too happy to grant an honorable capitulation. The garrison were allowed to go out with their arms and personal baggage. The citizens were permitted to retain or resume their privUeges and charters, on payment of two hundred thousand guldens. Of sacking and burning there was, on this occasion, fortunately, no ques tion ; but the first half of the commutation money was to be paid in cash. There was but httle money in the impoverished little town, but mint-masters were appointed by the magis trates to take their seats at once in the Hotel de Ville. The citizens brought their spoons and silver dishes, one after another, which were melted and coined into dollars and half- dollars, until the payment was satisfactorily adjusted. Thus fell Zierickzee, to the deep regret of the Prince. " Had we received the least succor in the world from any side," he wrote, " the poor city should never have faUen. I could get nothing from France or England, with aU my efforts. Nevertheless, we do not lose courage, but hope that, although abandoned by aU the world, the Lord God wiU extend His right hand over us."* The enemies were not destined to go farther. From their own hand now came the blow which was to expel them from the soil which they had so long polluted. No sooner was Zierickzee captured than a mutiny broke forth among several companies of Spaniards and Walloons, belonging to the army in Schouwen.f A large number of the most influential officers had gone to Brussels, to make arrangements, if possible, for the payment of the troops. In their absence there was more scope for the arguments of the leading * Bor, ix. 681. Hoofd, x. 440, 441. Meteren, v. 102, 103. Archives de la Maison d'Orange, v. 372, 373. Letter of 16th July, 1576, in Archives de la Maison d'Orange, v. 379-381. t Bor, ix. 681, 692, sqq. Meteren, vi. 106. Hoofd, x, 443. Groen v. Prinst v. 381, sqq. 70 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. mutineers ; — arguments assuredly, not entirely destitute of justice or logical precision. If ever laborers were worthy of theh hire, certainly it was the Spanish soldiery. Had they not done the work of demons for nine years long ? Could Philip or Alva have found in the wide world men to execute their decrees with more unhesitating docUity, with more sympa thizing eagerness ? What obstacle had ever given them pause in their career of duty ? What element had they not braved ? Had not they fought within the bowels of the earth, beneath the depths of the sea, within blazing cities, and upon fields of ice ? Where was the work which had been too dark and bloody for their performance ? Had they not slaughtered unarmed human beings by townfuls, at the word of command ? Had they not eaten the flesh, and drank the hearts' blood of their enemies ? Had they not stained the house of God with whole sale massacre ? What altar and what hearthstone had they not profaned ? What fatigue, what danger, what crime, had ever checked them for a moment ? And for all this obedience, labor, and bloodshed, were they not even to be paid such wages as the commonest clown, who only tore the earth at home, received ? Did PhUip believe that a few thousand Spaniards were to execute his sentence of death against three millions of Netherlanders, and be cheated of their pay at last ? It was in vain that arguments and expostulations were addressed to soldiers who were suffering from want, and mad dened by injustice. They determined to take their cause into their own hand, as they had often done before. By the 15th of July, the mutiny was general on the isle of Schouwen.* Promises were freely offered, both of pay and pardon ; appeals were made to their old sense of honor and loyalty ; but they had had enough of promises, of honor, and of work. What they wanted now were shoes and jerkins, bread and meat, and money. Money they would have, and that at once. The * Hoofd, x. 443, sqq. Bor, ix. 692. Meteren, vi. 106. Mendoza, xv. 298, sqq. Cabrera, xi. 848, sqq. 1576.] MUTINY AFOOT. 71 King of Spain was their debtor. The Netherlands belonged to the King of Spain. They would therefore levy on the Netherlands for payment of their debt. Certainly this was a logical deduction. They knew by experience that this process had heretofore excited more indignation in the minds of the Netherland people than in that of their master. Moreover, at this juncture, they cared httle for their sovereign's displeasure, and not at all for that of the Netherlanders. By the middle of July, then, the mutineers, now entirely beyond control, held their officers imprisoned within their quarters at Zierickzee. They even surrounded the house of Mondragon, who had so often led them to victory, caUing upon him with threats and taunts to furnish them with money.* The veteran, roused to fury by their insubordination and their taunts, sprang from his house into the midst of the throng. Baring his breast before them, he fiercely invited and dared their utmost violence. Of his life-blood, he told them bitterly, he was no niggard, and it was at their disposal. His wealth, had he possessed any, would have been equaUy theirs. 7 Shamed into temporary respect, but not turned from their purpose by the choler of their chief, they left him to himself. Soon afterwards, having swept Schouwen island bare of every thing which could be consumed, the mutineers swarmed out of Zealand into Bra bant, devouring as they went.*. It was their purpose to hover for a time in the neigh bourhood of the capital, and either to force the Council of State to pay them their long arrears, or else to seize and sack the richest city upon which they could lay their hands. The compact, disciplined mass, rolled hither and thither, with uncertainty of purpose, but with the same military precision of movement which had always characterized these remarkable mutinies. It gathered strength daUy. The citizens of Brussels contemplated with dismay the eccentric * Hoofd, x. 443, 444. f Ibid., x. 444. — Compare Cabrera, xi 848. i Bor, ix. 692. Cabrera, xi. 848 sqq. Mendoza, xv. 300. 72 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. and threatening apparition. They knew that rapine, murder, and all the worst evils which man can inflict on his brethren were pent within it, and would soon descend. Yet, even with all their past experience, did they not foresee the depth of woe which was reaUy impending. The mutineers had dis carded such of their officers as they could not compel to obedience, and had, as usual, chosen their Eletto. Many straggling companies joined them as they swept to and fro. They came to Herenthals, where they were met by Count Mansfeld, who was deputed by the Council of State to treat with them, to appeal to them, to pardon them, to offer them everything but money. It may be supposed that the success of the commander-in-chief was no better than that of Mon dragon and his subalterns. They laughed him to scorn when he reminded them how their conduct was tarnishing the glory which they had acquired by nine years of heroism. They answered with their former cynicism, that glory could be put neither into pocket nor stomach. They had no use for it ; they had more than enough of it. Give them money, or give them a city ;* these were their last terms. Sorrowfully and bodingly Mansfeld withdrew to consult again with the State Council. The mutineers then made a demonstra tion uponMechlin, but that city having fortunately strengthened its garrison, was allowed to escape. They then hovered for a time outside the walls of Brussels. At Grimsberg, where they paused for a short period, they held a parley with Captain Montesdocca, whom they received with fair words and specious pretences. He returned to Brussels with the favourable tidings, and the mutineers swarmed off to Assche. Thithei Montesdocca was again despatched, with the expectation that he would be able to bring them to terms, but they drove him off with jeers and threats, finding that he brought neither money nor the mortgage of a populous city. The next day, after a feint or two in a different direction, they made a sudden swoop * Bor, ix. 692. Meteren, vi 106. Hoofd, x. 444. Mendoza, xv. 300. 1576.] EXCITEMENT IN BRUSSELS. 73 upon Alost, in Flanders. Here they had at last made their choice, and the town was carried by storm. AU the inhabi tants who opposed them were butchered, and the mutiny, at last established in a capital, was able to treat with the State Council upon equal terms. They were now between two and three thousand strong, disciplined, veteran troops, posted in a strong and wealthy city. One hundred parishes belonged to the jurisdiction of Alost, aU of which were immediately laid Bnder contribution.* The excitement was now intense in Brussels. Anxiety and alarm had given place to rage, and the whole population rose in arms to defend the capital, which was felt to be in imminent danger. This spontaneous courage of the burghers prevented the catastrophe, which was reserved for a sister city. Mean time, the indignation and horror excited by the mutiny were so universal that the Council of State could not with stand the pressure. Even the women and children demanded daily in the streets that the rebel soldiers should be declared outlaws. On the 26th of July, accordingly, the King of Spain was made to pronounce his Spaniards traitors and mur derers. AU men were enjoined to slay one or all of them, wherever they should be found ; to refuse them bread, water, and fire, and to assemble at sound of bell, in every city, when ever the magistrates should order an assault upon them.f A still more stringent edict was issued on the 2nd of August,*, and so eagerly had these degrees been expected, that they were published throughout Flanders and Brabant almost as soon as issued. Hitherto the leading officers of the Spanish army had kept aloof from the insurgents, and frowned upon their proceedings. The Spanish member of the State CouncU, Jerome de Roda, had joined without opposition in the edict. As, however, the mutiny gathered strength on the outside, the indignation waxed daily within the capital. The citizens * Bor, ix. 693. Meteren, vi. 106. Bentivogho, ix. 173. Hoofd, x. 445. t See the Edict, in Bor, ix. 693. X Hoofd, x. 445. 74 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. of Brussels, one and all, stood to their arms. Not a man could enter or leave without their permission. The Spaniards who were in the town, whether soldiers or merchants, were regarded with suspicion and abhorrence. The leading Spanish officers, Romero, Montesdocca, Verdugo, and others, who had attempted to quell the mutiny, had been driven off with threats and curses, their soldiers defying them and bran dishing their swords in their very faces. On the other hand, they were looked upon with ill-will by the Netherlanders. The most prominent Spanish personages in Brussels were kept in a state of half-imprisonment.* Romero, Roda, Verdugo, were believed to favor at heart the cause of their rebellious troops, and the burghers of Brabant had come to consider aU the King's army in a state of rebelUon. Beheving the State Council powerless to protect them from the impending storm, they regarded that body with Uttle respect, keeping it, as it were, in durance, whUe the Spaniards were afraid to walk the streets of Brussels for fear of being murdered. A retainer of Roda, who had ventured to defend the character and conduct of his master before a number of excited citizens, was slain on the spot.f In Antwerp, Champagny, brother of GranveUe, and governor of the city, was disposed to cultivate friendly rela tions with the Prince of Orange. Champagny hated the Spaniards, and the hatred seemed to establish enough of sym pathy between himself and the hberal party to authorize con fidence in him. The Prince dealt with him, but regarded him warily + Fifteen companies of German troops, under Colonel Altaemst, were suspected of a strong inclination to join the mutiny. They were withdrawn from Antwerp, and in their room came Count Oberstein, with his regiment, who swore to admit no suspicious person inside the gates, and. in all things to obey the orders of Champagny.§ In the citadel, however, * Bor, ix. 692, 693. Cabrera, xi. 849. Hoofd, x. 445. t Bor, ix. 693. Meteren, vi. 106. X Archives de la Maison d'Orange, v. 487, 488. Cabrera, xi. 863.— "Pero el Champaigne estaba convenido con los Estados y con le Principe de Orange su grande amigo. § Bor, ix. 694. Hoofd, x. 447. 1576.] HAVRE ARRIVES FROM SPAIN. 75 matters were very threatening. Sancho d' Avila, the governor, although he had not openly joined the revolt, treated the edict of outlawry against the rebellious soldiery with derision. He refused to pubhsh a decree which he proclaimed infamous, and which had been extorted, in his opinion, from an impotent and trembling councU.* Even Champagny had not desired or dared to pubhsh the edict within the city. The reasons alleged were his fears of irritating and alarming the foreign merchants, whose position was so critical and friendship so important at that moment.y On the other hand, it was loudly and joyfully published in most other towns of Flanders and Brabant. In Brussels there were two parties, one holding the decree too audacious for his Majesty to pardon ; the other clamoring for its instantaneous fulfilment. By far the larger and more influential portion of the population favored the measure, and wished the sentence of outlawry and extermination to be extended at once against all Spaniards and other foreigners in the service of the King. It seemed imprudent to wait untU all the regiments had formally accepted the mutiny, and concentrated themselves into a single body.t At this juncture, on the last day of July, the Marquis of Havre, brother to the Duke of Aerschot, arrived out of Spain.§ He was charged by the King with concUiatory but unmeaning phrases to the estates. The occasion was not a happy one. There never was a time when direct and vigorous action had been more necessary. It was probably the King's desire then, as much as it ever had been his desire at aU, to make up the quarrel with his provinces. He had been wearied with the policy which Alva had enforced, and for which he endeavoured at that period to make the Duke appear responsible. The barren clemency which the Grand Commander had been instructed to affect, had deceived but few persons, and had produced but small results. The King was, perhaps, really * Mendoza, xv. 301. Cabrera, xi. 849. t Bor, ix. 694. X Ibid., 694, sqq. Hoofd, x. 447, sqq. § Bor, ix. 704. 76 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. inclined at this juncture to exercise clemency — that is to say, he was willing to pardon his people for having con tended for their rights, provided they were now willing to resign them for ever. So the Catholic religion and his own authority were exclusively and inviolably secured, he was wilhng to receive his disobedient provinces into favor. To accomplish this end, however, he had stiU no more fortunate conception than to take the advice of Hopper. A soothing procrastination was the anodyne selected for the bitter pangs of the body politic — a vague expression of royal benignity the styptic to be applied to its mortal wounds. An interval of hesitation was to bridge over the chasm between the provinces and their distant metropolis. " The Marquis of Havre has been sent," said the King, " that he may expressly witness to you of our good intentions, and of our desire, with the grace of God, to bring about a pacification."* Alas, it was well known whence those pavements of good intentions had been taken, and whither they would lead. They were not the material for a substantial road to reconcUiation. "His Majesty," said the Marquis, on delivering his report to the State CouncU, "has long been pondering over all things necessary to the peace of the land. His Majesty, like a very- gracious and bountiful Prince, has ever been disposed, in times past, to treat these, his subjects, by the best and sweetest means."f There being, however, room for an opinion that so bountiful a prince might have discovered sweeter means, by aU this pondering, than to burn and gibbet his subjects by thousands, it was thought proper to insinuate that his orders had been hitherto misunderstood. Alva and Requesens had been unfaithful agents, who did not know their business, but it was to be set right in future. "As the good- will and meaning of his Majesty has by no means been followed," continued the envoy, "his Majesty has determined to send CouncUlor Hopper, keeper of the privy seal, and myself, hither- wards, to execute the resolutions of his Majesty."*. Two such * See the letter, in Bor, ix. 704 t Report of Marquis of Havre-., in Bor. ix. 704. t Ibid 1576.] QUACKERY. 7? personages as poor, plodding, confused, time-serving Hopper, and flighty, talkative* Havre, whom even Requesens despised, and whom Don John, whUe shortly afterwards recommending him for a state councillor, characterized to PhUip as " a very great scoundrel,"f would hardly be able, even if royaUy em powered, to undo the work of two preceding administrations. Moreover, Councillor Hopper, on further thoughts, was not despatched at aU to the Netherlands. The provinces were, however, assured by the King's letters to the Brabant estates, to the State Council, and other public bodies, as weU as by the report of the Marquis, that efficacious remedies were preparing in Madrid. The people were only to wait patiently tUl they should arrive.*. The pubhc had heard before of these nostrums, made up by the royal prescriptions in Spain ; and were not likely to accept them as a panacea for their present complicated disorders. Never, in truth, had conventional commonplace been applied more unseasonably. Here was a general military mutiny flaming in the very centre of the land. Here had the intense hatred of race, which for years had been gnawing at the heart of the country, at last broken out into most malignant manifestation. Here was nearly the whole native population of every provmce, from grand seigneur to plebeian, from Catholic prelate to Ana baptist artisan, exasperated alike by the excesses of six thousand foreign brigands, and united by a common hatred, into a band of brethren. Here was a State Council too feeble to exercise the authority which it had arrogated, trembhng between the wrath of its sovereign, the menacing cries of the Brussels burghers, and the wild threats of the rebellious army. and held virtually captive in the capital which it was supposed to govern. Certainly, the confirmation of the Council in its authority, * " Loquillo y insubstancial." — Letter of Requesens to Phihp, cited by Gachard, Corresp. Guillaume le Tacit., iii. 130, n. 1. t " Muy grandissimo vellacho." — Letter of Don John to Phihp, cited by Gachard, ubi sup. X Report of Marq. Havre, etc., Bor, ix. 705. 78 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. for an indefinite, even if for a brief period, was a most unlucky step at this juncture. There were two parties in the provinces, but one was far the most powerful upon the great point of the Spanish soldiery. A vast majority were in favor of a declara tion of outlawry against the whole army, and it was thought desirable to improve the opportunity by getting rid of them altogether. If the people could rise en masse, now that the royal government was in abeyance, and, as it were, in the nation's hands, the incubus might be cast off for ever. If any af the Spanish officers had been sincere in their efforts to arrest the mutiny, the sincerity was not believed. If any of the foreign regiments of the King appeared to hesitate at joining the Alost crew, the hesitation was felt to be temporary. Mean time, the important German regiments of Fugger, Frons- berger, and Polwiller, with their colonels and other officers, had openly joined the rebellion,* while there was no doubt of the sentiments of Sancho d' Avila and the troops under his command.f Thus there were two great raUying-places for the sedition, and the most important fortress of the country, the key which unlocked the richest city in the world, was in the hands of the mutineers. The commercial capital of Europe, filled to the brim with accumulated treasures, and with the merchandize of every clime, lay at the feet of this desperate band of brigands. The horrible result was but too soon to be made manifest. Meantime, in Brussels, the few Spaniards trembled for their- lives. The few officers shut up there were in imminent danger. "As the Devil does not cease to do his work," wrote Colonel Verdugo,*. " he has put it into the heads of the Brabanters to rebel, talcing for a pretext the mutiny of the Spaniards. The Brussels men have handled their weapons so well against those who were placed there to protect them, that they have begun to kill the Spaniards, threatening likewise the * Bor, ix. 711, 712. Hoofd, x. 448. t Meteren, vi. 107. Mendoza, xv. 303, sqq. Cabrera, xi. 849, sqq. X This letter of Verdug" tn his Lieutenant De la Margella is published by Bor ix. 702, and by Groen, v. Prinsterer, Archives, v. 387-38S 1576.] GOVERNOR RODA. 79 Council of State. Such is their insolence, that they care no more for these great lords than for so many varlets." The writer, who had taken refuge, together with Jerome de Roda and other Spaniards, or " Hispaniolized" persons, in Antwerp citadel, proceeded to sketch the preparations which were going on in Brussels, and the counter measures which were making progress in Antwerp. " The states," he wrote, " are enrolling troops, saying 'tis to put down the mutiny ; but J assure you 'tis to attack the army indiscriminately. To pre vent such a viUanous undertaking, troops of all nations are assembling here, in order to march straight upon Brussels, there to enforce everything which my lords of the State Council shall ordain." Events were obviously hastening to a crisis — an explosion, before long, was inevitable. "I wish I had my horses here," continued the Colonel, "and must beg you to send them. I see a black cloud hanging over our heads. I fear that the Brabantines will play the beasts so much, that they will have all the soldiery at their throats."* Jerome de Roda had been fortunate enough to make his escape out of Brussels,y and now claimed to be sole Governor of the Netherlands, as the only remaining representative of the State Council. His colleagues were in durance at the capital. Their authority was derided. Although not yet actually imprisoned, they were in reality bound hand and foot, and compelled to take their orders either from the Bra bant estates or from the burghers of Brussels. It was not an illogical proceeding, therefore, that Roda, under the shadow of the Antwerp citadel, should set up his own person as ah. that remained of the outraged majesty of Spain. TU1 the new Governor, Don Juan, should arrive, whose appointment the King had already communicated to the government, and who might be expected in the Netherlands before the close of the autumn, the solitary councillor claimed to embody the whole Council. £ He caused a new seal to be struck — a pro- * Letter of Verdugo. t Bor- ix- '705- Hoofd, x- 449. % Bor, Hoofd, ubi sup. 80 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. ceeding very unreasonably charged as forgery by the provin cials—and forthwith began to thunder forth proclamations and counter-proclamations in the King's name and under the royal seal.* It is difficult to see any technical crime or mistake in such a course. As a Spaniard, and a representative of his Majesty, he could hardly be expected to take any other view of his duty. At any rate, being called upon to choose between rebeUious Netherlanders and mutinous Spaniards, he was not ?.ong in making up his mind. By the beginning of September the mutiny was general AU the Spanish army, from general to pioneer, were united. The most important German troops had taken side with them. Sancho d' Avila held the citadel of Antwerp, vowing ven geance, and holding open communication with the soldiers at Alost.f The CouncU of State remonstrated with him for his disloyalty. He rephed by referring to his long years of service, and by reproving them for affecting an authority which their imprisonment rendered ridiculous. % The Spaniards were securely established. The various citadels which had been built by Charles and Phihp to curb the country now effectually did their work. With the castles of Antwerp, Valenciennes, Ghent, Utrecht, Culemburg, Viane, Alost, in the hands of six thousand veteran Spaniards, the country seemed chained in every Umb. The foreigner's foot was on its neck. Brussels was almost the only considerable town out of Holland and Zealand which was even temporarily safe. The important city of Maestricht was held by a Spanish garrison while other capital towns and stations were in the power of the Walloon and German mutineers.§ The depredations com- mitted in the vUlages, the open country, and the cities were incessant — the Spaniards treating every Netherlander as their foe. Gentleman and peasant, Protestant and Catholic, priest and layman, all were plundered, maltreated, outraged. The * Bor, ix. 712. Hoofd, x. 449. t Mendoza, xv. 301, sqq. Cabrera, xi. 864, sqq. X Mendoza, ubi sup. § Bor, ix. 715. Mendoza, xv. 303. 1576.] SKIRMISHING. 81 indignation became daily more general and more intense.* There were frequent skirmishes between the soldiery and pro miscuous bands of peasants, citizens, and students ; conflicts in which the Spaniards were invariably victorious. What could such half-armed and wholly untrained partisans effect agamst the bravest and most experienced troops in the whole world ? Such results only increased the general exasperation, while they impressed upon the whole people the necessity of some great and general effort to throw off the incubus. * Meteren, vi, 107. Hoofd, x. 450-453. VOI» HI. 8 CHAPTER V. Rehgious and political sympathies and antipathies in the seventeen pronnces— Unanimous hatred for the foreign soldiery — Use made by the Prince of the mutiny — His correspondence — Necessity of Union enforced — A congress from nearly all the provinces meets at Ghent — Skirmishes between the foreign troops and partisan bands — Slaughter at Tisnacq — Suspicions en tertained of the State-Council — Arrest of the State-Council — Siege of Ghent citadel — Assistance sent by Orange — Maestricht lost and regained — "Wealthy and perilous condition of Antwerp — Preparations of the muti neers under the secret superintendence of Avila — Stupidity of Oberstein — Duphcity of Don Sancho — Reinforcements of Walloons under Havre, Eg. mont, and others, sent to Antwerp — Governor Champagny's preparations for the expected assault of the mutineers — Insubordination, incapacity, and negligence of all but him — Concentration of all the mutineers from different points, in the citadel — Tho attack — the panic — the flight — the massacre — the fire — the sack — and other details of the 'Spanish Fury" — Statistics of murder and robbery — Letter of Orange to tho states-general — Surrender of Ghent citadel— Conclusion of the " Ghent Pacification" — The treaty characterized — Forms of ratification — Fall of Zierickzee and recovery oi Zealand. Meantime, the Prince of Orange sat at Middelburg,* watch ing the storm. The position of HoUand and Zealand with re gard to the other fifteen provinces was distinctly characterized. Upon certain points there was an absolute sympathy, while upon others there was a grave and almost fatal difference. It was the task of the Prince to deepen the sympathy, to extin guish the difference. In Holland and Zealand, there was a warm and nearly uni- Bor, ix. 694, sqq. 1576.] RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS. 83 versal adhesion to the Reformed religion, a passionate attach ment to the ancient pohtical liberties. The Prince, although an earnest Calvinist himself, did all in his power to check the growing spirit of intolerance toward the old religion, omitted no opportunity of strengthening the attachment which the people justly felt for their liberal institutions. On the other hand, in most of the other provinces, the Cathohc religion had been regaining it3 ascendency. Even in 1574, the estates assembled at Brussels declared to Requesens' " that they would rather die the death than see any change in their religion."* That feeling had rather increased than diminished. Although there was a strong party attached to the new faith, there was perhaps a larger, certainly a more in fluential body, which regarded the ancient Church with abso lute fidelity. Owing partly to the persecution which had, in the course of years, banished so many thousands of famUies from the soil, partly to the coercion, which was more stringent in the immediate presence of the Crown's representative, partly to the stronger infusion of the Celtic element, which from the earliest ages had always been so keenly alive to the more sensuous and splendid manifestations of the devotional principle — owing to these and many other causes, the old reli gion, despite of all the outrages which had been committed in its name, stUl numbered a host of zealous adherents in the fifteen provinces. Attempts against its sanctity were regarded with jealous eyes. It was believed, and with reason, that there was a disposition on the part of the Reformers to de stroy it root and branch. It was suspected that the same enginery of persecution would be employed in its extirpation, should the opposite party gain the supremacy, which the Papists had so long employed against the converts to the new religion. As to political convictions, the fifteen provinces differed much less from their two sisters. There was a strong attach ment to their old constitutions ; a general inclination to * " Datse liever willen sterven de dood, dan te sien eenige veranderinge in de Religie,'' etc. — Remonstrance, etc., in Bor, viii. 518b. 84 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576, make use of the present crisis to effect their restoration. At the same time, it had not come to be the general conviction, as in HoUand and Zealand, that the maintenance of those hberties was incompatible with the continuance of Philip's authority. There was, moreover, a strong aristocratic faction which was by no means disposed to take a liberal view of government in general, and regarded with apprehension the simultaneous advance of heretical notions both in church and staie. StiU there were, on the whole, the elements of a con trolling constitutional party throughout the fifteen provinces. The great bond of sympathy, however, between all the sev enteen was their common hatred to the foreign soldiery. Upon this deeply imbedded, immovable fulcrum of an ancient na tional hatred, the sudden mutiny of the whole Spanish army served as a lever of incalculable power. The Prince seized it as from the hand of God. Thus armed, he proposed to him self the task of upturning the mass of oppression under which the old liberties of the country had so long been crushed. To effect this object, adroitness was as requisite as courage. Ex pulsion of the foreign soldiery, union of the seventeen provin ces, a representative constitution, according to the old charters, by the states-general, under an hereditary chief, a large reh gious toleiation, suppression of all inquisition into men's con sciences — these were the great objects to which the Prince now devoted himself with renewed energy. To bring about a general organization and a general union, much dehcacy of handling was necessary. The sentiment of extreme Cathohcism and Monarchism was not to be suddenly scared into opposition. The Prince, therefore, in aU his ad dresses and documents was careful to disclaim any intention of disturbing the established religion, or of making any rash political changes. " Let no man think," said he, to the au thorities of Brabant, "that, • against the will of the estates, we desire to bring about any change in religion. Let no one suspect us capable of prejudicing the rights of any man. We have long since taken up arms to maintain a legal and con stitutional freedom, founded upon law, God forbid that we 1576.] LETTERS OF ORANGE. 85 should now attempt to introduce novelties, by which the face of liberty should be defiled."* In a brief and very spirited letter to Count Lalain, a Catholic and a loyalist, but a friend of his country and fervent hater of foreign oppression, he thus appealed to his sense of chivalry and justice : " Although the honorable house from which you spring," he said, " and the virtue and courage of your ancestors have always impressed me with the conviction that you would foUow in their footsteps, yet am I glad to have received proofs that my anticipations were correct. I cannot help, therefore, entreating you to maintain the same high heart, and to accomphsh that which you have so worthily begun. Be not deluded by false masks, mumming faces, and borrowed titles, which people assume for their own profit, per suading others that the King's service consists in the destruc tion of his subjects."y While thus careful to offend no man's religious convictions, to startle no man's loyalty, he made skiUful use of the general indignation felt at the atrocities of the mutinous army. This chord he struck boldly, powerfully, passionately, for he felt sure of the depth and strength of its vibrations. In his ad dress to the estates of Gelderland, *. he used vigorous language, inflaming and directing to a practical purpose the just wrath which was felt in that, as in every other province. " I write to warn you," he said, "to seize this present opportunity. Shake from your necks the yoke of the godless Spanish tyranny, join yourselves at once to the lovers of the fatherland, to the defenders. of freedom. According to the example of your own ancestors and ours, redeem for the country its an cient laws, traditions, and privileges. Permit no longer, to your shame and ours, a band of Spanish landloupers and other foreigners, together with three or four self-seeking enemies of their own land, to keep their feet upon our necks. Let them no longer, in the very wantonness of tyranny, drive * Letter to States of Brabant, in Bor, ix. 695. t The letter to Lalain is published by Bor, ix. 696. X Address to the Estates of Gelderland. aoud Bor. ix. f02. 86 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. us about hke a herd of cattle— hke a gang of weU-tamed slaves." Thus, day after day, in almost countless addresses to public bodies and private individuals, he made use of the crisis to pUe fresh fuel upon the flames. At the same time, while thus fanning the general indignation, he had the adroit ness to point out that the people had already committed them selves. He represented to them that the edict, by which they had denounced his Majesty's veterans as outlaws, and had devoted them to the indiscriminate destruction which such brigands deserved, was likely to prove an unpardonable crime in the eyes of majesty. In short, they had entered the tor rent. If they would avoid being dashed over the precipice, they must struggle manfully with the mad waves of civil war into which they had plunged. " I beg you, with aU affec tion," he said to the states of Brabant,* "to consider the danger in which you have placed yourselves. You have to deal with the proudest and most overbearing race in the world. For these quahties they are hated by aU other nations. They are even hateful to themselves. 'Tis a race which seeks to domineer wheresoever it comes. It particularly declares its intention to crush and to tyrannize you, my masters, and all the land. They have conquered you already, as they boast, for the crime of lese-majesty has placed you at their mercy. I teU you that your last act, by which you have declared this army to be rebels, is decisive. You have armed and excited the whole people against them, even to the peasants and the peasants' chUdren, and the insults and injuries thus received, however richly deserved and dearly avenged, are aU set down to your account. Therefore, 'tis necessary for you to decide now, whether to be utterly ruined, yourselves and your chUdren, or to continue firmly the work which you have begun boldly, and rather to die a hundred thousand deaths than to make a treaty with them, which can only end in your ruin. Be assured that the measure dealt to you will be ignominy as * In Bor, ix, 694-696. 1576. J NECESSITY OF UNION. 87 weU as destruction. Let not your leaders expect the honor able scaffolds of Counts Egmont and Horn. The whipping post and then the gibbet wUl be their certain fate."* Having by this and similar language, upon various occasions, sought to impress upon his countrymen the gravity of the position, he led them to seek the remedy in audacity and in union. He famUiarized them with hiB theory, that the legal, historical government of the provinces belonged to the states- general, to a congress of nobles, clergy, and commons, ap pointed from each of the seventeen provinces, t He maintained, with reason, that the government of the Netherlands was a representative constitutional government, under the hereditary authority of the King. J To recover this constitution, to lift up these down-trodden rights, he set before them most vividly the necessity of union. "'Tis impossible," he said, "that a chariot should move evenly having its wheels unequally pro portioned ; and so must a confederation be broken to pieces, if there be not an equal obligation on aU to tend to a common purpose."§ Union, close, fraternal, such as became provinces of a common origin and with similar laws, could alone save them from their fate. Union against a common tyrant to save a common fatherland. Union, by which differences of opinion should be tolerated, in order that a million of hearts should beat for a common purpose, a miUion hands work out, invin cibly, a common salvation. " 'Tis hardly necessary," he said,|[ " to use many words in recommendation of union. Disunion has been the cause of aU our woes. There is no remedy, no hope, save in the bonds of friendship. Let aU particular dis agreements be left to the decision of the states-general, in order that with one heart and one wiU we may seek the dis- enthralment of the fatherland from the tyranny of strangers." * " Aen de galge of kake," etc. Address to the Estates of Brabant, eta, Bor, ubi sup. f Missive of Prince of Orange to States-general, in Bor, x. 747-749. X Missive, etc., Bor, ubi sup. § Gachard, Correspondance de Guillaume le Tacit., iii. 140-154. I Address to Estates of Brabant, apud Bor, ix. 694-696. 88 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. The first step to a thorough union among aU the provinces was the arrangement of a closer connection between the now isolated states of HoUand and Zealand on the one side, and their fifteen sisters on the other. The Prince professed the readiness of those states which he might be said to represent in his single person, to draw as closely as possible the bonds of feUowship. It was almost superfluous for him to promise his own ready co-operation. " Nothing remains to us," said he, " but to discard aU jealousy and distrust. Let us, with a firm resolution and a common accord, liberate these lands from the stranger. Hand to hand let us accomphsh a just and general peace. As for myself, I present to you, with very good affection, my person and aU which I possess, assuring you that I shaU regard all my labors and pains in times which are past, weU bestowed, if God now grant me grace to see the desired end. That this end wiU be reached, if you hold fast your resolution and take to heart the means which God pre sents to you, I feel to be absolutely certain."* Such were the tenor and the motives of the documents which he scattered broadcast at this crisis. They were addressed to the estates of nearly every province. Those bodies were urgently implored to appoint deputies to a general congress, at which a close and formal union between HoUand and Zealand with the other provinces might be effected. That important measure secured, a general effort might, at the same time, be made to expel the Spaniard from the soil. This done, the remaining matters could be disposed of by the assembly of the estates-general. His eloquence and energy were not without effect. In the course of the autumn, deputies were appointed from the greater number of the provinces, to confer with the representatives of Holland and Zealand, in a general congress.f The place appointed for the deliberations was the city of Ghent. Here, by the middle of October, a large number of delegates were already assembled.*. Events were rapidly rolling together from every quarter, and * Letter to Estates of Brabant, Bor, ix. 694-696. t Bor, ix. 703. 718, 719. J Ibid., ix. 719, sqq. Meteren, vi. UL 1576.] DISASTROUS ENCOUNTERS. 89 accumulating to a crisis. A congress — a rebeUious congress, as the King might deem it — was assembling at Ghent ; the Spanish army, proscribed, lawless, and terrible, was strength ening itself daily for some dark and mysterious achievement ; Don John of Austria, the King's natural brother, was expected from Spain to assume the government, which the State CouncU was too timid to wield and too loyal to resign, whUe, meantime, the whole population of the Netherlands, with hardly an exception, was disposed to see the great ques tion of the foreign soldiery settled, before the chaos then existing should be superseded by a more definite authority. Everywhere, men of all ranks and occupations— the artisan in the city, the peasant in the fields — were deserting their daily occupations to furbish helmets, handle muskets, and learn the trade of war.* Skirmishes, sometimes severe and bloody, were of almost daily occurrence. In these the Spaniards were invariably successful, for whatever may be said of their cruelty and hcentiousness, it cannot be disputed that their prowess was worthy of their renown. Romantic valor, un flinching fortitude, consummate skill, characterized them al ways. What could half-armed artisans achieve in the open plain against such accomplished foes ? At Tisnacq, between Louvain and Tirlemont, a battle was attempted by a large misceUaneous mass of students, peasantry, and burghers, led by country squires. 7 It soon changed to a carnage, in which the victims were aU on one side. A smaU number of veterans, headed by Vargas, Mendoza, Tassis, and other chivalrous com manders, routed the undisciphned thousands at a single charge. The rude militia threw away their arms, and fled panic-struck in aU directions, at the first sight of their terrible foe. Two Spaniards lost their hves and two thousand Nether landers.*. It was natural that these consummate warriors * Strada. t Bor, ix. 715, 716. Hoofd, x. 450. Mendoza, xv. 305-308. X Hoofd, x 450. — "Bet dan twee duizent man, wil man dat er het leeven Het," etc., etc. — " Dit geluk hadden de Spangaerds zonder booven twee man te verliezen,1' etc. This is Dutch authority. Mendoza, one of the chief com- 90 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. should despise such easily slaughtered victims. A single stroke of the iron flail, and the chaff was scattered to the four winds ; a single sweep of the disciphned scythe, and countless acres were in an instant mown. Nevertheless, although beaten constantly, the Netherlanders were not conquered. Holland and Zealand had read the foe a lesson which he had not forgotten, and although on the open fields, and against the less vigorous population of the more central provinces, his triumphs had been easier, yet it was obvious that the spirit of resistance to foreign oppression was growing daily stronger, notwithstanding daily defeats. Meantime, while these desultory but deadly combats were in daily progress, the Council of State was looked upon with sus picion by the mass of the population. That body, in which resided provisionaUy the powers of government, was believed to be desirous of establishing relations with the mutinous army. It was suspected of insidiously provoking the excesses which it seemed to denounce. It was supposed to be secretly intriguing with those whom its own edicts had outlawed. Its sympathies were considered Spanish. It was openly boasted by the Spanish army that, before long, they would descend from their fastnesses upon Brussels, and give the city to the sword. A shuddering sense of coming evil pervaded the population, but no man could say where the blow would first be struck. It was natural that the capital should be thought exposed to imminent danger. At the same time, while every man who had hands was disposed to bear arms to defend the city, the Council seemed paralyzed. The capital was insuffi ciently garrisoned, yet troops were not enrolling for its pro . manders in the affair, says no Spaniard was killed, and that but one was wounded, slightly, in the foot, but he does not give the number of the states, troops, students, and burghers slain.— Mendoza, xv. 308. Cabrera, xi. 856, states the number at two thousand. That bitter Walloon, Renom de France, who saw the states' force pass through Louvain, on their way to the encounter', exults, as usual, over the discomfiture of his own countrymen. " The Spaniards cut them all to pieces," he observes, " teaching . these pedants and schoolboys that war was a game in which they had no skill."— Histoire des Causes des Re- voltes, etc. — MS., iii. c. xii. 1576.] ARREST 'OF THE STATE COUNCIL. 91 tection. The state councUlors obviously omitted to provide for defence, and it was supposed that they were secretly assisting the attack. It was thought important, therefore, to disarm, or, at least, to control this body which was impotent for protection, and seemed powerful only for mischief. It was possible to make it as contemptible as it was beheved to be malicious. An unexpected stroke was therefore suddenly levelled against the CouncU in full session. On the 5th of Sep tember,* the Seigneur de Heze, a young gentleman of a bold, but unstable character, then entertaining close but secret relations with the Prince of Orange, appeared before the doors of the palace. He was attended by about five hundred troops, under the immediate command of the Seigneur de Glimes, bailiff of WaUoon Brabant. He demanded admit tance, in the name of the Brabant estates, to the presence of the State Council, and was refused. The doors were closed and bolted. Without further ceremony the soldiers produced iron bars brought with them for the purpose, forced all the gates from the hinges, entered the hall of session, and at a word from their commander, laid hands upon the counciUors, and made every one prisoner.y The Duke of Aerschot, Presi dent of the Council, who was then in close aUiance with the Prince, was not present at the meeting, but lay, forewarned, at home, confined to his couch by a sickness assumed for the occasion. Viglius, who rarely participated in the delibera tions of the board, being aheady afflicted with the chronic malady under which he was. ere long to succumb, also escaped the fate of his fellow-senators.*. The others were carried int: * Bor, ix. 712, Meteren, vi. 197, fix the date of this important transaction at the 14th September. A letter of "William of Orange to Count John of 9th September states that it occurred on the 5th September. — Archives de la Maison d'Orange, etc., v. 408, and note 1. Tassis gives the same date, ui. 207, 208. t Gachard, Correspondance de Guillaume le Tacit., iii. 106 — note 1. Bor, ubi sup. Hoofd, x. 448. Meteren, vi. 107." I. B. de Tassis, Coram, de Turn. Belg., 1. iii. 207, 208. X Ibid. There is, however, considerable doubt upon this point. Viglius was ill and confined to his bed at the time of the Grand Commander's death, in 92 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH- REPUBLIC. [1576. confinement. Berlaymont and Mansfeld were imprisoned in the Brood-Huys,* where the last mortal hours of Egmont and Horn had been passed. Others were kept strictly guarded in their own houses. After a few weeks, most of them were liberated. Coun- ciUor Del Rio was, however, retained in confinement, and sent to Holland, where he was subjected to a severe examination by the Prince of Orange, touching his past career, particularly concerning the doings of the famous Blood Council, f The others were set free, and even permitted to resume their func tions, but their dignity was gone, their authority annihilated. Thenceforth the states of Brabant and the community of Brussels were to govern for an interval, for it was in their name that the daring blow against the Council had been struck. All individuals and bodies, however, although not displeased with the result, clamorously disclaimed responsi- March. He ceased to write letters to Hopper in April. The arrest of the State Council took place in September, and Viglius died on the 8th of May of the following year (1577). It seems highly probable, therefore, that Tassis is correct in his statement, that Viglius was kept at home by the illness " quae erat ei continua." The historians, however, Meteren (vi. 107), Bor (ix. 712), Bentivoglio (lib. ix. 176), Strada (viu. 414), Hoofd (x. 448), De Thou (lib. 64, vii. 534), all mention the name of President Vighus among those of the coun cillors arrested. The Prince of Orange (Archives, etc., v. 408) also mentions him as having been arrested and imprisoned with tho rest. De Thou (ubi sup.) gives an account of a visit which he paid to him in the following spring, at which time the aged president seems to have been under arrest, although '¦ il n'etoit pas garde fort etroitement." — Some writers mention him as among those who were detained, while others of the arrested were released, (Meteren, Hoofd, Bor, etc.), — others, as Cabrera, (who is, however, no authority in such matters), mention him as one of those who were immediately set at liberty, in order that the Council might have an appearance of power. (Don Fehpo II., xi. 853). On the whole, it seems most probable that he was arrested after the seizure of the Couneil, but that he was kept confined in a nominal durance, which tho infirmities of illness and age rendered quite superfluous. It is almost unquestionable that De Thou visited him at his own house in Brussels, and not at any state prison. "Wagenaer, vii. 106, says that Viglius was released in October, and quotes Langueti, ep., hb i. (ii.), ep. 93, p. 289. — Compare Groen v. Prinst., Archives, etc., v. 404, sqq., and Hoynk van Papendrecht, Not. ad Vit. VTglii., Analect. Belg., 192, 193. and Not ad Coram., I. R, de Tassis, iii. 208. * Van der Vynckt; ii 188. t Archives et Correspondance, v. 406. Extracts from the confessions of Dal Rio have been given in the first volume of this history. 1576.] CONGRESS OF GHENT. 93 bility for the deed. Men were appaUed at the audacity of the transaction, and dreaded the vengeance of the King. The Abbot Van Perch, one of the secret instigators of the act, actually died of anxiety for its possible consequences.* There was a mystery concerning the affair. They in whose name it had been accomphshed, denied having given any authority to the perpetrators. Men asked each other what unseen agency had been at work, what secret spring had been adroitly touched. There is but little doubt, however, that the veiled but skilful hand which directed the blow, was the same which had so long been guiding the destiny of the Netherlands.f It had been settled that the congress was to hold its ses sions in Ghent, although the citadel commanding that city was held by the Spaniards. The garrison was not very strong, and Mondragon, its commander, was absent in Zealand,*, but the wife of the veteran ably supplied his place, and stimulated the slender body of troops to hold out with heroism, under the orders of his lieutenant, Avilos Maldonado.§ The mutineers, after having accompUshed their victory at Tisnacq, had been earnestly solicited to come to the relief of this citadel. They had refused and returned to Alost. || Meantime, the siege was warmly pressed by the states. There being, however, a de ficiency of -troops, application for assistance was formaUy made to the Prince of Orange. Count Reulx, governor of Flanders, commissioned the Seigneur d'Haussy, brother of Count Bossu, who, to obtain the liberation of that long-im prisoned and distinguished nobleman, was about visiting the Prince in Zealand, to make a request for an auxiliary- force.^" It was, however, stipulated that care should be taken lest any prejudice should be done to the Roman Cathohc * Hoofd, x. 448. Ev. Reid. Ann., lib. ii. 20. t "Wagenaer, vii. 105. Langueti Epist., lib. i. (ii.) ep. 87, p. 230. — Declaration of the Brussels Deputies in 1584. Bor, xix. 20 (477). — Compare Groen v. Prinst., Archives, etc., v. 404-407. X Bor, ix. 726, 727.. § Bor, ix. 727. Hoofd, xi. 470. — Compare Meteren, vi. 108. || Hoofd, xl 450, 451. Bor, ix. 716. f Bor, ix. 716. 94 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. religion or the authority of the King. The Prince readily acceded to the request, and agreed to comply with the condi tions under which only it could be accepted.* He promised to send twenty-eight companies. In his letter announcing this arrangement, he gave notice that his troops would receive strict orders to do no injury to person or property, Catholic oj: Protestant, ecclesiastic or lay, and to offer no obstruction to the Roman rehgion or the royal dignity.f He added, however, that it was not to be taken amiss, if his soldiers were per mitted to exercise their own religious rites, and to sing their Protestant hymns within their own quarters.*. He moreover, as security for the expense and trouble, demanded the city of Sluys.§ The first detachment of troops, under command of Colonel Vander Tympel, was, however, hardly on its way, before an alarm was felt among the Cathohc party at this practical aUiance with the rebel Prince. An envoy, named Ottingen, was despatched to Zealand, bearing a letter from the estates of Hainault, Brabant, and Flanders, countermanding the request for troops, and remonstrating categoricaUy upon the subject of religion and loyalty. [| Orange deemed such tergiversation paltry, but controlled his anger. He answered the letter in liberal terms, for he was determined that by no fault of his should the great cause be endangered. He reas sured the estates as to the probable behaviour of his troops. Moreover, they had been already admitted into the city, while the correspondence was proceeding. The matter of the psalm- singing was finaUy arranged to the satisfaction of both parties, and it was agreed that Niewport, instead of Sluys, should be given to the Prince as security.^ The siege of the citadel was now pressed vigorously, and * Bor, ix. 716. t See the letter in Bor, ix. 716, 717. — Compare Groen v. Prinst., Archives, etc., i20, 421. t Letter of Prince of Orange, in Bor, ix. 716, 717. § Bor, ix. 717. | Bor, ix. 717, 718. TT Bor, ubi sun. — Compare Groen v. Prinst. Archives, etc., 420, 421. Meteren, Vi. 108. 1576.] MAESTRICHT LOST AND WON. 95 the deliberations of the congress were opened under the inces sant roar of cannon. While the attack was thus earnestly maintained upon the important castle of Ghent, a courageous effort was made by the citizens of Maestricht to wrest their city from the hands of the Spaniards. The German garrison having been gained by the burghers, the combined force rose upon the Spanish troops, and drove them from the city* Montesdocca, the commander, was arrested and imprisoned, biit the triumph was only temporary. Don Francis dAyala, Montesdocca's lieutenant, made a stand, with a few com panies, in Wieck, a viUage on the opposite side of the Meuse, and connected with the city by a massive bridge of stone.f From this point he sent information to other commanders in the neighbourhood. Don Ferdinand de Toledo soon arrived with several hundred troops from Dalem. The Spaniards, eager to wipe out the disgrace to their arms, loudly de manded to be led back to the city. The head of the bridge, however, over which they must pass, was defended by a strong battery, and the citizens were seen clustering in great numbers to defend their firesides against a foe whom they had once expeUed. To advance across the bridge seemed certain destruction to the little force. Even Spanish bravery recoiled at so desperate an undertaking, but unscrupulous ferocity supplied an expedient where courage was at fault. There were few fighting men present among the population of Wieck, but there were many females. Each soldier was com manded to seize a woman, and, placing her before his own body, to advance across the bridge.*. The column, thus bucklered, to the shame of Spanish chivalry, by female bosoms, moved in good order toward the battery. The soldiers levelled their muskets with steady aim over the shoulders or under the arms of the women whom they thus held before them.§ On the other hand, the citizens dared not discharge their cannon at their own townswomen, among whose numbers * Strada, viii. 416. Hoofd, xi. 454. f Strada, Hoofd, ubi sup. X Strada, viii. 416. § Ibid. 96 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. many recognized mothers, sisters, or wives.* The battery was soon taken, while at the same time Alonzo Vargas, who had effected his entrance from the land side by burning down the Brussels gate, now entered the city at the head of a band of cavalry. Maestricht was recovered, and an indiscriminate slaughter instantly avenged its temporary loss. The plunder ing, stabbing, drowning, burning, ravishing, were so dreadful that, in the words of a cotemporary historian, " the burghers who had escaped the fight had reason to think themselves fess fortunate than those who had died with arms in their hands."f This was the lot of Maestricht on the 20th of October. It was instinctively felt to be the precursor of fresh disasters. Vague, incoherent, but widely disseminated rumors had long pointed to Antwerp and its dangerous situation. The Spaniards, foUed in their views upon Brussels, had recently avowed an intention of avenging themselves in the commercial capital. They had waited long enough, and accumulated strength enough. Such a trifling city as Alost could no longer content their cupidity, but in Antwerp there was gold enough for the gathering. There was reason for the fears of the in habitants, for the greedy longing of their enemy. Probably no city in Christendom could at that day vie with Antwerp in wealth and splendor. Its merchants hved in regal pomp and luxury. In its numerous, massive warehouses were the treasures of every clime. StUl serving as the main entrepot of the world's traffic, the Brabantine capital was the centre of that commercial system which was soon to be superseded by a larger international life. In the midst of the miseries which had so long been raining upop the Netherlands, the stately and egotistical city seemed to have taken stronger root and to flourish more freshly than ever. It was not wonderful that its palaces and its magazines, * Strada, viii. 416. f Bor, ix. 725. — Compare Strada, Hoofd, ubi sup. Meteren, vi. 109. 1576.] THE STORM GATHERING. 97 glittering with splendor and bursting with treasure, should arouse the avidity of a reckless and famishing soldiery. Had not a handful of warriors of their own race rifled the golden Indies ? Had not their fathers, few in number, strong in courage and discipline, revelled in the plunder of a new world ? Here were the Indies in a single city.* Here were gold and silver, pearls and diamonds, ready and portable ; the precious fruit dropping, ripened, from the bough. Was it to be tole rated that base, pacific burghers should monopolize the trea. sure by which a band of heroes might be enriched ? A sense of coming evU diffused itself through the atmosphere. The air seemed lurid with the impending storm, for the situation was one of pecuhar horror. The wealthiest city in Christendom lay at the mercy of the strongest fastness in the world ; a castle which had been built to curb, not to protect, the town. It was now inhabited by a band of brigands, outlawed by government, strong in discipline, furious from penury, reckless by habit, desperate in circumstance — a crew which feared not God, nor man, nor Devil. The palpitating quarry lay expect ing hourly the swoop of its trained and pitUess enemy, for the rebeUious soldiers were now in a thorough state of disciphne. Sancho dAvUa, castellan of the citadel, was recognized as the chief of the whole mutiny, the army and the mutiny being now one. The band, entrenched at Alost, were upon the best possible understanding with their brethren in the citadel, and accepted without hesitation the arrangements of their superior. On the side of the Scheld, opposite Antwerp, a fortification had been thrown up by Don Sancho's orders, and held by Julian Romero. Lier, Breda, as weU as Alost, were likewise ready to throw their reinforcements into the citadel at a moment's warning. At the signal of their chief, the united bands might sweep from their impregnable castle with a single impulse.f ¦ queste Indie d'una citta." — Bentivoglio, ix. 181. Bor, ix 727, sqq. Mendoza, xv. 303, sqq. VOL. HI. 7 98 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. The city cried aloud for help, for it had become obvious that an attack might be hourly expected. Meantime an attempt, made by Don Sancho dAvila to tamper with the German troops stationed within the waUs, was more than partially successful. The forces were commanded by Colonel Van Ende and Count Oberstein. Van Ende, a crafty traitor to his country, desired no better than to join the mutiny on so promising an occasion, and his soldiers shared his sen timents. Oberstein, a brave but blundering German, was drawn into the net of treachery* by the adroitness of the Spaniard and the effrontery of his comrade. On the night of the 29th of October, half-bewildered and half-drunk, he signed a treaty with Sancho d'Avilaf and the three colonels — Fugger, Frondsberger, and Polwfller. By this unlucky document, which was of course subscribed also by Van Ende, it was agreed that the Antwerp burghers should be forthwith dis armed ; that their weapons should be sent into the citadel ; that Oberstein should hold the city at the disposition of Sancho d' Avila ; that he should refuse admittance to all troops which might be sent into the city, excepting by command of Don Sancho, and that he should decline comphance with any orders which he might receive from individuals caUing them selves the council of state, the states-general, or the estates of Brabant. This treaty was signed, moreover, by Don Jeronimo de Roda, then established in the citadel, and claiming to represent exclusively his Majesty's government.*. Hardly had this arrangement been concluded than the Count saw the trap into which he had faUen. Without intending to do so, he had laid the city at the mercy of its foe5 but the only remedy which suggested itself to his mind was an internal resolution not to keep his promises. The burghers were suffered to retain theh arms, while, on the other hand, Don Sancho lost no time in despatching messages to Alost, * Bor, ix. 727, sqq. t ™d- Hoofd, xi. 455, 456. X See the Articles in Bor, ix. 728.— Compare Meteren, v. 109, 110; Hoofd, xi. 455, 466. 1576.] MEASURES OF DEFENCE. 99 to Lier, to Breda, and even to Maestricht, that as large a force as possible might be* assembled for the purpose of breaking immediately the treaty of peace which he had just concluded. Never was a solemn document regarded with such perfectly bad faith by all its signers as the accord of the 29th of October. Three days afterwards, a large force of WaUoons and Ger mans was despatched from Brussels to the assistance of Antwerp. The command of these troops was entrusted to the Marquis of Havre, whose brother, the Duke of Aerschot, had been recently appointed chief superintendent of mUitary affahs by the deputies assembled at Ghent.f The miscellaneous duties comprehended under this rather vague denomination did not permit the Duke to take charge of the expedition in person, and his younger brother, a stiU more incompetent and unsub stantial character, was accordingly appointed to the post. A number of young men, of high rank but of lamentably low capacity, were associated with him. Foremost among them was Philip, Count of Egmont, a youth who had inherited few of his celebrated father's qualities, save personal courage and a love of personal display. In character and general talents he was beneath mediocrity. Beside these were the reckless but unstable De Heze, who had executed the coup d'etat against the State CouncU, De Berselen, De Capres, D'Oyngies, and others, aU vaguely desirous of achieving distinction in those turbulent times, but few of them having any political or rehgious convictions, and none of them possessing experience or influence enough to render them useful at the impending crisis. J On Friday morning, the 2nd of November,§ the troops * Mendoza, xv. 303. Cabrera, xi. 862, 863, sqq. Strada, viii. 417. t Bor, ix. 719. X Bor, ix. 728, 729. Cabrera, xi. 863. Mendoza, xv. 313. Meteren, vi 109. § Bor, ix. 728. Meteren, vi. 109. Hoofd, xi. 457, and not the 3rd of October as stated by Mendoza, xv. 313, and by Cabrera, xi. 863, following Mendoza. 100 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. appeared under the walls of Antwerp. They consisted of twenty-three companies of infantry and fourteen of cavalry, amounting to five thousand foot and twelve hundred horse. They were nearly all Walloons, soldiers who had already seen much active service, but unfortunately of a race warlike and fiery indeed, but upon whose steadiness not much more dependence could be placed at that day than in the age of CivUis. Champagny, brother of Granvelle, was Governor of the city. He was a sincere Catholic, but a still more sincere hater of the Spaniards. He saw in the mutiny a means of accomplishing their expulsion, and had already offered to the Prince of Orange his. eager co-operation towards this result. In other matters there could be but small sympathy between William the Silent and the Cardinal's brother ; but a common hatred united them, for a time at least, in a common purpose. When the troops first made their appearance before the waUs, Champagny was unwilling to grant them admittance. The addle-brained Oberstein had confessed to him the enormous blunder which he had committed in his midnight treaty, and at the same time ingenuously confessed his inten tion of sending it to the winds.* The enemy had extorted from his dulness or his drunkenness a promise, which his mature and sober reason could not consider binding. It is needless to say that Champagny rebuked him for signing, and applauded him for breaking the treaty. At the same time its iU effects were already seen in the dissensions which existed among the German troops. Where aU had been tampered with, and where the commanders had set the example of infidelity, it would have been strange if aU had held firm, On the whole, however, Oberstein thought he could answer for his own troops. Upon Van Ende's division, although the crafty colonel dissembled his real intentions, very little reli ance was placed.f Thus there was distraction within the * Bor, ix. 729. Hoofd, xi. 457. t Bor, ix. 729, sqq. Hoofd, xi. 457, sqq.— Compare Strada, viii. 117 ; Mendoza xv. 313. Cabrera, xi. 863, et al. 1576.] CONFUSED COUNCILS. 101 walls. Among those whom the burghers had been told to consider their defenders, there were probably many who were ready to join with their mortal foes at a moment's warning. Under these circumstances, Champagny hesitated about ad mitting these fresh troops from Brussels. He feared lest the Germans, who knew themselves doubted, might consider themselves doomed. He trembled, lest an irrepressible out break should occur within the waUs, rendering the immediate destruction of the city by the Spaniards from without inevi table. Moreover, he thought it more desirable that this auxUiary force should be disposed at different points outside, in order to intercept the passage of the numerous bodies of Spaniards and other mutineers, who from various quarters would soon be on their way to the citadel. Havre, however, was so peremptory, and the burghers were so importunate, that Champagny was obhged to recede from his opposition before twenty-four hours had elapsed. UnwUling to take the responsibility of a farther refusal, he admitted the troops through the Burgherhout gate, on Saturday, the 3rd of November, at ten o'clock in the morning.* The Marquis of Havre, as commander-in-chief, called a councU of war. It assembled at Count Oberstein's quarters, and consulted at first concerning a bundle of intercepted letters which Havre" had brought with him. These consti tuted a correspondence between Sancho d' Avila with the heads of the mutiny at Alost, and many other places. The letters were aU dated subsequently to Don Sancho's treaty with Ober stein, and contained arrangements for an immediate concen tration of the whole available Spanish force at the citadel, f The treachery was so manifest, that Oberstein felt all self- reproach for his own breach of faith to be superfluous. It was however evident that the attack was to be immediately expected. What was to be done ? AU the officers counsehed the immediate erection of a bulwark on the side of the city * Bor, ix. 729. Hoofd, xi. 457. Meteren, vi. 110. t Bor, ix. 730. Hoofd, xi. 457, 458. 102 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. exposed to the castle, but there were no miners nor engineers. Champagny, however, recommended a skUful and experienced engineer to superintend the work in the city ; and pledged himself that burghers enough woifld volunteer as miners. In less than an hour, ten or twelve thousand persons, including multitudes of women of aU ranks, were at work upon the lines marked out by the engineer. A ditch and breast-work sxtending from the gate of the Beguins to the street of the Abbey Saint Michael, were soon in rapid progress. Meantime, the newly arrived troops, with military insolence, claimed the privilege of quartering themselves in the best houses which they could find. They already began to insult and annoy the citizens whom they had been sent to defend ; nor were they destined to atone, by their subsequent conduct in the face of the enemy, for the brutality with which they treated their friends. Champagny, however, was iU-disposed to brook their licentiousness. They had been sent to protect the city and the homes of Antwerp from invasion. They were not to estabhsh themselves at every fireside on their first arrival. There was work enough for them out of doors, and they were to do that work at once. He ordered them to prepare for a bivouac in the streets, and flew from house to house, sword in hand, driving forth the intruders at imminent peril of his life. Meantime, a number of Itahan and Spanish merchants fled from the city, and took refuge in the castle. The Walloon sol diers were for immediately plundering their houses, as if plun der had been the object for which they had been sent to Antwerp. It was several hours before Champagny, with all his energy, was able to queU these disturbances.* In the course of the day, Oberstein received a letter from Don Sancho d' Avila, calling solemnly upon him to fulfil his treaty of the 29th of October, f The German colonels from the * Bor, ix. 730. Hoofd, xi. 458. Meteren, vi. 110. Cabrera, xi. 864. Strada, viii. 417.— A remarkable pamphlet, published by Champagny in 1578, entitled "Recueil d'Aretophile" (Lyon. Guerin, 1578), is the best authority for many striking details of this memorable affair. t Bor, ix. 729. 1576.J champagny's exertions. 103 citadel had, on the previous afternoon, held a personal inter view with Oberstein beneath the waUs, which had nearly ended in blows, and they had been obliged to save themselves by flight from the anger of the Count's soldiers, enraged at the deceit by which their leader had been so nearly entrapped.* This summons of ridiculous solemnity to keep a treaty which had already been torn to shreds by both parties, Oberstein answered with defiance and contempt. The reply was an immediate cannonade from the batteries of the citadel, which fliade the position of those erecting the ramparts excessively dangerous. The waU was strengthened with bales of mer chandise, casks of earth, upturned wagons, and simUar bulky objects, hastily pUed together. In some places it was six teen feet high ; in others less than six. Night feU before the fortification was nearly completed. Unfortunately it was bright moonlight. The cannon from the fortress continued to play upon the half-finished works. The WaUoons, and at last the citizens, feared to lift their heads above their fraU rampart. The senators, whom Champagny had deputed to superintend the progress of the enterprise, finding the men so Ul disposed, deserted their posts. They promised themselves that, in the darkest hour of the following night, the work should be thoroughly completed.f Alas ! aU hours of the coming night were destined to be dark enough, but in them was to be done no manner of work for defence. On Cham pagny alone seemed devolved aU the labor and aU the respon sibility. He did his duty well, but he was but one man. Alone, with a heart full of anxiety, he wandered up and down aU the night.*. With his own hands, assisted only by a few citizens and his own servants, he planted all the cannon with which they were provided, in the " Fencing Court," at a point where the battery might teU upon the castle. Unfortunately, * Hoofd, xi. 457, 458. t Bor, ix. 729, sqq. Meteren, vi. 110. Hoofd, xi. 458-460. X Recueil d'Are*tophile. 104 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. the troops from Brussels had brought no artiUery with them, and the means of defence against the strongest fortress in Europe were meagre indeed. The rampart had been left very weak at many vital points. A single upturned wagon was placed across the entrance to the important street of the Be- guins. This negligence was to cost the city dear. At day break, there was a council held in Oberstein's quarters. Nearly aU Champagny's directions had been neglected. He had desired that strong detachments should be posted during the night at various places of security on the outskirts of the town, for the troops which were expected to arrive in small bodies at the citadel from various parts, might have thus been cut off before reaching their destination. Not even scouts had been stationed in sufficient numbers to obtain in formation of what was occurring outside. A thick mist hung over the city that eventful morning. Through its almost impenetrable veil, bodies of men had been seen moving into the castle, and the tramp of cavalry had been distinctly heard, and the troops of Romero, Vargas, Oliveira, and Valdez had already arrived from Lier, Breda, Maestricht, and from the forts on the Scheld.* The whole available force in the city was mustered without delay. Havre had claimed for his post the defence of the lines opposite the citadel, the place of responsibility and honor. Here the whole body of Walloons were stationed, together with a few companies of Germans. The ramparts, as stated, were far from impregnable, but it was hoped that this living rampart of six thousand men, standing on their own soU, and in front of the firesides and altars of their own countrymen, would prove a sufficient bulwark even against Spanish fury, Unhappily, the hving barrier proved more frail than the feeble breastwork which the hands of burghers and women * Meteren, vii. 110. Recueil d'Arctophile. Hoofd, xi. 460. Bor, ix. 730, Cabrera, xi. 864. Mendoza, xv. 315. t Hoofd, xi. 458, 459. Recueil d'Arctophile. 1576.] LAST ARRANGEMENTS. 105 had constructed. Six thousand men were disposed along the side of the city opposite the fortress. The bulk of the Ger man troops was stationed at different points on the more central streets and squares. The cavalry was posted on the opposite side of the city, along the Horse-market, and fronting the "New-town." The stars were stUl in the sky when Champagny got on horseback and rode through the streets, calling on the burghers to arm and assemble at different points. The principal places of rendezvous were the Cattle- market and the Exchange. He rode along the lines of the Walloon regiments, conversing with the officers, Egmont, De Heze, and others, and encouraging the men, and went again to the Fencing Court, where he pointed the cannon with his own hand, and ordered their first discharge at the fortress. Thence he rode to the end of the Beguin street, where he dismounted and walked out upon the edge of the esplanade which stretched between the city and the castle. On this battle-ground a combat was even then occurring between a band of burghers and a reconnoitring party from the citadel. Champagny saw with satisfaction that the Antwerpers were victorious. They were skirmishing weU with their disciplined foe, whom they at last beat back to the citadel. His experienced eye saw, however, that the retreat was only the signal for a general onslaught, which was soon to foUow ; and he returned into the city to give the last directions.* At ten o'clock, a moving wood was descried, approaching the citadel from the south-west. The whole body of the mutineers from Alost, wearing green branches in their helmets, f had arrived under command of their Eletto, Navar- rete. Nearly three thousand in number, they rushed into the castle, having accomplished their march of twenty-four mUes * Recueil d'Aretophile. Meteren, vi. 110b. Hoofd, xi. 458, 460, 461. Bran tome, Hommes Hlust., ii. 201 (Sane. d'Av.) t Ibid., 113. 106 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. since three o'clock in the morning.* They were received with open arms. Sancho d'Avfla ordered food and refreshments to be -laid before them, but they refused everything but a draught of wine. They would dine in Paradise, they said, or sup in Antwerp.f Finding his aUies in such spirit, Don Sancho would not balk their humor. Since early morning, his own veterans had been eagerly awaiting his signal, " straining upon the start." The troops of Romero, Vargas, Valdez, were no less impatient. At about an hour before noon, nearly every living man in the citadel was mustered for the attack, hardly men enough being left behind to guard the gates. Five thousand veteran foot soldiers, besides six hundred cavalry, armed to the teeth, saUied from the portals of Alva's citadel.*. In the counterscarp they feU upon their knees, to invoke, according to custom, the blessing of God§ upon the Devil's work, which they were about to commit. The Eletto bore a standard, one side of which was embla zoned with the crucified Saviour, and the other with the Virgin Mary. || The image of Him who said, " Love your enemies," and the gentle face of the Madonna, were to smUe from heaven upon deeds which might cause a shudder in the depths of hell. Their brief orisons concluded, they swept forward to the city. Three thousand Spaniards, under their Eletto, were * Mendoza, xv. 314, 315. t Mendoza, xiv. 315. — " Respondieron el estar resueltos de comer en el Parayso 6 cenar en la villa de Anvers." — Bor, ix. 730. Hoofd, xi. 461. Cabrera, xi. 864, et al. X Hoofd gives the numbers as two thousand from Alost, five hundred under Romero, five hundred under Valdez, one thousand under the German colonels, and one thousand cavalry under Vargas, in all, five thousand. — xi. 461. Men doza states the whole attacking force at two thousand two hundred Spanish infantry, eight hundred Germans, and five hundred cavalry, in all, three thousand five hundred. — xv. 315. Cabrera, following Mendoza as usual, estimates the number at a little more than three thousand. — xi. 864. § Mendoza, xv. 315. Hoofd, xi. 461. | " Con la figura de Jesu Cristo cruzificado en la una faz, i en la otra la de su Madre Santissima manifestando iban a vongar la magestad divina ofendida de la eregia depravada." — Cabrera, xi. 864. Mendoza, xv. 315. Hoofd, xi. 431. 1576.] THE ATTACK. 107 to enter by the street of Saint Michael ; the Germans, and the remainder of the Spanish foot, commanded by Romero, through that of Saint George. Champagny saw them coming, and spoke a last word of encouragement to the Walloons. The next moment the compact mass struck the barrier, as the thunderbolt descends from the cloud. There was scarcely a struggle. The WaUoons, not waiting to look their enemy in the face, abandoned the posts which they had themselves claimed. The Spaniards crashed through the bulwark, as though it had been a wall of glass. The Eletto was first to mount the rampart ; the next instant he was shot dead, while his foUowers, undismayed, sprang over his body, and poured into the streets. The fatal gaps, due to timidity and carelessness, let in the destructive tide. Champagny, seeing that the enemies had aU crossed the barrier, leaped over a garden wall, passed through a house into a narrow lane, and thence to the nearest station of the German troops. Hastily coUecting a small force, he led them in person to the rescue. The Germans fought weU, died well, but they could not re animate the courage of the Walloons, and all were now in fuU retreat, pursued by the ferocious Spaniards.* In vain Cham pagny stormed among them ; in vain he strove to rally their broken ranks. With his own hand he seized a banner from a retreating ensign, 7 and called upon the nearest soldiers to make a stand against the foe. It was to bid the flying clouds pause before the tempest. Torn, broken, aimless, the scattered troops whirled through the streets before the pursuing wrath. Champagny, not yet despairing, galloped hither and thither, caUing upon the burghers everywhere to rise in defence of their homes, nor did he call in vain. They came forth from every place of rendezvous, from every alley, from every house. They fought as men fight to defend their hearths and altars, * Recueil d'Aretophile. Meteren, vi. 110°. Mendoza, xv. 316. Hoofd, xl 461 Bor, ix. 731. t Meteren, vi. 110°. Hoofd, 461. 108 THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. [1576. but what could individual devotion avaU, against the compact, disciplined, resistless mass of their foes ? The order of defence was broken, there was no system, no concert, no raUying point, no authority. So soon as it was known that the Spaniards had crossed the rampart, that its six thousand defenders were in full retreat, it was inevitable that a panic should seize the city.* Their entrance once effected, the Spanish force had sepa rated, according to previous arrangement, into two divisions, one half charging up the long street of Saint Michael, the other forcing its way through the street of Saint Joris.f " Santiago, Santiago ! Espafia, Espaiia ! a 6angre, a carne, a fuego, a sacco !" Saint James, Spain, blood, flesh, fire, sack ! ! — such were the hideous cries which rang through every quarter of the city, as the savage horde advanced.*. Van Ende, with his German troops, had been stationed by the Marquis of Havre to defend the Saint Joris gate, but no sooner did the Spaniards under Vargas present themselves, than he deserted to them instantly with his whole force. § United with the Spanish cavalry, these traitorous defenders of Antwerp dashed in pursuit of those who had only been faint hearted. Thus the burghers saw themselves attacked by many of their friends, deserted by more. Whom were they to trust ? Nevertheless, Oberstein's Germans were brave and faithful, resisting to the last, and dying every man in his harness.|| The tide of battle flowed hither and thither, through every street and narrow lane. It poured along the magnificent Place de Meer, where there was an obstinate con test. In front of the famous Exchange, where in peaceful hours, five thousand merchants^ met daUy, to arrange the com mercial affairs of Christendom, there was a determined rally, a savage slaughter. The citizens and faithful Germans, in this * Hoofd, xi. 461. t Hoofd, xi. 461. Mendoza, xv. 315. X Brantome, Hommes Illustres, etc., ii. 203. Mendoza, xv. 315. § Hoofd, xi. 461. Mendoza, xv. 316. I Bor, ix.730. Hoofd, xi. 465.