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YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

Gift of
Albr* N. DasA

The Art
of
Supplying Armies in the Field
as exemplified
During the Civil War.

By
Henry G. Sharpe,
. Capt. (now Major) U. S. Army.

PRIZE ESSAY IN THE COMPETITION
^ FOR 1895 -^ '

OF THE

MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION OF THE U. S.

Bepkint pkom the Joubnai. or Jl. s. I. fob .January, ifi96.

prise j£ssa^.

THE ART OF SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD
AS EXEMPLIFIED DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
By Captain HENRY G. SHARPE, Subsistence Department.
THE art of supplying armies in the field comprises all those
means essential to procure the supplies, to store them in
depots located at advantageous points, and to transport
them to the troops. The methods of operating the lines of com
munication so as to expedite the tran.sportation of supplies,
materials, and troops passing along them, either going to the
front or moving to the rear, are also parts of the art of supply
ing troops in the field.
In war a well organized, armed, and trained force should be
always ready to move in any direction and prepared to give bat
tle upon any locality that may have been selected by the com
manding general, or to oppose the advance or check a flank
movement of the enemy. Mobility is thus a factor of great con
sequence, and it follows that an army can only be endowed with
equipment and supplies up to such an extent as will not impede
or hinder this important factor. To make the best possible use
of a force in the field it must therefore be provided with efficient
and sufficient means of transport and with a practical and well-
arranged system of supply.
To provide for the wants of the troops every army has a num
ber of administrative* departments charged with the procuration^
custody, and distribution of certain description of supplies which
are essential to keep the troops in health and strength, and which
provide them at all times with everything that is indispensable
for the furtherance of the plan of the campaign. The supply
departments in our army are the Quartermaster, Subsistence,
Ordnance, Pay and Medical Departments, f
*<" Men brought together in large numbers have wants ; the talent to satisfy these
with order, economy, and intelligence, forms the science of administration." (Mar-
mont.) \ The duties of the different supply departments, as prescribed by laws in force
45

46 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
The work performed by the administrative departments of an
army is divided into two distinct and separate spheres of action :
1st, the service performed in rear of the army; and 2d, that
whose province is confined to the troops in the field. These two
services are entirely separate but work in conjunction with each
other to carry out the main object for which they are created, —
the supply and maintenance of the army.
SUPPLY SERVICE WORKING AT THE REAR.
The service in rear has two distinct duties to perform; 1st,
the procuration and custody; 2d, transportation and distribution.
The supplies are procured or manufactured in the national terri
tory, or abroad, and experience proves that in order that the pro
curation should be more successful it should be located perma
nently in some place remote from the theatre of war, because it
is only at a distance from such locality that commerce is able to
be entered upon with advantage. These reserve supplies that are
accumulated by the service in rear are intended to replace those
carried with the army, and are located in such parts of the na
tional country as are most accessible to the fields of operation,
.and such section of the country or place is known as the base
of operations of the army.*
The base of operations of an army being that portion of a
country from which it obtains its reinforcement and supplies, its
selection necessarily has an influence upon the strategy of a cam
paign. Jomini says that it is a principle to establish the base
upon those points where it can be sustained by all the resources
of the country, and at the same time provide a safe retreat, for
the army. The dependence of an army upon its base of opera
tions increases in proportion with its size and, therefore, the in
fluence of the base on the operatioiis of an army is magnified as
the numbers of the same are, increased.

during the war, are set forth in the following sections of the Revised Statutes, U,. S.,
viz. :
Section 1133 — Quartermaster's Department.
" 1141 — Subsistence ¦••
'•' 1164— Ordnance "
1188— Pay , "
And an Act passed in the 2d Session of the 37th Congress and approved April 16,
1862, prescribed the duties of the Medical Department.
* " The base of operations is most generally that of supply." (Jomini.)
" The base of operations of an army is composed of the country which it covers
which furnishes its wants, which sends 10 it every day the supplies of every kind which
it cQnstimes, — and which receives its sick and wounded, etq." (Marmont.)

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 47
" The value of a base of operations will seldom determine
the choice of an undertaking in the first instance. Mere difficul
ties which may present themselves in this respect must be put
side by side and compared with other means actually at our com
mand ; obstacles of this nature often vanish before the force of
decisive victories." *
While the selection of a base of operations should not, in
general, interfere with the plan of campaign, the location and
configuration of a base will affect the readiness with which the
supplies can be procured and fowarded to an army. A base
should rest on many points, as it is both difficult and dangerous
to collect all the supplies in one depot.
The extent of the Federal base gave its armies an advantage ;
not only had they a variety of lines of invasion to select from,
but when defeated in Virginia it was almost hopeless to attempt
to intercept them. In 1862, Jackson's flanking movement cut off
Pope from the upper Potomac but could not prevent him from
reaching Alexandria, and if cut off from Alexandria he could still
have retreated on Acquia and the flotilla. And in 1863,, when
Grant was baffled on the line of the Rapidan he changed his
base as he moved around Lee's right successively to the Pamun-
key and to the James.
The supremacy at sea, and the fact that the theatre of war
was largely bounded by coast line, gave the Federal Govern
ment an immense advantage. The capture of the forts at Hat-
teras Inlet, of Roanoke Island, Newberne, New Orleans, Fort
Fisher, and Fort Pickens, the Peninsula Campaign, and the sup
ply of the armies operating against Richmond in Grant's cam
paigns, were feasible mainly because of the Government's su
premacy at sea.
The facility of procuring the supplies depends upon the rich
ness and financial resources of the country and the number of
men available to raise the crops and prepare the needed supplies.
During the Civil War the population of the North was largely in
excess of that of the South, and while it was first considered
that the slaves at the South would prove a source of anxiety and
apprehension, it turned out actually that they were trusted to
take care of the families where the able bodied white men had
gone to the war, and they never betrayed their trust. They were
largely engaged in building fortifications, and raised the crops
* Von Clausewitz.

48 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
upon which the entire South subsisted during the whole war.
Both sides had to depend to a considerable extent on Europe for
supplies of arms and ammunition. This was, of course, more
true of the South than of the North for the principal arsenals for
the manufacture of arms were situated in the Northern States,,
but it was very much easier for the North to obtain the importa
tions than it was for the South, as vessels containing the cargoes
were obliged to run the blockade and were often captured when
they attempted it.
The South, at the commencement of the war, was able to
draw upon the supplies stored in ths arsenals located in that sec
tion, and which had been " well stocked by the provident treason
of Buchanan's Minister of War."* But when these resources
were exhausted, replacement was difficult, the blockade having
been established, though extraordinary efforts to manufacture>the
military supplies were made.
The Confederate government enacted a law providing that a
certain portion of the cargo of every vessel entering its ports must
consist of arms or ammunition, otherwise vessel and all would be
confiscated. This insured a constant supply; and though the
soldiers were often barefoot, ragged, and hungry, they never
lacked arms, nor were they defeated for want of ammunition.
Procuration.
The principal points of supply for the Federal armies for the
supplies furnished by the Quartermaster's and Subsistence De
partments, were in the cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia^
Baltimore, Washington, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, Chi
cago, New Orleans, and San Francisco, and in each of these cities
there were one or more officers in charge of the depot belonging
to each department, provided with ample force of clerks, laborers
and mechanics. The,re were large establishments at Cincinnati,^
Louisville, Jeffer.sonville, and Alexandria, in which hard and soft
bread were baked by the Subsistence Department, but the greater
part of the bread supplied was furnished from New York, Balti
more and St. Louis. There were also large pork packing estab
lishments located at Louisville, Ky., operated by the Subsistence
Department. The principal depots for the purchase and manufacture of
clothing were at Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Cincinnati,
* Gold win Smith—" The United States."— Mr. Floyd.

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 49
Louisville, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Detroit, and at Springfield,
Ills. When the Rebellion first compelled the Government to call
out a large force the stock of clothing on hand in the depots,
being intended only for the supply of the regular army, about
thirteen thousand strong, was inconsiderable. The manufacture
of cloth for army clothing was engaged in by few factories
throughout the country and the stock of clothing was at once
exhausted ; there was also great scarcity of suitable blankets and
undergarments.* The troops being received generally through
State authorities these authorities were engaged to assist the
Quartermaster's Department to provide the necessary supplies.
Large importations were made by merchants, and the goods thus
imported were bought by the State authorities and by the Quar
termaster's Department, and manufactured by contract, or in the
establishments of the Department, into clothing.
A very large proportion of the ordnance supplies was manu
factured in the arsenals, foundries and armories throughout the
North, of which there were twenty eight in number. The most
important ones were located upon railroads or water ways. Some
of these arsenals were devoted to special work, as, for instance,
iron gun carriages were manufactured at Fortress Monroe, Va.,
and Watertown, South Boston. Wood carriages were manufac
tured at Watertown, Watervliet Troy, N. Y.), Alleghany City,
and Washington, D. C. Harness was made at Watertown and
Watervliet. The principal repair shops, especially for small arms,
were at St. Louis, Mo., and Washington, D. C. Compressed
bullets were made in the arsenals at St. Louis, Washington, and
Alleghany City, and large quantities were also furnished by pri
vate factories. Ammunition was prepared at all the arsenals ex
cept that of Fortress Monroe. Guns were cast in the foundries

* " Under these circumstances, and to supply the immediate and absolute necessi
ties of the suffering troops, large quantities of such materials as could be found in the
market in the hands of the dealers and manufacturers — materials manufactured for the
ordinary clothing of the people — were purchased and made up. In some cases these
articles were redyed, of the uniform colors, light and dark indigo blue; but the greater
part of the gray, brown, and black cloths purchased were made up in those colors. * *
* * When the troops came in contact with the enemy on thickly wooded fields mis
takes occurred. The rebel forces were generally clothed in gray, and our own troops,
in some cases, fired into each other. This caused orders to be issued, both by the
eastern and western commanders, prohibiting the issue or use of clothing of any but the
established uniform colors, light and dark blues." (Report of the Quartermaster-Gen-'
eral, November i8, i86z.)

50 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
at Pittsburgh, Reading, Cold Spring, South Boston, and Provi
dence. The armory at Harper's Ferry having been destroyed to
prevent its occupation and use by the rebels, the Government
was compelled to rely upon the single armory at Springfield, and
upon private establishments for a supply of arms. The capacity
of that armory was largely increased until it was capable of pro
ducing several thousand stands of arms per month. The demand
for arms caused the establishment of numerous manufactories
throughout the Northern States, and these were encouraged by
the Government.
Combinations among manufacturers, importers, and agents,
for the sale of arms, caused a great advance in prices, and to pre
vent advantage being taken of the necessities of the Government,
the Customs officers were directed to deliver to Government
agents all arms and munitions that were imported into the
country. The Ordnance Department likewise furnished all the horse
shoes and nails used in the army during the war. The powder
was furnished by private mannfacturers, the Ordnance Depart
ment being charged with the duty of making the necessary proof
upon its receipt. The purchase of arms abroad continued until
1863, by which time the manufacturers of Pennsylvania succeeded
in furnishing suitable iron and steel for the purpose of manufac
turing arms.
Prior to the war the production of minerals at the South was
insignificant, in fact the great mineral wealth of that section was
not then known ; and no manufactories or foundries were situated
in that region as the institution of slavery was more particularly
concerned with agricultural pursuits, and the South was supplied
with machinery and everything that it required from factories
and mills in the Northern States. The establishment of the block
ade cut off the possibility of supply from European markets and
thus compelled the Confederate States to rely upon the ingenuity
and skill of their inhabitants to produce the supplies of all kinds
required. The iron mines in Georgia and Alabama were oper
ated on an extensive scale and yielded all the iron used in the
manufacture of guns and projectiles. The Tredegar works, near
Richmond, were the largest iron mills in the South, and at that
establishment cannon and projectiles of every calibre were manu
factured. A few of the machines in the Harper's Ferry armory were

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 51
saved by the Confederates from the fire and were forwarded to
Richmond where they were set up.
Nearly all the Confederate States established such factories as
were needed, all of which were eventually placed under the exclu
sive control of the Confederate government. Shops for the re
modelling of old guns and the manufacture of Mini6 rifles were
established at Memphis, New Orleans, Nashville, Gallatin, Rich
mond and many other places.
At Dahlonega, Georgia, was located the principal powder mill
of the rebels ; and their factories for percussion caps were in Rich
mond. At first the cartridge factory was at Memphis but was
later moved to Grenada.
All the horses and mules used in the army were purchased by
the Quartermaster's Department ; in consequence of very decided
objections raised by the cavalry officers, a Cavalry Bureau was
established in 1863 by General Orders No. 236. This bureau was
charged with the organization and equipment of the cavalry forces
of the army and with the duty of providing for the mounts and
re-mounts of the .same. The purchase of all horses for the cavalry
service were to be made by the officers of the Quartermaster's
Department under the direction of the chief of the Cavalry Bu
reau, and depots were directed to be established for the reception,
organization and discipline of cavalry recruits and new regiments,
and for the collection, care and training of cavalry horses, which
depots were to be under the control of the Cavalry Bureau. In
consequence, there were established by authority of this order,
depots at Gisboro', D. C, St. Louis, Mo., Greenville, La., Nash
ville, Tenn. ,-Harrisburg, Pa., and Wilmington, Delaware. The Gis
boro' depot was the principal one for the supply of the armies in
the Atlantic States and it occupied a farm of about 625 acres and
had a capacity of providing for 30,000 animals at the depot, but
not more than about 20,000 were ever on hand there at any one
time. During the first nine months of 1864 the supply of horses
by the Cavalry Bureau averaged about 500 per diem. The supply
of fresh horses to General Sheridan's army during his campaign
in the valley of the Shenandoah was at the rate of 150 per diem.
Large corrals for the reception of beef cattle were also established
at various points, notably at Louisville, Kentucky, which corral
could accommodate between 30,000 and 40,000 head ; there was
likewise a large corral at Alexandria, Va. ; and a large herd was kept
on what is now the Monument grounds in Washington, D. C.

52 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD,
There are two methods of procuring the supplies required for
an army :
1st. By entrusting to contractors the entire work of collecting
and delivering them to the troops ; and,
2d. By direct purchases made by designated officers of the
supply departments.
In the first method the supply departments simply exercise
an administrative scrutiny over the contracts made with various
firms or individuals.
The defects of this system are universally acknowledged, and
it has been the cause of disastrous failures in every army in which
it has been adopted. Under this system the success of the most
important military operations is dependent upon men who are
subject to no military responsibility ; and it is often to the interest
of the contractor to fail at the most critical juncture, when the
means of supply become the most difficult and expensive. Con
tracts are never fulfilled to the letter, and never will be, so long
as avarice exists. General Scott said : " The method is believed
to be impolitic, and is vicious in time of war; also liable to many
objections in a state of peace. The principal only is known to the
War Office, and therefore may be supposed to be free from this
objection ; but his deputies and issuing agents are appointed
without the concurrence or knowledge of the general or the Gov
ernment. The deputies or issuing agents are necessarily as
well acquainted with the numerical strength of the army to which
they are attached, as the Adjutant-General himself. For a bribe .
they may communicate this intelligence to the enemy, or fail to
make issue at some critical moment, and thus defeat the best
views and hopes of the Commander-in-chief." From the close of
the Revolutionary War until after the close of the War of 1 8 1 2 " the
mode of subsisting the army, by contracts for complete rations,
had remained substantially unchanged, but various instrumen
talities and combinations of instrumentalities for carrying it into
execution, had been adopted. Throughout all these changes the
result had been uniformly the same — failure."*
By the second method, the officers of the supply departments
purchase either in open market, or after making a contract with
dealers for the delivery of the supplies, and upon acceptance the
supplies are forwarded by the Government to the' places where
required. The advantage of this system is that it is possible to
* Barriger. — " Legislative History of the Subsistence Department." '

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 53
accumulate the supplies in a distant locality without the likeli
hood of the enemy's hearing of the same and thus obtain infor
mation regarding a contemplated movement. Furthermore, by
this system it is possible to, in a measure, prevent any combina
tions on the part of dealers to advance the prices of supplies.
The Army Regulations and Acts of Congress in force during
the Civil War required, in general, the purchase of all supplies for
the army to.be made under contract ; and section 16, of an Act
approved July 17, 1862, provided that any person who contracted
to furnish supplies of any kind or description for the army or
navy, should be deemed as a part of the land or naval forces
and subject to the rules and regulations for the government of the
same. In case such contractor should be found guilty of fraud or
wilful neglect of duty, the above cited section provided that he
should be punished as the court-martial should direct.
The fresh beef was generally furnished on the hoof, and pur
chased under contract. During the war the troops on the coast
of the Carolinas and also the Gulf posts, including New Orleans,
received their fresh beef by .shipments of the animals from New
York ; and Louisville and Nashville were the supply points for ,
the armies operating in that section.
The pay of the army was provided by appropriation made by
Congress. The enormous sums which were disbursed during the
war necessitated some extraordinary means of the Government's
raising the same, as the mere fact of a war of that character
tends to diminish very largely the ordinary receipts of the Gov
ernment. " Modern warfare, with its principle of an uninterrupted and
regardless employment of all competent forces, would scarcely
be conceivable without subscription loans, by which loans the
requisite funds are procured." *
Congress met at the call of the President on July 4, 1861, and
on the 17th passed a bill, for the issue of bonds and treasury notes
to the amount of two hundred and fifty million dollars.f It also

* Von der Goltz.-^" The Nation in Arms."
¦f In August, i86r. Secretary of the Treasury Chase, held a conference with sev
eral of the principal bankers of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, to negotiate a
National loan, and when it looked as if negotiations might fail the Secretary stated
that he would return to Washington and issue notes for circulation, " for it is certain
that the war must go on until the rebellion is put down, if we have to put out paper
until it takes a thousand dollars to buy a breakfast."

54 SUPPL YING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
increased the duties on many articles, passed an act for the con
fiscation of property of rebels, and levied a tax of twenty million
dollars, apportioned among the States and Territories. The in
terest bearing debt of the Government in 1865 was considerably
over two thousand millions of dollars.
The Confederate government likewise issued large amounts
of paper money which was to be redeemable six months after the
ratification of a treaty of peace with the United States. The
South early resorted to requisition and confiscation ; the uncon
vertible bank bills which it issued in vast volumes* speedily lost
all value, and the Confederate soldiers waived the farce of being
paid in them. The South disposed of its bonds among its Euro
pean friends ; and at the close of the war, when, of course, these
bonds could not be paid, " their holders were thus fined for abet
ting, or confiding in a slave power." f
The central depot for the supply of the Medical Department
was at Philadelphia, with storehouses at New York, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, Memphis, Nashville,
Chicago, San Francisco, Hilton Head, Salem, Fortress Monroe,
Newberne, New Orleans and Washington. There were in the
United States at the termination of the war over two hundred
general military hospitals containing 136,894 beds. When the
condition of a patient in general hospital was so far improved as
to render a relapse improbable, he was sent to a camp of conval
escents, of which there were several situated throughout the
North, at places from which transportation to the theatres of
war was comparatively easy. When the men had entirely re
covered their health and strength they were armed and returned
to duty in detachments of sufficient force to resist attacks by
guerillas. In preparing supplies for a campaign the following points are
to be -considered :
I. Their composition.
2. The probable daily consumption, and the number of days'
reserve to be accumulated.

* By November, 1864, the Confederacy had issued over four hundred millions of
dollars of treasury notes which were selling at sixty to one for specie at the treasury.
The supply of specie, February 15, 1864, was but seven hundred and fifty thousand
dollars. Bonds and certificates were not salable, taxes were with difficulty collected.
(Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War of the Confederate States.)
t Goldwin Smith.

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD, 55
3. Where, and by what date they must be ready,
4. Whence are the supplies to be obtained, and how are they
to be conveyed to their destination.
5. How are the expended supplies to be replenished.
During the war the ration was composed as follows : 1 2 ounces
of pork or bacon, or, one pound and four ounces of salt or fresh
beef; one pound and six ounces of soft bread or flour, or, one
pound of hard bread, or, one pound and four ounces of corn
meal; and to every one hundred rations, fifteen pounds of
beans or peas, and ten pounds of rice or hominy; ten pounds
of green coffee, or, eight pounds of roasted (or roasted and
ground) coffee, or, one pound and eight ounces of tea; fifteen
pounds of sugar; four quarts of vinegar; one pound and foiir
ounces of adamantine or star candles ; four pounds of soap ;
thirty pounds of potatoes, when practicable, and one quart of
molasses. Desiccated compressed potatoes, or desiccated com
pressed mixed vegetables could be substituted for beans, peas,
rice, hominy, or fresh potatoes, at fixed rates.*

* " During the Atlanta campaign we were supplied with all sorts of patent coir.-
pounds, such as desiccated vegetables, and concentrated milk, meat biscuit, sausages,
but somehow the men preferred the simpler and more familiar forms of food, and
usually styled these 'desecrated vegetables and consecrated milk.'" (Sherman II.
391.) The method of preserving food products in hermetically sealed tin cans was
but little used until after the close of the Civil War ; it has now been brought to such
perfection that all military authorities agree, preserved and prepared foods and forage
must be largely used in the future by armies in the field.
Von der Goltz says : " Provisions which are best, and at the same time, most
agreeable to the soldier, are always those that are fresh. * * * gut fresh pro
visions have this disadvantage, that they take up a comparatively large space, that
they easily go bad, are difficult to keep, and are difficult to cook. * * * How
often does it happen in war that just when the water has begun to boil in the pots, an
alarm is raised, and a start must be made. No attempt to cook fresh provisions
should be made, unless it is certain that the troops will be undisturbed. Artificially
prepared provisions are accordingly, an excellent makeshift. They take up but little
room, and are not nearly so heavy as the fresh, so that the soldier can carry far more
without being burdened by a greater weight. A handful of compressed coffee
squares, or a few bars of compressed soup and vegetables, thrown into the knapsack,
do not inconvenience, and in the hour of need they can form refreshment and nutri
ment for a considerable time. Nothing is required save boiling water, for all the
various condiments have been already added to the small bodies. A few minutes are
sufficient to prepare them, and their preparation requires no knowledge or especial
dexterity. The food remains clean and does not become bad."
Colonel Maurice in his article on " War" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, gives,
as one of the modern conditions affecting strategy, " the facility afforded for the sup
ply of armies by compressed food and compressed forage."
Von Schellendorf says : ' ' The problem of feeding an army in the field has again

56 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
The allowance of clothing was fixed by regulations and the
men drew such as was necessary, but were by orders obliged to
carry certain articles in their knapsacks ; many officers reported
the tendency of the men to throw away the knapsacks on the
march ; and when they were taken off prior to going into battle
they were seldom again recovered.
Fuel is one of the most essential of all the supplies required by
an army in the field, and on account of its great bulk is very diffi
cult of transportation. In a well wooded country, and when on
the march, it is a comparatively easy matter to supply the fuel
required solely for cooking purposes, but when the army remains
stationary for any length of time the difficulty increases, and
when it goes into winter quarters the task becomes one of the
greatest importance and the supply most urgent. The theatres
of operation during the Civil War were generally well wooded
and the troops provided the fuel by their own labor. The fields
in the different theatres of operation were generally enclosed by
the ordinary " rail " fences, and the order published the early
part of the war authorizing the use of the " top " rail of the same
for fuel, speedily caused the obliteration of all such landmarks.
Troops not in the enemy's country were provided by contract
made by the Quartermaster's Department.
The fuel required for the large fleet of ocean steamers was
purchased by contract principally at Philadelphia and Pittsburgh,
and that required by the steamboats on the Mississippi and tribu
tary rivers, was cut by contract along the banks of those rivers.
The freedmen were employed to cut the wood and thus were
given much needed occupation and in this "way a fund was created
sufficient to clothe, feed, and house them.*
The supply of water to troops in the field is sometimes a
most difficult problem, 'and particularly so in a desert country.
Under such circumstances arrangements must be made to trans
port a supply for the men and animals. " It might be possible
on an emergency to do without firewood and straw, but water is
absolutely necessary. It must be good, sufficient in quantity,
and accessible. "f
in recent years been facilitated by the use of railways and the partial substitution of
preserved for fresh provisions.'' It must be remembered, however, that canned meats
barrelled pDrk, bacon, etc., require an increase of transportation, as only cattle on tie
hoof furnish their own.
* Grant's Memoirs, Vol. I., page 426.
t Clarke.—" Staff Duties."

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 57
During the war the troops were enabled to obtain an abund
ant supply of water from the numerous streams which intersected
the country ; though the quality was in many instances very bad
and was the cause of much sickness, but it was not necessary for
any department to arrange for a supply of this most necessary
article, except at such enormous establishments as the cavalry
depot at Gisboro', D. C.
The forage ration was fourteen pounds of hay and twelve
pounds of oats, corn or barley. For mules, fourteen pounds of
hay and nine pounds of oats, corn or barley.
The supply of small-arm and artillery ammunition must be
ample to enable a general engagement being entered into even if
the same is brought on unexpectedly.
The daily consumption of supplies will be governed by the
number of troops, camp followers and animals to be provided,
and whether active operations are undertaken in which general
engagements are to be brought on.
" He who, according to directions, calculates the needs of an
army in the field by pounds, and provides for it according to the
most careful dispositions, certainly will scarcely ever run the risk
of a portion of the supplies he has furnished being spoiled. But
the army will suffer by this arrangement. Two and three times
as much as an army needs must be supplied, if it is to be kept
from want ; double and treble in respect of the good quality of
the provisions, double and treble of the quantity.'""
From May 1st until August 12th, 1864, the daily average num
ber of rations forwarded from Chattanooga to Sherman's army,
which numbered about one hundred and five thousand men, was
four hundred and twelve thousand — more than three rations for
every man that left Chattanooga on that campaign.f
Transportation.
The second sub-division of the duties performed by the service
acting in rear consists of transportation and distribution. The
following are the means of transport which are at various times
available for use in forwarding supplies to armies in the field :
I. Railroads.
2. Steamers, sailing vessels, boats by sea, on rivers, lakes or
canals.

» Von der Goltz.
\ Symonds. — " Report of a Commissary of Subsistence."

58 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
3. Wagons or pack animals on ordinary roads.
Railroads. — The employment of railroads in war tends to in
crease that important factor of the mobility of the troops. It is
fully acknowledged that without their aid it would be next to
impossible to supply regularly the large armies that would be em
ployed in wars at the present age.
" In a country with numerous lines of railway and vast quan
tities of rolling stock ready at hand, there are immense possibili
ties of attack or defense, provided it possesses competent military
force. Great bodies of men and material can be moved over ex
treme distances at a very brief notice, by a vigorous government,
directed by the necessary skill and ability. To make the result
of full value, however, both men and material must be on hand
in entire readiness and fitted for instant use in advance of the
movement."* When railways pass directly from the national territory into
that of the enemy, as was the case during the Civil War, they
can carry the resources of the former right through, in which
case its territory usually becomes a great base of operations.
The facility of transport afforded by railways renders the estab
lishment of great magazines at the junction of important lines a
comparatively easy one, " but the same principle as before must
govern the selection of points on which to establish magazines,
and the direction of the lines of supplies. "f
" It is thus evident that railways have become the true military
roads of an army, and that their location in the future will
have a determining influence on the plans of campaign to be
adopted.":]; Early in the war Jihe Government realized the importance of
utilizing the railroads for transportation of troops and supplies,
and on January 31, 1862, Congress passed an Act which author
ized the President, when in his judgment the public safety re
quired it, " to take possession of any or all railway lines in the
United States, the rolling stock, their offices, shops, buildings,
and all other appendages, and to prescribe rules for using and
maintainii)g, and to extend, repair and build the same in the
manner most conducive to the interests of the Government, and
to place under military control all officers, agents and employes,
* Holabird. — " Transportation of Troops and Supplies."
f Hamley. — " Operations of War."
% Michie. — " American Military Roads and Bridges."

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 59
belonging to the lines, so that they shall be considered as a post-
road and a part of the military establishment of the United
States, subject to all the restrictions imposed by the rules and
articles of war." The same act imposed severe penalties on any
person resisting or interfering in any manner with the unre
strained use by the Government of such property, and provided
further, " that the transportation of troops, munitions of war,
etc., throughout the United States, shall be under the immediate
control and supervision of the Secretary of War, and all such
agents as he may appoint."
On February 11, 1862, by order of the President, a military
director and superintendent of railroads in the United States was
appointed (D. C. McCallum) with authority to take possession of,
hold and use all railways, engines, cars, locomotives, equipments,
etc., that were required for the transport of troops, arms, ammu
nition, and military supplies of the United States. At the time
General McCallum assumed his duties indicated above, there was
only one railroad in the possession of the Government, that from
Washington to Alexandria, which was seven miles long.
It was not found necessary to exercise within the loyal States
the power conferred upon the President by law, to take actual
military possession of the railroads of the country, but a uniform
-tariff for Government transportation was made with the officials
of the different railroads. Some oT the railroads within the the
atre of military operations — as the Baltimore and Ohio, the
Louisville and Nashville, and the Missouri railroads, — repaired
their bridges, restored their track and replaced their rolling stock
at their own expense. ( Others, abandoned by their disloyal own
ers and managers, were' taken possession of, repaired, stocked and
managed by the Quarterrnaster's Department. J
As the war progressed, the nature, capacity, and value of rail
roads were better understood on both sides, and systematic and
determined efforts were made against the lines used for trans
porting supplies for the Federal armies. The destruction of
track and bridges was greater each time the roads passed within
the enemy's lines, and extraordinary efforts had to be made to
meet it.
A small construction corps numbering three hundred was at
first formed ;rthTs was later enlarged ji-ntil at the end of the war
it numbered nearly ten thousand men. Storehouses were estab
lished at principal points with an ample stock of tools and mate-

6o

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.

rials for making needed repairs. This construction corps was at
all times prepared for any emergency, either to build bridges of
great length and dimensions, or lay miles of track or repair dam
ages done by guerrillas and raiding parties. The attacks on the
line in rear of the army were of such frequent occurrence and
often of so serious a character that to insure speedy repairs it
was necessary to station detachments of the construction corps at
various points along the different roads operated and also to col
lect supplies of construction material, such as iron rails, chairs,
spikes, cross ties and bridge timbers, at points where they would
be comparatively safe and easily obtained when required.
Seventeen hundred and sixty-nine miles of military railroads*

* I. — THE FOLLOWING ROADS WERE OPERATED IN VIRGINIA I
Name of Line. Terminal Stations.
From.
Alexandria and Washington  Alexandria,
Alexandria, Loudon, and Hampshire  Alexandria,
Orange and Alexandria  Alexandria,
Manassas Gap,. . .  Manassas,
Norfolk and Petersburg  Norfolk
Seaboard and Roanoke   Portsmouth
City Point and Army  Pitkin Station
Southside  City Point
Richmond and Danville.  Manchester
Winchester and Potomac  Harper's Ferry,
Richmond and Petersburg  :. . . . Petersburg,
Clover Hill Branch  Clover Hill Station

ns. Len)

»th in

To. Miles.

Washington,

7

Vienna,

I.'i

Rappahannock,

51

Piedmont,

.34

Suffolk,

23

Suffolk,

18

Humphrey.

13

Burkevilie,

62

Danville,

140

Stevenson,

z8

Manchester,

21

Coal Mines

18

430
It. — THE FOLLOWING ROADS WERE OPERATED IN THE DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

Name of Line.

From.

Terminal Stations.

Nashville and Chattanooga  Nashville,
Nashville, Decatur, and Stevenson  Nashville,
Nashville and Northwestern  Nashville,
Nashville and Clarksville  Nashville,
Shelbyville Branch  Wartrace,
Chattanooga and Knoxville  Chattanooga,
Knoxville and Bristol  Knoxville,
Cleveland and Dalton  Cleveland,
Chattanooga and Atlanta  Chattanooga
Rome Branch  Kingston,
Atlanta and Macon  Atlanta.
Memphis and Charleston  Memphis,
Mississippi Central  ^  Grand Junction,
Mobile and Ohio   Columbus, Ky.-,

Length in
Miles.

To, Chattanooga Stevenson,Johnsonville, Clarksville,
Shelbyville,Knoxville,
Carter's Station
Dalton, Atlanta, Rome,
Rough and Ready, 1 1
Pocahontas, 75
Tallahatchie river, 48
Union City, Tenn.26

151
200 7862 9
112no 27,
136 17

1062

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD, 6i
were, during the war, repaired, stocked and operated by the
agents of the Quartermaster's Department, under the energetic
supervision of General Mc(I!allum. In the repair of so many
miles of railroads great quantities of iron, burned and twisted by
the contending forces, both of which destroyed railroads which
they were obliged to abandon, fell into the possession of the Fed
erals. To make this iron serviceable in the repair of the rail
roads leading to Atlanta and the Gulf, after the capture of Chat
tanooga, the rolling mill there was completed, and the twisted
rails re-rolled at a cost of about fifty dollars per ton ; thus effect
ing an enormous saving as new rails delivered in Chattanooga
cost about one hundred and forty-five dollars per ton. The sup
ply of rails for new lines, or extension of old ones, in the east
ern portion of the theatre of operations, was obtained by pur
chase, manufacture, and by taking up lines unnecessary for mili
tary purposes in that section.
The celerity with which the Federal forces repaired the roads
was marvelous. Early in October 1863, the Orange and Alex
andria railroad was thoroughly destroyed by the rebels from
Manassas Junction nearly to Brandy Station, about twenty
two miles. Repairs were commenced the 23d of October, and,
among other works, the Rappahannock river bridge, six hundred
and twenty-five feet long and thirty-five feet high, was re-built in
nineteen working hours.
During Sherman's advance from Chattanooga to Atlanta at no
time were the railroad trains more than five days behind the gen
eral commanding. The reconstruction of the bridges over the
Etowah and Chattahoochie are unparalleled feats of military con
struction. The Etowah bridge, 625 feet long and 75 feet high,
was rebuilt in six days by six hundred men of the construction
corps.

III.-_THE FOLLOWING LINES WERE OPERATED IN NORTH CAROLINA.
Terminal Stations. Length in
FroiB. , To, Miles.
Morehead City  '.  Goldsborough  85
Wilmington   Goldsborough  95
Goldsborough  Raleigh  48
228
The only line in Arkansas used for military purposes was a portion of the Mem
phis and L,ittle Rock Railroad between Duvall's Bluff, on White River, and Little
Rock, forty-nine miles long.

62 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
The Chattahoochie, 740 feet long and ninety feet high, was rebuilt
in four and a half days by the same number of men belonging to the
corps. The repairs of the various railroad lines were accomplished
so rapidly as to almost justify the statement of a Confederate that
" old Sherman carries a duplicate tunnel along."*
The principal factors in the transportation of armies and sup
plies by rail are the following:
I. The capacity of the train.
2. The time necessary for loading.
3. The time interval between trains.
4. The rate of running.
5. Time required in unloading.
6. Number of railways available.
On a railroad which is employed for the transportation of
.troops and supplies, the ordmary freight and pllssenger service
wUl be considerably distiirbed,_ and at Hmes even it may be neces
sary to_entireIy suppress them.
In April, 1864, when making preparations for the Atlanta cam
paign, Sherman found the capacity of the railroads from Nashville
forward to Decatur, and to Chattanooga, so limited that on April
6th he issued an orderf restricting the use of the railroad plant to
transporting only the essential articles of food, ammunition, and
supplies for the army proper, and cutting off all civil traffic. The
commanders of posts within thirty miles of Nashville were re
quired to haul the stores for their commands from that place in
wagons ; the troops forwarded to the front were obliged to march,
and the beef cattle were driven in herds.
While a railroad may, during the period of preparing for a cam
paign, be devoted exclusively to transportation of supplies, when
active operations commence, the reverse is frequently the case, as
the fighting line needs to be at once and strongly reinforced
with men.
When the number of railway lines, which can be used as lines
of communication during a campaign, is sufficient, it is advisable
to assign eacLline for the supply of one or more designated corps ;
where .several arnriies act in conjunction such ^signment is par
ticularly desirable whenever it is^possible. '
When the Armies of the OhioTXumberland, and Tennessee
were in the vicinity of Chattanooga (from March to May 1864)
* Sherman's Memoirs, II. 151.
fG. O., No. 6, Hdqrs. Military Div'n of Miss., April 6, 1864.

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 63
preparing for the Atlanta campaign, the supplies were forwarded
from Louisville to Nashville by rail and alsO by the Cumberland
River. General Thomas, as commanding-general of the Depart
ment of the Cumberland, exercised_absolute__coiiamaTid and con
trol over the railroads in his department, and the other armies
thought that his (General Thomas's) army received more than its
share of the supplies and other advantages of the railroads. "I found
a good deal of feeling in the Army of the Tennessee on this score
and therefore took supreme control of the roads myself, placed
all of the army commanders on an equal footing, and gave to each
the same control, so far as orders of transportation for men and
stores were concerned."*
Water Transport. — While transportation by rail is liable to in
numerable interruptions caused by obstruction or destruction of
the railroad lines, and is further limited by the number of trains
that can be sent over the line in any given time ; transports by
water, on the other hand, are liable to none of these accidents,
except that caused by ice, when once the command of the water
course has been secured. There is, moreover, no limit to the ca
pacity of a lake or navigable river so long as there are boats in
sufficient number; but a railway, especially a single track railway,
may be overcrowded. An ordinary Ohio river steamer carrying
both passengers and freight, has a capacity of about five hundred
tons. To supply forty thousand men and eighteen thousand
animals requires about two hundred and sixty tons daily, there
fore, one such steamer would carry supplies for such a force for
nearly two days. Jomini says that rivers are excellent lines of
supply and powerful auxiliaries in the establishment of good lines
of operation, but never the line itself.
The country commanding the sea by its naval force is only
limited as to the amount of stores that it can transport by the
capacity of the vessels it has at command.f
The demand upon the Quartermaster's Department compelled
it to employ not only the fleet which it had gradually acquired
by purchase but nearly every new steam vessel built in the
United States for ocean traffic.

* Sherman's Memoirs, II. 9.
f The Quartermaster's Department had in charge during the war, for use on the
ocean and lakes, 394 vessels having a gross tonnage of 137,006 tons. There were
238 vessels employed on the ocean and lake service owned by the Government, having
a tonnage of 165,248 tons.

64 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
The steamboats used on the rivers, etc., were either con
structed or purchased by the Government, or captured from the
enemy, or impressed under military necessity, either from dis
loyal or loyal owners, or they were chartered at fixed rates. The
vessels in all the above cases being sometimes run by crews in
direct Government pay, sometimes by individuals under contract
with the Government to man, victual, and equip, sometimes run
by the crews found on board, whose services were impressed
with the vessels, and who were paid by the owners.*
On the 17th of March, 1862, the transportation of the Army
of the Potomac to Fortress Monroe for the Peninsula campaign
was commenced. 125,000 men, 14,592 animals and 44 batteries of
artillery, and the wagons and ambulances, pontoon trains, and
enormous equipage, required for an army of such magnitude,
were transported in about four hundred steamers and sailing
craft. Later, during Grant's campaign against Richmond, a large
fleet was constantly employed in supplying the armies and the
troops at the various stations along the coast from the Chesa
peake to New Orleans.
The greater part of the stores intended for the supply of
Sherman's army on the completion of its march to the sea, were
sent to Port Royal Harbor, there to await his arrival at some
point on the coast of the Carolinas or Georgia, and transports
were dispatched to Pensacola with supplies to await the arrival
of the troops, in case some unexpected opposition compelled
General Sherman to turn his course to the South. When he ap
peared in the rear of Savannah and captured Fort McAllister by
a coup de main, and communicated with the naval squadron ; the
transports were sent around by the Ogeechee and Savannah
rivers, and light draught steamers suitable for use on the rivers,
which had been dispatched on the first news of his approach, ar
rived in time to transfer to the river landings the clothing, camp
and garrison equipage, quartermaster's stores, forage and pro
visions which had been sent in sea-going vessels, both sail and
steam, and which were of too heavy draught to enter the Ogee
chee or Savannah rivers at that time, as obstructions in the chan
nel were not entirely removed.
* There were 119 steamers, 305 barges, and 109 coal drayage boats and railroad
floats belonging to the United States on the Mississippi River and its tributaries and at
Mobile, Alabama. There were 1750 steamers and other vessels chartered on the
Mississippi River and its tributaries by the Quartermaster's Department.

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD, 65
Wagon Transports. — The introduction of steam as a motive
power has effected a remarkable change in the water and land
transport throughout the world. But even where these improved
means of locomotion are plentiful, an army requires, also, other
means of transport on account of the constant shifting of direc
tion of military operations, the destruction of railway lines, and
the necessity of distributing what the railways, steamboats, and
steamships carry in bulk.*
The wagon trains used in the Federal armies during the war
were the results of long experience and operations upon the wes
tern plains. The wagons and harness were the model so success
fully used there in the movements of the troops upon the high
and narrow plains at the base of the Rocky Mountains and
along the rough defiles of that great chain. Portable forges with
boxes of smith's, wheelwright's and saddler's tools accompanied
all the larger divisions of the trains, and spare parts of materials
for repair were carried with them, thus any ordinary repairs could
be made during the night halt.
The experience of the war convinced all officers of the Quar
termaster's Department, that for army trains mules f are much
superior to horses, and the latter part of the war horses almost
entirely disappeared from the trains, being transferred to the
cavalry or artillery and replaced by mules.
General Ingalls, the Chief Quartermaster of the armies oper
ating against Richmond, in his report for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1864, says: " I have, during the year, frequently reported
my views as to the best and proper means of transportation for an
army. I do not think that the kind and amount now furnished
these armies could be improved upon. The common six-mule
wagon has proved to be the most economical and durable for
years past of any ever tested."
In order that the enormous streams of supply may be uninter
rupted the wagon roads should be of the best construction,
drained, hard and smooth. Up to the time of the Civil War but
little attention had been given to the wagon roads throughout
the country. The ordinary dirt roads over which the armies
* " Much suffering has been caused by the impossibility of furnishing supplies to
the wounded, when those supplies were within a few miles of them in great abundance.'
(Report of the Surgeon-General, dated November lo, 1862.)
+ " This country produces in great abundance, and of the best quality, one of the
most valuable animals in the world for purposes of war— the army mule." (Holabird.
 " Army Wagon Transportation.")

66 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
moved during that war were soon cut up by the heavy traffic to
which they were subjected, and in wet weather they became ab
solutely impassable. General McClellan in his report of the Pen
insular campaign tells us : " On the 15th and i6th (May, 1862) the
divisions of Franklin, Smith, and Porter, were with great difficulty
moved to White House, five miles in advance ; so bad was the
road that the train of one of these divisions required thirty-six
hours to pass over this short distance."
After the battle of Chickamauga the Army of the Cumberland
was encamped in and around Chattanooga. Its line of commun
ication, along the south bank of the Tennessee, with its depot at
Bridgeport, was broken by the rebels ; and furthermore the de
struction of the railroad bridge at that place interrupted the com
munication with Nashville, the base of supply. The wagon trains
were thus obliged to move by a circuitous route along the bottom
lands of the Tennessee and Sequatchie valleys and then to cross
Waldron's Ridge by very steep, narrow, and rough roads. Until
the rains commenced the roads were practicable, though difficult ;
but early in October (1863) they became impassable, and the rebel
cavalry, having crossed the Tennessee above Chattanooga, at
tacked the trains, entangled in the mud of the Sequatchie valley
and the rocks of the western slope of Waldron's Ridge, and de
stroyed about three hundred wagons, and killed or captured
eighteen hundred mules.
The' roads leading from the main depot of supply of an army
to the several corps, divisions, brigades, and other subdivisions of
the same, were especially liable to be rendered unserviceable and
impassable. To remedy this recourse was had to "corduroying"
the roads.
Intimately associated with the maintenance of roads is the
bridging of rivers, streams and torrents ; as an impassable stream
or a swollen torrent may lead to unfortunate results, by delaying
the advance of very much needed reinforcements, or of very
urgent supplies.
Pontoon trains accompanied all the armies in the Peninsular
campaign, and " the pontoons were used in discharging quarter
master and commissary stores at Ship Point ; in disembarking
General Franklin's command at West Point, and in constructing
bridges over Hampton creek, the stream in front of Yorktown,
and upper Chickahominy." * "During the year 1863 the pon-
* Michie.

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 67
toon trains accompanied the army in all its marches backward
and forward through Virginia, frequently bridging the Potomac,
Rapidan and Rappahannock. * * * Dilring the campaign
of 1864, trains composed of fourteen pontoons and two trestles
accompanied each of the three army corps of the Army of the
Potomac."* SUPPLY SERVICE WORKING IN THE FIELD.
In order to insure the continuity of the service of supply for
troops in the field, that is to say, the connection between the
troops during the operations of war and the centres of produc
tion in rear of the army, there are officers, with necessary assist
ants, belonging to the various departments of supply, attached to
each of the different organizations of an army.
On June 24, 1861, General McDowell was authorized to divide
his army into brigades and divisions. By an order of the Presi
dent, dated March 8, 1862, the Army of the Potomac was divided
into corps ; similar organizations existed in the other Federal
armies. Each regiment had an officer with the rank of lieuten
ant who was charged with the duty of obtaining supplies from
the different supply departments for the troops in the regiment.
Each brigade consisted of two or more regiments, and had an
officer assigned to it from each one of the supply departments,
who was designated as brigade quartermaster, commissary, etc.,
respectively. Such officers received, took charge of, and trans
ferred to the proper officer all property and supplies furnished for
the use of the brigade. The brigade quartermaster also had
charge of the baggage train, material and animals. Each division
consisted of two or more brigades, and had officers known as the
division quartermaster, commissary, etc., to perform duties re
lating to the division similar to those attributed to a brigade.
When several divisions were organized into a corps, a chief
quartermaster, commissary, etc.. were designated; these officers
had the general superintendence of the affairs of their depart
ments within the corps. When several corps were united into
an army there were officers appointed, designated as chief quar
termasters, commissaries, etc., for the army. The Medical ser
vice was under the supervision of the medical director, who had
one assistant. Each corps had its medical director ; each divisiorv

* " Organization of the Bridge Equipage of the United States Army." — War De
partment, 1870.

68 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD,
a chief medical officer; and each regiment one surgeon, two assist
ant surgeons and a hospital steward. Each of these officers exer
cised general supervision over the conduct of the officers and
agents subordinate to him and within his command. Each re
ceived his orders and instructions from the commander of the body
of troops to which he was attached, and also from his immediate
superior in his own department.
The difficulties of supplying armies in the field ai-e mainly
caused by their state of concentration and by their constant
change of locality. The supply of an army in the field is depend
ent upon, first, the resources of the country forming the theatre
of operations, in the way of food, forage, transport and commu
nications ; second, on the time of year and the climate ; third, on
the nature of the war, whether offensive or defensive ; fourth, on
the character, condition, length and number of the lines of com
munication ; fifth, on the rapidity of the movements ; sixth, on
the propinquity of the enemy and the temper of the inhabitants.
" A general should neglect no means of knowing in advance
and in its details, the country in which he is going to make war.
He should procure its most accurate statistics ; Tie should know
in what its resources of every kind consist. * * * The least
negligence in this study may have the gravest consequences." *
At the outbreak of the Civil War there were few if any good
maps of the theatre of operations, and the science of statistics
had not then received much attention in this country, conse
quently the knowledge of the resources of the theatre of war was
very imperfect. Later on very accurate information was ob
tained of the location of the various flour mills and other centres
of production of food and other supplies.
The Civil War was really a war of conquest and of invasion.
" The North, therefore, if it undertook to fight for the reestab-
lishment of the Union, was forced to commence a war of con
quest. No other phrase can so precisely describe the kind of
war which the North must prosecute, or else acquiesce in the
permanent dissolution of the Union.'' f
It is easier to provide the supplies when acting on the defen
sive in one's own country than when engaged in war in the
enemy's territory ; for regular communications with the depots
and magazines can be organized, and if obliged to retire the sur-
* Marmont, page 262.
\ liopes' •' Story of the Civil War."

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 69
plus stores can be destroyed to prevent them falling into the
hands of the enemy. If in an enemy's country the troops re
main stationary and the lines of communication are secure and
in good working order, the question of supply is comparatively
an easy one, but when the troops begin to move the question be
comes more complicated in proportion to the rapidity of the
movement and the.size of the army. Upon the march the ex
tent to which the local resources can be utilized will depend upon
the breadth of the march-front and the rate of the movement.
The broader the front in this case the easier the supply. When
leaving Atlanta Sherman directed that the habitual order of
march should be, wherever practicable, by four roads, one for
each corps comprising his army, as nearly parallel as possible,
and converging at indicated points ; this same order of march
was adopted in his campaign through the Carolinas, and thus, in
both instances, he was able to fully utilize the local resources.
The propinquity of the enemy obliges an army to diminish its
march-front, prevents the resources of the country from being
utilized, and also impedes the supplies being brought from the
rear as the trains cannot be brought within easy distance of the
troops. If the inhabitants are hostile the task of supplying is
most difficult, as, in that case, the population will conceal, carry
off, or destroy its own resources, and endeavor to capture and
burn the supply trains of the invading army. "There was
* * * nothing in the temper of the South to suggest that
the war was carried on for the redress of grievances. * * *
On the contrary, the attitude of the South was from the begin
ning one of resistance to the uttermost. " * The bitter ani
mosities and burning passions gave rise to the most im
placable enmities which raged so at New Orleans and culminated
in Washington, in April, 1865, but which it is most devoutly
hoped were forever calmed and obliterated by the Message of
Peace from Mount McGregor twenty years after.
There are two methods of supplying an army in the field : \
I. By consignments of supplies forwarded by the service in
rear to an advance depot, and carried from that depot by the sup
ply trains of the army ; and,
2. By utilizing the resources of the country.
The supplifes an army carries with it may be divided into two
classes, those carried by the troops themselves, and those which
* Ropes' " Story of the Civil War," page 4.

70 SUPPL YING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
are carried in the trains. The quantity of supplies the men can
carry is limited not only by the strength of the men but by the
rapidity of the movement which is entered upon. The amount
of supplies, and, therefore, the size of the trains containing them,
are dependent upon the distance of the army from the base or its
advance depot.
At the commencement of the war the supplies to be carried
by the troops were prescribed in General Orders, which provided
that, in ordinary marches where the troops could receive daily
issues from the trains they should carry only two days' rations ;
but in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, and where the exi
gencies of the service rendered it necessary for the troops to
move without baggage or trains, the men were required to carry
with them from eight to twelve days' rations,* which were ar
ranged as follows : For Eight Days,
5 days' beef or mutton to be driven on the hoof or
collected in the country passed over.
3 days' cooked rations in haversack, weight, . . 5|- pounds.
5 days' rations of bread and small stores in knapsack,
weight, ........ 6 "
A change of underclothes in knapsack, weight, . 2 "
A blanket, weight, ...... • Si "
Total weight,  19 "
For Twelve Days.
9 days' ration of meat on the hoof.
3 days' cooked rations in haversack, weight, . . 5f pounds.
9 days' rations of biscuit and small stores in knap
sack, weight,  loi "
A change of underclothes in knapsack, weight, . 2 "
A blanket, weight, ....... 5^ "
Total weight, ...... 23^ "
* General Orders No. 7, Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, dated
April 18, 1864, provided : "II. When troops are ordered to march for action or to
be in condition for action, all encumbrances must be left in store at the most safe and
convenient point. Mounted officers (general, regimental or cavalry) will be expected
t) carry on their own or led horses the necessary bedding and changes of clothing, with
<orage, and provisions for themselves for three days — which must last five days. In-
*jivtry officers and soldiers must carry on their persons or on led-horses or inules the
same ; to which end will be allowed to each company when practicable — one led-horse
or pack-mule. Artillery can carry the same on their caissons, so that all troops must
be in readiness for motion without wagons for a five-days' operation."

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD, 71
The men carried sixty rounds of ammunition, forty in the
cartridge boxes and twenty in their pockets. It was observed
that in the second and third days of the march many men aban
doned their overcoats and blankets if the weather was warm.
General Ingalls in his report said : " Our troops are undoubt
edly loaded down on marches too heavily even for the road, not
to speak of battle. I have witnessed great loss of knapsacks and
articles of clothing on the routes taken by our troops at the com
mencement of the campaigns. In my report of the Chancellors-
ville campaign I showed you that the loss of knapsacks of those
actually engaged was at least twenty-five per cent. I am in favor
of putting the lightest possible weight on the soldier, consistent
with his wants and the character of the service. I do not think
the knapsack should be dispensed with altogether, for it should,
ordinarily, form a part of the equipment, but on short campaigns,
and on the eve of battle and when near the supply trains, a
blanket rolled up and swung over the shoulder, and looped up
under the arm, is sufficient without knapsack or overcoat. The
soldier can carry three days' cooked food in his haversack. If
necessary he can carry two or three days' bread and some under
clothes in his blanket. Our men are generally overloaded, fed
and clad, which detracts from their marching capacity, and in
duces straggling."*
As the war progressed the tendency to abandon the knapsacks
was very marked until finally they were seldom used in the field,
and the suggestions outlined above were adopted with the addi
tion of half of a shelter-tent and a rubber blanket (poncho) to the
blanket roll.
General Sherman says: " Each soldier should if not actually
' sick or wounded,' carry his musket and equipments containing
from forty to sixty rounds of ammunition, his shelter-tent, a
blanket or overcoat, and an extra pair of pants, socks and drawers,
in the form of a scarf, worn from the left shoulder to the right side
in lieu of knapsack, and in his haversack he should carry some
bread, cooked meat, salt, and coffee. I do not believe a soldier
should be loaded down too much, but, including his clothing,
arms, and equipment, he can carry about fifty pounds without
impairing his health or activity."
The coffee and sugar components of the ration were usually
mixed together by the men when stowing them in their haver-
* Report dated August 28, 1864.

72 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD,
sacks ; this prevented them from constantly " nibbling " while on
the march and therefore tended to husband the supplies carried.
The supplies that the men carried with them were replenished
at the earliest opportunity from those carried in the trains.
Depots, — Depots are classed in three categories: ist, the base
depots ; 2d, advance depots ; 3d, temporary depots. The base
depot, from its name, is located at the base of supply and must
be remote from the theatre of operations. The advance depots
are those formed during offensive movements when an army pro
ceeds so far from its base that it would waste time by drawing
supplies directly from the base. These depots are supplied with
stores obtained by consignments from that at the base ; supple
mented, when possible, by others procured in the vicinity. They
are located in such places where the supplies can be brought to
them and carried from them with the greatest ease, rapidity and
safety, and where they can be most easily secured from danger of
hostile attack.
A secondary base of supply is an advance depot of sufficiently
large dimensions to make an army independent of the base when
the line of communication is very long. As the difficulties of sup
ply increase with the length of the line of communication, when
the distance of an army from its base is very great the formation
of a secondary base becomes indispensable to facilitate the trans
portation of supplies. A secondary base must contain a surplus
of such stores and army needs, so as to provide against any tem
porary interruption on the lines of communication, and a very
complete organization is essential, as a variety of demands will be
made upon it, all of the utmost urgency and admitting of no de
lay. Temporary depots are small ones, sufficient to provide
merely for the daily wants of the troops. Such depots are usually
temporary in character, existing for a few days, and sometimes
only for one day.
In Sherman's campaign against Atlanta the base depot was
located at Louisville. Nashville, Chattanooga, Knoxville, and
Johnsonville, were the advance depots. Allatoona, and Big
Shanty in Georgia, were the temporary depots containing supplies
intended solely for the immediate use of the army. The depots
of Nashville and Chattanooga were expanded so as to form a
secondary base of supply, and a thirty days' supply of rations for
100,000 men and clothing for six months were stored at Chatta
nooga. During Sherman's march through the Carolinas depots

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD, 73
were established at the following places : Sister's Ferry, Fayette-
ville, Morehead City, Newberne, Goldsborb' and Raleigh.
The base depots for the Army of the Potomac were at Alexan
dria, Baltimore, and Annapolis. During the Peninsular campaign
depots were located at Fort Monroe, Cheeseman's Landing, and
Brick House on the York River, and White House on the Pamun-
key ; the railroad was rebuilt from White House as far as
Savage Station and at the latter place a depot of supplies was es
tablished which was destroyed when the army let go its hold on
the Pamunkey and established itself on the James River, when the
depot was located at Harrison's I.,anding. These depots were
changed in accordance with the movements of the troops, the fleet
with the transports moving around to the different places so as to
be in easy reaching distance of the trains. In the Maryland cam
paign the Army of the Potomac was supplied direct from the base at
Alexandria, by means of its wagon trains, until after the recapture
of Frederick. The destruction of the railroad bridge over the
Monocacy necessitated the formation of a temporary depot on
the left bank of the river while the bridge was being rebuilt and
supplies were shipped there over the Baltimore and Ohio railroad,
from the base depot, at Baltimore. After the battle of South
Mountain a depot was established at Hagerstown, and the sup
plies forwarded there over the Cumberland Valley railroad. After
the' battle)^ of Antietam the supplies were forwarded from Alex
andria, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and an advance
depot was formed at Harper's Ferry and later at Berhn. When
the army crossed the Potomac a depot was established at Salem
on the Manassas Gap railroad, and supplies were forwarded there
from Alexandria.
When the army entered upon the Fredericksburg campaign
depots were estabhshed at Acquia and Belle Plain ; the former
assumed the proportions of a secondary base (although it was
never so designated), and large wharves were constructed and
storehouses erected there to accommodate all the supply depart
ments. The army was supplied from these depots by the Acquia
and Fredericksburg railroad, along the hne of which temporary
depots were located at convenient points for the delivery of the
supplies, the principal one being at Falmouth.
After the battle of Chancellorsville the depot at Falmouth was
broken up and the army nioved by Dumfries, Fairfax, Leesburg,
Edwards' Ferry and Poolesville to F'rederick and entered upon

74 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD,
the Gettysburg campaign. For its supply during that epoch
depots were estabhshed at Westminster and Frederick ; the sup
plies were forwarded to the former from Baltimore over the
" branch road " from that place, and to the latter over the Balti
more and Ohio.
When the rebel army crossed into Virginia after the battle of
Gettysburg the Army of the Potomgc concentrated in the vicinity
of Harper's Ferry and Berlin and replenished its supplies from the
depots located at those places and also from the one at Sandy
Hook ; the lines of supply were the Chesapeake and Ohio canal
and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. Having crossed the Poto
mac the army was supplied from depots at Gainsville and White
House on the Manassas Gap railroad, and also from the one at
Warrenton, on the branch road of that name. The army then
took up a line near the Rappahannock, across the Orange and
Alexandria railroad, and depots were established at Warrenton
Junction, Warrenton, and Bealton.
September 15, 1863, the army advanced to Culpeper and vi
cinity and remained there until October nth, when the move
ments of the rebel army necessitated a rapid march to Centre-
ville. The Orange and Alexandria road was destroyed by the
rebels from Broad Run to the Rappahannock during this retro
grade movement, and while it was being rebuilt the depots were
at Manassas and Gainesville. When the concentration at Cen-
treville was effected, Fairfax Station became the advance depot.
The enemy retreated to the R'appahannock and was pursued by
the Army of the Potomac, which forced a passage of that river
and drove the enemy to the Rapidan, and then Brandy Station
became the advance depot. While at Mine Run the army was
supplied by its trains, of wagons and pack-mules, from that depot.
December ist, 1863, the army fell back and occupied its
former positions in the vicinity of Culpeper and remained there
until May 4, 1864, when the grand campaign from the Rapidan
to the Jarries was commenced. On that day the depots at
Brandy Station and at other points on the railroad, as far as the
Rappahannock, were broken up and all surplus stores sent to
Alexandria. Communications were opened with Acquia and
Belle Plain, the river was cleared of obstructions by the navy, and
the railroad from Acquia to Fredericksburg was repaired. During
the flank movement to Spottsylvania the trains were parked at
Fredericksburg, and the depots remained unchanged. On May

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD, 75
2 1 St the depots at Acquia, Belle Plain, and Fredericksburg, were
abandoned, and one was established at Port Royal. The army
crossed the Pamunkey on the 28th and took up a position at
Cold Harbor, and on the 31st a depot was established at White
House. June 12th the advance across the Chickahominy and the
James was commenced, and, on the i6th, upon reaching the lat
ter river, a depot was established at City Point. During the
siege of Petersburg in the final operations against Richmond,
City Point was made a secondary base of supplies for the armies
of the Potomac and the James ; and separate wharves were pro
vided there for unloading the various kinds of supplies ; a large
repair depot for the wagon transportation ; twenty large ovens
constructed by the Subsistence Department, capable of producing
one hundred and ten thousand rations of bread per diem, for the
supply of the armies of the Potomac and James ; and the Medi
cal department had large permanent hospitals located there
which received the sick and wounded from the field hospitals and
from which the convalescents were conveyed by water, in steamers
specially fitted for such service, to the great hospitals at Wash
ington, Philadelphia, Baltimore, etc.* Expense depots were
located at Cedar Level, Bermuda Hundred, and at Jones' Hun
dred, Point of Rocks, Deep Bottom, Broadway Landing, and
Varina Landing.
In 1862, during Grant's campaign against Vicksburg, Holly
Springs was his secondary base of supplv. The capture of that
place by Van Dorn and the destruction of supplies there, valued
at over a million dollars, together with the demolition of the rail
road between Jackson, Tenn., and Columbus, Ky., by Forrest,
caused the abandonment of the campaign.
After the capture of New Orleans that city became the sec-

* " All of these improvements were rendered absolutely necessary in order to cre
ate a depot of sufficient magnitude and facilities for the supply of the armies lately op
erating against Richmond. Storehouses had to be erected to protect the daily supplies,
and to hold in depot 20 days forage, and at least 30 of subsistence, besides large quan
tities of clothing, ordnance, and hospital stores. Wharves had to be put up for the differ
ent departments. There were, generally, at the depot, in harbor, from 150 to 180 vessels
of all kinds daily, and the amount of business transacted was immense. The daily
supply of forage, for instance, was over 600 tons of grain and hay. I make these re
marks simply to show you why such extensive preparations were necessary. The
depot was and is the most perfect and commodious of any ever established anywhere
for the supply of armies, and the Government has gained by it more than it co«t.''
Report of General Rufus Ingalls, dated June'£4, 1865.

76 SUPPL YING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
ondary base of supplies for all operations throughout the south
western portion of the theatre of war.
In Banks'. Red River campaign the condition of the river and
the inability of the transports to pass the falls, made it necessary
to establish an advance depot at Alexandria ; which was a depar
ture from the plan of the campaign as no depot at any point on
the Red River was contemplated.
Allowance of Transportation. — The number of wagons required
by an army in the field will vary according to the character of the
theatre of operations, the resources of the same in food supplies,
and the railroad and water transportation, the length of haul from
the depot to the army in the field and also with the capacity of
the wagons. * In other words, as the distance of an army from
its base of supply increases a greater number of wagons is re
quired. The Comte de Paris has calculated that an army of
100,000 men to move ten days from its base would require 10,-
975 wagons drawn by 65,850 animals. In order to prevent tying
an army to its base advance depots were formerly established at
places separated by about four days' march ; the introduction of
steam made an army still more independent of its base ; and dur
ing the Civil War as the character of the country favored it, an
innovation was effected by moving these advance depots to dif
ferent points so as to be within easy distances from the army. This
was especially the case with the Army of the Potomac as the fleet
of transports could move around by the rivers and Chesapeake
Bay so as to keep near the army in all its movements.
At the beginning of the war the amount of transportation
considered essential and allowed the armies was so excessive that
General Halleck said : " If it be true that the success of an army
depends upon its ' arms and legs,' ours has shown itself deficient
in the latter of these essential requisites. This defect has been
attributed to our enormous baggage and supply trains. * * *
There is no doubt that the baggage trains of our armies have
been excessively large. Every possible effort has been made
* * * to reduce them ; but it is no easy task. Once accus
tomed to a certain amount of transportation, an army is unwilling
to do without the luxuries which it supplies in the field." f He
* "One good six-mule team, in the best season of the year, is sufficient to haul this
load (z. e., 3730 lbs.) and its own forage of 270 lbs., or a total of 4000 lbs.'' (Hola
bird. — "Army Wagon Transportation.")
fjGeneral Halleck's Report, dated November 25, 1862

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD, 77
also stated that the increase of the army ration, " which was pre
viously larger than in any other country," necessitated a consid
erable amount of transportation.
The allowance of transportation was reduced from time to
time by orders* from Army Headquarters until it was finally re
duced to the following for the armies operating against Rich
mond : t
The Lieutenant-General and army commanders were allowed
such transportation as was deemed necessary ; army corps head
quarters, four wagons or eight pack-mules; division headquarters,
three wagons or five pack-mules ; brigade headquarters, two
wagons or five pack-mules. The foregoing wagons and pack
animals included the transportation for all personal baggage, mess
chests, cooking utensils, desks, papers, etc.
^ Each regiment of infantry, cavalry, or battalion of heavy ar
tillery, two wagons ; for each battery of artillery, one wagon.
The number of wagons allowed for artillery ammunition depended
upon the number and character of the guns; for the reserve ar
tillery there was to be 20 rounds of ammunition for each gun ;
for small arm ammunition there were allowed three wagons for
every one thousand men of cavalry, infantry and heavy artillery,
present for duty ; for fuses, powder, and primers, for the reserve
ammunition train, two wagons./ For the general supply trains
seven wagons to each one thousand men of cavalry, infantry and
heavy artillery, for forage, subsistence, etc., which should carry
eight days' supply; to each cavalry division exclusively for for
age, fifty wagons ; to each battery for its subsistence, forage, etc.,
four wagons ; each horse battery for the same purpose, four
wagons; to every 25 wagons of artillery ammunition train, five
wagons additional for the forage of the animals and the subsist
ence of the men. Ammunition trains were loaded exclusively
with ammunition. To each brigade, for hospital supplies, three
wagons ; to each corps headquarters for forage and subsistence,
three wagons ; each division two; each brigade one wagon, for
similar purposes; and to each brigade one wagon for commissary
*G. O., No 130, A. G. O., September 14, 1862.
G. O., No. 160, A. G. O., October 18, 1862.
G. O., No. 274, A. G. O., August 7, 1863.
f Special Orders No. 44, Headquarters Armies U. S., City Point, Va., June 28,
1864. This order, published the third year of the war, may very properly be consid
ered as the standard upon which, in the future, all estimates for allowance of transpor
tation for armies in the field will be based.

78 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD,
stores for sales to officers.* The unit of organization for the
supply trains of subsistence, ordnance and forage was by division,
and the division quartermasters were responsible for them. Bri
gade and regimental quartermasters were responsible for the
brigade and regimental baggage trains respectively. It was found
by experience that the advantage of keeping up regularly organ
ized pack trains was not commensurate with the expense ; and
to provide for emergencies whtn they could very advantageously
be used, two hundred pack saddles were carried in the wagon
trains of each corps ; and in cases where it was necessary to pack
baggage, provisions and ammunition, for short distances over
rough roads and broken country, the pack trains were made up
temporarily by taking mules from the wagons, not exceeding two
mules from any one wagon.
Size of Trains. — The Army of the Potomac in its first opera
tions upon the Peninsula was supplied by means of a flotilla sent
down the Potomac river and Chesapeake Bay, which established
advance depots at the points indicated above, and as such places
were within easy distance of the troops large supply trains were
unnecessary. General Ingalls reports on the first of July, 1862,
as the result of an inspection then made, that the Army of the
Potomac had in its possession the following means of transport ;
3100 wagons; 350 ambulances; 17,000 horses and 8000 mules;
the arn^y numbered 80,000, or forty wagons in all to every thou
sand men. After the battle of Antietam the size of the train
with the army was : 3911 wagons; 907 ambulances ; 12,483 mules
and 8693 horses, not including those with the artillery and cav
alry ; the army numbered 110,000 men; or, forty-nine wagons for
every thousand men.
In the Gettysburg campaign the trains numbered over four
thousand heavy wagons. After the retreat of the rebel army
from Gettysburg the Army of the Potomac was ordered concen
trated at Middletown on the evening of July 7th, and no trains
but ammunition wagons, medical wagons and ambulances were
permitted to accompany the troops. The supply and baggage
wagons were ordered to be parked in the Middletown valley on
the roads taken by their respective corps. After crossing the
Rapidan, in Grant's advance upon Richmond, the troops that
composed the armies on that river numbered about 125,000 men.
* Paragraph III. of General Orders No. 7, 1864, Military Division of Mississippi
restricted the officers to the same food as the men were provided with.

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 79
There were 4300 wagons ; 835 ambulances; 29,945 cavalry, am
bulance, and team horses ; 4046 p!rivate horses and 22,528 mules ;
34 wagons to every thousand men. In the Appomattox cam
paign the Army of the Potomac numbered 107,777 men ; there
were 25,796 horses and mules ; 2448 wagons; twenty-two wagons
and 239 draft animals per thousand men.
On July 1st, 1864, General Sherman's army, which was com
posed of the armies of the Ohio, Cumberland and Tennessee,
numbered aboot 100,000 men, and had about 28,300 horses,
32,600 mules, 5180 wagons, and 860 ambulances, or 60 wagons to
every one thousand men. On leaving Atlanta November 15,
1864, General Sherman's army consisted of 63,680 men, 14,768
horses, 19,410 mules, 2520 wagons, and 440 ambulances ; forty
wagons to every one thousand men.
From the foregoing it is seen that the size of the trains de
creased in each successive campaign, and at times the armies
were sent forward without any.
Composition and Movement of the Trains.— ^'Y\it. trains moved
as follows : Wagons containing small-arm ammunition coming
first, and then those containing the ordnance, subsistence, and
forage, following after in the order named, and the sutlers' wag
ons bringing up the rear of the column. jJ'
^" In a forward movement our trains are never in the way of
the troops ; on the contrary, each corps has its train which fol
lows it on the march, and which forms its indispensable, mov
able magazine of supplies. Wagon trains should never be per
mitted to approach within the range of battle fields. They
should be parked in safe and convenient places out of risk, and
well guarded. Troops should go forward to battle lightly loaded,
and without wagons except for extra ammunition. If they are
successful, the trains can be brought up very quickly ; if defeated,
they will find an unobstructed road, and will get back to their
wagons soon enough."/f
Generkl Ingalls says of the Gettysburg campaign that the
wagon train and all impedimenta were assembled at Westminster,
a distance of about twenty-five miles in the rear of the army, no
baggage was allowed in the front, a portion only of the ammuni
tion wagons and ambulances were brought up to the immediate
rear of the lines. By this arrangement, which was always made
in the Army of the Potomac, on the eve of battle and marches
* General Ingall's Report, dated September 28, 1863.

8o SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD,
in the presence of the enemy, experienced officers were enabled
to supply their demands without risking the loss of trains or ob
structing roads over which the columns marched. Empty wagons
were sent to the rear and loaded ones or pack trains brought up
during the night or at such times and places as did not interfere
with the movements of the troops. He also adds that in this
campaign the trains, large as they were, never delayed the march
of a column, and excepting the small-arm ammunition trains were
never seen by the troops. The main trains were conducted on
roads to the rear of the army without the loss of a wagon.
In Sherman's march to the sea, in starting out from Atlanta,
the empty wagons to be loaded with forage and other supplies
taken from the country were at the head of the trains so that,
when reaching farm houses and other points where supplies were
obtained, the wagons turned out of the road and were loaded by
the time the rear of the general supply trains came up to them,
and then fell into their proper places.
In the Red River expedition the column was preceded by
the cavalry which was followed by its wagon trains and then the
infantry. On approaching Sabine Cross-roads, April 8, 1864, it
was confronted by a Confederate force commanded by General
Richard Taylor, and after a short conflict the cavalry was driven
back, and as the wagons blocked the roads the infantry were un
able to be brought to the front and in consequence the Federals
lost their trains.
General Grant says* there never was abetter organized corps
than that of the quartermasters corps of the Army of the Poto
mac in 1864. The wagon train would have extended from the
Rapidan to Richmond if marched in single file upon one road.
General Ingalls had each wagon marked with the corps
badge, division color and the number of the brigade, so that the
particular brigade to which each wagon belonged could readily
be told. The wagons were also marked to indicate the contents,
if ammunition whether for artillery or infantry, if forage whether
grain or hay, if rations whether bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar,
coffee, or whatever other components of the ration. As soon as
a wagon was emptied it was at once dispatched to the base to
obtain a load of precisely the same article as that which had been
taken from it.
Ambulances — Hospital Supplies. — An Act of Congress approved
* Memoirs, Volume II., page 198.

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 8i
March ii, 1864, provided that there should be furnished to each
army corps two-horse ambulances on the following basis : three
to each regiment of infantry of five hundred men or more ; two
to each regiment of infantry of two hundred men and less than
five hundred men ; one to each regiment of infantry of less than
two hundred men ; two to each regiment of cavalry of five hun
dred or more ; one to each regiment of cavalry of less than five
hundred men ; and one for each battery of artillery; two ambu
lances to headquarters of each army corps ; and to each division
train of ambulances, two army wagons. The Medical Director
of the army corps was given charge of the direction and super
vision of all ambulances, medicine and other wagons, horses,
mules, harness, etc., and of all officers and men detailed to assist
the management thereof in the corps in which he was serving.
Officers and men were detailed from each corps for service in its
own ambulance corps. The field hospital of each corps was
located about three miles in rear of the line of battle, and there
were assembled the medicine wagons, four army wagons con
taining a thousand rations, clothing and other supplies. The
field hospital was composed of the same number of sections as
there were divisions in the corps, each section being under
charge of the medical officer of the division to which it apper
tained. Necessary assistants were detailed in these hospitals and
the remainder of the surgeons were on the battle-field where
they took advantage of any shelter to form small temporary
hospitals, in the rear of which ambulances were stationed. The
litter bearers brought the wounded to these temporary hospitals
from which they were transferred to the field hospital, and
eventually to the permanent hospitals located at the depot of
supplies, and thence transferred to the general hospitals in dif
ferent parts of the country.
" We began the war with methods borrowed from Europe.
We ended with methods that were developed by the cries of our
wounded for relief. We realized that to enable a medical depart
ment to care properly for the wounded of an army it must have 1
full control of all the men and material needful to this end."*
There were various charitable organizations instituted during
the war for the purpose of relieving the sick and assisting the
wounded, among these may be mentioned the Sanitary Commis
sion, the officers of which received donations of supplies and money
*Major Smart. — " Medical Department of the Army."

82 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
from all the loyal States. " Wherever our armies fought, wherever
there were any sufferings to assuage or sick to relieve, upon the
field of battle or in the hospital, amongst the camps and in the
garrisons, for the men assembled under the flag and for those
whom sickness or wounds sent singly to their homes, the Sanitary
"Commission was always there, as indefatigable in its devotion as
it was inexhaustive in its assistance."*
General Sherman says : " For the more delicate and costly
articles of food for the sick we relied mostly on the agents of the
Sanitary Commission. I do not wish to doubt the value of these
¦organizations, which gained so much applause during our Civil
War, for no one can question the motives of these charitable and
generous people ; but to be honest, I mu.st record an opinion that
the Sanitary Commission should limit its operations to the
hospitals at the rear, and should never appear at the front. "f
Sutlers. — The laws of Congress authorized the appointment of
a sutler for each regiment in the army. But one sutler was allowed
to a regiment and the various stores which they were permitted
>to sell were also defined by law, with a restriction limiting the lien
^to one-sixth of the monthly pay of the officers and men. In Gen
eral Halleck's report dated November 15, 1863, in speaking of the
reduction of the size of the army trains, he says: " In this con
nection I would respectfully call attention to the present system
of army sutlers. There is no article legitimately supplied by sut
lers to officers and soldiers which could not be furnished at a much
less price by the quartermaster and Commissary Departments.
-Sutlers and their employes are now only partially subject to mili
tary authority and discipline, and it is not difficult for those who
are so disposed to act the part of spies, informers, smugglers, and
•contraband traitors. The entire abolition of the system would rid
the army of the incumbrance of sutler wagonson the march, and
the nuisance of sutler stalls and booths in camp." :|:
Beef Cattle Herds.— ^he beef on the hoof accompanying the
armies was under the entire control of the commissary officers.
"The herds of beef cattle were driven by special drivers who were
-directly under the orders of the chief commissary of the army, or
* De Trobriand. — " Army of the Potomac."
^Sherman's Memoirs , Volume II. , page 392.
% See also Par. II. G. O., No. 130, A. G. O., 1862, which states that the trains
were increased by carrying sutlers goods in them under guise of being. Government
supplies, and prescribed severe penalties for any one permitting that abuse.

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD, 83
of an army corps if operating detached/ The position of the herd,
its places of holding, and the rate of march were all controlled by
the chief commissary, who received orders on such matters only
from the general upon whose staff he was serving, ^he move
ments of the herd were so arranged that such number of cattle as
were required to furnish the meat ration equivalent to the number
of days ration of hard bread, coffee, sugar, and salt carried in the
men's haversacks, marched as a unit of brigade organization ; the
number necessary to constitute the meat ration corresponding
with the number of days rations in the soldiers knapsacks, were
marched as a division unit./ The main or corps herd comprised
sufficient number of cattle to furnish rations corresponding to the
number carried in the trains. In addition to these there was a
general herd provided as a reserve upon which drafts could be
made when necessary to replenish the corps herds.*
The butchers connected with the brigade organization slaugh
tered the cattle at night and then the meat was cooked, and, if
upon the march it was issued to the men either late that night or
early the next morning so that it could be placed in the haver
sacks. It was found necessary during the war when the army was
encamped for any length of time in the same place to frequently
change the location of the herd in order to obtain better pastur
age and water, and also to avoid an^ urisanit^.y conditions which
are likely to arise ffom the continued holding of^ a large number
of animals in the same locality. No epidemic or disease was,
during the last war, directly traceable in any way to the large
herds of cattle which were then so generally used. Although in
wars on the continent of Europe, as in 1813 and later in 1870-71,
great epidemics were traced directly to the large herds of cattle
then brought together, some of which were found to be diseased.
The difficulty of obtaining proper pasturage, the slow rate of
movement which the herd is capable of, and the fact that one or
more roads in rear of the army must be given up to the use of
the herd, are (now that the method of shipping dressed meats
by means of the cold storage system is so much in vogue), very
potent objections to the practice of furnishing the beef supply of
an army by means of a cattle herd. But it niust be remembered
that if this method of supply is to be abandoned a large increase
will be required in the trarisportation furnished the various
armies. * Wilson. — " Feeding a Great Army."

84 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
'^ UTILIZING THE LOCAL RESOURCES.'"
^The right of armies to take from the country all that they re
quire for their sustenance is indisputable ; though we usually
understand that the expression " living upon the country " has
direct application to the enemy's country/ Military necessity, as
understood by all civilized nations, permits in an enemy's coun
try the enforcement of all those measures which are indispensable
for securing the end of the war, and which are lawful according
to the modern law and usages of war, and also permits an army
to make use of the resources of its own country when face to face
with the enemy, because of the absolute necessities of the case
and of the paramount duty to defend the country against inva
sion. XThere are four methods of utilizing the resources of the
country: I. By billeting or quartering the troops upon the in
habitants, a right maintained by General Orders No. loo, when
in an enemy's country. 2. By contributions levied upon the
country. 3. By making requisition for such supplies as are re
quired to satisfy the wants of an army ; and, 4. By foraging
upon the country, or the collection of supplies found therein by
the troops themselves. /
Lg?7/^/m^.-^uppliefe of food are, as a rule, to be found for
several days in every town or village, and every householder
usually has a sufficient quantity of the same to provide his fam
ily for a few days, consequently, at least the same number of
men as there are numbers in the household can obtain subsist
ence there a day or two.| When troops are billeted upon the in
habitants the number assigned to each household is dependent
upon the number composing the family of the same. An excep
tion should always be made in favor of the poorer classes, who, at
the best of times, are barely able to provide for their own fami
lies. The following exceptions are usually made: ist. Any
householder who has entertained a wounded man in his house is
" exempted from the quartering of troops, as well as from a part
of the contributions of war which may be imposed."* 2d.
Charitable institutions, hospitals, asylums for aged and infirm ;
unprotected women, and educational institutions for young girls,
should not have troops billeted iipon them. The advantage to
be derived by this system of subsistence is that the men at the
* Article V, Geneva Convention of 1864, acceded to by U. S. March ist, 1882.

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 85
end of a day's march find, as a rule, their meal ready cooked and
prepared, or at any rate, will have to trouble themselves very
little with cooking and preparing it. The great disadvantages
are that it causes very great dispersion and separation of the
different units composing the army, and, except in very thickly
settled countries, obliges a command to spread out over too large
a portion of the country in order to obtain subsistence. The
men, furthermore, live in the kitchen and are very apt to obtain
either by force or in other ways more supplies than they are en
titled to, and, furthermore, very many indignities are liable to be
offered to the female portion of the inhabitants of the country,
as their natural protectors are, in many instances, enrolled in the
ranks of the enemy's army. Moreover this method may lead to
oppression on the part of the troops, if they are not treated as
liberally as they consider they should be, and it will provoke fre
quent disputes if more is demanded from the inhabitants than
they can fairly be expected to furnish ; and the dispersion of the
troops prevents the officers enforcing strict compliance with or
ders, and, therefore, is subversive of discipline. This method of
subsisting the troops was not resorted to upon any occasion dur
ing the Civil War, although the Government, in General Orders
No. xoo. Section 37, reserved the right to do so in the enemy's
country. Contributions. — Contributions in money were formerly im
posed upon cities and districts instead of subjecting them to pil
lage. They are now recognized as one of the justifiable means
of causing the inhabitants of an enemy's country more fully to
feel the rigors of war and thus are means of bringing the same to
a speedy termination. The Army Regulations of 1863 provided
that when the wants of the army absolutely required it, and under
special instructions from the War Department, that the General
of the Army was authorized to levy contributions in money on
the enemy's country occupied by the troops. But no other com
mander could levy such contribution without written authority
from the General Commanding in chief. " Contributions are
principally possible in large towns and cities, and as a rule, are
the only demands that can be made on a manufacturing popula
tion."* Contributions have the following advantages oyer requisitions
in kind : i. The collection is less difficult. 2. While the burden
•Furse. — " Lines of Communication in War.''

86 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD,
of the requisition bears almost entirely upon the producers and
manufacturers, contributions bear upon each one in proportion to
his financial resources and are consequently, less of a hardship.
3. They can be made over a wide extent of territory, as money is
easily transported. They should not be imposed in excess of
military necessity, and the amount should be fixed in accordance
with the wealth of the country and so as not to affect social con
ditions, but it is perfectly permissible to make contributions ex
cessive, provided the purpose is by such means to effect a more
speedy termination of the war. Private property and the person
of the peaceable inhabitants who are citizens of the occupied
territory are respected, as war is waged against a State and not
against individuals, and consequently contributions are as a rule
imposed on municipalities. The sum demanded should be col
lected through the local civil authorities, if any remain in the
country, and should by them be handed over to the proper officer
in the invading army to be by him accounted for in accordance
with instructions.
The contributions imposed during the Civil War were not in
tended to secure funds to provide the necessary supplies for the
armies but were usually resorted to as a species of reprisal as
shown by the following order, viz. :
" Special Orders, \
" No. 40. i
" Hdqrs. Left Wing, i6th Army Corps,
" Pulaski, Tenn., December 16, 1863.
" I. In accordance with the orders of Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant,
Perry Nicks, of Lewis County, Tenn., having been damaged by
guerrillas, citizens, etc., to the amount of $800, it is hereby or
dered that an assessment to that amount be made upon the
known rebels of that county, and collected in money, cotton, or
stock, and turned over to Mr. Nicks. A full account and report
of the transaction under this order will be made to these head
quarters. Major Murphy, of Fifth Tennessee Cavalry, is re
quested to carry out this order.
*****
" By order of Brig. Gen. G. M. Dodge.
" J. W. Barnes,
" Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
Requisitions. — Requisitions are demands for necessary supplies
and services made on the inhabitants of certain districts or locali-

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 87
ties, through their civil authorities, to satisfy the requirements of
an army. They are accompanied by force, if necessary to resort
to such extreme measures, to exact the fulfilment of the demands.
Requisitions are of comparatively recent date.* In former
times the invader possessed the right of booty and pillage, the
practice of which was most unfortunate for the army, as it embit
tered the population and compromised the safety of the troops in
an enemy's country, and in the event of any real or imagined injury
being done them it gave rise to redress and reprisals ; it further
more caused the interruption of all commercial transactions, and
stores were not offered for sale, as private individuals were com
pelled to submit their supplies to the rapacity of the enemy.
Requisitions may be considered under two aspects ; according
to whether they are made in an enemy's country or in the national
territory. In the latter instance they are only made in case of
urgent necessity, and receipts are always given, which are eventu
ally paid. In our own territory we can count on the patriotic feel
ing of the people and on their obedience to the mandates of the
civil authorities. To enforce requisitions, however, when cam
paigning in a friendly State, is a delicate operation. For, in all
appearances, the people are subjected to the same exactions as are
enforced on the inhabitants of a hostile country. Even in an ene
my's country requisitions should never be imposed in too arbitrary
a manner. Before making any exactions an estimate should be
formed of all the resources which the inhabitants can be made ta
surrender without subjecting them to serious want.
Vauchelle remarks : " These demands should be imposed and
apportioned with judgment and moderation, taking into consider
ation the population, the geographical situation, the nature of the
products, the richness of the country, and also, when possible
proportioning the extent of the demands to the grievances of the
* Requisitions were first employed by Washington and so named by him during the
Revolutionary War. " In order to provide for the wants of the Continental troops
who were in need of food and clothing, and even shoes, he frequently resorted to
requisitions, but ' always exercised great moderation and endeavored to protect private
property. He never resorted to such means except in cases of urgent necessity, and
then asked in a detailed manner for such articles as were indispensable for his army,
employing the form of a request, reserving vigorous measures for the recalcitrant.
Furthermore, he gave receipts for the articles received, which were eventually paid.' '"
Cf. Georges Ferrand Requisitions Militaires, page 3, and Calvo "Droit Interna
tional Thhiique et Practigue," section 2235 ; also Rouard de Card, " La Guerre Con~
tinentale," etc., page 170, quoted by Georges Ferrand, page 3, " Requisitions
Militaires."

88 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
conquerors. To ravage a country you reduce the inhabitants to
misery, to despair, flight, etc. ; and then you not only deprive
yourself of their favorable cooperation, but, on the day of reverse,
you will find in these same men implacable and cruel enemies."
Requisitions are further divided into two categories: first,
those that are paid for ; and, second, those that are not, but are
imposed as a species of fines to help reduce the cost of the war.
Jomini says : " A general should know how to turn to advan
tage all the resources existing in the country which he invades ;
he should make use of the authorities, when they remain there, to
impose uniform and lawful requisitions, which he will cause to be
paid for promptly if he has the means ; when the authorities do
not remain, he should appoint provisional ones, composed of well-
known men and invested with extraordinary powers. They will
have the supplies requisitioned collected in the safest places and
the most favorable for the movements of the army, and in the
vicinity of the principal lines of operations."
Such requisitions as were imposed during the late war were
ordinarily not paid for at the time. Resort was frequently had,
and particularly by the Confederates in their various raids through
out the border States, to requisitions exacting the delivery of cer
tain supplies. These requisitions were made upon the local
authorities and were usually of the form given below :
" Headqrs. 2D Army Corps, A. N. V.
June 27, .1863.
" To the Authorities of Carlisle, Pa. : *
" By direction of Lt. Gen'l R. S. Ewell, I require the follow
ing articles :
" 5000 suits clothing, including boots, shoes and hats.
" 5000 bushels grain (corn or oats).
" 10,000 pounds sole leather.
" 10,000 pounds horse shoe nails.
" Also use of printing office and two printers, to report at
once. " All articles except grain will be delivered at the Court
House Square at once.
(Signed) " John A. Herman.
" Major and Chf. Qr. Mr.,
" 2d Army Corps, A. N. V."
Foraging upon the Country. — Foraging upon a country is to col
lect the supplies for men and horses either from the enemy or

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 89
from friends by impressment. This method differs from requisi
tions in that the collection ismade directly by the troops without
the assistance of the local civil authorities.*
Instructions were given to generals operating in hostile terri
tory, to subsist their armies whenever possible upon the country,
receipting and accounting for everything taken, so that all loyal
persons might afterwards be remunerated for their losses.f The
supplies obtained in accordance with the instructions referred to,
were gathered by detachments designated from the various corps
throughout the army. The laws of the United States and the
general laws of war authorized in certain cases the seizure and
conversion of private property for the subsistence, transportation
and other uses of the army, and provided that all property law
fully taken from the enemy or from the inhabitants of an enemy's
country instantly became public property and was to be used and
accounted for as such. The Articles of War (Art. 52) prescribed
the severest penalty, death or such other punishment as the court
directed, for any officer or soldier who should quit his post or
colors to plunder and pillage ; and the penalty was the same
whether the offense was committed in our own or the enemy's ter
ritory. A very marked distinction was thus drawn between for
aging or the collection of supplies by properly deputed forces,
acting under lawful orders, and pillaging or plundering by indi
viduals or squads. All property, public or private, taken from
the enemy was to be inventoried and duly accounted for. If the
property taken was claimed as private, receipts were to be given
such claimants or their agents, and officers were held strictly re
sponsible for all property taken by them or by their authority
and it was accounted for the same as any other public property.
When foraging bodies were sent out to collect provisions or
other stores, the commanding officer of such party was held re
sponsible for the conduct of his command and required to make
a true report of all property taken.
In order to enable the troops to utilize the supply of corn
* "Of course, you cannot question my right to ' forage upon the country.' It is a
war right as old as history. The manner of securing it varies with circumstances, and
if the civil authorities will supply my requisitions, I will forbid all foraging. But I
find no civil authorities who can respond to calls for forage or provisions ; therefore
must collect directly from the people.' " General Sherman to Wade Hampton, Febru
ary 24th, 1865. See also Century Dictionary.
f Order of the President, dated July 22, 1862, published in G. O. No. IC9, A. G.
O., 1862.

90 ¦ SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
which was sometimes found in great abundance, portable mills
for grinding the same were in some instance provided,* and
proved quite useful in the Army of the Tennessee. Suitable mills
for grinding wheat were not made. The, objection to using port
able mills is that it is practically impossible to properly bolt the
meal or flour with them, and in consequence it is very liable to
cause sickness by creating stomach troubles ; but such flour or
meal can be used to advantage if mixed with other of good
quality. General Johnston said, in speaking of the methods adopted by
the Confederates to obtain their supplies in the States in rebel
lion, that " supplies, also, instead of being honestly raised, were
impressed by a band of commissaries and quartermasters, who
only paid one-half the market value. As might have been ex
pected, this was enough to prevent them getting anything. These
they took by force, and did it with the greatest injustice. You
can imagine what disorganization of labor and what discontent
this produced. "t
During the early part of the war there seemed to be some hes
itation among the commanders of the Federal armies about
utilizing the resources of the enemy's country in order to obtain
the supplies for their armies.;]:
In speaking of the collection of supplies by the foraging par
ties. General Sherman says that each brigade commander had au
thority to detail a party of foragers of about fifty men with one
or two commissioned officers. This party was sent out before
daylight, being informed of the route of the day's march, and
proceeded five or six miles from the road travelled by the brigade
and then visited every plantation and farm within range. Wagons
of some sort were obtained which were loaded with the supplies
collected and then the party regained the main road and waited
until the arrival of the train, when the supplies were turned over
to the l^igade commissary or quartermaster. General Sherman
states : " No doubt, many acts of pillage, robbery, and violence,
were committed by these parties of foragers, usually called 'bum
mers' * * * but these acts were exceptional and incidental.!
* " Movable columns in the field should be furnished with hand and horse mills for
grinding the grain which they procure in the country." Par. III. G. O. No. il}U,
A. G. O., 1863.
¦f Swinton's — " Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac." Page 572.
j: General Halleck's Report, November 15, 1863; and Grant's Memoirs, Volume
I., page 369.

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 91
* * * No army could have carried along sufficient food and
forage for a march of three hundred miles ; so that foraging in
some shape was necessary. The country was sparsely settled,
with no magistrates or civil authorities who could respond to re
quisitions, as is done in all the wars of Europe ; so that this sys
tem of foraging was simply indispensable to our success."
The supply of forage for the animals in an army is at all times
a most difficult task, as the bulk to be supplied is so enormous.
There was much suffering and great loss among the animals in
the several armies when they went into winter quarters owing to
the difficulty of obtaining forage ; this was particularly the case
in the Army of the Cumberland when in the vicinity of Chatta
nooga, in 1863. When upon a campaign it is usually possible to
collect all of the long forage and most of the grain the animals
require; this was strikingly shown in Sherman's march to the sea
and is concisely expressed in his letter to the Quartermaster Gen
eral dated December 25, 1864.* A large body of cavalry, and
especially an independent cavalry command, may often be unable
to provide forage for its animals even in a rich country, for if in
pursuit of the enemy it cannot take time to search for the grain
during the march, otherwise it is likely that but little damage
could be inflicted upon the enemy. Whenever cavalry is to rest
and recuperate from the strain of a hard campaign, it cannot be
expected that the command will be able to provide forage for its
animals; for 10,000 or 15,000 horses consume the surplus of a
very rich district in an incredibly short time, and if the horses
and men are sent out to scour the country for forage neither will
obtain the rest needed ; and therefore depots of grain and hay
must be provided in such cases. General J. H. Wilson in his re
port t dated February 6, 1865, of the pursuit of Hood's army and
his march from Athens, Ga., to Gravelly Springs, Ala., sets forth
the difficulty of providing forage for the horses under such cir
cumstances. ^The great objection to the method of supplying an army by
means of foraging upon the country is that it is almost impossible
to prevent the men from scattering over a wide extent of the
country in search of food and plunder, and as a consequence the
number of stragglers and skulkers largely increases and the dis-

* Rebellion Records, Volume XLV. , page 512.
f Rebellion Records, Volume XLV., page 513.

92 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
cipline of the army is apt to be very lax.* The armies in the
western part of the theatre of operations resorted to foraging ,
quite generally during the latter portion of the war, and this sys
tem was also employed by the cavalry when on their raids. The
Confederate army at all times adopted this system. The Confed
erate reports are replete with evidence of the enormous straggling
in their armies, and, in speaking of his campaign in Maryland,
Lee says : " The arduous service in which pur troops had been
engaged, their great privations of rest and food, and the long
inarches without shoes over mountain roads, had greatly reduced
our ranks. * * * These causes had compelled thousands of
brave' men to absent themselves and many mofe had done so
from unworthy motives. "f And General D. H. Hill also says :
" Thousands of thieving poltroons had kept away from sheer
cowardice. The straggler is generally a thief, and always a cow
ard, lost to all sense of shame ; he can only be kept in ranks by
a strict and sanguinary discipline." :]: Swinton says, page 67,
that during the Maryland campaign Lee lost over twenty-five
thousand from his effective strength by straggling. When deal
ing with this evil in his army General Sherman ordered§ " The
only proper fate of such miscreants is that they be shot as com
mon enemies of their profession and country, and all officers and
privates sent to arrest them will shoot them without mercy on
the slightest impudence or resistance."
An Act of Congress approved July 2, 1864, for the purpose
of regulating commercial intercourse between loyal and insurrec
tionary States, and to provide for the collection of private and
abandoned property, provided that all moneys arising from the
leasing of abandoned lands, houses and tenements, or from sales
of captured and abandoned property, should be paid into the
Treasury of the United States. In conformity with the above
laws of Congress, General Sherman issued instructions prohibit
ing trade in his army in the field or with moving columns of
troops, save that necessary to supply the wants of the troops
themselves. This was also probably done as a precautionary
*"Of all things, the most important is, that the men, during marches and in
camp, keep their places and do not scatter about as stragglers or foragers, to be picked
up by a hostile people in detail." Special Field Orders No. 119, Headquarters Mili
tary Division of Mississippi, November 8, 1864.
\ Confederate Reports of Maryland Campaign, Vol. I., page 35.
X Confederate Reports of Maryland Campaign, Vol. II. , page 119.
§G. O. No. 18, Headquarters Military Division of Mississippi, June 21, 1864.

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. 93
measure, as spies, on a pretext of being on mercantile errands,
have often gained admission within the lines of an army and thus
acquired very valuable information. General Sherman also or
dered that all such cotton as was found should, when transporta
tion to the rear was practicable, be consigned to some quarter
master at the base to be by him delivered to the agent of the
Treasury Department and, moreover, was to be treated as the
captured property of an enemy and invoiced accordingly, and no
claim of private interest in it was to be entertained by the military
authorities. The exportation from any of the States in rebellion, although
fully occupied by Federal forces, of such supplies as were neces
sary for armies, was frequently prohibited in General Orders.
As, for instance, by General Sherman in General Orders No. 20,
dated July 13, 1864, prohibiting the exportation of grain and hay
raised in the State of Tennessee, and providing that the Quar
termaster's Department should purchase the same required for
consumption by the army.
There were immense amounts of abandoned and captured
property disposed of by the Government during the war, and on
February 19, 1867, the Secretary of the Treasury reported that
the net amount received from the sale of the same and covered
into the Treasury was over twenty five millions of dollars.*
In order to provide for the supply of an army, in the portion
of an-eneriiy's country occupied by it, the commanding general
exercises direct military control over the same or administers the
affairs of the country with the assistance of the local authorities,
if they remain, or if not, with those whom he has appointed in
their stead. It is perfectly lawful, according to the rules of war,
for him to compel the withdrawal from city or town of such por
tion of the enemy's subjects as he may designate, in order to se
cure a greater supply of provisions and so forth for the use of his
army, and oblige the enemy to deplete his own resources in order
to supply inhabitants expelled from the town or city.f
In a communication, dated September 12, 1864, addressed to
the mayor and a committee irom the City Council of Atlanta,
General Sherman said : "We must have peace, not only at Atlanta,
* See House Executive Document No. 97, 39th Congress, 2d Session.
I " War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the hostile bellig
erent armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy."
General Orders No. 100, paragraph 17.

94 SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.
but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that
now desolates our once happy and favored country. * * * You
might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these
terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way
the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and
quiet at home is to stop the war. * * * Now you must go, and
take with you the old and feeble, feed and nurse them, and build
for them, in more quiet places, proper habitations." * * *
^If, under the conditions of modern warfare, an attempt was
made to bind an army, as regards its supplies, to any one par
ticular form^or system of providing the same, it would soon be
found utterly incapable of making war, or, at any rate, would be
at a great disadvantage when opposed by an army supplied by
different methods according to circumstances./
Freedom of movement is only possible where a judicious use
of the resources of the theatre of war is made ; but as large armies
cannot be supplied entirely from the same and be held in that state
of concentration which insures the best results being obtained,
such resources must be supplemented by obtaining a portion of
the needed supplies from the base and advance depots ; and this
is especially necessary as regards the ammunition supply which
in general must be obtained from the national territory.
VThe marked features connected with the supply of the Federal
armies during the Civil War were : the use of railroads and nav
igable rivers, and the facility with which the depots of supply
were constantly changed so as to be always in touch with the
armies in all their various movements, and always so located as to
be within ready access by the wagontrains./"^
General Baratier. says that if it is not always possible to
approve the strategy employed by some of the Federal com
manders, or to admire their methods of conducting the different
campaigns, one is however, " amazed by the vigorous and liberal
policy which directed the organization and maintenance of the
large armies, which were at all times furnished with great possi
bilities for action." * In this connection it may be said that the
results of a campaign are gauged by the victories and other feats
of arms which are exhaustively described by the many partici
pants therein ; but it is very seldom adequate credit is accorded the
efforts of the administrative officers who indirectly contribute very
greatly to the successful issue, although the work of such officers
* Baratier. — L'Art de ravitailler les grandes Armies.'"

SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD, 95
never ceases, nor can flag for one instant. When the army is upon
the march these departments are strained to their utmost capacity
to supply the wants of the same, and when it goes into winter
quarters or halts to recuperate its strength, the same unremitting
care and attention must be given by the administrative officers.
As a consequence this great subject of the art of supplying
troops in the field is very apt to be neglected in time of profound
peace, but, as General Lewal says : " In time of war every mo
ment is precious ; to hesitate before acting is a fault ; to ask for
instructions, to await for orders for supplying the troops would
be almost criminal."*

" Tactique des ravitaillements .'

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