The Shenandoah Valley and Virginia, 1861-1865 SANFORD G. KELLOGG, U.S.A. (Z^w^^s 0 "/ give the/e Bdiiifi't ¦; v'k-i BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE PERKINS FUND 190i- The Shenandoah Valley and Virginia 1861 to 1865 THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY AND VIRGINIA ===== I 8 6 I TO 1865 === A WAR S T U D T BY SANFORD C. KELLOGG, U. S. A. NEW YORK & WASHINGTON The Neale Publishing Company COPYRIGHT, 190J, BY THE NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY CONTENTS PAGE I The Seizure of Harper's Ferry and the Pat terson Campaign g II McClellan's West Virginia Campaign, in cluding the Battle of Rich Mountain, July II, 1861 27 HI Lewisburg, Cheat Mountain and Romney, West Virginia— Evacuation of Winches ter and Manassas 36 IV Jackson's Campaign in 1862 50 V The Capitulation of Harper's Ferry 71 VI Jones's and Imboden's Raid into West Virginia 86 VII The Gettysburg Campaign and Second Battle of Winchester 107 VIII • The Averell Raids of 1863 127 IX The Dublin Depot, New Market and Lynch burg Campaigns 147 X The Early Raid to Washington and the Return to the Valley 173 XI Sheridan's Campaigns — Battles of the Opequon, Fisher's Hill and Tom's Brook 196 XII Sheridan's Campaigns (Continued) — Battle of Cedar Creek and Subsequent Cavalry Movements 217 Epilogue 241 PREFACE No section of the United States furnishes a fuller picture of the extraordinary operations of two American armies, pitted against each other for four long years, than does the beau tiful "Valley of Virginia," from Harper's Ferry south to Staunton. Its most important city, Winchester, in the lower valley, was oc cupied or abandoned sixty-eight times by the troops of both armies, as has been said by men of the period of 1861 to 1865, still living there. Indeed, that city changed commanders so fre quently and so suddenly that it became cus tomary for the inhabitants to ascertain each morning, before leaving their dwellings, which flag was flying — the Stars and Stripes or the Stars and Bars. Aside from its superb location, framed in by the Bl'ue Ridge on the east and the AUeghen- ies on the west, the bottom lands watered by the two branches of the Shenandoah on either side of the main valley, it produced wonderful crops of grain and droves of horses, cattle and swine, proving a bountiful granary to either army that occupied it. With such attributes and its peculiarly ad vantageous strategical location, it became a military thoroughfare of the greatest impor- tance to control, being subjected in consequence to all the ravages that war, even in its mildest mood, is capable of inflicting. Much as it suffered then, that same valley is to-day once more the garden spot of Vir ginia; its wounds of forty years ago were rap idly healed as soon as peace was allowed to stand vigil over the thousands of dead, in gray and blue, that dotted the banks of its rivers, and the honest population that now live there train their sons to honor the flag against which the fathers fought, maintaining all the sturdy for titude that has made the American soldier a world-wide wonder. The operations of the war in the Valley were naturally connected with the movements east of the Blue Ridge and west of the Alle- ghenies, as access' to the Shenandoah was read ily had by numerous mountain passes from either direction, causing collateral or co-opera tive expeditions beyond the limits of the Val ley proper. The writer has made a very ex haustive study of the War of the RebelHon records and maps ; he relies on them mainly for the accuracy of this compilation, together with such other books as Sheridan's '"Memoirs," Allan's "History of the Army of Northern Vir ginia," Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," Spark's "Washington," etc. Sanford C. Kellogg, U. S. Army. Washington, D. C, 1903. CHAPTER I THE SEIZURE OF HARPEr's FERRY AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN Virginia (which then included what is now West Virginia) seceded from the Union on the 17th of April, 1 86 1. The State authorities proceeded to seize all United States property within Virginia, particularly the Arsenal at Harper's Ferry, which with its contents— 15,000 arms and machinery for their manu facture — was partially destroyed by Lieutenant Roger Jones, U. S. Army, on the night of April 1 8th, Lieutenant Jones then withdrawing his small party to Carlisle Barracks, Pa. The Virginia State troops occupied the Ar senal during the night of the i8th, extinguish ing the fires. By the 21st of April Maj.-Gen. Kenton Harper, of the Virginia State forces, reported his strength at Harper's Ferry to be "about two thousand." General Harper ar ranged with the Maryland State authorities for the occupation of Maryland Heights and start ed to Winchester all the machinery and arms he could recover from the ruins of the Arsenal. He mentioned "the absence of all written in- lO SEIZURE OF HARPER S FERRY structions" and that he had "had to assume heavy responsibility." This little town of Harper's Ferry, pictur esquely located at the point where the Shenan doah River enters the Potomac and where Thomas Jefferson loved to come and gaze upon the superb mountain scenery, had already, only a year and a half before, been the theater of the celebrated John Brown raid, when the Ar senal had also been seized by an irresponsible zealot as part of a wild project "to free the slaves." For this Brown and his small party paid the penalty of their lives, but the intense commotion caused by their attempt had not been allayed when this second seizure of the United States Armory by the Virginia State authorities fanned into blaze again the dormant excitement of a thoroughly aroused country. To suppress the John Brown raid in October, 1859, Virginia and Maryland had recourse to their military forces, of whom many thousand were sent to the scene. Of the Virginia troops, one company of artillery, composed of cadets from the Virginia Military Institute, went from Lexington under command of the after wards celebrated Thomas J. Jackson, who was then Professor of Applied Mathematics, Artil lery Tactics, etc., at Lexington, he having re signed from the United States Army only a short while before. The United States authorities, to repossess the Arsenal which Brown had seized and which AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN II had never been guarded, sent a party of sixty marines and other troops from Washington, all under command of Lieut.-Col. Robert E. Lee, 2d U. S. Cavalry, who had with him, as his adjutant, Lieut. J. E. B. Stuart, of the ist Dragoons. A most interesting account of their operations is to be found in the annual report of Secretary of War J. B. Floyd, dated Decem ber I, 1859, and in Horace Greeley's "The American Conflict," Vol. I. »= With the renewed fame of Harper's Ferry as a locality in 1861, soon followed the marvelous notoriety of the principal actors in the suppres sion of the insane attempt of 1859, for Lieut.- Col. R. E. Lee, as well as Lieut. J. E. B. Stuart, resigned from the United States Army when Virginia seceded. Lee was immediately (April 23d) appointed a major-general by Governor Letcher and assigned to command all the mili tary and naval forces of the State; Stuart in June appears as a lieutenant-colonel of cavalry at Bunker Hill, near Winchester, while T. J. Jackson commanded a brigade nearby. All three were destined to become famous Confed erate leaders. Col. Thomas J. Jackson ("Stonewall"), on being appointed by Governor Letcher, had been ordered by General Lee, on the 27th of April, to proceed to Harper's Ferry to organize into regiments the volunteer forces collected in that vicinity, and to expedite the transfer of the ma chinery from the Arsenal to the Richmond Ar- 1 2 SEIZURE OF HARPER S FERRY mory. He was to take command of all the forces at and near Harper's Ferry, ' relieving Major-General Harper. On the 7th of May Jackson reported to Lee he had occupied and fortified Bolivar and Lou doun Heights and would do the same with Maryland Heights; that his command was badly supplied every way and that his strength should be increased to 10,000 disciplined men. He reported the Union troops as being at the Relay House, near Baltimore, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. A large force was also said to be forming at Chambersburg, Pa. On the nth of May Jackson reported his strength at about 4,500, but not all armed. He had outposts at Point of Rocks, Berlin, Shep- herdstown and Martinsburg. He mentioned an armed Union force of Marylanders oppo site Shepherdstown, threatening that place with artillery. An order of S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspec tor-General, dated Montgomery, Ala., May 15, 1861, notified Joseph E. Johnston of his ap pointment as brigadier-general, C. S. A., and directed him to proceed to Harper's Ferry, he having been assigned by President Davis to the command of the troops there. At this period there was great confusion and conflict of authority arising from orders issued at Montgomery and those emanating from Richmond, in relation to military affairs in Virginia. This was partially cured by an order AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 1 3 from Secretary of War Walker at Montgom ery, dated May lo, in which General Lee, to prevent confusion, was directed to assume con trol of the Confederate forces in Virginia until further orders. Later on, by the removal of the administra tive machinery of the Confederate Government from Aiontgomery to Richmond and the ab sorption of the Virginia State troops into the Confederate Army, all friction was terminated. An inspection made of the troops at Harper's Ferry and outposts on the 21st of May by Col. George Deas, mentioned the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Virginia, the Fourth Alabama, two Mississippi regiments, five com panies of Virginia artillery, eight companies of Virginia cavalry, four companies of Kentucky infantry, and some small detachments, number ing in all 7,700 men, nearly all well armed and available for active service. This force was soon afterwards increased to 20,000. Deas reports having visited Ashby's posi tion at Point of Rocks, twelve miles below Harper's Ferry, where he found two compa nies of Virginia cavalry, six pieces of light ar tillery, and a company of riflemen, together with some Marylanders. Ashby had control of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at that point with his artillery and had mined the piers of the wagon bridge over the Potomac. Deas speaks of all the troops as raw and in experienced; they could not well have been otherwise. 14 seizure of harper S FERRY The correspondence of the Confederate au thorities of this early period shows a desire to avoid as long as possible any aggressive move ments, every effort being made to organize, arm and equip an effective army. The region to the westward and northwest ward of Harper's Ferry, at Berkeley (Bath), and beyond toward the Ohio River, was filled with Union men who resisted or fled from the Confederate recruiting officers. This was a great disappointment to the Richmond authori ties, who counted upon getting control of the western branches of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, especially at Grafton and Parkers- burg. It was this section that afterwards be came the State of West Virginia, by refusing to accept the ordinance of secession of the mother State and by organizing a separate Statehood. The country being mountainous, the inhab itants, like the highlanders of Kentucky, Ten nessee and North Carolina, were in the main very loyal to the United States, and furnished it a valuable body of troops and scouts. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston assumed command of the troops at Harper's Ferry on the 24th of May, pursuant to the orders of the Confederate Adjutant-General already mentioned. Colonel Jackson had not been notified of the coming of Johnston and at first demurred to yielding up the command, but when he received a commu nication having the endorsement "referred to AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 15 Gen. J. E. Johnston, commanding officer at Harper's Ferry. By order of Major-General Lee," etc., Colonel Jackson contended no lon ger. Immediately on taking command. General Johnston reported the position at Harper's Ferry untenable except by a very large force, or against an enemy strong enough to turn it above or below. His outposts extended from Williamsport through Shepherdstown to Point of Rocks, a distance of about 40 miles. Gen eral Johnston advised General Lee, that in case of a serious flank attack, the forces at Harper's Ferry and outposts be retired and employed as a screening army to oppose an enemy's advance into the lower valley, and that the troops at Harper's Ferry should never allow themselves to become invested. General Lee, on the 31st of May, authorized General Johnston, in case he should be attacked or threatened at Harper's Ferry, to take the field and oppose the advance of an enemy into the Shenandoah Valley. However, General Lee deprecated the abandonment of Harper's Ferry on account of the depressing effect it would have upon "the cause of the South." A column of Union troops from Ohio under General McClellan was expected by General Lee to push through eastward by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, to effect a junction, east of Cumberland, with the Union army forming at , Chambersburg, Pa. To prevent this expected 1 6 SEIZURE OF harper's FERRY junction of the two columns. General Lee sent Gen. R. S. Garnett, early in June, 1861, to Beverly, west of the Allegheny Mountains, via Staunton, the Greenbrier country, and Hut- tonsville, with some organized troops and local levies, to gain possession of, or at least to ob struct, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad be tween Grafton and Parkersburg. General Lee also sent a Colonel Angus MacDonald, with a light party of partisan cavalry, to break the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at Cheat River, including roadbed, tunnels and bridges. Both of these movements were effectually prevented ; General Garnett reached Huttonsville on the 14th of June, and was defeated soon after by McClellan near Beverly, while MacDonald'. ^ party never got farther than Romney. General Lee placed so much hope in the suc cess of the two above-mentioned raids upon the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad that he re assured General Johnston at Harper's Ferry, on the 7th of June, as to the improbability of any immediate attack upon that position by the Federal Ohio column, and expressed the be lief that General Johnston would have "merely to resist an attack in front from Pennsylvania." Mr. Jefferson Davis was particularly averse to the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, and so ex pressed himself in a letter to General Beaure gard at Manassas, dated June 13th, 1861, in reply to a suggestion of Beauregard that John ston's troops might be joined to his, so that a and the PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 17 forward aggressive movement might be made with a view to the capture of Alexandria and Arlington Heights. Mr. Davis discouraged that project with the argument that by with drawing Johnston from the Valley of the Shen andoah, the enemy would be left free to pass to Beauregard's rear, cut his communications with Richmond and attack him in reverse, while he (Beauregard) was occupied with the enemy in his front. On the same date, June 1 3th, authority to re tire from Harper's Ferry, should he find it im perative to do so, was given General Johnston by Adj. -Gen. Cooper, Johnston to destroy the bridge across the Potomac and everything he could not bring off, and then to fall back on Winchester. If necessary, Johnston was to still further retire toward Manassas along the railroad from Front Royal and endeavor to check the enemy at the passes of the Blue Ridge. On the 14th of June Johnston commenced to withdraw from Harper's Ferry, reaching Bunker Hill, 12 miles north of Winchester, on the 1 6th, to meet General Patterson's command of Union troops then moving from Hagers- town toward the Shenandoah Valley through Williamsport and Falling Waters. Johnston's main force at Bunker Hill was about 7,000 strong. He had an additional force of about S,ooo under T. J. Jackson at 2 1 8 SEIZURE OF harper's FERRY Shepherdstown, in front of Martinsburg and along the Potomac. He also had with him a small force of cavalry under Lieut.-Col. J. E. B. Stuart, and over twenty pieces of field artil lery. Winchester was then held by about 5.000 militia and some newly arrived volunteers, all covered by field works, in which twelve bat teries were placed; these troops were com manded by Gen. J. H. Carson, of the Virginia State Militia. A force of Union troops having appeared at Romney, 43 miles west of Winchester, on the 14th of June, Johnston detached three regi ments under Col. A. P. Hill to meet it. The Confederate authorities had relinquish ed Harper's Ferry with the greatest reluctance, principally because they still had hopes that there was sufficient disaffection in Maryland to carry that State over to the Confederacy and thus isolate Washington. These hopes had been greatly encouraged by the attack on the Sixth Massachusetts, while passing through Baltimore to Washington on the 19th of April, and the vacillating actions of the Maryland State authorities, particularly Governor Hicks, but especially by the action of both State and municipal authorities in resisting, or actually preventing, the approach of Northern troops to the relief of Washington through Baltimore or Maryland. Washington was thus isolated for three weeks. AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 19 While holding Harper's Ferry the Confed erate authorities at Richmond were in actual contact with their disaffected Maryland breth ren, from whom they received supplies of all kinds, besides recruits for their armies, which were openly enlisted at Baltimore by Lieut.- Col. , Geo. H. Steuart and others. Moreover, Harper's Ferry constituted the principal gate way for an invasion of Pennsylvania from Vir ginia when the time should be ripe to attempt it. It also throttled and prevented the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad by the Federal authorities as a means of communication east and west. It was as important a point on their north ern frontier for the Confederates to hold as Chattanooga afterwards became on their cen tral line. Consequently, the troops guarding that important gateway were strengthened as rapidly as circumstances would permit, Johnston's army being justly regarded as sec ond only in importance to that of Beauregard at Manassas, then threatening Washington. The Capital's position during May and June, 1861 was critical, the enemy's Hnes and out posts being advanced almost to the fortifica tions; the enemy's left flank extended to Lees- burg, with pickets along the Potomac from the Chain Bridge to Point of Rocks, threat ening to cross at the many fords and ferries. General McDowell was placed in command of the troops in front of Washington on the 27th 20 SEIZURE OF HARPER S FERRY of May, the aged General Winfield Scott re taining the direction of all the armies in the field. Communication with the North through Baltimore had then been effectually restored by Gen. B. F. Butler, who seized that city by a coup de main on May 14th, 1861, the citi zens finding him in possession of Federal Hill when they opened their windows that morning. Their surprise was equaled only by that of Gen eral Scott and the Washington authorities, who had given no orders for the movement ; on the contrary. General Scott so much disapproved of General Butler's action that he relieved him from the command the following day and sent him to Fortress Monroe. Reinforcements for Washington were then rushed through Balti more even to the extent of weakening Patter son's column, then assembling at Chambers burg to operate toward Harper's Ferry and Cumberland. A column of about 2,500 men under General Stone was organized at Washington on the 8th of June to proceed through Rockville, Mary land, toward Edward's Ferry on the Potomac and Leesburg in Virginia, as a diversion in favor of Patterson's expected advance on Har per's Ferry from Chambersburg. Stone made his headquarters at Poolesville and eventually extended his pickets to the Monocacy River and Noland's Ferry. He did not connect with Patterson's troops and had nothing on his right. AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 2 1 Another diversion in Patterson's favor was made from the center of McDowell's army as far as Vienna, Va., on the 17th of June, toward Leesburg, but which threatened to become so serioiis an affair and caused General Scott such uneasiness that he stopped General Patterson's movement south of the Potomac at Williams port, ordered him to recross the river, and de tached from him all his most experienced troops and all his artillery, for service at Wash ington. This left Patterson with a force com posed almost entirely of three-months' men and no artillery capable of being moved for lack of horses. McClellan's operations in West Virginia, from which so much assistance to Patterson's movement on Harper's Ferry had been expect ed, failed of realization, although McClellan did succeed in reopening and firmly holding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as far eastward as Cumberland, to which point he pushed Col. Lew Wallace's Eleventh Indiana Regiment, but could not afterwards spare any other troops to support the position, as all of McClellan's then available force was being used in keeping open and securing the railroad west of Cumberland, besides operating against the troops of Garnett south of the railroad at Philippi, Buckhannon, Beverly, and Rich Mountain, where McClellan finally defeated Garnett and dispersed his com mand on the nth of July and occupied Beverly on the 1 2th. 22 SEIZURE OF HARPER S FERRY This was a beautiful strategic movement of two converging columns — one from Buckhan non and the other from Philippi — on the enemy's two strong positions at Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill, covering Beverly, and resulted in the loss to the enemy of all his stores and artillery, a great part of his wagons, with 135 killed, and over 800 prisoners, of whom a large number were wounded. Wallace, who reached Cumberland on the nth of June and communicated with Patter son, made a reconnaissance southeastward to ward Winchester, which reached Romney - on the 14th, where he attacked and dispersed Mac- Donald's forces strengthened by two pieces of artillery, after which Wallace returned to Cum berland. This was the Federal force mention ed by Johnston and against which he detached Hill with three regiments. Wallace's move ment proved serviceable to Patterson, as it alarmed the militia and other troops at Win chester and attracted the attention of Johnston and Jackson at Bunker Hill and Martinsburg, who believed Wallace's forces to be the advance of McClellan's West Virginia column.- Wallace at Cumberland then became uneasy because of rumors (which afterwards proved unfounded) that he was to be attacked by a heavy force from the west and south. He call ed on General Patterson, who had not then crossed the Potomac, for assistance. Patterson AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 23 instructed Wallace to move toward Hancock, eastward, or, if that was not feasible, to retire northward into Bedford, Pa., unless he could hold his own at Cumberland. Patterson detach ed Burnside's newly-arrived Rhode Island reg iment and battery, on the i6th, to move to meet Wallace at Hancock; but Burnside was almost immediately recalled by orders from Washing ton and sent to the latter point, together with all the regular troops and all the artillery form ing a part of Patterson's column, to meet a threatened attack on the Capital. With the bulk of the remainder of his army, then reduced to barely 12,000 men, Patterson crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 1 6th of June and advanced to find the enemy; but the same orders which called away the Rhode Island Regiment and all the regular troops, directed Patterson to recross the Poto mac, which he did on the 17th and i8th, but not before he had driven the enemy southward through Martinsburg and also beyond Falling Waters. Johnston, with 12,000 men, then re- occupied Martinsburg and threatened to cross at Williamsport, which had the effect of delay ing the sending off of the troops ordered to Washington, so that they did not all go until the 2 1 St of June. The aggressive movement into the Shenan doah Valley was thus abandoned for the time being. Patterson established hhnself in front of Harper's Ferry, at Williamsport, Falling ii4 SEIZURE OF HARPER S FERRY Waters and Sharpsburg, his own headquarters being at Hagerstown. He was called upon by General Scott to project a new campaign, but to remain in front of Johnston's army. After persistent solicitation, Patterson succeeded in obtaining the Rhode Island battery once more, and Stone's Brigade of three regiments and a half from Poolesville ; he also got the harness he needed to move his only battery (Perkins's), so that on the 2d of July, with about 10,000 men, he recrossed the Potomac into Virginia near Falling Waters and forced back T. J. Jackson's force of about 4,000 infantry, artil lery and cavalry to beyond Martinsburg, which Patterson occupied again on the 3d of July and halted for supplies. Part of Stone's command joined Patterson there on the 8th of July, when preparations were at once made to move on Winchester, in which direction all of Johnston's army had retired, but finding sev eral of his officers unfavorable to that move ment, Patterson called a council of war on the 9th, at which it was decided to remain in obser vation of Johnston, but not to pursue him, as it was known he had been heavily reinforced, some extravagant estimates of Johnston's strength at Winchester being 40,000 men of all arms. On the 15th of July Patterson moved his army to Bunker Hill, and on the 17th to Charlestown ; his base was then established at Harper's Ferry, ten miles away. The terms of AND THfi PATTERSON CAMPAlGlST 25 service of his three-months' men commenced to expire and but very few would consent to re main longer. McDowell commenced his advance from Washington toward Manassas on the i8th of July via Fairfax Court House. Naturally, great anxiety was felt as to the effect this move ment would have upon Johnston's army in the Shenandoah. Patterson's instructions were to endeavor to detain Johnston, but if he went to wards Manassas, Patterson was to cross the Shenandoah River near its mouth at Keyes's Ferry and march to McDowell's assistance via Hillsboro and Leesburg. Johnston did get away from Winchester without the knowledge of Patterson on the i8th (the same day that Mc Dowell passed through Fairfax Court-House), and marched via Millwood and Ashby's Gap to Piedmont on the Manassas Gap Railway dur ing the 19th and 20th, the last of his entire force arriving upon the Bull Run Battlefield during the 2 1 st, his advance guard under Jack son reaching Manassas as early as 4 p. m. of the 19th. Had McDowell's attack been hastened by but two days, Johnston could not have reached Beauregard in time to assist him. As it was he brought with him a reinforcement of over 10,- 000 men. Patterson was too weak to have prevented him from going, even if he had known of Johnston's departure ; and he was too deficient in wagon transportation to have reach- 26 SEIZURE OP HARPER S FERRY ed McDowell before Johnston could get to Beauregard, particularly as he (Patterson) would be on an exterior line. After the Battle of Bull Run Major-General Banks was sent from Baltimore to relieve Pat terson at Harper's Ferry, reaching there July 25 ; Major-General McClellan was called from West Virginia to command the Division of the Potomac, superseding General McDowell, and assumed that command also on the 25th of July- The original order for Patterson's relief was dated July 19, before the Battle of Bull Run, to take effect July 27, "when his tour of duty will expire." The same order designated the Val ley of Virginia as the future Department of the Shenandoah (G. O. 46, of 1861). Patterson held the commission of major-general of Penn sylvania militia, which had been ordered out for three months' service in the field under the call of the President the day after the firing on Fort Sumter, April 14, 1861. CHAPTER II m'cLELLAn's WEST VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN^ IN CLUDING THE BATTLE OF RICH MOUN TAIN, JULY II, 1 86 1. With a small advance party General McClel lan personally reached Grafton by rail from Ohio on the 23rd of June, his column consisting of seven regiments, three batteries, and one troop of cavalry closely following. Grafton had been occupied from Wheeling as early as May 30 by Col. B. F. Kelley, First Virginia Volun teers, supported by Col. J. Irvine's Sixteenth Ohio. The Fourteenth Ohio, Col. J. B. Steed- man, was sent at the same time from Marietta, Ohio, to occupy Parkersburg. Colonel Kel ley then moved on Philippi, fifteen miles south of Grafton, where a Confederate force several hundred strong, under Col. George A. Porter- field, had collected. This latter force had been operating on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad north and west of Grafton, burning bridges, etc. Colonel Kelley received his orders from Gen. T. A. Morris, Indiana Volunteers, who had reached Grafton with four Indiana regi ments from Indianapolis on the ist of June, and assumed command. 28 m'cLELLAn's W. va. CAMPAIGN On the 2d of June two cooperating columns were sent by General Morris to Philippi; one, under Kelley, went by rail to a point 6 miles east of Grafton, and then, by a delayed night march, to Philippi; the other column, under Colonel Dumont, of the Seventh Indiana, went by rail to Webster, a few miles from Grafton, and then marched in the same direction as Kel- ley's column, but by a different route, both columns timing the movement so as to reach the vicinity of Philippi very early on the morn ing of June 3d, Dumont to attract attention from Kelley's movements. The two columns reached Philippi almost simultaneously, sur prising and routing the enemy, who was pur sued in the direction of Beverly and Huttons ville, where Colonel Porterfield met reinforce ments, and remained in command until super seded, on the 14th of June, by Gen. R. S. Gar nett, especially sent from Richmond by Gen eral Lee. Immediately on assuming command of the Confederate troops at Huttonsville, General Garnett moved them northward through Bev erly, where he established his depot, to the passes of the mountains westward through Rich Mountain on the Buckhannon road and northward on the Philippi road at Laurel Hill. Both positions were then fortified and some few pieces of artillery placed in the fortifica tions. He had an outpost at Leadsville, on the St. George road, to protect his rear. battle of RICH MOUNTAIN 29 General Garnett's instructions from General Lee were not only to impede McClellan's ad vance eastward through the passes, but also to endeavor to break the Baltimore and Ohio Rail road effectually by destroying the Cheat River viaduct. The latter part of these orders Gar nett was never able to accomplish, but to secure his own position in and about Beverly he block ed all the mountain roads in the direction of the enemy as far north as St. George, the county- seat of Tucker County. He found the Union sentiment strongly in the ascendency among the people of the country, and complained to General Lee that he neither could get assist ance from them nor prevent their giving infor mation to the enemy of all his movements. His strength was about 10,000 men, with six pieces of artillery, as shown by his ration returns, when McClellan attacked him on the nth of July at Rich Mountain; but he had made the fatal mistake of dividing his force, although both of his main positions at Rich Mountain and at Laurel Hill were strong. After securing the position at Philippi with Morris's Brigade, and placing a force of 2,000 men at Cheat River Bridge and Rowlesburg under Brig.-Gen. C. W. Hill, ample forces were kept by McClellan at Grafton, Webster, Clarks burg and Parkersburg to maintain rail com munication with Ohio. With the surplus regi ments reaching him from Ohio and Indiana, McClellan organized at Buckhannon a column 30 m'cLELLAN's W. va. CAMPAIGN of about 6,000 men to attack Garnett, with the expectation of driving him out toward Staun ton. While McClellan attacked Garnett in front at Rich Mountain, Morris, with the forces at Philippi (about 6,000), was to move to Laurel Hill and capture that position if Garnett evacu ated or weakened it. McClellan's column was organized into two brigades under Rosecrans and Schleich. Early on the morning of July n he sent Rosecrans with 2,000 men through the mountains south of the enemy's fortified position, by a circuitous route, which brought Rosecrans at noon into the turnpike, two or three miles to the enemy's rear, on the crest of Rich Mountain at Hart's Farm. With the other troops and twelve guns, McClellan moved directly on the fortified camp at the foot of Rich Mountain near Roaring Creek, but before McClellan attacked it Rose- crans's flank movement had forced its abandon ment. Rosecrans had met with no resistance until he reached Hart's Farm, on the turnpike on top of the mountain, where the only casualties to McClellan's column occurred and these were but slight — only 12 killed and 49 wounded; whereas, the enemy's loss, there and in the pur suit which followed, was 135 killed and 800 prisoners, including among the latter Lieuten ant-Colonel Pegram, the commanding officer on that part of the line, who first endeavored BATTLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN 3 1 to escape, but then surrendered with a party of 593, including 33 officers. The remainder of the enemy's force was dispersed and pursued towards Huttonsville and Monterey southeast ward through Beverly, which latter place, with all its stores, was captured on the 12th. Mc Clellan pursued only as far as Cheat Moun tain. While the attack on Rich Mountain was pr(j- gressing, Garnett, with the remainder of his troops, was at Laurel Hill, confronted by the Philippi troops under Morris. The distance from Beverly to Laurel Hill is 17 miles, and from Beverly to the fortified camp at the foot of Rich Mountain, 7 miles.. When Garnett found the enemy had gained his rear and his communications southward toward Staunton, he evacuated Laurel Hill, abandoned his camp equipage, and retreated northward through Leadsville to Cheat River, Morris following him with part of his force, but not with sufficient vigor to complete his destruction. Three of Morris's regiments and Barnett's Battery came up with the enemy, however, and engaged him in a spirited ac tion at Carrick's Ford of Cheat River, 8 miles south of St. George. In this affair — a rear guard action — Garnett was killed and many of his wagons captured. This part of the pursuit was then halted, 26 miles from Laurel Moun tain, on the 13th instant. 32 m'CLELLAN's W. va. CAMPAIGN As soon as General McClellan occupied Bev erly, early on the 12th, and he ascertained that Garnett's main force was retreating northward through the mountains, he ordered General Hill, on the railroad, — at Grafton and Rowles burg, — to collect a force of 5,000 men and en deavor to head off the enemy toward St. George and eastward on the Northwestern turnpike. Hill had an outpost on that road at West Union, 1 3 miles east of Rowlesburg. An additional force of 500 men on the 12th had reached the Red House, 8 miles still farther east on the Northwestern turnpike, via Oak land, on the railroad, and Chisholm's Mill, but through error had then gone on westward to join the troops at West Union instead of push ing out southward toward St. George. Although Hill had reached Oakland on the night of the 13th by rail and hurriedly moved out 12 miles to the Red House with such of his forces as had arrived, they were entirely lacking in wagon transportation, and could ac complish nothing beyond following the rem nant of Garnett's army, which had already passed the Red House early on the 14th, avoid ing West Union, and was moving southward on the Northwestern turnpike toward Peters burg, West Virginia, Franklin and Monterey, in the valley of the South Fork of the Potomac. The few cavalry sent by Hill to try to take con tact with the retreating enemy went as far as BATTLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN 33 Stoney Creek and then turned back, having only seen a few stragglers in the distance. Another effort, with a stronger force, was made on the 15th by Hill to come up with the enemy toward Petersburg. This party went almost to Petersburg on the 17th, when it was recalled by a dispatch from McClellan to dis continue the pursuit. While McClellan's operations from Buck hannon and Philippi were proceeding, cotem- poraneously with Patterson's movement near Harper's Ferry, Gen. J. D. Cox, with five regi ments, was ordered by McClellan from Ohio, into the Kanawha Valley, early in July, to clear that region of any enemy and to act as a col lateral column to his own movements against Garnett. Cox's opponent in the Kanawha was Gen. Henry A. Wise, with a force estimated at about 3,000 badly- organized men, known as the Wise Legion. In an engagement which took place at Scarey Creek, July 16, between Wise and Cox, the latter was defeated (very much to McClellan's disgust) and his advance checked until he could get reinforcements from Ohio, when he moved on again up the Ka nawha, forcing Wise back beyond Charleston and the Gauley, Wise finally retreating to Lewisburg, August ist, his movements being hastened by the threatening position of some of Rosecrans's troops at Weston and Summer- ville, on his right flank and rear. 34 m'clellan's w. va. campaign The news of Cox's repulse at Scarey Creek, following upon Morris's dilatory pursuit of Garnett's forces on Pleasant Run and Cheat River, to which was added the fact that Gar nett's retreating command had passed across the front of Hill's troops at the Red House, unmolested, caused McClellan intense disap pointment. The results of these movements, however, were the chasing out of the enemy from the western slope of the Alleghenies in West Vir ginia and the freeing of the Kanawha as high up as the Gauley, besides the securing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Parkers burg and Wheeling eastward to Cumberland. McClellan was then called east and Rosecrans succeeded to the command. The locations of the armies in Virginia (in cluding West Virginia) August i, 1861, were as follows : Rosecrans, commanding McClellan's old army, holding Gauley Bridge, Summerville, Beverly and Cheat Mountain; Garnett's Con federate army dispersed toward Staunton, but its remnants being collected at Monterey by Gen. W. W. Loring, strengthened by ten regi ments and two batteries, with outposts at Elk and Middle Mountains and the crest of the Al leghenies, drawing its supplies from Staunton by way of Millboro. Wise's Confederate Legion was at Lewis burg, where Floyd was marching with troops BATTLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN 35 from Dublin Depot on the Virginia and Ten nessee Railroad to join him. Banks at Harper's Ferry, commanding Pat terson's old army, with no enemy of conse quence to confront him nearer than Winches ter. McClellan at Washington, commanding the army that recently had been defeated at Bull Run under McDowell, and which was still closely threatened from the direction of Ma nassas by the enemy under Beauregard and Johnston. Butler at Fortress Monroe, the Rip Raps, and Newport News, with several thousand men, unable to make any headway up the Pe ninsula against Magruder at Yorktown. Norfolk and the Navy Yard were strongly held by the Confederates, while the Virginia and East Tennessee Railroad was not yet with in striking distance of any Federal army. General Scott still retained direction of all the Union armies, although it was beginning to be recognized he was past the age for active, efficient service. It may not be amiss here to remark that Gen erals R. E. Lee, McDowell, and McClellan had all three been especial favorites of General Scott when the war commenced in April, 1861, and also that General Scott was somewhat in clined to permit the "wayward sisters [to] de part in peace," CHAPTER III LEWISBURG^ CHEAT MOUNTAIN AND ROMNEY, WEST VIRGINIA EVACUATION OF WINCHESTER AND MANASSAS On the 1st of September, 1861, Gen. J. E. Johnston, who remained in command of the Confederate army at Manassas after the Bat tle of Bull Run, recommended the reduction of Carson's Militia at Winchester to 2,500 men, as Banks had shown no disposition to advance from Harper's Ferry, and as all surplus men were needed to cultivate the Valley, where the percentage of slaves was very small. Consid erable local agitation on the subject of getting the services of as many men as possible for agricultural purposes had existed for some weeks, culminating in strong appeals to Rich mond from such local magnates as Randolph Tucker et al. McClellan's army, as well as Banks's, remain ed strictly on the defensive throughout the summer and autumn of 1861 and until March, 1862, with the exception of an occasional re connaissance and consequent skirmish. The enemy was not prevented from obstructing the LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA 37 Potomac below Washington with batteries, notably at Evansport and at Matthias's Point, threatening to sever communication by water with Fortress Monroe. A serious engagement with the enemy on the 2 1st of October at Ball's Bluff, near Leesburg, had resulted in a disaster to the Federal troops before they could be withdrawn. The only activity was in West Virginia, where General Lee had gone in person to take command of the Confederates, after Garnett's defeat near Beverly and Wise's retreat east ward from the Kanawha to Lewisburg. Lee called to Wise's assistance from the East Ten nessee and Virginia Railroad a column of about 4,000 men under Gen. J. B. Floyd (the former Secretary of War of the United States), which force marched northward through the valley of New River and then joined Wise at Lewisburg. This joint force of about 6,000 men under Floyd was then moved by General Lee back toward the Gauley, to endeavor to regain the territory lost by Wise, but found the position at Gauley Bridge too strongly held by Cox to justify attacking it. Besides, a movement of Rosecrans's force from Summerville towards Floyd's right flank at Carnifix Ferry, on the Gauley, diverted Floyd in that direction, re sulting in Floyd being forced to retreat by Rosecrans at the last-named place on the loth of September. By this affair Rosecrans pre served his communications with Cox lower 38 LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA down on the Gauley at its junction with New River, and Rosecrans, with Cox, then turned his attention toward breaking the enemy's rail communications between Virginia and Ten nessee at New River Bridge, by sending an ex pedition to Raleigh Court-House and beyond, which, however, never succeeded in getting farther than Princeton or in reaching the rail road, although Floyd, in November, again re treated from before Rosecrans toward the rail road. Before going to direct the movements at Lewisburg, General Lee had assumed charge of the Confederate forces in the Allegheny Moun tains at Monterey and Huntersville, command ed by Generals H. R. Jackson and Loring. With these, on the 12th of September, he made a strong reconnaissance of the Federal positions on Cheat Mountain and toward Huttonsville, and, having satisfied himself of their strength, he then turned his attention to Lewisburg. While these movements were progressing, considerable activity was being shown by the Federal forces on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from about Cumberland toward Winchester. On the 24th of October Gen. B. F. Kelley, at Cumberland, under orders from Gen. Winfield Scott, formed an expedition of about twenty- two companies of infantry, a troop of cavalry, and two guns, at New Creek (now called Key- ser, but shown on the maps as Paddytown), on EVACUATION OP WINCHESTER, ETC. 39 the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, to operate on Romney, 26 miles southeast. This force left New Creek at midnight of the 25th, and marched through Mechanicsburg Gap to within three miles of Romney without opposition. A supporting column from Patterson's Creek, consisting of the Second Maryland Infantry (Colonel Johns), also moved southward through Frankfort and Springfield toward Romney, but was met by the enemy at a bridge over the South Branch of the Potomac about eight miles from Romney, and there checked on the 26th. With his own column, however, General Kelley captured Romney after some resistance and pursued the enemy under Colo nel MacDonald through and beyond the town, on the Winchester pike, capturing all his trains and artillery, camp equipage, etc. General Kel ley then occupied Romney, where he remained until January, when he was threatened by Jack son in force, and retired again toward New Creek Station. This occupation of Romney and the driving out of MacDonald's Confederates had created much uneasiness at Winchester and in the army at Manassas, as it was again supposed to be the advance of the Federal troops from West Vir ginia endeavoring to form a junction with Banks, just as, earlier, in June, a similar move ment on Romney by Wallace had been believed to be the advance of McClellan's West Virginia forces to cooperate with Patterson. This un- 40 LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA easiness resulted in the sending of Gen. T. J. Jackson, on the ist of November, from the Manassas army to take charge of the opera tions about Winchester and in the northern part of the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson first called out all the local militia belonging to Boggs's, Carson's and Meem's Brigades, many of these men having gone to their homes to attend to their farms, etc. He then was joined during November by his old brigade, composed of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-seventh and Thirty-third Vir ginia Volunteers, and, during December, by TaHaferro's Brigade and Loring's Division, which had been withdrawn via Staunton from about Monterey and Huntersville, in the Alle gheny Mountains, where it had been found im practicable to maintain and supply them in win ter quarters. This reinforcement gave Jackson, besides the militia, sixteen regiments of infantry and three batteries of fairly well-seasoned artillery. He also had a respectable force of cavalry under Cols. Turner Ashby and Angus MacDonald (a partisan ranger). Banks still continued north of the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, with his flanks extended to cover Williamsport and Point of Rocks. Jackson first turned his attention to disabling the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which follows the north shore of the Potomac, and did sue- EVACUATION OF WINCHESTER, ETC. 4I ceed in breaking Dam No. 5 near Williamsport, on the 2 1st of December, btit not irreparably. On the 1st of January, 1862, Jackson, with about 8,500 men, moved from the vicinity of Winchester northward toward Bath (Berkeley Springs), which! was taken on the 4th, the small party of Federal infantry and cavalry holding it retreating six miles to Hancock. Two regiments and a battery were sent by Jackson to destroy the railroad bridge over the Big Cacapon River. A brigade under Colonel Gilham was detached at Bath to pursue the Federals in the direction of Sir John's Run, a station on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad east of Hancock, but did not come up with them. However, the next day, January 5th, the entire force proceeded to destroy the rail road below and opposite Hancock, the Federals in that town, which is on the north bank of the Potomac, refusing to surrender, while the party sent to Cacapon Bridge accomplished its destruction. Jackson says that "on the 6th the enemy [at Hancock] was reinforced to such an extent as to induce me to believe that my ob ject could not be accomplished without a sacri fice of life, which I felt unwilling to make; as Romney, the great object of the expedition, might require for its recovery, and especially for the capture of the troops in and near there, all the force at my disposal." So, on the 7th of January, Jackson, with his entire force of over 8,000 men, moved toward 42 LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA Romney, via Unger's Store, at which latter place he halted "for several days ;" but the Fed eral forces evacuated Romney on the loth and fell back to the railroad west of Patterson's Creek. Loring's Division was then placed by Jack son in winter quarters at Romney, and the local militia sent to the vicinity of their homes, not far away. By extending southward up the South Branch of the Potomac, via Moorefield, connection was made with Gen. Edward John son's Brigade at Monterey, and the entire re gion secured against immediate attack from west of the Alleghenies. Carson's Brigade of Militia was posted at Bath and Meem's Brigade of Militia at Mar tinsburg, while Jackson took his old brigade (now commanded by Gen. R. B. Garnett) back with him to Winchester as a reserve. Then arose one of those situations which the lack of discipline of the troops and the inter meddling of politicians often causes discontent to self-respecting commanding generals. In this case it caused Jackson to tender his "con ditional resignation," because the Acting Con federate Secretary of War (Benjamin) order ed Jackson to withdraw Loring's command from Romney and the South Branch of the Po tomac, giving as a reason that they were in formed at Richmond a movement by the Fed erals was being made to cut Loring off. The true reason was that Loring's officers and Lor- EVACUATION OF WINCHESTER, ETC. 43 ing himself did not fancy being kept at Rom ney when they might be more comfortable and enjoy the social advantages of Winchester, only forty-three miles away, during the remainder of the winter. Hence their appeal to Rich mond over Jackson's head. It required all the influence of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, Governor Letcher and many of Jackson's brother officers tcyinduce him finally to withdraw his resignatio/. His forebodings as to the result of withdrawing Loring from Romney proved true, for that place and Moore field were almost immediately reoccupied by Kelley's commafid, the Federal outposts being advanced on the 14th of February to Bloomery Pass, within twenty-one miles of Winchester, capturing there, after considerable resistance, sixty-five officers' and privates of Sencendiver's (Carson's) Brigade. From Bloomery a dash was also made to Unger's Store. General Banks, whose headquarters were es tablished at Frederick, Md., held the line of the upper Potomac from Hancock to Berlin. On the 25th of February a detachment of fourteen companies of infantry, a squadron of the First Michigan Cavalry, and four guns was sent, under Col. John W. Geary, Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania, across the river at Harper's Ferry and then across the Shenandoah River and Loudoun Heights into Pleasant Valley eastward, small parties of Confederates retir ing before Geary through Lovettsville and 44 LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA Waterford toward Leesburg, which place was occupied by Colonel Geary at sunrise of March 8th, the Confederate forces under D. H. Hill retreating southward through Middleburg. On the 1 2th Geary marched to Snickersville, after leaving a small garrison at Leesburg, and thence to Upperville on the 15th, reconnoiter- ing en route the gaps of the Blue Ridge and Front Royal, finally halting at Aldie on the 24th of March, having cleared Loudoun County of the enemy. Johnston's army was then withdrawing from the Manassas line. The remainder of A. S. WilHams's Brigade, to which Geary belonged, had advanced on the 4th of March from Williamsport through Mar tinsburg to Bunker Hill. Shields's Brigade fol lowed Williams's.' On the 9th of March, 1862, Johnston's army fell back from Centerville, Manassas and Dum fries to the line of the Rappahannock, the movement being evidently hastily made, as the valuable guns in the works at Cockpit Point and Evansport, on the Potomac, were abandoned; 800 barrels of flour were destroyed at Dum fries, besides a great quantity of general stores at Manassas. Gordonsville was then made the Confederate depot for supplies. This retro grade movement was a great surprise to the Richmond authorities, as it was not ordered from there, although preparations for it had been made. EVACUATION OF WINCHESTER, ETC. 45 The retirement of Johnston's army was closely followed up by the advance of McClel lan's, Centerville being occupied by Kearney's Brigade on the loth and Manassas by the Third and Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry on the 14th. Repairs to the Manassas Gap Railroad and the railroad back to Alexandria were com menced at once, under the direction of Col. D. C. McCallum. Johnston's withdrawal from Manassas and Banks' advance on Winchester caused Jackson to retire on Strasburg, which he accomplished on the 13th of March, Banks occupying Win chester on that same date. Shields's Division of 11,000 men, on the 19th, advanced to Stras burg, 18 miles, Jackson retiring to Woodstock and thence to Mount Jackson, 23 miles farther up the Valley, where he had previously estab lished his depot. Williams's Division of Banks's Corps had been ordered to Washington, via Harper's Ferry, thus leaving Shields alone in the Valley. On the 13th of March, 1862, Gen. R. E. Lee was placed by executive orders in command of all the armies of the Confederacy, with his headquarters "at the seat of government." This gave General Lee the same general authority over the Confederates for combined movements as was conferred upon General McClellan when he reheved General Scott on the ist of Novem ber, 1861, of the command of all the armies of the United States, 46 LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA McClellan had been busy all the autumn and winter of 1861 reorganizing the Army of the Potomac and supervising the campaigns of all the other armies then in the field, but he gave his principal attention to the army at Washing ton and to its preparation for an offensive cam paign a» soon as the ro^ds in Virginia would admit, or the general preparedness of his army would justify a forward movement. The delib erative delay of McClellaruin dealing with these problems caused so much impatient agitation by the newspaper press of the country, that the Government was compelled to urge McClellan to perfect his plans and move the Army of the Potomac aggressively upon the enemy. The strength of Johnston's army when at Center ville, Manassas and Dumfries was greatly over estimated as being 100,000 strong, whereas, Johnston never had more than 50,000 present, as his returns for February show, while Mc Clellan on the same date had assembled at and in front of Washington a force of 222,000 "present and absent." In announcing to the President his general plan for the movement of the Army of the Po tomac, McClellan favored a scheme to avoid attacking Johnston's army and to move the bulk of his force by water down the Potomac into Chesapeake Bay, thence up the Rappahan nock River to Urbana, making that a sub-base for attacking Richmond, via West Point, only three marches distant from Urbana. A large EVACUATION OF WINCHESTER, ETC. 47 force was to be left at Washington to secure it beyond hazard. The movement to the Chesa peake and thence toward Richmond by river was predicated upon using Fortress Monroe as the main base, having the cooperation of the navy in the rivers and on the bay, getting into a country where campaigning was more favor able than in Northern Virginia in winter. This plan was afterwards changed to a movement up the Peninsula between the York and James Rivers to West Point and Richmond. On the 31st of January the President had ordered "that all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seiz ing and occupying a point on the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction, * * * the expedition to move on or before the 22d of February next" ; and while he disapproved McClellan's project of an expedi tion to attack Richmond by way of Chesapeake Bay, he did not insist subsequently on the above order to move on the 22d of February being immediately executed, for means of transportation by water were being accumu lated and other arrangements for the proposed Chesapeake Bay expedition, attention mean while being given to reopening the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Cumberland east ward, to do which it became necessary to throw Banks's command across the Potomac, force 48 LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA the evacuation of Martinsburg, and drive the enemy well up toward Winchester and Stras burg. This heavy flanking movement, which has already been described, and McClellan's large army in front, caused first the withdrawal of the enemy from Leesburg, then Winchester, and finally Manassas and Centerville, including the abandonment of the batteries which had im peded the navigation of the Potomac. On the same day that the enemy was withdrawing from Manassas and Winches ter, March 9, 1862, there occurred in Hamp ton Roads the celebrated defeat of the Merri- mac by the Monitor, and as there no longer ex isted any serious obstacle to the carrying out of McClellan's Chesapeake Bay project, the Presi dent consented to its execution after McQellan had pursued Johnston's retreating army as rap idly as the terrible roads permitted, and had definitely located it in its new position beyond the Rappahannock, and near the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. McClellan then embark ed at Alexandria the troops constituting the Peninsula expedition, the vanguard leaving there on the ist of April. General McClellan having taken the field with the Army of the Potomac, the President temporarily rearranged the other commands by placing Major-General Halleck in command of the armies operating in Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri, designating that section as the EVACUATION OF WINCHESTER, ETC. 49 Department of the Mississippi ; the army oper ating west of the Shenandoah and east of Hal- leck's armies, in West Virginia principally, constituted the Mountain Department, under Maj.-Gen. John C. Fremont. After McClellan's departure for his Penin sula campaign, separate commands were made of the army left in front of Washington under McDowell and the force under Banks left to guard the northern part of the Shenandoah Valley (at Strasburg and toward Front Royal, on the Manassas Gap Railroad), for Stone wall Jackson, with 6,500 men, still showed great activity in the Valley from near Mount Jackson. The separate commanders reported direct to the Secretary of War. Shields, who had followed Jackson on the 19th of March in the direction of Mount Jack son, first fell back to Strasburg and then, on the 20th, to Winchester, Shields says, "to draw him [Jackson] from his position and support ing force, if possible." In that Shields suc ceeded, for Jackson followed him and attacked him on the 22d and 23d near Kernstown, im mediately south of Winchester, with the result that Jackson was badly beaten, losing 80 killed, 375 wounded, 270 missing and two guns, be sides being forced to return again to Mount Jackson. Shields' own loss was 118 killed, 450 wounded and 22 missing. CHAPTER IV Jackson's campaign op 1862 TwobrigadesofWilliams'sDivisionof Banks's Corps, that had already started on their march to Manassas, were recalled from Castleman's Ferry, of the Shenandoah, to assist Shields, but did not reach Winchester until the 24th, after the Battle of Kernstown; they took part, how ever, in the pursuit of Jackson as far as Stras burg. On the 1st of April Banks, with five bri gades (less the necessary garrisons left at strat egic points and as guards at bridges, etc. ) , ad vanced from Strasburg, 18 miles, to Edenburg, the enemy contesting his movement. At Eden burg a halt for 15 days was made to bring for ward supplies, scant wagon transportation be ing given as the reason for the delay there. On the 17th of April another forward movement up the Valley turnpike was made through Mount Jackson to New Market, the latter place being twelve miles south of Edenburg. There Banks held his main body and established his headquarters temporarily, sending out his cav alry and some of his infantry to seize and hold Jackson's campaign op 1862. 51 Columbia Bridge over the Shenandoah, 12 miles eastward on the Luray road. Another and a larger party of cavalry and infantry went 17 miles farther south, to Harrisonburg, on the 24th of April, where another halt was made to bring up supplies. At Harrisonburg Banks was within 25 miles of Staunton. Jackson had left Harrisonburg on the 19th of April and marched eastward 18 miles into Elk Run Valley, at Conrad's Store, east of the Shenandoah and at the foot of Swift Run Gap, in the Blue Ridge. In his new position Jackson was near support from Gordonsville and Cul- peper, via Stannardsville or Madison Court- House, which could come to him either through Swift Run Gap or one 17 miles farther north. This support had been provided by General Lee, and consisted of Ewell's Division, 8,000 strong, which was marched from Culpeper toward Jackson and joined him west of the Blue Ridge, on the 30th of April, by way of Swift Run Gap. McClellan's movement to the Peninsula had required the reinforcement of Magruder's forces at Yorktown early in April, resulting in the withdrawal of Johnston's army toward Richmond from Central Virginia, except a body of 2,500 men left at Fredericksburg (which later also withdrew) and a force of 8,000 under Ewell at Culpeper to observe the Federals at Warrenton, as well as defend the -line of the Rapidan. 52 Jackson's campaign of 1862. Jackson entertained the hope that Banks might move toward Staunton, when it was his purpose to dash suddenly from Elk River Val ley (Swift Run Gap) through the Massanut- ten Range, attack Banks in rear and sever his communication with Strasburg and Winches ter ; but Banks's orders from McClellan were to proceed only to New Market and Harrisonburg with his main army, so Banks was not to be lured any farther south. Another column of Federals, under Milroy from west of the Alleghenies was, how ever, threatening Staunton from the di rection of Monterey, the Confederates under Gen. Edward Johnson, who had been holding Monterey, having been obliged to fall back to Buffalo Gap, near Staunton, before Milroy's advance ; Milroy reached McDowell in the Bull Pasture Valley on the 20th of April. He was then 26 miles from Staunton, on the Parkers burg turnpike, where it crosses Shenandoah Mountain. Gen. R. C. Schenck's Brigade of Fremont's army (to which Milroy also belonged) was moving up the South Branch of the Potomac from Romney through Moorefield to Franklin, keeping parallel with Banks's movements up the Valley turnpike, Schenck's objective being a junction with Milroy in an attack on Staun ton. Fremont himself, with an additional force which he had collected at New River Depot (now called Keyser), on the Baltimore Jackson's campaign of 1862. 53 and Ohio- Railroad, and at Romney, moved to Petersburg, 25 miles north of Franklin, through the mountains, establishing there a sec ondary base of supplies. All three columns had very limited wagon transportation and the roads were execrable. These were the positions during the first week in May, 1862, when Jackson quietly slipped away from Elk Run Valley, leaving the ubiquitous Col. Turner Ashby's cavalry to en tertain Banks's forces at Harrisonburg and New Market. Ewell's Division replaced Jack son's infantry near Conrad's Store and in Swift Run Gap, and remained there also to watch Banks at New Market and Harrisonburg. Jackson moved up the east side of the Shen andoah to Brown's Gap, making very slow progress on account of the bad roads until he had passed through the Gap, but he conveyed the impression he had gone to reinforce Rich mond. At Mechum's River Depot, near Char lottesville on the Virginia Central Railroad, he placed his troops on cars and rapidly con veyed them westward to Staunton, where, on the 5th of May, he effected a junction with Ed ward Johnson's Brigade, that had retired be fore Milroy from Monterey. The joint com mand was then 9,000 strong, and with it Jack son marched to McDowell, where he attacked Milroy on the 8th, Milroy being reinforced by about 1,500 men of Schenck's Brigade from Franklin shortly after the engagement opened, 54 Jackson's campaign of 1862. thus giving Milroy a force of about 3,500. Al though outnumbered, Schenck and Milroy suc cessfully resisted Jackson and Johnson through out the day of the 8th, but retired slowly on Franklin, 30 miles, during the night and on the 9th, loth and nth, Jackson following and en gaging them in their impregnable position at FrankHn during the 12th and 13th, after which Jackson withdrew toward Staunton. At McDowell the casualties were 498 Con federates (including 54 officers) and 256 Fed erals, the engagement lasting four hours, but Jackson claimed it as a victory because he held the field and saved Staunton. He also pre vented a junction of Fremont's forces with Banks. From Franklin, Jackson retraced his march through McDowell and came out of the moun tains at Augusta Springs on the 15th of May, when, after resting his troops, he took the di rect road to Harrisonburg via Mount Solon. He had taken the precaution to send parties along the eastern base of the Alleghenies north ward to block the passes toward Moorefield, so that his flank would be secure against any at tack that might come from the direction of Fremont's army at Franklin. On reaching the Valley Jackson ascertained that Banks's forces had all retired to Strasburg, leaving any move ment he might make in that direction unop posed. Jackson's campaign of 1862. 55 Jackson's departure from Elk Run Valley was only discovered by Banks through scouts, when, on the 5th of May, Banks fell back to New Market, under orders sent him by Mr. Stanton several days before, to retire his en tire command to Strasburg, which latter place Banks reached on the 13th, leaving his cavalry at Woodstock, 12 miles south. Of Jackson's movement to Mechum's Depot and thence by rail to Staunton, his junction with Edward Johnson's command and his attack on Milroy at McDowell, Banks was entirely ignorant until he received, on the 12th, a dispatch from Fre mont to Stanton, written at Petersburg, W. Va., the day before, telling of Schenck's posi tion at Franklin, and Banks did not ascertain Jackson's whereabouts when the latter returned to the Valley until the 20th, when Fremont tele graphed him to that effect from Franklin, which information was corroborated the same day from New Market by Banks's own scouts. At Strasburg, Banks had detached Shields's Division and sent it over the Manassas Gap Railroad to report to General McDowell. Geary's Brigade of Williams's Division, 1,500 strong, was guarding the railroad from Front Royal to Manassas, 52 miles, that line being visited occasionally by the enemy's cavalry from beyond the Rappahannock. Shields reached Manassas on the i8th of May, and marched from Catlett's, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, toward Fredericksburg 56 Jackson's campaign op 1862. on the 2 1st, reaching General McDowell at Fredericksburg on the 22d, where McDowell was concentrating a large force of 38,000 men to move on Richmond via Hanover Junction, in cooperation with McClellan's advance up the Peninsula. McDowell's only opponent would have been Gen. J. R. Anderson, with 11,000 men, at Massaponax. Besides detaching Shields and Geary, Banks sent a regiment of Maryland infantry, 700 strong, two guns and a party of cavalry, under Colonel Kenly, to hold Front Royal, and post ed one regiment on the railroad between Front Royal and Strasburg. This left Banks on the 2 1 St of May with only about 7,000 men at Strasburg. On the very day that Shields's Division reach ed Fredericksburg, May 22d, Jackson's and Ewell's commands, 18,000 strong, were march ing on Front Royal via Luray, east of the Shenandoah River. Front Royal was attacked on the 23d and easily carried, the Maryland regiment holding it being cut up and driven out across the river toward Winchester, the enemy pursuing and capturing many prison ers. On the 24th, Jackson, with the main body, moved to Middletown from Cedarville, and placed his command on the turnpike five miles north of Strasburg and thirteen miles south of Winchester, expecting to interpose between Winchester and Banks at Strasburg, but the latter place was evacuated sufficiently JAcKsoN^s campaign OF 1862. 57 early in the day to enable Banks to reach Win chester by 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 24th, in advance of Jackson, saving the greater part of his trains, but losing some prisoners, being fiercely attacked while passing Middle- town, Newtown and Kernstown. Ewell, with part of the command, moved directly from Cedarville on Winchester. Both commands converging on Winchester were de layed by the resistance of Banks's retreating forces during the evening of the 24th and throughout the 25th until late in the day, when they entered Winchester, the Federals retiring toward Martinsburg, which they all reached during the afternoon, marching 22 miles, the enemy not pursuing with vigor. Reaching the Potomac at Williamsport on the 26th, Banks safely crossed his trains and troops. His losses in killed, wounded and missing were 2,010. The enemy occupied Mar tinsburg with two regiments of cavalry, but his main force proceeded toward Harper's Ferry via Charlestown, reaching Halltown, three miles from Harper's Ferry, on the 28th, where he remained one day, but, beyond mak ing a demonstration on Harper's Ferry, did not attack. Then Jackson became uneasy, for both Mc Dowell from the east and Fremont from the west, were marching to the relief of Banks, the former via Manassas and Front Royal, the latter from Franklin via Moorefield, while a 58 Jackson's campaign of 1862. large force — some 6,000 men — had been hasti ly assembled at Harper's Ferry under Gen. Rufus Saxton, to contest Jackson's further progress, and Banks was fast restoring his battered army at Williamsport. The formation of McDowell's large force at Fredericksburg had caused General Lee, at Richmond, much uneasiness, for, with the ex ception of Ewell's command at Swift Run Gap, and Anderson's force near Fredericksburg, Northern Virginia had been depleted of Con federate troops. He sent two additional bri gades to Gordonsville from Richmond (Branch and Mahone) early in May. McClellan had then reached the "White House," on the Pa- munkey, and Lee desired at all hazards to pre vent McDowell's advance to a junction with McClellan. When Banks withdrew to Strasburg Lee be lieved it was for the purpose of abandoning the Valley and going to McDowell's army. Lee had already consulted Ewell and Jackson, be fore the latter went on his expedition against Milroy, concerning the expediency of a hurried joint movement towards Warrenton and Fred ericksburg, especially in vitw of Banks's inert ness, but Jackson held fast to his project of striking in detail first Milroy and then Banks. The possibility of Banks leaving the Valley and joining McDowell or McClellan by way of Staunton was also considered, Jackson from Elk Run Valley, when reinforced by Ewell, in- Jackson's campaign op 1862. 59 tending, in case Banks pushed south from Har risonburg, to move rapidly westward on New Market, and not only place himself across Banks's route of supply but attack him in rear as well. So, when Jackson had returned to the valley at Mount Solon, after having forced Milroy and Schenck back to Franklin, and he had learned of Banks's withdrawal to Strasburg, he hastily moved to the east side of the Shenan doah, and, taking Ewell with him, marched on Front Royal instead of directly on Strasburg, intending, no doubt, at least to prevent Banks from reaching McDowell across the Blue Ridge. Indeed, this scheme had been virtually communicated to Ewell by General Lee, during Jackson's absence, in a letter dated May 8th, and again to Jackson in a letter dated May 1 6th; furthermore, urging the breaking up of the Manassas Gap Railroad so as to prevent Banks's troops leaving the Valley by that route, but Shields had already passed through Front Royal eastward on the i6th. A possible invasion of Maryland had been considered as feasible for Jackson in case Banks's army could have been overtaken and defeated. Accordingly, possibly to find and effect an unopposed crossing of the Potomac, Taylor's Brigade of Ewell's Division was de tached by Jackson as he moved up towards Harper's Ferry, and sent into Loudoun County east of the Blue Ridge. It was probably part 6o Jackson's campaign op 1802. of this force that attacked Geary's posts along the Manassas Gap Railroad. Jackson also detached Ashby's Cavalry to proceed toward Moorefield, from which direc tion Fremont was reported to be coming ; then, on the 31st of May, Jackson withdrew his main body from Halltown, marched rapidly through Winchester and Strasbtirg during the ist of June, and thence up the Valley turnpike toward Harrisonburg, carrying with him 2,300 prison ers, 10,000 small arms and two pieces of ar tillery complete, captured principally from Banks's depots, Fremont's approach from near Wardensville being meanwhile effectually checked by Ewell's troops. When Fremont joined Schenck and Milroy at Franklin, on the 13th of May, with Blen- ker's Division (then reduced to 6,000 men), Fremont's entire force numbered only 12,000. Blenker's Division, originally 10,000 strong, when detached from the Second Army Corps by McClellan, on the eve of his departure for the Peninsula, was composed mainly of Ger mans, and was sent to join Fremont by the President's direct order, evidently on account of some political pressure. To reach Fremont, Blenker had to march across country from Ma nassas to Harper's Ferry, thence to Winches ter and Romney, mostly over bad roads, and with very defective transportation, camp equip age and clothing. So that when the division finally reached Fremont at Petersburg, W. Va., Jackson's campaign of 1862. 61 on the 9th day of May, it was in bad condition every way. Fremont remained at Franklin tintil May 25th, getting his command in order, contem plating an expedition to break the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad somewhere between Salem and Newbern, then to turn toward Richmond. But on the 24th orders to move to Banks's as sistance in the Shenandoah Valley were receiv ed, and Fremont moved in that direction via Moorefield and Wardensville, his advance reaching the later point on the 31st. He was then 15 miles west of Strasburg. Fremont was originally ordered to go to Harrisonburg from Franklin via Brock's Gap, but he came via Moorefield toward Strasburg instead. On the 24th, also, McDowell at Fredericks burg was, very much to his disappointment, ordered to suspend his contemplated movement on Richmond via Hanover, and, instead, to de tach 20,000 men to move westward to the suc cor of Banks via Front Royal, in which direc tion Shields started on the 25th to retrace his march; he reached Front Royal on the 30th, driving out the enemy and capturing 156 pris oners. Front Royal is 12 miles east of Stras burg. He sent his cavalry under Bayard to ward Strasburg and moved his infantry up the Luray road to Conrad's Store, but Jackson had destroyed the bridges over the Shenandoah and the river was unfordable. Shields's advance was at Luray on the 6th of June. 62 Jackson's campaign op 1862. Meanwhile, Fremont had moved into the val" ley near Strasburg, and on the 2d of June took up the pursuit of Jackson, who had eluded him, but whom he drove steadily before him through Woodstock, Edenburg and Mount Jackson, finally reaching Harrisonburg on the 6th. The enemy retreated to Port Republic, having aban doned much captured property and many pris oners during the pursuit, besides suffering many losses in killed and wounded during the many rear-guard actions, in one of which the gallant Ashby was among the killed, just be yond Harrisonburg, June 6th. Fremont continued the march toward Port Republic on the 8th and became seriously en gaged with the enemy at Cross Keys through out the day, the losses on both sides being very large. The next day, the 9th, Fremont received delayed orders from Washington to halt at Harrisonburg. Banks's army moving to the support of Fre mont had made very slow progress from Wil liamsport. On the 8th of June it had only reached Winchester, where orders were sent Banks to move to Front Royal, sending troops to guard the Manassas Gap Railway eastward and to place an advance post at Luray. On that date General Orders No. 62 of the War Department, series of 1862, was issued, changing the geographical limits of both Fre mont's and Banks's commands as follows : Jackson's campaign of 1862. 63 "The Mountain Department is extended east ward to the road running from Williamsport to Martinsburg, Winchester, Strasburg, Harri sonburg and Staunton, including that place; thence in the same direction southward until it reaches the Blue Ridge chain of mountains; thence with the line of the Blue Ridge to the southern boundary of the State of Virginia. "The Department of the Shenandoah is ex tended eastward to include the Piedmont Dis trict and the Bull Run Mountain Range." An additional division of troops, 6,000 strong, under Maj.-Gen. Franz Sigel, reached Winchester via Harper's Ferry on the 4th of June, under orders to join Banks, but Sigel got to Winchester in advance of Banks, who was slowly marching there from Williamsport and Martinsburg. Under his new orders Banks moved his main force to Front Royal, Shields's Division, as al ready noted, being at Luray and beyond. Mc Dowell's troops, except Shields's, were then all withdrawn eastward. While Fremont was engaging Jackson at Cross Keys, the head of Shields's Division was approaching Port Republic from the direction of Luray. His troops, in their effort to hasten the march, had become greatly attenuated and had lost cohesion. On the 9th the leading bri gade, Tyler's, neared Port Republic, on the op posite side of the Shenandoah from Fremont. 64 Jackson's campaign of 1862. The enemy, after engaging Fremont, had moved from Cross Keys into Port Republic during the night and had destroyed the only bridge by which Fremont could cross and fol low him. Jackson then turned on Shields's approach ing brigade and engaged it with such vigor that he forced it to retire upon the main body at Conrad's Store, after quite a spirited resist ance and considerable loss, including seven guns. Fremont established communication across the river with Shields's retreating troops and found they had received preparatory orders to return to Fredericksburg. The orders of the 9th to Fremont to withdraw to Harrisonburg and there act on the defensive, had only just reached him when he ascertained Shields's lo cation and new orders. Considering the loca tion of Harrisonburg imperfect for defensive purposes, and being seriously crippled by his losses at Cross Keys, besides hearing nothing from Banks, Fremont decided to retire to Mount Jackson where he arrived on the 12th of June, his action receiving the President's ap proval. Subsequently, on the 24th of June, Banks withdrew to Middletown, and on the 27th he asked to be relieved from service under Major- General Pope, who, by orders of the President, dated June 26th, had been called from the West and placed in command of all the troops cover- Jackson's campaign of 1862. 65 ing Washington, including those in the Shen andoah Valley. During this campaign, from May 23 to June 9, 1862, Jackson's troops had over 1,500 casu alties. Fremont's losses were 684, Banks's 2,019 ^^^ Shields's 1,018. As Fremont withdrew from Port Republic Jackson followed him closely with his cavalry, now commanded by Munford, making always a show of strength and never losing contact. Jackson's infantry, which had certainly been overworked both by marching and by fighting, was concentrated at and near Mount Meridian, where they were enabled to get a few days of rest before being moved again, this time, by Lee's orders, toward Richmond and the Pa- munkey River, whither, whilst great secrecy covered the movement, they were rapidly trans ferred by rail and by marching, and arrived at Ashland, near their destination, on the 25th of June. Fremont (12,000) was then at Middletown, Banks (12,500) at and near Front Royal, Mc Dowell was gathering a new army at Freder icksburg and McClellan was on the Chicka- hominy. The only Confederate troops left in the Valley were some of Munford's cavalry, which, later, were also withdrawn. Jackson's correspondence with General Lee and his instructions to his Chief of Cavalry, Munford, reveal how great was the desire of the Richmond authorities that Jackson should 66 Jackson's campaign op 1862. retire from the Shenandoah as secretly and as rapidly as possible, to reinforce the Confederate Army confronting McClellan before Rich mond. The Union records show how success ful Jackson and his subordinates were in im pressing Fremont, Banks and Stanton that an other invasion of the lower Valley was impend ing, long after Jackson had taken off all his in fantry and artillery toward Richmond, includ ing Lawton's and Whiting's Brigades, which had recently come to Jackson as reinforcements from Lee's army. With his own and Ewell's Divisions, strengthened by Lawton's and Whit ing's Brigades (14 regiments of about 8,500 men), Jackson carried to Lee an army of over 25,000. He left his cavalry, under Munford and about 5,000 strong, supported by some few infantry and dismounted men, to demonstrate down the Valley and at New Market or Luray, toward Fremont's and Shields's retiring col umns at Strasburg and Front Royal. Munford allowed only those to pass his lines northward who were sent purposely to take false informa tion of the most exaggerated character, to cover and conceal the movement of Jackson toward Lee. How little true information the Federal troops received during the ten days following Jackson's departure is shown by the dispatches sent to and from Washington by Stanton, Fre mont and Banks. By the 20th of June Fremont had his army of 12,000 men at and west of Strasburg, while Jackson's campaign op 1862. 67 Banks at Middletown had his two divisions (Sigel and Williams) about 13,000 strong ex tended along the north bank of the Shenandoah and Cedar Creek, from Front Royal to Middle- town. Later, all this force except one small brigade kept at Winchester, another brigade at Martinsburg and still another at Harper's Ferry, was sent east of the Blue Ridge to Pope, who had been assigned, June 26th, by the Presi dent to a new command, designated the Army of Virginia, and embracing the troops in the Valley, of Fremont and Banks, together with those of McDowell, between the Blue Ridge and Fredericksburg. Fremont was relieved, at his own request, from the subordinate com mand contemplated by the President's order, and left the army in the field. Banks and Mc Dowell loyally accepted their new assignments as corps commanders under Pope, although they, as well as Fremont, had previously been commanding separate departments, now abol ished. The Confederates relieved Munford's cav alry with Robertson's, at Harrisonburg and New Market, so as to enable the former to re join Jackson. The Valley then enjoyed comparative quiet throughout July and August of 1862, but in September, with Lee's advance to the Rapidan and Pope's subsequent defeat at Bull Run, came a renewal of the disturbed conditions for which the Shenandoah had become famous. 68 jackson's campaign of 1862. table of distances Miles. Mount Jackson to Strasburg 22 Strasburg to Winchester 18 Winchester to Harper's Ferry 28 Strasburg to Elk Run Valley 50 Elk Run Valley to Mechum's Station. ... 60 Staunton to Bull Pasture Mountain (Mc dowell) 32 Bull Pasture Mountain to Franklin 30 Bull Pasture Mountain to Augusta Springs 10 Augusta Springs to New Market 42 New Market to Luray 12 Luray to Front Royal 29 Front Royal to Harper's Ferry 57 Strasburg to Woodstock 12 Woodstock to Mount Jackson 12 Mount Jackson to New Market 7 New Market to Port Republic 30 Port Republic to Brown's Gap 12 Brown's Gap to Mount Meridian 10 Mount Meridian to Ashland 120 Looking backward, after forty years, at this wonderful Valley campaign of 1862, the mili tary student cannot fail to be impressed with the audacity and strategical eminence of Stone wall Jackson, as compared with the lack of ca pacity and want of cohesion on the part of his opponents. Jackson's campaign op 1862. 69 On the Federal side the day had not yet dawned for the military leaders to disappear who had been sent to command armies in the field through political or social influence. La tent military talent had not yet sufficiently de veloped itself among those having neither po litical nor social influence to justify the au thorities at Washington to call it to the chief commands, and, unfortunately, those same au thorities had not yet recovered from the shock and surprises of the year before ; they were still groping for suitable commanders for the thou sands of ardent but inexperienced soldiers who only asked to be led against the enemy. For a past-master in the art of war like Jack son to handle an army, no matter how inferior in strength, against generals of the military calibre of Patterson, Banks, Fremont, or Pope, was not difficult, for he was of the Cromwellian type, who fought as sincerely as he prayed, and looked for no ulterior reward; whereas those leaders against whom he operated had been se lected either to gratify a political faction or to please a military clique, and who hoped to se cure either professional advancement or politi cal preferment. Taking into consideration Jackson's situa tion May 29th and 30th, with his army of 16,000 men thundering away at Halltown for possession of Harper's Ferry, only three miles distant, and threatening to cross into Maryland or attack Washington through the passes of the 70 jackson's campaign op 1862. Blue Ridge; with Banks's shattered army of 7,000 men reorganizing at Williamsport, but threatening Jackson on his left flank and front ; Saxton, with a hastily gathered but incongru ous force of 6,000 men, sturdily barring Jack son's progress at Harper's Ferry; McDowell, with 20,000 men, on his right rear, approach ing Front Royal from Manassas ; while Fre mont, with 12,000 men, was debouching into the Valley from Wardensville on his left rear, — a weak-hearted, incompetent commander would then have made a precipitate retreat toward his base, with consequent demoraliza tion and disaster. Not so Jackson, for when he found his posi tion no longer tenable in front of Harper's Ferry he rapidly, but no less cohesively, re traced his march through Winchester and Strasburg to Mount Jackson and Harrison burg, taking with him safely an immense wagon train of munitions of war and 2,300 prisoners, captured from the enemy. With all this impedimenta he was passing Strasburg on the ist of June, when Fremont was only ten miles away toward Wardensville on his right and McDowell was at Front Royal only twelve miles away on his left, but the Val ley was clear ahead of him and Banks made no effort to fall upon his rear. A more desperate situation, so successfully solved, would be dif ficult to find in the annals of war. CHAPTER V THE CAPITULATION OF HARPER's FERRY Pope's army had been defeated at Bull Run during the last days of August, 1862, and had sought shelter within the defenses of Wash ington, where it was reorganized by McClellan and made ready to take the field again, this time north of the Potomac. After dispersing Pope's command, and real izing the futility of either attacking the fortifi cations of Washington or of besieging that city, Lee determined upon an invasion of Maryland and possibly of Pennsylvania. In his letters to President Davis of Septem ber 3 and 4, 1862, Lee states his opinion that the time was then propitious for such a move ment, "to give material aid to Maryland and afford her an opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject." On the 3d of September this project was com menced by Lee moving his elated army to Lees burg, where, from the 4th to the 7th, his troops crossed the Potomac at the fords and ferries of that vicinity and headed for Frederick, with out demonstrating toward either Washington or Baltimore. 72 CAPITULATION OF HARPER's PERRY As early as September 2, before Lee's north ern march had commenced. General Halleck ordered the troops occupying Winchester to re tire down the Valley to Harper's Ferry and prepare to hold that position as well as Mar tinsburg, at least temporarily. But this ar rangement was contrary to the expectation of General Lee, who had believed that his move ment into Maryland would force the entire evacuation of the Shenandoah and give him an unobstructed route of communication through the Valley to Richmond. To remove this ob struction became imperative. McClellan, meanwhile, became aware of Lee's movement into Maryland and prepared to cover Washington and Baltimore from at tack north of the Potomac by interposing his army between those cities and Lee's forces, until Lee's ultimate intentions could be dis closed. A large force was left to defend Wash ington, in case Lee's Maryland movement should prove only a feint to attack, with an other force, the Capital itself. These precau tions rendered the advance of McClellan to ward Lee very slow, as he moved his army west ward toward Frederick, between the Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, so that it was only late on the 12th that McClellan's ad vanced troops entered Frederick, unopposed, Lee having moved two days before through Hagerstown, westward into the passes of CAPITULATION OF HARPER S PERRY 73 South Mountain (a continuation of the Blue Ridge north of the Potomac). All this while the position at Harper's Ferry gave the authorities at Washington great un easiness, especially when it became known to them that Lee, at Frederick, on the loth or September, had detached a very large force under Jackson (Stonewall) to recross the Po tomac at Williamsport, to operate against Har per's Ferry and clear a route for Lee's possible return to Virginia. McClellan, on the nth, at Rockville, when it was already too late, asked Halleck to order the garrison of Harper's Ferry to join him, but this Halleck declined to do, although the next day (the 12th) Halleck transferred that garri son from Wool's Department to McClellan's, to take effect as soon as he (McClellan) "could open communication" with the place. The Federal commander of Harper's Ferry (Col. Dixon S. Miles), with a garrison of 10,000 men, had strict instructions from Wool to hold the place at all hazards, at least until he could be succored from McClellan's advanc ing army. Maryland Heights, overlooking Harper's Ferry, had been partly fortified and was occupied by a small detachment of Miles's troops, the remainder of his forces being en trenched on Bolivar Heights and in the town of Harper's Ferry. No one could be more familiar with the pos sibilities of defending Harper's Ferry, or of its 74 CAPITULATION OF HARPER S FERRY untenableness, than was Jackson, for he had been sent there early in 1861, and, after fully studying the situation, had advised against its retention except by an exceedingly strong force- It is therefore presumable that when Lee se lected him to reduce the position, he (Jackson) insisted on being provided with a heavy body of troops. So Lee sent from Frederick one- half of his army, six divisions (A. P. Hill's, Ewell's and Starke's), to move via Williams port and Martinsburg, while McLaws's Divi sion, supported by Anderson's, occupied Mary land Heights from the north, and Walker's Division was ordered b}' way of Cheek's Ford of the Potomac to occupy Loudoun Heights. Walker was prevented "by the enemy" from crossing at Cheek's, so he crossed at Point of Rocks during the night of the loth instead, and got into position on Loudoun Heights, which he found unoccupied, during the night of the 13th, effectually barring any escape of the gar rison of Harper's Ferry down the south side of the Potomac. McLaws, with his own and Anderson's Divi sion, moved on the loth (via Crampton's Gap of South Mountain and Pleasant Valley, Mary land) to take position on Maryland Heights and the debouche of the Valley along the Po tomac at Sandy Hook and Weverton. He forced the retreat into Harper's Ferry of the troops on Maryland Heights, after some resist ance, on the 13th, and succeeded in getting CAPITULATION OF HARPER S FERRY 75 some guns into position there, after consider able labor, that effectually commanded Har per's Ferry. His troops in Pleasant Valley moved forward to the Potomac and thus closed all egress north or east to Miles's forces, north of the Potomac. On the 14th Franklin's Corps of McClellan's army reached and forced the passage of Cramp- ton's Gap, only seven miles north of Maryland Heights, and advanced a short distance down Pleasant Valley toward Harper's Ferry, when Franklin most unaccountably halted, went into camp and did not attack McLaws on the 15th, although McLaws had drawn up six small brigades across the Valley near Crampton's Gap and invited attack. McLaws also, had four brigades at Weverton and Sandy Hook, besides the force on top of Maryland Heights, which latter was firing down into Harper's Ferry. This Federal force in Pleasant Valley on the 14th and 15th consisted of Franklin's (Sixth) Army Corps and Crouch's Division (three large divisions of three brigades each), and was 20,000 strong. It did not even follow up McLaws' weaker force when, on the 15th, the latter crossed his troops and trains into Har per's Ferry after the capitulation. The main movement to reduce Harper's Ferry was conducted by Jackson in person, and consisted, as already mentioned, of three divi sions, which, after crossing the Potomac at 76 CAPITULATION OF HARPER's PERRY Williamsport on the nth, moved on Martins burg and down the south side of the river. The Federal garrison of Martinsburg, under Gen. Julius White, evacuated the place during the night of the nth, safely reached Harper's Ferry on the 12th, closely followed by Jack son's troops, however, who reached Halltown, three miles south of Harper's Ferry, on the 13th, where Miles's forces were found drawn up on Bolivar Heights nearby. The withdrawal of the garrisons of Win chester and Martinsburg gave Miles at Har per's Ferry a force of nearly 13,000 men. The six divisions of the enemy, surrounding him on all sides, could not have numbered less than 30,000, for they were all composed of more than three brigades each, some having five or six. On joining Miles, for some magnanimous reason which Miles seems to have greatly ap preciated. General White presented the most unusual example of not claiming command of all the Federal troops at Harper's Ferry, by virtue of his superior rank, but generously waived it, instead, on the ground that Miles was more thoroughly familiar with the situa tion and had already made all preparations to defend the place. White then most loyally as sumed command of only part of the line and gave Miles conscientious support to the end. That end came on the morning of the 15th, when the Confederate lines had been more CAPITULATION OF HARPER's PERRY 77 closely drawn around the position, which was also enfiladed from several directions by the enemy's artillery. At Miles's request, after tak ing a unanimous vote of his council of war. White negotiated with Jackson the terms of capitulation, which surrendered over ii,ooo men as prisoners of war, besides a vast quanti ty of arms and stores. It was after the white flags of surrender had actually gone up that Miles was mortally wounded by a shell fired from one of the Confederate batteries and the command then devolved on White. Lee, in his report, says that "the advance of the Federal army was so slow at the time we left Fredericktown [September lo] as to jus tify the belief that the reduction of Harper's Ferry could be accomplished and our troops concentrated before they would be called upon to meet it." Lee retained with him only Longstreet's, D. H. Hill's and his cavalry corps, after detaching Jackson's three divisions, as well as McLaws's, Anderson's and Walker's. On the 13th and 14th Lee was attacked by Mc Clellan's advance at the Gap in South Moun tain on the Boonesborough pike, during the absence of his six divisions operating against Harper's Ferry, but as McClellan did not push his attack with sufficient vigor, Lee succeeded in checking McClellan as well as preventing any relief going to Harper's Ferry. He became uneasy, however, and dispatched couriers to hasten the return of all his detachments. Jack- 78 CAPITULATION OP HARPER's FERRY son rejoining him at Sharpsburg on the i6th, where Lee had retreated on the 15th. Jackson left A. P. Hill's Division temporarily at Har per's Ferry, but Hill's, as well as McLaws's, Anderson's and Walker's Divisions, returned to Lee's main army at Sharpsburg on the i6th and 17th. McClellan's army came up to the Antietam during the afternoon of the 15th, but made no attack on Lee beyond some artillery firing until late on the i6th, after Jackson and Walker had rejoined Longstreet and D. H. Hill at Sharps burg. The Battle of Antietam came off on the 17th. Lee says, "The resistance that had been of fered to the enemy at Boonesborough Gap se cured sufficient time to enable General Jackson to complete the reduction of Harper's Ferry." The engagement at Boonesborough is known to us officially as the Battle of South Mountain. It certainly enabled Lee to reunite his troops and meet McClellan behind the Antietam. During the night of the i8th Lee's army re crossed the Potomac into Virginia, near Shep herdstown ; he was covered by his cavalry under J. E. B. Stuart. An effort of Porter's Federal Corps to cross and pursue was repulsed by A. P. Hill's Division on the 20th. Lee then moved his army slowly to Martinsburg, Bunker Hill and Winchester, the Federals reoccupying the line of the Potomac and Harper's Ferry, but made no other forward movement. It was dur- CAPITULATION OF HARPEr's FERRY 79 ing this period of inactivity, in the early days of October, that Stuart crossed the Potomac above Williamsport with his cavalry, about 1,500 strong, and made his successful raid on Chambersburg, recrossing again into Virginia below Harper's Ferry, without loss or inter ference by the Federal cavalry. Stuart passed entirely around McClellan's army, just as he had done earlier in the summer on the Penin sula. No amount of urging, ordering or pleading by Lincoln could induce McClellan to move south of the upper Potomac until the last days of October, when he crossed his army at Berlin, below Harper's Ferry, and moved south along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, occupying some of the gaps as far south as Snicker's, to protect his flanks, but not to threaten Lee, whose army still remained near Winchester. McClellan's objective point was still Richmond, but as he moved with characteristic ponderous- ness and elaboration, Lee immediately sent Longstreet's Corps (half his arniy) by Front Royal through Chester Gap to Culpeper Court- House, to which point he transferred his own headquarters on the 6th of November, leaving Jackson (with the other half of his army) in the Valley to threaten either another invasion of Maryland or McClellan's flank and his com munications with Washington, should the lat ter advance far enough southward. 8o CAPITULATION OF HARPER's FERRY McClellan left Slocum's Corps to hold Har per's Ferry and placed three additional brigades at Sharpsburg, Williamsport and above. These troops were intended mainly to observe and guard the crossings of the Potomac, but they also made an occasional reconnaissance toward the enemy at Berryville, Winchester or Mar tinsburg. From Snicker's Gap McClellan deflected his army to the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad and fixed his own headquarters first at Rector- town. His base was then at Alexandria, whence his supplies came by rial. On the 9th of No vember General McClellan was superseded in command of the Army of the Potomac, at Warrenton, by General Burnside. Lee still retained Jackson in the Valley about Berryville and Winchester, but prepared to rap idly move through the upper passes of the Blue Ridge to unite with Longstreet at Culpeper, should Burnside attempt to interpose between them by moving on Culpeper in force, or, in case Burnside moved on Fredericksburg, down the Rappahannock, Jackson was to rejoin Lee by the shortest practicable route. Jackson drew his supplies from Staunton and Lee from Rich mond. On the 19th of November and again on the 23d, Lee wrote to Jackson that he considered it advisable for him to leave the Valley and bring his corps of 35,000 men east of the Blue Ridge to a point nearer Fredericksburg, where CAPITULATION OP HARPER's FERRY 8 1 Lee had gone in person, and from which point it was expected Burnside's assembled army would try to force its way to Richmond. Jackson left a small force, principally Mary landers under Steuart, and some cavalry, to hold Winchester and the lower Valley, and then moved up the Valley through Strasburg and New Market to Swift Rim Gap, where he crossed the Blue Ridge and reported his troops to Lee from Orange Court-House on the 27th of November. The next day General Lee di rected Jackson to move his command to a po sition near the railroad from Fredericksburg to Richmond, on Massaponax Creek, as at that time Lee did not believe Burnside would en deavor to cross the Rappahannock at Freder icksburg, but would select a crossing at some point below — possibly Port Royal. A strong reconnaissance, sent out December I from Harper's Ferry, under Geary, went through Charlestown to Berryville and thence to Winchester, returning to Harper's Ferry via Bunker Hill and Smithfield. Geary encounter ed some resistance along his route from the Seventh and Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, the in fantry troops (about 2,000 Marylanders) evacuating Winchester and moving south to ward Strasburg when Geary entered Winches ter on the 4th of December. Geary soon with drew and the Confederates reoccupied the town. A small reconnaissance made from New Creek to Moorefield, on the same dates as the 82 CAPITULATION OF HARPER S FERRY above, found two companies of partisan cav alry under McDonald, which were dispersed, after killing two, wounding several and cap turing ten. Another small cavalry reconnaissance through Martinsburg, toward Darkesville, on the nth of December, captured thirteen prisoners and dispersed three companies of the Seventh Con federate Cavalry to Bunker Hill. On the 9th of December General Burnside ordered Slocum to withdraw his troops from Harper's Ferry and march via Leesburg to Centerville where he was to report to General Sigel as part of the reserve of Burnside's army. Morell, who, from his headquarters at Hagers town, commanded the defenses of the upper Potomac, was directed to replace Slocum's troops at Harper's Ferry with Kenly's brigade of Marylanders, and at the same time another force was to reoccupy Martinsburg. On the 1 6th of December Morell was relieved by Gen. B. F. Kelley, whose command at Cumberland was extended to include all the line of the Bal timore and Ohio Railroad from New Creek (now Keyser) to Harper's Ferry. The rail road was then being rebuilt into Martinsburg from the west. Kelley fixed his headquarters mostly at Har per's Ferry. He had, besides his own brigade and local garrisons between Cumberland and Grafton and Kenly's Maryland Brigade at Harper's - Ferry, a force of eight regiments CAPITULATION OF HARPER's FERRY 83 under Milroy, recently arrived at New Creek from the region between Monterey and Bev erly, west of the Alleghenies. Milroy was sent to reinforce the troops on the railroad east of Cumberland when Jackson was still about Winchester, and who threatened further inter ruption of the railroad west of Martinsburg as well as to carry out Jackson's favorite hobby of an invasion of the territory in West Virginia containing his original home, at Clarksburg. From New Creek Kelley sent, December 6, one brigade from this column of Milroy's to reoccupy Petersburg, W. Va., southeast from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad toward Franklin and Monterey, and later sent the re mainder of Milroy's command in the same gen eral direction, so that by the end of December Milroy's forces occupied Romney, Moorefield, Petersburg and up the valley of the south fork of the Potomac, while with his mounted troops under Cluseret (later celebrated as one of the leaders of the Commune in France), he took possession of Winchester. Kelley also repaired and reopened the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad eastward from Hancock to Harper's Ferry. The inaction of the Army of the Potomac under Burnside, after his unsuccessful assault at Fredericksburg, might have enabled Lee to dispatch troops for service elsewhere. Notwith standing the severity of the winter and the dreadful condition of the roads, some enter prising cavalry raids were made by Lee's troops 84 CAPITULATION OP HARPER's PERRY to the rear of Burnside's army, one small party under Rosser penetrating into the Shenandoah almost to Martinsburg, but returning east of the Blue Ridge immediately The Confederate forces in the Shenandoah consisted mainly of cavalry, supported by some Maryland infantry, all under command of Gen. W. E. Jones, and numbering about 2,500 in all. This force had retired to New Market late in December of 1862, but early in January, by General Lee's orders, made an unsuccessful at tempt to drive back the Federal forces at Moore field and Petersburg, having McNeill's Com pany of Imboden's partisan cavalry from the direction of Monterey, to cooperate with him. Realizing the difficulty of maintaining too many detached positions. General Kelley re moved the troops from Petersburg and Moore field to strengthen those at Romney, soon after Jones was beaten off, recognizing the impor tance of Romney and Winchester as outposts for the protection of the newly-reconstructed Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from the west through Martinsburg. Again, Romney was only 26 miles east from New Creek, whence the command drew its supplies, and was as im portant an outpost for New Creek and Cumber land as it was for Winchester. From Romney cavalry could penetrate southward, up the fer tile valley of the south fork of the Potomac, as far as Monterey, and thence to the Virginia Central Railroad. CAPITULATION OP HARPEr's FERRY §5 On the 19th of January, 1863, all movements south of the Winchester line were ordered stopped, as the W^ashington authorities did not desire any cause to be given Lee to detach any portion of his army then confronting Burn side. The reoccupation of the lower Valley by the Union forces and the reopening of the Bal timore and Ohio Railroad gave General Lee great concern, so he endeavored, as the winter closed in, to detach to the support of his troops about New Market, up the Valley, such of the Confederate forces at Staunton and the Lewis burg or Huttonsville lines as could be spared. Burnside's rapidly increasing army in his front, though inactive, perplexed Lee. On the 25th of January, 1863, orders were issued, by direction of the President, supersed ing General Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac by Gen. Joseph Hooker. CHAPTER VI Jones's and imboden's raid into west Vir ginia Both armies remained inactive at Fredericks burg, after Hooker assumed command of the Federal army, until the latter part of April, 1863, when Hooker attempted to turn Lee's left flank and was badly defeated at Chancellors- ville. Meanwhile, the small force of Confederates in the Valley, under Col. W. E. Jones, was as active as the severe weather and their weak strength permitted, while Milroy had his head quarters and main force at Winchester, with outposts at Berryville, Strasburg, and Romney, throughout the winter of i862-'63. Jones had his headquarters first at New Mar ket and then at Lacey Springs, near Harrison burg, from either place being within communi cation with J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry headquar ters at Culpeper, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. During the winter General Lee organized an expedition, to be sent from the Valley as soon Jones's and imboden's raid 87 as the spring opened, to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad west of Cumberland. It had been General Lee's unremitting endeavor from the beginning of hostilities to interrupt Federal communication with the West by that railroad, especially at the Cheat River viaduct at Rowlesburg. The expedition for 1863 was to consist of two cooperating columns, one under W. E. Jones to move via Brock's Gap and Lost River down the South Fork of the Potomac through Moorefield, and thence toward Cheat River Viaduct; the other, under a noted "partisan ranger," Imboden, to be formed near Monterey and Hightown, on the Parkersburg turnpike, to move over the mountains northwest through Beverly in the same general direction as the Jones column, which was to move on the Northwestern turnpike. In the correspondence of General Lee of this period it appears he was becoming very much impressed with the feats of a noted guerilla (or partisan) named J. H. McNeill, who operated in the region about Moorefield and Romney. McNeill was one of Imboden's captains and had made several daring and successful forays. To get an understanding of the status of the Confederate "partisan rangers," as distinguish ed from the regular soldier, consultation of Confederate legislation and the correspondence arising therefrom, is necessary. There was nothing similar in the United States service. 88 Jones's and imboden's raid We find first that Virginia as early as March 27, 1862, by an act of the General Assembly, authorized the forming "of ten or more com panies of rangers," of 100 men each, "to be composed exclusively of men whose homes are in the districts overrun by the public enemy, within the limits of said counties, who shall en list for twelve months in the service of this Commonwealth, to act as rangers and scouts on our exposed frontier near the lines of the enemy. * * * The said officers and privates shall receive the same pay as is allowed to the privates and officers by the Confederate States. * * * Shall be under the command of the Gov ernor, and shall conform their operations to the usages of civilized warfare. * * * Whenever the said rangers shall be in the neighborhood of a Confederate army, they shall be subject to the orders of the commandant of the same and shall always cooperate with the movements of said army when ordered to do so. * * * " Within a month, April 21, 1862, the Confed erate Congress passed an act "to organize bands of partisan rangers throughout the Con federacy, in companies, battalions, or regi ments, either as infantry or cavalry," and to "be entitled to the same pay, rations and quar ters * * * as other soldiers. That for any arms and munitions of war captured from the enemy by any body of partisan rangers and delivered to any quartermaster * * * the rangers shall be paid their full value. * * * " Into west Virginia 89 It will be observed, by the last clause of the foregoing act, the rangers received a premium for capturing property not allowed "other sol diers." Also that they were not required to confine their operations to any particular re gion of the country, but might enter the enemy's territory at will. Then, too, the Confederate Congress was si lent about the ranger conforming his opera tions, "to the usages of civilized warfare." The "public defense" acts absorbed into the Con federate army all troops that had been raised under State authority, including the rangers, although these latter were never brigaded with other troops, but operated, under their own of ficers, independently. These independent commands, with their freedom from all the restraints and discipline of the line, soon made the partisan service very popular to serve in, so much so that the Confederate War Department found it neces sary to restrict the partisan service to persons not liable to conscription and to forbid any transfer from other branches of the army. Also to endeavor to exclude from the partisan corps deserters from the regulars, of whom there were already great numbers in hiding through out the Confederacy as early as 1862. The Virginia Assembly, on the 28th of Feb ruary, 1863, transferred all State troops and rangers to the Confederate Government and 90 JONES S AND IMBODEN S RAID Stopped their further enlistments under State authority. There were ninety-five companies of rangers registered at the Confederate War Department on the 1 2th of September, 1863, with many more in process of formation. The operation of the Ranger Act was not long in making itself felt to the detriment of the Confederate Army, as shown by the reports and correspondence of both army and civilian officials, but all attacks upon the system proved unavailing until the acts organizing these guer illa forces were revoked by the Confederate Congress, February 17, 1864, exception being then made to retain such as were acting as regular cavalry. Of these, McNeill's Company and Mosby's Battalion were continued in serv ice as partisans. It is presumed the action taken by the Con federate Congress was finally reached through consideration of the annual report of the Sec retary of War, James A. Seddon, dated Rich mond, November 26, 1863, where he mentions the rangers as follows : "The advantages anticipated from the allow ance of corps of partisan rangers, with peculiar privileges of prize to stimulate their zeal and activity, have been very partially realized, while from their independent organization and the facilities and temptations thereby afforded to license and depredations, grave mischiefs have INTO WEST VIRGINIA 91 resulted. They have, indeed, when under inef ficient officers and operating within our own limits, come to be regarded as more formidable and destructive to our own people than to the enemy. The opportunities, too, afforded them of profit by their captures, as well as the lighter bonds of discipline under which they are held, serve to dissatisfy the trained soldiers of the Provisional Army, who, encountering greater perils and privations, are denied similar indul gences. There are certainly some honorable exceptions to the general estimate thus held of the partisan corps, and in several instances par tisan leaders have distinguished themselves and their corps by services as eminent as their achievements have been daring and brilliant. They constitute only notable exceptions, and experience of the general inefficiency and even mischief of the organizations would recom mend that they either be merged in the troops of the line or be disbanded and conscripted. To preserve the few that are valuable coadjutors to the general service, discretion may be in trusted to the Department." General Lee was very much of the same opinion, for April i, 1864, he writes to Adju tant-General Cooper, recommending that all rangers, except Mosby's Battalion, be disband ed, and saying : "Experience has convinced me that it is al most impossible, under the best officers even, 92 JONES S AND IMBODEN S RAID to have discipline in these bands of partisan rangers, or to prevent them from becoming an injury instead of a benefit to the service, and even where this is accomplished, the system gives license to many deserters and marauders, who assume to belong to these authorized com panies, and commit depredations on friend and foe alike. Another great objection to them is the bad effect upon the discipline of the army, from the constant desire of the men to leave their regiments and enjoy the great license al lowed in these bands. * * * " It was to one of these partisan leaders, how ever, that General Lee entrusted in April, 1863, the main column for the raid on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, as we find in his corre spondence with Col. J. D. Imboden, Capt. J. H. McNeill (both partisans), and with the two Joneses (both regulars). Imboden, at Staunton, had in June, 1862, raised four full companies of the ranger regi ment he had been authorized to recruit, and was told by the Secretary of War to organize the men he already had into a battalion and aft erwards increase it to a regiment. He was get ting his recruits mainly from the mountain dis tricts east and west of the Alleghenies. On the 3d of February, 1863, General Lee addressed a letter to Imboden, as "General Commanding Northwest Brigade," congratu lating him on his promotion and urging him INTO WEST VIRGINIA 93 "to bring out all the men subject to military duty in the Northwest. I think it unnecessary to caution you against receiving men who have deserted from other companies or regiments. * * * " Referring to the enemy, General Lee continues : "He cannot during the winter move with any large infantry force across the moun tains against you. * * * I am very anxious to drive him out of the Valley, and desire you to be prepared to cooperate with Gen. W. E. Jones whenever an opportunity occurs." On the 2d of March, Imboden, from his camps near McDowell and Monterey, submit ted to General Lee a plan of an expedition to destroy all the bridges of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad between Oakland and Grafton, and then tp move against the enemy at Beverly, Philippi, and Buckhannon, in West Virginia, the enemy at that period not being in strong force at any point on that line. Imboden pro posed to start with 2,500 men and extra arms for 1,500 additional, whom he expected would join him as soon as he reached Beverly and be yond. For the latter purpose, Imboden asked that the Twenty-fifth and Thirty-first Virginia Infantry, composed mainly of refugees from that section of country, be sent to him for the movement, and whose ranks, as well as those of his own rangers, Imboden hoped to fill up while in West Virginia. As a collateral movement, Gen. W. E. Jones, commanding the Valley District, was to press 94 Jones's and imboden's raid the enemy down the Shenandoah toward Win chester and then move rapidly on Romney, New Creek (Keyser), and Cumberland. While Jones was doing this Imboden was to send a mounted flying column of .500 men, probably under the celebrated J. H. McNeill, to move through Moorefield to Oakland on the railroad by the Northwest turnpike, but avoiding the enemy at New Creek. Meanwhile, Imboden, with his infantry and artillery, would move from Monterey on Huttonsville and Beverly, west of the mountains, while his cavalry with McNeill was cutting and destroying the Cheat River Viaduct and the trestle work on the rail road. The enemy at Beverly was to be forced out toward Weston or Clarksburg, so as to en able the party operating on the railroad to re join the dismounted men south of Grafton. If successful, Imboden expected to be joined by thousands of recruits and to collect for the Confederate Army large numbers of horses and cattle. This plan was promptly approved by General Lee and preparations for its execution com menced as early as March n, but the severe winter and the condition of the mountain roads and streams delayed the departure of either Im boden or Jones until the last week in April, and then with the original plan somewhat modified. Gen. Sam JOnes, commanding the Department of West Virginia, was ordered to supply some troops to Imboden and otherwise assist him by INTO WEST VIRGINIA 95 threatening the enemy's positions on the Ka nawha, and preventing reinforcements going from that point to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. So much did General Lee have in mind the regaining of the lower Valley that, while writ ing confidentially from Fredericksburg to President Davis of army matters generally, he says, on the 2d of April, "when the roads per mit of our moving, unless in the meantime General Hooker takes the aggressive, I propose to make a blow at Milroy, which, I think, will draw General Hooker out, or at least prevent further reinforcements being sent to the West." At that time Burnside had taken 20,000 men of the Ninth Army Corps from the east to Cin cinnati by rail, where he was organizing an ex pedition to march on Knoxville, in cooperation with a forward movement from Murfreesbor- ough, in Middle Tennessee, by Rosecrans's army. At that same time General Lee was having great trouble in subsisting his army, so that he urged upon all the detached commanders in the field, especially "the partisans," to collect horses, cattle, provisions, etc., from the coun try in which they operated. As "munitions of war" had been construed by the Confederate authorities to include everything needed by an army, an additional incentive for indiscrimi nate plundering was held out to the partisans, for, by the law creating them, they received 96 JONES's AND imboden's RAID prize money for all stores captured by them and turned in to proper authority. Imboden finally got started on the 20th of April, 1863, from Shenandoah Mountain and Monterey, over the main range of the Alle gheny Mountains toward Beverly. He had a mixed command of nearly 3,500 men, regulars and partisans (of which latter 700 were mount ed) and he had six guns. About half this force had been furnished by Gen. Sam Jones. W. E. Jones moved from Lacey Springs, in the Upper Shenandoah Valley, on the 21st of April, by way of Brock's Gap and Lost River, toward Moorefield. The plan submitted by Imboden had been modified, so that, instead of pressing the enemy toward Winchester and then passing through Romney, Jones was to avoid both those places, as well as New Creek, and move rapidly for the railroad at Oakland. Jones says he took "all my [his] available strength in cavalry, infantry and artillery," but fails to mention his actual strength, which was probably not less than 3,500 men. Of these, he sent back about 1,000 from Moore field, when he could not get all his command over the Potomac on account of high water. Before starting, all men and horses unfit for a hard campaign were left behind in the Valley, under Lieut.-Col. O. R. Funsten, Eleventh Virginia Cavalry, who had his outposts ex tended well toward Strasburg, and where, on INTO WEST VIRGINIA 97 the 28th of April, he had a brisk skirmish with some of Milroy's troops. Jones reached Moorefield on the 24th of April, the same day that Imboden, on the other side of the mountains, was attacking Beverly. Jones found no enemy at Moorefield but the river was too high to cross, so he was forced to make a detour of eleven miles up stream to Petersburg, where he succeeded in getting most of his mounted men over after considerable dif ficulty. The dismounted men, artillery and trains, as well as some three hundred of his cavalry, not being able to cross at all, were sent back to the Shenandoah Valley by way of Franklin, gathering up all surplus bacon, etc., along the route. With the bulk of his mounted force, consisting of the First Mary land and White's Virginia Battalions, the Sixth, Seventh and Twelfth Virginia, and some of McNeill's partisans, in all about 2,500 men, Jones resumed his movement on Oakland. He was obliged to pass through Greenland Gap, in the Knobley Mountain, 20 miles west of Moorefield, to get onto the Northwestern turnpike and to avoid the strong force of Fed eral troops at New Creek (Keyser). Most unexpectedly, Jones found at the Gap a small and stubborn detachment of eighty-three In fantry, under Capt. Martin Wallace of the Twenty- third Illinois (Irish Brigade), who, from a church and a log house in the Gap, de layed Jones half a day on the 25th and only 98 JONES'S AND imboden's RAID yielded when the buildings were set on fire by Jones's men, after darkness enabled them to crawl up close enough. Three previous assaults had been repulsed with considerable loss to the Confederates, including Col. R. H. Dulaney, Seventh Virginia Cavalry, wounded, and sev eral of his officers. Wallace says the Confed erates lost 104 killed and wounded, while his own loss was two killed and six wounded. Jones admits his casualties to have been seven killed and twenty-two wounded. These delays enabled Federal reinforcements to be sent west over the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, to points threatened by Imboden's strong column, before the raiding parties from Jones's command succeeded in interrupting rail communication at Oakland, but Jones after wards passed one column of his troops through Oakland to Kingwood and thence to Morgan- town on the Monongahela, during the 26th, while his main party went direct to Rowles burg, at Cheat River Bridge on the railroad, by way of the Northwestern turnpike through West Union. The column Jones sent to the railroad at Oakland also destroyed some small bridges farther east, at Altamont, stopping for a while traific on that part of the line, but the party which went to Rowlesburg, April 26, to cap ture the small garrison there and then destroy the massive railroad viaduct and the trestle work near by, failed in its attempt. Jones, with INTO WEST VIRGINIA 99 his main party, went as far as Evansville, where he found meat and forage, and endeavored to communicate with Imboden from whom he could get no news. Jones then crossed to the north of the railroad from Evansville, destroy ing a two-span bridge at Independence, and, on the 28th, having been joined by the column he had sent through Oakland, reached Morgan- town, on the Monongahela, north of Grafton. He crossed to the west side of the river over the suspension bridge and then turned south on Fairmont and captured the garrison at that place on the 29th, by making a slight detour to the west. An unsuccessful effort to save the garrison and the railroad bridge was made by rail from Grafton, but came too late. Jones drove off this succoring party and then thor oughly destroyed the fine railroad bridge at Fairmont (on the Wheeling and Grafton branch of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad). He sent a small party as far as Mannington. During the night of the 29th and on the 30th, Jones continued his march southward from Fairmont, searching for Imboden but avoiding Clarksburg, where the Federal troops were in strength. He crossed to the south of the rail road at Bridgeport, five miles east of Clarks burg, capturing the small garrison there, con sisting of 47 men, and destroyed the railroad bridge nearby, besides a railroad train which was run into Simpson's Creek. He reached Philippi at noon of May ist, where he disen- ICO Jones's and imboden's raid cumbered himself of all impedimenta in the shape of captured animals, wagons, beef cattle, etc. These he sent to Beverly, under escort of the Sixth Virginia Cavalry, and with his main force moved leisurely to Buckhannon, where he found Imboden's command on the 2d of May, preparing to move on Weston, in which direc tion the joint command then marched. Their route was unobstructed except for the bad con dition of the roads, as Gen. B. S. Roberts, in command of the Federal forces, had withdrawn to Clarksburg and Grafton all the small garri sons that had held Beverly, Philippi, Buckhan non and Weston, on Imboden's approach to those places, destroying vast quantities of stores, but still leaving much to fall into Im boden's hands. Roberts was more apprehensive of the enemy under Jones getting possession of Clarksburg and Grafton, with all the military stores and railroad material accumulated there, than he was of attack from Imboden separately, but with a junction of Jones's and Imboden's two columns impending, with communication by rail already severed east and north by Jones's raid, thus cutting him off from all immediate reinforcement, Roberts very wisely decided to draw in to the railroad, at the two points above mentioned, all his scattered garrisons to the southward. This he succeeded in accomplish ing by the 28th of April, he himself taking into Clarksburg everything from the Weston line INTO WEST VIRGINIA lOI that he did not destroy, while Colonel Mulligan retired into Grafton with the force from Philippi. Imboden, after getting possession of Beverly, on the 24th of April, followed the retreating garrison a few miles toward Philippi and then discontinued the pursuit. He had previously secured possession of the direct road from Bev erly to Buckhannon over Rich Mountain (the scene of General McClellan's brilliant opera tions in July, 1861), so that the Beverly garri son was forced to retreat on Buckhannon by a detour through Philippi, which it safel)^ ac complished on the 26th, although Imboden had pushed out to the Buckhannon River, mitlway between Philippi and Buckhannon, but too late to intercept the movement. Colonel Mulligan, the Federal commander at Grafton, having been reinforced from the east by two Maryland regiments from New Creek before Jones broke the railroad at Altamont and Oakland, and acting under instructions from General Roberts, had reoccupied Philippi on the 26th, when the Beverly garrison under Colonel Latham had already left for Buckhan non, Mulligan being sent to Philippi to help Latham's retirement; but finding Latham was safe and that Grafton was being threatened by Jones's troopers. Mulligan returned to Grafton on the 27th. The countiry north of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in West Virginia, and even as I02 JONES S AND IMBODEN S RAID far away as Harrisburg from the region being raided, was in an uproarious panic, which was greatly intensified by the telegraph operators along the railroad sending broadcast alarming messages concerning the raiders, before aban doning their posts. The commanding officer at Clarksburg, Col. N. Wilkinson, contributed no little to the panic by erroneously reporting to Roberts the capture of Grafton and Webster, and adding that he was preparing to abandon Clarksburg. Indeed, it was only after consid erable urging that Roberts induced Wilkinson to hold on at Clarksburg until Roberts could reach there with the troops on the Buckhannon and Weston lines. At Wheeling, on the 28th, the banks and the postal authorities were packing up their valua bles ready for removal, while the United States Ordnance Officer stationed there asked for au thority to "blow up the depot in case it is nec essary" (meaning the Ordnance Depot). Jones was then at Morgantown, threatening Pitts burg as well as Wheeling, and his troops, 2,000 strong, were about to destroy the bridge at Fairmont, only twelve miles north of Grafton, on the railroad to Wheeling, besides sending a detachment to Mannington, only twelve miles from Wheeling. To intensify the situation, the commanding officer at Clarksburg, Colonel Wilkinson, had deemed it prudent two days before to destroy a bridge on the railroad five miles east of Clarksburg, thereby severing rail INTO WEST VIRGINIA 103 communication with Grafton and obstructing any reinforcement to Clarksburg from the East. The enemy under Jones and Imboden, hav ing joined, their forces at Weston, on the 4th of May, and withdrawn their raiding parties from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad east of Clarksburg, an attack on Clarksburg with the joint command, then about 6,000 strong, was contemplated, but abandoned when information had been received of the arrival there of ma terial reinforcements from Harper's Ferry, Winchester and New Creek. It was decided, instead, that Imboden (whose troops were mostly dismounted) should move south, while Jones, with his cavalry, should raid the railroad west toward Parkersburg. This latter movement was commenced on the 6th of May by sending the Eleventh and Twelfth Regiments and part of the TMrty- fourth Virginia Cavalry, all under Col. A. W. Harman (Twelfth Virginia Cavalry), to West Union, while, with the remainder of his com mand, Jones moved westward on the Parkers burg turnpike. Harman destroyed several small bridges on the railroad before reuniting with the main column under Jones at Cairo, where several more bridges were burned. From Cairo the command went to Oiltown, on the Little Kanawha, where, on the 9th of May, it destroyed the extensive oilworks and an im mense quantity of the oil. From Oiltown I04 Jones's and imboden's raid Jones marched southeastward via Glenville and Sutton to Summerville, where he again re joined Imboden on the 31st of May, and thence returned leisurely to the upper Shenandoah by way of the Greenbrier Valley. His losses were 10 killed, 42 wounded and 15 missing. He brought out 1,250 head of cattle and 1,200 horses, but was unincumbered by wagons dur ing a march of about 700 miles. He claims to have killed about 25 of the enemy and wounded about 75, besides capturing about 700 prisoners with their small arms and one piece of artillery, two trains of cars, sixteen railroad bridges and a vast quantity of oil, with appurtenances, were burned. But he failed to destroy the Cheat River Viaduct, which was the main object of the expedition. Imboden, after sending his sick and stores to Monterey by way of Beverly, had moved on the 6th south toward Summerville, over very bad roads daily made worse by the rains, pass ing through Bulltown and Suttonville. His advance guard, on the 12th of May, captured part of the rear guard and train of the Federal troops, six miles beyond Summerville, about two hours after they had evacuated the town. From Summerville Imboden sent part of his force to cross the Gauley River at Hughes' Ferry and thence via Meadow Bluff to Lewis burg, while the main force marched up the Gauley and by the Cold Knob road, both par ties eventually reaching Buffalo Gap near INTO WEST VIRGINIA I05 Staunton. Imboden's losses were only 16 men, besides about 200 deserters, but he recruited about 500 for his own and W. L. Jackson's regiments and brought out about $100,000 worth of captured horses, mules, wagons and arms, besides purchasing, in the country passed over, 3,100 head of fine cattle for the Commis sary Department of the Confederate Army. The expectation that a considerable part of the people of West Virginia would flock to his flag was not realized. While this double raid from the Shenandoah into West Virginia was occurring. Hooker's unsuccessful movement across the Rappahan nock above Fredericksburg and the Battle of Chancellorsville (May i, 2 and 3, 1863,) took place. In the latter battle the celebrated Gen eral (Stonewall) Jackson was mortally wound ed, his death following a week later. It had been Jackson's dream, since the be ginning of hostilities, to lead an expedition to Clarksburg, W. Va., which had been his home in early life. On the day Jack.son's final sum mons reached him (May 10) the Jones-Imbo- den raid to the vicinity of Clarksburg had be come an accomplished fact. To the comparatively small amount of dam age done by Jones's and Imboden's raid into West Virginia, Stoneman's great and destruc tive cavalry raid to the vicinity of Gordons ville and Richmond, at about the same period, and his burning of railroad bridges as well Io6 JONES's AND imboden's RAID as the commotion he caused, was more than an offset. It so disturbed General Lee that, in a letter of May 9th to Gen. Sam Jones, he says : "You see how General Stoneman has been run ning wild over the State, cutting our railroads, etc., and even going to within sight of Rich mond. * * * He must be restricted in his opera tions or we shall be ruined. * * * " Had Hooker, with his still preponderating force, immediately renewed his attack on Lee at Fredericksburg, while Stoneman, with 28 regiments of cavalry, was operating well to the rear on Lee's communications, an important re sult might have been obtained. CHAPTER VII THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND SECOND BAT TLE OP WINCHESTER On his return to the Shenandoah Valley, Gen. W. E. Jones's Brigade of Cavalry was or dered east of the Blue Ridge by General Lee, to join Gen. J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry command in the region of Culpeper Court-House. Gen, A. G. Jenkins's Brigade of Cavalry, from Gen. Sam Jones's Department of West Virginia, re placed W. E. Jones's Brigade in the Valley. In addition to Jenkins's cavalry, there were then in the upper Valley a battalion of Maryland cavalry and about a regiment of Maryland in fantry, besides Imboden's Brigade of Partisan Rangers at Monterey and local garrisons of depot troops, these latter mainly at Staunton, the supply point. The aggregate strength of the troops in the Valley District May 30, 1863, was about 8,000, and Maj.-Gen. I. R. Trimble was assigned to command them. The Federal troops, under Milroy, occupied Berryville, Winchester and Romney, with out posts toward Strasburg and Front Royal. Har per's Ferry and Maryland Heights, Martins burg, Williamsport and posts westward to Io8 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND Cumberland and New Creek were held in strength by troops belonging to Gen. B. F. Kel ley's command. As early as May 19 General Lee commenced his preparations for his second invasion of Maryland, which culminated in the Battle of Gettysburg. He had been hampered by the difficulty of finding troops to meet the threat ening Federal concentrations, not only in his own front on the Rappahannock but to meet the advance toward Richmond, south of the James from Suffolk as well as a concentration made at West Point, on York River. Burnside, in Kentucky, was already at Som erset on the Cumberland River, having Knox ville as his objective, and the powerful army of Rosecrans at Murfreesborough, in Tennes see, was preparing to attack Bragg at Tulla- homa and force its way toward Chattanooga. Then, too. General Grant had already com menced his Vicksburg campaign on the Mis sissippi, and on the South Atlantic coast troops were sorely needed to defend Charleston, Wil mington and intermediate points, so Lee could draw no reinforcements from these places. It was to divert Federal attention, as well as to draw away Federal troops from the threaten ing movements above mentioned, that General Lee's second Maryland and the Gettysburg campaign were conceived, notwithstanding that General Hooker with a vastly superior force was immediately confronting him at Freder- SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER IO9 icksburg, the relative strength of the two ar mies being as 90,000 Confederates to over 100,000 Federals. General Lee reorganized the infantry of his Army of Northern Virginia into three army corps instead of two, commanded respectively by Longstreet, Ewell and A. P. Hill. He had found that 30,000 men was too large a com mand for any corps commander to handle, es pecially when operating in broken countries. His cavalry, under J. E. B. Stuart, was also rearranged within brigades, these brigades be ing commanded as before by Wade Hampton, Fitz Hugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee, W. E. Jones; A. G. Jenkins's Brigade being on detached duty in the Valley of Virginia (the Shenandoah), and Robertson's Brigade still in North Caro lina. The artillery, which was organized by battalions and counted altogether 270 guns, was assigned by battalions to the three army corps, each battalion consisting of four batter ies, usually of four guns each. This gave each division of the three army corps a battalion of artillery, with an artillery reserve of two bat talions to each corps. During the latter part of May information came to the Federal authorities that General Lee was undoubtedly preparing for some ag gressive movement, indications being that it would consist, first, of turning General Hook ¦ er's right flank by way of the Upper Rappa hannock. These rumors were confirmed when no THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND Stuart's Cavalry, covering Ewell's and Long- street's Corps, advanced on the 7th of June from the region of Culpeper Court-House to ward the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford and above. Ewell's Corps had previously been moved, on the 4th of June, from Hamilton's Crossing, of the Rappahannock, below Fredericksburg, across country, via Verdierville and Somer- ville Ford, of the Rapidan, to Culpeper, which was reached on the 7th of June. Longstreet's Corps had been moved also to Culpeper from Fredericksburg on the 3d of June. Stuart's Cavalry had then been pushed out toward the Upper Rappahannock from the vicinity of Cul peper. Stuart was attacked by all of Hooker's Cavalry, under Gen. Alfred Pleasanton, sup ported by about 1,500 infantry, the two col umns under Pleasanton having crossed the Rappahannock, on the 9th of June, at Beverly and Kelly's Fords, and converged toward Brandy Station of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. From this reconnaissance ensued the brilliant cavalry engagement, on the 9th, known by the Confederates as the Battle of Fleetwood and by the Federal troops as that of Beverly Ford. The movement developed the fact that the Con federates were in very heavy force beyond Hooker's right flank, south of the Rappahan nock, and, from papers captured in Stuart's camp, that Stuart was to have started on a raid SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER III into Maryland that very day, June 9th, but that expedition was then deferred until later. Enough was ascertained of the enemy's movements, however, to cause Hooker at once to move the bulk of his army from in front of Fredericksburg toward his right, up the north bank of the Rappahannock, so as to be prepared to cover Washington while operating on an in terior line to that of the enemy, should the lat ter intend another invasion of Maryland by way of the upper Potomac. General Lee, who had already moved his headquarters to Culpeper, from which point he was watching the effect on Hooker's forces of the withdrawal of two of his three army corps from Fredericksburg, had determined on the 7th of June to commence that part of his projected movement which embraced the clear ing of a way through the lower Shenandoah Valley, by forcing out of Winchester and Berryville the troops then in occupation, under Milroy. Accordingly, on the 7th of June, he sent or ders to Imboden, then near Monterey with his Partisan Ranger Brigade, to move on Rom ney, by way of the South Branch of the Poto mac, through Franklin and Moorefield On the same day he sent orders to Gen. A. G. Jen kins, with his brigade of regular cavalry, to move down the Valley of the Shenandoah and "to be concentrated at Strasburg or Front Royal, or any point in front of either, by Wed- 112 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND nesday, the loth instant, with a view to co operate with a force of infantry. Your pickets can be kept in advance as far as you may deem best toward Winchester. * * * " Imboden's movement was intended mainly "to attract the enemy's attention in Hampshire County," and to detain "whatever force they may have at New Creek, Cumberland, Caca pon, etc."; but Imboden's general instructions were: "Of course, do them all the injury in your power, by striking them a damaging blow at any point where opportunity offers, and where you deem most practicable. It will be important, if you can accomplish it, to destroy some of the bridges, so as to prevent communi cation and the transfer of reinforcements to Martinsburg." Imboden, with his force of 2,500 men, was then to "cooperate with any troops that he might find operating in the Shenandoah Valley" ; he was also "to collect in the country passed through all the cattle and recruits possible." General Lee had kept Im boden's brigade of partisans independent of all other commands and had him report directly to himself (General Lee) for orders. Imboden's command was made up mainly of mountaineers recruited in the Alleghenies, thoroughly famil iar with every valley, stream or cattle track. Moreover, under the Confederate Partisan Ranger Act of April 21, 1862, they enjoyed immunity from the treatment usually accorded the ordinary guerilla, and, besides, were given SECOND BATTLE OP WINCHESTER I13 a bonus for all property (munitions of war) captured by them and turned over to the regu larly constituted Confederate agents. Their loyalty and zeal were thus doubly stimulated. The day following the cavalry engagement at Beverly Ford of the Upper Rappahannock, Ewell's Corps was set in motion from near Culpeper for the Shenandoah, moving via Gaines's Cross-Roads, Flint Hill and Front Royal, reaching Cedarville in the Valley on the I2th of June. There, on the 13th, Ewell de tached Rodes's Division, with Jenkin's Cav alry Brigade, to move on Berryville and en deavor to capture McReynolds's Brigade of Milroy's Division, about 2,000 strong, which had been in position there for several months, but McReynolds made good his retirement on Winchester where he joined Milroy's main force. Ewell sent Early's Division toward Win chester via Newtown and the Valley turnpike, while Edward Johnson's Division moved upon Winchester by the direct road from Front Royal. The three divisions were all in posi tion before Winchester on the morning of June 14. Part of the outer works on the west side of the town, near the Pughtown road, were captured by some of Early's troops late in the afternoon and the main works thereby ren dered untenable by Milroy's forces, who, dur ing the night, endeavored to retire on Martins burg. This, Ewell claims to have foreseen and 114 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND provided against, by sending Johnson's Divi sion late in the evening to place himself on the Martinsburg turnpike about two and a half miles north of Winchester, but Johnson could not reach the position assigned him until after Milroy's retreat had commenced, and when Milroy endeavored to cut through, the head of Johnson's column, near the Martinsburg pike, was ready to receive him and fired into Mil roy's right flank, eventually throwing him into confusion. General Milroy, with a small party only, succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry, al though many other small parties of fugitives reached that place the following day. By the abandonment of Winchester on the night of June 14, twenty-three pieces of ar tillery, 4,000 prisoners, 300 loaded wagons, more than 300 horses and a quantity of stores fell into the hands of the Confederates; their loss was 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3 miss ing. Anticipating some such disaster, General Halleck from Washington had on the nth of June, as soon as General Lee's threatened movement into the Shenandoah Valley became probable, ordered Gen. Robert C. Schenck at Baltimore, to withdraw General Milroy's com mand from Winchester to Harper's Ferry, but the order had not been carried out when Ewell attacked there. Although Rodes's Division of Ewell's Corps met some little resistance to his movement on Berryville, the troops of McReynolds's Fed- SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER II 5 eral Brigade succeeded in reaching Winchester by a roundabout way, safely, on the 13th. Rodes then moved on Martinsburg, sending Jenkins's cavalry through Bunker Hill. Mar tinsburg was evacuated during the evening of the 14th, the Federal infantry troops retiring unmolested toward Shepherdstown and Har per's Ferry, while the artillery, with a small in fantry support, endeavored to reach Williams port, but lost in the attempt five out of six guns and about 200 prisoners. On the 15th Rodes had crossed his three brigades at Williamsport and had sent Jenkins's Cavalry Brigade forward toward Chambersburg. On the 19th Rodes moved to Hagerstown and went into camp on the Boonsborough road, while Johnson crossed to Sharpsburg and Early moved from Win chester to Shepherdstown, to threaten Harper's Ferry, which still held out. Otherwise, the en tire Shenandoah was once more in possession of the Confederates. It was peculiarly fitting that General Lee should have entrusted to Ewell's Corps (for merly Jackson's) the recovery of that section of country, for the year previous Ewell had operated with Stonewall Jackson by way of Front Royal on Winchester, Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, and he, as well as his troops, was thoroughly familiar with the terrain. The cooperation of Imboden, by way of the valley of the South Branch of the Potomac, through Franklin, Moorefield and Romney, was Il6 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND also very fruitftfl of results and proved to be an invaluable flanking party to Ewell's more se rious column. On the i8th of June Imboden reported to General Lee from French's Depot, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, that he had destroyed all the important bridges on that railroad, with water tanks, depots and engines, between the Little Cacapon River and Cumber land. Also that he had collected and sent back a large quantity of horses and cattle. General Lee then authorized Imboden to move north on the left flank of Ewell's Corps. General Lee, on the i6th, had moved his own headquarters from Culpeper to Millwood, near Winchester, and then to Berryville, where he perfected the subsequent movements of his army into Maryland and Pennsylvania. He maintained communication with Richmond by way of the Valley to Staunton and thence via Gordonsville. Longstreet's Corps was put in motion from Culpeper toward Winchester via Front Royal on the 15th, and A. P. Hill's Corps was all withdrawn from Fredericksburg by the 17th, as soon as it was definitely ascertained that Hooker's entire army had been marched away from that front and that Richmond was no longer threatened from that direction. Hill moved across country by way of Germanna Ford of the Rapidan to Culpeper and thence followed the route of Longstreet's Corps. SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER 1 17 Stuatt's cavalry moved on the right flank of Longstreet's column, effectually screening the latter's movements, being repeatedly required to repel the enterprising efforts of Pleasanton's Federal cavalry from penetrating to the passes of the Blue Ridge at Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, which Longstreet held. Spirited cavalry fighting occurred at Aldie, Middleburg and Upperville on the 17th, 19th and 21st of June, both bodies of cavalry being engaged in mask ing the location of their respective main ar mies, in which for several days each was very successful. Stuart was eventually forced back beyond Upperville and into Ashby's Gap. On the 1 6th of June Hooker had his own headquarters at Fairfax Station, and concen trated his entire army near the old Bull Run battlefields, at Manassas, Centreville and Fair fax Court-House. It was Lee's announced in tention to attack Hooker in case he took up any faulty position after being drawn away from the line of the Rappahannock, and, with this in view, Stuart's cavalry, supported by Long- street's infantry, was specially zealous in his efforts to develop Hooker's whereabouts. At Harper's Ferry, on the 15th of June, were concentrated the remnants of Milroy's Division from Berryville and Winchester, Tyler's Bri gade from Martinsburg, and the original garri son of Harper's Ferry, in all a force of about 6,000 men, which was placed mainly upon Maryland Heights, on the north bank of the Il8 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND Potomac, a strong grandguard only occupying the town. The whole was placed under the com mand of Gen. Dan Tyler, Milroy being relieved for his delay in leaving Winchester and for the disaster to his command which thereby en sued. Milroy's conduct was soon afterwards investigated by a court of inquiry, which ac quitted Milroy of all blame, as his immediate commander. Gen. R. C. Schenck, had author ized Milroy only to prepare to evacuate but to then await further orders, which never came. With the capture of Winchester and the ap pearance of so large a portion of Lee's army north of the Potomac, at Williamsport and be yond, any doubts that may have remained of Lee's intentions were dispelled from the minds of President Lincoln and his advisers. At this time the relations between General Hook* and the General-in-Chief of the Army ( General Hal leck) had become so strained that the former never communicated with the latter if he could avoid it. In a dispatch to the President of June i6th, n a. m.. Hooker says: "You have long been aware, Mr. President, that I have not enjoyed the confidence of the Major-General commanding the army, and I assure you so long as this continues we may look in vain for success, especially as future operations will re quire our relations to be more dependent upon each other than heretofore. * * * " At lo p. M. that same night (June i6) Mr. Lincoln telegraphed General Hooker : "To re- SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER 1 19 move all misunderstanding, I now place you in the strict military relation to General Halleck of a commander of one of the armies to the General-in-Chief of all the armies. I have not intended differently, but as it seems to be dif ferently understood, I shall direct him to give you orders and you to obey them." Almost simultaneously, at 10.15 p- ^-^ Gen eral Halleck directed General Hooker to move a strong column of his army to Leesburg, "to ascertain where the enemy is and then move to the relief of Harper's Ferry, or elsewhere, as circumstances might require. With the re mainder of your force in proper position to sup port this, I want you to push your cavalry to ascertain something definite about the enemy." It has been seen that Hooker's cavalry was already in motion to endeavor to locate Lee's main army, and that it became hotly engaged with the Confederate cavalry at Aldie, on the 17th, but could not penetrate the screen suffi ciently far to develop the infantry supports of Longstreet's Corps, then holding the passes of the Blue Ridge. On that date Tyler, with about 10,000 men, was on Maryland Heights, opposite Harper's Ferry, unmolested, although threatened by Ewell's Corps and Jenkins's cav alry, which had crossed the Potomac northwest of him two days before. On the 17th, also, the Twelfth Corps of Hooker's Army, under Slo cum, was put in motion for Leesburg, the re mainder of his army being strung out on a line ISO THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND that passed through Gum Springs, Centreville, and Sangster's Station. In the absence of defi nite information of the whereabouts of Lee's main army or of the latter's intentions, it was not deemed prudent either by General Halleck or by General Hooker to move any portion of the Army of the Potomac north into Maryland, and it was only on the 25th, when Lee's un doubted movement on Harrisburg became con firmed, for all his infantry had then crossed the Potomac, that Hooker's army was also moved across the Potomac at Leesburg and Edward's Ferry in pursuit of Lee. At Pooles ville, in Maryland, on the 25th of June, Gen eral Hooker reported his strength at 105,000 men. On the 27th he requested to be relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac, owing to a new disagreement with General Halleck. His request was complied with at once and Gen. George G. Meade designated as his successor. Under the latter the Army of the Potomac was marched to Gettysburg, where Lee had concentrated his army, and where was fought what is considered the blood iest battle of the war, resulting in Lee's defeat and the retreat of his army back to the south side of the Potomac at Falling Waters, which was safely accomplished on the 14th of July. On leaving Winchester to move into Mary land, on the 1 8th of June, Early left the Thir teenth Virginia Infantry to garrison the town, having previously sent the Fifty-fourth North SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER 121 Carolina and the Fifty-eighth Virginia back to Staunton to escort the prisoners, about 3,000 in number, taken from Milroy and Tyler. On the 1 6th of July, after his return from Pennsylvania, Lee's army was encamped around Bunker Hill, Va., between Winchester and Harper's Ferry. He reported to President Davis he did not need any more troops, and recommended that such as had been collected be kept in front of Richmond as a protection to that city. Lee also wrote : "I learn the enemy has thrown a pontoon bridge over the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. Should he follow us in this direction, I shall lead him up the Val ley, and endeavor to attack him as far from his base as possible." From Culpeper, on the 24th of July, Gen eral Lee reported that his intention had been to move his army into Loudoun County, but the high water in the Shenandoah River had first prevented that movement and then the enemy had occupied in such strong force the passes of the Blue Ridge that they could not easily be forced, and, besides, he threatened a movement on Richmond. This determined Lee to move up the Valley and cross the Blue Ridge at Chester's and Thornton's Gaps. While threatened by Meade's main army on one flank from the Blue Ridge, Lee had also been more or less annoyed by the Federal forces sent after him by way of Harper's Ferry, and by a column which Gen. B. F. Kelley had hasti- 122 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND ly gathered in West Virginia, and had moved via Hancock, where he crossed the Potomac, on Lee's other flank. At Hedgesville, on the 19th of July, Kelley had a brisk engagement with some of the enemy's forces holding Mar tinsburg ; he reoccupied Martinsburg with Av- erell's Brigade on the 25th and Winchester on the 26th. Gen. John D. Imboden, on the 21st of July, had been assigned to command the Valley Dis trict by Lee, in recognition of his valuable serv ices during the Gettysburg campaign and be cause of his great familiarity with the country. His troops consisted of his own partisan bri- grade of infantry, cavalry and artillery, known as the Northwestern Brigade and numbering about 2,500 men. His headquarters were in the upper Valley. General Lee's instructions to Imboden were to be vigilant and to seize every opportunity to strike the enemy a blow, "and annoy him all in your power." On the 26th of July Imboden was near Woodstock with his command, when he was urged by Gen eral Lee to make "a rapid movement upon Pied mont or some point higher up the railroad." Imboden undertook the above-mentioned raid in September, of which mention will be made later on. Averell had moved his brigade away from Winchester altogether, on the 5th of August, to Moorefield via Wardensville, and to the Upper Valley of the South Branch of the Po- SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER I23 tomac, on an expedition toward Lewisburg which finally reached the vicinity of White Sul phur Springs, in Greenbrier County, where, at Rocky Gap, on the 26th of August, Averell met a force under Gen. Echols, of Gen. Sam Jones's command, too strong for him to drive out, and which forced him to retire through Huntersville to Beverly, where he arrived and took station on the 31st of August. He was again within the limits of the territory assigned him to command. Winchester was not then reoccupied in force by Federal troops, being only visited occasion ally by patrols sent out from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg. At Harper's Ferry there was a force of 5,500 men under Gen. Henry H. Lockwood. A brigade under McReynolds was stationed at Martinsburg, and a brigade under Col. J. A. Mulligan was sent from New Creek to occupy Moorefield and Petersburg, in the South Potomac Valley, after Averell had passed south, as an outpost from New Creek on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. A small force was also posted by General Kelley at Romney, 27 miles down the South Branch of the Potomac from Moorefield. The Department of West Virginia, com manded by Gen. B. F. Kelley, had been extend ed on the 9th of August so as to include all the State of Maryland west of the Monocacy River, and that portion of Virginia in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. By the tri-monthly return of 124 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND August 10, 1863, the troops therein numbered 18,114 present for duty, soon afterwards in creased to nearly 30,000. These were dis tributed as follows : Maryland Heights Divi sion, 5,000; Martinsburg, 3,000; Sir John's Run and Romney, 1,000; New Creek (Key ser), 3,000; Petersburg, 3,000; Grafton and Parkersburg, 3,000; Kanawha, 6,000; Beverly, 4,000, and several small scattered commands. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was thus securely guarded throughout its entire length, and direct communication maintained with the West. This was a period of great depression in the North as well as at the South. Following Lee's defeat at Gettysburg, in July, and his es cape back to his old position, near Culpeper, came the draft riots in New York and the nec essary detachment of a large force from Meade's army to quell them. For the time be ing all eyes were then turned toward East Ten nessee, where Burnside had succeeded in reach ing and establishing himself at Knoxville, while Rosecrans, moving on Burnside's flank farther west, had crossed the Tennessee River, and was seeking to gain possession of Chat tanooga. To arrest the progress of Rosecrans, Lee detached from his army Longstreet's en tire Army Corps, and hurried it by rail through North Carolina and Atlanta to reinforce Bragg's army in Northern Georgia. SECOND BATTLE OP WINCHESTER I25 All the Confederate armies had become greatly weakened by the enormous losses inci dent to the campaigns and battles of the pre ceding two years, to which should be added the appalling number of desertions of those whom the terrible experiences of the war had disheart ened. It had already become almost entirely impossible to procure recruits, even by the ex traordinary methods of conscription, the age limit even being extended so as to take in boys of eighteen and men of forty-five. In the hope that many of those hiding in de sertion might be induced to return to the ranks, President Davis, in August, proclaimed am nesty to such as would rejoin within twenty days, the women of the Confederacy being con jured to use their all-powerful influence to aid the measure. Meanwhile, patrols were actively searching every possible hiding place of those recreant, but generally meeting armed resist ance. General Lee himself, in a letter to President Davis from Orange Court-House, August 8, gives the following despondent view of the situation : "We must expect reverses, even de feats. They are sent to teach us wisdom and prudence. * * * I know how prone we are to censure and how ready to blame others for the non-fulfillment of our expectations. This is un becoming in a generous people, and I grieve to see its expression. The general remedy for the want of success in a military commander is his removal. This is natural, and, in many in- 126 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN Stances, proper. * * * I have been prompted by these reflections more than once since my re turn from Pennsylvania to propose to Your Excellency the propriety of selecting another commander for this army. I have seen and heard expression of discontent in the public journals as the result of the expedition. I do not know how far this feeling extends to the army. * * * I, therefore, in all sincerity, request Your Excellency to take measures to supply my place. * * * j hope Your Excellency will attribute my request to the true reason, the de sire to serve my country, and to do all in my power to insure the success of her righteous cause. * * * " This request of General Lee, however, was never granted. At the North, also, great dissatisfaction had been expressed in the newspapers at General Meade's failure to attack and destroy Lee's army when he found it still north of the Poto mac, ten days after the Battle of Gettysburg, and trying to cross that swollen river in the vicinity of Williamsport. The explanation made by General Meade, why Lee was not at tacked in his perilous position, apparently sat isfied the Washington authorities, for Meade was continued in command of the Army of the Potomac until the close of the war. When General Grant was brought from the Middle West, in March, 1864, and placed in command of all the armies in the field, he selected the Army of the Potomac to supervise in particular. CHAPTER VIII THE AVERELL RAIDS OP 1 863 With a view to carrying out General Lee's instructions "to seize every opportunity to strike the enemy a blow and annoy him all in your power," Imboden, on the 13th of Septem ber, 1863, from near Brock's Gap in the upper Valley, reported several minor engagements of his Rangers in the Valley District, which in cluded a foray through Winchester to Bath (Berkeley Springs) on the 6th, killing, wound ing and capturing part of Wynkoop's Pennsyl vania Cavalry at the latter place. Also an af fair between four companies of Imboden's cav alry and a small force of Federal infantry and cavalry, on the nth, near Moorefield, killing and capturing, with small loss, about 150 of the latter by surprise. Imboden stated: "I am so well convinced of the utility of this mode of warfare on the border, that day after to-mor row I start out two parties, one of 100 men under Major Lang, Sixty-second Virginia Reg iment, to penetrate the enemy's country north of Beverly on foot, and harass the enemy two 128 THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 or three weeks in Barbour and Randolph; the other, a single company, under Captain Nelson, to go to the North Fork, in Pendleton, and try to clear out Snyder's gang of Union robbers and murderers, known as 'Swamp Dragoons.' All remains quiet in the lower Valley. Only a small force of the enemy at Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, and they stick to the railroad very closely. * * *" The most serious of these small affairs was the capture of 356 officers and men, mostly of the Ninth Maryland Infantry (Colonel Simp son), at Charlestown, ten miles southwest of Harper's Ferry, on the i8th of October, by a force of about 1,500 men belonging to Imbo den's, Gilmor's and White's commands, with artillery. This Confederate party was in turn attacked by a force, sent out from Harper's Ferry by Gen. Jer. C. Sullivan, who had suc ceeded to that command when General Lock- wood was relieved. Imboden was driven through Charlestown to near Berryville, the Federals capturing twenty-one prisoners and killing or wounding about as many more. This movement by Imboden was in pursu ance of orders sent him by General Lee on the 9th of October, when Lee commenced his flank ing march around Meade's army at Culpeper, and which forced the latter to retire north of Bull Run. Lee in his report, dated October 23, says : "General Imboden was instructed to ad vance down the Valley and guard the gaps on our left." THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 1 29 Imboden fell back from Berryville, first, to Front Royal, and then to the upper Valley by way of Powell's Fort Valley, to meet an ex pected expedition under Averell, which was re ported to be forming near Huttonsville, in Ty- gart's River Valley, west of the main Alleghen ies, and threatening to move either upon Staun ton or Lewisburg. This movement was started by Averell, by orders from Gen. B. F. Kelley, on the ist of November, and proceeded over Cheat Moun tain into the Valley of the Greenbrier, via Camp Bartow, to Huntersville, which it reached on the 4th. It consisted of Averell's entire bri gade, except about 400 men, left to hold Bev erly; about half of it was mounted infantry. Averell attacked the Confederates under Gen. John Echols on Droop Mountain, twenty miles north of Lewisburg, on the 6th, completely de feating him and driving him out in the direc tion of Lewisburg, where Averell followed him through the town on the 7th, Echols's men retreating toward Union and the narrows of New River, blockading the roads behind them. On reaching Lewisburg, Averell found Duf- fie's Federal cavalry brigade, which had just arrived from Meadow Bluff and the Kanawha to the westward, but not in time to intercept the Confederate fugitives from Droop Mountain. Averell's instructions from Kelley contempla ted a further movement from Lewisburg toward the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at Dub- 130 THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 lin, to destroy an important bridge at that point, but discretion was left to Averell as to that further movement after he should have reached Lewisburg and been joined there by Duffie. On the 8th, Averell, with Duffie, again push ed forward toward Dublin via Union, but after going a few miles he found the road so formi dably blockaded that it was necessary to cut out a passage. Here General Duffie reported his men as being unfit for further operations, hav ing only one day's rations left and so exhausted as to be able to march only ten miles per day. This decided Averell to abandon further pur suit of Echols and to send Duffie back to Mea dow Bluff, while he (Averell) should send his dismounted troops (two regiments) and one battery back to Beverly, escorting the prison ers, captured property, etc. With his mounted troops, Averell then proceeded to carry out the remainder of Kelley's instructions, which were to "move by any route you may think best, into the Valley of the South Branch (of the Poto mac), and down that to New Creek, where supplies will be in readiness for you." Accordingly, with his mounted troops ( four regiments) and Ewing's Battery, Averell marched through White Sulphur Springs and the August battle-ground of Dry Creek (Rocky Gap), picking up his wounded who had been cared for by the Confederates since August, and reached Callaghan's, on the road THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 1 31 to Covington, early on the 9th of November. He was then on the east side of the main Alle gheny Mountains. Learning that Imboden, with a small force of about 1,500 men, was at Covington, he sent a small mounted party to brush him away from his line of march, cap turing a few prisoners. From Callaghan's the march northward was continued by Gatewood's into the Valley of Back Creek (a branch of Jackson's River), thence up that stream and through Hightown and Monterey to Franklin, in the South Branch Valley, and to Petersburg, which latter place was reached on the 13th and supplies found for the command. On the 17th Averell arrived at New Creek (Keyser), bringing with him about 150 captured horses, several hundred head of cattle and 27 prisoners, taken in addi tion to those already sent to Beverly. Averell's losses at Droop Mountain aggregated 119 kill ed, wounded and missing ; those of the enemy, as stated by General Echols, were 275. The part taken by Imboden in the foregoing operations was important only as one of ob servation. He was at Goshen, on the railroad, a few miles west of Staunton, on the 6th of November, with most of his command, and at Covington on the 8th; from there he returned to Goshen via Clifton Forge on the loth and to Buffalo Gap, near Staunton, on the nth, which place he feared might receive a visit from Averell by way of Monterey. That not 132 THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 coming off, Imboden moved his command far ther down the Valley to near Mount Jackson, sending occasional scouting parties toward Berryville, Strasburg, and Moorefield. Having rested and refitted his brigade at New Creek (Keyser) since his arrival there, on the 17th of November, General Averell started out again on another expedition into the enemy's country on the 8th of December. His general instructions from Gen. B. F. Kelley, commanding the Department of West Vir ginia, were to proceed via Petersburg, Frank lin and Monterey, by the most practicable route to the line of the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at Bonsack's Station, in Botetourt County, or Salem, in Roanoke County, or, by dividing his command, move on both points at the same time. The object was to destroy or cripple that railroad. At Petersburg, Averell was to pick up two regiments of infantry and a battery belonging to Thoburn's Brigade, carry ing them with him as far as Monterey, at the head of the South Branch Valley, where he was to leave them to guard his train and await his return. Having accomplished the object of his expedition, Averell was to return to the Bal timore and Ohio Railroad, at any point he might deem best, between Harper's Ferry and New Creek. After receiving these orders, Averell secured from General Kelley several modifications of them, which proved of great value as coopera- THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 1 33 tions or diversions. One was that, simultane ously with his own movement, Scammon should move his forces in the Kanawha region eastward to Lewisburg, as a protection against any forces of the enemy coming in from the north, and then to operate to the southward, on Union or beyond. The date fixed for Scam mon to be at Lewisburg was December 12th, and he was to remain in that vicinity until the 1 8th. Moor's Brigade was to move forward from Beverly toward Droop Mountain, reaching that vicinity also on the 12th, and to remain until the 1 8th, when he was to withdraw, bringing off the wounded left behind near there after the battle of the 6th November. Sullivan's Division, at Harper's Ferry, was to move up to Woodstock, in the Valley, so as to get there by the 12th of December, and re main near there until the i8th, when he was to move still farther toward Staunton and threat en that place, in cooperation with Thoburn's forces from the direction of Monterey. It will thus be seen that all of General Kel ley's troops were intended to be in motion to ward a common center simultaneously, except those guarding the railroad at and west of Grafton. Averell's own brigade was essentially a fly ing column, being composed of the Second, Third and Eighth West Virginia Mounted In fantry, Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Gib- 134 THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 son's Battalion of Cavalry and Ewing's Light Battery. He and Thoburn reached Monterey on the 1 2th, where Thoburn, with all the wagons except about forty, was sent to Mc Dowell, on the Parkersburg road to Staunton, while Averell with his flying column and the forty wagons proceeded down Back Creek, a fork of Jackson's River, where, at Gatewood's, on the 13th, he came upon the rear-guard of W. L. Jackson's regiment (the Nineteenth Vir ginia) retreating from the Greenbrier coun try, west of the mountains, whence they had been driven out by Moor's Brigade from Bev erly, as intended they should be. Pushing on to Callaghan's, which he reach ed on the 14th, Averell got information that Scammon had carried out his part of the gen eral movement and was at Lewisburg, whence he had driven the Confederates, under Echols, and who were then retreating on Union and the Narrows of New River. Early on the 15th of December Averell made a demonstration toward Covington as a feint to cover his main movement toward Salem, on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, by way of Sweet Sulphur Springs and New Castle. Salem was reached early on the i6th, just in time to partially tear up- the railroad near the depot before a train loaded with troops ap proached from the direction of Lynchburg, which, by a few well-directed artillery shots, was forced to run back again. Parties were THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 135 then sent out by Averell several miles to the eastward and westward to more thoroughly de stroy the railroad, while everything that could be of value to the enemy in the vicinity of Sa lem was destroyed during the next six hours, when the command withdrew about seven miles on the New Castle road, by which it had come, and went into camp after a march of about 80 miles in 30 hours. A heavy rain then came up which made the return to New Castle very dangerous as well as difficult in the swollen creek bottoms, so that it was sundown of the 1 8th when New Castle was reached, and, as Averell says, with ammunition wet and the command "drenched, muddy and hungry * * * in miserable condition to make the march be fore us." At New Castle, Averell learned that Fitz- hugh Lee, with his own and Imboden's troops, besides some cadets and militia from Lexing ton, Va., was near Fincastle, a few miles east of New Castle, and that Sam. Jones, with troops from Union, was on the Sweet Springs road, north and west of him. With his ammu nition virtually destroyed by the recent storms, Averell realized the necessity of avoiding a bat tle with either of the enemy's converging columns, so he determined to retreat to Coving ton in a northeasterly direction, which he suc ceeded in doing, although with some slight op position from a mounted force of Confederates when still eight miles from Jackson's River. 136 THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 A captured dispatch of the 19th from Gen, Sam. Jones to General Early, the latter being then at Millborough on the railroad between Covington and Staunton, informed Averell of the large force that had been sent by General Lee to intercept him, in addition to W. L. Jack son's command at Clifton Forge and Fitzhugh Lee's forces, above mentioned. Averell succeeded in getting all his com mand, except one regiment and his small wagon train, across Jackson's River and through Cov ington during the night of the 19th, although sharply attacked by Jackson's troops in their efforts to destroy the bridges and thus cut him off. This isolated regiment (the Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry) forded the river the following day, losing, however, over 120 pris oners and several men drowned, besides all the wagons and ambulances, but rejoined Averell at Callaghan's. By following the very blind and seldom-used Cold Knob road, Averell then took his com mand over the main Allegheny Mountains and across the Greenbrier Valley to the northern slope of Droop Mountain, where he encamped on the night of the 21st, successfully avoiding contact with the advanced parties of Ewell's column, then reported to be at Gatewood's, only twenty miles to the eastward. At Droop Moun tain, Averell expected to hear of Colonel Moor's command, which he had ordered to re main there until the i8th before withdrawing. THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 137 but who had retired on the 14th by General Kelley's order. So Averell pushed on for Ed- ray and Beverly with his very tired command of 2,500 men, over execrable roads, but unmo lested by any enemy except a slight rear-guard action near Edray on the 22d. He reached Beverly safely on the 24th of December, having marched over 400 miles. The country passed through by Averell is the most broken and mountainous of any in the Eastern United States, and the difficulty of campaigning in it can only be appreciated by a visit. The valleys run nearly north and south, en closed on the east and west by superb mountain ranges, most entrancing in summer but very forbidding in winter. The large streams be come torrents in the rainy season, when wag oning is both difficult and hazardous. The bottom lands are very fertile and furnish large crops, while cattle, sheep and horses are abun dant. As above mentioned, Scammon with the Ka nawha troops left Lewisburg sooner than Av erell expected, and while he was still far within the enemy's country at Salem with his flying column, beyond all possible support. This left the enemy free to act from the direction of Union. Colonel Moor, who was to remain near Droop Mountain and Frankford until the i8th of December, was withdrawn several days be fore that date. Thoburn, with 700 men, who 138 THE AVERELL RAIDS OP 1 863 had been detached at Monterey on the 12th and sent toward McDowell and Staunton on the Parkersburg pike to attract the enemy's atten tion from Averell's main movement, after ac complishing that mission returned to his sta tion at Petersburg. The force sent directly up the Shenandoah Valley from Sullivan's com mand at Harper's Ferry went as far as Harri sonburg, threatening Staunton, 25 miles far ther to the southward, and for a few days held the attention of Imboden's forces, as well as Early's and Fitzhugh Lee's, from Averell's movements on Salem. The enemy attempted to cut off this detachment by sending Colonel Rosser from Lee's army with a brigade of cav alry to fall upon its rear by way of Front Royal, but could not cross the Shenandoah River by reason of high water. Sullivan's detachment returned to Charlestown and Harper's Ferry on the 24th of December, the same day that Averell reached Beverly. Early, with his two brigades of infantry and Lee's two brigades of cavalry, having given up all hope of intercept ing Averell's retreat, followed Sullivan's troops down the Valley through Harrisonburg to New Market, at which latter place, on the 24th of December, Early reported to General Lee the failure of all the Confederate columns, about 15,000 men in all, to head off or get contact with Averell. On this report Gen. R. E. Lee endorsed : "High water and erroneous re ports, with untoward events, prevented the sue- THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 139 cess of the* arrangements that I had hoped would have resulted in Averell's capture." After a short rest at Beverly, Averell march ed his brigade to Webster via Philippi, where he put it on the cars and moved to Martins burg, which place he reached on the 31st of December, 1863, just in time to prepare for the enemy under Imboden, Fitzhugh Lee and Ros ser, who were demonstrating from the direc tion of Winchester to cover a movement the last two named were making on Moorefield and Petersburg by way of Wardensville, which was eventually extended to the vicinity of New Creek and the\ railroad'j but this movement failed of success on account of the high streams and the bitterly cold weather, so that Lee returned to Harrisonburg via Romney, Lost River and Brock's Gap. The only success Lee had was the capture of a small wagon train of artillery ammunition, about 100 prisoners and as many cattle. He reported there were very few supplies to be found in the region passed over, as it had long been occupied by an enemy. With the appearance of Early's forces in the lower Valley, a brigade of infantry was sent from General Meade's army to strengthen the troops holding points between Harper's Ferry and Cumberland. A new epoch may then be stated to have taken place in the Valley, commencing with Gen. Jubal A. Early's being placed in command there at the beginning of Averell's third raid 140 THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1863 and dating from December 15, 1863, when, by S. O. 308, Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, General Lee directed Early to "pro ceed to Staunton, Va., and assume command of all the troops there and in the Valley of Vir ginia, and make the best disposition of the same to resist the advance of the enemy." This order, of course, was primarily to protect Staunton, with its extensive military depots, from the raiders under Averell or his cooper- ators. When that raid ended and the Upper Shenandoah" region had been cleared of Fed eral troops. General Lee, under date of Decem ber 22, 1863, wrote General Early, then at New Market, as follows : "I wish you to avail yourself of the present opportunity to collect and bring away every thing that can be made useful to the army from those regions that are open to the enemy. * * * I hear that in the lower Valley, and par ticularly in, the country on the South Branch of the Potomac, there are a good many cattle, sheep, horses and hogs, * * * and all these sup plies are accessible to and can be used by the enemy. I desire to secure all of them that it is in our power to get, and you will use your command for the purpose of keeping back the enemy while the work is being done. * * * Where you cannot buy, you must impress. * * * Of course, you will not take what is necessary for the subsistence of the people, but leave THE AVERELL RAIDS OP 1863 141 enough for that. * * * While so engaged, I wish you to subsist the troops on those supplies that are most difficult of transportation, such as bacon, potatoes, and other vegetables, * * * sending back those that are easy to transport, such as cattle, particularly sheep and hogs. * * * "P. S. — You will give out that your move ment is intended as a military one against the enemy, and, of course, will do them all the harm you can. You will use all the troops, including those of Imboden and Gilmor, that you may require." At this time all the Confederate armies were in sore straits for subsistence. So much so that, most reluctantly, resort was had to impress ment where purchases were impossible, mainly by reason of prohibitive prices. This impress ment was made under the provisions of the Act of March 26, 1863, and its subsequent amend ments. Early's force in the Valley consisted of two brigades of infantry (H. H. Walker's and Thomas's) from his old division in Ewell's Corps; Imboden's Brigade of Partisans; Gil mor's and White's Battalions (also partisans) ; W. L. Jackson's Brigade of Infantry ; some ar tillery and Rosser's Brigade of Cavalry. The remainder of Fitzhugh Lee's Cavalry Division was withdrawn to Charlottesville during the latter part of January, 1864. Throughout the winter and spring of 1864 Early kept his troops active in the lower Valley, 142 THE AVERELL RAIDS OP 1 863 foraging mainly, but occasionally making dashes into Winchester, the lower valley of the South Branch of the Potomac, and even as far as the vicinity of New Creek or toward Cum berland, sometimes breaking the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad but never very seriously. These forays compelled the strengthening of the Fed eral garrisons along the line of the railway, es pecially at Harper's Ferry, Martinsburg and New Creek. The garrison at Petersburg was withdrawn to New Creek January 31st, for the reason that its exposed position and distance from New Creek rendered it very difficult to maintain, especially in stormy weather, over the mountain roads. On the 29th of January, 1864, two brigades of Confederates under Early and Rosser, which had come over from the Shenandoah, captured an important wagon train near Medley, on the road from New Creek to Petersburg, dispersing the wagon guard and driving it back to New Creek. The following day the troops at Petersburg having discovered the presence of so strong a force of Confeder ates approaching from Moorefield, and being nearly out of provisions, fell back to New Creek by way of Greenland Gap, followed by the enemy, who, however, did not attack there, but turned off toward Burlington and Patterson's Creek to the railroad, where Rosser destroyed two bridges within eight miles of Cumberland, after capturing the guards, and then made good his escape by way of Sheet's Mill and Romney, THE AVERELL RAIDS OP 1 863 1 43 up the South Branch of the Potomac, rejoin ing Early at Moorefield and eluding a force of Federal cavalry sent from Martinsburg to Wardensville and Romney to intercept the raid ers. All the force from New Creek that could be spared moved out toward Moorefield via Pur- gittsville, where a junction was made with the mounted troops from Martinsburg, but too late to recover either the captured wagons or the prisoners, who, covered by their escort of in fantry, cavalry and artillery, effected their es cape up the South Fork Valley and thence over to Lost River and the Shenandoah via Brock's Gap. This was the last raid made by the Con federates in that direction until later in the year. Early claims they brought out, besides the 50 wagons and their teams, 1,200 cattle, 500 sheep and 78 prisoners. Few of those who campaigned during the Civil War through these beautiful valleys, whether they wore the gray or the blue, were aware they were on historic ground, where Washington in his youth, first as a surveyor and then as a soldier, had already penetrated. The beetling crags that frown upon the radiant valley of the South Branch of the Potomac had seen George Washington first come into those undisturbed fastnesses a young lad of sixteen, with transit and surveyor's chain, to define for Lord Fairfax the western limits of his vast land grant. Those same mountains saw Washington come there again in 1753, at the age of twenty- 144 THE AVERELL RAIDS OP 1 863 one, a major and adjutant-general of the Vir ginia militia,, but sent by Governor Dinwiddle to warn off the French troops sent from Can ada to establish themselves in the Ohio River Valley. Washington's errand took him through Winchester, then already a flourishing frontier town, to Will's Creek (now the City of Cum berland), where, with a few companions, he plunged farther into the wilderness northward toward Lake Erie, until he came to the fort, within fifteen miles of the lake, where was found the commanding officer of the French expedition, M. de St. Pierre, and to whom Washington delivered the Governor's notice, which De St. Pierre forwarded to the Governor of Canada, the Marquis Duquesne. No attention being paid to Governor Din widdle's warning, and the intended encroach ments of the French into what was claimed by the colonies as British crown lands, having be come well defined, the colonies, under the lead of Virginia, prepared to dispute with the French and their savage Indian allies the pos session of the Valley of the Ohio. Washing ton, as lieutenant-colonel, commanded a small force of four companies at Will's Creek, after wards called Fort Cumberland, then the most exposed and advanced post on the frontier, confronted by a much stronger party of French, who had established themselves on the Ohio River, where Pittsburg stands now, but which was then called Fort Duquesne and afterwards Fort Pitt. This was in 1754. THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 1 45 At the age of twenty- three we find Wash ington again at Winchester as a volunteer aide- de-camp to General Braddock, who had been sent out from England with two regiments of regular troops to operate from Fort Cumber land against the French and Indians in the Ohio country. The disastrous march to Fort Duquesne soon followed and Braddock's defeat was the result. Braddock himself was mor tally wounded and died four days after, his troops became panic-stricken and precipitately retreated to Fort Cumberland. Virginia then provided a new army of six teen companies and gave the command to Washington, who fixed his h'eadquarters at Winchester, with advanced parties along the frontier from Fort Cumberland south to Fort Dinwiddle, on Jackson's River. This line must have extended up the South Branch Valley to its head, where Monterey now stands, and then down Jackson's River to Covington. Sparks, in his "Life of Washington," says "he per formed a tour of inspection among the moun tains, visiting all the outposts along the fron tier." So all the country raided through by Averell in 1863 and defended by Sam. Jones, Imboden, W. L. Jackson, Echols, and others was more than a hundred years before pa trolled by Washington and his hardy troopers. A large fort was built by Washington at Win chester in 1756 which was called Fort Lou doun in honor of thte Earl of Loudoun, who 10 146 THE AVERELL RAIDS OT 1863 had come out from England to command all the troops in the American colonies. Fort Duquesne was abandoned by the French in November, 1758, and destroyed, the garri son escaping down the Ohio River in boats ; a small force of two hundred Virginians was left there and the name changed to Fort Pitt. The remainder of the Virginia troops returned to Winchester. Washington resigned his com mission in the Virginia militia the last week in December, 1758, when he was only twenty-six years of age, and settled down again at Mount Vernon until h'e was called to command the Continental Army, June 15, 1775. CHAPTER IX THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET AND LYNCH BURG CAMPAIGNS On the 29th of February, 1864, a special or der, by direction of the President, was issued assigning Maj.-Gen. Franz Sigel to the com mand of the Department of West Virginia, and that officer assumed command on the loth of March, thus superseding Maj.-Gen. B. F. Kelley. The headquarters of the Department were located at Cumberland, Md. On the loth of March, also, Lieut.-Gen. U. S. Grant was assign'ed by the President to the command of the armies of the United States, pursuant to an Act of Congress, approved Feb ruary 29, 1864, by which Grant was made a Lieutenant-General. Major-General Halleck, at his own request, was relieved from duty as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, but was re tained as Chief of Staff. General Meade was also retained in command of the Army of the Potomac, although General Grant, during the remainder of the war, made his headquarters with and personally directed the movements of that army. 148 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET From his headquarters at Cumberland, Gen eral Sigel at once proceeded to reorganize and partially redistribute his troops, preparatory to taking the field. He placed all his mounted troops belonging to the First and Fourth Divi sions under General Averell, commanding the Fourth Division, which then becam'e known as the Cavalry Division, at Martinsburg, and took away Averell's infantry, which he gave to Sul livan's Division at Harper's Ferry. He re tained Mulligan's Division unchanged, at New Creek, and Moor's two regiments at Beverly. About this period Early's Division of infan try and Rosser's Brigade of cavalry were with drawn from the Valley and rejoined Lee at Gordonsville, leaving Imboden, together with Mosby's, White's and Gilmor's battalions (all rangers) to operate in the Shenandoah region. General Grant, on assuming command of all the armies, proceeded first to reorganize and consolidate the Army of the Potomac into three army corps (the Second, Fifth and Sixth, commanded respectively by Generals Hancock, Warren and Sedgwick), and made preparations for an early advance on Richmond from the line of the Rapidan. Among other collateral movements contemplated was an ex pedition from Beverly, W. Va., and one from the Kanawha, to break the Virginia and Ten nessee Railroad in Southwestern Virginia. Of the first named he gave the command to Gen. E. O. C. Ord and the latter to Gen. George And LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS l4$ Crook. Although the troops composing both expeditions were to be taken from General Sigel's Department of West Virginia, both Ord and Crook received their instructions direct from General Grant. On the 29th of March Sigel reported the strength and location of the troops of the De partment of West Virginia, as follows : Infantry, 15,680; cavalry, 5,441; artillery, 2,276 — divided into three infantry divisions and one of cavalry. The Cavalry Division, under Averell, in front of Martinsburg, with a line of outposts from the Shenandoah River to Back Creek, sending out patrols for thirty miles south, southwest, and west. The First Infantry Division (Sullivan's), occupying Harper's Ferry, Martinsburg, Fred erick and the line of the railroad from Monoc acy River to Sleepy Creek. The Second Infantry Division (Mulligan's), scattered along the railroad from Sleepy Creek (near Hancock) to Parkersburg, with ad vanced posts at Philippi, Buckhannon, Bull- town, Glenville and Wirt Court-House. There were two regiments of infantry holding Bev erly, under Colonel Moor, temporarily attach ed to Averell's Cavalry Division, but New Creek was the most important point on this line. The remainder of Sigel's troops constituted a Third Division, under Crook, who occupied 150 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET the Kanawha and Gauley River region, with an outpost at Fayette Court-House. Only a few of the above-mentioned positions were for tified with guns mounted. On the same day that Sigel made the report of the location of the troops of his depart ment. General Grant directed him to concen trate at Beverly and Charleston the troops to make up the two expeditions under Ord and Crook, those at Beverly to number not less than 8,000 infantry, three batteries and 1,500 cavalry. Crook, from Charleston on the Ka nawha, was to move at the same time as Ord, throwing his infantry as far south as the passes in the mountains held by the Confederates, to prevent them coming north, and, with his cav alry. Crook was to force his way through to the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, then move eastward to join Ord. The Confederate commander of the region to be passed over by these expeditions was Maj.-Gen. John C. Breckinridge, who, by an order dated Richmond, February 25, 1864, had relieved Gen. Sam. Jones of what was known as the Trans-Allegheny, or Western Depart ment of Virginia. It contained an aggregate of 7,000 troops present, organized into two brigades of infantry (Echols's and McCaus- land's) and W. L. Jackson's Brigade of cav alry, with seven batteries. Echols was station ed between Union and Lewisburg, and Mc- Causland at the Narrows of New River. Their AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS I5I main base was at Dublin Depot, on the Vir ginia and Tennessee Railroad. Jackson's cav alry was in the vicinity of Warm Springs, Bath County, watching the approaches by way of the valleys of the South Branch of the Potomac and the Greenbrier. By the middle of March all these troops were on the alert for any Federal raids, al ready reported by Confederate scouts as being in preparation ; the passes through that difficult mountain region were not blockaded by fallen timber, were fortified, and arrangements made to organize and call out the "minute men" of the entire region bordering upon the eastern slope of the Allegheny Mountains, as far south as the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. These "minute men" were first provided for by an Act of the Confederate Congress ap proved April 16, 1862, known as the Public Defense Act, by which all men of the ages be tween eighteen and thirty-five were called to arms for three years, but where an excess of such men existed in any State over the number required to fill to a maximum the regiments al ready organized from that State, the surplus were to be held as reserves for any future calls from that State. By an Act, approved Febru ary 17, 1864, the age limit was made to include all white men between the ages of seventeen and fifty, those only being called to the ranks who were between eighteen and forty-five, and all others held as reserves or for local defense, or, as General Lee called them, "minute men." 152 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET In a letter to Gen. Braxton Bragg, who, on the 24th of February, 1864, was assigned to direct all the armies of the Confederate States, General Lee says (April 7) : "I think it ap parent that the enemy is making large prepara tions for the approaching campaign in Vir ginia. * * * I think every preparation should be made to meet the approaching storm, which will apparently burst on Virginia, and unless its force can be diverted by an attack in the West, that troops should be collected to oppose it. * * * With our present supplies on hand, the interruption of the trains on the Southern roads would cause the abandonment of Vir ginia. * * * " Longstreet's Corps, which, after its bitter ex perience at Chickamauga and at Knoxville, had wintered at Morristown and Newmarket, in upper East Tennessee, was ordered on the 7th of April to rejoin Lee via Lynchburg. Ran som's Division was left in East Tennessee. The Federal prisoners and all paroled Con federates were removed from Richmond, as well as much of the useless population, so as to diminish the number of mouths to feed and en able the accumulation of subsistence there for the combatants. The preparations for an advance of all the Federal armies simultaneously were perfected by General Grant during the month of April, to take place early in May, and included a force of about 25,000 men, under Gen. B. F. Butler, AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 153 from the direction of Norfolk and Fortress Monroe, who was to move on Richmond along the south side of the James River and establish a base on that river at City Point. This was accomplished on the 5th of May. We have already seen the arrangement for the two expeditions, from Beverly and the Ka nawha, to cut the Virginia and Tennessee Rail road in Southwestern Virginia, where the two commands were to join and then move north ward toward the Army of the Potomac by way of Lynchburg. General Grant himself, with the Army of the Potomac, greatly strengthened by the return of convalescents and furloughed men as well as by new troops, was to move directly upon Gen eral Lee's army and force it to accept battle or to retire upon Richmond. To secure against any strengthening of Lee's army from other Confederate armies, especially from the direction of Georgia, General Sher man, with a powerful force of over 100,000 men, made up from troops from East Tennes see and Mississippi, with Thomas's splendid army at Chattanooga as a nucleus, was to move upon Gen. Joe Johnston's army at Dalton simultaneously with Grant's and Butler's move ments upon Richmond, and "to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can." Still another factor in Grant's general scheme was a movement on Mobile by Banks's army 154 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET from the direction of New Orleans, but this part of the plan had to be abandoned because of the delay in getting Banks's army back from his Red River expedition into Texas, which had proved such a dismal failure. The gen eral project thus consisted originally of a grand left wheel simultaneously by all the armies in the field east of the Mississippi River, with the Army of the Potomac as a pivot, or, as General Grant in his letters to Sherman stated it, "to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat toward a common center." All of the foregoing movements were to be made simultaneously on a telegraphic signal from Grant. During April the weather was so stormy and the roads through the mountains of West Vir ginia were so unpromisingly bad, that General Grant, on General Sigel's advice, abandoned that part of his plan which related to the expe dition under General Ord from Beverly south ward via Covington to cut the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, and General Ord, on the 19th of April, was relieved from the command at his own request, although the troops who were to compose the movements had already been concentrated at Grafton, Webster and Beverly, thus leaving the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad east of Cumberland very much de pleted of its guarding forces. As a substitute for the Ord expedition from Beverly, General Grant at the last moment au- AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 155 thorized Sigel, at that general's suggestion, to organize a force of about 7,000 men for an ag gressive movement up the Shenandoah Valley on Staunton and beyond, where he could be joined by Crook's column of 10,000 men from the Kanawha. Sigel's column was concen trated at Martinsburg by the 28th of April, and moved out toward Winchester and Stras burg on the 2d of May, Crook's expedition from Charleston, W. Va., starting the same day, one column through Logan Court-House toward Saltville and another through Fayette Court-House toward the Virginia and Tennes see Railroad. The Sigel column, marching up the Shenan doah, soon came to grief. At the very outset Mosby, with his ranger battalion (known as the Forty-third Virginia Cavalry), harassed Sigel on his left flank and rear, at Bunker Hill, Martinsburg, Winchester and Front Royal, capturing wagons, animals and prisoners. The partisans under Imboden and McNeill also took advantage of the weakening of the Federal garrisons along the railroad from New Creek westward to raid that section success fully early in May, and destroyed considerable railroad property at Piedmont, capturing the guards. Another and larger party on the loth of May, under Imboden in person, attacked a small party of Federal cavalry from the direc tion of Lost River and Brock's Gap on the road leading from Wardensville to Moorefield, driv- 156 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET ing the Federals out toward Romney and Springfield. The Federal train was lost but most of the horses were saved. The Federal party, under Colonel Higgins, of the Twenty- second Pennsylvania Cavalry, lost also about fifty men killed, wounded and missing. Im boden then withdrew hastily to Mount Jackson, in the upper Shenandoah Valley, by way of Brock's Gap. After some preliminary cavalry skirmishing at Rude's Hill and the town of New Market, Sigel engaged the enemy under Breckinridge, two miles south of the latter place, on the morning of the 15th of May, and was repulsed with the loss of five guns, about 600 killed and wounded and 50 prisoners. Sigel then safely retreated to Strasburg and behind Cedar Creek. His force in the action consisted of Moor's and Thoburn's Brigades of infantry, a brigade and a half of cavalry and five batteries of artillery, in all less than 6,000 men. Breckinridge's command consisted of Echols's and Wharton's infantry brigades (which had been hastily brought from near Union and the Narrows of New River, West Virginia, to Staunton), a battalion of cadets from the Lexington (Va.) Military Institute, Imboden's Brigade, White's and Gilmor's Battalions of mounted partisans, and several batteries of artillery, in all about 8,000 men. Except the partisans, these were all concentrated by Breckinridge at Staunton and marched from there down the Valley AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 157 through Harrisonburg to meet Sigel's ap proach. After his defeat at New Market, Sigel was superseded in command of the Shenandoah column by General David Hunter on the 21st of May, but Sigel was retained in command of the Reserve Division, holding the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from the Mo nocacy to Cumberland. Hunter on taking command immediately resumed the march on Staunton through Har risonburg and Port Republic, avoiding Breck inridge's forces at Mount Crawford on the di rect route. Staunton was reached on the 6th of June after a very spirited engagement with the Confederates, about 6,000 strong, under com mand of W. E. Jones, at a small town called Piedmont, seven miles southwest of Port Re public. This battle lasted all day of the 5th of June, finally resulting in the complete de feat and dispersion of the Confederates, with a loss to them of about 600 killed and wound ed ( Gen. W. E. Jones being left dead upon the field), over 1,000 prisoners (including 60 of ficers), and a large number of fugitives. The remnant of the command, under Gen. J. C. Vaughn, then retreated on Waynesborough to the eastward through Fisherville. Hunter's losses did not exceed 500 in killed, wounded and missing. The reason why Breckinridge was not in command of the Confederate troops at Pied- 158 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET mont was that he had been ordered by Gen eral Lee, on the 17th of May, to bring his com mand by rail from Staunton to Hanover Junc tion, after leaving a guard for the Valley. That guard consisted of Imboden's Brigade, 3,000 strong. W. E. Jones' and Vaughn's Brigades, after Crook had turned north again from the line of the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at Chris- tiansburg, were ordered by General Lee to move by rail from their stations at Glade Spring and Dublin Depot, on the 30th of May, with all their available forces, to the assistance of Im boden in the Valley, against whom Hunter's column was then advancing. Jones, being the senior in rank, assumed the command of Vaughn's, Imboden's, and his own Brigades, in the absence of General Breckinridge with Echols's and Wharton's Brigades, which had reported to General Lee at Hanover Junction on the 2 1st of May and had afterwards par ticipated in the Battles of Cold Harbor. Staunton was occupied without opposition, as it had been entirely depleted of regular troops. Indeed, there was no Confederate force left in the Valley except Gilmor's and McNeill's small parties of partisans, who were operating near Winchester and Moorefield. At Staunton, Hunter paroled several hundred sick and wounded Confederates and destroyed much Confederate property and supplies, besides ef fectually crippling the Virginia Central Rail road. AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 159 Another Confederate force of two brigades (McCausland's and W. L. Jackson's), which had been operating against Crook on and near the Virginia and East Tennessee Railroad, but under orders to join Breckinridge at Staunton, had moved as far as Buffalo Gap, ten miles west of Staunton, to interpose between Crook and Hunter, to delay if not to prevent their columns joining. Crook being then marching on Staunton from Lewisburg. As soon as Hunter reached Staunton, McCausland moved southward toward Lexington and left the way clear for Crook's column to move into Staun ton, unopposed, on the 8th of June, with his troops in fine condition. On his way eastward Crook had destroyed all the railroad bridges, depots, etc., from the western terminus at Cov ington onward. The operations of Crook's Kanawha column, before its junction with Hunter, had been fraught with great results, but on account of exceptional difficulties had not accomplishel all that had been laid out for it. It had found Saltville too strongly held by the Confederates to justify an attack on the saltworks, after a most difficult march through a sparsely settled mountain region and with the most refuse transportation the West Virginia Quartermas ter's Department could contrive to furnish. Crook left Charleston by the Lewisburg road on the 2d of May, detaching at Camp Piatt a picked mounted column of 2,500 men under l6o THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET Averell to proceed to Saltville via Logan and Wyoming Court-Houses, Abb's Valley and Jeffersonville, then to move eastward along the Virginia and Tennessee River to rejoin Crook. This latter, with the main body of his troops, numbering 6,155 infantry, moved parallel with Averell on a road farther east, to the south ward through Fayette Court-House and over Flat Top Mountain to Princeton, finding on his arrival there a small party of Confederate cavalry which was readily dispersed in the di rection of Rocky Mount. McCausland's Con federate Infantry Brigade had left Princeton the day before Crook's arrival, leaving their camps standing, apparently not expecting any enemy to come upon Princeton, and had march ed toward Dublin to take cars for Lynchburg and Staunton to reinforce Breckinridge against Sigel in the Shenandoah. McCausland reach ed Dublin on the 7th of May, where he was held by Gen. A. G. Jenkins, commanding that region in the absence of General Breckinridge, and marched back five miles on the 8th to Cloyd's Farm, to meet Crook, who was ap proaching from Princeton. Here Jenkins took up a strong position with McCausland's Bri gade and gave battle to Crook on the 9th on Walker's Mountain, which resulted in a disas trous defeat to the Confederates and their pre cipitate retreat to and through Dublin to Sa lem. General Jenkins was among the wounded and the command then devolved upon McCaus- AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS l6l land, who was reinforced at Dublin by 500 men from John H. Morgan's command from Salt ville. At Cloyd's the Confederate losses were several hundred killed and wounded and 230 prisoners, while Crook's was 27 killed, 117 wounded, and 25 missing. It may be here noted that during the last two years of the Civil War the Confederate reports never show ed either the strength of their troops in action or their casualties. Crook captured and destroyed many valu able public stores and then moved out to New River Railroad Bridge on the loth of May, where he found McCausland's troops drawn up on the east side. These he dispersed with his artillery and then destroyed the important railroad bridge which had been the unattain able object of several Federal expeditions dur ing the preceding three years. Crook says that at Dublin he found dispatch es from Richmond stating that General Grant had been defeated, which determined him to move to Lewisburg as soon as possible. On the loth of May Grant was attacking Lee at Spottsylvania, and these dispatches may have been concocted to encourage those Confeder ates away from Richmond who had commenced to despair of success. It is certain that Lee could not detach any part of his troops in the Wilderness, at Spottsylvania or Cold Harbor, and until after Grant had crossed to the south side of James River, to go to the assistance of 1 62 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET his sorely-pressed troops in the Shenandoah Valley or in Western Virginia. His losses had been enormous (John Tyler said 18,000), but not so great as Grant's, who, between May 4 and June 15, had lost in killed, wounded and missing 52,789 officers and men; but these could be replaced by fresh levies at the North, whereas Lee's losses in men could not be re stored, for the Confederacy had then exhaust ed its available fighting strength. From New River, Crook commenced to put into execution his determination to return to Lewisburg, so he crossed New River below or north of the destroyed railroad bridge, at Pep per's Ferry, and marched to Blacksburg, thence to Union and, via Alderson's Ferry of the Greenbrier, to Meadow Bluff. He was joined at Union by Averell on the 15th of May. Averell, after an exceedingly difficult march through the mountains, had come out at Jef fersonville on his way to Saltville, when he learned that place was held in strength by W. E. Jones's (who was shortly afterward killed near Staunton) and John H. Morgan's com mands, so Averell turned toward Wytheville, where the lead works are located. On the loth of May he engaged the enemy there, finding him to consist of part of the Saltville garrison, which had been hurriedly sent to its defense, and was also under orders to join Breckinridge at Staunton by way of Lynchburg. This was occurring while Crook, on a road farther east, AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 163 was pursuing the remnants of McCausland's and A. G. Jenkins's Brigades through Dublin and at New River Railroad Bridge. At Wytheville the enemy gave Averell con siderable resistance and caused him a loss of 114 officers and men killed and wounded, be sides Averell did not succeed in destroying the lead works. The Confederates retired from Wytheville during the night of the loth and Averell moved to Dublin on the nth, crossed New River on the 12th, followed by Morgan and Jones as far as the river, which they could not cross. Averell then moved to Christians- burg, and thence followed Crook's route over the mountains to Union, where he overtook Crook on the 15th. While the foregoing operations up the Shen andoah and from the Kanawha were progress ing. General Grant, with the Army of the Po tomac, had crossed the Rapidan at Germanna and Ely's Fords, on the 4th of May, and was attacking Lee's army at the Wilderness, Spott sylvania Court-House and Cold Harbor. Grant's largely superior strength prevented Lee from detaching any of his troops to the assist ance of his depleted West Virginia and Shen andoah forces, as he was fully occupied in holding his own against Grant's murderous as saults or his dangerous flanking movements. With the accession of Crook's forces at Staunton, Hunter had a command of over 15,000 men, with thirty guns, but both he and 164 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET Crook were a long distance from any base either on the Potomac or on the Kanawha, be ing entirely dependent upon their wagon trains for supphes, and especially for ammunition. Crook, however, had established a secondary base at Meadow Bluff, which, in turn, was de pendent on Charleston, W. Va. Behind both columns, particularly through the Shenandoah Valley back to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the inhabitants were thor oughly hostile and the country swarming with guerillas, partisans and home-guards, through which supply trains could not penetrate with out a small army to guard them. Mosby was especially active in the region about Strasburg, along Hunter's line of communication back to Harper's Ferry, his true base, so, after passing Harrisonburg, Hunter abandoned that route altogether for replenishing his stores. At Staunton, Hunter disembarrassed himself of his empty and surplus wagons and the pris oners taken at Piedmont, by sending them to Beverly, by way of Buffalo Gap and west of the Alleghenies, under escort of Colonel Moor and 800 men, whose terms of enlistment had ex pired. This he could do with comparative safety, as the country west and northwest of Staunton had been cleared temporarily of any large force of Confederates. On the loth of June, with his own column and Crook's, Hunter resumed his movement on Lexington and Lynchburg, opposed at first AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 165 only by a small force of Confederate cavalry — 2,000 men and a battery — under McCausland, which was easily driven into and through Lex ington on the nth, although the remnants of Vaughn's command, 2,500 strong, still remain ed on Hunter's left and rear at Waynesborough and Rockfish Gap, but too much disorganized since the Battle of Piedmont to be seriously considered. The character of the country south of Staun ton and beyond Lexington to the East Tennes see and Virginia Railroad is a continuation of the beautiful Valley of Virginia; bounded on the east by the softly-lined Blue Ridge and on the west by the outer ridges of the Alleghenies. In the reorganization of his army at Staun ton, Hunter gave the command of the Cavalry Division, which had accompanied his column from Cedar Creek, to Duffie, relieving Stahel, who had been wounded and sent back with the train to Beverly. Part of Stahel's mission was to get a re-supply of ammunition for Hunter's column, which, however, it was found imprac ticable to forward to him. Early on the loth of June, Duffie's cavalry was sent out on the Waynesborough turnpike to make a demonstration on Vaughn's com mand, then to turn south to Tye River Gap. Imboden's and W. L. Jackson's Confederate Cavalry Brigades moved north and east of Duffie's column. Near the Gap, Duffie de stroyed Mount Torry Furnace, where Confed- 1 66 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET erate pig-iron was being made; the Gap was passed by an almost impassable mountain road to the head of Tye River on the i ith, and thence Duffie marched on Amherst, near which place a courier from Hunter overtook him on the 1 2th with orders to rejoin Hunter at Lex ington. Imboden, by passing through How- ardsville Gap and east of the Southwest Moun tains, succeeded in reaching Lynchburg on the 14th, which, up to that time, had barely 1,200 men under General Nicholls to defend it. So, had Duffie not been recalled, he might easily have entered Lynchburg two days before Im boden got there. Instead, Duffie rejoined Hun ter at Lexington by way of White's Gap on the 13th. On the second day out from Staunton, June nth, Duffiie had come up with, in Tye River Valley, and destroyed for the most part, a valu able wagon train of Confederate stores, specie, bonds, records and money, capturing with it about 40 prisoners, 7 of whom were officers. This train had been hurriedly sent away from Staunton toward Lynchburg on Hunter's ap proach to the former place after the Battle of Piedmont. That same afternoon Duffie sent a small party to the Virginia and Tennessee Rail road at Arrington Depot, where they burned the depot and several small bridges, and tore up the track, besides destroying a large quan tity of boots, shoes and other Confederate quartermaster stores. AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 167 On the 1 2th, when near White's Gap, a small refugee wagon train loaded with provisions and forage was captured, and on the morning of the 13th, not far from Lexington, Duffie de stroyed about 2,000 cords of wood, which had been cut to manufacture into charcoal. An other furnace for making pig-iron was also burned. Hunter was in Lexington from the nth to the 14th of June. While there he destroyed a great quantity of Confederate and State prop erty, including the Virginia Military Institute and the residence of Governor John Letcher. He also captured a few prisoners and eleven pieces of artillery; the latter were destroyed. On the 13th Hunter sent Averell's Cavalry Division forward to Buchanan, on the James River, and on the 14th followed with his entire command. Before leaving Lexington, Hunter learned of the large force under Early that General Lee had detached to the succor of Lynchburg, but as that place was still feebly held, Hunter pushed on. At Buchanan he found that Averell had driven McCausland across the James, but not before McCausland had destroyed the bridge; a practicable ford was, however, found nearby. At Buchanan a number of barges in the James River Canal, loaded with stores, fell into ' Hunter's hands, and such as were not needed by his command were destroyed. On the 15th Hunter moved by the Peaks of Otter road to Liberty, on the Virginia and l58 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET Tennessee Railroad, twenty-four miles from Lynchburg. At Liberty a picked party of 200 cavalrymen, which Averell had sent out from Lexington to ride around Lynch burg, reported. They had crossed the Blue Ridge and struck the Charlottesville Railroad near Amherst, tearing up considerable track. Thence they had moved southeastward and crossed the James eight miles below Lynch burg, destroying two railroad trains and the depot on the South Side Railroad at Concor dia; thence, passing through Campbell Court- House, they moved south of Lynchburg to Lib erty. They met with trifling loss. On the 1 6th the movement on Lynchburg was resumed from Liberty. Duffie's cavalry was sent to the left on the Forestville road, sending out a strong reconnaissance toward Balcony Falls. Crook's Infantry Division fol lowed the railroad, destroying it as they ad vanced. Averell's cavalry and Sullivan's Divi sion of Infantry, with the reserve artillery and the train, moved on the Bedford turnpike. Averell crowded back McCausland, but in the afternoon found that he had been reinforced and was becoming stubborn. That night (the 1 6th) Hunter encamped seven miles east of Liberty, with his cavalry thrown out to the Great Otter River. Here General Hunter di vested himself of an empty supply train of 200 wagons and sent it, under guard of a 100- day Ohio regiment, by way of New Castle, AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 169 Sweet springs and Lewisburg to Charleston, W. Va. Late in the afternoon of the i ith the enemy was found strongly posted at Diamond Hill, on the Bedford road, five miles from Lynchburg, from which point he was driven into the town by Crook's infantry, killing and wounding a number of Confederates and capturing 70 pris oners and one gun. It was then unmistakably ascertained that Breckinridge had reached Lynchburg from Waynesborough with all his troops, but it being too late in the day for fur ther operations. Hunter camped for the night on the battlefield. He was still ignorant of the near approach of Early's Corps (late Ewell's), which commenced to arrive via Charlottesville from Richmond the afternoon of the 17th, but that also was developed early on the morning of the 1 8th of June, when Hunter pushed for ward his skirmishers to the toll-gate, two miles from the town, and a brisk fire was opened from the Confederate works, which was kept up throughout the forenoon. In this position Hunter was finally assaulted by the Confeder ates, who were repulsed and driven back into their main redoubts with considerable loss. Hunter says : "It had now become suffi ciently evident that the enemy had concentrated a force of at least double the numerical strength of mine, and what added to the gravity of the situation was the fact that my troops had scarcely enough of ammunition left to sustain 170 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET another well-contested battle. I immediately ordered all the baggage and supply trains to retire by the Bedford turnpike and made prep arations to withdraw the army as soon as it be came sufficiently dark to conceal the movement from the enemy." It being impossible for Hunter to return to the Shenandoah by way of Lexington and Staunton, he retired westward through Liberty and Buford's Gap during the 19th, 20th, and 2 1st, to Salem, "destroying all the bridges, depot buildings and contents on the railroad," being unmolested except by an occasional rear guard action between his own and the Confed erate cavalry. The most serious of these af fairs occurred near Salem early on the 21st, when he suffered the loss of two batteries mov ing on the New Castle road, which, being in sufficiently guarded, were disabled and spiked by the Confederate cavalry and the horses car ried off. The guns, however, were recovered by Hunter's cavalry, and the Confederates in turn driven away with loss, but eight of the pieces had to be abandoned finally, after de stroying all their carriages, for the lack of horses to haul them. After passing Catawba Valley, on the New Castle road, the pursuit ended, and Hunter moved on leisurely to Mea dow Bluff, where he arrived on the 25th, and found ample supplies. Hunter's losses in this campaign foot up 103 killed, 564 wounded and 271 missing, from AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 171 June 10 to 23. He was so far beyond possible support, or even communication by courier, that dispatches could not reach him after he had passed south of Staunton. General Grant endeavored to send two divisions of Sheridan's cavalry to Hunter's assistance by way of Char lottesville, expecting Hunter to be in that vicin ity, but Sheridan was attacked by Wade Hamp ton's and FitzHugh Lee's cavalry at Trevilian Station of the Virginia Central Railroad on the nth of June, and compelled to withdraw to the White House, on the Pamunkey, over the circuitous route north of the North Anna by which he had come. Although Sheridan had started from Grant's army on the 7th of June, Breckinridge's two brigades succeeded in pass ing from Lee's army over the railroad to Char lottesville and Waynesborough, before Sheridan could intercept them at Trevilian. Wade Hamp ton also had got into position so as to cover Gordonsville before Sheridan appeared at Tre vilian and Fitzhugh Lee's Division had reached Louisa Court-House, only six miles from Tre vilian. While General Grant remained confronting General Lee at Cold Harbor it had been unsafe for the latter to detach more than Breckin ridge's two small brigades to go to the relief of either Waynesborough or Lynchburg, but as soon as General Lee discovered, on the 12th, that General Grant had withdrawn from his front to cross to the south side of the James 172 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET to join Butler, he, on the 13th, detached Early's entire Army Corps (formerly Ewell's) in hot haste to the relief of Lynchburg, which Early, with part of his troops, reached on the 17th, just in time to save the city from Hunter. CHAPTER X THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY When Hunter placed his army south of Lynchburg and then withdrew to the Kanawha, he left the Valley and Washington uncovered except by the Federal troops on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Cumber land to the Monocacy, commanded by Sigel. Early telegraphed General Lee from near Salem, on the 22d of June, that Hunter had made good his retreat into the West Virginia Mountains and that he (Early) would proceed the next day to carry out General Lee's original instructions. These were to move down into the Shenandoah Valley and into Maryland if practicable. In a letter to President Davis, June 29th, relating to Early's movements. Gen eral Lee says : "I still think it is our policy to draw the attention of the enemy to his own territory. It may force Grant to attack me, or weaken his forces. It will also, I think, oblige Hunter to cross the Potomac or expose him self to attack. From either of these events I anticipate good results. * * * There will be time to shape Early's course, or terminate it, 174 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON when he reaches the Potomac, as circumstances require. He could not be withdrawn from the Valley without inviting a return of Hunter's expedition. To retain him there inactive would not be disadvantageous: As before stated, my greatest present anxiety is to secure regular and constant supplies. * * * " Part of General Lee's plans for Early con templated the release of the Confederate pris oners at Point Lookout, Md. It seems pertinent here to mention the great difficulty to obtain, and the high prices paid for, supplies at this period by the Confederate authorities. Besides the tithe required from all producers, there was an impressment law passed, by the Confederate Congress, Mai^ch 26, 1863, and subsequently amended, which was regulated by a tariff of prices to be paid for supplies taken, which tariff was established every two months by a Board of Appraisers in each State of the Confederacy, one member be ing appointed by the President and the other by the Governor of the State. For instance, the tariff for stores impressed in Virginia dur ing October and November, 1864, gave the prices for wheat at $7.50 per bushel, flour from $33 to $42 per barrel, corn $5 per bushel, bacon $2.75 per pound, butter $5 per pound, horses and mules $800 per head, wood $8 per cord, potatoes $4 per bushel, onions $8 per bushel. New Orleans molasses $25 per gallon, Rio cof fee $3 per pound, beef cattle $30 per 100 AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 1 75 pounds, sheep $35 per head, pig-iron $278 to $350 per ton, cotton sheetings $1.75 per yard, army shoes $15 per pair, men's socks $2 per pair, apple and peach brandy $10 per gallon. All these prices were largely increased as the Confederate currency became further depre ciated, so that in March, 1865, the last schedule furnished by the Virginia appraisers before they adjourned to May 2, 1865, showed the market price of wheat to be $25 per bushel, flour $126 per barrel, potatoes $20 per bushel, beef cattle $50 per hundred pounds, sheep $70 per head, army shoes $25 per pair, labor $8 per day. These were the prevailing market rates. The suffering of the people and the diffi culties of the Confederate Government became so great that in March, 1865, just before the close of the horrible drama, the Confederate Congress passed "An Act to raise coin for the purpose of furnishing necessary supplies for the Army," by which the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to pledge cotton and tobacco for coin, not to exceed three millions of dollars, as a loan payable two years after ratification of a treaty of peace. The cotton and tobacco belonging to the Confederacy so pledged, was to be given safe conduct beyond the limits of the Confederacy "free from any molestation" to the exporter, or the payment of any duty. The attention of the officers of the army was called to the clause allowing the 176 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON free exportation of the above-mentioned sta ples, and they were cautioned not to resist its operations. Cotton at Liverpool was then sell ing at $250 per bale of 400 pounds. Up to the passage of this Act no cotton was allowed to pass the Confederate lines into those of the United States. Officers of the Confederate supply depart ments were calling upon Richmond for coin to enable them to obtain supplies even by impress ment, as the holders of grain or provisions, es pecially in counties bordering upon the Poto mac, refused the depreciated Confederate cur rency and demanded coin or "greenbacks." Early had abandoned further pursuit of Hunter at Salem and turned his army north ward through Buchanan and Fincastle in two columns, which passed through Lexington and Jackson's River Depot, converging at Staun ton, and arriving there between the 25th and 27th of June. General Lee expected Hunter to refit and reorganize at Lewisburg and then return to the Valley, for, in a letter dated June 26 to President Davis, he says of Early ; " * * * I think it better that he should move down the Valley, if he can obtain provisions, whicK would draw Hunter after him. * * * jf (-jj._ cumstances favor, I should also recommend his crossing the Potomac. I think I can maintain our lines here against General Grant. He does not seem disposed to attack and has thrown himself strictly on the defensive. I am less AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 1 77 uneasy about holding our position than about our ability to procure supplies for the army. I fear the latter difficulty will oblige me to at tack General Grant in his intrenchments, which I should not hesitate to do but for the loss it will inevitably entail. * * * " At Staunton, Early rearranged his command, so that General Ransom, commanding all the cavalry in the Valley District, was relieved from duty with General Breckinridge and took his orders thereafter from Early direct. This cavalry command consisted of Col. Bradley T. Johnson's Brigade (formerly W. E. Jones's), to which Bradley Johnson's Mounted Mary land Battalion was added; Imboden's and W. L. Jackson's Brigades ( formerly partisans, but now incorporated in the regular cavalry), and McCausland's Brigade (formerly A. G. Jen kins's). Breckinridge's infantry was reorganized into two divisions, commanded respectively by him self and Maj.-Gen. J. B. Gordon. The transportation for baggage was mate rially reduced. On the 30th of June Early passed beyond New Market northward, finding ample supplies of wheat and grass along his route. He de tached Imboden to proceed down the South Branch Valley to the Baltimore and Ohio Rail road. Early camped near Winchester on the 2d of July, and, dividing his force, sent one column under Breckinridge to Martinsburg on 12 178 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON the 3d, and with his own corps occupied Har per's Ferry on the 4th, the weak force of Fed erals retiring before both columns; those at Martinsburg, where Sigel had his headquar ters, falling back to Shepherdstown, and the Harper's Ferry garrison to Maryland Heights. McCausland's Cavalry Brigade moved on the left of Breckinridge from Winchester via White Hall and down Back Creek, while the main cavalry under Ransom preceded Early's column of infantry on the 3d to Kearneysville via Brucetown and Leetown, having quite a lively engagement with the Federal cavalry at Kearneysville. Early on the 4th, after McCausland's Mount ed Brigade had captured the blockhouse at North Mountain Depot (Hedgesville), and de stroyed the railroad, it swung around to Hainesville. Breckinridge's two divisions also broke the railroad east and west from Martins burg, while the men of Early's Corps were similarly engaged from Harper's Ferry west ward. In the presence of such a very large body of Confederates (four divisions of infantry and one of cavalry) it was remarkable that Sigel should have been able to retire the small garri sons of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry to the north side of the Potomac in safety and with so little loss of stores, but on the morning of the 5th of July he was able to report from Maryland Heights, where he had gone via AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 1 79 Shepherdstown, that his own and Weber's commands were there and had provisions for twenty days, besides a liberal supply of ammu nition. Weber partially destroped the railroad bridge at Harper's Ferry after crossing, and took up the pontoons. Sigel intimated that he had no intention of abandoning the position, although he soon learned that Breckinridge had crossed that day to Sharpsburg and was forag ing as far east as Boonsborough. Sigel re ported his own force on Maryland Heights to be 6 regiments of infantry, 2,500 dismounted cavalry, 2 battalions, of heavy artillery and 26 field guns. Nearby, in Pleasant Valley, there were about 1,000 mounted cavalry, 2 compa nies of artillery acting as infantry, and one 4- gun battery. General Sigel was relieved by Gen. A. P. Howe on the 8th of July, the day the enemy disappeared from Harper's Ferry, after having sent Breckinridge's two infantry divisions the day before to feel the Federal position on Maryland Heights from the diirection o^f Sharpsburg, but who found it too strong to assault. Early then moved his entire force to the north side of the Potomac west of Harper's Ferry, and sending his cavalry, part to Freder ick and part to Hagerstown, where it met some parties of Federal cavalry on observation, he moved his infantry column through Rohrers- ville, Boonsborough and Middletown to Fred- l8o THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON erick and Jefferson, Md., and thence, on the 9th, to the Monocacy River, where they met resistance which lasted throughout the day of the 9th, from troops hastily gathered at Balti more by Gen. Lew Wallace and marched out to the Monocacy, to reinforce a small party under General Tyler already there. The ob ject was to delay Early's progress toward Bal timore or Washington, at the iron railroad bridge and where the turnpikes to both Balti more and Washington converge within a dis tance of two miles. Wallace had thus succeeded in collecting a rather incongruous party of 2,500 men of all arms on the 6th of July, the Confederate cav alry being then only at Middletown. At this juncture Ricketts's Division of the Sixth Army Corps, which had been started from City Point by General Grant on the 7th of July on trans ports, commenced to arrive, and by daylight of the 9th two brigades (Truex's and McClen- nan's) 3,350 strong, were in position near Mo nocacy Bridge, thus increasing Wallace's com mand to nearly 6,000 men, but still a very weak force to oppose Early's vastly superior num bers. Wallace had but one field battery of six guns and one 24-pounder, as against at least 16 of Early's. Yet from 9 a. m. until 4 p. m. Wal lace held his position, repulsing two infantry attacks, when, being heavily outflanked on his left, he threw all his force over to the other flank at the stone bridge on the Baltimore turn- AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY l8l pike to cover the retreat to Baltimore. The bridge was held by General Tyler with his handful of men until after all the other troops had passed to his rear and he was virtually sur rounded by Rodes's Division, when he cut his way through with the larger part of his troops. Wallace's losses were 1,294 killed, wounded and missing, mostly in Ricketts's Division; that of the Confederates is given by Early as 600 or 700, yet he left 435 of his wounded at Freder ick, who could not bear transportation. The great importance of the Battle of the Monocacy lay in the delay it caused Early in his march on Washington, thereby enabling the remainder of the Sixth Corps to reach the Capital from Grant's army, as well as the Nine teenth Army Corps from New Orleans, before Early could reach there, which he would have accomplished had he not been forced to march around Harper's Ferry and then been checked by Wallace at the Monocacy. These most im portant events saved the Capital from capture, and General Grant so accords it in both his of ficial report and in his "Memoirs," notwith standing which Sigel was relieved by Howe on the 8th of July and Wallace was superseded by Ord on the nth, after he had marched his command safely back to Baltimore. Sigel and Wallace between them had delay ed Early's progress at least three days. The inscription Wallace proposed to place on the monument over his dead at the Monocacy — 1 82 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON "These Men Died to Save the National Capi tal" — would not be amiss. Making no pursuit of Wallace toward Balti more, Early, on the day after the Battle of the Monocacy, resumed his march on Washington, through Rockville, where he turned to the left so as to get upon the Seventh street road. He appeared before Fort Stevens (now Bright- wood) during the afternoon of the nth of July and pushed his skirmishers up to within 40 rods of the defenses, driving in the small force of Veteran Reserves, convalescents from the hospitals, quartermasters' employees, and civilian volunteers gathered there to dispute his advance; but he made no general assault, giv ing as a reason that he found the works too strong and his men too much worn by the heat and the forced marching of the past two days. Then came the dramatic arrival of the two Di visions of Wright's Sixth Army Corps from City Point by water and the head of the Nine teenth Army Corps from New Orleans by ocean steamers, with Mr. Lincoln meeting them at the wharf and then going out to Fort Stev ens to see in person what was being accomplish ed. It is said that as the President stood by the side of General Wright on the parapet of Fort Stevens, watching the movements of the skir mishing then in progress between Wheaton's Division of the Sixth Corps and the Confeder ates, as Wheaton was recovering the ground lost before his troops arrived on the line, an of- AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 1 83 ficer standing near the President was struck, and it was only this that induced the President to yield to the entreaties of those about him to no longer expose himself. Early remained in close proximity to Fort Stevens throughout the 12th until night, skir mishing continually. His headquarters were at Silver Spring, about two miles north of Washington, at the house of Montgomery Blair, then Postmaster-General of the United States, which was destroyed when his army re treated, although Breckinridge pleaded with Early to save it. In passing through Hagers town, Early had levied a contribution of $220,- 000 on the inhabitants and another of $200,000 at Frederick. While Early was feeling the lines at Fort Stevens on the Seventh Street road, his cav alry, under McCausland, was demonstrating on the Georgetown road at Tenallytown and in front of Fort Reno. Mosby's Battalion of partisans was threatening to cross the Potomac at the Chain Bridge and move toward George town by the River road. Both these points, however, were well protected. When Early retired from in front of Wash ington during the night of the 12th, he moved through Rockville and thence crossed the Po tomac to Leesburg, by way of Darnestown, Poolesville and White's Ford. He remained near Leesburg during the 14th and 15th. 184 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON At Frederick, on the 8th of July, Early had detached Bradley Johnson's cavalry to make a raid on the Northern Central and the Phila delphia and Baltimore railroads, which resulted in their being closed to traffic by the destruction of several bridges. The most notable was the burning of the bridge two miles long over Gun powder Creek, 15 miles northeast of Baltimore, and the capture there of two passenger trains by Major Harry Gilmor, commanding a Mounted Maryland Battalion, which Gen. Bradley Johnson detached for that purpose. Part of the latter's mission was to endeavor to surprise the small garrison at Point Lookout, Md., where the Potomac enters Chesapeake Bay, and release the Confederate prisoners confined there ; but from this he was recalled at Bladensburg by Early, when the latter had de cided to withdraw south of the Potomac from in front of Washington. While Early was ravaging Maryland and threatening the seat of the Federal Govern ment, Hunter, with all the troops he had car ried to the Kanawha from Lynchburg, was re turning to the Valley as rapidly as he could, by boat up the Ohio to Parkersburg and thence eastward by rail. His advance left Charleston, on the Kanawha, on the 3d of July (the day Breckinridge occupied Martinsburg and Early reached the vicinity of Harper's Ferry) and his head of column reached Cumberland on the 9th (the day of the Battle of the Monocacy). AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 185 Martinsburg was reoccupied by Hunter's cav alry on the loth, followed soon after by Sulli van's Division, the first infantry to arrive from the West. (Early was then — July 14th — at Leesburg, and who, in a letter to General Lee, announced his intention to "start for the Val ley in the morning. * * * I will retreat in forced marches by land toward Richmond. * * * " Later events changed Early's intentions after he reached the Valley and had placed the Blue Ridge between his army and the pursuing column under Wright with the Sixth and part of the Nineteenth Army Corps. Wright was given command, by order of the President, July 13) 4-35 P- M., "of all the forces moving from Washington or elsewhere against the enemy," including any that might join him from the commands of Hunter, Ord, "or elsewhere." For a while some difficulty was found in lo cating Hunter, owing to the breaks caused by the Confederates in both the railroad and the telegraph lines, although it was known that he had passed eastward through Cumberland to ward Harper's Ferry. Finally he was reached at the latter place on the 15th by a special mes senger, bearing instructions from General Grant, for Hunter to move with all his forces that had arrived from the west, and with Howe's troops at Maryland Heights, and then to form a junction with Wright's col umn to attack Early. Sullivan's Division and some detachments of Hunter's command, 8,000 l86 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON Strong, which had only then reached Harper's Berry, immediately pushed out toward Hillsborough and Purcellville east of the Blue Ridge, preceded by Duffie's cavalry, who struck into the rear of Early's col umn near Purcellville, and captured from it about 80 wagons and 50 prisoners, the main force of Confederates having passed about two hours before, headed for Snicker's Gap, in which direction Duffie, supported by Crook's troops, followed on the 17th, passing through the Gap and into the Valley, where the enemy was found drawn up in strength at the west side of the crossing of the Shenandoah River on the Berryville road. During the i8th Early remain ed in this position and resisted Crook's efforts to force a crossing, those troops which had suc ceeded in getting across farther down stream being forced to retire again to the east bank, with considerable loss. Ricketts's Division of the Sixth Corps, which had rejoined Wright from Baltimore, came up in time to cover Crook's retirement. The Confederate losses are not stated, but were also considerable. Wright, with the Sixth Corps and two Divi sions of the Nineteenth, as soon as Hunter's column under Crook had been located at Hills boro, feeling uneasy about Crook's proximity to so largely a superior force of the enemy un supported, crossed the Potomac at White's Ford, and followed the track of Early's army through Leesburg out on the Snicker's Gap AND THE Return to the valley 187 road until he was joined by the head of Crook's column at Purcellville, when he sent him in ad vance to pursue Early into Snicker's Gap. Another attempt was made to cross the Shen andoah early on the 20th, when it was found Early had retreated the night before, and had gone with his main army toward Front Royal and Strasburg, covering his trains. Early had thus succeeded in getting away with all his Maryland plunder, including several thousand head of horses, mules and cattle. Wright then deemed the time had come to obey Grant's orders, communicated through Halleck, to return to Washington with the Sixth and Nineteenth Army Corps, preparatory to rejoining Grant at City Point, as Grant said, "before the enemy can get Early back * * * ;" for Grant then believed Early to be in full re treat on Richmond by way of the Valley. His dispatch of July i6th, 4.40 p. m., to Halleck, indicates that he expected Hunter's troops to be able, without any assistance from Wright, to pursue Early to Gordonsville and Charlottes ville, break up the railroad there, etc. Grant adds: "I do not think there is now any fur ther danger of an attempt to invade Maryland. The position of the enemy in the West and here (meaning Richmond) is such as to de mand all the force they can get together to save vital points to them. * * * As soon as the rebel army is known to have passed Hunter's forces, recall Wright and send him back here with all l88 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON dispatch, and also send the Nineteenth Corps. If the enemy have any notion of returning, the fact will be developed before Wright can start back. * * * " When Wright started to march back to Lees burg and Washington, Crook set out for Win chester by way of Berryville. He reached Win chester on the 22d, finding Averell and his Cav alry Division, with some infantry as supports, already there since the 2 1 st, when he had enter ed Winchester unopposed, after quite a spirited affair on the afternoon of the 20th at Stephen son's Depot, north of Winchester, with Imbo den's and Jackson's cavalry, supported by Ramseur's Division of Early's infantry, where Averell captured 4 guns, 17 officers and 250 men, killed 73 and wounded 130 of the enemy; his own loss being 53 killed, 155 wounded and 6 missing. Averell's Division was the last of Hunter's command to return from the Kana wha, so that on the 22d virtually all of that force was again reunited at Winchester, and was about 11,000 strong. Early's strength was estimated at 25,000. The departure of Wright's two Army Corps for Washington was known in Richmond and by Early almost as soon as they started. Early's intention to "retreat in forced marches by land on Richmond" underwent a sudden change at Strasburg, for he turned back toward Win chester on the 22d and badly defeated Crook's command at Kernstown on the 23d, driving it AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 189 through Winchester on the 24th and into Mar tinsburg on the 25th, where a stand was made during the day, and a retreat on Williamsport across the Potomac during the night was unop posed by Early, who followed only with his cavalry to the river. Crook then marched his infantry north of the river to Harper's Ferry, leaving his cavalry along the Potomac from Hancock to Harper's Ferry to guard the cross ings. As Hunter had remained at Harper's Ferry while Crook commanded in the field, Hunter now resumed charge of all the troops within his Department. Crook's losses at Kernstown and during the retreat were 100 killed, 606 wounded and 579 missing. Early's losses were also severe. Early then occupied Martinsburg, Smith- field and Bunker Hill with his infantry, his cavalry being thrown forward to the Potomac ; his own headquarters were at Bunker Hill. The Valley was again in entire possession of the Confederates, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which had been placed in complete running order throughout its entire length on the 2 1st of July, was again interrupted as a means of Federal communication with the West. As soon as Early had retired to the Valley from his raid on Washington, General Lee sent Fitzhugh Lee's Division of cavalry to Cul peper Court-House, to be used as a means of communication with Early and to gather fresh 190 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON horses, its absentees, etc. These troops were found in position on the Rapidan on the 25th by a scouting party sent out from Washington. The trains on the Virginia Central Railroad were then running and bringing supplies from Richmond to Culpeper, which were there transhipped by wagon trains to Early's com mand, via Front Royal. Eventually these troops, strengthened by Kershaw's Division of infantry under Gen. R. H. Anderson, joined Early in the Valley. On the 2 1st of July, on representations made from Washington by Halleck, General Grant modified his orders about sending the Sixth Corps, and that part of the Nineteenth with Wright, to City Point. Grant's new instruc tions to Halleck read : "You may retain Wright's command until the departure of Early is assured, or other forces are collected to make its presence no longer necessary. * * * I am now sending back all veterans whose terms of service expire previous to the 25th of Au gust. * * * " Wright's command all reached Washington by nightfall of the 23d (Early had then turned on Crook, and drove him through Winchester the next day). Grant at that time telegraphed Halleck as follows : "City Point, Va., July 23, 1864, 6 p. m. — If Wright has returned to Washington, send him immediately back here, retaining, however, the portion of the Nine teenth Corps now in Washington for further AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY I9I orders. Early is undoubtedly returning here to enable the enemy to detach troops to go to Georgia. * * * " That same morning Mr. Lin coln had telegraphed to General Hunter at Harper's Ferry : "Are you able to take care of the enemy when he turns back upon you, as he probably will do on finding out that Wright has left?" To which Hunter had immediately repHed: "My force is not strong enough to hold the enemy should he return upon me with his whole force." And Early was then return ing in full strength. At noon of the 24th Gen eral Grant telegraphed Halleck : " * * * You can retain General Wright until I learn posi tively what. has become of Early. * * * " On the morning of the 26th of July Wright's column, about 19,000 strong, was again set in motion from Washington via Rockville for the Monocacy, to form a junction with Hunter's forces at such point as the latter might select. As already mentioned, Hunter's entire com mand, about 11,000 strong, was then at or near Harper's Ferry, with his cavalry (two Divi sions) guarding the crossings of the Potomac on the north bank as far up as Hancock. In addition to authorizing the retention of Wright, General Grant dispatched from City Point all that portion of the Nineteenth Corps, which had been sent to the Army of the Poto mac, when he learned that Baltimore and Wash ington were no longer seriously threatened. He also sent six more regiments of his cavalry. Of 192 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON course, all these troops went by water. On the 30th General Grant sent Torbert's Division of Cavalry from the Army of the Potomac to Washington, followed on the 2d of August by General Sheridan in person. Grant's intention being then to give Sheridan command of all of Hunter's troops in the field ; but, finding oppo sition existing to this arrangement at Washing ton, Grant deferred action until he could first confer with Hunter in person, which he soon after did. Meanwhile, Wright's column had joined Hunter's at Harper's Ferry on the 29th of July, both commands, except Crook's cavalry, being assembled at Halltown, three miles south, on the Charlestown road. The next day the en tire force was marched back toward Freder ick to more effectually cover Baltimore and Washington. Kelley, at Cumberland, was strengthened by troops from Kentucky by way of Parkersburg. Up to the 29th of July, besides an occasional demonstration by Confederate cavalry at the upper crossings of the Potomac, Early's troops were busily engaged foraging in the lower Val ley and gathering the ripening crops; but on that date Early sent two of his mounted bri gades, under McCausland and Bradley John son, to cross the Potomac at McCoy's Ferry and raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania. This forcenumberedabout2,6oomen, commanded by McCausland, and moved via Clear Spring, Md., AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 193 and Mercersburg to Chambersburg, Pa., where it appeared early on the 30th of July, brushing away to the eastward, all along the route, the feeble parties of Averell's Federal cavalry watching its progress from the direction of Ha gerstown, where Averell had his headquarters. As soon as the enemy's strength and purpose had been developed, Averell gathered a consid erable force of his cavalry and set out for Chambersburg via Greencastle, in pursuit, but did not reach there until some hours after Mc Causland had burned the town and fallen back toward McConnellsburg, westward. McCausland on entering Chambersburg de manded a ransom of $100,000 in coin or $500,- 000 in United States currency, to be paid in three hours' time, failing which the town was fired in many places simultaneously, after a scene of most revolting villainies perpetrated by the Confederates. There exists no report from McCausland of events at Chambersburg, but Bradley Johnson recounts them in consid erable detail. McCausland, who had intended proceeding west from McConnellsburg toward Bedford, was so closely followed by Averell that he was forced to turn southward to Hancock. There, on the 31st, a ransom of $30,000 and 5,000 cooked rations were demanded under threat of destroying the town; but before they could be collected, McCausland was attacked by Averell, and hastily moved off with his command to la 194 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON ward Cumberland, in front of which he appear ed and engaged Kelley's troops late in the after noon of August 1st. Finding Kelley too well prepared, McCausland drew off eastward after nightfall, abandoning his dead and wounded, and at Oldtown forced a crossing of the Poto mac at daylight of the 2d of August, capturing or dispersing a regiment of new troops from Ohio that Kelley had placed there to defend the crossing. The Confederates then moved south into the Valley of the South Branch of the Potomac, via Springfield and Romney. From Romney, on the 4th of August, Mc Causland moved on New Creek (Keyser), and was repulsed in his attack on that fortified place, leaving 25 of his dead on the field when he moved off again that same day toward Moorefield, where he was surprised in camp by Averell on the morning of the 7th of August and routed, with a loss of 27 officers and 393 men prisoners, 4 guns and caissons complete, several hundred horses, equipments and small arms. The greater part of McCausland's forces were dispersed and retreated into the Shenandoah Valley through the mountain passes in small squads, which finally were as sembled at Mount Jackson. The movement later of Hunter's and Wright's combined commands from Harper's Ferry again to Frederick, except the strong- force left behind under Howe to hold Mary land Heights, was the result of the commotion AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 1 95 at the North and in Washington caused by the Chambersburg raid, together with hostile dem onstrations along the line of the Potomac from Williamsport down to Leesburg. As soon as it was definitely ascertained that none of Early's infantry had crossed to the north side of the river. Hunter's infantry was marched to a line east of and along the Monocacy, to ob serve Early's movements in the lower Valley and be available to protect the Capital from any coup de main. It was in this position that Hun ter was visited by General Grant on the 5th of August, which resulted in Hunter's asking to be relieved from command of the Department of West Virginia, and Sheridan, who had al ready reached Washington from City Point, being sent for to meet Grant at the Monocacy, when he was placed temporarily in command of the newly-formed Middle Military Division, comprised of the States of Maryland, Pennsyl vania, West Virginia, the District of Colum bia, and as much of Northern Virginia as was then occupied by the Federal army. Grant had already ordered the troops assem bled at the Monocacy to move back to Harper's Ferry and Halltown before Sheridan's arrival. The written instructions prepared for Hunter were given to Sheridan instead, and Grant re turned to City Point. CHAPTER XI Sheridan's campaigns — battles of the OPEQUON, fisher's HILL AND tom's brook The written instructions addressed to Hun ter, which Sheridan received, were as follows : "Monocacy Bridge, Md., "August 5, 1864, 8 p. M. Maj.-Gen. D. Hunter: "General — Concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be neces sary. Use, in this concentration, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. From Har per's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him if driven south of the Potomac as long as it is safe to do cr\ 'T^ 'I' 'I' There are now on the way to join you three other brigades of the best of cavalry, number ing at least 5,000 men and horses. These will SHERIDAN S CAMPAIGNS 197 be instructed, in the absence of further -orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac. * * * In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all pro visions, forage and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings be destroyed; they should rather be protected, but the people should be informed that so long- as an army can subsist among them recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are de termined to stop them at all hazards. Bear in mind the object is to drive the enemy south, and to do this you want to always keep him in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes. * * * (Signed) U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General." Sheridan found Early's army concentrated west of the Opequon River, covering Winches ter and Bunker Hill. He moved his own army from Halltown to a line running from Clifton to Berryville, sending part of his cavalry to White Post on the Front Royal road and post ing the remainder under Lowell at Summit Point, on the Harper's Ferry and Winchester Railroad, to guard his right flank. From these positions a general advance was made west ward to the Opequon, when it was ascertained 198 SHERIDAN'S CAMPAIGNS by the cavalry on the White Post and Winches ter road that Early was retreating toward Strasburg, where the Valley is narrowest and most favorable for defense. This was on the nth of August, 1864. Sheridan followed to Cedar Creek and, through very brisk recon- noitering, developed Early's main line on Fish er's Hill, immediately south of Strasburg, strongly entrenched. While in these relative positions on the 12th, Sheridan learned of a large force of Confeder ates approaching Front Royal from Culpeper by way of Chester Gap, in the Blue Ridge, almost directly opposite his left flank and only fifteen miles from it. Sheridan's information about the approach of these Confederates was confirmed on the morning of the 14th, when a special messenger from Washington, who came by way of Snicker's Gap, brought the follow ing dispatch from General Grant : "City Point, August 12, 1864, 9 a. m. Major-General Halleck : Inform General Sheridan it is now certain two (2) divisions of infantry have gone to Early, and some cavalry and twenty (20) pieces of artillery. This movement commenced last Saturday night. He must be cautious and act on the defensive until movements here force them to detach to send this way. Early's force, with this increase, cannot exceed forty thou- battles of the opequon, etc. 199 sand men, but this is too much for General Sheridan to attack. * * * U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General." To fully verify this information, Sheridan, on the 14th and 15th, sent Merritt's Division of cavalry to Front Royal and withdrew all his infantry to the north side of Cedar Creek, prior to withdrawing entirely to what Sheridan con sidered the best defensive position in the lower Valley — at Halltown and Harper's Ferry. By this movement he would also be marching to ward reinforcements then coming to him from Washington by way of Snicker's Gap, of the Blue Ridge, and consisting of Grover's Divi sion of the Nineteenth Corps and Wilson's Di vision of cavalry. On the nights of the 15th and i6th he with drew his entire infantry force to Winchester, leaving his cavalry out as a screen, but with instructions, as it retired, to carry out that part of General Grant's orders to destroy all stores and forage south of a line drawn westward from Millwood to Winchester and Petticoat Gap, in North Mountain. Also to seize all mules, horses and cattle that might be useful to his army. No houses were to be burned and the people were to be informed "that the ob ject is to make this valley untenable for the raiding parties of the rebel army." The infan try was withdrawn at night, mainly because 200 SHERIDAN S CAMPAIGNS the movement could not be concealed during the day from Early's lookouts on Massanutten Mountain, overlooking the entire region about Strasburg and Cedar Creek. This withdrawal was made none too soon, for on the afternoon of the i6th, before the main infantry had commenced to move back, Merritt's cavalry was attacked at the Shenan doah crossing of the Front Royal and Winches ter road by Gen. R. H. Anderson's infantry, Kershaw's Division, and Fitzhugh Lee's two brigades of cavalry, arriving in the Valley from Richmond and Culpeper via Chester Gap. Mer ritt repulsed Anderson's attack, capturing two battle flags and three hundred prisoners, and then fell back to White Post, while the infan try was getting into position on the 17th at Berryville and Clifton, and Wilson's and Low ell's cavalry held Winchester. Averell's Cav alry Division had returned to Hancock from Moorefield, where it had attacked and dispersed McCausland's Confederate cavalry on the 7th of August. Early started in pursuit of Sheridan on the 17th, as soon as he became aware of the lat ter's retirement, driving the Federal cavalry out of Winchester toward Summit Point that same evening. Early being joined by Ander son's column near Winchester on the morning of the 1 8th. Sheridan then drew Merritt back from White Post to Berryville, while the cav alry on his other flank held a line from Sum- BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON, ETC. 20I mit Point, with pickets out along the Opequon, to Smithfield Bridge, the infantry being posted near Charlestown, where, on the 21st, Early made a reconnaissance in force by way of Smithfield Bridge, but quickly withdrew again west of the Opequon, and Sheridan then moved his entire army to Halltown, posting his cav alry on his right flank toward Shepherdstown. This general retrograde movement from Strasburg to Halltown by Sheridan's army, leaving Maryland and Pennsylvania again open to Confederate raiding parties, caused in tense commotion at the North and excitement at Washington, although, by keeping close con tact with Early, Sheridan, from his position at Halltown or from Berryville, was able to closely follow after Early's army should the latter attempt to cross north of the Potomac, or, if he went east of the Blue Ridge toward Washington, Sheridan could readily interpose his army to protect the Capital. Still it was a retrograde movement, justified by the prudence of not risking a battle with a superior force at Cedar Creek, so far away from his base at Harper's Ferry, and with Anderson's reinforce ments arriving at Front Royal on his left flank to threaten his communications to the rear. Early felt Sheridan's Hnes at Halltown on the 22d and the following days, until the nighf of the 25th, when he retired west of the Ope quon, concentrating his forces at Bunker Hill and Brucetown. Sheridan moved forward to 202 SHERIDAN S CAMPAIGNS Charlestown on the 28th and seized Smith- field Bridge with Merritt's Cavalry Division. On the 29th a heavy force of Confederate in fantry first drove Merritt back toward Charles town, and then, in turn, were driven out across the Opequon, which was thereafter held by Sheridan's cavalry. Averell, who had been guarding the cross ings of the Potomac from Hancock down the north side of the river to Antietam Creek, crossed to the south side and advanced to Mar tinsburg on the 29th, driving out the enemy's pickets; but Averell in turn was driven back to Falling Waters by Rodes's Division of in fantry on the 31st. On the 2d of September Averell advanced again through Martinsburg to near Bunker Hill, where he attacked and routed Early's Cavalry (now commanded by Lomax, who had succeeded Ransom), captur ing 2 battle-flags, 55 prisoners, some wagons and a herd of cattle, finally driving Lomax nearly into Winchester on the 3d. On that day Sheridan moved his infantry to a line running from Clifton to Berryville, his cavalry (except Averell's Division) being pushed south to White Post. Averell was brought east of the Opequon to Leetown. There was virtually no change in these positions until •the 19th of September. Information had been received a fortnight before, that Kershaw's Division of infantry had been or was to be ordered to return to Rich- BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON, ETC. 203 mond, where Grant's activity was causing Lee great concern. Lee had already recalled Hamp ton's Cavalry Division when it was marching to join Anderson at Culpeper on the 14th of August. Kershaw's Division of infantry, with Gen. R. H. Anderson, finally left Winchester on the 14th of September to return to General Lee via Front Royal; by Early's advice he had already made an attempt on the 3d to go through to Millwood and Ashby's Gap into Loudoun County, for the purpose of giving the appearance of moving on Washington, but on that occasion he had unexpectedly run into Crook's Corps near Berryville, and, after a sharp engagement, returned to Winchester. Everything then being quiet, and at the repeat ed summons from General Lee that at least he and his staff should return to Richmond to re sume command of the First Army Corps, An derson started again from Winchester with Kershaw's Division, as above seen. This was what Sheridan claims to have been waiting for to assume the offensive against Early; General Grant, having come from City Point to Charlestown on the i6th of Septem ber, approved Sheridan's plans of attack and then returned to the Army of the Potomac. At 3 A. M. of the 19th, Sheridan's army moved out from the Clifton-Berryville line to the Opequon, Wilson's cavalry first striking Ramseur's Confederate Division immediately west of the Opequon in the canyon on the 204 Sheridan's campaigns Berryville- Winchester road, driving it in to ward Winchester. This movement was sup ported by the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, who, with Crook's Eighth Corps in reserve, then took up the fighting, which became desper ate, with varying results throughout the day, until Crook's Corps, having been put in on the right of the Nineteenth Corps, found the enemy's left flank and crushed it. Simulta neously the two Divisions of cavalry (Merritt's and Averell's) under Torbert, which had cross ed the Opequon lower down (north) and had joined forces at Stephenson's Depot, came charging up the Martinsburg road, driving be fore them Lomax's Confederate Cavalry Divi sion in a confused mass through the Confeder ate broken infantry troops. Sheridan then ad vanced his entire infantry line, and assembling Torbert's two Cavalry Divisions on the right of the infantry, directed them to renew the charge, and Early's army was driven through Winchester hopelessly routed at dark, in full retreat toward Newtown and Fisher's Hill, where the valley narrows down to about four miles in width and furnishes an almost im pregnable defensive position, which Early had also strongly entrenched. The losses at the Battle of the Opequon (or Winchester) were: Union, killed, 697; wound ed, 3,983; missing, 338— total, 5,018. Con federates ; Early's official report gives his killed at 226, wounded, 1,567; missing, 1,818 — ^total. BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON, ETC. 205 3,611, and he also admits losing three guns, but makes no report of his cavalry losses, which were undoubtedly heavy. Among general offi cers lost were Generals Rodes and Godwin by the Confederates; Gen. D. A. Russell by the Federals — all killed. On the 31st of August Sheridan's returns showed a strength present of about 50,000 men, of whom 8,000 were cavalry. It is not possible to get at Early's strength for the same period, on account of the incompleteness of his re turns, and want of mention of either his artil lery or his cavalry, but his army was undoubt edly inferior in all arms to Sheridan's, espe cially in cavalry. Sheridan, on the 20th of September, follow ed Early with his infantry and Merritt's cav alry on the Valley turnpike to the Heights of Strasburg, sending his cavalry under Averell by a parallel road to the westward, known as the Back road, and Wilson's cavalry eastward toward Front Royal by a road diverging from the Valley pike at Newtown. During the night of the 21st orders were sent to Crook's Corps to repeat his movement of the 19th, by getting into position on the Confederate left flank and attacking from that direction. To do so. Crook was moved from his position in reserve on Cedar Creek to a point on North Mountain, some distance beyond where Sheri dan had massed the Nineteenth and the Sixth Army Corps, then passing through a series of 2o6 Sheridan's campaigns ravines and woods, which concealed his move ments, to a point which brought him in beyond the Confederate left. Crook, early on the 22d, formed in two parallel columns and proceeded in that formation until he had gone almost the length of his columns to the rear of the Confed erate entrenchments, when he faced to the left, and thus formed a double line of battle, which was moved forward with a shout, going over very difficult ground and taking the Confeder ate battle-lined entrenchments in reverse, driv ing out its defenders in confusion, who were pursued four miles without being permitted to reform. A battery near the left of the Con federate line was abandoned by its gunners and run over by Crook's men, and small arms in great quantities were thrown away. Being then joined by Ricketts's Division of the Sixth Corps, which, equally with all the remainder of the infantry, had passed through the Confed erate lines in their front. Crook continued the pursuit until dark. Crook's losses were only 8 killed, 153 wounded and i missing. The en tire losses were but 528. Among those Crook thanked in his official report, was Capt. Wil liam McKinley, acting assistant adjutant-gen eral. At Fisher's Hill Early reported his losses to aggregate 1,235 men and 12 guns, and many small arms thrown away. In taking up that po sition, which had been repaired and strength ened a month before, Early evidently expected battles OF THE OPEQUON, ETC. 207 to check effectually Sheridan's jubilant army from passing farther south up the Valley. To secure himself at Fisher's Hill and his commu nications with Harrisonburg and Staunton, Early immediately detached Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on the 20th of September to prevent any movement of the enemy into the Luray Valley by way of Front Royal. There Fitzhugh Lee was attacked by Sheridan's cavalry under Torbert on the 21st and again at Milford Creek on the 22d. At the latter place the Shen andoah impinges so closely upon the Blue Ridge that the position could not be turned, and the banks of Milford Creek so precipitous that a direct attack was out of the question ; so, on the 23d, Torbert withdrew to Front Royal, Cedarville and Buckton. There he learned of the victory at Fisher's Hill, and at the same time received orders from Sheridan to move up the Luray Valley again. Torbert found the enemy had gone from Milford Creek, but came up with him on the 24th, three miles from Lu ray, driving him through the town and out on the New Market road over Massanutten Mountain. On the 25th Torbert rejoined the main army at New Market, Early having re treated through that place the day before, and gone through Harrisonburg to Port Republic, in which direction he was followed by Tor bert's cavalry, who also sent a part of his force around through Staunton to Waynesborough. Here Torbert met resistance from Early's main 2o8 Sheridan's campaigns army and fell back toward Staunton on the night of the 28th, to Spring Hill, on Middle River, and went to Bridgewater, on North River, on the 29th. The other part of Tor bert's cavalry was at Cross Keys operating in the vicinity of Brown's Gap and Piedmont. Early, meanwhile, had been reinforced by Ker shaw's Division of infantry, which had been diverted by General Lee at Orange Court- House, while it was marching to rejoin him at Richmond pursuant to previous orders already mentioned. Kershaw joined Early at Port Re public. Rosser, with his brigade of cavalry, was also sent to Early via Burksville. Sheridan moved his infantry to Harrison burg on the 25th and to Mount Crawford on the 29th, while Torbert's cavalry were carrying out General Grant's instructions to desttoy all mills, grain, forage, etc., that they could not use themselves, in the vicinity of Staunton, Waynesboro, Piedmont and Port Republic. Grant's latest orders to Sheridan of September 26 read : "If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley lO remain a barren waste." It was while at Harrisonburg on the ist of October that Sheridan received a dispatch from General Grant, dated September 28, and sent through General Halleck at Washington, that it was expected of him to reach Charlottes ville. Sheridan, in reply, said : "It is no easy matter to pass these mountain gaps [meaning BATTLES OP THE OPEQUON, ETC. 209 the Blue Ridge] and attack Charlottesville, hauling supplies through difficult passes, 14 miles in length, and with a line of communica tion from 135 to 145 miles long, without the or ganization of supply trains, ordnance trains, and all the appointments of an army making a permanent advance. * * * i am ready and willing to cross the Blue Ridge, but know from present indications that the enemy will strongly fortify at Charlottesville and Gordonsville, and that these places cannot be taken without the expenditure of a largely superior force to keep open the line of communication. With my present means I cannot accumulate supplies enough to carry me through to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad." In a dispatch to Halleck of the same date as the one to Grant (October i, 1864,) Sheridan says : " * * * I strongly advise General Grant to terminate this campaign by the destruction of the crops in the Valley and the means of planting, and the transfer of the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps to his army at Richmond. This is my best judgment. With Crook's force the Valley can be held. * * * There is no ob jective point except Lynchburg, and it cannot be invested on the line of this Valley and the in vesting army supplied. What we have destroy ed and can destroy in this Valley is worth mil lions of dollars to the rebel Government." On the 3d of October General Grant tele graphed Secretary Stanton: "I will follow 14 2IO Sheridan's campaigns Sheridan's suggestion of bringing the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps here and yoiirs as to bringing them by rail from Front Royal." So General Grant relinquished for the time his pet idea of getting possession of Charlottes ville and breaking up the Virginia Central Rail road at that point. He had urged that move ment on Hunter when that officer was on his expedition up the Valley towards Lynchburg in June, and had sent Sheridan with two divi sions of cavalry from City Point to meet Hun ter in that vicinity when Sheridan was inter cepted by Wade Hampton at Trevilians's. Grant repeated the project to Hunter and to Wright after Early had retreated from in front of Washington, and we have just seen how he recurred to the same plan when Sheridan reach ed Harrisonburg and Staunton. On the 3d of October Grant directed Sheri dan : "Take up such position in the Valley as you think can and ought to be held, and send all the force not required for this immediately here. Leave nothing for the subsistence of an army on any ground you abandon to the enemy. I will direct the railroad to be pushed toward Front Royal, so that you may send your troops back that way. * * *" As the Manassas Gap Railroad from Strasburg and Front Royal would carry the troops to Alexandria, water transportation from that place to City Point was arranged for. With this authority Sheridan commenced withdrawing from the upper Valley on the 6th BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON, ETC. 211 of October, his cavalry moving in rear of his infantry and stretched "across the Valley from the Blue Ridge to the eastern slope of the Alle ghenies, with directions to burn all forage and drive off all stock, etc., as they moved to the rear, fully coinciding with the views of the Lieutenant-General, that the Valley should be made a barren waste. The most positive orders were given, however, not to burn private dwell ings. In this movement the enemy's cavalry followed at a respectful distance until in the vi cinity of Woodstock, when they attacked Cus ter's Division, and harassed it as far as Tom's Brook, a short distance south of Fisher's Hill." There, on the 8th of October, Sheridan halt ed his infantry and instructed Torbert to en gage the Confederate cavalry and to defeat it. With Custer's Division on the Back road and Merritt's on the Valley pike, the heads of the opposing columns came in contact at Tom's Brook on the 9th and deployed. "After a short but decisive engagement the enemy was defeat ed, with the loss of all his artillery, excepting one piece, and everything else that was carried on wheels. The rout was complete and was followed up to Mount Jackson, a distance of some twenty-six miles. "On October loth the army crossed to the north side of Cedar Creek, the Sixth Corps continuing its march to Front Royal. * * * " From this the Sixth Corps was recalled, how ever, when it was learned that Early's army 212 Sheridan's campaigns had returned to his entrenched lines on Fisher's Hill on the 13th. While Sheridan was at Harrisonburg and above, it was found to be exceedingly difficult to get the necessary supply trains through to him from Martinsburg or Harper's Ferry, un less heavily escorted. It was simply a repeti tion of the experience of Banks and Fremont in 1862 and of Hunter in June, 1864, while op erating in that same region, among a thorough ly hostile population, with Mosby's and White's men swarming through the passes of the Blue Ridge from Loudoun County to fall upon any unprotected convoy that could not be fought through. With Sheridan the case was made more difficult still, by the addition of hundreds of armed stragglers from Early's army who had been dispersed at the battles of Winchester and Fisher's Hill, and who, under the leader ship of their officers, likewise stragglers, had been gathered from the mountains in squads, after Sheridan's army had passed on, and form ed in the aggregate quite a formidable force in his rear. While on his return march, Sheridan report^ to Grant from Woodstock on the 7th of Octo ber the results of his operations as follows : "In moving back to this point the whole country from the Blue Ridge to. the North Mountains has been made untenable for a rebel army. I have destroyed over 2,000 barns filled with wheat, hay and farming implements; over 70 BATTLES OP THE OPEQUON, ETC. 213 mills filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4,000 head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than 3,000 sheep. This destruction embraces the Luray Valley and Little Fort Valley, as well as the main Valley. A large number of horses has been obtained, a proper estimate of which I cannot now make. * * * Since I came into the Valley from Harper's Ferry up to Harrisonburg, every train, every small party and every straggler has been bushwhacked by people, many of whom have protection papers from commanders who have been hitherto in this Valley. From the vicinity of Harrisonburg over 400 wagon loads of refugees have been sent back to Martinsburg; most of these people were Dunkers and had been conscripted. * * * To-morrow I will continue the destruction of wheat, forage, etc., down to Fisher's Hill. When this is completed, the Valley from Win chester up to Staunton, ninety-two miles, will have but little in it for man or beast. * * * " These Dunkers are a religious sect which came to America from Switzerland and Ger many between 1719 and 1729; they settled first in Pennsylvania, from where they spread out into Ohio, Maryland and Virginia. Their be lief was akin both to that of the Baptists and the Friends, particularly that tenet of the latter sect which forbids the shedding of human blood in battle. 214 SHERIDAN S CAMPAIGNS Being essentially an agricultural people, the fertile valley of the Shenandoah was not long in inviting them to settle there the overflow from their increasing numbers in Pennsylvania, especially from the Cumberland Valley, by way of its physical extension southward across the Potomac through Winchester, up to the broad expanse of the Valley at Harrisonburg and vi cinity. It was the descendants of these Dunker pio neers that Sheridan found means to provide for, when he loaded them into his empty wagons at Harrisonburg and brought them North with him. His orders had required him to destroy their means of subsistence and leave them des titute, so that Confederate troops could no lon ger forage there. The relations of the Dunkers to the Confed eracy were passive rather than disloyal. They meekly accepted the situation and the usual conditions of war, except to volunteer to bear arms and go into battle. This their religious faith forbade. , They submitted to all the penalties of the Conscription Acts, but still refused to shed blood, — until modified relief came to them through an Act of the Confederate Congress, dated October n, 1862, by which provision was made to exempt them as follows : " * * * and all persons who have been or who are now members of the Society of Friends and the As sociation of Dunkards, Nazarenes, and Men- BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON, ETC. 215 nonites, in regular membership in their respec tive denominations, provided, * * * [they] shall furnish substitutes or pay a tax of five hundred dollars each into the public Treasury." A more liberal Act of the Legislature of Vir ginia had already beien passed March 29th, 1862, by which there was a proviso that, where unable to pay the tax of five hundred dollars, a Dunkard might "be employed as a teamster or in some character which will not require the actual bearing of arms," etc. To the westward of the Valley, about Ward ensville and Moorefield, there were two bodies of partisans, under the leadership of Harness and McNeill, who were very enterprising, and constantly making forays through that moun tainous section toward the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad near Cumberland or New Creek (Keyser), or up the South Branch Valley. But the most formidable of all the independ ent parties of Confederate regulars or irregu lars sent out that season, was one organized under Lieut.-Col. Vincent A. Witcher, of the Thirty-fourth Battalion Virginia Cavalry, which, starting from Jeffersonville, in South western Virginia, passed down the Valley of New River to Lewisburg, where Witcher pick ed up several small guerilla bands commanded by the Thurmond brothers and others, making an aggregate force of 523. Leaving Lewisburg on the 22d of September, Witcher marched northward over the Cold 2i6 Sheridan's campaigns Knob trail to Bulltown, thence to Weston and Buckhannon. The only resistance Witcher mentioned having was from some home-guards at each of the above-mentioned places, who were easily dispersed. He claims to have cap tured and paroled 300 prisoners, taken 1,000 small arms, 400 horses and 300 beef cattle, and destroyed large quantities of commissary, quar termaster and medical stores. General Lee had authorized the expedition and commended the results, but it had no military value beyond causing a commotion to the weak guards of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad within Gen eral Kelley's jurisdiction, west of Cumberland, although none of Witcher's men reached the railroad itself. The movement was intended by General Lee as a diversion in favor of Early, but Witcher found the railroad too well guard ed to be attacked, so he withdrew to the Green brier country. The excesses committed by Witcher's men were so discreditable that the Confederate War Department was forced to take notice of them. CHAPTER XII Sheridan's Campaigns (Continued) BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK AND SUBSEQUENT CAVALRY MOVEMENTS That the project of a movement on Gordons ville still existed in General Grant's mind was made manifest by a dispatch from Halleck to Sheridan, dated Washington, October 12, noon, reading: "General Grant wishes a position taken far enough south to serve as a base for future operations upon Gordonsville and Char lottesville. It must be strongly fortified and provisioned. Some point in the vicinity of Manassas Gap would seem best suited for all purposes. * * * " It is to be recalled that a large force of men and a railroad construction corps were at work restoring the Manassas Gap Railroad from x'Vlexandria (or Manassas Junc tion) through to Front Royal, although con tinually harassed by Mosby's and White's guer rilla bands. The expectation was to transfer Sheridan's base of supplies from Harper's Ferry to Alexandria as soon as the Manassas Gap Railroad could be made use of. 2i8 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) This revived Gordonsville project Sheridan disapproved of, and after considerable comrnu- nication backward and forward between him and Washington, and Washington with City Point, he was called to Washington by Mr. Stanton on the 13th of October, who said : "If you can come here a consultation on several points is extremely desirable. I propose to visit General Grant and would like to see you first." Early, who had been reinforced by Ker shaw's Infantry Division at Port Republic, September 26th and by Rosser's Cavalry Divi sion on the 2d of October at Mount Crawford, followed Sheridan's forces as the latter retired down the valley. Early halting his infantry for a few days at New Market, and then moving down to his old line at Fisher's Hill on the 13th of October, as already stated, closely ob servant of Sheridan' .:f further movements. In his general report of the Valley cam paigns, which he wrote at New Orleans Feb ruary 3, 1866, Sheridan says: "On the even ing of the 15th I determined to go [meaning to Washington] , believing that the enemy at Fish er's Hill could not accomplish much, and as I had concluded not to attack him at present, I ordered the whole of the cavalry force under General Torbert to accompany me to Front Royal, from where I intended to push it through Chester Gap to the Virginia Central Railroad at Charlottesville, while I passed Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 219 through Manassas Gap to Piedmont, thence by rail to Washington. Upon my arrival with the cavalry at Front Royal on the night of the 1 6th, I received a dispatch from General Wright, who was left at Cedar Creek in com mand of the army, to the effect that a message taken off the Confederate signal fiag on Three Top Mountain, overlooking Fisher's Hill, indi cated that Longstreet was moving to Early's support, and when the two forces joined they would crush Sheridan. Moreover, Wright ex pressed great uneasiness that the enemy might attack his right fiank from the direction of North Mountain." Sheridan then says concerning the Confeder ate signal message: "My first thought was that it was a ruse, but, on reflection, deemed it best to abandon the cavalry raid and give to Wright the entire strength of the army. I therefore ordered the cavalry to return and report to him." Sheridan then rode on to Piedmont, where he found transportation to Washington by rail, reaching that city on the morning of the 17th; had his interview with Mr. Stanton and re turned to Winchester by a special train over the Baltimore and Ohio as far as Martinsburg, so that he reached Winchester on the night of the 1 8th of October and slept there. Torbert's two divisions of cavalry, mean while, had rejoined Wright from Front Royal on the 17th, one division (Powell's) being 220 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) placed along the line of the Shenandoah from the left of the army toward Front Royal, while Merritt's division returned to its former posi tion on the right of the infantry, where Cus ter's Division had remained to cover that flank, during the absence of the other two divisions, when Sheridan organized the projected raid on Charlottesville via Front Royal and Chester Gap, which he subsequently abandoned. So that, on the night of the i8th, the line of the Union Army was along Cedar Creek, the Eighth Corps (Crook's) on the left, with Powell's Cavalry Division to his left, 1)ut about eight miles away at the crossing of the Shenan doah on the Front Royal and Winchester turn pike. To the right of Crook came the Nine teenth Army Corps, then commanded by Em ory, and still farther to the right was the Sixth Corps (Wright's). Merritt's and Custer's Cavalry Divisions were placed beyond the right of the Sixth Corps, and west of Middletown. The general direction of the entire line was originally S. E. to N. W., north of Cedar Creek. Early, in his report of October 21 to General Lee from New Market, says : "After ascertaining the location of the en emy's camps by observation from the signal station on Massanutten Mountain, I determined to move around the left flank of the enemy. * * * To get around the enemy's left was a very difficult undertaking, however, as the river Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 221 had to be crossed twice, and between the moun tain and river, where the troops had to pass to the lower ford, there was only a rugged path way. I thought, however, the chances of suc cess would be greater from the fact that the enemy would not expect a move in that direc tion, on account of the difficulties attending it and the great strength of their position on that flank. The movement was accordingly begun on the night of the i8th just after dark, Gor don's, Ramseur's and Pegram's Divisions be ing sent across the river and around the foot of the mountain, all under command of General Gordon; and late at night I moved with Ker shaw's Division through Strasburg toward a ford on Cedar Creek just above its mouth, and Wharton was moved on the pike toward the enemy's front, in which road the artillery was also moved. The arrangement was for Gordon to come around in the rear, for Kershaw to at tack the left flank, and for Wharton to advance in front, supporting the artillery, which was to open on the enemy when he should turn on Gordon or Kershaw, and the attack was to be gin at 5 A. M. Rosser was sent to the left to occupy the enemy's cavalry, and Lomax, who had been sent down the Luray Valley, was ordered to pass Front Royal, cross the river and move across to the Valley pike. Punctually at 5 A. m. Kershaw reached the enemy's left work and attacked and carried it 222 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) without the least difficulty, and very shortly afterwards Gordon attacked in the rear, and they swept everything before them, routing the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps completely, get ting possession of their camp and capturing i8 pieces of artillery and about 1,300 prisoners. They moved across the pike toward the camp of the Sixth Corps, and Wharton was crossed over, the artillery following him ; but the Sixth Corps, which was on the enemy's extreme right of his infantry, was not surprised in camp, be cause Rosser had commenced the attack on that flank about the same time as the attack on the other, and the firing on the left gave that corps sufficient time to form and move out of camp, and it was found posted on a ridge on the west of the pike and parallel to it, and this corps of fered considerable resistance. The artillery was brought up and opened on it, when it fell back to the north of Middletown and made a stand on a commanding ridge running across the pike. In the meantime the enemy's cavalry was threatening our right flank and rear, and the country being perfectly open, and having on that flank only Lomax's old brigade, number ing about 300 men, it became necessary to make dispositions to prevent a cavalry charge and a portion of the troops were moved to the right for- that purpose, and word was sent to Gordon, who had got on the left with his division, and Kershaw, who was there also, to swing round Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 223 and advance with their divisions; but they stated in reply that a heavy force of cavalry had got in their front, and that their ranks were so depleted by the number of men who had stopped in the camps to plunder, that they could not advance them. Rosser also sent word that when he attack ed the cavalry he found a part of the Sixth Corps supporting it, that a very heavy force of cavalry had massed in his front and that it was too strong for him and that he would have to fall back. I sent word to him to get some po sition that he could hold, and the cavalry in front of Kershaw and Gordon having moved toward Rosser, they were moved forward and a line was formed north of Middletown and fac ing the enemy. The cavalry on the right made several efforts to charge that flank but was driven back. So many of our men had stopped in the camp to plunder (in which I am sorry to say that officers participated), the country was so open and the enemy's cavalry was so strong, that I did not deem it prudent to press further, especially as Lomax had not come up. I deter mined, therefore, to content myself with trying to hold the advantages I had gained until all my troops had come up and the captured prop erty was secured. If I had had but one division of fresh troops I could have made the victory complete and beyond all danger of a reverse. We continued to hold our position until late in 224 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) the afternoon when the enemy commenced ad vancing." In the Union army the first blow had fallen upon the left flank and rear of Crook's Eighth Army Corps (the Army of West Virginia), then numbering about 4,000 men present, and constituting the left of the Federal infantry forces. This corps was soon crushed back upon the Nineteenth Corps, which, in turn, was fiercely attacked by the Confederates from the rear and on both flanks, and after some resist ance forced from its position, and both corps being overpowered, were seized with panic and dispersed toward Middletown, north of which place a rally was finally made upon the un broken Sixth Corps (Wright's) about i p. m., and further attacks by the enemy successfully resisted. It was at this stage that General Sheridan reached the field from Winchester, ten miles away, and resumed command of the disordered army. General Wright, on whom the command had devolved during Sheridan's ab sence, returning to his own, the Sixth Corps. Sheridan in his report of the battle says : "At about 7 o'clock on the morning of the 19th of October an officer on picket at Winchester re ported artillery firing, but, supposing it resulted from a reconnaissance which had been ordered for this morning, I paid no attention to it and was unconscious of the true condition of affairs until about 9 o'clock, when, having ridden through the town of Winchester, the sound of Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 225 artillery made a battle unmistakable, and, on reaching Mill Creek, half a mile south of Win chester, the head of the fugitives appeared in sight, trains and men coming to the rear with appalling rapidity. I immediately gave direc tions to halt and park the trains at Mill Creek, and ordered the brigade at Winchester to stretch across the country and stop all strag glers. Taking twenty men from my escort I pushed on to the front. * * * I am happy to say that hundreds of the men, when on reflection found they had not done themselves justice, came back with cheers. On arriving at the front I found Merritt's and Custer's Divisions of Cavalry, under Tor bert, and General Getty's Division of the Sixth Corps, opposing the enemy. I suggested to General Wright that we would fight on Getty's line, and to transfer Custer to the right at once, as he (Custer) and Merritt, from being on the right in the morning, had been transferred to the left ; that the remaining two divisions of the Sixth Corps, which were to the right and rear of Getty about two miles, should be ordered up, and also that the Nineteenth Corps, which was on the right and rear of these two divisions, should be hastened up before the enemy attack ed Getty. I then started out all my staff offi cers to bring up these troops, and was so con vinced that we would soon be attacked that I went back myself to urge them on. Imme diately after I returned and assumed command, 15 226 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) General Wright returning to his corps, Getty to his division, the line of battle was formed on the prolongation of Getty's line, and a tempo rary breastwork of rails, logs, etc., thrown up hastily. * * * At 4 p. m. I ordered the advance. * * * It was at this stage of the battle that Cus ter was ordered to charge with his entire divi sion, but, although the order was promptly obeyed, it was not in time to capture the whole of the force thus cut off, and many escaped across Cedar Creek. Simultaneous with this charge a combined movement of the whole line drove the enemy in confusion to the creek, where, owing to the difficulties of crossing, his army became routed. Custer, finding a ford on Cedar Creek west of the pike, and Devin, of Merritt's Division, one to the east of it, they each made a crossing just after dark and pur sued the routed mass of the enemy to Fisher's Hill, where his strong position gave him some protection against our cavalry ; but most of his transportation had been captured, the road from Cedar Creek to Fisher's Hill, a distance of over three miles, being literally blockaded by wagons, ambulances, artillery, caissons, etc." For the harrowing particulars of that rout, the loss of artillery and transportation, etc.. Early gives in his report to General Lee a most graphic and pathetic account of the crumbling away of his infantry under Sheridan's attack, commencing on the left of his line in Gordon's Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 227 Division, followed by Kershaw's and Ram seur's; "when they found Gordon's giving away, not because there was any pressure on them, but because of an insane idea of being flanked. Some of them, however, were rallied, and with the help of the artillery the army [enemy] was checked for some time; but a great number of the men could not be stopped, but continued to go to the rear. * * * The left again gave way, and then the whole command falling back in such a panic that I had to order Pegram's and Wharton's commands, which .were very small and on the right, to fall back, and most of them took the panic also. I found it impossible to rally the troops. They would not listen to entreaties, threats, or appeals of any kind. A terror of the enemy's cavalry had seized them and there was no holding them. They left the field in the greatest confusion. All the captured artillery had been carried across Cedar Creek and a large number of cap tured wagons and ambulances, and we succeed ed in crossing our own artillery over. * * * A small body of the enemy's cavalry dashed across Cedar Creek above the bridge and got into the train and artillery running back on the pike, and passed through our men to this side of Strasburg, tore up a bridge, and thus succeeded in capturing the greater part of the artillery and a number of ordnance and medical wagons and ambulances. The men scattered on the sides and the rout was as thorough and dis graceful as ever happened to our army." 228 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) Early claims to have captured i8 guns and 1,300 prisoners in the early part of the day; he secured his prisoners before the panic struck his troops, but his "net" loss in artillery on the 19th was 23 pieces. He does not give his own losses in prisoners, killed or wounded. As none of his division commanders made any re ports that are now available, those losses will probably never be ascertained. Sheridan gives his losses for the battles of the Opequon, September 19th, Fisher's Hill, September 22d, and Cedar Creek, October 19th, 1864, besides reconnaissances and minor engagements, as follows: Killed, 1,938; wounded, 11,893; missing, 3,121 — an aggre gate of 16,952. His field return for September 10, 1864, showed a strength of 40,672. There is no record of Early's strength nor of his losses during the 1864 campaign in the Valley. It was several days before Sheridan could give many particulars of his victory at Cedar Creek, but on the 25th of October he tele graphed to General Grant as follows : "The battle of the 19th still increases in re sults. We captured 48 pieces of artillery, cais sons, horses and all the appointments; 24 of the above number were captured from us in the morning; these I returned, and in addition al lowed the batteries to refit and exchange, and have left 24 pieces of rebel artillery, with cais- Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 229 sons complete, which I will send to Washing ton to-morrow. All the ambulances of the Nineteenth Corps captured by the enemy were retaken, with 56 rebel ambulances in good con dition, and as many more were destroyed. A number of wagons and ambulances were burn ed unnecessarily by the cavalry in the excite ment. Not less than 300 wagons and ambu lances were captured or burned. The road be tween Cedar Creek and Fisher's Hill for three miles was blocked by captured artillery and wagons. * * * We captured 14 battle-flags. * * * We are now reduced to an effective force of not over 22,000 infantry. From the ac counts of officers, Early's infantry when he at tacked me was 25,000; the number of cavalry not yet known." This pecuHar battle of Cedar Creek, or Belle Grove as the Confederates called it, probably has never had its exact counterpart. Early gives his reason for attacking an intrenched enemy, who was probably his superior in strength, that owing to the lack of forage for his animals and the great difficulty of otherwise supplying his troops, so far from his base, the intermediate country having been laid waste, he would be forced soon to withdraw his army altogether unless he could accomplish by sur prise what he dared not attempt otherwise. He selected also the stronger flank of his enemy for the execution of his well-conceived plan, with success almost within his grasp, when, by 230 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) superhuman efforts on the part of his enemy, together with the disintegration of his own troops, while plundering the captured Federal camps, the tide was turned against him. An hour more of daylight would have destroyed entirely his panic-stricken army. He found he could not rally his forces in his old entrenchments at Fisher's Hill, they having lost all organization, so under cover of the night he retreated to New Market, fortunately for him unpursued, while Sheridan's army simply returned for the night to the camps they had lost in the morning. All reports show that no Confederate attack was expected, for even General Sheridan be lieved he could safely leave his army to obey Mr. Stanton's call to Washington, although the false Confederate signal message from Long- street caused him great uneasiness. Wright, whom he left in command, says that the reconnaissance by a brigade sent out from Crook's command returned on the i8th and reported "that nothing was to be found in his old camp (the enemy's), and that he had doubt less retreated up the valley." That reconnais sance could not have proceeded very far, for Crook's line, as shown by both Confederate and Union maps, was less than five miles from Early's. Not being satisfied with the result of this reconnaissance of the i8th, Wright pre pared two others — one brigade from the Nine teenth Corps and another from the cavalry — to start at early dawn of the 19th of October, up Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 231 the Valley turnpike and the Back road respect ively, to ascertain the enemy's whereabouts. Both these columns were in the act of starting when the attack opened on both flanks of the army. Wright expected an attack on his right flank instead of the left flank, if the enemy attacked him at all, for he said in his despatch of the 1 6th to Sheridan, then at Front Royal, trans mitting the bogus signal message: "If the enemy should be strongly reinforced in cavalry, he might, by turning our right, give us a great deal of trouble. I shall hold on here until the enemy's movements are developed, and shall only fear an attack on my right, which I shall make every effort for guarding against and resisting." After the battle of Cedar Creek and until the loth of November, Early remained with his shattered army in the vicinity of New Market and Harrisonburg, reorganizing and recruiting his forces. He received during this period some accessions by conscripts, detailed men, and men of the second class (farmers) — reserves probably. At sunrise of the loth of November Early marched his army from New Market down the Valley again, through Woodstock, and the next day to Middletown, where Sheridan's cavalry pickets were first encountered, the latter's main army being entrenched north of Newtown, at Kernstown, etc., where Sheridan had with- 232 SHERIDAN*S CAMPAIGNS (CONTINUED) drawn shortly after the battle of Cedar Creek, to shorten his line of supplies from his depots at Winchester. Early lay in line of battle near Newtown on the 12th, but made no attack; his cavalry on both flanks were driven back, Rosser by Custer on the Back road as far as Cedar Creek and McCausland on the Front Royal road by Powell as far as Milford. Sheridan says of this movement: "In consequence of contradictory information received from scouts and captured cavalry prisoners, I was uncon vinced of any rebel infantry being in my vicin ity until it was too late to overtake it in its galloping retreat, a retreat which was con tinued until in the vicinity of Lacey's Spring, near Harrisonburg." This affair was reported by Early to General Lee on the 13th from New Market, where he returned with his entire army, which he had taken with him to Newtown to ascertain Sheri dan's location; he remained in the vicinity of New Market until December 16, meanwhile detaching Rosser's Cavalry Division on the 26th of November for a raid on Moorefield and New Creek. Kershaw's division of infantry had already been detached on the 15th of No vember and sent to Richmond by way of Staunton. On the i6th of December Early also sent to Richmond, Gordon's and Pegram's Divisions of infantry by way of Staunton and Waynesboro. Early then had left with him but two divi sions of infantry (Wharton's and Rodes's, or Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 233 Grimes's) and Rosser's and Lomax's Divisions of cavalry, which were then retired up the val ley from New Market on the i6th of Decem ber, Wharton and Grimes going to Fishersville, while Lomax went to Swift Run Gap and Ros ser to Swoope's, five miles west of Staunton. Rosser's raid on Moorefield, New Creek and Piedmont, from which he had only recently returned, yielded great and unexpected results, for he had captured and destroyed vast quanti ties of army and railway material at both New Creek (Keyser) and Piedmont, besides 8 pieces of artillery, part of which he brought off. Also about 350 prisoners, and all with very small loss to his own troops. The capture of the forts at New Creek on the 28th of November, being a complete surprise in broad daylight, was a disgrace to the garrison. At Piedmont, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, five miles west of New Creek, a detachment, under Major McDonald, endeavored to destroy the railway material and shops, but succeeded only partially in so doing, being prevented by the small gar rison of Federal troops, thirty-five men in all, under Captain Fisher of the Sixth West Vir ginia Infantry. Rosser then hurriedly withdrew his division to New Market by the route he had come, via Greenland Gap, Petersburg and Brock's Gap, rejoining Early in the upper valley. For permitting his garrison at New Creek to be surprised, and the consequent humiliating 234 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) losses of prisoners and public stores. Colonel Latham, Fifth West Virginia Cavalry, the commander, was sentenced by court-martial to be dismissed from the service, but this sentence was subsequently revoked by a War Depart ment order and Colonel Latham was "honor ably mustered out of the service at his own request March 9, 1865." On the 28th of November, 1864, after Early had withdrawn to the region of Staunton in the upper valley. General Sheridan, from his in trenched camp at Kernstown, sent out Merritt's Division of cavalry to clear the country of guerrillas east of the Blue Ridge and in Lou doun county. This was the main field of oper ations of the Confederate partisan Colonel Mosby, who had shown much enterprise in cap turing small bodies of Federal troops passing through the country, both east and west of the Blue Ridge, attacking parties repairing rail roads, or insufficiently guarded wagon-trains, and for which he had received the warmest approval of General Lee. Sheridan, in his report of the Valley cam paign, mentions the annoyance these guerrillas or partisan bands had caused him, but had con stantly refused to operate against them, "be lieving them to be, substantially, a benefit to me, as they prevented straggling and kept my trains well closed up, and discharged such other duties as would have required a provost-g^ard of at least two regiments of cavalry." In re- Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 235 taliation for the assistance and sympathy given them, however, by the inhabitants of Loudoun valley, Sheridan sent out Merritt, with instruc tions to operate in the region east of the Blue Ridge "bounded on the south by the Manassas Gap Railroad as far east as White Plains, on the east by the Bull Run Range, on the west by the Shenandoah River, and on the north by the Potomac." Merritt was further instructed to "consume and destroy all forage and subsistence, burn all barns and mills and their contents, and drive off all stock in the region. * * * This order must be literally executed, bearing in mind, however, that no dwellings are to be burned, and that no personal violence be offered the citizens. The ultimate results of the guer rilla system of warfare is the destruction of all private rights in the country occupied by such parties. This destruction may as well com mence at once, and the responsibility of it must rest upon the authorities at Richmond, who have acknowledged the legitimacy of guerrilla bands. * * * " Merritt, in his report of December 6, 1864, says these orders "were most fully carried out," but although the entire Loudoun Region was gone over, few guerrillas were found. Shortly after Merritt's return from Loudoun valley, Sheridan sent Custer's Cavalry Division up the Shenandoah to locate the whereabouts of Early's army. Custer left the vicinity of 236 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) Kernstown at an early hour on the 19th of December, by way of the Valley Turnpike. At Woodstock, on the 20th, Custer first learned of the presence of the Confederate cavalry ad vanced scouts, who were picketing the three roads leading down the Valley — the turnpike, the Middle and the Back roads — extending from Edenburg westward to Little North Mountain. Custer took with him but three days' rations and one day's forage, expecting to find the enemy's cavalry no farther south than New Market ; but finding no serious opposition even at Woodstock, and learning of no large force of the enemy being nearer than Staunton, Custer continued his march into the region that had been devastated by General Grant's orders in the early autumn, camping at Lacey's Springs, 9 miles north of Harrisonburg, dur ing the night of December 20. Strong pickets were thrown out toward Harrisonburg in front, Keezletown on the left. Timber ville on the right, and a large force was left on the pike well to the rear. In this position Custer was attacked about 6 A. M. of the 2 1st by Payne's Brigade of Ros ser's Cavalry Division from the direction of Timberville, to Custer's right and rear, toward which point they had marched from their camp near Staunton the day before, reaching Custer's vicinity during the night- of December 20. Rosser's other two brigades attacked from the Back road. Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 237 These were all readily repulsed before day light, after which there was no further demon stration, but as two of his three day's rations and all of his forage had been consumed, with no expectation of replenishing either for at least two days should he continue his advance to Staunton through a devastated country, Custer decided to retire, especially as the weather was exceedingly inclement and he had quite a number of wounded, mainly from sabre cuts, to care for. He took 32 prisoners, but does not state how many he lost in killed or captured, although Early claims Rosser took forty. As Rosser attacked with sabres a force he expected to surprise in camp, but which he found on the alert, and who resisted with car bines at very short range, the probabilities are Rosser's losses in killed and wounded were larger than he cared to report. Simultaneously with Custer's reconnaissance up the Valley to locate Early's army. General Sheridan sent another expedition of two divi sions of cavalry under Torbert, to proceed from Winchester across the Blue Ridge by way of Front Royal and Chester Gap, thence south, to carry out, if practicable. General Grant's favorite hobby of seizing Gordonsville and Charlottesville, with a view to destroying the Virginia Central Railroad at those points. Torbert's column moved out the same day as Custer's (December 19), both columns suffer- 238 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) ing intensely from the severe winter weather. By the morning of the 20th Early had already received information of the movements of both commands, and prepared to meet them from both sides of the Blue Ridge with his greatly depleted and much scattered forces, together with such reinforcements as could be sent him from Richmond by rail. At that time Early had already sent off to Lee three of his divisions of infantry and, with his one remaining infantry division (Whar ton's), had established his winter quarters at Fishersville, on the Central Railroad, a few miles west of Waynesboro. He had placed one of his cavalry divisions (Rosser's) at Swoope's, five miles west of Staunton, while Lomax's Cavalry Division was posted east of the Blue Ridge, between Gordonsville and Liberty Mills. All these points were easily reached by rail and were outside the zone of Sheridan's destructive autumn operations. When Sheridan had learned earlier in the month that Early had sent away Kershaw's, Gordon's and Pegram's Divisions, he, too, de tached all of the Sixth Corps (Wright's) and sent it to Grant at Petersburg, by way of Har per's Ferry, Washington, Chesapeake bay and City Point. In addition he sent Grant one di vision of Crook's Eighth Army Corps, with drawing the remainder of that corps to Cum berland, where it went into winter quarters. This left to Sheridan for immediate service in the Valley, the two divisions of the Nine- Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 239 teenth Corps (Emory's) and Torbert's three divisions of cavalry, and he had placed the railroad from Harper's Ferry in running order almost to his camps around Winchester. The two divisions of the Nineteenth Army Corps were also subsequently withdrawn and sent to Grant. Torbert approached Gordonsville by way of Madison Court-House, driving in Jackson's Brigade of Lomax's cavalry, which rallied at Liberty Mills, and, together with McCaus land's Brigade, succeeded in delaying Torbert there by destroying the bridge over the Rapi dan and forcing Torbert to use the fords both above and below, when Lomax's troopers hasti ly fell back to a line of defenses immediately north of Gordonsville, which Torbert assaulted but could not carry, early on the morning of the 23rd. He had succeeded the night before, however, in capturing two field pieces and some thirty prisoners, with small losses. Having failed to dislodge Lomax, Torbert endeavored to flank him out by sending a strong column to turn the left of the position. While that movement was proceeding, the cars came in from Richmond loaded with infantry, which soon after were seen to file into the works. Torbert then became convinced it was useless further to attempt to break the Virginia Central Railroad at that point, and withdrew via Madison Court-House, with a loss of "six or eight men killed and about forty wounded, 240 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) more than I could transport, and the worst cases were left behind. * * * About thirty prisoners were taken, but having no provisions, and it being very difficult, if not impossible for them to keep up, I paroled them. The guns, two three-inch rifles, were brought to camp." * * * The infantry which Torbert saw file into the entrenchments in South West Mountain, north of Gordonsville, was Bratton's Brigade of Field's Division, which had been taken out of the lines in front of Petersburg and hurriedly sent by rail to Gordonsville at Early's call for assistance; Hunton's Brigade was following Bratton's, but did not reach Gordonsville when Torbert withdrew. The alarm being over, Hunton and Bratton were as rapidly taken back as they had been taken away from the lines of Lee's army. With the return of Torbert's expedition to Sheridan's army at Winchester, operations in the Valley or in the adjacent region were suspended. EPILOGUE Sheridan devoted the months of January and February, 1865, to the refitting of his cavalry and light artillery in the vicinity of Winches ter, preparing for a renewal of his campaign against Early. On the 31st day of December, 1864, Early's strength in the region of Fishersville and Staun ton, as shown by his inspection reports, aggre gated 3,611 men present and absent, with 28 guns. This strength was greatly diminished when the campaign against him opened two months later. Both armies sent out small expeditions dur ing January and February, noticeably one from Early's army, consisting of Rosser's cavalry, which went in January from their winter can tonment at Swoope's, a few miles west of Staunton, over the main Allegheny and Cheat River Mountains into Tygart's River Valley, and surprised Beverly. In going, Rosser fol lowed the old Parkersburg turnpike, one of the few good roads leading west and northwest out of the Valley, and had always been in coaching days, before the era of railroads, a favorite route to the Ohio river from Southern Vir- 242 EPILOGUE ginia. It is in excellent order today and was driven over by the writer in August, 1902. Some of the old taverns of the days of i860 still exist. Rosser, after capturing Beverly on the nth of January, returned to Swoope's by way of Huntersville and Warm Springs. The results of this raid were the capture of 572 officers and men belonging to the Eighth Ohio Cavalry and Thirty-fourth Ohio Infan try, about 100 horses, a small amount of quar termaster's stores and 10,000 rations, besides over 600 arms and equipments. The surprise was complete, as no attack was expected in the dead of winter, when the snows and inclement weather, as well as the isolation of the position among the mountains of West Virginia, gave a temporary fancied security to the garrison. The commanding officers of the Eighth Ohio Cavalry and Thirty-fourth Ohio Infantry were recommended for dismissal by General Crook, the Department Commander, "for disgraceful neglect." As at the surprise and capture of New Creek November 28, 1864, three months before, Ros ser's men wore Federal clothing, enabling them to effect a close approach before their identity could be discovered. Rosser claimed to have had only 300 men with him. If so, his divi sion had dwindled away to the size of a dimin utive regiment. During January and February several cav alry expeditions were sent out from Sheridan's EPILOGUE 243 position at Winchester, mainly to operate against Mosby and White, east of the Blue Ridge, and against Harry Gilmor or the Mc Neills in the vicinity of Moorefield, to the west ward in the South Branch of the Potomac Valley. In one of these latter Harry Gilmor was sur prised in bed at Randolph's, three miles out from Moorefield, at an early hour of the 5th of February. Gilmor, who appeared to be a free lance partisan from Maryland, had been sent by Early to take charge of the McNeill and Harness bands, operating near Moorefield, who resisted all control by anybody (especially by Gilmor). Sheridan in his "Memoirs" says of Gilmor's capture: "Thus the last link between Mary land and the Confederacy was carried a pris oner to Winchester, whence he was sent to Fort Warren." The capture was effected by Colonel Young and twenty men of Sheridan's scouts, dressed in Confederate uniforms, supported by a mixed cavalry detachment of 300 men under Lieut.-Col. E. W. Whitaker, First Connecticut Cavalry. As an offset to this capture of Gil mor, a party of 50 of his men, led by young Jesse McNeill and dressed in Federal uniforms, entered the City of Cumberland during the night of the 21st of February, proceeded direct to the hotel which was the headquarters of both Generals Kelley and Crook, surprising them in bed. Not a shot was fired and so little dis- 244 EPILOGUE turbance created, that staff officers living in rooms adjoining those of Generals Crook and Kelley, were not awakened. The raiders remained only ten minutes in the town, and then hastily withdrew on the Spring field and Romney road with their prisoners, reaching Staunton in the upper Shenajidoah on the 24th — all efforts to intercept the party hav ing failed. These captures were even more daringly made than was that of Harry Gilmor, about a fortnight earlier in the month, by Colonel Young. On the 27th of February, 1865, Sheridan started from Winchester with two divisions of cavalry (Custer's and Devin's) and three sec tions of artillery, the whole commanded by Major-General Wesley Merritt. The strength of the force was 9,987 officers and men. The men carried five days' rations in haver sacks, with fifteen days' additional rations of coffee, sugar and salt in wagons, thirty pounds of forage for each horse, one wagon for each division headquarters, eight ambulances and an ammunition train. No other wagons were allowed except a pontoon train of eight boats. According to the instructions of General Grant, Sheridan was to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad, the James River canal, cap ture Lynchburg, if practicable, and then join General Sherman wherever he might be found in North Carolina, or return to Winchester. EPILOGUE 245 Sheridan's troops were in fine condition for the movement, notwithstanding the bad con dition of the roads and the continued inclem ency of the weather, Early's depleted command near Staunton promising Httle opposition. Staunton was reached in four marches and found abandoned by the enemy, who had with drawn eastward to Waynesboro. He was closely followed and assaulted in position by Custer's Division, March 2d, who charged around and over the breastworks of Early's two brigades of infantry, dispersing them as well as a small body of cavalry under Rosser. The pursuit of the fugitives was continued as far as the South Fork of the Shenandoah river, where 11 pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, 200 loaded wagons, 17 battle flags and 1,400 officers and men were captured. Generals Early, Long, Wharton, Lilley and Rosser, with a few men, escaped. From Waynesboro the prisoners and cap tured artillery were sent back to Winchester under escort of 1,600 men, who safely reached their destination, although constantly harassed by a considerable force which Rosser had suc ceeded in gathering. Meanwhile Custer pushed on to Charlottes ville, destroying much government property on the way, besides the railroad and its bridges. At 4 p. M. of the 3d of March he was met by the mayor and prominent citizens of Charlottes ville, that town so long coveted by General Grant, who surrendered the place peaceably. 246 EPILOGUE Wharton, who had gathered a few of his infantry at Charlottesville the day before Cus ter's arrival, endeavored to find Early, but the latter with a small party had fled eastward toward Richmond. With this dispersal of Early's army at Waynesboro, campaigns in the Shenandoah were ended. Some minor scouting expeditions against Mosby's partisans were made from the region of Winchester, where Sheridan had left behind two or three thousand men to protect the lower valley. The line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and of the Potomac River, from Har per's Ferry westward, were strongly held against possible raiding parties coming either from the direction of the country where Mosby continued to operate, or from the region of Moorefield, where Jesse McNeill still had a small following. When Sheridan moved south from Winches ter, President Lincoln showed some concern that Washington might be uncovered from that direction, but he was reassured by General Grant, who sent Hancock to command, during Sheridan's absence, all the territory comprised within the Middle Military Division, from Washington west to the Ohio River. Han cock's headquarters were fixed at Cumberland. From Charlottesville Sheridan subsequently moved to the White House on the Pamunkey, and thence to the south side of the James, EPILOGUE 247 where he joined Grant and was placed by him on the extreme left of his army. That part of his instructions to capture Lynchburg and then strike out to join Sherman's army coming north through North Carolina, Sheridan found to be impracticable, on account of the very high stage of water in the James from Lynchburg down, all bridges having been destroyed and his eight pontoons being insufficient to effect a crossing. YALE UNIVERSITY a39002 0030675iif»b