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YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY Gift of
Dr. Alfred Yaqts

ON

THE RECOaNlTION

SOUTHERN CONFEDERATION.

BY

JAMES SPENCE,

ACTHOK OP " THE AMEKIOAN TOflON, AND THE S. LETTEBS TO THE TIMES
ON AMEEIOiN AEFAIKS.

LONDON :
BICHAED BENTLEY, NEW BUELINGTON STEEET,
1862.

*»«». ^«»™» ^^ J

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If

/<j'--I/Ot : I 1.1 TICD BY W, CLOWES AKD S' 'NS, STAMFORD ^tXltrR'" A?CS CilArj^f- TfiOSR

ON THE EECOGNITION

SOUTHERN CONFEDERATION.

The time has arrived when it becomes the duty
~ of the governments of Europe to acknowledge that
another power is added to the family of nations.
For a considerable period the Southern States of
America have maintained an established govern
ment, which is manifestly in accordance with the
"free will of their people. The effort made to pre
vent their independence is obviously a failure, and
if continued, can only waste more human life to no
purpose. At this moment, the general issue of the
second Northern campaign can plainly be seen, and
the question arises whether those who are vitally
interested, and who have the sufferings of a coming
winter in prospect, should remain quiescent whilst
another army shall be formed and drilled for a
third attempt. If there be any step calculated to
bring about peace, that step should be taken whilst
B 2

the minds of all rational men in the North are in
doubt as to the policy of continuing the war. At
such a time when elation of spirit is subdued by
disappointment; when, in either course of action,
to stop or persevere, the difiQculties are equally
great ; when judgment is on the balance, uncertain
to which side to incline — it is at such a time that
an influence from without will tell with decisive
weight, and turn the scale. If, on the other hand,
we wait till another army shall have been recruited,
disasters will fade from recollection, as that of
Bull's Run passed away ; with new apparent
strength new hopes will arise and generate a fresh
brood of illusions. Contractors, fundholders,
schemers, and enthusiasts will again pull the wires ;
a " sensation " press will arouse another excite
ment, and the present opportunity will be lost, to
the cruel injury of our workmen, and the irrepa
rable injury of America.
Yet the step to be taken is of so grave import
ance that it behoves us to weigh it well in all its
bearings. Modern history has well illustrated the
evil of moving too rapidly, and although it is in
cumbent on every government to be guided in the
main by the interests of its people, it is no part
of our practice to omit, or hold as secondary, what
may plainly appear to be our duty. I take the
position that it is now a duty, an obligation that
has devolved upon us, to recognize the_de facto
government of the South. Is it the fact that the

Southern States form a distinct community, and
have over them a government approved by them
selves, and reasonably executing the functions of
administration ? If this be so, the well-established
practice of modern times requires us to admit that
to be a fact which is a fact. And the principle of
neutrality also demands it. Foreign powers are
not the friends of any section of a people. Northern
or Southern, but of the whole of it. If it divide
in two, by acts to which they are not parties,
neutrality^ requires _ them to remain the friends of
both. But their official relations were with one
government only, and if it succeed in putting down
the movement they have nothing to say. On the
other hand, if -ftey fail to suppress the movement
within a reasonable time — within, for instance, a
period named by itself as sufficient — and if the
result be the continuance and consolidation of the
second-^gQiemment, with, so far as human judg
ment extends, the power to maintain itself — then
the original .principle of neutrality requires that
we recognize the existence of both these govern
ments. We cannot refuse to do so on the ground
that they are at war, for if Austria and Prussia
were at war, this would not enable us to deny the
independent existence of either. Nor have we a
right to do so on the plea that the new government
ought not to have come into being. To listen to this
argument would be to sit as judges in a quarrel.
Few governments, if any, exist in the world, wliose

origin was perfectly legitimate. International law
has no cognizance of questions of this kind, and
abjures the inquiry. When an important com
munity has established a government, it may have
to dispute a counter assertion of divine right with
its immediate adversary, but not with us ; we have
no more right to inquire why it has come into exist
ence than to question of a man what right he had
to be born.
For some time past we have admitted the ex
istence of the Southei-n government as a belligerent.
Not of necessity, but as a matter of reason, this
involves their recognition if they maintain them
selves in the war. For the term belligerent cannot
be applied to pirates or mere insurgents ; it admits
the existence of a government acting by the rules
and entitled to the rights of war. It is, therefore,
in its essence a provisional recognition, and one
that is provisional only because the issue is yet
doubtful. The principle involved in a formal re
cognition is conceded by it, and all that really
remains is to perfect officially what we have already
initiated. The practice of Europe is established
beyond any manner of doubt, and I cannot find an
instance where the belligerent right of a people has
been admitted without this being followed by the
recognition of its independence. Mr. Whiteside, in
his eloquent speech on Mr. Lindsay's motion, quotes
Sir. James Mackintosh as saying of recognition, " It
implies no guarantee, no alliance, no aid, no ap-

proval of revolt, no intimation of opinion concern
ing the justice or injustice of the circumstances by
which it has been accomplished. The tacit recogni
tion of a new state, not being a judgment for the
new government or against the old, is not a devia
tion from perfect neutrality or a cause of just offence
to the dispossessed ruler." But a writer of greater
authority in American eyes is Wheaton, the head of
their expounders of international law. Admitting
that the secret assistance rendered by France to
the United States in their revolt gave just ground
of complaint to Grreat Britain, he goes on to express
a doubt whether " had they maintained good faith,
a treaty of commerce or even the eventual alliance
between France and the United States could have
furnished any just ground for a declaration of war
against the former by the British Grovernment."
And in discussing the general question of recogni
tion, Wheaton gives it as the law of nations that
" when a revolted province or colony has declared
and shown its ability to maintain its independence,
the recognition of its sovereignty by other foreign
States is a question of policy and prudence only."
Its effect upon the discontented party is well de
scribed by President Jackson, in his message to
Congress of 20th December, 1836, as being, "a
transient estrangement of good-will in those against
whom we have been, by force of evidence, com
pelled to decide." Upon no point is the practice of
this country more thoroughly established- We

acknowledged as de facto governments the Nether
lands in their revolt from Spain, Portugal also from
Spain, Greece from Turkey, Belgium from Holland,
the Italian duchies from the family of Austria, the
Legations and other provinces from the Pope,
Mexico and other colonies from Spain, and Texas
from Mexico. To this list other countries may add
that of the United States from ourselves. And
in every one of these instances our recognition
occurred under precisely the circumstance that
now exists — that is, before it was assented to by
the older government.
But the practice of the United States is more
immediately in point than any other, and they have
invariably been the foremost, the most eager to
acknowledge each de facto government that has
presented itself. Nay, in the case of the recogni
tion of the French republic, this eagerness was laid
down by them as a kind of duty. " It is the duty
of the United States government always to be the
first to recognize a new government." In the case
of Texas, the province of a sister republic, they
preceded recognition by bringing about the very
course of events that led to the revolt. In the
case of Hungary they expressed beforehand with
an extreme of alacrity their intention to recognize
if the opportunity should come within their reach.
On that occasion Mr. Webster observed in a state
paper, "Questions of prudence arise in reference to
new States brought by successful revolutions into

the family of nations, but it is not required of
neutral powers to await the recognition of the
parent States." Within the last thirty years eight
or ten new States have established independent
governments within the colonial dominions of Spain,
and the same thing has been done by Belgium and
Greece. All these governments were recognized by
some of the leading powers of Europe, as well as
by the United States, before they were acknow
ledged by the States from which they had sepa
rated themselves. It is indeed notorious that the
United States, both in teaching and in practice,
have taken the lead in advocating the prompt re
cognition of new powers. By what rule of logic
can they forbid others to act upon the principle
they have so sedulously taught ? They have been
active and able expounders of international law : it
is of the essence of that law that it shall apply to
all people alike. The moment a power is permitted
to lay down rules to be applied to others, but not
itself, international law is at an end. If it were
praiseworthy of the United States to be first in the
recognition of new powers, that government will
be meritorious, by their rule, which is first in the
recognition of the Southern Union.
Belgium and Holland bore in some points a
striking similarity to the Federal republic of the
United States. They were a federal kingdom — the
one mercantile, the other agricultural-, they were
united for that which was the main object of the

10
Union — mutual defence. But they were joined under
our own auspices, and we were under a direct and
grave responsibility to the Dutch crown, by virtue
of the most important and solemn treaty of modern
times. In the face of all this we not only recog
nized without delay the independence of Belgium,
but forcibly intervened and were parties to the ac
tion of France in bombarding the citadel of Antwerp
and rendering the revolution successful. Here,
then, we take an active part in the formation of a
federal kingdom, yet the moment it appears that
the nations cannot remain together to the happiness
of both, we forcibly intervene to break up the work
of our own hands. Is the Federal republic of the
United States a more sacred edifice than the
Federal kingdom of the Netherlands ? Is it our
duty to treat the views of Mr. Abraham Lincoln
with a deference so entirely omitted in the case of
the King of Holland ? Or are we to intervene by
force of arms in Federal affairs where the parties
are weak, and to shrink from the possibility of
giving offence where one of them is supposed to be
strong ? If this be the meaning of a non-interven
tion policy, it may be a convenient one, but it is
one that reflects little credit on any country.
It has been observed that in the case of the
Spanish colonies we deferred our recognition for a
long term of years. This is perfectly true; but
why was it so ? We have acknowledged every
de facto government established in modern times ;

11
this is a rule to which hitherto we have made no
exception. But there has been a wide diversity in
the time taken for consideration, and in some cases
it has been prolonged. On a study of the subject
it will be found that here again there has been a
guiding principle — namely, the magnitude or insig
nificance of the interests we had at stake. We
looked on for years whilst the Spanish colonies
were in revolt, because our interests were so slight
as to permit this. But when the government of
France was overthrown by the coup d'etat we did
not hesitate for one week, but instantly acknow
ledged the new state of things, because the interests
at stake were so vast as to render delay dangerous
to the peace of Europe. Apply this, our invariable
rule, to the present case. Are the interests now
jeopardized such as will permit us to look on with
folded arms for a series of years, or are they so
great and pressing as to require prompt decision ?
To this there can be one reply only ; but before
pursuing this branch of the inquiry it may be con
venient to consider the objections to recognition
which are brought forward. Of these, that which
appears to have the greatest force at this moment
is the argument that any action on our part will
provoke the undying hostilitj'^ of the Northern
power. But that hostility cannot be provoked, for it exists
already. From the earliest history of the United
States it has always been there, either active or

12
latent, and some politicians have made a trade of
pandering to it. This we deplore, but we cannot
prevent the existence of that which exists, which
will exist, and which neither action or inaction on
our part can avert. We are the competitors, the
rivals, of the North ; in every direction, commer
cial, manufacturing, maritime, we form the obstacle
to its desire of ranking as the first power in the
world. This we cannot help, and we must pursue
the even tenor of our way without regard to^ it.
Throughout this contest we have shut our eyes to
political interests so obvious that any child could
see them. We adopted from the first a line of strict
neutrality, the only one befitting in a domestic
quarrel. The effect of this, in its results, has been
highly favourable to the North, yet it has been
repaid by virulent abuse. A grievous insult was
offered to our flag, and gave us an opportunity,
thrust into our hands by fortune, to break up the
Union and the blockade. In place of availing our
selves of it, despatches were written in terms, firm
indeed but friendly, and accompanied by instruc
tions of the utmost delicacy. History will find in
those despatches not so much the proofs of an in
dignant spirit as of a kindly one.
On this subject what says an eminent authority,
Mr. Henry Ward Beecher ? " When our rebellion
broke out, if there was any nation under heaven
that we looked to for sympathy and help, it was
the mother country, England. But how did she

13
treat us ? She sympathized with our enemies,
and when we were all engaged with the rebels, and
had as much as we could do on our hands, she
kicked up that contemptible fuss about the Trent
and took our rebel citizens from us. Oh, it was
mean — it was mean ! And now what are we going
to do about it ? When we get this affair off our
hands and have time to attend to other matters shall
we give England what she deserves ? " Here is a
minister of the gospel of peace educating his people
in this spirit — so ignorant of human nature as to
expect that a "Mother" would be pleased to see a
big son trampling upon a weaker one — so incapable
of manly sentiment as to be unable to conceive that
we found it a hindrance, and not an inducement,
that the North was then powerless — so exact a
judge of what is mean as to denounce on our part
the conduct he would have applauded to the skies if
pursued by his own country upon a similar event.
Yet even this is tame when compared with the
revilings of Wendell Phillips, another authority, or
the ribaldry of Brownlow, who was enabled to de
light educated audiences of New York and Boston,
because the Southerners held him to be too con
temptible to be worth the cost of keeping any
longer in gaol. Passing by such as these, let us
take a calm writer whose views are commented upon
in the ' Times ' of the 28th May : " There is to-day
one sentiment in which the whole American people.
North and South, seem to agree, and that is a sen-

14
timent of hostility to England. The South is full
of it and fierce in its expression. The North is
equally full of it and silent. We state this as a
truth and we regret it profoundly. With an im
mense army, a triumphant general, a splendid mili
tary equipment, an iron-clad navy already superior
to any in the world, our people are impressed with
an idea of their prowess. . . . England will ter
ribly mistake the tone and temper of the American
people if she imagines that the Mason and Slidell
affair has passed out of our minds."
Here then exists the very evil which we are told
not to bring into existence. Whether we, our
press, or writers, are in some measure to blame for
it is not now under consideration ; I speak of the
simple fact. The causes that mainly lead to it and
sustain it in the North are ineradicable. None of
them affect the South : we are their best customers,
not their competitors ; we have no adjoining province
that tempts their desires ; they regard our aristo
cratic institutions with admiration, not with hatred.
It is true that if trampled down in this contest,
could such a thing occur, they would then be im
pelled by bitter animosity to this country, because
they would ascribe their subjugation, not without
some show of reason, to our truckling to the North
in the matter of the blockade. But when an inde
pendent power, no feeling of the kind can exist.
Their obvious interest will be to cultivate with us
the closest commercial relations, and to retain our

15
goodwill as a counterpoise to their formidable
neighbours. Here is a continent of which one half
is full of ineradicable hostility, sometimes latent
but ever there; the other half anxious to be
friendly. What kind of statesmanship would that
be which should spread over the whole this hos
tility, inevitable in half of it ?
But it may be observed that beyond the mere
question of existing sentiment, the recognition of
the South would be an actual cause of war. Why ?
It has been seen that the recognition of a de facto
Government is not a casus belli, but an act con
sistent with the most JDerfect neutrality. Nay, in
order to be really neutral, we must take this step.
The Washington government tells us that it either
rules in Georgia or has the right to do so ; the
Richiliond government tells us that it both rules
there and has the right to do so. Can that be neu
trality which listens to the one and declines to hear
the other ? Mr. Lincoln might, indeed, declare war,
as he may do at any time with or without assigning
a pretext, but there is nothing in our recognition of
the South which would afford a pretext. In the
case of the ' Trent,' too, there were very violent
threats, which, when the day arrived to test them,
subsided in a moment.
It is essential to distinguish between the press of
the United States and the people. In this country
the press is a mirror in which is reflected the public
opinion of the country. In the North this is not

16
so. Those papers whifl have the largest sale and
are best known in ..this country, aim at making
themselves saleable by " sensation " writing, by a
style which spurns reason, logic, and truth. The
inimitable character of Jefferson Brick is daily per
formed before our eyes, but the vast majority of the
Northerners are not Jefferson Bricks ; on the con
trary, they are well-meaning men, diligently em
ployed in their own pursuits, and those of intellect or
information, avoiding politics with disgust. They
cannot step out of their sphere to correct the press
or give us their real sentiments. But if a war with
this country were seriously proposed, self-pre
servation would arouse them. It is asserted that
we are dependent on the North for food ; a shallow
delusion. If the North were excluded from our
knowledge, there are regions in Eastern Europe
amply sufficient to supply all the grain we need to
import. It would be less cheap ; but against this
drawback there is the advantage that it would be
supplied by those who are willing to take our
manufactures in exchange. But there is really an
abject dependence in another direction. The
Northern States have no other exports of the least
importance than agricultural products, grain, and
provisions. Cotton, tobacco, rice, sugar, naval
stores— these are all products of the Slave States.
Now, in the event of a war with this country, where
is the North to sell its grain ? We have an option
in buying, but where would be its option in selling ?

17
With the South it is at war ; Canada is a compe
titor, and would also be at war ; from Europe it
would be blockaded. Hence the industry of the
great majority — of seven-eighths of the area of the
country — would be instantly paralyzed. The people
of the West know this well enough ; and, although
they take no concern in what they know to be mere
bluster about war, if it came to be in prospect as a
reality they would speak out for their own existence.
In the war of 1814 the New England States found
their commerce ruined, on which they threatened to
secede from the Union, and took, for the purpose,
the preliminary step of calling a convention at Hart
ford. Had we continued that war for another year
it would probably have broken up the Union. Now,
that Union is already broken, its prestige is gone
for ever as a unity, secession is in every man's
mouth, a representative of New York has discussed
in Congress the policy of that city seceding from all
its neighbours, in California it is regarded as sim
ply a question of time, and the effect of a prospect
of war with this country would be that the agricul
tural States of the West would threaten to separate
from the monopolizing and manufacturing States of
the East.
It is also forgotten by those who imagine that
recognition might involve a risk of war, that no
one recommends the step as one of separate action
on our part. It is notorious that, for a long time
past, we have restrained the action of France. It

18
is true that the French Government have not
officially requested the co-operation of our own, but
it is the fact that its views on this subject have been
unofficially conveyed, and are well known. Hence
we incur the responsibility not only of delaying to
recognize the established government of the Southern
States, but also of practically impeding another
power desirous to do so. It may be assumed as
beyond question that recognition, on our part, could
be made conjointly with France, and, doubtless,
other powers. Hence any risk of war, as a result,
would be that of the North, with its hands already
well occupied, declaring war without any just pre
text against the two great naval powers of the
world. Such a thing it is idle to consider. The
people of New York and Boston, only the other
day, were thrown into a paroxj^sm of alarm at the
idea that a single vessel, the Merrimac, might pay
them a visit. To suppose that, by any act of their
own, they would invite the visit of the combined
fleets of France and England is too improbable a
thing to be worthy of discussion. Separate action,
on our part, would undoubtedly be met by the
Northern press with an earnest shout of defiance ;
but we cannot suppose that this people are so far
gone in folly as to defy a joint action of European
powers. Let us proceed to examine the objection to recog
nition which is based on the fact that slavery exists
throughont the Southern States. This affects the

19
judgm-ent, or rather the sentiment, of many excel
lent men. There is a vague impression, that in
recognizing the South we afford some kind of coun
tenance to slavery. How so? We admit the
independence of Spain and Brazil ; does this coun
tenance slavery ? The South is termed by one
writer a " slave power." Was not jhe^ Union a
"slave power" — would not a reconstructed Union
be a " slave power " ? If it be the desire of any
writer to abolish slavery, let him consider if the
hope of doing so will not be greater when the
South stands alone, comparatively weak, anxious
for the fellowship of other powers, than if standing
strong and defiant in copartnership with the power
of the North. The question of recognition is one
wholly political. We are in cordial alliance with
Turkey, yet slavery exists there, and along with it
a social system criminal by our law and repugnant
to our creed. We cannot deal with one country
upon one principle and with another country on
another. Either our Government must undertake
to act as universal policeman, and inquire into the
internal afi'airs of all other States, or it must abstain
from this entirely. The pretence that the object
of this war was to extinguish slavery nas been
thoroughly exposed. It is but justice o say, that
neither the Washington Government nor the people
of the North, as a people, are open to any charge
of hypocrisy on this head. They have consistently
asserted that their object was and is to maintain
c 2

20
the Union, its slavery and all, its cotton, tobacco,
rice, and the means of producing them. So far,
indeed, from this being a war for the extinction
of slavery, it is a war to prevent its going out of
the Union.
But this is not the place to discuss the slavery
question, except so far as it affects the immediate
point of recognition. In this sense the question is
narrowed to this — Which is more likely to end it,
the reconstruction of the Union or the independence
of the South ? We all want to end it. The idea
of men doomed to live without freedom is paiufal
to us as the idea of men doomed to live without
air. The age has gone past for the sale of men as
cattle. But any argument on the evils of slavery,
both moral and economical, would be idle when, on
this point, we are all of one mind. The simple
question is^How shall we end it ? If the North
were to subdue the South, they could then, of course,
abolish the system ; but we know, first, that they
cannot subjugate the South, and, secondly, that if
they did so the last thing they would do would be
to destroy the value of a property obtained at so
terrible a cost. But they may be driven to declare
emancipation as an act of war, as a measure of
revenge, of the meanest and foulest spite. What
would be the effect of this ? Simply a smile of
derision on the part of the Southerners. Mr. Lin
coln has already issued a proclamation perhaps
sincere, though gencrall}- regarded as a manoeuvre

21
to divide the Southern people. It has been treated
with contempt even in the States, Maryland and
Kentucky, that are entirely at his command.
What, then, the value of a proclamation of his in
States at open and successful war with him ? And
would the reconstruction of a Union afford any
promise ? But the Union was a slave-owning power
and the Constitution is a slave-owner's protection.
Under it slavery has thriven in the very highest
degree ; under it the slave-trade was protected by
the " star-spangled banner ;" under it the system
once lowly and of doubtful repute has become
strong and defiant ; under it every imaginable safe
guard to the institution would be eagerly conceded
by the North.
The truth is, slavery can never be abolished in
the States except by the will of the Southern
people. There is no impossibility in devising a
plan of emancipation, gradual, accompanied by laws
to prevent squatting, to prevent freedom from
degenerating into idleness and barbarism, to supply
the free labour instead of the slave labour of the
negro, to ameliorate the condition of the one race
without detriment — nay, with ultimate benefit to
the other. Not, indeed, without grave difficulties
can the status of four millions of mankind be
altered ; but it is a possible thing ; and where
there's a will there's a way. The problem really is
how to bring about this will. Now, so soon as the
Southern Union becomes an independent power,

22
slavery ceases to be a political question ; it is no
longer a battle-cry in the heated strife of parties ;
it is no longer connected with a struggle nominally
for the territories, really for national existence ; it
may cease to excite the revilings of fanaticism, and
to stir up the hatred which they arouse. Deprived
of these stimulants, the people of the South will be
enabled, for the first time in this generation, to
look upon it calmly — to weigh the arguments of
reason, to hear the admonitions of friendship, and
to feel the influence of that power which is the
voice of civilization — public opinion — a power
which neither kings nor republics can defy. In
the Union, slavery as a system identifies the
Southerner with his own land. Remove it, and
you obliterate the line of demarcation. The South
would become to the North what Delaware is to
Maryland, or New Jersey to New York. Right
or wrong, it is essential to his national existence.
Once out of the Union, we have no more reason to
doubt that slavery would soon be altered into
serfdom, and freedom eventually follow, than that
truth will prevail in the end over error. In Bengal
a contented peasantry exists and prospers as black
as the negro, as incapable of amalgamation with
ourselves. What exists in the Eastern may exist
in the Western world. We, as a people, planted
slavery in America. If it be now a crime, it may
be said to us, " Let him that is without sin cast
the first stone." Our duty in this matter is so to

23
act that we may enable the people of the South to
deal calmly with this evil. Let us not add to the
injury we inflicted upon them by denying the only
rational prospect of escape from it, which is,
through their independence.
There is an objection to our moving in this
matter which tells with force on many minds. It
would express itself thus : " These people are kins
men of ours who are quarrelling amongst them
selves ; let us keep out of so painful an affair, and,
above all, let it never be said that we derived
any advantage from it." Now, in the first stage
of events these sentiments were highly proper ; for
it would have been unworthy had we sought any
advantage, political or commercial, by fomenting
the causes of this convulsion. We did nothing of
the kind. We neither elected Mr. Lincoln, nor
approved of the course taken on that event by
South Carolina. On the contrary, the great majority
in this country held it to be an act of folly or of
passion. None will dispute that, in the first in
stance, the preponderance of feeling was in favour
of the North. Whose fault is it that this has
entirely changed ? The constitution of the United
States had been little studied here, and numbers
were influenced by the sound of the word "rebel,"
so absurdly applied by the North to the co-equal and
sovereign States of the South. Without word, will,
or deed on our part, these events have come to
pass. Having come to pass, to shrink from dealing

24
-with them now would not be a disinterested, but a
highly selfish policy. It would really be to avoid
risk of annoyance or responsibility of judgment, by
folding our arms, and permitting things to drift.
The interests at stake are too critical for a dolce-
far-niente policy. We cannot at convenience place
ourselves in the position of Portugal or Wirtem-
burgh, or disappear from the stage when the part
we have to play is difficult. We owe a duty to the
North, but we also owe a duty to the people of the
South, which we cannot refuse to discharge on the
ground that it may be troublesome to ourselves or
distasteful to others.
It has been asked, what we should have said
had Americans come forward to acknowledge Ire
land or India when in rebellion ? But historical
parallels are ridiculous when the only resemblance,
like that between Macedon and Monmouth, is that
both begin with the same letter, or are called by
one name. If the Irish people had ever re
volted, formed a well-organized government, and
defeated our armies in the field, so as to render it
clear that they could sustain the position they had
taken, it would have been the duty of the Americans
to acknowledge their government. Whenever this
shall occur they will be welcome to do so; but
nothing like it has yet been recorded in history,
and is not probable now, seeing that we have just
as much reason to turn rebels as they. The American
idea that Irishmen are inevitably rebellious is about

25
as exact as the old French belief that Englishmen
were always committing suicide or selling their wives
in market places. As to India, it is strange that
any one should come forward to compare the
groundless mutiny of pampered and murderous
soldiers with the movement of a great and unani
mous people ; a movement directed in every State
by its legislature, and in each instance submitted
to the deliberation and decision of the most solemn
authority known in American politics — a conven
tion of the sovereign people of the State.
It has also been contended that the Southern
States, instead of seceding, ought to have proposed
an amendment of the Constitution in the manner
provided by it. Where was it possible to obtain
the majority required ? To have attempted that
which no rational man could hope to carry, would
have been mere waste of time. They were parties
to a Federal compact, from which they openly
announced their determination to retire if a given
event should happen. That event did happen, and
they carried out their determination, in the exercise
of their sovereign rights, and using all the forms,
solemnities, and powers in withdrawing from the
Union which were employed in forming it. Of
what use could it be to discuss modifications of the
terms of a partnership when men were resolved to
retire from it altogether ?
Another complaint frequently made is that there
was some kind of treachery in obtaining arms

26
through Mr. Floyd, then a member of the Washing
ton Cabinet. This is an exceedingly simple matter
when explained. The arms manufactured in the
North are divided periodically amongst all the
States, in the ratio of their respective quotas of
militia. Of late years the militia service had been
greatly neglected in the South, in many parts of
which it had fallen altogether into abeyance. In
consequence they had not applied for their propor
tion of those arms, which remained in the Northern
storehouses, set apart and marked off for the States
to which they belonged. All that Mr. Floyd did
was to send them to those to whom they were due,
or rather a part of them, for at the outbreak of the
war a large quantity of artillery belonging to the
Southern States or fortresses was in the North, and
remained there. This fact will show how little
truth there is in the assertion that the movement
had long been secretly prepared.
With equal injustice the blame is charged upon
the South of being the aggressors in this scene of
bloodshed. It is true, that on declaring their
independence, they took possession of the Custom
houses and other public property in their States
precisely as the Northerners did when they re
volted from us. They sent Commissioners to
Washington to arrange all matters of this kind.
They abstained from occupying Fort Sumter, a
position of the first importance. In the midst of
this, and in breach of an agreement, Anderson

27
moved from Fort Moultrie .into Fort Sumter, an
act of war and of treachery on the part of the
North. Even this was endured, but when it was
found that whilst their Commissioners were amused
at Washington, a secret expedition had sailed for
Charleston and was then off the harbour, to have
permitted the adversary to strengthen himself in
their midst would have been to declare themselves
poltroons. Vattel observes, " A war may be de
fensive in its principles though offensive in its
operations, as where attack is the best means of
repelling a menaced invasion. He who first renders
the application of force necessary is the aggressor,
though he may not be the one who first actually
applies it." This is precisely what occurred. The
arrival of a Federal fleet off Charleston rendered
the application of force necessary in self-protection,
but the Washington government which sent that
fleet was the aggressor, not those who were driven
by it to the application of force to resist it.
Having examined the objections to recognition
let us now consider the reasons why that measure
should be taken. In the first place, it is matter of
necessity to Europe that this war should cease.
Not in this country only, but in France, Belgium,
Switzerland, in every manufacturing region, cotton
has become a necessity of industrial life. Vattel
observes, " Every nation has an undoubted right
to provide for its own safety, and to take due
precaution against distant as well as impending

28
dangers. The right of self-preservation is para
mount to all other considerations." There can
be no kind of self-preservation more urgent than
that of preserving great masses of people from
deprivation of the means of existence. It would
be consistent with international law for Europe
forcibly to end the blockade. It could not do
so rightfully on the plea of inconvenience or loss,
but it would be justified in doing so on the ground
of necessity. No event, similar in its consequences
and magnitude, has occurred in history. If a grain
country be blockaded there are others in which corn
may be purchased ; but, in this case, except to a
very limited extent, there is no choice or alterna
tive. America has hitherto looked on our com
plete dependence upon her for cotton with very
great complacency, and cannot now complain of
the consequences that flow from it.
The opinion has been expressed that we may
endure the existing difficulty with patience in view
of the advantage India will derive from it. Those
who are suffering find it but cold comfort to be told,
" it is an ill wind that blows nobod}^ good." And
it may well be questioned, whether a sudden ex
tension of the growth of cotton in India, based upon
a foundation we know to be temporary, might not
produce disaster instead of advantage. There are
social and permanent causes now promoting the
progress of India— the opening of railways, the
spread of steam navigation on the rivers, the right

29
to hold land in fee simple, the infusion of European
energy — these are causes that will safely and yet
enormously extend our Indian commerce. Nor
will Indian cotton ever fall back into its old
condition of disrepute, for the prejudice against
working it is gone. Formerly but few spinners
would use it ; in future, with the majority, it will
be a mere question of price. Nor is it likely, that,
in the Southern States, the former rate of increase
in growth will be kept up, or that, in future, the
cost of production will be free from the effects of
taxation ; these are elements that will promote
steady progress, but if a sudden expansion should
occur, though convenient for the moment, it would
be injurious to India in the end. At the worst no
one can expect this war to last more than another
year, and whenever it end, at least four millions of
bales of cotton, and more probably five millions,
would be suddenly liberated. The quantity de
stroyed is, after all, but a small proportion of last
year's crop, and if we estimate the present crop
only at one-third we shall reach the quantity named.
What would be the effect of throwing this mass upon
a market already filled with Indian cotton ? It must
be sold ; if ten cents cannot be obtained eight cents
must be taken ; if eight cents cannot be obtained
six cents must be taken. It must be sold at some
price or other, which, combined with its superior
quality, will force it into the market, or, in other
words, drive the Indian cotton out. This process

30
would clearly be disastrous to the inferior staple.
We should see what has been seen before. New
Orleans cotton at Ad. per lb. in Liverpool, and
Surat cotton driven down to a price, which, after
deducting the heavy charges upon it, leaves to the
grower a pittance he cannot live upon. Any efforts
now made in India would bring cotton here to meet
a redundant supply and a disastrous fall in prices.
There will permanently remain advantages to India
from this convulsion, but to increase her production
suddenly and greatly on the strength of a demand we
know to be temporary, would simply be to extend a
building over what we know to be a quicksand.
— >The stocks at Liverpool and Havre have spun
out beyond anticipation, but this is not a subject
..for unalloyed satisfaction. They have lasted because
mills have been closed, or have worked short time,
which means that human suffering has been spun
out too. The patient endurance of the operatives
has been great, and benevolence will be active.
But the men say, " We don't want bread and water,
we want work ; we are sick of walking up and
down the streets, or breaking stones for the parish."
No Poor Law can cure this. There is but one cure
for it and that is the termination of the war. And
all this suffering might be viewed more calmly if it
were the inevitable result of war. It is not so. If
the North possessed all that boasted superiority of
strength, surely it could subdue the South in fair
contest on the open field. Surely, if the object were

31
attainable those 600,000 men and all those gun
boats were sufficient? If unattainable by such
means the attempt was hopeless with or without
the addition of a blockade. As the resource of a
power weaker by land it would have been excus
able, but as that of one prepared to crush all before
it, it was superfluous, a mere arrogant contempt for
the sufferings of Europe. There is no clause, power,
or principle in the constitution that warrants this
employment of the Federal fleet. The question of
taking power to coerce a State was considered in
the convention that framed it, and deliberately
excluded. The Federal executive has power to act
on individuals only, on the guilty or the accused,
but none to act against one of the sovereign States
of which it is the agent. We suffer from a mere act
of despotic power committed in contempt of the
constitution and of those who framed it, the ablest
of whom, Madison and Hamilton, declared with pro
phetic vision how futile such measures would be,
and what they would produce.
At the present date the stock of cotton in the
whole of Europe may be estimated at 230,000 bales,
against 1,650,000 on hand at the same period of
last year. The consumption of Europe at the old
rate required more than 80,000 bales per week.
Reduced as it now is, it absorbs the supplies arriving,
and gradually diminishes the remnant of stock. The
day approaches when all will be gone, and the trade
will be restricted to the arrivals, which will not

32
exceed one-fourth of its actual wants. Three-
fourths of the subsistence of the operatives will be
abstracted from them. They may continue to
endure this with patience, from month to month,
from bad to worse. There is no fear of actual
starvation — they will not be allowed to perish like
fish left dry upon a bank. But are we to feel the
less, or to act with less decision because they are
patient and silent ? In other days there would
have been riots and incendiarism, and we should
have been very stirring to remove the cause.
Ought we to be less earnest in behalf of sufi"ering
that is without reproach ?
The distress that now afflicts the cotton trade is
about to be extended to other branches of our
industry. The Morrill tariff, framed by the manu
facturers of Pennsylvania and New England, was
purposely designed to exclude our manufactures.
The new tariff Bill, a worthy supplement to it, is
entirely prohibitory in practice to all our leading
exports. Take, for instance, railway iron. The
duty imposed is 70 per cent, on its present value,
but this duty must be paid in gold, which adds 20 -
on the 70 per cent., and may increase any day. In
addition, there is the cost of transport to New York,
making the entire protection enforced against this
article at least 1 10 per cent. It would be ridiculous
to suppose that our manufacturers could compete
with those of Pennsylvania with such a millstone
round their necks. In two or three months the

33
effect of this tariff will be felt in the stoppage
of our exports of all those articles it is to our
advantage to supply. Having excluded us entirely
from half the continent, this measure will now
exclude all our important manufactures from the
other half. In the face of this Northerners are
surprised we have little sympathy with them. Now
what is the character of our relations with the
Americans ? We have no aid to seek from them,
no province to covet, 'no courtesy to expect. All
we have to do with them is to trade with them.
And whilst half the continent is anxious to trade
with us on terms just and beneficial, the other half
strains its ingenuity to exclude and injure us. To
which of these should we incline ? We have done
some generous, some foolish things as a nation, but
we are not utterly void of common sense.
And passing from the interests of commerce, there
is a voice that appeals to Europe, more solemn than
the tenets of international law, or the calculations
of trade — the voice of humanity. It is plain that
neither of these excited combatants can subdue the
other. It is clear that this terrible sum of life,
suffering, and sorrow, now lavished, is lavished in
vain. In the recent engagements before Richmond,
apart from the dead, there would probably be
12,000 wounded on each side. Over those twenty
miles would be stretched more than 20,000 muti
lated human beings, crying in vain for water to
quench that agonizing thirst — crawling like crushed

34
worms into the swamps to shelter them from the
fierce heat of that scorching sun. The mind sinks
from the efi'ort to gauge the depth of all that anguish,
of shattered hope, of young brave life thrown there
as water thrown aside to waste. Even to this day,
in deep recesses of those woods one might find
haggard forms that roots and herbs have enabled
not to live but miserably to lengthen out their
dying. And beyond this there spreads a circle far
and wide of wives, sisters, orphans, of old men that
will now go down in sorrow to the grave. And
this is but one spot. Over a range of 1,500 miles,
hundreds of thousands are busy at this work —
peopling the soil with the dead, and the cities with
the maimed, and the air with pestilence, and the
future with passions of hatred or revenge. With
all this we have no right to interfere. But if there
be any step we have an indisputable right to take,
and if it tends to terminate so sad and iniquitous a
strife — then, if in doubt whether and when to act,
we cannot omit to remember that our kinsmen are
perishing by the edge of the sword, are swept away
by passions that have overmastered reason, and that
• an effort on our part may ¦expel the fiend that tears
them, and bring back to them the blessing of
peace. That all this suffering is futile may be seen by
a brief review of the progress of the war. From
the commencement of it English writers showed
that the subjugation of a country so vast, so diffi-

35
cult in its natural features, and so dangerous in its
climate, when defended by a brave and resolute
people, was an undertaking such as no modern army
had ever accomplished or could achieve. The only
similar attempt, that of Napoleon on Russia, had
failed terribly ; not, as some have supposed, from
cold, but in reality from causes existing in this case,
and chief of them the vastness of the country. The
elements which in the end would govern the result
have been developed as was expected ; for though
ao one can foresee what incidents may occur in war,
or how the tide of success may waver to aud fro,
there are influences discernible from the first which
ultimately decide a contest of this character. The
first campaign of the North may be regarded as
an experimental attempt which ended in disaster.
After the battle of Bull's Run, it was v\'ell known
to the Southern generals that Washington could be
taken. Emissaries came out from the city to urge
the entrance of the victorious troops, and Beaure
gard was urgent for the step. With great wisdom
President Davis forbade it, on the grounds that as a
military measure it would be a source of weakness,
whilst it would supply a stimulus to the energies of
the North it was most desirable to avoid. After
that event, eight months were occupied by the
Federals in raising an army of gigantic magnitude,
and none will be slow to acknowledge the energy
and skill in organization they displayed. That
army of 600,000 men is indeed a wonderful proof
D 2

36
of creative and administrative power. Is it possible
that now, when laden with debt and drained of
venturous spirits, another effort can be made greater
or as great ? Yet that effort has resulted in failure
so decided that no one could assert that Wash
ington is now free from danger. What prospect
can there be then in repeating what has proved to
be ineffectual ? The campaign opened with a series
of small successes, insignificant in military import
ance, and injurious in their cost of money and men,
but of value in one sense. The power that sustains
this war on the part of the North is the power of
excitement. It is said they arc fighting for nation
ality, from motives of patriotism, and many of them
think this. But if so, where were these for three
months whilst State after State was departing, when
all in the North had made up their minds to the
change, and every speaker was denouncing with
indignant eloquence the shedding of brother's
blood ? If reason or a sense of justice and right
were the moving impulse, why did actual dismem
berment by the secession of one State after another
find all apathetic? An event occurred, in com
parison very trivial, the capture of Fort Sumter,
without loss of life or any affront to the flag greater
than it had already endured. But that event
supplied this stimulus — excitement. The successes
on the coasts of the Carolinas and Georgia fed and
sustained this, kept up the money-market, and
affected European opinion, but only for a time.

37
In the western campaign the Federals were
favoured by two causes they could hardly have
anticipated. First, it was the conviction of the
Richmond government that Europe would stop the
war. In this belief those efforts and sacrifices were
spared which otherwise would have been made, and
it resulted that no force was prepared in the west
worthy the name of an army. Clear evidence of
this may be found in the report of General A. S.
Johnson, who answered unjust reproaches with his
life, on the field of Shiloh. The other cause was a
remarkably wet season, which raised the rivers far
beyond their usual height. This enabled the
Federals to ascend the Tennessee, and to penetrate
the Cumberland river with vessels of war even as
far as Nashville. It enabled them to effect a
passage to the rear of No. 10 Island, and by sweep
ing away the boom below New Orleans, enabled
them to pass the forts which they had failed to
silence. The whole success on the Mississippi has
resulted from this cause ; not a single position on
that river has been captured by actual fighting.
On land, the invasion was irresistible in its onset,
but, aroused from the error into which they had
fallen, the people of the South soon rallied ; within
a few weeks, after apparently hopeless disperaion,
they brought an army into the field, and at Shiloh
gained a victory which had well-nigh been decisive.
From Corinth, Beauregard inflicted upon Halleck
more than the loss of a defeat by employing him for
two months in sending his men into hospital from

38 *
the swamps through which he was toiling. This
process completed, the Southern general suddenly
disappeared with plans bewildering to his antago
nist, the results of which are now appearing. The
latest accounts render it probable that the whole
State of Tennessee will be regained, and but a rem
nant be left, at the close of the campaign, of that
Federal army which commenced it so triumphantly.
The invasion of Arkansas has already closed by the
expulsion of Curtis.
In the east. General Hunter, after meditating the
reduction of Savannah for two months, during which
it grew stronger every day, at last abandoned the
project in despair. It is a curious fact that in
excavating ground for the fortifications, the people
of Savannah came upon four of the guns used by us
in our successful defence of that city against a
combined French and American force, and found
them in such excellent preservation that they re-
bored them, and mounted them on one of the forts,
with the old G. R. upon them. From Savannah,
Hunter removed his force to Charleston, and there
suffered at once a decisive defeat. Both these
cities had been fortified by General Lee, the ablest
engineer officer of the old army ; and although either
might have been endangered by a vigorous attack
in spring, the opportunity was lost aud cannot be
regained. Loss of time is of all things fatal to an
expedition. When we ascended the Dardanelles,
indecision for forty-eight hours converted success
into failure. Nothing has been squandered in

39
greater profusion by all the Federal comman
ders. In Virginia the Northern army broke upfrom the
Potomac, to all appearance irresistible. Advancing
on Manassas the enemy disappeared, and M'Clellan,
instead of pursuing him to Richmond, returned to
Washington. He had then an excellent base in
Acquia Creek on the Potomac, but eighty miles
from Richmond, with a straight line of railway to
that city. Instead of adopting this route, the
Federal army was divided and the main body
transported to the peninsula, which of all the roads
to Richmond is that least promising to an invader.
Here, when a month had been expended before
Yorktown, the unexpected fall of New Orleans
determined the Southern generals to concentrate
their forces and to withdraw from the reach of gun
boats. Evacuating Yorktown, their rear-guard
inflicted at Williamsburg severe loss on its pur
suers and captured from them nine guns. Arrived
at length before Richmond, M'Clellan had the power
to place himself on the line of railway to Frede
ricksburg. He would thus have been within three
hours of the Potomac, in communication with the
forces on the Shenandoah ; he would have com
manded the resources of Central Virginia, and, se
lecting a healthy position, he might have awaited
such reinforcements as he required. Instead of
this he proceeded to bury himself in the swamps of
the Chickahominy — the most pestiferous position to
be found in the State. These, it is true, sheltered

40
him from serious danger if attacked; but what
business has a general to threaten a city if afraid to
encounter its garrison ? Here the battle of Fair
Oaks destroyed one of his divisions and ruined
another, and again he permitted the enemy to carry
away a number of his guns. There followed the
recent battles, in which he was driven from the
base of his operations, sustained a loss of probably
25,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, left
behind him a number of siege-guns and several bat
teries of field artillery, and lost the camps and
stores of many divisions of his army. The first
essential of a line of communication is to be free
from interruption by the enemy : he is now hemmed
in between two rivers, and depends for his existence
upon one of them, which the enemy can interrupt at
any moment. The south side of the James River
is entirely in the hands of the Southerners ; it has
many bluffs and woods running to the water's edge,
and the Southern generals may any day, when their
arrangements are complete, open fire from ten or
twelve batteries and stop transports from ascending.
In this event M'Clellan must either surrender or
fall back to the end of the peninsula. It is true he
might attack Richmond as an alternative, but an
army just defeated in spite of its shelter and supe
riority in artillery cannot expect to conquer the
same opponent when the weight of artillery and
fortified positions would be against it, and defeat
in such an enterprise would be overwhelming ruin.
Who, reflecting on these facts, can entertain a

41
doubt that the object of this war is unattainable,
and that all the misery inflicted in America and
endured here is to no purpose ? The people of the
North have shown no want of vigour ; it may be
doubted whether, under like circumstances, any
people of Europe could have placed in the field
such numbers, supplied in such profusion with
artillery and munitions of war. Their men have
exhibited a patient endurance of suffering, and a
courage on the field which none can fail to admire.
But they have no generals ; these cannot be made
or contracted for, and war cannot be waged success
fully without them. They have men of the utmost
skill as mechanics, shipbuilders, engineers ; they
excel in all that energy can impel or ingenuity
contrive. But they have neither a statesman nor a
general. This great crisis, with everything to draw
out talent, has not produced a single man of mark.
Absorbed in other pursuits, the people of the North
have permitted their government to fall into the hands
of such a class of men that Mr. TroUope, a most
favourable witness, tells us that to speak of a person
as a politician is the same as to speak of him as a
blackleg. How is a countiy, so unfortunate as to be
under such a rule, to conduct to a successful issue
an undertaking of so great a magnitude and diffi
culty that the most experienced and powerful of the
governments of Europe would have shrunk from the
attempt ?
But it may be said that, admitting the disasters
that have lately attended the Federal cause, they

42
are now raising another army, their resources are
abundant, fortune is fickle in war, and even yet
they may succeed by perseverance. I admit that,
although with great difficulty, another army may
be raised. Let us even suppose that, against all
probability, it should drive the Southern army out
of Richmond. That city is very small in com
parison with New Orleans. What effect has the loss
of the latter had in subduing the South ? On such
an event the Southern generals would simply fall
back into the interior of Virginia, into a country as
strong as the Tyrol, altogether removed from the
reach of gun-boats, to which the transport of the
Federals would be through a hostile State. What
would be the chances of General M'Clellan in con
fronting his opponents in such a position ? The
truth is, the invasion has broken down before the
real hardships have been experienced, or the real
strength of the Southern defence has been touched.
The 300,000 men now called for, if obtained, will
render the army no stronger in October than it was
in March, for that number will have left the ranks
during the campaign. But they will have a far
more arduous undertaking : cities are strongly for
tified which were then open ; men are burning with
hostility who were then apathetic ; the forces of
the enemy are concentrated which were then dis
persed ; above all, they will have to encounter the
spirit of a people thoroughly aroused, troops inured
to battles, and generals (to victory. Let any one
consider what kind of effort he would make rather

43
than count as one of a subjugated people, and he
will then realize what makes the Southerners
strong. Nothing but the knowledge that they
are defending their rights and their liberty could
have imparted the strength they display.
The army which the Southern States have now
in the field is in proportion to their numbers what
ours would be if a million and a half of men ; and
they have raised this army where there was not the
nucleus of a regiment, a company, a squadron, a
solitarj^ piece of field artillery. They have raised
men in such numbers where there was no dense
population ; they have made powder where there
were no mills ; they have cast guns where there
were no foundries ; they have had to make car
tridges without paper, shoes without leather, clothing
without looms — all this, too, in a country whose
industry and credit were paralysed, and whose
intercourse with the rest of the world was suddenly
shut out. Depressed by many reverses, reduced
from luxury to the coarsest necessaries of life,
assailed by ill fortune with great floods, maligned
by a virulent press, regarded but coldly by those
from whom they expected aid, unable to tell what
city might not fall next, and who might not be
roofless, confronted in the open field by a greater
power, and threatened by fanaticism with a servile
war beneath their feet ; it is amidst such difficulties
as these that they have placed great and gallant
armies in the field, and exhibited a spirit which
suffering and danger have only made more resolute.

44
What conclusion is forced upon the mind by these
facts ? It is that such a people, in possession of so
vast and difficult a country, cannot be subdued ; in
other words that they are certain to maintain their
independence. But the moment this becomes clear,
and who pretends to doubt it,) that moment it
becomes the duty of the powers of Europe to recog
nize their government, and this duty is more espe
cially our own. Having the largest interest at
stake, and exposed to the greatest suffering, it
is not for us to say to France, " You lead and we
will follow." And there are reasons why this
step should be taken at once for the sake of the
North as well as the South.
It may be considered certain that if uninfluenced
by Europe the North will continue the struggle
for another year. How indeed are they to end
it ? Are they to send to Richmond to admit that
they are beaten ? We indeed see clearly what
the end must be, but they cannot see through our
eyes, and their own are blinded with illusions
and excitement. Besides, as a people they have no
voice. Who ever hears the sentiments of Phil
adelphia, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Chicago, or even
Boston ? The whole country is in abject slavery to
New York ; and who rules New York ? Not the
people of New York, but a handful of men, who, as
they term it in America, "pull the wires." And
who compose this handful ? There are some men
thoroughly sincere but so impelled by excitement as
to see right or wrong simply as may accord or conflict

45
with their desires. Have we not seen good ingenious
men in the same mental condition, inventors, per
petual motionists, ready to go through fire and water
for what all the rest of the world know to be a delu
sion ? In addition to these there are schemers, con
tractors, stock-jobbers — men who have made vast
fortunes by the war, or hope to make them, or who
would be ruined by the return of peace. And New
York has an interest of her own in continuing the
struggle. She has grown great on the Southern trade.
It is not breadstuff's that built those palaces in the
Fifth Avenue. She has an interest entirely apart
from that of the Northern people as a whole, and
this self-interest will lead her to go on. And what
is likely to be the result to the North of a con
tinuance of the war for another year ? At present
the debt is enormous, yet by reducing the interest
it might be possible to endure it ; in another year it
would reach a point that must involve either repu
diation or bankruptcy. Up to this time the rowdy
population has mainly fed the war, in future the
real American must go down to those shambles.
Now the North is united and would remain a
power of the first magnitude and importance ;
it may begin to divide, for its interests are not
like those of the South, homogeneous, but on
the contrary are conflicting, and it may break up
into pieces like Central America. At present, too,
terms of peace might be demanded, at the end of
another year they may be imposed.
All this is known to numbers of men in the

46
North, and expressed in letters reaching this
country. There are numbers praying for peace
and imploring a move in Europe, but what can they
do ? Who is to speak out when the next man calls
him a traitor, and the next day may find him on
the way to Fort Warren ? What could any rational
man say that might not be called " aid and
comfort " to the enemy, and that is treason ? The
truth is, the peace party in the North are dumb and
powerless because they have no pivot, no point to
rally upon. The recognition of the South would
afford this rallying point. That which gives
strength to the Northern effort is the belief, the
delusion, that they are really fighting to put down
rebellion. This theory supports them with the
strength of a principle. But so soon as the inde
pendence of the South is acknowledged by the
leading powers of Europe, the scales will fall from
their eyes. All reasonable men wiU say, " What is
the use of our calling men rebels whom the rest of
the world acknowledges as citizens of a separate apd
formidable power ? We shall only make ourselves
ridiculous by pursuing that further, and we shall
only ruin our country, swamp it with debt, or
crumble it into pieces by going on longer with this
war." Let no one confound the idea of recognition with
%hat of intervention. Intervention is an act of
force, an act of war, which, as a matter of course, the
North would resist. When they assert that they
will resist it with all their might, it is simply

47
saying that if we go to war with them they will go
to war with us. No writer in this country has
proposed anything of this kind. Mediation, on the
other hand, is an act of peace, of friendly interest
and good-will : an act which very frequently termi
nates a war. The war with this country of 1814
was terminated by the mediation of Russia, acting
as the friend, and at the request of America. But
we cannot mediate except there be two parties, and
even then both must assent. It is, therefore, not
an act within our own reach. Recognition is
within our reach ; it is an act, as we have seen,
perfectly compatible with neutrality — one against
which no action can be taken, no argument can be
raised, and the moral effect of which upon the
money-market, the peace party, and the minds of
all would probably terminate the war.
Why should we procrastinate ? Winter will not
procrastinate, nor the hunger of hundreds of thou
sands. The last Poor Law Return shows within
certain districts 141,560 paupers, and these, as
representing the usual average of three persons,
give 424,680 souls now in beggary. That return,
too, shows an increase of 1,760 paupers, or 5,280
souls in the previous week, and this will now go on
at an accelerating rate. Even this represents but a
part of the misery ; and those who doubt this may
read the account of the poor widow who died last
week in London of absolute starvation rather than
beo-. Are we to shrink from trouble or evade
responsibility with this before us ? the existence of

48
the famishing, the welfare of commerce, the;' claims
of humanity, the laws of nations, the inter'ests of
America, all demand our decision. Beyond all, it
is our duty. We have no right to say'; to the
people of the South, " We know you ikve an
established government, but we decline to jpwn the
knowledge ; we see you are independent, jl)ut it is
our policy to be blind ; we witness your'' gallant effort
for self-government, and are certain of yo.'i; success,
but waste another hundred th5usand r^]ves, im
poverish yourselves still more, and at some quite
convenient season we will acknowledge you."
Instead of this, our duty is to say, " We have just
acknowledged, and at once, the right of Tuscans and
Neapolitans to change their government when they
deemed it esssential to their happiness to do so.
We cannot dispute the same right with those of otir
own kin. Justice requires us to take the same
course in America as in Europe, holding in respect
the wishes of a people in preference to the claims of
discarded governments, and it requires us without
fear or favour to recognize as a fact what all the
^world knows to be a fact — that the Southern States
are now a distinct community or nation, with an
organized government, inconformity with their will,
and a power that entitles them to respect as well as
recognition."

LONDON : PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS. STAMFORD STRKRT AND OnARING CROSS.

YALE UNIVERSITY

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