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THE BRITISH EMPIRE
AND
THE UNITED STATES

THE BRITISH EMPIRE
AND
THE UNITED STATES
A REVIEW OF THEIR RELATIONS DURING THE CEN
TURY OF PEACE FOLLOWING THE TREATY OF GHENT
BY
WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING
III
LIEBEE PKOFESSOR OF HISTORY AND FOLIIICAL FHILOSOFHy
IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
SOUETIME PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATIOH

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT BRYCE, O.M.
AND A PREFACE BY
NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER
PRESIDENI OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1914

Copyright. 1914, by
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

FubUshed October, 1914

PREFACE
Under the happiest auspices and with the
hearty co-operation of the leaders of opinion
throughout the British Empire and in the
United States, plans have been made for an
adequate and dignified celebration of the im
pressive fact that for one hundred years the
English-speaking peoples throughout the world
have been at peace with one another. The
impressiveness of this fact is heightened by the
circumstances leading up to and attending
the American Revolution and by those which
relate to the War of 1812. With the exception
of the short contest of 1898 with Spain, which
contest had its origin in purely American con
ditions, the United States has been not only
at peace, but usually in the friendliest possible
relations with Germany, France, Russia, Italy,
and the other nations of continental Europe.
On the other hand, there have been many and
frequent occasions when public opinion, either
in Great Britain or in the United States, or in
both, has been deeply stirred by some difference

vi PREFACE
of view or by some incident of diplomatic con
troversy. There have been more tempting oc
casions for misunderstanding and armed con
flict between the British Empire and the United
States than between the United States and
all other nations of the earth combined. The
points of contact between the British Empire
and the United States are many, and each point
of contact is a point of possible friction. Their
commercial interests are often in keen rivalry.
In times past theirterritorial ambitions have been
in sharp conflict with each other. Notwithstand
ing, a full hundred years has passed during which
war between them has been avoided. This fact is
of itself an eloquent testimony to the temper and
self-restraint of the English-speaking peoples and
a noble tribute to the statesmen who have in
succession guided their policies and conducted
their international business. The long invisible
line which separates the United States and the
Dominion of Canada has been left unguarded
despite the fact that two energetic, rapidly ex
panding peoples have been pushing steadily west
ward on either side of it. This long, invisible,
unguarded line is the most convincing testimony
that the world has to offer to the ability of
modern self-disciplined peoples to keep the

PREFACE vii
peace. It affords an example which it is not
unreasonable to hope may one day be univer
sally followed.
As part of the celebration of one hundred
years of peace between the British Empire
and the United States, the committees in charge
planned a historical review of the relations be
tween the two countries since the signing of the
Treaty of Ghent. This delicate and difficult task
was committed to William Archibald Dunning,
Lieber Professor of History and Political Phi
losophy in Columbia University, and at the
time President of the American Historical
Association. With what clearness, cogency, and
impartiality Professor Dunning has fulfilled
his task the pages that follow amply testify.
It has been his purpose to
". . . Nothing extenuate.
Nor set down aught in malice. . . ."
He has made no attempt to minimize or to
gloss over the differences that have arisen
between the two peoples, the grounds or causes
for those differences, or the errors of judgment
that may have been committed in attempting
to resolve them. The result is a survey of the
past century which is full of encouragement

viii PREFACE
for those who are longing for the day when
justice and not force shall rule the destinies of
the world. If disputes such as are here traced
and recounted can be adjusted without war; if
differences of temperament, of ambition, and
of interest such as are here described can be
settled without armed conflict; if points of honor
and of national pride like those here presented
can be satisfactorily met without the shedding
of innocent human blood, then surely there is
no limit to what may be hoped for in the cen
tury that is to come. The United States has
sedulously followed the earnest injunction of
Washington in maintaining friendly relations
with all nations while entering into alliance
with none. Having been itself carved by revo
lution from the side of the British Empire, it
is but natural that both the bonds of friend
ship and the causes for jealousy should be more
numerous between the United States and the
British Empire than between the United States
and any other people. This is a plain histor
ical fact which must be accepted by those who
guide opinion and who frame public policies.
Friendship, close intercourse, and peace be
tween the English-speaking peoples involve
no antagonism to the interests or influence of

PREFACE ix
other nations. On the contrary, they are but
the beginning of a new world order when neither
differences of speech, nor of race, nor of creed
shall longer be permitted to sow dissension
among civilized men, or to arouse human pas
sion to an extent where human reason cannot
control it and direct it toward the goal of jus
tice, of human sympathy, and of a peace which
is lasting because it rests upon a secure eco
nomic and ethical foundation.
Nicholas Murray Butler.
Columbia University,
June 4, 1914.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAGE

Readjustment After War  i
Signing of the Treaty of Ghent — Power and importance of
Great Britain — ^Weakness and insignificance of the United
States — European expectation that the American Republic
would be short-lived— Contrasting views of Tories and Whigs
as to the Americans — -Peace the only important matter settled
at Ghent — ^Rejoicing over the Treaty in the United States —
Treaty attracts slight interest in Great Britain — Canadians
develop a patriotic tradition of the war — Diverse British views
as to the future of Canada — Commercial convention of iSlJ
between Great Britain and the United States — Rivalry in fleet-
building on the Great Lakes at the end of the war — Proposals
for disarmament discussed by Adams and Castlereagh — Con
clusion of the Rush-Bagot Arrangement of 1817 — ^The rival
fleets on the Great Lakes voluntarily destroyed — Conciliatory
attitude of Castlereagh in London and Bagot in Washington —
Conclusion of the Treaty of 18 18 between Great Britain and
the_ United States — Positions and proposals of the two govern
ments as to the right of search — Draft agreement on the sub
ject fails ultimately of adoption — Peril to peace in the opposing
views tenaciously maintained — Agreement in the Treaty of
1818 as to the North Atlantic fisheries — Nature of the disputes
on this subject — Claims respectively of Americans and British
— ^Limited liberty of inshore fishing recognized to Americans —
Agreement as to boundary from Lake of the Woods to the Pa
cific — Oregon territory left open to both British and Americans
— ^Difficulties as to the northeastern boundary of the United
States as defined in the Treaty of 1783 — ^Progress in defining
the line before 18 12 — Failure to agree by commissioners under
Treaty of Ghent — ^Arbitration of King of Netherlands fails of
acceptance — Correct and friendly character of diplomatic
intercourse after the war — ^Anti-British feeling among Amer
icans in the Mississippi valley — Basis of this feeling in British
alliance with the Indians— Disturbing influence of Andrew

xii CONTENTS PAGE
Jackson's proceedings in Florida — ^Military execution of
Arbuthnot and Ambrister — Indignation in the British press
and populace — Cabinet ultimately concedes that victims had
forfeited right to protection — Conflicting commercial interests
of Great Britain and the United States — Americans favor free
dom of commerce, British maintain restrictive system — Agree
ment to abandon discriminating duties, 18x5 — ^The doctrines of
Adam Smith and Bentham promote economic and political
reform in Great Britain — ^America exhibits these doctrines in
practice — ^Reform in Britain, therefore, means approach to the
American practice.

CHAPTER II
Whig Reform and Jacksonian Democracy . . 46
Personality and policies of John Quincy Adams and George
Canning — ^The European situation that produced the Monroe
Doctrine — Canning's suggestion and Monroe's message as to
intervention — Effect of Monroe's pronouncement; Canning's
dissatisfaction — Monroe's message as to colonization; Canning's
protest — Influence and spirit of John Quincy Adams in the
matter — Canning's fear of an American alliance against Europe'
— Tension between British and American governments over y-
commerce in West Indies — Improved relations after death of /
Canning and displacement of Adams by Andrew Jackson—/
Whig ministry of Earl Grey supplants Tories in Great Britain —
Movement for economic and political reform in Great Britain
after the fall of Napoleon: Whigs and Radicals — Liberalizing
trend of Canning's policy; Navigation Laws relaxed — Restrict
ive labor laws repealed — Protective corn laws assailed but suc
cessfully defended by Tories — Catholic emancipation carried by
O'Connell, 1829; effects in Ireland and in Great Britain — Par
liamentary reform carried, 1832 — ^American sympathy with
Whig and Radical politics — Abolition of West Indian slavery
and regulation of impressment— Futile negotiations between
Great Britain and the United States for joint action in sup
pressing the African slave-trade — Influence of the claim to right
of search and impressment — Influence of British abolitionism on
South in United States — America adopts protective tariff
for manufactures— Protectionism defeated by Southern slave-
holders--Era of Andrew Jackson: traits of the American people
at that time — ^The democracy versus the expert: Jackson versus
the Bank — ^The democracy and the administration of govern
ment: theSpoils System— Britishliterary judgments of theAmer-
icans under the Tory ascendancy— Less unfavorable judgments

CONTENTS xiii

PAGE

after 1832: Harriet Martineau; Tocqueville— Richard Cobden's
views in the thirties — ^American opinions of British formed by
observation of immigrants — Judgments due to this fact and
to the treatment of the Chartists.

CHAPTER III
The Roaring Forties: Polk and Palmerston . 88
Van Buren and Victoria at the head of the governments in 1837
— Political ebuUition in the Canadas — Conflict of the races in
Lower Canada — ^United Empire Loyalists versus later-comers
in Upper Canada — Insurrections of Papineau and Mackenzie,
1837 — Defeated insurgents make raids from United States —
Steamer Caroline destroyed on American side by Canadian
troops — Arrest of McLeod in New York for complicity, 1840 —
Extreme tension and ill feeling till his acquittal, 1841 — Simul
taneous grounds of ill feeling in Maine, Texas, and Oregon —
Lord Durham's mission and report as to Canada — His com
parison of the Canadas and the United States — Views of Rad
icals and of Cobden as to future of colonies — Durham favors
policy looking to Canadian nationality — ^Union of the two
Canadas by constitution of 1841 — Failure of arbitration and
negotiation as to the northeastern boundary of the United
States — New Brunswick lumbermen and Maine militia: the
Aroostook War — Renewed diplomacy, more surveys, no agree
ment — ^American Whigs in power at Washington; British
Whigs out of power at London — Webster secretary of state;
Aberdeen succeeds the truculent Palmerston — Friction over
search of American ships by British slave-trade patrol — ^Web-
ster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842: criticised by British, Americans,
and Canadians — Controversies settled by it — Conventional
line fixed between Maine and New Brunswick — ^The red-line
map and other maps — Joint patrol of the African slave coast
agreed to — The diplomatic debate over search, visitation, and
approach— The popular forces behind the diplomacy — Webster
sets impressment over against slavery — ^The case of the Creole —
American expansionist movements bring friction in the South
and the West — British policy as to Texas — Annexation to
United States strongly opposed by Aberdeen — Anti-British
feeling strong among American annexationists — British and
American fur-traders in Oregon — Missionaries and settlers
from the East enter by the Oregon Trail — Popular demand in
the United States for the whole of the Oregon territory: "fifty-
four forty or fight" — President Polk indicates a positive atti
tude — Buchanan-Pakenham negotiations for division of region,

xiv CONTENTS PAGE
184s — Polk's belligerent message of 1845 — ^His extension of the
Monroe Doctrine — ^Joint occupation denounced by United
States — ^Treaty of June 15, 1846— The war between the United
States and Mexico — Polk's purpose to secure California lest
Great Britain acquire it — Aberdeen eager to keep it from the
United States — Mexico rejects his advice to refrain from war —
Aberdeen abandons California policy — Idealistic basis of the
American movement to Oregon and California — ^The democ
racy's sense of power and craving for bigness — Discovery of
gold an amazing coincidence, confirming destiny — Compara
tive population: Great Britain, 27,000,000; United States,
20,000,000 — No need for more territory for American population
— Dependence of British industry and commerce on the United
States — Danger of famine in the United Kingdom — American
sentiment on O'Connell's Irish agitation — Peel's policy of
abolishing the protective tariff — Cobden and the Anti-Com-
Law League — Democratic agitation involved in the activity
of the League — Corn Laws repealed in 1846 — ^The Tory min
istry gives way to the Whigs under RusseU and Palmerston —
The great famine in Ireland and its effects on America^

CHAPTER IV
Through Threefold Tension to Harmony . . 149
Singular importance of the month of February, 1848 — Emigra
tion from revolutionary Europe to Great Britain and America —
German immigration into United States rivals Irish — ^The pop
ular foreign poUcy of Lord Palmerston — Manchester school of
Cobden and Bright oppose Palmerston — ^His triumph in the
Don Pacifico debate and after — Contrast of Polk and Palmer
ston — Importance of transisthmiaft communication after
Mexican War — British protectorate over the Mosquitos used
to control Nicaragua route — ^Treaty of 1846 with New Granada
gives United States control of Panama — Critical situation at
the island of Tigre — Danger removed by the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty, April 19, iSjo— Purpose and content of the treaty-
Controversies over its meaning— Settlement in i860 by with
drawal of Great Britain from Mosquito coast — Joint guarantee
of protection faUs to bring construction of canal — FUibustering
projects against Latin America — British suggestion for stopping
them resented by United States— Anti-British feeling in
Democratic party due to Irish and slaveholders — Effect of the
Crimean War on American opinion — Enlistment of recruits for
British army in the United States— Dismissal 6f Crampton the
British minister — Revival of discussion of the right of search —
American view formally accepted by the British Government—

CONTENTS XV
PAGE
Effect of this on the slave-trade and impressment — Canadian
problems under the constitution of 1841 — Policy of Lord Elgin
assures responsible government — Conflict between French and
English interests — Industrial and commercial depression in 1849
— Effect on Canada of Peel's free-trade policy — Agitation for
annexation to United States — Party politics at the basis of the
agitation — ^American indifference to the movement — British
political leaders expect ultimate separation of Canada — Lord
John RusseU's speech on the subject — Protest of Lord Elgin —
Disintegrating elements in the philosophy of the free-trade
movement — Canadian situation brings final repeal of British
Navigation Laws — Importance to Canada of trade with United
States — Dissatisfaction in United States at Umits upon the in
shore fisheries — Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 results from this
situation — Effects of the Treaty on relations between Canada
and America — Comparative numbers of English-speaking peo
ples in i860 — Economic leadership of Great Britain — Demo
cratic movement in British poUtics — Effects of great migrations
on Britain and America — Influence of the Irish in America —
Growth and influence of American literature — Harmonizing
influence of the British mid- Victorians, especially Dickens.

CHAPTER V
The American Civil War and Its Effects . 199
Influence of slavery on British feeling toward the warring sec
tions — Southern argument for independence — Northern coun
ter argument — Difficulty experienced by the other English-
speaking peoples in choosing between these arguments — ^The
British belief that a great democracy could not endure — Favor
for the South due to this belief and to the Southern preference
for free trade — Slavery a source of suspicion toward the South
— Influence of British antislavery leaders like Cobden and
Bright — ^British proclamation of neutrality and its grounds —
Resentment in the North at the British position — Attitude of
the British cabinet toward the Southern demand for recog
nition — Resentment of the South at this position — ^The Trent
affair of November, 1861 — American rejoicings at the act of
Captain Wilkes — Indignation and warUke fervor in England —
Demand for release of the envoys and preparations for war —
Surrender of the envoys — Confused reasoning of Seward and
Russell about the matter — ^Hatred of British caused by the
affair — Attitude of the British cabinet toward the Confederate
envoys — Increased irritation on the part of the South — Addi
tional causes of anger in the North — ^The effect of blockade-
running — ^The careers of the cruisers, especially the Florida and

xvi CONTENTS PAGE
the Alabama — Grievances of the victorious North at the end of
the war — ^Hatred of Great Britain in the South — Ill-feeling
between the United States and Canada — ^Termination of the
Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 — ^The Fenian movement from the
United States against Canada — Complaints as to the treatment
of naturalized Irishmen in Great Britain — Strong Irish in
fluence in the United States — Cleavage of sympathies accord
ing to social classes in England — Result of the war discredits
the foes of democracy — Triumph of the Liberals in the Reform
Bill of 1867 — Lincoln's death softens hostility to the United
States in Great Britain — Absorbing nature of domestic prob
lems after the war — Alabama claims formally presented by.the
United States — Basis and content of the claims as presented
by Charles Francis Adams — The reply of Earl Russell — Lord
Russell peremptorily rejects arbitration as well as compensa
tion — Sentiment in Great Britain against RusseU's attitude —
Renewal of negotiations by Lord Stanley — ^The Johnson-Clar
endon Convention of January, 1869 — Great concessions by the
British Government — Rejection of the Treaty by the American
Senate — Charles Sumner's demand for reparation for national
wrongs — ^His demand for compensation for national losses —
Anti-British feeling greatly stimulated by Sumner's speech —
Resentment caused by it in Great Britain — Connection of
Sumner's views with those of Cobden and Bright — Sumner aims
to acquire British North America — Secretary Fish begins ne
gotiations with the Gladstone cabinet — ^Influences promoting
success — The Treaty of Washington of May, 1871 — The agree
ment as to arbitration of the Alabama claims— Great conces
sions by the British Government as to the "three rules" —
American concession on the recognition of Confederate bellig
erency — The Geneva Tribunal and its work — Final exclusion
of the national claims — ^The award of the Tribunal — ^Amity
with America associated with the liberalizing projects of Glad
stone — ^Arbitration of the San Juan water boundary — Arbi
tration of Civil War claims other than Alabama claims — Arbi
tration as to the inshore flsheries — Award of the Halifax
Commission — Relation of the fisheries arbitration to political
movements in Canada.

CHAPTER VI
The Growth of Canada and Its Problems . 265
Participation of the Canadians Rose and Macdonald in ne
gotiating the Treaty of Washington — Influences making for
union of the British-American provinces — Effect of the Civil
War across the bordei— Party deadlock in Canada— Movement

CONTENTS xvii PAGE
for union in the Maritime Provinces — General conference of
delegates at Quebec, 1864 — Dominion of Canada established,
1867 — Influence of the United States on the constitution —
Extension of the Dominion to the Pacific and the Arctic Oceans
— ^The problem of national unity in the Dominion — Separation
of Ontario from Quebec — Projects for east-and-west railways
— Protectionism adopted under lead of Macdonald, 1878 —
United States committed to protectionism — Friction-making
influence of these tariff poUcies — Operation of the agreement of
1873 as to the inshore fisheries — ^Termination of the agreement
by the United States, 1885 — Seizure of American fishing-vessels
by the Canadian coast-guards, 1886 — Retaliation enacted by
Congress — Adjustment by temporary modus vivendi — Treaty
for permanent settlement fails in American Senate — Anti-
British feeling caused by the situation — Increased by defeat of
Irish home rule and accession of Salisbury — And by incidents
in the conflict over Cleveland's tariff policy — Dismissal of Sack-
ville-West, the British minister — Forebodings of trouble when
Blaine became secretary of state — Previous trouble over seal-
hunting in Behring Sea — British vessels seized in Behring Sea
beyond three-mile limit — American court, decides Behring Sea
to be mare clausum — Secretary Bayard seeks joint prohibition
of pelagic seaUng — ^Agreement fails through intervention of
Canada — Renewed seizures of Canadian vessels in 1889 —
Warm correspondence between Blaine and Salisbury — Modus
vivendi and treaty of arbitration — Decision of the tribunal
against the United States — Influence of the episode on national
susceptibUities — Sense of growth and power in the United
States — Creation of a modern fleet — Foothold secured in Samoa
— British movement for imperial federation a challenge to the
United States — Canadian development of militia and railways
causes uneasiness — Agitation in Canada for commercial union
with the United States — Goldwin Smith holds annexation inevi
table — Sir John Macdonald wins election of 1891 on protection
and loyalty to the British connection — American tariff policy,
after fluctuation, settles on high protection — General effect of
tariff controversies on American opinion.

CHAPTER VII
Venezuela — ^and After  300
SaUsbury's Liberal-Unionist ministry of 1895 and its problems
— ^The difference with Venezuela as to the boundary of Guiana —
Early aspects of the controversy — Tender of good oflSces by
United States declined by Salisbury— Venezuela presses for

xviii CONTENTS

arbitration of full claims; Great Britain declares Schomburgk
line her irreducible minimum — Cleveland's foreign policy and
American public sentiment — Secretary Olney's despatch of
July, 1895 — Extreme positions as to the Monroe Doctrine —
Salisbury's replies of November 26 — Irreconcilable views of the
two governments — Cleveland's message of December 17, sug
gesting war — Excitement and approval in America — Calming
effect of longer reflection — British increduUty and amazement —
Strong movement of unofficial opinion against rupture with
America — ^Jameson's raid diverts attention to Africa and
Germany — British Government agrees to negotiate with United
States as to the disputed line — ^Arbitration with Venezuela
arranged and carried out — General effect of the incident on
American prestige — Effect on the movement for arbitration —
Unratified Ohiey-Pauncefote Treaty of 1897 — Influences con
tributing to its failure — ^The war of 1898 with Spain popular
in the United States — British sympathy demonstratively with
the Americans — Anti-British feeling dies out in America —
Reciprocal sympathy in connection with the wars in the Trans
vaal and the Philippines — Cordiality leads to efforts to settle
outstanding controversies especially with Canada — ^The un
successful HerscheU Commission of 1898-9 — Failure due to
dispute as to the boundary of Alaska — ^The opposing claims and
their relation to the Klondike gold mines — Diplomatic agree
ments between Great Britain and America effected by Secre
tary Hay and his successors and associates — ^The modus vivendi
as to the Alaskan boundary — American dislike of the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty — Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 supersedes
Clayton-Bulwer — Alaskan boundary fixed by arbitration, 1903
— End of boundary disputes confirmed by Root-Bryce con
vention, 1908 — Other treaties of 1908 — Renewal of friction
over inshore fisheries — Arbitration, as recommended by Hague
Conference, agreed to by English-speaking nations, 1908 —
Northeastern fisheries sent to arbitration — Decision of the
tribunal, 1910 — Pelagic sealing in Behring Sea forbidden by
treaty, 191 1 — Proposal for reciprocity rejected by Canadians
in elections — Spirit and reasoning of the Canadians not repug
nant to Americans — Arbitration treaty of 1911 — ^Transforma
tion of British and American systems at end of century of
peace — American imperialism approved by British — British
federative empire approved by Americans — American activity
in world politics under Roosevelt — Recasting of speculative
equilibrium as a consequence — British opinion approves Amer
ican development — Movement for imperial federation of Brit
ish dominions — The Colonial Conference of 1887 — Develop
ment into the Imperial Conference — Results of its consolidating
activity — Democratic reaction of the colonies on the mother
land — Influence on the Irish Home Rule problem — Promotes

CONTENTS xix
PAGE
harmony with the American Republic — Changes of the cen
tury of peace in the EngUsh-speaking world — Is Great Britain
StiU the nerve centre? — Populations of United Kingdom and
colonies, 1814 and 1914 — American Republic the home of most
of the EngUsh-speaking people — Contrast with British Empire
geographicaUy — Resemblances social, economic, and political —
Cordial relations probable in the future.

CHAPTER VIII
Conclusion  357
The fallacy of too sweeping generalization in international
affairs — Illustrated in the relations of Great Britain and the
United States — The four periods of the century of peace —
What the Treaty of Ghent did not do — Progress and failure in
the diplomacy of the first period — Many causes of friction in
the second period — Influences making for amity and their
triumph — General disturbance of good feeling through the
American Civil War — Pacifying processes after the war —
Initial controversies of the fourth period — Cause and meaning
of the explosion over the Venezuelan boundary — Effects of the
Spanish-American War — Far-reaching progress in cordiality —
The two great political organisms of the English-speaking
world — Persistent consciousness of a special ground for peace
between them.
Indej^  373

INTRODUCTION
That the centenary of the treaty which has
secured to Great Britain and the United States
one hundred years of unbroken peace should
deserve a celebration might seem strange to
some philosopher in his study, whose medita
tions on the folly and cruelty of war would have
led him to suppose that peace was natural
between two great nations kindred in blood,
both highly intelligent and highly civilized.
Very different are the feelings of the historian,
who remembers how often wars have arisen from
slight causes, or of the practical statesman,
who knows the kind of motives by which rulers
who determine the issues of peace or war have
been and still are governed. Jealousies, rival
ries, antagonisms have still so much power over
peoples, rulers are still so far from trying to
apply as between states that moral law which
the better sort of individual men recognize in
private social and in business intercourse, and
which public opinion imposes even upon the
worse sort, that the maintenance of peace be-

xxii INTRODUCTION
tween neighbor states through three genera
tions of men is a novel and admirable thing, fit
to inspire joy and deserve commemoration.
The peoples of these two states were no doubt
of kindred blood. But the quarrels of kins
folk are proverbially bitter, and between these
there were plenty of causes for quarrel. The
separation, begun in 1776, sealed by treaty in
1783, had been made by war, a long war, which
left angry feelings. The behavior of some of
the British forces, and especially of the Hessian
mercenaries, had exasperated colonial senti
ment, while the harshness with which the rev
olutionary party among the Americans had
treated those of their fellow citizens who ad
hered to the British Crown had sown the seeds
qf more enduring anger, especially among those
Uijited Empire Loyalists who when expelled
from the United States took refuge in Canada.
For many years afterward the offensively super
cilious attitude of the English and the self-assert
ive arrogance of the Americans made the aver
age man in each people distasteful to the other,
and it was only the wisest and largest minds that
preached good understanding and good feeling.
These aversions did not die down till the Civil
War of 1 86 1-5, with its display of courage and

INTRODUCTION xxiii
high spirit on both sides, had brought Europeans
to respect the American people, and had given
that people itself new martial deeds to be proud
of, deeds of a valor which had not been directed
against the old country.
Besides these unpleasant memories there were
also controversies over important material in
terests that emerged from time to time. The
northeastern frontier of the United States where
the State of Maine borders on New Brunswick
and Lower Canada had been left uncertain by
the treaty of 1783, and also by that of 18 14, and
as the country began to be settled the disputes
over it became threatening. After this question
had been disposed of by the Webster-Ashburton
treaty of 1842 another boundary quarrel arose
for the possession of the region then called
Oregon. Each nation had a legal case, and for
many months neither seemed likely to give way.
Even after the treaty of 1846 had fixed the
forty-ninth parallel of latitude as the frontier
line all the way to the shores of the Pacific, the
diplomatists of both countries were harassed by
a dispute relating to the ownership of the
island of San Juan in the Straits of Juan de
Fuca, and after that dispute had been referred
to the German Emperor, and determined by

xxiv INTRODUCTION
him in favor of the United States, a larger issue
was raised over the frontier of Alaska and that
newly colonized extreme northwestern region of
Canada which we call the Yukon. This was
disposed of by a joint commission in 1903.
There still remained one small outstanding con
troversy about a tiny island, called Pope's Folly,
and some fishing-grounds in Passamaquoddy
Bay (a large inlet from the Bay of Fundy),
through which the international boundary runs.
In 1911 an agreement was drafted to refer it
to arbitration. When the negotiators, feeling the
absurdity of employing the elaborate machinery
of a court to determine so trivial a matter, agreed
to split the difference, they gave the islet to the
State of Maine while the fishing-grounds were
assigned to the Canadian province of New Bruns
wick. With this there ended the long series of
frontier questions that had so often been a
source of disquiet, and now every yard of the
nearly four thousand miles of boundary has been
marked out by scientific surveyors. To have
escaped or amicably settled all the grounds of
friction which might occur along this line, far
longer than any other frontier between civilized
nations, is itself an event without parallel in
history.

INTRODUCTION xxv
Even after the land boundary had been de
termined, the sea and the creatures that make
the value of the sea remained to disturb the
repose of the two nations. In the wandering
waves one can fix no boundaries, and in the
wandering fish one can assert no property, so
fishing questions have always been a source of
trouble. Questions arose regarding the seal
fisheries of the Pacific. Controversies far more
intricate and far more protracted produced an
almost incessant irritation between the fisher
men who came from New England to the coasts
of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and the
native fishermen who plied their trade there
under the British flag. Not till 1910 was this
seemingly endless dispute adjusted by the sen
tence of The Hague tribunal which both parties
accepted without a murmur.
The two nations were akin in blood and speech,
but a common speech carries with it one disad
vantage. Each nation can read all the ill-
natured things that are said about it in the other;
and there are never wanting those who like to
say ill-natured things, sometimes from a vanity
which seeks to exalt itself by depressing others,
sometimes from a wish to compel attention and
produce an effect — for in literature, and espe-

xxvi INTRODUCTION
cially in journalism, blame draws more notice
than praise — sometimes from pure ill nature, the
love of mischief for mischief's sake. Thus, of
the many offensive words uttered on both sides
when temper was up, a larger proportion reached
the eyes and ears of the other than if they had
spoken different tongues, and what was spite
fully said proved more galling.
There was, moreover, one exception to that
community of ideas and traditions which was
fitted to draw Americans and Englishmen to
gether. From the third decade of the nine
teenth century there had been a considerable
immigration from Ireland to the United States.
It increased largely after 1845, but it did not
begin to be politically significant till the days of
the Fenian movement, when some violent mem
bers of the insurrectionary party escaped to the
United States and placed there their base of
operations against the British Government. At
the same time they sought to organize and to
rouse the Irishmen settled in America, a large
and rapidly growing element, against England.
Not only the volume of the Irish vote but its
compactness, as well as the prominence of Irish
leaders in municipal government and in the
party machine, made the constant attacks upon

INTRODUCTION xxvii
England and the constant pressure upon Con
gressmen and on successive administrations to
adopt an anti-British policy, a factor of some
moment. After the remarkable change of Brit
ish policy toward Ireland which began with Mr.
Gladstone's Church Disestablishment Bill of
1869, and reached its high-water mark in his
Home Rule Bill of 1886, this anti-English senti
ment gradually declined, affecting an always
diminishing percentage of that part of the
American population which springs from an Irish
stock and cherishes an Irish patriotism. It is
now confined to a comparatively small section,
and is likely soon to disappear. But from the
end of the Civil War till about the end of the
century it was an obstacle to perfectly good
relations, being one of the many ways which
Irishmen have found of avenging the wrongs
their forefathers suffered at the hands of English
governments. Nevertheless, despite these grounds of dis
sension and others which need not be here re
counted, peace did last unbroken, and, though
there were several strains, none came quite to the
breaking-point. The times at which the risk
of a breach was greatest seem to have been the

xxviii INTRODUCTION
dispute about Oregon in 1845, the Trent affair
in 1861, and the years just after the Civil War
(1865 to 1871), when the resentment over the
depredations committed by the Alabama was
acute. The Venezuela incident at the end of
1895 was a passing squall, which the English,
astonished at the vehemence shown over a mat
ter which not one Englishman in a hundred had
ever heard of, could not be induced to take
seriously. In the two former of these instances
there was some bellicose sentiment on both
sides of the Atlantic, in the two latter such a
sentiment existed on the American side only,
and few persons in England could imagine war
as likely to result.
To what causes, then, do we owe it that all
the sources of trouble which from time to time
arose, some of which were for the moment
formidable, have so passed away that for more
than a generation there has been a growing
sense of concord and good will ?
The cause which naturally occurs to most
minds is blood kinship and a common speech.
}t is, however, easy to overrate the value of such
a tie. It has not prevented fierce wars between
communities of the same nationality. Athe
nians and Thebans bore to one another an un-

INTRODUCTION xxix
dying hate. So did Pisans and Florentines.
Bitter were the wars between German prin
cipalities in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen
turies. Tocqueville said in 1830 that he could
conceive of no hatred more poisonous than that
which the Americans then felt for England.^
Kinship alone would not have been enough. '
Kinship, however, was reinforced by a sense of
the common possession of a great literature and
great traditions. The New Englanders, bitter
as they often were toward England, could not
forget that Milton and Cromwell were English
men. Many a Virginian family was proud of its
Cavalier ancestry. So too, though it was at
one time the fashion among the English upper
and literary class to treat the Americans as a
purely commercial people, and to disparage their
literature, each nation had a genuine interest
in the other's performances and a capacity for
understanding the other which neither possessed
as toward any other people. Each was secretly"
proud ofthe other, though neither would avow it.
The American masses would from 18 14 down to
1871 have felt less repulsion from the notion of
armed strife than would the English, but fortu-
'One may, however, conjecture that in listening to the sharp words
of his New England friends he underrated an underlying sentiment
running the other way.

xxx INTRODUCTION
nately there was no standing army in the United
States, and only a small navy, so that the country
was free from that pernicious influence of a
professional military caste which works such
frightful evil in Europe, being indeed driven to
desire opportunities for practising the work for
which the profession exists. In Britain the army
and navy never wished to fight America. They
would have felt wars with her to be almost civil
wars, bella nullos hahitura triumphos. And when
in recent years America began to have a great
navy, her officers and sailors, as often as they
found themselves in foreign ports, always frater
nized with those of British vessels, and found
the latter friends ready made.
The basis for good will grew wider and
firmer with the increased intercourse of private
citizens which followed the introduction of
steam navigation. Private friendships became
incomparably more numerous, and the interests
of commerce were more closely interwoven.
Neither nation was drawn into war by such
alliances with any other state as we now see
to be among the most deadly sources of war.
Happily for herself, America has had no entan
gling alliances; that risk existed only in 1793-5.
Britain, not always so carefully detached, never

INTRODUCTION xxxi
has had, and it may safely be said never will
have, any that could require her to array herself
against America.
But the main factor working for peace has
been the good sense and self-control inherent
in the character of the two peoples. Neither
of them suffers itself to be swept away by pas
sion, neither forgets, even when demagogues seek
to excite it by appeals to national vanity and
so-called "points of honor," that there are, be
hind the susceptibilities of the moment, large
issues of permanent well-being to be considered.
In the days when both nations claimed Oregon,
a territory of great extent and value, imper
fectly as that value was then known, was in
dispute. But in both countries public opinion
recognized that the other side also had a case,
and that war would be a greater evil than the
loss of part of its own rights. The territory
was accordingly divided and peace was pre
served. So on other occasions also the peoples
came near the brink of a rupture, but showed
their inborn quality by stopping on the brink.
The question arises — and it is a question of
high interest — how much of this self-restraint
and underlying wisdom is to be attributed to
the fact that the United States Government ever

xxxii INTRODUCTION
since 1814 and the British Government ever
since 1832 have been popular governments, in
which the general feeling of the nation has been,
though more evidently in the United States than
in Britain, the ultimately decisive factor in
international relations. One would like to as
cribe much weight to this factor, for it would be
reassuring as to the pacific tendencies of democ
racies in general. But the facts are not all one
way. Let us consider them. It is clear that
if the government of Britain had been as pop
ular in 1776 as it was in 1876 the North Amer
ican colonies would not have been alienated as
they unhappily were, and also clear that in 1862
the existence of a wide-spread sympathy for the
Northern States among the British masses im
mensely diminished the risk that the British
Government might yield to the persuasions of
the French Emperor and might thus, in recog
nizing the independence of the Southern Con
federacy, find herself in a conflict with the '
North.^ But on every occasion since 18 14 in
¦ a well-known writer. General von Bernhardi, observes in his recent
book, Germany and the Next War (p. 94 of English translation) : " England
committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of view, of not
supporting the Southern States in the American War of Secession."
What the Prussian general caUs an "unpardonable blunder" was the
scornful refusal of the British nation — a practically unanimous refusal —
to take advantage of the divisions in a kindred people and set back the
cause of human freedom.

INTRODUCTION xxxiii
which peace seemed to be threatened from the
American side, popular feeling in the United
States was, or seemed to be, so far bellicose
that the statesmen who directed American
policy thought they could make political capi
tal out of a menacing attitude. Such was the
case with Mr. Polk and Mr. Seward, and again
with Mr. Blaine; and such seemed to be the
case with Mr. Cleveland in December, 1895,
though the motives with which he launched his
message of that year have never been fully
understood. If nothing similar happened in
Britain, it must be remembered that the ques
tions which arose between the two countries
were all (except the Trent affair) remote from
the knowledge and interest of the great bulk of
Englishmen, so that it was never worth the
while of any politician, however free from scru
ples, to win any popular favor by an anti-Amer
ican policy. Had the controversies which arose
over Canadian issues directly affected Britain,
or, in other words, had the English been Cana
dians, defending their view of their rights to dis
puted territory or to absolute control of sea-
fisheries, the temper of the British people might
have been more sensitive and their latent pug
nacity more easily aroused.

xxxiv INTRODUCTION
One remarkable proof of good feeling and of
a good sense which rises to the level of the
highest political wisdom has been of late years
given by the people of the United States.
There was a time when they desired to com
plete their control of the North American
continent by absorbing Canada. It was a
natural desire, for there were geographical con
siderations which seemed to favor it, and it
would, if peaceably effected, have increased
their strength and wealth. But never since
1 8 14 have they seriously thought of using force
against Canada, for they know that just govern
ments are based on the consent of the gov
erned, while in recent years they have frankly
renounced the notion of employing any kind
even of a pacific pressure, and have recognized
in a large-minded and friendly spirit that Can
ada has a patriotic ideal of her own and wishes
both to become a great nation and to maintain
her political connection with the mother-coun
try and those other great dominions which re
gard the ancient crown of Britain as their
centre of unity. In this matter at least let us
stop to honor and admire the spirit of Amer
ican democracy.
He who reads this record which Professor

INTRODUCTION xxxv
Dunning has set forth with so much judgment as
well as with a conspicuous impartiality, will be
struck by the fact that groundless suspicions
by either nation of the purposes of the other,
and the attribution by either to the other of
motives which did not exist or were of slight
importance, played no small part in the imbit-
terment of relations. Such suspicions and mis
conceptions between states are always to be
feared. They have been fruitful, sources of
strife. That they did not, as between Britain
and America, prove fatal in times bf strain may
be ascribed to the fact that there vvtfre always
in both nations men capable of con acting these
misapprehensions, and that each knew enough
of its own defects to be able to make al
lowances for the like defects in the other. The
most serious misapprehension was that which,
owing largely to the unwisdom of a section of
the English press, arose during the Civil War,
when most Americans supposed that a jealous
spirit made England desire the d(j)wnfall of the
Republic. That was never the o.ase, as I can
venture to assert from my recollection of those
now distant days. There was /a good deal of
sympathy with the valor and constancy of the
Confederates. But the fact W2.s, though Amer-

xxxvi INTRODUCTION
icans did not then know it, that the bulk of the
British people, and most of its intellectual
leaders, men like John Bright and Goldwin
Smith, always stood for the cause which they
held to be that of human rights and of demo
cratic progress. During the years from 1861
to 1865 no meetings open to the general public
were (so far as I can remember) ever held to
give support to the Confederate cause, because
it was known that in such an open meeting no
resolution aidverse to the North could have been
carried oh a vote. In the upper classes there
were then some people who would have liked
to see a republic discredited. But the larger
heart of the British nation as a whole refused
the most favorable opportunity it ever had of
injuring its greatest competitor.
Though Professor Dunning is right in dwell
ing upon the fact that the gradual democra
tization of Britain tended to the promotion of
good relktions, it is to be noted that in neither
country was >^ither of the great parties identified
with either ai anti-American or an anti-British
tendency .H Party politics came but little into
the matter* - But men, that is to say, the views
and characters of individual statesmen, did
come in, and made an immense difference.

INTRODUCTION xxxvii
The portraits of Webster and Ashburton that
hang on the walls of the State Department
at Washington commemorate two negotiators
whose happy co-operation solved a problem the
solution of which might, in the hands of lesser
men, have been remitted to the sword. On that
occasion both the United States and Canada
were displeased, the press of each declaring that
its representative had conceded far too much.
That has almost always been said in both coun
tries alike when any compromise was made.
But the outer world and posterity have ap
proved the compromise. Neither American nor
British interests were always in the keeping of
men so tactful and prudent as Webster and
Ashburton. There were moments when the
stiff and frigid attitude of the British foreign
secretary exasperated the American negoti
ators, or when a demagogic secretary of state
at Washington tried by a bullying tone to win
credit as the patriotic champion of national
claims. But whenever there were bad manners
in London there was good temper at Washing
ton, and when there was a storm on the Poto
mac there was calm on the Thames. It was
the good fortune of the two countries that if at
any moment rashness or vehemence was found

xxxviii INTRODUCTION
on one side, it never happened to be met by the
like quality on the other.
The moral of the story which Professor Dun
ning has told so clearly is that peace can always
be kept, whatever be the grounds of contro
versy, between peoples that wish to keep it.
Mr. Root, the greatest of Webster's successors in
the office of secretary of state, has well said that
there is no issue in diplomacy which cannot be
settled if the negotiators sincerely try to settle
it. The questions that arose between these two
countries were questions in which, especially on
the American side, the negotiators could not act
without having the mind and will of the people
behind them, because the people had some
knowledge of the questions, a knowledge far
wider than European nations have of the con
troversies that arise between their governments.
The people could exert their judgment, and
their judgment, even in moments of excitement,
realized how frightful would be the calamities of
a fratricidal war.
This feeling has grown immensely stronger
within the last half-century, as any one whose
recollection extends that far back can testify.
It is a guarantee of unbroken peace for the
future. May not that sense of an unbreakable

INTRODUCTION xxxix
peace have effects going beyond the two na
tions whom it blesses ? They understand one
another. The material interests that unite them
are greater than ever before, the private friend
ships more numerous, the reciprocal knowledge
of one another more complete. Are they not
naturally fitted to act together whenever their
efforts can be jointly put forth on behalf of
international justice and peace, confirming by
their influence the good which their example
has already done ? They have given the finest
example ever seen in history of an undefended
frontier, along which each people has trusted
to the good faith of the other that it would
create no naval armaments; and this very
absence of armaments has itself helped to pre
vent hostile demonstrations. Neither of them
has ever questioned the sanctity of treaties,
or denied that states are bound by the moral
law. Be that as it may, it is, to those who are sad
dened by the calamities which the year 19 14
has brought upon Europe, a consoling thought
that the century of peace which has raised the
English-speaking peoples from forty millions
to one hundred and sixty millions has created
among those peoples a sense of kindliness and

xl INTRODUCTION
good will which was never seen before, and
which is the surest pledge of their future pros
perity and progress,^ as well as of the main
tenance of a Perpetual Friendship between
them. James Bryce.
Hindleap, Sussex,
September 14, 1914.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE
AND
THE UNITED STATES
CHAPTER I
READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
In the late afternoon of December 24, 18 14,
the commissioners who had agreed upon the
Treaty of Ghent signed their handiwork and
exchanged conventional expressions of satis
faction at the conclusion of their labors. John
Quincy Adams, as he tells us in his diary, as
sured Lord Gambler of his hope that it would
be the last treaty of peace between Great
Britain and the United States. Two weeks
later, at a banquet given by the citizens in
honor of the commissioners, Mr, Adams, pro
posing the culminating toast of the occasion,
worded it thus: "Ghent, the city of Peace;
may the gates of the temple of Janus, here
closed, not be opened again for a century!"

2 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
It is not likely that a conscientious search of
his heart, such as Mr. Adams was wont to en
gage in at times, would have revealed any very
large measure of the confidence that his formal
words had implied. Neither in the course of
the negotiations nor in their result could the
most sanguine observer have found assurance
of even the lesser degree of permanence that
had been piously suggested. Actual war be
tween English-speaking peoples the treaty did
indeed bring to an end; the causes of the war
it djd not make the subject of even a remote
allusion. By all the canons of judgment that were war
ranted by history and by the conditions of the
times, the peace made at Ghent could be merely
a truce. Great Britain in 1815 stood on the
pinnacle of fame as the mightiest political power
,. on earth. Her population of 19,000,000 was
not large, relatively speaking, but it was com
pact. Included in it were some 5,000,000 Irish
men, who, though perpetually troublesome in
some respects, could always be depended upon
to furnish a goodly quota of both brains and
brawn in war. Her navy had established an
undisputed control of all the seas. Her army,
under Wellington, had given the final blow to

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 3
the prestige of the greatest military genius of
modern times, if not of all times. Her colonial
possessions, largely increased by the twenty
years of war just ended, covered vast areas in
every part of the globe. Commercially, no
other power approached her in the magnitude
of her interests. In manufactures she was
slowly but surely forging to the front on lines
that were soon to revolutionize industry. Po
litically and socially the forces that made up
this mighty organism were centred in a nar
row aristocracy. The landowners of the United
Kingdom ruled the British Empire. There was
indeed a monarch; there was a House of Com
mons; there were courts and juries and bills of
rights and all the elements that had for cen
turies been the vaunted guarantees of English
liberty. In the actual working of the complex
system, however, the decisive influence was
wielded by the landed aristocracy, and more
particularly by the peers whose estates consti
tuted so significant a fraction of the surface of
the islands.
The United States, when it ventured to en
gage in war with this huge empire, presented a
contrast with its adversary that was almost
ludicrous. A population of S^jOQijOop, of whom

4 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
some i.tjoo.ooo were negro slaves, was scattered
along a thousand miles of the Atlantic seaboard,
with a few straggling lines of settlement in the
Mississippi valley. For military power this na
tion could boast a dozen half-filled regiments of
regular troops, distributed in small detachments
over the whole territory, and a navy so insig
nificant in size as to evoke roars of laughter
when the number of its ships was mentioned
in the House of Commons. Before the end of
the war this minute navy had given such an
account of itself as no longer to be a cause of
mirth at Westminster, and even the army, after
bitter humiliation, had won somewhat of dis
tinction. Yet in no sense could the United
States be reckoned as of much significance
among the powers of the civilized world. Its
foreign commerce had assumed some impor
tance during the long Napoleonic wars, but
could expect no great development in the com
petition with Great Britain after peace had been
made. In manufacturing, a little jmpetus had
been given by the exclusion of British goods
through embargo and war; but here again the
restoration of peace would put the Americans
under the crushing weight of competition from
England^ and would end, for the time at least,

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 5
any likelihood that the United States would
figure among the important industrial powers.
The one aspect in which the American Re
public attracted serious attention among en
lightened nations was the political and social.;-
Here was to be found in practical operation on
a large scale the democracy that the French
Revolution had threaten ec;! to impose upon all
Europe. Liberty and equality of a kind and
degree portentously suggestive of the ideals of
1789 and 1792 prevailed throughout the United
States and were watched with some anxiety by
the dominant classes in the Old World. It was
a cardinal maxim of conservative political phi
losophy in Europe that republican government
could not be adapted to the needs of a great
territory and population. The career of the
American Republic was expected therefore to
be stormy and brief. War with the United
States in 1812 had not been desired by the
British governing aristocracy; it involved an
annoying diversion of attention and resources
from the serious business of the hour. Only
because it might in some measure hasten the
inevitable failure and downfall of the American
system was it regarded with any equanimity.)
The attitude of the New England Federalists

6 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
during hostilities had confirmed this feeling in
the class among whom it prevailed, and the
feeling was manifest in the negotiations by
which the war was brought to an end.
It would indeed be a serious error to as
sume that the feeling here referred to was very
general in England. Party divisions, though
dimmed by the national solidarity that was de
veloped by the exigencies of the long war with
France, still marked the line of cleavage in po
litical thinking, and the Whigs, for decades in
a hopeless opposition, still bore the tradition
of admiration and pride concerning the branch,
of the English race which Tory policy had sev
ered from the parent stem. Conspicuous fea-r
tures of American constitutional practice were
the goal of Whig aspiration and this fact tended
to produce tolerance of other features that were
abhorrent. Thoroughgoing democracy such as
was manifest in the United States was no more
attractive to the Whigs than to the Tories.
The Tories, however, feared it, while the Whigs
looked indulgently upon it as a pathetic error
that would in time correct itself. To the Tory
the American people was a brawling, disrepu
table loafer, who had disgraced his family by
plundering it and had by his character and

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 7
conduct put himself beyond the possibility of
toleration by any member of respectable soci
ety. The Whig, on the other hand, felt toward
the United States much as the upper-class col
lege man feels toward the freshman, the jour
neyman toward the apprentice, the old and
sophisticated in any occupation toward the
newcomer. The strong points of the new man
were duly appreciated and admired; there was
satisfaction that the English-speaking group
should include a stout, smart, likely young
fellow, and there was shrewd calculation of
what he could contribute in a competition or
fight with a rival group; but there was a feel
ing that within his own group he must learn
his place and keep it, and must submit peace
ably to the hazing and fagging that were the
prerogative of his elders.
It was the Tory point of view that dominated
the British approach to the negotiations at
Ghent. For their temerity in undertaking the
conquest of Canada the Americans must be
required to surrender enough territory to make
a renewal of that enterprise very difficult; and,
moreover, they must refrain from all discussion
of the practice of search and impressment,
which they held to be the cause of the war.

8 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
The announcement of these terms by the British
commissioners at Ghent suspended negotiation
abruptly. Peace on any terms involving ces
sion of territory by the United States was
promptly shown by the attitude of the Amer
icans to be impossible; the Britons at the same
time were unyielding as to search and impress
ment. Accordingly, peace pure and simple was
agreed to. The Treaty of Ghent embodied,
in addition to the articles necessary to end the
war, only certain provisions for determining the
northern boundary of the United States as fixed
by the treaty of 1783, and an agreement to pro
mote the abolition of the slave trade. Matters
of grave and pressing importance, the right of
search, the navigation of the Mississippi and
the Saint Lawrence Rivers, the rights of inshore
fishing on the Atlantic coast — all were broached,
but were dropped from consideration in order
to insure the one great end of peace.
~ In the United States peace was greeted with
iiniversal rejr^r.ing- The chagrin of those in
authority at the failure of a far-reaching settle
ment found no place in popular feeling. In the
dazzling glamour of McDonough's victory on
Lake Champlain and Jackson's final achieve
ment at New Orleans, the humiliation of De-

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 9
troit and Washington and Chrystler's Farm was
lost to sight entirely, and the belief hardened
into century-long tradition that in a second war
for independence the Americans had won as
decisive a triumph as that which was crowned
at Yorktown,
In Great Britain, meanwhile, the conclusion
of peace with the United States was sjarcely^
noted, and the very fact that there had been a
war was forgotten. The news that the Treaty
of Ghent had been ratified reached London
almost simultaneously with the report that
Napoleon had returned from Elba. Already
for months the progress of affairs at the Con
gress of Vienna had enlisted the anxious atten
tion of all Europe. Lord Castlereagh, the Brit
ish foreign secretary, on his way to Vienna
with a train of twenty coaches, as John Quincy
Adams casually noted, had stopped at Ghent
long enough, in August, 18 14, to give the Brit
ish negotiators the instructions that made the
conclusion of the treaty possibly The con
flicting interests and cross-purposes that were
in play at Vienna had made a renewal of wide
spread war among the great European powers
not unlikely; the astonishing reception of Na
poleon in France made it practically certain.

IO READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
In the presence of such a prospect it was not
to be expected that the petty affair of American
relations should excite any interest. Then fol
lowed the Hundred Days, Waterloo, and Saint
Helena. These furnished engrossing material
for British reflection, both popular and official,
and all things American faded from view and
from memory.
No such oblivion enveloped the recent events
in that group of loyal Britons who dwelt in
the provinces north of the United States. Of
the half-million inhabitants of these provinces
some fifty per cent were English-speaking, and
of this fifty per cent the most influential ele
ment consisted of the families who had been
driven from the United States by the result of
the Revolution. New Brunswick and Upper
Canada were peopled almost exclusively by these
exiles. In them the memories and traditions
of the civil strife that had caused them such
hardships nourished undying bitterness toward
the Americans. Toward the thriving democ
racy to the south the attitude of the British
Canadian was that of the English Tory. When
war broke out in 1812, with the loudly pro
claimed purpose of Henry Clay and other san
guine spirits to sweep over Canada and dictate

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR ii
peace at Quebec or Halifax, both French and
British subjects rallied faithfully to the colors
of the King, but there was a special ardor in
the response of the British. Those who recalled
the proceedings of the triumphant party in New
York and other States at the end of the Revo
lutionary War could not be lured to welcome
the invaders by any call to escape from oppres
sion. It happened that the brunt of the fight
ing on land fell upon the scattered communities
of Upper Canada, where anti-American feeling
was strongest, and the loss and suffering inev
itable in even minor hostilities were greatest
along the shores of Lakes Erie and Ontario and
the marvellous river that connects them. This
region, destined to become the leading province
of the British dominion in America, was per
meated thus with the stories of heroic effort,
sacrifice, and triumph in resistance to invasion.
To the original Loyalist hatred of the American
Republic was thus added the confirming force
of a patriotic tradition, and no little impulse
was given to the influence that was working to
develop a proud and prosperous English-speak
ing state on the northern half of the continent.
That the hope and wish for such a future de
velopment were less prevalent in England than

12 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
among the Loyalists in Canada is manifest in a
remark of Alexander Baring (later Lord Ash
burton) to John Quincy Adams in 1816: ". . .
it is in vain for us to think of growing strong
there [in Canada] in the same proportion as
America. ... He wished the British govern-
Vment would give us Canada at once. It . . .
was fit for nothing but to breed quarrels,"
Baring's pessimistic observation was made in
the course of a conversation on the question
of disarmament on the Great Lakes, and was
premonitory of a feeling among British pub
licists that was to become wide-spread and no
torious by the middle of the century. At the
time when Baring's private opinion was re
vealed and was recorded with grim satisfaction
by Adams, the feeling that gave rise to it was
probably shared by very few leaders of Brit
ish policy. Yet the events of the war had
served to give the officials of the Colonial De
partment much uneasiness about the exposed
condition of Upper Canada and had thus led
to the demand for territorial readjustments that
should bar the Americans from the shores of
i Lakes Erie, Huron, and Superior. The demand
was peremptorily rejected, but the purpose
behind it remained active. When, therefore,

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 13
the peace had been made and the British Gov-
erhment had sufficiently recovered from its
Napoleonic distractions to give some attention
to American affairs, it came to pass, happily
enough, that the situation on the frontier of
Upper Canada was the first of the many dis-i
turbing questions at issue that was satisfac
torily adjusted by diplomacy.
The work of the diplomats on the problems
left unsettled by both the war and the treaty
of peace was begun in the middle of 1815, with*'
the negotiation of a convention of commerce
and navigation at London. John Quincy Ad
ams, Clay, and Gallatin wrestled again with the
Britons who had been at Ghent, but made no
progress toward securing for the United States
the eagerly sought privileges of trade with the
British-American colonies. The treaty signified ,
practically nothing beyond the formal resump
tion of reciprocal commerce as it had existed
before the war, the East Indies becoming again
the only transmarine dependencies of Great
Britain with which American vessels were per
mitted to carry on trade.
The matter of the armaments on the Great
Lakes was formally entered upon diplomatically
only at the beginning of 18 16. Under instruc-

14 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
tions from Washington, John Quincy Adams,
now minister of the United States at London,
proposed to Lord Castlereagh that both gov
ernments set a limit to their respective naval
forces on the Lakes. The actual situation there
had given much concern to American and Brit
ish authorities alike. The termination of hos
tilities came in the midst of energetic efforts by
the commanders on both sides of the frontier
to complete and equip new and larger vessels.
Especially on Lake Ontario, where the supe
riority of the Americans was less clearly estab
lished than elsewhere, the rivalry in naval con
struction was most energetic and ambitious.
The primitive processes by which a few acres
of forest had been turned almost overnight
into fleets of small but sufficient war-ships were
now being developed and extended to more
pretentious designs. At Kingston, on the Ca
nadian side. Sir James Yeo was pressing to
ward completion one ship-of-the-line that should
mount no guns and two that should mount
74, and across the lake at Sacketts Harbor two
rival 74's were on the stocks. Many lesser
craft were in various stages of construction.
The cessation of hostilities- naturally did not
end the strenuous rivalry. The same reason-

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 15
ing that was destined a century later to fill the
oceans and the scrap-heaps of all the world
with gigantic masses of steel, operated to keep
at full tension the workers on the puny wooden
structures that embodied the hope of triumphant
sea-power in the earlier day. Only when the
actual strain on the finances of the govern
ments overcame the care for a contingent future
of naval glory, was a halt called in the extrava
gant proceedings on the Lakes.
The proposition of Adams for disarmament
met with no satisfactory response at first from
Lord Castlereagh. His Lordship freely ad
mitted the ruinous consequences that were
threatened by the competition in fleet-building,
but urged that, because Great Britain was at
a great disadvantage as compared with the
United States in respect to facilities for defen
sive equipment in that remote region, any re
striction of force should apply to the Americans
only. The truth was that the British cabinet
were seriously divided on the policy to be pur
sued in this matter. A party headed by Lord
Bathurst, the colonial secretary, insisted that
an overwhelming naval force should be created
on the Lakes, so as to render forever out of the
question any American aggression upon Upper

i6 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
Canada, Demands for this policy were strongly
urged in both Parhament and the press during
the winter and spring of 1816, and gave Adams
much anxiety. Ultimately, however, the bel
ligerent faction was overcome by the pacifists
of the government, and Adams, much to his
surprise, was informed by Castlereagh in April
^that the proposal for disarmament would be
taken up for discussion.
The detailed discussion of the business was
transferred to Washington, where it was handled
by Monroe, the secretary of state, and Bagot,
the British minister. Final action was not
reached without considerable delay. On both
sides of the water there prevailed in military
and naval circles, and was reflected in the press,
the usual post-bellum irritation and bluster,
making the diplomats cautious. Adams re
ported his fear that the sudden change in
Castlereagh's attitude concealed some treach
ery, and Bagot was suspicious of an ulterior
motive behind Monroe's earnestness in seeking
a settlement. All the clouds were dissipated,
V however, and at the end of April, 18 17, a
formal agreement was effected by an exchange
of notes at Washington. By this date Monroe
had become President of the United States, and

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 17
the State Department was under the charge of
Richard Rush, pending the return from abroad
of the new secretary, John Quincy Adams.
The notes were signed, therefore, by Rush and
Bagot respectively, and the arrangement em
bodied in them became known as the Rush-
Bagot Agreement. By its terms each govern-"
ment bound itself to limit its naval force on
the frontier to four vessels, each not exceeding
one hundred tons burthen and armed with one
18-pound cannon, one vessel to be stationed
on Lake Ontario, two on the Upper Lakes, and
one on Lake Champlain. All other war-ships
on these lakes were to be forthwith dismantled,
and no others were to be there built or armed.
In conformity with this arrangement the
British authorities disposed of their three ships-
of-the-line, six medium-sized vessels, and many
smaller craft, while the Americans dismantled,
sold, or scuttled and sank a number consider
ably larger. So long as the good faith of the
two governments endured, it was thus insured
that the Great Lakes should be free from the
martial ardor that is inevitably inspired by the
parade of rival forces. The future was to show
that even more important than this direct in
fluence was the indirect effect of the adjustment

1 8 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
in setting the standard of peaceful methods for
the determination of the vexatious problems
that arose along the whole long boundary be
tween the United States and British America.
The comprehensive consideration of the ques
tions at issue between the United States and
Great Britain in connection with the late war
was taken up in 1817 at London. Two years
of general peace had by this time cleared up
many cloudy matters of domestic and foreign
politics and the British cabinet could devote
some leisurely attention to the issues which
the Americans were so insistent on bringing
forward for settlement. It could not be said
that the slow progress toward a settlement was
due to any ill feeling on the part of the British
Government toward the United States. So far
as Castlereagh's conduct at the Foreign Office
was concerned, not even John Quincy Adams,
temperamentally indisposed to approval of an
adversary, could find much to criticise, while
Richard Rush, who in 18 17 succeeded Adams
as minister at London, positively and warmly
proclaimed the conciliatory disposition of the
secretary. Charles Bagot was sent to Wash
ington with imperative instructions to promote
cordial relations with the American Govern-

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 19
ment, and his success in accomplishing this was
understood to be the condition of his future
advancement in his diplomatic career. He did
not anticipate much pleasure from his task.
He was an intimate of George Canning, whose
antipathy to Castlereagh and all his works made
much scandal in the circles of the ruling aris
tocracy. "Your plan of treatment," wrote
Canning to Bagot just after his appointment
in 1815, "may or may not succeed with the
Yankees, but it is obviously, for your sake,
the proper one. I am afraid, indeed, that the
question is not so much how you will treat them
as how they will treat you, and that the hard
est lesson which a British Minister has to learn
in. America is not what to do, but what to bear.
But even this may come round. And Waterloo
is a great help to you, perhaps a necessary help
after the (to say the least) balanced successes
and misfortunes of the American war."
Despite all the obstacles, however, Bagot suc
ceeded in his undertaking. Though he was
fully impressed with the fact that ill feeling
toward Great Britain was a controlling influence
in the predominant party in the country, he was
tactful and far-sighted enough to establish at
Washington the same official cordiality that

20 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
Rush reported at London, Under such favor
able conditions the negotiations that were in
tended to define the results of the war pro
ceeded to a conclusion in the treaty that was
signed at London October 20, 1818.
This convention fell far short of what the
Americans had hoped for. Its omissions were
almost as significant as those of the Treaty of
Ghent. In particular, there was no reference
to the right of search and impressment. This
subject had naturally been put first in impor
tance of the long list on which Rush was in
structed to seek an agreement. His efforts
revealed at the very outset, so far as the funda
mental principle at issue was concerned, the
same hopeless impasse that had existed for
twenty years. Great Britain stood absolutely
immovable on her right to search foreign mer
chantmen on the high seas for British seamen;
the United States declared categorically that
she would never admit the right of any foreigner
to muster the crew of an American vessel on
their own ship. In view of this unpromising
antagonism on fundamental principle, the ne
gotiations made a degree of progress that was
highly significant of the conciliatory spirit on
both sides. Castlereagh freely conceded that

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 21
the practice of visitation and search by the
British commanders had been attended with
serious abuses, and he was ready to do every
thing possible to prevent their recurrence.
Rush ultimately agreed that the best way to
attain this end was to keep British seamen out
of American ships. Accordingly, a draft treaty
was actually formulated in which Great Britain
abandoned the visitation of American ships ex
cept for purposes recognized by both govern
ments as justifiable by international law, while
the United States undertook to exclude from
service in its merchant marine all natural-born
subjects of Great Britain, even those who
should in the future become American citizens
under the naturalization laws.
This project eventually was dropped, on ac
count of disagreements on subsidiary points
concerning ratification and administration. It
probably involved rather too large concessions
for the time and circumstances on both sides.
America had already become as tenacious of
her claim concerning the rights of her naturals
ized citizens as Britain was concerning the
right of her navy to recruit its forces wherever
it could find British seamen. The points on
which the treaty came to grief were so rela-

22 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
tively insignificant as strongly to suggest that
they were merely a cover for retreat from a
too advanced position on the main questions.
Whatever was the truth in this matter, the
failure of the project left active a serious men
ace to the peace of the two nations. The peril
was destined to endure imtil the progress of
ideas had undermined the British conviction
that the* brutal practice of impressment was the
/only adequate means by which to insure naval
pre-eminence, and until the growth and prestige
of the United States had made respect for her
claims as to the rights of her citizens a neces
sity in practice if not in theory.
Of the subjects on which agreement was
actually embodied in the convention of 1818,
the majority involved relations between the
United States and the British possessions to
the north of it. Most important was the ad-
' justment of the differences as to the fisheries
on the Atlantic coast. By the treaty of peace
in 1783 Great Britain recognized the right of
the people of the United States to take fish
on the banks of Newfoundland, in the Gulf of
Saint Lawrence, and at sea in general, and
further accorded the "liberty" of fishing on
practically all the coasts, bays, and creeks of

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 23
British America, with the additional "liberty"
of drying and curing fish on certain unsettled
parts of the shore. By these provisions a prom
inent American industry was made very pros
perous and profitable. The excessive generos
ity of the British negotiators was severely
criticised by their compatriots on both sides of
the Atlantic. At Ghent, in 18 14, there was an
opportunity to correct the error of the earlier
treaty. Accordingly, the British commission
ers took the position that, under a familiar
principle of international law, the fisheries
article of 1783, like all the rest of that conven
tion, had been abrogated by war between the
signatory governments. The Americans were
fully equipped with reasons why this principle
did not apply to the fisheries article. The
debate reached no conclusion, however, on ac
count of the agreement to treat of peace only.
After hostilities ceased friction naturally arose
in the fishing regions. The Americans resumed
their accustomed pursuit of the herring and cod
in the accustomed places; the British author
ities in the Maritime Provinces manifested a
purpose to protect their coast from the intru
sion of the Americans, A zealous naval com
mander even warned an American fisherman

24 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
who was plying his vocation out of sight of land
not to venture to do so within sixty miles of
the shore. Protests on these incidents evoked
from the British Foreign Office at last the
formal declaration that it claimed no right to
interfere with fishing on the high sea, but that
it would treat as extinct the liberty once recog
nized to Americans to take and cure fish on any
^ British coasts or bays. It was obviously high
time for serious effort to remove so disagree
able a situation as was thus created.
In the negotiations on the subject the case
of the Americans was almost hopeless. The
inshore privileges long enjoyed were vital to
the prosperity of a great industry that cen
tred in Massachusetts. To maintain these
privileges, however, it was necessary to sus
tain two contentions that were desperately
weak, namely, that the "liberty" accorded by
the treaty of 1783 was in reality a right under
the law of nature and of nations, and that this
liberty or right had not been abrogated by the
war. Gallatin and Rush, the American pleni
potentiaries, as well as Secretary Adams, who
directed them, were adepts in the diplomatist's
art of extracting from the hazy realms of nature
and history the particular principle or prece-

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 25
dent that happened to be useful to their cause;
but their skill availed little against the stiff
British dogma that territorial jurisdiction was
absolute as against the claims of any foreign
power, especially one that had recently failed
of success in war.
The result, however, in the actual treaty pro
visions was more favorable to the American
interests than had prima facie seemed possible.
Great Britain again made substantial conces
sions. The liberty of inshore fishing was as
sured forever to the inhabitants of the United
States on certain limited stretches of British
coast, namely, in Newfoundland, the whole
western shore and an important piece of the
southern; in Labrador, from a designated point
in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence eastward and
northward indefinitely; and all the shores of
the Magdalen Islands. In Labrador and the
south of Newfoundland drying and curing fish
on shore was also permitted. Besides the sohd
gain contained in these provisions, the American
commissioners flattered themselves that they
had saved their face in the very terms in which
the fishing privileges were abandoned as to all
the other British coasts. "And the United
States hereby renounce forever any liberty

26 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
heretofore enjoyed or claimed" as to fishing
within three miles of coasts, bays, creeks, or
harbors outside of the foregoing limits. This
wording was held to imply that the inshore
privileges recognized in the treaty were not
newly granted or ever granted by .Great Britain,
but were part of a natural heritage possessed
by the United States, of which another and
larger part was voluntarily renounced.
It is interesting to notice that, despite the
meticulous care which the Americans devoted
to the phrasing of the article, with a view to its
more or less metaphysical implications, there re
mained in it the germ of a long and vexatious
^dispute on a most practical point of interpre
tation. Within twenty years of the signing of
the treaty the British Government took the
position that the "bays" from which the Amer
icans were excluded embraced great expanses
of deep sea where fishermen could ply their
vocation on the largest scale without coming
within three miles of the shore. If any one
concerned in the negotiation of the treaty in
1818 suspected the possibility of such a view,
he left no record of his insight.
I'n addition to the settlement as to the fish
eries, this treaty dealt with the delimitation of

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 27
territory from the Lake of the Woods to the
Pacific Ocean. No serious controversy devel
oped over this matter, not because the views
of the two parties were entirely harmonious,
but because the occupation of the vast wilder
ness concerned was as yet on too limited a scale
to raise any immediate issue. From the Lake-
of the Woods to the summit of the Rocky Moun
tains it was easily agreed that the forty-ninth '
degree of latitude should be the boundary. As
no one knew the position of the lake with refer
ence to the parallel, but all felt sure that a
meridian from the lake would cross the parallel
somewhere, it was provided that from the
northwestern point of the lake a north and
south line should be run, if necessary, to inter
sect the parallel, and this line, with the paral- '-
lei, should mark the boundary. West of the
Rocky Mountains, however, the Oregon coun
try, with its great rivers and its long and much
indented Pacific coast, presented problems and
possibilities of such obvious magnitude that
neither party was especially eager to press for
a definitive adjustment till fuller knowledge
was forthcoming. Both British and American
merchants had established fur-trading stations
on the coast, and from the opposite direction

28 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
the Oregon country had been penetrated by
the hardy and enterprising agents of great com
mercial interests centring respectively at Saint
Louis and Montreal, All that was provided
by the treaty was that the whole region, so far
as claimed by either Great Britain or the United
States, should for ten years be free and open to
the vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two
powers. The most satisfactory feature of the conven
tion of 1818, so far as concerned delimitation of
territory, was the provision by which a thou
sand miles of the boundary was made dependent
upon the fairly certain mechanical processes
of the surveyor. An astronomical line will in
deed vary with the personality of the men
and the precision of the instruments employed
in determining it, but it is certainty itself as
compared with most other customary means
of demarcation. A priori one might suppose
that geographical features, such as rivers and
mountains, fixed by nature beyond the ordinary
power of man to change, would furnish the
most satisfactory boundaries. Experience has
proved, however, that this is very far from the
truth. Not until the present century, when
almost every mile of the thousands in North

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 29
America where British and American posses
sions are contiguous has been marked by mon
uments erected by human hands, have contro
versies over territorial limits been set finally
at rest.
At the time when the convention of 18 18, by
the provision for the joint occupation of Oregon,
postponed a dangerous dispute concerning the
western side of the continent, a serious but
unsuccessful effort was in progress to adjust
a threatening difference at the far eastern end
of the line. The treaty of peace in 1783 had
been singularly unsuccessful in the attempt to
make clear the northern boundary of the United
States. Difficulties in running the line made
their appearance all the way from the Atlantic*^
Ocean to the Lake of the Woods. The start
ing-point was set forth with much apparent
particularity in the treaty: "From the north
west angle of Nova Scotia, viz., that angle
which is formed by a line drawn due north from
the source of Saint Croix River to the High
lands; along the Highlands which divide those
rivers which empty themselves into the river
Saint Lawrence, from those which fall into the
Atlantic Ocean, to the northwesternmost head
of Connecticut River . . ." But no one knew

30 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
or ever discovered the whereabouts of the
"northwest angle of Nova Scotia"; the "High
lands" referred to could not be identified; the
rivers "which fall into the Atlantic Ocean"
might or might not include those that reached
their destination by way of the great gulfs and
bays that abounded in the neighborhood, and
much depended on which alternative was se
lected; the "northwesternmost head of the
Connecticut River" was doubtful and undeter
mined. Most important of all at the outset,
moreover, was the fact that the two govern
ments disagreed as to what stream was meant
by the Saint Croix River. As the middle of
this river, from mouth to source, completed, in
the treaty, the long circuit of the boundary as
there described, and separated Maine fipm New
Brunswick, it early became imperative to settle
on the identity of the Saint Croix. Only after
fifteen years of controversy was an agreement
reached. In 1798 a joint commission provided
for in Jay's Treaty found that the Schoodic
River was what the treaty meant by the Saint
Croix, and determined by survey its mouth and
its source.
This was the limit of the progress made prior
to the War of 1 812. In the Treaty of Ghent

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 31
the boundary question was taken up in earnest,
and three distinct commissions were provided
for, with recourse to arbiters in case of disagree
ment between the commissioners.
The whole undetermined line from the At
lantic to the Lake of the Woods was parcelled
out to these bodies for final survey and indica
tion. Only one of the commissions was suc
cessful in its task: the course of the line among
the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay and the -
Bay of Fundy was agreed upon without much
trouble. At the other end of the boundary, be
tween Lake Huron and the Lake of the Woods,
some points were presented on which the com
missioners could not reach an agreement, but no*^
pressing necessity for a settlement arose. The
task of the third commission, namely, to run
the line from the head of the Saint Croix to the
point where the Saint Lawrence is intersected
by the forty-fifth parallel of north latitude,
proved to be wholly beyond its power. The
commissioners toiled for five years, from 1816 y
to 1 82 1, only to reach a hopeless disagreement.
As the "northwest angle of Nova Scotia" the
opinions of the two commissioners designated
respectively points that were 105 miles apart;
their views as to the "highlands," etc, left a

32 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
region of over ten thousand square miles in dis
pute on the frontier of Maine and New Bruns
wick; and further the discovery was made, much
to the discomfort of the Americans, that what
had for fifty years passed for the forty-fifth
parallel and served as the boundary between
New York and Vermont on the one side and
Canada on the other, was in fact so far from the
true parallel as to leave on British soil a costly
fortress under construction by the United States
\j at Rouse's Point,
The progress of settlement and development
made this situation a cause of great concern to
the two governments. Arbitration was ar
ranged in 1827 and the King of the Netherlands
was chosen as umpire. His opinion, pronounced
in 183 1, frankly declared the impossibility of
deciding which, if either, of the conflicting
claims conformed to the terms of the treaty of
1783, and proposed a line that divided the
region in dispute. This proposal was not ac
cepted by either government, and the matter
remained to be the source of ever-increasing
J friction, as we shall see, until 1842.
If the character of their formal diplomatic
intercourse were a conclusive criterion of the
general feeling of two nations toward each other,

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 33
cordial respect and friendship would be said to
have prevailed between Great Britain and the
United States in the years immediately follow
ing the end of the war. Even when, as in re
gard to the right of search, differences of view
were obstinate and irreconcilable, the debate-'
had involved no display of bitterness. All the
negotiations had been correct and amicable
according to the most exacting requirements
of the diplomatist's art. The technique of this
art, however, consists largely in devices through
which good manners shall cover feelings of quite
another sort. A model plenipotentiary may be
an indifferent index of the national spirit which
he represents. Like the second in an affair of
honor, he must guide his principal along the
lines of the established proprieties, however
deeply he may sympathize with the principal's
impulse to slay the adversary out of hand. In
the period with which we are dealing there is
no room for doubt that the statesmen chiefly
concerned with Anglo-American relations re
garded one another with sincere respect, and '•
were earnest in their desire for harmony between
the peoples. They were all aware, at the same
time, of deep feelings and powerful interests
on both sides of the Atlantic that worked inces-

34 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
santly in the opposite direction. In i8i8, in
the midst of the negotiations for the convention
of that year, a disconcerting illustration of this
fact was brought before the public by the pro
ceedings of the American general Andrew Jack
son on the Spanish soil of Florida.
In the United States the most particular
abode of hostility to all things British was the
valley of the Mississippi — the frontier region
where population was sparse but now rapidly
growing. Of the causes which nourished this
hostility, the most active was probably the tra
ditional relations between the British and the
Indians in both the Northwest and the South
west. Practically every village and settlement
between the mountains and the Mississippi con
tained inhabitants who had suffered personally
from the ghastly incidents of savage warfare.
That the Indians who butchered and burned
and scalped throughout the West had been sys
tematically inspired and sustained in their acts
and methods by British authorities, was an in
grained conviction among the American people.
The open alliance of the army in Canada with
Tecumseh during the late war confirmed this
conviction for generations. Long after the war,
Indian bands from the remoter regions of the

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 35
Northwest made annual pilgrimages to Maiden,
the Canadian garrison town across the river from
Detroit, and there received the long-custom
ary gifts from the commander. The American
authorities in Michigan viewed this proceeding
with much anxiety and protested to Washington
against its continuance. It was firmly believed
by many in the United States, including so
hard-headed a personage as John Quincy Ad
ams, that the continued distribution of gifts to
the Indians was deliberately calculated to insure
the support of the savages in future hostilities.
In the southern part of the United States the
Creek Indians, during the war with Great
Britain, had, more or less under the inspiration
of Tecumseh, opened war of the usual kind on
the whites. The ruthless energy of Andrew
Jackson soon crushed the savages, many of
whom sought safety across the boundary in
Florida, where Spanish authority held feeble ./
sway. So feeble was this sway that a British
force had ventured to occupy Pensacola, the
capital of the province, as a base of operations
against the Americans, Jackson pursued his
Indian foes into Florida, and did not aban
don Spanish territory till he had captured Pen
sacola and driven the British force out of the

36 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
neighborhood. The utter inability of Spain to
maintain a semblance of effective sovereignty
in Florida was made perfectly clear by these
events. After the peace of Ghent her weakness
continued to be manifested in the threatening
activities of hostile Indians, runaway slaves,
and many varieties of outlaws along the Amer
ican frontier. The Spanish governor, in reply
to complaints, acknowledged that he could not
keep these people in order. In 1817 Seminole
Indians attacked United States troops on the
border and Jackson, with the prestige of suc
cess in the defence of New Orleans about
him, was sent to take charge of the situation.
His procedure was characteristic. He marched
straight into Florida, scattering the Indians as
he advanced, and seized the Spanish town of
Saint Mark's. Among the captives taken here
was a substantial trader named Arbuthnot, a
British subject, whose home was the island of
Nassau. He was well known to the American
commander as a man of influence with the In
dians, and as one who believed that the Semi
noles had been unjustly treated by the United '
States. Garrisoning Saint Mark's, Jackson set
out for the chief town of the Seminoles, a hun
dred miles away, but on reaching it after a dif-

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 37
ficult march, found it deserted, and thus was
unable to deliver the crushing blow that he had
planned. From a white man whom he cap
tured he discovered that a letter from Arbuth
not had warned the Indians of the impending
danger and prompted their escape. Robert
Ambrister, an employee of Arbuthnot and also
a British subject, was captured in the vicinity
of the Indian town. All the circumstances
seemed to Jackson to call for summary proceed
ings. Returning to Saint Mark's, he brought
the luckless Britons before a court martial, con
victed them of various offences under the laws
of war, and had Arbuthnot hanged and Ambris
ter shot.
The doughty general's vigor did not end with
these achievements, A little later he felt obliged
to go and capture Pensacola again, and teach
the Spanish governor the error of his ways.
This incident was not necessary, however, to
set the wheels of international controversy in
motion; they were spinning at top speed already.
The summary execution of two British subjects
by an American general at a place where the
right of the victims to be secure was more ap
parent than the right of the commander to be
at all, caused a great explosion of wrath in

38 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
England. At the very first reports of what
had occurred, the press flamed with demands
for the vindication of Britain's outraged honor.
The cabinet were much embarrassed to refrain
from serious action before the arrival of full and
official information as to the affair. War might
have been brought about, Castlereagh later
told Rush, "if the ministry had but held up a
finger." When all the facts were known, how
ever, the government was fully justified in its
caution; for on the evidence submitted it was
obliged to admit that Arbuthnot and Ambrister
had by their relations with the Indians forfeited
the right to protection by the British Govern
ment against the military power of the United
States. Jackson's high-handed proceedings in
Florida were in the long run more violently
assailed in his own country than abroad. The
Monroe administration only with much dif
ficulty agreed upon sustaining him, and rival
politicians in Congress attacked him without
mercy. Popular feeling, however, especially in
the West, was enthusiastically in his favor, and
eventually made him President of the United
States, Not least among the influences that
worked to bring him this distinction was the
wide-spread tradition that in executing Arbuth-

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 39
not and Ambrister he had deliberately flouted
and defied Great Britain,
The correct and friendly attitude of the
British Government was manifested in other
incidents during this period. Even on so stub
bornly contested a point as the right of search
Rush had reason to believe that an agreement
would have been reached if Castlereagh had
been able to remain in personal supervision of
the negotiations. The foreign secretary was
called away to the Continent at a critical stage
of the discussion, after having given very clear
indications of his individual disposition to go
far in yielding. In the negotiation of the treaty
of commerce, also, Frederick John Robinson,
the chief British representative, intimated a
feeling that the American demands were too
early in time rather than too objectionable in
substance to be conceded.
It was inherent in the general condition of
world politics that America should be seeking
new things and Great Britain should be stand- ..
ing by the old. Especially was this the case
in regard to commerce and navigation. The
newcomer among maritime powers found her
self barred in every direction from profitable
trade by the existing system under which every

40 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
nation protected its own merchants and ship
ping interests by excluding foreigners from its
jurisdiction save under heavy burdens. To the
Americans it seemed something like a violation
of natural justice that they should be forbidden
to sell a cargo of goods in Halifax or Jamaica;
yet such was British law. It was hard to ques
tion the right of a government to exclude for
eigners from its ports; but the desperate eager
ness of the Americans for certain kinds of trade
led them at times to take the ground that free
dom of commercial intercourse was so pro-
/ foundly an interest of all mankind as fairly to
-¦) be within the domain of natural law. Such a
trend of argument could, of course, have no
practical effect in any concrete case; the Brit
ish, entrenched in commanding commercial sites
all over the globe, could and did merely
inquire what the Americans could offer for the
privileges they sought. Bargaining of the kind
thus suggested was a very unsatisfactory proc
ess where there was such disparity between
the two parties in actual possessions. It was
like the freedom of contract in a later day that
was alleged to be a sufficient principle on which
to base the relations of wage-earner and wage-
payer.

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 41
In the treaty of commerce and navigation of
181 5, which was, as stated above, a recurrence
to ante-bellum conditions, there was one pro
vision that proved to be influential in breaking
down the ancient system of commercial restric
tion. For the first time on record, two nations
agreed by treaty to abandon the recourse to ^
discriminating duties. Great Britain limiting
her concession to her European territories.
Commodities produced in these territories and
the United States respectively were to pay as
favorable customs duties as were paid by the
products of any other nation, and tonnage
duties were to be precisely the same on British
and American ships in the ports of both powers.
As discrimination in duties was a favorite means
of carrying out the old restrictive policy, this
reciprocal concession of equality was a dis--
tinct step toward a different system. It be
came, in fact, a model for a long line of later con
ventions by which the nations advanced in the
path of commercial freedom. The treaty of
18 1 5 was tentative only, being limited by its
terms to four years. It was renewed for ten
years by the treaty of 1818, and later was re
newed indefinitely.
It is not to be gainsaid that the motive of

)/

42 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
the powers in promoting as they did the cause
of freedom of commerce was mainly a shrewd
calculation of immediate self-interest rather
than any devotion to an abstract ideal. Equally
beyond question is it that the ideals that per
vaded the intellectual atmosphere of the day
were wholly adverse to the old system. After
the Napoleonic storm had subsided, doctrines
that had played a large part in producing the
French Revolution, but had been driven to
cover by the course taken by that convulsion,
began to assume prominence in England. The
economic theories of Adam Smith and the legal
and political dogmas of Jeremy Bentham won
adherents if not yet respectability. These sys
tems, in all their implications, were hostile to
the existing institutions of Great Britain. Un
derlying both philosophies was the concep
tion of man as a free and intelligent being,
working out, each individual for himself, the
mode and content of his welfare. British com
merce and industry were based upon a complex
of regulations and restrictions designed to favor
particular kinds of business and special classes
of people; and the government which dis
tributed the favor was itself controlled by a
particular business and a special class of people.

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 43
Between the two political parties, Tory and
Whig, the only important difference was as to
what interests and classes should be preferred;
neither contemplated a political or economic
system in which preference should have no
place. This latter idea found expression, how
ever, through the radical reformers who began
about 1820 to exert a perceptible influence on
British thought. Between that date and 1850
a far-reaching transformation was effected in
economic and political conditions, chiefly by
the Whigs. Much as this party detested the
Radicals, the general character of the reforms
that it effected followed the lines laid out by
the acute reasoning of the Benthamite school —
the two Mills, Ricardo, Grote, Joseph Hume,
Austin, and Molesworth.
In America the conditions which the British
approached as far-distant ideals were conspic
uous facts. Within the vast region controlled
by the United States commercial and industrial
freedom was complete. No legal barriers re
stricted a man's choice among the opportuni
ties for self-betterment that beckoned in every
direction. Whether he devoted his energies to
farming or to manufacturing or to trade was
determined solely by his judgment as to the

44 READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR
profit to be expected; and what he should raise
on his farm, what he should make in his work
shop, or to whom he should sell the products
of his labor, was a question to be settled by
no different criterion. Politically, the freedom
of the individual was only less complete. Prop
erty qualifications for the suffrage and for hold
ing office generally prevailed, but were of con
sequence only in the eastern States. In the
growing West, where differences of wealth were
as slight and rare as all other marks of social
inequality, distinctions in political rights were
from the outset unknown in fact and were early
banished from the law.
Thus it was true that despite the enormous
differences between the two great societies of
English-speaking people, a subtle force was
operating to bring them together. Every step
in Great Britain toward breaking down the
ancient system of privilege and restriction was
an approach, however unintended, toward the
democratic ideal. Every step in the United
States toward national consolidation involved
such development and fostering of special in
terests, however reluctantly, as to limit per
ceptibly the laissez-faire individualism of the
democratic fact. The progress of the two na-

READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR 45
tions in the indicated directions was made very
manifest in the history of their internal devel
opment during the decades of the thirties and
the forties.

CHAPTER II
WHIG REFORM AND JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY
The transition to the full tide of Whiggery
in Great Britain and of Jacksonianism in the
United States was marked by the ascendancy
respectively of George Canning and John Quincy
Adams. Canning succeeded Castlereagh as for
eign secretary in 1822, became prime minister
in 1827, and after a few months died in that
office. Adams was secretary of state under
Monroe for eight years, 1817-25, and was Pres
ident from 1825 to 1829. So largely was the
interest of both these statesmen centred on
foreign affairs that something distinctive in the
relations of the two powers could reasonably
be expected at this time. Nothing novel oc
curred, however, in connection with the familiar
subjects of debate: the right of search, com
merce, navigation, fisheries — all remained sub
stantially as before. Yet the distinctive some
thing did not fail to appear. In 1823 the group
of policies famous collectively and individually
46

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 47
as the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated in
the President's annual message, and the fact
and form and time of the announcement re
flected in no small measure the influence of both
Canning and Adams.
Canning did not like the American democ
racy. The attitude of the Foreign Office after
he took charge was significantly different from
what it had been under Castlereagh. If the
latter in his soul felt a Tory contempt for the
Americans, he took pains to keep it from af
fecting his diplomatic intercourse with them.
Canning was not so successful in this. The
truth seems to be that Castlereagh regarded his
policy in European affairs as requiring that
America be kept quiet and contented, so as not
to interfere with the progress of really impor
tant matters. To him the great American Re
public gave no concern; to Canning it was the
object of distrust and fear. Yet Canning did
not hesitate to make the United States an
instrument of his own policy. When engaged
in the operations through which, as he elo
quently boasted, he "called the New World
into existence to redress the balance of the
Old," he sought the co-operation of the Amer
ican Government. President Monroe's mes-

48 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
sage of 1823 signified to a certain extent the
success of Canning's advances. Its pronounce
ments as a whole, however, were widely at
variance with the British secretary's desires
and expectations, and caused him annoyance
and vexation that he ultimately took no pains
to conceal. He was confirmed in his feeling of
dislike and distrust of the Americans and in
his foreboding of danger from their rivalry with
British interests in the future.
The European situation that produced the
Monroe Doctrine is familiar history. A revo
lution in Spain that jeoparded the throne and
life of the King brought military intervention
by France, supported by Russia, Prussia, and
Austria. The Spanish monarch was restored
to his authority at home, but found himself
wholly unable to regain control of his continen
tal colonies in America, which had declared and
were successfully maintaining their independ
ence. Accordingly, he applied to the powers
that had assisted him for like assistance on the
other side of the Atlantic. The British Govern
ment had refused to join the other powers in
the intervention in Spain, and had viewed with
great uneasiness the proceedings of the French
army. Tories were unpleasantly reminded by

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 49
the situation of the days when Napoleonic
France had possession of Spain; Whigs and the
liberalizing element of the Tories were dis
gusted with Bourbon absolutism wherever it
appeared, British commerce with the insur
gent Spanish colonies was much harassed by
the irregular privateering and ineffective block
ades through which the Spaniards maintained
the semblance, with but little of the substance,
of war. This commerce had attained large pro
portions and all its advantages would be lost if
Spanish authority should be restored; for Spain,
like Britain herself, regarded colonial trade as an
exclusive privilege of the mother country.
Under all the circumstances Canning was
readily able, at the first manifestation of a proj
ect for intervention in behalf of Spain in Amer
ica, to gain substantial support for his purpose
to thwart it. An indication of interest in the
general subject by Rush, the minister at Lon
don, was promptly made by Canning the oc
casion of a suggestion for a joint, or at least a
simultaneous, declaration by the United States
and Great Britain of their hostility to the threat
ened intervention. The idea was received with
the liveliest interest at Washington and was the
subject of the most serious consideration by

so REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
the President, the cabinet, and even Jefferson
and Madison, whose opinions were confidentially
sought by Monroe. Abundant reasons were
perceived for refraining from formal association
with Great Britain in a declaration of policy,
but the wisdom of some pronouncement was
not questioned by any. Accordingly, the fa
miliar paragraphs were inserted in the Presi
dent's annual message to Congress in December.
After a general expression of sympathy with
the peoples of Europe in their struggles for lib
erty and happiness, and of a purpose, never
theless, to abstain from taking part in any wars
there, the momentous declaration was made:
With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of
necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes
which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial
observers. The political system of the allied powers is
essentially different in this respect from that of America,
The difference proceeds from that which exists in their
respective governments. And to the defence of our own,
which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood
and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most
enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed
such unexampled feUcity, this whole nation is devoted.
We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable re
lations existing between the United States and those
powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt
on their part to extend their system to any portion of this
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and Safety. With

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 51
the existing colonies or dependencies of any European
power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.
But with the governments who have declared their inde
pendence and maintained it, and whose independence we
have, on great consideration and on just principles, ac
knowledged, we could not view any interposition for the
purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other
manner their destiny, by any European power, in any
other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly
disposition toward the United States. . . .
... It is impossible that the allied powers should ex
tend their political system to any portion of either con
tinent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor
can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left
to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is
equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such
interposition, in any form, with indifference.

So far as concerned the particular subject
that evoked these paragraphs, they were en
tirely efficacious. No possibility was left of
intervention in America by the allied powers.
As a matter of fact the project was dead before
the President spoke; for Canning had secured
assurances from the French Government that
it would not take part in the proposed action,
and without French aid the powers would be
as helpless as the Spanish King himself. This
situation was not known outside of diplomatic
circles when Monroe's message appeared. In
consequence, the pubhc announcement, in such

52 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
uncompromising terms, of the attitude of the
United States appeared very decisive and made
a prodigious sensation both at home and abroad.
That so weighty a judgment on a question of
world politics should emanate from Washington,
satisfied the spirit of the most ardent patriots
in America; in England the Whigs and Radicals
rejoiced at the alliance of the two English-speak
ing nations for the defence of liberty against
the despots of the Holy Alliance, and even the
Tories found something to approve in the aid
given by the Americans to a keen stroke of
British policy. The press on both sides of the
Atlantic teemed for a time with expressions of
amicable feeling.
Canning accepted with complacency the flat
tering tributes to his skill and astuteness in
bringing America to the aid of Britain. He
had, however, no illusions about the realities of
the case. He perceived at first sight, in the
salving ointment of Monroe's message, a very
unpleasant and dangerous insect. In the par
agraphs that have been quoted there was, he
saw, a conspicuous lack of care to discriminate
precisely among the "European powers," so as
to exclude Great Britain from the warning
addressed to them. It was not hard to read

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 53
the document as embodying the claim that the
American continents were to be reserved for
republican, as contrasted with monarchic, in
stitutions — a reservation that would shut out
George IV of Great Britain as effectively as it
would Ferdinand VII of Spain. In another part
of the message, moreover, quite unrelated to
that which dealt with the matter of the Euro
pean intervention on behalf of Spain, a pro
nouncement was made that revealed with
distinctness the spirit suspected by Canning.
Apropos of negotiations with Russia concern
ing the respective claims to the Pacific coast,
this passage occurred :
. . . the occasion has been judged proper for asserting
as a principle in which the rights and interests ofthe United
States are involved, that the American continents, by
the free and independent condition which they have as
sumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered
as subjects for future colonization by any European
powers.
Here again was a warning to all European pow
ers, and in connection with a matter — coloniza
tion — that was a specialty of Great Britain.
Canning was assured that the reference in the
passage was to a reported project of Russia for
a southward extension of her settlements on

54 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
the Pacific coast of America. He took pains
to declare, however, that his government did
not accept the principle laid down, and he
emphasized his protest by withdrawing from
association with the United States in the nego
tiations at Saint Petersburg by which the limit
of Russian claims in America was fixed.
Canning was right in restraining his enthu
siasm over Monroe's message. It was, in fact,
the pronunciamento of a great democracy just
arrived at aggressive self-consciousness. Its un
derlying spirit was in very truth antagonism,
so far as concerned affairs of the Western Hemi
sphere, to all monarchic Europe, Great Britain
included. The significant passages in the doc
ument owed their phraseology, in great part,
to John Quincy Adams; and he has left on rec
ord abundant evidence that no sentiment of
attachment to Great Britain would ever in
fluence him to except her from the sweep of
a policy devised to promote the interest and
glory of his own government. Canning in
stinctively resented the spirit of which Adams
was the particular embodiment. Hence the
marked subsidence, after 1823, of the demon
strative warmth which the Monroe Doctrine
of that year temporarily produced between the

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 55
two governments. They had become serious
rivals for the controlling interest in American
affairs. During the last two years of Canning's life,
1825-27, the diplomatic situation in general was
very unpleasant. What he had tried most dil
igently to prevent, when he summoned the New
World to solve the problems of the Old, seemed
near to realization, namely, the confronting of
monarchic Europe by a solidly republican Amer
ica. The establishment of monarchy in Brazil
he had regarded with much satisfaction, and
Iturbide's imperial enterprise in Mexico seemed
to him likely to provide a useful counterpoise
to the influence of the United States. The
melancholy failure of Iturbide confirmed the
disappointment that Monroe's message created.
It only remained to oppose at every point the
ambition of the United States, and to be un
ceasingly watchful against the development of
her claims. In a familiar letter to Bagot, now
ambassador at Saint Petersburg, of July 29,
1824, Canning urged haste in concluding with
Russia a convention assuring to Great Britain
the right of navigation in Behring Sea and
Straits. "There is very nice 'bobbing for
whale' they tell me, ipsis Behringi in faucibus.

56 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
which must be guarded." And then he added,
with a prophetic vision that the future was re
markably to verify: "We shall have a squabble
with the Yankees yet in and about these
regions." The most explicit revelation of Canning's
feelings and policy at this time is seen in a
secret despatch to Vaughan, the British minister
at Washington, recently brought to light by Pro
fessor E. D. Adams, It is dated February 8,
1826, and relates to certain discussions con
cerning Cuba,
The general maxim that our interest and those of the
United States are essentially the same, etc., etc., is one
that cannot be too readily admitted, when put forward
by the United States.
But we must not be the dupes of this conventional lan
guage of courtesy.
The avowed pretension of the United States to put
themselves at the head of the confederacy of all the
Americas, and to sway that confederacy against Europe,
(Great Britain included), is not a pretension identified
with our interests, or one that we can countenance as
tolerable. It is however a pretension which there is no use in con
testing in the abstract; but we must not say anything
that seems to admit the principle.'
When this note was penned, the two gov
ernments were in the midst of a long and
'Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, November,
1912, p. 234.

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 57
disagreeable controversy over the trade with
the British-American colonies. Parliament, en
gaged in revising the Navigation Laws, opened
the colonial ports in America to foreign vessels
on certain conditions in 1825. The United
States refused to accept the conditions, and
took ground, both through the Department of
State and in Congress, that seemed to question
the right of Great Britain to impose restrictions
at her discretion on commerce in her own col
onies. To Canning and his party this was but
another exhibition of the "forwardness, not to
say impudence, " that was typical of the Amer
ican policy, especially when directed by Adams,
It was met therefore by an open and unmis
takable snub. An Order in Council closed the
West Indian ports absolutely to American ships.
The order was issued while Gallatin was on his
way to England, for the special purpose of set
tling by negotiation this and other questions
between the two governments. On his arrival
he was met by a flat refusal to discuss in
any way the matter of the West Indian trade,
and was left entirely in the dark as to the
reason for the unexpected attitude of the gov
ernment, Gallatin's despatches after his arrival, in

S8 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
August, 1826, indicate very well the impression
made by the Canning administration.
There is certainly an alteration in the disposition of
this government since the year 18 18, when I was here
before. Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Robinson had it more
at heart to cherish friendly relations than Mr. Canning
and Mr. Huskisson. The difference may, however, be
in the times rather than in the men. Treated in general
with considerable arrogance till the last war, with great
attention, if not respect, during the years that followed it,
the United States are now an object of jealousy; and a
policy founded on that feeling has been avowed.
This was written to Clay. To Adams Gallatin
wrote :
, . . it is impossible for me not to see and feel the temper
that prevails here toward us , , . quite changed from
what it was in 1815-1821; nearly as bad as before the
last war, only they hate more and despise less, though
they still affect to conceal hatred under the appearance
of contempt.
This diplomatic irritation did not penetrate
deeply into the national tissues. Its cause lay
largely in the personalities of Canning and
Adams. Party politics on both sides of the
ocean contributed somewhat to increase and
prolong the inflammation. But Canning died
in August, 1827; and it is probably more than
a mere coincidence that in that month and the

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 59
following no less than three conventions were
signed for the provisional settlement of ques
tions at issue between the two governments.
By these conventions the joint occupation of
Oregon and the commercial treaty of 18 15 were
renewed indefinitely, subject to abrogation by
either party on twelve months' notice, and the
northeastern boundary was referred to arbitra
tion. The West India trade situation was thus
left the sole disturbing feature of the rela
tions between the governments. It played a
part in the presidential campaign of 1828, in
which Adams failed of re-election. The suc
ceeding administration, that of General Jackson,
with Martin Van Buren as secretary of state,
promptly reversed the policy of the United
States, dropped the contentions that Adams had
sustained, and came to an agreement with Great
Britain on her own terms. In the autumn of
1830 commerce between the United States and
the British West Indies, with some limitations
still remaining, was reopened, and the contro
versy over the subject ceased to trouble the
intercourse of the governments.
Pending the final disposition of this question
the long domination of the Tory party in Great
Britain came to an end. Incompatibilities of.

6o REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
personality and principles between Canning
and his friends on one side and the ultra-Tory
element led by the Duke of Wellington on
the other, hastened this event. In 1830 the
Whigs, headed by Earl Grey, assumed the
reins of power and entered upon a famous era
of internal reform. Domestic politics on both
sides of the Atlantic assumed an absorbing im
portance, and the diplomatic relations became
cordially calm.
The far-reaching transformation, industrial,
social, and political, that marked the decade
of the thirties in the United Kingdom had its
culmination rather than its inception under
the regime of the Whigs. The forces making
for change became very manifest immediately
upon the restoration of peace in 1815. A sud
den shift from the condition of general European
war to that of universal peace was necessarily
accompanied by a vast displacement and read
justment in the field of trade and industry.
British commerce and manufactures had flour
ished greatly during the war, thanks to the
immunity of the United Kingdom from the rav
ages of contending armies, and to her unques
tioned control of the sea. With peace the
peoples of the Continent resumed their normal

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 6i
productive activities and British trade heavily
declined. Prices fell; complications in the cur
rency, due to the suspension of specie payments,
aggravated the troubles; bad harvests recurred
at unfortunate intervals; and the great change
in progress in the methods of manufacturing,
owing to the introduction of machinery, con
tributed in its turn a quota of evil. The gen
eral result was unsettlement, discontent, and
from time to time severe distress among the
working classes, both agricultural and indus
trial. Into the field thus well prepared came
agitators of the political type. Radicals, preach
ing the doctrines of the French and Americans,
and demanding universal suffrage, voting by
ballot, and other reforms of a sort to shock the
Tories beyond expression.
To the governing classes these popular move
ments were but a manifestation of the subver
sive spirit that had animated the French Revo
lution and was still troubling the Continental
rulers. In 1819, after a fatal conflict between
the people and the military at Manchester,
Parliament enacted the "Six Acts," which im
posed severe restrictions on the press and on
the holding of public meetings. These were
the methods of suppressing political opposition

62 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
that were in use on the Continent, and they
were felt by the less reactionary element in
Great Britain to be inconsistent with the tra
ditions of English liberty. Whether because of
the odium thus incurred, or because of their very
effectiveness itself, the Six Acts marked prac
tically the culminatibn of the policy of aggres
sive severity against the Radical agitation.
It became increasingly clear to Whigs and lib
eral Tories alike that the recurring popular dis
turbances were due quite as much to deep-
lying economic causes as to the mere idealism
and ambition of visionaries and Radicals, The
advent of Canning to the position of chief in
fluence in the government in 1822 contributed
to the change in the trend of official feeling.
Under Castlereagh's dominance the cordiality
between Great Britain and the allied monarchs
of the Continent in foreign policy promoted a
correspondence in domestic policy. Canning's
spectacular and defiant break with the powers,
and his open support of insurgents in Europe
and in America, gave inspiration and hope to
those who were looking for extensive, if not
technically Radical, changes in ancient British
institutions. The anticipated process of reform promptly

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 63
made its appearance. Huskisson, brought by
Canning to the presidency of the Board of
Trade, was deeply imbued with the doctrines
of Adam Smith as to keeping the hands of the
government off commerce and industry. The
ancient restrictions through which business was
parcelled out among particular groups and se
cured to them at all hazards, were incompat
ible with Huskisson's principles and were, more
over, at present working to the disadvantage of
the favored classes and producing the disturb
ances that were so significant signs ofthe times.
First, the shipping industry received Huskisson's
attention. The Navigation Laws had for a cen
tury and a half given monopolistic protection
to British merchant-vessels and had secured
for them a clear control of the carrying trade
of the world. The United States was now
contesting that control and was using in the
competition the same methods by which Great
Britain had secured it, namely, a monopolistic
protection of American shipping against all
foreign rivals. Parliament dropped in 1823
the rigidity of the old policy by authorizing the
government to suspend the application of the
laws through agreements with other govern
ments for reciprocal advantages. This was the

64 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
beginning of the end of the old system. A
quarter of a century elapsed before the final
step was taken that opened the ports of Great
Britain without restriction to the shipping of
all the world.
In the next two years laws were passed giving
recognition to the new conditions in manufac
turing that the industrial revolution had brought
into prominence. Labor troubles in the mod
ern sense, contests over wages between factory-
owners and employees, had become a conspic
uous element in the popular agitations of the
time. Under the ancient legal system the em
ployers had every advantage in the chronic
struggle. Great as was the fear in Parliament of
the working classes, it gave way before clear
evidence that the law imposed upon them
something near to the lot of the slave. To
help himself was a right that the spirit of the
day regarded as inherent in every British free
man. Hence the old statutes were repealed
which prohibited meetings and associations of
workmen for getting increase of wages, and
even forbade artisans absolutely to leave the
country. The progress of this reforming legislation
was followed with deep concern and covert hos-

REFORM 'AND DEMOCRACY 65
tility by the extreme Tories. It did not so
directly affect the ruling aristocracy as a whole,
however, as to excite a decisive opposition.
Quite otherwise was the case with the Corn
Law, on which the rents of the landowners
were believed absolutely to depend. Protec
tion to the domestic grain-growers was by this
legislation ingeniously complete. Duties on im
ported grain varied with the price in England;
importation was prohibited so long as the price
was under a maximum figure; and exportation
was stimulated by bounties when the price fell
below a minimum figure. Despite the guar
antee thus apparently established that Great
Britain should produce the food for her own
people at a fair and steady cost, there was
continual friction over the matter. Prices
fluctuated disastrously with variations of the
weather, and were never low enough for the
consumers or high enough for the farmers and
the landlords. Parliament was called upon
repeatedly to consider exceptional modifica
tions of the system, in order to check distress
among the farmers or the working classes. De
mands became frequent and loud for a radical
change that should do away with the high pro
tection to grain-growers; but here the aristo-

66 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
cratic landed interest by which both parties
were controlled stood firm and unyielding.
The Corn Law was to prove the last strong
hold of the old system to be carried by the ris
ing middle-class industrial interest. After the
death of Canning in 1827 his powerful patronage
was seen to have been indispensable to the re
forming projects of Huskisson; for there soon
came open rupture between the Canningites
and the ultra-Tories headed by the Duke of
Wellington. Differences about the Corn Law
had much to do with this dissension, though
two other subjects took precedence in practical
consideration when the reforming influence got
the upper hand.
The first of these subjects was Catholic eman
cipation. In 1829 the general disqualification of
Catholics for holding office or sitting in Parlia
ment was finally removed. This action had
long been sought by enlightened statesmen,
and had failed of realization in law only through
the dogged resistance of royalty itself. The
relief act of 1829 was significant less from its
content than from the means through which its
passage, despite the sullen opposition of the
King and a few bigoted advisers, was made
unavoidable, Daniel O'Connell, between 1823

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 67
and 1829, made Catholic Ireland self-conscious
and strong enough to paralyze entirely the
authority of the legal government. He did
this without bloodshed and without giving a
chance to his adversaries to use against him
with any success the processes of the ordinary
law or to find ground for resort to exceptional
measures. His method was agitation, of a
species so astutely controlled and regulated as
to make the maximum impression with the
minimum opportunity for lawlessness. The
feature of his triumph that caused the deepest
alarm in the ruling class was the severance of
the Irish tenantry from almost slavish depend
ence on their landlords. The creation thus of
an independent spirit in the mass of the Irish
population was destined to produce most revo
lutionary results in the long run on the relations
between England and Ireland; its immediate
influence on the political movements in Great
Britain was of the utmost concern to the class
that was opposing the onward sweep of reform.
The removal of disabilities from the Catholics
was effected while the Tory cabinet of Welling
ton and Peel was still in power, A year later,
in 1830, the Whigs, led by Earl Grey and
Brougham, came into control for the first time

68 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
in a quarter of a century, and at once opened
the famous struggle for Parliamentary reform.
The demand for this reform received a great
impulse from the revolutionary wave that swept
over the Continent, and the popular agitation
in Great Britain, reflecting the methods of
O'Connell's late operations in Ireland, assumed
a very threatening aspect. The Tories fought
with dogged energy to retain the ancient power
and privilege of the landed interest. Two years
of violent political strife resulted, however, in
the enactment of the reform. Through its pro
visions the House of Commons ceased to be
under the control of the landed aristocracy and
became fairly representative of the industrial
class that was assuming such importance in the
growing towns. The apportionment of seats
among the constituencies was based in some
measure upon the number of the population,
thus recognizing a principle that was dear to
the democratic reformer. Moreover, while the
landed aristocracy still retained its control of
the House of Lords, the passage of the Reform
Bill had finally been effected by a proceeding
that showed how, in a contest between the two
houses, the Commons could constitutionally
carry the day.

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 69
The Parliamentary reform of 1832 did not
make Great Britain a democracy, but it put
in a very clear light a trend of social and polit
ical progress that must narrow the distance
between the British and the American systems.
All the reforming movements that have been
noticed promoted liberty, in the sense of re
moving from some class of the population re
strictions which, however valuable at one time,
had lost their utility. In the United States the
restrictions had never existed, because they
had never been useful; and for that reason and
in the sense suggested America had led Great
Britain in respect to liberty. The era of the
Reform Act was signalized by the appearance
of political practices that were new and terrify
ing in England. Associations for partisan agi
tation among the townspeople were larger,
wealthier, and better organized than had ever
been the case before. Both leaders and follow
ers in these political unions displayed a high
degree of genuine skill in the game of politics
and beat the aristocracy in the field where it
claimed to be alone qualified to appear. The
repressive legislation of 18 19 was no longer in
effect, so far as its most rigorous features were
concerned, and the British people enjoyed in

70 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
far larger measure than any other European
nation the liberty to organize and assemble
for peaceful discussion and to express opinions
in speech or print. Popular sentiment was
readily articulate. Doctrines much too radi
cal for the possibility of adoption were never
theless freely canvassed. The periodical press
was expanded and cheapened to correspond to
the widening of political interest and intelli
gence. In all these conditions there was a
fundamental bond of sympathy between Great
Britain and the United States. The progress
ive Radicals in England were conscious of this,
and systematically adduced American examples
in support of their demands for reforms. Across
the Atlantic the Americans, so far as they were
informed of British conditions, threw their sym
pathy with the Radicals, The Whig species
of reform aroused but a qualified enthusiasm
in the United States, It was Whig reform, how
ever, that was alone destined to be practically
feasible in Great Britain for many decades to
come. After 1832 the reformed Parliament, under
Whig control, continued the process of remov
ing inveterate abuses. With many of its great
est measures, such as Poor-Law reform and the

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 71
rationalizing of municipal government, our con
cern is too slight for more than passing men
tion. Other legislation, however, had a defi
nite bearing on relations with the United States,
In 1833 an act was passed abolishing slavery
in the British West Indies, by a process that
became actually complete five years later. In
1835 the ancient methods of impressment in
recruiting for the navy were practically ended
by legislation regulating the procedure and at
the same time encouraging voluntary enlist
ment by bounties and pensions.
The abolition of slavery in the West In
dian colonies marked the triumph of a long
agitation, begun by Wilberforce and continued
by the Quakers and Buxton, The African slave-
trade had been prohibited by Parliament, largely
through Wilberforce' s efforts, as early as 1807,
only a year before a like prohibition was enacted
by the Congress of the United States, British
and American vessels were thus excluded from
a very lucrative business, but the humanitarian
purpose of the legislation was not in any large
measure achieved, for the trade continued to
flourish. Under the continuous pressure of the
Abolitionists the British Government sought
to arrange by treaty for the co-operation of

72 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
Other governments in suppressing the traffic.
The subject was repeatedly brought up in con
ference with the representatives of the United
States, and a treaty was actually agreed to in
1824, but failed through the unwillingness of
Great Britain to accept amendments made by
the Senate. The difference between the two
governments over the right of visitation and
search was the real cause of the failure. It was
clear that the slave-trade could never be ex
tinguished save by some arrangement for an
international patrol of the coasts and seas where
the traffic was carried on. Such arrangement
would necessarily involve the examination by
a war-ship of suspected vessels flying colors
other than those of the overhauling cruiser.
A reciprocal authorization of such procedure
as between American and British cruisers the
United States would never consent to; since
it was held to admit the right of a British cap
tain to search a ship bearing the American flag,
and this the United States was firm in its reso
lution never to concede. The British were
equally tenacious in opposing any kind of ar
rangement that might be construed as an aban
donment of the right.
The long-standing tension over the right of

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 73
search thus prevented the two great English-
speaking peoples from uniting for the effective
suppression of a business that was admitted by
both to be a scandal to civilization. Nor was
the situation improved when Parliament enacted
the laws that practically put an end to impress
ment, of which the right of search was an inci
dent. Nothing in this legislation formally abol
ished the old system of recruiting, and the
Foreign Office remained as tenacious of the claim
to take British sailors from foreign ships as Par
liament was of the undoubted right to take
them by force wherever the royal jurisdiction
extended. Whatever the era of reform effected
in respect to the practice, the time had not yet
come when the theory of personal liberty for
Britons would extend to that class on whose
service the safety of the empire was believed to
be in a special way dependent.
Conditions in the United States also contrib
uted to prevent the harmony of the gov
ernments in respect to the slave-trade. The
slaveholding interest, concentrated in the cot
ton-growing States, became a powerful factor
in politics during the twenties and thirties.
Though there was no important sentiment in
favor of the African slave-trade, there was al-

74 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
ways a base and lawless element in the South
ern population who were ready to take part in
the illicit operations through which small num
bers of negroes were often introduced. In 1820
a violent political contest arose in Congress
over an issue of internal policy respecting
slavery, and thenceforth the Southern politi
cians were very sensitive to any movements
. affecting the institution. Abolitionism of a
vehement type made its appearance in the
North in the early thirties, almost simultane
ously with a barbarous insurrection of slaves
in Virginia. The two events combined to cause
deep alarm in the South, and the feeling made
the discussion of any phase of the slavery ques
tion highly inexpedient to politicians. Then
came the emancipation of the slaves of the
British West Indies, This action, hailed with
joy by the Abolitionists, confirmed the uneasi
ness in the Southern States of the Union, Re
sentment toward the British was increased by
a series of cases in which the colonial authorities
of the Bahamas and the Bermudas forcibly
liberated the slaves who happened to be on
American coasting vessels that came within
British jurisdiction through stress of weather,
wreck, and mutiny. That the feeling aroused

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 75
by these various occurrences had an influence
in making futile the efforts to agree concern
ing the slave-trade cannot be doubted; yet
the difference as to the right of search on the
high seas was the vital cause of failure.
The growth and self-consciousness of the
slaveholding interest in the United States had
a close relation to other phases of the develop
ment of the American democracy. I have said
above that in the Jacksonian era there was a
narrowing of the interval which separated the
American from the British ideals of social struc
ture and policy. In Great Britain the trend
was steadily, as has been noted, toward removal
of the restrictions that sustained established in
terests and privileges. In the United States,
on the other hand, a pronounced movement
appieared toward the creation of similar restric
tions. The powers of the general government
had already been devoted, through diplomacy
and legislation, to vigorous efforts for the pro
tection and promotion of foreign trade and the
mercantile marine. During the twenties a sys
tematic agitation was begun for a like degree of
governmental activity in behalf of the nascent
manufactures of the Union. Henry Clay, a
statesman of extraordinary popularity, led this

76 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
movement on its political side, and sustained it
by fervent appeals for an "American system"
that should make the United States in all re
spects economically self-sufficient, and independ
ent of foreign, especially British, producers.
The result was tariff legislation, culminating
in 1828, by which heavy protective duties were
imposed on textiles, iron, and other leading com
modities. Protectionism of this species was not destined,
however, to be permanent. Accepted with much
misgiving in the North and West, it aroused
violent hostility in the slaveholding States of
the South. Their sole commercial product was
cotton, and three-fourths of the crop was ex
ported, mostly to Great Britain, To them,
therefore, the high tariff meant only a disas
trous increase of taxation, for the benefit of
the manufacturers of the North. A bitter op
position to the new system was carried on by
the State of South Carolina, involving serious
threats of a dissolution of the Union, The
pohcy that was proclaimed as necessary to the
free life and full development of the republic
thus proved fraught with peril to its very exist
ence. Clay himself bowed before the storm
that he had evoked, and took the lead in legis-

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 77
lation through which, by stages beginning in
1833, the tariff was so reduced that the protect
ive features entirely disappeared. The slave
holders whose system exemplified the extreme
of curtailment of personal liberty thus proved
the successful champions of a policy that in
sured the fullest freedom in respect to property.
The failure of protectionism was a feature of
the era of Andrew Jackson, It is with good
reason that this President's name has become
descriptive of a period of American history,
Jacksonian democracy designates a psycholog
ical phase in the growth of the republic. It was
the phase in which a people became fully aware
of its freedom, unity, and power, and began to
strive, with pathetically crude and ineffective
means, to make a useful application of these
qualities. Jackson was the first President from
west of the Appalachian Mountains, With him
began the conspicuous influence of the Missis
sippi valley in the American Government. That
vast region was by 1830 making great strides
in population and prosperity. Steam trans
portation on its innumerable rivers and lakes
gave a great stimulus to settlement and trade.
The social type still remained, however, that of
the frontier, slightly refined, and this was the

78 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
type that Jackson exemplified and impressed
upon the nation as a whole. Abounding phys
ical vigor, courage, self-confidence, resourceful
ness, fervid patriotism. Mosaic morality with
a primitive interpretation, a narrow intellec
tual horizon — these were the characteristics that
were predominant. The problems of social life
in the simple conditions that generally pre
vailed were readily enough solved by a people
of this type. Where circumstances called for
the settlement of questions of some, complexity,
such as the growth of the nation brought to the
front, the popular feeling was often that of
irritability and suspicion toward those who pro
fessed to be able to furnish answers on the basis
of a scientific knowledge that was beyond the
reach of the average man.
This democratic distrust of the expert played
a large part in the conflict between President
Jackson and the United States Bank, a conflict
that most clearly exhibited the tendencies of the
times. The bank was chartered by Congress
and had since 1816 served a useful purpose as
an agency for the fiscal operations of the treas
ury and also for providing a currency by its
note issues. Jackson formed the opinion that
the bank was a dangerous institution, of a mon-

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 79
opolistic character and repugnant to the Con
stitution and to sound public policy. On the
question of renewing its charter the financial
and commercial interests of the nation rallied
strongly to the support of the bank and were
sustained by a majority in Congress, The Presi
dent was able, however, after a spectacular
struggle, to defeat the renewal and to destroy
the bank. His economic reasoning was crude
and primitive, but his appeal to the people
against the moneyed class that he said was
oppressing them struck a responsive chord,
especially in his native West. In a campaign
that was fought chiefly on the issue of the bank
Jackson was re-elected in triumph to the presi
dency. In popular estimation his patriotic serv
ice in destroying the bank took rank with that
performed when, as was commonly believed, he
saved his country from the yoke of the British
by the victory at New Orleans,
The democratic trend in the political opera
tions of the Jacksonian era might be traced in
many phases of public life. One only may be
referred to here. It was in Jackson's time that
the so-called "spoils system," not unknown to
the practice of the politicians before, became
openly and on principle employed in manning

8o REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
the civil service of the National Government.
Many influences united, of course, in producing
this result. What never failed to win support
for the system, however, was the contention
that it was democratic — that it was based on
the idea that where equality was the order of
the day there must be no permanent tenure,
no monopoly, in the service of the people, but
every individual must be presumed equally
qualified for the service, every one must have
the chance in rotation to perform the duties of
office. Just as the business of banking was to
be open to all without restriction, so the offices
of the government must be open to all. And
no safer test was available of the people's will
as to the tenant of appointive office at any par
ticular time than the result of a contest for
the great elective ofiices. The voice of the
successful party was the voice of the people,
and the choice of the party leader was the
sufficient index in any particular case of the
party's wish as to the tenant of an office. In
vain was it pointed out by the well-informed
that patronage of this type was a conspicuous
feature of the British governmental system and
a mainstay of aristocratic ascendancy. Amer
ican public opinion was incredulous or un-

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 8i
daunted before this argument, and sustained
the spoils system without flinching in the face
of the evils that it increasingly involved.
The era of Jacksonism in America and Whig
reform in Great Britain was marked by a sig
nificant change in the character and extent of
the information about the republic that was
embodied in the British literature of the day.
For a decade and more after the Treaty of Ghent
Tory sentiment had predominated in both trav
ellers' books^ and the periodical press whenever
the United States was the subject of discus
sion. Radicals, humanitarians, agriculturists,
interested in the conditions among the com
mon people, found somewhat to commend in
the bounty of nature and the material comfort
and prosperity of man. Social, intellectual, and
spiritual conditions generally impressed the
Briton as repulsive and intolerable. Politics
and government, so far as they were at all in
telligible, seemed unbalanced, incoherent, and
corrupt. These views of the United States
were systematically and repeatedly set forth,
with all the effect of skilled literary massing and
polish, in the great Tory organ of the day, the
Quarterly Review. Its distinguished Whig rival,
'See the valuable article by E. D. Adams, "The British Traveler in
America," in Political Science Quarterly, June, 1914.

82 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
the Edinburgh Review, was less harsh in judg
ment on things social and political, but, be
cause of its patronizing irony, not less offensive
to the Americans. In 1820 Sydney Smith pub
lished in the Edinburgh Review his famous series
of questions concerning the culture of Jonathan
as compared with that of John: "In the four
quarters of the globe, who reads an American
book? or goes to an American play.? or looks at
an American picture or statue? . . . Finally,
under which of the old tyrannical governments
of Europe is every sixth man a slave, whom his
fellow creatures may buy and sell and torture?"
The North American Review and other pub
lications took up the cudgels for the Americans
with spirit, and a wordy warfare raged through
many years. By the judicious the controversy
was deprecated; for it obviously stirred up ill
feeling and misunderstandings on both sides
of the ocean. The great British reviews were
regularly reprinted in the United States, and
though their circulation was small and confined
chiefly to the towns of the seaboard, all criti
cism of the Americans was diligently reproduced
in the local periodicals, and the exasperation
was spread to the remotest regions of the Union.
In Great Britain the influence of the quarterlies

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 83
was chiefly with the ruling class; but here again
their ideas penetrated to the lower social strata,
especially through the clergy, and confirmed the
impression that the Americans were an anarchic,
godless, brutal crew. In many cases the deter
rent effect of such impression was welcomed by
authorities of church and state whose charges
sought to escape the misery of recurrent agri
cultural distress by emigration. Piety and
patriotism both required that the emigrant
should seek a home on British rather than
American soil — should turn to the Canadas and
avoid the United States.
After the accession of the Whigs to power,
and while their reforms were in progress, British
literary judgments about America began to
reflect a less hostile spirit. Travellers reported
more that was tolerable in the working of
democratic customs and institutions, while the
reviews conceded the existence of a rudimen
tary literature in the writings of Irving, Bryant,
Cooper, Simms, and a few others, Harriet
Martineau's descriptions and estimates of social
and intellectual tendencies, while none too
flattering, differed much in sympathy and ac
curacy from most that had preceded, Tocque-
ville's profound study, appearing in 1835 and

84 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
attracting wide-spread attention at once in
Great Britain, gave strong support to the revi
sion of opinion concerning the American democ
racy. On the other side Mrs, Trollope's "Do
mestic Life of the Americans," published in
1832, with its clever and cattish caricatures,
inflamed the old animosities, which a never-
ending train of Tory travellers, with far less of
vivacity and of malice, contributed to keep
glowing. Finally, it is to be noted that in 1835
appeared the first important literary produc
tion of Richard Cobden, treating the economic
forces of the United States with much analytic
power and from a novel point of view. His
vision of the transforming influence of American
agriculture and commerce, as well as of manufac
tures when once the initial obstacles should be
overcome, was not confused by suspicions as
to the religious, moral, or political soundness
of the people. He was by training one of the
middle class of English society, a Manchester
manufacturer, and the lack of culture that
disturbed so many British observers in America
did not affect Cobden's perception of the eco
nomic strength that was developing. The thesis
of his essay was that Great Britain's leading
position among the powers of the world was in

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 85
far greater peril from the economic competition
of the United States than from the diplomatic
or military rivalry of any European govern
ments. War with the Americans he regarded
as impossible. In commerce and manufactures,
however, he believed they were destined to
take the lead, because of their enormous popu
lation and resources. His conclusion was that
British policy should be directed more with
reference to American conditions than along
the ancient lines of the balance of power in Eu
rope. The size of Russia's army or of France's
navy should be of less interest to the govern
ment than the number of cotton looms in the
United States or the statistics of her merchant
marine. All restrictions that hampered the
fullest development of British commerce and
industry must be abolished, and the first of
these to go must be that main bulwark of the
aristocratic ascendancy, the Corn Law.
Thus Cobden made the United States the
text of his earliest sermon against militarism
and protectionism. Through the thirty years
that were to follow of successful agitation and
of profound influence on English policy, he
never deviated from cordial appreciation and
sympathy for the institutions and ideals of the

86 REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
American Republic. His influence became im
portant, however, only somewhat later than
the period with which we are now dealing.
The Anti-Corn-Law League took shape and
position under his leadership in the late thirties,
and achieved its crown of success in 1846. It
is more than a coincidence that this was the
year that saw the last element of protection
banished from the tariff law ofthe United States.
That part of British public opinion con
cerning America which was based upon the
printed accounts of travel and personal obser
vation had no counterpart in American public
opinion concerning Great Britain. Few Amer
icans visited the United Kingdom, and of those
who did so the number who published their
impressions was negligible. Some opportunity
to form judgments of the British individually, if
not in the mass, was afforded by those who came
and settled in the United States, There was
in the twenties and thirties a continuous stream
of immigration from all parts of the United
Kingdom, The dimensions of the stream can
not be known from any trustworthy statistics.
A sprinkling of English, Scots, and Irish was
to be found throughout the Union. The Cath
olic Irish congregated clannishly in the towns

REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 87
and were already exciting the antagonism that
was to be so serious in the middle of the cen
tury. The other elements nowhere became
numerous or assertive enough to produce a
perceptible impression. They were mostly arti
sans or farmers, Presbyterians or English dis
senters, well adapted to conform without fric
tion to the social conditions into which they
came. A large proportion of them had left
their homes under pressure of social or economic
discontent and distress, and so far as they gave
a basis for opinion as to Great Britain they
confirmed the conviction that the people there
were a very decent body, shamefully oppressed
by a haughty group of peers and clergy. This
opinion derived new support from the fate of
the Chartist movement in the late thirties. The
demands of the Chartists were to Americans
elementary political rights; and the summary
treatment of the agitation strengthened the
notion that English liberty under Whig domina
tion was as unreal as under the Tories.

CHAPTER III
THE ROARING FORTIES: POLK AND
PALMERSTON
In 1837 Martin Van Buren succeeded Andrew
Jackson as President of the United States and
Victoria succeeded William IV on the throne of
the United Kingdom. These changes did not
signify any open reversal of governmental pol
icy in either case. Van Buren was Jackson's
own choice for the succession and was thor
oughly identified with the Democratic Party
that followed Jackson; the Whig cabinet of
Lord Melbourne continued to direct affairs
under the Queen as they had done under the
King. Yet from this date the relations among
the English-speaking peoples lost the tone of
cordiality that had characterized them for a
decade, and entered upon a protracted period
of hostility and tension, approaching more than
once to the verge of war.
First among the conditions that revealed
the new trend of things was a political ebul
lition of serious proportions in Canada. In
88

THE ROARING FORTIES 89
neither of the two provinces bearing this name
had the development of political and economic
life since 1815 been calm and satisfactory.
Party strife was keen on lines that strongly
suggested the history of the United States just
before it broke away from Great Britain. The
chief organs of government in each province were
a governor appointed by the crown, a legislative
council likewise appointed, and an assembly
elected by the people. In both the Canadas the
central point of constitutional strife was the ten
ure and powers of the legislative council. When
in 1 79 1 the existing province of Quebec was di
vided into the two provinces of Lower Canada
and Upper Canada, it was expected that the
one should be distinctively the centre of a policy
adapted to the character and feelings of the
French population, and the other the particular
home of the English. In the course of time,
however, the English element in Lower Canada
gained largely on the French through immigra
tion. In the thirties the ratio of English to
French was possibly as high as one to three.
Compared with the conservative, easy-going
French element the newcomers were radical
and aggressive and they aroused strong misgivings
in their compatriots. Political parties tended

90 THE ROARING FORTIES
steadily to follow the lines of race. In the
assembly the numerically stronger French easily
maintained the ascendancy, but the members of
the legislative council were selected by the gov
ernors chiefly from the English element. Hence
a persistent demand from the assembly that the
council should be made elective. On all sub
jects of party contest the antagonism between
the two houses, with the governor sustaining
the council, was intense, and the hostility was
but the central point of a far-reaching race
conflict. In Upper Canada there was no difference of
nationalities to fix the lines of the party con
flicts. The issues here turned chiefly on the
rivalries between the original settlers and the
later arrivals, the latter being almost entirely
British, with only a small though active ele
ment of immigrants from the United States.
The Loyalists by whom, at the end of the
American Revolution, the colony was practically
created, became by their landed wealth, their
substantial character, and their political ex
perience, as well as by the deliberate recogni
tion of the home government, a social and
political aristocracy in the province. By the
thirties a relatively narrow group of this class

THE ROARING FORTIES 91
had firmly in their control all branches of the
administration save the assembly. The oppo
sition party consisted of the later immigrants,
whose origin and characteristics were much like
those of the people who were filling up the
neighboring borders of the United States. They
were of the dissenting creeds, for example, while
the aristocratic party, known commonly as the
United Empire Loyalists, preserved in general
a connection with the Church of England. This
matter of ecclesiastical attachment had no lit
tle influence in the critical politics of the time;
for profound issues of educational and fiscal
policy turned on the conflicting interests of the
various sects.
The aspect of affairs in Lower Canada as
sumed a threatening character in 1836. For
four years prior to that date the assembly had
refused to vote the money for the judicial and
administrative service. The British home gov
ernment was much embarrassed by the situa
tion; for the Whig traditions of the cabinet
pointed to sympathy with the ostensible prin
ciples of the popular party, and both the English
Radicals and the Irish followers of O'Con
nell vigorously sustained the cause of the dis
contented French- as the cause of liberty and

92 THE ROARING FORTIES
democracy against aristocratic privilege. On
the other hand, the conservative element of the
Whigs stood out stiffly for the protection of the
English-speaking minority in Canada, and this
position was taken also by a special commis
sion sent out to examine the situation. Some
concessions offered by this commission had
merely the effect, however, of evoking a fresh
manifestation of recalcitrance by the majority
in the assembly at Quebec, and the British
cabinet was forced to appeal to Parliament for
decisive action. Accordingly, a series of reso
lutions was passed in May, 1837, authorizing
the governor-general to pay the arrears due
for the public service without waiting for the
vote of the assembly, declaring it inexpedient
to make the legislative council elective, and
denying other important demands of the French
party. The result of this action was insurrection.
In November, after a period of violent agita
tion led by the Frenchman Papineau and a
few British sympathizers, armed uprisings took
place in several French communities. There
was little organization and no discernible co
operation in the various movements, and they
were all quickly suppressed, with trifling blood-

THE ROARING FORTIES 93
shed. At the same time the popular party in
Upper Canada were led to venture on revolt,
headed by a Scottish editor named Mackenzie,
An attack was made by a disorderly body of
the disaffected on Toronto, but it had no more
effect than the rising in the lower province.
The insurgent leaders who escaped death and
capture succeeded in crossing the line into the
United States. Papineau and Mackenzie were
both among the number. Many of the rank and
file of the insurgents also took refuge across the
border, and found there a measure of sympa
thy and support that had serious consequences.
For a year or more the Canadian frontier was
harassed by a series of petty but exasperating
raids organized and directed in the States of
Vermont, New York, and Michigan,
The most important of these border forays
was that conducted from Buffalo as a base in
December, 1837, A force of several hundred
men took possession of an island on the Canadian
side of the international boundary, as a first
step toward attack on the mainland. Supplies
for the invaders were drawn from the Amer
ican side by means of the small steamer Caro
line. Canadian troops, sent to destroy the
steamer, found her lying at a wharf on the Amer-

94 THE ROARING FORTIES
ican shore, cut her loose, and burned her. In
the slight skirmish that accompanied the sei
zure of the vessel an American was slain. No
further progress was made by the invading
party on the island, but the destruction of the
Caroline by British troops in American territory
caused a fierce wave of indignation to sweep
through the United States. To this incident,
more perhaps than to any other cause, was due
the prolongation of active movements against
Canada across the border. Popular feeling was,
of course, no less wrathful on one side ofthe
boundary than on the other; for the Canadians
were deeply irritated at the sympathy and con
nivance given by the Americans to the insur
gents. Diplomacy was prompt to take up the affair
of the Caroline, and urgent demands for repa
ration for the violation of American territory
were made by the United States upon the
British Government. The latter assumed re
sponsibility for the act as a regrettable but
necessary proceeding of defence in time of insur
rection and flagrant war, during which the United
States was a base of supplies for the enemy.
Negotiations dragged according to their wont
until a fresh incident gave an exciting impulse

THE ROARING FORTIES 95
to their movement. In November, 1840, three
years after the burning of the Caroline, Alex
ander McLeod, a British subject, was arrested in
New York State on a charge of arson and mur
der in connection with the affair. Indignation
flamed high in Canada and Great Britain at
this action, and the authorities at Washington
were pressed to release McLeod, whose offence,
if any, had been committed as a soldier under
orders for which the British Government had
assumed responsibility. The situation was most
difficult for the American Department of State;
•for it involved an awkward conflict of jurisdic
tion, only too familiar, between the Federal
Government and the government of New York
State. The latter, backed by a demonstrative
popular sentiment, insisted that its courts must
enforce its criminal law. The right to do so
could not be questioned by the Federal Govern
ment, though the latter alone had to confront
the threatening demands of Great Britain for
the release of McLeod. A way out was found
by Daniel Webster, who became secretary of
state in March, 1841. He on the one hand
moderated the urgency of the British demands
and on the other moved all possible influences
to insure that McLeod should not be convicted

96 THE ROARING FORTIES
by the State court. In October the accused
man was duly acquitted by a jury, and was
hastily sent out of the State,
The period of McLeod's detention was one
of great bitterness of feeling among all three of
the English-speaking peoples. While exciting
conditions of internal politics served to temper
somewhat the prevailing international antip
athies, there was little doubt that the gravest
results would have followed the conviction and
punishment of the man. The Canadian revolt
was indeed only one of several matters that
combined to produce the tension of the time.
While the two Canadas were in the throes of
civil war New Brunswick was on the verge of
hostilities with the State of Maine over the old
question of the disputed northeastern boundary.
On the Gulf of Mexico Texas was fighting for
independence from Mexico, and was receiving
from sympathizers in the United States an
amount and kind of assistance that had not been
without effect on the expectations of the in
surgent Canadians, Finally, on the far-distant
Pacific coast the late thirties saw the beginning
of an immigration from the United States into
the valley of the Columbia River that foretold
trouble over the Oregon country. The Amer-

THE ROARING FORTIES 97
ican people were indeed showing in every direc
tion a disposition to burst the territorial bonds
that confined them, easy as those bonds had
been. And the far-flung interests of the British
Empire need no more striking illustration than
the fact that in whatever direction the Amer
icans sought to expand their bounds, whether
on the Atlantic or on the Pacific, in the Gulf of
the tropics or under the Arctic circle, they found
subjects of the Queen, with vested rights, oppos
ing the movement.
The risings in Canada gave a healthy shock
to British interest, which had been languid in
respect to the American branch of the empire.
Parliament, early in 1838, passed an act sus
pending the constitution of Lower Canada, and
in the spring the Earl of Durham was sent out
as governor-general, armed with dictatorial
powers. His stay was short, but its influence
was lasting; for it gave occasion for the famous
report that furnished the mother country with
her first clear ideas as to the causes, facts, and
tendencies of the situation in North America.
He showed that in every one of the North
American provinces there was a standing polit
ical antagonism between the elected popular
assembly and the executive officers appointed

98 THE ROARING FORTIES
by the" crown — such antagonism as had pro
duced the revolution of 1688 in England and
that of 1776 in America. This condition, dan
gerous everywhere, became disastrous in Lower
Canada, where it brought to a head the race
animosity that was the basis of all the trouble
there. The general remedy for the evils con
cerned, in Lord Durham's opinion, was the in
troduction of responsible government, that is,
responsibility of the executive to the repre
sentatives of the people in the assembly. As
to the Canadas, his Lordship saw no hope of
stability and peace save through the union of
the two provinces under a single legislature and
executive. By such a system the French ele
ment would be deprived of the hope of an inde
pendent, or at least autonomous, government,
and the English-speaking people would be as
sured of the political predominance to which they
were entitled by their numerical, economic, and
intellectual superiority.
Lord Durham's outspoken project for sub
merging the French in Canada was equalled in
candor by his discussion of the relations of the
British provinces with the United States. The
enterprise and material prosperity on the re
publican side of the boundary, as compared with

THE ROARING FORTIES 99
conditions on the British side, he set forth in
terms that were bitterly resented, especially in
Upper Canada, He appraised in a spirit of ju
dicial detachment the sympathy and support
given by the people of the United States to the
Canadian malcontents, and the expectations of
the latter as to the possibilities of escape from
British rule by incorporation into the republic.
He estimated with care the strength of the
traditional antipathy with which the aristo
cratic dominant class in Upper Canada regarded
the democracy across the border. As against
the force of this feeling he considered the influ
ence that contiguity, with identity of problems
and interests, would exert for the promotion
of respect and amity. The general deduction
from his calculation was that, in default of a
very wise and considerate policy on the part
of the home government, union with the United
States might become a popular demand among
both the French and the English elements in
the Canadas.
The importance of Lord Durham's discussion
of this point was conspicuous in view of ideas
that were freely broached by British politi
cians of prominence at this time. A calculus
of the value of colonies and dependencies was

loo THE ROARING FORTIES
becoming a rather common feature of debate.
Ultra Radicals like Roebuck and Hume, and
less violent ones like Brougham, contended that
the connection of the Canadas with Great
Britain either already was, or in the near fu
ture would be, irrational and adverse to the
true interests of both parties. Cobden and his
anti-Corn-Law followers assailed, in the name of
economic and political liberty, the system under
which, for the sake of imperial glory, the nat
ural law of freedom in trade and navigation
was set at naught. Lord Durham himself had
been identified with the Radicals, but on the
question of colonies he did not join the ultras.
The burden of his contention in his great report
was, that the North American provinces should
be so administered as to grow into a unified
nationality, attached to the British ¦ Empire,
and sharing by give and take in the civilization
and progress of which that empire was the
home. Under an act of Parliament that went into
effect in 1841 a new constitution for Canada
became operative. It joined the two provinces
in a legislative union, with many features that
Lord Durham had recommended. The new
system did not bring at once the tranquillity

THE ROARING FORTIES loi
that had been hoped for. It included, however,
provisions through which the popular element
in the legislature could grow in relative influence,
and it became thus instrumental in the develop
ment of responsible government and an increas
ing autonomy.
Just at the time when the popular excitement
along the border was at its height in connection
with the insurrection in Canada, it was unfor
tunate, but scarcely surprising, that the friction
over the unsettled boundary of Maine and New
Brunswick should have become acute. The
King of the Netherlands had failed, as we have
seen, to find any geographical facts that he
would judicially warrant to embody the line
described in the treaty of 1783, After the fail
ure of this arbitration, desultory negotiations
were carried on by the two governments, but
with little progress toward agreement; so that
in 1838 the "northwest angle of Nova Scotia"
and the "highlands" were eluding the diplomats
and surveyors as successfully as at any time
during the previous half-century. It had been
informally agreed by the two governments that
neither should seek to strengthen its position
in the disputed territory pending the determina
tion of the boundary. Despite this agreement

102 THE ROARING FORTIES
vexatious incidents occurred from time to time.
The authorities of Maine and New Brunswick,
while professing to conform with exactness to
the agreement not to strengthen their respect
ive positions, were at no less pains to see that
their positions were not weakened. Settlers,
both British and American, and for the most
part of no very desirable character, drifted into
the region; local ofiicials of the neighboring
jurisdictions extended their activities and ar
rested each other as intruders; lumbermen,
with or without color of right, plied their enter
prise in the rich forests of the no-man's-land.
In the summer of 1838 an unusually large force
of British lumbermen carried on extensive
operations on the Aroostook River. Ordered
off by an American official, they refused to go,
and assembled in considerable numbers to main
tain their position by force. The government of
Maine thereupon sent a strong body of militia
to enforce its authority, and the government
of New Brunswick responded by procuring the
despatch of a detachment of British regulars
to the neighborhood.
No bloodshed resulted from this threatening
situation. Popular and official excitement, of
course, ran high along the border, and contrib-

THE ROARING FORTIES 103
uted to increase the wide-spread ill feeling al
ready caused by the incidents of the rebeUion
in Canada, The British and American foreign
offices quickly took charge of the affair and
soothed the inflamed susceptibilities of Maine
and New Brunswick. President Van Buren felt
obliged to rebuke the rather high-handed way
in which the governor of Maine had begun to
make war on the British Empire. It was clear
in this matter, however, as became even clearer
a little later in the case of McLeod, that the
constitutional partition of authority between
the States and the Federal Government in the
American system must often cause great em
barrassment to the United States in its rela
tions with foreign powers.
The most important practical result of this
so-called "Aroostook war" was the impulse it
gave to serious efforts toward the settlement of
the boundary. Negotiations had lagged in a
spiritless way ever since the failure of the arbi
tration. Maine was justified at least in her
complaints on this score. The administrations
of Jackson and Van Buren on the one side, and
the cabinet of the Melbourne Whigs on the
other, found subjects much more to their taste
than the exhausted and exhausting question as

104 THE ROARING FORTIES
to where the northwest angle of eighteenth-
century Nova Scotia was situated. The gov
ernor of Maine, with his militia, stirred up the
diplomats as effectually as he did the lumber
men. Palmerston, the British foreign secre
tary, and Forsyth, the American secretary of
state, after some despatches manifesting more
acerbity than had characterized the correspond
ence since Canning's time, agreed in a recog
nition of each other's highly correct and amicable
intentions, and proceeded to institute a new
series of surveys and a new set of commis
sioners to guess out the location of the elusive
angle and highlands. For three years, 1839-42,
there was great activity in the search for the
boundary and vast ingenuity was displayed in
the construction of new theories about the mean
ing of the treaty and the topography of the dis
puted region. The country was so covered with
hills that a surveyor who knew it well could
construct a chain of highlands in nearly any
direction that suited his taste or his instruc
tions, and was as free to indulge his fancy
about the boundary as were the negotiators
in 1783, who knew nothing whatever about the
facts. In 1 841 there was a change of administration

THE ROARING FORTIES 105
in both Great Britain and the United States.
At Washington in March the American Whigs
assumed control of the government; at London
in September the British Whigs fell from power.
Daniel Webster became American secretary of
state, and Lord Aberdeen became foreign sec
retary in place of Palmerston. The relations
of the English-speaking peoples with one an
other could scarcely have been more unpleasant
than they were at the time of these changes.
The McLeod incident, with the other friction
due to the Canadian insurrection, was at the
most critical stage, and the boundary dispute
was as far as ever from settlement. Added to
these came a fresh revival of the old and ex
tremely inflammatory issue about the right of
search. Slave-traders of various nationalities
were freely using the American flag to protect
themselves, and British cruisers on the African
coast, in trying to stop the trade, now and then
visited and examined a vessel whose right to
carry the American flag was beyond question.
The complaints of merchants whose business
was thus interfered with led to energetic pro
tests to the British Government, and one of the
last acts of Palmerston before his retirement
from the Foreign Office was to send in reply to

io6 THE ROARING FORTIES
such a protest a despatch that raspingly refused
to concede the American demand.
With Aberdeen at the Foreign Office the tone
of the correspondence between the two govern
ments underwent a notable change. Webster,
after seeing the McLeod affair peacefully set
tled, went earnestly to work on the boundary
question. His plan was to drop all the great
mass of surveyors' and historians' data, to give
up trying to find out the meaning of the treaty,
and to reach an agreement by direct negotia
tion on a conventional line. It was deemed
necessary first to obtain the assent of Maine
and of Massachusetts (within whose jurisdic
tion Maine was originally included) to this
method of settlement. Though the govern
ment of Maine had declared in the most formal
way that it would never consent, it consented,
and Massachusetts raised no difficulties. The
British Government showed its sense of the im
portance of the whole situation by announcing
that it would send a special envoy to deal with
the pending questions, and manifested its ami
cable spirit by designating for the mission
Alexander Baring, Lord Ashburton, whose fit
ness was signified equally by his distinguished
public services in England and his well-known

THE ROARING FORTIES 107
cordiality toward the United States. Ash
burton reached Washington in April, 1842, and
on the 9th of August the famous Webster-
Ashburton treaty was signed. It was savagely
attacked in the British provinces, in Great Brit
ain itself, and in the United States. These
attacks were for the most part, however, mere
ebullitions of partisan spite or of that queer
conception of public duty which requires fault
to be found with every achievement of the
administration for the time being.
So far as it went the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty was an extremely important step in
the development of pacific relations among the
English-speaking peoples. The convention it
self provided definitely a settlement of all open
questions about the boundary from the Atlantic
Ocean to the Rocky Mountains; it established
an unobjectionable, if not supremely efficient,
system of co-operation for the suppression of
the slave-trade; and it embodied an agreement
for the extradition of>»criminals that was urgently
demanded by the disturbed conditions along
the 'Canadian frontier. In the published corre
spondence between the negotiators were incor
porated a satisfactory expression of regret by
Great Britain for the violation of American ter-

io8 THE ROARING FORTIES
ritory in the affair of the Caroline, and an ex
change of views that was interpreted by Web
ster as a substantial abandonment of the ancient
claim to the right of search and impressment.
In regard to the case of McLeod, Webster re
newed the admission by the United States of
the British contention that a private citizen
could not be punished for an act for which his
government assumed the responsibility, but
amicably forbore to point out, as his predeces
sor had done, the awkward position in which
the British Government would be put by this
contention in connection with certain incidents
of Palmerston's aggressive policy in the af
fairs of continental Europe. The forbearance of
Webster in this matter was typical of the gen
eral tone of the correspondence and of the whole
negotiation, A spirit of friendliness and cour
tesy was manifested at every stage, and an
almost ostentatious avoidance of ideas or ex
pressions that could irritate. Whatever of
soothing effect was produced by the mission of
Lord Ashburton was probably due as much to
this characteristic of the negotiations as to the
treaty itself,
/ The boundary fixed by the treaty gave to
Maine a little more than half of the area claimed

THE ROARING FORTIES 109
by her, and a little less than what was assigned
to her by the rejected arbitration of the King
of the Netherlands, As a solace she received
from the United States the sum of $150,000,
a like sum going to Massachusetts, The line
dividing Canada from Vermont and New York,
which, as we have seen, had been erroneously
run by the surveyors to the substantial advan
tage of the United States, was fixed by the
treaty in accordance with the now long-estab
lished error.
The consent of Maine to the negotiation of
a conventional line was secured largely through
means that, when later disclosed, became the
focus of a heated controversy. Just when
Webster was getting his plans for the negotia
tion under headway his attention was called
to a map recently discovered in the French
archives which might be the one which Frank
lin was known to have sent to Vergennes in
1782 with the bounds of the United States, as
agreed upon by the negotiators of the treaty of
peace, marked upon it by a strong red line.
The new-found map bore no evidence as to its
identity, but the boundary of the United States
was marked on it with a strong red line, and the
line in the region of Maine followed very closely

no THE ROARING FORTIES
that claimed by the British as designated by
the treaty of 1783. Webster showed a copy of
this map to the governor of Maine, suggesting
how awkward it would be to go into a new arbi
tration with the possibility that the map might
come before the arbiter, Maine gave in her
adhesion to the project of a conventional line,
Webster refrained from showing the red-line
map to Lord Ashburton, and further directed
Everett, the minister at London, to abandon all
searching for maps that might have been used
in the negotiations of 1782-3,
Under all the circumstances, this abstention
from further map-hunting was a dictate of
elementary prudence. It was made ridiculous
by what became known a little later. In the
British Museum lay the actual map used in
the negotiations of 1782 by Oswald, one of the
British commissioners, and on this map the
boundary agreed to was marked by a line that
followed very closely what was claimed by the
United States. If Everett had continued his
search and happened upon this map, Webster's
way with Great Britain, if not with Maine,
would have been materially smoothed.
Neither the red-line map nor Oswald's map
came forth from retirement till Webster and

THE ROARING FORTIES in
Ashburton had concluded their treaty. Then,
in connection with the debate in the Senate on
the ratification, the fact of the discovery in
Paris became public, and from this followed the
disclosure of Oswald's map, which had been
removed to the British Foreign Office. The
opponents of the treaty found in these incidents
good material for their attacks upon it. Web
ster was accused of trickery, and Ashburton of
imbecility. The whimsical fortune that gave
to each party exclusive control of evidence
strongly sustaining its adversary made the sit
uation most interesting, and promoted a dili
gent re-examination of the boundary issue on
its merits. A furious cartographic controversy
developed, in official and non-official circles.
Maps, rumors of maps, traditions of maps, bear
ing on the line described in the treaty of 1783,
came forth in impressive but perplexing num
bers. Long before the debate assumed its
greatest dimensions, however, the treaty of 1842
was duly ratified. To the layman the argu
ments of the cartographic and historical ex
perts were reciprocally annihilating, and the
wisdom of the negotiators in discarding the whole
method was confirmed. All of ill feeling from
the treaty that survived into later years was

112 THE ROARING FORTIES
that on the part of the British-Americans,
who were debarred by the Webster-Ashburton
boundary from the most direct and practicable
line of communication between Halifax and
Quebec. They long continued to feel that their
interests and plain rights had been sacrificed
to the mother-country's exaggerated fear of a
breach with the United States.
The provisions of the treaty touching the
slave-trade avoided all reference to the right
of search. It was agreed that each govern
ment should maintain on the coast of Africa
a considerable naval force to apply its own laws
against the trade. The two forces were to
work in co-operation with each other for the
common end, under orders from their respect
ive governments adapted to make this co-opera
tion most effective.
This article was the best that could be de
vised to end the dangerous controversies that
arose from time to time over the activities of
the British cruisers on the African coast. It
insured a more positive and definite participa
tion by the United States in the suppression of
the slave-trade, and at the same time, by pro
viding for the presence of an American' squad
ron in the most troublesome neighborhood, gave

THE ROARING FORTIES 113
some guarantee that slavers who misused the
flag and traders who lawfully used it should be
judged by its natural protectors rather than by
the officers of a foreign power. The article in
this shape was designed to leave wholly un
touched the controversy over the right of search,
and merely to reduce the frequency of the
incidents that might raise anew that contro
versy. At this date the discussion of the right of
search by the publicists, official and unofficial,
had assumed new phases in connection with the
matter of the slave-trade. How, it was asked,
could the nefarious traffic ever be interfered
with, if a vessel loaded with slaves could escape
examination by the simple expedient of running
up a flag other than that of the cruiser that
wished to examine her? There must be at
least such examination as will determine whether
the suspected ship has a right to the colors
wRich she displays. Irrespective, thus, of any
serious search, there must be a right of visitation
as to a merchantman concerning which there
is any ground for suspicion.
Not so, was the reply. Visitation would be
futile without such a degree of examination as
would constitute all that is involved in the

114 THE ROARING FORTIES
practice of search. The claim of the lesser
right is no more tenable in law and reason than
the ancient pretension to the greater. The
utmost that can be conceded is the right of
approach. A cruiser may regard from a respect
ful distance and in a peaceful manner a ship
flying an innocent flag, but any attempt by
force to stop such a ship or to interfere with her
course is a violation of the flag and of that free
dom of the seas on which the civilization and
progress of mankind so closely depend.
But what if the suspected vessel is a pirate?
Shall a pirate be allowed to roam the seas at
will, guaranteed against interference by the
possession of a few lockers full of flags that she
has taken from the victims of her lawlessness?
Far from it, was the answer. A pirate has been
from time immemorial, under the law of nations,
hostis humani generis — at war with all mankind.
No one pretends that the right of search is not
possessed by a belligerent in time of war, as a
reasonable precaution against the rendering of
aid to the enemy. Only in time of peace is it
wholly without justification. But as to pirates
there is never a time of peace. War is perma
nent and coextensive with the human race.
Therefore, as to pirates the right of search on

THE ROARING FORTIES 115
the high seas belongs to the ships of all na
tions at all times.
These various arguments were iterated and
reiterated, amplified and fortified with the in
genuity and historical learning that the experts
in diplomacy and international law were readily
able to supply. The practical outcome so far
as concerned Great Britain and America was
determined, however, by popular feelings that
were independent of the reasoning on abstract
principles. In the United Kingdom the hu
manitarian sentiment against the slave-trade
pervaded all classes and demanded insistently
that the great naval power of the government
should be freely used for the suppression of the
evil. In the United States the memory of con
ditions during the Napoleonic wars was un
ceasingly active and prohibited any semblance
of recognition to the exercise of British juris
diction for any purpose on American vessels
on the high seas. There was a wide-spread
behef in the United States that the British
enthusiasm for the suppression of the slave-
trade covered a greater enthusiasm for main
taining the right of search as the unmistakable
token of her naval supremacy. Nor was this
belief without foundation; for in some centres

Ii6 THE ROARING FORTIES
of surviving high Toryism the sufferings of the
Africans were notoriously of little concern in
comparison with the maintenance intact of
British rule on the seas as against the aspira
tions of the upstart republic of the West, On
the other hand, there was a feeling among the
liberals in England that the obstinate refusal
of the Americans to join with whole soul in the
operations against the slavers was dictated less
by fears and scruples about the right of search
than by unavowed indifference to the existence
of the traffic. And this again was not without
foundation; for the trend of events during the
past ten years in relation to slavery had markedly
strengthened a feeling in the South that war
on the slave-trade was too closely associated
with abolitionism to be wholly free from peril
to the institutions of the section.
In the negotiations of 1842 Webster secured
an opportunity to put his government's views
correctly on the record, by asking that the right
of search in connection with impressment, rather
than with the slave-trade, be taken up for dis
cussion. Ashburton declared that his instruc
tions did not permit him to enter upon that
subject. Webster made use of the occasion to
enlarge with eloquence and force upon the views

THE ROARING FORTIES n7
of his government. The most significant fea
ture of his plea was probably not his solemn
declaration that the United States would no
longer permit the impressment of seamen from
American vessels, but the attention that he
gave to the remarkable change of conditions
since the practice was last resorted to. He ad
verted to the extraordinary proportions at
tained by immigration from the British Isles,
much of it encouraged by the British Govern
ment, and he pointed out the disastrous conse
quences that would ensue if, in time of future
war, any attempt should be made to assert the
doctrine of indefeasible allegiance among these
swarming myriads and to force them into the
service of the government that had encouraged
them to leave its soil,
Ashburton's answer was of the soft species
that turneth away wrath. He declined to enter
into argument and merely deprecated the dis
cussion of a topic that was so full of difficulty
in the abstract and so happily remote from any
practical importance. He freely admitted, how
ever, that a serious question "has existed, from
practices formerly attending the mode of man
ning the Biitish navy in times of war." This
form of expression indicated a belief that im
pressment was a matter of the past.

ii8 THE ROARING FORTIES
It is not unlikely that Webster, when inject
ing the discussion of impressment into the cor
respondence with Ashburton, was conscious of
the influence it might have as a set-off against
the attacks of the anti-slavery agitators upon
the United States. In America, at least, forced
service in the navy was regarded as not much
different in principle from forced service in the
cotton-field. So long as the British Govern
ment insisted on the right to drag freemen away
into such servitude, its interest in mitigating
the woes of the African slave savored of hypoc
risy. The utility, if not the validity, of this
kind of reasoning was rendered obvious by an
incident that threatened serious consequences
just at the time of the Webster-Ashburton ne
gotiations. In November, 1841, the brig Creole was
bound from Hampton Roads to New Orleans
with a few passengers and 135 slaves on board.
On the way the slaves rose in revolt, slew one
of the passengers, wounded many of the crew,
and took the vessel into the British port of
Nassau, in the Bahamas, where the local au
thorities, after arresting those of the slaves who
were implicated in the mutiny, forcibly took the
rest from the ship and set them free. This

THE ROARING FORTIES 119
action caused intense exasperation in the United
States, especially in the South," The feeling
was not softened by the fact that Northern
abolitionists rapturously applauded the free
ing of the slaves. The case was indeed only
the culmination of a series in which, since the
emancipation of the blacks in the West Indies,
the Bahama officials had rigorously applied the
principle of English law that a slave on enter
ing the jurisdiction of Great Britain became
ipso facto free. Webster felt obliged to inject
this matter also into the correspondence with
Lord Ashburton, contending that under the
law of nations jurisdiction over a foreign ship
brought into a port against its will did not
extend to the divesting of property rights on
board, and that on the general principles of
international comity rigorous procedure under
such circumstances as those that brought the
Creole into port was barbarous, and destructive
to all hope of amicable relations. Here again
Ashburton disclaimed authority to go at large
into the question, but engaged that the govern
ors of the British colonies near the slave States
should be cautioned against "officious interfer
ence with American vessels driven by accident
or by violence into those ports."

120 THE ROARING FORTIES
The pacific adjustment of the boundary on
the northeastern border of the United States
was the most decisive and satisfactory feature
of the treaty. There had been high hopes in
British governmental circles that all the old
questions at issue between the two nations
would be set at rest. Not only did these hopes
fail, but almost before the ink was dry on the
treaty the unsettled issues took on a threaten
ing aspect. American aspirations were directed
with new earnestness to territorial expansion
on the Gulf of Mexico and on the Pacific
Ocean. British interests were supposed to re
quire that such expansion should be thwarted.
Out of this situation arose serious ill feeling,
both governmental and popular, in relation to
Texas, Oregon, and California.
Texas was in 1842 an independent repubhc,
recognized as such by the leading powers of the
world, though not by Mexico, British interests
in Mexico were very large, chiefly through the
extensive holdings of Mexican bonds in Great
Britain. Texas freed herself from Mexican rule
in the later thirties, largely through the aid
given by immigrants and adventurers from the
United States. The British Government at first
used its influence to bring about the reunion

THE ROARING FORTIES 121
of the revolted state to Mexico, In 1839, how
ever, the policy was changed, and systematic
pressure was brought to bear to induce Mexico
to recognize the independence of Texas. Palm
erston, then at the British Foreign Office, was
convinced that the Texans were too strong to
be reconquered, and that further efforts in that
direction would only bring the Americans in
overwhelming numbers to the aid of Texas, with
annexation to the United States as the inev
itable result. For Mexican welfare it was im
portant, he argued, that there should be a
strong buffer state to hold the ever-aggres
sive Americans in check. For British interests
a great cotton-growing community, competing
with the United States, promised signal advan
tages in commerce and industry. This reason
ing failed to win Mexico, and Great Britain,
abandoning the hope of harmony with the
Mexican Government, conceded the long-with
held recognition of Texan independence.
The treaties that embodied this recognition
were ratified only in the middle of 1842, One
of them was directed to the suppression of the
slave-trade through the reciprocal grant of the
right of search. The first diplomatic represent
ative sent by Great Britain to Texas was an

122 THE ROARING FORTIES
ardent abolitionist, who began unofficial ef
forts to bring about the emancipation of the
slaves in Texas through money loaned by Great
Britain. Thus there entered into the situation
an influence that was destined to have most
important consequences. In the course of 1843
Lord Aberdeen committed his government def
initely to the policy of promoting abolition
in Texas. Reports of this proceeding, however
inaccurate and distorted, produced an imme
diate commotion in the United States. That
Great Britain should be taking any active in
terest whatever in Texan affairs, was regarded
all over the land as disquieting; that she should
be seeking to abolitionize Texas, was regarded by
the slave States as a malicious attack on their
welfare. The long-dormant project of annexa
tion was taken up and pressed with energy as
the only sure way of counteracting the insidious
activity of the British, Not that Aberdeen's
policy was the sole basis of the new agitation;
but it played an important part in the affair
and revealed again the peculiar sensitiveness of
the Americans in relation to Great Britain.
Advances to Texas in respect to annexation
were made by the United States in the autumn
of 1843, and a treaty was concluded in April of

THE ROARING FORTIES 123
1844. Two months later the treaty, after a
fierce struggle, was rejected by the American
Senate. During this whole period the British
Government, as is known perfectly now but was
only a matter of strong suspicion at the time,
labored earnestly to thwart annexation, Aber
deen sought the support of France and proposed
to Mexico that, if she would recognize the inde
pendence of Texas, Great Britain and France
should jointly guarantee the boundaries of both
Mexico and Texas against the United States.
This drastic project was eventually dropped
because France declined to face a war with the
United States, and because the British and
French ministers at Washington agreed in re
porting that the immediate result, if the plan
should become known, would be the carrying
out of annexation at all hazards by the United
States, In the presidential campaign of 1844
a demand for annexation was formally incor
porated into the platform of the Democratic
Party, and that party triumphed in the election,
British "interference" in American affairs was
a conspicuous theme of Democratic denuncia
tion during the heat of the canvass, and the
suspicions, half-truths, and downright fabrica
tions that always play so large a part on such

124 THE ROARING FORTIES
occasions evoked abundant manifestations of
anti-British feeling among the people. Under
the impulse of the Democratic victory President
Tyler pressed upon Congress a plan for the
annexation of Texas by legislative act rather
than by treaty, and the plan was adopted in
the ensuing session and put in operation by
Tyler before the inauguration of the newly
elected President, Polk. The formal consum
mation of the plan was effected by the latter
late in 1845, Aberdeen's efforts to thwart it
did not cease till the decisive step toward enter
ing the Union was definitely taken by Texas
itself. Meanwhile a more open and dangerous con
troversy with the United States had developed
in relation to the interests of the two nations
in the Oregon country. The region concerned
lay between the Pacific Ocean and the Rocky
Mountains and between the parallels of 42°
and 54° 40' north latitude. Under the treaties
of 18 1 8 and 1827, as we have seen, the boundary
in this region was left undetermined, and the
country was left "free and open ... to the
vessels, citizens and subjects of the two Powers."
The object of this provision was to permit the
natural course of settlement to proceed without

THE ROARING FORTIES 125
interference and furnish some indication of a
desirable boundary. British occupation was
carried out by the Hudson's Bay Company,
which established a chain of posts along the i
Columbia River from the ocean to the moun
tains, with other posts to the northward and
the southward. This famous company absorbed
in 1821 its rival, the Northwest Company, of
Montreal, and thereafter possessed a monopoly
of all trade throughout British America to the
west and north of Canada. Of government foij
this vast territory there was none save that fur-f
nished by the agents of the company. As a
commercial enterprise the company was suc
cessful. As a promoter of colonization it was|
worse than useless. Its interest lay obviously |
in maintaining the, jenditions that produced j
the most furs; sett^ments and civilization were
not among such conditions. Hence all the
reports and all the influence of the great com
pany were strongly adverse to any influx of
settlers either overland from the provinces or
by way of the ocean,
American occupation of the Oregon territory
began with the establishment of Astoria as a
fur-trading post at the mouth of the Columbia
just before the War of 181 2. Seized by the

126 THE ROARING FORTIES
British during the war, it was restored in ac
cordance with the terms of peace, but was
ultimately abandoned by the American traders.
During the twenties the fur-trade that centred
in Saint Louis extended its operations on a
large scale beyond the Rocky Mountains, The
South Pass, through which the first transconti
nental railway was destined to cross the moun
tains, was discovered and was made the high
way for a well-organized traffic with the Indians
and trappers in the extreme southeastern part
of the Oregon territory. From the South Pass
access to the head-waters of the Columbia River
was, by the standards of that vast wilderness,
short and easy. Hence communication with
the Hudson's Bay Company's posts soon be
came frequent, and the famous Oregon Trail
entered into history.
Early in the thirties futile schemes for emi
gration to Oregon were essayed by restless and
visionary New Englanders. Somewhat later a
definite impulse to interest in the region was
given by the missionary spirit of the Methodists
and Presbyterians, Parties sent out under the
auspices of these sects in 1834 and succeeding
years crossed the plains and the mountains in
company with the fur-traders who set out in

THE ROARING FORTIES 127
well-organized caravans from Saint Louis every
spring. The purpose of the missionaries was
to Christianize and civilize the Indians, but the
sites selected for the stations were naturally
determined by the requirements of the white
man's life. The valleys of the Columbia and |
its tributaries were found to abound in rich
agricultural lands. The climate was mild and I
the rainfall copious. Reports of the attractive- '
ness of the region circulated through the United
States, together with highly colored descriptions
of the establishments by which the Hudson's
Bay Company was maintaining and consol
idating the British occupation. As a conse
quence demands began to be heard, in Congress
and out, for action by the government for the
encouragement and protection of an American
occupation. Before anything was done, how
ever, emigration from the settled States assumed
large proportions. From 1841 every spring saw ;
a numerous company start from western Mis- j
souri on the long journey to Oregon, which they \
were lucky to reach six months later. Arrived \
in the promised land, they found no semblance
of political organization or authority save where
the British flag waved over the posts of the Hud
son's Bay Company.

128 THE ROARING FORTIES
Resentment at such a condition of affairs
was expressed with steadily increasing volume
throughout the United States, but especially
in the West, and was accompanied by shrill
demands that the American claim to the whole
of the Oregon territory should be effectively
asserted. In the presidential campaign of 1844
the Democrats united this demand with that
for the annexation of Texas. " Fifty-four forty
or fight" was the alliterative slogan that em
bodied the jingoistic feeling as to Oregon. The
Democratic convention recorded in the party
platform its conviction "that our title to the
whole of the territory of Oregon is clear and
unquestionable; that no portion of the same
ought to be ceded to England or any other
power." With all due allowance for the insin
cerities and bluster of campaign declamation,
the election of Polk on such a platform, together
with the popular feeling exhibited during the
canvass, gave strong evidence that the time
was at hand for a definitive settlement of the
long-standing question. The inaugural address
of the new President, in March, 1845, made the
matter perfectly clear. Polk declared it his duty
to "assert and maintain by all constitutional
means the right of the United States to that

THE ROARING FORTIES 129
portion of our territory which lies beyond the
Rocky Mountains." This declaration attracted '
much attention in Great Britain, where it was
regarded as a bellicose claim to the whole i
of Oregon. Sir Robert Peel, the prime min
ister, as well as the leader of the opposition and
other political chieftains, felt called upon to
make public counter-declarations that British
claims to the region would be sustained at all
hazards. While this little flurry of long-range defiance
was in progress, with the embellishments that
the newspapers were able to add, a more sig
nificant element in the general situation showed
itself in the unusually large numbers that as-|
sembled in western Missouri to join the annual 1
trek over the Oregon Trail. The character of 1
these emigrants was as a whole excellent, and
their purpose of making homes for themselves
in the distant territory was guaranteed by the
large numbers of women and children in every
party. To look after the interests of these peo
ple, both on their long progress across the
plains and mountains and in their new homes,
was a most obvious duty of a government that
made any pretensions to efficiency.
Polk's secretary of state, Buchanan, took up

I30 THE ROARING FORTIES
the Oregon question with Pakenham, the Brit
ish minister at Washington, in the summer of
1845. Negotiations as to the northwestern
boundary of the United States had been carried
on at intervals ever since the purchase of the
Louisiana territory in 1803 gave the United
States a definite interest in the region. Diplo
macy had exhausted all the arguments based on
discovery, exploration, treaty, and occupation,
without leaving any possibility that either the
British or the American Government could ex
clude the other entirely from the tract in dis
pute. Division of the territory had been pro
posed by both sides, the Americans offering the
extension of the parallel of forty-nine degrees
from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific, the
British insisting on the Columbia River from
the point at which its northern branch was
intersected by the same parallel. Near the
close of Tyler's administration an offer of arbi
tration by the British was declined. When
Buchanan resumed negotiations in July, 1845,
he again offered forty-nine degrees to the Pacific,
explaining that while President Polk believed
the American claim to the whole region was
valid, he felt precluded by the acts of his prede
cessors from insisting on it without first trying

THE ROARING FORTIES 131
what they had been willing to concede, Pak
enham here made a grave tactical error. With
out consulting his government he rejected the
proposal, in terms so peremptory and ill-advised |
as to give great offence to the President, Polki
promptly revealed a spirit that he had not been
supposed to possess. Against the almost tearful
protests of the timid Buchanan he practically
broke off negotiations by directing the secretaiy
to withdraw his offer and to refrain from all
further consideration of the question until some
definite proposal should be received from Great
Britain, This position the President main
tained unflinchingly despite repeated efforts of
Pakenham to induce a renewal of the offer; for
Lord Aberdeen had disapproved of his course
in rejecting it, and Pakenham was left in a very
uncomfortable position.
In his message to Congress in December, 1845,
Polk confirmed his uncompromising attitude by
revealing the whole situation, claiming that the
conciliatory policy of the United States had been
flouted by Great Britain, and calling upon Con
gress for legislation to sustain the right to all
Oregon, and to protect its citizens who should
settle therein. As against the policy of Great
Britain he propounded two dogmas that must

132 THE ROARING FORTIES
prevail in relation to America: first, that there
must be no interference by European powers
with the independent action of the nations on
this continent; second, that no new colony shall
be established by any European power in North
America. These principles he considered to be
implicit in the celebrated dicta of President
Monroe twenty-two years earlier, which he
cited and reaffirmed. Polk's immediate appli
cation of his principles was, of course, to Texas
and Oregon. If any portion of the people of
this continent should wish to join with the
United States, no European power shall inter
fere to prevent the union; further, "no future
European colony or dominion shall, with our
consent, be planted or established on any part
of the North American continent." As the first
of these expressions referred unmistakably to
Aberdeen's diplomatic activities in Texas, so
the second, through the indefinite extension of
Monroe's doctrine implied in the words I have
italicized, referred no less clearly to Oregon,
This belligerent pronouncement of Polk was
naturally the prelude to a long season of war
like feeling and hostile recrimination on both
sides of the Atlantic, As the treaty of 1827
provided for the termination of the joint occu-

THE ROARING FORTIES 133
pation of Oregon by one year's notice from either
government, Polk asked Congress for authority
to give the necessary notice. After debates
lasting all through the winter, the authority was
given, and Great Britain was duly notified in
April of 1846, Long before this date, however,
a way had been found for the resumption of
diplomatic discussion of the question, Polk
stiffly maintained his old position, but consented
to take the advice of the Senate on any propo
sal that should come from Great Britain. The
offer duly came of the forty-ninth parallel, re
serving to the British Vancouver Island and
the navigation of the Columbia River. On the
advice of the Senate Polk accepted this; the
treaty was signed June 15, 1846, and went into
effect in August. This happy outcome not only
ended a dangerous tension between the two
great English-speaking peoples, but by com
pleting a conventionally fixed boundary from
ocean to ocean, seemed to remove definitively
a prolific source of controversy. Unfortunately
a small fraction of the line at the ocean end
was defined in terms of geography rather than
astronomy, and thus a dispute was prepared
that was destined to carry the history of bound
ary troubles over another quarter of a century.

134 THE ROARING FORTIES
Before a settlement was reached of this rather
insignificant difficulty Alaska had been acquired
by the United States, with additional thousands
of miles of contact with British territory, and
material was provided for controversy that ex
tended well into the twentieth century.
When the Oregon dispute was ended by the
signing of the treaty, the United States was at
war with Mexico, Hostilities had been pre
cipitated by a collision between Mexican and
American troops on territory claimed by both
governments. War had been practically cer
tain ever since the annexation of Texas, and Polk
was on the point of beginning it on other grounds
when the destruction of a small detachment of
American troops gave him an opportunity to
appeal strongly to popular passion. The griev
ances of the United States against Mexico were
neither new nor few, but it was well understood
that they could be satisfactorily adjusted by a
cession of territory, California, extending some
ten degrees of latitude southward from Oregon
on the Pacific coast, was on the point of revolt
from the weak and distant central government
of Mexico, That the Californians were in mor
tal terror of the Yankees was common knowl
edge; that British relations with Mexico were

THE ROARING FORTIES 135
intimate was equally well known. The pre
dilection of Great Britain for coastal territory
all over the globe, especially where adorned
with so attractive a harbor as that of San Fran
cisco, had been exhibited for centuries. Finally,
the British naval squadron on the Pacific coast
displayed from time to time a kind and degree
pf activity that aroused grave suspicions of sin
ister designs. Out of all these elements was
developed a wide-spread belief in the United
States that California was about to fall into the
hands of Great Britain. While the Oregon
issue was acute, this feeling was naturally a
source of much unhappiness. Polk entered the
White House with a firm purpose to settle for
all time the California question by acquiring the
territory, with such an additional tract in the
interior as would neatly round out the bound
ary eastward to Texas, Since Mexico refused
to hsten to any proposition for the purchase of
California, forcible acquisition became an in
dispensable feature of Polk's programme, and
the Mexican War would doubtless have taken
place regardless of all other matters at issue.
What actual ground there was for the fear
that Great Britain was seeking to forestall Amer
ica in California has become known only in re-

136 THE ROARING FORTIES
cent years. The gist of Lord Aberdeen's policy
was, not to acquire California for Great Britain,
but to keep it out of the hands of the United
States by any means short of war. His posi
tion was the same as in relation to Texas,"
The interests of Great Britain required that the
expansion of the American Republic be opposed
by every peaceful influence. Aberdeen would
have guaranteed California to Mexico if France
had been willing to join in the bond. He re
jected overtures from a revolutionary party of
California who suggested a British protectorate,
but accompanied the rejection with a plain inti
mation 'that if a revolt should separate the
province from Mexico, Great Britain would pre
fer to give it protection rather than see that
function undertaken by any other power. After
the annexation of Texas, when war was clearly
impending, he urged Mexico in the most ener
getic terms to avoid war, on the ground that she
would surely lose California also. He even took
into apparently serious consideration schemes
for the creation of a British interest in Califor
nia by large grants of land to British holders of
Mexican bonds. But this was at the time when
the Oregon question was in its acute stage, and
the British cabinet perceived easily enough that

THE ROARING FORTIES 137
any such proceeding would be regarded as hos
tile by the United States, and would indefinitely
postpone the settlement that was so eagerly
desired. To keep open the possibility of Mex
ican aid in case the Oregon dispute led to war,
was a most obvious duty of the British Govern
ment, and accordingly Aberdeen continued to
show interest in California in the winter of
1845-46, After the way to agreement with the
United States became clear, and Mexico at the
same time took the course that made a breach
with that nation certain, California and Mexico
were both left to their fate.
If reason were anything like as large a factor
in human affairs as is often pretended, the fric
tion between Great Britain and the United
States in the forties over Oregon and California,
if not over Texas, would never have developed.
There was nothing of the rational in the spirit
that led the American immigrants to Oregon,
when much more promising opportunities for
welfare in every sense lay open without a jour
ney of two thousand desert miles to reach them.
The acquisition of California was projected be
fore any man faintly suspected its power to
satisfy the hunger for gold, and when its enor
mous area could not reasonably be expected to

138 THE ROARING FORTIES
be adequately peopled for centuries. So far as
suspicion of British designs on the Pacific ter
ritory operated to promote the American policy,
that policy was doubtless rational; for the his
tory of the British Empire gave little assurance
of a dislike for expansion, and strong Britain
would be a less desirable neighbor than weak
Mexico, Yet it would not have been difficult to
ascertain and publish the truth, that neither the
government nor the people of Great Britain in
the forties had any wish or purpose to acquire
any regions contiguous to the United States,
The rather pronounced trend of feeling was in
just the opposite direction, toward the thought
that there was already somewhat more con
tact with the republic than was altogether de
sirable. What did most to increase by two-thirds the
already vast area of the United States was the
aggressive idealism of the American democracy.
In the forties this characteristic was probably
at its maximum. The nation was permeated
with a sense of power and of destiny that tol
erated no suggestion of limit in any direction.
On the cultural side indications of an approach
ing realization of the ideal were scanty; on the
material side every manifestation of bigness

THE ROARING FORTIES 139
was accepted as normal and inevitable. The
addition of 12,000,000 square miles of territory
to their 18,000,000 aroused no misgivings in the
mass of the people, and there were not lacking
those who felt that the whole of Mexico should
properly have been taken over instead of the
northern provinces only. In the very month
in which the treaty of peace was signed (Feb
ruary, 1848), by one of the most astonishing
coincidences that history records, the acquisi
tion of California was justified, in the economic
sense, by the discovery of gold in its mountains.
As against this providential confirmation of
manifest destiny, promptly developed the bitter
strife over slavery in the new territory, with
results so disastrous to the unity of the nation.
Between 1815 and 1840 the population of
the United States increased from 8,000,000 to
17,000,000. While large, this gain was not
astounding, and it certainly gave no basis for
an extension of territory. Overcrowding could
not be considered imminent when the number
of persons per square mile stood at 9,73, As
compared with the United Kingdom the growth
of the United States had effected a significant
change in relations. The War of 1812 was
fought by a people numbering 8,000,000 against

I40 THE ROARING FORTIES
one numbering 19,000,000; a war over Oregon
would have pitted 20,000,000 against less than
27,000,000. What these figures portended as
to the future distribution of the English-speak
ing race, was not difficult to see. With all its
growth, however, whether absolute or relative,
the American people sprawled and straggled
over a territory much too large for its immediate
needs, yet drew from the excess only the in
satiable yearning for more.
In the thick of the unpleasantness over the
Oregon question, it was often proclaimed by
boastful Americans that Great Britain would
not dare to fight a people so numerous as they
had now become. So far as military or naval
considerations were concerned, this was, of
course, ridiculous. In another aspect, however,
the growth of population in America had indeed
raised up a powerful influence against war.
British industry and commerce had become de
pendent in an extraordinary degree for their
prosperity on the United States. As regularly
as the seasons, three-fourths of the great cotton
crop took ship for England from the ports of
the southern States of the Union. Lancashire
in the forties well understood the danger, that
in the sixties became disaster, from the shutting

THE ROARING FORTIES 141
off of the raw material for the cotton-mills.
At the earlier date, moreover, the peril was
greater; for as yet Great Britain was still feed
ing her people from her own crops, and the
people often went hungry. Starvation on a
large scale would have ensued very promptly
if the cotton supply had been stopped in the
early forties.
This was one disturbing result of the growth
of population in the United Kingdom — a result
that had no parallel in the United States,
Where the food supply was redundant and cheap
any interruption of normal economic processes
by war or other disaster produced loss and dis
comfort but not famine. Where, as in England
and Ireland, the food supply was precarious and
dear, any interference with the normal condi
tions brought famine and revolt. In the early
forties recurring distress and agitation among
the working classes gave abundant warning to
the leading statesmen that so grave an economic
disturbance as would be involved in a war with
the United States was not to be risked so long
as any way of escape was open.
The task of handling the delicate issues that
were presented by the international and the
internal problems that have been noticed fell

142 THE ROARING FORTIES
to the lot of the Tory cabinet of Sir Robert
Peel, 1 841-6. As the one set of problems cen
tred in the due recognition of the American
democracy, so the other set involved large con
cessions to the democratic movement in Great
Britain, There was a connection between the
two that, while it did not escape notice in the
reasoned debates, for the most part lurked ob
scurely in the channels of popular feeling.
Peel's government was called upon to deal with
two questions of internal politics that particu
larly appealed to the American interest, . These
were the repeal of the union with Ireland and
the abolition of the Corn Laws.
O'Connell's tremendous agitation for the res
toration of an Irish Parliament such as had
existed before 1800, won sympathy in America
on various grounds other than that unthinking
joy which greeted every situation producing
trouble for the British Government. It seemed
to be the demand of the common people for
relief from oppression by a privileged class; it
seemed to be a demand for self-government as
opposed to foreign rule; it seemed to be a per
fect application of that principle of nationality
that had been so eloquently proclaimed by
Englishmen, both official and unofficial, in sus-

THE ROARING FORTIES 143
taining the claims of the Greeks and the Poles
to independence. There survived, too, in the
United States, the tradition of Grattan's Par
liament, which received the breath of life
through the success of the war that made
America free from Great Britain. Irishmen in
thousands, many of them high in the esteem of
their communities, pervaded the United States,
and preached antipathy to Britain, Repeal
rent, as the funds were called that sustained
O'Connell's cause, flowed in copious streams
from America, The suppression of the agita
tion by main force in 1843 made on more than
Irish hearts the impression that in the govern
ment of Peel the hated forces of aristocratic
tyranny were still clearly in the ascendant.
The different outcome of the popular move
ment against the Corn Laws in England had some
effect in moderating the distrust of Peel, When
he came to power in 1841, every branch of
British industry, mining, manufacturing, and
agricultural, was protected by customs duties.
When he left ofiice five years later, the whole
protective tariff had disappeared, and Great
Britain was committed to freedom of trade.
This great revolution was a direct continuation
of the liberalizing reforms that had been in

144 THE ROARING FORTIES
progress since 1815. The immediate occasion
for the change was the necessity of readjustment
in the budget to get rid of a persistent deficit;
the character of the change was determined,
however, by the intellectual conviction slowly
reached by Peel and his coadjutors that Adam
Smith's economic philosophy was sound. To
get rid of the protection on manufactures was
no hard matter. The manufacturing centres
were the abodes of Whigs and Radicals, and
Peel's Tory followers were not unwilling to see
them ruined. By 1845, through successive re
ductions, most of the old tariff was gone. The
process involved some changes in the agricul
tural items and every step in this direction
caused frantic alarm among the landowning
aristocracy who furnished the bulk of the Tory
party. It was becoming clear that the Corn
Laws were doomed, and it seemed likely that the
Tory leader himself was to be the agent for
executing the decree. The full meaning of this
situation to the aristocracy is to be realized
only when attention is given to the extra-
Parliamentary activities of the Anti-Corn-Law
League, This organization was formed, as has been
stated, in the later thirties, and was made a

THE ROARING FORTIES 145
vital force by Richard Cobden. In 1841 John
Bright became formally associated with Cobden
in their famous partnership of agitation. Under
the leadership of these two men the League
was, in object, in methods, and in organization,
the open and determined foe of the ruling aris
tocracy. Its members were drawn chiefly from
the working classes of the towns; its branches
spread all over the land, on the model of the
associations which O'Connell had made so well
known; its method was that of unceasing ap
peal, in speech and print, to the thought and
the emotions of the people; its object was to
break down, not only the protective system and
its particular provision as to corn, but the whole
controlling influence of the landed aristocracy
in the public affairs of the British nation.
There was no effort to disguise this object.
Cobden's lucid reasoning was pointed with
scorn of the stupidity of the peers and squires
in failing to see that free trade in corn was
for their real interest; Bright's passionate elo
quence went straight to their selfishness, cruelty,
and oppression in fighting to keep up their
rents at the expense of a starving people. A
stupid, selfish, cruel, tyrannical aristocracy, so
the corollary ran, must no longer control the

146 THE ROARING FORTIES
destinies of the nation. The despised common
people must assert themselves and be free.
What Cobden and Bright did not say, though
the harried Tories were not silent about it, was
that the result of free trade would be to substi
tute an industrial and commercial for the old
agricultural aristocracy in dominion over the
nation. From 1842 to 1845 bad harvests, industrial
depression, strikes, wide-spread poverty and dis
tress in England played perfectly the game of
the Anti-Corn-Law League, In the last of these
years came the frightful failure of the potato
crop, making imperative some drastic step to
mitigate the impending famine in Ireland. Peel
knew that if he suspended the corn duties, as
had been done twenty years before in an emer
gency, the League would be able to see to it
that they should never be restored. He was
already convinced that protection was econom
ically and politically wrong. There was noth
ing for him to do but demand of his party
consent to the repeal of the Corn Laws, His
measures for this purpose passed Parliament in
1846, but their passage was the death-knell of
the Tory party. An embittered fraction of the
party, inspired chiefly by the rising Disraeli,

THE ROARING FORTIES 147
seized an early opportunity to desert the cab
inet and effect its downfall.
The overthrow of the Peel government coin
cided in time with the conclusion of the treaty
settling the Oregon dispute. Aberdeen an
nounced the agreement with the United States
to the House of Lords on the same day that his
retirement from office was announced. Though
Cobden and Bright, with their middle-class and
working-class followers, had played so large a
part in the politics that brought about the crisis,
it was not for them to take up the responsibil
ities of government. The Whigs, under Lord
John Russell, assumed the governmental power,
with Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office, and
with little indication that the democracy of En
gland was becoming self-conscious and articulate.
For the first two years of its life the Russell
administration was absorbed in dealing with
the terrible conditions due to the potato blight.
Famine effectually solved the problems of over
population in Ireland, At the same time it
brought confusion into the whole social and
political situation of the United Kingdom,
American interest in British conditions received
a great stimulus from the disaster in Ireland,
Generous sums of money and whole fleets of

148 THE ROARING FORTIES
food-laden ships testified to the impression
made by the pitiable sufferings of the afflicted
people. Then came the great movement of
the stricken Irish to the land of plenty. While
the South and the West watched with all-ab
sorbing interest the gleams of smudgy glory
from the war in Mexico, the eastern ports of
the United States gave attention to the dismal
myriads of half-starved Celts that poured in
from distracted Erin. Economic, social, and
political problems of many kinds promptly ap
peared in connection with the influx of aliens
that assumed vast proportions first in 1847.
The Irish were but the largest element in the
immigration. Germans in large numbers also
fled from the pinch of the potato famine. It
was through the Irish, however, that a new and
most important element was introduced into
the relations among the English-speaking peo
ples. Canada and the other British provinces
in America received no insignificant share of
the immigration, with results that soon made
themselves noticeable. Full half a century was
destined to elapse before the impulse first given
by the famine in Ireland ceased to be easily
distinguishable among the factors determining
Anglo-American relations.

CHAPTER IV
THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION TO
HARMONY
Philosophical historians warn us against
over-emphasis on particular units of time or of
space or of personality. To centre attention on
a single date, a single place, a single individual,
is to distort the truth and misrepresent the
general movements of events. If disregard of
this wise warning may ever be tolerated, a fair
case for a free hand is presented by the year
1848 in the history of the United States and
its relations with Great Britain. Even more
narrowly the month of February in that year
may be assigned to a position of unique signifi
cance. To that month belong, as we have seen,
the definitive acquisition of vast Mexican ter
ritory by the signing of the treaty of peace, and
the discovery of gold in the newly acquired
region. In the same month Louis Philippe was
dethroned by a revolution in France, and a
popular agitation was engendered that swept
over all central and western Europe. Mon-
149

I50 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION ^
archies disappeared. Republics and constitu
tions and bills of rights and new nationalities
became the order of the day. An orgy of liber
alism convulsed the Continent; even the United
Kingdom felt the delirium, and was forced to
deal with the Chartists demanding democracy
and Young Ireland proclaiming itself a nation.
When the tumult, after several feverish years,
subsided, the most conspicuous result of it all
was, oddly enough, the revived Napoleonic Em
pire in France. Less obvious, but not less
influential in the long run on the history of
human progress, was the host of exiles from the
Continent who betook themselves to the lands
of the English-speaking peoples. In particular,
a great body of ardent, high-spirited, but bit
terly disappointed German liberals found refuge
in the American Republic, in whose democratic
institutions they expected to find a full realiza
tion of their cherished ideals. Though there
was naturally much disillusionment when the
actualities were discovered, the new environ
ment did not fail to prove attractive, and these
political exiles were followed by a stream of
Germans rivalling in volume that which was
flowing in full current from Ireland.
In Great Britain the revolutionary tempest

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 151
on the Continent gave occasion for new and
striking manifestations of the species of foreign
pohcy that was already associated with the
name of Lord Palmerston. His Lordship's sym
pathy and support went out to those who felt
themselves to be victims of oppression with
a degree of vehemence and ostentation that
varied directly as the square of their distance
from London. The Italians and the Magyars
received strong encouragement in their efforts
to escape from the Hapsburgs; the French
republicans were tolerated in freeing themselves
from Louis Philippe, but were relegated to the
clutches of Napoleon III with much satisfaction;
the English Chartists and the Irish Repealers
were, of course, summarily suppressed. What
ever the defects or inconsistencies of Palmer
ston's conduct of the Foreign Office, it was
enthusiastically supported by British popular
sentiment. It appealed effectively to the jingo
istic spirit of a generation that had known only
"little wars," It was aggressive, but with a
strongly liberal leaning in the immediate ends
in view; its heaviest demonstrations were di
rected against the Russian Czar and the Aus
trian Emperor, whose sins with respect to their
subjects were aggravated by a presumed hos-

152 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
tility of a specially deadly character to British
interests in the Orient.
The Palmerstonian policy and methods were
most violently antagonized by the Manchester
School, as Cobden, Bright, and their followers
were called. It was the cardinal doctrine of
this school that internal, npt international,
affairs furnished the proper field for govern
mental activity at this particular time; that
the welfare of the people and the due course of
foreign relations would be best promoted by
the readjustment of taxation, expansion of
trade and industry, and abstention from the
waste of war and of armaments in preparation
for war. The two theories as to the policy of
the government came to a decisive issue in the
House of Commons in the famous debate over
Don Pacifico in the middle of 1850. Against
an assault led by. Disraeli, Gladstone, Peel,
and Cobden, Palmerston defended himself in
his most celebrated speech, won a decisive tri
umph in the vote of the House, and thus com
mitted Great Britain to the policy associated
with his name. Only a few months later his
natural bumptiousness, accentuated doubtless
by the sense of his great victory, brought him
into conflict with his chief. Lord John Russell,

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 153
and with Majesty itself, with the result that
Palmerston was summarily dismissed from his
place. Even this severe experience did not
loosen his hold on popular admiration and sym
pathy. The Whigs could not carry on the gov
ernment without him, and fell from power; the
Aberdeen coalition cabinet drifted into the
Crimean War through the force of the Palmer
stonian influence, but failed to develop the
vigor that the situation required. In 1855,
sorely against her own wishes, but responsive
to an overwhelming popular demand, the Queen
summoned Palmerston himself to form a cab
inet. For more than eight of the remaining
ten years of his life he was prime minister, and
British foreign relations were presumed to fol
low the lines associated with his name, though
actually his policy and methods were substan
tially modified in passing through the hands of
the foreign secretaries. Clarendon and Russell.
It was well for the cause of amity that Polk
and Palmerston did not synchronize more pre
cisely in their political ascendancy. A serious
clash between the two would have meant
disaster. The crude and narrow Tennessee
Democrat offered a strange contrast to the
broad culture and long experience of the Brit-

154 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
ish aristocrat, but neither exceeded the other
in strength of conviction that his people had
the right and the duty of asserting itself in
the world without overscrupulous regard for
the rights and interests of other peoples. It
was well again that Palmerston's chosen field
for manifesting British power was the hemi
sphere from which Polk deliberately excluded
himself. If this division of territory had worked
both ways, some friction between the two great
promoters of Anglo-Saxon ideas might have
been avoided. Polk's hemisphere was too thor
oughly permeated with British interests, how
ever, to permit of any American development
without touching them. Though Palmerston's
personal concern about the Americans was of
the slightest, and he preserved to the end the
attitude of his early chief. Canning, in regard
ing the United States as a vexatious intruder
in the field of serious diplomacy, yet his spirit
was active in the subordinates who were on the
ground in America, and trouble was an early
result. The disintegration of Mexico on its northern
frontier and the great southward stride of the
United States along the Gulf of Mexico and the
Pacific Ocean naturally excited the liveliest

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 155
interest in Latin America and the colonial
West Indies, With California a part of the
United States, the long-discussed projects of
easy transit from ocean to ocean across Central
America assumed immediate and pressing im
portance. The discovery of gold and the ensuing
movement of fortune-hunters and settlers in
myriads to the Pacific territory added a prodig
ious practical emphasis. Before this unforeseen
climax appeared, however, both British and
American diplomats had been diligently fishing
in the murky waters of Latin-American politics
for a controlling position in respect to any pos
sible isthmian canal. In the early forties a
British official formally asserted that the terri
tory of the Mosquito Indians included the port
of San Juan de Nicaragua, which would be the
terminus of any canal that should be cut across
Nicaragua, As the Mosquitos were held to
be a kingdom under the protection of Great
Britain, the bearing of the claim on their behalf
was obvious. In 1848 the British officer came
to San Juan with a war-ship, captured the Nica-
raguan garrison, established a British garrison
in possession, and changed the name of the port
to Greytown, Meanwhile a group of islands
off the coast, conveniently situated with refer-

156 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
ence to San Juan and claimed by Honduras,
was also occupied by a British garrison.
In New Granada, at about the same time,
the American charge d'affaires displayed a like
activity, and in 1846, without instructions, con
cluded with the government of that state a
treaty of far-reaching importance. By its pro
visions the government and citizens of the
United States and their property secured free
dom of transit across the Isthmus of Panama
in return for a guarantee by the United States
of the neutrality of the isthmus, and the fur
ther guarantee of the sovereignty and property
of New Granada in the said territory. This
treaty remained pending in the Senate until
after the British movements in Nicaragua in
1848, In June of that year the treaty, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, was duly
ratified. With this favorable position secured in respect
to the Panama route, the Polk administration di
rected its attention to the situation in the region
of the Nicaragua route. A charge d'affaires
was sent to Central America to ascertain the
condition of affairs. He readily obtained from
the Nicaraguan Government, which was highly
indignant at the activities of Great Britain, a

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 157
treaty giving to the United States the exclusive
right to construct a canal or railway through
Nicaragua, in return for the guarantee of her
just limits. Mr, Hise, who negotiated this con
vention, was succeeded shortly afterward by
President Taylor's appointee, Mr, Squier, who
in September, 1849, concluded a treaty with
Honduras by which the island of Tigre, on the
Pacific coast, was ceded to the United States,
This island commanded the western end of the
Nicaraguan route as Greytown commanded the
eastern end. Less than a month after the con
clusion of this treaty, a British force took pos
session of Tigre.
The situation thus created was a decidedly
serious one. If all the successive proceedings
had become public as they occurred, the two
great English-speaking peoples would doubtless
have been at each other's throats in short order.
But communication with Central America was
arduous and slow, and diplomacy was able
to smooth out the wrinkles in the situation
before the public was aware that they existed,
Clayton, the new secretary of state at Wash
ington, was of pacific disposition, and President
Taylor had none of the aggressive propensities
of his predecessor. Nor did Lord Palmerston

158 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
show any tendency to crabbedness, regarding
the whole matter probably as a tedious trifle.
The two governments promptly exchanged as
surances that no occupation or colonization of
Central America was contemplated, and no
exclusive control of a railway or canal across
the isthmus. Clayton, on his side, withheld
from the Senate the draft treaties of Hise and
Squier; Palmerston disavowed the seizure of
Tigre and ordered the garrison to be withdrawn.
In considerable haste, lest new tempests should
issue from the prolific storm-centre on the Carib
bean, the representatives of the two govern
ments at Washington then concluded the famous
but ill-fated treaty of Clayton and Bulwer,
signed April 19, 1850, and proclaimed in effect
July 5th,
The purpose of this convention, as defined
by its own provisions, was to promote the con
struction and maintenance of an interoceanic
canal by the Nicaragua route "for the benefit
of mankind, on equal terms to all," The two
governments engaged never to obtain any ex
clusive control over such a canal, never to erect
fortifications or establish colonies in its vicinity,
never to use any relation of protection, alliance,
or intimacy with contiguous states for the pur-

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 159
pose of obtaining special privileges in the use of
the canal. The two powers further undertook
a joint guarantee of the neutrality of the canal,
and of its protection from interruption, seizure,
or unjust confiscation.
The amicable and benevolent spirit supposed
to be embodied in this treaty soon proved to
be illusory. Approval of its provisions in the
United States had been based in no small de
gree upon the impression that Great Britain
was bound by it to abandon all her pretensions
to a political foothold in Central America,
Article I declared that neither party would ever
"colonize or assume or exercise any dominion
over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito
coast or any part of Central America," or make
use of any protectorate or alliance for the pur
pose of colonizing or exercising dominion over
those same carefully specified regions. Under
what appeared to be the obvious intent of this
article, the withdrawal of the British from the
Mosquito coast was awaited with impatience
in America, but no indication of approaching
withdrawal appeared. On the contrary, the
islands off the coast were in 1851 formally or
ganized as a crown colony of Great Britain,
thus giving permanence and solidity to an oc-

i6o THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
cupation which had hitherto seemed tentative.
Eventually it came to public knowledge, what
the foreign offices had known only too well,
that the British interpretation of the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty involved no obligation whatever
to withdraw from Central America. The two
governments were, in fact, seriously at logger
heads as to the meaning of the vaunted agree
ment. The British position was this. Just prior
to ratifying the treaty Sir Henry Bulwer, the
negotiator, made the formal declaration that
the British Government did not understand
that the provisions applied to her Majesty's
settlement at Honduras or to its dependencies,
Clayton declared in reply that he also under
stood that Article I did not apply to "the Brit
ish settlement in Honduras (commonly called
British Honduras, as distinct frorii the State of
Honduras), nor the small islands in the neigh
borhood of that settlement which may be known
as its dependencies." The guarded expression
of Clayton indicates the gist of the controversy
that developed. Great Britain claimed a bound
ary for British Honduras, or Belize, as it was
commonly called, that was denied by the Cen
tral American states; she claimed further that

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION i6i
the islands which had been made a colony were
dependencies of Belize; and she claimed finally
that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty required her,
not to relinquish her protectorate over the
Mosquitos, but merely to abstain from using
this protectorate for the purpose of control
ling the canal or of establishing colonies or
dominion in Central America. Any such pur
pose she categorically disclaimed. She early
manifested a readiness, moreover, to withdraw
from occupation of territory held in the name of
the King of the Mosquitos as soon as it should
appear that this humble potentate and his sub
jects were assured of proper respect by their
neighbors. The American contention, as fully developed,
was based upon not only the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty, but also the Monroe Doctrine. It de
nied the validity of any claim of sovereignty
by the Mosquitos, who, as a savage, degraded,
and insignificant tribe of Indians, could be
recognized by the public law of civilized na
tions as enjoying only a qualified right of occu
pation in the territory over which they roamed.
A "treaty" with such a tribe could not be re
garded as vesting political authority in a great
power like Great Britain, The alleged "pro-

1 62 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
tectorate" was, therefore, the diplomatic equiv
alent of a fraud. As to Belize, history revealed
that British rights there were limited to certain
privileges of cutting mahogany and dye-woods,
and included no political authority. This dis
posed of the claim to power over the adja
cent islands as dependencies of British Hon
duras. The act of Great Britain in erecting
these islands into a colony was therefore repug
nant to the announcement of President Monroe,
often since formally reiterated, that the United
States could not recognize the American con
tinents as open to colonization by European
powers. Controversy on the lines of these widely
divergent views was active in diplomacy and
in popular debate for many years. Greytown,
or San Juan de Nicaragua, assumed much
importance as a station on the route of the
thousands who were seeking California. Amer
icans in this adventurous host often took pains
to show their disrespect for the officials who
were exercising de facto authority there, and
incidents occurred from time to time that
caused popular indignation to flame high on
both sides of the Atlantic. The troubles culmi
nated in the bombardment and destruction of

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 163
Greytown by an American war-ship, as a pun
ishment for violence by the townsmen to the
American minister to Nicaragua.
James Buchanan went as minister to London
in 1853 with the special mission of bringing the
serious situation to a settlement. Under the
pacific ministry of Lord Aberdeen it was not
hard to reach the general outline of an adjust
ment. Great Britain was ready to relinquish
the Mosquito protectorate and the Bay Island
colony as soon as it could be done with grace
and dignity. The peculiar politics of Nicara
gua, with the extraordinary exploits of Walker's
filibusters, interposed serious obstacles to this
happy outcome, and the Crimean War raised up
untimely diversion of the British Government's
attention. Palmerston's accession to power in
1855 brought a noticeable stiffening up of the
British attitude. In consequence Buchanan re
turned to America in the following year with
out his mission attained. As President of the
United States, however, he was able to an
nounce in his annual message of i860 a final
settlement of the subject in a manner entirely
satisfactory to the United States,
The settlement in which Buchanan found rea
son for solid comfort was embodied in treaties

i64 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
concluded by Great Britain in 1859 and i860
with Honduras and Nicaragua respectively. In
these conventions all claim to a British pro
tectorate over the Mosquito territory was relin
quished and the sovereignty over that territory
within their respective frontiers was recognized
to the Central American states. The Bay
Islands were recognized as an integral part of
the republic of Honduras, In this adjustment
the contention of the United States as to the
effect of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was sus
tained in full. British Honduras was, indeed,
left to the dominion of Great Britain; but this
was in accordance with the view adopted by
the Americans that the territory was outside
of Central America, and therefore was not af
fected by the provisions of the treaty. So
far as concerned control over the expected
canal through Nicaragua, neither the United
States nor Great Britain had a privileged posi
tion in Central America. The great work
might, therefore, be expected to be brought to
completion promptly for the benefit of man
kind. Unhappily, by the time when the way
became clear, all hope of progress in the actual
construction of the canal had been relegated to
an indefinitely distant future. Capital proved

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 165
less enthusiastic than diplomacy over the pros
pects of transisthmian communication; but,
however slowly the realization of the great
dream approached, and with whatever of wile
and guile in the lobbies of legislation in Nica
ragua and at Washington the realization must
be promoted, the work of Clayton and Bulwer
stood a majestic monument of a union of the
two great English-speaking peoples for the ac
complishment and protection of a great public
work that should be "for the benefit of man
kind, on equal terms to all."
While the tension over the Central American
affairs was acute, its effect was aggravated by
various other subjects of suspicion and of con
troversy between the two governments. The
craving for expansion of territory continued to
manifest itself in the United States and to take
a form determined more or less by the sectional
cleavage of the nation on the slavery question.
There was a steady pressure from the southern
States for the extension of influence and pos
sessions in Latin America, Popular sympa
thy for the filibustering expeditions of Lopez
against Cuba, and Walker in Central America,
was strong enough to paralyze the efforts of the
Washington government to prevent them. But

l66 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
the suggestion of a readiness on the part of
Great Britain, in conjunction with her good
ally Napoleon III, to undertake a guarantee of
the threatened regions against the filibusters
was peremptorily repelled by the United States,
This much of interest in the subject by Great
Britain only confirmed, however, the appre
hensions of the extreme pro-slavery partisans
in the South, to whom the avowed abolitionism
of the British was an ever-present terror.
Internal party politics in the middle fifties
contributed singularly to confirm the Amer
ican manifestations of anti-British feeling.
After 1852 the Democratic Party controlled
the government. The strength of this party
consisted largely of the slaveholders of the South
and the masses of Irish immigrants in the
North. Enmity toward all things British was
a dominant passion in both these classes. That
the administrations of Pierce and Buchanan
should, under the circumstances, have pre
served amity with Great Britain, is a tribute to
the diplomatic correctness of statesmen whose
reputations have been dimmed by the malev
olence of later political events.
What was probably the most serious situation
during the period we are discussing was pro-

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 167
duced by the Crimean War. The causes and
issues of that strange conflict, grasped only
with much difficulty by the experts in Europe,
were quite unintelligible in the United States.
Sufficient for general popular feeling was the
fact that Great Britain was a party to the war,
in which case the other party must be right.
Such at least was the reasoning of an influen
tial element of American society. It was ill-
judged by the British Government that the
time should have been selected for the project
of raising a foreign legion in America to serve
in the Crimea. The enlistment of troops for
military service against a friendly power was,
of course, prohibited by the laws of the United
States. Success in the enforcement of the laws
had not been especially marked in the case of
the filibusters. Whether this fact was taken
into account by the British, need not be de
bated. At all events, a systematic procedure
was instituted through which a large number
of men were forwarded from the United States
to Halifax, to be there regularly incorporated
into the British army. The procedure was
directed by her Majesty's minister at Wash
ington, Mr. Crampton, and the consuls in sev
eral important cities. The enemies of England

i68 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
did not fail to inform the Washington govern
ment as to what was going on. Protests were
at once made diplomatically at London, and
their result was seen in an order from the Brit
ish Government forbidding the further execu
tion of the scheme. It was asserted by Lord
Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, that no vio
lation of the American laws had been contem
plated or committed, and an interpretation of
these laws was presented under which all that
had been done was legal. Mr. Marcy, the
Secretary of State, declined to adopt this inter
pretation and demanded the recall of Crampton.
Upon the refusal of this demand, Crampton was
notified that the President would have no fur
ther intercourse with him, and the notification
was accompanied with his passport. At the
same time. May, 1856, the exequaturs of three
British consuls were revoked.
The dismissal of a minister is likely to be
more thrilling in popular than in official circles.
The whole progress of the affair was attended
by violent declamation in the beUicose contin
gent of the press in both England and America.
British excitement was enhanced by the simul
taneous reports, persistently reiterated, that a
ship under construction at New York was to

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 169
be a Russian privateer. Later the ministry
thought wise to reinforce the naval force at the
Bermudas, and this further nourished the pre
vailing war spirit. There was a good deal of
sentiment in England that the rather unsatis
factory meed of military glory acquired in the
now finished Crimean War should at once be
supplemented in a contest with the aggressive
Americans. No such feeling made any headway,
however, in the cabinet. Crampton's dismissal
was accepted as within the rights of the Amer
ican Government. But he was knighted and
promoted. A new minister. Lord Napier, was
soon sent to replace him at Washington, and
to Napier's lot fell the duty of confirming a
satisfactory adjustment of all the outstanding
controversies between the two governments.
The war with Russia furnished the first sit
uation since 181 5 that might raise anew the
question of the right to impress sailors into
the British navy from American merchant ves
sels. There was some speculation as to the
possibility of a revival of the practice, and some
bristling discourse in the jingoistic American
press as to the dire consequences that would
follow. The generation that had elapsed since
the Napoleonic wars had brought changes.

I70 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
however, which, without reference to the feeling
pf the Americans, rendered the idea of resort
to the old method of recruiting by the British
Government ridiculous. Nor did the power of
Russia, as compared with that of her allied foes,
suggest that Great Britain would be driven to
desperate devices. Yet the British Govern
ment had never formally abandoned her claim
to the right of search and impressment, and the
memories and traditions of the way in which
the right had been exercised in the old days
undoubtedly sharpened the resentment in Amer
ica at the operations for the enlistment of re
cruits for the army.
The time was now at hand for the termina
tion of the long diplomatic difference between
the two nations on the matter of the right of
search. Complaints about the detention and
search of American ships by British cruisers
led to a renewed discussion of the procedure
for the suppression of the slave-trade. This
was in 1858, when the American interests were
in the hands of President Buchanan and Sec
retary of State Cass, both men of long and
intimate acquaintance with the diplomacy of
this question. We have seen that the British
contention in the matter had been reduced to

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 171
the claim of a right of visitation, as distinct
from the right of search, and that the American
view denied the validity of any such distinction.
Cass presented the American view in an elabo
rate note to Lord Napier on April 10, 1858, deny
ing the " right of the cruisers of any other power
whatever, for any purpose whatever, to enter
their [United States] vessels by force in time of
peace." Lord Malmesbury, Foreign Secretary
in the cabinet of the Earl of Derby, which
interrupted the domination of Palmerston from
February, 1858, to June, 1859, declared in a
despatch to Napier that Great Britain recog
nized as sound "those principles of international
law which have been laid down by General
Cass in his note of the loth of April." This
formal abandonment of the claim that had made
so much trouble between the two countries was
publicly avowed by Lord Malmesbury soon
afterward, who said: "We frankly confessed
that we have no legal claim to the right of visit
and of search which has hitherto been assumed."
So full and frank a confession of persistent error
afforded ample ground for the gratification felt
and proclaimed by President Buchanan. There
was involved in the British 'action no relaxation
of vigor in the suppression of the slave-trade,

172 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
no abandonment of the claim to the indefeasible
allegiance of the subjects of the crown or of the
right to force those subjects into the service of
the navy. All that resulted from the new atti
tude of the British Government was the addi
tion of that government's powerful support to
the movement toward the freedom of the seas.
So soon as the visitation of a vessel bearing the
American flag ceased to be claimed as a right
by Great Britain, the last great obstacle was
removed that barred the most efficient co-opera
tion for the suppression of the slave-trade.
Within a few years the United States came to
an agreement with Great Britain authorizing the
cruisers of either nation to search a suspected
slaver bearing the colors of the other. This
arrangement had been diligently sought by the
British Government for years, but the United
States had held off so long as that was claimed
as a right which they were willing to concede
only as a conventional impairment of a right.
While the Central American situation and
the other matters noticed above were dragging
their troubled way to a settlement and engag
ing the chief interest of the two greater peoples
of the English-speaking trio, the third member
of the group passed through a series of inter-

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 173
esting and somewhat critical experiences in
both domestic and foreign affairs. The insur
rectionary movements in Canada in the late
thirties were followed, as we have seen, by the
establishment of a new constitution in 1841,
under which the two provinces were united
into one. Party strife continued in the new
system to centre about the same question that
had been the core of controversy in the old,
namely, how far the governor-general and his
ministers should be subject to popular control.
The problem was difficult. The administra
tion of the colony must be subject to the con
trol of the home ministry; how could it be
subject at the same time to the direction of
the majority in the legislative assembly? How
could the connection with the British Empire
be secure if Canadian policy must be deter
mined by a majority that might follow a Papi
neau or a Mackenzie? So long as the Tory
cabinet of Sir Robert Peel held sway at West
minster, with Lord Stanley at the Colonial
Office, the old system continued to prevail in
Canada. The popular opposition grew steadily
stronger and more demonstrative as the fear
of renewed violence wore away. The Whig
cabinet that succeeded Peel in 1846 sent as

174 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
governor-general to Canada the Earl of Elgin,
son-in-law of Lord Durham, Elgin at once
committed himself fully to the principle of min
isterial responsibility. The first election after
his accession to power resulted in a sweeping
victory for the Reform or Liberal Party, and
to the leader of this party's majority in the
legislature Elgin intrusted the formation of a
ministry. In this action the advance of de
mocracy in Canada was definitely recognized,
whatever the effect might be on the connection
with the mother country. Within a few years
responsible ministries were conducting the af
fairs of the other North American provinces also,
without visible peril to the unity of the empire.
Lord Elgin's practical solution of the chief
constitutional issue did not bring political calm
in Canada. On the contrary, he had to deal
with a particularly bitter revival of the race
conflict that was latent in the party alignment.
The strength of the Tories was in the English
population of Upper Canada, while the Liberals
had their largest membership among the French
of the lower province. With the accession of
the Liberals to power the long domination of the
United Empire Loyalists ended, and the loss
of place and privilege in the administration was

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 175
attended by the ill feeling natural under the
circumstances. Fear of approaching French as
cendancy was widely proclaimed, and in a less
degree actually felt. The disquiet was aggra
vated by one of the early acts of the Liberal
legislature. This was a law giving compensa
tion to loyal subjects in Lower Canada whose
property had been destroyed in the military
operations against the rebels in the late insur
rection. A similar measure applying to Upper
Canada had been passed by the Tories before
their fall; their view in reference to the lower
province was, however, that disaffection had
been practically universal, and that compensa
tion for losses would, therefore, be a premium
on rebellion. The Liberals pushed their bill
through in spite of the bitterest hostility, and
Lord Elgin, with the assent of the home gov
ernment, gave it his approval. One immediate
result was that his Lordship was stoned by a
mob, and the Parliament House was burned to
the ground.
This riotous outbreak occurred in April,
1849, at Montreal. Other causes co-operated
with the compensation bill to inflame the pop
ular wrath. All Canada was suffering from a
serious industrial depression. Montreal was

176 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
the chief centre of business and the largest city
of the colony. The distress among the people
was peculiarly severe at this centre, and the ma
terial for a riotous assemblage was peculiarly
plentiful. Montreal was, moreover, the chief
seat of the English Interest in Lower Canada,
and the place in which the fear of French
ascendancy was keenest. In 1849 a consider
able group of influential men at Montreal
were indicating a willingness to go even so far
as separation from the British connection if
that should prove the only means of escape from
the evils that threatened or actually beset them.
To understand the source of this extreme coun
sel it Is necessary to look at the larger aspects
of the free-trade reform and of Manchesterism
in general so far as it affected the English-speak
ing world.
The protective system that Peel destroyed
in 1846 was based primarily upon the purpose
of benefit to the people of Great Britain, but
it by no means disregarded the interests of
the British subjects who lived in the colonies.
Both customs and navigation laws included
many and Intricate provisions designed to give
to the colonists advantages over all the world
save the favored producers and merchants of

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 177
the mother country, Canada, owing to its
proximity to the United States and the identity
of Its chief products with those of the republic,
required and possessed special preferences In
the British tariff in order to maintain any sat
isfactory position in the competition with her
more advanced and more populous neighbor.
In 1843 the Peel government passed an act
designed to aid agriculture In Canada, by giving
to Canadian wheat and flour a much-reduced
duty in Great Britain. The provisions of this
act applied to all flour exported from Canada,
regardless of the origin of the wheat. The
effect of the law was soon manifest In a great
development of the milling Industry In the col
ony, with corresponding activity in commerce,
American wheat was imported all along the
border, turned into flour, and shipped from
Montreal and Quebec to England, where the
tariff barred direct importation from the United
States, The prosperity that followed the Canada Corn
Act had just become generally manifest when
In 1846 protection was abandoned and the ports
of Great Britain were thrown open to wheat
and flour from all the world. Every advantage
enjoyed by colonial produce in the British mar-

178 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
ket was swept away by free trade. The result
in Canada was the prompt collapse of the in
dustries that had been built up by the act of
1843. The short season of exaggerated pros
perity was succeeded by a period of depression
and distress. Angry protests arose from the
capitalists and mercantile classes that they had
been ill treated by the home government. The
working class mobbed the governor, as we have
seen. In the destruction of their business the
Canadian Tories, who included the leading mer
chants of Montreal, found an aggravation of the
disregard for their feelings and Interests that
was manifested in the "compensation for rebel
lion." Expressions of discontent began to take
on extreme form in the press and in the legis
lature. The cure for the existing and threat
ened evils that was most often proposed was
annexation to the United States,
During the year 1849 an agitation for annexa
tion assumed proportions that attracted serious
attention. A manifesto issued at Montreal In
October, and signed by a large number of the
most substantial citizens, set forth the misfor
tunes and distress of Canada in temperate but
convincing terms, and argued that of all the
remedies suggested the only one that promised

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 179
results was "a friendly and peaceful separation
from British connection, and a union upon eq
uitable terms with the great North American
confederacy of sovereign states." The revival
of protection In the United Kingdom could not
be depended on; a system of protection for
Canada might create manufactures but would
furnish no market for them; the same failure
would attend the suggested federation of the
American colonies or their independence. Un
restricted commercial Intercourse with the great
population to the southward was indispensable
to the economic welfare of Canada, and this
could be secured only by Incorporation into the
Union. Political advantages also would flow
freely from such a connection. With malicious
allusion to the late tension about Oregon and
the rising dispute over Central America, the
manifesto continued:
Disagreement between the United States and her chief,
if not only, rival among nations would make the soil
of Canada the sanguinary arena for their disputes. . , ,
That such is the unenviable condition of our state of de
pendence upon Great Britain is known to the whole world;
and how far it may conduce to keep prudent capitalists
from making investments in the country, or wealthy set
tlers from selecting a foredoomed battlefield for the home
of themselves and children, it needs no reasoning on our
part to elucidate.

i8o THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
There was added a comparison of the depend
ence and subordination of the Canadians In the
existing conditions with the proud equality they
would enjoy as citizens of the United States.
The honors and emoluments of the British Em
pire were denied them as colonials, while all the
distinctions of the American Republic would be
within their reach.
The movement of which this document was
the pronunciamento was In Canada to a great
extent an episode of provincial party politics.
Support for It was drawn almost entirely from
two sources, the Tories and the ultra-demo
cratic element of the French Liberals. Such an
alliance had no possibility of permanence or of
effectiveness. What the one party had most
at heart in the proposed union with the United
States was wholly abhorrent to the other. The
inner repugnance of the two elements was kept
in abeyance at first, and for some months agita
tion through associations and public meetings
was active and to the government disquieting.
Though the annexationists Invariably declared
that the peaceful consent of Great Britain was
an absolute prerequisite to the realization of
their purpose. Lord Elgin, on the advice of his
ministry, took pains to discourage the agita-

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION i8l
tion, and excluded from the public service those
who identified themselves with the movement.
This was a severe blow to the Tory element of
the discontented. The French element received
a like setback through the strong and open con
demnation of the agitation by the Catholic
clergy. Good harvests and a revival of business
served to alleviate the economic situation, and
after some small successes In the elections in
1850 the organization and activity of the an
nexationists faded gradually away.
In neither Great Britain nor the United States
did the movement in Canada attract much
attention. Home politics in the great republic
were just at the time in a state that left little
room for public concern with matters beyond
the border. Territorial extension had raised Is
sues as to slavery that were threatening dis
ruption of the Union. Under the circumstances
a proposal of further extension could hardly be
expected to enlist much enthusiasm. In some
of the States contiguous to Canada the legis
latures passed resolutions approving the idea
of reuniting the long-severed members of the
English-speaking race in North America. At
Washington, however, there was no manifesta
tion of feehng by either legislature or executive.

1 82 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
Indifference or positive hostility was indeed the
attitude assumed toward even the projects of
commercial reciprocity that were being urged
upon the attention of the government by repre
sentatives of Canada.
At Westminster and in England at large the
growth of the movement for annexation was
followed naturally with rather closer interest.
There was ample basis for the assertion of the
Canadian agitators that their proposed remedy
for colonial Ills had Its origin In Great Britain.
Ultimate separation had long since been de
clared by distinguished Britons to be a natural
incident of development in the colonies so soon
as the union with the mother-land should become
burdensome. On this principle, it was argued,
the British Government's concern In the matter
was limited to the question of separation. As
suming that the reasons for separation were
sufficient, the determination as to what shall
follow Independence must be left to the colonists
themselves. Annexation proper, therefore, was
no matter for discussion with Great Britain.
During the process of transition from protec
tion to free trade the debates of British politics
had furnished an Impressive addition to the
list of great names sustaining the idea of even-

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 183
tual Independence for the colonies. All shades
of party opinion contributed to the list. Pro
tectionist Tories believed that the burden of
sustaining the colonies would be intolerable
now that the policy of exploiting them for the
benefit of the mother-land was given up. The
Peelites and conservative Whigs contended that
free trade would prove the economic salvation
of both colonies and mother-land, and would
thus strengthen the bond uniting them, but ad
mitted that if for any reason the Interests of
either clearly should demand separation, there
would be no valid ground for opposing It. Rad
icals proclaimed the democratic dogma of the
people's will and held that Independence was
the right of the colonists whenever and for what
ever reason they demanded it. Disraeli, Peel,
Gladstone, and Lord John Russell all put on
record their conviction that British policy must
be shaped in contemplation of the gradual dis
solution of the empire. Cobden was, of course,
the high priest of this creed; but Cobden never
held the reins of governmental authority. His
luminous expositions of the creed lacked the
immediate practical effect of such words as those
of Lord John Russell, prime minister. In 1850.
Concluding his speech In the Commons in which

i84 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
he denounced the annexationists of Canada, he
said: I anticipate indeed with others that some of the col
onies may so grow in population and wealth that they
may say: "Our strength is silflEicient to enable us to be
independent of England . . . the time is come when we
think we can, in amity and alliance with England, main
tain our independence." I do not think that that time
is yet approaching. But let us make them as far as pos
sible fit to govern themselves — let us give them, as far
as we can, the capacity of ruling their own affairs — let
them increase in wealth and population; and, whatever
may happen, we of this great empire shall have the con
solation of saying that we have contributed to the hap
piness of the world.
This amiable and pacific pronouncement was
not relished by the Canadian authorities. It
involved a concession of the chief principle of
the annexationists and limited controversy with
them to the mere question of the proper time
for putting their project into effect. Lord
Elgin recorded a strong protest against the
prime minister's expressions, as seriously embar
rassing to the colonial government. Russell
undoubtedly voiced, however, the prevailing
political philosophy of his day. The free-trade
movement In Great Britain presented a com
bination of two clearly distinguishable ele
ments, a refined and gentle Idealism and a crude.

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 185
rough materialism. Its intellectual supporters
considered unrestrained action In commerce and
industry as but a further realization of the
liberty that was natural to a rational being; free
trade was a right of man like free speech and
free worship; abolition of the protective tariff
was a step toward the perfection of the indi
vidual and the race. In Cobden's expositions
this philosophy was most skilfully blended with
consideration of the practical needs of the Brit
ish merchants and manufacturers. The latter,
however, were little concerned about abstract
liberty and the progress of the race. Free trade
with them was a matter only of markets. Ex
pansion of commerce, new consumers of com
modities, enlargement of plants to the point of
maximum production and profit — these summed
up the advantages of free trade from the busi
ness man's point of view. To him colonists
were but customers; to the idealists they were
but men, with natural rights. That they were
Englishmen and were determined by that fact
from the beginning of the world to changeless
political union with other Englishmen, was a
conception that had no place in the thought
of either element of the free-traders. The fed
eration of the world and not Imperial feder-

1 86 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
ation was the key-note of British liberalism
In 1850,
Lord John RusseU's peremptory denial of
the claim that the time was ripe for Canadian
Independence was preceded by legislation de
signed to remedy some of the ills that gave rise
to the claliri. In 1849 Parliament swept away
the last remnants of the old restrictive com
mercial system by repealing the famous Nav
igation Laws. The operation of these laws
greatly aggravated the misfortunes that were
brought upon Canada by the abolition of
preferential duties In the mother country. Co
lonial commerce with Great Britain was limited
to British ships, and freight rates were corre
spondingly high, American competition, duly
favored by Congressional legislation, was able
thus to make sad inroads on various branches
of the trade with the home country. Com
plaints from Canada became urgent at West
minster, and there was no room to doubt that
they were well founded. The Whig cabinet,
therefore, resolved to complete the work that
Huskisson had begun twenty years before, and
the carrying trade between the colonies and the
United Kingdom was thrown open to the ships
of all the world.

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 187
The abandonment of the restrictive system
generally by Great Britain left the North Amer
ican colonies, and especially Canada, still In an
uncomfortable plight. Free trade made their
prosperity dependent on the commercial policy
of the United States as fully as protection had
kept it dependent on the policy of the United
Kingdom. From the point of view of pro
duction the northern part of the United States
and the British provinces were a unit; the out
put of their fields and forests was practically
the same. From the point of view of markets
the colonists were at a great disadvantage. In
the United States population was much denser,
and the facilities for transportation were vastly
superior. The Canadians were not yet beyond
the stage of canals, while on the other side of
the border railways had attained a remarka
ble development. What was necessary to the
prosperity of the Canadians was free access to
the markets of the greater neighbor. But the
Americans made no haste to remove the tariff
barrier with which they had met the old policy
of restriction. To the advances of the British
Government looking to reciprocal free trade on
the Canadian frontier they presented the old
familiar question: What have you to offer in

i88 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
return? Fortunately a now long-standing dis
pute over the ancient subject of the fisheries
enabled Westminster to make an answer that,
after years of consideration, was accepted as
sufficient. We have seen that, in 1818 the United States
renounced the liberty of taking fish "within
three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays,
creeks, or harbors" of British America except
certain clearly described portions of the shores
of Newfoundland and Labrador, In the later
thirties complaints began to be heard from
Nova Scotia that the American fishermen were
disregarding this agreement by plying their
trade in the bays of that colony. Legislation
was enacted to punish the intruders and ulti
mately British naval vessels were sent to patrol
the coast. The Americans stoutly denied that
they were intruding, and the seizure of their
fishing-vessels gave rise to prolonged diplo
matic proceedings.
It appeared that certain most valuable species
of fish had, with the disregard of human con
ventions that is so characteristic of the lower
species of animate things, manifested their pres
ence in paying numbers much nearer land than
the standard cod ever ventured. In pursuit of

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 189
the profitable game the Americans were brought
within what the British claimed were "bays,"
and as such were barred to the fishermen. A
"bay," in the sense of the treaty, was, accord
ing to the contention of the British, any ex
panse of water designated by that name, so
that an American fisherman was an intruder
even twenty miles from land, if he was fishing
in water that was called a bay. The Americans
claimed that the term "bay" applied with cer
tain qualifications only to an indentation of the
coast-line of such size and shape that a ship,
when entering It, must pass within three miles
of the land. In Its full development the Brit
ish doctrine held that the "coasts" from which
the Americans were excluded were defined by
a broken line running from headland to head
land, so that there was no right to fish within
three miles of such a line. The American
claim was that British jurisdiction extended no
more than three miles from actual land, and
that the geometrical lines from headland to
headland included often large portions of the
high seas that were free to all.
There was abundant material in this conflict
for endless debate by the experts of the law
of nations. Of most importance to the prae-

I90 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
tical statesman was the simple fact that the
Americans were as deeply Interested to get
admission to the inshore fishing as the Cana
dians were to get free access to the markets
of the United States. The quid pro quo ex
pected by the Washington government was at
hand, and the bargain was formally struck In
the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, concluded by
Lord Elgin and Secretary of State Marcy. By
this agreement the Americans acquired again
the liberty, renounced in 1818, of taking fish
in the bays, harbors, and creeks of the British
provinces (except Newfoundland), without re
striction as to distance from the shore. The
British colonists gained the coveted access to
the American markets through the provision
for the reciprocal admission duty-free of enu
merated commodities that included the prin
cipal products of the soil, the mines, and the for
ests. Reciprocity was further applied through
the admission of the Americans to the naviga
tion of the Saint Lawrence River, and the ad
mission of the Canadians to the navigation of
Lake Michigan.
The effect of this treaty on the relations
between the English-speaking peoples of the
Western world was marked and salutary. Fric-

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 191
tion over the fisheries passed away. Trade
increased by leaps and bounds, British Amer
ica and the United States tended manifestly
toward that economic solidarity which the
geographic conditions seemed to make natural.
In 1854, the last full year before the treaty went
into effect, the total trade between the two
peoples was about $35,000,000; in 1856, the
first full year after the treaty went into effect,
the total trade was $57,000,000. This increase
signified more than a mere enhancement of
mercantile profits. It meant the promotion of
the neighborly spirit and feelings between neigh
bors. It meant that those people who lived
on opposite banks of the Detroit or the Niag
ara River, or on opposite sides of a surveyor's
line, should no longer meet with legal obstacles
to the free intercourse that proximity Invited,
It meant a great multiplication of the social
and financial ties across the frontier that are
sure to be created by Increasing trade. In any
estimate of the Influences that made for friendly
and sympathetic relations among English-speak
ing peoples in i860, the Reciprocity Treaty of
1854 must stand side by side with the diplo
matic adjustments already described concern
ing Central America and the right of search.

192 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
The general International harmony and cor
diality that pervaded the English-speaking world
at the beginning of the sixties was destined to
disappear for more than a decade through the
conditions produced by the Civil War In the
United States. Before considering the unfortu
nate effects of that convulsion, let us note the
salient features of the English-speaking world at
this period, as compared with what the term
had denoted at the date of the Treaty of Ghent,
forty-six years in the past.
In numbers the United Kingdom no longer
stood first. With 10,000,000 more inhabitants
than In 18 14, its 29,000,000 fell short by 2,000,-
000 of the population of the United States,
British North America showed a sixfold Increase
to 3,000,000, of whom all but 500,000 were in
Canada. Among the scattered dependencies
of Britain the vast spaces of Australia were be
ginning to fill up through the thirst for gold,
and some half-million settlers were shaping the
foundations of a new English-speaking com
monwealth. In none of these chief groups, how
ever, was there such uniformity of English
speech as to prophesy complete social and po
litical concord. The brogue of the Irish Celt, the
barbarous dialect of the African slave, and the

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 193
patois of the French habitant suggested grave
problems of statecraft In Great Britain and
America y while Australia at this date was so
little developed as to make the ultimate triumph
of English still problematical.
Economically Great Britain was In i860, as
she had been In 18 14, the leading power of the
world. In both trade and manufactures she
stood easily first. Her mercantile marine and
her navy still surpassed those of any other na
tion. Yet there was no such disparity between
her and the American Republic as was so con
spicuous half a century earlier. In the carry
ing trade of the world the United States was
Britain's nearest rival. In manufactures Brit
ish supremacy was confirmed by the transition
from the domestic to the factory system, which
was practically complete In England in i860.
This supremacy it was not yet in the power of
the sparse population of the United States to
contest. For one branch of textiles, however,
and that a most Important one, namely, cotton
goods, the dependence of England on the Ameri
cans for raw materials was complete, as was fore
seen by the leaders of the American secessionists.
Politically, also, British and American ideas
and conditions were much less remote from

194 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
each other than at the time of the Treaty of
Ghent, Both peoples had been moving to
ward democracy. The Americans found little
to obstruct their swift and steady advance.
The British moved sluggishly on among the
obstacles of century-old institutions and preju
dices, and made certain. If less than rapid,
progress. England could not show In i860, as
the United States could, manhood suffrage, one-
year terms for Important executive officers, or
an elective judiciary. On the other hand, the
Tory aristocracy that had controlled British
policy in 18 14 had passed from power forever.
The Whig nobles were giving way, as a con
trolling political force, to the liberal and radical
elements of their party, hot from Birmingham
and Manchester. Though "the Dukes" contin
ued to figure In the' councils of the party, its
vital energy centred elsewhere, and was nour
ished on projects touching the suffrage, the
church, education, and landlords, that could be
realized only after Palmerston and Russell had
passed from the political stage and left Glad
stone to transform the Whig Into the Liberal
Party. The ideas that were thus approaching
their triumph In Great Britain were Ideas that
America claimed as peculiarly its own. They

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 195
embodied the aspirations of the working classes
and non-conformists In Great Britain and the
great mass of the Irish. These were the classes
best known and best understood in the United
States, Politics that involved their point of
view and their interests was intelligible to the
Americans, while the politics of the aristocracy
was unintelligible and hence repulsive. So far,
therefore, as the character of British problems
changed in the sense described, sympathetic and
cordial relations were strengthened.
At just the period we are treating, moreover,
the effects of the vast migration of English-
speaking people that marked the middle of the
century were fully manifest. In the fifteen years
ending with i860 4,700,000 emigrants" left the
United Kingdom, of whom something like three-
fourths went to the United States, British
America was the announced destination of a mil
lion of them; but the drift of the newcomers
across the boundary from the provinces Into
the United States was continuous and on a large
scale. The number who set out for the United
States direct was 2,900,000.
Of the total from the United Kingdom Ire
land furnished, of course, the very great ma
jority. A million Irishmen emigrated to the

196 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
United States in the years 1847-52, and a quar
ter of a million went to British North Amer
ica, The census of i860 gave the number of
natives of Ireland in the United States as
1,611,304; the number of English-born as 433,-
494; of Scots as 108,518; of Welsh as 45,763,
The Irish made an impression socially and po
litically that was even deeper than their excess
in numbers would warrant. Their animosity
toward the English made it imperative that a
politician who needed their support should dis
play in some form an anti-British feeling. The
performances that were elicited by this require
ment were at times disheartening to those who
hoped for harmony; but the motive became
in time so obvious and the act so perfunctory
that "twisting the British lion's tail" lost all
relation to serious thought. The tales of suffer
ing in the famine and of heartless oppression by
landlords doubtless roused much feeling as they
circulated through America. On the other hand,
the religion and various racial traits of the Irish
tended to excite a hostility to them that coun
teracted much of their anti-British influence.
Among the elements that co-operated to de
termine the relations between the British and

THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION 197
the American branches of the English-speaking
people, contemporary literature was In i860
of well-defined Importance. By that date the
United States had fairly freed itself from the
reproach of utter unproductiveness in this field.
Only the most narrow and hidebound devotees
of expiring English Toryism still failed to find
a readable American book, Irving, Cooper,
and Poe had won distinct. If not wildly enthu
siastic, recognition from the oracles of literary
taste in Britain, Prescott, Motley, and Emer
son were receiving attention. Not a few other
writers were wresting from the cultivated classes
of the United Kingdom the hesitating admis
sion that the American democracy might yet
mean something in the life of the spirit. The
harmonizing influence of this feeling had Its
complement in the impression made by British
writers in America. The stars of the mid-
Victorian galaxy were glowing with merldla.n
splendor in i860. Carlyle, Ruskin, Tennyson,
Browning, Dickens, Thackeray, and George
Eliot — to name but a few — were honored as
intensively, if not as extensively. In the United
States as in England. One of them, Charles
Dickens, had vogue and popularity far above
all the rest in the United States, and this de-

198 THROUGH THREEFOLD TENSION
spite the lively resentment excited by the de
scriptions of Americans and their life in his
American Notes and Martin Chuzzlewit. The
explanation lay in the social stratum in which
he almost exclusively found his inspiration.
The life, aspirations, pleasures, and pains of the
common people furnished all his material. These
things the American masses could understand.
From his stories they received a strong and
lasting Impression of plain people like them
selves in England, living real and understand
able lives down beneath the glorious but misty
region where moved the lords and ladles, and
the magnates of philosophy, art, religion, and
politics, who were commonly the dramatis per-
sonce of other writers of English fiction. When
the Civil War in America brought tension of a
most threatening sort between the two nations,
the bonds of a common literature like this were
of the highest service in averting rupture.

CHAPTER V
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND ITS EFFECTS
Despite repeated and notorious demonstra
tions bf their error. Idealists will doubtless con
tinue in the future to maintain as In the past
that an omelette can be made without break
ing any eggs. Many of the good people who
preached ardent abolitionism In the name of
humanity were equally devoted to the propa
ganda of universal peace. The four years of
desperate war that brought about the extinc
tion of slavery in the United States presented
awkward problems of comparative humanity,
and vexed the spirits of all the English-speaking
people in whom hostility to slavery had be
come strong. Ill feeling toward Great Britain
was manifested In both the contending sections
in America very early in the war. Ill feeling
toward both sections was manifested quite as
early in Great Britain. The balance among
these various emotions at any particular time
depended to a great extent upon the relation
then seeming to exist between slavery and the
objects of the war. 199

200 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
Fighting between South and North began on
the clearly defined Issue of political independ
ence. Seven states, organized in a confederacy,
claimed the rights and authority of a sovereign
power, and expelled by force a body of troops
that refused to recognize that claim. The rea
soning by which the claim was sustained had
as Its basis the familiar democratic dogma that
government Is just only when it rests upon the
will of the governed. There was no room to
doubt, so the Southerners held, that the peo
ple of the seven States willed to be governed by
the authorities of the Confederacy, and not by
the organs of the government at Washington,
Whether the manifestation of this will had
been constitutional or revolutionary, might be
debatable. In either case, however, the result
was unassailable. No power on earth could
justly dispute the authority of that government
which the people of the South had set up.
President Lincoln, when he sought to assert
the power of a government which the people
had repudiated, was but treading In the tyrant
footsteps of George III in 1776.
The logical strength of this Southern argu
ment could not be disputed. Nor could, on the
other hand, the strength of the reasoning by

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 201
which it was controverted on behalf of the
North. The same dogma of popular sovereignty
served the one cause as the other. The will of
the people must prevail. But who were the
people? Since democracy became In the later
middle age a favorite dogma of radical philos
ophy, this question. Who are the people? has
been the source of half the political woes of
mankind. In 1861 Mr, Lincoln and the North
maintained that the people in whom sovereign
power Inhered was the whole body of Inhabit
ants of the United States; that no less aggre
gate possessed any of the attributes of sover
eignty; that this body, expressing Its will
through a constitutional majority, was supreme
as against any Individual or group of individ
uals In the United States; and that refusal to
recognize such supremacy was simply treason.
The corroboration of this doctrine in the last
analysis was to be found in the dogma that
the United States was a nation, and the gov
ernment at Washington was a national govern
ment. To the contemner of nationality and
Its representatives was ascribed something of
the ineffable depravity that characterized him
who sins against the Holy Ghost.
When the beginning of the war in the United

202 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
States obliged the other English-speaking peo
ples to form some definite opinion as to the right
and wrong of the disastrous situation, a judg
ment on the merits of the political and consti
tutional arguments was naturally very difficult.
That a people possessed the right to determine
what its government should be, had been a
dogma of all English political philosophy since
the Whig revolution of 1688, That a nation
was entitled to Independence and self-govern
ment, was, with certain qualifications adapted
to the latitude of Ireland, an accepted maxim
of British policy. But the application of these
principles to the American situation was effec
tually barred by the very unanimity with which
they were accepted by the contending sections.
The South stood for sovereignty of the people
(excluding negroes) and self-government for a
nation, and stigmatized the North as a ruthless
and bloodthirsty foreign invader. The North
stood for sovereignty of the people (also exclud
ing negroes) and self-government for a nation,
and stigmatized the South as a lawless aggre
gate of rebels and traitors. Elaborate reason
ing from history and law was adduced by both
sides in support of their respective contentions;
but this was even less successful abroad than at

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 203
home in producing a consensus of opinion on
the merits of the case. Political and legal
theory was bankrupt in the presence of the
fierce passions that dominated the American
democracy, and recourse was had to other
grounds when foreign judgment and sympathy
were determined.
In Great Britain the South had from the
outset the favor of the leading classes — the
great newspapers and the most eminent men In
politics [and society. This was In some meas
ure due to the almost universal acceptance of
the ancient doctrine that a state of great area
and population, under democratic political in
stitutions, could not long endure. All think
ers of repute, for centuries in the past, had
sustained this view, and it was ingrained in
the Intellectual apparatus of the age. France
since 1789 was held to have confirmed the
dogma. For three-quarters of a century the
United States had thrived in defiance of this
profound truth; but the secession of the South
had at last justified the philosophers. As the
South was but fulfilling the requirements of
Ineluctable fate, she was entitled to the respect
and sympathy of mankind. There was cur
rent at the same time in the upper circles of

204 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
English society a conviction that the democracy
of the South was much less pronounced and
aggressive than that of the North — that the
Southerner was more likely than the North
erner, on the average, to conform to the stand
ards of the "gentleman," both In his social and
his political ideas and actions. Of the two
republics, therefore, into which the United States
was henceforth to be divided, the Southern was
to be the more amenable to British influence.
Moreover, the policy of the South In respect to
commerce was sure to be more In accord with
the liberal views of Great Britain, Free trade
was the manifest preference and the obvious
Interest of the South, while the recent recur
rence of the North to protection, in the Morrill
tariff of 1861, revealed a menace to the pros
perity of British manufactures.
The Achilles heel of the Southern case before
British opinion was slavery. Hostility to this
Institution was immovably fixed in the feelings
of all classes of the people. Among the aris
tocracy. Intellectual and social, there was appre
ciation of the hard problem of the Southern
whites In dealing with the great mass of blacks
on their hands, and there was corresponding
toleration of the institution as a transitory

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 205
solution; but there was no sympathy with the
suggestion of permanent utility in slavery and
of a revival of the African slave-trade, nor was
there any approval of the idea that the main
tenance of slavery was In Itself a sufficient jus
tification of secession by the South. Hence
the unceasing vigilance of the most acute South
ern leaders to avoid all discussion of the slavery
question and to put the case of the South on the
other grounds. This policy received much sup
port from the Northern government itself In
the early days of the war; for out of regard for
sentiment in the non-seceded slave States Pres
ident Lincoln's administration systematically
kept abolitionist doctrine in the background,
and based its appeal for support on the su
premacy of the nation over the State. It is
not at all surprising that foreign governments
adopted at the outset the view that slavery
was involved only incidentally in the quarrels
of the sections.
One powerful element of public opinion in
Great Britain adopted very early the view that
slavery was the real cause of the war and that
it was the duty of good people, therefore, to
give their sympathy to the North, Such was
the conviction reached by Cobden, Bright,

2o6 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
Forster, and Mill, under the Influence of Sum
ner and other extreme antislavery doctrinaires.
This judgment gained no great support in the
higher classes of society, but, through the ear
nestness and eloquence of Bright and Cobden
especially, won a vast body of adherents among
the middle and lower classes, and thus secured
for Charles Francis Adams, the American min
ister, a moral backing for which he was pro
foundly grateful. It was not till after the
formal adoption of the policy of emancipation
by President Lincoln, however, that the maxi
mum influence of this particular element of
British opinion was discernible.
At the outbreak of the war Lord Palmerston
was prime minister, and Earl Russell was
foreign secretary. When in April, 1861, large
armies were called into the field by both the
United States and the Confederacy, privateers
were commissioned by the South, and a blockade
of the Southern ports was proclaimed by Presi
dent Lincoln, it was clearly time for the British
Government to recognize the situation. Com
mercial relations with both sections were vast
and Intricate, and with privateering In full sway
on one side and blockade proclaimed on the
other, trouble tor British merchants and mar-

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 207
iners was plainly In sight. What to do seems
not to have caused any serious anxiety to the
cabinet. The United States had followed the
long-foreseen course of nature and had fallen
in pieces. The pieces were at war with each
other, and it was incumbent on the British
Government to assume promptly the attitude
and the duties of a neutral. Accordingly, on
May 13, the Queen's proclamation of neu
trality was issued. In this the proceedings in
the United States were referred to as hostilities
"between the government of the United States
and certain states styling themselves the Con
federate States of America*" and all subjects of
the Queen were notified that acts in violation
of neutrality would bring heavy penalties upon
the offender. <*
Here began an Iliad of woes for the English-
speaking peoples. By this proclamation the
British Government recognized the Confederacy
as a belligerent, with the rights and responsi
bilities ascribed to a power engaged in inter
national war. To the North, which considered
the Confederates as mere riotous assemblages
of rebels and traitors, the attitude of the Brit
ish Government appeared to be a manifestation
of open hostility. It gave to the Insurgents a

208 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
dignity which they had not deserved, and
encouraged them beyond measure. Not only
in the press and in popular speech, where the
law and practices of war were not understood
in their details, but also In the despatches of
Secretary Seward and other diplomatic proceed
ings, resentment against Great Britain was open
and bitter. It happened that the offending
proclamation was promulgated on the very day
that the new minister from Washington, Charles
Francis Adams, reached London, and before
he had entered upon his duties. This, to the
agitated North, proved that the British Gov
ernment hastened its action designedly, to avoid
listening to the arguments against it, and to
make clear beyond controversy a sympathy with
the Confederacy. The distrust and hatred en
gendered by this proclamation of neutrality
continued to determine for a generation the
feeling of a great body of influential Americans
toward the ruling classes of Great Britain.
The alienation of the North from the British
was not accompanied by any marked growth of
friendliness between the British and the South,
The Palmerston cabinet devoted itself to the
maintenance of the most rigid impartiality
between the two contending sections of the

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 209
Americans. Earl Russell consistently refused
official Intercourse with the commissioners sent
by the Confederate Government to England, and
the instructions as to enforcement of neutrality
by the local and colonial officials of the empire
showed no special favor whatever for either of
the belligerents. The South was Indeed grat
ified by the proclamation of neutrality; but Its
chief hope of early success In establishing inde
pendence rested on the expectation of a more
complete recognition by Great Britain — a recog
nition through the reception of its diplomatic
representatives In their official character. The
refusal of such reception in the spring and sum
mer of 1 861 caused mutterings and disquiet
among the more ardent Southerners, with sub
dued curses of the abolitionism that was be
lieved to poison the sources of British policy.
After the triumph of the Confederates at Bull
Run in July, hope took on a brighter hue. All
the reports from England teemed with evidence
of unofficial sympathy with the South and
confidence In its success. The impending cot
ton famine, which was expected to force the
government to action by the ruin of Lancashire,
was already beginning to make itself felt. To
be quite ready for the change of attitude that

2IO THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
seemed near at hand, the Confederate Govern
ment designated a minister for Great Britain
and one for France, and despatched the two to
their posts. Before they reached their destina
tions they contributed much to the cause they
represented, but involuntarily and in a manner
that was In no ^^^ contemplated in their in
structions. After their destinations were reached,
their contributions to the cause of the Confed
eracy were negligible.
On November 8, 1861, the two ministers.
Mason and Slidell, were forcibly taken from the
British mail-steamer Trent by Captain Wilkes,
of the United States man-of-war San Jacinto.
The captives were taken to the United States
and by order of the government put in con
finement as prisoners of war. Wilkes's action
was entirely of his own initiative. Though It
was a matter of general knowledge that the two
ministers were on their way to Europe, and
though there was a passionate desire in the
North to prevent them from getting there, no
orders for their capture had been Issued. The
news of their seizure was the signal for a rap
turous outburst of rejoicing in the North.
Wilkes was officially thanked by the Secretary
of the Navy and by the House of Represent-

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 211
atlves; his praises were voiced in countless
unofficial ways by countless unofficial persons.
In the swelling chorus of popular approval the
dominant note was the efficient patriotism of
the commander In seizing the traitors and
thwarting their plans. Here and there was
clearly audible, however, another note — the
shrill, wild cry of vengeful joy that Wilkes, in
doing his duty, had flouted the flag of Great
Britain. Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts,
at a banquet given In honor of Wilkes, pro
claimed It the crowning satisfaction of the whole
affair that the commander "fired his shot across
the bows of the ship that bore the British lion
at its head." It Is hardly doubtful that the
rejoicing at the North owed half Its ecstasy
to the fact that the Trent was a British vessel.
There were a few cool heads in the North
that believed Wilkes's action unwise and unjus
tifiable by the law of nations. By these men
the course of Great Britain was awaited with
serious foreboding. Their anxiety was not di
minished by the news that reached America on
December 12 of the overwhelming storm of
rage and warlike fervor that swept over En
gland when the proceeding of Wilkes became
known. Philosophical observers were rare in

212 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
those days, but the situation must have ap
pealed with strange bewilderment to such as
there were. Americans were splitting their
throats with joyous approval of a harsh, crude
exercise of the right of visitation and search;
Englishmen were girding up their loins for war
in defence of the rights of neutrals. The men
of 1812 — Castlereagh, Canning, Madison, John
Quincy Adams — ^would have been in sad straits
to adjust themselves to this extraordinary re
versal of national roles. What explained it
lay for the most part beneath the surface. The
Americans exulted not more over the capture of
two conspicuous domestic foes than over the
incidental flouting of the British flag, finding
in this latter a fitting retaliation for the hostile
haste In recognizing the Confederacy as a bel
ligerent. The British, for their part, took high
ground on the rights of the neutral flag less be
cause those rights were apparently assailed than
because the apparent assailant was the Yankees;
for there was persistently current in England
a suspicion that the Lincoln administration in
tended to make trouble with her for the sake of
improving Its position In home politics.
The course adopted by the Palmerston cab
inet left no room for diplomatic subtleties or for

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 213
political finesse in the adjustment of the Trent
affair. Three days after the report of the affair
was received, a despatch was sent to Lord Lyons
at Washington instructing him to demand the
surrender of Slidell and Mason, and a suitable
apology for the affront to the British flag. In
case the demand should not be complied with in
seven days, the minister was directed to close
the legation and leave Washington. The trans
mission of these instructions was accompanied
by open and strenuous preparations for war.
Exportation of military stores was forbidden;
arsenals and dockyards hummed with access of
Industry; great quantities of arms and ammuni
tion were hastily shipped to the North American
provinces; most Impressive of all, several thou
sands of troops, including a regiment of the
Guards, embarked for the same destination.
Confronting such a situation, the Lincoln ad
ministration had no choice of policy. To think
of conquering the Confederates after Great
Britain should become their ally, was beyond
the bounds of sanity. Accordingly, the cap
tive envoys were put at the disposal of Lord
Lyons, and were duly conveyed by a British
war-ship back to the West Indies, whence they
resumed their journey In triumph to England,

214 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
In announcing compliance with the British de
mand. Secretary Seward did what was possible
to save the face of the Americans, He wrote
with one eye on the British fleet and the other
on the Northern people. Such strabismic ad
justment of the gaze does not conduce to clarity
of vision, and Seward's paper elicited scant ap
plause from the experts of International law.
His contention was that Wilkes was wholly jus
tified in stopping the Trent and searching her
for the Confederate envoys, but committed an
error when, having found them, he omitted to
bring the ship Into port as a prize and secure a
judicial condemnation of her for violating the
laws of war by carrying contraband persons and
despatches. The Northern people were as
sured, that is, that Wilkes must be disavowed
not because he Insulted the British flag, but
because he did not in addition capture it. Earl
Russell's reply to this despatch naturally con
troverted this view of the law of the case, and
argued elaborately that there was no warrant
in the law of nations for the Interruption of the
Trent's bona fide course from one neutral port
to another. He reinforced his argument by
the discomforting suggestion that the principle
by which the act pf Wilkes was justified would

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 215
equally justify the search at any time, by either
a Confederate or a Federal cruiser, of the Dover-
Calais packet, and its conveyance to America
If agents or despatches of the enemy should be
found aboard. How utterly at sea the experts
were in regard to the law applicable to this case,
and how little the technical law had to do with
the practical policy adopted, appears in the fact
that the law officers of the crown, at almost the
exact moment when Wilkes threw his shell
across the bows of the Trent, gave their opinion
that the course which he, all unknown to them,
was actually pursuing was strictly conformed
to the precedents of British practice.* Later,
these same legal authorities modified their opin
ion and solemnly declared that the law required
that the offending neutral ship on which con
traband persons or despatches were found must
be taken to the captor's port and passed upon
by a prize court — the precise ground that
Seward took in his despatch and that Russell
controverted in his reply.
The surrender of Mason and Slidell was so
clearly a case of hard necessity that Northern
opposition to it was scanty. The hatred of
* C. F. Adams, The Trent A fair, in Proceedings of the Massachusetts
Historical Society, XLV.

2i6 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
Britain that it engendered was, however, gen
eral In prevalence and malignant In expression.
Ever5^where the thought was current: Great
Britain has taken advantage of our weakness
to browbeat and humiliate us. We will settle
our domestic troubles and bide our time for
revenge. Hamilcar's classic procedure recurred
to many minds; and an inspection of London
clubs to-day would probably reveal more than
one elderly American dozing the pleasant hours
away in happy forgetfulness of a Hanniballc
obligation of enmity to Albion, assumed under
paternal direction at the dim Chrlstmastide of
1861. The smart of defeat was not diminished by
the taunts and jibes that issued in a broad, full
stream from the British, Canadian, and Con
federate press. " Swagger and ferocity, built on
a foundation of vulgarity and cowardice, " was
sweetly declared by the London Times to be the
compendium of Captain Wilkes's characteristic
qualities, and he was, it said, " an ideal Yankee."
Secretary Seward was described in hardly more
complimentary terms, and was credited with a
set purpose to pick trouble with Great Britain.
The secretary's reputation as a reckless chau
vinist and an undisguised Anglophobe seems

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 217
indeed to have had much Influence in official as
well as In popular circles, and to have played a
considerable part in determining the ministry
to a hard, brusque demand for reparation.
Earl Russell was not naturally disposed to
harshness, and his assumption of so uncompro
mising an attitude was apparently due to a
purpose not to give Seward any chance to win
popular applause.
As to the Southerners, some pains were taken
to show them that British policy was not chosen
with any least reference to their Interests. The
arrival of Mason and Slidell in England was
ostentatiously Ignored by the cabinet, and The
Times served semi-official notice on them In
advance that they were not to assume the airs
or expect the halo of martyrs. They could well
afford, however, to submit with cheerfulness
to such snubbing; for they were cordially re
ceived in aristocratic society, and they per
ceived on every side the currents of public
opinion setting strongly in favor of the Con
federate cause. Throughout the year 1862 the
utter failure of the North to gain any deci
sive advantage in the field confirmed the con
viction that the South could not be conquered,
and that the vast sacrifice of blood and treasure

2i8 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
in the attempt was Inhuman and should be
stopped. In Lancashire poverty and distress
among the cotton-workers became extreme, and
added a powerful practical argument in favor
of steps toward opening the ports of the South.
Yet the ministry persisted In its refusal to re
ceive Mason or to adopt the projects of media
tion and Intervention that were from time to
time seriously considered. Its rigidly correct
attitude as a neutral in this respect resulted In
a steadily growing hatred on the part of the
South, which abandoned In the autumn of 1863
all efforts at diplomatic intercourse.
The alienation of the South from the British
Government was not accompanied by any
access of friendly feeling on the part of the
North. On the contrary, the angry passions
kindled by the proclamation of neutrality and
the Trent affair found ever fresh fuel to main
tain the flame. During 1862 blockade-run
ning between the Confederacy and the British
ports of the Bermudas and the Bahamas as
sumed large and spectacular proportions, and
the cruisers Florida and Alabama began their
destructive raids on the maritime commerce of
the North. Popular sentiment, little versed
in the niceties of neutral obligations, instinc-

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 219
tively laid at Britain's door the responsibility
for all the loss and humiliation due to these
proceedings. Nor did the Lincoln government
fail to make an adequate and proper appeal to
the British ministry for a more rigorous and
efficient enforcement of Its own laws touching
such matters, Charles Francis Adams had a
task more delicate and exacting than that of
either his father or his grandfather at the court
of Saint James's, and the perfect success with
which he performed It has been recognized In
full by his adversaries. He brought Earl Rus
sell to realize that the Alabama should not be
permitted to sail from Liverpool, though the
earl's order to detain her arrived too late to
serve Its purpose, A year later, when a far
more serious menace to the Northern cause was
prepared by the clever Confederate agents In
England, and two great ironclads were nearing
completion by the same firm that built the
Alabama, Adams went to the verge of a hostile
rupture before he persuaded Russell to seize
the vessels. The detention of the ironclads
was a sickening blow to the hopes of the South.
In the North It caused great elation, but it
served at the same time to evoke the truculent
vow that when the Union should have been

220 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
made secure the failure of the British to detain
the Alabama also should be put before them for
explanation and settlement.
Such was the disturbing spirit with which the
North approached Its triumph In 1865. The
friendship and harmony that were conspicuous
among English-speaking peoples in i860 had
been supplanted by as unprepossessing an ag
gregate of evil emotions as the inferno of a four
years' desperate war could be expected to pro
duce. The victorious people, with an army of
a million men, a navy of five hundred ships,
a crushed and helpless rival at its feet, looked
round to see If any scores remained to be set
tled. Against every other branch of the English-
speaking race the flushed and angry conqueror
believed that it had a grievance to present. The
West Indian colonists had sustained and thrived
by the blockade-runners, through whom the
Confederacy had preserved Its life long after
the end was assured. The Canadians and their
associates of the Maritime Provinces had given
refuge to Confederate agents who had organized
expeditions of rapine and murder across the
Northern boundary, . In the African and Asiatic
colonies of England the Alabama and other
cruisers had received indispensable aid in their

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 221
piratical enterprises. Even from remote Aus
tralia came eventually reports that the last of
the Confederate cruisers, the Shenandoah, had
been enabled by illegitimate privileges allowed to
it at Melbourne to destroy the American whal
ing fleet in the Arctic seas. Every Item in this
account — and by no means all the items familiar
in 1865 have been catalogued here — ^was charged
with bitterness, hatred, and a longing for re
venge. Nor were these emotions less conspicu
ous in the conquered South than in the victo
rious North. Recognition by Great Britain for
the sake of cotton had been the rock bottom on
which Confederate hopes were built. Refusal of
this recognition left a feeling that Great Britain
was wholly responsible for the ensuing catas
trophe, and not a few voices were heard from
the ruins of the South declaring that, if a settle
ment of old scores with that power should be
undertaken, Lee's veterans would not be slow
to join Grant's In the enterprise.
The vindictive feeling In the United States
declined in aggressiveness as Napoleon's Insolent
challenge across the Rio Grande engaged atten
tion, and as the problems of reconstructing the
South became more and more absorbing. Yet
governmental action, legislative, diplomatic, and

222 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
administrative, as well as movements of the
popular spirit, continued to reveal the working
of the latent hostility. The happy relations
built up by Lord Elgin between the United States
and Canada suffered hopeless damage. Even
the ancient and indurated Rush-Bagot arrange
ment came into Imminent peril of extinction.
During 1864 Confederates from Canada cap
tured steamers on Lake Erie and also made a
raid on a town In Vermont, After these affairs
Secretary Seward gave notice that the Rush-
Bagot arrangement would be disregarded after
six months. In March of 1865, however, he
withdrew this notice of abrogation, and an
nounced that the United States would continue
to observe the terms of the arrangement.
The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 In respect to
Canadian trade met with a less kindly fate.
Complaints of unfairness In the working of the
treaty became common In the United States
only a few years after it went Into operation.
These gained In force and volume as the be
ginnings of tariff protection to manufacturers
appeared In Canada. The revival of protec
tionism In the United States In connection with
the war strengthened the foes of the treaty, but
the impulse that was decisive of Its fate was

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 223
apparently due to the anti-British feeling en
gendered by the incidents of the war. Congress
directed by act of January 18, 1865, that the
requisite one year's notice of abrogation be
given, and accordingly the provisions went out
of effect in 1866, By this action the unsatis
factory conditions as to the inshore fisheries re
vived, and a period of friction over this trouble
some matter was prepared.
Still more directly and obviously the outcome
of the changed feeling toward Great Britain
was the support given to the earnest but rather
absurd undertakings of the Fenians, Among
the millions of Irishmen in the United States
hatred of all things British was practically
universal. Any project, however chimerical,
for breaking the power of the "Saxon" was sure
of wide sympathy and support from Irish-
Americans. In the armies that fought the war
of secession the Irish were conspicuous in both
numbers and achievement. When the armies
were disbanded many of these veterans were
easily induced to join the Fenian movement —
an enterprise directed with rather ostentatious
secrecy to the estabhshment of an independent
republic in Ireland, It would not seem likely,
a priori, that the first overt step toward this

224 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
end should be an Invasion of Canada by an
Irish army. Yet such was In fact what occurred.
Considerable bodies of Fenians, with some ru
dimentary organization and equipment as a mil
itary force, assembled along the northern fron
tier of the United States, and In the summer
of 1866 crossed Into Canada at various points.
They were promptly chased back across the bor
der by the Canadians, and were then gathered
up and sent to their homes by the authorities
of the United States, It was not creditable to
the government at Washington that such an
attack on a neighbor from its territory was not
prevented. In explanation it could only be
said that the proceeding was so inherently
fatuous as never to have warranted an expec
tation that it would be actually undertaken.
Beyond this, however, was the undoubted fact
that the minor officials from whom the earliest
reports of impending trouble should have come
had very little disposition to be vigilant in
warding off trouble from Great Britain. The
conviction that the British Government had
not overstrained its vigilance In connection
with the Alabama was thus producing results.
Evidence that the grievance against Great
Britain was actively operating on the American

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 225
mind at the time when the Fenian disturbance
was at its height is to be seen In the action of
the House of Representatives in relation to the
neutrality laws. In the summer of 1866 the
House passed by a unanimous vote a bill to
repeal the prohibition, in those laws, of fitting
out ships for belligerents. The bearing of this
is clearer when connected with the suggestion
made in debate that the "Republic of Ireland"
be recognized as a belligerent. When, a year or
two later, there was war between Great Britain
and Abyssinia, an Anglophobe senator intro
duced and sustained with great vigor a resolu
tion recognizing King Theodore as a belliger
ent, and authorizing him to fit out privateers
in the ports of the United States.
In Ireland and England the Fenians man
ifested their existence through a long series of
plots and ineffective lawlessness. Very many
of those who were most active in these opera
tions had duly equipped themselves with the
rights of American citizenship. At no time
after the first weeks of 1866 were the British
authorities In the least danger from the Fenians.
The government had the situation well In hand,
and the arrests of offenders went on without
ceasing. Naturally, loud appeals for help came

226 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
in an endless stream from the unfortunate Amer
ican citizens to Mr. Adams In the legation at
London. The minister had little taste for the
special kind of duty that this situation Imposed.
His chief function had become, so he wrote
privately to Seward, to rescue Irishmen from
punishment which In most cases they richly
deserved. There was often at Issue, however,
in these cases a principle that was well worthy
of most serious diplomatic attention. Ever
since the great immigration from Europe began
in the forties, the American Government had
been under pressure to assert for Its naturalized
citizens the same rights In the land of their
birth that were granted to native-born American
citizens. Grave and well-founded objections to
this claim were raised by foreign governments,
who denied the right of expatriation. There
was a very natural disposition in Great Britain,
for example, to manifest special rigor in the case
of an Irishman who used an easily acquired
American citizenship as a cover for promoting
in Ireland the cause of the Fenians, In the
United States every such instance evoked a
passionate Celtic clamor, whose Influence ap
peared at every session of Congress and in every
electoral campaign. To reflecting and well-bal-

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 227
anced Americans the qualifications with which
the claims of the naturalized citizens were to
be taken were obvious; yet the incessant de
nunciation of Great Britain by the Irish and
their friends inevitably strengthened the cur
rent of III feeling that derived its portentous
volume from other sources.
While American feeling and policy were tak
ing the forms that have been noticed, what were
the effects in Great Britain of the triumph of the
North? Sir George Cornewall Lewis, a mem
ber of the Palmerston cabinet, recorded in the
midst of the tumult the opinion that the civil
war in the United States was a phenomenon of
world-wide significance, not a mere local fray.
The soundness of the judgment has been con
tinuously confirmed as the decades have passed
along, but It was discernible very early In the
effect of the conflict on the trend of British home
politics. The division of sympathy In England
as between the two contending sections followed
pretty closely the cleavage between the social
classes whose antagonism was crossing and con
fusing the old party alignment. The Duke of
Argyll, sustaining the North, and Laird and
Roebuck, sustaining the South, were Indeed
examples of deviation that served to emphasize

228 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
the rule; but Bright and Cobden, leading the
lower middle and working classes, with Glad
stone and Palmerston speaking for the upper
middle class and the titled aristocracy, were the
typical exponents of the respective sympathies.
When the Emancipation Proclamation seemed
to announce the extinction of slavery as the
purpose of the North, a perceptible gain in favor
for that section followed, and those humani
tarians who had committed themselves to the
South were called upon to revise or explain
their position. Their task was no harder than
that of the Quaker, John Bright, who in 1854
was full of scorn for the idea that there could be
any connection between the slaughter of thou
sands and the cause of freedom, but ten years
later found the slaughter of hundreds of thou
sands abundantly justified by the liberation of
the blacks.^
As a matter of fact, a fundamental influence
in fixing the sympathies of Britons was the
more or less unconscious perception of a rela
tion between the American problem and their
own. The liberalizing and democratizing spirit
was steadily disintegrating both the old polit
ical parties. Those who welcomed the work of
' Trevelyan, Life oJ John Bright, 226, 3 18.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 229
this spirit longed for the preservation intact
of the American Union as the model of a great
and prosperous democracy. Those who dreaded
the approach of democracy were quick to see in
the American war a proof of Its weakness and
futility. When, in the course of 1864, the strangling
and crushing of the Confederacy by the terrific
power of the North became pretty clearly a
matter of time alone. Southern sympathy In
England ceased to manifest itself. Politicians
and scholars who had portrayed with eloquence
and learning the inherent vices of democracy
and the impossibility of its application in the
government of large populations, abandoned In
silence the field of political theory and prophecy.
The complete triumph of the North in the spring
of 1865 was attended by a great impetus to the
radical propaganda of Bright and his Manchester
followers. The Whig and Tory aristocracy were
badly discredited, and with the death of Lord
Palmerston lost their ancient control over the
government. For three years, indeed. Earl Rus
sell and the Earl of Derby maintained the
nominal succession of the old order, but Glad
stone and Disraeli were the real representatives
of the actual controlling power, which lay in a

230 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
social stratum below that of Russell and Derby.
This new power received its formal recognition
In the British system through the Reform Bill
of 1867, which gave a wide extension to the
suffrage. It is hardly too much to say that
the Reform Bill of 1867 was a direct product
of the Northern triumph in the American war.
Extension of the franchise was forced upon
ministerial attention by Bright and the radicals,
was undertaken In vain by Gladstone and the
Russell government, and was actually enacted
by the Derby cabinet, with the cynical Disraeli
in the lead. This peculiar record of Its genesis
shows the wide basis of public opinion on which
it was reared, and in this shows the far-reaching
influence of the American situation.
While the end of the war brought little abate
ment of the 111 feeling in the United States
toward the British, there was in England a
somewhat pronounced reaction toward amicable
sentiments even among those classes whose dis
tress at the success of republican ideas was
deepest and most sincere. The tragedy of
Lincoln's death had much to do with this move
ment. The most stolid Tory could not re
sist the softening effect of that most pathetic
sequence — the divinely humane inaugural of

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 231
March 4, the triumph at Appomattox of April
9, and the assassin's bullet of April 14. No
class of British society denied to Abraham Lin
coln a high place among the heroes of the En
glish-speaking race, and none could evade the
truth, proclaimed by the whole story of his
life, that he was the purest possible product, as
well as the successful leader, of the American
democracy. For the seven full years following the end of
the war in the United States, diplomacy found
engrossing labor in the task of restoring the
concord that was so rudely shattered In 1861.
Domestic problems of highest significance di
verted popular attention in large measure from
a dangerous international situation. Recon
struction in the United States, federation In
Canada and her British neighbors, electoral re
form and Irish disestablishment in the United
Kingdom — these Insured to the foreign offices
much-needed time for their slow pacific processes.
The ministers labored always in the conscious
ness of Impending peril. It was the heroic
age of the Hohenzollern monarchy, and German
unity was taking shape at Bismarck's bidding
out of the ruin of Prussia's neighbors. Den
mark was partitioned in 1864; Austria, Han-

232 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
over, and some of the smaller German fry were
crushed two years later; all the world knew
that war with France was coming next. How
far the unifying energy of the new Germany
would extend, was uncertain. That Great Brit
ain might become involved In war, If Holland
or Belgium should be proclaimed Indispensable
to the territorial integrity of the German or the
French nation, was obvious to all. When Den
mark was attacked in 1864 it had not been per
fectly easy to keep Great Britain out of the
fray, though the non-interference policy had
prevailed. The difficulty of such a policy In
connection with aggression upon the Low Coun
tries would be insuperable. And what was
clear to all who stopped to think at all on the
subject was, that the day when Great Britain
declared war would witness the adoption by
the United States of a policy as to neutrality
that would encourage the use of American ship
yards and ports by the enemies of Britain for
the destruction of her commerce. Even in lack
of formal announcement of such a policy Flori
das and Alabamas would be sure to escape the
drowsy vigilance of the authorities, and to pur
sue their devastating careers under guarantee
of the same non possumus with which Earl Rus-

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 233
sell had met the reclamations of Secretary
Seward. From the July day In 1862 when the "No.
290" passed out of the Mersey on her "trial
trip," to become the redoubtable Alabama,
responsibility for the damage done by her to
American commerce was formally and syste
matically charged upon the British Govern
ment by Seward and Adams. The long lists
of vessels captured and destroyed that came In
to the State Department at Washington were
duly submitted to Earl Russell, with intima
tions that indemnity would be expected from
Great Britain. Because the operations of the
Alabama were so far-reaching and so successful,
they assumed very great prominence In diplo
matic as in popular discussions, and by the end
of the war the term "Alabama claims" was
commonly used to designate the whole mass of
complaints against the British Government for
the favor that it was alleged to have shown to
the Confederacy In violation of its profession of
neutrality. The use of the term in this broad
sense reflected and stimulated a feeling in Amer
ica that British delinquency was of a kind that
could not be atoned for by mere financial com
pensation for the losses caused by the Confed-

234 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
erate cruisers. The existence of this feeling and
the bitterness with which It was resented in
England give a clue to some of the most seri
ous complications of ensuing years.
While war was flagrant, claims based on acts
of the Alabama were presented by Secretary
Seward, and rejected by Earl Russell, with
monotonous frequency. A rather peevish re
quest of Russell that the annoying procedure
be abandoned was followed by some curtail
ment of the arguments that accompanied the
claims, but not of the lists of losses. In 1865,
when the Confederacy was in ruins and the last
cruiser had abandoned her career of destruc
tion, the two governments girded themselves
for the diplomatic contest that was now pos
sible without the distractions of hostilities.
The complete case for the United States com
bined the Queen's proclamation of neutrality
with the government's derelictions of duty in
respect to the cruisers as a comprehensive man
ifestation of partiality to the Confederacy, and
a wrong to the American nation. The procla
mation of neutrality, Adams argued, was pre
mature and unfriendly. In recognizing the
insurgents as belligerents on the ocean before
they had a single vessel afloat, her Majesty's!

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 235
government had acted In a manner that was
without precedent In the practice of nations.
This action in Its essence created an ocean bel
ligerent Instead of recognizing one that was
already self-created. Thereafter the belliger
ent character on the ocean was maintained
exclusively by vessels built, equipped, and
manned In British ports, in spite of protests by
the United States and demands that such' viola
tions of neutrality be prevented. Freely con
ceding the desire of her Majesty's government
to maintain a real neutrality, Adams declared
that all efforts to that end had proved Ineffec
tual, first because the laws were Inadequate,
and second because the government did not
secure such change In the laws as would have
healed the defects. In consequence of this
failure of real neutrality, hundreds of American
ships, with millions of dollars' worth of cargo,
had been destroyed, and the commercial marine
of the United States had been transferred to
the protection of the British flag, insuring thus
to the British people an unjust advantage from
the wrong committed against a friendly nation.
For such manifest injuries, due to the defects
in the British law and the failure of the govern
ment to remedy them, the United States was

236 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
entitled in reason and justice to reparation and
indemnity. Earl RusseU's response to these representa
tions was in substance as follows. When her
Majesty's Government, on May 13, 1861, recog
nized the Confederacy as a belligerent power,
it was in fact a belligerent, acknowledged to
be such by official act of the United States Gov
ernment. The fact of belligerency was clear
from the great population and territory con
trolled by the Confederacy, its complete govern
mental organization, its large armies and nu
merous fortresses, its undeniable exercise de
facto of all forms of sovereign authority, includ
ing the Issue of letters of marque. The recog
nition of belligerency by the United States was
equally clear from the blockade of the Con
federate coast officially announced by President
Lincoln before the 13th of May; and this
view had been sustained by the Supreme Court
of the United States, The British Govern
ment, if it did not recognize the Confederates
as belligerents, would have been obliged to
treat them as outlaws and pirates, and this the
government was unwilling to do In the case of
so large, well-organized, and valiant a popula
tion. The demands of British merchants and

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 237
ship captains, moreover, for directions as to
their rights and duties in the circumstances,
made the government's prompt action necessary.
As to later questions. Lord Russell stoutly con
tended that his government had enforced with
fairness and impartiality the neutrality which
was proclaimed. The Foreign Enlistment Act
authorized the seizure of a ship that was proved
to be armed and equipped, wholly or In part,
in British jurisdiction, for the purpose of naval
service for a power at war with a power friendly
to her Majesty, The proof required by the act
as preliminary to seizure was very difficult to
obtain. Of nineteen vessels complained of by
Mr. Adams, however, only five actually hoisted
the Confederate ensign, and of these one never
got into actual service, and another was seized
but released after trial, for lack of sufficient
evidence as to her warlike character. Under
such circumstances. Lord Russell argued, it
was idle to accuse the government of ineffi
ciency in the performance of its duties under
the law.
As to the ships that escaped the vigilance of
the authorities, his Lordship held the methods
employed by the Confederate agents to have
been so skilfully adapted to their purpose that

238 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
only the arbitrary and inquisitorial procedure
of despotic governments could have thwarted
them. To build a ship is the undoubted right
of every Englishman, To set sail with a party
for a foreign land, is equally the right of all.
To ship cannon and munitions of war to for
eign destinations is also a right of Britons,
When the ship and the party and the cannon and
munitions, after leaving British waters, come
together and coalesce into a Confederate cruiser,
the British Government may feel deceived and
flouted, but it cannot be held responsible for in
efficiency. On this principle every case alleged
against Great Britain by the United States
failed absolutely except that of the Alabama.
In this instance evidence as to her true char
acter was pronounced by the law officers of the
crown sufficient to justify her seizure, and
orders to hold her reached Liverpool in the
afternoon of the day on which she passed In
the morning out to sea. Lord Russell was
greatly angered at this peculiar coincidence,
and there was no room to doubt the sincerity
of his assurance of regret to the American min
ister. Yet he was wholly justified In arguing
that the failure of duty by subordinates of the
administration was no sufficient basis for the

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 239
sweeping charge of bad faith and hostile ani
mus against the British Government.
Lord Russell's discussion in 1865 with Mr,
Adams culminated In a rather brusque rejec
tion of the proposal, submitted In a more or less
tentative way by the American some two years
earlier, looking to arbitration. The only ques
tions to be submitted to an arbiter, Russell
said, would be, first, whether the British Gov
ernment had acted "with due diligence, or, in
other words, in good faith and honesty," in
maintaining neutrality; second, whether the
law officers of the crown properly understood
the Foreign Enlistment Act when they gave
their opinions as to its application to the cases
of the Alabama and other cruisers. To put
either of these questions to the representative
of a foreign government, would be incompatible,
he held, with regard for the dignity and char
acter of the British crown and the British na
tion. "Her Majesty's government must, there
fore, decline either to make reparation and
compensation for the captures made by the
Alabama, or to refer the question to any for
eign state."
The most that Lord Russell saw his way to do
in the existing situation was to set up a joint

240 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
commission to pass upon all claims arising on
either side out of the Civil War, provided, as he
explained with great care, that the claims con
cerned In the exploits of the cruisers should
be excluded. This proposition was declined
by Seward with no less directness than that
which Russell displayed in declining arbitra
tion. It was soon evident that the attitude as
sumed by Earl Russell failed to win the sup
port of important elements of British public
opinion. The maritime commercial interest per
ceived with ever-increasing vividness the peril
to English trade that was Involved in any re
laxation of neutral duties. Party leaders were
embarrassed by the strained relations with the
United States, Respect for the American Re
public was general, and admiration even was
found in many circles where only contempt
had appeared before Appomattox. With a
realizing sense of the losses Inflicted by the
Alabama, and the knowledge that orders to
detain her were actually issued by the govern
ment, many voices were heard In high quarters
declaring that there was ground for the com
plaints of the Americans, and that the best
British policy would be to reach a settlement

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 241
as speedily as possible, even If it cost consider
able money.
Under the influence of these conditions the
Derby cabinet, which came to power In June,
1866, proposed a renewal of the discussion as
to arbitration. Lord Stanley, the foreign sec
retary, avowed a willingness to submit to an
arbiter the question whether the British Gov
ernment was so far responsible for the depreda
tions of the Alabama as to be bound to pay the
claims of those whose property was destroyed
by the cruiser. He declined absolutely, how
ever, to include in submission to the arbiter
the question as to whether the recognition of
the Confederacy as a belligerent on May 13,
1861, was justifiable. As Seward was tenacious
on this point and insisted that the conduct
of Great Britain as a whole should go Into
the determination of her responsibility for the
cruisers, arbitration failed again to be adopted
as the way out of the difficulties.
To the anxiety of the British cabinet to
reach a settlement was added In 1867 a growing
eagerness on the part of Secretary Seward to
make such a settlement the capstone of his
long public service, now approaching Its end.
Stimulated by these forces, diplomacy overcame

242 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
the obstacles that had seemed insuperable. In
1868, after Charles Francis Adams had been
succeeded as minister by Reverdy Johnson, a
general agreement on all the matters at Issue
between the governments was slowly worked
out. The Irish trouble was first cleared away
by a protocol, eventually amplified into a
treaty, assuring to naturalized citizens of the
United States, though originally British sub
jects, the full rights In Great Britain of native-
born citizens of the United States, that Is,
recognizing the right of expatriation for which
the American Government had long contended.
A second protocol referred to arbitration a
boundary dispute in the far northwest that
had been pending since the last years of Bu
chanan's administration. The third and last of
the agreements, the ill-fated Johnson-Clarendon
convention signed January 14, 1869, provided
for the Alabama claims.
In this convention the controverted issues as
to belligerency and neutrality during the war
were hidden away In a series of general provi
sions for the settlement of all claims upon ei
ther government for money compensation to cit
izens of the other, on account of transactions
since 1853. A commission of four members,

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 243
two appointed by each government, was in
trusted with the power to pass upon the claims
by majority vote. When no majority should
be obtainable an umpire should be selected, if
necessary by lot; or, upon the demand of two
commissioners, the umpire should be the head
of a foreign state, to be agreed upon by the two
governments. In this convention the British Government
yielded all that which It had hitherto held to be
impossible. Both its administration of its neu
trality laws, which Russell refused to regard as
arbitrable, and Its recognition of Confederate
beUigerency, which had been reserved by Stan
ley, were subject to the judgment of the arbiter
under the Johnson-Clarendon treaty; for in the
consideration of every claim the commissioners
and the umpire were directed to base their
decisions on the official correspondence of the
two governments, together with one oral argu
ment on each side and such papers as the gov
ernments should choose to submit. So far as
concerned the Alabama claims, these provisions
put before the tribunal every aspect of the long
controversy. There was, however, little hope, from the
outset, that the concessive attitude of Great

244 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
Britain would bring the desired settlement.
The internal political conditions in America
were decidedly unpropltious. A presidential
election in November of 1868 resulted In the
choice of General Grant to succeed Andrew
Johnson In the following March. There was
extreme antipathy, personal and partisan, be
tween the outgoing and the incoming admin
istrations, and nothing so dear to Seward's
heart as ratification of his final treaty could be
anticipated. More than this, there was a wide
spread feeling in the United States that the
offence of Great Britain was not of a kind to be
expiated by the mere compensation of private
individuals for financial losses. Seward had
once Instructed Adams that the conduct of
Great Britain during the war must be regarded
as "a national wrong and Injury to the United
States," for which indemnity to private citizens
would be only the lowest form of satisfaction.
The spirit of this declaration was not reflected
in the Johnson-Clarendon convention, and the
omission had much to do with the fate of the
agreement. On the 13 th of April, 1869, the
Senate of the United States refused its consent
to the ratification of the treaty by a vote of
forty-four to one.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 245
The practical unanimity of this vote was even
less significant than certain incidents that ac
companied the Senate's action. Though the
session in which the treaty was considered was,
as usual in such cases, secret, the Senate made
public the speech of Senator Charles Sumner,
chairman of the Committee on Foreign Rela
tions, whose views thus were Impressed with a
quasi-official character. In this speech Sumner
rehearsed the tale of British unfriendliness to
the United States during the war, much as it
had been told often in the despatches of Seward
and Adams. A shifting of emphasis by the
senator, however, impressed a new character
upon the discussion. He put In the foreground
of his complaint the charge that the course of
the British Government had been a wrong to
the American nation, bringing upon it suffering
and humiliation in addition to vast expense;
yet for this public and notorious wrong to a
friendly and kindred people no Intimation or
expression of regret had come from Great
Britain. The injuries sustained by the United
States could not be measured, Sumner argued,
by the losses of individuals, nor be compensated
by payments to individuals, British respon
sibility was to the American nation, and was

246 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
not to be limited by the property destroyed by
the Confederate cruisers. As grounds for na
tional claims against Great Britain that were not
to be ignored In any satisfactory settlement,
Sumner Included the shrinkage of the American
mercantile marine through the transfer of ves
sels to the British flag for protection against the
cruisers; the rise in the cost of marine Insurance;
and the cost of the war for the two years by
which it was estimated to have been prolonged
through the acts and negligence of the British
Government. As to the money reckoning of
the claims thus set forth, Sumner admitted that
a figure was difficult to arrive at. The direct
losses by the destruction of private property
he thought might total some ^15,000,000; for
the Indirect losses the suggestions that he made
pointed to a sum of many hundred millions,
Sumner's speech was received with vocif
erous joy by all the Anglophobes In the United
States. The Fenians were deeply gratified with
his exposure of British treachery, and prepared
with eagerness for the revenge that they thought
must be exacted. The great mass of average
citizens whose antipathy to the British had
been dulled by the lapse of years since the war,
were stirred with the ancient wrath through

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 247
the artful and eloquent recital of the old tales
of wrong. The effect of Sumner's speech was
magnified on both sides of the Atlantic by the
fact that he had always been reckoned the
chief among the small number of friends of
England In American public life. That he
should now be hailed in the United States as
the leader of the Anglophobes, threw his En
glish admirers into consternation that was al
most comical in Its Intensity, His suggestion of
claims that would run up Into the hundred
millions was unsparingly denounced by all or
gans of British public opinion, and It proved
a serious obstacle to the continuation of diplo
matic discussion of the general question. There
is little doubt, on the other hand, that the
emphasis that he laid on what he called the
national claims and on the national sense of
injury received, as distinct from Individual
losses, was an important Influence in determin
ing the form of the ultimate settlement.
Sumner's attitude was, in fact, the outcome of
a deliberate purpose, for which British radical
politics was in some degree responsible. We
have seen that for several decades the feeling
had been common and unconcealed in high
quarters that the colonies were a burden to

248 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
Great Britain and should be got rid of as soon
as possible, Sumner's relations with Cobden
and Bright, the most convinced advocates of
this policy, made It very familiar to him. It
was to Cobden's speeches, indeed, that Sumner
was Indebted for the catalogue of the national
losses for which he held the British Government
responsible. The great free-trader, when as
sailing the conduct of the Palmerston-Russell
cabinet during the war, set forth in full detail
the damage to the American merchant marine
due to that conduct, and was scarcely less
specific than Sumner in justifying a claim by
the United States for reparation. In 1869
Cobden was dead, but John Bright and other
radicals were in the Gladstone cabinet, and the
prime minister himself was well over toward
the radical wing of the liberal line, Sumner's
purpose, then, was to use Cobden's views on
the Alabama claims to promote his views as to
the colonies. The senator would put the claims
at so enormous a figure as to make the settle
ment of them impossible except by turning over
to the United States all the British possessions
in the Western Hemisphere. Such was the prop
osition that he later advised Secretary Fish to
make the basis of all further negotiation, adding

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 249
the profound suggestion that this simple ex
pedient would remove for all time the tension
on the Canadian frontier due to the activities
of the Fenians,
This project of Sumner's is illuminating as to
the practical quality of his statesmanship. He
assumed that the dismemberment of the British
Empire, because it was considered as an ideal
by politicians concerned in the internal prob
lems of England, could be demanded with im
punity by a foreign power as a sort of war
indemnity for a purely constructive war.
Hamilton Fish became secretary of state in
the spring of 1869, and devoted himself from
the outset to a serious but not ostentatious
effort to overcome the ill effects of Sumner's
speech and bring the negotiations back to at
least as hopeful a situation as that in which
Seward had left them. The Gladstone cabinet,
with Lord Clarendon at the Foreign Office, was
as eager as Fish to work toward an adjustment.
On both sides, however, the difficulties were
great. British susceptibilities had been so out
raged by Sumner's extravagant demands that
any sign of concession to them by Clarendon
would destroy the Gladstone government. On
the other hand, American popular sentiment

250 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
was keyed up to the pitch set by Sumner, and
the senator's influence had to be reckoned on
in opposition to any abatement of the extreme
national claims. Nearly two years of secret
and unofficial negotiations were necessary be
fore a plan of adjustment was hit upon that
could be allowed to take official shape. In the
Interval the stars In their political courses had
fought for harmony, Sumner, through a vio
lent personal and political quarrel with Presi
dent Grant, lost his Influence with the support
ers of the administration, and was eventually
deposed from his powerful position as chair
man of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela
tions, The Franco-Prussian War, with its cloud
of threatening diplomatic questions on the Con
tinent, gave a fresh impulse to the desire of
the British leaders to be free from the harass
ing burden of American unfriendliness. Under
these conditions the agreement was reached for
the appointment of a joint high commission to
meet at Washington and provide by treaty for
the settlement of all the matters in controversy
between the two governments. This commis
sion, after deliberations lasting from February
27 to May 8, 1871, concluded on the latter date
the Treaty of Washington that constitutes a

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 251
noteworthy landmark In the history of Anglo-
American relations.
In the forty-two articles of the treaty were
embodied provisions for the settlement of the
Alabama claims; of other claims by British and
American citizens arising out of the Civil War;
of the various controversies between the United
States and British North America — as to the
inshore fisheries, navigation, and commerce —
left pending by the abrogation of the Reci
procity Treaty in 1866; and finally of the dis
pute as to the ownership of the island of San
Juan, at the far western end of the line fixed
by the Oregon Treaty of 1846.
As to the Alabama claims, the agreement
embodied in the treaty signified great conces
sions on both sides in the interest of an amica
ble settlement. Great Britain expressed regret
"for the escape, under whatever circumstances,
of the Alabama and other vessels from British
ports, and for the depredations committed by
those vessels," In addition to this soothing
admission that something disagreeable had hap
pened to the United States, the British Gov
ernment consented to arbitration in the full
est sense in reference to all the claims. Three
rules were laid down as to the duties of a neu-

253 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
tral government, and the arbitral tribunal was
enjoined to base its judgment on these rules,
though the British Government recognized them,
not as a statement of principles of interna
tional law in force in 1861-5, but as prin
ciples that ought In the future to be adopted
by maritime powers, and that Great Britain
had, in fact, sought to live up to during the
American war. The three rules defined the
duty of a neutral government, in respect to the
fitting out and supplying of war-ships, in such
terms as to make it morally certain that judg
ment would be adverse to Great Britain on the
case of the Alabama, if not as to other of the
Confederate cruisers. The British Government,
in short, not only assumed a somewhat apolo
getic attitude at the outset, but also submitted
to be judged by principles that were not obli
gatory as rules of international conduct at the
time of the acts concerned, and that insured
an unfavorable decision. A proud and powerful
nation does not put itself in such a position
without potent motives. One such was obvious
and unconcealed : the general adoption of rigor
ous rules of neutral duty would be very advan
tageous to Great Britain whenever she should
become a belligerent. More influential than

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 253
this selfish interest, however, was the desire. In
no small measure purely sentimental, to be on
friendly terms with the United States. The
American democracy had proved In the severest
of tests its fitness to survive, and the homage
of a people and a generation in whom Darwin-
Ism was taking deep root was generously
bestowed on the people who so opportunely
illustrated the dogma of science.
Not all the concession in the Treaty of
Washington was on the part of the British,
One point that had been strenuously insisted
on as the original grievance of them all by
Secretary Seward and Mr. Sumner was al
lowed by Secretary Fish to recede quietly Into
the background. This was the premature recog
nition of the Cpnfederacy as a belligerent. Fish
took the position that this action of the Brit
ish Government was evidence of an unfriendly
spirit, but could in no sense be the ground of a
claim for compensation. This admission was
regarded as having a bearing on the general
question of the national or Indirect claims.
These were not the subject of any reference or
allusion in the treaty, and it was understood by
the British negotiators that the American Gov
ernment had definitely abandoned them, as it

254 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
was known to have ignored the demand of
Sumner that a withdrawal of the British flag
from the Western Hemisphere should be a pre
liminary condition to any settlement whatever.
As a matter of fact, the Americans had no
desire to urge the extravagant claims that
Sumner had made so conspicuous. The British
commissioners, on their side, were without au
thority to consider them. Yet because popu
lar feeling was so sensitive about them on both
sides of the water the negotiators avoided all ref
erence to them, and by this very excess of caution
left room for a dangerous misunderstanding.
The tribunal of arbitration met and organ
ized at Geneva, Switzerland, In the middle of
December, 1871. It consisted of five arbitra
tors, appointed respectively by the govern
ments of the United States, Great Britain,
Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil, The cases of
the two contending governments were at once
presented in printed form. That of the United
States was found to include, in addition to the
claims for losses due to the destruction of ves
sels by the cruisers and to the pursuit of the
cruisers, claims also for the loss involved in the
transfer of the merchant marine to the British
flag, the Increased cost of insurance, and the

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 255
prolongation of the war. That is, the indirect
or national claims were laid before the tribunal
along with the rest. Protests arose at once
from every organ of opinion In Great Britain.
To admit responsibility for that kind and degree
of loss would mean, it was declared, national
humiliation and financial ruin. The govern
ment and the negotiators contended that the
wording of the treaty excluded the indirect
claims from submission to the tribunal, and that
such exclusion had been agreed to In conference
by the American negotiators. The latter de
nied any such agreement or interpretation.
Great Britain stood firm in her contention,
however, and her agent was directed to with
draw from the arbitration In case consideration
of the Indirect claims should be persisted In.
After many months of tension and of deep dis
tress among the friends of peace and amity, a
way out of the impasse was found that was
acceptable to both parties. The tribunal Itself
declared that it did not consider itself author
ized, under international law, to award money
compensation for such losses as those involved
In the indirect claims. The American agent
thereupon refrained from demands upon the
arbiters for further attention to these claims.

256 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
This happy outcome of the dispute was quite
as pleasing to the American as to the British
Government. Fish and his coadjutors had no
expectation or desire that Great Britain should
be mulcted In consequential damages. Sum
ner's speech had created a surprisingly strong
sentiment In support of such mulcting, and it
was problematical whether the administration
could afford. In the year of a presidential elec
tion, to run counter to this sentiment. Ani
mosity toward the Southerners was at this time
a strong factor In the politics of the Republican
party, and It fell in well with this feeling to
disparage the South by contending that the
remarkable prolongation of Its resistance to the
North was due solely to the aid It received
from Great Britain. The rejection of the indi
rect claims by the tribunal of arbitration itself
relieved the administration of all responsibility
for abandoning them, and passed without note
worthy effect on American public opinion.
The judgment of the tribunal needs but cas
ual mention. In respect to three of the Con
federate cruisers, the Alabama, the Florida, and
the Shenandoah, Great Britain was found to
have contravened the three rules of neutral con
duct laid down by the treaty, and the damages

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 257
due to the United States on account of the
dereliction were assessed at $15,500,000. Sir
Alexander Cockburn, the British arbitrator,
dissented from the judgment of the tribunal on
all but a single point, namely, that due dili
gence had not been used in ascertaining the
character of the Alabama and preventing her
departure from Liverpool. The dissenting opin
ions of the Englishman were embodied in a very
lengthy document. In which he expressed with
unjudicial candor his contempt for the intelli
gence of his fellow arbitrators and for the meth
ods and attainments of those who conducted
the American case. Cockburn's caustic crit
icism found some reflection in the Tory press,
and there appeared more or less of the once
familiar diatribe against the Yankees. In gen
eral, however, the judgment was acquiesced
in by British public opinion with good grace.
Even Cockburn ended his offensive opinion with
an expression of the hope and desire that the
arbitration would prove a potent influence In
maintaining amity between the two kindred
peoples. This was indeed the dominant note in Great
Britain. The whole social and pplitical move
ment of the day, with the now liberalized Glad-

2S8 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
stone in the lead, was In the democratic direc
tion. Following the extension of the suffrage
to the lower classes came the adoption of the
secret ballot, to secure the independence of the
new voters; and a great increase of state and
rate supported education, to promote intel
ligence among them. Aristocratic privilege was
summarily suppressed In one of Its most cher
ished strongholds by the abolition of the pur
chase of commissions in the army. Disestab
lishment of the Irish church, and the Irish Land
Act of 1870, whatever other factors played a
part In their enactment, were for the benefit of
the masses as against the classes. In the sup
port that Mr. Gladstone derived from public
opinion for all these great measures it is quite
impossible that no influence was traceable to
the example of the American democracy, now
so recently triumphant over the dangers that
had been considered certain to insure its ruin.
Conservatism could no longer point a warning
finger, as In the early days of the war, to the
fate of a nation that should follow American
examples, France also just at this time re
newed her republican experimentation, and
furnished the world again with illustrations of
the working of popular government. In En-

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 259
gland, however, only the "blind hysterics of the
Celt" were discernible across the Channel, and
the gaze must follow the trail of the Anglo-
Saxon across the ocean to rest on anything
really trustworthy.
In the United States the announcement of the
actual award attracted little attention or com
ment. It came in the midst of a heated elec
toral campaign, and was little available for
partisan purposes. The Treaty of Washington
had afforded to the Americans their most sub
stantial victory a year earlier, when Great
Britain expressed her regret and agreed to arbi
tration. The carrying out of the treaty was
followed with the somewhat languid interest
of him who gathers up the trophies after the
victory is won.
Before the expiration of the year 1872 another
trophy dropped quietly into the hands of the
United States. The Treaty of Washington
provided for the settlement of the San Juan
water boundary by the arbitration of the Ger
man Emperor. By the treaty which ended
the Oregon dispute in 1846 it was provided that
the line between the United States and British
America should be the forty-ninth parallel of
latitude from the Rocky Mountains to "the

26o THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
middle of the channel which separates the
continent from Vancouvers Island, and thence
southerly through the middle of the said chan
nel ... to the Pacific Ocean," The channel
in question was at one place about fifty miles
wide and filled with islands, among which
several navigable passages trending southward
were discernible. The dispute was as to which
of these passages was the "channel" through
which the boundary passed. The island of San
Juan, occupied since 1859 by detachments of
both American and British troops, would belong
to the one country or the other according to
the result of the dispute. In October, 1872, the
German Emperor rendered a decision sustain
ing the contention of the United States and
assigning the Island thus to the Americans,
Two other arbitral procedures must be men
tioned before the unique achievement of the
Treaty of Washington In this field is exhausted.
One arose under the provision in the treaty for
the adjudication by a commission of all Civil
War claims, other than those known as the
Alabama claims, for compensation by either
government for losses sustained through its
acts by citizens of the other. In the negotia
tion of this provision Great Britain agreed that

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 261
no claim based on the loss of slaves by a Brit
ish subject should be presented. On the other
hand It asked that the losses sustained by
Canadians through the Fenian raids should be
passed upon by the commission. This the
Americans refused to concede, and the British
withdrew the demand. What actually came
before the commission was chiefly a large mass
of claims by British subjects for the seizure or
destruction of their property incidentally to the
military operations on land and to the blockade
of the coast. A few claims against Great Brit
ain were presented by Americans for losses sus
tained in the operations of the Confederates
in Canada in raids across the frontier. The
commission, on which the position of umpire
was held by the Italian minister at Washington,
rendered its final judgment In September, 1873.
All the claims by Americans were dismissed,
and out of the 478 claims by British subjects
181 were allowed, with awards totalling some
thing over $1,900,000,
The last of the arbitral proceedings provided
for in the Treaty of Washington related to the
familiar old matter of the inshore fisheries.
We have seen that the much-prized privilege
of fishing within the three-mile line was con-

262 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
ceded to the Americans by the Reciprocity
Treaty of 1854 in return for the free admission
of leading Canadian products Into the United
States, and that the privilege expired with the
abrogation of the treaty In 1866. Friction be
tween the American fishermen and the authori
ties of the Maritime Provinces, such as had been
common and troublesome prior to 1854, made its
appearance again after 1866. Efforts to read
just things on the basis of tariff concessions, as
in the Reciprocity Treaty, failed before the
uncompromising refusal of the Americans to
modify their duties. In the Treaty of Wash
ington an agreement was reached through the
offer of the Americans to pay for the privilege
of the inshore fishing in hard cash. This prop
osition was accepted, but the negotiators were
quite unable to get together on the amount that
should be paid. This question, therefore, was
left to arbitration. The treaty provided that
the Inshore fisheries should be open to the
Americans, and, on the other side, that Canadian
fish and fish-oil should be admitted duty-free
to the United States. This arrangement was
to last for ten years, after which it was subject
to termination on two years' notice by cither
party. The task of the commission of arbltra-

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 263
tion was, therefore, to determine how much
cash, if any. In addition to the free admission of
fish and fish-oil, would make a fair compensa
tion for the privilege of the Inshore fishing.
The commission to whom the matter was re
ferred made its decision at Halifax on Novem
ber 23, 1877, and awarded $5,500,000 in gold
to Great Britain, This award was regarded as
excessive and unfair by many well-informed
persons In the United States, and Its validity
was questioned on technical grounds by some;
but the government duly paid the sum and
closed the incident.
This Halifax commission completed the re
markable series of judicial proceedings of an
international character through which the jolts
and displacements caused by the Civil War were
corrected and compensated, and the relations
of the English-speaking peoples were restored
to the plane of official and. In a greater degree
than ever before, of real amity. The adjust
ment in respect to the fisheries was, of course,
less closely and exclusively than the other
arbitrations related to the Civil War. The
difficulty that made the issue was destined to
remain, as it had been for a century, a source of
irritation and disturbance for an indefinite

264 THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
future. It afforded at this time, as it had afford
ed earlier, and would afford later, a transition
topic from controversies in which the mother-
country was the chief protagonist against the
United States to those in which the British-
American provinces held the leading position.
Not the least important of the results which are
traceable in a distinct If not a wholly decisive
way to the influence of the desperate war in the
United States, was the great political transfor
mation In British America made effective by
the creation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867.
This was a capital event in the history of the
relations of the English-speaking peoples of the
earth and to it our attention must be for a time
directed.

CHAPTER VI
THE GROWTH OF CANADA AND ITS
PROBLEMS
In the proceedings that resulted in the Treaty
of Washington of 1871 an important part was
played by two prominent Canadians. Sir John
Rose was the confidential agent of the British
cabinet in the twenty months of secret di
plomacy at Washington through which negotia
tion of the treaty was made possible; Sir John
A. Macdonald was one of the five British mem
bers of the joint high commission by which the
treaty was actually concluded. Rose had been
until very recently minister of finance in the
Canadian cabinet; Macdonald was the prime
minister of the Dominion. The participation
of Rose in the affair was determined largely by
his exceptionally wide and Intimate business
and social connections In all three of the coun
tries concerned, and by his amiable personality;
the appointment of Macdonald signified the
formal recognition by Westminster that the
British-American commonwealth was entitled
265

266 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
to share through Its government in the imperial
diplomacy that affected It. Complaints had
always been made by the colonials that their
interests were lightly regarded in the adjust
ments reached between the British Government
and the United States. A Canadian represent
ative in the negotiations would shield the gov
ernment against such complaints, though, as
Sir John Macdonald shrewdly foresaw, colonial
wrath, if things went wrong, would not again
be dissipated In long-range fretting against
Westminster, but would fall with concentration
and promptness upon his own devoted head.
Despite the suspicion that his function might
be primarily that of the scapegoat, he served
on the joint high commission with force and
efficiency, and strengthened pro tanto the pres
tige at home and abroad of the recently organ
ized Dominion of Canada.
The union of all the British provinces of
North America In a single governmental system
had been contemplated as possible and desirable
by thoughtful publicists for many decades.
With the increase of population, the growth of
intercourse, commercial and social, and the im
provements in means of communication, the
advantages of union became ever more percep-

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 267
tible. The impulse to its actual realization
came, however, as much from without as from
within the provinces. It was not a mere coin
cidence that the initial steps toward creating
the Dominion of Canada were taken during the
Civil War in the United States,
Sympathy in Canada with the South was
sufficiently common and sufficiently outspoken
during the war to evoke much heated denun
ciation across the border. With the rumors
and realities of extensive operations by the Con
federates from a base in Canada, the temperature
of Northern comment became excessively high.
The attitude of the Canadian authorities re
mained scrupulously correct, and the excitement
pervading the press and platform of the North
was properly discounted; yet there remained a
feeling of uneasiness and foreboding as to what
was going to happen when the titanic struggle
should end. If the North should triumph, a
war of revenge against Great Britain and its
possessions was likely; If the North should fail,
an effort to compensate for the loss of the South
by expansion at the expense of Great Britain
might equally be expected. In either case It
behooved the prudent statesman to take all
possible precautions for the care of the provin-

268 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
cial Interests. Some kind of consolidation was
obviously desirable for the security of the half
dozen all but independent political organisms
that made up British North America.
It so happened that just at this time the
legislative union by which Upper Canada and
Lower Canada had been brought into harmony
in 1 841 reached the end of its usefulness. Party
conflict, turning upon the antipathy between
the French and the English races, brought
paralysis upon the administration. A way out
could not be found till a coalition of the dead
locked parties was effected for the purpose of
instituting a new constitutional system through
federation. The specific requirement In the
internal politics of Canada was some readjust
ment that should satisfy the demands of the
English element In the upper province for power
proportioned to their now superior numbers as
compared with the French of the lower prov
ince. Failure to satisfy these demands was
likely at any moment to cause a revival of the
sentiment in favor of annexation to the United
States. The Americans were manifestly re
solved upon abrogating the Treaty of Reci
procity, In order to renew the commercial pres
sure upon the Canadians, at the same time that

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 269
the bitterness of the war-time was making a
resort to arms far from Improbable. Under
these circumstances all the statesmen and other
classes who were devoted to the British con
nection were stimulated to strenuous action.
The Maritime Provinces meanwhile had been
for some years discussing the idea of a union
among themselves. Their motives were in some
measure the same as those that were operative
in Canada, and in some respects peculiar to
themselves. A conference on the subject be
tween delegates from New Brunswick, Nova
Scotia, and Prince Edward Island took place In
1864, just at the time when the political situa
tion In Canada was most critical. The Cana
dian ministry, a coalition of George Brown,
the ablest Radical, and John A, Macdonald, the
astute Conservative leader, seized the oppor
tunity and effected the transformation of the
conference of the Maritime Provinces into a
more comprehensive body in which delegates
from Canada and Newfoundland were included.
The larger conference met at Quebec In October,
1864, and formulated a series of resolutions out
of which, after long and varied discussion in
each province and at London, was shaped the
constitution of the Dominion of Canada. The

270 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
British North America Act, in which this con
stitution found legal expression, was enacted
by the British Parliament in 1867, and the new
system went into operation on the ist of July
of that year. The acceptance of the new order
by Canada was prompt and easy. To the other
provinces, however, the appeal of the confedera
tion was far less strong. New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia acceded only after a sharp conflict,
and after the Fenian forays of 1866 accentuated
the arguments of the reformers. Prince Ed
ward Island held aloof from the union until 1873,
while Newfoundland persisted permanently In
her Independence.
A strong and conspicuous influence of the
United States in the formation of the Dominion
was to be seen in the distrust and fear that the
great republic inspired; yet this was by no
means the whole of the part played by the
greater nation in the self-realization of the less.
The constitutional problems of federal union
that confronted the Canadians were in most
cases those that had been the core of American
history since 1776. Hence throughout the de
bates In which the constitution of the Dominion
took form, the experience of the United States
was continuously before the debaters. Amer-

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 271
ican history and Institutions were as sedulously
searched as those of the mother-country for
precedent and for warning. Despite the un
friendly feelings in which the Dominion took
its rise, its constitution is in the fullest sense an
embodiment of the combined experience of all
three of the great English-speaking peoples of
the day.
In the project for the union of the British
provinces was involved the larger project of a
national consolidation of the whole of the Brit
ish territory in America north of the United
States, In correspondence with the expansion
of the republic across the continent to the
Pacific, the new Dominion was to include the
whole vast region westward to the ocean and the
Russian boundary. Nor was the slow and pain
ful process through which the United States had
acquired its western area to be duplicated. The
course of the Imperial government was defi
nitely agreed upon before the British North
America Act was passed. In 1868 the rights
of the Hudson's Bay Company, in whom up to
1859 the sole control of most of the region had
for generations been vested, were taken over
by the Dominion. Three years later the prov
ince of Manitoba was organized on part of this

272 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
territory as a new member of the confederation,
and still another province, British Columbia, far
across on the Pacific, also entered the Dominion.
Thus emulously the new English-speaking na
tion duplicated, with whatever disproportion
in numbers, the westward progress of Its great
neighbor on the south. The faithfulness of the
duplication unhappily extended to certain un
savory details of politico-financial operations In
the development of the new regions. In the
United States the first transcontinental railway
was completed in 1869. In Canada the pledge
of Immediate and energetic prosecution of a
parallel enterprise was a feature of the proced
ure through which British Columbia became a
part of the Dominion. A single year, 1873,
witnessed in its early months the ruin of several
fair political reputations in the United States
by the malodorous exposure of the Credit
Mobilier, and In its later months the downfall
of the first prime minister of the Dominion in
consequence of relations with the financiers of
the inchoate Canadian Pacific enterprise.
The consolidation of British North America
into the Dominion was in itself an expression of
the feeling of national unity, and it was fol
lowed by the steady unfolding of policies that

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 273
were in harmony with that Ideal. Nationality,
as a basis of political organization, has been
historically a concept quite free from the
limitations of exact definition. Community of
ancestry, of language, of traditions, of customs,
of religion, of geographic environment, of eco
nomic Interest, and of Intellectual ideals have
been jointly and severally set up as the essential
justification for the claim to the rights and
privileges of a nation. No one of these could
be predicated of the Dominion of Canada in
1867. Under such circumstances it was no
light undertaking for the 3,500,000 scattered
people of the provinces to set out on the way of
self-sufficiency. The initial requirements of the
enterprise were obviously the assurance of po
litical and economic independence of the United
States and the maintenance at all hazards of
the connection with the United Kingdom.
Awkward questions were involved from the
outset in these requirements, but they were
met with boldness and success.
The constitution of the Dominion dealt with
the most rancorous problems of race and relig
ion by disjoining the two old provinces of
Canada and giving to each — Protestant and
English Ontario and Catholic and French Que-

274 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
bee — a complete government of its own, sub
ject to the supremacy of the government of the
Dominion. To counteract the well-nigh over
whelming economic pressure by which commerce
and Industry were made subject to the United
States, every effort was put forth to develop
railways running east and west. The Inter-
cplonial Railway, uniting Quebec with Halifax,
a long-projected enterprise of both economic
and military Importance, was completed with
imperial aid in 1876. The Canadian Pacific,
delayed by the scandal of 1873, was not in opera
tion until nearly ten years later than the Inter
colonial. Along with these great monuments
of national growth came the slow but sure de
velopment of that system which has been a
feature of every new birth of national spirit
In the nineteenth century — the stimulation of
industry by a protective tariff. In 1878 Sir
John A. Macdonald, after five years of exclu
sion from power following his downfall on the
Canadian-Pacific affair, won a great popular
triumph on the clearly defined issue of pro
tection, and at once put the new policy into
operation. The United States was just at this
time emerging from the fiscal chaos of the Civil
War. Specie payments superseded the irre-

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 275
deemable paper currency, and the refunding of
the huge war debt rendered possible far-reach
ing readjustments in revenue and taxation.
This situation brought the question of the tar
iff to the foreground In politics and demanded
the judgment of the people as to maintaining
the high protection that had been established
through the fiscal exigencies of the war. Though
the principle was less decisively settled for
many years than in the Dominion, the practical
issue was the same. As Canada Introduced the
protective tariff, the United States retained It,
Thus by the opening of the ninth decade of
the century the two English-speaking peoples
of America had reverted to the restrictive com
mercial and industrial system that had been
dropped with much parade of finality in the
fifth decade. Economic Independence of Great
Britain was the chief end that determined the
policy of the United States; economic Independ
ence of the United States was the chief end
that determined the policy of Canada. In
each case the experiment was costly, but far
more so to the Dominion than to the republic.
No small sacrifice to the national ideal was re
quired In resisting the lure of trade, transporta
tion, and financial advantage to the southward

276 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
and laboriously building up a purely Canadian
economy. The spirit that sustains such sac
rifices, however noble and exalted it undoubtedly
may be In some aspects, is notoriously not the
spirit that most promotes cordial friendships
among neighboring peoples. The simultaneous
renascence of protectionism in the United States
and Canada had a very close relation to the
friction that became spectacular In the eighties
and the early nineties. The immediate source
of the friction was the very familiar old ques
tion of the inshore fisheries on the Atlantic
coast, with later a less familiar but no less troub
lesome dispute over the seal fisheries of the far
northwestern ocean.
The Treaty of Washington of 1871, as we
have seen, admitted Americans to the inshore
fisheries on the coast of the Dominion, In return
for the admission of fish and fish-oil free of
duty to the United States and such additional
compensation as should be awarded by arbi
trators. This arrangement went Into effect July
I, 1873, and a year later Newfoundland became
a party to It. The award of $5,500,000 by
the Halifax commission practically sounded the
knell of this arrangement. The amount was
deemed exorbitant by most Americans com-

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 277
petent to judge, the position officially taken
by the government being that the privilege pf
the inshore fishing was desirable for Americans,
not at all for economic advantage, but merely
to remove a cause of International friction.
This latter purpose was not wholly achieved.
In 1878, at Fortune Bay, Newfoundland, an
American fishing crew was mobbed by local
residents for disregarding the prohibition to
ply the trade on Sunday. The British Govern
ment ultimately granted an indemnity to the
Americans, but the question whether local
provincial legislation was seriously to affect
the rights based on treaties remained not alto
gether clear.
The definitive committal of both Canada and
the United States to protectionism confirmed
the fate of the fisheries arrangement. The
fish-packing interests of New England entered
strong and continuous protests against the sac
rifice of their rights by the free admission of
Canadian fish, while other products of the
Dominion were subject to heavy duties. When
the ten years expired for which the fisheries
articles were to run. Congress, with little or no
opposition, directed the President to give the
requisite two years' notice of the abrogation of

278 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
the articles. Accordingly, they ceased to be
operative on July i, 1885, and the way was
open for renewal of the ancient friction. A
provisional arrangement by which the Amer
icans were not to be molested in their custom
ary pursuits for the season of 1885 secured
peace for that year; but with the next fishing-
season troubles promptly developed that se
verely strained the resources of diplomacy.
The authorities of the Dominion, in whose
jurisdiction the police of the shores and the
enforcement of the customs laws now lay, pro
ceeded to a merciless enforcement of the rules
that operated to hamper the enterprise of the
American fishermen. Under these rules fishing-
vessels were forbidden to enter Canadian ter
ritorial waters except for shelter, repairs, wood
or water. Many a captain took the chances of
trouble by seeking under cover of these excep
tions to renew the supply of bait on which the
success of his deep-sea fishing depended. The
zeal of the Canadian guard-boats was as active
as that of the American fishermen, and frequent
seizures were made of the alleged offenders.
Complaints and recriminations in the press and
In the legislatures of the two countries assumed
great scope and bitterness. It was charged in

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 279
the United States that the sole animus of the
Canadian procedure was the desire to force
concessions to Canadian goods In the tariff. In
Canada, on the other hand, it was charged that
the agitation across the border was designed to
break down the Canadian tariff In the Interest
of American manufactures. That there was an
element of truth In both charges did not ma
terially relieve the situation.
The tension due to this matter lasted till af
ter the presidential election of 1888. Only the
season of 1886, however, presented incidents
of a really serious character. As a consequence
of these incidents the American Congress, In Its
following session, enacted a retaliatory law, au
thorizing the President, in case of further 111
treatment of the fishermen, to exclude from
American waters and ports the vessels and com
modities of the Dominion. No action was ever
taken, however, under the authority conferred
by this act. The lessons of 1886 produced a
less militant attitude on the part of both the
American fishermen and the Canadian revenue
officers. Methods were devised through which
the difficulties that arose between them could
be and were promptly adjusted. Yet on ac
count of the partisan political conditions pre-

28o THE GROWTH OF CANADA
vailing, especially in the United States, the
significance of every frictional episode was
systematically exaggerated, and the permanent
diplomatic settlement of all the controversies
was prevented. A treaty was actually con
cluded, February 15, 1888, the terms of which
provided a full and equitable provision for all
the doubtful points that had arisen. The
Senate of the United States refused to approve
it, for reasons which, so far as the public debate
on the question may be assumed to reveal them,
related much more to President Cleveland's
candidacy for re-election than to the merits of
the fisheries question. Pending the action of
the Senate, a modus vivendi for two years was
agreed to by the governments, under the terms
of which licenses to trade for fishing-supplies in
the British ports were granted for a price to the
American fishermen, and they were absolved
from burdensome customs regulations. Though
the treaty failed, the terms of this modus con
tinued to govern the situation by the tacit
consent of all the parties concerned, and fur
ther trouble was for the time avoided.
The friction after 1885 over the fisheries had
far-reaching effects. It contributed to the de
velopment of an anti-British sentiment in the

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 281
United States that reached a serious climax
a decade later. The feeling at first excited by
the seizure of the American fishermen was di
rected naturally against the Canadians. Later,
despite the unconcealed and eager efforts of
the British Imperial government to bring about
a satisfactory accommodation, a truculent spirit
In respect to England became Increasingly
manifest throughout the United States. It was
wide-spread rather than deep, and It received
nourishment from a number of casual circum
stances. The home politics of Great Britain contrib
uted something. It was in 1886 that Mr.
Gladstone's Irish policy wrecked the Liberal
Party and brought Lord Salisbury In for a long
tenure of the premiership. The Parnell move
ment for home rule had for years attracted
much sympathy In the United States, even out
side the circle of Irish-Americans from whom it
drew so much of Its financial support. When
Gladstone gave way to the pressure of the
Irish and introduced his first Home Rule Bill,
the action presented Itself to very many Amer
icans as another step In the democratic direc
tion which he had followed, notably In the
extension of the suffrage In 1884, The failure

282 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
of the bill and the accession of the Marquis of
Salisbury to power appeared to denote a great
triumph of reaction. Lord Salisbury's reputa
tion In America was that of a case-hardened
aristocrat, with no faculty of aristocratic reserve
when the caustic delineation of his adversaries
was concerned. His opinions and expressions
concerning the United States had been noto
riously contemptuous. It was easy, therefore,
for those who were interested, to strengthen the
presumption that the British policy In the mat
ter of the fisheries was but a manifestation of
the unfriendly spirit which the prime minister
was disposed to promote.
The same disturbing end was furthered by the
condition of party politics in the United States,
Control of the government was divided between
the two great parties. President Cleveland
was a Democrat; the Senate was by a small
majority controlled by the Republicans, In
the country at large the voters were very evenly
divided, and the struggle of the politicians for
the support of those whose preferences could
be influenced by anti-British prejudice was very
keen. As the campaign of 1888 approached.
President Cleveland, in a dramatic manner,
brought the tariff into the foreground as the

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 283
chief Issue between the parties, and committed
the Democrats to the policy of abolishing the
protective system. The Republicans, adopt
ing formally the defence of protection, strove
with energy and much success to attach to
their adversaries the odium of devotion to
"British free trade," It was freely asserted
that English manufacturers were actively as
sisting the Democrats. By a trick that any
thing above infantile sagacity would have
detected, the British minister at Washington,
Sir L, S, Sackvllle West, was actually Induced
to write a letter to an unknown correspondent
advising him to vote the Democratic ticket as
the most advantageous to British Interests.
At the climax of the campaign the letter was
published and was hailed by the Republicans
as conclusive proof of their allegations concern
ing the relations of the English with the Demo
crats, President Cleveland demanded the re
call of Sackvllle West. Lord Salisbury refused.
Thereupon the minister received his passports,
and his post was left vacant for many months
by his government. The Republicans, mean
while, triumphed In the elections, and under the
presidency of Mr, Harrison entered uppn a
policy of extreme and aggressive protectionism

284 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
through the enactment of the famous McKinley
Bill. In addition to this policy, the Harrison ad
ministration brought to the front a personality
which gave small promise of better relations
with any foreign power, Mr, James G, Blaine
became secretary of state. He brought to
that office the reputation of one who would
assert with exceptional vigor the rights and
claims of the United States, His political fol
lowing Included a group of Irish- Americans to
whom the separation of Ireland from Great
Britain was an end that justified any means.
His public career teemed with incidents that
had rasped the feelings of Britons and Cana
dians as effectively as Lord Salisbury had rastoed
the Americans. The conjunction of these two
men at the head of the foreign offices boded IH
for amity among the English-speaking peoples.
It was expected that the accession of the
Harrison administration would be followed by
a renewal of the tension concerning the north
eastern fisheries. Forebodings in this respect
proved groundless. No settlement of the dis
puted questions of right was indeed arrived at,
but careful and considerate conduct by both
fishermen and authorities made serious clashes

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 285
avoidable. On the other side of the continent,
however, in the waters of the northern Pacific,
a situation had arisen In which, with reversed
roles, Americans and Canadians were In dan
gerous controversy.
In the summer of 1886, at the very time when
the Canadian revenue cutters were giving most
trouble to the cod and mackerel fishermen of
New England, American revenue cutters be
gan to make trouble for the seal-hunters of
British Columbia, The laws of the United
States prohibited the killing of fur-seals In
Alaska except by a company to whom the right
had been leased of taking a limited number of
skins, by carefully restricted methods, on the
Pribllof Islands in Behring Sea. These is
lands were the resort of vast numbers of the
animals each summer for breeding. Hunting
of the seals on the high seas, beyond the three-
mile line, was carried on actively by vessels of
American, British, Japanese, and other nation
alities. The methods employed by these deep-
sea hunters were wasteful of seal life, and were
alleged to be the chief cause of a great decline
in the number of animals frequenting the
breeding-grounds. At the Instance of the com
pany whose interests were thus threatened,

286 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
the American authorities in Alaska proceeded
to assert far-reaching powers for controlling
the situation. In 1886 three, and in the next
summer four, British sealers were seized by
American revenue cutters in Behring Sea, at
distances from the shore varying from fifteen
to one hundred and fifteen miles, on the charge
of violating the law forbidding the killing of
seals in Alaska. The court of the district up
held the seizures and Inflicted penalties on the
crews of the vessels, taking the ground that
Behring Sea was mare clausum, and that so
much of It as lay to the eastward of the water
boundary described In the treaty of cession by
Russia was subject to the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.
Against this whole procedure the British
Foreign Office entered vigorous protests. There
was involved a claim to control over a stretch
of open ocean some seven hundred miles in
width — and that by a government which was
vehemently objecting to the exercise on the
Atlantic coast of like control over ocean spaces
but a paltry forty miles wide. The administra
tion at Washington refrained from pressing the
contention on which the Alaskan court rested,
and ordered the release of the seized vessels. On

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 287
Other grounds, however, the preservation of the
seals from extinction was taken up as a duty of
general concern to civilized nations, and on the
proposition of Secretary Bayard a project of
joint action for the protection of the seals was
agreed to in Its general features by the British
and other governments. This plan looked to a
prohibition of pelagic sealing in Behring Sea.
Before the adjustment of the details could be per
fected. In May, 1888, the negotiations were
somewhat abruptly suspended by the British
Government at the request of the Canadian
authorities. The sealing Interests of British
Columbia had by this, time impressed upon the
Dominion government the fear that an impor
tant industry was about to be sacrificed for the
benefit of an American monopoly. Polntblank
issue was made against the claim that the
Pribllof seal herd was seriously decreasing In
numbers, and it was stoutly maintained that if
there was any perceptible diminution, it was
attributable to the methods of the American
monopoly rather than to pelagic hunting.
To the disputes as to the facts was added,
as an Influence In the sudden change of attitude
by the British, the coincident rejection by the
American Senate of the draft treaty touching

288 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
the northeastern fisheries.^ Both controversies
thus went over to be taken up by the successor
of the Cleveland administration. In this situa
tion there was no room to question the impor
tance of the Canadian governmental and un
official sentiment. Sir Charles Tupper, the
shrewd and experienced associate of Sir John
Macdonald in the Dominion cabinet, was a
member of the commission that negotiated the
unratified treaty of 1888, and was the official
through whom the communication was made
that put an end to the negotiations as to the
seals. The oft-reiterated complaint that Cana
dian interests were sacrificed through failure of
the Imperial government to make itself Informed
about them could have no place In connection
with these Incidents. On the contrary, the
Americans manifested from time to time Im
patience and even stronger feeling because of
the time lost, as they declared, by the care of
the British Foreign Office to Insure that its
every step should receive the vise of the Do
minion cabinet.
In the summer of 1889 the activity of the
revenue cutters In Behring Sea, which was sus
pended during the preceding summer, was re-
' See above, p. 280.

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 289
sumed. Nine British sealers were visited and
six of them were seized. This precipitated a
fervid diplomatic correspondence between Sec-
•• retary Blaine and Lord Salisbury. His Lord
ship stood firm on the ground that British ves
sels must not be molested on the high seas.
The secretary, dropping the claim of mare
clausum, justified the action of the United
States on the ground that pelagic hunting under
the circumstances was contra bonos mores — in
contravention of the general Interest and wel
fare of mankind — and was therefore to be sup
pressed, like piracy, without regard to the nor
mal freedom of the seas. By degrees, however,
the debate worked around to the proposal of
arbitration, with a provisional cessation of the
killing of seals, A modus vivendi was arranged
for the seasons of 1891 and 1892, under which
taking furs was prohibited, and experts were
set to work to ascertain all the facts of the
situation. Meanwhile a treaty of arbitration
was signed February 29, 1892, and duly ratified.
The tribunal of arbitration consisted of two
Americans, two representatives of Great Britain,
and one member appointed by the French, the
Italian, and the Swedish Governments respect
ively. It was entirely In keeping with the

290 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
trend of Imperial relations that one of the
British representatives should be Sir John S, D,
Thompson, Canadian minister of justice, and
that the responsibilities of British agent should
be assigned to Sir Charles Tupper. The tri
bunal met for Its first session at Paris in Feb
ruary, 1893, ^^d rendered its decision on the
15th of August following. On all the points
formally submitted for adjudication the de
cision was adverse to the contention of the
United States. It was held that that power, in
taking over Alaska from Russia, acquired no
exclusive jurisdiction in Behring Sea and no
exclusive rights In the seal fisheries therein;
and that the American Government had no
right of protection or property in the fur-seals
that frequented the Pribllof Islands when the
animals were outside the three-mile limit. At
the same time the tribunal formulated regula
tions and restrictions under which, for the pres
ervation of the herd, pelagic sealing ought to
be carried on, and these rules were duly enacted
into law by both governments for their respect
ive subjects. Thus the maintenance of bonos
mores on the high seas was made a matter of
international co-operation, while the American
Government, for its ambitious undertaking to

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 291
exercise that lofty function unaided, was obliged
to pay something like half a million dollars in
damages to the seized British sealers.
The settlement of this dispute by arbitration
gave much satisfaction to the special friends
of peace among English-speaking peoples. Not
that the controversy over the seals had seri
ously threatened war. Feeling In relation to It,
whether in governmental circles or In the public
at large, never became generally bellicose In
either Canada, Great Britain, or the United
States. Yet it doubtless did contribute a share,
however small, to the stimulation of the Intense
nationalistic susceptibilities that were manifest
in both the Dominion and the republic.
Pride of strength and of achievement became
peculiarly demonstrative In the United States
during the decade of the eighties. The cause
can be but uncertainly detected amid the
obscurities of national psychology, but the
effects are patent and unmistakable. Through
press and pulpit and platform was revealed a
consuming sense of power and a deep craving
to make It felt, and to extort recognition of It
from other peoples. For three decades the prob
lems of slavery and civil war had absorbed the
physical and intellectual strength of the nation.

292 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
These had passed and a new generation de
manded new opportunities for testing its forces.
The population exceeded 50,000,000; the ma
terial resources of the land were being revealed
in ever-increasing variety and volume; by the
progress of settlement the vast Interior spaces
of the continent were peopled and organized,
till at the decade's end the full-fledged States
of the Union stretched in unbroken series three
thousand miles from ocean to ocean. It was
an Imposing political fabric, and the citizen
who admired It from within might be pardoned
for Insisting on tributes of admiration from
without. This national pride found something of sat
isfaction during the eighties in the beginnings
of a fleet that should conform to the standards
of the time. Likewise expressive of the feeling
was the popular approval of the policy which
secured to the United States, after a somewhat
acrimonious tilt with Germany, a substantial
foothold In the far-distant Samoan Islands.
This Initial excursion into the field of extra-
American dependencies was stimulated by the
exciting competition during the preceding years
between Great Britain and Germany for colo
nial possessions. Those who had confidence In

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 293
the future expansion of American commerce
were much Irritated at the thoroughness with
which the most promising scenes of coming
trade and naval stations for Its protection were
appropriated by the European rival powers,
Samoa at least was insured to the commerce of
the United States, and In that fact was a source
of small but sufficient comfort for those to whom
the future of the Philippines was darkness.
Additional stimulus to American sensibilities
was given by the movement for imperial fed
eration that took shape and became prominent
throughout the British Empire during the
eighties. The chief Impulse to this movement
came obviously enough from the expanding
activities of Russia In Asia and Germany in
Africa. British prestige and commercial in
terests were felt to be Imperilled. The Indian
Empire might readily yield to the insidious
sapping of the Russians; the self-governing
colonies in Australasia and Africa might be
lured to seek through nominal independence a
real connection with Britain's latest commer
cial rival. In Australia notoriously, and in
other of the colonies with no less certainty, an
active fraction of public opinion favored sev
erance, sooner or later, of the British tie. In

294 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
England itself, as we have seen, such severance
had long been regarded In high political circles
as inevitable and not wholly undesirable. Now,
however, that the time seemed to be approach
ing for the realization of this predestined break
up, opposition became vigorously vocal In bpth
colonies and mother-land. The Imperial Feder
ation League, unofficially, and a succession of
conferences under the auspices of the imperial
and colonial governments, officially, instituted
earnest discussion of the ways and means of
maintaining the unity of the empire.
While the origin of this agitation was in con
ditions remote from America, the future of
Canada and Its relations with the United States
became at once, when the problem was fairly
posed, the central question of the debate. The
immediate practical end that engaged the
attention of the federatlonists was military and
naval defence of the widely scattered members
of the empire. Tariff arrangements that should
promote a unifying tendency were also sug
gested. So soon as discussion of these ends
touched Canada, her great neighbor to the
southward became the subject of disquieting
consideration. Defensive arrangements for New
South Wales might suggest malevolent inten-

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 295
tions on the part of Germany or France or
Japan; the tariff of the Cape Colony might be
directed against the intrusive competition of
these or half a dozen other enterprising nations:
but in connection with the Dominion of Canada
military and commercial protection could refer
primarily to no power save the United States.
Hence it was that the animated discussion of
Imperial federation acted as a challenge to the
militant national spirit in the republic. Inci
dents of normal national development In which
the Canadians took justifiable pride — the sup
pression of the Riel uprising of 1885 by Domin
ion forces, the completion of the railway line
from ocean to ocean In the same year, the great
improvements in the canals, and the develop
ment of manufactures — ^were jealously regard
ed by sensitive Americans as so many steps
toward the perfection of an imperial policy of
hostility toward the United States.
The Internal party politics of the Dominion
presented certain incidents that served to con
firm the unfriendly trend in American opinion.
In the later eighties systematic agitation was
begun by a small group of able men for a policy
of commercial union, even if it should lead
eventually to political union, between Canada

296 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
and the United States. The basis of the move
ment was the despair of ever securing other
wise such trade relations with the powerful
neighbor as would bring real prosperity to the
people of the Dominion. The rejection of
reciprocity of the old sort in 1888 and the
triumph of the protectionists In the presiden
tial elections of that year were held to have
ended all hope of escaping the ruthless extinc
tion of Canada's Industrial Independence. With
out ill feeling toward the mother-land and with
out desire to sever the political ties uniting the
colony to her, the advocates of commercial
union frankly declared that to Canadians, as
conditions had developed, the economic bur
den of the British connection had become too
great to be borne. Goldwin Smith, the lit
erary high priest of this creed, sustained it with
all the frigid doctrinaire logic of Manchesterism
in Its best estate, contending that geography
made physically inevitable, and political econ
omy made morally necessary, the annexation of
Canada to the United States. Federation with
the far-flung fragments of English-speaking
humanity was to him a ridiculous dream. The
Liberal Party In the Dominion, with its tradi
tion of free trade, showed some tenderness for

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 297
the commercial-unionists, while Sir John Mac
donald, leading the Conservatives, In his last
campaign, gladly seized the opportunity to
appeal once more to the sentiment of loyalty
to Great Britain. The elections of 1891 gave
him a final victory, and showed with quite
adequate clearness that the Canadian people
preferred to follow their feelings In the British
Empire rather than their Interests In the Amer
ican Republic,
No great access of hostile feeling In the United
States toward the Canadians was manifest as
a result of this preference. It was regarded by
many Americans as a natural and properly
spirited response to the McKinley tariff of the
preceding year. This law administered almost
fatal blows to certain important Canadian indus
tries, and It was accompanied by the rejection,
so peremptory as to be almost insulting, of
overtures from Canada looking to the renewal
of reciprocity as in 1854. The McKinley Act
in fact proclaimed a tariff war a outrance be
tween the two neighbors, and the Canadian
election of 1891 signified a readiness for the
struggle. In the United States, however, there
was halting and indecision. The elections of
1892 brought the Democrats again into power.

298 THE GROWTH OF CANADA
and the result was a renunciation of the Mc
Kinley programme, with the modified tariff of
1894. This in turn was repudiated by the
voters, and In 1897 the DIngley Act brought the
definitive adoption of protection In its most
thoroughgoing form.
The shifting phases of the prolonged and
complex struggle In the United States produced
the results that are inevitable when the con
flicts over trade and markets that used to con
vulse the politics of monarchies are reproduced
In democratic states. Among the masses there
was but a dim perception of the real financial
and industrial interests that were at stake In
the discussions over the tariff rates. What
appeared clear to all, however, was that for
eigners, especially the British, were In some way
seeking to get advantages over American com
petitors. The merits of the case not being
intelligible, the average citizen could be moved
in his judgments only by the sense of an insid
ious and pernicious activity by foreigners di
rected against his countrymen.
Such was the contribution made by the
tariff controversies to the latent feeling of hos
tility In the United States toward all things
British as it existed In the later eighties and

THE GROWTH OF CANADA 299
early nineties. The unfavorable decision in
the fur-seal arbitration had a certain Influence
of the same nature. Whatever the merits of
the case on the technical claims of the lawyers,
it was a game played In which the British won
and the Americans lost. To show too much
chagrin over the defeat must be avoided; but
to nourish a dislike of the victor and be vigilant
for a chance to get satisfaction was within the
reach of all.
It was a synthesis of the various elements of
popular feeling just noticed, supplemented by
the Influence of conspicuous political personali
ties, that produced the astounding explosion of
1895 In relation to Venezuela,

CHAPTER VII
VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
In June, 1895, after a Liberal interlude of
nearly three years under Mr. Gladstone and
Lord Rosebery, the British Government came
once more into the hands of the Marquis of
Salisbury, leading the coalition of Conserva
tives and Liberal-Unionists, It was destined to
be ten years before another change of party con
trol should take place, so thoroughly were the
Liberals demoralized by the fall of Parnell and
the retirement of Gladstone.
Lord Salisbury entered upon his administra
tion with complete consciousness that the rela
tions of Great Britain with the other powers
of Europe would require the most absorbing
attention. The harrying of the Armenians by
the Turks was in full progress, disturbing the
delicate adjustment made by the Conference of
Berlin in 1878; in the Far East, Japan, fresh
from her triumph over China, was confronting
Russia in such a way as to raise pressing ques
tions about British interests in that region;
300

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 301
Africa, from the Cape to Cairo, teemed with
disquieting problems — ^with Kitchener just start
ing to redeem the Soudan, Italy on the verge
of disastrous war with Menelik of Abyssinia,
France and Germany, in the central and south
ern regions of the continent, watching the
promise of trouble between the British and their
Dutch and native neighbors. Intent on the
possibilities In all these directions, his Lordship
was probably much shocked to be confronted,
only a few weeks after taking oflice, with a
diplomatic communication that peremptorily
diverted his attention to affairs in America.
On August 7 Mr. Bayard, ambassador of the
United States, presented to Lord Salisbury the
celebrated note of Secretary of State Olney on
the matter of the Venezuelan boundary.
The line separating British Guiana from
Venezuela had never been determined. Nego
tiations touching the subject had been carried
on by the Venezuelan and British Governments
at intervals since early in the nineteenth cen
tury, but for various reasons without conclusive
result. Beginning in the late seventies, Vene
zuela had pressed Insistently for a submission
of the question to arbitration. At the same
time she had kept the Government of the

302 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
United States Informed as to the situation, and
had urged upon that government the duty of
sustaining the demand for arbitration. The
Venezuelan contention was that Great Brit
ain, under cover of the- uncertainty as to the
boundary, was continually extending her settle
ments and her jurisdiction into the disputed
territory, and was thus contravening the Mon
roe Doctrine. In the documents submitted to
the United States by the Venezuelan author
ities there was some evidence to support this
view, and to sustain the charge that the British
refusal to go to arbitration was animated by
the purpose to delay a settlement until still
larger areas of rich mineral land should be oc
cupied by British subjects.
Successive administrations at Washington lis
tened with friendly interest to the Venezuelan
representations, but refrained from taking up
the matter with the British Government, partly
because it was the wish of the Venezuelans that
the United States should be the umpire In case
of an arbitration, and this would be rendered
Impracticable If the United States should com
mit herself In any degree to the Venezuelan
interest at the outset. During the first term
of President Cleveland, however, when the ten-

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 303
sion on the subject had become so acute as to
result soon in the rupture of diplomatic rela
tions between Venezuela and Great Britain,
Secretary Bayard made a formal tender of good
offices to the British Government, alluding in
his despatch to the Monroe Doctrine. The
tender was declined, with no overwhelming
manifestation of gratitude on the part of Lord
Salisbury, and with only the most vague and
general indication of the British position. A
year later, in 1888, upon a report that British
mining operators were beginning work In parts
of the disputed territory hitherto untouched.
Secretary Bayard made another offer of media
tion, but with no more success. Somewhat
later, with the active interest of the American
Government negotiations between Venezuela
and Great Britain were resumed, but in 1893
they came to a full stop again on account of the
old obstacle. Venezuela demanded arbitration
on the full claims of both parties; Great Britain
refused absolutely, as she had done since the
middle of the century, to submit to an arbiter
her title to certain regions that had long been
occupied by British settlements. These regions
were held to be sufficiently well determined by
a line run by a surveyor named Schomburgk,

304 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
and the territory within this Schomburgk line
was declared to be the Irreducible minimum of
the British possessions. Only what lay beyond
it could be made the subject of arbitration.
Against this attitude of the British Government
the Venezuelan Government entered solemn
protests, and made passionate appeals for inter
vention to the United States.
Mr. Cleveland was at this time President,
and Mr. Bayard was ambassador of the United
States at London. All the influences expressive
of the national self-consciousness, as noticed
in the last chapter, were obtrusively active in
the American Republic. At the very beginning
of his term the President had antagonized the
whole chauvinistic spirit by a summary reversal
of his predecessor's policy looking to the annex
ation of the Hawaiian Islands, and by a disas
trous attempt to restore the native monarchy
which the American population of the islands
had recently overthrown. To the enemies of
the administration this somewhat humiliating
episode gave the cue for incessant iteration of
the charge that the President lacked the virile
spirit that would give the nation its proper
place among the powers. Various unimpor
tant incidents, which might have been magnified

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 305
into demonstrations of aggressiveness In foreign
policy, were adjusted without excitement or
display; and this again was used to strengthen
the idea that nothing worthy of a great nation
was to be expected of Cleveland. Reference
to the Venezuelan dispute with Great Britain
was made in the President's annual message
to Congress in December, 1894, and Congress
later responded by a resolution urging that the
question be settled by arbitration; but the
general feeling in America was that, however
desirable such procedure was, no action by the
administration was to be expected.
Mr. Cleveland, meanwhile, reached the con
clusion that peril to peace would result if the
boundary dispute remained longer unsettled.
Venezuelan complaints continued frequent and
shrill; reports of further encroachments by
the British in the gold-mining regions were
diligently circulated; and ominous Indications
appeared in the American press of nervousness
lest the Monroe Doctrine were threatened with
infringement. It was resolved to bring the
affair to a head at once, and Secretary Olney's
despatch above referred to was the means
adopted. That the despatch was well calcu
lated to effect the Immediate end in view, could

3o6 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
hardly be questioned. It reviewed the course
of the boundary dispute. In the sense, for the
most part, of the Venezuelan representations;
it asserted the interest of the United States In
the controversy on the ground, first, of the
general principles of international law, and
second, of the long-established and often-pro
claimed policy known as the Monroe Doctrine;
it maintained that the British refusal to submit
the question to arbitration might cover a process
of aggression upon Venezuela that the United
States could not tolerate; and it concluded
with a demand for a definite decision as to
whether the British Government would or
would not submit the boundary question In Its
entirety to impartial arbitration.
The tone and temper of this communication
were unusual and should have warned Lord
Salisbury of an impending crisis. In connec
tion with the Monroe Doctrine, In particular.
Secretary Olney's pronouncements were start
ling. Among Its Implications were: that there
must be no intrusion by any European power
in the politics of any state of either North or
South America; that any permanent political
union between an American and a European
state is unnatural and Inexpedient; that the

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 307
United States is practically sovereign on the
American continent, "and Its fiat is law upon
the subjects to which It confines its interposi
tion." The challenge of such audacious and
arrogant dogmas It was naturally difficult to
resist, and Lord Salisbury was not of the tem
perament to ignore it. His response to Olney's
despatch took the form of two notes of the same
date, November. 26, 1895, One was devoted to
a demonstration that the Monroe Doctrine had
no standing In international law; that Mr,
Olney's version of Its content and implications
had never before been heard or dreamed of;
that neither in the Monroe Doctrine nor else
where could the United States find warrant for
the assertion of an Interest in every boundary
dispute between an American state and a
European power; and that Great Britain would
repel with emphasis and something of indigna
tion Secretary Olney's sweeping assumption
that her connection with her American colonies
was unnatural, inexpedient, and destined to
cease. In his second note Lord Salisbury re
viewed the course of the controversy with
Venezuela, presenting facts and considerations
that for the first time gave to the British case
a reasonable. If not wholly convincing, founda-

3o8 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
tion. The conclusion of the note, however,
embodied a reiteration of the old decision, not
to submit to arbitration the claims to regions
within the Schomburgk line.
If in substance and spirit Olney's note was
startlingly new, the response of Salisbury was
discouraglngly old. If the changed position
and aspirations of the United States were by
the one put in so high relief as to be somewhat
coarse and repulsive, they were by the other
left wholly out of the modelling. If Olney
brusquely voiced the feeling of the youth who
had reached his majority and claimed a grown
man's estate, Salisbury sounded the old Tory
note of querulous impatience with the restless
and Innovating spirit of the immature. No
doubt was left by the correspondence that the
two great English-speaking peoples were diplo
matically at the point of most serious tension.
President Cleveland's demand having been
refused by the British Government, he referred
the whole matter to Congress, laying before that
body, on December 17, 1895, the despatches
above referred to, with a message announcing
his views as to the existing situation and as to
the course that should be pursued by the United
States. With regret that the British Govern-

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 309
ment had declined to agree to the most satis
factory mode of ending the controversy with
Venezuela, he declared that the right, the duty,
and the Interest of the United States required
that it ascertain in some way what the true
boundary was. Only thus could there be cer
tainty that a strong European power was not
encroaching upon and oppressing a weak Amer
ican republic, and thus violating the Monroe
Doctrine. He asked Congress, therefore, to
provide for a commission to investigate the
history and facts of the matter, and report what
the true divisional line was between Venezuela
and British Guiana. The line thus determined
It would be the duty of the United States to
maintain as the lawful boundary. Any appro
priation of lands or exercise of jurisdiction by
Great Britain in places thus decided to belong
to Venezuela would be, Mr. Cleveland aflirmed,
a wilful aggression upon the rights and interests
of the United States, to be resisted by every
means in its power. And this belligerent atti
tude he confirmed beyond all misapprehension
by the ominous words: "In making these
recommendations I am fully alive to the respon
sibility Incurred, and keenly realize all the
consequences that may follow." Yet, he con-

3IO VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
eluded, "there Is no calamity which a great
nation can Invite which equals that which fol
lows a supine submission to wrong and injustice
and the consequent loss of national self-respect
and honor beneath which are shielded and
defended a people's safety and greatness."
The shock that was propagated through the
English-speaking world, and far beyond Its
bounds, by this message of President Cleveland
had no parallel since the seizure of Slidell and
Mason a generation in the past. Two facts
contributed much to the Intensity of the dis
turbance. The existence of anything like a
serious difference between the British and the
American Government was absolutely unsus
pected outside of a very small circle of public
men; and the President was believed by both
his friends and his foes to be so resolutely pacific
in his attitude that only the most Imperious
exigency could change it. The message re
vealed a disagreement so grave as to haye moved
even Mr. Cleveland to thought and speech of
war. Nor was anything reassuring to be found
In the action of Congress; for both houses,
without opposition, adopted the measure that
the President recommended, and with the new
year a commission of distinguished Americans

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 311
appointed by the President began its laborious
task of determining the true divisional line be
tween Venezuela and British Guiana.
It Is agreed by persons experienced In earth
quakes that this species of phenomenon Includes
distinct varieties, clearly marked off from one
another by physical and psychological effects.
The most destructive materially and most dis
turbing mentally is that known in unscientific
parlance as the "twister." President Cleve
land's message had all the effects of the twister.
Materially there was a huge displacement of
credits and securities In the financial markets.
Psychologically there was manifest on both sides
of the Atlantic great bewilderment and obfusca
tlon, with strange distortions and incoherencies
in the reasoning processes. American public
opinion sustained with extraordinary emphasis
and unanimity the President's assertion of the
Monroe Doctrine and his belligerent attitude
toward the violation of It by Great Britain.
Every latent current of hostility to the British
and all the springs of aggressive national con
sciousness united in an Impressive flood of popu
lar feeling. If the administration had had no
other purpose than to evoke for the information
of the world the visible spirit of the American

312 VENEZUELA-AND AFTER
democracy, that purpose was fully achieved in
the first week succeeding the Venezuelan mes
sage. Then came the distortions and confusion
of the twister. It began to appear on calm re
flection that, despite the stirring words at the
end of Cleveland's message, war with Great
Britain was neither declared nor imminent.
Whether or not the Monroe Doctrine applied to
the boundary dispute, no allegation was made
that the treasured doctrine had in fact been
violated. Peril to the honor and interests of
the United States was hypothetical, not actual;
and the warning of dire results to follow a cer
tain contingency was to be effective only after
a body of historians and jurists should have
discovered a boundary line which in all proba
bility was humanly undlscoverable. With the
due realization of these conditions the spirit of
militant Americanism receded into the depths
and, stronger and more self-confident for hav
ing been revealed In its full proportions, awaited
a more propitious season for asserting Itself.
Among the English people, meanwhile, Cleve
land's message and the manifestations of Ameri
can feeling that followed It were received chiefly
with bewilderment and Incredulity. That the
two governments should have reached in utter

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 313
secrecy the verge of war, was incomprehensi
ble; that so grave a situation should be due
to an obscure boundary dispute In one of the
least important fragments of the empire, seemed
grotesquely beyond the limits of belief. Some
voices from the lurking-places of ancient Tory
ism were shrill with resentment and defiance
toward the new display of Yankee insolence;
but the great volume of opinion sounded the
note of amazed regret that tension had arisen,
and of eager confidence that Its causes could be
removed. While responsible politicians were
appropriately reticent, men of light and leading
in other fields pronounced with emphasis and
Iteration that war between the two great Eng
lish-speaking nations was unthinkable. Au
thors, journalists, ministers of the Gospel, and
business men demanded that a peaceful way
out of the threatening difficulty should be
promptly found. The enormous development
in means of communication and thence in per
sonal relationships between the two peoples
made powerfully for amity. Where in the days
of the Trent affair Intimacies between English
men and Americans were numbered by dozens,
thousands and myriads existed in 1896. Across
the dividing Atlantic, therefore, sped by mail

314 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
and by cable great streams of protest against
rupture in fact or In feeling. Friendly re
sponses from America came promptly In reas
suring volume. Influential groups on both sides
of the ocean demanded that, no matter how
tight and tangled the knot made by diplomacy,
it be opened by the methods of peace, not of
war. Arbitration for the settlement of disputes
between the kindred peoples became within a
few weeks the theme of an extremely energetic
and wide-spread agitation, guided by co-operat
ing leaders of the intellectual classes of both
nations. While this unofficial sentiment was taking
active shape, there was much uneasiness lest the
diplomatists should not see their way, after so
peremptory a disagreement, to a dignified re
sumption of intercourse about the Venezuelan
question. A counter-irritant to oversensitive-
ness on this ground in the British Foreign Office
was found in the acute conditions that arose in
a far distant part of the empire less than a fort
night after Cleveland's disturbing message was
published. Jameson's ill-starred raid Into the
Transvaal met Its humiliating end on January
2, 1896, and on the following day the German
Emperor's congratulatory despatch to the Boer

VENEZUELA-AND AFTER 315
President was made known. The explosion of
British wrath over this incident drove Venezuela
and its boundary quite out of the range of pop
ular interest. Yankee interference in South
America excited mild regret; German inter
ference In South Africa roused the fiercest fight
ing passion. Yet the attitude of the United
States, however unimportant relatively, could
not be ignored by a prudent foreign minister
in the presence of threatening conditions nearer
home. For this reason, perhaps, among others.
Lord Salisbury met more than half-way the ad
vances of the Cleveland administration toward
further negotiation.
In the middle of January the American com
mission applied through Secretary Olney for
documentary and other information on which
Great Britain based its views as to the true
divisional line between Guiana and Venezuela.
Lord Salisbury furnished with enthusiasm all
that his office possessed. At the opening of
Parliament in February both he and Mr. Bal
four, leader of the Commons, admitted the
interest of the United States m the boundary
question, and Intimated the hope that diplomacy
would achieve a settlement of the difficulty.
At the same time his Lordship indicated a much

3i6 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
less intolerant attitude than before as to the
efficacy of arbitration In international differ
ences. In accordance with the disposition thus
manifested, a suggestion from Mr. Olney that
negotiations be undertaken at Washington for
the settlement of the difficulty with Venezuela
was agreed to by the British Government, with
a voluntary expression of willingness to take up
the matter either with Venezuela or with the
United States acting as her friend. So full a
concession to the American view could not fail
to insure a pacific agreement. The negotia
tions were begun forthwith between Great Brit
ain and America. The British abandoned their
insistence on a fixed line as the irreducible min
imum of their territory, and accepted the sub
mission of the whole claim of each power to
arbitration, with the proviso that actual occu
pation or control of any region for fifty years
should give title to either party. On this basis
a treaty of arbitration between Great Britain
and Venezuela was readily agreed to and duly
carried out. With this the matter of the
boundary passed out of concern in the rela
tions of the English-speaking peoples.
In its broad character as a diplomatic episode
this whole affair stands as an assertion by the

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 317
United States and a recognition by Great Brit
ain of a far wider Interest and authority be
yond her borders than was ever before definitely
maintained by the American Republic, whether
as Monroe Doctrine or otherwise. The giant
democracy took her place among the great
powers of the earth, whether for weal or for
woe, and the British motherland was the first
to accord recognition to the new position.
More than this, however, gives Importance
to the Venezuelan boundary controversy In
the history of the relations of English-speak
ing peoples. Here began a systematic and
comprehensive agitation for the definitive sup
planting of war by arbitration as the last resort
in the disputes among nations. The negotia
tion of the treaty by which the Venezuelan
boundary was settled was accompanied by the
framing of a general treaty of arbitration appli
cable for the future to controversies between
Great Britain and the United States. The
diplomats who in November and December of
1895 sent thrills of warlike feeling through a
hundred million English-speaking people. In
the spring of 1896 were meticulously intent
on devising the formulas that should render
war impossible. So far as this situation was a

3i8 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
result of the disturbance caused by the presi
dential message of December 17, it Impressively
confirmed and justified the unwavering conten
tion of Mr, Cleveland that that document was
in purpose and effect a powerful factor in the
maintenance of peace.
On January 11, 1897, three weeks before the
conclusion of the treaty that sent the Venezue
lan boundary to arbitration. Secretary Olney
and Sir Julian Pauncefote signed at Washing
ton a general treaty of arbitration. It embodied
the closely reasoned conclusions of strong and
sincere minds as to the best practical methods
of solving the intricate problems presented by
the end in view. All differences between the
two governments that diplomacy should prove
unable to adjust were to be sent to arbiters.
Three kinds of tribunals were provided, among
which the jurisdiction over the various classes
of controversies was distributed, with provi
sions for appellate and revisory procedure. The
tribunal whose function it was to deal with the
delicate questions of territorial claims and of
principles affecting "national rights" was to
consist of three judges from the higher courts
of each government, with no umpire, decisions
to be valid only by a vote of at least five to one.

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 319
The provisions of this treaty proved to be
in advance of effective public opinion in the
United States. Distrust of Great Britain could
not be eliminated so expeditiously from the
popular as from the diplomatic mind. The fly
in the ointment of Mr. Cleveland's pacifist
method became now unpleasantly conspicuous;
for his suggestion that British pohcy in South
America might involve sinister designs on the
Monroe Doctrine became a fixed Idea with
many sincere patriots. A treaty of general
arbitration might, they claimed, bring sooner
or later the obligation to submit the validity of
this doctrine to an arbitral tribunal — a possi
bility that could not be contemplated save with
repulsion. An additional element, moreover,
in the popular prejudice against Great Britain
had received much development in the revolu
tionary electoral campaign of 1896 in the United
States. This was the year in which the move
ment for the free coinage of silver reached its
climax and obtained the support of the Demo
cratic Party. To the passionate propagandists
of the free-silver dogma the immovable attach
ment of Great Britain to gold monometallism was
an evidence of political depravity and reinforced
the suspicion of inveterate hostility to America.

320 VENEZUELA-^AND AFTER
Under the influence of these and other like
feelings the opposition to the arbitration treaty
was strong enough, first to effect the amend
ment of the draft In its most essential features,
and finally to deny it the approval of the
American Senate. The decisive vote, on May
5, 1897, stood 43 to 26, less than two-thirds in
the affirmative. Before this vote was reached
the safety of the Monroe Doctrine had been
insured by an amendment requiring a special
agreement for the submission of any difference
"which in the judgment of either power ma
terially affects its honor or its domestic or
foreign pohcy."
The failure of this treaty was the source of
bitter disappointment to the friends of peace,
official and unofficial, on both sides of the ocean,
Hope had run high that the English-speaking
peoples were about to pronounce decisively In
favor of the principle of unrestricted arbitra
tion and to give to this very advanced Ideal the
test of practical application. Even after the
Senate, by amending the draft, had demolished
this hope, the confidence still remained that the
influence of these two powerful nations would
be exerted for peace through the adoption of
arbitration In some form. Failure in this also.

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 321
and by a margin so narrow that a change of
three votes would have made the result different,
was depressing, if not wholly discouraging. It
was on the scroll of fate, however, that the
decisive advance toward International harmony
was to come In the wake of wide-spread war.
An actual agreement on arbitration followed
hostilities In Cuba, in South Africa, and in the
Far East,
Whether the declaration of war on Spain by
the United States In the spring of 1898 was
justifiable and unavoidable, will be a useful
topic of debate by generations of schoolboys.
There can be no room for debate, however, as
to whether the war was popular in the United
States. Every nerve of the nation tingled with
joy that the great American democracy had at
last a chance to show the spirit and power that
were in it. Serious and thoughtful classes as
sumed with due sense of responsibility the task
that had become the nation's duty. The belli
cose and reckless classes greeted with ardor
the opportunity for adventure and excitement.
To every class, intent on the particular aspect
of the situation that especially concerned it,
came with thrlUing satisfaction the evidence
that the other English-speaking peoples were

322 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
giving their sympathy and moral support to
the Americans, The evidence was not always
of so clear and precise a character as to pass
in a court of law. Rumor and gossip and cal
culated lying played the part that is usual in
times of stress and excitement. There was no
room for serious doubt, however, that British
opinion was running strongly with the United
States — ^that an aggressive war for the acquisi
tion of Cuba and other desirable West Indian
islands that Great Britain had always been
supposed to covet, was actually applauded by
all the leading elements of English sentiment.
Before the war was ended, numerous and highly
significant Incidents confirmed the trend of
British feeling. Members of the cabinet. In
cluding even Lord Salisbury himself, publicly
praised the Americans and their mission in the
war. The leaders of the press, with a few
permanent exceptions of the ancient Tory type,
valiantly sustained the cause of the United
States against the generally violent assaults
of the Continental editors. At Manila, after
Dewey's victory suddenly raised far-reaching
problems as to the future of the Philippines, the
harassed American commander received demon
strative moral support from the British naval

VENEZUELA-AND AFTER 323
force In the harbor. And when, finally. In the
treaty of peace the United States, with misgiv
ings and reluctance, took over from Spain her
Far Eastern dominions, a cordial chorus of
British approval greeted the assumption by the
great English-speaking democracy of so consid
erable a share in the white man's imperialistic
burden. The effect on American opinion of these gen
eral and emphatic manifestations of sympathy
and support was revolutionary. The springs
of hostility to Britain that had been running full
volume for a decade dried up to futile and un
noted trickllngs. Mere exuberance of strength
and spirit had accounted for much of this hostil
ity, and the fighting with Spain had diverted this
particular current. An uneasy sense of slighted
vanity — of inadequate recognition of America's
physical and moral greatness — ^was soothed to
rest by the generous British approval of the
correctness of American motives In declaring
war on Spain, and by the warm welcome to the
republic at its entry into the larger world-pol
itics. If British cordiality in 1898 had been
based exclusively on shrewd calculation of self-
interest, it could not have been more precisely
opportune. In the following year the South

324 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
African situation shaped itself into the war with
the Boers. It is not hard to imagine what would
have been the course of American feeling if this
episode had developed three years earlier. As
it was, however, reciprocity in sympathy and
moral support was imperative. Those who
were absorbed in the pursuit of Aguinaldo found
little opportunity to carp at the harrying of
Kruger. Transatlantic strictures therefore were
but feeble as the two great English-speaking
peoples, in Africa and the Philippines respect
ively, ruthlessly imposed upon backward na
tions the conditions of civilization and progress.
The unprecedentedly cordial relations pro
duced by the conditions in 1898 were promptly
made use of by the foreign offices in an effort to
reduce the rather extensive list of unsettled
differences outstanding between the two govern
ments. Most of these Involved Canada, and
internal politics on both sides of the frontier
happened to be just at this time propitious for
adjustment. The Liberal Party won control
of the Dominion government in 1896, and Sir
Wilfrid Laurler, the prime minister, was anx
ious to try again for a system of reciprocity with
the United States, At the same time President
McKinley, approving though he did the excess-

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 325
ively protectionist tariff of 1897, was definitely
committed to the scheme of reciprocal arrange
ments for which that tariff act provided. The
possibility of some agreement on this difficult
but familiar subject led to the discussion of
other matters, some equally familiar, others less
familiar but distinctly more pressing. Among
the old and well-known items were the seal
fisheries of Behring Sea, the coast fisheries of
the North Atlantic, and, after long quiescence,
the Rush-Bagot arrangement concerning ships-
of-war on the Great Lakes. Of the novel items
by far the most important was the Alaskan
boundary; for the discovery of gold on the
Klondike River in 1896 brought a large popula
tion at once to that remote region and raised
grave questions of jurisdiction where the bound
ary line had never been run.
For the settlement of all these and other mat
ters a joint commission was constituted, which
met at Quebec and also at Washington from
August, 1898, to February, 1899. In the mem
bership of the commission the now established
policy of leaving Canadian foreign affairs
chiefly to Canadians was again conspicuously
illustrated; for the British representatives in
cluded five British-Americans and but one

326 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
member. Lord HerscheU, from across the At
lantic, The five consisted of the premiers of
Canada and Newfoundland, with two other
members of the Canadian cabinet, and a mem
ber of the Canadian House of Commons. The
United States was represented by no less dis
tinguished and highly qualified persons — Sen
ators Fairbanks and Gray, Mr. DIngley, ma
jority leader in the House of Representatives,
and three experienced diplomats. All the prep
arations promised well for a comprehensive
adjustment, and roseate reports of progress
attended the work of the commission. On
February 20, however, a recess was taken, which
gradually became recognized as permanent.
The sessions were never resumed, and the chief
cause of this unfortunate outcome was the
inability of the two governments to agree about
the Alaskan boundary.
This last of the boundary disputes that filled
the hundred years of peace with contention had
all the familiar characteristics of its predeces
sors. The line dividing Russian from British
America was described in the treaties that fixed
it as following the summit of the mountains
situated parallel to the coast between two
designated points of latitude and longitude;

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 327
where the mountains should prove to be more
than ten leagues from the ocean, the line should
run parallel to the coast at a distance of ten
leagues from It, Mountains such as the treaties
called for, the Americans could not find; Cana
dian geographers found them In adequate abun
dance and very near to the ocean. As to the
"coast" from which the ten leagues were to
be measured, the difference of opinion was no
less marked. To the Americans the term
meant continental land, with all the sinuosi
ties and Indentations with which the region
abounded, so that the boundary should never
come within thirty miles of tide-water; to the
Canadians the coast-line was a wholly different
thing, to be run by the general trend of the
land, and to be determined on occasion by the
headlands of inlets, or by offshore Islands, so
that the boundary would often cross consid
erable stretches of tide-water.
There was no concealment of the practical
issue that lay behind the technical contentions
of the two parties. The American position
excluded Canada absolutely from contact with
the ocean an3rwhere on the Pacific coast north
of the southernmost point of Alaska; the
Canadian claim insured to Canada a seaport on

328 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
the arm of the ocean that afforded the most
practicable access to the Klondike gold-fields,
which were mostly on Canadian soil. The
interests at stake were very great and the
conflict was correspondingly stubborn. When
agreement became impossible in the confer
ences of the commission, the British representa
tives offered arbitration, but the Americans
refused consent to any form of tribunal that
left the decision to an umpire, and the British
rejected as futile any tribunal that might be
deadlocked. In such an impasse there was no
recourse but to give up the matter, since the
Canadians had consented to the commission
largely in the expectation of a favorable out
come on this point, and had been ready to make
substantial concessions In other directions in
order to attain their purpose here.
The inauspicious result of this first attempt
to reap a crop of adjustments from the inter
national cordiality produced by the Spanish
War did not prevent a further cultivation of
the field. Apparently the first attempt had
been too ambitious — had sought returns of too
diverse a character. Taken one at a time In
stead of collectively, the problems calling for
solution might be more successfully handled.

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 329
Such seems to have been the conclusion reached
by the British and American Governments, and
the procedure in accordance with which It was
put in practice effected smoothly and harmoni
ously the remarkable series of agreements that
brought the century of peace to a close In un
precedented good feeling. The era had come
of a singularly sane and gifted series of per
sonalities in control of American foreign affairs.
John Hay, after distinguished success at the
court of Saint James's, became In 1899 head of
the Department of State at Washington. Jo
seph H, Choate succeeded Hay as ambassador
at London. Elihu Root, after indispensable
service in other positions, took over the Depart
ment of State at the death of Hay In 1905.
To these men on the American side, with
Salisbury, Lansdowne, and Grey at the British
Foreign Office, and Pauncefote and James
Bryce in the British embassy at Washington,
is to be ascribed in a particular degree, though
without disparagement of others, the con
firmation of that deep amity with which the
century of peace came to a close.
The decade following 1898 shows a far larger
total of diplomatic agreements between Great
Britain and the United States than any other

330 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
decade In history. First, the disturbing bound
ary of Alaska was removed from the fore
ground till the disagreeable feelings aroused by
it should have time to subside. A modus
vivendi was put into effect in October, 1899,
fixing a provisional line at the points where
friction was most imminent and protecting all
rights and claims of both parties pending the
definitive settlement.
Soon followed the announcement of negotia
tions peculiarly calculated to give satisfaction
to the Americans. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty
of 1850, hailed as a momentous triumph of
American diplomacy when it was concluded, had
become later offensive to the national pride.
It obligated the United States to refrain from
exclusive control of the proposed Nicaragua
Canal, and to insure the safety and neutrality
of that or any other transisthmian communica
tion only In association with Great Britain.
During the half-century that had elapsed since
the conclusion of this treaty, the interests and
the power of the United States had taken such
form that no canal was likely to be actually
constructed except in accordance with her will.
The restrictions on this will embodied in the
Clayton-Bulwer agreement were not only a

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 331
source of exasperation to American feelings,
but were also a grave obstacle to the construc
tion of a canal, A strong sentiment prevailed
that no canal at all was preferable to one over
which Great Britain should have joint control.
Especially In view of the recent extension given
to the Monroe Doctrine, the intrusion of a
European power In the affairs of the isthmus
was resented as Intolerable.
Under the circumstances, the willingness of
Great Britain to abandon her rights under the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was a very great step
in the promotion of good feeling. Yet the mode
of abandonment was subjected to diligent, not
to say suspicious, scrutiny by the American
Senate. Secretary Hay and Sir Julian Paunce
fote concluded a treaty in February, 1900, that
the Senate refused to approve except with
amendments. In this draft Great Britain re
nounced all right to participate in the construc
tion, ownership, or maintenance of a canal, but
assumed jointly with the United States, and
such other powers as should be willing, respon
sibility for the neutrality of the work. Even
tually the American extremists had their way,
and the United States was left In sole control
of neutralization as well as of construction

332 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
and maintenance. A new convention was con
cluded by Messrs. Hay and Pauncefote Novem
ber i8, 1901, and duly ratified, under which the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was formally "super
seded," and the United States was left with an
entirely free hand In respect to any trans
isthmian canal, save that the general principle
of neutralization was declared to be left unim
paired, and the American Government formally
adopted as the basis of neutralization the rules
which were in force as to the Suez Canal.
A little over a year after this notable achieve
ment Secretary Hay and Sir Michael Herbert,
Pauncefote's successor at the embassy, signed
a convention sending the Alaskan boundary
to arbitration. The tribunal agreed upon was
of the sort that the United States had been
willing to accept In 1899, namely, a joint com
mission of six jurists, three designated by each
government. Such a tribunal was duly con
stituted. Great Britain being represented by the
Lord Chief- Justice Baron Alverstone and two
distinguished Canadians, the United States by
the Secretary of War Mr. Root and two prom
inent Senators. A decision was announced by
this tribunal October 20, 1903, in which all
the seriously contested points were determined

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 333
in favor of the United States, by a majority
consisting of Lord Alverstone and the three
Americans. Thus passed finally to rest the boundary
contention that had tried the tempers of the
English-speaking peoples continuously since
the beginning of their history as neighbors.
Until some new and unforeseen acquisition of
territory by one or the other of the nations
shall take place, no further differences of this
sort seem possible. Every yard of the four-
thousand-mile line along which the British and
American domains are contiguous, from the
Bay of Fundy to the point where the 141st
meridian Intersects the shore of the Arctic
Ocean, is now fixed, and most of them marked,
by the most precise methods known to modern
science. Yet eternal vigilance alone can assure
the maintenance of the certainty that has been
provided. It was, in fact, one incident of the
era of good international feeling that we are
describing that Messrs. Bryce and Root were
able to conclude In 1908 a convention providing
for the verification and re-marking of the line
from the eastern extremity to the Pacific.
This annus mirabilis of diplomatic achieve
ment produced also a convention that secured

334 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
to American and Canadian officers of the law
having prisoners in their custody reciprocal
rights of transit across one another's territory,
and further removed the rather mediaeval re
strictions Imposed by the customs laws of the
two governments upon the rendering of aid to
disabled mariners, in waters traversed by the
international boundary, by vessels belonging
on the other side of the line. It became a
new bond uniting the English-speaking peoples,
that through the efforts of Messrs. Root and
Bryce a Canadian captain on Lake Erie might
go to the aid of a disabled ship In American
water without exposure to heavy penalties under
the laws of the United States.
Four other conventions marked this period.
The only one that need detain us was that
through which a definite term was put to the
controversies touching the North Atlantic fish
eries. After the sharp clash In the eighties^
between the United States and Canada, there
followed nearly twenty years of substantial
calm. Not till 1905 was there a revival of
trouble. In that year the government of New
foundland gave up the practice of licensing the
American fishermen and assumed toward them
' See above, p. 278.

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 335
an attitude that raised anew all the old con
troversies. The colony sought to prescribe
regulations for fishing, even on the treaty coast,
that were held by the Americans to be wholly
destructive to their business. Diplomacy in
tervened and, by resort to a new modus vivendi,
preserved the peace until an agreement to arbi
trate was arrived at. The procedure of the
British Government in this matter aroused
sharp resentment in Newfoundland, and con
formity by the colonial authorities to the
prescriptions of the cabinet at London was
insured only by a threat of force.
While this situation was giving cause for
vexation, Messrs. Root and Bryce, in the course
of their treaty-making progress, signed on April
8, 1908, an arbitration convention that suc
ceeded In winning the approval of the American
Senate. It was no such broad and comprehen
sive agreement as that framed by Olney and
Pauncefote in 1897. Yet It served its pur
pose in the trend of world movement; for it
took its form under the influence and pre
scription of The Hague Conference, and ex
pressed the concurrence of the English-speaking
peoples In the beneficent work of that assembly.
By the treaty a dispute concerning the inter-

336 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
pretation of a treaty is to be referred by a
special agreement to the permanent Court of
Arbitration at The Hague. Such agreement
must In the United States be submitted to the
Senate for approval, and in Great Britain may
be subject to the concurrence of any self-gov
erning dominion whose interests are affected
by the matter at issue. That the fisheries
dispute fell within the provisions of this arbi
tration treaty, and that the fact was keenly
present to the minds of the negotiators, may be
inferred from the fact that under the same
date as the signature of the treaty a special
agreement under its provisions was signed by
Messrs, Root and Bryce, referring to The Hague
Tribunal the interpretation of the fisheries
article of the treaty of 1818 between the United
States and Great Britain. This agreement,
put in effect by exchange of notes Maych 4,
1909, insured a settlement of practically all the
issues of this century-old controversy.
The presentation of the case to the tribunal
took place in the summer of 19 10, and the
decision was made on September 7 of that
year. By the terms of the arbitration the
judgment of the tribunal was called for on
seven questions. In these were summed up

VENEZUELA-AND AFTER 337
the chief points in the long controversies be
tween the two governments. The character
of the tribunal's answers is a conclusive ref
utation of the charges, made throughout the
century of conflict by hotheads on each side,
that its rights were so clear as to leave delib
erate aggression the only explanation of the
acts of the other side. On practically every
point the judgment of the tribunal was so
framed as to recognize merit in the contention
of each side.
The decision on all the issues was accepted
with perfect good temper by all parties. It was
decided that Canada and Newfoundland had
the right to make reasonable regulations for the
fishing on the shores to which the Americans
had access by treaty; but in case of dispute
as to what was reasonable, neither of the gov
ernments concerned, but an impartial tribunal,
must have the authority to answer the ques
tion. It was decided that Americans fishing
on the treaty shores might hire natives to aid
in the work, but that the natives so employed
did not thereby gain immunity from the laws
of the jurisdiction, or, in terms of the concrete
situation involved : the American fishermen had
the right to man their ships with Newfound-

338 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
landers, as was the general practice, and the
colonial government had the right to prohibit
the Newfoundlanders to serve and punish them
for serving, as was also becoming a practice.
It was decided that the American fishermen
ought not to be subjected to the custom-house
requirements and harljor dues that applied to
commercial shipping; that they were not,
however, excluded from the privileges of com
mercial shipping, provided that they did not
try to enjoy the liberty of fishing and the priv
ilege of trading at the same time. Finally,
on the very important question as to what
constituted "bays," in the sense in which the
Americans had by treaty the right to fish In
them. It was decided that where the arm of the
sea did not exceed ten miles in width at its
mouth, the coast-line should be considered as
running from headland to headland, while
elsewhere it should follow the sinuosities of the
shore, save that for a considerable number of
indentations the shore line at their mouths was
specifically described in the decision.
The result of this arbitration, completed by
the supplementary proceedings called for, left
apparently no opijprtunlty for a renewal of
friction in connection with the Atlantic fish-

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 339
eries. As to the seals In the Pacific Ocean,
whose diminishing numbers at the breeding-
places in the Behring Sea gave great concern
to the United States, an agreement was reached
In the summer of 1911 by the four powers
chiefly concerned. Great Britain, the United
States, Russia, and Japan, prohibiting pelagic
hunting for a period of fifteen years. This
involved the temporary extinction of a large
industry of British Columbia in order to avoid
the utter destruction of the fur-seals.
By this time no controverted question of
right remained to make trouble so far as con
cerned the relations of the United States and
Canada. Commercial policy offered, however,
as for the last half-century, inviting opportuni
ties for modifications and improvements. In
both countries there were Indications of serious
discontent with the existing high tariffs. The
American revision of 1909 was followed by an
overwhelming defeat of the Republicans in the
elections, In which tariff questions played a
large part. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, prime minister
of the Dominion, thereupon entered vigorously
upon negotiations with the American Govern
ment for a reciprocal reduction of duties on
the commodities most Involved in the commerce

340 VENEZUELA-AND AFTER
between Canada and the United States. An
agreement was reached with astonishing ease,
considering the peremptory rejection of earlier
proposals, and a very far-reaching reduction
of rates was scheduled, subject to the approval
of the respective legislatures. At Washington
this approval was readily secured; at Ottawa
it was opposed with vehemence, and on appeal
to the constituencies the government met with
an overwhelming defeat. Canada thus rejected
with something of contempt an arrangement
that would have brought her enormous economic
benefits — an arrangement that she had often
sought with almost humble diligence from the
United States,
The decisive factor in bringing about this
abrupt reversal of Canadian policy was the
spirit of nationality. Inept comments by prom
inent American statesmen on the situation dur
ing the electoral campaign were diligently inter
preted In Canada to mean that the ready assent
to reciprocity was a first deliberate step towards
annexation. Again, as in 1891, the Canadian
people declared for political Independence in
preference to economic ease, as they conceived
that alternative to be placed before them.
Nor did it lie in the mouths of the Americans

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 341
to chide or reproach; for every argument,
whether sound or merely silly, that was used In
Canada to resist the demand for freer trade
with the United States had been used with
effect in the United States, in a dozen campaigns,
to resist the demand for freer trade with Great
Britain. The national spirit was producing
in Canada the identical phenomena that had
attended the growth of the United States to its
magnificent estate of Independence and power.
Hence no bad blood was made by the failure
of reciprocity. The Americans looked serenely
on while the great Dominion displayed the
same spirit, in maintaining economic independ
ence at the end of the century of peace, that
the little Canadian provinces had displayed at
the beginning of that century, in maintaining
their political and military Independence,
The harmony between Britain and America
was the leading factor in another effort to pro
mote the cause of general arbitration. With
the seriously qualified success of this undertak
ing the diplomatic record of the hundred years
of peace was substantially completed. In the
summer of 191 1 a form of agreement was de
vised which referred to arbitral procedure all
international controversies that were "justici-

342 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
able." Treaties embodying this agreement were
concluded by the United States with Great
Britain and also with France. But the objec
tions that found their home in the American
Senate were too strong to be overcome. That
body gave Its approval of the treaties only after
amending them so as to make each party for It
self the final judge as to whether a dispute was
justiciable, and further excluding altogether
from the provisions of the treaties several cat
egories of differences, notably those Involving
the Monroe Doctrine. These amendments left
the treaties barren of all the advance that had
been hoped for toward general arbitration.
Such was the situation when the centennial
of the Treaty of Ghent drew near. The sharp
exchange of notes about the Venezuelan bound
ary In 1895 had been followed by the estab
lishment of ostentatiously cordial diplomatic re
lations between the two great English-speaking
nations; and this had been followed In turn,
after the outbreak of the Spanish War, by
demonstrations of good feeling, both official
and unofficial, that were quite unprecedented
for warmth as well as for generality. The few
discordant notes — In America over the fate of
the Boers, in Canada over the outcome of the

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 343
Alaskan boundary arbitration, among Irishmen
perennially and ever5rwhere — ^were barely dis
coverable by the acutest observers amid the
multifold chorus of amity.
There was especial significance In this sit
uation from the fact that It was accompanied
by a remarkable transformation in the Ideals
and principles of both British and American
political systems. In the last quarter of the
century of peace his Britannic Majesty's do
minions became very distinctly a federative
empire, and the United States became no less
unmistakably an imperialistic republic. The
earliest evidence of a tendency In these direc
tions had been the occasion of reciprocal resent
ment and hostility on the part of Great Britain
and the United States. The southern and
westward expansion of the American Republic
in the first half of the nineteenth century caused,
as we have seen, much uneasiness and dissat
isfaction to the British Government; yet the
absorption of the Spanish dominions in the
West Indies and the Far East at the century's
end evoked that government's cordial approval.
So on the other side the earlier steps toward
the development and utilization of Canadian
resources for distinctively Imperial purposes

344 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
was followed with truculence in the United
States; while the later creation of the strongest
commercial and political bonds between the
United Kingdom and the Dominion has been
viewed with placid content. It would seem
to augur well for the perpetuity of peace be
tween the greatest of the English-speaking
peoples, that each approves the policy that
enhances the power and prestige of the other.
The general causes that have operated to pro
duce this situation are worthy of brief con
sideration; for in them we shall see again the
forces that have from the beginning of our
century wrought for English-speaking harmony,
despite all the temporary influences that have
from time to time prevailed against them.
The distinct assumption by the United States
of the imperialistic character and responsibil
ities coincided precisely in time with the warm
est manifestations of cordiality on the part
of Great Britain. President Roosevelt's ad
ministrations (1901-09) teemed with incidents
announcing the new role of the American
Republic. The Philippines were relentlessly
reduced to order and subjection; Panama was
"taken" for the sake ofthe world's commerce,
if incidentally for the specific military and

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 345
commercial advantage of the taker; Cuba was
summarily denied by superior force indulgence
in her long-wonted pastime of civil war — all
these by virtue of conditions produced directly
by the war with Spain. Indirect results of this
war were no less striking, American troops
joined with those of other great powers in
queuing the tumult of the "Boxers" in China,
and American diplomacy wrought effectively to
maintain the open door in Chinese trade and
the very existence ("administrative entity,"
Secretary Hay obscurely called it) of native
government in China, when the rivalry of
Russia and Japan threatened it with extinc
tion. The terrific clash of arms between these
two powers was brought to an end on the soil
of the United States and through the agency
of Its chief executive. It became suddenly
apparent to all the world that the American
democracy was a force of the first magnitude
in the general international situation.
The effect of this revelation was not without
its humor to the philosophical observer. In the
world and the half-world of universal politics
rumor and gossip ran wild over the possible
results of the new phenomenon. Veteran dip
lomats saw copious visions and retired admirals

346 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
dreamed horrid dreams. Periodical literature
teemed with speculation as to the influence of
the American position on the various ententes
and numerical alliances, dual, triple, quadruple,
on which the peace of the world was supposed
to rest. The navy of the United States was
taken in hand by the theoretical experts, and
subjected to the mathematical scrutiny from
which the guUd derives its sufficient conclu
sions as to future relations of the nations.
Almost before the Treaty of Portsmouth was
ratified, the prophets had the broad breast of
the Pacific tumultuous with the rivalry of
America and Japan and convulsed with hypo
thetical battles. The results on the combat
ants and the wider effects on mankind at large
naturally varied with the fancy of the prophets,
but in no case were unworthy of the occasion,
or failed to involve a startling change in the
political equUIbrlum of the world.
Amid all the disquiet and suspicion created
by the entrance of the United States upon its
new role, there was no deviation on the part
of Great Britain from the attitude of admir
ing welcome to the republic. No prognostica
tions of disastrous rivalry wherein the pride
of Britain would be humbled — and there was

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 347
abundance of such warnings — availed to stir
up jealousy or fear. The grounds of British
complacency were, of course, manifold. That
the Americans, in assuming dominion over less
developed races, would be forced to solve some
problems by the same methods that had brought
harsh criticism upon the British, was so cer
tain as to be a source of some natural satisfac
tion. The course of events in^he Philippines
very quickly confirmed this feeling. Beyond
all such reasons, however, the source of British
approval of American policy was a genuine
joy that through it English institutions and
traditions, however modified by transmission
through the United States, were to be extended
still further in their remarkable progress over
the world.
Meanwhile this progress was reacting In a
noteworthy manner on the complex political
aggregate known as the British Empire, Till
the ninth decade of the nineteenth century it
remained the basic conviction of reflecting
politicians in England that the destiny of the
self-governing colonies was Independence, The
grip of Cobden's dogma was strong twenty
years after he himself had passed away. No
way of escape from disintegration of the empire

348 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
could be thought of that did not involve un
thinkable readjustments in the government of
the United Kingdom, as to structure or policy
or both. In the eighties, however, conditions
in both foreign and domestic affairs brought
the unthinkable peremptorily under consid
eration. Germany's colonial ambitions and
Russia's advance on India suggested sickening
possIbUItles as to the fate of an Australasian
state that should lack the protection of the
British navy; Gladstone's proposal of home
rule for Ireland made the remodelling of the
British Government a staple of daily debate.
Under these circumstances a demand for some
strengthening of the bonds uniting colonies
and motherland became vigorously manifest
throughout her Majesty's dominions.
The formula of this demand In the eighties
was "imperial federation," on behalf of which
an imposing agitation was carried on for some
years. Official support for this particular form
of union was for various practical reasons slow
and scanty, and the movement under this
name lost its force in the early nineties, not
without having contributed, however, a great
Impulse to the cause of preserving the empire
intact. Meanwhile a procedure for the discus-

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 349
sion and solution of pressing concrete problems
opened a way through which, more Britannico,
the broad considerations of constitutional theory
were sidetracked and Imperial consolidation was
approached by the slow but sure pathway of
extra-constitutional experiment. In 1887, on
the occasion of Queen Victoria's jubilee, a con
ference of colonial representatives was held at
London under the auspices of the colonial
secretary. Its consultations were of little ef
fect save in revealing a basis of common In
terest in the widely scattered members of the
empire. As was prophesied by Lord Salisbury,
however, this meeting became "the parent of a
long progeniture"; for such conferences have
become an established feature of the imperial
system, assembling every four years, and act
ing under a well-defined constitution. This
imperial conference is, in fact, a new and sig
nificant organ of policy and administration for
his British Majesty's dominions. In Its de
liberations have taken shape the policies which
in recent years have done so much to Increase
the force of the British Empire. The obstacles
to be overcome, in the shape of conflicting
interests and the spirit of local independence,
have not availed to thwart the trend toward

350 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
Imperial unity. A general system of naval and
military organization and action has been put
into operation; tariff preferences, varying in
scope and volume, have been generally estab
lished In reciprocity among the subordinate
members of the empire, with the United King
dom enjoying In most cases a unilateral ad
vantage; a great Impulse has been given to
exclusively British lines of communication and
transportation. These and many other in
stances of consolidating activity reveal the
widely scattered dominions of the British crown,
though geographically so discontinuous, as a
very effective unity.
In the process through which imperial unity
has been practically realized there has been
a mighty. If subtle, reaction of the colonial
spirit upon the motherland, Canada, South
Africa, Australia, New Zealand are democratic
in their social structure and their political
ideals. Two of them embody the most ad
vanced democracies In the world. An im
perial councU in which a leading part is played
by the chosen representatives of such com
munities must inevitably take color in Its
resolutions from the programme of radicalism.
The colonial secretary who goes from a dis-

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 351
cussion in the imperial conference to a debate
on social legislation in the House of Commons
can hardly faU to carry with him some Infection
of the ideas that are current coin in Australia,
Wherever the delegates from beyond the seas
are brought in contact unofficially with the
political Issues most agitated In the United
Kingdom, it is not the conservative views that
are supported by the recitals of experience In
the colonies. What to the English radical is
ultimate ideal, to the colonial conservative Is a
commonplace of actuality. Even Irish home
rule, that smacks so perilously of disintegra
tion to many of the wisest minds of England,
offers nothing of terror to the colonial; for he
sees autonomy and unity reconciled in diverse
but sufficient ways, in the Dominion of Canada,
the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Union
of South Africa. Popular self-government Is
so fundamental In the political philosophy of
the English beyond the seas that the full appli
cation of the principle to the United Kingdom
appears only normal. A Canadian or an Aus
tralian is not likely to see anything alarming In
a project for the transformation of the govern
ment of the United Kingdom In the federal
sense; while the union of all parts of the British

352 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
world under something In the nature of a
federative bond makes a strong appeal to every
English-speaking group that treasures the tra
ditions and achievements of the race.
By every step toward the closer union of the
scattered parts of the British Empire the more
general solidarity of the English-speaking peo
ples has been brought nearer. For every such
step signalizes the democratizing pro tanto of
social and political Ideals and institutions In
the United Kingdom, and the realization thus
of conditions that promote harmony with the
American Republic. An intimate llke-minded-
ness Is, as was said at the beginning of this
review, the indispensable factor In permanent
international amity. The whole trend of mod
ern development in civilization is strongly
toward the widespread working of this factor.
Its influence Is most marked, however, where
historical identity of language and tradition
clears the way. The people of the United
Kingdom and the people of the United States
are drawing nearer each other daily in both the
material and the spiritual aspects of life. What
has been expected to retard, has in fact accel
erated the movement. Nervous Britons strike
out for a closer union of all the parts of the

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 353
empire, to check the influence of the United
States — and the result is an access of democ
racy from Australia that makes American Ideas
inviting by comparison. Americans rush Into
war to uphold the cause of humanity and In
dependence for oppressed peoples — and find
themselves struggling to carry, in the most ap
proved British manner, the burden of distant
and barbarous dependencies. But the federa
tive empire of the Britons and the Imperialistic
republic of the Americans are more neighborly
after than before their transforming experiments.
The hundred years of peace for which John
Quincy Adams politely^ if not very hopefully,
prayed after the signing of the treaty of De
cember 24, 1 8 14, have become realized his
tory. The gates of Janus, closed at Ghent,
have not been opened for a century. The
pacific years have brought changes, however,
more amazing than could have been wrought
by the desolating arts of war. It is not so
clear In the twentieth as it was in the nine
teenth century that the nerve centre of the
English-speaking world Is In Great Britain,
The United Kingdom, with Its 45,000,000 of
population, is a wonderful aggregate of ma-

354 VENEZUELA— AND AFTER
terial and spiritual forces. Yet it does not
stand out so Incontestably the chief reservoir
of such forces as was the case a century earlier,
when it numbered but 19,000,000 souls. Then
it dominated the English-speaking peoples of
the earth commercially. Industrially, intellec
tually, and, save the United States, polit
ically. Its dependencies were already vast In
extent, but none contained more Inhabitants
of British origin than Canada, where there
were hardly 250,000, To-day the dependen
cies Include, in addition to Canada, with its
7,500,000 people, Australia, with some 4,500,-
000, New Zealand, with 1,000,000, and South
Africa, with another 1,000,000 of whites, among
whom the English type is somewhat modified
by the Dutch, The reaction of these great
progressive communities upon the mother-land
Is altogether too significant to be disregarded,
and it Is growing from year to year. Domi
nation, in any such sense as was accurate In
1 8 14, cannot be predicated of the United
Kingdom, It Is now but the most powerful
member of a larger unity, the British Empire,
already in fact, and rapidly becoming in name,
a federation of English-speaking states.
Outside of this political and cultural aggre-

VENEZUELA— AND AFTER 355
gate the English-speaking world presents only
the American Republic, Its population, nearly
100,000,000, includes probably three-fifths of
the English-speaking people of the earth, fifty
per cent more than inhabit the British Empire,
Geographically the United States presents the
most striking contrast with that empire — the
one territorially continuous, the other a series
of widely scattered areas. Socially, econom
ically, and politically the contrasts, whUe
apparently great, shrink remarkably on close
examination. Institutions that characterize the
old, wealthy, and highly developed society of
England have appeared, at least in rudimen
tary form. In many of the first-settled, richer,
and more prosperous States of the American
Union, The institutions, on the other hand,
that are typical of the sparse and primitive
communities of Canada, Australia, and South
Africa have their perfect counterpart on the
plains and arid plateaus in the western half of
the United States, Between the American
people and the people of the British Empire as
a whole there are the political and cultural
conditions of a complete understanding and
sympathy. History and traditions, when prop
erly interpreted, must contribute to the same

356 VENEZUELA-AND AFTER
end. There seems no reason, therefore, to sup
pose that the next hundred years will show less
progress than the last In cordial relations among
the English-speaking peoples.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
The discussion of international relations Is
almost invariably tainted with the fallacy of
too sweeping generalization. This Is as true
of historical as of argumentative discussion.
It has been copiously iUustrated In the events
narrated in the preceding chapters. It may
doubtless be found Illustrated by the narrative
Itself; for the vice inheres In the very structure
and function of language, A crisis or a policy
of vital import to the English-speaking peoples
has more than once had its origin in some
jaunty judgment that Great Britain despised the
United States, or that Canada was enamoured
of annexation, or that America hated the
English, when In truth the emotions referred
to could be predicated only of some individual
or group in the respective nations. The editor
of the London Times or The Saturday Review
has been taken for Great Britain, Goldwin
Smith for Canada, and any one of a dozen
3S7

358 CONCLUSION
politicians of Celtic extraction or sympathies
for America. These and sImUar identifica
tions have figured largely In the historical writ
ings of the century, with distracting results.
There has been on the whole overemphasis on
the evidences of 111 feeling among the English-
speaking peoples. The influence of the episodes
that gave rise to diplomatic friction has been
exaggerated. Forces that worked unceasingly
and powerfully for good feeling have been
ignored. An ingrained diplomatic policy, a
strong and popular personality, an expedient
of party strategy or a demand of an insistent
economic interest has been treated as a con
clusive Index of the national spirit, whereas
such spirit is justly discoverable only in a care
ful synthesis of these elements. Surveyed with
proper reference to this fact, our review of the
century of peace may be summarized as follows:
The hundred years fall into four fairly well
distinguishable periods. In the first, 1 8 14-183 5,
the key to Anglo-American relations is to be
found In Great Britain's foreign policy in Eu
rope and her Internal politics. In the second,
1836-1860, the controlling feature Is the growth
of the United States In population and terri
tory. The third, 1861-1885, takes its character

CONCLUSION 359
from the American Civil War. The fourth,
1886-1914, turns on the projection of American
and British Interests and influence beyond the
bounds of the United States and the United
Kingdom. In the first period there was a gradual prog
ress from the bitterness that the war made
intense in America and Canada to a condition
of general amity. The Treaty of Ghent put
an end to flagrant war; It did little or nothing
for the promotion of lasting peace. It did not
weaken the conviction in the minds of many
Americans that a leading principle of British
policy was to bully and dragoon the United
States into a condition of dependence as near
as possible to that which had been thrown off
in 1776; It did not extinguish the fear among
the English in Canada that the United States
was resolutely bent on conquering and annex
ing them; It did not qualify the belief wide
spread among the ruling aristocracy In England
that the American democracy was a barbarous,
brawling political organism, whose growth was
to be restricted by all possible means in the
interest of civilization. For each of these
various beliefs there was not lacking a certain
foundation in fact; and the progress toward

36o CONCLUSION
amity was measured by the transformation of
the facts.
The diplomacy of this period made some
important contributions to the perpetuation
of the peace secured at Ghent. The Rush-
Bagot arrangement was the chief of them. An
influential element of American opinion was con
ciliated by the limited access to the inshore
fisheries conceded by Great Britain in 1818,
though the concession embodied potentialities
of trouble. So far as the Monroe Doctrine
may be regarded as a product of diplomacy. It
must stand high In the records of this period.
Whether its function was pacific, or ever wUl
be so, is doubtful. At the time of its announce
ment, however, it unquestionably promoted
good feeling between the British and the Amer
ican peoples. A like effect was produced by
the modification In commercial policy through
which the bars were let down for the American
traders in the West Indies. On the other side
was felt throughout the period the exasperat
ing operation of the failure to get together on
the right of search and in respect to the north
eastern boundary of the United States, No
amount of concession by the British Govern
ment on other points could keep down the

CONCLUSION 361
American's gorge at the thought that the
right was stIU claimed to Inflict on American
vessels and seamen the humiliations that were
common before 1815, This feeling In the
United States and the irritation In Canada and
New Brunswick over what was felt to be the
unfounded claims of the Americans as to the
boundary were the chief factors of popular
ill feeling that survived to the end of this first
period. The spectacular triumphs of the Whigs
over the Tories in the United Kingdom tended
greatly to reduce the springs of animosity
among the Americans In reference to the
British In general.
Our second period began with trouble, and
trouble among the English-speaking peoples
was continuous almost to the end. There was
insurrection in Canada and exasperating bor
der incidents. The northeastern boundary pro
duced a grist of friction and popular excite
ment. Antislavery authorities In the British
West Indies took doubtful liberties with Amer
ican slaves and ships. The singular sequence
of serious controversies dissipated the general
friendliness and introduced a persistent con
dition of distrust and acrimony. Webster and
Ashburton succeeded In settling the north-

362 CONCLUSION
eastern boundary and some other points of
contention, but many were left, including the
right of search. The American democracy
was fully embarked on its career of expansion.
Led by the men of the mighty West, it pro
ceeded to realize its "manifest destiny" In
Texas, In Oregon, and in California. Half the
total coast of the Gulf of Mexico and half the
total Pacific coast of North America were the
modest limits of its demands. Great Britain,
congenital mistress of the seas and sovereign
over Canada and the Hudson's Bay Company,
had necessarily to take notice of these pro
ceedings. She saved part of Oregon, but her
projects for Texas and California gave way
before the resolute aggression of Polk, Through
the war with Mexico the United States realized
its alleged destiny. In the very month In
which peace was concluded the golden secret
of the Sierras was disclosed at Sutter's Mill,
and the adventurous of all the earth started
for California. At once the Central American
isthmus became one of the greatest highways
of the world, and as promptly appeared the
clash between British and American claims and
interests In Nicaragua, The Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty, and ten years of harassing negotia-

CONCLUSION 363
tion to determine what it meant, followed this
development. The events on which these two decades of
diplomacy turned were replete with incidents
that stirred the passions of the peoples and
made much bad blood between them. At the
same time other events In the national life
of all concerned worked clearly for friendship
and good feeling. Free trade became the com
mercial policy of both Great Britain and the
United States. The whole democratic spirit
of Cobden and Bright became influential In
British politics and won the approval of Amer
icans, Palmerston's foreign policy after 1848,
whatever its Inconsistencies, was at least favor
able to the Liberals of the Continent. In this
again American opinion was concUiated. The
exiled heroes of unsuccessful revolt on the
Continent — Kossuth, Garibaldi, Schurz — found
equal welcome in England and the United
States; and those who gave the welcome
could not but feel drawn to each other. Com
mon sympathy with Magyars and Italians and
Germans tended somewhat to counteract the
effect of the wide divergence of sympathies
in respect to the Irish, Canadians and Amer
icans, whose antipathies rose high at the be-

364 CONCLUSION
ginning of this period, were at its close once
more on cordial terms through the Reciprocity
Treaty of 1854. There was indeed, in i860,
a general spirit of trans-Atlantic friendliness
among the English-speaking peoples, to which
the visit of the youthful Prince of Wales in the
United States and Canada was a witness. The
American Republic Itself was, however, per
meated with the animosities of the sections,
and the fiercest antipathies that ever divided
English-speaking peoples were about to be
manifested in the conflict between North and
South. The period of the American CivU War was
one of utter distraction, as to both feeling
and convictions, among the English-speaking
peoples. From the outset there was in both
the warring sections as much fear and distrust
of Great Britain as hatred of each other.
British sentiment was at the same time almost
as badly divided as American. No assertion
could be more inaccurate than that the British
in general favored the South, There was a
large and Influential body of Southern sympa
thizers, moved by the conviction that the
secession rested on a just claim to Independence
and self-government. There was an equally

CONCLUSION 36s
convinced body of Northern sympathizers,
moved by hatred of slavery and hope that it
would be extinguished. In both these bodies
alike the prevaUing expectation was, tUl late
in the course of the struggle, that the dis
ruption of the American Republic would be
permanent. This expectation, rather than sym
pathy with the South, was the basis of Glad
stone's declaration, proclaimed with such shock
ing Indiscretion at Newcastle, that Jefferson
Davis had created a nation, and of Edward A.
Freeman's famous title-page, "History of Fed
eral Government ... to the Disruption of
the United States." Satisfied that but one
outcome was possible, the great mass of Brit
ish sentiment watched with but the sightseer's
interest the course of events through which the
inevitable end was to be reached. This atti
tude was the substantial foundation of the gov
ernment's policy of neutrality. The good faith
of Palmerston and RusseU In the assumption
of this policy is now beyond question; the lack
of entire success in its execution is equaUy
clear. The South complained as bitterly as
the North of British policy; only the victo
rious North got satisfaction. If the South had
established its independence. Great Britain

366 CONCLUSION
might have had double grievances to settle for.
As it was, she settled with more grace than
could fairly be anticipated the cost of her
errors in respect to the North. Whatever
grounds she had for contesting the claims of the
United States, her position was almost hope
lessly weakened from the outset by the staring
fact that the result of the American war was
precisely that which highly respected leaders of
British opinion had assumed to be Impossible.
The Treaty of Washington of 1871, with the
arbitrations that followed, signified the recog
nition by the other English-speaking peoples
that the American Republic was a new and
permanent species of political organism. It
signified the acceptance of democracy as a
respectable mode of national existence. It
marked the transition in British politics from
the regime of Whigs and Tories to that of
Liberals and Conservatives, from Palmerston
and Russell to Gladstone and Bright, from
Aberdeen and Derby to Disraeli and Salisbury.
Throughout the English-speaking world the
democratic spirit was visibly transforming in
stitutions. In the United Kingdom It gave
the suffrage to a million hitherto excluded men
of the working class, made education more

CONCLUSION 367
accessible to the poor, began the transfer of
the land of Ireland from the aristocracy to the
Irish tenant farmers. In the United States
it raised four millions of negroes from chattel
slavery to civil and political equality with their
former masters. In Australia and British Amer
ica It dominated In every respect the great
expansion of these communities that charac
terized the period. The Dominion of Canada
was established, to parallel on the north of the
United States the development of free institu
tions across the continent. With whatever
disparity of population and resources, the new
Dominion exhibited as distinctly as Its great
neighbor the qualities of a progressive, inde
pendent, and self-sufficient democracy.
Our fourth period opens with friction be
tween the two neighbors in North America.
Both peoples were in the course of marvellous
internal development. The two oceans were
bound together by railways and the vast In
terior spaces of the continent were becoming
peopled and prosperous on both sides of the
astronomical line that alone marked them off
as distinct. Along aU the thousands of mUes
of this line no Incident occurred to arouse the
concern of the governments, but the tide-water

368 CONCLUSION
at each end of it was in the eighties stirred with
conflict. On the Atlantic the Inshore fisheries
again caused trouble; on the Pacific the fur-
seals of Alaska, Both disputes were duly set
tled by rational administration and finally by
arbitration. Then came the successive man
ifestations of American self-consciousness in
connection with Samoa, Hawan, ChUe, Cuba.
A restless, sensitive condition of the popular
mind was discernible to an acute observer.
The British Foreign Office for some reason failed
to note this phenomenon. Likewise unno
ticed was the coincidence of a high-strung and
irritable chief executive at Washington with a
cynical quondam Saturday Review essayist as
foreign minister in Downing Street, The in
ternal politics of both nations contributed con
ditions that favored an explosion, and the
explosion duly occurred,
Cleveland's policy as to the Venezuelan
boundary announced to the world, with seismic
suddenness and violence, that the American
democracy was of age. Its cherished Monroe
Doctrine was declared the basis of much the
same authority that European powers were
assuming In Africa and Asia through the doc
trines of Hinterland and "sphere of influence."

CONCLUSION 369
Once recovered from the shock caused by the
occasion and manner of the announcement, the
British Government and the British people were
the first to recognize the new situation and to
welcome it. The maintenance of peace and
amity between the English-speaking nations
became the goal of official and unofficial effort
on both sides of the ocean. With the Spanish-
American War came the convincing demonstra
tions of good feeling on the part of the British
for the United States. From this event dates
unbroken cordiality to the end of the hun
dred years of peace. Diplomacy, directly or
through arbitration, settled all the old disputes
that threatened tension. Progress was made
toward the comprehensive substitution of pa
cific for warlike means in dealing with all kinds
of controversies. Canada waxed great and
prosperous on the frontier of the United States,
and proclaimed an unmistakable purpose to
remain the rival rather than become in any
sense the appendage of the republic; Aus
tralia, New Zealand, South Africa developed
into progressive democratic commonwealths;
and all these powerful political societies moved
steadily toward closer union with the United
Kingdom in an earth-girdling federative em-

370 CONCLUSION
pire. Each step in the consolidation of this
mighty structure has received In the United
States the same degree of cordial approval that
Great Britain displayed when the United
States set forth on Its imperialistic career
among the ruins of the Spanish dominion.
The century of peace ends with the English-
speaking world comprehended in two great
political aggregates, differing much from each
other in obvious characteristics, but permeated
in the subtler arteries of their social life with
forces that make for like feeling and like
thinking. The same basic conceptions of de
mocracy, liberty, and law prevail In both these
organisms and determine the direction of con
scious progress; the growing parallelism of
economic conditions, the long-established finan
cial and commercial relationships, the intimate
solidarity of Intellectual life, assure that the
lines of unconscious progress will be the same
In both. Everything seems to promise the
absence of all but friendly rivalry in reciprocal
benefits and In contribution to the welfare of
the race.
Our historical review has shown that in the
relation of the English-speaking peoples there
has been much misconception, distrust, suspi-

CONCLUSION 371
cion, and general incompatibUity of temper —
that these peoples have been in a high degree
human. But It has also shown that they have
exhibited, on a steadily growing scale, that
loftiest of human attributes — the wiU to adjust
the frictions of social life by reason, the faculty
that President Butler has so well designated. In
its broadest aspect, as "the international mind."
Our review has shown finally, if it has been ade
quate and truthful, that there has persisted in
the consciousness of these peoples, often enough
obscurely, but none the less certainly, the feel
ing that some special fiat of God and nature en
joins enduring peace among those whose blood
or language or institutions or traditions, or
all together, go back historically to the snug
little island of Britain.

INDEX

Aberdeen, Lord, 105, 106, 122-124,
131, 132, 136, 137, 147, 163,
366.
Abyssinia, 225, 301.
Adams, Charles Francis, 206, 208,
21S, 219, 226, 233-239, 242, 244,
245.
Adams, Professor E. D., 56.
Adams, John Quincy, i, 2, 9, 12-
18. 24. 35. 46, 54, 57-59. 212,
353-
Africa, 293, 301.
Aguinaldo, 324.
Alabama, the, 218-220, 224, 233
et seq.
Alabama claims, the, 233-257, 260.
Alaska, 134, 286, 290.
Alaskan boundary dispute, 325-
328, 330; settlement of, 332,
333; 343-
Alverstone, Lord, 332, 333.
Ambrister, Robert, execution of,
36-39-
Andrew, Govemor, 211.
Anti-Corn Law League, the, 86,
100, 144-146.
Arbitration, Alaskan boundary,
332, 333; inshore fisheries, 261-
264, 334-338; seal fisheries, 289-
291; treaty of 1897, 318-320;
treaty of 191 1, 341, 342.
Arbitration, Geneva tribunal of,
254-257; permanent court of,
336.
Arbuthnot, execution of, 36-39.
Argyllj Duke of, 227.
Aroostook River war, 102, 103.
Ashburton, Lord, 12, 106-108,
116-119, 361.
Asia, 293.

Astoria, 125,
Australia, 192, 193, 221, 293, 350,
351. 354, 355, 369.
Austria, 48, 231.
Bagot, Charles, 16-19, 55-
Bahamas, the, 218.
Balfour, Mr., 315.
Bank destroyed by Jackson, 78, 79.
Baring, Alexander, 12, 106.
Bathurst, Lord, 15.
Bayard, Secretary, 287, 301, 303,
304-
Behring Sea, 285-290, 339.
Belgium, 232.
Belize, 160-162.
Bentham, Jeremy, 42.
Benthamite school, the, 43.
Berlin, Conference of, 300.
Bermudas, the, 169, 218.
Bismarck, 231.
Blaine, James G., 284, 289.
Blockade-running, 218-220.
Brazil, 55.
Bright, John, 145-147, 152, 205,
206, 228-230, 248, 363, 366.
British Columbia, 272, 285, 287,
339-
British Guiana, 301, 309, 311.
British North American Act, the,
270, 271.
Brougham, 67, 100.
Brown, George, 269.
Bryce, Lord, 329, 333-336.
Buchanan, President, 129-131, 163,
166, 170, 171, 242.
Bull Run, 209.
Bulwer, Sir Henry, 158, 160, 165.
Butler, President, 371.
Buxton, 71.

373

374

INDEX

California, 120; acquisition of,
134-139; 155, 162, 362.
Canada, 7; anti-American feeling
in, 10, ri; British views as to
future of, II, 12; political strife
in, 88 et seq., 173 et seq.; insur
rections in, 92, 93 ; raids on fron
tier, 93, 107, 261; Lord Dur
ham's report concerning, 97-100;
constitution of 1841, uniting
Upper and Lower, 100, 173;
boundary dispute, loi-lli; ad
vance of democracy in, 174;
French and English interests in,
174-176; industrial depression
in, 175-178; effect on, of free-
trade policy, 176-178, 187; an
nexation agitation in, 178-184,
296; importance to, of trade
with United States, 187; refuge
given by, to Confederate agents,
220; ill feeling between United
States and, 222; invaded by
Irish army, 224; 231; Dominion
of, established, 264, 266-273,
367; influence of United States
in formation of Dominion, 270;
extent of Dominion of, 271;
participation in negotiating
Treaty of Washington, 265, 266;
effect of Civil War in, 267; race
antipathy in, 268; problem of
national unity in, 272, 273 ; pro
tectionism adopted in, 274-276;
fisheries dispute, 276-291; agita
tion for commercial union with
United States, 295, 296; efforts
to settle differences with United
States, 324-340; proposal for
reciprocity rejected by, 339, 340;
national spirit in, 340, 341; pop
ulation, 354; 355, 361, 364, 369.
Canadian Pacific Railway scandal,
272, 274.
Canning, George, 19; personality
and policies of, 46-48; action to
thwart intervention in behalf of
. Spain, 49-52; dissatisfaction

with Monroe's message, S3, 54;
fear of American alliance against
Europe, 55-57; 58, 60, 62, 63, 66,
104, 154, 212.
Caroline, the, destruction of, 93-
95, 108.
Cass, Secretary of State, 170, 171.
Castlereagh, Lord, 9, 14-16, 18-
20, 38, 39. 46, 47. 58. 62, 212.
Catholic emancipation, 66-68.
Central America, 155-166, 172,
362.
Century of peace, four periods of,
358-371-
Chartists, the, 87, 150, 151.
China, 345.
Choate, Joseph H., 329.
Civil service, "spoils system" in,
79-81.
Civil War, the arguments for and
against secession, 200-204; Brit
ish favor for the South, 203,
204; influence of British anti-
slavery leaders, 205, 206; neu
trality proclaimed by Great
Britain, 207-209; the Trent af
fair, 210-216; effect of blockade-
running, 218, 219; grievances of
the North and South at close
of, 220, 221; British recognition
of Confederacy as a belligerent,
221, 233-236, 241-243, 253; ef
fects in Great Britain of North
ern triumph, 227-230; absorbing
nature of domestic problems
after, 231, 232; settlement of
Alabama claims, 233 et seq.; ar
bitration of other claims, 260,
261; general disturbance of good
feeling during, 364-366.
Clarendon, Lord, 153, 168, 249.
Clay, Henry, 10, 13, 58, 75, 76.
Clayton, Secretary of State, 157,
158, 160, 165.
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, the, 158-
165. 330-332. 362.
Cleveland, President, 280, 282,
283; foreign policy of, 302-305;

INDEX

375

message suggesting war, 308-
314; 315, 368.
Cobden, Richard, views of, 84, 85,
100; and the Anti-Corn Law
League, 145-147; 152, 183, 185,
205, 206, 228, 248, 347, 363.
Cockbum, Alexander, 257.
Colonial conference of 1887 at
London, 349.
Colonization, 53.
Columbia River, 96, 126, 127, 130,
133-
Commerce and industry in Great
Britain, 63-66; in United States,
39-44-
Commerce and navigation, treaty
of, 39-42.
Commercial convention of 1815,
13-
Congress of Vienna, 9.
Convention of 1818, London, 20-
29.
Cooper, Fenimore, 197.
Com Act, Canada, 177.
Com laws, British, 65, 66, 85; re
peal of, 142-146.
Cotton, England's dependence on
America for, 193 ; famine in Lan
cashire, 209, 218.
Crampton, dismissal of, 167-169.
Credit Mobilier, the, 272.
Creek Indians, 35.
Creole, the, mutiny on, 118, 119.
Crimean War, the, 153, 163, 166,
167, 169.
Cuba, 56, 165, 321, 322, 345.
Davis, Jefferson, 365.
Delimitation of territory in 1818,
27-30.
Democracy, American, 5-7, 73, 77-
81, 138, 201, 203, 253.
Democratic Party, anti-British
feeling in, 166.
Denmark, 231, 232.
Derby, Eari of, 171, 229, 230, 241,
366.
Dewey, Admiral, 322.

Dickens, Charles, 197, 198.
Dingley, Mr., 326.
Dingley Act, the, 298.
Disarmament on the Great Lakes,
12-17.
Disraeli, 146, 152, 183, 229, 230,
366.
Don Pacifico debate, the, 152.
Durham, Eari of, his mission and
report as to Canada, 97-100;
174.
Dutch, 301.
Duties, discriminating, 41.
Edinburgh Review, the, 82.
Elgin, Earl of, 174, 175, 180, 184,
222.
Emancipation Proclamation, the,
228.
Emerson, 197.
Europe, American alliance against,
feared, 55, 56.
Everett, 110.
Expatriation, right of, 226, 242.
Fairbanks, Senator, 326.
Federalists, New England, J.
Fenians, the, 223-226, 246, 249,
261, 270.
Ferdinand VII, 53.
Filibustering, 165-167.
Fish, Secretary Hamilton, 248,
249, 253, 256.
Fisheries, inshore, 22-26, 188-190,
223, 261-264, 276-282, 284, 288,
334-338-
Fleet-building, rivalry in, 14, 15.
Florida, Indian troubles in, 34-38.
Florida, the, 218, 256.
Foreign Enlistment Act, the, 237,
239-
Forster, 206.
Forsythe, 104.
France, 48, 49, 51, 149, 150, 203,
232, 258, 301, 342.
Franco-Prussian War, the, 250.
Franklin, Benjamin, 109.

376

INDEX

Freeman, Edward A., 365.
Free-trade, 143, 176-178, 182-185,
187, 204, 363.
French in Canada, 89 et seq., 98,
99, 174-176, 180, 181, 268.
French Revolution, 5, 42, 61.
Fur-traders in Oregon, 125, 126.
Gallatin, 13, 24, 57, 58.
Gambler, Lord, I.
Garibaldi, 363.
Geneva Tribunal, the, 254-257.
George III, 200.
George IV, 53.
German immigration, 150.
Germany, 232, 292, 293, 301, 315,
348.
Ghent, Treaty of, I, 2; terms of, 8;
9. 13, 20, 23, 24, 30, 192, 194;
centennial of, 342; 359.
Gladstone, 152, 183, 194, 228-
230, 248, 249, 257, 258, 281, 300,
348. 365. 366.
Gold discovery, California, 139,
149. 155, 362; Klondike, 325,
328.
Grain-raisers, British, 65.
Grant, President, 244, 250.
Grattan's Parliament, 143.
Gray, Senator, 326.
Great Britain, power and impor
tance of, in 1815, 2, 3; slight in
terest of, in Treaty of Ghent, 9;
cordial feeling toward United
States, 18, 33, 39; restrictive sys
tem of commerce in, 39-42; eco
nomic and political reform in,
42-45; Whig reform in, 46 et
seq.; commerce with Spain, 49;
economic and general reform in,
60 et seq.; widening of political
interest, 69, 70; public opinion
in, concerning Americans, 81-
86; indignation at McLeod af
fair, 95; attitude toward slave-
trade, 115, 116; opposition to
annexation of Texas, 120-124;
claims in Oregon, 124-134; pol

icyof, as to California, 135, 137;
industry and commerce of, de
pendent on United States, 140;
danger of famine in, 141; free-
trade in, 143-146, 182-185;
claims in Central America, 155-
163; enlists recruits in United
States, 167, 168; abandons claim
to right of search, 171, 172; pro
tective tariff in, 176; attitude
toward Canadian independence,
182-186; population, i860, 192;
economic leadership, 193 ; move
ment toward democracy, 194,
195; feeling in, toward the
South, 202-204; hostility to
slavery, 204-206; influence of
slavery on feeling toward North
and South, 199, .204; proclama
tion of neutrality of, 207-209,
218; attitude toward Southern
demand for recognition, 209;
toward Confederate envoys, 217,
2l8; indignation over Trent af
fair, 211, 212; treatment of nat
uralized Irishmen in, 226; ef
fects in, of Northern victory,
227-230; sentiment in, against
RusseU's attitude toward Ala
bama claims, 240; democratic
tendencies in, 257, 258; move
ment for imperial federation,
293-295; Liberal-Unionist min
istry of 1895, 300; treaty with
Venezuela, 316; sympathy with
Americans in war with Spain,
322, 323; willingness to abandon
rights in isthmian canal, 331;
transformation of political sys
tems, 343, 344; American imperi
alism approved by, 346, 347; im
perial consolidation of, 347-352,
369, 370; democratic reaction of
colonies on, 350, 351; popula
tion, 1815 and 1915, 353, 354;
influences toward amity with
United States, 357-371; demo
cratic spirit in, 363, 366.

INDEX

377

Great Lakes, disarmament on,
12-17.
Grey, Earl, 60, 67.
Greytown, 155, 157, 162, 163.
Hague Tribunal, the, 335-338.
Halifax commission, the, 263, 276.
Hanover, 232.
Hapsburgs, the, 151.
Harrison, President, 283, 284.
Hawaiian Islands, 304.
Hay, Secretary, 329, 331, 332, 345.
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 331, 332.
Herbert, Sir Michael, 332.
HerscheU commission, the, 325,
326.
Hinterland, 368.
Hise, 157, 158.
Hohenzollern monarchy, the, 23 1.
HoUand, 232.
Holy Alliance, the, 52.
Home Rule Bill, Irish, 281.
Honduras, treaty with, 156, 157;
160, 162, 164.
Hudson's Bay Company, 125-127,
271, 362.
Hume, 100.
Huskisson, 58, 63, 66, 186.
Immigration to United States, 86,
87, ISO, 195, 196-
Imperial conferences, British, 349-
351-
Imperial Federation League, the,
294.
Impressment of seamen, 20-22, 73,
116, 117, 169, 170.
India, 348.
Indians, British alliance with, 34,
35; in Florida, 35-38.
Intercolonial Railway, the, 274.
Ireland, 67, 141; the great famine
in, 146-148; 150, 225, 226; home
rule, 348, 351; 367.
Irish-Americans, 143, 223, 224, 281,
284.
Irish immigration, 150, 195, 196.

Irish Land Act, the, 258.
Irish, naturalized, in Great Britain,
226, 227.
Irish Parliament, O'ConneU's agi
tation, for, 142, 143.
Irish Repealers, the, 151.
Irving, Washington, 197.
Isthmian canal question, 155 et
seq., 330-332.
Italians, the, 151, 363.
Italy, 301.
Iturbide, 55.
Jackson, Andrew, 8, 34-38, 59. 77"
79, 88, 103.
Jacksonian democracy, 75, 77, 79,
81.
Jameson's raid, 314.
Japan, 339, 345, 346.
Jay's treaty, 30.
Jefferson, 50.
Johnson, Andrew, 244.
Johnson, Reverdy, 242.
Johnson-Clarendon convention,
the, 242-244.
King of the Netherlands, 32, loi,
109.
Kitchener, Lord, 301.
Klondike River, the, 325, 328.
Kossuth, 363.
Krager, 324.
Laird, 227.
Lake of the Woods, the, 27, 29,
31-
Lancashire, 209, 218.
Lansdowne, 329.
Latin America, 155 rt seq.
Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, 324, 339.
Lewis, Sir George Oomewall, 227.
Liberal Party, in Great Britain,
186, 194, 281, 366; in Canada,
174, 175, 180, 324; on the Conti
nent, 150, 363.
Liberal-Unionists, the, 300.
Liberalism, 150, 186.

378

INDEX

Lincoln, President, 200, 201, 205,
206, 212, 213, 219; death of,
230, 231; 236.
Literature, British, 81-86, 197,
198; growth and influence of
American, 197.
Lopez, filibustering expeditions of,
16s.
Louis Philippe, 149, 151.
Louisiana, 130.
Lower Canada, 89; political as
pect in, 91, 92; 97, 98, 17s, 176,
, 268.
Loyalists, Canadian, 10-12, 90.
Lyons, Lord, 213.
Macdonald, Sir John A., 265, 266,
269, 274, 288, 297.
McDonough, 8.
Mackenzie, insurrection of, 93, 173.
McKinley, President, 324.
McKinley Bill, the, 284, 297, 298.
McLeod, Alexander, arrest of, 95,
96, 103, 105, 106, 108.
Madison, 50, 212.
Magyars, the, 151, 363.
Maine boundary dispute, 96, loi-
iio, 120.
Maiden, Michigan, 35.
Malmesbury, Lord, 171.
Manchesterism, 152, 176, 229, 296.
ManUa, 322.
Manitoba, 271.
Manufacturing reforms in Great
Britain, 64.
Marcy, Secretary of State, 168.
Maritime Provinces, the, 220, 269.
Martineau, Harriet, 83.
Mason, James M., 210-218, 310.
Massachusetts Historical Society,
Proceedings of, quoted, 56.
Melbourne, Lord, 88, 103.
Mexico, 55, 120, 121, 123; war
with, 134-139; 149, 154, 362.
Mill, 206.
Mississippi valley, anti-British feel
ing in, 34; influence in American
Government, 77.

Monroe, President, 16, 46,47; mes
sage as to intervention and col
onization, 50-54; 132.
Monroe Doctrine, 46 et seq.; situa
tion that produced, 48, 49; 132,
161, 302-307, 309, 311, 312, 317,
319, 320, 331, 342, 360, 368.
Montreal, 175, 176; manifesto is
sued at, 178, 179.
Morrill tariff of 1861, 204.
Mosquito Indians, 155, 161, 163.
Motley, 197.
Napier, Lord, 169, 171.
Napoleon Bonaparte, 9, 10.
Napoleon III, 151, 166, 221.
Napoleonic empire, revival of, 150.
Navigation laws, British, 63; re
peal of, 186.
Neutrality, "three rules" regard
ing, 251, 252, 256.
New Brunswick, boundary dis
pute, 96, 101-110, 361; 269, 270.
Newfoundland, 269, 270; fisheries
dispute with, 276, 277, 334-338.
New Granada, treaty with, 156.
New Zealand, 350, 354, 369.
Nicaragua dispute, the, 155 et
seq.; treaty with, 164; 362.
Nicaragua route, the, 155-158.
North American Review, the, 82.
Northwest Company, the, 125.
Nova Scotia, 269, 270.

O'ConneU, Daniel, 66-68, 91, 142,
143, 145-
Olney-Pauncefote Treaty, 335.
Olney, Secretary of State, 301,
305-308,315,316,318.
Ontario, 273.
Oregon, joint occupation of, 27-
29, 59; 96, 120; immigration to,
126-129; dispute concerning,
124-134, 140, 147; treaty, 133,
134, 251, 259, 362.
Oregon Trail, the, 126, 129.
Oswald's map, 110, ill.

INDEX

379

Pakenham, 130, 131.
Palmerston, Lord, 104, 105, 108,
121, 147; foreign poUcy of, 151-
154; contrasted with Polk, 153,
154; 157, 158, 163, 171, 194, 206,
208, 212, 227, 228; death of, 229;
248, 365, 366.
Panama, 156, 344.
Papineau, insurrection of, 92, 173.
Paris, arbitration tribunal at, 290.
Parliamentary reform in Great
Britain, 68-73.
ParneU, 281.
Pauncefote, Sir Julian, 318, 329,
331.332.
Peel, Sir Robert, 67, 129, 142-144,
146, 147, 152, 173, 176, 177, 183.
Pensacola, Florida, 35, 37.
Philippines, the, 293, 322, 324, 344,
.347-
Pierce, 166.
Poe, Edgar AUan, 197.
Polk, President, 124, 128; attitude
toward the Oregon question,
130-133; toward acquisition of
California, 134, 135; contrasted
with Palmerston, 153, 154; 156,
362.
Prescott, 197.
Press, the British, 8 1, 82.
Pribllof Islands, 285, 287, 290.
Prince Edward Island, 269, 270.
Prince of Wales, 364.
Protectionism, 76, 77.
Protective tariff, in the United
States, 76, 77, 222; abolition of
British, 143, 144, 176, 185.
Prussia, 48, 231.
Quarterly Review, the, 81.
Quebec, 269, 273, 325.
Queen's proclamation of neutral
ity, 234.
Radical party, 43, 52, 61, 62, 70,
81, 91, 100, 144.
Reciprocity treaty, 190, 191, 222,
223, 251, 262, 268, 364.

Reform Bill, British, of 1832, 68-
70; of 1867, 230.
Riel uprising, the, 295.
Robinson, Frederick John, 39, 58.
Roebuck, 100, 227.
Roosevelt, President, 344.
Root, Secretary, 329, 332-336.
Root-Bryce conventions, 333-338.
Rose, Sir John, 265.
Rosebery, Lord, 300.
Rouse's Point, fortress at, 32.
Rush, Richard, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24,
38, 39, 49-
Rush-Bagot arrangement, 17, 222,
32s, 360.
RusseU, Lord John, 147, 152, 153;
on Canadian independence, 183-
186; 194, 206, 214, 215, 217, 219,
229, 230, 232, 234; attitude re
garding Alabama claims, 236-
240; 243, 248, 365, 366.
Russia, 48; Pacific coast claims of,
53-55; war with, 169; 29O, 293,
300, 339. 345. 348-

Saint Croix River, the, 29-31.
Saint Mark's, seizure of, 36, 37.
SaUsbury, Lord, 281-284; 289,
300, 301, 303, 306-308, 315, 329,
349, 366.
Samoan Islands, the, 292, 293.
San Jacinto, 210.
San Juan de Nicaragua, 155, 156,
162.
San Juan Island, ownership of, 251,
259, 260.
Saturday Review, London, 368.
Schomburgk line, the, 303, 304,
308.
Schurz, 363.
Seal-fisheries dispute, 276, 285-
291, 299, 325, 329-
Search, right of, 20-22, 39, 72, 73,
105; discussions concerning, 112-
119; 169-172.
Secession, Southern, 200-204.
Seminole Indians, 36.

38o

INDEX

Seward, Secretary, 2o8, 215-217,
222, 226, 233, 234, 240, 241, 244,
245, 249, 253-
Shenandoah, the, 221, 256.
Silver, free coinage of, 3 19.
"Six Acts," the, 61,62.
Slavery, 73, 74, 165, 365; British
hostiUty to, 204-206.
Slave-trade, African, 71-75, 105,
107, 112-119, 170-172, 205.
Slidell, John, 210-217, 310.
Smith, Adam, 42, 63, 144.
Smith, Goldwin, 296, 357.
Smith, Sydney, 82.
South Africa, 321, 324, 350, 351,
354. 355. 369-
South Pass, the, discovery of, 126.
Spain, weakness of authority of,
in Florida, 35, 36; request for in
tervention in behalf of, in Amer
ican colonies, 48-51.
Spanish-American War, 321-323,
342, 369-
Spoils system, the, 79-81.
Squier, Mr., 157, 158.
Stanley, Lord, 173, 241, 243.
Suez Canal, 332.
Sumner, Charles, 206, 245-250,
253, 254, 256.
Sutter's miU, 362.
Tariff, protective, in the United
States, 75-77, 283, 297-299, 325,
339; in Canada, 274, 275; abol
ished in Great Britain, 143, 144,
176, 185.
Taylor, President, 157.
Tecumseh, 34, 35.
Texas, 96; annexation of, 120-124;
132, 134-137, 362.
Theodore, King, 225.
Thompson, Sir John S. D., 290.
Tigre, island of, 157, 158.
Times, the London, 216.
TocqueviUe, 83.
Tories, views of, as to Americans,
6, 7; 43. 48, 49. 52, 59-^2, 65-68,
81, 87, 142, 144, 146, 173-175;

Canadian, 178, 180, 181; 183,
194, 229, 230, 322, 361, 366.
Transvaal, the, 314.
Treaty, of 1783, 8, 29; of arbitra
tion, of 191 1, 341, 342; Clayton-
Bulwer, 158-165, 330-332, 362;
commerce and navigation, 39-
42, 59; Ghent, 1814, i, 2, 8, 9,
13, 20, 23, 24, 30, 192, 194, 342,
359; between Great Britain and
Venezuela, 316; Hay-Paunce
fote, 331; with Honduras, 157,
164; inshore fisheries draught,
280, 288; Johnson-Clarendon,
242-244; London, 1818, 20-29;
with New Granada, 156; with
Nicaragua, 164; Olney-Paunce-
fote, 318-320; Oregon boundary,
132-134, 251, 259;of Portsmouth,
346; Reciprocity, 190, 191, 364;
Root-Bryce, 333-338; seal fish
eries arbitration, 289-291; Texan
independence, 121; of Washing
ton, 250-254, 259-262, 265, 276,
366; Webster-Ashburton, 107-
"3-
Trent affair, the, 210-216, Zl8, 313.
Trevelyan, his "Life of John
Bright" cited, 228.
TroUope, Mrs., her "Domestic
Life of the Americans," 84.
Tupper, Sir Charles, 288, 290.
Tyler, President, 124, 130.
United Empire Loyalists, the, 91,
174.
United States, weakness and in
significance of, in 1812, 3, 4; de
mocracy in, 5-7; rejoicing over
Treaty of Ghent in, 8; difficul
ties as to northwestern bound
ary of, 27-32, 130; northeastern
boundary dispute, 110-112, 120,
242, 361; commercial interests
of, 39, 40; industrial and polit
ical freedom in, 43, 44; Jack
sonian democracy in, 46 et seq.;
poUcy of, in West India trade

INDEX

381

controversy, 57-59; resentment
at British attitude toward
slavery, 74; predominant char
acteristics of people, 78; public
opinion in,' concerning Great
Britain, 86, 87; territorial ex
pansion, 120 et seq., 139, 154,
165, 343, 362; growth of popu
lation, 1840, 139, 140; popular
sentiment in, in Irish agitation,
142, 143; Irish and German im
migration to, 148, 150; signifi
cance of the year 1848, 149 et
seq.; indifference to Canadian
annexation, 181, 182; reciprocity
with Canada, 187-191, 340; pop
ulation in i860, 192; immigrants
in i860, 195, 196; influence of
Irish in, 196, 226; dislike of Brit
ish caused by Trent affair, 216;
sense of growth and power in, in
the eighties, 291-293 ; creation of
a modern fleet, 292; war with
Spain popular in, 321; cordial re
lations with Great Britain in
1898, 322-324; controversies
with Canada, 324-340; diplo
matic agreements with Great
Britain, 1898-1908, 329 et seq.;
transformation of poUtical sys
tems, 343, 344; activity in world
politics, 345; imperialism in,
344-347; home of most of En
glish-speaking people, 355; con
trasted with British Empire,
355; influences toward amity
with Great Britain, 357-371-

United States Bank, the, 78, 79.
Upper Canada, 10-13, 16; political
aspect in, 90, 91; 99, 174, 175,
268.
Van Buren, President, 59, 88, 103.
Vaughan, 53.
Venezuela boundary controversy,
299, 301-318, 342, 368.
Victoria, Queen, 88, 349.
Visitation, right of, 171, 172.
Walker's filibusters, 163, 165.
War of 1812, 139.
Webster, Daniel, 95; in boundary
settlement, 105-112, 361; in de
bate over right of search, 116-
119.
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, the,
107-113.
WeUington, Duke of, 2, 60, 66, 67.
West Indies, commerce with, 57-
59; aboUtion of slavery in, 71,
74; 155, 322, 360, 361.
West, Sir L. S. Sackville, 283.
Whaling fleet, destruction of, 221.
Whigs, views of, as to Americans,
6, 7; 43, 49, 52; reforms of, 60,
62, 67, 70, 81, 83; 87, 88, 91, 92,
103, los, 144, 147, 173, 183. 186,
194, 202, 229, 361, 366.
WUberforce, 71.
Wilkes, Captain, 210-216.
WiUiam IV, 88.
Yeo, Sir James, 14.

YALE UNIVERSITY

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