¦i:-li»i!i£idij8i4 Moore : International Arbitrations, Vol. I, pp. 528-530 [78] HAMILTON FISH Commission, to consist of five persons respectively from the two governments, to sit at Washington, for the purpose of treating all questions that had arisen between the two countries respecting Great Britain's possessions on the con tinent of North America. In reply Secretary Fish expressed the willingness of the administration to enter upon the negotiation, provided that within the purview of the settle ment the dissensions growing out of the so-called Alabama claims should be included; a stipulation to which the Gov ernment of Great Britain readily acceded. As the Commissioners from the United States Grant appointed: Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State; Robert Gumming Schenck, newly appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain; Samuel Nelson, an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court; Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar, late Attorney-General in the Grant cabinet; and George Henry Williams, Attor ney-General. The British members were : The Right Hon orable George Frederick Samuel, Earl de Grey and Mar quis of Ripon; the Right Honorable Sir Stafford Henry Northcote, a leader of the Conservatives in Parliament; Sir Edward Thornton, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States; Sir John Alexander Macdonald, Minister of Justice and Attor ney-General of Her Majesty's Dominion of Canada; and Professor Montague Bernard, Chichele Professor of Inter national Law in the University of Oxford. These gentlemen convened as the Joint High Commis sion in Washington on February 27th. Mr. Fish, although he declined the post of chairman of the Commission, be lieving that such a form of organization would retard nego- [79] HAMILTON FISH tiations, guided its deliberations throughout with both energy and skill. On the 8th of May, 1871, the treaty was concluded; and on the loth laid before the Senate. An event had occurred in the meantime which must be recorded here if only to make the coherence of the story complete. When Secretary Fish informed Sir John Rose of the administration's determination to proceed with the proposed negotiation, he first had ascertained if he could count on a two-third vote of the Senate for confirmation. On the evening of his last interview with Senator Sumner, the Secretary called at the home of Senator Morton, and asked whether he thought that a treaty on the basis then under consideration could be ratified by the Senate against Sumner's opposition? Morton thought it could; and upon being told that Patterson had already approved, he said, "that gives a majority of the committee, and there can be no doubt of the Senate." Secretary Fish also had assur ances of support from the leaders of the opposition ; namely. Senators Bayard and Thurman. Thus "no precaution was neglected." But this did not seem to be enough: Sumner was still a power. Yet there seems to have been a difference of opin ion in the quintessence of the Senator's strength; some thought that his influence was the more potent over Sena tors; others, that it lay mainly in his ability to "stir up," in the language of Sir Stafford Northcote, "a great deal of bad feeling in the country, if he were so minded."* The latter could not be prevented; the former, however, could at least be curtailed by removing Sumner from his Senatorial chairmanship, a course which was agitated four months before it actually took place. Those who defended the * Lang : Northcote, Vol. II, p. 23. [80] HAMILTON FISH action contended that both in theory and detail Sumner stood diametrically opposed to a foreign policy, pregnant with uncertainty, to which the administration was com mitted; that a large majority of the Senate favored this policy ; that when he notified Secretary Fish in unequivocal terms the course he advocated, Sumner had put himself entirely out of harmony with his party on the one issue then uppermost in the public mind; and that so doing he had forfeited his right to be retained as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations when the new Congress, overwhelmingly Republican, was about to assign new com mittee appointments. The other position may be summed up by a series of questions, as indeed it was by Carl Schurz.'' Should a chairman of so important a committee as that on Foreign Relations of the Senate of the United States, who, not in sympathy with an administration of which he is a member, be deposed from the said chairmanship, because of his opposition to a particular treaty? Again, is it incumbent upon a chairman to support a treaty merely because the ad ministration of which he is a member desires favorable action? If so, what becomes of the Senate as an independ ent factor in the treaty-making functions? Would not such a rule be wholly a misinterpretation of our constitu tional plan of government? As a matter of fact no one questions the right of a single Senator to think for him self, nor to vote as his conscience may dictate. The fact that Sumner was removed before the treaty was laid before the Senate savors of Executive intermeddling, which is not ^ Carl Schurz : Speeches, Correspondence, Political Papers, Vol. VI, p. 283. [81] HAMILTON FISH observing strictly to the distinctive functions of the co ordinate branches of government. Mr. Sumner, however, acquiesced in the provisions of the treaty, and it was duly ratified on May 24, 1871 ; and on July 4th proclaimed to the world. The scene now shifted to Geneva, where the Arbitrators having been named by both governments, organized the Tribunal on December 15th. The United States appointed as its Arbitrator, Charles Francis Adams; Great Britain chose Lord Chief Justice Alexander Cockburn; the King of Italy named Count Frederic Sclopis; the President of the Swiss Con federation designated Mr. Jacob Staempfli, and the Em peror of Brazil named the Baron d'ltajuba. The Assistant Secretary of State, J. C. Bancroft Davis, was the agent for the United States, while the American counsel com prised three very distinguished lawyers ; namely, William M. Evarts, Caleb Cushing, and Morrison R. Waite, later Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Lord Tenterden was Great Britain's agent, and Sir Roundell Palmer, the chief counsel. Upon convening the Tribunal, Count Sclopis was elected as presiding officer. Each side immediately filed its case, after which a recess was taken to the following June, in order to give time for the contracting parties to file counter cases. The British public was soon discussing with a degree of feeling what they considered the extravagant claims of the United States. The cause of rupture came over the claims for national and indirect damages; these they averred should be withdrawn. Secretary Fish said in reply that "there must be no with drawal of any part of the claim presented." A diplomatic discussion then followed between Lord Granville, the Brit ish Foreign Secretary, and Secretary Fish, in which the [82] HAMILTON FISH latter "held his ground with great courage and ability, in sisting that the claims of every character should be dis posed of by the Tribunal in order to remove them from the domain of further controversy, and in order to estab lish perfect harmony in the relations of the two countries."* Without dilating in detail the imperilled sessions of the conference, which more than once almost resulted in final suspension of all activity towards a settlement of the ques tions at issue, suffice it to say that in the end through the firm and consistent course of Secretary Fish, aided by the tact and ability of Charles Francis Adams, the Government of the United States succeeded in having the subject of national and indirect claims passed upon to the satisfac tion of both countries, after which a rapid progress towards a final conclusion was made. On September 9th the de cision was reached; on the 14th it was proclaimed, the award being $15,500,000 as the amount due to the United States from Great Britain for the loses sustained by the depredations of the Confederate cruisers Florida, Alabama, and Shenandoah. Sir Alexander Cockburn alone declined to sign the award. Thus at the hands of an impartial Tribunal the principle of arbitration in international disputes was given a tre mendous impetus ; that it has not served as a binding prin ciple for all international disputes, of whatever character, is matter for regret. Yet in the years to come may we not look forward to its re-establishment among the nations of the world, compelling them by its very nature to observe it, and by a league of nations to be protected by it. By the Treaty of Washington and the Arbitration at 8 John W. Burgess : Reconstruction and the Constitution, p. 312. [83] HAMILTON FISH Geneva the United States and Great Britain bequeathed to the world a priceless legacy. For this, we are indebted to Hamilton Fish more than to any other person. To have been the chief designer of so momentous a piece of work in statesmanship is fame enough for any man. [84] CHAPTER VIII THE CUBAN REBELLION THE influence of Fish was equally dominant in the Cuban agitation, though during its initial stage his restraining guidance was of necessity concealed, and consequently the public knew little of the influence he really exerted on the administration. Previous to the ad vent of Grant the discontent of the Cuban people against Spanish misrule had ripened into open rebellion; and the sympathy of the American people naturally went out towards the suffering Cubans. Cognizant of this sentiment, certain Cuban promoters of the revolution, having estab lished headquarters in the city of New York, began to enlist the aid of our Government in behalf of their cause. They soon received the support of various Government officials, chief among whom was Rawlins, Secretary of War, who immediately endeavored to induce the President to issue a proclamation extending belligerent rights to the Cubans, which would have placed our Government in a position similar to that of Great Britain and Spain when they recognized Confederate belligerency in the early days of our Civil War. Grant was inclined to accept Rawlins' point of view; and so early as June, 1869, consulted a number of public men, among whom was Sumner, as to the advisability of following such a course. Sumner opposed it, as did others with whom the President counseled. The cabinet was divided. Fish, who was already feeling his way towards reopening the Government's case in the Alabama claims controversy, at once perceived the inconsistency of [85] HAMILTON FISH even a perfunctory declaration of our grievance of the Queen's proclamation of 1861, if we were to perform a like act in regard to a body of insurgents who, as he later wrote, "have no army — no courts, do not occupy a single town, or hamlet, to say nothing of a seaport — carrying on a purely guerrilla warfare, burning estates and attacking convoys, etc. " To his view, "Great Britain or France might just as well have recognized belligerency for the Black Hawk War." But Rawlins was persistent ; and later a story was widely circulated that he had a pecuniary interest in the success of the independence of Cuba.^ Grant finally yielded, and ordered a proclamation to be drawn up. This he signed on the night of August 19th in the cabin of a Fall River boat, sending it back to Washington by the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis, with a note to Fish, direc ting him to sign it, affix the official seal, and promulgate it. Secretary Fish complied with the President's orders, except as to issuing the proclamation, which he withheld, laying it safely away for further directions, which never came. In the meantime. Grant's mind was diverted towards other pursuits. His summer vacation was hardly over before he was saddened by the death of Rawlins, who died on Sep tember 6th; Wall Street's "Black Friday" followed eight een days later. In the midst of these events the President seems to have forgotten about his proclamation. Be this as it may, it never was issued, and subsequent circumstances 1 But this was untrue. In a personal letter to the author, Rawlins' biographer, General James H. Wilson, writes that General John E. Smith, who was Rawlins' executor, and had possession of and opened his effects, sent to Wilson some few years before his death an affidavit in which he declared that no such bonds were found or ever came into his possession. [86] HAMILTON FISH made its promulgation inadvisable. In his first annual message, in December, 1869, President Grant disavowed any design on the part of the United States "to interfere with the existing relations of Spain to her colonial posses sions on this continent." But, thinking perhaps of the growing sentiment in the country in favor of belligerency, he had maintained in a preceding paragraph "that this nation is its own judge when to accord the rights of bel ligerency, either to a people struggling to free themselves from a government they believe to be oppressive, or to in dependent nations at war with each other."^ Congress had not long been in session after the Christmas recess before the subject of Cuban belligerency again was broached. Early in February, 1870, John Sherman intro duced in the Senate a resolution in favor of according belligerent rights to Cuba, and made a speech in advocacy of its passage. On the 19th of the same month it appears Fish by appointment called on Sherman, and asked if he had recently examined the provisions of the treaty with Spain of 1795. Sherman replied that he was not aware of the existence of such a treaty. Fish then referred to its main provisions, especially that of the right of search, which he thought our Government would resist, the result of which probably would lead to war. The Secretary finally advised the Senator "to prepare bills for the increase of the public debt, and to meet the increased appropriation which will be necessary for the army, navy, etc."* Time did not tend, however, to abate the increasing de- '^ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VII. p. 32. ^ From the diary of Mr. Fish, as recorded in Adams' The Treaty of Washington, p. 216. [87] HAMILTON FISH mand on the part of the public for recognition of belliger ency; and had it not been for the controlling influence of Fish in all probability Grant would have succumbed to the pressure. Being informed that the vote in the House would be close Fish resolved again to urge the President to send a special message to Congress, setting forth the reasons why a state of belligerency was not then expedient. On the 1 2th of June the Secretary retired to his study and pre pared such a message, which treated the entire subject ex haustively. On the 13th it was laid before the President and the Cabinet, and with but slight changes was sent by the President to Congress on the same day. The message was received with mingled cries of approval and of disapprobation. A spirited debate ensued, with "much denunciation"; but as Fish records in his diary, "it evoked also much good sense, in the speeches of those who sustained it ; an expression of good, sound international law, and of honesty of purpose." It focused, moreover, the attention of Congress on a foreign problem of grave im portance, and solidified the party. Fish had triumphed; and his policy, precarious as it may have been at first of adoption, had prevailed. Hoar and Cox called it "the great est triumph the administration had yet achieved"; and Robeson, Secretary of the Navy, added, "Yes — the first triumph." "I felt," writes Fish in his diary, "that the Cuban question was the one on which perhaps more than on any other, the sensational emotions of the party and of the country might be arrayed in opposition to what is hon est and right. Believing, as I do, that the public sentiment, however much influenced by questions of sentiment, and of supposed popular impulse, is sure eventually to be just and correct, I have pressed this question in the way I have [88] HAMILTON FISH done, and first tried the proposed message submitted a short time since; finding the President would not adopt it, I tried the latter message, and he was induced with great hesitation, and with much reluctance to sign it, and after it was sent in he told me that he feared he had made a mistake. I never doubted the propriety of it, nor the policy of it, in the mere sense of ordinary politics."* Grant eventually came to deeply appreciate the manner in which his Secretary of State had handled the Cuban affair. "On two important occasions," he is recorded as having said to Fish, "your steadiness and wisdom have kept me from mis takes into which I should have fallen." One related to the non-issuance of the proclamation of Cuban belligerency ; the other to the Cuban message of June 13th, which was written solely by Fish, and which caused the administra tion to inaugurate a fixed policy in regard to Spain and Cuba. But the Cuban imbroglio was still to continue to perplex the administration; and Secretary Fish confronted each new complication with undaunted courage and a profound confidence in his ability to surmount it. As the desultory conflict in Cuba continued, the difficulty of handling the situation increased. But our relations with the then Spanish Republic, over which Castelar was President, were finally brought to a head and indeed clarified by an atrocious and unexpected event, which if it had been managed with less delicacy probably would have involved us in war. It gave Secretary Fish, however, an opportunity of showing in the midst of public clamor that he was a man who could not be swerved from his convictions; and history may * From the diary of Mr. Fish, as recorded in Adams' The Treaty of Washington, Appendix E, pp. 219 and 220. [89] HAMILTON FISH rightly praise the fair and prompt course on which he based his official acts. On October 31, 1873, while on her way from Kingston, Jamaica, to a port in Cuba a steamer called the Virginius, having an American registry and flying the stars and stripes, but loaded with war material and carrying a large number of men, was sighted, pursued, and seized by a Spanish war ship, and conducted to Santiago. Less than a week later fifty-three of the passengers and crew, having been con demned to death by summary court-martial, were executed under conditions, to use the words of Fish, of "peculiar brutality." Of these eight were American citizens. There was no concealment of our feelings when the news reached Amer ica. Those who had long advocated intervention now thought the time was ripe to strike. Popular excitement everywhere prevailed; and war talk for a time superseded all other questions. Largely attended meetings of protest, non-partisan in character, were held in two of the biggest halls — Tammany and Stein way — in the city of New York on November 17th. William M. Evarts presided at the meeting at Steinway Hall, and made a thrilling address. S. S. Cox followed Evarts in an impassioned appeal. Telegrams were read from Wendell Phillips, Joel Parker, Governor of New Jersey, Henry Ward Beecher, Vice- President Henry Wilson, and others of equal prominence. "If international law does not furnish a precedent," de clared Governor Ingersoll, of Connecticut, "our Govern ment should furnish a precedent for international law."° Thus in an hour which required poise and temperate speech there were those who would have rushed us into ^ New York Tribune, November 18, 1873. [90] HAMILTON FISH war without a complete knowledge of the facts. Fish, fortunately, was cool-headed; but this did not make him less ardent in his determination to act with promptness and decision. "The capture on the high seas of a vessel bear ing the American flag," he telegraphed on November 7th to General Sickles, our minister to Spain, "presents a very grave question, which will need investigation . . . and if it prove that an American citizen has been wrongfully executed, this Government will require most ample repara tion." On the I2th, Secretary Fish cabled to Sickles that doubts existed as to the right of the Virginius to carry the American flag, and concluded by saying that "investigation is being made." "Unless abundant reparation shall have been voluntarily tendered," he again cabled Sickles on the 14th, "you will demand the restoration of the Virginius and the release and delivery to the United States of the persons captured on her who have not already been massacred, and that the flag of the United States be saluted in the port of Santiago, and the signal punishment of the officials who were concerned in the capture of the vessel and the execution of the passengers and crew. In case of refusal of satisfactory reparation within twelve days you will . . . close your legation and leave Madrid."* In the meantime the Spanish President had expressed to Sickles his profound regret of the tragedy, and there is no reason to disbelieve his sincerity. This tended to clear the air, for it showed that the Spanish hostility towards us, which was said to have prevailed to an extraordinary de gree, had been exaggerated. Sickles, another example of one untrained in diplomacy, being sent to an important mis sion, at times blundered. This finally led Secretary Fish to 8 Foreign Relations, 1874, pp. 927, 936. [91] HAMILTON FISH take up the negotiations with Admiral Polo, the Spanish minister at Washington ; and with the approval of President Grant they reached an agreement satisfactory to both nations. Spain was to deliver up the Virginius, and her survivors to our Government; give ample indemnity to the families of those Americans who had been executed, and salute the American flag. On December i6th, the Vir ginius was turned over to the American authorities at Bahia Honda, but as she was proceeding to New York, sank in a storm off Cape Fear; the survivors, however, were picked up and reached New York safely. The in demnity for the benefit of the sufferers, and for the families of those who were so unlawfully executed, was ultimately secured. But the Attorney-General, having come to the con clusion that the Viginius was not entitled to carry our flag or to have an American registry at the time of her capture, a salute was not required. [92] CHAPTER IX RELATIONS WITH SAN DOMINGO THE CURRENCY VETO SECRETARY FISH had been unhampered, as we have seen, in his conduct of the Cuban problem ; but Grant was less pliable when his views in regard to San Domingo were opposed. Soldier-like he sought to dis ciphne those who looked with disfavor upon his project of annexation ; and when without deference to legality or prec edent, he attempted to exert all the power at his command to further his designs, a situation arose which caused not only a serious breach in the ranks of his own party, but a considerable lowering of the prestige of his administration. It is not certain just when Grant began to take an interest in San Domingo ; he may have kept his personal views in regard to the subject at first somewhat concealed. Yet it had been discussed freely around the cabinet table; but as one member wrote years later, "there was a general acquies cence in the opinion of Mr. Fish that a cordially friendly attitude to the actual government in San Domingo, with decided discouragement to all intervention and filibustering, should be our policy."^ Grant, however, was hardly seated in the presidential chair before a representative of the Baez government urged upon him intervention. Nor was this the first time that Baez had attempted to seek the aid of our Government, for he had not permitted Johnson to be unmindful of his wishes. Baez's reasons in making overtures to both Johnson and Grant of course were 1 Cox: How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney-General. Atlantic Monthly (Aug., 1895), Vol. LXXVI, p. 165. [93] HAMILTON FISH obvious. The stability of his government was uncertain: his rival, Cabral, whom he' had only lately sucd^eded, was on the Haytian frontier, waiting an opportunity to regain his lost domain. That his country was in a feritaent of revolution only intensified his ardor. If he could nbt rule supreme, his vehement foe must not rule at all. If Grant erred in judgment, it must be forgiven in the general disinterestedness of his motives, however his meth ods of procedure were open to criticism. To him.the pos session of San Domingo would mean a refuge for the negroes of the South; it would also extend our national area, and thus increase our natural resources. At the time he thought that certain European powers had their eyes on San Domingo, and he wished to maintain the doctrine that no territory on this continent should be acquired by a Eu ropean power. But the honest purposes of Grant did not deter a majority of his associates in the Government from looking at the mat ter differently. It was urged against the annexation scheme that by it our strictly continental entirety would be broken, and that foreign territory would involve us in extraneous complications. Others were of opinion that our own negro race presented a problem of sufficient magnitude without as suming the government of still another colored population ; that indeed it was unjust to the race of which they were a part to take from the Dominican people their territory over which they were entitled to work out for themselves the problem of self-government. Still other objections, of more or less weight, were advanced ; but without, it may be said, resulting in changing the views of the President. Early in May, 1869, President Grant suggested to his cabinet that inasmuch as the Navy authorities were desirous [94] HAMILTON FISH of having the Bay of Samana as a coaling station, he would dispatch General Orville E. Babcock to San Domingo to investigate as an engineer the natural resources of the coun try, and report on the subject. The original instructions, as signed by Secretary Fish, limited Babcock's trip to one simply of inquiry. Whether Grant privately supplemented these instructions is not known; that he approved of Babcock's entire course is evident by a letter to Senator Nye, which appeared in the Washington Republican of De cember 23, 1870, and which closed with these words : "Gen eral Babcock's conduct merits my entire approval." When the general tenor of this conduct is considered it becomes the more amazing. On September 4, as an "Aide-de-camp to his Excellency, Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States," a title which Babcock assumed apparently of his'i own accord in the negotiations, he induced the Dominican! officials to sign a treaty which provided for the annexation,' of their country to the United States, and for the payment I of $1,500,000 by the United States for the extinguishment! of the Dominican debt. The protocol also contained a stipulation to the effect that the President would use pri vately his influence to persuade members of the Senate to ratify the treaty. Before Babcock left for San Domingo, however, an inci dent occurred which clearly demonstrated that the con fidential aspect of the mission was not being properly guarded, and that the Department of State was being com promised. The President informed the members of the cabinet one day that the merchants of New York who had extensive trade interests in the island had offered to Babcock a complimentary passage on one of their vessels. With unconcealed surprise Secretary Fish declared "that it [951 HAMILTON FISH seemed to him very undesirable that General Babcock should be the guest of merchants having great trading in terests in San Domingo, whilst he was upon a confidential investigation for the President."^ Grant, catching Fish's idea, assented, and said that as the navy was about to send vessels down to join the West India squadron, he would direct that Babcock be furnished with transportation upon one of them. Presently Babcock returned, bringing with him a treaty of annexation, as above stated. "What do you think?" de clared Secretary Fish to Secretary of the Interior Cox, with great astonishment, "Babcock is back, and has actually brought a treaty for the cession of San Domingo; yet I pledge you my word he had no more diplomatic authority than any other casual visitor to that island !"* Mr. Fish's position was one of embarrassment, but he was disposed to let the matter pass as a State secret, little dreaming at this juncture that the President would defend the action of Babcock. At the next cabinet meeting, instead of taking up the work of each department as usual. Grant it seems led off by saying : "Babcock has returned, as you see, and has brought a treaty of annexation. I suppose it is not formal, as he had no diplomatic powers; but we can easily cure that. We can send back the treaty, and have Perry, the consular agent, sign it ; and as he is an officer of the State Department it would make it all right."* Grant's advisers were nonplussed. After a painful silence of some few minutes. Cox it appears volunteered the in- 2 Cox: How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney-General, Atlantic Monthly (Aug., 1895), Vol. LXXVI, p. 166. « lb., p. 166. *Ib., pp. 166, 167. [96] HAMILTON FISH quiry, "But Mr. President, has it been settled, then, that we want to annex San Domingo?" Grant, evidently em barrassed, "smoked hard at his cigar"; and, turning to Fish, on his right, as if to shift the answer to the head of the Department to which the subject by right belonged, found the eyes of the Secretary intent "on the portfolio before him."^ No one ventured to speak further on the subject, nor was it ever again discussed by the cabinet. But Fish, who had all along treated the question of an nexation only as current gossip, now found himself in a most unfortunate position. Not only had the prerogatives of his office been overlooked, but his personal sincerity would be called in question; for under the circumstances he could not divulge the manner in which the Department of State had been disregarded; and yet he had assured Sumner and others that the annexation issue was but idle talk, of which there was absolutely no foundation in fact. There was but one thing for him to do, tender his resigna tion, which he did. To this Grant would not listen; and after much persuasion, coupled with much outside pressure. Fish consented to postpone his resignation, but only because the paramount sense of duty towards the consummation of another problem, of greater importance, overcame his natural predisposition. The treaty, having been signed and transmitted to the Senate for ratification early in December, remained in the possession of that body until its final rejection in the fol lowing June. During this interval. Grant, as Babcock had promised, exerted his personal influence in behalf of its ratification. He elicited the aid of his cabinet, summoned 5 Cox: How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney-General, Atlantic Monthly (Aug., 1895), Vol. LXXVI, p. 167. 197] HAMILTON FISH Senators to the White House, and there endeavored to have them commit themselves in favor of ratification. "The headquarters of this activity," says Cox "were in the private secretary's office at the Executive Mansion. Papers and files from the State Department were sent for and retained without even the formality of using the President's name and authority, so that Mr. Fish was obliged to protest against the irregularity, and demand that it be stopped. He was ready, he said, to attend the President with any papers in his department at any time, but he could not permit their custody to be transferred to any other place."* But the precipitancy of the President, and the methods of his subordinates, created an insuperable barrier by arousing the sensibilities and apprehensions of certain Senators, chief of whom was Charles Sumner, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. This was unfortunate, not that Sumner's opposition alone defeated the ratification of the treaty; any more than that a less vigorous intervention on the part of the President would have led Sumner to favor the treaty, for we believe that other reasons were more potent in determining his course than the mere fact of his antipathy towards Grant. Yet one more gifted in the art of political strategy than Grant proved to be might have won rather than alienated those whose support he needed. But Grant belonged by birth and temperment to a sec tion of our country noted for a type of mgged and inde pendent manhood. The texture of his mind disqualified him from perceiving any other point of view than that to which he had directed his thought; and his want of tact may also be said to have minimized the effectiveness of his 8 Cox : How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney-General, Atlantic Monthly (Aug., 1895), Vol. LXXVI, p. 168. [98] HAMILTON FISH political leadership. But from his previous career one could hardly expect him to have been otherwise. Too long had he been surrounded with camp etiquette to be the dis creet and subtile harmonizer of the intricacies of states- craft. He chafed under opposition, and at times was im petuous and sardonic; yet to one who took the trouble to understand him Grant was in the words of Fish "a very true man, and warm friend — accustomed to deal with men of more frankness and sincerity, and loyalty to a cause, than many of those whom the business of Washington attracts hither."^ The narrative of the San Domingo controversy during the period the treaty was before the Senate, and later when the subject was renewed, is an interesting bit of political history, but would far exceed the scope of this study. But knowing the temperamental differences between Grant and Sumner a clash between two such positive forces was in evitable. But it may be said, however, that before the Massachusetts Senator had become an element of dis cord. Grant pursued a most deferential attitude in his zeal to gain the support of Sumner, as evidenced by his call early in January at the Senator's home. That Grant as sumed more in the way of aid than Sumner's answer im plied must be attributed to a misunderstanding on the part of the President. Simmered down to a final analysis Grant was not skillful in dealing with men whom he could not dominate. Fish remains one of the few exceptions. He was as little like Grant as Sumner. But Fish succeeded where Sumner failed in that he knew how to handle the President. At the outset he was no more in sympathy with T From Mr. Fish's diary, Adams : The Treaty of Washington, p. 247. [99] HAMILTON FISH the project of annexing San Domingo than Sumner, yet when it had been made an issue by the administration, the Secretary did what he could to sustain it. As a loyal cabinet officer he could have done no less. Sumner might have opposed the treaty and yet remained a friend of Grant, as did others who were equally as hostile to ratification. But Sumner thought Fish ought to resign. We know now that the Secretary would have welcomed retirement, and that more than once he actually asked to be relieved of his official duties which had become irksome. That patriotic reasons solely deterred him from taking the final step may now with certitude be affirmed; for between him and the President there had come to be an understanding that the Secretary should have full authority in the conduct of all other business of his Department. Thus Fish became the bulwark of the administration, and the oracle through whom great diplomatic victories were won. Another issue of paramount importance with which Grant had to deal, and in which the influence of Fish was felt, was on the question of the currency. Of domestic problems at the close of the war, second only to recon struction, lay the adjustment of the nation's finances. The war had lasted four years; and a national debt of nearly three billions of dollars had accumulated. To liquidate this debt, so as to make the process of funding easier; to regulate taxation in conformity of the debt policy; and to restore the old standard of value to a specie basis, were the immediate problems which confronted the Government. Without going into the history of the Currency question during the Johnson administration, it may be said that be fore Grant came into office a long period of financial controversy, in which diversity of opinion was almost as [loo] HAMILTON FISH voluminous as the leaves in the Vallombrosan Vale, had engaged the attention of Congress. Meanwhile, public opinion had become imbued with the proposition of funding the debt in greenbacks. The argu ments in favor of such a policy were indeed numerous. It was contended, for example, to be unfair to pay bond holders in coin, when other creditors received depreciated paper; and that inasmuch as there was not explicit provi sion of the law under which they were issued, except as to interest, the Government was not compelled to redeem the bonds in coin. These arguments, whatever may now be thought of their worth, appealed with irresistible force to many of our statesmen, for whom the retention of power, or the obtainment of it, seem to have been the only con sideration. Both parties were affected by this financial heresy. Though it was denounced in the Republican national platform of 1868, certain Republican leaders, among whom were Sherman, Butler, and Morton of In diana, favored it. Several Republican State conventions of the West, moreover, endorsed the proposition. Even An drew Johnson, then seeking a presidential nomination, such- cumbed to the fallacious teachings of the Greenback move ment. The payment of the bonds in greenbacks, instead of by coin, was incorporated into the national platform of the Democratic party in 1868, though its presidential candidate, Horatio Seymour, did not approve of that particular plank. But when Grant entered upon his presidency, the Repub licans in Congress at once endeavored to redeem their cam paign pledges in regard to the currency. The President called an extra session of the Congress, and on March 18, 1869, the celebrated "Act to Strengthen the Public Credit" [lOl] HAMILTON FISH became law. It solemnly pledged the faith of the nation to the payment in coin, or its equivalent, of all obligations of the United States, except when other provision was plainly stipulated in fhe law by which the issue was authorized. During the next few years the country's economic condi tion passed through every stage of fluctuation known to the financial world. The climax was reached with the country wide panic of 1873, which with other causes, moved Con gress to action. At this juncture a still further issue of paper money was deemed necessary. To meet this demand an inflation bill received the sanction of both Houses of the Congress, in spite of the strenuous protests of the sound money men, and early in April, 1874, reached the President. Grant was in a dilemma; great pressure was brought to bear on him to sign the bill. Some of his chief supporters, such as Logan and Morton, men in whom the President had great confidence, had been most urgent in their ad vocacy of the bill; and now they sought to persuade Grant to approve it. It has also been maintained by one in close touch with the situation that all but two members of the Cabinet were in favor of the bill ; the two who opposed the measure were Secretary of State Fish and Postmaster- General Creswell. At first President Grant decided to sign the bill, and went so far as to prepare a message in which he set forth his reasons for approving the measure. After thinking over the question more carefully he became undecided as to the proper cause to pursue. He then called in Secretary Fish, who very candidly and fully gave his reasons why the bill should be vetoed. More than one conference on the sub ject was held between the President and his Secretary of State. On April 21st, Grant stated to his Cabinet his final [102] HAMILTON FISH conclusion, and read the veto message, which was sent to Congress on the following day. That body hardly anticipated the result; for it had been led to believe that Grant was not opposed to a slight in flation; and some of his past acts served to confirm this behef. Under the circumstances, however, the veto was a very creditable act. "For twenty years," wrote Garfield, "no President has had an opportunity to do the country so much service by a veto message as Grant has and he has met the issue manfully." Historians also are agreed that it is one of the worthiest single deeds of Grant's executive achievements. But due credit must be given to the potent arguments of at least two advisers, who saw clearly, and reasoned logically. One of these was Senator John P. Jones, of Nevada, whose financial opinions carried great weight with President Grant; the other Hamilton Fish, whose "position and reasons," declares George F. Edmunds, former United States Senator from Vermont, "were more influential than those of any other man in inducing the President to take the course he did on that occasion."* * George F. Edmunds, Memorial Address Before the Legislature of New York, April 5, 1894, pp. 55, 56. [103] CHAPTER X IN RETIREMENT MAN AND STATESMAN AS THE presidential term of General Grant came to AA a close, the President naturally took an interest in ¦^ -^ the approaching election, and in the choice of his successor. It was no secret among his intimate friends that he would have been pleased, not alone because of his fitness, but as an endorsement of the administration, to have had Secretary of State Fish fall heir to his mantle. The vehement cohorts of Blaine and of Conkling presaged a struggle the intensity and bitterness of which were destined to result in the selection of a candidate not affiliated with either camp of these two political chieftains. This Grant apprehended ; and desiring that the Republican party should select from its best timber, he wrote a letter to be read to the convention when it should appear certain that neither Blaine nor Conkling could win, and when the time was propitious for the mention of another candidate, in which he advised the nomination of Hamilton Fish. The letter, however, was never read, and Mr. Fish knew nothing of its existence until long afterwards. It may also be observed in this connection that President Grant was not the only one to suggest the nomination of Secretary Fish. A day or more before the Republican convention of 1876 convened, Tom. Nast published a front-page caricature in a New York newspaper in which he was represented as sug gesting Fish and Hayes as a winning ticket. The next week in another caricature the cartoonist congratulated himself [104] HAMILTON FISH upon the partial success of his suggestion. When this sec ond picture was shown to Mr. Fish he is said to have re marked : "Well, I'm glad Nast had to scratch me off. I've got enough of politics." And this was said with perfect sincerity; for Mr. Fish had long looked forward to the time when he could retire and spend the remainder of his days in the seclusion of his family and friends. He had now reached a time of hfe when the joy of freedom and the peace of mind, which comes to those who after an eventful life lay off the cares of official duties, was welcome. His health at this time was on the whole good, though frequently, as much as eight years before his death, he writes in a private letter, that he suffered from "painful neuralgia troubles, to which I am subject," and which "so often interrupt me in the midst of whatever I may have on hand" and which "leave me un fit for any effort." For sixteen years Secretary Fish lived in retirement, en joying the memories of great things accomplished; and thus surrounded by the esteem of friends, and the affection of his family ; with children of the third and fourth genera tion gathered around his hearth stone; venerated by his countrymen; and secure of lasting remembrance, he passed his evening of life. There is not much more to relate. The end came quite suddenly. On the evening of September 6, 1893, Mr. Fish felt as well as usual, and had enjoyed before retiring a game of cards with his daughter, Mrs. Benjamin. He seemed cheerful when he bade her good night. But the following morning, soon after arising, and while sitting in his chair, he passed quietly away, Mrs. Benjamin being the only member of the family present when the end came. He [105] HAMILTON FISH was eighty-four years old, and death was attributed to old age. He rests in the cemetery of St. Philip's church in the Highlands, where other members of his family are interred. Here the distinguished statesman lies not far from his beautiful home at Garrison, which skirts the waters of the majestic Hudson, on whose banks, like Irving, he was wont to personally supervise the affairs of his large estate, and while away many a quiet hour. Opposite, to the right, may be seen the Government buildings at West Point, as they stand out abruptly against the rugged cliffs of rock, for which the Highlands of the Hudson are famed ; still farther up the river stands Storm King mountain like some sentinel guarding the peaceful villages over which her shadows fall. In such a setting the life of Hamilton Fish passed out; and no more beautiful location could have been selected by the aged statesman in which to pass the remainder of his days. Actuated by the purest motives, and the innate de sire to serve his fellowmen, Hamilton Fish entered upon one of the most precarious of careers with faith in his own rectitude, and desired no other emolument save the satisfac tion of adding another name to those who have served man kind for the love of service. Free from cant or those petty jealousies and prejudices which so often drag the reputations of statesmen down to the leval of politicians, in the worse sense of that term, Mr. Fish used the language and practised the manners of a gentleman. The patience and fidelity he displayed were not less conspicuous than the inflexibility of will with which he served the interests of his country, for above all he was a patriot "in whose honor and integrity," to use the words of another, "there has never been found a flaw." [io6] HAMILTON FISH He belonged, moreover, to a type of American gentleman long since passed on. The type of whom Calhoun and Benton, Webster and Clay, were among the most conspic uous representatives. Stately in appearance; courteous of bearing ; conservative in thought ; slow to anger ; of pleasing personality, he could when occasion required leave no uncertainty as to where he stood. Mr. Charles Francis Adams, in a letter to Carl Schurz, observes that Mr. Fish possessed in his make up "a good deal of that Dutch ele ment ;" that he was "a quiet and easy-going man ; but, when aroused, by being,- as he thought, 'put upon,' he became very formidable. Neither was it possible to placate him." His letters, however, show him to have been a man just in his estimate of men; not caring for the plaudits of the crowd, yet appreciating kindly references of his efforts; shrinking from undue publicity, but at the same time ever ready to stand without reservation for any idea the prin ciple of which he conceived to be right. The precepts to which he clung in private life, he also carried with him into public station. Generosity, fairness in dealing with an opponent, and steadfast fidelity were practised as conscien tiously in his public career, as they were in private Hfe. These qualities were in the man; and while used to the luxuries of life he was as much averse to the snobbishness and dehumanizing tendency of class hatred as any son who springs from a less lavish environment. Mr. Fish believed in the dignity of labor, whether of the brain or of the muscle, when conducted wholesomely; and he conceived it to be his duty as a public servant to ignore all superficial dis tinctions which had no bearing on the ability, the character, or the usefulness of the man whom he was to appoint. And he was the greater for this catholicity of selection. [107] HAMILTON FISH The opportunity for the performance of great public service came to Mr. Fish late in life, but this very fact per haps was of greater benefit to his country than if he had not possessed the experience and poise, the well-trained mind, and painstaking characteristic, which was so esential in dealing with so fateful a chapter of our international his tory as the events leading up to and culminating in the Treaty of Washington. Nor has history lost sight of these qualifications, with which Mr. Fish was so splendidly en dowed. Indeed they have drawn from one of his suc cessors the tribute, we think justly bestowed, that Mr. Fish "was one of the most useful secretaries who ever adminis tered the affairs of the Department of State. "^ The wide influence of Secretary Fish with members of Congress also made him an invaluable asset to the adminis tration of President Grant, and although he had his share of criticism, he commanded men's confidence and respect by his firmness, candor, and justice. He was genial, and his wide range of reading, especially along historical and political lines, made him an interesting host. Thus among our Secretaries of State his name will take rank with the greatest who have filled that office; and history when she comes to record a final judgment will also place the name of Hamilton Fish among those who by their character have elevated the public service. And no greater tribute can be paid to the memory of those who have not labored in vain to make of our country a land of freedom and of oppor tunity. 1 A Century of American Diplomacy, by John W. Foster, p. 436. 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