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Julian B. Bishop Fund

CAMBRIDGE NAVAL AND MILITARY SERIES
General Editors — Sir Julian S. Corbett, LL.M., F.S.A.
H. J. Edwards, C.B., M.A.

THE NAVY IN THE WAR
OF 1739-48

IN 3 VOLUMES
VOLUME I

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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ADMIRAL SIR JOHN NORRIS
THE NAVY IN THE WAR
OF 1739-48

BY

H. W. RICHMOND

REAR-ADMIRAL

VOLUME I

CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1920

PREFACE
This book was begun in 1907 as during the preceding two or three
years I had tried in vain to understand the part played by the
Navy in the wars between 1739 and 1748. I therefore began to
study the original papers and the result of my researches gradually
developed into this book. As opportunity was scanty and odd
hours only could be given to the work I took some years to com
plete it. The book was finished in August 1914 and would have
been published that autumn if it had not been for the outbreak
of war. Although the story affords many analogies with, and
abundant matter for comment on, the course of the War with
Germany, it has been thought best to issue it as originally written,
without any knowledge of the events which lay so close ahead.
I was the fortunate recipient of help from the late Sir John
Laughton who was always ready to give to others the benefit of
his own great store of knowledge; from Mr W. G. Perrin and
Mr Carr Laughton who have procured papers and undertaken
research for me when I was unable to do it for myself; from
Lord Hawke and the late Lord Sandwich who allowed me to
examine their family papers at Womersley and Hinchinbrooke ;
and finally from Sir Julian Corbett who has given me invaluable
advice on many matters and to whom I owe more than I can
express for his never-failing assistance and encouragement.
I am indebted to Mr Emery Walker for the use of his copy
right photographs of the portraits, and to the authorities of the
National Portrait Gallery for permission to reproduce that of
Admiral Vernon.
To all of these my grateful thanks are due. H. W. R.
H.M.S. ' Conqueror,'
March 1918.

CONTENTS
CHAP. Introduction 
I. Preliminaries of the Spanish War
II. The Consideration of the War Plans
III. The Opening Operations in the West Indies .
IV. Beginning of the War in the Mediterranean
V. Events in Home Waters, 1740 ....
VI. The Expedition to Cartagena, Santiago and Panama
VII. The Beginning of the War of the Austrian Succession
VIII. Operations in the Mediterranean, 1741 .
IX. Events in Europe and Home Waters, 1742— 1743
X. Reinforcement of the Mediterranean Command with
the Development of the War in Italy, 1742
XI. The Mediterranean Command {continued) .
XII. The West Indies. End. of Colonial Offensive. October
1742 to February 1744 
Appendix I. A List of Ships in Sea Pay in September
1739 with their Stations .
„ II. Contemporary Criticism (1740) of the
Conduct of the War
„ III. The Marines and the Manning Question
„ IV. Considerations on War with France and

Spain

Index

PAGE ix I
14
39 59
73
101
138151 179
197 221241
261264 267276279

ILLUSTRATIONS
Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Norris .... Frontispiece
The Trade Routes to the West Indies and Central
America (Carte Marine)  between 16 and 17
The Attack on Porto Bello  „ 48 an-d 49
The Attack on Chagres  ,,52 a"d S3
Ferrol Harbour and approaches  to face 84
Cartagena  between 112 and 113
The Fort of San Lazar  to face 120
Guantanamo Bay  » 126
The Isthmus of Panama  between 132 and 133
The Western Mediterranean  to face 1 51
The Italian Coast  between 196 and icfl
The Caraccas Coast  to face 245
Puerto Cabello  » 254
R.N.I. b

"The next great war has now passed almost entirely out of
memory, not having brought to light any very great com
mander, nor achieved any definite result. But we have all
heard speak of the fable of fenkins' ears, and we have
heard of the battles of Dettingen and Fontenoy, though
perhaps few of us could give a rational account either of the
reason for fighting them or of the result that came of them."
Seeley, Expansion of England.

INTRODUCTION
The war which lasted from 1739 to 1748 marks a definite phase in
English naval history. The seventeenth century, which in an historical
sense may be said to have lasted until the peace of Utrecht, had been
a period in which the sea had played a supremely important part. It
had been a century in which colonial expansion had held the foremost
place in the external policy of England. As the sixteenth century had
witnessed the discoveries of the Portuguese and Spaniards, and the
acquisition by those powers of vast dominions and trading interests
oversea, so the following hundred years had seen Holland, England and
France stretching out their arms both in the East and in the West.
England had become a truly maritime power on a new scale. She had
taken her place as a factor to be reckoned with in the Mediterranean,
as a colonial power in the West Indies and America and as a trading
power in the Far East, where the first year of the century was marked
by the establishment of the East India Company. The eighteenth cen
tury inherited the effects of this development, which shewed themselves
in a struggle, lasting through a series of wars, to decide whether France
or the United Kingdom should finally become the great colonial power.
"The explanation of that second Hundred years' war between England
and France which fills the eighteenth century is this, that they were
rival candidates for the possession of the New World, and the triple
war which fills the middle of the century is, as it were, the decisive
campaign in that great world struggle1."
In considering therefore the strategy of this war the great struggles
on the continent must not be allowed to obscure the fundamental con
tention between France and England; and the importance attached
to colonies and trade was the direct outcome of the prevailing national
sentiment. The significance of naval power was fully appreciated by
the statesmen of the day, and naval strategy took the colour of the
objects of national policy. With this object — the development of
colonial power and trade — crystallised in their minds they saw clearly
the means of reaching their ends. That a supreme navy was the
1 Expansion of England, p. 34, Sir John Seeley. The "triple war" referred to
is the series 1739-1748, 1755-1762, 1778-1783. Cf. also A. Sorel Essais d'histoire
et de critique, for a parallel French view. 62

x Introduction
essential instrument formed an article of faith; but they had an equally
unshakeable conviction as to the general principles governing the em
ployment of that weapon. Whether it were the trade of the enemy to
be attacked or our own to be protected, whether the kingdom were to
be defended or military operations to be supported, it was an accepted
formula that these ends could only be fully attained by the destruction
of the sea forces of the enemy. If these were swept away or rendered
impotent the enemy's trade, without protection, must collapse; the
enemy's troops, undefended, could not risk themselves upon the water;
and the troops and stores of ourselves or our allies could pass unmolested
across the sea, or our small vessels could combine tactically with the
troops on shore to the extent of the range of their guns because the sea
forces of the enemy would be unable to interfere with them. Whatever
the ends might be the means were governed by the one main principle—
the necessity for destroying the enemy's sea forces.
There was however a link wanting in the chain of the factors
necessary for success. However sound may be national policy, and
however correct the tactical doctrines, the desired results cannot be
reached unless the principles of the strategy are equally appreciated
and acted upon. The overwhelming navy manned by expert tacticians
and seamen must still fail fully to exercise its strength if the fleets and
squadrons are not correctly disposed. This was the case in the early
years of this war, and the country was, and had reason to be, dis
satisfied with the results obtained by the navy. Commerce suffered
heavy losses at the hands of the privateers of Spain alone and Spanish
fleets sailed, effected junctions and escorted armies apparently as they
pleased. A great oversea expedition, prepared in high hopes of con
quests which should outshine those of any previous time came to a
standstill before the walls of an inconsiderable city, whence it eventually
retired reduced by sickness and battle to a fourth of its original strength.
French squadrons sailed from their harbours and convoyed, un-
attacked, transports of troops and rich fleets of merchants across the
Atlantic. There were, besides, inconclusive engagements between
squadrons in more than one of which there were suggestions of miscon
duct; and to crown all, in the eyes of the British public, a British fleet
engaged an approximately equal fleet of the enemy and parted without
a victory. The common habit of accounting for things by establishing general
isations or employing catchwords has led to the failures of this war being
ascribed entirely to a want of professional ability on the part of the
naval officer of the day. The "degree of responsibility borne by the
direction of operations and the state of naval thought, as influenced

Introduction xi
by precedent, have not been sought for; yet in any study of war this
should be one of the first points to be investigated. A navy, however
well conducted, officered and manned, can do nothing in the shadow of
inefficient strategical direction ; the best manned fleet will be impotent
if its tactical government embodies a wrong doctrine. Although these
statements are platitudes and should seem to need no repetition, yet
they continue to he, in spite of experience, at the root of the cause of
failure in war.
Infinite pains at different times have gone to the making of officers,
as experts in seamanship and gunnery, but little towards instructing
them in the design and conduct of operations. War, in its higher aspects,
in what Kempenfelt called its "more sublime parts,"has too often in the
course of our history received only a Cinderella's share of attention.
This defect existed in that part of the eighteenth century to which
this book refers both in the British and French navies. Indeed, in the
French service the conditions were worse than in our own. At the
Academie de Marine1 sea military knowledge was in the background,
while mathematics, hydrography, astronomy, navigation, construction
of instruments, naval architecture, medicine, botany, agriculture,
philosophy and even gynaecology found their places. Mineralogy and
gun manufacture, "les productions d'ingenieur d'artillerie et non
d'officier de marine cannonier," as M. Castex pertinently remarks —
were included, but military studies only appear in an anecdotal his
torical form2.
While the British navy did not err in the direction of a worship of
mathematics, science and other matters unconnected with seamanship
and sea fighting, there was a tendency to put purely nautical acquire
ments so high that sea military knowledge suffered in consequence.
This was not peculiar to the fifth decade of the eighteenth century. It
had existed earlier and continued to exist later. Yet, like Kempenfelt
in 1779, there were men of the earlier period who had recognised the
same defect in their time. Curtis Barnett and Vernon were both well
aware that an officer must be something more than a seaman alone, and
apparently Anson had had an idea of doing something to remedy
1 Although the Academie de Marine at which the extraordinary education
described was not instituted until 1752 the ideas which permeated the curriculum
must have been long in existence or they could not have obtained a hold sufficient
so completely to dominate the training. Castex, Les idies militaires de la Marine du
XVIIIieme siecle, chap. 5.
2 Out of 274 units of instruction, two only were accorded to strategy and
tactics, "a particularly edifying percentage. It is equal to that of agriculture."
Castex. Les idies etc., chap. 5. The causes of the successes of the British navy in
the eighteenth century are largely to be found in this book, and in particular, in
this chapter.

xii Introduction
matters before 1739. In a letter from Barnett to Anson, written in 1745
on hearing of the latter's appointment to the Admiralty, the following
sentence occurs:
I expect a great deal from you. I am stupi,d enough to think that we are worse
officers though better seamen than our neighbours; our young men get wrong
notions early, and are led to imagine that he is the greatest officer who has the
least blocks in his rigging. I hope you will give a new turn to our affairs and
form a society for the propagation of sea-military knowledge. I think you had
formerly such a scheme1.
Barnett and Anson moreover were not solitary in their views even
at this time. A senior officer, writing in 1747, says
It is certainly necessary that a sea officer should have some natural courage:
but it is equally just that he should have a good share of sense, be perfect master
of his business, and have some taste for honour; which last is usually the result of
a happy education, moderate reading, and good company, rarely found in men raised
on the mere credit of being seamen.
And, continuing, he complains that " the art of offensive and defensive
sea fighting " and fitness to govern others are not so much as thought
about in the examination for lieutenant.
The general notion about sea officers is that they should have the courage of
brutes, without any regard to the fine qualities of men, which is an error them
selves too often fall into. This levels the officer with the common seaman, gives
us a stark wrong idea of the nature design and end of the employment, and makes
no distinction between the judgement skill and address of a Blake, and a mere
fighting blockhead without ten grains of common sense2.
While the business of sea-fighting belongs to the seaman, the
direction of a war concerns also and in a greater measure, the statesman,
who in time of war becomes a member of Committees or Council, Inner
Cabinets, War Councils or whatever name or form suits best the taste
of the day. If therefore some study of strategy is incumbent on the
seaman it is none the less incumbent on the statesman, lest when war
breaks out there should be no definite doctrine as to how the national
resources — navy, army and finance — can most effectively be employed
in bringing about a victory which shall give a satisfactory and lasting
peace. If this has not been determined, and the resultant course of
action decided upon, there can be no national strategy, no clear plan
of operations. Internal dissensions which hamper the full development
of our strength, such as those caused by the Jacobites or the Chartists
or their modern counterparts will not have been provided for and
guarded against. In such cases the consequence must be indecision,
vacillation and controversy in the execution of such immature plans as
are eventually made. The war of 1739 to 1748 was no exception to this,
and furnishes indeed an excellent example of the working of a system in
1 Anson correspondence Add. MS. 15955.
2 An article, probably by Vernon in The Fool, Feb. 25, 1747. B.M., 12530, c. 30.

Introduction xiii
which preparation for war finds too small a place in the activities of
government. Until the general European war began in the end of 1740 Great
Britain's main strategy presented no very controversial points. Since
Spain for want of an adequate naval force could not invade England
nor England for want of a military force invade Spain on any large
scale, the problem of the utilisation of the army of each kingdom was
fairly restricted. Each country had in its power to attack the outlying
possessions of the other, or to make feints against the home country.
But in case of an invasion of foreign territory it is not sufficient merely
to carry the troops thither in safety; the command of the sea must be
sufficient to maintain the army and to prevent the enemy from sending
out a counter expedition to recapture it. The only places in which
England was seriously vulnerable abroad were Jamaica, Barbados,
Antigua and some lesser West Indian islands of no great importance,
Minorca and Gibraltar. Jamaica, great in area and equipped with a
numerous local militia of white and black servants, would have required
an expedition greater both to convoy and maintain than Spain could
hope successfully to send across the Atlantic. The Leeward Islands and
the Bahamas might have been taken with smaller forces, but would
have been difficult to hold. Gibraltar and Malta remain. The former
had proved its power of resistance in 1727 : its capture would not involve
the sending of a force by water, but it could not be invested unless reliefs
could be intercepted by sea. Minorca might however be attacked swiftly
by a considerable force despatched from the neighbouring ports of
Carthagena and Barcelona, and its subsequent supply would not have
been impossible owing to the large number of local Catalan small craft
whose interception would be difficult. But provided that England re
tained the command of those seas its eventual recapture would depend
only upon whether England could send a sufficient military force to
reduce it by siege and blockade.
In consequence of these difficulties, inherent to her weakness at sea,
Spain chose commerce attack as her principal strategical measure and
used her army to assist this by threatening to attack the most important
British points — the United Kingdom, Gibraltar and Minorca — in the
hope that by preoccupying the British fleet with their defence, the
high seas would be left open for the operations of her cruisers and
privateers against trade.
England, with her larger fleet was able to undertake larger military
operations against the distant and valuable possessions of the enemy.
Attacks upon the principal naval ports of Spain lay also within her
compass, for with the slowness of communication on land reinforce-

xiv Introduction
ments took so long to reach a threatened point that a well prepared and
informed expedition, carried out by surprise, had great promise of
success even against places on the mainland. Rebuffs at Cadiz on earlier
occasions had however been experienced and there was no great desire
to incur them again, though an expedition was suggested. There was
also a school of military thought — and the experienced Duke of Argyll
was amongst its exponents — which advocated the employment of com
bined raiding expeditions on the fines of that carried out by Lord
Cobham in 1719 against Vigo and Pasages, the object of such ex
peditions being the destruction of enemy privateers, their bases and the
shipping. For warfare of this kind a comparatively small military
force which could be carried in the fleet together with a few transports
was sufficient. One definite proposal was made to use the army to
assist the navy in obtaining command of the sea by the capture of
Ferrol, but this was rejected in favour of the colonial attack. The
ruling opinion however was that it was preferable to use the army in
a more comprehensive way in capturing places on which Spanish
prosperity depended. Such part of the army therefore as was avail
able when the defence of the kingdom against internal rebellion on-
the part of the Jacobites had been allowed for, as well as external
attack from a dubiously neutral France, was to be used in large bodies
against the oversea possessions whence Spain drew the wealth on which
her capacity for continuing the war depended. The innumerable dis
cussions however which were heard before any decision was arrived at as
to how and where war should be made against Spain, and the lamentable
result of the constant procrastinations, provide examples for all time of
the need of thinking out the employment of the national forces before
war begins.
When the continental war broke out English main strategy received
a new orientation. The great problem of whether British policy were
to be mainly naval or mainly military divided the opinions of the day
into two separate camps. There was on the one hand a body of opinion
which would have conducted the war entirely at sea and in the colonies,
sending no troops to the continent; and on the other a school which
urged our taking a considerable share in the continental war and making
that our principal effort. Both recognised the necessity of furnishing
subsidies to our allies. The numerous debates in Parliament both on
the question of sending troops to take part in the war on the continent,
and on the subject of a standing army furnish interesting and important-
evidence of the way in which this question was regarded by the states
men of the day. In the aims of the two schools there was no real
difference. Both had the same objects in view— the security of the

Introduction xv
kingdom and the trade, the development of the colonies and the main
tenance of the liberties of Europe, though the last of these was less
considered by some supporters of the maritime and mercantile doctrine
than by their opponents.
Those who advocated the strategy of a purely maritime and colonial
war, leaving the continental battle fields severely alone, relied largely
on arguments of a financial kind. As Britain was primarily a trading
nation it was against her most important interests to hamper herself
by the heavy expenses of an army. Continental struggles, they argued,
did not concern this island nation; and if war were necessary it should
only be such a war, waged in such a manner, as would advance our true
interests, which were commercial. We should sweep the enemy's com
merce from the sea, destroy his naval power and capture his colonies, the
sources of his wealth; for by the monopolistic colonial system then in
vogue we should thus become sole masters of the commerce, both export
and import, of those colonies.
If we should take part in a land war the extra expense would involve
extra taxation, which would cramp imports, hinder the re-exporta
tion business, thus enhancing the prices of commodities sold to foreign
countries, reducing trade and leading to borrowing and unsound
finance1. A further argument, though of a different nature, was that if this
country refused to afford military assistance on the continent it would
not affect the war since the continental powers would then exert them
selves more on their own account, as they could very well do, and
would not look to the United Kingdom to repair their own sins of
omission. It was argued that we should always be expected to bear the
whole of the expense of the sea war to which there would be added the
chief expense of the land war2. Moreover, if our army were used on the
continent to defend Europe against France, the interested powers would
leave to England the defence of those of their possessions as affected
her — such as the Netherlands — and would themselves embark upon
offensive operations for the increase of their own dominions. So, it was
pointed out, had the Emperor behaved in King William's wars. When
he saw that the Dutch and ourselves were ready to defend Flanders for
him because of the great importance we attached to its not falling into
the hands of France, he left us to fight these battles for him, and himself
carried on a war of conquest against the Turks3. Indeed, an example
1 Parliamentary History, vol. xm, p. 176.
2 Alderman Beckford's speech, Pari. Hist. vol. xiii. At a later date, see also
Lord Strange and Beckford, Pari. Hzst. vol. xiv, "Debate on the subsidy to the
Elector of Hanover."
8 Velters Cornewall's speech, Pari. Hist. vol. xiii, p. 159.

xvi Introduction
corroborating in no small measure this view arose later in this very war
of the Austrian Succession. In 1745 Austria under the guidance of
Kaunitz endeavoured to leave the defence of her territory in Lombardy
to the King of Sardinia and the British fleet, while her own forces were
used to conduct a campaign of conquest on Naples.
Finally, the supporters of the maritime policy urged that no success
of France on land could affect us so long as we preserved our superiority
at sea. No ignominious peace could be imposed upon us. By devoting
our whole resources to the navy and to expeditions against the sources
of wealth of the enemy we could ensure both the free flow and increase of
our commerce, the destruction of that of the enemy, and the capture of
the colonies of France and Spain; so that in the end the exhaustion of
those powers would be brought about and a satisfactory peace obtained.
As to the military operations on the continent our fleet alone, without
the help of a single soldier landed in Europe, would render the most
important service in the Mediterranean by commanding the sea com
munications, transporting where necessary the armies of our allies, and
preventing the enemy from moving troops by sea from France or Spain
into Italy, or from carrying supplies for his army by water. If on the
other hand we should take upon us the burden of a continental war, we
must abandon operations in America and the West Indies, and thus
deny ourselves the only really profitable offensive in our own interests,
for we could not conduct a strong war in two important theatres at the
same time. Alderman Beckford summed up the views of this school.
" The most effectual way," he said, "to assist our allies will always be to prose
cute the war by sea and in America. . .We may conquer from our enemies, they
can conquer nothing from us, and our trade will improve by a total extinction of
theirs1."
Admiral Sir Peter Warren was a no less pronounced advocate of the
purely maritime policy. While not believing that we could bring France
to a peace solely by the operation of our squadrons at sea, he was
strongly averse from our taking any part in a continental war.
"We are not the weaker party," he said, "we have nothing to do with the
continent; we do not stand in need of assistance from any state on the continent;
let us confine ourselves to our own element, the ocean. There we may still ride
triumphant, in defiance of the whole house of Bourbon2."
Warren considered it possible to keep a navy that could defy whatever
force Europe brought against it, though he deplored the tendency he
observed to neglect the navy, a tendency which would lead to our being
" beat out of the ocean, and then we must contend not for any part of the
continent of Europe, but for our own island."
1 Parliamentary History, vol. xiii, p. 119.
2 Parliamentary History, vol. xiv, p. 470.

Introduction xvii
The two postulates on which the maritime policy rested were that
the continental powers alone should be able to withstand France without
our help; and that we should be able, whatever the result of the con
tinental campaign, to maintain our supremacy at sea in the face of such
maritime confederations as might be arranged against us in succeeding
years under the guidance of a Franco-Spanish alliance.
These views were disputed and their conclusions denied by the pro
tagonists of the continental school. It was pointed out that in any case
we were already engaged by treaty to furnish troops for the defence of
Holland, and to uphold the rights of the Habsburg dynasty in the
Netherlands. These countries could only be defended against French
attack by an army on land, and our allies, in the dispositions of their
forces, had counted upon our promised help. Whether this agreement
were a right or a wrong one was now beside the case. We had entered
into it and must act upon it.
Apart however from the question that honour dictated an abiding
by our agreements, there was the fact that if Holland and the Austrian
Netherlands were conquered owing to lack of cooperation on our part
the ports of both and the maritime force of the latter would be at
the disposal of France. The material assets of sea power of that country
would thus be increased. But another, and possibly more important
consideration would be that our allies, incensed at our desertion of their
cause, would willingly turn to our enemies and execute vengeance upon
the nation that had deserted them1.
It was denied that our allies could stand against France unaided by
us: in that case, they would be beaten; Europe would be at the feet of
France. The conquests of the Netherlands by her, and of Lombardy by
Spain would place the Bourbon Powers in so strong a military position
that they would no longer have anything to fear on land. It would not
be necessary for them to devote so large a proportion of their revenues
to their armies and their attention would be devoted to developing
their navies and that of Holland, who would fall under the Bourbon
yoke. Then, with Portugal and the Italian states under the military
thumb of the alliance and ordered to close their ports to us, with the
Flemish and Dutch ports as bases of operation and trade, our navy
though we should strengthen it to the utmost could not protect effici
ently our kingdom, our colonies and our commerce. Tariffs and treaties
would be arranged against us at the bidding of France for the destruc
tion of our trade in peace, and, when the allied powers should feel them
selves strong enough to engage us in war, first the trade and finally the
kingdom would succumb to the superior forces they would bring out
1 H. Fox, Parliamentary History, vol. xiii, p. 169.

xviii Introduction
upon the seas. Anticipating the pohcy of the Napoleonic decrees by
sixty years, Mr James West, a member of Parliament, said :
They might perhaps by threats or money get all the ports of the Baltic, except
the Russian, shut against us; and in this case I should be glad to know how we
could carry on even a naval war against the House of Bourbon, assisted by the
Dutch. We might it is true fit out a most powerful navy, because all our merchant
ships except those engaged in the East and West India trade would of course be
laid up in our harbours. But as neither the French nor Spaniards would then have
occasion to be at the expense of keeping up numerous land armies they might in
a year or two be able with the assistance of the Dutch to provide a navy at least
equal if not superior to ours.
As to possible conquests in America and at sea whose effect was so
strongly represented by the maritime school, they would avail us
nothing if the continental campaign were favourable to the Bourbons.
The colonies would be reconquered in Europe, and their temporary loss
by the enemy would not affect the final result. "I fear," said Hardwicke
in a letter of August 17th, 1741 to the Duke of Newcastle, "that now
America must be fought for in Europe, whatever success we may have in
the former, I doubt it will always finally follow the fate of the latter1."
It was further argued that if we should abstain from sending
troops, the Dutch would not move in defence of the Austrian Nether
lands. Our abstention would thus have a double effect, and only a weak
Austrian contingent would be left to defend that vital area. Austria
without the aid of ourselves and the Dutch could not protect her Flemish
and Italian provinces. First the former and then the latter would be
over-run and reduced. Lord Perceval in a debate which took place
three years after the continental war had been in progress gave a
practical example of the value of the British contingent in the Dettingen
campaign, the troops which took part in it being those British, Hessian
and Hanoverian troops voted in 1743. It was owing to the presence of
this pragmatic army that 60,000 French troops had been detained on
the Maine and defeated at Dettingen. If these had been able to join the
French armies in Bohemia and Bavaria, was it probable, asked the
speaker, that the Queen of Hungary could have stood her own in
Germany? or could the King of Sardinia have resisted France, Spain
and Naples unless this diversion had been made?
The opinion of the Duke of Newcastle was that a military force upon
the continent was necessary.
"Naval force," said he, "tho' carried never so high unsupported with even the
appearance of a force upon the continent, will be of little value  France will
outdo us at sea when they have nothing to fear by land  I have always main
tained that our marine should protect our alliances upon the continent; and they,
by diverting the expense of France, enable us to maintain our superiority at sea2."
1 Life of Lord Hardwicke, Yorke, vol. 1, p. 263.
2 Duke of Newcastle to Lord Hardwicke, Sept. 2, 1749. Life of Lord Hardwicke
Yorke, vol. 11, p. 23.

Introduction xix
Students of the later wars between this period and 1815 can consider
whether the views of Newcastle or of Warren were borne out by the
experience of those struggles.
The advocates of the continental policy were in the majority. Hence,
from 1742 to 1748 we maintained an army in Europe which took part
in the victory at Dettingen and shared the defeats at Fontenoy, Roucoux
and Laffeldt; it was unable to prevent the Austrian Netherlands from
falling into the hands of France, or the surrender of the great Dutch
fortress of Bergen-op-zoom. The wished for attack upon Canada could
not be carried out and was postponed until the second war of the trilogy.
Whether the policy adopted were the one most in accordance with the
national interests of the time will possibly be as much a matter of
difference of opinion to-day as it was in 1740.
When the sea strategy of the war is examined an impressive evidence
of continuity of tradition comes into view, a continuity broken only
during the unhappy early years in which the advice given by the
experienced seaman Norris, a veteran of Queen Anne's wars steeped in
the doctrine of that time, was disregarded by those in whose hands the
direction of the war rested. The Committee of Council frequently made
their decisions in direct contradiction to the opinion of the Commander-
in-Chief, and on many occasions made them without consultation with
any of the sea-officers of the Admiralty. At one time, when Lord
Winchelsea was first commissioner, the orders issued were such that
the two Admirals then on the Board refused to put their names to them,
that being the only way that lay in their power of expressing their
disapproval. We have it on Vernon's authority that the basic principle
of defence of the kingdom and of trade was a strong squadron operating
in the Channel approaches from which detachments could be made as
necessary. Norris continually urged this course in the early years
of the war with Spain but without result; and Vernon revived it on
his taking up a command in home waters after his return from the
West Indies. Finally it fell to Anson to re-establish the squadron in the
closing years of the war. The letters of the Duke of Bedford and Lord
Sandwich in 17461 are important landmarks in this connexion, while
Anson's later views on the western squadron as the corner-stone of our
naval strategy in a war against France are well known.
The instructions to the Commanders in the Mediterranean at various
periods of the war, which in many cases are reprinted at length in order
fully to illustrate their form and the ideas which they express, shew
how well accepted was the idea that in the event of a French squadron
breaking out of the Mediterranean it should be followed to the West
1 Vide vol. in.

xx Introduction
Indies, as Nelson followed ViUeneuve. The value of the West Indies
was so great that they were considered to form the natural objective
of a French naval force. Nelson, so far from creating a precedent, was
in fact carrying out, perhaps instinctively, a practice the tradition of
which extended over at least three generations.
While British strategy was comparatively consistent in its main
lines, if not in its execution, French strategy was undecided. The
operations of the French navy were not coordinated with those of its
ally. The fleets of the two powers, except upon two occasions1, worked
separately, each pursuing its own pohcy. To criticise however is easy:
but when the intense provincialism of the Spaniards themselves is re
membered, and the difficulty of obtaining cohesion between the thirteen
kingdoms, it is not hard to appreciate that full cooperation with a
foreign power should be unattainable. This lack of cooperation gave
England the greatest possible advantage throughout the war, combined
as it was with a want of practical experience on the part of the enemy.
Vernon's operations in the West Indies in 1741 were watched by France
with grave and unconcealed anxiety in consequence of the loss to French
trade, and the gain to Enghsh strength which would follow from an
English capture of the more valuable Spanish possessions. To oppose such
conquests France sent a fleet to Hispaniola, but, though it was expected
by the Spaniards, cooperation was not provided; and lack of sea experi
ence caused such illness in the fleet that it returned to Europe without
having effected anything. When war broke out France began hostilities
with two surprise attacks, one upon the British fleet in the Mediter
ranean, the other upon the United Kingdom itself, failing in both: in
the former because it was not made clear that the destruction of the
British fleet was the overwhelmingly important object, in the latter
through a variety of causes which are not reducible to a generalisation.
Immediately abandoning direct attack upon the British fleets, although
the combined Franco-Spanish naval forces in European waters were
superior to those of England, the French attempted a form of guerilla
warfare upon the fines of communication of the Mediterranean fleet. It
failed. A further attempt to invade England, and an endeavour to
recover Louisbourg were made. The former again relied upon evasion,
and upon the assistance of the Jacobites. The latter was conducted as
though there was no enemy fleet to be considered nor communications
to be maintained. Beyond these the strategy was concerned almost
entirely with the protection of trade by convoy, that is by direct
1 Viz., the scheme for the invasion of Italy in the last months of 1741, and the
battle of Toulon in Feb. 1744. In the second case cooperation ceased after the
battle.

introduction xxi
tactical defence and not by attack upon the enemy's force which
threatened it. Attack upon British trade was relegated to privateers,
which, though they caused heavy losses were unable to bring about any
serious dislocation of British commerce, and therefore no decisive effect
upon the war. The French naval strategy of protection of trade by
convoy alone, and of offence by sporadic attack failed.
When the strength of the British navy and the individual efficiency
of its seamen are considered in relation to the divided forces, wrong
ideas and inefficiency with which it was opposed, it is impossible not to
regret that such great advantages should so largely have been thrown
away by those who had to make use of our formidable weapon. What
actually brought us through the war with some measure of success,
was that the enemy made more mistakes than we did.

CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARIES OF THE SPANISH WAR
The events which led up to the war with Spain in 1739 were the direct
outcome of the exclusive colonial system which prevailed in the eight
eenth century. Colonies were not established with any idea of civilisa
tion, creating empires, extending the influence of the country or giving
a home under the country's flag to a surplus population. They were
regarded purely as a means of carrying on trade to a greater advantage.
The colonies were an exclusive market for the products of the mother
countries, and were themselves obliged to send their products to those
mother countries exclusively. Monopoly of supply to the colonies,
monopoly of manufacture and monopoly of colonial produce were the
leading if not the sole principles of colonial intercourse1. Colonists
could not supply their own wants from any market other than the
home market, and were obliged to send their produce to the home
countries. The restrictions did not end there. The produce must be sent
in a raw or unmanufactured state, so that the profits of the processes
of making the goods ready for consumption might accrue to the home
manufacturer. A British example will illustrate the working of this
system. Raw sugar — muscovado — paid an import duty of fifteen
shillings per cwt.; refined sugar paid a duty of £4. 18s. 8d. By means
of this duty the industry of refining sugar was made prohibitive in
the West Indies in order that the British refiners might reap the profit,
and although great waste of sugar through leakage took place on the
voyage, with proportionate loss to all concerned, this duty was steadily
retained. What applies to this one industry applies to others. The
merchants, who were a class with the power of making their voices
heard, insisted on retaining a system which provided them with a
certain market, untainted by competition, and which forbade the raw
materials from falling into any hands other than their own ; the
Molasses Act of 1733 and the Colonial Manufacturers Prohibition Act
of 1750 are further examples of the idea in its practical application.
This vast system of monopoly extended also to shipping, and its
influence is fo be seen in the Navigation Act of Charles II. Colonial
goods could not be sent to the British market except in British or
Colonial bottoms, and, as freight at that time may be taken as 20 per
cent.2, no small portion of the benefits of the system fell to British
1 Bryan Edwards, History of the West Indies. 2 Bryan Edwards.

2 Preliminaries of War
shippers. Finally, the Government came in for a share, since colonial
produce had to pay an import duty which went direct into the coffers
of the Treasury1.
The same doctrine of monopoly which was held by Great Britain
was held in essence, if not in detail, by the other European powers
possessing colonies2. The right to prevent foreigners from trading
with colonial possessions was recognised by all powers. A treaty of
1667 between England and Spain stipulated that if any ships belonging
to the subjects or merchants of either nation entering into bays or
in the open sea, were met by the ships-of-war of the other nation,
such merchant ship might be examined and any prohibited goods
taken out of her; and a further treaty of 1670 provided that British
ships should not approach Spanish Colonial ports unless driven by
stress of weather or provided with a licence to trade. By the Treaty
of Utrecht of 1713 other trading facilities were wrung from Spain.
A thirty years' monopoly of the slave trade, and permission to send
one ship annually of not more than 500 tons burden was granted to
the South Sea Company. The door to the Spanish colonies was thus
opened, very slightly, to Great Britain.
Abuses on both sides were not long in coming. The South Sea
Company exceeded their treaty rights by various devices and also con
ducted an extended smuggling trade in which they were imitated by a
host of private adventurers — regarded by the company as interlopers —
who came very largely from the North American Colonies. On the
other hand, the Spaniards did not confine their attentions to vessels in
the neighbourhood of their colonial ports, but extended the operations
of their coastguard ships outside territorial waters, and a number of
privateers, acting on commissions granted locally, pretended to be
honest guarda-costas and acted in the same manner ; so that a system
not far removed from piracy prevailed in West Indian waters. The
seamen taken on board the ships arrested were maltreated in a brutal
manner, and on occasions lost not only their property and their liberty
but their lives as well. On one occasion3 at a later date a small
British vessel was wrecked on the coast near a Spanish port ; her crew
were taken prisoners and as one man among them had been previously
convicted of illicit trading, the whole crew of 26 men and the captain
1 The average annual value of imports from the West Indies from 1739 to
1749 was ^1,300,000: before the end of the century these had risen to over seven
millions. Bryan Edwards.
2 France, more liberal to her colonies, allowed them to manufacture. For a
fuller account of the colonial system see Cambridge Modern History vol vi
pp. 50 et seq., pp. 183-186; and G. L. Beer, The Old Colonial System. ' '
3 Commodore Brown, in letters, June 1739. Brown sent the 'Dragon' to Tolu
and obtained the release of the crew.

The Right of Search 3
were condemned to imprisonment, although there was no evidence
whatever that they had been guilty of any malpractices.
Cool-headed men who looked at both sides of the question could
see where the faults lay. Walpole summed the matter up very clearly
in the House of Commons. " Spain," he said, "has never pretended to
dispute our right of sailing from one of our own settlements to another :
but she pretends, that in the course of that navigation, we ought not
to touch upon her coasts, nor to trade with any of her subjects. We,
on the other hand, admit that the Spaniards have a right to prevent
any trade from being carried on by the subjects of other nations with
hers, except that trade which is expressly stipulated by the Asiento
treaty. But we deny that under that pretence her subjects ought to
stop or search our ships1." Montijo, the President of the Council of
the Indies expressed the matter with greater brevity but equal justice
when he said to Mr Keene, our Ambassador at Madrid, that there were
faults on both sides, that the British contrabandists ought to be
punished and some of the Spanish Governors hanged2. Admiral Charles
Steuart, who commanded in the West Indies in 1731, while complaining
of the conduct of the guarda-costas and the privateers, was not blind to
the fact that the British merchants were also to blame. " The question
will be," he wrote, "whether we by carrying on the clandestine
trade are not ourselves the authors of our complaints." He had no
sympathy with those merchants who broke a nation's laws and then
cried out at the results 3
The Spanish claim to search vessels near their own coasts was indeed
no more than our own to search vessels near the English coast. Thus,
at this time, the exportation of wool and woollen goods from the United
Kingdom was prohibited, and a squadron — known as ' Owlers ' — of two
frigates and eight or more armed sloops was maintained constantly to
prevent such exportation. These ships, cruising in the Channel, had
orders to search for vessels with contraband export goods of this nature,
and were a parallel to the guarda-costas, searching British or foreign
craft impartially. The difference lay in the manner in which they
performed their duties and in their treatment of ships and men found
infringing the law.
Complaints as to the conduct of the Spanish cruisers had been made
as early as 1728; they continued throughout the next two years; In
1731 a commission was appointed to examine the claims made by
certain merchants, but no conclusion was arrived at. It was during
1 Parliamentary History, vol. x. p. 131 1.
2 "The Causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear." H. W. V. Temperley in the
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, vol. in. p. 204.
a Sir John Laughton in The English Historical Review.

4 Preliminaries of War 1734-38
this year that the incident which gave a name to the subsequent
war took place. On April ^, a Spanish privateer captain named
Fandino captured the 'Rebecca,' Captain Jenkins, a ship belonging
to Jamaica, which was on her way to England. The Spanish captain
used Jenkins "in a most barbarous inhuman manner, taking all his
money, cutting off one of his ears, plundering him of those necessaries
which were to carry the ship safe home1." This incident, though suffi
ciently dramatic to have furnished the popular name for the war, was
not brought to public notice until several years later.
For some years these high handed actions of the Spaniards con
tinued, on one occasion — in 1734 — even reaching so high a point as
an attack on some ships engaged in the lawful occupation of gathering
salt at the Tortugas under the convoy of a man-of-war — the 'Scar
borough.' No redress was sought. The smuggling on the one hand and
the piracy on the other continued, and a list exists which shews no
fewer than 52 ships taken and plundered by the Spaniards up to the
18th December, 1737. A petition from the West Indian Merchants
was submitted to the King in October of that year, and it became
evident that popular feeling was becoming stirred. Counter complaints
were made both by Spain and France in which the captains of two
ships of the West Indian squadron, the 'Kinsale' and 'Antelope,'
were accused by these Powers of using their ships to conduct an illicit
trade in negroes to the Spanish and French colonies2 — a complaint
which was ordered immediately to be investigated, and which the Com
modore on the station indignantly denied.
Under the influence of all these causes relations between England
and Spain became seriously strained in the early part of 1738, and
each began to make preparations for war. Both navies were on a peace
footing, the bulk of the ships being kept in home waters. Only such
small squadrons were maintained abroad as were necessary for the
purposes of preventing piracy and smuggling, or for protecting traders
in the less civilised regions, such as the coast of Africa.
Our foreign stations were classified under two main headings, the
Plantations and the Mediterranean. The various Plantation stations
comprised Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Barbados, the coasts of the
American colonies, Newfoundland and the West Coast of Africa. On
all of them ships, principally small ones, were stationed, but the only
area in which a squadron was permanently maintained was the Jamaica
station. It was also the custom for vessels to go to the West Coast of
^Rear-Admiral Steuart to the Governor of Havana, September 12th i7«
quoted m Engl. Hist. Review. ' » »
2 Out letters. March, 1737-8.

1738

Strength of Squadrons Abroad

Africa for some months and then pass on to the westward to the West
Indies. At Jamaica a flag officer flew his flag or broad pendant on
board a sixty gun ship. The Mediterranean was treated as one station
and was policed by a squadron composed mainly of small frigates with
a stiffening of heavy ships. The actual distribution in March 1738 was
as follows:

Plantations

Mediterranean

Ship

Guns

Station

Ship

Guns

' Dunkirk '

60

)

' Gloucester '

5°

' Kinsale. '

40

V Jamaica

' Eltham '

40

'Drake' (sloop)

4.10*

J '

' Dursley ' galley

20

' Diamond '

40

)

' Greyhound '

20

' Greenwich '

5°

j- Coast of Africa

' Gibraltar '

20

' Spence' (sloop)

6.10

1

' Dolphin '

20

' Roebuck '

40

Barbados

' Grampus '

20

' Tartar '

20

New York

' Deptford '

6

' Squirrel '

20

New England

(lighter)

' Lowestoft '

20

Leeward Islands

' Rose '
' Seaford '

20 20

[•South Carolina

' Seahorse '
20
Virginia
' Shark ' (sloop)
8.12*
Bahama Islands
' Hawk ' (sloop)
6.10*
Georgia
' Falkland '
50
Newfoundland
' Phoenix '
20
On her way to S. Carolina
* The first figure denotes carriage guns; the second, 'swivels.'
It was with relations between the two powers in the highly strained
condition described above that Captain Jenkins is said to have made
his celebrated speech in March 1738. Whether he actually used the
words attributed to him or not, the decision to strengthen the force
in the West Indies had already been made two months earlier: in
January a force of five ships1 had been ordered to be prepared for
service on the Jamaica station under Commodore Charles Brown.
Commodore Brown's instructions, which were dated February 10,
1738, directed him to take his squadron to Jamaica where he would
be joined by two ships from the West Coast of Africa — the ' Falmouth,'
50, and 'Diamond,' 40. One of his frigates, the 'Anglesea,' was to
reinforce the Leeward Islands, and the ' Dunkirk ' and ' Kinsale,' which
had been on the Jamaica station for some time, were to be sent home
with the trade, so that a relief of fresh ships from England was provided
in case of war. The duty of the squadron was to be the protection of
1 'Hampton Court,' 70; 'Windsor,' 60; 'Anglesea,' 40; 'Torrington,' 40;
'Sheerness,' 20.
6 Preliminaries of War 1738
Jamaica and the trade of those parts; in addition to which Brown was
directed to observe closely all movements made by the French and
Spaniards, information as to whose preparations he was constantly to
send home. He was informed that as frequent complaints had been
made that British ships had been seized by guarda-costas both on their
outward and return journeys and condemned as prizes under pretence
that they were intended to carry on illicit trade at the Spanish ports
and settlements, he was to protect the trade from such attempts in
all parts, particularly in the Windward Passage and the Gulf of Florida,
the two main channels respectively for the outward and homeward
bound trade. If any of his squadron should meet any Spanish armed
vessels pretending to be guarda-costas which were known to have com
mitted such depredations, they were to seize and bring them into port.
If Georgia were said to be in danger of attack he was to protect it
in conjunction with the stationed ships on the American coasts.
Subsequent movements of ships still further strengthened the
Jamaica squadron. The 'Centurion,' 60, which had been sent to Bar
bados from the West Coast of Africa with instructions to convoy the
trade to Barbados and back, was ordered to remain with Brown at
Jamaica : the 'Saltash' and the ' Spence ' from the African coast were
also to join him, and he was directed to keep the 'Dunkirk' and
'Kinsale' with his squadron if he found they were still fit to remain
abroad. Thus the result of these dispositions was to concentrate a formidable
squadron at Jamaica, and to strengthen the Leeward Islands command
by one heavy ship1 : the whole of the ships on the West Coast of Africa
were transferred to the West Indies, except the 'Greenwich' which
was ordered home. At the same time a squadron of four ships— tw^
of 50 guns and two of 20— was fitted out for Newfoundland.
The care of the colony of Georgia also came under consideration.
This colony was a most probable objective of any Spanish attack, as
Spain disputed our right to the territory. It was the latest colony
settled by Great Britain, and was an exception to the general rule
which governed the establishment of colonies. Instead of being purely
mercantile, its foundation was due partly to a desire to protect South
Carolina from the Spaniards in Florida and the French in Louisiana,
and partly to the efforts of Colonel James Oglethorpe, a soldier and
¦f.r\Ti\e ^asti^°n of the intended squadron on April ist was as follows
if Dunkirk 'and 'Kinsale 'were fit to remain: '
With Brown at Jamaica: 'Hampton Court,' 70; 'Windsor Castle' 60 •
Centurion, 60; Dunkirk,' 60; 'Falmouth,' 5o; 'Diamond.' 4o; 'Torrington ' 40'
Sheerness,' 20; 'Saltash,' 20; 'Drake' sloop; 'Spence' sloop omnSton. 4°.
At the Leeward Islands: 'Anglesea,' 40; 'Lowestoft,' 20.

x738 Commodore Brown's Instructions 7
philanthropist, who wished to provide a settlement for poor debtors
in London prisons and for oppressed Protestants from the continent.
Oglethorpe had visited England in the preceding winter and had
obtained permission to raise a regiment for the defence of the Colony,
the first detachment of which, 680 strong, had sailed in December
in three transports convoyed by the 'Phoenix,' Captain Fanshaw1.
A further reinforcement was sent in June, 1738, in five more trans
ports, under convoy of the 'Hector,' Captain Sir Yelverton Peyton2,
and the 'Blandford.' These three ships were also to remain and
reinforce the squadron on the colonial coasts, the 'Hector' at
Virginia, the 'Phoenix' at South Carolina, and the 'Blandford' at
Georgia. Commodore Brown sailed from Spithead on the 19th February, but
owing to bad weather was forced into Torbay and did not clear the
coast till the 2nd March. The ' Anglesea ' was dropped at the Leeward
Islands in accordance with instructions, and the remainder of the
squadron proceeded to Barbados where it arrived on April 17th. The
Commodore then detached the 'Sheerness,' Captain Stapylton, to
cruise off San Domingo and Cape Alta Vela, and sent orders to the
'Diamond,' Captain Knowles, to cruise off the north side of Porto
Rico and Hispaniola and in the Windward Passage. He directed both
of these commanders to use their utmost efforts to come up with any
guarda-costas they might meet with in their cruising stations, "and if
on a strict examination of them or by any other intelligence he might
gain on his cruise it should appear that the Spaniards did continue to
commit their usual depredations (which probably might be without any
orders from his Catholic Majesty, in regard it was contrary to the
Treaties subsisting between the two Crowns) I ordered him not only to
seize such armed vessels as might have committed them but also all
other ships and vessels of Spain that cruised and lurked about under
the notion of Guarda costas, in order to take the ships and vessels of
his Majesty's subjects. And whatever armed vessels he might so seize
on, I directed him to take care that not anything belonging to them
was embezzled on his way to Jamaica, to which port he was to carry
them, where it would be determined in a judicial manner whether they
ought or ought not to be condemned as prizes3." In similar terms he
instructed the captains of his other ships as to their behaviour in regard
to guarda-costas ; and having made these arrangements he sailed for
1 Fanshaw's instructions are dated December 3rd, 1737. Out letters.
2 Peyton's instructions are dated May 19th, 1738. Out letters.
3 Commodore Brown's Journal. The Commodore gives a very full and valuable
account of his proceedings.

8 Preliminaries of War r737~8
Jamaica where he arrived on April 29th. His line of battle, which he
issued on May 3rd after his arrival, was as follows :
'Sheerness,' 20;
'Kinsale,' 40;
'Dunkirk,' 601;
Repeating/ 'Spence' sloop 'Windsor,' 60;
Ships \' Drake' sloop 'Hampton Court,' 70;
'Falmouth,' 50;
'Diamond,' 40;
'Torrington,' 40.
The squadron in the Mediterranean was under the command of
Captain George Clinton, ' with his broad pendant on board the
'Gloucester,' 50. Clinton had been appointed in April, 1737, and his
instructions, dated May 26 of that year, related principally to the
protection of Mediterranean trade against the Barbary pirates — those
useful people whose conduct had so often furnished a plausible reason
for sending ships to the Mediterranean when diplomatic exigencies
called for an increase of strength in that quarter. On this occasion the
commodore was further instructed to keep himself constantly informed
as to any naval preparations that might be made in the ports of France
or Spain ; and, when the strain between England and the latter power
became acute in the early part of 1738, additional orders were sent him
to be particularly watchful to prevent the Spaniards from making any
attempt by surprise or otherwise on Minorca. If he should hear of any
such intention he was to carry his squadron to that island, and, in
cooperation with the Governor, to take all measures to protect it.
The Government did not confine themselves to these orders. Things
were critical in March, and as Clinton's instructions shew, it was not
considered impossible that Spain might act in the same manner as she
had in 1726 and begin a war by an attack on one of the Mediterranean
fortresses of which she had been deprived by the Treaty of Utrecht.
She had broken her teeth on Gibraltar at that time. She now might
make her attempt on Minorca. A reinforcement for the Mediterranean
was therefore ordered to be prepared in April, consisting of nine ships2
and two fireships, and this squadron was placed under the command
-of Rear-Admiral Nicholas Haddock.
Haddock's instructions, which were dated May 13th, directed him
to sail for Gibraltar as soon as not less than five or six of his ships
could be manned, and on arrival to inform himself of the strength of
the Spanish naval forces. " Having done so," the instructions continued,
1 The 'Dunkirk' sailed for England on May 28th.
2 'Somerset,' 80; 'Edinburgh,' 70; 'Dragon,' 60; 'Lancaster,' 8o- 'Ipswich'
70; 'Berwick,' 70; 'Plymouth,' 60; 'Canterbury,' 60; 'Jersey,' 60 ¦ 'Solebav' 20
(fireship); and 'Alborough,' 20 (fireship).

*738 Admiral Haddock's Instructions g
" you are without loss of time to proceed to the island of Minorca and
use your utmost endeavours to protect the same from any attacks the
Spaniards may make thereon. And in case you shall find that the
Spaniards actually attempt to attack the aforesaid island of Minorca,
or come on the coast thereof with any number of ships of war and
land soldiers in order to do the same, you are to do your utmost to
frustrate them therein, and to seize and destroy such ships as may be
employed on such an enterprize." Further clauses directed him to look
out for the defence of Gibraltar; to send home constant accounts of
the Spanish preparations; to defend trade; to demand immediate
restitution of any British ships taken; and, if this were refused, to
attack the Spanish captors whether they were privateers or King's
ships. To sum up the sense of the orders: they were defensive but
put power of retaliation into the Admiral's hands in the event of any
attack by Spain.
Spain, very unready and already impressed by the attitude taken
up by the British Government in its diplomatic correspondence, had
been inclined to give way to the storm which she saw brewing1. The
preparation of Haddock's squadron created no small stir at Madrid.
Consul Strangford, writing from Alicante, said: "The notice of Admiral
Haddock's coming out here with a squadron for these seas seems to
have alarmed the court, so that everywhere they seem to be putting
themselves in a posture of defence," and other writers from Spain
reflect a similar apprehension2. The moving of squadrons or troops
when diplomatic relations are strained invariably produces uneasiness,
and Spain was no exception to the rule. She expected that a blow
might be delivered at any moment, and she began taking measures of
defence and at the same time preparing for counter-attack. The
fortresses of Barcelona and Cartagena were hastily put in order, instruc
tions were given to get the Cadiz squadron ready, 40,000 troops were
ordered to move in the direction of Gibraltar, and another body towards
the frontiers of Portugal3. Hostilities now appeared to be imminent
and masters of British ships in Spanish ports were warned to be on
the look out for an embargo. Haddock, who had arrived at Gibraltar
in June, kept his squadron cruising between Cartagena and Gibraltar
in order to be between the two main bodies of Spanish naval force at
Cartagena and Cadiz. His information was that the Ferrol and Cadiz
squadrons were coming to join the ships at Cartagena, and this intention
1 Cf. "The Causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear," pp. 211-212.
2 Enclosed in Haddock's letter of June. See also letters from Consuls, Ad. Sec.
In letters. 3 Haddock to Secretary. May and June, 1739- In letters.

10 Preliminaries of War 1738
he interpreted as indicating an attack on Minorca or Gibraltar. He
therefore cruised in this station in order to be able to move quickly
to either place if his surmise should be correct. Like his instructions,
his movements were defensive, but not unnaturally Spain interpreted
them in a different sense, believing that they portended an attack on
some part of her dominions or her trade. It is however clear that if
his intentions had been offensive he would more probably have cruised
on the other side of the Straits, where an objective was to be found
open to such attack as a squadron could make — viz., the Western
Trade returning to or saihng from its headquarters at Cadiz.
While Haddock was thus covering Minorca and Gibraltar, Commo
dore Brown was similarly cruising to cover the trade and colonies in
the West Indies and America. So early as March, 1738, a Spanish
expedition had been in preparation at Havana directed against Georgia,
and Brown detached the 'Torrington,' Captain Knight, to Havana to
get intelligence as to its readiness, and also to find out the condition
and strength of the Spanish squadron. In the then state' of affairs
Knight was not welcomed by the Spaniards. "We received some stiff
civilities," he said, "but if we were not affronted it was easy to see
we were not liked1." He found that an expedition of 3000 men had
been made ready, but had been countermanded by orders from Madrid
in March just at the time when Brown had sailed from England. The
troops were to have been carried in flat-bottomed boats, "ridiculous
things which could all be destroyed at sea by one ship of 40 guns and
one of 20," and these were being kept ready against another occasion.
The main business of Brown's squadron was connected with the
protection of the legal and the suppression of the illicit trade-
British, colonial, and foreign — and though his instructions contain no
reference to the suppression of the British illicit trader, the commodore
issued orders to his captains to give no countenance to British or North
American offenders whose actions, he pointed out, were doing so much
to disturb the harmony between England and Spain2. Cases of all
kinds concerning British, French, and Spanish ships occurred. Thus
in June the 'Elizabeth,' a British ship homeward bound from Jamaica
to London, was driven for water into Donna Maria Bay (at the west
end of Hispaniola), where she was seized by a French 20 gun ship.
Brown sent the 'Falmouth' to demand her release and redress, both
of which were granted. On the other hand a French ship, the ' Volante,'
was taken trading on the coast of Jamaica and condemned. In July
the 'Kinsale' was sent to cruise in the Windward Passage to secure
1 Captain Knight to Commodore Brown. June 21st, 1738. In letters
Brown's orders to Captain of ' Kinsale.' In letters.

1 738-9 Convention of the Par do 11
our trade, as a Spanish guarda-costa, the 'Trionfo'1, was reported to
have plundered a British trader in that channel; while the 'Falmouth'
arrested and brought into Jamaica a Rhode Island trader whom she
found unloading a cargo on the coast of Hispaniola. It is worth noting
that although this vessel was taken red handed and proved to have
no licence for trading with the French, the local court at Jamaica
¦ acquitted the smuggler. Thus, while the admiral was endeavouring to
suppress the traffic that was leading up to war, the legal gentlemen
were upholding illegal acts. Nor was this the only occasion during
these years in which the West Indian courts shewed a partiality to
offenders which hampered the actions of the naval forces2. The presence
of the squadron nevertheless reduced the practice of smuggling, and
relations were not seriously strained during that year, at any rate not
in the West Indies, where lay the original seat of the trouble. Brown
was able to report in April, 1739, tnat tne British trade had not lately
suffered any interruption either from France or Spain.
In European waters the summer passed without matters proceeding
to extremities. Although the first appearance of Haddock's squadron
had given rise to great anxiety in Spain it had not only not precipitated
war but had acted as one of the causes predisposing towards peace.
It shewed Spain that England was in earnest. Behind these few ships
loomed the remainder of the British fleet. "You ought not to be
surprised," wrote Mr Trevor from the Hague, "at these pacifick
appearances when I tell you that England has at present 107 ships of
war of different force and denominations actually in commission3."
The influence of Walpole, which was exerted towards finding a peaceful
solution of the quarrel, and a strong measure of common sense on the
part of the Spanish Ministers, were tending to produce the same result
along other fines, and some months were spent in endeavouring to
arrive at an agreement by which the claims of the British merchants
and the rights of the Spanish Government should be satisfied. The >
result of these efforts was the Convention of the Pardo, in which it
was stipulated that all losses whicIThad been sustained at the hands
of the guarda-costas up to December 10th, 1737, should be met by a
payment of £95,000 by Spain, this sum to be paid within four months of
the ratification of the convention. The treaty was signed on January T3T,
1739- 1 She was subsequently taken at Porto Bello.
2 Many similar cases occurred in the Seven Years' War: so great were the
abuses that it was seriously discussed, Mr Temperley tells me, whether means
should be used for over-awing the local courts.
3 R. Trevor to Sir E. Fawkener, September 6th, 1738, quoted by Mr Temperley
in his "Causes of the War, etc."

12 Preliminaries of War 1739
Everything now appeared to be making for peace and on January
29th Haddock was ordered to return with his squadron to England,
leaving CUnton in command at Gibraltar with two ships only, the
i Gloucester,' 50, and the 'Dursley galley,' 20.
Haddock had gone to Minorca for the winter in order to refit his
squadron. He could not return at once as several of his ships were on
the careen, and it was only on March 13th that he sailed for Gibraltar
on his way home. But in the interval since January the situation had
taken a different turn. Parliament met on February 1st, and the
convention was debated hotly in both houses. Petitions from merchants
opposing the ratification rained in, their main objection being that
the question of search was not settled. "No search" was the watch
word. "No search, my Lords," said Lord Carteret, "is a cry that runs
from the sailor to the merchant, from the merchant to Parliament,
and from Parliament, my Lords, it ought to reach the Throne1." Party
feeling was imported wholesale into the discussion and a matter which
required cool handling between statesmen, became the subject of
windy declamations from politicians. The peace, which the possession
and use of a strong and ready fleet had so nearly secured, was to be
wrecked at Westminster.
The debates came to an end on March 10th; the Ministry had a
narrow majority in favour of the convention, but the country was
stirred up by speeches and pamphlets against it. There can be little
doubt that the nation was inclined to war. Men still looked back to
the days of Cromwell and even those whose political views made them
eye the Protector with no favour, sighed for a return to his conduct
of foreign affairs. Throughout the debates in Parliament the days of
Elizabeth and the Commonwealth were referred to constantly, and it
would appear that the country was under one of those influences,
perhaps the outcome of a long peace, which need war to exorcise
them. The Duke of Newcastle, the principal Secretary of State, kept his
eye on the temper of the mob. He watched the trend of public feeling,
and prepared to follow it. Suddenly another factor entered into the
situation. The Ministry received intelligence that a Franco-Spanish
treaty concluding an offensive and defensive alliance between the
crowns was about to be arranged2. This news, in fact, was doubtful
and premature, but nevertheless carried weight, and the net result of
the combined causes was that the recall of Haddock's squadron was
cancelled. On March roth, the day the debates in Parliament on
1 Parliamentary History, vol. x. p. 754.
2 "Causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear," pp. 229-230.

1739 Spain Declines to Pay 13
the convention came to an end, Haddock was ordered to remain at
Gibraltar1. Spain, who in consequence of the favourable turn of affairs had
disarmed her fleet, now became anxious. To her it appeared that a
double game was being played; and though Newcastle instructed
Mr Keene at once categorically to deny that the counter orders had
been sent to Haddock, the Spanish ministers, who could see the
British squadron still at anchor in Gibraltar Bay, not unnaturally
declined to accept the statement. When May 25th — the date on which
the payment should have been made — arrived, no money was forth
coming from Spain. On May 29th the Spanish Minister informed
Keene that nothing would be paid until Haddock's squadron was
recalled. On May 31st the question was asked in Parliament whether
the money had been paid and the reply, to make use of a formula
familiar to us to-day, was in the negative.
Spain had broken the convention and thereby put herself in the
wrong. War was now inevitable.
1 Out letters. March ioth, 1739.

CHAPTER II
THE CONSIDERATION OF THE WAR PLANS
The naval and military forces of the powers immediately concerned,
and the probable attitude of the other powers, must now be taken in
review. The English fleet consisted, in May, 1739, of 124 ships of the line
and fifty-gun ships; besides these there were many frigates of 40 and
20 guns, sloops, bomb-vessels, and smaller craft. Although the fifty-
gun ship was not a ship of the line it was not unusual to include her
among the heavy ships and to speak generally of "50 gun ships and
above," but it is important to bear the difference in mind — a difference
which was not only one of the number of guns, but of scantling and
weight of guns as well. Of the 124 heavy ships, no fewer than 44 were,
by the Admiralty accounts, unfit for service. Of the 80 remaining,
only 35 were in sea-pay, that is to say actually ready for service, and
of these 5 were in the West Indies with Commodore Brown and 10 in
the Mediterranean with Haddock, so that the immediately ready force
of ships of the fine in home waters consisted of 20 ships, of which 10
were guard-ships.
The English army numbered about 29,000 to 30,000 men disposed
in garrisons about the United Kingdom, at Gibraltar and in Minorca.
The Spanish navy consisted of 58 ships altogether, of which 41 were
of 50 guns and upwards. It was however by no means ready ; nor was
it concentrated, since the necessity under which Spain lay to convoy
her treasure fleet involved her always having a number of her heavy
ships in the West Indies. The fleet in home waters was organised in
three divisions at the ports of Cadiz, Ferrol and Carthagena, the whole
being under the Infante don Philip as General-Admiral of the naval
forces. Twenty-one of the great ships belonged to the first-named
port, and out of the remaining twenty, eight belonged to the Flota (the
armed ships which traded with South America), five to the Buenos
Ayres service and two to the Barlovento, or Windward squadron. Her
army, including about 23,000 militia, numbered some 110,000 foot and
20,000 horse1.
France, whose exact diplomatic relationship with Spain was
uncertain but suspected, had a fleet of about 50 ships of line, divided
1 Les preliminaries de la Guerre de la Succession d'Autriche, M. Sautai, p. 388.

I739 Spain's Vulnerability 15
between the ports of Toulon, Rochefort and Brest : but according to
the information in the possession of the Administration, very few of
her ships were ready for service at this date. As a military power she
was the strongest in Europe and could place over 300,000 men in the
field1. The immediate struggle that was to take place was thus between
a nation with a force of about 80 ships of the line and a small
army, and another with about 40 ships of the line and a very large
army, with the possibility that the latter might be assisted within a
certain time by a third nation with a force of about 50 ships of the
line and a larger army still. There could thus be no question of
England's undertaking military operations on any large scale against
Spain in Europe : the disproportion between the military forces of the
two powers precluded any such possibility. Spain was only vulnerable-
in her colonial possessions overseas, and in the trade that passed
between those possessions and the old country. Such pressure might
be brought upon her by interference with that overseas trade and
deprivation of the sources of wealth themselves, that the losses she
would suffer by a continuation of hostilities, would exceed those
incurred by a recognition of and subscription to the demands put
forward by England. It was therefore obvious that the efforts of
England would be directed towards sapping the wealth of Spain.
The wealth of Spain lay in her trade and in her colonies. But her-
colonies without trade were valueless to her ; it was only because they
were the sources of her trade that they contributed to her wealth.
If the communication between those colonies and the home country
were cut, or were interfered with to so great a degree that trade could
not be carried on, the colonies lost their value. Thus as Spain could
not be brought to an agreement by measures of military force, occu
pying the country and throttling the economic life, the pressure could
only be brought to bear externally by throttling the channels on which
that economic life depended. True, a certain degree of pressure might
be brought to bear by the capture of oversea possessions, and their
conversion into possessions of our own ; but only so far as those posses
sions were of direct economic importance to Spain would this method
affect her. The energies of Great Britain required therefore to be
directed towards the destruction of Spanish trade. So much was clear;
but when it came to consideration of the methods to be employed
there was room for wide differences of opinion.
Trade could be attacked either by spreading ships fanlike over the
1 Pajol, Guerres sous Louis XV, gives the state of the French army in 1745
as 322,000 men.

1 6 Consideration of War Plans x739
seas and capturing every vessel that sailed under the Spanish flag
which came in sight: or by concentrating squadrons at the points of
arrival and departure of that trade : or by seizing, by means of military
force, the ports whence the trade sailed. Such ports as were seized
might be held temporarily for the immediate purposes of the war, or,
if favourably situated for strategic reasons, might be retained per
manently afterwards. A still further development of such a trading
war would be not only the seizure of a port, but the actual conquest
of the territory in which the port was situated with the view of
appropriating it to the Crown and settling colonists there, in order
that that territory might be used to supply the wants or increase the
riches of the kingdom, or because its occupation was essential to the
secure tenure of an important strategic position in the territory.
The principal theatres of activity of the Spanish commerce were
in the West Indies, Central and South America and the Philippine
Islands ; but the trade from all these parts came to Europe by the
route across the Atlantic. On the continent the trade came down to
the coast at Vera Cruz, Cartagena1, Porto Bello (which received the
trade from Peru) and Buenos Ayres. The trade from the Philippines
which was embarked at Manila was carried across the Pacific to
Acapulco and thence transported through Mexico City and re-embarked
at Vera Cruz.
All of this trade was conducted by the Royal and privileged fleets.
The South American trade was carried in the galleons, which, sailing
from Spain went first to Cartagena where they awaited the news of
the arrival of the Peru fleet at Panama. When this intelligence was
received they proceeded to Porto Bello, whither the trade was brought
from Panama either on mules over the stone-paved track which led
across the Isthmjsjfr, or by water down the Chagres River, according to
the season of tne year. The arrival of the galleons was the occasion
for the holding of a great market at Porto Bello. The merchandise
brought out from Spain was then sold, the products of South America
were embarked on board the ships, which then returned to Cartagena,
received that part of the trade which came from the mainland and
then stood over to Havana where all the Western trade collected on
its return journey to Europe.
The trade between Spain and Mexico was carried out by the Flota.
This fleet was fitted out at intervals— sometimes as much as three or
four years apart— or as occasion required, and sailed from Cadiz taking
1 In order to avoid confusion I have adopted the following arbitrary spelling
to distinguish the two Cartagenas; the Spanish port, Carthagena; the Colombian
one, Cartagena.

CARTE TOPOGRAPHIQUE BELABAYE ViLLE ET FAUBOURG DE CARTAGENE AV.
Ly Tout duaitltpar da Plain ParaetiUtnt ttrei d'aprat Phuiairi aiitrco letwj jur lit lien* ¦ Con 1/ a joint tint Carte Marine redutte. pour serpir a luxtrttpencc du a

I Carte Topographtque de la
\Baye t>e Carthagene des Indes
4 CeUta iftu. otic paitbcjutfu'a pcia'
 -be Ord in ;u 1 ¦<: du Roy.

pikir Purrte) CJturificatlvi-trnsnu.
H Fbrt de J-"CfvuE. ou, U ertvutCA&tnu
 "dt&o Catunu .-•r.-.t-l,: dtna-rx.-ii
•j-Jnutj Jvta rrjnftlu diiuc . t t - I

M naiun* da/aeyuj de $ Canoia. T ffata^ri dc fhim*j \ •tmtmZZS?™* h^B^mmaa id  :=t^^
N ilaxme dejatvu* dt.8 rjuwnJ V. ibi-cde clUmin. J ST

dc Can am d* Si,. iLvre*.

THE TRADE ROUTES TO THE WEST U

Lis Forts et Batteries nouvellement ftablievpour vfuvtr a va nFFFFiv^

rouia, que hinmitt la i'.iitfmut Pour 14 oiler el restnir.

FORT DE BoCACHIdl

jg, ¦ \pus DEL/l Villi, et EfUXBCVxc. V£ Cua-HJoene\

AND CENTRAL AMERICA (Carte Marine)

x739 . Course of Spanish trade 17
out wine, oil, brandy, cloth and wearing apparel of all kinds. It called
at Porto Rico to refresh and thence sailed to Vera Cruz. The harbour
of Vera Cruz was very small and not more than 30 to 35 ships could
lie in it; it was also weakly defended, so that any ships lying there
were in danger of attack from the sea. The market was therefore not
held at the port but at Jalapa, a town about a third of the way between
the port and Mexico city. The treasure and trade were not brought
down to the coast until the ships arrived and were ready to embark
it, in order to shorten as much as possible the time during which they
would be exposed to danger.
In the interval between the sailings of the Flota, vessels known as
Azogues sailed between Spain, Havana and Vera Cruz, carrying quick
silver out from Spain for use in reducing the silver ore, and returning
with the produce of Mexico and Havana. These ships, which figured
among the men-of-war, were armed with about 60 guns.
The trade to Buenos Ayres, which was not as yet very extensive
was conducted by ships which sailed separately from the great trading
fleets. Their home port was Cadiz, and the imports they carried to
Spain consisted largely of gold, silver and hides.
One other class of ship remains to be mentioned, the Register
ships. These vessels belonged to merchants who by payment of a
certain sum were privileged to carry goods to any part of the Spanish
settlements. They were free to move independently, sailing when they
wished and steering their own courses.
The Havana itself, besides being the principal port of Cuba where
the products of that island — hides, sugar and tobacco — were embarked,
was also an important shipbuilding centre not only for merchantmen
but also for men-of-war of the largest classes. But its main importance
lay in the fact that it was the rendezvous where the whole Western
trade, except that of Buenos Ayres, collected before proceeding home
under convoy. Porto Bello, Cartagena, La Vera Cruz and Chagres
were minor trading bases at which the exports of the country immedi
ately behind them, or of more distant parts such as China and Peru,
were embarked, subsequently to be concentrated at Havana. Thus the
capture of Havana, the focus of the trade, would be the most serious
blow that could be inflicted on Spain, while the capture of any of the
other ports would exercise a severely restraining effect upon the trade
that they fed. In home waters Cadiz was the principal port: there
a Casa de Contratacion of the South Sea Company was established,
and there the Flota collected for its outward sailing. The minor ports
were Coruiia, Santander, San Sebastian and Bilboa.
Sir Charles Knowles, an officer of whom we shall hear much during
r. n. 1. 2

1 8 Consideration of War Plans 1739
this war and a careful observer, writing in 1748, gave a fairly full
account of the course of Spanish trade and its seasons. He said : " The
Spanish ships generally arrive in May. The places to watch for them
are off Cartagena, fifteen miles S.E. of Cape Tiberoon, and on the
north side of Hispaniola to prevent their going through the old straits
of Bahama, and between Cape Antonio and Cape Cartouche: which
being so many different routes require the more ships.... In the middle
of August or beginning of September the Spaniards generally bring up
their treasure from Vera Cruz in two men-of-war, and three or four
ships sail from the Havana much about that time over to the Dry
Tortuga where they anchor and wait for those from Vera Cruz, when
all proceed to the Havana. This has been the practice these eight
years past, so that as the Hurricane months are not proper to arrive
off Cape Frangois1, the time falls out well for the large ships upon this
station going to waylay the Spaniards. The ships destined to carry
the treasure generally sail from the Havana about the middle of
October when they wait to see the first North {i.e. northerly gale)
over before they sail : then they push through the gulf, so that if they
were missed on the way from Vera Cruz with the treasure, our cruisers
might run through the gulf and have a second chance of meeting them
on their passage home ; but then we must be very strong as the treasure
ships are generally convoyed by most of the men-of-war from the
Havana as far as the Bermudas." The treasure here referred to by
Knowles was obtained from mines upon the American continent, the
importance of which to Spain may be realized by the fact that the
average annual receipt from them was at this time calculated at more
than 4^ million pounds sterling. The protection of this trade by convoy
formed a perpetual duty of the navy even during peace. Privileged
persons only were permitted to take part in the commerce, and the
King himself was in effect the principal merchant of the kingdom.
Instead of encouraging the trade to increase, those persons who
could obtain permission to take a part in it held it jealously in
their hands. "Kept under by absurd regulations, hindered by all
kinds of obstacles, cramped by a thousand chains, yet this commerce
is the richest in the universe." It was this rich commerce on which
Spain so greatly depended that must be the first object of an attack,
the successful issue of which would deprive her of the money she
would require immediately for conducting a war.
The Ministry had a fairly clear field to work in so far as their
offensive operations were concerned. If they decided to attack the
1 The principal French station. The trade from the French settlements
usually sailed for home in June, before the hurricane season set in settiemems

1739 Offence and Defence 19
headquarters of Spanish trade in the West Indies they required a
combined force to capture the ports and a naval force to cover the
operations, ensuring the immunity of the troops on their passage and
holding the fines of communication at the required points to prevent
either interference with our own supplies, or reinforcements from
reaching the enemy. The main ports requiring observation would be
Cadiz in the south, in connexion with which Carthagena would be
included, and Ferrol in the north, which would include the ports on
the Biscay coast. The security of our dominions — the British islands,
Gibraltar and Minorca in the Mediterranean, and our scattered posses
sions in the West Indies and America had also to be provided for
against counter attack ; and so far as they were concerned the squadrons
employed to cover our oversea offensive operations would, if properly
disposed, secure those territories from invasion. There remained the
defence of the trade. The large squadrons watching the enemy ports
could not ensure its safety. While the squadrons off Carthagena,
Ferrol or Cadiz could guard against the sailing of any similar body
of ships, it was impossible for them to guarantee that single ships
or small squadrons should not slip out from those ports; and over
and above these main bases every harbour on the coast that would
hold a ship could send out a privateer, so that some force in addition
to the main squadrons would be required to deal with these pesti
lential craft. Sir Robert Walpole, speaking in the House of Commons
in the early part of the following year1, indicated the lines on which
he surmised the war must proceed: "It is true," he said, "our Navy
is much superior to theirs; but by our Navy alone we cannot propose
to force them to a peace. We must attack them on land at some
place or other, and for this purpose we must have a sufficient land
force. I believe they have not at present any great number of regular
troops in the West Indies; and we may prevent their sending a great
; fleet and army there at the same time; but we cannot prevent their
sending small detachments in single ships or in half-a-dozen ships
at a time, and by such means they may considerably increase
their regular troops in the West Indies even before we can attack
them." It will appear strange that with so clear an appreciation
of the situation so little attempt should have been made to prevent
the saihng either of fleets or smaller bodies of ships from the Spanish
ports. Unreadiness of the fighting forces and irresolution as to their use
were among the reasons why Spain was allowed so free a hand as she
was at the beginning of the war; but there were others as well. The
1 Parliamentary Debates, 1740.

20 Consideration of War Plans 1713-25
irresolution was to some extent created by the relations with foreign
powers. A brief reference to these will therefore be made, so that the
effect of the prospects of interference or assistance from the continent
may be appreciated, and the extremely evanescent character of the
alliances of the preceding years brought out.
From 1713 to 1731 France and England had been at peace. In
1717 they had been in actual alliance1, and the short war of 1718-1720
had seen France, Austria and Great Britain acting together against
Spain. England's attitude in this matter was dictated by her continuous
pohcy of the preservation of the balance of power, but another potent
influence was also at work — her regard for her trade ; and this played
no small part in weakening the ties that hitherto had bound her to
Austria. The desires of the Emperor for an external commerce which
he was anxious to develop from his Flemish Province, led to Austro-
Spanish rapprochement which culminated in a treaty2 in 1725. By
this arrangement Spain agreed to assist Austria in the development of
an overseas trade and the establishment of an East Indian trading
corporation known as the Ostend Company, while Austria in return
was to use her influence to obtain the restoration to Spain of Gibraltar
and Minorca. Secret clauses included an attack on France, and marriages
by which Austrian archduchesses were to be united with Spanish in
fantes and thus provide these princes with settlements in the Austrian
dominions in Italy. This treaty gave rise to serious fears both in
England and France. Not only trade and power were believed to be
affected, but it was rumoured that a Jacobite restoration was among
its provisions. Holland would be in danger, and through her, England;
for the Dutch had openly announced that they would attack the
Imperial ships if they should meet them in the East Indies, in which
case a war would follow between the Empire and the United Provinces
in which Spain would be bound to assist Austria. England could not
afford to see Holland either crushed or driven into the arms of France;
and, if France should go to war in defence of Holland, England could
not sit by and see French squadrons attacking Spanish West Indian
settlements, which would result in an increase in French strength in
those parts. France, no less than England, had good reasons for not
standing alone in the presence of two such powerful enemies as Spain
and Austria. The result of the mutual danger was a treaty between
the two powers, into which Prussia also entered3; and a triple alliance
of England, France and Prussia confronted the dual alliance of Spain
and Austria.
The moral support which Spain had thus obtained from Austria
1 Treaty of Vienna. 2 Ibid. * Treaty of Hanover.

1726-33 Alliances and Friendships 21
did not content her. She next desired active assistance in recovering
Gibraltar which she attacked in 1726. But the money which was
needed to induce the Emperor to participate was not forthcoming
until too late owing to a blockade of Porto Bello by a British squadron
under Hozier, — that terrible pacific blockade which cost so many lives.
Thus Spain received no help from her ally. England likewise received
none from her's, and a half-hearted struggle, hardly worthy the name
of war, in which the Spanish attempt upon Gibraltar failed com
pletely, soon came to an end.
The Austro-Spanish alliance lasted only a short time. The grouping
of the powers underwent another change in 1729 in which dynastic
and trading influences were supreme. Austria having rejected the
proposed Austro-Spanish marriages, Elisabeth Farnese, the very
masterful consort of the King of Spain, in high dudgeon carried Spain
into the arms of France and England, and a treaty, in which the
Emperor was obliged to take part, resulted in 173 1. England was
guaranteed the possession of Gibraltar, her treaty rights as regards
trade were secured to her, and the Ostend Company was abolished.
Spain obtained some of the concessions in Italy desired by her Queen.
From this time Anglo-French friendship had gradually grown
fainter, a tendency accentuated two years later by the conclusion of
the first Pacte de Famille between Spain and France. In this compact
the former agreed — notwithstanding previous treaties — to transfer to
the latter the commercial advantages conceded to England by the
Treaty of Utrecht, France in return engaging to assist Spain to recover
Gibraltar, to suppress the illicit trading, and provide an army of
40,000 men if required. That same year however the attention of the
parties was diverted in another direction by the death of the King of
Poland which brought about a war concerning his succession in which
France, Spain and Sardinia were opposed to the Emperor. The British
Ministry adopted an attitude of non-interference, mainly through the
influence of Walpole— an attitude strongly criticised at a later date
by opponents of that Ministry. Carteret, in the debate on the motion
for the removal of Walpole, said: "Our joining the Emperor in the
war would in all human probability have entirely cast the balance...
but we remained idle spectators and by this our inaction the power
of the house of Austria was diminished, the power of France increased
and the whole system of Europe turned upside down." The kingdom
of the two Sicihes passed at the peace in 1733 from Austria to a Spanish
prince. The main effect of the war, so far as it concerned England,
was a great increase of Spanish power in the Mediterranean ; all
that had been gained by the war of 1726 was lost.

22 Consideration of War Plans 1739
This short survey will have shewn that while Austria entertained
no friendly feelings towards Spain, she had no reason to extend any
help to England, who had just been instrumental in killing at its
birth her overseas trade to the East Indies, and had allowed her
territories to be taken from her in the recently ended war. Holland
had no cause to come into the war unless she were attacked by France;
but she was bound by treaty to assist England in the event of the
Protestant succession being endangered.
Of the smaller powers whose attitude affected the situation, the
most important was Sardinia, whose ruler, King Charles Emmanuel,
was a soldier held in high esteem by all his contemporaries. But so
long as the quarrel between Spain and England was concerned with
matters without the Straits of Gibraltar, the attitude of Sardinia
mattered little. The northern powers similarly had even less concern
in the dispute, and France only remained. Her attitude was of serious
importance and of great uncertainty, and every effort was made by
the British ministry to ascertain the exact relations existing between
her and Spain, and whether certain rumours as to a secret treaty
between them were true. As we have seen, the first family compact
between the French and Spanish branches of the house of Bourbon
had been secretly signed in 1733. In it France agreed to assist Spain
if she were attacked by England, to obtain for her the restitution
of Gibraltar and Minorca and to assist her to check the illicit trading
in the West. The agreement was known to the Duke of Newcastle
early in 1734, and, though the compact had lasted not much longer
than the ink took to dry, it indicated the trend of a considerable body
of influential opinion in France making for a close alliance between
the Bourbon powers. Cardinal Fleury, the " Prime Minister" of France,
was known to be averse from war. All his influence, it was rightly
anticipated, would be employed in the maintenance of peace; and
Newcastle hoped that if only Holland could be persuaded to throw
in her lot with England the scales might be turned so definitely in
England's favour that Fleury would keep out of the contest. "I
sometimes flatter myself," he wrote to Horace Walpole1, "there
are strong indications of success: a little spirit in the Dutch would
certainly frighten the Cardinal, and give him an excuse for not
taking part with Spain, since that would bring on a general war
and make the Dutch take part with us; but if our friends in
Holland shew plainly nothing will engage them to act, France will.
then think they may then quarrel with us without endangering a
general war."
1 Duke of Newcastle to Horace Walpole, (Brit. Mus.) Add. MS. 15055.

1739 The Council 23
It was however suspected that measures were on foot for a renewal
of the treaty of 1733 ; and as the Cabinet had themselves experienced,
the peaceful tendencies of a minister might not be proof against a
popular outcry for war. It was therefore the obvious duty of the
administration not to rely too confidently on Fleury's attitude, but
to take all the steps possible to guard against the situation that might
arise if he were unable to keep the reins in his own hands. The first,
the most obvious, step was to prepare every ship in the yards for
service, so that a force superior to that of the two powers would be
available if required. As the sequel will shew, this was not done, and
ministers contented themselves with gambling with the security of the
nation, trusting to the pacific character of a frail old statesman 86 years
of age. Such, then, was the actual pohtical situation when the British
Government found itself faced with the necessity of deciding on some
definite plan of war with Spain.
At that time the direction of all warlike measures was in the hands
of the Privy Council, but in practice the business was done by a Com
mittee of the Council, which constituted in effect a Committee of
Imperial Defence. This Committee was a Committee of the Privy
Council, and though the same great officers of the State who formed
the Cabinet were to be found attending it, it was wholly distinct from
that body, nor was attendance confined to members of the Govern
ment or Council. So far as the navy was concerned, while its repre
sentative was generally the First Commissioner, others of the Board
frequently took part in the discussions; and the officers commanding
the Fleet in home waters are often to be found at its deliberations.
Such matters as the operations to be undertaken, the movements of
the various fleets and the instructions to be given to their commanders
were considered by this body1.
The two sea-officers who in the initial stages figure most prominently
in the work of preparation for, and conduct of, the war, were Sir Charles
Wager, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and Sir John Norris, the
Commander-in-Chief, or Admiral of the Fleet.
Sir Charles Wager was now 73 years of age. He had held the office
of First Commissioner since 1733, an office held by many sea-officers
since 1688 2. In his young days he had served with Russell at Barfleur,
1 Cf. Professor E. R. Turner in American Historical Review, July and October,
1913; Sir William Anson in English Historical Review, January and April, 1914;
Mr Hi V W Temperley in the same Review, No. xxvn. of 1912; Memoirs of
Court of George II, by Lord Hervey; Diary of Sir John Norris (Brit. Mus.) Add.
MS. 33004; Minutes of the Privy Council.
2 Admirals Herbert, Edward Russell, Sir John Leake, Sir George Byng and
Lord Berkeley.

24 Consideration of War Plans 1739
and later was present at the taking of Gibraltar in 1704 and of
Barcelona in 1705. He had made himself a rich man by the capture
of a great quantity of treasure from a Spanish fleet of seventeen ships,
which he boldly attacked with a squadron of three vessels only. He
had commanded in the West Indies, where his conduct of affairs was
marked by the success of his defence of trade and capture of prizes.
He was present at the siege of Gibraltar and the blockade of Cadiz
in 1726 and 1727, but he had never had the good fortune of commanding
a great fleet action, and the majority of his services had been connected
with squadrons rather than fleets.
Sir John Norris, the date of whose birth is uncertain1, was
apparently about 79 years old. He had been present at Barfleur,
la Hogue, and at the loss of the convoy off Lagos in 1693. He took
part under Sir Cloudesley Shovel at the capture of Barcelona in 1705
and the operations round Toulon in 1707. He commanded in the
Mediterranean in 1710 and 171 1, when he took part in the joint opera
tions with the Archduke Charles. He had been employed in the Baltic
both in naval work and diplomacy in the years between 1715 and
1727, and was appointed Admiral and Commander-in-Chief in 1734.
Sir John's Diary contains a very full account of the meetings of the
Committee of Council attended by him2; it gives a singularly clear
picture of the method, or rather the lack of method, with which the
war was directed.
It was at a meeting of the Council held on June 3rd, when Spain's
failure to conform to the agreements arranged in the Convention of
the Pardo was known, that the first acts of hostility were decided on.
The acts of hostility were not to be acts of war but reprisals3, blows
directed against Spanish commerce in reply to the injuries Spain had
inflicted upon British trade. Spanish shipping was to be attacked in
its two great focal areas, Cadiz and the West Indies. With this in view
the Council decided to send orders immediately to Haddock to dispose
his squadron in the best manner to seize the Flota, then preparing at
Cadiz, and to stop all Spanish advice-boats going to the West ; and to
Commodore Brown to "act hostilities against the Spaniards in the
West Indies, making the interception of the galleons from Havana his
1 Sir John Laughton in the Diet. Nat. Biography gives the year of his birth
as 1660, with a query.
2 It is in the British Museum Add. MS. 28132-5.
3 "The term applied to such injurious and otherwise internationally illegal
acts of a State against another as are exceptionally permitted for the pu'rpose
of compelling the latter to consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference
created by its own international delinquency." L. Oppenheim, International
Law, vol. 11. p. 34.

J739 Instructions for Reprisals 25
principal object." The defence of the kingdom was to be provided for
by manning a strong squadron for home service and augmenting the
land forces. The proper method of issuing letters of marque was to
be gone into, in accordance with precedent.
Orders in the sense decided upon were despatched three days later
in three six-rates to the Mediterranean, West Indies and Northern
Colonies respectively, a fourth and a fifth-rate were sent to guard the
fisheries at Newfoundland, and Sir John Norris was appointed to
command the fleet at home. Thenceforward meetings of the Council
were held daily to discuss the operations which were to be under
taken. The instructions to Haddock1, dated June 6th, began with a
preamble in which the unjust seizures committed by Spain, the injuries
suffered by our commerce and the cruelties inflicted on our seamen
were recited; and Haddock was directed, as Spain had failed to fulfil
her undertaking to pay £95,000, to commit "all sorts of hostilities"
against the Spaniards, seizing both ships of war and merchant vessels.
In particular he was to cruise off Cadiz to try and capture the Flota
fitting out for the West Indies, and also to look out for some Azogue
ships expected soon to arrive, and for the galleons in case the squadron
in the West Indies should miss them. As it was not improbable that
these measures of reprisal might provoke the Spaniards to retaliate
in the form of an attack on Minorca, he was from time to time to
detach such ships as he considered necessary to prevent such an
attempt being made, going himself to the island in case of urgent
need, but not otherwise. Besides this he was ordered to protect trade,
to station ships off Lisbon and Gibraltar for the purpose of getting
intelligence of Spanish ships, and to attack the enemy's privateers;
but he was directed not to weaken his own squadron to an extent
that would make it inferior to any squadron that might come out
from Cadiz, or from any other port of Spain to join the ships at Cadiz;
which junction he was enjoined to prevent.
When it is borne in mind that Haddock's force consisted of ten
ships of the line, one large frigate and eight small craft, and that the
force in Cadiz so far as was known consisted of thirteen ships of the
fine besides small craft in unknown numbers, it will be seen that his
task was sufficiently comprehensive. He had not only to keep a force
off Cadiz which could engage the Spanish squadron if it came out,
but also to provide ships for the other scattered services enumerated.
To enable him to carry out these instructions an increase of force was
obviously required.
1 They were drawn up by the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Harrington, Henry
Pelham and Sir John Norris.

26

Consideration of War Plans

1739

The actual disposition of all the ships in sea-pay when these orders
were issued was as follows : —

Rates

Plantations

Mediterranean

Home Service

Guardships

34
56
Sloops

1
467
8

5
5 1
6 1

10 1
68

6
4

26

18

25

10

making a total of 79 ships, of which 36 were of the line.
On June 20th news was received from Gibraltar that two Buenos
Ayres and two Azogue ships were expected to arrive at Cadiz during
June. The Council at once decided to endeavour to intercept them.
Sir Chaloner Ogle was ordered next day to hoist a broad pendant on
board the 'Augusta,' 60, take the 'Pembroke,' 60, and 'Jersey,' 50,
under his command and, as soon as he could be ready, to sail for
Gibraltar with sealed orders (which were not to be opened until he
reached Cape St Vincent) directing him to cruise off that Cape for the
expected Spanish ships. Admiral Haddock also was warned that these
ships were on their way home and informed that Ogle was being sent
to intercept them. Both of these sets of orders were shewn to Lord
Hardwicke, the Lord Chancellor, a statesman whose strategic insight
was considerable. Hardwicke at once drew attention to the fact that
the Spaniards would not neglect the obvious precaution of ordering
their ships to come to some other home port than Cadiz, watched as
it had been for so long, but would divert them elsewhere, probably
to Corufia. In confirmation of Hardwicke's surmise information appears
to have been received that some such measure had been taken, and
it was settled immediately after the Lord Chancellor's remarks to' send
another force to watch off the northern capes of Spain. For this
purpose the Council decided to employ a squadron which had been
prepared for the purpose of making the opening moves against Spain
in the West Indies, and now lay at Spithead, nearly ready, under the
command of Admiral Edward Vernon1 The instructions to Chaloner
Ogle were therefore not altered, and Vernon was directed to get to
sea as quickly as he could and proceed to Finisterre with the object
of intercepting the Spanish ships in case they should make for Corufia.
1 'Burford,' 70 (flag); 'Worcester,' 70; 'Strafford,' 60; 'Princess Louisa' 6o-
Norwich, 50. M' uu>

J739 Vernon off Cape Ortega! 27
As however it was important that he should arrive in the West Indies
before the galleons should leave for Europe, which they were expected
to do in October, he was told not to wait more than fourteen days off
Finisterre unless he should get information that the ships were actually
coming, and in any case not to wait so long as to risk missing the
galleons in American waters.
Ogle was unable to get away until July 22nd in consequence of
a severe gale, and even when he did sail the weather was still tem
pestuous ; after a day or two of battling with foul winds he lost his
foremast and was obliged to return to harbour. A new mast was
stepped and rigged and he once more set out on the 30th and worked
down to Cape St Vincent, where he found three of Haddock's squadron
— the 'Ipswich,' 70, 'Edinburgh,' 60, and 'Dragon,' 60, — already cruis
ing on the look out for the same quarry as himself.
The possibility that the Azogue ships might be met and protected
at their home terminal by the Ferrol squadron caused the Admiralty
to strengthen Vernon's command by four more ships1 under Captain
Coville Mayne, and with these he sailed the day after Ogle's first
departure and ran into the same bad weather. Although he lost no
spars he was not able to get clear of the Channel until the end of the
month, the foul winds keeping him battling about the Isle of Wight
until then. On the 2nd August he was out of the Channel and on the
9th he made Cape Ortegal where he cruised for the inside of a week,
and then, leaving Covill Mayne the three 70-gun ships and the frigate
which had been added temporarily to his squadron, with orders to
cruise in those parts for another month, he bore away with the
remainder of his ships towards Madeira, where he arrived on the 23rd
of the month.
Mayne continued cruising with the detached squadron off Ortegal
until the 1st of September when he received certain news that the
Azogue ships had got into Santander a month before. This was true.
Under the command of Admiral Pizarro they had sailed from Vera
Cruz and made their European landfall at Cape Clear; in that part
they appear to have received warning from an advice-boat sent out
from Spain that the British squadron was cruising off Cadiz, where
upon Pizarro shaped course across the Bay direct for Santander where
he anchored in safety on August 2nd. Mayne, having thus missed his
quarry, returned to England.
The Azogue ships had good luck in their safe arrival. But for the
foul winds which had delayed the departure of the two British squadrons
there would have been a very fair chance of their being intercepted
1 'Lenox,' 70; 'Elizabeth,' 70; 'Kent,' 70, and 'Pearl,' 40.

28 Consideration of War Plans 1739
off Ortegal, if indeed they were not met in the northern part of the
Bay. Thus the first blow of reprisals in home waters had failed.
In the Mediterranean, Haddock, after refitting quietly at Mahon,
had arrived at Gibraltar on April ist on his way home in accordance
with his instructions of recall. Here the orders met him rescinding
those instructions, and directing him to remain at Gibraltar. He was
still there in the end of June when the orders for executing reprisals
reached him. He sailed within a couple of days with a strong squadron1
to cruise in the approaches to Cadiz', with the objects of falling upon
the Flota if it should put to sea, and of intercepting the homecoming
Azogue ships of whose expected arrival he had received timely notice.
Making his base off Cape St Mary's, that convenient spot just within
Portuguese territory so often used by British squadrons for observing
Cadiz, he kept a detachment cruising about Cape St Vincent, sending
a constant succession of reliefs from the main body; and in this manner
he was in a position to deal with either the Flota or the Azogue ships
and to save his own as much as possible.
Haddock remained in this situation throughout July and the early
part of August. Fresh instructions then reached him in which he was
told to devote his main attention to preventing the Spaniards from
using the delay in the declaration of war to concentrate their fleet
or get the Flota to sea. Nothing, he was told, was to divert him from
keeping a sufficient number of ships off Cadiz to frustrate either of these
movements. Thus the British ministry were prepared to treat any
attempt towards effecting a junction between the Cadiz and Ferrol
squadrons as an act of war; but as this blockade could not be main
tained indefinitely the Admiral soon received instructions for more
drastic action. On August 13th the Privy Council had decided to
attempt what was an actual act of war and to attack the Spanish
squadrons in their own harbours2. His particular attention was directed
to a squadron of four ships which was known to be at Carthagena
under the command of M. de la Bene. The reason for this new orienta
tion is clear. The administration, as Haddock's original instructions
shew, were particularly anxious lest Spain should attack Minorca
without any declaration of war, and were not averse from forestalling
any such action if a favourable opportunity presented itself, by the
destruction by bombardment or burning of the squadron and shipping
which constituted the most serious threat to the island. The instruc-
1 'Somerset,' 'Berwick,' 'Edinburgh,' 'Ipswich,' 'Plymouth,' 'Dragon,' 'Can
terbury,' and 'Chester.'
2 This was agreed to by the Privy Council on August 13th, but the instructions
were not sent out until September 4th — a delay of three weeks. Add. MS. 33004.

x739 From Reprisals to War 29
tions to attempt to destroy the Spanish squadron reached Haddock
towards the end of September. He at once sent Lord Augustus Fitzroy
to reconnoitre Carthagena and Barcelona — the latter being the port
at which any troops destined for the enterprise would collect as they
had on previous occasions — with orders to bring back a report as to
the possibility of executing an attack upon either the squadron or
the shipping by means of fireships and bomb-vessels. Lord Augustus,
who returned in the middle of October, reported that the enterprise
was impracticable in view of the strong defences of the harbours.
In the same despatch in which the burning of the shipping was
recommended to Haddock's consideration, he was instructed to keep
the main body of the squadron off Cadiz as long as the weather would
permit, and then return to Mahon for the winter. His station at length
yielded him two prizes of value, the first captures since the orders for
reprisal. On September 23rd and 29th his squadron took two rich
Caraccas ships whose cargoes were valued at over £200,000. This was
more than double the sum of which the non-payment had led to the
present situation.
In this manner the opening moves of a preparatory and protective
nature were made and reprisals were carried out. Vernon had been
sent with his squadron to attack Spanish trade in the most advan
tageous manner at one end of the trade route, at the same time pro
tecting the British trade and settlements in that area, while Haddock's
squadron at the other end held up the outgoing and intercepted the
homecoming trade and protected Gibraltar and Minorca. The fleet in
home waters was being fitted out as fast as the defective organisation
for manning would admit, trade was carried on under convoy, and a
few cruisers were sent out into the Soundings to protect shipping
against attack by privateers. It now lay with the Council to determine
how the coming war was to be conducted.
At the time when England issued the orders for reprisals, Spain
had sixteen ships at Cadiz, of which two only, which were preparing
to sail with the Flota in July, were ready. The remaining fourteen
were under orders to be fitted out as soon as possible, in consequence
of the threatening aspect of affairs. At Carthagena there were five
ships, and at Ferrol there were from twelve to fourteen, of which four
only were ready for the sea. Like England, Spain experienced great
difficulties in manning her ships and was anxious to protract negocia-
tions and stave off reprisals or war as long as possible, or at any rate
until the valuable Azogue ships should have arrived. She accordingly
did not answer the British order for reprisals at once, but when those
vessels reached Santander safely, in August, she felt herself in a position

J

o Consideration of War Plans 1739

to take action. Her orders for reprisals were issued and a number of
privateers got to sea with very little delay.
The plan upon which Spain intended to conduct the war consisted
in a general attack upon British trade by privateers. The field was
to be opened for them by forcing the British to concentrate their
naval forces by threats of invasion of the British Islands and the
recapture of Minorca and Gibraltar. For this purpose three armies
were to be formed, one in Galhcia ostensibly to be thrown into Scotland
or Ireland, one opposite Gibraltar and one in Catalonia to menace
Minorca. It was further anticipated in Madrid that France would
throw her lot in with Spain in accordance with the terms of the Family
Compact. The number of ports the English squadrons would then
have to keep under observation would demand so great a naval force
that the Spaniards hoped that not enough ships would be available
to deal with their privateers. They estimated that a squadron of
twelve vessels would by these threats be tied to Gibraltar, and another
of the same force to Mahon, so that the privateer zebecks from Majorca
and Catalonia would be free to ravage the unprotected British trade1.
The Enghsh plan consisted mainly in an attack on Spanish sea
borne commerce until information should be received as to which
oversea Spanish ports were vulnerable to attack. But the idea as to
how the campaign against commerce was to be organised was by no
means clear in the minds of the Council; and while instructions were
given to Haddock to cruise off Cadiz and blockade that port, no
measures were taken to maintain a squadron off the other great arsenal
at Ferrol. One only of the Spanish bases was watched; and, as Spain
had hoped, an insufficient force was provided to deal with the privateers
on which she so largely depended to cripple our resources. Very slowly
the Council set about receiving and considering suggestions for an
oversea military expedition against some part of the Spanish colonies.
Although the order for reprisals was issued in June, no war plans
were made or even discussed, nor were any methods taken to get
troops ready, (beyond the formulation in the Council of a pious opinion
that it was advisable to augment the land forces) until September.
On the 4th of that month the Privy Council met to consider the under
taking of some expedition to the West Indies, but dissolved without
doing anything2. On the 10th they reassembled and heard a scheme
proposed by Colonel Bladen3 and his son-in-law, Mr Tinker, which
consisted in a suggestion to attack and make a settlement in the
1 Duro, Armada Espanola, vol. vi.
«- 2 Minutes of the Privy Council. Newcastle Papers, Add. MS. 33004
3 Colonel Bladen was uncle of Lord Hawke.

J739 Schemes of Oversea Attack 31
isthmus of Darien, and, holding this as a base, to seize the Spanish
gold mines, which, said Mr Tinker, would be the means of carrying
on a trade with the Spaniards and the opportunity of putting off
great quantities of European goods. A force of 2000 men was supposed
to be all that would be necessary. The Council were pleased with the
notion; and, saying the scheme "deserved consideration," they referred
it to Sir John Norris and Sir Charles Wager. These officers met on the
17th September and reported that the plan was feasible and could be
carried out either by sending ships to Panama, or from the Eastern
side by carrying the men up the Chagres River. Further consideration
however caused the scheme to be laid aside, and another proposal
which had been brought forward earlier1 to send two 50-gun ships to
the Philippines to intercept the Acapulco ship and assist the Portuguese
to recover Salsette was examined. This developed into a proposal to
attack Spain in the South Seas and as a part of the operation to capture
Manila and there take the Acapulco ship. A squadron which should
leave England before Christmas could reach Manila in time. The
garrison was reported to be very weak — only 150 men — and it was
suggested that after capture the city should be transferred to the
East India Company who would then provide the permanent garrison —
that a flourishing trade with China and the South Seas might result. A
similar suggestion of making a permanent settlement on the coast of
Chile with the same object was discussed2 and rejected, but it was
agreed that a squadron of three or four ships on the Chile coast would
be able to do serious harm to Spanish trade. One further proposal
remains to be mentioned. General Oglethorpe, the founder of the
colony of Georgia, had recommended sending an expedition to demolish
the Spanish settlement at San Augustine, and on September 25th this
was agreed to. The General was to raise forces locally, ordnance and
other stores were to be provided from England, and the stationed
ships on the American coast were to form the necessary naval force.
A 50-gun ship was at once sent to tell Oglethorpe what had been
decided, and to carry the necessary instructions to the vessels scattered
along the seaboard of the northern colonies.
Although the Council were able to make their decision in this small
matter by the end of September they were wholly unable to do so
with regard to the other and more important operations. The expedition
to the Chile coast was not agreed upon until November 10th, and even
then the Council could not make up their mind as to whether the
Manila proposal should be carried out. They met and dissolved again
many times without settling anything, preferring, it would appear
1 On September 6th. 2 October 12th, 1739.

32 Consideration of War Plans 1739
postponement to decision. It had been intended that Captain Anson
should command the Manila expedition, and he had been recalled
from sea in October— he was then cruising in the Soundings for the
protection of trade— and informed that he would do so. The opera
tions on the coast of Chile were to be undertaken by another squadron
under Captain Cornewall who was to proceed thither round the Horn,
and after ravaging the Spanish trade and settlements on the west
coast of South America, stretch across the Pacific and join Anson at
Manila. This scheme was however dropped, at the instance of Walpole
who considered that it would take too many men, and that as one
squadron was already going to Chile it might as well afterwards cross
the Pacific and take Manila. Finally, after three months of vacillation
and two months after war had been formally declared, the Council
made up its mind in the direction suggested by Walpole. Anson was
to take four ships round the Horn, attack the trade of Chile, attempt
to capture Darien, and if necessary proceed afterwards to Manila and
endeavour to intercept the Acapulco ship.
The larger question of a serious territorial attack on the Spanish
possessions had meantime been discussed as well, though the manner
of doing so had been equally dilatory. The Council on September ioth
expressed the opinion that it was "extremely desirable" that an
expedition should be made in the Spanish West Indies which should
distress the Spaniards, and they asked when any number of land
forces sufficient for that purpose could, with safety, be spared from
the country. No answer to this elementary request seems to have
been given, and although an opportunity of increasing our land forces
in a simple manner was afforded, advantage was not taken of it. In
September the King of Sweden had offered to hire a number of his
Hessian troops to France ; but Prince William of Hesse-Cassel who was
to marry Princess Mary, offered 6000 troops to England. The Council
advised the King to accept the offer, which would set free a number
of troops for service abroad, but nothing came of it. Another month
went by, and on October 12th, the day after the Council had advised
the declaration of war, the subject of the large expedition which had
lain dormant since September ioth was once more brought out of its
pigeon-hole, and Wager and Norris were directed to consider it. This
they did. "Sir Charles and I," wrote Norris, "took into consideration
what Sir Robert Walpole has so earnestly desired as his Majesty's
opinion and all of his Council, that some undertaking of consequence
should be undertaken in the West Indies; and the Havana being the
first to be wished for." The two Admirals examined all the information
available about Havana and concluded that it was impossible to attack

J739 Havana or Cartagena 33
it by sea, the town being wailed round and the entrance closed by
a boom, but that it could be captured by an army. Its batteries
mounted 152 guns and its garrison consisted of 1300 good soldiers,
5000 militia and six troops of horse of from 60 to 70 men each; the
arsenals contained arms for 10,000 men. Taking these matters into
consideration it was estimated that an army of from 8000 to 10,000
men would be required, who might be landed in a bay to the westward
of Havana — a distance of about two miles — while the ships carried
the heavy stores along the coast. The town was reported to be weakest.
to the westward, but with no gates in that direction, so that the
attacking troops would not be in danger of a sally by the garrison.
If however so many men were not available. Wager and Norris con
sidered Cartagena the next best place to take and hold, "as the
entrance of that port is narrow and may be made defensible against
a stronger force; the town is hkewise commodious for that purpose
and, being upon the continent, if we can maintain ourselves, communi
cation with the natives will follow, and the way to the mines [that]
are now used by the Spaniards1." Thus Cartagena would fulfil the
necessary condition of being self-supporting, and easy to hold, would
open up a trade with the interior, and by its position on the flank of
the trade route to Porto Bello would enable the power that held it
to dominate the Spanish trade. "The Spaniards," said Norris, "would
hardly venture to send their galleons to Porto Bello with us in posses
sion of Cartagena." In suggesting the number of men that would
be necessary the Admiral instanced that de Pointis took the city in
1697 with 3000 men, and proposed to send the same number, which
might be supplemented by a force of 1000 local buccaneers.
When 'these proposals were put before the Council they caused some
consternation among its members. Walpole informed the sea-officers
that the idea of taking Cartagena came as a complete surprise to
the Ministry, who had never had that operation in their minds; while
as to Havana, he said, they had never imagined that so large an army
would be required. The intention had been to send General Wade
with a far smaller force than that suggested, and though he thought
the lesser number proposed for Cartagena might be obtained, he did
not think the 10,000 for Havana could be had2. To this the Admirals
very properly replied that the military force was purely a soldier's
question on which their opinions might be wrong, and Norris added
that "the best method to avoid diversity of opinion would be a meeting
with a Secretary of State, Sir Robert Walpole and whom his Majesty
should think proper to be consulted, which of the expeditions should
1 Diary of Sir John Norris. 2 Diary.
R. N. I. 3

34 Consideration of War Plans 1739
be undertaken: and Sir Charles Wager and myself being with them
would answer how far the naval assistance could sustain the expedition
that should be thought proper to be undertaken1." This proposal was
not adopted, and full meetings of the Council went on without any
decision being arrived at. One day it was agreed that 10,000 men
could not be had; Havana was then laid aside and Cartagena con
sidered; a few days later the Duke of Newcastle suggested that perhaps
more men could be raised in America which might make the Havana
enterprise possible. But when the subject became difficult it was
dropped and one of the other expeditions — Manila, Panama, Chile —
was brought up and toyed with. The inevitable result was that time
passed and nothing was done.
While the British Ministry were thus dallying with war the Spaniards
were making effective preparations. Reinforcements were being des
patched from Ferrol to Cartagena and Havana, both of which were
rightly considered as threatened, and privateers were putting to sea
in increasing numbers daily. The Spanish armies were assembling as
arranged, and the fleets were preparing, albeit slowly.
The omission on the part of the British Fleet to observe Ferrol,
an omission which permitted those reinforcements to sail without
hindrance was not due to forgetfulness. From the first Norris had
urged that ships should be kept off Finisterre for the double purpose
of intercepting troops and supplies intended for the West Indies, and
as a precaution against a possible junction of the fleets of the supposed
allies, France and Spain. No notice of his reiterated advice had how
ever been taken. Sir Charles Wager appears from Norris's account
to have persistently opposed this measure. Sir. John's disappointment
at the failure to take this obvious step is repeatedly shewn in his
accounts of the Council meetings. His Diary for November 26th, 1739,
contains the following entry, rather involved in its construction but
clear in meaning: "Sir Charles [Wager] was asked if 2 Spanish
men-of-war with about 4 or 5 hundred men were not sailed from
Ferrol to the West Indies: he said he believed there was; and in almost
all Councils I have been called to I have always proposed some ships
to cruise off the Norward Capes to prevent the Spaniards putting, to
sea from Ferrol: the different sentiments of Sir Charles has prevented
it, and it has always been my opinion that if we could not keep a
squadron off that coast to prevent the ships at Ferrol coming to sea,
that [theyj might with those men-of-war and two or three thousand
soldiers send to the West Indies, and by that means disappoint any
desires we might have of making great conquests in those parts."
1 Diary of Sir John Norris, October 21st, 1739.

1739 An Expedition decided upon 35
Norris himself was strongly in favour of making Havana the main
objective. His plan was to collect all the troops then in the West
Indian garrisons and North America, together with those from San
Augustin after that place had been captured, and assemble them at
Providence, there to be joined by an army coming out from England.
The whole force would then move direct to Havana. Chmate, he
urged, was a matter of the highest importance in determining the
objective, and in this respect Havana was in every way preferable
to Cartagena, being 120 further to the northward and comparatively
healthy, whereas Cartagena was notoriously unhealthy. The ap
proaches to Havana presented no great difficulties, but at Cartagena
the landing was bad in the strong winds that prevail along the coast,
and, in addition, the fortifications were known to have been con
siderably strengthened since its capture in 1697.
A decision, typical of the Duke of Newcastle, was finally arrived
at on December 5th. The expedition should be sent to Jamaica, and
when it arrived there a local council of officers should decide what
was to be done with it. The responsibility was thus shifted from
Newcastle's shoulders to those of other people. As to the command
of the army, the first proposal was that it should be given to Lord
Stair, a veteran of Marlborough's wars and one of the most distinguished
soldiers of the time; but the King refused to consider his name when
it was submitted to him, and desired the command to be given to
Lord Cathcart1, another experienced officer who had taken part in the
previous war.
The Council at last, six months after they began to take steps
which must infallibly lead to war, had succeeded in deciding that an
expedition should be sent to the West Indies, its objective to be
decided when it got there ; and the question of raising troops for that
expedition began to form the subject of their deliberations. It was
agreed that a force should be raised in America under the command
of Colonel Spotswood of Virginia; that the Governors of the colonies
should be instructed to embody men, grant commissions to officers
and arrange transport so as to meet the army coming from England
at Jamaica; and that all the troops in the West Indian garrisons were
to join the expedition. Five regiments, to be called Marines, were to
be raised at home; but in truth, these regiments were Marines in name
only. The essential of a Marine was and always had been that he was
borne principally for manning and fighting on board the ships of the
Fleet. These Marines were not to be in any way allotted to the squadron,
but were to be an expeditionary force, and were given the name of
1 Diary of Sir John Norris, December 14th, 1739. 3—2

36 Consideration of War Plans 1739
Marine only because under that name it was easier to raise men, as
the pubhc believed them to be for the service of the Navy. The regi
ments were ordered to be assembled in the Isle of Wight, and transports
for 8000 men at the rate of 1 J tons per man, victualled for six months,
were ordered on the 31st December, 1739.
While these matters were under discussion the preparation of the
fleet in home waters proceeded slowly. Men were the great difficulty.
Although bounties of two guineas a head for able seamen and thirty
shillings for ordinaries were offered, seamen were not forthcoming. It
was proposed to remedy this lack in various ways. One suggestion
was to withdraw the protections from impress extended to the seamen
of the coastwise traffic and fisheries who numbered some 14,000 and
thereby make them available for service in the fleet. Another alterna
tive was to man the fleet largely with soldiers; while a better one,
which had the support of the sea-officers of the Council, was to re
establish the Marines and to use them for the objects for which they
had originally been raised of manning the fleet and providing a body
of continuous service seamen1 Sir Robert Walpole's proposal to
embody men into regiments for the West Indian expedition and call
them Marines, when they were not going to form part complements
of the ships, was naturally ill-received by the seamen on the Council ;
and though the men so raised were denominated "Marines" in spite
of the protests of the Admiral of the Fleet, the intention as to their
functions was subsequently modified and a proportion of them was
definitely allocated to the sea-service. But while these discussions
continued as to the methods in which men were to be obtained to
man the fleet, the ships were lying helpless in the dockyards, the ports
of Spain were insufficiently watched, and the ports of France were
not watched at all.
It soon however became known that, for the present at any rate,
no danger was to be expected from France. A letter from Lord
Waldegrave, our Ambassador in Paris, received on October 25th,
shewed that no immediate junction of the French and Spanish ships
was to be apprehended, as the French ships could not be ready before
the spring of the foUowing year. In consequence Haddock was even
ordered to send home six of his ships2, a number reduced a week later
to four, and eventually cancelled altogether when French preparations
were again reported. For the present, a watch on Ferrol and Cadiz
1 See Appendix on the manning question.
" He had had a reinforcement of six ships sent him in conseauence of the
expected interference of France. He was to send home six of hifearner ships.
SS Add. MS 11^^ reaCh6d hlm' MimteS °f ^^ C°URCi1' °Ct°ber 25*'

1739 War Declared with Spain 37
would meet all strategical requirements; but it was imperative to
hurry on the manning and fitting out of the fleet, as the French
might early in the next year have twenty-eight ships of the line
ready1. Seeing what the actual state of preparations were it is not
surprising that when on October 2nd the Council met and discussed
whether it were not now time to declare war, Norris strongly opposed
such a precipitate step. He urged that there was not only no need
to declare war, but that it would be most undesirable to do so
until the naval and military forces were ready to carry out offensive
operations against Spain and to protect the kingdom and its outlying
possessions. At present, he pointed out, such squadrons as were abroad
had instructions which entitled them to do all that lay within their
powers ; more they could not do. The winter was approaching in which
regular sea blockades would be most difficult to maintain, and until
the fleet was manned it would be impossible to support those blockades.
Besides this, he argued, France could have no object in joining Spain
until we actually declared war, and it would be well to be ready to meet
both powers from the beginning. To exhaust our ships in a winter
blockade would lead to their being unready to undertake the operations
in the spring when the naval forces of both the allied powers might
be ready for combined action against us. He might indeed have
continued his arguments further — possibly he did — and carried them
on from the unreadiness of personnel and material to the not less
important matter of unreadiness of a war plan. But whatever pleas
he used he only succeeded in delaying the declaration of war for a
few days. Notwithstanding his protests and arguments, the decision,
deferred on October 2nd, was definitely taken on October nth, and
war was formally declared by proclamation on October 19th. In this
proclamation the unjust seizures made and the injuries done to our
merchant ships and seamen, the interference with legitimate commerce,
the claim of Spain to the right of search in other than her territorial
waters were referred to. Her failure to fulfil her part of the arrange
ments agreed to in the Convention of the Pardo, and the apparent
impossibility of obtaining either redress or any guarantee of future
security were mentioned; and it was represented that since all peaceful
means of settling the dispute had proved fruitless there remained to
us only to endeavour to secure our rights by war.
To this communication Spain replied on November 17-28 by one
couched in similar language. England's declaration of war, her pre
tensions, and her failure to observe treaties, left Spain, so it ran, no
1 Eleven were preparing at Brest, five at Rochefort and twelve at Toulon.

38 Consideration of War Plans 1739
course open but to declare war in self-defence. Relations between the
two powers were broken off, and commerce between them ceased1.
War was at last begun, and it cannot be said that it began under
the most favourable auspices. The fleet was not ready, the army was
not ready, and the offensive operations had not yet been determined,
nor were they fully decided upon two months later. After a period
extending over several years during which the relations of the two
Powers had steadily tended towards a conflict, war had actually broken
out before the British Administration began to consider in what
manner it should be conducted. Months more passed before the
Cabinet decided, and then only partially, what operations against the
oversea possessions of the enemy should be undertaken and how they
should be executed. Such an unreadiness shews how little the problem
of war occupied the mind of the Government during the years of
disturbed peace preceding 1739.
1 The cessation of commerce meant the laying up or transfer of a very large
quantity of British shipping, the volume of which may be appreciated by the
fact that in the year 1737, out of 1243 French, Dutch and British ships that
entered Cadiz, 183 were French, 153 Dutch and 907 were English. Duro, Armada
Espanola, vol. vi.

CHAPTER III
THE OPENING OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES
The orders for reprisals, issued when Spain failed to fulfil the obligations
imposed upon her by the Convention1, reached Commodore Brown at
Jamaica in July 1739. They directed him to "act hostilities" against
the Spaniards in the West Indies, and accordingly he took his squadron2
to sea early in August, and cruised with it in a solid body, first between
Cape Corrientes and Cape Antonio for outgoing trade, and then between
Cape Santa Maria and Havana for the trade arriving at the latter
port. Two ships were detailed to see the homeward-bound British
trade through the Windward Passage, and a sloop was kept cruising
along the north coast of Jamaica to guard against small raids from
Cuba. Brown's information was that the Spanish ships in the West Indies
were scattered. He heard there were no ships of war at Havana, but
that three lay in Cartagena, two in Porto Bello and two at San
Domingo; a small force under Pizarro, which had been sent to cover
the trade from Porto Bello in the preceding winter, was reported to
have sailed already for Spain and was in fact the force that reached
Santander on August 2nd. The galleons however were collecting or
collected at Havana, and upon them, as the principal objective against
which reprisals could be executed, he concentrated his attention. What
amounted to a pacific blockade of Havana ensued, as a consequence
of which hardly a ship left that port between August and October.
In the middle of October, knowing that Vernon was on his way and
ought to arrive shortly, Brown carried the bulk of his squadron
down to Jamaica leaving only the 'Windsor' and 'Falmouth' to
watch Havana. He arrived on the 28th to find Vernon impatiently
awaiting him.
Admiral Edward Vernon, whom we have already seen starting
from England to cruise off Finisterre, was now fifty-five years of
age. At Westminster as a boy under the famous Dr Busby he had
learned Latin and Greek, and is said to have made some progress in
Hebrew by the age of sixteen, when he went to Oxford. There he
studied mathematics, navigation and geometry, and, under a private
1 Minutes of the Privy Council, June 3rd, 1739, B.M. Add. MS. 33004.
2 'Hampton Court,' 70; 'Windsor,' 60; 'Falmouth,' 50; 'Torrington,' 40;
'Diamond,' 40; 'Shoreham,' 20. The 'Windsor' was at that moment cruising
off Hispaniola: Brown recalled her to join him as soon as possible.

40 The West Indian Opening 1739
tutor, fortification and gunnery. He was nearly seventeen when he
entered the Navy, and his first experience of battle was at the destruc
tion of the galleons at Vigo, which took place a month before his
eighteenth birthday.
Vernon thus started his sea-fife with a good grounding in the
elements of the most important part of his profession, and also with
a liberal education of a wider nature than that of the average sea-
officer of his time. He combined broad views on varied subjects with
an attention to all matters of detail connected with his profession.
His writing is the formed hand of an educated man, and his letters
display an insight and thoughtfulness which are not to be found in
the same degree in those of the majority of his contemporaries. His
early education may possibly have contributed to his defects as well
as to his qualities, and it is not unnatural that while his outlook was
wider than that of the greater number of the officers of the day he
was affected by an impatient temper which did not permit him to
suffer fools gladly. He who saw so clearly the essentials of a situation,
who could pierce through superficialities and reach main principles,
found himself unable to sit silent while he observed an Administration
blundering in the mires created by its own lack of foresight. He could
not resist the temptation, which a certain facility in expressing his
opinions encouraged, of putting forward his views and criticisms with
a directness which no Ministry at that time appreciated. In Parliament,
where he sat for Rochester, Penrhyn and Ipswich1, he was a frequent
speaker, especially upon all subjects connected with the seamen, of
whose cause he was always a pronounced and advanced advocate.
Vernon's first operations on leaving England had been concerned
with the attempt to intercept Pizarro. Apart from this diversion, his
instructions, dated July 16th, 1739, directed him to take command in
the West Indies and there "commit all sorts of hostilities against the
Spaniards in such manner as you shall judge the most proper." Further,
he was to sink, burn and destroy all Spanish ships; to procure the
best intelligence about the galleons at Cartagena and Porto Bello,
particularly the time at which they were to sail from either port on
their return voyage, and of all Spanish ships in West Indian waters;
to take station and cruise or fie in the best places to intercept Spanish
trade; if the Spaniards appeared to be preparing to attack South
Carolina or Georgia, to send ships to intercept any squadron or flotilla
sent from Havana for that purpose; and always to keep two or three
1 Horace Walpole says he was elected at the same time for these three
constituencies (vol. 1. p. 93). He is shewn as Member for them in Parliamentary
Debates.

1739 Vernon's Instructions 41
small frigates about Jamaica for the protection of that island and
its local trade. The instructions continued: "In case yoU shall find
that the Spanish men-of-war or galleons either at Cartagena or Porto
Bello lie so much exposed as that you shall judge it practicable to
burn or destroy them in port, you are to attempt to do it provided
it may not too much hazard the disabling of our squadron under your
command from performing any other services that may be necessary."
Secret instructions were added later, directing him to make it his
business to procure the best intelligence as to where a descent could
be made on the Spanish dominions in the West Indies or on the
•continent, which would be of prejudice to Spain and of advantage to
England. He was to state the number of troops that would be required,
and, so soon as he had ascertained these matters, to send the informa
tion home with the utmost despatch by a sloop.
From all this it will be observed that Vernon was by no means
sent out, as the popular legend would have it, to capture Porto Bello ;
for except in so far as an attack on the shipping in the harbour is
mentioned, Porto Bello is not referred to in his orders. It will also
be noted that territorial attack on the Spanish possessions was con
templated, though not decided, so early as July, 1739 ; but while Vernon
was ordered to send home prompt information as to where these
possessions were most vulnerable, the Ministry took no steps whatever
to be ready to act upon that information when it should be received,
other than by passing a resolution in a Cabinet Council in June that
His Majesty should be advised to increase his land forces1-
From the time of leaving England Vernon had assiduously busied
himself in preparing his squadron for service. His first consideration
was the manner in which he would handle his command in action,
and he issued an addition to the Fighting Instructions "for forming a
sort of Corps de Reserve in case my squadron should exceed the number
of the Spanish Fleet I might meet with, and which I explained more
fully to them in the verbal orders I gave them upon it yesterday,
having called all my Captains together to deliver them their orders,
and advise with them on the execution of them2." The Additional
Instructions ran as follows: —
"In case of meeting any squadron of the enemy's ships, whose number may
be less than those of the squadron of his Majesty's ships under my command,
and that I would have any of the smaller ships quit the line, I will in such case
make the signal for speaking with the captain of that ship I would have quit
the line: and at the same time I will put a flag, striped yellow and white, at the
1 Cabinet Memoranda, June 3rd, 1739. Add. MS. 32993; Minutes of the Privy
Council, June 3rd, 1739. Add. MS. 33004.
2 Vernon to Duke of Newcastle, July 29th, 1739.

42 The West Indian Opening 1739
flagstaff at the main topmast-head, upon which the said ship or ships are to
quit the line and the next ships are to close the line, for having our ships of
greatest force to form a line just equal to the enemy's. And as, upon the squadrons
engaging, it is not to be expected that the ships withdrawn out cf the line can
see or distinguish signals at such a juncture, it is therefore strictly enjoined and
required of such captain or captains, who shall have their signal or signals made
to withdraw out of the line, to demean themselves as a Corps-de-re'serve to the
main squadron, and to place themselves in the best situation for giving relief
to any ship of the squadron that may be disabled or hardest pressed by the
enemy, having in the first place regard to the ship I shall have my flag on board,
as where the honour of his Majesty's flag is principally concerned. And as it
is morally impossible to fix any general rule to occurrences that must be regulated
from the weather and the enemy's disposition, this is left to the respective
captains' judgement that shall be ordered out of the line to govern himself by
as becomes an officer cf prudence and resolution, and as he will answer the
contrary at his peril."
This order is noteworthy. It is the first Additional Instruction;
and thus the originator of the system which set the Navy free from
the trammels of the Fighting Instructions was Vernon. His v.are
was always to look as far ahead as possible and to issue instructions
to govern such cases as he could foresee; but he was none the less
careful to limit those instructions, and to explain their limitations,
making it clear to his subordinates that he could provide only for
the conduct of affairs up to a certain point, after which it fell to
individual captains to act according to the circumstances of the
case. He realized that signals in battle may fail, and impressed
upon his captains that he could not depend upon being able to send
them any instructions during the progress of an action. He provided,
in fact, the major tactics to be followed, and left the minor tactics
to be evolved according to the unforeseen circumstances that might
arise. "It is from my knowledge of the experience of my captains,"
he wrote, "and my confidence in their resolution, that I have my chief
reliance successfully to execute his Majesty's orders." Throughout
his operations Vernon pursued this course, taking his captains into
his confidence, explaining to them verbally what he wished them to
do, and letting them know that he depended on them to carry out his
intentions by an intelligent exercise of their own judgment. And in
no case during his command did his captains fail him.
Besides this he exercised his ships' companies daily with the guns
and small arms. He had, he said, found "our unfledged mariners
very raw at it." This inexperience of his ships' companies was the
theme of more than one of his letters. "We are under one general
misfortune," he wrote, "to be sent upon service with such numbers
of raw men we have to instruct in everything"; and it was upon his
passage out that he expressed his opinion to the Duke of Newcastle
that it would be well to turn several of the marching regiments into

*739 Waterhouse at La Guayra 43
Marines in order to strengthen the ships' companies with riflemen, and
provide men capable of being readily turned into able seamen— an
intention as regards the formation of a Marine corps that dated back
to the reign of William and Mary1, and was still prominent in the
minds of the senior men.
Vernon's efforts to intercept the Azogue ships on his way out had
been fruitless. After leaving Finisterre he had stood for the Canaries
and thence passed on to Pahna, but had failed to get any news of
them at either place. He therefore sailed for Antigua which he reached
on the 28th of September. From Antigua he went on to St Kitts
and there detached Captain Waterhouse with three ships2 to harry the
trade off the Spanish Main from La Guayra to Puerto Cabello, and
then rejoin him at Port Royal. Waterhouse on parting company sailed
to La Guayra, where he saw some ships and small craft hauled up in
the cod of the bay. He at once made preparations to attack them,
but when he got nearer, he found the difficulties were greater than he
expected. The harbour mouth was defended by two well placed forts,
he had neither chart nor pilot to guide him in the local navigation,
and the shifty breeze inshore increased the risks of attacking under
such circumstances. The forts received him with a smart fire, and he
soon found that an attempt to force his way into the bay would
probably involve his squadron in losses which would not be com
pensated for by the destruction of a few coasting vessels. Knowing
how important it was that his ships should be in a fit condition for
the more important services that were to follow, he hauled off after a
brisk engagement and proceeded to rejoin Vernon at Jamaica. His
conduct met with the Admiral's full approval.
After detaching Waterhouse, Vernon had proceeded with the rest
of the squadron to Jamaica, and anchored at Port Royal on the 12th of
October. Here he found things very different from what he expected.
His original intention had been to proceed direct to Havana to intercept
the galleons, but he now heard that they had not even all arrived
at that port. One was still at Cartagena and none were likely to be
ready to sail till after Christmas. He had expected to be joined by
Commodore Brown immediately on his arrival at Jamaica, and was
much annoyed to find the Commodore was not there, but was still
cruising with his squadron at Havana, where according to his informa
tion, there was no need for him.
Vernon's last instructions directed him to advise as to where a
territorial attack would best be made against Spain. His views on this
1 See Appendix.
2 'Strafford,' 60; 'Princess Louisa,' 60; 'Norwich,' 50.

44 The West Indian Opening 1739
question, in the hght of both an earlier and later experience of land
warfare in the West Indies, are so clear that they shall be quoted
with some fullness. He was uncompromisingly opposed to any opera
tions of the kind on an extended scale; but if territorial attack, with
a view to ultimate possession, were intended, he considered Cuba would
afford Spain the "most sensible loss," and was most capable of being
retained and colonized. "But when I reflect," he wrote, "on the
populousness of that island, their neighbourhood to the French at
Hispaniola, who would never fail to assist them and could always
speedily do it, the great expense of a transport from Britain of any
number of forces into these seas, and the many unsuccessful expeditions
of that kind that have been attempted by land in these seas, the best
advice I can think of giving is to lay aside all thoughts of such expensive
land expeditions, as all advantages may be better and cheaper procured
by keeping a strong superiority at sea in these seas ; by which means,
let who will possess the country our Royal Master may command the
wealth of it : and as such a force at all times not only serves to distress
his Majesty's enemies by destroying their trade, but to protect and
encourage that of his Majesty's subjects, I can never be the adviser
of land expeditions especially into this country, that may drain the
Royal Treasury, and, in case of a French war, disable His Majesty from
keeping a superiority at sea, on which, in my. apprehensions, both the
security and the prosperity of the Kingdom depend1."
Among the proposals he was directed to consider was that, already
referred to, of Mr Tinker for making a settlement at Darien with the
object of developing a private trade with the Spaniards. This scheme
he deprecated. Such trading could equally well be carried on from
Jamaica, which was also a better base for naval operations, both from
its geographical position and from the fact that it was more difficult
for the enemy to gather information of intended movements from
there than from any place on the mainland. "Success," said Vernon
in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle of January 23rd, 1740, "depends
on well-concerted enterprises of which they can have the least notice."
He pointed out as an additional argument against Darien that scattered
solitary settlements were only a weakness, needing garrisons from the
army and detachments from the fleet to defend them. The wisdom
of these remarks has received abundant confirmation since Vernon's
time. Vernon also answered that part of the questions put to him as to
the force required, in an interesting manner. " My own reflections," he
^* Vernon to the Duke of Newcastle, October 31st, 1739. Received March 13th,

*739 Vernon considers Porto Bello 45
wrote, "upon the almost general disappointments of past expeditions
in America is this : that they were principally owing to delays in order
to gather more strength in these parts, by which they were weakened
more in the force they brought out within that time than any additional
forces they collected amounted to: and gave the enemy all the time
they could desire to strengthen themselves against them. So that, in
my judgment, I should hmit all expeditions to this country to be
entered upon immediately on their arrival, and to be executed within
the first six weeks, before their men would begin to fall sick1." The
history of West Indian operations shews how well judged was this
advice. At a rather later date the life of a battalion in the West Indies
averaged two years. In the three terrible years 1793, 1794 and 1795 the
services of no less than eighty thousand men were lost to the country,
and at any time during those years the proportion of sick in the West
Indian garrisons might be taken as fifty per cent, at the least. In
reading these almost prophetic opinions of Vernon's it is not difficult2
to appreciate his impatience at the dilatory methods of Wentworth
in the subsequent operations at Cartagena and Santiago.
While Vernon considered what operations should follow, he had to
determine what to do at once to distress Spain. Casting his eye round
the station he saw that he could not strike any blow directly against
the Spanish Navy, and his attention centred on the two nearest main
ports of trade — Cartagena and Porto Bello. Trelawny, the Governor
of Jamaica, who conferred with him, strongly recommended an im
mediate attack on Cartagena, but with the force he had, without more
troops, Vernon did not consider it would be practicable. Porto BeUo,
however, he thought could be taken. Reports reached him that the
Spaniards were moving, or intended moving, many of their ships
towards it from Havana, Vera Cruz and Cartagena, thus showing that
they were very anxious about its safety. The treasure had not yet
reached Porto Bello, and therefore no direct blow in the shape of
its capture could be effected, but an attack on the harbour promised
several important results. By arriving there before the Spaniards, the
British squadron might attack and destroy the fortifications and render
the harbour useless as an assembling-place for trade; or it might, by
being off the port when the enemy arrived, intercept his ships and
sink them; or finally, if any Spanish ships were there before him, Vernon
felt confident of being able to sail in and attack and destroy them at
their anchors, as he had seen the galleons at Vigo attacked and de-
1 Vernon to the Duke of Newcastle, January 23rd, 1740.
2 Cf. Fortescue, History of the British Army, vol. iv. and vol. vn. Bryan
Edwards, History of the West Indies.

46 The West Indian Opening 1739
stroyed in his younger days. Everything in his opinion pointed to Porto
Bello as his most suitable objective, and in deciding to sail there, he
acted in fact upon the principle that the best place to find the enemy's
squadron is in the vicinity of what he most wishes to protect.
Having made his decision, Vernon prepared to sail as soon as
possible, with or without Commodore Brown. Brown however returned
to Jamaica in time on the 28th of October, his ship was watered and
victualled with all despatch, and the squadron1, consisting of the five
ships Vernon had brought out from England and the 'Hampton
Court' sailed for Porto Bello on the 5th November. A sixth-rate —
the 'Sheerness,' 20 — was detached to watch Cartagena and keep
Vernon informed of any movements made in that part, especially
looking out for the arrival of reinforcements from Spain.
The harbour of Porto Bello is a small bay running about east and
west, a few miles to the eastward of the Colon of to-day: to the west
ward lies the harbour of Nombre de Dios. Both of these ports were
connected with Panama by a paved road (which still exists) across
the isthmus. By this road the treasure and merchandise were carried
to and from Panama, except such portion as was embarked at Chagres
at the season when the river of that name was full enough to permit
navigation2; at such time the treasure was carried down the Chagres,
leaving only a short land journey between Panama and the place of
shipment on the river.
The entrance to Porto Bello harbour is a bare half mile across,
and the land rises steeply behind it on either side. The winds inside
are tricky and in the month of October are light and mainly westerly.
On the north shore, with thickly wooded hills immediately behind it,
stood the Iron Castle. At the head of the bay in its south-eastern
corner were the Gloria and San Jeronimo Castles, protecting the
town. There is bold water close inshore at the Iron Castle, so that
ships could go practically alongside, but the Gloria and San Jeronimo
could not be approached closer than about 400 yards.
Vernon issued his orders as to the manner in which he proposed
to attack, on the day after sailing from Jamaica. The squadron, led
by Commodore Brown, was to sail in close line of battle so as to pass
less than a cable's length from the Iron Castle, each ship firing its
broadside into the castle as she went by; from this point Brown was
instructed to lay up for the Gloria Castle and anchor as near as he
•Norwlt ^o- °lhitll -WaS ^.foUows: 'Hampton Court,' 70; 'Worcester,' 60;
Norwich, 50; Burford,' 70; 'Strafford,' 60; 'Princess Louisa,' 60
ihe present Panama Canal follows the line of the Chagres River for a long

1739 The Attack on Porto Bello 47
could to its eastern end, leaving room for the 'Worcester' to anchor
astern of him abreast the western bastion. The ' Norwich,' after passing
the Iron Castle was to anchor off the fort of San Jeronimo and engage
it; the 'Strafford' and 'Princess Louisa,' following the flagship, were
to anchor abreast the Iron Castle and assist in its bombardment. All
ships were directed to have their longboats in tow astern and their
barges alongside ready to tow the longboats in with the soldiers, who
would receive their directions as to landing from the Admiral. Special
instructions were given to avoid hurry, confusion or waste of am
munition. The squadron arrived near Porto Bello on November 20th, and
Vernon anchored for the night some two to three leagues to windward
in order to avoid being driven to leeward. At five o'clock next morning
he called all his captains on board to give them final instructions. An
hour later the squadron weighed, formed fine of battle, and beat to
windward until it could weather the Salmadinas rocks. In order to
avoid the possibility of any mistake in the leading, Vernon had arranged
that when the red flag was hoisted at the maintopmast-head it was
to indicate that Commodore Brown was to lead whichever tack was
on board. This was the first introduction of this invaluable signal
which so greatly increased the flexibility of tactics. It was wanted
badly when Mathews left Hyeres Bay on February ioth, 17441.
The wind during the forenoon was between north and north-north
west. By about 2 p.m. the 'Hampton Court' was in a position to
weather the Salmadinas, and the Commodore bore away, passed
between the Rocks and Drake's Island, and when he opened the
harbour mouth hauled his wind to stand up harbour. But now the
wind came easterly. His orders to attack the Gloria Castle became
impracticable. Without hesitation he disobeyed them and anchored
half a cable off the Iron Castle. His prompt action received full
approval. "Commodore Brown," wrote Vernon, "discharged his duty
like an experienced good officer." For about half an hour the ' Hampton
Court ' alone was engaged with the Iron Castle, for the light wind had
opened out the squadron and their progress was slow, but in that
half hour the heavy fire of the Commodore's broadsides beat down
much of the Spanish defences. The ' Hampton Court's ' cable was then
cut away by the enemy's shot and she dropped to the southward
before she could bring up again, but as she did so the next two ships,
1 On that occasion a shift of wind on leading out of harbour reversed the
tacks and in consequence the whole line had to be inverted in order that the
commander ordered to lead with the starboard tacks might get into his position.
The meaning attributed to the signal by Vernon was a special one, the red
flag — No. 3 — having no signal significance when so hoisted.

48 The West Indian Opening 1739
'Norwich' and 'Worcester,' came in and took up their positions inshore
of her. They opened fire as briskly as the leading ship had done, while
Brown, seeing that the resistance would not be long, prepared for the
assault which was to follow by getting his soldiers and seamen into
his boats ready to push in to the shore immediately the signal to land
was made.
Close behind the 'Norwich' and 'Worcester' came the flagship,
which was so lucky as to pick up a large puff of wind as she rounded
the point, which enabled her to luff up and anchor closer her next
ahead; she dropped her anchor within about a pistol shot of the castle,
hauled her broadside to bear with a spring, and opened fire. A tre
mendous battering of heavy guns and fusillade of small arms from
the three closely placed ships was now concentrated on the castle,
whose defenders were already shaken by the 'Hampton Court's'
attack. Vernon very quickly saw that the resistance was broken and
within a few minutes of anchoring signalled for the boats to land.
Brown's boats were immediately on their way, and in less than a
quarter of an hour the men were on shore, scrambling up into the
lower batteries, helter skelter, driving what remained of the garrison
before them. Such of the Spaniards as were able escaped, and when
the attackers climbed into the upper batteries they found no more
than some thirty-five of the defenders remaining alive. Before the
'Strafford' and 'Princess Louisa' got into position abreast the Iron
Castle the Union flag was flying over its bastions.
Thus four ships only had got into action and had all been engaged
with the Iron Castle. The rest of the plan was undone. The reason
for this was that the wind, which had been at about north when the
squadron stood into the harbour, went round to the eastward before
the ships were in position, a shift which not only delayed the rear
ships from getting into action but also prevented the three leading
ships from carrying out the intended plan and moving up the harbour
to engage the Gloria and San Jeronimo Castles. Brown, in his Journal,
after describing the capture of the Iron Castle, remarks: "The wind
being far easterly which obhged me to anchor as it was right down
the harbour: ordered a spring on our cable and fired several shots at
Gloria Castle as they did at our ships till nigh eight o'clock at night."
Some of the Gloria's fire reached the ships of the squadron. The
'BurfordV foretopmast was cut through and other shght damage done,
but most of the shot fell short. The ships replied, and although the
range was long they dropped some shot into the castle and sunk a
sloop lying close off it. Vernon soon afterwards carried the squadron
a little further to the south-westward to be out of range for the night,

TJIJo~^~)
THIS PZ^i'^V
of the Haxbour.Town and Forts of
PORTO BTZZO
(Taken by Edward Vernon Eftf.
VICE ~4Z>~4fIR^lL of the BLUE
on the 22* of November 1739. With Six Men of War only)
Drawn by Lieuten' Philip Durell :
Is most Humbly Infcribed to the
K. HorPSSJt C&^RZES ffCdGER
Erft Lord Commifsioner of the Admiralty.
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REFERENCES <D -J^^w^Ej^K

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*739 Surrender of Porto Bello 49
and the ships ran out the necessary warps and made all possible
preparations to be ready to resume the attack the first thing in the
morning. At 5 a.m. on the 22nd, the Admiral again called the captains on
board and gave them instructions for the attack on the remaining
castles, and an hour later the squadron began moving up harbour.
Hardly had they got under way when a launch was seen coming off
from the shore with a flag of truce, brought by the Governor of Porto
Bello who was prepared to surrender the town upon conditions. Vernon
received him, but not finding the articles proposed sufficiently to his
liking, as they did not include the surrender of the vessels in harbour,
he returned them, and giving the Governor until 3 p.m. to agree to
the conditions which he laid down, he continued to warp his ships
into position. In the afternoon the Admiral's terms were accepted.
The troops were landed at once and took possession of the castles.
Vernon gave the strictest orders against plundering the inhabitants,
and the occupation of Porto Bello was carried out in a manner which
the Spaniards admitted did honour to the Admiral's humanity and
justice1. Vernon now set about destroying the fortifications, in order,
as he told his captains, to leave the place "an open and defenceless
bay." The iron guns were spiked, the brass ones and the ammunition
were carried on board, and the walls of the castles were blown up,
their demohtion being entrusted to Captains Boscawen and Charles
Knowles, who carried it out with skill and thoroughness. This work
occupied three weeks, during which Vernon considered the possibility
of repeating Morgan's exploit of 1671 and making a dash on Panama.
The treasure from Lima was reported to be there, and the temptation
to make the attempt was great, but the difficulties were considerable.
The distance across the isthmus is over forty miles ; the road, a paved
path through thick bush where ambushes might be arranged; and
cannon for attacking the walls would either have to be dragged by
hand, for the squadron had no transport, or the walls would have to
be carried by assault. Even if these difficulties were overcome the
object might be missed, for it was not impossible that the treasure
would have been shipped back to Lima. The journey would thus have
been in vain, and there was the added risk that during the landing
party's absence the Ferrol squadron, that ever-present danger, would
have arrived and cut off their retreat. In these circumstances he
decided to return to Jamaica and refit his ships, and wait to determine
1 Principal authorities consulted for the preceding description: Admiral
Vernon's Despatches and Journal, Commodore Brown's Journal, Journals of
Captains of ships concerned. Letter of A. Campbell in A Forgotten John
Russell, by M. E. Matcham.
R. N. I. 4

50 The West Indian Opening J74°
his next move until he should have received further reports from his
cruisers. On arrival at Port Royal, the Admiral found a refit a less easy
matter than he had anticipated; the stock of stores of all kinds in
the dockyard had fallen very low, and no supplies had been sent out
since reprisals were ordered. This neglect on the part of the authorities
seriously hampered his movements; but though this fact was fully
realized and was the subject of much just criticism at home, his suc
cessors suffered in a similar manner, and the operations in the West
Indies were gravely prejudiced throughout the war from this cause.
In consequence of the difficulty of refitting under these conditions,
he was not ready for sea again until February 25th. During this time
however, he had five ships out cruising off Havana, convoying and
attacking trade; and he employed his enforced stay at Port Royal by
making improvements in the administration of the place. His charac
teristic care for the seamen shews itself throughout his despatches.
It was at this time that he reported the necessity for an hospital at
Port Royal, plans of which he drew out and sent to the Navy Board,
shewing all the requirements of such a building in this climate, with
comforts both for officers and men. He strongly recommended its
being taken in hand, using a reasoning that he knew would appeal
to the authorities, namely, that it would prove an economy. "It
would be a great saving to you in a long war," he wrote, "and be a
means of preserving many men's lives and securing many men from
desertion." While Vernon was refitting at Jamaica, a small joint expedition
was in progress in Georgia. Colonel Oglethorpe having obtained per
mission to attack the Spanish settlement at San Augustin which
threatened his colony1, the Admiralty ordered all the ships stationed
on the American coast to take part in the operations2. The troops
were to be furnished by the garrison of Georgia, reinforced by a
regiment and a troop of horse voted by the Legislature of South
Carolina at a cost of £120,000.
The squadron3 under the command of Captain Vincent Pearce was
assembled by April and at once established a close blockade of San
Augustin in the course of which some warm fighting took place with
the local flotilla of six half-galleys and two armed launches. The land
forces under Colonel Oglethorpe failed however to make any serious
impression upon the Fort. Both Oglethorpe and Pearce proved them-
1 Minutes of the Privy Council, Add. MS. 33004, September 21st 1739
2 Admiralty 2.55, dated October 5th, 1739. '
3 'Flamborough,' 20; 'Phoenix,' 20; 'Tartar,' 20; 'Hector,' 40; 'Shoreham,'
20; 'Squirrel,' 20; 'Spence' and 'Wolf,' sloops.

174° Reconnaissance of Cartagena 51
selves indifferent leaders; the former, though he developed the idea,
was incapable of putting it into execution; the latter saw difficulties
everywhere but made little effort to overcome them.
The redeeming feature of an otherwise unsatisfactory enterprise
was the conduct of Colonel Vanderdussen and Captain Peter Warren
of the 'Squirrel,' both of whom continually urged their superiors to
energetic action, and when acting together worked in that perfect
harmony which is the outcome of a full appreciation of the joint
dependence of the Services. Subordinates, however, are powerless in
the face of unintelligent or inactive superiors, and the small expedition,
which was brought to an end by the approach of the hurricane season
in July, failed solely for want of energy and initiative.
This enterprise, while in no way affecting the main course of the
war, represented the sound conception of defence by forestalling
attack, and illustrates the flexibility of the system of colonial defence
then in vogue1 which enabled a number of scattered ships to be rapidly
assembled and formed into a useful fittle squadron for such local
operations. Although the defence of Georgia and South Carolina formed a
portion of Vernon's responsibihties he was not called upon to make
any detachment from his squadron at Jamaica to assist in the attack
upon San Augustin. The ships remained at Port Royal throughout
the winter, and when the refit was completed in February, the Admiral
sailed to reconnoitre Cartagena. Some fire-ships and bomb-vessels had
recently been sent him from England wherewith he was recommended
to endeavour to attack the shipping in Cartagena — a very favourite
scheme of the Duke of Newcastle, who appears to have thought the
destruction of shipping in a fortified harbour by means of bomb-
vessels a simple operation; Ferrol and Barcelona were among the
places to which he proposed to apply this method of attack, although
frequently informed by seamen that it was impracticable2. Vernon was
under no delusions on the matter, but he desired to know what defences
there were at Cartagena, and, if possible, tempt the Spanish Admiral
to sea to fight him. He arrived there on March 2nd, sent the boats
of the fleet away sounding, and sailed close along the coast himself
examining the works from seaward. After five days' surveying and
observing he ordered the bomb-vessels in with covering ships, and
opened fire on the town, moving the ketches about as the enemy
picked up the range. Five large ships of the fine, under Don Bias
1 See Appendix, Vol. in. "Colonial Defence."
2 The views of Lords Keith and Barham on this matter may be noted. See
Barham Papers, vol. in. pp. 156-162. 4—2

52 The West Indian Opening 1740
de Ledo, and an equal number of galleons, — a force nearly double his
own, — lay in the harbour, but though he carried out these deliberate
observations, and insulted the town by throwing bombs into it, he
could not tempt Don Bias to sea to fight him. Though so far unsuc
cessful, he had by this reconnaissance in force gained much useful
information. St Philip's Castle "appeared to be a regular square fort
of four bastions containing 22 embrasures in the two faces, and I take
it to be a fortress of upwards of 80 pieces of cannon. They seem to
have raised some new works under it level with the water, and there
was another fort built in the water on the opposite side of the channel."
So he says in his Journal; and to the Duke of Newcastle he wrote
that he now knew as much about the approaches as the Spaniards
themselves. Besides this material information gained, the poor opinion
he formed of the fighting spirit of the Spaniards was not without its
influence on his attitude towards them in the later operations of the war.
In the second week in March he weighed and sailed for Porto Bello.
His next objective was Chagres.
Chagres, lying at the mouth of the river of that name, was of
importance as a headquarters of the guarda-costas and as related
previously, as a port of embarkation of treasure. The port was protected
by a castle of no great strength, and this Vernon intended to destroy.
Sending a few cruisers to block up the harbour, he watered his ships
at Porto Bello and appeared off Chagres on March 23rd. The ships
of the squadron under Captain Herbert of the 'Norwich,' and the
bomb-vessels under Captain Knowles, opened a bombardment at 3 p.m.
which continued until 10 o'clock at night. Next day the castle sur
rendered. Knowles with a party of seamen was landed to destroy the
fortifications; the stonework was blown up, the woodwork burnt, and
the merchandise, which was of considerable value1, together with all
the guns worth taking, were carried off.
Having thus destroyed another of the Spanish bases and set a
further check on their trade, Vernon sailed on March 30th for Porto
Bello and Cartagena, with the object of intercepting on his way two
Spanish ships of the line which he heard were expected at Santa Fe.
Lack of provisions and stores did not however permit him to remain
cruising for more than a few days, and he was obliged to return to
Jamaica on May 3rd, thereby missing the Spaniards who got safely
into port, bringing a reinforcement of 700 soldiers for the garrison,
as well as a new Governor for the town.
1 "Having now got a deal of the Nut I may the less envy Don Bias de Ledo
the shell of his galleons, tho' I shall narrowly watch him. for them too." Vernon
to the Duke of Newcastle.

A B CD E F

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z74° Threat from Cadiz and Ferrol 53
The news of the capture of Porto Bello had reached England in
the end of March. It gave the greatest gratification, and the Ministry
exploited the success to the utmost, using it as a proof of their own
aptitude for conducting war. How little the capture had been of their
own devising the extracts from Vernon's instructions have shewn. It
was wisely resolved to leave him a free hand in any further operations.
"The King," wrote the Duke of Newcastle on March 26th, "does not
think it proper to prescribe any particular service to be undertaken
by you, but leaves it entirely to your direction to act against the
Spaniards in such a manner and in such places as shall appear to you
best to answer the ends proposed by his Majesty's orders to you."
The compliment to Vernon's capability, implied in this sentence, was
lessened by the fact that his advice on the matter of land expeditions
was wholly neglected.
Though this reply of the Duke's gave Vernon a free hand, he was
in some difficulty as to how to act effectively against the Spaniards.
His squadron was small and he had no troops. The only places which
lay within his power to attack — Porto Bello and Chagres — he had
reduced. All the other ports were more strongly defended and would
require the assistance of a land force. There remained the attack
upon Spanish trade, which he could carry out either by spreading his
ships in the channels of approach or concentrating them to blockade
the principal ports. The state of his ships and his lack of stores made
it difficult to maintain a blockade, and on the other hand he felt it
was undesirable to scatter his forces now that war was declared and
Spain might concentrate her navy and take the offensive; especially
as he apprehended that France might at any moment join Spain
and attack him1. In these circumstances he decided that the only
course open to him was to collect the bulk of his squadron and await
further developments.
Vernon's fears that Spain would take the offensive received apparent
confirmation towards the end of May when he received a letter from
Lord Tyrawley, our Ambassador at Lisbon, dated April 21st (N.S.),
informing him that a squadron of nine of the line and three frigates
had sailed from Cadiz under Admirals Pintado and Reggio, and was
believed to be coming to the West Indies. This news was corroborated
a few days later by a letter from the Duke of Newcastle, dated April
18th, which told him not only that the Cadiz squadron had sailed on
the 19th March, but that the Ferrol squadron had also got away the
day before, that both were believed to be coming to the West Indies,
and that he was to arrange to protect Jamaica. The Duke said that
1 Vernon to the Duke of Newcastle, May 9th, 1740.

54 The West Indian Opening 1740
a division of ten ships from Haddock's command in the Mediterranean
would reinforce him so soon as it should be definitely known that the
enemy had gone to the westward. A "most private" order of the
same date showed that the Government shared Vernon's expectations
that France might play some part in assisting Spain, although war
should not be declared, and instructed him how he should act in such
a case. He was told that if in making attacks on the Spanish ships
or settlements the ships of any other nation should defend either the
vessels, effects or possessions of Spain, he was not to allow them to
stop him, but was to carry out bis designs; and if the ships of the
Flota coming from old Spain, or the galleons on their return journey,
were convoyed by ships of any other nation, he was nevertheless to
attack, sink, burn and destroy them. The same letter brought him
the first intimation that his advice against extensive land operations
had been ignored. It contained the constitution and intentions of the
expeditionary force which, he was told, was shortly to sail under the
command of Lord Cathcart, would consist of about 8000 troops in
all, and would arrive at Port Antonio in September when Vernon was
to have his squadron cleaned and ready for instant action. A body
of troops was also coming from North America, which was expected
to arrive before the main body from England.
Vernon's reading1 of the situation was that the Spaniards, in sending
this considerable fleet to the West, intended to cover the homeward
journey of the treasure, now held up at Panama. It is noticeable that
he does not refer to the possibihty that the enemy might come and
attack his httle squadron. He believed that they would make either
for Porto Bello or Chagres, the only places in the vicinity of Panama
where the treasure could be embarked; and as he had destroyed the
fortifications of both these places he would in such case have an oppor
tunity to attack the enemy at a considerable advantage. Their
squadrons would be crowded in the harbours, unprotected by batteries,
and he proposed, if Haddock's reinforcement should reach him in
time, to proceed at once to those places and fight the enemy at anchor2.
Though his numbers would be inferior to the combined squadrons,
the advantage of the attack in such a case would he with him, and
he intended to make full use of it. Until, however, the reinforcement
did arrive, he would be too greatly inferior to the enemy to hope to
effect any valuable service; but there was a chance that he might
be able to fall in with a separated portion of the large fleet on its way
out, and with this object he hastened the refit of his squadron so that
1 Vernon to the Duke of Newcastle, June 3rd, 1740.
2 Ibid.

174° The Territorial Operations 55
by dint of hard work he was able to sail with six ships and a fire-ship
on the 6th June. With five of these he intended to lie in wait off
Cartagena for the Spanish detachment he hoped might arrive; the
other two he sent to cruise between Vera Cruz and Havana to intercept
the Viceroy of Mexico, who was reported to be about to sail from
the former to the latter place, and whose capture, as he would command
in any land operations, would be of importance. These two ships very
nearly achieved their object, as they captured the Dutch vessel in
which the Viceroy was travelling; he narrowly escaped by shifting
into a fast privateer, but all his papers and orders, some of which
gave Vernon much up-to-date information as to the progress of affairs
in Europe, were taken.
The cruise off Cartagena came to an abrupt conclusion. Rotten
rigging and spars sent two ships back to Jamaica within a few days;
another was damaged aloft and forced to follow them about a week
later, and Vernon returned in the 'Burford' on June 21st, leaving the
only remaining serviceable ship, the 'Hampton Court,' to watch
Cartagena. Again it was want of stores that crippled his squadron
and hampered his operations; not a coil of rope had so far been sent
to Port Royal since reprisals were ordered over a year before.
Another month passed without Vernon's getting any information as
to the whereabouts of the Spanish squadrons ; for this reason, and also on
account of the very doubtful attitude of France, he decided to keep his
squadron together and run no more risks of damage in cruising. Beyond
sending out ships to the necessary stations for trade protection and
attack — the Windward Passage, off Havana and Cartagena, — and
to watch the French off Port Louis, he kept his vessels at Port Royal
preparing them as far as possible for service1.
The proposed territorial operations occupied his mind, and he did
not cease to communicate his views on the subject to the Duke of
Newcastle. Writing on July 25th he reiterated his feeling against
extensive military operations in these unhealthy climates: "the more
I consider of it," he wrote, "I think the objections the stronger against
the Havana," and he explained what those objections were. The
island offered no anchorage for a fleet near the town whence a descent
could be made; anchorage on the open coast would be most inadvisable,
especially after November when the Northers — northerly gales of great
violence — set in; the nearest large anchorage was in Honda Bay, but
that was very far from the objective, and a long overland march was
most undesirable.
Turning from Havana and Vera Cruz to Cartagena, he expressed
1 In letters. July 19th, 1740.

56 The West Indian Opening 1740
the opinion that a better chance of success lay in the latter place; but
the rainy season was now in progress and would continue until
November. Operations there would be impossible until the rains were
over, but if the troops arrived, as the Duke said they would, in
September, Vernon considered that the best immediate step to take
would be to capture Santiago de Cuba. The troops could then be
kept exercising there until November, when they would make straight
for Cartagena where the so-called dry season would have set in.
With men seasoned by this experience of local warfare and confident
in themselves, the attack upon the larger town would be undertaken
under the conditions most promising of success. The proposed occupa
tion of Santiago had a further advantage. By holding this port Vernon
would occupy a base interposed between the Spaniards at Havana
and the French in Hispaniola, a matter of importance in the supposed
event of France co-operating with Spain.
With this campaign planned in his mind, Vernon sent the ' Sheerness '
in August to reconnoitre Guantanamos Bay with the view of using
it as his base of operations. He intended, so soon as he heard that
Cathcart had sailed from England, to carry the squadron off the
West end of Hispaniola and meet him there, and thence to proceed
at once in execution of his plans, falling upon Santiago by surprise.
Above all he was anxious that the troops should not come to Jamaica
and there "get acquainted with Captain Punch," which, as he truly
said, might cost as many men as a general action. It was at this time
that he issued the well-known order, for which and his waistcoat, so
is history distorted, he is better known than for his real talents as an
Admiral. The order is in effect one of the many evidences of Vernon's
real care for his men1.
The welcome appearance of some store-ships on the 5th of September,
under escort of the 'Defiance' and 'Tilbury,' enabled him to refit his
squadron; but here good fortune ended. September passed with no
news of Cathcart, and on October 3rd, thinking he must surely be
nearing these waters, Vernon sailed for Tiburon with his squadron to
meet the expedition. He threw ships out to windward as far ahead as
Cap Nicolas to get warning of its approach, and before many days
1 The order for the mixture of water with rum, termed ' grog ' after
Vernon who wore a grogram waistcoat, and was known as ' Old Grog.' It
runs thus, after a short preamble: "You are therefore hereby required and
directed as you tender both the Spiritual and Temporal Welfare of His Majesty's
Service, to take particular care that Rum be no more served in Specie to
any of the Ship's Company under your Command, but that the respective
daily allowance of Half-a-Pint a man for all your Officers and Ship's Company
be every day mixed with the proportion of a Quart of Water to every Half-Pint
of Rum...."

174° Arrival of the French 57
received some news, but not what he hoped for. From the master of
a Spanish brigantine captured by the 'Tilbury' on October 12th, it
was learned that she had left Ferrol in the company of a squadron of
twelve ships of the fine under Admiral de Torres with 2000 troops
on board, which had gone to Porto Rico and sailed thence on October
6th for Cartagena. Nor was this all. The same day that the 'Tilbury'
gave him this information he received a despatch from England saying
that Cathcart was delayed at Portsmouth by foul winds, that the
Channel squadron under Norris was windbound at Torbay, and that
it was feared that the Spanish squadron had sailed from Ferrol — as
it had; in which case, so soon as its destination was known, a rein
forcement of ten ships would be sent him as on the previous occasion.
The ten ships must however be still a long way off, while the Ferrol
squadron was already here and might get between him and his base.
Luckily, it had gone to Cartagena and not to Havana, and was
thus to leeward of him. It had not yet joined the ships in Cuba,
and was not in a position to attack the troops coming from North
America. In this situation Vernon decided to carry out his attack
upon Santiago with the American troops if they arrived soon enough:
but if they did not, he would be obliged by want of supplies to fall
back on Jamaica and replenish his fleet in order to be ready for
Cathcart's arrival.
Six days later worse news reached him, which sent him back
without further delay to Jamaica. A French squadron from Brest
under the command of the Marquis d'Antin had anchored in Martinique.
This squadron, Vernon guessed, had not come all this way "to take
the air only " ; he now expected that the squadrons of the two powers
would unite and attack Jamaica, and he most impatiently awaited
instructions as to how he was to act in view of this probability1.
At Jamaica he received definite news from his cruising ship, the
'Strafford,' that the Spanish squadron had reached Cartagena on the
21st October and landed troops there next day, the 'Strafford' herself
having narrowly escaped capture; and he decided that the first thing
to be done when the promised reinforcement of ten ships should
arrive was to blockade Cartagena, and, if Cathcart arrived in time,
to attack Santiago as well. But neither Cathcart nor the reinforcement
reached him.
In the meantime the transports from the northern colonies had
begun to arrive; but they were not all assembled until the 12th
December; it was a rehef to Vernon that they had reached Jamaica
in safety, for the situation was now worse. The 'Torrington' had
1 Vernon to the Duke of Newcastle, October 20th, 1740.

58 The West Indian Opening 1740
captured a Spanish sloop and from her had acquired information,
which he had given to Vernon on November 26th, that the Brest
squadron, after embarking an extra 1200 troops at Martinique, had
arrived at Port Louis, and had there been joined by the Toulon
squadron under de Rochalart; and another of his cruisers reported
that the Havana squadron was preparing to sail. These movements
confirmed his opinion that the combined enemies intended to attack
Jamaica. "The French collecting their forces to windward of this
island makes me conjecture their views are against this island, particu
larly as they own they daily expect orders for a war against Britain1."
He had ministerial authority for believing that the French would not
do less than assist to protect the Spanish trade and settlements2, and
they might well be expected to do more. But whether the Spaniards
were going to act offensively in conjunction with the French against
the British squadron or settlements, or to content themselves with
protecting their trade and carrying it home in safety, he could not
tell. Until further reinforcements reached him he could only con
centrate his force at Jamaica and act defensively against the superior
numbers that threatened him from three directions. The causes that
had led to this unhappy situation must now be traced.
1 Vernon to the Duke of Newcastle, December 12th, 1740.
2 See ante p. 54, "Most Private Letter" of April 18th, 1740.

References to the Plan of Port Bello
A. The Governor's House which was shot through by one of the lower
tier of guns from the Admiral's ship the 'Burford.'
B. The Plantation in the Castle of Gloria.
C. The 'Worcester' man-of-war.
D. The 'Norwich.'
E. The 'Burford.'
F. The 'Hampton Court.'
G. The 'Strafford.*
H. The 'Princess Louisa.'
I. The tenders.
K. The Spanish Guarda-costas.
M. Trading Sloops.
N. A Sloop sunk by a shot from the Admiral's ship.
O. Two boats going to land the soldiers under the walls of the Fort.
Soundings in fathoms. Figures on sands in feet.

CHAPTER IV
BEGINNING OF THE WAR IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN

On October ist Haddock carried the bulk of the fleet from his advanced
station at St Mary's to Gibraltar, for the purpose of watering and
victualhng. He left a detachment out to keep an eye upon the Flota
and the men-of-war in the inner harbour above the Puntales; the
instructions to these cruising ships were if possible to prevent the
Spaniards from coming to sea, but if they should do so in superior
force, the detached cruisers were to rejoin the flag with all despatch.
The disposition of the Squadron on October ist, 1739, was as
follows :

Station

Ship

Guns

Remarks

At Gibraltar

' Somerset '

80

' Augusta '

60

' Lancaster '
80
' Edinburgh '
70
' Ipswich '
70
' Berwick '
70
Several planks rotten
' Pembroke '
60
Bowsprit sprung
' Plymouth '
60
' Eltham '
40
Going to Lisbon and
England
' Dolphin '
20
' Solebay '
20
Going convoy to Mahon
' Mercury '
8.6
1
' Ann ' galley
8.6
y Fire-ships
'Duke'
8.6
J
' Salamander '
6.8
Bomb
' Grampus '
6.10
Sloop
Off St Mary's
' Canterbury
60
' Dragon '
60
' Jersey '
60
Off St Vincent
'Oxford'
5°
With Captain Clinton
' Gloucester '
5°
^1 Attending trade in the
' Guarland '
20
V Straits and about
' Aldborough '
20
J Gibraltar
Convoy to Alexandria
' Falkland '
5°
Convoy to Italy
' Kennington '
20
On Italian coast
'Tyger'
50
Convoying trade. To
return to England
Cruising off Lisbon
' Dursley ' galley
20
Cleaning at Lisbon
' Greyhound '
20
Then to cruise off St
Vincent
60 The Mediterranean Opening 1739
The Mediterranean squadron had by now been brought up to twenty-
eight sail all told. The main body was based upon Gibraltar with the
observation of Cadiz as its principal object; the small ships were mostly
dispersed for trade protection, endeavouring to suppress the privateers
which the Spaniards were sending out in continually increasing numbers.
Haddock's small craft were insufficient indeed for the purpose, and he
had to supplement them by hiring vessels locally. His letters at this
time shew that he expected considerable difficulties in protecting
trade. The news of the declaration of war reached Haddock on December
2nd by the 'Fox.' His instructions had been to winter at Mahon,
but this he had not done, as it would have been impossible to maintain
the watch on Cadiz from so distant a port. He had therefore remained
at Gibraltar and tried to keep his squadron efficient with the local
resources, but this had proved very difficult as there were neither
sufficient stores nor facilities for refitting, and the hospital accommoda
tion was wholly inadequate. Sickness was rife among his crews, and
in his letters home he continually reiterated the urgent need of a
properly equipped hospital for the fleet, succeeding at length in
January of the New Year in obtaining a grant of land from the
Governor for the purpose.
The arrival of a reinforcement of five clean ships1 in the middle
of January, coinciding with reports from his cruisers that the Flota
shewed no sign of moving, furnished Haddock with an opportunity
of giving his most disabled ships a more complete overhaul than had
been possible at Gibraltar. He was however faced with the difficulty
that if he should unduly weaken the squadron in the neighbourhood
of Gibraltar he would be unable to frustrate any attempt the French
might make to cooperate with the Spaniards in Cadiz, or any junction
of the divided Spanish squadrons. Still, the need of refitting was
pressing, and though he should keep all his squadron at Gibraltar,
trying to clean them two or three at a time, he would still have only
a patched up fleet to meet the enemy's clean ships if they made any
move. The indication given by the unreadiness of the Flota to sail
pointed towards the probability of no immediate action on the part
of the enemy, and this, combined with the fact that even if the French
did make any movement, even to the extent of trying to enter Cadiz,
his instructions did not give him permission to attack them, made
him decide that the risks of leaving Gibraltar were not so great as was
the importance of efficiently refitting his ships. A final, and apparently
determining factor, appears to have been a letter he received at this
1 'Prince of Orange,' 'Lyon,' 'Superbe,' 'Sunderland,' 'Warwick.'

174° Haddock's New Instructions 61
time from General Anstruther, the Governor of Mahon, informing him
that serious preparations were being made in the eastern Spanish
ports for an attack upon Minorca. He therefore decided to go to
Mahon. While Haddock was making this decision his position was also
being considered at home. The Council received his report as to the
unreadiness of the Cadiz squadron and the Flota at the end of January;
and at the same time they heard that no preparations for a military
expedition were being made in Catalonia. On January 31st a Council
was held, at which it was decided that the opportunity was a favourable
one for Haddock to clean his ships at Gibraltar, keeping a small
detachment to watch Carthagena and cover Minorca1. It was considered
that even with such a detachment and with ships absent cleaning he
would still have enough strength cruising to deal with either the French
at Toulon or the Spaniards at Cadiz. "As the Spaniards could not
sail from Cadiz but with easterly winds," argued Sir John Norris,
"so Mr Haddock could always pass the Strait with the same winds,
which would probably prevent their sailing: and should the ships at
Toulon pass and join the Spaniards and their flota at Cadiz, if his
strength was sufficient he could take a proper station or go to join
Vice-Admiral Vernon, or otherwise] come to England as should be
most proper as considering the affairs at home." It will be noted
that Sir John assumed the ships could be cleaned at Gibraltar, whereas
Haddock's letters point to the conclusion that they could not, owing
to want of facilities, and, more particularly stores.
The Council, in accordance with Norris's opinion, sent instructions,
dated February 4th2, directing Haddock to keep five ships based on
Mahon to watch Carthagena and provide against a surprise from the
Catalan ports, and to cruise off Cadiz with the remainder to intercept
the Flota. If the Toulon squadron should come through the Straits
and go to Cadiz to form part of the Flota's escort across the Atlantic,
so that it would be too strongly protected for Haddock to venture
to attack it, he was to detach five ships to join Vernon and warn
him of the coming of the fleet. Thus strengthened, Vernon could deal
with it; but if the Toulon fleet passed the Straits and did not go to
Cadiz, Haddock was to leave Ogle with ten ships for the Mediterranean
and himself come to England with all the remainder of his squadron,
the fear being that such a move on the part of the Toulon squadron
1 Diary of Sir John Norris, January 31st, 1740.
2 The members of the Council present who drew up these instructions were
Sir Robert Walpole, Duke of Newcastle, Lord Harrington, Lord Hardwicke,
Lord Wilmington, Sir Charles Wager and Sir John Norris.

62 The Mediterranean Opening 1740
would indicate an intention on the part of France to begin operations
against the British Islands themselves.
Before these instructions reached him Haddock had already sailed
for Mahon with six ships. He weighed from -Gibraltar on February
nth, leaving Ogle there in command of a squadron consisting of the
cleanest ships1 to continue the observation of Cadiz, and proceeded up
the coast to look into Carthagena on his way to Mahon. De la Bene's
squadron still lay there; and he got information that considerable
preparations were in progress at Barcelona, where troops were being
massed and a large number of fishing boats and other small craft
were collected, capable of carrying from twenty to thirty men apiece.
It appeared to be the intention to use these to convey the troops across
to Minorca when a fine weather opportunity presented itself, and
although he did not regard these preparations with any great serious
ness, he responded to them by detaching two of his ships and four
small craft2 to cruise between Minorca and the Catalan coast. The
other four ships he carried to Mahon and began cleaning them.
A week after the orders of February 4th had been drawn up, a
despatch was received in London from the Dutch Minister in Madrid,
with a very alarming account of Spanish preparations in Catalonia
for an attack on Minorca. A hundred battalions with 28 guns were
said to be collected there, and the tenour of the report appeared to
indicate that everything was ready for immediate action. In the same
despatch the Dutch Minister reported the assembly of a number of
troops, foot and horse, in Gallicia under the Duke of Ormonde for the
purpose of disturbing England.
The Council at once made out instructions which were sent two
days later to Haddock by the Falmouth packet, enclosing the Dutch
Minister's report and directing him, if he had not already done so,
to detach a sufficient force of ships under Ogle to prevent the sailing
of any expedition from Catalonia towards Minorca, and to endeavour
to destroy the transports inside the Mole of Barcelona or at Majorca
by means of his bomb-vessel. With the remainder of the squadron,
Haddock was to cruise off Cadiz to prevent the Spaniards from sending
the Flota or any ships or troops to the West Indies, "which you will
be particularly careful to do"; but, notwithstanding this, the safety
of Minorca was, he was told, to be his "first consideration," and he
might even, if he considered it necessary, take his whole force to Mahon.
The contradictory nature of these instructions is to be noted: the
1 'Lancaster," Elizabeth,' 'Lyon,' 'Prince of Orange,' 'Superbe," Sunderland,' ¦
'Tyger,' 'Warwick,' 'Greyhound,' a bomb-vessel, a sloop and a fire-ship.
! He had supplemented his small craft by hiring two Zebecks locally.

174° Minorca Threatened 63
Admiral is enjoined to be particularly careful to prevent the Spaniards
from sending troops to the West Indies, and at the same time is told
that he may if necessary carry the whole Mediterranean squadron to
Minorca to protect the island, in which case the road to the West
Indies would be open. But as the words "first consideration" are
used in relation to the protection of Minorca, it cannot be doubted
that the instructions should be read as meaning that whatever western
or other movements the Spaniards might make, there was to be no
question that Minorca was not to be allowed to fall into their hands.
Haddock, as we have seen, had sailed on February nth. The
instructions of February 4th, directing him to keep five ships based
on Mahon and to cruise off Cadiz with the remainder, arrived at
Gibraltar by the 'Litchfield' and 'Assistance,' which came out in the
first days of March to reinforce the squadron. They were opened by
Ogle. The distribution of the ships, since Haddock had already gone
to Mahon, was practically in accordance with those instructions; and
beyond replying that the Spaniards were reported to have a force of
fifteen completely fitted ships in Cadiz, Ogle took no action upon them.
But a few days later — on March 6th — in came the Falmouth packet,
which had hurried out under a press of canvas with the new instruc
tions of February 14th, emphasising the danger in which Minorca was
reported to be. Ogle was now placed in a position in which he had
to decide immediately what course he should take.
The decision was not an easy one. Haddock, so far as he knew,
had gone to Mahon under the impression that nothing was ready in
the Catalan ports that could endanger Minorca; he would therefore
have begun at once to strip and careen his ships. The information
from England was confirmed by a report Ogle received at the same
time from a trading vessel, which set out the news in even more circum
stantial detail. Eighty battering cannon, twenty field guns, eighteen
mortars, twenty-four cohoms, intrenching materials in great quantities,
ammunition and aU natures of military stores were at Barcelona,
together with fifteen thousand troops under the Conde de G limes;
and the general impression at Barcelona was reported to be that France
had agreed to join Spain as soon as the campaign should be opened
in April. Such accurate information in detail, corresponding in general so
completely with the news sent him by his Government, could not be
lightly treated by the officer in command. In the earlier orders the
safety of Mahon had been indicated as his first consideration; he had
been told that if he deemed it necessary he might carry the whole
squadron there; and now both the local news and that from England

64 The Mediterranean Opening 1740
pointed to the island being in immediate danger. Ogle had to consider
that Haddock, with his six ships, probably already being stripped
and in any case inside the harbour of Mahon, might find himself
blockaded by the squadron from Carthagena long enough to allow
the Spaniards to land their troops; or, if the anticipations as to French
action were correct, he might be crushed by the combined French
and Spanish squadrons. To Ogle it seemed that the safety or loss of
Minorca in either case was a matter depending on instant action, and
if he were to be any help to Haddock he must start at once. The first
week in March had already gone by, and foul winds — Levanters are
common in the spring — might well delay his arrival for weeks. On
the other hand he had to consider his orders respecting Cadiz, where
lay the Flota, and in all probability the troops that might be carried
either to the West Indies or to join the force at Ferrol where the
Duke of Ormonde's army was assembling, thence to make a descent
on England, Scotland or Ireland. Once that squadron got to sea
unlocated its possibilities of mischief were incalculable. When Haddock
sailed from Mahon he had guarded against this danger by leaving
Ogle to watch Cadiz, and if Ogle were now to follow him Cadiz would
be left open. The orders of February 14th enjoined on the Admiral
however that the importance of Minorca overrode everything. That
Ogle's choice was difficult it is impossible to deny. Unfortunately the
decision that he made proved not to be the right one. He decided
to sail at once for Minorca, which appeared to be the place towards
which there was no doubt that an expedition was being directed.
Whether he brought France into his calculations is uncertain, but
from the fact that he took with him only six ships it appears probable
that he considered Spain alone; such a force would be superior to the
Carthagena squadron, but even if combined with Haddock would be
greatly inferior to the combined Toulon and Carthagena ships. So
far as Cadiz was concerned, he effected a compromise by leaving a
squadron of four ships under Captain Hervey in the 'Superbe' to
cruise off St Vincent for the homecoming Register and Azogue
vessels, which were expected soon to arrive, with instructions that if
intelligence were received that either the Cadiz or Ferrol squadrons
passed the Straits, Hervey was to follow and join Haddock at Minorca
with the least delay. This disposition provided only for the interception
of homecoming trade. Cadiz, from a military point of view, was left
practically open. The squadron there was free to proceed and carry
troops to any part of their own or of British oversea possessions, or
to combine with their northern squadron for an attempt on the United
Kingdom. They were not slow to take advantage of their opportunity.

1740 Prospects of French Intervention 65
Haddock in the meanwhile had arrived at Minorca, and had fully
satisfied himself on his way thither as to the state of affairs at
Carthagena and Barcelona. At the former place he saw that the
squadron was lying well up the harbour, protected by batteries; the
wind was then on shore, and all places in which a landing might have
been practicable were protected by works; his ships were foul after
twenty months cruising and he did not consider a descent possible.
As to any attempt on Minorca, which he heard the Spaniards proposed
to attack with 16,000 men, he wrote: "As such an embarkation must
take up a very considerable time and a great number of ships and
vessels, it seems to me very impracticable with the force they have
at present only (sic) in these seas to put their designs in execution:
and as I hope we have nothing to fear from other Powers in friendship
with us, I shall not doubt of defeating any resolutions the Spaniards
shall be able to form by themselves." It will be noticed that Haddock's
feeling of security was based largely on having nothing to fear from
any foreign power. It would appear from this that he was not kept in
formed as to the probabilities of French intervention. On October 25th,
1739, after war had been declared, a Cabinet Council had been held
at which it was decided that so soon as a reinforcement reached him
Haddock should be ordered to send home six ships ; this decision was
in consequence of letters from Lord Waldegrave1, which indicated that
no junction of the French and Spanish fleets appeared probable during
the winter, and that Haddock's squadron would be sufficient to deal
with any force the Spaniards might send into the Mediterranean.
A week later the number of ships to be sent home was reduced to four.
During November Lord Waldegrave's letters2 shewed that the French
might fit out from forty to fifty-five ships in the spring; and by the
time the reinforcement reached Haddock in January, it was decided
that the possibility of Spain's being joined by France was so great that
it was undesirable to deprive him of any part of his force3.
France thus entered into all the calculations of the Government ;
her interference was looked on as not only possible but probable. Yet
Haddock was told nothing of this probability, and he was basing his
movements on the supposition that no danger from Toulon was to be
expected, an assumption that was clearly incorrect and one which he
would not have made if the Ministry had kept him fully and constantly
informed as to our foreign relations. By their own actions as regards
1 Minutes of the Privy Council, Add. MS. 33004. Also Diary of Sir John
Norris, October 26th, 1739- „. , „. T , „
2 Read at Council Meeting, November 26th, 1739- Diary of Sir John Norris.
» Minutes of the Privy Council, Add. MS. 33°°4- See also P- 7°. P°st-
R. N. I. ¦*

66 The Mediterranean Opening 1740
Haddock's ships the Council shew that they anticipated interference;
and the main line of their defence in Parliament, when attacked for
their conduct of the war, was that they had not a free hand in con
sequence of France1. Yet they left their Admiral in the Mediterranean
under the impression that he had nothing to fear from our neighbours.
As a matter of fact the French fleet was in a state of much less
readiness than the Government supposed. From a reconnaissance of
Toulon, made by Captain Pocock of the 'Aldborough' on March 23rd,
Haddock learned that though there were nineteen ships of 40 guns
and upwards in the harbour, three only of the whole number were
ready for service. Ignorant of the danger supposed by the Government
to be brewing, and satisfied by his own reconnaissance that no large
French force was in a fit state to do him any harm, Haddock had no
fears of an attack by France. He had made himself equally secure
from Spain by the four ships he had detached to cruise on the Catalan
coast2, he knew that Ogle was keeping watch on Cadiz, and was thus
with an easy mind able to refit his remaining ships at Mahon. It is
possible to conceive therefore what his feelings must have been when
on March 29th Ogle sailed with his squadron into the harbour, having
come with all speed from Gibraltar in twelve days.
The information which Haddock had as to the situation shewed
him at once that a supreme mistake had been made. Minorca, contrary
to the expectations which had brought Ogle there in such haste, was
in no danger. The force already under Haddock's command at Mahon
was amply sufficient to deal with any embarkation the Spaniards
could make from Catalonia, and the reconnaissance of Toulon had
shewed that nothing was to be feared from that quarter. An un
necessarily large force had thus been drawn into the Mediterranean
and Cadiz had been thrown open. The Spanish plan had indeed
succeeded admirably; the troops had attracted the ships exactly as
the Spaniards had hoped they would.
The only thing to be done was to send Ogle back to Cadiz at once,
or as soon as he could be made ready— for he had sailed from Gibraltar
without waiting to take in any of his stores, and many of his ships
needed repair and provisions. A fortnight was spent in getting four
ships fit to go, and on April 16th Ogle, with the 'Augusta,' 'Elizabeth,'
'Lyon' and 'Plymouth,' left Mahon to return to Cadiz as fast as was
consistent with his passing down the Catalan coast in case of there
being a possibihty of doing any service against the squadron or the
1 See Parliamentary History, vol. x., and the many debates on the war at
this time.
a 'Oxford,' 'Guarland' and two small frigates.

174° Ogle Returns to Cadiz 67
shipping on his way. The repairs of three more ships were hurried
forward, and Haddock calculated that with two others that would be
ready soon after, Ogle would then have at least nine clean ships, or
with those already off St Vincent, thirteen ships, to watch Cadiz;
but he could not fail to see that in all probability Ogle would be
too late to prevent the Spanish squadron from leaving the port if it
wished to do so.
Several points are brought out by this incident. In the first place,
the force assigned to Haddock was too weak to carry out the watch
on both Cadiz and Carthagena. It was hardly sufficient, when the
exigencies of reliefs are allowed for, to maintain the blockade of Cadiz.
When Haddock went for his absolutely necessary refit, after twenty
months cruising, the force he left with Ogle was barely equal to holding
the Spanish squadron, still less to the duties of continual cruising in
a long blockade of that squadron. This was a matter for which the
Ministry were responsible. But, if when Haddock left, he had informed
Ogle of his intention to reconnoitre Carthagena and Barcelona on his
way to Mahon, Ogle would have been in no apprehension for that
fortress, for he would have known that if the preparations in Catalonia
were in any way advanced, Haddock would not risk laying up his
ships. This he did not know; and an omission on the part of the
Commander-in-Chief to inform his subordinate fully of his intentions
was undoubtedly in a high degree contributory to the miscarriage.
The root cause of the whole misunderstanding, however, seems more
hkely to have been the ministerial instructions, particularly that
clause, which does not appear in those proposed by Norris, which
referred to taking the whole Mediterranean squadron to Mahon.
The news that Ogle had left Gibraltar reached the Council at the
beginning of April. They had previously been informed that Haddock
had gone to Mahon, and the error now made was seen no less clearly
by them than by Haddock. After hearing the letter read on April 2nd
the Council1, "observing that Sir Chaloner Ogle was gone to join
Mr Haddock with almost all the squadron under Mr Haddock's com
mand, whereby the Spaniards might be at liberty to send from Cadiz
what ships or forces they might think proper to the West Indies,
were of opinion that directions should be forthwith sent to Mr Haddock
to go himself or send Sir Chaloner Ogle to fie off Cadiz with as many
ships of war as can be spared... leaving all the small ships, fire ships
and bombs with as many ships of the line as he may think proper
1 Present: the Lord Steward, Lord Chamberlain, Sir Robert Walpole, Sir
John Norris and the Duke of Newcastle. Minutes of the Privy Council, Add.
MS. 33004. 5—2

68 The Mediterranean Opening 1740
for the defence of Minorca." Detailed instructions in this sense were
despatched on April 6th. It was further pointed out — perfectly truly
but somewhat unnecessarily and somewhat late, considering that the
Council themselves had told Haddock he could take the whole fleet
if he considered it necessary — that a strong fleet of ships of the fine
was not required for the defence of Minorca, as M. de la Bene had
only four or five heavy ships at Barcelona; and Haddock was ordered
to leave at Minorca all the small ships of his squadron, "which will
be of greater use for intercepting the Spanish Embarkations than ships
of a larger size," also such ships as he should think necessary to deal
with de la Bene; and take all the rest to Cadiz.
The Spaniards had not let slip the opportunity that was offered
them. In the third week in March the Cadiz squadron sailed1. A rumour
to this effect reached the Council on the ioth of April. It was confirmed
four days later by a letter from the Dutch Minister at Madrid which
stated categorically that twelve ships had sailed from Cadiz. There
was no mention of troops in the Minister's letter, but it was stated
that a Spanish Governor for America was on board one of the Cadiz
ships. This, combined with the probability that the Spaniards intended
to crush Vernon — the news of the capture of Porto Bello had been
received about three weeks previously and was known throughout
Europe — indicated the West Indies as the destination of the expedition.
As this would leave the squadron in Carthagena as the only Spanish
naval force in the Mediterranean, it was decided that Haddock with
about five ships and some small craft would be able to fulfil all purposes
of defence of our Mediterranean possessions, and Ogle with ten of
the line should be directed at once to sail and join Vernon. A few
ships for purposes of observation were to be left off Cadiz, where it
was said the Spaniards had still some ships fitting out or ready. Orders
in this sense were prepared; but before they were sent fresh hews
arrived on the 17th. Seventeen Spanish ships had sailed from Ferrol
in addition to those which had left Cadiz.
A new set of instructions was hurriedly made out, in which Haddock
was told that nine sail of the line and three frigates had sailed from
Cadiz on March 19-30, and eleven of the line from Ferrol on March
18-29. Tneir destination was believed to be the West Indies, and
if the course they had taken confirmed this belief, Ogle was at once
to go to Jamaica with the ten best sailing ships and join Vernon, who
was being warned of his danger by a sloop despatched with the intelli-
1 'St Ysidoro,' 70; 'Asia,' 60; 'San Antonio,' 60; 'Andalucia,' 60; 'Real
Familia,' 60; 'Nueva Espafia,' 60; 'San Luis,' 64; 'El Fuerte,' 64; 'Galga,! 54;
'Grieg,' 24; 'Jupiter,' 22; 'Mars,' 22.

1740 Spanish Concentration at Ferrol 69
gence from England. If, on the other hand, the Cadiz ships had gone
to Ferrol, Ogle was to follow them thither; and if they had shaped
course for Great Britain he was to come home. If Haddock should
be at Gibraltar with seven or eight sail only when these orders reached
him, he was to send these to Vernon at once without waiting for
reinforcements from Mahon. The rest of the squadron was to be
retained for the defence of Minorca.
On April 23rd the situation took yet another turn. A letter from
Madrid stated that the two Spanish squadrons had not gone to the
West Indies, but were cruising to interrupt Haddock's communications,
and were going to Ferrol to embark the Duke of Ormonde's army.
The Duke of Newcastle now proposed suspending the instructions of
the 18th, which had directed Ogle to take ten ships to Jamaica, and
instead to prepare ten ships at home in case the Spaniards should
after all go to the West Indies.
On April 28th information was received stating definitely that the
Cadiz squadron had gone into Ferrol. Lord Hervey in his Memoirs
gives a picture of the state of indecision into which the Duke of
Newcastle was thrown by these movements of the enemy's squadrons.
Describing a meeting of the Council on the 28th, he says that after
two letters had been read which shewed that the Cadiz squadron had
joined the Ferrol ships in their harbour, Newcastle proposed des
patching the instructions to Haddock, referred to above, not to detach
the ten ships to America, as he had been ordered a fortnight ago,
"because," says His Grace, "you knojc as soon as those orders were
gone we changed our minds, and thought it better to send ten ships
from hence to America to reinforce Vernon, and prevent the ill effects
of the Cales squadron arriving there; but as on changing our minds
we forgot to change the first orders to Haddock, if we do not send
soon, those orders1 will be followed, and instead of ten ships being
sent to America, twenty will go, ten from hence and ten from Haddock."
Astounding as it may seem nothing however was done, and another
week went by. The Council met on May 2nd, and then again on the
6th, and on that day2 the Duke of Newcastle enquired when they
should ask the King to send the counter-orders to Haddock about the
ten ships, and what further orders should be sent to him and to Ogle ;
and read his previous orders dated April 18th with gusto. To which,
Hervey says, he (Hervey) observed that counter-orders would now be
no use as the orders of April 18th would already have been acted on —
1 The orders had been sent out at once in a 6o-gun ship which was to form
one of Ogle's squadron for America.
* Memoirs of John, Lord Hervey.

70 The Mediterranean Opening 1740
Ogle with ten ships would have gone to Ferrol and would in all
probabihty be overpowered; to which Newcastle replied "Yes, it is
so," and bemoaned Ogle's fatal step in leaving Cadiz; but in the end
no further orders were given for yet another three weeks. Who can
wonder that war conducted in such a fashion is unsuccessful?
Ogle, on parting company from Haddock at Mahon, had proceeded
to and cruised off Cadiz. When Haddock received the instructions of
April 18th, he sent the part of them which related to ordering Ogle
to the West Indies to that officer, and directed him to complete with
provisions at Gibraltar at once, then look into Ferrol and, if the
Spaniards had gone to the West Indies to follow them, making the
best of his way to Jamaica1. This order reached Ogle on June 2nd. He
at once dropped down to Gibraltar to complete and was about to sail
on June 14th when a letter from the Lords' Justices, dated May 27th,
airived, instructing him to return with his squadron to England. So,
leaving three small ships at Gibraltar for the service of the garrison,
he sailed for Spithead where he airived on July 8th. Sir John Norris
with a squadron was riding there, and Ogle put himself under his orders.
The news of the sailing of the Cadiz squadron reached Haddock
at Minorca early in May and confirmed the fears he had expressed
when Ogle unexpectedly turned up at Mahon. "By the intelligence
I have received," he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, " the feint against
Minorca was pretended only to draw off our squadrons from the coast
about Cadiz, which to be sure hath too well succeeded : and the troops
the Spaniards have embarked to Majorca will serve as well to defend
any design they may apprehend against them (i.e. Majorca) as to
make a descent on this island were they to find it defenceless."
Haddock now remained at Mahon to ensure its protection, in accordance
with his instructions to make its security his principal care. He kept
some frigates cruising and busied himself refitting the remainder of
his squadron2. Having got four ships fit for sea in June, he took them
over to the Catalan coast and cruised, principally off Barcelona, to
hinder any shipping from getting in or out of the harbour and to
1 Haddock to Ogle. In letters.
a The state and disposition of the ships remaining with Haddock on May 7th
were as follows :
' Somerset,' 80, 'Harwich,' 50, 'Aldborough,' 20... Preparing to careen.
'Lancaster,' 80  In need of careening but
kept ready for sea.
'Ipswich' (flag), 70, 'Pembroke,' 60  Careened. Ready for sea.
'Oxford,' 50, 'Dursley,' 20 ... .-.  Cruising between Majorca
and Catalonia.
^Kennington," 20  Cruising on Italian coast.
'Guarland,' 20  Observing Carthagena.
Two fire-ships and one bomb-vessel  Getting ready for sea.

174° The Toulon Squadron at Sea 71
observe the preparations being made there. He returned to Mahon at
the end of July.
And now a new factor appeared upon the scene — the Toulon
squadron. It had been known that the ships at Toulon were fitting
out for sea. In March, as we have seen, Captain Pocock had looked
in to the port and found only three ships ready; at the end of May
Captain Watson, who made a reconnaissance, found this number
increased to twelve. A fortnight after Haddock returned from his
cruise off the Catalan coast, the 'Oxford,' Captain Russel, sighted this
squadron at sea to the southward of Minorca, standing to the west
ward. All the outlying ships1 on the Catalan coast at once returned
to Mahon for fear of being cut off; but, although the presence of a
French squadron at sea was disturbing, Haddock did not believe they
meant him any ill, and on September ist, when he had refreshed his
squadron after his July cruise, he took all his ships to sea to blockade
Carthagena and Barcelona, for he was expecting a convoy of store-
ships from England and it was essential to ensure their safety. When
the convoy arrived at Mahon in the second half of October, Haddock
also returned to port, and, leaving three ships to cruise off Cadiz under
Captain John Byng, he awaited further developments at Mahon.
When Parliament met in November the Government came in for
a storm of criticism as to the "worst conducted part of the worst
conducted war that was ever carried on by this nation or any other2."
A debate, originating in a motion of Lord Carteret's, that Haddock's
instructions from the time of his sailing in 1738 up to June 24th, 1740,
should be laid before the House, developed into a general attack on
the whole conduct of the war. The events which had resulted from
those instructions having already taken place, it was argued there
could be no harm in letting the House know what the instructions
were, for the enemy could now profit nothing by such information,
and Parliament could judge whether the war was being conducted
intelligently or otherwise. The Duke of Newcastle dechned to produce
the instructions. They were, he said, the expression of the plans
which had been made for protecting our Mediterranean trade and
possessions, and to expose them would enable the enemy to evade
the measures that the country was taking, and be of great benefit to
the Spaniards. To this Mr Sandys replied: "There have been, Sir,
many incidents in these last two years of which examination can be
of very fittle advantage to the Spaniards : I do not know what pernicious
intelligence they can gain from an enquiry into the reasons for which
1 'Pembroke,' 60; 'Warwick,' 60; 'Advice,' 20; and three small craft.
2 Lord Chesterfield, Parliamentary History, vol. x.

72 The Mediterranean Opening 1740
Haddock's fleet was divided, and Ogle sent to the defence of Minorca,
or for which he afterwards returned." Lord Bathurst said that the
only secret that he was afraid of was the secret of procuring such
instructions to our Admirals as must prevent their doing their duty
to their country; and Pulteney sarcastically remarked that "every
man that has had opportunities of knowing the wonderful accomplish
ments of our Ministry, the depth of their designs, the subtility of
their stratagems and the closeness of their reasoning will easily conceive
it possible that they might send such orders as none but themselves
could understand." The suspicion was general that Haddock's orders
had either been improper, or that they were so worded that they
might be misunderstood. The preceding narrative will have shewn
that the Opposition were not far wrong in assuming that in this cause
lay some of the seeds of the miscarriage.
The criticism on the conduct of the war in general took the line that
although a whole year had gone by, no offensive action of any im
portance had been taken against Spain. Why, it was asked, had not
any use been made of the army? Why had both the fleet and the
army been used for nothing but defence? Gibraltar needed no protec
tion; it had already shewn its impregnability. To secure the safety
of Minorca a force superior to the Carthagena squadron and no more
was sufficient. The United Kingdom was in no danger so long as we
had a superiority at sea. If the army had been utilised oversea
to attack Cadiz or Ferrol, and to harass the coasts of Spain and its
northern ports, Spain would have been too much occupied in her own
defence to attempt any invasion of the United Kingdom; while the
advantage of destroying the Spanish naval forces in their own harbours
might have resulted. The Ministry defended the policy of not employing
the army, — or a portion of it, such as some 8000 or 10,000 men, — in an
attack on Cadiz, by reference to previous unsuccessful Cadiz expeditions,
and to the necessity of keeping troops at home in case of invasion.
They could only explain the escape of the Cadiz squadron by saying
that it arose through "an accidental mistake as to the orders which
were sent to our Admirals1" — a sufficiently damaging admission. The
Duke of Newcastle's unfailing following carried him, however, through
the storm, and though the debate clearly brought out that the war
was being most inefficiently conducted, the motion which would have
served to place its management in other hands was defeated.
1 Lord Cholmondeley's speech. Parliamentary History, vol. xi. p. 802.

CHAPTER V
EVENTS IN HOME WATERS, 1740
While ministerial mistakes were contributing to the movements which
allowed the Spamsh squadron to sail from Cadiz unopposed on the
21st of March, they were similarly concerned in the sailing of the
Ferrol squadron the day before. No steps had been taken to keep
Ferrol either under observation or blockaded.
During the first months of the war the ships in home waters were
still fitting out; and the beginning of 1740 passed by without a
fleet being made ready in the Channel, in spite of the reiterated advice
of Sir John Norris. He saw clearly enough the need of watching the
northern Spanish ports, and was anxious from the first to get ships
to sea without delay, manned with the crews of the less ready ships
and soldiers of marching regiments. He continued to advocate this
measure unceasingly, pointing out that a squadron off Ferrol was the
first necessity, and that the step next in importance was to make
ready every ship that could float, so that a fleet might be completed
in the spring and assembled at Spithead in a condition to be employed
against Brest if France should join Spain, an eventuality that he
considered as being certain to arise.
On the 18th of January a meeting of the Council took place, at
which the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Harrington, Lord Hardwicke, Lord
Wilmington, Sir Charles Wager and Sir John Norris discussed the
preparations to be made for the expedition to the West Indies under
Cathcart. The hiring of the necessary transport, the arms and clothing
to be sent to the American contingents, the instructions to Vernon
as to meeting the troops, were looked into, and the action to be taken
by the Mediterranean squadron in the event of the Toulon ships going
to Cadiz or coming to the ports on the French Atlantic coast was
considered. It was agreed that if the Toulon squadron should go to
Cadiz, Haddock was to be ordered to cruise with his whole force on
that coast, except such strength as he considered necessary to cover
Minorca from any attempt that might be made from Carthagena; if
it came to the Atlantic ports he was to sail direct for England, as it
was clear that such a move would necessitate strengthening the force
in the Channel and securing the kingdom from the danger of invasion.
Sir Charles Wager was directed to prepare orders and bring them up

74 Events in Home Waters 1740
for consideration, and on the 24th of the month his draft was examined
by the Council. Sir Robert Walpole expressed his apprehensions that
France would join Spain, and pointed out that caution was therefore
necessary in our conduct of the war with the latter Power, while the
Duke of Newcastle went so far as to propose the withdrawal of the
whole Mediterranean squadron at once in order to strengthen the force
on our own coasts. To this Norris made strong objection. His
appreciation ran as follows : " It was my opinion, that to reduce our
force in the Mediterranean to be inferior to the ships at Toulon and
Carthagena would be the greatest disgrace to our country, and give
the Spaniards an opportunity to take Mahon, which, if we once lost
we could never retrieve. And without it in a French war there is no
port where we could support a superior naval force against France
and Spain, and must in war be the loss of all our Mediterranean trade.
And as the French have about twelve men-of-war that can be fitted
at any time they please, and should they attempt to sail from Toulon
to Cadiz or West France, our squadron by proper care can't want
intelligence of them, and keeping their ships clean by two or three
at a time they will always be able to follow them and have a sufficient
strength against the four Spanish ships at Carthagena. And if they
find the French to stop at Cadiz and our ships [are] equal to what
the French and Spaniards may have together, with intelligence of
their intentions to convoy the Flota or Galleons to the West Indies,
they can cruise off that coast: but if they think themselves inferior
to that strength they may detach a proper strength, or all of them if
proper, to join Vice-Admiral Vernon in the West Indies and by a
superiority in the West Indies disappoint the intentions of France and
Spain: or, as it may appear to them after they are sailed from Cadiz,
they may send a part of our ships home. And as our ships may be
supposed to be cleaner than the Spaniards' and they having their laden
Galleons or Flota under their care, they won't separate from them to
give us chase."
To put it briefly, Norris's plan was to make the Mediterranean
squadron up to the strength of the French and Spanish squadrons in
Toulon and Carthagena; to follow the Toulon squadron wherever it
went; and to be in no fear of pursuing a superior force to the West
Indies, as Vernon was there and the superiority could be reversed in
those waters.
At the same time, he pointed out that over 30 per cent, of our
ships of force were unfit for sea, "and therefore I was for using all
methods," he writes, "for repairing or building ships, the want of
which in the year 1690 when Lord Herbert Torrington (sic) commanded

174° Shortage of Small Craft 75
our fleet in the battle of Beachy sufficiently shews how necessary it
is to have our Navy in good condition, as our country is unguarded
when an enemy can be superior at sea1."
It was not big ships only that were wanting. The small cruisers
had been allowed to fall into disrepair, and none were available for
service where they were urgently required to deal with the Spanish
privateers. On the 31st of January the Council wrote: "Finding that
the demand for convoys and cruisers become very frequent we think
it our duty to represent to your Majesty that there is not a sufficient
number of ships of the 5th and 6th rates2 to answer the several services
that may be required, and do therefore humbly propose that we may
be empowered to give orders for the building of five ships of 40 guns
and twelve of 20 guns by contract in the merchants' yards in the room
of as many of the same rates whose names are in the margin which
were a part of the Navy but have been some time since worn out and
sold as unserviceable or broken up for other use3."
Besides ships, men were lacking. A Committee on manning had
made proposals which were intended to improve matters; but the
problem was a large one, and so far the suggestions of the Committee
had not been acted upon.
The news of the Spanish preparations both in Gallicia and Catalonia,
where large camps were being formed in accordance with the Spanish
war plan, was received at the same time4 and their bearing on the
situation so created was considered. The Catalonian forces, which were
presumably intended to threaten Minorca, could be sufficiently guarded
against by retaining in the Mediterranean a squadron equal to that
at Carthagena; the assembhng of so many men in Gallicia might be
connected with the recent appearance of the Young Pretender at Madrid,
and indicate an intention to repeat the attempt of 1719. But it was
believed that the formation of the camp was more probably intended
for gathering together troops for the reinforcement of Havana, whither
they would be carried by the ten ships from Ferrol, a certain number
having already sailed to the West Indies to strengthen the garrisons.
Norris wrote bitterly in his Diary at this time about the neglect of
his advice to station ships off Ortegal to stop these reinforcements.
"Had we as we should have kept a few clean ships to cruise off the
1 Diary of Sir John Norris, January 18th, 1740.
8 I.e. 40- and 20-gun ships.
8 Ad. Sec. In letters. Orders in Council, January 31st, 1740. The ships
named were the 5th rates, ' Dover, ' ' Folkestone, ' ' Feversham, ' ' Gosport, ' ' Lynn ' ;
the 6th rates, 'Rye,' 'Lyme,' 'Fox,' 'Winchelsea,' 'Lively,' 'Experiment,' 'Port
Mahon,' 'Rose,' 'Biddeford,' 'Success,' 'Scarborough' and 'Bridgewater.' Thir
teen fireships were also to be bought.
* Reports read at the Council, January 24th, 1740.

76 Events in Home Waters 1740
Norward Cape the Spaniards would not have ventured to sea1." As
these precautions had been neglected, and vessels had not been stopped
at the point of departure, hurried orders were sent to Vernon to inter
cept them off Havana — an obviously unsatisfactory measure, as it was
by no means certain that Cartagena might not be their destination.
Every advice that came in from France pointed to the probability
of her soon throwing in her lot with Spain. A great number of East
Indiamen, capable of being armed with 60 guns, was assembling at
l'Orient, an embargo on both ships and men was strictly laid in all
French ports, and the greatest activity was reported at Dunkirk, where
the defences, demolished under the Treaty of Utrecht, were rapidly being
restored. Any interference with this clear breach of the Treaty was
delicate work, as it might drive France into the arms of Spain ; and our
Ministry, while keeping an anxious eye on these preparations through
out the early months of 1740, felt itself unable even to protest, much
less to hinder the works at Dunkirk by force. The question of forming
an alliance with Prussia and Holland, and with their help attacking
France, was considered and rejected2; but on April 18th Newcastle
wrote the "most private" order to Vernon, already referred to, in
which he empowered him to attack French ships interfering with his
operations3. Thus the interference of France was fully anticipated, but at the
same time it was hoped that it might be delayed, or that even if she
did take a hand she might confine her action to the West Indies and
observe a neutrality in Europe. The operations in the West Indies
involved, in fact, a vast diplomatic gamble, the result of which depended
more than anything else on the personality of the French Minister
and the chance of his remaining in office. The French themselves
were convinced that the intention of England was to strike at their
interests in the West Indies, and thus cripple a great and growing
trade in silk, laces and cloth. "France could not look on with an
indifferent eye at a quarrel in which her interests were so much
involved: to allow the English to destroy the Spanish settlements in
America, establish herself there and take possession of their trade, was
to permit the ruin of the flourishing French commerce4." Besides,
the French believed we intended to force them into a war to destroy
a growing maritime rival6.
1 Diary of Sir John Norris, January 28th, 1740.
-, * Notes of Cabinet meetings. Newcastle papers. Add. MS. 32993. Meeting
of April 23rd et seq. J 6
» Newcastle to Vernon, April 18th, 1740, Add. MS. 32693.
Les priliminaires de la Guerre de la Succession d'Autriche. Maurice Sautai.
° Ibid.

174° France and the West Indies 77
The Duke of Newcastle took no definite line of action. He thought
the French might come in, hoped they would not, expected they might,
and in the end preferred to believe that they would do nothing.. Writing
to Lord Harrington a few months later — in July — when French naval
preparations were far more advanced, and their squadrons nearly ready
for the sea, he said: "As the dread of war affects the Cardinal more
than any other consideration, I am apt to think he will either flatter
himself that we shall miscarry in our attempt in the West Indies, and
in that case their taking part will be unnecessary: or if we should
succeed, that he may be able to patch up such a peace as may prevent
any ill-consequence from our success in the war1." This view was indeed
not without plausibility. The Duke had received a definite report from
our Ambassador in Paris, pointing to the determination of France to
take a part if we should seek to extend our possessions in the West
Indies2. In this letter Lord Waldegrave had written that the Cardinal
had said, "that as long as we did not make ourselves masters of any
part of the Spanish possessions in the West Indies and did not offer
at keeping them as our own, he had nothing to say to us; but if we
did, as such a step could not but be a great detriment to France, and
curb her trade in the West Indies, she should be forced to take a share
in the war." Yet with this pronouncement in his hand, and the know
ledge that it was the intention to capture Havana or Cartagena,
Newcastle indulged himself in the pleasing belief that France would
do nothing; and he took no measures to guard against the situation
that would arise if his conjectures were incorrect.
Whatever excuse there may have been for postponing measures
against France it is difficult to see any for the lethargy in dealing
with Spain. No steps were taken to stop the continued activity of
the Spaniards in sending troops to their West Indian possessions,
although the necessity for establishing a watch on the northern part
of Spain was proved still more clearly by news, which arrived on March
3rd, that another thousand troops under convoy of two men-of-war
had left San Sebastian and Santander. It appears to have been
impossible up till now for Norris to stir the Council into an apprecia
tion of the military necessity of intercepting these succours, although
its members were well alive to the need of conducting active offensive
operations against the Spanish treasure fleets. Thus, when information
was received on March 25th that two Buenos Ayres ships had sailed
homeward, orders were despatched on the same day express to Ports-
1 Duke of Newcastle to Lord Harrington, July nth, 1740, Add. MS. 32693.
2 Newcastle to Lord Harrington, quoting Lord Waldegrave's letter, July 4th,
1740. Newcastle Papers, Add. MS. 32693.

yS Events in Home Waters 1740
mouth, to send three ships1 to sea at once under Covill Mayne to
capture them.
Mayne wasted no time in getting to sea, and the events of his
cruise may here be related, as they are not connected with the move
ments of any other part of our fleet. His squadron was increased by
two more ships— the 'Rippon' and 'St Albans' — he weighed at 3 a.m.
on the 29th of March with a north-easterly wind and slipped through
the Needles and down Channel, picking up a fair wind after two
days. On the 5th of April the 'Rippon' and 'St Albans' dropped
astern, and though Mayne lowered his topsails and waited for them
they did not come up again. On the 9th, being then about 300 miles
south-west from the Lizard on the look-out for the Buenos Ayres
ships, the 'Lenox,' 'Kent' and 'Orford' sighted a ship to the north
ward and gave chase; the log of the ' Lenox ' contains such a graphic
description of the action which followed that it is here given:
"At 10 'Orford' handed her topgallant sails, hauled up her mainsail and
settled her topsails. We continued our sail till we came within 2 miles of the
chase: at J past n she hauled down her French jack and hoisted a Spanish
ensign, upon which we fired a shot from one of our chase guns, as soon after did
the ' Orford ' who was astern. About J before 12 we gave her our larboard broad
side on her starboard bow, which he returned with his starboard broadside, and
shooting ahead of her more and brought our larboard broadside on his lee bow
and gave him a second broadside, then wearing under his lee brought our starboard
broadside to bear upon him and carried away his foretopmast. Then wearing
again passed under his lee and gave him our larboard broadside, then passing
astern tacked and came up to him and seeing him lie disabled, raked him fore
and aft with a starboard broadside repeating it five times more and on coming
up to fire the 7th broadside she struck her colours."
The prize was the 'Princesa,' 74, mounting however only 64 guns.
She was brought to England at once by the squadron which arrived
at Spithead on the 27th of April.
At the same time as the orders to Mayne were given, the Council
at last awoke to the need of checking the movements of Spanish
transports, and decided to send a squadron of seven of the line under
Sir John Balchen to cruise off Ferrol, as well as ordering Ogle to cruise
off Cadiz with the same object. The instructions to Ogle however
proved useless, as the very next day the Council received his despatch
announcing that he had left Cadiz to assist Haddock at Mahon in
defending the island against the anticipated attack from Barcelona.
Those to Balchen, although decided upon on March 25th, were not
given to him until April 2nd. They directed him to sail without a
moment's loss of time, with the 'Russell,' 'Boyne' and 'Grafton,' from
Spithead; to pick up the 'Norfolk' at Plymouth, the 'Dunkirk' off
the Start and the 'Deptford' off the Lizard; off Finisterre he would
1 'Lenox,' 'Kent' and 'Orford.'

J740 Balchen goes off Ferrol 79
find Mayne's squadron of five ships, and there he was to cruise " and
to use your utmost endeavours to prevent the Spanish squadron at
Ferrol from going thence or the West Indies: but if they should get
out and endeavour to sail towards Great Britain or Ireland you are
to follow them, and use your utmost endeavours to destroy them1."
Every one of these orders was too late. Ogle, as we have seen, had
already left Cadiz when those to him were sent. The Ferrol squadron
which was to be blockaded by Balchen had sailed on the 18th of
March — a week before the Council made up its mind to send him to
stop it ; and the Buenos Ayres ships arrived at Santander on April 4th.
The failure to oppose these movements of the enemy can only be
attributed to the Council, which had been advised in ample time what
steps were necessary, but had neglected to take them. "Had my
continued opinion been observed," wrote Norris on March 25th, "in
guarding those stations very few ships going in or out of old Spain
would escape our ships."
A spell of easterly winds was holding in the Channel2 and was
as favourable to Balchen as it had already been to Mayne, enabling
him to escape the unfortunate delays which gave rise at a later period
to such serious results. Balchen received his orders, which were dated
April 2nd and sent by express at 10 o'clock at night, on April 3rd.
He had to complete his complements and pick up the 'Norfolk,' and
on the 9th he left Plymouth Sound with four ships. Off Ushant he
found the 'Deptford,' and with this squadron he proceeded to Corufia,
where he could see that there were no Spanish vessels; but it was not
so easy to get information as to the state of affairs in the well-closed
harbour of Ferrol. Information, gathered from craft he met, put the
force at Ferrol as five ships, but there was much uncertainty about
the correctness of the reports, and he decided to remain cruising off
Ferrol unless he should find out for certain the ships were sailed, or
until he received other information or instructions from home.
The day after Balchen sailed a rumour reached the Council that
a French squadron of twelve ships had left Brest, and that the Spanish
squadron had left Cadiz with eight men-of-war and four other ships.
No great uneasiness was felt, as it was expected that the latter had
gone to the West Indies, where Vernon's fleet would be able to deal
with them, especially as a reinforcement of two men-of-war, which
were convoying some store ships, was already on its way to Jamaica.
But to be on the safe side it was decided to send two more ships which,
1 P.R.O. out letters, April 2nd, 1740.
2 April ioth, E. by N; nth, E. by N.; 1.2th, E. by S.; 13th, E. by N.; 14th,
E.N.E.; 15th, E. by N.; 16th, N.E.

8o Events in Home Waters 1740
Wager said, could be got ready in about ten days' time, provided men
could be had to man them.
The news of the departure of the Cadiz ships was confirmed on
the 14th, but the easy feelings with which the news had first been
received were rudely dispelled by the additional information which
came in at the same time. The Ferrol squadron was also at sea. Matters
now were more serious, for if these two squadrons joined they would
form a powerful fleet, while hovering in the neighbourhood was the
uncertain factor of the ships from Brest. In addition therefore to
the measures agreed upon for dealing with the movements of Haddock's
ships, Norris proposed that Balchen should be recalled, leaving a
couple of clean ships off Ferrol for observation, and that every ship
that would float should at once be completed with six months 'provisions.
The fleet thus formed should, he said, be assembled at Spithead
ready to sail wherever their services might be required1. For a couple
of days no more news was received. A letter was written to Vernon
telling him of the sailing of the Spanish squadrons and of the reinforce
ments which would be sent him if necessary. Three days later it was
heard that some Spanish regiments were under orders to embark at
Bayona. The possibility that this meant an attempt to land in Ireland
was at once considered, and orders, dated April 18th, were sent to
Balchen, ordering him to return to England if he found the Ferrol
squadron had sailed to the West Indies, leaving a few ships to intercept
the Galleons and Buenos Ayres ships.
Definite information was received on the 28th of April that the
combined squadrons had undoubtedly returned to Ferrol, and now
Balchen's force was evidently in danger of being crushed. The Spanish
squadron was reported to number twenty, of which fifteen were ships
of the line. Balchen had only seven ships at the most, for Mayne's
squadron, which had never joined him, had returned with its prize
on the 27th of April. The capture of the 'Princesa' had reduced the
Spaniards to fourteen, but even this was double Balchen's force.
There were no ships ready at home which could be despatched im
mediately to join him, and in consequence it was decided to recall
his squadron and to employ it in defence of the trade in the Soundings
and to safeguard the United Kingdom. Although as yet at war with
one Power only, and that Power immeasurably weaker at sea than
herself, Great Britain was drawing in her naval forces and assembling
them in the Channel for defensive purposes. To such a point had a
combination of inefficient administration and war direction brought
1 Diary of Sir John Norris. He added, "but the want of men for manning
our ships will one day be fatal to the nation."

174° Problem of the Ferrol Squadron 81
the country which had seen the triumphs of the Elizabethans and the
Commonwealth. In accordance with this decision orders were sent to Balchen, dated
May ist, to return to Plymouth at once, leaving two ships to cruise
off Scilly for the defence of trade against the privateers in the Channel
mouth. Balchen meanwhile had been cruising off Ferrol with the inten
tion of holding that station till he got definite intelligence as to
whether the enemy were inside. It appears that he was not able to
keep the close watch his instructions required of him, for the combined
squadrons, after meeting at sea, returned in company into Ferrol on
the 16th of April. Balchen heard of their arrival about a fortnight
later, on the 2nd of May ; and realising, as the Government had done,
that their junction would make them too strong for him to deal with,
he withdrew further to the northward, to the latitude of 460, and wrote
home asking for a reinforcement or for further instructions.
The orders, as we have seen, were already on their way. After
despatching them on May ist the Council received no more news for
some days either of the enemy, Ogle or Balchen, but some disturbing
information from France came in. On the 6th of May it was definitely
reported that the French were getting twenty ships ready at Brest, to be
under the command of the Marquis d'Antin. There was still a measure
of uncertainty as to whether the ships that returned to Ferrol were
only those that went out, or whether the Cadiz squadron formed a
part of them. Norris appears to have been of the opinion that the
Cadiz ships had gone west and not joined those at Ferrol, but Sir
Robert Walpole spoke in favour of their having effected the junction,
saying "that as the squadrons were useless so long as they were kept
separate, it must in common sense be the policy of Spain to unite
them as soon as she was able, and then to employ them either in an
invasion of England or Ireland, in preventing Lord Cathcart's expedi
tion to the West Indies, or in attacking Vernon or our colonies in the
American waters"; and concluded by saying that if they were joined
by the Brest squadron and made any attempt on the kingdom itself
we appeared to have no force capable of resisting them. Such indeed
was the situation.
Certain news that the combined squadrons, to the number of twenty
sail in all, were in Ferrol, was received on May 19th by a letter from
Lord Waldegrave. At the same time came reports concerning the
camp in Gallicia, which was considered to indicate an intention to
invade Great Britain. Fifteen thousand troops were assembled there,
20,000 stand of spare arms were ready, the Duke of Ormonde, that
faithful adherent of the Stuart cause, was expected daily, and an
r. n. 1. 6

82 Events in Home Waters 1740
embargo had been laid on the shipping and seamen in all the Gallician
ports. The Carthagena squadron was reported to have passed the
Straits, evidently on its way to complete the concentration of the
Spanish naval forces, a squadron of twelve ships of the line was being
prepared at Toulon and another of eighteen sail under d'Antin at
Brest. The situation was unquestionably becoming threatening, and
the available forces to meet it were but inadequate. Balchen with
six or seven ships was cruising somewhere in the Bay, but nothing
had been heard of Ogle for some time, and for all that was known
he might have gone to the West Indies as he had been ordered to do.
The Cabinet met next day to consider the situation, and it was
agreed that either an invasion of Ireland or an attack in the West
Indies was intended. At last the Ministry was stirred into considering
more seriously the condition of the ships in home waters. The Admiralty
accounts appeared to shew there were enough ships to withstand the
Spanish fleet, if they could be got together and if they could be manned.
Norris, as Commander-in-Chief, was asked why matters were in such
a state; to which he replied that not having any part in the administra
tion, he had no powers to force the Admiralty to provide men. He
reminded the Council that he had from the beginning recommended
that twenty-five ships should be manned and kept ready as a home
guard, "and the people not turned over to other services." The
"application" of those ships, he said, would have prevented the
Spaniards' coming to Ferrol or their ships at that port from going
to sea. The Council thereupon desired him to go on their behalf to the
Admiralty and elicit from the Board a report as to the state of affairs—
the state of the ships in commission, what provisions they had on
board and what number of men, how many tenders had been taken
up and what men they had procured, and what stores and provisions
there were in the yards. The Admiralty at Norris's request made
their report, which was considered next day. It confirmed Walpole's
opinion expressed on the 6th. There was no squadron in home waters
ready to sail to oppose the Spanish fleet if it should come towards
England. The Lords of the Admiralty, — Lyttelton, Poulet and Lord
Vere Beauclerk — were called in and examined, but could make no
suggestions as to how the fleet was to be manned. They thought
that by turning over 1000 men from the less ready ships, seventeen
might be put in a condition to sail. But to get these ships really fit
for service 2465 men were required; while to complete eight ships and
a frigate that were supposed to be ready for sea another 2200 were
wanted. Unfortunately they could make no suggestion as to how these
numbers were to be obtained.

174° Difficulty of manning the Fleet 83
After this expression of inability their Lordships withdrew, and the
Council debated what steps should be taken. Walpole suggested
cancelling all protections covering colliers, fishermen and outward-
bound ships, which would set free 14,800 seamen; but Norris pointed
out that this method would be too slow, and repeated his previous
suggestion that two battalions of foot and 1800 marines should be
put on board. The proposal to embark troops for service abroad was
viewed with some distrust. What would happen, suggested Walpole,
if an invasion took place? To which Norris replied with the simple
solution that in that case they could be landed again. Indeed, if the
fleet could but be manned so that it could he off Ferrol, the danger
of invasion disappeared, for the enemy would not be able to leave his
harbour. In the end Norris's suggestion was adopted, and the Council
decided to advise the King to embark two regiments and raise 1800
more marines, to recall Ogle, to order Balchen to cruise off the Scilhes
for the protection of trade, and to send two clean ships off Ferrol to
obtain information of the movements of the enemy1 : this last was the
recommendation made by Norris three weeks before but not yet carried
out, as, according to Wager, there had been no clean ships to send!
Before the orders ordering him to cruise in the Soundings were
sent to Balchen, a despatch from him was received saying that his
provisions were exhausted and he would be obliged to return. The
orders were therefore altered, and he was told to victual at Plymouth
and get ready to sail again at the shortest notice2. Balchen made the
Scilhes on June ist and anchored next day in Plymouth Sound.
A concentration in home waters was thus being made at the cost
of a withdrawal of the squadrons in the Bay. Ogle with ten ships had
been recalled to Portsmouth, Balchen with six to Plymouth; and
measures were being taken to complete a squadron out of the ships
that, except Tor want of men, were ready for sea. Some relief was
caused three days later when it was heard that the Carthagena ships
had been damaged by a gale and had returned to their port.
There were now signs that an offensive policy was going to be
adopted by the Spanish squadron at Ferrol. Admiral Pintado put to
sea with all his force to attack Balchen. But he made his movement
in so half-hearted a manner that even the Spanish Government found
1 The regiments ordered to embark were those of Colonel Bland and Lord
James Cavendish. The ships ordered to observe Ferrol were the 'Fox,' 20, and
'Dolphin,' 20. Accounts of this Council meeting are given in Lord Hervey's
Memoirs and Sir John Norris's Diary. They are corroborated by the Minutes of
the Privy Council in Add. MS. 33004. The figures given above as to shortage
of men are those presented to the Privy Council.
2 The orders were sent by the 'Mountagu.' She was to find Balchen "cruising-
n lat. 460 between Ushant and Finisterre." Out letters, May 23rd, 1740.
6—2

84 Events of Home Waters 1740
fault with him. They removed him from his command, and superseded
him by a more energetic admiral, de Torres. At the same time the
advices from Brest shewed great activity in that port. Eighteen ships
were in harbour, of which nine were complete and ready for the sea,
and the Marquis d'Antin who was to command the squadron had
already left Paris on the ioth of June. Admiral Rochalart was simul
taneously to hoist his flag at Toulon.
The fleet for service against this imposing force of potential and
actual enemies was to be commanded by Sir John Norris. The exact
duties it was to carry out were discussed in Council on the nth of
June. Sir John was told, to his infinite surprise, that he was to take
the fleet to Ferrol, and on arrival there to hold a council and consider
forcing the entrance and destroying the squadron and arsenal.
Such a wholly impracticable task was opposed strongly by the
Admiral. He pointed out, to begin with, that the decision to undertake
such a task as this should be made at home before the fleet sailed;
and next that the undertaking was as much a military as a naval one.
The method of executing the operation and the force necessary to do
so should first be considered. From the purely seamanhke point of
view, ships, hampered by faihng winds, could not sail up that narrow
and tortuous approach, shut in by high land on both sides, and strongly
defended by batteries. Appealing to history, he pointed out that in
all such previous expeditions it had been considered necessary to land
an army to take the shore defences; and he quoted a wealth of past
examples. Thus, when the Dutch attacked Chatham they first took
the fort at Sheerness; when the Anglo-Dutch fleet went to attack
Brest they landed their men in Camaret Bay; in the attempt on Cadiz
under Rooke and Ormonde, the troops were landed at St Mary's, but
in consequence of their failure to take Fort Mattagorda the attempt
did not succeed; in Rooke's attack on Vigo the troops landed and
took Redondella before the fleet forced their way up the harbour;
and de Pointis, in his attack on Cartagena, did not attempt to force
the Channel of Boca Chica, but rode outside, landed his troops and
captured Boca Chica Castle before entering the harbour. In the same
way, the Admiral pointed out, must an attack on Ferrol be managed.
The first essentials were to decide how it was to be done and to provide
a sufficient army for doing it.
These arguments so convinced the Council that they decided that
the attack upon Ferrol by the fleet alone must be given up ; and Norris
and Wager were directed to consider what else the fleet might do.
A week later a Captain Cole1 brought a report shewing how Ferrol
1 Who this was I am not sure; he appears to have been a military agent.

vUs.//, ma,
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? \^

174° Proposal to attack Ferrol 85
could be taken by a land force, and Norris at once proposed that
Cathcart's army, now practically complete at Spithead, should be used
to put the plan into execution. The troops were ready and so was
much of the shipping; the destination of the expedition had already
been published as the West Indies (which could not fail to mislead
the Spaniards) and this would secure the important element of surprise.
Of all means of destroying the Spanish naval power, this offered the
fairest prospects of success. "If the Spanish men-of-war can be
destroyed in Ferrol," wrote Norris, "the Spaniards could not be able
to make any naval action for some time in this war." Norris was
convinced that this was the best possible use to make of both the
land and sea forces. Once the Spanish fleet was destroyed, the British
army would be re-embarked and brought home again, or could proceed
on its way to the West Indies, where its operations would be secured
against interruption. A few ships only would then suffice to watch
the remaining Spanish naval forces in their home ports, and the main
body of the fleet would be free to devote its attention to France if
that Power should feel inclined, after this blow to its ally, to join in
the war1.
The Duke of Newcastle would not adopt the suggestion. His idea
was that the fleet could watch at one and the same time the harbours
of Brest and Ferrol, and by that means cover the West Indian expedi
tion. Writing on July 4th to a correspondent he said that the strong
fleet under Norris would prevent France from interfering with
Cathcart's sailing, while "Vernon will have a great strength with him
and as long as the Spaniards are locked up in Ferrol, he can't want
more. I heartily wish we could burn their ships in Ferrol. Sir John
Norris won't hear of it without land forces and we cannot spare any
at this time except we would have entirely defeated Lord Cathcart's
expedition, which we all think would have been destruction."
Doubtless the Duke did "heartily wish" the Spanish fleet in Ferrol
could be burnt, but unfortunately he and his colleagues declined to
provide the means by which this wish could be gratified. Instead of
being so employed, the troops were to be sent to destruction in
another manner at the hands of an inexperienced officer and a cruel
climate. The main fleet was at length in a way to be ready for sea, the
manning difficulty being overcome by the embarkation of the soldiers
and marines, and Norris received his orders to take command on
1 Pitt had the same idea of attacking Ferrol in 1804 and sent Sir John Moore
to examine the defences and report on the feasibility of taking it with 18,000
men. Cf. Diary of Sir John Moore, by General Maurice.

86 Events in Home Waters 1740
June 20th. The instructions1, dated the day before, June 19th, 1740,
ran as follows2:
"Upon receiving these instructions you are to repair immediately to Ports
mouth and take his Majesty's ships mentioned in the margin under your command;
and you are to proceed with them to the coast of Gallicia, and there to cruise
or to take such other station as you shall think most proper for the execution of
these your instructions; and you shall also take under your command such other
ships as shall be sent to you or shall afterwards be directed to join you.
When you are arrived at your station you are to endeavour to get what
intelligence you can, whether the Spanish ships are still in Ferrol: and if you
shall find that they are remaining there you are to cruise on that coast in order
to keep them in, in case they should attempt to come out. And you are to employ
the ships that are or shall be under your command in such manner as you shall
think may most distress and annoy the enemy, and be most for bis Majesty's
service. If you should receive certain intelligence that the Spanish fleet, or any part
of them, are sailed from Ferrol you are in that case to endeavour to discover
which way they are gone; and if you shall find they are coming towards Great
Britain, or Ireland, you are to follow them with your whole fleet if you shall
judge it best and endeavour to take, sink, burn and otherwise destroy them.'
But if you should find that the Spanish fleet, or any part of them, are gone
to the West Indies or towards Cadiz or into the Mediterranean, you are then
to detach such a number of ships as you shall judge necessary to reinforce the
squadrons his Majesty may have in those parts and to make them equal or superior
to the strength the Spaniards may be sending thither.
In case you shall meet with Sir Chaloner Ogle you are to take his. Majesty's
ships, that he has with him. under your command, and dispose of them as you
shall think best for his Majesty's service. But as soon as you shall be joined by
Sir Chaloner Ogle you are to transmit an immediate account of it and of the
number and condition of the ships he shall have with him.
You are to protect the trade of his Majesty's service as far as is consistent
with the services directed by these instructions ; and you are to transmit constant
accounts of your proceedings with such intelligence as you shall be able to procure
of the motions and designs of the Spaniards, and of everything that may relate
to his Majesty's service, to one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State,
with whom you shall correspond, or to the Secretary to the Lords Justices; and
you are to follow such further orders and directions as shall be sent to you by
one of his Majesty's said Principal Secretaries of State, or by the Secretary to
the Lords Justices."
The fleet3 which Norris was to command was to consist of twenty
ships of the fine, three frigates, three fireships and a hospital ship.
On paper it looks sufficiently formidable, but even if it had consisted
of the ships named in the list it would clearly have been inadequate
to carry out the duty the Duke of Newcastle contemplated, and at
1 Instructions to Sir John Norris, June 19th, 1740, S.P. Dom. Naval, 1740.
2 These instructions are signed by Lords Hardwicke and Wilmington, Dukes
of Dorset, Richmond, Devonshire, Montague and Newcastle, Lords Pembroke and
Hay, Sir Robert Walpole and Sir Charles Wager.
3 'Victory,' 100; 'Princess Amelia,' 80; 'Princess Carolina,' 80; 'Boyne,' 80;
Shrewsbury,' 80; 'Cumberland,' 80; 'Chichester,' 80; 'Torbay,' 80; 'Cambridge,'
80; 'Russell,' 80; 'Norfolk,' 80; 'Grafton,' 70; 'Lenox,' 70; 'Kent,' 70; 'Orford,'
70; 'Suffolk,' 70; 'Prince Frederick,' 70; 'Dunkirk,' 60; 'Deptford,' 60;
'Weymouth,' 60; 'Winchelsea,' 20; 'Fox,' 20; 'Phaeton,' 20; 'Firebrand,'
•Etna, and 'Blaze,' fireships; and 'Princess Royal,' hospital ship.

174° Defence of Cathcart 's army at sea 87
the same time watch the ports of Brest and Ferrol. There were about
twenty Spanish ships, of which fourteen or fifteen were ships of force,
lying in Ferrol, and the French had another eighteen in Brest, of
which latter at least nine were ready for the sea. To prevent either
of these squadrons from interfering with Cathcart's expedition it would
be necessary to watch each port with a force at least equal to the
number in that port, or to escort the expedition with a squadron
equal in strength to the French and Spanish fleets combined. The
latter would be the more economical use of force, but on the other
hand it would be open to the objection that while the army's departure
would be protected, the country would be left open to attack. Besides,
how far should the expedition be carried to sea? The customary
practice was to escort a convoy about 100 leagues out, after which
it was in such open water that it was considered safe till it arrived
at its destination. But what if the enemy should send their conjunct
fleets into the Caribbean Sea and appear before Jamaica, as the probable
starting-point of any expedition against the Spanish territories, and
there await the coming of the army over sea? No real security could
be given from that danger without escorting the transports the whole
way. The alternative method of blockade, while possessing the advantage
of preventing the enemy's squadrons in Brest and Ferrol from uniting,
from sailing unobserved, or from making an attempt on the British
islands with troops in Gallicia, had the disadvantage of requiring a
very great force to put it into execution. No method is so expensive
in ships as close blockade. To maintain a squadron cruising off an
enemy's port which shall at all times be at least equal to the blockaded
squadron, a surplus number for the purposes of relief is essential. To
watch Brest in the summer months this surplus might be as low as
twenty-five per cent.; and at least the same proportion, but more
probably a higher one, would be required for Ferrol. The total number
of ships in the two harbours was not less than twenty-six, at a low
estimate, so that thirty-two ships at the smallest computation would
be required to maintain blockades on the two ports. If Cathcart's
expedition were going to sail at once, so that the blockade would only
be temporary until the convoy was clear, a lesser number might
suffice, but the delays consequent on foul winds had to be taken into
consideration when a fleet of transports of the magnitude of that in
question was concerned. A hundred and sixty transports could not
beat down channel in company against a south-wester, and weeks might
go by without the fleet being able to weigh from St Helens. This was
shewn in 1740 when from July 9th until September 13th, out of 67

88 Events in Home Waters 1740
days there were only 12 in which the wind came free enough to fetch
down Channel1.
Norris left London for Portsmouth to take command on the 22nd
of June, under the impression that his ships would be awaiting him.
He hoisted his flag on board the 'Victory' on the 24th, and found that
by no means aU the squadron was ready; and as neither the regiments
nor the marines had yet arrived, such ships as were at Spithead were
1197 men short of complement. Knowing the importance of getting
to sea at the earliest possible moment, Norris wrote that he would
sail as soon as he had fifteen ships ready, this being the number he
estimated as being in Ferrol, though he recognised that it was possible
there were more.
On the 5th of July the Duke of Cumberland, who was about to
begin a sea-career, joined the 'Victory'; on the 7th the Admiral
reviewed the troops of Cathcart's army in the Isle of Wight; and on
the 9th, no more ships having yet joined, he wrote that sooner than
wait he would put to sea with fourteen ships. Ogle had just arrived
from St Mary's with his squadron2, but it was 851 short of complement
and had 621 sick on board whom he had to land before he could do
anything; otherwise the squadron was capable of going to sea again,
and Norris prepared to sail, asking that marines might be sent out
after him in the victuallers to complete his crews.
Next day, July 9th, Norris received a letter from the Duke of
Newcastle, urging him to get full information about the state of the
ships at Brest, and teUing him that if they should join the Spaniards,
he was to act so as "to disappoint the views of the united fleets,"
but particularly to take care that Cathcart with the fleet and transports
went safely to the West Indies, and to prevent any attempt on the
British islands.
In consequence of these directions Norris sent the 'Winchelsea,'
20, Captain Mostyn, to cruise off Ushant. As Maurepas had lately
complained that the English men-of-war cruised in an offensive manner
off Brest, Norris told Mostyn to explain, if asked, that he was looking
out for Spanish privateers until Cathcart and his troops were safely
at sea. Mostyn was to remain off Brest as long as the squadron there
remained in harbour, and when they sailed to bring the Admiral
information of their movements. Replying to the Duke of Newcastle
in acknowledgment of the receipt of his orders, Norris said that he
took them to mean that if the French tried to enter Ferrol he was
1 Commissioners Book, Portsmouth Dockyard.
2( 'Augusta,' 60; 'Elizabeth,' 70; 'Lyon,' 60; 'Prince of Orange,' 70; 'Superbe,'
60; 'Litchfield,' 50; 'Jersey,' 60; 'Assistance,' 50; 'Falkland,' 50.

174° Attitude towards the French and Ferrol 89
to treat such a movement as an unfriendly act and would prevent it ;
but at the same time he pointed out that while he was off Ferrol
blockading the Spaniards, there would be nothing to prevent d'Antin
from attacking Cathcart's expedition without any declaration of war.
"I confess," he said, "I do not see that it is in my power to prevent
it." In reply to this, a letter drafted by Hardwicke, Walpole and
Wager was sent to him, which was intended to clear up the situation.
"It is not his Majesty's intention," it ran, "to begin hostilities against
France unless the conduct of the French squadron should make it
unavoidable by shewing an indispensable resolution to attempt to
join the Spanish fleet, which can only be with a view to protect and
defend the King's enemies against his Majesty's arms.... Upon the
first intelligence you shall receive from any of your cruisers of the
French squadron putting to sea and coming towards Ferrol you should
endeavour to put yourself between that port and them, and dispose
your squadron so as to make it difficult for them to go into Ferrol
without either using force against you, or you removing from before
that port, which you will refuse to do though demanded, and declare
to the Commander of the French squadron that though his Majesty
is firmly resolved on his part to preserve the most perfect friendship
with the Most Christian King, yet that you cannot suffer any ships
of force belonging to any power whatever to go at this juncture into
Ferrol as long as the Spanish squadron shall continue there, and the
place be blocked up by his Majesty's fleet, since that can be for no
other purpose but to protect and defend the King's enemies from his
Majesty's just resentment." This letter gave Norris a free hand to
prevent the French from joining the enemy in Ferrol.
The escort of the transports across the Atlantic was to consist of
a small squadron of three ships and two small frigates1 under the
command of Captain Gascoigne, whose orders for this duty were
dated July ioth — the day after Norris had written pointing out the
danger from Brest. On that same day Balchen, who had completed
the six ships now under his command with water and victuals, arrived
at Spithead. Ogle had arrived on the 8th, and thus the fleet was now
brought up to a total of twenty-six2 ships. As this gave Norris a stronger
force than he needed to deal with the Ferrol squadron, he detached
Balchen with four3 to strengthen the escort and see the expedition

1 'Buckingham,' 70; 'Rippon,' 60; 'York,' 60; 'Experiment,' 24; 'Seahorse,'
20. 2 Thirteen of those ordered under Norris, seven of Ogle's and six of Balchen's
ships. 3 'Russell,' 80; 'Norfolk,' 80; 'Cumberland,' 80; and 'Prince Frederick,' 70.

90 Events in Home Waters 1740
100 leagues into the sea. The Commander-in-Chief was now waiting
only for a favourable wind to get away from Spithead.
On July 13th the wind came into the north-west by west and Norris
prepared to sail. He had with him a vast convoy of over 160 sail which
he was ordered to escort clear of Brest, and a leading wind was necessary
to carry this fleet down channel. At 9 a.m. next day the breeze came
further to the northward, and he weighed; but the fair wind did not
hold. It veered to west by south and west, and was soon blowing
a fresh gale, but in spite of this he managed to get as far as Exmouth.
During the night of the 16th, when the fleet was tacking, his flagship
the 'Victory,' was fouled by the 'Lyon' who came on board her,
carried away her heads and bowsprit and did other damage, losing
her own foretopmast in the collision. Putting the fleet into Torbay,
Norris carried the 'Victory' back to Bembridge and shifted his flag
into the 'Boyne,' rejoining the fleet at Torbay on the 22nd. That day
the wind again came fair from the northward and the squadron got
as far as the Start ; but a southerly gale came up, the weather turned
thick and bad, and Norris, finding it impossible to tack down channel
with his great fleet, which had by now been increased by several other
merchant vessels seeking protection, was obliged to return to Torbay,
into which anchorage he thought himself lucky to arrive without loss.
As he lay there wind-bound, with the gale blowing strong between
west and south, he learned on the 29th that d'Antin, with seventeen
sail of the line and three frigates, had been lying in Brest road ready
to sail at an hour's notice. He might already have gone by the time
the news reached the Admiral; but calms and fogs now followed the
¦recent gales, and Norris could do nothing beyond transmitting the
intelligence to the Duke of Newcastle.
On receiving the news of the impending departure of the Brest
squadron the Admiralty decided to strengthen the escort for Cathcart's
expedition. Gascoigne's squadron was increased to five ships and four
small vessels, and until it was clear of danger it was to be accompanied
by the squadron which was bound to South America under Anson,
and also by six ships under Sir John Balchen, who was to be in command
of the whole force until 150 leagues into the sea1. The expedition
Large ships
1 -d i t. j r-r-, of over Small
x .Balchen s Russell, Cumberland," 'Prince Frederick,' 40 guns ships
squadron 'PrincessAmelia,"Lyon,"Grafton," Augusta' 7
Anson's 'Centurion,' 'Gloucester,' 'Severne,' 'Pearl' 4
squadron 'Wager,' 'Trial'  2
Gascoigne's 'Buckingham," York,"Mountagu," Assistance '
squadron 'Litchfield'  5
'Seahorse,' 'Strombolo,' 'Vulcan,' 'Pr. Royal' 4
"iff T

174° The Spanish Privateer Ports 91
would thus have an escort of sixteen large and six small vessels to pro
tect it against the Brest squadron. Gascoigne's instructions were to
provision his squadron for six months, be ready to leave at immediate
notice, and, on receipt of orders from Balchen, to sail with the rest
of the convoy until it was clear of the danger area. He was then to
part company, make the best of his way to Montserrat or St Kitts,
water and take in anything required, embark the regiments ' from
Antigua and the Leeward Islands, and go with the least delay to Port
Royal where he would come under Vernon's orders. Anson's instruc
tions were to place himself under Balchen, continue with the expedition
till Balchen left it, and then carry out his own orders. The whole of
these orders were dated July 24th, 1740.
The bad south-westerly weather which had delayed Norris's start
continued and detained him at Torbay. His impatience and anxiety
were increased when two of his cruising ships off Ferrol brought him
the news that thirteen ships lay there ready to sail, all of from 60 to
78 guns, and that another three of the same size lay in Santander.
As his main fleet could not get away he resolved to attempt an attack
upon the lesser Biscay ports with some of his frigates. He had been
told by the Duke of Newcastle on July 19th that fifty-six English
prizes lay in San Sebastian; he therefore detached the 'Newcastle,'
50, 'Dolphin' and 'Fox,' 20's, to cruise off that part of the Gallician
coast; and in informing the Duke that he had made this detachment
he asked if some bomb-vessels could be sent as well to endeavour to
bombard the ports. None however were available, all the bomb-vessels
being in the West Indies or the Mediterranean.
The Parliamentary effect of carrying out some military operation
against these ports was obvious and appealed irresistibly to the Duke
of Newcastle. Directly he received Norris's letter saying he had
detached the three cruisers, the Ferrol squadron was forgotten, and
the Duke sent down orders (dated August 12th) directing the main
fleet to attack San Sebastian, for which purpose two more regiments,
Whetham's and Handasyde's, were being at once ordered to join the
Admiral. Any landing operations, said the Duke, were to be under
the command of Colonel Bland, and the object was to destroy the local
arsenals and shipping. Bland, who was ordered to obey all orders
given him by Norris — a rare case of a naval Commander-in-Chief in
a combined operation — replied that he would do so cheerfully " as Sir
John's known abilities in all military operations are beyond dispute."
Sir John's military abilities shewed him two things very clearly;
one, that September was very late in the year to begin landing
operations on the iron-bound coast of Gallicia; and another that the

92 Events in Home Waters 1740
proper duty of the fleet was to get to sea as quickly as possible and
lie off Ferrol, in order to prevent the squadron there from saihng to
the West Indies; or, better, to intercept it if it should put to sea.
Every day's delay caused by waiting for the embarkation of the
regiments for such a secondary enterprise as attacking the lesser
Gallician ports was increasing the chance that the Ferrol squadron
would sail. Cathcart's expedition was already embarked on board the
transports at St Helens, and the danger to which it would be exposed
if the Spaniards got to sea was incalculable.
Before the winds had allowed the unfortunate Commander-in-Chief
to get away with his unwieldy mass of ships, the news reached England
that the Spaniards were leaving Ferrol. A message came from Ostend
on August 14th, saying that a vessel of that port had met sixteen sai
of Spanish men-of-war 30 miles off the Burlings on the 31st of July
they were coming from Ferrol and steering to the west by south
There could be little doubt of the truth of this report, as it was con
firmed at once by news from other craft.
The departure of Cathcart's expedition was at once deferred unti
the escort had been strengthened. Norris — who was still lying wind-
bound in Torbay1 — was ordered to readjust the fleets, sending Chaloner
Ogle with seven ships2 to join the convoy and escort it to the West
Indies, while Balchen, whom Norris had left at Spithead, was to
rejoin the main force. By this arrangement the expedition would be
escorted the whole way by twelve of the line, all of which would then
reinforce Vernon and give him a superiority in case the combined
Spanish fleet had sailed direct to the West Indies.
Worse news was to follow. On August 31st Mostyn, who for the
past six weeks had been cruising off Brest to watch the movements
of the Brest squadron, returned with information gathered from a
Dutch ship on the 27th that the French had been sighted at sea on
the 27th of August standing to the westward. Much as Norris must
have longed to get to sea on receipt of this news, he was still rendered
helpless by foul or hght winds, and it was not until September 4th
that he was able to weigh with the wind at east by south. His hopes
of getting in touch with the French were short-lived, for two days
later he was once more anchoring in Torbay, driven back by a severe
westerly gale.
Here the Lord Justices transmitted to him a letter of Lord
1 The winds this fortnight were: 14th, W.S.W.; 15th, S.W. by W.' 16th,
S.W. by W. ; 17th, S.W. by W. ; 18th, S. ; 19th, W. by S. ; 20th, S.W. ; 21st, S.W. by
S.; 22nd, E. by N.; 23rd, N.N.E.; 24th, S. by W.; 25th, S.W.; 26th, S. by W.;
27th, W. by S. ; 28th, S.S.W.
2 Two of 80 guns, three of 70 and two of 60.

174° Brest and Toulon Squadrons sail 93
Waldegrave's, received on September 4th, which made the situation,
bad enough already, far worse. Not only did it confirm the sailing of
the Brest squadron on August 22nd, but it stated definitely that the
other French squadron under Rochalart had also sailed on August 15th:
"and," their Lordships continued, "there being reason to believe that
both those squadrons as well as the Spanish ships that sailed from
Ferrol are gone to the West Indies... you are to remain at Torbay
with the fleet under your command until you shall have their
Excellencies' further directions." The proposed operations on the
Spanish coast now assumed their proper proportions and were dropped ;
the regiments embarked for the operations were ordered to be landed
at once1. Fresh instructions followed next day. Since the Spaniards had now
left Ferrol, the necessity for blockading that port had disappeared.
Another six ships2 were therefore to be added to the escort for Cathcart.
But, curiously enough, although the troops for the expedition against
the northern coast of Spain had already been ordered to be landed,
the project was revived. Norris was ordered to carry the ships which
would now remain with him to the north of Gallicia "to pursue such
other parts of your instructions as remain practicable." Anson, with
out further waiting, was to proceed on his voyage, already long overdue
from constant delays and procrastinations, and the trade, which had
encumbered Norris's sailing, was ordered to proceed with an escort
of three ships only.
The ships which would remain with Norris when he had strengthened
Ogle's squadron numbered twelve, the escorting fleet numbered thirty-
three large and eight small ships; but the ships of the enemy that were
now loose on the ocean amounted in all to thirty-nine sail. What their
intention might be could only be guessed at, but the probability was
that a rendezvous had been arranged for them in the West Indies,
and the whole of the squadrons would there act in conjunction against
the British expedition.
The order to Norris of the 5th of September about attacking the
northern coasts of Spain, which was rendered pecuharly impossible by
that of the preceding day ordering the regiments to be landed, was
cancelled a few days later, and Norris was told3 on the 8th to return
to Portsmouth, victual the whole fleet and take it to the West Indies
after the enemy. He weighed from Torbay on the 12th, and arrived
1 Lords Justices to Sir John Norris, September 4th, 1740.
2 'Russell,* 80; 'Cumberland,' 80; 'Prince Frederick,' 70; 'Princess Amelia,'
80; 'Lyon,' 60; and 'Grafton,' 60.
3 Duke of Newcastle to Norris, September 8th, saying that it appeared the Brest,
Toulon and French squadrons numbering 39 sail had gone to the West Indies.

94 Events in Home Waters 1740
at Spithead on the 13th. There he found orders awaiting him to the
effect that Ogle was to take command of all ships at Spithead and
escort Cathcart to the West Indies, whilst he himself was directed
to come ashore. Norris struck his flag next day and went to London,
after, as he said "a campaign of ten weeks with continual bad weather
and contrary winds."
A week later (September 20th) Sir John Norris was again attending
the meetings of the Council. On this day the Duke of Newcastle had
an interesting document to communicate to the members, in the shape
of a copy of a circular that the King of France was addressing to
Foreign Courts, explaining his reason for sending his squadrons to
the West Indies. In this document it was clearly stated that the
object was to prevent Great Britain from making any conquests in
those parts, and that there was no intention on the part of France
to attack the possessions of this country. This information was of
the same colour as that which had been received in July, when "101"1
informed Lord Waldegrave that if we made acquisitions in the West
Indies, France could not remain inactive. In the two months that had
passed since his report came in, France and Spain were reported to
have drawn closer together and a more active policy was to be
anticipated. Newcastle had therefore written urgently to Lord
Waldegrave to take all possible steps to discover whether a Franco-
Spanish Treaty had been actually signed, but this question still
remained unsolved2.
On the announcement at the Council meeting that the French
squadrons had gone to the West, Walpole remarked "that it was
like to break out into a new sort of war"; and Norris asked "if this
war was to be supposed to be only England against Spain and France:
which Sir Robert nor any of the company said otherwise." If we were
to have France and Spain against us, with no European complications
on their side, so that both could devote the whole of their money to
a naval war, Norris thought they would certainly be too strong for us.
"I told Sir Robert," he says, "I thought the best way to embarrass
France was to endeavour to get four score thousand men into Flanders
without reckoning on the Dutch that would then be obhged to come
in: that as France and Spain were now joined, the Emperor could
not be secure of his hereditary dominions without the help of us and
the Northern Powers: and if he could see in case he engaged in a war
that we would not leave him, upon a satisfaction stipulated for his
security he must certainly come into it: and were I in Sir Robert
1 M^jdeJBugsy is alluded to as " 101 " in the correspondence.
2 Letters from Lord Waldegrave, B.M. Add. MS. 32802.

174° Death of the Emperor 95
Walpole's place I would by March have an army of 80 thousand men
in Flanders and the Emperor in Naples: [this] would be the greatest
hope of success against France1." As an outcome of this, Walpole told
Norris a couple of days later that measures were being taken to form
an alhance with the Emperor. On October 7th a full Council meeting
was held, at which the advisability of declaring war with France, and
the formation of a grand alhance against her and Spain were considered.
The Duke of Newcastle's notes run thus :
"Considered: Whether to declare war against France for sending their
squadrons to the West Indies avowedly to act against his Majesty's, and for
the repairing of the works at Dunkirk contrary to the Treaty of Utrecht and the
Triple Alliance.
"If there was a neutrality in Europe only with France we might be obliged
to be at the same expenses at home for our own security : it being not safe to depend
upon the faith of that neutrality: in which case France would be at liberty to
carry on their trade without being molested, which if war was declared they
could not do: and it is apprehended their trade would suffer much more from
us than ours would do from them, considering that we are at present at war
with Spain and must for that reason be necessarily obliged to have convoys
for our trade in those seas."
The gist of this note is that we should be better off with the
active hostility of France than with her precarious neutrality.
The grand alliance proposed was to consist of England, the Emperor,
the Czarina, Prussia, Poland, the States General, the Landgrave of
Hesse and such other princes of the Empire as could be induced to
join. The Emperor, upon reciprocal engagements and proper conditions
with England, was to be assisted to recover Naples and Sicily; the
Czarina was to use her good offices to obtain the duchies of Berg and
Julier for the King of Prussia; and the minor states were to obtain
proportional advantages2. Whatever decision might have been come
to in this matter was however rendered nugatory by the death of the
most important partner in the proposed coalition. On the 20th of
October the Emperor died. A new grouping of the Powers was the
result, very different from that proposed by the Privy Council; and
the course of the Anglo-Spanish War was to be deflected into new
channels. When this news reached the Council, their attention was still
occupied by the question of the probability of success of the West
Indian expedition. In the middle of October they heard that four of
Rochalart's squadron had already returned to Toulon, and four of
d'Antin's to Brest on the 2nd of October, thus reducing the French
1 Diary of Sir John Norris, September 22nd, 1740. Cf. Newcastle's views
on Policy in letter to Hardwicke, September 2nd, 1749, Life of Hardwicke, vol. 11.
P- 23. 2 Minutes of the Privy Council, October 7th, 1740, Add. MS. 32993-

96 Events in Home Waters 1740
squadrons abroad to a total of nineteen ships; but in addition to these,
six more ships were fitting for the sea in Brest. So far as the information
at the disposal of the Council went, there was a possibility of being
faced in the West Indies by a total of thirty-nine, or, including two
additional ships believed to be with d'Antin, forty-one, sail1.
The fleet which was eventually to go out with Ogle consisted of
twenty-five sail, to which Vernon's ten would be added when it reached
the Caribbean. Norris's behef was that the enemy would unite and
attack Vernon; in which case the result would depend largely upon
which fleet had the wind. With the weather-gage he believed Vernon
could deal with them, but if the enemy had the wind he considered
he would be weak. He foresaw that the season being late, Vernon
would probably be constrained to attack Cartagena rather than
Havana on account of the strong northerly winds which would make
operations on the north coast of Cuba impossible. Threatened, there
fore, as the Spanish squadron at Cartagena would probably feel itself,
Norris considered it probable that it would not remain in harbour,
but would attempt to join the fleet coming out from Europe, thus
establishing a shght superiority over the forces under Vernon.
Meanwhile Ogle was still at St Helens. The revictualling of his
ships, which had been using up their provisions since June, had been
begun early in September. The question of keeping this great fleet
and army supplied with food and water was a very important one,
and though the crews were still far from complete, it was decided that
as the troops were on board it was better the fleet should sail short
of complement than remain any longer at St Helens consuming its
supplies at anchor. Accordingly on the 18th of October the wind,
coming into the east by south, gave Ogle the opportunity he desired.
He weighed with the whole fleet, but only to be driven back by a
south-wester the following day, nor was it till the 26th that another
shift to north-east allowed him to get away. The wind held northerly
for another day and enabled him to clear the Channel before it went
back to the westward; then he ran into strong westerly gales which
scattered his squadron and transports. Luckily both the French and
Spanish squadrons were well ahead, and the quarry offered by Ogle's
1 Made up as follows :
From Toulon 12 had sailed and 4 returned ... ... 8
From Brest 15 had sailed and 4 returned  n
From Ferrol 14 had sailed  14
There were at Cartagena (in America) ... ... ... 6
39
Two ships possibly with d'Antin  2
41

174° Anson's expedition 97
storm-driven vessels, now saihng singly and unprotected, was not
within their reach. The scattered ships found their way in safety
across the Atlantic and gradually rejoined at the rendezvous, Prince
Rupert's Bay, where they were all reassembled by December 23rd.
Greatly to the disappointment of the Spaniards the enemy squad
rons did not effect a junction. 1 The Ferrol squadron, as we havei
already seen, after calling at Porto Rico went to Cartagena and landed
some troops; but fearing that a British squadron would fall upon it,
sailed again as quickly as it could for Havana. The French squadrons
proceeded to Martinique. Their effect upon the operations in the West
Indies was to be as marked as it had been upon the movements of
the ships in home waters.
Before concluding the operations at home in this year the expedition
under Commodore Anson must be referred to, as although it had been
first proposed so early in the war as October, 1739, it was not until
September, 1740, that it sailed from England, and the discussions and
delays which preceded its departure are an example of the dilatory
and inefficient conduct of the war by the Administration.
Originating, as has been seen, in a proposal to attack Manila, which
was brought up in the Council in the middle of October, only a few
days before war was about to be declared, the scheme was under
discussion — if indeed the term "discussion" may be used for a series
of desultory conversations — for over two months. On November ist
Anson, who had been chosen for the command of the expedition,
was ordered to attend the Admiralty for orders; but November
passed without any decision being made. In the middle of December
the Manila part of the scheme was abandoned, Walpole considering
that it would take too many men, and orders were given for Anson
to command the expedition destined to annoy Spanish trade in the
South Seas.
Instructions were drawn up by Wager on the 28th of December
and discussed; they were agreed upon on the 8th of January and were
dated the 31st of that month. Their terms were that Anson was to
proceed with the squadron1 to the South Seas and distress the Spaniards
by sea and land. He was to attack any town or other places practicable
of assault, endeavouring to get the Indians to side against the Spaniards.
A council of war was to consider whether Callao should be attacked,
and if it were decided not to do so, or if the attack were made and
miscarried, he was to go on to Panama, looking into all the ports
between Lima and Panama and capturing shipping. On arrival at
1 'Centurion,' 60; 'Gloucester,' 50; 'Severne,' 50; 'Pearl,' 48; 'Wager,' 28;
'Trial,' 8.
r n. 1. 7

98 Events in Home Waters 1740
Panama he was to get into communication overland with the West
Indies squadron, and if it were considered practicable by the com
manders of the joint forces, some of the troops in the West Indies
were to be landed at Porto Bello to attack Panama, both squadrons
cooperating from the sea.
This done, his subsequent movements were to be at his own
discretion. He was told he might go to Acapulco, the American port
of arrival of the Philippine trade, and endeavour to take the treasure
ships as they arrived then return home by the Cape or the Horn as
he desired, leaving, if he considered it necessary, two ships in the
South Seas to protect trade and cover any places taken.
In an enterprise of this kind swiftness of execution, secrecy and
good organisation are essential to full success. None of these was
present. Discussed in October, 1739, decided on in December, and
ordered at the end of January, 1740, the expedition did not sail till
September, 1740, — exactly eleven months after the first proposals were
made in the Council.
Although the expedition had the primary military object of attack
upon the enemy's interests in the South Sea, there was a suspicion,
from the fact that cargo was put on board and two agents lately in
the employment of the South Sea Company were appointed to trade,
that there were the seeds of a commercial venture in it. Sir John
Norris wrote of this: "It was my opinion that instead of 20 tons of
merchandise it might have been better to have carried that quantity
of rice or other provisions, to prevent the calumny that may arise
from the opposers of the Administration that this expedition is for
the advantage of a private trade more than to annoy the enemy:
and in my opinion, all the warlike expeditions of the Crown should
be free from that censure, that the public may be satisfied that all
expeditions are purely for their nation's good." Even if every possible
step to preserve secrecy as to the objects of the squadron were taken,
it would have been impossible to prevent the news from leaking out
when the commercial element was introduced. Long before the
squadron was ready to sail the Spaniards had received information
of its proposed destination and were preparing a superior squadron,
under Admiral Pizarro, to forestall it1.
In addition to the handicap thus given to the enterprise by its
plans being known to the enemy, the organisation for equipping it
was so bad that the regiments put on board were composed of invalids
and old worn-out men, entirely incapable of the arduous service
'Asia,' 64; 'Guipuscoa,' 74; 'Hermiona,' 54; 'Esperanza,' 50; 'San Esteban,'
40; and a patache. A battalion of 300 infantry was embarked.

I74°_i Anson in the Pacific 99
demanded of them. It is indeed impossible to imagine worse conditions
than those under which this expedition finally sailed from England.
In June, 1740, the squadron was at length considered ready. On
June 19th orders were sent to sail at once, but owing to the threat
ening news from Brest it was detained to form part of the escort
to Cathcart's expedition, which was to have sailed in July. The
movements of the French and Spanish squadrons which delayed the
departure of the West Indian expedition kept Anson also at Spithead,
and it was not until September, when the decision to escort Cathcart
with the whole fleet was arrived at, that Anson was directed to sail
alone1. The Spaniards being sufficiently well informed of his movements
and destination were able to dispatch their squadron ahead of him,
and while Anson anchored at Santa Catalina on the coast of Brazil
on December 21st, Pizarro arrived at the River Plate on January 5th.
Anson sailed again on January 18th, and Pizarro having already
heard of his arrival hurried to sea also on January 22nd without even
awaiting the embarkation of fresh provisions. On their way to the
Horn the squadrons were so near to one another that one of Anson's
ships, the 'Pearl,' becoming separated from her consorts, actually
sighted and was nearly taken by the Spaniards.
Terrible weather was experienced in the south. One only of the
Spanish squadron, the 'Esperanza,' got round to the coast of Chile,
and shipwreck and scurvy took their toll of the remainder. The
British squadron, though hard hit, fared better. The 'Severne' — on
board of which was the future great Lord Howe— and the 'Pearl'
parted company off the Horn, and the 'Wager' was wrecked; but the
'Centurion,' 'Gloucester' and 'Trial' at last reached their rendezvous
at Juan Fernandez in June and July, 1741, having passed through
three months of hardships only comparable to those experienced by
Drake in his great voyage. Wind, weather and the fatal scurvy had
played their part. More than 600 men were dead.
After refreshing at Juan Fernandez, Anson sailed up the coast,
snapping up prizes as he went. He stormed and captured Paita and
sank the shipping in the harbour: but the projected attack upon
Panama was not made, for the Commodore, from information of the
situation in the West Indies, concluded that no troops would be
available for Panama. He therefore put into execution that part of
his instructions which gave him discretion to proceed to Acapulco,
hoping there to secure a treasure-ship he knew was coming from the
1 Orders of September 5th and September nth, 1740. Out letters.
/ 7—2

TOo Events in Home Waters 1740
Phihppines. But he was too late; the treasure-ship was safely in
harbour before he arrived off the port.
Anson replenished on the coast and sailed on the 28th of April,
1742, for China. On the way across the 'Gloucester' was abandoned
and burnt, the ship being no longer sea-worthy and the crew so reduced
by sickness that they were too few to work the ship. The 'Trial' had
already been destroyed, and the 'Centurion' alone proceeded grimly
on her way, the scurvy destroying men daily. In August she reached
the Ladrone Islands and refreshed at Tinian, where two months were
spent in building up the shattered health of the crew, and thence
she sailed for the Canton River and anchored off Macao in the end of
November. Here she remained, refitting, all the winter; and on the
15th of April, 1743, she weighed and sailed for the Philippines, Anson's
intention being to endeavour to capture the Manila galleon. Arriving
off Espirito Santo on the 31st of May he cruised for three weeks, and
was rewarded on the 20th of June by the appearance of the long-hoped-
for treasure-ship, the ' Nuestra Sefiora de Caovadonga.' After a smart
action of an hour-and-a-half the ship was taken, and putting her under.
the command of Lieutenant de Saumarez, Anson stood away once
more for Macao which he reached on the 12th of July. Here, after
spending some months in making arrangements, he sold the prize, and
on October 15th, 1743, sailed for England, rounding the Cape of Good
Hope in March, 1744.
On the 15th of June, 1744, he anchored at Spithead, having
providentially passed through a French fleet in the soundings in a
thick fog.
The voyage must always rank as one of the most wonderful exhibi
tions of dogged resolution of all time. As an operation of war its effect
was negligible; but for all that the voyage has an interest of its own
from a strategic point of view; it illustrates the conservative tendency
of naval thought. Both in its principal object and in its execution
it betrays itself as a link with the Elizabethan idea of warfare. The
resemblance to Drake's great voyage, even to the details of the taking
of Paita, is too remarkable for one to forbear connecting* the one with
the other, and tracing the influence of 1577 on the thought of the
eighteenth century. But it was the last of its kind; a new conception
of war had already grown up, and the dissipation of naval strength
in predatory voyages was to be relegated to the past.

CHAPTER VI
THE .EXPEDITION TO CARTAGENA,
SANTIAGO AND PANAMA
As the preceding narrative has shewn, the decision to send an expedition
to the West Indies had no connexion with the capture of Porto Bello.
The enterprise was determined on before that place was attacked, and
Cathcart's troops were assembling in the Isle of Wight before the news
reached England that it had been taken. The actual decision was
reached in December, 1739. Transports for 8000 troops were ordered,
the command was to be in the hands of Lord Cathcart, and meetings
of the Council were held, at which he was present, to discuss the
details of the matter.
It was decided that so soon as the five regiments miscalled Marines
should have been raised, the English part of the army should sail
for Montserrat. There Colonel Daly's regiment was to be embarked
and the army would thence go to Jamaica. The troops from the
northern colonies under Colonel Spotswood were to be assembled
at Port Antonio, then the principal careening port in Jamaica, as
soon as they could be transported thither. Vernon was ordered to
meet the transports at Donna Maria Bay, in the West end of Hispaniola,
with his squadron, and the whole force was to sail in company for
Havana. The first intention was that the expedition should sail in
March, and transports were ordered to be at Portsmouth during that
month; but as by sailing then, the army would arrive in the West
Indies during the hurricane season, and, for the further very good
reason that the troops were not ready, it was determined to defer the
sailing till July and thus bring its arrival to September.
Vernon's first letter to the Duke of Newcastle, dated October 31st
in which he strongly advised against West Indian operations on shore
on a large scale, was received on March 14th; but whether the advice
therein given was communicated to the Council is not certain. The
letter does not form a part of his usual correspondence, written in
duplicate by his secretary, but is a separate letter, written in his own
hand and marked " very private." The Duke of Newcastle's memoranda
of Cabinet meetings contain no indication that he let the other members
of the Council know Vernon's opinion; and Sir John Norris in his
Diary, which very fully relates all the discussions which took place.

102 The West Indian Expeditions 1740
makes no mention of this matter. As far as negative evidence goes
it is by no means improbable that Vernon's opinions never got beyond
the Duke.
In any case, preparations continued. By the end of July the troops
were embarked. It has been shewn that the initial idea was to escort
the army with five ships under Captain Gascoigne, strengthened by
Anson's squadron and covered from interference by that under Norris;
that foul winds blocked Norris in Torbay and prevented him from
getting away to watch the western ports of Spain and France; and
that, in consequence, while both army and fleet were wind-bound in
their anchorages the actual enemy in Ferrol and the presumptive one
in Brest put to sea from their respective ports unchallenged. The
covering force was then no longer required, a larger escort became
necessary, and the former was converted into the latter.
Command of the sea in the area to be used is regarded as an essential
preliminary to the transport of an oversea army. There was no
established command in this case. A force of about 8000 men was
to be carried across the Atlantic, escorted by a squadron of twenty-
five sail of the line, in the presence of hostile fleets whose numbers
amounted to about forty of the fine, whose whereabouts and destination
were unknown. It can hardly be denied that the movement was a
bold one, unless the enemy were thought so contemptible that his
forces could be disregarded. This was far from being the case, and Ogle
cannot but have been anxious for the security of his expedition. The
destination of the army was as well known to the enemy as to ourselves
for no attempt at secrecy had been made, and, as in the case of Anson's
squadron, both France and Spain were fully aware of whither it was
going. This carelessness, or worse, compares very unfavourably with
Cromwell's procedure when he had a similar enterprise in hand. By
him the secret of his Hispaniola expedition was most jealously guarded.
No one ever knew against what part of the world it was directed,
and no one knew better than he the advantages of simulation and
dissimulation "to lay asleep opposition, and to surprise. For where
a man's intentions are published, it is an alarum to call up all that
are against them1." The Ministers of a later date had a less clear
appreciation of the importance of secrecy in war2.
Owing to the various causes that have already been described,
the expedition instead of saihng in July did not leave St Helens until
October 26th. As Sir Chaloner Ogle's great fleet worked down Channel,
1 Bacon, Essays, "Of Simulation and Dissimulation."
2 Mr Fortescue gives many examples in later wars. His comments in History
of the British Army, vol. iv. p. 102 are very just.

1740-1 Cathcart's army sails 103
additional items of information as to the general situation filtered in
as they were picked up from passing merchant ships, The squadrons
from Brest, Toulon and Ferrol were reported all to be to the westward ;
and while one account said they were going in company to capture
Jamaica, another had it that it was their intention to lay in wait for
the expedition and attack it. Thirty sail of large ships had been seen
in company on the nth of October, so that evidently some parts of
the squadrons had joined, and it appeared by no means improbable
that the allies would endeavour to intercept the British fleet.
No interference however took place. In spite of encountering a
severe gale which scattered many of Ogle's ships, the transports and
squadron arrived at Dominica within a few days of each other, and
when all were collected one ship only, the 'Cumberland,' was missing.
She, having been dismasted in the gale, had made for Lisbon where
she refitted and subsequently joined the fleet off Hispaniola.
At Dominica an event befell which influenced the whole course of
the later events. Lord Cathcart was seized by an internal complaint
and, after a brief illness, died. The command of the expedition there
upon devolved on Brigadier-General Wentworth. "Lord Cathcart is
dead," wrote a letter- writer, "and General Wentworth commands the
forces, which gives great concern as he was never yet in any service,
but he is certainly a very sensible man." Something more, however,
than "a very sensible man" who had never seen service was needed
for an undertaking of such magnitude.
On December 27th, the transports having all rejoined, the fleet
weighed and sailed for Jamaica. The voyage was not interrupted by
the enemy, but a first sight of the French was obtained. On the
morning of January 7th, when the fleet was about six leagues to the
southward of Cape Tiburon, and therefore in the neighbourhood of
the French ports in the western end of Hispaniola, four strange ships
of war were sighted. Ogle detached six of his squadron1 under the
command of Lord Aubrey Beauclerk to examine them. No colours
were shewn by the strangers until three in the afternoon, when French
ensigns were hoisted, but as this was no certain evidence of their
nationality Lord Aubrey continued his chase, and eventually over
hauled them at about 10 o'clock at night. The 'Weymouth,' Captain
Charles Knowles, was ordered to speak with whichever ship she could
come up with, and closing to within half-pistol shot, her interpreter
hailed one of the ships and asked what they were. The question was
1 'Prince Frederick,' 70; 'Orford,' 70; 'Lyon,' 60; 'Weymouth,' 60; 'Rippon,'
60, and 'Dunkirk,' 60. The French were 'Ardent,' 64; 'Mercure,' 54; 'Diamant,
50; 'Parfaite,' 44, under the Chevalier d'Epinay.

104 The West Indian Expeditions 1740
met by a counter-question of the same nature, to which Knowles
rephed that they were Enghsh men-of-war. "And we are French
men-of-war, and what is it you want?" replied the stranger. Knowles
rephed that he must speak with them. The French — for such they
were — then asked if war were yet declared, and were told that it
had not been when the squadron left England.
While this conversation was passing, Lord Aubrey was similarly
hailing another of the ships. He appears to have received no answer,
and, suspecting them to be Spaniards, he fired a shot across the bows
of the ship he was speaking, following it soon after by another as the
first induced no reply. To this the chase rephed by a broadside, and a
hot engagement immediately began between the three leading British
ships and the four Frenchmen. After about an hour's random fighting
Knowles, who was separated from his antagonist, went on board the
'Prince Frederick' and advised that the fight should be stopped, "as
we were in a wrong cause," but his representations were not acted
upon and scattered fighting continued until about 4.30 in the morning,
the other British ships taking part as they came up. The wind being
variable and hght the ships became much separated and the British
ships were never all in action together. The ' Rippon ' was never en
gaged at all, the ' York ' fired two or three broadsides only, while in
the confusion of the fight the 'Dunkirk' fired into the 'Orford.'
At daylight the French were seen lying to about a mile off, pre
paring to renew the engagement, but after a consultation had been held
by Beauclerk, at which Knowles reiterated his opinion that the ships
were French, it was agreed to send over a flag of truce to ask who
they were, and why no answer to the hail had been given. The French
commander rephed to the flag with the information that they were
French men-of-war bound from Petit Guave to Port Louis, and that
they had answered to that effect the night before; then, after some
what restrained mutual compliments, the squadrons separated. The
incident gave no clue to the intentions of the French except in so far
as it tended to shew that the French had not any instructions to begin
hostihties. In the British fleet the skirmish was looked upon as a
blunder. "What is said of the affair here," wrote a correspondent to
the Duke of Montagu, "is that we had done too much or too little":
a description which fairly represents the situation as it appeared to
the men on the spot1.
1 Accounts of this engagement are in Vernon's despatch, Lord Elibank's
narrative, the Journals of the ships taking part, a letter of Sam. Speed to the
Duke of Montagu in Montagu Papers. Hist. Man. Com. Report: and of the French
view in Lacour Gayet, La marine miliiaire de la France sous Louis XV.

l74l Vernon's appreciation 105
The British detachment, after repairing such damage as it had
suffered aloft, made sail for Jamaica where it rejoined the main body,
whose arrival there on January 7th had filled Vernon with chagrin
and dismay.
As late as December 26th Vernon had hoped to be able to meet
the expedition to windward, and had kept cruisers off Cape Tiburon
to give him early notice of Cathcart's arrival. His wishes to do so
were not governed solely by the need for avoiding the influence of
"Mr Punch" at Jamaica; the arrival of the French squadrons at Port
Louis had accentuated the importance of not coming to leeward. So
soon as he knew that their junction had been effected at Port Louis
he saw that a new situation had been created. He at once wrote to
Cathcart and Ogle, desiring them to anchor the fleet between Donna
Maria Bay and Cape Tiburon where he could hasten to join them
directly he heard of their arrival. His reasons for this will best be
given in his own words: "The Brest and Toulon squadrons having
joined and having posted themselves just to windward of us at Port
Louis, and brought with them 1800 men raised at Martinique, I cannot
imagine to be with any other view than immediately to attack this
island whenever we should set out on any expedition to attempt
anything on any part of Spanish territories. And as thus posted they
will be masters of this island, and all our trade, whenever we should
move from hence to leave it exposed to them, I cannot but judge
it to be absolutely necessary for his Majesty's service that these
auxiliary forces of the Spaniards should be first secured before it can
be safe for us to attempt anything else ; and fear, without it the whole
event of this expedition will be rendered fruitless1." If the fleet and
army were to come to leeward, and need watering at Jamaica, "I
think," he wrote, "your arrival here with so large a fleet of transports
would be the fatal Rock for this expedition to split on, thro' delays
and the many other fatal consequences that would result from it.
Your Lordship has experienced the difficulty of getting out of Channel
with a large fleet of transports with a fair wind, and may easily imagine
the greater difficulty there will be to beat up to windward with them
with a contrary wind, which must be the case here. And besides that
uncertainty, I fear a month or six weeks would be lost before they
could be got into the sea again, if they wanted to water here: and
this six weeks is the flower of time for expecting any service from
new comers into these climates2." Unfortunately this letter never

1 Vernon to Lord Cathcart, December 26th, 1740, S.P. Dom. Naval, 85.
2 Ibid. S.P. Dom. Naval, 90-

106 The West Indian Expeditions 1741
reached the out-coming expedition, which therefore made its way to
Jamaica, as already related, anchoring there on January 7th.
A meeting was held as soon as possible to discuss the operations
to be undertaken. Vernon, Ogle, W'entworth, Guise and Governor
Trelawny were present. They agreed at once that the only action
possible was that suggested by Vernon against the French at Port
Louis. There was the most complete harmony between the officers of
the two services; in the Admiral's letters of this time and for some
time forward there are frequent references to the excellent relations
which existed between them.
The fleet, as Vernon had feared, needed watering before it could
sail again. This considerable labour was at once begun, and proceeded
with such despatch that it was completed by January 21st, well
within Vernon's estimate of the time required. The first division of
ten ships under Ogle sailed next day, the second division under
Commodore Lestock followed two days later, and the Commander-in-
Chief's division began working out on the 26th, followed by the
transports on the 27th. By the 28th of January the whole fleet, con
sisting of twenty-nine sail of the line1 (including two 50-gun ships),
a 40-gun ship, twenty-three corvettes, bomb-vessels and tenders, a
fireship, a brigantine as Admiral's tender, together with eighty-five
sail of transports had got to sea and was starting on its way towards
Cape Tiburon, to find and destroy the French squadrons and then
be free for the attack upon the Spanish possessions.
On the same day that the first division sailed, Vernon detached
the 'Wolf sloop, Captain Dandridge2, to observe the French at Port
Louis. Dandridge arrived off this port on January 30th, looked into
the harbour, and wrote as follows in his log: "1 p.m. Saw nineteen
sail of ships, one whereof had a large white flag at his maintopmast
head, another with a white broad pendant; their colours were all
hoisted, etc., awnings spread, at the same time the flag on the fort
and that on the look-out were hoisted. It being very hazy under the
land, that we might better view them hauled the mainsail up and
backed the maintopsail; judging ourselves about five miles from Port
Louis Castle and being much embayed, at 2 p.m. out reefs and worked
to windward." Having got this information, Dandridge bore away for
1 Vernon had 30 of the line, but the 'Augusta' took the ground in leaving
harbour, owing to the parting of a warp, and was obliged to return for repair,
having beat off her rudder.
2 Dandridge was an officer who for some years past had been a planter in
America, but came to sea again when war broke out, when he was given command
of the 'Wolf,' then employed upon the coast of America. He was married to
a sister of George Washington.

J74x Decision to attack French Fleet 107
Cape Tiburon and continued cruising in that part until February 8th
when the fleet arrived. He then carried his news to the Admiral.
Vernon at once called a council of war which decided to attack
and destroy the French fleet. The troops were first to be disembarked to
take the land defences, the fleet was to attack the forts and the ships
at anchor in the harbour. The decision to take this extremely decisive
step is particularly interesting in view of the instructions issued to
the French commander to protect the Spanish settlements, instructions
which were in full accordance with the reply given to the question of
our Ambassador in Paris as to the intentions of the Cardinal regarding
the French ships fitting out in their ports1. A sentence, in a letter
from Maurepas to d'Antin found on board a prize, put the matter
very clearly: "L'objet capital de sa Majeste et celui de votre
destination, est toujours de mettre a couvert les colonies espagnols,
et a plus forte raison les n6tres, de toute entreprise de la part des
Anglais. Vous ne devez point perdre cet objet de vue, et sa Majeste
attend que vous employerez tous les moyens possibles pour rompre
leurs desseins, soit separement ou conjointement avec les espagnols2."
The whole question lay in whether the French or British should take
the initiative; the council of war decided that it should be the British.
This decision having been made, everything was at once prepared
to put it into execution. The fleet worked close inshore to land the
troops and by the 12th of February all the ships were in position. The
'Spence,' sloop, Captain Laws, was then sent in to get further in
formation as to the position of the French squadron. She rejoined
with the news that sixteen sail of men-of-war lay at anchor within.
But some contradictory reports having then been received from some
vessels and boats which had been sent in to sound the channels,
Vernon sent the ' Spence ' in a second time. Laws returned with the
distressing information that he had been deceived by the haze and
that the vessels he had seen were merchants only. To obtain confirma
tion of this news Vernon sent Knowles ashore with a message to the
Governor. Shortly afterwards a French officer came out with a letter
1 See ante, chap. v. p. 77.
2 Vernon to Duke of Newcastle, enclosing the intercepted letter. So great
was the exasperation caused in Spain by the failure of the French squadrons to
support the Spaniards in the West Indies that it was reported that the Queen
of Spain was ready to make peace in order to pay out France for her behaviour.
Vide Mr Thompson's letters in June, 1741, S.P. Foreign, France, 1741.
The situation in which Vernon found himself may be compared with that
which Admiral Alexieff anticipated might arise in the East when the Anglo-
Japanese Treaty was concluded. "La flotte anglaise surveillerait les vaisseaux
de notre escadre et generait nos operations en menacant d'ouvrir les hostilites
au moment qui lui plairait." Russian General Staff History of the Russo-Japanese
War, French edition, vol. I. pp. 272, 273.

108 The West Indian Expeditions 1741
of civihty from M. de Larnage, offering the hospitalities of the port
and volunteering the information that d'Antin's fleet had sailed for'
Europe a month before.
The French had sailed on January 27th. Not only had the 'Spence'
been deceived, but Dandridge in the ' Wolf ' had made a similar mistake
on January 30th when he thought he saw the squadron of men-of-war1.
In hazy weather he had made his examination from about five miles
from the Castle, inside which the squadron would be lying, a distance
in such circumstances that was too great to ascertain the particulars
of the ships with that exactitude which a reconnaissance demands.
Thus it was not until February 13th that Vernon and his colleagues
learned that the French had sailed eighteen days earlier, before even
his whole fleet had been clear of Port Royal. The supreme importance
of early information of any movements of the French fleet makes it
desirable to trace why it was that they were able to get away from
a place a bare 180 miles to windward of Jamaica without the news
of their departure reaching the British Admiral within forty-eight
hours at the outside. If Vernon could have had two cruisers off Port
Louis with the usual instructions, there is no reason why the news of
d'Antin's saihng should not have reached him by the 29th of January,
before his whole fleet was away.
The reason why he had no cruisers off Port Louis was that owing
to his having so few he had been unable to keep them clean, and he
could not risk a foul ship close off an enemy's port. " I have no cruisers
clean enough at present," he had written on January 5th, "to trust
off Port Louis." To make up for this he had stationed his cruisers
in the safer area off Cape Tiburon2, and there he had had them cruising
up to January 26th. But it so happened that at the critical moment
there were no cruisers even in that part. "As I find a period of four
days between the 26th and 30th of January that I had no one to
watch the Marquis's motions in, I cannot be certain which way he may
move in that time." The accidents of the sea had removed the watching
cruisers on those days, and during their absence the French sailed
unobserved. It is perhaps idle to speculate what would have happened
if immediate information had been brought to Vernon of their de
parture; how soon he could have learned that d'Antin's destination
was France cannot be said, but there can be little doubt that he would
have known of it soon enough to enable the expedition to arrive at
1 A letter (S.P. Dom. Naval, 1741) confirms the sailing of Rochalart on
February 7th (N.S.) from French sources. Captain Rentone, who went to Petit
Guave, brought back the news that d'Antin had sailed "about the 26th of
January" (February 6th, N.S.).
2 See ante p. 105.

I74I The situation altered 109
Cartagena some weeks earher than it did. Dandridge's incorrect report
again was a cause of loss of time. If on the 30th this officer had found
that the French fleet was not in Port Louis the information might
have reached Vernon a few days sooner than it did, and the four days
spent in getting the fleet round from Tiburon to Isle de Vache would
have been saved. Dandridge has been saddled with the blame for
the whole of the loss of time caused by coming to windward; but
taking all things into consideration it is doubtful whether more than
a week was lost through his mistake. In judging him we must
remember not only the circumstances of pomp and procedure ob
served by him and his officers, confirming the opinion that the ships
they saw were men-of-war, but also that Captain Laws made a
similar error. Thus, accurate observation was evidently difficult.
The incident serves as a warning to remind officers of the imperative
necessity of making absolutely sure, and of their duty, as expressed
by Admiral Patton, of going sufficiently near to form a clear and
accurate judgment of the size and force of any ships seen1.
A second council of war then sat to discuss the altered situation,
which decided that before proceeding further it was essential to get
more news of the French, and find out whither they had gone when
they left Port Louis. Frigates were sent to Petit Guave and Leogane
with that object and the fleet was moved round to Irois and Donna
Maria Bays, where wood and water could be obtained, there to await
the return of the cruising ships. In those bays the soldiers were landed
and employed in cutting wood and making fascines for the forthcoming
siege operations, the seamen meanwhile filling up the water casks,
four weeks already having passed since leaving Jamaica.
The ' Squirrel,' Captain Warren, which had gone to Cartagena from
Jamaica, rejoined the squadron on February 23rd and brought the
report that de Torres with fourteen ships had sailed on January 31st,
and was beheved to have gone to Havana; only three sail of the line
and six galleons were said to have remained at Cartagena. From
Petit Guave came the news that only seven sail of French men-of-war
lay there. Where d'Antin had gone was however still absolutely
unknown. He might, as the French officer had said, have returned to
Europe; but it was equally probable that this was merely misinforma
tion, and that he had really gone to Havana to join de Torres. Havana
was the nearest spot at which any body of the enemy of sufficient
strength to dispute Vernon's operations could be ; much time had been
lost already and further delays were dangerous. It was therefore de-
1 Cf. Mostyn's mistake off Brest March 18, 1747; Linois and Dance; Dewa's
reconnaisance of the Russian squadron, Feb. 9, 1904; and other similar cases.

no The West Indian Expeditions 1741
cided to take the risk of the two squadrons having joined, and to move
down to Cartagena at once. This uncertainty as to the whereabouts
of the French squadron must be fully appreciated in considering the
further operations1.
By this time the chances of success had been seriously prejudiced.
A combination of circumstances, some avoidable and some unavoid
able, had set a severe check on the progress of the expedition. The delay
in saihng from England, which could have been avoided if proper
precautions to watch the ports of the enemy had been taken at an
earher date, was the first and principal cause; Vernon's operations
were then hampered by the presence of the French squadrons in the
West Indies. Owing to their appearance he took the expedition to
windward to Port Louis ; in consequence the troops, instead of arriving
at their destination by the end of January, fresh and ready for the work
before them, spent another month on board the crowded transports
and did not reach Cartagena until' the beginning of March. The loss
of this month was not only of supreme importance in a region where
climatic conditions have to be so carefully studied, but may also have
altered the whole course of the campaign. If Vernon had sailed direct
for Cartagena there is a strong possibility that he might have met de
Torres' squadron at sea. The result of an engagement between a fleet
of twenty-nine ships and one of fourteen could hardly be doubtful.
It is even possible that he would have arrived off Cartagena before
de Torres sailed, in which case the entire Spanish squadron would
have fallen into his hands so soon as the harbour mouth had been
forced. That neither of these things happened was through no fault of
Vernon. The responsibility lay at home where the proper covering
for the oversea operations had not been provided. Instead of being
able to carry his expedition straight to its destination Vernon had
to go out of his way to deal with the French, and had also lain
exposed to a blow from Spain — a blow that did not fall only
because the Spanish Admiral failed to execute the well-conceived
instructions he had been given by his Government. These instructions
1 The following is a summary of the movements of the French (all in O.S.):
Aug. 14 Rochalart with 12 ships of the line sailed from Toulon;
Aug. 21 D'Antin with 14 of the line and 5 frigates left Brest; detached 4 ships
under Roquefeuil to cruise on Spanish coast;
Oct. 10 D'Antin arrived Martinique. Embarked about 1500 troops;
Oct. 27 D'Antin arrived Port Louis, Hispaniola;
Dec. 7 Rochalart with 8 ships joined d'Antin;
Dec. 28 Roquefeuil with 4 ships joined d'Antin;
Jan. 27 French sailed for Europe, leaving about 7 sail under Roquefeuil at
Petit Guave.

I741 The Fleet off Cartagena in
directed de Torres to attack Vernon whilst he was still in inferior
force before Ogle joined him; or, if Vernon retired to Jamaica, to
blockade him there. Vernon did retire to Jamaica, as the Spanish
orders anticipated, and a great opportunity was then open to de Torres.
He lay with a considerably superior force between Vernon's squadron
and the reinforcements that were coming to him from England, and
might have moved with troops from Cartagena immediately on Port
Royal and by a rapid blow captured both the squadron and the port
itself, the defences of which were weak. He might have cruised to
intercept the transports which were on their way, unprotected, from
the North American colonies. He did neither: and at length hearing
in January that d'Antin, whose help he had hoped for, was returning
to Europe, he hurried to Havana and remained there to defend it,
hoping at least that de Roquefeuil with the small, squadron left him
by d'Antin would join him — a hope doomed to disappointment1.
Vernon therefore remained unmolested and the transports arrived
without loss.
In accordance with the decision of the council of war to make
Cartagena the first objective, the 'Wolf was despatched to England
to inform the Government. The fleet sailed on February 25th. It
stood down to leeward and came to an anchor on March 4th in Plaza
Grande, the roadstead off Cartagena. The small ships were sent in at
once towards the northern end of the town as though a landing there
were intended, while the 'Weymouth,' 'Dunkirk,' 'Experiment' and
'Spence,' sloop, passed close along and examined the shore from Boca
Grande to Fort San Philip. They found only one small fascine battery
of six embrasures on that stretch of coast, but the heavy swell on the
beach near the town, rendered a disembarkation in that part im
practicable, and the result of the three days2 examination of the
shore led to a decision to get the fleet inside as soon as possible.
This involved an attack on the batteries guarding the Boca Chica.
From the plan it will be clear that the prevailing wind being east
by north to east-north-easterly the passage could not be rushed by
ships under sail so long as the shore forts and castles covering it
were in the hands of the enemy. Besides these forts, a boom was
in place across the channel, covered by the guns of four Spanish
ships of the line.
On March 6th the method of attack was decided on. Three 80-gun
ships— the 'Norfolk,' ' Shrewsbury' and ' Russell'— were to move close
1 De Torres' orders, and a letter from him expressing his intentions, were
found on board a Spanish prize and sent home by Vernon.
2 The fleet was anchored by the afternoon of March 5th. The bombardment
preparatory to landing began at 9 a.m. on the 9th.

112 The West Indian Expeditions 1741
in and bombard Forts St Iago and St Philip. The 'Princess Amelia'
and 'Litchfield' were to engage the battery of Chamba, the bomb-
vessels at the same time throwing their shells into Fort St Louis which
was outside the battering range of the ships' guns. When the forts
close to the shore should be silenced the troops were to land and take
Fort St Louis by assault; while in order to occupy the attention of
the garrison of Cartagena itself and prevent them from coming to the
assistance of the defences of the Boca Chica, Lestock's division was
to remain off the town and make a feint of landing there.
Vernon thereupon drew up his instructions. In these he clearly
explained the situation, saying that it was intended to attack Cartagena
vigorously by land and sea. The first thing to be done was therefore
to secure Boca Chica Castle and the forts covering the entrance in
order to block up the town effectually and secure a safe anchorage
for the transports ; the landing place was to be the small bay between
St Iago and St Philip — the point, he said, where de Pointis had landed.
His instructions then proceeded to describe the forts to the northward
of the entrance, and to insist that what was particularly required was
to engage all the batteries as closely as possible.
Thus far his memorandum was in the nature of a general survey
of the situation, giving broad outhnes as to the opposition he expected
and the methods by which this opposition should be overcome. He
then continued: "Having thus informed and instructed you according
to the best intelligence I have received, and furnished you with pilots
of the best abilities and experience I could procure, I rely on your
judgement and resolution for the due execution of my orders giving
such additional orders as you shall find to be necessary from the
motions and dispositions of the enemy and other events that may
arise in the vigourous execution of these orders." To Chaloner Ogle
he further wrote: "And the better to secure the success of your enter
prise you are to give orders to every respective Captain of your division
not to suffer any imprudent or hasty firing from their ships, which
only serves to embolden an enemy instead of discouraging them; but
to give strict orders not to suffer any gun to be fired from any of the
decks till the officers appointed to command on each respective
battery has seen to the pointing each gun he is appointed to have
the inspection over, and directed the firing of it, so that aU possible
care may be used to secure the success of this first attempt on which
the success of the whole so much depends; and they are to endeavour
to persuade and convince their men of the folly and imprudence of
hasty firing, which serves only to encourage their enemy and expose
themselves. And you are likewise in your orders in writing to assign

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1 74 l Opening of the A ttack 113
to each particular captain the post he is to take, and the order he is
to execute, that no one may have the least pretence to plead ignorance
of your orders, which you are to enjoin the due execution of, at their
utmost peril1."
The clearness with which Vernon's orders are drawn up is admirable.
The general plan of attack is made clear, the parts the different bodies
have to play are clearly set out to their commanders. There is nothing
rigid except that the ships will proceed to certain places with a certain
object in view, and the essential flexibility is attained by an ample
decentralisation of command. No attempt is made to predict all that
may happen or to provide for every eventuahty that may arise. The
commanders, unfettered by hampering instructions, are trusted to use
their own judgment and to act as unforeseen circumstances may direct.
On March 9th, all preparations having been completed and the
necessary information as to depth of water and other matters obtained,
the five ships selected for attacking the batteries moved in. They
anchored as close to the shore as possible and opened a devastating
fire with all their tiers upon the batteries. In less than two hours
the Spanish gunners were driven from their guns, the ships, except
the 'Shrewsbury,' suffering very small losses. That ship, whose cable
was cut by an unlucky shot in the forenoon, drove close in to the
harbour's mouth before she could be brought up, and received the
whole fire of the heavy inner forts and of the Spanish ships which
were moored inside the boom; and it was not until after dark that
she could be warped out of range, having lost over sixty men.
By noon the shore batteries were all silenced. The order was then
given to land the troops, and the grenadier companies to the number
of 500 men were ashore by 2 p.m. on Terra Bomba, and secured them
selves. Disembarkation continued during that and next day, and by
the evening of the" ioth the whole army was on shore. No advance
however was made. The nth was spent in landing tents and forming
a camp, the seamen working without intermission in getting the
artillery and stores on to the beach, most of the time in a heavy surf.
This dilatory manner of beginning the movement against Fort
Louis, whereby two days were occupied in doing nothing, was observed
by Vernon with extreme uneasiness. WeU acquainted with the climate
and not less acquainted with the character of the enemy and the art
of war, he foresaw that a continuance of these methods would spell
ruin to the undertaking. He and Ogle therefore wrote a joint letter
to Wentworth suggesting that an immediate advance through the
1 Vernon's report to Duke of Newcastle and Vernon to Chaloner Ogle. S.P.
Dom. Naval, 90.

1 14 The West Indian Expeditions 1741
woods to the inner side of the harbour, would, by isolating the castle
of St Louis by land, serve greatly to lessen the resistance of that
fortress. They further pointed out that if the troops lay about in the
sun a general sickness would be the result.
Wentworth did not adopt these suggestions but continued to form
his camp. Guards were placed to protect it, and the work of raising
batteries to attack the fort was begun. A mortar battery was ready
by the 13th, but the heavy gun battery was not finished until the 22nd.
Although the island where the troops were encamped was separated
by several miles of sea from Cartagena Wentworth entertained constant
fears of an attack and placed large guards on all sides of the camp
for its protection. This, besides harassing the troops unnecessarily,
took them from services in which they were required, and a shortage
of men was felt. Vernon was therefore applied to to lend his marines.
The Admiral declined to do so. His fleet was lying in an exposed
anchorage and might at any time have to put to sea, when all the
ships' companies would be needed on board; and, for another and more
important reason, the French and Spanish squadrons were at large,
and as intercepted letters shewed that they were acting in conjunction
the topsails of their combined fleet might at any moment appear
above the horizon1 Vernon could not risk being suddenly attacked
from seaward by an equal or superior force with a large proportion
of his complements on shore2. Even in fine weather re-embarkation
of a number of men would take time, which might prejudice his
tactical position. The unsettled weather, however, was already
making boat work difficult; a night attack from the sea upon the
Baradera battery had to be postponed for this reason on the 18th,
but was executed by Captain Watson on the 19th in a brilliant
manner, the battery being boarded and set on fire.
On March 21st another council of war was held, at which the
military representatives urged that the ships should attack the castles
of St Louis and St Joseph by bombardment. These castles were far
1 Vernon to the Duke of Newcastle, March 17th, 1741.
2 When Sir Cloudesley Shovel landed his men at Lord Peterborough's request
for the storming of the castle of Monjuich in 1705, the circumstances were wholly
different. The French fleet was located in Toulon where Shovel's cruisers were
watching it. The news of its sailing was immediately to be communicated to
the Admiral, who would have time to re-embark his men before the enemy's
squadron was upon him, and that they should be re-embarked in such a case
was an essential condition upon which he agreed to land them. In Vernon's
case it was not known where the enemy were, nor their strength. It was impossible
so to command the approaches with cruisers as to ensure adequate notice of
the enemy's approach; and if the enemy appeared on the horizon it would be
too late to begin embarking and getting his large fleet under way and formed
in line of battle.

I74I Ships versus Castles 115
more formidable works than St Iago, St Philip and Chamba. Vernon
and Ogle reluctantly agreed to make the attempt, though, as they set
out in writing, it was against their judgment as seamen to risk the
ships in battering castles of such strength. The 'Boyne,' 'Prince
Frederick,' 'Hampton Court,' 'Tilbury' and 'Suffolk' were placed
under Commodore Lestock's orders for this service, with most strict
injunctions that, in order to prevent confusion, he was to give
the captains positive orders "not to have their men to the guns till
the ship be safely anchored where she will have your orders to post
herself for battery."
On the 23rd the ships moved in and attacked St Louis Castle and
the battery. The depth of water did not permit the ships to get closer
in than 700 yards from St Louis and 900 yards from St Joseph's. At
such a range the ships were at a great disadvantage. "'Tis most
certain," wrote Lord Elibank, "that where a ship can come within
musket-shot of a fort there is no withstanding her. The constant fire
from three tier of guns, joined to that of the small arms from the
poop and tops, make it impossible for an enemy to stand to their
guns, and indeed such a fire is irresistible. But it is quite otherwise
where a ship attacks at a distance; for besides that it is impossible
to take aim from a ship so well as from a battery, every shot that
hits any part of a ship has its effect. The sides of a ship are so far
from covering the men that the splinters do more execution than the
ball itself, and every man on board is more exposed than if he had
nothing to cover him."
It was in such circumstances as these that the ships attempted
to batter the castles. For two days a gallant attempt was kept up,
and then, with their ammunition expended, the 'Boyne,' 'Prince
Frederick' and 'Hampton Court' severely damaged, Captain Lord
Aubrey Beauclerk and a large number of men killed, they were ordered
to withdraw. No effect had been produced on the castle and the
squadron was diminished by the disablement of- the ships.
A second assault had now to be made on the Baradera battery,
which the Spaniards had succeeded in repairing after the previous
attack on the 19th. Watson was sent in again on the afternoon of the
24th, and this time having daylight to work in, not only made a
thorough business of the battery, but afterwards hauled his boats
across the narrow spit of land behind it, and pulled into the harbour,
where he captured and burnt a sloop which had served as ammunition
carrier for the battery. This assault was even more brilliant than
the preceding one.
In spite however of the evidence given by the destruction of the

116 The West Indian Expeditions 1741
Baradera, that a resolute assault would drive the enemy from his
positions, Wentworth would not attempt to carry Fort St Louis.
Within two days of the completion of his heavy battery on Bomba
Island several of the guns of the castle had been dismounted, and a
breach had been made on the third day — the 25th. Vernon wrote on
the 23rd suggesting that as the castle had then been well battered
for twenty-four hours it might be taken by assault; and next day he
wrote again, saying: "The longer you delay the attack, it will be the
harder work for you." On the morning of the 25th the naval council
again wrote, urging an energetic attack: "Diffidence of troops," they
wrote, "we fear tends only to discourage them; and in our opinion
you have numbers sufficient for finishing the attack of such a paltry
fort with vigour, that has no outworks." Further, they expressed the
opinion that long distance battering would never do any good, as the
enemy would keep them in play till sickness destroyed the army.
"As we are best acquainted with this intemperate climate," they
wrote, "we think it our duty... to advise your pursuing more vigorous
measures as most conducible to the preservation of your mens' lives
from the ravaging sickness."
Whether the naval officers were right in thus giving their unasked
for opinions to the General as to the best way of conducting a siege
may be questioned. Their duty was to assist in any operation in which
the ships and men could be of use; but in offering views upon a purely
military concern they went beyond their province. It may well be
that Wentworth chafed under these letters, and in the manner of
many a weak man, obstinately took the opposite course. The excuse
for the Admirals is that they had long experience of the climate and
of the Spaniard in those parts, and knew that once sickness set in
more men would die in a day than would be lost in a direct assault
on the walls. Besides this their large fleet was lying in an open
roadstead, its ground tackle was being cut to pieces and the need for
getting the ships into the shelter of the harbour was an urgent one.
For these reasons their impatience was great and must be allowed
for1. But neither Vernon nor any other seaman would have tolerated
interference from a military officer in a corresponding naval operation,
and it is natural that Wentworth should have resented the attempts
of the seamen to dictate the manner in which he should conduct his
business. Probably however the Admiral's opinions could have been
proffered in a more tactful form, and friction might have been avoided
if this had been done. But it is greatly to be doubted whether it were
really possible for two men of such different temperaments as Vernon
1 Compare the case of Hood at Capri in 1793.

I74I St Louis Castle taken 117
and Wentworth to work harmoniously in company. In truth, it was
a misfortune that they came to be associated1.
Up to this point however the friction had not become acute, and
in reply to Vernon's letter of the 25th, Wentworth wrote to say that
a sufficient breach having been made in the walls of the castle he would
assault it. Whether or no Vernon had been right in making the
suggestion, the result justified his views.
On receiving Wentworth's letter the Admiral at once ordered the
bomb-vessels to be ready to support the assault by a bombardment
of St Joseph's Castle. A party of seamen under Knowles, who had
with him Captains Watson, Cotes, Dennis, Cleland and Brodrick was
also ordered to make a diversion on the Baradera side to draw the
Spaniards to that part. When all the preparations were completed
the grenadiers advanced against the castle. No sooner was their
approach seen than the garrison hung out a white flag and beat the
"chamade" for surrender. But the flag not being made out, nor the
"chamade" understood by the British officers, the advance and firing
continued, and the garrison fearing that this indicated that no quarter
would be given, incontinently fled, so that the castle fell into the hands
of the army without trouble and with the loss of one man only. The
misunderstanding about the "chamade" was however unfortunate, and
it caused the escape of the 500 men of the garrison, who got away to
swell the ranks of the defenders of Cartagena city. That the fort was
in no condition to withstand assault is shewn by the words of an
officer who took part in its capture. "It was surprising," he wrote,
"to reflect upon their having kept this place so long, for besides the
breach in the walls the embrasures were aU knockt down and of 90
cannon only two remained fit for service, with one iron mortar of
vast diameter2."
While the troops were assaulting St Louis Castle, Knowles landed
his party of seamen and soldiers at the Baradera. Seeing the panic
which was taking place at the castle he immediately manned his
boats, pulled into the harbour along the southern shore, and with his
boats' crews stormed St Joseph's Castle, all unbreached as it was.
Having taken this work by about 10 p.m. he rowed to the 'Gallicia,'
1 The reason for the great failure at St Domingo in 1654 was the impossibility
that Penn and Venables should work together, and Cromwell, great man that
he was, knew where the fault lay and unhesitatingly laid on himself the blame
for having allowed those two officers to be sent on a joint enterprise.
2 An account of Admiral Vernon's attempt upon Cartagena in the West
Indies Add MS. 3970; see also Narrative of Lord Elibank in Hardwicke Papers,
Add. MS 35898; Journal of Captain Knowles (P.R.O.); Naval Chronicle; and
Vernon's letters to the Duke of Newcastle; besides the various published discus-

118 The West Indian Expeditions 1741
the Spanish flagship, which had been deserted by all but sixty men and
fell an easy prize. Knowles then cut the boom and the cables securing
it; the entrance to the harbour was now open except for the wrecks
of the 'San Carlos' and 'Africa' which the Spaniards had deserted
and sunk in the main channel. Of the remaining men-of-war the
' San Philip ' was burnt, but the ' Conquistador ' and ' Dragon ' together
with some other shipping lay out of reach in the carenage off the
town. Next day — the 26th — the Admiral began moving his fleet into
harbour. The sunken vessels had to be shifted and the whole fleet
and transports had to be warped in through the narrow channel. The
labour was great, but by the evening of the 27th the whole of the
ships were berthed inside. It was none too soon, for the weather was
tempestuous, the holding-ground bad and ships' cables were badly
cut. Once inside Vernon wasted no time in pressing his advantage. The
' Burford ' and ' Orford ' worked up to within gunshot of Castillo Grande
on the evening of the 26th, and the 'Gallicia' was converted by the
carpenters of the fleet into a floating battery to bombard it. Knowles
was sent in the 'Weymouth,' with the cruiser sloop, to destroy the
batteries at Passo Cavallos and seize the hulks there as a first step
towards isolating the town. These batteries were demolished by the
28th. Sixteen cannon were nailed up, and Knowles rejoined the fleet
in the upper part of the bay.
When he had anchored the fleet in security Vernon felt justified,
as weU he might do, in writing a triumphant despatch, which he sent
home at once by Captain Laws. The ease with which the Baradera
battery, St Louis and particularly St Joseph's Castles had fallen, and
the abandonment by the Spaniards of four ships of the line without
an attempt to defend them, gave him confidence that the enemy would
not stand if they were pressed vigorously. The capture of the town
should therefore follow quickly.
The news of the imminent fall of Cartagena ran hke wildfire through
Europe. Vienna, St Petersburg, Turin and the Hague received it
with rejoicing, Paris and Madrid with acute depression, and Europe
suddenly turned from its own affairs to those of the New World.
Cardinal Fleury foresaw that the French trade of over sixty million
livres annual value would be lost, and that all his efforts to keep
France out of the war must fail. "He has the unhappiness of seeing
that the conquest which the Enghsh have just made, places them in
a condition to become masters of the American trade and to carry
further weight in the great affairs of Europe; and that if he wishes

I74I Weak Spanish opposition ng
to oppose her in it he must come into a general war, which he greatly
dreads1." Preparations for the new landing began on March 30th, when a
council of war decided to put the troops ashore on the east side of the
harbour and isolate the town by a cordon across the neck of land join
ing the lake to the bay, running behind La Popa Hill. The Spaniards
at the same time proceeded to block the approaches to the town by
sinking eight galleons, all the shipping in the harbour, and their last
two 64-gun ships in the main channel. While this was being done they
evacuated Castillo Grande, the large fortress mounting 60 guns which
commanded the approaches. Captain Knowles, whose eye missed
nothing, observed the stores being removed. He at once pointed this
out to Ogle, who ordered him in to attack the fortress. Knowles
weighed immediately, laid his ship alongside the fort and opened a
fire which was not returned. The garrison had abandoned it.
The failure to retain this strong work besides giving further evidence
of the quality of the opposition which any determined attack would
receive, opened the way to the town, made the removal of the hulks
sunk by the Spaniards an easier matter, and rendered it possible to land
the troops closer than had been intended. A day's hard work sufficed
to clear the fairway. By April 2nd the bomb-vessels were in position
to open fire on the town, and the ' Weymouth ' cruiser and eight fire
ships were warped in to cover the landing by scaling the bushes with
their fire. On the night of the 5th the disembarkation was begun at
Texar de Gracias, three miles from Madre La Popa. No serious
opposition was met and by noon on the 6th it was completed.
Everything now depended upon rapid and determined action.
But the General was unable to relax the strict rules of his art to
meet the conditions of a combined operation, and again time was
wasted in forming camps and in consultations. Letter-writing began
again with vigour but no advance was made. In vain Vernon and
Ogle on that day reminded Wentworth of the approach of the rains,
which once they had begun, would not allow further operations. "As
every day's experience," they wrote, "has shewn the Spaniards are
an enemy that cannot stand being vigorously pushed we cannot but
advise you against slow proceedings as what may prove of greatest
detriment to your forces, it being plain the enemy are infinitely
better provided with engineers than you2, and will have the advantage
1 Chambrier to Frederic II, June 5th, 1741. Les prMiminaires de la Guerre de la
Succession d'Autriche.-M. Sautai, pp. 361, 362. Cf. corroborating this Mr Thompson
to Duke of Newcastle,' S.P. Foreign France, 1741.
2 Mr Moor, the principal engineer, had been killed in the operations round
St Louis Castle. \

I20 The West Indian Expeditions 1741
of you in everything depending on carrying on works of that
kind." The mihtary council of war had however decided to march to La
Quinta and there encamp, and thither they went led by General
Blakeney. They passed through a wood in which a few of the enemy
were posted, with a loss of only one man killed; and coming to a
clearing where a road crossed the bush path and a large house com
manded the approaches leading to the city, found a detachment of
about 500 Spaniards drawn up. As soon as an attack could be developed
on the position these also gave way and retreated pell mell for the
town. Now was the moment for a dash! The enemy, wholly de
moralized, were on the run, the road was open for the city gates, and
there were those present who thought that a rapid pursuit would have
carried the British troops into the city with the fleeing Spaniards1.
But a fatal caution, a fear of ambushes and stratagems, and a lack of
appreciation of the total want of moral in the forces opposed to him,
weighed strongly with the General. Instead of following up his success
he recalled Colonel Grant from his pursuit, and proceeded to encamp
and post guards for his own defence. A council of war was held to
decide how to capture the hill on which the convent of Madre La Popa
stands. But while the council was deliberating the question was
solved for them. A party of "marauding American soldiers," with a
most reprehensible disregard of the proprieties of war, climbed the
hill themselves and occupied it without the slightest opposition.
The only remaining outwork was the fort of San Lazar. This was
a small square building mounting six guns on each face, the walls
of which were about fifteen to twenty feet high. The western face is
approached by a fairly gentle slope which was covered by the guns
of the town. The approach to the southern face is very steep and in
accessible, and that to the eastern is also broken and steep. The northern
face, although narrowed, presented the best line of approach as it is
led up to by an easy slope, but troops ascending it were enfiladed by
the guns on the eastern bastions of the town2. Although however
the fort was a sufficiently strong little work it was commanded by
a hill not more than 300 yards from it, the ascent to which was some
what steep but not impracticable. A battery mounted on this hill
would have knocked the fort to pieces in a few hours.
1 Lord Elibank's narrative; also Add. MS. 3970. Lord Hervey 's Journal
says: " 'Twas the opinion of most of the generalls that had we pursued the enemy
in their retreat we should with very little trouble have gained San Lazar." Lord
Elibank expressed the view we should have gained the town itself.
2 It is to be noted that the bearings given by Beatson in his description of the
town are wrong. He has turned the place round through eight points to the right.

Road to Cartagena

The original fort

FORT ST LAZAR FROM THE NORTH

Hill on which guns were to
be mounted by engineers

I74I Preparations to attack St Lazar 121
Two whole days went by during which the General neither advanced
to seize the fort by assault nor took steps to raise a battery on the
hill. Vernon urged an assault at once. Wentworth considered the
fort must first be reduced by battering, and requested that the squadron
might bombard it — a wholly impracticable suggestion in view of the
range. Vernon replied by reminding Wentworth that when de Pointis
took Cartagena he did not wait for a breach, but recognising the
danger of the climate, rushed the foot of the walls and scaled them;
and he suggested that if the foot of the walls were reached they might
be mined and blown up. So paltry a fort, said he, needed no battering,
but if the General was of the opinion that a battery was necessary,
the fleet would provide the guns and get it ready so soon as the engineers
should have selected the position in which they wanted it raised. The
engineers however could see nothing but difficulties in getting the
battery erected on the commanding hill. Mr Armstrong, now the
principal engineer, gave as his opinion that to get the battery in place
would take so many men and so much time that injthe circumstances
it would be impracticable, for the rains were now beginning and the
mosquitoes were already at work. Sickness among the troops had
increased terribly, and each hour's delay was adding to the quota of
the victims. The engineers also confirmed Vernon's opinion that the
walls were not too high to be scaled, adding that there was no ditch
and that the approach was not difficult. From what point they had
made their reconnaissance cannot be said; but while the slow advance
of the army had been made the Spaniards had busied themselves
digging entrenchments outside the walls, so that, in the opinion of
an officer1, the outworks were now stronger than the fort itself.
Urged by Vernon to go on "sword in hand2" and the place would
fall, advised by his engineers that the walls could be carried by assault
and that a battery could not be raised, Wentworth, after a heated
discussion at the military council in which Blakeney and Wolfe strongly
took the opposite view, decided to assault the fort at daylight on the
morning of April 9th. Fifteen hundred troops were ordered for the
attack, the remainder — some 500— being kept as guards to the camp.
The main assault under Guise was to be made on the eastern — the
steeper of the two possible faces, — and another under Colonel Grant
on the northern face. At 3 a.m. the advance began. The troops carried
woolpacks and scaling-ladders and advanced as silently as possible,
led by a locally obtained guide. Colonel Wynyard, who led one column,
particularly requested that Colonel Blane, who had made a recon-
1 Colonel Burrard, Add. MS. 342°7-
2 Letter of 8th of April, Vernon to Wentworth.

122 The West Indian Expeditions 1741
naissance two days before, might accompany his column as guide, but
Wentworth refused this, "bidding him follow the guides he had
appointed1." On the eastern side the enemy was ready and received
the attack with a hot fire at twenty paces, and the troops, instead of
rushing the entrenchments with fixed bayonets, advanced slowly,
carrying out "street firing" and losing heavily. On the northern face
no better result was obtained. No sooner was the alarm given by the
outguards than the guns in the town joined in the defence with a
flanking fire. In a description written by Colonel Burrard2, he says,
"We received a continual fire of their cannon from the town and fort
and their batteries, which swept off many of our men being quite
exposed to their shot, and when we drew near enough for them to make
use of their muskets their fort and batteries seemed one continuous
hght. The men behaved with the utmost resolution but 'twas our
misfortune to attempt an impossibility. 'Tis true we got up to their
breastworks and drove them from their trenches but what could we
do when we came up to the fort we found it surrounded by a very
deep trench and the walls of the fort too high by ten feet for our
ladders, and we in return firing against their stone walls." A one
sided battle in which Colonel Grant fell, mortally wounded, continued
for over two hours, after which the attack was abandoned and the
troops withdrew, having lost about 600 men and 43 officers. The
500 men in camp were not sent to make a demonstration on the
southern face which might have assisted the assault, but remained
behind, an unused reserve. No feint had been made against any other
part, and Grant, in the agonies of death, exclaimed that the General
ought to hang the guide and the King ought to hang the General.
According to Captain Watson, who commanded the naval force that
took part in the attack and met the Spanish officers when burying the
dead afterwards, the Spaniards fully expected the fort to be taken
and said that it might have been "if other methods had been pursued."
The squadron was unable to give any help in the attack as a bombard
ment of the town at long range could not have assisted the assault
on the hill; it would not have served to withdraw any of the fire from
the eastern walls which caused such losses to the troops ascending
the northern face; and no battering at the southern face, which was
the only one the ships' guns could reach, could have had any effect
on the action proceeding at the outwork.
This repulse at San Lazar had a most depressing effect on the
troops, and not less so on the leaders. On April ioth another council
1 Lord Elibank's narrative.
2 Letters of Col. Burrard, Add. MS. 34207.

I741 Decision to abandon the attempt 123
of war was held by the mihtary commanders at which it was agreed
that the forces now remaining were insufficient to provide guards for
the camp, much less to raise and work batteries against the fort ; and
unless the fleet could arrange to provide men not only to get the guns
up but also to man and work the batteries the whole enterprise had
better come to an end. A very acrimonious correspondence followed,
ending with a letter from Vernon saying that the sea-officers could
give no opinion as to where the batteries should be placed, but if the
General would say where he wanted them, the seamen should not
only raise and fight them, but storm the breach as well ; and if it was
desired to isolate the town and the General could not spare troops
or feared being cut off, seamen should also be landed to do this;
but the last danger was not a real one for he had given instructions for
the 'Dunkirk' and a sloop to support the outlying party on its calling
for help.
On receiving this letter Wentworth proposed a council of land and
sea-officers, which sat on the 14th of April. At this meeting the General
represented that he had now only 3500 men left out of the 8000 with
whom the attempt had been begun; these were dying daily and it
would take at least a fortnight to raise the batteries to bombard
San Lazar during which time sickness would still further reduce the
force. After a heated debate the decision was made to abandon
the enterprise and re-embark the army. Orders to this effect were
therefore given, and the 'Gallicia,' fitted with protective lockers of
sand round her batteries and manned by 300 volunteers, was sent
in at 5 a.m. to moor as close alongside the main walls of the town as
possible. The difficulty of warping a ship close to the shore batteries
under a heavy fire, combined with a defective knowledge of the
soundings, prevented her from being placed with exactitude1. She
maintained nevertheless a hot action for several hours in which she
lost one-fifth of her crew. Then, in a sinking condition, she was
abandoned after a gallant but too unequal fight. The exact reasons
for sending her on this fatal service are not easy to determine. It is
clear that it had been contemplated to use her to cover the embarkation,
as the report of the naval council of war of three days earlier shews.
She was to be supported by the bomb-ketches, but these vessels had
expended all their ammunition. Vernon, in a letter to the Duke of
Newcastle, says that the ' Gallicia ' was sent in "to satisfy gainsayers,"
meaning, perhaps, to prove to the General by an ocular demonstration
1 The criticism in one of the contemporary attacks upon Vernon, that the
'Gallicia' could have gone closer in since galleons could moor alongside, leaves
out of account the different circumstances in which they reached that position.

124 The West Indian Expeditions 1741
that the fleet was not able to do more in the capture of fortresses
than it had done. But it is difficult to see why he should think this
necessary after the ample evidence of March 23rd, when to satisfy
Wentworth he had made a similar attack against St Louis. If his
object were merely to stifle criticism it was one unworthy of him and
quite uncalled for.
Whilst this engagement was proceeding the remains of the army
were embarked and as soon as the transports were warped out of
the harbour they sailed for Jamaica. The fleet, before following them,
destroyed all the captured shipping, carried off such stores and masts
as would be of service, and blew up all the forts that had been taken.
It may be questioned why, having gained the Boca Chica and
possessed themselves of the harbour the commanders of the expedition
did not think it worth while to retain those dominating points. The
Council in London had previously considered the retention of Cartagena
as a permanent possession with the object of proceeding thence to
seize the mines in the interior, but the place itself would have been
too expensive a possession. It would have saddled the army with
a large permanent garrison requiring complete renewal every two years,
and the navy with the provision of a squadron to attend upon the
garrison. These objections applied with less force to the castles at the
entrance. They could have been held with a much smaller force
and their retention would have placed in our hands a tremendous
weapon against Spanish trade. By holding them and keeping an ob
servation upon the Spanish naval forces in the west, the trade of
Cartagena would have been stopped as effectually as that of London
was stopped while the Dutch rode outside the Thames. Not a ship
could have passed in or out, and as the shipping of the harbour
had been destroyed, troops from the city could not have retaken the
forts on the island of Tierra Bomba. A squadron operating from the
bay could have had the trade of the coast at its mercy.
Such at least was the view Sir John Norris was quick to take
when the news of the failure of the expedition reached London.
The retention of the harbour mouth he said "could have prevented
the Spaniards the use of the coast and have been a means to enable
the Government to treat with Spain towards a peace: which being
abandoned takes from us the advantages we might have had in
treating with them; for [if] we could have kept that port the
Spaniards could not have got any effects from the kingdom of Peru
by the West Indies. And by taking the castle of Vera Cruz they would
likewise be debarred the use of the kingdom of Mexico. That must
have brought us the advantage of a good peace and commerce with

J741 Plans to attack Santiago 125
them." The wise old Admiral shews herein the clearness of his states
manship and his strategy. His words form a confirming comment on
the dictum of de Criss6 that the object of war is peace.
In considering what their next move should be after the failure of
the attempt on Cartagena, it will not be just to assume that the
desirabihty of garrisoning the castles and retaining what they held was
overlooked by the commanders. Lord Ehbank, in his account of the
expedition, refers to the idea, saying that the occupation of Boca
Chica would be as good a§ holding Cartagena. It is probable that
with the troops dying, and the harbour becoming daily more un
healthy as the rainy season approached, it was deemed impossible
to leave either ships or men in the place with any hopes what
ever of their surviving1. Hosier's losses at Porto Bello had not yet
been forgotten, and this blockade of Cartagena — for such it would
have amounted to — would have been but a repetition of Hosier's
terrible pacific blockade of the Bastimentos. At all events the decision
to abandon the place was taken, and the castles having been blown
up and all stores of any value embarked, Vernon sailed on March 6th
followed next day by Ogle, and on the 9th by Lestock with their
respective divisions. After a beat to windward to examine the French
harbours the Admiral returned to Port Royal on the 19th. No signs
of the French squadrons were seen.
Meetings of the naval and military commanders and the Governor
of Jamaica were at once held to discuss further operations. Intercepted
despatches had disclosed that the defences of Havana had been greatly
strengthened and the garrison increased, so that no attempt against
it was practicable with the forces available. Trelawny put forward
the favourite Jamaican idea of an attack upon Panama but the other
officers considered this undesirable. After several days' discussion it was
decided on May 26th to attempt to capture Santiago. This place, as
Vernon had pointed out in an earlier letter to the Duke of Newcastle,
lay between the main base of the French in Hispaniola and that of the
Spaniards in Cuba. If France should come into the war its possession
would thus be of high value to us. It was moreover an important privateer
base on the flank of the main channel of outward trade to Jamaica.
Finally, there was the question of an ultimate conquest of Cuba which
was in the minds of the Ministry though Vernon himself doubted its
possibility. Though the forces at the disposal of the General were
wholly inadequate to invade Cuba without considerable reinforcement
the occupation of Santiago could be effected by them and a pied a terre
1 Even the delay of the few days which were spent in demolishing the castles
cost a great many lives (Lord Elibank's Narrative).

126 The West Indian Expeditions 1741
secured which would be of service if more comprehensive operations
should be ordered later.
The strategy of making the attack upon Santiago has been com
mented on in such adverse terms that it deserves consideration. The
criticism1 is based upon the argument that the conquest of Cuba was
the chief object in view, and therefore "sane strategy" would have
dictated firstly the annihilation or neutralisation of that formidable
"potential fleet" at Havana and secondly the dealing of a blow at
the heart instead of at the extreme end of the island.
If the conquest of Cuba had been the chief object, and if the military
resources had been adequate to undertake it, there is much to be
said for this view. But neither of these conditions was present. The
commanders carefully considered that question and rejected it as
impossible, but knowing that the Ministry contemplated sending out
reinforcements and that the capture was greatly desired by the Cabinet,
they decided to utihse the time at their disposal by undertaking the
lesser operation. In view of these actual facts the sweeping criticism
falls to the ground, unless it should be said that even in an attack
upon Santiago the proper station of the fleet was one of observation
of Havana. Vernon however had orders, dated September 25th, 1740,
to send back to England as soon as possible all ships beyond those
necessary for local superiority. In his cruise to windward after leaving
Cartagena he had been able to satisfy himself that the French had
now certainly returned to Europe, and as the Spaniards, according to
report, had only nineteen ships of the line in West Indian waters, he con
sidered it essential to act upon those orders and to detach his surplus
eleven ships to England; this he made ready at once to do, placing
them under Lestock's command and sending with them the homeward-
bound trade. The remaining squadron would not have been sufficient
to furnish the necessary escort to an expedition and maintain a blockade
of Havana, considering its distance from the base and the prevailing
winds; considerations which make it clear that Vernon was not so
deficient in strategical insight as his critic imphes.
No offensive operations could be begun until the fleet had been
refitted and replenished. As soon as the ships were ready, Lestock's
detachment sailed for England, and on June 30th Vernon, with the
remainder and the transports, sailed from Jamaica for Guantanamos
Bay where they arrived on July 18th.
After a reconnaisance of Santiago a council of war sat on July 20th
to decide the method of attack. Captain Rentone who had made the
observations reported that the high land, the faihng breezes inshore
1 History of the Royal Navy, Laird Clowes, vol. n. p. 77.

GUANTANAMO BAY

J741 Delays at Santiago 127
and the strong forts covering the narrow entrance made a sea-attack
impossible, and Vernon with his own experience of attacking castles,
concurred in this view, after having personally made an examination
of the entrance. The Council thereupon agreed that the attack
must be made by land1. It was therefore determined to land the
army at Guantanamos Bay, march to the heights overlooking the
town, and assault the defences from that direction. It was further agreed
that when this had been successfully accomplished Santiago should be
held and future movements must depend upon the arrival and strength
of the reinforcements which were expected to be coming from England.
The troops were therefore landed, and an advance was begun
against the village of Catalina, but ceased abruptly before reaching
that point. The same hesitations which had marked the mihtary
operations at Cartagena were repeated, and with them the campaign
of letter writing began. Vernon and Ogle wrote a joint and strongly
worded protest to the effect that the service was not being conducted
with zeal. Wentworth replied that the squadron ought to have forced
the mouth of the harbour — an operation agreed to be impossible by
the general council of war which included himself. Although protesting
that the advance on Catalina was impracticable, he nevertheless
resumed it, and arrived there without encountering the smallest
resistance. On this success Vernon wrote an encouraging and friendly
letter, complimenting him upon his success, urging a further rapid
advance and expressing the opinion that the only enemy to be feared
was delay. He promised further that directly the troops arrived above
the Morro he would cooperate off the harbour's mouth with the
fleet; but he declined to land more than a comparatively small number
of his marines for the same reason as he had refused to do so off Boca
Chica: the Havana squadron might still have to be engaged.
Wentworth now saw nothing but difficulties. The road was long,
the enemy might be industrious and resolute, though of industry
or resolution they had not yet given a sign. The . burden of his
reply was that there might be opposition to his march and that if
there were, nothing could be done. Again Vernon and Ogle wrote,
urging that the danger was surely small and that a little vigour and
determination would overcome it; but they wrote in vain. For over a
month the only campaign which was conducted was one on paper, in
which the General argued that it was quite impossible to do that for
which he had come. Yet during all this time small parties, wholly
unmolested, were going out in all directions, bringing in cattle as they
1 Cf. Norris's views on this general question as expressed in the discussion
in Council to attempt Ferrol.

128 The West Indian Expeditions 1741
pleased, and meeting resistance nowhere. Vernon in desperation went
round again to Santiago on September 2nd to see whether he could
not force the harbour mouth, but the narrow entrance and the un
certain breezes inshore, in which the ships would he at the mercy of
the batteries, convinced him that such an attempt would be useless.
September passed without anything further being done. The
operations had dwindled down to an occupation of Guantanamos Bay,
and all efforts to stir Wentworth into a more energetic pohcy failed.
The men fell sick with appalhng rapidity, and more than half were
down with agues and fevers by the end of the month; fifty-one died
in the last week of the month and twice as many in the following
week. " Our inactive situation is very melancholy as well as useless,"
wrote a correspondent. "Our men are very sickly and die fast, more
from want of necessaries than the inclemencies of the chmate, I fear.
Some die from their own excesses in drink1." So the army dwindled
away, dying in camp from its own immobility.
To a man of Vernon's temperament such inaction was maddening,
and it may well be imagined that he expressed his feelings with little
restraint, till personal communications between the commanders
became impossible. At the end of September the Admiral wrote to
the General saying that in future all communication between them
had better be made in writing. But no representations, whether verbal
or written, made any difference, and October passed as September
had done, the list of sick and dead steadily increasing with each week,
until some companies which had embarked at Jamaica seventy strong
could muster only six men.
The fleet suffered less than the army, for Vernon, seeing that the
Spaniards were as inert as his colleague and that no danger was to
be feared from them, sent his ships cruising. His instructions had
enjoined him to attack Spanish trade and protect our own. Keeping
only a small body at Guantanamos to attend upon the army and
protect it against attack by privateers, he dispersed the squadron on
six cruising stations for that purpose in the main lines of trade2. This
1 Sam. Speed to Duke of Montagu. Montagu Papers, Hist. Man. Com. Report.
2 The stations were as follows:
(i) To windward of la Hacha, to intercept ships outward bound from Spain
to Cartagena or Porto Bello ;
(ii) Between Cape Corrientes and Grand Camanes, for ships from Cartagena,
Porto Bello or the Caraccas going to Vera Cruz or Havana;
(iii) On the north side of Cuba to intercept ships going to Havana by the old
Bahama Channel;
(iv) To windward of Cape Francois to protect British trade coming from North
America;
(v) Off Cape Bacca to protect trade passing along the south side of Hispaniola;
(vi) Off Santiago.

174° Reduction of Vernon's squadron 129
dispersion had its dangers ; in the face of an energetic enemy it would
have been impossible. But Vernon rightly gauged that his enemy
would be inactive, and with a squadron only equal in numbers to that
at Havana, he at the same time covered the military operations and
protected and attacked trade. Herein lies one of the many differences
in character between Vernon and Wentworth. The former, after
experience of his enemy's behaviour, drew conclusions as to what he
was hkely to do and acted accordingly, adopting measures which were
not risky because he knew that the enemy would not take advantage
of the weakness of his dispositions. The latter never appeared to get
the measure of the enemy's character.
The demands for ships in home waters in the late summer of 1741,
owing to the difficulties of keeping the Mediterranean squadron up to
a strength sufficient for the operations under Haddock rendered it
necessary still further to reduce Vernon's squadron. Orders, dated
August 17th, reached him late in October, directing him to send home
eleven unsheathed ships that they might be refitted and made ready
for the spring campaign. He had shortly before made a detachment
of five, having learned that the Spanish squadron at Havana had
been reduced to sixteen ships. This made a great drain upon his
strength, but he proceeded at once to make four more ships1 ready,
which was the most he felt he could spare, reducing however their
crews to bare saihng complements in order to keep up the strength
of his remaining ships. This detachment reduced his squadron to
twelve ships whose duties were numerous. De Torres with about
sixteen was still at Havana, the Spaniards and the French were
reported to be preparing ships at Cadiz and Toulon which might be
coming his way, and the army had to be covered. The protection
of British trade moreover had latterly become increasingly difficult.
The Spanish privateers, driven by Vernon's cruising ships from the
favourable areas hke the Windward Passage and the track south of
Hispaniola, had extended their operations further north and were
even meeting ships as far away as lat. 300, to the southward of
Bermuda, entailing a far greater effort upon the British cruisers. Spread
over a wider area the privateers were more difficult to deal with by
cruising methods, and the only satisfactory manner of securing the
trade was by convoying it through the whole of the danger zone. The
smaller ships — sloops and lesser craft — were scattered in the channels
used by the trade, the more powerful ships were employed in convoys,
and the bulk of the ships of the line was massed in a squadron to
cover the operations of the army. The defeat of this squadron, Vernon
1 'Orford,' 70; 'Prince of Orange,' 70; 'Suffolk,' 70, and 'Prince Frederick,' 70.

R. N. 1.

9

130 The West Indian Expeditions 1741
remarked1, would overthrow all the other objects; for the ring would
then be broken and the whole organisation would fall to the ground—
a very good example on a small scale of the complementary duties
of ships of the hne and cruisers.
The further reduction in his squadron led to a council of war being
held on October 31st to review the situation. Attacks upon Havana,
Cartagena and Panama were all once more discussed and rejected.
Havana was too strong — as it had always been — Cartagena had already
repulsed an attack by a force stronger and in better health than the
army then available, and Panama was so far to leeward of Jamaica
that if a French war broke out that island might be in danger. It was
therefore decided to remain at Guantanamos and await the arrival of
reinforcements in sufficient numbers to allow of an attack on Santiago.
The decision was an unfortunate one. How many more troops were
expected is not stated, but apparently not more than 3000. If the
original force, of which about 1500 men were now out of action, had
been considered inadequate, the extra number would not counter
balance the increase in strength of the defences at which the Spaniards
had been labouring for three months.
Thus for another three weeks a deplorable inactivity continued; it
was brought to an end by the alarming increase of illness during
November. No less than 2260 men were down with fever on the 24th
of the month, and each day shewed a rising sick rate. It was therefore
decided to abandon the expedition, and the troops after occupying
the ground round Guantanamos for four months were re-embarked and
carried back to Jamaica. Vernon, bursting with rage at the miserable
conduct of affairs, asked permission of the Duke of Newcastle to return
to England as he desired "no longer to be conjoined to a gentleman
whose opinions I have experienced to be more changeable than the
Moon." In spite of the disappointing results of their previous conferences,
another council of war was held on arrival at Jamaica to consider a
fresh enterprise. Trelawny again suggested Panama and received the
support of a naval lieutenant called Lowther — a gentleman until lately
a pirate, but to whom a commission had been given for services which
he had rendered to the fleet. Lowther knew the isthmus of Panama
weU and considered it perfectly practicable to carry artillery up the
Chagres River as high as Cruces, whence a good road and open country
led to Panama. This was the old treasure route used in the season
when the river carried water enough for navigation. It avoided the
long and difficult land transport of cannon across from Porto Bello
1 In letters. October 31st, 1741.

I742 Decision to attack Panama 131
by the paved treasure path through the bush, and, from the nature
of the surroundings of the river, an attack upon the boats would be
practically impossible. The troops could land at Porto Bello and march
by the road, unencumbered by heavy baggage. The distance was about
forty-five miles. The scheme appeared feasible to the Council, and
they decided to make the attempt. Lowther was sent at once to Porto
Bello in the 'Triton' sloop to reconnoitre and return with his report
as soon as possible. The ships were prepared for sea and the army
for further service, Lowther having laid stress on the necessity that
everything should be ready for a start immediately he returned with
his report, in order that the expedition might be carried through
before the rains began. The rainy season at the isthmus of Panama
is something of a misleading term: it rains there nearly all the year,
but more persistently in that season than at other times.
On the 15th of January the expected reinforcement consisting of
3000 men — rather more than had been lost at Santiago — arrived from
England. A fortnight later the squadron was in a condition to sail.
The troops however were not yet ready, for the requisite negro transport
had not been obtained. The employment of negroes in any capacity
other than in the plantations was often a very difficult matter to
arrange, owing to the opposition of the planters who resented the
slaves being taken away from earning their master's fortunes. The
gentlemen of the West Indies, in whose interests so many lives of
soldiers and seamen were sacrificed, and so much money spent, gave
but a poor assistance to the Mother Country. The merchants supplied
the enemy with stores to enable him to continue his depredations, the
shipowners seduced the seamen from the king's ships to man their
privateers, and the planters put obstacles in the way of the employment
of negroes, vehemently opposing the formation of black regiments
which would have saved the lives of thousands of British soldiers.
On this occasion their unwillingness to co-operate added another
to the many difficulties of the expedition. The months slipped by.
On March 2nd Vernon wrote and reminded Wentworth that time was
everything; delay would spell ruin. He suggested that the expedition
should get away at once without waiting to complete the number
of negroes, but the General said he could not do this. The army would
not be ready, he said, until the 6th, nor, if he sailed at once, could
he land until the negro transport arrived.
Next day Vernon received information that a Spanish squadron
was reported to be on its way to Cartagena carrying troops. Leaving
Ogle with the remainder of the ships to convoy the army, he got to
sea with the ' Boyne, ' ' Mountagu,' ' Worcester,' ' Defiance ' and two small
9—2

132 The West Indian Expeditions 17 42
craft and stood over to La Guayra in the hopes of intercepting them,
with instructions to Ogle to join him off Cartagena. He cruised on
and off Playa Grande, Cartagena and the coast to windward, seeing
nothing of the Spaniards, and getting more impatient each day, until
the 25th of March, when the transports (from Jamaica) and their
escort came in sight. The whole force at once bore up for Porto Bello
and arrived there on the 28th. As usual Vernon had prepared his
orders in advance giving full instructions as to how the squadron was
to approach the harbour, to anchor, and to begin the operation of
landing. After anchoring a naval council met and decided to send
boats up the Cascajal River at once and cut off the communications
between Porto Bello and Panama. This was about to be done when
Vernon received the astonishing request from Trelawny for the use
of a ship to take him back to Jamaica! The expedition had been
abandoned before a soldier's foot had been put on shore. With the
troops ready to land, with news that Anson was in the vicinity of
Panama, with Lowther's report that the garrison consisted of but 450
men and that the place could certainly be taken, a military council
of war decided not to make any attempt. The reasons for this surprising
decision were twofold. It was said that this weakly garrisoned place
could not be taken with less than 3000 men, and, owing to sickness on
the voyage, the force now amounted to only 2032, and that as the
rainy season was so close it would be undesirable to make the attempt.
Both these reasons may have had some justification, but Wentworth
before leaving Jamaica when reminded by Ogle that the season was
getting late had replied that he anticipated no difficulty from the
rain. Now, however, he anticipated every difficulty and used it as
an argument to support the conclusion that the enterprise was im
practicable. As far as the numbers were concerned Panama was a
weakly defended place by land, its garrison was small, and even two
thousand men would seem to have a good chance of success against
it. In any case the reasons for abandoning the attack were of a kind
which, even had they been sound, should — and could — have been
advanced sooner. It was too late to make these discoveries only at
the moment when, after three months preparation, the expedition
arrived at the port of disembarkation. "More changeable than the
moon" seems indeed a not inappropriate description of the character
of Wentworth. As the General had come to this decision there was nothing to do
but to return. The last of the convoys sailed for Jamaica on April 9th
and Vernon foUowed on the 14th with the two flagships, two 7o's,
four 6o's and three small craft. He first beat up to Cartagena to see

1742 Vernon and Wentworth recalled 133
if anything were passing intfiat part, and then stood up to Jamaica,
fetching the western end of the island at Blewfields where he landed
on the 12th of May and returned by land to Port Royal.
Councils of war again met to discuss the situation and any further
operations. To Vernon's mind the attitude of France had again become
a most disquieting feature. Intelligence from the Mediterranean
shewed that France was adopting an attitude in those waters
similar to that which she had adopted in the West Indies, and
he inferred that her active participation in the war must soon follow.
This he proposed to anticipate by taking the army to Leogane, the
French station in the west end of Hispaniola, and capturing it. The
proposal was not adopted, and finally all that this great armament
effected was to seize and garrison the little island of Ruatan, off the
coast of Honduras, with the object of securing it as a base from which
to protect and attack trade.
Henceforward trade defence and attack formed the principal object
in the West Indies. Detachments from the squadron had gradually
reduced it to eight sail of the line. The Spanish squadron at Havana
rarely fell below fourteen, but varied in strength according to the
convoys. Both squadrons occupied themselves with the defence of
their own trade in their own way, and, in the end of 1742 both Vernon
and Wentworth were recalled, and they returned to England.
Vernon's return may be said to mark the termination of the pohcy
of conjoint naval and military operations in the West Indies. Though
proposals for further territorial attacks on a smaller scale were made
at a later date, they were none of them of the magnitude of those of
1740 and 1741, and were rather concerned with the immediate defence
of trade than with any great strategical object of bringing the enemies
to a peace. Perhaps the termination of the policy may be said to be
dated with the accession of Carteret to power, the last act of Walpole's
administration being the despatch of the reinforcement of 3000 men
at the end of 1741.
It is the fashion to attribute the failures in the West Indies to
Vernon, and to speak of him in a contemptuous and disparaging
manner. His capture of Porto Bello is treated as an operation of no
importance, and the failure at Cartagena is put down to his overbearing
and arrogant attitude towards his colleague. He is summed up as a
boasting creature of no solid qualities, though in reality the boasting
attached to his name was none of his doing, but was the outcome of
the spirit of the time. His success at Porto Bello was made much
of, not by him, but by the Ministry, who hoped to derive credit for
their conduct of the war from it. The foolish mob believed the Ministry

134 The West Indian Expeditions 1741-2
and made a hero of Vernon for an action which in its practical execution
was of no very great difficulty. What should be borne in mind in
relation to the taking of Porto Bello is Vernon's attitude towards the
operation. He had spoken of it as a place that could easily be taken,
when other men beheved it to be impregnable. When the opportunity
came Vernon attacked it as he had said he would, in a manner which
was beheved to be the incarnation of rashness; but Vernon saw no
rashness in the attempt. He believed that if he could get close enough
he could destroy the castles and take them, and he did so. He beheved
this without knowing how very weak the place actually was — as the
despatch of de la Vega shews it to have been; it is this accurate
judgment and resolute execution more than the absolute operation
which entitles him to credit.
Vernon is described by a contemporary1 as "Mr Vernon that
provident great Admiral who never suffered any useful precaution to
escape him." It is impossible to read Vernon's despatches, his orders
and his instructions, without concurring in this description and seeing
that he was a careful, competent and resolute commander. The repulse
at Cartagena was the result of a series of causes, the first link in the
chain of which was the incompetent Administration at home. Every
canon of the art of war was broken by the Ministry. War, which was
rendered nearly certain when Newcastle played a double game and
rescinded the order to recall the Mediterranean squadron on March 6th,
1739, became quite certain when Spain failed to fulfil her obligations
on May 25th. Yet, while the Ministry pursued a pohcy which was
nearly certain to lead to war, and when it became evident that war
would be the outcome, they did nothing towards making the necessary
preparations for the result they were courting. It was not until over
six months from May that a decision was come to as to the plan of
war that was going to be pursued, and, when this decision was reached
the news of it was known in Madrid as soon as in Whitehall.
Following upon this, the expedition was prepared in a leisurely
way. Transports were not ordered till December. Owing largely to
the unreadiness of the fleet, but also to the manner of employing it,
the Spanish ports were not watched, and reinforcements to the garrisons
of Cartagena, Havana and Vera Cruz sailed from Spain without let
or hindrance. Walpole spoke truly enough when he said that single
ships or even small squadrons could not be prevented from sailing;
but no attempt worthy of the name was made to prevent them, nor
were the measures taken such as would hamper the movements of
whole squadrons or fleets. At a time in which Vernon had under his
1 Probably the writer was Lestock.

i74I-2 Responsibility of the Administration 135
command a force of twelve ships, mostly crippled from want of stores —
a failure of supply for which the Administration was responsible —
a Spanish squadron of seventeen sail and two French squadrons
making twenty-two sail were permitted to put to sea and to proceed
unhindered to act as their Governments might have ordered them.
It was no thanks to the foresight or strategy of the Ministry that
Vernon was not destroyed before ever Ogle and his reinforcement saw
the coast of San Domingo, nor indeed that that reinforcement and
army ever arrived there. If the pohcy of France had been directed
by men who appreciated better than Fleury the true interests of their
country, or if the Spanish Admiral had intelligently executed the
orders given him, they would never have done so. Vernon recognised
the position more correctly, as men are apt to do when they themselves
are in the position of danger. He saw that the French squadrons
formed a bulwark against his contemplated operations, and inferring
with justice that Monsieur d'Antin "was not come to the West Indies
to take the air," as soon as he had his fleet together he proceeded
against that detachment of the enemy — the French— whose where
abouts he knew of, with the definite intention of destroying it. What
lay in his power to remedy the deficiencies of the strategy of the
Government, Vernon did, at the risk of a very remarkable stretch of
his instructions.
In estimating the blame of the failure one must further consider
that, besides the delay of a year in sending the expedition, the troops
of which it was composed were largely raw men. The Ministry had
in their power, notwithstanding the low state to which the army had
been reduced, to send regular troops of seasoned men; but this they
did not do on account of France, the Jacobites and the fear of invasion.
"If we had no disaffected party among ourselves," said the Duke of
Newcastle, " or if we had at the beginning of the war no enemy but
Spain, we might perhaps have ventured to have sent a few of our
regular troops for attacking Spain in the West Indies, before we had
replaced them by new levies: but neither of these was the case... if
the Spaniards had found means to land 4 or 5000 regular troops in
any part of Great Britain or Ireland, at a time when we had not a
sufficient number of regular troops for its defence, the invaders would
have been joined by such a'number of the disaffected as would have
made it very difficult for us to support our Government at home,
and consequently utterly impossible for us to attack the enemy, or
even to defend our own dominions abroad1."
1 Parliamentary History, vol. xi. p. 711 et seq. Debate in the Lords on a
Motion for Admiral Vernon's Instructions.

136 The West Indian Expeditions I74I-2
Having thus done nothing to reduce the difficulties of a most
arduous undertaking, the Government despatched it at a time which
left a very narrow margin to allow for chmatic conditions. They
made the force unnecessarily large and thereby delayed its departure.
Fewer men sent earher would have done the business. Indeed, if
3000 troops under an able commander had been sent at the beginning
of the war, it is well within the bounds of possibility that Vernon, as
he said he could, might have taken Cartagena. There still remains
however the undoubted fact that the best was not made of the bad
situation, and that in spite of the politicians Cartagena might still
have been taken. For this Vernon is commonly held responsible, and
the failure is put down to his brutal insolence to Wentworth, his
boisterous and peevish manners. Even incidents so remote from tactical
or strategical considerations as his catching turtle for the ships'
companies and not for the army are employed as arguments to prove
his share in the failure. But no boisterous manners or brutal insolence
on the part of the Admiral could have been the cause of Wentworth's
pitching his camp where the enemy's shell fell into it, of his assaulting
St Louis Castle too late, or of his making no proper arrangements for
the attack on St Lazar. All these were matters in which Vernon,
whatever he might think and whatever he might say, had no part.
That Vernon used every method from advice to action to expedite
the undertaking admits of no question. Indeed, the fault to be found
with him is that he offered too much of the former; but for all that,
what he offered was good. It was for the General to accept or reject
the advice. He chose to reject it at St Louis and to proceed against
the castle by the slow methods of Low Country warfare, whereby his
men became saturated with fever; he accepted it at St Lazar but made
ineffectual arrangements. If success had crowned the undertaking the
honour would have been his. So also must failure lie at his door.
That harmonious co-operation between naval and mihtary com
manders is essential to success in a conjunct operation is an axiom
needing no elaboration, but it is doubtful whether harmony were
possible between two men so fundamentally different as Vernon and
Wentworth. If it were shewn that Vernon in any case held back and
failed to render assistance when it lay in his power he would deserve
great blame: but that is a wholly different thing from saying that his
manners were the cause of the failure.
These conclusions might safely be drawn from Cartagena only,
did it stand alone. But it does not. At Santiago and Panama
there were the same indecision and lack of initiative in the
military commander. What Wentworth was at Santiago, so he

I741-2 Vernon and Wentworth 137
was at Cartagena : and we have only to read the despatches, the letters
of officers who took part, and the reports of the councils of war to see
clearly whom, of the officers on the spot, to blame. Had the Administra
tion at home been in the hands of a Chatham and the mihtary direction
in the hands of a Peterborough, Wolfe, "No-flints" Grey, Aber
crombie, Auchmuty, Moore, or any of the brilliant soldiers whose names
illuminate our record of amphibious warfare, we never should have
heard a word about Vernon's pride or incompatibility of temper, and
the actual operations in the West Indies in 1741 and 1742 would form
a chapter we should read with pride.

CHAPTER VII
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR OF THE
AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION
Events in Home Waters 1741
The West Indian expedition of which the outcome has just been
described was well upon its way towards the theatre of its operations
when Parliament met on November 18th, 1740. Threatening as the
attitude of France had been — she had followed up at the time of its
departure her uncompromising declarations of opposition by the actual
step of despatching two considerable squadrons to enforce them — there
had yet existed a hope that an alhance might be arranged in Europe
which would deflect her energies into other channels, more favourable
to the employment of British sea power. This hope however had been
dashed to the ground by the death of the Emperor Charles VI on October
20th. In place of the grouping of powers, with defined objects in view,
which Walpole had desired to create, an unknown and precarious
situation faced England. The King's speech in the House of Lords on
this occasion reflected the anxiety with which Ministers viewed the
European situation. "The great and unhappy event of the death of the
late Emperor," so it ran, " opens a new scene in the affairs of Europe, in
which all the principal Powers may be immediately or consequentially
concerned. It is impossible to determine what turn the pohcy, interest
or ambition of the several courts may lead them to take in this critical
conjuncture. It shall be my care strictly to observe and attend to
their motions, and to adhere to the engagements I am under to the
maintaining of the balance of power and the liberties of Europe: and
in concert with such Powers as are under the same obhgations or
equally concerned to preserve the public safety and tranquillity, to
act such a part as may best contribute to avert the imminent dangers
that may threaten them1."
These fears that the "interest or ambition" of the several courts
might be productive of complications were quickly realised. Claimants
for the whole or for parts of the Hapsburg dominions sprang up on
every side. Among those who came forward to wrest her heritage
from the new Queen Maria Theresa were the heads of many states
1 Parliamentary Debates, 1740.

I7I4~4° European changes since 1714 139
which had agreed to guarantee her succession. Their demands became
henceforth a dominant factor in British naval policy.
Spain had never been satisfied with the terms of the Treaty of
Utrecht by which she had lost, besides Gibraltar and Minorca, her
territories in northern Italy. Sicily had been ceded to Savoy; Naples,
Sardinia, Mantua and Milan fell to Austria. In 1714 King Phihp of
Spain had married the Princess Elizabeth Farnese, heiress to the Duchy
of Parma and claimant by virtue of her descent from the Medici, to
the Duchy of Tuscany, and smarting under the recent losses, the able
Italian Cardinal Alberoni was bent on using the claim as a lever
to restore the Spanish power. Time, however, that essential factor
both in war and statesmanship, was denied him. Hurried by his
masterful Queen the Cardinal's hand was forced in 1718 into a pre
mature effort to recover Sicily and Sardinia. A quadruple alhance of
England, Austria, France and the United Provinces, all parties to the
Treaty of Utrecht, brought an end to this attempt; and after a two
years' war the Spaniards were ejected from both Sicily and Sardinia,
the former of which was transferred at the peace to Austria and the
latter to Savoy, whose reigning Duke thenceforward took the title of
King of Sardinia.
The war of the Polish succession saw a further readjustment. The
Grand Duke of Parma having died in 1731, the succession to the
Duchy passed to Don Carlos, son of the King of Spain and Ehzabeth
Farnese. On the marriage of Maria Theresa, heiress to the Emperor,
with Francis of Lorraine, yet another redistribution of territory took
place. Louis XV objected to the increase of the Empire which would
occur through the addition of Lorraine, and that duchy was in con
sequence ceded to France, the Duke receiving Tuscany and Parma in
exchange, while Don Carlos was given the Kingdom of Naples. The
Queen of Spain thus saw the territories to which she laid particular
claim forcibly torn from her son, and transferred to the House of
Austria. Herein lay seeds of further trouble.
The two sons of Leopold I were without male issue, and the Emperor
had therefore made special provision that the daughters of the elder,
Joseph, who were married to the Archduke Charles Albert of Bavaria
and the Electoral Prince of Saxony, should have precedence over those
of the younger, Charles. Joseph died in 1711. His brother, on suc
ceeding to the throne, at once began to make arrangements for the
succession of his own daughter in disregard of his father's wishes.
Having passed a secret law which transferred the precedence to her,
he proceeded steadily to obtain from the Estates of the Empire and
the Powers of Europe an assent to her rights. After years of diplomatic

140 Beginning of the European War 1740
bargaining, in the course of which he was obhged to make substantial
concessions, he obtained the guarantee, known as the Pragmatic
Sanction, for his daughter's succession, from all the estates and Powers
except Bavaria and the Palatinate. Among the concessions was the
transfer of Parma, Placentia and Guastalla to Don Carlos, an agreement
which was abrogated in the Treaty of Vienna by the placing of Don
Carlos as related above, on the throne of Naples.
Charles had however neglected the measure essential to secure that
the treaties should be observed. He had an insufficient army to enforce
them. The Archduke of Bavaria, by virtue of his marriage with the elder
daughter of Leopold I, claimed the Imperial crown itself, in spite of
the fact that his wife had renounced her own title to it. Spain demanded
the Itahan Duchies, which the Queen desired as an establishment for
her son, the infante Don Philip. Minor claims were made by other
powers : but the height of iniquity was reached by King Frederick of
Prussia who concealing his actions with protestations of recognition
and offers of mihtary help, invaded Silesia in December, sending at
the same time a message to Vienna that if the Queen would cede that
province to him he would assist to maintain her claims to the remainder
of her dominions. Maria Theresa indignantly repudiated the suggestion;
but she was hampered by her father's neglect of military measures.
The Prussian army rapidly overran Silesia; its capital, Breslau, fell
into Frederick's hands.
The Prussian example was quickly followed. Bavaria and Spain
prepared to support their claims by force of arms, and the grouping
of the Powers began. Although France had been one of the guarantors
of the succession, and her Prime Minister admitted that the Elector
of Bavaria had no claim whatever to the Imperial Dominions1, she
began negociating with Bavaria, Spain and Prussia with the view of
placing the Elector of Bavaria upon the Imperial throne, assisting
Prussia to secure Silesia and Spain to obtain territories in Italy. The
aim of this policy is evident. Not only would France's great rival,
Austria, be weakened, but the Emperor having obtained his crown
through the good offices of France would develop into a friend and an
ally. Maria Theresa appealed to the Powers who had given their word
1 " If the pretensions of the Elector of Bavaria had some foundation, and if
it had been possible to find in the dismemberment of the heritage of the Emperor,
some opening of which advantage could be taken in favour of the most serene
Infante  but.. .it is clear by the will of Ferdinand Ist that the House of Bavaria
has not any right to the Austrian succession." Fleury to Philip V, Nov. 24th (N.S.)
1740. Les Priliminaires de la Guerre de la Succession d'Autriche, Sautai.

1740-1 Effect on the West Indian area 141
to recognise her claims, but without success. Among others she applied
to England for the 12,000 troops promised by that Power1. England
however was already deeply involved in her struggle with Spain, the
bulk of her army was on the Atlantic, and such as remained could
not be spared out of the kingdom when at any moment European
affairs might take a turn which would bring France into the conflict
against her.
As events turned out the war did not immediately become general,
nor did France take any further steps which threatened England. The
operations against Spain were therefore for the time unaffected, and
no alterations were made in the dispositions of the British squadrons
or the instructions to their commanders. Although the situation in
the West Indies was admittedly dangerous, and there was considerable
uncertainty as to how it might develop, it was not looked upon with
any grave anxiety even when, at the end of January, the fact was
definitely established that the two French squadrons had joined, and,
reinforced by some troops from Martinique, lay at Port Louis in
Hispaniola. They might be intending to attack Jamaica, as Vernon
suggested in a letter written when he learned of their arrival in that
part; but in the opinion of Sir John Norris, given at a Council meeting,
their choice of this station was in accordance with the intentions with
which, according to our information, they had been despatched. "As
Port Louis is towards the west end of Hispaniola and near the Wind
ward Passage, and consequently to windward of all S. America they
may have taken that station to intimidate our people from attempting
anything on the Spanish settlements2." There was every reason to
believe, from our information from Paris, that Vernon would not be
interfered with by the French until he made a move against some
Spanish port. Vernon could well be depended upon to exercise his
judgment wisely according to the situation and not to expose his
expedition to the risk of destruction at sea. It was always possible
that the French and Spaniards might act independently of each other,
and if they did so the British force could cope with either; but even
if they joined and proceeded to attack Vernon, Norris considered that
he would have a fair chance against them in spite of his inferior numbers
as he could strengthen the complements of his ships so greatly by
means of the troops of the expeditionary army. The Council thus
felt that no reinforcements need be sent to the West Indies.
1 Her letter was discussed in the Cabinet meeting of January 15th, 1741.
2 Diary of Sir John Norris, January 29th, 1741. Describing Council meeting
discussing letters received from Vernon. Present : the Lord Chancellor, Duke of
Newcastle, Duke of Devonshire, Lord Harrington, Sir Robert Walpole, Sir Charles
Wager and Sir John Norris.

142 Beginning of the European War 1741
At home however matters were less satisfactory. It was reported
in the early days of January that the French had taken ten or twelve
sail of their East India ships, each mounting some 50 to 60 guns,
into the Royal service, and that ten ships were fitting out at Ferrol
besides some galleons which were being armed as men-of-war. To
oppose these there was no British force ready. There were about nine
sail of the hne that might be fitted out, but none were manned, and
without some other stronger authority to raise men than the Admiralty
possessed Sir Charles Wager said he saw no possibility of providing
crews for them. "It requires the utmost diligence," wrote Norris on
hearing this, " to do everything in our service to get a fleet in condition
superior to the naval force of those two kingdoms or else we shall
not get well out of this war."
The first step was taken a fortnight later, on February ist, when
a strict embargo was laid on all shipping and it was announced that
no merchant vessels would be allowed to sail until the fleet was manned.
A Bill for the registration of seamen, the terms of which compelled
them to serve in the navy if called upon, was drafted by Wager and
Norris and submitted to Parliament. It called forth a vigorous debate.
Its promoters urged the undeniable need of manning the fleet and
the danger to which the Kingdom would be exposed if the ships could
not be prepared. Its opponents, among whom was Pitt, denounced it
as an encroachment upon liberty and an injustice to one particular
class of men, in that they alone of all others should be selected for
compulsion. The Bill was rejected by a large majority. Thus, between
Parliament's opposition to take measures of either compulsion or
concession and the seamen's refusal to come forward and serve, trade
was paralyzed, the fleet was impotent and the Kingdom exposed to
the enemy. The want of some means of rapidly expanding the personnel
of the fleet was a factor which must not be lost sight of in considering
the operations of this war. On this occasion its results were very
far reaching. The delays in fitting out the fleet affected the whole of
the operations of this year, and reacted upon the subsequent cam
paigns in every theatre.
A means which had not been used did however exist and had been
suggested by Norris. Marines could have been raised for the sea-
service at an earlier date, and the manning of the fleet made, as it
should have been, their first duty. In opposing the Bill for compulsory
service of seamen Sir John Barnard, among many others, drew attention
to this: "The Marines that have been raised too lately to be of any
service," he said, "might with the same ease have been levied sooner:
they might have been dispersed in proper proportions among the

1741 Difficulties of manning the Fleet 143
crews of our men-of-war, where, by instruction and example, the
business of a common sailor might have been quickly learned, and our
merchants might still have had a sufficient number of sailors to enable
them to carry on their business1."
The embargo lasted from February ist till April 14th. On March
28th the merchants petitioned for its removal, but their petition was
dismissed in Parhament by 166 votes to 95. The Admiralty then
offered to remove the embargo if the merchants would guarantee to
contribute a proportion of their crews to man the men-of-war, and
in the end an arrangement was made by which the merchants bound
themselves to carry landsmen as one-third of their crew and to supply
one man in every four to the King's ships. By this means the Mercantile
Marine was made to serve as an agency for the provision of men.
The need for hastening the preparation of the fleet was accentuated
in the middle of March when it was learned that d'Antin's squadron
was on its way home, a report which evoked a great outcry in France
where the commander was severely censured for abandoning the West
Indies and leaving the British forces at hberty to act as they chose2.
In view of the strong feehngs which were reported to exist as to his
return and this repeated declarations of Cardinal Fleury that France
would oppose any British attempts, it was felt that some important
reason must exist for this movement, connected in all probabihty with
the European situation ; and this view was accentuated by a declaration
of the Cardinal that he did not consider France bound by the Pragmatic
Sanction3. The efforts to get a fleet ready in the Channel redoubled.
But although the embargo and the agreement with the merchants
was now producing men, the crews were coming in but slowly, and
when the French squadrons returned to their home ports in the middle
of April4 there was still no force ready to deal with them. As it turned
out, the return of these squadrons could not immediately affect the
situation. It was soon learned that no sinister purpose underlay their
changed plans. Illness had decimated the crews of whom over 2000
were dead, and the ships were so foul that it would be some time before
they could again be ready for service. One cause for immediate anxiety
was thus removed, and though reports soon arrived which stated
that France was working with the utmost expedition to refit the ships
1 Parliamentary Debates, 1741. See also Norris's proposals. Appendix 1.
vol. 1.
8 S. P. Foreign, France. All the information from France shews how much
the squadron had been relied upon to prevent the British from increasing their
possessions and engrossing the trade of that part of the world.
3 Mr Thompson to Duke of Newcastle, April &, S. P. Foreign, France.
4 Rochalart with seven ships reached Toulon on April A- The remainder
arrived at Brest on April A-

144 Beginning of the European War 1741
and intended to put out a fleet of 50 sail, it was known that so great
a result could not be quickly obtained.
The news of the capture of the forts and harbour of Cartagena
reached London on May 17th and sent up the spirits of the Administra
tion beyond words. Captain Laws of the 'Spence' sloop brought
Vernon's despatches and attended at a meeting of the Council at the
Cockpit, at which he described the operations to the members of the
Council. This opened up a new situation. With Cartagena taken, as
the despatches provided good reason to hope that it would be, it
would no longer be necessary to keep so large a naval force in the West
Indian seas. The French had all, or nearly all, returned, and it was
at the same time reported that Don Roderigo de Torres had sailed
for Spain from Havana with twelve sail. In view of this Norris recom
mended that some of Vernon's force should at once be recalled, and
that 2000 troops should be despatched to garrison Cartagena and
enable further attacks to be made on the Spaniards. The Council
however rejected this advice, twice proffered1, and decided to wait
until Vernon's success was complete. The Commander-in-Chief received
this decision with grave forebodings, since he had no sufficient squadron
in readiness at home if the French should come into the war: "It is
highly necessary," he wrote, "all the force of our navy should assemble
at Spithead, as France and Spain are doing all they can to get their
naval force in condition for the sea2."
Before the news of the capture of the approaches to Cartagena had
been received our Ambassador in Paris sent over the information that
at last France and Spain had arrived at an agreement3. At the same
time another most disquieting piece of information came in. The
British squadron which had been watching Cadiz had been blown off
in a gale, and the Spanish squadron had seized the opportunity and
sailed to Ferrol where it had joined the other division. Combined with
the activity at Brest these reports gave rise to serious apprehensions.
A hot press was ordered on June 2nd, and Norris received instructions
on the nth to repair to Spithead with the utmost despatch and take
command of the fleet, the ships of which were scattered in the various
ports of the Kingdom4.
1 At the Council meetings of May 19th and May 27th.
2 Diary of Sir John Norris, May 27th, 1741.
3 Mr Thompson to Duke of Newcastle, May 20th, N.S. (May 9th O.S.)
4 'Victory,' 100; 'St George,' 90; 'Cambridge,' 80; 'Bedford.'
70; 'Buckingham,' 70; 'Kingston,' 60; 'Assistance,' 50 At Spithead
'Nassau,' 70  AtPortsmouth
'Royal George,' 90; 'Royal Sovereign,' 90; 'Duke,' 90;
'Marlborough,' 90; 'Essex,' 70  At the Nore
'Elizabeth,' 64; 'Ruby,' 50  At Plymouth
'Lenox,' 70  In the Downs

I741 The Havana Squadron 145
A few days later another factor entered into the situation. The ,
Havana squadron of seventeen sail under Admiral de Torres, bringing
the treasure from Vera Cruz, was definitely reported to be on its way
home, and our Ambassador in Paris sent the information that so scarce
was money now in Spain that the court of Madrid were most anxiously
awaiting the arrival of this squadron. So much were the Spaniards
in need of ready money that the expedition preparing at Barcelona
was at a standstill for want of it. When the financial condition of <
Spain at this time and her entire dependence upon her West Indian
fleets for ready money are taken into consideration, the importance
attached by our Ministers to intercepting the treasure will be appre
ciated. It was not a mere piratical attack for the sake of gain ; it was
a means of preventing Spain from being able to carry on the war1.
New instructions to Sir John Norris, dated June 18th, 1741, were
issued. They ran as f ollows :
"Whereas we have received advice that a squadron of Spanish ships has
passed from Cadiz to Ferrol and since put to sea again from Ferrol; and whereas
there is reason to suppose that ten or twelve Spanish ships of war lately gone
from Cartagena to the Havana may be soon expected in some of the ports of
Old Spain; and whereas we have also accounts that ten French men-of-war are
now at Brest ready to put to sea, and that they may be strengthened by more
ships now in the port of Brest. We have thought it for his Majesty's service
to order you with the ships named in the margin2 or with such of them as shall
be ready and such others as may join you, to proceed forthwith to Cape Finisterre
and to continue cruising between that Cape and the mouth of the Channel.
And you are during your said cruise to commit all manner of hostilities against
the Spaniards, and to take, sink, burn or otherwise destroy all Spanish ships
and vessels that you shall meet. And particularly you are carefully to look out
for the Spanish squadrons which is supposed to be coming from the Havana to
Old Spain, and may probably be intended to put into Ferrol, and to use your
utmost endeavour to intercept and take or to sink, burn or otherwise destroy
the ships belonging to the said squadron.
2. And you are to distress and annoy the Spaniards in the best manner you
are able either in their ports or on their coasts. And whereas it would be of great
importance to his Majesty's service that the Spanish ships of war or privateers
which may be in the port or harbour of San Sebastian, or in any other of their
ports in the Bay of Biscay, or in Gallicia, should be destroyed, you are (in case
you shall find it practicable) to attempt it, either by going thither yourself with
your squadron, or by detaching such a number of ships as you shall think proper
for that purpose. And you are to detach cruising ships to intercept and take
the Spanish privateers (and especially those from San Sebastian) or any other
Spanish ships: and to procure what intelligence you can of the motions of the
enemy. And you are in the best manner you are able to protect the trade and
1 Cf. letters of Mr Thompson of June 14th, 23rd and 30th, all emphasising
the urgent Spanish need of money at this moment. S. P. Foreign, France, 1741.
2 'Victory,' 100; 'Royal George,' 90; 'Royal Sovereign,' 90; 'St George,' 90;
'Duke,' 90; 'Marlborough,' 90; 'Cambridge,' 80; 'Bedford,' 70; 'Buckingham,'
70; 'Nassau,' 70; 'Lenox,' 70; 'Essex,' 70; 'Elizabeth,' 64; 'Rupert,' 60; 'King
ston,' 60; 'Assistance,' 50; 'Ruby,' 5°; 'Argyle,' 50; 'Newcastle,' 50; 'Bridge-
water,' 20; 'Success,' 20. Bomb-vessels, 'Thunder," Blast," Carcass," Lightning.
Fireships, 'Scipio,' 'Blaze.' Hospital ship, 'Sutherland.'
R. N. 1. IO

146 Beginning of the European War 1741
commerce of these kingdoms, and particularly the homeward and outward bound
merchant ships.
3. If you shall have an account that the French squadron now at Brest (of
which you will constantly get the best intelhgence you can as well with regard
to their number as their motions) should be gone into the Mediterranean, you are,
in that case, to detach from the squadron under your command such a reinforce
ment to Admiral Haddock as you shall judge proper, and at the same time to
send him the best accounts you can procure as well with respect to the motions
of the French as of the Spanish squadron. But if you should find that the squadron
from Brest should be come towards the Channel, or shall have reason from
your intelhgence to believe that the said squadron is preparing so to do, you
are in that case, so to dispose the squadron under your command as to be able
to follow them immediately, and carefully to watch and observe their motions.
And if they shall commit any hostility against any of bis Majesty's ships, or on
the coast, you are to oppose them with your squadron and to use your utmost
endeavours to take, sink, burn or otherwise destroy them.
4. You are to keep a constant correspondence, as opportunity shall offer,
with Rear Admiral Haddock and to send him from time to time the best intelli
gence you shall be able to procure of the motions of the Spaniards, in order the
better to enable him to perform the services on which he is employed : and there
will be herewith put into your hands, for your information, copies of the orders
that have been lately sent to Mr Haddock, as also a list of the ships which are
at present under his command.
5. You are to continue cruising two months from the time of your sailing
unless you shall find it necessary in consequence of these instructions to return
sooner into the Channel, or shall receive directions for that purpose. And you
are to transmit constant accounts of your proceedings, with such intelligence
as you shall be able to procure of the motions and designs of the Spaniards, and
of the French ships at Brest, and of everything that may relate to his Majesty's
service to one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, with whom you
shall constantly correspond; or to the Secretary to the Lords Justices. And you
are to follow such farther orders and directions as shall be sent to you by one of
his Majesty's said principal Secretaries of State, or by the Secretary to the Lords
Justices1." In obedience to these instructions Norris went down to Portsmouth
to take command of the fleet. Only nine ships had arrived and these
were short of complement, but some marines from the Thames and
two regiments of foot — Jeffrey's and Powlett's — were daily expected,
and also some nine ships from the westward.
While Norris lay at Spithead, impatiently awaiting his ships and
men, news reached London that France had defined her attitude and
had determined to assist the Elector of Bavaria with 30,000 men2.
Her entry into the sea operations in Europe might therefore follow at
any moment, and, what was of still greater importance, she had no
further fears for her position in the West Indies for it now was known
that the assault upon Cartagena had failed. This news the Duke of
1 Signed by Lord Wilmington (President of the Council), Lord Hervey, Dukes
of Dorset, Grafton, Bolton, Montagu and Newcastle: Earl of Pembroke, Sir
Robert Walpole and Sir Charles Wager. These instructions, particularly in the
wording relating to the protection of trade, should be compared with those of
the preceding June.
2 Mr Thompson to Duke of Newcastle, July i (N.S.) 1741, S. P. Foreign, France.

I74I The Channel Squadron sails 147
Newcastle at once sent off to Norris, and it is interesting to see how
readily the advice of the Admiral was sought although it was so httle
acted upon. The Duke asked his opinion as to how these two events
of the "highest importance" should now affect us. He was clearly
anxious lest the sailing of the fleet to Finisterre should leave the
Kingdom exposed. Norris replied that there was no need for uneasiness
on this point, since the French could not dare to attack us with our
Fleet at sea and its whereabouts unknown to them. There could indeed
be no greater deterrent to any move by sea on the part of France
than the existence of an unlocated fleet of uncertain strength. As to
the West Indies, Norris replied that he had insufficient information as
to the general situation to offer an opinion1.
The next day — June 27th — the regiments and some more ships
having arrived, which brought his squadron up to sixteen heavy ships2,
Norris sailed. He detached the 'Ruby' to Brest to obtain information
as to the state of the squadron there, with instructions to watch if
the French ships were getting to sea and, if so, to find out what course,
either to the British coast or the Mediterranean, they were making;
and, having determined it to bring him the news to his rendezvous.
A few days of foul wind delayed the squadron in the Channel.
In the interval a French brig from Cadiz was boarded from which it
was learned that eighteen large Spanish ships had been in that harbour
when she left, all ready to sail at a moment's notice to meet, so it was
reported, the squadron that was coming from Havana. Anxious to
ascertain how soon de Torres was expected, and whether in a northern
or a southern port of Spain, Norris at once detached two frigates to
Oporto to get the latest news, and pressed all sail to arrive as early
as possible at the rendezvous he had appointed eight leagues north of
Sisargas. This he reached on the 8th of July. Another French ship
was intercepted which informed him of the return of the Spanish
squadrons to Cadiz. They were said to have left Ferrol on May 27th.
Still uncertain as to whither de Torres was going, for he could place
no implicit reliance on these neutrals' reports, the Admiral remained
cruising off Sisargas, spreading his squadron in a formation very
similar to that used by Anson at a later stage of the war. After a week
one of his frigates from Oporto rejoined him and corroborated the
departure of the Spaniards from the Gallician ports, but brought no
1 Norris to Duke of Newcastle, June 26th, 1741, S. P. Dom. Naval.
2 'Victory,' 'Royal George,' 'Royal Sovereign,' 'St George,' 'Duke,' 'Cam
bridge,' 'Elizabeth,' 'Essex,' 'Nassau,' 'Buckingham,' 'Bedford,' 'Lenox,'
'Argyle,' 'Assistance,' 'Kingston,' 'Ruby': 'Gosport,' 40; 'Blaze' and 'Scipio'
fireships. The ' Marlborough ' also arrived but was not ready to sail and remained
at Spithead.

148 Beginning of the European War 1741
news as to their probable destination, and it was not until he had
been in this area for three weeks that he received news of de Torres.
On July 28th his second frigate returned from Oporto with the informa
tion from the Consul that the Havana squadron had not been able
to sail at all. The ships were in such bad state, they were so short
of complement and stores and in such a condition of sickness — they
had lost 4000 men from this cause — that they had been unable to put
to sea. The Consul further informed him that except for a very few ships
fitting out there was no Spanish force in the northern ports, but that
the joint Spanish fleet was now in Cadiz, watched by Haddock with
the whole Mediterranean squadron.
There was now no object in continuing to cruise off Finisterre,
nor was it within the scope of his instructions to join Haddock in his
blockade off Cadiz, even if his supply of provisions had been sufficient
to enable him to do so. There still remained the possibihty of some
operations against the northern privateer bases, whither early in the
cruise he had sent the 'Argyle,' which ship had captured and burnt
several Spanish craft. He now detached the 'Nassau,' 'Kingston,'
'Assistance' and 'Rupert' to cruise for a month off Santander, San
Sebastian and Sisargas, under the orders of Captain Medley, to operate
against the privateers, with instructions that if some bomb-vessels
v/hich the Admiralty had promised should arrive he was to try to
oombard and destroy San Sebastian, the most notorious and trouble
some of those ports. Having made this disposition, Norris revictualled
the detached ships from the remainder, and carried his squadron back
to England where he arrived on August 23rd. He was followed about
a month later by Medley who had made some captures but had not
been able to deal with San Sebastian as the bomb-vessels did not arrive.
This two months' cruise of Norris's was most violently criticised.
It was stated — in complete ignorance of what his instructions were—
that he had gone out with no orders and had done nothing1. Yet his
instructions were clear enough and had a definite object. It was more
over no fault of the Admiral's that his squadron had not sailed in
time to intercept the Spaniards before they left Ferrol for the south,
nor that his principal objective, the Havana squadron, did not present
itself for capture.
During Norris's absence fresh information concerning the intentions
of the French and Spaniards had reached the Government. These
advices, which were regarded as trustworthy2, stated that the Brest
1 Vide the merchants' complaints as to lack of protection for trade.
2 The Duke of Newcastle, in informing Norris on August 7th, described the
information as being "certain."

1 74 1 Influence of the Brest and Toulon squadrons 149
and Toulon squadrons were intended to unite, and in conjunction with
the Spaniards, convoy a combined Franco-Spanish army into Italy.
To meet this situation the Channel squadron, reinforced by three more
ships, was to watch Brest1. If the French went south, Norris, though
he was not to attack them, since war had not been declared, was to
follow them, join Haddock, and prevent the Brest and Toulon squadrons,
either together or separately, from joining the Cadiz fleet. These
instructions missed Norris; but they are important in view of the
Duke of Newcastle's statement, made later in the year in defence of the
measures taken by the Government, that on Haddock lay the blame for
the unopposed saihng of the Spanish expedition from Barcelona. Nothing
could be clearer than these instructions. No station off Barcelona
could prevent the junction of the Cadiz and Brest squadrons, and these
orders shew that Haddock was expected to keep his eye upon Cadiz.
Yet the Duke gave the House to believe that Haddock had no authority
in his instructions for observing Cadiz, and that he ought to have
been off Barcelona2.
Norris had a short time for refitting. On September 4th he was
ordered again to take command of his nineteen ships3, and on the ioth
to sail to Finisterre. The reason for this return to his recent station
was that fresh reports had just been received that de Torres had at
last left Havana with the Vera Cruz treasure, and in consequence
Norris was to work to the westward of the Cape regulating his cruise
so as to return to England in the latter end of October. His instructions
ended: "Whereas intelligence has been received that at the beginning
of July last the intention of the French Court was that the Brest and
Toulon squadrons should join and in conjunction with the Spaniards
convoy the French and Spanish troops to Italy: if the French squadron
at Brest should put to sea and sail to the southward you are then to
follow them with all your ships and to endeavour to prevent the Brest
and Toulon squadrons, either separately or jointly, from joining the
Spaniards, provided the season of the year shall not be so far advanced
as to endanger your not being able to return home with your squadron
this winter: in which case you are not to proceed farther than the
station above directed."
Norris, who had gone to London on his return, remained until
September 16th, in order to attend, at the Duke of Newcastle's especial
1 The French squadron was reported to consist of nine heavy ships : ' Superbe,'
74; 'Neptune,' 74; 'St Philippe,' 74; 'Mars,' 66; 'St Michel,' 66; 'Eclatant,' 66;
'Auguste,' 54; 'Griffon,' 54; 'Apollon,' 54; and 'Nereide,' 26.
2 This is dealt with in the next chapter.
3 The original sixteen and the reinforcement of three: the latter were at
Plymouth but not yet ready.

150 Beginning of the European War 1741
request, a Council meeting on the 15th. This was held to discuss a
grave report from Paris stating that France had decided on war with
England and intended to send expeditions to Scotland and Ireland.
As the Brest squadron consisted of nine ships, nine of Norris's were
detailed at Spithead to observe them, and Norris with the remaining
ten was ordered to proceed to intercept de Torres with the Havana
fleet. It appears to have been considered that the weakness of the
Spanish seventeen was such that Norris's squadron of ten would be
sufficient to deal with them.
This alteration made, the Admiral repaired to Portsmouth next
day and prepared to sail ; but owing to difficulties of obtaining provisions
he was not able to get away until the ist of October. In the interval
pressing letters were being received from Haddock at Gibraltar repre
senting the weakness of his force in face of the fleet that was now
preparing at Cadiz. A reinforcement of four ships under Captain
Cornewall1 had been ordered to go to join him on September 4th, but
did not actually sail for over five weeks; and when Norris returned
on November 7th after cruising for a month off Finisterre without
seeing anything of the Havana squadron, he found an urgent letter
from London awaiting him. The Toulon squadron had been sighted
at sea, the Spaniards at Cadiz, fourteen strong, were preparing to sail.
CornewaU's reinforcement would now be insufficient, for the French
were reported to have a number equal to the .Spaniards. Norris was
therefore ordered to detach another five2 sail to Gibraltar without
a moment's loss of time to strengthen Haddock.
The season for cruising to the westward was now past. The great
ships remaining were ordered to their ports in accordance with custom,
Norris hauled down his flag and returned to London, and a disposition
was made of the lesser ships to protect trade during the winter months,
using the foUowing stations :
Cruising in the Bay of Biscay  ('Rupert,' 60; 'Newcastle,' 50;
I Argyle, 50 ; Port Mahon, 24
Between Waterford and Cape Clear ... 'Dolphin,' 24
In Bristol Channel ... ... ... ... 'Ruby,' 50
Between Milford and Lundy ... ... ' Shark, ' sloop
Start and Isle of Wight  'Carcass,' bomb- vessel
Downs and Portsmouth  'Scipio.' fireship
30 to 40 leagues W. and W.S.W. from Scilly 'Lynn,' 40; 'Lyme,' 20
Between Scilly and Lizard ... ... ... 'Biddeford,' 20
Ushant and Scilly  'Bridgewater,' 20.
1 'Bedford,' 70; 'Elizabeth,' 64; 'Marlborough,' 90; 'Essex,' 70.
2 Two of 90 guns, one of 80, one of 70, one of 60. Duke of Newcastle to Norris,
November 7th, 1741, S. P. Dom. Naval.

THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN

CHAPTER VIII
OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1741
Admiral Haddock, when he returned to Port Mahon in October 1740,
left a small squadron1 of observation of two heavy ships and a fire
ship off Cadiz under Captain John Byng. The duties of this detachment
were to intercept single ships entering or leaving the harbour, and to
keep the Admiral informed of the movements of such Spanish ships
as remained at Cadiz after the departure of the Spanish squadrons to
the West Indies. These consisted of a small number of partly ready
men-of-war proper, and the vessels of the Flota which, unable to sail
with cargoes, were being fitted as fighting ships. All the advices trans
mitted by our Consul at Faro pointed to the fact that the Spaniards
intended in no way to slacken their attempts to hamper the British
operations in the West Indies. These reports caused Byng some
apprehension. Before he had been long on his station he wrote urging
his need of a reinforcement. "I imagine," he said, "as the thoughts
of Sir John Norris coming this way is over, they may take heart and
come from above the Puntales: nay, I do not see what should hinder
their coming quite out and cruising off the Straits mouth. We have
nothing this side to prevent them." Byng's fatal habit of seeing the
worst side of things is illustrated in this letter, the tone of which is
like that of his letters from the Hyeres Islands at a later period of the
war, and of his celebrated letter from Gibraltar in 1755. The news of
the Spanish preparations was certainly ominous, but it was as yet
unconfirmed rumour only, and until some more certain advices should
be received there was no need for despondency.
Haddock, who had ten ships at Mahon, did not consider it desirable
to weaken his force in order to reinforce Byng. He had heard that
four of the twelve French ships which had sailed to the West Indies
with Rochalart were reported to have returned to Toulon, and the
fitting out of other ships was at the same time said to be in progress.
How many ships were ready, or what the intentions of France were,
Haddock did not know, but in the unsettled political atmosphere he
judged it inadvisable to weaken his own force to an extent which might
render it inferior to the Toulon squadron.
Two months of comparative inaction followed, during which the
reports of the Spanish preparations at Cadiz continued. On December
1 'Sunderland,' 60; 'Plymouth,' 60, and 'Duke,' fireship.

\ '

152 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1741
16th a despatch was received in London from our Consul at Faro,
Mr Cayley, stating that a force of men-of-war and galleons which
would carry reinforcements and supphes for the Spanish garrisons was
then nearly ready to sail to the West Indies. The importance of inter
cepting these reinforcements was strongly felt by the Privy Council,
and instructions were therefore sent to Haddock directing him to
detach three or four ships to reinforce Byng1, with orders that vessels
of all nations whatsoever carrying supphes inwards or outwards for
the Spaniards were to be arrested. The Admiral was ordered to remain
at Mahon with the rest of the squadron and look after the defence of
Minorca. He was also told to take steps to get the best possible informa
tion as to the truth of a rumour which was current to the effect that
the Spaniards intended to send a considerable body of troops into Italy.
The intentions as to the route the troops would take were, he was told,
uncertain; they might sail from Barcelona, but it was also possible
that they would be permitted to march through France and embark
at Antibes, as they did in the previous war. Whatever they should
do, Haddock was to make their destruction the principal object of
the ships he still had in company, bombarding them in Barcelona if it
were practicable, or attacking them at sea when they sailed either
from a French or Spanish harbour.
Haddock's battle squadron consisted of ten ships of the line. Two
were off Cadiz with Byng, and by these orders this detachment was
to be made up to at least five. He would therefore be left with five
ships at Mahon. Against this the Spaniards had four or five under
M. de la Bene at Carthagena and the French at least four, possibly
more, at Toulon. If any such move as the Council outlined should
be intended it was well within the bounds of possibihty that these
squadrons would unite, since the whole of France's recent conduct
had shewn that she might join Spain. The Council were not blind to
this fact, for in a letter of the same date as these instructions, Haddock
was ordered to be especially watchful of all that passed at Toulon.
It is true that no reinforcements were sent him to enable him to take
any measures which his watchfulness might discover to be necessary;
but the account already given of the naval unreadiness at home has
shewn that it would not have been possible for the Government at
that moment to back up their comprehensive orders to Haddock with
any increase of his forces.
In accordance with these instructions Haddock detached Captain
WiUiam Martin to Cadiz with the 'Ipswich' and 'Pembroke.' He had
1 Official correspondence of Admiral Haddock, December 18th 1740.
Egmont MSS. Add. MS. 2529.

I74I Martin and de Caylus 153
shortly before sent the 'Oxford' to strengthen Byng, so that the
squadron thus would be brought up to five ships1. Martin was to
take over the command, with instructions2 to lie off Cadiz, or in such
station as the weather permitted, and stop all vessels of all nations
going into or leaving Cadiz with men, provisions or warlike stores.
If the Cadiz squadron should try to pass into the Mediterranean with
superior force in order to effect a junction with the ships at Carthagena
or Toulon, or to attack Gibraltar or Minorca, Martin was to detach
a fast ship at once to inform Haddock, and if absolutely necessary3
to bring his whole squadron to join the Admiral. The possibility that
the Spaniards could bring out a superior force was disclosed in an
intercepted letter from Spain which stated that the squadron then
preparing in Cadiz consisted of seven large men-of-war and seven
armed ships of the Flota*. Haddock was thus in the unpleasant
situation of having his fleet, already a weak one, split into two parts
which could not support each other.
However, although the Council could not know it, the French had
for the present no intention of attacking British ships in European
waters. Fleury was prepared to interfere in the West Indies if French
interests were likely to be prejudiced, but relations at home need not
be immediately affected by this. The four ships at Toulon were actually
fitting for West Indian service. They were to be under the command
of M. de Caylus, to whom Maurepas wrote, "Vous §tes destine pour
les lies du Vent: les operations que vous aurez a y faire dependront
de la situation ou vous trouverez les choses5." He was told to steer
for Gibraltar, avoiding as far as possible meeting any British ships,
as well as anything else that might delay his passage.
On February 12th Caylus fell in with three of Martin's squadron6
in the Straits. A slight brush between the British and French ships
took place, but the mistake was discovered before much damage was
done. Though it resulted in nothing, the episode shewed how highly
charged was the atmosphere, and how small a spark was needed to
set the nations definitely in a blaze. Although shots were exchanged
the affair created no stir, and was not even officially reported. The
Captains of the 'Ipswich' and 'Oxford' took a very hght view of it,
1 'Ipswich,' 70; 'Pembroke,' 60; 'Sunderland,' 60; 'Plymouth,' 60; 'Oxford,'
50; and 'Kennington,' 20; ' Guarland,' 20; 'Duke,' fireship.
2 Haddock to Martin, January 24th, 1740. Haddock In letters.
8 The underlining is Haddock's.
4 ' Real ' 1 14 ¦ 'StaYsabel,' 80; 'San Fernando,' 62 ;'Sta Teresa, 62; Paloma,
52; 'Fama',' 46; 'Xavier,' 46. The merchant ships, of lighter build than the
men-of-war, mounted from 5+ to 62 guns. Egmont MSS. Add. MS. 2528.
6 Lady du Cane's MS., Hist. Man. Comm. Report.
6 'Ipswich,' 'Oxford,' 'Sunderland.'

154 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1741
and alluded to it only in a passing manner in their Journals. Thus,
Martin says: "at 8 A.M. saw four sail to the S.W. made sail and gave
chase after them.... 6 p.m. spoke with our chase, they proving to be
three French men-of-war and a merchant ship, the 'Boree,' 60 guns,
commanded by the Chevalier Caylus, one of 40 guns and the other
of 20, came from Toulon1." Byng in the 'Sunderland' described it
at greater length.
Haddock, who remained at Mahon with the remnant of his force,
had now four large ships and four small actually ready, and two ships
refitting2 Five small ships were cruising and employed upon convoy
work, but these were wholly insufficient to enable him effectually
to defend trade, keep a watch upon Carthagena and Barcelona, and
observe the area between the Balearic Islands and the Catalan coast.
As a result the Spaniards were able to withdraw all their troops — some
four to five thousand men — from Majorca without the loss of a man,
and British trade on the Italian coast suffered appreciable losses at
the hands of the enemy's privateers. The shortage of small craft to
protect trade was seriously felt.
In February Captain Watson of the 'Guarland' gathered some
information as to the state of affairs at Barcelona. Preparations for
a military expedition seemed now to be in fuU swing, no less than ten
to twelve thousand troops being ready for embarkation though as
yet there was insufficient transport for them. At the same time news
from Leghorn indicated that the Austrian territories in Lombardy were
threatened from the direction of Naples — whose King, Don Carlos,
was a son of the Queen of Spain — where an embargo had been laid on
all shipping and a great military expedition was reported to be in
preparation with Parma and Placentia as its objective. The rumours
which had reached the Council in London were evidently well-founded.
Haddock's position was unenviable at this time. It was not merely
in the fewness of his ships that his difficulties lay, but also in the want
of men for such ships as he had. His crews had been greatly reduced
by sickness, no drafts to replace his losses had been received for several
months, and no local maritime resources existed on which he could
1 Captain's Journal of 'Ipswich,' April 12th, 1741.
2 Haddock's force at this date consisted of:
('Somerset,' 80; 'Lancaster,' 80; 'Warwick,' 60; 'Dragon,' 60; 'Advice.'
40 — with Haddock
'Ipswich,' 70; 'Pembroke,' 60; 'Sunderland,' 60; 'Plymouth,' 60;
'Oxford,' 50 — with Martin
Small f 'Dursley' galley, 20; 'Aldborough,' 20; 'Salamander,' 6.8; 'Ann,' 8.6;
vessels ), 'Mercury,' 8.6— with Haddock
^ (.'Kennington,' 20; 'Guarland,' 20; 'Duke,' 8.6 — with Martin
The 'Guarland' rejoined Haddock in January.

I74I The Cadiz squadron breaks out 155
draw to any great extent. He therefore requested permission from
the Council to embark soldiers from the garrison of Port Mahon1. This
was granted and the Governor was directed to put four or five hundred
troops on board the squadron whenever the Admiral should ask for
them2. All through March and the early part of April Spanish troops con
tinued to pour into Barcelona. Haddock kept all the hght vessels
he could constantly relieving each other in the watch upon the Catalan
coast, while his ships of the hne lay in Mahon ready to proceed to
sea if the expedition were reported to have sailed. At length on April
21st definite news came in. On that day Captain Curtis Barnett, the
senior officer on the coast, returned to Mahon reporting that the ships
of the Carthagena squadron had their yards across and sails bent and
were evidently preparing to put to sea. As the transports in Barcelona
were still far too few to carry any considerable body of troops, Haddock
inferred from this news that an attack upon trade or some expected
victualling ships was intended, and prepared to sail for Carthagena.
On May 30th, when he was about to leave, the 'Dursley' galley
arrived at Mahon bringing the victuallers under her escort. Besides
the victuallers she brought news, and bad news. The Spanish squadron
in Cadiz had put to sea and was gone none knew whither. Martin's
squadron had been drawn away from the port through chasing some
French ships which had attempted to enter the Bay; a westerly wind
carried him well to the eastward, and through the Straits; and before
the ensuing levanter enabled him to regain his station the Spaniards
had taken advantage of it and sailed ; they had last been seen standing
to the west-south-westward.
The object of the Spanish squadron in putting to sea could only
be conjectured. Martin's instructions anticipated that the Spaniards
might send reinforcements and supphes to the West Indies, or come
into the Mediterranean to join the Carthagena squadron. Captain Lee
of the 'Pembroke,' one of the blockading ships, who became separated
from Martin in the gale, when he heard that the enemy was at sea
assumed that they had gone to the West Indies as their course indicated.
On his own initiative — that initiative which officers used so freely
in the past— he at once detached the 'Kennington,' 20, to warn Vernon
at Jamaica, where she arrived on May 15th.
Haddock did not draw the same conclusion as Lee as to the object
of the Cadiz squadron, but for all that he fully approved the Captain
1 Haddock to Duke of Newcastle, March 18th, 1741.
2 This function of oversea garrisons was frequently made use of in the wars
of the eighteenth century. It deserves attention to-day, in relation to both naval
and mihtary training.

156 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1741
of the Pembroke's action in sending the frigate to warn Vernon "in
which," he wrote to the Admiralty, "I presume their Lordships will
think he did right." His own view was the Spaniards would devote
their attention to European waters, and that this movement was made
either with the intention of destroying Martin's squadron or of inter
cepting a second and more important convoy which was known to
be on its way to Mahon1. There was the further possibility that a
junction with the Carthagena squadron was intended, in order to over
whelm Haddock and force the passage of the troops, now assembled
at Barcelona, across the sea to Italy.
Whichever of these might be the object of the Spaniards, it was
essential for Haddock to get to sea as soon as he could, either to inter
cept the Cadiz ships before they reached Carthagena, or to reinforce
Martin and protect the convoy. But his position was complicated by the
arrival at Mahon of a most valuable fleet of nine sail of Turkey merchants.
Not to afford convoy to these, in the presence of a superior squadron
that might be holding the Strait's mouth, would expose him to the
severest censure. Protection of trade was one of the most important
of his charges, and although sailing in company with a fleet of laggard
merchants might delay his passage, he considered it was his duty to
convoy them even though it should involve the risk of missing the
Spanish squadron. He therefore sailed with the Turkey fleet on May
5th, steering towards Cape Palos.
Next day he received reassuring news about the Spaniards. The
'Port Mahon,' sloop, joined him at midnight bringing letters from
Martin and Lee, informing him that the Cadiz squadron had returned
to harbour. They were eight sail strong, and their sally had been
made to escort some outward-bound merchant ships clear of the
British squadron — the common function of a squadron which occupies
a terminal point of giving a reinforcing local escort. Haddock, on
getting this news, called a council of war at which it was decided
"to protect with this squadron the Levant trade, which is very con
siderable, through the Straits; and [I] shall then repair off of Cadiz
to give a reinforcement to the ships there." The news of the return
of the Cadiz squadron was most comforting. It implied that Martin
was safe and the West Indies unthreatened. But there still remained
the outward-bound convoy, exposed to a sally of the Cadiz squadron;
and Haddock was very anxious to get into position to cover it.
Westerly winds seriously delayed his passage towards Gibraltar;
1 The difficulty and danger of the convoy work will be noticed. Convoys
had to pass through a stretch of water with strong enemv squadrons, incompletely
covered, on the flank of their track.

I741 Anxiety for the Convoy 157
ten days beating against them only brought the squadron as far as
Cape Palos. Then all his hopeful dreams were swept away. The
'Guarland's' prize met him with the news that the Spaniards had left
Cadiz a second time on April 30th, nine sail strong with orders to destroy
either Martin or the outward-bound convoy. The 'Guarland's' prize
had left Gibraltar with the news on May 4th, had been to Mahon to
find Haddock and inform him, and since then had been working back
to the Spanish coast in search of him. The preparations at Carthagena
may have been a feint to detain Haddock in the Mediterranean.
The foul winds still held, and an anxious ten days passed before
Haddock came in sight of Gibraltar. Martin's squadron proved to be
safe and in harbour; as soon as the Admiral appeared off the Bay it
put to sea to join him, bringing out also a great number of merchant
ships, bound to many parts, who had put into the Bay for protection
when the news got abroad that the Spaniards were at sea. At seven
in the evening the whole fleet with its great convoy of over eighty
vessels made sail to the westward. Haddock now intended to carry
this trade at least twenty leagues to seaward of Cape St Vincent and
then to seek the Spanish squadron1.
His fears for the outward bound convoy with which his supplies
were coming were no less than for Martin and the Levant trade,
and his anxiety for its safety was increased by the news he received.
On the following day the 'Dragon' intercepted a French ship and
learned from her that the Cadiz squadron had done none of the things
anticipated by the Admiral. It had gone direct to Ferrol, and had
been seen by the Frenchman standing into that harbour on the nth
of the month, carrying with it some English prizes. This was indeed
a great blow. The Cadiz and Ferrol squadrons were now united and
apparently the convoy, or some part of it, had fallen into their hands.
In the low state of the Mediterranean squadron's supphes the loss of
these victualling and store ships would be most serious.
The convoy had however in reality escaped, having either been
missed by the Spaniards between Lisbon and Finisterre or not having
reached as far south as Ferrol when the Spaniards arrived there. The
prompt action of our Minister at Lisbon on this occasion, although
it did not actually save the convoy, deserves notice. Directly Lord
Tyrawley heard of the departure of the Cadiz squadron he sent out
1 His squadron at this time consisted of 'Somerset' and 'Lancaster,' 80;
'Ipswich,' 70; 'Sunderland,' 'Pembroke,' 'Warwick,' 'Plymouth,' 60; 'Oxford,'
'Guernsey,' 'Salisbury,' 50; 'Winchelsea,' 24; 'Guarland,' 20; 'Ann, galley;
'Duke' and 'Mercury,' fireships; 'Salamander,' bomb, and three zebecks. The
¦ 'St Albans' and 'Lark' were sent with the direct homeward-bound trade and
'ithe 'Aldborough' with the trade to Lisbon.
\

158 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1741
the ' Fly ' sloop from the Tagus to meet the approaching merchantmen
and warn them of the danger. Escorted by five ships1 only, the convoy
arrived near the Tagus on May 13th — two days after the Spaniards
had reached Ferrol — and was intercepted by the sloop. Captain
Ohphant, who commanded the escort, at once ordered all his ships
into the river and before dark they were anchored in safety.
No news of the movements of the convoy reached Haddock. Since
his first consideration on leaving Gibraltar was the safety of the four
score merchants he had with him, he stretched to the westward of
St Vincent until the 31st of May and then, being far enough out to
detach them on their way alone, he began to fall back to St Vincent
to cruise there with the object of intercepting the Spaniards if they
returned to the south from Ferrol. He had only begun this movement
when he received a report that the enemy had already returned to
Cadiz. If this were true it was indeed disappointing beyond measure.
The nearest place for intelligence was Lagos; thither he therefore
proceeded at once to see if our Consul could confirm or add to this
report. But Cayley had only heard of the arrival of the squadron at
Ferrol, though he was able to give the Admiral the news of the safe
arrival of the outward-bound convoy at Lisbon. As it was probable
that if the Spaniards had returned Cayley would have heard of it,
Haddock considered it most likely that they were still at Ferrol, and
he therefore sent the Portugal trade, which he had detained till now
on account of the danger, to Lisbon under escort of the ' Aldborough."
By her Captain he sent a letter to Lord Tyrawley desiring that the
convoy should sail for Gibraltar at once and that he would inform the
senior officer that the squadron would meet it off St Vincent.
The convoy however had sailed already. Tyrawley heard of the
enemy's presence at Ferrol about May 25th and at once gave the news
to the senior officer of the convoy. The 'Fox,' which had been lying
in the Tagus, sailed immediately to inform the Admiral or whoever
was in command at Gibraltar; the convoy sailed next day, and making
a good passage arrived at Gibraltar on the 7th of June. The 'Fox,'
being off the Burlings on the 28th, sighted the Spanish squadron of
twelve stout ships, standing to the southward. She followed them
until the evening to make sure of their course, and having satisfied
herself that they were not bound to the West Indies, she hastened to
Gibraltar where she arrived on the 2nd of June. A consultation of
the Captains was immediately held at which it was decided to Ml

1 'Panther,' 50; 'Falkland,' 50; 'Colchester,' 54; 'Tyger,' 50 and 'Deal
Castle,' 20. A part was bound to Port Mahon and the remainder to St Helena and
India.

I

I74I The Spanish squadrons located 159
as soon as possible and look into Cadiz and then take what news they
would have gathered to Haddock off St Vincent.
The frigates sailed next day. They looked into Cadiz Bay and saw the
masts of the Spaniards at anchor there : then, spreading to cover as much
water as possible, they hastened independently towards St Vincent
to find Haddock and give him the news. They reached him on June 8th,
and "it was by them," wrote Haddock, "that I received the first
certain accounts of the return of the Spanish squadron to Cadiz."
How the enemy had returned unobserved is clear. On the 31st,
when they passed St Vincent, Haddock had just reached the westerly
point to which he had been steering in order to secure the homeward
bound ships, and the enemy passed between him and the Cape. The
whole episode is a singularly interesting one, in which the risks run
by convoys when incompletely covered are well illustrated; and in
considering the propriety of Haddock's movements, the current doc
trines of trade protection and the absence of information must be
given their due weight. The convoy had experienced extraordinarily
good fortune. If it had been a little earher it might have met the Cadiz
squadron before it reached Lisbon. If the news of the arrival of the
Cadiz squadron at Ferrol had reached Tyrawley a fittle sooner he
might have sent out the convoy into the very arms of the enemy.
At length Haddock had some certain news to act upon. Besides
the twelve ships which had returned from Ferrol there were five or
more apparently ready for the sea. There were thus at least seventeen
ships concentrated at Cadiz, to which he could oppose twelve only. So
far as he could see, this squadron might be intended to go to the West
Indies, where Cartagena was being besieged1 by the British expedition,
or it might be going into the Mediterranean to escort the army collected
at Barcelona into Italy. The latter was the more probable, but the
former could not be left out of account. The junction of these seventeen
sail with the squadron at Havana, the strength of which Haddock
beheved to be between twelve and seventeen sail, would furnish a
fleet equal to that under Vernon and taking into consideration the
losses which the West Indian squadron might have suffered it was
within the bounds of possibility that the Spaniards might be the
superior force. Although the invasion of Italy loomed large, the siege
of Cartagena at that moment loomed larger. The capture of that
city would influence the whole course of politics on the continent,
and however greatly Haddock was concerned with affairs in Europe
he could by no means dismiss those distant operations from his mind.
1 The news of the forcing of the harbour mouth had reached England on
May 17th, but was not yet known to Haddock.

160 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1741
He decided therefore to cruise to the westward, where he could inter
cept the enemy if they went to the West Indies, or follow them quickly
if they went into the Mediterranean. "As we may expect, I presume,
some reinforcements soon," he wrote on June 19th, "I shall continue
cruising near Cape St Vincent, St Mary's or sometimes to the south
ward, unless for want of provisions or anything extraordinary the
squadron should be obhged to proceed to Gibraltar: and their Lordships
will be pleased perfectly to judge how incumbent it is on me to keep
our twelve ships entirely together." None could be spared, that is to
say, to watch Barcelona and Carthagena. If the expedition to Italy
were to be intercepted it was imperative that he should have more
ships for the constant observation of these ports.
As he soon found it impossible to keep all his squadron cruising,
he made Lagos his headquarters and kept three or four ships out
watching Cadiz, reheving them as frequently as possible, that none of
his ships should become unduly short of provisions or water; and con
tinued so doing throughout the remainder of June and July.
On July 25th the squadron of observation 1 was under the command
of Captain Curtis Barnett, an officer of whom more will be heard
during this war. On the morning of that day when he was about thirty
miles to the westward of Cape Spartel, three strange sail were sighted
to the east-north-eastward. Barnett's ships were separated, the
' Feversham ' being to the southward in chase of a vessel, but Barnett
and the two others made sail at once to close the strangers to whom
they were close enough by noon to make them out to be two large
ships and a frigate standing for the Straits of Gibraltar. The three
British ships chased all the afternoon and gradually drew up dropping
the 'Mary' galley, a slow sailer, astern as they did so. As the 'Dragon'
and ' Folkestone ' overhauled the chase French colours were shewn on
board them. Barnett was suspicious that these were false, since a
French ship should have had no reason for not bringing to. He therefore
continued the pursuit, himself putting Dutch colours abroad. Towards
midnight he overhauled them, and coming close to the second ship
on her port side, hailed her, asking who she was and whence she came.
The stranger replied that they were all French ships from Martinique.
Barnett, disbelieving this, desired them to bring to in order to allow
him to board them. The accounts of the subsequent conversations
written by Barnett and de Caylus — for he it was who commanded the
strange squadron2 — differ somewhat, as might be expected. Barnett's
1 'Dragon,' 60; 'Feversham,' 40; 'Folkestone,' 40; 'Mary,' galley, 20.
2 British ships: 'Dragon,' 60; 'Folkestone,' 40. French ships: 'Boree,' 62;
'Aquilon,' 46; 'Flore,' 26. The 'Boree' was the leading ship, then 'Aquilon,'
' Flore ' in the rear.

1741 Skirmish between Barnett and de Caylus 161
story is that he told them he was an English man-of-war and must
speak with them, and they replied that they were King's ships and
would stop for nobody; that they were going their course, and Barnett
might do as he liked. To which, said Barnett, " I told them if they
were French men-of-war I was very far from intending to offer any
insult or indignity: that they had no reason to make any difficulties
in the affair, being at peace with all Europe." The French captain
declined to shorten sail, telling Barnett he could go ahead and get
his information from the Commandant in the ship ahead. " I then told
them I asked as a favour what I was in a condition to compel them
to: and that if they obliged me to do it they were answerable for the
consequences: and therefore if they were French I conjured them tc
prevent the mischief that might happen. But all my entreaties had
no effect; their answers growing more pert as I appeared unwilling to
use anything but words to bring them to reason." Ranging ahead
therefore, he fired two or three shots. The foreigner promptly replied
with a broadside1. According to de Caylus, when Barnett ranged up
alongside the 'Aquilon,' commanded by M. de Pardaillan, he roughly
ordered "Heave to, Heave to, we are British ships of war." On being
told the name of the French Commander and his ship, the English
Commander rephed that his name was Barkley, and that he commanded
the 'Dragon': and once more ordered the "Aquilon' to heave to. The
request, continued Caylus, was refused, and Barnett was referred to
the Commander of the squadron. "The impatient and very insolent
Englishman then shouted 'Stop, or I will stop you,' to which no
reply was given; and he repeated 'If you are French, bring to, or I
shall treat you as an enemy.'" M. de Pardaillan replied that this
annoyed him, and that the English Captain had only to speak to the
Commodore; adding, "we are French men-of-war." To which the
Englishman rephed "You are not French at all. You are 
Spaniards." This "polite expression," said Caylus, was followed by a
shot which passed between the 'Aquilon's' masts. Upon this M. de
Pardaillan asked "Are we at war? If you fire another shot I will
give you my whole broadside in the belly." The Englishman fired
three more shots, and M. de Pardaillan was as good as his word and
let fly his broadside2.
Whichever account more nearly approximates to the truth— and
both are probably true, differing only in the point of view of the
1 Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs. A full account of this is given
copied from Barnett's letter: a copy of Barnett's letter is in Haddock's despatch
of August 3rd. The Captain's Journal of 'Dragon' has the same account.
2 Guerin, Histoire Maritime de la France; Hist. Man. Comm. Report, vol. x.;
Lady du Cane's papers.

1 62 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1741
writers — it is perfectly clear that the French Captain provoked Barnett
to engage. Barnett was fully within his rights in insisting on making
sure of the nationality of the strangers; indeed, it was his duty so to
do. It would be idle to pretend that in such a situation an officer
should be satisfied with a mere statement that the vessels were French—
a Spanish Register ship could have given that answer equally well.
A running fight followed. Barnett engaged the second ship which
he had been haihng, the 'Folkestone' the frigate in the rear. Both
ships bore away to the southward slightly, the 'Aquilon' more than
the 'Flore,' and Caylus in the 'Boree' backed astern and was able to
bring his after guns to bear on the ' Folkestone ' and his forward guns
on the 'Dragon.' In this situation the action lasted about an hour.
Both the British ships were considerably cut about aloft by the fire
of the three Frenchmen and were obhged to lie to to knot and splice.
The French took this opportunity to make sail away from them, and
when the ' Feversham ' came up about four in the morning the ' Folke
stone' and 'Dragon' were sufficiently refitted aloft to continue the
pursuit. Daylight shewed the French going away large before the
westerly breeze with all sail set, but shortly afterwards Caylus brought
to and fired a gun to leeward as a signal to speak. Barnett then came
up and sent a flag-of-truce on board, and mutual explanations followed,
in which Barnett explained to Caylus that the whole incident would
have been avoided if it had not been for the obstinacy and insolence
of the Captain of the 'Aquilon.' The squadrons then parted company
peaceably. Pardaillan and twenty-five men were reported killed; the
' Boree ' lost a few ; the ' Dragon ' had four kiUed and fourteen wounded;
the 'Folkestone' seven killed and eight wounded. Caylus wrote a
despatch in which he ingeniously made it appear that his three ships
had engaged four English of superior force and had beaten off their
attack, and this, joined with a certain amount of airy gasconade,
gained him great credit. Maurepas, the Minister of Marine, wrote to him
in a highly appreciative manner about " le combat que vous avez rendu
a l'entree du detroit contre quatre vaisseaux anglais qui ont attaqu6
votre escadre." The fact that only two British ships were in action
was neatly passed over.
Like the skirmish between Ca3dus and Martin on his voyage out,
the incident had no significance beyond shewing how the wind was
blowing, in that French commanders should be prepared to invite
complications in this manner. The feeling of hostility against England
was driving France into a war with her, for which on the surface
there was no immediate cause or quarrel. The real feeling lay deeper
and is found expressed in a letter written to Caylus by a friend of his,

I74I Troubles with Neutrals 163
M. de Remond. This writer said: "France will never be able to enjoy
any peace on earth, or return to a flourishing condition until she has
curbed and enfeebled the English despotism on the water." This
sentence, so curiously modern, in reality sums up the national feeling.
France felt that her development was in some way being checked,
and she attributed the check to her greatest trade rival, England1.
It was not only with France that friction was arising. Haddock
also experienced difficulties with other neutrals in carrying out his
orders to arrest ships of all nations bringing stores into Cadiz. Dutch
ships carrying masts and naval stores were taken by his cruisers and
strong protests from the Dutch Ministers followed. A Venetian ship
was chased by Captain Watson into ViUa Nova Road and taken by
him actually in the anchorage. This action was protested against by
the Portuguese Governor, in reply to whom Watson invoked the old
doctrine that the jurisdiction of a country extended so far as a gun
would carry and no further. "I do not comprehend," said he, "any
neutral port to be a safeguard to enemies' ships when they are out of
the protection of the fortifications." The matter was quietly smoothed
over, — as was Boscawen's even more marked disregard of neutrality
on a later occasion, — and nothing further was heard of it. But protests
from the Dutch against interference with their shipping, which were
more serious in view of our relations with Holland, continued to em
barrass the Admirals and the Ministry throughout the war.
Haddock's difficulties did not end with the disputes with the neutral
traders. The constant cruising, notwithstanding the use of St Mary's
as a base, was wearing out his crews ; in September they were f ailing sick
in such numbers that he found it necessary to carry the squadron
back to Gibraltar where he sent over 300 men to the hospital; many
others lay in their hammocks on board for want of accommodation on
shore. There was however some hope of an improvement, for the
Council at last were sending him a reinforcement. On September 4th
orders were given for four ships2 under Captain Cornewall to be
detached from home waters to join him. The preparations at Barcelona,
which led to this tardy step, were interpreted in London as threatening
Minorca, and Haddock was directed3 to take the necessary measures to
protect the island if he should have reason to suspect that the Spanish
armament were directed against it. There was however no modification
of his earher instructions to blockade Cadiz where the main Spanish
fleet of seventeen sail still lay. Yet it was palpably impossible for him
1 The above quotations from de Caylus' letters are taken from Lady du
Cane's MS., Hist. Man. Comm. Report, vol. x. p. 287.
2 'Bedford,' 'Elizabeth,' "'Marlborough,' 'Essex.'
3 Lords Justices to Haddock, September 15th, 1741.

164 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1741
to observe two places over 600 miles apart with a squadron inferior
even to that of the enemy in one of them. In view of the strength
of de la Bene's squadron the least number of ships that he could have
detached to watch Barcelona would have been four. This would have
left him with nine ships, and those sickly and undermanned, to blockade
a fresh and completely equipped fleet of seventeen sail and provide
the necessary rehefs. To make such a division of his squadron would
have been madness. He must, as he had said in July, keep all his
force together. The question was, which port should he leave open?
The escape of which enemy squadron would produce the more serious
results? The Cadiz squadron was a concrete and certain fact. The
sailing of the Barcelona expedition, though probable, was less certain;
and, if it were intended to take place, there was every likelihood
that the Cadiz squadron would enter the Mediterranean to escort it.
Haddock therefore steadily kept his eyes upon Cadiz, nursing his ships
as much as possible so that all might be available to dispute the passage
of the Straits or follow the enemy whatever might be his objective.
He remained at Gibraltar where fresh water and provisions, sick
quarters and stores were available, keeping, as hitherto, a squadron
of observation off Cadiz, and awaiting impatiently the arrival of the
reinforcement for which he had pointed out the necessity in July.
At the end of September Captain Barnett, who commanded the
squadron of observation, saw the Spaniards crossing their yards and
bending sail. Their appearance shewed him so unmistakeably that
they were coming to sea, that he dropped down to Tangier lest an
easterly wind which might bring them out should find him cut off
from his main body. Haddock, on getting this news, recalled Barnett's.
force to Gibraltar in order that the whole squadron should be assembled
and ready to move together if the enemy entered the Straits1.
Not only were the Spaniards nearly ready, but the French at Toulon
were in a similar condition ; and rumour added that the Brest squadron
was coming to join them. This intelligence Haddock reported to the
Government on October 3rd. Meanwhile fresh advices continued to
pour in from his correspondents in Italy and France. The army at
Barcelona was reported to be all but ready for an expedition the
destination of which was kept most secret; some said Italy, some
Minorca. Various estimates placed its strength at 10,000 20,000 or
even 36,000 troops. The Toulon squadron was to be its escort. Finally
on November ist came news which confirmed the seriousness of the'
situation and the truth of the last-mentioned report; the Toulon
squadron had sailed on October nth to escort the expedition.
1 In letters. October 14th, 1741.

174I The Spanish Army sails 165
This news, which was brought by the 'Dursley' galley, Captain
Hughes, from Genoa, had been long in coming owing to bad weather
with south-westerly gales which prevented the 'Dursley's' sailing and
delayed her passage. But Hughes was able to corroborate by his own
testimony the truth of the report, for on October 30th he fell in with
the whole Toulon squadron, thirteen ships strong, off Cape de Gatt
standing under an easy sail apparently going towards Gibraltar.
Hughes closed the French and watched them for some time; but they
made no effort to interfere with him and he proceeded to Gibraltar
without hindrance from them.
When Haddock received this news he concluded that the French
intended to join or be joined by the Cadiz squadron; he would then be
faced by a fleet of no less than thirty sail. Whichever enemy squadron
he should separately engage, a tough fight was to be looked for, which
would leave him, even if victorious, in no condition to oppose the
second fleet of the enemy.
In the meanwhile his letter of October 3rd had reached the Govern
ment. In consequence of his representations a further reinforcement1
was now ordered to be sent to him in addition to the four that had
already sailed under Cornewall. This made a total of nine when all
should have joined him, but it would still leave him in an inferiority
to the Alhes. The need for more vigorous measures than these was
quickly made evident. Four days later came the news that the Spanish
army, consisting of between thirteen and fourteen thousand men,
embarked on board 220 transports escorted by the Carthagena squadron,
had sailed from Barcelona.
This news, though it provoked a storm of excitement and indignation
in England, did not draw from the Government any decided action,
such as an increase in the reinforcement, or a hastening of its departure.
They seem to have accepted the strange belief, so often prevalent in
public affairs, that once an order has been given the thing is accom
plished. On this occasion they wrote in very measured tones, saying
that as they were not certain how Haddock would have disposed the
squadron, "considering the situation of the French squadron and the
embarkation at Barcelona" they could not send him "any positive or
absolute rules from hence for your conduct which must be governed
by the motions of the enemy. Such a reinforcement is sent you as may
it is hoped enable you to execute any services that may be performed
by your squadron." If the troops from Barcelona should have been
landed in Italy, and the Spanish squadron or transports have returned
1 Instructions of November 7th, Sir John Norris to detach five ships, two of
90 guns and three of 60 and above.

1 66 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1741
to the Catalan ports, or gone into a Mediterranean harbour where they
could not be attacked " all you can do is to prevent a second embarka
tion." In any event he was to try to destroy the Spanish transports
either at sea, or in their own or Italian ports.
It was not "positive or absolute" or any other rules that Haddock
needed. It was ships he wanted. He had thirteen of 40 guns and above;
the Government believed he had four more, but these had not yet
reached him. The second reinforcement of five sail was still at Spithead.
According to the rumour upon which the Council was acting the
combined fleet of the Allies might consist of anything from twenty-one
to forty-three sail 1. Thus they were leaving Haddock with seventeen
sail, which might be increased to twenty-two when the ships which were
still at Spithead joined him, to meet any of these possible combinations,
and at the same time ensure the interception of the army at sea.
Ample information had been received as to the French attitude, yet
at this moment, when their squadrons were ready, their demeanour
hostile to us, and their armies acting against those of Queen Maria
Theresa on the continent, the total reinforcement which the Govern
ment sent Haddock would give him a bare superiority of one ship over
the force of Spain alone.
Not only was the reinforcement too small; it was also too late.
At the very date on which the advisory set of instructions were being
written the Barcelona expedition had already sailed and the Cadiz
squadron was at sea on its way to join the squadron from Toulon.
By the time the instructions reached Haddock the crisis was over.
The squadrons had joined and were about to cover the passage of a
second and a larger army into Italy.
The intentions governing the movements of the French in October
are now clear. The Toulon squadron stood down to Cape de Gatt and
lay there, acting as a covering force to the first expedition which was
escorted by the Carthagena squadron. If Haddock had received the
news that this first expedition was about to sail and had thought
proper to proceed to intercept it, he would have found this squadron
in his path. He would have been warned by the French Commander
that any interference with the convoy would be met with force, and
would have been opposed by seventeen ships from Toulon and Cartha
gena; for as soon as the army was ready to sail the French went to
Carthagena, joined the squadron, the joint fleet went on up to Barcelona,
picked up the transports and the whole fleet and expedition sailed on
1 At a maximum, 43: Brest 9, Toulon 13, Cadiz 17, Carthagena 4; or without
the Brest, 34: Toulon 13, Cadiz 17, Carthagena 4; or without the French, 21:
Cadiz 17, Carthagena 4.

I74I News of Cornewall 167
November 3rd for OrbiteUo. There they landed the first instalment
of the Spanish invasion.
It was not until November 8th that Haddock received his first
news of the junction of the Toulon and Carthagena squadrons. The
'Winchelsea,' which had been watching Carthagena, learned of this
from a prize and also of their subsequent arrival in company at
Barcelona. The sailing of the expedition had not been witnessed, and
the 'Winchelsea' returned to Gibraltar with the bare but important
news of the arrival of the combined squadron at Barcelona. When
this reached Haddock a strong levanter had been blowing for some
days, of which the enemy would probably have availed themselves if
they had intended to pass the Straits into the Atlantic. He therefore
inferred that the Toulon squadron was not coming to Cadiz, as he had
supposed from Hughes' report of a week earlier, but that a junction
between the Cadiz and Toulon squadrons would be made inside the
Mediterranean. The Cadiz squadron would in that case be the next
to move, and early intelligence of its motions would furnish him with
the best clue to his own behaviour. He therefore sent the ' Winchelsea '
to sea again at once to go to Cadiz and get information. His expecta
tions were fully realized : she returned on November 13th bringing the
news that the Spaniards had already sailed on the 4th.
Still there was no sign of the promised reinforcement under Corne
wall. The first report Haddock had of its approach was brought by
a schooner, one of a convoy coming out under Cornewall's escort,
which hastened into Gibraltar Bay on the 19th with the news that
the reinforcement itself had been intercepted by the Spanish squadron
about 30 leagues south of St Vincent. This craft, by her good saihng
on a wind, had managed to beat round the flank of the enemy and
get past them, but there was no indication as to what was the fate
of the reinforcing squadron.
Cornewall and his convoy indeed came within an ace of never
reaching Gibraltar. Leaving England on October nth — over five
weeks after their orders for sailing — with a large convoy of the trade
for Portugal and the Mediterranean, they ran into a violent gale on
September 30th in which the 'Marlborough' lost company with the
remainder. The three other ships and the convoy reached a position
about 35 leagues to the southward of Cape St Vincent on November
13th. About midnight, while beating for the Straits against the
levanter, Cornewall who wore his broad pendant on board the ' Bedford '
sighted the lights of a fleet to windward. At daylight he made out
the ships to be a Spanish fleet. The enemy at once made sail and
came rapidly down towards him before the wind. Cornewall put his

1 68 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1741
helm up and made all possible sail to the westward, pursued by the
enemy who so gained upon him that by ten o'clock their leading ships
had come up with the rearmost of the convoy, the first of which, a
vessel with a valuable cargo of naval stores badly wanted at Gibraltar,
was captured. As the breeze freshened Cornewall and three others
of the convoy began to draw away, but one of them, the schooner
already referred to, finding that the enemy gained on him with the
wind aft, hauled his wind and succeeded in getting round the enemy
and reaching Gibraltar. The Spaniards continued to chase Cornewall
under a press of sail. "I never saw so great a cloud of sail," wrote
Cornewall in his Journal, " but in point of seamanship1 they behaved
just like themselves, for they never attempted to spread to cut us off
if we shifted our course, but kept in a body." When dark fell the
' Elizabeth ' had dropped astern and Cornewall, though he brought to
and shewed lights, was not rejoined by her or the convoy.
Knowing now that the enemy was at sea Cornewall was in some
doubt as to what he should do. His instructions had directed him to
call at Lisbon for intelhgence of the enemy from the Consul "and if
he shall advise you of a superior strength of the enemy being at sea
in those parts, you are to go into the bay of Wales and stay there
till you hear of their departure. But if you receive no intelligence
from him of the enemy's being in your way, you are to proceed and
join Rear Admiral Haddock who is cruising near Cape St Vincent,
St Mary's and sometimes to the southward towards the Barbary coast2."
The enemy had proved to be in his way in superior force, and the
fact that they were in that part shewed that Haddock was elsewhere,
probably at Gibraltar. Cornewall did not consider it possible to force
his way past the large squadron of whose good saihng qualities he had
received some evidence the day before; and he therefore considered
that he would be interpreting his instructions correctly by returning
to the Tagus. For this he was subsequently court-martialled and
convicted of an error in judgment, the Court considering that he should
first have made an effort to join the Admiral at Gibraltar.
The experience of the 'Elizabeth,' Captain Lingen, with the convoy
shews that such an effort would have been dangerous. He remained
about the approaches to the Straits, beating towards the gut for several
days and on the 23rd, being then near Spartel, once more sighted the
Spanish fleet, also beating for the Strait's mouth. Lingen still held on, but
next day was pursued by three of the enemy's squadron, and expecting
1 This use of the word ' seamanship ' to embrace more than the actual handling
of a ship is frequently used at this time.
2 Out letters. Orders and Instructions, September 4th, 1741.

1741 The Cadiz squadron past Gibraltar 169
that the Spanish main body might now be in Tangier or Ceuta and
that if he entered the Straits he might run into them and lose all his
store ships, he bore up and like Cornewall returned to Lisbon where
he arrived on the 5th of December. The 'Essex,' which had been
separated from the squadron when they first met the Spaniards, acted
in a similar manner; the 'Marlborough,' on the other hand, although
not very distant from the remainder of the squadron came through the
Straits without seeing anything of the enemy and anchored at Gibraltar
on November 21st. From the schooner's account of what she had seen,
and the knowledge of CornewaU's instructions given by the Captain
of the 'Marlborough,' Haddock guessed that the remainder would have
retired to Lisbon and that his promised reinforcement was still a long
way from joining him. He sent orders to Lisbon for them to come on
to Gibraltar at once, and proceeded to repair the 'Marlborough,' whose
damages in the six weeks' tempestuous passage were very extensive.
Although it was evident to Haddock that the Spanish squadron
was at sea, and that it intended to join the French inside the Mediter
ranean, he did not sail at once. The 'Marlborough,' a 90-gun ship,
was not in a condition to leave, and though the whole of the carpenters
of the fleet were put to work on her, it was a week before she could
be tightened up and made fit. Three days later — on the morning of
the 24th — his cruisers in the Straits brought him in news that the
Spaniards had passed through the Straits the night before.
Still Haddock decided not to move until the 'Marlborough' was
ready to accompany him. On December ist a privateer brought him
news that the Spaniards were at anchor off Malaga. The repairs to
the ' Marlborough ' were completed that night1, and at daylight next
morning Haddock sailed with his thirteen ships2 in search of the seven
teen of the enemy. "I shall proceed," he had written, "in search of
the Spanish squadron in order to attack them provided they are not
joined by the French squadron which has been cruising a considerable
time off Cape de Gatt3."
It is open to discussion whether Haddock should not have risked
an engagement with a superior force, and put to sea to bring the Spanish
fleet to action before it could join the French. It must be recalled that
the first knowledge he had that the enemy had sailed from Cadiz on
1 Journal of 'Marlborough.'
2 'Marlborough,' 90; 'Lancaster,' 80; 'Somerset,' 80; 'Ipswich,' 70;
'Pembroke,' 60; 'Warwick/ 60; 'Dragon,' 60; 'Plymouth,' 60; 'Guernsey,' 50;
'Dartmouth,' 50; 'Oxford,' 50; 'Salisbury,' 50; 'Panther,' 50; 'Folkestone,' 40;
'Feversham,' 40; 'Ann,' galley, 8; 'Duke,' fireship; 'Mercury,' fireship and
' Guarland's ' prize, zebeck.
8 Haddock to the Duke of Newcastle, November 25th, 1741.

170 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1741
November 4th was on the 13th. He then had with him twelve ships of
the hne to sixteen or seventeen (so his information went) of the Cadiz
squadron. He was expecting a reinforcement of four large ships daily.
The action he took was to send a cruiser to Cadiz to bring him further
news, keeping his squadron in harbour where he could best make sure
of being joined by the reinforcement which would give him approxi
mately an equahty with the Spaniards.
No general action had yet been fought with the Spaniards during
the war, and the English had not yet established that feeling of superi
ority which in later times served them so well. Yet, as soon as the
'Marlborough' was ready, and it became obvious to Haddock that he
must give up hopes of being joined by the remaining ships of his rein
forcement, he sailed with thirteen ships in pursuit of the Spanish
seventeen. A greater man might have taken the risk of sailing earlier without
the 'Marlborough'; but let anyone who thinks Haddock's conduct
deserving of censure put himself in the Admiral's place, consider all
the circumstances, and decide what he would have done.
Malaga Bay was drawn blank and Haddock stood on towards
Cape Palos. At 3 p.m. on the 6th of December the 'Roebuck,' which
was scouting ahead, made the signal to seeing a fleet, which soon
became visible from the mastheads of the squadron, bearing about
east. The Admiral at once crowded sail and steered in pursuit, but
the wind was very light and he closed little during the night. Next
morning sixteen sail were visible from the masthead at daylight. The
wind was south-east by east and the enemy bore east by north and
were going large to the westward of north, evidently for Carthagena.
At last Haddock had his evasive enemy well in sight with every
probability of being able to cut him off and bring him to action before
he could gain the shelter of another port. The ships were all cleared
for action, every stitch of canvas was set, and hopes ran high that
the enemy would soon be brought to action.
About 9 a.m. a midshipman who was at the masthead of the ' Dragon '
saw another four or five sail ahead. He came down from aloft and
informed Barnett, who at that time was going round the decks seeing
everything clear. When Barnett reached the poop after completing
his rounds he caUed to the mastheadman and asked if he saw any
more ships ahead; he was told that seven were now in sight. A
lieutenant went aloft, and returned confirming the news. Barnett at
once made the signal for seeing a fleet and altered course to steer for
them as the Saihng Instructions enjoined, so as to point them out to
the Admiral. The Spaniards about the same time bore away more to

I741 The Toulon squadron foils Haddock 171
the westward; by 10 o'clock the strange, ships were visible from the
poop. Haddock continued in chase of the Spaniards till about noon by
which time the strangers could be clearly made out. It was the French
squadron consisting of eleven ships. Haddock with his thirteen sail
of the line was in presence of twenty-eight sail of the enemy.
The relative positions of the three squadrons can now be seen. The
French bore north, about fifteen miles distant and were standing
towards Haddock. The Spaniards bore east-north-easterly and were
about nine miles distant, steering to meet the French. The wind was
about east-south-east. Whether Haddock should attempt to attack
the Spaniards, cutting them off before they should be able to join
the French was now the question he had to decide. There was little
doubt that the neutrality of the latter could not be depended on, " not
being able," as Barnett says in his Journal, "to account for their
having cruised near six weeks off Cape de Gat at this season of year
without supposing that it was in order to join the Spaniards and
defend them, if not jointly to attack us."
Haddock called a council of war of his eight senior captains which
decided that in view of the great superiority of the enemy it would
be dangerous to continue the pursuit, and that the best course would be
to keep to windward of the enemy and not to allow him to get between
the British squadron and any reinforcements that might be coming J
For the next four days Haddock continued cruising in the neigh
bourhood of Cape de Gatt with easterly winds. On the nth the wind
came westerly and drove him over to the Balearic Islands, and next
morning he again sighted the conjunct fleet, now numbering twenty-
seven sail and standing to -the north-eastward under easy sail. They
were to windward of the British squadron, but although it lay in
their power to bear down upon Haddock they made no attempt to do
so. From their abstention Haddock inferred that the French intended
leaving him alone provided he did not attack the Spaniards. " I con
clude," he wrote, "that the French in the present conjuncture will
forbear hostihties, at present at least, but on condition we should offer
to attack the common enemy under their protection." Arguing at
the same time that it was now beyond the power of his squadron to
prevent the expedition, guarded by so superior a force, from sailing,
he steered for Minorca there to await further instructions or, better,
a reinforcement. He anchored at Port Mahon on December 17th. The
enemy, content with having prevented him from attacking, proceeded
to Barcelona where they arrived on December 24th. The army was
1 Decision of council of war. In letters. Haddock, December 15th, 1741.

172 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1741
ready to embark, and ten days later the fleet with 52 large transports
under convoy sailed to the eastward with the intention of landing
the troops at Spezia; the passage occupied nearly seven weeks owing
to strong north-easterly gales, and the combined fleet then returned
to the harbour of Toulon.
Haddock was right in supposing that the French would only act
defensively. The instructions to M. de Court who commanded their
squadron directed him to support the passage of the Spanish troops
"sans cependant unir vos vaisseaux a ceux d'Espagne. Au surplus,
vous garderez dans l'entretenu le croisiere d'Yvice a Majorque." If
the British squadron should follow the Spaniards into the Mediterranean
in order to fight them — a contingency that apparently was considered
improbable — de Court was instructed to inform Haddock that he had
neither orders nor intentions to attack him himself; but if Haddock
should attempt to attack the Cadiz squadron, the French would assist
the Spaniards to defend themselves 1.
Putting aside any question of whether the policy of the French
was the one best calculated to achieve their ends it must be admitted
that they had handled the situation very cleverly. While maintaining
peace with England which they particularly desired to do, they had
the whole time hampered our operations keeping us in uncertainty as
to what they were going to do. Their demonstration of activity at
Brest had tied up the British ships in home waters until it was too
late to reinforce Haddock; by effecting a junction with the Carthagena
squadron they had secured that whichever way Haddock turned he
found a force of seventeen ships against his thirteen. They had sup
ported their ally without breaking with his enemy, and enabled him to
do what he could not do alone, effect the passage of his army into Italy
by sea; while at the same time their own commerce was not endangered
by a war with England. They had thus succeeded in the Mediterranean
as they had partly succeeded in the West Indies, in spoiling the whole
of our campaign; and without breaking the peace had obtained a
very considerable part of the advantages of war. The part omitted
was however of supreme importance. They had missed the opportunity
of destroying a British squadron, and the communications of their
expedition were henceforth insecure.
A storm of indignation burst out in England when it was learned
that for the third time the Mediterranean squadron had failed to prevent
a junction of enemy squadrons and the success of enemy plans. Twice
1 Newcastle papers, Add. MS. 32802. A copy of de Court's orders; ending
with the information that de Court must be on his guard as Norris with ten
sail was coming to reinforce Haddock.

I741 Criticism in England 173
the Cadiz squadron had sailed unhindered and joined the squadron
at Ferrol, and now an even more important junction with the French,
culminating in an invasion of Italy which it was our particular province
to prevent, had been permitted under the very nose of tbe British
Admiral. It is not to be wondered that a general idea took root
that Haddock's forbearing to engage the enemy in the Straits was due
to restraining instructions from the Government, who were openly
accused, as modern expression would put it, of being pro-Spanish. One
pamphleteer, writing no less than sixteen years after the event-
shewing how persistently this view was held — said: "What were the
motives of sending such orders does not become me to say; whatever
they were, they were such as could not be made public, and therefore
to justify so extraordinary and unexpected behaviour the friends of
the Admiral and the Ministry urged the importance of the fleet — the
ill-consequences that would happen to the nation if it should be
destroyed — the necessity there was of taking care of the King's ships —
and many such arguments; as if men-of-war were fitted out, armed
and manned so well but for no other reason but only to make a fine
figure and keep out of harm's way for fear their gildings and carved
work should be damaged1." The same idea was current in France
where it was believed that Haddock had allowed the Cadiz squadron
to pass the Straits under instructions from home, given with the object
of forcing the King of Sardinia into taking a definite stand on the
side of England and Austria2. Charles Emanuel had so far taken neither
side but was inchning slightly towards England. If he could be made
to feel the danger he was in from the two Bourbon Powers he might,
so ran the argument, be induced in self-defence to declare himself.
The junction of the French and Spanish squadrons and the landing of a
Spanish army were thus permitted in order to open his eyes to his danger.
It has already been seen that no such orders as those supposed
were given. The last word in the matter rests in a letter written by
the Duke of Newcastle on November 26th, when the news arrived that
the Spaniards had sailed from Cadiz on the 4th, and it was assumed
that they would proceed to the Mediterranean, "in which case his
Majesty does not doubt that pursuant to his repeated orders you will
have fallen upon them3."
It is not difficult to see that the principal cause of the failure to
prevent the invasion of Italy by sea was the weakness of the squadron
in the Mediterranean, owing to which it had been impossible for the
Admiral to watch both Carthagena and Cadiz in sufficient force. The
* Three Letters relating to the Navy, Gibraltar and Port Mahon, London, 1757.
2 Pajol, Guerres sous Louis XV. vol. in. p. 7.
3 Duke of Newcastle to Haddock, November 26th, 1741, S. P. Dom. Naval.

174 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1741
least that could have been done would have been to maintain Haddock's
squadron at a strength equal to that of the Spaniards, with a margin
for ships absent re-fitting; the most would have been to bring his
strength up to that of the combined Powers. It is difficult, in view of
the numerous references to the probability of French intervention, to
avoid the conclusion that the Government was to blame for not
adequately strengthening the Mediterranean fleet.
When the news of the sailing of the first expedition from Barcelona
reached London, the Ministry were violently attacked. Newcastle
sheltered himself by throwing the blame of the whole miscarriage upon
Haddock. Speaking in the House of Lords on December 4th, he said
that a reinforcement of five ships had been sent to the Mediterranean
in order that the squadron might be able to oppose the designs of the
Spaniards, even though the French should lend their assistance. The
House was thus intended to believe that such a reinforcement was of
sufficient strength to deal with even the combined fleet, and had been
sent in time to enable it to oppose the saihng of the expedition. Neither
of these suggestions was true.
The Duke went on to say that Haddock was stationed before
Barcelona in order to block up the Spanish expedition. "Why he
departed from that port, or upon what motives of policy or maxims
of war he suffered the Spaniards to prosecute their schemes, he only
is able to inform us1." For a shameless mis-statement, a baseless and
cowardly attack upon an absent Commander, unable to defend himself
and expose the truth, this must surely have few equals. Haddock
was not stationed before Barcelona. His instructions made Cadiz the
most important point in his strategy, and his force was insufficient to
watch even that one port effectively, far more to watch both. But apart
from questions of force the Duke's reply conveyed to its hearers the
belief that the Ministry had sent Haddock to blockade Barcelona and
that he had failed in that duty, shewing either a lack of conduct or
of courage in not preventing the expedition from saihng. Walpole, in
private at least, was more honest. Horace Walpole, writing the day
before the Duke's speech said: "You ask me about Admiral Haddock...
he had discretionary orders to act as he should judge proper from his
notices. He has been keeping the Spanish fleet at Cales. Sir Robert
says, if he had let that go out, to prevent the embarkation, the Tories
would have complained and said he had favoured the Spanish trade
under the pretence of hindering an expedition that was never designed 2."
For us the point of living interest is whether Haddock by any
1 Parliamentary History, vol. xn. p. 267.
2 Horace Walpole to Horace Mann, December 3rd, 1741.

I741 Changes in strategical objects 175
means in his power could have stopped the enemy's army at sea.
His force consisted as we have seen of thirteen ships, some frigates and
some light craft. The enemy had twenty-seven large ships and frigates,
with which to protect a convoy of about fifty-two sail of transports.
The chances of a successful attack on the transports in an engagement
may be estimated. We may compare Kempenfelt's attack on de Gui-
chen's convoy on December 12th, 1781, in which that brilliant Com
mander snatched nineteen prizes from the enemy under the noses of
a superior force1, or Cotes's attack on the convoy on March 7th, 1748.
But the odds in neither case were so great as those against Haddock, nor
would a defeat in either case have entailed such serious consequences.
In whatever way the blame should be apportioned, the fact remained
that the expedition from Barcelona had got clear away to Italy and
that its saihng gave the war a new character which materially changed
the objects of the Mediterranean squadron. Up to this time the
squadron had three successive principal objects. At the beginning of
the war, when the offensive was restricted to an attack on trade, its
objective was the ships leaving or returning to Cadiz, and as a defensive
function the protection of Minorca. As the operations in the West
Indies extended and developed into a territorial attack of considerable
magnitude the Mediterranean squadron became in effect a portion of
the forces operating in the West Indies, covering that attack from
interference from Old Spain; at the same time it acted defensively as
before in protecting Minorca. Then, when the invasion of Italy resulted
from the Franco-Spanish compact of May 1741, and the forces at
Barcelona instead of being aimed at Minorca were aimed at the Italian
coast, the squadron became a portion of the Allied forces engaged in
the protection of Lombardy. The maintenance of the balance of
power, that fundamental axiom of British policy of the day, could
only be attained by a strong support of the Queen of Hungary, and
consequently Haddock's orders of 26th of November laid the greatest
stress on the destruction of embarkations saihng for Italy and the pre
vention of "any attempt making by the Spaniards upon the dominions
of the Queen of Hungary, the Grand Duke or their Allies."
With this new orientation now fully developed, Haddock on his
arrival at Mahon set to work to refit his ships while waiting for the
reinforcement. On January ist it arrived at Gibraltar under the
command of Commodore Lestock2, whence it sailed, after four days
1 Kempenfelt, 13 ships, 4 frigates; de Guichen, 21 ships, 6 frigates; Cotes,
4 ships and a 24-gun frigate; Spaniards, 9 ships. Cotes took 5 prizes.
2 'Neptune,' 90; 'Barfleur,' 90; 'Lenox,' 70; 'Nassau,' 70; 'Royal Oak,' 70;
'Winchester,' 50; 'Romney,' 50, and 'Sutherland,' hospital ship. All these ships
arrived very' sickly, e.g. 'Neptune,' 250 sick and had buried 54 on the passage out.

176 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1742
for watering and refreshing, for Mahon and anchored in the harbour
there on January 27th. The original ships of the squadron were still
under repair when it arrived. Five months cruising, without much
opportunity or material for repair work, had reduced the ships to a
very poor condition. Haddock himself was worn out. The anxieties
through which he had passed had proved too much for him. He felt
very deeply the situation to which he had been brought, and complained
bitterly at having been left so long without reinforcement.
The ill-health of the chief Commander reflected itself in inaction of
the ships; during the first three months of the year1, the fleet remained
at Mahon. No cruisers were sent out on the coast of Italy, nor were
any steps taken to interfere seriously with the transport of troops
and stores which the enemy was pouring into the Italian ports. At
length, on March 20th, Haddock informed Lestock that he was now too
ill to take any further part in the command, and directed the Commo
dore to call a council of war to consider what should be done. The
council, which consisted of Lestock and twenty-four captains, reported
that the first and immediate necessity was to send out cruisers to get
some clear information as to what the enemy was doing. This
report was given to Haddock, but some days passed without his being
able to deal with it; and in the meantime the 'Folkestone,' which had
been at Genoa and Marseilles, arrived in Mahon harbour on the 26th
of March with the information that the Infante Don Philip himself
had arrived at Aix and was daily expected at Marseilles. Thence he
would proceed to Antibes, where he would embark for Italy in French
and Neapolitan galleys, escorted, by the Spanish squadron of which
twelve ships were then ready, lying in the inner harbour of Toulon.
The French ships were reported as unready. When this news reached
Lestock he wrote to Haddock and pointed out that it was now clear
that a squadron should proceed without delay to the coast of Provence;
he proposed that a detached squadron of twelve ships should at once
be made up to he off Toulon and deal with the twelve Spanish ships
if they should try to put to sea.
Haddock however was doubtful. He could not decide whether
such a squadron would do all that would be required of it. He called
another council to deliberate on the proposal, directing it to consider
what force was needed, to pay due regard to the safety of a convoy
expected from England, and to the possibility that such a squadron
might find itself cut off from the main body. There was indeed no
reason why the whole fleet should not proceed to the Riviera and so
be in a position to confront the combined fleet of the Allies, if by any

J742 Lestock in Command 177
chance the French should get their ships ready. Twenty-four sail
were now at Mahon, their complements were strengthened by 500 men
from the garrison, and this fleet would have been able to deal with
any that the enemy could put to sea. As to the out-coming convoy,
it was clear that the Spaniards were busy with bigger game than
convoys. They were engaged in the very operation that his instructions
directed him to oppose. This was not a moment to centre on the
defence of store ships, nor, with the force at Haddock's disposal, need
he consider anything except how to prevent the transport of troops
into Italy. His attitude can only be attributed to the complete nervous
breakdown from which there is no doubt he was suffering at this time1.
It is to be regretted that he could not have been reheved sooner from
his duties. It was not until March 30th that Lestock took over the
command. The Council met and recommended that the whole fleet should
put to sea as soon as possible, and that in order to save time the best
sailing small ships and frigates should go at once in advance to intercept
the transports. Captain Forbes of the 'Guernsey' was ordered to sail
that day with a small cruiser squadron2, with instructions to cruise
between Marseilles and Villefranche, particularly watching Antibes,
and to prevent "the transporting of Spanish troops or utensils of war
from them [Marseilles and Toulon] or any other Spanish or French
ports towards Italy, or any galley with Spanish troops or effects in
them." Forbes sailed on April 7th, and Lestock with the main body
consisting of twenty-one large ships, a 20-gun frigate and five small
craft3 followed on the 12th for the Riviera where he arrived on the 17th.
For a few days Lestock kept the squadron together, and cruised
in company watching Toulon, and sending out single ships to chase when
any craft were sighted. Several Spanish coasting craft with provisions
and stores were taken in the first few days. A large number of tartans
and settees — about thirty — were chased by the ' Rupert ' on the 17th
but by spreading all except two of them escaped. French vessels
engaged on the Spanish service were captured and carried inshore where
1 Dr Lidderdale to Haddock's son, April 17th, 1742: " Nothing could so much
contribute to his recovery as a total recess from business of all kinds.... I have
all along advised him to proceed to England... it will be necessary that you
prevail on him to begin his journey without loss of time, etc."
2 Lestock's fleet consisted of: 'Neptune,' 90; 'Barfleur,' 90; 'Marlborough,' 90;
'Lancaster,' 80; 'Somerset,' 80; 'Ipswich,' 70; 'Bedford,' 70; 'Royal Oak,' 70;
'Buckingham,' 70; 'Lenox,' 70; 'Essex,' 70; 'Nassau,' 70; 'Warwick,' 60;
'Dragon,' 60; 'Pembroke,' 60; 'Rupert,' 60; 'Plymouth,' 60; 'Kingston,' 60;
'Dartmouth,' 50; 'Salisbury,' 50; 'Romney,' 50; 'Guarland,' 20, and five small
vessels. 8 'Guernsey,' 50; 'Oxford,' 50; 'Panther,' 50; 'Folkestone,' 40; 'Winchelsea,'
24, and a zebeck.
R. n. 1. I2

178 The Mediterranean Campaign under Haddock 1J42
they were burnt, so that the French might know what would be the
fate of any ships of theirs captured while serving the Spaniards.
The numbers of small craft to be dealt with was soon found to call
for a greater dispersal of the fleet, and Lestock therefore made up
squadrons, composed of two or three big ships and a frigate, to cruise
on different parts of the coast. Thus, on the 19th of April the 'Dragon,'
60, 'Dartmouth,' 50, and 'Romney,' 50, were sent off on a cruise to
watch MarseiUes. On the same day the 'Pembroke,' 60, 'Kingston,'
6o, and 'Ann,' 20, went off Cape Creux with orders to stretch along the
coast as far as Barcelona. On the 22nd the 'Ipswich,' 70, 'Lenox,' 70,
' Nassau,' 70, and ' Duke ' (fireship) were detached to cruise to the south
eastward of Cape Sicie, stretching as far as 30 leagues out. On the 28th
the 'Buckingham,' 70, 'Warwick,' 60, 'Essex,' 70, and 'Mercury' (fire
ship) were sent to cruise off Cape Sicie and to the westward. Lestock
kept the remainder of his ships together, with his 50-gun frigates
thrown out to within signal distance or employed to carry instructions
to the outlying squadrons. With his forces thus disposed he kept his
eye principally upon Antibes, as it was the place where the Spanish
troops were gathering. So long as he was there the transports could
not sail unless the combined fleet should come out from Toulon to
drive him off and clear a passage, and this was exactly what he wished
it to do. But so long as it chose to remain in harbour Lestock com
manded the situation, and mihtary help could not be sent by sea tp
-join the forces in Lombardy. The effect of this blockade soon made
itself felt. Those in Turin who inclined to favour the Spanish cause
saw that matters were not so simple as had at first appeared, and Mann,
our Minister at the Piedmontese capital, observed a drooping in their
spirits since the squadron had established itself upon the coast and
stopped the passage of the Spanish troops. "Their barks," he wrote,
" continually fall into Mr Lestock's hands and they see 'tis impossible
to pass." One thing, however, Lestock badly needed — a base. He sent small
craft along the coast to examine all the anchorages for a good one,
"which," he said, "if we cannot find we must keep at sea or go to
the eastward of Villa Frank as wind and weather will permit." For
the present he made use of Villefranche, and thither he carried the
bulk of his ships. In this way he carried on till May 13th, when he
recalled his cruisers and gathered his fleet together to meet the new
Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Mathews, who was expected soon to
arrive from England.

CHAPTER IX
EVENTS IN EUROPE AND HOME WATERS, 1742— 1743
The spring of 1742 saw the European war in the full tide of its progress.
The invasion of Silesia by the King of Prussia had marked the beginning
of the struggle which was to develop into the War of the Austrian
Succession. The rapid successes of Prussia, and the clear demonstration
she gave of her importance as a military Power, dissolved such doubts
as France had entertained as to what should be her attitude in the
contest, and in March 1741 she had sent Marshal Belleisle as a special
Ambassador to Frederick to arrange an alliance and to persuade the
Electors to support the Bavarian claimant against Maria Theresa. At
the same time she made ready her army to act as an auxiliary to the
forces of the Elector of Bavaria.
The battle of Mollwitz in April 1741 confirmed the expediency of
the choice made by France; and Queen Maria Theresa soon found
herself attacked in Silesia by Prussia, and on the Danube by Bavaria
and France, while another French army threatened her on the Lower
Rhine. In September 1741 the Franco-Bavarian army had swept all
before it and Vienna itself was in danger. Austria then, to avoid
greater losses, at the instigation of the British Minister, concluded
with Frederick the secret convention of Klein Schnellendorff, by the
terms of which Lower Silesia was ceded to Prussia. The army which
had been opposing Frederick was thereby set free to protect the
capital, and at the same time 10,000 troops were recalled from the
Austrian possessions in Italy to assist in the defence; but neither of
these measures was effected in time to save Prague, which fell to an
assault of the Franco-Bavarian army in November 1741.
So far England had done nothing directly to maintain the Pragmatic
Sanction. By the terms of her agreement with the late Emperor she
was bound to furnish an army of 12,000 men to support Maria Theresa,
but with the whole of her army deeply engaged in the Spanish war this
was impossible; and when the French move on the Lower Rhine in
September became a serious threat to Hanover, King George, whose
heart was in his electorate, felt obliged to agree to England's neutrality.
Spain, on the other hand, had forces to spare from her large army
to take a share in the spoliation; and it was with Austrian affairs in
this deplorable state that the Spaniards passed their troops by sea
from Barcelona into Northern Italy, protected from British attack by

180 Europe and Home Waters iy^z
the combined squadrons from Toulon and Cadiz. The causes which
made this invasion by sea possible have already been seen. No unusual
pressure was exercised to prepare ships to reinforce Haddock, and it
appears that England had not yet sufficiently realized that now, since
the object of the war had developed from a purely commercial one
into an endeavour to maintain the balance of power, the focus of
operations must henceforth lie in Europe.
The Ministry had survived the attack made upon them at the end
of 1740, but the case against them in the winter of 1741-2 was too
strong. Austria had been abandoned for the sake of Hanover, the
Spaniards had sent an army into Italy in the face of the British
squadron, the operations in the West Indies had been a complete
failure. The conduct of the war by the Ministry was criticised from
every point of view — criticism which it fully deserved. But to this
were added charges of a political nature, based largely on dislike of
Walpole and an intense desire to drive him from office. Corruption,
mismanagement, his assumption of the hitherto unheard of office pf
Prime Minister were charged against him ; and after a series of debates
of exceptional acerbity he resigned in February 1742 and retired to
the Lords with the title of Earl of Orford. Pulteney and Carteret, who
had been his most vehement and determined critics on the subject of
the war, were admitted to the Cabinet. Sir Charles Wager, who had
not come off scathless, resigned the office of First Commissioner of the
Admiralty and a general shuffle took place.
The First Commissionership was offered to the Duke of Montagu,
a nobleman whom Horace Walpole has described as being "very
diffident of himself." The Duke refused the offer " as being a commission
of sea-affairs in which he was wholly unacquainted1 " ; and it was then
offered to Lord Winchelsea who, with equal lack of experience in sea
affairs but less diffidence, accepted it. Sir John Norris was invited
to take the second place at the Board, but indignantly refused. "I told
Mr Gibbon," he writes, "that I was concerned after our long friendship
that he should bring me such a message, having so long been the first
officer of the Fleet." He considered it impossible that he could sit at
the Board in a subordinate position, a Board "that had in all the
time of this formerly (sic) had a seaman at the head of it, and was
very right to be so." Just at this moment, while the filling of the
commission was still undecided, letters came in from Haddock asking
that he might be relieved in the command. Lord Carteret at once
offered the Mediterranean to Norris, who replied that he would accept
on condition he was given the first place at the Admiralty. "If," he
1 Diary of Sir John Norris, Add. MS. 28135.

I742 Norris's Position 181
wrote, "it should be his Majesty's pleasure that I should undertake that
command, and where many eminent services might be expected, I hope
I might be made First Commissioner  To be able to execute the
service that was in view I thought it absolutely necessary that I should
be First Commissioner of the Admiralty, and then setthng what was
necessary to support the service I should immediately endeavour to
put myself at the head of that service in the Mediterranean1."
Finding Carteret obdurate, Norris petitioned the King in the
following terms :
"May it please your Majesty,
I am sure your Majesty knows very well that ever since you have
been in this Kingdom the chief direction of sea affairs has been in the hands
of a seaman. I once flattered myself your Majesty did me the honour to think
me capable of it, and I am sure all those who now have the principal part in
your Majesty's business did formerly think and have often declared I was. Since
it is now thought otherwise I must look upon it as a strong admonition that
I am grown too old for my business, and therefore I come to beg your Majesty's
permission to retire."
His application to retire was not granted; the King had too high
an opinion of the valuable advice he could give. Norris therefore
requested, and was granted, permission to remain on shore; but no
mark of favour for his long services was given to him, and he no longer
took a part in the Cabinet discussions. The Admiral of the Fleet, he
said, should either be first of the Commission or have some mark of
his Majesty's favour to support his command; and without such a
consideration "I can neither be of the Cabinet or in those private
councils where the affairs of the Navy are consulted and the intention
of their operations considered." And so Norris remained in private
life, and the Navy was mismanaged until another sea-officer was
appointed to the Board who not only had a mind of great power which
had applied itself to the study of the higher parts of his profession,
but also wealth and influence to carry his ideas into execution.
The change in the Cabinet induced a change in England's share in
the war. The new Ministry, headed by Carteret, favoured a policy of
mihtary co-operation on the continent "to give direct assistance to
Austria, and consequently in May 1742 a British army of about 16,000
men, together with a Hanoverian force, were sent to Flanders. The
West Indian expeditions necessarily relapsed to a secondary place,
and the squadron in those waters was reduced to a bare equahty, or
1 Diary of Sir John Norris. The holding of such a dual appointment had
occurred before. Lord Berkeley in 1719 had, while First Commissioner, com
manded a squadron in the Channel; and Sir George Byng, while, a Commissioner
commanded the Mediterranean squadron 1718-20 as also E. Russell when First
Commissioner.

1 82 Europe and Home Waters 1740
less, with that of Spain. The Mediterranean squadron was at last
reinforced in order to support the Queen of Hungary against France
and Spain; and in home waters, where no enemy immediately
threatened, the operations were centred round the protection of British
and attack upon Spanish trade. The gradual development in the
system of trade protection in home waters therefore claims attention.
The Soundings — that is, the approach to the Channel — was the
all-important area to control, but in the early months of the war with
Spain very few ships were employed there, not more than two ships at
a time being appointed1. Complaints of lack of protection soon began
to be made. As early as January 1740 the merchants trading to Portugal
represented how greatly their fleets were suffering from the privateers;
to which the Admiralty could only regretfully reply that they were
fitting out ships as quickly as they could but that there was great diffi
culty in gettingready"so great a number as have been deemed necessary
on account of the war with Spain2." A ship of 20 guns and a sloop were
however detached to cruise, on the Portuguese coast, particularly off
Lisbon. Shortly after, the same question was brought up in Parhament,
where the lack of small vessels to protect trade was pointed out. Sir
John Barnard complained that instead of building 20-gun ships, " the
only ships that can most effectually curb the Spanish privateers," we
had paid aU our attention to equipping ships of the line; to which
Sir Charles Wager admitted that 20-gun ships were of great value but
that it took time to construct them in the numbers required, and those
we had " were not sufficient to supply all the services the circumstances
of the war required." Many had been found unfit for sea, not having
been kept in order in the preceding years of peace; others were being
bought from private persons, or built in private yards; but none could
be ready at once.
The Spanish privateers in the meantime were cruising in the very
heart of the Channel, and the remonstrances of the merchants as thejr
losses increased grew louder month by month. In May 1740 the West
India merchants presented a petition for more protection, in con-
1 The following ships were quoted by the Admiralty as being so employed
at the end of 1739: Received orders Returned

'Deptford,' 60 12 Oct.
'Centurion,' 60 13 Oct.
'Panther,' 50 17 Nov.
'Advice,' 50 20 Nov.
' Deptford,' 60 15 Dec.
'Winchester,' 50 20 Dec.
2 Out letters to Secretary of State, 368.

To cruise in the Sounding
for a month

n Nov.
9 Nov.
24 Dec.
20 Dec.
28 Jan.
29 Dec. (damaged).

I740_4I Shipping losses 183
sequence of which the Duke of Newcastle gave an order to the
Admiralty that "a sufficient number of ships" was to be stationed as
necessary to protect trade. The weakness of the protection that had
been given is illustrated by the answer the Admiralty gave to this
order: that one 50-gun ship had been cruising in the Soundings since
March, and that in accordance with the order another 50-gun ship and
a sloop had now been sent to cruise off the Cornish coast, where some
privateers had been reported in the merchants' complaint. Their
Lordships "heartily wished," they said, that they could comply with
all services, "but the great and unusual sickness that rages in the
fleet, the difficulty of getting seamen, and the several orders your
Grace has sent us from his Majesty to provide a number of ships for
other services, puts us under a disability of answering the expectations
of the merchants in the way we should be glad to do1."
Meanwhile the number of captures steadily increased. Over 100
vessels at the least were lost during the following year — 1741 — of
which no fewer than 71 were captured in the Channel and Bay2 and
carried into Spanish Biscay ports, notwithstanding the fact that there
was a considerable squadron of ships of the line in commission in the
Channel during that year, and that the number of small craft had
been increased. Dissatisfaction consequently increased, and towards
the end of the year a great petition, signed by 214 of the merchants
of London, was addressed to the King, praying that orders might be
given to the Admiralty to provide better protection for the trade.
The petition set forth, firstly, that upwards of 300 ships had been
taken by the enemy since the beginning of the war, and these mostly
in the Channel and Soundings; secondly, that this would have been
in a great measure prevented if a few of his Majesty's small ships
had been properly stationed from the beginning of the war, and their
commanders had done their duty; and thirdly, that the trade to the
North American Colonies had suffered greatly from the privateers,
principally due to a want of proper care on the part of the commanders
of the ships stationed in those parts.
In reply to this indictment the Admiralty prepared a lengthy
memorandum, dated November 28th, 1741, in which they gave lists
of all the ships that had been employed cruising for the protection
of trade since the war began. It is to be observed that they shewed
in their return every squadron that had cruised in the Bay, including
those under Norris and Balchen. They stated that convoy had always
1 Out letters to Secretary of State, 22nd May, 1740.
2 Lloyd's List, f or 1 74 1 , " Reports of vessels captured. ' ' The merchants of London
however claimed that over 300 captures had been made.

184 Europe and Home Waters 1741
been furnished when asked for, and said that fourteen outward and
twenty-one homeward convoys had sailed to and from Portugal; eleven
and ten to and from the Mediterranean; six and eleven to and from the
West Indies; four to North America and three from thence homeward.
They pointed out that to furnish convoy was one thing, but to obtain
obedience to the commanders of the convoy was another. " Nothing is
more frequent," wrote the Admiralty, "than the complaints from the
commanders of convoys of the obstinacy or folly of several masters
of merchant ships who refuse to obey their signals or directions for the
better keeping company together; but disregarding all order and
government desert their convoys from impatience of getting sooner
into Port." Several reports from commanders of convoys were quoted
to shew how common this behaviour was, and how many losses had
resulted from it. "If the trade could be brought under regulation,"
they wrote, "as was practised in the late wars, when those concerned
in the same branches of commerce advised together, and conformed
to the rules agreed upon between them and the Government, for sending
out their ships at times settled and fixed for the departure of their
respective convoys, fewer convoys would have sufficed for all the
purposes of our foreign trade, than have been employed in this war
on that service ; but the greatest part of our trade is at present under
no sort of order or method, which we presume proceeds from the
great increase of the practice of insuring ships, beyond what was
known formerly : which not only makes Traders more adventurous in
sending their ships to- sea, without convoys, but makes them less
concerned to fit them out in a defensible manner to resist an enemy.
There was an Order in Council made in the Dutch War in 1672 to oblige
masters of merchant ships to stay with their convoys and to provide
themselves with arms and ammunition for their defence1."
The order in Council, at the re-establishment of which the Admiralty
so broadly hinted, was one of the 4th December, 1672. It ran thus:
"His Majesty having taken into his consideration of what ill-consequence
and loss it is as well to the whole kingdom as to the Persons particularly con
cerned, that Merchant ships going out on foreign voyages in time of War, are
not sufficiently provided with Guns, Fire-arms, and other Necessaries for their
Defence against the Enemy, as also that such Ships are found frequently to
forsake their Convoys and the rest of their Company, by which means it often
happens that they fall into the hands of the Enemy. It was this day ordered
by his Majesty in Council, that all Masters of Vessels going out on any Foreign
Voyage as aforesaid shall, before they be cleared at the Custom House, or per
mitted to sail out of any Port of this Kingdom on their respective Voyages,
give good Security to the Commissioners and Officers of his Majesty's Customs
that they will not separate or depart from such Men-of-war as shall be by his
Majesty appointed for their Convoy, nor from the rest of their Company, but
1 In Admiralty Miscellaneous, vol. 340.

1741 Merchants and the Convoy System 185
that they will keep together during such their Voyage and mutually assist and
defend each other against any Enemy, in case they shall happen to be attacked,
and that to this End they will take care their respective Ships and Vessels shall
be well provided with Muskets, small Shot, Hand Granadoes, and other sorts
of Ammunition and Mihtary Provisions according to the proportion of the men
they carry. And of this his Majesty's pleasure the Commissioners and Officers
of his Majesty's Customs and all others whom it may concern are to take notice,
and have due regard thereto accordingly."
This system had been in use under the Commonwealth Government,
who in 1653 had made convoy compulsory on the east coast of England1.
Penalties other than pecuniary were added later. In 1689 it was
enacted that "if any merchant ship shall wilfully leave the convoy
to come earlier to market, if they are taken by Turks or Moors they
shall never be redeemed by any pubhc Treaty or Contribution2."
Compulsory convoy was enforced to the westward and southward
during Tourville's deep-sea cruise in 1691, but was gradually relaxed
during Queen Anne's reign by a series of orders which permitted ships
to sail without convoy provided they were armed in their own defence.
It was to the pohcy of 1672 that the Admiralty evidently desired to
return, a pohcy of grouping the various sections of the trade in convoys
which would sail at regular dates, and in which obedience and some
measure of self-protection and co-operation should be enforced by
civil law.
This however was by no means the view of the merchants, as can
well be understood. Trade requires freedom and the removal of
restrictions, and their object was to obtain such protection as would
allow their ships to sail so soon as they were ready, without the delays
incident to collecting large fleets of traders.
It is clear that there was much to be said on both sides, and the
views of neither the merchants nor the Admiralty can be hghtly
dismissed. Overseas trade was a matter of such importance that, as
the first paragraph of the Order in Council of 1672 shews, reciprocal
obligations were clearly considered to exist between the merchants
and the State. It was the duty of the merchants, by arming and saihng
in company, to do all that was possible to protect themselves; it was
the duty of the State to give protection, without payment, by means
of ships of war3. But the whole question was further comphcated by
the manning difficulty; and the problems of the protection of trade,
the protection of the colonies, and the manning of the fleet are so inter-
1 Oppenheim, Administration ofthe Royal Navy. p. 313- It was extended to
whole coast at the end of the First Dutch War, ibid. p. 342.
2 Admiralty Records. ,„ , . T_ , „ ,, , ,
3 A notorious case in the last war, known as "Captain Kerr s Case, had
led to the enunciation in clear terms of the illegality of the act of taking convoy
money,

1 86 Europe and Home Waters 1 741-2
woven and interdependent that it is not possible wholly to dissociate
one from the other. As a general proposition it may be said that the
attitude of the Admiralty expressed the broader and more national
view. They reahzed fully the importance of trade, but they were able
to weigh its importance fairly in comparison with the other mihtary
needs of the war. If too much weight were given to one factor in the
problem, other factors must suffer, and the paramount object which
the Admiralty always kept in view was that of having a strong force
to oppose the main fleets of the enemy. It is true that they did not
always take measures to have that force ready at the right place and
at the right time; but the doctrine was so well appreciated, so fully
absorbed, that from the time of the Dutch wars onward, it was never
wholly lost sight of, and. England's avoidance of the heresies which
affected the navies of France and Spain at this period proved her
salvation. While France or Spain confined the employment of their
fleets to the defensive operation of the protection of trade, and the
King df France drew revenues from French merchants for escorting
their ships, England used her navy to her utmost as an offensive
mihtary force, acting in conjunction with the armies of her allies,
supporting her oversea military expeditions, attacking her enemies
wherever they could be found, and at the same time affording such
protection to trade beyond that given by the offensive operations, as
the exigencies of those operations permitted.
The Admiralty's defence was transmitted to the King, and his
decision — or, to be more correct, that of the Privy Council— confirmed
this doctrine. The King's reply to the merchants' petition was dated
the 31st of December 1741. In it the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty were ordered to take a proper care that a sufficient number
of his Majesty's ships of war be employed to cruise in the Soundings,
at or near the approaches to the Channel and in other stations to protect
the trade, "this service to be duly and constantly performed as far
as may be consistent with the necessary services and operations of war."
This message however by no means contented the merchants. They
returned to the charge at once, and in January 1742 another petition
was presented, this time by the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of the
City of London. Among other things it represented "that at a time
when a feeble enemy holds our naval power in derision, and the conduct
and distribution of our ships of war are the subject of universal censure,"
heavy losses were being suffered from the privateers of Spain. Com
mercial interests, said the petitioners, were disregarded, and those
ships which they might reasonably expect "would have been employed
in protecting our trade have not contributed either thereto or to the

J742 Losses and petitions 187
interest or honour of the nation, and that we have seen a powerful
and well provided fleet remaining inactive in our ports, or more
ingloriously putting to sea without the appearance of any enterprise
in view or even the possibility of meeting an enemy worthy of its
attention, whilst our trading vessels have been daily exposed in the
British Channel and Soundings to the Privateers of a place so in
considerable as San Sebastian."
This repetition of the complaint was not without its effect. In the
foUowing month the Duke of Newcastle gave orders for the disposition
of certain ships for trade protection; orders which, although not so
far reaching as the merchants desired, gave them some satisfaction and
encouraged them to ask for more. These orders laid down that ten
ships of the fourth, fifth and sixth rates1 were immediately to be sent
out to cruise in the Channel and Soundings, off Ushant and Cape
Clear, and in the Bay of Biscay; and that at least the same number
was to be constantly employed upon the protection of trade. Inter alia,
a 20-gun ship and a sloop were to be kept cruising off Lisbon, and the
same force off Oporto, to protect trade along the coast of Portugal; the
captains of these vessels were constantly to consult with the Consuls
and keep themselves informed of sailings and other relevant matters ;
the ships were to be cleaned at Gibraltar, and when possible, at Lisbon.
To this order the Admiralty were able to reply that fifteen ships
were already so employed2. These ships were stationed as follows:
Between mouth of Channel and Cape Clear ' Bridgewater, ' 20 ; ' Spy ' sloop, 8.12
Between Cape Ortegal and Cape Pinas \ Mahon i± ' '
30 to 50 leagues west of Scilly, and as far! .Newcartte . 50; 'Tartar,' 20
as Cape Clear J
80 leagues west of Scilly 'Biddeford,' 20
Between Ushant and 50 leagues S.W. of it 'Deal Castle,' 20; 'Hound' sloop,
8.12
In Bristol Channel ' Ruby,' 50
Between Milford and Lundy Island 'Shark' sloop, 8.12
„ . _ ,, . . T ,, _. , j'Deptford's' prize, 8.12; 'Success'
Between Portland and Land s End 1 si0or> 8 6
Convoy between Downs and Portsmouth 'Scipio,' 8.8.
The discontent of the commercial community was too intense to
be assuaged by such rephes as this. As long as their losses continued,
it gave traders httle satisfaction to know that this or that number
of vessels was employed, and petitions still rained in from representa
tives of commerce, finally culminating on March 4th in a Resolution
in the House of Commons to the following effect :
(1) That notwithstanding the repeated applications of the Merchants for
cruisers to be properly stationed for the protection of the trade of this nation
1 I.e. 60-, 50-, 40- and 20-gun ships.
2 Out letters to Secretary of State, 19th February, 1742.

1 88 Europe and Home Waters xy^z
from the privateers of the enemy, the due and necessary care has not been taken
to keep a proper number of bis Majesty's ships employed upon that service
more especially in and near the Channel and Soundings: for the want of which
many ships have been taken by the enemy, some of them of considerable value,
to the great loss of many of his Majesty's subjects, the great advantage and
encouragement of the enemy, and the dishonour of this nation.
(2) That the detention of the fleet of merchant ships, bound to Portugal,
for near twelve months, by the refusal of protections for some time, and the
delay of convoys afterwards, gave our rivals in trade an opportunity of intro
ducing new species of their woollen manufactures into Portugal, to the great
detriment of this Kingdom.
This resolution led to a Bill being brought forward on the 20th
May1, by the terms of which it was proposed that, between November
ist and December ist of each year the Admiralty should nominate a
sufficient number of vessels to act as cruisers and convoys between
England and Cape Finisterre during the succeeding twelve months.
These ships were to be earmarked solely for the service of protecting
outgoing and homecoming trade in that area, and ships for convoy
of trade to distant parts were not to be taken from their number.
They were only to be available for the line of battle in case of "great
necessity" and even then not beyond Cape Finisterre. A special
Commissioner was to be appointed to superintend everything connected
with them. If any ships came into harbour for refit this officer was to
see that they refitted as quickly as possible and were sent to sea again
at once. Rigorous orders for the captains of convoys were proposed,
and a close watch was to be kept on the proceedings of the ships, to
ensure that they cruised constantly and with diligence. Finally, each
ship was to be cleaned at least three times a year, if not oftener.
Remarkable as may appear this intrusion of the legislature into
the sphere of the naval executive, the Bill was framed upon the fines of
two previous Acts. The first of these, passed in 1695, provided that over
and above the ships of war for the hne of battle, 43 s ships were to be
employed to cruise in proper stations to protect homecoming and out
ward trade; but in case of great necessity they might be employed
in the hne of battle. The second one, dated 1708, was to the same
effect though the provisions were rather more extended. The merchants
in that war had put forward a series of complaints of insufficient
convoys, delays and consequent loss of markets through having to
wait for convoy, the want of cruisers in the Channel and Soundings,
and the arbitrary proceedings of the King's ships in the matter of
impressment. To remedy these grievances this Act provided that "over
and above the ships of war for the line of battle and for convoys to
' "An Act for the better protecting and securing of the Trade and Navigation
of this Kingdom in times of War," Parliamentary Debates, 1742
2 Viz.: 4 of the 3rd rate, 16 of the 4th, 13 of the 5th, and 10 of the 6th.

I742 More cruisers provided 189
distant parts at least 43 x ships of war be employed as cruisers on proper
stations," of which at least nine were to cruise on the N.E. coast
of England and three on the N.W. coast. As in the Bill of 1742,
these ships could only be employed in the line of battle on this side of
Finisterre. Although the Bill of 1742 was a repetition of that of 1708, except
that it did not specify the exact number of ships, it was not carried
in Parliament. Lord Winchelsea opposed it with legitimate reasoning
on behalf of the Admiralty, shewing that the Board would be fettered
in their disposition of ships for other purposes of war and declaring
that trade must take its share in common with other interests. The
practical result of such a Bill is evident. It would create a second
navy, independent of the main force2; and the Admiralty, to whom
this proposal had been made in the previous year, replied to the King
in their memorandum that "we can not take it upon ourselves nor
advise your Majesty to bring such an increase of expense upon the
public as the creation of so many new employments and other charges "
as the execution of such a project would entail. The agitation however
bore fruit, as the Admiralty Lists shew. By July the fifteen ships of
February had increased to twenty-five, and a more dihgent conduct
and greater care are to be traced in the Orders and Instructions at
this time. The disposition of the cruisers employed on the protection
of trade in July was as follows:
Between Ushant and Isle of Wight ' Stirling Castle,' 70
From Lizard to Scilly 'Launceston,' 40
From Dieppe to La Hogue ' Kinsale,' 40
Off Ostend and Dunkirk 'Hastings,' 40
Convoying troops to Flanders 'Liverpool,' 40
Off Belleisle 'Seaford,' 20
Orkneys and Shetlands 'Tartar,' 20
Convoying trade to Elsinore 'Gibraltar,' 20
Cruising in North Sea 'Lyme,' 20
Between St Malo and Isle de Bass ' Success,' 8.6
Isle of Wight to Portland 'Deptford's' prize, 8.10
Ostend to Calais 'Neptune,' 8.10.
Besides these there were twelve other smaU craft between Beachy
Head and Yarmouth, convoying trade in the North Sea, and following
up privateers. This was stiU far from the ideal of 1708. Only one 3rd-rate and
four 5th-rates are included in the force and the number is stiU far
short of the 43 granted at the earher time. There is no force specially
1 Viz.: 6 ships of the 3rd rate (70- to 80-gun ships), 20 ships of the 4th rate
(60- and 50-gun ships), 13 ships of the 5th rate (40-gun ships) and 4 ships of the
6th rate (20-gun ships).
2 Cf. the Dutch Directors' ships.

1 90 Europe and Home Waters x 742-3
appointed to the north coast of Spain, and it was from the privateers
which issued from that part that our trade suffered. But although
San Sebastian, Santander and the other ports in North Spain were
the principal bases of the privateering industry, the French harbours
were also used by the Spanish craft both for shelter and for disposing
of their prizes. Information that this was being done appears to have
reached England, but there is nothing to shew that any diplomatic
action was taken. Small frigates or sloops were sent instead to watch
the ports reported to be in the use of the enemy and possibly, an
occasional French ship suffered. The instructions to the commanders
of vessels so employed gave a fair latitude to them to go beyond
their stations in certain circumstances. Thus, a captain ordered "to
proceed to sea with H.M. Sloop under your command and cruise
between Point Barfleur and Cape la HoguC," in quest of certain priva
teers reported to be infesting the ports of Cherbourg, la Hogue, Conquet
and Barfleur, was also told that "you are at liberty to cruise on any
other station where you shall have good intelligence or a probabihty
of meeting the enemy's ships, taking care to return to the above
mentioned station when the service for which you left it is performed
or that there are no longer hopes of meeting with the enemy, according
to the intelligence which had been given to you1."
Thus the year 1742 saw a marked increase in the care taken to
protect sea-borne commerce since 1739; but for all that the losses
were still considerable, and the number of ships employed in cruising
was further augmented in 1743. The Straits of Gibraltar, through
which a constant volume of trade with the States of Italy and the
East was always going, was a peculiarly favourable spot for Spain,
who could put out vessels of all sizes, from 24-gun privateers down to
row-boats, to attack the passing British merchantmen. In consequence
of this the Admiralty sent four small ships2 expressly for the protection
of trade in the Gut. The instructions to the captains of these vessels
ran as follows : " You are to put yourself under the command of Captain
Crookshanks of the Lowestoffe or the eldest captain of his Majesty's
ships that may be cruising about the Straits' mouth, being your
senior officer, and follow his directions until you receive orders to the
contrary from Vice-Admiral Mathews to whose squadron you are to
esteem yourself to belong, and to follow such orders as he shall send
you3." As a matter of fact it was only in name that these ships were
a part of Mathews's squadron, for the Vice-Admiral was specially
1 Instructions to Captain Elliott, 'Granado' sloop, September 24th, 1742.
2 'Lowestoft,' 20; 'Solebay,' 20; 'Saltash' and 'Shark,' 8.12.
3 Orders and Instructions, March 7th, 1747.

I743~4 Development of cruising squadrons 191
informed that they were placed in the Straits for the protection of
trade, and he was powerless to move them. They were within the
limits of his command, which extended as far west as St Vincent,
but beyond that of discipline he had no powers over them. The
Admiralty later in the year endeavoured to make out that they had
met Mathews's requests for small ships by appointing these vessels;
but this was equivalent to saying that a ship could be in two places
at once; for it was on the coasts of Italy and not in the Straits of
Gibraltar, that Mathews was wanting small frigates.
Measures were also taken early in this year to deal with the priva
teers of the Biscay ports. In March the 'Hampshire,' 50, was sent
to cruise between Finisterre and Ortegal to protect ships making their
landfall at the N.W. Cape, and the 'Biddeford,' 20, 'Bridgewater,'
20, 'Lyme,' 20, and 'Loo' were ordered1 to cruise between Bilboa and
St Jean de Luz, "we having intelligence of large privateers of the
enemy being at sea: looking frequently into the ports within your
station and using your utmost endeavours to intercept the privateers
or other ships of the enemy, and to take or destroy them 2."
Three Caraccas ships being reported to be coming to San Sebastian,
the 'Sutherland,' 70, Captain Pocock, and 'Leopard,' 44, Captain
Lord Forrester, were sent to strengthen this squadron for three weeks3;
and a few light vessels with a backbone of ships were kept cruising
in this station till well into the latter part of the summer4.
The increased number of cruisers and vessels employed in the
defence of trade in 1743 and 1744 is shewn best by the accompanying
table. Although this slightly anticipates events, it carries the system
up to a point at which a still more marked increase took place, and
a separate squadron, the Western squadron, was initiated, whose
function in the first instance was purely the protection of trade.
Offensive operations against Spanish trade were at the same time
in progress; but few Spanish ships were taken in 1742 owing to the
1 Orders of March 9th, 17th and 30th. 'Loo' was added 8th April.
2 The clause as to extending the cruise beyond the limits of the station
formed a part of the instructions, in terms similar to those already quoted.
3 Instructions of April 8th and 9th.
4 7th June. 'Hampshire' and 'Augusta' to St Jean de Luz to join 'Suther
land,' etc., already cruising there. Intercept five or six Caraccas ships and attack
Tj ri vs, t c ers
30th June. 'Prince Frederick,' 70, Captain Barnett, to cruise from Cape
Finisterre to Cape Machichaca for protection of trade. To " have a particular
attention to prevent any ships or privateers of the enemy from coming into or
going out of the Groyne or Ferrol."
ist July. 'Lyme,' 20 and 'Dolphin,' 20, to the same station under Barnett s
orders. 8th July. ' Hampshire' to St Jean de Luz so soon as she is once more ready.

192

Europe and Home Waters

1 743-4

small number of enemy ships at sea. The squadron in the West Indies,
still in considerable strength, cruised on the trade routes, and severe
British attacks were also made early in 1743 against the ports on the
Caraccas coast1. These twin measures of passive cruising and an
active offensive kept some of the trade within its harbours.
Convoys and cruisers.

Rates
Month
Remarks
Year
3
4
5
6
Sloops
Smaller vessels
Total
t743
March
—
3
5
9
4

21
April
—
3
4
7
6
—
20
fn of these taking
May
1
10
5
13
7
6
42
\ King to Holland
June
1
9
5
11
8
—
34
("' Centurion,' first
July
3
1.3
5
8
10
—
41
•J heard of at Canton,
\ included
Aug.
3
10
5
n
7
1
37
Sept.
3
8
4
n
10
1
37
Oct.
—
4
3
5
9
—
21
Nov.
2
9
4
6
9
—
30
Dec.
3
8
4
6
7
—
28
1744
Jan.
3
7
4
9
7

SC
Feb.
2
4
5
10
10
—
SI
( 4 ships watching Brest
\ included
/Threat of invasion;
March
—
2
3
6
5
—
16
J all ships assembled
| in Downs. War de-
(. clared with France
April
2
9
8
5
5
—
29
May
—
3
5
8
5
—
21
June
2
4
4
10
7
—
27
July
2
3
6
10
10
3
34
Aug.
—
4
7
n
12
6
40
Sept.
—
3
5
10
12
6
36
Oct.
—
4
6
10
10
6
36
Nov.
4
3
9
10
12
6
44
Dec.
7
7
10
8
9
6
47
The effect of the increased numbers of cruisers employed on trade protection
cannot be stated with accuracy, as Lloyd's lists, except that for 1741, are missing
up to 1749, having been burnt in the fire of 1838. The year 1741 shews 71 British
ships taken by the Spaniards. Beatson gives no figures for that year and does not
differentiate between the various parts of European waters: he shews 109 as
having been taken in Europe in 1742, 136 in 1743 and 84 in 1744.
1 See post chapter xn.
1743 Measures for attack on Trade 193
In *743 the Spanish trade began to sail once more and we have seen
that heavy ships were sent off Ortegal and San Sebastian to intercept it.
Although these ships were an addition to the force of smaller vessels
that was cruising there with the purely defensive object of suppressing
the privateers, they were not needed for that purpose and belong
more properly to the category of ships employed in the attack of
trade. Two other small divisions concerned with trade attack were sent
out in April 1743, the 'Monmouth,' 70, and 'Medway,' 60, under
Captain Windham, and the 'Dreadnought,' 60, and 'Deptford,' 60,
under Captain Boscawen; the former to cruise off the Canaries and
the latter off the Azores. Information had been received that several
Spanish ships were on their way home from the West Indies to Spain.
Windham's instructions directed him to station one of his ships between
Cape Gear and Lancerotto and the other off Teneriffe and Grand
Canary; but these stations were not rigidly imposed, for the instructions
continued "or in case you shall find that other stations about the
said islands will more effectually answer the aforementioned purposes
of your cruising, you are to station the said ships accordingly. But if
you shall at any time receive such advices of the strength of the enemy
as shall make you think it advisable to keep both ships together you
are at liberty to do so, and annoy the enemy by land or sea as shall
be thought proper, taking care to divide them again to the different
stations when you shall judge it necessary no longer to keep them
together." If Windham heard that de Torres had sailed for Spain
he was to inform the three other captains1, and consult together as
to how they should act, and where it were best to waylay him. But
if de Torres when met with should prove too strong to be attacked
with prudence "You are nevertheless not to fail to attend him in
his passage to Spain and endeavour to lay hold of any favourable
opportunities that may happen of cutting off such of his ships as may
be lame sailors, or which by any accident may separate from the
main body of the squadron." The squadrons were to remain out as
long as their provisions would last and then return to Spartel, range
along the Spanish and Portuguese coasts as far as Lisbon and bring
home the trade from that port. The instructions to Boscawen were
of the same tenour, but gave the cruising stations of his two ships
as St Mary's and Flores in the Azores.
These divisions sailed on April 25th, 1745, escorting 67 sail of
merchant ships. The Spanish homeward-bound trade from Havana
however did not sail. Windham's division attacked and destroyed
1 I.e. Medway and Boscawen's division.
R. N. 1. r3

194 Europe and Home Waters 1743
the fortifications at Santa Cruz in Gomera Island on May 20th, and
took a richly-laden outward-bound ship, a privateer, and three other
small craft. The ' Deptford ' took a ship from Caraccas. Both divisions
returned to England in July.
In the end of June another small division under Captain John
Byng, consisting of the 'Captain,' 70, 'Jersey,' 60, 'Biddeford,' 20, was
sent to cruise off Belleisle and the Garonne for six weeks, also for the
purposes of attacking trade, but did no great service; and in October
a similar small squadron under Captain Barnett, 'Prince Frederick,'
70, 'Jersey,' 60, and 'Leopard,' 44, was sent to cruise "off Cape Cantin
and thence 50 to 60 leagues to the N.W." Byng, when he returned
in September was sent out again with three ships, the 'Captain,' 70,
'Antelope,' 50, and 'Hampshire,' 50, to cruise 18 to 20 leagues west
by south of Cape Ortegal.
To sum up the main proceedings of the ships in home waters in
1743 : a force of small vessels, occasionally supplemented by ships of
the hne was employed upon the protection of trade by cruising in
certain stations and by direct attack upon the privateers in the neigh
bourhood of their bases; and small divisions of two or three heavy
ships were sent out to cruise to intercept Spanish trade at the principal
landfalls — the Canaries, the Azores, the approaches to the Straits of
Gibraltar and the northern capes of Spain.
But while the principal duty which fell to the Navy in home waters
during the years 1742 and 1743 was concerned with the defence and
attack of trade, an eye was kept on the French Atlantic ports and any
activity in them produced its effect in England. Towards the end of
1742 the Brest squadron was reported to be fitting out, and rumours
that France was about to declare war disturbed the Admiralty at
home as well as the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean.
Admiral Stewart, who commanded at Portsmouth, was at the same
time ordered to complete all the ships there1 to four months provisions,
and informed that the ships at Spithead were to be kept in instant
readiness to sail. The suspected intentions of France are illustrated
in the instructions sent to the ' Seaford ' early in November, at which
time a second frigate, the 'Biddeford,' went to reinforce him. These
instructions ran: "If you shall discover any considerable squadron of
men of war coming out of Brest or any other port of France you are
to come away immediately with the 'Seaford' to the first port in
1 'St George,' 90; 'Sandwich,' 90; 'Duke,' 90; 'Shrewsbury,' 80; 'Princess
Amelia,' 80; 'Princessa,' 70; 'Monmouth,' 70; 'Orford,' 70; 'Stirling Castle,' 70;
'Dreadnought,' 60; 'Hampshire,' 50; 'Lynn,' 40; 'Diamond,' 40; 'Roebuck,' 40;
' Hastings,' 40; 'Scipio' and 'Aetna,' fireships. Orders and Instructions, October
19th, 1742.

1743 Renewed preparations at Brest 195
England you can reach, and send a particular account of their number
to this office by express, and direct Captain Laton in the 'Biddeford'
to follow them into the sea, and if they steer their course into the
Mediterranean to make the best of his way to Port Mahon or where
else you shall hear Vice-Admiral Mathews to be, and inform him of it."
If no intelhgence of moment were found at Brest, Rochefort was
to be examined and all possible information obtained as to the ships
of war in that port; after which the 'Seaford' was to return off Brest
and watch the proceedings of the ships there, sending in accounts from
time to time.
The winter of 1742 however passed quietly and no move was made
from Brest. In April 1743 rumours were again current that France
was about to declare war. The British forces which had been sent
to Flanders in May 1742, but had done nothing during that year,
were at this moment making the move which culminated in Dettingen,
and two frigates were again sent to watch the French port, and to
learn whether any men-of-war had lately put to sea from thence, and
if so whither bound. As the French were now reported to have a
squadron ready or nearly ready at Brest, it was proposed to fit out a
force in the Channel, and Norris was sent for by the King and asked to
take command. The Admiral of the Fleet reminded the King of the
circumstances in which he had asked leave to retire in the previous
year, but the King repeated his desire, and further gave Sir John
permission to express his opinion generally upon naval affairs. This
Norris at once did. The first thing, he said, in view of the armament
now preparing at Brest, was to assemble a strong force at Spithead:
for, if the French should come over with their fleet to St Helens as
they might suddenly do "we have not sufficient strength at that place
in readiness to oppose, and that would prevent the junction of other
[squadrons] and put the country in great consternation: and our
squadrons lying in their road near Toulon might be an inducement
for them to do it if they found we were not in readiness to receive
them1." How correctly the old Admiral appreciated the possible action
of France was proved by subsequent events.
Norris further told the King that he did not believe we had above
ten ships of war at Spithead in a condition for action. The King said
that this could not be so, for he had been shewn a list of no less than
thirty sail that would soon be ready for service ; to which the Admiral
bluntly replied that he did not beheve the report — a disbelief which
was amply justified later. The King thereon directed him to put down
in writing what he thought should be done. In accordance with this
1 Diary of Sir John Norris. 13—2

196 Europe and Home Waters 1743
order Norrfs submitted the following question to the Duke of Newcastle,
on behalf of the King. "If the squadron at Brest, which according
to Lord Waldegrave consists of 35 sail, of which 22 are from 78 to 60
guns, should come into the Channel and place themselves at St Helens,
what force is there provided at present to drive them away or even
to look them in the face? "
This direct question was put before the Council at its next meeting
on April 25th. Lord Winchelsea, in reply on behalf of the Admiralty,
read a report from Brest which stated that ten ships were ready, but
the remainder were not as yet in a condition for sea, some still being
in need of repairs. Reassured by this the Cabinet took no further
steps. Nothing was done even to keep a squadron superior to that
of the French ready for immediate service. The English fleet remained
scattered at the three home ports and, as the preceding narrative has
shewn, further broken up into small divisions to attack trade. Norris
was thus appointed to a phantom command. His flagship was at the
Nore, unready for sea. Some ships were at Spithead, others off the
Canary Islands, others at Plymouth, Chatham and the Nore. To crown
all, when he asked the Admiralty for a list of the ships in commission,
with their stations and muster, so that he could form some idea of the
force he would have under his command, it was refused him ! Yet at
this moment England's own policy was leading straight to war with
France. An army under the British King in person was marching
against the French in the Palatinate, and a British fleet was lying
outside the principal French naval port. It was not to be expected
that France would submit tamely to such treatment; nor did her
manner of behaving shew her to be unresentful of the British action.
It is certain that when the failures of this war are under con
sideration the share borne by an Administration which behaves in
such a manner must be given full weight.

THE!

:oast

CHAPTER X
REINFORCEMENT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
COMMAND WITH THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE WAR IN ITALY, 1742
The Mediterranean under Mathews, 1742
Admiral Thomas Mathews, when he was appointed to relieve Admiral
Haddock, was an officer just over 65 years of age. He had been in
the Navy since 1690, and is believed to have served in the battles of
Beachy Head and Barfleur1. He had commanded ships from 1703 till
the peace of Ryswick. In Sir George Byng's expedition to Sicily in
1718 he was captain of the 'Kent,' serving with distinction it the battle
of Passaro, and he appears to have possessed the confidence of that
distinguished officer, his Commander-in-Chief. For two years he com
manded squadrons in the East Indies operating against the pirates,
and in 1724 he came ashore and settled down to develop his estate
in Wales. In 1736 he was made Commissioner at Chatham, and
held that civil appointment up till 1742 when he was sent to the
Mediterranean Fleet.
During the time Mathews was Commissioner at Chatham Captain
Lestock had been senior officer in the Medway. The acquaintance had
not impressed Mathews favourably with the qualifications of his future
second -in command. "I took the liberty of giving your Grace," he
Wrote to the Duke of Newcastle on January 3rd, 1744, "my opinion
with regard to Mr Lestock before I left England. I did the same to
Lord Winchelsea and Lord Carteret," adding, that he need therefore
say no more than that Lestock was a cripple and unable to sustain
the fatigue which would be involved by an action or the command
of the squadron. A campaign in which the senior officer frofn the
beginning entertains this opinion of his principal colleague, is one
of which the promises of complete success are not very great.
The naval operations in the Mediterranean in the year 1742 were
subordinate entirely to the military operations in the north and
middle of Italy. The instructions on which Mathews was to act were
not issued by the Admiralty but by the Secretary of State. These
will be given at some length as without them it is impossible to ap
preciate the share of the fleet in the continental war.
1 Dictionary of National Biography.

198 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1742
In the preamble the Admiral was told that his principal objects
were to destroy the Spanish ships and embarkations — that is, oversea
expeditions, — and the combined fleets of Spain and France wherever
they could be met with; and to assist, protect and defend the States
and Dominions in Italy belonging to the Queen of Hungary and the
Great Duke1, his Majesty's allies. The instructions continued:
" It must in great measure be left to your discretion how and where to employ
your squadron the most effectually for these purposes; his Majesty has however
ordered me in a particular manner to recommend to you the procuring constant
intelligence of the motions and designs of the French and Spamsh Fleets; the
want of doing which may possibly have been the occasion of the unfortunate
accidents that have already happened; and you will from thence be able to judge
whether it will be most advisable for you to attend upon the Spanish and French
Fleets (now said to be in the harbour of Toulon) with your whole squadron;
or whether you may not (as occasion shall offer) detach part of it to destroy any
embarkations that may be at any time carrying on from Barcelona, or to intercept
what may be coming from Antibes, where, it is said, the Spanish cavalry, or even
some of their infantry too, are to embark; or to go directly with your whole
squadron or send part of it to the coast of Italy.
As soon as you shall arrive on the coast of Italy it is His Majesty's pleasure
that you should take the first opportunity of acquainting Mr Villettes, the King's
Minister at Turin, with it, who will be with the King of Sardinia at the Army;
and you will also take some way of informing the General, who shall command
the Queen of Hungary's troops in Italy, of your arrival on that coast, and that
you are ready to concert with the General that shall command the Queen of
Hungary's troops in Italy, and with such person as shall be appointed by the
King of Sardinia, in what manner His Majesty's Fleet may be the best employed
for the service -of the Common Cause: — viz. the protecting or defending the
States and Dominions of His Majesty's Allies and the disappointing and defeating
the designs of the Spaniards in Italy, and of such powers as may join with them;
and if you and the General of the Queen of Hungary's troops and the person
appointed by the King of Sardinia shall be of opinion that His Majesty's Fleet
can be most usefully employed in making an attempt upon Naples in order to
make a diversion of the Neapolitan troops now joined with the Spaniards and
acting against the Queen of Hungary, it is His Majesty's pleasure that in that
case you should do it: and in order thereto you will take care to be provided
from the Admiralty with Bomb Vessels and other necessaries for the execution
of such design, without however letting it be known that you have any particular
service or place in view.
As His Majesty has always at heart the care and protection of the Trade of
his subjects, and as there is a very considerable one constantly carrying on in
the Mediterranean and through the Straits, it is the King's Pleasure that you
should give the utmost attention to the security of it : and you will take care to
execute that part of the directions sent to Mr Haddock by which he is ordered
to have a particular attention to the security of the persons and effects of His
Majesty's subjects at Leghorn during the continuance of the present troubles
in Italy.... If contrary to expectation the Spanish or French squadrons should separately
or jointly repass the Straits in order to go to Cadiz or to proceed on any othei
expedition; and if by that means no naval force or only one much inferior to
yours will be left in the Mediterranean, you are in that case to employ his Majesty's
squadron under your command in such manner as you may think most for his
Alajesty's service and for the destruction of the Maritime force of the enemy,
by pursuing or following the Spanish fleet, or any other fleet that may be joined
1 I.e. the Duke of Tuscany, husband of Queen Maria Theresa.

I742 Admiral Mathews's Instructions 199
with them, wherever they go, taking care however to leave constantly on the
coast of Italy such a force as may be sufficient to oppose any naval strength
that can be brought against it there and for the defence of the Dominions of
his Majesty's Allies in Italy and for the security and protection of the trade
of his Majesty's subjects1."
These instructions obviously left untouched a most dehcate part
of the Admiral's mission, and before leaving England Mathews very
naturally asked how he was to act in relation to the French. Was he
to attack the French and Spanish ships in Toulon harbour if he should
find it practicable? And also was he to destroy any French ships
coming from Brest and going into Toulon to join the fleet in that
port? In reply, the Duke of Newcastle told him, in the presence of
Lord Winchelsea and Lord Carteret, that if he found he could effectually
attack the combined fleet in Toulon he should do so, and that he should
also attack and destroy any number of French ships that he might
meet going into any harbour in which the Spanish squadron lay2.
Further, he was to act in a similar manner towards all Neapolitan
ships he should find assisting the Spaniards or acting against the Queen
of Hungary. These instructions may be compared with those issued
to Sir John Norris, concerning the attitude he was to assume towards
French vessels attempting to enter Ferrol in 1740. Notwithstanding
the declared neutrality of France, the British Government had now
firmly made up its mind to prevent by force any attempt on the part
of the French and Spanish squadrons to effect a junction which would
place them in a favourable position in which to begin hostilities.
These instructions left nothing to be desired in clearness, decision
or elasticity, but the squadron with which they were to be put into
execution was less satisfactory. It consisted in June 1742 of twenty-
one ships of the line3, nine 50-gun ships, two of 40, and eleven sloops,
bomb-vessels, fireships and an hospital ship, these small craft mounting
from 20 to 8 guns. Thus Mathews had altogether 30 ships which he
could put in the line of battle, although the 50-gun ships were not
considered as regular ships of the line, and are always spoken of
separately by the Admirals.
The force that lay in Toulon harbour was superior to this. Seventeen
sail of Spanish ships, of which twelve were of the line — 60 guns and
1 The close analogy between the strategy expressed in these instructions and
that of the Great War deserves attention.
2 Newcastle Papers, Add. MS. 32993. These instructions are similar to those
given to Nelson when he left for Toulon in 1803: "...however desirable it may
be to avoid any measure of hostility against that country [Spain], you are not to
suffer any squadron of Spanish ships of war to enter a French port or to form
a junction with any squadron of ships or vessels of that, or the Batavian
Republic." 3 Four of 90 guns, four of 80, eight of 70 and five of 60.

200 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1742
upwards — had sailed into the Mediterranean from Cadiz. These had
been joined by a French squadron of fifteen heavy ships, of which
twelve were of the line. Mathews, therefore, so far as he knew, had to
deal with a combined fleet of thirty-two ships of force, of which at least
twenty-four were of the line, lying in Toulon harbour. In addition there
was the squadron in Carthagena under de la Bene consisting of at least
four ships. Over and above these heavy ships there was a considerable
force of frigates and smaller craft.
When the position is considered it is evident that the task in front
of Mathews was sufficiently formidable. A squadron probably superior,
and certainly equal to his own lay in a strongly defended harbour.
In the face of this he had to blockade a stretch of coast from Carthagena
to Naples; to prevent succours and supphes from getting into the
Neapolitan ports; to protect the trade in the Mediterranean and
Straits' mouth; and also to detach vessels on any service that the
common cause might require, such as the protection of the Austrian,
and the attack on the Spanish-Neapolitan, sea communications in the
Adriatic. If the enemy brought their whole combined fleet to a state
of readiness, Mathews would of necessity require to concentrate every
ship of force that was under his command to oppose them; yet while
maintaining the blockade he must be able to detach ships to refit
and clean at proper intervals. For this he had no margin of reserve
allowed. In a paper of 1757 the Board of Admiralty expressed the
opinion that a margin of 25 per cent, was necessary for a blockading
squadron off Brest, in order to provide sufficiently for the reliefs,
refits and cleaning1, while at a later date an even higher allowance is
to be found: "Calculating... upon making up the squadron to 20 ships
of the line, upon 12 ships of the hne being constantly at sea while
the remainder may necessarily be in port for the purpose of repair
and refreshing their crews2." On this estimate, in order always to
be ready to engage the combined French and Spanish squadrons
Mathews would require no less than thirty-two sail of the hne; though
this proportion might be modified by the difference between the
Atlantic weather and that of the Gulf of Lyons. As has already been
seen, so far from his having anything approaching this number he
had only twenty-one sail of the line or, if his 50-gun ships were included
he had thirty,— but none of the enemy's twenty-four referred to were
of less than 60 guns. The force which would then be available for the
cruising and convoy services would be two 40-gun ships and eleven
1 The loss of Minorca. Navy Records Society
™i\f'°M^o0/"?m/!' V°L '¦ Pp- I74' J75. N.R.S. See also Barham Papers,
ZrY.A' 7 V°, *XXVIIt- P- 4°2, where 32 sail of the line are allowed for a
squadron of 24 sail ofi Brest.

1742

State and Disposition of Squadron

20 1

small craft, one of which was a hospital ship ; and let it not be lost
sight of that these services were those for which the naval force was
being maintained in the Mediterranean. It was the direct action of
the British cruising ships in exercising command of the intervening
waters which was preventing the conquest of Lombardy by the
Spaniards or the destruction of British trade in the inland sea.
Thus, this force, even if it had been in the highest trim, would
have been less than adequate; but, in fact, its state when Mathews
took command was deplorable. Owing to the shortness at which
Haddock had been kept, a proportion of his ships — considerably more
than 25 per cent. — had not been out of the water for over two
years and were in consequence foul, slow, and in need of extensive
repair. This was a point on which Mathews could not be silent : " Your
Grace will give me leave to say it's not possible for an officer to do
the service His Majesty may reasonably expect from him except he
is properly supported. I am greatly apprehensive from what I know
of the condition of His Majesty's squadron now in the Mediterranean
and the very few ships at present designed to reinforce it, that I shall
not be able to answer His Majesty's expectations1."
In June 1742 the squadron was disposed as follows :

At Villefranche
Cruising between Marseilles and the
east end of Hyeres Island under
Lestock

Up the Adriatic
Between Leghorn, Corsica and Elba
Between Cape Delle Melle, Corsica
and Spezia
In San Soupires Bay
Between Villefranche and Cape
Garoupe (watching Antibes
closely)
Off Monaco
Between Mentone and Cape Delle
Melle
Between Barcelona and Majorca
At Mahon careening

'Namur,' 90; 'Royal Oak,' 70; 'Romney,'
50; 'Sutherland,' H.S.
' Neptune,' ' Barfleur,' ' Marlborough ' (90) ;
'Lancaster,' 'Princess Caroline,'
'Somerset,' 'Russell' (80); 'Bedford,'
'Essex,' 'Nassau,' 'Ipswich,' 'Hamp
ton Court' (70); 'Plymouth' (60)
'Pembroke, '60; ' Warwick,' 60 ; 'Winchel
sea,' 20
' Rupert,' 60 ; ' Panther,' 50 ; ' Winchester,'
5°
'Guernsey,' 50; 'Mary,' galley, 40;
'Guarland's' prize, 8
'Salisbury,' 50; 'Mercury,' fireship, 20
'Kingston,' 50; 'Oxford,' 50; 'Ann,'
galley, 8; 'Duke,' fireship, 20
'Spence,' 8
'Guarland,' 20

'Rochester,' 50
'Folkestone,' 40; 'Buckingham,'
'Dursley,' galley, 20

7°;

1 Mathews to the Duke of Newcastle, March 24th, 1742, S.P. Dom. Naval,
P.R.O.

202 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1742
Cruising on Languedoc coast 'Lenox,' 70*
Convoying transports with pro- 'Dragon,' 60*
visions from Mahon
Cruising off St Vincent and Trafalgar ' Dartmouth , ' 50
Proceeding with despatches ' Salamander,' bomb
* These two ships formed part of Lestock's squadron, making it up to fifteen
sail, a squadron considered sufficient to meet the Spaniards if they should come
out alone.
This disposition of the squadron enabled it to control the sea-
communications of the Spanish armies, whose situation in the middle
of the year was far less happy than it had been when they passed un
interruptedly into Italy.
The preliminary movements of the Spanish forces had all been
made with success. The first body of troops, consisting of twenty
battalions and seven squadrons of horse under M. de Montemar had
disembarked at OrbiteUo in November. At the same time a Neapolitan
army of 12,000 men under the Duke of Castropignano, marching
through the Papal States by permission of the Pope, had arrived at
Spoleto, where Montemar joined it in January. This combined Bourbon
army then moved to the north-eastward across Italy and reached the
neighbourhood of Faenza in March. In the meantime the second
convoy of sixteen battalions under M. de Casteljar, having flouted
Haddock, arrived at Spezia on January 20th. Demanding and receiving
permission from the Grand Duke, this army marched through Tuscany,
and on February 22nd the good people of Florence had the curious
experience of seeing the army of the enemies of their ruler's wife passing
with his permission under the walls of his capital.
From Florence Castel jar's troops moved up to join the forces which
had preceded them, and by the middle of March an army of over 30,000
men was assembled at Forli, ready to advance into Lombardy. The
base of this force was established at Rimini, a well fortified town on
the coast, and thither the bulk of its supplies were brought by sea
from the Neapolitan ports on the Adriatic. As the army moved to
the northward supplies could be brought to the mouth of the Po and
carried up the river. Thus, although both Bourbon armies were
operating in a theatre remote from their own countries, their line of
communications would have been a comparatively short and secure
one, if they had continental adversaries only to contend with.
The forces opposing the advance into Lombardy were, in the early
months of 1742, an Austrian army of about 11,000 men under General
Count Traun in the Milanese, and a Piedmontese army of observation
of about 11,000 under Charles Emanuel, King of Sardinia. For a long
time the attitude of Sardinia had been doubtful— we have seen how it

x742 Attitude of Sardinia 203
was regarded in relation to Haddock's failure to stop the Cadiz squadron.
Even now there was some mistrust as to the sincerity of the King's
intentions. He was, indeed, in a very difficult situation and found it
hard to decide as to whither expediency pointed his steps. As a
descendant of a granddaughter of Phihp II he had claimed the Milanese,
but this relationship was only a pretext. His real reason for the claim
was his fear as to what would happen to his kingdom in the alternative
events of a Bourbon or Hapsburg victory. The crushing of Maria
Theresa would leave the Bourbons supreme in Italy. Then, with France
pressing him on one side, with another branch of the French ruling
family in Lombardy, while yet a third held Naples, the prospects that
Sardinia would remain an independent kingdom were slight. Although
a Bourbon victory was thus opposed to his interests, he could hardly
hope to prevent it as the forces arrayed against the Queen were so
formidable. An eventual partition of the Imperial dominions seemed
inevitable and by being on the winning side he might secure a share.
He had lent therefore a favourable ear to a proposal, made in May 1741,
that Prussia should maintain her conquests in Silesia, Glatz and
Niesse; Upper Silesia should fall to the King of Poland; Bohemia,
the Tyrol and Austria proper to the Elector of Bavaria; and Northern
Italy should be divided between the House of Bourbon and himself.
There was everything in favour of his joining the Bourbon coalition
except the one factor — that he had no guarantee that he would be
able to keep his spoil. Paper treaties, as Prince Eugene had truly
warned Charles VI and as Europe at that moment was experiencing,
were of little avail unsupported by armed force. Sardinia, weak and
powerless in comparison with her greedy neighbours, would be a
tempting object to them.
The great and unexpected patriotic rising in the Queen of Hungary's
own dominions in the latter part of 1741, and the immediate successes
which followed, assisted the King to make up his mind. England at
the same time was evincing a strong sympathy with the Queen and
appeared likely to give active support to her cause. Charles Emanuel
decided therefore, temporarily and tentatively, to throw in his lot
with Austria. In February 1742 an agreement was entered into between
the two countries that they should unite in a defensive alliance to
prevent the invasion of Milan, Parma and Placentia by the Spanish
and Neapolitan armies that were advancing against those territories.
In pursuance of this convention a Piedmontese army of twenty-two
battalions and eighteen squadrons, under the personal command of
King Charles Emanuel moved into the Duchy of Parma in March and
jjoined the Austrian forces under Marshal Traun. No movements of

204 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1742
importance took place until the beginning of May; but while reinforce
ments were joining both the Piedmontese and Austrians, none were
reaching the Spaniards. Both Hapsburgs and Bourbons tried to induce
Venice to throw in her lot with their own sides, but the Republic
withstood their solicitations and remained neutral.
In May the Bourbon army advanced towards Bologna, the Sardinians
at the same time moving on Modena which they straitly invested; and
a further series of bold movements on the part of King Charles Emanuel
paralysed the Spanish Commander.
The importance to the Spanish army of their sea-communications
with Rimini had not escaped the notice of the King of Sardinia, who
requested that a naval force might be sent to act against them.
Mathews received this request in the first days of June. On the very
next day he detached three ships under Captain Lee of the ' Pembroke '
with instructions to intercept any vessels carrying stores or provisions
to the Spanish or Neapohtan armies. An immediate success followed.
The whole of the Spanish heavy artillery which was about to sail for
Rimini from Brindisi was unable to move, and its services were lost
to the enemy.
The same fear of compromising Tuscany which had induced the
Grand Duke to permit the Spanish troops to march through his Duchy,
was also the cause of hampering in some measure, though but a small
one, the movements of Lee's squadron. Having no charts of the
Adriatic, Lee had opened negociations with the Tuscan Minister for
the hire of some pilots from the Duke's galleys. The loan was most
definitely refused by the Minister. Such a step, he said, would be
most improper; the Spaniards might put a hostile interpretation on
the Grand Duke's action and Tuscany would then be exposed to Spain's
resentment. When those in whose interests our squadron was operating
behaved in such a manner, the difficulty of the British commanders
may well be imagined. We can understand the feelings of Lee when
he wrote to the Admiral, with reference to this refusal: "I leave to
your prudence to consider whether these people are as hearty in our
service as we seem to be in theirs."
Lee's stay in the Adriatic was short. He reached Rimini on July
22nd, made some useful captures of Neapolitan vessels with stores,
and remained off that part of the coast until August 12th; the Spaniards
and their allies then being in full retreat there was no further need
for his services, and he rejoined the main squadron at Hyeres.
While his sea-communications were thus being threatened by the
British navy the Spanish General found his army being far more
seriously endangered on land. The reinforcements which had reached

I742 Situation of Spanish Armies 205
the allies enabled the King of Sardinia to detach a considerable body
to the southward of the Spanish army, with the result that in July
Montemar found himself in danger of being surrounded in the district
of Ferrara. Hopes ran high in Turin that this would be brought about.
A hurried retreat, however, saved the Spaniards, and they and their
Neapolitan allies retired first to Rimini and thence to the borders
of the Kingdom of Naples, where they arrived in August K
While the Spanish invasion was meeting with this severe and
unexpected check in Italy, due in a great measure to British action
at sea, strenuous efforts were being made in Spain to reinforce the
army or to restore the balance by providing a diversion elsewhere.
It had originally been intended that a third army should, hke the
others, be sent by sea, and shortly after the departure of the second
convoy in January this force, consisting of twenty battalions and
twenty-eight squadrons of horse was assembled at Barcelona ready for
embarkation. But the allied Franco-Spanish fleet, damaged by the
bad weather it had experienced in the Gulf of Genoa, had put into
Toulon instead of returning to Barcelona. Passage by sea unescorted
was impossible, delay was undesirable. It was therefore decided not
to wait but to send the army by land to Antibes, where it should be
embarked and thence escorted by the fleet to Spezia. Permission to
pass through France was requested and obtained, and on March 4th
the army set out on its journey. It reached the neighbourhood of
Antibes in the middle of May. Here the transports were assembled
to carry it to Spezia; but here also was the British Mediterranean
squadron, reinforced since Don Navarro and de Court had defied it
in December. Still, the aUied fleet was superior in numbers; and unless
the ships of which it was composed were in no condition to put to
sea again it is hard to understand why an endeavour was not made
to clear the way and repeat the previous coup. Possibly the ships
were not yet refitted after the bad weather they had experienced in
February; possibly France did not wish to risk an indecisive engage
ment with forces so nearly balanced. Whatever the reason, however,
it was accepted that the passage by sea was closed.
The alternative of marching into Lombardy from Lower Provence
was equally barred. Twelve battalions of Piedmontese troops held
the hne from Nice to Coni and had it in their power effectually to
block the Col di Tenda. Genoa was neutral, and it was not possible
to march through the territory of the Republic; though even if such
a route could be taken, it would be open to attack from the sea at all
1 His route was: Rimini, August9th; laCattolica, ioth; Fano, nth; Sinigaglia
thence across the Apennines and 18th, Foligno.

206 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1742
parts. Direct aid to Montemar being thus impossible, it was decided
to attack and occupy the Duchy of Savoy, the absence of whose King
with a large body of troops on the other side of Italy left it ex
posed. Such then was the situation with which Mathews had to deal when
he assumed command. The Spanish troops had just arrived in Provence
and the transports were at Antibes. This he knew; but he did not
know by what measures the Spaniards intended to assist Montemar,
and not without good reason he expected that they would try to pass
the troops by sea. Naturally his first concern on his arrival on the
coast was to ascertain how things stood at Toulon, and he had proceeded
direct from Minorca for that port. He found however that he could
gather but httle intelhgence, for the enemy's ships were all in the
inner harbour and their state of readiness could not be seen from the
offing. He therefore passed on to join Lestock at Villefranche where
he airived on May 26th.
It is said that at this first meeting Mathews treated Lestock with
great discourtesy, reproving him publicly, in the presence of Sardinian
officers, for not communicating with him at Gibraltar by means of a
frigate when he arrived on the station1 If he did so it was a bad
beginning to their service. The Admiral was certainly dissatisfied to
find the whole fleet at Villefranche instead of being spread along the
coast; not one single ship was cruising — so he reported to the Duke
of Newcastle — between Barcelona and Cape Garoupe, and in con
sequence the Spaniards had been able to land more troops and all
their artillery at Marseilles2. To remedy this Lestock was directed to
return to cruise off Toulon, and he sailed thither with nine ships3 on
June 2nd. Mathews remained at Villefranche* in order to get into
communication with the Sardinian authorities and inform himself as
fully as possible as to the situation.
Ignorant of the decision already made by the Court of Spain to
march through Savoy, the Sardinians were convinced the Spaniards
intended to make their advance through Genoa, beginning with an
attack on Villefranche. They also drew Mathews's attention to the
fact that the French garrison of Monaco was being strongly reinforced
by troops who were passing by sea from Antibes. Now a strong French
garrison at Monaco, of greater force than was necessary for the actual
1 Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs, vol. 1. p. 153.
2 Mathews to Duke of Newcastle, June 6th, 1742, S.P. Dom. Naval.
3 'Neptune,' 'Marlborough,' 'Elizabeth,' 'Russell,' 'Ipswich,' 'Somerset,'
'Lancaster,' 'Bedford' and 'Nassau.'
1 Villefranche, or Villa franca as it then was called, was at that time a
possession of the King of Sardinia.

r742 Importance of Villefranche 207
defence of the place, could only be regarded as a serious threat to
Villefranche. If the Spaniards made their direct advance through
Nice, these French troops might co-operate with them and attack the
defences from the other direction. To prevent such assistance from
being given to the enemy was within Mathews's instructions, and
accordingly, to stop any further reinforcement, he issued orders to
all his cruising vessels to arrest any French vessels carrying troops
from Antibes to Monaco. The boats of the fleet, manned and armed,
patrolled the coast. On the first day they were out— June 3rd— three
polaccas with French soldiers on board were taken and brought into
Villefranche harbour. French tartans, laden with timber and plank
for Toulon which might be intended for the use of the Spanish squadron,
were also taken prize — a somewhat high-handed proceeding as these
cargoes were not contraband, being free goods under the treaty with
France, nor was there any evidence to shew that their final destination
was on board the Spanish ships. These actions drew a strong protest
from the Governor of Antibes. Mathews in reply bluntly pointed out
that the French were obviously intending to assist the Spaniards by
moving troops to Monaco; and though he subsequently agreed to
release the soldiers he had taken, he insisted on their return to Antibes,
and intimated his fixed intention to allow no more to pass. The pos
session of Villefranche was of too vital an importance to both the
British and their Sardinian allies to permit an unfriendly neutral to
establish himself in force in a position which rendered its tenure
uncertain. The importance of Villefranche was two-fold. On land it was the
principal barrier to an eastward advance of the Spanish army; at sea
it was the base of the fleet, the only place where ships could he in
security and where water and provisions could be obtained.
As early as the 6th of June, less than a fortnight after his arrival,
Mathews was urging the Sardinian authorities to strengthen the
defences. He himself landed twelve swivel guns from the fleet and a
good supply of ammunition, and offered also to land heavy guns and
to put 200 marines and 400 soldiers ashore to assist in the defence.
But the dilatory methods of his allies made him fear that an attack
would be pushed through before the defences were completed, and
he therefore held himself in readiness to sail as soon as he should
hear the Spanish advance had begun from Antibes, as he could not run
the risk of being caught in the harbour of ViUefranche where, if bad
weather should prevent their sailing at short notice, his ships could
be destroyed by land batteries on the surrounding heights.
On June 16th a small but useful service was rendered by one of

208 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1742
the squadrons off Cape Garoupe. This squadron1, under Captain
Richard Norris, sighted some Spanish galleys with guns and mihtary
stores for the army in Italy leaving the anchorage at St Marguerites.
Norris at once chased, and the galleys fled into San Tropez and took
refuge under the mole. Norris brought to off the port and sent a
message in to the Governor requesting that the enemy's galleys might
be denied shelter and sent to sea, a request which was refused. At
six in the evening, therefore, Norris prepared to attack them. The
'Kingston' and 'Oxford' sailed up to the mole and anchored close
to it, and at 1 a.m. the fireship was sent in with all the boats of the
squadron to burn the galleys, covered by the guns of the ships. The
action is thus described in the log of the ' Spence ' :
"At 5 p.m. anchored before San Tropez in 9 fathoms: found riding here H.M.
ships 'Kingston,' 'Oxford' and 'Duke,' fireship, and found in the Mould of San
Tropez five Spanish galleys which Captain Norris demanded of the Governor.
Made a clear sloop and brought a spring on my cable. The Commodore finding
me too much exposed to the enemy ordered me to weigh and anchor further
out. Weighed and anchored against Mould head in 10 fathoms water. The
Commodore and 'Oxford' warp[ed] nearer in and brought springs on their
cables. At 2 a.m. the galleys not coming out the 'Duke' fireship was sent in
to burn them which was done accordingly by being all burnt without any damage
to the French. My Lieutenant was ordered [with] the boats attending the fireship
in order to bring off the officers and men belonging to her. Just as the fireship
entered the Mould the galleys began to fire as did the Commodore and the
rest of the ships and then left off. At 3 my boats returned with two of my men
shot in her: at the same time my yawl was shot from the stern and lost with
the oars and furniture in her. At 4 a.m. weighed and' came to sail...."
A protest was of course lodged by the French for this breach of
neutrahty, for such it unquestionably was. Norris's action has been
severely criticised by modern writers, but it may well be borne in mind
that international law was still in a very fluid state, and moreover
that the French were dehberately assisting our enemies and giving
them the use and shelter of their ports. The main Spanish squadron
was lying in safety behind the boom and the fortifications of Toulon;
and to criticize Norris's conduct by the light of modern views of
neutrality would be wholly wrong. We must consider what the doctrine
was at that time, and judge by that; and that it was not looked upon
as greatly exceeding the rights of nations at war is shewn by the fact
that beyond the local protest made by the Governor of San Tropez
nothing further was said about it. Modern fulminations describing it
as an unheard of outrage are quite out of keeping with the event.
Contemporary opinion judged it differently; Captain Callis of the
' Duke ' was given a gold medal by the King.
A few days after this, on June 18th, Mathews held a conference
at ViUefranche with Villettes, our representative at Turin (who had
1 'Kingston,' 50; 'Oxford,' 50; 'Spence,' sloop; 'Duke,' fireship.

J742 Reconnaissance of Toulon 209
arrived the day before in the 'Feversham' from Genoa), de Corbeau,
the Sardinian Commandant at Nice, and de Vettes, the Commandant
at Villefranche. In discussing the situation Mathews repeated his
representations to the Sardinians to take immediate steps to defend
Villefranche as it was absolutely necessary, in the interest of the
common cause, that the fleet should have a safe anchorage. It was
decided in consequence to raise four new batteries, the squadron was
to aid in the defences to the approaches to Villefranche by watching
the mouth of the River Var, the Piedmontese troops were to hne the
course of the river, and six hundred troops which were offered by
Mathews were to be landed at La Turbie directly the enemy's advance
should be reported. At the same time, as Mathews learned there was
a great quantity of spars and naval stores in Villefranche which were
to have been brought by the French for their squadron. at Toulon,
he purchased them all himself for the service of the British fleet and
embarked them, thus making it impossible for the enemy to use them
for the purpose of building a bridge across the Var. Finally, as he
learned that the Genoese were preparing magazines of stores and
provisions in their territory for the use of the Spaniards, Mathews
agreed that he would burn any stores falling into his hands which
might be destined to the sendee of the enemy.
Having made these arrangements with his military colleagues, the
Admiral left Villefranche on the 29th of June to examine Toulon,
leaving a force of four detachments of soldiers and a number of gunners
from the fleet to man the eighteen guns which he had put ashore in
the batteries round Montalban. After looking into the Var on his way,
he joined Lestock at Hyeres on July 2nd, and reconnoitred Toulon.
New batteries had everywhere been erected and a boom was across the
mouth of the harbour. In his letter to the Duke of Newcastle of July
25th he expressed regret that he had not been sent out earher to take
command — a regret tinged with criticism of what he considered
Lestock's inaction. " Had it been my good fortune to have been sent
out in time to have taken the command upon me before Rear-Admiral
Lestock had appeared off of Toulon, it's my opinion good service
might have been done; but from the hour Mr Lestock appeared to
this day they have been hard at work in raising batteries and mounting
guns...." His verbal instructions, as we have seen, had been to attack
the French and Spanish ships in Toulon if he found he could do so
effectually, and it may be that such an attack would have been
possible. But such a criticism on Lestock as is imputed in his letter
has a spice at least of unfairness, for the Rear-Admiral had no such
instructions. It was only through Mathews having personally asked
R.N. I. I4

210 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1742
the Duke what he was to do if he should find that the enemy lay
exposed to attack, that he received these instructions himself.
His conference at Villefranche and his reconnaisance of Toulon
had now put the Admiral in a situation to form a judgment of the
services that would be demanded of the Mediterranean squadron.
His view was that a considerable increase would be required to carry
out those services effectually. The first necessity was the constant
maintenance of a sufficient force off Antibes to be able at all times
to deal with the transports and ships that might come out from that
port and from Toulon. His own words best place us in possession of
his ideas at this time. After saying that he could not keep the sea
summer and winter with all his ships, he pointed out how dangerous
it would be to reduce the force off Antibes: "It will be making the
Spaniards a voluntary present of so many ships," he says, "and
without any probability of preventing it. Toulon is but a day's journey
from Antibes, often but twelve hours by sea. They can in that time
know the exact strength of the ships I leave on this station, viz. between
Cape Rous and Cape Delle Mele ; they have 17 sail there, many of them
already cleaned, the rest careening, without mentioning the French.
My ships all foul. They can double-man as many as will be sufficient
to destroy those I leave, and return again into Port before I can
possibly have any intelhgence of their being at sea; whereas had I
been supplied with a few more ships I could have kept some constantly
a-refitting and cleaning, by the doing of which I should have had
a squadron in good order to have kept the sea in the winter of sufficient
strength for the Spaniards, whereas as the case stands I have not
dared to part with but one ship at a time1." This was not Mathews'
first reference to the need of clean ships. On June 6th he had written
asking that eight ships, all completely fitted for a winter cruise, should
be sent out in September, in order that he would have them available
for the winter service, sending home the eight ships most in need
of repair. " Such a rotation, spring and fall," he had then written, " will
greatly contribute in every respect to his Majesty's service." He had
also asked for more sloops. " It is next to an impossibihty to intercept
any of their small vessels and feluccas who pass from Antibes to
Genoa and back again every week, though our boats are out constantly
all night, which is a very great fatigue to those ships that have the
stations from Cape Rous to Cape Delle Mele2." In reply to these
applications, which the Duke of Newcastle transmitted to the Admiralty,
Mathews was informed that the state of the ships at home would not
1 Mathews to the Duke of Newcastle, July 25th, 1742, S.P. Dom. Naval.
Letter of June 24th.

J742 Mathews's appreciation 21 r
permit the request regarding the eight ships to be complied with, but
that two ships would be sent. As to the small vessels, said the Duke,
they were no less distressed at home for want of them, "though new
ships are continually building and though they purchase ah the Spanish
privateers taken by our cruisers which are fit for his Majesty's service,
there being so many stations which require such vessels to curb the
insolence of the small privateers and row-boats of the enemy which
at this time infest all parts of our Channel1."
In reply to this Mathews pointed out that his principal objects
were, by his instructions, to destroy the Spanish and French fleets,
to prevent the Spanish army under Don Philip from getting into Italy,
and to protect and defend the Italian territories of the King of Sardinia
and the Queen of Hungary and those of the Grand Duke of Tuscany,
besides carrying out any enterprises agreed upon for the common cause.
With the force he had he considered it impossible to prevent the Spanish
army from passing if it should really desire to do so, since he could
not keep all his ships cruising, and no less than all would suffice. He
therefore intended to gather his main strength at Hyeres, with two or
three cruisers out off Toulon to watch the Spanish squadron so that
it should not put to sea without his hearing of it. This plan he con
sidered a bad one — a "desperate expedient" he called it — but the best
that could be arranged with the forces he had. Hyeres therefore was
to be his base, and from thence he hoped to be able to control the
sea-communications along the coast.
The narrative has been interrupted in order to make Mathews's
view of the position clear. We see him entering upon an extensive
blockade with the conviction that his forces are inadequate to maintain
it effectually; indeed, if the Spaniards had acted with any decision or
energy, he would have found it impossible. Much less could he have
carried out his instructions if the French had continued to work in
the spirit of benevolent neutrahty which had enabled the second
embarkation of troops to pass into Italy in defiance of Haddock's
squadron. Although his interpretation of the intentions of the enemy was
wrong, Mathews cannot be blamed for anticipating that the Allies
would act as they had acted before, and make use of the great naval
strength that lay in Toulon harbour to further their ends. In requesting
that he might be furnished with a squadron of ships of the line sufficient
to deal with the main squadron of the Spaniards, and of a sufficiency
of frigates to deal with the lesser vessels of all kinds which were assisting
1 Duke of Newcastle to Mathews, July 29th, 1742. 14 — 2

212 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1742
the army in Italy he was doing no more than common prudence
dictated. Mathews had other preoccupations besides the blockade of the
Riviera. His instructions authorised him to take action against Naples
whose King had furnished troops to assist the Spaniards1. On July 18th
the first two2 of the bomb-vessels promised to him arrived, and a
third — the ' Salamander ' — on the 22nd. Mathews, on the arrival of the
first, at once prepared an expedition to assist the Austrians in North
Italy. He ordered Captain William Martin to go to Naples with a
squadron3 of frigates and small vessels, with directions that he was
"to bring the King of the two Sicihes to a just sense of his errors in
having attacked in conjunction with the Spaniards the Queen of
Hungary's territories in Italy." Martin's instructions were" to take,
sink and burn all vessels belonging to the Two Sicilies laden with any
kind of provisions, ammunition, or warlike stores, and "to use his
utmost to lay the said city in ashes, unless the King of the two Sicilies
shall agree forthwith not only to withdraw his troops now acting in
conjunction wth those of the King of Spain in Italy, but to forbear
from giving in future any assistance of what kind soever." He was
to send an officer ashore for a "categorical answer," and to direct the
said officer to insist that it be made in half an hour. If the King should
refuse to comply he was to put his orders in execution at the expiry
of that time; after which he was to cruise along the coast destroying
all vessels belonging to the King of the Two Sicilies. These orders
Mathews first sent to the King of Sardinia and Marshal Traun for
their concurrence, in case they should consider them too severe. They
agreed to them4.
Captain William Martin was an officer about 46 years old. He had
served in the Mediterranean squadron since it came out under Haddock
in 1738, but had not so far had any particular opportunity of dis
tinguishing himself. The abruptness of his proceedings off Naples and
1 See ante p. 198.
2 'Terrible' and 'Firedrake.'
s 'Ipswich,' 70; 'Panther,' 50; 'Oxford,' 50; "Feversham," 40; 'Dursley'
galley, 20; 'Guarland's' prize (zebeck); 'Terrible,' 'Firedrake,' 'Salamander'
and 'Carcass,' bombs. Martin's instructions were dated July 22nd, 1742.
4 Writing to Horace Walpole on August 18th Mann says: "Admiral Mathews
rides triumphant before Toulon and prevents all stirring.... The Lord of the
Mediterranean has sent a considerable detachment to Naples under the command
of Captain Martin with a compliment to King Charles as how he wishes his
Majesty would withdraw his troops from Lombardy — or else. I really don't
know what else, but they say the four bomb vessels that make part of the seventeen
have about 6000 shells on board." Mann expected that the operation would
force Montemar as well as the Neapolitans to return to Naples. Dr Doran's
" Mann and Manners at the Court of Turin."

I742 Martin's expedition to Naples 213
the lack of any nicety of diplomatic manners might lead to the behef
that he was a rough Tarpauhn of the Benbow school; but it would
appear on the contrary that he was a most polished and finished
gentleman. Charnock says of him : " He not only possessed a very con
siderable degree of classical learning, but spoke the French, Spanish,
Italian and German languages with the greatest ease and fluency. In
his person he was remarkably handsome, and particularly attentive to
his dress, manners and deportment.... When in command he always
lived in the greatest splendour, maintaining his rank in the highest
style; so that, viewing him in every point, we scarcely know which
most to admire, the finished gentleman, the elegant scholar, or the
brave Commander." It is well to guard against the impression which
might be gathered from Smollett's and Horace Mann's descriptions of
the sea-officers whom they met, that all the naval officers of the time

Town, of Napless

l^omther Scrtcunatuler Cancass
O 00

¦Duratey O

Jtredm&e O

Terrible J*bveraham
O O

Tender Tender
O O
Tinder O
Tender 0
Ipswich, O
Oxlbrtt
Anchorage of Martin's squadron off Naples.
were mere blustering Commodore Trunnions, or of the types described
by the "Author of the London-Spy" with much forcible language
and breadth of illustration1.
Martin had only arrived from a cruise on the forenoon of the 22nd.
His ship was watered with all imaginable despatch2 by the 'Bedford'
and 'Essex,' and the squadron sailed at 4 P.M. on July 24th. By
August 8th he was off Naples where he at once began disposing the
bomb-vessels in a line about a cable apart off the town, with the
'Panther,' 'Feversham' and 'Dursley' covering them. The 'Ipswich'
and 'Oxford' came to outside, and the bomb-tenders got into position
soon after dark. The British Consul, Mr Allen, came on board soon
after the squadron anchored, with a message asking whether Martin
1 The Wooden World dissected in the Character of a Ship of War: as also
the Characters of all the Officers from the Captain to the Common Sailor, 1706.
8 Journal of Captain Martin, July 22nd, 1742.
21:4 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1742
came in a friendly manner or not, but as the bombs were not yet in
correct position, Martin detained him on board until everything was
ready, and then sent him ashore again with Captain Merrick de
1' Angle1 to carry Mathews's message to the King. De 1' Angle went
to the Palace and there saw the Duke of Montallegra and gave him
the message exactly in the terms of Martin's instructions, including
the demand for a categorical answer in half an hour. The Duke
replied that the King was at Church and would not be back within
that time, and protested mightily that he was not to be threatened
into compliance with anything that was unreasonable. He spoke about
the indignity that was being offered to the King's honour, asked what
guarantee he would receive that Naples would not be molested, and
finally requested the Captain to go back and represent this to Martin,
promising him his answer when he should return.
De l'Angle went on board and saw Martin, who replied that he had
no powers to treat. His orders were simply to make the demand and
secure a reply in half an hour, and if de l'Angle could not see the
King he must get the assurances from the Minister. With this message
the Captain returned. It was now between seven and eight in the
evening. When he reached the palace he was told the Prime Minister
was closeted with the King. He waited twenty minutes of the thirty
he was allowed, and then insisted he must see some one at once, where
upon a General, an Irishman called Burke, was brought in. Burke
renewed the procrastinating conversation, saying how hard it was to
insist on the King's withdrawing his troops from his father's aid.
De l'Angle replied shortly that was not the question ; he had brought
a plain message and wanted a plain answer, and there were only five
minutes left in which to give it. The General, replying quaintly: "Yes,
the message is plain enough," went off and brought back the Secretary
of State at once, who assured de l'Angle that the King agreed to all
that was demanded of him. This verbal message was obviously not
sufficiently satisfactory and de l'Angle desired it might be put in
writing. The Duke demurred to signing anything, and requested him
to accept his assurance and carry it to Martin, taking Burke with him.
When they arrived on board, Burke again attempted to gain time,
asking for guarantees, whereupon Martin told him shortly that he was
sent as an Officer to act and not as a Minister to treat. He could
give no guarantees, but required his answer. Turning to de l'Angle
he said : " Sir, you will go on shore and insist on an answer being given
to your message, yes or no, in half an hour, or return without one,
1 De l'Angle had been detached to Leghorn on the way to get the latest
news of Montemar's army. He heard it was then at Rimini.

1 742 Effect of Martin 's expedition 215
which I shall look on as a refusal of compliance and put my orders
in execution; do you understand me, Sir?" No doubt could now
remain in Burke's mind as to what would happen if Martin did not
get his answer, and when de l'Angle returned to the palace he received
his reply in writing, and took it on board with him. The letter did
not wholly satisfy de l'Angle, but as he was promised that he should
receive one on the following morning, embracing the points to which
he took exception, he accepted it. The letter duly reached Martin
next day. It ran thus: Au Palais. 20 Aoiit 1742.
Monsieur, Le Roy avait deja resolu et ordonne que ses troupes qui sont unies
a celles d'Espagne, se retirassent pour veiller a la surete de ses 6tats, et sa Majeste
m'ordonne de vous promettre en son Nom, qu'elle va reiterer ses ordres pour
que ses troupes rentrent incessamment dans ce Royaume en se retirant de la
Romagne, oil elles se trouvent a present, et qu'elle n'aidera ni assistera plus
celles d'Espagne en aucune maniere dans la presente guerre en Italie.
Le Marquis de Sales1.
The effect of Mathews's action, so adequately carried out by
Martin, was definitely to detach the Neapolitans from their allies and
leave Montemar alone with his Spanish army in the Romagna. This
depletion of force came at a most opportune moment, for at that
very time the Sardinians had been obliged to withdraw a large portion
of their own army from their Austrian allies, Don Philip's advance into
Savoy2 constituting so serious a threat to the Duchy that the King
of Sardinia, so soon as he heard of it, carried his own troops back
to his western frontier ; a withdrawal that would have left Traun very
inferior to Montemar but for the valuable diversion effected by the
British Admiral.
The movement -through Savoy relieved the situation on the Riviera;
there was now no longer any fear of an advance on Villefranche.
Mathews therefore re-embarked his soldiers and sailed for Toulon on
the 5th of September to cruise with a strong force off that port, but
he left the cannon he had landed at Villefranche, that the defences
should still be complete if the Spaniards should alte,. their minds and
return to Antibes. Even if they should do so Mathews was not anxious,
for he would be able to have news of their return before they could
reach Antibes, and he could send 1000 men from the squadron off
Toulon more quickly than the Spanish army could reach Antibes. He
considered that in consequence of the impossibility of trusting France
1 Narrative of Captain de l'Angle, Stowe MS. s.56; Martin's letter enclosed
in Mathews's of August 16th, 1742, S.P. Dom. Naval; Log of 'Ipswich';
Mathews's orders to Martin, July 22nd, S.P. Dom. Naval.
2 See ante p. 206.

216 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1742
no less than twenty sail of the line would be necessary off Toulon;
otherwise twelve would have been enough1. His intention therefore
was to keep this number constantly in a state of readiness at Hyeres
to deal with the French and Spanish squadrons, which were reported
to be ready for sea at 48 hours' notice. He hoped to be able to main
tain this force throughout the winter by keeping up a succession
of reliefs from the remaining ships of the hne. His cruising services
would thereby be greatly crippled, but this he could not help.
Besides France, Mathews had Genoa to reckon with. Notwith
standing his notification to her in June, she was again reported to be
making magazines, or permitting them to be made in her territories,
which would serve a Spanish army. He therefore sent a strong repre
sentation to the Government of the Republic on August 29th, through
Mr Birtles, our Consul at Genoa, pointing out that their conduct
in this matter, and also in endeavouring to seduce the troops of
Sardinia and Austria to desert, was such that unless it ceased, it would
be necessary for him to "make them still more sensible of their errors."
Commodore Martin was ordered to Genoa with instructions to send
an officer on shore to " demand of the magistrates to be taken to the
magazines and to desire them at once to be burnt " ; failing com
pliance in half an hour, Martin was to "lay their town in ashes,"
and to complete the business by landing all his men to destroy the
magazines, and if opposed, "to repel force by force, and beat the
town about their ears " in such way as he considered desirable. This
action produced the desired assurance from Genoa that her assistance
should cease to be given. All of these measures received the full
approbation of the Home Government.
In the meantime Mathews had been made a Plenipotentiary, in
accordance with his own request2. This appointment has been charac
terised as a mistake. There were however very good reasons for giving
the Commander-in-Chief these extended powers. As the representative
of Great Britain's forces in the Itahan war it was of great advantage
that he should have authority to partake in all the discussions that
took place on the plans of campaign. As a seaman his opinion on the
possibilities of such functions as were ascribed to the fleet was necessary.
A Plenipotentiary unacquainted with the sea, the requirements of
the squadron, the demands of its services in many directions, and the
questions connected with its administration which affected the number
of ships at any moment available for service— such a Plenipotentiary
would be less able to express an opinion as to whether the squadron
1 Mathews to Duke of Newcastle, August 30th, 1742.
2 Duke of Newcastle to Mathews, July 29th, 1742.

I742 Mathews appointed Plenipotentiary 217
could take part in any particular operation. The similar appointment
of Sir George Byng in 1719 had been attended with the happiest results.
The successful issue to which the Mediterranean campaign was brought
on that occasion was due very largely to the powers extended to the
Admiral, which allowed him to interview other Ministers, to persuade
them to undertake concerted measures and to act in co-operation with
each other. It has been objected that Mathews' duties as Plenipoten
tiary took him away from the fleet and obliged him to spend his time
at Turin. This is not correct. For one thing the number of days he
was at Turin might be counted on the fingers of the two hands. For
another, as Commander-in-Chief of the fleet his duties extended from
Gibraltar to the Adriatic. He needed constantly to be in touch with
his mihtary colleagues; and there was no particular reason why he
should confine his attentions to Toulon at all times. The squadrons
in that harbour were not always ready for sea. When he heard of their
readiness he could move thither: but until then he had ample duties
to employ him in regulating the operations of the remainder of his
ships, which in point of numbers made up over two-thirds of his
command. He was however at Hyeres with the fleet without inter
mission for nearly ten months — from September 13th, 1742, to June
26th, 1743.
We have seen that Mathews joined the squadron at Hyeres in
September in consequence of two causes — the altered line of advance
of the Spaniards and the preparations of the allied squadron in Toulon.
The withdrawal of his ships and his 600 soldiers from Villefranche
drew a letter "full of fright and fears" — in Mathews's words — from
Arthur Villettes. The Minister feared that Mathews's absence would
be taken advantage of by Don Philip to return to Antibes at once
and so push by sea into Italy. Mathews was able to reassure him that
from his position at Hyeres he could deal with any force coming down
to Antibes to embark. The anchorage was not a good one and if it
were not for the French, he said, he could have kept half his squadron
in a far better bay within sight of Antibes; but circumstances being
as they were he must make the best of his position at Hyeres.
During September a new element appeared. It was reported that
a squadron was fitting out at Brest which was not improbably destined
for the Mediterranean. On the last day of the month the Duke of
Newcastle warned Mathews that this force was preparing, and gave
him additional instructions to meet the situation that might arise
in consequence. Beginning by repeating that the Admiral was to keep
a sufficient force on the look out for the French and Spanish squadrons
in Toulon the Duke continued: "But if the French and Spanish

218 The Mediterranean under Mathews 174,2
squadrons, or either of them should escape you and get through the
Straits, and if you get news that after the French squadron was passed
the Straits it is intended to proceed to Brest to join the squadron
there, you are to send home as many ships as you can spare, keeping
with you in all events a force superior to what France' and Spain can
bring against you."
This news that he might find the Brest squadron on his back
caused a further demand on Mathews' frigate force. He detached the
'Romney,' 50, and two bomb-vessels to act as cruisers in the Straits
of Gibraltar and give him timely warning of the enemy's approach, "so
as the better to enable me to prevent the conjunction of the two
squadrons which if not prevented may prove fatal to the nation."
Action by France might undoubtedly be expected at any time, for the
main British squadron had now estabhshed itself definitely at Hyeres
Bay, and from that anchorage controlled the movements of all ships
going in and out of Marseilles and Toulon. Mathews at this time gave
orders to Martin, who was in command of seven ships cruising off
Toulon, and Barnett who had another squadron of three off Barcelona,
to intercept all stores and provisions going from Spain into any French
ports. This gave rise to protests from the Governor of Toulon, who
said that if Mathews continued to forbid the entry of provisions to
Toulon, he would be constrained to refuse him the conveniences of
the harbour of Hyeres. Mathews allowed this threat to trouble him
not at all. He informed the Duke of Newcastle that he intended to
continue to prevent the entry of provisions to Toulon and Marseilles,
and that if wood and water were refused him at Hyeres, he would
reply that he should regard such refusal as a declaration of war and
act accordingly. To be driven from Hyeres would have made the
operations of the British squadron more difficult. A conjunction of the
ships from Brest and Toulon could only be prevented, and the defence
of Italy secured, by his maintaining this station. The situation was
unquestionably galling in the extreme for France, but the attitude
she adopted in sheltering the Spanish squadron made it inevitable
that consequences inconvenient to her should follow.
The bad weather which came on towards the end of October made
Mathews's position precarious. Heavy gales from the north-west and
north-north-west rendered it very difficult for Martin to keep his
squadron at sea. Losses of spars and sails were continually occurring,
and the lack of stores made their replacement a serious question.
"Scarce a day," he wrote on October 26th, "but some or other of the
squadron come in crippled." Mathews husbanded the ships as much
as possible, relieving them continually from the main body at Hyeres;

*742 Sardinia declares against Spain 219
but the sendee was very trying, and was accentuated by the lack of
small ships to keep close watch on the harbour of Toulon. If the
Spaniards should abandon their endeavour to pass into Piedmont and
return to Antibes Mathews foresaw that his position, without an
adequate number of small craft, would be nearly impossible.
The Spanish advance on Piedmont produced the satisfactory result
of banishing the last scruples of the King of Sardinia in regard to
how he should act, and to a small extent served to ameliorate the
position of the squadron in the matter of small craft. The King now
became a declared enemy to Spain. He abandoned his purely defensive
attitude and moved to attack the Spanish army that was advancing
towards Piedmont. At the same time he placed his Sardinian galleys at
the disposal of the British Admiral. These craft, though they worked
poorly in bad weather, were nevertheless useful, for in calms and
hght weather, when the small vessels of the enemy crept along in
shore and were out of reach of the larger ships of the British fleet,
the Sardinian galleys could intercept them.
As the year drew to its close the military campaign became more
intense, and the efforts of the Spaniards to effect the junction of
their armies in the east and in the west were increased. In the Alps
a series of operations left the Spaniards in possession of the whole
of Savoy. In the east, where General de Gages had replaced Montemar,
the Spanish army, though reinforced by some Neapohtan troops in spite
of the King's assurance to Martin, retired northward to Bologna,
and the Austrians under Traun fell back to the Panaro. It was now
fully anticipated that the next move of de Gages would be on Tuscany.
An intercepted letter from Paris, communicated by Horace Mann to
Mathews on November 6th, stated that the intentions of the enemy
were to wait till the season should oblige the British squadron to leave
the coast, when the troops from the west would be embarked on
board the combined Toulon and Brest fleets and carried to Spezia.
The army under de Gages would at the same time advance, probably
to Leghorn ; and the desired junction would thus be effected. Magazines
were in formation in Tuscany; Neapolitan troops were daily joining
the Spaniards.
To deal with this situation Mathews gave orders to capture and
burn all Neapohtan craft, and sent a small squadron of four ships to
reinforce Captain Peter Osborn1 in the defence of Leghorn, in case
Tuscany were invaded. De Gages's advance, however, did not ma-
1 Captain of the 'Salisbury.' This ship, sometimes with the 'Folkestone,'
had been employed at Legh'orn since July, protecting British interests and
preventing supplies going thropgh Tuscany to de Gages's army.

220 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1742
terialize. He received some reinforcements from Naples1, but Traun
was able to keep his own numbers up to an equality with the help of
troops sent him by the King of Sardinia.
The end of the year saw the armies in both theatres of the Italian
war facing each other in winter quarters. The Sardinian army was
in Piedmont, the army under Don Phihp in Savoy; de Gages was at
Imola, Traun on the banks of the Panaro. The main body of the
British squadron remained at Hyeres, cruising squadrons watched
Toulon and Barcelona2, a small squadron lay at Leghorn, another of
two ships was in the Adriatic; watch was being kept on the Straits
of Gibraltar; separate vessels were cruising on the coast of Naples and
the Papal States3, in the Straits of Bonifaccio, between Sardinia and
the squadron at Hyeres, and on services of trade protection. The
Franco-Spanish squadrons amounting in all to twenty-eight sail of the
hne were partly ready for sea in Toulon harbour. The Spanish ships
were refitted and rigged but had not bent their sails, the French had
about six ships cleaned which were as yet unready, but they were
keeping a tight hand on their seamen, none of whom were allowed to
leave the Port. Although he had no knowledge of the enemy's intention
one thing appeared clear to Mathews — that above all he must keep as
many as possible of his ships constantly ready in Hyeres. " It is lucky,
very lucky," he wrote to the Admiralty, "that there is such a place as
Hyeres Bay, else I should not have been able to have executed any
one part of his Majesty's commands, for to keep the sea was wholly
impracticable; and had I been obliged to have retreated to Minorca I
could never have answered for it as an officer to have put out to sea
with such crippled ships in all respects, the consequence of which
might have been fatal to Italy." His perseverance had its reward in
the Alps. The threatened return of Don Philip to the coast did not take
place, and the invasion of Lombardy through Piedmont was stopped
for the time by the strong positions held by the King of Sardinia.
1 The attitude of the Court of Naples in sending troops after the King's
engagement to forbear from doing so, is explained by the fact that Neapolitan
troops came under two separate headings. About 10,000 were actually Spanish
troops, lent to Don Carlos by the King of Spain. The King of Naples himself
maintained about 15,000. The troops that were being sent to de Gages were
a portion of the Spanish troops which the King of Naples was under an engage
ment to restore to Spain.
2 A large body of vessels laden with provisions, powder, ball, grenades, etc.,
for the army and provisions for the Spanish ships in Toulon lay in Barcelona
for months unable to sail. In letters, January 18th, 1743.
3 Finding that corn was being imported into the Papal States Mathews
ordered his cruisers to stop the importation as "the Pope cannot want it for the
use of his own subjects, whatever corn is brought into this country by sea must
be for the service of the Spaniards." (Mathews to the Duke of Newcastle,
December 22nd, 1742.)

CHAPTER XI
THE MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND (continued)
The difficulties with which Mathews had to contend were not confined
to defeating the enemy or co-ordinating the efforts of his allies. His
relations with the Admiralty were not good. Instead of help he received
rebuffs; and the strain of an acrimonious correspondence with the
Board concerning his needs must have reacted on his health and his
powers of conducting the Mediterranean campaign.
The numerous services the fleet was called upon to perform in
connection with the mihtary campaigns left the Admiral very few
ships to employ on the protection of trade; and trade in consequence
suffered. The winter season was too severe for the Sardinian galleys,
and such help as they had given earher in the year now ceased whenever
bad weather came on, so that the Admiral could not depend on their
services. To his intense dissatisfaction he found it necessary to employ
his 60- and 70-gun ships for cruising. "I am at this instant distressed
for smaU ships," he wrote in December, "...I am forced to use the 70
and 60 gun ships upon stations I would not do had I more ships,
especially at this critical time." But to all his appeals for more small
craft he received one answer only — that there were no small ships to
send him. Nevertheless sententious reproofs were sent for permitting
the trade to suffer, and he was advised to hire barcolongos and other
smaU craft to cruise in the Gut of Gibraltar for protection against the
privateers. But no men were provided to make up crews for such craft,
nor did the suggestion get over the difficulty that many more small
frigates were needed on the coast of Italy, for which service barcolongos
were quite inadequate.
The letters written by Mathews at this time and the replies sent
to him are not pleasant reading, but they explain more clearly than
anything else the reason why in this war the navy failed to fulfil the
expectations of the country.
In February 1743 Mathews wrote as follows to the Duke of
Newcastle: "It will not be in my power to hinder the French and
Spanish fleet coming out of Toulon except I totally neglect all other
services; for to be able to hinder effectually the combined fleet putting

222 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1743
to sea, I must keep my whole strength together: if so, I cannot have
any ships on the coast of Italy. Should that be the case, I cannot
prevent any embarkations taking place; besides which, I must take
leave to acquaint your Grace that it is not possible in the nature of
things to keep ships perpetually at sea without their being fitted and
careened; being when all together but barely a match for the combined
fleet will not admit of my parting with any ships of force, and the
want of them being refitted, etc. must inevitably prove in the end
the ruin and destruction of this squadron: without I have more ships
I dare not part with any: it would be good husbandry and greatly
for the service if I had constantly with me a sufficient number of
ships to keep two or three constantly a-refitting, or that the great
ships were relieved every year. I know but one inconvenience attending
my proposition, viz.: the fresh ships being generally sickly whereas
the other crews are seasoned men, consequently better able to do
their duty1." On the day of writing this letter, the disposition of the
squadron was as follows :
In Hyeres Road Sixteen of the line, one 50 and two fireships
On Catalonian coast Three 6o's, one 50, one 40
At Minorca refitting Three of the line, one 50, one 20
On the coast of Italy Two 50's, one 40, one 20, one galley, one
sloop
At Genoa for supplies One 50, one 20
Between Gibraltar and Malaga One 50
Off Cape St Vincent2 One 50
Off Marseilles One 70
Between Gibraltar and C. Spartel Four bomb-vessels (as cruising ships)
Off Majorca One zebeck
The correspondence on this subject, which continued for some
months, places in a clear hght the difficulties under which Mathews
laboured and the attitude of the Administration towards those diffi
culties. In March he again wrote twice asking for an increase in his
force as the French and Spaniards had now thirty-two sail of the fine
in Toulon, of which nineteen were ready. He received no reply. In
May he wrote asking that some 50-, two 40- and two 20-gun ships
might be sent out, as he was being obliged to use 60- and 70-gun ships
on services proper for frigates. In answer to this the Admiralty in
' Mathews to Duke of Newcastle, February 24th, 1743.
2 The station out to St Vincent came within the Mediterranean command.
Mathews was also responsible for the protection of the trade in the Gut of
Gibraltar. "Their Lordships having received strong complaints of the many
prizes taken in the Gut by the enemy's small privateers, and charging the captains
of his Majesty's frigates and sloops stationed there with great remissness in the
performance of their duty... will certainly dismiss them upon the next complaint."
Secretary of the Admiralty to Mathews, August ist, 1743.

1743 Mathews and the Admiralty 223
June sent one 40, two 20's and two sloops, and proposed to send two
50's in lieu of two 50's which Mathews would be told to send home.
On June 4th Mathews again called attention to his want of small
ships: "most of the few I have are old and whenever they are sent in
to be careened and fitted they are kept so long in port that the service
suffers, not having others to send on their stations. On June 13th he
wrote once more in the same sense: "Such has been my unhappy
condition that I have not been enabled to clean the small ships in
eleven months, though they ought never to exceed ten weeks, occasioned
for want of ships to relieve them1. I am at this instant obliged to employ
70-gun ships where small ships are wanting, and the fire ship, and a
bomb vessel with her mortar in, to cruise with them. It is what I
cannot in strictness justify. But absolute necessity must be my
justification should any unforeseen accident happen to them." Again
on June 30th he repeated his statement of his need of more ships of
50 guns and downwards. "Ten sail," he said, "is barely sufficient for
the coast of Italy, besides two or three for the Adriatic, two perhaps
for the Archipelago, besides all the coast of Catalonia and Provence."
All these requests were passed on by the Duke of Newcastle to the
Admiralty, who informed the Duke in reply that Mathews had been
reinforced with a 40-gun ship and two 20-gun frigates. This reply
shewed the economy of truth employed by their Lordships, for the
forty had not sailed until June and could not arrive for an indeter
minate time; the two small frigates were not a reinforcement but
were in replacement of two that had been lost no less than a year
before. Mathews, when he received a copy of this letter, was not slow
to point out the manner in which the Admiralty evaded the real
facts. Writing on July 19th he shewed how untrue the reply was,
and strongly represented once more his want of ships. At length, in
August, a typical answer was drawn from the Admiralty, who said that
Mathews's letters consisted of a " disagreeable repetition of complaints."
"If you compare the squadron you had then [i.e. when he left England]
with that which is now under your command you will find the former
inferior both in force and number, tho' the Spanish squadron is fewer
and in general in worse condition than at that time both in respect
to men, stores and provisions. So that they cannot see any foundation
for the constant complaints you have made on that head when it
appears that notwithstanding the many other services which call for
his Majesty's ships they have not only supported the same strength
1 It will be recollected (vide p. 188 ante) that in the proposed Bill for the
protection of trade in 1742 it was laid down that the ships should be cleaned
emery four months without fail.

224 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1743
you set out with, but have rather increased it." To the Lords Justices
the Admiralty wrote: "Your Excellencies will please to judge by these
lists1 whether the Admiral is not superior in ships of the line of battle
to all his Majesty's enemies in those parts, and whether he has not
a sufficient number of frigates and small ships to protect the trade
and perform other contingent services."
Thus the Admiralty brushed all Mathews's complaints on one side.
Because his force was slightly stronger than it had been when he sailed
from home eighteen months ago it was big enough. No notice of the
entirely changed situation is taken, nor of the fact that before Mathews
left he had expressed the opinion that the force was not strong enough
effectually to perform the services. His arguments as to the necessity
of careening and refitting his ships are ignored; his requests for more
small ships, and the need for these above all to be kept cleaned, are
not even referred to. There is no doubt that Mathews's complaints
were disagreeable; but it is also clear that great difficulty was
experienced in supplying him with more ships, large or small, in con
sequence of the state into which the navy had been allowed to fall
and the lack of men. To say that they could not increase his force
might have been a correct, though a regrettable, reply. But to say that
he had enough ships without taking the pains to examine his complaints
in detail was a different matter and less easy to justify. If the Board
had consisted of persons whose opinions were entitled to respect from
the fact that they were acknowledged authorities on war and on
seamanship, it would still have been desirable to support the authority
of their names with argument. But they were not. The signatories
of the letter were Lord Winchilsea, a politician jobbed into the office
of First Commissioner; Lord Baltimore, a man who took some interest
in sea-affairs but whose knowledge of the technical requirements
affecting the maintenance of ships could only be that of an amateur;
John Cokburne, a man who had been a Commissioner for trade in
1716 and a Commissioner of the Admiralty in 1717, but who had no
special attainments or experience which entitled him to put aside the
Admiral's reasons without discussing them; and Sir George Lee, a
lawyer and pohtician, recently appointed to the Admiralty through the
influence of Lord Carteret. These gentlemen failed to appreciate the
fact that a ship to be efficient required frequent cleaning, and that
while she was on the careen or under refit she was not ready for employ
ment against the enemy; and also that in the services upon which
the Mediterranean fleet was employed, a mere counting of the numbers
1 These were comparative lists of ships of the squadron when Mathews sailed
in April 1742 with the squadron he had in August 1743.

1743 Mathews and the Admiralty 225
of ships of the line was no solution of the strategical situation1. Because
Mathews had a slight superiority in that class of ship it by no means
followed that he had a force suitable for the services of an extensive
and continuous blockade.
Besides the Commissioners who thus traversed Mathews's opinions
there were also seamen on the Board. But no seaman's name is
appended to the letter referred to, nor to many others of the same
and later times. The reason for this was the First Commissioner's
habitual disregard of the advice of sea-officers. Admiral Cavendish,
one of the Commissioners, told Vernon that Lord Winchilsea paid no
regard to his advice, or the opinion of those who knew anything of
sea affairs, and "that the only method left him of shewing his dislike
to the absurd and ridiculous orders which were issued from that Board
was to refuse signing them2." Mathews, indignant at the Board's
reply, went so far as to draw the Duke of Newcastle's attention to the
lack of qualifications of his critics at the Admiralty. He quoted how,
in July of the preceding year he had been ordered to send home eight
ships, but that he had then pointed out how impossible it was to
reduce the squadron by so considerable a detachment. "My answer,"
he said, "gave great offence: yet had I complied with it I should
have justly incurred his Majesty's displeasure and convinced the world
of my being ignorant of my duty and unworthy of the trust his Majesty
has honoured me with. Had some of their Lordships been bred to the
sea they would have been better acquainted with discipline and
consequently would not have sent an order they would have known
not to have been within my power to have complied with, but as is
before excepted." The most influential of their Lordships had how
ever not been "bred to the sea," and this, combined with their being
kept in ignorance of the instructions under which the Commander-
1 Mathews's fleet on April ist, 1743, was as follows, including 4 ships ofthe line
which had not yet reached him :

2nd rates (90-gun ships)
3rd rates (80- and 70-gun ships)
4th rates (60- and 50-gun ships)

4
18 14

5th rates (44-gun ships) 2
6th rates (24- and 20-gun ships) 6
Sloops 3
Zebeck 1

Total ships of the line
Of which were 50-gun ships

36 8

Bomb-vessels 4
Fireships 2

Ships of the line proper

28

18
50-gun ships 8

Cruising vessels 2&
Also a store-ship, a hospital ship and a lighter. ~
2 Vernon in the Debate on appointing a Committee of Enquiry into the
conduct of the J'leet, April 16th, 1744. Parliamentary History, vol. xm.
ft W T 5

226 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1743
in-Chief in the Mediterranean was acting, served to make the conduct
of the operations very much of a game of cross purposes.
Notwithstanding the attitude of the Board towards the Admiral,
the Mediterranean campaign had been far from unsuccessful. The
enemy had made no use of their great fleet locked up in Toulon, no
progress had been made by the allied armies, and the conquest of
Lombardy was as far off in the end of 1742 as it had been a year
before. A great army was wasting its strength in Provence, another
was dwindling perceptibly for want of reinforcements in the region of
the Panaro. The twin barriers of the Alps and the sea kept these two
forces separated, and the Austrian army in Lombardy was still un
defeated. The new campaign opened early in 1743. The Queen of Spain,
anxious to bring about a decision without further delay, sent cate
gorical orders to de Gages, who was then in the neighbourhood of
Bologna, to attack the Austrian army at once, beginning his advance
within three days of receiving the order1. Much against his own
judgment, based upon his knowledge of the poor condition of his
army, de Gages obeyed the orders. He met the Austrians at Campo
Santo on Jan. 28 — Feb. 8 and fought a bloody but indecisive action.
The Austrians held their ground, the Spaniards retired, first to Bologna
and later in Neapolitan territory. Thus the first attempt to break
through in this theatre was a complete failure.
The news of the battle reached Mathews on the 12th of February
at Hyeres, where he was lying with seventeen ships. This sudden opening
of the campaign on shore was accompanied by reports of considerable
preparations at Toulon, where ships were being hastened into readiness,
troops were being assembled, defences were being thrown up, and a
very high tone was being taken by the local authorities who were
boasting that they were soon going to drive the British into the sea.
It seemed probable that a move of the combined fleet would shortly
follow. Mathews therefore recalled his outlying 50's from Spezia and
Leghorn and sent orders to Mahon for all ships refitting to be com
pleted with the utmost despatch and to join him.
Some vessels however he could not recall. He had heavy ships off
Gibraltar and Barcelona the former of which were preventing some
3000 seamen from coming from Cadiz to reinforce Don Navarro's
crews, while the latter were holding a considerable body of troops at
Barcelona. By retaining these minor blockades Mathews was forcing
the enemy to march their men by land — a lengthy process in the
course of which a large number deserted.
1 Pajol, Les Guerres sous Louis XV, vol. in. p. 23\

1743 Difficulties of combined action 227
There was no radical change in Mathews's instructions. He was given
a free hand to take a part in any operations against Naples that might
be decided upon by the King of Sardinia and the Austrian General1,
but he found it extremely difficult to persuade his allies to come to
a common understanding and to agree to concerted action on a definite
plan. Suspicion between the Sardinians and Austrians was rife. Each
looked upon any proposal of the other as directed by motives of
self interest, and Mathews's position was singularly hke that of
Sir George Byng in 1719, whose principal labour had been to arrive
at a settlement between the representatives of the same two Powers.
Numerous reports had been received in the latter end of 1742
indicating that Don Carlos of Naples was sending troops to help the
Spaniards, and the Admiral had communicated with our Consul,
Mr Allen, on the subject. Allen reported that the rumours were untrue,
but as the Consuls of the other Powers continued to repeat them,
and as considerable strengthening of the fortifications of Naples was
in progress, Mathews was inclined to beheve them. The Neapohtan
assistance was of great importance and must be stopped, and an
expedition to Naples, which Mathews had discretionary powers to
undertake, appeared to him the only means of checking this dangerous
movement. He therefore made ready a squadron of six ships and
some bomb-vessels which he placed under the orders of Martin, to
pay the city a second visit. At the same time he wrote to Villettes
and requested him to arrange a meeting with the Sardinian and
Hungarian Ministers to discuss the question of combined action against
Naples. Villettes saw M. d'Ormea, the Sardinian Minister, and urged the
desirability of striking a blow to prevent Naples from assisting Spain.
D'Ormea was averse from taking action. He explained that the
Sardinian alliance with the Court of Vienna was only "provisional
and defensive," and would not extend to offensive operations, as the
King of Sardinia did not wish to involve himself too deeply, or raise
up new enemies against himself. "As any attempt you can make on
Naples," wrote Villettes after this interview, "must turn to the
advantage of the Queen of Hungary, we cannot be too cautious in
giving credit to intelligence that comes through the hands of the
Generals and Ministers of the Court of Vienna2." D'Ormea fully
appreciated the value of such a stroke, but he was for temporising
and doing nothing until the Neapohtan troops were known to be in
1 Duke of Newcastle to Mathews, January 18th, 1743.
2 Villettes tp Mathews. Enclosed in Mathews's to the Duke of Newcastle,
March 4th, 1743, S.P. Dom. Naval. 15—2

228 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1743
motion. Yet it was already quite clear from witnesses uninfluenced
by Hungary's interests that the Neapolitans had begun to move and
were joining de Gages in the northern parts of the kingdom. Mathews
therefore wrote back to Villettes intensely regretting that the Sardinians
would not agree to his proposal, and pointing out how necessary it
was to have a settled plan of action before a campaign" began1, and
how these dilatory methods would spell eventual ruin. Mutual suspicion
was at the bottom of this hesitancy; an ineffectual campaign was the
result. A small British mihtary force would on this occasion have been
invaluable to bring Naples to a better frame of mind. Mathews had
suggested earlier in the year that he should be supplied with a few
thousand troops with which to produce a diversion in Spain. He
had asked for three or four thousand soldiers, with which, he said,
"I could demolish very easily the works before Gibraltar, destroy
Malaga and many other places along the coast which perhaps might
obhge the King of Spain to recall part of his troops : if my intelligence
is true, Cadiz is by no means in a condition to make any great defence."
It is interesting to speculate what effect an army of such a size under
an able general, or a larger force of eight or ten thousand men as
suggested by the Duke of Argyll, acting in conjunction with the fleet,
might have produced on the operations in Italy during this war. Such
a force might have carried out those expeditions on which Sardinia
hesitated to embark from jealousy of Austria; but more important
than that, it would have served as a guarantee to Sardinia and would
have gone far towards consolidating the alhance, which was still by
no means secure, between that kingdom and Austria. Both Spain and
France had made overtures to Charles Emanuel during the winter,
offering him the possession of the Milanese as the price of his friendship;
and Carteret's efforts had been directed towards bringing the Courts
of Vienna and Turin2 to a closer alhance.
The attitude of Genoa was less equivocal. Her inchnations were
plainly in favour of Spain and she had already permitted magazines
of provisions to be prepared in her territory for the use of the Spanish
army. These, as we have seen, Mathews had destroyed. In February
it was reported to the Admiral that Genoese seamen were being recruited
1 Napoleon's saying that "Rien ne reussit a la guerre qu'en consequence
d'un plan bien combine" is well exemplified in this campaign. (Quatriime
Bulletin, November 15th, 1808.)
2 "The King is using his endeavours to bring the Courts of Vienna and Turin
to a perfect unison: at least he is in hopes that he wiU be able to prevent the
King of Sardinia from taking part with the enemy." Duke of Newcastle to
Mathews, April 26th, 1743.

1743 Destruction of the ' San Isidro ' 229
for the Spanish squadron, and that a Spanish ship of the line had
embarked men in the Genoese island of Corsica and carried levies into
Italy. In consequence of this Mathews sent Martin in the 'Ipswich,'
with the 'Revenge' and 'Ann' galley, to destroy the ship, though she
lay under the guns of the Corsican batteries in the neutral harbour
of Ajaccio. Martin sailed from Hyeres on the 13th of February and anchored
off Ajaccio on the afternoon of the 18th. The ship, the 'San Isidro,'
was at anchor in the harbour. Her Captain, a French officer named
de Lage, prepared to resist and hauled himself close in to the batteries.
Martin weighed at 4 A.M. next day, warped in to her and anchored
with a spring on his cable to bring his broadside to bear; the ' Revenge'
did the same, about 300 yards from the Spaniard. De Lage boldly
opened fire, the British vessels returned it, and in a very short time
the 'San Isidro' was in flames. At noon she blew up, and Martin
returned to Hyeres1. The Corsicans, very impatient of Genoese misrule,
made no protest. Corsica was, in fact, rather an encumbrance than
an advantage to Genoa, and it was reported that the Genoese proposed
to sell the island to France or Spain; a rumour which reached Mathews
and caused him to write to the Genoese Senate to inform them that
in the present state of affairs this sale could not be countenanced by
Great Britain.
France, who had now definitely decided to take an active part in
assisting Spain to gain her ends in Italy, was occupying herself busily
during all these early months of the year in securing her coasts and
the port of Toulon from attack by sea. Work on the ships was also
proceeding diligently, and a squadron was expected to be shortly fit
for service. The French officers were also being actively drilled in
tactical exercises. "They have rigged 20 odd long boats," wrote
Mathews, "which they propose to send out to teach their young
officers how to work a ship and to form a hne of battle," and it appeared
as though they were at last going to be of some positive assistance
to their Spanish friends. The months however went by without their
completing their work, but the expectation that they soon would be
ready, and the imperfect intelhgence that Mathews received as to their
exact state, made it impossible for him to relax his vigilance or weaken
his force at Hyeres. Hence he was unable to carry out those repairs
and refits which were so greatly needed in order to keep his squadron
fit for the sea.
No movements of any importance, either of fleet or army, took
1 Log of 'Ipswich'; Mathews to the Duke of Newcastle, February 24th, 1743.
De Lage was subsequently Chief of Staff to Admiral Navarro.

230 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1743
plade during the months preceding June, but the strain on the Admiral
was incessant, and in May he was constrained by ill-health to Write
home asking to be reheved in his command, as he had been indisposed
since October, and the long confinement on board ship had told seriously
upon his health1. The Government were anxious he should not give
up the command at this juncture; the Duke of Newcastle however
gave him permission to go ashore for his health if it should still be
necessary, but desired that he would continue to carry out the duties
of the chief command from Villefranche, where he could land and get
both exercise and medical treatment. The preliminaries of the Treaty
of Worms, which pledged the King of Sardinia to assist in driving the
Spaniards out of Italy, Were at that moment under discussion, and
Mathews was informed that the difficulties attending combined opera*
tions would soon be removed; a plan of campaign embracing the .
armies of Sardinia and Austria and the fleet of England could then
be formulated. An attack on Naples would probably be included, but
however this might be, that part of the plan relating to the sea would
be left, he was told, entirely in his hands, "since your knowledge of
the present situation of affairs in the Mediterranean and the constant
attention you have shewn to his Majesty's service must have enabled
you in the best and most effectual manner to answer his Majesty's
expectations upon any great occasion that may arise2."
In spite of the permission to go ashore Mathews felt he could not
give up his duties while such matters were in the balance; and moreover
at this moment trouble with Genoa had again become acute. A quantity
of arms and ammunition had been run into the harbour of Genoa in
a flotilla of fourteen zebecks which had evaded both the blockading
vessels off Barcelona and the frigate ' Kennington ' which was watching
Genoa. A cautionary letter, implying that this should not have
occurred, was written by the Admiral to the captain of the
'Kennington'; the Government of the Republic was also informed that
it was not to permit any supphes to pass out of its territory to the
Spanish army. The British Consul, Birtles, conveyed this message ti)
the Senate, but as he was unable to obtain from them any assurance
that the powder would not be forwarded to its proposed destination,
Mathews, leaving Lestock with a strong squadron at Hyeres, proceeded
himself to Genoa with six ships of the line and three bomb-vessels
to enforce his demands. Deputies came on board to see him directly
he arrived. They explained how helpless they were in the matter,
and how completely they were under the thumb of Spain, but "I cut'
1 Mathews to the Duke of Newcastle, May 22nd, 1743.
2 Duke of Newcastle to Mathews, June 17th, 1743.

x743 French intervention imminent 231
the matter short," said Mathews, "by telling them I had no time to
spare and that I was determined the Spaniards should not have the
use of the cannon, powder, etc., during the present war in Italy."
He gave them thirty hours in which to make up their minds, and
while they were doing so he moored his ships and bomb-vessels to
cover the town. The Deputies first proposed that the zebecks should
be allowed to return to Spain, but to this Mathews would by no means
agree. He had one demand and one only to make, namely, that the
guns, stores and ammunition should be lodged in the Castle of Boni-
faccio in Corsica, there to remain until the end of the war. As the
Deputies demurred to this, he said he should take the Spanish vessels
out from the Mole and destroy them. In the face of the Admiral's
determination, and the force with which his proposals were backed,
, the Deputies consented. His point being thus fully gained Mathews
left two ships to see the transportation and deposit of the stores
properly carried out, and returned himself to Hyeres.
It was now the end of June. The situation was increasing in
seriousness each day, as it became more certain that France was about
to join Spain and to declare war with England, for the battle of
Dettingen, fought on June 27th, was bound to increase French
animosity, while the continued presence and arbitrary acts of the
British Mediterranean squadron could not fail to be exasperating to
France. Although the Treaty of Worms was approaching completion,
Sardinia and Austria were far from being yet in agreement, and indeed
so hostile to each other did they appear to Mathews that on the 6th
of July he wrote asking for instructions as to how he should act if
the King of Sardinia should join the Spaniards. Finally, the one
great advocate of peace was dead, and a man of different sentiments
held the reins of power in France. When Cardinal Fleury died in
January 1743 his place had been taken by Cardinal Tencin, an ecclesi
astic known to be devoted to the Stuart cause, and believed to be in
active communication with the Pretender and to have promised him
assistance. With such great events impending as must follow the declaration
of war by France Mathews naturally was disinchned to abandon his
'post. Greatly, however, as he wished to remain with the fleet, his
'| health made it impossible for him to do so. For thirty-eight weeks
j he had not been out of his ship, and he now found it absolutely necessary
I to remain at Villefranche and endeavour to recover his health. He
'therefore went ashore, but not to rest. Once more he tried to obtain
1 a conference of the Allied Powers, but until he could be sure of Sardinia's
I agreement to the proposed terms of the Treaty of Worms, he could

232

The Mediterranean under Mathews

J743

make no arrangements. The difficulty of the position may be easily
imagined. His instructions were to protect the dominions of Sardinia,
Tuscany and Hungary against the Spaniards, and, if the French joined,
against them also. While the French shewed every sign of preparing
to take part by land and sea, it seemed possible that Sardinia would
desert the cause of the Allies and also join the Spaniards. If a blow
were successfully struck by the French army on the Rhine it ap
peared certain that their forces in Dauphin6 would be able to join the
Spaniards and push into Italy. Placed as they were they might move
up to Savoy or down to Nice, and as it was impossible to predict
their line of advance, or to tell whether Sardinia would be fighting for
or against them, Mathews could not make any plans for the employ
ment of the fleet. One thing seemed certain: he must keep all his
large ships as much concentrated as the various services would admit,
and as many small ships as possible constantly ready to work along
the coast of Provence and Genoa in case of a military advance in that
part. To effect this concentration he was obliged to withdraw ships
from other services; one of the immediate effects was that trade
suffered considerable losses, losses which drew remonstrances from the
Admiralty and further recommendations to protect commerce more
effectively. The disposition of the squadron in September was as follows:

At Hyeres

At Villefranche

Off the mouth of the Var
About Elba and Civita Vecchia

Cleaning at Minorca
Off St Vincent
Off Gibraltar
Off Cape de Gat
In the Straits' mouth
Between Toulon and Ventimiglia
In the Archipelago
Convoying stores from Genoa
On special cruising service

1 8 ships of the hne: of these 8 were
acting as cruisers between Marseilles,
Porquerolles, Levant Island and
Cape Roux
4 of the line with Mathews, assisting
in the preparation of the defence of
Villefranche
i 50-gun ship
1 50, 1 40, 1 20 and 2 bombs, cruising
to prevent supplies going to the
Spanish army through the Papal
States and Naples
4 of the line and 1 50
1 5°
1 50
1 50
5 small vessels
4 small vessels
1 small frigate
1 small frigate
2 50's

In the beginning of September Sardinia's attitude was at length
defined by the Treaty of Worms, to which, after long negociation and
with great distaste, the Queen of Hungary agreed. By this treaty
Charles Emanuel recognised the Pragmatic Sanction, ceded all his

1743 Treaties of Worms and Fontainebleau 233
rights in the Milanese to Maria Theresa, and bound himself to defend
Lombardy with 40,000 foot and 5000 cavalry. In return for this the
Queen agreed to assist the defence of Lombardy with 30,000 men,
and to cede the Upper Novarese, Piacenza and some territory on the
left bank of the Nura to the King; she abandoned all her claims to
Finale, in taking possession of which the Sardinians were to have the
assistance of the British squadron. The supreme command of the
allied army was placed in the hands of the King of Sardinia, who
was to regulate all military operations in concert with the Queen of
Hungary. The clauses of the Treaty which referred to Great Britain's
obligations committed her to pay a yearly subsidy of £200,000 and to
maintain a fleet in the Mediterranean. The clause relating to the
fleet and the orders it would receive ran as follows:
" Article VII. Aussi longtemps qu'il sera necessaire de favoriser et de seconder
les operations et aussi longtemps que le danger des allies de l'ltalie le demandera,
Sa Majesty le Roi de la Grande Bretagne s'engage de tenir dans la Mediterranee
une forte Escadre de ses vaisseaux de guerre, des galiotes a bombes et des brulots,
dont les Amiraux et les officers commandants auront ordre de concerter constam-
ment et regulierement avec Sa Majeste le Roi de Sardaigne ou avec ses Generaux,
ou avec ceux de la Reine de Hongrie qui seront les plus a portee, pour les mesures
les plus convenables pour le service de la Cause Commune."
While this treaty brought Sardinia into line and facilitated joint
action on the part of the Allies, it had an opposite effect on Genoa,
who saw her own possessions in Finale being transferred to Sardinia
without consultation or compensation. Her relations with Spain,
which had hitherto been merely benevolent, now became more actively
friendly; and she prepared to dispute the possession of Finale with
an army of 10,000 men. France and Spain at the same time concluded
a counter-treaty at Fontainebleau by the terms of which France
agreed to declare war upon Sardinia, to assist Spain to recover Minorca
and Gibraltar, to recognise Don Philip's claim to the Milanese, Parma
and Placentia, and to declare war upon Austria and England1. On
the signing of this treaty a contingent of eleven French regiments
which had already been assembled in Dauphine under M. de Marcieu
proceeded to Briancon to join the Spanish general, the Marquis de la
Mina. The relations with Sardinia being now satisfactorily established,
every effort was made to strengthen the defences of Villefranche in
case the Franco-Spanish armies should advance in that direction. The
King of Sardinia arranged to hurry reinforcements to that part in
such a case, and Mathews, besides lending 54 guns from his squadron
1 October 14th, 1743. The clauses relating to declaring war on Austria and
England were of a later date.

234 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1743
to strengthen the batteries, kept a landing party of 800 soldiers ready
to put ashore at the shortest notice. He also furnished transports
and made all preparations for a retirement of the garrison to Vado
Bay in the case of the capture of Villefranche by the enemy.
The enemy's advance was however made through the Alps, positive
orders having been sent from the Spamsh Court to march by the route
of Monte Viso. The movement began on September 13th, and a week
later the enemy was on Piedmontese soil. But the positions held by the
Sardinian army were so strong and so well defended that the enemy
were unable to pierce them, and, after a ten days' campaign in which
the Franco-Spanish army lost over 8000 men, many guns and much
moral, they retired into Savoy and Dauphine. The first round had
been fought and had resulted in the discomfiture of the enemy.
Lombardy was now safe for the winter, provided the British squadron
could continue to hold the route of the sea.
On the other side of Italy things had been quiet from the time of
the battle of Campo Santo until September. The enemy had retired
to Bologna unmolested; for this Marshal Traun was censured and
superseded in his command by Prince Lobkowitz. The new Austrian
Commander arrived at Carpi on September 5th with a reinforcement
of nine battalions, and proceeded immediately to infuse a more energetic
spirit into the campaign. Advancing rapidly against de Gages he
drove him from Bologna to Fano. Once more the campaign was upon
the Adriatic littoral. The need for using the sea was felt immediately
and Lobkowitz therefore wrote to Mathews asking that the frigates
which had been in the Adriatic, but had been withdrawn, might be
replaced as soon as possible. The 'Seaford' and 'Dartmouth' were
at once sent ; their removal from the other services was an appreciable
drain, and Mathews, writing on October 30th, again took the oppor
tunity of pointing out his need of more vessels of the frigate class.
"There must be ships," he wrote, "constantly in the Adriatic and
cruising from Cape del Colonne and Otranto while the two armies in
Italy continue in their present motions and situation, not only to
prevent the enemy's receiving any succours or provisions by sea, but
also Prince Lobkowitz being distressed for want of his provisions and
thereby losing the fruit of his glorious labours and endeavours to
destroy M. de Gages' army, or drive them to the necessity of taking
shelter in the Kingdom of Naples which the Marquis d'Ormea writ
me the 6th November N.S. is generally thought they will do. In that
case many more proper ships will be absolutely necessary. Sixty or
seventy gun ships are by no means proper for these coasts at this
season of the year, as I full well know by experience."

1743 Differences with the Admiralty 235
There Were indeed many services calling for the ships of the navy.
At this very moment the Pope was permitting cannon and stores for
the use of the Spaniards to be landed at Civita Vecchia, an unneutral
action With which Mathews was not slow to deal. He sent Captain
Powlett with the 'Oxford' and 'Kennington' to cruise in the neigh
bourhood of OrbiteUo with instructions to destroy all the galleys in
the harbour. It had first been his intention to bombard Civita Vecchia
itself, but in deference to the request of the King of Sardinia for a
less severe punishment he contented himself with this stroke.
The signing of the Treaty of Fontainebleau was still unknown in
England, btit every day was bringing about a greater tension with
France. The British cruisers were making prizes of all vessels, French
or Spanish, intercepted carrying mihtary stores into Antibes. M. Mire-
poix protested against this treatment of a neutral power, but Mathews,
in reply to the French Minister's objection, pointed out with some
pertinence that in acting as he did he was only performing the duties
of an auxiliary to the King of Sardinia whose dominions he was
assisting to protect, in the same manner as the French themselves
were acting as auxiliaries to the King of Spain whose forces were
attacking the Sardinian Kingdom.
Notwithstanding his requests for more vessels for cruising, no
reinforcements were sent to him. There are indications that a wretched
jealousy may have been a factor in the friction between himself and
the Admiralty. The military direction of the Mediterranean fleet came
immediately under the Secretary of State, who, as a clerk of the King,
transmitted his Majesty's orders. Thus on all questions concerning
the operations of the war, the Admiral communicated direct with the
Duke of Newcastle; and he was led to believe that the Admiralty took
no notice of his complaints owing to his not being under their Lordships'
immediate command in regard to his mihtary operations1. In the end
of the year the Admiralty wrote in the foUowing terms: "Though their
Lordships think it incumbent on them to keep up the strength of
Mr Mathews' squadron by supphes of fresh ships in the room of those
disabled, they cannot take upon them to send out an additional force
Of ships to him without express direction, as they are not informed
of the reasons or necessity for it2." There lies the whole petty quarrel.
The Admiralty declined to give the Commander-in-Chief the ships
he so greatly needed for the services he had to carry out, because they
had not been consulted as to the military requirements. The excuse
1 Mathews to Duke of Newcastle, June 13th, 1743; September 21st, 1743.
2 Secretary of the Admiralty to Mathews, October 26th, 1743. Yet Mathews
had written seventeen letters giving reasons.

236 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1743
was also made that Mathews had not informed the Admiralty as to
the strength and fitness of the French and Spanish squadrons in
Toulon1. This, however, was an incorrect statement, for Mathews had
kept them informed in nearly every despatch of the disposition of his
ships and the requirements of the situation. In addition, all those
parts of Mathews's letters to the Duke of Newcastle relating to his
needs were transmitted by the Secretary of State to the Board. The
plea that the Admiralty were not acquainted with his requirements
is wholly insufficient to justify their fafiure to meet his wants; some
other motive was at work.
In the end of November the Admiral received information that
the French authorities in Toulon had orders to fit out aU the ships
in port, numbering twenty-one vessels. The Spaniards had at the
same time eighteen ships, so that the situation was now one in which
it was necessary for the British ships to be kept together to meet any
move which might be made by the combined fleet2. Just before
receiving this letter the Duke had written another set of instructions,
outhning the conduct Mathews was to foUow, but remarkable for
nothing except its reiteration of earlier orders. Mathews was again
told to concert with the Powers appointed in what manner the fleet
should be employed for the execution of the Treaty of Worms. He
was to keep himself informed as to how soon the ships at Toulon would
be ready, and ascertain what they were expected to do: whether in
particular, any attempt on Mahon or Gibraltar were likely, in which
case he was to take steps for the securing of those places. " The war,"
wrote the Duke, " in aU probability wUl now be carried on with great
vigour in Italy; and as his Majesty's fleet must have a material share
in it, it wiU require great conduct and attention how that may be most
usefully employed." Letters from Paris of November 12-23 confirmed
the reports "that aU the men of war in French ports are to get ready
for sea by a date in January: it is not doubted that this is done at
the instigation of the Court of Spain to oblige Mr Mathews to retire
from the coast of France in hopes to carry and convoy troops to
Italy3"; about which the Duke remarked: "His Majesty doubts not
you wiU be able to disappoint their designs." The Duke this time
backed up his instructions with some practical help and gave orders
for a reinforcement of three ships4 to saU with the first fair wind, and
1 Out letters. December gth, 1743.
2 An extract from this letter is given post p. 238. The letter reached the
Duke on December 14th.
3 Extract of a letter from Paris enclosed in Duke of Newcastle's letter of
December 13th, 1743.
4 'Burford,' 70; 'Boyne,' 80, and 'Chichester,' 80.

J743 The Brest and Rochefort squadrons 237
another, consisting of two large ships and a frigate, as soon as they
could be ready. Some steps to give Mathews the help he needed were
thus at last taken, but considering how long reinforcements had been
in reaching Haddock, there was no small danger of these not arriving
untU after the crisis was over.
This despatch had not been received at the end of November when
the Admiral, UI in health and weary of the way in which his proposals
had been received1 again asked leave to come home. The mere state
ments of his wants appeared, he said, to be regarded as a crime.
" Permission was given; but the Duke hoped he would not leave unless
his health absolutely demanded it2. Everything pointed to renewed
attempts on the part of Spain to force her army into Italy, and to the
probabihty of France taking an active part in the war with her Atlantic
squadrons. On the first of these points the Duke was under no mis
apprehension as to what the Mediterranean fleet should do. "You
know," he said, "how necessary it is in all events to prevent the
Spaniards from pouring more troops into Italy: and nothing could
so effectually tend to the disappointing of the views of his Majesty's
enemies in Italy as the destruction of the combined fleet at Toulon."
He then added such information as he had as to the second point.
The Brest and Rochefort squadrons were preparing for sea and it was
reported that seven ships from Brest and five from Rochefort were
about to saU, or might even already have done so. "It has been
conjectured," said the Duke, "that the real destination of the ships
that are to be sent from Brest is to place themselves in the Straits
of Gibraltar in order to prevent any reinforcement of ships, or any
supplies of provisions, etc., from being sent from hence.... I am also
authorised by my Lord WinchUsea to assure you that you shaU have
further reinforcements according to the advices he shaU have of the
number of ships that saU from Brest and Rochefort, and such as shall
be sufficient to oppose any force they shall meet with in their passage
to you, and as may enable you to resist the combined fleets of France
and Spain now at Toulon, even tho' they should be joined by any
ships from Brest." And he concluded by observing that it was "very
material that any such junction should be prevented." He reiterated
the instructions given to Haddock on November nth, 1741, to intercept
any French men-of-war coming from any of the Western ports and
going to Toulon.
1 "I am sorry to see the pains their Lordships have taken to throw dirt so
thick at me, but I have the pleasure of knowing where it must of necessity stick
at last." Mathews to Secretary of Admiralty, November 25th, 1743.
2 Duke of Newcastle to Mathews, December 23rd, 1743.

238 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1743
Thus every element in the situation indicated the importance of
the Mediterranean command at this moment, and it is obvious that
no one who felt himself capable of carrying out the duties, could
relinquish it at such a critical time. Mathews's position must have
been doubly difficult, inasmuch as the man on whom the command
would devolve was one whom he considered unfit for the responsibility.
Not improbably his personal f eelings towards Lestock went some way
towards influencing Mathews, but this can be surmise only. At all
events he decided to retain the command, and prepared to take the
first opportunity of going to Turin to meet ViUettes and the representa
tives of the aUied Powers in conference; ViUettes had begged him to
do this in an express letter of November 26th.
On December 8th therefore Mathews landed at ViUefranche on his
way to Turin. He left Lestock at Hyeres with a force of as many
ships as he had been able to muster1; but the fleet was still greatly
scattered. The foUowing list shews how the outlying ships were
employed on December 19th, the remainder of the fleet being either
with Lestock or at ViUefranche:
At Minorca refitting and cleaning 'Marlborough,' 90; 'Princessa,' 80; 'Eliza
beth,' 70; 'Kingston,' 50; 'Norwich,' 50;
'Winchelsea,' 20; 'Folkestone,' 40 (un
serviceable); 'Berwick,' 60 (with 200 men
sick)
Cruising off Malaga, Cape St Vin- 'Dragon,' 60; 'Newcastle,' 50; 'Guernsey,'
cent and Lisbon 5°
In the Adriatic 'Dartmouth,' 50; 'Seaford,' 20
On the coast of Calabria 'Feversham,' 40
On the coast of Romagna 'Oxford2,' 50; 'Kennington,' 20
At Genoa 'Salisbury2,' 50
The situation at the end of the year as it appeared to Mathews
cannot be better shewn than by an extract from a letter written a
fortnight before he went to Turin. The Admiral's views not only of
the position in the Mediterranean but also of the way in which he was
being treated by the Admiralty are therein set out most clearly:
" My last letter to your Grace was dated the 13th instant. I only hinted at
some particular things which I judged absolutely necessary to be for his Majesty's
service, but as I send this to your Grace through Germany I shall speak plainly.
I have received certain intelligence that orders are come to Toulon to fit
out with the utmost expedition all the ships great and small in that port; their
number is twenty-one. One of the persons I have had for a considerable time in
pay was about ten days since seized and carried to prison, but after searching
his person and house and not finding one scrip of paper by which he might be
discovered he was after twenty four hours confinement released, but I have
reason to believe is narrowly watched in regard he has quitted the Spanish
service in which he was a master of one of their ships, on purpose to serve me.
1 See Mathews's letter to Duke of Newcastle, November 23rd, 1743.
2 These ships were being called in by express letter.

J743 Mathews on the situation 239
I shalf Sfore'onti^ ^ **? hC b^evw a meetin«1 wiU be aSreed to *°°n-
1 snau therefore continue here2 some few days longer, but I shall send awav
SE£T m°rm^ aU.the great Ships to Prev«nt MrgLestockVteing surpriled
When they join him he will have the ships in the enclosed list which I am of
opinion are sufficient at present for any number the French caT put to IZ °n
three weeks. 1 daily expect ships from Minorca but I arc ^apprehensive °that it
will not be prudent to send any more ships there to refit, etc. I shaU govlrn
myself m that agreeable to such intelligence as I shall be^ able to get E
Z«^* PTT0n+f^feaV,he f0rmer should to refused admissiof or shZd
be detained They talk confidently that they are to be joined by twelve sail
from Brest My man wnt me that he had read a letter from Brest to one of the
Master-Builders at Toulon giving him an account that two were actually sailed
I must now take leave to state facts, at least those I judge must be such in
a little time. The French will have twenty-one sail at Toulon only. The Spaniards
have eighteen great and small and I take it for granted that the scheme I formerly
mentioned to your Grace was talked of at Toulon will now take place viz • the
French to take some of the Spanish ships and to man them, without which
it is my opinion, that all the Spanish ships cannot possibly get manned And
the strength that I can depend upon having with me against January is twenty-
eight, fifty gun ships included, and they all to be in a condition to keep the sea-
and then all other parts of his Majesty's commands must be totally neglected'
by the Spaniards and French having the whole coast of Italy open to them to
carry by small embarkations recruits into Italy. That is not all, for when the
conjunct fleet is kept ready for the sea, how shall I, or the person his Majesty
shall judge proper to relieve me, be able to assist at the reduction of the Kingdom
of Naples? To divide the fleet will be imprudent and he would justly deserve
to be censured as no officer that should do so. Therefore one of these two things
must inevitably happen, viz., either the conquest of Naples must be postponed
if the assistance of the fleet should be absolutely necessary (as it is generally
thought to be); or the conjunct fleet must be left at liberty to go and do what
they please. In the latter case they may transport what troops they please
to Port Especia [Spezzia] and thereby endanger the liberty of Italy, and after
all if joined by any number of ships from Brest, may come and make me (or
as I have said before, whoever may be appointed to command) a visit, the con
sequence of which is submitted to your Grace.
I flatter myself that I have fairly and honourably stated the facts in regard
to the present situation of affairs without magnifying the strength of the conjunct
fleet. The French ships will be in good order and well manned. The Spanish
ships are generally speaking in bad order and ill-manned, and except they should
be greatly assisted by France (as I have said before) they will be incapable of
putting to sea. They have eight sail in sufficient order and these they can man
to put to sea for a short expedition. That number is full sufficient to prevent
his Majesty's commanding officer to divide his present strength, and I think
it my indispensable duty to acquaint his Majesty in order to undertake the
attacking Naples by sea in regard they have put it in the best posture of defence
it possibly can be ; having been at work in raising batteries all along the coast,
and fortifying the Mole heads ever since Captain Martin was there, it will require
at least fourteen sail of capital ships besides frigates to protect the bombs.
With a less number, according to the account given me of the additional works
made, I should be unwilling to undertake the expedition, because I judge that
with a less force I should not have any probability of success. I send this by
express messenger and must entreat your Grace to lay what I have now the
honour of writing before his Majesty for his consideration and farther instructions
before the expedition takes place.
As to his Majesty's commands in regard to Finale, I flatter myself that a few
of the small ships will be sufficient for that service, though Consul Birtles acquaints
1 I.e. a meeting with the allied commanders, to discuss a plan of campaign.
2 Villefranche.

240 The Mediterranean under Mathews 1743
mt in his letter of the 30th inst. N.S. that the Republic1 has got and is getting
together 10,000 men and that they are determined to dispute it with the Savoyards,
inch by inch; these are his words. Should that be the case I am of opinion that
my going with the bombs to Genoa will be the surest method for saving the
King of Sardinia's troops, and the most expeditious way of reducing that Republic
to reason. I shall therefore propose it to his Sardinian Majesty when his Majesty's
commands are to be put into execution.
I sincerely wish the severe reflections the Lords of the Admiralty were pleased
to make in their letter of the ist of August may not soon be retorted upon them,
by their being convinced that what I have all along complained of, viz. want
of ships to enable me to execute his Majesty's commands, was not without just
grounds: which in my humble opinion they cannot justify but by confessing
they are unacquainted with the different services to be performed by virtue
of his Majesty's commands. And I must take leave to add, that severe manner
of writing is grounded upon notorious mistaken facts as will plainly appear to
any sea-officer in the list of ships I sent your Grace with my letter of the 30th
ultimo, wherein are the dates when ships were detached from me, and when those
sent out joined me. By their Lordships' manner of representing things one would
imagine that the ships ordered out to me were to join me the very day they
received their sailing orders, when God knows I never saw any of them until
ten weeks or three months after, and then they were so sickly, and some disabled
in their passage out, that they have been useless for a considerable time after,
particularly the 'Cambridge,' 'Stirling Castle, 'Newcastle' and 'Nonsuch.' I am
not afraid to declare that the discouragement and severe treatment I have
constantly met with from their Lordships, not to mention the difficulties I have
laboured under, greatly to the prejudice of the service, has not assisted to the
bettering of my constitution."
Such was the situation and such the state of mind of the Admiral
on the eve of the important events which were about to take place;
but before following further the course of the war in the Mediterranean
we must return to the West Indies, where the nature of the operations
was modified by the development of affairs in Europe.
1 I.e. of Genoa. Finale was to fall to Sardinia, by the Treaty of Worms.

CHAPTER XII
THE WEST INDIES. END OF COLONIAL OFFENSIVE.
OCTOBER 1742 TO FEBRUARY 1744
Under the British system of colonial defence the naval forces in West
Indian and North American waters were practically divided into two
categories, the active squadron and the stationed ships. As we have
already seen, the latter comprised a number of smaU craft allocated
definitely to the local protection of certain colonies and their trade.
They were under the Commander-in-Chief of the Jamaica squadron,
but at the same time he never interfered with them nor called them
away from the waters in which their particular duties lay, except upon
pressing occasions. The main force of the squadron was at Jamaica,
since Port Royal was the harbour most suitable as a base of operations
against Spain, and from that centre the Commander-in-Chief directed
the operations of the ships in aU parts of the West Indies. But as
the conditions of war changed, and the probabUities of French inter
ference increased, the Leeward Islands which were contiguous to im
portant French possessions received more attention. When the French
attitude became more actively hostile a smaU increase in the number
of ships in the Leeward Islands was made, and when in October 1743
it became practicaUy certain that France was about to join Spain,
there was a further increase, and the Leeward Islands became a
separate station under its own Commander-in-Chief. Thenceforward
increments were made to cope with the more powerful squadrons that
France was maintaining in those waters.
Sir Chaloner Ogle received his instructions to relieve Admiral
Vernon on September 23rd, 1742, and the command was definitely
transferred to him on October 19th when Vernon sailed for England.
The force to be left on the Jamaica station was laid down in a letter
from the Duke of Newcastle dated August 5th, 1742, part of which
ran as foUows: "Mr Vernon is directed, in determining the number of
ships to be left with you, to consider the strength that de Torres has
with him at the Havana, if he is stiU there; and in all events to take
care that the force he shaU leave with you may be superior to any
strength that the Spaniards can bring together against you in those
parts, and though this may not be to be done without leaving some ships
in the West Indies which may not be in so good a condition as were to
be wished, yet, in these circumstances, they must remain tUl others
R.N.I. l6

242 Minor offensive in West Indies 1742
can be sent from home to reheve them." The information1 Vernon
had as to the Spanish squadron was that it consisted of twelve ships,
and that only half were ready for service, while the whole squadron
was very short of men from death and desertion ; the squadron he left
with Ogle presumably represents his views as to the fighting value of
the ships at Havana.
The naval forces in the three areas of these "Plantations" stations
when Ogle took over the command are shewn upon the opposite page.
The disposition of the ships of the Jamaica squadron made by him
for the protection of trade and other services was as foUows:
Ships of Smaller
larger classes vessels
Off Cartagena : to attack trade to Porto Bello i
Off Cape del Vele cruising up to Rio de la Hacha i
In Windward Passage to protect trade and attack privateers i
Off the South Keys ("where three galley privateers are r
reported")
Convoying 500 troops sent for relief of Georgia and South — 2
Carolina
Going to Ruatan Island for its protection and to cruise — 2
The remainder of the squadron were at Port Royal or in American
waters, mostly refitting, but a few ready for sea.
A report was current that those ships of de Torres's which were
ready were shortly to sail for Europe with the trade. Judging by the
use the Spaniards had hitherto made of their squadron it appeared
unlikely that they would now use it offensively, but would more
probably continue to devote it to the protective duties of convoy.
Ogle could therefore afford to send out his ships of the line to cruise
independently, relieving them from time to time by those ships
which were refitting at Jamaica. But although the Enghsh squadron
was in a better condition than the Spanish, Ogle found the greatest
difficulty in keeping even a proportion of his ships at sea. Ships would
be tediously refitted from the store-houses at Port Royal, proceed to
the Caraccas coast, and in the strong winds which prevail in those
parts, the repairs that had taken months to make might be rendered
useless in a week. Not only were the rope and the canvas at Port
Royal rotten and insufficient, but it was no uncommon thing for ships
to be laid up for months owing to the want of stores to supply them.
1 Report of Captain Brodrick, of Shoreham dated 8th of July. The ships
he reported at Havana were the 'Reyna,' 80; 'Principe,' 74; 'Leon,' 70; 'San
Ysidro,' 64; 'Africa,' 64; 'Andalusia,' 64; 'Hercules,' 64; 'Fuerte,' 64; 'Glorioso,'
64; 'Vittoria,' 54; 'Nueva Espafia,' 54, and 'Real Familia' cruising between
Cape Antonio and Cape Corrientes. Some of these names would appear to be
wrong — e.g. 'Africa' and 'Hercules'; a ship of the former name having been
destroyed the year before at Cartagena, and a ship of the latter name being
at this time blockaded in Toulon by Mathews.

H72 Squadrons in the Plantations 243
Squadrons in North America and the West Indies, October 1742.
A. The Jamaica squadron

'Cumberland,' 80; 'Kent,' 70; 'Grafton,' 70;
'Lyon,' 60; 'Mountagu,' 60; 'Rippon' 60'
'York,* 60 ... T  ...
'Assistance,' 50; 'St Albans,' 50; 'Litchfield,' 50
'Eltham,' 40; 'Fowey,' 40; 'Ludlow Castle,' 40;
'Adventure,' 40" ... ... ... ..'
'Shoreham,' 20; 'Experiment, '20; 'Seahorse, '20;
' Astraea,'2o;'Bonet.ta,'4;'Spry,' 6; ' Strom -
bolo,' 'Vulcan,' fireships; 'Thunder,' 'Basi
lisk' and 'Blast,' bomb-vessels

50 guns
and
above

40

7
3

—

4

—

—

10

4

Smaller vessels

B. The Leeward Island and Barbados stationed

ship

s

At Barbados: 'Norwich,' 50; 'Advice,' 50; 'Scar
borough,' 20 ...
In Leeward Islands1: 'Launceston,' 40; 'Gos-
port,' 40; 'Eltham,' 40; 'Lively,' 20; 'Pem
broke's' prize...

50 guns
and
above 2

40 3

Smaller vessels 1
2

2

3

3

C. The North America stationed ships

Newfoundland :' Sutherland,' 50
North Carolina: ' Swift,' sloop 8.12 
South Carolina: 'Rye,' 20; 'Flamborough,' 20;
'Hawk,' sloop, 8.12 ...
Virginia : ' South Sea Castle, ' 44 ; ' Hound,' sloop,
8.12; 'Cruiser,' sloop, 8.12 
New York: 'Launceston,' 44
New England : ' Gosport, '44

50 guns
and
above

40

1

—

1

—

1

—

1

1

3

Smaller vessels

1 The 'Otter' joined the Leeward Island command in October. 16 — 2

244 Minor offensive in West Indies 1742
Empty stqre-houses played their part in the strategy of this war, both
in the West Indies and the Mediterranean.
In November Ogle received sufficiently fuU information of the
situation in the Mediterranean to form a picture of what was passing
there and an anticipation of the consequences. The squadron under
Mathews was then definitely established off Toulon and along the coast of
Provence and the Riviera. French ships were being arrested for carrying
troops, French interests were being flouted and a practical blockade:
of the principal French naval port was in progress. To Ogle it appeared
that the hands of France would soon be forced; and her open
espousal of the cause of Spain against Austria gave colour to this
belief. It was therefore necessary to be ready for eventualities in the
West Indies. There were no French men-of-war in those waters, but
as the first intimation of war might be the arrival of a French squadron
from Europe it was undesirable to have his ships scattered. Concentra
tion was also to be aimed at for offensive reasons, in order that any
attack upon French possessions might be put in hand immediately
hostilities were declared. Ogle therefore recalled aU his cruising ships,
and made preparations, in consultation with Governor Trelawny, to
attack the French settlements at Petit Guave and Leogane, destroy
their fortifications and naval faculties, and so begin the war by clearing
the board of these two naval bases. Trelawny arranged to embark
400 troops from the Jamaica garrison to serve as a land force in
those operations; but month after month went by and stiU advices
shewed that France did not intend to be goaded, at least for the
present, into any overt act. In the spring therefore Ogle again sent
out his ships cruising against Spanish trade.
In the meantime the Admiralty had decided to prosecute the war
against the Spanish settlements, though on a different scale from that
of the great expeditions of 1741 and 1742. The harbours of Puerto
Cabello and La Guayra on the coast of Caraccas which were selected
for attack were both important trading settlements of the second
order. Puerto CabeUo was the careening port of the Caraccas Company,
whose ships had rendered great assistance to the Spanish navy during
the war in carrying troops, arms, stores and ammunition from Spain
to her colonies, and its destruction would be a severe blow both to
the Company and the Government1. La Guayra was — as it stiU is — the
port of Caraccas and an important shipping centre. It was believed
by the Admiralty to be very weakly defended, an opinion possibly
based on the report of the ships which attacked it in 1739 2.
1 Duro, Armada Espanola.
2 See vol. 1. p. 43.

1742 Puerto Cabello and La Ouayra 245
Against these two ports the Admiralty decided to send an expedition,
the scope and intentions of which were set out in the instructions to
the officer selected to command— Captain Charles Knowles. Knowles
had returned to England in the 'Weymouth' which he paid off on
24th of March 1742. He held strong views as to the best manner
in which to prosecute the war, and it is possible that the suggestion
to attack these ports emanated from him, and that he was in con
sequence entrusted with the command1. He rightly looked upon the
destruction of the enemy's bases as one of the most important
measures in attacking and defending trade, and was strongly averse
from confining operations merely to cruising and convoy.
Knowles's instructions, dated October 14th, 1742, ran as foUows:
Instructions to Captain Charles Knowles, Captain of his Majesty's
ship the ' Suffolk,' and Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's
ships and vessels designed on a particular service.
1. Whereas we have thought fit to entrust you with the command of a
squadron of his Majesty's ships to be employed on a particular service, you are
hereby required and directed carefully to observe the following Instructions.
2. You are to take his Majesty's ship the 'Buiford' under your command,
whose captain is directed to follow your orders, and as soon as the said ship and
the 'Suffolk' are supplied with all the provisions and naval and ordnance stores
ordered for them, and are ready in all other respects for the sea, and the wages
and advance money due to their companies paid at the Nore, you are to proceed
with the said ships to Barbadoes, and if you meet with any of his Majesty's ships
named in the margin2, either at that island or anywhere else, you are to deliver
the inclosed pacquets to their commanders, and to take them under your com
mand, and without making any unnecessary stay at Barbadoes, to proceed on
"without loss of time to Antegoa; but if you meet with none of the said ships in
your way thither, you are to leave such orders for their commanders to follow
you, as you shall judge proper.
3. When you arrive at Antegoa you are to cause the pacquets directed to
the Governor of the Leeward Islands, and to the officer commanding in chief
Lieut' General Dalzell's regiment of Foot to be delivered to them, the same
containing his Majesty's orders, that four hundred men of the said regiment
with a proper number of officers shall embark on board the ships under your
command to serve in the intended expedition ; and you are accordingly to make a
proper distribution of the said officers and soldiers on board the ships with you,
and to see that their embarcation be made with all possible despatch.
4. And whereas we have ordered the Captain of his Majesty's ship the
'Falmouth,' which ship and the 'Assistance' are going out with a convoy of
victualhng ships to Jamaica, to proceed himself no farther than Antegoa, and
keeping with him such one of the victualling ships as he thinks fit, and also the
' Comet ' bomb vessel and her tender, to send the ' Assistance ' on with the rest
of the victuallers and trade to Jamaica, you are to take the said ship ' Falmouth,'
and ' Comet ' bomb vessel with her tender, under your command, and to retain
the said victualling ship with you, she being laden with dry provisions, and to
supply the wants of your ships from h;r; and if you apprehend that you shall
want flesh provisions or any other species of provisions, when you return from
1 Beatson wrongly attributes the origin of this expedition to Ogle.
2 'Scarborough,' 'Advice,' 'Norwich,' 'Eltham,' 'Lively,' 'Pembroke,' prize.
'Otter,' sloop.

246 Minor offensive in West Indies 1742
the expedition you are going upon, you are to give the contractor at the Leeward
Islands timely orders for providing the same.
5. And whereas you carry out an eight inch mortar for his Majesty's ship
the 'Scarborough,' you are to order the same to be fixed in her, and to supply
her with shells and other necessaries, and proper persons for the service of the
mortar. 6. And whereas we are informed there is an eight inch Howitz on board
bis Majesty's ship the 'Pearl,' you are, if you meet with her, to take the same
Howitz from her, together with the officers, and shells and other materials thereto
belonging, which her captain is hereby directed to deliver to your orders, and
you are to cause the same to be put on board such ship of your squadron, as
you think fit.
7. You are at liberty to communicate these our Instructions to Mr Mathews,
Governor of the Leeward Islands, and you are to consult and advise with him
about the best methods to be taken for performing the intended service; and
also to get privately what intelhgence you can of the state and condition of the
enemy, where you are going.
8. Having got all things in a readiness to go upon service, you are to put
to sea with the squadron and forces aforesaid and proceed over to the coast of
Caracca where the Guipuscoa Company have established settlements for their
trade, at the towns of La Guira and Puerto Cabello, the taking of which places,
or any others upon the Main, together with the merchandise and treasure that
shall be found there, as also such ships as you shall meet with, and their ladings,
are the services that you are sent upon and which you are to endeavour to perform
and execute with your whole force and power.
9. But whereas many designs have miscarried by not making an immediate
attack upon the enemy after arrival, but wasting the time in deliberation, whereby,
their first fears being over they have time given to strengthen themselves and
prepare for their defence; you are, before you arrive in sight of the coast to call
a consultation of the captains of the ships under your command at which the
officer commanding in chief the land forces is to have a vote and the second
place in rank, and to lay these our instructions before them, as also such intelli
gence as may have been received concerning the state and condition of the enemy,
and there to settle fully the whole plan of operation against the enemy so that
nothing may remain to be done after your arrival but to go immediately upon
the attack and perform the whole service, according as shall have been agreed
upon at a general consultation.
10. And for the better distinction of command and dignity of the expedition
we do empower and direct you to wear a broad pendant while you are in sight
of the Spanish continent aforesaid.
n. In case it shall be thought proper to send any soldiers or marines on
service ashore, they are to be under the command of the officer who commands
in chief the detachment of soldiers sent from the Leeward Islands; but both the
landing and re-imbarking the troops, as also all other operations whatsoever
in this expedition, either by land or sea are to be performed according as shall
be agreed on at a general consultation as above mentioned.
12. In case you shall succeed to take La Guira, Puerto Cabello or any other
place on the Main, you are to refer it to a general consultation whether it may
be advisable to keep or abandon the same; and in case of keeping any places,
you are to appoint the 'Falmouth' and a small frigate or sloop to attend on the
same, for the protection and service thereof, and of the forces that shall be left
there: and you are likewise to apply to the Governors of Barbados and of the
Leeward Islands, for a supply of negroes to assist in fortifying the said places
and for such other succour as shall enable the commanding officer to maintain
and secure the same, as it is a settlement that may very much redound to the
security and advantage of the trade of those islands; and you are to apply the
cannon and other warlike stores taken on shore, towards fortifying the said places.
13. You are likewise at liberty to draw from his Majesty's ships under your
command such cannon and other warlike stores as shall be judged necessary, at

J742 Knowles' s Instructions 247
a. general consultation, to be landed and left there for the better security of the
settlements. 14. You are to inform yourself of the disposition of the native Spaniards
established in the Province of Venezuela before the settlement of the Guipuscoa
Company, and if you find encouragement, you are to publish and disperse among
them declarations, setting forth that it is not the design of the English nation
to make a conquest of their country or to meddle with their property religion
and liberty, but only to free them from the tyranny and oppression of the
Guipuscoa Company and to open a free and equal trade with them of their
mutual commodities, without any exorbitant duties, charge or imposition what
ever: and you are to make such provisional agreement with these people, if you
find them disposed to it, as shall be thought proper at a general consultation,
subject to his Majesty's pleasure and determination.
15. If you keep possession of any place you are to settle the form of Govern
ment there 'til his Majesty's pleasure shall be known, and in order thereto you
are to give such instructions to the senior captain of his Majesty's ships that
you shall leave there as you think proper for the protection of the place by sea,
and to the officer commanding the garrison in whatever relates to the defence
thereof by land. And whereas Captain Thomas Somers, who is well acquainted
with the coast of Caraccas, has voluntarily offered his services to go upon this
expedition, and whose advice and assistance will be very necessary towards
facilitating the success of the undertaking, we do therefore hereby direct and
order that he shall be called to, and have a vote at, all general consultations:
and you are to appoint the said captain to take charge of all the stores and
provisions on shore as also of the collection and receipt of the Duties or Revenue
that shall be settled there, and likewise of the repair of the Garrison, and all other
contingent expenses, as also of providing hospitals for the seamen and soldiers,
and other necessaries; and you are to direct the said three officers to advise and
consult together in all matters relating to the settlement of the colony and of
the duties to be established, and to forward as well everything relating to the
general service, as the respective services with which they are entrusted in
particular, and to continue acting in their employments until his Majesty's
pleasure shall be known, recommending it to them above all things to cultivate
and maintain a fair correspondence with the natives, and to comport themselves
so towards them as may dispose and incline them to have a good opinion of the
English nation, and to be assured of a free and peaceable commerce with us,
without any fears or apprehension of danger.
16. In case you do not succeed in your attempts upon the coast of Caracca
you are to call a general consultation to consider whether any attempt may be
made upon the island of Porto Rico, or on any other place, and to proceed
according as shall be agreed on, at the general consultation.
17. But if, when you return from the coast of Caracca to the Leeward Islands,
you shall have certain information from Governor Mathews that there is a rupture
with France, you are to consult with the said Governor how to annoy any of the
neighbouring French settlements, and to proceed therein as shall be approved
and agreed on at a general consultation as before mentioned.
18. You are to send us early and particular accounts of your proceedings
and success on the coast of Caracca by a small sloop or frigate, as you are likewise
to do of any other services you may afterwards go upon, with the opinion taken
at a General Consultation of what may be necessary to be done here for the
furtherance of the service you are employed on.
19. When the service of the expedition is at an end, and it shall not be
thought advisable to attempt any further enterprise upon the enemy by land,
you are to order the captains of the ships stationed at Barbados and the Leeward
Islands to repair to their respective stations and pursue their former instructions,
and to come home yourself to England with the two 70-gun ships and the
'Norwich.' And if you have made no settlement for the 'Falmouth' to attend
on you are to send her to Jamaica, directing the captain to put himself under the
command of the Admiral or Commander-in-chief at that place.

248 Minor offensive in West Indies 1742
20. In case of your inability by sickness or otherwise you are to leave these
our instructions with the next commanding officer who is hereby directed to
put them in execution.
Given, etc., the 14th of October, 1742,
Winchelsea, J. Cokburne, Philip Cavendish, Geo. Lee.
An additional and more specific order of the same date foUowed:
Whereas the taking the town of Puerto Cavallo, with the forts in and about
the same, and keeping possession thereof, is the first and principal object that
you are to have in your view, in the expedition you are going upon; you are
hereby directed, in addition to our instructions to you of this date, not to make
any attempt with the land forces on any other place until you have first tried
what can be done at Puerto Cavallo. But you are at liberty, in your way to
that place, if it shall be thought proper at a general consultation, to range along
the coast of La Guira, and seize on any ships that you may find there, or else
where along the coast, and also to insult the said town from the sea, taking care
not to waste so much time there as may alarm the people at Puerto Cavallo,
and enable them to put themselves into a posture of defence. For which, etc.,
Given, etc., the 14th of October, 1742. W.,J. C, PC, G.L.
These instructions present several interesting features. While going
into a good many detaUs they aUow a considerable latitude in execution
to the commanders. They provide for what is to be done if it be
decided to retain any places in the event of capture. They emphasize
the importance of surprise and rapidity of execution and the need of
complete preparation, so that the attacks by land and sea can be
set in motion immediately on arrival, in fuU co-ordination with each
other. The command was a joint one, according to our usual custom;
Knowles was in command of the squadron only (paragraph 1), and any
soldiers or marines serving on shore are placed under the command
of the military officer (paragraph 10); and aU operations connected
with landing or on land are ordered to be agreed upon in a joint con
sultation at which the military officer is to have the second place. But
whether, in preparing the plans for the specific conduct of affairs on
shore, the judgment of the military officer could be overridden by that
of the naval officers who would be in a majority of the council ordered
in the same paragraph, appears to be left in some shght doubt.
WhUe the aim of the operations was fairly outlined, a clearer
distinction might have been drawn between merely annoying the
enemy and developing a strategical situation which would be of per
manent injury to him. The attack on Puerto CabeUo was of the latter
nature, that on La Guayra of the former. The latitude accorded to
Knowles to perform the minor operation of destroying shipping at
La Guayra was a weak point without a distinct provision that it
was in no way to prejudice the success of the major operation.
Concentration upon the achievement of the principal object is a
fundamental principle which cannot lightly be disregarded; and while

I742 Warren and Knowles

249

every latitude in execution must be extended to a commander, no
loophole should be left which can hinder the successful attainment of
that object.
Besides issuing these instructions the Admiralty took steps about
a fortnight earlier to assemble the Leeward Islands stationed ships in
readiness for the expedition1. The sloop ' Otter ' was sent out to Barbados
and Antigua with despatches ordering all the ships on those stations
to assemble at Antigua and there complete with provisions and water,
and hold themselves "in a constant readiness to proceed on service
according to such orders as shall be sent to you. But if you hear of
any enemy's ships cruising in the neighbourhood of that island you
are at liberty to go in quest of them, taking care to return to Antigua
when the service is performed or that there shall be no longer hopes
of meeting with the enemy's ships according to the inteUigence you
had received." This last part of the instructions is to be noted. It
constantly recurs in aU instructions to ships sent on particular service.
Thus a squadron cruising in the Channel, to which certain limits are
assigned, is invariably given the same permission to extend its cruising
ground beyond those limits if it shall receive information of enemy's
ships in a part outside its patrol; and the same sentence about returning
to its station when there is no longer hope of meeting the enemy is
also a constant formula2.
The senior officer in the Leeward Islands was Captain Peter Warren
of the 'Launceston.' He had been appointed to her on the 18th of
January 1742 for Channel service. On the 31st of March he was ordered
to fit for New York and after a cruise on the French coast after priva
teers, saded for that station on August 23rd, 1742. His instructions
were to fall down to the Leeward Islands in the winter when the
weather was unseasonable on the American coast, returning to his
station in the spring. He was senior to Knowles, and a letter of the
same date— October 14th— was sent to him, informing him that
Knowles was appointed Commander-in-Chief of a squadron going on a
particular service, and directing Warren not to give him any orders
"that may anyways interrupt or delay the service he is going upon,
nor to take any of the ships or vessels from him that are appointed
to his command." And further, to avoid the chance of friction which
the situation might produce, Warren was ordered to take the
' Launceston ' and ' Gosport ' cruising " on such stations either separately
1 Out letters. September 27th, 1742.
a Similar instructions were given to the Admiral commanding the Western
squadron who was permitted to chase an enemy squadron so long as there was any
reasonable expectation of overhauling it.

250 Minor offensive in West Indies 1743
or together as may best protect the aforesaid islands and the trade
going to or coming from thence from the ships of the enemy untU
the season wiU admit of your returning back to your proper stations
at New York and New England."
Knowles sailed from Spithead with the 'Suffolk,' 'Burford' and
'Comet.' He picked up his squadron at Antigua, embarked a detach
ment of Colonel DalzeU's regiment, and saUed from St Kitt's on
February nth and anchored off the Tortugas on the 16th. There he
caUed a councU of war of the captains of the ships, the Commander of
the land forces and Captain Somers, to communicate to them his
sealed instructions.
It is said1 that the Spaniards had two months' warning of the
attack; whether this be true or not cannot definitely be stated. Duro
makes no mention of any such information having been received;
and that precautions for secrecy had been taken is shewn by a letter
of September 1742, written by Lord Winchilsea to the Director General
of Ordnance, the Duke of Montagu, in which he very privately informed
the Duke that two ships were being fitted out for a public service
which would require some special stores from the Ordnance Board.
" As all designs for the pubhc service," wrote Winchilsea, " are generally
defeated by being known long before our ships saU, and by the manner
of fitting out our ships.... I must beg to know from your Grace who
it is at your Board to whom you would direct me to apply that these
things might be provided privately2." Besides this, Knowles's orders
were sealed and not opened tiU he reached Tortugas. If therefore the
Spaniards had the information, it could only have been from some
person in close touch with the Admiralty who had seen the instructions.
Rumour of such leakage is common and frequently untrustworthy;
but its possibility was suspected by Anson after he had been at the
Admiralty for nearly two years, and had learnt something about the
ways of the place; in August 1746, when sending some information
to the Secretary this weU-balanced officer concluded: "When }^ou have
communicated this letter to their Lordships I desire you will keep it
in your possession and not let it go into the office, that the clerks may
not see it."
The instructions were opened by Knowles in the presence of the
officers forming the council of war. The capture of Puerto Cabello was
clearly the principal object; but it was observed that "we were left
at hberty to take what vessels we might see in La Guayra Road and
insult the fortifications as we passed." The instructions contemplated
1 Beatson, vol. I. p. 164.
2 Montagu Papers, Hist. Man. Comm. Report.

x743 Attack on La Guayra 251
the squadron going to windward, passing La Guayra and taking any
shipping that was exposed, and passing rapidly to leeward to Puerto
Cabello without any delay. But the council reasoned thus: if any
ships were seen at La Guayra, the Spaniards, on sighting the squadron,
would haul them in under protection of the fortifications. Therefore,
before the vessels could be taken the defences must be destroyed,
"which, by the inteUigence laid before us, would not be difficult."
Also, if Puerto Cabello were first attacked, and the squadron damaged
aloft, it would take a long time to beat up to La Guayra against the
strong winds and currents on that coast. The garrison would in that
interval get news of the presence of the squadron and be better prepared
than if the attack were made by surprise "which we had great reason
to believe would be the case, from the secrecy of our expedition." On
the other hand, even if damaged aloft at La Guayra, the squadron
would be able to drop down to Puerto CabeUo in less than 24 hours,
a shorter time than a courier would take by land. Provided, therefore,
the spars were not too crazy to stand enough sail to carry the ships
past the forts, success would depend more upon anchors and cables
than masts and rigging1.
Upon these arguments the council decided to avail themselves of
the latitude in their instructions, and to attempt first to destroy such
shipping as might be at La Guayra, and then drop rapidly to leeward on
Puerto CabeUo and attack and capture the town. The arguments are
interesting ; they have aU the appearance of being dictated by good sense
and seamanship. The decision was nevertheless an unfortunate one.
Arrangements for the attack on the defences of La Guayra were
made. In a weU locked up line of battle the squadron was to sail in
and anchor, each ship as close to her next ahead as possible, abreast
the forts in the foUowing order: 'Burford,' 'Eltham,' 'Norwich,'
'Suffolk' (flag), 'Advice,' 'Assistance,' 'Lively.' The 'Scarborough'
and a bomb-ketch, from a position on the off side of the squadron,
would join in the bombardment, the 'Scarborough' having, as the
instructions had laid down, an eight-inch mortar specially fitted into
her — an innovation, it would appear, introduced by Knowles, who had
also mounted mortars on the poop of his flagship.
The discussions and preparations for the attack lasted two days.
On the evening of February 18th the 'Otter' was detached to recon
noitre and report what ships were in the port. Reconnaissance is of
high importance in many of the operations of war; but when surprise
1 Account of the La Guayra Expedition described in a letter from Captain
Watkinsof H.M.S. 'Lively' to Sir John Norris. Naval Chronicle, vol. I. pp. 204,
314-

252 Minor offensive in West Indies 1743
is aimed at, a reconnaissance which, unlike the work of scouts on shore,
cannot be concealed from the enemy, lurnishes him with a warning
and puts him on his guard. So it was in this case. The Spaniards
sighted the 'Otter' and instantly took alarm. Seven or eight vessels
hastily got under sail and hurried to leeward in the direction of Puerto
CabeUo, and thus both that port and La Guayra were warned of an
impending danger. This was a distinct failure to observe the tenth
clause of the instructions in which the importance of secrecy was so
insistently enjoined upon the Commander.
At dayhght on the 19th of February the squadron stood in in a
line of battle as arranged. When within a short distance of the town
sail was shortened to fore and aft sail only, in order that there should
be as little canvas as possible to handle whUe anchoring, and to ensure
bringing the ships in good order into a close range of the forts. As
the squadron approached, the batteries opened a heavy fire to which
the ships rephed. There was little wind and the smoke of the squadron
hung so heavy that vision was obscured 1- Instead therefore of anchoring
as Knowles intended within pistol shot of the waUs, they found them
selves much farther off, and indeed too far to use their smaU arms
which in such an attack were invaluable. The top riflemen in such
a case, firing into the open batteries from their high situation aloft,
were of great importance, as the attack at Porto Bello had shewn.
It took about an hour to get the whole squadron anchored. The
forenoon had gone by, and it was now near 1 p.m. For over two hours
a tremendous fire was maintained by both ships and batteries in whioh
the former, in spite of the drawback of the long range and the sweU,
were getting the upper hand and driving the gunners from their forts,
when came a mishap. A lucky shot cut the cable of the 'Burford,'
and about the same time the 'Eltham' also parted her cable. The
two ships dropped foul of the 'Norwich'; all three ships then drifted
out of action, and although the remainder of the squadron maintained
their place, the garrison was encouraged, returned to its guns and
reopened fire, whUe at the same time the bombardment of the ships
began to slacken owing to the necessity for refining cartridges. A
magazine in the fort was however blown up, and fighting only ceased
at 8 p.m.
Knowles now prepared to send in his boats to attack the enemy's
shipping under cover of darkness, but his men were so worn out with

1 Vernon's orders of March 21st for the attack upon Fort St Louis had antici
pated this difficulty. It will be recollected that he forbade the men being placed
at the guns until the ships were in position. See p. 115.

J743 Failure at La Guayra 253
the long day's fighting, and. so many of his boats were shot through,
that he was unable to carry out his intention.
The next day was spent in repairing damages, bombarding the
west end of the town and the shipping with the bomb-ketch, and
making preparations for a night attack on the shipping. At 3 a.m.
the launches were sent in, with strict orders to burn aU the ships and
not to attempt to bring any of them out. No opposition was encountered
in entering the harbour and the first ship was boarded without the
smallest difficulty. Then the whole enterprise was spoiled. Not
withstanding Knowles's strict orders, a lieutenant of the 'Suffolk,'
tempted by the possession of a fine new ship, partly laden, cut her
cable and began to tow her to sea, whUe others of the men went
plundering. An alarm was raised; the forts sprang into life and opened
fire and all the boats except one immediately retired, — a retreat which
Knowles characterised as "scandalous." He ordered a court martial
upon the lieutenant who had so flagrantly disobeyed his orders, but
before it could be held the officer was kiUed in the attack at Puerto
CabeUo. The attack thus became a complete fadure. Four hundred men
had been kiUed and wounded1, among whom was the captain of the
'Burford,' and many of the ships were badly damaged aloft. Knowles
was therefore unable to proceed to Puerto Cabello until he had refitted.
He had appointed a rendezvous at the Keys of Barbaratt, about four
miles to the eastward of Puerto CabeUo, and thither he saUed next
morning, only to find on arrival that the ships damaged in the action —
the 'Burford,' 'Norwich,' 'Assistance' and 'Otter' — which should have
been there, were missing. These ships were reported to have been
sighted to leeward, and Knowles sent a sloop to order them to anchor
anywhere on the coast to enable him to join them. The search was

The losses of the squadron

in the whole affair at La Guayra were as follow!

Shot

received
Killed
Wounded
'Suffolk'
146
29
80
' Burford '
94
24
5°
' Assistance '
54
13
71
' Eltham '
41
14
55
' Norwich '
9
1
11
' Advice '
10
5
15
' Lively '
10
6
24
'Scarborough'
3
0
2
367 92 3°8
The enemy are said to have lost about 700. (Charnock, vol. iv. p. 352 ; Beatson,
vol. in. p. 39, gives nearly the same figures.)
254 Minor offensive in West Indies 1743
fruitless; and, knowing that they were badly damaged, he concluded
they must have gone to Curacoa to refit. Thither therefore he next
proceeded, and there found them, and expressed to their captains his
severe displeasure at their disregard of his instructions.
Having got his ships together at Curacoa he proceeded to make as
complete a refit as possible, to enable him to carry out his operations
against Puerto Cabello. Powder, plank and rope were obtained, but
men were lost from sickness and desertion. As good a refit for the
immediate purpose could have been made at an anchorage on the
coast and less delay incurred. Although surprise was now out of the
question, for Curacoa was in constant correspondence with the Spaniards
at Cabello who procured their own supplies from the Dutch island,
the delay was a serious matter on account of the extra time given to
the enemy to strengthen his defences. The action of his disobedient
captains had involved him in this situation and all Knowles could
do was to make the best of it. Hastening his repairs to the utmost,
as soon as he was able — on March 5th — he sent four of his smaU ships
to prevent further succours from getting in, or any vessels already there
from escaping. As his ships were made ready he detached them to
Barbaratt to stiffen the blockade.
By March 21st his last ship left Curacoa. The winds and currents
were strong and adverse, and it was not until April 14th that he reached
the Keys of Barbaratt, after having been obhged to make a board
right over to Hispaniola in order to fetch the place.
The harbour of Puerto Cabello is formed by an isthmus, stretching
to the westward from the main land to a cape called Point Brava.
On this point a fascine battery of fifteen guns was erected. The neck
then turns sharply south and ends in a point on which a castle stood,
commanding the entrance to the harbour. Between Point Brava and
the castle a second fascine battery of eight guns had been built, designed
to rake ships as they made their approach towards the castle and
harbour mouth. The entrance is narrow, a bare pistol shot across,
and the prevaihng wind being easterly it is clear that any attempt
to force the entrance by naval action alone was impossible.
After a personal examination made by Knowles from the masthead
of the 'Suffolk,' the plan decided upon was to land the seamen and
capture the fascine batteries, supporting them with 1100 land troops
under Major Lucas. The 'Assistance' was to move close in to that
part of the isthmus which runs towards Barbaratt, command it with
her guns, and prevent the enemy from reinforcing the crews of the
batteries. The landing was to be made in the evening, the actual
attack to be made in the dark. Surprise was hoped for; if the two

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T743 Attack on Puerto Cabello 255
batteries were taken their guns could be turned on the castle, a breach
made, and a general assault by the land troops and squadron would
follow. In order to provide a diversion and weary the enemy, the 'Norwich,'
'Lively' and 'Eltham' were to bombard the fascine batteries all day
from the earhest moment. No particular execution was expected
from this. It would be enough if the Spaniards was well harassed and
tired out, so that when the night attack came a sleepy and fatigued
enemy would be either unready, or if ready unfit, to repel the assault.
Success was looked upon as certain.
There was some delay in beginning the bombardment, a delay the
cause of which gives some insight into the disciphne of that time.
The captain of the 'Norwich' was dilatory in taking up his position,
and when called on by the Commodore to hasten, replied that he would
consult with his officers about doing what he had been ordered. Knowles
acted promptly. He suspended him and sent another officer to command
the ship. The batteries were kept busy all day, and at sunset their
crews, jaded and shaken, were in need of repose; the ships were httle
damaged. The landing party was put on shore after dark without being seen
or opposed, and marched along the isthmus. Fighting began about
n o'clock. An advanced guard of the enemy had been stumbled
upon asleep and might have been taken prisoners quietly, but a naval
officer shot one of them. Some of the seamen began firing wildly,
voUey foUowed voUey, men shot each other, and in the middle of the
confusion some guns from a fascine battery, whose garrison was now
alert, opened fire. A complete panic seized the whole party, and though
Knowles, who in his barge was pulhng along in shore abreast the
landers, did aU he could by hailing to stop the rout, and the officers
on shore endeavoured to check the men, the whole party bolted back
to their boats without any efforts on the part of the enemy.
A surprise on shore was now as impossible as a surprise attack
by sea. Knowles sent in the same three ships next day to renew the
bombardment, but no great harm could be done, and the enemy set
themselves strenuously to add to their defences. At a council of war
held on the 21st, it was decided that the only chance of success lay
in a general attack by the squadron. The 'Assistance,' 'Burford,'
'Suffolk' and 'Norwich' were detaUed to batter the castle, the 'Scar
borough,' 'Lively' and 'Eltham' the fascine batteries. This attack
was to be made on the 23rd, but the wind failing it had to be post
poned till the 24th. As at La Guayra, difficulty was experienced
in getting close to the castle, and though a fierce bombardment was

256 Minor offensive in West Indies 1743
kept up from 2 p.m. tiU 9, in which the castle was greatly damaged,
the range was too great for the ships to have the advantage necessary
for success. FinaUy, when most of their ammunition was exhausted,
some 90 to 100 men kiUed and wounded, and the ships much shattered
in both huUs and rigging, Knowles gave up the attempt and signaUed
the ships to cut or slip and stand to sea.
The squadron then returned to Barbaratt where the councU of
war came to the conclusion that in view of the shortness of am
munition, and the state to which the ships were now reduced, it would
be impossible to execute any further service either here or at Porto
Rico; Knowles therefore ordered the ships to disperse and to return
to their stations.
The decision to attack La Guayra before proceeding to Puerto
CabeUo, notwithstanding the apparent soundness of the arguments
already given, was assuredly an error. It involved a violation of
principle. Puerto CabeUo was Knowles's main objective, and to run
the risk either of frittering away strength in advance of his attack
on that place, or of giving notice of his coming, must be considered a
mistake. The law of concentration upon the principal object, to the
exclusion of everything else, was not being observed; and though
victory may often attend operations conceived upon hnes which
violate correct doctrine, those who do so not only throw away some
of their chances of complete success, but leave more than a loophole
for complete faUure.
In the actual attack upon La Guayra the ships lost their bearings
in the smoke through not withholding their fire, and thereby anchored
too far off for a fuUy effectual bombardment — a mistake Knowles
took to heart and provided against in his later attack upon Fort Louis
in 1748. In the landing at Puerto CabeUo the advance was spoUed
by the letting off of a pistol, an occurrence which on more than one '
occasion has had the same effect. By removing the flints, as Grey
did in his successful attacks in the West Indies at a later date, this
mischance would have been impossible.
These initial mistakes in the plans, unfortunate and avoidable as
they undoubtedly were, might yet have been retrieved if better fortune
had attended the squadron. The cutting away of the cables of the
ships in the attack upon La Guayra at a moment when victory seemed
in their hands, and the immediate loss of the services of three ships,
was a stroke rather of ill-luck than anything else. At La Guayra there
was no want of gaUantry on the part of Knowles or his men, as the
heavy losses testify. At Puerto CabeUo the attack was well conceived
and begun successfully. The panic foUowing the letting off the pistol

I743 Trade attack and defence 257
was one of those incidents which occurs even in the best troops, in
explicable by any form of reasoning. If the attacks on the outlying
batteries at Cartagena form any guide, it seems probable that if cold
steel had been the order Puerto CabeUo would have been taken. It
is interesting to note that in spite of the failures of this carefuUy
considered expedition, no enquiry was made into the causes of the
miscarriage, nor does it appear to have been anywhere suggested that
blame attached to the Commanders.
No operations other than those of trade-attack and protection
were carried out during 1743. Ogle remained continuaUy at Port
Royal, his cruisers in the various channels used by shipping. But
although he sent out all the smaU craft under his orders they were
unable adequately to protect the merchants against the privateers.
So great was his need of small ships that in August he took the mortars
out of the bomb-vessels and converted them to sloops, but for every
small ship he sent to cruise, the Spaniards sent a dozen privateers.
The merchants complained both to him and to the home Government
of their losses, but he pointed out that he had every ship employed,
and remarked, in writing to the Duke of Newcastle on the subject,
that it was quite impossible to do more with the force he had, especiaUy
as the merchant ships would not help themselves, even weU armed
ships surrendering without an attempt at defence. In such circum
stances a far greater number of smaU vessels than was at his disposal
was needed; but the best answer to the privateer would have been a
weU armed and well manned merchant service.
Towards the end of the year 1743 the operations were further
hampered by a renewal of the French danger. So threatening was
the outlook that Ogle was forced to keep his cruising ships in such
stations that he could readily assemble them if a rupture took place
with France, giving them orders to rejoin him immediately if they
should have information that war was declared. The Spanish squadron
which appeared to be in a very unsatisfactory condition stiU remained
inactive. Ogle was in no fear Of them, for they were reported to be in bad
repair and lacking in cordage and stores of aU descriptions; these they
were trying to buy from the French, who themselves were not weU pro
vided, in order to fit the ships for return to Europe. One rumour
certainly disturbedhim for a moment. In February 1744 Captain Taylor
of the ' Fowey' brought in a report that four of the Havana squadron1
with some thirty smaU vessels had sailed to retake Ruatan, leaving
eight large ships in fair order at Havana. Ogle had at that time a

R. N. I.

'Nueva Espafia,' 'Real Familia,' 'Castilla,' 'Europa.' 17

258 Minor offensive in West Indies 1743
squadron of four ships1 at or about Ruatan, and he left matters to
take their course, confident that these four could deal with whatever
situation arose; but the affair never came to anything, and no more
was heard of the prospective expedition.
It was after this false alarm that the long threatened intervention
of France became a reality, and the importance of the Leeward Island
theatre developed. UntU this time, while Spain had been the only
adversary, operations had necessarily centred in the waters round
Jamaica, Cuba and the Spanish Main, in which the respective trading
interests of England and Spain focussed and clashed. When however
it appeared that France was about to join Spain definitely as an ally
instead of an auxiliary, the Administration considered it prudent to
make a different disposition of the forces for the area of the Lesser
AntUles where French and British islands were close to each other.
Lying so far to windward of Jamaica they could not be promptly
succoured from that station. It therefore became necessary not only
to have more ships on the spot but also to constitute them an inde
pendent squadron with a separate Commander-in-Chief.
The first officer appointed to the new command was Captain
Knowles, with the title of "Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's
vessels at Barbados and the Leeward Islands and the Islands adjacent."
It is curious to observe that Captain Warren was given a simUar
appointment on the same day. The latter was to exercise the command
during the winter months when he came down to the West Indies
from North America, and Knowles was to resume it again after his
departure. The gist of Knowles's instructions ran in the foUowing sentence:
"You are to employ the said ships either separately or together in
such manner as you judge best for his Majesty's service, making the
security and protection of his Majesty's islands in those seas, and
the free navigation of the trade to and from hence, the principal
point of your care and attention : and, in the next place, how to annoy
the enemy's trade, ships and settlements2." He was appointed Captain
of the ' Superbe ' and ordered to hoist a broad pendant on board her,
and to take the 'Biddeford' and 'Comet' bomb under his orders and
proceed with them to his station.
Some changes in the ships in the Leeward Islands and Barbados
had taken place since the preceding year and reinforcements were
also about to be sent. The squadron which Knowles was to command
was to be made up as foUows:
1 'Mountagu,' 'Greenwich,' 'Adventure,' 'Assistance.'
8 Out letters. October 3rd, 1743.

1743 Influence of French intervention 259
Over 50 guns Frigates and Sloops
'Boyne,' 80* 'Lynn,' 40
' Suffolk,' 70* ' Launceston,' 40! (Flag of Warren)
, Burford , ' 70 * ' Hastings, ' 40 \
' Superbe, ' 60 (Flag) ' Biddeford,' 20§ (to relieve ' Scarborough")
' Severne,' 50 • Deal Castle,' 20
'Argyle,' 5of 'Lyme,' 20
'Woolwich,' 5of 'Otter,' 14
'Comet,' bomb
* These ships were to have followed in November, but events in Europe
made it necessary to keep them at home: they were sent to reinforce Mathews.
f These ships were sent from the West Coast of Africa.
\ From New York and Virginia: for the winter season only, then to return
to their stations.
§ Did not leave England till January 29th, 1744, with a convoy.
From the above it wiU be seen how large an increase was intended
in October 1743 to be sent; a wholly new squadron of considerable
strength was to be constituted; but the state of affairs in the Mediter
ranean and the urgent need for reinforcing Mathews prevented this
from being done.
The question of strengthening the Leeward Island squadron at this
time opens up one of the fundamental principles of strategy. The
reason for doing so was to protect these British possessions against
France if she should declare war. France, and France alone, was the
danger. But if that Power declared war, where could she strike her
most effectual blows? She had three main theatres in which she
might employ her sea-forces — the Channel, the Mediterranean and
the West Indies. It is true she might make an attack on the last
named her opening gambit; but she might equaUy, or even more
probably, attempt to overwhelm our forces in Europe. War was raging
on the Continent from the Rhine to Naples; would not France's navy
be better employed in co-operating with her land forces either in Italy
or elsewhere? The area in which a defeat would most seriously com
promise England at this moment was clearly the European theatre
of war, and before any British sea forces were detached to outlying
parts, superiority in that theatre should be assured. The loss of the
West Indian Islands would have been a serious, but not a fatal, blow.
The crushing of the Mediterranean fleet, or the invasion of the United
Kingdom — and either might foUow as the result of the other — would
have been an irretrievable disaster. Unless therefore a superiority in
European waters were assured it would clearly be a mistake to send
ships to distant stations, the protection of which moreover would
be better provided for off Ushant and Finisterre. If an adequate
watch were maintained whereby early knowledge of the departure
and course of any enemy's squadron could be conveyed to the
17 — 2

260 Minor offensive in West Indies 1743
Admiralty or the Commander of the cruising squadron, a force could
be sent in pursuit, which, saihng unhampered by transports, might
reasonably be expected to arrive in the threatened area in time to
prevent any serious harm from being done. The greater the force in
home waters, the less was the danger to the colonies, as cruising
squadrons could be more nearly maintained constantly at an adequate
strength and the chances of intercepting any expedition at the point
of departure would thereby be proportionaUy increased. It was on
this principle that aU our subsequent wars were conducted down to
1815: its truth was simUarly realized in 1743. As the danger of war
with France passed from the region of possibUity into that of imminent
probabUity, statesmen began to look round to see whether the force
in Europe were adequate. Danger quickens the perceptions; they
saw that it was not, and the order to send the ships to the West Indies
was rescinded. Strategical dispositions, however, should not depend
for their propriety upon the fortuitous stimulus of danger — a stimulus
which not infrequently acts in a highly unscientific manner.
In this case however no harm was done. Knowles reached Barbados
on December 4th and hoisted his pendant as Commander-in-Chief;
Warren arrived on the 22nd from North America and the two Com
manders met at Antigua. Here Knowles transferred the command to
his superior and went ashore to superintend the defensive works of
the island while Warren cruised in the 'Superbe.'
This closed the events of the year 1743; and in the early months-
of 1744 there is little to record. Very few Spanish and no French
ships were in West Indian waters and the part played by the British
squadron was governed by the necessity for readiness to meet a French
declaration of war which was expected at any moment.

APPENDIX I
A LIST OF SHIPS IN SEA PAY IN SEPTEMBER 1739 WITH
THEIR STATIONS x
Plantations.

'Burford,

7°,

'Hampton Court,' 70
'Windsor,' 60
'Strafford,' 60
'Pr. Louisa,' 60
'Worcester,' 60
'Norwich,' 50
'Falmouth,' 50
'Diamond,' 40
'Torrington,' 40
'Sheerness,' 20
'Shoreham,' 20
'Blandford,' 20
'Drake,' sloop, 4.10
'Anglesea,' 40
'Lowestoft,' 20
'Saltash,' 8.12
'Spence,' sloop, 6.10
'Roebuck,' 40
'Phoenix,' 20]
'Tartar,' 20/
'Hector,'
'Wolf,' sloop,
'Flambro,' 20
'Squirrel,' 20
'Deal Castle,' 20
'Romney,' 50}
'Adventure,' 40/
'Salisbury,' 50

WtJ

amaica under Admiral Vernon

Leeward Islands
BahamaBarbados
South Carolina

8.12} VirginiaNew York
New England
Canso
Newfoundland
Africa

ll, Papers relating to the Navy, B.M. Add. MS. 19030. The Admiralty Lists
of shj ps give the same information for September ist.

262

Ships in Sea Pay, September 1739

Mediterranean.

N 'Somerset,'
80
'Eltham,'
40
'Lancaster,'
80
'Dursley,' galley,
20
' Edinburgh,'
70
' Greyhound,'
20
'Ipswich,'
70
' Dolphin,'
20
'Berwick/
70
'Guarland,'
20
'Augusta,'
60
' Aldborough,'
20
'Dragon,'
60
'Solebay,'
20
'Plymouth,'
60
'Kennington,'
20 \ Under Rear-
'Canterbury,'
60
'Grampus,'
6.10
f Admiral Haddock
' Pembroke,'
60
'Ann,' galley,
8.6
'Jersey,'
60
'Duke,'
8.6
'Oxford,'
5»
'Mercury,'
8.6
'Gloucester,'
50
'Terrible,' bomb
'Chester,'
5°
'Alderney,' bomb
'Falkland,'
50
'Salamander,' bomb
'Tyger,'
5°
'Deptford,' lighter
Coming Home.
/
'Pearl'
From Lisbon
'Seaford'
From Carolina
'Hawke,' sloop
From Georgia
Ireland,
'Hound,' sloop 8.12 Waterford and Cork
'Dublin,' yacht 6.10 Attends on the Government
At Home
• 'Namur,'
901
/'Pr. Caroline,'
'Russell,'
80
80
¦ Spithead
' Princess Amelia,
'80
Portsmouth
'Boyne,'' Cumberland,'
80 80
DeptfordWoolwich
'Norfolk,'' Lenox,'
'Kent,'
^'Elizabeth,' 'Orford,'
80707070 70
Plymouth
*" Spithead
* Buckingham,'
' Pr. Orange,'
'Grafton,'
707070
Portsmouth
Ships in Sea Pay, September 1739

263

' Superbe,'
'Lyon,''Dunkirk,''Sunderland,''Centurion,'
'Deptford,' ' Warwick,'
'York,''Rippon,''Defiance,''Tilbury,' 'Weymouth,'
'St Albans,'
' Argyle,'
'Newcastle,'
'Greenwich,''Colchester,''Chatham,''Portland,''Bristol,''Rochester,''Ruby,'
'Panther,'' Severn e,'
'Assistance,' 'Advice,''Litchfield,''Winchester,'
' Ludlow Castle,
'Trial,' x
'Otter,''Fly,'
'Swift,'
' Bonetta,
'Cruiser,' 'Spy,'
'Success,''Eleanor,' 'Cumberland,'' Deptford,' store ship
'Royal Escape,' 4
'Royal Carolina,' \
' William and Mary,' |
' Catharine,'
'Charlotte,'
'Fubbs,'
'Mary,'
IQueenbro,'

60 Ordered to Spithead
60 To Plymouth
60 Sheemess
60) „
, > Portsmouth

60
6060
60 60
60 60
5°
50 505°
5°505050
50
50 5°50
50 5050
50
40
8.12 4

Plymouth
\ Chatham
!¦ Ordered on a cruise
Downs Sheerness
!• Ordered to the Downs
•1 Sheerness
Portsmouth

Plymouth
Sent to Ireland for men
Plymouth

Portsmouth Sent to Rotterdam for seamen
*"*}¦ Attend the Herring Fishery
.sloops 4.4 Pressing ofi the Isle of Wight
8.12 Sent to Vernon with despatches
[ Bristol Channel
8.12J Portsmouth
NoreSheernessDeptford30 men. N. coast of Scotland surveying
IO)

In the river

yachts

1 > Pressing about the Nore
Attends Sheerness garrison

264

Contemporary Criticism in 1740
ABSTRACT

and vessels

Men

Plantations 

... 29

6,825

Mediterranean 

... 32

8,122

Coming home 

3

440
Ireland ...
2
120
At home 
... 62
18,762
128
34,269
A 90-gun ship
has 800
men
80 „
„ 600
men
excluding retinue
70 „
„ 480
men
60 „
,. 4°°
a
5° ..
„ 3°o
a
4° ..
„ 25°
a
APPENDIX II
CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM (1740) OF THE CONDUCT
OF THE WAR
The following extracts from a contemporary pamphlet entitled " Britain's
mistakes in the commencement and conduct of the present war, by a
Merchant and Citizen of London," dated 1740, are of interest. After
discussing the general conduct of the Administration, the author proceeds
as follows: " However, if our Ministers saw, as I suppose they did, that the spirit
of the nation would not allow them to make such compliances as were
necessary for satisfying the pride of the Spanish nation, I must from
thence conclude that before the end of March, even our Ministers began
to look upon a war with Spain as inevitable. What in this case were we
to do ? It was not, 'tis true, proper for us to issue any letters of Reprisal,
or to commence hostilities, till the 24th of May because we could not till
then judge certainly of the King of Spain's intentions; and it was prudent
in us to wait till the first breach of the Convention, I mean the articles
ratified by His Majesty, should be made by the Court of Spain. But surely
we ought to have begun that moment to prepare, at least in a private
manner, for war ; and how were we to prepare ?
"Spain, we knew, was a nation that durst not look our squadrons in
the face at sea. A squadron of 15 hne of battle ships before Cadiz, another
of a like number in the West Indies, and a third of the same number
upon our own coasts, was, we knew, sufficient to lock up their men-of-war
in their ports, and to prevent their attempting to make an invasion upon
Contemporary Criticism in 1740 265
any part of our Dominions. By having three such squadrons at sea we
should have made it impossible for them to do us any injury except by
their privateers; and for preventing this a few 4th or 5th rates to serve
as convoys to our own ships and to lie in the way for intercepting their
ships bound to or from the West Indies; and a great number of 6th rates
and armed sloops to cruise upon their coasts in order to intercept their
privateers, and to give notice to our merchant ships not to approach the
ports or coasts of Spain, would have made it difficult for them to annoy
our trade and very dangerous to carry on any trade of their own.
"For this purpose we should, in my humble opinion, have had at least
eight 20-gun ships and armed sloops with three or four 4th or 5th rates,
stationed in the Mediterranean, and actually upon duty there; together
with at least twelve 20-gun ships and armed sloops and six 4th or 5th
rates stationed upon the coasts of Portugal and Gallicia and in the Bay
of Biscay, and actually upon duty in their several stations before we had
published reprisals or committed any act of hostility in Europe. As for
the West Indies, we had no occasion to send many 20-gun ships or armed
sloops to that part of the world. If we had taken care to have had a
squadron of fifteen line of battle ships there, with three or four 20-gun
ships besides the guard-ships usual in time of peace, we might have trusted
for the rest to our own people in that part of the world for fitting out such
a number of privateers as would have been sufficient to protect their
own trade, and intercept that of the enemy; especially if we had taken
care to give proper encouragement to the armed vessels fitted out by
private adventurers to attack those of the enemy. And as for our own
coasts, a squadron of fifteen men-of-war with our usual guard-ships and
Custom House sloops would have been sufficient to have protected our
trade at home and to have secured us against any invasion that could
have been made by so impotent an enemy."
The writer then proceeds to argue that instead of publicly issuing
orders for reprisal on the 25th of May we should have issued them secretly
to the Commodore in the West Indies and avoided giving the alarm;
and in European waters to withhold orders for reprisal till July at least,
but instruct Haddock privately to seize any rich ship he should find sailing
to or from the West Indies ; one reason for this course being that by issuing
orders for reprisal we warned the Spaniards, who therefore kept their
large ships in harbour, leaving nothing but the small fry for our squadrons
to attack. If by the middle of July no rich capture had been made by
Haddock, operations might openly have been begun in Europe, and some
additional men-of-war sent off the north capes of Spain to look out for
the Azogue ships; having thus got our squadrons in position we could
proceed to put other schemes in operation for bringing Spain to a peace.
By beginning to increase our land forces in March and raising Marines
to man the fleet, we might have had 40,000 or 45,000 regular troops in
the country, and of these 14 or 15,000 could have been spared for an
attack on Spain by land, preferably in the West Indies. "And," continues
the Merchant, " that we might have been ready to set out upon such an
expedition as soon as we declared war, we should have begun to contract

266 Contemporary Criticism in 1740
for Transports, and prepare for victualling them, by the beginning of
June, so that they might have been all ready to sail by the end of
September at farthest.... My reasons for saying that the month of August
or September is the proper season for sending out a fleet and land army
to attack the Spaniards in America are these. First, about that time of
the year the air is more temperate than it is either in summer or winter;
and therefore the soldiers could not suffer so much by being penned up
in transports as they would do in the summer or winter months. Secondly,
they would probably be landed in some of the Spanish settlements in the
West Indies in the month of November or December which is the coldest
season of the year in all the Spanish settlements on this side of the continent
of America; so that they would probably have done their business before
the hot season came on1, and would by degrees be accustomed to bear
the excessive heats of the summer in that part of the world." The writer
gives two other reasons, the avoidance of the hurricane season and the
possibility of bringing the forces home again before it begins, and then
goes on: "Now as we cannot propose to compel the Spaniards to agree
to reasonable terms, or to make any conquests upon them that can be
of advantage to this nation but by attacking their settlements in America,
we should have thought of this, and begun to prepare for it, as soon as
we saw that a war would be the necessary consequence of our disputes
with them. If we had done this we might have been ready by the end
of August to have embarked 12,000 of our best troops, which in my opinion
is the smallest number that ought to be sent upon such an expedition,
because it would be of the most dangerous consequence to the nation to
miscarry in any such expedition... and particularly we ought to have
taken care to have the troops we sent thither provided with clothing fit
for a march in that hot country: for I must observe that the clothing
they have in this country would be very unfit for them in that: which
I hope those whose duty it is will take proper care of if we ever do send
any troops to that part of the world.
" But in order to have rendered ourselves the more secure of success,
and to have saved the public expense as much as possible, we should,
the moment we declared war, have published a proclamation promising
all the rewards and encouragements we could give to such private adven
turers and volunteers as should join in the intended expedition: which
we might have done without declaring the place against which it was
designed. And at the same time we ought to have sent orders to all our
Colonies in America to raise as many men as they could spare and to have
them ready to rendezvous at St Christophers or Antigua, some time in
the month of November.
" By these means we might have invaded the Spanish settlements in
America with an army of at least 20,000 men; and such an army, with
the assistance they might and would certainly have received from our
seamen, would in all human probability have been sufficient not only
1 It is to be noted that this was written before the West Indian expedition,
which concluded so disastrously.

Marines and Manning 267
for taking but holding any of those settlements we might have thought
most convenient and advantageous for this nation. Nay, as the Spaniards
could no way guard against this danger by sending any relief or assistance
from Old Spain, the very apprehension of it might have forced them to
give us a sort of Carte Blanche: which would have restored the Honour
and Character of this nation at every court in Europe, and would have
secured the freedom of our trade and navigation in all parts of the world
much better than it is possible for us to do by any treaty we can make."
At the end of his suggestions of this nature the writer observes: "that
it has always been reckoned ridiculous in any nation to declare war till
they were fully prepared to undertake some important expedition against
the enemy; and this method of beginning a war is now become more usual
than it was in ancient times. The declaration of war is generally now
accompanied by an army, and often first published by an army's entering
the territories of an enemy."

APPENDIX III
THE MARINES AND THE MANNING QUESTION
The difficulties of manning the fleet played so large a part in this war,
particularly in its early stages, that a reference to the intentions underlying
the formation of the corps of Marines is necessary to their proper apprecia
tion. The principal cause which led to the introduction of the corps was
the need of rapidly providing men to man the fleet. It had no relation,
as is sometimes supposed, to the preservation of discipline, to the provision
of soldiers for landing work, or to an assumed necessity for having two
different types of fighting men on board a man-of-war.
During the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the bulk
of the fleet was laid up in the winter season; the three-deckers, for instance,
in King William's time never went to the westward after the ioth of
September. In the spring the squadrons required for the ensuing campaign
had to be fitted out, and proclamations were then issued offering a bounty,
frequently of two months' pay, to all seamen and able-bodied landsmen
who came into the service of the King within a certain time. In addition
to this voluntary entry, warrants for pressing men were issued to all
captains by the Lord High Admiral, and officers were sent from place to
place to receive volunteers and to impress those who would not come
willingly. Ships fitting out were provided with tenders, specially hired
for the purpose, which cruised in hkely spots in the Channel to pick up
seamen, principally from home-coming merchantmen.
The bounty and the press-gangs provided a proportion of the men
required, but were rarely a sufficient source of supply. The merchants
who offered higher wages, and the privateers whose service promised

268

Marines and Manning

more immediate and greater rewards under less irksome conditions of
discipline, absorbed a large number of the available seamen. In con
sequence, when the fleet was fitting out, many of them retreated into the
inland counties in order either to avoid service altogether or to postpone
joining until the period of the bounty was nearly expired. Besides this
a large number of the seafaring population, calculated to amount in 1741
to some 14,800 men, was protected from the press, including men employed
in the coasting and fishing trades, colliers, watermen and outward-bound
ships' crews.
Under these conditions the manning of the fleet was a constant difficulty,
and when it was desired to fit out a squadron for a campaign early in the
spring, serious delays which not infrequently compromised the whole of
the operations of the year were experienced1.
It is not therefore matter for surprise that a means should early have
been sought to overcome this grave defect, and in 1664 a regiment, called
"the Duke of York and Albany's Maritime Regiment of Foot" was raised
by Charles II specially for sea service. This regiment was always to be
held in readiness for manning the fleet. In 1669 two three-battalion
regiments were raised by William III, each battalion consisting of 500
men. The intentions as to their employment are indicated in two para
graphs of the Order in Council of February 22nd, 1693.
"Para. VI. That the two regiments be not at any one time kept
both on shore together, but during the winter season when the gross of
the fleet is laid up, one of them be alternately kept abroad upon the 3rd
and 4th rates of the winter squadron ; by which means they will in a little
time be capable of doing their Majesties the service of Mariners at sea,
as well as by what follows render themselves no less useful to them on
shore. "Para. VII. That the same regiment during its being quartered on
shore be at or in the neighbourhood of their Majesties' yards as following,

Companies

Yards

Companies

Yards

Four . . .

. . . Portsmouth

Two . . .

. . . Woolwich

One ...

. . . Sheerness

Two...

. . . Deptford

Five ...

. . . Chatham

One ..:

. . . Plymouth

to be employed from time to time at the call of the Commissioners of
Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth and at the desire of the Master
shipwrights of the other yards (where no Commissioner resides) upon all
extraordinary occasions of service, such as, assist in heaving in and out
of ballast, manning the cranes, taking up and removing goods and stores,
transportation of ships, laying of cables and of various other works; with
the encouragement of sixpence a day per man over and above their
1 This state of things continued into the nineteenth century. See Sir Vesey
Hamilton's remarks on the fitting out of the 'Desperate,' which left Sheerness
in 1837 after being three months in commission "with only 12 Petty officers
and seamen and half our complement of stokers." Byam Martin's Memoirs,
N. R. Society, vol. 1. p. xiii.

Marines and Manning 269
military pay to be allowed them for every day they shall be so extra
ordinarily employed.
" Para. X. That the captains of each ship on board of which the soldiers
shall serve do send yearly to the Lord Admiral a list of the names of such
soldiers as shall in any measure be made seamen, and how far each is
qualified towards being an able seaman."
This last paragraph was further amplified in an Order in Council of
February 17th, 1694, which reads:
"That the captain of each ship on board of which the soldiers shall
serve do send once in two months to the Lord High Admiral or Com
missioners of the Admiralty a list of the names of such soldiers as shall
in any measure be made seamen, and how far each of them are qualified
towards being made an able seaman; and that upon a certificate signed
by the commander, master and boatswain of any of his Majesty's ships
on board of which the said soldiers serve that they are so qualified, they
shall be discharged and the captain of the Marines to be allowed recruit
money to raise others in their stead."
One hundred and fifty able seamen could be raised yearly out of the
corps: "it being one of the chief uses of the establishment that those
regiments may prove nurseries whence the severe necessities of their
Majesties' service may be abundantly supplied." So much indeed was
the Marine a seaman in the early years of the establishment, that when
a captain of a man-of-war impressed seamen from home-coming merchant
men in the Channel it was the practice to put on board those ships a
number of Marines in lieu of the impressed men to carry her up Channel
with a sufficiency of hands, the Marines on landing returning to their
depots. Out of the fifteen companies, eight were commanded by land officers
and seven by naval officers. " In the attack upon St Christophers," says
Burchett, "we had killed or wounded upwards of 150 men, and Captain
Keigwin, a sea commander who was appointed Colonel of the Marine
Regiment which consisted of about 230 seamen, was shot through the
thigh." At the Peace of Ryswick in 1697 the army was reduced and the Marines
were disbanded. But in 1702 when the difficulty of getting the fleet
manned and to sea was again experienced, the Marines were revived.
Burchett, then Secretary to the Admiralty, wrote: "The French had a
great advantage in manning their fleet, their sea trade being very little
compared with ours and their seamen not therefore drawn away into the
merchant service1.... We had indeed some part of the last war several
Marine regiments designed as a nursery for seamen, but for want of being
put at first on a good footing, they did by degrees dwindle away and were
at length laid aside, a fate I hope will not attend those six regiments now
allowed for sea service." The advantages which would accrue to the public
1 A statement which seems to contradict itself. For where were the seamen
to come from except from the merchant service, the source of supply of France
as well as of ourselves.

270 Marines and Manning
services if the regiments should be kept entire are argued by the Secretary:
they would be useful as labourers and riggers, and also for the protection
of the ships and magazines.
These new regiments of Marines were however on a different footing
in one respect from those earlier established. The purpose of making
foremast hands of them, which as Burchett tells us was "one of the
principal motives for the first raising of such a body of men," was not
continued. Their usefulness however as a means of rapidly increasing
or completing ships complements remained. "Experience hath shewn,"
says the same authority, "that these regiments have been very useful,
but more especially in fitting out squadrons of ships for any immediate
expedition. For as they are constantly quartered when not at sea as near
the principal ports as possible, viz., Plymouth, Portsmouth and Chatham,
so they were with great facility put on board such ships as had most
occasion for them, for they were under the immediate direction of the
Admiralty." The Peace of Utrecht, which brought the war of the Spanish Succession
to an end in 1714, also terminated the existence of these Marine regiments,
which were disbanded in the following year. Sir George Byng's squadron,
which was sent up the Mediterranean in 171 8 to deal with the Spanish
invasion of Sicily, carried soldiers. Three regiments were embarked from
the Isle of Wight with whom, said Byng, he should " endeavour to complete
our complements, and the best of what shall be left I will put on board
the fire frigates in the harbour, and discharge the remainder." Writing
later on the subject of the pay of these men, Byng urged that they should
receive sea-allowances, pointing out that " they actually serve in the fleet
and do the duty as Mariners, whether called so or not." The soldiers
borne in the squadron during that two years' campaign were throughout
the time part complements of the ships and not auxiliaries of the army;
they did not serve ashore at any of the operations.
When the war with Spain began in 1739 the manning difficulties at
once became acute. As early as September, 1739, Norris was urging that
soldiers should be embarked to make up the deficiencies in the ships'
complements. At a meeting of the Council on the 25th of that month
he said : " If all the foot soldiers that shall be kept up in the country were
by detachments to enrol in the naval service it might be of the greatest
utility to the public service, and with those detachments of about 100
to a ship of the line, or if they were a fourth part of the ship's complement,
there would never need to be above a lieutenant or a captain to be with
them; and if this were a method to be observed in all sea service to have
such an establishment, and a register for all seamen going upon the water,
or such a number upon an annual allowance as once passed in a Register
Act, the nation would never want on any sudden occasions to have their
ships manned and at sea as any other nation."
Norris's advice was not heeded. Nothing was done, and the ships
lay idle for want of men to man them; and when war was declared the
unreadiness of the fleet was largely, indeed principally, due to this cause.
Norris then returned to the subject, urging that the Marines should be

Marines and Manning 271
re-established, using nearly the same arguments as Burchett. He sug
gested "whether it might not be proper from the example of France to
establish about a number of 80 or 100 Marine companies, the captains
and under-officers being made out of the elderly (i.e. senior) sea-lieutenants
commissioned from the Admiralty as all other officers are at sea, and when
on shore to be quartered about our docks, and a party of them when on
shore to keep a daily guard. And that every ship of the line of battle
should have upon fitting out one of these companies to be borne as part
of their complements that would be a means always to have in every
ship a number of men disciplined (i.e. trained) to the small arms, and
is what the French have in every ship, a third part of their complements
being marine. And none of them are regimented but always keep in pay
for the sea service as they have occasion to arm their ships. And if we
should come into this method it would put our ships upon an equal footing
with the French... but we have so many proofs of our misfortunes for
want of small arms that the necessity of putting ourselves at least upon
an equal armament with France cannot be denied by any reasonable
person." In the discussion which followed this proposal, Lord Harrington
(another member of the Council) argued that unless Marines were regi
mented they could not be of proper service on shore. " To which I replied,"
writes Norris in his Diary, "that it was proper that land troops should
be regimented, as was the custom of all nations; and yet the French did
not regiment their Marines. And experience has shown from their example :
when M. du Guay Trouin took Rio Janeiro he had only Marines with him,
commanded by his sea officers: and when he landed them he ordered
them into battalions commanded by his captains and himself as commander-
in-chief, and as they were all under one naval direction so without any
dispute of power he attacked a more numerous regular force in a strong
town and succeeded beyond what could have been expected had they
been veteran troops1."
Vernon, who was on his way to the West Indies at this time, expressed
a similar opinion as to the desirability of embarking troops. His views
coincided with those of Norris, even to the point of turning foot soldiers
into Marines. Writing to the Duke of Newcastle he said: "I could wish
we had each of us a company of regular troops on board of us which would
have strengthened us in numbers as well as by their expertness in their
arms to have excited our seamen to the imitation of them. If we should
come to a general war with France as well as Spain, I believe your Grace
will have already perceived, from the difficulty of manning those ships,
the necessity there may be of converting most of our marching regiments
into Marines. And if they become seamen, and were admitted to be
discharged as such, that would make a good nursery for breeding them at
a time we might probably find such a necessity for them."
It was at length decided to raise troops who were to be called Marines ;
but they were to be in regiments and were not to form part of the comple-
1 Diary of Sir John Norris, Add. MS. 28132.

272 Marines and Manning
ments of the ships fitting out for the Cartagena expedition. As soon as
Norris heard of this, he pointed out to Sir Robert Walpole — who appears
to have been responsible for the decision — that those regiments of so-
called Marines would be of no help whatever so far as the manning of the
fleet was concerned, and in fact would not be what was generally under
stood in the country by the term "Marines." "It would," he said, "dis
appoint the trade of our country, as they believed the regiments to be
raised as Marines were to serve as part of the complements of the fleet
whereby an equal number of seamen might be spared out of the fleet
for the merchant service." In similar terms Lord Polwarth criticised the
proposal in Parliament. "The Marines," he said, "as they are proposed
to be raised at this juncture are very different from the Marines that were
raised at the beginning of the last war and are indeed no other than an
additional number of standing troops."
When it was necessary to denude merchant ships of their seamen in
order to man the fleet, suffering was imposed upon trade. Parliament,
while averse from voting soldiers, were ready to vote men for the sea
service, who in manning the fleet not only served actively to protect
trade but also prevented the ships which carried that trade from being
laid up for want of hands. Walpole's proposal would have turned the
Marines into an expeditionary army, and all the difficulties of manning
the fleet would still have remained to be solved. On Norris's representations
the proposal was reconsidered, and the decision made that some of the
Marines should be allocated to the fleet — a bad solution as all compromises
must be which vitiate a correct principle.
A debate of very considerable length took place in November of this
year — 1739 — when the manner in which the Marines should be recruited
was discussed by Parliament. It hinged largely on whether they should be
regimented or raised and kept in companies, and whether the men should
be newly recruited or transferred from the regular regiments. The cheapest
way, in Walpole's views, would be to take newly raised men, and this
would he said be the quickest as well: "for a great many fellows that
called themselves seamen have been rejected or turned out of our men-of-
war because they were found not to be expert seamen, nor any way fit
for their business. These men will immediately list as Marines, and will
make good Marines, though they could not be accepted of as good seamen."
Sir WiUiam Yonge, the Secretary at War, was of the same opinion as
to the method of recruiting Marines. "Newly raised troops are as good
on board a man-of-war as disciplined soldiers," he said. "In fighting a
ship there are no marches or counter-marches, there is no part of the
land discipline required but that of loading and firing the musket, and a
country fellow from the plough may in three days be taught to do this
as adroitly as the most expert soldier in the army1." Lord Pulteney
expressed what were clearly the contemporary views as to the functions
1 The same view as to the limitations of field training necessary for Marines
will be found at later periods, in A Discipline of the Marine Force, 1763: and
in the description of the battle of Alexandria by the contemporary historian of
the corps.

Marines and Manning 273
-of Marines. "I shall most readily join in opinion," he said, "that a body
of Marines ought to be formed, and that it ought to be such a one as
may on occasion be fit for the land as well as the sea service. But gentlemen
seem to mistake the principal design of having a body of Marines. They
ought to be principally designed to come in aid of our national stock of
seamen, and that we may not be obliged to draw away from our trade
too many of that necessary body of men. If this be, as it ought to be,
the chief design, there is no occasion for forming them into regiments or
for putting ourselves to the expense of having any Generals or field-
officers of Marines.... I know that Marines ought to be men bred to land
as well as sea discipline, and for this reason : men who have already learned
the land discipline are more fit for Marines, especially as we have immediate
use for them, than new or fresh men that know nothing of the land or sea
discipline. But gentlemen I find mistake the land service which Marines
ought to be designed for. If Marines were to serve a whole campaign at
land, and to be made a regular part of a land army, I shall grant that
they ought to be formed into regiments and be officered in the same
manner as the other land forces are. But this is a service that Marines
ought never to be employed in. When such an army is to be formed, a
sufficient number of land forces ought to be sent out for the purpose.
The only land service that Marines ought to be designed for, or employed
in, is to support our seamen in storming a town or castle after a squadron
of men-of-war has so battered and bombarded it as to make an assault
practicable; or to make an incursion upon some open country where there
are no regular troops as can be called an army to oppose them. And
for both these services a body of Marines formed as independent companies
are as good as if they were formed into regular regiments." Full and
lucid as was the debate the matter went no further. The men were not raised
and the fleet continued to go short of crews for all sagacious men could urge.
The Admiralty in the meantime was trying to find out some method
of raising more seamen, and a Committee was appointed on January 13th,
1740, under the presidency of Sir John Norris "to consider of such means
and methods as may be taken for the speedy and effectual a-manning of
our fleet1." Their task was confined to the question of seamen and did not
touch the Marine problem. Their recommendations were:
(1) Payment of same bounty as in preceding year.
(2) Pay to men entering to date from day of being entered and men
to join in fourteen days from then.
(3) Commanders of frigates on the coast to press and receive seamen.
Lieutenants employed on pressing to know that their diligence will be
noted and contribute towards their advancement.
(4) Justices of the Peace and Magistrates of inland towns to be charged
to seize all straggling seamen, watermen and others.
(5) Masters of fishing-vessels not exceeding 15 tons to be liable to
1 Admirals Cavendish, Stewart and the Earl of Granard, Captains Stewart,
Vanbrugh, Hardy and Gregory, all senior officers, were the members of this
Committee. k. tm. 1. 18

274 Marines and Manning
impressment. Protections to men employed on the rivers or coast only
to extend six months, and to be renewed personally and not generally.
(6) Protections to be allowed to Master, Mate and Carpenter, and one
seaman per ioo tons; to servants under 18 and to old people unfit for
service belonging to colliers or coasters.
(7) An embargo to be laid on all merchant ships and vessels outward
bound: this to be continued until the fleet was manned, and a severe
press to be begun at the same time1.
These recommendations formed the basis of a Bill, introduced by Wager.
It was violently resisted in Parliament and did not pass, but some of
the recommendations were adopted. The means in any case could not
have been effective, since none of them struck at the root of the matter, the
grievances which prevented men from joining the navy. The unpopularity
of the service at sea in men-of-war — it was popular enough in privateers —
was due to these grievances, and to redress them should have been the
endeavour of the Government. How averse the seaman of the day was
from the service was well understood, and his reasons appreciated, by
Vernon. In a lengthy speech in 1749 the kindly Admiral appealed for
justice and better treatment of the seaman, and gave an impressive picture
of the hardships under which they suffered. "Our fleets," he said, "which
are defrauded by injustice, are first manned by violence and maintained
by cruelty. When our ships are to be fitted an impress is sent into the
streets to bring those who shall fall in the way by force into the vessels
From that time they are in effect condemned to death, since they are
never allowed to set foot again on shore, but turned over from ship to
ship; and when they have finished one expedition, hurried into another
without any regard for the hardships they have undergone or the length
of the voyage." Vernon foretold that unless better treatment, more
regular pay, and a fairer distribution of prize money were given, a mutiny
might break out at a time when the security ofthe Kingdom was in danger —
a forecast of what actually occurred forty-five years later. Others saw the
root of the problem not less clearly. " Since my leaving Plymouth," wrote
the captain of a sloop, " I have pressed in all forty-five men, four of whom
notwithstanding a strict watch kept, swam away from the ship in the night
when it blowed so hard that a boat could not row ahead, two of which in
the attempt were drowned some time before on an attempt of a like nature.
This I mention to show their Lordships the aversion they have to the
service and the reason why I have raised no more volunteers. I have
raised only eight volunteers since my being out2."
Thus, as no improvement was made in the inducements to seamen
to serve, and as compulsion provided an insufficient quantity besides
hampering the trade of the country, the wants of the navy had to be
met by the embarkation of soldiers or Marines. In May, 1740, in spite
of the embargo which had been imposed, the fleet was still unready at
the time when what appeared to be an invasionary force was assembling
1 The embargo was laid later. The press was not ordered until June 2nd, 1741.
2 Captain James Douglas, H.M.S. 'Ferret,' December 26th, 1743. Captain's
letters.

Marines and Manning 275
at Ferrol, and France was adopting a contumacious attitude. To meet
the difficulty two marching regiments and 1000 so-called Marines were
put on board the ships of the Home Guard which was sent in Julv off
Ferrol under Sir John Norris. In September of the same year when the
French squadrons sailed for the West Indies and the intervention of France
seemed certain, a proposal was made to increase all our regiments by one
battalion and thus furnish another 6000 or 7000 men to man the fleet;
but it was not put into execution. Throughout the war the Commander-in-
Chief of the Mediterranean fleet had power vested in him to call on the
Governor of Minorca to complete his complements from the garrison of
Mahon. The original reason for raising Marines, as expressed by Burchett, was
not entirely lost sight of, although it had disappeared in fact. The Marines
were still to be afforded opportunity of becoming seamen. In 1 746, Brigadier
Jeffreys having written to the Admiralty that he might be informed
what was expected of Marines on board concerning their going aloft and
handling the sails, the Board replied that "though their Lordships
would not have Marines beat or punished who do not show an inclination
to go aloft to handle the sails, provided they do their duty on deck and
assist there in working the ship in the same manner as the rest of the
ship's company do, yet their Lordships are very far from giving a Hberty
to the officer of Marines to discourage their men from going aloft who
shall show an inclination to learn seamanship; but on the contrary, do
expect they shall endeavour to qualify themselves as seamen : and if their
Lordships shall be informed that any officers of Marines shall act otherwise,
they shall resent it in a proper manner." The spirit of this letter is again
to be found in Lord Howe's standing orders of 17761, which say: "the
Marines are not to be forced to go aloft, nor on the other hand aie to be
restrained from rendering themselves expert in a seaman's duty, at proper
opportunities agreeable to the standing instructions."
The principal sources of the difficulties of getting the fleet ready for
service — difficulties which had so great an effect particularly upon the
campaigns in the beginning of the war — are to be traced to the omission
to raise Marines for the sea service and the failure to treat the seamen with
a proper regard. The second of these could not be remedied at a moment's
notice: it would involve inducing confidence into a number of men, and
confidence in Parliamentary promises was not a plant of rapid growth.
But the former might have been done, and it was not for want of advice
either from sea officers or members of Parliament that it was left undone.
No change was made in this war or later, and throughout the long struggle
in which the British Empire was built up the Navy was manned under the
old system; the introduction of the continuous service seaman, of whom
the Marine was the first representative, did not take place until the middle
of the nineteenth century.
1 Signals and Instructions, p. 89, Navy Record Society.

276 Considerations on War with France and Spain

APPENDIX IV
CONSIDERATIONS ON WAR WITH FRANCE AND SPAIN
A sidelight upon contemporary thought is thrown by a paper1, written
in 1738, in which the existing political situation, and the measures required
to meet it, are discussed. The writer does not appear to be a naval officer,
though he clearly appreciates the covering functions of the fleet in home
waters: " Our men of war being thus at leisure to watch the motions of the
French and Spaniards at home, our people in America can meet with little
or no opposition, since it will be difficult for the enemy to find means to
send succour to their friends in the West Indies when our fleets are masters
of the seas at home." He belongs to that school of thought then repre
sented in Parliament by Heathcote and others, and at sea, to a great extent,
by Vemon; and later by Pitt and Hardwicke. He desires to concentrate
upon offensive war which he argues can only be conducted at sea and in
the colonies; he is utterly opposed to continental alliances; he believes in
the policy of expanding British trade by destroying that of her competitors;
and he attaches high importance to the influence of finance as an element
in national strategy.
War, he argues, has now become inevitable. Neither England nor Spain
can afford to let matters continue in their existing condition in relation to
West Indian trade. He allows full weight to, and recognises the fairness of,
the Spanish point of view. "The Spaniards very justly observe," he says,
"that if they were to let all English ships pass on pretence of coming to
Jamaica, they would lose half their annual Treasure that comes from New
Spain; which every reasonable man must certainly admit to be true." The
treasure which would otherwise go to Old Spain would be drawn away into
the local trade by the contraband traffic and so lost to the home Govern
ment. But Britain's point of view is not less important and deserves equal
weight. Unless the British colonies could trade with the Spanish settle
ments they could not continue to exist, since all their ready money came
from those parts: "they have no other way of getting one shilling of ready
money for their commodities... not having one penny of gold or silver but
Spanish money in the country." Hence, the writer argues, "the affair is
brought to this dilemma; that Spain must either be content to give up half
of their yearly treasure from the West Indies at once, or that the English
must give up their Plantations and entirely lose their whole West Indian
Trade. Therefore it is clear that this dispute can never be determined but
by war."
] P.R.O. State Paper Miscellaneous 200. Endorsed " State of the land forces of
France 1738."

Considerations on War with France and Spain 277
Starting from this basis of political economy — the natural outcome of
the mercantilist theories of the period — the writer proceeds to shew that
the opportunity is a favourable one; that it is advantageous to Britain to
capture Spanish trade; that the effect of French intervention is not to be
feared, for Britain could fight the combined French and Spaniards, and, ii
France should not intervene, each power could be dealt with separately;
also that, while so long as the quarrel is maritime and colonial, France has
no cause to attack Austria and so weaken our position in the Netherlands,
Great Britain can exercise her full strength with greater effect if she is not
hampered by continental alHances. Thus, first having reasoned that war
is inevitable, the writer proceeds to shew why it should be brought about
at once. The headings of his arguments for war on these lines run as follows
in his text: —
" I. Because England is at present in a much better condition than at
the beginning of 1702, and France in a much worse than they were at that
time. II. Because our Plantations are both able and willing to fit out 50 large
ships of force1 and to raise land forces sufficient to take Cuba, Hispaniola
and Porto Rico.
III. Twenty galleys with 500 men to each, added to the guard ships
upon our coast, would effectually secure England against French invasions.
IV. Because the success is more certain, and the expense much less to
England, of a war carried on against France and Spain without the alliances
of the princes of the continent.
V. Because in this present case France and Spain have no pretence to
attack the Emperor or the Dutch if they take no part with us in this war.
VI. Because our Trade will not suffer in this war.
VII. Because of the great strength which our colonies in America have
acquired since the last war, and the facilities of taking Cuba, Hispaniola
and Porto Rico2.
VIII. Because the war cannot be of any long duration, and the annual
expense thereof cannot amount to one half of what we expended the last
war. IX. Because in so just a war there will be no difficulty at home of
raising the necessary yearly supphes."
The writer discusses in detail and at some length the military, naval and
financial powers of France and Spain. Great stress is laid on the last of
these. The emphasis with which he urges the inability of the prospective
enemy powers to sustain a long war when their oversea trade is cut off
affords a measure of our reasons for attacking French and Spanish oversea
commerce. Far from being mere piratical warfare, or predatory operations
maintained, as some writers argue, at the instance of fortune-hunting
naval commanders, trade attack held, as it had for over a hundred years,
1 The " ships of force " subsequently described are " galleys of 500 men each,
built in the nature of the French and Spanish galleys," and not what seamen
understood bv the term, viz. ships of the line and heavy frigates.
2 An extension of II above, dealing more with the supply of troops from the
various colonies. „
is — 3

278 Considerations on War with France and Spain
a clearly understood and logical place in our national strategy. As Blake's
destruction of the Spanish Treasure fleet at Santa Cruz in 1657 had been a
determining factor in the campaigns in Portugal and Flanders, so in 1738
it was proposed to cripple France and Spain by cutting off their principal
sources of revenue — the West Indian trade and treasure — without which
they could neither pay their armies nor build, fit out and maintain their
fleets. The survey of the problem made by the writer shews no sign of that
narrowness which regards war merely as a matter of conflicts between
armies and fleets, nor of a watertight subdivision into "naval" and "mili
tary" operations. It exhibits it on the contrary, as a struggle between
two antagonists, each with a definite object in view and making use of all
the available resources at its disposal to attain its end; and it does not
leave out of account, among the elements that go towards national strength,
the willingness of the whole people.

END OF VOLUME ONE

INDEX ~ \Ij

'A/MA

Acapulco, 16; proposal to intercept
Acapulco ship, 32, 98, 99
Admiralty, First Commissioner, 23,
23 n.; Lord Winchelsea as, 180;
Norris's claim to, 180-1, 181 n.;
trade protection, 182-192; manning
of fleet, 82; differences with Ma
thews, 221-6, 235, 236, 240
Adriatic Sea, squadron in, 204, 234
Africa, west coast of, squadron in
(1738), 5, 6
Alexieff, Admiral, 107 n.
Anson, Captain G., xi, xii, 32, 90 w., 91 ;
his expedition, 97-100
Antibes, Port of departure of Spanish
troops, 152, 176-9, 205-7, 210
Antin, Admiral, Marquis d', 57, 81, 109,
now., Ill
Argyll, Duke of, on coastal attacks, 228
Army, strength of, British, 14; Spanish,
14; French, 15 and n.
Balchen, Admiral Sir J., off Ferrol
(April 1740), 78-83; commands
Cathcart's escort, 90-2
Baltimore, Lord, 224*
Baradera battery, n 4-1 17
Barbados, 5, 243
Barbaratt, keys of, 253-5
Barcelona, defences put in order, 9;
projected British attack on, 29;
Spanish plan to assemble army at,
30; military preparations reported
at (1740), 62; influence of threat,
63-7; success of plan, 70; prepara
tions at (1741), 154-5, !59. l6°.
163-4; first expedition sails from
(Oct. 1741), 165-6; second expedi
tion sails from (Jan. 1742), 171
Newcastle and the blame, 172-8
observation of (June 1742), 201
(Dec. 1742), 220; (Feb. 1743). 222.
226
Barlovento, squadron, 14
Barnard, Sir J., M.P., 182
Barnett, Captain Curtis, xi, xii, 155;
skirmish with de Caylus, 160-3,
1 70-1
Bene, Admiral, de la, 28, 152, 164
Bermuda, 18
Bilboa, 17
Bladen, Colonel, 30, 31
Bland, Colonel, Acts under Norris on
Spanish coast, 91
Boscawen, Captain E., 49, 93

Brest squadron, threat of (1740), 79,
81, 82, 87-91; squadron sails (Aug.
1740), 92-4; effect of arrival in
W. Indies, 105-111, 114, 135; in
fluence of in European campaign
(1741), 148-9, 195-6, 237
Brown, Commodore C, his instructions
(1738), 5; duties, 10-n; further
instructions, 24; executes reprisals,
39, 43 ; at Porto Bello, 46-8
Buenos Ayres, ships, 14, 16, 17, 26
Burrard, Colonel, 121 n.
Byng, Captain John, his command off
Cadiz (Oct. 1740), 71, 151, 154
Cadiz, watched by Haddock (1738), 9,
10; squadron at (June 1739), 14, 17,
24, 25; Ogle sent off, 26-30;
shipping entering (1737), 38».,
53; Haddock off (Oct. 1739 — Feb.
1740), 59-63, 73, 74; movements
of first concentration (Mar., April
1740), 62-70, 78-82; Byng sent
off (Oct. 1740), 71, 151; reinforced,
I52, J53: considerations of attacks
upon, 74, 84, 86, 228; movements
of second concentration (May —
June 1741), 144-150, 154-9; neutrals
entering, 163; campaign off (Sept. —
Dec. 1741), 163-176; Mathews's
instructions as to, 198, 264
Campo Santo, battle of, 234
Carolinas, squadrons at, 5, 7, 243
Cartagena (America), place in Spain,
trading system, 16-18; discussion as
to attacking, 32-5; Vernon recon
noitres (1740), 51; cruises off, 55;
de Torres reinforces, 57 ; expedition
to, 101-123, 134-137; report of cap
ture, 144-5; failure, 146
Carteret, Lord, 12; asks for Haddock's
instructions, 71, 181
Carthagena (Spain), 14; squadron at
(Aug. 1739), 28; detachment off
(Jan. 1740), 61 ; threat from, 62-64,
66, 67, 74, 81, 82; situation at (Jan.
1741), 152, 157
Cathcart, Lord, selected to command
expedition to W. Indies, 35; delays
in arrival, 56-8; in sailing, 73~94:
departure,1 102 ; death of, 103"
Cayley, Consul at Faro, 158
Caylus, Chevalier de, skirmish with
Martin, 153-4; with Barnett,
160-3

28o

Index

Chagres, 16, 17, 31; capture of, 52~54
Charles Emmanuel, King of Sardinia,
202-3, 227, 233
Chile, expedition to, planned, 31, 32
CUnton, Captain, 8
Cokburne, John, 224
Colonial system, 1, 2
Concentration before war. Haddock to
orevent cruising of Cadiz and Ferrol
squadrons, 28; Norris to prevent
Brest squadron entering Ferrol, 89;
Vernon's measures to prevent cruis
ing of French and Spaniards, 107;
Mathews to prevent Brest squadron
entering Toulon, 199. 237- Nelson
in 1803, 199 m.
Convoy system, 1 83-6, 188
Cornewall, Captain, 32, 150,163,165,167
Corufia, 17
Council, Committee of, constitution,
23, 24-28; discusses plans for war,
30-37, 50M., 61, 62; Spanish escape
from Cadiz (April 1740), 67-9; di
rection of war (Jan. — April 1740),
73-9; sends Balchen off Ferrol, 78;
concentration at Ferrol, 79-89 : atti
tude towards France (Sept. 1740),
94-5; on annexing Cartagena, 124,
141 n., 144, 150, 152, 166, 181, 196
Court, Admiral de, instructions to, when
escorting Spanish army, 172
Criticism, Parliamentary, 71-2, 72-5;
of defence of trade, 182-190
Dandridge, Captain, his reconnaissance
of Port Louis, 106-9, 106 «.
Darien, proposed attack upon, 30, 31,
32
Diversions, divided idea in Spanish war
plan, 30; divided effect of expedi
tion to Naples (1 742) ,215; Mathews's
proposals for attacks on Spanish
coast, 228
Ehbank, Lord, opinions on ships v.
forts, 115, 117*2., 120OT., 122M.; on
holding Boca Chica, 125
Fanshaw, Captain, 7
Ferrol, 14, 19; squadron at (July 1739),
29, 30, 34, 51; movements for first
concentration at (Mar., April 1740),
53, 68, 69, 78-82; offensive sally
from, 83; proposal to attack with
fleet, 84-5 ; Norris ordered to watch,
86-9 ;- sailing of Ferrol squadron
(July 1740), 91-3, 102; arrival of
Ferrol squadron in W. indies (Oct.
1740), 57, 103; second concentra
tion at Ferrol (May 1741), 144-7,
!57-9
FirstCommissionership, 23, and n. ; Lord
Winchelsea as, 180; Norris's claim
to, 180-1, 181 n

Fleury, Cardinal, 22, 23, 118,135, i40«.;
death of, 231
Flota, 17, 24, 25, 28-9, 60, 61, 74
Forts v. ships, Waterhouse at La
Guayra, 43 ; Vernon at Porto Bello,
46-50; at Chagres, 52 ; Norris'sviews
on, 84; Vernon at Port Louis, 107;
at Cartagena, 111-113; attempt on
the Castles at Cartagena, 114, 115;
the 'Gallicia' used as bombarding
ship, 123; Rentone at Santiago,
125-6; Mathews off Toulon, 209;
Martin at Naples, 213-5; Knowles
at La Guayra, 251-3; at Puerto
Cabello, 254-6
Frangois, Cape, 18
Galleons, 16, 25, 74
Gascoigne, Captain, 89, 90, 91, 102
Georgia, defence of, 6, 7; Spanish ex
pedition against, 10
Guantanamos Bay, 56, 127, 130
Guayra, La, attacked by Waterhouse,
43 ; by Knowles, 245, 254, 256
Haddock, Admiral Nicholas, his in
structions (May 1738), 8, 9, n-13,
25, 26; begins reprisals, 28-9; be
gins war, 59; his instructions (Feb. 4,
1740), 61; operations (Oct. 1740),
62-5 ; Cadiz squadron escapes home,
66-8; second escape of Cadiz squad
ron, 155-160; difficulties with neu
trals, 163; Haddock and Toulon
squadron, 165; and Barcelona ex
pedition, 165-7; ant* second Cadiz
squadron, 167-171; blamed for mis
carriage, 173-5; illness and retire
ment, 176-7
Harrington, Lord, 25M., 61 n., 77 and
n., 141 w.
Hardwicke, Lord, modifies instructions
to Ogle and Haddock, 26, 61 n., 73,
86«., 89, 95 n., 14m.
Hardy, Admiral, 273*1.
Havana, 10; its place in Spanish trade
system, 16-18; question of attack
upon, 32-5; Brown cruises off, 39,
43, 45; Vernon's objections to at
tempting, 55; potential fleet at, 126,
129; squadron at (Oct. 1742), 242;
sally against Ruatan, 257
Hervey, Captain, 64
Hervey, John Lord, 69
Illicit trade, 2-4, n
Instructions, Vernon's additional, 41,
42- 47
Jacobite, restoration feared, 20, 75, 135
Jalapa, 17
Jamaica, squadron at (1738), 5, 6, 43,
50 ; Vernon ordered to protect, 53-4 ;
want of stores at, 55; Ogle ordered

Index

281

to reinforce Vernon at, 68-9; expe
dition to assemble at, 101 ; Vernon
expects French attack on, 105;
Kennington goes to, 155; separation
of Jamaica and Leeward Island sta
tions, 241; squadron at (Oct. 1742),
243
Jenkins, Captain R., 3«., 4, 5
Keene, Mr, Ambassador at Madrid, 3,
13
Kempenfelt, xi, 175 and n.
Knowles, Captain Charles, 7 ; on course
of Spanish trade, 18; at Porto Bello,
49; engagement with d'Epinay, 103 ;
at Port Louis, 107; at Cartagena,
1 1 7-9; at Puerto Cabello and La
Guayra, 245-260
Lage, Captain de, 229
Laton, Captain, 195
Lee, Captain, his initiative, 155; in
Adriatic, 204
Lee, Sir G., 224, 248
Leeward Islands, squadron at (1738),
5; reinforced, 6; separated from
Jamaica station, 241
Leogane, 109, 244
Lestock, Captain Richard, 106, 112,
115; leaves W. Indies, 126; in
Mediterranean ; temporary com
mand, 175-8; Mathews's opinion of,
197, 206, 209, 238
Lingen, Captain, 168-9
Lisbon, ships stationed off (1739), 25;
convoy puts into, 157
Manila, 31, 32
Marines, 35, 36, 83, 142, 265, 267-275
Marlborough, her voyage to Mediter
ranean, 167-9
Martin, Captain William, 152-7; char
acter of, 212 ; his diversion at Naples
(1742), 212-5; at Genoa, 216, 218;
destroys San Isidro, 229, 239
Martinique, French arrive at (1740),
57. 58, 97
Mathews, Admiral Thomas, early ca
reer, 197; his instructions, 198; his
views (June 1742), 199-201; arrives
Villefranche, 206-210; orders action
against Naples, 212; against Genoa,
216; made Plenipotentiary, 216-7;
operations Sept. — Dec. 1742, 218-
220; differences with Admiralty,
221-225; campaign of 1743, 226-
234; further differences, 235-8;
views on situation Dec. 1743, 238-
40
Mattagorda, Fort, Rooke's failure to
take, 84
Maurepas, de (Minister of Marine), 88,
107, 162
Mayne, Captain Covill, 78

Mediterranean squadron, strength be
fore war, 4, 5; reinforced (1738), 8;
recalled, 12, 28; remains out, 13,
28; disposition (Oct. 1739), 59; re
inforced (Jan. 1740), 60; weakness
of (April 1740), 67; Norris urges
strengthening, 74; Cornewall's re
inforcement (1 741), 150, 163, 166-9,
174; Lestock's reinforcement or
dered, 165; arrives, 175; strength
(June 1742), 199-202; Mathews
on weakness of (1742), 210;
(1743), 221-6; mihtary direction of,
235; general situation (Dec. 1743),
239
Medley, Captain H., 148
Naples, Neapolitan galleys assist Don
Philip, 176; Mathews's instructions
as to (1742), 198, 199, 200; Neapo
htan help to Spain, 202, 204; Ma
thews sends Martin to, 212-215,
219, 210, 220«.; renewed Naples
help, 227-8, 234, 239
Newcastle, Duke of, 12, 25, 35; corre
spondence with Vernon, 44, 45, 53-
58; attitude towards French inter
vention (1740), 77; reasons for not
sending veteran troops to Cartagena,
I35> correspondence with Norris
(1741), 147-150; blames Haddock
for Spanish evasion (Dec. 1741),
I73_4; correspondence with Ma
thews (1742) 199, 201, 209-211,
216, (1743) 221, 227, 235-240
Newfoundland, Defence of, 5, 243
Norris, Admiral, Sir John, 23; early
career, 24; appointed to command
fleet in home waters, 25; discusses
war plans, 31-37; proposals for
Mediterranean (Jan. 1740), 61; on
Spanish escape from Cadiz, 67;
plans for 1740, 73-5, 80-83; views
on attack upon forts by ships, 84-5 ;
his instructions (June 20, 1740), 86;
takes command, 88; attitude to
wards French, 89; windbound.go-i ;
final operations of 1740, 91-7; on
Anson's instructions, 98; on holding
Cartagena, 124; on manning, 142,
270-4; his instructions (June 18,
1741), 145-6; Biscay cruise, 147-
150; relinquishes his command and
position in cabinet, 181; consulted
on state of fleet, 195
Ogle, Admiral Sir Chaloner, misses
Azogue ships, 26-7; opens Cadiz
(1740), 62-8, 70, 78-9, 81, 82;
brought home, 83, 89, 93; appointed
to command escort to Cathcart, 94 ;
sails for W. Indies, 96, 102-106,
in; Vernon's instructions to, 112,
113, 115, 119; leaves Cartagena, 125,

282

Index

127, 132; assumes command at Ja
maica, 241, 242-5, 257
Oglethorpe, Colonel, 31
Ostend, Company, 20, 21
Owlers, 3
Pacte de Famille, 21
Paita, taken by Anson, 99
Panama, 16, 31 ; Anson and, 97
Pearce, Captain Vincent, failure at San
Augustin, 50, 51
Peru, trade of, 17
Peyton, Captain Sir Yelverton, 7
Pintado, de, Admiral, 53
Pizarro, de, Admiral, 27; in command
against Anson, 98, 99
Plantations, squadrons at (1738), 5;
(1739), 261, 264; (1742), 241-3
Port Louis, 55, 104
Porto Bello, 16, 17, 33; capture of,
45-50, 54; Anson and, 97, 133
Porto Rico, 7, 17; proposed attack upon
(1742), 247
Pretender, the young, 75
'Princesa,' capture of, 78
Puerto Cabello, 43 ; attack upon, 245-8,
253-7
Reggio, Admiral, 53
Register ships, 17
Rentone, Captain, 108 n., 126
Rochalart, Admiral, 58, 84, 93, 95.
iiom.
Roquefeuil, de, Admiral, no, in
Ruatan, 133, 257, 258
Steuart, Admiral Charles, 3
Strangford, Mr, Consul at Alicante, 9
Strategy, opposing views on, xiv-xix
Tencin, Cardinal, 231
Tinker, Mr, his plan to attack Darien,
30, 31
Torres, Admiral de, appointed to com
mand Ferrol squadron, 83 ; his sail
ing reported (Aug. 1742), 92; effect
of French squadron on.de Torres' s
movements, 109, no; his instruc

tions, in, 129, 144; Norris ordered
to intercept, 145-7, 149; Windham
to intercept, 193
Trelawny, Governor of Jamaica, 45; at
councils of war, 106, 125, 130, 244
Tyrawley, Lord, prompt action of, 158
Vera Cruz, 45
Vernon, Admiral Edward, xii, 26, 27;
early life and character, 39, 40; his
instructions (July 1739).. 40. 41;
additional instructions initiated by,
41, 42; views on territorial attacks,
43-5. 55_°: takes Porto Bello, 45-
50; off Cartagena and Chagres, 51-2;
movements to Dec. 1740, 53-8, 68,
73-4, 79 ; views on French intentions,
105-7; at Cartagena, 106 et seq.;
instructions to fleet, n 2-3; opera
tions, 114-124; Santiago, 125-30;
Panama, 130-2; recalled, 133;
blame for failure, 134-7, 225
Villefranche, British naval base, 178,
206-9, 232, 238
Virginia, naval defence of, 5, 7, 243
Wager, Sir Charles, First Commissioner,
23; discusses plans, 31-4, 83-4, 87,
142; resigns, 180
Waldegrave, Lord, 36, 65, 77, 81
Walpole, H., 22
Walpole, Sir R„ 19, 21, 33, 36, 81, 89,
94. 180
Warren, Captain Peter, at San Au
gustin, 51, 109; Commodore in West
Indies and North America, 258, 260
Waterhouse, Captain, 43
Watson, Captain T., 114; captures
Baradera battery, 115, 117, 122
Wentworth, General, 103, 106; at
Cartagena, 113-124; Santiago, 125-
130; Panama, 131, 132; recalled,
133; blame for failure, 136, 137
Winchelsea, Lord, First Commissioner,
180; opposes Bill of 1742, 189; 196,
197, 224, 225, 237, 248, 250
Worms, Treaty of, 230-2

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