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SKETCHES

OF THE

LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

MAJOR GEKERAL OF THE ARMIES OF THE \W\TED STATES,
m m Wtex of tp a&efcoltttfon.

COMPILED CHIEFLY FROM ORIGINAL MATERIALS.

BT WILLIAM JOHNSON,
OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH-CAROLINA.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL I.

CHARLESTON :
PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR, BY A. E. MILLER,
NO. 4, BROAB-STREET, NEAR THE BAY.
1822.

District of SoutJi-Carolina.
*ocoo# BE it Remembered, that on the twentieth day of November, Anno Domini, one
0 seal, o thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, and in the forty-sixth year of the Independence
#0000* of the United States of America, the Honorable William Johnson, one of the Asso
ciate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, deposited in this Office, the title of a book,
the right whereof he claims as author and proprietor, in the words following, to wit :
" Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene, Major General of the Armies
" of the United States, in the War of the Revolution, compiled chiefly from original materials. By
" William Johnson, of Charleston, South-Carolina."
In conformity to the Act of Congress of the United States, entitled " An Act for the encourage
ment of learning, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of
such copies during the times therein mentioned," and also, to the act entitled " An Act supplemen
tary to an act entitled, < An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of Maps,
Charts and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such copies, during the times therein men
tioned,' and extending the benefits thereof to the art of designing, engraving and etching historical
and other prints."
JAMES JERVEY,
District Clerk, South-Carolina District.

TO

Vfyt VtwtttfWte &mt%i^mu

OF THE

®t>tm lusts avt vtnputfulls Be&tcatetr,
By one, who, in humility, acknowledges, that exalted as
had been his previous admiration of their worth and services,
he had formed but a faint idea of their virtues and sufferings,
until drawn to the study of their actions in the unaffected
narrative and unquestionable authority of their own corres
pondence. THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

T
A HE author who lays claim to the advantages of original materials, owes to the world some
explanation of the nature and authenticity of the documents, upon which he rests this demand upon
public confidence.
Some years since, I was consulted by Mrs. Shaw, the youngest daughter and administratrix of
General Gresne, on the manner in which she should dispose of her father's original papers. Until
that time, I had never understood that they had been preserved. For the first time, I learnt that
theyjiad been carefully husbanded, and never yet submitted to the examination of any one, with a view
either to add to the materials of general history, or furnish those of a biography of the great man,
who had bequeathed them to posterity. Nor had I, until then, been struck with the fact, that his
biography had never been attempted, nor his name even mentioned in the cyclopaedias of the day.
I therefore, suggested to Mrs. Shaw, that if she approved of my undertaking the biography of her
father, I would take the papers under my care, and examine how far they afforded the necessary
materials for such an undertaking. The proposal was readily assented to, and she soon after forwarded
to me a large collection of letters, containing his private correspondence ; and addressed a letter to General-
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, . requesting him to deliver me the trunk containing the official papers
of the southern department, whilst General Greene was in command. The latter were immediately
delivered up to me, and I found them in the highest state of preservation and arrangement. It
appears, that on disbanding the army, these papers had been committed to the care of the late Major
Edward Rutledge. After the decease of Major Rutledge, the papers passed into the hands of his
son and executor Henry Rutledge, Esq. at present, of the State of Tennessee, by whom, on his
leaving this State, they were consigned to the care of General Pinckney. These two collections of
papers consisting of several thousand, had obviously been preserved with great care, and the motive
became explained in the course of examining them.
It is well known to many eminent men, that the late Governor Read of Pennsylvania, contem
plated writing a history of the Revolutionary war. As he was among the most intimate and valued
friends of General Greene, he had requested of the latter to preserve for him, every thing that could
assist him in the undertaking. This has been gladly complied with, and at the close of the war,
when General Greene had resolved to establish himself in Georgia, and General Wayne had actually
seated himself down beside him, Governor Read contemplated establishing himself in their neigh
bourhood. Both Greene and Read were cut off in the prime of life, and thus has the world been

vi. PREFACE.
deprived of such a history of the Revolution, as we can no longer hope ever to have. For it
cannot be denied, that there exists a considerable defect in all the histories of that period, that
have been as yet written. For, although, the military and more public events may have been accu
rately narrated, the intrigues that agitated Congress, and a variety of events explanatory of their
acts and their errors, which transpired with closed doors, or out of doors, remain in utter
obscurity. Of all these, Mr. Read could have furnished the most perfect narrative, and of all mili
tary events the illustrious trio that would then have graced the banks of the Savannah River, could
not have been surpassed.
With regard to that part of those events in which General Greene was himself an actor, there is
the fullest evidence that it was his intention to give to the world an exposition of the causes and
motives that governed his actions. In a letter to Mr. John Adams, of the 28th of January, 1781,
he writes thus : " the American armies have gained some advantage ; my public letters will have
given you some idea of them, but the previous measures which led to important events, and my
reasons for those measures must lie in the dark until a more leisure hour. The people are deter
mined to defend themselves from age to age, rather than^give up their independence."
It is not material to explain, though there is no difficulty in doing it, why these papers were never
brought to public notice, after the death of General Greene. Suffice it to say, that much time was
necessarily consumed, after they came into my possession, in perusing them, and making my extracts
from them. But after surmounting this labour, I found that there was a considerable space yet to be
filled up, and for which the materials could only be found among his early friends, and in the country
in which he passed his early life, and acted during the greatest part of the Revolutionary war.
This made a trip to Rhode-Island indispensable ; and during the summer of 1818, I was occupied
in exploring the private cabinets of his friends, in the northern and eastern states.
It is impossible to express my sense of the polite attention, which I received from the friends and
admirers of General Greene, during these researches. The intelligence had preceded me, that I was
collecting materials for the Biography of General Greene, and original documents were showered
upon me from all quarters, while his friends showed themselves ever ready to listen to, and satisfy
all those explanatory inquiries, which the materials already in my hands suggested.
I found that the general's early correspondence had been religiously preserved, and that various
"small collections of historical materials had been made, which were now liberally communicated to
me, to aid in a work, in the promotion of which every one manifested an individual interest. I must
here express my sense of the kind attentions of General Gibbes, at present Governor Gibbes, of Rhode-
Island, of his brother, Colonel Gibbes, of Long-Island, and of the surviving brothers and nephews
of General Greene ; also, of his two early friends, Colonel Ward and General Varnum, who had
passed their youth in habits of unrestrained intimacy with the subject of these Sketches, and could
famish of him, what may be called, the delineations of the heart.
Whilst in New-York, I had several conferrences with the late Judge Pendleton, with whom, I had
previously corresponded on the subject. He had himself intended to undertake the work now sub
mitted to the public ; and being among the few who were acquainted with the existence of the mate
rials for such an undertaking, in the possession of the family, he had made application to the
executrix for them. This he had communicated to me through a friend, and I readily lent my influ
ence to obtain her consent, and offered to decline it in his favour. But there existed private reasons,
•which I was not then apprized of, for her declining to assent to this request.
Mr. Pendleton possessed many advantages for entering upon this undertaking. He had been in
the general's family from the time of his taking command of the southern department, to the termina-

PREFACE. vii.
tion of the war ; and having established himself in Savannah, lived on the most contkleulial fcoting
with him, to the close of his life. He was among the afflicted group who surrounded him in his last
moments. Having too high a sense of honour to attempt the undertaking without the assent of the family, as
well as a perfect knowledge of the impracticability of effecting it without the papers in their posses
sion, with a liberality, which I gratefully record, he from that time made the most cordial efforts in as
sisting me with all the minute and interesting information which his own memory and researches
could accumulate. And to him, I am indebted for many pages of original information.
As I knew from corresponding with some of my friends, that Philadelphia and Baltimore were rich
in the materials that I sought for, my steps were next directed to the former place. And I was richly
rewarded for the journey. From my friends Mr. Joseph Read, and the relatives of the late Colonel
Petit, "I was favoured with a large collection of the most interesting original documents, and among
them the outlines of the Biography of Greene, sketched by Mr. Read's father. To their politeness,
also, I was indebted for an introduction to the widow of General Harmar, and from her I received o
document of a veryjeurious and interesting character. General Harmar was a colonel in the Pennsyl
vania line, and marched with his command, under Wayne, to reinforce the southern army. This
march, it will be recollected, was full of interest, as the Pennsylvania line was arrested in its progress,
first to re-enforce La Fayette, (then retreating before Lord Cornwallis) and afterwards to assist in the
reduction of York Town. It then joined the southern army at the Rouad-O, and Colonel Harmar
succeeded Colonel Otho Williams, as adjutant general of the southern army ; in which capacity, the
former remained until near the close of the war. During all this time, General (then colonel) Harmar
kept a journal, which, with a most authentic record of facts, combines innumerable remarks, emanat
ing from an acute and luminous mind. This was liberally confided to my hands, and has often been
leferred to, in aid of his orderly books, which follow those of Colonel Williams, in succeession, to the
disbanding of the army.
Hitherto, every aid was gratuitous ; every communication dictated, by a patriotic desire to aid an
individual who was known to have no pecuniary motive, in an effort to do justice to the reputation of
one whom all delighted to honour. But, whilst in Philadelphia, my attention was directed to a collec
tion of papers, which were offered me for sale. A Mr. De Silver was at that time advertising a-prosr
pectus of a life of General Greene, from original materials. These materials were offered me for the
sum of fifteen hundred dollars, which was, I believe, afterwards reduced to one thousand. But in my
bargain was to be included, the advantage of not having my pecuniary, or other views anticipated, by
a rival publication. I had previously corresponded with my friends Mr. Read and Mr. John Vaughn,
on the subject of these papers, and from the first moment positively declined any interference to preyeni
a publication, the loss of which to the world, I did not choose to assume the responsibility of; and as to
purchasing materials for my Biography, I should as soon have expected to purchase air, or fire ; yet,
if necessary, to enable me to do justice to the undertaking I had entered upon, I had no objection t«
incur any incidental expense. I therefore cast my eye over a few of the papers, and soon discovered,
what I had previously suspected, that they were only the vouchers of the quarter master general's de
partment, preserved by Colonel Petit, to support him in a settlement with the treasury department of
the United States. As all the private and confidential letters between General Greene and Colonei
Petit were already in my possession, I could very well dispense with such as merely contained orders
/or a penknife or a packsaddle; but still as my friend Mr. Vaughn, the indefatigable perveyor of
science and philanthrophy, expressed a wish to get them into his possession, and I was apprehensive
ihaX a book written on such materials would be no great acquisition to the republic of letters, I autho
rised my friends to offer Mr. De Silver a respectable number of (copies of my work, merely to induce

Villi

PREFACE.
him to deliver up the papers, to be deposited in Mr. Vaughn's hands. The offer was rejected, and 1
have never regretted it, notwithstanding that it was accompanied with a threat, that I should be antici
pated in the book-market. If ever that collection of papers has furnished, or shall furnish to the world
one page of history or biography, (unless it be a fac-simile page) I shall acknowledge my error in not
possessing myself of them. Yet, it has been asserted, that it was impossible, for the Biography of
Greene to be written without them.
It is proper here to observe, that the respectable descendants of Colonel Petit, are in no wise respon
sible for what transpired relative to those papers. They, it seems, after the trunk containing them
had lumbered the garrets of three generations, had disposed of them as waste paper ; from which fate,
they were rescued, by the laudable zeal of Mr. De Silver.
My journey to Baltimore, consummated my collection of materials. The sons of Colonel Otho
Williams, through the polite agency of Mr. John Oliver, put me in possession of their father's papers,
and from these I have collected some of the most interesting facts narrated -in this work, and have
been enabled I hope, to shed some light upon characters, which Maryland has much reason to be
proud of. Before I entered upon this undertaking, I was almost ignorant of Colonel William's cha
racter, but I have met with no one in the course of my investigations, that has interested me more. He
did not survive the revolution long enough to have his merits engraven on our recollection by the
association of memory. He retired not from service while the tug of war lasted, but as soon as the
enemy were driven into Charleston, he obtained a furfough to attend to the care of a constitution broken
down by wounds and hard service. From this time, he rather lingered than lived, until at length, he
sunk under the most racking diseases. But the country he had done honour to,- was grateful ; and
his latter days were passed in all the honours and comforts that his state of health admitted of.
To two other distinguished worthies of the revolution, I have to acknowledge the greatest obligations,
General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and the late General Davie. The privilege of consulting these
two gentlemen, on all occasions, has been to me of the highest importance. Until the fall of Charles
ton, when General Pinckney was made prisoner, no one was more actively employed in the busy
scenes of the revolution ; and General Davie, who, just about that time had attained the age of man
hood, and appeared in arms, was closely connected with the southern army, and enjoyed the highest
confidence of its commander to near the close of the war. One of his last communications concludes
with " I thank God that I have lived to discharge this work of duty and gratitude in contributing to
the Biography of that great and good man." From General Davie I was favoured with voluminous
communications, the value of whieh can only be appreciated by those who were acquainted with his
himinous mind, and elevated character.
My personal acquaintance, also, with almost all the officers of rank, who distinguished themselves
in the southern campaigns, has furnished me with many opportunities of making those inquiries which
sometimes became necessary to explain and elucidate occurrences in those campaigns. And to
Colonels Hampton, Taylor, Morris, Watts, Polk, and Dr. Read who had charge of the hospitals, I
acknowledge myself under obligations for the civility with which they have answered my inquiries.
As to the conduct of the work, my leading motive has been to bring the reader familiary acquainted
with the character of my hero : subordinate to this object, to throw light on the history of the times
in which he flourished, and of my country generally. When the life of the individual becomes iden
tified with the revolutionary history, I have endeavoured to use the latter as the frame-work in which
Jo suspend my Sketches. In this effort, it is a matter of no small difficulty to strike the medium be
tween giving enough, and not over-loading the work with extraneous matter. I believe I have erred
in the last member of the alternative. But the reader will pardon me for observing, that I have
written for my own amusement as well as his. Intrenched behind a mass of four thousand original

PREFACE. ix.
fetters, written by the hands of all the distinguished men of a period, the events of which are destined ta
change the face of the world, I really felt an irresistible desire, to loiter away my time in the most bril
liant assembly that I can ever again hope to be encircled by. I now find that I have written twice as
much as I had supposed, and yet it was with a painful sensation that I dropped my pen at the close of
the last line. I felt as if separating from the most venerable company that had ever given interest to
a long journey. And in this — I hold myself pardonable ; . for, as all my indemnity for many a labori
ous hour, will probably be limited to the pleasure of the employment, it was with me " carpe horam."
Nevertheless, I affect not to be insensible to the applause of the learned and the good ; and, flatter
myself, that this work will exhibit some attention to the duties of the citizen and the author. Popular
ity I have endeavoured to dismiss all thought of; to make my book saleable has never entered into
my mind ; it is the bane of independence and truth. Yet-, while I shall thrust my book upon no one
by a subscription on the basis of faith, I do not affect to be insensible to the loss or gain that may result
from it. But I do most anxiously covet the reputation of having undertaken the work from motives,
not at all mixed up with pecuniary reward.
To those who may be of opinion that I have wrtiten too much, I would remark, that there is a
sacredness in the character of our revolution, that gives importance to the minutest incident connected
with it. Like the fly that has plunged into the consecrated chalice, its insignificance gives place to a
new character, communicated to it by association. Add to this, that we are at this period engaged,
rather in collecting materials for the future historian, than ourselves writing the history of our coun
try. With the mass of materials which I had before me, and which perhaps may never pass into the
hands of another, I felt strongly called upon to extract and introduce into this work as much as the
subject would reasonably admit of. Yet volumes might still be extracted from the same source. The
select letters of General Read, the Marquis La Fayette, and Baron Steuben, with those of Generals
Washington and Greene, would alone make up two interesting volumes.
There is one part of the work in which I have been very minute ; this is in the occurrences in the »
south, subsequent to the battle of the Eutaws. I found there was no history existing of that period-;
and as it was the time of the occurrence of many events, interesting to the inhabitants of South Caroli
na and Georgia, although of a minor character, I have indulged my pen in narrating them from the
official letters of the several commanders, for the gratification of those whose fore-fathers were active
in the scenes they present. This part of the work, I consign to the patronage of South Carolina and
Georgia. It exhibits the outlines of our partisan war, and is intended to preserve an accurate know
ledge of events, which still furnish us with topics of conversation, interesting to us, however they may
dwindle in the eyes of others. I have furnished detailed accounts of these occurrences in hopes that
the recollection of them may serve to keep alive the sacred flame that burned while they were trans
piring. And I have felt myself authorized in doing so in this work, as they were all connected with
the general plan of the war at its close, and exhibit the struggles between the contending generals for
the possession or control of the low country of the two states. Desultory as the events of that period
appear in all the accounts ever published of them, there was a perfect connection and dependence of
every one upon the general system of measures pursued by the commander of the southern depart
ment ; and all influenced, in some degree, the success of that system. They will serve at least to ex
hibit to my young countrymen, the struggles which their fathers maintained to acquire the blessings,
which they conquered, and we enjoy ; and will render dear to us many a spot of ground that has heen
hallowed by their blood.
But let not him who carries his researches into the regions of historical truth, receive with too
much fastidiousness the narrative of minor events. While men govern the world, their passions govern
men, and trifles act upon the passions, trifles will have much to do in the affairs of mankind. From the

V.VU

PFtEFACE.
that desolated the kingdom of Priam, founded that of Rome, changed the face of conqueticg
Greece, and gave two immortal poems to the world, to that which broke its rage upon the Icebergs of
Russia, gave a new master to Europe, and chained its old one to a sea-girt rock, like the unhappy
Andromeda, many have been the mighty conflicts that have been produced by trifles. When the
quail escaped from beneath the cloak of Alcibiades, and the assembled people of Athens ran obse
quiously to catch it, who would have imagined this to be the first link in the chain of incidents, that
should depiive that people of liberty, and their country of the dominion of Greece ? How sovereign
must have been the reign of trifles, when the mistress of the world was herself governed by the peck
ing of a chicken, or the perching of a crow ! And where was there ever a spectacle exhibited oi
abject subjection to trifles, more conspicuous, than when, in the plains of Pletea, the congregated armies
of Greece, awaiting the issue of a battle decisive of country, family, freedom, life, crouched beneath
their shields, could abide the pelting of the Persian darts, while an ignorant fanatic was slaughtering
oxen to find the prophectic speck that chance might place upon their intestines. It is a subject on
which either history or humour might indulge itself for a month.
As this work has grown to a bulk which I never anticipated, I plainly foresee that I shall be ex
posed to the imputation of having swelled it by the free use of what has flowed from the pens of others.
For the insertion of Colonel Williams' narrative of Gates' defeat and its subsequent events, I will
make no apology ; it is an invaluable historical fragment, and would perhaps never have appeared
in print had it not been inserted here — I publish it as a tribute of respect to the memory of a man, too
little known to the American people. And as to the correspondence with which the work is inter
spersed, I pray the reader to consider its publication as a token oi respect to himself. For I am very-
much deceived, if it does not constitute the most interesting and acceptable part of this work. I have
endeavoured to select those passages only, which exhibit some trait of character— contain some useful
lesson, — or cast some light upon our revolutionary history. I am not ambitious of the fame of a
writer : I would rather serve mankind by an useful compilation, than fascinate them by the charms of
fine writing. Yet, I have indulged myself more in these extracts, from the consciousness that the
larger my book becomes, the more it may prove injurious to my own purse ; and still more so, from
the strong aversion I feel to that propensity of some authors, to show more of themselves than their
hero ; and of others, to indulge in that vague, general eulogy, which is unsupported by specimen or
example, and is better adapted to a tombstone than an attempt at Biography. But I will faithfully
promise, that should there be any one of these letters or extracts which all my readers shall agree
ought to have been omitted, it shall be expunged from — the next edition.
There is one subject on which I must, with sincere humility, cast myself on the benevolence of my
reader. In narrating facts relative to the two conspiracies, or we will call them intrigues, that dis
figure our revolutionary history — the one to put down General Washington, the other to close the
war in usurpation and monarchy. I have mentioned names highly respected by the American people;
and individuals, closely connected with some whom I rank among my most valued friends. To make
an enemy, is to incur one of the greatest misfortunes in life ; and hence true history seldom commences
under a century after mportant events have occurred. In the effort to place myself at the end of that
century, and write as one would write from the same materials, who could not incur a frown from
living man, I know that I have exposed myself to the painful feelings of one who gives umbrage
where he would most deprecate it. But " to all whom I've offended," I must make one common
apology, if I could not have sunk all individual feeling, I ought not to have entered on this undertaking.;
and if groundless imputations have found their way into the materials from which I write, now is the
time most favourable to their detection. Joyfully shall I acknowledge every error that shall be can
didly revealed to me. I have set down "nought in malice," nor any thing without written authority

PREFACE. xl
I have ventured sorastimes even <! to extenuate ;" and I fondly hope, have been more intent on em
bellishing good actions, than aggravating bad ones.
There was one subject on which, in the prosecution of the work I felt very much embarrassed ;
This was in the use of the pronoun : it became indispensable to write frequently in the first person,
and the most natural mode would have been to use it in the singular number. But to avoid singular
ity I felt compelled to adopt the fashionable use of the, plural. This sacrifice to the practice of
others, I beg the modern arbiters of taste, science, and politics, to accept as a tender of my respectful
homage. I feel no compunction, in hastening by my example, the time when the press shall govern
the world, provided, that candour, benevolence and urbanity, shall govern the press.
Should this work be productive of no other good effect, I will indulge the hope, that I shall not in
vain have reminded my fellow citizens, that the monuments which their gratitude has voted to several
distinguished men who have figured in these pages, remain to be erected : and that some of our
greatest public benefactors have since left this transitory world, whose deeds in arms, deserve well to
be commemorated by some monument of public gratitude. The bloody fields too of the Eutaws, the
Cowpens, and Guilford, remain undistinguished by any expression of public reminiscence. The
two former are desart wilds. But they are classic ground ; and should public patronage follow this
effort of my pen, the traveller shall no longer pass those hallowed spots, unheeding, that he treads
upon the mould that has been moistened by the best blood of our country.

Charleston, January 10th, 1825.

NATHANAEL GREENE.

CHAPTER I.

Portrait, Parentage, and early Life.
1 HE order of the commander in chief, which assigned General Nathanael chap.
Greene to the command of the Southern department, bears date the 14th of v_^v^>
October 1780. Until that period, his standing in the army was of the first ^
order in respectability; he enjoyed the confidence of Washington and of the
country, and had ever discharged the duties of the man and the soldier with
fidelity and ability. But no opportunities had yet been afforded him of
displaying those eminent talents which then broke upon the American people,
and exhibited a splendour of military character excelled only by him whom
none can equal.
The subject of these memoirs was at that time in the thirty-ninth year
of his age. His stature about five feet te$ or eleven inches ; his frame
vigourous and well proportioned ; his port erect and commanding ; nor was
his martial appearance diminished by a slight obstruction in the motion of
his right leg, contracted in early life. The general character of his face was
that of manly beauty. His fair and florid complexion had not entirely
yielded to the exposures of five campaigns ; nor was a slight blemish in the
right eye observed, but to excite regret that it did not equal the benevolent
expression and brilliancy of the left. Such is the portrait of the man whom
1

I MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, we are to follow through these pages. His manners were uniformly con-
,^~v^, sonant to the gravity of his character and dignity of his station. Yet he
could be cheerful even to playfulness, and his intercourse with the world
was marked with that unaffected urbanity of manners which flows from the
politeness of the heart. Whether grave or gay, he could accommodate him
self to society, with a grace and facility which may be acquired from long
and general intercourse with polite circles, but which in him is to be attributed
to rapid observation, a quick perception of propriety, and a mind well stored
with sound and useful information.
Advantages, in early life, he had none; born and raised in obscurity,
without education and without society, he exhibited a striking instance of
what good examples, sound principles, native genius, and above all, indus
trious habits and a careful improvement of time, can accomplish.
His first appearance on the arena of the revolution, was at the siege of
Boston. He then commanded the Rhode Island contingent of troops, raised
under the recommendation of the Congress of 1774. Until that time, he had
scarcely emerged from the narrow limits of his native state. Yet, although
in the contingents of the states, there were many men of polite and liberal
education, he appeared inferior to no one. He conversed with ease and
elegance ; though not forward in eliciting conversation, he shrunk not under
a consciousness of deficiency ; and in soundness of judgement, knowledge of
his profession, and neatness of diction in his correspondence, he was inferior
to very few. Yet all knew that his connexions were of the religious sect of
Quakers, and that his early days had been sedulously devoted to the most
laborious occupations. But until then, they did not know, that his vigorous
mind had risen superior to early prejudice ; that from his sleep or his meals
he had stolen time to acquire a considerable share of polite learning; and by
denying himself the most ordinary indulgences, he had acquired a respectable
library, and with its contents had stored an herculean memory, which never
was known to relinquish its acquirements.
His stern integrity and devotedness to religious and political liberty he had
acquired in a country planted by the victims or the exiles of persecution ; or
had inherited from an ancestry proverbially devoted to the assertion of equal
rights, who had also cruelly felt and traditionally commemorated, the evils of
oppression. The protosire of our Hero (who, in the family, is emphatically styled the
General) was John Greene, one of the followers of the persecuted Gorton,
who, in the year 1640, fled from the fanatics of Boston, and sought an asylum
on the west side of the Narraganset (then called Nanhyganset) Bay. The

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. £
land, originally purchased by him of the Indians, is still in the family ; for chap.
it is consecrated by the tombs of the fathers. And the original conveyance ^-J^,
from the headmen of the Narraganset Nation is still shown, as the indispu
table evidence of the fairness of the acquirement. It is situated in the tract
of country now known by the epithet of Warwick Neck, originally called
Shaw-omit. It is in the township of Warwick, and near the town of that
name. But the place of the General's nativity, is some miles distant from it,
and on the opposite side of an arm of the Narraganset Bay. In all the biogra
phical notices of General Greene, the town of Warwick is said to have been
the place of his natb^ty. This is correct, in the language of the Eastern
States, in which " town" means a district, or municipal division of country,
synonymous with " township." The place of his nativity is, in fact, included
within the township of Warwick, because the western line crosses the basin
of East- Greenwich, and comprises the opposite fauces of the bay or harbour.
But the town of Warwick, properly so called, is some miles distant to the
north of the Potowome Mills.
To the west of this bay, and on a beautiful little basin, stands the town of
East- Greenwich. This basin is formed by two small streams, the principal
of which still retains the Indian name of Potowome, or Potow-o-mit ; the
former being probably an abbreviation of the latter. On this stream, and
near to where it empties itself into the basin, at the distance of about two
miles south-east of East-Greenwich, stand the Patowome Mills, and this is
the place of the nativity of the General. The house is a comfortable stone
building, of one story, and is still occupied by his respectable and hospitable
brothers. And the forge, at which for many a year he cheerfully toiled as an
anchor-smith, together with the mill, which, with a book in his hand, he
attended as a respite from labour, although exhibiting strong symptoms of
remote antiquity, are still in active operation. Here, the curious traveller
will be shown the humble spot where labour strung the nerve and the mind
of a Cincinnatus ; and here, too, he will behold the rude forge at which, when
a mere boy, he consumed the hours in which industry may rest, in making
an axe, or repairing some implements of husbandry, to acquire a pittance
for purchasing some book that he had heard of, and sighed to possess.
He who views these objects without a deep sense of humiliation, must be
well assured, that he has not enjoyed superior opportunities, or has not
abused them. Among the most instructive and useful lessons in life, is that
of a superior mind, guided by sound principles, struggling against the united
disadvantages of poverty, obscurity, and prejudice, rising superior to every
difficulty, and emerging to fame and to utility.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. There are some incidents respecting the early history of the settlement of
*~v~^, this family in Rhode Island, which merit attention, not only from their singu
larity, but from their probable effect in giving a bent to the genius, and origin
to the sentiments and principles which governed the conduct of our Hero.
It is true, the hereditary transmission of talents or principles is exploded
every where, except when necessary to console family pride, or perpetuate
political delusion ; but, place a family in a situation remote from active inter
course with the world, and the examples and opinions of an ancestor may
be transmitted through many generations, and give a tone and character to
his posterity.
Such was the situation to which this family was consigned, and to this
day there remains, at least among the elder branches, something of primeval
simplicity in principles and manners which is seldom to be met with.
The State of Rhode Island was originally settled by religious sectarians,
who sought in the wilderness, for that freedom of conscience, or of speculation,
which was denied them in the parent colony of Massachusetts. Although
the settlers of the latter colony had fled from the persecutions which disgraced
England in the commencement of the seventeenth century, yet scarcely had
they effected a settlement in their place of refuge, before they exhibited an
additional proof that fanaticism, whether in a city or a wilderness, is still
cruel, selfish , and tyrannical ; or that the corrupting influence of power may
taint even the purity of the Christian religion.
Roger Williams was the first who fled, and led off with him a colony to
found the city of Providence. Next Mrs. Hutchinson and her followers
acquired and settled the Island of Aquetnet, or Rhode Island proper, and
built the town of Newport. And lastly, Samuel Gorton, and his eleven
followers, descending the Narraganset Bay on the west side, settled on War
wick Neck.
This flourishing little abode of heresy and toleration soon inflamed the
religious or official zeal of Governor Winthrop. And a Captain Cook, with
an armed party of treble Gorton's number, was dispatched with strict orders
" to bring the hereticks to Boston, dead or alive." At the head of this crusade
in miniature, marched a holy man, with strict injunctions to keep his soldiers
regularly to their prayers, and to explain to Gorton and his deluded followers,
the whole enormity of their errors — before they were put to death. What
those errors were it is immaterial to relate. Suffice it to say, they had refe
rence to the most abstruse and speculative doctrines, and were wholly imma
terial to Christian piety or a good life*

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 5
Gorton persisted sturdily in the argument against the nuncio of Winthrop ; chap.
and thinking he had- the best of it, refused to acknowledge himself convinced. ^v**~>
Cook accordingly gave the word for the onset, and that Greene, the proto-
sire of "our Hero, was not then a Quaker, is proved by their having made a
brave resistance against the Massachusetts men, until resistance was hopeless.
They were made prisoners and conveyed to Boston. The women and children
were dispersed in the woods, and as it was at a time when the ground was
covered with snow, several of them actually perished — the rest of these help
less fugitives, after sustaining incredible hardships, were protected, clothed
and hospitably entertained— by Savages. But the effect of these kind offices
of the Aborigines of the country is seen at this day. The Narraganset tribe
of Indians, still about five hundred strong, is the only nation, which, from
Maine to Georgia, can boast of a national existence, and the least advance
ment to civilization. They owe their preservation to Gorton and his follow
ers ; and there is good reason to believe, more particularly to Greene.
Gorton was actually condemned to die ; and his followers, after many
ineffectual attempts to make them renounce their errors, were ultimately,
ex mero motu, pardoned on condition that they should never again settle on
the Narraganset Bay.
But, much to the credit of the people of Boston, popular sentiment appears
to have been excited in favor of Gorton, and their fanatical Governor was
at length obliged to release his victim.
The first effort of the party on their return home, was to secure the inde
pendence of the country of their choice, as the only means of future security,
or justifiable retaliation.
The Massachusetts Bay colony laid claim to a jurisdiction over the whole
of that country as far as the limits of New York, or to the Pacific. But they
had repeatedly attacked and harassed the Indians ; had sold them into
slavery, set a price upon their heads, and recently had nearly extirpated the
Pequots, killing the men, shipping off the boys to Bermuda, and distributing
the women and female children among the colonists.* The Narragansets,
therefore, feared and hated them ; and Gorton's party adroitly availing them
selves of this state of things, secretly prevailed upon their chiefs, to execute a
deed of transfer of soil and sovereignty to the King of England. The grant
is still preserved, and embraces the whole country within the limits of Rhode
Island. Whether their rights were co-extensive with their cession is not to

* Massachusetts Memorial.

5 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, be ascertained. Generally the limits of Indian territory is but ill defined,
^~ss~*^ and various nations will lay claim to the same hunting grounds.
Furnished with this important document, one of Gorton's followers was
immediately dispatched to England. The grant was accepted, and the char
ter, which created the State, so soon followed, that it was unquestionably the
result of this cession from the Narragansets.
These events are all commemorated by Gorton in a publication under thc
quaint title of " Simplicity's defence against seven headed tyranny," a rare,
amusing, and obviously authentic narrative.
In these occurrences, Greene must have been a principal sufferer ; that he
lost his wife about this time is recorded in the family annals, from which
circumstance it is probable she was one of those who perished in the snow.
And that he was soon after in England, where he married another wife, is
equally well established ; from which the inference is a very reasonable one,
that he was the bearer of the Narragansets' deed of cession, and a principal
negociator for the independence of that nation, and of the State of Rhode
Island. The family, ever since its establishment, have clung to their little Ithaca
with a singular pertinacity. They are now much ramified, very numerous,
and very respectable. They are mostly substantial farmers, industrious, and
judicious in the culture of a soil which possesses kw natural advantages; but
live in great comfort and singular harmony. Several of them have filled the
highest offices in the State.
The family of General Greene were originally from Salisbury in England.
His father, Nathanael, was the third in descent from the original emigrant.
Nathanael, the subject of these memoirs, his second son by Mary Mott, was
born May 27, 1742. The father had been previously married, and had two
sons, so that Nathanael was the fourth of eight whom he raised to manhood.
Very early in life they were deprived by death of the cares of their mother ;
and with the aid of a motherly house keeper, the eight boys were brought
up together under the eye of the father. And although nothing was further
from the intention of his sire than preparing him for a military life, he lite
rally received a Spartan education. The old gentleman was a highly respec
table Quaker preacher, and for nearly forty years was in the habit of deli
vering himself in the meeting at East Greenwich, with a force and eloquence,
it is said, which would have done honour to any pulpit. As his family in
creased, he regularly attended his place of worship, followed by his train of
boys, all habited in the simplest costume of their sect. Temperate, frugal
and laborious himself, his habits were inculcated on his children, not less by

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 7
his own example, than by the impressive lessons of a rod and a vigorous arm. chap.
Passive and prompt obedience were among his favorite doctrines ; and the ^^*_
least undutfful hesitation was followed by a frown of authority, and a look
of command that admitted of no delay. Yet he was kind and affectionate,
and acted rather from dictates of duty, and a sense of propriety, than im-
periousness of character. His forge, his mill, and his farm, divided his
attention ; and, regularly, as his children attained to a proper age, they were
assigned to the plough, and gradually passed through their degrees, until
honoured with a station at the anvil. _ Eighty fine athletic boys, to a man thus
circumstanced, were not only a boon from heaven, but a real accession of
fortune. His own limited education, the fanaticism of the times, and something per
haps of the peculiar opinions of his sect, had impressed him with an opinion,
that the Bible was the only book worthy the study of an intellectual being.
Mere human learning he held in very low estimation, and never encouraged
the acquirement of it in his children beyond the simplest rudiments of edu
cation. To their moral and religious conduct, he paid the most undivided
attention. Nor did he fail to inspire them with the most elevated principles
of moral conduct, or to form them for the conscientious discharge of those
duties, which constitute the good man and the useful citizen.
The father of biography has seldom introduced a great man to his readers
without relating the concomitant omens at his birth, or some early prognostic
of his future greatness. Justly as these superstitions are derided, it is pro
bable that where the tales of these early prognostics had reached the ears of
their imputed object, they have had, not unfrequently, some effect in giving a
direction to his views, and a stimulus to his exertions. It is a tolerated
opinion, that prophecies have preceded and probably aided to produce the
conquest of kingdoms. Such are very gravely related by historians, both of
Mexico before the invasion of Cortez, and of Egypt before the French inva
sion. Whether these observations were verified or not in the instance of
Greene, it is very certain, that from the time of his birth a vague expectation
prevailed, not only in his family, but in his neighbourhood, that he was one
day to become an eminent personage. It is even asserted, that the church to
which he belonged, looked forward to his becoming the great champion of
their faith ; but his family, or at least some of them, gave another direction of
their ambitious hopes, and maintained that he was to become a military
leader. In so many ways did this tradition reach the ears of the writer of
these pages, that he could not forbear inquiring into the particulars from men

! MAJOR GENERAL GREENE:
chap, of the greatest gravity and soundest understanding. And the tale will serve to
^-^-*.s illustrate the origin of many other similar prophecies.
To the humiliation of human pretensions, it is well known tfiat judicial
astrology once reigned over the world, even under the sanction of the rulers
of nations. And the folios which still exist to elucidate its principles, attest
that the world was in earnest in their belief in its reality as a science. A large
proportion of the East still persist in this melancholy proof, that man may be
made to believe any thing.
It is not then to be wondered at, if in the year 1742, in the vicinity of two
States in which prosecutions for witchcraft had been once pursued with zeal
and vigour, a remnant of judicial astrology should be found in a remote
corner of the State of Rhode Island.
Among man-midwives of that day, a Dr. Spencer stood foremost in emi
nence. But, whatever skill or success the Doctor may have exhibited in an
obstetrical case, he would hardly have been thought to have earned his fee,
had he not cast a ¦ nativity, or uttered some grave prognostic relative to the
new accession to the family. Yet it is probable, that in the present instance
the Doctor, observing the correct form, healthy aspect, vigourous limbs and
sonorous pipes of little Greene, meant no more than to foretell his future
excellence in bodily strength — when he predicted " that he would one day
become a mighty man in Israel." But the omen was greedily caught at by
servants and nurses until it became a favorite gossipping tale. Certain it is
that the prediction got abroad : so that, when he afterwards attained to emi
nence, there were many of the elderly people who would gravely declare,
" It was what we always knew would happen."
But much more satisfactory prognostics appeared a few years afterwards.
His agility, bodily strength, quickness of apprehension, emulation and reso
lution, were always above his years. It is a well attested fact, that at the age
of seventeen, he exhibited proofs of bodily strength, which we cannot venture
to relate. And in wrestling, running, skating, and other athletic and rural
amusements, he was never satisfied as long as there was anyone who excelled
him. These were the early objects of his emulation. No others had yet been
presented to his mind ; and even when mischief was the proposed pursuit of
his companions, as is too often the case with such minds, his genius impelled
him to take the lead. Children are generally very sagacious discoverers and
candid acknowledgers of each others talents ; and the deference paid to his
genius and prowess, among the companions even of his earliest years, was a
subject of general remark. Even his stern father was observed to yield to

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 9
his opinions and wishes an. attention which no other of the family could chap.
ever command. v^r%^-w'
Such is the ascendancy of mind ; and fortunate it is for society, when a
judicious direction is given to the early efforts of aspiring genius. In the
present instance, the sole points of excellence presented to the view of our
hero were, to become a neat ploughman or skilful mechanic ; employments
safe, useful, and reputable in themselves ; but, to which a mind like his could
only be confined by keeping from his view those which are calculated, to afford
more intellectual enjoyment, and a wider range to genius and ambition.
Until his fourteenth year, he had been brought up almost in a state of
ignorance. In the long and severe winters of that climate, when the waters
are bound in ice, and the labours of the field and of the furnace suspended,
an erratic teacher had been employed to instruct the boys to read. But as
yet he knew not that the bounds of human knowledge had ever reached
beyond the spelling book and the bible. Contented in his ignorance, he
enjoyed all that eminence which promptness in school, and activity and
enterprize out of it, could impart, and never sent forth or ever felt a wish
after other objects.
An accidental acquaintance formed about this time was destined to open
his eyes to his own ignorance. A lad of the name of Giles happened to
be on a visit at East Greenwich during the vacation of the university of
Rhode Island, in which he was a student. With him, in one of his winter
rambles, Greene formed an acquaintance, and to him he was indebted for
the information that there were other things to be learned in the world besides
reading and writing!
From this time his tranquillity fled, and a few odd volumes of the most
ordinary books, picked up on the shelves of his few acquaintances, so irritated
his appetite for reading, that he was literally never without a book in his
hand, whilst he could obtain one, except when engaged in the most laborious
occupations ; and when his little stock was exhausted, and he could borrow
no more, there was no toil or privation that he would not submit to in
order to procure the means of acquiring them by purchase. Neither the
mill nor the plough presented any facilities for making a penny on his Own
account ; but by the rapid acquirement of the trade of a smith, which his
father then carried on at the mills, in several branches, he was soon enabled
to attain his wished for object. It was but little, very little, that he could
thus acquire, and only in intervals of respite from his father's business ; but
it was all devoted to the purchase of books. No childish toy, no article of
2

10 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, decoration, no idle amusement ever withdrew a penny of his earnings from
^^-^-^ the object that wholly engrossed him.
But all he could thus acquire was soon devoured. A shelf in one corner of
the shop received his treasure as soon as it was brought home, and neither
diversion nor sleep could withdraw him from it. It was read, and re-read
whenever his care could be withdrawn from the massy anchor, until every
page became familiar to him.
There are no means existing by which it is any longer possible to trace
the course of his reading ; nor can it be at all material to pursue it, since his
resources were so scanty, that with the ravenous appetite that impelled him,
it cannot be expected that he was fastidious in the choice of books. Nothing
ever came amiss ; while ever books could be commanded they were read.
And his whole thoughts were then devoted to the means of acquiring more.
His father's business alone could withhold him from his darling occupation ;
for, whether from a strong sense of duty, early habit, or strict discipline,
that alone he would not neglect. Yet, when it came to his course to attend
the mill, he uniformly seated himself beside the hopper with his book in his
hand ; nor were his eyes always withdrawn from it, until long after the ebb
ing grain had vanished from between the mill-stones. His usual seat is still
shewn, and the sight of it is well calculated to call forth from the beholder,
this most useful of all inquiries, " How have 1 appropriated my time ?"
It will no doubt be to many, a subject of amazement, that such a dispo
sition should not have been encouraged by a parent. But it must be recol
lected, that to his only parent all this appeared little less than idleness, or
perhaps worse than idleness, a dangerous appropriation of time. Reared,
himself, in a very retired part of the country, his intercourse had been almost
exclusively with a sect who habitually and conscientiously dreaded whatever
could withdraw the mind from religious contemplation, or create a rivalship
in the heart between this world and the next. By the sole advantage of a
strong mind, he had reared himself from indigence to independence, and
from obscurity to a kind of distinction, which in his view was preferable
to all others, that of " the chief seat in the synagogue." It is not then to
be wondered at, if, never having himself tasted the delights of mental im
provement, he could not form a correct idea of its fa -cinating influence ; or
if, from his long habit of preaching to others the infinite superiority of divine,
when compared with human knowledge, it was with apprehension, rather
than pleasure, he comtemplated this fondness of his son for miscellaneous
reading. Yet he did not check him ; his assiduous discharge of his full share
of the duties of the mill, the forge and plantation, left the father no grounds

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 11
to charge him with idleness or neglect of duty ; and by a mutual under- chap.
standing, working and reading went on together without jostling against each ^-^-^
other. Nay, at the expiration of a year or two the beseeching looks, some
times entreaties, but more than all, dutiful behaviour and industrious habits of
a son in whom he could not conceal his pride, induced him to look out for
a master for the approaching winter, who possessed acquirements much
superior to those of the teachers previously employed.
Fortunately his choice fell upon a Mr. Maxwell, the father of several respec
table men of that name now living, and to him Greene was indebted for
the little Latin he ever acquired. But a study which brought into exercise
nothing but memory was not to his taste ; and after three months diligent
application, the Latin books were laid aside and never afterwards resumed.
New objects had opened on his mind, the nature and uses of the exact
sciences had been explained to him by Mr. Maxwell, and the anvil rung until
he had made himself master of an Euclid.
This was a store for a long feast ; and although the master was of course
dismissed for the summer, yet Euclid was not dismissed with him. With
surprising facility and rapidity, he made himself master of geometry and its
application to surveying and navigation. The pursuit of truth, unclouded by
a doubt, and conducting him to usefulness, and, perhaps, eminence, had
charms for our hero, which threw altogether in the shade, the mere amuse
ment of books.
In the school of Euclid it was that he acquired those clear distinct con
ceptions, which, it will be seen, distinguished his pen. Nature had given him
the weapons, but geometry taught him to use them with skill and effect.
And the exercise to which his mind was now subjected, prepared it to master
with facility, several other studies, to which his attention was soon after
directed. It was not until his sixteenth or seventeenth year, that he possessed the
advantage of an acquaintance with one, competent to direct his studies or
inform his judgement in the selection of books. His good fortune about this
time introduced him to two men, who afterwards acquired some eminence in
the literary world. These were President Stiles, of Yale College, and
Lindley Murray, well known as the author of Murray's Grammar, and several
other popular works.
Stiles was, at this time, established minister to one of the churches in
Newport. There was a shaloupe attached to the Potowome Mills, in which
the anchors were transported to Newport for sale. In this boat Greene had
worked his passage to Newport, to lay out his earnings in the purchase of a

12 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. book. It happened, that Stiles was in the bookstore when Greene entered,
^^^and informed the bookseller, " he wished to purchase a book." What book?
asked the merchant. The long pause that ensued, caused Stiles to turn about,
and discover a Quaker boy, in the plainest costume of his sect, with a hat
and coat, bearing unequivocal marks of the mill and the forge, but a fine
florid ingenuous countenance, suffused with the deepest blush. His ignorance
and inability to choose, Avith a consciousness of his very limited capacity to
gratify a choice, rushed so forcibly upon his recollection when the question,
What book? was proposed to him, that his embarrassment was extreme.
Stiles saw it, and benevolently resolved to relieve him. He knew human
nature, and gradually insinuated himself into the confidence of the abashed
boy, until he drew from him sufficient information to direct his choice. This
was the commencement of a mutual confidence and esteem, which lasted
through life. Greene was invited to his house, and ever after venerated him
as a father. Stiles saw and encouraged his avidity for knowledge, and gave
a direction to his taste and application, which relieved him from all future
embarrassment on similar occasions. These are the sendees, which make the
most indelible impression on an ingenuous heart. Unexpected and gratuitous,
they are hailed as boons from heaven. And depraved as the human heart
may be, it is seldom that man forgets his early benefactor. The young, with
a proper degree of modesty and merit, are ever grateful for the countenance and
support of the grave and the aged. The transit from the privacy of a parent's
roof, to the bustle and vicissitude of actual life, is attended by a degree of appre
hension and anxiety, that solicits the patronage of the veterans of society. And
little, very little encouragement is often of infinite importance in facilitating
the entrance of modest merit into life. The young feel that their claim is a
moderate and just one ; to refuse it, disgusts and dispirits them; whilst their
warm and ingenuous feelings magnify the obligation, where it is cordially and
spontaneously bestowed. In acknowledging obligations conferred at this
period, men refer to it as the time " when they had no friend."
It was a real acquisition to Greene to have made a friend of Dr. Stiles.
He was no longer at a loss where to look for information, or to whom to
submit his early crude conceptions. And a visit to Newport became now
a very interesting object. The means he made use for this purpose, were
perfectly in character. He soon made himself a skilful boatman, and got
preferred to the captaincy of the shaloupe. This gave him frequent oppor
tunities of conversing with his friend, and of poring over the books that
crowded the shelves of the bookseller. Yet it was never unattended with a
sigh, drawn from the inquiry, " Shall I ever command all these ?"

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. IS
But labour had hitherto supplied him with the scanty reading he had chap.
enjoyed ; labour might acquire wealth, and wealth would command the trea- v^-v~^/
sure before him. These reflections stimulated his exertions, and rendered him
indefatigably laborious. It is a fact, that he has been known to grind off
the calosity from his hands at the grind-stone, to render them more pliant,
when small work was to be done ; and such were his efforts at the heavy
work of the forge, as to produce the lameness which attended him through
fife. The position of the right foot of the anchor-smith at the forge, is pre--
cisely that in which his right foot became permanently fixed, from no other
cause than his persevering efforts at this laborious business. Yet, at this very
time, he was studying Watts' Logic, Locke on the Human Understanding, and
Ferguson on Civil Society; and was even attentive to, what is shamefully
neglected in most of our learned institutions, writing a good hand, and
acquiring a critical knowledge of arithmetic and orthography. The comple
tion of a load of anchors to take to Newport, was always to Greene a joyful
event, and it was on one of these visits, that he casually met with Lindley
Murray. Murray was of a respectable Quaker family in the city of New York. His
father was a man of more than ordinary intelligence, and becoming sensible
of the disadvantages their sect laboured under from want of members pos
sessing education, he had liberally afforded his son every opportunity of
instruction. Young Murray was now on an excursion to the eastward, on a
visiting tour to the settlement of Friends, in that quarter of the country.
Greene seized with avidity the opportunity of taking him with him to his
father's ; and Murray was so delighted to find a congenial soul in the young
miller, that an intimacy ensued, and a mutual esteem was created that never
subsided. From Murray's funds of knowledge it may well be supposed, that Greene
did not fail to draw largely. The following winter, he prevailed on his
father to permit him to visit Murray in New York ; and on that occasion,
gave another specimen of that decisive turn of mind, which, in after life, be
came so conspicuous. It is well known how much the small-pox was dreaded
at that time. Injudicious treatment had made it a most formidable disease;
and passing through it, was considered a crisis in human life. Greene saw
the importance of passing that crisis ; he felt that he was not destined to spend
his life in the obscurity of Potowome, and as the small-pox was then in New
York, he availed himself of that opportunity to be inoculated for it. The
blemish in one eye was the result of contracting that uiseaoe.

1.

14 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Thus passed the days of our hero until he reached his twentieth year. It
j must not be supposed, notwithstanding his extraordinary application, that he
partook not in common with the companions of his youth, of the sports and
amusements adapted to his time of life. Before he became absorbed in study,
his eminence in the sports and exercises of the country proved that he partook
of them largely. And nothing of moroseness, or indifference to join in, or
contribute to the enjoyment of others, followed upon the change given to the
direction of his thoughts. He was of a cheerful turn of mind, and even the
sprightly dance would have been a favourite amusement with him, but for the
utter abhorrence entertained by his stern father for this carnal indulgence.
Yet, as it led to female society, of which he was passionately fond, his sense
of duty, and dread of an athletic arm, were not altogether sufficient to resist
the influence of this allurement. A descent from the eves of the house was
found practicable, and scandal says, that Nathanael Greene could be gay
among the gayest. When the long winter evening gathered the village youth
around the social hearth, and when the sprightly violin was expected to
enliven the social group, he would seldom fail to risk his neck to partake of
the amusement. He was too much the favourite among the village lasses, not
to receive regular and authentic intelligence on these subjects. Yet the vigi
lance of the argus who watched over his morals, and who fondly looked
forward to him as a successor on the floor of the meeting-house, could not
always sleep. Actual detection soon followed suspicions, and nothing but the
timely and military interposition of a rearguard, promptly thrust up his clothes
under cover of night, could have protected his back from the pain of severe
castigation, inflicted by an angry father.
The mind of man, even in his earliest years, revolts at unnatural and
unnecessary privation. Children well know when they are justly treated •
and in pursuit of the indulgences adapted to their years, exhibit a perseve
rance and ingenuity under opposition, which are too apt to lead to habits of
obstinacy, disobedience, and deception.
In time, the Spartan discipline of the father prevailed; and aided by his
own strong moral sense, and the resources for amusement which he found in
books, his habits became perfectly subdued and regular. Nay, very early in
life, in imitation of the frugal habits of Lacedemon, he adopted the most
abstemious regimen: a single cup of tea or coffee was his breakfast, and for
the rest of the day, one solid meal sufficed. This was altogether spontaneous.
Nor was he less a disciplinarian than his father. By common consentj
notwithstanding he had senior brothers, he was generally viewed as second in
command. And when the old gentleman was absent, which he sometimes

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 15
was, on a circular visit to the Quaker establishments, the younger boys found chap.
it no time of respite from labour. It was a common cause, and every asso- s^v-^
ciate must do his duty, under the same penalties which had been so forcibly
inflicted at times by the commander in chief. Yet he was just in his severity,
or intended to be so, and no enmity ensued. As much harmony and love
prevailed, as was consistent with good government.
During this time, his reading was of necessity very miscellaneous. He
read every book that came in his way, and exhibited a disposition to select,
only when his little earnings were to be appropriated, and a permanent acces
sion made to his scanty library. Swift was among his favourite authors, and
he always -endeavoured to imitate the strong, chaste, and lucid style of this
author. Nor did he fail ; for he wrote with facility, in the clear and manly
style of this author, from the earliest time of which any specimens of his
correspondence are preserved.
The works of Swift, and of all the most eminent writers of the Eng
lish Augustan age, were added to his library, as soon as he could accumu
late the means of procuring them ; and he had taste to enjoy their contents,
and a mind and application to make their wisdom his own. The reading of
history he was particularly devoted to, and the survivors of those who per
sonally knew him, are unanimous in expressing their surprise at the generality
and minuteness of his historical knowledge. Indeed, he never spent a day,
whilst a book could be procured, without reading something ; and even during
the most busy scenes of the war, after all the necessary business of the camp
was dispatched, he commonly read till midnight.
But at the period of which we are speaking, there was a new direction
given to his inquiries, and in addition to his other pursuits, he actually
acquired a very tolerable stock of legal knowledge.
By the death of his two brothers by the first marriage, his father became
involved in a lawsuit, on a question which elicited all the abstruse learning on
contingent remainders and executory devises. The father began already to
feel the superiority of the son, and he gladly delegated to him the superinten
dence of a business so wholly new to himself. This introduced him to courts
of justice, and to an acquaintance with the gentlemen of the bar ; and as he
seldom failed to acquire the esteem of those who knew him, he soon formed
a general acquaintance among a class of society hitherto new to him, but
in whose conversation and company he soon took great delight. He became
fond of attending at the sittings of the courts, and, at length, added second
hand copies of Blackstone's Commentaries, and Jacob's Law Dictionary to
his library. With these, he sat down seriously to the study of the law.

16 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Without the most distant intention ever to follow it as a profession, he promptly
v^-v-^./ saw, that in a country where every member of society is a member of the
administration, a general knowledge of the principles of its jurisprudence is
indispensable to him who would become an useful or conspicuous citizen.
To him, too, it Avas a new journey of discovery; every hill he ascended,
opened new views to him, and though sterile as the sands, they had novelty,
and the consciousness of still adding something to his stock of knowledge
to recommend the pursuit to him. He saw, also, that it was of the greatest
importance to keep up an acquaintance with the class of society to which he
had been thus recently introduced. Their manners were those of gentlemen,
and furnished him with a model, which he must imitate, should he ever enter
into a more enlarged sphere of life. He accordingly prevailed upon his
father to invite them occasionally to his house, when the court sat in East
Greenwich, and thus formed an acquaintance with many respectable men,
with whom he had afterwards to associate, during the trying scenes of the
revolution. And his promptness at observing, and facility at imitating, ena
bled him soon to acquire much of that easy and courtly address, which can
only be acquired by mixing with the cultivated classes of society.
Greene was in the twenty-third year of his age, when the celebrated stamp-
act became the subject of general investigation. Politics had hitherto occu
pied very little of his attention; his ambition had scarcely ever been excited
but by a hope, which his modesty still threw to a fearful distance. The
religious tenets of his ' sect, his own humble employments, his age, and want
of education, all conspired to detach him from the thoughts of entering imme
diately into public life. But it was not to be expected, that his ardent mind
should be insensible to the general excitement produced by that threatening
measure of the British ministry. He soon .caught the flame that had spread
over the American continent, and, as was his habit, sat down very seriously
to study the subject, so as to master it maturely. The authors on politics and
jurisprudence of that day, were familiarly quoted in the newspapers and public
declamations; and more studied and canvassed than, perhaps, even at present.
The discussions of the times of the commonwealth, were still in the recollec
tion of all, particularly the descendants of those, who, about that time emi
grated to this country. The various revolutions of a hundred eventful years
of English history, had firmly established the constitutional, or rather civil
rights of the English subject. The charter of James I. to the people of Virginia,
which, on this point, was considered as the Magna Charta of America,
secured all those rights to the American colonists. Although, in the reign of
that monarch, those rights were very weakly established, or indistinctly under-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 17
Stood, a series of important events had now fixed them on a basis which was chap.
not to be shaken. The sturdy republicans who had swarmed to the United v^-v-^.
States, understood them well, and had, moreover, very distinctly given their
sovereigns to understand, that they were ready to fight to maintain them.
Their principles and their knowledge, were carefully transmitted to their pos
terity ; and, equally removed from the fascinations and impositions of royalty,
the elevated sentiments of the best days of Greece, of Rome, and of England,
existed in high preservation among a large proportion of the American people.
In the little circle in which Greene moved, this was particularly the case.
Not even the dampening effect of rigid Quakerism, could suppress the feeling
of republicanism, which always exhibited itself in that quarter. They were
almost to a man related to each other, and the regular descendants of Gorton's
persecuted followers. To them, the feelings and opinions of their ancestors
had been transmitted, in many a winter's evening's conversation, and the
very name of oppression, struck upon a chord that vibrated to every heart.
When it was, that a part of Greene's family became Quakers, is not known,
but originally they were not so, nor were they ever all so. And of those who
were, they generally must have been of that description commonly denomi
nated fighting Quakers. The original proprietor of the Potowome Mills, had
recently sold out to Greene's father, (his copartner and younger brother,) to
pursue a military career as an officer in the Canadian war. And whatever
may have been the severity of the father's tenets, there was no one of the
sons who hesitated at braving the anathemas of the meeting, when summoned
away by the sound of the drum.
In the midst of such society, it would have been wonderful, if the ardent
mind and warm feelings of our hero had not become deeply interested in the
discussions of the day. He soon became firmly convinced of the justness of
the American cause, and as firmly resolved to take part in the opposition.
But, as yet, the effects of early habit and education hung too heavily upon him
to admit of his aspiring to military command.
It was not long before an event occurred, which wholly changed the direc
tion of his thoughts, and pointed out to him the career for which heaven had
destined him.
The sons were now generally well grown, and the vigour, skill, industry,
and fidelity of eight such labourers, showered down wealth upon the venerable
parent. He resolved to extend his business, and accordingly purchased
another mill-seat at Coventry, in the same neighbourhood, eight or ten miles
distant from Potowome. 3

18 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. To the charge of this establishment Nathanael had been advanced, and he
^rt^, was admitted to a participation in the profits of the concern. This to him
was a most enviable change; it gave him the command of money, and that
was the command of books. In a few years, he accumulated a library of two
hundred and fifty volumes ; which, at that time, in that remote place, was
viewed as a prodigy. It also gave him, comparatively, a command of time.
And one of the uses he made of that time, decided his fate.
In the year 1773, the states had begun seriously to organize and discipline
their militia; and a grand parade was announced to take place at Plainfield,
in Connecticut, not far distant from the Coventry Mills.
Military parades, and assemblages leading to idleness, had always been
prohibited to the sons, as sternly as cards or dancing. But the day arrived,
the country was all moving towards the gala scene, and Greene could not
resist the impulse. He mounted his horse, and galloped away with the rest.
And here he first saw an assemblage of men, " in all the pomp and circum
stance of glorious war." From that time, he could think of nothing else. It
was in vain that the father reprimanded severely, and the church threatened
to throw him over the wall; nothing could afterwards prevent him from
devoting his thoughts to a military life.
Military books became now a necessary of life, and it was not to be
expected, that his early friend and mentor, Dr. Stiles, could direct him, or
would encourage him in this study; he was left to grope in the dark. Acci
dent threw in his way Marshal Turenne's works, and Sharp's Military Guide ;
and under these two preceptors he entered himself a disciple of Mars. From
these books his attention was directed to others on the same subject, and by
the aid of his friend in New York, and occasional trips to Newport, he was
enabled to make a respectable collection of military books. Plutarch now
became his bosom companion; a translation of Caesar also afforded him a
treasure of amusement and information ; and with a military eye he read and
studied the history of all the wars of celebrity, both ancient and modern.
But the vigilant eye of the peaceful disciples of John Fox did not let the
visit to Coventry pass unnoticed. He was duly summoned to answer for this
breach of ecclesiastical rule, and warned, that he must discontinue such prac
tices, or be debarred the privilege of mingling his dust with theirs. The
charge against him, as it stands on the minutes of the monthly meeting, is
that of " attending a place of public resort, where he had no proper business."
A committee was duly appointed " to visit him on the subject," and that
committee reported, " that they had treated with him, but he had not given
any satisfaction as yet." Still, however, the door of repentance was kept

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 19
open to him ; but, after holding the subject for several months under advise- chap.
ment, the meeting despaired of recalling the prodigal, and entered in their ^t~*.-
minutes the following record of his final doom : "As he has not given the
meeting any satisfaction for his outgoing and misconduct, therefore this meet
ing doth put him from under the care of the meeting, until he make satisfac
tion for his misconduct."
Such satisfaction was never made, for in this conflict of duties he wisely
decided to obey the calls of his country. Yet he always entertained the most
pious veneration for the sect, and never let pass an opportunity of doing
towards them a civil or benevolent action. He always, in fact, professed
himself a Quaker, but modelled his duties as such, to the state of society in
which God and nature had placed him. Yet he not unfrequently afterwards
had occasion to charge some of the sect with making their peace principles
subservient to their political or avaricious views. Of what sect are there not
hypocrites ?
He had been established but a few years in Coventry, when he was elected
to represent the county in the state legislature. This was in the year 1770.
And from that time, even until after he took command of the southern army,
he was uniformly returned as a member from the same county. His military
engagements whilst in the army, of course prevented his attendance as a
member, except on extraordinary occasions ; but he had, by that time, acquired
a popularity in the state, and a distinction as a commander, which made his
constituents unwilling to give him up.
At the Coventry Mills a genteel establishment was prepared for him ; and
he led, for several years, a studious and retired life. Yet order, neatness,
industry, and hospitality reigned in his house ; and the fame of his acquire
ments and of his library, was already diffused through the state. There is
still living a highly respectable gentleman of that state, who has filled several
conspicuous offices, who remembers to have visited him in this place, in search
of some_rare book which could not be procured in Providence. His object,
Was his only introduction ; but the social converse of one evening fastened his
affections on his hospitable and interesting entertainer, for the residue of his
life. He is himself a man of liberal education, and at that time filled the
place of a professor in the college. He was, therefore, competent to judge of
the mind and acquirements of his new acquaintance, and was often after
wards heard to declare, " Mr. Greene was a very extraordinary man." Of
his habits of early rising, he well remembers this particular. That being
under the necessity of reaching Providence at the hour of recitation, he apolo
gized over night to his host for the necessity he was under of leaving the house

20 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, before the family would be up in the morning. But what was his surprize at
.^r-^u finding in the morning the table neatly set, his breakfast ready, and Greene
at the fireside poring over a book, before daybreak.
This habit of early rising had heen early inculcated on him by his father.
He invariably adhered to it through fife, and the consequence with him, as
with all early ris ,rs, was, that he was always beforehand in his affairs. Few
men have prospered in the world, or enjoyed vigorous health, good appetites,
well ordered houses, and unclouded tempers, who were not early risers.
" The morning speeds the traveller and the plough." Greene found, or made
a sufficiency of time for labour, for study, and for the society of his friends ;
nor was he inattentive to his duties to society. The first school ever estab
lished at Coventry, was set up under his auspices, and it was his constant
habit to persuade and assist all around him to improve every opportunity of
acquiring useful knowledge of every kind. Thus occupied, he advanced to
his thirty-fourth year.
But there is a void in the heart of man that woman only can fill up. His
circumstances now admitted of his marrying, and the object of his choice
yielded to his solicitations.
In July 1774, he married Catharine Littlefield, then in her eighteenth year.
A lady of respectable connexions, an agreeable person, sprightly, interesting,
and intelligent, and altogether an exceedingly engaging woman. To the sub
stantial enjoyment of life, there was now nothing wanting. But the political
horizon bore a portentous aspect, and public duty was soon to claim him from
the arms of his family.
As a member of the legislature, he had taken a decided part against the
royal government, and the firmness, public spirit, and great good sense which
he displayed on all occasions, had acquired for him a highly respectable
standing in that body. He seldom spoke, for a consciousness of his want of
early education hung upon him, and rendered him diffident. But when he
did, his manner was bold, commanding, and unembarrassed, and he was
listened to with marked attention. Yet he was often employed on important
committees. And on one occasion, when envoys were to be sent to Connec
ticut to concert measures preparatory to arming for defence, he was one of the
delegates selected. This was a dehghtful opportunity to Greene to visit his
early and venerable friend, Stiles, then President of Yale, and he gladly
embraced it. An entry on the minutes of the legislature shows, that his
expenses on this mission amounted to ten pounds, about thirty-three dollars.
Such were the frugal habits of the men of that day.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 21
It was in the Kentish Guards, and in the year 1774, that Greene first chap.
assumed the panoply of the soldier. He had now thrown off the respectable ^^-^
dress which, with many excellent qualities and correct opinions covers a few
tenets not adapted to this sublunary world. The corps that he had joined, was .
organized under a law of the state, in imitation of the British Guards, and
their captain took the rank of colonel. It was composed of the most respect
able young men of the country, the sturdy yeomenry, the companions of his
youth. And never, perhaps, in the same number of men, did there exist more
excellent materials for a military corps. More than thirty of them bore com
missions afterwards in the revolution, and several became highly distinguished
officers. Greene proposed himself as a candidate for a lieutenancy, but did
not succeed. His Quaker education most probably prevented him. Yet,
unabated by this defeat, his military ardour felt nothing of the dampening
influence of disappointment, but displayed itself in a devoted attention to
excel in all the discipline and manoeuvres of a single corps. An opportunity
soon presented itself of exhibiting a specimen of that daring and decisive turn
of mind, tempered with proper wariness and caution, which so eminently
qualified him for military command.
The year 1 774 was a year of very extraordinary excitement throughout the
United States. Great Britain had wholly thrown off the mask, and the
necessity of open resistance was obvious. Arming and disciplining was the
order of the day. It was the amusement of the young, and even the hoary
head assumed the casque and _plume, in a late novitiate, for the approaching
contest. Good fire-arms were very scarce, and as every individual provided
for himself, it became an object of soldierly pride to procure the best. The
Kentish Guards, in common with other corps, felt the inconvenience, and
Greene more particularly, found it impossible in the country to equip himself
in a suitable manner. Nor did any place but Boston offer a prospect of sup
plying his wants. He soon formed his resolution, and as promptly carried it
into effect. An old account due by a customer of his father was the pretext,
and an old coat and hat of the true Quaker cut, well marked with the evi
dences of his calling, furnished the passport which introduced him into the
streets of Boston.
Here a new and interesting object caught his attention. The town, was full
of British troops. Morning and evening they were regularly paraded, and
here were lessons to be received, that could be acquired no where else in the
United States. A protracted and perilous residence in Boston was the conse
quence; every motion and manoeuvre was carefully observed and noted
down; and in a few days he acquired a stock of military knowledge, that as

22 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
many months would not have taught him in any other place. In the mean
time, he had found means to purchase a musket and accoutrements, probably
from a deserter ; and as the intercourse between the town and country was
still kept up, he managed to bribe a waggoner to conceal his purchase in the
straw in the bottom of his waggon. Thus were they safely transported beyond
the British posts, whilst he cautiously followed at a distance, anxiously watch
ing the success of his adventure. Fortune also threw in his way another boon,
which proved of no small utility in training the corps of which he was a
member. This was an experienced British serjeant, a deserter whom he either
brought out of Boston with him, or met with on the road, which, is now
forgotten. But the man is still remembered, and his excellence as a fugleman,
gave a taste and style to the discipline of the guards, which is still the subject
of eulogium.
On the next parade Greene made his appearance with his new musket and
his drill-master, and the adventure being soon noised abroad, acquired him no
small eclat among his compatriots. The musket is still in the family, after
having been faithfully used, and almost superstitiously guarded for more than
forty years.
Another event not long after occurred, which afforded him a new oppor
tunity of exhibiting his spirit and zeal in the cause he had espoused.
On the 19th of April 1775, in the memorable affair of Lexington, the soil of
America first drank the blood of her sons, shed by the hands of Englishmen.
The combat was warmly kept up the whole day r and before night Rhode
Island was alarmed with the intelligence, that the people of Massachusetts
were engaged in mortal affray with the English troops. The whig; corps all
beat to arms, and the Kentish Guards took up the line of march for Boston.
Unfortunately, Wanton, the Governor of Rhode Island at that time, was very
much of a loyalist, and was not at all pleased with this exhibition of spirit in
the Kentish Guards. Their rout lay through Providence, the place of his
residence. He very soon dispatched a message after them, ordering them
back. They received it with indignation, but the officers did not feel them
selves at liberty to refuse obedience. Not so with Greene ; at all hazards, he
was resolved to fly to the assistance of the whigs, and having communicated
his intention to three of his most trusty friends, including one of his brothers
the four immediately procured horses, and with reeking spurs, hastened on to
Boston. But it was too late ; the British army that night retired into Boston
and the intelligence met his gallant little band before they had passed quite
half way of their intended journey.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 23
By this time, the corps began to acknowledge that they were ignorant of chap.
the character and just claims of the man whom they had rejected as their ^~v~^
lieutenant. His superiority and spirit became obvious to all, and the example
he set of zeal and discipline as a private, convinced them, that he who knew
so well how to obey, must be qualified to command. Many of them had soon
an opportunity of giving a shining example of candour and disinterestedness
toward him.
It was now obvious to all, that the struggle between the colonies and the
mother country, must end in an appeal to the sword. Great Britain persisted
in her odious assertions of power, and the means to which she had resorted to
enforce its exercise, plainly avowed, that she considered the colonies as holding
their lives, liberties, and fortunes at the will of a despotic parliament. Such
measures could only have been intended to drive the colonies to open resist
ance, in order to furnish a plausible pretext for actual subjugation. Such has
often been the policy of rulers. In producing the state of things which justi
fied the attempts of the ministry to sweep away before her armies all the
chartered rights of the colonists, the ministry were successful; but heaven
denied to them the fruition of its expected consequences.
Immediately after the battle of Lexington, the Massachusetts legislature
resolved on collecting an armed force, and confining the British under Gage
to the limits of Boston. Deputies were dispatched to Rhode Island and Con
necticut, demanding their co-operation. The request was promptly complied
with, and Rhode Island proceeded to organize what was called her " army of
observation." This consisted of sixteen hundred men, enlisted till the 31st of
December 1775. In officering this army, it is a very singular circumstance,
that the eyes of all should have been turned upon an humble private in the
Kentish Guards. No better evidence of the degree to which Greene grew
upon all who became acquainted with him can be adduced, than this highly
honourable selection; his subsequent conduct proved the judgement of the
men who chose him. Among those who were selected as officers under him,
were several of the officers of the Kentish Guards. The captain of the
Guards, who ranked as colonel, was elected a colonel in the new levies, and
the celebrated Christopher Greene, the hero of Red Bank, was one of his
majors. General Varnum was of the same number. Such were the virtues
and self-denial of the times. Men whose after-conduct bore ample testimony
to their high worth and understanding, cheerfully surrendered the sensitive
feelings of military pride to the good of the country ; and superior to the daz
zling influence of self-love or vanity, could forego their just claims of prefer-

24 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
ence in favour of one in whom they had sense to discover, and magnanimity
, to acknowledge superior talents for command.
The astonishing rapidity with which the Rhode Island contingent was
raised, organized, and marched to the scene of action, adds infinite credit to
the patriotism of the state.
Indeed, when posterity shall distribute justice with impartial hand among
the states, Rhode Island, diminutive as it is in territory, will stand pre-emi
nent for the spirit and vigour with which she supported the revolutionary war.
It was not with her the cause of Massachusetts; there was nothing to be
ascribed to contiguity or consanguinity; jealousies and ill will had prevailed
between these two states. Rhode Island viewed Massachusetts as the op
pressor and persecutor of her forefathers, and Massachusetts, in addition to
the feelings which accompany a consciousness of having done an injury, never
cordially forgave the Rhode Islanders, for having eluded her claims of domi
nion. These early causes have left their traces so deeply engraven, that to
this day there is a want of cordial feeling plainly to be discovered, at least,
among the less enlightened classes in these two states. But every disagreeable
recollection was magnanimously sacrificed by Rhode Island. And in the short
space of forty-eight days, at the requisition of Massachusetts, she raised,
officered, equipped, and marched to the rendezvous, sixteen hundred men, of
as high promise, and as well disciplined and officered, as any that were assem
bled. Rhode Island has not yet had her historian to palliate her faults, and
blazon her fame in the eyes of posterity. But when one shall arise, he will
find other events beside this to relate highly to her honour. The great states
of Virginia and Massachusetts are contending for the honour of having led in
the revolution, but perhaps, upon inquiry it will be found, that the first daring
and decisive act was done in Rhode Island. This was in taking possession of
the king's artillery, as soon as the proclamation reached them prohibiting the
exportation of arms and ammunition from Great Britain ; and openly, by an
act of the government, encouraging the importation from other quarters, of the
articles necessary to equip themselves for war. And even in declaring for
independence, Rhode Island took the lead of most, if not all, the states. In
April '76 this bold and decisive step was taken, in the midst of internal dis
tention, and under the eye of a powerful British army. A tribute of respect
was also paid that state by the common enemy, which no other state can
boast of. Long as the British army was in possession of Newport, they made
no seriour efforts to reduce the country. And very cautious were they at all
times, how they ventured from the security of their insular situation and
entrenchments. The more credit is due this state, also, from having both the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 25
•governor and lieutenant-governor decided loyalists, so that the secretary of chap.
state, the first whig in the descending line, was obliged to sign the commis-,
sions of the officers ; and all other acts of the whigs were authenticated in the
same manner.
It was in May 1775 that Greene was elected commander of the Rhode
Island contingent of the army of observation ; and such was the avidity with
which the hardy yeomanry of that country enrolled themselves under his
standard, that in a very few days his command was complete. Much of this
no doubt is attributable to the popularity of the cause, but it cannot be
doubted, that his own high standing in the confidence of his fellow citizens,
and that of the officers selected to serve under him, contributed greatly to fill
up his ranks. He was soon ready to depart in his new career ; his brothers
cheerfully undertook to discharge his part of the common duty, and in the true
character of this primeval family, the business went on as usual for the com
mon account.
His father was now dead, and the brothers had continued the business of
the forges and mills, harmoniously participating of the proceeds as each stood
in need; fully confiding in each other's integrity and moderation. No jealous
distrust, no wrangling settlements ever took place among them; but when the
common chest was full to overflowing, some purchase was made by eommon
consent, or some addition to their living or accommodations. It is a very
singular fact, and almost unprecedented in these times of commerce and of
lust of wealth, that the two brothers, who at present own the Potowome Mills,
have toiled together for sixty years, and reared and set out their families, living
in common, and having never had a statement of accounts in all that time,
nor ever intending to have one. Yet their business has been lucrative and
extensive. Such are the benign effects of purity of heart and disinterested
ness of conduct. It was in a school like this, that Greene acquired his habits
of self-devotion. Accustomed from early fife to consider himself only as a
member of a little community, to labour for the common interest, and covet
no enjoyment but what he was ready and desirous of participating in common
with his fellow labourers, selfish feeling, that foul destroyer of all virtue and
all happiness, was in him early subdued, or perhaps never felt. The motives
that govern the hearts of men, are soon discovered by the discerning, through
the veil too commonly thrown over human actions ; often before the individual
is himself conscious of their full effect in influencing his conduct. Nothing
attaches the hearts of men, or commands their confidence so much as that
dignified simplicity of conduct which results from a consciousness that we
have no motive to conceal, and not a wish inconsistent with the just claims
4

26 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, of others. When these quahties are blended with a strong mind, quick parts,
^s^, and a cultivated understanding, they form the most happy combination for
public usefulness. Hence Greene never failed to acquire not only the confi
dence, but the affections of all who became acquainted with him. And it
may be truly said of him, that he never lost a friend, whose worth entitled
him to that honourable appellation, nor public esteem, but whilst his character
was obscured by calumny or misconstruction.
The most honourable proof of this observation is to be found in the fast
hold he ever held in the esteem and confidence of the commander in chief.
Washington soon distinguished him among the numerous military acquaint
ance introduced to him before Boston. There is a sympathy between talents
- and integrity, by which those who possess these quahties intuitively discover
them in others. And in addition ; there was in our hero a calmness that
nothing could ruffle, a firmness that nothing could shake, and a deference of
manner and inviting openness of countenance, that ever rendered him a favo
rite with his officers and soldiers. It will be found in the course of these pages,
that he became the object both of admiration and of individual attachment
to most of the celebrated men, both natives and foreigners, who figured in the
American revolution ; and there are living witnesses who have heard the late
General Hamilton declare, that he wanted nothing but an education to have
made him the first man in the United States. General Hamilton no doubt
meant, with the exception of the commander in chief, and uttered himself
with his characteristic warmth, not a little heightened by individual feeling ;
for Greene's quick eye had first marked him out for future celebrity.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 27

CHAPTER II.

Camp before Boston. Correspondence.

.LjAMENTABLE was the defect of military knowledge prevailing in the chap.
states at the commencement of the revolution. The commander in chief ^^L^
himself, might, without disparagement, as a practical soldier, be pronounced
ignorant: all the service he had ever seen was in a few desultory campaigns
against the wandering tribes of our forests; but his fine combining head,
comprehensive mind, and analytic turn of thought, supplied the defect of
experience. Yet, he too had to learn in the school of adversity.
All the military knowledge of the country was to be found in a few soldiers
of fortune, who had sought retirement in the shades of our forests, or were
attracted hither by the prospect of employment, or the more honourable motive
of supporting the cause. In the instance of our hero, it must be acknow
ledged that he was promoted to a command for which he was yet to qualify
himself. The sequel proved, that it was not vain presumption which stimu
lated him to accept it ; upon the most modest estimate, he was as well quali
fied as any other the state of Rhode Island could have furnished, and the
" sting and goad of genius" impelled him to the effort for which nature had
designed him ; and in which, with an humble dependence on the God of
armies, he flattered himself with the hope of serving his country, while he
acquired an honest fame.

28 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. It was on the 6th of June 1775 that Greene assumed his "command before
•-*-v-^ the lines of Boston. From this time, his history becomes identified with that
of the coimtry; but the reader is not to expect that under the title of Sketches
of a life, the writer of these pages means to impose upon him a minute history
of the American war. It is not in a general history, that delineations of
character can be brought together so as to present them to the eye in a com
bined view. What is indispensable shall be presented, but brevity shall always
be consulted. We have chosen the date of General Greene's appointment to the
command of the southern army, as a resting point from which to review his
progress from early life ; and after tracing his course up to that event, we shall
follow him through his brilliant, but short career to the grave. A succint view of
the leading events of the revolutionary war becomes indispensably necessary »
Through this alone can we be understood when refering to the part our hero
acted in the transactions of that period. But the thrice told tale shall not
arrest the reader any farther than is indispensable to the explanation of his
part of the drama, or of a fair view of some of the events of the war, derived
from materials not yet furnished to the historian. General Greene's conduct
as a military man has been long before the world and often canvassed; but as
his own correspondence has never before been submitted to historical scrutiny,
it is with confidence we assert, that even his military conduct has never been
fully explained, or duly appreciated. So also with his private and confidential
correspondence. The cabinets of all his most intimate friends have been open
to us, and to us alone. It is here alone that the private man is to be traced
out. Here there is no affectation; the picture is not glossed over for public
exhibition; what he was, and how he thought, and how he wrote, can be
inquired into without one fear of deception. He, in common with all other
men who have acted a conspicuous part in life, had at times his enemies ; his
conduct was misunderstood, misinterpreted, or misrepresented; nor did he
escape the commission of faults. These are subjects that must claim the
particular attention of his biographer. But here the writer must be indulged
with one apology. The most discouraging circumstance attending his inqui
ries on the subject now before his readers, has been the utter imposibility of
eliciting from any one who was intimate with Greene, the acknowledgement,
that he had a fault. That modern biography has degenerated from the dignity
of history into abject, often venal eulogy, is a palpable truth. We look with
more dread on the possibility of this work's incurring the same imputation,
than on any other subject of criticism or censure. But, whether General
Greene's faults have been lost in the high reputation to which he attained, or
sunk or forgotten in the ardour of affection in which his memory is cherished

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 2<
by all who knew him ; certain it is that they have been sedulously, nay, im- chap.
portunately inquired after by the writer, but almost or altogether in vain. If ^~J~+.
he has discovered any, they are very few, and very venial, and such as would
scarcely be recognized as faults in any other. Much more easy, and certainly
more pleasant was the task, of discovering evidence to acquit him of the crimes
which had been unjustly imputed to him in public opinion. Here, inquiry
has not been restrained by that indignation which, in his lifetime, prevented
him from giving to the public the proofs of his innocence.
The latter part of 1775 and beginning of 1776, were passed before Boston in
a state of comparative inaction. The British were about 8,000 strong, after
the arrival of Howe, Burgoyne, and Clinton ; and the force of the Americans
at no time exceeded 15,000. The latter had neither discipline, arms, nor
powder to attempt the reduction of the former ; and the British remembered
too well the stone walls that lined the road to Concord, and the entrenchments
of earth and staw that crowned the summit of Breeds' or Bunker's Hill, to
attempt any enterprize against the American lines. They had learned to
respect the deadly aim of the undisciplined militiaman, when he imagines
himself protected from his adversary's bayonet.
The post assigned Greene, on his arrival in camp, was Prospect Hill, an
important point in the centre of the left wing, or northern extremity of the
American line. And at or near the same point he continued to command,
until some time after the arrival of General Washington.
On the 3d of July 1775, the commander in chief, General George Wash
ington, arrived and assumed the command of the American army. It was
the fashion of the day to welcome him by a formal address, and Greene, as
the military chief of the state to which he belonged, very cordially complied
with the received custom. This was the era of his introduction to an ac
quaintance with the commander in chief; and from this day to the close of
their invaluable lives, no two men ever more cordially confided in each other.
Washington's discerning eye, which never was deceived in character, how- •5"°"
ever policy might impose silence; soon discovered the sound judgement, de
voted zeal, and military cast of character of the Rhode Island commander.
The head-quarters were at Cambridge, and Greene's post at a little distance
to the left of that place. As the enemy was then posted, (being chiefly on or
near Bunker's Hill,) this position was among the most important on the line,
and its proximity to the residence of the commander in chief, placed the
conduct of Greene particularly under the view of his commander; whilst the
advanced positions assigned to the Rhode Islanders on the extreme left at
Winter Hill and Lewell's farm, suggests, that previous to the general's arrival.

II.

30 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, both the commander and his men had acquired the confidence of their bro-
, ther soldiers. We are in possession of a communication from a member of
General Washington's family, whilst he lay before Boston, which contains this
encomium on the Rhode Islanders and their commander : " His command
consisted of three regiments, then the best disciplined and appointed in the
whole American army."*
The congress of the United States, having resolved to place the troops before
Boston on the continental establishment, soon after appointing the commander
in chief, also appointed and commissioned four major generals and eight
brigadiers. Of the latter, Greene was the eighth in rank, and although he
held the rank of major general under the state commission, having now re
solved to devote himself to a military life, he accepted of an inferior appoint
ment, which promised more enlarged scope of action, and the pleasure of
serving under the immediate command of Washington.
In the new arrangements of command which necessarily took place after
these appointments, that of the two brigades posted on the extreme left at
Winter Hill, the nearest post to the enemy, was delegated to Greene and Sul
livan, the latter being also one of the newly appointed brigadiers.
In this subordinate command Greene found not enough of employment to
occupy his industrious habits and ardent mind. Close application to the
study of his profession, filled up his leisure hours. He was indefatigable in
training his brigade, and one of his letters boasts of the proficiency of two of
the regiments of his Rhode Islanders, those of Varnum and Hitchcock, both
excellent officers, and afterwards distinguished men in the revolutionary war.
The change of habits, of life, and increased exposure at night, brought
upon him about this time, a severe attack of the jaundice. To a man who
had never in his life been sick, this was a serious occurrence ; in a letter to his
brother on the subject, the burthen of his complaint is not, his suffering under
disease, but the necessity of taking medicine, and above all, the fear that the
army would march into Boston without him.
This, it is well known, had been resolved on in a council of war, and would
certainly have been attempted, had the ice in Cnarlestown Bay ever become
hard enough to bear the army. For several days the hope was seriously
entertained, that this opportunity would have been afforded, of exhibiting
their spirit and zeal in the hazardous enterprize. Fortunately (probably) for
the American people, the event on which it depended never occurred. And

* Gov. Read's Heads of Biography of Greene.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 31
notwithstanding the opportunity afforded the enemy for striking an effective chap.
blow, while Washington dismissed one army and embodied another under ^!^
their very guns, the enemy lay quietly within his trenches until the 17th of
March 1776, when he embarked his whole force for New York.
It is a fact, that on the day of the expiration of the term of service of the
troops composing the army of observation, which was the 31st of December
1775, Washington could not have brought 5,000 men into action. But his
vigilance and judicious manoeuvres concealed from the enemy the dangers of
his situation, and the bustle of marching and countermarching was made to
present the appearance of an accession, instead of a diminution of strength.
The avenues of information were carefully guarded by the much dreaded rifle,
and the hearts of the people were with him, or he could not have concealed
from a vigilant foe, a transaction unexampled in the history of warfare.
Whilst Greene lay before Boston, his mind was actively engaged in promot
ing the great cause in which he had embarked. His letters to his friends
breathe a fervour for the general good, and exhibit a degree of foresight and
intelligence in the choice of means to attain it, that make a selection from
them worthy of a place in the memory of posterity. Mr. Samuel Ward, who
had been governor of the state, was then a delegate in the continental con
gress, and the general's elder brother, Jacob Greene, an active and influential
whig, was chairman of the committee of safety in Warwick. These were
among his most intimate friends and correspondents. At this time, he had
not many ; for his range in life had hitherto been very limited. A few ex
tracts from his first letters, written some time after making his debut on the
revolutionary theatre, will show that he was new in life, while they furnish a
few authentic incidents of the revolutionary war.
From General Greene to Jacob Greene, Esq.
" Rhode Island Camp, June 2d, 1775.
" I arrived in camp on Saturday last, and found it in great commotion. A
few days longer in the state of excitement in which I found our troops, would
have proved fatal to our campaign. The want of government, and of a cer
tainty of supplies, had thrown every thing into disorder. Several companies
had clubbed their muskets in order to march home. I have made several
regulations for introducing order, and composing their murmurs ; but it is
very difficult to limit people who have had so much latitude, without throwing
them into disorder. The commissaries had been beaten off at my arrival,
and were about returning home the next day. I believe there never was a

32 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, person more welcome who was so little deserving, as myself. I wish you
.^^ would forward Colonel Varnum's regiment; he will be a welcome guest in
camp. I expect much from his and his troops' example,"
From the same to the same.
" Rhode Island Camp, June 2.8th, 1775.
" The hurry I have been in, and the numerous employments I am called
to, have left me no opportunity to write to you.
" I regret it the less, as I am confident that you have heard every day from
the camp, and almost every particular transaction here, with jnany that never
were transacted here or any where else.
" The particulars of the late battle (of Bunker's Hill) have, been differently
represented. Sometimes the enemy have lost a hundred, sometimes a thou
sand ; and now it is up to fifteen hundred. I believe, from the best accounts I
can collect, that they suffered a loss nearly equal to the last accounts. Many-
officers fell in the action. The Welsh Fusileers, the finest regiment in the
English establishment, is ruined ; there are but one captain and eleven privates
left in the regiment. It is said, that if some regiments on our side had done
their duty as well as others did, the regulars must have suffered a total defeat,
and would never have got possession of the entrenchments. Upon the whole,
I think we have little reason to complain. There were but about fifty killed
on our side, thirty made prisoners, and sixty wounded. I wish we could sell
them another hill, at the same price.
" The regulars are now encamped on Bunker's Hill, and our people on
Prospect and Winter Hills; both strongly entrenched. Our people are in
good spirits, but regularity and discipline are much wanted. Our own troops
are raw, irregular, and undisciplined ; yet, bad as they are, they are under
much better government than any troops round about Boston. There are
some officers in each regiment who exert themselves to bring the camp under
regulations. There are some captains, and many subaltern officers, who
neglect their duty ; some through fear of offending their soldiers, some through
laziness, and some through obstinacy. This makes the task of the field offi
cers very laborious. I have warned them of their negligence many times,
and am determined to break every one for the future, who shall lay himself
open to it.
" My task is hard, and fatigue great. I go to bed late, and rise early.
The number of applications you cannot conceive of, without being present to
observe the round of business. But hard as it is, if 1 can discharge my duty

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. S3
to my own honour and my country's satisfaction, I shall go through the toil chap.
with cheerfulness. My own officers and soldiers are generally well satisfied ; v^v^.
nay, I have not heard one complaint.
" The general officers of the neighbouring camps treat me with the greatest
respect ; much more than my station or consequence entitles me to. Were I
to estimate my value by the attention paid to my opinions, I should have great
reason to think myself some considerable personage. But fatal experience
teaches me every day, that mankind are apt to pay deference to station and
not to merit. Therefore, when I find myself surrounded by their flattering
attentions, I consider them as due to my office, and not to me. I shall study
to deserve well, but cannot but lament the great defects I find in myself to
discharge with honour and justice the important trust committed to my care.
You know I never made much parade, nor was ambitious of raising people's
expectation higher than I had reason to hope my conduct would be answer
able to. The world in general are too good judges not to learn the true merits
of men, after being furnished with an opportunity to inspect them. I hope God
will preserve me in the bounds of moderation, and enable me to support my
self with proper dignity, neither rash nor timorous, pursuing a conduct marked
with manly firmness, but never bordering on phrenzy."
It will be recollected, that in the year 1775 the hopes of accommodation
with the mother country were not yet relinquished by many of the leading
men in America. Short-sighted politicians thought Great Britain would yield,
as in the affair of the stamp-act; and did not perceive, that she had now
rested from war, and digested her plan for reducing the colonies to a state of
absolute dependence on the will of parliament. The free charters of some of
the states were viewed with particular jealousy. The proprietary governments
had generally been bought out, or seized as forfeited, and royal charters sub
stituted for them ; and it was no doubt an interesting object to bring all parts
of the colony to the same state of subjection, which existed where the king
appointed to the army, the chief magistracy, and the judiciary. This, which
was at first only an opinion drawn from facts, and was not avowed by the
British government, was in the course of the war fully detected.*

* In a letter taken on board of one of the prizes, and published to the world. This prize was
the British packet for North America, captured by the French ; and the letter was published in
the Amsterdam Gazette. It was dated Whitehall, March 7th, 1781, from William Knox, Esq.
secretary to Lord George Germain, to James Simpson, Esq. The following is an extract.
5

34 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. The eyes of many were wilfully shut against conviction ; and the confidence
^t^-^a of others in the integrity of the ministry, rendered them willing to submit to
present usurpation without fearing that it would be extended farther ; whilst
some had selfish objects to govern their conduct. The better-informed saw,
that the late encroachments of the British government were but the prelude to a
gradual advancement to absolute despotism. Of this number was Greene ;
nor did he hesitate about the alternative, or desist from pressing upon others
the necessity of a declaration of independence. And with the necessity of
that measure his ready mind soon discovered the means indispensable to
achieving it.
It will be recollected, that the battle of Bunker's Hill, which shed such a
ray of glory round the Massachusetts' militia, produced a delusion in the
public mind, which had nearly proved fatal to the American cause — a blind
implicit reliance on the efficiency of undisciplined troops. In the midst of the
men who had acquired such glory, in the sight of the spot that had been hal
lowed by their devotion, in the very height of exultation and eulogy, his mind
was not to be borne away by the popular impulse. It will be found, that he
even anticipated the warning voice of Washington against the danger and
impolicy of the prevailing sentiment, and pressed upon his correspondents the
necessity of making the war in every sense a common undertaking, — to
enlist troops for the war, and enlist them at once as an act of the congress,
without delegating the work to the states by assigning to each a specified
quota. Unfortunately, these opinions were not the fashion of the day. De-
claimers had excited an alarm at the idea of a standing army, and short
enlistments, and contingents of militia, brought the country to the brink of
ruin. Fortunately, heaven shielded us from the effects of our own folly, in
sending us men to command whose genius was prolific in resource, and Avhose
bravery and patriotism were proof against mortification and defeat: and public
virtue enough to bear up against every misfortune.

" When I consider from the deplorable condition of the rebellious forces, and our great supe
riority, that the inhabitants of the revolted provinces will probably solicit for a negociation, and
perhaps such a request may come from congress itself, I wish you to be present; for, knowing
your perfect acquaintance with the dispositions of the inhabitants to republican principles, and
their aversion to monarchy, it may be in your power to prevent making any concessions that
may tend to keep up those principles among the inhabitants, and to see that no alteration be
made in their constitutions, as it is intended to establish among them distinctions of rank, and
new model their government by that of Great Britain." — An. Reg. 1781, Appendix to Chronicle
254.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 35
The subjoined letters will be given to the reader without apology, as they chap.
serve to show the style of writing, turn of thought, and habit of feeling of the v^^J^
individual whose character we are delineating. We shall frequently have occa
sion to copy similar letters into these pages, wherever they serve to present
some trait of character, or furnish an original view of some event of the revolu
tionary war. This is a deviation from the design with which this undertaking
was entered upon, but it has been adopted upon mature reflection. The two
little volumes of official letters written by General Washington, are destined to
survive the many volumes that have been written on the American war, and
to present to the world the best eulogy on his character, as well as the most
authentic history of his times.

General Greene to Governor Ward.
" Camp on Prospect Hill, June 4,th, 1775.
" Dear Sir,
" Your kind favour of the 23d last is now before me. I am extremely
happy to find your views so affectionately extended to the combined interests
of the united colonies. Your apprehensions that George III. is determined, at
all hazards to carry his plan of despotism into execution, is fully confirmed by
his late gracious speech to both houses of parliament. In that, you will find,
he breathes revenge, and threatens us with destruction. Indeed, it is no more
than common sense must have foreseen long since, had we not been blinded
by a too-fond attachment to the parent state. We have consulted our wishes,
rather than our reason, in indulging the idea of accommodation. Heaven has
decreed that tottering empire to irretrievable ruin, and, thanks to God, since
providence has so determined it, America must raise an empire of permanent
duration, supported upon the grand pillars of truth, freedom, and religion,
based upon justice, and defended by her own patriotic sons.
" No doubt a large army must be raised in addition to the forces upon the
present establishment. You are acquainted with my sentiments upon that
head already. How they must be divided, and where stationed, is a matter
at present problematical. However, one thing is certain, the grand body
must be superior in number to any force the enemy can send. All the forces
in America should be under one commander, raised and appointed by the same
authority, subjected to the same regulations, and ready to be detached wherever

36 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, occasion may require. Your observation with regard to the Canadians has
^JI^a often struck me ; that their attachment to the one party or the other will
greatly depend upon the superiority of force. To prevent which in some
measure, and fix them to the common interest, let us raise one or more regi
ments of Canadians to serve in New England, and send an equal number
into Canada from the states, in addition to what you have proposed. With
regard to the scanty measure dealt out to the army upon the new establish
ment, we are not altogether different in sentiment. Yet I am convinced the
regiments will fill to their full complement. I believe they are more, upon an
average, than half full already. Undoubtedly the detaining of arms, being
private property, is repugnant to many principles of civil and natural law, and
hath disgusted many.* But the great law of necessity must justify the expe
dient, till we can be otherwise furnished. The pay of the soldiers is certainly
generous, and the officers likewise, except the field officers, whose pay is much
below that of any others, considering their rank and experience, and it will
operate to excite an opinion derogatory to their merit.
" My dear sir, I am now to open my mind a little more freely. It hath
been said that Canada, in the late war, was conquered in Germany. Who
knows but that Britain may be, in the present controversy! I take it for
granted, that France and Spain have made overtures to the congress. Let us
embrace them as brothers. We want not their land force in America ; their
navy we do. Their commerce will be mutually beneficial ; they will doubt
less pay the expense of their fleet, as it will be employed in protecting their
own trade. Their military stores we want amazingly. Those will be articles
of commerce. The Elector of Hanover has ordered his German troops to
relieve the garrisons of Gibraltar and Port Mahon. France will of conse
quence attack and subdue Hanover with little trouble. This will bring on a
very severe war in Germany, and turn Great Britain's attention that way.
This may prevent immense expense, and innumerable calamities in America.
" Permit me, then, to recommend from the sincerity of my heart, ready at all
times to bleed in my country's cause, a declaration of independence; and call
upon the world, and the great God who governs it, to witness the necessity,
propriety, and rectitude thereof.

* The arms of the militia were detained by General Washington when they had served out
their tour of duty before Boston and were replaced by others. Most of the latter came in un
armed, and there were no other means of supplying the want.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 37
" My worthy friend, the interests of mankind hang upon that truly worthy chap.
body of which you are a member. You stand the representative, not of,,^^^,
America only, but of the whole world ; the friends of liberty, and the sup
porters of the rights of human nature.
" How will posterity, millions yet unborn, bless the memory of those brave
patriots who are now hastening the consummation of freedom, truth, and
religion! But want of decision renders wisdom in council insignificant, as
want of power hath prevented us here from destroying the mercenary troops
now in Boston. Frugality, a most amiable domestic virtue, becomes a vice
of the most enormous kind, when opposed to the common good. The tyrant
by his last speech has convinced us, that to be free or not, depends upon our
selves. Nothing, therefore, but the most vigorous exertions on our part, can
shelter us from the evils intended us. How can we, then, startle at the idea
of expense, when our whole property, our dearest connexions, our liberty, nay,
life itself is at stake : let us, therefore, act like men inspired with a resolution
that nothing but the frowns of heaven shall conquer us. It is no time for
deliberation ; the hour is swiftly rolling on when the plains of America will
be deluged with human blood. Resolves, declarations, and all the parade of
heroism in words, will not obtain a victory. Arms and ammunition are as
necessary as men, and must be had at the expense of every thing short of
Britain's claims.
" An army unequipped, will ever feel the want of spirit and courage ; but
properly furnished, fighting in the best of causes, will bid defiance to the united
force of men and devils. When, a finishing period will be put to the present
dispute, God only knows. We have just experienced the inconveniences of
disbanding an army within cannon-shot of the enemy, and forming a new one
in its stead. An instance never before known. Had the enemy been fully
acquainted with our situation, I cannot pretend to say what might have been
the consequence. A large body of troops will probably be wanted for a con
siderable time. It will be infinitely safer, and not more expensive in the end,
for the continent to give a large bounty to any number of troops in addition to what
may be ordered on the present establishment, that will engage during the war,
than to enlist them from year to year without a bounty. And should the present
regiments be inclined to engage for the same term, let them receive the same
encouragement. There is not the least prospect of our being able to disband
and form a new army again, without the enemy's availing himself of the
advantage. " I have taken the liberty to show your last letter to General Lee, whose
knowledge of Europe, and American genius and learning, enable him to give

38 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, you the advice you want. He has written you fully on the subject; it would
"' be mere arrogance in me to say any thing upon the subject, after he has taken
up the pen.
" I this day manned the lines upon this hill, and feel a degree of pleasure
that I have not felt for several days. Our situation has been critical. We
have no part of the militia here, and the night after the old troops went away,
I could not have mustered seven hundred men, notwithstanding the returns of
the new enlisted troops amounted to nineteen hundred and upwards. I am
now strong enough to defend myself against all the force in Boston. God
bless you and preserve you. " Adieu, &c."
From the same to the same.
"Prospect Hill, October 16th, 1775.
" It gives me great pleasure to hear that the troops from Rhode Island
stand as high in public esteem as the troops of the neighbouring colonies. I
have spared no pains, night or day, to teach them their duty. How far I have
succeeded, I leave to his excellency to say. Colonel Varnum and Colonel
Hitchcock are excellent disciplinarians.  knows nothing about it,
and never will.
" With regard to paying the troops part of their wages, and the committee
part, it will be productive of a multitude of inconveniences. The colonels
can retain part of their wages for their families at home ; the people may give
orders to those who supply their families to receive it. This will give less
dissatisfaction, and answer every salutary purpose. A man from each town
or county may undertake to supply the families of those that are engaged in
the army. The colonels are the best judges of the prudence and good economy
of their soldiers ; those who behave well, and make a prudent use of their
money, want no agent ; for they will receive monthly payments, and such parts
as they can spare for the support of their families, can easily be conveyed
home. As the troops are considered continental and not colonial, there must
be some systematical plan for the payment, without any reference to any
particular colonies; otherwise, they will be partly continental, and partly
colonial. His excellency has a great desire to banish every idea of local
attachments. It is next to impossible to unhinge the prejudices that people
have for places and things which they have long been connected with. But
the fewer of those local attachments which discover themselves in our plan
for establishing the army, the more satisfactory it must be to the southern

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 39
people. For my part, I feel the cause, and not the place. I would as soon go chap.
to Virginia,. as stay here. I can assure thcgentlemen to the southward, that ^J^,
there could not be any thing more abhorrent to  , than an union of
these colonies for the purpose of conquering those of the south.
" The pay and provision of the troops cannot be lowered at present; they
do not feel themselves under a necessity to enter the service for the support of
themselves and families, and, therefore, would refuse to enlist again. This
might produce a recess at the termination of their present enlistment, which
would be dangerous to the liberties of America. At some future period, if the
people are obliged to resort to the army for employment, such a measure might
be prudent and practical, but by no means at present. The committee from the
congress arrived last evening, and I had the honour to be introduced to that
very great man, Dr. Franklin, whom I viewed with silent admiration during
the whole evening. ' Attention watched his lips, and conviction closed his
periods.' Colonel Harris is a very facetious, good humoured, sensible, spirited
gentleman ; he appears to be calculated for military employment. Mr. Lynch
was much fatigued and said but little, but appeared sensible in his inquiries
and observations. You may depend upon our paying the gentlemen every
mark of respect and attention during their stay.
" I had the pleasure to hear from your son Samuel, the 26th of September.*
He was at Fort Weston, just going to set off on their journey. All in health
and good spirits. I had the same apprehensions with regard to Samuel's
health and strength to endure the fatigues of such a campaign, as you had. I
advised him to decline it ; but the heat of youth, and the thirst of glory,
surmounted every obstacle, and rendered reasoning vain and persuasion fruit
less. Colonel Christopher Greene is gone with him. His going made me
the more readily consent to your son's going. I gave the colonel a particular
charge to lend him a helping hand in every case of difficulty, and he promised
that his aid should never be wanting. By several letters from Quebec, things
wear a promising appearance there. If the expedition succeeds, and we get
possession of Canada, we shall effectually shut the back door against them.
And I make no doubt of keeping them from entering at the front. You may
depend on my influence to obtain Charles a commission in the new establish
ment."

* These officers had volunteered under Arnold. A considerable proportion of these volun
teers were from the Rhode Island troops. Colonel C, Greene is best known as the hero of Red
Bank.

40 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap.
n- From th» mme to the same.
"Prospect Hill, October 23d, 1775.
" An express arrived from Casco Bay last evening, bringing an account
that the enemy had been firing a day or two upon Falmouth. What has
been the consequence we have not heard. The enemy had orders to burn
Falmouth and Portsmouth, unless the inhabitants would deliver up their arms,
and give hostages for their future good behaviour. Truly, 'their tender
mercies are cruelties.' Will not this brutal conduct rouse a spirit of indigna
tion throughout America? Such a shocking scene as was exhibited at Bristol,
you cannot conceive of. The people of Newport are all moving into the
country. The night after Wallace returned from Bristol* the confusion in
Newport was nearly equal to what it was there. Captain Wallace has made
the inhabitants the following proposition : ' If they will supply his vessels with
fresh provisions, beer, &c. and remove the troops from the island, he will
spare the town; but, if they do not comply with these conditions, he has posi
tive orders to lay it in ashes, which he is determined to execute.' What will
be the event, God only knows. There is a committee from Newport down
here to see Governor Cook, to get an order for the removal of the troops, and
liberty to furnish the ships with fresh provisions. The matter was laid before
the continental committee, who advised furnishing the ships with fresh provi
sions, but not to remove the troops off the island, which, I suppose, will take
place. But there appears a strange hobble in our gait. Here, we are at
loggerheads ; in other places, only sparring, and others again, are in perfect
tranquillity. Here, we are cutting them off from fresh provisions, and remov
ing the stock from the island, which amounts to a perfect depopulation;
while at New York, Philadelphia, and many other parts of America, their
ships are supplied with every thing they stand in need of, and live in the midst
of peace and plenty. If we are to be considered as one people, and they as
the common enemy, upon what principles are they so differently treated in
different governments? Oh, could the congress behold the distresses and
wretched condition of the poor inhabitants, driven from the seaport towns, it
must, it would kindle a blaze of indignation against the commissioned pirates
and licensed robbers. They would not be permitted to find rest or an abiding
place in America. The fate of kingdoms depends upon the just improvement

* Bristol was sacked by Wallace.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 41
of critical minutes. Suffer not the noble ardour to slacken for want of action, chap.
nor smother the generous flame for want of fuel. The temper and feeling of s^-v^,
men can be wrought up to a certain pitch, and then, like all transitory things,
they sicken and subside. This is the time for a wise legislator to avail himself
of the advantage which the favourable disposition of the people gives him to
execute, whatever sound policy dictates. It is not in the province of mortals
to reduce human events in politics to a certainty. It is our duty to provide
the means to obtain our ends, and leave the event to Him who is the allwise
Governor and Disposer of the universe.
"The state of Rhode Island from its situation must suffer amazingly; the
stock which lies exposed to the enemy's ravages would be a plentiful supply
for their troops in Boston. An object so considerable will not escape their
attention. Without doubt they will attempt to avail themselves of the advan
tage. The situation of the island affords the means, and the attempt must be
successful, unless some provision be made to frustrate their measures. As their
defeat is a general benefit, it is but just that it should come within the line of
a genera] charge against the continent. Fresh provisions will be of infinite
service to the troops in Boston. If they do not provide some very fine anti-j
scorbutics, they must suffer amazingly by the scurvy. By two captains of
vessels who came out of Boston the day before yesterday, we learn that it is
extremely sickly ; eight or ten are buried every day. Cold weather coming on
with the scurvy locked up in their blood, from eating salt provisions, must
produce a prodigious mortality. Nothing can heighten their distress so much
as cutting them off from fresh provisions. Therefore, I think it a subject
worthy public attention, to lend a helping hand to Rhode Island to secure the
stock on the island. It must be grievous to the inhabitants to be subject to
such an expense themselves, and unjust, seeing the whole continent are to be
benefited by its consequences.
" The committee has been closely engaged in forming a plan for regulating
the army. I hope when the army is re-enlisted, and the best of the officers
selected, the troops will be under better regulation. The number agreed on
may be larger than may appear necessary. But when you consider how raw
and Undisciplined the troops are in general, and what warlike preparations are
going on in England, and how necessary it is to have a good army in die
spring, and the favourable prospect we shall have of making ourselves masters
of Boston this winter, I doubt not you will cheerfully concur in the establish
ment. The general officers agreed upon 20,000. What number the com
mittee has determined upon I have not heard, but make no doubt they will
approve of the number agreed to by the generals.
6

42 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. « I wish we had a large stock of powder, that we might annoy the enemy
^^s^u wherever they made their appearance. We could easily, in my opinion, drive
them out of Boston if we had the means, but for want thereof we are obliged
to remain idle spectators ; for we cannot get at them, and tiiey are determined
not to come to us. However, I hope ere long fortune will favour us agreeably
to our wishes.
" I hinted in my last that people began heartily to wish a declaration of
independence. I would make it treason against the states to make any further
remittances to Great Britain, and stop all supplies to their shipping. We had
as well begin in earnest at first as at last, for we have no alternative but to
fight it out or be slaves. We should open our ports to all who have a mind
to come and trade with us. But it will be necessary to keep a check upon
commerce, lest it take the lead of military pursuits. The merchants are
generally a body of people whose god is gain, and their whole plan of policy
is to bring public measures to square with their private interest.
" The French will never agree to furnish us with powder as long as there
is the least probability of an accommodation between us and Great Britain ;
the alternative is a separation from Great Britain, or subjugation to her. In the
latter case, Great Britain as a nation will receive little or no advantage from
the colonies, for slavery is ever unfriendly to trade, and trade is the strength
and sinews of Great Britain. Therefore, France, as a real enemy to Great
Britain, acts upon a true plan of policy in refusing to intermeddle, until she is
satisfied that there is no hope of accommodation. Then she can interpose
with propriety to lend us a helping hand. Should France undertake to fur
nish us with powder and other articles, and the breach between Great Britain
and the colonies be afterwards made up, she would incur the hostility of her
rival, without reaping any solid advantage."

From the same to the same.
" Prospect Hill, December 10th, 1775.
" In my last I mentioned to you, that the troops enlisted very slowly in
general. I was in hopes then that ours would not have deserted the cause of
their country. But they seem to be so sick of this way of fife, and so home
sick, that I fear the greater part, and the best of the ttoops from our colony
will go home. The Connecticut troops are going home in shoals this clay.
Five thousand of the militia, three from this province, and two from Hamp
shire, are called in to take their place. There is a great defection among their

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 43
(the Connecticut) troops, but from the spirit and resolution of the people of chap.
that province I make no doubt they will furnish their proportion without delay. >^~^~^,
New Hampshire behaves nobly ; their troops engage cheerfully. The regi
ment raised in the colony of Rhode Island has hurt our recruiting amazingly ;
they are fond of serving in the army at home, and each feels a desire to pro
tect his own family.
" I harangued the troops yesterday; I hope it had some effect; they appear
of a better disposition to-day; some have enlisted, and others discover a
complying temper. I leave nothing undone or unsaid that will promote the
recruiting service. But I fear the colony of Rhode Island is upon the decline.
There have been, and now are some unhappy disputes subsisting between the
town and country interest, and some wretches, for the sake of a presents-popu
larity, are endeavouring to widen the breach, to build up their own conse
quence to the prejudice and ruin of the public interest. God grant that they
may meet with the disgrace they deserve!
" This province begins to exert itself; the general court has undertaken to
provide for the army, wood, &c. Their troops begin now to enlist very fast.
They are zealous in the country to engage in the service.
" I sent home some recruiting officers, but they got scarcely a man, and
report that there are none to be had there. No public spirit prevails ; I wish
you and your colleague were at home a few days, to spirit up the people.
Newport I believe, from the best intelligence I can get, is determined to ob
serve a strict neutrality this winter,' and in the spring join the strongest party.
I feel for the honour of the colony, which I think in a fair way, from the
conduct of the people at home and the troops abroad, to receive a wound.
It mortifies me to death that our colony and troops should be a whit behind
the neighbouring governments in private virtue or public spirit.
" I have been strengthening this hill, in order, that if the soldiery should not
engage as cheerfully as we expected, I might be able to defend it with a less
number." _,

From the same to the same.
" Prospect Hill, December 18th, 1775.
" The army is filling up slowly; I think the prospect is better than it has
been. Recruits come in out of the country plentifully, and the soldiers in the
army begin to show a better disposition, and to recruit cheerfully.

44 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. " Your observation is exceedingly just. This is no time for disgusting the
¦^--.'s^, soldiery when their aid is so essential to the preservation of the rights of
human nature, and the liberties of America. His excellency is a great and
good man, I feel the highest degree of respect for him. I wish him immortal
honour. I think myself happy in an opportunity to serve under so good a
general. My happiness will be still greater, if fortune gives me an opportunity
in some signal instance to contribute to his glory and my country's good.
" But his excellency, as you observe, has not had time to make himself
acquainted with the genius of this people ; they are naturally as brave and
spirited as the peasantry of any other country, but you cannot expect veterans
of a raw militia from only a few months' service. The common people are
exceedingly avaricious ; the genius of the people is commercial from their long
intercourse with trade. The sentiment of honour, the true characteristic of a
soldier, has not yet got the better of interest. His excellency has been taught
to believe the people here, a superior race of mortals ; and finding them of the
same temper and dispositions, passions and prejudices, virtues and vices of the
common people of other governments, they sink in his esteem. The country
round here, set no bounds to their demands for hay, wood, and teaming. It
has given his excellency a great deal of uneasiness that they should take this
opportunity to extort from the necessities of the army such enormous prices.
" The general has often expressed to me his uneasiness about the expenses ; they
so far exceed the expectations of congress. He is afraid they will sink under
the weight of such charges. Economy is undoubtedly essential in this dispute ;
there should be no wanton waste of public property ; but if you starve the
cause, you protract the dispute. If the congress wish to put the finishing
stroke to this war, they must exert their whole force at once, — give every
measure an air of decision. I pray God we may not lose the critical moment.
Human affairs are ever like the tide, constantly on the ebb and flow. Our
preparations in all parts of the United States ought to be so great, as to leave
no room to doubt our intentions to support the eause and obtain our conditions..
This will draw in the weak and wavering, and give such a turn to the minds-
of people, that small shocks shall not be seriously felt in the general plan of
operations. Your proclamation in answer to that of the king's of August last,.
is glorious, is noble; was it unanimous, or only the voice of a small majority?
The papers announce to you the much greater part of the military operations
here. " From the best accounts we can get out of Boston, they are prodigiously
distressed. It begins to be very sickly; the scurvy discovers itself, the small
pox prevails, and general Howe is inoculating all the soldiery who have never

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 45
had it. I think they cannot hold out the winter through, though we were to chap!
leave them unmolested, which God grant we may not. ^r^J^^>
" It is reported that Quebec is taken. General Montgomery and Colonel
Arnold will acquire immortal honour. Oh, that we had plenty of powder; I
should then hope to see something done here for the honour of America!
" Our barracks are almost completed. Blankets and clothing will be very
much wanted, notwithstanding your supply from congress. The Connecticut
troops are gone home ; the militia from this province and New Hampshire
are come in to take their places. Upon this occasion, they have discovered a
zeal that does them the highest honour. New Hampshire behaves nobly."
From the same to the same.
" Prospect Hill, December 31st, 1775.
" You entreat the general officers to recommend to the congress the giving
of a bounty. But his excellency General Washington has often assured us,
that the congress would not give a bounty, and before they would give a
bounty, they would give up the dispute.
" The cement between the northern and southern colonies is not very
strong, if forty thousand lawful, will induce the congress to give us up.
Although I do not imagine that the necessity of allowing a bounty would
have broken the union, yet it was a sufficient intimation that the bare mention
was disagreeable. Can you think we should hesitate a moment to recommend
a bounty, if we thought ourselves at liberty to do so? We should then have
an opportunity of picking the best men, filling the army soon, keeping up a
proper diseiphne, and preserving good order and government in camp ; while
we are now obliged to relax the very sinews of military government, and give
a latitude of indulgence to the soldiery incompatible with security of either
camp or country. What reason have you to think that a proposition of that
sort, if it came recommended by general officers, would be acceded to by the
congress? Most of the generals belong to the northern governments; if the
congress refuse to hear their delegates, I apprehend they would the generals
also. The congress cannot suppose that the generals are better acquainted
with the temper and genius of this people, than the delegates are from these
provinces ; and why they should refuse to hear you, and not us, 1 cannot
imagine. " A good politician will always have an eye to economy, but to form an
extensive plan, and not provide the means for carrying it into execution,
betrays either a defect in counsel, or want of resolution to prosecute.

46 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE;
chap. "There is nothing that will encourage our enemies, both external and
^J^, internal, like the difficulties we meet in raising a new army. If we had given
a good bounty and raised the troops speedily, it would have struck the minis
try with astonishment to see that four colonies could raise such an army in so
short a time. They could not expect to conquer a people so united, firm, and
resolutely determined to defend their rights and privileges. But, from the
difficulties we meet with, the confusion and disorder we are in, the large
number of the soldiers who are going home, our enemies will draw a conclu
sion that we are like a rope of sand, and that we shall soon break to pieces.
God grant it may not be the case.
" You misunderstand me, my dear sir, or I wrote what I did not mean. It
was not the lower class of people that I meant to complain of, but the mer
chants and wealthy farmers, who, I think, do not exert themselves as they
ought. This is no time for getting riches, but to secure what we have got.
Every shadow of oppression or extortion ought to disappear ; but instead of
this, we find many articles of merchandize enhanced in price four times the
first cost, and most of them cent per cent. The farmers are extortionate
wherever their situation furnishes them with an opportunity. These are the
people that I complain most of; they are wounding the cause. When people
are distressed, it is natural for them to try every thing and every where to get
relief; and to find oppression instead of relief, from these two orders of men,
will go near to driving the poorer sort to desperation. It will be good policy
in the united colonies to render the poorer sort of people as easy and happy
under their present circumstances as possible ; for they are creatures of a day,
and present gain and gratification, though small, has more weight with them
than much greater advantages at a distance. A good politician must and will
consider the temper of the times and the prejudices of the people he has to
deal with, when he takes his measures to execute any great design.
" The current sentiment in the New England colonies generally favours the
opposition ; but if the distresses of the people are multiplied, their opinions
may change. They will naturally look back upon their former happy situa
tion, and contrast that with their present worse condition, and conclude that
the source of all their misery originates in their dispute with Great Britain.
" If all the maritime towns throughout the united colonies had a body of troops
in continual pay, it would, in a great measure, remedy this evil. Provision
must be made for those who are throion out of employ by the decay of trade. If
they are not engaged for us, necessity will oblige them to engage against us ;
for they cannot five upon the air. What signifies our being frightened at the
expense! If we succeed, we gain all; but if we are conquered, we lose all;

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 47
not only our present possessions, but all our future labours will be appropriated chap.
to the support of a haughty, proud, insolent set of puppies, whose greatest v^-^^,
merit with the crown will be, to render the people as completely humble as
possible. " I agree with you, that congress should embody seventy thousand men —
all the troops raised in the different colonies to be upon continental pay, and
where there are any stationed for the protection of any particular province,
to be considered as a detachment from the grand army, and all in every
province to be subject to the commander in chief, and at his disposal and
discretion. A body of troops in each colony would support the spirited, con
firm the weak and wavering, and awe our oppressors into submission. For
there are no arguments, however well supported by truth and reason, that
carry such conviction with them as those which are enforced from the muzzle
of a gun, or the point of a bayonet.
" If the southern and northern troops were exchanged, it would be service
able to the cause. It would in a great measure cure the itch for going home
on furlough, and save the continent the needless expense of paying a large
body of troops that are absent from camp.
" You complain and say the New England colonies are treated ill. Why
are they treated so? You think there ought to have been a bounty given.
The congress always had it in their power to give a bounty if they pleased.
Why were not the New England delegates sent to establish the plan for the
constitution of the new army? Why were strangers sent at so critical a
period ? History does not afford so dangerous a measure as that of disbanding
an old army and forming a new one within point blank shot of the enemy.
This task was rendered very difficult by the reduction of eleven regiments,
and the discharge of such a number of officers who have done every thing to
obstruct and retard the filling the new army, in hopes to ruin the establish
ment and bring themselves into place again.
" From whence originates that groundless jealousy of the New England
colonies? I believe there is nothing more remote from their thoughts than
designs unfavourable to the equal rights of the other colonies. For my own
part, I abhor the thoughts, and cannot help thinking it highly injurious to the
New England people, who ever have been distinguished for their justice and
moderation. I mentioned this subject to Mr. Lynch and Colonel Harrison,
who assured me there was no such sentiment prevailing in congress, nor
among the southern inhabitants of any respectability. I am sorry to find
they were mistaken. It grieves me that such jealousies should prevail. If
they are nourished, they will sooner or latter sap the foundation of the union

43 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, and dissolve the connexion. God in mercy avert so dreadful an evil! How
^^l^, unhappy is it for the interests of America, that such colonial prejudices should
prevail, and partial motives influence her councils ! The interests of one
colony are no ways incompatible with the interests of another. We have all
one common interest, and one common wish to be free from parliamentary
jurisdiction and taxation. The different climates and produce of the colonies
will ever preserve a harmony amongst them by an active trade and commerce.
Each colony will have the benefit of its own staples, whether they are inde
pendent or connected with Great Britain.
" Governor Franklin [of New Jersey] and the assembly go on with a high
hand. His impudence and the congress' silence astonish all this part of the
world. To suffer such presumption to go unpunished, betrays a want of spirit
to resent or power to punish.. The dignity of the congress ought to be held
sacred, or else its authority will soon be brought into contempt. His conduct
is calculated to breed a mutiny in the state ; such budding mischiefs cannot be
too early nipped ; diseases that might have been easily remedied if seasonably
attended to, have often been rendered incurable by being too long neglected.
I wish this may not be the case here.
" This is the last day of the old enlisted soldiers' service. Nothing but
confusion and disorder reign. We are obliged to retain their guns, whether
private or public property. They are prized, and the owners paid ; but as
guns last spring ran very high, the committee that values them sets them much
lower than the price they were purchased at. This is looked upon to be both
tyrannical and unjust. I am very sorry that necessity forces his excellency to
adopt any measures disagreeable to the people. But the army cannot be pro
vided for in any other way; and those we detain are very indifferent; gene
rally without bayonets, and of different sized bores. Twenty thousand troops
with such arms, are not equal in an engagement to fifteen thousand with such
arms as the king's troops are equipped with. I wish our troops were better
furnished, the enemy has a great advantage over us.
" We have suffered prodigiously for want of wood. Many regiments have
been obliged to eat their provisions raw for want of fuel to cook it; and not
withstanding we have burnt up all the fences and cut down all the trees for
a mile round the camp, our sufferings have been inconceivable. The barracks
have been greatly delayed for want of stuff. Many of the troops are yet in
tents, and will be for some time, especially the officers. The fatigues of the
campaign, the suffering for want of wood and clothing, have made a multitude
of soldiers heartily sick of service.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 49
14 The Connecticut troops went off in spite of all that could be done to pre- chap
vent it. But they met with such an unfavourable reception at home that ^^^-^
many are returning to camp again already. The people upon the road ex
pressed so much abhorrence at their conduct for quitting the army, that it was
with difficulty they got provisions. I wish all the troops now going home
may meet with the same contempt. I expect the army, notwithstanding all
the difficulties we meet with, will be full in about six weeks.
" We never have been so weak as we shall be to-morrow, when we dismiss
the old troops. Our growing weaker, whilst the enemy are growing stronger,
renders our situation disagreeable.
" General Lee has just returned from Rhode Island. He has taken the
tories in hand, and sworn them by a very solemn oath, that they would not
for the future grant any supplies to the enemy, directly or indirectly, nor give
them any kind of intelligence, nor suffer it to be done by others, without giving
information.  and  , were the principals. He gives a very
favourable account of the spirit and-resolution of the people.
" I beg leave to congratulate you on the -recovery of your health, which
may God in his providence long preserve, that you may enjoy happiness your
self, and continue a blessing to your country."

General Greene to Jacob Greene, Esq.
"Prospect Hill, December 20th, 1775.
" Wallace, I hear, continues a thorn in your side — burning and destroying
wherever he can get an opportunity. It is to me a most astonishing thing that
the committee of Newport are desirous of nourishing such a serpent in the
bosom of the country. If his depredations were to cease in all parts of the
country, there might be some small reason for listening to his propositions.
But, for him to obtain his supplies, and grant an indemnity only to the town
of Newport, is sacrificing the rest of the province to the benefit of that town
only; for he will be continually committing piracies upon all the islands and
shores that he can get footing upon. I think Wallace's conduct has been such,
from the insults and abuses he has offered to government, that it is highly
dishonourable to have any further intercourse or commerce with him. Be
sides, these separate treaties weaken the chain of connexion and injure the
general interest of the continent. We must expect to make partial sacrifices
for the public good. I love the colony of Rhode Island, and have ever had
7

50 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

u.

chap, a very great affection for the town of Newport; but I am not so attached to
, either as to be willing to injure the common cause for their particular benefit.
" It is a very great unhappiness that such a division of sentiment in political
matters prevails in the colony; it distracts her councils and weakens her exer
tions. The committee in the town of Newport, you say, seem inclined to
counteract the prevailing sentiment in the government. It is astonishing that
ancient prejudices and selfish motives should prevail, at a time when every
thing that is dear and valuable is at stake. I hear some of the inhabitants of
Newport are very jealous of the views of the town of Providence ; fearing that
the latter has in view the destruction of Newport, for their own private advan
tage. I cannot harbour a thought so derogatory to the patriotism of the people
of Newport, as to suppose that such a fear can have any real existence. Can
the inhabitants of Newport suppose that the legislature of the colony acts upon
such absurd principles as to make a sacrifice of one town for the benefit of
another ?
" George III.'s last speech has shut the door of hope for a reconciliation
between the colonies and Great Britain. There are great preparations going
on in England to prosecute the war in the spring. We have no reason to
doubt the king's intentions. We must submit unconditionally, or defend our
selves. The calamities of war are very distressing, but slavery is dreadful.
I have no reason to doubt the success of the colonies, when I consider their
union, strength, and resources. But we must expect to feel the common
calamities which attend even a successful war. We are now driven to the
necessity of making a declaration of independence. We can no longer pre
serve our freedom and continue the connexion with her. With safety we can
appeal to heaven for the necessity, propriety, and rectitude of such a measure.
" I flatter myself the king's speech will induce the congress to raise one
large continental army proportionable to the extent of our undertaking, to be
under one commander, and by him directed ta the security and preservation
of the several united governments. This will unite and cement the whole
strength of the several colonies. If this method is not adopted, some govern
ments from their natural situation, will be subject to fourfold the expense of
others for their own particular security. As we have one common interest in
the opposition, and it is merely accidental and uncertain where the enemy may
exert their greatest force, I think the continent ought to provide for the security
of every colony.
" Letters were received this day from General Montgomery near Quebec.
He says he expects to be master of the place in a very little time. He has
powder and all kinds of military stores to facilitate the reduction. He and

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 51
his troops are in good health, and he speaks very highly of Colonel Arnold and chap.
his party. Many officers and a large number of the privates belong to our v^J-^
government. " The regiments fill up very slowly here. It is really discouraging: I fear
the advantages proposed from so large an armament as our establishment was
to consist of, will be defeated by the length of time it takes to fill the army.
However, I still hope for better things, and pray God my expectations may
not be defeated. If the congress had given a large bounty, and engaged the
soldiery during the war, the continent would be much securer, and the measures
cheaper in the end. The wisest may sometimes err. To profit rightly by past
evils is the only right use that can be made of former misfortunes. God grant
that our future measures may be so taken, as to render our success equal, to our
wishes." The three following extracts will serve further to develope to the reader,
the opinions and feelings, or, in other words, the mind and character of the
subject of these pages. We hope he will not be inclined to attribute the
strong language of the first of these to any remains of resentment against the
inhabitants of the place in which the meeting-house is situated, from which,
with all due attention to the solemnity of the occasion, he had been not long
since expelled, for professing the heretical opinion, " that the rights which God
has given, man may defend with the sword." Nor must the reader be per
mitted to rest under the impression, however just the reflections cast upon East
Greenwich may have been at the time, that they are at all applicable at pre
sent. We can assure him, that he will find as kind-hearted and civil people
in its now half-deserted streets, as grace the most flourishing or polished cities.
" Prospect Hill, January 22d, 1776.
" I am glad the certificate had some effect upon the tyranny of East Green
wich. An exertion of arbitrary power not paralleled in history. The policy
of that town has ever been narrow and confined, and generally as dishonour
able as unjust. Nature has formed it for a place of trade and commerce, but
the genius of the people and their measures counteract its natural advantages.
I am told the old inhabitants treat those who come in there for shelter with
great incivility; and some few that have attempted to open a small trade with
the country, have been prohibited in the most peremptory manner, unless they
would agree to sell at certain stated prices, which rendered it impossible for
them to support their business ; and they have been driven off by it to Provi
dence and other places. I wish to God their sentiments were more liberal,

II

52 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, they would find great advantages in it. I am glad you did not adopt the
.advice of those who were for opposing the committee. You observe very
justly— The populace borrow almost all their opinions. A few designing
men can sometimes set the rabble foul of the best of characters, and ruin their
reputations for a time. It is unsafe to oppose the current of public prejudices,
but one may seem to join with the throng and swim on with the tide of public
sentiment for a time, until you can slip out unobserved, without injury to
yourself or your country. For, when the first heat and zeal of the populace
has had a little time to cool, many things may be done with safety that would
have been deemed criminal even to propose but a little before. In human
affairs we have only to watch the temper of the times, and the disposition of
the people, and take our measures from them. This is all the politician can
do. He cannot drive mankind into measures that are even necessary to pro
mote their own interest and happiness." " Prospect Hill, February 8th, 1776.
" I have-got the jaundice, and have been confined twelve or fourteen days.
I am as yellow as saffron, my appetite all gone, and my flesh too. I am so
weak that I can scarcely walk across the room. But I am in hopes I am get
ting something better. I am grievously mortified at my confinement, as this is
a critical, and to appearance, will be an important period of the American
war. Cambridge Bay is frozen over ; if the weather continues a few days*
longer as cold as it has been some days past, it will open a passage into Bos
ton. Sick or well, I intend to be there, if I am able to sit on horseback.
" There is nothing new in camp, only preparations making for the attack.
Whether it will take place or not, God only knows. Heaven grant us success
if it should be made. That will depend upon the bravery of the troops ; how
they will act, time and the experiment only can determine. If I am called
from time to eternity, I hope you will see justice done to my family. I com
mit them to you and the rest of my brothers."
" Prospect Hill, February 15th, 1776.
" Your apprehensions 'about attacking Boston are very well founded in
many respects. The troops are raw and undisciplined, and consequently unfit
for an attack sword in hand. But out of an army of 20,000 men, it will be
hard if we cannot find 8,000 who will fight manfully. There must be some
cowards among them, as well as among us. But, however, an attack upon a
town garrisoned with 8,000 regular troops, is a serious object, and ought to be
well considered before attempted, I always thought an attack with 20,000

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 53
men might succeed. I still think so ; and were the Bay to be frozen over, I chap.
should be glad to see the attempt made ; not but that it would be horrible if it v^-v^.
succeeded, and still more horrible if it failed. But the advantage that America
would derive from making ourselves masters of that garrison at this time,
would be inconceivable. It would damp the spirits of Great Britain, and give
ours a new spring. In a word, it would put a finishing stroke to the war; it
would heal all the divisions among ourselves ; silence the tories, and work a
general reformation throughout the continent. But I have little hopes now of
such a happy event, as the weather is greatly moderated, and the scarcity of
powder puts it out of our power to attempt any thing by cannonading or bom
bardment,"

54 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

m.

CHAPTER III.

American army inoculated. Boston evacuated. March to New York. General
Hamilton. Capture of Fort Washington. Battle of Trenton. Battle of
Brandywine. Enemy in possession of Philadelphia.

chap. DURING the winter of 1775-6 nothing material transpired. The two
, armies lay in sullen silence watching each other's movements, neither, suffi
ciently confident in itself to commence offensive operations. During this time,
the small-pox raged in Boston. And a very general alarm prevailed lest it
should break out in the American camp. Nothing in that event could have
detained the militia at their posts ; and the most positive information having
been communicated to the commander in chief, that the enemy intended to
introduce it into the American camp, he entertained the most lively apprehen
sions respecting the consequences. A very small proportion of either officers
or men had had it, and besides the actual loss of life and temporary diminu
tion of force to be apprehended from it, an inevitable consequence would have
been, a difficulty of recruiting, and an unwillingness to furnish the camp from
the country. The patriotism and promptness of Greene supplied, in part, the
remedy; at his suggestion, Dr. Senter was appointed to open a hospital at the
Coventry Mills, for inoculating the officers, and Greene's house was given up
for the purpose, whilst his family was removed into lodgings. Here, many of
them passed through the disease, and others succeeded them, as soon as the
first party could return to duty.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 55
In the last of March 1776, the enemy evacuated Boston, and sailed to pur- chap.
sue other operations. Their objects in this campaign were to reduce New s-r^-^'
York and Charleston. Clinton, with a very respectable land and naval force
was dispatched to attempt the reduction of the latter city, but the memorable
day of the battle of Fort Moultrie defeated this part of the plan. Howe suc
ceeded in getting possession of New York. At his first sailing, the British
commander's designs had been so well concealed, that in the American camp
his destination rested altogether in conjecture. But Washington acted with
vigour upon the opinion that New York was his object. His troops were all
ordered on to that place. Greene had the third brigade consigned to his com
mand, with orders to march through Providence to New London, and there
to embark for Long Island. He arrived about the middle of April at the place
of his destination, and established his head-quarters at Brooklyn. Here he
soon received information of the partial consummation of one of his most
ardent wishes. A letter from Governor Cook of Rhode Island enclosed an
act of the state, declaring themselves independent. In a letter of May 14th,
1776, on this subject he observes, "By a letter from Governor Cook, covering
a late act past last session in your government, you have declared yourselves
independent. 'Tis nobly done, God prosper you, and crown your endea
vours with success."
The army was encamped under the orders of Washington, partly in New
York and pardy on Long Island. The division, posted on Long Island, was
placed under the command of Greene. With indefatigable assiduity he
applied himself to the duties which this important command imposed upon
him, and expecting himself, as did the commander in chief, that the principal
operations of the enemy would be carried on on Long Island, he lost no time
in making every preparation to meet him, and in acquiring that knowledge of
the geography of the counny which was necessary to meet him with advan
tage. But heaven had destined our hero, on this occasion, to one of the most
serious disappointments of his life ; or, at least, one that he appears to have felt
most sensibly ; it was the first of a long series to which he was destined, and
the vicissitudes of military life were yet new to him.
After a very long voyage the enemy entered the Narrows towards the last
of June ; and by a singular coincidence, their first landing, avowedly hostile,
took place at Staten Island on the very day of the declaration of indepen
dence. On the same day of the same month was established the common
wealth under Cromwell.
On Staten Island, they remained in a state of torpor no less than eight
weeks, when, all their expected reinforcements being united, they crossed the

56 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, bay, and on the 22d of August landed at Gravesend Bay, and approached
v^JX./ within tbree mile of t,e '.merman lines. Some time previous, after more
than ordinary fatigue, General Greene had been attacked with a bilious com
plaint, which brought him to the brink of the grave. In a letter from Ueneral
Washington to congress, dated the 23d of August, are found these fines: " I
have been obliged to appoint Major General Sullivan to the command of the
island, owing to General Greene's indisposition; he has been extremely ill for
several days, and still continues bad."
The unhappy result of the affair on Long Island is but too well known.
The attack was conducted on behalf of the enemy with skill and vigour.
Whilst a strong advanced party under Lord Stirling, and another under Gene
ral Sullivan, were warmly assailed in front, a column of the enemy silently
moved over the plain that stretches along the south side of the island, and
turning the left wing of our troops, gained their rear behind the range of hills
that runs from Brooklyn to Jamaica. The American advance fought hero
ically until borne down by numbers, and both Stirling and Sullivan were
made prisoners. Efforts were made by these officers to retreat within the
lines of Brooklyn as soon as the ruse de guerre of the enemy was discovered,
but it was too late ; the stratagem had succeeded. That evening the whole
army retreated over the East River, ere the movement appears to have been
suspected by the enemy.
In a letter of Greene's of the 30th of August, communicating this affair, is
contained the following passage :
" Providence took me out of the way ; I have been very sick for near three
weeks; for several days there was a hard struggle between nature and the
disorder. I am now a little better, though scarcely able to sit up an hour at a
time. I have no strength or appetite, and my disorder, from its operation,
appears to threaten me with long confinement. Gracious God ! to be con
fined at such a time. And the misfortune is doubly great, as there was no
general officer who had made himself acquainted with the ground as perfectly
as I had. I have not the vanity to think the event would have been other
wise had I been there, yet I think I could have given the commanding gene
ral a great deal of necessary information. Great events sometimes depend
upon very little causes." " I think from this manoeuvre the general proposes
to retpeat to Kingsbridge, and there make the grand stand." " If this is the
determination, two to one New York is laid in ashes."

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 57
His conjectures on the subject of making a stand at Kingsbridge were chap.
realized by the event. Nor were his apprehensions for the fate of New York ^^^^
altogether chimerical. General Washington in a letter of September 2d,
1776, actually submits the question to congress, whether it should be destroyed
or not ; and one would almost be inclined to think, that the tenor of this letter
solicits the sanction of congress to this measure. A similar sacrifice in modern
times is said to have been the salvation of a mighty Idngdom, and great and
good men may be driven by the necessities of war to perform acts most repug
nant to their feelings.
It was soon after Greene's arrival on Long Island, and during the time of
his command at that post, that he became acquainted with the late General
Hamilton, afterwards so conspicuous in the councils of this country. It was
his custom when summoned to attend the commander in chief, to walk, ac
companied by one or more of his aids, from the ferry landing to head-quar
ters. On one of these occasions, when passing by the place then called the
park, now enclosed in the railing of the City-Hall, and which was then the
parade ground of the militia corps, Hamilton was observed disciplining a
juvenile corps of artillerists, who, like himself, aspired to future usefulness.
Greene knew not who he was, but his attention was rivetted by the vivacity
of his motion, the ardour of his countenance, and not less by the proficiency
and precision of movement of his little corps. Halting behind the crowd
until an interval of rest afforded an opportunity, an aid was dispatched to
Hamilton with a compliment from General Greene upon the proficiency of
his corps, and the military manner of their commander, with a request to
favour him with his company to dinner on a specified day. Those who are
acquainted with the ardent character and grateful feelings of Hamilton, will
judge how this message was received. The attention never was forgotten,
and not many years elapsed before an opportunity occurred, and was joyfully
embraced by Hamilton, of exhibiting his gratitude and esteem for the man
whose discerning eye had at so early a period done justice to his talents and
pretensions. Greene soon made an opportunity of introducing his young
acquaintance to the commander in chief, and from his first introduction
Washington " marked him for his own."
As soon as his debilitated state would permit him, Greene joined the retreat
ing army, and shared in all the misfortunes and mortifications of his beloved
commander. He had now been promoted to a major general's commission.
And when General Washington marched to White Plains, as there was a
strong detachment of the enemy still on Staten Island, the command of the
American troops in New Jersey, destined to watch the movements of that de<-
8

58 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, tachment of the enemy, was assigned to Greene. His head-quarters were at
^J!^a Bergen, at Basken Ridge, or at Fort Lee, according as the situation of affairs
rendered his presence necessary. The important object was to keep open a
communication with the main army on the east of the Hudson, and secure a
retreat for Washington, if a retreat should becdme necessary.
From the last of September to the middle of November, the main army
was employed in marching and countermarching, to elude the manoeuvres of
Howe, and to wear out the campaign so as to prevent the enemy from over
running the Jerseys and advancing upon Philadelphia. The American army
was now extremely feeble, and hourly wearing away ; and the officers exposed
to the severest toils and most gloomy forebodings that could result from the
unpromising state of affairs, and the continued adherence of congress to the
wretched system of short enlistments and militia requisitions. But Washing
ton now plainly told them, that their country was lost, if they any longer
adhered to this short-sighted and mistaken policy. His two letters of Sep
tember 24th and October 4th, ought to be piously read by every American,
and it is interesting to observe in what perfect concurrence the opinions 0
these two great men were expressed upon, the same subject.
In a private letter of September 28th, 1776, Greene expresses himself thus:
" I apprehend the several retreats that have lately taken place begin to make
you think all is lost. Don't be frightened ; our cause is not yet in a desperate
state. The policy of congress has been the most absurd and ridiculous ima
ginable — pouring in militiamen who come and go every month. A military
force established upon such principles, defeats itself. People coming from
home with all the tender feelings of domestic life, are not sufficiently fortified
with natural courage to stand the shocking scenes of war. To march over
dead men, to hear without concern the groans of the wounded — I say few
men can stand such scenes, unless steeled by habit, or fortified by military
pride.. "There must be a good army established; men engaged for the war; a
proper corps of officers, and then, after a proper time to discipline the men,
every thing is to be expected.
" The congress goes upon a penurious plan. The present pay of the offi
cers will not support them, and it is generally determined by the best officers
to quit the service, unless a more adequate provision is made for their support.
The present establishment is not thought reputable.
" The congress has never furnished the number of men voted, by near one i
half, certainly by above a third. Had we had numbers, we need not have
retreated from Long Island or New York. But the extent of ground to guard;

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. B9
rendered the retreat necessary ; otherwise the army would have been ruined chap.
by detachments. The enemy never could have driven us from Long Island .^-/-w.
and New York, if our rear had been secured. We must have an army to meet
the enemy every where ; to act offensively as well as defensively. Our sol
diers are as good as ever were, and were the officers half as good as the men,/
they would beat any army on the globe of equal numbers,"
This observation relative to the officers was no doubt elicited by facts that
had come to the general's knowledge relative to the officering of some of the
eastern corps then in service. That most miserable of all systems, which ren- ;
ders the officers subordinate to the men by giving the men the election of
the officers, had been adopted in some of the states. And it is a well known
fact, that in some instances the commission was actually purchased by a com
pact to throw the pay and emoluments into a common stock and divide it
equally. To see a captain with his drummer and fifer at table with him, is
asserted by an eye witness to have been a familiar occurrence; and on one
occasion, a colonel being seen carrying home his ration of beef slung on his
finger, declared that he did it to set the officers a good example.* These were
the officers to whom the general alludes in the concluding part of his letter ;
and not the seven times tried heroes, who afterwards fought the battles of
the revolution.
In another private letter of the 3d of October 1776, he expresses himself on
the same subject thus : " The congress have ordered eighty-eight regiments to
be raised for the war. This looks well. For God's sake let us have good
officers from Rhode Island, if you wish to preserve its reputation. We want
nothing but good officers to constitute as good an army as ever marched into
the field. Our men are infinitely better than the officers. I do not speak of
Rhode Island officers, for they are generally good, and behaved exceedingly
well in the late action. They did themselves a great deal of honour. I shall
send a fist to the governor of such as deserve a preference. I think you may
officer your regiment as well as any on the continent, if you will consult
nothing but the merit of the man."
There is in this letter a paragraph which is rather foreign from the subject
we are upon. But it merits to be copied into these pages, as it exhibits a
mind fertile in resources whatever it be applied to, and suggests a ruse de
guerre which has actually, in later times, been successfully resorted to, within
the knowledge of the writer.

* Captain Grayden.

60 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. The letter is addressed to a gentleman who was interested in several priva-
III
^~J^, teers, and who had suffered by repeated recaptures. " This fall," says the
writer, " will be the last of the harvest. After this season, all the navigation
of Great Britain will go armed sufficiently to manage the small cruizers of
America. If your privateers should take any vessels bound to America or
Great Britain, let the prize-master assume the character, and personate the
original captain; if he should have the misfortune to fall in with an enemy's
vessel, let him answer, 'bound to and came from the port mentioned in the
ship's papers.' If the captain or prize-master does this with sufficient effrontery,
nothing but personal knowledge can detect him. It would be a good method
to engage the crews Of the prizes by giving them an opportunity to enter on
board the privateer, and to share in all the prizes made after they entered on
board. This may enable the captain of the privateer to continue his cruize,
and bring in a number of prizes, when he would otherwise be obliged to
return home for want of men. And as to the fidelity and attachment of the
sailors, you may depend upon it, they will be as faithful after becoming inte
rested, as the generality of our own seamen.
" This fall is the golden harvest. I think the fishing ships at the eastward
may be objects of attention this fall. In the spring, the East India ships may
be intercepted on the coast of Africa. Were I at liberty, I think I could
make a fortune for my family. But it is necessary for some to be in the field,
to secure the property, of others in their stores."
It was on the 16th of November in this year, that Fort Washington sur
rendered to the British arms. And as some writers have thought proper to
censure the conduct of Greene in that affair, and, at the time it occurred, public
opinion imputed the misfortune in a great measure to his not ordering the fort
to be abandoned in time, it becomes necessary to give a particular account of
the part which devolved upon him in that affair. He never entered into a
public vindication of his conduct, but it will be found that this was a generous
sacrifice to the feelings of the commander in chief, or perhaps it may be attri
buted to an habitual indifference to the opinions of those to whom he was not
responsible for his conduct.
Fort Washington was constructed on a commanding eminence on Man
hattan Island, two and a half miles below Kingsbridge, and where, by the
approach of the Harlaem Creek to the North River, the island is reduced to a
narrow strip of about five eighths of a mile in width. This creek communi
cates with the East River near Hurl Gate; and uniting with a stream that
communicates with the North River, forms Manhattan Island. Fort Wash
ington was near the bank of the North River, covered to the south-west by a

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 61

in.

small creek and morass. Parallel, nearly, to each other, and in an easterly chap.
direction so as to strike the Harlaem Creek at the nearest point from the,
North River, two slight field works were thrown up about two hundred yards
from each other, and comprising the fort between them. There was an open
space between the extremities of these lines upon the bank of the Harlaem.
Fort Lee was on the opposite bank of the North River, on the narrow neck
of land formed by the approach of the Hackensack to the North River.
The original design for which these forts were constructed was to prevent
the ships of the enemy from ascending the river. A design conceived in the
days of our military infancy, and which the experience of a few days showed
to have been conceived in military ignorance. The vessels passed with an air
of ridicule. But still, when our troops were obliged to abandon the city,
these forts were found to answer two important purposes : they kept open the
communication between the opposite shores of the Hudson ; and that on the
east served to protect the encampment on the heights of Harlaem, and gave a
strength to this position which deterred the enemy from attempting to carry it.
But still the forts might be passed, and could the enemy have possessed himself
of Kingsbridge by his troops, and of the river by his shipping, retreat would
have been impossible, and the American army must have fallen. With these
objects in view, Howe ascended the East River, and landed at a place called
Frog's Neck ; and Washington, penetrating his design, passed over from the
island and took an impenetrable position on the main, in his enemy's front.
This was in the last of October, and from this time was conducted a series of
the most skilful manoeuvres ; the enemy having for his object to find an op
portunity to attack with advantage, or to turn the left of our army ; whilst
Washington, by the most cautious movements, manoeuvred so as to prevent
the enemy from taking advantage of his superiority, keeping always three
objects in view ; first, to prevent the enemy from cutting him off from the
Hudson; second, from intercepting his retreat to the Highlands if necessary;
or, third, from cutting him off from the country to the north-east of the Hud
son, which furnished his supplies. This game of skill was kept up until the
13th of November, when, Washington crossed a part of his army over to the
west side of the North River, and joined General Greene at Fort Lee :
whilst General Lee, left in command on the east side of the river, with the
enemy still near enough to strike him, retired until he threw the Croton
between him and his superior foe. Howe then descended to attack Fort
Washington, and thus to obtain the undivided possession of Manhattan Island.
When General Washington moved across the Harlaem to throw himself in
front of Howe, he had placed Colonel M'Gaw in command at that post, with

62 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, orders to defend it to the last extremity. The force assigned him for this
^~J-^ purpose consisted of about thirteen hundred troops, chiefly of the Pennsylvania
and Maryland contingents. The measure, his biographer asserts, was advised
by a council of war. General Washington himself says it was by advice of
most of his general officers.
The capture of Fort Washington was also the achievement of a masterly
manoeuvre successfully practised upon the American post. Howe had occu
pied a position on the east of the Harlaem, opposite to where the two Ame
rican lines approached that stream. Here he erected a battery, which com
manded a great part of the ground stretching from Fort Washington to the
banks of the Harlaem. The. 16th of November was the day fixed on for the
attack ; and M'Gaw, attentive to his designs, had made every preparation to
receive him. These designs had been developed, as far as they were intended
to be obvious, by the movements of the day before. Three (some accounts
say five) thousand Hessians had ascended the Harlaem, and crossed the Kings-
bridge ; while twice that number of British troops had fallen down the stream,
and established themselves to the south of the American fines. M'Gaw being
summoned to surrender, replied as usual, that he would defend the fort to the
last extremity, and Greene passed over to him a reinforcement of 600 militia
to support him in the effort.
Colonel Rawlins, at the head of a regiment of Marylanders, posted on a
commanding eminence to the north of the fort, was opposed to General Knip-
hausen. Colonel Cadwallader, with 800 men, occupied the lines to the south,
and had to sustain the attack of the British column commanded by Lord
Percy ; and Colonel Baxter, with a regiment of militia, was posted on the
steep and rocky banks of the Harlaem, opposite the British fort.
The attack on Rawlins and Cadwallader was made at the same instant,
about 10 o'clock in the day, and was met with rival gallantry. Rawlins' fire
was particularly destructive to the Hessians. It was the first trial of the
American rifle upon the enemy. Covered by the trees, the carnage made
among their enemies scarcely admitted the belief that the latter counted at
least six times the American numbers. Here it was that Otho Williams, then
a major in the Maryland line, and whom we shall often have to name in these
pages, gave the first presage of those soldierly qualities which afterwards so
highly distinguished him. He was here severely wounded and made prisoner.
At the lines also, Cadwallader appears to have kept the enemy successfully at
bay, until the developement of Howe's plan of attack, disconcerted the whole
of the measures pursued by the Americans.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 63
A strong column of British troops, commanded by some of Howe's best chap.
officers, had been held in reserve on the eastern bank of the Harlaem, and so ^J^,
completely masked from view, that when the Americans thought themselves
engaged with the whole British force, to their astonishment they were apprised
that, a formidable and fresh enemy was descending the Harlaem, and about to
effect a landing on the rocky shore which extends nothwardly from the post
occupied by Colonel Baxter. Pressed before by very superior numbers, this
new danger which threatened the rear of both Rawlins and Cadwallader,
required immediate attention. About one hundred and fifty men dispatched
from Cadwallader's command, and one hundred from the fort, in vain op
posed a prompt and resolute resistance to eight hundred picked men, already
landed and forcing their way up the hill. But the contest was not bloodless.
A loss of eight hundred killed and wounded, acknowledged by the enemy on
this day, sufficiently vindicates the valour of about thirteen hundred men, the
whole American force actually engaged.
Upon the first developement of this manoeuvre of Lord Howe's, intelligence
of it had been transmitted across the Hudson, and the anxiety of Greene,
Sullivan, Putnam, and several other general officers to determine the reality
and extent of the danger, induced them to pass the river, and hasten over to
the banks of the Harlaem, where the two parties were now contending for the
possession of the bank. From a hill in the rear of the Americans they soon
discovered the fatal success of the enemy's manoeuvre, for the British detach
ment already appeared above the hills that skirt the river, and in fifteen
minutes after was established in force on the very hill from which it had been
reconnoitred. The Americans now retreated to the fort, and by the capitulation which
followed, the American cause sustained a loss of two thousand men, and a
more irreparable loss of artillery, arms, and munitions of war.
The charge made against General Greene on this occasion was, that he
suffered that loss to be incurred when he ought to have withdrawn the garri
son and stores, and not have suffered them to fall into the enemy's hands ; that
he in fact increased the loss by a detachment of six hundred militia s^ent over
to the fort. For these causes his judgment was arraigned, and his military
reputation attacked. The notice which Mr. Marshall takes of this event is
thus expressed:
"From too great a confidence in the strength of the post at Fort Washing
ton, and a hope that by still further increasing the obstructions in the North
River, the original object for which that place had been fortified might be
obtained; from an unwillingness too, further to discourage the army by an

64 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, evacuation of its posts, General Greene had not withdrawn the garrison under
^-v^s the discretionary orders he had received on that subject ; but still indulged a
hope that the post might be maintained; or, if its situation should become
desperate, that means might be found to transport the troops across the river
to the Jersey shore, which was defended by Fort Lee." *
Never were the views and motives of a military commander more entirely
misunderstood. We know not upon what authority Mr. Marshall attributes to.
General Greene " too great confidence in the strength of the post at Fort
Washington;" since General Washington in his communication to congress of
the date of the 16th November, only writes that " General Greene struck with
the importance of the post, and the discouragement which our evacution of
posts must necessarily have given, reinforced Colonel M'Gaw with detachments
from several regiments of the flying camp, but chiefly of Pennsylvania troops,
so as to make the number about two thousand." Nor does the general hesi
tate to avow, that the preservation of that post was a favourite object of his
own, or to present such a view of Greene's agency in that affair as to show
that he acted precisely in the spirit of the orders communicated to him.
General Washington's words are-these : " The preservation of the passage of
the North River was an object of so much consequence, that I thought no
pains or expense too great for that purpose. And therefore, after sending off
all the valuable stores, except such as were necessary for its defence, I deter
mined, agreeable to the advice of most of the general officers, to risk some
thing to defend the post on the east side, called Mount Washington. When
the army moved up, in consequence of General Howe's landing at Frog Point,
Colonel M'Gaw was left in that command with about twelve hundred men,
with orders to defend it to the last. Afterwards, reflecting on the smallness of
the garrison, and the difficulty of their holding it if General Howe should fall
down upon it with his whole force, I wrote to General Greene, who had the
command on the Jersey shore, directing him to govern himself by circumstances,
and to retain or evacuate the post as he should think best, and so far revoking
the absolute order to Colonel M'Gaw to defend the post to the last extre
mity."! From this letter it is obvious, that if, under existing circumstances, the post
could not with prudence be abandoned, it perfectly comporte i with General
Washington's- views to add to the strength of its garrison. It is the weakness
of that garrison which he avows to congress as the ground upon which he

Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. 2, p. 512. t Letter of 16th November 1776.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. '&>
wavered at this time, in his original design of defending that post at all chap.
hazards. Now, to have abandoned the fort at that time, must have exposed ^~^~^,
the main army to the most imminent peril.
It will be observed, that until the receipt of the letter in which General
Washington authorizes Greene to withdraw the garrison, the latter possessed
no sort of control over this post. His command was limited to the Jersey
shore, and Colonel M'Gaw was acting under the immediate orders of the
commander in chief.
The letter communicating this authority bears date the 8th of November ;
two days after it had been resolved in a council of war, to retreat with the
American army into the Jerseys, and after orders had been issued to Greene to
cover the passage of the river at Dobbs' Ferry for that purpose. General
Washington lay at this time under the eye of a superior army, commanded by
veteran and able officers, and was about to venture upon an important reduc
tion of his effective force by detaching all the eastern troops under General
Lee to hold possession of the Highlands on the east of the Hudson. In the
letter of the 8th which authorizes the abandonment of Fort Washington, a
reason is urged for the measure, which led to a conclusion directly contrary
to that which the commander in chief deduces from it. The fact alluded to is,.
the recent passage of several frigates up the river, in despite of the guns and
booms opposed to them by the American posts. Now, had the British ship
ping passed up the river in sufficient force to watch the various ferries on the
North River, or even Dobbs' alone, what wouM have been the situation of
the army under Washington? He must either have retreated up the river
until the whole country below him, and the two forts themselves, were left at
the mercy of the enemy, or have fought at a time and place prescribed by his
adversary, or, finally, have descended the river, and effected his passage under
cover of the only guns that could have controlled the operations of a naval
force, to wit, the guns of Fort Washington. The last alternative is certainly
that to which, in such an event, the commander in chief would have resorted ;
and hence, to have abandoned this fort until the main army had effected the
passage of the river, would have been little short of madness. These are the
considerations to which General Washington must be understood to have
alluded when he says that, " General Greene struck with the importance of the
post, &c. reinforced Colonel M'Gaw, &c." And far from disapproving of
General Greene's conduct on this occasion, it only served still further to excite
the confidence and esteem of his commander.
But there existed other reasons to justify the conduct of General Greene.—
9

6Q MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. The principal cause that checked Lord Howe from pressing General Wash-
^X,ington up the east bank of the Hudson, was the possession of a post by the
* Americans on the Manhattan Island; it excited in him a jealousy for New
York, and not only compelled him to leave a strong detachment for its defence,
but made him uneasy for the possible consequences that might flow from his
leaving that detachment beyond supporting distance. This uneasiness General
Greene had, recently, by a measure of his, much irritated. There was at
this time, as has been seen, an army of observation in the Jerseys, which
General Greene had now ordered up to Fort Lee, and he seriously meditated
a diversion, if not a serious attempt against New York, in the event of a for
ward movement of Howe's to cut off General Washington from the Highlands.
General Howe saw the practicability of this, and checked his progress. But
to have withdrawn the garrison, when the two armies were thus relatively
situated, would have left him at liberty to press upon General Washington, and
even to operate with the garrison of New York up the Hudson ; for Greene
was cut off from crossing, by the British shipping, every where below the pass
which Fort Washington commanded.
This state of things, it will be observed, continued until the 13th of Novem
ber, when the army made good its passage. And why, it will be asked, was
not the garrison removed between that and the day of the attack?
To this we are not called upon, nor competent to give an answer. On that
day the commander in chief arrived at Fort Lee,* and his dispatches of the
14th and 15th, dated at General Greene's head-quarters, show that he was
present to direct and order such measures as he deemed advisable. The letter
of the 8th, under which alone General Greene acquired any control over the
commander at Fort Washington, expressly delegates that authority to him
because he was personally present; and both expressly and impliedly, that
authority ceased when the commander in chief was himself present. General
Washington mentions in his letter to congress, "that on the night of the 15th,
he had partly crossed the North River, on his way to Fort Washington, when
he met Generals Putnam and Greene just returning from thence, who informed
him that the troops were in high spirits, and would make a good defence ; and
it being late at night, he returned." This clearly proves his presence and
agency on this occasion, and at a time when, if he had thought a retreat neces
sary or advisable, it was yet in his power to have effected it.

* Washington's Letter of 14th November 1776-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 67
m
But, in the practicability of defending this fort at that time, there appears chap.
to have been little difference of opinion. The unhappy event has had the ^^-^^
usual effect of an unfortunate issue, to elicit many severe criticisms. General
Washington left the post under the protection of twelve hundred men; General
Greene, on the former's expressing his apprehensions from the weakness of the
garrison, increased it to two thousand. If this measure had not met with the
entire approbation of General Washington, or if he had entertained any seri
ous dOubts of the adequacy of the garrison to defend the post, or of the policy
qf retaining it, he had abundant time from the 13th, to the morning of the
16th, to have evacuated it. The movement might have cost the service the
sacrifice of one company of artillerists, left to man the guns of the fort and
cover the transportation ; but probably would not even have cost that loss.
Whether, in fact, 2,000 men could, under any circumstances, have defended a
circuit of near eight miles, accessible at many points, against a well-appointed
army of 15,000, is a question on which few military men, it is presumed, will
differ at the present day. Yet we find the biographer of Washington main
taining, that had all the troops in the garrison acted on this day with die bra
very of the Marylanders, the enemy might have been repulsed.*
Severely as this effort to maintain these posts has been animadverted upon
by General Lee and others, there is much, very much to be said in palliation
of the error. The command of the North River was certainly an important
object. The command of its banks was identified with a communication with
the country that furnished that subsistence without which the army must have
disbanded. To maintain the command of it at the lowest point possible,
was an interesting object, for it checked the advance of the enemy towards the
seat of government. Hence, when beaten from Forts Washington and Lee,
a stand was successively made at the next defensible passes, to wit, Stoney
Point, Fort Montgomery, and ascending finally to West Point. At the time
when this attack was made upon Fort Washington, an additional reason
pressed very heavily upon the minds of the American commanders. The
wasteful and short-sighted policy of short enlistments, was about to prostrate
them spiritless and sinewless at the feet of their adversary. The American
army was soon to be disbanded and renewed. Every thing depended upon
public opinion and public feeling, towards obtaining enlistments and drawing
out the militia; and to have succeeded in making a stand at this point, would
have been worth an army to the commander in chief, while the alternative

* Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. 2, note to p. 517.

68 MAJOR GENERIC %REENE.
*
chap, was, disastrous and abandoned retreat. Strong wishes generate lively hopes,
V^N/1>^ and the firmest heart, or most unclouded mind, is not always proof against
the mistakes they generate.
The fall of Fort Washington with 2,000 troops, 1,200 of whom were enlisted
men, and some of his very best troops, together with so large a stock of artil
lery, arms, tents, and equipage, made it necessary for Gen. Washington to has
ten the evacuation of Fort Lee, before his active enemy could intercept the
retreat of the garrison. Orders were issued accordingly, and preparations com
menced with all the zeal and rapidity that circumstances would admit. But the
quarter-master's department was in a miserable state of derangement, and the
means of transportation could not be procured. The enemy were already
crossing at Dobbs' Ferry, to hem the American army in between the Hacken-
sack and Hudson, and the force of the Americans was wholly inadeqnate to
meet them in the field. At this crisis, General Greene could only retard their
approach by a show of resistance, whilst the men, ammunition, and whatever the
means of transportation were adequate to, were pushed over the Hackensack.
Much credit has been given to our hero by historians for his conduct on this;
occasion ; but after making every exertion that could be made, the retreat
was attended with the loss of many articles which, at that time, could not be
replaced. General Washington, in his letter of November 16th, 1776, writes, "We
lost the whole of the cannon that was at the fort, (except two 12-pounders,)
and a great deal of baggage, between two and three hundred tents, about a
thousand barrels of flour, and other stores in the quarter-master's depart
ment. This loss was inevitable. As many of the stores had been removed,
as circumstances and time would admit of. The ammunition had been hap
pily got away."
With the " tristes reliquce" of his destitute army, (scarce 3,000 strong,) the
commander in chief sullenly retreated through the Jerseys, until, at length,
compelled to throw the Delaware between him and his pursuing enemy. Sad
and portentous, at that time, was the gloom that hung over the American
people. Fatal might it have proved to the budding hopes of independence,
had a proclamation of general amnesty, and the repeal of the obnoxious Bri
tish laws, been announced in general orders ! There were many who would
have peopled the wilderness, rather than have again passed under the Bri
tish government, and Washington and Greene were of this number. But it
is more than probable the people generally would have submitted. A pro
tecting providence had turned the enemy's wisdom into foolishness; for

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 69
it was decreed, that the American people should be rescued from their domi- chap.
* ur.
mon. wv-*/
During all this time, our hero corresponds with his friends with a confidence
and cheerfidness that nothing could subdue. He consoles himself with the
consideration, that congress had at length adopted the only measures that
could lead to success, to wit, lengthened enlistments, &c. and though the
militia were beaten, they had .shown that they could fight; and that in their
very misfortunes the American army was acquiring the only thing in which
they were deficient — military knowledge and experience.
It was on the morning of the 26th of December that the sun of glory rose
once more upon our political horizon. The ice that impeded the passage of
two detachments of the army, that were destined to cross between Trenton
and Bordentown, and intercept the flying enemy, limited the success of the
attack on the former place. This disappointment, still left a sufficiency of
embarrassments to check the exultation of the American people, and perhaps
to prevent their relapsing into the folhes that had brought them to the verge of
the precipice.
But the surprize of Trenton was still brilliant, and the effect decisive.
About a thousand of the Hessians were captured; the blow was followed up
by a masterly manoeuvre against Princeton; all the hopes of the enemy were
at once blasted, his chain of posts broken up, his designs against Philadelphia
frustrated, and with an army infinitely superior to his adversary's, Howe was
obliged to submit to be shut up and watched during the winter of 1 776-77.
The most decisive victory gained by Washington in the field by the prowess
of his troops, could not have operated upon the American people with half the
effect of this brilliant coup de main. They never doubted the courage, or the ,
worth of their commanders, but now they found them in stratagems of war,
an overmatch for the boasted veterans of the mother country ; and the Hes
sians too, who had been boasted of as the flower of the army, were the troops
who had been defeated and captured. The effect pervaded the whole country
with electrical velocity, and from that day the independence of America was
no longer problematical.
On the night of the 25th, Greene was entrusted with the command of the
left wing, accompanied by Washington in person. Sullivan, who was senior
in command, led the right. The left division, it is well known, was the first
which' reached the town, and having seized the enemy's artillery, cut off their
retreat to Princeton. The arrival of the other a few minutes after, opened
their eyes to the folly of resistance, and they laid down their arms. But where
every man does his duty, a military leader in a subordinate command has

70 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, httle opportunity of distinguishing himself. Suffice it to say, that through all the
^r^^, vicissitudes of tin* trying winter, Greene followed the fortunes of Washington,
proving himself the able, vigilant, intelligent commander, the animated patriot,
disinterested friend, and judicious counsellor.
It was plainly perceived, that whenever the just claims of others would admit
of it, the commander in chief was fond of selecting Greene for particular ser
vices. And unfortunately, the envious began about this time to look with
jealousy upon the obvious confidence reposed in him by Washington. Yet the
most scrutinizing could not assert that this confidence was unmerited or mis
applied on the one hand, or converted to improper or selfish purposes on the
other. The head-quarters of the American army during this winter was at Morris-
town. Here, with a body of troops that never exceeded one thousand regu
lars, often not half that number; and militia sufficient to make up a total of
about three thousand; the whole wretchedly deficient in munitions of war ;
Washington, to the astonishment of the world, managed to keep in cheek the
British force, near 25,000 men, occupying a chain of posts from Brunswick,
by Amboy, down Staten Island, and thus keeping up the communication with
New York.
1777 The British plan of the campaign of 1777, was to get possession of the
southern states and of Philadelphia, whilst Burgoyne, descending from
Canada, should reduce the country lying along Lake Champlain and the
Hudson, and cut off the communication between the eastern and western
states. The glorious days of Bennington and Saratoga put an end to Burgoyne%
quixotic expedition; for quixotic it most certainly merits to be denominated,
since, had he succeeded in reaching New York, it would have exhibited but
the trace of the keel upon the ocean. But the chances against his success
were infinitely more than he had calculated. The force that he commanded
must soon have been exhausted by detachments, had he occupied the posts
necesary to retain possession of the country he passed over; and without occu-'*
pying it, no end was to be answered by traversing it. Little also did he know
of the character of the people whose firesides he was invading; circumstances,
natural and moral, combine to render them the hardiest yeomanry of the
United States; and perhaps a region could scarcely have been selected^ in
which greater unanimity prevailed in the American cause, than among' the
mountains of Vermont and New Hampshire. It has been conjectured, that
when Burgoyne became embarrassed, Sir Henry Clinton might have relieved
him. The utmost that he could possibly have done, would have been to save

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 71
him from capture ; but still the expedition would have been utterly useless, nay, chap.
highly detrimental to the royal cause. A tardy, and it would seem, vindictive ^^^^^
diversion was attempted ; but it was probably wise in Clinton to attempt no
more; for, with the militia swarming around them, it would have been difficult
to withdraw, any number of troops that could have been brought to his aid,
consistent with the security of New York.
It must not be supposed that Washington was for a moment an idle specta
tor. He foresaw that the country from Peekskill northwardly might become the
scene of interesting operations, and had early in the spring dispatched Greene
and Knox to explore the passes in the Highlands, and prepare to intercept
reinforcements, or embarrass a retreat. The militia of Connecticut and Mas
sachusetts were at hand to effect this service, and his position enabled him to
operate against Howe's posts, from Brunswick to New York, if weakened by
detachments to the Highlands; or to throw troops across the North River, if an
opportunity presented itself of rendering service in that quarter.
But his attention was soon called off to another quarter. The designs of
the enemy were now developed ; for the efforts of Burgoyne upon Ticonde-
roga were simultaneous with those of Howe to penetrate through New Jersey
to Philadelphia.
After making every arrangement that his resources permitted, to enable
Schuyler to meet Burgoyne, Washington's own immediate care was to coun
teract the movements of Sir William Howe. Notwithstanding every effort that
had been made through the winter to enlist troops, the continental regiments-
were still miserably deficient. Sickness and discontent, or despondency, are
the ordinary attendants upon new raised troops. In this instance, these casu
alties bore with discouraging severity upon the American levies. Sickness
had thinned their ranks in a most extraordinary degree. The whole had
to pass through inoculation for the small-pox, and the free habits, plentiful
living, and comfortable habitations of the American, in private life, make the
discipline, exposure, and restricted diet of a camp, to bear with peculiar seve
rity upon the first months of his initiation as a soldier.
Yet, with an army still far inferior in number, although considerably rein
forced ; miserably equipped, and mostly undisciplined, Washington resolved to
oppose his enemy, as soon as the latter manifested a design to move across the
Jerseys. For this purpose, he had removed from Morristown to Middlebrook,
and improved its natural advantages so as to feel secure against any attempt
to carry it.
It was not until the middle of June that Howe marched out of Brunswick,
He had imagined that Ms judicious adversary, elated with the affair of Trenton*

72 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, would leave his fastnesses, and meet him on the plain. But it was in vai«i
,that he offered Washington battle. Though never deficient in enterprize/ the '
American commander knew it to be the chief attribute of a good general, to
fight when he pleased. He well knew that Howe would not proceed on to
Philadelphia, and leave the American army in his rear. It were a folly even
to gain that by battle, which could be effected without the sacrifice. He,
therefore, remained quiet upon his hills ; and Sir William, after strutting his
hour between the Raritan and Millstone, re-entered Brunswick, and com
menced a retreat to New York, by the way of Amboy. As soon as his design
became manifest, Washington lost no time in preparing to annoy his retreat.
But, it may have been a feint; his circumstances required a strict adherence
to cautious self-command and vigilance, and his orders were given accord
ingly. The command of a strong detachment was assigned to Greene, with orders
to han"- on the rear of the enemy, and await the arrival of reinforcements ;
then to embrace the first opportunity to attack him. Messengers were dis
patched immediately to Sullivan and Maxwell, to march with all expedition,
and co-operate with Greene against the British army in its march to Amboy.
But fortune, who has ever delighted to teaze and mock the god of war, had
decreed to our hero another serious disappointment. Sullivan, either from the
delays of the messenger, or his distance from the scene of action, could not
arrive in time, and the messenger dispatched to Maxwell, deserted or was
taken. The three brigades which Greene commanded were not sufficient to
cope with the rear column of the enemy, and the British army made good
its retreat to Staten Island, without any material loss. Sir William Howe's
portable bridge, prepared for passing the Delaware, expedited his return across
the channel that divides Staten Island from the main.
To reach the place of his destination by water, was Sir William Howe's
next object; and accordingly, about the middle of July, the British fleet sailed
from New York, having on board a well appointed and highly disciplined
army of thirty-six battalions, estimated at 18,000 strong, including a powerful
artillery, a regiment of horse, and the provincial corps called the queen's
rangers — a corps that often during this war disgraced the British arms by
their licentiousness and barbarity. Colonel Delancy, a native of New York,
commanded them.
The correspondence about this time, presents a curious scene of anxiety and
perplexity about the destination of the British fleet. Washington did not
doubt that it was Philadelphia, and every preparation was made for marching
to its defence; but it nfght have been a feint, and the enemy returning sud-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 73
denly, might find the country open to invasion, if the American troops were chap.
immediately marched away. The British commander, on this occasion, had v^-v^^
thought proper to throw out false lights to mislead his adversary. A letter
was mysteriously conveyed to General Putnam, informing him that their real
destination was Boston; a rumour was industriously circulated in New York,
that they aimed a blow at the south ; and finally, when the fleet entered the
Delaware on the 30th of July, and sailed again, all was mystery and conjec
ture. The fact was, that Howe intended originally to ascend the Delaware to
Philadelphia, but upon entering the bay, he found the navigation intricate, and
thought from information, that the attempt to ascend in the fleet to that place
would be so hazardous, that he resolved to land on the eastern shore of the
Chesapeake Bay, and cross the isthmus to Philadelphia.
He accordingly put to sea again, and baffling winds detained him on his
voyage such an unusual time, that Washington actually concluded he had gone
against Charleston. As it was impossible to march to the defence of that
place, he promptly resolved to aim a blow at New York, and had already
issued orders to march to the North River, when every doubt was dissipated
by the arrival of the British fleet off Elk River in the Chesapeake.
A busy scene now presented itself over the American States. Burgoyne was
to be opposed, a strong and well-appointed army under Clinton in New York,
to be watched, and the invasion of Howe to be repelled. The mind of Wash
ington was every where, and all that his feeble means permitted was promptly
done. Strong reinforcements were dispatched to Gates. Putnam was posted,
with an army of observation, on the Hudson, and the commander in chief,
with the elite of his army, marched to meet Howe.
The division that Greene commanded was composed of the Virginia bri
gades of Muhlenberg and Weeden. With this division Washington remained -^
in person ; and it will be found, by reference to Ms own letters, that he seldom
separated himself from Greene in the hour when counsel was requisite. This
was at the time noticed by the officers under his command, and whilst among
the just and sensible it increased the confidence reposed in the latter, there
were too many who were disposed to cavil at it. But as he shared the labours
and enjoyed the unlimited confidence of the commander in chief, so it is no
little to his honour that he participated in the envy or jealousy of the few
unworthy men who were hostile to Washington. It was about this time that
Conway was intriguing to undermine the public confidence in the most imma
culate of public servants. 10

74 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Washington had halted on the Delaware, until he could ascertain the real
Ul' design of General Howe. The position was favourable to watching his
movements, and to ulterior measures, when Sir William's real destination
should be developed.
The two armies came in sight of each other on the ridge that divides
Christiana Creek from the Elk River. The British estimated at 18,000
strong, and the American numbering 15,000, but really having no more than
1 1 ,000 effective men.
General Howe manoeuvred with a view to turn the right of Washington,
and cut him off from his communication with Philadelphia. TMs would have
thrown him between the British army and the fleet, on a tongue of land,
where he must have fallen, or fought his way out under every disadvantage.
WasMngton saw and eluded the artifice by retreating across the Brandy-
wine Creek; and, throwing up some slight worksrat Chad's Ford, on the east
bank of that creek, he resolved to meet and fight the enemy at that place.
Howe, who was equally desirous of measuring swords with his adversary,
approached within seven miles of the ford, and having coolly reconnoitred the
American army, offered him battle on the 11th of September.
The issue of this day was also unfavourable to the American commander..
The familiar artifice of amusing in front, whilst manoeuvring to gain an
adversary's rear, was destined a third time to baffle the valour of the Ameri
can army. It happened, unfortunately, that about six miles above the ford at
which the two armies were facing each other, the creek forked, and both the
streams were easily fordable. The advance of the whole British army upon,
Chad's Ford, fixed the attention of the American commander to that pass,.
and an animated attack by a strong column under Knyphausen, with the
skirmishing of parties thrown over the creek by the American commander,
occupied the whole American army at that point, whilst the far greater part of
the British army silently filed off on their left under Cornwallis, and crossed
the creek above the fork. How the American general could suffer himself to
be thus deceived, has hitherto been unaccounted for. And from all accounts
hitherto published, it would appear, that he had not bestowed proper attention
to reconnoitre the movements of the enemy, and guard the roads by which his
flank might be approached. But it was not so. He had detached Colonel
Bland, with Ms regiment of horse^ across the creek for this express purpose ;
but by some unaccountable fatality or neglect, no intelligence of this move
ment of the enemy had reached him, until they were already crossing the
ford above him, called Jones' Ford. He had indeed been informed, that a
considerable column had filed off from the enemy's left, and had adopted the:

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 75
bold resolution to cross with his whole army, and attack the force opposed to chap.
him. The vanguard, of the two columns into which his army was thrown for v-»-N^w
this purpose under the command of Sullivan and Greene, had already entered
the creek, when counter intelligence was communicated to General Sullivan,
and he made a halt to convey the information to the commander in chief.
This produced a retrogade movement, and in the event, it would appear, that
the falsehood had been communicated by some favouring deity. For had the
attack been prosecuted, Knyphausen would, no doubt, have retired fighting, and
the stratagem of the enemy would have been fatally successful ; for the British
army would securely have gained the heights in the American rear, and cut
them off from their magazines and from retreat. About two o'clock intelli
gence was received of the enemy's having actually gained the road that turned
the American right, and led directly to Philadelphia; nor was it then commu
nicated by any of the American reconnoitring party, but by a zealous volun
teer, who had very correctly concluded that the enemy had stolen a march
upon the American commander, and who for this patriotic service, was actu
ally arrested as a spy, so improbable did the intelligence appear to Sullivan.
The promptness with which Washington adapted his measures to this sud
den and unexpected change of circumstances, ought to have acquired him
more eclat as a military commander than has been allowed him. But the day
terminated in defeat, and success is the grand criterion by which military
merit is estimated.
Two great objects were now to be kept in view. The advance of Corn-
wallis must be arrested, and the division under Knyphausen must be kept in
check, since by crossing at Chad's Ford he would gain the rear of the army
when engaged with Cornwallis. All this was promptly provided for. Wayne
with his brigade, was thrown into the redoubt that commanded the ford, and
Greene, with the brigades of Weeden and Muhlenberg acting as a reserve, was
halted in the rear of Wayne, in a situation from which he could readily fly to
the relief of either of the parties engaged ; whilst every other brigade of.
which the army consisted, was ordered off under the command of Sullivan,
with instructions to form and engage, as they should respectively reach the
ground on which they were to be drawn up. These orders were obeyed with
alacrity, and the ground on which the army was formed, is acknowledged to
have been judiciously selected. But an unfortunate occurrence happened on
this occasion, which greatly influenced the fortune of the day, and which
ought to be recorded as a warning to those who are too fastidious to sacrifice
mere etiquette to substantial service. It so happened, that in the previous dis
positions of the day, the division of Lord Stirling had been thrown into a

76 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, position wMch brought him nearer to the enemy than the division of Sullivan.,
^JH^, The honour of the right was not contested with Sullivan, but in order to reach
that part of the fine, it was necessary that his division should change positions
with that of Lord Sterling; and in marching and countermarching to gain
this empty honour, they lost perhaps the palpable and tangible honour of
repelling the enemy. Cornwallis urged the attack during this change of posi
tion, and this is the reason why every historian relates that the attack was
made before the American line was completely formed. No efficient opposi
tion was made ; the army was supported awhile by the artillery, but was soon
thrown into confusion, and a total rout ensued.
As soon as the firing commenced, General Washington had hastened to the
scene of action, leaving Greene in command at the ford. At the same signal
also, Knyphausen recommenced his attack, and with great firmness advanced
to force the passage at the ford. Greene was advancing to oppose him, whilst
Wayne, with artillery and musketry, was dealing death through his ranks,
when the former received an order from the commander in chief to hasten to
the support of the main army.
Never was an order obeyed with more alacrity and dispatch. The distance
was at least four miles, yet it is established on the best authority, that it was
made good in forty-nine minutes ; indeed, the men moved on a trot, and with
an ardour that scarcely admitted of preserving order. Both the commander
in chief and General Sullivan, in advancing to the ground first occupied, had
noted a field in their rear, as proper for a second position in the event of their
being driven from the first. On this ground Greene's command was met by
an order from General Washington, delivered by his aid Colonel Pinckney,.
(now the venerable patriot, Major General Pinckney,) to occupy it, and
cover the retreat of the main army. This was immediately complied with,
and Weeden was halted here, while Muhlenberg, attended by Greene in
person, passed on to Weeden's right, and met the enemy at the road. Both
brigades here exhibited that firmness and precision of movement which drew
forth the admiration of the enemy, whilst it checked their advance in the
career of victory.
These two checks effectually stopped the progress of the enemy, and
covered the retreat of the flying army. Weeden, when he could no longer
sustain the attack of the whole right of the enemy, retreated in good order to
the protection of the other brigade; and Greene drew off the whole in order,
in the face of the enemy, and covered also the retreating brigade of Wayne,
who, after a brave resistance, had been obliged to yield to the very great
superiority of Knyphausen. Yet, had not the night fortunately closed in upon

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 77
this bloody and unfortunate day before Knyphausen could effect a junction chap.
with Cornwallis, it is not to be supposed that the little band which still main- , '"
tained the conflict, would much longer have been kept together.
Considering the sharpness of the fighting whilst it lasted, the length of time
and number of men engaged, and the general rout which ensued, the loss of
the American army was surprisingly small, and all agree in attributing it to
the firm and active movements of the reserve. A Virginia regiment under
Stevens, and another under Stuart, had acted the most conspicuous part.
A tale has been made up, of an occurrence after this battle between Wash
ington and Greene, in which there is no truth whatever that we can find. It
is said, that sometMng like altercation took place between Greene and his
commander, because the latter had omitted to notice the good conduct of
Weeden's brigade in general orders. That General Weeden and his officers
were dissatisfied, is very certain ; and that some of them addressed themselves
to Greene on the occasion, is also true ; but he declined remonstrating with
the commander in cMef, and correctly replied, " Our general has enough to
distress him ; let us not add to his perplexities. The whole army admits the
services you rendered, let us rest satisfied with the consciousness of it."
It is also true, that the opinion of the army was, that the general's reason for
not distinguishing Greene and his command in general orders was, that he
knew he could confide in their good sense to do justice to his motives, and
would submit to the sacrifice, rather than add to the mortification of their
fellow soldiers from their recent defeat. How could the commander in chief
have applauded the one division without obliquely, if not directly censuring
the rest ? And the common interest required that an effort should be made to
keep up the spirits of the raw, half-disciplined troops of which the army chiefly
consisted, and to spare the sensibility of as brave and respectable a body of
officers, as ever were drawn together under any commander, and who were
now writhing under the mortification of their recent defeat. Greene well
understood the feelings and reasoning of Washington on the subject, and
needed no explanation of the grounds of his conduct. The writer who could
charge him with sharply remonstrating with Washington on that occasion,
little understood the delicacy of his own feelings, or the respect he entertained
for those of his commander and his brother officers. Nor is it by any means
true, that General Weeden was dissatisfied with Greene on this occasion, for
not pressing the subject on the commander in chief. His retiring, shortly after
this affair, favoured this story ; but it was altogether from dissatisfaction with
congress on a question of rank, in which he thought Ms just claims had been
pretermitted ; and his long and affectionate correspondence with Greene, even

78 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, to the time of his death, proves a respect and regard amounting to enthusiasm.
,He afterwards returned into service, under circumstances which removed the
subjects of his complaint ; and was in command under La Fayette when he
opposed the British army in Virginia.
Neither is it true, that Greene remonstrated against the choice of the ground
on which the battle was fought, at the time the army was drawn up for action.
He was with his own division acting as the reserve, and could know nothing
about the ground chosen by Sullivan ; and as to the position generally, it is
acknowledged on all hands to have been judiciously chosen. All the disad
vantages under which the American army fought, and possibly the fate of the
day, are to be attributed to the want of early and correct intelligence. Wash
ington expected to meet the enemy at Chad's Ford, and had he known of their
movement up the stream on the west side, he could have made a correspondent
movement on the east side, and at Jones' Ford have met them under every
advantage that was presented by Chad's Ford. Why proper videttes and
reconnoitring parties were not sent out by Colonel Bland, on the road leading
to the upper ford, and early intelligence obtained and forwarded, never has
been, and probably never will be explained.
Chester had been fixed upon as the rendezvous of the army, and here the
general was agreeably surprised to find his loss comparatively small, and his
men in unexpected good spirits. The truth is, there were not in the army five
hundred men who had ever been in battle before. And the good conduct of
some of the corps had set an example, and given a specimen of what could be
effected by men who were cool and firm, which inspired a hope and confidence
in their own future efforts when better disciplined. The artillery had behaved
admirably, and done great execution ; and the high eclat acquired by some of
the regiments who composed the reserve, excited a promising emulation.
Washington prepared again to give his enemy battle. But with an army
inferior in number, deficient in cavalry and artillery, and dispirited by defeat,
he could not venture on an engagement except under advantages which his
prudent adversary was resolved not to afford him. On the 16th of September,
in the neighbourhood of Goshen, the two armies again approached each other
with intention to risk another battle. A deluge of rain separated them, and
so damaged the arms and ammunition of the Americans, that Washington
was compelled for the present to decline fighting, and to give Up the hopes of
defending Philadelphia.
Congress removed to Lancaster, and on the 26th of September Sir William
Howe entered Philadelphia. The public stores had been previously removed,
and the shipping ordered to ascend the river. Necessity had compelled the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 79
commander in chief, with the advice of the state and general authorities, to chap.
exact a forced loan of all the blankets and the clothing that the inhabitants s>(^-v->ta/
could well spare for the army. A supply was thus procured, which relieved
the distresses of the hospitals, and covered a proportion of the troops from the
cold which now began to be experienced.
There was an evil prevailing over the destinies of the American people at
this time, which no author has ammadverted upon with sufficient severity.
Congress acted the aulic council over the conduct of the army. Hence the
enormous and fruitless efforts for the defence of Philadelphia, a place of little
importance in a military view, open on all sides, and not necessarily com
manding any great extent of country. Whether the withdrawing of Wash
ington, at this time, from the designs conceived against New York, was not
productive of the most injurious consequences to the service, must ever remain
at least problematical. Had the whole American force been directed to that
object at the time of Howe's landing in Maryland, it is probable, when com
bined with the increasing embarrassments of Burgoyne, that he would have
returned to the defence of his grand depot, the moment it was ascertained that
his advance upon Philadelphia could not withdraw Washington from his
designs on New York. Had that place fallen before he could relieve it, no
thing would have remained for him to do but to seek safety in his fleet. But
the resolves of congress and public opinion, which even Washington had not
then learned to resist, drew him to the defence of Philadelphia; and in pursuit
of tMs object, he effected little more than to exhibit new proofs of his own
zeal and resources, and of his unconquerable attachment to the cause he had
espoused.

80 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE,

IV.

CHAPTER IV.

Affair of Germantown. Impressments. Manoeuvring with the enemy. Corre
spondence. Made quarter-master-general. Retreat of General Clinton from
Philadelphia. Battle of Monmouth.

chap. AFTER the battle of Brandywine, General Howe hastened to move Ms fleet
, from the Chesapeake, and dispose of it so as so co-operate in an effort to force
a passage up to PMladelphia. Great pains and expense had been bestowed
by the Americans in erecting fortifications and other obstructions, so as to
prevent the British fleet from ascending that river. The influence of Phila
delphia upon the deliberations of congress had been actively and successfully
exerted for that purpose, and much blood and treasure was expended on the
one side in defending, and on the other, in reducing the forts called Mud Fort,
and Fort Mifflin.
In the mean time, the British and American armies had encamped, the
former at the village of Germantown, the latter about sixteen miles in advance
of it, near a stream called Skippack Creek. This brought on the action of
Germantown, an affair in which the military reputation of WasMngton suf
fered much more than he merited, and in which the most unjust and un
founded censure was cast upon the conduct of Greene.
As Howe's fleet could not pass the American forts, he was obliged to detach
strong convoys to secure the transportation of stores and provisions by land to

BATTLE of GERMANTOWN.

C retreats, B advances to N! '1. to support him: both retire to H. I) beinci
pushed also retires to A.A. 1 — n- 
Maautll r-"-l

The British Army advanced to support Musgrove/, and the Amer
ican Columns displayed jbr action.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE 81
Philadelphia. He had recently detached a force of near 3,000 men for this chap.
purpose, and Washington having been joined by about 2,500 regulars, drawn ^J^,
partly from Virginia and partly from Peekskill, it was resolved in a council of
war, to make a dash at the British main army in its encampment.
The village of Germantown is about six miles from Philadelphia. It has
extension in length only; being nothing more than a string of houses at short
distances from each other, extending for near two miles on the high road, and
the country for some distance on both sides, divided into small regular inclo-
sures, each secured by strong post and rail fences.
From the post occupied by the American army, there are four roads which
lead towards Philadelphia ; the shortest and most westerly is called the Mana-
tawny, or ridge road ; it also takes the name of Wissahiccon, from the creek
between which and the Schuylkill lies the ridge down which it leads to Phila
delphia. TMs creek runs between Germantown and the Schuylkill, leaving
Germantown to the east ; and crossing the ridge road a little below the centre
of the town, there empties itself into the Schuylkill. The next road to the
east of the ridge road, is the main Germantown road, the course of which is
generally north and south. Next to the east of the last, is the LimekiM road,
which preserves nearly the same direction until it approaches the town, when
it turns into it nearly at right angles with the main road, and enters at the
market-place. The fouth is the York road, which falls into the main road
some distance below the town, at a tavern well known by the epithet of the
Rising Sun. To get into these two latter roads from the place where the
Americans were encamped, you have to deviate some distance to the left or
eastward, as they do not communicate directly between the village and the
encampment at Skippack Creek.
The armies opposed to each other were numerically of an equal force, but
in point of quality there was a fearful odds. The British and Hessians were
disciplined veterans, well fed, well clothed, flushed with victory, and com
manded by officers of tried skill and valour. The Americans were one third
militia, and of the eight thousand continentals, there were very few who were
not undisciplined recruits ; besides which, in a country which ought to have
yielded them abundance,- they were almost destitute of every thing, even the
necessaries of life. Under these circumstances, Washington had nothing to
depend upon but their native valour, his many excellent officers, and the favour
of a just God. .
It was on the evening of the 3d of October that he marched to surprise the
British encampment. His army was divided into two columns ; the right,
commanded by Sullivan, and consisting of Sullivan and Wayne's divisions,
11

82 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, marched by the main Germantown road. It was preceded by Conway's brl-
,_^N^^/ gade, and attended by the commander in chief in person. On this road also
marched the reserve, consisting of three brigades under Lord Stirling.
The left column, consisting of Greene's and Stevens' divisions, under the
command Of General Greene, and supported by General M'Dougle's brigade,
was ordered to proceed by the Limekiln road; whilst the militia, divided into
nearly equal parties, were destined to operate upon the ridge and York roads.
General Armstrong led the column which proceeded by the ridge road, and
General Smallwood that which was allotted to the York road.
The encampment of the enemy stretched across the village, at right angles
with it, and nearly about the centre. All the writers who have given a rela
tion of this action assert, that the British encampment extended from the
village westwardly to the Schuylkill; but we are in possession of the sketch of
the battle and encampment, drawn up by the assistant engineer of the British
army, and the following are the positions assigned to it. The line was divided
nearly equally by the village, and from its right, strong detachments were
posted at intervals as far as the ridge road. The German chasseurs were
posted to watch that road, which at this place approaches very near to the
bank of the Schuylkill. In advance of the village, on the Germantown road,
was posted a battalion of light-infantry, and a little in the rear of them and to
the eastward of the road, Colonel Musgrove was posted with the 40th regi
ment. A battalion of light-infantry was also advanced upon the Limekiln
road, and the queen's rangers on the York road, whilst the 1st and 2d batta
lion of the guards watched both, from two convenient points occupied by
them between those roads. Thus it appears, that the British commander
had omitted no ordinary precaution in posting his troops for the purpose of
guarding against the danger of surprise. Nor were his patrols neglected, and
to their vigilance it will be seen, is to be attributed probably, the failure of the
attempt of the American eommander; whilst a corresponding vigilance in the
American patrol might have rendered that of the British of no avail.
All the writers on the American war seem to have vied with each other in
working up this battle to a scene of the most abject confusion-. Yet, upon the
simplest principles the whole of the events may be p&uced to order, and every
occurrence rationally accounted for. Each of the contending parties was
certainly best acquainted with Ms own movements, whilst the obscurity of the
night, and <ftt extraordinary fog which prevailed until near the termination of
the action, rendered it impossible to discover the movements of his adversary.
Giving each, then, credit for correctness with regard to what was within his

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 83
own knowledge, there is no difficulty in reconciling every seeming inconsis- chap.
tency. v^-v-%^
The Americans are not a little at a loss a]sq» to account for some events,
merely because they write under the erroneous impression that theasurprise
was complete. Yet the British assert, and on this point their assertion is not.
to be controverted, that their patrols had given them an hour's notice of the
approacMng attack. It is not to be wondered at that the Americans doubt
this, upon the supposition, that the British patrol could not have approached
the American army without being discovered by their own. But it is a melan
choly fact of which few were informed, that the celebratedJPulaski, who com
manded the patrol, was found by General Washington hhnsejf, asleep in a
farm house. Policy only, and regard to the rank and misfortunes of the
offender could have induced the general to suppress the fact. Yet to this
circumstance, most probably, we are to attribute the success of. the enemy?s
patrol in approaching near enough to discover the advance of the American
column. The hour's notice thus communicated, was well improved by the British
commander. The troops were called to arms, and stood in readiness to
receive the Americans, hoping to profit by their surprise when meeting a vigi
lant, instead of a supine and sleeping enemy. «The British commander appears
to have been at first in doubt, whether the attack* in his front may not have
been intended as a feint, whilst the principal attack was to be made by the
ridge road, which would have infallibly turned his left and gained his rear ;
for his first step was to detach a strong reinforcement to support the chasseurs
on that road. Why the American general did not adopt that measure, it is in
vain, at this distant day, to inquire ; unfortunately, the militia who marched
to the attack on that road, soon left this reinforcement at liberty to join the left
wing of the British, at a very critical point of time. Th^v scarcely looked
their enemy in the face, or, as the British relate it, only amused the chasseurs
during the action. The few of their light troops acted better. They crossed
the creek, and moved up to join the American right. The party which
advanced by the York road, did little more than that under Armstrong.
On the advance of Sullivan's column, the battalion of British light infantry
delivered their fire and retired before the bayonets of Conway's brigade ; this
was about four o'clock in the morning. Colonel Musgrove then struck into
the Germantown road to support them; but feeling the pressure of Sullivan's
whole column upon him, he perceived he must retire, and by one of those
rapid conclusions which genius only can attain to, he adopted the bold resolu
tion of throwing himself into a strong stone house, owned by a Mr. Chew8

84 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

IV.

chap, and which stood at the head of the village directly in the rout of the American
_, army, a hundred yards eastward of the road. Six companies of his command
were all that could be advantageously employed from the windows of this
house, ^nd the rest, with the light infantry, retired to join the main army.
TMs was*a gallant measure* and bravely persisted in.
The detention at this house is generally assigned, by the American writers,
as the cause of the failure of this enterprize. And General Washington, who
was there in person, has been ridiculed by some, and censured by many, for
having halted before it. That it was a principal cause of producing an unfa
vourable issue, is unquestionable; but there were other causes conspiring,
some of which were indistinctly known at the time and others not duly appre
ciated. The enemies of General Washington also, who unfortunately at that
time were in the zenith of their influence, and active in their intrigues, had
the art to give a turn to the affair which did not present his conduct in its
proper light. Nay, it would not be unreasonable to charge one of them with
treachery, for it is an established fact that General Conway had privately left
his brigade in the height of the action, and refused to join it, though pressed
by two of General Washington's aids to do so. That he was then intrigmng
against General Washington, is also established ; and it may not have been
consistent with his views, that, the reputation of the commander in chief
should be confirmed by a brifiiant coup de main at this time. His personal
courage alone was brought into suspicion, but a much more probable cause
was assigned when it wa sascertained that in writing and conversation he was
then actually endeavouring to undermine General Washington's reputation.
It is true, that on reaching Chew's house Sullivan's column was halted ; that
General Washington rode up, and paused a few minutes to observe the effect
of General Knox's bullets upon its massy walls ; that during this time, some
very precious minutes were lost ; but by no means as many as are generally
supposed. It was not that he was under the antiquated error which required
that a fortified enemy should not be left in the rear, but it was under the con
sciousness of the inestimable importance of every minute, that he thus acted.
Filing off to the right and left, to avoid the murderous fire from the house,
must occasion a great waste of time, whilst it divided his line and left an
opening that the enemy, then actually forming under cover of the house, might
take advantage of. It was the hope that the well-directed fire of Knox would
speedily bring the contest to a close, that induced him to submit to the delay.
And the hope was a rational one, for the impenetrable thickness of the walls
could only be ascertained by experiment. Yet a very few minutes elapsed
before he issued his orders to leave a regiment to observe the party in the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 85
house, whilst the army inclined to the right and left to avoid it. But now chap.
another and more((^rious difficulty presented itseh) The left wing of the ^^^i^
British army had advanced as soon as the firing on the road commenced, and
the whole fine was drawn up, extendmg from the Germantown road to the
Limekiln road, and crossing their line of encampment on the right, so as to
meet the attack of both the American columns. This required a new dispo
sition, and Sullivan's column was displayed, one division to the east, the other
to the left of the road, while the reserve under Lord Stirling was ordered up
to cover his right. This movement consumed the greatest part of the time
spent in the neighbourhood of Chew's house ; and when the army was
moved forward to action, another very serious cause of delay presented itself.
There was no moving without clearing a passage through the post and rail
fences for the artillery and the horses of the officers. This was a most embar
rassing circumstance, and could offly be overcome by pulling up the posts and
prostrating the fences. Whilst one part of the army was engaged in this work,
the other was, to little effect, expending their ammunition ; so that before the
retreat commenced, although the army had been furnished with sixty rounds,
the cartouch-boxes of this column were generally empty.
We will now pursue the progress of the other column. This was much
influenced by the occurrences which happened on the right. Having reached
the ground on which the British fight-infantry were posted, the latter were
soon obliged to retreat ; but they preserved their order, notwithstanding they
were vigorously pressed by the American light troops, and galled by their
artillery. The day was now breaking, but no object was visible at the dis
tance of thirty yards. During the whole action, the fire of the troops on both
sides was directed by the flash of each other's guns; for the morning was so
still that the smoke rested over their heads in clouds, or mingled with and
darkened the fog. On arriving at the ground directly east of Chew's house,
the attention of Greene was rivetted by the active firing kept up in that quar
ter, and as his rout was remote from the village, he very naturally concluded
that the other column had met and engaged the enemy. It became then
necessary to halt, to reconnoitre the enemy; and finally to display and prepare
to meet him also. In the original disposition of the American force, it was
contemplated that Sullivan should meet and fight that part of the enemy's
force which was encamped to the west of the village, 'and Greene that part
which lay to the east.* Which would have made it necessary that Sullivan

* Marshall.

86 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, should display to the right of Ms rout, and Greene across the Limekiln, road.
^^^J^But when an unexpected*state of things, (the position in<which the enemy was
forming,) made it necessary to throw one half of Sullivan's column on the same
side of the village with Greene's, the right of the latter was necessarily thrown
into the rear of Sullivan's left; and in the obscurity of the morning, having
no expectation of seeing any one but an enemy in front, the rear line, com
posed of Stephen's division, is said to have fired on the front, under Wayne,
who commanded Sullivan's left. The front, of course, supposing itself be-'
tween two fires, was thrown into confusion. Greene, whose division was on
the left of the whole, and who, upon the fine's being formed, commanded the -¦
American left, pressed on his men to find their enemy, who, from the direction
of his line of march, was considerably in advance, and from the darkness of
the morning could only be discerned by the fire, now opened upon the left
wing of Sullivan's column. General Stephens' division embarrassed with the
left of Sullivan's column, could render him no present assistance, and their
commander was unfortunately in a situation which disabled him from restoring
tilings to order. Such was the darkness, that orders could not be conveyed
with promptness and dispatch. The aids in vain gallopped about the fields at
every instant arrested by the fences, for they could not see to what point
to direct their course. The increasing employment of his own advancing
division, and perhaps a secret interest in its reputation, detained Greene near
his division, which, as second in command in the line, was his appropriate
post. ,»
Never did a body of men perform their duty with more firmness and zeal
than the American left. It is a truth which defies contradiction, that it was the
only part of the American army that had the good fortune to effect the service
allotted it that day. For they broke the enemy's right, drove them at the point
of the bayonet through their encampment into the village, and made ajarge
number of prisoners. But finally its very zeal proved fatal to a considerable
proportion of it; for, by pressing forward in the pursuit, while Stephens was
embarrassed and detained, its right flank became exposed ; and two regiments
on the left of the British right wing, not being confronted by any part of the
American force, was at liberty to wheel upon the left of Sullivan's line. This
movement was conducted by General Grant. The confusion in that quarter
soon became irretrieva*ble, and General Gray, with a division from the enemy's
left, was thus at liberty to hasten to the support of their right wing. By tMs
time, the morning had cleared sufficiently to discover to Greene the danger of
his exposed flank, and the general rout on his right. The order was received
for a retreat, and he soon overtook Stephens' column, which had suffered but

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 87 ?
little, and was enabled to support a countenance that covered the retreat of chap,
the American army. The officers who were at tMs time near the person of ^^-^
General Greene, concur in asserting that he pertinaciously exposed his person
to the very last ; so much so, that some have ventured to express an opinion
that his chagrin at having victory snatched from his grasp at the very moment
when, from every appearance under his immediate eye, it was all their own,
was so great that he did not wish to survive it. But there was another cause
to which it was more justly attributable ; this was his affectionate care for
every officer and every man in his immediate division. He was unwilling
to move whilst one of them would be left behind, if possible to avoid it. At
this time, some of the bravest of his men and officers had penetrated far into
the enemy's rear, and if not- immediately rescued, they must be made prisoners.
It was to recover these that he lingered on the field, as long as the safety of Ms
division would possibly 'admit of it. Notwithstanding every effort to with
draw them, Colonel Matthews, who commanded one of his regiments, and
who had made so many prisoners as to encumber his retreat, was surrounded
and captured. All the American prisoners that were made in this action,
except the wounded, were made in this quarter, and on tMs occasion.
This was a long and sharp action ; it lasted near two hours and a half.
The bayonet was only used on the American left, for the enclosures kept the
rest of the combatants apart. Wayne and Sullivan did every thing that men
could do, but the obscurity of the morningj and the obstructions that embar
rassed them baffled their efforts. Had there been sufficient light for the Ame
ricans to discover the precise manner in which the enemy had formed, and to
have adapted their own movements to the occasion, the wings of the columns
would not have got interlocked, and there can be little doubt of the result; for
there was a spirit and emulation displayed by every regular corps in the action,
from which the most happy consequences might have been expected. But had
the enemy retreated, the Americans could not have pursued far, as Cornwallis,
with a strong reinforcement of grenadiers and dragoons, arrived near the close
of the action, and in time to join in the pursuit. But the pursuit was not
pressed very long nor very vigorously, nor attended with any loss on the side
of the Americans; for the artillery of the rear division often warned the
enemy to maintain Ms distance; whilst Colonel Moylan, with three regiments
of horse, steadily guarded the flanks of the retreating army.
The artillery was all saved, even to a piece belonging to Greene's column
which had been dismounted. So scrupulous was he on this point, that he had
it*placed in a waggon and brought away; a conclusive proof both that the

•88 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, retreat was not hurried, and that he retained his self-possession in the midst of
^-v^a the greatest dangers.
But a more striking proof was exhibited on this occasion in a ludicrous
incident that occurred to one of his aids. His station was in the rear ; cues
and curls were at that time the fashion in the army. Major Burnet, who was
riding beside him, had turned his head to observe some occurrence behind him,
when a musket-ball cut away his cue, and it fell to the ground. Greene ob
serving it called out, " Burnet, if you can spare time, get down and pick up
your cue." Burnet, who had just then put up his hand to observe what had
happened in that quarter, in turning round to join in the laugh, saw that one
of the general's curls had fallen a sacrifice to a similar casualty. He coolly
replied, " And your curl at the same time, if you please, general." Greene
laughed and moved on, but without mending his pace.
In this action many brave men fell on both sides." The loss in killed and
•wounded was about equal, probably seven or eight hundred; but by the fall
of Matthew's regiment, the British acquired 400 prisoners, and among them
some very valuable offices. General Agnew on the British, and General Nash
on the American side, were among the slain ; both officers in Mgh estimation,
and greatly regretted.
General WasMngton, in his letter to congress three days after the battle,
writes thus : " It is with much chagrin and mortification I add, that every
account confirms the opinion 1 at first entertained, that our troops retreated at
the instant when victory was declaring in our favour. The tumult, disorder,
and even despair, which it is said had taken place in the British army, were
scarcely paralleled." And General Greene was always of the same opinion*
For, the reserve of three brigades under Lord Sterling had been brought up
into action on the American right, and the left flank of the enemy lay entirely
open to them. Had the reserve been pressed forward, the enemy's left wing
must have retired, and this would have given time for the broken divisions to
rally, whilst it found employment for General Grey, whic t would have pre
vented his restoring the fortune of the day on the enemy's right. In that
quarter the work of vcory had so far advanced, that nothing was wanting
but to save the assailants from the attack of a new and unexpected adversary.
Had the fog cleared away but a few minutes sooner, it is to be presumed this
woukj[ have been done. But such was its extreme density, until a few minutes
before the retreat became general, that the army was broken and scattered,
before General Washington knew that they hal paused. The hurrying o£ a
field-piece by him, with the horses in limber, was the first notice he had of fte
extent of Ms misfortunes. Colonel Pinckney, who was near his person, was

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 89
ordered to make an effort to halt and rally the men, who now began to hurry chap.
by in groups ; but all the zeal and ardour with which he endeavoured to effect ^^
it were in vain. The men showed their empty cartouche-boxes and ran on.
Several of the writers on the American war present a scene almost ludicrous
as having occurred before Chew's house. One would suppose, that General
Washington stood almost stupified on the occasion, listening with deference to
every babbler who chose to obtrude his opinions. Even field officers are sup
posed to have forced their way into the circle of his legitimate counsellors;
and the opinion of some stand recorded in commemoration of their correctness
and his folly. These gentlemen may have expressed their opinions, but
General Washington was listening to the counsels of his own mind and of his
general officers. And as has been before observed, an anxiety to avoid the ne
cessity of taking a large circuit to attack his enemy, then but a little distance in
front and actively forming under cover of the house, was the real cause of the
halt, wMlst Knox tried the weight of his metal upon it. But the active faction
then in the height of action, in a great measure succeeded in fastening on the
general the loss of the battle, whilst he carried on, what they were pleased
to call this wind-mill attack upon Chew's house. Some of the adherents of
that faction may be still in existence, and will deny this ; but all Ms aids have
not yet joined him in another world, nor are there wanting those who will be
ready to render his memory justice, not in mercy, but in love. The writer
of these pages will again venture to boast, that all the enemies Greene had,
at this time, were among those, who could be hostile even to the greatest and
best of men.
Will it be believed that they could have found any thing in Greene's conduct
in the affair just related to charge him, not only with neglect of duty, but
even with cowardice? Yes, and the name of Washington was cited for
authority. In a letter to congress, written the day after the battle, 5th of October 1 777, A
are contained these words: " I cannot enter into particulars of what happened
in that quarter, [speaking of the left wing,] as 1 am not yet informed of them
with sufficient certainty and precision." This passage, which is accompanied
by one passing high encomiums on the conduct of his right wing, has been
tortured by malice into an indirect censure on the conduct of the left. But
the passage admits of another most obvious explanation ; whether we refer to
facts contained in the letter, or to others that are extraneous. That passage of
the letter must have been written as soon as he had regained his camp, and,
as the letter declares, he had not then received Greene's report of the occur
rences on his left. That he was not informed of those occurrences during the
12

90 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, action is obviously accounted for by the obscurity which disabled the aids from
, finding the station of the commander in chief, the innumerable fences which
almost precluded communication, and the monopoly of their attention to the
important object of endeavouring to extricate Stephens' brigade, and bring
it up to its place in the line. The erroneous impression relative to Greene's
conduct was not a little promoted by the known fact that two regiments of the
enemy under Grant had been brought to act on the left flank of Sullivan's
command ; and the general ignorance with regard to the real cause. It was
known that they ought to have been engaged by the right of Greene's com
mand ; and until inquiry was made, the fault was thrown upon the commander
of the left column. But upon a fair estimate of circumstances, how stands
the question with regard to the embarrassments in which Stephens' division
was involved? In displaying so as to extend his line from the Limekiln road
to the village, the left column was pursuing the original order of attack. But
in displaying Wayne's brigade of the right column, from the village towards
the Limekiln road, a change from the original plan of attack had been forced
on the commander in chief, by the movements of the enemy in advancing to
the head of the village and forming on the east side of it. Of this change in
the order of attack sufficient notice had not been given, to arrest the execution
of the original order, in time to prevent the two columns from getting embar
rassed with each other. Yet, had the commander of the division which be
came thus embarrassed with the left of Sullivan's command, not unfortunately
indulged himself that morning too freely with his canteen, there was still a hope
that he might have extricated himself from this situation, and filled the space
left in the American line by the absence of his division. To censure the absent,
the dead, or the unfortunate, is among the most painful of all necessities ; nor
should the writer of these pages have suffered his pen to revive the recollection
of it, had it not been established by the decision of a court-martial, which has
never been complained of. It is also ordinarily mentioned as among the
principal causes of the misfortunes of that day, since it was Ms line that was
charged with firing on Wayne's, in the rear of which it was thrown in moving
to the right.
Another cause which favodred the propagation of an opinion unfavourable
to Greene, in the affair of Germantown, was his not entering into action from
a half to three quarters of an hour later than the column on the right. Gene
ral Washington, in his letter to congress, says three quarters of an hour, Mr.
Marshall, half an hour, and some others, some minutes over half an hour. But
no one has paused to remark that, all things considered, at the highest compu
tation, it was much less time than ought to have been expected. And yet it

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 91
was obviously so. For it must be recollected, that Greene had a route of a chap. IV
mile at least longer to perform than the other column, to reach opposite to ,
the head of the village, where the right column had engaged the enemy; and
then had to proceed near a mile further to reach the centre of the village,
where the enemy was drawn up which he had to engage. Nor was the pro
gress of Ms own division a little impeded by short halts, in hopes of being
joined in line by that under Stephens. All these facts considered, he must
have proceeded with more than ordinary expedition to have engaged as soon
as he did.
We have before observed, that General Stephen's conduct was submitted
to the investigation of a court-martial. In Marshall's Life of Washington we
find this notice of that fact: " Major General Stephens, who commanded the
right of the left wing, was cashiered for misconduct on the retreat, and for
intoxication. No inquiries appear to have been made into the conduct of other
general officers."
. The known candour and established character of that author will not for a
moment admit the supposition, that he intended by this passage obliquely to
intimate, that had there been such inquiries made, others might have shared
the same fate. His intention in the remark must certainly have been, that
during the investigation into Stephens' conduct, so severe a scrutiny must have
been made into the conduct of the commanders of every other corps, that no
one could have escaped had there been room left for censure or suspicion.
One thing is very certain, that Greene could not have suffered by the investi
gation, since he not only maintained Ms previous standing in the confidence of
his commander, but actually rose in estimation. And one of his particular
friends having felt some uneasiness on the publication of General Washington's
letter, and begged of him to say whether he was at all dissatisfied with the
conduct of Greene, he magnanimously replied, " No, it was our fault."* Yet
so successful were his enemies in propagating their construction of that letter,
that one of the British writers, in his account of this affair, has put that con
struction upon it. Yet no one who is acquainted with the invariable delicacy
of sentiment and conduct of the commander in chief towards his officers,
would have hesitated at assigning as the leading cause of Ms declining in that
letter to remark on the conduct of the left wing, the very serious charges
which had been made against General Stephens, and on which he was unwil
ling to animadvert, whilst it was uncertain whether he was in fault or not.

Governor Read.

92 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Finally, it appears that Stephens was acqmtted altogether of misconduct in
^-^s^j the affair of the embarrassment produced between the extremities of the two
lines, and his sentence was alone founded on Ms being intoxicated, and misbe
having on the retreat.
It will not be unacceptable to the American reader to peruse the following
compliment bestowed by a British pen, upon the American army in the affair
of Germantown. " In this action, the Americans acted on the offensive, and
though repulsed with loss, showed themselves a formidable adversary, capable
of charging with resolution, and retreating with order. The hope, therefore^
entertained from the effect of any fair action with them as decisive, and likely
to put a speedy termination to the war, was exceedingly abated."
The enemy did not remain long, after this affair, in their encampment at
Germantown. They had felt too sensibly the danger of being near to their
vigilant and enterprizing enemy. Retiring into PhiladelpMa, Sir William-
Howe ordered reinforcements from New York, and directed all his efforts to
qpemng the communication with his fleet; whilst Washington with his army
lay at Whitemarsh, watcMng the movements of the enemy at the distance of
fifteen miles, and ready to pounce upon Mm, should he lay himself open to
attack. At length, an opportunity presented itself which he thought favourable for
enterprize, and he hastened to embrace it. Cornwallis was detached with a
command of 3,000 men, to make a descent upon the Jerseys, by crossing from
Chester to Billingsport ; with the combined object of collecting supplies for
the army, and of opening the navigation of the Delaware by reducing Fort
Mercer. That place, better known as Red Bank, was important in com
manding the channel of the Delaware, and had become identified with Ame
rican glory by the gallantry of Colonel Christopher Greene, and the death of
Colonel Donop and repulse of the Hessians. An effort was thought advisable
to protect it, and it was no inconsiderable object to keep up in the British army
the state of distress for want of fuel and provisions, to which the vigilance
and advantageous position of Washington had reduced them.
It was determined in council, to send a force into the Jerseys to meet and
engage the British detachment, and Greene was selected for the command.
But to use Washington's own words, " they were so rapid in their advances,
that our troops could not form a junction and arrive in time to succour the
garrison." It was still an important object to restrain Cornwallis from col
lecting supplies. And, as soon as Greene could form a junction with the bri
gades of Huntingdon and Varnum, then in the Jerseys, he marched down the
left bank of the river with an intention to give battle to the enemy. Unfortu-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 93
nately, a large remforcement had arrived from New York ; which, added to chap.
the force detached from Philadelphia, gave Cornwallis a superiority even in s^J^L^
number. In quality of troops it was very great, for a large proportion of
Greene's command was militia.
However, he cautiously hung on the left wing of Ms superior enemy, until
positive orders were received from the commander in chief to retire and join
him. His conduct on this occasion has acquired for him the following just
eulogium from the biographer of Washington: " That judicious officer feared
less the reproach of avoiding an action, than the just censure of sacrificing the
real interest of his country."
Indeed, the struggle he had to undergo was, one of the most trying kind.
The Jersey militia under his command looked with the most restless impa
tience upon the marauding parties of the enemy, plundering their granaries,
and driving off their cattle ; and the strongest expressions of the wishes of the
members of Congress that he should engage the enemy, daily assailed him.
Could he indeed have cut off the party under Cornwallis, the best conse
quences might have been augured from it; for it would have reduced the gar
rison of PhiladelpMa to inertness, if not to absolute distress. But on the other
hand, Greene well knew how fatal the destruction of his command might have
proved to the safety of the grand army. It is well known, that his inclina
tions commonly led him to fighting, and he had under him several officers who
were celebrated for the same propensity. But a sense of duty, and a just
construction of his orders, prevailed, and he acted the part that prudence and
firmness, not his inclinations, dictated.
It has been said that, " General Greene's instructions, though not peremp
tory, indicated the expectations of the commander in chief that he would be in
a condition to fight Lord Cornwallis." *
Let the commander in chief speak for Mmself.
In a letter to congress of the 23d November 1777, he says, " General Greene
is still in Jersey, and when Glover's brigade joins him, if an attack can be made
on Lord Cornwallis with a prospect of success, I am persuaded it will be
done." But before Glover's brigade had effected a junction, Cornwallis
crossed over his baggage and stores to Gloucester Point, and indicated an inten
tion to rejoin Sir William Howe in Philadelphia. Their united force would
have put it in the power of Howe to attack the commander in chief at White-

* See Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. 3, p. 219.

94 major General greene.
chap, marsh, and the force under Greene having become necessary to the security of
v^-v^, the main army, he was recalled.
On this expedition Greene was accompanied by the Marquis La Fayette,
and a mutual esteem conceived at the battle of Brandywine, and increased by
a subsequent participation of toils and dangers, became now cemented into an
union of friendship and affection, which lasted with the one to his death, and
with the other exists to this day.
Thus ended the campaign of 1777. Washington being considerably rein
forced from the northern and eastern armies, went into winter quarters at the
Valley Forge, on the west bank of the Schuylkill, about sixteen miles from
Philadelphia ; whilst Sir William Howe, after gaining two considerable victo
ries, and acquiring possession of the defences of the passage of the Delaware,
sat down in Philadelphia — having conquered no more American territory than
would have sufficed for his men to spread their blankets on.
This was an important winter to the American cause. The capture of
Burgoyne, and the force under Washington, which was now becoming very
respectable, brought forth the European powers tojoininthe contest; whilst
the commander in chief, having his men and officers collected under his eye,
had for the first time a fair opportunity of reducing them to diseiphne. Nor
was it the least important circumstance, that he had now acquired some one
who was capable of disciplining them. Very small, indeed, was the number
of his officers, even in high rank, who were fully competent to discharge this
duty. Their knowledge wanted the fuiish of example and actual service.
But the talents of Stuben were now brought into reqmsition, and aided by the
zeal and aptness of the American officers, great advances were made in the
course of the winter, to give the army the consistency and power which disci
pline alone can communicate. Yet, afflicting were the discouragements under
which Washington had to labour, and such as had nearly marred all these
advantages. Tents he had none ; earth-epvered huts and the habits of the
American people, supplied that deficiency. But clothing, blankets, and provi
sions could not be obtained. The quarter-master's, commissary's and clo
thier's departments were in sad confusion. Severe as the winter had been
before the campaign terminated, many of Ms men were actually without
shoes, or blankets ; and it was no exaggeration when it was declared, that the
frozen ground was marked with the blood from their lacerated feet. But the
opening spring was destined to dispel the gloom of this winter.
It was the last of November when Greene joined Washington at White
marsh. Some movements of the enemy indicating an attack, detained the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE 95
army on this ground until the night of the 12th, when they crossed the Schuyl- chap.
kill and proceeded to the Valley Forge. v^-v-^w
The soldier looks forward to winter quarters as the place of rest and com
fort, if not of enjoyment. But sad were the disappointments which the
American troops were destined to encounter here.
Exposure, want of clothes and blankets, deficiency of food, and other causes,
operated to produce despondency and disease; whilst defects in the hospital
establishment consigned thousands to the grave. The sickness and loss of life
was truly astonishing. And the returns of the first of February exhibit a total
of near four thousand unfit for duty for want of clothes. The clotheir-general
wanted money, the commissary-general could find nothing to purchase, and
the quarter-master-general had not been in camp since the middle of the sum
mer. Finally, the army was on the point of disbanding for want of provision,
when Washington was driven to an expedient which he abominated, that of
ordering out Greene to forage as in an enemy's country, and bring in what
ever could be found. This was the first instance in which General Greene
had an opportunity of experiencing the activity and intelligence of the late
General Henry Lee, who afterwards served under him with so much eclat
in his southern campaign. By exploring the woods and meadows it was
found, that cattle were in abundance, but were concealed. And it was not to
have been expected otherwise. The American commissary had nothing to
offer in payment, but a depreciated currency, or promissory certificates of an
unestablished government ; whilst British gold flowed in streams through the
market-place of Philadelphia. On the score of patriotism, the majority of the
inhabitants of the country they were in, felt their consciences completely at
rest. Most of them were Quakers, who considered themselves as neutrals in
the war ; and a sense of natural justice suggested to all, that while they bore
their due proportion of the common burden, there was no just reason why
their property should be seized by violence, or sold for a compensation that
was a mere mockery in value. Hence, strong individual feelings conspired to
withdraw supplies from the American army, wMlst the evil was consummated
by a resolve of congress, empowering, nay, requiring the commander in chief
to impress whatever he wanted, within seventy miles of his camp. Of course,
every thing that could be removed beyond that distance, was removed to a
place of safety ; or concealed, until it could clandestinely be conveyed to the
Philadelphia market, where every necessary of life bore a most tempting
price. Painful as it was to the commander in chief to issue this order, it was still
more painful for Greene to execute it ; but he consoled himself with the con-

96 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, sciousness that it was unavoidable, and it was executed with as much order,
v^^^., and attention to individual feeling and interest as the nature of the case would
admit of
Plenty once more flowed into the American camp, and to keep it up by the
the same means, Wayne was detached into the Jerseys for the same purpose.
TMs was the origm of the jeu d' 'esprit of the celebrated Major Andre, written
on Wayne, concluding with four lines said to have been prophetic of his own
fate :
" But now I end my lyric strain,
I tremble whilst I show it,
Lest this same warrio-drover Wayne
Should ever catch the poet."
The unfortunate poet was indeed caught, and delivered to Wayne ; and suf
fered death.
The following letters written by General Greene, in moments snatched from
the busy scenes of tMs active campaign, present incidents, feelings, and opi
nions, a view of which will, we hope, not be unacceptable to the reader.
" Morristown, April 20th, 1777.
" On Sunday last, Lord Cornwallis from Brunswick, made an attempt to
surprize General Lincoln at Bounbrook. They in part effected it, owing to
the valorous conduct of the militia, who were posted at a fording place on the
Rariton. They deserted their post, without giving the general the least notice.
The enemy were at the general's quarters before he had any knowledge of
their approach. We lost three pieces of cannon, and about thirty men; they
had about as many killed and wounded. The enemy had five generals, and
four thousand troops; our General Lincoln had but about four hundred.
Lord Cornwallis and General Grant breakfasted at the house at which I dined.
The enemy halted but an hour and a half. I marched from Baskenridge upon
the first intelligence, but the distance was twelve miles, and the enemy had
retreated before I got down. The next night we surprized one of their
pickets, killed one officer and seven privates, and took sixteen prisoners.
Pray, how goes on recruiting with you? / am sure the continent must come to
drafting at last, the sooner the better. Very late news from Europe mentions
that a French and Spanish war is inevitable, and that but few recraits can be
got for the reinforcement of the British army in America. Our strength now
is trifling. It is to be regretted, that the cause of freedom rests upon the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 97
shoulders of so few. General Howe is preparing with all imaginable dili- chap.
gence to take the field. His bridge to cross the Delaware, so much talked of,
is arrived at Brunswick, as I am informed by a spy who left that place last
night. I would thank the British myrmidons to protract the opening of the
campaign for about three weeks, but that is not to be expected. Our army
will appear like Gideon and Ms pitchers. God grant us the same success ; the
cause is equally righteous, and claims his heavenly protection."
" Camp at Middlebrook, June kth, 1777.
" I have only time to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from you, deli
vered me by Lieutenant Littlefield. I suppose you are a little out of temper
at the ingratitude of the people in turning you out of your political chair. The
state of Rhode Island is too democratic for the happiness of the people ; there
is very little or no executive force in its government. Passion and prejudice
have too much influence in administration to preserve the best and happiest
line of conduct.
" I think you mention a division of our interests. If you think it best I am
content. Set me off such parts of the estate as you may judge equal; let it be
valued, and I will either give or take. I had no thought of a division of our-
interests at present, but if it is necessary, I am content ; every thing for the
good of the whole.
" God knows how long this war may last — the want of union and virtue
among the Americans may protract it for some time. We have now a very
respectable force in the field from the southward, though not large. The
eastern troops are very backward in coming on. The state of Pennsylvania
is in great confusion. The 'Quakers are poisoning every body; foolish
people ! The congress and I do not agree in politics ; they are introducing
a great many foreigners. I think it dangerous to trust so large a part of the
American army to the command of strangers. British gold is of a poisonous
quality, and the human heart treacherous to the last degree. There are no
less than four general officers of the  T  > nation now in the American
serviee. There is a French gentleman sent over by Mr. Dean to have the
command of all the artillery in America. If his appointment is confirmed, it
will rob us of one of the best, or at least, as good an officer as we have in the
service — General Knox. I tremble for the consequences, as I fear it will
ruin the whole corps, and it is now upon a very respectable footing and in
creasing in perfection daily. Wisdom and prudence sometimes forsake the
wisest bodies. I am exceedingly distressed at the state of things in the great.
national council.^' 13

98 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

CHAP. IV.

" Pompton Plains, New Jersey, July 13th, 1777,
" General St. Clair, who commanded at Ticonderoga, has evacuated that
important post. His garrison consisted of between four and five thousand
men, in good health and high spirits. With such a garrison, strongly en
trenched and well armed, fully supplied with provisions and ammunition, and
the works defended by 170 pieces of cannon, it was evacuated without firing
a gun. General Schuyler had 2,000 men with him at Fort Edward. General
Nixon was on his march from Albany with upwards of 1 ,000 continental
troops— the militia of the country coming in from all quarters to the aid of the
garrison— and the commanding officer^ fully acquainted with all these circum
stances, has abandoned- *htr post. What could induce him to take such a
measure God only knows. Burgoyne's whole force only consisted of 5,500
men ; the whole is a mystery to all the army. Charity obliges me to suspend
all ill-natured reflections, but I fear there has been some misconduct some
where. Our affairs never were in so prosperous a train as they were before
this. This affair will give us a severe wound. But by the blessing of God,
I hope to recover the shock. What has become of the garrison, whether they
are prisoners, or gone down to No. 4, I cannot learn. 1 think it is probable I
shall be sent to the north.
" General Howe and almost all his troops are embarked, their destination
unknown. I have had some fears for Providence, but Philadelphia or the
North River are objects of much greater importance ; we are on our march
to join General Putnam on the North River."

" Camp Cross Roads, 11th August 1777.
" Your favours of the 12th and 19th of July I have received. I am exceed
ingly alarmed at the ill state of health you appear to be in.
" The calamities of the war, the late misfortnnes and the common depres
sion of spirits that accompanies every species of indisposition, generally prey
upon the imagination, and perhaps may have taken an ungenerous advantage
of you in the present case. However, I would recommend great attention
to your diet and exercise. Nothing contributes more to health than seasona
ble and light diet, accompanied with moderate exercise. You must learn to
be the philosopher — to behold misfortunes without repining, limit the passions,
the appetites' and desires to the state of the body, and the necessity of the
times. However unfortunate things may appear, let us console ourselves with

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 99
reflecting that the greatest good often springs out of what we consider as the chap.
worst of evils. General Burgoyne' 's triumphs and little advantages may serve ^^^^^.^
to bait his vanity and lead him on to his total ruin. This is not improbable when
we consult the temper of the human heart, the history of mankmd, and the
dispensations of divine providence upon the rise and fall of men and kingdoms.
The campaign opened with a very fortunate train of circumstances. General
Howe was foiled in all Ms manoeuvres, and disgraced in every movement.
Our success was equal to our utmost wishes. The northern department has
brought disgrace upon the American arms, and a cloud over New England.
But even all these misfortunes may be a necessary prelude to General Burgoyne' 's
final overthrow. I agree with you that there is something very mysterious in
conducting the military operations to the northward. There must have been
a want of judgment in the choice of the posts and extent of the works, or
some great negligence in fairly representing the true state of things. We were
all led to believe the situation of the place so strong by nature and so improved
by art, that the garrison was sufficient to defend itself against any number that
might be brought against it. Whatever may be the source of the misfortune, it
is not owing to cowardice. I have been with General St. Clair in two actions,
and know him to be a man of bravery ; and it is agreed on all hands, that the
garrison was in high health and full of spirits, and left the place with great
reluctance. Charity obliges me to suspend my opinion until there is a fair
and candid inquiry made into the cause of the evacuation of Ticonderoga,
and if it was necessary to evacuate it, why it had not been done earlier. If
the stores and garrison had been saved, the loss of the place would have been
inconsiderable. " We have been in and about the city of PMladelphia for near a fortnight
past, ignorant of ^General Howe's destination. I hope it will not be against
New England, but I have my fears. We were marching towards Coryel's
Ferry from the city, expecting the fleet was gone eastwardly, when, by an
express from the president of congress last night, we learned that the fleet are
bound westwardly. I wish it may be true. It was said that two hundred sail
were seen off the coast, between Delaware and Chesapeake Bays, but I doubt
the intelligence ; for I cannot persuade myself that General Burgoyne would
dare to push with such rapidity towards Albany, if he did not expect support from-
General Howe.
" You lament the ruin of trade, the depreciation of money, and the discon
tent of the people as so many sure marks of the downfall of our cause. It is
true, our trade is greatly injured, but remember whilst it rains upon us, the sun
does not sMne upon them. Our trade is perhaps not more injured than theirs ;

100 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, we must balance accounts in national suffering. If the diminution of their
, force and resources equal our misfortunes and losses, then we are not sufferers
on the great scale of national gain. The depreciation of money is rather a
temporary, and in some respects, a local evil. The increase of trade and a
proper attention to taxation will soon correct the evil. The army are the
greatest sufferers. All the other parts of the community regulate their conduct
and prices by one another. But the wages of the army are fixed and un
changeable. There is a fund of hard money now establishing in Europe,
sufficient to pay the interest of all our loans. TMs cannot fail of establishing
the credit of the money abroad and at home. This is a good piece of policy.
The discontent of the people is not greater than is to be expected in every
revolution, when robbed of the blessings of peace and plenty, and forced into
along and distressing war to obtain some future advantage that they have but
an indistinct conception of. I have no doubt of a happy issue, although we may:
experience many calamities in the course of the dispute.
" You distress me exceedingly in committing to my charge the care of your
family. God grant you may long live to discharge the duty yourself. I feel
the force of brotherly affection equally strong with yourself I have been
equally happy in our mutual good understanding. The sweet pleasures
of social fellowsMp have ever been one of the greatest sources of my happi
ness. Few misfortunes in life, however tender my other connexions may be,
could equal the loss. Although I should esteem this charge one of my greatest
misfortunes, yet I trust I should discharge my duty to the survivors of the
family with such a brotherly affection as to leave no cause of a blush when
we meet in another world. But heaven avert so great an evil to them and
to me, and grant you long life and better health shall be my constant prayer."
We will not restore tMs letter to our files without giving the reader a further
extract from it, to show how deep and durable are the impressions of nursery
tales even upon the strongest minds. Speaking of his youngest child, an
infant, he says, " Mrs. Greene tells me she is marked with port wine. Be
pleased to send some to the nurse, and direct her to wash the part and give
the child a little. This, however simple it may appear, has been often known
to remove the marks."
During this winter Washington strained every nerve to place his army on a
respectable footing for operating in the ensuing campaign; and as the quarter
master-general's department is vitally important to every movement of an
army, Washington pressed Greene to accept of the appointment.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 101
It was with extreme reluctance that he yielded to the solicitations of the chap.

commander in chief. He was above all things apprehensive of undertaking >
an office which required the expenditure of public money. He well knew
how few men undertake such offices without being chargeable with a view to
private emolument, and he knew also the morbid jealousy felt by lookers on,
at the conduct of those to whom such trusts are confided. He was aware, too,
of the murmurs which the party of Conway would industriously excite against
his administration, whatever should be the purity of his conduct. Congress
also, in that spirit of mistaken economy which governed too many of their
acts, had increased the objections to undertaking this office by heaping upon it
duties only remotely connected with it. For a length of time it was impos
sible to get any competent person to undertake the office, and it was only when
General Washington was compelled to exclaim, " Some one must make the
sacrifice," that Greene submitted to undertake it. But he subjoined two con
ditions ; first, that he should not lose his right of command in action ; secondly,
that he should have two assistants that would be agreeable to him. These
conditions the commander in chief readily complied with, and the choice of
assistants fell upon two men, than whom, none better could have been selected
— his two friends, Colonels Coxe and Petit.
To those who are unacquainted with the duties of a quarter-master-general,
it may still appear surprising that the subject of these sketches should quit a
station that he was fond of, and the duties of which were familiar to him, to
enter upon the untried career of an office, which, notwithstanding its vital
importance, is still, like the useful arts, considered as inferior in gradation.
But military men are competent to appreciate the importance of the duties of
a quarter-master-general. The fact is, it gives life and motion to an army.
The commissary-general must purchase, but the quarter-master-general must
transport every article of the first necessity to camp. The army may be
ordered to move, but he only can furnish the indispensable means of setting it
in motion. And it may be ordered to halt, but he must provide for its halting
in comfort. In fact, although he does not move the automaton, he prepares
the whole macliinery and winds it up for motion.
There was one consideration which was not without its influence in inducing
Mm to accept of this appointment. Hitherto he had almost always acted in a
subordinate station. This appointment furnished an opportunity for discover
ing that he was competent to any other. The office reqmres an arranging
and combining mind, habits of industry and business, and an ubiquity of
talent that will leave notMng unattended to.

IV.

102 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Such, he soon gave the most satisfactory proofs of his possessing, in a degree
v^-v-w tnat justified the commander in chief in this appointment.
Washington no longer suffered the vexatious delays which had resulted from
the previous defects in this department. Although often driven to the most
disagreeable of all means for supplying an army — impressment, and always
embarrassed by the scarcity and depreciation of money, within a few weeks
after this appointment, which was 2d March 1778, order was introduced every
where, and at the opening of the campaign of that year, the commander in
chief was enabled to follow up the movements of the enemy, with an activity
Mtherto unexampled. A change which we have the express avowal of Gene
ral Washington, was attributable altogether to the measures of the new quar
ter-master-general. Howe had now been superceded by Cfinton, and on the 18th June 1778
Philadelphia was evacuated. This measure was produced by intelligence that
a French fleet had sailed to intercept the British army in the Delaware.
Unfortunately, adverse winds had greatly protracted the voyage of this fleet
across the Atlantic, or the Count D'Estaing, who commanded it, might have
signalized the commencement of the war between France and Great Britain
by many important captures, and perhaps by the fall of the whole British
army; for the British force was now greatly reduced. Philadelphia had
proved a Capua to Howe's army. He had landed certainly 15,000 (it is con
fidently believed 18,000) men at the head of Elk River, and been since largely
reinforced from New York. Yet not more than 1 1,000 effective men marched
out of Philadelphia. About a thousand had fallen in battle or been made
prisoners, and their loss by sickness could not have been very great; for com
fortable quarters had kept their army comparatively healthy. But great
number's had deserted. Their intercourse with the women of that place, with
whom many intermarried, and with the Europeans settlers, particularly the
Germans, induced many to wish to remain in the country. Among the Hes
sians, the spirit of desertion was universal. Their countrymen who had been
captured at Trenton, were comfortably disposed of in a part of Pennsylvania
inhabited by Germans, and possessing every thing that could tempt men to
return to it; and on being exchanged, few of them missed an opportunity to
escape, or to carry off with them some of their companions in arms. On their
retreat through the Jerseys, it is thought that not less than one thousand more
effected their escape.
Washington's force was about equal to his adversary's, and on the same
day that the enemy crossed the Delaware at Philadelphia, he took up his line
^>f March for Coryel's Ferry, about forty miles above that city, and crossed Ms

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 103
army over into the Jerseys. Two detachments were at the same time thrown chap.
across the river, the one at, the other below the city, with orders to hang upon ,
the rear and right of the enemy, whilst the main army pursued the direct route
towards New York on his left. The importance of the occasion rendered it
proper, in the opinion of the commander in chief, to call a council of war to
deliberate on the question, what course ought to be pursued with regard to the
enemy. At this board there was a great diversity of opinion. General Lee, as well
as most of the foreign officers, and a large majority of the whole board, were
decidedly against fighting. Wayne and Cadwallader, " such in that moment
as in all the past," were warmly for battle. Only two members of the board
expressed the opinion which appeared afterwards to have governed the con
duct of the commander in chief. These were Greene and La Fayette, who
declared that the country ought to be protected, and if necessary to fight the
enemy for that purpose, or if a favourable opportunity presented itself of
attacking him with effect, it ought not to be avoided. In other words, that it
was impossible to anticipate a decision.
With a guarded but firm step Washington approached his enemy, and when
in the vicinity of Monmouth, he thought the opportiuiity of fighting, which he
really coveted, had arrived.
He had detached a strong force under La Fayette to approach the enemy's
rear, with orders to act as circumstances should suggest; and bodies of riflemen
and militia were in advance of him and on his flanks. Clinton thought his
enormous train of baggage waggons^ containing his provisions, and the estab
lishments matrimonial or otherwise, made by his officers in Philadelphia, was
the object aimed at, and placing them under a very strong escort commanded
by Knyphausen, he united the rest of his force in his rear, to check the advance
of the parties that hung upon him.
The troops under Knyphausen were too far advanced to reinforce Clinton
had it been necessary, and it was probable' that Knyphausen's orders were
such as would not admit of his abandoning the particular object of his care.
And as the enemy were still in a champaign country, presenting no extraordi
nary defensive advantages, General Washington thought it advisable to hasten
an attack, before the enemy should reach the high grounds of Middletown,
about twelve miles in advance, and where he would be utterly unassailable.
The commander in chief accordingly dispatched a strong reinforcement
under Lee to join La Fayette, with orders to engage and detain the enemy,
whilst he in person brought up the rest of his forces.

104 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Upon Lee's junction with the marquis the command devolved upon the
^-^^j former, and in pursuance of his orders, he advanced upon and engaged the
enemy. But soon commenced a retreat, and whilst in the act of retreating
was joined by Washington with the main army. The latter, in a moment of
chagrin at a supposed disobedience of orders, threw something either into his
words Or manner which was retorted with less respect than was consistent
with their relative stations ; and General Lee followed up the affair after the
battle with letters, which certainly were not written in the spirit of proper
decorum. The issue is well known ; Lee was suspended from command ; but
whilst impartial posterity shall condemn the insubordination of his letters to
the commander in chief, they will probably decide strongly in favour of the
propriety of his conduct in retreating when he did. It was calculated to draw
his enemy further from his baggage, and to involve him amidst morasses that
would have greatly favoured his final overthrow. Perhaps it was the real
cause of the partial success which ensued. But our province is to enter no
further into this discussion than to show the part which it fell to the lot of our
hero to act on the occasion.
He commanded, in pursuance of the stipulation under which he undertook
the duties of quarter-master- general, the right wing of the second line. And
the most fastidious unite in acknowledging the signal services rendered by
him on this occasion. Greene was ordered to a particular position, in the rear
of the enemy's left; but a change of circumstances which soon ensued, deter
mined him to occupy another, and the signal service rendered from that posi
tion, in checking and repelling the enemy, ^drew from the magnanimity of the
commander an acknowledgment of its correctness.
The occurrence is thus related.
On meeting with the retreating detachment under Lee, with the enemy close
at their heels, Washington ordered him to face about and engage them, whilst
he brought up his troops and formed them for battle. Aided by a check given
the enemy from the artillery of the first line, Lee obeyed these orders with
spirit, and after a sharp action retreated in good order.
During this action, on a movement made by the enemy which threatened
the right of Washington's line, Greene was ordered to file off about two miles
from Englishtown, which is on the road to Monmouth, and to fall into the
Monmouth road a small distance in the rear of the court-house, while the
residue of the army proceeded directly forward. This movement would have
brought him into the rear of the position in which the armies were now
engaged. He had already advanced some distance, but hearing of the retreat
of the party imder Lee, and foreseeing that it would expose the troops imme-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 105
diately under Washington to the whole weight of the enemy's attack, he im- chap.
mediately changed his route and took an advantageous position near to the ^r^s^
enemy's left. As he had foreseen, this movement withdrew the enemy from
his designs against the left or first line of the American army, and drew on a
most furious attack upon his own division. General Knox, who commanded
the artillery of this division, poured in a most destructive fire upon the advanc
ing line, and being seconded by the infantry with the greatest firmness and a
steady fire, the enemy were soon driven with great loss back to the position
they occupied when Lee first advanced upon them in the morning. It was
now that the whole army had an opportunity of perceiving the strength of this
position, and the difficulties of assailing him whilst he continued in it. After
carefully reconnoitring it, the American army was withdrawn, and lay for the
night upon their arms, ready to renew the attack in the morning.
Rolled up in his cloak, Greene reposed at the foot of a tree on the field of
battle, whilst the commander in chief shared no better accommodation. Yet
it is affectionately related of him by the soldiers who fought under him, that
he sought not his pillow until due care was taken of the wounded ; and the
humble fare of the common soldier sated an appetite rendered keen by a day's
fasting. Nor was he at liberty to retire after this fatigmng day, until innume
rable orders were dispatched relative to the affairs of the department over
which he presided.
It will be some gratification to the American reader to peruse the British
account of this occurrence. It is extracted from the Annual Register of
1778, and is quoted with more confidence, as the subject of these sketches
used to speak with respect of the candour with which that history was written.
" The British grenadiers, with their left to the village of Freehold and the
guards on their right, began the attack with such spirit that the enemy soon
gave way. But their second line preserved a better countenance, and resisted
a fierce and eager attack with great obstinacy. They were, however, com
pletely routed, but in this exigency, with a very unusual degree of recollection
as well as resolution, took a third position with so much judgment, that their
front was covered by a marshy hollow which scarcely admitted of an attack
by that way."
The first line here spoken of obviously means the command under Lee, and
the second, both the bodies of troops which the enemy successively engaged
after his retreat. The account is incorrect in asserting that they were routed,
for they never receded from the positions at which they repulsed the enemy's
successive attacks. And the position, covered by a morass, on which they pass
14

106 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, an encomium, was that taken by Greene on changing his route and coming
^>-v^.a UP to the relief of Washington and the main army.
The oppressive heat of this day will long be a subject of painful recollection.
Several of the Americans dropped dead without a wound, and of the British,
full fifty-nine shared the same fate.
It was in this battle that the Americans first felt the incalculable advantages
of mature discipline, and complete organization. It was fought with order and
science, and except a little irregularity committed by a small portion of Lee's
command in their first retrogade movement, there was no instance of confu
sion. Nothing of the waywardness of unsubdued minds, or of the panic fears
which invade an army not connected by the bonds of discipline.
Yet, had not Greene risked his reputation by deviating from his commander's
orders, the event might have been truly disastrous. Lee had retired from the
field, and was ordered to a new position at least three miles distant from the
scene of action, on the enemy's right. Greene was ordered, and on his march,
to a point not much nearer, on his left, and military men will judge whether
there was not the most serious danger that the several corps of the American
army would have been cut up in detail, for no one alone was sufficient to resist
the concentrated force of the enemy. Such are the vicissitudes of human
fame! Lee in the morning had ventured on the same thing, perhaps with
equal judgment and effect, and was ultimately ruined. Greene, not deterred
by the offence, wMch Lee had given on the occasion, on the same day ventured
on disobedience, and perhaps saved the army, certainly much increased his
own reputation.
The enemy halted, merely long enough in the mght to rest and refresh Ms
men, and then silently moved on and rejoined Knyphausen. This movement
was not discovered until it was too late to pursue, and Clinton crossed in secu
rity to New York, whilst Washington inclined to the left to defend the Jerseys
and secure the passes of the Highlands.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 107

CHAPTER V.

French fleet arrives. Attempt on Rhode Island. Embarrassments in the
quarter-master-generaVs department. Views of policy suggested. Conway's
intrigues. Greene resigns his appointment in the staff.

JL HE American forces Were now at leisure to turn their attention towards CHAP
offensive operations. v
Ever since the fall of the year 1776, the enemy had remained in possession v*
of the town of Newport in Rhode Island. It was a position well chosen, and
recommended by many important considerations. The port and bar are
peihaps the best on the whole Atlantic coast, and whilst it served to distract
the attention of the eastern states from the grand operations under Burgoyne
and Howe, it in a great measure excluded the American privateers and their
prizes from an invaluable place of rendezvous and retreat. It was also
remarkable for the salubrity of its climate, and served for the retreat of con
valescents, whilst it contributed to give countenance to, and draw supplies
from the disaffected in that section of country.
At this time the number of troops at Newport was about six thousand, under
the command of Major General Pigot. And there were in the harbour, six
frigates and various vessels of minor force. Clinton, on his retreat from
Philadelphia, apprehensive that a blow would be aimed at this point, had
reinforced it, and abundantly supplied it with all the munitions of war. Works

108 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
«
chap, had been constructed across the island at convenient distances, and the whole
>^Zs^a placed in as complete a state of defence as circumstances would admit of; and
while the British fleet commanded the coast, all hopes of success in an attack
on it were abandoned by the Americans. On the other hand, the enemy never
dared penetrate into the country, for they feared the spirit and patriotism of
the militia. The hardy and valorous mountaineers of New Hampshire and
Vermont were not far distant. The populous states of Massachusetts and
Connecticut looked to the head of Narraganset Bay as their point of concen
tration, whilst a spirit of independence animated the state of Rhode Island far
beyond her strength or her resources. Early recollections still gave a tone
and character to the conduct of this little state, which caused their enemy to
dread approaching the shores of the bay; and such respect was paid to the
spirit of the people, that their privateers could still run in and out of the bay,
and lie in safety under protection of the small arms of the inhabitants on its
banks. At length the long looked for French fleet arrived. It was decidedly supe
rior to that of the enemy, and had been expedited under the advice of our
commissioners at Paris. But all the ill omens of the heavens must have been
in conjuction at the birth of this expedition. Never had finer prospects been
held out to man, of rendering efficient and gallant services than now presented
themselves to D'Estaign the commander of this fleet. But every opportunity
appeared to glide from his grasp just at the moment when it ought to have
been embraced.
First, he was eighty-five days on a passage that generally requires but half
that time. Ten days sooner would have put him in possession of his enemy's
fleet and army in the Delaware. As it was, had he steered for New York
instead of the capes of Virginia, he might have intercepted the transports and
the army, or entered with them pell mell and obtained possession of New York,
Again, from the capes of the Delaware he proceeded to New York, and such
was the weak state of the naval defence of that place on his arrival, that it was
the English opinion that his force was even then adequate to have forced his
way into the harbour. But, after loitering twelve days before that place, he
sailed for Rhode Island just when a day's further delay would have put him
in possession, by detail, of Admiral Byron's whole fleet, which had been sent
out to reinforce Lord Howe, and now arrived singly and crippled at New
York. Nor did his evil fortune desert him here ; or rather, the subsequent
events are more properly attributable to evil conduct.
When arrived before Newport, Lord Howe being reinforced by Byron's
squadron, followed Mm from New York with a resolution to relieve Newport.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE 109
He found the French admiral securely anchored in the bay, in a situation chap.
which it was impossible to force, and he had not a thought of making the v^r-v-w
attempt. Could he by any means draw off the garrison from the east side of
the island, it was the utmost he could hope to effect; for Sullivan then lay at
the heights near Newport, having landed on the island with eleven thousand
men, one half of them disciplined troops. The fate of the British garrison
was certain ; and the French admiral, after one brilliant achievement, would
have been at liberty to attack the fleet with men inspirited by recent victory,
and disembarrassed of the large and useless body of land forces which he had
on board. The assault was actually destined for the next day, on a plan
which could not have failed of succeeding ; and it would have taken place but
for the sensitive feelings of the chivalrous count, on a stupid affair of etiquette,
which no great and good man will ever hesitate to pretermit to views of sub
stantial service. But, under the influence of the same morbid sensibility to
the honour of his royal master, he coukl not brook to be insulted by an offer
of battle from the British fleet, and gallantly abandoned an original and con
certed enterprize, now matured for certain success, to chase " the bubble repu
tation" on the inconstant ocean.
His experienced adversary saw into his character, and the improvement to
be made of this movement ; and promptly availed himself of the advantages
they held out. It was his intention to give battle ; but with the chance of
victory he could now combine the certain advantage of withdrawing the
French fleet from Newport, whilst Clinton, by the way of Long Island and
the Sound, advanced to its relief. Manoeuvring with his adversary, ostensibly
to get the weather gage, a " sine qua non" of that day among nautical men,
he drew him out to sea several days' sail, and at last, when the proper time
arrived for action and the fleets approached to end the contest, a furious gale
separated, damaged, and scattered them over the ocean.
Howe, made for New York, D'Estaing, for Newport, and even then the
golden opportunity was not lost had he been disposed to improve it. For, his
fleet, crippled as two of his principal ships were, would still have been secure
within the fauces of the Bay of Narraganset, against every effort that could
have been made against it ; and long before the British fleet could have re
turned to relieve Newport, the place must have fallen. But he pertinaciously
refused to return to the attack, and without entering the bay sailed away to
Boston to refit.
As soon as the intelligence from Europe rendered it probable that a French
fleet would be on the coast in the spring, General Washington had dispatched
SuMvan to Rhode Island to take command of a small army of observation

110 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, formed near Providence, with instructions to make a requisition on the neigh-
.^^J—, houring states for militia, and acquire all the information necessary for an
attempt on Newport. Upon the arrival of the expected fleet, the Marquis La
Fayette was dispatched with a reinforcement to join Sullivan, and a request
communicated to General Greene to make such arrangements in his depart
ment as would admit of his absence for the time necessary for joining Sullivan
to act against Newport. His local knowledge, numerous connexions, and
great popularity in that country rendered this appointment peculiarly proper.
Accordingly, as soon as D'Estaing sailed from New York to co-operate with
Sullivan, Greene proceeded to Rhode Island and took command of the left of
the troops, then posted in advance on the heights of Tiverton. This position is
separated from Aquetnet, or Rhode Island proper, by a narrow channel, and
presents the greatest facilities for throwing troops across into the island, while
it is in itself perfectly secure and commanding.
Volunteers soon crowded to his standard, from all quarters, and a zeal and
confidence prevailed through the camp which augured the most happy conse
quences. On the 8th of August the French fleet entered the bay and anchored above
the reach of the British batteries ; and a plan of attack was arranged for the
next day. In the conferences for this purpose it soon appeared that the con
federates were likely to be much embarrassed about points of etiquette.
D'Estaing held a commission of lieutenant general in the land service, as well
as admiral of the fleet. He was therefore entitled to the command of the
whole combined force, should he land with his troops ; and much importance
was attached to the honour of landing first when entering on the attack. The
first difficulty was obviated by the admiral's declimng to land, and requesting
that the command of the French troops should be assigned to La Fayette ;
and the second obviated, by an agreement that both columns for attack should
land simultaneously.
The plan of the attack was, that one division of the American army, under
cover of a frigate, should be thrown across below Tiverton, on the east side of
the island, within the enemy's outer lines ; while the French, and another
division of Americans landed from their fleet on the west side of the island,
also within the enemy's outer line, and the whole to proceed immediately
against the fines constructed near the town. If the American account of the
conduct of D'Estaing on this occasion be correctly given, he certainly is
chargeable with having been captious and assuming. The command of the
combined forces was tendered to him, and he ought to have accepted it, or
ought not to have insisted on dictating respecting the command of the right

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. Ill
wing. This he did, and although the high standing, unbounded popularity chap.
and real merit of the Marquis La Fayette made every one willing to concede ^*~v^a
what he could with honour, yet the punctilious pretensions of the count him
self ought to have made him respect the rights and feelings of others on this
occasion. The propriety of delegating the command of the French troops to
La Fayette was conceded by all ; but when D'Estaing insisted that an entire
division of the American troops should act with them, and the command of
the whole be delegated to La Fayette, he certainly carried his pretensions too
far for one who had declined the chief command.
The delicate and magnified point, concerning the party which should land
first, probably in the end proved the destruction of the whole expedition. A
party of Massachusetts and New Hampshire militia who were expected on the
8th, not having arrived, Sullivan declined acting on that day, and dispatched
a message with an apology on the subject to D'Estaing, appointing the next
for the assault.
In the night of the 8th, General Pigot perceiving the preparations for a
descent, withdrew the troops that occupied his outer line, within the lines
which defended the town. And in the morning, as soon as Sullivan perceived
this movement, he crossed his whole force over into the island, and occupied
the lines thus abandoned by the enemy. This was done without previously
consulting the French admiral, but was early communicated to him by letter,
urging as excuse, an apprehension that the enemy might return and re-occupy
the lines, before Sullivan could move in force to prevent it. But the admiral
was seriously offended, and refused to answer Sullivan's letter. That day,
which ought to have been appropriated to action, was consumed in discussion,
and the next, Lord Howe arrived to terminate the dispute, and with it, the
expedition. Whatever apologies may be made for Sullivan, it must be acknowledged
that he acted unadvisedly. He had seen enough of his noble colleague to
know that he wTas to be treated with wise precaution ; and although, under any
circumstances, an immediate necessity for action must have excused him for
acting without communicating with D'Estaing, it was impossible to prove that
the case actually existing was one of that description. There was but a
remote, if any, probability that the enemy would re-occupy the lines they had
abandoned, and if he did, the case was but the same concerning wMch the
previous arrangements had been made, and was one wMch ought rather to
have been desired than prevented, as it withdrew a part of the force of the
enemy from the main point of attack to a situation where they might have
been easily amused with a false attack whilst the principal one was in pro-

112 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, gress ; or at least, would have exposed their flanks to the allies. It was m fact
s^-J^, an important change of circumstances, and the American general's movement
was one of magnitude, on which the French commander had a right to be
consulted before the Americans proceeded to act.
Whatever may have been the grounds of conduct assigned by the French
admiral for his subsequent measure in sailing out of the bay to meet the
British fleet, those who are acquainted with the workings of the human mind,
will ever suspect that the great disgust expressed by him at Sullivan's conduct
was not without its influence in instigating him to act, in his turn, indepen
dently of the wishes and advice of his associate in the expedition. Such feel
ings cannot be acknowledged in explaining our motives for action, and often
maintain an influence over our conduct, the full force of which we are our
selves unconscious of.
The occurrence of this misunderstanding gave the most sensible uneasiness
to the commander in chief. He had previously cautioned Sullivan on the
subject, and pressed on him the necessity of being very guarded in his con
duct. By the departure of the fleet on the appearance of that of the enemy, the
situation of the American army had become embarrassing, nay, dangerous.
Fortunately, the British shipping in the bay were all destroyed on the approach
of the French, or Sullivan's retreat would have been impossible. But rein
forcements might arrive from New- York by the Sound, in twenty-four hours,
and involve him in difficulties from which he could not extricate himself. To
carry Newport by storm, was impossible. He had but 8,000 men fit for duty,
more than half of them militia, and the enemy were six thousand strong and
well defended by every work of art, as well as many natural advantages.
And to carry on a siege with a body of troops, one half of whom were only
fit for desultory operations, would have been a folly. Yet the return of the
fleet might hourly be expected, and to abandon the island whilst that expecta
tion remained was what he could not resolve on.
Under every disadvantage he resolved to remain ; and during ten days of
painful suspense he continued before the town, making dispositions for a siege,
and anxiously looking out for the return of the French. At length, they made
their appearance ; but what was the chagrin of the troops when the French
commander intimated, that he must immediately proceed to Boston to refit.
Greene and La Fayette were immediately dispatched to the fleet to confer
with D'Estaing, and to strain every nerve to persuade him to resume the
attack on Newport. Only two days' co-operation was solicited, and Greene
pledged himself, under protection of the guns of the fleet, to lodge his troops

Major general greene. 113
within the lines of the enemy. But D'Estaing finally declined, and insisted chap.
that he must depart for Boston. >^-v-w
It was but a few hours that Greene remained on board the fleet, but the
admiral had called his officers together, and Greene had an Opportunity to
discover, that D'Estaing was not as blameable in this affair as he at first
appeared to he. From some source of information (what, his prudence would
never permit mm to commumcate) he was able to ascertain, that a party had
been formed by the sea captains against their admiral, who was not popular
among them. Sailors have generally a mortal aversion to be commanded by
landsmen, whom they really esteem an inferior order of beings. D'Estaing,
it was said, had been advanced by court favour to a command for which he
had not been qualified by service or education. And it was thought that this
party were resolved to thwart, and if possible, disgrace their commander.
It was the opinion of both Greene and La Fayette, that but for this cause the
admiral would not have remained deaf to their arguments, or inexorable to
their solicitations.
The indignation and dismay which overspread the camp on the return of
Ctreene and La Fayette, and their report on the subject of their mission, can
only be imagined by those who have encountered defeat and disgrace, in the
moment when they merited and expected victory and glory. Another fruit
less attempt was made to stay the fleet, or at least the land forces on board of
it ; but disappointment, aggravated by reproach, increased the chagrin of the
Americans. D'Estaing pursued his voyage to Boston, and to heighten apprehension,
information was received that Clinton was rapidly approaching from New
York. The militia could no longer be detained ; that night they deserted with
such precipitance, that in the mormng Sullivan found his force reduced to
barely five thousand men.
In the night of the 28th of August -the camp of the American army was
broken up, and with the utmost silence and order, the whole army retreated to
seek the protection of two redoubts which had been prudently constructed on
the north end of the island. In the morning, as soon as the enemy discovered
this movement of the Americans, they commenced a pursuit, in two columns.
Greene covered the retreat of the American army ; under the gallant conduct
of Colonels Livingston and Laurens, whose regiments composed his rear
guard, the whole army reached their point of destination, and drew up in
order of battle. Greene commanded on the right, and from a redoubt in his
front a cannonading was kept up upon the enemy throughout the day, whilst
15

114 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, it was warmly returned from a hill called Quaker Hill, on which the enemy
^~v^, were drawn up in front of the Americans.
From Newport towards the north end of the island, there are two roads
which communicate with each other near the north end. The two redoubts
constructed by the Americans, commanded the junction of these roads, and
the communication with the main. By these two roads the two armies had
marched in column, the one in retreat, the other in pursuit. m~
About two o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy advanced upon the western
most of these roads, and indicated a design to turn the American right. Rein
forcements were ordered up to the support of that wing, and the action soon
became warm and bloody. About one half of the American army sustained
the whole pressure of the attack. The numbers actually engaged were nearly
two to one against the Americans. But they sustained it with the coolness
and recollection of experienced veterans. Greene had under him a number
of most gallant officers ; and most of the men had partaken of the discipline
of the Valley Forge. It would be superfluous to say any thing of the conduct
of their commander. He was in sight of the place of his nativity, and of
thousands of his countrymen and friends, who anxiously lined the surrounding
eminences. The enemy were repulsed with slaughter. But they, too, were disciplined
soldiers, and retreated in order, to the hill from which they had descended to
the attack. Partial as this engagement was, and comparatively small as were
the numbers engaged, the loss was equal to that of the hard-fought day at
Monmouth. Greene appears to have been scarcely able to find language to
express his sense of the conduct of his men and officers, and their enemies
bestow on them a justly merited encomium. " Though he was most vigo
rously pursued and repeatedly attacked," say they, " in every quarter wher
ever an opemng was made, yet he took his measures so well, and had chosen
his posts so judiciously, that although much honour was claimed and deserved
on both sides, he gained the north end of the island without sustaimng any
considerable loss."
Baggage, stores, ammunition, artillery, every thing was conveyed over that
mght from the island, and the next day Sir Henry Clinton arrived, with a
force that would have baffled all the bravery and self-devotion of a much
superiour corps.. One day more, and they could not have escaped from the
island. Being now once more encamped in security, they had time to brood over
the conduct of their allies; and it was plainly perceivable, that mutual irrita
tion had risen to a most alarming height. Sullivan, goaded by chagrin and

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 115
disappointment, of a temperament rather warm, and under the influence of a chap.
deep and just sense of injury, had, in general orders of the 28th, expressed a^
hope, " that the event would prove America able to procure that by her own "*
arms, which her allies refuse to assist in obtaining;''1 and, together with every
officer under his command, excepting La Fayette, (and we believe Greene,)
had unwisely dispatched to the admiral, a protest against his conduct, in lan
guage but little calculated to soothe the feelings of that officer,— piqued as he
had been by Sullivan's invasion of the island, and irritated by the disasters
that followed upon his abandoning the army at the most interesting crisis.
General Washington, congress, and every thinking man in the country fore
saw the fatal consequences that would ensue upon an irreparable breach with
our new ally; and the njost judicious and unremitted efforts were pursued, to
allay the ferment and restore confidence and harmony.
The part which our hero was called upon to act, on this occasion, will
appear from the following extract of a letter written to him by General Wash
ington, on this subject: " I have not now time to take notice of the several
arguments that were made use of for and against the count's quitting the har
bour of Newport and sailing to Boston ; right or wrong, it will probably dis
appoint our sanguine expectations of success ; and what I deem a still worse
consequence, I fear it will sow the seeds of disunion and distrust between us
and our new allies, unless the most prudent measures are taken to suppress the
feuds and jealousies that have already risen. I depend much on your temper
and influence to conciliate that animosity which I plainly perceive, by a letter
from the marquis, subsists between the American and French officers in our
service. This, you may be assured, will extend itself to the count and the
officers and men of his whole fleet, should. they return to Rhode Island, unless
a reconciliation -should, have taken -place. The marquis speaks kindly of a
letter from you to Mm, on this subject. He will, therefore, take any advice
from you in a friendly way, and if he can be pacified, the other French gentle
men will, of course, be satisfied ; since they look up to him as their head.
The marquis grounds his complaint on a general order of the 28th of August,
and upon the universal clamour that prevailed against the French nation.
" I beg you will take every measure to keep the protest entered into by the
general officers from being made public. Congress, sensible of the ill conse
quences that will flow from our differences being known to the world, have
passed a resolve to that purpose. Upon the whole, my dear sir, you can con
ceive my meaning better than I can express it; and I therefore, fully depend on
your exerting yourself to heal all private animosities between our principal

116 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, officers and the French, and to prevent all illiberal expressions and reflections
.^-v-^, that may fall from the army at large."
Nor was this confidence misplaced. His personal influence with the mar
quis was great, and could be exerted with more of the freedom and familiarity
of a friend than that of Washington, though certainly not with the same
parental weight. And the dignified, dispassionate, yet respectful deportment
that he had exhibited to D'Estaing, in the personal conference between them,
had given him a standing with that gentleman, which successfully promoted
Ms efforts at conciliation. With the American officers, after the first ebullitions
of passion, the task was not difficult; for theirs was a system of sacrifices to
the country's good. And with congress, a signal opportumty not long after
wards was presented to him of showing his prudence and. promptness in
promoting the views of the man whom he respected above all others ; and his
own, as previously exhibited in his letter to the marquis alluded to in that of
Washington. The endearments of a wife whom he loved, and who had now presented
him with two fine children, the pleasant places of his early youth, and caresses
of relations and friends who idolized him, were ineffectual to detain him from
the pressing duties that called him to head quarters. His presence was no
longer necessary in the army under Sullivan; it was only when battle ap
proached that his stipulation with Washington admitted of his absence from
the connecting point of his operations as quarter-master-general ; and he soon
joined the commander in chief at his camp near the White Plains.
The murmurs in congress relative to the failure of the expedition against
Rhode Island, at this time, were low, but portentous. An inquiry seemed to
be required by public opinion, and a resolution to that effect was brought into
congress, but wisely waved by the previous question. Vet it was privately
much desired, that means of information of an unofficial nature could be
afforded ; and as Greene's commission of quarter-master-general furnished the
most plausible grounds for his visiting the seat of government, he repaired to
that place at Washington's request, and his arrival was reported to congress*
Immediately an unanimous vote was passed, that he should be invited to a
| seat on the floor, and in pursuance of it, he was shown to a chair beside the
' president.
I Colonel Henry Laurens then filled that chair; and but a few minutes
/ elapsed after Greene had taken his seat, before the arrival of a communication
from the Governor of Rhode Island was announced, and an order passed that
it be read. Whilst the clerk was preparing to open and read this communica
tion aloud, Greene, who had a suspicion of its contents from some previous

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 117
\
intimation, wrote on a scrap of paper which he handed up to the president, chap.
" For God's sake, do not read that paper aloud, until you have looked it over." v^^
A whisper from the president to the clerk arrested his progress, and another
whisper passed round to the members, an explanation wMch produced a call
for the order of the day. Thus a remonstrance against the conduct of D'Es
taing, which could not have failed to give the greatest umbrage to that officer,
and to several others of the first respectability who chanced then to be present
in the gallery and lobby; to the minister of France then residing in Philadel
phia, and perhaps to their sovereign and the nation at large, was most judi- 1
ciously suppressed.
But Greene's zeal in the public service did not permit him to return to
head quarters, until he had accompanied the Marquis De La Fayette on a
visit to D'Estaing at Boston, to promote the interesting work of national
reconciliation. The following letter to General Greene from the count will
show that the effort was crowned with success, while it exhibits that officer's
idea of the causes of umbrage that had been afforded by the conduct of Gene
ral Sullivan. "Boston Road, October 1st, 1778.
" Sir, " The letter which your excellency did me the honour of writing to me
when you were leaving Boston, was of a nature to console me for the little
irregularities which you perceived in General Sullivan's letter, which I took
the liberty of com mumcating to you, upon receiving it. It is from you, and
what you are, that it is doubtless suitable and flattering to judge of the respect
able and amiable qualities of the American general officers whom I have not
the honour of knowing by correspondence or personally : it is with cordial
warmth that I render homage to truth in assuring you, that on every occasion,
I have had reason to admire their zeal and talents, and to feel personal satis
faction for their behaviour with regard to me ; and to add to the motives of
duty those of inclination and attachment, which I shall always profess to have
for them. I shall be enchanted if the assurance and the homage of these sen
timents appear to you of any value.
" With respect to the conduct more or less moderate, that General Sullivan
seems to have adopted in his literary commerce with me; as a zeal and devotion
for the common cause which I glory in, had engaged me to style him my
general, he avails Mmself of the privileges which this title gives; beginning, as
you saw in his letter, by scolding me unjustly, and finishing by telling me in
confidence, that he has rivals whom he supposes Ms enemies. This mixture

118 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, of chagrin and confidence being confined personally to me, did not offend me ;
^-v~^ there is another more important article, and which I am not at liberty to pass
in silence — I mean the obstinacy which General Sullivan exhibits in national
imputation, and the abuse of his place in filling incessantly the public papers
which are under his direction, with things wMch might, at length, create ill
blood between the individuals of two nations who are and ought to be united.
It is wounding their interests in a capital manner to dare, by indiscretion or
passion, to foment what ought to be extinguished, if it exist. I have been
obliged lately to entreat General Sullivan to reflect on this subject. In doing
it, I observed all the deference that was due to him ; but my quality as a public
person, and that of his well wisher, equally imposed this law on me.
" I hope that your excellency and your respectable colleagues will not
disapprove my conduct. To merit that it should please them, will ever be one
of my desires, as well as to prove to you particularly, all the consideration
which I have for you and them, and the respect with which I have the honour

of being,

" Sir, your excellency's
" Most humble and most obedient servant."

Upon the retreat of Sullivan from Rhode Island, there were many, and
among them some men of high standing, who loudly expressed their disappro
bation of his conduct. Among these, was the late Mr. John Browne, whose
influence in that commumty as a man of wealth, intelligence, and public spirit,
and one who had filled many high offices, was very great. The following
generous vindication of the conduct of his commander, from the pen of
Greene, will not be unacceptable to the reader.

" Coventry, September 11th, 1778.
" Sir, " In all republican governments, every person that acts in a public capa
city must naturally expect to have observations and strictures upon his conduct.
This is a tax generally laid by all free governments upon their officers, either
civil or military, however meritorious. I am not surprised, therefore, to hear
the late unsuccessful expedition against Newport, fall under some degree of
censure; but I must confess I am not a little astonished to hear such a princi
pal character in society as you, throw out such illiberal sentiments against a
gentleman's conduct, merely because he took his measures different from your
opimon.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 119
" This expedition was planned upon no other consideration than that of the chap.
French fleet's co-operating with the American troops. The strength of the v^^^,
garrison was considered, and a force ordered to be levied accordingly, that
might be sufficient to complete its reduction. In forming the estimate, there
was the aid of the fleet and the assistance of 3,500 French forces that were on
board the fleet, taken into consideration.
" The loss of this force with that of the aid of the French fleet, was a suffi
cient reason for abandoning the expedition. You say, you think the expedi
tion was ill planned and worse conducted. In the first place, that the forces
were drawn together at an improper place. I must beg leave to dissent from
you in opinion. Was there any time lost by the continental troops coming to
Providence? There was not; for all got together some days before the militia.
Would it not have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to have brought
the forces to have acted in concert with each other, one body at Tiverton, and -
the other at Boston Neck?* And divided as they were, both parties would
have been unequal to the descent. If either party was sufficient of itself,
then the other part was superfluous. Besides the objection of a division of
jforces, and the distance they would be apart, there are two other objections
against the measure. One is, the difficulty of embarking troops from that
rugged shore; the delays that storms and high winds might produce; the
accidents that might happen in crossing where there is such a large swell
going ; and the languor that a sea-sickness might produce among the men.
The other is, there were no stores or magazines of any kind at South Kings
ton to equip and furnish the troops for the attempt ; besides which, it was
necessary for the general to have all his troops together, that he might select
such officers and men as were most suitable for the enterprize.
" If the troops had been collected at South Kingston, it would have too fully
explained our intention, and put the enemy on their guard ; whereas landing
on the north end of the island, led the enemy into the belief, that we intended
to carry the garrison by regular approaches, which would have given us an
opportunity of re-embarking the troops and landing upon the south part of
the island, without being mistrusted. This was the plan of attack, and it
must have succeeded had our strength been sufficient, and the disembarkation
countenanced by the fleet.
" You cannot suppose that General Sullivan wants spirit or ambition to
attempt any thing that reason or common sense can justify. It is the business

* A measure, it seems, pressed by Mr. Browne.

120 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, of every general officer that is desirous of distinguishing himself, to court all
s^^^a opportumties to engage with the enemy, when the situation and condition of
his own forces, and that of theirs, will admit of it. But the safety of our
country is a greater object with every man of principle than personal glory.
" Before a general officer engages in any hazardous enterprize, he should
well consider the consequences of success and failure; whether the circum
stances of the community will not render one infinitely more prejudicial, than
the other can be beneficial; the strength and quality of the troops should be
considered that you are about to attack — how they can be approached, and by
what means you can secure a retreat. Then you have to take into considera
tion the number and quality of your own troops — how they are found — what
temper they are of---whether they are regular or irregular, and how they are
officered ; even the wind and weather are sometimes necessary considerations,
and not to be neglected.
" I have heard some people foolish enough to suppose, that it was only
necessary for a general to lead on his forces, in order to secure success, without
regard to the strength or situation of the enemy, or the number or goodness
of his own troops. Those that have often been in action can only judge what;
is to be expected of good, bad, and indifferent troops. Men are often struck
with panics, and they are generally subject to that passion in a greater or less
degree, according as the force of discipline has formed the mind by habit to
meet danger and death. I dare say that many a man has gone from home
with a determined resolution to meet the enemy, that has shamefully quitted
the field for the want of habitual fortitude. Men often feel courageous at a
distance from danger, who faint through fear when they come to be exposed.
Pride and sentiment support the officer, habit and enthusiasm the soldier;
without these, there is no safe reliance upon men.
" I remember you recommended an attempt to effect a landing upon the
south part of the island, the night we returned from the fleet. But I could not
possibly suppose you to be serious, because we could not possibly get the boats
round, draw out the men and officers proper for the descent, and effect a land
ing before day. It was, therefore, impracticable, if it had been ever so eligible.
But I am far from thinking, under our circumstances, the measure would have
been justifiable by reason or common sense, in a common view, much less by
military maxims. The day after the fleet sailed, such a great change took
place in the two armies, particularly in ours, whose spirits all sunk upon the
departure of the fleet, (except the few regular troops, and it had its effect upon
them,) that nothing could be attempted with the hopes of success. The gani-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. ' 121
son at Newport that before gave themselves up for lost, ,now collected new chap.
courage, and would have defended themselves with double obstinacy. >^»-v^>
" Suppose General Sullivan had attempted a landing and actually effected
it, and the garrison had defeated his troops, what would have been the conse
quence ? The whole would'have been made prisoners, and not only the party
that landed, but all those who remained in camp, with all our stores of every
kind. Was the object important enough for such a risk ? Was the chance
equal of our succeeding? Every one who will suffer himself to reflect a
moment will readily agree, that neither the importance of the object, nor
the chance of succeeding, would have warranted the attempt. It must be
confessed, that the loss of such a garrison would have given the British army
a deadly wound, but the capture of our army would have put our cause in
jeopardy. Remember the effect that the loss of the garrison of Fort Washing
ton had : there were men enough to have defended themselves against all the
army had they not been struck with a panic ; but being most of them irregular
troops, they lost all their confidence when the danger began to grow pressing;
and so fell a prey to their Own fears.
" But when you take into consideration the little prospect of our effecting a
landing where there were batteries almost all around the shores, and cutters to
intercept any attempt, with guard-boats to make discoveries, the measure
Would look more like madness, than rational conduct.
" There was another objection to the measure ; that was, our force was
unequal to the attempt— *fre party detached to make the landing should have
been superior to the whole garrison; the remaming part left in camp to cover
the stores, and co-operate occasionally with the detachment after they had
effected a landing, should have been equally strong. For, both being so cir
cumstanced as to render it necessary to be able, independent of each other, to
resist the whole British garrison ; if either had been deficient, it might have
proved the ruin of all. If the party that was landed had not been superior to
the garrison, they wOuld have been defeated, and not having any ships to
cover their retreat, all would have been lost. Or if, during the embarkation
the garrison had sallied, the troops left in camp would have been put to the
rout, and nearly the whole have been made prisoners, and all our cannon and
stores would have fallen into the enemy's hands.
" These are common and probable events in war, and to be guarded against
accordingly. The garrison at Newport was generally thought to be 6,000
strong, including sailors ; our force amounted to 9,000 at most; indeed, the
field returns made it but 8, 174, and the much greater part of these, militia ;
but I would swell it to the utmost extent, and still you will see it will fall far
16

122 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

CHAP. V.

short of the necessary number to warrant the measure, even supposing ours to
/ have been all regular troops.
" Here I cannot help remarking, that some people seem desirous of deceiv
ing themselves with regard to our strength. They rather incline to credit the
votes of assembly, and the resolves of councils of war with regard to numbers,
than returns actually taken on the ground. Would not a general officer be a
fool to take a measure from numbers voted him for an expedition, without
examining them, to see how they agreed with his actual force fit for duty ?
Some, I hear, assert that 6"ur strength must have been much greater than
our returns, from the number of rations that were drawn. I remember very
well last winter at Valley Forge, our army drew 32,000 rations, when the
most we could muster fit for duty was about 7,500. In all irregular armies
there will be generally one third more rations drawn, than in a well appointed
one, to have the same strength on the ground. Therefore, there can be no safe
conclusion drawn from the circumstance of the rations; their being either
greater or less, is no certain evidence of the real strength of an army.
" I am further informed, you think this expedition has been the worst con
certed, and most disgracefully executed, of any one during the war. I must
confess I differ widely from you in opinion. I think it prudently concerted,
and honourably, as well as faithfully executed. If the general had attempted
to storm the lines in common form, he would have met with a disgraceful
defeat. Some people are foolish enough to think that because the northern
army carried Burgoyne's lines, that these might have been attempted with
equal success, not adverting to the difference of circumstances. These lines
were ten times as strong as those of Burgoyne's ; besides which, the enemy
came out of their works there, and our people drove them back again, and
entered pell mell with them. Burgoyne's force was much less than this garri
son, his troops much dispirited, the army that surrounded him more than as
strong again in regular troops as ours.
" Remember the loss of the British army before Ticonderoga, last war, in
attempting to storm lines, inconsiderable when compared to the fortifications
at Newport, and defended with a less number of men in the works than were
here. Recollect the fate of the British army at Bunker's hill, attacking slight
works defended by new levied troops. Consider the disgrace and defeat that
happened to the Hessians upon the attack of the inconsiderable redoubt at
Red Bank, and then form a judgment what prospect General Sullivan had of
success in making an attack with an army composed chiefly of militia, upon
a garrison as strong as that at Newport, consisting almost wholly of regular
troops, and fortified so securely as they were. There was but one possible

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 123
mode of attack^by storm, which was proposed to the general ; but the men chap.
necessary for the attempt could not be found, and, consequently, the attack v^^^,
could not be made.
"I am told you censure General Sullivan foy not bringing on a general
action, and urge my opinion as a proof of the propriety. I remember you
asked me, why there had not been a general action, when you were on the
island, the evening of the day of the battle. I told you, I had advised one in the
morning, but that I believed the general had taken the more prudent measure.
He had fought them by detachment, defeated and disgraced them, without
running any great risk.
" Our numbers, at the time we left the enemy's lines, were not much supe
rior to the garrison ; we know they expected a reinforcement hourly. Had
any considerable force arrived the night we retreated, landed, and marched out
with the old garrison, we should have met with a defeat. The smallness of
our numbers, the dispirited state all troops are in on a retreat, together with
the probability of the enemy's having received a reinforcement, determined
the general not to risk a general action, when he was sure of an advantage in
a partial one, and by risking a general one, he exposed the whole of his troops
to certain ruin on a defeat. He thought the other measure most advisable,
and I dunk so too, upon cool reflection, although I thought otherwise at the
time. " I have seen as much service almost, as any man in the American army ;
and have been in as many, or more engagements than any one. I know the
character of all our general officers as well as any one, and if I am any judge,
the expedition has been prudently and well conducted, and I am confident
there is not a general officer, from the commander in chief to the youngest in
the field, who would have gone greater lengths to have given success to the
expedition than General Sullivan. He is sensible, active, ambitious, brave
and persevering in his temper, and the object was sufficiently important to
make him despise every difficulty opposed to his success, as far as he was at
liberty to consult his reputation ; but the public good is of higher importance
than personal glory ; and the one is not to be gratified at the risk and expense
of the other.
" I recollect your observations to me on board the, fleet — that the reputation
of the principal officers depended upon the success of the expedition. I have
long since learned to despise vulgar prejudices, and to regulate my conduct by
maxims more noble than popular sentiment. I have an honest ambition of
meriting the approbation of the public, but I will never go contrary to my
judgment, or violate my honour or conscience for a temporary salute.

124 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. " If congress, or any particular state, who entrusts their troops under my
.^rv^/ command, thinks proper to give orders to run all risks and hazards to carry a
point, I would cheerfully lead on the men ; but when it is left discretionary, I
must act agreeably to the dictates of my own judgment.
" People, from consulting their wishes rather than their reason, and by form
ing a character of the spirit and firmness of irregular troops more from gene
ral orders sounding their praise, than from any particular knowledge of their
conduct, are led to expect more from such troops, than is in the power of any
person to effect with them.
" I would just remark one thing further to you, that an attack with militia,
in an open country where they could get off upon a defeat, might be very
prudent, which would be very rash and unwarrantable upon an island.
" I have written thus much in justification of a person's character whom 1
esteem a good officer, and who, I think, is much more deserving your thanks
than reproach, and that of the public also. With regard to myself, it was
unnecessary for me to say any tiling in justification of the measure of collect
ing the troops at Providence, because I had no voice in it; neither was I
opposed to a storm, providing a proper number of men of a smtable quality
could be found for the attempt. My advice for a general action, I think was
wrong ; and the retreat that followed, every body must allow was necessary,
and that it was well conducted.
" I have been told that your brother Nicholas let fall some ungenerous
insinuations with regard to me, a few days before the action upon the island.
" These are the rewards and gracious returns I am to expect, for years of
hard and dangerous service, where every sacrifice of interest, ease, and domes
tic pleasure, has been given up to the service of my country. But I flatter
myself I am not dependent on the state of Rhode Island for either my charac
ter or consequence in life. However, I cannot help feeling mortified, that
those who have been at home making their fortunes, and living in the lap of
luxury and enjoying all the pleasures of a domestic life, should be the first to
sport with the feelings of officers who have stood as a barrier between them
and ruin. " I am," &c.
*
The year 1778 terminated without any other event to call the talents or
patriotism of Greene into requisition. The British army under Clinton had
returned to New York, after the retreat of Sullivan ; and from this time to the
close of the war, the enemy appear to have relinquished all hopes of effecting
a conquest of the states, north of the Chesapeake. But the hope was relin-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE, 125
quished with evidences of disappointment and irritation that did but little chap.
honour to the British arms. The predatory expeditions occasionally under- ^s^/
taken from this time, were distinguished only by rapine, conflagrations and
murders. Until the arrival of the French to the aid of America, or perhaps
until the recall of Howe and substitution of Clinton, the war had been con
ducted in a style honourable to the British nation. With the exception of the
burning of Esopus, and some other irregularities committed on the same expedi
tion, the enemy had not been charged with inhumanity, or a deviation from
the practices of civilized warfare, in any other particular than the treatment of
prisoners on board their prison ships. This was, indeed, horrible, from the
American account; but the enemy urged many circumstances in extenuation
of the charge. From this time, wherever they advanced they were to be
tracked by blood unnecessarily shed, or followed by the light of wanton con
flagrations. Witness the massacre of Bayler's troop of dragoons at Tappan,
by Major General Gray; and of a party of American militia surprised by
Ferguson, near Egg-Haabour. Witness the burning of private dwellings at
Bedford, and near the Vineyard. The descent made by Collyer and Mathews
on Virginia; that of Tryon and General Garth on Connecticut; and to these
may be added the invasion of South Carolina under Prevost, in which the
enemy on their retreat, justly merited the epithet Of a plundering banditti.
During the year 1779 the British government appear to have been too busily 1779
employed upon the ocean and abroad, to have meditated any important ope
rations on the American continent. When they did resume active operations
on the land, those operations were principally directed against the southern
states. It has been before repeatedly mentioned, that it was only in the hour of
battle that Greene had stipulated for the right to advance from the curtain
behind which he silently conducted the indispensable, though less dignified,
duties of his department.
The whole of the year 1779 passed away without presenting any oppor
tunity for a general action. The British army, about sixteen thousand strong,
were distributed between New York and Newport — in the former six, in the
latter ten thousand men. Washington's whole force from north to south, did
not exceed that number. With about five thousand under himself at Middle-
brook, and the same number divided between M'Dougal and Putnam, in the
Highlands, he could do nothing more than watch and counteract the move
ments of his enemy ; and, excepting a few affairs of posts, and an expedition,
under Sullivan, against the northern Indians, this whole campaign passed
away in a state of inactivity in the northern states. In the southern, there

126 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, were a few occurrences, which we will have occasion, hereafter, briefly to
^~^~+.s notice. Forts Montgomery and Clinton, which were first held by the Americans to
command the North River, had fallen into the hands of the enemy; and the
next passes above, called Stoney and Verplank's Points, were then fixed upon
for the same purpose ; but these again, after various vicissitudes, and the gal
lant action of Wayne in storming the former, remained also finally in the
hands of the enemy. The attention of the American engineers was then
fixed by the singular combination of advantages possessed by West Point, and
great efforts were made to render it impregnable. Here Washington estab
lished his head quarters, and here he remained until it was necessary to go
into winter quarters. He then hutted one half of his army under General
Heath, at this place, and with the other half established himself, in the same
mode, near Morristown in New Jersey. In the mean time, D'Estaing having
repaired his ships at Boston, had sailed to the West Indies, had been strongly
reinforced and returned to the American coast. Admiral Howe also had been
reinforced, but Clinton thought it prudent to withdraw his troops from Rhode
Island; and occupied himself in strongly fortifying New York Island, whilst he
prepared to make an attack upon Charleston in South Carolina.
In the winter of 1779-80, Washington's army was reduced even to abject
distress. Hunger, cold, and nakedness, combined to render their situation
truly deplorable. Congress were without credit and without money. To
tender to the farmer or merchant their depreciated paper, in payment for the
articles wrested from them, was to add mockery to oppression. And to take
without compensation, was to render the cause of independence odious." Death
and desertion thinned the ranks of the American army, and the miserable
. plan of depending upon the states to keep up quotas, instead of enlisting, as
Washington and Greene had early recommended, on the credit, and in the
immediate service of congress, prevented the numbers voted, from ever being,
one half, in the field.
As difficulties thickened, Washington remonstrated, his officers complained,
the army murmured, and the quarter-master and commissary-generals became
importunate for money. Unfortunately, at that time, congress had beeome
distracted by party. The dignified unanimity with which they had hitherto
proceeded, had forsaken them; Jefferson, Franklin, Adams, Laurens, the
Rutledges, and several others of their great leaders, were absent, at home or
abroad, promoting the common cause by many successful efforts. Party
always renders a legislative body fretful, and the members naturally became
discontented with every body, because not content with themselves. Com-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 127
plaints the most unfounded began to circulate against the quarter-master and chap.
commissary departments. And congress imagined that they could remedy v^-v^^
evils flowing really from the want of money in themselves, by correcting the
administration or organization of those two departments.
The commander in cliief, confident in the integrity and ability with which
the two departments had been conducted, and dreading the consequences of
the want of practical knowledge in congress, and not less of the temper which
occasionally gleamed tiirough their proceedings, summoned to his aid the talents
and experience of Greene and Schuyler, and digested a system adapted to the
actual state of the country and the army, which, with his characteristic mo
desty, he brought to the notice of congress. Accompanying this communica
tion was an offer from Greene to administer it gratuitously, " for the country
needed the system, and it was practical and easy."
Hard is the lot of man in public life where the expenditure of money con
stitutes a part of his duty. The most exalted virtue there, exposes him to the
most jealous suspicion. A selfish, sordid world cannot admit of the possibility
of disinterestedness in the individual who offers to discharge such offices gra
tuitously. A purer, more unsullied character than Greene had from infancy
sustained, is seldom to be met with. Had the public formed but a just estimate
of the purity and judgment of Washington, his selection of Greene for the
department he presided over, and his unabated, nay, increasing confidence in
that officer, ought to have satisfied them that no sinister motive dictated this
offer. Yet was it resorted to as " confirmation strong" of the original and
malevolent insinuations thrown out against his administration.
It is, indeed, fortunate for the support of human virtue, that the good man
can, with confidence, look forward to the time, " when the secrets of all hearts
shall be revealed." Were it not for the reality of another, this life would but
too often disgust those who add most to its ornament and happiness. Calumny
is the great evil of the human state ; the most wary cannot wholly escape
from it, and those who least merit imputation, are too commonly the least
guarded against its attacks. They apprehend it not, and, of course, are indif
ferent about collecting or preserving the evidence necessary to avert it. Emi
nence is the favourite target for its shafts ; for little souls are ever intent to
draw down the more elevated to their own miserable level. " I cannot bear
that he should be called just," is a reason oftener acted upon than owned. It
has, indeed, been correctly said, that a good life is the unfailing remedy against
this evil. But the poison circulates with rapidity, whilst the antidote operates
but slowly. Far and wide does calumny often circulate before it reaches the
ears of its victim. As a mere topic of conversation, it passes rapidly among

128 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, the indifferent, whilst envy and malevolence urge its speed through too large'
.^-^^a a portion of the world. And the unwillingness of friends to disturb the tran
quillity of its object, by communicating what they disbelieve and despise, pro
duces a backwardness on their part, to make the communication.
In the present instance, however, it was productive of a curious and charac
teristic incident between Greene, and one of his brothers. That such a report
prevailed, was communicated to the latter at his residence in Rhode Island.
Mounting his horse, he sought the general at the distance of one hundred and
fifty miles, at his quarters near Morristown. Greene's cordial salutation was
met with rather a dignified reserve, for the brother had still to ascertain whe
ther he was addressing himself to an honest man. A private conference was
immediately requested, and as promptly granted. " I have come, brother," in
a voice half choked by emotion, " to inform you, that you are charged with
improper conduct in your office ; are you innocent ?" With an affectionate
smile, and a hand firmly placed on the heart, the reply was, " I am." The
brother, after rendering thanks to the Almighty, and giving yent to the feelings
that had impeded his utterance, had nothing more to detain him. But the
information sunk deep into the general's recollection, and he resolved to qmt
the office, as soon as he could resign it with honour and without prejudicing
the service.
It is with a feeling of disgust that the writer of these pages enters upon the
task of vindicating the subject of them from a charge which nothing could
for a moment support, but malevolence, and an ignorance of his intrinsic
worth and simplicity of character. It would be enough to allege a fact that
is known to all who knew him, that he left the office poorer than he entered
upon it, although his habits were frugal, and his style of living scarcely equal
to what his station required. But there is other evidence in existence of a
nature above suspicion, and which it may be satisfactory to the reader to
peruse. It is drawn from his private and confidential correspondence, which
spoke from the heart, and could not have been intended for the public eye.
Among the earliest attachments of the general's life, was one formed with a
cousin of the name of Griffin Greene. And to the close of their fives, the
affectionate regard in which they held each other, was nearly proverbial. It
does not appear that Griffin possessed any brilliancy of talent. But the quali
ties of the heart were what rivetted the general's affections to him. Of a
temper irritable to a fault, his companions viewed him almost with apprehen
sion ; but Greene, who had nothing to fear from his impetuosity, had distin
guished in him a noble ingenuousness and disinterested devotion where his
affections fastened, on which he knew how to set its proper value. Nor was

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 129
it perhaps, among the least of the causes that wedded him to this early friend, chap.
that he had himself been greatly instrumental in correcting the faultiness of his ^-v^
temper. Gratitude from the one followed the effort, while the other, under an
influence wisely grafted into the nature of man, contemplated in his friend, a
being improved by his own exertions. Their correspondence shows the
warmth of their mutual attachment, and the unbounded confidence of their
private communications. Of the truth of this, let the following serve as a
specimen. On the 17th of August 1780, General Greene writes to his friend
from camp in the following terms :
" Nothing could have been more welcome than your letter of the 30th ult.
It has relieved me from the greatest anxiety, being apprehensive that you had
taken offence at some part of my conduct; although, upon the strictest exa
mination, I could find nothing in it that could have wounded your feelings."
" Our long and happy connexion has been such a source of happiness to me,
that I tremble when any occurrence happens which threatens an interruption."
" I should esteem it one of the greatest misfortunes that could befall me, to find
myself sinking in the friendship and esteem of those whom I value." " I am
not much afraid of any thing of this kind taking place between you and me;
but the best way to avoid the evil is, to guard the heart against all impressions
urged by envy and malevolence, which often mingle in the affairs of man
kind." And in another letter of the 29th of August 1779, we have the following
expressions: " I hope you do not think me negligent for not writing to you
oftener; depend upon it, it is not for want of affection, for my heart feels an
unceasing regard for you, and I hope ever will. You are to me as a brother,
nay, nearer than a brother; as Jonathan loved David, so do I love you."
In the confidential intercourse of men who feel thus towards each other,
there is no room for disguise, and those who are acquainted with the language
of the heart, will recognize in the following extract, the genuine expressions of
indignant integrity.
It is contained in a letter of the 29th of June 1780. " I beg you to write
to me by every opportunity, as nothing is more agreeable than domestic mat
ters in this bustle of life. You cannot imagine what pleasure letters from our
friends afford. You are at home among all your connexions, and think less of
us who are absent, than we of you. You are happy in your circle, we are not
17

130 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, so, and, therefore, want something to entertain us. No pleasure is equal to
^_^-v--s_, domestic happiness. This mode of life is living for ourselves, every other
is living for other people. I wish the war was over, that I might return to my
dear fireside. I can say with Solomon, ' all is vanity and vexation of spirit.7
The world is full of folly, superstition, and ignorance, and overrun with malice,
prejudices and detraction. Good intentions are no security against abuse,
especially when ambition is to be gratified by prostituting honour and justice.
Little did I think when I first engaged in the public service, it was such a
slippery, thorny path. My heart was honestly devoted to the public interest,
and I expected to feel myself rewarded according to the merit of my actions.
But what a novice did I find myself. The black passion of jealousy, and the
cankering spirit of envy, had well nigh worked my overthrow, before I had
the least idea that I had an enemy in the world. I was an enemy to no man,
and could not see why they should be to me. But so it was, and so it will be
to the end of the world, in political life."
Our reader is already partially acquainted with the correspondence between
the general and Ms elder brother. He will have occasion to become more so,
when we come to consider our hero in his domestic relations. As early as
April 1779, he writes to this brother in the following words: "You mention
the envious dispositions of Mr.  and Mr.  . I expected nothing better
from the first of these gentlemen ; the last, I thought had more principle than
to be wholly under the influence of a spirit of detraction ; but it is as impos
sible for a person to be appointed to a place of either honour or profit, and not
be subject to the attacks of the malevolent and envious, as it is for the sun to
shine and vegetation not to spring.
" I feel the attacks of such people daily, but as I am conscious Of having
faithfully discharged my duty, I regard them the less. There have been great
pains taken of late to draw a cloud over my department, from the amazing
disbursements that have taken place. But as that has been owing to the
depreciation of money, and not to want of economy, I regard it the less.
However, it is a popular subject, and the people in general seem to be better
pleased at finding their servants rascals, than at finding them honest and faith
ful to their trust. I have just returned from Philadelphia, where I have been
to make a representation of the growing clamours. I have told the congress
I will not serve them at the risk of my reputation, and if they think my re
ward greater than my merit, I wish to quit the business ; or if my past services
are not satisfactory, it is my desire to leave the department, as I have no hopes
to conduct the business more to their satisfaction. This representation I have

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 131
made in writing, to which they have given no answer. But they give me all chap.
the assurances in their individual capacity that I can wish or desire, ' that they ^^^l^,
have the most perfect confidence in my justice and integrity, as well as ability
and attention.' However, these assurances did not satisfy me, as I knew they
might vanish like smoke, at a future day, and would not serve as vouchers to
the public for my justification."
At that time, however, calumny was not able to prevail over the unques
tionable evidence in favour of the quarter-master-general's department ; and
on the 7th of June following, the congress passed a resolve, that they " had
full confidence in the integrity and abilities of the quarter-master-general and
commissary-general ; [Colonel Wadsworth ;] and although there is reason to
believe, that abuses have been committed by inferior officers in their respective
departments, yet congress are persuaded that many of them deserve well of
their country, and that measures will speedily be taken to distinguish such of
them as have been faithful from such as have been otherwise, and thereby
cause justice to be done to all."
Greene was sufficiently soothed by this resolve to listen to the solicitations of
the commander in chief and of the army, not to relinquish the quarter-mas
ter's department. But calumny when once set in circulation, seldom ceases to
extend and diffuse itself until it no longer continues to be a subject of curiosity,
malevolence, or conversation. And unfortunately the improvidence and folly
of some of the minor agents of the department, gave too much countenance
to the report, that all who were employed in administering it, were acquiring
immense fortunes by fraud and peculation. In the annals of that time, we
have an anecdote of a Colonel John Mitchell, an agent in this department,
and an honest, but ostentatious man, who gave an entertainment to the French
ambassador at which the confectionary alone cost £800. Unfortunately, also,
the attack and defence of the general staff became a party object, and the
unhappy dissentions at that time prevailing in congress, soon blew up the
phantom to an alarming magnitude.
The commissary-general, in some measure, escaped the persecution, for he
was not followed by the envy which necessarily attended the favourite. There
happened also again to be a remnant of the faction commonly called Con
way's faction, in congress, and they uniformly fastened on Greene as a favour
ite object. This affair requires the more attention from his biographer, as its
malevolence was particularly directed against himself and General Knox, as
the known inseparable adherents of the commander in chief. And at last,
was worked up to such a state as to eventuate in a serious design, conceived

132 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
crap, by some of the members of congress, and actually moved and debated, to
, deprive Greene of his command in the line.
The general clamour was, " the officers in that department are all acquiring
the estates of nabobs, and the expenses of the army are enormous." Unfor
tunately for poor Greene, the first member of this notable syllogism which led
to the conclusion of his gmlt, was not true. And of thisi we are in possession
of evidence that would have put to shame his most hardy persecutor.
Among the many inestimable friends who attached themselves to him during
his military career, -there was no one whom General Greene prized more, or
more justly, than the late Governor Read of Pennsylvania. It was before
this gentleman had immortalized himself by his celebrated reply to the agent
of corruption, that these two distinguished patriots had begun to feel for each
other the sympathies of congemal souls. Mr. Read had accompanied General
Washington to Boston, when he first took command of the American army;
there he became acquainted with Greene, and, as was almost invariably the
case with those who became acquainted with him, and had hearts to acknow
ledge his worth, a friendship ensued which lasted with their lives. Had that
of Governor Read been sufficiently prolonged, he would have discharged in a
manner worthy of the subject, the debt of national gratitude to which the
humble efforts of the writer of these pages are now dedicated. We are in
possession of the outlines of a sketch of the life of Greene in the handwriting
of this friend.
Many letters are in our possession expressive of sentiments on both sides
equally warm and animated, and it may well be asserted, that the evil of mis
representation had arisen to an alarming height when such a friend could, in
a letter to our hero, address him in the following language : " Your situation
in the main army was a delicate one, and I verily believe, a good man in it thought
himself bound to treat you with less friendship than you deserved, or he felt, lest
his own character should be lessened."
The clamours of the day did not vent themselves alone upon the head of the
quarter-master-general's department. His two assistants, Mr. Petit and Colo
nel Coxe, bore their proportionate share of the malicious attack. It is a fact
but little known, but of which there exists the most incontestable proofs, that
the appointment of those two gentlemen was a condition upon wMch Greene
accepted the appointment that he held in the staff, and the arrangement was
made under the friendly auspices of Governor Read.
The duties imposed on that department comprised the whole extent of the
Umted States. To have waded through the immense details incident to that
office, and extending to every part of the union, and every expedition that

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 133
might have been going on it, was beyond human power. Greene felt full chap.
confidence in his own talents to combine and direct the whole, but to hope to ^^r**i>
be competent to superintend immediately, the receipt and application of
money, and the multifarious mercantile transactions which unavoidably must
result from the undertaking, would have been an instance of weak confidence
of which he was incapable. The talents, integrity, zeal, and capacity for
business of those two gentlemen, were well known, and Governor Read's
individual influence over them secured their consent to act. But such was
the disinterestedness with which Greene entered upon the undertaking, that he
voluntarily relinquished to them an equal participation in all the pay and
emoluments incident to the office.
Their conduct was such as merited the sacrifice/ and ought to have vindi
cated his motives and judgment in securing their services for the country.
But unfortunately, this arrangement which, in the integrity of their hearts,
none of the parties ever concealed, but rather felt that it ought to be viewed
as a subject of public commendation, was basely perverted into evidence of an
artful copartnership, and a league to cover and promote peculation. Let the
private correspondence of these gentlemen develope the principles upon which
they acted, and the opinions they entertained of each other.
In a letter of March 9th, 1778, General Greene writes to Governor Read
thus: " I will share the profits equally with Colonel Coxe and Mr. Petit; or,
in other words, I will leave two thirds to be divided as they can agree ; but I
would wish, for the satisfaction of the whole, that all were equally interested,
there could then be no complaints. Colonel Coxe and Mr. Petit cannot wish
or expect any thing more generous and equal than this — I am appointed prin
cipal in the department, made responsible for all the branches, I am taken out
of the line of distinction, I shall be subject to as much fatigue as any one, and
more expense. I only agreed to accept the department upon Colonel Coxe's
being joined. I would gladly relinquish it to him if practicable, but if not, I
am ready to act, provided the Colonel undertakes to act. But I cannot
engage upon the conditions of the present appointment, upon any other terms
than the foregoing. I wish Mr. Petit to engage in it, because I have a great
opinion of his integrity. 1 am persuaded Colonel Coxe will agree that Mr.
Petit shall share equally with him."
In another letter to the same gentleman he observes, "Mr. Petit is every
way to my liking, there is a most happy assemblage of good qualities in him,
necessary to constitue the man of business and the confidental friend." And

134 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, in this opinion the reader would fully coincide, were it consistent with the
^r-J*^ object of this work, to fill our pages with the luminous, patriotic, and well
written letters of tMs gentleman. From one only shall we extract a passage,
as elucidating the subject which immediately engages our attention. It is
dated September 24th, 1779. " But after all, it appears to me very doubtful
whether we can with propriety continue in our stations another year. The
emoluments we receive on the present footing, we do not esteem more than
bare compensation for our trouble, and at the same time we have the reputa
tion of amassing the fortunes of nabobs, and, of course, are held up as objects
of envy, and other invidious passions. These are reasons that affect us both
alike ; but we have each our separate objections. Yours you have mentioned.
Military fame is not only out of my reach, but out of my view, and, of course,
holds out no temptation to me ; neither am I thirsty for fame in any of the
public walks of life ; my desires, in this respect, grow fainter every day : my
pursuit now, is ease and retirement, which I would gladly seize as soon as I
find it in my power, consistently with the duties of a parent; and as to this, I
do not extend my views farther than giving my children a good education,
and securing to my family the means of living in a decent mediocrity. How
far this is now in my reach depends on the winding up of our political affairs,
and therefore it appears to me necessary to remain in the busy world till the
time and manner of closing these affairs can be better discerned. At the same
time, I doubt Whether in point of profit we should wish to continue in office.
Clamours, however ill founded, run so high, that some sacrifice must be made,
and at least some considerable changes to appease the people. These changes
may probably place us in a situation far from profitable or desirable, unless we
should choose to justify the suspicions of the multitude by deriving profits in a
way we both despise, however commonly it may have been practised in like cases.
But, however this may be, the consideration that by attempting a much longer
continuance, we may lose the opportunity of retiring with fair reputations,
deserves no small weight. Before we take any decided step in the matter, I
think we ought to come to a full understanding with congress, and learn their
mind on several points; for there may be as much danger in attempting to
withdraw abruptly, or against their will, as in continuing too long."
Nothing had been omitted, on the part of General Greene, to conciliate the
confidence of congress, and afford every opportunity for investigating his con
duct. As it was possible that the murmurs abroad, and the invidious hints
which were occasionally thrown out in the newspapers, may have infected the
minds of the members, even as early as April 1779 he repaired to Philadelphia,

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 155
and solicited a conference with a committee of that body, on subjects relative chap.
to the duties and situation of his department. v^-v~*^
A committee was accordingly appointed, and an ample andTuminous view
of the state of that department was laid before them. On a previous day, he
had addressed to the president, Mr. Jay, a letter, in which he pointed out many
improvements that he thought indispensably necessary to the perfect organiza
tion of that department; and in it, it is remarkable that he recommends
strongly the increase of the pay of all concerned in it except himself. He now
took occasion to renew the same subject, but that it might not be thought that
this conference was solicited with any private views, he cautiously avoided
whatever related to Mmself individually. Yet, knowing the importance in a
popular government of enjoying the support of opinion, and seriously wishing
to quit a station in wMch all the disinterestedness with which he had under
taken it, and the ability and integrity with which he had discharged it, had
not been sufficient to protect him from suspicion, the day after this conference
he addressed to the president of congress the following letter:

" Philadelphia, 21th April 1779.
" Sir, " When I had the honour to meet a committee of congress on Friday last,
I took occasion to mention to them my apprehensions that some reports which
were spread abroad concerning the quarter-master's department, would have
a tendency injurious to public service, by souring the minds of the people, and
rendering it difficult to obtain the necessary supplies for the army. But as that
part of the conference was not committed to writing, and may not have been
considered in so serious a light as I intended, I take the liberty of communicat
ing it more fully to your excellency by letter.
" The gentlemen appointed by congress to assist me, as well as myself, begin
to be alarmed at the murmurings and complaints which have of late been
spread abroad to the prejudice of the system and management of our depart
ment. It is scarcely possible to govern a department so extensive, and which
requires the employment of so many persons in different places, without giving
opportunities to dishonest men, in the detail of the business, to take undue
advantages ; but from the care taken in the choice of our agents, and the atten
tion which has been paid to the economy of the business, we have reason to
believe there have been as few of these abuses as could reasonably have been
expected. We, therefore, believe, that these growing clamours are founded on
general suspicions, rather than on facts, and propagated from improper mo-

136 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, tives ; and though we are conscious of having faithfully discharged our duty
,io the best of our abilities, we are nevertheless apprehensive that injurious
imputations, however unjust, may reach our reputations, and that unless those
evil reports are speedily corrected, jealousies and discontents may grow among
the people to injury of the public service.
" I cannot but consider the department in a critical situation, and should the
prejudices of the people throw new difficulties in the way of our business, it
cannot fail of producing some disagreeable consequences. We, therefore,
request the favour of congress to signify their sense of our conduct.
" If the present system on which our agents are employed, is thought to be
prejudicial to the public interest, and that a new one ought to be adopted, we
have already declared our willingness to give aid to such a measure.
" Our highest ambition has been to give satisfaction to the army, and to
merit the approbation of congress. These ends we have assiduously endea
voured to obtain, but if our past services have no claim to this honour, we
have no hopes of succeeding in future, and would wish to give place to abler
hands. We pretend not to be regardless of the pecuniary reward we derive
from the public, but a fair reputation and the esteem of our fellow-citizens, we
value at a much higher rate. No pecuniary consideration would, therefore,
induce us to continue longer in the present employment, than is consistent
with their preservation. We did not solicit our appointment, neither have we
a wish to hold it, if our merit is less than our reward.
" I have the honour to be," &c
Every word of this letter is given to the reader, that he may the better judge
of the temper that must, at that time, have swayed the judgment of congress,
when it could have given umbrage, and drawn upon him the imputation of
writing it under the influence of passion. Yet so it was ; and instead of excit
ing their admiration for the purity and manliness of the sentiments that it
breathes, it was the origin of that personal feeling which afterwards exhibited
its full force against him.
In a letter of the 13th of January following, written at New Windsor, and
which was drawn forth by a communication from his friend Mr. Petit, who
resided at the seat of government, he thus expresses himself on this subject :
" The congress are mistaken if they suppose I wrote either under the influ
ence of passion or prejudice. I wrote what I thought, and I think what I
wrote. It is no small misfortune, that that body are too little acquainted with
the nature of the business of the staff, to distinguish between evils incident and

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 137
inseparable from it, and those which originate from neglect or any other im- chap.
proper cause. Designing men, who dishke the system or the agents employed ^^^
in it, have nothing more to do, to ruin the one or destroy the other, than to
employ a few secret emissaries to instil poison and jealousies into the people.
This being worked up into a ferment, and the congress ignorant of the cause,
they fall upon measures to remedy the evil that only serve to add new difficul
ties. They who do not support measures from their usefulness, will ever be the
sport of designing men. It is astonishing, how easily the honest and well-
meaning, are duped too, into the most destructive measures, by the secret arti
fices of a few. In a government like ours, how cautious ought legislators to
be in crediting evil reports to the prejudice of their servants ; and how careful
to examine their actions before a judgment is formed, or a decision takes place !
How much the reverse of this has been the policy of congress in several in
stances !
" 1 will venture to pronounce, we shall ever be in confusion and distress
while popular frenzy takes the lead in administration, instead of just measures
founded in maxims of sound policy.
" Have not the tories a power to render us odious to one another? Cannot
they create jealousies concerning the designs of the army? How easily can
they brand the fairest characters as violators of public trust! Nothing is
easier than to set such measures in operation ; and distrust and deep-rooted
prejudices, with perhaps violent measures against the suspected, are the conse
quences. " A bad system and abuse of trust are popular subjects. Change your
system and remove delinquents, is their cry. This must be done to satisfy the
people, whether any more useful system can be substituted, or better men be
found to serve in the department or not. The object of administration seems
to be, not whether business be well done, but whether individuals gain by it ;
not whether better men or better systems can be adopted, but whether a
change is a popular measure. Unfortunate people ! to be the sport of every
wind and tide of passion and prejudice. I have said very little to any body
in support of the system, or in justification of those employed in the depart
ment. But I am confident, fatal experience will soon convince the world that
there can be no change for the better. The constitution of the department,
or the extent of its business, appears to be little known to congress. There
fore, the monies expended in it, are in amount both alarming and inexplicable
to them. It is evident they know nothing of the nature of the business from
their manner of inquiry. Neither have they any idea of the difficulties inci
dent to it. I enclose you a copy of what I wrote to congress, by which you
18

138 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, will see I shall consider myself a volunteer after your resignation, and deter-
^^^ mine to get out of the business as soon as possible, without giving my enemies
an advantage over me from the manner in which I leave the department.
This precaution may be necessary for you to attend to. I entered this depart
ment upon the express condition of your acting with me ; the moment you
quit, I shall think myself at liberty also. There are few men with whom I
would be concerned in business like this. Men are difficult to be found whose
capacity, knowledge of business, temper and integrity can be relied on. And
to be connected with men deficient in either, or to form connexions at hap
hazard, is a risk that I will not run. I am willing to make any reasonable
sacrifice, but I will not expose my character and fortune to certain ruin. As
soon as you announce your resignation formally to me, I shall send in mine.
But at the same time, I mean to offer my services as a volunteer, but will not
be answerable for monies spent in the department, or for the supplies that may
be wanted. I have found it very difficult to support myself with our united
exertions. What is to be expected, therefore, when two principal branches
are lopped off?
" I like you address to congress, and would cheerfully have signed it, if it
had been only to awaken their attention to the state of the department. I am
far from being displeased with your resignation. I think you have just cause,
and would be wanting to yourself were you to continue in office. This cir
cumstance will open a door tiirough which I can escape out of the department,
which both my wishes and interest lead to. It is now in a tolerable state. I
am not certain it would be in my power to continue it so with our whole
exertions ; and, therefore, it may be a happy circumstance in the end, that we
have an opportunity of quitting it when in a tolerable condition."
As a prospect of being able to resign with reputation, he thought now pre
sented itself, he deemed it expedient to draw up an expose of the circum
stances under which he had at first undertaken, and ever continued to dis
charge the duties of that department, and for that purpose addressed a letter
to the late Mr. Duane, who was then a representative in congress from the
state of New York, and had ever been distinguished for his excellence of heart
and gravity of character. This letter furnishes the fullest, and certainly the
most authentic history of this period of General Greene's life.
" I have had frequent conversations with you upon the quarter-master's
department. Your being at the head of the treasury board, president of the
committee for conferring with the general, and perfectly acquainted with the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 139
secrets of congress, as well as their opinions and sentiments respecting men chap.
and measures, I wish to explain myself to you upon the subject more fully than ^Z^,
I hitherto have done.
" It has been hinted to me, that some members of congress think I am too
griping in my demands, and am making a fortune too rapidly. As this is an
insinuation of a personal nature, and implies a charge of taking an ungene
rous advantage of the public necessities, I feel myself not a little hurt at it.
" There is not a man in the army who has been a greater slave to public
business from the infancy of the war, than I have; and I flatter myself no one
more useful in the humble station in which I have served. 1 have been in
every action that has taken place with the grand army since the commence
ment of the war, except those upon Long Island and at the White Plains.
And although I have never derived any great mifitary merit, yet no one has
been more exposed, or more intent upon doing his duty. I think, therefore, I
may claim some merit, as I make very great sacrifices in leaving the honours
of the line, at a season when I had the fairest prospects of reaping personal
advantages by my military services.
" I have never spent a single moment in attending to my own private affairs
since I entered the army, nor have I been at my own home above an hour,
and that on the march from Boston to New York, except when I went on the
Rhode Island expedition last summer, and then I was near home but about a
fortnight. I trust, therefore, it will not be thought that I am not unreasonably
attentive to my own private interest, especially when it is known that I had a
considerable interest in trade, which I have been obliged to leave to the direc
tion of others, with a transfer of a great proportion of the profits to transact
the business.
" The emolument expected from the quarter-master's department I freely
confess, are flattering to my fortune, but not less humiliating to my military
pride. I have as fair pretensions to an honourable command as those who
hold them, and wMle I am drudging in an office from which I shall receive no
honour, and very few thanks, I am losing an opportunity of doing justice to
my military character. And what adds to my mortification is, that my pre
sent humiliating employment is improved to pave the way for others' glory.
There is a great difference between being raised to an office and descending to
one. Had Ibeen an inferior officer, I might have thought myself honoured
by the appointment. But as I was high in rank in the army, I have ever
considered it as derogatory to serve in this office. It was with the greatest
difficulty that I could prevail on myself to engage in the business. Nothing
but the wretched state that the department was in, and the consequent rmn

140 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, that must follow, added to the general's and the committee of congress' solid-
,^-^^a tations, could have procured my consent. It was not with a view to profit;
for the general and the committee of congress well remember, that I offered to
serve a year, (unconnected with the accounts of the department,) in the mili
tary line, without any additional pay to that which I had as major general.
But as this plan did not comport with their views, I told them that I would
serve upon the same conditions that Colonel Coxe and Mr. Petit could be
engaged upon ; and I have no more now than they have — notwithstanding my
situation subjects me to a double share of fatigue, and holds me responsible for
every failure. My emoluments are far less than the commissary-general,
while the duties of my office are infinitely more perplexing and troublesome.
" However high you may consider the late proposition which I made to
congress as a reward for my services, it was far short of what the other gentle
men concerned in it thought themselves entitled to ; and I believe they could
not have been brought to engage upon such terms as were offered, had I not
told them it was what the president of congress and the gentlemen of the
general's own family advised.
" I did not solicit the appointment in the first instance, neither am I solicitous
to hold it. I wish but to know the inclinations of congress in that respect, to
gratify their wishes. I undertook the business with a flattering expectation of
meeting with their approbation ; but I can have no hopes of succeeding if they
think my reward higher than my merit. I will appeal to facts for my fidelity.
" The distress of the army and the confusion of the department at the time
I entered upon it, are notorious. I wish but to have the state of the de
partment at the two periods, this and the last spring, fairly contrasted. I wish
the general to be called upon, and every other officer in whatever department,
to know whether they have not had every assistance that they had a right to
demand of the office, or that the state of the country would admit of. And
also whether the business has not been conducted with as much economy and
order, as could be expected in the confused state in which I found it, and from
the complexity of its nature.
" I found the line of the army and the staff almost at open war. The differ
ences subsisting between them I have been happy enough to reconcile, and to
restore a mutual good understanding ; in a word, I have had a very laborious
task. The business of the department has been very expensive. The decline
of the currency, the avarice of the people, and the plan of the war, have ren
dered it unavoidably so. I have studied economy as much as was in my
power, and am persuaded there has been little wanton waste of public pro
perty. I cannot add more industry or attention to the business than I have

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 141
done. If my conduct is not satisfactory, it is my wish to quit a business chap.
wherein I cannot please. » v"
" I have been in expectation ever since I left Philadelphia of anew system.
I gave you all the assurances in my power of seconding your measures, in any
plan you should think proper to adopt. I have given in the conditions upon
which I would act under it; which, by the by, are far from being thought
unreasonable. On the contrary, the terms are considered moderate and equi
table. How it got abroad into the world, I know not, but it seems it has, and
such are people's sentiments respecting it. It is to be remembered, that the
quarter-master-general in all armies is always liberally rewarded, as he re
ceives no honour or laurels for all his toils. From the nature of the duty and
the importance of the trust, the time and qualifications necessary to execute
the office in all its branches, it cannot be thought that my proposition was the
child of avarice, or a creature of extortion. So perfectly satisfied am I with
the rectitude of my own actions, that I have not the least objection to the
whole world being made acquainted with every circumstance and transac
tion. I have always written and spoken my mind truly to congress, and the
committees acting under them, whenever I have thought it necessary for the
public good. In doing this, I trust I have always preserved that decorum and
respect which is due to so honourable a body. But if plain truth and matters
of fact give offence, it is the matter, and not the manner that is faulty.
" I find difficulties enough that are incident to, and inseparable from, the
office. If these are multiplied by prejudices and discontent, the task will be
rendered intolerable.
" Previous to my engaging in the business, the committee of congress and
the general promised me all the assistance that congress, or the different states
could render, in aid of the business committed to my care. From some states
I have had it, whilst in others I have met with almost every embarrassment.
I only mention this circumstance to show on what a broad bottom I undertook
the business, and to afford an opportunity of observing, that if my means be
restricted, I cannot be responsible for the consequences.
" Having thus, sir, presented you an honest view of my present standing,
may I solicit your advice as to the part I ought to act as most consistent with
my own honour and the public wishes?"
This letter is an original historical document, comprising in itself both the
fact and the evidence, and presenting a modest, yet manly narrative of services
unquestionably rendered, sacrifices actually made, and feelings unaffectedly
sincere. The circumstances under which it was written, the person to whon>

142 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, addressed, and the references it makes, all conspire to challenge investigation,
.^l^and defy contradiction; whilst the sentiments it expresses are such as the
soldier ought to breathe, and the man connected with society, is justified in
avowing. Although Greene did not resign at this time, it was perfectly understood
that in continuing to hold the office, he had made a sacrifice of his wishes and
interests to the solicitations of the commander in chief, the comforts of the
army, and the general interests of a cause in which his zeal and ardour were
unabated. Influenced by these motives also, Colonel Coxe and Mr. Petit still
continued to act as his assistants, and patiently, they awaited the fulfilment of
the soothing promises of congress to adopt such measures as would secure
them against future embarrassments in their office.
A committee was accordingly appointed to report a new system for his
department, and another to devise the means of checking the depreciation of
the paper currency.
The former committee never reported until the month of March in the
ensuing year; but pressing necessity drew forth from the latter, a system from
which great things were expected, but which proved in the end a mere piece
of quackery in finance.
The means devised to restore public credit were, to redeem the continental
bills in circulation at the rate of forty for one, and that too, by a new emission
from the same body that had promised to pay the former in Spanish milled dol
lars at par. But the slates were individually to pledge themselves for the
new emission. Unfortunately, the credit of the endorser was no better than
that of the drawer, and the project resulted in very little more than one of
those fluctuations in the value of a circulating medium, which serve to fatten
the speculator at the expense of the ignorant or the credulous.
The other measure was, to supply the necessities of the army by chaining
opinion to the car of legislation, and subjecting individual avarice to public
exigency. The prices of articles of prime necessity were to be regulated by
law. All the states came readily into these measures, with the exception of Vir
ginia; she at first rejected them by a large majority; and excited a degree of
consternation in the breast of every whig, whilst the exultation of the enemy
knew no bounds. " The rope of sand is at length broken," was their excla
mation. By dint of extraordinary exertions, the Virginia legislature was pre
vailed upon to reconsider this vote, and the measures were finally adopted by
a majority of two.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 143
, It will excite in our readers no small opinion of the political foresight of our chap.
hero, when it is shown that these occurrences drew forth from him a predic- v^~^-^/
tion of the result of these measures, and of the necessity of adopting a consti
tution independent of, and possessing some control over, the authority of the
states. We have already secured to him the praise of having been, if not the
first, at least among the first, who boldly espoused a declaration of indepen
dence ; and are not a little gratified in having it in our power to prove, that
he was at least among the first who suggested the necessity of our present
constitution. In a letter to a friend, dated August 15th, 1779, he writes thus: " I see by
the eastern papers, they are making great exertions to give new credit to our
money. The spirit is laudable, but the attempt will fail, without the aid of
heavy taxes and a stop to emissions of paper. If the public are convinced
that the congress and the states are in earnest about redeeming their money, it
will rise in value, but there is the rub. One circumstance leads me to think
they are really in earnest. Colonel Dyer, who was against redeeming the
money at its full value formerly, is now supporting the necessity of the mea
sure with all his influence. This, and some other circumstances, lead me to
think there will be a serious attempt to redeem the money. If there is a trial,
it will succeed."
In another letter of the 29th October of the same year, he observes, " The
late regulations have had just the effect I at first expected. This kind of mea
sures will always terminate in this way, that is, in adding to the evil they are
meant to remedy. The great bodies of men who entered upon this plan to
give support to the money, rather staggered my opinion in some stages of the
business; although it was clearly opposed to the principles of commerce and
the experience of mankind. Noise and bluster very often dupe our reason,
and betray men into measures which their better judgment is unwilling to
assent to. I wish to my soul the measure had been practicable, both for pri
vate and public reasons. I have been growing poorer every day for some
time past, although nominally getting richer. The public business gets more
and more difficult to manage, for want of some steady and uniform represen
tative of property. Therefore, in every point of view it was clearly my inte
rest to wish a regulation ; but I was, and am still persuaded, the thing is
impracticable. We may try the same thing over and over again, and it will
always terminate in vexation and disappointment."

144 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
f
chap. And in another letter of June 29th, 1780, he observes, "The money has
^-^~**a been in a most wretched train for a long time ; the last plan of finance is far
from being agreeable to every body. The state of Virginia has rejected it.
This injudicious measure will give it a staggering blow, and I wish it may not
give it a deadly wound. The congress have lost their influence. No state in
the union would have dared to counteract what they had recommended, three
years ago. But they have trifled so much with national faith and national
honour, that their mandates begin to have no more force than the doings of a
town-meeting. / have for a long time seen the necessity for some new plan of
civil constitution. I am more and more convinced of the necessity for it every
day of my life. Unless there is some control over the states by the congress, and
unless they are in some way more independent of the states than they have been,
we shall soon be like a broken band."
We will detain the reader with two more short specimens of that foresight
and judgment which constituted the true basis of Greene's influence over the
minds of those who knew him.
The first is from a letter dated June 9th, 1 779 : " The state of the money
is alarming; the depreciation grows more and more rapid with you, I find.
Nothing but heavy taxes, and a considerable loan, properly applied, can save
its declining credit. The congress seem to have got awake a little, with
respect to the state of the money. They have ordered the states to raise sixty
million of dollars this year. If the states will second their measures, the cir
cumstances of the currency may change, but on that alone it depends. My
observations in my former letter were founded on this supposition, that neither
congress, nor the states, would take any adequate measures to restore credit
and vigour to the declining currency. There are sOme of the first characters
on the continent who think there is a party in congress, who wish to destroy
the paper money altogether. Whether this suspicion is well, or ill founded, I
cannot say ; but there are many circumstances which give credit to such an
opinion. The attempt is abominable ; but party faction, and private views,
are capable of almost any thing. I agree with you in sentiment, that if our
currency fails, the congress will fail with it. You have seen their address to
the states, and in addition to those it is said, a plan for negociating a loan is on
foot, but what foundation there is for this opinion, I am a stranger to. It is
impossible to tell, in their present situation, what turn affairs will take. The
prospects of peace, and neglect of money, have brought us into a most disa
greeable state. The most able politicians, and greatest financiers we have,

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 14,5
are at a loss to tell what turn our currency will take. 1 still hope its credit chap.
will be supported. I would rather give two thirds of my little fortune than ^-^-^
have it sunk; it will be an everlasting disgrace upon us. I am not personally
interested in the support of it, having no money in the loan, and very little by
me or due to me."
And in a letter of the 31st January 1780, he observes, " There never was a
more difficult time to determine what is best to be done ; some have great
expectation of a peace. Some think one thing, and some another, concerning
the money. 1 am of opinion, upon the whole, there will be some settled
depreciation fixed at stated periods, and the money finally redeemed in this
way. But how and what will be its fate, is unknown to me, and I believe to
mortal man."
The winter of 1779-80 set in with unusual severity. It is still remembered
emphatically, as " the cold winter." The British army, comfortably housed
as they were in the cities, suffered greatly under the privations imposed upon
them by being cut off from a free communication with the country.
But their sufferings were nothing when compared with what the Americans
had to sustain. The country adjacent to New York, having been so long the
seat of war, was nearly exhausted, and most of their supplies were necessarily
brought from a great distance. The North River was frozen up at a very
early day, and transportation by land supplied all their wants. When the
roads had become in a state adapted to the use of sleds, this difficulty, in some
measure was obviated, but until then, their camp was precariously supplied
with the necessaries of life; for although the country afforded it, the miserable
means by which it was to be procured, caused it either to be concealed, with
drawn, or withheld. The consequence was, that it was impossible ever to
have in camp any quantity in depot, and when the transportation was inter
rupted by bad weather, the rations of the soldiers were reduced. On one
occasion, after a succession of snow storms, they actually were so straitened
for provision, that there was not in camp enough for a single regiment
Famine stared them in the face ; for the roads were impassable, and naked and
barefoot as they were, the soldiers could do little towards breaking the roads,
(as it is termed,) and serious apprehensions were entertained, that they would
disband and range at large in search of subsistence.
The hurried manner and strong language of the subjoined letter will show„
either that a very serious alarm was excited in camp, or that the quarter-mas-
19

146 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, ter-general knew how, when necessary, to excite it in others. It is addressed
^^^ to the colonel of the Morristown militia.
"The army is upon the point of disbanding for want of provisions ; the
poor soldiers having been several days without any, and there not being more
than a sufficiency to serve one regiment in the magazine. Provisions are
scarce at best; but the late terrible storm, the depth of the snow and the drifts
in the roads, prevent the little stock from coming forward which is in readiness
at the distant magazines. This is, therefore, to request you to call upon the
militia officers and men of your battalion, to turn out their teams and break
the roads between this and Hatchetstown, there being a small quantity of
provisions there that cannot come on until that is done. The roads must be
kept open by the inhabitants, or the army cannot be subsisted. And unless
the good people immediately lend their assistance to forward supplies, the army
must disband. The dreadful consequences of such an event I will not torture
your feelings with a description of; but remember, the surrounding inhabitants
will experience the first melancholy effects of such a raging evil. We would
give you assistance were it in our power, but the army is stripped as naked of
teams as possible to lessen the consumption of forage, which has reduced us to
such straits as render us unable, with the teams we have, to do the duty called
for in camp.
" You will call to your aid the overseers of highways, and every other order
of men who can give dispatch and success to the business.
"P. S. Give no copies of this for fear it should get to the enemy."
Let this serve as a specimen of the arduous duties that Greene's office im
posed upon him. For the manner in which those duties were discharged,
there exist voluminous proofs of his guileless integrity, and even scrupulous
attention to economy. The fair gains of his subordinate agents he felt no
disposition to curtail, nor would he readily lend an ear to complaints against
them. Yet wherever retrenchments were practicable, they were sternly
insisted on, and where complaints appeared founded in probable causes, the
faulty could not escape. Were we disposed to encumber these pages with
letters not essential to display the opinions, character, talents, and worth of
their subject, volumes might be compiled of the evidence in his vindication.
But the following letter from the commander in chief supercedes the necessity
of all others, on this subject ; and though out of its chronological order, it
becomes proper to introduce it under this head.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 147

chap.- V.

" Head Quarters, Orangetown, August 15th, 1780.
** Sir, " As you are retiring from the office of quarter-master-general, and have
requested my sense of your conduct and services while you acted in it, I shall
give it to you with the greatest cheerfulness and pleasure.
" You conducted the various and important duties of it with capacity and
diligence, entirely to my satisfaction, and, as far as I had an opportunity of
knowing, with the strictest integrity.
" When you were prevailed on to undertake the office in March 1778, it
was in great disorder and confusion, and by extraordinary exertions, you so
arranged it as to enable the army to take the field the moment it was neces
sary, and to move with rapidity after the enemy when they left PhiladelpMa.
" From that period to the present time, your exertions have been equally
great ; have appeared to me to be the result of system, and to have been well
calculated to promote the interest and honour of your country ; and, in fine, I
cannot but add, that the states have had in you, in my opinion, an able,
upright, and diligent servant."
General Greene's resignation as quarter-master-general, did not take place
until the month of August 1780, and he voluntarily continued to act for some
time after that day, until his successor, Colonel Pickering, had been duly
initiated. Several interesting occurrences in his military life, are of a prior
date to his resignation, but we will, for the present, follow him to that event,
and then return to those of his military history.
From the time of the commencement of the discussions in congress relative
to Ms department, the office was to General Greene an irksome and disagree
able post. He had himself been considerably soured by the facility with
which members of that body gave themselves up to jealousy and suspicion,
and, as he declares in one of his letters, found it exceedingly difficult to com
municate with them in that temper, which both his station and theirs exacted
of him.
They, on their part, were under the influence of very many causes to render
them irritable — even fretful. Feebly supported by the states in keeping up the
army, disappointed in their hopes of peace, chagrined at receiving so little,
where they expected so much aid from their ally, they were but ill prepared
for the additional mortification of waking to disappointment from all the

148 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, dreams of financial prosperity with wMch they had been flattered in their new
^*J^j system. Unhappy is the condition of the public officer, who has to importune such
a body, under such circunfstances, for supplies of money. And yet the most
pressing necessity amidst the distresses of this cold winter, obliged Greene to
be more than ordinarily importunate with congress to obtain indispensable
advances. Had he been suffering alone, the evil might have been borne; but tortured
by witnessing the distresses of the army, and less affected by their clamours
than by the example of patient suffering that they exhibited, his temper,
although remarkably equable in its ordinary movements, was scarcely proof
against the trials to wMch it was subjected.
The following brief sketch is from his pen, and bears date the 11th of Janu
ary 1780.
" Such weather as we have had, never did I feel. For six or eight days it
has been so extremely cold, that there was no living abroad ; the snow is also
very deep, and much drifted ; it is so much so, that we drive over the tops of
the fences. In the midst of snow and surrounded on every side by its banks,
the army has been cut off from its magazines, and been obliged to fast for
several days together. We have been alternately out of meat and bread for
eight or nine days past, and without either for three or four. The distress of
the army has been exceedingly great from the weather, want of clothing and
provisions. But the soldiers have borne it with great patience and fortitude.
They have displayed a degree of magnanimity under their sufferings wMch
does them the highest honour." " Provisions are scarce indeed, not from any
scarcity in the country, but from want of money to purchase it."
It will be remembered, that at this time the United States was under the
pressure of the " full tide of unsuccessful experiment," flowing from their cele
brated regulating act. Every department of the army was consequently sus
taining the extra-embarrassment of an artificial scarcity. On this subject, in
the same letter Greene remarks, " The states are coming very fast into the
regulating act. Many expect great things from it; for my part, I do not. It
will have its usual operation and conclusion. It was never successful, even
under the most arbitrary governments."
And in a letter to Governor Greene of the 8th October 1779, after dilating
on his increasing embarrassments, he expresses the following correct and

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 149
practical sentiments on the operation of this law : " There have been great chap.
pains taken, from east to west, to regulate the produce and commerce of the ^v^,
country. I viewed the thing as impracticable from the beginning. It was
rather to be wished for, than expected ; how it will terminate is yet uncertain.
But from what I see and hear from almost every quarter, I think the measure
will fail. The attempt has been made again and again, in Europe and Ame
rica, but to no purpose. The commerce of mankind must be free, or almost
all kind of intercourse will cease. Regulation stagnates industry and creates
an universal discontent. Men value themselves not less upon the privilege of
exercising their industry in trade, than on the gains they derive from it. Even
the market people would be very unhappy to be cut off from the opportunity
of making the most of their commodities. There is a pride in every class of
people in displaying their ingenuity in their transactions ; to be deprived of
this, makes them restless and uneasy. Give men even more than they ask for
a thing, and they will not be satisfied without the liberty of still trying to make
more of it."
It happened also, unfortunately, that at this time there was a subject under
discussion, which, of all others, was least likely to be satisfactorily adjusted
between a public body and a man of delicate feelings. It was that of Greene's
compensation in the quarter-master-general's department. When he first
entered upon that office, the compensation affixed by law was a commission
on the sums expended. But when those sums arose to a great nominal amount,
Greene saw clearly that, though no one should be hardy enough directly to
impeach his integrity, many would secretly suspect his fidelity, whilst there
existed a temptation to favour the increase of expense. He therefore, at a very
early period, signified his wish that the compensation should be changed to a
fixed salary, and the amount of that salary was the subject of several consulta
tions. To present a just view of his wishes and conduct in this delicate affair,
we will give an extract of a letter from his friend Mr. Petit, addressed to a
member of congress, who consulted him upon the subject. " With respect to
the sum that would be satisfactory to General Greene as quarter-master-
general, I cannot pretend to ascertain it. Were he looking to this office as
one he woidd wish to continue in, I have reason to believe that he would not
accept of less than £3,000 currency per annum, and perhaps he might demand
£3,000 sterling. But as I am confident he continues in from other motives
than a view of gain, and wishes to leave it whenever he can, consistently with
the public good and his own honour, I believe he will neither demand nor
accept more than an indemnification for his expenses. I ground this opinion.

150 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, as well on what I have heard him say on the subject, as on my own feelings?
being actuated by the same motives as to a continuance in office as I suppose
him to be."
For more than twelve months was this tantalizing discussion protracted, and
even when he left the office it had not been closed. To him, this state of
things was peculiarly irksome ; habituated as he appears to have been to gra
duate his expenses by his income, and never to be guilty of the folly of living
beyond it, he remained all this time uncertain how to govern himself in this
particular; and, feelingly alive to every thing that could even bring on him
the indignity of a suspicion, he felt it painful to act under circumstances wMch
exposed him to imputations which his soul abhorred. Yet the wishes of the
commander in chief, the good of the service, the affectionate importunities of
his brother officers, and the comforts of the soldiers required the sacrifice, and
he made it.
As early as the 7th June 1779, a committee of congress had been appointed
to look into the transactions of the quarter-master and commissary-generals.
It consisted of the Hon. John Dickinson, Roger Sherman, and John Scudder.
These gentlemen immediately repaired to the camp to prosecute their inqmries.
The language in which the resolution appointing these gentlemen was ex
pressed, was rather grating to ears that coveted and claimed to be, not only
innocent but unsuspected. It was " to make strict inquiry into the establish
ment and contingent expenses of the quarter-master's department," &c. How
ever, with a slight murmur, Greene made every effort by means of circulars
to his agents, and a developement of all his personal transactions, to give those
gentlemen all the information and Satisfaction that could be afforded them ;
and they returned perfectly satisfied with his conduct, and henceforth enlisted
among his particular friends.
On the 7th May in the following year, another appointment took place of a
committee constituted for the same purpose. Mr. John Mathews of South
Carolina, was a member of that committee, and to those who were acquainted
with his excellent character it will be enough to say, that, (in an apologetic
letter he acknowledges) " he entered upon the task of investigation with the
strongest prejudices against Greene, and closed, in common with his col
leagues, under a perfect conviction of his fidelity, ability, and zeal." That a
mutual esteem was contracted between them, on this occasion, which lasted
.through life, is evidenced by the remains of a most friendly and confidential
correspondence still extant.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 151
It would seem that congress ought now to have been satisfied. To attribute chap.
the enormous increase of expense to a want of economy or arrangement, was v^^,
little short of ridiculous, after the public acknowledgment that, in their own
biassed estimation, their money had sunk to forty for one, and that too, when
compared with the value of an emission of bills of credit by a body whose
credit had been blasted by the failure of the very money now to be redeemed.
But the rumour had gone forth, and the congress was surrounded by the
whisperers of a faction who sought Greene's ruin. The report still prevailed,
that he was acquiring an unbounded fortune, and envy fastened her fangs upon
him. Alas ! had his country but known the lank state of his purse as well as
it was known to his intimate friends ; instead of being persecuted by suspicions,
he would have been followed by that admiration which is the merited meed of
patriotism and integrity.— Fighting, watching, toiling, for ungrateful employers,
while the approaching tread of poverty alarmed him for the fate of an in
creasing family.
We are resolved to risk nothing upon general assertion ; our hero shall not
be the creature of a partial imagination. Let his own words depict his situ
ation. To his early friend he writes, " Many people have propagated a report that
I have made a fortune in the quarter-master-general's department. Some
have done it from one view, some from another, but most of them to excite a
jealousy and distrust among the people. Was the fact so, I should feel less
uneasiness on the occasion ; but to be thought rich, and at the same time to be
poor, is the most disagreeable situation in the world. The greater part of my
dependence is with you, and the funds in your hands. These, you advertize
me in your last, are nothing very considerable. If they are not, I am poor
indeed." And to add facts to the evidence of words, when in the year 1780,
Mrs. Greene proposed to make her usual visit to him, when the army was sta
tionary in winter quarters, he writes to a friend in these words : " I shall be
exceedingly obliged to you to furnish Mrs. Greene with cash to pay her ex
penses to camp ; this article is running low with me."
Nor was this state of his finances the consequence of improvidence on his
part; it was the result of a combination of circumstances which he could not
control, and which grew chiefly out of the nature of the service in which he
was engaged.
It will be recollected, that he was acting in the army in the united capacities
of quarter-master-general and major-general. The former drew to his quarters

152 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, a multitude of people, while the latter obliged him to entertain them in a style
w^v^, consonant to his elevated rank. Although far from being inclined to ostenta
tious parade, he well knew the necessity of maintaining the dignity of rank
by a proper display of liberality. The expenses of the rich are the inherit
ance of the poor, and with the materials which compose an army more espe
cially, the sense of inferiority must be kept up by maintaining the distance
between the soldier and the officer.
To maintain a proper style in life was, at that time, exceedingly expensive.
In the midst of all the privations of war, an extravagant style of living had
been gradually growing on the habits of Philadelphia, and to this place, his
communications with congress and his assistants, frequently called him.
To the propagation of these habits several causes contributed. It has
always been the result of an extraordinary circulation of a representative of
property, although it be of a factitious value. Men are but slow calculators,
and easily seduced to the enjoyment of pleasures, and the gratification of
vanity. Fortunes suddenly acquired, are generally foolishly expended. The
rage for speculation which followed . the fluctuations of the paper currency,
gave many opportunities to speculate successfully; and the success of some
individuals in privateering, was another fruitful source of a sudden increase of
riches. These causes, added to the great influx of foreign gentlemen of wealth
and distinction, and of men of- fortune connected with the government from
all parts of the union, produced an extravagance of living, not easily to be
borne by those who had slender private fortunes. On the officers of the
army it fell with peculiar weight ; their compensation was fixed by law, and
even that irregularly paid. And when the money had sunk almost to nothing,
still the obligation remained, under every disadvantage, to live according to
their rank.
In times of depreciation, those who have it in their power to anticipate
funds, must realize a profit; but to those who have to wait the gradual accu
mulation of their resources, the receipts of yesterday are to-day reduced to
half their value.
Greene had but a slender private fortune when he entered the service. In
fact, he had nothing distinct from the general stock of the family, vested in the
business of the Potowome and Coventry Mills. In 1777. this concern was
dissolved, and a division of the property made among the several branches of
the family. To him was assigned a small unproductive property near
Charlestown, on the north side of the state ; and a dividend of the stock and
money which had been employed in the business of the concern. These funds

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 153
he had left in the hands of his brother Jacob, and his friend Griffin Greene, to chap. v
be employed by them in any way they thought proper for joint benefit, com-^^v,,
pensating themselves by an allowance for the trouble of conducting the busi
ness. Unfortunately, these funds were principally employed in the purchase
of shares in various privateers, and before the close of the war, it appears to
have been all lost. The following brief, but pathetic passage, is extracted from
a letter to his friend, General Henry Lee, written near the close of the war:
" My circumstances are far from being easy, and my family' have not where
to put their heads. It is men in my situation, in the progress of this war, who
have had feelings which exceed description. Alas! few know what I have
felt. My fondness for my family has increased my" distress. Men of affluence
have been in quite different circumstances. Public virtue is best proved by
private sacrifices. But enough of this ; your letter has thrown me into these
disagreeable reflections."
In the spring of the year 1780, congress resolved to constitute a board of
commissioners to superintend the administration of the staff. Disagreeable
and embarrassing as such an appointment must have been to Greene's depart
ment under any circumstances, it was rendered intolerable to him by the
appointment of General Mifflin at the head of it. He felt it as an indignity
offered not only to himself, but to the commander in chief. An enemy to the
fame of General Washington could not have wished for a station better calcu
lated to thwart and embarrass him, than one that would cramp and embarrass
the operations of the quarter-master's department. General Mifflin was well
known to be personally hostile to General Washington. General Greene had
much reason to believe General Mifflin Jireftdwn personal enemy. True or
false, it is not now possible to determine, but we are in possession of various
communications made to General Greene calculated to support this opinion.
Indeed, Greene always considered the persecution he had sustained as having
originated among the adherents of Conway and Gates, and it was well
known, that all the army viewed General Mifflin as the secret head of that
faction. We know not if there exists, or ever was published, a detailed account of
that mysterious affair, and at this late day it may be an object of curiosity
with our readers to know what were the received opinions on the subject, of
the best informed persons of that day. This we shall present from original
papers in our possession.
When General Washington was hesitating what course to pursue on the
embarkation of Sir William Howe from New York in the year 1777, General
Mifflin, then quarter- master-general, was exceedingly importunate with him to
20

154 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, hasten to the protection of Philadelphia. General Washington was unwilling
^-v~^a to march southwardly, as long as it remained doubtful whether Howe had not
sailed for Boston, or might not suddenly return and ascend the North River,
in co-operation with Burgoyne. But to pacify Mifflin, he submitted the sub
ject to a council of war, and at that council General Greene incurred the
unrelenting hatred of Mifflin by opposing successfully his wishes to march
immediately to Philadelphia. Not that Washington or Greene had any seri
ous doubts with regard to the real destination of Howe, but they thought his
fleet would be sufficiently delayed in ascending the Delaware, to enable them
to reach Philadelphia in time to oppose him, and there was, therefore, no
necessity to leave him scope for the execution of a coup de main.
Immediately upon this disappointment Mifflin hastened away to Philadel
phia, and complaining bitterly that Washington had given himself up to the
influence of Greene, and sacrificed Philadelphia to the security of the eastern
section of the union, excited a distrust and hostility against the former which
often manifested itself during the war. Afterwards, when the starving condi
tion of the army at Valley Forge obliged Mm to resort to the strong means of
collecting provisions by foraging parties as if he had been in an enemy's coun
try, and the execution of this measure was given to Greene, a confirmed
enmity appeared to have been excited against both, which discovered itself
whenever occasions presented themselves.
In the midst of the excitement that had been produced by General Mifflin's
Complaints, the news arrived of the surrender of Burgoyne. The battle of
Brandywine had then been lost, Howe was in possession of Philadelphia, and
congress had fled to Yorktown^'^t.
The honours of Washington appeared to have been cast into the shade by
the brilliant successes of Gates. Impartial history will one day decide whether
the latter did not reap the laurels that ought to have graced the brows of
Schuyler, of Starke, and of Arnold. It is certain, that invidious comparisons,
unfavourable to Washington, were at that time too much the fashion of the
day. But the nation and the army knew well his worth, and frowned his
enemies into silence. Yet certain it is, that at that time he had enemies, and
among them were ranked Samuel Adams, the Lees of Virginia, Wilson of
Pennsylvania, and some minor characters. Whether the design was to sub
stitute Gates or Lee, appeared to have been unsettled among the party, but
certainly to substitute one or the other.
Whether General Mifflin ever entered deeply into the views of the party,
cannot now be ascertained. It is, however, very certain, that but for the
clamour which he had so successfully excited against the commander in chiefj

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE: 155
Conway never would have dared to prosecute his machinations. The confor- chap.
mity of their views fastened upon them, in the public estimation, a co-opera- ^-.„~^,
tion in design.
An opinion was entertained, on some evidence against Gates and Conway,
which was probably not unfounded in truth, that Samuel Adams, R. H. Lee,
and Mifflin, had it in contemplation to substitute General Lee for Washington,
but that Gates and Conway thought it a favourable opportunity to make use
of the discontents of that party to supplant him themselves.
We know not if there exist any evidence to prove that General Lee had
embarked with either party. On the contrary, from the intercourse kept up
between Generals Greene and Lee during their fives, we are induced to think
he had not ; or, at least, that Greene entertained a favourable opinion of his
principles and conduct. Lee was a warm man, and too apt to speak and act
with indiscreet freedom. But all the world acknowledged him to be a man
of honour, and of soldierly frankness. He had censured some of the mea
sures of General Washington with a degree of freedom that approached to
insubordination. In the council of war which preceded the battle of Mon
mouth, he had opposed the avowed sentiment of Washington to fight the
enemy, and Washington certainly attributed his retreat, in that battle, to an
obstinate adherence to his own opinion in violation of orders. These cir
cumstances, combined with the known wish of some of the malecontents in
congress to substitute him for Washington, gave rise to the opinion that he
had taken part in the intrigues against the commander in chief. That he
would have accepted the command and been gratified in it, there can be no
doubt ; but there exists no evidence of his having actively engaged in the effort
to sink General Washington in the estimation of the public ; unless his conduct
during and after the battle of Monmouth, and his severe animadversions on
the affair of Fort Washington, receive a construction of which, it must be
acknowledged, they were too fairly susceptible. A subordinate officer is not
at liberty to raise his own reputation on the ruins of a superior in command.
With respect to Gates and Conway, the evidence was such as left not a
doubt upon the public mind. It is well known that the first developement of,
the intrigue was made at the table of Lord Stirling, by a gentleman attached
to Gates' family. The indiscretion of youth and the unguarded freedoms of a
convivial hour, heightened by exultation in the recent triumphs of the Ame
rican arms, palliated, but did not excuse the unwary communication. Yet,
pleasure at the early deyelopement of an intrigue involving the interests and
affections of the American people, closed the lips of censure, and the commu
nication was received with gratitude, rather than with the feeling winch,

156 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, under other circumstances, it might have excited. The present Major General
, Wilkinson has, in his Memoirs, given a detailed account of the circumstances
attending the communication. Until that was published, it was supposed to
have been designedly made under the influence of patriotic feelings, but it is
now candidly acknowledged to have been an indiscretion. General Washing
ton at first thought that it had been made under the instructions of Gates, as
the means of evading an injmiction of secrecy ; but this favourable view of the
subject was soon removed by the very singular letter addressed to him by the
latter, and disrespectfully conveyed through the president of congress. In
addition to this information, we have the evidence of General Morgan, who
was then serving under Gates, and who, being tampered with, as he consi
dered it, by Gates upon this subject, incurred his lasting hatred by repulsing
him with indignation.*
As to Conway, General Washington has pronounced him " an active and
malignant partizan." The freedoms which he took with General Washing
ton's conduct involved him in a duel with General Cadwallader. When he
supposed the hour of retributive justice was approacMng, (for he was wounded
and his life was in serious danger,) General Conway wrote a pemtent letter to
General Washington, which put down his resentment for ever.
The offensive passage in Conway's letter to Gates was this : " Heaven has
determined to save your country, or a weak general and bad counsellors
would have ruined it." And it is remarkable, that in the anonymous letters
written and circulated at the time, were the following passages: " The north
ern army has shown us what Americans can do with a general at their head.
The spirit of the southern army is no ways inferior to the spirit of the north
ern; a Gates, a Lee, or a Conway would, in a few weeks, render them an
irresistible body of men. The last of the above officers has accepted of the
new office of inspector-general of the army, in order to reform abuses, but the
remedy is only a palliative one." In one of his (Conway's) letters to a friend
he says, " A great and good God hath decreed America to be free, or the
commander in chief and weak counsellors would have ruined her long ago."
" You may rest assured of each of the facts related in this letter. The author
of it is one of your Philadelphia friends. A hint of his name, if found out by
the handwriting, must not be mentioned to your most intimate friend. Even
the letter must be thrown in the fire."

* Lee's Memoirs.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 157
The copy of this letter, addressed to Patrick Henry was not thrown in the chap.
fire, but commumcated immediately, as it ought to have been, to the com- ^^^^
mander in chief. And he on the comparison of hands, had no doubt to which
of his " Philadelphia friends" he was indebted for it. In General Washing
ton's answer to Governor Henry, he attributes it to the late Dr. Benjamin
Rush. Both letters are said to be still in existence in Richmond, Va. and the
correctness of the opinion of General Washington may still be tested. But, if
it be true that this amiable and excellent man was thus made the dupe and
secret agent of this faction, it is but another cause for public indignation, while
it affords a melancholy proof of the errors into which the purest of men may
be precipitated.
We are in possession of various communications to prove that the " weak
counsellors" of this best of men, who had incurred the envenomed hatred of
the party, were Generals Greene and Knox, who were supposed to possess his
private ear, and were known to be his faithful and affectionate adherents. As
to the former, he had been involved in a variety of occurrences which had
rendered Mifflin, Gates, and Conway individually hostile to him.
The first of these gentlemen had been at the head of the quarter-master-
general's department before Greene took charge of it; and the just complaints
against that department had first excited a disgust against the commander in
cMef. As to Greene, when could man tolerate a comparison that resulted to
his disadvantage ? Where is the predecessor in a public office who can hear
the praises of his successor sounded, without one disagreeable sensation?
There is a natural rivalsMp in the heart of man between those who have stood
in that relationship to each other, which the wisest can with difficulty restrain.
That the reader may himself be enabled to draw a comparison, we will
refer him to the letter of General Washington of the 15th August 1780, in a
preceding page, and then to the following extracts from the report of a com
mittee of congress appointed to inspect the state of the army, when it lay at
Valley Forge, at which time General Mifflin acted in that department : " We
had flattered ourselves that before this time the pleasure of congress would be
made known to us, respecting the quarter-master's department. We fear our
letter on this subject has miscarried, or the consideration of it yielded to other
business. You will pardon us, sir, when we again solicit your attention to it
as an object of the last importance, on which not only the future success of our
arms, but the present existence of our army immediately depends. The influ-.
ence of this office is so diffusive through every part of our military system, that
neither the wisdom of arrangement, the spirit of enterprize, or favourable
opportunity will be of any avail, if this great wheel in the machine stops, or

158 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, moves heavily. We find ourselves embarrassed in entering on this subject,
^r^,, lest a bare recital of facts should carry an imputation (wMch we do not intend)
* on those gentlemen who have lately conducted it. We are sensible, great and
just allowances are to be made for the peculiarity of their situation, and we
are perhaps, not fully acquainted with all their difficulties. It is our duty, sir,
to inform you, it is not our intention to censure. We find, sir, the property of
the continent dispersed over the whole country. Not an encampment, route
of the army, or considerable road, but abounds with waggons left to the mercy
of the weather, and the will of the inhabitants. Large quantities of entrench
ing tools have likewise been left in various hands under no other security that
we can learn, than the honesty of those who have them in possession. No
less than three thousand spades and shovels, and the like number of toma
hawks have lately been discovered and collected in the vicinity of the camp,
by an order from one of the general officers. In the same way a quantity of
tents and tent-cloth, after laying a whole summer in a farmer's barn, was lately
discovered and brought to camp, by a special order from the commander in
chief." And thus the report goes on to state, that the soldiers were sickening
and dying for want of straw, and waiting to be inoculated until they could be
supplied with an article which could not be procured merely because there
were not waggons to transport it, and that all the service of that kind per
formed in camp, was done by the men, who yoked themselves to the vehicle
for that purpose; and, "finally, that nothing can equal the sufferings of the
soldiers, but the patience and fortitude with wMch the faithful part of the army
endured it. Those of a different character deserted in great numbers. At
present, sir, there is not one gentleman of any rank in this department in
camp, [nor had there been since July,] though the duties of the office reqmre
constant and unremitting attention. In whatever view, therefore, the subject
presents itself, we trust that you will discern that the most essential interests are
connected with it The season of preparation for the next campaign is passing
swiftly away. Be assured, sir, that its operation will be ineffectual either for
offence or protection, if an arrangement is not immediately made, and the
most vigorous exertions used to procure the necessary supplies. Permit us to
say, that a moment's time is not to be lost in placing a man of approved abilities
and extensive capacity at the head of the department; who will restore it to
some degree of order and regularity; whose provident care will immediately
relieve the present wants of the army, and extend itself to those which must be
satisfied before we can expect vigour, enterprize, and success."
It is not to be wondered at that General Mifflin should look with an evil eye
upon the man who was appointed to the quarter-master-general's department

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 159

V.

under the influence of this report, and at the pressing instance of the commit- chap.
tee who made it. His irritation vented itself occasionally in disrespectful,
expressions, which were communicated to General Greene, and the result
was, that there existed much coolness, if not actual enmity between them.
As to General Gates, it will be recollected how much Washington exhausted
himself to support the operations against Burgoyne, and what tardy obedience
Gates paid to his pressing order to march to the support of the grand army,
after he had triumphed over his enemy. Greene entered warmly on this occa
sion, into the feelings of the commander in chief, as he participated largely in
all the embarrassments which pressed upon him at the time. And afterwards,
when, upon the failure of the expedition against Rhode Island and the recall
of Sullivan, Gates was put in command of the army which held in check the
British force at Newport, that officer appears to have indulged Mmself in much
latitude of censure upon the manner in which that expedition was conducted.
We are in possession of some very angry letters of Greene on this subject,
from which it is obvious that the latter felt himself seriously injured. Nor did
the evil rest here. When it was deemed necessary that an officer should be
despatched to the south to relieve Charleston when besiged, or cover the coun
try in the event of its fall, General Washington wished to nominate General
Greene to, that command. But congress took the appointment out of the hands
of the commander in chief, and nominated Gates — to the equal mortification
of both Washington and Greene.
As to Conway, Greene had been instrumental in bringing upon him a
mortification which could never be forgiven. In a subjoined letter we will
present the reader with a view of the intrigue by which Conway obtained the
appointment of inspector-general of the army. This appointment affected the
rank of the brigadiers in the army, and they immediately addressed to con
gress a strong and animated remonstrance, in which they evinced that they
were as ready and able to defend their own rights by the pen, as those of their
country by the sword. Greene as well as Washington, took a decided part
against him, and Conway, who had thought himself securely seated on the
first stage of his military ascent, was obliged to retire ; and the congress were
not a little chagrined at being convinced that they had acted unjustly towards
the remonstrants, and unwisely towards the interests of the country at large.
This event inclined too many of them, afterwards, to lend a willing ear to the
malicious suggestions of Conway and his associates against Washington and
Greene. Besides this, Greene entertained a very contemptible opinion of
Conway, and in his deportment towards him was never studious to concealit.

160 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Pursuing our resolution of furnishing every opportunity to our reader to
, form Ms own opinion of the character, talents, and turn of thinking of our
hero, we will subjoin two letters, written on the subjects which have last occu
pied our attention.
They are both dated at Camp Valley Forge 1778. The first is on the 3d of
January. " Our army are tenting themselves at this place ; they are almost worn out
with fatigue and greatly distressed for want of clothing, particularly the articles
of shoes and stockings. The present mode of clothing the army will always
leave us without a suffident supply. The change in the commissary depart
ment has been a very distressing circumstance ; the army has been fed from
hand to mouth ever since Mr. Trumbull left it. Our operations have been
greatly retarded from the situation of the commissary department. The
quarter- master-general's department also has been in a most wretched condi
tion. General Mifflin, who ought to have been at the head of the business,
has never been with the army since it came into the state. He was unwell the
early part of the season, but it is said he is disgusted with the general for not
paying such mighty deference to him as his vanity leads him to think Mmself
entitled to. I am credibly informed, he has been endeavouring to wound the
general's reputation, in order to bring in General Gates at the head of the
army ; and for fear I should be an obstacle to his measures, he has thrown out
some insinuations to my prejudice. I am but little afraid of his insinuations.
He may possibly poison the public mind for a time, but he cannot injure me
in the army, where my conduct is best known.
" The congress have lately appointed Colonel Wilkinson to the rank of a
brigadier and Brigadier General Conway to the rank of major general. Both
these appointments are exceedingly disgusting to the army ; the first to the
colonels, the last to the brigadiers. The army is exceedingly convulsed by
these appointments, and God knows what will be the issue. Almost all the
colonels in the army will resign in consequence of Wilkinson's appointment.
General Gates is exceedingly blamed for recommending the measure.
" General Conway is a man of much intrigue and little judgment. He is a
great incendiary, of a restless spirit, and always contriving to puff himself off
to the public as an officer of great consequence. He left the army under pre
tence of going to France, alleging for reason that there was the greatest proba
bility of a French war, and that he should injure his interests by staying
here. Every body in the army thought he was gone. But he stole away to
congress, announced his intention of going to France, got in with some of the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 161
court faction to trumpet his consequence to the congress, and they hastily chap.
appointed him a major general, to the prejudice of the brigadiers, who to a v^-v^
man will resign their commissions if he holds his rank and remains in the
army. This appointment appears to have been obtained by such low artifices
that every body in the army despises him for it. The Marquis La Fayette,
and all the other French gentlemen, will scarcely speak to him. He is the
greatest novice in war, in every thing but disciplining a regiment, that ever I
saw. He is by no means of an enterprizing military turn of mind, and of
very little activity. This is the true character of the man, and yet he is
palmed off upon the public by little arts, as the first military man upon the
continent. " Our cause is sure, if we do not get divided among ourselves. But there
is great danger that we shall. Men of great ambition, and without principle
or virtue, will sacrifice every thing to their private views. The army in gene
ral has been very well united ; but I am afraid the injudicious appointments
made in congress will ruin it.
" You mention my letter to Governor Cook, in which I pronounce the divi
sion of the British force as a fortunate circumstance for America. The events
of the campaign have verified it. And had our force been equal to General
Howe's, or at least as much superior as the northern army was to Burgoyne's,
he must have shared the same fate. But alas ! we have fought with vastly
superior numbers, and although twice defeated, have kept the field. History
affords but few examples of the kind. The people may think there has not
been enough done, but our utmost endeavours have not been wanting. Our
army with inferior numbers, badly found, badly clothed, worse fed, and newly
levied, must have reqmred good generalship to triumph over superior numbers
well found, well clothed, well fed and veteran soldiers. We cannot conquer
the British force at once, but they cannot conquer us at all. The limits of the
British government in America are their out-sentinels.
"Reports prevail very strongly again of a French war. I honestly confess
to you I do not believe it; for France can have no pretext for declaring war,
and certamly it is not the interest of Great Britain to do it. But nevertheless
it may happen. I wish congress may not be lulled into security from their late
successes to the north, and their hopes of a French explosion. It is our busi
ness to levy a new army as soon as possible ; each state to furnish its propor
tion by a draft. There is no such tiling as filling the army by voluntary
enlistments as speedily as will be necessary to open the campaign to advan
tage. Each state will be compelled hereafter to furnish clotMng for their own
troops. The present mode of clothing the army is ruinous. We have had
21

162 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. 3,000 soldiers unfit for duty for want of clothing, tMs fall and winter. The
^r^*^, Rhode Island troops have done themselves great honour this campaign. Col.
Greene's character is in high estimation. Major Thayer distingmshed himself
at Fort Mifflin, and has acquired universal applause. Your troops are gene
rally exceedingly well officered from the northward tMs year. General Gates
is a child of fortune, the successes to the northward are all-glorious. General
Arnold and General Lincoln are in high esteem; and it is said General Bur
goyne gives Arnold the credit for the successes obtained over him.
" I am happy that the work is but done ; I do not care who does it. But I
should like to have a hand in the mischief.
" I have no hope of coming home this winter; the general will not grant
me permission. Mrs. Greene is coming to camp. We are all going into log
huts — a sweet life after a most fatiguing campaign."
The other letter bears date the 7th of February following. The following is
an extract from it: "Governor Cook wrote me a few days since a most
alarming letter respecting the situation of Rhode Island. Mr. Ellery proposed
to me to take the command there, provided it was agreeable to his excellency;
but he is totally averse to the measure. General Spencer has resigned ; who
will take the command I know not ; I wish General Sullivan may, as I can
think of no person who will do it more justice. I am in hopes to prevail on
the general to let the Rhode Island troops return home, and there continue
until the enemy leaves the state. I Matter myself they will fill up their ranks
very soon if they go home with that understanding.
" A horrid faction has been forming to ruin his excellency and others. Am
bition, how boundless! Ingratitude, how prevalent! But the faction are
universally condemned. General Mifflin is said to be at the head of it. And
it is strongly suspected that General Gates favours it. Mifflin has quarrelled
with the general, because he would not draw the force off to the southward
last summer and leave the New England states to themselves, before the ene
my's object was ascertained. It was uncertain whether he mtended to go up
the North River, to Newport, or to the southward. The general thought it
his duty to take a position to give the earliest support to either. Mifflin thought
Philadelphia was exposed by it, and went there and raised a prodigious cla
mour against the measure, and against me for advising it. But the general
like the common father of all, steadily pursued the great continental interest
without regard to partial objects, and the discontents of individuals. This
faction has been the offspring of that measure. See upon what a monstrous
principle the general is persecuted. To injure his reputation, and prejudice

V.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. f83
the country and army against me, General Mifflin has been endeavouring to chap.
persuade them that I governed the general in all things." " I hope my little ,
children are -well. Money becomes more and more the Americans' object.
You must get rich, or you will be of no consequence."
We will furnish the reader with but one more extract on this subject. It is
from a book not long since published, but the authority of which is very
respectable, since it carries on the face of it abundant circumstances of identi
fication to be pronounced the work of Captain Graydon, of the Pennsylvania
line. It is entitled, " Memoirs of a Life chiefly passed in Pennsylvania the last
sixty years." The passage is this: " Besides the families established in this
place, [Reading,] it was seldom without a number of visiters, gentlemen of
the army and others. General Mifflin, at this era, was at home, a chief out of
war, complaining, though not ill, considerably malecontent, and apparently
not in high favour at head quarters. According to him, the ear of the com
mander in chief was exclusively possessed by Greene, who was represented to
be neither the most wise, the most brave, nor the most patriotic of counsellors.
In short, the campaign in this quarter was stigmatized, as a series of blunders,
and the incapacity of those who had conducted it, unsparingly reprobated.
The better fortune of the northern army was ascribed to the superior talents
of its leader, and it began to be whispered that Gates was the man who should
of right have the station so incompetently sustained by Washington. There
was, to all appearance, a cabal forming for his deposition, in which it is not
improbable that Gates, Mifflin, and Conway were already engaged, and in
which the congenial spirit of Lee, on his exchange, immediately took share.
The well known apostrophe of Conway to America, importing that heaven
had passed a decree in her favour, or her ruin must long before have ensued
from the imbecility of her military councils, was at this time familiar at Read
ing ; and I heard him myself when he was afterwards on a visit to that place,
express himself to this effect: 'That no man was more a gentleman than
Washington, or appeared to more advantage at his table, or in the usual inter
course of life, but as to his talents for the command of an army, (with a
French shrug,) they were miserable indeed.' Observations of this kind con
tinually repeated, could not fail to make an impression within the sphere of
their circulation, and it may be said that the popularity of the commander in
cMef was a good deal impaired at Reading."*

* Page 278.

164 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. When all these circumstances are added to the embarrassment brought on
^^^^the army during the campaign of 1777 and the winter following, from the
defective administration of the quarter-master's department, over which Gene
ral Mifflin presided, it was impossible for both Greene and Washington to
view his appointment as chairman of the commissioners for superintending the
staff of the army otherwise than personally offensive. And it was soon after
followed up by a succession of acts of a nature too unequivocal not to furnish
Greene with the occasion he had long wished for, to resign without commit
ting his honour or his patriotism.
All the money that had been drawn by the department, had passed through
the hands of Colonel Petit. That gentleman thinking that he was often un
reasonably delayed and embarrassed by the treasury board, some warm alter
cation had ensued between them. On the 3d of May that board passed a
resolve, " that the accounts and vouchers in the quarter-master's department be
delivered in for settlement on the first of June following, (twenty-seven days;)
and that whosoever should fail so to do, should be published and prosecuted."
A copy of this resolve was transmitted to Greene, and offensive as it was, he
made every effort to obtain a compliance with it. In a circular, which was
immediately forwarded to all the agents of the department he observes, " For
tMs and many other reasons it is necessary that our accounts be brought to a
close. Many improper suspicions of abuse prevail respecting the expenditure
of public money. I hope our accounts will sufficiently prove that the plan of
the war and the nature of the service entail the expense, and that it is not
owing to any misapplication of the public money. However, persons are not
wanting who propagate such reports, and even some who are high in political
life, and whose duty it should be to silence improper suspicions. As I have
the highest confidence in the integrity and ability of the agents acting under
me, I hope they will one and all be able to prove themselves honest and faith
ful trustees for the public."
But to collect not only accounts but vouchers from Georgia to Maine, the
board well knew was impossible, and the hostility of the measure was too
glaring for them to adhere to it in opposition to the indignant remonstrances
of the gentlemen at the head of the quarter-master's department.
With an ill grace and a strong compliment to their own generosity, they
graciously conceded to him another month ; for a purpose wMch all the world
must have known, if due allowances be made for the extent of the sphere of
action, tlje number of expeditions that had been carried on, and the limited
means of correspondence then existing, ought to have required as many years.
The early periodical settlement of accounts had never been neglected since

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 165
Greene took charge of the department; for a standing order existed that chap.
monthly returns should be made, and this had been partially complied with ; ^.^-^
but defaults innumerable had been made, and such was the difficulty of getting
proper men to act for the trifling compensation allowed, that the department
did not dare to be rigid. Yet, as if not satisfied with the attacks already made
on the feelings of Greene, the commissioners consummated the persecution by
dispersing the following very delicate circular :
" Treasury Office, 13th June 1780.
" Ordered, That the several persons following, viz. Nathanael Greene,
quarter-master-general, &c. render their respective accounts of receipts and
expenditures, with the requisite vouchers as aforesaid, on or before the first
day of August next ensuing ; and that whoever shall fail so to do, be published
and prosecuted agreeably to the order of the board of the 3d May last, without
further indulgence. " CHARLES LEE, Secretary."
And in addition to being thus pressed and threatened, Greene was very
fairly given to understand that he must consider himself liable for any failure
or defalcations of all the host of agents who were necessarily employed by a
military officer obliged to act by agents or deputies, and to act at the same
time in every part of the union.
He now addressed a letter to congress, stating the injustice of such a prin
ciple, and the ruinous effects upon his private fortune, of not having formally
declared, at an early period, their understanding on this subject.
But to his astonishment, congress would not recede. In their resolves in
reply to his letter, they assert their right, and reserve to themselves to judge
when it shall be enforced.
He now no longer hesitated about the course to be pursued, but intimated to
the commander in chief his resolution to resign. Washington was still unwil
ling to part with him, and in his answer, which bears date the 6th of August,
entreats him to wait a little longer. The committee who had been despatched
to the army to inspect the transactions of the staff departments, as well as
General Washington, had written to congress on the subject of his claims and
complaints, and Washington expresses a hope that the result will be favoura
ble. The system also drawn up by Washington, Greene and Schuyler, was
still before congress, and it was possible it might be adopted.
In this the commander in chief was disappointed. It is a fact, that at that
time there existed a jealousy between the army and congress. The former

166 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, complained loudly of the injustice of congress towards them, of inattention to
v^-^-^ their wants, and the hardship of receiving their pay in a depreciated medium,
at a rate fixed without a view to depreciation. And the latter suspected,
or pretended to suspect in the army a spirit of military domination, a desire
to dictate to congress, and control them in their measures.
There is strong reason to believe that at this time, the party that had been
formed against General Washington had rather gained ground. The ascend
ancy of such men as Samuel Adams and Richard H. Lee could not but be
felt ; and Mifflin and Wilson, leading men in Pennsylvania, were both avow
edly hostile to him. The state of Pennsylvania had adopted their prejudices,
and had for some time manifested a resolution to mingle in, if not to control the
proceedings of congress.
Philadelphia, of course, lent its powerful aid, and those who have mingled
much in public life, will know the secret but powerful influence of the opinions
of the society in which the members mingle, upon the acts of a deliberative
assembly. Indeed, the censorious do contend that hospitable entertainers,
fascinating women, and even assiduous landlords and landladies are not with
out their influence in regulating the affairs of some nations. That the fair sex
have ever piqued themselves in rising above the state of political nonentity to
which the lords of the creation have reduced them, is the opinion of many;
and that they delight to mock the fancied soverignty of man, by skilfully touch
ing the master-spring of his actions, is an idea not altogether destitute of histo
rical facts to support it. Where is the human heart that takes no pleasure in
contemplating its own ascendancy? and where the female heart that does not
claim that ascendancy over the will of man as its natural sphere of action?
That General Mifflin's star was in the ascendant, at this time, was proved
by his activity in congress, his being first nominated chairman of the commis
sioners to superintend the staff, and afterwards president of congress.
Indeed, there had been about this time a report circulated and credited by
some, that a proposition had been made to General Washington to assume
dictatorial powers, and as the pure ermine of innocence is soiled even by the
breath of solicitation, this circumstance for awhile affected his standing in
public opinion. That it was at the time treated seriously, will appear from
the following correspondence.
Governor Read, on the 2d September 1780, writes to General Greene thus:
" The change of sentiment which has taken place in the army respecting civil
government, has for the first time given me apprehension. I am told that
some officers of considerable rank have pressed the general to assume dictato-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 167
rial power. Is it so ? Necessity may perhaps plead for such a measure, but chap.
certainly the power ought to be received from other hands. He, it is said, ^-^^
treated the proposition in a suitable manner. But necessity has ever been the
tyrant's plea, and I prize his judgment and virtue too highly to believe he will
contaminate a glorious and honourable life by such a mistake ; for, however
congress may be depreciated, as well as their money, they are still the supreme
power of the country."
In reply to this letter on 8th September, General Greene writes, " I have
made inquiry at head quarters whether there was such a proposition made to
the general, either by an officer or officers of any rank, to assume dictatorial
powers, and am assured by Colonel Hamilton that no such thing ever took
place. And you may depend upon it, that the principal officers of the army
are far from proposing any such thing to the general. Nor can I see what
he could effect by dictatorial powers, without the helping hand of civil govern
ment." It happened, most unfortunately, that the discussions which arose in con
gress in deliberating upon the new system for the quarter-master-general's
department, took a turn exactly calculated to foster this jealousy entertained of
the general and the army.
Under the existing regulations, impressment for transportation could only
' take place under the sanction of state authority. The difficulty of obtaining
orders for this purpose, had sometimes greatly embarrassed the movements of
the department. And the plan drawn up under the eye of the commander in
chief, had principally in view to confer this power on himself, and thus obviate
one principal obstacle to military operation. This did not suit the palate of
congress, and the system was rejected. The one substituted for it, imposed
the check of civil authority upon military power. But although to those who
had experienced the embarrassments of the existing system, and who thought
that more confidence was due to the commander in chief than was exhibited
in this restriction, it was by no means agreeable ; yet Greene's objections to
acting under it were principally founded on another ground. The new
system destroyed the office of assistant, and thus deprived Mm of the two able
coadjutors, without whom he had always declared he would not act a mo
ment. It is true, Colonel Petit was afterwards brought into the department
in the capacity of assistant quarter-master-general, but it was because con
gress plainly foresaw that no successor to Greene could dispense with Petit?s
experience and, intelligence ; and because, notwithstanding prevailing reports*

168 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, they wished to soothe Greene into a further continuance into office. But his
, resolution was instantly taken, and as he was not of a temper to sustain inju
ries without feeling them, smarting as he did under what he considered as
reiterated acts of persecution, he sent in his resignation.
As the letter which accompanied it, was the subject of much animadversion
in congress, we regret that it has not been in our power to procure it. We
have, however, sufficient evidence of Ms not being sensible of having deserv
edly drawn upon himself the irritation that it produced, or willingly departed
from that deference and respect which nothing can excuse an individual, more
especially a public officer, from exhibiting to a representative body. What
ever may be the correctness of the delegates of the people, there is a reverence
due to those who constitute them, which is of absolute and indispensable obli
gation. If, in this respect, General Greene deviated from the due observance
of this duty, we do not wish to vindicate him ; but impartial truth will require
of us to present the reader with his own vindication, in various letters ad
dressed to his friends on the occasion.
Such was the excitement produced in congress, that immediately on the
reading of the general's letter a member rose and proposed that he be dismissed
from the service. He had many excellent and warm friends on the floor, who
heard the letter read with regret, and the utmost they could do, at that time,
was to obtain a reference of it to a committee. But that committee reported
a resolve, that " the resignation of Nathanael Greene be accepted, and that he
be informed that congress have no further use for his services." For ten days
this report was under consideration ; six days it was called up and debated,
and the minds of his friends anxiously, most anxiously employed to obtain a
negative vote from congress, or a concession from the offender. But Greene
thought he was right and would not yield, and the army (who had espoused
his cause) looked gloomy and tiireatening. Thus, in a moment of mutual
irritation, was the country on the verge of losing the services of one who was
destined, in a few months, to cover the American arms with glory; to rescue
three states from the dominion of the enemy, and, under the smiles of benign
providence, to do more than any other, with one exception, to the fortunate
termination of the war.
The latter part of the report was finally stricken out, and that only which
related to his resignation as quarter-master-general carried. Colonel Picker
ing was elected to succeed him, and Greene anxiously awaited the moment
when he should be relieved from the heavy burthen that had now been pressing
on him for near three years. Yet near two months did he patiently continue
to discharge the duties of the station, while Ms successor was prudently inform-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 169
ing Mmself of its details, and endeavouring to obtain money to enter upon it chap.
with eclat. <^v-w
Immediately as Colonel Pickering's appointment was announced to him,
Greene addressed letters to all his agents, informing them of his own resigna
tion and the appointment of his successor ; thanking them for their faithful
services, pressing them to close their accounts, and earnestly requesting them
to lend every assistance to Ms successor that could contribute to facilitate the
discharge of his duties.
Notwithstanding all the irritation that had previously prevailed, there was
not an individual in the administration who did not confess that he retired
from the office in a manner highly dignified and patriotic.
In his communications to his subordinate officers, Greene places his resigna
tion on his resolution not to assume the extent of pecuniary liability, to which
the late resolution of congress had subjected him ; and the fear that in the
middle of a campaign it would be found impracticable to substitute the one
system for the other. Indeed, it is very obvious that this latter objection was
too forcible to be obviated, from the delays which attended the assumption of
the office by. Ms successor ; which, not much to the credit of the candid dealing
of the congress, threw upon Greene the discharge of the duties upon the old
plan, until near the close of the campaign of 1780.
In his correspondence with his intimate friends it will be seen, that he places
his conduct on other, but consistent grounds; but there was one ground known
only to himself and the commander in chief; and with a very commendable
discretion, communicated to no one else. It was this. Greene could not
have expected cordial support, dther from the treasury board, after their late
hostile proceedings ; or from the commissioners for superintending the staff
with General Mifflin at their head ; or from the congress, whilst the party
hostile to himself and Washington retained their influence ; and it became
necessary to throw upon that body the appointment of some one, in whose
success, as well as in the success of their new system, they would feel their
own responsibility implicated.
The choice made, on the occasion, was a judicious one. Colonel Pickering
had some time acted as adjutant-general. His reputation stood high as a man
of honour. The work of combination and arrangement was done to his
hand, and such were his invincible habits of application, and his stern integ
rity; that indolence and peculation, had they existed in the department, must
have fled at his frown. If the most rigid economy could have reduced the
expenses of the department, no man was better qualified to effect it. But no
economy could obviate the effects of the total dearth of money and of credit
22

V.

170 major general greene.
chap, which then prevailed. And the persecutors of Greene must have blushed,
, when this truth burst upon them with all its mortifying results.
The following sketch of the army is from the pen of Washington, written
1st May 1781 — the spring of the year following the appointment of Colonel
Pickering, and after he had been acting about six months — sufficient time for a
fair experiment.
*' Instead of having our arsenals well supplied with military stores, they are
poorly provided, and the workmen all leaving them. Instead of having the
various articles of field-equipage in readiness to deliver, the quarter-master-
general is but now applying to the several states (as a dernier resort) to provide
these things for their troops respectively. Instead of having a regular system
of transportation established on credit, or funds in the quarter-master's hands
to defray the contingent expenses of it, we have neither the one nor the other:
and all that business, or a greater part of it, being done by military impress
ment, we are daily and hourly oppressing the people, souring their tempers
and alienating their affections."
From the voluminous correspondence carried on between General Greene
and his friends, from the spring of the year 1 780, when these discussions first
commenced to their terminating in Ms resignation, we will select a few pas^-
sages for the amusement of the reader.
In a letter to his friend Governor Read, dated Morristown, February 9th,
1780, we find this passage: " I suppose you have seen the late extraordinary
appointment of General Mifflin as commissioner to superintend the staff de
partment. TMs is the more extrordinary, as******f If the
institution be proper, some of the characters to act under it are not. It has,
therefore, the appearance of a design to embarrass rather than facilitate the
public business. I cannot help thinking that the commander in chief will feel
himself hurt at this step, and consider it as a new clog to embarrass his milL-
tary operations." "Morristown, April 25^ 1780.
" My situation is peculiarly disagreeable, and I have a most delicate and
critical part to act. If I force myself out of the department, and any great

t Erased from the original.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 171
misfortune happens, no matter from what cause, it will be chargeable to my chap.
account. If I stay in it and things go wrong, or any failure happens, I stand ^-^^
responsible. What to do or how to act, I am at a loss. I think, upon the
whole, your advice is prudent and on the safe side of the question, and, there
fore, I determine to embrace the first opportunity to get out of the business. I
feel myself so soured and hurt at the ungenerous, as well as illiberal treatment
of congress and the different boards, -that it will be impossible for me to do
business with them with proper temper ; and besides I have lost all confidence
in the justice and rectitude of their intentions. The board of treasury have
written me one of the most insulting letters I have ever received either from a
public or private hand. I shall write them as tart an answer, and as 1 expect
it will bring on a quarrel, I shall have occasion to call upon you and others to
certify the manner of my engaging in the business, the circumstances it was
under, and all other attendant matters that may be necessary to give the public
a proper idea of the part I have acted, should I be obliged to publish any thing
in my own justification. Nothing will be more disagreeable to me, but neces
sity may drive me to it."
On the 29th he writes to the same friend : " It was my intention, at the
time you left camp, to have been in Philadelphia before this; but Colonel
Coxe, on his arrival there, wrote to me that a new system was certainly fixed
upon, and new agents to fill it. This was all I wished for, as that would give
me a fair opening to retire without censure ; and should I go to Philadelphia,
might be suspected of coming with a view of soliciting a continuance. As
nothing was further from my thoughts, I was unwilling to give ground for the
suspicion. " You are perfectly right in the opinion that I have nothing to expect from
public gratitude. And I am the more convinced of this from what I have
seen in camp ; for if individuals can so easily forget their former distress and
personal obligations, it is no wonder that changeable bodies, ignorant of all
the circumstances, should be ungrateful. I am sensible I am placed in a deli
cate situation, and must move with circumspection. Honest intentions and
faithful services are but a poor shield against the secret machinations of men
without principle, honour, or honesty. And, therefore, I have but little conso
lation from having served the public with fidelity, or little security from perse
cution in the same consideration. But I will ever have an approving con
science, if I am not blessed with an applauding country. The one depends
upon my own conduct, the other upon accident. The advice of a friend in
an hour of difficulty is worth a kingdom. I am the more obliged to you.

172 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, therefore, for your information and sentiments of the course I ought to pursue*
, But from Colonel Coxe's positive manner of writing, I thought I should rather
expose myself than save the department, if I went to Philadelphia. However,
from letters I have since received from members of congress who would not
deceive me, I am inclined to think your advice was salutary. I shall wait a
few days longer, and if nothing occurs that forbids my coming forward I am
rather inclined to think I shall set out for the city.
" I have been expecting the commissioners for superintending the staff, for a
fortnight past. This was one objection to leaving camp, lest I should be sus
pected of avoiding an inquiry. General Schuyler is expected in town this
week. Perhaps the other commissioners intend to meet him here. I have
had little conversation with the commander in chief upon General Mifflin's
appointment, but sufficient to convince me he is not pleased with the compli
ment. " Colonel Butler wrote to me a few days since from Carlisle, that it was
currently reported there, that I had refused to serve in the quarter-master's
department any longer, unless the congress would give me 3,000 gmneas a
year. This I suppose is the beginning of General M.'s superintendence. And
I dare say the whole of his conduct will lead to embarrass the service and
****** .j. i^g king's speech and the debates in parliament have
arrived, and seem to confirm what you conjectured, that there would be ano
ther campaign. How are we to carry it on ? We are without money, credit,
or means to obtain the one or the other. Never was a nation in such a situa
tion, and yet, I am told, congress think all things are going smoothly on. It
is astonishing how they can be so indifferent to the approaching crisis.
" We have opened an assembly in camp. From this apparent ease, I sup
pose, it must be thought we are in happy circumstances. I wish it was so ;
but alas ! it is not. Our provisions are in a manner gone. We have not a
ton of hay at command, nor magazines to draw from. The people who have
the public horses to winter, demand immediate payment for the time past, and
refuse to keep them any longer without it. If they persist, 1 see no resource
but to sell the public cattle to keep them from starving. The people will not
trust as they have done, while depreciation continues to rage.
" Money is extremely scarce, and worth little when we get it. We have
been so poor in camp for a fortnight, that we could not forward the public.

t Erased in the original.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 173
dispatches for want of cash to defray the expenses. Has this the appearance chap.
of a vigorous campaign ? >^-v^^
" The new system* recommended by congress, I fear, will not be produc
tive of all the good expected from it. On the contrary, I fear it will introduce
much disorder and numerous complaints."
The following is an extract from the letter from Governor Read, the receipt
of wMch is acknowledged in the preceding.
" Your favour of the 9th instant is now before me. I had neither forgot nor
neglected my promise made to you, but was prevented by two reasons. First,
that I really could not find out what was doing at the civil head quarters with
sufficient certainty. And, secondly, that I expected you daily in town. I am
almost afraid to commit to paper my full and undisguised sentiments on the
present state of affairs, with which you are specially connected. So many
accidents have, in the course of the war, happened from epistolary freedoms,
that I have grown very fearful of trusting any thing in so hazardous a channel.
However, I will venture to tell you, that I think you have nothing to expect
from public gratitude, or personal attention, and that you will do well to pre
pare yourself at all points for events. General Mifflin's appointment to his
present office without including the heads of departments, is a sufficient com
ment on my text, and by your letter I find you understand it as I do. I have
had some experience of that body with whom your principal concerns lie, and
am clearly of opinion there is more to be done by resolution and firmness than
temporizing. All public bodies seem to me to act in a manner which, if they
were individuals, they would be kicked out of company for ; and the higher
they are, the greater liberties they take. In my opinion, you ought not to
delay an explanation on your affairs : if a tub is wanted for the whale, you are
as likely to be it as any one. A torrent of abuse was poured out against
Wadsworth, but that has all died away, as all unjust and ill grounded calumny
ever will. I think he was a valuable officer, and wish they may not feel his
loss. Your particular situation will enable you to leave the department not
only without discredit, but your station in the line will preserve a certain
respect which, in other circumstances might be wanting. Whoever is quar
ter-master-general this year, must work, if not miracles, at least something
very near it ; for I verily believe there will not be shillings where pounds are

* Of specified supplies in kind from the states.

174 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, wanted. In all my acquaintance with public affairs I never saw so complete
^-s^+.a a mystery — a vigorous campaign to be undertaken, 35,000 men to be raised,
fed, &c. and not a step taken that I can learn, to raise our drooping credit,
gratify the people, or conciliate a common confidence. A new arrangement
of the army and reduction of officers is now talked of with as much composure
as if it were a common business — little do they know the delicacy and diffi
culty of such a work. Nothing can rouse us from this lethargy, but some
signal stroke from the enemy, and I shall not be sorry to see them set about it,
as I am persuaded, we are slidmg into ruin much faster than ever we rose
from its borders. Whatever you do or resolve, must be done soon, or you will
be plunged into another campaign, without a possibility of retreat, and though
the circumstance I have above alluded to is a favourable one, it is impossible to
envy your situation; for whether you move on, or stand still, it may be im
proved to your disadvantage. If you quit, they will say, that having made a
fortune you leave the department in distress when you could have been of
most service to your country. If you stand fast, you become responsible for
measures and events morally impracticable. If an honourable retreat can be
effected, it is beyond doubt your wisest and safest course; but I am not certain
that this can be done even now, and every hour adds to the difficulty. Your
department, as I have ever told Mr. Petit, must bear some censure for the
appointments in this state, and they are now used, as I expected they some
day would be, to its prejudice. When such men as ***** * and
****** | ^.c> ,3^]^ sucn display of fortune, it is impossible to help
looking back, and equally impossible for a people, soured by taxes and the
continuance of the war, to help fretting, and the general ill temper gives lati
tude to thought and speech'. When things go wrong, no matter where the
wrong bias is given, every one concerned finds a pleasure in shifting the blame
on his neighbour, or at least making him share it. It would never surprize
me, therefore, to see the quarter-master or commissary general made the poli
tical scape-goat, and carry off the sins, if not of the people, of those who repre
sent them. Upon the whole, I retain my opinion of the propriety of your
being here as soon as possible, and in the mean time can only inform you of
two things with certainty. 1st. The plan of the department will be altered
with regard to commissions, 2d. That nothing but necessity will induce them
to continue the present department, for although it may have a great deal of
the utile, it has little of the duke on the palate of the present congress. But

t Erased from the original.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 175
you will be drilled on till the campaign opens, and if they can do no better chap.
they will keep you. In this, as well as every thing else, much will be left to ^-^^,
the chapter of accidents. But it is time to relieve you from this tedious letter,
in which my pen has run away with me. I intended to have been very pru
dent and reserved, but I find I have, as we poor mortals are apt to do, made
good resolutions and broken them every one."
It was the 1st of August 1780 that Greene sent in his resignation as quarter-
ter-master-general. We again express our regret that we have not been able
to procure a copy of it that our readers might themselves judge if it merited
the reception it met with.. Some little idea of the grounds of offence that it
furnished may be gathered from the following extracts.
On the 7th of August Colonel Coxe writes : " I am informed that the word
administration in your letter of resignation, was so highly offensive to congress
that some of the worthy members immediately on the letter's being read,
Moved the house instantly to disrobe you of all military rank, at the same time
that they accepted of your resignation as quarter-master-general. Others
more moderate, (though not at bottom more friendly,) objected to a measure so
violent, but at the same time proposed that congress should immediately desire
the commander in chief to signify to you that your future services in the line
would be dispensed with until your accounts in the quarter-master's depart
ment were settled. Neither of which propositions, though warmly urged by
your enemies, was carried into resolves. Nor do I believe they dare, great as
they are, seriously to attempt any thing of the kind, though some of your
friends have been not a little alarmed on the occasion." He further writes,
 " is in strict alliance with a quondam major general, who has been
long since suspected of being hostile to the commander in chief; and who, it
is well known, had a principal hand in forming the present system. A system,
in my opinion, as well calculated to effect a dissolution of the army, and of
course the ruin of its commander, as could possibly be devised by the art of
man." Mr. Petit on the 11th of August, writes more moderately: " I have already
intimated to you that I did not entirely agree with you in opinion respecting
the new plan, nor respecting your letter to congress; but I could make large
allowances for these differences from the various circumstances which placed
the matter in different points of light to one and to the other of us. The
general causes of complaint arising from a series of disagreeable treatment,

176 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
ch \p. were, in a measure, common to both of us ; but we had not conceived exactly
<,«*-v~w alike as to the secret spring and motives of these transactions. You had sup
posed them to arise from a seated malevolence of disposition against you in
many members of a certain house, who lost no opportunity of playing them
off to your disadvantage, until at length they had tinctured the whole body,
except a few of your particular friends, with strong prejudices against you;
and that their measures had been designedly affronting to you. You seemed
also to suppose a prevailing disposition in the house to cramp and con
fine the supplies and provisions for the army lest they should become formi
dable, and seem to be more independent than certain persons wished to see
them. And I apprehend your opinions were not a little strengthened and
confirmed by the conduct of certain persons, with whom you have had many
conferences for some months past, and who might be supposed to be capable
of judging of the secret motives of action in their colleagues. From these
opimons thus formed, it was by no means strange that you were induced to
take the step you did. My opinions on the same points were somewhat differ
ent; and I believe I have pretty fully described them in some of my late let
ters. Hence you will in turn make allowances for me that I did not so fully
approve your measures as might have been expected. But at the same time
I must, in justice to you say, that I did not conceive your manner of doing it
ought to have been considered as so offensive as they have taken it. The
torrent has been too great, as well out doors as within, for your friends to
appease it with any success. I have used emollients wherever I could find an
opportunity to apply them, but in many instances I found the patients in a
disposition to be rather inflamed than softened by them. At length, however,
I found the fever abating, and they were applied with more success, till the
letter arrived from the committee, which raised the rage still higher than ever,
and seemed to leave no room for conciliation. I have not seen that letter,
and can, therefore, only judge of it by its effects, and from select expressions
that have been retailed to me, and in which you are charged with dictating
terms and conditions which they deem highly offensive. The violence is
again abating, but it will settle into a solid dislike in the minds of most of the
present members of congress. What was said by some heated members
respecting the major general did not, I believe, gain much ground, and is laid
aside. Your character as a military officer is too well established to be easily
assailed. The component parts of congress are continually changing, and it
may not be long before you may regain a respectable standing with the main
body, though there never will be wanting some, who will open the old wound
and try to keep it from entirely healing. The opinions without doors have

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 177
not, at present, a fair chance. They are governed, as you may suppose, by chap.
representations from the hot-bed, and not one in a thousand have either oppor- VP^,
tunity or inclination to inquire into the real situation of things, or to view both
sides of the question fairly. The reason of quitting stumbles many who would
otherwise willingly give it a favourable turn.
" I have written to you on this subject with a freedom which nothing but
friendship would warrant, and yet short of what I would use in the open air,
where there would be no other record than your own mind. I fear the coals
have been blown up on both sides by the same instruments, but I cannot now
explain myself on this point. Your sagacity will lead you to a meamng.
" Divers overtures were made to me for advice, and at length to accept the
head office myself, This I discouraged in its first dawnings. I had always
insisted on the propriety of the choice falling on a general officer. An over
ture was again made to me on a supposition of suitable rank annexed. This
I rejected with equal promptness. My reasons for which you will easily con
ceive, knowing the disposition of the army on such an acquisition of rank."
It was not to be expected that Governor Read would remain an unconcerned
spectator of the agitation excited in congress by the affair of Greene's letter.
His affections were too much interested, and Ms knowledge of Greene's merit
in that department too full and minute to admit of his looking to the result
without the most anxious solicitude.
In a letter of the 19th August he writes: " This is the fourth time I have
sat down to write to you, but the multiplicity of business and the nature of the
subjects on which I write have constantly prevented it; for before I could
finish one letter some new event respecting you and your department occurred,
so as to change the whole complexion of the affair. There have been some
unhappy misunderstandings and misapprehensions of each other's views and
intentions between you and congress, which artful spirits have inflamed. I
have felt great concern on the occasion, as our public affairs never required
better councils or more valuable men to conduct them. Mr. Petit has commu
nicated to me most of your letters, as he has those to you, and in general we
have agreed upon the line to be pursued. You have undoubtedly great reason
to complain of the public gratitude, so have the best men in all ages. But it
is not of the present men who compose congress, or at least a majority of them,
of whom you have most reason to complain. You perhaps will be surprized
when I assure you that, in my opinion, you never had fewer enemies in con
gress than at present. A keen and a just sense of its treatment has drawn
23

178 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, from you expressions which would have been properly applied to some mem-
, bers now gone, and perhaps to a few that remain ; but not being applicable
to many, they have kindled that resentment which we are all subject to under
reproach, the grounds of which we are ignorant of, and the desert of which we
are not conscious of. I observe in a letter to Mr. Coxe this morning you men
tion, the design of superceding you in command is not laid aside. I assure
you it never was seriously entertained by a great majority of congress. One
hot member dropped it in a speech, another afterwards moved it with some
more formality; but it was soon scouted, and respect paid to your military
character, at the same time that your freedom as quarter-master-general gave
umbrage. " I hope to see you shortly. I know no hardships, dangers, or distress I am
not wiUing to share with you."
The following extract is the answer to the foregoing letter.
li August 29th, 1780.
" Your obliging letter of the 19th I have had the pleasure to receive. I
should have been happy in having your advice and opinion before I sent in my
resignation. But I thought then, and cannot help thinking now, that the mea
sures pursued in congress were calculated to compel me to quit the department.
This might not have been the design of the greater part, but I am persuaded
it was the plan of a few, who influenced others to adopt their measures upon
different principles from those which governed themselves.
" You know I had got sick of the department long since, and was desirous
of resigning. But I should not have ventured upon the measure this cam
paign, if I could possibly have got through the business upon the new system.
It appeared to me that congress intended to tie up my hands in such a way,
that I should either fail in the undertaking, or depart from the plan. In either
case, I should have been ruined. If I had not answered the demands of the
service, I should have fallen into disgrace with the army ; and if, to answer the
demands of the service, I had departed from the system, I made myself liable
for the consequences. Which, to be judged of hereafter by persons altogether
strangers to the circumstances under which 1 acted, could not help drawing
upon me censure, if it did not subject me to heavy losses. Upon the whole I
consider myself as cruelly and oppressively treated. I did not wish to desert
the office at a critical hour, nor did I wish to get into a quarrel with congress.
My letter of resignation may have more tartness in it than was prudent, but I
am far from dunking it merited the severity with which they were about to

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 179
treat it. For I am well informed it was seven days in agitation to dismiss me chap.
the service altogether. This they may do when they please. I am not,,^^,
anxious to continue a moment longer than I am thought useful to the com
munity. " If I have many friends in congress at this time, my enemies have the art
of moulding them to their views. Leaving out Mr. Coxe and Mr. Petit,
served to convince me that the measure was more personal than political.
" What served to fix my determination for quitting the department was, just
about the time I received the new system, I received a resolution of congress
that the principal of the department which handled public money, however
diffuse his services, should be held responsible for all the subordinate agents.
This appeared to me so unreasonable, as well as unjust, the whole complexion
of the business had something so cruel and at the same time so personal in it,
that I was determined to leave it, be the consequences what they might.
" As to public gratitude, I expected none, especially in so changeable a body
as that of congress; for the members this year cannot know the merits of their
servants the last, and are, therefore, not very likely to reward them for past
services. All things considered, I am very glad I am out of the department,
though I have run some risk in getting out, and perhaps lost some friends
by it."
Yet Greene duly estimated the importance of the good opinion of those with
whom we are connected in society, to the enjoyment of life, as well as to our
utility in a public station, and took some pains upon his resignation to collect
"and diffuse correct information on the subject of his conduct in that affair.
The letter from General Washington on that occasion has already been
presented to the reader. And the following is the letter to which that is an
answer. " Camp Verplank's Point, August 5th, 1780.
" Sir, "The time for which I engaged to act in the quarter-master's department
at the request of the committee, is almost expired ; and as I cannot exercise the
office any longer consistently with my own safety, I have to request that your
excellency will take measures for relieving me as soon as possible from the
disagreeable predicament in which I am placed. In the mean time, I shall be
exceedingly obliged to your excellency for the sense you entertain of my con
duct and services since I have been in the department, as you alone are the
best judge of the merit of one, or propriety of the other. The business is

180 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, truly disagreeable and distressing, and has been so for a long time. Notwith-
^^-^^ standing, if it had been possible for me to have gotten through this campaign,
consistently with my own safety and the public good, upon the plan proposed
by congress, I would readily have done it. But, from the knowledge I have
of the department, I know it is utterly impossible to follow the system and
answer the demands of the service, and to attempt it at this critical season,
will most assuredly defeat our plan of operations, and bring the army into the
greatest distress.
" It would be a folly in me to attempt to combat the prejudices of public
bodies with hopes of success. Time alone can convince them that their mea
sures are destructive of their true interests, as well as highly injurious to some
of their most faithful servants.
" I am sensible my conduct has been viewed by many in a very improper
light. And I am persuaded many think the business can be done with more
method and at less expense than it has been. I wish it may be the case; but
am much mistaken if the nature of the business is capable of more system, or
will admit of less expense, if the plan of the war continues on its present scale,
and the army on its present footing.
" I have endeavoured to the utmost of my power to enter into the spirit of
your excellency's measures, and if my conduct has not been satisfactory to
government and to yourself, it has been owing to a want of abilities, and not of
inclination." To Governor Greene of Rhode Island, in which state he always manifested
the strongest desire to sustain his reputation, he writes thus:
" The late change in the quarter-master-general's department has no doubt
been a matter of some speculation with you. The true reasons and causes that
led to this measure are not known, and probably never will be ; but those which
have been held up to public view were to introduce economy and order into
the department.
" At the close of last campaign, I represented to congress the necessity of
making some alteration in the quarter-master-general's department; as the
pay allowed the officers serving upon salary was so incompetent to their trou
ble and expense that it would be impossible either to get or continue in office
suitable men to conduct the business. And this I pressed upon them in several
letters during the winter, arguing strongly the necessity of having it done
before the campaign must open. They took no notice of these letters until
April, and then only requested that I would continue to make the best prepa-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 181
ration I could. In the same letters in which I represented the necessity of chap.
making these alterations in the department, I requested leave to qmt it. This ^Z^
they absolutely refused me.
" The commander in chief" sent me to Philadelphia, the last of April or the
first of May, to represent in person the difficulties attending the business. On
my arrival there, I was presented with a new plan formed by General Mifflin,
Colonel Pickering and others, for conducting the affairs of the department,
which, I told them, could never be reduced to practice, however pleasing it
may be in theory. Speculative projectors in matter of business, are like meta
physical reasoners in affairs of religion. Experience is the great school of
human life, and the only sure guide. They who take up other principles as a
rule of conduct, generally plunge themselves into new and endless difficulties.
" My remarks upon the plan proposed, induced congress to listen to a propo
sition to send a committee of their own body to camp, to consult with the
commander in chief and the heads of the great departments of the army, and
to concert with them a plan wMch might be reduced to practice. The com
mittee was appointed, a plan formed and approved by the commander in chief,
and recommended to congress to be carried into execution. This they muti
lated and altered in so many essential points, that when it came out I found
it impossible for me to introduce it, with the least hopes of answering the
demands of the service. Besides, to attempt to carry it fully into execution in
the most critical part of the campaign, I thought would be sporting with expe
riments at too hazardous a rate; and as the order was positive to carry it into
immediate execution, without any latitude of discretion to be accommodated
to circumstances, I was reduced to the disagreeable alternative of sending in
my resignation, with a positive refusal to act under the new arrangement.
" I had been long sensible there had been many political and vulgar preju
dices respecting the commission that had been allowed in the department, and
had taken care long before this to make an offer to congress that I would serve
during the campaign without fee or reward, paying only my family expenses
in camp, which the business necessarily subjected me to. I also told the
committee that there should be no commission allowed to any of the deputies.
I made these offers to remove every shadow of suspicion that might induce a
belief that I was actuated by interested motives in the advice and opinion I
might give. But all this had no influence. I always considered the preju
dices that prevailed, respecting the commission having an ill effect as to the
public expense, an idle thing. But be that as it may, I did not introduce it.
General Mifflin and the board of war were both before me in the business, and

182 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

V.

chap, gave a much higher commission than I would agree to, after I had charge of
, the department.
" Doubtless you have heard many things respecting my letter of resignation ;
that you may judge for yourself I have sent you a copy of it, and a copy of the
commander in chief's letter upon my being about to leave the department.
" Many people, to answer party purposes, have insinuated that I had made
a fortune. If I had, it is nothing more than was promised me by the commit-
mittee of congress, at the time I accepted the office ; but I can assure you it is
no such thing. / am poor, and find it difficult to support myself agreeably to the
rank and standing I hold in the army; for you will give me leave to assure you,
that no man can preserve himself from contempt unless he keeps up those
appearances which are expected in the rank he holds. There are few or none
who have been hardy enough to impeach my integrity, and of this I will leave
you to judge from your former acquaintance with me in private life — the best
rule, in my opinion, to judge of actions and principles. He that is not virtuous
in his private walks, never will be so in his public.
" To prevent the confusion which I foretold from great and sudden changes
in the department, at this interesting and critical season, I have continued to
conduct the business a month since my appointment ceased, otherwise we
should have been all in confusion, and perhaps disbanded before this. Had
the second division of the French fleet arrived, and called upon the general to
co-operate with them against New York, congress would have had reason to
repent of the measures they have taken. They must have delayed, if not
defeated the whole plan of operations for which the northern states have been
put to such amazing expense.
" Iivish that America could see her true interest, and raise an army for the war.
These short enlistments are ruinous in every point of view. We are ahvays dream
ing of peace, and for ever adopting temporary expedients. The country is op
pressed and discouraged, and the army distressed and disgusted."
Thus have we waded through this perplexing period of our hero's life, and
profess to have established that he never sought the office of quarter-master-
general ; that as he entered upon it, so he continued in it, solely from patriotic
motives ; that holding it was altogether an instance of self-denial, a sacrifice to
the good of the service, and the wishes and interests of the commander in
chief; that instead of acquiring wealth in the exercise of it, as calumny had
established in the opinion of thousands, it reduced him even to poverty ; that
he suffered the most cruel and unjust persecution in the discharge of it; that
the persecution originated with the party who considered every friend of

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 183
Washington as the enemy of themselves ; and that, finally, under the influence chap.
of some of the party, he was forced to abandon it. V'
If it be asked, what could have been the motives for this persecution? the
answer is obvious.
His fidelity to the commander in chief, they well knew, could never be
shaken. The aid to be derived from him was cordial, candid, and zealous.
And if it be admitted that the misfortunes of the campaign of 1 777 were, in a
great measure, attributable to the wretched administration of the quarter
master-general's department, (and the committee of congress so reported it,)
never was the man to be forgiven who had snatched the destined victim of the
party from impending ruin. But there was, in the minds of many, another
cause. The duties of the quarter-master-general detained Greene near the
person of the commander in chief; his presence at head quarters was gene
rally indispensable, and here the manifest deference of Washington for his
integrity and judgment, was a continual cause of spleen and envy. To dis
credit the favourite also, was to wound the friend who confided in him ; and to
bring Ms conduct into suspicion, was to discredit the judgment of the man
who had selected him.
One circumstance contributed greatly to exacerbate the enmity of those who
were looking to the place of chief in command. It was generally understood
about that time, that Washington had intimated that in case of his fall, Greene
was the man who ought to fill his place. It is very possible that there may
have been some ground for the report, for Washington had looked into his
heart, and knew that it was not every man whose integrity could withstand
the temptations which that post held out to the ambitious. Others might
equal, perhaps excel him in military talents, as many certainly did in literary
acquirements ; but of that unassailable political honesty which could be influ
enced by no occurrences to turn his sword against his country, and erect a
throne on the ruins of a republic, the conformity of their sentiments, habits,
and principles of action afforded the best guarantee. The sequel will show
that he was olestined to undergo this very trial.
We know not, however, that there exists any positive proof that such a com
munication from the commander in chief in favour of Greene was ever made.
We are in possession of a letter written from Yorktown, when congress sat at
that place, mentioning that it was so reported and believed there. This letter
was probably not without authority.
In looking into the transactions of Greene in a station which involved him
in so much calumny and suspicion, the bureaus of all his most intimate friends
have been open to us, and we solemnly aver, that they do not afford one letter

184 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, from which even a surmise might be drawn unfavourable to his disinterested-
v .
v*-v~v ness an<* integrity.
Yet it must be acknowledged that he was guilty of some errors, which, pro
bably, were not without their influence in involving Mm in suspicion.
As the first of these we will notice his appointing his brother Jacob, and
his particular friend Griffin Greene, as deputies to act under him. Nepotism,
as it is called, always has been, and always will be viewed by the public with
considerable jealousy. It has the appearance of family monopoly of public
office, and offends the selfishness of mankind — who always assert a right to
participate, and are seldom inclined to give credit for impartiality where the
judgment is liable to be warped by the ties of blood. Yet why should the just
claims of a relative be sunk in the advancement of his kinsman to the office
from which appointments flow ? And why should a public officer be restricted
from calling to his aid, talents excited to action by zeal and affection?
It is difficult to draw the line with precision, but in general it may be laid
down as a rule of conduct, that wherever the support of public opinion is
necessary to a public officer, it is dangerous to advance hrs relatives to posts
under him, more especially if the office admits of the suspicion of connivance
and mutual concealment of each other's offences. Greene had occasion very
soon to feel the dangerous consequences of such appointments ; not only in
the slanders which prevailed against him, but in seeing his example followed
by an agent who did not use it with all the precautions of Ms employer. In
a letter which he was obliged to address to him upon the reiterated complaints
that were made, he is reduced to the mortifying acknowledgment that it was
true, he had in two instances done the same, but he was resolved immediately
to remove the relations whom he had so appointed.
Yet they were men of honour, and established respectability and integrity,
and at a time when good agents could scarcely be procured, their consenting
to act was an obligation conferred on their employer.
That he was rigidly scrupulous in his conduct towards them, their volumi
nous correspondence sufficiently establishes. Almost every letter presses them
to be particular in their accounts, and to leave not a speck on their conduct to
excite suspicion. In the letter in which he announces to his early friend his
resignation of the quarter-master's department, he says, " I wish you and my
brother Jacob to have your accounts and vouchers forwarded for settlement,
as they will be sought for first. I think you had better get Mr. Bowen to
overlook them, as he is a pretty good judge of what forms and vouchers are
necessary. You cannot preserve too much regularity in the business, as the
Commissioners are very critical, and no doubt will be more so with yours than

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 18&
common. These people appear to pay little or no attention to the integrity of chap.
the party and the uprightness of his conduct, but altogether to the form and ^
method observed in transacting the business. As I am sure you have dis
charged your duty in one, so 1 wish you to put it out of their power to injure
you in the other. The sooner your accounts are forwarded the better."
Among the errors of his administration may also be noted Ms failing to
dismiss those agents whose sumptuous living involved the department in popu
lar suspicion. The support of opinion was indispensably necessary to all the
operations of the feeble government under which the war was conducted.
When a public officer, without any private means of sustaining it, will live in
habits of expense, which the fair profits of his office cannot support, suspi
cions necessarily follow, and jealousy, envy, malice, and popular excitement
soon convert those suspicions into proof.* He was not unconscious of the
unfortunate impressions resulting from these causes, and they constituted, fre
quently, the subject of correspondence with Ms assistants ; but finding not the
least cause to suspect the integrity, and having experienced the good effects of
the industry and zeal of those agents, he resolved not to sacrifice them to
popular clamour. Yet upon their not listenmg to his remonstrances, he ought,
perhaps, to have acted otherwise ; for it was necessary that his agents should
not only be innocent, but unsuspected.
It was certainly an error in General Greene to accept compensation by way
of commission on the sums expended in his office. This he appears to have
done under the influence of an ignorance of the world, and of that indiscreet
fearlessness of imputation which conscious purity of heart too often carries with
it into the world. In the ordinary mercantile transactions of men, where the
chance of imposition is reciprocal, where the competition for business, and the
scrutinizing spirit of individual interest are supposed to interpose a competent
check on the transactions of an agent, the same suspicions are not apt to
arise. But with a public officer it is different; his office gives him a monopoly
of profit, his means of evasion are supposed to be great, and he is, in public
opinion, exposed to a more than ordinary temptation to deceive. For, such is
the casuistry with which men examine their own actions, that the moral turpi
tude of defrauding the public seldom weighs as heavily on the human con
science as in the case of friends or individuals. Besides, every one asserts the

* Poor Mitchel who expended <£800 in pastry at one entertainment, was actually thought suffi
ciently dignified by his munificence to be made the subject of a formal impeachment by a great
state.
24

186 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, right to censure, and in proportion as individuals are excluded from the right
, of personal scrutiny, are the public apt to indulge in loose and general charges
and suspicions. It was not very long before Greene discovered this error, and
he endeavoured very earnestly to correct it by proposing to have a fixed salary
substituted, or to be allowed only the expenses necessarily incident to his
family in camp. But this proposition was held long under discussion, and in
the mean time, being unwilling to draw his commissions, and unauthorized to
receive any other compensation, he was obliged to consume his patrimony ;
and then finally, to draw his commissions, when depreciated to nothing.
Much, probably, of Greene's embarrassments in Ms negociations with con
gress was the result of his military cast of manners. The frankness of the
soldier is but ill adapted to practise the conciliating suppleness of the man of
the world. He was never loquacious, nor ever gmlty of the weakness of
indiscriminate communicativeness. But in his intercourse with the members
of that body he was strong, pointed, and decisive, in his requisitions ; and
while he was ever ready to render every service, and make every sacrifice for
the good of the country, he never sunk below his just claims on the confidence
and gratitude of his employers. But they were preferred as claims, and not
solicited as gratuities.
In his communications with his particular friends also, he exhibits a free
dom in his remarks which no man, in his station, could indulge in, without
danger. Men in public life would do well always to remember the aphorism,
that " Walls have ears." His friends were well chosen, and it is literally true,
that he never lost a friend whom he had once acquired. But there are few
men proof against the temptation of indulging their vanity in boasting of an
eminent correspondent, or their partiality in boasting of the correct informa
tion, or wise remark of a beloved correspondent. If no other effect is produced,
it gives a turn and point to the conversation and opinions, which will be attri-
tributed to the hints of him with whom one corresponds. We will give the
reader one specimen of the remarks to which these observations are intended
to apply. It is dated 15th July 1779.
" The designs of the congress it is difficult to interpret, but the state of the
money remains much the same as when I wrote you before. Upon the whole,
I think it is rather gaining ground. It gains ground much faster to the east
ward than to the westward. The congress have it now in their power to put
a check upon depreciation, if they had hut resolution to improve the opportu
nity. But they are always perplexing themselves with expedients, until the
enthusiasm of the people cools and abates, and then, like old maids who have

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 187
refused good offers in the bloom of youth, are obliged to accept of inferior chap.
objects. v^v~w
" There is a parcel of little politicians at the head of the treasury board.
Their plans have led our currency to death's door. They are so ignorant of
the principles of financiering that they mistake effects for causes, and causes
for effects. It is not likely that a physician can prescribe successfully for a
disease which he does not understand. This is their situation. They are
distracting the community with imaginary evils, and spreading the spirit of
jealousy far and wide. This will prove the loss of confidence in one another,
and we shall be like a rope of sand, without strength or cement. In a word,
I believe them to be the worst politicians that ever had the management of so
important an affair. I write to you freely, because I write in confidence.
, " The empire is tortured to death with factions and mutual distrusts. The
parties, instead of aiding each other with their counsels, are opposing each
other's measures. They are more intent upon strengthening their own inte
rests, than promoting the common good. Thus the money has been left to
expire without a helping hand, and the army to dissolve without regard to the
distress it was in."
After all, perhaps Greene's great misfortune was " that he had made an
enemy." Experience oMy can show the baneful consequences of such a mis
fortune. It is truly the leaven that leaveneth a great mass. " Beware how
you despise an enemy," is a favourite military maxim, and, in civil life, may
justly be added, " Beware how you make one." There is, perhaps, no human
being so insignificant as not to be able, if constantly under the wakeful influ
ence of vindictiveness, to find some means of doing us an injury. But when
possessing the advantages of personal respectability, and an extended inter
course with society, his means of annoyance are truly formidable. The
venomous spider does not extend his snares for his victim with more assiduity,
or more fatal consequences, than vindictiveness.

88 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE,

VI.

CHAPTER VI.

Military movements. Battle of Springfield. Major Andrl. Reflections. Greene
in command at West Point. Appointed to the command of the southern de
partment.

chap. J.T was obvious that from the time of Greene's resignation, the current of
, prejudice began to set -from Mm. Indeed, his enemies had given him so
decided an advantage in the advances made to get Colonel Petit into Ms place,
that every pretext was lost for doubting Ms integrity or economy. It was well
known that they equally shared the profits, and that no important step was
ever taken with regard to the application of money without Colonel Petit's
knowledge. All the money transactions passed through his hands, and pecu
lation in the quarter-master-general must have been winked at by him, or it
could not have prevailed. The offer made to him, therefore, and even his
appointment as assistant quarter-master-general, was at once relinquishing
every charge unfavourable to integrity, nay, to economy likewise.
We had pursued the military career of General Greene up to the time of
Sir Henry Clinton's withdrawing his troops from Rhode Island. This was in
the autumn of 1779, and the cause of the movement was the expectation of
D'Estaing with a powerful fleet and a considerable body of troops, who had
arrived on the coast, and was then employed in an attempt on the town of
Savannah. A joint attack on New York had been concerted between the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 189
French and American commanders, as soon as the former should have com- chap.
pleted the destruction of Savannah. This was thought to be the work of a v^-v-^-
day, and the fullest confidence entertained in the result of the attack. Unfor
tunately, disappointment in his first attempt deterred D'Estaing from making
the second. Defeated, disgraced, and mortified, he sailed away from Savan
nah to the West Indies, while the arrival of a strong British fleet under
Arbuthnot, enabled Clinton to prosecute his designs against Charleston and
the, southern states — still leaving a sufficient force under Generals Pattison and
Knyphausen to keep at bay the feeble, starving, dispirited army under Wash
ington. Had the American army been at this time in a condition to act, the
fall of New York was certain. No rivers any longer interposed a barrier
against an attack ; every stream was bound in ice that would have afforded a
passage to an army. Tantalizing in the extreme was the view to the Ameri
can commander. But his men were fewer in number than the garrison of the
town, and they were half starved, half naked, sick, dispirited, and deserting.
The British commander in New York was exceedingly alarmed at his situa
tion ; and is entitled to the highest praise for his efforts to avert the impending
danger. The ships were stripped of their seamen, and nearly the whole popu
lation of the city pressed into the service. At this time it was that " the honour
able board of associated loyalists" was formed, and formed to disgrace the king
whom they professed to serve. At least, it is upon their implacable hatred and
revenge that the British writers throw off from themselves the enormities that
were committed by the marauding parties, (for they merit that contemptuous
epithet,) which issued from New York in various directions. In a civil con
test, every citizen has a right to choose his party, but not to dispense with the
sacred rights of humanity. Some of the expeditions in which the loyalists
took an active part have been mentioned. They have still other trophies to
boast of. The murder of Mrs. Caldwell with her infant at her breast, the
burning of the Connecticut Farms, and the wanton sacking of Springfield,
two beautiful, thriving, and pacific villages ; as they could produce no possible
benefit to the royal cause, must be reprobated by the voice of posterity.
The last of these events only, are we at liberty particularly to notice ; as it is
connected with an event in which the subject of these pages acted a conspi
cuous part.
It was in December 1779 that Sir Henry Clinton sailed from New York on
his .expedition against Charleston. In May 1 780 the town surrendered, and in
June he returned to New York.
During the winter, so feeble had been the exertions made by the states to
re-establish the American army, that Washington found Mmself, on the return

190 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, of Clinton, in command of an army of 5,558 regular troops, and not above
^^a 3,000 of those really effective. His adversary had double that number, besides
the advantage of perfect concentration, while the American troops were sta
tioned in the sweep of a semicircle of many miles, in order to protect at the
same time Philadelphia, the banks of the North River, and the eastern states
from invasion.
The incursion in which Mrs. Caldwell was killed and the Connecticut
Farms consumed, took place shortly before the return of General Clinton, and
terminated every way disreputably to the British arms. No object could be
assigned to it, but that which it effected, partial plunder and conflagration.
The force detached was not sufficient to make a serious impression on the
country, and, that fighting was not the object of Knyphausen, Roberson, and
Tryon, who commanded, is sufficiently evinced from their stealing back in the
night. Yet the enemy retired from a more serious danger than he was aware
of. Washington's whole regular force in that neighbourhood was but 2,500 ;
these were posted in advance of Morristown under Greene. As soon as the
advance of the enemy was communicated, a night attack had been resolved
on, and Greene's forces were actually in motion, when the enemy moved off.
Knyphausen escaped but by two hours.
The ravages committed on this occasion may have been the immediate act
of the loyalists, who formed a part of the British detachment ; but the com
manders themselves were not all loyalists ; and whether or not, they are all
responsible to posterity for the authorized acts of their forces.
As soon as General Clinton arrived, he began to make dispositions which
manifested some serious design. Having now the complete command" of the
islands and waters about New York, it was in his power to move with force
and rapidity to many points. General Washington, whose, head quarters were
then at Morristown, felt alarmed for the safety of his garrisons on the North
River, and leaving Greene in command in the Jerseys, he moved off with in
tention to take the command at West Point.
He could spare but one thousand* regular troops to perform the important
task of occupying the passes of the range of hills that stretch along between
the rivers Rah way and Pasaic, and to cover the country about Morristown,
and the magazines which had been collected in that neighbourhood. To
these were added a body of perhaps 300 New Jersey militia, who, about this
time, conducted themselves with a decision and spirit which proved, that they

Marshall. Private letters say 700.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 191
never wanted any thing but the support of a regular army to induce them uni- chap.
formly to act with equal fidelity to the cause of the revolution. v^r-v^w
Things were thus circumstanced when, on the 23d of June, the enemy sud
denly made his appearance in great force at Elizabethtown Point, and moving
with great rapidity, advanced upon Greene's post in two columns of 2,500*
men each, well provided with cavalry and artillery, and commanded by Sir
Henry Clinton in person.
The village of Springfield is situate on the west side of the little river
Rahway, and at the foot of the hills occupied by the American army. It is
distant about eight miles in a north-west direction from Elizabethtown Point.
Two roads lead from Elizabethtown to Morristown, the one passing through
the village of Springfield, the other to the northward of it. This latter is
called the Vauxhall road, and crosses above the point of confluence of two
small streams, which unite to form the Rahway. These roads, after passing
the hills at the back of the village, unite. Over each of these three streams
there is a bridge constructed where the road crosses the stream.
Long as Greene had been in service, so continually had he been employed
under the immediate command and near the person of the commander in chief,
that this was the first opportunity he had ever had of exhibiting his capacity in
an independent command. And his conduct was such as manifested resources
which his commander and his immediate friends had always been satisfied of,
but no opportunity had yet been afforded him of exhibiting ; uninfluenced by
the counsels, command, or movements of a superior.
None of the usual means of information had been neglected, and he had the
earliest possible notice of the enemy's landing and marching. So many were
the passes that he had to guard, that his men were unavoidably posted in dis
persed stations. To draw them together was the first thing necessary, and to
gain time for that purpose no effort was to be omitted. To forward intelli
gence to General Washington, to hasten the remote detachments to a point of
rendezvous, and to order the several detachments immmediately about his
person to advance, skirmish with, and delay the enemy, were the work of the
same instant. Every order was issued with coolness and precision, and exe
cuted with promptness and zeal.
Colonel Dayton was advanced to meet and skirmish with the left column
of the enemy, whilst Major Lee, afterwards the celebrated partizan Colonel
Lee, with his dragoons and some infantry, performed the same service against

* Marshall.

192 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, then- right. Both these corps executed the duty assigned them with great
..^-^s-^ spirit, and made all the opposition to the enemy's advance that their inferior
force and the circumstances of the country would admit. But scarcely had
Greene collected and drawn up his troops on the right bank of the Rahway,
than the heads of the enemy's columns, which had united on the main road,
made their appearance.
Greene's artillery was posted behind the bridge that crosses the principal
stream, and the artillery of the enemy was in advance of his columns. The
action commenced by a brisk cannonading, which was kept up with great
spirit for near two hours. In the mean time, the enemy manifested, by his
manoeuvring, an intention to get into the rear of the American army by turn
ing their left. This Greene knew was practicable ; for the streams that formed
the Rahway were both passable, not only by the bridges on the Vauxhall road,
but by fording ; and for the enemy to possess himself of the hills in his rear,
would be decisive against him. He resolved, therefore, to take a new position ;
and having posted Major Lee, with the pickets under Captain Walker, in
advance at the bridge over the southern branch of the Rahway, and Colonel
Shrive, with his regiment of 200 men, at the upper bridge over the principal
branch; he left Colonel Angel, with about 170 men and one field-piece, to
defend the lower bridge, or that over the main stream ; and moved off to a
very strong pass on the range of hills in the rear of the town, extending from
one road to the other where they approach to their junction. Shrive's position
was in the route from both the other bridges to the point where the main army
was drawn up; and Lee and Angel were ordered, when Greene had gained
and occupied his ground, to retreat under protection of Colonel Shrive's com
mand. Never were orders more gallantly executed. As soon as the main body
began to move off, the enemy made a most furious assault with intent to force
the bridge where Angel was posted, but met with a reception that made them
recoil in confusion. Angel has not received the rank among the officers of the
revolution to which the defence of this pass entitles him. For forty nine
minutes, -with a handful of men, did he maintain it against a formidable
column, with ten pieces of artillery, flushed with conquest, and animated by
the most gallant and experienced officers. And as soon as his commander had
reached his destined position, after one fourth of his numbers were killed or
wounded, he, with the utmost coolness, retreated to the other bridge, where
Shrive was posted, bringing off his artillery and Ms wounded.
Great gallantry was also displayed by Lee at the pass confided to his pro
tection. Supported by Colonel Ogden, he maintained his post with obstinate

MA*ft)R GENERAL GREENE. 193
firmness, until a superior force had forded the creek above him, and gained a chap.
hill which commanded his flank and rear. He then retired as commanded, ^^J^^.
under the protection of Shrive. This officer also distinguished himself on this
occasion. Coolly and without the least confusion he retired to the main body,
baffling every attempt of the enemy to retard or alarm him. With his regular
force drawn up in a single line, flanked by the militia and dragoons, Greene
now waited for the general attack. But the enemy had received a check
from the few who had been engaged, which made them respect the firm coun
tenance with which the American army awaited the assault ; and enraged at
the serious loss they had sustained, they vented their fury on the defenceless
village now occupied by their troops. Immediately as the design to set fire to
the village was developed, parties were ordered out in all directions to prevent
the spread of the fire to those buildings which were not under cover of the
enemy's artillery. And many an English soldier bled that day by the light of
the flame. The enraged militia creeping within gun-shot, revenged them
selves by the deliberate selection of particular objects. As soon as the village
was in flames, (for only four houses out of fifty escaped,) the enemy began
their retreat ; and as soon as their intention was fully ascertained, small parties
were pushed forward to hang on their wings and harrass them, while Starke's
brigade was put in motion for pursuit.
But being disencumbered of baggage, the celerity of their retreat, and a
powerful rear guard, preserved them from any essential injury. By two
o'clock they reached the point at which they had landed, and at twelve at
night recrossed to the city.
This was, upon the whole, a disgraceful day to the British army. If the
burning of Springfield was their sole object, it was one which stamps indeli--'
ble infamy upon them. If the burning of a beautiful and defenceless village
was not their object, then were they repulsed by a very inferior foe.
As soon as General Washington received intelligence of the advance of the
enemy, he dispatched a reinforcement of 300 men to Greene's assistance, and
rapidly returned Mmself some miles on the route to Springfield. But he was
too far off to afford any aid in the action. The party detached did not reach
the scene of action until long after the retreat of the enemy; and the main
body had not proceeded on their return above five or six miles before the intel
ligence was communicated that the retreat had commenced.*

* Greene's letter to Gordon.
25

194 MAJOR GENERAL GREJ^E.
chap. The conduct of the American army on that day has drawn forth the. folio w-
^^^^jing eulogium from a British pen: "These ineffectual attempts by a force
which would have been deemed capable of sweeping the whole continent
before it, sufficiently manifested that the practical habits of service and danger,
without any thing near absolute perfection in discipline, will place all troops
nearly upon an equality. It was now evident that the British forces had an
enemy little less respectable in the field than themselves to encounter; and that
any difference which yet remained in their favour, would be daily lessened.
In a word, it was now obvious, that all that superiority in arms which produced
such effects in the beginning of the contest, was, in a great measure, at an end ;
and that the events of the war must, in future, depend upon fortune, and upon
the abilities of the respective commanders."*
We are in possession of the original rough draught of Greene's official
account of this battle. It is a specimen of clear natural description, and mo
dest good sense. For the manner in which he made communications to his
private correspondents, we will give the following extract of a letter from a
very particular friend : " Were it to any other person I am indebted for an
account of the enemy's late excursion to Springfield and their expulsion from
Jersey, I should think the obligation a small one ; but relations of this kind
come so sparingly from you, especially where your own part in the business
gives you the best information, that I am thankful for so small a portion of so
rich a subject as that ' We have had a small fight with the enemy at Springfield;
they have since evacuated Jersey, and gone up the North River.'
" How am I by this, better informed than the crowd at the coffee-house, save
that I have better evidence of a few points in the transaction, which are too
conspicuous to be unknown even to the vulgar? But, of circumstances, most
entertaining, instructive, and interesting to private feelings, I learn not so much
as those who take common fame for their informer. Is it to avoid egotism
that you are thus shy and reserved ? And does this arise from mere modesty,
or from that conscious pride which disdains to open the mouth of fame by any
other mode than extortion ? One general is so enraptured with the sound of
the trumpet that, like youth in the height of excited passion, he loses sight of
every other object in the energy of a particular pursmt. Another, to avoid
the ridicule deservedly excited by folly, like a mendicant friar, denies himself

* Annual Register, 1781, p. 18,

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 195
the common rights of humanity, and seeks present mortification in hopes of chap.
future reward. But I like not the extremes of either libertinism or stoicism." VJ^
Little more was done by the northern army during this campaign; the
scene had shifted to the south, and both armies to the north were anxiously
looking for the promised and long expected aid from France.
It arrived on the 11th July. But arrived to repose six months in the luxu
rious enjoyment of the comforts and elegancies of Newport.
The fleet of De Tierney was superior to that of the British; and the 6,000
well-disdplined troops that it transported, ought to have secured to the allies a
superiority by land and sea; but the opportunity for enterprize was soon lost
by the arrival of Admiral Graves, with a force which gave preponderance to
the opposite scale. Clinton immediately prepared for action, and marched a
strong force to the eastern extremity of Long Island, with intent to make an
attempt on Newport. His watchful adversary, the American commander,
was also on the alert, and immediately directed his views to the long medi
tated attempt on New York. This he was enabled to do, by the alacrity with
which the militia crowded to his standard, immediately on the arrival of the
French army. With all the salutary jealousies entertained of standing armies,
the militia are generally willing to shelter themselves, in time of real action,
under the cover of regular forces.
Greene, it will be recollected, was, at this time, acting in the quarter-master-
generaPs department. And it was during the vexations attending the immense
efforts he had to make to give activity by land and water to 12,000 troops, that
many of those expressions of disgust were extorted which he has vented in his
letters. The good of the service and the honour of his commander, now to be
supported under the eye of their allies, were near to his heart ; and not to have
command of the resources indispensable to his purposes, or to have them ad
vanced with reluctance and expressions of distrust, had drawn clouds over a
temper generally all sunshine, but still susceptible of strong excitement.
Indeed, the situation of an American officer at that time, without the addi
tional causes that acted upon Greene, was one of the most trying that can be
imagined. Amidst all their sufferings, privations, and dangers, to be obliged
moreover to exhaust their little patrimony to support themselves in camp, and
yet not to be confided in, but regarded with real or affected jealousy by the
government they were serving with so much zeal and fidelity, was more than
every temper could tolerate, or every mind bear without the deepest disgust.
Many of the best officers had resigned ; during the distresses of the Valley
Forge the spirit of resignation had become so prevalent, particularly in the

196 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Virginia line, that the most serious and alarming consequences were appre-
,hended. Since that time, from the restoration of comparative order and
plenty m camp, and the vote of half pay for life, it had in a measure subsided ;
but now again, such were the distresses and mortification produced by the,,.,
total failure of the paper currency ; and such the apprehension excited by the
recent discussions in congress, on the adoption of a new system in the econo
my of the army, that nothing but patriotic devotion to their country and their
chief, kept most of them in the service. The men who passed through these
trials and rose superior to them, merit statues.
Hear this from the pen of Washington. After complaining that his troops
were generally destitute of shirts, and many of them of a more indispensable
article of clothing, he proceeds: " It is also most sincerely to be wished, that
there could be some supplies of clotiiing furnished to the officers. There are a
great many whose condition is still miserable. This is in some Instances the
case with the whole line of the states. It will be well for their own sakes and
for the public good, if they could be furnished. They will not be able when
our friends come to co-operate with us, to go on a common routine of duty ;
and if they should, they must, from their appearance, be held in low estima
tion." After this, the reader will not be surprized to learn that scandal whispered,
it was not unusual to fit out the officer of the day by contributory loans for the
honour of a regiment, or even a state ; and that, in one instance, there was but
one sMt of parade clothes in a whole regiment. And from whence did relief
arrive at last? From the heart where patriotism erects her favourite shrine,
and from the hand which seldom is closed or withdrawn when the soldier
solicits. The ladies of PMladelphia immortalized themselves by commencing the
generous work, and it was a work too grateful to the feelings of the American
fair, not to be followed up with zeal and alacrity. The profane pen of a
Rivington may have sneeringly written, that the finen of the fair-one was
converted into a corresponding garment to decorate the person, or add to the
comforts of a lover; but the fear of ridicule shrunk away from the more inte
resting reflection, that soon it might be tinged with the heart's blood of the
wearer. By the greatest efforts, the means of transportation and of a joint attack by
land and water on New York, were prepared; and with renovated hope, the
American army marched to brave the assault, under a full knowledge of its
accumulated dangers.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 197
Clinton soon discovered his danger, and although the British writers attri- chap.

bute his retrograde movement to the prevalence of dissensions between the „
army and the navy, it is more just to his military reputation to attribute it to
the movement of the American army. He soon regained the fortresses that
defended his strong hold, and it was once more in a state of safety.
Such also would probably have been the effect upon the conduct of General
Howe, had the same measures been adopted to counteract his expedition
against Philadelphia. And such, had Washington felt himself at liberty to act
untramelled by an Aulic Council, and possessing his present experience, would
probably have been the course pursued. His conduct manifested a strong dis
position to pursue it.
Upon the return of General Clinton, Washington's militia were dismissed ;
for he could not subsist them ; and his army, though now reduced very low,
he soon after recrossed into Jersey, and encamped at Orangetown.
It was when Washington was on his march to Kingsbridge, with a view to
the attempt on New York, and when he had mustered under him every man
who could carry a musket, that he placed Arnold in command of a corps of
invalids at West Point.- The commander in chief had offered him a command
suitable to his rank and reputation in the army ; but he made the unhealed
state of his wounds, and some other causes, the pretext for declining it ; for Ms
negociations for the surrender of West Point, had already commenced, or
been consummated ; and he made interest to obtain that appointment.
Greene was in command of the American army, at the time Arnold's
treachery was detected. Soon after the relinquishment of the enterprize
against New York, a meeting was concerted to take place between the Ame
rican commander in chief, and the French military and naval commanders.
Hartford, on the Connecticut River, was the place assigned for their meeting,
and its object was to consult on their future joint operations.
Upon the departure of Washington, Greene was placed in command of the
main army. This was on the 17th of September. On the 18th, Admiral
Rodney arrived with such an overwhelming reinforcement to the British navy,
as must have set the consultations .at Hartford all at nought. From that time
Greene's communications to the president of congress are full of the hurried
preparations going on at New- York for some important enterprize. Little did
he or any other suspect to what point that enterprize was directed. It appears
that he had established a regular communication for obtaining intelligence
from the city by spies; and his correspondents in that place were at a loss
whether the expedition was intended against Rhode Island or Virgmia. To
one or the other of those places the enemy had been careful to throw out hints,

VI.

198 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, or exhibit appearances that the expedition was directed. Yet Greene was not
, deceived; for in a letter of the 21st to General Washington, he writes, " Colo
nel .  communicated the last intelligence we have from New York ;
since that I have not been able to obtain the least information of what is going
on there, though we have people in from three different quarters. None of
them returning makes me suspect some secret expedition is in contemplation,
the success of which depends altogether upon its being kept a secret."
This letter is dated at Tappan, for to that place he had been directed by
General Washington, on his departure for Hartford, to remove a division of
the army.
On the 23d, the whole mystery was developed by the capture, of Major
Andre. He had ascended the river in the Vulture sloop of war to hold a per
sonal conference with General Arnold. The British commander had become
sensible that no time was to be lost ; as most probably, on the return of Wash
ington from Hartford, he would assume the command in person at West Pomt,
or confide it to Greene. The present, therefore, was the most favourable time
that would ever present itself; the recent movement of the army nearer that
place, excited to dispatch ; and the arrival of Rodney gave the enemy the
command of such abundant means of water transportation, without exposing
the city to a coup de main from the French and American forces, that the Bri
tish commander would have been culpably negligent, not to have embraced it.
Andre was accordingly dispatched to make the final arrangement for consum
mating the treachery of Arnold.
The well known object of Arnold's negociation was to put Clinton in pos
session of the post at West Point. This is a beautiful little plane, lying on the
west bank of the Hudson, a little below where it breaks through the chain of
mountains called the Highlands. Its form is nearly circular; in one half of its
circumference defended by a precipice of great height, rising abruptly from
the river ; and on the other, by a chain of rugged, impassable mountains. It
is accessible by one pass only from the river, and that is narrow and easily
defended ; while, on the land side, it can be approached only at two points, by
roads that wind through the mountains, and enter it at the river bank, on the
north and south.
Great importance had always been attached to this post by the Americans,
and great labour and expense bestowed upon fortifying it; whether judiciously
or to good effect, has never been tested. But the place is naturally, scarcely
assailable, very healthy, and commands the river, throughout a long circmt that
it stretches round the point, and where it is deep and very narrow.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 199
The North River had long been the great vein that supplied life to the chap.
American army ; and had the enemy obtained possession of this post, besides v^r-v^^
the actual loss in men and stores, the American army would have been cut off
from their principal resources in the ensuing winter, or been obliged to fall
back above the Highlands, and leave all the country below open to conquest ;
while the communication between the eastern and western states would have
been seriously interrupted, if not wholly occluded.
Arnold well knew the bearing of this post upon all the operations of the
American army, and afterwards avowed his confident expectation, that had
the enemy got possession of it, the contest must have ceased, and America
been subdued. Clinton, it appears, also well understood the value of this
place; and it is probable, that the purchase of it had been- arranged with
Arnold some months prior to the detection of the plot. It was well remem
bered, afterwards, that he had intrigued for some time to get appointed to the
command, not only in person, but through the agency of his friends in con
gress and the army ; and the activity which he displayed in making his escape,
and afterwards, as a commander under Clinton, support the belief that the pain
and weakness from his wounded legs, on which he founded his claims to a
command suited to an invalid, were in a great degree affected. Indeed, in one
of his publications he acknowledges, that he had long retained his commission
only to find some opportunity to inflict such a blow.
The eventful career of this unhappy man exhibits a melancholy specimen,
either of the fearful instability of human virtue, or of the singular combinations
to be met with, of the greatest and vilest qualities in the same character. He
was unquestionably one of the bravest soldiers of the age ; nor did he only
excel in the mere animal and subordinate quality of personal courage ; he had
a head to plan, and genius and conduct to execute the boldest and most com
plicate undertakings. There was in Mm a spirit of adventure almost romantic ;
yet it did not exhibit itself in mere ebullitions, or desultory efforts ; for he was
capable of the most enviable perseverance. This was strikingly exemplified in
his expedition through the wilderness against Quebec. Yet he was a villain,
or became one. if the latter, perhaps his case presents an instance of the
demoralizing effects of persecution, even upon sound principles. The most
timid animal becomes terrible under the influence of despair. He affected to
think that in the prosecutions instituted in Philadelphia against him, for his
conduct in Canada as well as Philadelphia, he had been treated with harsh
ness, if not injustice; with indignity, he certainly had been, and to a proud
spirit, elevated by glory and command, this is the least tolerable of all injuries.

200 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Yet we are in possession of too many reasons for believing that he was in
constitution a villain ; and had only added to the most depraved principles,
the finish of hypocrisy.
There is not a more impudent instance on record of an attempt to palliate
crime and justify treachery, than his letter of the 25th September, written to
General Washington from on board of the Vulture; or that of the 1st October,
addressed to the people of the United States from New York.
The first begins with " The heart which is conscious of its own rectitude,
cannot attempt to palliate a step which the world may censure as wrong. I
have ever acted from a principle of love to my country, since the commence
ment of the present unhappy contest between Great Britain and her colonies :
the same principle of love to my country actuates my present conduct, how
ever it may appear inconsistent to the world, who very seldom judge rightly of
any man's actions," &c.
Twice in the course of the letter addressed to the people, has he the hardi
hood to invoke the sacred name of the Almighty: " You have felt the torture
in which we have raised our arms against a brother. God incline the guilty
protractors of these unnatural dissensions to resign their ambition and cease
from their delusions, in compassion to kindred blood. In behalf of the candid
among the latter, some of whom I believe, serve blindly, but honestly in the
bands 1 have left, I pray God to give them all the light requisite to their own
safety before it is too late ; and with respect to that herd of censurers whose
enmity to me originated in thdr hatred to the principles by which I am led to
devote my life to the re-union of the British empire as the best and only means
to dry up the streams of misery that have deluged this country, they may be
assured that, conscious of the rectitude of my intentions, I shall treat their ma
lice and calumny with contempt and neglect."
The reasons which, in tMs address, he assigns for his justification are, the
refusal of congress to listen to the overtures made by Great Britain, and the
alliance entered into with France. But it happened, most unfortunately for
the candour of this pious and virtuous man, that on board a packet, captured
on her passage from England to New York in January following, was found a
letter from a London banker, addressed to General Arnold, which contained
these words :

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 201
" Parliament- street, 30^ January, 1781. chap.
"Sir, * \ J^
" I have received the honour of your different letters, enclosing bills of
exchange upon Harley and Drummond, bankers to the court, of £5,000, ster
ling," &c*
How many of these sets of bills for £5,000 each, were drawn in favour of
the immaculate general, is not known. Report at that time stated, in addition
to a commission of brigadier, he stipulated for £20,000 as the price of West
Point; but on the failure of the principal part of the contract, he compounded
for £10,000 sterling. For tMs he had sacrificed the respect of mankind, and
the calm of an approving conscience.
Indeed, discoveries were made shortly after Arnold's defection, to wMch a
proper publicity was promptly given, and which set his character in a very
unfavourable point of view. A few extracts from original letters will furnish
the most satisfactory information of these facts.

From Colonel Petit to General Greene.
"Philadelphia,- October 6th, 1780.
" I arrived in town yesterday, and found the inhabitants had been much
roused by the discovery of General Arnold's plot. The wMgs are now more
exasperated at Mrs. Arnold, from a number of letters that have been found,
which had passed between her and General Arnold. A number of commer
cial connexions of a very offensive nature are discovered ; but I don't hear of
any with him in his diabolical scheme of betraying the fort. Mr.  has
been obliged to leave the town from an agreement being found between Mm
and Arnold, to share the profits of the goods taken from the inhabitants, when
the enemy left the city." From Colonel Coxe. li22d October 1180.
"Among the papers of Arnold there was found an agreement, signed
Arnold,  and  , dated a few days after he entered the city; set-

* Annual Register.
26

202 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap: ting forth, that as there were large quantities of goods in the city not wanted
,for the army, said  and —  were to purchase all in their power, at
the joint risk and profit of the three. What purchases were made remain a
secret as yet.  =  is proscribed by the state, and  has thought it
prudent to leave the city for awhile. The inhabitants, I am told, are much
enraged at his conduct. And many smts have been commenced against Mm
by those from whom the goods were taken,"
To explain these two letters it is proper to mention; when General Wash
ington left his camp near PMladelpMa, to enter on the pursmt of General
Clinton, he left Arnold in command at that place. It was this opportunity
that Arnold had embraced to plunder the merchantsan the manner mentioned,
by pretending to draw upon them for goods for the use of the army. But he
had been accused of a similar piece of conduct at Montreal ; and the following
passage of a letter from General Alexander Hamilton will show that he had
pursued similar practices when in command at West Point.
" TMs man Arnold is in every sense despicable. In addition to the scene of
knavery and prostitution durmg his command in PMladelpMa, wMch the late
seizure of Ms papers has unfolded, the Mstory of his command at West Point
is a history of little, as well as great villainies. He practised every dirty act of
peculation, and even stooped to connexions with the suttlers of the garrison,
to defraud the public."
But Arnold was a hypocrite, — a description of men who are capable of the
vilest actions, and incapable of reformation ; because, their distingmshmg vice
is founded in meanness and practical falsehood.
In a letter written to General Greene so short a time prior to Ms detection as
the 11th of the same month, he speaks of public delinquency to the prejudice
of the army, as a crime which ought to be pumshed capitally.
" Yours of the 8th, by Captain Vanderhorst and Lieutenant M'Call, were
delivered me by those gentlemen. I have endeavoured to render their situa
tion pleasing to them during their short stay with me ; which respect I shall
always be happy to pay to any gentleman who entitles himself to your intro
duction and recommendation.
" It is a matter much to be lamented, that our army is permitted to starve in
a land of plenty. There is a fault somewhere ; it ought to be traced up to its
authors, and if it was prepense, they ought to be capitally punished. This is, hi

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 203
my opinion, the only means left to procure a regular supply to the army in chap.
future. v^-v->^
" With sentiments of the most sincere regard and affection, I am," &c.
Yet Arnold was far from being penurious. On the contrary, all his mean
nesses were committed to enable Mm to maintain a style in living very far above
Ms known resources. And when did poverty with expensive habits, ever fail
to attract the eye of seduction ? It was observed, not long after the evacuation
of Philadelphia, that he had purchased a sumptuous establishment, and lived
in a style which few, (at least of the whigs,) could emulate. Indeed, notwith
standing Ms hatred afterwards expressed to the French nation, when he found
it convenient to assign that as one cause of his defection ; on the arrival of the
French mmister, Arnold had entertained him at his house in a manner, which
no other man connected with the government, could then pretend to. Not
knowing of the scheme of plunder wMch had been played off by him upon the
merchants of the city, public suspicion attributed his apparent wealth to frauds
practised in his accounts ; and at the instance of the whigs of Philadelphia, he
underwent a very severe scrutiny, and had his charges reduced at a most ruin
ous rate. There were many who doubted the correctness of this act, and with
the army his reputation had not suffered materially ; for they were not satis
fied with the justice or liberality of the board who investigated his accounts.
The consequence was, an enormous balance against him, wMch drove him,
perhaps, from the elegance and comforts of PMladelpMa to those of New York.
Yet there is reason to suspect, that even at that time, he was basking in the
sunshine of royal favour, tiirough the medium of Messrs. Harley & Drum-
mond, court bankers. For all his intimacies were remarked to exist among
the disaffected families of Philadelphia. Many of those had remained in Phi
ladelphia during the time that it was in the hands of the enemy. And that
they lived on the best terms of friendly intercourse with Sir William Howe
and his officers, is recorded in the printed account of the celebrated Mischi-
anza, given by his officers to their general, on his being superceded in the
command by Sir Henry Clinton. Among the fair ladies who, on this occa
sion, condescended to grace the tournament with their presence, and in the
voluptuous elegance of Turkish dresses, to bestow what, in chivalry, are called
favours on their gallant British kmghts, will be found the names of some of the
most opulent and fashionable families of PMladelpMa. These became the
favourite society of Arnold; and as they had enjoyed " the glorious mountain
tops," wMle the poor whigs had been " battening on the moor," it may very
well be supposed, that it was not without some disagreeable sensations that the

204 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, latter found themselves outdone by the liberal living of the former ; and per-
.^-s^^a haps they were somewhat uneasy at the corrupting influence which polished
society, embellished by beauty and wealth, might exert over the political tenets
of their officers. Certain it is, that Arnold gave great umbrage by devoting
himself, and attaching his brother officers to this description of society, and'
even at that time, was suspected by many to be disaffected.
The developement of Arnold's plot was communicated to Greene by a letter
from Colonel Hamilton, dated Verplank's Point. It was received the evemng
of the 25th. The object of the preparations in New York immediately became
palpable ; and without delay, he made every disposition for marcMng to the
defence of West Point; so that when General WasMngton's order reached
him, at a quarter past tliree, on the morning of the 26th, the whole army had
already been put under marching orders. The first Pensylvania brigade under
Wayne had been first put in motion ; so that it actually fell to the lot of Andre to
find the " warrio-drover Wayne" in command, when he was delivered a prisoner
at the village of Tappan. But Wayne did not sit in the board of officers who
tried him ; perhaps from considerations of delicacy ; there may have remained
something of personal irritation ; the wounds of the pen last longer than those
of the sword.
It is very well known, that Major Andre was taken near a place called
Tarrytown, on the east side of the Hudson, where it forms Haverstraw Bay.
Ten years afterwards, the large sycamore near wMch he was taken, was shown
to the traveller; and the incidents at his capture were familiarly known to,
and related by every inhabitant of the village. Paulding, Williams, and Van-
vert, who captured him, were poor, but reputable men, and exMbited a striking
instance of disinterestedness and fidelity. Andre offered them large bribes, but
they were not to be corrupted, and conducted him a prisoner to Colonel Jamie-
son, who commanded a scouting party on that side of the river.*
The circumstances attending the capture of Andre are differently related by
the different authors who have written on the American war. They are all

* There occurred, about this time, two signal instances of extraordinary integrity among the
American soldiery, which did great honour to the national character, and contributed not a little
to convince the enemy that the hearts of the people were interested in the revolution. Arnold's
proclamation, calculated to seduce the American soldiers to desert, is said, by the English writers,
not to have produced a solitary instance of desertion ; and when the Pennsylvania line mutinied,
the emissaries who were sent by General Clinton, with the most liberal offers ^of pay and protec
tion, with liberty to dispose of themselves as they pleased, were seized by the soldiers, and deliv
ered up to execution.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE, 205
correct as far as they go ; but being deficient in a few particulars, excited sur- chap.
prise at the supposed want of self-possession in so brave a man as Andre. The ^v^
British army in New York was, at that time, supplied with beef, principally
through the aid of a class of men, who obtained the appellation of Cowboys.
They were a species of suttlers, or dealers in live stock, who, being well
acquainted with the roads and passes, penetrated into the country, and either
stole or purchased cattle, which they secretly drove into the enemy's fines.
Besides watching the movements of the enemy, one principal object for de
taching Jameison to that quarter was, to check the prosecution of this trade or
practice. For this purpose, small scouting parties were occasionally pushed
beyond the American posts, to reconnoitre the interjacent country between
their posts and those of the enemy. And as the cattle taken from the Cow
boys, unless stolen, were held to be prize of war; and it was an object with
the well-affected to suppress a practice wMch exposed their stock to depreda
tions, small volunteer parties occasionally waylaid the roads for that purpose.
Of this description were the captors of Andre ; v who, after the fatigue of prose
cuting their enterprize, had seated themselves under this tree, in a situation
retired from the view of travellers approacMng along the road. It is said,
they were engaged in a game at cards, when the tread of Andre's horse
attracted their notice. The station they had taken was in view of a point
where several roads unite near the village, and Andre, who was visible to the
party before they were visible to Mm, was engaged in examimng a sketch of
the route, no doubt to determine wMch of the roads in his view he ought to
follow. At the first rustling of the leaves made by the motion of the party in
ambush, he precipitately thrust the paper he was examining into his boot, on
the opposite side of his horse from that on which the party appeared. This
was noticed by one of the party, and led to the examination which produced
the detection. On being stopped, he resumed his composure, and exhibited
the pass from Arnold, on which he had thus far succeeded in clearing the
American posts and patrols ; and the party had already released his bridle,
when one of them inqmred what he had done with the paper he was reading?
An indistinct view of the dangerous dilemma in which the question involved
him, produced in Andre a momentary hesitation ; his embarrassment was no
ticed by the party, and made them resolve again to detain him. Knowing
that the pass from Arnold woMd not avail him after the discovery of the con
tents of his boot, Andre then desired them to tell him truly, whether they were
"from above or below?" and on their answering " the latter," which was
consistent with the truth in fact, though not in the sense he meant it, wMch
was whether they were whigs or tories ; he acknowledged himself to be a

206 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. British officer on urgent business, and begged them not to detain Mm. On
, their persisting to detain Mm, the whole extent of his danger burst upon him,
and he liberally tried the persuasive voice of gold. But though he had just
witnessed, that one in a much more elevated rank had lent a propitious ear
to similar arguments, he found these honest yeomen were not to be corrupted.
Until then, he had learned, that it is at last in the integrity of the well-in
formed yeomanry of a country that the strength and security of every free
government is to be found. Wo to that government which ever suffers this
class of men to remain in ignorance, or be exposed to corruption!
Upon searching the boot into which the paper had been thrust, a plan of
West Point, the strength and disposition of the garrison, and other suspicious
papers, were discovered ; and Andre was immediately conveyed to the head
quarters of Colonel Jamieson. By this time it appears, that Andre had com
pletely recovered his self-possession, if, indeed, he had ever lost it; and he had
the ingenmty to play off on Jamieson a ruse de guerre, to which the partiality
of his friends, and the feelings of his admirers have managed to give a cha
racter wMch it by no means merits.
He prevailed on Jamieson to dispatch a note to Arnold, informing him that
John Anderson (this was Andre's assumed name) was taken. This has been
construed into a magnammous effort to save Arnold ; whereas it was obviously
an ingenious artifice to save himself. And it must have succeeded, had not the
former, instead of taking the hint as it was intended, verifyed by his conduct the
trite adage, "there is no faith among the dishonest," by immediately transferring
all his attention to his own escape. Arnold could easily have dispatched an order
to Jameison to release Andre, or have adopted some fiction or plan for getting
him into his own hands, for the purpose of giving him his liberty, and thus
have escaped with him. Jamieson, obviously entertained no suspicion of
Arnold, by sending him tMs message : and by the time that elapsed before he
forwarded to General Washington the papers found upon Andre, it is clear
that he waited for some commuMcation from Arnold with regard to the future
fate of John Anderson.
It is curious to contemplate the good fortune of this interesting young man,
in the favourable views wMch writers of both nations, indeed all who have
ever noticed him have taken of his conduct. But such is the effect of excited
feeling upon the judgment of mankind, or perhaps, such the proclivity of man
to follow a popular leader, and to avoid the perplexity of reflection. The
breathing pen of Colonel Hamilton was generously employed in describing the
magnanimity with which Andre met death ; the direction once given to public
opinion has been followed, "notiiing loth," and every subsequent writer has vied

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 207
with Ms predecessor in representing Andre's conduct in the most favourable chap.
coulours. The stern moralist, who, knowing that first to pity, then to palliate, ^-^-^
then to imitate, is too often the course through which vice and error steal on
society, presumes, in such a case as this, to exclaim, " Pause and reflect;" will
be more apt to incur the frowns, than the plaudits of his cotemporaries. But
there is a time of life when a writer may no longer feel the undue mfluence of
popular applause.
Andre has also been greatly extolled for his magnanimity in communicating
to General Washington his real name and character, by the express which
conveyed to the commander in chief the papers found upon Mm. But what
else remained for him to do ? His life was clearly forfeited ; and m the cha
racter of John Anderson, he must have suffered, " unpitied and unwept," the
summary and ignommious death of a spy, or been detected as Major Andre,
with a falsehood on his lips. His oMy chance of escape was to declare his
real character, and place himself under the protection of the circumstances
under which he alleges that he came within the American posts ; or perhaps,
to interest the feelings or the fears of the American commander in his behalf.
His letter contains one passage which serves as a plain developement of Ms
motives in writing it. — It was to save his own life by exciting fear for that of
others. The passage alluded to is the following : " I take the liberty to men
tion the condition of some gentlemen at Charlestown, who, being either on
parole or under protection, were engaged in a conspiracy against us ; though
their situation is not similar, they are objects who may be sent in exchange for
me, or persons whom the treatment I received might affect."
It is truly astonishing, that jhe ungenerous character of this paragraph has
never been properly animadverted upon. Who these " gentlemen at Charles-
town" were, is afterwards more explicitly declared, in Arnold's letter to Gene
ral WasMngton, of the 1st October: " I have farther to observe, that forty of
the principal inhabitants of South Carolina have justly forfeited their lives,
wMch have hitherto been spared by the clemency of his excellency Sir Henry
Clinton, who cannot in justice extend his mercy to them any longer, if Major
Andre suffers, which in all probability will open a scene of blood at which
humanity will revolt."
Thus it appears that Andre's hint was greedily caught at by Arnold; and
Sir Henry Clinton himself in his communications, very plainly Mnts at the
same thing.
Yet nothing could have been more base and dishonourable than the attempt
to save his forfeited life by drawing down ruin upon a number of innocent
men, who, after bravely resisting the enemy, had surrendered on terms that

208 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, had been most dishonourably evaded. The assertion also contamed in An-
VI , dre's letter, that the prisoners alluded to had engaged in a conspiracy, was
absolutely destitute of truth ; as it was well known, that every individual Of
those prisoners had, from the first, courted and defied investigation ; and there
existed no cause for their confinement at St. Augustine, to wMch place they
had been removed, but the prevalence of an opinion that their influence kept
others from accepting of the king's protection, the illiberal suggestions of some
of the loyalists who could not bear the reproachful looks of those whom they
had deserted, and above all, the convenience of retaining such respectable
hostages to cover sueh men as Arnold and Andre.
The introductory paragraph also to Andre's letter, cannot be dismissed
without a remark. It is in these words.
" What I have as yet said concerning myself, was in the justifiable attempt
to be extricated. I am too little accustomed to duplidty to have succeeded."
(That is to say, I have hitherto been doing what no man who sufficiently
valnes the obligation of truth would do, or at least, expose himself to the dan
ger of being obliged to do, even for " the justifiable attempt to be extricated,")
I have hitherto dealt out notMng but falsehoods ; but for want of practice, my
firmness fails me."
In the first place, this paragraph is uncandid ; for if Ms disgmse could any
longer have availed him, he would have retained it; and in the next place,
there is no small cause to believe, that this was not the first time in which
Major Andre had played off the practical falsehood of assuming a disguise,
and acting the spy.
It is believed by many, that in the character of a spy he had been greatly
instrumental in involving in captivity, the very men whom he now wished to
involve in the horrors of retaliation.*

* The following facts may be relied upon. Let them weigh with the reader for what they are
worth. It was an universal belief, as well in the British army as in the city of Charleston after its
fall, that Andre had been in the city in the character of a spy, during the siege. There is
now living in the place a respectable citizen, who acted in the commissary department in the
British army, during and after the siege ; and another of equal respectability, and whose means
of information were much greater, who was in Charleston during the siege, and remained in it*
until the evacuation, who will testify to the truth of this assertion. And this opinion is corrobo
rated by the following fact. There were two brothers of the name of S. S. and E. S. both well

MAJOR GENERAL GREEiNE. 209
Let political expediency disgmse it as it may, still the character of a soldier chap.
cannot be blended with that of a spy, without soiling the pure ermine of the ^^
former. And, however his sovereign may applaud and reward the officer who
tempts Ms enemy to treachery, there is something so foul in the constitution of
the crime, that we cannot look upon him who seduces another to the commis
sion of it, but as the instigator or propagator of crime. The breath of trea
chery gives a taint to the reputation of the man who but holds converse with it.
Indeed, there appear to have been a combined attack upon morals made by
all the particepes criminis in this black transaction. One can hardly read with
patience the letters of Clinton, Robertson, and Arnold, boldly insisting that
Andre was not punishable as a spy, because he came within the garrison under
the sanction of a flag, or under the protection of the commander; although in
fact, with that commander he was concerting measures to get possession of the
post where that officer commanded; that he was himself innocent, because he
had prostituted the usual protection of innocent and honourable purposes to
the perpetration of the basest treachery. And to complete the ridicule of the
scene, the chief-justice of the state is brought upon the carpet to support this
holy doctrine.
This was at a conference wffich was held by appointment at King's Ferry,
between General Robertson and General Greene on the subject of Andre's
treatment. Robertson brought with him from New York, Chief Justice Smith
and the lieutenant governor to support hitn in the argument; but whether it
was that the man of the sword was afraid to encounter the man of the gown
in argument ; Greene would not suffer Smith to land, and the conference re
sulted in nothing but mutual confirmation in pre-existing opimons. On the

known as men of property and respectable standing in society. The former was, to the last,
faithfully devoted to the cause of the country, the other was disaffected. During the siege, S. S.
being taken sick, was permitted to go to his brother's house to be better attended. There, he was
introduced to, and repeatedly saw a young man, in a homespun dress, who was introduced to him
by his brother as a Virginian, connected with the line of that state then in the city. After the
fall of Charleston, S. S. was introduced to Major Andre, at bis brother's house, and in him recog
nized the person of the Virginian whom he had seen during the siege. This he remarked to his
brother, who acknowledged that he was the same, asserting his own ignorance of it at the time.
S. S. related these facts to many persons in his lifetime, and his veracity was unquestionable. An
other citizen, Mr. W. J., at the time of Andre's capture, a prisoner at St. Augnstine, also saw the
supposed Virginian at the house of E. S. while S. S. lay sick, and his recollection of the fact was
revived by S. S. soon after he had made the discovery of his real character. It is also known that
the life of E. S. was afterwards assiduously sought after by Marion's men, on the charge of his
treachery.
27

210 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. 2d October, Andre was executed as a spy on a gibbet, at the village of Tappan,,
^^J-^ where the principal part of the army was then encamped.
As his case was one of many novel features, and threats of retaliation had
loudly resounded, General Washington did not order Ms execution summarily,
as by the laws of war he would have been justified to do, but commanded a
board of general officers to be convened, and submitted the case to their con
sideration. Greene was appointed^ to preside, and Colonel John Laurens was present
in the capacity of judge advocate general, wMch station he held in the army.
La Fayette and Stuben were members of the court; and if dignity, worth,
and service can give weight to the decision of a court, never was one consti
tuted more worthy to be respected. There were in it six major generals and
seven brigadiers. They were unammously of opinion, that Andre must suffer
as a spy. But such was the imposing appearance of tMs interesting young
man, that amidst all the trials these great men had undergone, none bore so
heavily on their sensibility as this. And it is related of Greene, that, so excited
were Ms feelings when the report was drawn up by Laurens and handed to
him to sign, the pen shook m the hand of the veteran, and in vain was Ms
head bent low over the paper to hide " the starting tear." The sheet that bore
the death warrant of Andre, bore also the evidence that it had not been dic
tated by insensible hearts. Indeed, it is said, that this sensibility was so conta
gious, the whole court shed tears on sigmng the report.
Andre died like a brave man, but expressed much regret at the mode in
which the laws of war prescribed that he should suffer. He addressed a very
pathetic letter to the commander in chief, soliciting the consolation of dying in
a more soldierly manner ; but, with a painful effort, though commendable firm
ness, it was resisted.
It has been said, that General Greene's opposition alone prevented General
Washington from complying, and a speech has been made for him on the
occasion ; but we can find no evidence of such a fact ; and General Washing
ton's firmness is too known to admit the belief, that he acted from any other
influence than his own sense of propriety.
The hour was now approaching wMch was to remove General Greene from
the scenes in which he has hitherto been acting, to a command which gave to
his genius and talents a more adequate scope for employment. On the 6th of
October, General WasMngton addressed a letter to Mm, to know if it would
be agreeable to him to take command of the detachment at West Point, and
of the military operations on the east side of the river. He did not hesitate to
comply, and on the 8th we find him in command at that post. Of the state in

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 211
which he found tMngs at West Point, the following brief extract of a letter to a chap.
friend, dated the 11th, will show both the fact, the cause, and his feelings with ^^i^,.
regard to it: " Was there ever such a devil as General Arnold? What confu-
fusion he has thrown everything into! This post has been shamefully neg
lected ; but the mystery is now all out." And of the efforts which he made
to put it in a state of defence, commensurate to its importance and the detected
views of the enemy against it, the best evidence lies in the many letters in
stantly written to summon to his aid all the means necessary to hasten the
indispensable works.
Nor did this object occupy, his undivided attention. It appears that not^i
day passed, in which he had not to answer the letters of General Washington,
on some weighty and important subject. Their present separation drew forth
that communication by letter which usually had taken place in personal confer
ences. And this correspondence contains the most uneqmvocal proof of the
unlimited confidence reposed in General Greene by the commander in chief;
of the respect in which he held Greene's judgment and talents, and the various
purposes to which he applied them.
Thus at one time he is called upon to make a full estimate of all the expenses
for a year attendant upon an establishment of 32,000 men. At another, to
sum up the whole annual expense incident to the war, to give a view of the
sums paid by each state towards it, and their capacity to continue or increase
their present contributions. At another, to consider the expediency of prose
cuting the plans of the campaign hitherto pursued, or what changes shall be
adopted upon the various contingencies which might occur. They are the
commumcations of a great and good man to a zealous, faithful premier, whose
integrity and disinterestedness he has proved, and whose candour and judg
ment he has the highest respect for.
The answers to these various communications present a most appalling view
of the embarrassment which then pressed upon the commander in cliief. It is
truly wonderful that he, and every officer of merit in the army, had not
thrown up their commissions in disgust and despair. But a vow to save their
country was upon them, and every selfish feeling had long since been expelled
or subdued.
Man too soon forgets the lessons that are forced upon him in adversity. His
own folly has generally too great an influence in producing them, to admit of
their being received with cheerfulness, or stored with a view to reformation,
In our late contest with Great Britain, the grave experience of the revolution
appears to have been very much forgotten or rejected. Short enlistments and
military requisition brought us then, to the very brink of subjugation ; and the

212 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap* same causes have, in a more recent instance, been conspiculously insti'umental
, in involving us in debt, and threatening us with disgrace. Heaven sent us a
few brave men to snatch us from impending danger; and the redeeming spirit
of a people who adore their liberty, sustained the government tiirough a war
in wMch the experience of the revolution was, for a long time, rejected. Many
difficulties pressed upon the congress of the revolution, wMch could palliate in
them the adoption of feeble or temporizing measures ; but the government, in
the late war, had the command of resources which ought to have saved them
from falfing into the imbecile measures of the times of which we are now
writing. It is, mdeed, wonderful that any admimstration should* at the commence^
ment of a war, enlist for any other period than the duration of the war. To
enlist for a shorter term, is to hold out an inducement to your enemy to protract
the war beyond that term. And the same infatuation that might seduce the
government to believe that the war will be of short duration, will tempt the
soldier to enlist at its commencement for the period of its duration. It is a
mistake to suppose that the men who have once become soldiers, will always
afterward readily enlist. TMs is the case only with the most wortMess. Those
of a superior description, leave the service resolved afterwards rather to try
any other pursmt in life. It is only when men of tMs description have ad
vanced to a time of life, or length of service, wMch makes them incapable of
succeedmg in any other pursmt, that, in despir, they devote themselves to the
hardsMps, privations and exposure of a camp. Others may be influenced "by
an attachment to the vices or indolence of a mifitary life ; but to fill an army
with such materials, is to compose it of drunkards and deserters.
One tiling experience will ever verify, — that enlisting and militia reqmsitions
can never go on together ; they are essentially rival means of forming an army,
especially if substitutes be received in militia service ; for to serve as substitutes
then becomes a metier, a calling in life, and takes off every individual of that
class of society which furmshes the materials for a regMar army. And even
where substitutes are not received, that class of men find more agreeable and
more profitable employment in the service of the militiaman who is compelled
to leave his home ; or in the various services to which such men are requisite
in the commissary, quarter-master, or other departments essential to the move
ments of an army, and wMch, with regard to the militia, are generally greatly
multiplied. To doubt the importance of militia to our national security, or to detract
from its efficiency in desultory warfare, would be the height of folly. It is the
rock of refuge to which all must look for defence in the last resort. But, like

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 213
the reserve of an army, it is too important to the security of all, to be exposed chap.
to the brunt of the battle ; and the materials which compose it are too precious ^^v^w
to be unnecessarily exposed to the devastations of war, and the diseases and
habits of camps. Their time is the wealth of the country ; the labour of the
husbandman may be well employed in raising the products of the earth to sup
ply the necessities of an army, and of the artificer, in preparing the innumerable
mumtions of war necessary to give efficiency to the courage and discipline of
the soldier. Yet it is a truth which ought never to be forgotten, that every
individual is the most trust- worthy depository of his own freedom ; and the
nation which has forgotten the use of arms, and habitually entrusted the care
of its defence to a mercenary army, invites attack both from within and with
out. Hence, the militia ought to be organized, armed, and trained to military
service. And for sudden emergencies, the country that does not prepare them
to meet an enemy, or enforce the execution of its laws, must have recourse to a
burdensome and dangerous permanent army.
But, for the more serious operations of protracted warfare, they are wholly
unfit. It is impossible to bring them to submit to that severe discipline, with
out which an army is but a " rope of sand ;" or to remain a sufficient time in
camp to be inured to the hardsMps of a military life. Disease and discontent
are the ordinary concomitants of a raw soldiery; and scarcely do they pass
through the trials necessary to prepare them for service, before those who
escape are withdrawn to> give place to others, — among whom death and disease
must recommence their ravages.
In pomt of economy, militia only claim preference as the substitute for a
standing army ; in all other respects, it is incomparably the most expensive
force that can be employed.
From its known incompetency to cope with an enemy that uses regular
troops, a much greater numerical force must always be called into the field ;
and from the frequent changes that take place on the expiration of a term of
service ; during the greater part of the time a double complement must be kept
on foot, and half the year consumed in marching and countermarching be
tween the place of rendezvous and the scene of military operations.
If the militia receive pay and rations, therefore, the expense is at least dou
bled ; but the duplicate of the cost of mamtaimng a regular army is but a
small estimate of the actual difference. Setting aside the positive loss which
the community sustains in withdrawing useful men from their ordinary occu
pations, it has always been observed that there is an improvidence in the habits
of militia which produces a waste of the provisions and munitions of war, of
wMch regular troops may be broken, but militia never can. Besides which.

214 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE;
chap, there is a positive expense attending the movements of militia, which is inci-
, dent to a regular army, only in a much less degree. Every individual is more
or less supplied with the means of purchasing from Ms private funds, and thus
raises the price of articles of necessity wherever the troops arrive or are ex
pected. During the revolutionary war, (and partially it will always be the
case,) they could seldom be brought from their homes without being provided
with horses, and hence, in their advance through a country, they seldom left
provision enough on the route they followed, to maintain them on their return.
It was universally complained of, that after calling out the militia, the difficulty
of supporting the regular army became greatly increased.
It is probable, that upon a fair estimate of every expense, the most econo
mical measures would eyer be to enlist an army for the war. Many objections
to the use of militia operate with equal force against short enlistments of regu
lar troops. And when it is recollected hereafter, that the American forces
were, in the course of both our wars, often placed in the most critical circum
stances, and arrested or cramped in their most important operations, by the
necessity of discharging one body of men and drawing together another, the
American people ought ever to bear solemnly in mind the reiterated warnings
of WasMngton and Greene on this subject. Many causes exist to facilitate
enlistments at the commencement of a war, which disappear in the course of
it. Many a gay vision of glory, riches, and preferment that imagination then
conjures up, vamshes before the sober realities -* of experience, of toils, of suffer
ings, and of wounds. " The pomp and circumstance of glorious war" soon
loses the fascination pf novelty, and the answer which inquiry draws forth
from those who have served, will seldom be calculated to tempt their friends
or relations into the galling restraints of military discipline. The experience
of two wars will conclusively support the truth of these observations; and
had those contests been much longer protracted, our ranks could only have
been filled by conscription. This method would, indeed, have made our arms
terrible ; for in every point of view, it is unquestionably the best mode of form
ing an army. It is rapid, it furmshes the best of materials, and no danger is
to be apprehended from it when thus composed, whether in keeping it together
or in disbanding it. It would seem as if our enemy had made peace with us
in both wars, just when the idea of adpting this mode began to become popular.
But how far the genius, the easy life and free habits of our citizens can be
reconciled to the sacrifice, is a question not easily solved.
There are also many difficulties of the most serious nature attending the
blending of regular troops and militia in the same service. They never har
monize well together. The regular soldier despises the militiaman for Ms

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 215
Ms want of discipline, impatience of the hardships and privations of a camp, chap.
and inferior dependence placed in him when exposed to the tug of war. And v^-v^^
tMs is repaid tenfold by the miltiaman, upon the mercenary engagement of the
regular soldier, his poverty, dependence, and subjection to servile punishment
and occupations. Besides wMch, the militiaman knows, and the general who
commands, feels, that it is his duty to husband his best troops, and place the
militiaman in the most exposed, though least essential stations in battle. The
militiaman is placed in the van, while the regular force forms the rear line or
the reserve. Disagreeable as it is to the commander, and much as it exposes
him to censure thus to expose the lives of valuable citizens, the safety of the
whole exacts tMs duty of him. Hence, both the militiaman and his com
mander are reluctant at serving in camp with the regulars ; and in time of
action, thinking themselves unreasonably and unjustly exposed, they are the
less ashamed of deserting the post assigned them, and too often do nothing
more than carry confusion into the ranks, — which they increase numerically,
but weaken morally. In the hour of battle they have seldom been of essen
tial benefit to an army, and perhaps never but when used in light, active,
desultory service, as expert horsemen, or under cover, as destructive marksmen.
At the period we are now speaking of, the service was sinking under the joint
weight of both short enlistments and militia reqmsitions.
The Marqms La Fayette had, during the preceding summer, returned from
France. That nobleman, whose ardent zeal in their cause ought ever to call
forth the warmest gratitude of every American, had privately paid a visit to
France, for the sole purpose of promoting the cause he had espoused. Some
fear was entertained, that unfovourable results might proceed from the fracas
which occurred- at Rhode Island, and he had seen and felt the mortifying
embarrassments which environed the active promoters of the revolution, from
a combination of causes which could be best explained in personal and reite
rated interviews with those who directed the policy of the French cabinet.
His success was equal to the noble motives that influenced his conduct. He
suddeMy made his appearance in the American army, before it was even
generally known that he had left the country ; and brought with him the
welcome tidings, that large reinforcements were immediately to be forwarded
to the French army and navy. The time when they might be expected was
designated, and as it was expected that the naval reinforcement would be suf
ficient to give the allies the command of the ocean, the states were pressingly
called upon for such supplies of men and money as would enable the American
army to co-operate with efficiency in the proposed attack on New York.

216 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. In September, it will be recollected, the appalling news arrived, that the
French fleet was closely blocked up in port by a superior British force, and the
expedition against New York was reluctantly abandoned. The militia were
,of course dismissed, and the term of enlistment of a large proportion of the
other troops soon expired. The continent seemed exhausted by the effort
that had been made : and the American army was again reduced to a handful.
When the unfortunate news of Gates' defeat arrived, its effect was not, most
happily, to produce despondency, but to open the eyes of the nation to the
dangers which threatened it. This was soon followed by the detection of
Arnold's plot, and the continent seemed once more aroused from a lethargy.
From the commencement of the war, the people and the congress had fondly
indulged an expectation of peace from year to year, which had always para-
lized their efforts ; but when France, and then Spain, and then several other
European powers embarked in the contest, there had prevailed too much
of a temper to resign all the cares and glories of the war to other hands. The
necessity of doing still something for themselves now broke upon the public
mind, and the occasion was improved by the wise and spirited part of the
nation. In this effort none were more conspicuous than the commander in chief and
the subject of these pages. Many of the letters of the former are in possession
of the public. Those of the latter, (and he had at this time many correspond
ents among the most enlightened and influential men in the United States,)
breathe the same spirit, and inculcate the same doctrines with those of his
exalted friend and commander. With equal skill and truth he presses the
reflection, " that a decree from heaven had gone forth in our favour ; for the
arm of providence had been made bare in the late affair with Arnold, as well
as in raising up powerful friends and allies in our behalf whenever we began to
sink under difficulties. But it is not in the order of providence for man to
expect more, than the smiles of heaven upon his own exertions. That it was
not to be expected even of our allies, to continue, much less increase their
efforts, if we relax in ours ; nor was it altogether certain, that if we remained
in such a state of feebleness as would impose the whole burden, and bestow
the whole eclat of achieving our independence upon our ally, that the idea
might not be excited of exacting, or imposing upon us terms, that were seriously
to be deprecated. National honour had not always been proof against elevated
notions of obligations conferred by one nation on another, especially where
weakness invited encroachment. Sound policy, in every point of view, re
quired the most active exertion on our part. The people were getting tired of

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE" 217
the war, the allies might get tired of it, or dissensions arise or be sown among chap.
them that would induce them to abandon us. He then presses upon them the ^~J~^
expense, the feebleness, the embarrassments that have grown out of the means
hitherto adopted for military defence ; and finally concludes, that if their trea
sures be all exhausted, the object for which they are contending is worthy of
resorting to actual conscription and contributions in kind. Whilst any means
remained, the thought of abandomng the contest was unworthy of man."
The time consumed in this private correspondence, although it might be
considered as employed in public service, was never detracted from public
duty. General Greene's habits of early rising and close application to busi
ness were never relinquished; and hence, with facility he went through a
multiplicity of business, without suffering one duty to jostle against another, or
being obliged to encumber the present hour with the duties of the past. His
private correspondence was the last that occupied his attention, and in one of
his letters to a friend he complains that " his fingers ache, for he has just fin
ished Ms thirty-second letter on business." The relief afforded him in the
quarter-master-general's department was very trifling ; on his aids the severity
of the duty of copying principally fell, and the number of letters written, and
even copied in his own hand, is truly astonishing. Yet he always found time
for reading, and whatever was the lateness of the hour employed in public
duty, he never failed to read for an hour before he would suffer sleep to steal
upon him. Books uniformly constituted a part of his camp equipage, and
though he had not a box set with diamonds to place his Homer and his
Plutarch in, he was seldom without translations of those authors in his retinue.
But this was rather recreation, and the indulgence of taste than serious study.
Books on the art to which he had devoted himself, engaged the greatest part
of his studious hours.
The appointment of General Gates to the command of the southern depart
ment was made, as has been noticed, by vote of congress. Had the appoint
ment of a successor to General Lincoln, who was then a prisoner, been confided
to General Washington, the following extract of a letter from Mm to General
Greene will show on whom the command would have devolved: "lam sorry
for the difficulties you have to encounter in the department of quarter-master,
especially as I have been instrumental, in some degree, hi bringingyouinto.it.
Under these circumstances I cannot undertake to give advice, or even to
hazard an opinion on the measures best for you to adopt. Your judgment
must direct you ; — if it points to a resignation of your present office, and your
inclination leads you to the southward, my wish shall accompany it ; and if
the appomtment of a successor to General Lincoln is left to me, I shall not
-28

>18 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, hesitate in preferring you to this command; but I have little expectation of
, bdng consulted on the occasion. " With truth and sincerity, yours," &c.
Washington was not consulted on that occasion. Gates' star was then in
the ascendant, and its brilliancy had tiirown even Washington's into shade.
It is impossible to avoid indulging conjecture on such an occurrence; nor
would it be presumptuous to assert, that the country was made, on this occa
sion, to feel the effects of ungenerous distrust, and unwise encroachment, with
regard to the judgment and powers of the commander in chief. Congress
appears, however, to have become sensible of the hnpropriety committed in
that instance ; to have distrusted their own judgment for the future ; and will
ing to make atonement to the feelings of Washington, when a successor to
Gates was to be appointed.
The unfortunate affair of the 16th of August 1780, one of the most unalloyed
calamities of the revolutionary war, had produced such an excitement in the
pubfic feeling, as to reqmre of congress an investigation into the conduct of
General Gates. A resolution for that purpose passed in congress on the 5th of
October, and it was accompanied with a resolution, authorizing the com
mander in chief to nominate a successor to General Gates, in the southern
military department. These resolutions produced the following commumca-
tion from General Washington.

" Head Quarters, Pasaic Falls, October 14^, 1780.
" Dear Sir,
" By a letter received yesterday afternoon from his excellency the presi
dent of congress, of the 6th inst. enclosing the copy of a resolution of the pre
ceding day, I find it has been their pleasure to direct me to order a court of
inqmry to be held on the conduct of Major General Gates, as commander of
the southern army ; and also to direct me to appoint an officer to command
it in his room, until the inqmry is made. As the congress have been pleased to
leave the officer to command on this occasion, to my choice, it is my wish to
appoint you ; and from the pressing situation of affairs in that quarter, of which
you are not unapprized, that you should arrive there as soon as circumstances
will possibly admit.
" Besides my own inclinations to this choice, I have the satisfaction to inform
you, that from a letter I have received, it concurs with the wishes of the dele
gates of the three southern ssates most immediately interested in the present

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 219
operations of the enemy. And I have no doubt it will be perfectly agreeable chap.
to the sentiments of the whole. Your ulterior mstructions will be prepared ^y^
when you arrive here.
" I have oMy to add, that I wish your earliest arrival, that there may be no
circumstances to retard your proceeding to the southward, and that the com
mand may be attended with the most interesting good consequences to the
states, and the highest honour to yourself. " With great regard and esteem, &c.
" P. S. You will bear in mind the estimates. I wish to receive them as soon
as possible, as I expect the return of the minister, and would willingly have
them for consideration, some time before," &c.
Various letters previously written to General Greene from his friends in
Philadelphia, had prepared Mm for the reception of this from General Wash
ington. Mr. John Mathews, one of the delegates from South Carolina, had
intimated to Mm the wishes of the southern delegation, with a friendly expres
sion of a hope that he would not decline serving ; and members of congress
from various quarters appear to have cast their eyes upon him as the com
mander to whom the country looked to restore the shattered fortunes of the
southern army. We have much correspondence on this subject; but will
confine ourselves to that which passed between Mmself and the commander in
chief on the occasion, with a view to show how these great men thought and
acted towards each other and their country.

General Greene to General Washington.
" West Point, October 16th, 1780.
" Sir, " Your excellency's letter of the 14th, appointing me to the command of
the southern army, was delivered to me last evening. I beg your excellency
to be persuaded that I am fully sensible of the honour you do me, and will
endeavour to manifest my gratitude by a conduct that will not disgrace the
appointment, I only lament that my abilities are not more competent to the
trust, and that it will not be in my power to be as extensively useful as my
inclination leads me to wish. But so far as my zeal and attention can supply
the defect, I flatter myself my country will have no cause to complain.

m MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. " I foresee the command will be accompanied with innumerable embarrass
ments ; but the generous support I expect from the partiality of the southern
gentlemen, as well as the aid and assistance I flatter myself I shall receive
from your excellency's advice, afford me some consolation in contemplating
these difficulties.
" I will prepare myself for the command as soon as I can; but as I have
been. upwards of five years in service, during all which time I have paid no
attention to the settlement of my domestic concerns ; and many divisions of
interest, and partitions of landed property have taken place in the time between
me and my brothers, and now lie unfinished, I wish it was possible for me to
spend a few days at home before I set out for the southward ; especially as it is
altogether uncertain how long my command may continue, and what deaths
or accidents may happen during my absence. I beg your excellency's opimon
upon the matter, and will regulate my conduct accordingly. However, it will
not be possible for me to set out under five days from this place, if I put my
baggage and business under the least degree of regulation ; nor is my state of
health in a condition to set off immediately, having had a considerable fever
Upon me for several days. General Heath arrived last mght, and will take
command this morning. I will make him fully acquainted with all the orders-
and steps I have taken which concerns, his command. And will give him my
opimon what is necessary further to be done for carrying mto effect your excel
lency's intentions, and putting the garrison into a proper state of defence, as
well as to prepare for the ensuing winter. " I have the honour to be," &e.

General Washington to General Greene.
" Head Quarters, October 18th, 1780.
" Dear Sir,
" Your letter of the 16th was delivered me an hour since. I am aware
that the command you are entering upon will be attended with peculiar diffi
culties and embarrassments ; but the confidence I have in your abilities, which
determined me to choose you for it, assures me you will do every thing the
means in your power will permit, to surmount them, and stop the progress of
the evils, which have befallen, and still menace the southern states. You may
depend on all the support I can give you, from the double motives of regard ta
you personally, and for the public good.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE- 221
" I wish circumstances could be made to correspond to your wishes to spend chap.
a little time at home previous to your setting out ; but your presence with your ^^^^
command as soon as possible is indispensable. The embarkation at New York
sailed the 16th, in all probability destined to co-operate with Cornwallis, who,
by the last advices, had advanced as far as Charlotte. I hope to see you
without delay, and that your health will be no obstacle to your commencing
your journey. " With the sincerest regard, I am," &c.

General Greene to General Washington.
"West Point, October 19th, 1780.
" Sir, " Your excellency's favour of the 18th was delivered me this afternoon.
I had given up the thought of going home, before the receipt of your letter,
even if I could have been indulged with your permission. My affairs required
it, but I was afraid it would take up too much time, considering the critical
state of affairs to the southward. The day that I marched from Tappan, (7th)
I wrote for Mrs. Greene, and expect her here every hour. When I wrote for
liberty to go home, it was my intention to have stopped her on the road ; but if
I should set out before her arrival, the disappointment, added to the shock of
my going to the southward, I fear will have some very disagreeable effect upon
her health, especially as her apprehensions upon the subject were very lively,
even before there was a probability of my going.
" I see the necessity for setting out,' and feel the necessity for staying. I
must beg your excefiency's indulgence for one day longer, after which, if Mrs.
Greene don't arrive, I shall immediately set out for head quarters. My
baggage sets off to-morrow, if I am not disappointed in getting horses,
which Colonel Hughes promises me I shall not be. Nothing shall detain me
longer than a couple of days from head quarters, unless I am very unwell in
deed. " I thank your excellency for the double assurance you give me of support,
and long to be upon my journey to meet Lord Cornwallis, before he advances
too far into the heart of North Carolina. " I have the honour to be," &c.
This promise was punctually complied with. Neither the fever that hung
upon him, the hourly expected arrival of a beloved and long absent consort, the

222 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE,
chap, demands of Ms private concerns, nor, above all, the endearments of children
, whom he had never seen but once, and whom he tenderly loved, detained Mm
a day longer from his duty. On the 18th he entered upon a journey of seven
hundred miles, on an expedition full of dangers and difficulties, and on an
indefinable absence from a home which he fondly sighed to return to, never
again to be torn from it,

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 223

VII.

CHAPTER VII.

Introductory to the southern campaign. Revolutionary spirit in the south.

A HE revolution wMch, in 1776, raised the American people to the rank of c**ap
an independent nation, is to be traced up to a very remote origm in the coun- ,
try south of the Roanoke. It was there but the last step of a gradual and
steady advance from despotism to freedom.
It was Sir Walter Raleigh who first drew the attention of the British nation
to the settlement of the noble country that stretches from the Gulf of Florida
to the Bay of St. Lawrence. In 1584, he set the example by an attempt
to plant a colony within the present limits of the state of North Carolina.
Why, with such a country before them, many parts of which they had actually
visited, his colony should have fixed on one of the wretched islands at the
mouth of the Roanoke River for such an establishment was a mystery, until
a recent discovery in Balcarras county has developed the fascinating cause.
" There is gold, and the gold of that land is good."*
It is a fact that somespecimens of that metal were seen among the natives
at an early period, and this, the great object of pursmt in that age, as it has

* Appendix A.

224 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, been indeed, in every age ; fixed the choice of this party to a situation possess-
^^a ing not one other quality to recommend it, unless it was the fish that the waters
afforded. This attempt ceased to be prosecuted upon the disgrace of Raleigh ; and
from James River to the Floridas the numerous aborigines ranged in peace
over their native forest until the era of the restoration.
It has been pertinently remarked of Charles II. of Great Britain, that there
was more wit than truth in the assertion, " That he never said a foolish thing,
nor ever did a wise one."
The acts of wisdom that distinguish his reign, were certainly not many in
number; but he had the good sense to favour and cherish the North American
colonies. He saw himself surrounded by thousands of needy dependants, and
boisterous spirits, both of which descriptions of men, it was Ms policy to find
employment for — adapted to their tempers and wants, and in a mode least
calculated to end in drafts on his purse, or interruptions of his pleasures. Many
causes in addition to those above alluded to, concurred at the time to impress
on this measure, the stamp of mature wisdom. Before the time of Cromwell,
whenever the British nation rendered itself formidable abroad, it was at the
expense of prosperity at home. As a politician, few men have ever excelled
that usurper ; for usurper he must be named, since, whether from king or
people, and however beneficially used, his power was violently acquired. His
views of national policy were grand and profound, and with promptness and
decision, he knew how to avail himself of times and circumstances. His
victories in Scotland and Ireland secured mternal tranquility to Great Britain,
whilst his splendid naval victories commanded the trembling respect of the
powers on the continent. All the legitimate race who had preceded him, had
never been able to give the same eclat to the British nation. The agricultural,
commercial, and naval prosperity of that kingdom, were laid in Ms time.
When Charles came to the throne, he found the lands distributed among,
and cultivated by industrious hands; commerce ready to explore the earth,
fearless under the protecting ascendancy of the British navy and the British
name ; and the whole nation in a state of elasticity, which needed only free
dom and security to lead to national prosperity. Revolutions, such as that
government had recently passed through, when not protracted until excitement
sinks under its own exertions, are eminently calculated to produce such a result.
Individuals are impelled to enterprize, and the human mind acquires vigour,
independence, and acuteness, from the reflections and discussions which are
forced upon it. Awakened from that state of torpor and of habit, in wMch
nine tenths of mankind doze away their lives, and in which it is too much the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 225
interest of the rulers of the earth to keep them absorbed, men discover, that, chap.
however bitted and harnessed, and flayed and goaded, still the physical ,^-v^
strength is with them, whether the car of state is to be kept in motion or over
turned: and rulers become (sometimes too late) sensible that they have duties
to fulfil towards the governed. Conscious security in their acqmrements, the
prospect of peace, and agricultural and commercial habits in England, led to
colonization ; and the listlessness of a state of inactivity, to many who had
long lived in the whirl of politics and war ; the discontents of those to whom
the restoration was not agreeable, (and who well knew they must long be
looked upon with suspicion ;) and of others, who abominated the re-establish
ment of the Episcopal Hierarchy, all contributed to furnish fit subjects in
abundance for such a purpose. The old colomes were rapidly filled up, and
attempts to establish others became popular.
The emigrants furnished to the Carolmas, by the causes originating in the
political events in England, appear always to have cherished a revolutionary
spirit ; or rather to have been fully sensible of the value of civil and religious
rights, and ready to risk their lives in asserting them. At the same time, there
always existed a royal party, cherished and nurtured under the patronage of
government: — tMs was the necessary result of the early political institutions
introduced into these colonies.
The code of laws called the Fundamental Constitutions, was the first system
of government proposed for the country south of Virginia. This has generally
been attributed to the celebrated John Lock. If correctly ; the profound inves
tigator of the human understanding, was placed, like Moses on Pisgah, the
Whole region open before him, without a hope of reaching it himself. Never
did human ingenmty devise a more striking specimen of inveterate folly. It
is easy to conceive, and the world has unfortunately but too much cause to
know, that the profound metaphysician may be miserably deficient as a prac
tical politician. Yet it is but justice to this great man to observe, that the
evidence of his havmg been the author of the Fundamental Constitutions, is
by no means satisfactory. A cotemporary writer attributes this truly sciolous
production to the Earl of Shaftsbury, one of the proprietors.*
The most striking feature in these constitutions was, that privileged or dig
nified orders were to be established, and the people to be converted into serfs.
A nobility, consisting of landgraves, casiques, and barons, were to be gradu
ated by the landed estates granted them along with the dignity; and their

* Oldmixon's British Empire, vol. 1, p. 332.
29

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, tenants, and the issue of their tenants, were to be transferred with the soil-
VII .
, and not at liberty to depart from it, without their lord's permission under hand
and seal.
It is obvious, that whilst other lands were to be had, this feudal nobility
would either hold their estates untenanted, or must depend on slaves, or else
descend to the servile task of cultivating them with their own hands. But
these institutions contemplated the introduction of Negro slaves, and vest in
the owner unlimited power over them.
Little did these dreamers know of the spirit of independence generated, if
not originally existing, in the adventurers of a colony in North America; where
men sleep on their fire-arms, and are every hour taught their own importance
in subduing both the forest, and the savages that prowl through it.
From the first moment of the settlement of the colony at Charlestown, which
was in 1669, — the year that gave birth to this system, the struggle against its
odious provisions commenced. And as early as 1675, parties had already
assumed a marked and decided character. They were compared to the court
and country parties in England ; and it is obvious, from all the accounts given
of the conduct and tenets of the parties, that they were the loyalist and repub
lican parties of the mother country. The former being patronized by the
lords proprietors, were exclusively in power ; and the latter, resolved to oust
them. The project was soon extended to ousting the proprietors themselves.
The distinction of cavaliers and puritans, by which the parties were sometimes
designated, sufficiently marks the leading characters of each.
At first, the republican party appear to have been viewed as malcontents ;
and were scoffed at and ridiculed by the cavaliers and their digmfied cotempo-
raries ; but it is evident the republicans gained ground rapidly ; for, the fear of
religious persecution and a popish successor, drove many of the adherents of
their tenets from Great Britain. As early as 1689, we find a majority of the
commons-house, as it was called, protesting against the Fundamental Consti
tutions, and in consequence thereof, the governor and council excluding them
from their seats in that body. But their fall was that of Antceus, for at the next
election the whole of that branch was decidedly in the opposition. And in
the spirit of the days of King John, they sullenly and pertinaciously refused to
pass any law proposed by the governor and council, notwithstanding the affairs
of the province were in the utmost derangement, and its safety seriously threat
ened both by the Spaniards and Indians.
James Colleton, the brother of one of the proprietors, was then governor.
He undertook to proclaim martial law; and in the " unquestionable exercise
of his prerogative," dissolved his mutinous commons*

major general greene. 227
Just at this crisis an event occurred, wMch gave to the opposition, a leader chap.
Calculated to answer their purposes. < ^w
Seth Sothel, an English gentleman, had purchased out Lord Clarendon's
share of the proprietary grant; and a similar revolutionary spirit to that which
now animated the oppositionists of the southern colony, having made its ap
pearance in the country lying between Albemarle Sound and the Virgima line,
Sothel was sent out to curb them armed with plenary power, and carrying in
his person all the weight of proprietary interest. Yet he was not able to crush
die hydra ; and after having signally disgraced himself by the most infamous
conduct, he was arrested, tried, deposed and banished by the commons of
North Carolina.
From Albemarle he proceeded to Charlestown, and arriving in the height of
the ferment existing there, he took upon himself to assume the office of gover
nor, supported by the strong party of republicans, now possessing all the physi
cal strength of the colony.
Sothel was precisely the man whom the revolutionary party now stood in
need of. His proprietary character and assumed authority, would protect
them from prosecution ; and Ms want of either talents or weight of character,
would remove all difficulty in deposing him, when they should no longer need
his name. A plan was concerted between him and the leaders in the opposi
tion; and to a well supported petition to issue writs for a new election, he
graciously accorded his consent.
The character of the legislature thus elected, may easily be conjectured.
The vaunting cavaliers began to be serious and respectful in their deportment
toward their adversaries; and Colleton, although as an individual anol a
governor very much respected for Ms correct and dignified deportment, soon
found himself accused and convicted of high crimes and misdemeanors, and
bamshed from the province. With him, the Fundamental Constitutions crum
bled to dust ; for, the lords proprietors finding it impossible to force them upon
a people who had exhibited such a spirit ; had good sense enough to resolve,
" that as the people have declared they would rather be governed by the powers
granted by the charter, without regard to the Fundamental Constitutions, it
will be for their quiet, and the protection of the well disposed, to grant their
requests."* Having now obtained their immediate purpose, the revolutionists made no
difficulty in surrendering Mr. Sothel to the rage of the lords proprietors ; and
quietly suffered him to be recalled, and another governor to be duly substituted.
* Chalmers' Political Annals, p. 552.

228 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. This wise and ingenious precaution of the South Carolimans, to interpose
Sothel between themselves and power, appears to have been suggested by an
occurrence which attracted universal attention in the colonies at that timer
inasmuch as in its progress the principle was estabfished hi Great Britam, that
the colonists were amenable to the British courts of law for treasons committed
in America. TMs occurrence will here be noticed somewhat at large, since it
leads to the developement of the early origin of the contest between the colo-
Mes and the mother country ; and proves the struggle to have been coeval with
the producmg cause. The British historian* has cited the navigation acts of
Charles II., the parliamentary measures consequent upon them, and the sub
mission of the coloMes, as precedents to justify the stamp-act, the duty on tea
and on other articles, and the subsequent parliamentary measures wMch led to
the revolution of 1776; it is then a full and natural reply to the argument to
show, that the attempt to establish a general parliamentary power over the
colonies, was resisted m its very inception ; and oMy submitted to, until the
coloMes had acquired power to resist with effect.
The great object at both periods was, to fix the limits of parliamentary
power ; and the great end of the people of America, to secure to themselves a
sanctioned participation in the rights of Englishmen. Just one hundred years
elapsed between the commencement of the colomal system, and its final op
pressive extension ; but at both periods it was met with the same temper, and
a plain indication was given, that nothing but the want of strength prevented
effectual resistance to the offensive principles wMch it involved. The imposi
tion of a small tax on the consumption of tea, led to the great revolution of
1 776 ; and a tax of a penny a pound on the consumption of tobacco in the
coloMes, actually produced a minor revolution one hundred years before. The
very leading questions which occupied the minds of the colonists at the period
of 1776, we will find convulsing the .coloMes in 1677. The right of throwing
off an arbitrary government ; the right of taxing the colonies without their*
consent; the right of subjecting the colomsts to trial before a British jury; and
even the right of cutting off the trade of Boston, will all be found involved in
the miMature revolution which took place m North Carolina in the year 1677.
It is contended by Mr. Chalmers, that the arguments at that time used by
the colonists, did not insist on the unconstitutionality of the measures com
plained of, but only on their inexpediency. But it would have been a folly in
the supplicants to have outraged those who certainly possessed the physical

* Chalmers.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 229
power, by denying their legitimate power, at a time when the colonists could chap
only hope to obtain from their benevolence what coMd not be extorted from v^-v-^/
them by force. But Mr. Chalmers is incorrect in pomt of fact; for it will be seen
that, in South Carolina at least, the question of unconstitutionafity was actually
insisted on, and such a spirit of opposition exhibited, as rendered the execution
of the laws complained of, for some time impracticable.
The name of John Culpepper has been handed down to posterity, loaded
with unmerited odium. A British court had pronounced Mm gmlty of high
treason, and no author has ventured to criticise that decision, or examine the
charges upon which it was founded. John Culpepper was an early and bold
assertor of some of the very principles which produced the revolution of 1776,
and had nearly fallen the victim of a premature struggle against the exercise of
arbitrary power. Washington would also have been convicted of Mgh trea
son had he failed of success, and the arbitrary influence of events upon
opmions may have changed the voice of eulogy into censure. Culpepper's
efforts were on a minor scale ; but they were marked with a character of
vigour and decision, and founded in a correctness of doctrinej and purity and
pMlanthropy of design, which ought to have secured to him a more favourable
notice from the authors who have dwelt on his conduct.
That the British writers should have represented him as a mere disturber
of Social order, is not to be wondered at; but that the historian of North
Carolina,* himself an actor in the scenes of the last revolution, should, not
only have adopted their views, but expressed their opinions with exasperated
severity, is a subject of some surprise. In this, however, he has copied not
only the facts, but the opinions of Chalmers; and Chalmers' palpable object
was to exhibit the conduct of the colonists as marked with ingratitude and
mutiny, .through every stage of their career. Had his work advanced to a
second volume, agreeably to Ms original design, tMs observation would have
been more amply verified.
As a relater of facts, Chalmers is an author of the first authority ; for he is
the only writer who ever had access to the archives of the lords proprietors,
and of the board of trade and plantations.. But through his own facts, his
errors in opinion may be fully detected ; nor is it unimportant to notice, that
in the views which he presents of those facts, he eannot be suspected of a
design to palliate the conduct that Ms patrons disapproved off

* Dr. Williamson. t He was secretary to the board of trade.

230 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. The ministerial documents of the day, represent CMpepper as a native of
¦^r-v-*^ New England, and as having " some time before fled from South Carolina,
where he was in danger of hanging, for endeavouring to set the poor people to
plunder the rich."*
TMs charge (which is copied by Dr. Williamson) is easily explained by a
reference to the early history of that state. A struggle existed there between
the court and country parties, and this was the complexion which it smted
the court party to give to the views and designs of their antagomsts. From
the early records of the state of South Carolina it appears, that Culpepper
was in fact a member of the commons-house of assembly, first constituted
under the proprietary government, or rather under what were called the Fun
damental Constitutions. Immediately on the organization of a legislative
body in South Carolina, it is well known that a struggle arose between the
champions of prerogative, and the champions of equal rights. We have only
to suppose Culpepper the active supporter of the latter party, and incurring
thereby the frowns of the party in power, to account for his fleeing from the
country, and being followed by the charge of encouraging " the poor to plunder
the rich;" and in order to understand the origin, and judge of the truth of the
character given him by the ministerial party. His subsequent conduct affords
sufficient ground to form a judgment of the course he had previously pursued.
The struggle in which Culpepper incurred the charge of high treason, had
its origin in a duty imposed on tobacco, a restriction on the right of exporting
it, and a consequent restraint imposed on the trade of New England, and on a
mercantile intercourse between the two states of Massachusetts and North
Carolina. It was attended by measures exactly analogous to those pursued
in the revolution of 1776, and followed by several of the identical arbitrary
acts complained of in the declaration of independence. Loyalty and dis
loyalty are, as usual, the stalking horses made use of by the friends of the pro
prietors ; but the disguise thrown over the real grounds of the contest, is too
flimsy to conceal its real character.
The southern boundary line of Virginia, commencing a little north of Curri
tuck, does not intersect the Roanoke until it passes Moody's Ferry ; leaving an
extensive and pleasant country between that line and the waters of Roanoke
and Albemarle. Very soon after the settlement of Virgima, adventurers were
tempted by many causes to occupy this tract of country. But every cause
conspired to give to this settlement a feeling and character strongly republican.

* Chalmers.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 231
The demons of religious and civil persecution had made their way across the chap.
Atlantic, and many of those who had sought the wilderness as an asylum from v^-^-^,
religious tyranny, found themselves obliged to flee still farther to avoid the
fangs of their persecutors. Virginia and Maryland, in common with almost
every established government in America, had commenced the unhallowed
career of persecution ; and quakers, puritans, sectarians of various descriptions
were obliged to fly, or suffer under civil or ecclesiastical despotism.* The
north shores of the Albemarle Sound, presented an eligible retreat; there was
there no civilized man to persecute, no legitimate government to devour them.
The country was still possessed by savages, who could be soothed by just and
mild treatment, and would, for a moderate compensation, surrender an ade
quate quantity of land, unembarrassed by reservations of quit-rents or feudal
services. The state of North Carolina was, at this time, peculiarly situated. All Sir
Walter Raleigh's efforts to colonize it having failed, it was, after the unparal
leled murder of that conspicuous man, granted out successively to companies,
and to Sir Robert Heath, "in piosusus." But no recent endeavours had
been made to colomze it, and it remained nearly in a derelict state. It was
at this time that the Albemarle settlement, unaided by government or com
pany, was commenced by men who had vigour of character sufficient to
govern, defend, and provide for, themselves. But man is never suffered thus
to elude " the powers that be." The grant to the lords proprietors which
extended from the 29th degree of north latitude to 36 degrees 30 minutes,
embraced this little settlement; and after near twenty years of tranqui
lity, prosperity, and self-government, the governor of Virgmia,f who, no

* Williamson, vol. 1, p. 81.
t This was Governor Berkeley, who presided near forty years over the destinies of Virginia,
a period which some seem to imagine the halcyon days of that province. The concluding lines
of a note of his addressed to the lords proprietors on the subject of the system the British govern
ment was entering upon, to prevent the colonies from building ships, or trading with foreigners,
or even with each other, although it abounds with loyalty and devotion to legitimate government,
exhibits a curious coincidence between the sentiments of the legitimates of that day and the present.
These are this worthy governor's words: "We have forty-eight parishes, and our ministers are well
paid, and by my consent should be better, if they would pray oftener and preach less; but as of
all other commodities, so of this, the Worst are sent us ; and we have few that we can boast of,
since the persecution in Cromwell's tyranny drove divers worthy men hither. Yet, I thank God,
there are no free-schools nor printing-presses, and I hope we shall not have these hundred years.
For learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into the world, and printing has
divulged them and libels against the best government : God keep us from both I" William Berke
ley. Chalmers, p. 328.

232 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, doubt, had long looked with jealousy on the escape and happiness of these
, fugitives from the wise laws over which he presided ; was gratified by the lords
proprietors with power to appoint them a legislative council and governor*
The next benefit conferred upon them was the code of " Fundamental Consti
tutions," with all their badges of aristocracy and vassalage ; and lastly, a
system of the most corrupt legislative regulations, exempting emigrants from
the recovery of debts, and thus converting this asylum of religion into a den of
iniquity. Lastly came laws prohibiting them from exporting their produce any
where but to the mother country, and then, to levy a tax not imposed by them
selves, and more offensive in principle, and more oppressive in operation, than
the stamp-act or duty on tea*which led to the revolution of 1776. TMs was
the duty of a penny on every pound of tobacco sMpped from one colony to any
other. The scheme of taxing the colonies had, in fact, already been adopted,
and an experiment was now to be made of the temper with which it would be
submitted to. The spirit with which it was met may have postponed its pro
secution for a century following.
Subsequent events in the colony of Albemarle exhibit the revolution of
1776 in miniature. Unhappily, however, for the former, the catastrophe was
different. During the time that the Albemarle settlement remained in a state of inde
pendence, it appears that the New Englanders monopolized the trade of their
little colony. Nor was that trade comparatively inconsiderable; for they
already sent to market a large quantity of tobacco. This was sMpped at their
doors, and in return they received the articles wMch they wanted, and which
were procured from whatever country afforded the most favourable market.
Here .was a subject of heart-burning both to the mother country and the
neighbouring colony ; for, but for the convenience of this trade, their tobacco
must have been transported to Jamestown, and there have paid a duty into the
coffers of Virginia ; — in the p&yment of which, it appears, the governor had a
direct interest; and thus supplies of European and West India articles must
have been obtained from England through the same channel, since vessels of a
heavy draft of water, such as the European trade then employed, could not
have had access to the waters of the Albemarle.
To break up the New England trade and restore the monopoly to the
mother country, was one object of the measures now| pursued by the ministe
rial party. But there was another of much higher importance.
The only three coloMes existing in America, during the civil wars in Eng
land in the time of Oliver Cromwell, very unwisely intermeddled in the con
test between the Charleses and their subjects. VirgiMa declared for the king,

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE, 233:
Massachusetts for the commonwealth, and Maryland was distracted and chap.
divided by contending parties. Cromwell thought proper to reward Massa- ¦^~^J^.
chusetts and punish Virgima, by commercial regulations ; and Charles, on the
restoration, showed a disposition to retaliate. Thus did commercial regula
tions on the colonies, become an object of parlamentary attention. During
the time of the commonwealth, the exclusive use of English shipping for the
transportation of colonial produce, was not imposed as a duty, but reserved
or purchased as the equivalent for favours conferred.* But Charles II. had
scarcely mounted his throne before the celebrated navigation act of 1661 was
passed, by which it is enacted, " that no merchandize shall be imported into
the plantations or territories to his majesty belonging, in Asia, Africa, or Ame
rica, or exported from them, but in English vessels, navigated by Englishmen;
and that no sugar, tobacco, ginger, indigo, cotton, fustic, or dying woods of the
growth of the English territories in America, Asia, or Africa, shall be trans
ported thence to any other countries than those belonging to the crown of
England," under penalty of forfeiture, &c. Rice, molasses, and copper-ore
were afterwards in due course subjected to the same restriction. — And all this,
as is expressed in an act on the same subject, passed in 1663, " to maintain a
greater correspondence and kindness between the coloMes and England, to
A keep them in firmer dependance upon it, and to make this kingdom a staple
not only of the productions of the plantations, but of the merchandizes of other
countries for supplying them ;" a preamble which honestly, does not pretend
to have any regard to the interests or wishes of the unfortunate colonists.
But still the intercourse between the coloMes remained open ; and there is
reason to believe that very little of the tobacco shipped for Massachusetts ever
reached an entrepot, or halted m its progress to its real destination — an Euro
pean market. And if it did, still the colonists obtained it free from the duty of
a penny per pound on the consumption of it in Great Britain.
Every session of parliament now produced some new regulation to confine
the commerce of the coloMes withm the prescribed limits, and to prevent those
evasions, which the wits of one of the shrewdest people in the world were now
at work to machinate.
At length, in the year 1672, to give the coup de grace to this colonial trade
in tobacco, at that time the only export of any value produced on the North
American continent, a penny per pound was imposed on all exports of it,
where bonds were not given to land it in Great Britain; and the whole busi-

* Act of 1646.
30

234 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, ness was required to be managed, and the imposts levied, by officers to be
,^-v-^, appointed by the commissioners of the customs in England, under the autho
rity of the lords of the treasury.
This law bore with peculiar hardship on the Albemarle settlement. As the
large European vessels were excluded by the shallowness of their bar, the
small New England sloops alone ascended to their doors, and hence all their
tobacco was really or affectedly shipped for Boston. Yet the people submit
ted ; for the idea was cherished, that after paying their penny impost, the right
was acquired of transporting their tobacco to any market ; and the number of
shippmg-places along the waters of the Albemarle, would probably have
afforded great facilities for evading the duty altogether.
At length, however, a rigid tax-gatherer made Ms appearance; and the
question being submitted to the attorney-general of England, whether the pay
ment of the duty, dispensed with the necessity of giving a bond to land the
tobacco in Great Britain — his decision was very correctly against the planters,
on the construction of the two laws. And finding themselves compelled, though
they paid the penny to give the bond, they appear to have become moody
and intractable. As long as it bore the aspect of a regulation affecting foreign
commerce, they were contented to submit. Great Britain had assumed and
exercised a control over their intercourse with other nations too long, and they
were too weak to admit of its being now disputed ; but when an intercourse
among themselves came to be thus cramped and encumbered, and the con
sumption of their own produce among themselves taxed, public sentiment
appears to have risen strongly against the measure. It will be found by refer-
ing to the history of the colonies at tMs time, there were serious disturbances
excited fin every one of them ; and though the object of the leaders in those
instances is not always avowed, there can be little doubt of its identity.
But in every colony except Albemarle, there was an orgamzed government
to control or suppress these ebullitions. In this settlement, although they had
passed under the lord proprietors, and been subjected to the governor of Vir-
giMa, the republican feefings generated by the early circumstances of their
settlement, appear still to have predominated.
It was not until July 1677 that a collector of the royal customs for Albe
marle made Ms appearance. His name was Miller, and he came vested at the
same time with the powers of a governor, and of a deputy of the lords pro
prietors. The post of governor having become vacant by the death of Gover
nor Stevens, the lords proprietors had nominated to the vacancy one East-
church, a prominent character of the mimsterial party in the colony, and who
chanced to be at that time in England*

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 235
Miller preceded Eastchurch, and was vested by the latter with power to chap.
discharge his duties in his absence, under the denomination of president. ^^-^^
Miller appears, immediately on his arrival, to have set about collecting the
obnoxious penny with active zeal ; and it is not without surprise, and a sus
picion that the tobacco of Virginia must in fact have vented itself through this
outlet, that we learn from unquestionable authority, that in the short space of
six months, he had collected 327,068 pounds of tobacco, and £1,242 sterling
m money, — from a colony represented by himself to have "consisted of a few
inconsiderable plantations dispersed over the north-eastern bank of the Albe
marle." But in comparison with that of the other colonies then existing, the popula
tion of Albemarle was not so inconsiderable. It consisted of about seven
thousand inhabitants, and the annual parliamentary revenue, though badly
collected, was estimated at £3,000 sterling per annum, — a very considerable
sum at that time, for so small a population.*
But the inhabitants resolved to resist; and that it was not the act of an
obscure rabble, is proved by the fact that they had the countenance of the
lower house of assembly, and were actually joined by one of the deputies of
the lords proprietors. That it was not a mere ebullition of passion, or riotous
tumult, is expressly avowed by the communications made to the lords proprie
tors, in which it is declared, that " the rebellion of the inhabitants of Albe
marle was not accidental, or arose from any sudden provocation, but rather
was the effect of a deliberate contrivance, "f
To determine the designs with which the opposition was ventured upon by
the people of Albemarle, we have the imputations of their adversaries on one
hand, and their own manifesto on the other; but what,fliey actually intended,
is best evidenced by what they actually performed.
Seizing upon Miller and the refractory deputies of the lords proprietors, and
putting them in prison, a new administration was constituted, with Culpepper
at the head of it, and Albemarle actually enjoyed a state of revolutionary
independence for several years after. The tobacco collected by Miller was
appropriated to the exigencies of the new state, and New England again
enjoyed for a time a monopoly of the trade. In the mean time, Eastchurch
arrived in Virginia, and hearing of Miller's deposition, made application to
Governor Berkeley for a force to restore him to his government. The demand
was promptly acquiesced in, and the levy of troops commenced when East-

* Chalmers, p. 558-. + Ibid. 56l.

236 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, church fell a victim, as some assert to mortification, but more probably to the
, climate, or to that of the West Indies, from wMch he had just arrived. In the
mean time, the revolutiomsts having arrested the present evil, endeavoured to
avert a greater which threatened them from Virginia; and Culpepper, attended
by another deputy, hastened to England, to throw himself at the feet of his
sovereign — an act indicative of great firmness and conscious purity. At first
he appears to have met with a favourable reception, and was about returning
in safety to America, when he was arrested in the Downs by a warrant from
the privy council, charged with the crime of high treason. CMpepper insisted
on his right to be sent home for trial, and the celebrated question arose and was
decided in Ms case, upon which thelife of Ethen Allen was made to depend,
in the late revolution; and which furnished one of the grounds of complaint
enumerated in the declaration of independence.
The British court decided that by the stat. 35 Henry VIII. c. 2. all foreign
treasons are triable in England ; and that to overturn the government of the
lords proprietors, was treason agMnst the king. Culpepper's fate now seemed
inevitable ; when he was saved by the testimony of Earl Shaftsbury, who de
posed, " that there had never been any regular government permanently estab
lished in that part of the proprietary territory where this offence was commit
ted." An assertion wMch flowed from his humamty, if not his ignorance.
Thus were the lives and properties of the citizens of the coloMes placed, for
the future, at the disposal of a British jury. Yet the decision was conformable
to precedent, as is exemplified in Lord M'Guire's case, in the State Trials.
And that class of offences wMch, of all others, ought least to be exposed to
court influence, is required to be tried under the eye of the offended monarch,
and where the accused*will be deprived of that constitutional security held out,
or intended to be held out, to every British subject charged with offences, — of
being tried by a jury of his own vicinage.
The following curious extract from the records of that remote day, will dis
cover that the cradle wMch rocked the infancy of the late revolution, was not
then used for the first time ; and North Carolina, ever modest in her pretensions
amidst the jarring claims at present asserted by some of the states, will not feel
outraged at the evidence of her having been an early nursery of the spirit of
1776: " Among the same papers there are several affidavits which uniformly
assert, that the traders of New England were extremely active in fomenting
and supporting the rebellion. A person who was known by the name of the
Boston ambassador, was extremely active among the late regulators in North
Carolina. The masters and sailors of the ships of New England, were equally
instrumental in promoting the more recent disturbances in the provmceJ'

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 237
Which facts are followed up by tMs sage reflection: " Mankmd should make chap.
a common cause against a people whose rooted principles necessarily incite v^-v-^,
them to disturb the repose of their neighbours."*
In the progress of these events, it appears that the lords proprietors fur
nished to the committee of foreign plantations, a memorial, which they deno
minate " the case pf the commotions at Albemarle ;" and in this, the first and
only plausible charge made against the colonists is, " Encouraging the New
England trade there." " The illness of the harbour," (they observe,) " was
the cause that tMs northern part of Carolina had no other vent for their com
modities, but either by VirgiMa, Where they paid a duty to the governor, or to
New England, who were the only immediate traders, who ventured in small
vessels, and had so managed their affairs that they bought their goods at very
low rates, eat out and ruined the place, defrauded the king of his customs, and
yet governed the people against their own interests."
It is not a little surprising that the historian of North Carolina should
have received this account, reiterated as it is by Chalmers, as an indisputable
view of facts. Surely, on the subject of selling and buying to the most advan
tage, a people may be trusted to their own judgment; though they should be
obliged on all others, to surrender their judgments to nilers, whose interests
clash with those of the community, or whose minds are biassed by malevolent
or interested representations.
Of the temper which prevailed in South Carolina on the subject of these
colonial restrictions, there is sufficient evidence furnished from the records of
the board of trade. In 1687, the officer of the crown established at Charles-
town to execute the trade-laws of Great Britain, writes to the commissioners
of the customs in England, " that he despaired of succeeding in enforcing the
revenue laws, as the people denied the power of parliament to pass laws incon
sistent with their Charter, "f The commissioners of the customs also actually
complained to the lords proprietors of the mutinous temper of the people of
Carolina; and they, far from disavowing it, could only profess that it received
no countenance or support from themselves.
Yet in South Carolina the opposition must have been founded on principle
and anticipation ; since the effects of the colonial regulations must have borne
at that time, very lightly upon this colony. The country had been very re
cently settled; all their time and labour had been consumed in felling the
forests, or constructing their houses ; while the daily hostilities of the Indians

* Carolina Papers^ and Chalmers, 558, 559. t 11th April 168?,

238 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, and the Spamards left them little tranquillity to till their fields. Thus their
, exports were trifling, and their subsistence depended chiefly upon credits ob
tained in England.
From the year 1692 the southern colony was continually convulsed by the
struggles of party. The lords proprietors asserted the right to govern, without
either the power or will to protect, — at least against the encroachments of par
liament; and the colonists, indignant at remaining the servants of servants,
sighed after the imaginary advantages of becoming a royal province. The
loss of mutual confidence was soon followed by mutual reproaches ; and every
thing was matured for an effort to put down the proprietary authority for
ever. In their desire to throw off the proprietary government, the coloMsts were
encouraged at this time by the avowed inclination of the crown to bring all
the colonies immediately under its own jurisdiction. As «arly as 1686, the pro
prietors had been threatened with a quo warranto to repeal their charter;* but
James II., who was then on the throne, getting soon after embroiled both with
church and state, found all Ms cares necessary to resist the quo warruntos which
soon after excluded him from his throne and kingdom.
In Great Britain, the distinction into court and country party, which suc
ceeded that of cavalier and roundhead, had now been superceded by that of
tory and whig. The latter professed to be the sturdy defenders of old English
rights ; and the name was given them by their opponents, from a supposed
analogy between their tenets and those of the conventiclers of Scotland, who
were then distinguished by that epithet in ridicule. The whigs after awhile,
cheerfully took the name ; but fastened on their adversaries in return an epi
thet altogether expressive of contempt; as it is said to have been the distin-
gmsMng epithet of a very degraded class of people in Ireland, then called
popish banditti.^ It is not then surprising that the royalists, whose tenets led
them to the umform support of monarchical power, should never cordially
have received a name which bore with it nothing but an expression of con
tempt. Names are often decisive of the fate of parties, or at least have a
great influence on their destimes. There was always a disposition in the
colonies to mimic the mother country — a disposition which two successive
Avars have not yet overcome ; and the tenets, and names, and even measures
of party, soon found their way across the Atlantic.

* Chalmers, p. 565. t Hume, vol. 8, p. 126.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 239
In the struggle which termmated in the overthrow of the Fundamental chap.
VII
Constitutions, we have seen the country party predominate ; but it is ever the s
tendency of a predominant party to work its own destruction. The efforts of
a minority are easily directed towards the one great object of all, viz. to pro
duce the downfall of their adversaries ; but scarcely do they find themselves in
the seat of power, before their views begin to diverge ; and it is too often
discovered that, whatever may have been the views of the followers, their
leaders were animated by other motives than mere public spirit. They get
embroiled about the loaves and fishes of government. Nor is the operation of
the same cause unfelt among the mass of the party ; for all expect to be re
warded, and few can be ; and of those that are, very few can be persuaded
that their reward is apportioned to their merit. Hence, discontent, defection,
dissolution. Accordingly, we soon find the country party m the southern
colony put out of power ; and their opponents, taught by experience, perfas et
nef as securing to themselves that power wMch they could not long expect to
hold from a vote of the people.
An event occurred about tMs time which was well calculated to deprive the
country party of much of their popularity.
Henry of Bearne, almost the only monarch on record since the days of
Alfred, of whom it can be truly said that he loved his people, and who had
acted the hypocrite, (a character totally opposite to his real one,) the more
effectually to serve them ; had secured to the people of France complete reli
gious freedom, but had not given them sufficient civil power to preserve it.
This was in the year 1598. And the town of Nantz, at which the edict was
issued, gave name to this magna charta of the French protestants. Lewis
XIV., who has been more eulogized than any monarch in Europe, because he
held half the pens of Europe in actual pay ;* but who really lived only to
disturb his neighbours, and exhaust the wealth, while he corrupted the morals,
of his people ; arbitrarily revoked this edict — at the instigation of an envious
and ambitious priesthood. This was m the year 1685; and from that day,
victory deserted his standard, his glory commenced its decline, and domestic
misfortune clouded his court with sorrow. Yet the evil did not rest here ; it
was not the revocation of that edict alone which drove from his realm 500,000
of his most industrious subjects. In the secret converse with their God, his

* " On Lewis all his bards bestow'd
Of flattery many a thousand load ;
But Europe mortified his pride,
And swore the fawning rascals lied." — Swift.

240 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, votaries might still have found consolation for the want of liberty to convene
V1T , in his temples ; but the shafts of.religious persecution are as cruel as the arrows
of the children of Latona. The tears of a parent cannot stay them, while
there is a victim surviving. The revocation of the edict was followed up by
a positive injunction, that the protestants should conform to the Roman
catholic religion, under the dreadful penalties of heresy, — to be inflicted by an
infuriate priesthood. Nor did the persecution stop here ; permission was given
to tear from them their children, in order that they might be educated good
catholics. In all directions a disposition was manifested by the protestants to fly. The
Colignis and the Condes were no more ; or the power of the monarch was too
overwhelming to admit of an effort at insurrection. Yet the victims were not
suffered to escape ; for the persecution has acquired the epithet of the " drago-
nade," from the use that was made of dragoons to pursue the fugitives or cut
off their escape out of the territories of their fanatical monarch. Yet many
of them got over into the neighbouring kingdoms ; and after lingering in the
neighbourhood some months in order to withdraw their effects from France,
and, no doubt, with the fond hope that their monarch woMd yield to wiser
counsels, many of them followed the impulse of emigration, to the North
American coloMes. Some few, who appear to have been men of property,
arrived in Carolina as early as 1687; and in the year 1690, a considerable
colony having been transported by King William to the banks of James
River, a number of these soon sought out and joined their countrymen in
the southern colony. Others again who had landed in the more northern
states removed southwardly; and by their union was a most respectable
settlement formed along the banks of the Santee, (the original destination
of Ribaut,) and between that river and the head waters of Cooper. Lands
were granted them, with the free exercise of their religion ; they took the
oath of allegiance to the king of Great Britain, mid for awhile every thing
promised them rest and comfort in their new abode. But national jealousy
soon arose to dash the cup of blessing from their lips. The colonists took
alarm at this exercise of proprietary legislation ; began to question the powers
of the lords proprietors to vest aliens with the rights of natural born subjects;
to qualify them to hold descendible estates, or to participate in the exercise of
the sovereign rights of natural born subjects. And the unfortunate Hugonots
were violently excluded from the right of suffrage, and alarmed with the sug
gestion that their children would not inherit from them, but that their estates
must escheat.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 241
The state of confusion was now so great in the colony, that the lords pro- chap.
prietors were obliged to send over one of their number, Mr. John Archdale, ^^^^
with ample powers to settle all differences, and strong injunctions to admit the
French protestants to a just participation in the rights of subjects, Archdale
is acknowledged to have been a man of understanding, and of great liberality
and personal worth, and he was, in a great measure, successful in allaying the
ferment prevailing in the colony. Being a quaker by religious profession, he
cannot be suspected of having been opposed to the execution of his instructions
in favour of the Hugonots. Yet so strong was the current of popular preju
dice, that he did not dare to oppose it; but, in issuing his writs of election for
a new house of delegates, wholly omitted the county called Berkeley, in which
the French settlers principally resided. The quiet acquiescence of the people
in tMs discrhnination, too plainly shows that the popular party had coincided
with their antagomsts m the shamefiil exclusion, and such a dereliction of prin
ciple was justly followed by a loss of public confidence. Accordingly we find
the parties about tMs time nearly balanced, and obliged by mutual concessions
to obtain the favourite ends of each.
Archdale remained but a short time in the colony, and on his return to Eng
land, presented a very unfavourable account of its state to the lords proprietors*
Yet he did so much towards allaying party-animosities, that his successor, John
Blake, who was a dissenter, was enabled to obtain of the assembly, ' at the
price of making public provision for the establishment of an episcopal minister
in Charleston,' " An act for makMg aliens free of this part of the province,
and for granting liberty of consdence to all protestants."*
Here also we see another step of the colony towards a state of political free
dom, notwithstanding it was exercised in such unfortunate measures. For,
this compromise proves, both that they had seized or possessed' the purse-
strings of the province, and that they had triumphed in denying to the lords
proprietors the power of conferring religious freedom without their concur
rence. The inference is obvious. Their opposition had been founded on the
proprietary exercise of legislative power. The emigrants might be vested
with political and religious liberty, but it must be granted by the people.
But the Hugonots appear to have deeply resented the injury supposed to
have been received from those on whose protection they ought to have been
able to rely. For at a subsequent election the royalists triumphed ; and in a
representation of the dissenters, against the violence of the church party, made

* See the two acts passed on the same day.
31

242 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, to the lords proprietors, it is expressly declared that they were supported by the
^^-vAw/ French from Berkeley and Craven county.*
Blake's administration, which lasted from 1696 to his death in 1700, was a
Season of political calm. Yet it was only by a succession of calamities that the
bickerings of party were suspended; the embers were covered, not extin
guished. The town was first inundated by a hurricane, then consumed by
fire, whilst the small-pox, now viewed without alarm, but then with horror,
spread death and desolation tiiroughout the colony. Bad treatment rendered
it fatal in its effects, and more patients fell victims to medicine, than to disease.
Scarcely had the coloMsts breathed from these evils, when a pestilential disease
broke out in the city ; and among numerous other victims, swept off nearly
all the public officers, and one half of the legislature.
The spirit of opposition did not wholly sink under the pressure of these acCu-
nrulated calamities. A new system of fundamental laws was sent out by the
proprietors, and by the governor transmitted to the assembly, with his instruc
tions to put them in execution; but that body, mamfesting their firmness by
their coolness, simply took no notice of the message, and the system fell " still
born" to the earth. Soon after, it became a question who shoMd appoint to
the vacancies in the public offices occasioned by the death of the late incum
bents. The governor and council claimed the right as the representatives of
the proprietors, and the assembly claimed it as the representatives of the people.
The governor and council elected their man to the office of public receiver,
and the assembly forbad any one's making him payments. The contest grew
warm, and was not a little irritated by questions of dignity and precedence
which now began to mmgle with it. The governor and council had arrogated
the name of the upper house, and the assembly of delegates was resolved to
admit of no distinction that implied inferiority in them. The people sided
with the assembly, and they enjoyed a temporary triumph. But all these acts
were disapproved of and rescinded by the proprietors ; and a jealousy of the
views of the people was excited in the breasts of those gentlemen, wMch had
great influence upon their subsequent conduct.
The year 1 700 was the commencement of the reign of violence in South
Carofina, and it was soon followed by that of bigotry and church usurpation.
The events of it are authenticated under the signature of some of the most res
pectable men of the colony, and are connected with English history.

* See Oldmixon, vol. 1. p. 355.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 243

vn.

William III., who was bred a Calvinist, was ever the steady friend of reli- c&ap.
gious freedom. One of his first efforts after being seated on the throne of,
England, was to mitigate the disabilities imposed on dissenters by that disgrace
of British freedom, the celebrated test-act.
But this did not suit the taste or interests of the British hierarchy ; and with
real or affected alarm, they sounded throughout the kingdom, " that the church
was in danger." To convince the nation that they were in earnest, the bishops
withdrew from parliament, nor did they cease from their efforts at organizing
an opposition, until they were obliged by law to submit, — or lose their partici
pation in the goods of this world.*
William had been placed on the throne principally by the influence of the
whig party, and all his measures at the commencement of his reign, exhibited
a disposition to cast himself on their protection. But this could not possibly
last long. Whatever affairs of posts this party may have been occasionally
engaged in, their grand attack was upon royal prerogative. TMs may ope
rate on the fears or policy of a monarch, but never can command his affections ;
much less the cordial attachment of a monarch like William, who was reallv
haughty and ambitious, though sometimes politic ; and said to have been more
disposed to consult his own passions, or the interests of the Netherlands, than
the inclinations or interests of the British nation. Before the end of his reign,
he was completely estranged from the wMgs, by their steady adherence to the
system of salutary restraints ; and openly espoused the opposite party.
The first act of his successor, Anne, who ascended the throne the 8th March
1701, was to throw herself unequivocally into the arms of thetories. Every
office was filled with their leaders, and, respecting the first parliament that she
convened, we will quote the words of the Engfish historian. " The commons
of this parliament had nothing more at heart than a bill against occasional
conformists. The tories affected to distinguish themselves as the only true
friends to the church and monarchy; and they hated the dissenters with a
mixture of spiritual and political disgust. They looked upon these last as an
intruding sect, which constituted a great part of the whig faction." " They
considered them as encroaching schismatics, that disgraced and endangered
die hierarchy; and those of their own commumon who recommended mode
ration, they branded with the epithets of lukewarm christians, betrayers and
apostates. They now resolved to approve themselves zealous sons of the

* Smollet, vol. 1. b. 1. s. 7-

244 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, church by seizing the first opportunity that was in their power to distress the
, dissenters," &c*
The occasional conformists, as they were at that time called, were dissent
ers who, to qualify themselves for office, had complied with all the requisites
of the test-act, but immediately returned to the worship of God in the mode
wliich each one thought most consistent with his will. Against these evaders
of a law, which, notwithstanding its high pretensions, was really dictated by
the most sordid motives, was the wrath of the disappointed and eluded tories
particularly excited; and it is further said of them, "that as the last reign
began with an act in favour of the dissenters, so the commons were desirous
that in the beginning of her majesty's auspicious government an act should
pass in favour of the church of England."
Nor was it only among the laity, that party animosity raged. The queen
summoned a convocation of the ecclesiastical clergy in the year 1702 — and
here the violence of party exhibited itself to the most indecent degree. All the
clergy of the kingdom became, m consequence of this meeting, divided into
two parties, denominated Mgh churchmen and low churchmen, of whom an
English historian furnishes us with the following account : "These contests
produced divisions through the whole body of the clergy, who ranged them
selves in different factions, distinguished by the names of Mgh church and low
church. The first consisted of ecclesiastical tories, the other included those
who professed revolution principles, and recommended moderation towards
the dissenters. The Mgh church party reproached the other as time-servers
and presbyterians in disgmse, and were, in their turn, stigmatised as the friends
and abettors of tyranny and persecution ; at present, however, the tories both
in church and State, triumphed in the favour of their sovereign."f
The effects of this triumph were soon felt m the little colony of South
Carolina. John Granville, a proprietor, and at that time palatine of Carolina, had
been conspicuous in the British parliament in promoting the proposed bill
against occasional conformists. His zeal as a leader of the tory faction had
already procured Mm a seat in the privy council, and tMs new proof his perse
cuting prmciples procured Mm a peerage under the title of Baron Granville of
Potheridge.t Under the patronage and advice of this fanatic it was, that in
the year 1703, the church of England became the established church of South
Carolina, and that the infamous test-act became incorporated into the laws of

* Smollet^vol. 1. b. 1. s> 29. t Ibid. vol. 1. p. 450. % Ibid. b. 1. s. 25.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 245
that province. And, in his pious purposes, he was aided by a society which chap.
masked an attack upon religious freedom under the specious pretext ofpromot- ^^s^s
ing religion. How often has that sacred name been polluted by the avarice or
ambition of man! But he is no friend to religion who will tempt man to
hypocricy, deprive him of the sacred right of conscience, or withdraw the
oracles of the CMistian religion from the severest scrutiny that the human
mind can subject it to.
This society was incorporated in William's reign, at the instance of the
archbishop of Canterbury, by the name of " A Society for propagating the
Gospel in Foreign Parts." It acquired much eclat in the early establishment
of the British coloMes, and has unquestionably done good enough to atone for
many faults. But, if actions arc to be estimated by motives, then, as far as it
is justly chargeable with simply promoting a sect, and that under the terrors of
temporal power, it cannot pretend to the high meed of promoting the service
of God. It is the service of man and of a sect ; and not of Him to whom
nothing but the sacrifice of a willing heart can be acceptable ; and who, hav
ing given conscience and reason to man, must see his purposes thwarted and
his service profaned, whenever one sect shall, in his name, deprive another of
the free exercise of those noblest attributes of beings created to serve Mm.
The historian He wit says, " to prepare the province for the charitable assist
ance of tins society, it was judged necessary to have the church of England
established in it by a provincial law, and the country divided into -distinct
parishes." " He [the palatine] knew that the episcopal form of church gov
ernment was more favourable to monarchy and the civil constitution, than the
presbyterian, as, in it, a chain of dependance subsists from the highest to the
lowest," &c.
The author does not favour us with the authority upon wMch he founds that
information, but the concurrence of events supports his assertion. It has never
been demed, and is repeated by Ramsay as an unquestionable fact, that the
creation of that society was the first step towards the establishment of the
episcopal church in South Carolina.
The instrument and the means made use of to effectuate tMs project were
worthy of the end. Of the times in which the episcopal church was estab
lished in Carolma, it may be truly said, " the land was full of violence." The
following are the facts attending it.
It took place under the administration of Sir Nathamel Johnson, and his
prime agents appear to have been James Moore, Nicholas Trott, and William
Rhett. The cotemporaries of these gentlemen have handled their characters

m MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, and conduct with great severity;*! but whoever considers the demoralizing
, influence of party rancour, will receive with great precaution whatever issues
from so impure a source. It seems, however, generally maintained, that by
bribery, intoxication, intrigue, and judicial protection, (for Moore was attorney
general, and Trott cliief justice, and the only judge in the state,) they suc
ceeded, in the year 1703, in obtaining a lean majority of one in the house of
assembly ; and by that one fastened on the country,
1st. An act entitled " An act for the more effectual suppressing of blasphemy
and profaneness," (but really calculated to establish an inquisitorial inquiry
into religious opinions.)
2dly. " An act for the more effectual preservation of the government of the
province by requiring all persons that shall hereafter be chosen members of the
commons-house of assembly and sit in the same, -to take the oaths and sub
scribe the declaration appointed by this act, and to conform to the religious
worship in this province according to the church of England and receive the
sacrament of the Lord's supper, according to the rights and usages of the said
church." (Which is the English test-act.)
3dly. " An act for the establishment of religious worsMp in this provmce
according to the church of England, and for the erecting of churches for the
public worship of God, and also for the maintenance of mmisters, and building
convenient places for them." And,
4thly. To give the " coup de grace" to civil and religious liberty,) " An act
for the continmng, meeting and sitting of this present assembly for the space
of two years and for the term and time of eighteen months after the change
of government by the death of the present governor, or the succession of ano
ther in his lifetime."
The term of service for which elections, then took place was two years, and
their term of service was within a few days of expiring when this last act of
usurpation was passed ; and its preamble contains an explicit exposition of the
views and influence under which it was adopted. " Whereas the church of
England has of late been so happily established among them, fearing by the
succession of a new governor the church may be entirely undermined, or wholly
subverted, to prevent that calamity befalling them, be it enacted," &c.
Thus did the church of England triumph over the liberties of Carolina ; — a
triumph which it continued to enjoy, with some little limitation, even down to
the revolution; for as late as April 1770, we find the resources of the state,

* Hewit and Oldmixon.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 247
levied alike upon Jew and gentile, upon dissenter and episcopalian, diverted chap.
to the building of episcopal churches and maintenance of episcopal ministers. v^r~v-^-'
When did ever a sect acquire power, without blending temporal views with
spiritual instruction !
Yet these zealous measures of " the sons of the church" met not with the
glowing approbation from their fathers abroad, which at first view might have
been expected. They unfortunately incurred the displeasure of the high church
faction, by a measure which savoured too much of the low church tenets.
The view given of the occurrence by a cotemporary writer is, " that Sir Na
thaniel Johnson had ingeniously succeeded in converting the republican party
into a low church party."* »
It will be recollected that in the convocation of 1702, the lower house had
manifested a strong disposition to kick against the legitimate power of their
dignified superiors ; until frowned into submission by sovereign disapprobation.
The faction who had seized the reins of government m Carolina had, most
undutifully, adopted the heterodox notion, that by establishing and supporting
the clergy of the church of England, their congregations acqmred a right to
install and dismiss them. But this was a direct encroachment upon the power
of the bishop of London, in whose diocess all the churches in North America
were included ; for he claimed the right to induct and to dismiss. And this
usurpation, (not those upon the rights of the people of the province,) drew
upon the party the frown of power ; a consequence which they foresaw might
follow, and might produce the dismission of the governor and deputies, and
therefore vested themselves with legislative powers for eighteen months after
such a change of rulers, if it should take place.
The Society for propagating the Gospel also took the alarm at this attack
upon the hierarchy, and refused to favour the colony with any more mission
aries, or rather ministers, until they should repeal the obnoxious law which
asserted this heretical doctrine. But it was now too late ; that law was a
component part of the act for establishing the church of England in the pro
vince; and with all their fondness for church, the party who passed it were
unwilling to part with power; or perhaps were obliged to insist on this sacrifice
to the feelings of an outraged people. These laws continued in foree until
1 706, when the bishop of London was again permitted to resume his powers
of acting by a deputy, called his commissary.

* Oldmixoa.

248 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Very soon after the passage of these acts, the assembly appears to have
.^-v^x^ repented, or become ashamed of its subserviency to the party that carried
them through; and to have passed an act to repeal those obnoxious laws:* but
> the governor and council possessed a veto, and prevented their repeal. The
dissenters forwarded a strong memorial against these measures to the lords pro
prietors, but in vain. The fanatic Granville declared they were wise laws, and
in reply to the moderate counsels of Archdale, avowed his resolution to support
them. Finding all efforts to obtain redress from that quarter utterly hopeless*
the agent of the dissenters brought the subject before the house of lords, who
espoused their cause in an address to the queen. The queen, no doubt with a
view to temporize, referred it to the lords of trade and plantations ; and they,
pursumg their system of redudng all the coloMes immediately to subjection to
the crown, advised their royal mistress to take the legal measures, to nullify
the charter of the proprietors. But Granville was at her majesty's elbow, and
the affair was soon dismissed from her thoughts.
Yet the usurpations of this period appear to have been altogether the result
of religious zeal, and (gross as were the infringements upon civil liberty) to
have had no other object than the secure establishment of the church of Eng
land, under influence of the alarm excited by the bishops in the precedmg
reign. As long as a preponderance in the council was preserved by the church
party, this end was complete ; for the laws passed for that purpose could not
be repealed. And the preponderance soon after acquired by the whig party in
the other house, could only be made use of to obtain occasional concessions
from the council by laying their offerings upon the altars of the church. At
length, however, on the 30th November 1706, a general compromise took
place,- and the repeal of the test-act was purchased by the passage of a church-
act divested of some of the clauses which trenched upon the jurisdiction of the
bishop of London. The minister was made eligible by the episcopal inhabit
ants of the parish, but not removeable by temporal authority ; and in order to
raise Ms salary, every inhabitant of a parish, of whatever religion or denomi
nation, was made liable to an assessment, to be levied, (under the sanction of a
penalty,) by a board of commissioners constituted for that purpose— whenever
the public treasury should be found inadequate to pay them.f Thereby mak
ing the levying of their salaries upon the people, independent even of the legis
lature of the state.

* Oldmixon, vol. 1. p. 361. t Trott's Laws, p. 127, 129, et sea.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 249
Heavily, as the act perpetuating the legislature of 1 703-5, bore at the time chap.
upon the liberties of the people, it afforded an ample precedent for the assump- ¦^v-^
tion of legislative powers by the representatives of the people. Accordingly
by refering to the legislative transactions of the colony we find, that their
power was extended in time to most of the popular subjects that come within
the cognizance of the legislature of a free people. In the year 1712, they
passed a law declaring what British statutes shall be held of force in the Coun
try, and giving validity to the common law of Great Britam; in 1716, they
passed a general law imposing a duty upon imports and exports, even so far
as to demand ten per cent, upon articles imported from the mother country ;
and in 1721, they adopt the language of the British parliament, in the passage
of a law granting a revenue to the king, " An act for granting to his majesty
a duty and imposition on negroes, liquors, and other goods and merchandize
imported into, and exported out of, tMs province."
Thus far the advance of the colony from a state of feudal subjection to that
of an mdependent people, was rather rapid than otherwise. Fifty years had
carried them through the successive changes wMch had required near five
Hundred in England. But some degrading badges still remained. All the
great officers of state were appointed by, arid retained at the will of the lords-
proprietors, and the provmce was held as a property, and the inhabitants re
garded only as the cultivators of the lands of another. The conduct of the-
lords proprietors towards them also, was that of sordid landlords ; or rather of,
what they proposed originally to render themselves, the lords of a colony of
serfs, or villams. Never regarding themselves as the dignified patrons of a
rising state, their sole object was to create a property, and not to promote the
interests of a colony. They claimed to themselves much credit for their
advances to the colonists in their first emigration ; but it was only the advance
of a merchant to a customer ; for the individual or the colony was made debtor
to the proprietors. To defend the colony from attack, they never seem to
have ranked among their duties ; and as the crown had surrendered all right
to interfere with the internal concerns of the colony, (except to levy imposts
or duties, it would seem,) the people were left wholly to their own protection,
by masters, who still asserted their right to govern them, and who addressed
all their efforts to drawing from them an income, which it was impossible for
them to pay, whilst all their resources were withdrawn to the defence of the
colony, or the maintenance of the officers set over them by the proprietors.
From the earliest settlement of the province the whig party had writhed
under the proprietary institutions, and were ever ready to join in an effort to
overturn this offensive system. But, restrained by the power and influence of

25© MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, the government; with their wealth and their cares for ever pre-occupied by
,the defence of the province, or the maintenance of their families; under the
pressure of poverty, or the ravages of disease ; they had been able hitherto
to advance only with a slow and cautious step towards the attainment of their
views. At length, about the year 1716, a variety of events occurred, to unite all
parties in the state in one great, and ultimately successful effort to throw off the
yoke of the proprietors. A governor was found in the person of Robert
Daniel to espouse the cause of the people; as were several deputies of the
proprietors, of sufficient independence to join in a remonstrance in their behalf.
Wars with the Spamards, the French, and the Indians, had involved the
colony deeply in debt ; and to find an expedient for present relief, they had
been driven to the measure of emitting bills of credit — resting for their value
upon mere national faith. The evil of course grew upon them, for the draft
only irritated the thirst it was intended to allay. At length, in the spring of
the year 1715, the colony was brought to the brink of ruin by the sudden
incursion of a bloody and formidable enemy. A league of the surrounding
Indians, (then very numerous,) promoted by the Spaniards, and headed by the
formidable tribe of the Yamasees, poured, in a torrent, upon the secure and
defenceless planters, and laid the whole province in flames and ruin. In the
course of three days, four hundred inhabitants were swept away, every plan
tation broken up or deserted, and the whole population of the province driven
for security within the entrenchments of Charlestown. Their governor,
Charles Craven, conducted himself with exemplary prudence and bravery ;
and not only repelled the invaders, but mflicted on them a chastisement from
which they never recovered. But the invasion had happened at a season that
was fatal to the crops of the year, and the families of the colonists must perish,
or provision be procured, at whatever hazard or expense. Impoverished, and
still distressed by scalping parties of their enemy, the colonists solicited relief
from the proprietors; but so far were these hard task-masters from affording^
it, that they conducted themselves towards the petitioners with iffiberality and
meanness. By the expulsion of the Yamasees, a very fine country was left open to
adventurous settlers. It is that which lies in the south-western part of the state
of South Carolina, and is now so justly celebrated for its productions of rice
and sea-island cotton. It was then, and is now by the aged, called Indian
land. Considering this as an acqmsition won by their own personal valour,
the colonists, with a disinterestedness and prudence greatly to their reputation,
resolved to devote it to the purpose, of establishing a frontier settlement that

Major general greene. 251
Would defend the interior of the colony against future inroads of the savages ; chap.
who, though driven beyond the Savannah River, were very numerous ; and v^^v^
from them continual irruptions might be expected as from an enemy, recently
driven from his country, exasperated by defeat, and excited by the Spaniards.
Five hundred of the brave and hardy yeomanry of Ireland immediately
embraced this opportunity of improving their condition, and volunteered to
encounter the dangers attending it, in consideration of the grant of moderate
tracts of the conquered territory. Yet, scarcely had they seated themselves in
their new acquirements, and exhausted their little stores in the first expenses of
such establishments, when the proprietors resolved to expel them, and lay off
the Indian land in baronies for themselves, or their creatures. The settlement
was ruined, and the surviving individuals of it, cursing the faithless Caroli
nians and avaricious proprietors, sought an asylum in Pennsylvama; whilst
the coloMsts, instead of deriving protection from the proprietors, saw their
flanks again laid bare to a relentless enemy.
The indignation excited by tMs event, was deep and universal ; for the
colonists saw that they were ever to be sacrificed to the private views of the
proprietors ; whilst the conduct of the proprietors is easily to be explained, by
considering how the precedent of a grant of land without their concurrence,
would operate, both on their interests, and their control over the legislative
powers of the colonial assembly.
The repeal of this, and several other salutary laws passed at the same time
by the colonial assembly, and approved of by the governor and council, gave
rise to the question upon which the revolution of 1719 was made to turn.
The colony resolved to maintain, " that the lords proprietors could not repeal
a law which had received the sanction of their deputies m council ; that they
would carry those laws into effect, notwithstanding the repeal by the proprie
tors." A variety of circumstances concurred to render this a very favourable time
for prosecuting the grand project of overthrowing the proprietary government.
For the first time, there was a governor and council disposed to side with the
popular party. They had given their assent to several highly popular acts,
and united with the people in their remonstrances against the conduct of the
lords proprietors. One of the acts wMch met the disapprobation of the pro
prietors, was designed to regulate the Indian trade, and draw from it a revenue
to be applied to the exigences of the country : another, for laying a duty on
imports for the same purpose : a third, for making a further issue of paper
money ; and a fourth, for conceding to the country party, the right of electing
representatives at their respective parish churches, instead of balloting for the

252 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, whole in Charlestown, as heretofore; a circumstance which had always given
v^-v^, to the party of the royalists, an undue weight in influencing the elections.
It is impossible to imagine laws better calculated to unite popular opinion,
or the rejection of which could tend more to disgust the mass of the commu^
Mty with their imperious rulers. But every one of these measures bore with
it an assumption of legislative power, although of powers oibviously necessary
for the good of the community, and of course awakened the jealousy of the
lords proprietors. About the same time also, the commuMty was made to feel
sensibly the degradation of being governed by officers in whose appointment
they had no voice ; and whose continuance in office, depended upon the arbi
trary will of the proprietors, not upon the correctness of their conduct. Chief
Justice Trott, had been accused and convicted of various disgraceful and op
pressive acts in his office, and a strong remonstrance sent on to obtain Ms
removal from office. But he was among the most able and active champions
of proprietary power, and instead of being degraded, his conduct was grate
fully eulogised ; whilst the governor and every member of council who had
espoused the popular cause, were dismissed from office. Affairs now ap
proached to a crisis.
Robert Johnson, the son of Nathaniel, a man very much beloved and
respected, had superceded DaMel, and arrived from England with instructions
containing the repeal of all the favourite measures of the colony, and enforcing
the prosecution of a plan of administration calculated to thwart the views of
the popular party. All the efforts and popularity of the governor were oMy
able to support the tottering fabric of the proprietary government for two years
longer. In 1719 the explosion took place; the revolution was effected without
bloodshed ; with a degree of system, talent, and unanimity, higMy creditable
to the agents who promoted it; and in a manner most ingeMously adapted to
precedents furnished by the mother country, in the revolution which put an end;
to the dynasty of the Stewarts, and placed the present family upon the English
throne.* The proprietary officers were all dismissed, with the exception of
Rhett, who, by playing a double game, ingeMously managed to retam Ms-
office, wMle he secured the thanks, and retained the confidence of his original
masters. A governor and council were elected by the assembly m the name
of the king ; and on him, with the most solemn and reiterated professions of
loyalty, they cast themselves for protection.

Hewifc, vol. 1. p. 232, et passim.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 253
Well they knew that they would not be rejected. The national inclination, chap.
and the views of the ministry were now strongly bent on reducing the colonies s^^^>
under regal government. A bill had actually been before parliament for the
purpose ; and would have passed, but for the opposition of the free states to
the eastward, and the descendants of the proprietary grantees. It would not
be uncharitable to suppose that some indirect intimation had been communi
cated to the leaders of the whig party in Carolina, that such a measure would
not be unacceptable, — in order to remove from their minds the terrors that
hung over the poor eokmists from the prmciples established in the case of
Culpepper. Yet they appear not to have been unmindful of the precedent of
their ancestors in the affair of the Fundamental Constitutions, in securing to
themselves a shelter against the charge of Mgh treason; for, all the arts of
flattery were exhausted to prevail on Johnson to take the government upon
Mmself under the new order of things ; but they were tried in vam. With a
digmty and firmness, equalled only by Ms moderation and perseverance, he
rejected their advances, and peaceably retired to his plantation. Though he
lost his power, he lost not an atom of public esteem and confidence. A very
few years elapsed before he was cordially hailed by all as the representative of
his sovereign, in the same station.*
George I. was then on the tilrone of Great Britain. He did not hesitate
long about the measures to be pursued. A governor of talents, moderation,
and popular manners, was appointed. A new assembly convened, an act of
amnesty passed, the regal government peaceably established, and some liberal
concessions made to the trade and commerce of the colony.
Shadowy indeed was the ground upon which the crown decided to resume
the grant made to the proprietors. But not more shadowy and insincere than
that upon which the grant had been originally solicited and obtained. " To
propagate the Christian religion among the native heathen." That they had
not answered tMs professed object of their endowment, was most true ; and the
resort to that ground for dispossessing them, was most just and retaliatory. It
may with confidence be asserted, that these very pious proprietors, with all the
aid of the pious society for propagating religion m foreign parts, had never
made a single Indian convert. Indeed, the officers of the province had always
been too intent upon making Indian slaves, and the two objects were then

* A monument near the pulpit in St. Philip's Church in Charleston, commemorates the worth
of this governor. Such an acknowledgment was, at that time, a work of signal distinction. Now,
the privilege i» conferred on any one who will incur the expense,, or endow the church.

254 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, supposed to be incompatible. Hence we find among the laws of this colony*
^t^s^a °ne declaring that a slave shall not be made free by being baptized.*
As between the proprietors and coloMsts, the case was widely different. If
ever it was lawful to resort to revolutionary principles, it was in this case. The
colony had never received from the proprietors the protection due from rulers.
It had been literally regarded by them as a plantation ; and the inhabitants as
mere labourers in the vineyard. Necessity obliged the inhabitants to defer the
effort too long. But the proprietors were regarded as the substitutes of the
crown, and to resist them had been decided to be treason against the king.
Still, however, three badges of dependance remained fastened upon the
colony. The parliament asserted the right of regulating the trade of the
country, and the king, that of appointing to all the great offices of the state ;
these offices, therefore, were held by men who, though paid by the colony,
acknowledged no dependance on, or responsibility to them. The third was
still more humiliating. The king retained a veto upon all the colomal laws.
This was exercised through the board of trade while that existed, and after
wards by the secretary of the colonial department. Before these representa
tives of sovereign authority, the colony was obliged to appear by counsel to
solicit the passage of its acts, or the adoption of any measure of policy thought
necessary for its own welfare. They had in fact to keep a standing agent, or soli
citor, in London, for these purposes, and it is not easy to read with temper the
humiliations to which they appear, at times, to have been subjected, by these
substitutes of proprietary tyranny. The correspondence between the board
appointed to conduct these solicitations on this side the water, through the aid
of agents retained counsel and benevolent patrons of the colony there, is still
extant. But, for the present, the people were content. Party seems almost to have
been annihilated. The common danger and common distresses that they had
recently shared, and the common effort that had been successfully made in
bringing about the present state of things, seem to have produced an umversal
good will throughout the colony, which was not a little heightened by the
pleasing contemplation of their rapid progress in wealth and population ; no
thing puts men in better humour with themselves and all the world. In nine
years afterwards, an adjustment between the proprietors and the crown, for
the purchase of the interest of seven of the eight proprietors, and a designa
tion of the eighth share in a particular region of the state of North Carolina,

Arts 1712, June 7.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 255
placed the mmds of the colonists entirely at ease. Liberal measures were chap.
adopted for giving encouragement to settlers, the government lent its aid to ^^-v-o
their protection, and the most grateful of all sacrifices was made to the feelings
of the country party, by delivering them from that odious badge of depend
ance, the degrading annual contribution, called quit-rents. This was but one
Shilling for every hundred acres ; but it was imposed as a badge of depend
ance, and the point of honour with the emigrant was to to become lord of the
soil. Hence, from the very commencement of the colony, it was ever a sub
ject of bickering and heartburning. A condition of forfeiture was attached to
the failure of payment, and the occupant of the soil coMd never tolerate the
idea of being thus bound down to make this annual offering on the shrine of
aristocracy. The years that elapsed between 1728 and 1763, were years of unprecedented
prosperity. The increase of population was immense, and in the enjoyment
of unexampled happiness, the people became gay, polished and devoted to
hospitality. Among those who passed the meridian of life during that period,
it was always affectionately remembered by the appellation of the good old
times. Society was, at that time, precisely in that state which is most favour
able to the enjoyment of fife. Sufficiently refined to gratify a cultivated taste,
without being encumbered with those factitious embellishments wMch embar
rass the intercourse of social life. The luxuries of the day were within the
reach of a moderate fortune, and few could be said to be elevated above one
common level. Hence social happiness was not disturbed by the workings of
envy, or the haughty demeanour of upstart pride. The party in power felt
and acknowledged that they had been called to the government by the voice
of the people; and the people blended with a respectful deportment, the elevat
ing consciousness of those who have conferred the power to which they sub
mit. Indeed, with all the high and just pretensions of republicanism, it will
ever be a question, whether that state of things which tempts all to ambitious
pursuits, although it developes the powers of man, and expands his bosom
with a conscious dignity not to be exchanged for life or happiness either, does
not entrench much upon that tranquillity of mind, without which much may be
possessed, but little enjoyed.
Yet even at this period, when seemingly absorbed in the enjoyments of the
present hour, and actually knowing no other rivalship than in expressions of
loyalty and affection to the parent state, was the colony silently preparing for
the revolution which finally severed it from this object of its earliest and
strongest affections. It was acquiring strength, wealth, habits of self-govern
ment, and above all, the information that was necessary to extricate it from

256 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, that moral dependance which resulted from a conscious, or inculcated inferio-
, rity to every thing transatlantic and British.
Insurrection, rebellion, popular commotion, may be result of single and
obvious occurrences ; but great revolutions are secretly prepared in the alembic
of time, and are the effects of causes seldom avowed by those who promote
them, and not always discernible, whilst the view is confused by passing
events. The polish of an English education at this time, was deemed indispensable
to every youth, whose fortune, connexions, or ambition, lifted his views to
distinction, or to public usefulness. At the great schools, or in the public msti-
tutions of Great Britain established for initiation to the learned professions, the
youth of Carolina learned to set a just estimate on their own talents and
acquirements, and to see and feel that the inferiority of the colonist or North
American, existed only in the reveries of the gownman, or the delusion of a
selfish policy. Hence, at the breaking out of the revolution, the state of South
Carolina was found well stocked with native citizens of talents, acqmrementt
and spirit, competent to conducting so great an undertaking. These men, on
their return to their native country, found themselves degraded by the intrusion
of a swarm of officers, whose promotion often had no other origm than the
intrigues of a footman, or the blandisments of a mistress. At the breaking out
of the revolution, and for some time before that event, there was scarcely a
native in any of the offices in the gift of the crown, in South Carolina. In
deed, some had been removed, to make place for others, from whom more
pliancy might be expected.* Thus, generally speaking, was the state of things

* The following facts will serve to illustrate this passage of the text. They are extracted from an
authentic source.
" About the year 1752 the great contest was decided for the Westminster election between Lord
Trenholm, the ministerial candidate, and Sir George Vandeput, the opposition candidate; Mr. Lee
was then an eminent counsellor in England, and high bailiff of Westminster, and he returned Lord
Trenholm as duly elected, when Sir George Vandeput ought undoubtedly to have been returned, as
the successful candidate. The opposition were so exceedingly exasperated at this return, that they
began to take serious measures to indict Mr. Lee, for a false and corrupt return. To disarm them he
agreed to vacate his office, and as our judges (of South Carolina) then held their offices durante bene
placeto of the crown, Chief Justice Pinckney's office was taken from him, and conferred on Mr. Lee,
who held the office to his death, and as he was a man of abilities and a good lawyer, he filled it well.
On his death, a Mr. Simpson, (not a lawyer,) was temporarily appointed; and afterwards, a Mr.
Shinner, (still less a lawyer than Simpson,) was made chief justice. This was through the influence
of Lord Halifax's mistress, he being then first lord of the board of trade and plantations. Shinner
held the office until the time of the stamp-act, when, upon his refusing to do business without stamps,

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. £57
in South Carolina favourable to the success of the revolution of 1776. Har- chap,
VII
mony prevailed among the people, their circumstances were easy, and the ,
spirit of independence, or attachment to civil liberty, which their fathers had
brought over with them into the colony, had been fostered by two successive
revolutions, which heaped honour upon the memory of their supporters, whilst
they greatly improved the condition of the citizens. Evfcn the establishment
of the episcopal church in the province, was not as unfavourable to civil
liberty as might be imagined. From its first establishment, it will be recol
lected, that it exhibited an attachment to the low church, or republican eccle
siastical tenets. And although most of their ministers adhered to their sove
reign, and left the country when the oath of allegiance to the state was
tendered them, it must be recollected that they were missionaries selected by
the society for propagating Christianity. Almost all the leading wliigs, in the
low country, were of the episcopal church ; nor was there ever exhibited any
thing of dissension or party spirit between the members of that sect and the
dissenters, during the war. The distinction of whig and tory had no reference
to, or dependance upon that cause. The distinction of sect was totally done
away by one of the first acts of the state. And the people had among them a
class of men calculated to moderate and direct the public efforts, mid who,
beside sharing in common in the feelings and interests of the community, had
an additional stimulus of their own for siding with, and sustaining a revolt
tionary effort. Nor can we omit the assertion, that South Carolina had always

the assembly, in the absence of the governor, prevailed on Mr. Bull, the lieutenant governor, to ap
point Mr. Lowndes, Mr. Benjamin Smith, and Mr. D'Oyley judges, and they, with Mr. Pringle,
already a judge, opened the court without stamps, and did business as usual. Chief Justice Shimmer
died, and Mr. Smith resigned, but the rest continued in office until the year 1770, or 1771, when a
secretary of state was appointed by the crown to supercede the board of trade and plantations; and,
Lord Hillsborough being first nominated to that office, he vacated the existing commissions, and
appointed a new set of judges, most of them Irishmen. The object was, that they might have
judges on whom the could always depend."
The following list exhibits the names of most of the Carolinians, if not all, who were educated in
England about this period, and those conversant with the revolutionary history of South Carolina,
will recognise among them many conspicuous actors on the arena of the revolution ; all of them, with
a solitary exception, it is believed, were the steady and animated supporters of the American cause.
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Thomas Pinckney, John Rutledge, Mr. M'Kenzie, Ralph Izard,
sen. Thomas Middleton, William Henry Drayton, Charles Drayton, Dr. Charles Drayton, Mr.
Stoutonborough, Hugh Rutledge, Thomas Heyward, Thomas Lynch, Paul Trapier, Mr. Harvey,
Alexander Moultrie, Mr. Hume, J. F. GrimW, Ralph Izard, jun. Walter Izard, Mr. Ladson, William
Heyward, Mr. Stead, Edward Rutledge, General Read, John Laurens, and Major Garden, besides
a number who were educated in Scotland, whose names we are not in possession of.
33

258 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, maintained a Mgh character for military enterprize. Her wars with the pirates
^^J^ and Spaniards woMd grace the early history of any state or nation, and
although some few of her conflicts with the aborigines have been narrated, a
very small proportion of her just claims to celebrity for this cause have been
published to the world. There exist the most authentic records to prove that
she extended her conquests even to the Apalachicola; and under the conduct
of Moor, her troops actually destroyed the Spamsh post near where Fort
Gadsden now stands; and after driving the Indians beyond that stream and
the Oakafanoka, to where the fugitives are even now distingmshed by the
name of Seminoles, brought back a number of prisoners, and settled them
under the control of Fort Moor, on the Savannah River. Hence the dignity,
firmness, and effect with which the revolution was sustained in the south, until
Charleston sunk under the overwhelming efforts of an enraged and baffled
enemy. Until that event, a most striking unanimity had exhibited itself in the
whole seacoast of the southern country ; but when the possession of that post
gave the enemy an influence, if not a command, from the Chesapeake to
Florida, the weak, the timid, and the corrupt, separated themselves from the
mass of the community, and too many manifested by their subsequent con
duct, that they either wanted stamina for the contest they had engaged in, or
had graduated their conduct by a selfish, time-serving policy.
In the upper country of the southern states the case was materially different
From the very origin of the contest, in various parts of that region, strik
ing symptoms of disaffection had manifested themselves. The diversity of
opimon that existed there, was the necessary result of a variety of causes.
The whole of that country had been recently settled. The progress of colo
nization had not been gradually extending from the seacoast to the interior ;
but a stream of emigration, extending from the north to the milder climate of
the south, had occupied that country. The conduct of the legislatures of the
several states, had not been marked with liberality, or proper attention to these
settlers; and very generally there prevailed a rivalsMp, or distrust, between the
upper and lower countries in these states, — feelings which, in a mitigated
degree, exist to this day. In every instance, the legislatures were tardy and
reluctant in extending to the new settlers the consideration due to members of
the commumty ; instead of securing their confidence and affections by a liberal
and enlightened policy. Hence many of them were disposed to consider the
promoters of opposition to the encroachments of the British government, as
disturbers of the public peace, and as selfish demagogues, whose only object
in throwing off the royal government, was to take the reins into their own
hands.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 259
Besides this, that country had long been distracted by the most violent feuds cttap.
VII
and private animosities. v>-v-^
The first wMte inhabitants of those frontiers were a bold and adventurous
race of men, often driven by their crimes, their debts, or their vices, to follow
the roving life of the hunter state ; and in civilization, but little, if at all ad
vanced beyond the native savage. When the respectable agriculturalist pene
trated these forests, he was sometimes obliged, for common defence, to associate
with this class of people, and the association was generally fatal to the morals
of the rising generations. But more frequently they formed distinct societies,
and, in process of time, became deadly hostile to each other. It seldom hap
pened that the first settlements made, were sufficiently numerous or respectable
to attract the notice of the government of the province ; and not unfrequently,
as they were made without the sanction of a grant, did it happen, that the set
tlers wished not to attract the notice of government. But it was necessary to
defend themselves, both against the incursions of the Indians, and the lawless
race of wandering whites, who were tempted by the prospect of impunity to
commit depredations on their property. Hence there were distributed over
that country various small communities, who entered into associations to do
that justice to themselves, and inflict that punishment upon others, which ought
to have devolved upon the state, within the limits of which they were situated.
y This was the origin of that class of people called regulators, — a name, in the'
first instance, assumed by the early settlers in North Carofina when resistance
to their rulers was the object of association.
It seldom happens that justice thus administered, is not oppressively admin
istered. v These associations were in the habit of inflicting the severest castiga-
tion for offences ; and individuals, when pursued for imputed crimes, were not
unfrequently brought down by the rifle. Nor was the vigilance of the regu
lators in time, limited to their own protection from the commission of crimes.
When the surveyors, under legitimate warrants, approached their establish
ments, they were not unfrequently warned to retire, and disobedience exposed
them to the penalty of a breach of regulation. It may very well be supposed
that these acts of violence provoked retaliation. And such was the animosity
often excited by acts done under this assumed authority, that resort was had to
ambush and the deadly rifle for revenge. It was many years after the revolu
tionary war, before the courts of justice were able to break down tMs habit of
inflicting punishment rather than prosecute the offender before a lawful tri
bunal.- ' When the settlements had advanced to a state of respectability, tMs mode of
administering summary justice assumed a more respectable form. The inha-

260 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, bitants alleged the neglect of the states to provide regular and conveMent
^r^^, courts for the admimstration of justice ; and large districts of country would
enter into associations, to which they would commuMcate something of sys
tem; and at the commencement of the revolution, which ever side was
espoused by such an association, all those whom they had punished or perse
cuted, would immediately crowd to the opposite standard in hopes of revenge.
Indeed, it not unfrequently happened, that a connexion, or an associate in one
band, incurred the vengeance or punishment of another, and then the whole
clan became arrayed in opposition to each other.
/ It has been noticed by some of the writers on the American war, and
/seems to have excited their surprise, that any of those settlements which had
! been in hostility with the royal government of the coloMes, should, during the
| revolution, have united themselves to the royal standard. But the thing
was perfectly natural. Such men had no state attachments, and consi-'
^ dered the revolutionary government as identified with the colomal govern
ments. From these therefore, they had nothing to expect but the perpetuation
of the laws and policy under wMch they had been vexed, and, as they con
tended, unjustly harassed. They naturally joined the enemies of their perse
cutors. From the success of the royal arms they might expect rewards,
revenge, or an amelioration of their prospects, but not from the firm establish
ment of that order of things, and those rulers, whom they had hitherto eyed
with hostility.
The effects of these feuds were severely felt in the course of the revolutionary
war, and drew forth from General Greene, in several of his letters, an assertion
that the parties pursued each other like wild beasts. The scene displayed was
indeed awful. Other states knew nothing of the horrors of the warfare car
ried on in the south. Horrors which, it will be seen, were greatly aggravated
by the countenance given to such acts, by officers holding British commissions.
There were still other causes of diversity of opinion operating upon the
interior of the southern states. Both in North and South Carolina, there were
respectable settlements of quakers, and that sect, notwithstanding the conspi
cuous commanders wMch it gave to the service, furMshed no soldiers ; it ap
pears to have been nearly unanimous against the war throughout the United
States. Indeed, their leading tenet admitted of no other conduct than a state
of neutrality ; but they have not had credit in these states for confining them
selves rigidly wilhing the limits which neutrality would prescribe. It was not
expected that they should fight, and if they were partial in furnishing supplies,
or intelligence, perhaps it is attributable to the dhTerence in value between
British gold and American paper. Yet it is more probable that they have

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 261
been calumniated by those who were sustaining evils from which the disciples chap.
of passive obedience were partially exempt. v^-s^w
In North Carolina there were also the Moravian settlements, whose tenets
are unfavourable to war, or interference in political contests ; and the settle
ment of Scots, in the neighbourhood of Cross Creek, who, to this day, are cut
off from communication with the rest of the world, by obstinately confining
themselves to speaking the Erse language. They of course had not risen
above the habits of devotion of their ancient countrymen, when summoned to
attend their chiefs to war. They were decidedly hostile to the American cause,
and always the firm adherents to a few active and enterprising leaders, who
greatly obstructed the progress of the revolutionary war in the country border
ing on the dividing line between North and South Carolina.

262 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

CHAP. VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

Progress of the war in the southern department, to the time of General Greene's
taking command.

JL HE writers of Great Britain are loud in their declamations against the
/ ingratitude of her coloMes, for engaging in what was represented by them, and
recognised by one American, as an unnatural war.* But it is a fact not un
worthy of notice, that the developement of the oppressive system which the
mother country had resolved to pursue towards the coloMes, was at a time
when Great Britain had been compelled to acknowledge a debt of gratitude
to her colonies.
She actually refunded voluntary advances made by the coloMes in the war
of 1756. It was at the conclusion of that war, by which the nation acquired
nothing but an accession to her pride and her debt, that she commenced the
prosecution of measures that drove from her arms the most promising of her
colonial offspring. The pretext for passing the stamp-act of 1765, was to raise
a revenue for the defence of the colonies. But the reason assigned was adding
insult to injury. The protection thus to be paid for, consisted in a swarm of
guarda costas, really intended for no other purpose than to protect the mother
.country from a diminution of the profits expected from the monopoly of colo-
Mal trade ; or in the maintenance of troops and officers intended to keep the
coloMes in subjection, while the parliament were riveting the chains forged for
* Colonel Lee.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 263
America by the premier Sir Robert Grenville. This was extending to the chap.
country the protection which the tenant of the dungeon derives from the sen- v^^-i^
tinel placed at the door. Dr. Franklin's witty fable on this occasion is more
remarkable for the aptness of its allusions, than the decency of its incidents.
Whatever may have been the state of the question as to other colonies, with
regard to those in the south, the principle of the stamp-act was founded m
palpable usurpation. The British constitution recogmzes the principle that the
rights and duties of the subject are the result of compact, and that such com
pacts are deducible, as well from usage and acquiescence, as from written
concession. The first charter of Charles dated in 1663, reserved nothMg to the crown
but the sovereign dominion of the country; all legislative, executive, and judi
cial power was vested in the lords proprietors, with the express reservation,
that these powers should be executed " with the advice, assent, and approbation
of the freemen of the colony." And the right was also granted them to
" enjoy customs and subsidies which they, with the consent of the freemen,
should impose upon goods loaded and unloaded." From this it would result,
that the king retained nothing but his royal veto upon the legislative power of
the colony. Whence the parliament derived any power at all to legislate over
the colonies, it is not easy to determine. But the colony, in the days of its
infancy, had submitted to the parliamentary assertion of the right of regulating
its foreign trade, and this was the inlet of further encroachments. The first
compact of the lords proprietors with the colonists in May 1663, declared,
" That all persons settling on Charles River to the southward of Cape Fear,
shall have power to fortify its banks, taking the oath of allegiance to the king,
and submitting to the government of the proprietaries; that the emigrants
may present to them thirteen persons, in order that they may appoint a gover
nor, and council of six, for three years ; that an assembly, composed of the
governor and council, and delegates of the freemen, should be called as soon
as the circumstances of the colony would allow, with power to make laws,
which should be neither contrary to the laws of England, nor of any validity
after the publication of the dissent of the proprietaries ; that the same freedom
from customs which had been conferred by the royal charter, should be allowed
to every one," &c* These were the original conditions on which South
Carolina was planted ; and when, in the August following, the lords proprie
tors undertook, in their celebrated fundamental articles, to impose a govern-

* Chalmers' Political Annals, 517-

264 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, ment upon the colony varying materially from their original concessions, the
,coloMsts at once resisted, and finally compelled the proprietaries to abandon
this unjustifiable encroachment upon the compact on which the relation be
tween the ruler and the ruled was first assumed. From that time the imposi
tion of " duties and customs on goods loaded and uMoaded," was uMformly
exercised by the colonial legislature ; and when the colony threw off the pro
prietary government, the right of the legislature to exercise that power, was
repeatedly acqmesced in by the sanction of the crown given to laws passed
upon that subject.
The flimsy ground upon which the right of parliament to impose internal
taxes on the colomsts was asserted, was, " that as British subjects they were
liable to be governed, wherever they were, by the legislative power of Great
Britain;" and it has been asserted, that the second charter of Charles II. of
June 1665, reserved the power of parliament to regulate and tax the colo
nists.* It is m vain that we look in that charter for any such reservation. The
colonists and their children were declared to be denizens of England, who
should always be considered as the same people, and possess the same privi
leges, as those dwelling within the realm. But it would be absurd to deduce
from this concession — tMs grant of a boon, a conseqent liability to be reduced
to a state of absolute subjection — of being governed without being represented.
It is obviously a grant of a right to enjoy the privileges of a colomst, without
losmg the civil rights attached to Ms character of a British subject. All the
other privileges conferred on him by the charter of 1663, are confirmed by tMs,
and a variety of others were intended to be conferred by it — that of a voice
in granting customs is particularly conferred, but not a syllable has any relation
to the right of parliament to exercise this power over the colonies. Nor, in
the course of near half a century that elapsed after the establishment of the
royal government in the province of South Carolina, was such a power ever
hinted at, except in the indirect instance of regulating the trade between the
coloMes. The previous history of the southern province might have furnished the
British ministry with a tolerably correct idea of the reception wMch the stamp-
act would meet with there. The alarm was universal, the measures of
the colonists prompt and decisive, their remonstrances respectful but charac
terized by a strength of language and boldness of thought that left no doubt to

* Chalmers, 522.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 265
what issue they pointed. With an ill grace the ministry receded from this first chap.
attempt ; for they saw the gathering of a storm that they had not anticipated. ^^^
But the repeal of the stamp-act was qualified by an assertion which rendered
the boon contemptible. A preamble to the repealing law, affirmed the right
of the parliament to legislate over the colonies in all cases whatsoever. Ex
travagant was the joy of the colonists, when the repeal of this obnoxious law
was announced to them. But not so with the more grave and flunking part
of the American people. The single law was nothing, the principle which it
asserted alarmed them, and the avowed adherence of the parliament to that
principle, left them every thing to apprehend for their posterity.
It has been mentioned by every American historian who has written on the
American war, that the people of America did not wish for a separation from
Great Britain. It takes a long time, and requires great pains to bring an
extensive people to think profoundly, especially on subjects which expose
opiMon to the restraints of authority ; but it is not to be supposed that the
enlightened and thinking men of the United States could have been long in
deciding to maintain their claim to either independence, or the extinction of
these pretensions of the British government. It is certam that there was at
least one man m South Carolina who, as early as 1766, foresaw and foretold
the views of the British government, and explicitly urged his adherents to the ¦
resolution to resist even to death.* A very few years showed, that although

* It is not to be expected that on a subject so highly important, th'ere is ever to be found a perfect
unanimity. On this point there is the best reason for maintaining that there were two parties in
South Carolina, who entertained very, opposite views as to the measure of independence. The
object of both was to have their grievances redressed; but one was willing yet to confide in the jus
tice and magnanimity of the British government, and deprecated the idea of a separation. The
other saw the impossibility of preserving the connexion of the two countries without perpetuating
the present badges of dependance and inferiority, and was disposed to make use of passing events as
the plausible pretexts, or present motives for resistance, but really with a view to absolute independ
ence, or a state approaching to a confederation. They were satisfied to continue in a state of firm
connexion with Great Britain, if secure from every exercise of royal or parliamentary authority that
could humble or degrade the colonist.
There is sufficient evidence in existence to prove that Colonel Henry Laurens was of the firsl
class, and that General Christopher Gadsden was of the last ; and these two gentlemen had much
influence in giving a turn and direction to opinion, in the commencement of the revolution.
The following extract of a memorial, addressed by Colonel Laurens, when in the tower, to the
, speaker of the house of commons, is taken from the New Annual Register for 1781, (Public Papers,
fa 65.) " The representation and prayer, &c. respectfully showeth, that your representer for many years
aithe peril of his life and fortune, evidently laboured to preserve and strengthen the ancient friendship
between Great Britain and the colonies, and that in no instance he ever excited, on either side, the
34

266 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, the parliament thought it advisable to retract at present, it was only retiring:
, to prepare its measures with more art and effect.
In the opposition which ensued, the southern states were surpassed by none
in zeal and energy. Georgia was at first a fittle checked by difficulties, greater
perhaps than any other state had to encounter, but her subsequent vigour am
ply atoned for her delay in the commencement.
Other states have of late exhibited much sensibility on the subject of pre
eminence in supporting the revolution, but let the following facts and dates
speak the just pretensions of South Carolina.
The first step towards continental union, was adopted m South Carolina
before it had been agreed upon by any colony south of New England;* this
was in the year 1765, immediately after the news arrived of the passage of the
stamp-act. South Carolina was the first of the uMted coloMes that formed an indepen
dent constitution; this was in March 1776, prior to the recommendation of
congress to that effect, f But an independent government in fact existed in the
colony from the 6th of July 1774. On that day a large convention of the
people was held, and an unanimous vote passed to support Massachusetts in
the vindication of her rights. From that time, although the royal government

dissensions which separated them. That the commencement of the present war was the subject of
great grief to him, inasmuch as he foresaw and foretold in letters now extant, the distresses which
both countries experience at this day."
General Gadsden, it is well known, and there are still living witnesses to prove it, always favoured
the most decisive and energetic measures. He thought it a folly to temporise, and insisted that cordial
reconciliation on honourable terms, was impossible. When the news of the repeal of the stamp-act
arrived, and the whole community was in extacy at the event, he, on the contrary, received it with
indignation. And privately convening a party of his friends beneath the celebrated Liberty-Treej
he there harangued them at considerable length on the.folly of relaxing their opposition and vigilance,
or indulging the fallacious hope that Great Britain would relinquish her designs or pretensions. He
drew their attention to the preamble of the act, and forcibly pressed upon them the absurdity of
rejoicing at an act that still asserted and maintained the absolute dominion of Great Britain over
them. And then reviewing all the chances of succeeding in a struggle to break the fetters whenever
again imposed on them, he pressed them to prepare their minds for the event. The address was
received with silent but profound devotion, and with linked hands, the whole party pledged them
selves to resist, — a pledge that was faithfully redeemed when the hour of trial arrived. The author
is in possession of the names of many who were present.
It was from this event that the Liberty-Tree took its name. The first convention of South Caro
lina held their meeting under it.
* Ramsay's History of South Carolina, vol. 1. p. 222.. f Ibid. 2<57«

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 267
nominally existed, the country was actually governed by committees and volun- chap.
tary associations, to whose will the most implicit obedience was paid, v^-v-^
On the 5th September 1775, the exigencies of the province obliged the
governor to convene an assembly ; but the first and only step they took was
to pass a vote approving the resolutions of the convention of July 1774; and
the governor, to prevent their proceeding further, immediately dissolved them.
Indeed, they had to proceed by concert and without debate, to prevent a disso
lution before the vote could be entered on their minutes.
On the 11th January 1775, the first revolutionary provincial congress met,
and laid the foundation for the more regular meeting of the convention of
March 1776, wMch formed the first constitution of South Carolina.
The convention of 1775 stamped money, established a court of admiralty
to condemn British vessels, issued letters of marque and reprisal, and on the
9th November 1775, authorized the commencement of hostilities against two
of his majesty's ships then lying in the harbour; having previously made them
selves masters of the royal forts that commanded the place of their mooring.
In April 1776, every thing was in active preparation for approaching hostili
ties. Intelligence had been recdved that Charleston would be honoured with
the attention of their enemy as soon as New York, their primary object, should
be disposed of. The conflict was anticipated without dread, and prepared for
with wise precaution. The state had raised three regular regiments, and these,
with the militia, constituted her own means of defence. In addition, the com
mander in chief had ordered on two regiments under Generals Howe and
Armstrong, and the abilities and experience of Major General Lee were called
into requisition to command the whole. The reinforcements arrived just at
the moment when they were wanted. On the 1st of June the enemy appeared *
off the bar of Charleston, and between that and the 28th, landed his troops on
Long Island, and advanced on Fort Moultrie with two heavy ships of fifty
guns, four frigates rating as twenty-eights, and four other heavy vessels.
Colonel Thomson at the head of the third Carolina regiment, kept the
army under Sir Henry Clinton in check, at the east end of Sullivan's island,
where they meditated an attack by crossing the channel that separates that from
Long Island ; whilst a dreadful conflict was maintained between Fort Moultrie
and the fleet under Sir Peter Parker. Here Colonel Moultrie commanded the
second Carolina regiment; and a better fought day has seldom been witnessed
in the annals of warfare. Its termination is well known. The British fleet
totally discomfitted, were scarcely in a condition to make their way good to
New York. The army reimbarked, and the enemy retired from before

268 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Charleston, strongly impressed with respect for the military prowess of the
^^~^A new state.
I This attack had been long in contemplation, and a co-operation of the
Indians on the western frontier had been arranged by the infamous John
j Stuart, Indian agent. The providential capture of one of his agents, put the
/ world m possession of the letters which proved the bloody transaction, and the
association of the loyalists in this savage warfare was incontestibly ascertained,
j by the capture of several dressed and painted like Indians.
Several hundred, men, women, and children, of the helpless inhabitants of
the frontier fell a sacrifice to the tomahawk and scalping knife. But it drew
\ a much greater number of recruits to the American standard. Horror per
vaded all classes of people at the early and deliberate employment, of these
savages by their humane ally. And many of the most respectable loyalists
became ashamed of an association that identified them with the perpetrators
of the barbarous cruelties that marked the progress of tMs enemy. Vengeance
soon followed them : the wMgs collected under Colonel Williamson, and in
flicted on these miserable deluded beings, evils under which the nation has
ever since langmshed. The knowledge, that tMs consequence unavoidably
follows upon inciting this unhappy race of men to war, is not among the least
reproaches that should fall upon the nation that employs them. In a few
months, the broken remains of these once powerful nations were obliged to
sue for peace, and of course obliged to make great sacrifices of territory to
obtain it.
The result of this campaign was highly honourable and beneficial to Caro
lina. The British repulsed ; the Indians chastised and driven over the moun
tains ; the spirit of the whigs were greatly animated, whilst the disaffected
were humbled and forced to fly to Florida, or purchase their safety by a time
serving submission. Nor was it among the least of the benefits which the
whigs derived from it, that they were initiated into practical warfare, and
taught to cherish confidence in themselves from the brilliant result of their
maiden efforts.
Another advantage flowed from this early success ; a general confidence was
diffused in the security of Charleston as a place of deposit for articles of mer
chandize ; and of retreat for privateers.
Whilst the British were occupied m their frmtless attempts in the north, and
their large fleets were engaged in watching the Chesapeake, Delaware, and
New York Bays, Charleston was for two years secure and tranquil, and in the
enjoyment of an extensive and lucrative commerce. But sad were the miseries

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 269
that ensued. And from north to south, no state suffered as South Carolina and chap.
VIII.
Georgia suffered, for the three or four last years of the war. v«*-v-^
It was not until the close of the year 1778, that the enemy again directed
their attention to the south. For two years, the two grand armies silently
watched each other on the banks of the Hudson, while the war was raging on
the ocean, or in the southern states.
On the 27th November 1778, an expedition sailed from New York under
Colonel Campbell, destined to operate against Georgia. Some time previous
to its sailing, orders had been issued to General Provost, who commanded in
Florida, to penetrate with all his disposable force into the state of Georgia, and
co-operate with CampbelFs detachment in getting possession of Savannah.
These orders were promptly obeyed, but so much delay attended the sailing of
the expedition from New York, that Provost, after penetrating to Sunbury,
was obliged to retire and wait its arrival. In December, Colonel Campbell
arrived in the Savannah River, and with great rapidity got possession of the
capital of Georgia. He then extended his line of posts as far as Augusta.
He was soon joined by Provost, and their joint force, now under the command
of the latter, consisted of 5,000 men, three thousand of whom were regular
troops. Upon the retreat of the British from before Charleston in 1776, General
Lee relinquished the command of the southern department to General Howe,
and rejoined the grand army. Upon the arrival of Campbell before Savannah,
he found Howe in command, with the poor remahis of an army that had been
broken and dispirited by an expedition undertaken m the most sickly part of
the preceding summer against Florida. Great as was the boast of the enemy
of his success against Savannah, the truth is, that Howe had not, at the
time of the attack, more than six hundred regular troops, and not above
one thousand militia, to cope with a well-appointed army of two thousand
picked troops. Yet Howe's reputation suffered greatly from the events of that
day. In the month of September preceding, Major General Lmcoln had been
appointed, by a resolve of congress, to supercede General Howe, and simulta
neous with the arrival of the enemy in Georgia, was that of Lincoln in South
Carolina. Without delay Lincoln proceeded with his whole disposable force
to the support of Howe, and at Purysburg, on the South Carofina shore of the
Savannah River, they formed a junction. A reinforcement under General
Ash from North Carolina, had increased their force nearly to an equality in
numbers with the enemy, and the post at Purysburg was so judiciously chosen,
as to oblige Provost to recall Campbell from Augusta, and concentrate his

270 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, forces near Hudson's Ferry upon the same river, a little below the mouth of
VIII , Briar Creek.
General Lincoln then conceived the design of covering the interior of Geor
gia, by pushmg a party, under General Ashe, across the river at a point above
the position of the British army. This movement led to the mdancholy defeat
at Briar Creek, where the command of General Ashe was totally surprised and
dissipated. This unfortunate event reduced Lincoln to the necessity of re
maining inactive until he could collect reinforcements that would again place
him in a condition for effective operations. It was not until the 19th of April
1779, that his reinforcements arrived, and he then immediately resolved, with
the advice of a council of war, to move up the river, and by crossing into
Georgia, to break the line of the enemy's posts, and operate upon his left or
rear. This unfortunate movement brought on the attack upon Charleston of
the year 1779. For immedately as General Provost had ascertained the inten
tion of his adversary, and that he had removed so far as to leave Charleston
exposed, he adopted the enterprizing resolution of penetrating to that place,
which, he had the best information did not expect and was not prepared for
such an attack.
On the 25th April, with 2,000 of the elite of his troops, flanked by seven
hundred loyalists and Indians, he crossed the river and pressed on towards
Charleston. General Moultrie had been left in command at Purysburg, with
one thousand men, chiefly militia, to hold Provost in check. With this inferior
force, composed of materials which a retreat always diminishes, he could do
nothing more than retreat before his enemy, check Mm at every pass, and
throw himself into the town, when he could no longer keep the field. It was
some time before Lincoln could be persuaded that this movement of the British
general, was any thing more than a feint, to recall him from his views of ope
rating in Georgia. But when the real object was ascertained, the American
general returned with all possible expedition, to defeat the enemy's purpose.
Yet, but for the zeal of the citizens and the firmness of Moultrie, he would
have arrived too late. The latter had opposed every possible obstacle to Ms
advance. In this he was much favoured by the innumerable streams which
cross the roads leading to Charleston. Although the distance does not exceed
one hundred and twenty-five miles, it required the British general seventeen
days to complete the march. In the mean time, every thing was in activity in
Charleston. Zeal supplied the want of time, and no hand, however unused
to labour, refused the spade or the axe. A breastwork was thrown up across
the neck of land on which the town is situated ; cannon mounted ; abbatis
planted; the woods that skirted the town, and woMd have protected the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 271
advance of an enemy, felled ; houses that impeded defence, destroyed; and, chap.
in fine, a state of preparation produced almost unexampled for the time v^-v-i^
allowed. Yet tMs exemplary zeal of the citizens was near being rewarded by indelible
disgrace. Some writers have slurred over tMs page of the history of the state,
and well were it if the fidelity of history could comport with the suppression.
It is too true, that when the town was summoned to surrender, a proposition
was made to stipulate for a neutrality during the war. Yet this was not made
by the military commander; Moultrie's sense of honour was too keen to admit
of a thought so degrading, and so inconsistent with the engagements of the
state to its confederates in the common struggle. The civil authority made it
in violation of the rights pf the military commander, and in violation of the
feelings of nine tenths of the citizens. Fortunately, it was rejected by the
British commander, or it is impossible to tell what would have been the con
sequences. The citizens would not have submitted to it without sacrificing
to their rage the authors of their disgrace. Perhaps an unbridled enemy
might have entered the city in the midst of civil tumMt. With the loyalist and
the Indian in his retinue, there can be little doubt of the scenes which this
would have led to.
It is common for those who wish to palliate this occurrence to assert, that
the proposition was only made with a view to spin out the negociation, until
time could be afforded for the arrival of Lincohi.
Gratifying indeed would it be to the feelings of a native, if it were possible
to sustain this view of the event. But would such a motive have been con
cealed from Moultrie, who commanded the garrison? or from the minority of
the council? one of whom shed tears on the occasion that should be embalmed
in the recollection of every CaroliMan. We have the unvarnished tale of
Moultrie himself to support the belief, that the proposition was made in ear
nest ; and his narrative was supported by the concurrent testimony of many
now no more. But the minority were not men on whom such a measure
could be imposed while there was an effort that might yet prevent it. The
deliberations of the governor and council were reqmred to be kept secret; but
it is a fact, although hitherto unrelated, that one of the minority* of the coun
cil commuMcated to some of the citizens, members of the legislature, then
under arms at the hormvorks, that such a measure had been decided on. And
solemnly and openly was it there declared,, that the lives of the advocates of

* General Gadsden.

272 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, the measure should atone for the disgrace inflicted on the country. The
, resolve was made known by them to members of the council, and how far this
may have prevented the proposition from being pressed further upon the British
commander, must ever rest in conjecture. The negotiation terminated where
it ought to have begun, by leaving the subject with the military commander. *
" I will then save the city," was the plain firm answer of the hero of the 28th
of June, and a defiance was the last message communicated to the enemy.*
That night Provost decamped, and fearing to be intercepted by Lincoln at
some one of the many difficult passes on the road by wMchhe had advanced,
he took shelter on the islands until he could procure the means of secure trans
portation, and then proceeded to Savannah ; leaving, however, Colonel Mart-
land with a strong detachment at Port Royal.
In the occupation of these positions the enemy remained, until the arrival of
Count D'Estaing in the month of September following, obliged Provost to
collect all his forces and concentrate them for the defence of Savannah.
The unfortunate atack on that place on the 8th October, blasted all the high
hopes of the combined armies of Lincoln and D'Estaing, of recovering at one
blow all that had been lost in the south, and of inflicting a wound upon royal
power from which it would scarcely have recovered in that quarter ; and which
would have saved oceans of blood, and prevented the exhibition of scenes of
barbarous warfare of which the details would shock an Arab. When the
French fleet first arrived, their army might have landed at several points on
the south, and marched into the town. The delay from the 9th September to
the 8th October, was fatal. Yet even at the last moment the attack might
have succeeded had not the treachery of a deserter assisted the vigilance of
the enemy in making dispositions to meet it ; and had all the corps of the
American army fought with equal bravery.
The failure of the attack on Savannah was the precursor of the loss of
Charleston, and the reduction of the southern provinces. Immediately after
that event, D'Estaing had left the American coast, and Ms mortification, disap-

* We have nof. been able to ascertain all the members of this council, as the journals of that time
cannot be found. A diligent search has been made, but the book containing those journals is not in
the secretary's office, where it ought to be. In the minutes of the court of equity for April 1779,
which jurisdiction was then exercised by the governor's council, we find the court consisting of the
lieutenant governor, C. Gadsden, C. Pinckney, J. Ferguson, R. Smith, J. Parker, J. Neufville, J.
Edwards, and J. Miller. Moultrie relates that Mr. Gadsden, Mr. Ferguson, and Mr. Edwards, voted
against the proposition.

?•*-**

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. $73-
pointment and actual loss, made it improbable that he would ever return, chap.
There were then many concurrent causes that invited an attack on Charleston. v^-v-w/
Howe's unfortunate expedition against Florida had totally broken up the
southern army. The Carolina regiments were thinned down by sickness to a
mere handful ; the northern regiments that had been sent on with Howe and
Armstrong had also melted away, chiefly by the expiration of their term of
enlistment; and the Georgia regiment had nearly all been made prisoners at
different times, and perished in the prison-ships. The quiet possession of
Georgia also gave such countenance to the loyalists and Indians as to secure a
powerful co-operation to the enemy from that quarter. Of the loyalists, great
numbers had fled from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, and
taken refuge in Florida and the Indian nation. These now began to collect
from all quarters under cover of Provost's army, and either to add to the
strength of the enemy, or, united in formidable bodies, to hunt down and
distress the whigs, so that many of them were forced in their turn, to desert
their plantations and transport their families beyond the mountains. It was
obvious, that the possession Of Charleston would complete the British ascend
ancy in the south, and should the southern army fall with it, the reduction of
the whole state, and most probably of North Carolina, must ensue. Besides
which, Charleston was the strong hold for the privateers and their prizes, and
supplied the wants of a great part of the United States, during the interrupted
state of commerce to the north. Such too was the confidence reposed in this
post as a place of security, that very considerable magazines had been col
lected in it, and it always contained shipping of considerable value ; nor was
there a place on the continent which held out greater allurements to those who
pursued plunder instead of honourable warfare ; and the work of rapacity and
sequestration had already been successfully carried on under the auspices of
General Provost. As furnishing the means of subsistence to an army, no place
held out greater temptations than this. The country was productive in rice
and other articles of bread, and the woods had swarmed with hogs and cattle.
The enemy also well knew the embarrassments of the state, in common with
all the others, in procuring men or money. Nothing but a paper of mere
nominal value was to be had, and the reader will judge how far this was ade
quate to tempt men to enlist, when seven hundred dollars was the price of a
pair of shoes. In fact it was impossible to fill up the regiments, and the six
which then belonged to South Carolina, mustered but 800 men. Nor could
tMs defect be supplied by militia, for besides the apprehensions reasonably
excited from leaving their, plantations unprotected, and being cooped up in a
town during a siege, and from thence transported to a prison-ship ; the small-
35

274 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, pox had made its appearance, and very few of the colomsts, and none of their
slaves had had tMs dreaded (now vanqmshed) disease. The actual situation
of this state at that time, has called forth from an enemy this confession :
" That it must ever appear a paradox to future times how the Americans were
enabled so long to keep up the conflict."
The British force destined to act against Charleston embarked at New York
the 26th of December 1779. As soon as their destination was ascertained, a
reinforcement of 1,500 men of the VirgiMa and North Carolina lines, were
sent on by order of congress, and two frigates, a twenty-gun sMp, and a sloop
of war, dispatched for the same purpose. Feeble as was this contribution to
the defence of the place when compared with the army that was sent against
it, it was the utmost that the reduced resources of the congress admitted of
their making.
The commander in chief of the British forces in America, took command
in person of the army destined to act agMnst Charleston ; and to secure him
self against a reiteration of the disgraceful issue of the expedition of 1776, he
omitted nothing which his ample resources could command to secure suc
cess. Arbuthnot also, cMef in the naval command in America, convoyed his
transports, and conveyed to the scene of action an immense supply of arms
and munitions of war. At least 10,000 chosen men, with heavy battering
cannon, and all the instruments of destruction or annoyance which the malice
of man against man has ever brought into reqmsition, were landed from the
fleet on John's Island by the 11th February 1780.
When the news of the intended attack reached Charleston, the assembly
was in session. Although there were not at that time above 800 regular troops
in the state, and the defences of Charleston in the most miserably dilapidated
or unfinished state, the assembly with one voice resolved to defend it to the
utmost; and vesting Mr. John Rutledge, then governor, with dictatorial
powers, they adjourned to add their personal influence to the general efforts
in preparation for defence. The siege of Charleston is a prominent event in
the history of the American war. It was the only instance in wMch American
firmness was tried during the toils and dangers of a protracted siege. The
issue was unfortunate, and thus the grand criterion of opinion not only in
military, but in all human affairs, decided against the prudence of sustaining
it. But as to the conduct of those who defended the place, there never was
but one opinion. There were not in the place at any one time, above four
thousand combatants, consisting of twenty-three hundred regular troops, and
the rest citizens and sailors. The enemy, after the capture, by taking into
account every male m the place from seventeen years and upwards, made the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 275
number much greater; as they also managed to swell the artillery to a most chap.
extravagant return, by taking into account every swivel lying on the wharves, ,^~N,~>_,
as well the guns substituted for posts at the corners of the streets. Five thou
sand good troops are perhaps as many as could be brought to operate to ad
vantage in a close siege in so small a place. General Lincoln had been pro
mised by the two states of North and South Carolina as many as nine thou
sand, and had that force been collected, he would probably have kept the
field with the greatest number ; and finally have succeeded in relieving the
besieged. Indeed, the provision laid in, was not more than adequate for the
actual number of the garrison, for it began to fail before the surrender. From
which circumstance and various others, it is inferred, that Lincoln's expectation
was, that six or seven thousand men would be advanced upon the rear of the
besiegers, in which case they would undoubtedly have retired, or at least been
obliged to divide their forces and attention. He was also obviously misled in
another very important point. He supposed that the same forts which in
1776 had proved so successful in repelling the enemy, would now be sufficient
to prevent his ships from approaching the town. In this he was soon made
sensible of his error. The castle which at present commands the anchoring
ground near the city, was not then in existence; and profiting by former expe
rience, the enemy with little loss, passed the forts and occupied positions which
enabled him to cut off the communication between the forts and the city, and
in a great measure between the city and the country.
Yet the defence was protracted from the 29th March to the 12th May; and
all the hardships and toils of it sustained by every description of troops in the
garrison, with a patience and cheerfulness that ever called forth the most
ardent and grateful acknowledgments of their venerable commander.
Yet, under every disappointment it was very much doubted at the time of ;
¦the surrender, whether victory was not hovering over the American standard,
just at the moment when she was driven away by one of those untoward ',
accidents which no foresight of a commander can guarantee him against. ;
The siege had evidently been protracted much beyond the calculations of the i
British commander. A division of the French fleet was hourly expected on
the coast; preparations were known to be in forwardness to co-operate with it
against New York ; rumours prevailed of the approach of militia and regular
troops from the neighbouring states ; and two corps were then actually on their '
march towards Charleston, whilst Mr. Rutledge was scouring the country
and thundering his anathemas to rouse the militia to action. And it was
asserted and generally believed after the fall of the city, that preparations were
in forwardness for raising the siege, when accident threw a letter Mto the hands

276 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, of the British commander, that determined Mm to persist, whilst it cast a
, gloom over the spirits of the besieged.
/ It was thought necessary to send some intelligence to the governor ; and his
I brother, Mr. Edward Rutledge, was selected for the purpose. A more faithful
and devoted agent coffid not have been chosen ; but Ms confidence in a friend
and connexion, betrayed him into an act of indiscretion the ultimate effects of
which must ever remain to be regretted. TMs was to take a letter from Mr.
Benjamin Smith, addressed to his lady, then at her father's in North Carolina.
As the roads were now every where beset, the communcation to the governor
was confided to Mr. Rutledge orally, and it is understood, with the strictest m-
junctions to take no written commumcations from the garrison. A letter ad
dressed by a friend to his lady, under an assurance that it was only a family let
ter, Mr. Rutledge unwarily considered as no violation of his instructions. He was
captured soon after he left the city, and printed copies of the letter were next
day thrown into the garrison in blank bomb-shells, and most unaccountably,
tiirough a secret agency, disperssd through all parts of the city in printed
handbills. The letter plaiMy told that the garrison must soon surrender, their
provisions were expended, and Lmcoln only prevented from capitulating by a
point of etiquette. From that time, hope deserted the garrison, wMlst the
re-animated efforts of the enemy showed the excitement revived amonst them.
Such is the precariousness of military fame ! Had the siege been raised, the
hoary head of the highly respectable man who commanded in the town, would
have been encircled with imperishable laurels. As it was, he retired under a
great deal of unmerited censure, to be no more called into service in the field.
The fall of Charleston was followed up by a train of occurrences fixing
indelible disgrace on the British arms, but calculated to exhaust the resources,
break the spirits, and weaken the efforts of the patriots of the country. The
retreat of Provost had been followed by scenes of devastation and pillage that
would have disgraced a horde of Tartars. But the loyalists and Indians who
were in his retinue afforded a pretext or apology for these transactions. Now,
however, the loyalists were excluded from participation. It was the perqui
site of the royal troops : and the commanders themselves, opeMy shared in the
proceeds of the plunder. Among other items, two thousand stolen negroes are
said to have been shipped off in one adventure ; not to the asylum of Sierra
Leone; that was an after thought; but to find a market, or cultivate planta
tions in the West India Islands.* These unhappy wretches occupied the decks

* Ramsay, vol. 1. p. 333*

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 277
of the vessels, while the waistes were filled with the spoils of the plundered chap.
* vnr
province. •
But perhaps the presence of his majesty's fleet sanctioned this plunder.
Such seems to be the British doctrine. Nothing, however, could sanction a
deviation from an honourable compliance with the articles of capitulation.
Yet it is certain that they were most shamefully violated in the treatment of
the prisoners.
For the continental troops and sailors the third article stipulates, " that they
shall be conducted to a place to be agreed upon, where they shall remain
prisoners of war until exchanged. While prisoners, they shall be supplied
with good and wholesome provisions, in such quantity as is served out to the
troops of his Britannic majesty."
Yet it is most certain that they were in a few days crowded on board prison-
ships, in opposition to remonstrances, and in violation of previous arrangement.
There, unaccustomed to confiement, foul air and bad provisions swept them
away with unexampled rapidity. Few, very few survived to be exchanged.
Nor was this treatment without an obvious motive. WMlst surrounded with
the sick, the dead, and the dying, they were urged to enlist in the royal ser
vice, and the constancy of many was not proof agamst the horrors that sur
rounded them. But still, " I cannot bear arms against my country," was the
general cry. This difficulty was obviated by a proposition that they should be
garrisoned at PensacOla. The temptation took. The British garrison was
withdrawn from that place, the American recruits substituted, and they have
never been heard of more. Nor did the evil rest here ; the American physi
cian and attendants were removed from the hospital, that the British agents
might be at liberty to operate with the greater effect upon the minds of men
just snatched from the jaws of death, and presented with the alternative of
returning to the abhorred prison-ship, or enlisting in the British service.f
Finally, we have the authority of the venerable hero of the 28th of June for
asserting, that when arts had failed, compulsion was resorted to, and several
hundred men were forced away, many of them from their families, shipped
off to Jamaica, and there made to serve in Sir C. Montagu's regiment. The
following pathetic letter of Moultrie on the subject, was not even honoured ,
with an answer: " What I am now to remonstrate against, is a violent and
inhuman breach of the capitulation ; which is, in pressing the American sol
diers from on board the prison-ships, taking them away by violence, and

Ramsay, vol. 1. p. 333. t Moultrie's Revolution, p. 143, 151, 159.

278 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, sending them on board the transports to be carried away from the continent
•^-v-"^/ of America, many of them leaving wives and young children, who may pos
sibly perish for the common necessaries of life. If I cannot prevail upon you
to countermand this violation altogether, let me plead for those unhappy ones
who have families, to be exempted from this cruelty."*
. By the departure of General Lincoln for the northern states under parole,
Moultrie was the senior American officer then in captivity at Charleston. It
was not with indifference that he witnessed the reiterated violations of faith
exMbited m that place by the conquerors; but his remonstraces were in vain,
and finally drew forth from the tyrannical Balfour this haughty reply: "I
shall do what I think best for his majesty's service towards the prisoners."!
Let those who would be further informed on this subject, peruse the letter of
a man of high character, Dr. Peter Fayssoux.J It presents a striking picture
of barbarous and unprincipled conduct on one hand, and magnammous suffer
ing on the other.
For many months wMlst the British were in possession of Charleston, were
the covered carts bearing away the dead* continually passing between the
prison-ships and the grave-yard. With a benevolence that ever characterized
the ladies of Charleston, they formed little associations to relieve the distresses
of these poor martyrs of liberty. The bemgn example spread even to the
lowest orders of the tender sex ; and among the most conspicuous Of those
who poured oil and wine into the wounds of the obscure sufferer, was a poor
Magdalen, whose youth had wanted the hand of religion to guide it, but whose
heart ever retained a benevolence which secured her a portion of esteem even
among the virtuous of both sexes. When the messenger of death summoned
her to another world, the last tokens of respect were paid her by hundreds of
respectable citizens, who followed her remains to the grave, commemorating
her active benevolence, and regretting that such a heart should ever become
the victim of the remorseless seducer.
But the most conspicuous violations of candour and good faith were exhi
bited in their conduct towards the citizens who had been made prisoners.
In the articles of capitulation Lincoln appears to have been completely
overreached by his more wary adversary, or rather he appears to have treated
like a soldier, while the other practised the finesse of the special pleader. In
his original propositions for surrender^ Lincoln had endeavoured to exempt
from captivity the citizens who had fought under him. He was aware of the

* Moultrie, vol. 2. p. 194. f Ibid. 142. | Ibid. 39£.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 279
danger to which their persons would be exposed ; and Ms enemy, as well aware chap.
of the danger of releasing the lion from the toils now thrown around him.
For some time the negociation was suspended on this point, until the citizens
made a voluntary sacrifice of the exception interposed in their behalf. In the
articles then submitted, on the renewal of the parley, the American general
proposed, " that the citizens should be protected in their persons and proper
ties." In that substituted, the British general stipulates, " that all civil officers,
and the citizens who have borne arms during the siege, must be prisoners on
on parole ; and with respect to their property in the city, shall have the same
terms as are granted to the militia." The article referred to as defining the
terms granted to the militia, is in these words : " The militia now in garrison
shall be permitted to return to their respective homes as prisoners on parole ;
which parole, as long as they observe, shall secure them from being molested
in their property by the British troops."
Little did Lincoln, or the whigs who fought under Mm, suppose at the time,
that these articles held out no security to the persons of the latter ; that they
were liable to be treated as rebels and traitors. If such had been their idea
while they had arms in their hands, desperate and bloody must have been the
contest before surrender. But they very reasonably concluded, that being
received as prisoners of war, entitled them to the rights of civilized warfare;
that an express stipulation secured their property in town, wMlst the general
reference to the terms granted the militia, protected that part of their property
which lay in the country. A very large proportion of the prisoners of this
description having both town and country property, and occasionally occu
pying one or the other, in a liberal construction were actually comprehended
under the general term militia.
But they soon found that neither person nor property was secure; and that
the articles of capitulation were little more than a mere ruse de guerre to con
quer without fighting. Or perhaps his majesty's officers did not hold them
selves bound to keep faith with rebels. Certain it is that immediately after
the capitulation a most vexatious persecution was set on foot; and unprovoked
aggressions, both on property and person, committed with the sole view to
break down the spirits of the whigs, and oblige them to return to their original
allegiance ; and finally, after ascertaining those whose resolution there was no
hope of subduing, they were suddenly seized in their houses by an armed sol
diery, torn from their families and transported to St. Augustine.
The pretext at first was, that they had engaged in a conspiracy to get posses
sion of the town; but when their accusers were demanded, and a trial braved
and sohcited, it was poorly excused as " a measure of pohcy." Yet these were

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE,
chap, the men on whom Andre afterwards wished to draw down vengeance for his
VIII. . °
.^r-v-s^ forfeited life. The truth is, their presence was thought to prevent many from
submitting to the royal government, and their eye was a continual reproach to
the dastardly spirits who had already joined the royal standard.
Colonel Tarleton has asserted that " some papers taken in the baggage of
the American general officers, (at Gates' defeat,) and other collateral intelli
gence, displayed the late opinions and conduct of many of the principal
inhabitants of Charleston. Upwards of thirty of that description, since they
had received pardon and protection from the British commanders, had held
treacherous correspondence with the armed enemies of England, or had been
indefatigably engaged in secretly advancing the interests of congress through
out South Carolina. An order was immediately given to secure the persons
of those individuals who had violated their engagements. The accused were
committed to prison-sMps, and from thence conveyed to confinement at St.
Augustine." It is some gratification to the injured, when his oppressor acknowledges
some apology necessary. But whatever may be the evasions or artifices which
opinion sanctions in military or political life, he who assumes the character of
an historian, enters into solemn compact with the world to observe a respect
for truth. Nothing can be more destitute of -foundation than the accusation
made by Colonel Tarleton against the individuals who were exiled to St.
Augustine. It would surely have been an easy matter to confront the accused
with evidence thus obtained. No considerations of policy could require the
suppression of papers taken in battle; and if the British commander was not
above all obligations to respect the opinions of the world, what would have
been easier than to refer the case of these prisoners to the scrutiny of a court-
martial ?
Another motive for this conduct suggests itself from concurrent circum
stances. Cornwallis had, after the defeat of Gates, commenced his career of
blood; he had hung several respectable men at Camden. Retaliation might
ensue; many British officers were prisoners, and others might become so.
The secure possession of these respectable victims as hostages might be re
sorted to, as the means of savmg the lives of those who had excited the vindic
tive passions of the Americans. In the case of Andre this was actually re
sorted to ; and at a subsequent period also, in the case of Colonel Browne, on
the fall of the British post at Augusta.
The subjoined letters will show that the conduct of the British commander
was not passed unnoticed by the proper authority,- and exhibit a specimen of

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 281
the stately step with which the representative of majesty strode over the necks chap.
of Ms enemies. *^>v~o
General Moultrie to Lieutenant Colonel Balfour.
"September 1st, 1780.
" SlE, " On my perusing the paper of the 29th August, published by authority^
to my astoMshment I find a paragraph to this effect : ' The following is a cor
rect list of prisoners sent on board the Sandwich, yesterday morning ;' and
underneath the names of a number of the most respectable gentlemen, inha
bitants of this state, most of whose characters I am so well acquamted with,
that I cannot believe they would have been guilty of any breach of their
paroles or any article of capitulation, or done any tiling to justify so rigorous a
proceeding against them. I therefore think it my duty as the senior continental
officer prisoner under the capitulation, to demand a release of those gentlemen,
particularly such as are entitled to the benefit of that act. This harsh proceed
ing demands my particular attention, and I do, therefore, in behalf of the
United States of America, reqmre that they be admitted immediately to return
to their paroles, as their being hurried on board a prison-ship, and I fear
without bdng heard, is a violation of the 9th article of the capitulation. If
this demand cannot be complied with, I am to request that I may have leave
to send an officer to congress to represent tMs grievance, that they may inter
pose in behalf of these gentlemen in the manner they shall think proper."
ANSWER. " Charleston, September Mh, 1780.
" Sir, " The commandant will not return an answer to a letter wrote in such
exceptionable and unwarrantable terms, as that to him from General Moultrie,
dated the 1st inst.; nor will he receive any further application from him upon
the subject of it.
" By order of the commandant.
"G. BENSON,
>' To General Moultrie. Major of Brigade."
It was not long before a communication from the same quarter openly
avowed a resolution, to set all restraints from the articles of capitulation abso
lutely at nought. This was, of a resolution to ship all the prisoners, officers,
3(y

282 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, regdars, and militia, off to the West Indies. A resolution, the execution of
viii. .
, which was only prevented by a general exchange wMch soon after took place.
The transports for the purpose were all ready-prepared.*
In Charleston the whole southern army fell, and the effect of the capture of
that place upon the whole interior country, was the best justification of Lincoln
in his effort to preserve it. There is not perhaps a seaport-town on the con
tinent, so necessarily involving in its fall a large district of country, as tMs. It
is the natural barrier against the possession of all the country lying between
the waters of the Savannah and Pee Dee, perhaps the Roanoke. Accord
ingly, in a few weeks after the fall of the city, the enemy found Mmself in
the tranquil possession of the country from the sea nearly to the mountams,
with the exception of a part of the present districts of York and Williamsburg.
The inhabitants very generally submitted, and either were paroled as prisoners,
or took protection as British subjects. The few small parties that remained in
arms, were either surprised and cut to pieces by Tarleton, or fled mto the state
of North Carolina, to be secure from the pursmt of the enemy. But human
prosperity is ever beset with snares, and seldom can uncontrolled power brook
the limits of reason and justice.
It was at this very time, when Lord Cornwallis was boasting that there was
left nothing more for him to do in tMs quarter, that he was preparing the causes
that led to the expulsion of the British army. Under the specious names of
commissaries, suttlers, quarter-masters, expresses, foraging parties, and a thou
sand others, the country now swarmed with peculators and plunderers, and
although his majesty was regularly charged with the maintenance of bis troops,
the honest commissary found the means of maintaining them gratiiitously on his
part. TMs charge, which was first preferred by Dr. Ramsay, was indignantly
repelled by Mr. Steidman; and it is but justice to admit the belief, that to him
the conduct of his inferiors was unknown, and would have been reprobated
by him. But many officers of high standing in the British army little knew
of the contempt, and insult, and imposition that the dispersed inhabitants had
to sustain, either from authority or the assumption of it.
The hopes of a quiet retreat on their farms, with which the inhabitants had
consoled themselves in submitting to the conquerors, were soon ascertained to
be wholly illusory. Nor were they suffered to remain long in suspense as to
the requisitions which the British commander meant to make upon them. It
was very soon announced to the loyalists, or those who had taken protection,

Moultrie, vol. 2. p. 178.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 283
that it was expected of them to embody themselves for actual service. There chap.
were men found among them, and many of these young men of family and ,
fortune, from whom then' country had expected better things, who accepted of
commissions ; and many of those, whose affections were with the royal govern
ment, received tMs notification without repining. But to the great majority
of the loyalists it was a thunder stroke. Many had taken protection for want
of nerves to support the conflict, and to these it was the death of all their
hopes. But by far the greater proportion of those who had adopted this
measure, had only yielded to the impulse which at last will govern the actions
of men — the dictates of natural affection, the desire of enjoying the society,
and providing for the wants and safety of their families. Yet their best wishes
were with their countrymen, and they had no idea of being called upon to take
up arms against them.
This measure therefore disgusted great numbers of those who had returned
to their allegiance, and converted them either into decided enemies, or luke
warm friends. It was not long before this measure was followed up by ano
ther wMch drove the inhabitants of the country to renew the contest. The
following is the account given of this undertaking by themselves.
" The commander accordingly, in settling the affairs and government of the
province, adopted a scheme of obliging it to contribute largely to its own
defence; and even to look forward to future security, by taking an active part
in the suppression of the rebellion on its borders. In this view he seemed to
admit of no neutrals, but that every man who did not avow himself an enemy
to the British government, should take an active part in its support. On this
principle, all persons were expected to be in readiness with their arms at a
moment's warning. Those who had families, to form a militia for home
defence; but those who had none, to serve with the royal forces for any six
months of the coming twelve in which they might be called upon to assist ' in
driving their rebel oppressors, and all the miseries of war, far from the pro
vince.' Their service was, however, limited, besides their own province, to
North Carolina and Georgia, beyond the boundaries of wMch they were not
ro be marched. And after the expiration of the limited term, they were to be
free from all future military claims of service, excepting the local militia du
ties." *
Thus were many of all classes of people disgusted with their new rulers,
and the public mind very generally disposed to welcome the arrival of a conti
nental army.

Annual Register, 1780, p. 223.

284 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. In the midst of the general submission which followed the fall of Charleston,
/there remained a few unconquerable spirits whom nothing but death could
quell. These were Sumpter, Marion, and Williams, in South Carolina, and
Clarke and Twiggs in Georgia. There were many others whose hearts were
as warm in the common cause, but circumstances had obliged most of them
to yield to the current that overwhelmed the country, and wait until some
favourable event should again restore them to a capacity for action. Of these
last was General Pickens, who had ever been among the foremost in maintain
ing the cause of the revolution, but who, together with the whigs of Ms neigh
bourhood, had surrendered himself prisoner and received Ms parole.
Clarke, and Twiggs, and Williams, had never submitted, and were for ever
in motion, harassing and waylaying the enemy ; but their force was seldom
considerable. Sumpter and Marion, both colonels on the continental estab
lishment, had retired, on the fall of Charleston, into North Carolina; not to
shun the war, but to gather the means of carrying on that partisan warfare, in
wMch they both afterwards became so eminently conspicuous.
No sooner was the enemy in possession of the city than they entered upon
measures for securing the submission of the remote parts of the state, and
pushing their conquests mto North Carolina. A party under Colonel Wemys
was dispatched to take possession of Georgetown, and his posts were advanced
up the Pee Dee to the fine of that state. Another under Cornwallis proceeded
by Nelson's Ferry to Camden, and occupied and fortified that place. A tiiird
did the same in the western part of the state at Cambridge, the county town of
Ninety- Six District, the most extensive, fertile, and populous district of the
state. Scarcely had these arrangements been made when the approach of the
American army under Gates was announced, and with it was communicated
intelligence of a disposition to rise, maMfested by the wMgs in various quarters
of the state. Lord Rawdon was then in command in Camden. Clinton had
been called away to New York, and Cornwallis had been summoned to
Charleston to assume the chief command.
The number of British troops in the state at that time, is variously stated.
Tarleton acknowledges 5,400 effectives.* The least computation makes it
4,000, — a number quite inadequate, but for the dependence that Clinton had
been led to repose in the zeal and numbers of the loyalists, and the pacific
appearances every where, prior to Ms departure. But it was the calm which
rests on the deep, when the conflict of the elements is concealed in the clouds.

* Page 86.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 285
The moment the approach of Gates was announced, the flame that had chap.
been covered broke out in various places. It was soon apparent that neither v^-v-^,
the affections of the people had been conciliated, nor their spirits broken. And
now prevailed a scene of horrors almost unexampled in the history of modern
warfare. The origin, progress, and termination of the private, cold-blooded
butchery, wMch so often occurred in these states during the last two years of
tMs war, and gave so much embarrassment to the southern commander, reqmre
our attention. It began among the inhabitants, but was consummated by the
bloody massacre of Colonel Bufort's command, inflicted by Colonel Tarleton.
When it became obvious that Charleston must sustain a siege, Governor
Rutledge left the city for the purpose of collecting the forces that were expected
to advance upon the rear of the besieging army. To promote the same design,
and to cut off the supplies of the enemy, whilst they covered the embodying of
the militia in their rear, Colonels White and Washington were ordered to keep
the field with about three hundred cavalry. TMs party was successively sur
prised by Colonel Tarleton, first at Monk's Corner, and afterwards at Lenud's
Ferry, and the last blow nearly annihilated it. Colonels Washmgton and
White, with about tiiirty or forty men, escaped by swimming Santee River.
All the efforts of Governor Rutledge to rouse the militia proved vain. The
small-pox was then in the city, and tMs, with the apprehension of being shut
up and undergoing the horrors of a siege, with death in their front and disease
m their rear, generally deterred the country nulitia from marching to jom the
garrison ; and when, afterwards, the attempt was repeated to collect them for
the purpose of obliging the enemy to raise the siege, the want of an army to
cover them whilst embodying, and the terror inspired by the rapid movements
of the British cavalry, and the successful blows struck by Colonel Tarleton,
had completely prevented every movement on their part.
Virginia had made two efforts to push forward reinforcements to General
Lincoln. One, under Colonel Porterfield, had not reached the fine of the
state when the news of the fall of the town warned him to halt and wait
events. The other, under Colonel Bufort, had proceeded as far as Santee
River, when the success of the enemy imposed on him the necessity of com
mencing a retreat. The remains of the cavalry who escaped the sabres of
Tarleton's legion and the waters of the Santee, had formed a junction with
Bufort's corps, and the whole formed a body of about four hundred infantry
and forty cavalry. The retreat of this corps was considerably impeded by a
number of baggage waggons, transporting a supply of clothing, and other
articles of infinite value to the service, and the loss of which was not easily to

286 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, be replaced. Yet it had reached the Waxaw settlement before it was over-
VIII , taken by Colonel Tarleton.
Immediately as Cornwallis had crossed the Santee, Tarleton had been
dispatched, with 280 well mounted cavahy and infantry, to overtake Bufort's
party. In fifty-four hours they made a journey of one hundred and twenty-five
miles, regardless of the number of horses killed on the journey, as they were
easily replaced by the seizure of others from the inhabitants on the road. Yet the
American commander was apprized of his approach, and had a force amply
sufficient to have destroyed his fatigued and inferior adversary. The strangest
mismanagement produced the destruction of Colonel Bufort's whole command.
They were cruelly butchered whilst supplicating for quarters. The hacked
condition of two hundred and eighty human bodies sufficiently testified the
relentless fury of the victors, while their own loss of but two killed, proves that
necessity did not justify it. Colonel Tarleton excuses it on the ground that his
own horse having been shot under him, the rage of his men proceeded from
a report that their commander was slain. It is a poor apology for conduct
which his own dispatches rather boast of than disapprove. It was from this
event that cutting down the suppliant who had surrendered, acquired the
epithet of " Tarleton's quarters ;" and too often did the memory of this event
afterwards lead to the retaliation of the horrors that attended it. Colonel
Bufort with the cavalry, and a few men who cut horses from the waggons,
were all who escaped. Only fifty-three prisoners were taken, for only fifty-
three were in a condition to be carried off behind the troopers, and the wounded
were left to perish on the field. Nothing but the humanity of the neighbour
ing inhabitants saved any of them ; and very small indeed was the number that
survived. Six of these unfortunate men were not long after casually seen
together, four of whom had lost both their arms, and the other two, each one
arm. Two arms remained to the six.
This event left South Carolina without a single organized corps for its
defence ; and left a deep and ominous impression on the minds of the inhabit
ants. Those of the immediate neighbourhood in which it occurred, were the
first who resumed their arms, and they never afterwards relinquished them,
until the enemy was expelled from their country. They were the men who
first embodied under Sumpter. It is a fact, the recording of which is due to
the merits of a particular description of the inhabitants of South Carolina, that
the settlements which furmshed the partisan corps which kept up the spirit of
opposition during the revolutionary contest, were generally composed of emi
grants from the north of Ireland, or their descendants. This was particularly
the case with Willi amsbiirg, the Waxaws, the Calhoun settlement in Ninety-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 287
Six, and the present district of York. On the other hand, where the Scotch chap
interest predominated, the leaning of the inhabitants was very general towards ^r^^^>
the enemy. This was the case with the Cunmngham settlement, between the
Broad and Saluda Rivers, and the country lying between the great and little
Pee Dees. And the observation is peculiarly applicable to that part of the
state of North Carolina which stretches along the dividing fine of the two
states from the coast to the county of Mecklenburg. The dissentions which
arose out of the regMating system, and converted the one settlement or the
other into whig and tory, more immediately operated upon settlers of a differ
ent description. v
As the epithet of wMg or tory-settlement frequently occurs in the history of
the southern war, it is proper to observe, that in most parts of the interior of
these states, the population for some miles in extent is derived from a common
origin. A few Scotch, Irish, Dutch, Virginia, Maryland, quaker, presbyterian,
or baptist families would sit down on a particular spot and form a nucleus,
around which a circle would extend, until checked by approaching the circle
of some other settlement. Sometimes the predominance of a particular name
would furMsh the distinguishing epithet of the settlement; sometimes the
country from which the settlers emigrated, and not unfrequently the sect to
which they belonged. The influence of early associations, or of leading indi
viduals, generally directed the politics of these circles to the same point.
Natural attachments and antipathies no doubt often influenced them in the
party they espoused, but generally where the American or Irish influence
predominated, the settlement favoured the cause of the revolution. The set
tlement of the interior was too recent to have formed a general amalgamation,
and many of the inhabitants of the fine country that stretches along between
the falls of the rivers, and the foot of the mountains, felt very little attachment
to the government of their respective states. Very little had been the protec
tion they received from their rulers in settling that country ; they considered it
as the land they had won with the sword and the spear, and had only felt the
government by the exaction of fees and taxes, not by the participation of the
benefits expected from it. But fortunately the enemy felt too confident in
themselves, or too much contempt for their enemy, to act with moderation or
policy. Amidst the infatuations of power and victory, their commanders ap
pear to have forgotten, that a nation may submit to conquest but never to
insult. On this point most men feel cast upon themselves for revenge or
protection ; and that nation cannot be conquered in which this individual feel
ing exists in all its force. They seemed to have forgotten also, that religion,
which looks to another world for its recompense or enjoyments, becomes the

288 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, most formidable enemy that can be raised up in this. As the dissenters of
¦^-v!^ New England had the reputation of having excited the war, dissenters gene
rally became objects of odium to the enemy. Hence their meeting-houses
were often burnt or destroyed. One of them in Charleston was converted
into a horse-stable ; in the populous settlement of Waxsaws, their minister was
insulted, his house and books burnt, and bellum internecionis declared against
all the bibles which contained the Scotch version of the Psalms. The author
of these indignities paid for them with his life ; and such injuries were calcu
lated to sink deep into the minds of men, whose ancestors had long maintained
a pious war against the church of England, and who had lately been deliv
ered by the present revolution from an established church.* Great were the
obligations of the American cause to the licentiousness and folly of the British
commanders !
The foregoing observations are not applicable to the quaker and Moravian
settlements. As their doctrines are abhorrent of war, they of course look
with an unfriendly eye on every attempt to shake off an established govern
ment. Nor are they applicable to the Scotch and British traders who had
spread through the interior and established themselves in the small villages
which began to rise in situations favourable to trade. Their affections and
those of their retainers were, of course, under the influence of strong national
attachments, and wedded to the power which they supposed best able to pro
tect them in the prosecution of their business. Their influence was generally
against the whigs wherever they had established themselves. Yet there were
some eminent exceptions.
From the first commencement of the revolutionary ferment, a partisan war
fare had occurred in the interior between the whigs and tories. The royal
governors had, at a very early period, established a correspondence with seve
ral populous settlements in all the southern provinces. How much soever all
parties must deplore the melancholy consequences which resulted from these
mternal dissentions, it cannot be denied that both in North and South Carolina
the loyalists were the aggressors. As early as November 1775, a party of
loyalists between Broad and Saluda Rivers, under Patrick Cunningham, rose
in arms and seized a quantity of gunpowder, which the whigs were forward
ing as a present to the Indians. The royal governor of the province, appre
hending that this peace offering would detach the savages from the royal
interests, and defeat the plan which had already originated of bringing them

* Ramsay, vol. 1. p. 352.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 289
upon the backs of the whigs, while the royal army attacked them hi front; chap.
excited this settlement, (the only one in the southern states in which the tories,
outnumbered the whigs,) to commit this act of aggression. This was the first
link in that chain of causes which led to the depopulation of this beautiful
tract of country.
After this event, it was not until the enemy overran Georgia that the tories
again appeared in arms. But, that a correspondence had been kept up be
tween them and the enemy, was obvious from the promptness with which they
embodied and marched to join the enemy as soon as Campbell advanced to
Augusta. A Colonel Boyd of South Carolina, recently arrived from New
York, and a Major Moore of North Carolina, were the leaders ; and eight
hundred men marched under their standard. The South Carolinians and
Georgians, about five hundred in number, commanded by Pickens, Clarke,
and Dooley, pursued, attacked, and killed, captured or dispersed the party.
This was at Kettle Creek in Georgia. Their leader fell, and not more than
200 men made their way good to Augusta. The prisoners were delivered to
the civil magistrate, tried and convicted, and seventy of them sentenced to
suffer death as traitors.* All but five were pardoned, and the political rulers
of the day thought the example of the execution of five necessary to the future
tranquillity of the state. It is not easy in the midst of the angry passions which
influence the mind in civil contests, duly to estimate the value of lenient coun-
sels. But consequences soon followed upon this measure, which opened the
eyes of the leading whigs to the danger of inflicting punishment even under
the sanction of existing laws. When men are taken with arms in their hands
prosecuting open war, however inconsistent with their civil duties their con
duct may appear to the victors, it is dangerous to stretch out the arm of civil
power against them, at least while the contest is still raging.
Colonel Brown, soon after this event was placed in command at Augusta.
History has preserved the memory of too many monsters in the human form ;
but this man has been surpassed by none. Yet his history conveys some use
ful lessons. It proves the danger of inflicting wanton outrage on the meanest
of human bemgs, and the fatal consequences that ensue from indulging popular
licentiousness, and the vindictive passions that predominate in times of civil
commotion. In the hour of festivity Brown had indulged himself in indiscreet censure
of the revolutionary party. He had done worse, — he had committed a fault

* M'Call's History of Georgia.
37

290 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, less easily forgiven; he had ridiculed them. Being apprised that their resent-
^-v^s ment was excited, he attempted to escape ; but he was closely pursued, brought
back to Augusta, tried before a committee of surveillance, and sentenced to be
tarred and feathered and carted, unless he recanted and took the oath of alle
giance prescribed by the administration of Georgia. Brown was a firm man,
and resisted with a pertinacity that should have commanded the respect of Ms
persecutors. But the motions of a mob are too precipitate to admit of the
intrusion of generous feeling. After undergoing the painful and mortifying
penance prescribed by the committee without yielding, it is too true that he
was doomed to have his naked feet exposed to a large fire, to subdue his stub
born spirit. But in vain ; and he was at length turned loose by a groupe of
men, who never once dreamed that the simple Indian-trader would soon re
appear, an armed and implacable enemy. He first visited the loyalists of
Ninety-Six, concerted his measures with them, then made his way to St;
Augustine, received a colonel's commission, placed himself at the head of a
band of desperate refugeess, and accompamed Provost in his irruption into
Georgia. His thirst for revenge appeared afterward insatiable, and besides
wantonly hanging many of his prisoners, he subjected the families of the whigs
who were out in service, to accumulated sufferings and distress. It was not
long after he was left in command at Augusta by the British general, that
Colonel Clarke, with a determined party of the militia whose families he had
persecuted, aimed a well-directed blow at his post. But Brown proved him
self a man of bravery and conduct, and he well knew that at all times he was
fighting for his life. After a severe and partially successfiil contest, the approach
of a party of Indians obliged Clarke to retreat and leave his wounded behind
him, with a letter addressed to Brown, requesting that he would parole them
to their plantations. But Brown's thirst for revenge knew no bounds ; it had
been irritated in tMs instance by a wound which confined him to Ms bed.
The unhappy prisoners, twenty-eight in number, were all hung; thirteen of
them were suspended to the railing of the staircase, that he might feast his eyes
with their dying agonies. This he justified on the ground of the execution of
the prisoners taken at the defeat of Boyd, and of a sanguinary order of Lord
Cornwallis, which will hereafter be noticed.
Among the prisoners thus executed were many of high respectability, and
one youth whose conduct merited a better fate. He was but fifteen years of
age ; his brother, but two years older, was wounded and fell beside him. He
refused to leave him, and they perished together on the gallows.
The outrage did not end here ; the bodies were given up to the savages to

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 291
be scalped, mangled, and thrown into the river. These things are beyond chap.
contradiction true,— they were extracted from the letters of British officers.* v^-v-^
In the state of North Carolina, the first aggression of the loyalists took
place in February 1776. This was under the command of one M'Donald,
created a general by the royal Governor Martin for that purpose. But M'Do
nald, too proud of his new dignity, or too zealous to repress his ardour, preci
pitately led out his followers from Cross Creek, before his royal coadjutors
were ready for action. The consequence was, that they were soon dispersed,
and for a long time afterwards, were too seriously impressed with the terrors
of battle to do more than keep up a correspondence with the enemy, and
make large promises of aid, which they never after felt themselves safe enough
fully to realize. They, however, and their connexions, stretcMng down be
tween the Pee Dees, constituted the perplexing enemies with whom Marion
afterwards was destined to cope. The district of Marion now comprises the
country in which the contest was long kept up between these parties.
It was not until the advance of the enemy to Camden and the Cheraws,
that the loyalists of North Carolina resumed their arms. Lord Cornwallis
had instructed them not to rise until his approach into North Carolina should
afford them countenance and support. But, after arrangements were made
for embodying, it was not so safe as Ms. lordsliip supposed, for his majesty's
loyal subjects to remain in a state of separation. They knew they were
watched, and military execution or civil prosecution might invade their fire
sides, before they could convene their friends for mutual protection. Colonel
Moore, the same who had accompanid Boyd, again made his appearance at
the head of an armed band from Tryon county. But before he had advanced
far, Colonel Rutherford was upon him, and his party was killed or dispersed.
Colonel Bryan, from the lower part of the Yadkin, was more fortunate. He
heard of the approach of an American army under De Kalb, on a route which
led near his habitation, and collecting about 800 followers, he hastened to join
the 71st British regiment, then stationed at the Cheraws.
Thus reinforced, the commander of the regiment, Colonel M'Arthur, dis
patching his sick and convalescents with a part of his baggage down the Pee
Dee in boats, under an escort of militia, struck across the country to unite with
Lord Rawdon at Camden. This left an opening for Marion to penetrate into
South Carolina on the enemy's right, of wMch he soon availed himself; whilst
Sumpter was entering upon active operations on his left.

M'Call.

292 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. A singular coincidence of events facilitated the career of these two active
^-sr+s commanders, and placed them most unexpectedly in the command of a force
which sanctioned their advance into the heart of the country. They were both
feebly attended, when, nearly about the same time, two instances of treachery
(as it was called by the enemy) placed them in the command of troops who
could never afterwards desert them — because of that treachery.
Among the few who had accompanied Sumpter, or united themselves to
him when he fled into North Carolina, was Colonel Neale. This gentleman's
command lay in the neighbourhood of the Tiger and Enoree rivers. After the
British commander had resolved to convert the militia into active instruments
in the war, Neale's command was given to one Floyd ; and Major Lile, who,
bending to the times, had taken protection, was made second in command.
While the British troops hovered near them, and no American force was in
view to protect them, the men had patiently submitted to be marshalled under
his majesty's commission. But no sooner was information brought them that
Sumpter was on the Catawba, accompanied by their beloved colonel, than the
Whole regiment, with Lile at their head, marched off and joined him. Shortly
after, he formed a junction with the Waxsaw whigs, and in the space of twenty-
six days, drove in the advanced parties of the enemy on the Catawba, and
severely handled them in three sharp conflicts, to wit, at Williams', at Rocky
Mount, and the Hanging Rock. The last affair occurred eight days before
the defeat of Gates, and near the scene of that action. Immediately after it,
Sumpter had recrossed the Catawba, and was lying on the west side of the
river at the time of Gates' arrival at Rugely's Mills.*
The same thing happened to Marion. With his little band, generally well
mounted but miserably clad and equipped, he sought out General Gates, who,
after superceding De Kalb, was then on his advance to Lynch's Creek, and
wdth him concerted the plan of penetrating into the heart of the state. A
messenger from the whigs of Williamsbupg had invited Marion to place himself
at their head, and he was cautiously tracing his way tiirough a country much
infested with loyalists, when M' Arthur's boats were descending the Pee Dee.
The advance of Marion spread an alarm among the loyalists, and the intelli
gence was promptly communicated to the escort of the boats, with advice to
hasten their descent to a place of security. The effect was exactly the reverse
of that intended. No sooner did the men receive tliisintelligence, than, rising
on their officers, they carried them off, and making the convalescents of the

* Tarleton's Campaign, p. 93.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 293
British army prisoners, they, with a very seasonable supply of munitions of chap.
war, were delivered to Marion. VIIX"
When these acts of " black treachery" (as they were denominated) became
known to the British commanders, their indignation knew no bounds ; and the
beneficial effects of these events on the American cause, is best expressed in
Colonel Tarleton's own language : " It ruined all confidence between the
regulars and militia." All Sir Henry Clinton's fairy visions of converting the
militia of South Carolina into a British army, at once vanished.* Yet such is
the unwillingness of men to acknowledge themselves wrong in their specula
tions, that his commanders would not for some time relinquish the idle project.
Many of the whigs whose high standing, or rigid notions of truth would not
admit of temporizing, had to sustain imprisonment and chains in their resist
ance to this imperious measure. These persecutions caused many to flock to
the standard of Marion, and soon swelled his corps to a size which enabled
him to scour the country from the North Carolina line even as far as Monk's
Corner, and greatly interrupt and embarrass the communication between
Charleston and the posts at Georgetown and Camden.
As soon as the formidable expedition under Sir Henry Clinton had sat
down before Charleston, congress resolved on maMng further provision for
sustaining the war in the southern states. But so feeble were their means, that
after leaving the necessary force for holding the enemy in check in New York,
they could spare but fourteen hundred men to be detached to the south. The
command of this detachment, consisting of the Maryland and Delaware fines,
was confided to Major General Baron De Kalb, and was intended as a rein
forcement to the army under General Lincoln. But Lincoln having been
made prisoner before their arrival, it became necessary to appoint a successor
to him in the command of the southern department.
The victor of Burgoyne at that time maintained an almost unrivalled emi
nence in popular opinion ; and such were the relative standings of himself and
Washington, even in the opimon of congress, that without consulting the com
mander in cMef, General Gates was ordered, by a vote of congress, to take
command in the southern department. It has been seen that Washington
would have conferred it on another, had the choice rested with him.
The Baron De Kalb had pressed his march to the south by the direct route
from Petersburg in Virginia, for Camden in South Carolina. On the 6th of
July he reached the hanks of the Deep River, and halted at Coxe's Mills to

* Tarleton's Campaign.

294 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, collect provisions, and decide from intelligence on his future course. A militia
^Xs force had been raised in the state of North Carolina and placed under com
mand of General Caswell. This was now in advance of De Kalb, beyond the
Pee Dee, on the route to Camden by Mask's Ferry. On the same route Col.
Porterfield, with his small detachment of VirgiMa regulars, was also posted.
But the country lying between was alarmingly sterile, and had been so ex
hausted of its few means of subsistence, that to pass it without forming maga
zines in advance, or transporting the means of subsistence with him, De Kalb
thought impracticable; and such was the abject state of the means of trans
portation, that either to collect provisions or transport them, was nearly impos
sible. Thus circumstanced, he was meditating on the project of deviating to
Ms right, so as to avail himself of the fertile and friendly counties of Mecklen
burg and Rowan, when General Gates arrived and took the command.
Orders were immediately issued for the troops to hold themselves in readi
ness to move at a moment's warning, and on the 27th, the army was under
march, in the direct route across the barrens to Mask's Ferry.
General Gates had not at this time one day's provision to serve out to his
army; and a measure so fraught with danger, and which, in its consequences,
had so nearly brought his army to starving or disbanding, must ever remain
the subject of severe criticism on Ms military conduct. Colonel Williams,
then adjutant-general under De Kalb, has written his apology, wMch, as an
authentic and interesting fragment of original history, and a specimen of the
talents and excellence of a man whom his country has reason to be proud of,
will be found at large in the appendix to this work.* The reason urged for
tMs dangerous adventure was, that General Caswell, too confident in his num
bers, and too emulous or avaricious of fame, and unconscious of the danger
to which he had exposed himself, had avanced to Lynch's Creek, and was in
the most critical situation from his near approach to the enemy: and that a pre
cipitate march was necessary to support or extricate him ; as, in case of his
dispersion, all hope of military support from North Carolina must be aban
doned. It would also seem, that Gates had some how been led to anticipate
supplies which never reached him, as he assured the men that there were wag
gons loaded with supplies in the rear, which must overtake them in two days.
Yet how could this have happened ? It was fortunate for him that he com
manded a body of the best officers and best troops in America. Well disci
plined as the troops were, and with all the zeal and devotion of his officers, it

Appendix B.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 295
was scarcely possible to preserve them from mutiny, such was the absolute chap.
state of starvation to which they were reduced before they formed a junction ^^^-i^
with General Caswell.
The most reasonable conjecture as to the motives of General Gates is, that
he urged Ms march across the desert, with the double intent of concealing his
own approach and anticipating that of reinforcements to the enemy.
Lord Rawdon being then in command in Camden, it was to be expected
that immediately as intelligence reached Lord Cornwallis of the advance of
an army to attempt that post, he would press forward reinforcements to Raw-
don's support. But, if this object entered into General Gates' views, it is not
easy to assign a cause why, when opposed by a very inferior force to his own
on the banks of Lynch's Creek, he should have suffered himself to be forced to
ascend its left bank and to pass its head, instead of forcing his way across to
Camden. Yet it is certain that he was detained manoeuvring on the east bank
of Lynch's Creek, from the 7th of August, the day on which the junction was
formed with Caswell, to the 13th, when the army encamped at Rugely's Mills,
called Clermont. The imputed object of General Gates in ascending the
stream, from the point where he first struck it to that at which Rugely's Mills
are constructed, was to effect a junction with Gen. Stevens, then on his march
with a brigade of Virginia militia ; but if this was his purpose, it would have
been equally well answered by crossing the stream below, and pressing on to
the great road to Camden by which Stevens was advancing, so as effectually
to cover the latter from all danger of attack. But the motives which govern
the conduct of a military commander can seldom be determined by conjecture,
however justly they may be weighed when avowed or discovered.
On the march through Virginia, De Kalb had been joined by Colonel
Carrington, with three lean companies of artillery, manning six pieces. On
the banks of the Pee Dee, Colonel Porterfield had joined the army, and shortly
after, Colonel Armand, with a legionary corps of about sixty horse and as many
foot. The day after the army had encamped at Rugely's Mills, General Ste
vens also came up with his brigade of militia; and the combined returns of
these several commands now flattered General Gates with the idea of being at
the head of seven thousand men.
The next day presented a fair opportunity for enteriug upon active opera
tions. Camden Ferry, on the line of communication between the enemy's posts,
had always been an important pass to the garrisons of Camden, Granby, and
Nixety-Six. The recent irruption of Marion had rendered the line of com
munication between Camden, Fort Watson, and Charleston, by the east side

296 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, of the Watcrree and Monk's Corner, so insecure as to compel the enemy to
--»~v-w resort to a more westerly route, crossing above the mouth of the Wateree at
M'Cord's Ferry, and ascending the west bank of the Wateree to Camden
Ferry. Here again the commumcation was watched by Sumpter, whose
recent victories over the advanced posts of the enemy, enabled Mm to occupy
the country in the vicinity of Rocky Mount. This rendered it necessary to
defend the pass at Camden Ferry, and a Colonel Carey, with a body of loyal
ists, was at this time employed in erecting a fort on the west side of the Wa
teree for that purpose.
On the morning of the 14th of August, Colonel Sumpter received intelli
gence of the advance of a considerable convoy of British waggons on the route
from M'Cord's to Camden Ferry, and dispatched an express to General Gates
to solicit of him a reinforcement of regulars to support his militia infantry, in
order to attempt the destruction of Carey and capture of the convoy. One
hundred picked men of the regulars and three hundred militia of North Caro
lina, with two pieces of artillery, under Colonel Woolford of the Maryland
line, were immediately ordered on this service; and General Gates put the
army under marching orders for Camden, with the double design of support
ing Sumpter, if necessary, and availing himself of the opportunity of attacking
Lord Rawdon, or his redoubts, if the latter should march out in force to repel
the attack of Sumpter.
On the night of the 15th at 10. o'clock, the American army moved from
Rugely's Mills, little dreaming of the terrible fate to which a few hours were
about to consign them. The interval between their march and their destruc
tion scarcely measured a span.
It is truly astonisMng that General Gates should have been profoundly igno
rant of the arrival of Lord Cornwallis at Camden the evening previous. Yet
so it was ; and at the head of 2,000 finished troops, at the very hour that Gates
moved from Clermont, Cornwallis had taken up the line of march to attack
him in Ms encampment. An event so probable, and so decisive on his future
operations, surely ought to have commanded General Gates' earliest attention.
The obscure route by "which Gates approached Camden, has been mentioned
as the cause why the movements of Cornwallis had not been communicated by
Gates' friends; but surely, if the necessary measures for obtaining intelligence
had been adopted, the route of the latter's march would have been made known
to those who were to communicate with him. There is too much reason to
believe, that those means were not adopted.
Nor was there the least necessity for his remaining destitute of mtelligence.
For he knew that Marion had penetrated into the state before him; and tiirough

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 29?
the medium of the settlements along the head waters of the Black River, only chap.
. . •j vm.
a little distance to his left, swarming with animated whigs, nothing would have v^-v-^.
been easier than to have dogged every step of the British commander. And
^even if the want of means be urged; up to the time of his junction with Cas
well, it may be admitted, but after that event there was notliing to prevent
his dispatching proper persons to procure the necessary intelligence along the
line of commumcation on the east side of the Wateree River, from Lenud's
Ferry, where Cornwallis crossed the Santee, even to the gates of Camden.
The unhappy fate which awaited him, is that which must ever attend the
commander who neglects the means of intelligence. His laurels were strewed
in the dust, his venerable head bowed down with humiliation, an army de
stroyed, and the southern states brought to the verge of ruin.
Lord Cornwallis, on the contrary, appears to have been accurately informed
of every particular relating to his adversary. It is even asserted that an emis
sary sent from Camden had had the address to pass himself upon Gates as a
friend and win his confidence. Thus instructed, the British commander
resolved to make a night attack upon his unsuspecting enemy, then posted but
ten miles in advance of him.
The first intelligence commuMcated to either army of the near approach of
the other, was from the fire of the British advance-guard upon the American.
The cavalry of Armand's legion being struck by this discharge, wheeled off in
confusion and carried dismay into the columns advancing in their rear. But
the infantry under Porterfield, who were advancing in files on the right of
the road, coolly returned the fire and checked the advance of the enemy.
This was about half after two in the morning, and about mid way be
tween Clermont and Camden. The ground was equally unknown to both
commanders, and the meeting equally unexpected. As if by mutual con
sent, the two armies drew off to reconnoitre and prepare for ulterior mea
sures. Orders had been issued by the American general for forming for battle,
and the line was soon formed under the activity of their adjutant-general.
The first Maryland division, including the Delawares, under De Kalb, was
posted on the right ; the Virginia militia, under Stevens, on the left ; and the
North Carolinians, under Caswell, in the centre : the artillillery in battery on
the road. Both wings rested on morasses, and the second Maryland brigade
was posted a few hundred yards in rear of the first, to act as a reserve.
The enemy was formed in one line, with -each wing covered and supported
by a body in reserve.
Thus drawn up, the break of day discovered the two armies to each other,
and the action was brought on by the American left wing's advancing upon

298 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, the British right, which had the appearance of still being unsettled in its posi-
vm.
, tion. The reception which the VirgiMans met with soon proved that their adver
sary was prepared for them ; and the proof of that fact was all they stood to
ascertain. They fled in the most abject confusion, " few discharged their
guns, and fewer still carried them off the field."
The North Carolina militia, with the exception of one corps under a Major
Dixon, which was on the extreme right of their brigade under protection of
the Marylanders, followed the cowardly example of the left, and broke away
notwithstanding every effort to detain them. Armand's cavalry also fled, a
bride abattue, and a charge of the British cavalry soon put an end to every
hope of rallying the fugitives. They scattered through the woods, seeking
the swamps or their homes, and spreading a paralysing alarm throughout the
country. As no returns could ever be obtained of the North Carolinians, it is
not known how many suffered ; but as some of them behaved well, it followed
that they sustained some loss ; but of the VirgiMans it is confidently asserted,
that their returns exhibited " three wounded."
The devoted Marylanders and Delawares were now left to struggle against
double their numbers. The state of affairs would have dictated a retreat, but
a post had been assigned them and they nobly mamtained it, waiting for orders
from the commander in chief. But he, it seems, had been borne away by the
torrent of militia, and could not find an aid to convey his orders. Why else
was there no attention paid to the safety of these brave men ?
The artillery was now lost, and Armand's legion fled ; the regular infantry
numbered but nine hundred men, and these had now to bear the undivided
pressure of two thousand of tbe best troops in the British service. But they
not only resisted, but at some points carried the bayonet into the ranks of the
enemy and made many prisoners. It was impossible that this could last. De
Kalb had fallen under eleven wounds, the British cavalry had returned from
dispersing the militia, the ground was unfavourable to manoeuvring in a square
or covering their flanks, and the only chance that remained to avoid a surrender
on the field, was to break away for the morass in their rear, into which they
could not be pursued by the cavalry. This was done ; and by this alone did
any part of this devoted corps escape from the swords of the dragoons, in which
the enemy was very strong. In this effort a large proportion of the officers
escaped ; but Major Anderson was the only one who succeeded in keeping toge
ther any body of men. Colonel Howard and some others collected some men
in their train, and the whole proceeded on in a state of utter dissolution until
they reached Charlotte. Scarcely any of the waggons escaped ; for the horses

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 299
were very generally brought into requisition to carry off the wounded officers, chap.
The artillery, baggage, every thing became prize to the victor, and to the utter i_/^w,
astonishment but infinite relief of the scattered Americans, Lord Cornwallis,
satisfied with his triumph, returned to celebrate it in Camden — by offering the
lives of some of his prisoners to the manes of his soldiers, or the demon of
revenge. It was in the midst of the hurry of flight that a courier overtook General
Gates with the consoling intelligence, that Sumpter had completely succeeded
in his enterprize. But Gates had only to communicate in reply intelligence of
his own irretrievable misfortune, and the necessity of Sumpter's urging a
retreat to the mountains for safety.
The moment the detachment under Woolford joined Sumpter, he put
his command under march for Camden Ferry. Near the break of day on the
morMng of the 16th, he found himself advanced undiscovered to within a few
miles of Carey's fort. A strong detachment of militia under command of
Colonel Thomas Taylor, was then pushed forward to gain the rear of the fort
and cut off the retreat of Carey's detachment, or prevent it from forming a
junction with the convoying party. Taylor approached with such caution
and silence as to find Carey's party wholly unconscious of the danger that
awaited them. The opportunity was favourable, and he improved it by so
sudden and impetuous an attack, that the whole party surrendered without
any serious opposition. Learning from them that the convoy was at no great
distance in the rear, and equally unapprehensive of danger, Taylor immedi
ately advanced upon it, and the similitude of his appearance with the home
spun dresses of the loyalists, excited no apprehension in the convoying party
until they found themselves sun ounded and secured.
A retreat up the river was immediately commenced, and the party under
Sumpter far advanced before either he, had notice of the advance of Corn
wallis upon Gates, or Cornwallis, intelligence of the disaster sustained by his
convoy. But it happened that Sumpter had been approaching danger instead
of avoiding it, for he was now nearly opposite the ground on which the battle
of the morMng had been fought. The river lay between him and the enemy,
but there were several points at which it could be passed.
As soon as Lord Cornwallis received intelligence of the capture of his con
voy and the route by which Sumpter was retreating, he detached Colonel
Tarleton with his legion and a corps of mounted infantry, to pursue the Ame
rican party by the route over Rocky Mount Ford.
Colonel Sumpter had acquired a valuable booty — forty waggons laden with
arms, spirits, clotMng, and every thing that the American army stood most in

300 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, need of. But he was also encumbered with near tMee hundred prisoners, and
,the whole, greatly operated to impede his retreat. Nevertheless by urging his
march by day and by night, he passed Fishing Creek about noon of the 18th,.
and halted to afford a moment of rest and refreshment to his harassed troops.
That moment proved fatal to the most flattering hopes that ever dawned on the
enterprize of a commander. Colonel Tarleton with his cavalry burst upon
them when there was not a man standing to his arms, and threw themselves
between the men and the parade where their muskets were stacked.
By what means Tarleton succeeded in effecting tMs uneqmvocal surprise
we are umnformed; the force under Sumpter was sufficient to have swept his
cavalry from the face of the earth had it been prepared to receive them. It
cannot be supposed that the army had been halted without posting proper
videttes and a camp-guard ; and Tarleton's reaching the parade ground before
a drum beat to arms, must ever remain a mysterious occurrence until some
explanation of the causes shall be furnished to the world. The only one ever
furMshed is, that the videttes were sleeping on their posts, and the commander
supposed himself beyond the reach of danger. Never is a military com
mander more certainly in danger, than when lMled by the belief that he has
nothing to fear.
By tMs unhappy occurrence many brave men lost their lives. Some few of
the regulars took post behind the waggons in hopes of rallying the militia, but
their fire oMy sharpened the swords of the dragoons,- by the death of a few of
their number. No other opposition was made; the rout was total; Colonel
Sumpter had the good fortune to escape, but very few of the officers or men
got off The aggregate loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was very little
short of that sustained by General Gates, and served to swell the returns of the
victors to the still exaggerated account of one thousand prisoners, and eight or
nine hundred killed and wounded — a loss which has been erroneously attri
buted to the defeat of Gates alone. ,
It was on this occasion that Colonel Tarleton set the example which was
but too closely imitated about six weeks afterwards upon the followers of
Colonel Ferguson. There are still living the most respectable witnesses who
saw him ride up in person, (for he was in the rear of the party that charged^)
and, under the information derived from the loyalists, late prisoners to Sump
ter, select and pinion with cords a number of the American prisoners, and in
this situation march them off to Camden. These were the men who were, a
few days afterwards, consigned to the gallows by " the amiable Cornwallis,"*"

An epithet given the British commander by Colonel Lee in Iris Memoirs.,

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 301
without even a form of trial. Were they British subjects? were they Ameri- chap:
. VIII
cans ? were they rebels ? were they even deserters ? were they any tMng but ,s^v^f
spies? Whence could a British commander derive this savage right? It was
an expression of contempt for the struggle in which they were engaged, and
the whigs, when victorious at King's Mount, were resolved not to be despised
with impunity.
Discordant, as usual, are the accounts transmitted, as well of the numbers
engaged, as of the losses sustained at the defeat of General Gates. The Bri
tish contended that they had fought and dispersed treble their own numbers ;
and could General Gates have brought into action the whole force supposed to
have been collected at Clermont, they would have exceeded that number. But
Ms march through the desert had made sad havoc in his line of regulars ; and
as to the militia, the fatigues of duty, change of habits, and a long march,,
had reduced them to almost one tiiird the number that had been mustered. It
is positively known that the American returns of the morning of the 15th
August gave exactly three thousand and fifty-two fit for duty. Of these, nine
hundred were of the fine, two hundred artillerists with four pieces, and one
hundred and fifty of Armand's legion — about sixty of whom were mounted,
but proved themselves very indifferent cavalry. The rest of the troops, about
seventeen hundred, were Virgima and North Carolina militia, nearly in equal
numbers. The British army are acknowledged to have consisted of about seventeen
hundred regulars and three hundred loyalists. On the night of the engage
ment, some prisoners taken in the rencounter between the advanced guards,.
reported it three thousand strong, and with that number General Gates sup
posed himself about to engage. With what hope of success he could venture,
with a force like his, to cope with three thousand British veterans in an open
champaign country, it is impossible to conceive. But it scarcely seems to be
the question whether he ought to have engaged them. The doubt is, whether
it was possible under actual cireumstanees, to avoid a general action. De
Kalb certainly thought that the army ought to retreat, and considermg that it
wanted yet four hours of day, there was probably much more to have been
hoped for, from the attempt to retreat, than from the possibility that a body of
raw militia, agitated by all the anticipations of four hours spent in the dark
in the face of a disciplined enemy, would stand its ground against their bayo
nets. Nor is this all ; it will be seen from Colonel Williams' narrative, that
an injudicious measure in the distribution of provisions, had actually put them
in a state of debility little adapted to the tug of battle.

302 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. The loss admitted by the British commander, is three hundred killed and
VIII
s^-v-^ wounded. No other evidence exists on that point. As to the American loss,
as the militia scattered to all the winds of heaven, there is no certainty of the
number lulled of them. With regard to the North Carolinians, as the 300
men who accompanied Sumpter were made prisoners, we find 350 North
Carolina militia made prisoners by the enemy. One of their best officers, Gen.
Rutherford, was wounded and fell into the enemy's hands. Their General
Gregory also was severely wounded. Of the regulars, not above six hundred
escaped ; so that the loss here, exclusive of those who had shared the fate of
Sumpter's detachment, was not less than six hundred,* a very large proportion
of whom were killed and wounded. Many valuable officers shared the same
fate, and none of them more deservedly lamented than Colonel Porterfield ;
who was severely wounded and fell into the enemy's hands. When able to
travel he was paroled, but his wound was incurable, and he finally expired
under it.
The tomb of De Kalb, erected by congress, still occupies a conspicuous
place in the cemetery of Camden, and history has reared a more imperishable
monument to the gallant Du Buissy, who with his own body shielded that of
his friend and commander from the British bayonets, — which had already
drank his blood from eleven orifices.
The command of Sumpter was irrevocably dispersed, but its commander,
supported still by the hope of retrieving the fortunes of his country, retired to
North Carolina, to endeavour once more to collect Ms followers.
General Gates, after ineffectual attempts to rally Ms men, first at Clermont,
then at Charlotte, then at Salisbury, finally retired to Hillsborough, to solicit
the support of the state legislature then in session. Gunby, Williams, Howard,
Anderson, and as many of the regular officers as had escaped, collected the
•' tristes reliquiae" of their late gallant regiments at Charlotte, and under the
conduct of General Smallwood, retreated to Hillsborough. Here, upon bring
ing together the little remnant of the southern army, they found the whole of
all descriptions in the Maryland line, including those who had been left in the
rear on the day of the action, to amount to six hundred and ninety-seven rank
and file, and eighty non-commissioned officers and musicians ; total, seven

* Colonel Williams says the killed, wounded, and missing, after the two affairs of the l6th and
18th, were, 3 lieutenant colonels, 2 majors, 15 captains, 13 subalterns, 2 staff officers, 52 non-com-i
missioned officers, 74 musicians, 71-1 rank and file.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 303
hundred and seventy-seven : Delawares, one hundred and seventy-five : Virgi- chap.
Mans, fifty. v^-v-w
After the dispersion of Colonel Sumpter's command, there did not remain
in South Carolina a man in arms in the American cause, except the few who
were embodied under Marion. This officer still maintained his ground below
the Santee River, and managed, among the swamps and defiles of that region,
to elude all the activity of his enemies. Nay, the communication with Charles
ton by the way of Nelson's Ferry, was almost broken up by his persevering
watchfulness, and even the defeat of Gates did not warn him to retire, as long
as the British cavalry remained with Cornwallis.
A masterly enterprize, marked with the boldness and intelligence that dis
tinguished all his movements, and crowned with signal success, soon made it
necessary for Cornwallis to dislodge him. Intelligence was communicated to
Marion that a detachment of the prisoners taken from Gates, about one hun
dred and fifty in number, were on their march for Charleston, under an escort
of nearly the same number. Placing his mounted militia in ambush in one
of the swamps that skirt the road from Nelson's Ferry to Monk's Corner,
he darted upon the escort at a moment when least expected, and made every
man of them prisoner. Then placing their arms in the hands of their prison
ers, paroling the officers and taking their receipt for the British prisoners, to be
exchanged, he hurried across the Santee and up the west bank of the Pee Dee,
until his prisoners were safely disposed of within the limits of North Carolina.
He was far beyond the reach of danger before the parties detached to drive
him from his covert had reached the scene of his recent enterprizes.
Thus was the state of South Carolina wholly abandoned to the enemy.
From the fatal 16th of August to the 7th of September, Lord Cornwallis
was occupied at Camden in measures to secure the province against that spirit
of revolt, which had so recently manifested itself on the approach of Gates.
During this interval it was, that the most influential of the whigs in Charleston,
in contempt of the faith of treaty, were torn from their families, hurried into
transports, and conveyed to the fortress of St. Augustine. And every measure
was adopted in council and enforced by example, which could give the citi
zens to understand that their lives and properties were held in subjection to a
military despotism. At the same time, measures were adopted to embody and
discipline the zealous loyalists; and for this purpose, Colonel Ferguson, an
active and intelligent partisan, and possessing peculiar qualifications for attach
ing to him the marksmen of Ninety-Six, was dispatched into that district.
To a corps of one hundred picked regulars, he soon succeeded in attaching
twelve or thirteen hundred hardy natives ; Ms camp became the rendezvous of

104 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, the desperate, the, idle, and the vindictive, as well as of the youth of the loyalists
, whose zeal or ambition prompted them to military service.
There was a part of the state which had not yet been trodden by a hostile
foot, and the projected march through tMs unexplored and undevastated region
drew many to his standard. This was the country which stretches along the
foot of the mountains towards the borders of North Carolina. His progress
is said to have been marked with blood and lighted up with conflagrations.
On the 7th September Lord Cornwallis, at the head of all his disposable
force, lightly equipped, as the English writers say, and not prepared for per
manent conquest, commenced his march for Charlotte ; while Ferguson, by an
oblique route, moved from Ninety-Six towards the same point. There was,
seemingly nothing to oppose, nothing to molest the progress of either. Yet one
met with death and ruin, and the other found an enemy swarming round him,
who could neither be driven away, nor evaded.
It was at the time of Clarke's retreat from Augusta that Ferguson was
crossing the country to form a junction with Cornwallis. The route that the
American colonel was pursuing in Ms retreat, appeared to indicate an intention
to pass in front of the British army, and form a junction with Gates, or with
the North Carolina militia, which had been recently called into service. Fer
guson, conceiving the idea of intercepting him in his course, made a movement
to the left, which seemed to threaten the habitations of the hardy race that
occupy the mountains. It was approaching the lair of the lion; for half the
families of the persecuted whigs had been deposited in this asylum.
The fate which Ferguson met with has been generally attributed to a casual
meeting of bodies of militia, who acted without any preconcert. To the
British commander, the force that destroyed him appeared to have sprung
up like the soldiers of Deucalion. But that country was never without the
force that Ferguson had to encounter. The same fate would have awaited
any other commander at any other time, who had approached that sanctuary
in no greater force.
From the Kenhawa to the Ogechee, there existed a connexion between the
frontier settlements stretching along the mountains. Their contiguity to the
powerful Indian nations, the Chickesaws, Cherokees, and Creeks, cemented
their union, by the sympathies that sprung from common danger and mutual
protection. Their frequent exposure to the incursions of these hostile nations,
kept them always on the alert, and always ready to fly to the support of each
other. The same cause had rendered them deadly hostile to the British inte
rest, for the Indians had repeatedly stained their hearths with blood, under the
influence of British emissaries. To the loyalists they were still more hostile,

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE, 305
for many of the latter had taken up their abode among the Indians the better chap.
to facilitate their plundering excursions ; and in the incursions of the Indians v^r-v-^-
which had recently harassed this whole frontier, white men had always min
gled with the savages in Indian disguises. At this very time, the whole fron
tier was in alarm from rumours of hostile preparation among the Indian towns.
The forward movements of the British army had always been accompanied by
a simultaneous irruption of their barbarian ally. Environed by their mountains,
the inhabitants had hitherto felt secure from British invasion, and the same
consideration had collected about them the families and property of many of
the wMgs from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. From the last-
mentioned state a caravan of hapless exiles had recently arrived among them.
The comrades of Clarke had all been plundered, their houses destroyed, and
their families turned destitute into the woods. This was among the measures
which claimed sanction under the instructions and proclamations of the
" amiable Cornwallis." This defenceless group had now been expedited to
the mountains, where they received such marks of kindness and hospitality as
can never be forgotten.
Maddened by the view of their sufferings and the anticipation of the evils
which invasion must bring along with it, the militia of this region was pre
cisely in that state in which a militia becomes terrible. Their families were
behind them, the enemy before them, and there was no time for hesitation.
Simultaneously all flew to arms, and the few passes of the mountams through
which they must penetrate, or at which they must make a stand, necessarily
drew them to a common point. The same cause also brought together a
number of the whigs from the planes of South Carolina and Georgia, fleeing
from the approach of Ferguson.
Clarke's march along the foot of the mountains was intended to cover the
retreat of the Georgia families from the enemy embodied on his right, and
Cleveland, Williams, Lacy, Brennan, and many others of the South Caro-i
lina wMgs had collected their followers on the approach of Ferguson, and
taken the route for the passes of the mountains to avail themselves of the pro
tection of the defiles, and of their friends who lay beyond them. Thus by a
combination of causes all leading to the same end, did near six thousand of
the choicest yeomanry of the country find themselves collected in front of
Colonel Ferguson, at a place called Gilberttown.
Nothing could exceed the astonishment of the British colonel at finding him
self in the presence of this formidable force. He dispatched couriers to Lord
Cornwallis for relief, but the country through which they had to pass was too
hostile to admit of their reachmg him. Nor would the distance, though not
39

vm.

306 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, great, have admitted of support against an enemy capable of moving with
, such rapidity. For they were all well-mounted, and not an article of bag
gage impeded their march! His blanket, his rifle, and his ammunition, was
all which any one carried with him into the field. In a mild and happy xli-
mate, they sought no other covering but the heavens ; and the morsel fur
nished from a scrip, supplied the food for several days of fatigue.
A retrograde movement made by Colonel Ferguson betrayed his apprehen
sions, and pointed out the necessity of an effort to overtake him. Nine hun
dred and ten picked men* were immediately mounted on the fleetest horses ;
the command of them given to Colonel Arthur Campbell, and under him, to
Cleveland, Seviere, Shelby, and Williams.
On the 7th October, Campbell overtook Ferguson, who had taken post on
King's Mountain, near the borders of North Carolina, where the great natural
advantages of the ground might well have protected him from a far more
numerous enemy. But Campbell did not hesitate to attack him, and in a
manner altogether new and characteristic.
It was precisely the Parthian contest, which proved so fatal to the disciplined
legions of the Romans.
Campbell divided his force into three equal parts; the one he led in person,
the others were commanded by Shelby and Cleveland. There were three
different points at which the mountain might be ascended, and these were
Severally assigned to the respective commanders. It seems, that Ferguson had
supposed Mmself assailable only by one route ; for on one only there was
posted a picket guard. This was the pass by which Cleveland ascended, and
he was in consequence the first engaged. His simple, manly, and forcible
harangue as given by Ramsay, is not imaginary, as there is reason to believe
that most of those transmitted to posterity as the speeches of military com
manders, are. From the conduct of Colonel Ferguson, it would seem, that he
was not aware of his enemy's order of battle until it was too late to counteract
it. He trusted to the bayonet against an enemy as nimble as the antelope,
and who, being altogether destitute of this weapon, had calculated on drawing
his enemy from the heights he occupied, by receding before it, while the other
parties advanced to possess themselves of the ground thus abandoned. There
was nothing gained by repMsing detachment after detachment, at the point of
the bayonet; on the contrary, it impeded the use of the only instrument of

* Mr. Marshall says sixteen hundred. We know not from what authority he takes this number.
But the American account was certainly as here stated.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 3(77
death that could reach them? Ferguson has been much eulogised for Ms con- chap.
duct ; but it will rest with militai'y men to determine whether the measure he v^r^v^/
persisted in, of keeping his men together and alternately pressing upon detach
ment after detachment, did not insure to him the fate he met with. It is most
probable, that he was unaware of the smallness of the number he was engaged
with, but supposed the whole body of six thousand upon him. But it is not
proble that he could, by any measures that his situation admitted of, have
escaped ; for the party surrounding him coMd certainly have detained him,
until the main body came up.
After a severe conflict of an hour, in which one hundred and fifty of his
men were already killed, and three or four hundred wounded, Ferguson him
self fell, and his whole command surrendered. Eleven hundred men, includ
ing the wounded, with fifteen hundred stand of arms, fell into the hands of the
victors. About two hundred, chiefly those whose crimes rendered it dangerous
to fall into the hands of their countrymen, escaped during the action, through
the intervals between the American parties.
The loss Aof the whigs was inconsiderable as to numbers, but rendered dis
tressing to the Carolinians by the fall of Colonel Williams. When this state
shall perpetuate her own gratitude and the memory of the worthies of the
revolution, by dedicating a column to the preservation of their names, let not
that of Williams be forgotten. But the time is not yet arrived when impar
tial history can graduate the rank of merit by an unbiassed judgment.
During the time of the events that terminated in the fall of Ferguson, Lord
Cornwallis was moving on, in all the tranquillity of conscious security, to
wards Charlotte. It is not easy at this day to decide upon his views ; when
he afterwards found it necessary to retreat to Winsborough, he wrote, that his
sole object was " to obtain recruits." But the known unwillingness, and even
impolicy in a commander to acknowledge that he has been baffled in his
manoeuvres, will ever cause the human mind to extend its scrutiny beyond his
avowed motives, in determining on his views and actions. It is not very likely
that the British commander would have left behind him the many friendly
settlements, in which the recruiting service was now going on with but too
much success, to seek recruits among the last men in America to furnish them,
— the determined whigs of the Waxsaws and Mecklenburg. A more simple
solution of his motives is to be gathered from a few facts unquestionably esta
blished. Emissaries* had been despatched from Camden to the loyalists

* Steidman. Marshall*

308 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, in the vicinity of the Deep and Haw rivers, with instructions to hold them-
- selves in readiness to act in concert with the British army ; and Ms lordship
had ventured to boast that two provinces were subdued, and the third was but
the stepping-block to the conquest of Virginia. It was then with a view to
realise this boast, that the expedition had been undertaken. There was no
army to oppose him from Georgia- to the Delaware; and after a junction with
Ferguson in Charlotte, at the head of three or four thousand men, he may
have marched to Hillsborough, where he was sure to be joined by a host of
loyalists; and from which, Gates' little army must have retired, if not prevented
by the rising of the loyalists in force.
All these plausible anticipations were blasted by events as unexpected as
they were vexatious.
As Ferguson's approach to the mountmns had excited an opposition which
he had not anticipated, so Lord Cornwallis7 movement to North Carolina
awakened the whigs of Waxsaws and Mecklenburg to efforts of daring and
active hostility wMch entitled them to receive from the British commander the
distinguishing epithet of " the hornet's nest." On tMs occasion was elicited
the first spark of that military genius which was destined, on the planes of
New Orleans, to shed so much lustre on the American arms.*
Fleeing from their homes, and removing their families as far from the
approaching danger as they could, the inflexible whigs collected under popular
leaders, and beset every road on which the foraging, parties of the enemy had
to pass. Often in small volunteer parties, they approached the pickets and
encampment of the enemy, and selected their objects with unerring aim.
Watching the rear of the army, no straggler escaped them, and expresses,
escorts, and detachments found no safety from their persecutions.
Among the partisans who now rendered themselves conspicuous, was the
late general, then Captain W. R. Davie. Scarcely attained to the age of man
hood, he gathered around him a small band of brave and adventurous youth,,
and showed himself every where, where danger was to be sought, or service
performed. It was he who, at the head of his little corps, made such a stand
at the court-house of Charlotte, as actually brought the whole British army
to a halt. Nor was it a bloodless effort that dislodged him.

* General Jackson, then 14 years of age, took the field on the advance of Lord Cornwallis. Lit
tle was it imagined that the obscure strippKng, who was contemptuously ordered by a British officer
to clean his boots, and sabred for his disobedience, would be honoured with the greatest triumph
ever acquired over a British army. Heaven decreed to him a signal opportunity of appeasing the
manes of a mother, and a brother, who perished through cruelty.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 309
But General Davidson, then in command of the Mecklenburg militia, ne- chap.
. vui.
eessarily acted the most conspicuous part. Brave, active, intelligent, and^r^,-^.,
influential, he so inspirited the inhabitants in their opposition, as to leave no
rest to the enemy by day or by night. Judiciously instructing his men to dis
tribute themselves in small parties so as to be every where at once, and leave
no prominent point for the enemy to strike at, he greatly delayed and incom
moded their advance.
Lord Cornwallis had passed Charlotte and was advancing to Salisbury,
after leaving orders for Ferguson to follow him across the Yadkin, when he
received the appalling intelligence of the catastrophe of King's Mountain.
Whatever had been Ms ulterior views, it was necessary now to abandon them.
For the fall of Ferguson had so inspirited the mifitia beyond the Catawba,
that they now began to gather round him in shoals. Could Campbell's six
thousand men have been kept together, and marched across the^ Catawba mto
the rear of the British army, a distance not thirty miles, the crest-fallen Gates
might still have had a hope of giving to America another exMbition as brilliant
as that which crowned his efforts at Saratoga. He had, by this time, collected
about one thousand three hundred regMars, and some militia, and the interval
between himself and his now retreating enemy> did not much exceed eighty
miles. But immediately after the affair of King's MountMn^ the militia had marched
home under their respective leaders, and by a most unexampled act of lenity
to their mifitia prisoners, had suffered them also to return to their homes, on a
solemn promise to keep aloof for the future from the existing contest. This
was a most unfortunate measure, inasmuch as there were then many prisoners
from Sumpter and Gates' defeats, perishing in the dungeons of Charleston;
for near a thousand of whom, the captured loyalists ought to have furMshed
the means of liberation. Yet the indulgence was not indiscriminately ex
tended to all. Ten were taken from the ranks on the field of battle and hung
in the view of both armies.
Many severe aMmadversions have been showered on the brave men who
fought at King's Mountain; and they have been feebly repelled, or quiescently
admitted by most of the American writers. As to the charge of indignity
shown to the body of Ferguson, it does not merit a serious refutation. But as
to the execution of ten* of their prisoners, the fact is unquestionable; it never
was disavowed.

* There were eleven selected, but one of them broke from the party conveying them to executions

310 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
CvihP' ^ar m lts mildest form, is so full of horrors, that the mind recbils from vin-
- dicating any act that can, in the remotest degree, increase its miseries. To
these, no act contributes more than that of retaliation. Hence no act should
be ventured upon with more solemn deliberation, and none so proper to be
confined to a commander in chief, or the civil power. But the brave men who
fought in the affair of King's Mountain, are not to be left loaded with unmerited
censure. The calmest and most dispassionate reflection upon their conduct, on
this occasion, will lead to the conviction, that if they committed any offence, it
was against their own country, not against the enemy. That instead of being
instigated by a thirst of blood, they acted solely with a view to put an end to
its effusion ; and boldly, for this purpose, took upon themselves all the dangers
that a system of retaliation could superinduce. The officers of the American
army, who, twelve months afterwards, hazarded their lives by calling upon
their general to avenge the death of Hayne, justly challenge the gratitude and
admiration of their country; but the men of King's Mountain, (for it is avowed
as a popular act, and not that of their chief alone,) merit the additional repu
tation of having assumed on themselves the entire responsibility, without wish
ing to involve the regular army in their dangers. And this was done in the
plenitude of British triumph, and when not a man of them could count on
safety for an hour, in any tMng but his own bravery and vigilance. But what
was the prospect before them ? They were all proscribed men ; the measures
of Lord Cornwallis had put them out of the protection of civilized warfare ;
and the spirit in which Ms proclamations and instructions were executed by
Ms officers, had put them out of the protection of common humanity. The
massacres at Camden had occurred not six weeks before, and those of Brown
at Augusta, scarcely half that time. Could they look on and see this system
of cruelty prosecuted, and not try the only melancholy measure that could
check it? The effect proved that there was as much of reflection as of passion
in the act ; for the little despots who then held the country, dared prosecute the
measure no farther. Another and an incontestible proof that blind revenge
did not preside over the counsels that consigned these men to death, is drawn
from the deliberation with which they were selected, and the mildness mani
fested to the residue of the prisoners.. It has been before observed, that in the
ranks of Colonel Ferguson there were many individuals notorious as habitual

and although he had to make his way through a thousand of the best horsemen and marksmen in
the world, such was the universal admiration or feeling on the occasion, not one would lift a hand to
stop him,

VIII.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 311
plunderers and murderers. What was to be done with these ? There were chap,
no courts of justice to punish their offences, and to detain them as prisoners of v
war was to make them objects of exchange. Should such pests to society 'be
again enlarged, and suffered to renew their outrages ? Capture in arms does
not exempt the deserter from the gallows ; why should it the cold-blooded
murderer ? There was no alternative left ; and the officers, with all the atten
tion to form, that circumstances would permit, and more a great deal, it is
believed, than either Brown* or Cornwallis had exMbited, could only form a
council, and consign them to the fate that would have awaited them in the
regular administration of justice.
Yet, however justice or policy may have sanctioned the act, there would
have been infinitely more magnanimity in abstaining from this act of severity.
The act of mercy would have been grateful to Him who had so signally crowned
their arms with victory ; and a remote gaol might perhaps, have confined to
inactivity those who could not be enlarged without exposing the country to
pillage and murder. Besides avoiding exposing others as well as themselves to

* The following is the account given of the conduct of Brown at Augusta, after the affair of the
1 8th, in which Clarke was repulsed : " Captain Asby, an officer noted for his bravery and humanity,
with twenty-eight others, including the wounded, fell into the hands of the enemy, and were disposed
of, under the sanguinary order of Lord Cornwallis, in the following manner : Captain Asby and
twelve of the wounded prisoners, were hanged on the stair-case of the white house, where Brown
was lying wounded, so that he might have the satisfaction of seeing the victims of his vengeance ex
pire. Their bodies were delivered up to the Indians, who scalped and otherwise mangled them, and
threw them into the river. John Burgamy, Scott Ruder, Jordan Ricketson,  Darling, and two
youths, brothers, of the name of Glass, were all hanged; the former of these youths was shot
through the thigh, and coidd not be carried off when the retreat was ordered, and the younger brother
could not be prevailed on to leave him; his tenderness and affection cost him his life: ahorse was
the fatal scaffold on which they were mounted, and from the gibbet they entered together the long
journey of eternity." What was the crime of these youth? They certainly' never had been re
quested to take protection. But the narrative does not end here. " All this was merciful when
compared with the fate which awaited the other prisoners ; they were delivered to the Indians to glut
their vengeance for the loss they had sustained in the action and the seige. The Indians formed a
circle and placed the prisoners in the centre, and their eagerness to shed blood spared the victims
from tedious torture : some were scalped before they sunk under the Indian weapon of war ; others
were thrown into fires and roasted to death. The record of these transactions is now before the
author from the pens of British officers who were present, who exultingly communicated it to their
friends in Savannah, Charleston, and London, where it stands upon record in the papers of the day."
M'CalVs History of Georgia, vol. 2. p. 326.
Should the British nation ever be induced to believe that suchfiorrors have disgraced the sanction
of British authority, their indignation wiU exceed that of those who witnessed them and suffered,
under them.

312 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, the dangers of retaliation, they might have been satisfied with the numerous
VUI" victims then bleeding around them, who had fallen in honourable warfare.
And there is very little doubt that they would have been satisfied, had they not
been goaded by the thought that the enemy believed they did not dare to reta
liate. When the remains of the southern army became concentrated at Hillsbo
rough, they were placed under the command of Colonel Williams; and being
hutted in the neighbourhood of the town, by dint of perseverance in their offi
cers, and die best of dispositions in themselves, they soon resumed their wonted
discipline. Yet they were not without temptations to adopt a contrary con
duct. This honourable testimony to their good conduct is recorded by one
who shared in all their toils, and had better opportuMties than any other to
judge of their merits. " Absolutely without pay — almost destitute of cloth
ing — often with only half a ration — and never with a whole one, (without sub
stituting one article for another,) not a soldier was heard to murmur."
Nor shoMd one honourable anecdote of their good conduct ever be forgot
ten. When the Pennsylvania line revolted and yet had the fidelity to deliver
up the agents sent among them by the enemy, a corrupt world gazed with
astonishment on an instance of such fidelity exhibited under such circumstances.
But though it has never been told, the example had been set by the sol
diers under Williams : but it was in a remote part of America, and no effort
was made to blazon it to the world. It is known that emissaries had been
sent from Camden into the neighbourhood of Hillsborough, and some of them
who ventured to tamper with the American troops, were actually delivered up
by them to the civil authority and punished.
On the advance of General Gates towards Camden, he had fortunately been
obliged to leave two pieces of artillery on the road, for want of horses to carry
them. These were now brought up to camp, and a few iron pieces gathered
from various places, being also collected, formed a small park of artillery.
The legislature of North Carolina being in session when General Gates
arrived, he presented an earnest request to them, to make efforts to call out
militia, collect munitions, and take such measures as the resources of the
country would admit of, to put him in a condition again to take the field. The
legislature manifested the best disposition imaginable to comply, but such
was the excitement produced among the loyalists by the recent successes of the
British army, that the assembly itself could scarcely §it in safety ; and an oppo
sition was sustained from the disaffected which paralysed every effort that was
made. They could scarcely furnish provision for the troops ; and when, after-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 313
ivards, Lord Cornwallis passed Charlotte and advanced upon Salisbury, the' chap.
'confidence of the loyalists appeared approaching to open insurrection. v^-v-^
Measures had also been adopted to bring forward reinforcements from Vir
ginia ; for that state having been engaged in recruiting, there was still a hope
of drawing some men from her depots. All that could be sent into the field
were promptly forwarded, but unfortunately, in no better condition for taking
the field than the troops encamped at Hillsborough. On the 16th September,
Colonel Williams says, " Colonel Bufort arrived from Virginia with the man
gled remains of his unfortunate regiment, reinforced by about two hundred
raw recruits ; all of them in a ragged condition. Uniform and other clothing
were to be sent after them, but they never arrived. About the same time, a
small detachment of Virginia mifitia arrived, without even arms."
Of the men whom Porterfield led into action on the 16th, only about fifty
escaped ; these, added to Bufort's reinforcement, constituted the Virginia line
then in the field, about three hundred in number: to which are to be added y
the remains of Harrison's regiment of artillery, commanded by Captain An
thony Singleton; the numbers we do not find specified, but the brunt of the
battle of the 16th had fallen very heavily upon this corps.
Gates now only waited for a supply of clothing and the embodying of the
militia, to take the field.
Upon the advance of Lord Cornwallis from Camden, extraordinary excre
tions had been made by North Carolina to draw out a respectable militia
force. The command of them was conferred on General Smallwood, and at
their head he advanced to the Yadkin.
About this time the celebrated Colonel Daniel Morgan, who had already
reaped such harvests of laurels at Quebec and Saratoga, arrived in camp. He
had been instructed so to do, from his high reputation as a partisan officer,
and great popularity as a commander of militia. A few young men, emu
lous to serve under him and near him, were all the force he brought with him.
Immediately on Ms arrival, General Gates ordered four companies to be
drafted from the regiments, to be equipped as light-infantry, and to form a
partisan corps to serve under Colonel Morgan. The arrival of Colonels
White and Washington, with the remains of the first and third regiments of
dragoons, so rougMy handled by Tarleton after the fall of Charleston, enabled
the general to add a body of seventy cavalry to Morgan's command. These
were commanded by Colonel WasMngton, as Colonel White appears never to
have met with a refusal when he solicited leave of absence. To these were
added a small corps of riflemen, about sixty in number, under Major Rose.
40

3i4 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. By extraordinary efforts the government of North Carolina had succeeded
, in collecting a small supply of clothing, which soon after arrived in camp, and '
enabled General Gates to furnish Morgan's command with a suit of comforta
ble clotMng round, before they entered upon the severe and active duties
which they were detached to perform. The rest of the troops also were par
tially supplied with clothing from the same quarter; but tents they had none,
and very few blankets in proportion to their numbers.
Yet the winter had commenced, and without a murmur, nay, with expres-
pressions of anxiety to proceed, on the 2d November the army took up the line
of march for Salisbury.
Morgan's command had marched the day before; and while General Small-
wood with his militia took post at Providence, six miles below Charlotte, and
the main army encamped and hutted itself in the latter place, Morgan pressed
forward into the neighbourhood of Camden, and an American force again
occupied the ground which had been the scene of the disaster of the 16th of
August. Such was the state of the war, and the position of the army, when General
Greene arrived and took command of the southern department.
After the fall of Ferguson, Lord Cornwallis crossed the Catawba River at
Land's Ford, and took post at Wmsborough. This completed Ms chain of
posts from Georgetown to Augusta, in a circle, the centre of which would
have been about Beaufort in South Carolina, equidistant from Charleston and
Savannah. These posts consisted of Georgetown, Camden, Winsborougb,
Ninety-Six and Augusta. Within this circle was an interior chain, at the dis
tance of about half the radius, consisting of Fort Watson on the road to Cam
den, Mott's house, and Granby on the Congaree. Dorchester and Orangeburg
on the road both to Ninety- Six and Granby, were fortified as posts of rest and
deposit on the line of communication, as was Monk's Corner, or Biggin
Church, and some other small posts on that to Camden. These posts were
all judiciously chosen, both for covering the country and obtaimng subsistence;
and the English writers speak with exultation of the excellent and abundant
fare produced from the confiscated and sequestered estates in their vicinity.
In these positions the British army was stationed when Greene took com
mand of the southern department. Their numbers then amounted to about
five thousand men ; their situation was highly favourable to recruiting, and
parties for that purpose were pushed into the tory-settlements in all directions.
Colonel Tarleton acknowledges they were very successful. No less than one
hundred and fifty were added to his own corps. In addition to the increase
from this source, five hundred recruits and convalescents, belonging to the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 316
different regiments in this quarter, had recently arrived from New York, and CfitAP.
jomed the corps they belonged to. In December, their numbers were further ^~v~%->
augmented by a reinforcement of two thousand three hundred men under
General Leslie. This body had been employed, it will be seen, in Virginia ;
but upon the news of the advance of Gates from Hillsborough, and the move
ments of the militia which followed or attended it, they were ordered to
Charleston to reinforce Cornwallis. Major General Leslie, on his arrival,
found an order to join Cornwallis with about fifteen hundred men of his
command, consisting of the brigade of guards, the Hessian regiment of Boze,
one hundred and twenty yagers, and a detachment of light dragoons.* As
Cornwallis was then preparing to advance through North Carolina into Vir
ginia, Leslie was ordered to take the route by Camden, there to await ulterior
orders. After Marion's exploit in releasing the prisoners taken at Gates' defeat, he
had been obliged to dismiss his followers, and retire to his secret and imper
vious swamps. Sumpter also, after the surprise and dispersion of his force on
Fishing Creek, had fallen back with the wreck of that fatal day, to the neigh
bourhood of the mountains. But no sooner was the American army again in
motion, than they emerged from their several retreats, and renewed their
harassing and distressing enterprises against the enemy and his adherents.
Tarleton's successes against Sumpter, and the ordinary promptness and
celerity of his motions, pointed him out to Cornwallis as the proper officer to
ferret out and destroy, the wary Marion. But after the affair of Fishing Creek,
the star of that officer commenced its decline ; he never afterwards effected
any important services in South Carolina. Marion eluded and baffled all his
adversary's manoeuvres to bring him to action, and remained in possession of
the whole disputed ground when Tarleton was recalled by his commander to
restrain the incursions of his ancient adversary, Sumpter; now advanced
within twenty-eight miles of the British camp at Winsborough. Having
formed a junction with Colonels Taylor, Winn, Middleton, Lacy, Bratton, Hill,
and a number of the whigs of Georgia under Clarke and Twiggs, his force
had accumulated to an imposing bulk; and at the head of these, he had lain
too long encamped at the Fishdam Ford, on the east bank of the Broad River.
The daring measure of approaching so near the royal army, suggested to
Cornwallis the enterprise of surprising Sumpter in his encampment. Such
importance was attached to securing his individual person, that it is confi-

* Tarleton's Campaign, p. 3.

316 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE,
chap, dently asserted, an officer with five dragoons had it specially in charge to force
, their way to his tent and take him, dead or alive.
The late writers on the American war, have taken Colonel Tarleton as their
guide in relating the incidents of this battle. But nothing can be more imper
fect, nay, incorrect, than his account of it. It was not the fall of Wemyss, or
his arriving sooner than he expected at the American camp, that produced his
failure ; but the firm and steady resistance made to him by the American
advanced guard, under Colonel Thomas Taylor. Wemyss had been very
fortunate in the circumstances attending his advance. He had obtained for
his guide a young loyalist, who had been discharged from confinement in the
American camp the day before ; and his detachment narrowly escaped being
discovered by the American patrole, which had been pushed far in advance,
but had commenced its return when at a very short distance from meeting the
British detachment on its march.
Fortunately, General Sumpter had given more than usual strength to Ms
advance-guard, and Colonel Taylor, who commanded it, had caused a num
ber of fires to be lighted in front of his line, and made the necessary arrange
ments, in case of alarm, that his men should form so far in the rear of the fires
as to be concealed, whilst an approacMng adversary would be exposed by their
fight. The army had lain so long in their position, that he anticipated an attack.
The videttes and pickets did their duty, and by the time the enemy had
reached his fires, Taylor's men were under arms and prepared to receive them.
A well-directed and murderous fire at their exposed enemy, prostrated twen
ty-three of them on the spot where they received it; and the rest imme
diately recoiled, and retreated one hundred yards in front of the fires before.
they could be rallied. Here the infantry dismounted, and being formed, ad
vanced steadily on the Americans. Several discharges were exchanged, but
the enemy pressing forward with the bayonet upon Taylor's troops, who had
none, he ordered Ms men to retire and form under cover of a rail fence in his
rear. The order was executed with precision, and a well-directed fire from
this position compelled the enemy to draw off. One of those curious incidents
now occurred wMch exemplify the vicissitudes of a day of battle. It is a fact,
that at the instant the enemy retreated, the party that repelled them had also
broken and fled. But the darkness of the Mght concealed their flight; and
had it been discovered by the enemy, the other troops were under arms in the
rear to prevent his availing himself of it.*
* The fate of one individual deserves notice. This was Sealy, the loyalist who acted as the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE: 317
The highly military conduct of Colonel Taylor was the decisive cause of chap.
this repulse. The obscurity of the night rendered it impossible for the rest of ,^-v-^.
the troops to yield their assistance, or the affair would have been fatal to the
British party. There were not above one hundred and fifty of the Americans
actually engaged. The rest were prepared for action, had the enemy suc
ceeded in passing Taylor; but coMd not fire, lest then- arms should be pointed
towards their friends.*
The repulse of this party gave such eclat to the American arms that Tarleton
was immediately recalled from the pursuit of Marion to retrieve the lost
ground of the royal cause. He lost no time in obeying the mandate, and im
mediately on his return, entered on the pursuit of the American party, until
his career was checked by the affair at Blackstock's house, on the banks of the
Tiger River. Here he was made severely to feel the consequences of that
contempt for Ins adversary which had been imbibed from his own previous
successes, and which was destined soon to strip him of all the military plumes
in wMch his exploits had heretofore decorated his character. Never did a
more uncandid account of an action find its way into the records of Mstory,
than that which Colonel Tarleton himself has given of this event. He has
managed to convert a signal defeat into a brilliant victory.
The astonishing rapidity with which Colonel Tarleton returned from the
pursmt of Marion, exposed Sumpter's command to the most imminent dan
ger. Whilst the cavalry and light troops of the British army were detached
on a distant expedition, Sumpter had no apprehension from Cornwallis supe
riority in infantry. He knew he could retreat with superior celerity, for he
was entirely unencumbered with baggage. His men wanted no covering but

guide. The sabre wound of which he died proved that it was inflicted by his own party ; and it is
thought to have occurred thus : after conducting the party that penetrated to Sumpter's tent, (which
was easily done, as it stood beside the main road which crossed the encampment,) in his hurry to re
join the main body he forgot that the presence of the party was necessary to prevent his being mis
taken, by his homespun clothing, for an American. And thus he incurred the fate that he merited.
* Colonel Wemyss was found wounded in the morning, shot through both thighs. His being left
on the ground, is the strongest proof of the precipitate flight of his men. He had recently returned
from carrying into effect Lord Cornwallis^ measures of mercy against the whigs on Black River and
the Pee Dee. The whigs had reason to believe, that he had in person attended at the execution of a
respectable citizen named Cuzack. He also had in his pocket the report of the houses he had burnt
over the heads of the families of the whigs. The paper was handed to General Sumpter; he read
it, threw it in the fire, and ordered every attention to be paid to the wounded officer. Col. Wemyss
is said to have been not a little surprised at such treatment.

318 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, the heavens, and were satisfied to subsist on the coarsest diet. Provided with
, their own horses, and intimately acquainted with all the roads, streams, and
recesses of the country, they could move with the speed of the Arab; and
when pressed, disperse and retire, to meet again at some place of rendezvous
assigned by their commander. He, therefore, after the affair with Wemyss,
still hung upon the skirts of Cornwallis, and proved himself a most disquiet
ing neighbour.
But he now learned that Tarleton was on the march to meet him, furnished
with artillery, his infantry on horseback, and a large force of well-mounted
cavalry : being himself destitute of both cavalry and artillery, he was forced to
hasten his retreat for the purpose of throwing the rapid Tiger between himself
and his adversary. By the celerity of his movements, he reached the banks
of the river on the 20th of November, and soon after, the British legionary
troops accompanied, by a mounted detachment of the 63d regiment appeared
in view.
Blackstock's house is on the south-west bank of the Tiger River, and, toge
ther with the ground about it, afforded a highly advantageous position for
drawing up a small force in order of battle. Sumpter stationed his men so as
to avail himself of every advantage ; not doubting that the whole force of the
enemy was upon him, he resolved to maintain his ground dMing the day, and,
under cover of the night pass the river and disperse.
Tarleton's command consisted of his legion, a battalion of the 71st, and a
detachment of the 63d British regiments ; with a lieutenant's command of the
royal artillery and one field-piece. Of this force, about 400 were mounted;
and with these Tarleton had pressed forward to overtake and retard the Ame
rican party.
It was not long before Sumpter discovered that the whole British force had
not come up, and very judiciously resolved to baffle the views of Tarleton, by
commencing the attack and cutting him up in detail. Tarleton supposing that
he had Ms prey secure, immediately on arriving occupied an elevated piece of
ground in front of the American position, dismounted his men to relieve them
selves and horses, until the arrival of his infantry and artillery should enable
Mm to commence the attack with advantage. Sumpter seized the critical mo
ment, and succeeded in repu sing him.
The Americans not being near enough to use with effect their rifles and
fowling-pieces, with which chiefly they were armed, descended from their
heights, and poured in upon their enemy a well-directed fire. The 63d pressed
forward with the bayonet, and the Americans retired to their heights, — because
they had no bayonets to meet their adversaries with, and were previously

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 319
* *
ordered to do so. This brought the enemy within rifle-shot, and at the foot chap,
of the hill, they, received a fire which brought many of them to the ground ^^-^
and threw the rest into confusion. Tarleton seeing his danger, made a despe
rate effort to obviate it, by charging directly up the hill ; but the Americans
stood firm, and his ranks were thinned by the deadly rifle. Drawing off his
whole corps, he then wheeled upon the Americans' left towards Blackstock's
house, where the ground was not so precipitous, and a better footing was
afforded for his horses. Here the Georgians were posted under Clarke and
Twiggs, and their little corps of about 150 men, displayed the courage of vete
rans; but the pressure of Tarleton's whole force was too much for them to
withstand, and at this point was gained the only semblance of advantage on
the side of the enemy. The left gave way ; but the timely interposition of the
reserve, under Colonel R. Winn, and the enfilading fire from the house, in
which a company had been posted, soon restored the fortune of the day ; and
the officer who, in the face of the world, has boasted of a victory, actually ran
away, and was pursued, and the Americans say, was saved by the darkness of
the night.
His assertion is, that "from the time the left yielded, the Americans began
to disperse, and nothing but the approach of Mght prevented the pursuit."
Strange, then! how the Americans came to possess themselves of all Ms
wounded, and many of Ms horses ! The fact is, he never halted until he joined
the residue of his corps, then two miles distant, and there he encamped. The
Americans, inferior in number and destitute of cavalry and artillery, could not
venture from their heights, and had obtained all they fought for, — safety in
crossing the river, and security in dispersing among their friends. That they
did not retreat precipitately, is obvious from the acknowledgement which truth
has wrung from the British commander, " that before they left the ground,
they paid the most humane attention to the wounded of the enemy." These
are said, by the Americans, to have amounted to one hundred, and the dead to
ninety-two ; but Taleton's account reduces the whole to fifty, with what fidelity
may be determined by the following fact. He makes the American loss to
have consisted of three colonels, and upwards of one hundred others killed and
wounded ; whereas, in truth, there were but three men killed, and the general
and three men wounded. The enemy never reached the American line with
the bayonet ; and as well from the elevated position of the latter, as the ordi
nary habit of the British soldiers, they fired entirely over the heads of the
Americans. The truth is, that so quietly did the Americans remain in posses
sion of the ground, that their rolls were called before they marched away.*
 ,  «^. — —  >— — -i — ¦ - ¦- — ¦ , ¦  .  ¦ — .. i i.— .i , ¦ , i i , . — ^.^.i ,— . ¦
* Middleton. Taylor. M'CalL

320 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. There is not less contradiction in the accounts relative to the numbers
, engaged, than relative to those who fell in the action. Tarleton makes his
number 280 ; and an American writer adopts it as the truth, because " he must
be supposed to have been best informed on this Subject."* This conclusion
assumes that the fidelity of the British colonel was unquestionable; but we have
already seen some reasons to hesitate at adopting this admission; and there are
still others of equal weight. The writer himself would have hesitated at it, had
he compared the loss which he admits on the side of the enemy with the num
ber engaged. One hundred and ninety-two men to have fallen out of two hun
dred and eighty, is an unexampled carnage in modern battles, unless the catas
trophe of the drama should resemble that of Colonel Bufort's. But to sustain
such a loss and then to claim the victory, would have been an instance of
extraordinary effrontery. There can be litttle doubt that Tarleton had with
him a much greater number of the 63d regiment than he admits. The Annual
Register asserts that he had the whole ; and if he took with him all his men
who were mounted, this is probably the correct account; for in the letter of
Cornwallis to Mm, of the 10th November,! we find these words: " The 63d
are well mounted for infantry, and may occasionally ride in your train."
These were the men who accompanied him in pursuit of Sumpter ; he admits
their number to have been but eighty; but it would be supposing in their
commander madness, and in his followers more resolution than falls to the
ordinary lot of man, to have charged with so small a number as eighty, the
whole American force, advantageously posted on a commanding eminence.
The Americans assert that their number approached nearer two hundred.
Tarleton admits his cavalry to have been 170, (Cornwallis says 190,) and this
brings the number to near the American account of 400 on the British side.
Three hundred more are said to have remained in the rear with the artillery.
Not less variance exists as to the number of the Americans. Tarleton
makes it 1,000; but the Americans, reduce their numbers to 420, or at the
utmost 500.
There are two other points in which the narrative of Colonel Tarleton is
held to be exceptionable. He relates that he cut up the American rear-guard
and carried off fifty prisoners. On these facts the tesiimoHy-©ftJie^ Americans
is uniformly as follows. ^^ \^
Colonel Thomas Taylor, with a small party of select horsemen, had been
ordered to approach the front of the enemy to reconnoitre and obtain intelfi-

\

Marshall. t Tarleton's Campaign, p. 201.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 321
<gence,- Having made prisoners of a few unarmed men and boys^drivihg car- chap.
riagesy and supposed to have passed through the enemy's camp, or to be able v^-v-i^,
otherwise to give intelligence, he had loaded them with provisions and was t ,
proceeding with them to rejoin Sumpter, when he found himself pursued by a
party of dragoons, His party easily escaped by the fleetness of their horses,
but the prisoners were necessarily left behind; and as the British dragoons
passed these unhappy wretches in pursuit of Taylor, they amused themselves
with hewing them down from their horses. This was the rear-guard that was
cut to pieces, As to the fifty prisoners, the high-minded colonel had read of
the triumphs of a Roman emperor over the ocean, and gathered on his return.
a few unarmed rustics, many of them loyalists* to grace his entry into camp,^
It would have been well had his retreating steps been marked only by the
traces of idle vanity. But his rage and disappointment was not extinguished
by the humanity shown to his wounded ; he appeased it by the sacrifice of a.
respectable whig of the name of Johnston, whose only crime was his fidelity
to his country, and whose large family of young children survived to execrate
the hand that made them orphans.
Sumpter's wound was very severe, (a ball through the right breast near the
shoulder,) and detained Mm a length of time from service. Suspended be
tween horses and guarded by a hundred faithful followers, he was conveyed
to North Carolina; whilst Twiggs and Clarke, with their persevering Georgi
ans, moved along the foot of the mountains, to annoy the enemy in another
quarter. The rest of Sumpter's force separating in small parties, retired to
places of security, ready to re-assemble whenever their country's service re
quired it,

* Taylor, M'Call, and others'.

322 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

CHAPTER IX.

General Greene proceeds to the south. Efforts to provide for the southern depart
ment. Arrangements in Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina.
Takes command of the army at Charlotte. Moves to Hicks' Creek on the Pee
Dee. Morgan detached across Broad River. Camp of repose. Reinforcements
arrive. Attempt on Georgetown. Descent into the interior contemplated.
Morgan's movements. Battle of the Cowpens. Retreat across the Catawba.
Greene joins Morgan in person.

C^F- J-T was a highly gratifying circumstance to General Greene, and no unfa-
^v^u vourable augury of his future fortune, that the first annunciation of his appoint
ment to the southern department was followed by earnest solicitations from
some of the most gallant spirits in the service, to be enrolled under his ban
ners. Colonel John Laurens,(l) Colonel Christopher Greene,(2) Dr. M'Hen-

(l) Colonel John Laurens, the son of Colonel Henry Laurens, the second president of. the
'continental congress, who was at this time a prisoner in the tower of London. He was literally the
chevalier sans tache et sanspeur. His intemperate bravery was the only fault ever attributed to him.
The following anecdote of him has not, we believe, ever been minutely related. When, at the battle
:©f Germantown, the American column on the right became embarrassed by the party who occupied
Chew's house, Laurens requested of Wayne forty volunteers to join him in the attempt to force the
door or windows. The request was readily complied with, and such was his chivalrous character in
the army, that volunteers promptly offered to accompany him. They moved on as briskly as possi
ble up to the house, and Laurens gave his horse to a serjeant-major,. who^in emulation of his bravery,

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 32$
ry,(3) then an aid to General WasMngton, Major Lee,(4) and finally, tiiC chap.
Marquis La Fayette,(5) all pressed to share his fortunes. Their affectionate v^-v^-w
letters addressed to him on this occasion, are still extant. ,fc

had.kept pace with him. An officer, at this time, was holding the door ajar, that his men might use
their muskets through the opening. Laurens made at him with his small-sword, and they actually
exchanged several passes before the door was shut by some pei'son of more discretion than the officer
opposed to Laurens. Turning round, he then perceived that not a man of his command was on his
legs, and at that instant, a musket fired perpendicularly down from a window, put an end to the brave
man who held his horse. Nothing but his own very near approach to the house had hitherto saved
him from the same fate. He then mounted his horse and gallopped briskly off; but not so as to'
escape altogether; for a ball glancing on his back, inflicted on him a severe contusion under which ho
suffered greatly, rather than complain of a wound not very flattering to his soldierly pride. Nor did
he retire from the field until he received another ball more honourably placed in the front of the
shoulder. Having been captured in Charleston, heTvas a prisoner on parole when General Greene was apj
pointed to the southern department; but at the general's solicitation, General Washington got him
exchanged. It was long after this period, however, before he joined the southern army. When he
reached Philadelphia, on his way south, he was arrested by an order from congress, to repair to
France, attended by the celebrated Thomas Payne, to solicit supplies abroad. For such-an under
taking his elegant acquirements and frank, engaging character, eminently qualified him. On his"
return from Europe, he immediately hastened to the southern army, — led by destiny.
His letters abound in the warmest expressions of personal attachment to General Greene, and
exhibit in every line the scholar,, the gentleman, and the soldier.
(2) Colonel Christopher Greene, the hero of Red Bank. He was a near relation and intfc-
mate friend of General Greene, and a brave and amiable man. They served their noviciate together
in the Kentish Guards; and when the Rhode Island contingent was formed, he was made a major
' under General Greene. When Arnold was permitted to embody the celebrated command of volun
teers, who penetrated through the deserts of New Brunswitk to Quebec, Major Greene led off a
number of volunteers from the corps that he commanded, and was one of those who, in the attempt
to storm that place, penetrated into the town and were made prisoners. He never reached the
southern army. Whilst just ready and prepared to move southwardly, he lost his life, under some
very melancholy circumstancs.
He had been ordered by General Washington with a detachment, to take post beyond the Croton
River, in the state of New York, to check the incursion of hostile parties into the country beyond
that river. ,, While there, he one evening visited Major Flagg, who commanded one of his outposts,
and took a bed at his quarters. In the night, a party of the enemy suddenly fell upon Flagg, and
forcing the post, rushed into the house where Flagg and Greene were lying in the same chamber. As
neither of them lived to explain the circumstances, nothing more is known than what was afterwards
visible to the eye. Several of the enemy lay dead in the chamber-door, about the body of Flagg,
and poor Greene was actually cut to pieces. In that condition, bleeding and expiring, the man whose
humanity to Ponop and his soldiers, called forth public acknowledgments, was thrown across a, horsp

IX.

324 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. The head quarters of the northern army were, at this time, at the Falls of
, Pasaic, and it became necessary for Greene to repair to that place for the pur
pose of a personal conference with General Washington. The Mterview

and hurried on some miles, until death released him from his sufferings, when he was thrown care
lessly off, an object for common charity, by the road-side.
This was attributed to the tender-mercies of the New York loyalists.
(3) Neither did Dr. M'Henry ever reach the southern army. He appears to have been a parti
cular favourite with General Greene.
As passing from the family of the commander in chief into that of General Greene would have
lowered his rank, General Greene solicited of congress a major's commission for M'Henry, and the.
application was backed by the commander in chief, although generally, they were both very much
opposed to promotions out of the line. The request was at present refused 3 but afterwards, in the
month of May, it was complied with. Then, however, General Washington having very great
designs in contemplation, could not immediately spas& hiia; «,n<M;fe©-siege of Yorktown afterwards
following, M'Henry was still detained.
During that expedition it will be recollected Colonel Hamilton, from some unfortunate misunder
standing with the general, left his family, and M'Henry could not be spared at all.
This was the gentleman who was afterwards secretary at war. He was zealously friendly to
General Greene in promoting his interests in Maryland, during the southern campaigns; and main
tained a regular and useful correspondence with him.
(4) The celebrated partisan Colonel Lee, — afterwards governor of Virginia, — the author of the
•memoirs of the southern war. Known in the latter years of his life as General Lee. After passing
through more vicissitudes in life than generally fall to'the lot of man, he closed his days in the man
sion-house of General Greene's family, on Cumberland Island, — where he was thrown by accident j
and where the friendly hand of the general's youngest daughter solaced his last moments, and bestowed
the last cares of humanity upon the remains of one who shared largely in the affections of the father.
(5) Neither did the Marquis La Fayette ever reach the southern army. After obtaining leave
from the commander in chief, he had proceeded as far as Philadelphia on his way south, when he was
called to the negociations then going on with the French minister, to forward the concerted co-opera
tion of the French forces in the West Indies, which finally resulted in the capture of Lord Corn
wallis. After terminating this important affair, he immediately resamed his journey, and had ad
vanced as far as Petersburg, on his way to join the army, when he was recalled to take command of
the combined expedition against Arnold when in Portsmouth. From that time until the capture of
Cornwallis, he acted under the command of Greene, and we shall have occasion to dilate upon his
occupations in Virginia. Immediately after the surrender of Cornwallis, the interests of the United
States drew him to Europe, to promote the negociations then pending both for supplies, and peace.
In the year 1784, he took another voyage to America, to which his attachments, as well private as
public, were strongly drawn.
The following extract of a letter, written at this time, will show what proplgtion of his regard was
bestowed on the subject of these pages*,

IX.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 325
which took place is said to have been attended with some painful sensations chap
on both sides. From the first day of General Washington's command, with ,
the exception of a few weeks, he had never been separated from General

« Light Camp, Nov. 10, 1780.
'* MY DEAR FRIEND,
" As soon as your letter from head quarters came to hand, I hastened to make an answer to the
several articles it contained, and was greatly disappointed to hear you were gone before it could reach
you. For my friends, my dear sir, I have no different feelings from those which I experience for my
self. I therefore feel for you as I would on my own account, were I appointed to command the south
ern army. You will, I confess, have great difficulties to struggle with ; the worst of them all will, I
fear, be the article of provisions. But, on the other hand, defeats are expected from that quarter. It
was yet more the case before Ferguson's affair. Could it have been properly agreeable for the public
welfare, I wish this affair had been postponed. Indeed, my friend, if I feel for you on account of the
obstacles which you will have to encounter, I, on the other hand, cannot help foreseeing a great deal
of personal glory which you are entitled to hope. But whatever might be hereafter the case; what
ever bad chances (and in our profession chance is something,) a malignant fortune might throw in
your way, believe me, my dear sir, my friendship, as well as my esteem for you, are founded upon
such a basis as cannot be shaken by any run of good or ill luck, which may subject you to the praise
or the blame of common opinions. In all cases I am heartily willing to have my fate united to yours,
and by this junction of stars to have my little share in any thing good or bad that may happen to the
troops under your command.
As soon as we enter into winter quarters, I shall the more freely ask the general leave to join you,
as by that time letters from France will have convinced us that my presence at head quarters is not
for some months, useful to his purposes of co-operation. By the 1st of January at farthest, and sooner
I hope, I intend to be with you, and to consecrate to the country I early loved, under a general I have
long marked out as my friend, the efforts of my zeal, and of any thing by nature or acquisition I may
be worth in the military profession. [We give the marquis' own English.] Hamilton has told me
that you have conversed with him on the manner of being employed that you thought most agreeable
to me. Though by my temper and principles I am bound to accept of any thing, and cheerfully to
act upon any scale that a superior officer thinks fit for me, I cannot help acknowledging your kind
ness and frankly tell you, you are not mistaken in believing that the command, of a flying-camp,
composed of the horse and light-infantry of your army, will better please me than the honourable, but
less active Command of a wing. As I am sure that my friend Lee will apply for being attached to
me, I beg leave to support the motion of that officer, whom I love, and in whom I greatly confide,
both for counsel and execution.
" In case the dispositions of the enemy make you wish that I should repair to such or such [any
particular] place, I will, on the least hint from you, ask leave from the general to fly there with the
greatest dispatch," &c.
" P. S. I have not yet settled with the general about leaving him this winter, so that I beg this to
be confidential."

While the marquis Jphained in America on his last visit, he spent a portion of his time with Gen
eral Greene at Rhode Island ; and on his return to France took with him the general's eldest son

IX

326 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Greene ; and to the habit of consMting him on every oceasioii, had succeeded
, a great personal attachment. Colonel Hamilton, who was then in General
Washington's family, has often dwelt upon the uneasiness expressed by Gene
ral Washington at relinquishing the society, services, and counsels of Greene.
But the sacrifice was due to his talents, services, and rank, and even to the
claims of that friendship which would have detained him. The most painful
circumstance, however, to General Washington was, the paucity of his means
to place the southern army in a situation, which could promise even justice to
the talents of his favourite commander, or vindicate his own selection. It was
the affectionate parent, dismissing a favourite son from the paternal domicil to
seek his fortune, upon nothing but a parental blessing. Yet he did not dismiss
Mm wholly unendowed; for, Major Lee and Ms legion were ordered to
follow him ; and the zeal, experience, and talents of Steuben, added to the
gift. It will be seen in the sequel, how invaluable were these acquisitions to
the southern army.
Nor was there any opposition made to the humble petition to have Laurens,
Greene, and M'Henry spared to his necessities. The standing and Mgh claims
of the marquis of course obviated all difficulties on his account, and the only
subject discussed was, how to employ him in a manner most flattering and
grateful to himself.
The following is the order under which Greene assumed the command of
the southern army. As it relates to General Gates, the reader will perceive
and readily account for the extreme caution of its provisions.
" To Major General Greene.
" Congress having been pleased, by their resolution of the 5th instant, to
authorize me to appoint an officer to the command of the southern army, in
the room of Major General Gates, till an inquiry can be had into his conduct
as therein directed, I have thought proper to choose you for this purpose.

George Washington, who appears to have been equally an object of interest to both the great man
whose name he bore, and to the marquis, who formed with them a virtuous and illustrious trio in
mutual attachment. .
As he acted under the command of General Greene whilst operating in Virginia, we are in posses
sion of his official as well as private correspondence, and his letters exhibit a dignified, amiable, and
Virtuous character.
Happy had it been for France could the benevolence, moderation, and.'Jfcd sense they exhibit,
have directed the early movements of their late revolution !

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 327
" You will, therefore, proceed without delay to the southern army now in chap.
North Carolina, and take command accordingly. Uninformed as I am of the v^v-^w
enemy's force in that quarter, of our own, or of the resources which it will be
in our power to command for carrying on the war, I can give you no positive
instructions ; but must leave you to govern yourself entirely accordmg to your
own prudence and judgment, and the circumstances in which you find your
self. I am aware that the nature of the command will offer you embarrass
ments of a singular and complicated nature ; but" I rely upon your known
abilities and exertions for every thing your means will enable you to effect. I
give you a letter to the honourable the congress informing them of your ap
pointment, and requesting them to give you such powers and such support as
your situation and the good of the service demand. You will take their orders
m your way to the southward.
" I also»propose to them to send the Baron Steuben to the southward with
you. His talents, knowledge of service, zeal and activity, will make him useful "
to you in all respects, and particularly in the formation and regulation of the raw
troops which will compose the southern army. You will give him a command
suitable to his rank, besides employing him as inspector-general. If the con
gress approve, he will take your orders from Philadelphia.
" I have put Major Lee's corps under marching orders, and as soon as he is
ready, will detach him to join you.
" As it is necessary the inquiry into the conduct of Major General Gates
should be conducted m the quarter in which he has acted, where all the wit
nesses are, and where alone the requisite information can be obtained, I am
desirous, as soon as the situation of affairs will possibly admit, you will nomi
nate a court of inquiry to examine into his case, agreeably to the fore-men
tioned resolve of congress. Major General the Baron de Steuben will preside
at this court ; and the members will consist of such general and field-officers of
the continental troops as were not present at the battle of Camden; or being
present, are not wanted as witnesses, or are persons to whom Major General
Gates has no objection. 1 wish this affair to be conducted with the greatest
impartiality, and with as much dispatch as circumstances will permit. You
will on your arrival at the army, take the sense in writing of the principal
officers concerning the practicability of an immediate inquiry. If they judge
it practicable on the principles of these instructions, you will have it carried
into execution. If they think it cannot take place immediately, you will inform
Major General Gates of it, and transmit me their determination; and you
will, from time tgttime, pursue the same mode, that any delay which may hapr
pen may appear^s I am persuaded it really will be, unavoidable. The court

;#u MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, need not consist of more than five, nor must it consist of less than three mem
bers ; in all cases there must be three general officers. You will keep me
advised, &c. My warmest wishes, &c.
, " Given, &c 22d October 1780.
" P. S. Should General Gates have any objection to tMs mode of inquiry,
wMch he wishes to make to congress or to me, you will suspend proceeding in
the affair till he transmits Ms objections and you receive further orders."
The first object of General Greene, on his arrival in Philadelphia, was to
inform himself accurately of the force and condition of the southern army,
the next, to make provision for supplying its present and future wants. Free
access to the correspondence of the southern department put him at once in
possession of the one object; but every thing conspired to multiply the difficul
ties before him in effecting the other.
From General Gates' letters he gathered, that the southern army was, as he
expresses himself to GeneralKnox, " rather a shadow than a substance, having
only an imaginary existence." Artillery, baggage, stores, every thing had
gone by the board on the fatal day of the recent defeat, and it now became
indispensable to obtain a new supply of almost every article that an army
could want. It is of importance to the reputation of General Greene to know,
that the subsequent sufferings of his troops for the want of many, if not every
article, are in no wise chargeable upon the inattention of their commander.
To every department connected with the army, whilst in Philadelphia he
addressed the most earnest remonstrances on the destitute state of his com
mand, and every motive that could be urged, as well as every engine that
could be set in motion, were brought up to his aid m assisting to obtain the
necessary supplies. And when the depressed credit and empty coffers of con
gress dissipated every hope of present relief, he had recourse to a voluntary
contribution or loan among the merchants, as a dernier resort to obtain clothing
for the troops whom he believed to be naked. This also failed, and he would
have wanted even arms, or waggons to carry them, had not private friendship
afforded him that assistance which the United States were incapable of contri
buting. General Read, then governor of Pennsylvania, supplied him with
arms for present use from the depot of the state, and even the waggons to
transport them were principally obtained from his kindness. In return Gover
nor Read relied on the armories of the United States and the pledge of Gene
ral Washington for his indemnity.
All the support that General Greene actually received froi^i Jhe United States
was, annexing Delaware and Maryland to Ms department, and furnishing him

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 32$
with money to bear his expenses on the journey. Perhaps we ought to add, chap.
gratifying him in a request that Major Lee be promoted to a colonelcy, a re- ,^-v^*
quest which was also made in favour of Dr. M'Henry, but for the present
refused. Liberal promises, however, were made by the several departments ; and
that these promises might not be forgotten, or the performance unnecessarily
delayed, General Greene did not leave Philadelphia without placing at their
elbow, Colonel Febiger, an. officer on whom he could rely, and to whom he
gave it particularly in charge never to let the memory of men in office flag for
want of a little modest importunity.
By a resolve of congress passed when General Gates took the command of
the southern department, power was vested in him to draw from the states
within his department, the contingent of men and money which they were
bound to contribute to the common cause ; to call on them when necessary,
for reinforcements of militia, and to impress for the subsistence of his troops,
whenever unavoidable necessity should require it. The same powers were
now transferred to Greene, and his journey from Philadelphia to Charlotte,
was one continued effort to avMl himself of these powers for the purposes of
recruiting and supplying his troops.
On the 23d of November, accompanied by Baron Steuben, and his two
aids, Major Burnet and Colonel Morris, he commenced his journey to the
south. This journey was interrupted only by a short halt at the seat of gov
ernment of each state, for the purpose of investigating the resources of each,
and the measures adopted for applying them to the support of the army; of
making his requisitions upon them, and awakening them to the necesssity of a
prompt and early compliance. His letters addressed to the executive of the
states respectively, exhibit some thing more than strong good sense ; they are
marked by a judicious application of his topic to the peculiar circumstances
of each state. ^
Thus to Governor Rodney of Delaware he says, " Enclosed is a requisition
which I have to make upon the legislature of Delaware ; I must beg their
earliest attention to the subject, as the situation of the southern army presses
hard for the most speedy reinforcements of men, and supplies of every kind.
General Gist of this state, will wait upon your excellency in a few days, and
fix upon proper places of rendezvous for collecting and inspecting the recruits,
I persuade myself that your legislature will be fully impressed with the neces
sity of putting the southern army in a condition to stop the progress of tne
enemy; otherwisMhese states, which now appear remote from danger, will
soon become the seat of war. Besides, it will not be less inhuman than impo-
42

330 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, litic, to suffer those states, now struggling with the enemy, to sink under tiieir
IX' oppression for want of a reasonable support. Should this be the case, I cannot
contemplate our future miseries without the deepest distress and anxiety.
Every wise people will keep the war as far from them as possible. The mid
dle states have no way of effecting this but by giving timely support to the
southern operations. It is in vain to expect to stop the progress of the enemy
with the little force we have now in the field ; and it is of the highest import
ance to succour the inhabitants of the southern states while the tide of senti
ment is in our favour," &c.
To Governor Lee of Maryland he writes, " The efforts which the inhabit
ants are making to prevent the further encroachments of the enemy, deserve
the most speedy and effectual support; as well from principles of humanity, as
of sound policy. Unless they are soon succoured and countenanced by a good
regular force, their distresses will inevitably break their spirits, and they will
be compelled to reconcile themselves to their misfortunes — than which nothing
can be more fatal to the happiness and independence of these states. It is
much easier to keep up an effectual opposition while the tide of sentiment is
in our favour, than it will be to secure the remaining states from the enemy's
further encroachments, after those states are subdued. There is no alterna
tive but base submission, or an effectual prosecution of the war. The horrors
of one, and the blessings which will result from the other, cannot admit of a
moment's hesitation on the choice. But in vain shall we contend, unless we
raise, clothe, and equip a regular army. The mode to effect this is not for me
to point out; but if a draught could be once accomplished, I am persuaded it would
damp the hopes of the enemy more than ten victories. Congress, in order to
reduce our national expense, and proportion the demands of men upon the
several states to the force of the enemy and the present plan of the war, have
made a great reduction of the regiments. UMess those required are filled up
to the full establishment, no effeclual opposition can be made. Nor can I be
responsible for consequences without it. Nothing on my part shall be want
ing to fulfil the duties of my command as far as my abilities extend, or the
means put into my hands are competent to ; but without support, I foresee
myself devoted to ruin, and the southern states to subjection ; and I wish that
those who now seem at a distance from the scene of operations, may not rest
in the shade of security, until the ravaging hand of war begins to spread deso
lation and terror within their own jurisdiction. I flatter myself, as well from
the past conduct of the legislature of this state* as from the assurances of the
committee of the two houses who did me the honour of a conference this
morning, that they are actuated by too just principles, and have too clear a

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 331
view of their own situation, to need arguments to induce them to give all the chap. IX
aid in their power. Eclosed are requisitions," &c. -^-v-^
In this letter it will be perceived that, the writer ventures to urge personal
considerations. Nor were they ill-timed, or ill applied, when addressed to the
state of Maryland ; for the transition was easy and natural from his " ruin,"
or disgrace, or danger, to that of the many valuable and well-connected offi
cers of the Maryland line, which, at this time, constituted two thirds of the
army in the field. To which we may add, that among the leading men of that
day in Maryland, he counted several intimate and zealous friends.
Conformably to the system which General Greene had adopted, of not per
mitting the cause to suffer for want of solicitation, or a representative at hand
to suggest expedients, or remove difficulties, General Gist was charged with
paying the necessary attention to the interests of the southern army in Mary
land as well as Delaware ; and the attention and influence of General Small-
wood were, a short time after, superadded. The following is a specimen of
the orders under which they acted : " You will please to make all your applica
tions in writing, that they may appear hereafter for our justification that we
left nothing unessayed to promote the public service. Let your applications
be as pressing as our necessities are urgent. After which, if the southern
states are lost, we shall stand justified. The greatest consequences depend
upon your activity and zeal in the business."*
In Virginia, the objects which demanded General Greene's attention were
various and peculiarly important. Every thing in that state had become
involved and difficult of management, from the pressure of those great na
tional evils, want of money and want of credit. A recent invasion had called
the whole attention of the government to its own defence, and the expenses
and sacrifices it had required, both discovered and increased the embarrass
ments of the state.
General Mathews, in the year preceding, had contented himself with expos
ing the vulnerable condition of the towns communicating with the Chesapeake,
and plundering Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Gosport. Upon the advance of
Lord Cornwallis after Gates' defeat, an expedition under General Leslie of
near 3,000 men, was fitted out at New York with orders to penetrate into
Virginia, and await the orders of Lord Cornwallis.
Leslie took possession of Norfolk and Portsmouth, and proceeded with all
diligence to secure the possession of both places by strongly fortifying the
latter.

* To General Gist, November 20, 1780.

IX.

332 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Virgima had at this time but very few regular troops in the field. A con-
, siderable force in militia had been called into service, and these, with all the
drafts and recruits then collected to reinforce the southern army, were at this
time watching the movements of General Leslie, under the command of Gene
rals Muhlenberg and Weeden.
The important objects which at this time divided the attention of General
Greene were first to establish that chain which binds together every military
operation — the quarter-master-general's department; secondly, to establish
depots and laboratories for the ordnance department, m conveMent and secure
situations; and lastly, to draw forth assistance from the state without exposing
it, and along with it, his own army to the mjuries which must result from
incursions of the enemy. As to the commissariate, he saw the impossibility of
making any present arrangements respecting it, and resolved to defer the sub
ject until he reached the army.
The business of transportation in thesouthern department was, at this time,
in a miserably deranged state. It had been conducted Mtherto, principally by
waggons and teams the property of the United States; and where they proved
inadequate or extraordinary aid became necessary, then by requisitions on the
states, and under the superintendance of state officers, or of deputies appointed
by the quarter-master-general. As all the public waggons, and most of their
teams, had been captured in Gates' defeat, and the government had no money
to procure others, the business of the department had necessarily been con
ducted since this fatal event, upon state reqmsitions. On these, he plainly saw
there could be no dependance placed. For, directly after Gates* misfortune,.
and prior to the invasion of Leslie, the state of Virginia had been endeavouring;
to send on her recruits to reinforce the army, but coMd not for want of wag
gons. Out of one hundred ordered, (and impress-warrants issued to collect
them,) in three weeks, the governor could collect but fifteen or eighteen.*
Plainly foreseeing, therefore, that he must sustain the most ruinous disappoint
ments uMess some remedy could be found for this evil, General Greene made
a strong representation of it to congress, and the states north of Virginia ; and
resolved to appoint an officer who should combine the whole means of trans
portation in his department, so that those of the north might supply the defi
ciencies of the soutM
It happened fortunately for this and several other purposes, that General
Greene had an intimate personal knowledge of all the officers of the Virginia

* Gen. Washington, Nov. 19, 1750.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 333
fine ; they had served under his immediate command in several campaigns, chap.
as that line had composed his division. An intimate knowledge of their ^-^**?
characters and talents, as well as much mutual confidence and esteem, had
grown out of this connexion. By the reduction of the Virginia contingent in
number of men to each regiment, and still more by the actual reduced state of
the numbers in service, many of their officers were now out of employ, and
among these was Colonel Edward Carrington. On this gentleman he fixed
his eye as eminently qualified to undertake the task of combining and conduct-
Mg the feeble means at the command of the quarter-master-general's depart
ment. Carrington obeyed the call to .the office, and discharged it with une
qualled zeal and fidelity.
To fix on eligible depots and laboratories, and posts of rest and communica
tion in the southern department, was a work of no small difficulty. In Mary
land they would have been too remote, in North Carolina too near the scene
of action. In Virginia, therefore, it was necessary to establish them ; and
against the risk of invasion there, the only security that could be afforded was
to establish them under the protection of the populous counties of the north
western parts of that state. At the confluence of Rivanna and Fluvanna,
called the Point of Fork, the principal laboratory was established, and at
Prince Edward Court-House the principal depot of stores and arms. To
keep these regularly supplied with powder from the manufactories, and with
lead from the mines in Fincastle county, Virginia, was one of the subjects
given specially in charge to Baron Steuben.
Among other officers whom General Greene found out of employment in
Virginia, were Captain Pendleton, Major Pearce, and Major Forsyth. The
merits of these gentlemen were personally known to him, and he resolved to
avMl himself of their talents. The two former he attached to his family, and
to the last he offered the place of commissary of prisoners; but on his declin
ing it, recommended him to the commissary-general, for the post of his deputy
in the southern department.
Having made every arragement which the service required, and the actual
state of things admitted in VirgiMa, General Greene vested the Baron Steuben
with the military command in that state, with particular charge to collect,
organize, discipline, and expedite the recruits for the southern army. He
then, preparatory to his departure, addressed to Governor Jefferson a letter, of
wMch the following is an extract: "The present state of the southern depart
ment, and the future operations that must be carried on in that quarter, induce
me to lay before your excellency the enclosed requisitions for men and supplies
of different kinds. Uninformed as I am at this tune of many things neces-

334 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, sary to explain the extent of our wants, I have confined myself in this applica-
,tion to some principal articles, which will be requisite under all circumstances.
But as the scene of operations may change, and as the emergencies of war are
numerous and various, from which new and pressing demands may arise, I
hope the legislature will vest you with full and ample powers to comply with
such as may happen. Without this, 1 foresee the most fatal consequences may
attend the army for want of timely support. It will be my province to inform
you, from time to time, of the men and supplies necessary to our operations,
and to conduct the force and direct the use when sent into the field. But the
levying of one and collecting of the other, must depend upon yourselves ; and
on your exertions hang the freedom and independence of the United States.
" It is perfectly consistent with sound policy in all cases to carry on war
abroad rather than at home, as well in matters of expense, as in humanity to
the inhabitants. But this policy is rendered doubly necessary to Virginia,
from the ease with which the enemy can penetrate the country, and the nume
rous blacks and other valuable property which must inevitably fall into an
invading enemy's hands. It is pretty evident that it was the enemy's original
plan of operations to penetrate through North Carolina and possess them
selves of all the low country of Virginia ; and notwithstanding they may have
sustained a temporary interruption to their plan, I make no doubt they will
prosecute their design as soon as the prevailing obstacles are removed ; unless
they are convinced by the exertions of the southern states that the thing is
become impracticable; nor will they relinquish the object from the feeble
opposition that may be made by the present force opposed to them.
" It affords me great satisfaction to see the enterprise and spirit with which
the militia have turned out lately in all quarters to oppose the enemy ; and this
great bulwark of civil liberty promises security and independence to the country,
tfthey are not depended upon as a principal, but employed as an auxiliary. But
if you depend upon them as a principal, the very nature of the war must
become so ruinous to the country, that though numbers for a time may give
security, yet the difficulty of keeping this order of men in the field, and the
accumulated expense attending it, must soon put it out of our power to make
further opposition; and the enemy will have only to delay their operations for
a few months, to give success to their measures. It must be the extreme of
folly to hazard our liberties upon so precarious a dependance, when we have
it so much in our power to fix it on a more solid basis. I hope, therefore, the
most speedy and effectual measures will be taken to fill up the army according
to the new arrangements ; and I have only to remark, that the reduction of
the regiments renders it absolutely necessary that those remaining should;,, be

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE, 335
iCompleted to their full estabfishment. It is not only necessary to furnish the chap.
number reqmred, but that the men be of a proper size, perfect in their limbs, ^-^^
of a good sound constitution, and not exceeding forty years of age. I would
wish a law relative to this matter might be passed, with proper directions to
the county-lieutenants not to receive any recruits, unless they are agreeable to
the foregoing description, as the continental officers stationed at the different
places of rendezvous will be instructed to this purpose.
" Officers are the very soul of an army, and you may as well attempt to
animate a dead body into action, as to expect to employ an army to advantage
when the officers are not perfectly easy in their circumstances, and happy in
the service.
" I am sorry to find that great dissatisfaction prevails among your officers. I
am not fully informed of the several grievances, but would beg leave to recom
mend an inquiry, and that immediate and reasonable satisfaction be given to
their just demands.
" The late distressing accounts from the southern army, claim the immediate
attention of government both with respect to provision and clothing. It is im
possible for men to continue long in the field unless they are well furMshed with
both these articles ; and to expose them to the want of either, will soon trans
fer them from the field to the hospital, or lay them under the necessity of de
serting. In either case, government is burdened with the expense of raising
men without the benefit of their service. Clothing is more important to an
army than, at first view, may be imagined, and to send troops into the field
without it, is to devote them to certain destruction.
" The business of transportation is accompanied with so many difficulties,
that I think great pains should be taken to fix upon some plan for feeding the
army with live stock; and I can think of none unless it be putting up a large
quantity of beeves to stall-feed ; which may be driven to the army from time
to time, as the service may require. I wish that some person could be com
missioned from this state to concert with North Carolina the most proper
measures for carrying such a plan into execution.
" There are a variety of stores of different kinds coming from the north
which, I am afraid from the deranged state of the quarter-master-general's
department, will meet with great difficulty in getting on. 1 most earnestly
recommend that the most speedy and effectual support be given to the officer
charged with that business, that he, without loss of time, may make the proper
arrangements for forwarding the supplies as they arrive.
" I have this moment received letters from General Washington and from
Mr. Mathews, chairman of a committee of congress appointed to correspond

336 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, with the commanding officer of the southern department, which mention the
, enemy's preparation making for another detachment to the southward. The
distress and sufferings of the inhabitants of North and South Carolina, deserve
the most speedy support, to keep alive that spirit of enterprise which has pre
vailed among them lately so much to their honour. It is much easier to op
pose the enemy while the tide of sentiment sets in our favour, than it will be
to secure Virginia after they are overrun. — A misfortune which may prove fatal
to the happiness and independence of America^
" I purpose to set out in the morMng for Hillsborough, but shall leave Major
General Baron Steuben to command in this state for the present, and to put
things in the most proper train for forwardmg reinforcements of men, and sup
plies of every kind for the southern armyv He will advise with your excel
lency," &c.
As acquiring an accurate knowledge of the rivers of the country which was
likely to become the seene of active operations, was a favourite and interesting
object with General Greene, the first service he required of Colonel CarringtoH
was to explore the Dan, the Yadkin, and Catawba, and to make himself tho
roughly acquainted with the streams, into which they discharged themselves.
Besides the indispensable purpose of ascertaining the places and means of
crossing those streams, either in pursuit or flight, General Greene flattered
himself with the hope that they would present facilities for the transportation
of heavy articles which would greatly relieve the quarter-master-general's
department. For this purpose Colonel Carrington accompaMed the general
on his journey from Richmond, and entered upon this undertaking. Intelli
gent and active officers were employed in forwarding the design on the Dan,
and it was expeditiously completed. A number of light boats also were built
on the banks of that river, and had the means of transportation by land been
more abundant, it was intended that a number of these should always have
attended the army on its marches. >
General Stevens of Virginia, at that time commanding a detachment of
militia with the southern army, undertook and executed with equal promptness
a survey of the Yadkin; while the celebrated Kosciusko, who had attended
General Gates as engineer to his army, was dispatched to perform the same
service on the Catawba. These surveys proved in the sequel of no little
importance in the progress of the campaign, as the general acquired a tho
rough knowledge of the depth, course, and the places and means of crossing
these rivers from sources which inspired thorough confidence.
There is reason to believe that General Greene was the first person who
explored the navigation of the Dan, the Yadkin, and Catawba rivers to any

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 331
extent ; and although the course of events did not lead him to make much use chap.
of the navigation of those streams, these surveys contributed not a little to <^-v~^
opening the eyes of the inhabitants to the uses which might one day be made
of them for water-transportation. The magazines which he established on
the banks of the Roanoke, and at Oliphant's Mills on the head of the Ca
tawba, proved of no small service in the future operations of the campaign.
At the time Of the arrival of the southern commander at Hillsborough, he
found that place abandoned both by the officers of the state and the army.
The latter, it has been seen, had moved forward to Charlotte, and the inva
sion of Leslie had called the former away to Halifax, by exciting public ap
prehension for the safety of the south-eastern quarter of the state. As it did
not comport with his views that the exertions of the state authorities should be
expended in vain and unnecessary efforts in that direction, he informed Gov
ernor Nash from Hillsborough, that he had, by Ms measures in Virginia, pro
vided for the defence of that quarter of the state, and solicited that the gover
nor would turn his attention' to the more pressing object of preparing to meet
Lord Cornwallis, on the opposite quarter.
On the 2d day of December, General Greene reached the encampment at
Charlotte, and on the 4th, took command of the army. The delicacy with
which, on this occasion, he conducted himself towards his unfortunate prede
cessor, is pronounced by Colonel Williams to have been "edifying to the army."
Every measure that could console Ms feelings and preserve respect for him in
the minds of the army, was cautiously attended to. But it was impossible that
a court of inquiry could, at that time, be held upon his conduct pursuant to
the order of congress. It was not the absence of Steuben that prevented the
holding of this court, for that could have been obviated by his presence; but
General Washington's order, it will be recollected, requires " that the members
of the court should consist of such general and field officers of the continental
troops as were not present at the battle of Camden ; or being present, are not
wanted as witnesses, or are persons to whom Major Genera] Gates has no
objection." To comply with these orders under existing circumstances, was
impossible; there were not three general officers to sit upon it. General
Smallwood, even though he could have been dispensed with as a witness,
could not sit upon this court, for he is understood to have been Gates' princi
pal accuser ; and Mughlenberg and Weeden could not be withdrawn from the
defence of VirgiMa. The court could not have consisted of field-officers
alone, and General Morgan, recently created a brigadier, was the only gene
ral officer besides Smallwood at that time with the army. The number
of field-officers who were not necessary as witnesses, on the one side or the
43

338 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
-chap, other, was exceedingly small, consisting altogether of Colonel Bufort, and'
^r*^^ those who had joined the army with the fragments of his regiment. Nor
would the circumstances of the army, and the probability of its being called
into immediate action, have sanctioned the delay incident to such an investi*
gation. But there were other, and some very benevolent motives for deferring the
mvestigation. The present state of Gates' feelings upon the loss of an only
son, disqualified him from entering upon the task of his defence ; and it would
have been indelicate in the extreme to have pressed on him an investigation
which his honour would not have permitted him to defer; besides which,
General Greene, in common with most of the officers whom he consulted, was
of opinion that his was a case of misfortune ; and the most honourable course
to be pursued, both for Gates and the government, would be to make such
representations as to obtain a revision of the order of congress which enjoined
the inqmry into his conduct. A measure which was successfully pursued.
The order on tMs subject, was communicated to General Gates in the most
delicate manner, immediately after General Greene assumed the command,
and Gates' reply solicits an immediate inquiry ; when, afterwards, the de
cision of the council of war was communicated to him, he appears to have
received it with regret, but with perfect acqmescence in its correctness. Cer
tain it is, that the state of mutual coldness, if not ill-will wMch previously
existed between these officers, from this time wholly disappears; and several
subsequent letters written by General Gates to General Greene, are all sub
scribed "yours affectionately," and written in a style of perfect cordiality.
The first hours of General Greene's taking command of the southern army
were brightened up by an event wMch the superstition of the soldiery seized
upon as a promising omen. This was the capture of Rugely's command at
Clermont, made by Lieutenant-Colonel Washington. The happy union of
triumph and mirth, diffused through the camp by this fortunate though ludi
crous occurrence, gave the first day of vivacity to the army that it had enjoyed
since the late defeat. Every one knows how the valorous loyalist laid down
his arms at the view of a pine log mounted on waggon wheels in imitation of
a field-piece. A respectable number of prisoners, and a seasonable supply of
refreshments and mumtions of war, rewarded the ingenmty and enterprise of
the victor.
The narrative of Colonel Williams affords a tolerable perspective of the
condition in which General Greene found the southern army ,- the sectional
views of it are to be fully obtMned from the correspondence of the day, both
of General Gates and General Greene. The tattered remnants of their uni-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE,
fbrins drawn ovcl' the small supply of clothes which the public spirit of North chap,
Carolina had afforded them, presented rather an uncouth appearance todie^^-^
eye of the beholder. Nor was the appearance of the recruits that had joined
them since the distribution of clothmg took place, a whit better; they were
wholly destitute. The whole number of regulars of all arms in camp, did not
exceed eleven hundred, and of these, not eight hundred could be mustered with
arms and clothing fit for duty. Such was the naked condition of some of Col.
Washington's cavalry, (who being absent, seem to have been shared out in
the distribution,) that they were ordered back to Virginia, upon Colonel
WasMngton's representing that they were too naked to be put upon service.
Two days after General Greene took command of the army, he addressed
a letter to Governor Jefferson on this subject, of which we will copy an extract,
as it furnishes the most authentic view of the state of his troops. " I arrived
at this place on the 2d instant, to which General Gates had advanced with
the army some days before I overtook him. I find the troops under his com
mand in a most wretched condition — destitute of every thing necessary either
for the comfort or convenience of soldiers. It is impossible that men can
render any service, however well disposed, while they are perishing with cold
and hunger. Your troops may literally be said to be naked, and I shall be
obliged to send a considerable number of them away, into some secure place
and warm quarters, until they can be furnished with clothing. It will answer
no good purpose to send men here in such a condition, for they are nothing
but a dead-weight upon the army, and altogether incapable of aiding in its
operations. There must be either pride or principle to make a soldier. No
man will think himself bound to fight the battles of a state that leaves him to
perish for want of covering ; nor can you inspire a soldier with the sentiment
of pride, while his situation renders him more an object of pity than of envy.
The life of a soldier in the best state, is liable to innumerable hardships ; but
when these are aggravated by the want of provision and clothing, his condition
becomes intolerable ; nor can men long contend with such complicated diffi
culties and distress. Death, desertion, and the hospital must soon swallow up
an army, under such circumstances, and were it possible for men to maintain
such a wretched existence, they would have no spirit to face their enemies,
and woMd inevitably disgrace themselves and their commander.
"It is impossible to preserve discipline when troops are in want of every
thing; — to attempt severity, will only thin the ranks by a more hasty deser
tion. The article pf clothing is but a small part of the expense in raising,
equipping, and subsisting an army, and yet on this alone the whole benefit of
their service depends. I wish the state to view this matter in its true point of

340 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, light. Some may think, it is urged for the sake of military parade,;but be
^-^-^ assured you raise men in vain, unless you clothe, arm, and equip them pro
perly for the field. I should not dwell upon the subject, did I not foresee the
misfortunes that must follow the neglect of it. The states may seem to derive
credit from having numbers in the field, however wretched their condition,
but a general with such troops can give no protection to the country. This
policy may serve to disgrace an officer, but never can promote the public inte
rests. " I see by the Charleston papers, a large reinforcement is coming from New
York, and part already arrived. There can be no doubt that Lord Corn
wallis will push his operations this winter to the utmost. Exertions on the
part of the states are necessary to counteract him, I . hope your excellency
therefore, will press the assembly to give the most speedy and effectual support
to tMs army. We have no magazines of provisions in the state, but depend
upon daily collections for support; and this state has been so ravaged by the
numerous militia that have been in the field, that it is a doubt with me whe
ther, with the greatest industry and the best dispositions, any considerable
magazines can be formed."
In General Greene's private and confidential correspondence, his represen
tations of the distressed state of the army are still more strongly coloured. To,
the Marquis La Fayette he writes,* " It is now within a few days of the time
you mentioned of being with me. Were you to arrive, you would find a few
ragged, half-starved troops in the wilderness, destitute of every thing necessary
for either the comfort or conveMence of soldiers." " Indeed, my dear sir, the
department is in a most deplorable condition, nor have I a prospect of its
mending. The country is almost laid waste, and the inhabitants plunder one
another with little less than savage fury. We live from hand to mouth, and
have nothing to subsist on but what we collect with armed parties. In tMs
situation I believe you will agree with me there is nothing inviting tMs way,
especially when I assure you our whole force fit for duty that are properly
clothed and properly equipped, does not amount to 800 men." " Your pro
fessions and assurances of friendsMp are very flattering and soothing to my
feelmgs. I wish my situation and future prospects afforded somethmg more
inviting and worthy your attention, that I might have an opportunity to indulge
your wishes and gratify your feelings. But I fear tMs department is to be the

* December 29th, 1780.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 341
great SarboMan bog to the American armies, and particularly to the general chap.
officers." s^v-w
To Colonel Coxe he writes,* " The condition of this army for want of cloth
ing would move your compassion, were you here to behold their wretched
ness." «' This country is very extensive and dimly inhabited, which renders it
exceedingly difficult getting supplies, if every thing were managed in the best
manner with the most perfect arrangement. But the loss of the army in
Charleston and the defeat of General Gates, alarmed North Carolina to such a
degree, that they have kept on foot such hosts of militia as have ravaged the
country from one end to the other; and to pay the expense of subsisting them,
this state has been obliged to strike such quantities of money as have almost
rendered it worthless.
" Thus, with an army without clothing or provisions, in a country ex
hausted, its currency ruined, the inhabitants divided, and our force less than
one third of the enemy's, I believe you will agree with me the situation is dis
agreeable and the prospect dismal.
" The whigs and tories too pursue each other in this country with little less \
than savage fury, and such a spirit for plundering prevails as threaten the de
population of the whole country. The whigs and tories are continually out
in small parties, and all the middle country is so disaffected, that you cannot
lay in the most trifling magazine, or send a waggon through the country with
the least article of stores, without a guard. I am subsisting the army by small
daily collections made by the credit and influence of individuals, who have
charitably engaged in the business. Nor have I the least aid of government
in the business of transportation, and not a shilling to help myself Our situ
ation is still more wretched than 1 have described it, and must soon terminate
in the ruin and loss of this country, unless some more perfect arrangements
can take place for the support of the army."
It was not the habit of Greene's mind to pause longer on difficulties than to
understand their full extent; the next moment was devoted to the application
of the means to obviate them. The method of subsisting the army from hand to
mouth was by no means to the taste of a general who had adopted the military
maxim, that " good feeding was the first principle of good service." The
inquiries made into the arrangements and means of subsistence, convinced
Mm both of the necessity of adopting some general improvements m the one,
and moving elsewhere to seek for the other. The country about him was so

* January 9, 1781.

342 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, much exhausted, that Colonel Polk, who then acted from mere patriotisni as
commissary, declared it could scarcely afford subsistence for a week longer.
To draw provisions from any distance was utterly impracticable for want of
the means of transportation ; and that which the contiguous country afforded,
had been consumed alternately by friends and enemies, until there scarcely
remained subsistence for the inhabitants. At the same time, it was with regret
he learned from the respectable commissary, that many reasons concurred to
compel him to relinqMsh his office.
To find a substitute, and a place to remove to, now occupied the attention
of the southern commander, and his resolution was quickly taken as to botM
Plenty and retirement directed his choice as to the latter ; talents, integrity,
influence, and zeal, as to the former.
In the person of Major Davie, the active partisan who has already made his
appearance with eclat in these pages, he found a commissary every way suited
to his purposes; and the public spirit of that gentleman prompted him to yield
to the solicitations of the southern commander to undertake the office. To
this appointment in behalf of the United States, he had the good fortune also1
to procure the appointment of state commissary to be added, both for North
and South Carolina; and with every thing that could ensure success, except
money, Major Davie entered upon the duties of his office.
In fixing on a place to retire to, General Greene did not hesitate in giving
a preference to the head of the boat-navigation of the Pee Dee River. No
army of any magnitude had ever visited that neighbourhood, and a very fer
tile country, extending some distance down its banks — accessible to boats of
common burden, offered plenty and convenience to an army so destitute of the
means of transportation. Thither Kosciusko was dispatched with a single
gmde, to explore the country and select a position; while the general occupied
himself in digesting a plan for combining the operations of the commissariat
and quarter-master-general's departments throughout the state.
Intelligence had now been received of General Leslie's departure from the
Chesapeake, and of a large embarkation of troops from New York. General
Greene had no doubt of Leslie's destination to South Carolina, and it remained
only to be ascertained, whether the detachment from New York, said to be
3,000 strong, was not intended also for Charleston. For that place or Nor
folk it certainly was destined. In the one case, his little force was to be over
whelmed at once by the torrent that would move northwardly ; M the other,
it was to be cut off from its resources in Virginia, and made to finger and
perish under the persecutions of the force under Cornwallis. In either case, it
was obvious that North Carolina must be the scene of active operations ; and

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. SS3
it became the more important to explore and combine its resources, so as to chap.
act with a full knowledge of the means of subsistence and transportation,
which every part could afford him; since it must depend upon casualties in
what part he must meet his enemy, it was necessary to be prepared to meet
Mm every where.
It was about this time that congress made that great change in its system of
subsistence by which the states were severally called upon to support the war by
specific contributions. Hitherto money had been required of them ; but " they
asked bread and received a stone." The money contributed consisted in
" promises" — for the printing-preSs was the only mint which furnished a me
dium of circulation. Paper money was sunk to a mere nominal value, and
such was the absolute prostration of public credit, that specific contribution
was the dernier resort.
In order to make efficient arrangements for availing himself of the contribu
tions of North Carolina, Major Davie was dispatched to attend on the legisla
ture, and concert with them a plan for registering all the waggons and teams
of every county, so that, together with correct information of their number
and place, the burden might be equally distributed; and for collecting small
magazines at various points in the rear of the army, in bulk not suffident to
make them an object of enterprise to an enemy, and in situations adapted to
the triple purpose of supplying the army, supporting the recruiting service, and
furnishing subsistence to the troops advancing from the north and west to his
relief. At Oliphant's Mill, high up the Catawba, one extensive magazine was
directed to be established, as the operations upon the Catawba might create a
large demand ih a quarter from which river transportation would present such
facilities. Major Davie met with the most prompt and liberal support from the state
authorities, and arrangements were made for collecting magazines at every
court-house in the state, as well as officers appointed to register and report the
produee and means of transportation of every county. But the want of zeal
in the county deputies sadly baffled these judicious arrangements.
The next object that drew the attention of the general was'the re-establish
ment of the North Carolina line. That»state had not, at the time, an enlisted
man in the field. Their whole force on the continental establishment, about
five hundred in number, had been captured at the fall of Charleston, and no
measures had been taken to restore the state's quota. Many of their officers
were dispersed throughout the country; and, although it was conjectured that
there were then wandering through the state several hundred soldiers of their

344 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, fine, who had been left behind from sickness or other causes, or bad escaped
,or deserted, no measures had been taken to embody them.
General Sumner, the senior officer on the continental establishment in the
state, was called upon to pay immediate attention to this subject, and a strong
remonstrance addressed to the governor against the impolicy and injustice of
leaving it neglected, at a time so critical. " On my arrival here," says the
writer, " I find nothing but the shadow of an army in the midst of distress.
War is a very critical business ; even where every precaution is taken, it is
subject to great and sudden changes. Nothing, therefore, should be left to
chance, but what cannot be avoided. In all governments much depends upon
opinion, but more in this than almost any other, from the circumstances of the
currency and the division of sentiment among the inhabitants. The liberties
of the people are a great object, and the security of their property little less so.
I persuade myself, therefore, if the inhabitants are rightly informed, they can
not be averse to taking such measures and submitting to such inconveniences
as are indispensable to their future security; especially as many have already
felt the ravaging hand of war. It does not admit of doubt, that the enemy
mean to prosecute offensive operations against this state. The only matter of
uncertainty is the force to be employed, and the particular places of destina
tion. Part of the troops said to be embarking at New York mentioned in my
former letter, have arrived in Charleston, and the rest cannot be far distant.
The small force which we have in the field is very incompetent to give protec
tion to this state ; nor would a large body of militia remedy the evil, as our
difficulties in the articles of forage and provision are not less than the want of
men, and these evils must constantly increase as long as the war is carried on
by the militia of the country. It requires more than double the number of
mititia to be kept in the field, attended with infinitely more waste and expense
than would be necessary to give full security to the country with a regular and
permanent army. Add to this, the obstructions to business, and the distress it
spreads among the inhabitants at large, and no one who has the true interests
of his country at heart can hesitate about the propriety of filling the continental
battalions agreeably to the late requisitions of congress. This I wish may
take place immediately, and, (if it can be effected,) by draft; as I am per
suaded, if it can be, it would damp the enemy's hopes more than ten victories.
" It appears to me, the misfortunes which have attended this country have
been owing to the commanding officers putting too much to the hazard ; and
this I fear, with a wish of complying with the wishes and impatience of the
inhabitants. By trying to save too much we often lose all. It is natural for
people who are affected with the calamities of war to wish to make a great

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 345
effort to remove the evil, but ill-judged exertions only serve to fix the chains so chap,
much the faster. ^^-v-w
" It is my wish and shall be my endeavour to render this state every service
in my power, and I hope every aid and support will be given me to crown my
efforts with success. I may not always agree with the people in the manner
of conducting the war, but they may be assured that I have their true interests
at heart.
" The king of Prussia says, in defending a country you must attend to great
objects and submit to partial evils.
" It is natural for an army in distress to lose its discipline and invade the
rights and property of the citizens ; nor is it possible always to avoid it without
driving your men to desperation. Soldiers feel like other men, and their
miseries should not be insulted, if they cannot be remedied. Many affect to
express their apprehension of the ambitious views of an army. Nothing can
be more idle ; for, what can be effected by an army when left to itself, which
can scarcely be subsisted by all the powers of government ? It is my wish to
pay the most sacred regard to the laws and constitution of the state ; but the
emergencies of war are often so pressing, that it becomes necessary to invade
the rights of the citizens to prevent public calamities. The occasion must
always give justification to the measure, and few but the captious will cavil at
it. This is what we are often driven to at the northward, and the commander
in cMef never hesitates to take whatever is necessary for the support of the
army. At the same time we consider it as a great misfortune to be reduced
to this necessity ; for nothing is more destructive to the discipline and good
government of an army. And for this reason, it is my wish that the state
would take measures for giving us the most effectual support. Every possible
severity shall be exercised to preserve the property of the people from unjust
invasion. Many may think that war can be accommodated to civil conve
nience, but he who undertakes to conduct it upon this principle, will soon
sacrifice the people he means to protect," &c.
It is obvious that this letter has in view another object besides inciting the
government to the raising of a regular force. It was to prepare them for the
exercise of that supreme authority which the commanding officer was resolved
to assert in the conduct of the war — not to be turned aside or controlled in his
measures by popular opinion or popular clamour ; and to incur any responsi
bility in order to promote the great end of his command — the protection of the
country. Hence he intimates that while he will sacredly respect private pro
perty, yet even that must be invaded when the exigencies of war shall require
it. A principle from which, it will be found, he never deviated, but which
44

346 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, was exercised with such justice and moderation as to produce the least possible
o»-v^/ inconvenience, and passively acquiesced in until a phantom inspired the opi
nion that it was no longer indispensable.
A multitude of minor cares shared the attention of the southern commander
during the first fortnight after he took command of the army ; and it was not
until every thing necessary for the operations of an army, even to an axe or
a nail, had received his attention, that he allowed himself a moment's respite
from the most intense application to business.
On the 16th of December, the troops were put under marching orders, but
incessant rains prevented them, not from striking their tents, for they had
none, but from abandoning their huts at Charlotte, until the 20th. On that
day they took up the line of march by Wadesborough to Haley's Ferry, where
it was originally designed that they should be posted, but on the recommenda
tion of Kosciusko, they were moved down the east side of the river to Hick's
Creek, nearly opposite the Cheraw Hill, the present site of the village of Chat
ham. On this march they were commanded by General Isaac Huger, the
only general, and almost the only officer of the Carolina line not in captivity.
He had joined Greene at Charlotte, and was at this time, the only general offi
cer with the southern army.
On the same day that the army was put under marching orders for the
Pee Dee, a movement to the enemy's right, the detachment under General
Morgan was ordered to cross the Catawba and approach the position of Lord
Cornwallis at Winnsborough, on his left. Their numbers, and the instruc
tions under which their commander acted, will be best developed in the fol
lowing letter : " Camp Charlotte, December \6th, 1780.
" You are appointed to the command of a corps of light-infantry of 320
men detached from the Maryland line, a detachment of Virginia militia of 200
men, and Colonel Washington's regiment of light-horse, amounting to from
sixty to an hundred men. With these troops you will proceed to the west side
of the Catawba River, where you will be joined by a body of volunteer militia
under command of General Davidson of this state, and by the militia lately
under command of General Sumpter. This force and such others as may
join you from Georgia, you will employ against the enemy on the west side of
the Catawba, either offensively or defensively, as your own prudence and dis
cretion may direct — acting with caution and avoiding surprises by every pos
sible precaution. For the present, I give you the entire command in that

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 347
quarter, and do hereby require all officers and solders engaged in the American chap.
cause to be subject to your orders and command. v^-v-^
" The object of this detachment is to give protection to that part of the
country and spirit up the people — to annoy the enemy in that quarter — to
collect the provision and forage out of their way — which you will have formed
into a number of small magazines in the rear of the position you may think
proper to take. You will prevent plundering as much as possible, and be as
careful of your provisions and forage as may be, giving receipts for whatever
you take to all such as are friends to the independence of America.
" Should the enemy move in force towards the Pee Dee, where the army
will take a position, you will move in such a direction as to enable you to join
me if necessary, or fall upon the flank, or into the rear of the enemy, as occa
sion may require. You will spare no pains to get good intelligence of the
enemy's situation, and keep me constantly advised of both your and their
movements. You will appoint for the time being, a commissary, quarter
master, and forage-master, who will follow your instructions, in their respective
lines. Confiding in your abilities and activity, I entrust you with this com
mand, persuaded," &c,
The main army reached their encampment on the 26th, and were soon after
joined by their commander. The motives which determined him to adopt
this position were, plenty, water-transportation, and security ; and although
the total prostration of government in South Carolina, and the extreme fee
bleness of that of North Carolina, in that remote and disaffected country,
greatly embarrassed the supplying of his army, his situation was perfectly
secure from disturbance, and left him at liberty to pursue the great design of
the movement, — recruiting the strength and spirits, and reviving and im
proving the discipline of his army. It was a camp of repose.
To this great object every one's attention was now directed. In order to
give his soldiers the full advantage of the instructions and exercises of the
camp, a number of the neighbouring militia were called into service to per
form those duties, on which otherwise it would have been necessary to detach
regular troops ; and every effort was made to give to the army that consist
ency, to impress upon it those habits of acting and dunking, to instruct it in
that camp economy, and inspire it with that martial spirit, which were neces
sary to prepare it for the active scenes now confidently anticipated.
But the work of preparation was not confined to the men; there was much
to be done towards combining and directing the feelings and talents of his
officers. Nothing is more fatal to an army than the want of harmony among

348 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, those who command it. The want of cordial, mutual, zealous support among
<^Z-^ officers, will mar the best digested plans of operation; men will not contribute
to increase the military fame of those whom they hate, or envy, and many
have been the sacrifices of public good to the baneful influence of jealousy and
rivalship. To inspire a noble emulation, far above yielding to the low sugges
tions of selfishness in his officers, is of incalculable importance to him who
stands responsible for the conduct of an army.
Few instances have ever occurred of the prevalence of more perfect har
mony in a camp than that which was exhibited in the southern campaign of
1781. The principal cause was unquestionably the good sense and excellent
qualities of the officers generally. It would be difficult to conceive an idea of
an army better officered. Young, gallant, intelligent, and devoted to the cuuse,
they sought out opportunities for service and distinction, but forgot not the
deference due to rank and merit, or the just claims of a brother officer. Sym-
patMzing in the distresses of the country they came to protect, they submitted
to every hardship and privation, not only with resignation but with cheerful
ness. With most of them the general had been previously acquamted, for
they had served with him or under him, from an early period of the war, and
what he had wanted of opportunity to study their characters, his camp of
repose on the Pee Dee now afforded Mm.
/ One consequence of his previous knowledge or subsequent observation was,
/ an obvious effort to find some honourable pretexts for keeping several distantly
\ employed, and a prompt extension of the furloughs of others, because their
presence woMd have superceded officers of inferior rank. Thus were Colonels
^ Williams, Howard, Ford, and WasMngton, kept in command as much as pos-
{ sible. So much importance did General Greene attach to the preservation of har-^
mony among his officers, that he never thought any pains too great to bestow
upon it. His own example undoubtedly contributed much towards promoting
it, for the manners of officers in camp soon receive a tone from those of their
commander, where he reigns in their affections as well as over their actions.
The winMng benevolence of his deportment towards them, directed their
attachments to the same object, and tMs naturally leads men to regard each
other as a band of brothers. Nor did he consider it of small importance, to
give that direction to their pursuits and appropriation of time, which would
add digMty to their profession, and contribute to render the society of Ms
camp both pleasant and instructive Of this he set them examples well worthy
of imitation. His only amusements were reading and conversation ; but nei
ther of them ever suffered to intrench upon the hours of busmess, or the calls

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 349
of duty. His industry was even laborious; for all his letters were written by chap.
Ms own hand and distributed to his aids for copying. The labours of the day v^r-v-*^
were uMformly closed by preparing the dispatches which the occurrences of
the day had required. It was seldom before midnight that he retired to rest,
and then, when the hum of the camp had subsided, and the silence of the night
was only interrupted by the challenge of the sentinel, or the heavy tread of
the night-guard, was his favourite time for reading and reflection. To these
purposes the allotted hour was uMformly devoted before he committed himself
to his pillow.
Nor was General Greene inattentive to the good effects of promoting con
vivial intercourse among his officers. It contributed to the promotion of all
his views; for while it brought them under his own eye in situations in
wMch the heart becomes undisguised, and temper and talent will flash out in
their true characters, it produced that additional tie among men, of mutual
dependance for enjoyments, and habitual participation of the same pleasures
or privations. Nor was it without its effects in opening the eyes of the junior
officers to the deference which mind, merit, and talents will command, or the
necessity of manners and acquirements to mantain the rank of an officer.
The officers of the army were regularly invited in rotation to their general's
table, and though the commander, who had neither riches of his own, nor
money of the state at Command ; who was not in the receipt even of a cent of
pay, and subsisted in common with others by forced means, could not offer
much to the palate of the epicure, or the eye of fastidious taste, every defi
ciency was made up by the cordial manners of their entertainer, and an occa
sional promise to treat them better when he should have the pleasure of enter-
taiMng them in Charleston. At the social board the restraints of parade no
longer existed, yet little was necessary for tempering familiar intercourse with
a digmty of manner that repressed familiarity. On these occasions the senti
ments of the young were elicited and the diffident encouraged to adventure in
conversation — an expedient well calculated to create a necessity which can
oMy be supplied by study and application. Modesty never was permitted, at
his table, to repine at the superior attention commanded by the gay and the
forward, and no guest left it dissatisfied either with himself or his entertainer.
The general was fond of conversation, and delighted to render it general
and entertaining. Yet he rather ranked among the listeners than the speakers,
and seldom did more than direct it by an observation or an inquiry. His
favourite subjects were ethics, politics, and military Mstory. On these his
funds were very ample, both of native and acquired materials — a circumstance
which probably recommended these topics to a preference, not less than their

350 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, being calculated to give dignity as well as an improving character to conver-
<^-v^j sation. Nor were subjects of taste and science excluded, or any restraint set
upon the predilections of his guests ; he had many officers well calculated to
give all the grace to convivial enjoyment that spirit, wit, and classic reading
bring in their train. Nor was the general deficient ,on subjects of taste ; for
although he had no knowledge of any language but Ms own, he had not passed
unnoticed the authors of rank of this class, either ancient or modern. But
the solid acquirements which the grave concerns of that day brought into
requisition, stamped a superior value on that kind of reading which was use
ful, rather than ornamental.
The time spent on the Pee Dee was also beneficially emproved to other
important purposes. It was at this period that his active and intelligent agents
were employed in exploring the rivers above him, and digesting those arrange
ments relative to the means of crossing them, which might become necessary
either to check the progress of an enemy, or facilitate his own. At. the same
time, with regard to the country below him, which being in possession of the
enemy could not be thus examined, he was himsdf busily employed in collect
ing from intelligent men brought together by the aid of Governor Rutledge,
then in camp with him, the most minute accounts of every thing that had rela
tion to the movements and subsistence of an army. The routes in all direc
tions were carefully minuted down in books, some of which are still extant ;
the topography of the country minutely ascertained, with a particular notice
of the ferries and fords of the rivers, and the means of transportation which
they afforded.
The following summary of his views of his situation is gathered from his
own correspondence as communicated to his friends from time to time, as those
views opened upon Ms inquiries. " I am here in my camp of repose, improv
ing the discipline and spirits of my men, and the opportunity for looking about
me. 1 am well satisfied with the movement, for it has answered thus far all
the purposes for which I intended it. It makes the most of my inferior force,
for it compels my adversary to divide his, and holds him in doubt as to his
own line of conduct. He cannot leave Morgan behind him to. come at me,
or his posts of NMety-Six and Augusta would be exposed. And he cannot
chase Morgan far, or prosecute his views upon Virginia while I am here with
the whole country open before me. I am as near to Charleston as he is, and
as near to Hillsborough as I was at Charlotte ; so that I am in no danger of
being cut off from my reinforcements, while an uncertainty as to my future
designs has made it necessary to leave a large detachment of the enemy's late
reinforcements in Charleston, and move the rest up on this side the Wateree.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 351
But although there is nothing to<g>bstruct my march to Charleston, I am far chap.
from having such a design in contemplation in the present relative positions s^-v^,
and strength of the two armies. It would be putting it in the power of my
enemy to compel me to fight him. . At present, my operations must be in the
country where the rivers are fordable, and to guard against the chance of not
being able to choose my ground. Kosciusko is employed in building flat-bot
tomed boats to be transported with the army, if ever I shall be able to com
mand the means of transporting them. I am now at the falls of the Pee Dee,
and the region of my future operations must be above the falls of the rivers,
until I can control the movements of my adversary. Below the falls, all
through this country from the Alleghany to the seacoast, and from the Chesa
peake to Georgia, the coutry is champaign, and presenting no passes that can
be held by an inferior force. Below the falls, the rivers are deep, and their
banks are covered with impassible swamps, across which, at long intervals,
roads have been constructed which afford the only avenues of retreat. I can
not venture to get entangled among the difficulties they present until I can turn
upon my enemy and fight him when I please.
" I find the difficulties of subsisting, an army far beyond all anticipation.
Even here, where the inhabitants are generally well disposed, they will not
gather in their crops from the field, because depositing their grain in their
barns exposes it to be seized by their friends, or burnt by their enemies. It is
hard to stand so much in need of friends, and be compelled to subsist ourselves
by means so well calculated to convert our friends into enemies. But we have
not a shilling of money, and must collect subsistence by force, or disband. I
have had an opportunity of learning the force of the loyalists in these states,
and the parts of the country in which they reside, and their numbers and zeal
present a formidable obstacle to our future measures. On the other hand, the
whig population has been greatly reduced by the numbers that have fled from
the distress that friends and foes have heaped upon them. The enemy are
now recruiting in all parts of this state, and the command of gold, aided by the
public distress and loyal feeling, has been too successful in promoting the pro
ject of making one conquest the stepping-stone to another. At present they
are in possession of all the fertile and populous parts of South Carolina, and
until circumstances will admit of my penetrating into the heart of the country
to meet and fight him, we shall have to operate in a country that has been
exhausted and depopulated by the swarms of mounted militia that have rather
been impoverishing than defending the country.
" Yet I should feel no apprehension for the event, had I a prospect of being
supported by a permanent force. But North Carolina has not a man on foot,

352 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, and Virginia only a few raw and naked traops, and those enlisted for a short
•~^>r-^/ time, The fine troops of Maryland and Delaware, enlisted for the war, are
now reduced comparatively to a handful, and General Gist gives me no hope
of an early reinforcement from that quarter. North Carolina seems disposed
to assist us, but her councils are so distracted that I cannot hope much from her
efforts. The whigs will not serve miless the tories are compelled, and the
tories are too strong to be driven, or if forced to take the field, will run away,
desert, or betray us. Virginia, without money and without credit, I fear can
do little more ; and in both states, militia substitutes are too much in demand,
to leave materials for enlisting an army, except for very limited periods. Hence
their troops will be for ever fluctuating, and will searcely have acquired disci
pline sufficient to give reputation or confidence to their officers, before they
must be discharged, greatly to the disgust of the troops enlisted for the war."
Great would have been the relief to General Greene's mind, if the imme
diate cares of the camp alone had been those wMch, at this time, engrossed his
attention. But the arrival of General Leslie in Charleston, had now been
communicated to him by Marion, and the daily accession of strength to his
adversary's force, caused him to turn his eyes anxiously to the north for sup
plies and reinforcements. It has been seen, that among the considerations
which had given a preference to his present position, was that of its being
nearer to Hillsborough, through which all his supplies must pass, than any
other place wMch could afford him subsistence without bearing the aspect of a
retreat. His late movement, therefore, produced no delay in the approach of
reinforcements, yet no supplies, and only a few, convalescents had as yet ar
rived in camp.
Whilst in PMladelpMa, General Greene had satisfied himself on a subject of
which he had previously very little cause to doubt, to wit, that he could draw-
nothing from the magazines of the United States, without distressing the com
mander in chief. Unwilling to do this, he had endeavoured, as has been seen,
to spirit up the merchants of that place to a voluntary contribution of clothing;
he had also repeated the effort at all the towns on his journey south, with as
little success. But congress, really solicitous on this subject, had appointed a
committee of their body for the express purpose of procuring clotMng, To
this committee he had recommended to make an effort at purchasing clothing
for the southern army by drafts upon our envoys abroad, in anticipation of
the sums which those envoys were authorised to borrow. This measure they
at first declined, but were soon after obliged to resort to. Still there was a
hope that the states would be able to afford him relief, but after diligently ex
ploring their resources, he found it a folly to rest on this dependance, and

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 353

IX.

renewed his instances to -the committee of congress. From Richmond he chap:
wrote to Colonel Matlock, chairman of that committee. " If was my inten- ^
tion to have addressed you before this, respecting the prospect and encourage-*
ment I met with of obtaining a supply of clothing, but I have postponed it with
a view of satisfying myself on this head in this state ; and am now fully con
vinced that the southern army will be entirely without clothing unless you
draw bills on France and provide for us in the way I proposed. The accounts
from the-southern army mention the condition of the Virginia fine as naked;
and distressing beyond description, and this state says it is utterly impossible
for them to furnish clothing* (nOr do I believe they can,) in time to save us
from ruin. You may depend upon its being utterly impossible to keep up a,
force sufficient to oppose the enemy's operations in the southern quarter, with
out clothing. • It may be disagreeable to draw bills on France, but it is better
to do this than to let the army go to ruin. The distress and suffering of the
troops of the southern army on account of provision, is sufficient to render the
service so disagreeable as to make it impossible to keep them in the field. But
when they are perishing With cold as well as hunger, the whole army must
become deserters, or patients in the hospitals. Both' policy and humanity call
loudly for supplies of clothing. The people of this state and Maryland say
they are willing to do all in their power to provide clothing, be the conse
quence what it may, and I wish that their ability to supply it may not be over
rated." His importunities were ably seconded in Philadelphia, by the instances of
Colond Febiger, and a respectable supply of tents, stores, and some clothing,
were put in motion for the southern army early in November. Colonel Pick
ering also, and GeneralKnox zealously contributed their good offices in '.the-
quarter-master and ordnance departments, and artificers and stores tor the
laboratories were forwarded to Virginia, together with a respectable supply of
equipments for cavalry horses. These had now been on their way for a length
of time, but the miserable state of the means of transportation in the south, and
the Virginia roads, even then celebrated for their distingMshing characteristic,
had greatly impeded their progress. Apprehensive that great embarrassments-
would result from these causes, General Greene had, early in December, dis
patched Colonel Carrington to Virginia, to superintend this important business
of transportation, with orders to hasten to rejoin the army as soon as he. should
have completed his line of arragements.
Nor had less delay been encountered in the advance of the reinforcements
which the Southern commander had a right to calculate on — an evil which he
had early -anticipated, from finding on his journey 'that the quarter-master's
45

354 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, stages could not furnish even forage for his own horses, not even in Rich-
^-^s^j mond. These reinforcements consisted of Lee's legion — a body of Virginia recruits,
and a legionary corps commanded by General Lawson of Virginia, which had
been put under marching orders for" the southern army.'
/ The legionary corps commanded by Col. Henry Lee, was perhaps the finest t
corps that made its appearance on the arena of the revolutionary war. It was
formed expressly for Colonel Lee, under an order' of General WasMngton
whilst the army lay in Jersey. It consisted, at this time* of about 300 men in
equal proportion of infantry -and horse. Both men and officers were picked
from the army ; the officers with reference only to their talents and qualities
for service, and the men by a proportionable selection from the troops of each l
state, enlisted for three years or the war. Virginia contributed twenty-five as j
her quota. No state South of Virginia contributed any, as they had no troops/
in the field. - L
t Colonel Lee had been expected to march early in October from Philadelphia,
/ but the equipping, disciplming, (and perhaps exhibiting) his command, had
rendered his movements very slow ; his journey from Fredericksburg to Rich
mond, for instance, required a fortnight, not a little to the distress of his com-
^mander, who, having sent home Armand's corps as no longer to be depended
upon after their conduct at Gates' defeat, and having sent off all Washington's
cavalry with Morgan, had not a horseman with his army.
In Maryland, General Greene had made a requisition of seventy-five cavalry
horses, and sundry equipments for the legion, and the liberal spirit in which
the requisition was complied with, gave Lee an opportunity of equipping his
cavajry in a brilliant style. In Virginia they were reviewed and completed by !
Steuben, and moved on, at the same time with a body of reeruits under Colo- I
nel Greene. .•;'¦- .™
Major General Baron Steuben is little known to the people of the United
States in any other character than the man to whom they were indebted for
the discipline of the army. Had he never rendered any other service than this,
those who are sensible of its indispensable nature, would acknowledge him -
entitled to lasting gratitude. But he has a higher claim on the affections of
this country; this was the ardent zeal with which he Was animated in its ser
vice, and the indefatigable spirit with which he struggled against difficulties,
(the extent of wMch is known to those only who peruse his letters,) when pro
moting the interests Of the .cause of the revolution. Those letters exhibit Mm
as a man of a warm and amiable heart — a clear, unclouded mincl — and of

\.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 355
perseverance, that no injury could disgust, no obstacle turn aside, while labour* chap.
ing to emancipate his adopted country. \^sa~^>
f To these motives were added that of a strong personal attachment in
stimulating his efforts to serve the southern commander. Unfortunately,* his j
zeal involved him in the sequel in the 'mortification of giving great disgust to
i Virginia, and the lips of many were closed by state or individual resentment,
/'who eould best have testified to his zeal and services. He had the hardihood
F to assert, " that the war could not be carried on by militia," and to express his
; feelings when he thought his friend and commander abandoned before Ninety -
\ Six ; and the injury sunk deep.
But his patience had repeatedly before been severely tried. It was so in a
high degree, about this time.
VirgiMa had now collected about a thousand recruits, who could not be
sent into the field from mere nakedness. But very extensive powers had
lately been delegated to Governor Jefferson, and he proved himself worthy of
pubfic confidence by daring to exercise those powers. In order to clothe their
soldiers, he was compelled to resort to an impress warrant, and from the
articles thus procured, Steuben was able, by the 1st of December, to equip
400 of the recruits,. enlisted for eighteen months, (a great part of which was
already expired,) in a condition fit to be marched for the southern army. But
even then, in the depth of winter, all the clothing he could procure for each,
consisted of one jacket with sleeves, one shirt,, a pair of linen overalls, a knap
sack, a blanket, and a pair of shoes.*
This detachment together with Lawson's corps, supposed to contain 500
men, were put under marching orders for the 3d of the month from Peters
burg ; and in high spirits, Steuben had written to his commander, that he
should forward on to him a reinforcement of 1200 men, consisting of Lee's
and Lawson's legions, and the 400 recruits, to enable Greene to meet the
enemy's reinforcement under General Leslie. Steuben was fully sensible of
the importance of time, not only for the purpose of giving strength to the
southern army, but to anticipate any interruption to the marching of these
troops from another invasion of VirgiMa; an event by no means improbable
or distant, from the state of intelligence from New York, — and an apprehension
which subsequent events proved was perfectly well founded, for these troops
finally moved off barely in time to avoid being detained to oppose Arnold.

* Steuben, 15th December 1750.

356 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. A reader must have been acquainted with the military feelings and habits of
, Europe, to form an adequate idea of the chagrin of a disciple of the great
Frederick, at finding that'on the day appointed, not a man could be marched
from the ground. Only one half of Lawson's corps paraded, and they were
ordered by the legislature of Virginia to be discharged, because their term of
service was far advanced to a termination ; and the officers of the detachment
of recruits had sent in a remonstance to the legislature for certain ill-usage
complained of, which must be redressed before they were ready to march.
" You may suppose," observes the baron, " I was exceedingly shocked at such
a procedure."* It was in vain to struggle against the tide that opposed him ; to attempt the
exertion of positive authority might produce absolute insurrection, and after
trying every thing that remonstrances and negociations could suggest, he was
obliged to acquiesce.
Lawson's corps was discharged, and the 400* recruits detained until the
middle of the month, that the officers might settle their differences with the
government. >
On the 15th, however, Steuben had the happiness to see Col. Greene with
400 men, and Colonel Lee with his legion of 300, move off for the southern
army. On the 12th of January, they reached the encampment on Pee Dee
where Lee had been for some time impatiently expected, to carry into effect a
plan of operation projected against Georgetown.
Among other inducements for taking the position on the Pee Dee, was, that
it placed the army directly in the rear of Marion, and whilst it gave counte
nance to Ms operations and inspirited the whigs on the Pee Dee and Black
rivers, secured to the commander the earliest and most direct intelligence of
the movements of the enemy in the low country, and the occurrences in
Charleston. For this kind of information, General Greene relied altogether
upon Marion. At his first arrival in Charlotte, on the day he took command,
Greene had addressed the latter on the subject, requesting that he woMd devote
himself particularly to the important care of gathering intelligence. " I have
not the honour of your acquMntance," says the writer, " but am no stranger
to your character and merit. Your services in the lower part of South Caro
lina, in awing the tories and preventing the enemy from extending their limits,
have been very important. And it is my earnest desire that you continue
where you are, until further advice from me. Your letter of the 22d last month

* Steuben, 4th December t780.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 357
to General Gates, is before me. I am fully sensible your service is hard and chap.
sufferings great, but how great the prize for which we contend! I like your^^^^
plan of frequently shifting your ground- It frequently prevents a surprise, and
perhaps the total loss of your party. Until a more permanent army can be
collected than is in the field at present, we must endeavour to keep up a parti
san war, and preserve the tide of sentiment among the people in our favour as
much as -possible. Spies are the eyes of an army, and without them a general
is always groping m the dark, and can neither secure himself, nor annoy his
enemy. At present, I am badly off for intelligence. It is of the highest im
portance that I get the earliest intelligence of any reinforcement which may
arrive at Charleston. I wish you, therefore, to fix some plan for procuring
such information and conveymg it to me, with all possible dispatch. The spy
should be taught to be particular in his inquiries and get the names of the
"corps, strength; and commanding officer's name, place from whence they
came, and where they are going. It will be best to fix upon somebody in
town to do this, and have a runner between you and him to give you the
intelligence, as a person who lives out of town canot make the inquiries, with- .
out being suspected. The utmost secrecy will be necessary in this business,"
&c. TMs letter found Marion at one of Ms lurking places on Black River,* and
as he had never been without his spies and runners, every occurrence in
Georgetown and Charleston was early known and promptly communicated.
Yet he complMns grievously of the embarrassment arising from the want of
hard money to assist his emissaries in communicating with the enemy's posts ;
— a want which his communder was very far from being able to supply.
The last exploit related of Marion's, it will be recollected, was Ms liberating
a detachment of prisoners taken at the defeat of Gates. Through the whole
course of his operations, it was his practice never to rest long in a place where
he had done mischief This is known to be a habit of Indian warfare, a
nation known to excell in wariness and stratagem. After seeing his prisoners
in safety over the Pee Dee, Marion renewed his persecutions on the, enemy
on" both sides the Santee, directing his operations against the parties commu
nicating between Camden and Charleston, and the boats transporting supplies
between. Granby and Charleston.
At the time when General Greene moved down to the Cheraws, Marion
had been engaged in some very active movements agamst a party under

* Marion, 22d December l78Qv

358 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. M'Arthur and Coffin, about Nelson's Ferry, and between that and the High
^^1^, Hills of Santee ; and with the hope to cut off his retreat by the Pee Dee, a
strong detachment had been pushed on from Charleston to Georgetown, in
tended to interrupt him by ascending the north bank of the Pee Dee River.
But Marion soon received intelligence of this movement, and divining its ob
ject, retired across the country and took a strong position on the north bank of
Lynch's Creek, in the vicinity of his favourite retreat at Snow's Island, where
he always kept a party to guard his boats and awe the loyalists.
From this place he communicated to General Greene, on the 27th of De
cember, the arrival of General Leslie, and successively his march for Camden
— the return of the detachment which had marched to Georgetown — and the
establishment of Colonel Watson near Nelson's Ferry, with about two hun
dred men.
The retirement of the detachment from Georgetown left Marion once more
at liberty to resume active operations. In a short time, his parties were pushed
down near to the town on all the rivers that flow into the Winyaw Bay, and
employed in collecting boats and removing provisions up to Snow's Island.
This was with the double purpose of supplying the army above him* and of
straitening the enemy in his movements and resources. In the mean time,
with a respectable force of mounted infantry, he pressed close to the town him
self, watching an opportunity to attack them in that place. But they confined
themselves to their redoubts, and he had neither bayonets nor artillery to at
tempt carrying their works. With one hundred continental troops, he informs
the southern commander, he should be able to render important services.
Whilst thus employed, he received intelligence that the loyalists, emboldened
by the main army's being destitute of cavalry, were embodying above him
under the celebrated Hector M'Neal. This was at Amie's Mill on the Drown
ing Creek. To detach a force sufficient to disperse him, was not in Marion's
power, and to suffer them to come upon' him whilst his detachments were dis
persed, must prove destructive. , He therefore resolved to call in his detach
ments, and communicate to the commanding general the necessity to reinforce
, him against his increasing enemies, and to look to the movements of M'Neal,
as he supposed them to be in part directed against the country Between the
Waccamaw and seacoast, which had never been foraged, and contained at this
time abundance of provision.
This was the situation of things when Colonel Lee reached the American
camp, and the "moderate speed of his movements leaving the legion in the finest
order for service, he was immediately placed under marching orders to join

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 359
Marion; w-hile a detachment of light troops under Major Anderson, was chap.
ordered to prepare far a movement against the loyalists at Amie's Mills. v^v-x^
Colonel Lee reached Marion's camp on the 23d, and on the 24th a com
bined attempt was made to surprise Georgetown. Marion furnished gMdes,
boats, and intelligence, and Captain Carnes, with the infantry of the legion,
undertook the enterprise. The enemy had no apprehension of an attack by
water, and were wholly unprepared to repel it.
The banks of the Pee Dee, closely covered with woods and deep swamps,
afforded a perfect covering to Captain Carnes, as he fell silently down the
river and occupied an island at its mouth, within a few miles of the site of
Georgetown. The rear of this place was wholly undefended, and dams run
ning through the rice-fields, which extend from the rear of the town to the
river, afforded easy access to it on the south-east.
On the island at which they had landed, the American party lay concealed
until one o'clock of the 25th, when, under the darkness of night, they landed
undiscovered, and entered the town before any alarm was given.
Yet the enterprise proved unsuccessfiil ; nor is it easy to determine the cause,
for we find the failure variously accounted for. Colonel ,Lee, in his Memoirs,
attributes it to an error in the plan, and assigns as the cause that both columns
in which the party entered were ordered to observe the parade ground, where
it was expected the troops would assemble upon the alarm; whereas one of
the columns ought to have been ordered to carry the fort with the bayonet.
But this varies materially from his official account of the affair, in which he
says, " Destitute of the expected assistance, my force was inadequate to the
assault of the enemy's enclosed works, nor was the possession equivalent to the
certain loss to be expected from such a measure." And again: " The blunder
of the guides prevented a full correspondence in the movements of the cavalry
and infantry, by which mistakes we were in some degree baffled in the import
ant consequences which the prowess of the infantry gave aright to expect."
But Marion says, " Colonel Lee informed you yesterday by express, of our
little success on Georgetown, which could not be greater without artillery." .
General Moultrie, on the otherhand, says, " In this hurry and confusion the \
guides got so alarmed and frightened that they lost their way to the fort, where
the main body of the British were quartered, or else the surprise would haye
been complete." And again. " By this time, the enemy began embodying,
and the firing being heard from different parts of the town, and General Ma
rion and Colonel Lee not entering the town at the same time, Captains Carnes
and Rudulph thought it proper to retreat." " The cavalry under General
Marion and Colonel Lee did not arrive [during the action ;] and as they met

360 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

ix

chap, with a breastwork not easily to be mounted, they proceeded no farther, parti-
cularly as the infantry had already retreated."
This probably, was " the want of due co-operation" between the cayalry
and infantry to which Colonel Lee alludes, in his letter; and it. agrees with
contemporaneous accounts, which represent the cavalry as having never en
tered the town, and the failure as attributable to the attention of the attacking
party having been drawn away from capital objects to the minor one of catch
ing the commanding officer, Colonel Campbell, in his bed, and pursuing the
fugitives, who ran in confusion about the streets. This account is also corro
borated by a passage in Colonel Lee's letter to General Greene in winch he
says "Many were killed, few taken; among the former is Major Irvine, among
the latter, Lieutenant Colonel . Campbell, the "commander of the garrison."
That Colonel Lee was in no wise satisfied with the issue of the enterprise,
appears from a letter of Ms of the 27th, in which he says, " I congratulate you
from my soul, on the glorious victory obtained by General Morgan; I wish
my fortune had been equally propitious, as then Lord Cornwallis must have
been exceedingly distressed." *
An assertion of which there cannot be the remotest doubt. For the great
object of the commanding "general in dispatching Lee to operate with Marion,
would then most probably have been attained. This was to draw the enemy's
attention towards the safety of his posts in the low. country, and check his
advance against Morgan ; whom to have pursued to any distance, would have
left his line of posts along the Santee up to Ninety-Six exposed to destruction.
Nor would complete success have been of little importance in another view.
Besides the military stores and prisoners that would have fallen into their
hands, the plan would have afforded .clothing to a considerable amount, and
the' fall of Georgetown would certainly have produced an effect upon the public
mind which the arrival of all the reinforcements under Leslie woMd not have
been more than sufficient to counteract.
Nevertheless the attempt was brilliant — the spirit displayed in its execution
served to raise the reputation of the American arms, and checked the forward
ing of reinforcements to the British army, by exposing the. necessu^v 0f strength
ening their garrisons below. A considerable reinforcement to Georgetown
was forwarded from the metropolis the moment the narrow escape of . thaw
place was known.
The surprise of Georgetown was not a simple coup demain; it was tb^first,,
step* in gradation of the* measures which General Greene had then in contem-
plation. The object which he proposed to himself was to recall Lord Corn
wallis from his views on Virginia and to detain him in South Carolina until

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. &2
an array could be collected and equipped of sufficient strength to penetrate into chap.
the country and fight him. i^-I^*,,'
This plan of operations is distinctly avowed in his correspondence in Oc
tober; and although the celebrated descent into South Carolina in the April
following, has been treated of as an idea then first presented to the general's
mind, reconstituted in January, the subject of a correspondence between
Greene, Morgan, Marion and Lee. The project was for Morgan to pass on
towards Ninety-Six, and even into Georgia, while a detachment ascended the
Santee and formed a junction with him before Ninety-Six, and the main army
attracted the attention of the enemy by threatening Camden.
The advance of Colonel Lee at this time, and his junction with Marion, had
expressly in contemplation a blow at the pOs*ts on the Santee and Congaree,
with a view of feeling the operation of the measure on the future movements
of Lord Cornwallis, as well as to injure him by their actual destruction.
In a letter of General Greene's to Marion, of the 25th, before the news of
the victory of the Cowpens was received, the general writes, " I wish to have
your opinion of the practicability of crossing the-Santee with a party of three
or four hundred horse, and whether they would be much exposed by being in
the rear of the enemy; — also whether the party could not make good their
retreat, if it should be necessary, and join our people towards Ninety-Six. If
the thing is practicable, can your people be engaged to perform the service ?
It may be a matter of the highest importance, connected with other move
ments, and therefore I beg you to give me all the information upon the sub
ject you can, without hinting the design to any person whatever, except Colonel
Lee, whom I wish you to advise with," &c. And Colonel Lee, on the 30th,
writes, " In your letter of the 26th, you suggest an idea of a very extensive
movement, and intimate a desire for a correspondent movement in me, at the
proper moment if practicable. My part of the game can be played, and in
my opiMon, will be of the most durable and comprehensive service." " I
pray to hear from you, and beg you to cherish the movement mentioned in
yours of the 26th," &c.
In the orders under which Colonel Lee marched to join Marion, he was
instructed to direct his attention, first to the surprise of Georgetown, and then
to an attempt on Watson, who had taken post at Nelson's Ferry ; and, notwith
standing Marion expresses strong doubts of the practicability of succeeding
against Watson, the general still urges him to attempt it. Thus too, in a letter
to General Sumpter of the 3d February, General Greene says, " I agree with
you in opinion, that if proper measures are taken, the enemy may be made
apprehensive for his rear. For this purpose, I desired General Marion to
46

362 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, cross the Santee if possible ; and in order to pave the way for this service, I
v^^w desired Lieutenant Colonel Lee to surprise Georgetown,* that the militia of
that quarter might be left more at liberty to cross the river." Accordingly,
after the attempt on Georgetown, Marion and Lee halted but a few hours to
rest their troops, and moved the same day directly up the north bank of the
Santee towards Nelson's Ferry. But Watson did not wait to receive them ;
after throwing a garrison of about eighty men into Fort Watson, five miles
above the ferry, he moved off to Camden. An attempt was then made to
throw a detachment of dragoons across the river, with orders to ascend its
south bank and destroy the enemy's stores at Colonel Thomson's, and some
other depots on the Congaree. Some delay ensued from the want of boats,
but the detachment was out on* that service, when Colonel Lee was recalled,
with orders to hasten to Salisbury and join Morgan, then retreating before
Lord Cornwallis.
The route which Morgan pursued from Charlotte, led across the Catawba
at Biggin's Ferry, below the mouth of the Little Catawba, and across the
Broad River, above the mouth of the Pacolet. On the banks of the Pacolet
he took post on the 25th December, and was soon after joined by about 220
mounted militia from North and South Carolina.
The state of things in that country was at this time, highly favourable to
this expedition. The whigs, it will be recollected, had, after the fall of
Charleston, been obliged to submit and give their paroles to remain inactive.
The pledge on the other side was, protection to their property and families.
The arbitrary and oppressive conduct of the enemy had satisfied them all, that
the protection promised them could not or would not be afforded, and a very
general disposition prevailed among them to resume their arms. General
Pickens who, among the rest had been compelled to submit, now resolved to
lead the way in exciting the well-affected to the American cause, to brave all
the hazards of taking the field. Clarke and Twiggs, after the battle of Black-
stocks, had kept together a small body of their followers, and moving along in
the rear of the whig-settlements towards Georgia, they presented a favourable
opportunity to the inhabitants to carry their resolution into effect. General
Pickens and Colonel M'Call, at the head of about one hundred men, took the
field, and sending off their families and slaves over the mountains for security,
ihey proceeded to join Morgan. Hundreds of others were ready to follow
the example, and only waited a favourable opportunity to effect their purpose.
The whigs of Mecklenberg also began to assemble, and General Davidson
v Yet Colonel Lee takes the credit of this surprise altogether to himself.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 3ft
having collected about one hundred and twenty, marched them to Morgan's chap.
camp, and by returning to hasten on 500 more who. were embodying, he lost ^~^±.
the honour of participating in the victory of the Cowpens.
On the second day after Morgan's arrival on the Pacolet, an opportunity for
enterprise presented itself, which was promptly embraced. A body of loyalists
had advanced from the banks of the Savannah to Fair Forest Creek, to check
the spirit of disaffection which had began to manifest itself, and had com
menced their depredations upon the settlements on that stream. Their dis
tance was about twenty miles in advance of Morgan's in the direction towards
Ninety- Six, and their number was reported at 250.
/ Colonel Washington with Ms cavalry, 75 in number, but of very superior ,
quality, and 200 mounted militia under Colonel M'Call, were dispatched to
dislodge this body of loyalists. The latter receiving intelligence of the ap
proach of Washington, retreated about twenty miles, to a place called Ham
mond's Store, where being covered as they supposed, on their right by Lord
Cornwallis at Winnsborough, and on their left by the post at Ninety-Six, they
halted in mistaken security. Washington pressed the pursuit with such dili
gence that he overtook them early the next day after a march of forty miles,
and instantly ordered a charge. It was a flight and not a conflict that ensued,
and we regret to state that the killed and wounded were reported at one hun
dred and fifty, and the prisoners at forty. Such were the bloody sacrifices at
that time offered up at the shrine of civil discord ! Posterity will never con
ceive an adequate idea of the dreadful state of society then prevailing in that
unhappy country. Yet let not unmerited censure fall on the officers who
commanded.* Men who had been in the habit of giving no quarters natu
rally expected none, and in their flight the unerring rifle brought many of them
to the ground. There was little time for hesitation or room for pursuit, for
Washington was now so far advanced between the enemy's posts, and so near
Colonel Tarleton at the head of 250 cavalry, that prompt measures alone
could insure his safety. Yet he would not let another opportunity of service
escape him, though it brought him still nearer to the enemy. At a place
called Williams, General Cunningham was at this time posted with about
150 men, in a stockade fort which, without the aid of artillery, could only be
carried by surprise. Thither, Colonel Hayes at the head of a detachment of
the infantry, and Cornet Simmons with a command of the cavalry, were
instantly dispatched. But intelligence of Washington's approach had pre
ceded the party, and the garrison were retiring precipitately as the Americans
* Morgan, 30th December 1780.

364 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE,
chap, came in view of the fort. A few of the British party were killed and taken,
^~v~^ and tne f°rt destroyed.
Morgan's fears were somewhat excited for the safety of Washington, on
hearing the distance to which he had penetrated between the enemy's posts,
and his whole force was now advanced to cover him on his return to camp.
But he reached the army in safety, and Morgan resumed his post on the north
of the Pacolet, carefiilly shifting Ms encampment every night to guard against
surprise. The effect of Morgan's advance and WasMngton's enterprizes, soon began
to be sensibly felt by Lord Cornwallis, in their effects upon popular sentiment.
Why measures were not more promptly adopted to drive him off or destroy
him, must probably be attributed to the hope of entrapping him. As soon as
it appeared that he had again established himself on the Pacolet, with a view
to collect and embody his militia preparatory to ulterior movements, Lieute
nant Colonel Tarleton was detached .with orders, as he expresses it himself,
" to push Morgan to the utmost."
Lord Cornwallis had been for some time preparing to prosecute his designs
upon Virginia ; the arrival of the reinforcements under Leslie, was the event
on which his getting into motion depended. That officer was now on his
march to Camden, a destination which, his lordship informs us, was intended
to hold Greene in suspense as to his future movements. But how the advance
of a reinforcement to Camden could produce this effect, it is not easy to ima
gine! Nor could it be of any importance to hold him in doubt after the
movement to Pee Dee; for, whether the intention was to push him, or to pass
him, he was equally prepared to fall back upon his reinforcements, until he
coMd turn upon his pursuers. For the purpose of meeting either movement,
his position was admirably calculated ; and it combined with that advantage,
the additional one of threatening the right flank and rear of the enemy.
Whatever may have been the original designs of the British commander, it
is very certain that Ms actual movements, if not governed, were materially
controlled by those of his adversary. For the posts of Camden and Ninety^
Six were those which kept both North and South Carolina in awe, and
while the advance of Morgan threatened the latter, the position of Greene
looked so directly towards the former, that the safety of both became sub
jects of uneasiness to the British commander. As these places were in
tended to be left shortly to their own protection and that of the loyalists,
they were at tMs time, filled with all the munitions necessary to the pro
secution of the war. Lord Cornwallis, therefore, determined to divide
Ms force; to press forward one detachment under Tarleton to destroy Mor-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 365
gan, or drive him out of the state; and as he doubted not that the latter chap.
must be compelled to fight, or fly towards Virginia, it was intended to move v^-v~w
rapidly forward himself, so as to cut him off from the place of his retreat ;
whilst Leslie, by marching up the east side of the Catawba River, would
effectually prevent Greene from advancing to Morgan's support.
All this well-digested plan was deranged by the unexpected event of the
battle of the Cowpens, or by causes preceding it.
Poetry, oratory, religion, have concurred in addressing the Supreme Being
as the God of armies, and it would seem that military events were peculiarly
the subject of a particular providence. Mortifying would it be to human
vanity or ambition, if those who guide the destiny of nations, would pause and
reflect with candour, how often the fate of battles depends upon single, unex
pected, and even minute incidents. Discipline, as it reduces more than any
other cause the number of these contingencies, is the only reliance on which
mature experience will calculate with confidence.
It is not easy to determine with precision, the number of troops with wMch
the British commander commenced operations in January 1781. Contempo
raneous information on such a point is seldom to be depended upon. There
are great temptations, or delusive prepossessions always influencing command
ers and historians, to give an inaccurate estimate of rival forces and rival losses.
Whether it be to exult in a victory, or apologize for a defeat, the mind leans to
diminution on one side, and exaggeration on the other; and perhaps it is only
when facts are wrung out by contention, or the secrets of the cabinet fearlessly
explored, that we can look confidently for truth. When misfortune over
whelmed the British commanders engaged in this expedition, mutual jealousies
and criminations arose, and these disputes put the world in possession of per
haps, the only evidence that can be relied on, on the point of numbers. This
is to be found in the private and confidential correspondence of the time, as
exhibited in a publication by Lord Cornwallis, entitled, " An answer to that
part of the narrative of Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. which re
lates to the conduct of Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, during the campaign
in North America in the year 1781 ;" and in the notes to Tarleton's Campaigns,
inserted to support many of the historical facts related in the work of Sir
Henry Clinton.
Referring to these sources of information, we find an official return, making
the British force under Cornwallis, comprising the three detachments then in
the field, to amount to 3,224 men. But as official returns are liable to many
of the objections which may be urged against the authenticity of other official
mformation, it may be proper to remark, that Cornwalfis, in a letter of the

366 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. 18th December, written at Winnsborough, when the reinforcement under
IX.
.^yi^ Leslie was not expected at that place, says, " I have a good account of our
recruits in general, and hope to march from hence three thousand five hundred
fighting men, leaving those I mentioned to you on the frontiers." And in a
letter of April 30th, 1781, from Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, is con
tained the following passage : " By the distribution sent me in your letter of
the 6th January, I am to suppose, it was your intention to take with you the
regiments mentioned in the margin, which, (notwithstanding the loss of the
71st and legion, in the unfortunate affair of the Cowpens,) I should have ima
gined must have amounted to considerably above 3000, exclusive of cavalry and
militia." If the opinion of Sir Henry Clinton is to be relied on, (and it would
seem that the information of the commander in chief is the least questionable,)
it would follow, that the force with which the British commander took the
field in this campaign, considerably exceeded the number of 4,000, which is
greatly above the usual estimate. The names of the several corps that marched
under him are accurately known ; these were, the brigade of guards, regiment
of Bose, Hamilton's regiment of North Carolina loyalists, the 7th, 23d, 33d,
and 71st British regiments, with three companies of the 16th, a light company
attached to the 71st, two companies of yagers, the British legion, and a com
pany of the 17th dragoons. But the sum of the whole must depend upon the
numerical amount of each corps, which is only to be had from actual returns,
and these returns, it is to be presumed, were duly transmitted to the com
mander in chief.
Upon receiving intelligence of the advance of Morgan to the Pacolet, the
fears of Lord Cornwallis were seriously excited for the security of Ninety- Six.
Although Morgan's force in regular troops, destitute as he was of artillery, was
not sufficient to excite any serious alarm for that post, yet the British com
mander knew the disaffection of the people, and exaggerated accounts poured
in upon him of the rising and embodying of the militia. His whole force at
that time, lay between the Broad and Catawba rivers ; the main body at
Winnsborough, and Tarleton a short distance in advance of him. The latter
had just then returned from the pursuit of Sumpter to Blackstocks, and, with
out accounting for any other reinforcement than that of the 71st, of 200 men,
had with him a force exceeding 800 effectives.
On the 1st of January Tarleton received orders from Lord Cornwallis, to
strike across the country and thpow himself between Morgan and the post at
Ninety-Six. With his usual celerity, for his motions were always rapid, he
obeyed this order; and leaving behind him his baggage, advanced twenty
miles beyond Broad River, to a position which placed him nearly south of that

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 367
of Morgan. Here in a few days, he was joined by his baggage, and reinforced chap.
with the 7th regiment and about fifty cavalry of the 17th dragoons. His.^^X,
force now amounted to about 1100 men, 550 of whom were the formidable
legion, who had been so long, with unvarying success, traversing every corner
of the state, and triumphing over every corps they had encountered. His
field-pieces were served by a detachment of the royal artillery, soon to have
an opportunity of proving that they justly merited the high reputation of the
corps they belonged to. The 7th regiment of 200 men, and the first battalion
of the 71st, the light infantry of the 71st, the dragoons of the 17th, and some
loyalists, made up the residue of his force, admitted by himself to have
amounted to one thousand, but which the Americans contend equalled eleven
hundred and fifty.
With this force he prepared to obey the orders of his commander, " to push
his adversary to the utmost." But that the fate of his victim, who lay on the
west side of Broad River, might be rendered inevitable, it was concerted that
Cornwalfis should commence his march a few days before Tarleton; that, by
advancing northwardly as far as King's Mountain, on the east side of that
river, Morgan might be cut off from retreat and compelled to fight, to surren
der, Or to fly across the mountains.
But other thoughts had now taken possession of Cornwallis' mind. The
force then remaming with him did not by his account, much exceed that de
tached under Tarleton. Should he advance too far, the fate of Ferguson
might await him. A fire had burst from the earth to consume that comman
der, and his lordship's route lay directly towards the ominous King's Mountain.
The same Scythian warriors might there arrest his progress, as their appear
ance was not more unlooked for formerly than at this time. Or, the rein
forcements flocking in upon Morgan, might excite in that commander the
audacity to strike at the main body in the absence of Leslie's corps, of the light
troops, and cavalry. A. cause of uneasiness had also occurred for the security
of the troops under Leslie. The whigs of Mecklenberg had been summoned
to the field under Davidson. Great efforts were making to embody them; with
what success it would be attended, was then uncertain ; and to advance on the
east side of the river, with Greene but 100 miles on his right, might prove
perilous. He concluded, it was no longer safe for his two corps to be sepa
rated by the Catawba: and concluded justly ; for, it will be seen by the official
correspondence of the day, that Greene actually contemplated striking at his
several corps whilst they remained in this detached and divided situation.
Lord Cornwallis accordingly ordered Leslie to cross the Catawba, and join
him on the route towards King's Mountain.

368 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. And now were felt the consequences of ordering that officer to take the

IX

, route by Camden, Had he ascended the Congaree to Granby, (the shortest
route to head quarters,) besides having a plentiful country to draw supplies
from, there would have been no impediment to his advance. But by
ordering him to the other route, a deep and rapid river, with wide and
often impracticable swamps, and no ford until you ascend many miles, was
thrown between Leslie's force and the main army. Several days were
consumed by General Leslie in the passage of the Swamps, and on the
16th, Cornwallis, waiting for his reinforcements, was still no further advanced
than Turkey Creek, twenty-five miles to the south-east of the position of Mor
gan ; instead of having advanced as many miles, to the north of his position,
and on the route which the latter must pursue, either to form a junction with
Ms commander, or to seek shelter in Virginia.
The conduct of Cornwallis during this campaign has been the subject of
much eulogy ; and in the field, it must be acknowledged, he always supported
the character of a brave and able commander. But in all his general mea
sures we see exhibited this strong proof of ill fortune, if not of inferior capa
city, that they uniformly worked together for his ruin. His operations at this'
period of the campaign, are strikingly marked with this characteristic. Noi*
is his conduct secure from the charge of indecision, — that bane of military
enterprise, and strongest proof of a want of concoction in design ; nor of ne
glect in obtaining and communicating intelligence, — among the first of military
duties, and not the least of mifitary talents. With a commanding superiority
of cavalry, and innumerable loyalists at command, he ought never to have
been without the best of intelligence, and might have pursued, whatever course
of operations he pleased with the greatest confidence. His measures against
Morgan were not, therefore, forced upon him, they were perfectly spontaneous;
but both the British commanders appear to have been seduced by the eclat of
a brilliant coup de main, and to have sacrificed to that object a more secure,
but less imposing course of conduct. And the usual result of too much confi
dence, attended their measures.
Had Tarleton, instead of being ordered " to push his adversary to the ut
most," been simply instructed to hang upon his rear and embarrass his march
whilst Cornwallis advanced up the east side of Broad River far enough to cut
off Ms retreat and then turned upon him, it would have been impossible for
Morgan to escape, except by the mountains. Or had he advanced up the east
side of Broad River as was originally projected, whilst Leslie continued his
march up the east side of the Catawba; even after the victory obtained over
Tarleton, it woMd have been impossible for both Morgan and his prisoners t©

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 363
have effected their retreat by the route he pursued. If it be urged that his chap.
uncertainty relative to the military force collecting in his front, would have k^v-^
rendered it imprudent to advance into a hostile country with his army in that
divided state, the reply is ; that we could scarcely credit it, were it not asserted
by his own officers, that with the advantage of having all the loyalists of Tryon
county- in his front to furnish him intelligence, he could remain in such a state
of ignorance on that subject. But it is not more surprising than that he
should have had no certain intelligence of the advance of Morgan, until the
latter reached the Pacolet; and then not to have known with certainty that he
had no artillery. To this last circumstance we are to attribute his apprehen
sions for Ninety-Six, a post which had been rendered perfectly secure against
an enemy destitute of artillery ; more especially when there was a considerable
British force in the field in its vicinity, composed of loyalists and regulars,
under a Colonel Innis. But a fact is asserted by Tarleton, on this subject,
still less creditable to the generalship of the British commander ; which is, that
though situate but a moderate distance from each other, and engaged in joint
operations against Morgan, yet from the 14th to the 17th, he left Tarleton
entirely without intelligence of his own movements or further intentions ; so
that Tarleton remained under the impression on the day of the battle, that the
British army was in the rear of Morgan, and, that though he should himself be
repulsed, the retreat of his enemy was effectually cut off, and his fall rendered
the more certain when Crippled by the attack.
It was on the 12th January that Tarleton commenced his march to attack
Morgan. At that time it was completely in the power of the latter to have
evaded it, though it would not have been so but for the slow progress or oscil
lating counsels of Cornwallis, who in eight days, had advanced but twenty-five
miles. It has been said by General Lee, that Morgan's decision to fight
Tarleton " grew out of irritation of temper." But there can be little doubt of
an original and deliberate intention to fight his adversary, if only a favourable
opportunity presented itself. General Greene speaks of it as an event which
he had sanctioned and anticipated, and it is known that Morgan was " nothing
lothe" to meet an adversary. It was not without his knowledge that the
movements of the enemy were made; for in one of his letters to Greene, to
whom he was very particular and regular in making his communications, not
withstanding the distance of one hundred and forty miles wMch separated
ihem, he mentions that he had emissaries always within half a mile of their
camp, and was regularly informed of all their movements. The last of these
letters bears date the 15th, two days before the battle, and we will give it to
47

370 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, the reader as a specimen of the calmness with which he viewed events, and
v^-v^x^ his utter freedom from the influence of irritation.
" Camp at Burr's Mills, Thickette Creek, Jan. 15, 1780.
& DEAR GENERAL,
" Your letters of the 3d and 8th instant, came to hand yesterday just
as I was preparing to change my position, — was therefore obliged to detam
the express until this evening.
" The accounts I have transmitted you of Lieutenant Colonel Washington's
success, accord with his opinion. The number killed and wounded on the
part of the tories must depend on conjecture, as they broke on the first charge,
scattered through the woods and were pursued in every direction. The con
sequences attending this defeat will be fatal to the disaffected. They have not
been able to embody since.
" Sensible of the importance of having magazines of forage and provisions
established in this country. I have left no means in my power unessayed to
effect this business. I dispatched Captain Chitty, (whom 1 have appointed as
commissary of purchases for my command,) with orders to collect and store
all the provisions that could be obtained between the Catawba and Broad
rivers. I gave him directions to call on Colonel Hill, who commands a regi
ment of mifitia m that quarter, to furnish him with a proper number of men
to assist him in the execution of this commission, but he, to my great surprise,
has just returned without effecting any thing. He tells me that his failure pro
ceeded from the want of the countenance and assistance of Colonel Hill, who
assured him that General Sumpter directed him to obey no orders from me,
unless they came through him.
" I find it impracticable to procure more provisions in this quarter than is
absolutely necessary for our own immediate consumption, indeed it has been
with the greatest difficulty that we have been able to effect this. We 1iave to
feed such a number of horses that the most plentiful country must soon be
exhausted. Nor am I a little apprehensive that no part of this state accessible
to us, can support us long. Could the militia be persuaded to change their
fatal mode of gomg to war, much provision might be saved, but the custom has
taken such deep root that it cannot be abolished.
" Upon a foil and mature deliberation, I am confirmed in the opinion that
nothing can be effected by my detachment in this country which will balance
the risks I will be subjected to by remaining here. The enemy's great supe
riority of numbers and our distance from the main army, will enable Lord
Cornwallis to detach so superior a force against me, as to render it essential to

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 371
our safety to avoid coming to action ; nor will this be always in my power, chap.
No attempt to surprise me will be left untried by them, and situated as we must y^J*^
be, every possible precaution may not be sufficient to secure us. The scarcity
of forage makes it impossible for us to be always in a compact body ; and were
this nqt the case, it is beyond the art of man to keep the militia from straggling.
These reasons induce me to request that I may be recalled With my detach
ment; and that General Davidson and Colonel Pickens may be left with the
militia of North and South Carolina and Georgia. They will not be so much
the object of the enemy's attention, and will be capable of being a check on the
disaffected, which is all I can effect.
" Colonel Pickens is a valuable, discreet, and attentive officer, and has the
confidence of the militia.
" My force is inadequate to the attempts you have hinted at. [An attack
upon Cornwalfis in the security of his camp.] I have now with me only 200
South Carolina and Georgia, and 140 North Carolina volunteeus. Nor do I
expect to have more than two thirds of these to assist me, should I be attacked;
for it is impossible to keep them collected.
" Though I am convinced that were you on the spot the propriety of my
proposition would strike you forcibly, should you think it unadvisable to recall
me, you may depend on my attempting every thing to annoy the enemy, and
to provide for the safety of the detachment. 1 shall cheerfully acquiesce in
your determinations.
" Colonel Tarleton has crossed the Tyger at Musgrove's Mill ; his force we
cannot learn. It is more than probable we are his object. Cornwallis by the
last accounts was at the cross-roads near Lee's old place.
" We have just learned that Tarleton's force is from eleven to twelve hun
dred British," &c.
This letter furnishes an ample exposition of the causes which induced Mor
gan to resolve on fighting Tarleton. The opposition of General Sumpter to
his collecting magazines in his rear, had put an end to all hope of performing
that service, so indispensable to a rapid retreat to the mountains: the vast
consumption of forage from the mifitia horses rendered it impossible to retain
his present position: to retire before the enemy would be injurious to the
cause he came to foster ; and Lord Cornwallis, instead of detaching against
him an overwhelming force, had detached Colonel Tarleton at the head of a
force numerically not superior to his own. We may add to these reasons, that
his men were in high spirits from their late success against the loyalists, and

372 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, he had reason to expect from his adversary all the errors that flow from pride
y^f-J^A and confidence, or from contempt for the forces he had to cope with.
Morgan's resolution was therefore promptly taken, the measure was sub
mitted to his troops, the cry to lead them on was universal, and he advanced
immediately to the Pacolet, intending to avail himself of the advantage, which
an attack on his enemy while crossing the stream, seemed to promise. TMs, it
must be acknowledged was a measure of at least " a noble daring ;" for Lord
Cornwallis' position was little more than a day's march on his left. But
Tarleton's avidity for glory rendered him as anxious as his adversary to anti
cipate the arrival of Lord Cornwallis, or rather, according to his own account,
worse informed than Morgan, he thought his commander at this time in the
rear of his adversary. The two detachments arrived opposite to each other
near the banks of the Pacolet about the same hour.
The Pacolet is a small river fordable in many places. Tarleton did not
leave his adversary long to deliberate. On the eveMng of the 15th, he put his
troops in motion towards the head of the stream to indicate an intention of
crossing it above Morgan's position, and thus to place his adversary between
himself and the main army. The stratagem took effect, for it was exactly that
measure wMch seemed to promise Mm the greatest advantage. Morgan ac
cordingly made a correspondent movement, but his adversary silently decamping
in the night, descended to a crossing place a few miles below, and made good
the passage of the river before daylight. Morgan then moved off precipitately,
and before night regained his position on Thicketty Creek, and resolved to
await the approach of the enemy. Tarleton halted for the night on the
ground that the Americans had abandoned, and supposing that his adversary
was resolved to fly, early on the morning of the 17th resumed his march, with
every preparation to embarrass the progress of the Americans, until he could
overtake them ; and if that event should be protracted until their reinforce
ments of militia rendered them an overmatch for the force under his com
mand, to hang upon their march until he could obtMn the co-operation of the
grand army. All tMs was foreseen by Morgan ; as well the conduct as the
motives of his adversary; and he prepared to avail himself of the advantages
to be derived from them.
It was about 8 o'elock, a. m. that the British army arrived in view of the
Americans; and instead of overtaking his adversary in the hurry, confusion,
and fatigue of a flight, Tarleton found him rested, breakfasted, deliberately
drawn up, every man at his post, and their commander in a popular and for
cible style of elocution haranguing them. On the other hand, the British
troops had been five hours that morning on the march ; but Tarleton judged

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 373
the excitement of the moment of greater consequence than rest or refreshment, chap.
and prepared immediately for battle. The spirit and alacrity exhibited by his v^^^
troops justified the determination.
Morgan has been blamed for risking this battle ; notwithstanding the impos
ing effect of its brilliant result, his military reputation has materially suffered
from it. Success seldom needs an apology, and he was too haughty and too
indifferent to the opinions of historians or critics, ever to have given publicly
his own explanations. Hence public opimon has settled down in one general
conclusion, — that he was a brave and fortunate, but not an able commander.
It is thus that reputations are gained or lost. One asserts, another repeats, and
no one afterwards takes the trouble to examine, or is sufficiently adventurous
to advance an opposite opiMon. Thus too it is that science tyranizes over
genius. The most brilliant adiievement, unless obtamed by the rules of art, is
not permitted to establish the reputation of the performer, lest it should detract
from that of the learned theorist. There are thousands, who must ever limp
after the rapid conclusions of genius, and quick movements of bold and deci
sive minds, who will yet be supported in their reveries by tens of thousands of
others, merely because the latter can best follow the views and actions of the
lower orders of genius.
It is a delightful part of this undertaking that it affords us so many opportu
nities of doing justice to the actions of the worthies of the revolution.
There is no part of Morgan's conduct in this affair that does not admit of
explanations calculated to exculpate him from the charges of irritation or in
discretion, or that will not show him to have acted under the mfluence of that
self-devotion for which he was eminently distinguished.
The subjoined answer to Morgan's letter of the 15th, shows that his com
mander attached much importance to his holding his ground.
General Greene to General Morgan. Camp Pee Dee, January 9th, 1781.
[extract.]
" Your favour of the 15th was delivered me last evening about 12 o'clock.
I was informed of Lord Cornwallis' movement before the receipt of your
letter, and agree with you in opinion that you are the object. And from his
making so general a movement, it convinces me he feels a great inconvemence
from your force and situation. He would never harass his troops to remove
you, if he did not think it an object of some importance. Nor would he put
his collective force in motion if he had not some respect for your numbers. I
am sensible your situation is critical, and requires the most watchful attention

374 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, to guard against surprise. But I think it is of great importance to keep up a
.force in that quarter; nor can I persuade myself that the militia alone will
answer the same valuable purposes as when joined by the continental troops.
" It is not my wish you should come to action unless you have a manifest
advantage and a moral certainty of succeeding. Put nothing to the hazard.
A retreat may be disagreeable, but it is not disgraceful. Regard not the opi
nions of the day. It is not our business to risk too much, our affairs are in too
critical a situation, and require time and nursing to give them a better tone.
" If General Sumpter and you could fix upon a plan for him to hold the
post which you now occupy, and he to be joined by the militia under General
Davidson, and you with your force and the Georgia and Virginia militia, to
move towards Augusta or into that quarter, I should have no objection, pro
vided you think it will answer any valuable purpose, and can be attempted
with a degree of safety.
"I am unwilling to recall you if it can be avoided, but I had rather recall
you than expose you to the hazard of a surprise.
"Before this can possibly reach you 1 imagine the movements of Lord
Cornwallis and Colonel Tarleton will be sufficiently explained, and you obliged
to take some decisive measures. I shall be perfectly satisfied if you keep clear
of misfortune ; for, though I wish you laurels, I am not willing to expose the
common cause to give you an opportunity to acquire them."
Colonel Tarleton, with characteristic candour, seems to have been resolved
to exempt his adversary from the reproach of having engaged with a great
disparity of force, for he asserts upon " accurate knowledge," that Morgan's
force amounted to 1300 militia, 500 regulars, and 120 cavalry, — exactly double
of what it did consist of. Colonel Tarleton may have consoled his mortified
feelings with believing this " accurate account." But the reader may rest
assured from the most authentic information, that Morgan's whole force on
duty, consisted of 290 regular infantry, 80 cavalry, and 600 militia, in all 970.
Tarleton certainly numbered 1050 regulars, and about 50 loyalists; leaving
the Americans only 130 inferior in numbers. In quality of troops, it has
been supposed the British had infinitely the advantage; but in this there is
some mistake. At least three or four hundred of the enemy are said to have
new recruits, and probably not yet subdued by discipline, or ever before in
battle. On the other hand, such a body of militia as were collected under Mor
gan, has seldom been collected on the field of battle. Two companies of them
under Captains Triplet and Tait, were from Virginia, and were very generally
Veteran soldiers, who had served out the time of their enlistment, and were

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 375
noAv hired as substitutes by the drafted militia. The Georgians consisted of chap.
Clarke's veterans, who had been almost the whole war in constant service, v^-v^_,
and a more dauntless little corps it would have been difficult to collect. Their
gallant colonel did not share with them in the honours of this field, for he had
recently been disabled by a severe wound ; but they were led by two distin
guished officers Cunningham and Jackson. The residue of the militia were
all determined whigs, practised marksmen, and most of them, like their com
mander Pickens, fought literally with halters round their necks. They were
also commanded by officers of distinguished merit, and who possessed their
unlimited confidence.*
~ There were among the militia forty-five men well mounted and equipped
with sabres. These were placed under the command of M'Call, and being
added to Washington's corps, increased that command to one hundred and
twenty-five men. Therefore, the disparity in quality of troops, though deci
dedly in favour of Colonel Tarleton, was not so overwhelming as it has gene
rally been rated. Yet two pieces of artillery, and treble the number of cavalry
and bayonets, presented a most appalling superiority.
It was met in the only way in which it could have been met. Morgan's
marksmen, if they could not maintain order themselves in action, presented the
means of introducing disorder into the ranks of the enemy. For this purpose
they were used, and the experiment succeeded.
But the subject on which Morgan has been most severely censured, was the
choice of ground. An open woodland, possessing nothing to recommend it
but a trifling elevation; and a river winding round his left at the distance of six
miles and extending parallel to his rear, so as to cut off all retreat in case of
misfortune. It is obvious, that the alternative exhibited is, extraordinary indis
cretion, or extraordinary boldness and originality of design. The well-read
tactician, who squares his opinions by military dogmas, will not hesitate to
decide against the prudence of leaving his wings in air exposed to a superior
cavalry and more numerous infantry, and a river in his rear, which cut off
every hope of retreat.
But those who were acquainted with the character of the man, may recog
nise in the following brief justification of himself, that dauntiess decision of

f7 * No eulogium of ours can add to the reputation of Pickens. But M'Call is less known, and has
/ been too soon forgotten. He was among the most distinguished partisan leaders of his time. But
he did not live to see the issue of the contest in which he had. taken a part. Excelled by no one for
\ activity, resolution, and intelligence, he fell a sacrifice to the small-pox, contracted in one of his rude
\ encounters with the enemy.
\

376 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, diaracter which always distinguished him, as well as something more than a
^-J^, plausibility of reasoning. " I would not have had a swamp in the view of my
/militia on any consideration; they would have made for it, and nothing could
, have detained them from it. And as to covering my wings, I knew my adver-
' sary, and was perfectly sure I should have nothing but downright fighting. As
to retreat, it was the very thing I wished to cut off all hope of. I would have
/ thanked Tarleton had he surrounded me with his cavalry. It would have
' been better than placing my own men in the rear to shoot down those who
broke from the ranks. When men are forced to fight, they will sell their fives /
dearly; and I knew that the dread of Tarleton's cavalry would give due;
weight to the protection of my bayonets, and keep my troops from breaking asl
Bufort's regiment did. Had 1 crossed the river, one half of the militia wouldj
immediately have abandoned me."
If these were really Morgan's reasons for selecting his ground, we can easily*
account for his having never avowed them in his official communications ; as
they carry with them assumptions not calculated to add to his popularity with
the mifitia, and uniavourable to the courage and conduct of men from whom
he derived the most essential services in the action. Yet we have seen, that
in his communications with the general he expressed doubts of the stability of
at least one third of the militia force then with him. A number whose defec
tion in time of battle might have been sufficient to carry with them many
more. Unscientific as these reasons attributed to Morgan will be adjudged, yet, if
several eminent commanders of other times, have been immortalised for burn
ing their fleets, that their men might have no other alternative but conquest, it
will be difficult to show in what their conduct differed essentially from that
of the American general.
It may be (and has been) contended that the obligation to fight was not
in this case imperative. But this point, it will be found very difficult to
sustain. It is true that the halt made by Tarleton on the ground abandoned
by the Americans on the morning of the 16th, left the latter in possession of
considerable ground. But it did not exceed ten or twelve miles. And the
British dragoons had been pushed forward in the evening with orders to hang
upon the American rear and impede his march. Morgan then well knew
that the moment he prepared to decamp, intelligence would be communicated
to the British commander, and the forces of the latter be set in motion to over
take him. This they probably would have done before he could have crossed
the river; and he must then have fought, with his troops fatigued and dispirited
by retreat, most probably, much diminished by desertion, and under the dis-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 377
advantage of forming in the face of a superior enemy, on ground, the choice of clf*P-
which would be forced upon him by his adversary. Could he even have .^-v-w
reached the river before the main body of his enemy had come up with him,
crossing it in the face of a powerful cavalry, must have been attended with
great loss, artd a loss of such a nature as might afterwards have brought him
completely into the power of one or the other, of the enemy's divisions. There
is one circumstance relative to the ground on which the action was fought, the
importance of which has never been duly estimated, but which it will be found
in the sequel, promised and subserved the most important uses. This was,
that in the rear of the eminence on which his regular troops were posted, the
ground, after descending a few yards, rose into another eminence sufficient in
height to cover a man on horseback placed in the rear of it ; so that it pro
tected bis cavalry from the artillery, and furnished a secure rallying point to
bis militia.
The battle of the Cowpens was fought on th«! 17th of January 1781. It
cannot be passed over Without due attention, as it was the first link in. the
chain of events that led even to the capture of Cornwallis and the successful
termination of the revolutionary war.*
Many authors have described this battle ; and by collating the accounts
of it given by Ramsay, Tarleton, Lee, Moultrie, and a late very accurate his
torian, Captain Hugh M'Call, a correct general view will be presented of it.
But there still remain a few important facts that have not been noticed, and
others, the connection and dependance of which have not been fully explained.
It will be recollected that Morgan had taken his ground on an eminence
gently ascending for about, three hundred and fifty yards, and covered with an
open wood. On the crown of this eminence were posted his best troops,
composed of the 290 Maryland regulars, and in line on their right, the two
companies of Virginia militia under Triplet and Tate, and a company of
Georgians under Captain Beatie, about 140 in the whole, making his rear line
to consist of 430 men. This was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Howard.

* The place of this memorable event has now lost its name, but no American will reflect with
indifference on the possibility of its identity ever becoming doubtful. The following remarks may
direct the researches of some future traveller or historian. At the first settlement of that country, it
was a place, of considerable notoriety from a trading path with the Cherokees which passed by it. In
the early grants of land in that neighbourhood it is distinguished by the epithet of Hannah's Cow-
pens, being the grazing establishment of a man of the name of Hannah. In time it became known
by the epithet of the Cowpens, and is now distinguished as attached to Nesbit's iron works, the pro.
perty of the honourable Wilson Nesbit,
48

37& MAJOR GENERAL "GREENE.

JX.

¦j^

¦ f
chap. One hundred and fifty yards in advance of this line, the main body of the
;, militia, about 270 in number, were posted in open order. These weie all
volunteers^ and practised marksmen, most of them glowing under a sense of
personal injury,- and were commanded by Colonel Pickens.
In advance of the first line about one hundred and fifty yards, were posted
150 picked men,- extending in loose order along the whole front; — on the
right commanded by Colonel Cunningham, and on the left by Major
M'Dowel, the former of Georgia, the latter of South Carolina. This selec
tion was calculated and intended to excite rivalship and emulation, and un
doubtedly had its effect. No particular orders were given to this Corps to
select objects, but they signified their knowledge of the service they were calcu
lated to render, by exclaiming as they separated, •" Mark the epaulette men."
A strange inconsistency of idea prevails among military men on tMs subject.
They justify the employment of marksmen, yet affect to execrate the direction
Of their skill to the use to which they/know it will be applied, and for which
chiefly it must be intended. If it be lawfol to use them, it would seem to fol
io w> that it it is lawful to. use them to f the best effect. An army without offi
cers becomes a mob. Far be it from the author to inculcate any doctrine that
would aggravate the horrors of war, but it is not improbable, that if those who
rule the destinies of nations, (and you may follow the chain down to the lowest
ruler of the destinies of armies,) were oftener brought within the reach of an
hostile rifle, the world would be less vexed with wars.
It has been remarked that in the rear of the second line the ground de
scended and then rose to an eminence sufficient to cover a man on horse
back. BeMnd this the American reserve was posted, consisting of Washing
ton and M'Call's cavalry, 125 in number. Their position was highly eligible,
as they were near enough to render the most prompt assistance, and yet per
fectly secure from the enemy's artillery.
The mifitia of the front line were also permitted to consult their security as
far as circumstances would admit, by covering their bodies with trees and fir
ing from a rest..
The order to the advanced party was, not to deliver their fire until the
enemy was within fifty yards, then to retire, covering themselves with trees as
occasion offered, loading and firing until they reached and resumed their places
in the first line.
The orders to the first line were, to deliver two deliberate discharges at the
distance of fifty yards, and then to retire and take their post on the left of the
regulars. If charged by the cavalry, every third man to fire and twd to re-

B AT T JL E of t li e C OWP ENS,,

It Vuvk_ Order of' Battle.

_3 +

? LJ

REFERENCES.
W." Cavalry coTrvmeoided by Cot. Washington.
H. Maryland. Troops.  by Major Howard.
T. Virg? 8c Gecr. Militia ...~— .Cap' Triplet.
P.P. Militia, CoLPiekens.
a.n. Biirish Carairv on the Wings.
b.b.b. DfJtegular Troops.
c.c. Arallery'of/):'
e. IniantJj or- the Reserve.
d. Cavalry of the Reserve.

3? ' Vicw^-lVhcn the British />. lib. surrendered.

^ n-V

")"-•' Vis, a, 1A71

View^When the Militia were driven ii

MSf!**-"  "

PjC} C3

a

3 t

3 ¦!• C

MAJOR GENERAL GREEN^, 379
main in reserve, lest the cavalry should continue to advance after the first fire ; chap.
or to be used if they wheeled to retire. v^-vr-w
The orders to the second fine were, not to be alarmed at the retreat of the
militia, (and the orders given to the latter were detailed to them,) to fire low
and deliberately, not to break on any account, and if forced to retire, to rally
on the eminence in their rear, where they were assured the enemy could not.
injure them.
The baggage of the American army, had been sent off early in the morning
under a suitable escort, with orders to halt a few miles in the rear, and the
militia horses (for the volunteers were all mounted) were secured to the boughs
of trees, a convenient distance in the rear of the reserve.
Every arrangement being thus~ completed, the men were ordered, in the
military ^phrase, "to ease their joints," by which is meant, to dispose of them
selves at their ease without qmtting their ranks.
All were in high spirits, for all had concurred in a wish to be led to battle.
Thus circumstanced the American army calmly looked on while the enemy
formed his order of battle at the distance of four hundred yards from the first
line. The British infantry with the exception of the 71st, were drawn up in one
line, co-extensive with and parallel to those of the Americans. Most of the
American writers place the artillery in the centre of the whole, but the position
of the two pieces was, equidistant from each other and from the extremity of -
each wing, dividing the line into thirds.
In the rear of the left, at the distance of one hundred and fifty yards, was
posted the British reserve, consisting of the 71st and 200 dragoons. The
residue of the dragoons covered the two wings, giving a squadron of fifty to
each. If the reader will now place himself on the eminence in the rear of the
line, he will have a distinct view of the battle.
Tarleton has generally been charged with having, in his impatience, com
menced the attack before his dispositions were completed. But the mistake
arose from the following circumstance. Upon his advancmg to reconnoitre,
the parties under CunMngham and M'Dowel prevented his approaching near
enough to distinguish satisfactorily the American order of battle. He there
fore ordered the cavalry to advance and drive them in. On the advance of
the cavalry, the American parties retreated and fell into the first line, and were
thus precluded from performing the service for which they were most probably
assigned to this advanced position. But they peformed another which in the
sequel answered nearly as beneficial a purpose, They gave the cavalry a few

380 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, discharges which made them tremble, for at least that day, at the deadly aim
, of an American rifleman.
The dispositions of the enemy being completed, he advanced steadily under
fire of his artillery, and the militia maintained their ground with perfect cool
ness. At the assigned distance they delivered their fire with unerring aim^
and it was the magnanimous confession of a gallant officer of the Maryland
line who fought on this day, "that here the battle was gained." The killed
and wounded of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers who lay on
the field of battle where the fire of the riflemen was delivered, and the high
proportion which the killed and wounded of this description bore to the whole
number, sufficiently justified the assertion.
As soon as the militia broke from their line, the enemy rent the air with their
shouts and quickened their advance ; and from that moment the want of offi
cers discovered itself by the confusion which ensued in their ranks.
As soon as the militia were cleared away from before the second line, the
latter commenced their fire, and for near thirty minutes, it was kept up with
coolness and constancy. The enemy, although halted frequently for the resto
ration of order, steadily advanced ; yet obviously with such hesitation that the
British commander was induced to order up the 71st into line on his left;
while the cavalry made a sweep upon the American right. Morgan perceived
this movement, and with it the necessity of covering his flank.
The events of the succeeding fifteen minutes of this action are almost too
rapid and crowded to admit of description. They moved together like the
rays of light, but are not as easily shown in their distinct brilliancy, when
separated through the medium of language.
Howard naturally cast his eyes to the reserve as the ordinary means to be
resorted to for protection. But Washington was at that time actively and
vigorously engaged where duty called him on the left. The cavalry of
Tarleton's left wing had poured upon the rear of the retreating militia. As the
right of the line of militia had to traverse the whole front of the second line to
reach the ground on which they were ordered to rally, they were necessarily
very much exposed to this danger. Washington flew to their assistance, and
repulsing the enemy, enabled the militia to regain the tranquillity necessary for
returning to a state of order. The eminence which had covered the reserve
was exceedingly favourable to this purpose, and Pickens knew how to avail
himself of it. Here most of them gathered round him and were soon reduced
to order.
Apprehensive that the reserve could not be brought up in time to defend Mg
exposed flank, or if it were, that it would leave his other flank too mueh ex-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 381
posed, Morgan dispatched an order to the militia on his right, to fall back from chap.
their right so as to form at right angles with his line, and repel the enetoy's s^-«^s^
advance upon his right flank. To effect this manoeuvre with precision and
dispatch, the commanding officer ordered his men to face to the right about,
and wheel on their left. The first part of the order was executed with cool
ness and recollection, and the militia began to move. At this point of time it
was that fortune, ever hovering over fields of battle, played off that celebrated
freak which at first threatened destruction to the American arms, but in a
moment after, crowned them with the most signal success. Seeing the move
ment of the right of their line, and supposing that this was the state of things
which required a retreat to the eminence in their rear, the whole American
fine faced about and began to move rather in an accelerating step, but still m
perfect order, towards their intended second position. Howard presuming the
order must have emanated from the commander, made no opposition, but bent
his whole attention to the preservation of order, and encouragement of his
men. Morgan also under the impression that the movement was made under
the order of Howard, and thinking favourably of it, under existing circum
stances, rode along the rear of the line reminding the officers to halt and face
as soon as they reached their ground. But just at that crisis they were accosted
by another officer, and their attention drawn to some facts which produced an
immediate change of measures. This officer was a messenger from Colonel
Washington, who having been carried in pursuing the enemy's cavalry some
distance in advance of the American line, found the right flank of the enemy
wholly exposed to him, and had a fair view of the confusion existing in their
ranks. " They are coming on like a mob, give them a fire and I will charge
/them," was the message delivered, and the messenger gallopped back to join
his command. At that instant' Pickens showed himself above the second hill,
advancing to support the right, and in twenty minutes more the whole British
': army were in possession of the Americans.
1 No sooner was the resolution taken to halt and resume the action, than the
order flew to right and left ; " Face about, give them one fire and the victory
is ours," was reiterated by Morgan as he passed along the line. It was
promptly obeyed ; the enemy were within thirty yards, tumultuously shouting
and rapidly advancing; scarcely a man of the Americans raised his gun to his
shoulder; when their fire was delivered, they were in an attitude for using the
bayonet, and the terrible "pas de charge in a few steps brought them to that
crisis which ever terminates in victory or defeat — the bayonets of the two
armies were interlocked. The enemy threw down their arms and fell upon
thdr faces. Happy was it for the honour of the American arms, that the

382 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, soldiers now found before them only a prostrate enemy. These were the men
,and this the commander who had massacred the troops under Bufort, and
Tarleton's quarters" had already rung from right to left. But Howard (apd
humanity seems identified with the name) anxiously exclaiming " Give them
quarters," soon had the pleasure to see, that an American soldier could not
shed the blood of a conquered enemy.
There was much yet to be done on the field of battle. The 71st had got
upon Howard's right, the dragoons were also approaching the same vulnerable
point, and Washington had his hands full in front with the artillerists and the
cavalry of the enemy's wings. But Morgan's measures were taken with
promptness, and his orders obeyed with alacrity. One company advanced to
the support of Washington, three remained in charge of the prisoners, and the
right battalion wheded upon the 71st.
The affair in this quarter now became very animated. In vain did Tarleton
urge forward his dragoons. Pickens' marksmen had now opened upon them,
and they literally broke away with a " sauve qui peu."
These dragoons never fought well ; they had repeatedly hacked to pieces a
flying, unarmed, or supplicating enemy, but neither at Blackstocks, in this-
affair, or any Other did they ever do any thing to distinguish themselves in fair
conflict. How unlike was theirs to the conduct of the British artillery. This devoted
corps, thrown in the rear by the advance of the lme, abandoned by the cavalry,
supported only by a few fugitives of the infantry, seemed resolved to surrender
their guns only with their lives. There was no time to parley, the busy scenes
now acting in every part of the field obliged the Americans to act towards
these brave men, with a dispatch wholly inconsistent with th$ esteem which
their noble conduct inspired. They were mostly killed or wounded by the
time that Tarleton, with a number of mounted officers, and all that remained
to him of his cavalry about fifty in number, arrived to support them. It was
here and in this part of the contest, that occurred that memorable conflict from
which Colonel Washington so narrowly escaped.*

* The affair thus occurred. Whilst Washington was engaged with the artillerists Colonel Tarle
ton, at the head of all the cavalry who could follow him, hastened to their relief. Washington per
ceiving his approach, ordered his men to charge and dashed forward himself. Tarleton prudently
commanded a retreat. Being of course in the rear of his men, and looking behind, he perceived thaf
Washington was very near him and full thirty yards ahead of his troops. Attended by two of his
officers, he advanced to meet Washington. One of his officers led, and parrying a blow aimed at
him by Washington, the sword of the latter proved of inferior temper and broke midway. The

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 383
In the mean time all was over with the British army on the extreme right of chap.
the Americans. The 71st exhibited for sometime a firm countenance, andv>^v^
maintained their order to the last. But when the cavalry fled, and the whole
weight of the American army pressed upon them, resistance was vain. They
laid down their arms, and Colonel Pickens in person received the sword of
, their commander M'Arthur.
" Never was victory more complete. Not a corps retired from the field under
command, except the few cavalry who accompanied Tarleton. Washington
pursued the flying enemy until the declining sun and his panting horses, warned
Mm to retrace his steps and join his commander. On his return he drove be
fore him near one hundred straggling prisoners collected on his route.
Two field-pieces, (four-pounders,) eight hundred muskets, two stand of
colours, thirty-five baggage waggons, and one hundred dragoon horses fell
into the hands of the victors.
The loss sustained by armies in battle is generally as difficult to be ascer
tained as the relative force of the contending parties. The British assert that
the American loss amounted to 150 killed and wounded. But this is altoge
ther erroneous ; nor is thdr account entitled to much credit, since they had no
possible means of ascertaining the fact. The truth is, it was surprisingly small
for an action kept up for fifty minutes with so much aMmation. As usual, the
enemy fired entirely over the heads of the Americans. The whole loss of the
latter from authentic returns, were 11 killed and 61 wounded. No officer of
rank was among the killed or wounded.
The loss admitted by the enemy to have been sustained on this occasion was,
150 killed and wounded and 400 prisoners. The accounts published at the
time by the Americans, stated 150 killed, 200 wounded, and 500 prisoners,

\
next effort must have brought Washington to the ground. But a little Henchman not fourteen years \
old, who was devoted to his master, and carried no other weapon but a pistol at his saddle-bow, had
pressed forward to share or avert the danger that threatened his beloved colonel, and arrived in time
to discharge the contents of his pistol into the shoulder that brandished the sword over Washington's
head. It fell powerless, but the other officer had already raised his sword to inflict the wound, when
Serjeant-Major Perry reached the side of his commander just in time to receive the sword-arm of the
officer upon the edge of his extended weapon. The wound also broke this blow. But Colonel Tarle
ton in the mean time was securely aiming another from his pistol. The noble animal that bore
Washington was destined to receive the ball that had, rather discourteously, been aimed at his rider.
Poor Perry's destiny was bound up with that of his commander, for at the battle of Eutaw, when the
latter was made prisoner, Perry by the same discharge fell under five wounds. We are uninformed,,
but believe that he never recovered from them.

IX

384 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, exclusive of the wounded. Historians have generally estimated the slain of
7the enemy at 100, and it probably did not equal that number. But their loss
in officers was very great. At least one tenth of the killed and wounded were
commissioned officers. Ten, almost all where - the militia delivered their fire*
were , found on the field of battle. Hence that irretrievable confusion which
the writers on both sides admit to have ensued in the British line.
The world is at present in possession of the means of ascertaining with tole
rable precision the actual amount of the British loss. This is in the correspon
dence between Cornwallis and Clinton, in which the former admits a loss in
this affair of 700 men. But by comparing the returns of the British army of
the 15th of" January and 1st of February, we find the diminution amounting
to 784 men. Which number agrees with other facts in our possession on the
same subject; for, Major Hyrne, the commissary of prisoners, received' of
Morgan, 600 on the east bank of the Catawba, and this will leave 184 for the
lulled and wounded, probably the true number; we may estimate the slain at
sixty. Among the booty taken on this occasion and probably among the causes,
why the enemy were beaten, must be included a great number (it is said
seventy) negro slaves. The luxury of being waited upon, it would seem, had
spread among the British officers along with the facility of obtaining expert
waiting men. Nor were waiting women at that time altogether unknown in
the British camp ; but Tarleton had a few days before disembarrassed himself
of a swarm of the latter. The slaves were of course returned to their original
owners ; but having been originally included among the prisoners, their num
ber swelled that of the former up to the American estimate of 850 killed,
wounded and taken.
If the reader has perused Colonel Tarleton's account of tMs affair, he will
^be surprised to find that officer taking credit, for having performed two gallant
feats as he left the field. The one was repulsing Washington's whole com
mand with fifty of his dragoons and fourteen mounted officers; the other, dis
persing an American party which had seized upon his baggage. It was a bold
attempt, to adorn, his crest with 'plumes which there existed so many hands to
pluck away. These feats dwindle astonishingly upon a candid investigation of
facts.
/" The personal rencounter with Washinhton in which his sword was broken,
/ was the ground work on which imagination got up a repulse of his whole
I corps. The other was a ludicrous incident. The reader must be prepared
[ for such an event, when he is told of an American party which had preceded
\ the flighj of the enemy and taken possession of Ms baggage. Colonel Tarleton

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 385

/ue

md in his train a party of about fifty loyalists, good woodsmen, excellent chap.
marksmen, but great plunderers and scoundrels. They were beneficially v^^^^
employed as spies and expresses. These men, having moved off at a conve
Ment season during the action, and finding the baggage abandoned, very laud
ably entered upon the work of saving what they could of the officers' effects
from the enemy, by appropriating it to their own use. Alarmed by the tram
pling of Tarleton's horses as they approached, these zealous loyalists hastened
their retreat to the bushes, imagining that the enemy was upon them. This
movement, with the identity of dress and accoutrements, presented them to
their friends as a party of their enemies ; and the wrath of the mortified dra
goons was let loose upon all who were not fortunate enough to make good
their retreat, or secure themselves from the sword by the body of a waggon.
It is an observation of Colonel Lee's, that " the British cavalry having taken
no part in the action, except the troops attached to the line, were in force to
cover the retreat." But in this the colonel is in part mistaken. That there
were two hundred of them remaing unhurt, and that if they had kept together,
both the baggage and the fugitives might have been brought off, is perhaps
true ; for Morgan could not have spared the time or men necessary to disperse
them. But the feet is, that the cavalry on that day had been handled very
roughly, as is evidenced by the capture of one hundred of their horses. One
third of their number had fallen under the sword of the American cavalry, or
the deadly aim of the riflemen. In the two attacks made, first upon the
advanced party and then upon the American right, opportunities had been
presented and successfully improved, of using that weapon with effect. Colo
nel Tarleton acknowledges that they were reduced to two hundred and fifty,
but the British returns of the 1st February give one hundred and seventy-four
as the total of the legion remaining on that day. So that the cavalry of the
enemy, admitting that none of the infantry escaped, must have been greatly
reduced in this action.
Morgan was neither dazzled, nor lulled into security by his signal success.
Reasoning to what his adversary would do, from a knowledge of what he
ought to do, he made no doubt that Cornwallis would be in motion to cut him
off from retreat before night. His distance was not much above 25 miles,
and the speed of the terrified and flying cavalry would complete that distance
in five or six hours. It was not yet noon when the battle was terminated, and
he knew that the main army had been for some days held under marching
orders. He halted, no longer on the field of battle than to refresh his men
and prisoners, and make the dispositions which humanity required of him; and
moved across the Broad river the same evening,
49

386 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, , Colonel Pickens with a suitable detachment of mounted militia, was left
IX
.^v-^ upon the field of battle to bury the dead and provide for the wants and com
forts of the wounded of both armies. This duty was discharged with all the
care and diligence of a brave and benevolent man. The baggage of the enemy
furnished an abundant supply of tents, (the Americans had none,) and com-
i forts and even luxuries were drawn from the same source without sparing.
After making every possible provision for their care and attendance, the
wounded of both armies were left upon the field of battle under a safeguard
and a flag, and the next day Pickens rejoined his commander.
Early in the morning Morgan had resumed his march, anxiously expecting.
the return of his patroles with intelligence that the enemy was at hand ; but
never was surprise or relief greater, than when authentic intelligence was
received, not only that the enemy had not moved, but exhibited no present
evidence of an intention to move on that day. Still, however, he pressed his
march to reach the fords of the Catawba, and escape interruption from the
rise of the waters. He felt himself still witMn the power of his adversary, and
resolved to spare no pains to escape his grasp.
It is truly astonishing that Lord Cornwallis has not only escaped all censure
for suffering his enemy to elude him and carry off prisoners, arms, ammuni
tion, artillery, every thing in triumph, but has been most extravagantly eulo
gized for his conduct on this occasion; yet it is most certain that, under the
favour of providence, Morgan owed his escape to the supineness and mdeci-
sion of his adversary.
At the time the battle was fought, the position of the two armies was nearly
equidistant from the point of concurrence of the two roads by which the one
must retreat, (if North Carolina was his object,) and the other might pursue.
The time necessary to convey intelligence of the defeat could not exceed that
which must have been consumed in the cares devolved upon Morgan by hi*
very victory. And Cornwallis being already on the east side of Broad River,
which Morgan must cross, had in his favour the time which the latter necessa
rily consumed in the passage of the river, and which could not have been less
than what was necessary to put in motion an army under marching orders.
To these considerations we must add, that the British army was at this time
completely rested, refreshed and recruited, and abundantly furMshed with
every thing necessary to give vigour and promptness to its movements.
On the other hand, Morgan's army had begun its march after the fatigues of
a hard-fought day. It was not encumbered with its own baggage, because
almost destitute of every thing; but it was embarrassed with a mass of prison
ers equalling two thirds of his whole force, and perseveringly dragging after it*

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 387
^a prize too valuable to be relinqliished. The heavy baggage of the enemy,, chap,
after supplying the wants of the wounded, Morgan had consumed, but the ^^^^
muskets, artillery, and ammunition, were too much wanted to be relinquished
while a hope of saving them remained. With all this he moved so slowly
as not to have reached the north fork or main stream of the Catawba until
the 23d.
Where was the British commander during this time ? The precious and
irretrievable day of the 18th, the day after the action, he consumed entire in
his encampment, " to effect," as he tells us, " a junction with Leslie, and collect
the fugitives of Tarleton's detachment." In war, days are years. Here again,
the notable manoeuvre of ordering Leslie to halt at Camden, " that General
Greene might be uncertain of his intended movements as long as possible,"*
retroacted upon the British commander with fatal consequences. It is impos
sible to justify this delay, except upon the supposition that Cornwallis, deceived
by the exaggerated account wMch Tarleton, to palliate his defeat, had com
municated of the American force, had formed the opinion that it was superior
to his own. This inference is fairly deducible from the representation of that
force, which Colonel Tarleton, in his publication, has palmed upon the world*
, He may have believed that his enemy numbered two thousand four hundred ;
but it is astoMshing that he should have believed it, after deliberately reconnoi
tring his force, obtaining the most authentic intelligence, and measuring his
fine by his own. We take his own acknowledgments.
Had Cornwallis immediately on receiving intelligence of the disaster his
detachment had encountered, put in motion one thousand infantry and a few
pieces of light artillery, with orders to the cavalry to follow, after resting for
the night, it is unquestionable that he must have overtaken General Morgan
at Ramsour's Mills, where their roads united and crossed the south fork of the
Catawba. For his baggage he had nothing to apprehend, since he could still
have left a sufficient guard for its protection, and the army of General Leslie
was encamped on the night before at so short a distance as to have joined him
early on the 18th. Morgan, with numbers diminished by the preceding battle,
numerous detachments ever out to collect provisions, and one third of his force
at least, appropriated to guarding the prisoners, could have done nothing
against one thousand of such infantry as Cornwallis had under him. . He must
have abandoned his prisoners and baggage, mounted his infantry behind his
militia, and escaped by a hurried march, or fled to the mountains on Ms left.

See the Correspondence, &c. p. 24.

388 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Even after the loss of the 18th, when joined by the division of Leslie, the
, means were still in Lord Cornwallis' power of reacliing his adversary.
The immense attirMl of the army, prepared for an entire campaign and a
junction with the forces under PMlips, could not but have furnished a sufficient
number of horses to have mounted and pushed forward one thousand infantry
by forced marches for two days, either directly upon Morgan, or by a route
which, crossing the Little Catawba near its junction with the Great, leads up
the west bank of the latter stream, so as to intersect the route which Morgan
was pursuing. This route would also have presented the advantage of leading
through a country not exhausted by the recent march of the army he was pur
suing, an inconvenience which, it appears, he felt when too late, in pursuing
the route by Ramsour's Mills. But the commander, whose vigour, activity,
and sacrifices on this occasion, have animated the pens both of British and
American writers, not pursuing either of these measures, contented Mmself
with putting the whole army in motion on the 19th, dragging after him in the
chase a lengthened train of cumberous baggage, and employing his still respect
able cavalry to no other use than reconnoitring the field of battle, with orders
to return under protection of his camp before night.*
This vigorous pursuit after an enemy of whose activity and enterprise he
had had sufficient evidence, brought Cornwallis to Ramsour's Mills on the
25tht — a place which, if we credit Colonel Tarleton, he ought to have
reached by the day of the battle. Had he done so, Morgan's victory would
have availed Mm little ; for, to cross the Catawba in the rear of Cornwallis,
would have been impossible, since Leslie advancing at that time to join the
latter, would have intercepted him ; and could he have reached the mountains
on his left, he could not have passed them with Ms baggage, or probably with
Ms*prisoners, for want of subsistence, and would have been in that case, effec
tually cut off from forming a junction with Greene. Or had Cornwallis pur
sued the design originally attributed to him, of pressing Leslie up the east side
of the Catawba, whilst he ascended on the west, Morgan's escape would have
been most certainly intercepted. And the British divisions would still have
been so near to each other as to have easily formed a junction on the approach
of Greene. Though, had the British commander been well informed of the
weak and destitute state of the main southern army, he would not have been
disquieted on that subject; neither could he have entertained a fear of the
militia on the east side of the Catawba, had he been in possession of that

Tarleton's Campaign, p. 222. + See his letter, ante.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 389
intelligence which his connection with the loyalists of that country, and other chap.
advantages which he possessed, might have insured to him. v«*"v~w
The escape of Morgan has been generally atributed to an extraordinary
interposition of providence in raising the waters of the Catawba between the
night that he passed it and the morning following, when the British reached it.
The incident was handsomely worked Up in the papers of the day, and having
some foundation in truth, the circulation was favoured, since it served the pur
poses of both parties. To the British it furnished an excuse, and to the Ame
ricans a fine subject for working upon the enthusiasm of the people. But a
simple reference to original documents respecting dates, will prove that Corn
wallis was neither so pressing, nor Morgan so pressed as to need the mterposi-
tion of a miracle to check the one, or save the other.
Much error has crept into the details of the events of the period between the
time when Cornwallis commenced his pursuit, and the 1st of February, when
he crossed the main stream of the Catawba. Neither the actions nor motives
of the rival commanders appear to have been well understood, or correctly
explained. Dazzled with the magnanimity of the sacrifice made by Cornwal
lis in destroying his baggage in order to give speed to his movements, histo
rians shut their eyes upon the concomitant errors which rendered that sacrifice
in the first instance, vain and useless, and finally, fatal to the British comman
der. On the other hand, the American commanders, satisfied with having
secured to their country the benefit of their manoeuvres, were willing to sacri
fice a portion of their military merit, that they might secure to the service the
eclat of an imputed miracle in behalf of their cause.
Several authors mention the destruction of the baggage as a measure prepa
ratory to Cornwallis' first movement. Had this been the case, it would have
afforded an excuse for the loss of the 1 8th, a day which he never did recover.
But the fact was not so; it was at Ramsour's Mills that he destroyed his bag
gage, six days after the commencement of his march, and when his adversary •
had already, two days before, passed the other branch of the Catawba, twenty
miles in advance of him. Nor is this all ; he consumed two days at that place
in the performance of this work and the collection of provisions, and did not
resume his march until the 28th.*
In the mean time, had his adversary been disposed to do so, he could easily
have advanced too far beyond the North Catawba to have been again ap
proached by his enemy. But Greene had now joined him in person, though

See his letter, Correspondence, &c. p. 25.

390 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, with no reinforcement. And it was resolved to make a stand on the east bank
IX
^rv~^ °f mat riverJ t0 endeavour to check the advance of the British army, that the
prisoners and baggage, which had never been halted, should be secured from
molestation while hurried on to the interior of Virginia.
Thus like those birds, which instinctively throw themselves into the way of
the fowler and imitate death or decrepitude to draw him away from their
young, Morgan's little army braved the approach of the enemy, to detach him
from the pursuit of the object of their solicitude, — the trophies of the day of the
Cowpens, by inviting him to exhaust his efforts on themselves.
It was during the march of Lord Cornwallis from Ramsour's Mills that the
swell of the waters of the Great Catawba took place,* and not on the night of
the day on which Morgan crossed that river. It is correctly stated by Colonel
Lee and others to have occurred on the night of the 29th, but the American
army had crossed several days before. And the prisoners were then so far
advanced on their march, that Greene might have left the bank of the river
without apprehension, had not the height of the water given him more time to
endeavour to collect the mfiitia, and if successful in this effort, to dispute the
passage of the river, until his main army should have advanced sufficiently up
the country to facilitate his reaching them by a few forced marches. To have
collected in this neighbourhood a considerable reinforcement of militia, was an
object of the greatest importance, and every hope of this must be abandoned
the moment the troops under Morgan should move away.

* See his letters before referred to.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 394

CHAPTER X.

State of the Southern army. Moves to Guilford. Morgan's retreat from the
Catawba. Junction at Guilford. Movement across the Dan. Lord Corn
wallis in pursuit, reaches the Dan. Retires to Hillsborough. Greene recrosses
the Dan. Interesting manoeuvres. Affair with Colonel Pyles, of Alemance
Creek, of Wetzel's Mills. Dash at the American reinforcements. Greene
throws himself in face of the enemy. Lord Cornwallis retires to Deep river.
American army moves to Guilford.

IjrENERAL Greene had been called to the banks of the Catawba, by intel- chap.
ligence of Morgan's victory. It will be recollected that we left him on the v
banks of the Pee Dee, prosecuting enterprises against the enemy's posts in the
interior, at the moment when tMs interesting piece of intelligence was received.
This was on the evening of the 25th of January, and the army was immedi
ately put under marching orders.
The situation of Greene was at that time truly tantalizing. With the finest
opening imaginable for rendering important service and increasing Ms mili
tary reputation, under circumstances too, calculated greatly to excite public
expectation and increase the demand upon him for some brilliant achievement,
he found himself without men, without money, without clothing, and so scant
even of provisions as to be obliged to gather the corn from the field, pre
pare it for the mill, and guard the mill during the process of converting it into

x.

392 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. meal. Such and so many had been the interruptions to the labours of the
^-v-^/ husbandman, that at that late day, much of the Indian corn, (the only grain
cultivated in that country,) still remained ungathered. As to men, notwith
standing the reinforcements lately received under Colonels" Greene and Lee,
his regular force, including that under Morgan and every other detachment in
the field, did not exceed 1426 infantry, 47 artillerists, and 230 cavalry. In
addition to which he had with him about 400 militia. But both the regulars
and militia were for ever fluctuating in number ; for, the continentals of the
Virginia line having been enlisted for various periods of service, and calculat
ing their time from the date of enlistment, were continually claiming their dis
charges ; and their commander had the mortification of seeing daily his best
troops drop off in detail.
As to the militia, most generally, bemg volunteers they came and went
when they pleased; or being summoned. into service for a short time, one half
of their term was consumed in marching and countermarching, and they
could never be calculated upon for a week together.
As to money, he literally had none. There was not a dollar in the military
chest when he assumed the command, and for two months after, he had not
wherewith to bear the expense of his expresses : they had to live at free
quarters in traversing the country. He had even occasionally to borrow from
his officers, When money became indispensable for secret services. Congress,
it is true, at the earnest instances of Mr. John Mathews, voted him a supply of
10,000 hard dollars, deemed at that time a great stretch, of liberality; but We
cannot find that he ever received a cent of it. The only supply that came to
the hands of the paymaster during the whole campaign, arose from the sale of
bills on our ambassadors abroad, — an expedient which shed a momentary
gleam over his prospects, but soon left him in total darkness.*

* This measure of finance, it will be recollected, was adopted by congress at a time when they *
were literally pennyless. As it was in its nature temporary and. speculative, it soon faltered and
failed. The great relief which it at first afforded to the necessities of the United States made several
persons emulous of arrogating the praise of it. We will not undertake to say with whom it origi
nated, but we have furnished the reader with an extract of a letter to Mr. Matlock in congress, which
shows that General Greene had pressed it upon that body, as the means of clothing the army. It
certainly is spoken of in the correspondence of the day as " his plan ;" and that, whilst yet in the
quarter-master-general's department. He recommended its adoption as soon as the negociation com
menced for borrowing money abroad. He -had received letters from Commodore Gillon and Mr..
Adams, from which he concluded that the negociation for loans would be successful, and urged the
necessity of adopting this method of anticipating the result.;. There was at that time a considerable

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 39;
As to clothing, the situation of the southern army had been recently some- chap.
what improved ; otherwise it>would have been impossible to take the field. ^^^-^
Early in January several hundreds of the troops actually could not appear at
drill, or perform guardrxlutyj for want of clothing. They had not even what
Was indispensable todeeency, notwithstanding the small supply, gathered with
infinite difficulty in North' Carolina, which had enabled General Gates to
furnish his men with a single suit. What they thus obtained, was light
and scanty, by no means such as was necessary to comfort, in a march to the
north at that inclement season of the year. The following brief extract of a
letter of- the 15th January to General Sumpter, needs no comment; " It is a
great misfortune that the little force we have is in such a wretched state for
want of clothing. More than one half our numbers are in a manner naked,
so much so that we cannot put them on the least kind of duty. Indeed, there
is a great number that have not a rag of clothes on them except a little piece of
blanket, in the Indian form around their waists."
But there was no time now for hesitation, every hardship must be encoun
tered, every thing put to hazard, to succour General Morgan and intercept the
march of the enemy through the state of Virginia. Reinforcements, supplies,
every thing on which the hope of a successful opposition coMd have rested,

forced trade carried on with Europe, and as shipments could not be made of produce to meet the
purchase of articles adapted to this trade, money was very much wanted in Europe by the traders in
America. The enemy had hitherto supplied the bills which the trade required, and drawn to them
many of the advantages resulting from this branch of commerce. As it was known that congress
had opened negociations for loans in Europe, and was treating even with the crowned heads which
favoured their cause, to obtain advances, these bills found at first a ready sale, as they were naturally
supposed to be drawn upon funds realized, and not upon speculation. But the delusion soon va
nished ; a minority seldom suffers such measures to remain secret long, and the market either became
glutted, or the truth leaked out too soon to permit the southern army to reap much benefit from this
project. The commissary of purchases for the southern army at that time was Mr. Joseph Clay, a highly
respectable, intelligent, and patriotic gentleman from the state of Georgia. Deprived of an ample
estate, and driven into banishment, he at present resided at Newbern ; and by his integrity, assiduity,
and knowledge of business, contributed to the utmost of the means allowed him, to promote the inte
rests of the southern army through the medium of the fast-sailing vessels that traded between the
Pamptico and Albemarle Sounds, and the neutral or friendly islands in the West Indies. To him
the bills allotted for the southern army .were transmitted; some he succeeded in selling or passing off
in purchasing, and a small amount of them was placed in the hands of General Greene for negocia
tion. Some money was realized for these, but the amount was quite inconsiderable, and exhausted in
the purchase of hospital and other stores,
50

394 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, would have been cut off, could Lord Cornwallis have succeeded in destroying
^*s^ Morgan, and securing a position beyond the Roanoke.
The 25th, 26th, and 27th of January, General Greene employed in making
the indispensable arrangements for the march of his army, and on the 28th he
committed, what will be deemed by many the most imprudent action of his
life. With only a guide, one aid, and a Serjeant's guard of cavalry, he struck
across the country to join the army of General Morgan, and aid him in his
arduous operations. The distance was one hundred miles at least, the country
infested with tories, and Camden not far on his left, where such a prize would
have been liberally paid for. But there is less danger in such enterprises than
is generally imagined. History furnishes many instances of their successful
issue. The very surprise produces hesitation in the minds of many, who, if
they had time to deliberate, might be inclined to treachery; and the boldness
of the design deters or overawes those who might be disposed to make advan
tage of the occasion.
Immediately on the receipt of the news of Morgan's victory, orders had been
dispatched to call in all the detachments, and transport to camp all the provi
sions which did not lie on the route of the intended march. Colonel Lee was
instructed to hasten his return from below with all possible dispatch, and pro
ceed immediately to join Morgan by the shortest route. To the commissary of
purchases were issued orders to transpoit every thing from the seacoast to a
place of safety ; to the several commissaries at Salisbury and Hillsborough, to
hold themselves in readiness to move off with prisoners and stores in their
charge, into the upper counties of Virginia; to the quarter-master-general, to
hold his boats in readiness on the Dan and collect magazines on the Roanoke;
and the most pressing letters were written to the governors of the state of North
Carolina and Virginia, to fill up their quotas of regulars and to call into the
field all the militia they could command, to oppose the progress of the enemy
and enable the army to fight them ; to Steuben, to hasten on his recruits ; to
Colonels Shelby, Campbell, and others who had signalized their zeal In the
affair of King's Mountain, were addressed the most earnest and flattering letters
reminding them of the glory already acquired, and calling upon them to come
forward once more to save the country from invasion. These letters, it will be
found commanded very general attention, and prepared for the British army
the reception they met with at Guilford.
Some extracts of letters written at this time we will lay before the reader to
satisfy him that we have not imagined the picture that we have presented of
Greene's situation. Many others to the same effect could be produced-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 395
To the late Mr. John Mathews, chairman of a committee appointed by con- chap.
gress to correspond with the southern army, he writes : v^-v-^/
" This is a great affair, [the victory of the Cowpens,] was our situation
such as to take a proper advantage of it; but as it is, I fear little good will
result from it as to the final recovery of the country.
" The situation of these states is wretched and the distress of the inhabitants
beyond all description. Nor is the condition of the army more agreeable.
We have but few troops that are fit for duty, and all those are employed upon
different detachments, the success of which depends upon time and chance.
We are obliged to subsist ourselves by our own industry, aided by the influence
of Governor Rutledge, who is one of the first characters I ever met with. Our
prospects are gloomy, notwithstanding these flashes of success, and I hope
congress will not imagine that Lord Cornwallis is ruined from this fortunate
event. There is wanting for the recovery of this country, a well-appointed
army consisting of about 5,000 infantry, and 6 or 800 horse. These, with the
auxiliary aid of the militia, would be superior to any force the enemy have, or
can maintain in this quarter.
" You may depend, my utmost exertions shall not be wanting to take every
possible advantage that our situation will admit, to give a favourable turn to
our affairs in this quarter ; but unless I am better supported than I have at
present the most distant prospect of being, I have little to hope, and much to
fear." It will be recollected that when General Greene was on the way to the
south, he left behind him General Gist to urge his claims on the legislature of
Maryland. He had not omitted the same precaution either as to congress, or
the legislatures of the other states on which he was obliged to depend for the
means of prosecuting the war; he had rigidly observed his favourite maxim,
that those whom you are obliged to solicit ought not to be permitted to forget
vou. To General Gist he writes in these words: " Surely the states must be
sufficiently impressed with their own dangerous situation; and if they will not
come to some decisive measures for giving effectual support to this army, they
may have to repent in the hour of distress, of their own languor and inde
cision. " These southern states have been struggling a long time with a superior
force, until their spirits are broken, and the resources of the country exhausted.
Where the people are kept constantly in arms, they must live altogether on
their past labours, and totally neglect any future provision. This is the situa
tion of these southern states, which must render the condition of the mhabit-

396 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, ants distressing, and the support of the army impracticable. Such great
^J^*~> bodies of militia have been kept on foot, and those subsisted in a way so very
expensive and wasteful, that the states of North and South Carolina are in a
manner laid waste. Nor can any state when invaded, afford considerable
support to an army for any length of time, it causes such an universal obstruc
tion to all kinds of business. It is the states that are in tranquillity whieh
have it in their power to give effectual aid to an army, not those that are in
distress. " When I left Annapolis I was in great hopes that the legislature would have
taken measures before this for filling their regiments, and for supplying the
waggons which this army was, and still is in such want of. The cash which I
required was so essential, and might have been obtained so easily from hun
dreds of private gentlemen in Maryland, that I am surprised it has not been
forwarded, especially as I mentioned the purpose for which it was wanted,
[secret service.] I persuade myself, if the state of Maryland could realise the
critical situation of this army and the disagreeable consequences that may
follow the neglect of not giving it timely support, we should not be long with
out further aid. The enemy are receiving reinforcements continually, and
our numbers are daily declining. Nor is our whole collective force more than
one third of theirs, and the greatest part of those rendered unfit for duty for
want of clotMng.
" General Smallwood is gone home to join his influence to yours, in order
to bring out a seasonable reinforcement as soon as possible. Whatever stores
you send on to this army, give positive orders to the waggon-master in writing
not to deliver to the order of any person whatever except the Baron Steuben,
until he arrives in camp. The agents of posts have made such a practice of
opeMng and taking out stores for their own use, that the stores are generally
plundered in such a manner before they get to camp that there are little or
none left; and if we cannot check this practice, it is impossible for this army
to be properly supplied.
" We are now obliged to collect our own provisions, and were it not that
we have some of the militia of the country to assist us, we should be scattered
over the face of the earth, little less remote from each other than the inhabit
ants themselves. Our situation is distressing, and we must be ruined if the
enemy push us, which we have great reason to expect, as Lord Cornwallis has
been in motion some days past."
To General Varnum, then a member of congress, a very early acquMntance
and associate m arms, and who always stood high in his affection and confi
dence, he writes thus: "By a letter from General Washington which came to

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 397
hand a few days since, I am informed of your being on your way to congress, chap.
which I am happy to hear of. You have the feelings of a soldier, and know s«*-v^w
the wants of an army. But you have never been in a southern army, where
distress and difficulties beset you on every side. This department affords a
checkered scene. Sometimes one party is successful, and sometimes the other.
General Morgan gMned a complete victory over Colonel Tarleton. The par
ticulars are forwarded to congress ; for them 1 refer you to Major Giles, an old
acquaintance, who will have the honour to deliver you this," &c.
" This army is in a deplorable condition, and notwithstanding this little
success must inevitably fall a prey to the enemy if not better supported than I
can see a prospect of. Don't imagine that Lord Cornwallis is ruined; for
depend upon it the southern states must fall, unless there is estabfished a well-
appointed army for their support of about 5 or 6000 infantry, and 800 or 1000
horse, and these to be well equipped for active operations. Such a force,
assisted by the auxMary aid of the militia, would prove superior to any force
the enemy could maintain in the field in this quarter.
" There is a great spirit of enterprise prevailing among the militia of these
southern states, especially with the volunteers. But their mode of going to
war is so destructive, that it is the greatest folly in the world to trust the liber
ties of a people to such a precarious defence.
" In this command I am obliged to put every thing to the hazard, and, con
trary to all military propriety, am obliged to make detachments that nothing
but absolute necessity could authorize, or even justify. If they are successful
it is well, if not I am ruined. There is no alternative — I must commit myself
to fortune and trust myself to my friends for support. It is my only wish to be
upon an equal footing with Lord Cornwallis, and if I did not give a good
account of him, I would agree to be subject to censure," &c.
To the commander in chief also, General Greene had written, announcing
the victory of the Cowpens and expressing his deep chagrin at not being able
to avail Mmself of all the advantages which ought to be drawn from that event.
To this General Washington replies : " I wish I had it in my power to con
gratulate you on the brilliant and important victory of General Morgan with
out the alloy which the distresses of the department you command, and ap
prehensions of posterior events intermix. Amidst the complicated dangers
with which you are surrounded a confidence in your abilities is my oMy con
solation. I am convinced you will do every thing that is practicable. I
lament that you will find it so difficult to avoid a general action ; for our mis
fortunes can only be completed by the dispersion of your little army, which
will be the most probable consequence of such an event."

398 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. The apprehensions which these letters express were not a little increased
.about this time, by intelligence that a British fleet had made its appearance off
the Cape Fear river. A remforcement landed at that place and rapidly pushed
up the river, through the numerous settlements of loyalists who inhabited its
banks, would have produced no small ebarrassment to the American com
mander, and possibly must have occasioned a diversion of 'his forces from
direct operation against the grand army. Wilmington lay directly in the rear
of the American position, and communicated by a navigable river with Cross
Creek, now FayetteviUe, where stores had been collected, a manufactory of
shoes established, and the salting of provisions going on for the relief of the
American troops.
Lord Cornwallis had foreseen all this, and knew also that great advantages
might be derived from establishing a post at Wilmington, as well in giving
countenance to the loyalists, as in furnishing a magazine or depot preparatory
to his operations both in North Carolina and Virginia. Previous, therefore, to
opening the campaign, he had detached Major Craig to seize upon and fortify
that place. Craig found the place in a defenceless state ; it had generally,
during the war been in the hands of the enemy, and was now taken possession
of with little or no opposition. From some intelligence previously communi
cated, General Greene was apprehensive that it was Arnold from Virginia;
but his fears subsided when he learned that the troops landed were only suffi
cient for a garrison, and he did not despair of seizing an opportunity to pos
sess himself of it by a coup de main, and converting to his own relief the maga
zines that had been provided to aid the operations of his enemy.
At present the relief of Morgan claimed his undivided attention.
It happened at this time when his necessities were most pressing, that the
time of service of the Virginia militia brigade was near expiring. It was
commanded by General Stevens, who, from a colonel in the regMar service,
had been promoted to the command of a brigade in the militia. According to
an established rule, which was necessarily adhered to, or the militia would
have come no more into the field, it was necessary to march off this regiment
in time to arrive at their place of rendezvous, to be there discharged when
tiieir tour of duty expired. Greene availed himself of this opportunity, of per
forming a pressing service, without thinning his ranks by sending off a consi
derable detachment. Stevens was an excellent officer. Greene knew his
value, and hurried him away with his command, ordering him to take charge
of the prisoners then in the depot at Hillsborough, to hasten them on so as to
intersect the line of march of those recently taken by Morgan, and make the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 399
best of his way to the interior counties of Virginia, where, the whole would be chap.
secure and remote from the danger of recapture. *^sr>s
These orders were ably executed, and Stevens never rested after performing
this service, but hurried back to take part in the active scenes that he antici
pated, and rejoined his general in time to perform the most brilliant services at
Guilford. It is perhaps due both to the penetration of Greene and the merits
of Stevens to mention, that in the letter addressed to the governor of Virginia
pressing him to order out a reinforcement of militia, Greene solicits particu
larly that it should be placed under the command of Stevens. His subsequent
conduct proved that he merited the high opinion that his commander had
formed and expressed of him.
The state of things in Virginia at this time, left no doubt on the mind of
General Greene as to the course Lord Cornwallis would pursue. la the last
of December the celebrated Arnold entered the Chesapeake, and ascending
the James River on the 4th January, debarked about 700 men on the north
side of that river about 25 miles below Richmond.
The account of his subsequent proceedings, will be extracted from Baron
Steuben's official letter of the 8th of that month.
" The 4th in the morning we received intelligence that the enemy's fleet lay
off Westover, and were preparing to disembark. It was then evident their
object was Richmond, and orders were immediately given for the removal of
the public stores. As the enemy had 25 miles to march before they reached
the town, I was in hopes a force would collect sufficient at least to check their
progress; but to my surprise, about 100 men were all that could be assembled.
These I sent down under the command of a Major Dick, a state officer to
whom I gave orders to harass the enemy by firing at them from every favour
able piece of ground. These orders were, however, ill executed. The enemy
moved that evening to Four Mile Creek, where they encamped about eleven
o'clock. " What few continental stores were in town 1 sent out to Westham, having
before ordered Major Clairborne up the river to collect boats there to transport
them across. I also ordered the 150 continental troops to march from Peters
burg and take a position opposite to Westham; and, Colonel Davie having
sent all the stores and hospital from Chesterfield, was ordered to the same
place with the remainder of his naked troops. The state stores, of which
great quantities were in town, were under the direction of Colonel Minter, by
whose inactivity and downright negligence they were lost. Of their artillery
I saved myself five pieces which were mounted. The rest, consisting of three
brass and a great many iron pieces, fell into the enemy's hands.

400 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. » Not a single man except those I sent out presenting himself to oppose die
, approach of the enemy, I thought it prudent to cross the river in the evening,
and took my quarters in Manchester, and next day about 12 o'clock the enemy
took possession of the town, having marched about twenty-five miles with 850
men and 30 horse, without receiving a single shot. They left half their force
in the town and proceeded immediately with the rest to Westham, where they
bMnt all the public buildings, consisting of a foundry, with a boring-mill, pow
der magazine, and some small ships, and returned to Richmond the same
evening. The continental stores had been all sent across the river, and Some
state stores ; what part was left I have not yet learnt. About 800 militia had
arrived at Westham on their way down, and arms were actually recrossing for
them, but hearing of the enemy's approach and being unarmed, they dis
persed," &c. " In fact," the narrative concludes, " the enemy returned as
they went, without receiving a single shot, and have lam quietly at Westover
in a scattered manner all this day," (the 8th.)
In tranquillity, Arnold shipped his plunder; and exulting in his triumph over
that pride which he had contributed to elevate, he descended the river and
took possession once more of Norfolk and Portsmouth.
It may appear astonishing that such an enterprise, with such a handful of
men should have so effectually succeeded ; but it is a fate which a recent event
has proved, all those places communicating with the Chesapeake must be ex
posed to, from an enemy who can lie in security with his shipping, in that bay.
While an enemy can move on the wings of the wind, a force equal to his own
must be held in readiness to meet him at every assailable point at the same
time. The expense of this and of the preparation necessary to give certainty
to resistance, is too great to be incurred.
No preparation for defence had been made in this instance, except a small
fort on the river, which the enemy soon carried at the point of the bayonet.
Yet the most immediate resort was had to the defence on which the public mind
had rested in security, to wit, the militia. On the first intelligence of the ap
pearance of the fleet, Steuben had demanded 4,000 militia, and Governor Jef
ferson had promptly issued the order for their assembling. But it was not until
the enemy had retired, that they could be brought together in any force ; and a
panic, the general forerunner of an approaching enemy, will probably always
produce the same effect, among men, whose families and property lie scattered
along the line of the enemy's advance.
Steuben flew to his depot of recruits at Chesterfield, and there were in it
at that time 600 vigorous young men, who might alone have covered Rich
mond, could they have been brought into the field. But of the whole, there

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 401
were only 150 who had clothes on their backs,* and these were so badly clad, chap.
that he had to hasten them back to shelter, the moment the enemy had shrunk ^J^,
from, his design of crossing over to Manchester. With these Steuben, had first
taken post at Petersburg; and it appears that a show of resistance at that place
and 'Manchester, saved a vast property in shipping and tobacco for the time;
but it was only saved until another and more formidable enemy appeared.
This was General Philips, at this time preparing to embark from New York.
Whether Richmond, nay the credit of the state might not have been saved
by the rising of the militia en masse, we are unable to determine. The popu
lation of Richmond, Manchester, and Petersburg, all within a scope of twenty-
five miles, the same distance that Arnold had to march after landing, added to
Steuben's little force, and the inhabitants of the adjacent country, ought to have
greatly outnumbered the enemy, f But unfortunately upon such occurrences,
the tendency of every man's mind is first to look to individual interests, and
before he turns his attention to the public defence, the evjl is consummated.
The governments of the states had not at that time, and perhaps never will
have sufficient militia organization, to counteract the certain effects of this
individual influence upon the militia of a state on sudden emergencies.
When intelligence reached the southern commander, that Arnold had seated
himself down in Portsmouth and was fortifying it, that a. formidable embarka
tion of troops under General Philips was in forwardness at New York, and
that Morgan was retreating before Lord Cornwallis, he no longer doubted of
the course to be pursued, and the army got in motion on the 29th of January,
with orders to ascend the banks of the" Pee Dee, and crossing at Mask's Ferry
above the mouth of Little River, to move up with all possible expedition to
Salisbury. On this occasion the army was thrown into two brigades, the Virginia troops
composing one under command of General' Huger, the Maryland and Dela
ware troops the other, under Colonel Williams; and Lieutenant Colonel Mor-

* (Baron Steuben, 1 5th Dec. 1/80. Extract.) " The business now before me is to get clothes
for those wretches now at Chesterfield Court-House ; they amount to 'between" 5 and 600, but they
are so totally naked that except I can get- some clothes- for them,- they will be all sick-before they can
be ordered to march which (from the- great difficulty. of procuring clothing of -every sort) I feajr ,wil}
not be sooner than, four weeks. But as I wish, so my whole powers shall be exerted, to support you,
andl, shall not think any pains too great to-get 400 men on their way to camp."
t Mr. Jefferson states the numbers between the James and York rivers on one side, and the James
river and Carolina line on the other upon the tide waters, at near 10,000 fighting men, and the whole
militia of the state at 49,9^1.' 51

m MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, ris, of the general's family, was ordered to attend them on their march,, and in
v-»-^,-wthe absence of the commander, to discharge the various incidental duties that
might have required his attention. From Mask's Ferry, it will be seen, the
army afterwards moved on by forced marches until it formed a junction with
Morgan at Guilford, — a change of direction given it by subsequent events; and
seldom have officers or men better deserved the gratitude of their country than
those who had to undergo this laborious artd distressing journey. At the time of
its commencement there existed too many of those little jealousies and questions
of rank which too often disturb the harmony of an army drawn together and
composed as this was. These the officers were solemnly called upon to dis
miss for the present, and cordially to combine their efforts in the arduous ser
vice on which they were about to enter. The request was promptly complied
with, and the constraint thus imposed upon the feelings of many, terminated
in explanations and cordial reconciliation. Such sacrifices are easily obtained
from officers of merit in the state of predisposition which the general had been
sedulous in promoting at their camp of repose.
Nor were the effects resulting from the excellent temper of the men less
conspicuous. General Greene had always set a high estimate on possessing
the affections of his men ; he knew the full value of, gratitude, in quickening
obedience,, and esteemed the homage of the heart the best security against
treachery. Cold looks and reluctant services from dependants, are very un
congenial with the claims of a benevolent mind. Greene never failed to pur
chase a greeting smile from his humblest dependant at the easy rate of civil
demeanour, or a kind and encouraging word. Small indeed are the demands
of the common soldier on the benevolence of one high in command; trifling
is the sacrifice at which he is able to purchase the willing services which flow
from personal affection. A very striking proof of the success with which the
general had conciliated the • affections, and acquired the confidence of his
troops was exhibited on this march. Severe as the weather was, in the very
depth of winter, half naked, and marking their steps with the blood that flowed
from their bare feet, often pinched with hunger, never regularly supplied with
food, without tents, many destitute of blanketSj journeying on days when
every living creature else was driven to some place of shelter, drenched with
perpetual rains, often wading waist deep through rapid streams, with no means
but exercise of restoring warmth to their benumbed limbs, and not the ordi
nary solace of a glass of spirits, in a march of one hundred and fifty miles not
one man deserted. This instance of patient suffering and invincible fidelity t
should be engraven on the heart of every American.

r

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 403
,- Whatever danger might otherwise have attended the journey of General chap.
Greene across the. country, it was greatly, diminished by the celerity of his ^^~^^y
movements. He must have travelled from Hick's Creek on the Pee Dee, to
Beattie's Ford on the Catawba-, in two days, for we have his letters of the 27th
dated camp at Pee Dee, and many of the 30th written from the camp at She-
rard's Ford on the Catawba, all in his own handwriting. The hiatus is only
of the 28th and 29th, during which he was upon the journey. But it has been
remarked of him by one of his aids, that he never appeared to suffer in body
or spirits under the effects of fatigue. We have set down the length of this
journey at one hundred miles. Ramsay says one hundred and fifty; it may
be stated with correctness at one hundred and twenty-five.
When General Greene arrived at Morgan's camp, he found the state of
things materially changed and essentially improved from what he had reason
to apprehend from his last intelligence. A letter to -General Huger, written on
the 30th from Sherald's Ford, will present an authentic account of the relative
position of the two armies and of the measures adopted to meet the supposed
exigencies of the service.
" I, have just arrived at this place, where General Morgan is posted with his
light troops. The enemy lie on the other side of the Catawba about 18 miles
below this. All the fords between this and Charlotte are occupied by the
militia under General Davidson. The enemy appear determined to cross, and
from different accounts have in contemplation visiting Salisbury. If they
cross and push that way, they must have in view a plan of co-operation with
Arnold at Cape Fear. To disconcert them, it will be necessary for us to form
a junction before them, and give one or the other of them a defeat if practi
cable. The militia are arming in great numbers to appearance, but there is no
pessibifity of telling our force; and at any rate I wish to avoid an action until
our force is collected. I beg you to hasten your march towards Salisbury as
fast as possible. If the stores have arrived, issue whatever may be necessary
to put the troops in good order for action. Let the rest of the stores be sent
up to Guilford Court-House, under the care of Major Magaret, with a light
guard composed of troops unfit for other duty All the artillery except the four ¦
six-pounders, may go with him, but let those that are retained be well manned.
The heavy baggage of the army may move up the east side of the river to the
fords at Salisbury, and there wait further orders. Give General Lillington
orders to join you, leaving a proper guard at the mouth of Rocky Ptiver to
guard the provision and stores at that place, and to relieve all our parties at
the mills. These may be unarmed men, if he has a sufficient number for the
purpose: if not, he must detach those that are armed. Should Arnold land at

•m n

404 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Cape Fear, or Lord Cornwallis pass the Catawba and push for Rocky River,
, all the live stock at that place must be driven off, all* the spare waggons loaded
with meal to follow the army, and drive all the cattle with you that are col
lected. Give orders also that the waggons that' move off with the stores take
as much corn with them as will subsist the horses through the barrens. If the
musket cartridges have come up, take on 40 or 50,000 and Id the rest go on
with the stores. Should Arnold come into Gape Fear, give the Commissary
orders to move all the provisions and stores from Cross Creek, and such other
places as may be exposed. Bring forward with you all the rum and stores that
may have arrived. All the broken down horses belonging either to the quar
ter-master-general's department or the cavalry, may continue on the Pee Dee
until further orders, unless the movements of the enemy below, should be such
as to expose them. In this case, let them be moved to Guilford. Keep your
commissaries and forage-masters ahead of the army, to make all the collections
you can to assist the stock you bring from the Pee Dee. Let as many of the
boats follow the army as are complete, and you will also bring the tents of the
army with you if the means of transportation will admit of it.
" It is necessary we should take every possible precaution to guard against a
misfortune. But I am not without hopes of ruining Lord Cornwallis, if he per
sists in his mad scheme of pushing through the country. And it is my earnest
desire to form a junction as early as possible for this purpose. Desire Lieu
tenant Colonel Lee to force a march to jom us. Here is a fine field and great
glory ahead.
" If the companies of artificers are come up, detach a few to go "with the
stores and a few with the baggage, and bring the rest oil with you, and desire
Colonel Kosciusko to join me at this place as soon as he can.
" If General Marion cannot cross the Santee, give him orders to move up
towards Camden upon Lynch's Creek, that he may be at hand to co-operate
with us if necessary," &c. i
This letter is given as a specimen of the comprehensiveness of the mind
that dictated it, and the habit of the writer of leaving nothing, not even the
minutest measure, unattended to. It is obvious that it was written whilst
under the impression that Arnold had sailed from the Chesapeake with a view
to land at Wilmington and co-operate with Lord Cornwallis. The efficiency
of such a measure made him readily credit it, for he always reasoned on the
principle that an enemy would do what he had best do. But when the true
state of the force landed at Wilmington was ascertained, he no longer appre
hended that Lord Cornwallis would direct his march to Rocky River, and

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 405
returned to the ^original opinion that Ms views were directed agamst VirgiMa. chap.
Measures were then varied accordingly. . x'
General; Greene's journey to Sherald's Ford had been hastened by a hurried
scrawl recdved from Morgan, dated at that place on the 25th of January.
This letter, though: brief, is an important historical document, inasmuch as it
expunges from. historical truth all those miracles and brawls with which histo
rians adorn Morgan's retreat from the Cowpens to Guilford. But it is still
more important, as it removes a shade from his reputation under which it has
been somewhat obscured.
"I receive," says the writer, "intelligence every hour of the enemy's rapid
approach, in consequence of which I am sending off my waggons. My num
bers at this time are too weak to fight them. I intend to move towards Salis
bury, in order to get near the main army. I know they intend to bring me to
an action, which I am resolved carefully to avoid.
"I expect you will move somewhere on the Yadkin to oppose their crossing.
I think it would be advisable to join our forces and fight them. before they
join Philips, which they certainly will do if they are not stopped. I have
ordered the commanding officer at Salisbury to move off with the prisoners
and stores. If you think it right, you will repeat it. I cannot ascertain their
number, but suppose them odds of two thousand. That number, if they keep
in a compact body, which I make no doubt they will, we cannot hurt. r have
sent to General Davidson to join me, which I expect he will do to-morrow ;
his strength I do not know, as his men were collecting yesterday."
In another letter written at sunrise the same day, he mentions that Lord
Cornwallis nad arrived at Ramsour's Mills, and the two taken together, for
ever put down the miracle of the 29th, so gravely insisted on by every histo
rian, from Ramsay to the humblest copyist. It is not a fittle surprising that
Colonel Lee should have dwelt upon the same incident with such peculiar
stress. His opportunities of ascertaining dates and events render, what was
pardonable in others, in Mm a striking specimen of inaccuracy. It is unques
tionable that Morgan crossed the Catawba on the 24th, and Lord Cornwallis'
van reached Ramsour's Mills the same eveMng. On the 25th, Morgan sent
off his baggage and prisoners, and receiving "intelligence that evening, that
Lord Cornwallis had halted and made no dispositions for immediately pro
ceeding, he rested in tranquiffity on the banks of the Catawba, watching the
movements of his adversary, and waiting the further developement of Ms
views ; whilst his own presence countenanced the collection of the militia,
whom he prepared to lead to the banks of the Yadkin, where he hoped to be
able to turn upon his pursuerst Thus this celebrated miracle of modern times

406 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, vanishes at the touch of truth, and we are left to the more rational duty of
^^^^ adoring that' providence which gave wisdom and vigour to the councils of our
leaders, or confounded those of their adversary. The subsequent miraculous
rise of the Yadkin will also be found to have had no more foundation in real
ity. That it should have rained on the 27th and 28th of the month, and that
the great rivers should have thereby become swollen, has nothing miraculous
in it ; it was the season when these occurrences are looked for in every year ;
and should it be urged, that still the delays which followed the 29th, were all-
important to the advance of the main army to form a junction with that under
Morgan, and the security of the prisoners; while we disavow a wish to check
the grateful emotions, which this and a thousand other events of the revolution
are calculated to excite, it must be observed, that the same rains which checked
the progress of one army also checked the advance of the other. The miracle
that saved the American army in 1 his instance, was, that Cornwallis- should have
halted his whole army two days at Ramsour's Mills for the purpose of destroying
his baggage. Morgan and his prisoners were then still in his power — the river
continued passable for four days, on any one of which he could have pushed
forward his cavalry, and a sufficient body of mounted infantry, to have de
stroyed the one and recaptured the other. The distance was not twenty miles,
the crossing places numerous, and the opposition to be expected trifling; for
at that time the militia were not yet embodied. And a greater miracle perhaps,
and one more powerfully operating in favour of the American army, was, this
celebrated sacrifice of Cornwallis in destroying his baggage. It would not be
difficult to demonstrate, that it had then been too long deferred to be beneficial,
was. wholly unnecessary to the end proposed, and finally produced his com
plete discomfiture.
Colonel Lee has spoken of this event in a style of animation, which can
only be reconciled with Ms military knowledge and experience, by adverting
to the error which he and various others have fallen into, of supposing that the
sacrifice was promptly made by the British general upon the news of Tarle
ton's defeat, and made before the commencement of the pursuit of the Ameri
can detachment. But it has been shown, that it was not. resolved on until he
had first lost one irretrievable day, and wasted seven others in making good a
journey of a few miles. It was not, until the British commander reached the
banks of the Little Catawba, and saw his adversary still twenty miles in ad
vance, his rear covered by a rapid stream, and his prisoners and baggage
pushed forward towards the interior of Virginia, that all the dangers which
threatened his military fame broke upon his lordship's views. He had boasted
to the British ministry that he had subdued two provinces, that the third was

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE, 407
but the high road to Virginia, where a junction with Philips, it was fondly chap.
hoped, would not only insure to him the conquest of that state, but open a <^J~^,
passage, even to Philadelphia. But now, the shame of having an entire de
tachment of his army captured, in sight as it were of his head quarters, and
conducted triumphantly for fifty miles on a circle, the radius of which at no
time exceeded twenty-five miles, making his main army the centre ; his hopes
of recapture now nearly desperate, and the shame of an empty boaster await
ing him ; the destruction of his baggage bears more the appearance of the
result of desperation, than of cool and dispassionate reflection. Nothing but
complete success could obviate the dangerous consequences of the measure ;
and the commander who stakes all upon one throw when he has still many
chances in his favour, may claim the meed of intrepidity, but nothing further.
When Greene received the intelligence of this event on his arrival at Morgan's
camp, it is said, that with an air and manner which marked the energy of his
feelings, he exclaimed, " Then he is ours." And the event proved him right.
In the smoking heap of hundreds of waggons, of tents, baggage, clothing
equipage to an immense amount, Lord Cornwallis may have contemplated
the funeral pile of all his hopes. His watchful adversary saw that it portended
his ruin, and every movement of the American army from that period must
be explained with a reference to this occurrence. To delay, and detain his
now enraged adversary, was the leading motive of the American commander,
until wrought up to phrenzy he should commit some act of desperate impru
dence. Such an event was obviously probable, could he tantalize him with
the near prospect of a battle, still carefully eluding, and for ever harassing him.
With this view the march of the main army was immediately changed; it had
been intended to meet and check the enemy on the banks of the Yadkin, but
it now became important to tempt him higher into the country, to. prolong his
pursuit, to draw him into a country favourable to the proposed operation, and
which at the same time facilitated a junction with Greene's advancing rein
forcements, whilst it furnished provisions for subsisting the army. In the
mean time, it was reasonable to expect, that the troops of his adversary, dis
pirited by disappointment, worn down by fatigue, disgusted with the severity
of a winter campaign, vexed at being so long subjected to the severest priva
tions, would be (diminished by desertion. The event realized every calcMation.
Colonel Lee has been so rapt with admiration of the British soldiers on this
occasion as to have broken out with this apostrophe, " A memorable instance
among many others in this unnatural war of the hnmutable disposition of the
British soldiers to endure every privation in support of their king and coun
try !" Yet, had the colonel adverted to the British returns of the day, he would

:V,
408 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, have found, that during this very period, without a battle, the British forces in
i^r^-*^ less than a month were reduced m number two hundred and twenty^seven,
This must either have been by death or desertion, and those who had opportu
nities of observing the numbers Of Hessian and English labourers soon %fter
dispersed through the interior of that country, were at no loss to determine
who and what they were. The celebrated guards, the boast of the ' English
army, were reduced one eighth of their number. Mere mercenaries have few
of those feelings which keep Up the enthusiasm of their leaders: with them it
may be strong for a moment, but if is evanescent and soon yields to the pres
sure of natural wants or acquired habits. The want of his gill of rum was
more distinctly realized by the British soldier, than the duty of supporting
"his king and country»" What privations had they to complam of? They
were well clad, well fed, but had to march 230 miles between the 1st and the
15th of February. Before that time, their progress had been so far from being
precipitated, that between the 19th of January and 1st of February, they had
made good not eighty miles.
Another fact which Morgan's letter of the 15th serves to establish is, that
he has been unjustly charged with an intention of crossing the mountains:
This assertion which implies a charge, of being too careful of his own safety,
and too indifferent to the '¦ general interest* and the views of his commander,
has not a little affected the military fame of Morgan. It first made its appear
ance in Dr. Ramsay's History of the Revolution in South Carolina,* and has
been repeated by General Motiltrie,t and various other authors. It has also
given rise to a tale of an altercation or coolness that ensued between Greene
and Morgan which has been assigned as the cause of Morgan's retiring at that
time from the arena of the American revolution. Nothing was less consistent
with the state of facts, t
The direction of the movements of Morgan ought alone to have relieved
him from tMs imputation. For even from the field of battle the route he took
led away from the mountains, and as directly towards the point where he con
templated forming a junction with the mMnarmy, as the position of theBritish
army would possibly admit. If any further proof be wanted, his letter supplies
it; and as to any altercation with his commander, there was not the least occa
sion afforded for it, for Greene never did any act on tMs occasion, that could
bear the appearance of a wish to snatch from him his merited laurels; but con
fined his own efforts to the principal object which had drawn him to the banks

* Vol 2. 206. t Vol. 2. 260. % Colonel Lee.,

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 409
of the Catawba, to tvit, to embody the militia, to endeavour to retard the pro- chap.
gress'of the enemy, and combine and harmonize the movements of both divi- \^~v*^e
sions of his army. It has been noticed that he had paid the earliest attention
to the objectof embodying a force on the banks of the Catawba, foreseeing die
probability that Morgan woidd stand in need of it. One of the causes of his
rapid transit from the one army to the other, was a despairing letter received
from General Davidson, expressing his apprehensions that very few of the
militia would be prevailed upon to leave their homes. Every thing at that
time conspired to prevent them. All the hopes of the husbandman in that
country depend upon the labours of this month ; unless his fields can be pre
pared for a crop in February and March, his family must suffer for the neces
saries of life. Besides which, Morgan was retreating, the enemy advancing,
and both the " vigorous Tarleton" and " the amiable Cornwallis"* had given
ample specimens of their " tender mercies." The inhabitants well knew that
every house would be in flames, and every family left " no canopy but the hea
vens," if the master should be in arms, or even absent during the progress of
the British army. The whigs of Mecklenberg, through which county the armies
must march, had too good an excuse at this time for remaining at home, and
both to the north and east of them, the loyalists probably outnumbered their
opponents. From points more distant, time had not yet elapsed to expect
reinforcements since the letters were dispatched which solicited aid. Nor
could any reasonable hopes be entertained of aid from the brave race who
had swarmed around Ferguson; for the cares of husbandry pressed heavily
also on them. And, as generally had been the case on all other occasions, the
march of the British army had been announced to the inhabitants of the fron
tier by a simultaneous incursion of the Indians, headed, it was .asserted, by
whites painted as Indians.f
It is true that General Morgan was about this time engaged in a disagreeable
altercation, but it was with Colonel Sumpter, on the subject of the magazines
as previously mentioned, .not with General Greene. The latter was obliged
to take part in it at the instance of General Morgan, but so far from giving
offence to Morgan, that, thinking him in the right, he pointedly, but in the
most delicate terms, remonstrated with Colonel Sumpter on the occasion. To
manage two such towering spirits was a task of no little delicacy ; but not
withstanding the utmost efforts were used to avoid giving umbrage to either, it
is the opinion of some, that it was the origin of a coolness in Sumpter towards

* Colonel Lee. t Governor Rutledge's letter, 30th December 1780.
52

410 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE
chap. Greene which never subsided. The correspondence oh the occasion with
^r-^-*^ both these officers is before us, and exhiMts a knowledge of human character,
a painful apprehension for the consequences of dissensions and disgust among
his officers, and a lively anxiety to obviate them, highly characteristic, and
doing great honour to the feelings and talents of the commander.
It is not easy to assign a satisfactory or even plausible reason for Colonel
Sumpter's interference on that occasion, to prevent his officers from executing
the commands of General Morgan. The commander of the southern depart
ment was not only the supreme military governor of the country, but Colonel
Sumpter was at that time actually out of the state, stiff confined by his wounds.
Colonel Sumpter, it seems, complained of some interference of Morgan with
his commands, but M what instances, or to what effect, we are not informed.
But supposing it to have existed, still the authority of General Greene was
sufficeint to sanction it, and although Colonel Sumpter might have had cause
to complain, nothing could justify him in undertaking to resist the execution
of an order from the commander of the southern department. Upon the
complamt of Morgan, General Greene did not think it prudent to disgust, by
an exercise of authority, an officer on whose services he set such value as
those of Colonel Sumpter. A correspondence and personal interview with
that officer ensued, and the following two extracts will show that, if this inter
ference was ever remembered by Colonel Sumpter with resentment, there was
no just cause furnished by General Greene for exciting such a feeling.
General Greene to Colonel Sumpter, January 19th, 1781, Pee Dee*
" dear sm,
" I have just received letters from General Morgan, informing me of his
situation, and representing the difficulties he meets with in collecting provi
sions;, and among other things he mentions some embarrassment which has
arisen from an order of yours to Colonel Hill, not to obey any order from
him unless it came through you. I imagine there must be some misapprehen
sion about the matter, for I cannot suppose you would give an improper order,
or that you have the most distant wish to embarrass the public affairs.
" It is certainly right that all orders should go through the principal to the
dependants, as well for the preservation of good government, as to inspire a
proper respect. This is a general rule, and ought not to be deviated from but
in case of necessity, or where the difficulty of conveying an order through the
principal will be attended with a fatal delay. In that case, the order should
be directed to the branches and not to the head, and as the head is subject tos

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 411
¦such order, the members are of course ; for it would be very extraordinary, if chap.
a captain should dispute an order from his general, because it was not com- y^J^,
=municated through his colonel. At the same time that the right is indisputa
ble, it should always be avoided brut in cases of absolute necessity.
" General Morgan is an exceedingly good officer and understands his duty
perfectly, and I know he has the highest respect for your character; and there
fore am perfectly persuaded, if there has been any interference different from
the general principles which should govern military matters, it must have hap
pened through inadvertence, or from a persuasion that you did not mean to.
exercise command during the time of your indisposition.
" If any thing in his conduct has had the appearance of indelicacy or ne
glect, I hope you will not suffer it to bias your conduct from that line, which
has given you weight and influence among your countrymen. It is the mark
of a great mind to rise superior to little injuries, and our object should be the
good of our country, not personal glory-"
The same to the same, Sherald's Ford, February 3d, 1781.
" DEAR SIR,'
" When 1 had the pleasure of a personal interview with you, I discovered
nothing mercenary or illiberal in your disposition. On the contrary, I was
charmed with -the spirit of enterprise you exhibited, which I flattered myself
would be no less beneficial to your country than honourable to yourself. I
still entertain the same sentiments, and I can assure you 1 shall be equally as
happy in an opportunity to do justice to your merits as to those of General
Morgan. In what respect General Morgan's command embarrassed you, 1
am at loss to imagine ; but I dare say I could explain it to your perfect satis
faction in a few minutes, could I have the happiness to see you. I consider
you both as valuable men, as well as brave and good officers, and I hope the
merit of one does not in the least detract from that of the other.
" It is true, 1 wish to see you again in the field, and I have ever considered
it a great misfortune, that you were wounded on my first coming to the com
mand. I have not time to go more fully into the subject; we will postpone the
matter until we have the pleasure of meeting. The inhabitants are sensible
of your merits, and the world does you justice," &c.
We cannot discover from any of the correspondence of this period, that the
discussion on this subject left any hostile impressions between Colonel Sumpter
and General Greene. As between Sumpter and Morgan there is reason to

412 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. tMnk there was no reconciliation ; these two brave men probably ever after
/recollected each other with no very friendly emotions. It is, however, but too
natural in man to transfer the feelings excited against a successful opponent to
the judge who decides in Ms favour. Man seldom views with complacency
the face that accuses him of error or offence, or reminds Mm of defeat or mor
tification. And the secret workings of feelmg, influence our opinions and
actions, where we would resist it were we sensible of its operation. It is the
silent progress of contagion in the veins.*
The real cause of Morgan's disappearing about this time from the stage of
the war, was unquestionably a serious indisposition. No less than ague and
rheumatism, contracted during this severe winter campaign. His health had
been considerably affected before he crossed the Catawba, but in the hurried
march from that river to the Yadkin, it rained incessantly, and before the army
reached Guilford, he coMd no longer withstand the combined attacks of those
racking diseases.
Col. Lee, in speaking of this event, seems plainly to intimate that his retire
ment arose from some other cause ; that his indisposition was nothing serious,
perhaps feigned. But an event occurred, on the very day on which the conver
sation happened between himself and General Morgan which he relates,f
which has caused a record to be preserved of the fact, and of General Greene's
conviction, that the indisposition was too great to admit of his being detached
on active duty.
After the fall of their gallant commander General Davidson, and the advance
of the British army to the Yadkin, (as will be hereafter related,) the whigs of
Mecklenberg, being called upon to attempt a diversion in the rear of the
enemy, wrote to General Greene, to solicit that he would detach General
Morgan for that service, promising much, from the influence of his name and
talents, in drawing forth volunteers from their homes. To this letter General

* Some further explanation of this aflair will perhaps result from the following facts. It has been
seen, that immediately after General Morgan's arrival in camp, General Gates had placed him in
command of a detachment of light-infantry, and employed him in several enterprises. As the com
mands of the different state officers were extended over specified tracts of country, it happened that
where they ranked Morgan, he found himself thus subjected to their command. This was particu
larly the case with regard to Colonel Sumpter. To obviate this inconvenience, Gates applied t»
congress, and was warmly seconded by Governor Rutledge, to advance Morgan to the rank of a
general. The application succeeded, and if any indignant feeling was excited in the mind of Colonel
Sumpter on this occasion, it must have been aggravated when General Greene expressly gave t»
Morgan command over a part of Colonel Sumpter's district.-— Goi\ Rutledge, 4th Oct. 17S0.
1' Vol.. 1. d. 275-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 413
Greene returns an answer, dated Guilford Court-House, February 9th, in chap.
which he says, " The general is so unwell, that he could not discharge the ^^,
duties of the appointment if he had it."
Subsequent letters show that Morgan was arrested on his journey home
wards by the progress of disease, and obliged to halt at the mansion of a friend
to restore his shattered health. Yet his letters constantly discover that he cast
a " longing, lingering look behind," and was prevented by notMng but in
creased mdisposition from rejoining the army. We shall not dismiss him alto
gether as yet from bur reader's notice; for, although not actually present at the
battle of Guilford, we shall have to notice a signal instance of the respect in
which General Greene held his advice on that occasion. To recur to the story
of his intention to make for the mountains ; we can assign but one possible
cause for its origin. It is obvious that Lord Cornwallis acted upon the sup
position that such was his intention, as will be seen by examining his line of
march; and tMs was probably the true reason why he followed the route by
Ramsour's Mills, instead of striking across the country below them. And into
this misapprehension both he and the American writers may have been led by
the attempt made to establish magazines in that direction, which certainly
were intended by Greene to provide for a rapid movement towards the moun
tains, should Morgan have be/ 1 cut off from a more immediate route to form
a junction with the main army.
But to return to the progress of events. When the commander of the
southern army arrived at Morgan's camp, the latter lay at Sherald's Ford, on
the east side of the Catawba River. On the opposite side of the river, and
but a few miles distant from it, the British army was encamped, waiting for an
opportunity to force a passage. At present this was impossible, and the two
armies lay in perfect security from each other, although but a few miles dis
tant. For such is the precipitance of the river when swollen by rains, as to
baffle every human effort to pass it. But the same cause makes it subside
rapidly. And the two armies lay in sight of each other, anxiously watching
those indications which foretel its return to its ordmary level. In the course
of the 31st it became obvious that this event must soon take place.
When General Greene left his army on the Pee Dee, their orders, it will be
recollected, were to cross that river, then to proceed up the stream, and with
all possible dispatch to reach Salisbury. Here they were to receive his fur
ther orders ; and he contemplated either to order their further advance to the
Catawba, should the enemy still not have passed it, and the reinforcements of
militia been such, as to justify an attempt to arrest the progress of the enemy
at that or some intermediate point': or, if otherwise, to form a junction beyond

414 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Salisbury and make a stand on the east bank of the Yadkin, at the crossing-
, place distinguished as the trading or island ford. This is the nearest public
ford to Salisbury.
But the causes which have been already detailed, had prevented the militia
from embodying, and notwithstanding the most vigorous efforts of General
Davidson, and the early and reiterated instances of General Greene, there
were only about 500 volunteers in the field. As the river was now falling,
200 of these were necessarily posted in detachments at the different fords for
thirty miles along the river, to guard against surprise ; and General Davidson
was ordered to retain with him a corps of observation of about 300 mounted
riflemen, to watch the movements of the enemy, and annoy him on his pas
sage wherever it should finally appear that he intended to attempt crossing.
The fords in that neighbourhood, are very numerous, and the British com
mander was so posted, and had so masked his intentions, that it required much
watchfulness to give a proper direction to this little force. But Davidson's
capacity was competent to the task, and, notwithstanding all the false indica
tions which the enemy displayed, he was ready to meet them at M'Cowen's
Ford at daylight on the morning of the 1st, when they attempted their pas
sage. Morgan's detachment was encamped the day before at Beaty's Ford, six
miles above M'Cowen's, and nearly that distance nearer to Salisbury.
As soon as it was ascertained that the Catawba was falling, that no more
militia were to be expected, and that the enemy were making dispositions to
pass the river, a hasty retreat of the party under Morgan became inevitable.
Accordingly, he moved off in silence on the evening of the 31st, and pressing
his march all that night and a part of the next day, he gained a full day's
march upon his adversary.
General Greene had remained behind with a view to bring off the militia,
as soon as the enemy had effected the passage of the river; and for this pur
pose he had issued orders for them to repair, as soon as that event should take
place, to a rendezvous appointed about sixteen miles in advance, upon the
road to Salisbury. To the place of rendezvous he repaired in person to await
their arrival, and at that place he was very near terminating his military ca
reer. At the same time that Cornwallis attempted M'Cowen's Ford in person, he
dispatched Colonels Webster and Tarleton, with a strong detachment to pass
die river at Beaty's, higher up the stream. Finding that ford abandoned, it
was passed without loss or delay, and one of those fortuitous circumstances to
which we have already frequently referred, saved the division of the army

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 415
under Cornwallis from sustaining any material injury from the attack of Da- chap.
vidson. x-
It was fortunate for Lord Cornwallis that he attempted this passage in the
night; the appalling prospect of a stream five hundred yards in width, foam
ing among the rocks, and frequently overturning men and horses in its course,
might have shaken the stoutest heart. Nor would the aim of the riflemen then
have been distracted by the shades of night, or been directed by nothing but
the voice of the British officers, the increased noise of the current, or the mu
tual exhortations of the British soldiers. Placed among the trees and -bushes
that lined the banks, secure and destructive must have been their aim against
a body of men plunged up to their waists, moving slowly as they supported
themselves against the stream, and strove to preserve their arms from the
spray. But a singular instance of good fortune attended the British com
mander. He was saved from injury by a misfortune. In the midst of the
stream their guide got alarmed and fled away. The advance took the wrong
course and escaped the danger that awaited them.
Davidson had posted his men so as to receive the enemy at the point where,
they well knew the course of the ford led to the eastern bank. Upon losing
their guide the enemy deviated from the ford, waded through water somewhat
deeper, but approached a point where they were not expected. The darkness
of the night, and the noise of the waters prevented this deviation from being
discovered until the enemy approached the margin of >h,e river; and as Da
vidson led off his men to take a position in their front, it brought him between
the light of his fires and the advancing column. A well-directed volley from
them put an end to his existence as he mounted his horse. Thus fell a brave
and tried patriot, universally deplored. His men soon dispersed after his fall,
though not without avenging it by the death of a number of the enemy, and
among the rest of Colonel Hall of the guards, who appears to have been highly
esteemed and much regretted by his companions in arms. Lord Cornwallis
himself probably owed his safety to the darkness of the night and the deviation
of his troops, for, sensible of the dangers and difficulties of the undertaking, he
had pressed forward with his advance, and had his horse so wounded under
him as barely to stagger to the shore and expire.
At the distance of about ten miles from M'Cowen's Fords, the roads from
the different fords converge and unite near a place called Tarrant's Tavern.
Here many of the fugitives from the different fords convened in the course of
the day, and some, to the number of about 100, proposing to proceed in the
evemng to the place of rendezvous, and imagining themselves in a place of
safety, very indiscreetly made a halt to take refreshment. Most of those who

416 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, had been on duty, terrified at the fall of their commander and the retreat of
X' the army under Morgan, had made the best of their way from the posts they
had occupied, directly home. Others, after convemng at this place, had
adopted the same resolution, so that of the 500 who had been on duty in the
morning, a very small proportion now remained.
Colonel Tarleton soon got intelligence of the party assembled at Tarrant's ;
and with a promptness and vigour which certainly characterized his move
ments, he resolved to strike at it. The officer who was senior in command of
the militia was not inattentive to the ordinary precaution against surprise, and
when the approach of the hostile dragoons was announced, the men flew to
their horses, delivered one deliberate fire, and dashed into the woods. The
pursuit would have been vain. The facility acquired by men of this descrip
tion in guiding their horses and securing their rifle when pursued, is the result
of early habit and frequent practice m the hunt of wild animals.
But there was another cause for arresting the pursuit. A few victims re
mained to glut the English broadsword. These were a small number of old
men and boys, either not mounted or badly mounted, who sought security in
imploring mercy on their gray hairs, or their youth. Seven of them were
wantonly sacrificed, and that number is boastingly swelled in Tarleton's Cam
paigns, to the number of fifty. Dearly did the loyalists afterwards pay for the
blood of these men.*
With characteristio*ftccuraey the colonel has also magnified the number of
the party up to five hundred, and numbered the gallant Colonel Locke with
the slain. He also admits the fall of seven of his men and twenty horses. Had
the half of five hundred been present, they would probably have dismounted
his whole party ; and as to Colonel Locke, we can produce many of his letters
to prove that he was alive long after. His baggage fell into the hands of the
enemy, but his good steed soon bore him beyond the reach of danger.
After this exploit, which occurred early in the afternoon, Tarleton leisurely
retired to the main army, little dreaming of the prize which then lay but seven
miles in advance of Tarrant's, and which twenty nimble horsemen would
most probably have succeeded in securing and conducting to camp. This
was General Greene and his suite, who had taken his stand at the place of
rendezvous, and remained there until after midnight, when learning the fate
of Davidson, and total dispersion of the militia, he proceeded on to Salisbury.

* Brevard.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 417
On his arrival at Steel's Tavern in Salisbury, it was impossible not to perceive chap.
in the deranged state of his dress and the stiffness of his limbs, some symptoms of v^-^-^,
his late rapid movements and exposure to the weather; and to the inquiries of
Dr. Read, who received him on his alighting, he could not refrain from answer
ing, " Yes, fatigued, hungry, alone, and pennyless." This reply did not escape
the quick ears of his benevolent landlady ; and he was scarcely seated at a com
fortable breakfast, when she presented herself in the room, closed the door, and
exhibited a small bag of specie in each hand. " Take these," said she, " for
you will want them, and 1 can do without them."
An acquisition so important even to the public service, was not to be de
clined from excess of delicacy, and the favour was afterwards amply repaid.
But the general hurried away after a hasty meal, for his friends warned him
against the numbers and hostility of the loyalists who surrounded him, and he
hastened to rejoin the army then passing over the Yadkin.
Refreshed and recruited by the halt on the Catawba, Morgan made a rapid
march to the trading ford, and by the evening of the 3d, had effected the pas
sage of it, and seated himself on the western bank to mock the unavailing pur
suit of his disappointed adversary. Lord Cornwallis had now entered upon
a desperate effort to retrieve the ground he had lost by his previous want of
decision ; a second conflagration of waggons and baggage had announced Ms
preparations to resume his march.* But still he was destined to feel the con-
quences of a want of correct intelligence. Bold as was the design and vigorous
the execution of his plan for passing the Catawba River ,f the very measure of
attempting a private and little frequented ford, for which he claims some merit,
involved him in a consequence he had not anticipated. The road to it not
having been well opened, his waggons and artillery were so much delayed that
on the evening of the 1st, although he had passed the river by day -break, he
found himself but a few miles advanced upon the road to Salisbury. Then for
the first time, he began to act with that decision and promptness for which he
has been so much lauded. By the destruction of his baggage and waggons, he
was enabled not only to double his teams, but to mount a considerable body of
infantry. Joining his mounted infantry to his cavalry, he pushed forward a
formidable corps under General O'Hara, in hopes to overtake and detain his
adversary before he could pass the river; and thus at length effect the purpose
for which he had made such great sacrifices, and which was so indispensable
both to the service of his sovereign and his own military fame. But it was in

* G. L. to Gen. Huger, 1st February. + Tarleton, &c.
53

418 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. vain. An incessant rain which drenched the army of Morgan through the
, whole of the day andmght of the 1st, only quickened the celerity of his move
ments. Greene knew that a rise of the river in two days afterwards was the
ordmary consequence, and pressed their advance before the occurrence of an
event, which might give them security on the one hand, or expose them to delay
on the other. — But not to destruction ; for he had prepared the means of obvi
ating that evil.
It will be recollected, that very early, even before he had reached his com
mand, he had adopted the means of converting the navigable streams of the
country into highways for transporting supplies to his army. It will also be
recollected, that his plan of operations, upon the advance of the British com
mander, involved some probable munceuvring about the trading ford, which
might render the quick passage of the Yadkin either for attack or defence, an
important object. Both these purposes had led to the collection of the boats
for some distance up and down that river, at this point. And now the advan
tages of this foresight were developed. The transportation of the American
infantry and baggage was easily effected, and the waters were not too high for
the cavalry to ford it. Yet the enemy were upon them before the rear-guard
was removed. This was the consequence of a circumstance which had not
been foreseen, and could not be guarded against. Some wanton and unne
cessary acts of severity already committed, had excited an alarm among the
whigs of Salisbury, and hastening away with their families to follow the Ame
rican army, their waggons had fallen into the line of march with the baggage
of the army ; and as the rear-guard was composed of militia, many of them
the friends or relatives of the fugitives, and no immediate danger apprehended,
no opposition had been made to the measure, or unwillingness exhibited by
that corps to suffer them to pass. But before the whole could be got over, the
enemy were upon them, and a smart skirmish ensued, in which both parties
claimed the advantage. It is certain that the rear-guard made good their
retreat without loss, and that the enemy sustained some ; still a few of the
rearmost waggons were taken. TMs rencontre took place at midnight, and
the nature of the ground favoured the retreat of the American party.
One day's effort such as this, at any time prior to Morgan's passing the
Catawba, might have deprived the American army of ali the fruits of the day
of the Cowpens, except the glory. Its partial success fastens on Lord Corn
wallis the reproof of not having made it before ; for, the infantry alone pushed
forward on this occasion, were so superior to the American force, as to dis
pense with the cavalry and sit down in security on the west bank of the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 419
Yadkin, in face of an enemy abundantly supplied with the means of suddenly chap.
recrossing to attack them. v^-v-*w
But the effort was transient and desultory, and Lord Cornwallis appears to
have been revisited with his yawning fit upon reaching Salisbury.
It Was not long before Cornwallis with the whole British army, appeared on
the bank of the river; and a furious cannonading was opened upon the Ame
ricans on the opposite bank, but without effect. Morgan secured his men
behind a rising ground, while the rocks on the margin afforded shelter to his
sentinels. Artillery he had none, for the two pieces taken at the Cowpens had
been placed in waggons and hurried on along with the prisoners. During the
cannonading a respectable eye-witness thus relates the manner in which the
commander of the department was occupied : " At a little distance from the
river and behind a pile of rocks, was situated a small cabin. In this the gene
ral had taken up his quarters, and while his family and some of the staff were
amusing therhseives as they thought proper, he was busily engaged m prepar
ing his dispatches. All this time the artillery was playing furiously, but
seemed to attract no one's attention. At length, however, whether from intel
ligence or conjecture, their rage seemed to vent itself exclusively at our cabin,
and the balls were heard to rebound against the rocks directly in the rear of it.
Little more than its roof showed above them, and at this the firing was obvi*
ously directed. Nor were they long without striking it, and in a few minufts
the clap-boards were flying from it in all directions. But still the general
wrote on, nor seemed to notice any thing but his dispatches, and the innumera
ble applications that were made to him from various quarters. His pen never
rested but when a new visiter arrived, and then the answer was given with
calmness and precision,, and the pen immediately resumed."*
As the boats had been all secured on the opposite bank, and would cer
tainly be destroyed before the American army decamped, it was at once obvi
ous, that the British commander must take a circuitous route by the shallow
ford, a few miles higher up but not much out of the route to Salem, (to which
the American general seemed obviously directing his steps,) or await the uncer
tain, and at that season, improbable event, of the fall of the waters. Yet for
four days Cornwallis lay tranqMlly in Salisbury, and it was not until the even
ing of the second after his arrival, that he detached a party to reconnoitre the
country, and examine the streams on the route by the shallow ford. The con
sequence was that he did not pass the Yadkin until the morning of the 8th,f and

* Dr. Read. + Official letter.

420 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, this, notwithstanding that the river, instead of rising after Greene's passage, as
, historians generally assert, actually began to fall on the evening of the 4th so
rapidly, that it became obvious it would be fordable the next morning ; and
Greene, after halting a day, resumed Ms march on the evening of the 4th.*
From the indecisive movements attributed to the British commander in the
correspondence of this date, first down the river and then up it, it is reasona
ble to conclude that he was at this time pondering upon the question whether
he should attempt to cross below and cut off his adversary from his main army;
or by pushing up the river, intercept his march for the fords of the Dan, and
then turn upon him when hemmed in between the Roanoke and Yadkin,
thus to effect his designs as well on the divison under Morgan, as the main
army under Huger. The latter was at length resolved on, and one reason
assigned for it betrays a miserable specimen of defective intelligence — " that he
was informed, the American commander could not collect many flats at any
of the ferries on the river Dan."f He little thought of the provident care
which had dispatched Carrington, and under him Captain Smith of the Mary
land line, to examine and improve the facilities, and remove the obstacles
which the crossing-places on that river presented.
All the writers who have treated of this celebrated retreat of our American
§00, (not 10,000,) have considered it as a mere flight; it has been emphatically
pr%nounced " a military race,"f and much as admiration has been excited by
its vigour and success, full justice has never been done to the abilities displayed
in it, because all the views which directed the American commander, as well
as the dangers that threatened and difficulties that embarrassed him, have
never been fully explained or duly estimated. Indeed, important facts have
been suppressed, because they must appear irreconcilable with the single view
of escaping ; and some of his measures bear the appearance of indiscretion,
because the motives for adopting them have not been kept in view. In the
present instance, if escape had been the sole object of the American move
ments, why halt a day on the Yadkin, while the.height of the river secured
their rear? or why, after advancing but twenty-five miles, make a further halt
of four days ? Yet it is certain, although not mentioned or not insisted upon
by historians, these halts were made, and their silence on this point can only

* Both Lee and Tarleton are inaccurate in their dates as to these events. The one a day too
*arly, the other a day too late. In such a chase, this is no immaterial circumstance.
t Letter 17th March 1781, to Lord Geo. Germain.
% Ramsay's Revolution in South Carolina, vol. 2. p. 207.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 421
be ascribed to the difficulty of reconciling such delays with the idea of " a chap.
military chase." But by testing these measures by the motives' and views ^^^
already explained to the reader as influencing the conduct of the American
commander, he will see both their wisdom and necessity. Yet, to amuse,
avoid, delay and still draw on a superior enemy, was a delicate game ; and
the apprehensions of the American commander were frequently all awakened,
by the extreme difficulty he found in collecting provisions. The country was
now all in alarm and in motion, provisions removed, concealed, or destroyed,
and the roads cut to pieces by the waggons of the whigs, bearing off their
families and the means of their subsistence.
An event had recently occurred which had spread this alarm to no ordinary
extent. On the route to Salem stood the dwelling-house of an aged lady* of
the most respectable character and connexions. In the security of innocence
and widowhood, she had remained in it with the younger branches of her
family, notwithstanding the approach of the British army. Her house with
all its contents were delivered up to the rapacity of the flames and of the Bri
tish soldiery. It was no act of an incendiary, or of a party of Indians or loy
alists ; the " amiable Cornwallis" himself was present, ordered and directed it.
Reader, we blush for human nature when assigning the only possible cause
that can be alleged for the perpetration of an act so wanton. — Her eldest son
was an active, influential whig, and she was mingling her tears with those of a
widowed daughter over the fall of the gallant Davidson. Think not that this
event is related upon slight authority ; more could be told of the British com
mander on this occasion, but it is suppressed through delicacy to the military
profession.f In the forks of Abbott's Creek at a short distance from Salem, General
Greene selected a secure position, and halted to watch the movements of his
adversary. The situation was equally suitable for the prosecution of his own
plans, whether the enemy should cross above, below, or at the trading ford.
But it answered another purpose; it drew the eye of the enemy towards the
upper fords of the Dan, as the route by which he meditated an escape. Corn
wallis, in his communications to the British minister, takes to himself much
credit for his successful manoeuvre in cutting off the American general from
that route ; and some American writers, (even Colonel Lee,) suppose, that the
subsequent movements of Greene were influenced by those of his opponent,

* The house of Mrs. Brevard, the mother of the Honourable Joseph Brevard.
i Judge Brevard's letter.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, which gave the latter a position on the 10th, at the same distance from the
, upper ford with that of Guilford Court-House, where, by that day the Ame
rican detachment had formed a junction with the main army.
The error has originated in not knowing, or not considering the objects
which invited the American commander to prefer the lower route, at the same
time that it was necessary to lure his adversary away from the one which led
to the upper fords.
To prevent Lord Cornwallis from getting on his right, was all-important to
General Greene for several reasons. When the army commenced its march
from the Pee Dee, the heavy baggage had been ordered on, under a guard of
militia, to take the route by Hillsborough, to unite there with the baggage
removing from that place, and to pursue the march across the Dan, or until
countermanded. As soon as the movements of the enemy indicated an inten
tion to pass the Catawba, the necessity of several material changes in the
movements of the main army became obvious. The following rapid letter
addressed to General Huger on the 1st of the month, the original of which, in
a beautiful hand, written without a mistake, interlineation, or the omission of
a comma, is before us, will convey a full view of the change of movements
contemplated, whilst it presents a striking specimen of measures conceived
with promptness, and orders communicated with precision.
" The enemy crossed the Catawba this morning at M'Cowen's Ford, about
seventeen miles below this, a little after break of day ; they burnt a great num
ber of their waggons yesterday, and seem to be preparing for forced mardies.
The militia is to assemble at Mr. David Carr's, where I shall remain to-night.
1 think the enemy will push for Salisbury; and from the rapidity with which
they march will reach it in little better than a day, especially as we have little
force to retard their march. If you have crossed the Yadkin and are in a con
dition to force a march, push for Salisbury. If not, recross and come up the
other side. And if you have not already crossed the river, move up the east
side of the Yadkin. To have the baggage and stores secured is the next great
object to the salvation of the troops. Let them be sent to Guilford, notwith
standing the order to transport it to the ford near Salisbury. Give orders to
the waggon-master-general, or commanding officer of the guard with the bag
gage and stores, to impress all the horses they may require to hasten the march.
Let the officers keep as little baggage with them as possible, as they may stand
a great chance of losing it upon forced marches. Send orders to Lee to move
up with his horse and leave his infantry in the rear to follow. Had we a supe
riority in horse the militia would be useful, but for want of it, they dare not

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 423
go within miles of the enemy. Give orders to Colonel Wade, to have all his chap.
hogs collected at Rocky River driven off towards Guilford," &c. s^-^-w
1 After reaching Salisbury and ascertaining the impossibility of forming a
junction there, or on the east bank of the river, in consequence of the rapidity
of the enemy's advance ; orders were transmitted to General Huger to take the
direct route to Guilford Court-House, with a view to forming a junction at that
place: as, both Hillsborough and Guilford lay to the right or eastward of
Greene's position on the Yadkin, both the baggage and the army would have
been greatly exposed, if Cornwallis had directed his operations to gaining the
right of his adversary.
On the other hand, the route by the upper fords led, not only to the depot to
which the prisoners recently taken had been forwarded ; but to that to which
the troops captured under Burgoyne had been assigned. As no enemy had been
expected in that quarter, no preparation had been made for meeting, one, and
could Cornwallis have penetrated so far as to add the prisoners in the interior
of Virginia to his present strength, little could have been done to impede his
junction with PMlips, or to arrest Ms further operations for the present, in that
quarter. A position on the lower Dan was also recommended from various other .
considerations. The very cause which the British commander supposed the
greatest objection was its highest recommendation ; that, at this season, the
river could only be passed in boats. It would have been gaining little to have
thrown a river in the American rear that was fordable by the enemy. His pas
sage in boats might be obstructed, but with an overwhelming superiority in regu
lar troops and artillery, it was not to be hoped, that where the river was fordable
he could be long arrested. Nor was the route by the upper fords the most
convenient for favouring a junction with the reinforcements which were now
advancing. All those expected from North Carolina must come up the Roan
oke, and those to be looked for from, Virginia must all approach from the east^
ward, and generally by the road to Boyd's Ferry; so that to keep his enemy
to the north and west of him, without permitting him to- advance too far,
became all-important in the present posture of his affairs. Of his moving off
entirely in that direction whilst the American army was below, General
Greene felt no apprehension; because the lure of an offer of battle he knew
would always 'draw his adversary's attention the contrary way. Nor did the
American general deem it unimportant to him to occupy a position on naviga
ble water, and as near as possible to the mouth of the Staunton ; for, besides the
Increased facility of subsisting his army by water transportation, the Staunton

424 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, ran through an unexhausted country, and the rich lands on that river and the
.^-v^^, Roanoke promised him an abundant supply, whilst the near approach of the
Staunton to the Dan at Boyd's Ferry, which is near their confluence, afforded
him a secure retreat, should the enemy cross above and descend on the eastern
bank. In fact, like a double corner in some games of skill, this position once
gained, presented the means of effectually eluding the attacks of his adversary,
or by obliging him to divide his forces, of exposing himself to great hazards.
In a letter to General'Huger of the date of the 5th, General Greene expresses a
hope, " that from Cornwallis' pressing disposition and the contempt he has for
our army, we may precipitate him into some capital misfortune."
There was still another reason for this preference to the route by Boyd'.s
Ferry. General Greene was persuaded that Lord Cornwallis could not follow
him, in the race he meant to lead, very long before he would be obliged to
descend to the head of navigation at Halifax, for the purpose of replenishing
his stores ; and with a view to that event he had concerted a plan of co-opera
tion against him with Baron Steuben, which might possibly have put a speedy
end to his career. The original sketch and all the details of this plan are at
this instant before us. It bears the strongest features of the enterprising spirit
and fruitful genius that devised it. If further evidence be necessary to prove
that the passage of the lower Dan was not a measure forced upon Gen. Greene
by the address of his adversary, it will be found in the fact, that before his
departure from the Catawba, he had pressed on Colonel Carrington the neces
sity of establishing magazines on the Roanoke, foreseeing and providing for, a
contingency which obviously might occur.
Colonel Lee has represented the adoption of the route by the lower Dan, as
the result of the suggestion and advice of Colonel Carrington. Indeed, the
colonel has scarcely ever permitted his general to enjoy the reputation of hav
ing conceived any of his most prominent measures. To Colonel Carrington,
General Greene was unquestionably under the greatest obligations for the most
active and zealous services, and to him in this instance he was indebted, for
carrying into effect a measure, without which it would have been difficult to
avoid an action, after the hazardous game that had been recently carried on.
But General Greene knew that Colonel Carrington was to be depended on, in
preparing the means of passing his army over the Dan at Boyd's should he be
pressed so far ; otherwise he would have evaded his enemy by advancing with
rapidity, instead of halting so frequently at a small distance in advance of Mm,
as we have seen him do on his retreat from the Catawba. Had he by any
casualty been prevented from passing the Dan at Boyd's, he would have been
driven to the necessity of falling down and uniting with his main army at

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 425
some point on its advance to Guilford, and of taxing his invention for the chap.
further means of eluding his enemy. He might then have taken the rout v^^,
by Hillsborough, or retraced his steps to South Carolina, and left the road
open to a junction with Philips, if his enemy would then have advanced, and
left the southern army behind him ; which is not probable.
At 1 o'clock on the mOrning of the 8th of February, General Greene
received intelligence that the enemy were in full march for the Shallowford,
on the Yadkin, and had probably reached it by that hour. The rout they
meant to pursue was now ascertained, and he resolved to meet and fight
them. This had always been his first object and leading desire, should he
ever be placed in a condition that would render it prudent. His other designs
Avere but alternative and auxiliary. He now hoped to find his army in such
a state, and to be joined at Guilford by such reinforcements of militia, as
would put it in his power to meet his adversary at that place, on advantageous
terms. He accordingly addressed the. most pressing letters to the officers of
militia in the vicinity of Guilford, to call out their followers, and repair imme
diately to that place. Couriers were dispatched to Hillsborough, to forward
on supplies of ammunition and other articles, to order the men at that post to
join their regiments, and an approaching rencontre was generally and joyfully
anticipated. The main army was now so far advanced, that a junction by
the 9th or 10th was certain, and the exhilirating news had been received, that
the prisoners, and the baggage accompanying them, were in safety.
The detachment under Morgan was put in motion soon after the intelli
gence of the enemy's advance was received, and arrived unmolested that night
at Guilford. The main army, now increased by the junction of Lee, joined
them in the course of the next day, and the general proceeded to reconnoitre
the ground with a view to selecting the field of battle. It was at this time
that the celebrated position was fixed on which directed the steps of
Greene to this point a month after, when he found it advisable to give the
enemy a challenge to battle. So truly did he exemplify the military maxim,
" that a good general will fight only when and where he pleases."
But this was not the occasion on which General Greene was destined to
reap the benefit of this judicious selection. New mortifications now awaited
him, and he found himself obliged at present to relinquish the hopes of turning
upon Ms enemy. The fallen countenances of his officers proclaimed their
disappointment, but though grieved, they acquiesced without a murmur, in the
prudent resolution of their commander.
On this occasion General Greene submitted the question to a council of war,
whether it would be prudent to offer the enemy battle. The decision was
54

426 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. '
chap, unanimous, and without hesitation; against the proposition ; and the. reasons
^-^~**/ were such as could not have been resisted. The returns of the army are
before us; the whole of vail arms, rank and file fit for duty, .present and
detached, did not exceed 2036; of these 1426 were regulars. The militia of
his army had generally been discharged ; for Virginia had sent them into the
field for a tour of three months, in which time they had to march 600 miles,
in going and returning. The force of the enemy was satisfactorily ascertained
to be from 2500 to 3000, all soldiers in the highest state of discipline and
equipment. Nakedness and exposure had by this time sent a. fourth of the
American army to the hospitals. In a letter,, addressed to General Huger, of
the date of the 4tb, General Greene is led to exclaim, " How is it possible,
that an army, circumstanced as our's is, can make head against one organized
and equipped as Lord Cornwallis'! Is it possible to guard, against every mis
fortune with a force so inferior? If Lord Cornwallis knows his true interest,
he will pursue our army. If he can disperse that, he Completes the reduction
of this state, and without that, he will do nothing to effect."
Yet, with these correct views of the relative interests of the ' contending
parties, there is no doubt of his intention to offer battle on the junction of his
forces, could he have drawn together about 12 or 1500 militia. In various
letters he expressly avows it; but, to offer battle, with such precaution as to
prevent the possibility of his being driven from the field, it may well be
doubted,, whether the most prudential measures can always prevent dispersion
from following in the train of defeat. This pomt was frequently made a
subject of discussion among his officers; and, on such occasions, he always
expressed a perfect confidence in its practicability, with the advantage of a
superior cavalry. He repeatedly exemplified the correctness of this opinion,
in the events of his southern campaigns.
Yet, there were several reasons at this time which inclined the American
commander to offer his adversary battle. The first was, that he believed him
so anxious for it, as to be inclined to accept the offer, under any disadvantages ;
the second, that he dreaded the effect of a protracted retreat, as well in
depressing the spirits of the whigs, as in elevating those of their antagonists.
The British commander had now penetrated into a country, which by him
had always been looked forward to as the land of promise. The immediate
settlements through which he had passed, were well-effected to the American
cause ; but, this circumstance was the most favourable, possible to his views,
since both in front and rear lay the regions where the loyalists were numerous.
The spirit of enterprise of the former, was repressed by Ms presence, whilst
his army offered a rallying point to the latter, with the triumphs and comforts

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 427
•
of living at free quarters on the farms of the whigs. General Greene had just chap.
cause to fear, that the enemy's further advance would lead to a general insur- ,^^1^,
rectiori of the friends of royalty; an event, from which every thing was to be
dreaded ; and an event, which would probably have been realized, but for two
incidents (hereafter to be related) which combined most fortuitously to terrify
and disgust the royal party. To these considerations was added another,
minor in its nature, but by no means to be disregarded. General Greene was
of opinion, that in time of action, the enemy were in the habit of wasting a
great deal of ammunition to very little effect. They were now drawn on to
a situation where this article could only be procured by descending to his
depot at Wilmington, establishing himself at Halifax, or forcing his way,
through Virginia at all hazards. All these considerations will be found to be
held in view during the residue of the trial of skill between these two com
manders. There was also another, and this is feelingly expressed in a letter
to Steuben. It was to save the state, and particularly Mecklenberg and Roan,
from the desolating vengeance of the enemy. The light of burning cottages
had marked the stages of his advance, and the distress and consternation of
the fugitives added pangs to Green's consciousness, that he could neither relieve
nor protect them.
As soon as the resolution was adopted to prosecute the retreat, the com
manding general was not long in determining on the means of effecting it.
Attention had, at an early period, been paid to raising the militia in the rear of
the enemy, in order to give employ to his light troops, to intercept his foraging
parties, and embarrass the acquirement and communication of intelligence.
Colonel Sumpter also, whose health now permitted his return to the field, had
undertaken to call together his followers, and excite the apprehension of the
enemy for his posts in South Carolina. The fall of Davidson, and the office
which Davie had assumed, had left the whigs in the neighborhood of Char
lotte, without a leader sufficiently popular to inspirit and conduct them to
active enterprise. They, therefore, held a meeting, and unanimously solicited
of General Greene, to dispatch Morgan to command them. The general's
answer to this request has been already noticed. But, another officer had
now rejoined Greene, in whom he justly repoied the highest confidence.
This was Colonel Pickens, who had proceeded in command of the detachment
that guarded the prisoners taken at the Cowpens, until overtaken and relieved
by General Stevens. He then hastened immediately back, and rejoined his
commander at Salisbury.
His followers were now reduced to a handful, for the retreat of the army
had called most of them away, to provide for the subsistence and safety of

128 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. *
chap, their families. Some active, intelligent and influential officers remained,
</vv and many of these he was directed to disperse through the country beyond
the Catawba, with orders to collect the whigs in parties, to keep the tories in
awe, and to throw themselves under the command of the principal leaders,
whenever their assistance was required to strike some capital blow. The-
whigs of North Carolina were advised to place themselves under Pickens'
command, and he was instructed to hang upon the skirts of the enemy, watch
the movements of his small detachments, guard particularly against surprise,
and, as soon as an opportunity offered, to pass Lord Cornwallis, and join the
army at Guilford, or wherever else it should make a stand.
Great were the advantages which Greene derived at this time, from these
watchful and active agents. The only means he had of retarding the
progress of the enemy, and preserving himself from being harrassed by the
loyal mounted infantry, consisted in obliging his enemy to cover Ms foragmg
parties with large detachments of cavalry. Without the protection of the
cavalry, the infantry could not be pushed forward to annoy Morgan. But,
for this relief, it would have been difficult for him to preserve such a distance
m advance, as to put it out of the power of his adversary to control his
measures. He was himself often obliged to subsist his army on daily collec
tions, and this necessarily produced delay. To have collected magazines on
his intended rout, would at once have unmasked his views towards the corner
between the Dan and the Staunton : nor had the newly adopted arrangements
of the state, for assisting Colonel Davie in his department, been long enough
organized to be productive of very extensive relief.
But, the situation of the army was much improved upon its junction at
Guilford, by the arrival of both the commissary and quarter-master-general ;
and now, for the first time since taking the command, the commander found
himself at the head of an organized force ; yet it was feeble, destitute and
pennyless, and talents that merited a freer range of action, were wasted upon
shifts and expedients. Neither the quarter-master, the commissary, nor their
commander, had a dollar at command; and when most in need of conciliating
the favour of the people, they were compelled to disgust them, by supporting
and transporting every thing by exaction. It required more than ordinary
capacity, perseverance and prudence, to make head against such difficulties.
Among the causes which led to the decision of the council of war at Guil
ford, was the arrival of Carrington, with the agreeable intelligence, that every
thing was in a state of arrangement for the passage of the army below. The
boats were not actually collected at the point of transportation, for that also
would have unmasked the general's designs ; but they were secured at conve-

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE, 429
nient distances, so as to admit of their being collected at a few hours warning, chap.
But for this circumstance, Greene's situation would have been such, that he v
might have been compelled to fight the enemy, at this time, at Guilford, or
turn on him under every disadvantage, when pressed in the pursuit. It is
probably owing to this circumstance, that General Lee has attributed the
march of Greene for the lower Dan, in preference to the Ford, to the recom
mendation of Carrington. As Colonel Lee was not a member of the council
of war, he might easily be led into the error of attributing that to Carrington's
advice, which was only attributable to the quarter-master's report. But the
fact of Colonel Carrington's continuing with the army, and actually com
manding the left of Williams' detachment, ought to have satisfied Colonel
Lee, that this important arrangement had been previously organized.
The capital expedient resorted to on this occasion, to secure the unmolested
retreat of the American army, was that of detaching seven hundred light
troops, under Colonel Williams, to cover its retreat. Both officers and men
of this detachment, were of the elite of the American army. Williams, Car-
rington» Howard, Washington and Lee, were the commanders, and the men
were composed of all who had fought the day of the Cowpens, and who had
ever since led and baffled the pursuit of the enemy, strengthened by Lee's
legion, whose ranks had not yet been, thinned by battle or severe service, and
whose excellent equipment, discipline and mounting, made them an important
appendage to Williams' command.
On the 10th of the month, the two armies lay within twenty-five miles of
each other; the one at Salem, the other at Guilford. The halt which Lord
Cornwallis made at Salem, was the first that could be satisfactorily accounted
for. His antagonist had now formed a junction with his main army, and
prudence dictated the necessity of determining their force, and their views,
before he approached within striking distance. It is true, that in the end, this
halt proved destructive to his views, and the state of facts would have justified
his advancing and forcing an action; but, whatever might be the conse
quences attending such a precaution, he cannot be censured for adopting it.
Indeed, from this time, all his conduct was marked with decision and vigour,
checked only by the control of military prudence. It is true, the measures of
his adversary were crowned with the most signal success ; but, the errors
which contributed to it, if committed at all, preceded this date, or occurred
some time after.
Never smce the descent of Burgoyne, had the feelings of the American
people been so wrought up as they were on this occasion. The whole con
tinent seemed to hang in breathless expectation upon the fate of the southern

430 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. army. For near a month, had the public attention been engrossed by its
, perilous situation; and now the crisis of this interesting drama evidently
approached. A day, an hour, might produce its dissolution; and then, what
would arrest the progress of subjugation? A junction formed with Philips — •
the prisoners in Virginia released — -Richmond fortified — and posts established at
Hillsborough and Halifax ; and adieu, at present, to opposition in the south.
Nor was the interest of the scene confined to the people of America ; Great
Britain, France, the world, which had now taken a deep interest in the
pending contest, all saw the consequences that might follow the struggle
between these little armies, and waited with anxious anticipation upon its
issue. It is true, their numbers were not great; nay, exceedingly incon
siderable, when compared with the armies that figure on the theatre of
Europe. But, what are the European struggles for some norma agelli,. or
some question of succession, legitimacy or revenue, in comparison with the
stake for which these little armies contended ? Parties had also taken their
champions ; the amateurs of the military science, had concdved an interest in
the issue ; and a vast deal of individual anxiety prevailed on questions, only
remotely connected with national considerations.
The occasion was, indeed, one which called for all the talent of these two
eminent commanders. Every thing depended upon gaining a march; and
the trial of skill was, to give a direction to the movements, each of the other,
without letting a muscle betray the direction of his own. Spies, scouts and
patrols were lurking about both, intent upon the minutest movement, and
sleep seldom visited the eyes of either commander.
The first movement was, a ruse de guerre, attempted by Lord Cornwallis.
The object of this was, to alarm his adversary for the safety of his stores at
Hillsborough; these, notwithstanding the earliest attention to their removal,
had been so delayed, for want of waggons, that they were, most of them, just
now put in motion for Taylor's ferry on the Roanoke, below the confluence of
the Dan and Staunton. Hillsborough also, as the seat of government, and
depository of the state stores and records, it was thought, would claim the
protection of the American army. Its situation was to the right of the road to
Guilford, and accessible by a direct rout from Salem. On that rout, Lord
Cornwallis made a demonstration; for if Greene lost ground in that direction,
he would certainly be cut off from the banks of the Dan. But the American
general was too much on his guard to be overreached, and adroitly turned
the point of his enemy against himself. By pushing forward the detachment
under Williams, in the direct rout for the upper Dan, he induced his adversary
to make a movement to his left, for the purpose of cutting this. party off from

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 431
the upper fords, still fondly believing that he had the main army in a eul de chap.
sac, from which it could not escape, for want of ferry boats. Williams was ^^^-^
so lightly equipped, that he had nothing to fear from a near approach to the
enemy, and coolly placing himself in front of his advance, marched as steadily
before him for four days, as if he had been the enemy's advanced guard.
Greene thus secured the advantage of marching direct for the place where he
contemplated crossing; whilst his enemy approached it by a more circuitous
rout. His own march, also, was unmolested ; whilst in the rout of the enemy,
every bridge was broken up, the provision consumed or removed, and every
facility to his progress, swept away by his tantalizing precursor.
Williams displayed the most consummate prudence, vigilance and enter
prise in this service ; he was ably and zealously supported by the officers under
Kim; and notwithstanding the extraordinary fatigue to which this service
subjected his men, his engaging manners, and humane attention to their wants
and comforts, kept up among them the highest spirits possible.
Colonel Lee has written, and others have copied from him, a highly inte
resting narrative of the march of this party, interspersed with anecdotes, and
illuminated with remarks, wMch render it an exceedingly amusing passage.
But the general nature of our undertaking, does not admit of our borrowing
from it, any thmg to which there is no allusion in the official papers.
From the moment of leaving GMlford, all further disguise became unneces
sary or impracticable, and the American general pursued the direct rout to the
lower Dan. In the mean time, a proper party was pushed forward to collect
the boats, and with them General Kosciusko, who had rejoined his com
mander at Guilford, and who now preceded him for the purpose of throwing
up a breastwork at the ferry, for the double object of protecting the boats, and
covering the passage of the army.
So completely did the light detachment hoodwink the enemy, that it is an
acknowledged fact, they did not know of Greene's reaching the river until
they approached its banks, and saw the last of the covering party landing on
the opposite shore. This was on the 15th of the month. The main army
had reached the ferry the morning of the day before, and intelligence being
immediately dispatched to Williams, he adopted the necessary measures for
eluding his wary enemy, and making good his escape, before his intention
should be suspected. For this purpose, after taking ground in the evening,
and encamping as usual, leaving all his fires burning, he stole silently away,
and by a rapid movement^ reached the ferry, and crossed before his purpose
was suspected.

432 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. This retreat was not only the admiration of the friends of the revolution, at
,the time — it has called forth the most unqualified praises from every British
writer. Indeed, it is remarkable that, not only in this, but in every previous
and most subsequent affairs in which General Greene was engaged, and in
none but those which happened under his command, has an eulogium been
uttered by the British writers. Success, under most other commanders, has
been attributed to some fortuitous cause ; but, whether he had conciliated
their esteem, or from what other cause, we know not, they have not been
sparing of the commendation bestowed upon Mm.
Amid the general exultation, and the mutual felicitations which enlivened
the American camp, on the evening of the 15th, there was found one heavy
heart; and when the shades of night had summoned the weary veteran to
repose, there was found one watchful eye, that consumed the midnight lanfp
in cares for their security. There is in many of the numerous official letters,
written on this evening, a marked character of constraint, mingled with
occasional bursts of indignant feeling, or of complaint, tempered by respect,
which strongly pourtray the varied workings of the mind that dictated them.
Nor could it have been otherwise ; for, though the army was saved, and
with it the last hope of a successful issue to the campaign, yet another state
was given up to the ravages of the enemy ; and if this Fabian system had
exposed even Washington's courage and talents to suspicion, what right had
Greene to hope to escape the ready tongue, and wTakeful eye of censure?
There was yet a more mortifying reflection, pressing on the mind of the Ame
rican commander. In one o£ his letters to the Baron Steuben, borrowing
the words attributed to the great Frederick, he exclaims, "Oh that of the many
thousands now idle at home, a few, a very few hundreds more were with me
in the field!" His adversary was now obviously in his power. He had led
him to the very spot where he hoped, at the farthest, to be met by reinforce
ments, and to be able to turn upon and destroy him ; but, not a- man was
there ; even the numbers which he counted but a few days before, had been
greatly reduced. The volunteers would not wander far from their homes ;
some few, who had no homes, remained with him. The militia, called into
the field for a short period, had served their tour and retired ; and even the
continentals, not enlisted for the war, were claiming their discharges as fast as
their term of service expired.
But, relief grew out of his very misfortunes. The states of North Carofina
and Virginia now saw the flames of war rolling towards their dwellings.
Reiterated remonstrances had effected little ; the approach of the hostile army
produced much. Intelligence poured in from all quarters, Of the approach of

/ MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 433
the North CaroHna and Virginia militia, and Steuben was hurrying on, a body chap
of recruits for the Virginia regiments; yet, they were generally far distant, and^^J^w
days and weeks must elapse, before they could be marched to head quarters.
Now was the time for action; a few days more and their arrival might be too
late. For the third time, the enemy was separated from the Ameriqan general
only by a river. It might fall, and he might be attacked; or the enemy might
retire, and evade the present danger. To a mind conscious of its own
powers — to a heart glowing with love of country — to a soldier emulous of
military fame — to a commander, high in reputation, and conspicuous in the
part allotted him, it is difficMt to conceive a situation more tantalizing and
perplexing. The morning of the 16th dawned upon an anxious night, only to add to the
general's perplexities. It was announced, that the river was falling; and as
the crossing places in his viciMty were too numerous to admit a hope of
successful opposition to a superior enemy, a retreat appeared unavoidable :
the army was therefore put under orders to be ready to act at a moment's
warning. The baggage had already been ordered on the rout to Halifax old
court house, and the necessary orders issued to the quarter-master's department,
to make good the passage of Staunton river with the whole army, should
such a movement become necessary. These arrangements made, the two ar
mies rested in tranquility, watching each others motions. As the rise and fall
of these rivers are subject to great vicissitudes, and there was still a considerable
depth of water, the necessity of a movement, on the part of the American
commander, had not yet become imperative. A change of circumstances, on
the following day, induced him to give a new direction to Ms motions.
Pickens had succeeded m raising a force of about seven hundred militia,
and was approaching the enemy's left. General Caswell, of North Carolina,
had also collected a force below, and made a demonstration towards his other
flank. The depredations committed by the enemy in his advance, had sur
rounded him with inveterate enemies, and he saw nothing but hostility in his
vicinity, which ever way he directed his views. These considerations soon
convinced the British general, that he must direct his march to some more
friendly quarter, whilst the exhausted state of his stores made it advisable to
approach one, from which relief might be obtained from the privations to
which he had subjected his officers and soldiers.
Hillsborough was in the direct rout to Wilmington, and situate in a region
known to abound in loyalists, as wellas near the settlements between the Haw
and Deep rivers, in which the majority of the inhabitants were reputed to be
firmly and irredaimably attached to the royal cause. Thither he directed his
55

434 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, steps, and on the 18th left General Greene at liberty to resume offensive
^^ operations. These were delayed no longer than was necessary to guard
against a feint.
Many reasons imposed upon General Greene the necessity of still occupy
ing the east bank of the Dan, with his army posted partly at the river, and
partly at Halifax old court house on the Banister. The first moments of rest
that had been enjoyed, had been employed in the most pressing instances to
all on whom the duty devolved, or in whom power existed, to press forward
reinforcements at this critical juncture. None had yet arrived, but many
parties were in motion, and all their steps were pointed towards this post.
it was not among the least considerations that had directed his own march
towards this position, that it was above all others peculiarly eligible as a point
of concentration. The whole southern border of Virginia, will not furnish
one better suited for collecting to a point, the population of that state; and
it was little less proper, under present circumstances, for drawing together
that of North Carolina and facilitating the advance of the mountain men
who were expected under Shelby and Campbell. By crossing the Dan
above, or the Roanoke below, the militia might follow the east bank of those
rivers to Greene's encampment, in great security, from the interruptions of the
enemy. Nor would his apprehensions for the post of Halifax, in North
Carolina, yet permit him to abandon a situation, which would enable him to
hasten, if necessary, to the protection of that place. General Kosciusko had
already been dispatched to construct works for its defence, and Greene was
steadily resolved not to permit the enemy to possess it without a struggle. Being
accessible from the ocean, having a very fertile country above it, possessing
the only manufactories in the state, and conveniently situated to communicate
with the waters of the Chesapeake, it afforded too many military advantages
to his enemy to be neglected. It was not, therefore, until he was well satisfied
that the views of Lord Cornwallis were not directed to that post, that he
recrossed the Dan, and advanced with the mam army towards Hillsborough.
There was still another urgent reason for hesitating at resuming active
operations with the main army. It was the depth of winter, and the climate
cold beyond the gradation of its latitude. It is affected by the elevation of the
earth's surface, and the vicinity of the Alleghany mountains. Long marches,
thin clothing, and much exposure, had greatly thinned his ranks, and the state
of his best clad men, was but ill adapted to the prosecution of a winter cam
paigns. The returns of the Maryland line, that body of men to whose
gallantry the country was so much indebted, and whose fidelity had risen
superior to suffering and temptation, esMbited 861 fit for duty, 274 in the

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 43'
hospitals. In a letter from one of his officers, who had been employed in chap.
guarding and removing the heavy baggage, we find a complaint, " that as his^^,^
men were generally bare foot, long marches had, at length, incapacitated them
from marching at all;" and the following passage of a letter, from Greene to
Washington, exhibits an original picture of the sufferings of the main army :
"Irvine's Ferry*, February 15.
" The miserable situation of the troops, for want of clothing, has rendered
the march the most painful imaginable ; many hundreds of the soldiers
tracking the ground with their bloody feet. Your feelings for the sufferings of
the soldier, had you been with us, would have been severely tried."
Nor would the effective force of the army, at that time, sanction a hasty
pursuit. Sending off, and guarding the many detachments of baggage, stores
prisoners, sick, &c. had necessarily drawn off a number of men on detached
commands. The militia, alone, could not be depended upon for this service,
as they came and went almost as they pleased. Hence, a small guard of
regulars became indispensable ; and, where an auxiliary militia force was called
out, it . was relieved at different stages, according to the necessity of circum
stances. On the 17th of this month, there were no less than 345 of the
Maryland line thus employed ; and, on that day, every man in camp, fit for
duty, is stated at, infantry, 1078 — artillery, 64 — cavalry, 176 — legionary
infantry, 112. The militia had all departed, with the exception only, of the
gallant little band under Pickens, who alone, in the worst of times, never
abandoned the retreating army: but, at this time, they were detached under
their leader, on the service which has been already noticed. Their numbers,
then, were reduced to about 150, consisting altogether of volunteers from
South Carolina and Georgia — the former under Colonel M'Call — the latter
under a youthful leader of the highest promise, and who was destined
to attain to the highest distinction in the councils of his country — this was the
late General Jackson of Georgia, at that time a captain of militia. Most of
the officers and men from the two southern states who had fought at the
Cowpens, had been previously detached under the orders issued to Pickens,
to diperse themselves through the interior of those two states, in order to keep
alive the opposition in that quarter.

* Irvine's and Boyd's ferry, appear to be the same, by different names, or within a very short
distance of each other.

436 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Although no reinforcements had yet reached the American army, the most
.flattering promises now poured in from every side. The advance of the
British army to the banks' of the Dan, had spread universal alarm through
the two states that lie along the waters of the Roanoke. A busy bustling
seene was now exhibited in all directions. The cry "to arms," was universal ;
the people really manifested the best dispositions possible; and they were
numerous as the locusts of the desert ; a swarm of them might have swept
the British army from the face of the earth. But the demon of confusion
appeared to preside over every movement; and men without organization
only derive weakness from multitude. Portentous, as was the aspect of
public affairs at this time, it is scarcely possible to peruse the correspondence
it produced, without yielding to an irresistable impulse to be amused. One
officer collects a considerable force, and is ready to march to the Dan, when
the legislature of North Carolina orders Mm to take the contrary course,
and sit dlown near Wilmington. Another, is prepeared and anxious to
march immediately, but waits the order of the major general, and knows
not where to find him. A third, very high in command, excuses himself
from attending to the forwarding of troops, because he is a member of the
governor's council, and has been summoned to attend him an hundred miles
off. A fourth, is on the march to join the American commander, and is
ordered to take post at Eaton's Ferry and wait further orders. In Vir
ginia, the people fly to arms, are willing to act as volunteers, but the
county lieutenants dismiss them to their homes, because not called out
according to law ; and when the enemy is at their doors, insist on the
necessity of awaiting an order from Richmond. Thus, in every quarter,
under the most critical circumstances, when present relief appeared indis
pensable to ward off present destruction, were reinforcements detained,
merely because the American general could not himself command them
out, but must depend upon the good will, dilligence, or the intelligence of
others to afford them. A wakeful jealousy of arbitrary power, is unques
tionably salutary; but where the slow course of legal process must be
observed in attempts to arrest the desolating flame, the best of principles
may be adhered to, to the most unhappy of purposes.
Nor was the American commander doomed only to sustain these mor
tifications, from the delays incident to the measures of the state authorities :
he was also subjected to a disappointment of the most serious nature, from
a quarter whence he had least reason to expect it.
The party under General Arnold, intended to produce a diversion in favour
of Lord Cornwallis, and as the precursor of the expedition under General

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 437
Philips, arrived in the Chesapeake at the close of the year 1780. Expe- chap.
rience has taught, what reflection might have suggested, that the places
situate on the navigable waters of the Chesapeake, derive very little security
from their remoteness in the interior". An enemy who can command the
bay, can operate with safety and effect, against the towns which are ac
cessible to vessels of force, or not too far distant for a coup de main. Arnold,
it has been seen, met with no opposition in penetrating to Richmond, and
retired with little molestation. The rapidity of his movements, crowned
them with a cheap-purchased success. Having seized upon, and fortified
the post at Portsmouth, he retired securely from his devastating expedition,
and placed himself in it with a force of about 1700 men. In the meantime,
the Baron Steuben had collected together as many continental troops,
and militia under Generals Weeden and Muhlenberg, as rendered it no
longer safe for Arnold to venture out of his strong hold. Here they lay
for some time watching each others motions, the one occasionally pro
secuting his predatory expeditions along the shores of the rivers, the other
manoeuvring to decoy the wary traitor from his lurking place. Why, more
efficient operations were not carried on to compel him to retire or surrender,
is thus accounted for in a letter from General Muhlenberg to General Green:
" February 24, 1781.
" I must acknowledge it is derogatory to the honor of the state, to suffer
such a handful of men to retain possession so long, (now six weeks) but
what my dear general is to be done? They are strongly fortified ; I have
near two thousand men, and among the whole about 300 bayonets, and
two brass six pounders. With such a military apparatus, we cannot think
of attacking his works by regular approaches, and all my hope is, that we
shall be able to coop up Arnold so close, that he will be obliged to make
ah effort to dislodge us."
Measures were in considerable forwardness for the purposes expressed in
this letter, by the march of a large body of North Carolinas from below,
and the preparations for attack under the baron above, when the most
confident hopes of success were inspired by the arrival of a respectable
French naval force in the Chesapeake. The escape of Arnold appearing
now to be cut off, and intelligence being received of the retreat and critical
situation of General Green, Steuben resolved to order down his battering
cannon, and leaving General Muhlenberg in command before Portsmouth, to
march with Generals Weeden and Nelson, to the relief of the main army.

438 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. For this purpose he organized a corps of 400 regulars, under Colonel
.Campbell, and 2600 militia under Generals Weeden, Nelson and others,
and by the 25th they were in full march for the camp on the Dan. A very
handsome supply also of arms and accoutrements for 600 men, was for
warded on at the same time, with the same destination.
Is the reader prepared to see all these promising prospects blasted by the
most untoward incidents !
The French fleet refused to remain in the Chesapeake, and Arnold escaped ;
and a piece of incorrect intelligence, caused the recall of Weeden and Nelson,
and prevented Steuben from prosecuting his purpose of joining his com
mander. In order to make secure the effort to support Greene, and receive his
orders respecting the advance of these reinforcements, General Steuben had
dispatched a Captain North, who appears to have acted as his Md, with orders
to proceed to head quarters, and communicate immediately with the general
himself. North proceeded as far as Taylor's ferry, and hearing there that
Lord Cornwallis was hastily retreating to Wilmington, and Greene in pursuit
with a superior force, proceeded no further, but forwarded his dispatches by
another hand, and returned to arrest the advance of the intended reinforce
ments. The four hundred men, under Campbell, continued their march ; the
rest were remanded and returned, when their presence would have rendered
the most signal services. We do not find, that Captain North ever incurred
the censure which this act merited, but it was impossible to justify it. To
indulge conjecture on possible events, is almost nugatory, in a world where
human calculation is so much the sport of fortune, or of fate; but, it is impos
sible to avoid reflecting on the consequences which would probably have
resulted from the prosecution of the measures adopted by Steuben. That the
whole reinforcements would have been in time for the battle at Guilford, is
proved by the arrival of the detachment under Campbell ; and that so strong a
reinforcement, under such commanders, would have gathered in its progress
like a popular crusade, will readily be admitted by those who are acquainted
with the motives and propensities which influence militia volunteering.
Whence at last came relief to the commander of the southern department?
Colonel Lee, with the laudable feeling of a native Virginian, has asserted
that, "that state may well be denominated, the matrix of resistance in the
south. It is certain, that at this time, every effort of the enemy was directed
against Virginia. Secure within the defences of New York, the British com
mander in chief was wholly occupied in blockading the French army at
Newport, and prosecuting the war against Virginia. It was now plainly seen,

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 439
that nothing but the reduction of that state could secure the subjugation of those chap.
which lie to the south of it. Besides, being itself a magazine of men, and a^-^
place of retreat for an army operating in the southern department ; through its
upper counties must pass all the stores and reinforcements, that the northern
and eastern states could furnish. Thus, whilst Lord Cornwallis was pressing .
upon her southern frontier, Arnold had penetrated to the capitol, and a formi
dable expedition was in advanced preparation at New York, to reinforce the
army now lying at Portsmouth. These causes distracted the attention of
Virginia; and in the necessary effort to defend herself, the resources were
exhausted, which would otherwise have been applied to the relief of the
southern army."*
We feel no inclination to derogate from the merits of a state, which may
have been too much extolled, but which cannot be denied the honor of having
done its duty as well as any other; but it must be acknowledged, that neither
the force now with the army, nor the troops enlisted to reinforce it, were com
mensurate with what was expected of the population, resources and pretensions
of the state. Some very wise and spirited measures adopted about thjs time,
were calculated to answer public expectation ; but Virginia, though abounding
in men, provisions, and horses, had neither money, commerce nor manufac
tories. This was the great cause why at this time she makes so sorry a figure
in the field. In a letter from the indefatigable Steuben, of the 22d of February,
when the detachment under Campbell was preparing to march, we find the
following passage: — " All this has not diverted my attention one moment from
you. I have not ceased tormenting the governor for the clothing for the
troops at this place; but, with all my importunities, I do no think I should
have been able to have equipped them these six weeks, if a quantity of
stores had not arrived from the northward. From these, I have drawn such
articles as I was deficient in, and shall thereby be enabled to send on the de*
tachments the 25th instant." Thus it was, that the sufferings of the soldiers
with the' army were protracted, in order to expedite the march of reinforce
ments. Nor was the difficulty less with regard to arms. A dispute, it appears,
arose at this time, respecting the liability of the state to furnish arms to the
quota required of it. A question appears to^ have been made, whether a
requisition of men necessarily implied armed men. On this subject, we extract
the following passage of a letter from the Governor to Steuben, of the date of

Lee's Memoirs,

440 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, the 21st December, 1780: — " As arms were never among the requisitions made
,by Congress on the several states, this state never supposed it would be ex
pected, they should provide that article for their quota of continental troops.
They have only had in view, to procure from time to time, as many as might
. arm their militia when necessity required the calling them into service. From
this stock they have furnished arms for continental use, till it is so reduced, that
they have not the smallest prospect of being able, from the state magazines, to
spare as many as will arm their own continental levies."
It thus proved truly fortunate, that General Greene, before leaving PMladel
pMa, had drawn upon the friendship of the governor of Pennsylvania, and of -
the commander in chief, for supplies of arms ; otherwise it is most probable,
that Virginia could not at this time have sent a single recruit into the field. To
the intelligence and exertions of the baron also, was the army indebted for
ekeing out those limited supplies to their utmost. The artificers, in their
establishment at the Point of Fork, were kept employed in repMring and re
fitting arms and equipments ; and the waggons returnmg from the southward,
were diarged with the transportation of those which sustained injury in service.
Thus it happened, that in the fatal irruption of Colonel Tarleton, which we
shall have occasion particularly to notice, such quantities of arms are said to
have been found in that depot.
The correspondence between the commander of the southern department,
and Governor Jefferson, on the subject of requisitions, puts us in possession of
the official statement, under the hand of the latter, of all the troops which
Virginia clMmed credit for, at this time; and we can, therefore, speak of it with
minuteness, and with confidence. This statement bears date February the 1 0th,
1781, and from it, the state appears to have in the field two thousand three
hundred and twenty-one men, and to acknowledge a deficiency of three thousand
one hundred and eighty-eight. But of those in the field, five hundred were
still to be clothed, and armed, and marched from Chesterfield court house ; and
the return acknowledges, that " arms, we have none, nor can by any means
procure them." One thousand and sixty-one more are said to be posted at
various points in the state ; and the number actually with the army, is stated
to be twelve hundred and sixty, consisting of Harrison's regiment of artillery,
estimated at sixty — Bufort's infantry at five hundred — Greene's at four hun
dred — and White and Washington's cavalry at three hundred. Of the whole
number in service, only one hundred and forty-four, stationed at Fort Pit, and
Harrison's sixty artillerists were enlisted for the war ; the rest were engaged
for various, and generally very short tours of service. Of the actual state of
those troops stationed in the state, we know nothmg ; but, if the state returns

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 44T
with regard to them, be as inaccurate as they are with regard to the numbers chap.
with the southern army, the deficiencies in the Virginia line must have heen^^^^,
mnch greater than that admitted. The field-return of the army of the same
date, with Mr. Jefferson's statement, gives of the Virginia brigade, five hundred
and tiurty-four rank and file fit for duty, thirty metrosses, and seventy-four
cavalry— about one half the number claimed by the state. The deficiency
of six hundred and twenty-two, if with the army, must be made up of non
commissioned officers, musicians, sick, and absent on duty. But, it is well
known, that the cavalry especially, never equalled one hundred, instead of
three. Yet, there was obviously no want of zeal in the government of Virginia to
discharge its duty in the common cause. Their legislature being in session
when General Greene was moving southwardly, passed a most liberal act
in consequence of the requisitions which he made upon them. But laws,
without the means of carrying them into effect, can neither create or supply
an army. Very little aid to the southern army ever grew out of that law.
Yet, there was one hardship whieh the southern department generally, and
Virginia in particular, had at this time to complain of, which has remained
unnoticed, although its effects were at the time very sensibly felt. When Con
gress resolved, more in the spirit of policy than of faith, not to carry into effect
the convention of Saratoga, the troops captured with Burgoyne were marched
into the interior of Virginia, and here they were subsisted altogether by Vir-
fo-mia. The subsistence of prisoners, at this time, required of the state two
thousand rations per day, and was so much subtracted from her capacity to
supply the wants of the southern army; yet, the southern commander was
prohibited from exchanging these troops, even for the southern troops, then in
the prison ships of Charleston. But, a far greater cause of exhaustion to
Virginia was the unbounded license which every state then exercised, of keep
ing just what militia they pleased in the field. Virginia, at this time, had to
furnish 3000 rations per day for her own camp.
The government of Virginia, it would seem, began to be impatient at being
for ever enlisting, and yet never having troops in the field ; and the combining
and investigating headof Steuben was called into requisition to furnish the
remedy. The following lines, from his pen to the governor of Virginia, may
furnish useful hints to those who shall hereafter be engaged in the same under
taking. ;• *
" By the long continuance of a war, it is natural that the difficulty and
expense of raising men should be increased; and, therefore, every possible
means should be employed for the preservation of the men after they are
56

442 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, raised ; and every abuse which has a contrary tendency should be inquired
,into, and those who commit them severely punished.
" The incomplete state our regiments have always been in, has had a very
bad effect in this respect. The regiments were obliged to be incorporated into
one another, and the officers being shifted about, no longer had that attachment
to their men, which is necessary for their preservation. On the contrary, being
disgusted at this instability, and smallness of their commands, they became
careless of the men, and suffered them to absent themselves when well; and
when sent away sick, took no pains for their recovery or return; and every
doctor in a hospital gave furloughs and discharges, whereby numbers of them
have been lost to the service. As discharges from the army have been without
any prescribed form, and none printed, it is more than probable that many
have been counterfeited by deserters, who have then returned with impunity
to their homes," &c. ,
Virginia had but partially followed the wise example of some of the other
states, in enlisting for the war. It was now too late, the demand for sub
stitutes increased as the requisitions of militia multiplied, and very small
indeed was the number which even a high bounty could tempt, from the
more lucrative, and less permanent, and less rigid service of a militia
substitute. Hence a measure was forced upon her; which for energy and
wisdom, was excelled by no measure of the American war. This was a'
conscription ; such an one as will one day be adopted by the United States,
and after that day, she need never fear a foreign war. National feeling
seems lately to have been interested in arrogating to Virginia, the honor of
having given motion to the ball of the revolution, but it would be enough
for national pride to assert the less incontestible claim of having originated
this measure, although on a defective planv
• The whole population of the state Was equitably distributed into 2904
divisions, and each was required to furnish a man, or stand a draft for
eighteen month's service, and other specific contributions were imposed in
the same just and efficient mode.
The very spirited resolutions adopted by Virginia at this time, plainly
exhibit, that if the public energy had for a time flagged, the spring had now
resumed its elasticity. Yet such was the baleful influence of the militia
requisitions over enlistments for the regular army, that when the brigade
in service under Stevens, was about being discharged, Steuben solicited the
adjutant general not to order out a relief of the same species of troops,
assuring him that the war could not be carried on by militia. And even
after Greene had retreated across the Dan, and pressing necessity woMd have

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. , 443
made any species of reinforcements welcome, he consoles his commander for chap.
the loss of the detachment which had been halted and discharged when ^J~^
most wanted, by assuring him that while the militia are on foot, all re
cruiting of the regular troops is at an end. Yet, if the wisdom of man could
have suggested an expeditious, and effectual mode of filling the ranks of
% the Virginia contingent, it was that of a draft. • For although the demand for
militia substitutes, might for a while maintain the struggle for ascendency,
the union of powers and efforts, which forms the basis of the conscriptive
plan, must in the end have triumphed, had there been strength enough in
the civil arm to carry it into effect.
Ever since General Greene had taken the command, Maryland had much
exceeded Virginia in the number of her troops in the field. After the dread
ful reduction of their ranks at the defeat of Gates, a number of recruits
and stragglers of that line, had been collected and sent on to the army. That
state very early adopted the wise policy of enlisting for the war, and the
excellent effect of it was sensibly felt at the Cowpens, at Guilford, and the
Eutaws. On the 17th February, the Maryland troops in the field were
returned at 1312, but want of clothing, severe service and small detachments,
had reduced the number fit for duty, much below the aggregate.
The Delaware troops also, it will be recollected, had suffered very severely
at the defeat of Gates. This little corps, although numbering but about 60
or 80 effectives, was the admiration of the army, and their leader Kirkwood
was the American Diomed. Like the Marylanders they had been enlisted
for the war, and like the veterans of that brigade, were not excelled by any
troops in America, perhaps in the world. The attention of General Gist,
it will be recollected, had been devoted to soliciting aid from the legislatures of
these two states, but not with the most satisfactory result. A few recruits
were occasionally sent on, but the number in service from these two states,
at no time exceeded the present return. -'Georgia, South Carolina, and
North Carolina had not a single regular in the field. The miserable remnant
• of their troops were all pining in the prison ships of Savannah apd Charleston.
Immediately after the fall of Charleston, South Carolina, was entirely over
run, and her constituted authorities captured or dispersed. Georgia had been
similarly situated from the fall of Savannah. And North Carolina, exhausted,
distracted and enfeebled, had never bent her attention to the raising of new
troops. But their legislature were at this time in session at Newbern, and
urged. not less by the remonstrances of Greene than by their own zeal and
patriotism, were seriously devising means for raising a regular force.

444 • MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. The reinforcement with which General Greene determined to recross the
x *
, Dan, consisted altogether of volunteers from Virginia and North Carolina. The
people of Halifax, county, particularly exhibited a noble zeal on this occasion.
Such was the promising appearance of the temper of the people in the country
adjacent to his camp, that Greene promptly resolved to take advantage of the
tide that now set towards him. General Stevens had scarcely delivered his
prisoners, and halted to deliver at Pittsylvania court house the public arms
which had been furnished to his brigade ; when, accompanied by a few fol
lowers, zealous as himself, he repaired to the head-quarters of the commanding
general. His arrival was the most fortunate incident imaginable, for it enabled
Greene to furnish the Virginians with a popular and able officer of their own
state. On the 19th February, Stevens received an order from Greene to
engage any number of volunteers in the public service, for the term of six
weeks. Before the 23d he had near 1000 men enrolled.
It will readily be conceived that the spirit of volunteering had received its
direction and impulse from some influential quarter. However strong may
be the working of popular feeling, men generally wait for the example and
countenance of those who possess the public confidence. It would be in
justice to two distinguished patriots of the revolution, not to notice the share
they had in this noble effort of individual patriotism. These were Patrick
Henry and Thomas Jefferson.
A late writer has noticed the conduct of the latter gentleman about this
period, with imputations of which, judging from the evidence before us, we
should be disposed to pronounce him every way undeserving. Never did an
officer of the United States experience more cordial and zealous support, than
that which Greene received at this time from Governor Jefferson. That the
governor's effort in another quarter should have been less ready, less judicious, or
less efficient, it is difficult to conceive. Every reqmsition of the commanding
general was promptly complied with ; the militia of the neighbouring countries
ordered into the field, and several active and spirited measures pursued for
replenishing Washington's corps of horse. Indeed it is a well known fact that
Ms popularity was at this time greatly affected, by charges of his having done
too much ; and if we suppose Ms efforts in other quarters to have been met
with the same querulous spirit, it is not difficult to assign a cause why there was
not sufficient preparation made for repelling the incursions of Arnold.
From the numerous letters from this gentleman now spread before us, we
will only select the following passages :

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

"Richmond, February 17^,1781. chap.

'•In the moment of receiving your letter of the 10th, I issued orders to thev
counties of Washington, Montgomery, Botetourt and Bedford for seven hun
dred and odd riflemen, and to those of Henry and Pittsylvania, for four hun
dred and odd of their militia. Yet my trust is that neither these nor the
adjacent counties have awaited orders, but that they have turned out and will
have joined you in greater numbers than we have directed. I shall be glad if
you will call. on the neighbouring county lieutenants, for any succours which
you may. want and circumstances forbid to be delayed.
" P. S§. Since writing the above we are told Lord Cornwallis has advanced to
the Roanoke. I am, in consequence, issuing orders to embody every man be
tween this and that, for whom a firelock can be procured, and that they
march to join you." " Richmond, February 18th, 1781.
" I have this moment received yours of the 15th from Boyd's ferry. I had
heard yesterday of the approach of Lord Cornwallis, and gave orders in con
sequence, for embodying so many of the militia between this place and that as
could be armed, and of this gave you information in a letter of yesterday's
date. I hoped, at the same time, that the militia would not await my orders ;
and by the letters I receive, I trust they have not. I sincerely wish you may
find it practicable to avoid a general action, till you can be sufficiently re-
enforced with militia, which I am sure you will be as far as arms can be found.
The moment I hear Lord Cornwallis has crossed the Dan, I shall order every
man to be embodied on tMs side the river, witiiin a reasonable distance, who
can be armed. I shall attend, as far as depends on me, to officering the militia
as you recommend, [with continental officers] and mounting the cavalry. As
to yourself, I would advise, that you make no scruples about property, so far
as it is wanted for the public ; only give orders, that the owners be furnished
with proper documents, that they may be reimbursed."
" P. S. Take horses to mount your cavalry, and I will undertake to have it
justified." The day following, regular press warrants for this purpose were forwarded ;
and to give countenance and aid to the commanding general, in the measures
which he might find it necessary to pursue, a Major M'Gill, a gentleman of
respectable standing, was dispatched to attend the camp, and lend his personal
assistance wherever it could be beneficial.

x.

446 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. R is not in our power to give any thing of this date from the pen of the
, celebrated Patrick Henry ; for it is an acknowledged fact, that pen,, ink and
paper, were to Mm the objects of habitual loathihg. But, Ms patriotism needs
not a written record to support its reputation. On this occasion, he also dis
patched an envoy to camp, with a tender of his ever ready aid. The answer
of the general is before us, requesting him to set on foot a corps of volunteers,
1500 in number, if practicable. Henry's envoy had been dispatched at so
early a day, as to have reached the army when it lay at Guilford ; and the
advantage in point of time, not less than the winged zeal of voluntary service,
had brought Henry's volunteers into the field, much earlier than the drafted
men of the governor.
The following extract of the letter to Mr. Henry, written on this occasion,
will not be unacceptable to the reader; " February 10th, 1781.
" My force is too inconsiderable to confine the limits of the enemy's depre
dations, or in any wise to check the rapidity of their march through tMs
unhappy country. My duty compels me to retreat immediately, as the
only means eventually to save the country. Your influence in Virginia, pro
perly exerted at this important period, may terminate the war greatly to the
honor and advantage of the southern states. If it is possible for you to call
forth fifteen hundred volunteers, and march them immediately to my assis
tance, the British army will be exposed to a very critical and dangerous
situation. In all probability, you will find me on the north side of the Dan
river. I must repeat it, the present moment is big with the most important
consequences, and requires the greatest and most spirited exertions. You, I
know, are equal to them, and I trust no step will be omitted that may be
necessary to call forth the power of your part to the country."
The spirited and rapid concentration of the volunteers under Stevens,
enabled the commanding general to resume aggressive operations on the 23d
of February. On that day he recrossed the Dan with the main army, with a
resolution to cut off the British army from the upper country, and either force
it upon Steuben, who was ordered to watch any attempt that might be made
to strike across the country below; or oblige it to retreat to Wilmington, through ,
a country great part of which is barren; and in passing through which, there
was great reason to believe, it might be exposed to imminent danger, should
the militia collect with spirit in its front and on its flanks.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 447
Great as was the reluctance of the American commander again, to expose chap.
his barefooted troops to the severity of this service, the object was too inviting s^-^^>'
to admit of hesitation. From this time also, every moment was influenced by
the necessity of making the most of the time that his reinforcements were
engaged for, and in keeping up the excitement which motion communicates
to a species of troops, whose spirits soon flagg in a state of inactivity ; nor
was he less controlled in his measures by the obvious importance of repressing
that excitement which the presence of the British army was likely to produce
among the settlements of loyalists. Lord Cornwallis had now seated himself
down in his land of promise, and the alarming hatelligence had reached the
American commander, that he had succeeded in forming no less than seven
companies of royalists in one day, in Hillsborough.'
When the" British commander abandoned the banks of the Dan, he must
still have*entertained the hope of drawing his wary adversary into some act
of indiscretion. It is impossible otherwise to account for the apparent inde
cision of his movements. Instead of pursuing the direct road to Hillsborough,
his first day's march was up the course of the river, on the rout by which he
had pursued the retreating Americans, and appeared to threaten the party
under Pickens, or indicate an attempt to cross the river above Boyd's. The
next was in a direction nearly contrary, and indicated a view to the magazines
and stores, (now on the east bank of the Roanoke) or an intention to take a
route below, for pushing on to the shores of the Chesapeake. The tMrd was
in a direction nearly at right angles, or rather retrograde to the last, and led
directly to Hillsborough. Here he arrived on the 20th, and erected the
British standard, fondly flattering himself and his employers that the state was
conquered. Nothing was farther from the truth, and chagrine and disappoint
ment soon attended the development of his error.
Immediately on his arrival at Hillsborough, appeared the British commander's
celebrated proclamation- reciting, "that it had pleased the divine providence
to prosper his majesty's arms in driving the rebel army out of the province, and
as it was his majesty's most gracious wish to rescue his loyal and faithful sub
jects from the cruel tyranny under which they had groaned for several years,
calling upon his loyal and faithful subjects to. repair without loss of time to
his standard, equiped with arms, and furnished with ten days provisions." At
the same time appeared an advertisement, calling upon his majesty's loyal and
faithful subjects able and" willing to undertake to raise independent companies
to be formed into regiments, to give in their names immediately at head-quar
ters, and offering a bounty M guineas and lands to the men who should enlist
under them.

448 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Nothing could be more flattering than the prospects of the British com-
, mander, for the first three days after the appearance of these publications.
The most earnest professions of loyalty greeted his ear, and the crowds of
inhabitants who thronged around Ms camp, promised a rich harvest of recruits.
But, suddenly the crowd began to drop away, and the dissipation of his proud
hopes was soon accounted for by intelligence, that Greene, being reinforced',
had recrossed the Dan, and was marching in a direction to intercept his com
munication with the upper country, wMle Pickens and Lee were already in
view of his camp.
It was on this occasion that Lord Cornwallis wrote to the British ministry,
that he was surrounded by timid friends and inveterate enemies. The dangers
of his situation began now to open on his view; and to fight his antagonist,
became from tMs time as much a matter of necessity, as it had bfejen before a
matter of choice. The waning state of his stores — the falling off or his men
by desertion — the defection of the wary loyalists — the alarm from all quar
ters, of the advance of the hostile militia, and not less, a consciousness that he
had made no friends in his advance through the country — plMnly showed that
he had now no alternative, but conquest or destruction. The army of
Greene must be dissipated or driven off, or his own discomfiture was scarcely
avoidable. The numerous precautions adopted by the American commander to watch
the steps of the enemy, on the first appearance of motion in his camp, affords
an instructive specimen of military vigilance. An entire new combination of
measures and designs was now forming ; the views of the enemy in every move
ment were to be cautiously looked into, and it was as necessary to guard
against those that were mere feints, as to prepare to counteract those which
were real.
The waving handkerchief of a patriotic female, who had stolen under
covert of the bank, was the concerted signal that the enemy had commenced
a retreat from the Dan. Immediately every thing was in motion in the
American camp. Major Pierce, one of the general's aids, with a small but
select escort, equipped equally to fight or to fly, hung upon their wings and col
lected and dispatched intelligence. Colonels Williams and Campbell, too
eminent partisan leaders of the North Carolina militia, with their faithful
adherents on horse back, patrolled the banks of the river and guarded the
passes above. And Colonel Otho Williams, with the same select detachment
that had been placed under his command at Guilford, was pushed across the
river, to hang on the rear of the enemy, watch Ms movements, and if his inten«

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 449
tion should be to move on for Wilmington, by all possible means to retard his chap.
inarch. . ^^^^
Whilst the infantry of Williams' detachment approached with more cautious
steps the rear of the enemy ; the legion, under Lee, supported by two companies
of Marylanders, and the cavalry, under Washington, were pushed forward by
different routes on his wings.
Colonel Washington continued his march parallel to that of the enemy, until
he fully ascertained its direction towards Hillsborough, when he retraced his
steps and attached himself to Colonel Williams. The range of Colonel Lee was
of far greater duration and extent. He was now in the very element of his
talents. Better scope for the exercise of his partsian powers could not be
coveted, and we find him every hour meditating or executing some new
exploit. His communications, which were frequent and hurried, exhibit the
greatest activity, zeal and intelligence. On the right, on the left, in the rear
of the enemy, wherever service could be performed, or intelligence collected,
we find him continually occupied, and forever changing his positions, to guard
against surprise. At length, on the day that Cornwallis took the direct route to
Hillsborough, suspecting from its being the direct route also to Wilmington, that
the event which he knew his commander most deprecated, was about to take
place, -he formed the resolution to throw himself in the front of the whole
British army, and by forming a junction with Butler or Governor Nash, then
marching up the Cape Fear, to prevent, if possible, the escape of Lord Corn
wallis to his shipping, until Greene could be upon him with a reinforced army.
The letter in which this communication is made, contains a passage too
strikingly characteristic to be omitted : — " Should the enemy move on towards
Cross Creek, [the route to Wilmington] I have determined to get in their
front, in order to cause every opposition in my power, with the view of de
laying their progress. In this service I must lose men ; and rely on your
, promise for the filling up of the legion." This was all the boon that he asked
for exposing them to loss, or himself 'to the mortification of a diminished com
mand. At length, having fully ascertained, that the present views of Lord Cornwallis
did not threaten an immediate escape, and being informed that his pickets
exhibited all that consciousness of security which flows from the supposed
absence of danger, he resolved, on the morning of the 22d, to strike a blow at
one posted at Hart's Mills two and a half miles from Hillsborough, and make
prisoners for obtaining intelligence. Captain Egleston,; of the legionary corps,
was accordingly dispatched for the purpose ; and with the, boldness and precau
tion which always distinguished that officer, he approached the position of the
57

450 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, picket — But, what was his surprise, to find himself anticipated, and, the -whole
^-vw/ picket already killed, or in possession of an American party.
This service had been performed by a'party commanded by Colonel Hugh
M'Call, detached for the purpose by. General Pickens. That indefatigable
officer, the moment he learned that Lord Cornwallis, after a day's march
towards him, had taken a contrary direction, dispatched intelligence of it to
General Greene, and received from him instructions to put his command in
motion,, and press upon the enemy's rear. The necessities of their families,
had obliged one half of his command to return to their homes; but, the gallant
little band under M'Call still adhered to him, and by the accession of volun
teers from Virginia and North Carolina, their numbers were increased to 360
rank and file, consisting of the party of horse formed under M'Call at the
affair of the Cowpens, about 45 in number, and the rest, well mounted
riflemen. With this party he had advanced upon Cornwallis by the direct
route frpm Guilford to Hillsborough, and without knowing of his near approach
to the party under Lee, although apprized of their being on the same service,
had anticipated him in the enterprise against the British picket. The two
parties immediately after formed a junction, and found themselves in force to
brave more hazardous enterprizes.*
The obvious effect produced on the minds of the loyalists by the military
insult of the morning, indicated to Lord Cornwallis, the necessity of driving
away a party supposed to consist only of Lee's command ; so silent had been
the approach of Pickens, that his presence was not suspected, nor was it less
necessary for the purpose of protecting the loyalists who were now embodying
at different rendezvous appointed by their leaders. A detachment under
Tarleton was accordingly sent out, and never did a detachment more narrowly
escape destruction, for it passed very near the American force without knowing
of their presence. It was probably an overmatch for Lee's legion, especially
as it was furnished with two pieces of light artillery ; but, by the junction of the
party under Pickens, there was a decided superiority in numbers on the Ame
rican side. The march of this party was not known to the Americans until
the morning of the ensuing day.
On the night of the 21st, conformably to an intimation previously given to
General Pickens, General Greene, attended by a small escort of dragoons,
visited the former in his camp ; and having spent the greatest part of the night

* Colcnd Lee is quite mistaken with regard to the time and circumstances of his junction wit&
Pickens.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 451

X.

in his bush tent, iu consultation with himself and Colonel Lee on their future chap
measures, the two generals, wrapped in their cloaks, shared the same blanket
in a refreshing nap, preparatory to the labours of the ensuing day. Greene
then committed the whole detachment to the command of Pickens; and after
exhorting the two commanders in the most earnest and affectionate manner,
to let nothing disturb their harmony, and partaking of the sorry fare afforded
by Pickens' wigwam, he took his departure for Williams' head quarters.
The orders given to Pickens were, to make every effort to prevent the em
bodying of the loyalists, and impede the progress-of the British army, should
their commander attempt to retreat, before the main army could advance to
attack it. And, as several rendezvous of loyalists had been appointed in the
fork of the Haw and Deep rivers, and a position in that quarter would also be
in the way of the retreat of the British army to Wilmington, that tract of
country was particularly recommended to his attention. It was this fear of the
escape of Cornwallis, that had brought Greene to Pickens' encampment within
dghteen miles, and to the westward, of the British lines, and very narrowly
must he have escaped Tarleton in making the visit. In the letter which
announces his intention to obtain a personal interview, he writes, " 20th February.
" I'beg you will continue to pursue the enemy, and harass them as much as
possible. I have been joined by 1000 militia from this state, and expect 1000
more in a few days. If we can but delay Lord Cornwallis a day or two, he
must be ruined. 1 am sensible that your exertions have been very great.''
On the following day, he writes : — " Push up with their rear as soon as
possible — Colonel Lee, with Ms legion, is in full pursuit— Colonel Williams,
with the light infantry, is also on the march — The army will cross the river in
t'.io m or Mag with a considerable reinforcement of militia — If we can get up
with the enemy, I have no doubt of giving a good account of him- — Send
another express after Campbell, to push on with all imaginable dispatch —
Every thing depends upon it."
By the examination of the prisoners taken in the morning, the, American
general became satisfied that the enemy had no immediate intention of moving
southwardly. The impression that such was his design, had been produced
by a movement across the little river Eno, one of the heads of the Neuse,
running within a mile of Hillsborough. But, it was now ascertained, that the
sole object of the detachment inarched in that direction was, to take possession
of a commanding eminence, from which the army might have been annoyed

452 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, inks encampment. This bore the appearance of taking a post, and the Ame
rican commander was no longer in doubt about his enemy's motives. He saw
that the flattering appearances of loyalty in the people, and the -obvious dangers
attendant on a retreat, had led to a resolution to endeavour to hold the coun
try. NotMng now remained to be done but to prepare for the decisive blow
by hastening on his reinforcements, while he occupied, with the main army,
a position the most favourable for covering their concentration, and for
cutting off the enemy's communication with the upper country. With these
views, the army was crossed over the Dan, and marched towards the head
waters of the Haw river, on the route tb Guilford, in a westerly direction, and
encamped successively at Dobb's ferry, the plantation of Colonel Moore, and
the high rock ford on the Haw river.
In the mean time Pickens lost not a moment in performing the services
committed to his charge. Directing his march in a line nearly parrallel to
that of the main army, and about twenty miles distant from it, he contemplated
passing the Haw, and by secret and rapid movements to disperse the tories.
at their several rendezvous. This route soon brought him upon the trail of
Colonel Tarleton, and all his apprehensions were awakened for several rein
forcements of militia, whom he new to be marching to join him. One in
particular under the command of Colonel Preston, and another under Colonel
W. Campbell, he knew to be far advanced on their march. Colonel Locke,
also had been left in his rear with a party of foot, when he advanced
with his mounted men to the British lines at Hillsborough. Without hesi
tation therefore, he resolved to hasten forward in pursuit of Tarleton, and
direct Ms first efforts towards the safety of his friends. As they were without
cavalry, he anticipated their fate, should they fall, within the reach of Tarleton's
sabres. There was no difficulty in determining the route of the British party,
the smoking ruins of the settlements of the whigs, marked their course for many
miles ahead. General Butler's plantation which lay in their route, was a
particular object of their desolating valour. And the firm remonstrances of
Major Car, an inoffensive old man, but a firm whig, was answered by a gash
of the broad sword, and the mockery of the plundering soldiery.
Such was the expedition with which the American party pressed the pursuit,
that at noon of the 25th, they were near surprising their enemy when securely
seated at his dinner. The necessary halt in making arrangments for the attack,
gave the enemy time to move off and cross the Haw, at a fording place which
was too convenient to cause any delay : this was done without the least suspicion
of the approaching danger. Pickens followed on with expedition, resolved
to give his enemy no time to receive intelligence of his near approach. This,

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 453
but for one fortunate circumstance, would have been impossible. Nothing chap.
could be more unexpected to the natives, than an American party marching ^t~^
from Hillsborough. His command was therefore taken for a reinforcement to
that under Tarleton, and as the uniform of the legion was precisely that of
the legion commanded by the British colonel, the American commander found
no difficulty in keeping up the deception. "Never" says General Pickens in
his communication to General Greene, " was there a more glorious opportunity
of cutting off a detachment than this ; when, pushing on with the utmost hope,
and our men in the highest spirits, our sanguine expectations were blasted by
our falling in with a body of from two to three hundred tories under the
command of a Colonel Piles."
The situation of the American commander was now embarrassing in the
extreme ; but having ascertained, from the confident approach of a courier from
the party, that the general deception had been communicated to Colonel Piles,
he boldly resolved to pass him without an eclaircissement, and proceed on to
the attack of Tarleton, then within one mile, and ecamped without an appre
hension of danger. Piles, unfortunately, inspired with a loyal desire to pay
due homage to his majesty's troops, had drawn up his men on the right of the
road very near to its margin ; they were all mounted, and their guns resting
on their shoulders. So complete was the imposition, that the dragoons which
marched in files in front, their swords drawn, had reached the extremity of
Piles' line, before a suspicion was excited. The infantry of the legion might
also have passed, and probably the militia, for there was nothing to distinguish
them from the troops with Tarleton, but unfortunately, the Maryland companies,
under Lee, had been too familiarly known in that neighbourhood, and their
uniform had nothing like it, in the British army. Their appearance detected
the deception, and the instantaneous discharge of a few guns at the rear of the
cavalry brought the whole of that corps about upon the unfortunate loyalists.
What followed was chiefly the result of a very few minutes. Those who did
not sink under the first onset of the cavalry, broke away in confusion, and
many fell beneath a volley from the riflemen. Pickens made the most earnest
efforts to suppress the firing; though the dictates of humanity had not influenced
him, the fear of alarming the unsuspecting Tarleton would have suggested it.
But in a pell mell affair of this kind, even with regular troops, time would be
requisite to convey and enforce such an order. One hundred were left dead
upon the field, and very few escaped, not greviously wounded. Their com
mander fell under many strokes of the sword, but survived, although dreadfully
mutilated.

454 MAJOR GENERAL.', GREENE.'
chap. This was a daV of tears and lamentation to that neighbourhood. Many a-
x . - ^
,soii, a husband, and a father, met with a mast sudden and unexpected- fate.
The soul sickens at such an instance of unresisted slaughter, and it has called
down the severest animadversions upon the conduct of the American party,
Jt is enough to be said of it, that there cannot be found such another instance of
military execution inflicted by the American arms in the whole history of the
revolution. Far be it from us to stand forth the apologist of unnecessary
bloodshed. Yet two things cannot be denied, that the humanity of Pickens
was proverbial, and that Colonel Lee was never charged with any other in
stance of unnecessary severity. Let the extraordinary peculiarity of the
circumstances attending the affair be considered, and it will be difficult to point
out how such an issue could have been avoided. The first blow would pro
bably be decisive between the parties. Had the enemy been allowed time to
deliver their fire, the cavalry would have been prostrated, and that event would
have brought destruction upon the whole corps; for Tarleton would soon have
been upon the infantry. Nor would the evil have stopped there, the dispersion
of this party must have been followed by that of all the detachments on their
inarch to join it. It is appalling to follow up the train of consequences.
It is asserted that many of the sufferers endeavoured to stay the impending
sword by the most earnest professions of loyalty. This is true, and easily ac
counted for; the deception had only been detected on their left, the Maryland
troops were visible to no others, and great must have been the astonishment of
the far greater number of the party at such an unaccountable assault. Colonel
Tarleton relates, that some of the fugitives hurried to his camp exhibiting their
wounds, with a grevious complaint against the cruelty of his dragoons, and
that this was the first explanation given him of the firing which had been
heard from his camp; a decisive proof that the unfortunate loyalists had been
sacrificed by fortune not less to Ms safety, than to that of his enemy.
With regard to the fate of these unfortunate men, one ,fact never has been
contested— that the firing of their own party on the left was the signal for their
destruction. Colonel Lee asserts that his own intention was to make the dis
covery of the real character of his party to the enemy, and urge them to submit
and retire to their homes in safety; he even asserts that he had already seized
the hand of Piles and was commencing the explanation when the firing com*
menced. General Pickens says nothing ofthispartof the ruse de guerre,
practised upon the loyalists; and by referring to Colonel Lee's own letter of
the 26th, on the official files, we are induced to think him mistaken in his recol
lection, since he only says, "The legion cavalry passed them agreeably to
order, as if British troops. I did this that no time might be lost in reaching

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 455
Colonel Tarleton, the enemy discovered their mistake, &c." But, which ever chap.
of the two accounts be adopted, it is obvious that no present mischief was meant s_^v-*_
to the loyalists ; and but for their unfortunate fire upon the rear of the cavalry,
they would cither have been made prisoners, or passed unmolested. If also, it
be admitted, that the cavalry were withheld from the pursuit, as Colonel Lee
asserts, there will be addfd another strong evidence of the humane intentions
of the American commanders. On this point however, it must be acknow
ledged there hangs some obscurity; since Pickens in his official letter of the 26th
assigns as the cause why they did not immediately proceed against Tarleton
that "unfortunately the dragoons got separated from us, and our militia could
not be kept from firing. This brought night on us, &c."
But, notwithstanding the approach of darkness, the American commander
resolved not to rest until he had thrown himself between Tarleton and the
approaching reinforcements. For this purpose, the detachment was ordered
to proceed ; and a place of encampment being selected, three miles in advance
of the British party, Pickens halted for the night, and made every arrange
ment for attacking the enemy by the break of day. Never was there a more
fortunate step taken than this ; for, one mile beyond the American encamp
ment, Colonel Preston, with 300 respectable followers, had halted for the
night ; and at small intervals beyond him, were two other small detachments of
about 1 00 each, under Majors Winston and Armstrong. To have conquered
Tarleton, would have entitled Pickens to the laurel, but, the oaken wreath he
unquestionably earned this day. Colonel Tarleton had heard of the approach
of these small parties, and was at. that moment meditating their destruction.
For Pickens to have added to the two fortunate occurrences already related,
the third, of subduing the enemy he was pursuing, would have been too much
good fortune to be comprised within a single circle of the sun. It would
have ended in the expulsion, if not complete reduction of Cornwallis' army:
for, Tarleton's detachment was very respectable, comprising all the cavalry of
the British army, two pieces of artillery, and 250 infantry. Its construction
was strikingly similar, though not equal in number, to that which he com
manded on the day of the Cowpens; and before him lay about 250 of the
men whose prowess he had once so severely experienced, and under one of
the most conspicuous of the commanders in that memorable field. Deprived
of Ms cavalry, and of so large a portion of his infantry, Lord Cornwallis must
"have attempted a retreat, and it was scarcely possible for him to have suc
ceeded, with the mounted militia swarming around him in all directions.
To the American commander, the prospects of success were the most flatter
ing that could be imagined, He had 250 excellent bayonets— Lee's and

456 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. M'Call's cavalry nearly equalled the enemy's in number, and far excelled them
,in mounting; and in addition to the 300 marksmen already under him, he was
joined that night by Colonel Preston's command of 360 more, all hardy moun
taineers, and the most expert riflemen. Thus, he counted nearly double the
numbers of Ms enemy; and the celerity of his movements might have stripped
his adversary of the advantage of his artillery. A rout once commenced, not
a man could have escaped the expert horsemen with which Pickens' army
abounded. But, fate had assigned the fall of Lord Cornwallis to other hands. Tarleton
had no suspicion that he was in the face of so superior an enemy ; and had such
confidence in his strength, as to have actually drawn up his men at midnight,
intending, by a circuitous route, to strike at Preston, whom he supposed to be
still in his encampment, and thus to have placed himself in a situation, from
which he could not have been extricated — when an express from Lord Cornwallis
recalled him instantly to Hillsborough.* The British commander, it has beerr
before mentioned, had, on that day, heard of the advance of the American
army, and his fears were all awakened for the safety of Tarleton's detachment.
Such was his uneasiness on account of their exposed situation, that courier
followed courier to the number of three, to hasten their return. Colonel Tarle
ton obeyed ; and marched off with such precaution, that he had gained an hour
and a half upon his march, before his movement was discovered by the
American centinels. On the first intimation of the unwelcome tidings, the
American detachment was put in motion ; and pursued with such rapidity, as
to reach the banks of the river just as the enemy's rear guard ascended the
opposite shore. The artillery, posted on an eminence commanding the ford,
rendered pursuit in that direction impracticable; and, to ascend the river and
cross it at the nearest place where it was passable, would give the enemy an
advantage on the march, which could not again be redeemed, before he would
meet with the support which would certainly be marched to his relief. The
conjecture, in this respect was right, for a strong detachment had been pushed
forward to cover the retreat of Tarleton, which he soon met, after leaving the
banks of the river on the route to Hillsborough.
The events of this day present a strikmg picture of the uncertain issue of
all militiary movements. Two incidents, not at all connected with the move
ments of the two detachments, and which, had they occurred but a few
minutes later, would have been unconsequential — had, at two several times,

* Tarleton's Camp, 233.

X.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 457
saved the British detachment, when unsuspicious of danger; three several chap.
corps of patriotic citizens, were rescued from destruction, when least appre- ,
pensive of it, by a providential event, which they were actually ignorant of;
and a large number of unfortunate men had suffered death, or mutilation,
while they hailed an enemy as their deliverers— and that too from hands
which were raised against them, without a previous design, and contrary to the
wishes and views of the American commanders. The tale would appear like
fiction to one who had not before him the most authentic evidence of its truth.
Should a doubt be suggested, so far as it varies from the picture of the same
events drawn by Colonel Lee, the reader will recollect, that, that writer had
not before him the official correspondence of the day ; and being himself sub
ordinate in command, he was not necessarily privy to the communications
made by and to the commanding general, or the commander of the detach
ment. The reader must not be misled by the diminished figure given to his
commander on the colonel's canvass; for Pickens was never a mere nominal
commander ; although the most unaffected and unassuming of men, he was an
able and energetic officer; and, although the suavity of his manner might dis
guise his character, he had a firmness about him that would be obeyed. For
the light in which he was viewed by the commanding general, we will refer
the reader to the following extract:

General Greene to General Pickens,
"Camp at Dobbins's, February 26th, 1781.
" I have now to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters of the 23d,
wherein you acquMnt me with the surprise of a British picket, by Colonel
M'Call, and another of the 26th, with intelligence of the defeat of a body of
tories under Colonel Piles, by the detachment under your command. It gives me
infinite pleasure whenever I have an opportunity of expressing my thanks to
officers and soldiers, who can embrace opportunities of ornamenting their fame
by serving their country. The afiair of Colonel M'Call was executed with
firmness and address, and discovered a spirit of enterprise and genius, which I
shall be ever happy to cherish.
"The defeat of the tories was so happily timed, and in all probability will be
productive of such happy consequences, that I cannot help congratulating you
on your success. My warmest thanks are due to you, Colonel Lee, and all the
officers and 'soldiers under your command, and for the exertions which were
made to bring about so happy an event." 58

X

458 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE
chap. The conjecture of General Greene, respecting the effect of the affair of Piles
,upon the future conduct of the loyalists was soon verified. When the detach
ment under Pickens crossed the Haw and %as penetrating through the Forkw
the inhabitants appeared to be all in motion, preparing to join themselves to
the royal army. The bleeding fugitives, who soon passed their doors, convinc
ed them the service was attended with dangers they had not dreamed of.
From that day they ventured no more beyond their own thresholds. It is said
indeed, that on that very morning, another party of loyalists had suffered by
mistake, under the sabres of the British colonel. The assertion appears in the
annals of that time, and has been copied into Ramsay and several historians of
equal authenticity. Colonel Tarleton in his narrative, has furnished a very
strong corroboration of the fact ; for he takes credit for having dispersed a
body of rebels on his route from Hillsborough ; and as it is known that no
party of rebels, (unless it was poor O'Neal's family party) had been dispersed
on that day, it will follow that either the mistake must be admitted to have
occurred, or the colonel's veracity be questioned. That such an event did
occur on the 4th of this month, rests on unquestonable authority.* Cer
tain it is, that from this time all the British commander's efforts to rouse
the quailing royalists, was like " calling the spirits from the vasty deep." They
shrunk away at the recollection of these disasters. Nor could the presence of
the whole royal army, which was advanced a few days after for their pro
tection, dissipate their apprehensions or tempt them again to embody.
As soon as Colonel Tarleton had rejoined the army, Lord Cornwallis
prepared once more for active operations. Hequickly detected the motives of
the American commander, and promptly resolved on measures to counteract
them. With this view, he abandoned Hillsborough on the 26th, and pursuing the
same route on which Colonel Tarleton had lately operated, threw himself across
the Haw, and took post on the 27th, near Allemance Creek, one of the principal
streams that feed that river. This route ran nearly parrallel to that of the
American general ; and leading directly to Salisbury, was well chosen to coun
teract the design of cutting him off from the Upper country, whilst it lead him
into a country favourable for subsisting his troops, and to a position well calcu
lated to cover the loyalists in the Fork.
This very skillful movement presented to the American general three'
alternatives ; either to offer battle to his antagonists with a certainty of its. being
accepted ; to retreat once more across the Dan, and leave Lord Cornwallis the

Letter to Steuben, 5th March, from Colonel W. 4th March.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 459
undisputed master of the state ; or to preserve in cutting him off from the upper chap.
counties, by advancing still further on the route by Guilford towards Salis- ^^.
bury. He determined on the latter, but it was a movement of the most critical
kind, and a variety of precautions were necessary to strip it of its dangers.
Slowly therefore, he kept pace with the march of his adversary, carefully
avoiding whatever could force him to a general action, and equally providing
for a forward or retrograde movement, which ever way his adversary should
attempt to manoeuvre. • Proceeding thus, he advanced to the heights between
Reedy Fork and Troublesome Creek; having his head-quarters at the Speedwell
Iron Works on the latter, and Boyd's Mill, on the former stream. In the mean
time the American light troops were hovering close around the enemy, teazing
him on his march, pouncing upon his foragmg parties, intercepting intelligence,
beating up his quarters, and wearing out his light troops by incessant calls upon
their services.
Colonel Williams in discharge of the duties assigned him, had ever since the
29th, been constantly employed in watching the movements of the enemy ;
always maintaining a distance proper for supporting his detachments, and equally
proper for securing the support of the main army if requisite. At this time his
command was manceuvering in the vicinity of the Haw River, and Pickens
having fallen back upon the advancing of the British army, the two detach
ments now threw themselves in front of the enemy, one on each side of the
Allemance Creek. Their force by the accession of militia, was so considerable,
that they seriously meditated a combined attack, on the morning of the 2d of
March. Such had been the celerity and secrecy of the movement of the American
detachments, that Lord Cornwallis was conscious of their presence, only by
feeling them, (in military language) throughout the night, and of their numbers,
he appears to have been wholly uninformed. Yet they did not amount to less
than thirteen hundred men. With cautious steps, Williams had approached
within such a distance, as to be able to strike the meditated blow at the first tap
of the reveillee, but under the earnest remonstrances of Colonel Lee, he was
induced to defer the attack until the British army should have resumed its
march ; and subsequent occurrences prevented its being made at all.*
Lord Cornwallis had now advanced as far in that direction, as comported
with his ulterior views ; and his foraging parties in the morning having soon
come upon the centinels of his enemy, a strong party under Colonel Tarleton,
was pushed forward to disperse or drive back his unwelcome neighbours. This

* Colonel Lee, 1st March, 1781.

x

460 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, brought on the skirmish of Allemance Creek, an affair which Colonel Tarleton
,has magnffied infinitely beyond its real importance, and which, as usual, adds
another wreath to his imperishable honours. We are surprised to find in
Colonel Williams' official account of this affair, no other notice of his splendid
antagonist, but that " Colonel Tarleton appeared, but kept at a due distance."
The affair was thus. Not finding the enemy in motion, as he expected,
Williams ordered Colonel Lee, with his legion, and Major Rowland's rifle
battalion, to advance with precaution, and ascertain the present designs of the
British commander. This detachment was soon after joined by a small party
of mounted riflemen from General Pickens' command.* After advancing
about a mile, Lee's flank was fired upon by a party of the enemy, who were
silently advancing, with the same views as themselves — that is, to reconnoitre.
The fire being sudden and unexpected, the mounted riflemen were at first
thrown into some confusion, but soon recovered, dismounted, and prepared
for action. In the mean time, the legion infantry and militia on foot, were
quickly formed, and made as handsome a defence as could have been desired.
The appearance of Tarleton, at this junction, plainly pointed out to Williams,
that a reinforcement was at hand, and he drew his men off, without sustaining
any material loss — very few, not more than three of the Americans fell, and
only 10 were wounded. Tarleton acknowledges a loss of one officer and
twenty men of the guards killed and wounded; but, General Greene rates
them at 7 killed and 40 wounded. The enemy pursued no further, and Wil
liams could not advance upon him when so near the main army.f
The position in which Lord Cornwallis had encamped his army, was in the
Fork of the Haw and Deep rivers, at the point of concurrence of the roads
from Salisbury, from Guilford, from the High Rock Ford, from Cross Creek and
Hillsborough. Colonel Tarleton, who seldom seems disposed to compliment
his commander, remarks on this movement — "That if General Greene lost
the confidence of his friends, by quitting North Carolina, when pursued by a
superior force, Earl Cornwallis likewise relinquished his claim to the supe
riority of the British arms, by abandoning Hillsborough upon the return of the
American general into the province." Yet, whoever will yield a candid
examination to this movement, in relation to all its motives and consequences,
will pronounce it one of the most masterly measures of this intricate campaign.
Besides its effect in counteracting the designs of the American commander, as
already explained ; whether considered with a view to attack or defence,

* O. Williams, 2d March, 1781. t.Letter to Steuben, 5th March, 1781.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 461
advance or retreat, it exhibits the strongest evidence of consummate general- chap.
ship. But, its distinguishing excellence was, that its leading object was ^^^
marked by the most specious appearances, whilst it covered the communication
with his stores at Wilmington, which now began to be a very interesting consi
deration — for hard service had brought distress and nakedness also into Ms
camp. But, the principal object of the movement was, to draw the attention of the
American commander another way, whilst his reinforcements were decoyed
into striking distance, and both they and the arms they were guarding, exposed
to a sudden and unlooked for blow ; and the stratagem was not far from
succeeding, for Colonel Campbell was, at this time, far advanced on his
march to Taylor's Ferry, and on his arrival at that place on the 3d of the
month, hearing that Lord Cornwallis had abandoned Hillsborough, and was
on his march for Salisbury, or Cross Creek, Campbell immediately crossed the
river, and took the direct route for Hillsborough. Generals Butler and Law-
son also, who would otherwise have marched up the north side of the
Roanoke, were induced to advance with their reinforcements of North
Carolina and Virginia militia, by the same route. As due notice of their hav
ing adopted this course was communicated to General Greene, it was still in
his ' power to have obviated the danger, by timely orders to recross the river
and ascend .on its left bank;. but, so anxious was he now for the early arrival
of his reinforcements, and so impressed with the belief, that Lord Cornwallis
meditated an escape, that he permitted them to pursue the route they had
adopted, and trusted to his own vigilance to protect them from being struck
at. Could they have been intercepted, his own fate was scarcely doubtful.
Hence, the two parties under Pickens and Williams, were kept constantly
hoverirtg around the enemy, with instructions, often reiterated, to strike at his
flanks should he leave them for a moment exposed ;* whilst the main army
advanced to Boyd's Mill on Reedy Fork, one of the tributary streams of the
Haw, and lay encamped within fifteen miles of the enemy's position. Thus,
General Greene imagined, that the light companies, by hanging on the skirts
of the enemy, or throwing themselves in his front, could, at any time, im
pede his march, so as to enable the main army to avoid an action, to fly, if
necessary, to the rdief of the re-enforcements, or to approach the enemy's
rear should he attempt a retreat.

* Letter to Colonel Williams, March 4th, from Colonel W. March 5th.

X

462 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Notwithstanding all these precautions, Lord Cornwallis was near eluding
, the vigilance of his adversary, and striking a blow, from wMch it would have
been difficult for the American army to have recovered.
Having now occupied his position for six days, and amused his importunate
attendants with repeated demonstrations on the road to Cross Creek, so as to
draw their attention that way, he suddenly, on the morning of the 6th, .when
the two American commanders least expected it, and when the reinforcement
under Campbell, with thirteen waggons loaded with arms, had already passed
Hillsborough on their way to the High Rock Ford, broke up his camp, and
pushed with great rapidity for that pass. Williams lay that night on the
enemy's left, on a road leading to the same point, and nearly parallel to that
of the enemy's march ; and as soon as it was discovered that the enemy had
decamped, every nerve was strained, first to communicate the intelligence to
the commanding general then encamped at Boyd's Mills, and then to throw
themselves in front of the advancing enemy. The route of both the com
petitors in the race, led to Wetzel's Mills, across the Reedy Fork, and the roads
united a small distance to the southward of that stream. The American de
tachments gained the point of concurrence first; but, they were so closely
pursued by the enemy, that they were obliged to cover their rear while
making the passage of the creek, by parties of riflemen under command of
Colonels Preston and Campbell. This brought on the skirmish gf Wetzell's
Mills, in which, as usual, Colonel Tarleton has slain his thousands, and which
Colonel Lee describes with a variety of amusing little incidents, but with sur
prising general inaccuracy. It is always a relief to us, to be able, on these
occasions, to resort to the narrative of Colonel Otho Williams ; it is illuminated
by the touches of genius, and equally conspicuous for its perspicuity, and for
the air of modesty and authenticity, with which it is delivered.
If the reader will peruse the narrative of this event, as furnished by Colonel
Lee, he will find that, as usual, his commander is thrown in the back ground,
whilst his own full length portrait fills up half the canvass.* The ground of
the picture represents a surprise upon Williams, and the retreating army
covered by Colonels Lee and Clarke. If he will then compare it with the
subjoined letter, he will find that Clarke is substituted for Colonel William
Campbell, and Colonel Preston; and that Colonel Washington, and not
Colonel Lee, covered the rear of the army — that so far was Williams from
being surprised, that the enemy were discovered when yet two miles off, and

* Lee's Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 323.

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 463

x.

that Colonel Lee's services are not noticed on that day, unless it be under the chap.
general observation, that the enemy were " awed by the cavalry" — an obser
vation in which Colonel Washington, who ranked Colond Lee, had at least
an equal right to participate :

Colonel Williams to General Greene.
Camp near the Old Bridge, on the Haw River, lih March, 1781.
Dear General, " Early yesterday morning, I detached an officer with a small party,
desigmng under cover of the fog, to have surprised and brought off one of the
enemy's parties stationed at a mill about a mile from their camp. Soon after,
I was informed by one -of my reconnoitering officers, that the enemy had
decamped early in the morning, and had taken a route leading to my left.
We were instantly in motion — they had approached within two miles of our
position, and their intention was manifestly to surprise us. I immediately
ordered the troops to march to Wiley's [Wetzell's] Mills; and soon after, was
informed by two prisoners, that the enemy were marching for the same place
on a road parallel to that in which we were. We annoyed them by light
flanking parties, and moved on briskly to the mill ; but, were so closely pressed
by Colonel Webster's brigade, and Colonel Tarleton's legion, that I found it
absolutely necessary to leave a covering party under the command of Colonel
Preston. The rest of the troops passed the Reedy Fork, and formed on the
north side without interruption. Very soon after, a brisk fire began on
Colonel Preston's party, which they returned with great spirit. In the mean
time, Colonel Campbell, who had previously, in concert with Lieutenant
Colonel Washington, served as a cover to the retiring troops, passed the creek
above the mill. The ground on this side being very unfavourable, 1 waited
only till Colonel Preston crossed, and then ordered the troops to retire ; the
enemy pursued some distance; but, receiving several, severe checks from
small covering 'parties, and being awed by our cavalry, he thought proper to
halt. We continued to retire about five miles, where we encamped, and were
refreshing ourselves, when Major Burnett delivered the instructions from you,
which induced me to cross the Haw river, and take post here. Our loss is
very inconsiderable; very few were killed, and most of our wounded were
brought off."

464 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. It was not until after Colonel Williams had taken his post on the north east
,bank of the Haw River, that he became possesses of the infcramtion necessary
to point out the real object of this movement of the enemy. It then became
manifest, that the object of the British commander was, to push past the detach
ment under Williams, and strike at a much more important object then nearly
in his reach — to wit, the detachment and escort approaching under Colonel
Richard Campbell of the Virginia line, and the two detachments of militia,
one from Virginia under Lawson, and another from North Carolina under
Butler. But, the activity of the American commander, snatched the prize
from the grasp of the enemy, when it appeared to be almost in his possession.
The moment intelligence was received at head quarters, that the British
army was pushing for the High Rock Ford, the American army was put in mo
tion, to anticipate the views of the enemy; but, the morning's march gained on
Williams, and the rapidity of his movements, now rendered it dangerous to
return by the direct route, as the enemy might be upon the rear of the army,
before the baggage and stores could make good the passage of the river.
This obliged the American general to make a push for another ford higher up
the same stream, and some miles nigher; while his fight companies under
Williams crossed it at the nearest point to their position, and by marching up
while the main army descended the left bank of that stream, they formed a
junction at the High Rock Ford. These well concerted movements succeeded
effectually; and when the British general reached the road, on which he
expectsd to intercept his adversary, ' and force him to action to protect his
advancing reinforcements, or to cut him off from them, and conquer the whole
in detail — he had the mortification to find that, having gained the opposite
bank of the river, the two divisions of the American army would soon form a
junction for the protection of their reinforcements, with the secure possession of
the advantage of occupying the river bank, to oppose his passage. After this
movement, he despaired of ever out-generalling his adversary ; and not daring
to attempt the perilous expedient of a retreat to Wilmington, or expose him
self to the censure of abandoning the contest, he sullenly retired to the head
waters of the other branch of the Cape Fear River, and devoted all his attention
to refreshing his troops, and preparing them for a desperate e'ffort against the
whole united force of his enemy, for which, he now foresaw an oportunity
would be offered him. There was an admirable boldness in this decision, but
it was putting every thing to hazard on a single cast, and could his adversary
have commanded one half the resources that had been promised him, the sur
render of Yorktown must now have been anticipated.

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MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 469
But full to the brim as had been the cup of mortification, that his adversary chap.
had been compelled to receive, there were still many disappointments awaiting ^t^J
the American commander.
On all sides his promised re-enforcements melted into visions. The whole
state of North Carolina at this time had but thirty men with the army, the
gallant Colonel Campbell, who had promised a re-enforcement of one thou
sand hardy mountaineers, flushed with the capture of an entire army on King's
Mountain, had, almost desperate with mortification, presented himself with only
sixty followers. And such was the singular combination of difficulties which
pressed upon the American commander at this time, that, weak and wan-
mg as his force was, he was obliged to detach some of his most faithful followers
on distant services, and to dismiss others, or disband his army.
From the time that General Pickens joined General Morgan, it has been
seen, that he had never rested a day. Most of the officers and men under
him, had been engaged in the most active services ever since the fall of Charles
ton. In all this time, they had received neither clothing nor pay, and came
into service mounted at their own expense. They were not of that class of
men, who can minister to their own wants, by invading the comforts of others ;
most, if not all of them were men of respectable connexions and comfortable
property. But their condition now was scarcely to be tolerated ; they had not
the clotMng necessary to common decency. Yet no one deserted, no one
murmured, but foregoing the privilege of volunteers, they resisted the examples
of hundreds, who daily, came and went as they pleased, setting authority at
nought ; and never winced from their duty, even in the midst of retreat, pri
vation and suffering. At length, however, their commander could not forbear
calling the attention of the commanding general, to their clMms and sufferings.
In the neighbourhood of their friends, their tattered wardrobes might be re
plenished, but from any other quarter^ the prospect was still far distant, if not
hopeless. Yet no demand for a discharge was hinted at ; but the obvious ne
cessity of their return at this time, could not be resisted. — The enemy were
embodying the negroes in South Carolina into regiments, and appearances on
the frontier threatened a serious invasion from the Indians : not only their
apprehensions, but those of the commanding general were seriously awakened
for the fate of their familes and connexions ; and General Pickens was ordered
to repair with his followers to the back parts of South Carolina, to protect the
whigs, suppress the loyalists, and co-operate with General Sumpter in the active
enterprizes in which that indefatigable patriot was at this time engaged.
This was the only militia force which General Greene as yet ever had under
him, on whose services he could venture to calculate from day to day ; and
59

470 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap, the only consoling circumstance attending their departure, was, that, being all
-^sr-+~A mounted, to be relieved, at this time, from subsisting their horses, was no in
considerable object. So completely had the country been foraged by the two
armies, that it was scarcely any longer practicable to find the necessary food
for the horses of the regular cavalry — the officers, and the baggage. So
seA^erely had this difficulty begun to press upon the army, that General Greene
had been compelled to call together the militia then in service, almost all of
whom had come out mounted, and earnestly to solict them to relinquish their
horses, to have them conveyed under guard to a place where they could be
subsisted, and to serve on foot; pointing out to them, that Ms regular cavalry
being superior to that of the enemy, they would be safe under its protection;
and if they persisted in retaining their horses, the horses must either perish for
want, the riders abandon the army, or the army abandon the country. At first
the measure appeared to be acquiesced in with cheerfulness ; but, to men who
confided much for their safety in the speed of their horses and their own skilful
use of them, and who were not at all habituated to marching under the burthen
of a rifle and a knapsack, the change soon became irksome and disgusting.
There was then no alternative left but to let them depart, and in a very short
time the army was left without a mounted militiaman.
Yet, this was not the greatest sacrifice to which the American general was
called upon to submit at this time. It is not generally known, that it was in
the midst of the busy scene we have been relating, that the negotiation for the
exchange of prisoners in the southern department was carried on. The ori
ginal instructions to Colonel Carrington for this purpose, dated March the 11th,
are before us. The negotiation was first commenced, whilst the army lay at
Halifax Old Court House; but was then broken off, because the British commis
sioner insisted on considering paroled privates as prisoners of war, to favour
their practice of exacting paroles of all the militia in the country. The ne
gotiation was renewed and finally adjusted between Colonel Carrington on the
American side, and Captain Frederick Cornwallis, on that of the British, at a
subsequent meeting, held on the Pee Dee, on the 8th May.
The full bearing of this convention, upon the American cause, at that time
has never been duly considered, or rather not considered at all. Yet it deserves
to be estimated among the most magnanimous actions of that day. The most
Obvious supposition is, that such a convention must be reciprocal and equal in
its advantages; that if the one side derived from it an accession ofos^rength, the
other must be equally benefited. But it was quite otherwise, the British
troops returned to the ranks of the enemy, and the American troops to their
firesides : their term of service had expired in captivity. With this obvious

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 471
disadvantage before him, pressed on all sides by difficulties, the country's fall, chap.
and his own reputation poised on a blow very soon to be struck, the American ^~J~*~i
commander did not hesitate when the opportunity presented itself, of endea
vouring to rescue, the faithful soldier from the gloomy prisonship. The American
army finally obtained some officers from the exchange, but no men.
But, where were the tens of thousands expected from Virginia ? They were
with the tale that it told — with the cloud that has passed by. The enemy
turned his back upon Virginia, and the gathering thousands returned to the
plough. A large portion of the volunteers under Stevens, continued faithful
to their engagement; but, the whole number of militia, who accompanied the
army to Guilford, including those from both states, only amounted to two
thousand seven hundred and fifty-three — of which, Virginia furnished sixteen
hundred and ninety-three — and North Carolina one thousand and sixty.
The season of the year, as has been observed, was exceedingly unfavourable to
the collection of the militia generally; it was not " the time when kings go to
war." But, the disappointment in not receiving the re-enforcement expected
from the mountains, was attributed to another cause. The inhabitants had
just returned from an expedition against the Indians, conducted by Colonel
Arthur Campbell. The tawny aborigines* as had been invariably the case,
had advanced upon the frontiers the moment the British army got in motion ;
and, as had also invariably been the case, had painfully atoned for their
wonted barbarities.*
A few days after the return of the army across the Dan, General Greene
received a communication from Colonel Arthur Campbell, announcing his
success in this expedition, and intimating, that the Indians were desirous of
submitting; and, of negotiating a treaty with any one who should be duly
authorized to treat with theni. As it was not, at that early day, clearly
ascertained in whom the power existed to conduct such a treaty, General
Greene concluded, that the exigency of the case would sanction him in nomi
nating commissioners for that purpose; it appertained to the conduct of the
war; and he represented the United States in its belligerent capacity. Under
this impression, on the 20th February, he issued a commission to William
Christian, William Preston, Arthur Campbell, and Joseph Martin, of the
state of Virginia ; and to Robert Sevier, Evan Shelby, Joseph Williams, and
John Sevier, of the state of North Carolina, " to enter into a treaty for res
toring peace, and establishing the limits between those two states and the

* Appendix C.

47$ MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. Indian tribes ;" but with the wary precaution of limiting their powers by the
^-v^, laws of those states ; and the duration of the commission, by the will of
the congress, or the commander in chief.
The original commission is now before us ; and under it was concluded
that treaty, which took place the ensuing year; still, however, the Indians
farther south continued hostile ; and the attention of General Pickens had
been particularly directed to that quarter, when, he left the army at this
period. It was not long after his return to Carolina, before his experience in
Indian warfare was called into reqmsition, and rendered the most signal ser
vices. Tor the fourth time had General Greene now eluded his pursuers, and
found security from a superior enemy, beMnd the shelter of a rapid river ;
still, that enemy might brave this disadvantage, and attempt the passsge of
the river — or, might aim a blow at his reenforcements, by crossing it,, lower
down. Lord Cornwallis appeared to pause awhile upon the alternative ; but,
finally, adopted the resolution to move down towards Deep River ; in the mean
time, every exertion had been made to hasten on the re-enforcements, by
forced marches, and by divesting them of the baggage that impeded their
progress. The latter was ordered to file off to the right of the line of march
of the advancing parties, while the troops hastened on to effect a junction
at the High Rock Ford. By the 11th, this long looked-for event was consum
mated ; and, although the circuitous route assigned to the baggage caused some
delay, by the 12th, General Greene was prepared to advance upon the enemy,
and offer him the long expected battle. With this view, he moved down and
encamped at Guilford Court House on the 14th. As soon as the junction
was effected with the detachment under Williams, that command was dis
solved, with the highest and best merited encomiums on the spirit and ability
with which it had discharged its laborious and important duties. Colonel
Lee was then detached, with orders to hang upon one wing of the enemy;
whilst Washington watched the other. On the 13th, orders were issued to all
the detachments to join the army at Guilford ; and on the next day, the order
of battle was communicated to the officers, and the day spent in a critical
survey of all the advantages of the ground selected for the purpose a month
before. Never was conflict prepared for with more coolness by the one party,
or more anxiously desired by the other.
Yet, on the part of the American commander, it was the dictate of neces
sity, though that necessity was not imposed by his adversary. He was still
much inferior to the enemy in disciplined troops ; and he knew how precarious
was the dependance on militia at the push of the bayonet. But, greater evils

MAJOR GENERAL GREENE. 473
threatened him, than he had reason to apprehend from the issue of the battle, chap:
No more re-enforcements of regulars could be expected — he had waited long, ^^.^^
and been flattered with a thousand hopes, before he could draw together the
present moderate re-enforcements of militia ; the term of service of these was
rapidly passing away ; the volunteers had engaged but for six weeks ; and
when they should leave him, where was his dependence ? Nor was this all ;
the country immediately around him, was now so exhausted, that it could not
long continue the theatre of war. The enemy had held untouched the
friendly country in his rear, from which he could still draw considerable sup
plies. He had not been compelled to waste his resources upon swarms of
mounted men, continually coming and going, and not to be subjected to the
restraints of discipline. He had even been able to collect magazines at a remote
place in the fork ; and it was rumoured, that the loyalists were once more
assembling in the vicinity of Ramsay's Mills on the Deep River. For these
reasons, General Greene resolved to give the enemy battle, in hopes of crip
pling him by means of the militia, whilst he covered their retreat with Ma
regulars ; but resolved, not to risk the security of the latter, except from the
most urgent necessity, or with the most flattering prospects of advantage ;
and in the mean time he dispatched Colonel Malmady, who had recently
joined him with a few North Carolina troops, to descend the left bank of the
Haw— -make a sudden incursion into the fork — possess himself of, and re-.
move or destroy the enemy's magazines, and disperse the loyalists.
The following extract of a letter to Governor Jefferson, of the 10th of this
month, selected from many others, will exhibit a succinct view of the feelings,
embarrassments and motives, which influenced the conduct of the writer at
this time : — " Every day has filled me with hopes of an augmentation of my
force; the militia have* flocked in from various quarters; but, they come and
go in such irregular bollies, that I can make no calculation on the strength of
my army, or direct any future operations that can ensure me success. At this
time, I have not above 8 or 900 of them into the field; yet, there have been
upwards of 5000 in motion in the course of four weeks. A force, fluctuating
in this manner, can promise but slender hopes of success against an enemy in
high discipline, and made formidable by the superiority of their numbers.
Hitherto, I have been obliged to effect that by finesse, which I dare not
attempt by force. 1 know the people have been in anxious suspense, waiting
the event of a general action. But, let the consequence be what it may,
nothing shall hurry me into a measure that is not suggested by prudence, or
dictated by the interests of the southern department.

474 MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
chap. « General Caswell is on his way with a considerable force of the Carolina
.militia; and Colonel Campbell* with the Virginia regulars,! expect, will be up
in a few days* When this force arrives, I trust I shall be able to prescribe the
limits of the enemy's depredations, and at least dispose of the army in such a
manner as to incumber him with a number of wounded men."
There was one consideration which was decisive with General Greene for
hazarding an action at this timet With the superiority which he possessed in
the quality, rather than the numbers of the cavalry, and the precautions which
he had resolved to adopt, both for action and retreat, (having the unrestrained
choice of ground for both,) he was morally certain, that whatever might be the
behaviour of his militia, he could not be exposed to the evils of a general rout.
But he still flattered himself, from the quality of a great part of the troops of
that description, and the talents of some of their leaders, that they would de
liver the enemy crippled, disordered and worn down with fatigue, into the
hands of his continentals. But at the worst, a defeat he was resolved should
only be a partial evil. — To his adversary it could scarcely eventuate in less
than total ruin.
Nor was his adversary at this time less urged by inclination than necessity to
adopt the same determination. The English writers of the day observe, that
the grevious distress of the army were now become nearly insupportable, un
der the want of supplies of every species. And that " he had now arrived at a
full conviction, that nothing less than a clear and decided superiority in arms,
could answer the great purpose and end of their exceedingly toilsome and
arduous winter campaign, which Was to draw forth into action, the supposed
numerous loyalists who inhabited that province."*

?Annual Register, 1781, p. 65.

^iPiPiEs^mo

476

APPENDIX A.

(See page 223.)

A. HE first European settlement ever made on the North-American continent, was made in South
Carolina. The design is attributed to the celebrated Coligni ; and the object was to secure an
assylum to religious freedom. During the persecutions which harassed the Calvinists in the
reign of Charles the Ninth of France, Coligni conceived the project of establishing a retreat for his
followers in America, should they be^riVen by the legitimates of the day, from the confines of the -
old world. Charles readily yielded tothe solicitations of Coligni, to promote the project ; for,
whether they succeeded, or were destroyed, he was equally relieved from a class of men whom he
hated and feared ; or, at least, a new direction would be given to the enterprise of a spirited race,
who had often shown themselves terrible in their civil wars. Charles the Second of England, would
seem to have brought with him, his sentiments on the same subject, from France.
Two ships were furnished Coligni by his sovereign ; and John Ribaut, an experienced navigator,
at the head of a select band of soldiers, and voluntary adventurers, all zealous Calvinists, set sail
from France on the 18th February, 1562. His design was, to strike the Santee, then called the
Jordan, by the discoverer Vasquez Allayon ; but, falling too far to the south, he first made land
south of the river St. John's, then named by him the river of Dolphins, and by the Spaniards the
river St. Augustin. Proceeding northerly about fifteen leagues, he discovered another river, where
he landed, erected a pillar in commemoration of his taking possession of the country in the name
of his sovereign, and gave it the name of the River May, for it was on the 1st day of that month
that he set foot on the land, afterwards distinguished as French Florida, as the whole of North
America seems to have been by that of New France. This is said to be the river, previously named
by the Spaniards, San Matteo ; but the distance agrees very nearly with the mouth of the St. Mary's.
Proceeding still northwardly along the coast, and mistaking many inlets for rivers, which he named
after the great rivers of France, Ribaut, at length, reached what he supposed to be the Jordan ; and,
being favourably received by the natives, he proceeded to adopt the necessary measures to accom
modate and defend their little colony.
The place where Ribaut made this establishment, has been the subject of some difference of
opinion among writers. The geographer Mr. Morse is wholly mistaken, when he asserts, that it
was " at the mouth of the Albetnarle River in North Carolina." He has been led into the error

APPENDIX A. 477-
By copying Hewatt, who has himself beeri misled by Oldmixon, without observing, that the latter-
author furnishes the me^ns of detecting the mistake.
The words of Oldmixon are, " At the mouth of Albemarle River, then called the Great River,
the port being safe and commodious, he built a fort, which he called Charles' Fort, and gave it the
name of Port Royal, in 32° of latitude, bordering on Virginia, now North Carolina.
The reference here to the latitude of the place, sufficiently detects the error with regard to the
identity of the river. For the Albemarle in North Carolina, lies in 35" 30', on Oldmixon's own
map. The" Grande Riv ere" is, in fact, in the latiude 32°, as laid down by Charlevoix. Whe
ther it ever bore the name of the Albemarle, we know not ; yet, that name "may have been given it
by the Lord Cardross, when he made his settlement at Port Royal. <
This confusion of names would naturally have led Oldmixon into the error ; but, still it is unaCr
•countable, that he should have noticed but one Albemarle on his map, and placed Port'Royal cor
rectly in point of latitude.
Chalmers, pursuing the narrative of Charlevoix, locates Ribaut's Fort, called fort Charles, on
Edisto Island, or an Island somewhere near the mouth of that river, and it cannot be questioned,
that it was situate somewhere between North Edisto and Broad River. The evidence of circumstances
preponderates in favour of the present site of Beaufort. For, if it be true, and every thing seems
to confirm the opinion, that it was built "at the mouth of the Grand Riviere, on an Island with a safe
and commodious port," and the name of Port Royal given to it, we have the evidence of names
and situation, to support the opinion that its site was that of Beaufort. The name of Port Royal is
still retained, and the name of Broad River is but the translation of the French epithet, " Grand
Riviere." Besides which, it is well known, that there is not to be found on any other Island extending
from North Edisto to Broa'd River, any port to compare in excellence and depth of water with
Port Royal ; and the latitude agrees exactly, for it is actually situated in 32Q 12' and should be
rather farther south, than farther north, to agree with the latitude given it by Ribaut.
We will conclude with a piece of evidence, well known to those who have been conversant with
the southern Indians, who were compelled to retire to the west of Georgia, as the population of
South Carolina pressed upon them. They still retafn the tradition, that the first place at which they
ever saw the whites, was at Coosawhatchie in South Carolina. Now, the Coosawhatchie River is
the principal stream that forms the Broad River, and was no doubt among the first that were explored
by Ribaut's boat. Nor is it at all improbable, that the whole extent of the stream to its discharge
into the ocean, was known to the Indians by the name which we have borrowed from them — the
Coosawhatchie. It is well known with what perfect truth, the tradition of striking events, is pre
served among these people.
This first attempt of persecuted man, to seek an assylum in the new world, was attended with
events too true to be disputed, and yet almost too tragical to be credited. They present a striking
view of the chivalrous spirit which animated the reformers of that day, and of the bloody, unrelent
ing temper with which they were pursued by religious bigotry. There is no history thai, we are
acquainted with in the English language, which has presented an account of those events as they
actually occurred.
The summary of them is this : as soon as Ribaut had provided for the security of his colony, he
•set sail for France, to report his progress, and bring out a supply of utensils and of colonists ;
leaving Captain Albert in command of the post. When Ribaut arrived in France, the civil war had
again broken out, and Coligni's attention was of necessity engrossed by more vital objects. It was
not until April 1564, that he was enabled to resume the prosecution of this colonizing project. . It
was the first subject on which he addressed the king, after their reconciliation, and Charles again
60

478 APPENDIX A.
readily honored him with three ships, and a considerable advance of money. The command was.
given to Rene de Laudonniere, and the object of the voyage, as well as &£ reputation" of the com
mander and his officers, immediately drew together a crowd of volunteers, many of them of the
most respectable connexions. In June Ihis expedition reached the Florida Coast, and when ap-
proaching'Fort Charles, they received the intelligence, that it was abandoned and the colony had
put to sea in a boat constructed by themselves for the purpose.
It is probable that Laudonniere distrusted the account received from the natives, and for that reason,
rather than those given for his subsequent measures, resolved to establish his colony at the river
Mai, at which he had recently landed, and met with a most flattering reception from the natives.
Thither, however, he bent his course, and was cheerfully supported by- his men in this change of
design, for the unfortunate reason, ' that they thought this stream communicated with the country
" where there was gold." Some small quantities of gold and silver, pearls, and precious stones, had
been seen among the natives, and they had pointed to the south west as the region from which it
was procured. It appeared afterwards to have been obtained from Spanish vessels wrecked on the
Florida coasts.
Laudonniere accordingly landed and established himself on the south side of the river Mai, and
constructed there a fort, which he named Fort Caroline, destined soon to be the scene of some of
the bloodiest events recorded in history. Whether this fort was built on the St. Mary's, or the
St. Ilia (now newly named the Satilla) river, is not satisfactorily ascertained. But, the evidence
is in favour of the St. Mary's, and would point to the first bluff on the south side of the St. Mary's.
The distance of the river Mai, of fifteen leagues from the St. John's, and that of six leagues from the
ocean, given to the fort, support this opinion ; nor does there appear to have been any river of
magnitude intervening between it and the St. John's. On the other 'hand, however, there is no
river given between the river Mai and the Altamaha, which would seem to point to the St. Ilia.
But, the course of the St. Mary's, whichj towards its source, appears to proceed from the quarter to
which the Indians directed the attention of the French, for procuring the precious metals, supports
the opinion, that the St. Mary's was really the river on which this second establishment was made.
In the mean time, the fate of Captain Albert and his associates, was made manifest ; the few who
survived of them, were picked up at sea and carried to Europe. Albert, it appears, was put ta
death by his men not long after the departure of Ribaut ; and as the only account we have of his
conduct was necessarily received from them, and their safety depended upon justifying that act, it ought
to be received with more precaution than historians have discovered. He is represented as having
conducted himself arbitrarily and capriciously, and even to have taken the lives 'of some of his
people, without cause or due sanction. At length, a piece of tyranny exercised towards one
Lachan, a soldier, whose subsequent conduct proved his popularity well founded, was followed by a
mutiny, which terminated Albert's life and the hopes of the colony. One Nicholas Barre was
then chosen their leader, and nothing being heard of Ribaut, famine and disorganization began to
threatenjhem with destruction. They now resolved to construct a vessel, and attempt the passage
to Europe, without chart or compass, and almost without provisions. The consequences were
inevitable. After suffering the last extremity of hunger, the proposition was made that they should
cast lots, to determine which of them should fall a sacrifice for the subsistence of the rest. That
the proposition should be acceded to is not to be wondered at.. Men have often submitted under
similar circumstances ; and the hope, which ever whispers to each individual that he will escape,
may well support the human mind in submitting fate to fortune. But, it requires no common effort
of self devotion, for a single individual to make a willing sacrifice of his own life to save that of his
companions in misfortune ; yet, Lachau did this and was eaten. He bared, his neck ' to the

APPENDIX A. 479
knife, and died, as the narrative says, without a struggle. Nor was there any reason to suspect im
position, since the more probable account of his having suffered by lot, was equally at the command
of the boat's crew. The want of water followed the want of food, and natural death had greatly
• thinned their ranks before they were picked up and transported to Europe.
In the meantime, intelligence was communicated to the Spanish monarch, of the attempt of the
Hugonots to effeet a settlement on the Florida coast. The annals of the day assert, that the trea*
cherous Charles himself made the communication, with an insinuation of his utter indifference as ta
the- fate that awaited them. A Hugonot settlement was, to their most Christian and most Catholic
majesties, equally, an object of abhorrence.
The Spaniards resolved to destroy the settlement ; and their subsequent conduct will prove, that it
was religious, not political zeal, which kindled the flame that consumed it.
Laudonniere was indefatigable while he remained in command at Fort Caroline ; but, his industry
was unfortunately applied to exploring the country in quest of the precious metals ; instead of forcing
from a genial soil the more indispensable articles of subsistence. His lieutenants Oligni and Erlac,
penetrated the forests in every direction, and in the course of eighteen months appear to have made
excursions throughout the interior of Florida, Georgia and South Carolina, even to the lakes that
gives rise to the St. Lawrence, even beyond the Apalachian mountains. But,their provisions began now
to fail, as the articles of merchandize which procured food from the Indians, were totally consumed.
Vessel after vessel had been dispatched to France for supplies, but none had yet raturned. His com
pany also had become mutinous ; and as often as he constructed small vessels for the purpose of
exploring the rivers, of collecting provisions, or, if necessary, of leaving the country, they were
seized upon by parties of mutineers, some of whom engaged in piratical cruizes against the Span
iards and others made their way to the islands and to Europe, to excite a clamour against the con
duct and the views -of their commander. Thus, was his force reduced to a small proportion of its
original numbers ; and with these he resolved to build a small brigantine, to transport himself and
them to France. The accidental arrival, and very liberal conduct of the English Captain Hawkins,
put it in his power to procure a more suitable vessel for this purpose, and to furnish and equip her in
a manner suitable for such a voyage; but, when he had dismantled his fort, and was shipping his
men to depart, Ribaut made his appearance, with a well equipped fleet of nine sail of vessels, some
of them heavy ships of war ; four of them of a draft of water which would not admit of their passing
the bar of the river, on which Laudonniere had established himself.
Mutual explanations, to their mutual satisfaction soon took place between^Laudonniere and Ribaut ;
but, the former refused any longer to continue in command at Fort Caroline. The assurances of the
Indians were again repeated, that the country produced gold, and they would point out the mines ;
and Ribaut resolved again to repair and garrison the fort, and to make the permanent establishment
of the colony at this place.
But on the 4th September, 1665, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, six Spanish vessels were seen to
enter t'he road and drop anchor near the four large ships. It was a fleet commanded by Don Pedro
Menendez de Avilez, an officer celebrated by his countrymen as one of the greatest heroes of the
new world • and the object of his mission was the extirpation of the heretics who had polluted, by
their tread,' a country which had been liberally dealt out to Catholics, as a part of the patrimony
of St. Peter.
This singular crusade is marked by a variety of striking incidents.
The legitimates of France and Spain, Charles the Ninth, and Philip the Second, were, at this time,
at perfect peace; and, the latter finding leisure to turn his attention to the settlement of the Flo
rida* began to experience the most sensible, qualms at his having so long deferred the good work of

480 APPENDIX A.
christianizing the aborigines — the very purpose for which these territories had beea bountifully he-
stowed upon him by the legitimate head of the Church. Menendez was selected to conduct the
enterprise ; and, in consideration of bearing the greatest part of the expense himself, he was vested
with the dignity of a Spanish Adelantade, and the hereditary government of the Floridas. It was in .
the midst of the preparation for the undertaking, that the intelligence arrived, that the Hugonots had
made an establishment on the coast, and the Propaganda expedition, immediately assumed all the cha
racteristics of a Proclaimed crusade. Clergy and Laiety crowded into his service, and voluntary con
tributions from the sovereign and individuals soon swelled his force to near three thousand men, and
near twenty vessels, some of them of very considerable force. Heaven, however, could not smile
upon the undertaking ; and before he reached Porto Rico, storms and tempests had reduced his
force to less than one-third. It was now seriously deliberated, whether they were strong enough to
proceed, for they had learned from the ministers of Charles, or from some other quarter, that the
re-enforcement under Ribaut had preceded them. But, either the fanaticism, or the policy of tiieir
commander, turned even their misfortunes into a reason for prosecuting their voyage. " The Al
mighty," said Menendez, " has thus reduced our force, that his own arm might achieve the work."
We have already seen that Ribaut had reached Fort Caroline some days before the arrival of
Menendez. But the latter appears to have been no ways deficient in promptness of design, or vigour
of execution. He resolved to surprise the French ships that lay in the outer road, and then»proceed
as after circumstances should dictate, in his designs upon the fort. The French captains charge
him with the most dastardly cunning, in endeavouring to lull them into security, by approaching
them under the mask of friendship ; a mask very easily assumed, considering the pacific relations
then existing between their sovereigns.
But, whatever was his conduct in this respect, the attempt did but succeed ; the French ships
eluded his grasp by putting to sea ; and he thought it prudent, after thus betraying .his views, to retire
from a garrison which he could no longer hope to surprise. Falling down the coast, below the
mouth of the river St, John's, Jie made choice of the present site of St. Augustine, and laid the
foundation of this formidable fortress, and of the first permanent establishment on the North Ame
rican continent. His intention was, to protect his present command by fortifications, and await the
arrival of re-enforcements.
Ribaut now promptly resolved to pursue Menendez ; and, contrary to the advice of his officers, he
crowded his whole force into his shipping, leaving- in Fort Caroline his stores, provisions, women
and children, and the sick of the expedition, and a garrison under Laudonnaire of about eighty
men, not above twenty of whom were perfectly effective.
The heavy ships which had kept the sea, were at hand to unite in the expedition ; and Menendez's
vessels were found moored in a situation where their fate was inevitable. Two hours more would
have been sufficient to place his whole command at the mercy of his enemy ; but, one of those
sudden tempests, so common in those latitudes, arrested the designs of Ribaut, and drove his vessels
down the Florida Gulph. This event gave an entire new aspect to the fortunes of Menendez.
Knowing that some days would probably elapse before Ribaut could return to Fort Caroline, he
resolved to open his way through the forests, and attack that fort before it could be prepared to
resist him.
Accordingly, with five hundred picked men, carrying eight days provisions, he took up. the line
of march for the French post, and arrived in the forests which surrounded it and whieh concealed
his approach, before Laudonnaire had a suspicion of his having left St. Augustine.
Dark and cruel was the superstition which appears to have clouded the minds of these bold adven
turers. The massacre of the heretics had been deliberately determined on from the commencement

APPENDIX A. 481
of this expedition ; and now, solemnly, on bended knees, in prayer and praises to the Almighty,
were his men prepared for this unhallowed sacrifice. From prayer they rushed to slaughter, and
a feeble and unarmed garrison fell an easy prey to their pious fury. The humanity of Menendez
extended no further than to spare the women and the boys that had not reached fifteen years ; but
his men, or their commander, appear to have amused themselves by preserving many of the garri
son for a more solemn sacrifice. After the heat of battle had subsided, the living and the dying
were, indiscriminately, suspended to the boughs of a tree, and their bodies left a prey to the birds of
the air. „
The truth of this achievement cannot be questioned, for Menendez himself commemorated it by 3.
monument, intended to transmit the meritorious deed to posterity. At the root of the tree was
«rected a stone, on which he had inscribed these words — " I do not do this as to Frenchmen, but
as to Lutherans." Laudonniere and about twenty of his men, effected their escape by leaping from
the parapet of the fort and flying to the woods. Ribaut had left his son with some inferior vessels
in the harbour ; these dropped down beyond the reach of the cannon as soon as they discovered
the fate of the fort, and fortunately succeeded in taking Laudonniere and his few followers on board.
Some others remained in the wood, and were hunted like wild beast. If taken, they were sold into
slavery. What became of the women and children we do not learn ; but, they had nothing to ex
pect from the tender mercies of their captors, unless saved by an hypocritical conversion. The
number of those who were saved from the sword is stated at seventy.
But, this tragedy was trifling when compared with that which followed :
Menendez, apprehensive that Ribaut would reach St. Augustine in his absence, and retaliate by
the capture of this place, and of his shipping, had scarcely terminated his butcheries at Fort Caro
line, when he hastened back with a part of his forces to the protection of his own post. Here, to
adopt the language of his historian — " All the world ran to meet the conqueror of the heretics, with
the cross, and the clergy singing te deum, and conducting him in triumph."
It is not to be wondered at, if such a reception, conducted by the ministers of religion, and sanc
tified by the presence of its most revered symbols, should whet his appetite for the enjoyment of
other triumphs similar and greater.
The fate of Ribaut's fleet had now been decided. After struggling for several days in the Florida
channel, they were all dashed to pieces on the coast south of St. Augustine, near Cape Canaveral.
Some arms and a small supply of privisions were saved to them — every thing else was swallowed
up. Thus situated, there remained to them but one course to pursue ; this was, to thread the coast
northerly and reach Fort Caroline, if practicable ; if not, to submit to the necessity of surrendering
themselves to the Spaniards. With this view, they appear to have formed themselves into two .
bodies, one of which preceded the other a few days march. The first, arriving at tire bank of a
small river, twelve miles south of St. Augustine, found themselves arrested in their progress ; and
before they could prepare the means of transportation, information was communicated to Menendez
that a number of white men were so situated. Accompanied by a detaehment of forty soldiers, and
a boat, Menendez proceeded to reconnoitre the party, and from a soldier who crossed the stream by
swimming, to his great relief, he learned the fete of Ribaut's fleet.
What follows, is differently related by the French and Spanish historians ; but, after all the gloss
that the latter has shed over the conduct of Menendez, he appears to have been guilty of an act of
deliberate tranquil barbarity— at the bare relating of which, the human heart freezes. They admit,
that two hundred men were brought over the river, by tens, all bound together, and when conducted
beyond the sight of their comrades, on the opposite bank, « at aline marked with his cane on the

482 APPENDIX A.
sand," were cruelly butchered. Nor were the rites of sepjikbre allowed to them — but, their bones
were left to bleach upon the sands.
A few days after, the remaining party appeared, with Ribaut himself at their head ; and Menen
dez again repaired to the banks of the river, but attended by a more respectable escort. A consi
derable negotiation ensued, and a large ransom was offered but, M&iendez, "deliberately pacing the
margin of the river, and permitting the negotiators to go and return as often as they pleased, nay,
even setting refreshments before them, gave them to understand that they must surrender at discre
tion. It is even related, that Ribaut himself came over to_ negotiate, attended* with five or six of his
officers ; and after being respectfully received by Menendez, and food set before him, was conducted*
to the plain where the bodies of his 200 men still lay exposed, and was informed of the chastisement
inflicted on those who had been left at Fort, Caroline — still he was required to surrender at discre
tion. It was in vain that these unfortunate men urged, that the two monarchs were not only at peace,,
but in alliance. All the answer they could obtain was — " It is true that the . Catholic French are
our allies and friends ; but it is not so with the heretics ; on them I wage a war of extermination,
and I will wage it with the utmost cruelty upon ail those of this sect that I meet with by land or sea ;-
and in this I serve both monarchs. I came to Florida to establish the Roman Catholic faith. If you
are satisfied to abandon yourself to my mercy, and to deliver up your arms and ensigns, I will do with
you what God shall inspire me. If not, chuse your own course, but do not hope from me either
friendship or peace. I have been ordered by my king, to conquer and people Florida, and establish
there the gospel."
Ribaut was permitted quietly to return to his companions in misfortune, and the painful alter
native was submitted to their choice. Flattering himself with the hope, that Menendez would
accept a ransom, he, with about one hundred and fifty others, resolved to submit themselves to
their enemy : but, the remainder, about two hundred in number, determined rather to brave every
danger. Ribaut was compelled to submit to the indignity of being tied with nine others, and met with the
common fate of all who were silly enough to surrender their arms. Eight hundred in all, it is said
perished ; but the number, even including the sick at the fort, would scarcely have equalled that
amount. The French had no interest in reducing the numbers ; and the Spaniards thought it
a boast to have destroyed so many heretics.
The two hundred who had the prudence to preserve their arms, finally met with a milder fate.
Returning to the wrecks of their vessels, they there furnished themselves with many articles gather
ed from the hulks, and constructed a small fort for their defence, while they proceeded to build a
vessel competent to convey them to some more hospitable shore. But, their perscutor was not
yet sated with blood. His conduct had all' along been regulated by the conviction, that his victims
were shut in the peninsula too firmly to escape him ; and now, hearing from the Indians of the mea
sures they were prosecuting, he resolved to anticipate them. Accompanied by an armed force and
attended by some small vessels, he threaded the Florida coast until he reached the resting place of the
fugitives. Their vessel was far advanced, but their fort was only intended to defend them against an
enemy that had not fire arms. They were, therefore, obliged to abandon it, and flying to an elevated
ground, they resolved to sell their lives dearly, if they could not repulse the enemy. A negotiation
ensued, and a surrender agreed on, upon a solemn ple> l^e of security and kind treatment. Their
commander, however, with about twenty, resolved rather to perish in the desert than trust them
selves to their cruel enemy ; and, leaving their companions in the night, sought safety in the thickets.
Whatever became of them is unknown. The test either established themselves in Florida, or found.

APPENDIX A. 483
their way home— the poor remains of the gallant company that had followed Ribaut from France,
many of them men of wealth and distinction.. It is very remarkable, that of all the number sacrificed
by Menendez, although the question was regularly prd|>ounded to the unfortunate victims, of what
religion are you, only eight saved their lives by acknowledging themselves Catholics.
This is the account furnished by the Spanish historians, and even by the brother-in-law of Me
nendez. But, the French writers of the day charge the Spaniards with having treacherously
promised Ribaut and his companions life and security, and violated that promise as soon as the
French had surrendered their arms. They further assert, that he was flayed alive, his body burnt,
and his stuffed skin sent to Europe, a worthy present to the barbarians who then ruled half the
world ! and that the most horrid and wanton barbarities were practised upon the wretched captives.
Certain it is, that when the news reached France, it was productive every where, but at court, of the
keenest indignation. Nor was this feeling confined to the Protestants ; it extended itself to the
Catholics, and by one of that faith was it shortly after most signally avenged.
The Chevalier Dominique de Gourgues, a character that would grace an epic poem, was a Gascon
gentleman, born at Mont Marsan, county of Cominges, of a respectable Roman Catholic family.
The youth of De Gourgues had been spent in arms, and he had acquired a reputation not sur
passed by any subaltern officer in France. A soldier of fortune, he passed from service to service
after the manner of that age, until an adventure, which occurred to him whilst serving against the
Spaniards in Italy, appears to have fixed him in irreconcilable hostility to that nation. For an instance
ef obstinate bravery, which ought to have ensured him the esteem of a generous enemy, he was
consigned to the Spanish gallies. A capture by an Algerine, under any other circumstances a
misfortune, broke the chain which confined him to this most disreputable of employments ; for the
prize was pursued, overtaken and recaptured by a vessel of Malta, and the admiration of the brave,
secured to De Gourgues- his freedom and honorable employment. De Gourgues now took to the sea
service, and a long absence in foreign seas, together with the accumulation of wealth, leaves little
doubt of his having employed this interval in indemnifying himself for the indignities received from
the Spaniards. «
He had retired to private life when the news of the massacre by the Spaniards in Florida revived
the half-extinguished resentment which his injuries had excited. De Gourgues immediately sold his
property, vested the proceeds, and even incurred large debts in equipping two gallies and a tender,
under the pretext of employing them in the African trade. The pursuits of the French, and the
habits of their government at this time, were exemplified by the commission under which he sailed, ,
which authorized him " to catch negroes on the coast of Africa."
De Gourgues communicated his design to no human being ; but, he had the precaution to secure
the services of one of Laudonniere's soldiers, who had resided long enough in Florida to acquire
some knowledge of the country and the language of the natives. He also engaged the services of
one hundred and fifty picked men, many of them gentleman adventurers ; and having equipped his
vessels with every thing necessary for a cruize of twelve months, set sail from Bourdeaux, the 2d
August, 1567-
His voyage was not fortunate ; and the better to conceal his design, he found himself obliged to
take a very circuitous course, so that he approached Florida by doubling the westward of the island
of Cuba.
It was not until he reached this point, that he acquainted his crew with the real object of this long
and perilous voyage. In an impressive speech, he exhibited to them the disgrace that their nation
kad sustained in the eyes of the world, by suffering such wrongs to remain so long unrevenged ; and

484 APPENDIX A.
painted in such striking colours the enormities that the Spaniards had been guilty of — that his cre%
with one voice declared their readiness to follow him in the enterprize.
The rest of his voyage consumed but liflple time. So entirely unsuspicious were the Spaniards, of
attack, that on passing Fort Caroline, now called by them Fort St. Matthew, De Gourgues received
a salute. Passing onto the Altamaha," he entered the mouth of that river, and as his gallies drew but
little water, and were provided with oars, he found no difficulty in ascending the river. Here he met
with a great number of natives ; and Laudonniere's soldier being recognized by them, they readily
conjectured that the commander was bound on no friendly errand. A league was soon entered into
to attack the fort, and only deferred until it could be reconnoitered by one of the officers of the expe-
pedition. De Gourgues was not appalled at the report of this officer ; notwithstanding that, the fort had
been much improved by the Spaniards, supported by two other works opposite each other on the
river, and garrisoned with four hundred men — two hundred in the principal, and one hundred in
each of the subordinate works.
The attack was immediately resolved on, and a rendezvous agreed on at the mouth of a stream
twelve miles north of the river. The affair appears to have been conducted with secrecy, fidelity
and spirit ; and the Europeans attribute to the Indians a degree of bravery in the assault, which it
would be imposible now to excite them to.
The small forts on the north and south sides of the river were carried by assault, and the men mostly
put to the sword. Then waylaying, with his Indians, all the avenues of escape from Fort Caroline, De
Gourgues proceeded to a deliberate examination of the difficulties of the undertaking. It was soon
discovered that it must be carried by escalade, and having brought with him the impliments necessary
for such an emergency, he was engaged in preparing his ladders, when the garrison precipitated their
fate, first by an imprudent sally, and then by a desperate attempt to gain the thickets. Here De
Gourgues had prepared for them the most certain destruction ; for the woods were full of exasperated
Indians, and not one of them escaped to tell of their disasters.
Thus far there is much to admire, and according to the received opinions of that day, relative to
garrisons carried by assault, nothing to blame. But there were some prisoners made, and the stone set up
by Menendez, being still standing to commemorate his barbarity to the French prisoners, unfortunately
De Gourgues was led to imitate as well as execrate the barbarous example. Could retaliation always
fall on the actual offender, even the wise and good might often retaliate. His prisoners were all
suspended on the same tree that had borne his countrymen ; and instead of the stone of Menendez,
was substituted a pine plank by De Gourgues, inscribed with " I did not do this as to Spaniards, nor as
to infidels, but as to traitors, thieves and murderers."
De Gourgues demolished the forts and returned to France ; not to enjoy the admiration of his
countrymen, but to be pursued by the Spaniards, and persecuted by his own government. He lived
in obscurity and dependence ; for his efforts to fit out his expedition had involved him deeply in
debt ; and when at last he was invited into honourable, and to him, pleasant service, by the King of
Portugal, against the Spaniards, he did not live to enter on his command.
Thus ended all the views of the French nation upon French Florida.. Thenceforth, the dispute
lay between the Spaniards and the British, which should retain the country.

APPENDIX B.

(See page 294. J
SOUTHERN ARMY.
A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780, 6y Colonel Otho Holland Williams, Adjutant General.
1 HE city of Charleston, South Carolina, was invested by a British army, commanded by General Sir
Henry Clinton, on the 1st day of ApriJ 1780. Major General Lincoln of the American army, who
commanded the garrison, made the best possible defence his situation and circumstances would admit
of; but, finding his garrison inadequate, and the resources of the country cut off, or exhausted, he
applied to the commander in chief of the American army for are-enforcement.
On the 16th day of April 1780, the quotas of Maryland and Delaware troops, about fourteen
hundred infantry, marched under the orders of Major General the Baron De Kalb, from can
tonments near Morristown in New Jersey, for the head of the Chesapeake Bay. They embarked the
Sd day of May, at the head of Elk River, and arrived at Petersburgh in Virginia, early in June.
Here the unwelcome news of the surrender of Charleston (on the 12th May) was first commu
nicated to the detachment, the principal object of whose destination was lost; but the country
was not yet conquered s and it was presumed that the countenance of a body of regular troops, how
ever small, would constitute more than any thing else to sustain the fortitude of the militia. Every
exertion, therefore, was made in Virginia to expedite the march of the baron's detachment, which
here received a small re-enforcement of artillery. It proceeded with some celerity, and in fine
spirits as far as Wilcox's Iron Works, on Deep River, in the state of North Carolina ; but here, on
the 6th day of July, the baron found himself under the necessity of halting for want of provisions.
The state of North Carolina, had made no provision for the troops of the union ; she was solely
occupied with her own militia, a great portion of which, being disaffected, were obliged to be dragoon
ed into the service. All the baron's applications and remonstrances to the executive, were without
effect ; he was obliged to send small detachments, under discreet officers, to collect provisions from
the inhabitants, who, at that season of the year, had but little to spare ; many of them were subsisting
-themselves upon the last of the preceding crop of grain, and the new, although it promised plenty,
was not yet mature ; consequently some of the inhabitants must have suffered notwithstanding the
61

4.86* APPENDIX B.
strict orders to th^fifncers to impress only a proportion of what was found on the farms. In this
dilemma the troops remained several days, but the resources failing, in the vicinity of the camp,wit be
came necessary to draw supplies from a greater distance, or march to where there was greater plenty,
the former was impracticable as the means of transportation were not in the barbn's power. He
consequently determined on the latter, previously extending the excursions of his foraging parties^
with directions to form a small magazine at Cox's (or Wilcox's) Mill, on Deep River, where the troops
arrived on the — day of July, and encamped near Buffalo Ford.
Still, however, the supplies of grain were scarcely sufficient, even for the present subsistence of *
the troops: and the only meat-ration that could be procured, was lean beef, daily driven out of the
woods and the cane-breaks, where the cattle had wintered themselves. Inaction, bad fare," and the
difficulty of preserving discipline, when there is no apprehension of danger,, have often proved
fatal to troops, and ruined whole armies. But here, the activity of the officers, and the persevering-
patience of the privates, preserved order, harmony, and even a passion for the service.
The baron did not fail to represent his situation to Congress, and to repeat his remonstrances to
the executive of the state of North Carolina. He had been flattered with a promise of a plentiful
supply of provisions and a respectable re-enforcement of the militia of North Carolina ; which, about
that time took the field, under the command of .Mr. Caswell, who was appointed a major general.
The supplies, however, did not arrive, and the commandant of the militia, ambitious of signalizing
himself, employed his men in detachments against small parties of disaffected inhabitants, who, to
avoid being drafted into the service of their country, retired among the swamps and other cover,
with which that country abounds.
It' was in vain that the baron required General Caswell to join his command ; and it was equally
fruitless to expect much longer to find subsistence for' his soldiers, in a country where marauding
parties of militia swept all before them. The baron, therefore, hesitated whether he h#d better march
to join the militia, in hopes to find that Caswell's complaints of a want of provisions for himself
were fictitious ; or to move up the country and gain the fertile banks of the Yadkin River. But
before1 any resolution was taken, the approach of Major General Gates was announced, by the
arrival of his aid de camp, Major Armstrong who was to have acted as deputy adjutant general, but
was prevented by sickness.
General Gates, who had so fortunately terminated the career of General Burgoyne in the north
was appointed to command the southern army, immediately after the reduction of Charleston. His
arrival on the 25th July, was a relief to De Kalb ; who, condescendingly, took command of the Mary
land division, which included the regiment of Delaware. Besides these two corps, the army con
sisted only of a small legionary corps, which formed a junction with them a few days before, under
the command of Colonel Armand, being about sixty cavalry, and as many infantry ; and Lieutenant
Colonel Carrington's detachment of three companies of artillery, which had joined in Virginia.
General Gates was received with respectful ceremony ; the baron ordered a continental salute
from the little park of artillery — which was performed on the entrance into camp of his successor,
who made his acknowledgments to the baron for his great politeness — approved his standing orders —
"and, as if actuated by a spirit of great activity and enterprise, ordered the troops to hold themselves
in readiness to march at a moment's warning. The latter order was a matter of great astonishment
ftfcthose who knew the real situation of the troops. But all difficulties were removed by the gene
ral's assurances, that plentiful supplies of rum and rations were on the route, and would overtake
them in a day or two — assurances that certainly were too fallacious, and that never were verified. All
were in motion, however, early in the morning of the 27th of July, and the general took the route
fiver Buffalo Ford, leading towards the enemy's advanced post on Lynch's Creek, on the road t®

APPENDIX R. 487
Camden, leaving two brass field-pieces and some baggage, for want of horses. Colonel Williams, '
presuming on the friendship of the general, ventured to expostulate with him upon the seeming pre
cipitate and inconsiderate step he was taking. He represented that the country through which he
was about to march, was by nature barren, abounding with sandy plains, intersected by swamps,
and very thinly inhabited ; that the little provisions and forage which were produced on the banks
of its few small streams were exhausted, or taken away by the enemy, and by the hordes of banditti,
(called tories) which had retired, from what they called the persecution of the rebels, and who
would certainly distress his army, small as if was, by removing what little might remain out of his
way.. On the other hand, the colonel represented, that a route about north west, would cross the Pee
Dee River some where about where it loses the name of Yadkin, and would lead to the little town
of Salisbury, in the midst of a fertile country, and inhabited by a people zealous in the cause of
America. That the most active and intelligent officers had contemplated this route with pleasure,
not only, as it promised a more plentiful supply of provisions, but because the sick, the women and
children, and the wounded, in case of disaster, might have an asylum provided for them at Salis
bury or Charlotte, where they would remain in security, because the militia of the counties
of Mecklenburgh and Roan, in which these villages stand, were staunch friends. The idea
of establishing an laboratory, for the repair of arms at a secure place, was also suggested as
necessary— the security of convoys of stores from the northward, by the upper route— the advantage
of turning the left of the enemy's out-posts, even by a circuitous route— that of approaching the
most considerable of those posts (Camden) with the river Wateree on our right, and our friends on
our backs — and some other considerations, were suggested. And, that they might the more forcibly
impress the general's mind, a short note was presented to him, concisely intimating the same opinion,
and referring to the best informed gentlemen under his command. General Gates said, he would
confer with the general officers when the troops should halt at noon. Whether any conference took
place or not, the writer don't know. After a short halt at noon, when the men were refreshed, upon
the scraps in their knapsacks, the march was resumed. The country exceeded the representation that
had been made of it — scarcely had it emerged from a state of sterile nature — the few rude attempts
at improvement that were to be found, were most of them abandoned by the owners, and plundered
by the neighbours. Every one, in this uncivilized part of the country, was flying from his hon#,
and joining in parties, under adventurers, who pretended to yield them protection, until the British
army should appear — which they seemed confidently to expect. The distresses of the soldiery daily
increased — they were told that the banks of the Pee Dee River were extremely fertile — and so
indeed they were; bat, the preceding crop of corn (the principal article of produce) was exhausted,
and the new grain, although luxuriant and fine, was unfit for use. Many of the soldiery, urged by
necessity, plucked the green ears and boiled them with the lean beef, which was collected in the
woods, made for themselves a repast, not unpalatable to be sure, but which was attended with pain
ful effects. Green peaches also were substituted for bread, and had similar consequences. Some
of the officers, aware of the risk of eating such vegetables, and in such a state, with poor fresh
beef, and without salt, restrained themselves from taking any thing but the beef itself, boiled or
roasted. It occurred to some, that the hair powder, which remained in their bags, would thicken
soup, and it was actually applied.*

Captain W. D. Beale, he.

488 APPENDIX B.
The troops, notwithstanding their disappointment in not being overtaken by a supply of rum and
provisions, were again amused with promises, and gave early proofs of that patient submission, in
flexible fortitude, and undeviating integrity, which they afterwards more eminently displayed.
On the 3d day of August the little army crossed Pee Dee River; in batteaus, at Mask's Ferry, and
were met on the southern bank by Lieutenant Colonel Porterfield, an officer of merit, who, after the
disaster at Charleston, retired with a small detachment and found means of subsisting himself and
his men in Carolina until the psesent time.
Colonel Marion, a gentleman of South Carolina, had been with the army a few days, attended by
a very few followers, distinguished by small black leather caps and the wretchedness of their attire ;
liieir number did not exceed twenty men and boys, some white, some black,' and all mounted, but most
of them miserably equipped ; their appearance was in fact so burlesque, that it was with much difficulty
the diversion of the regular soldiery was restrained by the officers ; and the general himself was glad
of an opportunity of detaching Colonel Marion, at his own instance, towards the interior of South
Carolina, with orders to watch the motions of the enemy, and furnish intelligence.
These trifling circumstances are remembered in these notes, to show from what contemptible
beginnings a good capacity will rise to distinction. The history of the war in South Carolina, will recog
nize Marion as a brave partisan, if only the actions of the two last year's campaigns are recorded.
The expectation, founded on assurances, of finding a plentiful supply of provisions at May's Mill,
induced the troops again to obey the order to march with cheerfulness; but being again disappointed,
fatigued, and almost famished, their patience began to forsake them, their looks began to be vindictive;
mutiny was ready to manifest itself, and the most unhappy consequences were to be apprehended ;
when the regimental officers, by mixing among the men and remonstrating with them, appeased mur
murs, for which, unhappily, there was too much cause. The officers, however, by appealing to their
own empty canteens and mess cases, satisfied the privates, that all suffered alike ; and, exhorting them
to exercise the same fortitude, of which the officers gave them the example, assured 'them that the
best means of extricating them from the present distress, should be immediately adopted ; that if the
supplies expected by the general did not arrive very soon, detachments should go from each corps, in
all directions, to pick up what grain might possibly be found in the country, and bring it to the mill.
* Fortunately, a small quantity of Indian corn was immediately brought into camp — the mill was
set to work, and as soon as a mess of meal was ground it was delivered out to the men ; and so, in
rotation, they were all served in the course of a few hours — more poor cattle were sacrificed — the
camp kettles were all engaged — the men were busy, but silent, until they had each ttken his repast ;
and then all was again content, cheerfulness and mirth. It was as astonishing as it was pleasing, to.
observe the transition.
The general and field officers were not the first served upon this occasion ; nor were they generally
the most satisfied ; but, as no one could point out the means of immediate redress, no remonstrances
took place with the commanding officer. The commanding officer, however, was well informed of
what was passing in the camp, and of the critical disposition of the troops. Impressed by a sense
of difficulties, and, perhaps, conceiving himself in some degree accountable to the army for the stepr
he had taken, he told Colonel Williams, who acted as deputy adjutant general to the southern
army, that he had, in a measure, been forced to take the route he had done — that General Caswell
had evaded every order which had been sent to him, as well by the Baron De Kalb as himself, to
form a junction of the militia with the regular corps — that it appeared to him, that Caswell's vanity
was gratified by having a separate command — that probably he contemplated some enterprise to
distinguish himielf, and gratify his ambiition ; which, said he, " I should not be sorry to see checked
by a rap over the knuckles, if it were not that the militia would disperse, and leave this handful of

APPENDIX B. 489
brave men without even nominal assistance." He urged further, that it was the more necessary to
counteract the indiscretion of Caswell, and save him from disaster, as he then commanded the only
eorps of militia that were embodied in the Carolinas — that the assurances he had received from the
executive of North Carolina, gave him cause to suspect, that supplies of provisions had been for
warded, and used in profusion in Caswell's camp, notwithstanding intimations had been communi
cated to him, that the militia were in as bad a situation, in that respect, as the regular corps.
That moreover, having marched thus far directly towards the enemy, a retrogade or indirect move
ment, would not only dispirit the troops, but intimidate the people of the country; many of
whom had come in with their arms, or sent their submissions to the general, promissing, upon his
engagement to indemnify them for what had passed, to assemble themselves under their own leaders
and follow the colours of the Union. The poverty of the country, and the perfidy of the people,
•were in vain opposed to these agreements, and in fact the troops had penetrated so far, as to make it
even as hazardous to return or file off for the upper country, as to advance.
Dangerous, as deceptions had been, it was still thought expedient to flatter the expectation of the
soldiery with an abundance of provisions, so soon as a junction could De formed with the militia;
therefore, after collecting all the corn which was to be found in the neighbourhood of May's Mill, and
huckstering all the meal that could be spared from our present necessities, the march was resumed
towards Camden.
On the 5th day of August, in the afternoon, General Gates received a letter, informing him that
General Caswell meditated an attack upon a fortified post of the enemy on Lynch's Creek, about
fourteen miles from the militia encampment. More anxious than ever, General Gates urged on the
march of the regulars. Whatever the men suffered, and whatever they thought, the example of
the officers, who shared with them every inconvenience, repressed the murmurs which were hourly
expected to break forth. The next morning, orders were issued for the army to march with the
utmost expedition to join the militia, under the idea that it was the only expedient to gain a supply
of provisions ; but, another and a more vexatious cause to General Gates was, a letter from General
Caswell, advising him that he had every reason to apprehend an attack on his camp by the garrison
from Lynch's Creek, (the very garrison which he, the day before, had determined to assault, for
there was no possibility of surprising troops so situated,) and requesting General Gates to re-enforce
him with all possible dispatch.
One of Caswell's letters began—" Sir, General W  , my aid de camp."— The osten
tation of this address weakened the little confidence which the general in chief might have had in
the major general's capacity for command, and increased his desire to have all the forces under his
immediate direction. Such evasions of orders— such pretences to enterprise, and such sudden
signs of intimidation in the militia general, determined Gates to reach his camp in person that same
day, although it was impracticable, without retreating the militia, for a junction to be formed until
the 'next. The deputy adjutant general had the honor of attending the general commandant to the
head quarters of the commandant of the militia. The reception was gracious, and the general and
his suite were regaled with wine and other novelties, exquisitely grateful and pleasingly exhilarating ;
but, a man must have been intoxicated, not to perceive the confusion which prevailed in the camp-
tables; chairs, bedsteads, benches, and many other articles of heavy and cumbrous household stuff;
were scattered before the tent doors in'great disorder.
It was understood that General Caswell had discovered, upon the last alarm, that by the death
of horses and breaking . down of carriages, he was rendered unabled to move, and was making an
" effort to divest himself then, of his heavy baggage. [If, in these notes, a tenor, censorious of General
Caswell's conduct, appears to the reader, the writer begs that it may not, as it ought not to be, imputed

490 APPENDIX B.
to any personal prejudice, or malicious motive. He never had the honor of seeing the general untii
this time ; and all that he had ever heard of him, was extremely favourable to his character as a gen
tleman and a patriot. A regard to facts, to which the writer thinks he may possibly hereafter be
Galled to testify on oath, obliges him to state them faithfully as they occurred, or were communicated
to him ; preserving the memory of authorities, as well as incidents, in order to a correct statement of
the circumstances, about which he may be interrogated.]
On the 17th of August, the wished for junction took place at the Cr^jss Roads, about* fifteen miles
east of the enemy's post, on Lynch's Creek.
This event enlivened the countenances of all parties ; the militia were relieved from their appre
hensions of an attack, and the regulars forgetting their fatigues, and disdaining to betray the least.
appearance of discontent, exulted in the confidence with which they inspired their new comrades;
h good understanding prevailed among the officers of all ranks, and General Caswell seemed satisfied
with the honor of being the third in command.
The Baron De Kalb commanded the right wing of the army, composed of the regular troops, and
General Caswell the left, of militia.
After the junction, which happened about noon, the army marched a few miles towards the
enemy's post on Lynch's Creek, and encamped in order.
The deputy adjutant general, who had as much anxiety as if he had been personally respon
sible for the fate of the army, in order to observe what guards were established for the safety of the
left wing, went with Lieutenant Colonel Ford, (officer of the day) at an unusual hour, to inspect
the lines. The guards and centinels of the right wing were, as usual, attentive, and hailed the
visiting rounds with that alacrity and spirit which inspired a confidence of security in that quarter ;
but, in the left wing, all was tranquil. The officers patroled around the encampment without
being hailed once ; and then rode into the lines and among the tents, and even approached the
marquees of some of the general and field officers — one of whom complained of being* disturbed, and
intimated that it was an unseasonable hour for gentlemen to call. The officers of the preceding
day were sent for, and guards and patrols sent out to secure the encampment from surprise.
The morning of the 8th of August .dawned, without revealing any appearance of an enemy.
Under the judicious mask of offensive operations, the commanding officer of the post on Lynch's
Creek evacuated it, and retired unmolested, and at leisure, to a much stronger position on Little
Lynch's Creek, within a day's march of Camden — which last was strongly fortified, and had a
considerable garrison under the command of Lord Rawdon.
The small posts which the enemy had advanced into the country, were calculated to cover the
parties, which were sent in all directions to collect the forage and provisions, that might be found on
the waters of Lynch's Creek and Black Rivers, and this business having been already effected, the
posts were no longer an object to them.
General Gates saw himself master of the field, but it was a barren one. The troops still subsisted
upon precarious supplies of corn meal and lean beef, of which they often, did not receive half a ra
tion per day, and no possibility exhisted of doing better, without departing from the route which the
general had all along pertinaciously persisted in. To have descended among the fertile fields of Black
River, would have been leaving the garrison of Camden between the army and the expected re-en
forcements from Virginia. Besides, the refugees of North Carolina repeated their assurances of
joining in considerable numbers in a few days.
On the other hand, the Waxaw settlement offered the greatest prospect of a comfortable supply of
provisions ; but it could not be gained under two or three days march ; it lay too much out of the
way — the movement would look like retreating from the enemy, and the swampers, as the expected

APPENDIX B 491
volunteers were called, would surely desert the cause. There was no deciding— there was no delay
ing—the army marched unconscious what step was next to be taken. General Gates however, began
to perceive the danger of approaching an enemy, of whose numbers he had no certain intelligence,
incumbered as he was with an enormous train of heavy baggage, and a multitude of women, and not
a few children. An effort was therefore formed under Major Dean, and a number of waggons were
appointed to convey to Charlotte, all the heavy baggage, and as many of the women as could be
driven from the line ; many of the latter, however, preferred sharing every toil and every danger with
the soldiery, to the security and provisions that were promised them. The army advanced, but ap
proaching the enemy's post on Little Lynch's Creek, it was discovered by good intelligence, to be
situated on the south side of the water, on commanding ground, that the way leading to it, was over a
«* causway on the north side to a wooden bridge, which stood on very steep banks ; and that the creek
lay in a deep muddy channel, bounded on the north by an extensive swamp, and passable no where
within/ several miles, but in the face of the enemy's work. The enemy was not disposed to abandon
these advantages, without feeling the pulse of the approaching army ; and General Gates observed,
^that to attack him in front, " would be taking the bull by the horns." It was necessary, for once, to
depart from the shortest route to the enemy's principal out post — Camden. The army defiled by
the right, and Colonel Hall of Maryland, with a detachment of about 300 men, covered the left
flank until it was out of danger from surprise, and then formed the rear guard. This manoeuvre, on
the 1 1th of August, induced the garrison to retire with some precipitation to Camden, and about the
same time the British garrison, which had occupied Clermont (or Rugley's Mills,) on the north road,
retired to the same place.
Lord Rawdon, who commanded the advanced corps of the British army, wisely collected his
whole force at Camden, which, besides being flanked by the River Wateree, and Pinetree Creek,
was considerably strengthened by a number of redoubts.
As his lordship's emissaries were in all parts of the country, he could not fail to be informed,
that General Gates was in his neighborhood with a brigade of regular troops, and two brigades of
militia, besides some small corps of artillery and cavalry — that Brigadier General Stevens was on
the same route, with a brigade of Virginia militia— that Colonel Marion, below, and Colonel Sumpter
above Camden, were stimulating their countrymen to re-assume their arms ; and that, in short, the
whole country were ready to revolt from the allegiance which had been extorted from them but a-
few weeks before. He, therefore, permitted General Ga'.es to march unmolested to Clermont, (where
the Americans encamped on the 13th,) and employed his men in strengthening his post for defence,
until re-enforcements might arrive from Charleston, where Lord Cornwallis was left in command ;
Sir Henry Clinton having returned to New York soon after the reduction of the former city.
Brigadier General Stevens arrived with his Virginians, at Clermont, on the 14th, and encamped
with the rest of the army. On the same day, (or the 15th,) an inhabitant of Camden came, as if
by accident, into the American encampment, and was conducted to head quarters. He affected
ignorance of the approach of the Americans-pretended very great friendship for his countrymen,
the Marylanders, and promised the general to be out again in a few days with all the information-
the general wished to obtain. The information which he then gave was the truth, but not all the
truth, which, events afterwards revealed; yet, so plausible was his manner, that General Gates
dismissed him, with many promises, if he would faithfully observe his engagements. Suspicions
arose in the breasts of some of the officers about head quarters, that this man's errand was easily
accomplished ;-the credulity of the general was not arraigned-but, it was conceived that it would
have been prudent to have detained the man for further acquaintance.

492 APPENDIX B.
Colonel Sumpter of the South Carolina militia, had intelligence that an escort with clothing, am-
munition and other stores, for the troops at Camden, was on the road from Charleston, by way of
M'Cord's Ferry on the Congaree ; and that it would neeessarily pass the Wateree at a ferry about a
mile from the town, under cover of a small redoubt on the opposite side of the river. This intelli
gence he communicated to the general, requesting a small re-enforcement of infantry, and two small
pieces of artillery to join his volunteers, promising to intercept the convoy. The colonel's accurate
knowledge of the geography of the country, and the qualities of the men who were his followers,
favoured the execution of this enterprise. The general ordered a detachment of one hundred regular
infantry, and a party of artillery, with two brass field-pieces, under Lieutenant Colonel Woolford,
to join Colonel Sumpter, and act under his command.
To attract the attention of the garrison in Camden, if they did not choose to retire, which seemed %
to be but too confidently expected ; and to facilitate the execution of the little expedition under
Sumpter, all other objects seemed to be suspended.
The only stores which were forwarded to the army by General Stevens, were a few articles of
West India produce, the principal of which was molasses. No supply of provisions of any sort
was collected, more than to serve from day to day. The obscure route the army had marched,
actually kept their friends ignorant of their movements ; and the arrival of General Gates at Cler
mont was, when known, a subject of more surprise to the patriots, than to the enemies of the
country. It is probable, and in the Opinion of many, a matter, of no doubt -whatever, that if
General Gates had taken a secure position with his army, and waited only a few days, abundance of
provisions would have flowed into his camp ; and that, by the addition of volunteers from the Caro-
linas, he would have acquired such a superiority over the British army, which did not much exceed
four thousand men, that he would have found no difficulty in recovering the country as far as
Charleston; but, opinions are fruitless. On the 15th of August, 1780, General Gates issued the
following : —
After General Orders — " The sick, the extra artillery stores, the heavy baggage, and such quar-
e r-master's stores, as are not immediately wanted, to march this evening, under a guard, to Waxaws.
" To this order the general requests the brigadier generals, to see that those under their com
mand, pay the most exact and scrupulous obedience.
" Lieutenant Colonel Edmonds, with the remaining guns of the park, will take post and march with
the Virginia brigade, under General Stevens ; he will direct, as any deficiency happens in the artillery
affixed to the other brigades, to supply it immediately; his military staff, and a proportion of his
officers, with forty of his men, are to attend him and await his orders.
" The troops will be ready to march precisely at ten o'clock, in the following order, viz: —
" Colonel Armand's advance; cavalry, commanded by Colonel Armand ; Colonel Porterfield's light
infantry upon the right flank of Colonel Armand, in indian file, two hundred yards from the road;
Major Armstrong's light infantry in the same order as Colonel Porterfield's, upon the left flank of
the legion.
" Advance guard of foot, composed of the advance pickets, first brigade of Maryland, second
brigade of Maryland, division of North Carolina, Virginia division; rear guard, volunteer cavalry,
upon the flank of the baggage, equally divided.
" In this order, the troops will proceed on their march this night.
" In case of an attack by the enemy's cavalry in front, the light infantry upon each flank will in
stantly move up and give, and continue, the most galling fire upon the enemy's horse. - This will
enable Colonel Armand, not only to support the shock of the enemy's charge, but finally to rout them ;
lhe colonel will therefore consider the order to stand the attack of the enemy's cavalry, be their num
bers what they may, as positive.

APPENDIX B. 493
" General Stevens will immediately order one captain, two lieutenants, one ensign, three sergeants,
one drum, and sixty rank and file to join Colonel Porterfield's infantry ; these are to be taken from
the most experienced woodsmen, and men every way the fittest for the service.
" General Caswell will likewise complete Major Armstrong's light infantry to their original number.
These must be immediately marched to the advanced posts of the army.
" The troops will observe the profoundest silence upon the march ; and any soldier who offers to
fire without the command of his officer, must be instantly put to death.
" When the ground will admit of it, and the near approach of the enemy renders it necessary, the
army will (when ordered) march in columns.
" The artillery at the head of their respective brigades, and the baggage in the rear.
" The guard of the heavy baggage will be composed of the remaining officers and soldiers of the
artillery, one captain, two subalterns, four sergeants, one drum, and sixty rank and file ; and no
person whatever is to presume to send any other soldier upon that service.
" All bat men, waiters, &c. who are soldiers taken from the line, are forthwith to join their regi
ments, and act with their masters while they are upon duty.
" The tents of the whole army are to be struck at tattoo."
After writing this order, the general communicated it to the deputy adjutant general, showing himj
at the same time, a rough estimate of the forces under his command, making them upwards of seven
thousand. That this calculation was exaggerated, the deputy adjutant general could not but suspect,
from his own observation. He, therefore, availed himself of the general's orders, to call all the
general officers in the army, to a council, to be held in Rugley's Barn — to call also upon the com
manding officers of corps for a field return ; in making which," they were to be as exact as possible ;
and, as he was not required to attend the council, he busied himself in collecting these returns and
forming an abstract for the general's better information. This abstract was presented to the genera
just as the council broke up, and immediately upon his coming out of the door. He cast his eyes
upon the numbers of rank and file present jit for duty, which was exactly three thousand and fifty-
two. He said there were no less than thirteen general officers in council ; and intimated something
about the disproportion between the numbers of officers and privates. It was replied, " Sir, the
number of the latter are certainly much below the estimate formed this morning ; but," said the
general, " these are enough for our purpose." What that was, was not communicated to the
deputy adjutant general. The general only added — " there was no dissenting voice in the council
where the orders have just been read" — and then gave them to be published to the army.
Although there had been no dissenting voice in the council, the orders were no sooner promulgated,
than they became the subject of animadversion. Even those who had been dumb in council, said
that there had been no consultation — that the orders were read to them, and all opinion seemed sup
pressed by the very positive and decisive terms in which they were expressed. Others could not
imaghje how it could be conceived, that an army, consisting of more than two-thirds militia, and
which had never been once exercised in arms together, could form columns, and perform other ma
noeuvres in the night, and in the face of an enemy. But, of all the officers, Colonel Armand took
the greatest exception. He seemed to think the positive orders respecting himself, implied a doubt
of his courage— declared that cavalry had never before been put in the front of a line of battle in
the dark— and that the disposition, as it respected his corps, proceeded from resentment in the
general, on account of a previous altercation between them about horses, which the general had
ordered to be taken from the officers of the army, to expedite the movement of the artillery through
the wilderness. A great deal was said upon the occasion ; but, the time was short, and the officers
and soldiers, generally, not knowing, or believing any more than the general, that any considerable
62

494 APPENDIX B.
body of the enemy were to be met with out of Camden, acquiesced with their usual cheerfulness?
and were ready to march at the hour appointed.
As there were no spirits yet arrived in camp ; and as, until lately, it was unusual for troops to make
a forced march, or prepare to meet an enemy without some extraordinary allowance, it was unluckily
conceived that molasses, would, for once, be an acceptable substitue ; accordingly the hospital stores
were broached, and one gill of molasses per man, and a full ration of corn meal and meat, were is
sued to the army previous to their march, which commenced, according to orders, at about ten o'clock
at night of the 15th. But I must arrest the progress of the narrative to apologize for introducing a
remark, seemingly so trivial. Nothing ought to be considered as trivial, in an army, which in any
degree affects the health, or spirits of the troops ; upon which often, more than upon numbers, the
fate of battles depends. The troops of General Gates' army, had frequently felt the bad consequen
ces of eating bad provision ; but, at this time, a hasty meal of quick baked bread and fresh beef, with
a desert of molasses, mixed with mush, or dumpiings, operated so cathartically, as to disorder very
many of the men, who were breaking the ranks all night, and were certainly much debilitated before
(he action commenced in the morning.
It has been observed, that the direct march of the American army towards Camden, and the pros
pect of considerable re-enforcements of militia, had induced the commanding officer, Lord Rawdon,
to collect there, all the forces under his directions. And it is certain, that the seeming confidence of
the American general, had inspired him with apprehensions for his principal post. Lord Cornwallis,
at Charlestown, was constantly advised of the posture of affairs in the interior of the country ; and, con
fident that Lord Rawdon could not long resist the forces that might, and probably would, be opposed
to him, in a very short time resolved to march himself, with a considerable re-enforcement, to Cam.
den. He arrived there on the 14th, and had the discernment, at once, to perceive that delay would
render that situation dangerous, even to his whole force ; the disaffection from his late assumed,
arbitrary, and vindictive power, having become general through all the country above General
Gates' line of march, as well as to the eastward of Santee, and to the westward of Wateree
Rivers. He, therefore, took the resolution of attacking the new constituted American army in
their open irregular encampment at Clermont. Both armies, ignorant of each other's intentions,
moved about the same hour of the same night, and approaching each other, met about half way be
tween their respective encampments, at midnight.
The first revelation of this new and unexpected scene, was occasioned by a smart, mutual salu
tation of small arms between the advanced guards. Some of the cavalry of Armand's legion were
wounded, retreated, and threw the whole corps into disorder ; which, recoiling suddenly on the
front of the column of infantry, disordered the first Maryland brigade, and occasioned a general
consternation through the whole line of the army. The light infantry under Porterfield, however,
executed their orders gallantly ; and the enemy, no less astonished than ourselves, seemed to ac
quiesce in a sudden suspension of hostilities. Some prisoners were taken on both sides ; from one
of these, the deputy adjutant general of the American army, extorted information respecting the
situation and numbers of the enemy. He informed, that Lord Cornwallis commanded in person
about three thousand regular British troops, which were, in line of march, about five or six hundred
yards in front. Order was soon restored in the corps of infantry in the American army, and the
officers were employed in forming a front line of battle, when the deputy adjutant general com
municated to General Gates the information which he had from the prisoner. The general's
astonishment could not be concealed. He ordered the deputy adjutant general to call another council
of war. All the general officers immediately assembled in the rear of the line ; the unwelcome
news was communicated to them. General Gates said, " Gentlemen, what is best to be done ?"

APPENDIX B. 495
All were mute for a few moments — when the gallant Stevens exclaimed, " Gentlemen, is it not too
late now to do any thing but fight ?" No other advice was offered, and the general desired the
gentlemen would repair to their respective commands.
The Baron De Kalb's opinion may be inferred from the following fact : When the deputy adju
tant general went to call him to council, he first told him what had been discovered. " Well," said
the baron, " and has the general given you orders to retreat the army ?" The baron, however, did
not oppose the suggestion of General Stevens ; and every measure that ensued, was preparatory for
action. Lieutenant Colonel Porterfield, in whose bravery and judicious conduct great dependance was
placed, received, in the first rencontre, a mortal wound, (as itdong afterwards proved,) and was
obliged to retire. His infantry bravely kept the ground in front ; and the American army were
formed in the following order : The Maryland division, including the Delawares, on the right —
the North Carolina militia in the center — and the Virginia militia on the left. It happened, that
each flank was covered by a marsh, so near as to admit the removing of the first Maryland brigade
to form a second line, about two hundred yards in the rear of the first. The artillery was removed
from the center of the brigades, and placed in the center of the front line ; and the North Carolina
militia (light infantry) under Major Armstrong, which had retreated at the first rencontre, was
ordered to cover a small interval between the left wing and the swampy grounds on that quarter.
Frequent skirmishes happened during the night, between the advanced parties — which served to
discover the relative situations of the two armies — and as a prelude to what was to take place in
the morning.
At dawn of day (on the morning of the l6th of August) the enemy appeared in front, advancing
in column. Captain Singleton, who commanded some pieces of artillery, observed to Colonel Wil
liams, that he plainly perceived the ground of the British uniform at about two hundred yards in
front. The deputy adjutant general immediately ordered Captain Singleton to open his battery ; and
then rode to the general, who was in the rear of the second line, and informed him of the cause of
the firing which he heard. He also observed to the general, that the enemy seemed to be displaying
their column by the right ; the nature of the ground favored this conjecture, for yet nothing was
clear. The general seemed disposed to wait events — he gave no orders. The deputy adjutant general
observed, that if the enemy, in the act of displaying, were briskly attacked by General Stevens'
brigade, which was already in line of battle, the effect might be fortunate, and first impressions were
important. " Sir," said the general, " that's right— let it be done." This was the last order that
the deputy adjutant general received. He hastened to General Stevens, who instantly advanced
with his brigade, apparently in fine spirits. The right wing of the enemy was soon discovered
in line—\t was too late to attack them displaying ; nevertheless, the business of the day could no
longer be deferred. The deputy adjutant general requested General Stevens to let him have forty
or fifty privates, volunteers, who would run forward of the brigade, and commence the attack.
They tvere led forward, within forty or fifty yards of the enemy, and ordered to take trees, and keep
up as brisk a fire as possible. The .desired effect of this expedient, to extort the enemy's fire at
some distance, in order to the rendering it less terrible to the militia, was not gained. General Ste
vens observing the enemy to rush on, put his men in mind of their bayonets ; but, the impetuosity
with' which they advanced, firing and huzzaing, threw the whole body of the militia into such a
panic, that they generally threw down their loaded arms and fled, in the utmost consternation.
The unworthy example of the Virginians was almost instantly followed by the North Carolinians ;
only a small part of the brigade, commanded by Brigade General Gregory, made a short pause.

496 APPENDIX B.
A part of Dixon's regiment, of that brigade, next in the line to the second Maryland brigade, fired two
or three rounds of cartridge. But, a great majority of the militia, (at least two-thirds of the army)
fled without firing a shot. The writer avers it of his own knowledge, having seen and observed
every part of the army, from left to right, during the action. He who has never seen the effect of
a panic upon a multitude, can have but an imperfect idea of such a thing. The best disciplined
troops have been enervated, and made cowards by it. Armies have been routed by it, even where
no enemy appeared to furnish an excuse. Like electricity, it operates instantaneously — like sym
pathy, it is irresistable where it touches. But, in the present instance, its action was not universal.
The regular troops, who had the keen edge of sensibility rubbed off by strict discipline and hard
service, saw the confusion with but little emotion. They engaged seriously in the affair ; and, not
withstanding some irregularity, which was created by the militia breaking, pell mell, through the
second line, order was restored there — time enough to give the enemy a* severe check, which abated
the fury of their assault, and obliged them to assume a more deliberate manner of acting. The
second Maryland brigade, including the battalion of Delawares, on the right, were engaged with the
enemy's left, which they opposed with very great firmness. They even advanced upon them, and
had taken a number of prisoners, when their companions of the first brigade (which formed the
second line) being greatly outflanked, and charged by superior numbers, were obliged to give
ground. At this critical moment, the regimental officers of the latter brigade, reluctant to leave the
field without orders, inquired for their commanding officer, (Brigadier General Smallwood) who,
however, was not to be found ; notwithstanding, Colonel Gunby, Major Anderson, and a number
of other brave officers, assisted by the deputy adjutant general, and Major Jones, one of Small-
wood's aids, rallied the brigade, and renewed the contest. Again they were obliged to give way —
and were again rallied — the second brigade were still warmly engaged — the distance between the
two brigades did not exceed two hundred yards — their opposite flanks being nearly upon a line per
pendicular to their front. At this eventful juncture, the deputy adjutant general, anxious that the
communication between them should be preserved, and wishing that, in the almost certain event of
a retreat, some order might be sustained by them, hastened from the first to the second brigade,
which he found precisely in the same circumstances. He called upon his own regiment, (the 6th
Maryland) not to fly, and was answered by the Lieutenant Colonel, Ford, who said — " They have
done all that can be expected of them — we are outnumbered and outflanked — see the enemy charge
with bayonets.'.' The enemy having collected their corps, and directing their whole force against
these two .devoted brigades, a tremendous fire of musketry was, for some time, kept up on both
sides, with equal perseverance and obstinacy, until Lord Cornwallis, perceiving there was no
cavalry opposed to him, pushed forward his dragoons — and his infantry charging, at the same mo
ment, with fixed bayonets, put an end to the contest. His victory was complete. All the artillery,
and a very great number of prisoners, fell into his hands— many fine fellows lay on the field—
and the rout of the remainder was entire — not even a company retired in any order — everyone
escaped as he could. If, in this affair, the militia fled too soon, the regulars may be thought almost
as blamable for remaining too long on the field ; especially, after all hope of victory must have
been despaired of. Let the commandants of fhe brigades answer for themselves. Allow the
same privilege to the officers of the corps, comprising those brigades, and they will say, that they
ircver teceived orders to retreat, nor any order from any general officer, from the commencement
of the action, until it became desperate. The brave Major General, the Baron De Kalb, fought on
foot, with the second brigade, and fell, mortally wounded, into the hands of the enemy, who
stripped him even of his shirt ; a fate which probably was avoided by other generals, only by an
opportune retreat.

APPENDIX B. 497
- The torrent of unarmed militia, bore away with it, Generals Gates, Caswell, and a number of
ethers, who soon saw that all was lost. General Gates, at first, conceived a hope that he might
rally, at Clermont, a sufficient number to cover the retreat of the regulars ; but, the farther they fled
the more they were dispersed ; and the generals soon found themselves abandoned by all but their
aids. Lieutenant Colonel Senf, who had been on the expedition with Colonel Sumpter, returned,
and overtaking General Gates, informed him of their complete success — that the enemy's redoubt,
on Wateree, opposite to Camden, was first reduced, and the convoy of stores, &c. from Charleston,
was decoyed, and became prize to the American party, almost without resistance. That upwards of
one hundred prisoners, and forty loaded waggons, were in the hands of the party, who had sus
tained very little loss ; but the general could avail himself nothing of this trifling advantage. The
detachment under Sumpter was on the opposite side of the Wateree, marching off, as speedily as
might be, to secure their booty— for the course of the firing in the morning, indicated unfavorable
news from the army.
The militia, the general saw, were in air ; and the regulars, he feared, were no more. The
dreadful thunder of artillery and musketry had ceased, and none of his friends appeared. There
was no existing corps with which the victorious detachment might unite ; and the Americans had no
post in the rear. He, therefore, sent orders to Sumpter to retire in the best manner he could ; and
proceeded himself with General Caswell towards Charlotte, an open village on a plain, about
sixty miles from the fatal scene of action. The Virginians, who knew nothing of the country
they were in, involuntarily reversed the route they came, and fled, most of them, to Hillsborough.
General Stevens pursued them, and halted there as many as were not sufficiently refreshed before
his arrival, to pursue their way home. Their terms of service, however, being very short, and no
prospect presenting itself to afford another proof of their courage,-General Stevens soon afterwards
discharged them.
The North Carolina militia fled different ways, as their hopes led, or their fears drove them.
Most of them prefering the shortest way home, scattered through the wilderness which lies between
Wateree and Pee Dee Rivers, and thence towards Roanoke. Whatever these might have suffered
from the disaffected, they probably were not worse off than those who retired the way they came ;
wherein, they met many of their insidious friends, armed, ano*advancing to join the American
army ; but, learning its fate from the refugees, they acted decidedly in concert with the victors ; and,
captivating some, plundering others, and maltreating all the fugitives they met, returned, exultingly,
home. They even added taunts to their perfidy ; one of a party, who robbed Brigadier General
Butler of his sword, consoled him by saying, u you'll have no further use for it."
The regular troops, it has been observed, were the last to quit the field. Every corps was
broken and dispersed ; even the boggs and brush, which in some measure served to screen them
from their furious pursuers, separated them from one another. Major Anderson was the only
officer who fortunately rallied, as he retreated, a few men of different companies ; and whose pru
dence and firmness afforded protection to those who joined his party on the rout.
Colonel Gunby, Lieutenant Colonel Howard, Captain Kirkwood, and Captain Dobson, with
a few other officers, and fifty or sixty men, formed a junction on the rout, and proceeded together.
The general order for moving off the heavy baggage, &c. to Waxaws, was not put in execution,
as directed to be done, on the preceding evening. The whole of it, consequently, fell into the hands
of the enemy; as well as all that which followed the army except the waggons of the General's
Gates and De Kalb ; which, being furnished with the stoutest horses, fortunately escaped, under
the protection of a small quarter guard. Other waggons also had got out of danger from the enemy ;
but the cries of the women and the wounded in the rear, and the consternation of the flying

498 APPENDIX B.
troops, so alarmed some of the waggoners, that they cut out their teams, and taking each a horse,
left the rest for the next that should come. Others were obliged to give up their horsts to assist in
carrying off the wounded ; and the whole road, for many miles, was strewed with signals of dis
tress, confusion and dismay. What added, not a little to this calamitous scene, was the conduct of
Armand's legion. They were principally foreigners, and some of them, probably, not unaccus
tomed to such scenes. Whether it was owing to the disgust of the colonel, at general orders, or
the cowardice of his men, is not with the writer to determine ; but, certain it is, the legion did not
take any part in the action of the l6th ; they retired early, and in disorder, and were seen plun
dering the baggage of the army on their retreat. One of them cut Captain Lemar, of the Mary
land infantry, over the hand, for attempting to reclaim his own portmanteau, which the fellow was
taking out of the waggon. Captain Lemar was unarmed, having broke his sword in action, and
was obliged to submit, both to the loss and to the insult. The tent covers , were thrown off the
waggons, generally, and the baggage exposed, so that cr.e might take what suited him to carry off.
General Caswell's mess waggon afforded the best refreshment ; very unexpectedly to the writer, he
there found a pipe of good Madeira, broached, and surrounded by a number of soldiers, whose
appearance led him to inquire what engaged their attention. He acknowledges, that in this in
stance, he shared in the booty, and took a draught of wine, which was the only refreshment he
had received that day.
But the catastrophe being over, before we pursue a detail of all its distressing consequences, it
may be excusable to consider, whether the measures which led to the necessity of fighting a general
battle were justifiable ? and whether such an event might not have been avoided, at almost any
time before the two armies were actually opposed ?
If General Gates intended-to risk a general action, conscious of all circumstances, he certainly
made that risk under every possible disadvantage ; and n contemplation of those circumstances,
would seem to justify Colonel Armand's assertion, made in the afternoon of the day in which the
battle was fought — " I will not, said he, say that we have been betrayed ; but if it had been the pur
pose of the general to sacrifice his army, what could he have done more effectually to have an
swered that purpose ?"
General Gates, however, notwithstanding his after order of the 15th, had, in the opinion of most
of his officers, and particularly of the writer, no more apprehension of meeting the enemy in force,
than the least informed man of his army. The circuitous route, first recommended to him, would cer
tainly have been the safest and best. Magazines, an armory, an hospital, and even fortified posts,
might have been established, without halting the effective force of the army ; posts to which they might,
in case of disaster, have retired under protection of the patriotic militia of Mecklenburg and Roan
Counties; who only wanted time to join the army in respeGtable numbers. Such at least, were
their subsequent declarations ; and such their subsqeuent conduct, rendered most probable.
But, even on the route the army had inarched, the danger of meeting an enemy of equal or supe
rior force, was passed when they got into the vicinity of the Wateree, and in the neighbourhood of their
friends. It was only necessary for General Gates to have been informed of the march of Lord
Cornwallis from Charleston, to have avoided, almost as long as he pleased, a conflict between the
two armies.
In the opinion of the writer, it was not too late, even after Lord Cornwallis reached Camden,
If, instead of meeting him, involuntarily, General Gates had been informed' of his intended move
ment, and quietly, in the afternoon of the 15th, have followed, with his whole army, the detach
ment under Woolford, over the Wateree, it would have been impossible for the armies to have met
until the next day, and after the success of Sumpter's expedition. If his lordship should then have

APPENDIX B. 499
thought of forcing a passage over the Wateree, General Gates would have had the alternative of
opposing him under that disadvantage, or of retiring to any position he might prefer, higher up the
river. Lord Cornwallis could not have adventured the passage of the river, much above Gates'
army, because the river being fordable in many places, his garrison and magazines at Camden would
have been jeoparded ; the forces he could afford to leave for its defence, would have been insuffi
cient for half a day ; and, if the post and its stores had been gained by the Americans, the British
army, destitute of supplies, would have been obliged to retire towards Charleston. On the other
hand, if his lordship should keep his post in his rear, he must consequently leave the communica
tion open between the American army and their friends in the upper country ; which would have
Tendered more practicable the avoiding of a general engagement. But, these are subsequent re
flections on measures, the idea of which, perhaps never occurred, nor was suggested to the
general. Involved, as he was, in the necessity of fighting, the disposition which was made for
battle, after the alarm, was, perhaps, unexceptionable, and as well adapted to the situation, as
if the ground had been reconnoitered and chosen by the ablest officer in the army of the United
States. (It was afterwards approved by the judicious and gallant General Greene, to whom the
writer had the solemn pleasure of showing the field of battle ; and with whom he had the additional
mortification of participating the danger and disgrace of a repulse, near the same place, the very
next campaign.)
The only apology that General Gates condescended to make to the army for the loss of the battle,
was, " a man may pit a cock, but he can't make him fight." — " The fate of battle is uncontrolable" —
and such other common maxims as admit of no contradiction.
It is, however, morally certain, considering the disposition of the citizens generally, and the
respectable body of militia that had already joined the army, that time was, of all things, the most
important to the success of General Gates' army.
Lord Cornwallis, conscious of this truth, and of the disadvantage the least lapse would prove
to him — seized the first moment to hasten the decision of an experiment, which was to gain or
lose the country. For that season at least ; perhaps for ever.
Generals Gates and Caswell arrived at Charlotte on the night of the action. The ensuing morn
ing presented nothing to them but an open village, with but few inhabitants, and the remains of a
temporary hospital, containing a few maimed soldiers of Colonel Buford's unfortunate corps, which
had been cut to pieces on the retreat, after the surrender of Charleston.
General Caswell was requested to remain there, to encourage the militia of the country, who were
to rendezvous there in three days, (as it was first intended) to countenance the reassembling of the
American army. General Gates perceived no effectual succour short of Hillsborough, where the
general assembly of North Carolina were about to convene; thither he repaired, with all possible
expedition ; and was followed the next day by General Caswell, who despaired of the meeting of
the militia ; probably because he thought that their first object, the army, was annihiliated.
On the two days succeeding the fatal action, Brigadier General Gist, who commanded the se
cond brigade of Maryland troops, previous to its misfortune at Charlotte, arrived with only two
or three attendants, who had fallen into his route. Several field officers, and many officers of the
line also, arrived similarly circumstanced ; and, although not more than about a dozen men of dif
ferent corps arrived in irregular squads, from time to time, not less than one hundred infantry were
collected in the village within that time ; besides Armand's cavalry, which was very little reduced ;
and a small corps of mounted militia, which retired from the Waxsmv settlement, under the command
of Major Davy, an enterprizing and gallant young man, who had been raising volunteer cavalry, to
join the army.

SOO APPENDIX B.
Very few of the fugitive militia resorted to this place.
Fortunately, there was a small supply of provision in the town — the inhabitants did all they
could to refresh both men and officers — and, by the provident care of Colonel Hall, of Maryland,
a quantity of flour was sent back on the route of the retreating troops.
^ Brigadier General Smallwood, who had the honor of the second line, or corps de reserve, assigned
him in the late action, deliberately came in on the morning, (or about noon) of the 18th, escorted
by one of his aids de camp, and two or three other gentlemen, and about as many soldiers, all
mounted. His route was by way of the Wateree.
The small squads assembled by Major Anderson, and the other officers already mentioned, were
on the direct route. The latter were not yet arrived, but were hourly expected ; and afforded, in
addition to those already collected, and those with Colonel Sumpter, a prospect of forming such a
body as might still encourage the militia to form, at least the semblance of an army, which might
keep up some appearance of opposition, until the resources of the union could be called forth by
Congress, or by the states most immediately interested.
An incident, which occasioned great distress the next day, must be here related. It has been ob
served, that many of the waggoners and retreating troops accelerated their flight, by taking horses
from the waggons which were left on the route. In this way many wounded officers and soldiers
made their escape, and bore with astonishing fortitude, the pains incident to their situation. They
gave indeed, (some of them) proofs of the uttermost pain and fatigue that the human constitution
can bear — others sunk under their accumulated distresses. Those who arrived at Charlotte, were
taken the best possible care of — the horses were turned out to graze in the adjacent fields, no forage
Being provided. It should have been remarked, that the tribe of Catawba Indians, good friends
to the Americans, quitted their villages on the Wateree, and followed the remnant of the army
towards the town of Charlotte, where many of them had already arrived; some of them, in their
irregular way, fired a number of guns after night, on the 18th, which gave a very general alarm ; and
many of the people fled in the night, taking as many of the horses as they could find, or had occa
sion for.
Another incident, much more consequential ! The morning of the 19th was fair, and the
officers were assembling about the public square, and encouraging one another with hopes of a more
favourable course of affairs than had been current for some time past, when they received unques
tionable information, that Colonel Sumpter, whose arrival they looked for every moment, was com
pletely surprised, the preceding day, and the whole party killed, captured, or dispersed. Dead or
alive, he was censured for suffering a surprise.
No organization, nor order, had yet been attempted to be restored among the few troops that
had arrived in Charlotte ; the privates were, therefore, hastily formed into ranks ; and the officers
were, among themselves, .adjusting the commands to be taken by them respectively, when the num
ber of supernumerary officers was discovered to be very considerable. Every one, however, took
some charge upon himself. The care of the wounded— the collection of provisions — and the tran
sportation of the heavy baggage, (preserved by Major Dean's small guard) and other matters,
which might, in any way, alleviate the general distress, engaged the attention of those who had no
division of the men.
There was no council, nor regular opinion taken, respecting this irksome situation. The general
idea was, that Charlotte, an open wooded village, without magazines of any sort — without a second
cartridge per man — and without a second ration, was not tenable for an hour, against superior num
bers, which might enter at every quarter— moreover, it was estimated by those who knew the

APPENDIX B. 501
geogrnphy of the country, that even then the victorious enemy 'might be in the vieinity of the place.
It was admitted, by every one, that no place could be more defenceless.
Only one officer, who was of the legion, proposed a temporary defence, by pulling down the
houses and forming a redoubt, which might induce the enemy to grant a capitulation. No respect
was paid to this destructive proposition, and the first suggestion prevailed.
Difficulties, almost innumerable, presented themselves to obstruct a march — several officers, with
small parties, were known to be on the route from Camden — some refugees might possibly escape
from Sumpter's detachment — many of the wounded were obliged to be left in the old hospital, depen
dant, probably, on the enemy, or on a few of the inhabitants who were unable to retire — and even
some who might have got off on horseback, were deprived of the means by the alarming incident
of the preceding night. Were all these to be abandoned ?
Time was never more important to a parcel of wretches than now ; but, how to take it, whether
w by the forelock," as the adage is, or wait its more propitious moments, none of us could deci
sively resolve. Biigadier General Smallwood, who quartered himself at a farm-house a little way
from town, appeared, at this crisis, approaching the parade in his usual slow pace. As senior officer,
his orders would have been obeyed, even to setting about fortifying the village.
Bu" being informed of what has just been related, and concurring in the general senti
ment, he leisurely put himself at the head of the party, and moved off towards Salisbury. The
deputy adjutant general, and Brigade Major Davidson, took the route to Camden, in order to direct
all they might meet, to file off towards Salisbury. The small parties that had attached themselves to
Colonel Gunby and Colonel Howard, were met near town, and an express was sent to Major An
derson who had, to no purpose, spent some time in endeavours to bring off some waggons, which
had escaped beyond the pursuit of the enemy, and were left without horses. By noon a very
lengtiy line of march, occupied the road from Charlotte to Salisbury. It consisted of the wretched
remnant of the late southern army ; a great number of distressed whig families, and the whole
tribe of Catawba Indians (about three hundred in number, about fifty or sixty of whom were war
riors, but indifferently armed) ; among the rest were six soldiers, who left the hospital with other
convalescents ; they had all suffered in Buford's unfortunate affair, and had but two sound arms
among them, indeed, four of them had not one arm among them; and two only an arm a piece;
each of them had one linen garment. Those officers and men, who were recently wounded, and
had resolution to undertake the fatigue, were differently transported ; some in waggons, some in
litters, and some on horseback — their sufferings were indiscribable. The distresses of the women
and children, who fled from Charlotte and its neighbourhood. The nakedness of the Indians, and
the number of their infants and aged persons, and the disorder of the whole line of march, conspired
to render it a scene too pictursque and complicated for description. A just representation would
exhibt an image of compound wretchedness— care, anxiety, pain, poverty, hurry, confusion, hi;-
miliation and dejection, would be characteristic traits in the mortifying picture.
The inhabitants, who had fled with their families, soon began to disperse, and take refuge among
their friends in the interior of the country. The Catawbas had a district of country assigned them
for hunting grounds in North Carolina. Brigadier General Smallwood continued the march of the
regular infantry to Salisbury, and arrived the third day after. Armand's legion proceeded, as
they threatened, when it was resolved to evacuate Charlotte : " If," said one of the officers, « you
will make de retreat, we will retreat faster dan you !"— they proceeded to Hillsborough. The
fertility of the country between Charlotte and Salis'r-.ry— the hospitality and benevolence of the
inhabitants— and the numbers of their habitations ,n the route, afforded, in many instances, that
63

502 APPENDIX B.
relief which was requisite to preserve life ; besides, a liberal supply of provisions for all this ca
valcade. It is not known, whether, if the Americans had not evacuated Charlotte, Lord Cornwallis would
not have made it an object to have dispossessed them ; but, as it was, his lordship contented himself,
with having defeated the southern army — driven it out of South Carolina — and cut up the only
detachment respectable enough to afford a head to which the patriots of the country might assemble.
His lordship certainly gave the world another instance in proof of the assertion, that it is not every
general, upon whom fortune bestows her favours, who knows how to avail himself of all the advan
tages which are presented to him. Victory is not always attended, perhaps never, with all the
superiority it seems to bestow. The British army retired to Camden.
So unexpected an event gave the poor Americans time to breathe. General Smallwood halted his
party at Salisbury — selected about one hundred and fifty effective men — and sent the remainder, per
haps fifty or sixty more, over the Yadkin River, with the waggons, women, &c. The effectives he offi
cered according to his pleasuie, and permitted the field officers, particularly those who had not
formerly belonged to his brigade, to proceed to Hillsborough. — Hall, Williams and Howard, were
of the number, who availed themselves, at their leisure, of this permission. At Salisbury, one
hundred and twenty or thirty miles from the scene of the late action, Swallwood took time to dictate
those letters which he addressed to Congress, and in which, he intimated the great difficulties he
had encountered, and the exertions he had made to save a remnant of General Gates' army. Let
ters which, with the aid of those he addressed to his friends in power, procured him, it was generally
believed in the line, the rank of major general in the army of the United States ; and which, pro
bably, promoted the resolution of Congress, directing an inquiry into the conduct of General
Gates. But, many of the officers wrote to their friends from Salisbury, and being chagrined and
mortified at not overtaking their commanding general in so long a retreat, expressed themselves with
great disgust and freedom.
Major Anderson, who casually heard of the retreat of the detachment that had surprised "Sump
ter, proceeded to Charlotte, where he found the milita inspirited by a change of circumstances,
disposed to organize themselves, and form such corps as might protect the country from the incursions
of the enemy, which might be expected from Camden. They requested the major to remain at
Charlotte, and through him, invited General Smallwood to return, importuning him, and even offering
hi;n the chief command of all the militia of Mecklenburg — General Caswell, their countryman,
having, as they alleged, abandoned them even before the expiration of the three days, in which he
had ordered them to assemble at Charlotte.
General Smallwood, however, declined the honour of this invitation : and sent orders to Major
Anderson, to join him, without delay, at Salisbury. And, in order that these instructions might
not be dispensed with on any pretence whatever, Lieutenant Colonel Ford, the particular friend
of Anderson, was charged with them, and with directions to expedite the march of the party. The
order was executed, and the mortified militia, were left to depend upon their own exertions, and
their own fortitude; which, notwithstanding the discouragements they had met with, did not fail.
They assembled — formed themselves into small partisan corps — and actually combated successfully,
the first detachments of the enemy that came afterwards into their country. These are facts which
entitle the patriots of Mecklenburg and Waxsaws, to a whole page of eulogium, in the best history
that shall record the circumstances of the revolution.
The unfortunate General Gates, at Hillsborough, where the assembly of the state had convened, hear
ing from the officers who arrived there, that the disasters of the army were not so completely ruinous
as he had at first apprehended, applied himself assiduously to the legislature for the supplies necessary

APPENDIX B. 503
to re-equip the regular troops. But what supplies, or rather the quantum, that would be requisite,
the general could not ascertain, having received no returns, or reports, of any kind, from General
Smallwood, who seemed to assume the command of the army.
In order, therefore, to obtain the requisite information, and to decide, at once, the doubt about
command, General Gates wrote explicitly to General Smallwood, and ordered him to pass the
Yadkin River with all the men under his command, and to proceed on the direct route to Hills
borough. This order had been anticipated. It was received by General Smallwood, after he had
passed the Yadkin and was on his march to Guilford Court House, on the route directed. At
Guilford, the troops were halted for refreshment ; and, as there was a great plenty of provisions
in the neighbourhood, General Smallwood, without regarding the instructions he had received from
General Gates, wrote to the assembly of the state, intimating that, with their approbation, he
would continue there until other arrangements should be resolved on. The assembly, properly,
declined interfering in matters which might involve a question of authority between two continental
officers, and referred the proposition of General Smallwood to General Gates. General Gates did
aot entirely disapprove of the execution of the proposition ; but, in his letter to General Small-
wood, he required, that certain returns, &c. should be forwarded to him without delay ; and gave
such explicit intimations, that he was not disposed to relinquish his command of the southern army,
as to induce General Swallwood to suspend, for the present, his hopes of succeeding thereto. He,
therefore, marched immediatety to Hillsborough, where he arrived with the tattered remains of
the army, early in the month of September. Thus ended the campaign of 1780.
A Narrative of Events relative to the Southern Army, subsequent to the arrival of General
Gales' broken battalions at Hillsborough, 1780.
Hillsborough had been a place of rendezvous for all the militia raised in the interior of North
Carolina ; and a stage of refreshment for all the troops which had marched from the northward to
succour Charleston, or re-enforce the southern army ; consequently, the resources of the country
had been generally collected and applied. What remained, did not afford an ample supply even
for the fugitives of the late army : which were now collected in the town, and were cantoned,
some in the houses of the inhabitants, and some in tents pitched near the court house, where the
assembly of the state were convened. The assembly saw and regretted the wants of the troops,
and did all that was then practicable, for their relief. A comfortable supply of fresh meat, corn-
meal, and wheat flour, was procured for the hospital ; and the rest of the men were subsisted by
provisions furnished by state commissaries, in part, and partly by the old expedient of collecting
by detachments — an expedient which gave great umbrage to the country.
At this time Lord Cornwallis was, with the principal part of his army, at Camden, where his own
woundedyand those of the American army were very differently treated.
The worse than savage system of severity, suggested by the malice of the king's minister, or
eonceived by the malignity of the king himself, which had been so fatally practised upon the prison
ers in New York and Philadelphia, was now practised with equal barbarity on the prisoners taken
in the southern department. Every where they were treated with cruel neglect, or insolent seve
rity. The difference of climates made some difference in consequences.
The same treatment, or rather worse, was suffered by the inhabitants of the country who had
ever been in arms, or were even suspected of disloyalty ; some who were accused of having received
protections, and violated the conditions, were hung without any form of trial. Prompt punishments,
for supposed crimes, were inflicted at the will of superior officers in the different British garrisons,
and every measure was adopted, which the arrogance of power could devise, to subjugate the

504 APPENDIX B
minds, as well as the privileges of the people. The want of energy in the union of the United
States, and the imbecility of the states theniselves, gave great lattitude to the effect of the British
measures. Their emisaries were in all parts of the country, and were but too successful in the lower
counties of North Carolina, where the inhabitants, except in and near the sea-port towns, began to
be generally disaffected to the American cause. Even in Chatham county, a considerable body
took arms and threatened to disperse the assembly of the state from Hillsborough; indeed so serious
was the alarm upon this occasion, that to guard against a surprise of the town, on a night when the
insurgents were confidently expected, all the troops were kept under arms the whole night ; as no
arrangement had yet taken place, General Gates desired Colonel Williams to command them. The
inhabitants were ordered to arm, and even the members of the assembly thought it incumbent on
them, to arm themselves also. The following fact may illustrate their character, as well for pa
triotism as soldiership.
It was requested that a regular officer would lend his assistance in arranging the militia. The
members of the assembly were collected near the court house, (the seat of government) and were
arming themselves when the officer arrived ; who, taking them for the militia who stood in need of
an adjutant, began the exercise of that office, and .marshalled them in a manner which showed no
respect for them as legislators. No exception, however, was taken to the conduct of the officer.
The circumstance was mentioned afterwards, only as one of these ludicrous incidents (and there were
many) which occurred during the night of the alarm. Although the alarm proved false, it proved
no less certainly, that the enterprise might have been effected by a few brave men, even on that very
night ; the hurry and confusion which it occasioned, discovered the expediency of re-establishing
order among the troops ; and every other man seemed to feel the obligation of giving his assistance
as well to provide for present necessities, as against future contingencies. Influenced by motives
not to be disregarded, the government of North Carolina soon began to exert all its powers. The
second class of the militia were ordered to assemble immediately — commissaries, quarter masters
and agents, with extensive powers, were appointed to procure every article requisite for another
campaign — and, for want of funds, (for the paper money of the United States was now depreciated
below calculation) these officers were authorized to take, on the account of government, all military
stores, arms, provisions, clothing, &c. that were to be found, and to grant receipts or certificates
for the same.
Notwithstanding that the disasters of the southern army, and a sense of common danger, had,
seemingly, obliterated all recollection of former differences and animosities, among the officers of
the regular corps, it ought not to be dissembled, that such were among the causes which, for a little
time, postponed the new organization of the troops.
What cause General Gates had to apprehend the being superceeded in the command of the
southern army, may be conjectured by those who have a knowledge of facts ; but, what reason
General Smallwood could have, to hope to become his successor, none who are not grossly imposed
on, can possibly imagine.
The misunderstanding between these two officers was never, I believe, avowed ; but, as Gates
reassumed his command, Smallwood retired from it.
General Gist was not ambitious of the command of men so circumstanced ; and, in fact, many
other officers wished for an opportunity of returning home without a laurel, or a scar.
A board of officers, convened by order of General Gates, determined, that all the effective men
should be formed into two battalions, constituting one regiment, to be completely officered, and pro
vided for in the best possible manner that circumstances would admit— the sick and convalescent

APPENDIX B. 505

IDJX

were to remain — but, all the invalids were to be sent home — and the supernumerary officers were
to repair to their respective states, to assist in the recruting service.
The command of the new formed regiment was given to Colonel Williams and Lieutenant Col
onel Howard; Majors Anderson and Hardman, commanded the battalions.
No sooner were these officers invested with command, than they began to restore order and dis
cipline among the troops ; and the colonel, who was inspector of the Maryland division of the
army of the United States, (comprehending the quota of Delaware also) demanded a general order
before any of the officers should depart, for the most correct returns that could be made, under
present circumstances, accounting as well for the men as for their arms, accoutrements, &c. &c.
The latter part of the order could not be complied with, in any satisfactory degree ; but, after some
time, the officers, by comparing notes, and recollecting circumstances, rendered returns, from which
the following abstracts were taken :
Total of Maryland troops : — Three colonels, four lieutenant colonels, five majors, thirty-eight
eaptains, fifty subalterns, twenty-four staff officers, eighty-five non-commissioned officers, sixty-
two musicians, and seven hundred and eighty-one rank and file.
The numbers which were killed, captured and missing, since the last muster, could not, with
any accuracy, be ascertained. The aggregate was, three lieutenant colonels, two majors, fifteen
captains, thirteen subalterns, two staff officers, fifty-two non-commis6ioned officers, thirty-four
musicians, and seven hundred and eleven rank and file. These, at least a very great majority of
these, and all of them for aught I know, fell in the field, or into t'le hands of the enemy, on the
fatal l6th of August. It is extremely probable, that the number killed much exceeded the number
taken prisoners.
The Delaware regiment being mustered, the return stood thus :
Four captains, seven subalterns, three staff officers, nineteen non-commissioned officers, eleven
musicians, and one hundred and forty-five rank and file, in actual service, &c. &c. &c. Eleven
commissioned officers, and thirty-six privates of the Delawara regiment, fell into the hands of the
enemy. These details may not be unessential to those who have been concerned in the affairs of the late
campaign ; and may give satisfaction to those of r.y friends, who may wish, hereafter, to have a
true knowledge of circumstances.
The inhabitants of Hillsborough soon began to experience and complain of the inconvenience of
having soldiers billetted among them; and the officers were equally sensible of the difficulty of restrain
ing the licentiousness of the soldiers, when not immediately under their observation. Williams, there
fore, drew his regiment out of town, distributing the few tents he had among the several companies.
He encamped on a vacant farm, or rather, in the woodland belonging to it, and covered his men
with wigwams, made of fence rails, poles, and corn tops, regularly disposed. The tents were
chiefly occupied by the officers ; but, as they were all much worn, wigwams, were soon preferred, on
account of their being much warmer.
The usual camp-guards and centinels being posted, no person could come into, or go out of camp
without a permit. Parade duties were regularly attended, as well by officers as soldiers, and dis
cipline not only began to be perfectly restored, but even gave an air of stability and confidence
to the regiment, which all their rags could not disguise. In this encampment no circumstance of
want or distress, was admitted as an excuse for relaxing from the strictest discipline, to which the
soldiers the more cheerfully submitted, as they saw their officers constantly occupied in procuring
for them whatever was attainable in their situation.

506 APPENDIX B

F]

Absloutely without pay; almost destitute of clothing; often with only a half ration, and nev«r
with a whole one (without substituting one article for another,) not a soldier was heard to mur
mur, after the third or fourth day of their being encamped. Instead of meeting and confering
in small sullen squads, as they had formerly done, they filled up the intervals from duty, with
manly exercises and field sports ; in short the officers had very soon, the entire confidence of the
men, who divested themselves of all unnecessary care, and devoted themselves to duty and past-
time, within the limits assigned them.
The docility and contentment of the troops were the more extraordinary, as they were not
unfrequently reminded, (when permitted to go into the country,) how differently the British troops
were provided for.
The article of rum, the most desirable refreshment to soldiers, was mentioned among other in
ducements for them to desert ; but, so great was their fidelity to the cause, or so strong their
attachment to their fellow sufferers and soldiers, that they not only rejected the most flattering
propositions to go over to the enemy, but they absolutely brought some of the most bold and
importunate incendiaries into camp, who were delivered to the civil authority, and some of them
punished. If any of my friends should inquire why I descend to particulars, so minute and unimportant 
I answer, that I am not writing a history of the revolution, nor of the proceedings of government ;
and that it is not unimportant for any officer to observe every incident in the life and conduct of a
soldier, which may, in any degree, serve to illustrate his disposition. The general characteristic
of a corps should never be mistaken, by the commanding officer especially. Misunderstandings
often arise from it ; and the consequences are usually what might be expected — unfavorable both
to officers and men.
The legion commanded by Armand was, on the 8th of September, sent to forage, and make can
tonments in Warren County, from whence Armand went to Philadelphia, and never returned.
General Gates did not conceal his opinion, that he held cavalry in no estimation in the southern
field. If he judged by the conduct of the legion, he ought to have confined his opinion to that
corps particularly — for subsequent experience has evinced, that no opinion could have been more
erroneous. Two brass field-pieces, which General Gates had left under a small guard at Buffalo Ford, for
want of horses, the first day of his march after taking the command, were brought to camp with
a few iron pieces picked up at Hillsborough, and formed a little park in the centre of the ragged
regiment of Maryland and Delaware troops, which constituted the southern army, until the 16th of
S«ptember, when Colonel Buford arrived from Virginia with the mangled remains of his unfortu
nate regiment, re-enforced by about two hundred raw recruits, all of them in a ragged condition :
uniforms and other clothing, were to be sent after them, but never arrived.
About the same time, a small detachment of Virginia militia, arrived without even arms.
On the 18th, the relicts of torterfield's corps, about fifty effective men, arrived under the com
mand of Captain Drew, and joined Buford. Thus the remainder of those corps, which had beea
recently cut to pieces, without being recruited, or refurnished with clothing, camp equipage, fee-
necessary for a campaign, were hastily assembled to form the head of an army, to act against their
conquerors. The body of the proposed army, was to consist of militia — the second class principally of those
very militia, who had so shamefully abandoned some of these same regulars at Camden, but a few
weeks before.

Appendix b. 5©7
Confident hopes were, notwithstanding, entertained that the interior of the two Carollnas, might
be defended from the ravages of the enemy, until Congress might gain time and find means to do
something more effectual.
The officers and the men began to recover their usual spirits.
Brigadier General Smallwoo.l, weary of waiting events at obscure quarters, and dissatisfied (as
every officer of reed merit, naturally is) of rank without command in time of war. Suggested
that as there were two nominal regiments, and a company of artillery encamped, a nominal brigade
might be formed, of which he claimed the command, and was gratified. Captain Anthony Singleton
of Virginia, commanded the artillery.
About this time, Colonel Morgan of Virginia, whose heroic conduct under General Mont
gomery at Quebec, General Gates at Saratoga, and other meritorious actions, will secure him an
honourable page in the history of the war in the north, arrived at camp, without command, and
with only two or three young gentlemen attending him.
The perfect security which Lord Cornwallis imagined resulted to his posts, and to the commu
nications between them ; and the presumption, that all the lower part of the country was in a state
of absolute subjection and tranquillity, in consequence of his extraordinary, not to say accidental
success, induced him to send a small guard from Camden, to convey one hundred and fifty of his
prisoners, principally regulars, to Charleston.
Colonel Marion of South Carolina, who has been mentioned in the previous part of these narra
tives, and who ought always to be mentioned with respect, had been stimulating his countrymen to
act in concert with General Gates, until after the unfortunate l6th of August, when he and his follow
ers were obliged to secret themselves in the swamps and deserts which intersect a considerable part
of the lower country. From one of these hiding places, Marion suddenly fell upon the British
guard, surprised, and made the whole of than prisoners. He paroled the officers, and took a list
of the privates to be exchanged. The American soldiers he sent off, with proper guides, to Wil
mington — having first distributed among them the arms of their captors. A circumstance so
honourable for a small squad of militia, particularly for their commanding officer, ought long to be
remembered with admiration. Marion and his men retook to the swamps.
On report, in camp, of this fortunate event, Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Ford, who had
not availed himself of the permission for supernumeraries to return home, went to Wilmington to
meet the released captives, and to conduct them to camp ; but, as they had been subject to very
little, or no control, after their releasement, being without any of their own officers, and doubting
of the existence of any considerably body of their fellow soldier:;, many of them repaired home with
all the expedition they could make. Colonel Ford did not recover more than about one half of the
number released by Marion ; and these, from their sufferings in captivity, their long and circuitous
march from Camden to Wilmington, and thence by Cross Creek to Hillsborough, and their want
of almost all the necessaries of life, were very little fit for service.
While the American troops were collecting at Hillsborough, measures were taken by the state
©f North Carolina, to expedite the embodying of the second class of their militia.
To intimidate the people from complying with the requisitions of Government— to collect forage
and provisions— and probably with an expectation of striking tenor through the country, Lord
Cornwallis moved from Camden, (in October) with a considerable body of troops, lightly equipped,
which he led immediately to the town of Charlotte, and from thence, manoeuvred about the country
as far north as Phifer's Mills. But, although his lordship could, and would go where he pleased,
he found himself much less at ease in this part of thefcountry, than in any other situation he had
experienced. The militia of Mecklenburg, and of^an, the most inflexible whigs in the whole

508 APPENDIX B.
state, were continually in his presence. He could make no movement without being observed— *
no negligence could be committed on his part, of which they did not take advantage. Major
Davie, with his mounted volunteers, equipped as dragoons, sometimes intercepted his convoys of
provisions — sometimes disturbed his pickets — and even once or twice, insulted the van of his army
on its march.
These, however, were feeble and ineffectual resistances ; his lordship could "go where he pleased."
This incursion of his lordship into the strongest part of the state, stimulated the exertions of
the legislature, in measures to organize and equip their militia for the field. They began to ren
dezvous in considerable numbers at Salisbury. Smallwood was complimented with a request of
the executive, to take the command of them, Caswell's confidence in the courage of his countrymen
not being yet restored ; and it was presumed that the militia would act with more subordination, and
perhaps, with more bravery under a continental general, than under one of their own neighbours.
After making some conditions, about horses for himself and his suite, the general accepted the
honour. At the same time, it was contemplated to send forward as many of the regular troops, as could
be tolerably equipped for service; and it fortunateV happened that, at that time, the state agents had
forwarded to Hillsborough, a small supply of coarse clothing and other articles convenient for the
purpose. General Gates ordered a committee to attend to the equitable distribution of these stores, among
the regular corps. But first, an appropriation was to be made for equipping four companies of
light infantry, to be drafted from the regiments, and destined to form a part of the corps, to be sent
in advance.The execution of this part of the plan, commenced on the 19th of October, the day the clothing
arrived, and was very soon completed. The four companies of infantry were formed into one
battalion, the command of which was obtained by Lieutenant Colonel Howard. About the 2d of
November, Lieutenant Colonels White and Washington, came to camp with a very few effectives,
of the first and third regiments of dragoons, which had also been surprised, routed, defeated and cut
to pieces the preceeding spring. White had leave to go to Philadelphia, and Washington remained
in command of the remnants of both corps, consisting of sixty or seventy effectives.
These corps joined the light infantry on their march towards Charlotte. A small corps of riflemen
(say 60) under Major Rose, had also joined the light infantry at Hillsborough. The gallant Colonel
Morgan, then took the command of all the light troops, and proceeded with them towards Char
lotte. He found the militia under Smallwood, advanced as far as the Old Trading Ford on the Yad
kin River, seven miles from Salisbury, in safety. Lord Cornwallis, without any known adequate
cause, thought proper to retire through Charlotte, cross the Wateree River, and encamp at Winns
borough. It is not probable, that he was deceived by any exaggerated account of the new levied
militia ; nor is it probable, that he had any fears from the relics of the corps he had so recently
cut to pieces. His lordship had been fatigued by the insolence of the volunteers, and chose to
retire to a camp of repose.
Colonel Williams succeeded General Smallwood in the command of the brigade of continental
troops. The diminution of its numbers, by the draft of four companies of light infantry was in
part, restored by the arrival of recruits from Maryland and Virginia. These were constantly at
the drill. A laboratory was erected, and employed mending arms ; and the residue of the clothin<*
&c. was distributed. Each man in the brigade was supplied with one new shirt, a short coat, a pair
of woollen overalls, a pair of shoes, and^a hat or a cap. The dividend of blankets was very
inadequate to the occasion — they were apjMJJioned to the companies j and every other practicable

APPENDIX B. 509
provision was made to prepare the brigade for the field. The officers exerted themselves, and the
soldiers were emulous who should be the first in readiness to march. Even the convalescents were
impatient of being left behind — so generally had the martial spirit revived in the soldiery.
The brigade marched on the second day of November, immediately after the light dragoons;,
with two brass field-pieces, some ammunition-waggons, and a small train of baggage. They fol
lowed the rout of the light infantry to Charlotte, where they encamped.
The militia under Smallwood, had, apparently, taken a permanent position at Providence, about
fourteen miles south of Charlotte ; and Morgan, now brigadier general, was itinerant with his
infantry about the Wateree.
Lord Cornwallis continued with the principal part of his forces at Winnsborough, and kept up
the garrisons of Camden and Clermont.
Such were the relative situations of the armies, when General Greene arrived at Charlotte the
4th of December, 1780.
Charlotte. — When General Gates had reviewed, and contemplated his situation at Charlotte,
lie considered it the most eligible place to encamp for the winter, with the principal part of his
army. The light troops were to keep the field, and to act as an advance-guard. With this
view, he ordered preparations to be made for building huts, and directed General Morgan to make
a foraging excursion towards Camden, On the very day of General Greene's arrival, and after
he had assumed the command of the army, Morgan reported that he had made a tour into the
country, in the vicinity of Camden, but found the cattle were taken off, and so little grain or
forage left, as to make it scarcely worth the fatigue of the troops ; but, that, fortunately, an event
had taken place, which made some compensation for their toil.
Mr. Rugely, proprietor of the farm called Clermont, had obtained the rark of Lieutenant Colonel
in the British army, and had obtained that of major for his son-in-law ; these two officers, with about
one hundred British troops and new levies, occupied a large log barn (the old council chamber) which
they fortified by a slight entrenchment and a line of abbatis, so as to render it impregnable to
small arms. This post was on the left of Morgan's route, as he returned from foraging — but too
near to Camden for him to risk any thing like a siege or blockade. It was suggested that the
cavalry might go and reconnoitre it — Washington, pleased with the idea, approached so near, as to
discover that the enemy had discovered him and were intimidated. He humourously ordered his
men to plant the trunk of an old pine tree, in the manner of a field-piece, pointing towards the gar
rison  at the same time, dismounting some of his men to appear as infantry, and displaying his
cavalry to the best advantage, he sent a corporal of dragoons to summon the commanding officer
to an immediate surrender. The order was executed with so firm a manner, that Colonel Rugely
did not hesitate to comply instantly ; and the whole garrison marched out prisoners of war.
The corporal was made a sergeant of dragoons — the old fort was set on fire; and Washington
retired with his prisoners without exchanging a shot.
Soldiers, like sailors, have always a little superstition about them.
Although neither General Gates nor General Greene, could be considered as having any agency
in this little successful affair, it was regarded by some, and even mentioned, as a presage of the
future good fortune which the army would derive from the-genius of the latter. But I have super-
ceeded my old friend rather abruptly, and with almost as little ceremony, as it was directed by
congress. As I approach the close of this narrative I assume the epistolary style, in which I intend
to make all my future remarks, as they may thus be more easily transcribed for communication.
The letters which were addressed to congress, respecting the overthrow of his whole army, were
so vague and imsatisfactory ; and others which were written, were so disengenous, that it was con-
64

510 APPENDIX B.
ceived by congress absolutely requisite to have a full inquiry into the circumstances of the campaign
and conduct of the commanding officer.
General Washington, was requested to nominate an officer to supercede General Gates, and it
was resolved that a court of inquiry should be held, of which major general the Baron Steuben
was appointed president. General Greene, whom General Washington distinguished by an election
to the command of the southern army, arrived as before observed, at head quarters the 4th of De
cember 1780 with full powers.
A manly resignation marked the conduct of General Gates on the arrival of his successor, whom
he received at head quarters with that liberal and gentlemanly air which was habitual to him.
General Greene observed a plain, candid, respectful manner, neither betraying compassion nor
the want of it — nothing like the pride of official consequence even seemed. In short, the officers
who were present, had an elegant lesson of propriety exhibited on a most delicate and interesting
occasion. General Greene was announced to the army as commanding officer, by General Gates ; and the.
same day General Greene addressed the army, in which address, he paid General Gates the com
pliment of confirming all his standing orders.
The detention of the Baron Steuben in Virginia, and no major general being present, or autho*
rized to serve in his stead, made it impracticable to hold the court of inquiry at this time or place.
General Gates, therefore, with the approbation of General Greene, repaired to Philadelphia, in
order to meet the charges and to counteract the calumnies against him.
I cannot conclude this narrative without remarking, that a soldier's fame is always precarious
during his life. If General Gates had fallen at the commencement of the action of Camden, who
would not have acceded to the opinion, that the disasters of the day were owing principally to that
circumstance ? The laurels of Saratoga would have been ever green on his tomb, and history
would have exulted in the merits of the hero.
What difference, in point of real merit, would there have been, (or could there be) between fall
ing by an early, accidental shot, or submitting to the irresistible impulse of the militia, who went
like a torrent from the field, forcing almost every thing before them? And yet, what a difference
in the public opinion ! ! Instead of praises, panegeric, and monumental honours, he was censured,
«alumniated, and even condemned, unheard.
The severity of this treatment was aggravated by a recent event, which was carefully kept from
his knowledge while in camp, but which too soon overwhelmed him in distress. His only son,
an elegant young man, well educated, and just entering into active scenes of life, was suddenly cut '
off by the stroke of death.
None but an unfortunate soldier, and a father left childless, could assimulate his feelings, to those
of this unhappy gentleman — yet many sympahtized with him, remembered his former public services
wished for the return of tranquillity to his afflicted mind, and hoped, even for a restoration of his
honours. General Greene took great pains to collect the best information relative to the circumstances of
the late campaign ; and his communications to influential characters^ finally determined congress to
.rescined their resolution respecting General Gates, and to restore Mm to his command in the northerii
army.

511

APPENDIX C.

(See page 471.)

ON THE ABORIGINES OF SOUTH CAROLINA.
± HIS unhappy race of beings, were still numerous and warlike, and they had strong reasons for
attaching themselves to the royal cause. At the commencement of the settlement of the Southern
Colonies, their numbers, from the Cape Fear River to the Gulf of Florida, must have been great-
A mild climate, abundance of game, and great facility in obtaining fish and oysters, had spread them
along the sea coast in innumerable villages. " To this day the heaps of shells, and fields strewed
with their fragments (broken small for want of iron instruments to open them) attest, both the an
tiquity and numbers of the aborigines. And the accounts of Varazani and Jean Ribaut, as well as
of the early English colonists, all concur in representing the population of this coast, as very consi
derable. It is probable that an accumulation of population in this region, is, in some measure,
attributable to the conquests of the Six Nations. Those Nimrods of their time, had extended their
dominion along the foot of the mountains, as far as the head waters of the Savannah River, and
down the Cape Fear to its mouth. A colony of the Senecas, one of the Six Nations, was found
upon the former stream, and of the Tuscaroras, another member of the confederacy of the Six
Nations at the mouth of the latter. The powerful nation of the Caltapows, now called Catawbas,
and formerly Katarbas, was probably the barrier against their progress down the streams, lying
south of the Cape Fear. This nation was attacked by a war-party from the Six Natibns, on the
principles of immemorial hostility as low down as within the memory of persons still living. And
the nations inhabiting the coast of South Carolina, never acknowledged themselves, in any respect
a dependant people.*

* The following anecdote illustrates the manners of a people, exhibiting many peculiar and striking charac
teristics. It never has been before committed to papeu, but, is related from the testimony of an eye witness, ef
perfect respectability, who communicated it to the author.
The C.itavvbas inhabit a territory of ten miles square, included within the bounds of pouth Carolina. All the
other Indian natives having retired before the whites, and the settlements of the colonists having spread near a
thousand miles between them and their hereditary enemy, the Catawbas had lived many years in the most undis
turbed tranquillity ; and, of consequence, had lost much of their warlike character, besides being reduced, com
paratively, to a handful. Thus circumstanced, about the year seventy, they were suddenly invaded by a very
superior enemy, a war-party of the Six Nations ; a number were scalped, and the rest driven for shelter into
the town of Camden, about thirty or forty miles distant fmm theii settlement. Great alarm was spread through
the country by an inroad so entirely unlooked for, but the people of the vicinity promptly collected, and joining
the Indiana, advanced to attack the invaders. The latter were easily repulsed—a few were killed— and one war-

512 APPENDIX C.
A short time prior to the settlement of Charleston, the numbers of the natives, had been greatly
reduced by the small pox. This disease was communicated from Virginia,' and the erratic habits

rior, a very handsome young man, was made prisoner, conveyed to the Catawba encampment, and put in charge
of the old men and women, whilst the warriors were following the trace of their enemy.
One of the women, who had lost a relative, immediately adopted the prisoner ; and on the return of the
chiefs, he was found quietly inhabiting her wigwam, seemingly as little occupied about ulterior possibi'ities, as
any individual in (he nation. But, a council of chiefs being called, it was decided that, according to immemorial
usage, the prisoner must die In torments— that their children may not degenerate from the virtues of their ances
tors. The prisoner was accordingly ordered to prepare himself for such an exhibition on a certain day; and the
decree having^got abroad, a number of the whites, whose curiosity got the better of better feelings, attended to
witness this national auto da fe. The poor fellow awaited the day in perfect tranquillity, keeping count, inthe
ndian mode, with a bundle of small sticks, one of which was removed every evening. When but one remained,
he sedulously decorated bimseif for the sacrifice, in nil " the pomp and circumstance" of an Indian warrior — one
of the most hideous exhibitions that human invention can combine!
On the appointed day and hour, he left his wigwam, and with a firm step, and composed countenance — not a
muscle expressing a care or apprehension — advanced to the public square, where every thing was in preparation,
to recieve him, secundum mores majorum. The stake — the fire—the faggots, and lightwood splinters, were all
in readiness ; and the children, male and female, in concentric circles, arranged according to sizie, surrounded
the stake. The warriors were variously disposed of, as the constitutional actors in the diabolical exhibition
But, the prisoner came not alone — his patroness followed behind him, and he moved forward, equally uncon
scious of her views and her presence. But, her right hand, wrapped beneath her blanket, held the instrument
of his deliverance ; and the moment he entered the circle, her tomahawk sunk deeply into the back of his head,
and disappointed his tormentors. No one murmured at the disappointment, for this also was according to ac
knowledged principles — it was the last solemn act of friendship, that one Indian could perform for another.
The subsequent conduct of these wretched beings, scarcely admits of relation ; but, a council was imme
diately held to determine the mores majorum, or, international law, on this new state of facts ; and, the heart of the
victim being taken from his body, was divided into small pieces, and distributed among the children. We will
spare the reader the disgusting recital of what followed.
This curious peculiarity among the aborigines of North Americarof passing by adoption from one nation to ano
ther, and more especially, the absolute moral and physical transmigration consequent upon it, will appear ag
incredible to many readers, as the passive acquiescence of prisoners made in war, to the dreadful torments to which
they were liable to be subjected. Yet, they are both supported by the authority of every writer who has at
tempted to delineate their character; and by many well attested narratives, transmitted under circumstances
w;hich leave no cause to suspect their authenticity. Charlevoix relates one very curious instance of the kind,
which occurred in Canada; and, in all the early and very minute narratives which we have received from the
first settlers of the colonies, we find signal instances of an apparent transfer of even feelings and interets conse
quent upon being made prisoner.
It would be difficult to name the folly which has not been made the national point of honour among rude and
barbarous nations; or, perhaps, it would not be too much to add, among many nations considerably advanced in
civilization. In the present instance, we find the opinions and customs of the savage of North America, not dif.
fering very widely from those of the highly civilized Romjin. The latter had their laws of adoption ; and the citi
zen who was made prisoner in war, was held during his captivity, to be cimliier morluus. The right asserted by
both, to dispose of the life or liberty of the prisoner at plensure, naturally led to the identification of the conse
quences of death and captivity. And the warlike habits and policy of both, may have introduced doctrines which
were calculated to make death more tolerable than submission to an enemy. With the savages of North America,
this notion is pushed to such an extreme, that the man who submits to be made prisoner, can only atone to liis
disgraced family and nation, by submitting to torture. Their constancy, in this respect, is unparalleled in tb«
history of man. And such is the contempt of death, which their whole education is calculated to cherish, that it
ceases to he a punishment. Maiming, beating, and even putting to death the dearest objects of natural nffection,
are resorted to in their civil policy, to prevent crime. The taking of life is most generally delegated to th«
"Avenger of Blood ;" until the crimes of the whole nation are washed away, in the annual jubilee.

APPENDIX C. SiS
of the hunter, extended its ravages over the whole country. The mortality was dreadful, and the
only remedy known to these simple sons of the forest (that of sweating in an oven, constructed of
earth or stones, and then plunging into a river) contributed not a little to increase the destruction of
!human life. Yet it was but little worse than the treatment prescribed at the sametime, by the disciples
of Galen and Hypocrites. This depopulation was rapidly hastened by their connexion with the
whites ; as additional cause and motives were furnished for hostility, by the new wants and new habits
then introduced among them.
At first, the animals of the forest were pursued only for food and clothing. For these purposes
"a moderate district of country, would supply the necessary consumption, whilst the toil in the pur
suit, was greatly enhanced by the defectiveness of the only weapons then known to them. But
when skins became an article of commerce, and the means of procuring intoxicating liquors, blankets
and fire arms, the cupidity of the savage could not be confined to his own hunting grounds, or the
fruits of the chase. Anxious to make experiment of his new weapons on man, he possessed
himself of the articles of commerce by violence, whilst he triumphed in the temporary enjoyment of
his newly acquired superiority. New broils ensued ; retaliation was provoked ; the hunting grounds of
neighbouring nations invaded ; and universal war and bloodshed "ensued. The natural effects of
intemperance and the frequent repetiton of the ravages of the small pox, combined to hasten the.
dimunition of their numbers ; and famine also now found its way into the country.
The Indian was not at that time -the degraded being that he is at present. All the early visitors
of this coast, acknowledged that they found the natives civil, respectful and hospitable. They lived
in comparative plenty, evey where cultivating maize and pulse, which, until the introduction of
domestic animals was easily done without fencing. It is- even asserted, that they had then among
them an art since altogether lost, that, of weaving cloth. Jean Ribaut found them in possession of
it in the neighbourhood of Beaufort, whether of their own manufactuing, or how obtained, is not
mentioned. They may have obtained it from Mexico. The Natchez Nation is known to have
emigrated from that country, or furnished inhabitants to it.
At that time, the fruits of the toil of the hunter, were faithfully brought home to add to the-
comforts bf his family ; whilst the women and children attended to the labours of the field. This
is a literal compliance, with the contract of marriage, symbolically entered into by the sexes. The
woman presents an ear of corn, and the man a piece of venison. Whilst they remained uncor-
rupted there was a scrupulous attention paid to social duties. But, the case was soon altered upon
their connexion with the whites. The man consumed the fruits of the chase, in the purchase of
his favourite beverage ; and even the women would expend the fruits of their labours in the gratifi
cation of the same pestiferous habit, whilst their children were left to starve and die; or were,
at lenoth sold to obtain these gratifications. A total depravity of character was the necessary con
sequence of contracting such habits ; and a check to the natural increase of the species, could not
•but ensue from their general prevalence, and the difficulty of subsistence consequent upon it.
Another and most fatal cause of this depopulation was, the practice of reducing Indians to a state
•f slavery; a practice which, it is believed, has prevailed in every colony from north to south,
*-ith the exception of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.
In South Carolina, it certainly did prevail on a very extensive scale. The proprietors repeatedly
affected to express great disgust at this practice, and to discourage it ; but, it is demonstrable, that
the principle was introduced by themselves ; nor was the practice, for many years, discountenanced.
They made provision in their fundamental constitutions, for the introduction of negro slaves into
their colonies; and what are the grounds upon which that measure was justified ?— saving the pris
oner from being sacrificed, and forcing John to a country illumined by the tight of the gospeL !

514 APPENDIX C.
These specious reasons were too applicable to the case of the Indians, not to be greedily seized
upon by- the Colonists. Thus, we find, that as early as 1680, West, twice appointed governor
is charged with dealing largely in Indian slaves. James Moore, also another governor, is said to
have stocked his plantation with Indian slaves in 1700, in an expedition, which he commanded
against the Indians. Several of the proprietor's deputies and counsellors, also, were convicted of
the same offence at that time, and degraded for it.* An extensive trade, it seems, was then car
ried on between Carolina and Barbados, in the sale of Indian slaves ; and as Yeomans, the second
% governor of the province, opened that commerce with Barbadoes, it is not improbable that he first
originated this nefarious traffic. The subjects of it, were either taken in war by the colonists them
selves ; or kidnapped or purchased from Indians, who were encouraged to procure them by arms
or stratagem. How prone is the human mind, to deceive itself by sophistry and casuistry ! Were
these unhappy men to receive instruction from the lives of their enslavers ? Could " they respect
the God of the colonists ? or; was it a favour conferred on the children, to save them from the
tomahawk, when their parents had been sacrificed to it, in order to take the children captive !
This is the great and true cause why the native Indian has become the irreconcilable enemy of
the North American colonists. Death he does not fear — all other ills he may be reconciled to bear ;
but, he who deprives him or his offspring, of the rights of ranging the forest, free as the air he
breathes, or compels him to submit to the disgrace of labour, 1^for in his-estimation, it is degrading
to the warrior) wounds, the most sensible nerve m his system— it is national insult — .individual de
gradation. And hence, that people never have been, and perhaps never will be, willing to receive in
struction from the inhabitants of the states. Their national animosities are faithfully transmitted through
their women, and are among the first lessons inculcated on the infant mind. It is more than
probable also, that the same cause produced those hereditary animosities which existed among the
native tribes. We have the evidence of Laudonniere, who succeeded Ribaut in the French attempt
at colonizing this country, for asserting, that it was the national practice, in his time, to put the men
to death, and make slaves of the women and children of their enemies. Whether the present
practice of murdering and scalping indiscriminately, has in any measure resulted from the extinction
of the trade in Indian slaves, is not easily determined. But, the colonists made slaves of the men
' also ; and of many who were kidnapped, not taken in war ; and this was in the view of the
Indian, an intolerable aggravation of the offence. Add to this cause, the continual advances by
conquest or purchases that the colonists had been making upon them for. near one hundred years
back ; and the continual deceptions and impositions the Indians sustain from the traders who go
among them, and it is not to be wondered at that they were hostile to the colonists.
Several circumstances contributed to attach them to the royal government. When the revolu
tion took place in 1719, the colonists advanced their arch enemy, James Moore, to the governor's
chair, in which he was superceded by Nicholson, as royal governor. The latter gentleman paid
particular attention to the interests of the Indians. And, by the establishment of an Indian agent,
whose duty it was to watch over their interests and protect them from impositions, whilst he also
gratified them with the distribution , of annual presents in the name of the king ; they were taught
to look up to the king as their protector, while they regarded the colonists as their natural enemies.
John Stewart was the Indian agent at the commencement of the revolution ; and his influence
was successfully employed in bringing upon the back settlements of the colony, a most murderous
invasion in the year 1775. It was made, as has been noticed, in concert with the attack upon

1 Oldmixon, vol. lstp.i34o.

APPENDIX C. 515
«
Fort Moultrie in that year ; and in one night, near four hundred men, women and children, sunk
under the tomahawk. But, the unfortunate beings were made to pay dearly in the sequel, for lis
tening to their savage empbyers. They were pursued by the militia, under Colonel Williamson of
South, and Colonel Rutherford of North Carolina ; many of them were destroyed, and their coun
try, for several hundred miles, made desolate. This chastisement kept them quiet for several years ;
nor did they again recommence their ravages until about the period of General Greene's arrival in
South Carolina. Yet, parties of them were made use of by Colonel Provost, Colonel Brown, and
other British commanders. With the exception of the Catawbas, they had now been driven far
from the principal theatre of the war, but were decidedly attached to the royal cause, and so will
always be to the nation that will give them the most rum and gunpowder. The poor remains of
the Catawbas, (their wide extended domain) now reduced to ten miles square, on the borders of North
and South Carolina, had taken up arms in the American favour, and shared the fortune of Gates •
but, the powerful and hostile nations beyond the mountains, frequently repeated their bloody
inroads, in small parties along the frontier, and kept the militia always on the alert, to guard their,
scattered habitations from sudden incursions,

FND OF VOLUME FIRST.

ERRATA TO VOL. 1st.

rAGE. LINE. 36 of Preface, expunge (.) after monarchy.
3 24 for nerve, read nerves.
3 32 • implements, • ¦ implement.
6 1 • • is, • • are
35 17 • • apprehensions, • • apprehension.
£9 36 • writer, • • author.
68 28 • • reliquae, • • reliquiae.
62 21 ¦ ¦ eastward, •¦ westward.
85 1 • • east, • • right.
189 2 • • destruction, • • reduction.
199 17 • • support, • • supports.
206 6 • • learned, - • not learned.
209 8 • • appear, • • appears.
210 31 •• known, •• well known.
239 14 ¦• perfasetnefas- • perfasetnefas.
251 3 • • them, • • whom.
253 22 • ¦ was before passed.
275 3 ¦• as after well.
284 3 (et passim) read Sumter for Sumpter.

FACE.

LINE.

289

2

insert two most, before southern

319

6 for

Americans, read American.

358

28 ••

him, • • them.

360

26 ••

plan, •• place.

374

33

after have, • • been.

399

33 ••

Davie, • • Davies.

425

21 ••

exhilarating, • • exhilarating

426

21

insert (.) after field.

4.37

30 •

Carolinas, read Carolinians'.

446

27 •

to, • • of.

459

1 •

preserve, • • persevere.

479

37 •

1665, • • 1565.

480

23 •

but, • ¦ not

482

1 •

sepulcftre, • ¦ seputare.

485

13 ••

constitute, • contribute.

491

5 •

effort, • escort.

499

39

omit, at Charlotte.

510

35 •

assimilate, read assimilate,: