mu?:^;- : S YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY OUTLINES OF mahAyAna buddhism. E. J. BRILL, PRINTERS, LEYDEN, HOLLAND. OUTLINES OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI CHICAGO THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY 1908 PREFACE. The object of this book is twofold: (i) To refute the many wrong opinions which are entertained by Western critics concerning the fundamental teachings of Mahayana Buddhism ; (2) To awake interest among scholars of comparative religion in the development of the religious sentiment and faith as exemplified by the growth of one of the most powerful spiritual forces in the world.- The book is therefore at once popular and scholarly. It is popular in the sense that it tries to expose the fallacy of the general attitude assumed by other religionists towards Mahayanism. It aims to be scholarly, on the other hand, when it endeavors to expound some of the most salient features of the doctrine, historically and systematically. In attempting the accomplishment of this latter object, however, the author makes no great claim, because it is impossible to present within this pres cribed space all the data that are available for a comprehensive and systematic elucidation of the Mahayana Buddhism, whose history began in the sixth century before the Christian era and ran through a period of more than two thousand years before it assumed the form in which it is at present taught in the Orient. During this long period, the Mahayana VI doctrine was elaborated by the best minds that India, Tibet, China, and Japan ever produced. It is no wonder then that so many diverse and apparently contradictory teachings are all comprised under the general name of Mahayana Buddhism. To expound all these theories even tentatively would be altogether outside the scope of such a work as this. All that I could or hoped to do was to discuss a few of the most general and most essential topics of Mahayanism, making this a sort of introduction to a more detailed exposition of the system as a whole as well as in particular. To attain the first object, I have gone occasionally outside the sphere within which I had properly to confine the work. But this deviation seemed imperative for the reason that some critics are so prejudiced that even seemingly self-evident truths are not com prehended by them. I may be prejudiced in my own way, but very frequently I have wondered how com pletely and how wretchedly some people can be made the prey of self-delusion. The doctrinal history of Mahayana Buddhism is very little known to Occidental scholars. This is mainly due to the inaccessibility of material which is largely written in the Chinese tongue, one of the most difficult of languages for foreigners to master. In this age of liberal culture, it is a great pity that so few of the precious stones contained in the religion of Buddha are obtainable by Western people. Human nature is essentially the same the world over, and VII whenever and wherever conditions mature we see the same spiritual phenomena; and this fact ever strengthens our faith in the universality of truth and in the ultimate reign of lovingkindness. It is my sincere desire that in so far as my intellectual attain ment permits I shall be allowed to pursue my study and to share my findings with my fellow beings. In concluding this prelude, the author wishes to say that this little book is presented to the public with a full knowledge of its many defects, to revise which he will not fail to make use of every oppor tunity offered him. Daisetz T. Suzuki. CONTENTS. Preface . . v Introduction . . . . i (i) The Mahdy dna and Hinayana Buddhism. Why the Two Doctrines? — The Original Meaning of Mahay ana. — An Older Classification of Buddhists. — Mahay ana Buddhism defined i (2) Is the Mahdydna Buddhism the genuine teaching of Buddha > No Life Without Growth — Mahayanism a Living Religion 11 (3) Some Misstatements about the Mahdy dnism. Why Injustice Done to Buddhism. — Examples of Injustice. — Monier Monier- Williams. — Beal. — Waddell . . 16 (4) The Significance of Religion. No Revealed Religion. — The Mystery. — Intellect and Imagination. — The Contents of Faith vary 24 Chapter i. A General Characterisation of Buddhism 32 No God and No Soul. — Karma. — Avidya. — Non- atman. — The Non-atmanness of Things. — Dharma- kaya. — Nirvana. — Intellectual Tendency of Buddhism. Chapter ii. Historical Characterisation of Maha yanism • . . 60 Sthiramati's Conception of Mahayanism. — Seven Principal Features of Mahayanism. — Ten Essential Features of Mahayanism. Speculative MahayAnism. Chapter iii. Practice and Speculation ... 77 Relation of Feeling and Intellect. — Buddhism and Speculation. — Religion and Metaphysics. Chapter iv. Classification of Knowledge. . . 87 Three Forms of Knowledge. — Illusion. — Relative Knowledge. — Absolute Knowledge. — World- Views founded on the three Forms of Knowledge. — Trans cendental Truth and Relative Understanding. Chapter v. Bhutatathata (Suchness) 99 Indefinability. — The "Thundrous Silence." — Such ness Conditioned. — Questions Defying Solution. — The Theory of Ignorance. — Dualism and Moral Evil. Chapter vi. The Tathagata-garbha and the Alaya- vijnana 125 The Garbha and Ignorance. — The Alaya-vijfiana and its Evolution. — The Manas. — The Samkhya Philosophy and Mahayanism. Chapter vii. The Theory of Non-atman or Non-ego 140 Atman. — Buddha's First Line of Inquiry. — The Skandha. — King Milinda and Nagasena. — Ananda's Attempts to Locate the Soul. — Atman and the "Old Man." — The Vedantic Conception. — Nagarjunaonthe Soul. — Non-atman-ness of Things. — Svabhava. — The Real Significance of Emptiness. Chapter viii. Karma 181 Definition. — The Working of Karma. — Karma and Social injustice. — An Individualistic View of Karma. — Karma and Determinism. — The Maturing of Good Stock and the Accumulation of Good Merits. — Immor tality. XI Practical MahAyAnism. Chapter ix. The DharmakAya 217 God. — Dharmakaya. — Dharmakaya as Religious Object. — More Detailed Characterisation. — The Dharmakaya and Individual Beings. — The Dharmakaya as Love. — Later Mahayanists' View of the Dharmakaya. — The Freedom of the Dharmakaya. — The Will of the Dharmakaya. Chapter x. The Doctrine of TrikAya. . . . 242 The Human and the Super-human Buddha. — An Historical View. — Who was Buddha ? — The Trikaya as Explained in the Suvarna-Prabhd. — Revelation in All Stages of Culture. — The Sambhogakaya. — A Mere Subjective Existence. — Attitude of Modern Mahayanists. — Recapitulation. Chapter xi. The Bodhisattva 277 The Three Yanas. — Strict Individualism. — The Doctrine of Parivarta. — Bodhisattva in "Primitive" Buddhism. — We are all Bodhisattvas. — The Bud dha's Life. — The Bodhisattva and Love. — The Meaning of Bodhi and Bodhicitta. — Love and Karuna. — Nagarjuna and Sthiramati on Bodhicitta. — The Awakening of the Bodhicitta. — The Bodhi sattva' s Pranidhina. Chapter xii. Ten Stages of Bodhisattvahood .311 Gradation in our Spiritual Life. — PramuditS. — Vimala. — Prabhakan. — Arcismati. — Sudurjana. — Bhimukhi. — Durangama. — Acala. — Sadhumati. — Dharmamegha. XIIChapter xiii. NirvAna 331 Nihilistic Nirvana not the First Object. — Nirvana is Positive. — The Mahayanistic Conception of Nirvana. — Nirvana as the Dharmakaya. — Nirvana in its Fourth Sense. — Nirvana and Samsara are One. — The Middle Course. — How to Realise Nirvana. — Love Awakens Intelligence. — Conclusion Appendix, Hymns of MahAyAna Faith. . . . 375 Index 409 INTRODUCTION. i. THE MAHAYANA AND THE HlNAYANA BUDDHISM. '""pHE terms "Mahayana" and "Hinayana" may sound unfamiliar to most of our readers, per haps even to those who have devoted some .time to the study of Buddhism. They have hitherto been induced to believe that there is but one form of Buddhism, and that there exists no such distinction as Mahayanism and Hinayanism. But, as a matter of fact, there are diverse schools in Buddhism just as in other religious systems. It is said that, within a few hundred years after the demise of Buddha, there were more than twenty different schools, l all claiming 1 According to Vasumitra's Treatise on the Points of Con tention by the Different Schools of Buddhism, of which there are three Chinese translations, the earliest being one by Kumarajiva (who came to China in A. D. 401), the first great schism seems to have broken out about one hundred years after the Buddha. The leader of the dissenters was Mahadeva, and his school was known as the Mahasangika (Great Council), while the orthodox was called the school of Sthaviras (Elders). Since then the two schools subdivided themselves into a number of minor sections, twenty of which are mentioned by Vasumitra. The book is highly interesting as throwing light on the early pages of the history of Bud dhism in India. 1 introduction to be the orthodox teaching of their master. These, however, seem to have vanished into insignificance one after another, when there arose a new school quite different in its general constitution from its predecessors, but far more important in its signifi cance as a religious movement. This new school or rather system made itself so prominent in the mean time as to stand distinctly alone from all the other schools, which latter became a class by itself. Essen tially, it taught everything that was considered to be Buddhistic, but it was very comprehensive in its principle and method and scope. And, by reason of this, Buddhism was now split into two great systems, Mahayanism and Hinayanism, the latter indiscriminately including all the minor schools which preceded Ma hayanism in their formal establishment. Broadly speaking, the difference between Mahayanism and Hinayanism is this : Mahayanism is more liberal and progressive, but in many respects too metaphys ical and full of speculative thoughts that frequently reach a dazzling eminence : Hinayanism, on the other hand, is somewhat conservative and may be considered in many points to be a rationalistic ethical system simply. Mahayana literally means "great vehicle" and Hina yana "small or inferior vehicle," that is, of salvation. This distinction is recognised only by the followers of Mahayanism, because it was by them that the unwelcome title of Hinayanism was given to their rival brethren, — thinking that they were more pro- introduction 3 gressive and had a more assimilating energy than the latter. The adherents of Hinayanism, as a matter of course, refused to sanction the Mahayanist doc trine as the genuine teaching of Buddha, and insisted that there could not be any other Buddhism than their own, to them naturally the Mahayana system was a sort of heresy. Geographically, the progressive school of Buddhism found its supporters in Nepal, Tibet, China, Corea, and Japan, while the conservative school established itself in Ceylon, 1 Siam, and Burma. Hence the Maha yana and the Hinayana are also known respectively Northern and Southern Buddhism. En passant, let me remark that this distinction, however, is not quite correct, for we have some 1 The Anagarika Dharmapala of Ceylon objects to this geographical distinction. He does not see any reason why the Buddhism of Ceylon should be regarded as Hinayanism, When it teaches a realisation of the Highest Perfect Knowl edge (Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi) and also of the six Virtues of Perfection {P&ramita), — these two features, among some others, being considered to be characteristic of Mahayanism. It is possible that when the so-called Mahayanism gained great power all over Central India in the times of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva, it also found its advocates in the Isle of Lion, or at least the followers of Buddha there might have been influenced to such an extent as to modify their conservative views. At the present stage of the study of Buddhism, how ever, it is not yet perfectly clear to see how this took place. When a thorough comparative review of Pali, Singhalese, Tibetan, Sanskrit, and Chinese Buddhist documents is effected, we shall be able to understand the history and development of Buddhism to its full extent. 4 introduction schools in China and Japan, whose equivalent or counterpart cannot be found in the so-called Northern Buddhism, that is, Buddhism flourishing in Northern India. For instance, we do not have in Nepal or in Tibet anything like the Siikhavati sects of Japan or China. Of course, the general essential ideas of the Sukhavati philosophy are found in the sutra literature as well as in the writings of such authors as Acva- ghosa, Asanga, and Nagarjuna. But those ideas were not developed and made into a new sect as they were in the East. Therefore, it may be more proper to divide Buddhism into three, instead of two, geo graphical sections: Southern, Northern, and Eastern. Why the two Doctrines} In spite of this distinction, the two schools, Hina yanism and Mahayanism, are no more than two main issues of one original source, which was first discov ered by Cakyamu'ni; and, as a matter of course, we find many common traits which are essential to both of them. The spirit that animated the innermost heart of Buddha is perceptible in Southern as well as in Northern Buddhism. The difference between them is not radical or qualitative as imagined by some. It is due, on the one hand, to a general unfold ing of the religious consciousness and a constant broadening of the intellectual horizon, and, on the other hand, to the conservative efforts to literally preserve the monastic rules and traditions. Both schools started with the same spirit, pursuing the introduction 5 same course. But after a while one did not feel any necessity for broadening the spirit of the master and adhered to his words as literally as possible; whilst the other, actuated by a liberal and comprehensive spirit, has drawn nourishments from all available sources, in order to unfold the germs in the original system that were vigorous and generative. These diverse inclinations among primitive Buddhists natu rally led to the dissension af Mahayanism and Hi nayanism. We cannot here enter into any detailed accounts as to what external and internal forces were acting in the body of Buddhism to produce the Mahayana system, or as to how gradually it unfolded itself so as to absorb and assimilate all the discordant thoughts that came in contact with it. Suffice it to state and answer in general terms the question which is fre quently asked by the uninitiated: "Why did one Buddhism ever allow itself to be differentiated into two systems, which are apparently in contradiction in more than one point with each other?" In other words, "How can there be two Buddhisms equally representing the true doctrine of the founder?" The reason is plain enough. The teachings of a great religious founder are as a rule very general, comprehensive, and many-sided : and, therefore, there are great possibilities in them to allow various liberal interpretations by his disciples. And it is on this very account of comprehensiveness that enables fol lowers of diverse needs, characters, and trainings to o introduction satisfy their spiritual appetite universally and severally with the teachings of their master. This comprehensive ness, however, is not due to the intentional use by the leader of ambiguous terms, nor is it due to the ob scurity and confusion of his own conceptions. The initiator of a movement, spiritual as well as intel lectual, has no time to think out all its possible details and consequences. When the principle of the movement is understood by the contemporaries and the foundation of it is solidly laid down, his own part as initiator is accomplished; and the remainder can safely be left over to his successors. The latter will take up the work and carry it out in all its particulars, while making all necessary alterations and ameliorations according to circumstances. Therefore, the role to be played by the originator is necessa rily indefinite and comprehensive. Kant, for instance, as promotor of German philo sophy, has become the father of such diverse philo sophical systems as Jacobi's Fichte's, Hegel's, Scho penhauer's, etc., while each of them endeavored to develop some points indefinitely or covertly or indi rectly stated by Kant himself. Jesus of Nazareth, as instigator of a revolutionary movement against Judaism, did not have any stereotyped theological doctrines, such as were established later by Christian doctors. The indefiniteness of his views was so ap parent that it caused even among his personal disci ples a sort of dissension, while a majority of his disciples cherished a visionary hope for the advent introduction. 7 of a divine kingdom on earth. But those externali ties which are doomed to pass, do not prevent the spirit of the movement once awakened by a great leader from growing more powerful and noble. The same thing can be said of the teachings of the Buddha. What he inspired in his followers was the spirit of that religious system which is now known as Buddhism. Guided by this spirit, his followers severally developed his teachings as required by their special needs and circumstances, finally giving birth to the distinction of Mahayanism and Hinayanism. The Original Meaning of Mahayana. The term Mahayana was first used to designate the highest principle, or being, or knowledge, of which the universe with all its sentient and non-sentient beings is a manifestation, and through which only they can attain final salvation (moksa or nirvana). Mahayana was not the name given to any religious doctrine, nor had it anything to do with doctrinal controversy, though later it was so utilised by the progressive party. Acvaghosa, the first Mahayana expounder known to us, — living about the time of Christ, — used the term in his religio-philosophical book ca\\ed Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana ' as synonymous with Bhutatathata, or Dharmakaya, 2 the 1 Translated into English by the author, 1900. The Open Court Pub. Co. Chicago. 2 These terms are explained elsewhere. 8 INTRODUCTION highest principle of Mahayanism. He likened the recognition of, and faith in, this highest being and principle into a conveyance which will carry us safely across the tempestuous ocean of birth and death (samstira) to the eternal shore of Nirvana. Soon after him, however, the controversy between the two schools of Buddhism, conservatives and progressionists as we might call them, became more and more pronounced ; and when it reached its climax which was most probably in the times of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva, i. e., a few centnries after Agvaghosa, the progressive party ingeniously invented the term Hinayana in contrast to Mahayana, the latter having been adopted by them as the watchword of their own school. The Hinayanists and the Tirthakas ' then were sweepingly condemned by the Mahayanists as inadequate to achieve a universal salvation of sentient beings. An Older Classification of Buddhists. Before the distinction of Mahayanists and Hinayanists became definite, that is to say, at the time of Nagar juna or even before it, those Buddhists who held a more progressive and broader view tried to distinguish three yanas among the followers of the Buddha, viz., Bodhisattva-yana, Pratyekabuddha-yana, and CJravaka- yana ; yana being another name for class. 1 Followers of any religious sects other than Buddhism. The term is sometimes used in a contemptuous sense, like heathen by Christians. INTRODUCTION 9 The Bodhisattva is that class of Buddhists who, believing in the Bodhi (intelligence or wisdom), which is a reflection of the Dharmakaya in the human soul, direct all their spiritual energy toward realising and developing it for the sake of their fellow-creatures. The Pratyekabuddha is a "solitary thinker'' or a philosopher, who, retiring into solitude and calmly contemplating on the evanescence of worldly pleasures, endeavors to attain his own salvation, but remains unconcerned with the sufferings of his fellow-beings. Religiously considered, a Pratyekabuddha is cold, impassive, egotistic, and lacks love for all mankind. The Cravaka which means "hearer" is inferior in the estimate of Mahayanists even to the Pratyeka buddha, for he does not possess any intellect that enables him to think independently and to find out by himself the way to final salvation. Being endowed, however, with a pious heart, he is willing to listen to the instructions of the Buddha, to believe in him, to observe faithfully all the moral precepts given by him, and rests fully contented within the narrow horizon of his mediocre intellect. To a further elucidation of Bodhisattvahood and its important bearings in the Mahayana Buddhism, we devote a special chapter below. For Mahayanism is no more than the Buddhism of Bodhisattvas, while the Prayekabuddhas and the Cravakas are considered by Mahayanists to be adherents of Hinayanism. 10 INTRODUCTION The Mahayana Buddhism Defined. We can now form a somewhat definite notion as to what the Mahayana Buddhism is. It is the Buddhism which, inspired by a progressive spirit, broadened its original scope, so far as it did not contradict the inner significance of the teachings of the Buddha, and which assimilated other religio-philosophical be liefs within itself, whenever it felt that, by so doing, people of more widely different characters and intel lectual endowments could be saved. Let us be satis fied at present with this statement, until we enter into a more detailed exposition of its doctrinal peculiarities in the pages that follow. It may not be out of place, while passing, to remark that the term Mahayanism is used in this work merely in contradistinction to that form of Buddhism, which is flourishing in Ceylon and Burma and other central Asiatic nations, and whose literature is princi pally written in the language called Pali, which comes from the same stock as Sanskrit. The term "Mahayana" does not imply, as it is used here, any sense of superiority over the Hinayana. When the historical aspect of Mahayanism is treated, it may naturally develop that its over-zealous and one-sided devotees unnecessarily emphasised its controversial and dogmat ical phase at the sacrifice of its true spirit ; but the reader must not think that this work has anything to do with those complications. In fact, Mahayanism professes to be a boundless ocean in which all form INTRODUCTION I I of thought and faith can find its congenial and welcome home; why then should we make it militate against its own fellow -doctrine, Hinayanism? 2. IS THE MAHAYANA BUDDHISM THE GE NUINE TEACHING OF THE BUDDHA ? What is generally known to the Western nations by the name of Buddhism is Hinayanism, whose scriptures as above stated are written in Pali and studied mostly in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam. It was through this language that the first knowledge of Buddhism was acquired by Orientalists; and nat urally they came to regard Hinayanism or Southern Buddhism as the only genuine teachings of the Buddha. They insisted, and some of them still in sist, that to have an adequate and thorough knowl edge of Buddhism, they must confine themselves solely to the study of the Pali, that whatever may be learned from other sources, i. e., from the Sans krit, Tibetan, or Chinese documents should be con sidered as throwing only a side-light on the reliable information obtained from the Pali, and further that the knowledge derived from the former should in certain cases be discarded as accounts of a degene rated form of Buddhism. Owing to these unfortu nate hypotheses, the significance of Mahayanism as a living religion has been entirely ignored; and even those who are regarded as best authorities on the subject appear greatly misinformed and, what is worse, altogether prejudiced, 1 2 INTRODUCTION No Life Without Growth. This is very unfair on the part of the critics, be cause what religion is there in the whole history of mankind that has not made any development what ever, that has remained the same, like the granite, throughout its entire course? Let us ask whether there is any religion which has shown some signs of vitality and yet retained its primitive form intact and unmodified in every respect. Is not changeable- ness, that is, susceptibility to irritation the most essential sign of vitality? Every organism grows, which means a change in some way or other. There is no form of life to be found anywhere on earth, that does not grow or change, or that has not any inherent power of adjusting itself to the surrounding conditions. Take, for example, Christianity. Is Protestantism the genuine teaching of Jesus of Nazareth? or does Catholicism represent his true spirit? Jesus himself did not have any definite notion of Trinity doctrine, nor did he propose any suggestion for ritualism. According to the Synoptics, he appears to have cherished a rather immature conception of the king dom of God than a purely ideal one as conceived by Paul, and his personal disciples who were just as illiterate philosophically as the master himself were anxiously waiting in all probability for its mundane realisation But what Christians, Catholics or Protes tants, in these days of enlightenment, would dare INTRODUCTION 1 3 give a literal explanation to this material conception of the coming kingdom ? Again, think of Jesus's view on marriage and social life. Is it not an established fact that he highly ad vocated celibacy and in the case of married people strict continence, and also that he greatly favored pious poverty and asceticism in general? In these respects, the monks of the Medieval Ages and the Catholic priests of the present day (though I cannot say they are ascetic and poor in their living) must be said to be in more accord with the teaching of the master than their Protestant brethren. But what Protestants would seriously venture to defend all those views of Jesus, in spite of their avowed decla ration that they are sincerely following in the steps of their Lord ? Taking all in all, these contradictions do not prevent them, Protestants as well as Catho lics, from calling themselves Christians and even good, pious, devoted Christians, as long as they are con sciously or unconsciously animated by the same spirit, that was burning in the son of the carpenter of Nazareth, an obscure village of Galilee, about two thousand years ago. The same mode of reasoning holds good in the case of Mahayanism, and it would be absurd to insist on the genuineness of Hinayanism at the expense of the former. Take for granted that the Mahayana school of Buddhism contains some elements absorbed from other Indian religio-philosophical systems; but what of it? Is not Christianity also an amalgama- 14 INTRODUCTION. tion, so to speak, of Jewish, Greek, Roman, Babylo nian, Egyptian, and other pagan thoughts? In fact every healthy and energetic religion is historical, in the sense that, in the course of its development, it has adapted itself to the ever-changing environment, and has assimilated within itself various elements which appeared at first even threatening its own ex istence. In Christianity, this process of assimilation, adaptation, and modification has been going on from its very beginning. As the result, we see in the Christianity of to-day its original type so metamor phosed, so far as its outward appearance is concern ed, that nobody would now take it for a faithful copy of the prototype. Mahayanism a Living Faith. So with Mahayanism. Whatever changes it has made during its historical evolution, its spirit and central ideas are all those of its founder. The ques tion whether or not it is genuine, entirely depends on our interpretation of the term "genuine." If we take it to mean the lifeless preservation of the original, we should say that Mahayanism is not the genuine teaching of the Buddha, and we may add that Ma hayanists would be proud of the fact, because being a living religious force it would never condescend to be the corpse of a by-gone faith. The fossils, how ever faithfully preserved, are nothing but rigid inor ganic substances from which life is forever departed. INTRODUCTION 1 5 Mahayanism is far from this ; it is an ever-growing faith and ready in all times to cast off its old gar ments as soon as they are worn out. But its spirit originally inspired by the "Teacher of Men and Gods" {castadevamanusyanam) is most jealously guarded against pollution and degeneration. Therefore, as far as its spirit is concerned, there is no room left to doubt its genuineness ; and those who desire to have a complete survey of Buddhism cannot ignore the significane of Mahayanism. It is naught but an idle talk to question the histo rical value of an organism, which is now full of vital ity and active in all its functions, and to treat it like an archeological object, dug out from the depths of the earth, or like a piece of bric-a-brac, discov ered in the ruins of an ancient royal palace. Mahaya nism is not an object of historical curiosity. Its vital ity and activity concern us in our daily life. It is a great spiritual organism ; its moral and religious for ces are still exercising an enormous power over mil lions of souls ; and its further development is sure to be a very valuable contribution to the world-progress of the religious consciousness. What does it matter, then, whether or not Mahayanism is the genuine teaching of the Buddha ? Here is an instance of most flagrant contradictions present in our minds, but of which we are not conscious on account of our preconceived ideas. Christian critics vigorously insist on the genuineness of their own religion, which is no more than a 1 6 INTRODUCTION. hybrid, at least outwardly ; but they want to condemn their rival religion as denegerated, because it went through various stages of development like theirs. It is of no practical use to trouble with this nonsen sical question, — the question of the genuineness of Mahayanism, which by the way is frequently raised by outsiders as well as by some unenlightened Buddhists themselves. 3. SOME MISSTATEMENTS ABOUT THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINES. Before entering fully into the subject proper of this work, let us glance over some erroneous opinions about the Mahayana doctrines, which are held by some Western scholars, and naturally by all uniniti ated readers, who are like the blind led by the blind. It may not be altogether a superfluous work to give them a passing review in this chapter and to show broadly what Mahayanism is not. Why Injustice is done to Buddhism. The people who have had their thoughts and sen timents habitually trained by one particular set of religious dogmas, frequently misjudge the value of those thoughts that are strange and unfamiliar to them. We may call this class of people bigots or religious enthusiasts. They may have fine religious and moral sentiments as far as their own religious training goes; but, when examined from a broader point of view, they are to a great extent vitiated INTRODUCTION. 1 7 with prejudices, superstitions, and fanatical beliefs, which, since childhood, have been pumped into their receptive minds, before they were sufficiently devel oped and could form independent judgments. This fact so miserably spoils their purityof sentiment and obscures their transparency of intellect, that they are disqualified to perceive and appreciate whatever is good and true and beautiful in the so-called heathen religions. This is the main reason why those Chris tian missionaries are incapable of rightly understand ing the spirit of religion generally — I mean, those missionaries who come to the East to substitute one set of superstitions for another. This strong general indictment against the Christian missionaries, however, is by no means prompted by any partisan spirit. My desire, on the contrary, is to do justice to those thoughts and sentiments that have been working consciously or unconsciously in the human mind from time immemorial and shall work on till the day of the last judgment, if there ever be such a day. To see what these thoughts and sentiments are, which, by the way, constitute the kernel of every religion, we must without any reluc tance throw off all the prejudices we are liable to cherish, though quite unknowingly; and keeping always in view what is most essential in the religious consciousness, we must not confound it with its accessories, which are doomed to die in the course of time. 1 8 INTRODUCTION. Examples of Injustice. As specimen of injustice done to the Mahayana Buddhism by Christian critics, we quote the following passages from Monier- William's Buddhism, Wad- dell's Buddhism in Tibet, and Samuel Beal's Buddhism in China, all of which are representative works each in its own field. Monier Monier- Williams. Monier Monier-Williams is a well-known authority on Sanskrit literature, and his works in this depart ment will long remain as a valuable contribution to human knowledge. But, unfortunately, as soon as he attempts to enter the domain of religious contro versy, his intellect becomes pitiously obscured by his preconceived ideas. He thinks, for instance, that the principal feature of Mahayanism consists merely in amplifying the number of Bodhisattvas, who are con tented, according to his view, with their "perpetual residence in the heavens, and quite willing to put off all desires for Buddhahood and Parinirvana." (P. 190.) This remark is so absurd that it will at once be rejected by any one who has a first-hand knowledge of the Mahayana system, as even unworthy of refu tation, but Monier-Williams takes special pains to give to his characterisation of the Mahayana doctrine a show of rational explanation. "Of course," says he, "men instinctively recoiled from utter self-annihi- INTRODUCTION. 19 lation, and so the Buddha's followers ended in chan ging the true idea of Nirvana and converting it from a condition of non-existence into a state of lazy beatitude in celestial regions (!), while they encour aged all men — whether monks or laymen — to make a sense of dreamy bliss in Heaven (!), and not total extinction of life, the end of all their efforts." (P. 156.) This view of the. Buddhist heaven as interpreted by Monier-Williams is nothing but the conception of the Christian heaven colored with paganism. Noth ing is more foreign to Buddhists than this distin guished Sankritist's interpretation of celestial exist ence. The life of devas (celestial beings) is just as much subject to the law of birth and death as that of men on earth. What consolation would there be for the Mahayanists striving after the highest princi ple of existence, only to find themselves transmi grated to a celestial abode, that is also full of sor rows and sufferings ? Always working for the welfare of their fellow-creatures, the Bodhisattvas never desire any earthly or heavenly happiness for them selves. Whatever merits, according to the law of karma, there be stored up for their good work, they do not have any wish to enjoy them by themselves, but they will have all these merits turned over (parivarta) to the interests of their fellow-beings. This is the ideal of Bodhisattvas, i.e., of the followers of Mahayanism. 20 INTRODUCTION. Beal. Samuel Beal who is considered by Western scholars to be an authority on Chinese Buddhism, refering to the Mahayana conception of Dharmakaya, i says in his Buddhism in China (p. 1 56) : "We can have little doubt, then, that from early days worship was offered by Buddhists at several spots, consecrated by the presence of the Teacher, to an invisible presence. This presence was formulated by the later Buddhists under the phrase, 'the Body of the Law', Dhar makaya." Then, alluding to Buddha's instruction that says after his Parinirvana the Law given by him should be regarded as himself, Beal proceeds to say : "Here was the germ from which proceeded the idea or formula of an invisible presence : teaching and power of the Law {Dharma) represented the Dharmakaya or Law-Body of Buddha, present with the order, and fit for reverence." To interpret Dharmakaya as the Body of the Law is quite inadequate and misleading. To the Hinaya nists, there is nothing beside the Tripitaka as the object of reverence, and, therefore, the notion of the Body of the Law has no meaning to them. The idea 1 The conception of Dharmakaya constitutes the central point in the system of Mahayanism, and the right compre hension of it is ot vital importance. The Body of the Law, as it is commonly rendered in English, is not exact and leads frequently to a misconception of the entire system. The point is fully discussed below. INTRODUCTION. 21 is distinctly Mahayanistic, but Beal is not well in formed about its real significance as understood by the Buddhists. The chief reason of his misinterpre tation, as I judge, lies in his rendering dharma by "law", while dharma here means "that which sub sists," or "that which maintains itself even when all the transient modes disappear," in short, "being," or "substance." Dharmakaya, therefore, would be a sort of the Absolute, or Essence-Body of all things. This notion plays such an important role in Maha yanism that an adequate knowledge of it is indispen sable to understand the constitution of Mahayanism as a religious system. Waddell. Let us state one more case of misrepresentation by Western scholars of the Mahayana Buddhism. Waddell, author of Buddhism in Tibet, referring to the point of divergence between the so-called Northern Buddhism and the Southern, says (pp. io — u): "It was the theistic Mahayana doctrine which substituted, for the agnostic idealism and simple morality of Buddha, a speculative theistic system with a mysticism of sophistic nihilism in the back ground." And again : "This Mahayana [meaning Nagarjuna' s Madhyamika school] was essentially a sophistic nihil ism, or rather Parinirvana, while ceasing to be ex tinction of life, was converted a mystic state which admitted of no definition." 22 INTRODUCTION. It may not be wrong to call Mahayanism a specu lative theistic system in a wide sense, but it must be asked on what ground Waddell thinks that it has in its background "a mysticism of sophistic nihilism " Could a religious system be called sophistry when it makes a close inquiry into the science of dialectics, in order to show how futile it is to seek salvation through the intellect alone? Could a religious system be called a nihilism when it endeavors to reach the highest reality which transcends the phenomenality of concrete individual existences ? Could a doctrine be called nihilistic when it defines the absolute as neither void {gunya) nor not-void (agunyd) ? I could cull some more passages from other Bud dhist scholars of the West and show how far Maha yanism has been made by them a subject of mis representation. But since this work is not a polemic, but devoted to a positive exposition of its basic doc trines, I refrain from so doing. Suffice it to state that one of the main causes of the injustice done to Buddhism by the Christian critics comes from their preconceptions, of which they may not be aware, but which all the more vitiate their "impartial" judgments. 4- THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION. Those misconceptions about Buddhism as above stated induce me to digress in this introductory part and to say a few words concerning the distinction INTRODUCTION. 23 between the form and the spirit of religion. A clear knowledge of this distinction will greatly facilitate the formation of a correct notion about Mahayanism and will also help us duly to appreciate its significance as a living religious faith. By the spirit of religion I mean that element in religion which remains unchanged throughout its successive stages of development and transformation : while the form of it is the external shell which is subject to any modification required by circumstances. No Revealed Religion. It admits of no doubt that religion, as everything else under the sun, is subject to the laws of evolution, and that, therefore, there is no such thing as a revealed religion, whose teachings are supposed to have been delivered to us direct from the hands of an anthropomorphic or anthropopsychic supernatural being, and which, like an inorganic substance, remains forever the same, without changing, without growing, without modifying itself in accord with the surrounding conditions. Unless people are so blinded by a belief in this kind of religion as to insist that its dogmas have suffered absolutely no change whatever since its "revelation," they must recognise like every clear headed person the fact that there are some ephemeral elements in every religion, which must carefully be distinguished from its quintessence which remains eternally the same. When this discrimination is not observed, prejudice 24 INTRODUCTION. will at once assert itself, inducing them to imagine that the religion in which they were brought up with all its truths and superstitions is the only orthodox religion in the world, and all the other religions are nothing else than heathenism, idolatry, atheism, apos tasy, and the like. This attitude of such religionists, however, serves only to betray their own narrowness of mind and dimness of spiritual insight. No one who desires to penetrate into the innermost recesses of the human heart and who longs to feel the fullest meaning of life, should foster in himself in the least degree a disposition of bigotry. The Mystery. Religion is the inmost voice of the human heart that under the yoke of a seemingly finite existence groans and travails in pain. Mankind, from their first appearance on earth, have never been satisfied with the finiteness and impermanency of life. They have always been yearning after something that will liberate them from the slavery of this mortal coil, or from the cursed bondage of metempsychosis, as Hindu thinkers express it. This something, however, on account of its transcending all the principles of separation and individuation, which characterise the phenomena of this mundane existence, has always remained as something indefinite, inadequate, chaotic, and full of mystery. And, according to different degrees of intellectual development in different ages and nations, people have endeavored to invest this INTRODUCTION. 2$ mysterious something with all sorts of human feelings and intelligence. Most of modern scientists are now content with the hypothesis that the mystery is unfathomable by the human mind, which is conditioned by the law of relativity, and that our business here, moral as well as intellectual, can be executed without troubling ourselves with this ever-haunting problem of mystery; — this doctrine is called agnosticism. But this hypothesis can in no wise be considered the final sentence passed on the mystery. From the scientific point of view, the maxim of agnosticism is excellent, as science does not pretend to venture into the realm of non- relativity Dissatisfaction, however, presents itself, when we attempt to silence by this hypothesis the last demand of the human heart. Intellect and Imagination. The human heart is not an intellectual crystal. When the intellect displays itself in its full glory, the heart still aches and struggles to get hold of something beyond. The intellect may sometimes de clare that it has at last laid its hand on what is demanded by the heart. Time passes on, and the mystery is examined from the other points that escaped consid eration before, and, to the great disappointment of the heart, the supposed solution is found to be wanting. The intellect is baffled. But the human heart never gets tired of its yearnings and demands a satisfaction ever more pressingly. Should they be considered a mere nightmare of imagination ? Surely 26 INTRODUCTION. not, for herein lies the field where religion claims supreme authority, and its claim is perfectly right. But religion cannot fabricate whatever it pleases; it must work in perfect accord with the intellect. As the essential nature of man does not consist solely in intellect, or will, or feeling, but in the coordination of these psychical elements, religion must guard her self against the unrestrained flight of imagination. Most of the superstitions fondly cherished by a pious heart are due to the disregard of the intellectual element in religion. The imagination creates : the intellect discriminates. Creation without discrimination is wild : discrimination without creation is barren. Religion and science, when they do not work with mutual understanding, are sure to be one-sided. The soul makes an ab normal growth at one point, loses its balance, and is finally given up to a collapse of the entire system. Those pious religious enthusiasts who see a natural enemy in science and denounce it with all their energy, are, in my opinion, as purblind and distorted in their view, as those men of science who think that science alone must claim the whole field of soul- activities as well as those of nature. I am not in sympathy with either of them : for one is just as arrogant in its claim as the other. Without a careful examination of both sides of a shield, we are not competent to give a correct opinion upon it. But the imagination is not the exclusive possession of religion, nor is discrimination or ratiocination the INTRODUCTION. 27 monopoly of science. They are reciprocal and com plementary : one cannot do anything without the other. The difference between science and religion is not that between certitude and probability. The difference is rather in their respective fields of acti vity. Science is solely concerned with things condi tional, relative, and finite. When it explains a given phenomenon by some fixed laws which are in turn nothing but a generalisation of particular facts, the task of science is done, and any further attempt to go beyond this, i. e., to make an inquiry into the whence, whither, and w h y of things, is beyond its realm. But the human soul does not remain satisfied here, it asks for the ultimate principle under lying all so-called scientific laws and hypotheses. Science is indifferent to the teleology of things : a mechanical explanation of them appeases its intellec tual curiosity. But in religion teleology is of para mount importance, it is one of the most fundamental problems, and a system which does not give any definite conception on this point is no religion. Science, again, does not care if there is something beyond or outside its manifold laws and theories ; but a religion which does not possess a God or anything corresponding to it, ceases to be so, for it fails to give consolation to the human heart The Contents of Faith vary. The solution of religious problems, as far as they fall within the sphere of relative experience, is large- 28 INTRODUCTION. ly a matter of personal conviction, determined by one's intellectual development, external circumstances, education, disposition, etc. The conceptions of faith thus formulated are naturally infinitely diversified; even among the followers of a certain definite set of dogmas, each will understand them in his own way, owing to individual peculiarities. If we could subject their conceptions of faith to a strict analysis as a chemist does his materials, we should detect in them all the possible forms of differentiation. But all these things belong to the exterior of religion and have nothing to do with the essentials which underlie them. The abiding elements of religion come from within, and consist mainly in the mysterious sentiment that lies hidden in the deepest depths of the human heart, and that, when awakened, shakes the whole structure of personality and brings about a great spiritual revolution, which results in a complete change of one's world-conception. When this mysterious sen timent finds expression and formulates its conceptions in the terms of intellect, it becomes a definite system of beliefs, which is popularly called religion, but which should properly be termed dogmatism, that is, an intellectualised form of religion. On the other hand, the outward forms of religion consist of those changing elements that are mainly determined by the intellectual and moral development of the times as well as by individual esthetical feelings. True Christians and enlightened Buddhists may, therefore, find their point of agreement in the recog- INTRODUCTION. 29 nition of the inmost religious sentiment that consti tutes the basis of our being, though this agreement does by no means prevent them from retaining their individuality in the conceptions and expressions of faith. My conviction is : If the Buddha and the Christ changed their accidental places of birth, Gautama might have been a Christ rising against the Jewish traditionalism, and Jesus a Buddha, perhaps propounding the doctrine of non-ego and Nirvana and Dharmakiya. However great a man may be, he cannot but be an echo of the spirit of the times. He never stands, as is supposed by some, so aloof and towering above the masses as to be practically by himself. On the contrary, "he," as Emerson says, "finds himself in the river of the thoughts and events, forced onward by the ideas and necessities of his contemporaries." So it was with the Buddha, and so with the Christ. They were nothing but the concrete representatives of the ideas and feelings that were struggling in those times against the established institutions, which were degenerating fast and menaced the progress of humanity. But at the same time those ideas and sentiments were the outburst of the Eternal Soul, which occasionally makes a solemn announcement of its will, through great historical figures or through great worldevents. * * Believing that a bit of religio-philosophical expo sition as above indulged will prepare the minds of 30 INTRODUCTION. my Christian readers sincerely to take up the study of a religious system other than their own, I now proceed to a systematical elucidation of the Maha yana Buddhism, as it is believed at present in the Far East. CHAPTER I. A GENERAL CHARACTERISATION OF BUDDHISM. No God and no Soul. OUDDHISM is considered by some to be a religion without a God and without a soul. The state ment is true and untrue according to what meaning we give to those terms. Buddhism does not recognise the existence of a being, who stands aloof from his ''creations," and who meddles occasionally with human affairs when his capricious will pleases him. This conception of a supreme being is very offensive to Buddhists. They are unable to perceive any truth in the hypotheses, that a being like ourselves created the universe out of nothing and first peopled it with a pair of sentient beings ; that, owing to a crime commited by them, which, however, could have been avoided if the cre ator so desired, they were condemned by him to eternal damnation ; that the creator in the meantime feeling pity for the cursed, or suffering the bite of remorse for his somewhat rash deed, despatched his only beloved son to the earth for the purpose of rescuing mankind from universal misery, etc., etc. If Buddhism is called atheism on account of its 32 CHAPTER I. refusal to take poetry for actual fact, its followers would have no objection to the designation. Next, if we understand by soul atman, which, secretly hiding itself behind all mental activities, direct them after the fashion of an organist striking different notes as he pleases, Buddhists outspokenly deny the existence of such a fabulous being. To postulate an independent atman outside a combination of the five Skandhas *, of which an individual being is supposed by Buddhists to consist, is to unreservedly welcome egoism with all its pernicious corollaries. And what distinguishes Buddhism most characteristically and emphatically from all other religions is the doctrine of non-atman or non-ego, exactly opposite to the postulate of a soul-substance which is cherished by most of religious enthusiasts. In this sense, Buddhism is undoubtedly a religion without the soul. To make these points clearer in a general way, let us briefly treat in this chapter of such principal tenets of Buddhism as Karma, Atman, Avidya, Nirvana, Dharmakaya, etc. Some of these doctrines being the common property of the two schools of Buddhism, Hinayanism and Mahayanism, their brief, comprehen sive exposition here will furnish our readers with a general notion about the constitution of Buddhism, and will also prepare them to pursue a further specific exposition of the Mahayana doctrine which follows. 1 They are: (i) form or materiality {r&pa), (2) sensation (vedand), (3) conception (sam/na), (4) action or deeds {samk&ra), and (5) consciousness {vijndna). These terms are explained elsewhere. CHAPTER I. 33 Karma. One of the most fundamental doctrines established by Buddha is that nothing in this world comes from a single cause, that the existence of a universe is the result of a combination of several causes (ketu) and conditions (pratyaya), and is at the same time an active force contributing to the pro duction of an effect in the future. As far as phe nomenal existences 'are concerned, this law of cause and effect holds universally valid. Nothing, even God, can interfere with the course of things thus regulated, materially as well as morally. If a God really exists and has some concern about our worldly affairs, he must first conform himself to the law of causation. Because the principle of karma, which is the Buddhist term for causation morally conceived, holds supreme everywhere and all the time. The conception of karma plays the most important r61e in Buddhist ethics. Karma is the formative prin ciple of the universe. It determines the course of events and the destiny of our existence. The reason why we cannot change our present state of things as we may will, is that it has already been determined by the karma that was performed in our previous lives, not only individually but collectively. But, for this same reason, we shall be able to work out our destiny in the future, which is nothing but the resultant of several factors that are working and that are being worked by ourselves in this life. 3 34 CHAPTER I. Therefore, says Buddha: "By self alone is evil done, By self is one disgraced; By self is evil left undone, By self alone is he purified; Purity and impurity belong to self: No one can purify another." ' Again, "Not in the sky Nor in the midst of the sea, Nor entering a cleft of the mountains, Is found that realm on earth Where one may stand and be From an evil deed absolved." 2 This doctrine of karma may be regarded as an application in our ethical realm of the theory of the conservation of energy. Everything done is done once for all; its footprints on the sand of our moral and social evolution are forever left ; nay, more than left, they are generative, good or evil, and waiting for further development under favorable conditions. In the physical world, even the slightest possible movement of our limbs cannot but affect the general cosmic motion of the earth, however infinitesimal it be; and if we had a proper instrument, we could surely measure its precise extent of effect. So is it even , with our deeds. A deed once performed, together with its subjective motives, can never vanish without leaving some impressions either on the individual 1 The Dhammapada, v. 165. Tr. by A. J. Edmunds. 2 The Dhammapada, v. 127. CHAPTER I. 35 consciousness or on the supra-individual, i. e., social consciousness. We need not further state that the conception of karma in its general aspect is scientifically verified. In our moral and material life, where the law of relativity rules supreme, the doctrine of karma must be considered thoroughly valid. And as long as its validity is admitted in this field, we can live our phenomenal life without resorting to the hypothesis of a personal God, as declared by Lamarck when his significant work on evolution was presented to Emperor Napoleon. But it will do injustice to Buddhism if we desig nate it agnosticism or naturalism, denying or ignoring the existence of the ultimate, unifying principle, in which all contradictions are obliterated. Dharmakaya is the name given by Buddhists to this highest prin ciple, viewed not only from the philosophical but also from the religious standpoint. In the Dharmakaya, Buddhists find the ultimate significance of life, which, when seen from its phenomenal aspect, cannot escape the bondage of karma and its irrefragable laws. Avidyd. What claims our attention next, is the problem of nescience, which is one of the most essential features of Buddhism. Buddhists think, nescience (in Sans krit avidya) is the subjective aspect of karma, involv ing us in a series of rebirths. Rebirth, considered by itself, is no moral evil, but rather a necessary 36 CHAPTER I. condition of progress toward perfection, if perfection ever be attainable here. It is an evil only when it is the outcome of ignorance, — ignorance as to the true meaning of our earthly existence. Ignorant are they who do not recognise the eva nescence of wordly things and who tenaciously cleave to them as final realities ; who madly struggle to shun the misery brought about by their own folly; who savagely cling to the self against the will of God, as Christians would say; who take particulars as final existences and ignore one pervading reality which underlies them all ; who build up an adaman tine wall between the mine and thine : in a word, ignorant are those who do not understand that there is no such thing as an ego-soul, and that all indiv idual existences are unified in the system of Dhar makaya. Buddhism, therefore, most emphatically maintains that to attain the bliss of Nirvana we must radically dispel this illusion, this ignorance, this root of all evil and suffering in this life. The dotrine • of nescience or ignorance is technically expressed in the following formula, which is com monly called the Twelve Nidanas or Pratyayasamut- pada, that is to say Chains of Dependence: (i) There is Ignorance (avidyd) in the beginning; (2) from Ignorance Action (sanskard) comes forth; (3) from Action Consciousness (vijndna) comes forth; (4) from Consciousness Name-and-Form (namarupa) comes forth; (5) from Name-and-Form the Six Organs {sadayatana) come forth ; (6) from the Six Organs CHAPTER I. 37 Touch (sparga) comes forth; (7) from Touch Sensa tion (vedana) comes forth ; (8) from Sensation Desire (trsna) comes forth ; (9) from Desire Clinging (upa- dana) comes forth; (10) from Clinging Being (bhdva) comes forth; (11) from Being Birth (jati) comes forth; and (12) from Birth Pain (duhkka) comes forth. According to Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakoga, the formula is explained as follows : Being ignorant in our previous life as to the significance of our existence, we let loose our desires and act wantonly. Owing to this karma, we are destined in the present life to be endowed with consciousness (vijndna), name-and- form (ndmarupa), the six organs of sense (sadaya tana), and sensation (vedana). By the exercise of these faculties, we now desire for, hanker after, cling to, these illusive existences which have no ultimate reality whatever. In consequence of this "Will to Live" we potentially accumulate or make up the karma that will lead us to further metempsychosis of birth and death. The formula is by no means logical, nor is it exhaustive, but the fundamental notion that life started in ignorance or blind will remains veritable. Non-Atman. The problem of nescience naturally leads to the doctrine usually known as that of non-Atman, i. e., non-ego, to which allusion was made at the beginning 38 CHAPTER I. of this chapter. This doctrine of Buddhism is one of the subjects that have caused much criticism by Christian scholars. Its thesis runs: There is no such thing as ego-soul, which, according to the vulgar interpretation, is the agent of our mental activities. And this is the reason why Buddhism is sometimes called a religion without the soul, as aforesaid. This Buddhist negation of the ego-soul is perhaps startling to the people, who, having no speculative power, blindly accept the traditional, materialistic view of the soul. They think, they are very spiritual in endorsing the dualism of soul and flesh, and in making the soul something like a corporeal entity, though far more ethereal than an ordinary object of the senses. They think of the soul as being more in the form of an angel, when they teach that it ascends to heaven immediately after its release from the material imprisonment. They further imagine that the soul, because of its imprisonment in the body, groans in pain for its liberty, not being able to bear its mundane limita tions. The immortality of the soul is a continuation after the dismemberment of material elements of this ethereal, astral, ghost-like entity, — very much resem bling the Samkhyan Lingham or the Vedantic su- hsama-garira. Self-consciousness will not a whit suffer in its continued activity, as it is the essential function of the soul. Brothers and sisters, parents and sons and daughters, wives aud husbands, all transfigured and sublimated, will meet again in the CHAPTER I. 39 celestial abode, and perpetuate their home life much after the manner of their earthly one. People who take this view of the soul and its immortality must feel a great disappointment or even resentment, when they are asked to recognise the Buddhist theory of non-atman. The absurdity of ascribing to the soul a sort of astral existence taught by some theosophists is due to the confusion of the name and the object corres ponding to it. The soul, or what is tantamount according to the vulgar notion, the ego, is a name given to a certain coordination of mental activities. Abstract names are invented by us to economise our intellectual labors, and* of course have no correspond ing realities as particular presences in the concrete objective world. Vulgar minds have forgotten the history of the formation of abstract names. Being accustomed always to find certain objective realities or concrete individuals answering to certain names, they— those naive realists — imagine that all names, irrespective of their nature, must have their concrete individual equivalents in the sensual world. Their idealism or spiritualism, so called, is in fact a gross form of materialism, in spite of their unfounded fear for the latter as atheistic and even immoral ; — curse of ignorance ! The non-atman theory does not deny that there is a coordination or unification of various mental oper ations. Buddhism calls this system of coordination vijnana, not atman. Vijnana is consciousness, while 40 CHAPTER I. atman is the ego conceived as a concrete entity, — a hypostatic agent which, abiding in the deepest recess of the mind, directs all subjective activities according to its own discretion. This view is radically rejected by Buddhism. A familiar analogy illustrating the doctrine of non- atman is the notion of a wheel or that of a house. Wheel is the name given to a combination in a fixed form of the spokes, axle, tire, hub, rim, etc. ; house is that given to a combination of roofs, pillars, win dows, floors, walls, etc., after a certain model and for a certain purpose. Now, take all these parts independently, and where is the house or the wheel to be found ? House or wheel is merely the name designating a certain form in which parts are sys tematically and definitely disposed. What an absurd ity, then, it must be to insist on the independent existence of the wheel or of the house as an agent behind the combination of certain parts thus definite ly arranged! It is wonderful that Buddhism clearly anticipated the outcome of modern psychological researches at the time when all other religious and philosophical sys tems were eagerly cherishing dogmatic superstitions concerning the nature of the ego. The refusal of modern psychology to have soul mean anything more than the sum-total of all mental experiences, such as sensations, ideas, feelings, decisions, etc., is precisely a rehearsal of the Buddhist doctrine of non-atman. It does not deny that there is a unity of consciousness, CHAPTER I 4 1 for to deny this is to doubt our everyday experiences, but it refuses to assert that this unity is absolute, unconditioned, and independent. Everything in this phenomenal phase of existence, is a combination of certain causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya) brought together according to the principle of karma; and everything that is compound is finite and subject to dissolution, and, therefore, always limited by something else. Even the soul-life, as far as its phenomenality goes, is no exception to this universal law. To maintain the existence of a soul-substance which is supposed to lie hidden behind the phenomena of consciousness, is not only misleading, but harmful and productive of some morally dangerous conclusions. The supposition that there is something where there is really nothing, makes us cling to this chimerical form, with no other result than subjecting ourselves to an eternal series of sufferings. So we read in the Lankavatara Sutra, III : "A flower in the air, or a hare with horns, Or a pregnant maid of stone: To take what is not for what is, 'Tis called a judgment false. "In a combination of causes, The vulgar seek the reality of self. As truth they understand not, From birth to birth they transmigrate." The Non-Atman-ness of Things. Mahayanism has gone a step further than Hina yanism in the development of the doctrine of non- atman, for it expressly disavows, besides the denial 42 CHAPTER I. of the existence of the ego- substance, a noumenal conception of things, i. e., the conception of particu lars as having something absolute in them. Hinaya nism, indeed, also disfavors this conception of thing- iness, but it does so only implicitly. It is Mahayanism that definitely insists on the non-existence of a personal (pudgala) as well as a thingish (dharma) ego. According to the vulgar view, particular existences are real, they have permanent substantial entities, remaining forever as such. They think, therefore, that organic matter remains forever organic just as much as inorganic matter remains inorganic ; that, as they are essentially different, there is no mutual transformation between them. The human soul is different from that of the lower animals and sentient beings from non-sentient beings ; the difference being well-defined and permanent, there is no bridge over which one can cross to the other. We may call this view naturalistic egoism. Mahayanism, against this egoistic conception of the world, extends its theory of non-atman to the realm lying outside us. It maintains that there is no irre ducible reality in particular existences, so long _as they are combinations of several causes and condi tions brought together by the principle of karma. Things are here because they are sustained by karma. As soon as its force is exhausted, the conditions that made their existence possible lose efficience and dissolve, and in their places will follow other con ditions and existences. Therefore, what is organic CHAPTER I. 43 to-day, may be inorganic to-morrow, and vice versa. Carbon, for instance, which is stored within the earth appears in the form of coal or graphite or diamond ; but that which exists on its surface is found some times combined with other elements in the form of an animal or a vegetable, sometimes in its free ele mentary state. It is the same carbon everywhere ; it becomes inorganic or organic, according to its karma, it has no atman in itself which directs its transformation by its own self-determining will. Mutual transformation is everywhere observable; there is a constant shifting of forces, an eternal transmigration of the elements, — all of which tend to show the transitoriness and non-atman- ness of individual ex istences. The universe is moving like a whirl-wind, nothing in it proving to be stationary, nothing in it rigidly adhering to its own form of existence. Suppose, on the other hand, there were an atman behind every particular being; suppose, too, it were absolute and permanent and self-acting ; and this phenomenal world would then come to a standstill, and life be forever gone. For is not changeability the most essential feature and condition of life, and also the strongest evidence for the non-existence of individual things as realities? The physical sciences recognise this universal fact of mutual transformation in its positive aspect and call it the law of the con servation of energy and of matter. Mahayanism, recognising its negative side, proposes the doctrine of the non-atman-ness of things, that is to say, the 44 CHAPTER I. impermanency of all particular existences. Therefore, it is said, "Sarvam anityam, sarvam gunyam, sarvam andtman." (All is transitory, all is void, all is with out ego.) Mahiyanists condemn the vulgar view that denies the consubstantiality and reciprocal transformation of all beings, not only because it is scientifically unten able, but mainly because, ethically and religiously considered, it is fraught with extremely dangerous ideas, — ideas which finally may lead a "brother to deliver up the brother to death and the father the child," and, again, it may constrain "the children to rise up against their parents and cause them to be put to death." Why? Because this view, born of egoism, would dry up the well of human love and sympathy, and transform us into creatures of bestial selfishness ; because this view is not capable of inspiring us with the sense of mutuality and commiseration and of making us disinterestedly feel for our fellow- beings. Then, all fine religious and humane sentiments would depart from our hearts, and we should be nothing less than rigid, lifeless corpses, no pulse beating, no blood running. And how many victims are offered every day on this altar of egoism I They are not necessarily immoral by nature, but blindly led by the false conception of life and the world, they have been rendered incapable of seeing their own spiritual doubles in their neighbors. Being ever controlled by their sensual impulses, they sin against humanity, against nature, and against themselves. CHAPTER I. 45 We read in the Mahayana-abhisamaya Sutra (Nanjo, no. 196) : "Empty and calm and devoid of ego Is the nature of all things : There is no individual being That in reality exists. "Nor end nor beginning having Nor any middle course, All is a sham, here's no reality whatever: It is like unto a vision and a dream. "It is like unto clouds and lightning, It is like unto gossamer or bubbles floating It is like unto fiery revolving wheel, It is like unto water-splashing. ''Because of causes and conditions things are here : In them there's no self-nature [i. e., atman] : All things that move and work, Know them as such. "Ignorance and thirsty desire, The source of birth and death they are: Right contemplation and discipline by heart, Desire and ignorance obliterate. "All beings in the world, Beyond words they are and expressions: Their ultimate nature, pure and true, Is like unto vacuity of space." 1 The Dharmakaya. The Dharmakaya, which literally means "body or system of being," is, according to the Mahayanists, 1 This last passage should not be understood in the sense of a total abnegation of existence. It means simply the tran- scendentality of the highest principle. 46 CHAPTER I. the ultimate reality that underlies all particular phe nomena; it is that which makes the existence of individuals possible; it is the raison d'etre of the universe; it is the norm of being, which regulates the course of events and thoughts. The conception of Dharmakaya is peculiarly Mahayanistic, for the Hinayana school did not go so far as to formulate the ultimate principle of the universe; its adherents stopped short at a positivistic interpretation of Bud dhism. The Dharmakaya remained for them to be the Body of the Law, or the Buddha's personality as embodied in the truth taught by him. The Dharmakaya may be compared in one sense to the God of Christianity and in another sense to the Brahman or Paramatman of Vedantism. It is different, however, from the former in that it does not stand transcendentally above the universe, which, according to the Christian view, was created by God, but which is, according to Mahayanism, a manifesta tion of the Dharmakaya himself. It is also different from Brahman in that it is not absolutely impersonal, nor is it a mere being. The Dharmakaya, on the contrary, is capable of willing and reflecting, or, to use Buddhist phraseology, it is Karuna. (love) and Bodhi (intelligence), and not the mere state of being. This pantheistic and at the same time entheistic Dharmakaya is working in every sentient being, for sentient beings are nothing but a self-manifestation of the Dharmakaya. Individuals are not isolated existences, as imagined by most people. If isolated, CHAPTER. I. 47 they are nothing, they are so many soap-bubbles which vanish one after another in the vacuity of space. All particular existences acquire their meaning only when they are thought of in their oneness in the Dharmakaya. The veil of Maya, i. e., subjective ignorance may temporally throw an obstacle to our perceiving the universal light of Dharmakaya, in which we are all one. But when our Bodhi or intellect, which is by the way a reflection of the Dharmakaya in the human mind, is so fully enlightened, we no more build the artificial barrier of egoism before our spiritual eye; the distinction between the meum and teum is obliterated, no dualism throws the nets of entanglement over us ; I recognise myself in you and you recognise yourself in me ; tat tvam asi. Or, "What is here, that is there ; What is there, that is here : Who sees duality here, From death to death goes he." ' This state of enlightenment may be called the spiritual expansion of the ego, or, negatively, the ideal annihilation of the ego. A never-drying stream of sympathy and love which is the life of religion will now spontaneously flow out of the fountain- head of Dharmakaya. The doctrine of non-ego teaches us that there is no reality in individual existences, that we do not have any transcendental entity called ego-substance. The Kathopanis.ad, IV. io. 48 CHAPTER I. The doctrine of Dharmakaya, to supplement this, teaches us that we all are one in the System of Being and only as such are immortal. The one shows us the folly of clinging to individual exist ences and of coveting the immortality of the ego- soul; the other convinces us of the truth that we are saved by living into the unity of Dharmakaya. The doctrine of non-atman liberates us from the shackle of unfounded egoism ; but as mere liberation does not mean anything positive and may perchance lead us to asceticism, we apply the energy thus released to the execution of the will of Dharmakaya. The questions : "Why have we to love our neigh bors as ourselves ? Why have we to do to others all things whatsoever we would that they should do to us?" are answered thus by Buddhists: "It is because we are all one in the Dharmakaya, because when the clouds of ignorance and egoism are totally dispersed, the light of universal love and intelligence cannot help but shine in all its glory. And, enveloped in this glory, we do not see any enemy, nor neighbor, we are not even conscious of whether we are one in the Dharmakaya. There is no 'my will' here, but only 'thy will,' the will of Dharmakaya, in which we live and move and have our being." The Apostle Paul says : "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." Why ? Buddhists would answer, "because Adam asserted his egoism in giving himself up to ignorance, (the tree of knowledge is in truth the tree of ignorance, CHAPTER I. -j for from it comes the duality of me and thee) ; while Christ on the contrary surrendered his egoistic asser tion to the intelligence of the universal Dharmakaya. That is why we die in the former and are made alive in the latter." Nirvana. The meaning of Nirvana has been variously inter preted by non-Buddhist students from the philologi cal and the historical standpoint ; but it matters little what conclusions they have reached, as we are not going to recapitulate them here ; nor do they at all affect our presentation of the Buddhists' own view as below. For it is the latter that concerns us here most and constitutes the all-important part of the problem. We have had too much of non-Buddhist speculation on the question at issue. The majority of the critics, while claiming to be fair and impartial, have, by some preconceived ideas, been led to a conclusion, which is not at all acceptable to intelligent Buddhists. Further, the fact has escaped their notice that Pali literature from which they chiefly derive their infor mation on the subject represents the views of one of the many sects that arose soon after the demise of the Master and were constantly branching off at and after the time of King Acoka. The probability is, that Buddha himself did not have any stereotyped conception of Nirvana, and, as most great minds do, expressed his ideas outright as formed under various circumstances ; though of course they could not be 4 48 CHAPTER I. in contradiction with his central beliefs, which must have remained the same throughout the course of his religious life. Therefore, to understand a problem in all its apparently contradictory aspects, it is very necessary to grasp at the start the spirit of the author of the problem, and when this is done the rest will be understood comparatively much easier. Non-Buddhist critics lack in this most important qual ification ; therefore, it is no wonder that Buddhists themselves are always reluctant to accede to their interpretations. Enough for apology. Nirvana, according to Bud dhists, does not signify an annihilation of conscious ness nor a temporal or permanent suppression of mentation ', as imagined by some ; but it is the ' Guyau, a French sociologist, refers to the Buddhist con ception of Nirvana in his Non-Religion of the Future I take his interpretation as typical of those non-Buddhist critics who are very little acquainted with the subject but pretend to know much. (English translation, pp 472—474.) "Granted the wretchedness of life, the remedy that pessi mists propose is the new religious salvation that modern Buddhists are to make fashionable. . . The conception is that of Nirvana. To sever all the ties which attach you to the external world ; to prune away all the young offshoots of desire, and recognise that to be rid of them is a deliverance ; to practise a sort of complete psychial circumcision; to recoil upon yourself and to believe that by so doing you enter into the society of the great totality of things (the mystic would say, of God); to create an inner vacuum, and to feel dizzy in the void and, nevertheless, to believe that the void is plenitude supreme, pleroma, these have always constituted temptations to mankind. Mankind has been tempted to meddle with them, as it has been tempted to creep up to CHAPTER I. 51 annihilation of the notion of ego-substance and of all the desires that arise from this erroneous concep tion. But this represents the negative side of the doctrine, and its positive side consists in universal love or sympathy (karund) for all beings. These two aspects of Nirvana, i. e., negatively, the destruction of evil passions, and, positively, the practice of sympathy, are complementary to each other ; and when we have one we have the other. Because, as soon as the heart is freed from the cangue of egoism, the same heart, hitherto so cold and hard, undergoes a complete change, shows ani mation, and, joyously escaping from self -imprisonment, finds its freedom in the bosom of Dharmakaya. In this latter sense, Nirvana is the "humanisation" of Dharmakaya, that is to say, "God's will done in earth as it is in heaven." If we make use of the the verge of dizzy precipices and look over . . . Nirvana leads, in fact, to the annihilation of the individual and of the race, and to the logical absurdity that the vanquished are the vic tors over the trials and miseries of life " Then, the author recites the case of one of his acquain tances, who made a practical experiment of Nirvana, rejecting variety in his diet, giving up meat, wine, every kind of ragout, every form of condiment, and reducing to its lowest possible terms the desire that is most fundamental in every living being — the desire of food, and substituting a certain number of cups of pure milk. "Having thus blunted his sense of taste and the grosser of his appetites, having abandoned all physical activity, he thought to find a recompense in the pleas ure of abstract meditation and of esthetic contemplation. He entered to a state which was not that of dreamland, but neither was it that of real life, with its definite details." 52 CHAPTER I. terms, subjective and objective. Nirvana is the former, and the Dharmakaya is the latter, phase of one and the same principle. Again, psychologically, Nirvana is enlightenment, the actualisation of the Bodhicitta1 (Heart of Intelligence). The gospel of love and the doctrine of Nirvana may appear to some to contradict each other, for they think that the former is the source of energy and activity, while the latter is a lifeless, inhuman, ascetic quietism. But the truth is, love is the emo tional aspect and Nirvana the intellectual aspect of the inmost religious consciousness which constitutes the essence of the Buddhist life. That Nirvana is the destruction of selfish desires is plainly shown in this stanza : "To the giver merit is increased ; When the senses are controlled anger arises not, The wise forsake evil, By the destruction of desire, sin, and infatuation, A man attains to Nirvana." - The following which was breathed forth by Buddha against a certain class of monks, testifies that when Nirvana is understood in the sense of quietism or pessimism, he vigorously repudiated it : "Fearing an endless chain of birth and death, And the misery of transmigration, Their heart is filled with worry, But they desire their safety only. 1 For detailed explanation of this term see Chapter XI. 2 The Ud&na, Ch. VIII, p. n8. Translation by General Strong CHAPTER I. 53 "Quietly sitting and reckoning the breaths, They're bent on the Anapanam. i They contemplate on the filthiness of the body, — Thinking how impure it is ! "They shun the dust of the triple world, And in ascetic practise their safety they seek : Incapable of love and sympathy are they, For on Nirvana abides their thought." a Against this ascetic practise of some monks, the Buddha sets forth what might be called the ideal of the Buddhist life : "Arouse thy will, supreme and great, Practise love and sympathy, give joy and protection ; Thy love like unto space, Be it without discrimination, without limitation. Merits establish, not for thy own sake, But for charity universal ; Save and deliver all beings, Let them attain the wisdom of the Great Way." It is apparent that the ethical application of the doctrine of Nirvana is naught else than, the Golden 1 This is a peculiarly Indian religious practice, which con sists in counting one's exhaling and inhaling breaths. When a man is intensely bent on the practise, he gradually passes to a state of trance, forgetting everything that is going on around and within himself. The practise may have the merit of alleviating nervousness and giving to the mind the bliss of relaxation, but it oftentimes leads the mind to a self-hypnotic state. 2 Here Nirvana is evidently understood to mean self-abne gation or world-flight or quietism, which is not in accord with the true Buddhist interpretation of the term. J4 CHAPTER I. Rule, 1 so called. The Golden Rule, however, does not give any reason why we should so act, it is a mere command whose authority is ascribed to a cer tain superhuman being. This does not satisfy an intellectually disposed mind, which refuses to accept anything on mere authority, for it wants to go to the bottom of things and see on what ground they are standing. Buddhism has solved this problem by finding the oneness of things in Dharmakaya, from which flows the eternal stream of love and sym pathy. As we have seen before, when the cursed barrier of egoism is broken down, there remains nothing that can prevent us from loving others as ourselves. Those who wish to see nothing but an utter bar renness of heart after the annihilation of egoism, are much mistaken in their estimation of human nature. For they think its animation comes from selfishness, and that all forms of activity in our life are propelled simply by the desire to preserve self and the race. They, therefore, naturally shrink from the doctrine that teaches that all things worldly are empty, and that there is no such thing as ego-substance whose 1 The sentiment of the Golden Rule is not the monopoly of Christianity; it has been expressed by most of the leaders of thought, thus, for instance : "Requite hatred with virtue" (Lao-tze). "Hate is only appeased by love" (Buddha). "Do not do to others what ye would not have done to you by others" (Confucius). "One must neither return evil, nor do any evil to any one among men, not even if one has to suffer from them" (Plato, Crito, 49). CHAPTER I. 55 immortality is so much coveted by most people. But the truth is, the spring of love does not lie in the idea of self, but in its removal. For the human heart, being a reflection of the Dharmakaya which is love and intelligence, recovers its intrinsic power and good ness, only when the veil of ignorance and egoism is cast aside. The animation, energy, strenuousness, which were shown by a self-centered will, and which therefore were utterly desplicable, will not surely die out with the removal of their odious atmosphere in which egoism had enveloped them. But they will gain an ever nobler interpretation, ever more elevating and satisfying significance ; for they have gone through a baptism of fire, by which the last trace of egoism has been thoroughly consumed The old evil master is eternally buried, but the willing servants are still here and ever ready to do their service, now more efficiently, for their new legitimate and more autho ritative lord. Destruction is in common parlance closely associ ated with nothingness, hence Nirvana, the destruction of egoism, is ordinarily understood as a synonym of nihilism. But the removal of darkness does not bring desolation, but means enlightenment and order and peace. It is the same chamber, all the furniture is left there as it was before. In darkness chaos reigned, goblins walked wild; in enlightenment everything is in its proper place. And did we not state plainly that Nirvana was enlightenment? 56 CHAPTER I. The Intellectual Tendency of Buddhism. One thing which in this connection I wish to refer to, is what makes Buddhism appear somehow cold and impassive. By this I mean its intellectuality. The fact is that anything coming from India greatly savors of philosophy. In ancient India everybody of the higher castes seems to have indulged in intellec tual and speculative exercises. Being rich in natural resources and thus the struggle for existence being reduced to a minimum, the Brahmans and the Ksatriyas gathered themselves under most luxuriously growing trees, or retired to the mountain-grottoes undisturbed by the hurly-burly of the world, and there they devoted all their leisure hours to metaphysical specu lations and discussions. Buddhism, as a product of these people, is naturally deeply imbued with intel- lectualism. Further, in India there was no distinction between religion and philosophy. Every philosophical system was at the same time a religion, and vice versa. Philosophy with the Hindus was not an idle display of logical subtlety which generally ends in entangling itself in the meshes of sophistry. Their aim of philos ophising was to have an intellectual insight into the significance of existence and the destiny of humanity. They did not believe in anything blindly nor accept anything on mere tradition. Buddha most character istically echoes this sentiment when he says, "Follow my teachings not as taught by a Buddha, but as CHAPTER I. 57 being in accord with truth." This spirit of self-reliance and self- salvation later became singularly Buddhistic. Even when Buddha was still merely an enthusiastic aspirant for Nirvana, he seems to have been strongly possessed of this spirit, for he most emphatically declared the following famous passage, in response to the pathetic persuation of his father's ministers, who wanted him to come home with them : "The doubt whether there exists anything or not, is not to be settled for me by another's words. Arriving at the truth either by mortification or by tranquilisation, I will grasp myself whatever is ascertainable about it. It is not mine to receive a view which is full of conflicts, uncertainties, and contradictions. What enlightened men would go by other's faith? The multitudes are like the blind led in the darkness by the blind." * To say simply, "Love your enemy," was not satis factory to the Hindu mind, it wanted to see the reason why. And as soon as the people were convinced intellectually, they went even so far as to defend the. faith with their lives. It was not an uncommon event that before a party of Hindu philosophers entered into a discussion they made an agreement that the penalty of defeats should be the sacrifice of the life. They were, above all, a people of intellect, though of course not lacking in religious sentiment. It is no wonder, then, that Buddha did not make the first proclamation of his message by "Repent, for ' The Buddhacarita, Book IX, 63 -64. 58 CHAPTER 1. the kingdom of heaven is at hand," but by the estab lishment of the Four Noble Truths. * One appeals to the feeling, and the other to the intellect. That which appeals to the intellect naturally seems to be less passionate, but the truth is, feeling without the support of intellect leads to fanaticism and is always ready to yield itself to bigotry and superstition. The doctrine of Nirvana is doubtless more intellec tual than the Christian gospel of love. It first recog nises the wretchedness of human life as is proved by our daily experiences ; it then finds its cause in our subjective ignorance as to the true meaning of exis tence, and in our egocentric desires which, obscuring our spiritual insight, make us tenaciously cling to things chimerical ; it then proposes the complete annihilation of egoism, the root of all evil, by which, subjectively, tranquillity of heart is restored, and, objectively, the realisation of universal love becomes possible. Buddhism, thus, proceeds most logically in the development of its doctrine of Nirvana and uni versal love. Says Victor Hugo (Les Miserables, vol. II): "The reduction of the universe to a single being, the ex pansion of a single being even to God, this is love." When a man clings to the self and does not want 1 According to one Northern Buddhist tradition, Buddha is recorded to have exclaimed at the time of his supreme spir itual beatitude : "Wonderful ! All sentient beings are univer sally endowed with the intelligence and virtue of the Tathagata !" CHAPTER I. 59 to identify himself with other fellow-selves, he cannot expand his being to God. When he shuts himself in the , narrow shell of ego and keeps all the world outside, he cannot reduce the universe to his innermost self. To love, therefore, one must first enter Nirvana. The truth is everywhere the same and is attained through the removal of ignorance. But as individual disposition differs according to the previous karma, some are more prone to intellectualism, while the others to sentimentality (in its psychological sense). Let us then follow our own inclination conscientiously and not . speak evil of others. This is called the Doctrine of Middle Path. CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL CHARACTERISATION OF MAHAYANISM T T 7E are now in a position to enter into a specific * " exposition of the Mahayana doctrine. But, before doing so, it will be well for us first to consider the views that were held by the Hindu Buddhist thinkers concerning its characteristic features ; in other words, to make an historical survey of its peculiarities. As stated in the Introduction, the term Mahayana was invented in the times of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva (about the third or fourth century after Christ), when doctrinal struggles between the (Jiravaka and the Bo dhisattva classes reached a climax. The progressive Hindu Buddhists, desiring to announce the essential features of their doctrine, did so naturally at the expense of their rival and by pointing out why theirs was greater than, or superior to, Hinayanism. Their views were thus necessarily vitiated by a partisan spirit, and instead of impartially and critically enume rating the principal characteristics of Mahayanism, they placed rather too much stress upon those points that do not in these latter days appear to be very essential, but that were then considered by them to be of paramount importance. These points, never- CHAPTER II. 6 1 theless, throw some light on the nature of Mahayana Buddhism as historically distinguished from its consan guineous rival and fellow-doctrine. Sthiramati's Conception of Mahayanism. Sthiramati1 in his Indroduction to Mahayanism states that Mahayanism is a special doctrine for the Bodhisattvas, who are to be distinguished from the other two classes, viz, the Cjavakas and the Pratyeka- buddhas. The essential difference of the doctrine consists in the belief that objects of the senses are merely phenomenal and have no absolute reality, that the indestructible Dharmakaya which is all-per vading constitutes the norm of existence, that all Bodhisattvas 2 are incarnations of the Dharmakaya, who not by their evil karma previously accumulated, but by their boundless love for all mankind, assume 1 His date is not known, but judging from the contents of his works, of which we have at present two or three among the Chinese Tripitaka, it seems that he lived later than Acvaghosa, but prior to, or simultaneously with, Nagarjuna. This little book occupies a very important position in the development of Mahayanism in India. Next to Acvaghosa's Awakening of Faith, the work must be carefully studied by scholars who want to grasp every phase of the history of Mahayana school as far as it can be learned through the Chinese documents. 1 Be it remarked here that a Bodhisattva is not a particu larly favored man in the sense of chosen people or elect. We are all in a way Bodhisattvas, that is, when we recognise the truth that we are equally in possession of the Samyak- sambodhi, Highest True Intelligence, and through which every body without exception can attain final enlightenment. 62 CHAPTER II. corporeal existences, and that persons who thus ap pear in the flesh, as avatars of the Buddha supreme, associate themselves with the masses in all possible social relations, in order that they might thus lead them to a state of enlightenment. While this is a very summary statement of the Mahayana doctrine, a more elaborate and extended enumeration of its peculiar features in contradistinc tion to those of Hinayanism, is made in the Miscel lanea on Mahayana Metaphysics, ' The Spiritual Stages of the Yogdcdra, 2 An Exposition of the Holy Doctrine, 3 A Comprehensive Treatise on Mahaya nism, 4 and others. Let us first explain the "Seven General Characteristics" as described in the first three works here mentioned. Seven Principal Features of Mahayanism. According to Asanga, who lived a little later than Nagarjuna, that is, at the time when_Mahayanism was further divided into the Yogacarya and the Madhya- mika school, the seven features peculiar to Mahayanism as distinguished from Hinayanism, are as follows: (i) Its Comprehensiveness. Mahayanism does not confine itself to the teachings of one Buddha alone; 1 Mahayana-dbhidharma-sangiti-rastra, by Asanga. Nanjo, No. 1 1 99. 2 Yogacarya-bhumi-fastra, Nanjo, No. n7o. The work is sup posed to have been dictated to Asanga by a mythical Bo dhisattva. 3 By Asanga. Nanjo, 11 77. 4 Mahdydna-samparigraha-fdslra, by Asanga. Nanjo, 1183. CHAPTER II. 63 but wherever and whenever truth is found, even under the disguise of most absurd superstitions, it makes no hesitation to winnow the grain from the husk and assimilate it in its own system. Innumerable good laws taught by Buddhas * of all ages and localities are all taken up in the coherent body of Mahayanism. (2) Universal love for All Sentient Beings. Hinaya nism confines itself to the salvation of individuals only ; it does not extend its bliss universally, as each person must achieve his own deliverance. Mahayanism, on the other hand, aims at general salvation; it endeavors to save us not only individually, but univer sally. All the motives, efforts, and actions of the Bodhisattvas pivot on the furtherance of universal welfare. (3) Its Greatness in Intellectual Comprehension. Mahayanism maintains the theory of non-atman not only in regard to sentient beings but in regard to things in general. While it denies the hypothesis of a metaphysical agent directing our mental operations, it also rejects the view that insists on the noumenal or thingish reality of existences as they appear to our senses. (4) Its Marvelous Spiritual Energy. The Bodhisattvas never become tired of working for universal salvation, 1 Perceiving an incarnation of the Dharmakaya in every spiritual leader regardless of his nationality and professed creed, Mahayanists recognise a Buddha in Socrates, Moham med, Jesus, Francis of Assisi, Confucius, Laotze, and many others. 64 CHAPTER II. nor do they despair because of the long time required to accomplish this momentous object. To try to attain enlightenment in the shortest possible period and to be self-sufficient without paying any attention to the welfare of the masses, is not the teaching of Mahayanism. (5) Its Greatness in the Exercise of the Updya. The term updya literally means expediency. The great fatherly sympathetic heart of the Bodhisattva has inexhaustible resources at his command in order that he might lead the masses to final enlightenment, each according to his disposition and environment. Mahayanism does not ask its followers to escape the metempsychosis of birth and death for the sake of entering into the lethargic tranquillity of Nirvana; for metempsychosis in itself is no evil, and Nirvana in its coma is not productive of any good. And as long as there are souls groaning in pain, the Bodhi sattva cannot rest in Nirvana; there is no rest for his unselfish heart, so full of love and sympathy, until he leads all his fellow-beings to the eternal bliss of Buddhahood. To reach this end he employs innume rable means (upaya) suggested by his disinterested lovingkindness. (6) Its Higher Spiritual Attainment. In Hinayanism the highest bliss attainable does not go beyond Arhatship which is ascetic saintliness. But the followers of Mahayanism attain even to Buddhahood with all its spiritual powers. (7) lis Greater Activity. When the Bodhisattva CHAPTER II. 65 reaches the stage of Buddhahood, he is able to manifest himself everywhere in the ten quarters of the universe ' and to minister to the spiritual needs of all sentient beings. These seven peculiarities are enumerated to be the reasons why the doctrine defended by the pro gressive Buddhists is to be called Mahayanism, or the doctrine of great vehicle, in contradistinction to Hinayanism, the doctrine of small vehicle. In each case, therefore, Asanga takes pains to draw the line of demarcation distinctly between the two schools of Buddhism and not between Buddhism and all other religious doctrines which existed at his time. The Ten Essential Features of Buddhism. The following statement of the ten essential fea tures of Mahayanism as presented in the Comprehen sive Treatise on Mahayanism, is made from a diffe rent standpoint from the preceding one, for it is the pronunciamento of the Yogacara school of Asanga 1 Ancient Hindu Buddhists, with their fellow-philosophers, believed in the existence of spiritually transfigured beings, who, not hampered by the limitations of space and time, can manifest themselves everywhere for the benefit of all sentient beings. We notice some mysterious figures in almost all Mahayana sutras, who are very often described as shedding innumerable rays of light from the forehead and illuminating all the three thousand worlds simultaneously. This may merely be a poetic exaggeration. But this Sambhogakaya or Body of Bliss (see Acvaghosa's Awakening of Faith, p. 101) is very difficult for us to comprehend as it is literally described. For a fuller treatment see the chapter on "Trikaya." 5 66 CHAPTER II. and Vasubandhu rather than that of Mahayanism generally. This school together with the Madhyamika school of Nagarjuna constitute the two divisions of Hindu Mahayanism. * The points enumerated by Asanga and Vasubandhu as most essential in their system are ten. (i) It teaches an immanent existence of all things in the Alayavijnana or All-Conserving Soul. The conception of an All-Conserving Soul, it is claimed, was suggested by Buddha in the so-called Hinayana sutras; but on account of its deep meaning and of the liability of its being confounded with the ego-soul conception, he did not disclose its full significance in their sutras; but made it known only in the Mahayana sutras. According to the Yogacara school, the Alaya is not an universal, but an individual mind or soul, whatever we may term it, in which the "germs" of all things exist in their ideality. 2 The objective world in reality does not exist, but by dint of sub- ' Though I am very much tempted to digress and to enter into a specific treatment concerning these two Hindu Maha yana doctrines, I reluctantly refrain from so doing, as it requires a somewhat lengthy treatment and does not entirely fall within the scope of the present work. 2 That Acvaghosa's conception of the Alaya varies with the view here presented may be familiar to readers of his Awak ening of Faith. This is one of the most abstruse problems in the philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism, and there are several divergent theories concerning its nature, attributes, activities, etc. In a work like this, it is impossibje to give even a general statement of those controversies, however CHAPTER II. £9 jective illusion that is created by ignorance, we pro ject all these "germs" in the Alayavijnana to the outside world, and imagine that they are there really as they are ; while the Manovijfiana (ego-consciousness) which is too a product of illusion, tenaciously clin ging to the Alayavijnana as the real self, never aban dons its egoism. The Alayavijnana, however, is indif ferent to, and irresponsible for, all these errors on the part of the Manovijfiana. ' (2) The Yogacara school distinguishes three kinds of knowledge: 1. Illusion (parikalpita), 2. Discrimi native or Relative Knowledge (paralantra), and 3. Perfect Knowledge (farinispanna). The distinction may best be illustrated by the well- known analogy of a rope and a snake. Deceived by a similarity in appearance, men frequently take a rope lying on the ground for a poisonous snake and interesting they may be to students of the history of intellec tual development in India. The Alayavijnana, to use the phraseology of Samkhya phi losophy, is a composition, so to speak, of the Soul (purusa) and Primordial Matter (prakrti). It is the Soul, so far as it is neutral and indifferent to all those phenomenal manifesta tions, that are going on within as well as without us. It is Primordial Matter, inasmuch asit is the reservoir of everything, whose lid being lifted by the hands of Ignorance, there in stantly springs up this universe of limitation and relativity. Enlightenment or Nirvana, therefore, consists in recognising the error of Ignorance and not in clinging to the products of imagination. ' For a more detailed explanation of the ideal philosophy of the Yogacara, see my article on the subject in Le Musion, 1905. 66 CHAPTER II. are terribly shocked on that account. But when they approach and carefully examine it, they become at once convinced of the groundlessness of this apprehen sion, which was the natural sequence of illusion. This may be considered to correspond to what Kant calls Schein. Most people, however, do not go any further in their inquiry. They are contented with the sensual, empirical knowledge of an object with which they come in contact. When they understand that the thing they mistook for a snake was really nothing but a yard of innocent rope, they think their knowl edge of the object is complete, and do not trouble themselves with a philosophical investigation as to whether the rope which to them is just what it appears to be; has any real existence in itself. They do not stop a moment to reflect that their knowledge is merely relative, for it does not go beyond the phenomenal significance of the things they perceive. But is an object in reality such as it appears to be to our senses? Are particular phenomena as such really actual? What is the value of our knowledge concerning those so-called realities? When we make an investigation into such problems as these, the Yogacara school says, we find that their existence is only relative and has no absolute value whatever independent of the perceiving subject. They are the "ejection" of our ideas into the outside world, which are centred and conserved in our Alayavijnana and which are awakened into activity by subjective CHAPTER II. 69 ignorance. This clear insight into the nature of things, i.e., into their non-realness as atman, constitutes perfect knowledge. (3) When we attain to the perfect knowledge, we recognise the ideality of the universe. There is no such thing as an objective world, which is really an illusive manifestation of the mind called Alayavijnana, But even this supposedly real existence of the Alayavijnana is a product of particularisation called forth by the ignorant Manovijfiana. The Manovijfiana, or empirical ego, as it might be called, having no adequate knowledge as to the true nature of the Alaya, takes the latter for a metaphysical agent, that like the master of a puppet-show manages all mental operations according to its humour. As the silkworm imprisons itself in the cacoon created by itself, the Manovijfiana, entangling itself in ignorance and con fusion, takes its own illusory creations for real realities. (4) For the regulation of moral life, the Yogacara with the other Mahayana schools, proposes the prac tising of the six Paramitas (virtues of perfection), which are: 1. Dana (giving), 2. Cila (moral precept), 3. Ksdnli (meekness), 4. Virya (energy), 5. Dhydna (meditation), 6. Prajnd (knowledge or wisdom). In way of explanation, says Asanga: "By not clinging to wealth or pleasures (1), by not cherishing any thoughts to violate the precepts (2), by not feeling dejected in the face of evils (3), by not awakening any thought of indolence while practising goodness (4), 70 CHAPTER II. by maintaining serenity of mind in the midst of disturbance and confusion of this world (5), and finally by always practising ekacitta * and by truthfully comprehending the nature of things (6), the Bodhisat tvas recognise the truth of vijndnamatra, — the truth that there is nothing that is not of ideal or subjective creation. (5) Mahayanism teaches that there are ten spiritual stages of Bodhisattvahood, viz., 1. Pramudita, 2. Vimala, 3 Prabhakari, 4. Arcismati, 5. Sudurjaya, 6. Abhimukhi, 7. Durangama, 8. Acala, 9. Sadhumati, 10. Dharmame- gha2. By passing through all these stages one after another, we are believed to reach the oneness of Dharmakaya. (6) The Yogacarists claim that the precepts that are practised by the followers of Mahayanism are far superior to those of Hinayanists. The latter tend to externalism and formalism, and do not go deep into our spiritual, subjective motives. Now, there are physical, verbal, and spiritual precepts observed by the Buddha. The Hinayanists observe the first two neglecting the last which is by far more important than the rest. For instance, the Cravaka's interpreta tion of the ten Ciksas 3 is literal and not spiritual; * "One mind" or "one heart" meaning the mental attitude which is in harmony with the monistic view of nature in its broadest sense. 2 These ten stages of spiritual development are somewhat minutely explained below. See Chapter XII. " The ten moral precepts of the Buddha are : (1) Kill no living being ; (2) Take nothing that is not given ; (3) Keep CHAPTER II. 71 further, they follow these precepts because they wish to attain Nirvana for their own sake, and not for others'. The Bodhisattva, on the other hand, does not wish to be bound within the narrow circle of moral restriction. Aiming at an universal emancipation of mankind, he ventures even violating the ten ciksas, if necessary. The first ciksa, for instance, forbids the killing of any living being; but the Bodhisattva does not hesitate to go to war, in case the cause he espous es is right and beneficient to humanity at large. (7) As Mahayanism insists on the purification of the inner life, its teaching applies not to things outward, its principles are not of the ascetic and exclusive kind. The Mahayanists do not shun to commingle themselves with the "dust of worldliness" ; they aim at the realisation of the Bodhi; they are not afraid of being thrown into the whirlpool of metempsychosis; they endeavor to impart spiritual benefits to all sentient beings without regard to their attitude, whether hostile or friendly, towards themselves ; having immovable faith in the Mahayana, they never become contaminated by vanity and worldly pleasures with which they may constantly be in touch ; they have a clear insight into the doc trine of non-atman ; being free from all spiritual faults, they live in perfect accord with the laws of Suchness and discharge their duties without the matrimonial sanctity; (4) Do not lie; (5) Do not slander; (6) Do not insult; (7) Do not chatter; (8) Be not greedy; <9) Bear no malice ; (10) Harbor no scepticism. 72 CHAPTER II. least conceit or self-assertion: in a word, their inner life is a realisation of the Dharmakaya. (&) The intellectual superiority of the Bodhisattva is shown by his possession of knowledge of non-par- ticularisation (andndrtha). ' This knowledge, philoso phically considered, is the knowledge of the absolute, or the knowledge of the universal. The Bodhisattva's mind is free from the dualism of samsara (birth-and- death) and nirvana, of positivism and negativism, of being and non-being, of object and subject, of ego and non-ego. His knowledge, in short, transcends the limits of final realities, soaring high to the realm of the absolute and the abode of non-par- ticurality. (g) In consequence of this intellectual elevation, the Bodhisattva perceives the working of birth and death in nirvana, and nirvana in the transmigration of birth and death. He sees the "ever-changing many" in the "never-changing one," and the "never - 1 Mahayanism recognises two "entrances" through which a comprehensive knowledge of the universe is obtained. One is called the "entrance of sameness" (samata) and the other the "entrance of diversity" (n&ndtva). The first entrance introduces us to the universality of things and suggests a pantheistic interpretation of existence. The second leads us to the particularity of things culminating in monotheism or polytheism, as it is viewed from different standpoints. The Buddhists declare that neither entrance alone can lead us to the sanctum sanctorum of existence ; and in order to obtain a sound, well-balanced knowledge of things in general, we must go through both the entrances of universality and parti cularity. CHAPTER II. 73 changing one" in the "ever-changing many." His inward life is in accord at once with the laws of transitory phenomena and with those of transcenden tal Suchness. According to the former, he does not recoil as ascetics do when he comes in contact with the world of the senses ; he is not afraid of suffering the ills that the flesh is heir to; but, according to the latter, he never clings to things evanescent, his inmost consciousness forever dwells in the serenity of eternal Suchness. (io) The final characteristic to be mentioned as distinctly Mahayanistic is the doctrine of Trikaya. There is, it is asserted, the highest being which is the ultimate cause of the universe and in which all existences find their essential origin and significance. This is called by the Mahayanists Dharmakaya. The Dharmakaya, however, does not remain in its abso luteness, it reveals itself in the realm of cause and effect. It then takes a particular form. It becomes a devil, or a god, or a deva, ot a human being, or an animal of lower grade, adapting itself to the degrees of the intellectual development of the people. For it is the people's inner needs which necessitate the special forms of manifestation. This is called Nirmanakaya, that is, the body of transformation. The Buddha who manifested himself in the person of Gautama, the son of King of Cuddhodana about two thousand five hundred years ago on the Ganges, is a form of Nirmanakaya. The third one is called Sambhogakaya, or body of bliss. This is the spiri- 74 CHAPTER II. tual body of a Buddha, invested with all possible grandeur in form and in possession of all imaginable psychic powers. The conception of Sambhogakaya is full of wild imaginations which are not easy of comprehension by modern minds. ' These characteristics enumerated at seven or ten as peculiarly Mahayanistic are what the Hindu Bud dhist philosophers of the first century down to the fifth or sixth century of the Christian era thought to be the most essential points of their faith and what they thought entitled it to be called the "Great Vehicle" (Mahayana) of salvation, in contradistinction to the faith embraced by their conservative brethren. But, as we view them now, the points here specified are to a great extent saturated with a partisan spirit, and besides they are more or less scattered and unconnected statements of the so-called salient fea tures of Mahayanism. Nor do they furnish much information concerning the nature of Mahayanism as a coherent system of religious teachings. They give but a general and somewhat obscure delineation of it, and that in opposition to Hinayanism. In point of fact, Mahayanism is a school of Buddhism and has many characteristics in common with Hinaya nism. Indeed, the spirit of the former is also that of the latter, and as far as the general trend of Buddhism is concerned there is no need of em- 1 The doctrine ol Trikaya will be given further elucidation in the chapter bearing the same title. CHAPTER II. 75 phasising the significance of one school over the other. On the following pages I shall try to present a more comprehensive and impartial exposition of the Buddhism, which has been persistently designated by its followers as Mahayanism. SPECULATIVE MAHAYANISM. CHAPTER III. PRACTISE AND SPECULATION. A TAHAYANISM perhaps can best be treated in two ¦*-"•* main divisions, as it has distinctly two principal fea tures in its doctrinal development. I may call one the speculative phase of Mahayanism and the other practical. The first part is essentially a sort of Buddhist metaphysics, where the mind is engaged solely in ratiocination and abstraction. Here the intellect plays a very prominent part, and some of the most abstruse problems of philosophy are freely discussed. Speculative followers of Buddhism have taken great interest in the discussion of them and have written many volumes on various subjects. ' 1 No efforts have yet been made systematically to trace the history of the development of the Mahayana thoughts in India as well as in China and Japan. We have enough ma terial at least to follow the general course it has taken, as far as the Chinese and Tibetan collections of Tripitaka are concerned. When a thorough comparison by impartial, un prejudiced scholars of these documents has been made with the Pali and Sanskrit literature, then we shall be able to write a comprehensive history of the human thoughts that CHAPTER III. 77 The second or practical phase of Mahayanism deals with such religious beliefs that constitute the life and essence of the system. Mahayanists might have reasoned wrongfully to explain their practical faith, but the faith itself is the outburst of the religious sentiment which is inherent in human nature. This practical part, therefore, is by far more important, and in fact it can be said that the speculative part is merely a preparatory step toward it. Inasmuch as Mahayanism is a religion and not a philosophical sys tem, it must be practical, that is, it must directly appeal to the inmost life of the human heart. Relation of Feeling and Intellect in Religion. So much has been said about the relation between philosophy and religion ; and there are many scholars who so firmly believe in the identity of religion either with superstitions or with supernatural revela tion, that the denial of this assertion is considered by them practically to be the disavowal of all religions. For, according to them, there is no midway in religion. A religion which is rational and yet practical is no religion. Now, Buddhism is neither a vagary of imagi nation nor a revelation from above, and on this account it has been declared by some to be a philosophy. The title "Speculative Mahayanism" thus, is apt to have governed the Oriental people during the last two thou sand years. When this is done, the result can further be compared with the history of other religious systems, thus throwing much light on the general evolution of humanity 78 CHAPTER III. be taken as a confirmation of such opinion. To remove all the misconceptions, therefore, which might be entertained concerning the religious nature of Mahaya nism and its attitude toward intellectualism, I have deemed it wise here to say a few words about the relation between feeling and intellect in religion. There is no doubt that religion is essentially prac tical; it does not necessarily require theorisation. The latter, properly speaking, is the business of philosophy. If religion was a product of the intellect solely, it could not give satisfaction to the needs of man's whole being. Reason constitutes but a part of the organised totality of an individual being. Abstrac tion however high, and speculation however deep, do not as such satisfy the inmost yearings of the human heart. But this they can do when they enter into one's inner life and constitution ; that is, when abstrac tion becomes a concrete fact and speculation a living principle in one's existence ; in short, when philosophy becomes religion. Philosophy as such, therefore, is generally distin guished from religion. But we must not suppose that religion as the deepest expression of a human being can eliminate altogether from it the intellectual element. The most predominant role in religion may be played by the imagination and feeling, but ratio cination must not fail to assert its legitimate right in the co-ordination of beliefs. When this right is denied, religion becomes fanaticism, superstition, fata morgana, and even a menace to the progress of humanity. CHAPTER III. 79 The intellect is critical, objective, and always tries to stand apart from the things that are taken up for examination. This alienation or keeping itself aloof from concrete facts on the part of the intellect, constantly tends to disregard the real significance of life, of which it is also a manifestation. Therefore, the conflict between feeling and reason, religion and science, instinct and knowledge, has been going on since the awakening of consciousness. Seeing this fact, intellectual people are generally prone to condemn religion as barring the freedom and obstructing the progress of scientific investiga tions. It is true that religion went frequently to the other extreme and tried to suppress the just claim of reason; it is true that this was especially the case with Christianity, whose history abounds with regretable incidents resulting from its violent encroach ments upon the domain of reason. It is also true that the feeling and the intellect are sometimes at variance, that what the feeling esteems as the most valuable treasure is at times relentlessly crushed by the reason, while the feeling looks with utmost con tempt at the results that have been reached by the intellect after much lucubration. But this fatal con flict is no better than the fight which takes place between the head and the tail of a hydra when it is cut in twain ; it always results in self-destruction. We cannot live under such a miserable condition forever; when we know that it is altogether due to a myopia on the part of our understanding. The 80 CHAPTER III. truth is that feeling and reason "cannot do with out one another, and must work together insepa rably in the process of human development, since reason without feeling could have nothing to act for and would be impotent to act, while feeling without reason would act tyrannically and blindly — that is to say, if either could exist and act at all with out the other; for in the end it is not feeling nor reason, which acts, but it is the man who acts ac cording as he feels and reasons". (H. Maudsley's Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings, p. vn). If it is thus admitted that feeling and reason, must co-ordinate and co-operate in the realisation of hu man ideals, religion, though essentially a phenomenon of the emotional life, cannot be indifferent to the significance of the intellect. Indeed, religion, as much as philosophy, has ever been speculating on the pro blems that are of the most vital importance to hu man life. In Christianity speculation has been car ried on under the name of theology, though it claims to be fundamentally a religion of faith. In India, however, as mentioned elsewhere, there was no divi ding line between philosophy and religion ; and every teaching, every system, and every doctrine, however abstract and speculative it might appear to the Western mind, was at bottom religious and always aimed at the deliverance of the soul. There was no philos ophical system that did not have some practical purpose. Indian thinkers could not separate religion from CHAPTER III. 8 1 philosophy, practice from theory. Their philosophy flowed out of the very spring of the human heart and was not a mere display of fine intellectuation. If their thinking were not in the right direction and led to a fallacy which made life more miserable, they were ever ready to surrender themselves to a superior doctrine as soon as it was discovered. But when they thought they were in the right track, they did not hesitate to sacrifice their life for it. Their philosophy had as much fire as religion. Buddhism and Speculation. Owing to this fact, Buddhism as much as Hinduism is full of abstract speculations and philosophical reflec tions so much so that some Christian critics are inclined to deny the religiosity of Buddhism. But no student of the science of comparative religion would indorse such a view nowadays. Buddhism, in spite of its predominant intellectualism, is really a religious system. There is no doubt that it emphasises the ra tional element of religion more than any other religious teachings, but on that account we cannot say that it altogether disregards the importance of the part to be played by the feeling. Its speculative, philoso phical phase is really a preparation for fully appre ciating the subjective significance of religion, for religion is ultimately subjective, that is to say, the essence of religion is love and faith, or, to use Buddhist phraseology, it is the expression of the Bodhi which 82 CHAPTER III. consists in prajna l (intelligence or wisdom) and karuna (love or compassion). Mere knowledge (not prajna) has very little value in human life. When not guided by love and faith, it readily turns out to be the most obedient servant of egoism and sensualism. What Tennyson says in the following verses is perfectly true with Buddhism : "Who loves not knowledge ? Who shall rail Against her beauty? May she mix With men and prosper! Who shall fix Her pillars? Let her work prevail. "But on her forehead sits a fire ; She sets her forward countenance And leaps into the future chance, Submitting all things to desire. "Half grown as yet, a child, and vain — She cannot fight the fear of death. What is she, cut from love and faith, But some wild Pallas from the brain "Of demons ? fiery-hot to burst All barriers in her onward race For power. Let her know her place; She is the second, not the first. "A higher hand must make her mild, If all be not in vain, and guide Her footsteps, moving side by side With Wisdom, like the younger child." 1 Prajna, bodhi, buddhi, vidya and jna or jn&na are all syn onymous and in many cases interchangeable. But they allow a finer discrimination. Speaking in a general way, prajnd is reason, bodhi wisdom or intelligence, buddht enlightenment, vidya ideality or knowledge, and jn& or jn&na intellect. Of these five terms, prajh& and bodhi are essentially Buddhistic CHAPTER III. 83 But it must be remembered that Buddhism never ignores the part which is played by the intellect in the purification of faith. For it is by the judicious exercise of the intellect, that all religious superstitions and prejudices are finally destroyed. The intellect is so far of great consequence, and we must respect it as the thunderbolt of Vajrapani, which crushes everything that is mere sham and false. But at the same time we must also remember that the quintessence of religion like the house built on the solid rock never suffers on account of this destruc tion. Its foundation lies too deeply buried in human and have acquired technical meaning. In this work both prajna and bodhi are mostly translated by intelligence, for their extent of meaning closely overlaps each other. But this is rather vague, and wherever I thought the term intel ligence alone to be misleading, I either left the originals un translated, or inserted them in parentheses. To be more exact, prajnd in many cases can safely be rendered by faith, not a belief in revealed truths, but a sort of immediate knowledge gained by intuitive intelligence. Prajna corres ponds in some respects to wisdom, meaning the foundation of all reasonings and experiences. It may also be considered an equivalent for Greek sophia. Bodhi, on the other hand, has a decidedly religious and moral significance. Besides being prajna itself, it is also love (karuna) : for, according to Buddhism, these two, prajna and karuna, constitute the essence of Bodhi. May Bodhi be considered in some respects synonymous with the divine wisdom as understood by Chris tian dogmatists ? But there is something in the Buddhist notion of Bodhi that cannot properly be expressed by wisdom or intelligence. This seems to be due to the difference of philosophical interpretation by Buddhists and Christians of the conception of God. It will become clearer as we proceed farther. 84 CHAPTER III. heart to be damaged by knowledge or science. So long as there is a human heart warm with blood and burning with the fire of life, the intellect however powerful will never be able to trample it underfoot Indeed, the more severely the religious sentiment is tested in the crucible of the intellect, the more glo rious and illuminating becomes its intrinsic virtue. The true religion is, therefore, never reluctant to appear before the tribunal of scientific investigation. In fact by ignoring the ultimate significance of the religious consciousness, science is digging its own grave. For what purpose has science other than the unravelling of the mysteries of nature and reading into the meaning of existence? And is this not what consti tutes the foundation of religion? Science cannot be final, it must find its reason in religion; as a mere intellectual exercise it is not worthy of our serious consideration. Religion and Metaphysics. The French sociologist, M. Guyau, says in his Irreligion of the Future (English translation p. 10) : "Every positive and historical religion presents three distinctive and essential elements: (i) An at tempt at a mythical and non-scientific explanation of natural phenomena (divine intervention, miracles, efficacious prayers, etc.), or of historical facts (incar nation of Jesus Christ or of Buddha, revelation, and so forth); (2) A system of dogmas, that is to say, of symbolic ideas, of imaginative beliefs, forcibly CHAPTER III. 85 imposed upon one's faith as absolute verities, even though they are susceptible of no scientific demon stration or philosophical justification; (3) A cult and a system of rites, that is to say, of more or less immutable practices regarded as possessing a mar velous efficacy upon the course of things, a propi tiatory virtue. A religion without myth, without dogma, without cult, without rite, is no more than that somewhat bastard product, 'natural religion,' which is resolvable to a system of metaphysical hypotheses." M. Guyau seems to think that what will be left in religion, when severed from its superstitions and imaginary beliefs and mysterious rites, is a system of metaphysical speculations, and that, therefore, it is not a religion. But in my opinion the French so ciologist shares the error that is very prevalent among the scientific men of to-day. He is perfectly right in trying to strip religion of all its ephemeral elements and external integuments, but he is entirely wrong when he does this at the expense of its very essence, which consists of the inmost yearings of the human heart. And this essence has no affinity with the superstitions which grow round it like excrescences as the results of insufficient or abnormal nourishment. Nor does it concern itself with mere philosophising and constructing hypotheses about metaphysical problems. Far from it. Religion is a cry from the abysmal depths of the human heart, that can never be silenced, until it finds that something and identifies itself with it, which reveals the teleo- 86 CHAPTER III. logical significance of life and the universe. But this something has a subjective value only, as Goethe makes Faust exclaim, "Feeling is all in all, name for it I have none." Why? Because it cannot objec tively or intellectually be demonstrated, as in the case with those laws which govern phenomenal exis tences, — the proper objects of the discursive human understanding. And this subjectivity of religion is what makes "all righteousnesses as filthy garments." If religion deprived of its dogmas and cults is to be considered, as M. Guyau thinks, nothing but a system of metaphysics, we utterly lose sight of its subjective significance or its emotional element, which indeed constitutes its raison d'etre. * * * Having this in view we proceed to see first on what metaphysical hypothesis speculative Mahayana Buddhism is built up ; but the reader must remember that this phase of Mahayanism is merely a preliminary to its more essential part, which we expound later under the heading of "Practical Mahayanism," in contradistinction to "Speculative Mahayanism." CHAPTER IV. CLASSIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE Three Forms of Knowledge. A l\ AHAyANISM generally distinguishes two or three forms of knowledge. This classification is a sort of epistemology, inasmuch as it proposes to ascertain the extent and nature of human knowledge, from a re ligious point of view. Its object is to see what kind of human knowledge is most reliable and valuable for the annihilation of ignorance and the attainment of enlight enment. The Mahayana school which has given most attention to this division of Buddhist philosophy is the Yogacara of Asanga and Vasubandhu. The Lan- kdvatara and the Sandhinirmocana and some other Sutras, on which the school claims to have its doctrinal foundation, teach three forms of knowledge. The sutra literature, however, as a rule does not enter into any detailed exposition of the subject ; it merely classifies knowledge and points out what form of knowledge is most desirable by the Buddhists. To obtain a fuller and more discursive elucidation, we must come to the Abhidharma Pitaka of that school. Of the text books most generally studied of the 88 CHAPTER IV. Yogacara, we may mention Vasubandhu's Vijnctnamatra with its commentaries and Asanga's Comprehensive Treatise on Mahayanism The following statements are abstracted mainly from these documents. The three forms of knowledge as classified by the Yogacara are : (i) Illusion (parikalpita), (2) Relative Knowledge (paratantra), and (3) Absolute Knowledge (parinispanna). Illusion. Illusion (parikalpita), to use Kantian phraseology, is a sense-perception not co-ordinated by the categories of the understanding; that is to say, it is a purely subjective elaboration, not verified by objective reality and critical judgment. So long as we make no practical application of it, it will harbor no danger; there is no evil in it, at least religiously. Perceptual illusion is a psychical fact, and as such it is justified. A straight rod in water appears crooked on account of the refraction of light ; a sensation is often felt in the limb after it has been amputated, for the nervous system has not yet adjusted itself to the new condition. They are all illusions, however. They are doubtless the correct interpretation of the sense-impressions in question, but they are not confirmed by other sense-impressions whose coordination is necessary to establish an objective reality. The moral involved in this is : all sound inferences and correct behavior must be based on critical knowledge and not on illusory premises. CHAPTER IV. 89 Reasoning in this wise, the Mahayanists declare that the egoism fostered by vulgar minds belongs to this class of knowledge, though of a different order, and that those who tenaciously cling to egoism as their final stronghold are believers in an intellectual fata morgana, and are like the thirsty deer that madly after the visionary water in the desert, or like the crafty monkey that tries to catch the lunar reflection in the water. Because the belief in the existence of a metaphysical agent behind our mental phenomena is not confirmed by experience and sound judgment, it being merely a product of unenlightened subjectivity. Besides this ethical and philosophical egoism, all forms of world-conception which is founded on the sandy basis of subjective illusion, such as fetichism, idolatry, anthropomorphism, anthropopsychism, and the like, must be classed under the parikalpita-laksana as doctrines having illusionary premises. Relative Knowledge. Next comes the paratantra-laksana , a welt-an- schauung based upon relative knowledge, or better, upon the knowledge of the law of relativity. Accord ing to this view, everything in the world has a relative and conditional existence, and nothing can claim an absolute reality free from all limitations. This closely corresponds to the theory advanced by most of modern scientists, whose agnosticism denies our intellectual capability of transcending the law of relativity. 90 CHAPTER IV. The paratantra-laksana, therefore, consists in the knowledge derived from our daily intercourse with the outward world. It deals with the highest ab stractions we can make out of our sensuous expe riences. It is positivistic in its strictest sense. It says : The universe has only a relative existence, and our knowledge is necessarily limited. Even the highest generalisation cannot go beyond the law of relativity. It is impossible for us to know the first cause and the ultimate end of existence; nor have we any need to go thus beyond the sphere of existence, which would inevitably involve us in the maze of mystic imagination. The paratantra-laksana, therefore, is a positivism, agnosticism, or empiricism in its spirit. Though the Yogacara Buddhists do not use all these modern phi losophical terms, the interpretation here given is really what they intended to mean by the second form of knowledge. A world-conception based on this view, it is declared by the Mahayanists, is sound as far as our perceptual knowledge is concerned ; but it does not exhaust the entire field of human experi ence, for it does not take into account our spiritual life and our inmost consciousness. There is some thing in the human heart that refuses to be satisfied with merely systematising under the so-called laws of nature those multitudinous impressions which we receive from the outside world. There is a singular feeling, or sentiment, or yearning, whatever we may call it, in our inmost heart, which defies any plainer CHAPTER IV. 91 description than a mere suggestion or an indirect statement. This somewhat mystic consciousness seems despite its obscureness to contain the meaning of our existence as well as that of the universe. The intellect may try to persuade us with all its subtle reasonings to subdue this disquieting feeling and to remain contented with the systematising of natural laws, so called. But it is deceiving itself by so doing ; because the intellect is but a servant to the heart, and so far as it is not forced to self-contradiction, it must accommodate itself to the needs of the heart. That is to say, we must transcend the narrow limits- of conditionality and see what indispensable postulates are underlying our life and experiences. The recog nition of these indispensable postulates of life con stitutes the Yogacara's third form of knowledge called parinispanna-laksana. Absolute Knowledge. Parinispanna-laksana literally means the world- view founded on the most perfect knowledge. Ac cording to this view, the universe is a monistico- pantheistic system. While phenomenal existences are regulated by natural laws characterised by condi tionality and individuation, they by no means exhaust all our experiences which are stored in our inmost consciousness. There must be something, — this is the absolute demand of humanity, the ultimate postu late of experience, — be it Will, or Intelligence, which, underlying and animating all existences, forms 92 CHAPTER IV. the basis of cosmic, ethical, and religious life. This highest Will, or Intelligence, or both may be term ed God, but the Mahayanists call it religiously Dhar makaya, ontologically Bhutatathata, and psycholog ically Bodhi or Sambodhi. And they think it must be immanent in the universe manifesting itself in all places and times; it must be the cause of per petual creation ; it must be the principle of morality. This being so, how do we come to the recognition of its presence? The Buddhists say that when our minds are clear of illusions, prejudices, and egotistic assumptions, they become transparent and reflect the truth like a dust-free mirror. The illumination thus gained in our consciousness constitutes the so-called parinispanna, the most perfect knowledge, that leads to Nirvana, final salvation, and eternal bliss. World-views Founded on the Three Froms of Knowledge. The reason will be obvious to the reader why the Yogacara school distinguishes three class es of world-conception founded on the three kinds of knowledge. The parikalpita-laksana is most primitive and most puerile. However, in these days of enlightenment, what is believed by the masses is naught else than a parikalpita conception of the world. The material existence as it appears to our senses is to them all in all. They seem to be unable to shake off the yoke of egoistic illusion and naive realism. Their God must be transcendent and anthro- CHAPTER IV. 93 popathic, and always willing to meddle with worldly affairs as his whim pleases. How different the world is, in which the multitudes of unreflecting minds are living, from that which is conceived by Buddhas and Bodhisattvas! Hartmann, a German thinker, is right, when he says that the masses are at least a century behind in their intellectual culture. But the most strange thing in the world is that, in spite of all their ignorance and superstitious beliefs, the waves of universal transformation are ever carrying them onward to a destination, of which, perhaps, they have not the slightest suspicion. The paratantra-laksana advances a step further, but the fundamental error involved in it is its persis tent self-contradictory disregard for what our inmost consciousness is constantly revealing to us. The intellect alone can by no means unravel the mystery of our entire existence. In order to reach the highest truth, we must boldly plunge with our whole being into a region where absolute darkness defying the light of intellect is supposed to prevail. This region which is no more nor less than the field of religious conscious ness is shunned by most of the intellectual people on the plea that the intellect by its very nature is unable to fathom it. But the only way that leads us to the final pacification of the heart-yearnings is to go beyond the horizons of limiting reason and to resort to the faith that has been planted in the heart as the sine qua non of its own existence and vitality. And by faith I mean Prajna (wisdom), transcendental 94 CHAPTER IV. knowledge, that comes direct from the intelligence- essence of the Dharmakaya. A mind, so tired in vainly searching after truth and bliss in the verbiage of philosophy and the nonsense of ritualism, finds itself here completely rested bathing in the rays of divine effulgence, — whence this is, it does not question, being so filled with supramundane blessings which alone are felt. Buddhism calls this exalted spiritual state Nirvana or Moksa; and parinispanna- laksana is a world-conception which naturally follows from this subjective, ideal enlightenment.1 Two Forms of Knowledge. The other Hindu Mahayanism, the Madhyamika school of Nagarjuna, distinguishes two, instead of three, orders of knowledge, but practically the Yogacara and the Madhyamika come to the same conclusion. 2 1 For detailed exposition of the three forms of knowledge, the reader is requested to peruse Asanga's Comprehensive Treatise on Mahayanism (Nanjo's Catalogue, No. 1183), Vasu bandhu's work on Mahayana idealism ( Vijnanamatra Casira, Nanjo, No. 1215), the Sutra on Ike Mystery of Deliverance (Sandhinirmocana-sutra, Nanjo. Nos. 246 aud 247), etc 2 When the eminent representatives of both parties, such as Dharmapala and Bhavaviveka, were at the height of their literary activity in India about the fifth or sixth century after Christ, their partisan spirit incited them bitterly to denounce each other, forgetting the common ground on which their principles were laid down. Their disagreement in fact on which they put an undue emphasis was of a very trifling nature. It was merely a quarrel over phraseology, for one insisted on using certain words just in the sense which the other negated. CHAPTER IV. 95 The two kinds of knowledge or truth distinguished by the Madhyamika philosophy are Samvrtti-satya and Paramdrtha-satya, that is, conditional truth and transcendental truth. We readin NagarjunaT Madhyamika "fSsWjr1 (Buddhist Text Society edition, pp. 180, 181) : "On two truths is founded The holy doctrine of Buddhas: Truth conditional, And truth transcendental. "Those who verily know not The distinction of the two truths. Know not the essence Of Buddhism which is meaningful." The conditional truth includes illusion and relative knowledge of the Yogacara school, while the tran scendental truth corresponds to the absolute knowledge. In explaining these two truths, the Madhyamika philosophers have made a constant use of the terms, gunya and agunya, void and not-void, which unfor tunately became a cause of the misunderstanding by Christian scholars of Nagarjuna's transcendental philosophy. Absolute truth is void in its ultimate nature, for it contains nothing concrete or real or individual that makes it an object of particularisation. But this must not be understood, as is done by some superficial critics, in the sense of absolute 1 Dve satye samupacritya buddhanam dhardecana Lokasamvrttisatyan ca satyan ca paramarthatah. Ye ca anayor na jananti vibhagam satyayor dvayoh, Te tatvam na vijananti gambhirabuddhagasane." 96 CHAPTER IV. nothingness. The Madhyamika philosophers make the satya (transcendental truth) empty when contrasted with the realness of phenomenal existences. Because it is not real in the sense a particular being is real; but it is empty since it transcends the prin ciple of individuation. When considered absolutely, it can neither be empty nor not-empty, neither gunya nor agunya, neither asti nor ndsti, neither abhdva nor bhdva, neither real nor unreal. All these terms imply relation and contrast, while the Paramartha Satya is above them, or better, it unifies all con trasts and antitheses in its absolute oneness. There fore, even to designate it at all may lead to the mis understanding of the true nature of the Satya, for naming is particularising. It is not, as such, an object of intellectuation or of demonstrative knowl edge. It underlies everything conditional and pheno menal, and does not permit itself to be a particular object of discrimination. Transcendental Truth and Relative Understanding One may say: If transcendental truth is of such an abstract nature, beyond the reach of the under standing, how can we ever hope to attain it and enjoy its blessings? But Nagarjuna says that it is not absolutely out of the ken of the understanding; it is, on the contrary, through the understanding that we become acquainted with the quarter towards which our spiritual efforts should be directed, only CHAPTER IV. 97 let us not cling to the means by which we grasp the final reality. A finger is needed to point at the mootv, hut- wh^n wphavp recognised fne moon, h3t_j^-j»o-moi^^JxcaibIe ourselves with the finger. The fisherman carries a basket to take the" fish home, but what need has he to worry about the basket when the contents are safely on the table? Only so long as we are not yet aware of the way to enlight enment, let us not ignore the value of relative knowl edge or conditional truth or lokasamvrttisatya as Nagarjuna terms it. "If not by worldly knowledge, The truth is not understood; When the truth is not approached, Nirvana is not attained." ' From this, it is to be infered that Buddhism never discourages the scientific, critical investigation of religious beliefs. For it is one of the functions of science that it should purify the contents of a belief and that it should point out in which direction our final spiritual truth and consolation have to be sought. Science alone which is built on relative knowledge is not able to satisfy all our religious cravings, but it is certainly able to direct us to the path of enlight enment. When this path is at last revealed, we shall know how to avail ourselves of the discovery, as then Prajna (or Sambodhi, or Wisdom) becomes the 1 Vyavaharam anacritya paramartho na decyate, Paramartham anagamya nirvanam na adhigamyata. The Madhyamika, p. 181. 7 98 CHAPTER IV. guide of life. Here we enter into the region of the unknowable. The spiritual facts we experience are not demonstrable, for they are so direct and immediate that the uninitiated are altogether at a loss to get a glimpse of them. CHAPTER V. BHUTATATHATA (SUCHNESS). T7R0M the ontological point of view, Paramartha-satya or Parinispanna (transcendental truth) is called Bhutatathata, which literally means "suchness of exist ence." As Buddhism does not separate being from thought nor thought from being, what is suchness in the objective world, is transcendental truth in the subjective world, and vice versa Bhutatathata, then, is the Godhead of Buddhism , and it marks the con summation of all our mental efforts to reach the highest principle, which unifies all possible contradic tions and spontaneously directs the course of world- events. In short, it is the ultimate postulate of exist ence. Like Paramartha-satya, as above stated, it does not belong to the domain of demonstrative knowledge or sensuous experience ; it is unknowable by the ordinary processes of intellectuation, which the natural sciences use in the formulation of general laws; and it is grasped, declare the Buddhists, only by the minds that are capable of exercising what might be called religious intuition. Acvaghosa argues, in his Awakening of Faith for the indefinability of this first principle. When we say it is cunya or empty, on account of its being indepen- IOO CHAPTER V. dent of all the thinkable qualities, which we attribute to things relative and conditional, people would take it for the nothingness of absolute void But when we define it as a real reality, as it stands above the evanescence of phenomena, they would imagine that there is something individual and existing outside the pale of this universe, which, though as concrete as we ourselves are, lives an eternal life. It is like describing to the blind what an elephant looks like; each one of them gets but a very indistinct and imperfect conception of the huge creature, yet every one of them thinks he has a true and most comprehen sive idea of it. ' Acvaghosa, thus, wishes to eschew all definite statements concerning the ultimate nature of being, but as language is the only mode with which we mortals can express our ideas and communicate them to others, he thinks the best expression that can be given to it is Bhutatathata, i.e., "suchness of existence," or simply, "suchness." Bhutatathata (suchness), thus absolutely viewed, does not fall under the category of being and non-being; and minds which are kept within the narrow circle of contrasts, must be said to be incapable of grasping it as it truly is. Says Nagarjuna in his Castra (Ch. XV.) : "Between thisness (svabh&va) and thatness (parabhdvd), Between being and non-being, Who discriminates, The truth of Buddhism he perceives not." a 1 Cf. The Udana, chapter VI. 1 Svabhavam parabhavanca, bhavancabhavameva ca, Ye pacyanti, na pagyante tatvam hi buddhagasane. Or, CHAPTER V. IOI "To think ' it is ', is eternalism, To think ' it is not ', is nihilism : Being and non-being, The wise cling not to either." ' Again, "The dualism of 'to be ' and ' not to be, ' The dualism of pure and not-pure : Such dualism having abandoned, The wise stand not even in the middle." * To quote, again, from the Awakening of Faith (pp. 58—59): "In its metaphysical origin, Bhutata thata has nothing to do with things defiled, i. e., conditional: it is free from all signs of individuali- sation, such as exist in phenomenal objects : it is independent of an unreal, particularising consciousness." Indefinability. Absolute Suchness from its very nature thus defies all definitions. We cannot even say that it is, for everything that is presupposes that which is not: existence and non-existence are relative terms as much as subject and object, mind and matter, this and that, one and other: one cannot be conceived 1 Astiti gagvatagraho, nastityucchedadarganam : Tasmadastitvanastitve nagriyeta vicaksanah 2 Astiti nastiti ubhe ' pi anta Quddhi aguddhiti ime ' pi anta; Tasmadubhe anta vivarjayitva Madhye ' pi syanam na karoti panditah. 102 CHAPTER V. without the other. "It is not so (na iti) i," therefore, may be the only way our imperfect human tongue can express it. So the Mahayanists generally desig nate absolute Suchness as Qunyata or void. But when this most significant word, cunyata, is to be more fully interpreted, we would say with Acvaghosa that "Suchness is neither that which is existence nor that which is non-existence; neither that which is at once existence and non-existence, nor that which is not at once existence and non existence; it is neither that which is unity nor that which is plurality; neither that which is at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity and plurality." 2 1 This is the famous phrase in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad occurring in several places (II, 3, 6 ; III, 9, 26 ; IV, 2, 4 ; IV, 4, 22 ; IV, 5, 5). The Atman or Brahman, it says, "is to be described by No, No ! He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended ; he is imperishable, for he cannot perish; he is unattached, for he does not attach himself; unfettered, he does not suffer, he does not fail. Him (who knows), these two do not overcome, whether he says that for some reason he has done evil, or for some reason he has done good— he overcomes both, and neither what he has done, nor what he has omitted to do, affects him." . 4 The Awakening of Faith, p. 59. Cf. this with the utterances of Dionysius the Areopagite, as quoted by Prof. W.James in his Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 416— 4i7: "The cause of all things is neither soul nor intellect; nor has it imagination, opinion, or reason, or intelligence; nor is it spoken or thought. It is neither number, nor order, nor magnitude, nor littleness, nor equality, nor inequality, nor similarity, nor. dissimilarity. It neither stands, nor moves, nor rests It is neither essence, nor eternity, nor time. CHAPTER V. 103 Nagarjana's famous doctrine of "The Middle Path of Eight No's" breathes the same spirit, which declares: "There is no death, no birth, no destruction, no persistence, No oneness, no manyness, no coming, no departing, ' Elsewhere, he expresses the same idea in a some what paradoxical manner, making the historical Buddha a real concrete manifestation of Suchness : "After his passing, deem not thus : ' The Buddha still is here, ' , He is above all contrasts, To be and not to be. "While living, deem not thus : ' The Buddha is now here. ' He is above all contrasts, To be and not to be." * This view of Suchness as no-ness abounds in the literature of the Dhyana school of Mahayanism. To cite one instance : When Bodhi-Dharma 3, the founder Even intellectual contact does not belong to it. It is neither science nor truth. It is not even royalty nor wisdom ; not one ; not unity ; not divinity or goodness ; nor even spirit as we know it.". . . . ad libitum. 1 Anirodham anutpadam anucchedam agagvatam, Anekartham ananartham anagamam anirgamam. (Madhyamika C&stra, first stanza.) 0 Param nirodhadbhagavan bhavatityeva nohyate, Na bhavatyubhayam ceti nobhayam ceti nohyate : Atisthamano ' pi bhagavan bhavatityeva nohyate, Na bhavatyubhayam ceti nobhayam ceti nohyate. (Madhyamika, p. 199). "He was the third son of king of Kagi(?) in southern India. He came to China A. D. 527 and after a vain attempt to con vert Emperor Wu to his own view, he retired to a monastery, where, it is reported, he spent all day in gazing at the wall IC4 CHAPTER VT of the Dhyana sect, saw Emperor Wu of Liang dynasty (A D. 502 — 556), he was asked what the first principle of the Holy Doctrine was, he did not give any lengthy, periphrastic statement after the manner of a philosopher, but laconically replied, "Vast emptiness and nothing holy." The Emperor was bewildered and did not know how to take the words of his holy adviser. Naturally, he did not expect such an abrupt answer, and, being greatly disappointed, ventured another question: "Who is he, then, that stands before me?" By this he meant to repudiate the doctrine of absolute Such ness. His line of argument being this : If there is nothing in the ultimate nature of things that distin guishes between holiness and sinfulness, why this world of contrasts, where some are revered as holy, for instance, Bodhi-Dharma who is at this very moment standing in front of him with the mission of propagating the holy teachings of Buddha ? Bodhi- Dharma, however, was a mystic and was fully con vinced of the insufficiency of the human tongue to express the highest truth which is revealed only without making any further venture to propagate his mysticism. But finally he found a most devoted disciple in the person of Shen Kuang, who was once a Confucian, and through whom the Dhyana school became one of the most powerful Mahayana sect in China as well as in Japan. Dharma died in the year 535. Besides the one here mentioned, he had another audience with the Emperor. At that time, the Emperor said to Dharma: "I have dedicated so many monasteries, copied so many sacred books, and converted so many bhiksus and bhiksunis : what do you think my merits are or ought to be?" To this, however, Dharma replied curtly, "No merit whatever." CHAPTER V. 105 intuitively to the religious consciousness. His con clusive answer was, "I do not know" 1 This "I do not know" is not to be understood in the spirit of agnosticism, but in the sense of "God when understood is no God," for in se est et per se conceptur. This way of describing Suchness by negative terms only, excluding all differences of name and form (ndmarupa) to reach a higher kind of affirmation, seems to be the most appropriate one, inasmuch as the human understanding is limited in so many respects ; but, nevertheless, it has caused much misinterpretation even among Buddhists them selves, not to mention those Christian Buddhist schol ars of to-day, who sometimes appear almost wilfully to misconstrue the significance of the cunyata philo sophy. It was to avoid these unfortunate misinter pretations that the Mahayanists frequently made the paradoxical assertion that absolute Suchness is empty and not empty, cunya and agunya, being and non-being, sat and asat, one and many, this and that. The "Thundrous Silence." There yet remains another mode of explaining absolute Suchness, which though most practical and most effective for the religiously disposed minds, may prove very inadequate to a sceptical intellect. 1 Another interesting utterance by a Chinese Buddhist, who, earnestly pondering over the absoluteness of Suchness for several years, understood it one day all of a sudden, is: "The very instant you say it is something (or a nothing), you miss the mark." IC»6 CHAPTER V. It is the "thundrous silence" of Vimalakirti in response to an inquiry concerning the nature of Sudaaess or the "Dharma of Non-duality,, " -as it is termed in the Sutra * Bodhisattva Vimalakirti once asked a host of Bodhi sattvas led by Manjucri, who came to visit him, to express their views as to how to enter into the Dharma of Non-duality. Some replied, "Birth and death are two, but the Dharma itself was never born and will never die. Those who understand this are said to enter into the Dharma of Non-duality." Some said, " T and 'mine' are two. Because I think 'I am' there are things called 'mine.' But as there is no 'I am' where shall we look for things 'mine'? By thus reflecting we enter into the Dharma of Non- duality." Some replied, "Samsara and Nirvana are two. But when we understand the ultimate nature of Samsara, Samsara vanishes from our consciousness, and there is neither bondage nor release, neither birth nor death. By thus reflecting we enter into the Dharma of Non-duality " Others said, "Ignorance and enlightenment are two. No ignorance, no enlight enment, and there is no dualism. Why? Because those who have entered a meditation in which there is no sense-impression, no cogitation, are free from ignorance as well as from enlightenment. This holds true with all the other dualistic categories. Those who enter thus into the thought of sameness are * The Vimalakirti Sutra, Kumarajiva's translation, Part II, Chapter 5. CHAPTER V. 107 said to enter into the Dharma of Non-duality." Still others answered, "To long for Nirvana and to shun worldliness are of dualism. Long not for Nirvana, shun not worldliness, and we are free from dualism. Why ? Because bondage and release are relative terms, and when there is no bondage from the beginning, who wishes to be released ? No bondage, no release, and therefore no longing, no shunning: this is called the entering into the Dharma of Non-duality." Many more answers of similar nature came forth from all the Bodhisattvas in the assembly except the leader Manjucri. Vimalakirti now requested him to give his own view, and to this Manjucri responded, "What I think may be stated thus: That which is in all beings wordless, speechless, shows no signs, is not possible of cognisance, and is above all ques tionings and answerings, — to know this is said to enter into the Dharma of Non-duality." Finally, the host Vimalakirti himself was demanded by Manjucri to express his idea of Non-duality, but he kept completely silent and uttered not a word. Thereupon, Manjucri admiringly exclaimed, "Well done, well done ! The Dharma of Non-duality is truly above letters and words!" ' 1 Deussen relates, in his address delivered before the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1893, a similar attitude of a Vedantist mystic in regard to the highest Brahma. ''The Bhava, therefore, when asked by the king Vaksalin, to explain the Brahman, kept silence. And when the king repeated his request again and again, the rishi broke out into the answer : 'I tell it you, but you don't understand it ; fdnto 'yam dtmd, this atma is silence !" 1 68 CHAPTER V. Now, of this Suchness, the Mahayanists distinguish two aspects, as it is comprehended by our conscious ness, which are conditional and non-conditional, or the phenomenal world of causality and the transcen dental realm of absolute freedom. This distinction corresponds to that, in the field of knowledge, of relative truth and transcendental truth. * ' It is a well-known fact that the Vedanta philosophy, too, makes a similar distinction between Brahman as sagunam (qualified) and Brahman as nirgunam (unqualified). The former is relative, phenomenal, and has characteristics of its own; but the latter is absolute, having no qualification whatever to speak of, it is absolute Suchness. (See Max Mueller's The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 220 et seq.) Here, a very interesting question suggests itself: Which is the original and which is the copy, Mahayanism or Vedan- tism? Most of European Sanskrit scholars would fain wish to dispose of it at once by declaring that Buddhism must be the borrower. But I am strongly inclined to the opposite view, for there is reliable evidence in favor of it. In a writing of Agvaghosa, who dates much earlier than £ankara 0r Badarayana we notice this distinction of absolute Suchness and relative Suchness. He writes in his Awakening of Faith (p. 55 et seq.) that though Suchness is free from all modes of limitation and conditionality, and therefore it cannot be thought of by our finite consciousness, yet on account of Avidya. inherent in the human mind absolute Suchness mani fests itself in the phenomenal world, thereby subjecting itself to the law of causality and relativity and proceeds to say that there is a twofold aspect in Suchness from the point of view of its explicability. The first aspect is trueness as negation (funyatd) in the sense that it is completely set apart from the attributes of all things unreal, that it is a veritable reality. The second aspect is trueness as affirmation (afiinyata), in the sense that it contains infinite merits, that it is self-existent. Considering the fact that Agvaghosa comes CHAPTER V. 109 Suchness Conditioned. Absolute transcendental Suchness defying all means of characterisation does not, as long as it so remains, have any direct significance in the phenomenal world and human life. When it does, it must become condi tional Suchness as Gesetzmassigkeit in nature and as ethical order in our practical life. Suchness as absolute is too remote, too abstract, and may have only a metaphysical value. Its existence or non-existence seems not to affect us in our daily social life, inasmuch as it is transcendental. In order to enter into our limited consciousness, to become the norm of our conscious activities, to regulate the course of the evolutionary tide in nature, Suchness must surrender its "splendid isolation," must abandon its absoluteness. When Suchness thus comes down from its sovereign- seat in the realm of unthinkability, we have this universe unfolded before our eyes in all its diversity and magnificence. Twinkling stars inlaid in the vaulted sky; the planet elaborately decorated with verdant meadows, towering mountains, and rolling waves'; the birds cheerfully singing in the woods ; the beasts wildly running through the thickets; the summer heavens ornamented with white fleecy clouds and on earlier than any Vedanta philosophers, it stands to reason to- say that the latter might have borrowed the idea of distin guishing the two aspects of Brahma from their Buddhist predecessors. Cankara also makes a distinction between saguna and nirguna vidya, whose parallel we find in the Mahayanist samvrtti and paramdrtha satya. IIO CHAPTER V. earth all branches and leaves growing in abundant luxury; the winter prairie destitute of all animation, only with naked trees here and there trembling in the dreary north winds; all these manifestations, not varying a hair's breadth of deviation from their mathematical, astronomical, physical, chemical, and biological laws, are naught else than the work of conditional Suchness in nature. When we turn to human life and history, we have the work of conditional Suchness manifested in all forms of activity as passions, aspirations, imagina tions, intellectual efforts, etc. It makes us desire to eat when hungry, and to drink when thirsty; it makes the man long for the woman, and the woman for the man; it keeps children in merriment and frolic ; it braces men and women bravely to carry the burden of life. When we are oppressed, it causes us to cry, "Let us have liberty or die"; when we are treated with injustice, it leads us even to murder and fire and revolution ; when our noble sentiments are aroused to the highest pitch, it makes us ready to sacrifice all that is most dear to us. In brief, all the kaleidoscopic changes of this phenomenal world, subjective as well as objective, come from the playing hands of conditional Suchness It not only constitutes the goodness and blessings of life, but the sins, crimes, and misery which the flesh is heir to. i ' While passing, I cannot help digressing and entering on a polemic in this footnote. The fact is, Western Buddhist critics stubbornly refuse to understand correctly what is CHAPTER V. Ill Agvaghosa in his Awakening of Faith speaks of the Heart (hrdaya) of Suchness and of the Heart of Birth-and-Death. By the Heart of Suchness he means the absolute and by the Heart of Birth-and- Death a manifestation of the absolute in this world of particulars. "They are not separate," however, says he, but they are one, for the Heart of insisted by Buddhists themselves. Even scholars who are sup posed to be well informed about the subject, go astra"y and make false charges against Buddhism. Max Mueller, for exam ple, declares in his Six Systems of Indian Philosophy (p. 242) that "An important distinction between Buddhists and Vedan- tists is that the former holds the world to have arisen from what is not, the latter from what is, the Sat or Brahman." The reader who has carefully followed my exposition above will at once detect in this Max Mueller's conclusion an incor rect statement of Buddhist doctrine As I have repeatedly said, Suchness, though described in negative terms, is not a state of nothingness, but the highest possible synthesis that the human intellect can reach. The world did not come from the void of Suchness, but from its fulness of reality. If it were not so, to where does Buddhism want us to go after deliver ance from the evanescence and nothingness of the phenomenal world ? Max Mueller in another place (op. cit. p. 210) speaks of the Vedantists' assertion of the reality of the objective world for practical purposes (yyavahardrtham) and of their antagonistic attitude toward "the nihilism of the Buddhists." "The Bud dhists" this seems to refer to the followers of the Midhyamika school, but a careful perusal of their texts will reveal that what they denied was not the realness of the world as a manifestation of conditional Suchness, but its independent realness and our attachment to it as such The Madhyamika school was not in any sense a nihilistic system. True, its advocates used many negative terms, but what they meant by them was obvious enough to any careful reader. 112 CHAPTER V. Suchness is the Heart of Birth-and-Death. It is on account of our limited senses and finite mind that we have a world of particulars, which, as it is, is no more than a fragment of the absoulte Bhutatathata. And yet it is through this fragmentary manifestation that we are finally enabled to reach the fundamental nature of being in its entirety. Says Agvaghosa, "Depending on the Tathagata-garbha, there evolves the Heart of Birth-and-Death. What is immortal and what is mortal are harmoniously blended, for they are not one, nor are they separate Herein all things are organised. Hereby all things are created." The above is from the ontological standpoint. When viewed psychologically, the Heart of Suchness is enlightenment, for Buddhism makes no distinction between being and thought, world and mind. The ultimate nature of the two is considered to be absolutely one. Now, speaking of the nature of enlightenment, Agvaghosa says : "It is like the emptiness of space and the brightness of the mirror in that it is true, and real, and great. It completes and perfects all things. It is free from the condition of destructibility. In it is reflected every phase of life and activity in the world. Nothing goes out of it, nothing enters into it, nothing is annihilated, nothing is destroyed. It is one eternal soul, no forms of defilement can defile it. It is the essence of intelligence. By reason of its numerous immaculate virtues which inhere in it, it perfumes the hearts of all beings." Thus, the Heart of Suchness, which is enlightenment and CHAPTER V. 113 the essence of intelligence, constantly works in and through the hearts of all human beings, that is, in and through our finite minds. In this sense, Bud dhism declares that truth is not to be sought in highly abstract philosophical formulae, but in the phenomena of our everyday life such as eating, dressing, walking, sleeping, etc. The Heart of Suchness acts and does not abstract ; it synthes ises and does not "dissect to murder." Questions Defying Solution. Speaking of the world as a manifestation of Suchness, we are here beset with the most puzzling questions that have baffled the best minds ever since the dawn of intellect. They are : Why did Suchness ever leave its abode in the mysterious realm of transcendentality and descend on earth where every form of misery greets us on all sides ? What inherent necessity was there for it to mingle in the dust of worldliness while it could enjoy the unspeakable bliss of its own absoluteness ? In other words, why did absolute Suchness ever become conditional Suchness ? To dispose of these questions as not con cerning human interests is the creed of agnosticism and positivism ; but the fact is, they are not questions whimsically framed by the human mind when it was in the mood of playing with itself. They are queries of the most vital importance ever put to us, and the significance of life entirely hangs on our inter pretation of them. 8 114 CHAPTER V. Buddhism confesses that the mystery is unsolvable purely by the human mind, for it is absolutely beyond the region of finite intellect and the power of a logical demonstrability. The mystery can only be solved in a practical way when we attain the highest spiritual enlightenment of Buddhahood, in which the Bodhi with its unimpeded supernatural light directly looks into the very abyss of Suchness. The Bodhi or Intelligence which constitutes the kernel of our being, is a partial realisation in us of Suchness. When this intelligence is merged and expands in the Body of Suchness, as the water in a vessel poured into the waters of the boundless ocean, it at once perceives and realises its nature, its destiny, and its significance in life. Buddhism is a religion and leaves many topics of metaphysics unsolved, at least logically. Though it is more intellectual and philosophical than any other religion, it does not pretend to build a complete system of speculation. As far as theorisation is concerned, Buddhism is dogmatic and assumes many propositions without revealing their dialectical processes. But they are all necessary and fundamental hypotheses of the religious consciousness ; they are the ultimate demands of the human soul. Religion has no positive obligation to prove its propositions after the fashion of the natural sciences. It is enough for religion to state the facts as they are, and the intellect, though hampered by limitations inherent in it, has to try her best to put them together in a coherent system. CHAPTER V. 115 The solution, then, by Buddhism of those queries stated above cannot be said to be very logical and free from serious dufficulties, but practically it serves all required purposes and is conducive to religious discipline. By this I mean the Buddhist theory of Nescience or Ignorance (avidyd). Theory of Ignorance. The theory of nescience or ignorance (avidyd) is an attempt by Buddhists to solve the relation between the one and the many, between absolute Suchness and conditional Suchness, between Dharmakaya and Sarvasattva, between wisdom (bodhi) and sin (klega), between Nirvana and Samsara. But Buddhism does not give us any systematic exposition of the doctrine. What it says is categorical and dogmatic. "This universe is really the Dharmadhatu; * it is character ised by sameness (samata) ; there is no differentiation (visama) in it ; it is even emptiness itself (gunyatd) ; all things have no pudgala (self). But, because of nescience, there are four or six mahdbhuta (elements), five skandha (aggregates), six (or eight) vijndna (senses), and twelve niddna (chains of causation). All these names and forms (ndmarupa) are of nes cience or ignorance." Or, according to Agvaghosa, "The Heart of Suchness is the vast All of one Dharmadhatu ; it is the essence of all doctrines. The ultimate nature does not perish, nor does it 1 Dharmadhatu is the world as seen by an enlightened mind, where all forms of particularity do not contradict one another, but make one harmonious whole. I 1 6 CHAPTER V. decay. All particular objects exist because of con fused subjectivity (smrti). 1 Independent of confused subjectivity, there is no outside world to be perceived and discriminated." "Everything that is subject to the law of birth and death exists only because of ignorance and karma." Such statements as these are found almost everywhere in the Buddhist lite rature ; but as to the question how and why this negative principle of ignorance came to assert itself in the body of Suchness, we are at a loss where to find an authoritative and definite answer to it. One thing, however, is certain, which is this: Ignorance (avidyd) is principium individium, that creates the multitudinousness of phenomena in the absolute oneness of being, that tosses up the roaring billows of existence in the eternal ocean of Suchness, that breaks the silence of Nirvana and starts the wheel of metempsychosis perpetually rolling, that, veiling the transpicuous mirror of Bodhi, affects the reflection of Suchness therein, that transforms the sameness (samata) of Suchness to the duality of thisness and thatness and leads many confused minds to egoism with all its pernicious corollaries. Perhaps, the best way to attack the problem of ignorance is to understand that Buddhism is a tho roughly idealistic doctrine as every true religion should be, and that psychologically, and not ontologic- 'The word literally means recollection or memory. Agva ghosa uses it as a synonym of ignorance, and so do many other Buddhist philosophers. CHAPTER V. 117 ally, should Suchness be conceived, and further, that nescience is inherent in Suchness, though only hypo- thetically, illusively, apparently, and not really in any sense. According to Brahmanism, there was in the begin ning only one being ; and this being willed to be two ; which naturally resulted in the differentiation of sub ject and object, mind and nature. In Buddhism, how ever, Suchness is not explicitly stated as having had any desire to be other than itself, at least when it is purely metaphysically conceived. But as Buddhism interprets this world of particularisation as a manifes tation of Suchness conditioned by the principle of ignorance, ignorance must be considered, however illusory in its ultimate nature, to have potentially or rather negatively existed in the being of Suchness ; and when Suchness, by its transcendental freedom of will, affirmed itself, it did so by negating itself, that is, by permitting itself to be conditioned by the principle of ignorance or individuation. The latter, as is expressly stated everywhere in Buddhist sutras and gastras, is no more than an illusion and a negative quantity, it is merely the veil of Maya. This chimerical nature of ignorance preserves the essential absoluteness of the first principle and makes the monism of the Mahayana doctrine tho roughly consistent. What is to be noted here, however, is this: Buddhism does not necessarily regard this world of particulars as altogether evanescent and dream-like. When ignorance alone is taken notice Il8 CHAPTER V. of and the presence of Suchness in all this multitu- dinousness of things is denied, this existence is positively declared to be void. But when an en lightened mind perceives Suchness even in the midst of the utter darkness of ignorance, this life assumes an entirely new aspect, and we come to realise the illusiveness of all evils. To return to the subject, ignorance or nescience is defined by Agvaghosa as a spark of conscious ness1 that spontaneously flashes from the unfathom able depths of Suchness. According to this, ignorance and consciousness are interchangeable terms, though with different shades of meaning. Ignorance is, so to speak, the raison d'etre of consciousness, is that which makes the appearance of the latter possible, while ignorance itself is in turn an illusive emanation of Suchness. It is then evident that the awakening of consciousness marks the first step toward the rising of this universe from the abyss of the self- identity of Suchness. For the unfolding of con sciousness implies the separation of the perceiving and the perceived, the visayin and the visaya, of subject and object, mind and nature. The eternal abyss of Suchness, so called, is the point where subjectivity and objectivity are merged in absolute oneness. It is the time, though strictly 1 Smrti or citta or vijndna. They are all used by Agvaghosa and other Buddhist authors as synonymous. Smrti literally means memory; citta, thought or mentation; and vijndna is generally rendered by consciousness, though not very accurately. CHAPTER V. 119 speaking chronology does not apply here, when all "the ten thousand things" of the world have not yet been differentiated and even when the God who "created the heaven and earth" has not yet made his debut. To use psychological terms, it is a state of transcendental or transmarginal consciousness, where all sense-perceptions and conceptual images vanish, and where we are in a state of absolute unconsciousness. This sounds mystical ; but it is an established fact that in the field of our mental activities there is an abyss where consciousness sometimes suddenly disappears. This region beyond the threshold of awaredness, though often a trysting place for psychical abnormalities, has a great religious significance, which cannot be ignored by superficial scientific arguments. Here is the region where the consciousness of subject and object is completely annihilated, but here we do not have the silence and darkness of a grave, nor is it a state of absolute nothingness. The self is here lost in the presence of something indescribable, or better, it expands so as to embrace the world-all within itself, and is not conscious of any egoistic elation or arrogance ; but it merely feels the fulness of reality and a touch of celestial joy that cannot be imparted to others by anything human. The most convincing spiritual insight into the nature of being comes from this source. Enlightenment is the name given by Buddhists to the actual gaining of this insight. Bodhi or Prajna or intelligence is the term for the 120 CHAPTER V. spiritual power that brings about this enlightenment. When the mind emerges from this state of sameness, consciousness spontaneously comes back as it vanished before, retaining the memory of the experience so unique and now confronting the world of contrasts and mutual dependence, in which our empirical ego moves. The transition from one state to the other is like a flash of lightning scintilating from behind the clouds; though the two, the subliminal and the superficial consciousness, seem to be one continuous form of activity, permitting no hiatus between them. At any rate, this awakening of subjectivity and the leaving behind of transmarginal consciousness marks the start of ignorance. Therefore, psychologically speaking, ignorance must be considered synonymous with the awakening of consciousness in a sentient being. Here we have the most mysterious fact that baffles all our intellectual efforts to unravel, which is: How and why has ignorance, or what is tantamount, con sciousness, ever been awakened from the absolute calmness (ganti) of being? How and why have the waves of mentation ever been stirred up in the ocean of eternal tranquillity ? Agvaghosa simply says, "spontaneously." This by no means explains anything, or at least it is not in the line with our so-called scientific interpretations, nor does it give us any reason why. Nevertheless, religiously and practically viewed, "spontaneous" is the most graphic and vigorous term there is for describing the actual state of things CHAPTER V. 121 as they pass before our mental eye. In fact, there is always something vague and indefinite in all our psychological experiences. With whatever scientific accuracy, with whatever objective precision we may describe the phenomena that take place in the mind, there is always something that eludes our scrutiny, is too slippery, as it were, to take hold of ; so that after all our strenuous intellectual efforts to be exact and perspicuous in our expositions, we are still compelled to leave much to the imagination of the reader. In case' he happens to be lacking in the experience which we have endeavored to describe we shall vainly hope to awaken in him the said impression with the same degree of intensity and realness It is for this reason that Agvaghosa and other Mahayanists declare that the rising of consciousness out of the abysmal depths of Suchness is felt by Buddhas and other enlightened minds only that have actually gone through the experience. The why of ignorance nobody can explain as much as the why of Suchness. But when we personally experience this spiritual fact, we no more feel the need of harboring any doubt about how or why. Everything becomes transparent, and the rays of supernatural enlightenment shine like a halo round our spiritual personality. We move as dictated by the behest of Suchness, i. e., by the Dharmakaya, and in which we feel infinite bliss and satisfaction. This religious experience is the most unique phenomenon in the life of a sentient being. 122 CHAPTER V. Dualism and Moral Evil. As we cannot think that the essence of the external world to be other than that of our own mind, that is to say, as we cannot think subject and object to be different in their ultimate nature, our conclusion naturally is that the same principle of Ignorance which gathers the clouds of -subjectivity, calls up the multitudinousness of phenomena in the world-mind of Suchness The universe in its entirety is an infinite mind, and our limited mind with its transmar ginal consciousness is a microcosm. What the finite mind feels in its inmost self, must also be what the cosmic mind feels, nay, we can go one step further, and say that when the human mind enters the region lying beyond the border of subjectivity and objectivity, it is in communion with the heart of the universe, whose secrets are revealed here without reserve. Therefore, Buddhism does not make any distinction between knowing and being, enlightenment and Suchness. When the mind is free from ignorance and no more clings to things particular, it is said to be in harmony and even one with Suchness. We must, however, remember that ignorance as the principle of individuation and a spontaneous expression of Suchness, is no moral evil. The awa kening of subjectivity or the dawn of consciousness forms part of the necessary cosmic process. The separation of subject and object, or the appearance of a phenomenal world, is nothing but a realisation CHAPTER V. 123 of the cosmic mind (Dharmakaya). As such Ignorance performs an essential function in the evolution of the world-totality. Ignorance is inherent in Buddhas as well as in all sentient beings. Every one of us cannot help perceiving an external world (visaya) and forming conceptions and reasoning and feeling and willing. We do not see any moral fault here. If there is really anything morally wrong, then we cannot do anything with it, we are utterly helpless before it, for it is not our fault, but that of the cosmic soul from which and in which we have our being. Ignorance has produced everywhere a state of relativity and reciprocal dependence. Birth is insepar ably linked with death, congregation with segregation, evolution with involution, attraction with repulsion, the centripetal with the centrifugal force, the spring with the fall, the tide with the ebb, joy with sorrow, God with Satan, Adam with Eve, Buddha with Devadatta, etc., ect., ad infinitum. These are neces sary conditions of existence; and if existence is an evil, they must be abolished, and with their abolition the very reason of existence is abolished, which means absolute nothingness, - an impossibility as long as we exist. The work of ignorance in the world of conditional Suchness is quite innocent, and Bud dhists do not recognise any fault in its existence, if not contaminated by confused subjectivity. Those who speak of the curse of existence, or those who conceive Nirvana to be the abode of non-existence 124 CHAPTER V. and the happiness of absolute annihilation, are consi dered by Buddhists to be unable to understand the significance of Ignorance. Is there then no fault to be found with Ignorance ? Not in Ignorance itself, but in our defiled attachment to it, that is, when we are ignorant of Ignorance. It is wrong to cling to the dualism of subject and object as final and act accordingly. It is wrong to take the work of ignorance as ultimate and to forget the foundation on which it stands. It is wrong, thinking that the awakening of consciousness reveals the whole world, to ignore the existence of unseen realities. In short, evils quickly follow our steps when we try to realise the conclusions of ignorance without knowing its true relation to Suchness. Egoism is the most fundamental of all errors and evils. When we speak of ignorance as hindering the light of intelligence from penetrating to the bottom of reality, we usually understand the term ignorance not in the philosophical sense of principium individuum, but in the sense of confused subjectivity, which conceives the work of Ignorance as the final reality culminating in egoism. So, we might say that while the principle of Ignorance is philosophically justified, its unenlightened actualisation in our practical life is altogether unwarranted and brings on us a series of dire calamities. CHAPTER VI. the tathagata-garbha and the Alaya-vijnAna. OUCHNESS (Bhutatathata), the ultimate principle of existence, is known by so many different names, as it is viewed in so many different phases of its manifestation. Suchness is the Essence of Buddhas, as it constitutes the reason of Buddhahood ; it is the Dharma, when it is considered the norm of existence ; it is the Bodhi when it is the source of intelligence ; Nirvana, when it brings eternal peace to a heart troubled with egoism and its vile passions ; Prajna (wisdom), when it intelligently directs the course of nature ; the Dharmakaya, when it is religiously considered as the fountain-head of love and wisdom ; the Bodhicitta (intelligence-heart), when it is the awakener of religious consciousness ; Cunyatl (vacuity), when viewed as transcending all particular forms ; the summum bonum (kugalam), when its ethical phase is emphasised; the Highest Truth (paramattha), when its epistemological feature is put forward; the Middle Path (mddhyamdrga), when it is considered above the onesidedness and limitation of individual existences ; the Essence of Being (bhutakott), when its ontological aspect is taken into 126 CHAPTER VI. account ; the Tathagata-garbha (the Womb of Tatha- gata), when it is thought of in analogy to mother earth, where all the germs of life are stored, and where all precious stones and metals are concealed under the cover of filth. And it is of this last aspect of Suchness that I here propose to consider at some length. The Tathdgata-Garbha and Ignorance. Tathigata-Garbha literally means Tathagata's womb l or treasure or store, in which the essence of Ta- thagatahood remains concealed under the veil of Igno rance. It may rightly be called the womb of uni verse, from which issues forth the multitudinousness of things, mental as well as physical. The Tathagata-Garbha, therefore, may be explained ontologically as a state of Suchness quickened by Igno rance and ready to be realised in the world of parti culars, that is, when it is about to transform itself to the duality of subject and object, though there is yet no perceptible manifestation of motility in any form. Psychologically, it is the transcendental soul of man just coming under the bondage of the law of karmaic causation Though pure and free in its nature as the expression of Suchness in man, the transcen- 1 Cf. the Bhagavadgitd (S. B E. Vol. VIII, chap. XIV, p. 107): "The Brahman is a womb for me, in which I cast the seed. From that, O descendant of Bharata ! is the birth of all things. Of the bodies, 0 son of Kunti ! which are born from all wombs, the main womb is the great Brahman, and I am the father, the giver of the seed." CHAPTER VI. 127 dental soul or pure intelligence is now influenced by the principle of birth- and-death and subjects itself to organic determinations. As it is, it is yet devoid of differentiation and limitation, save that there is a bare possibility of them. It will, however, as soon as it is actualised in a special form, unfold all its particularities subject to their own laws ; it will hunger, desire, strive, and even be annoyed by its material bonds, and then, beginning to long for liberation, will struggle inwardly. Here is then no more of the absolute freedom of Suchness, as long as its pheno menal phase alone is considered, since the Garbha works under the constraint of particularisation. The essence of Tathagatahood, however, is here preserved intact, and, whenever it is possible, our finite minds are able to feel its presence and power. Hypothetic- ally, therefore, the Garbha is always in association with passions and desires that are of Ignorance. We read in the Crimdld-Sutra : "With the storage of passions attached we find the Tathagata-Garbha," or, "The Dharmakaya of the Tathagata not detached from the storage of passions is called Tathagata- Garbha." In Buddhism, passion or desire or sin (Mega) is generally used in contrast to intelligence or Bodhi or Nirvana. As the latter, religiously considered, represents a particular manifestation in the human mind of the Dharmakaya or Bhutatathata, so the former is a reflection of universal Ignorance in the microcosm. Therefore, the human soul in which, according to Buddhism, intelligence and desire are merged, should 128 CHAPTER VI. be regarded as an individuation of the Tathagata- Garbha. And it is in this capacity that the Garbha is called Alayavijnana. The Alayavijnana and its Evolution. As we have seen, the Alayavijnana or All-Conserving Soul is a particularised expression in the human mind of the Tathagata-Garbha. It is an individual, ideal reflex of the cosmic Garbha. It is this "psychic germ," as the Alaya is often designated, that stores all the mental possibilities, which are set in motion by the impetus of an external world, which works on the Alaya through the six senses (vijndna). Mahayanism is essentially idealistic and does not make a radical, qualitative distinction between subject and object, thought and being, mind and nature, consciousness and energy. Therefore, the being and activity of the Alaya are essentially those of the Garbha; and again, as the Garbha is the joint cre ation of universal Ignorance and Suchness, so is the Alaya the product of desire (klega) and wisdom (bodhi). The Garbha and the Alaya, however, are each in itself innocent and absolutely irresponsible for the existing state of affairs. And let it be remarked here that Buddhism does not condemn this life, and universe for their wickedness as was done by some reli gious teachers and philosophers. The so-called wick edness is not radical in nature and life. It is merely superficial. It is the work of ignorance and desire, and when they are converted to do service for the CHAPTER VI. 129 Bodhi, they cease to be wicked or sinful or evil. Buddhists, therefore, strongly insist on the innate and intrinsic goodness of the Alaya and the Garbha Says Agvaghosa in his Awakening of Faith (p. 75) : "In the All- Conserving Soul (Alaya) Ignorance obtains, and from non-enlightenment [thus produced] starts that which sees, that which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularises." Here we have the evolution of the Garbha in its psychological manifestation; in other words, we have here the evolution of the Alayavijnana. When the Garbha or Alaya comes under the influence of birth-and-death (samsara), it no longer retains its primeval indifference or sameness (samata) ; but there come to exist that which sees (visayin) and that which is seen (visaya), a mind and an objective world. From the interaction of these two forms of existence, we have now before our eyes the entire panorama of the universe swiftly and noiselessly moving with its never-tiring steps A most favorite simile with Buddhists to illustrate these incessant activities of the phenomenal world, is to compare them to the waves that are seen for ever rolling in a boundless ocean, while the body of waters which make up the ocean is compared to Suchness, and the wind that stirs up the waves to the principle of birth-and-death or ignorance which is the same thing So we read in the Lankdvatdra Sutra : 130 CHAPTER VI. "Like unto the ocean-waves, Which by a raging storm maddened Against the rugged precipice strike Without interruption ; Even so in the Alaya-sea Stirred by the objectivity-wind All kinds of mentation-waves Arise a-dancing, a-rolling." ' But all the psychical activities thus brought into full view, should not be conceived as different from the Mind (citta) itself. It is merely in the nature of our understanding that we think of attributes apart from their substance, the latter being imagined to be in possession and control of the former. There is, however, in fact no substance per se, independent of its attributes, and no attributes detached from that which unites them. And this is one of the fundamen tal conceptions of Buddhism, that there is no soul- in-itself considered apart from its various manifesta tions such as imagination, sensation, intellectuation, etc. The innumerable ripples and waves and billows of mentation that are stirred in the depths of the Tathagata-Garbha, are not things foreign or external to it, but they are all particular expressions of the same essence, they are working out its immanent destiny. So continues the Lankdvatdra Sutra : 1 This is translated from the Chinese of Ciksananda; the Sanskrit reads as follows : "Taranga hi udadher yadvat pavanapratyaya irita, Nrtyamanah pravartante vyucchedag ca na vidhyate : Alayodhyas tatha. nityam visayapavana iritah, Cittais tarangavijfianair nrtyamanah pravartate." CHAPTER VI. 131 "The saline crystal and its red-bluishness, The milky sap and its sweetness, Various flowers and their fruits, The sun and the moon and their luminosity : These are neither separable nor inseparable. As waves are stirred in the water, Even so the seven modes of mentation Are awakened in the Mind and united with it. When the waters are troubled in the ocean, We have waves that roll each in its own way: So with the Mind All-Conserving. When stirred, therein diverse mentations arise : Citta, Manas, and Manovijfiana. These we distinguish as attributes, In substance they differ not from each other ; For they are neither attributing nor attributed. The sea-water and the waves, One varies not from the other: It is even so with the Mind and its activities ; Between them difference nowhere obtains. Citta is karma-accumulating, Manas reflects an objective world, Manovijfiana is the faculty of judgment, The five Vijnanas are the differentiating senses." * 1 From the Chinese. The Sanskrit reads as follows : "Nile rakte ; tha lavane gankhe ksire ca carkare, Kasayaih phalapuspadyaih kirana. yatha bhaskare : No ' nyena ca nananyena taranga hi udadher mata ; Vijnanani tatha sapta, cittena saha samyukta. Udadheh parinamo ' sau taranganam vicitrata, Alayam hi tatha. cittam vijfianakhyam pravartate; Cittam manag ca vijfianam laksanartham prakalpyate ; Abhinna laksana hi astau na laksya na ca laksana. Udadheg ca taranganam yatha nasti vigesana.. Vijfiananam tatha citte parinamo na labhyate. Cittena ciyate karmah, manasa ca viciyate, Vijfianena vijanati, drgyam kalpeti pancabhih." 132 The Manas. The Alayavijnana which is sometimes, as in the preceding quotations, simply called citta (mind), is, as such, no more than a state of Suchness, allowing itself to be influenced by the principle of birth-and- death, i. e., by Ignorance ; and there has in it taken place as yet no "awakening" or "stirring up" (vrtti), from which results a consciousness. When the Manas is evolved, however, we have a sign of mentality there by set in motion, for the Manas, according to the Mahayanists, marks the dawn of consciousness in the universe. The Manas, deriving its reason of consciousness from the Citta or Alaya, reflects on it as well as on an external world, and becomes conscious of the distinction between me and not- me. But since this not-I or external world is nothing but an unfoldment of the Alaya itself, the Manas must be said really to be self-reflecting, when it discriminates between sub ject and object. If the Alaya is not yet conscious of itself, the Manas is, as the latter comes to realise the state of self-awareness. The Alaya is perhaps to be compared in a sense to the Kantian "ego of transcendental apperception"; while the Manas is the actual center of self-consciousness. But the Manas and the Alaya (or Citta) are not two different things in the sense that one emanates from the other or that one is created by the other. It is better to under- CHAPTER VI. 133 stand the Manas as a state or condition of the Citta in its evolution. Now, the Manas is not only contemplative, but capable of volition. It awakens the desire to cling to the state of individuation, it harbors egoism, passion, and prejudice ; it wills and creates : for Ignorance, the principle of birth-and-death, is there in its full force, and the absolute identity of Suchness is here forever departed. Therefore, the Manas really marks the beginning of concrete, particularising consciousness-waves in the eternal ocean of the All- Conserving Mind. The mind which was hitherto indifferent and neutral here acquires a full consciousness ; discriminates between ego and non-ego; feels pain and pleasure ; clings to that which is agreeable and shrinks from that which is disagreeable ; urges activities according to judgments, false or truthful; memorises what has been experienced, and stores it all: — in short, all the modes of mentation come into play with the awakening of the Manas. According to Agvaghosa, with the evolution of the Manas there arise five important psychical activities which characterise the human mind. They are : ( 1 ) motility, that is the capability of creating karma ; (2) the power to perceive ; (3) the power to respond; (4) the power to discriminate; and (5) individuality. Through the exercise of these five functions, the Manas is able to create according to its will, to be a perceiving subject, to respond to the stimuli of an external world, to deliver judgments 134 CHAPTER VI. over what it likes and what it dislikes, and finally to retain all its own "karma-seeds" in the past and to mature them for the future, according to circumstances. With the advent of the Manas, the evolution of the Citta is complete. Practically, it is the consumma tion of mentality, for self-consciousness is ripe now. The will can affirm its ego-centric, dualistic activities, and the intellect can exercise its discriminating, rea soning, and image-retaining faculties. The Manas now becomes the center of psychic coordination It receiv es messages from the six senses and pronounces over the impressions whatever judgments, intellectual or volitional, which are needed at the time for its own conservation. It also reflects on its own sanctum, and, perceiving there the presence of the Alaya, wrongfully jumps to the conclusion that herein lies the real, ultimate ego-soul, from which it derives the notions of authority, unity, and permanency. As is evident, the Manas is a double-edged sword. It may destroy itself by clinging to the error of ego- conception, or it may, by a judicious exercise of its reasoning faculty, destroy all the misconceptions that arise from a wrong interpretation of the principle of Ignorance. The Manas destroys itself by being over whelmed by the dualism of ego and alter, by taking them for final, irreducible realities, and by thus fos tering absolute ego-centric thoughts and desires, and by making itself a willing prey of an indomitable egoism, religiously and morally. On the other hand, when it CHAPTER VI. 135 sees an error in the conception of the absolute reality of individuals, when it perceives a play of Ignorance in the dualism of me and not-me, when it recognises the raison d'etre of existence in the essence of Tathagatahood, i. e., in Suchness, when it realises that the Alaya which is mistaken for the ego is no more than an innocent and irreproachable reflection of the cosmic Garbha, it at once transcends the sphere of particularity and becomes the very harbinger of eternal enlightenment. Buddhists, therefore, do not see any error or evil in the evolution of the Mind (alaya). There is nothing faulty in the awakening of consciousness, in the dualism of subject and object, in the individualising operation of birth-and-death (samsara), only so long as our Manas keeps aloof from the contamination of false egoism. The gravest error, however, perme ates every fiber of our mind with all its wickedness and irrationality, as soon as the nature of the evol ution of the Alaya is wrongfully interpreted by the abuse of the functions of the Manas. 1 1 A little digression here It has frequently been affirmed of the ethics of Mahayanism that as it has a nihilistic tendency its morality turns towards asceticism ignoring the significance of the sentiment and instinct It is true that Mahayanism perfectly agrees with Vedantism when the latter declares : "If the killer thinks that he kills, if the killed thinks that he is killed, they do not understand; for this one does not kill, nor is that one killed." (The Katopanishad, II 19.) This belief in non-action (Laotzean Wu Wei) apparently denies the ex istence of a world of relativity, but he will be a superficial critic who will stop short at this absolute aspect of Mahayana I36 CHAPTER VI. Though Mahayanism most emphatically denies the existence of a personal ego which is imagined to be lodging within the body and to be the spiritual master of it, it does not necessarily follow that it denies the unity of consciousness or personality or individuality. In fact, the assumption of Manovijfiana by Buddhists most conclusively proves that they have an ego in a sense, the denial of whose empirical existence is tantamount to the denial of the most concrete facts of our daily experiences. What is most persistently negated by them is not the existence of ego, but its final, ultimate reality. But to discuss this subject more fully we have a special chapter below devoted to "Atman." The Samkhya Philosophy and Mahayanism If we draw a comparison between the Samkhya philosophy and Mahayanism, the Alayavijnana may philosophy and refuses to consider its practical side. As we have seen above, Buddhists do not conceive the evolution of the Manovijfiana as a fault on the part of the cosmic mind, nor do they think the assertion of Ignorance altogether wrong and morally evil. Therefore, Mahayanism does not deny the claim of reality to the world of the senses, though of course relatively, and not absolutely. Again, "Tat tvam asi" (thou art it) or "I am the Buddha" — this assertion, though arrogant it may seem to some, is perfectly justifiable in the realm of absolute identity, where the serene light of Suchness alone pervades. But when we descend on earth and commingle in the hurly-burly of our practical, dualistic life, we cannot help suffering from its mundane limitations. We hunger, we thirst, we grieve at the loss of the dearest, we feel remorse over errors committed. CHAPTER VI. 137 be considered an unification of Soul (purusa) and Nature (prakrti), and the Manovijfiana a combination of Buddhi (intellect) or Mahat (great element) with Ahankara (ego). According to the Sdmkhyakdrika (11), the essential nature of Prakrti is the power of creation, or, to use Buddhist phraseology, it is blind activity; while that of Purusa is witnessing (saksitvd) and perceiving (drastttvd). (The Kdrika, 19.) A modern philosopher would say, Purusa is intelligence and Prakrti the will ; and when they are combined and blended in one, they make Hartmann's Unbewusste Geist (unconscious spirit). The All-Conserving Mind (Alaya) in a certain sense resembles the Unconscious, as it is the manifestation of Suchness, the principle of enlightenment, in its evolutionary aspect as condi tioned by Ignorance; and Ignorance apparently Mahayanism does not teach the annihilation of those human passions and feelings. There was once a recluse-philosopher, who was considered by the villagers to have completely vanquished all natural desires and human ambitions They almost worshipped him and thought him to be superhuman. Qne day early in Winter, a devotee approached him and reverentially inquired after his health. The sage at once responded in verse : "A hermit truly I am, world-renounced ; Yet when the ground is white with snow, A chill goes through me and I shiver." A false conception of religious saintliness . as cherished by so many pious-hearted, but withal ignorant, minds, has led them into some of the grossest superstitions, whose curse is still lingering even among us. Our earthly life has so many limitations and tribulations. The ills that the flesh is heir to must be relieved by some material, scientific methods. I38 CHAPTER VI corresponds to the will as the principle of blind activity. The Samkhya philosophy is an avowed dualism and permits the existence of two principles independent of each other. Mahayanism is fundamen tally monistic and makes Ignorance merely a condition necessary to the unfolding of Suchness ' Therefore, what the Samkhya splits into two, Mahayanism puts together in one. So is the parallelism between the Manovijfiana, and Buddi and Ahankara. Buddhi, intellect, is de fined as adhyavasdya (Kdrika, 23), while Ahankara is interpreted as abhimanas (Kdrika, 24), which is evidently self-consciousness. As to the exact meaning of adhyavasdya, there is a divergence of opinion : "ascertainment," "judgment," "determination," "ap prehension" are some of the English equivalents chosen for it. But the inner signification of Buddhi is clear enough ; it indicates the awakening of knowl edge, the dawn of rationality, the first shedding of light on the dark recesses of unconsciousness ; so the commentators give as the synonyms mati (understand ing), khydti (cognition), jiidnam, prajiid, etc , the last two of these, which mean knowledge or intelli gence, being also technical terms of Mahayanism. And, as we have seen above, these senses are what the Buddhists give to their Manovijfiana, save that the 1 That the Buddhist Ignorance corresponds to the Samkhya Prakrti can be seen also from the fact that some Samkhya commentators give to Prakrti as its synonyms such terms as fdkti (energy) which reminds of karma or sankara, lamas (darkness), mayd, and even the very word avidyd (ignorance) CHAPTER VI. 139 latter in addition has the faculty of discriminating between tetim and meum, while in the -Samkhya this is reserved for Ahankara. Thus, here, too, in place of the Samkhya dualism, we have the Buddhist unity. Another point we have to take notice here in comparing the two great Hindu religio-philosophical systems,