Yale University Library 39002005330924 »>»!*.*" IffilrCwSKi:'-!* ¦':' ' |^v?v;*«i" .11 ,¦ ¦ - .¦' ¦•.¦-.^iH'if-J'- '¦il' ..¦ .... (•.¦.<.¦*.«¦ ¦ . ., . . i . ' ' 7''."^ *.¦ ¦ ¦ -' '¦ fT^-2.:, fo!- tkk: foii,nding 'f^ a. College ifv this. Colony'^} «Yi^ILE«¥]MII¥El^SIIir¥« ¦.v^.^JJ!v¦^.\.s^.^^^.^A^^aal^8^lJJ8R-gKawJ¦JJ|g.V^^^ Gift of WINTHROP E. DWIGHT 1928 w.tJJ.'SKij!j«gg'.*aw »^^^^-^^¦^.^'C^^l^t.A i>i„Met«'' MAP OF GENERAL LEES CAMPAIGNS PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 133 " Whatever movement you make against Banks, do it speedily, and, if successful, drive him back toward the Potomac and create the impression as far as pos sible that you design to threaten that line." The battle of Winchester soon following, Banks was pressed in confusion across that stream, and Mr. Lincoln was made too apprehensive for the safety of Washington to permit McDowell to unite with McClellan. Thus with the aid of his energetic lieutenant, Lee, without quitting his desk in Eich mond, had relieved that city of the impending presence of 100,000 additional Federal invaders, and had lured McClellan into a position of extra ordinary difficulty and danger. All this had been accomplished by the strategical use of the 17,000 Confederate soldiers stationed in the Valley, the flrst conspicuous illustration in practice of that au dacious spirit which Lee was to display throughout the remaining years of the war, and upon which he was to rely, and to rely successfully so long as Jack son lived, as the only means of equalizing the chances in contending with such superiority in numbers. This spirit was confirmed by the sympathy and cooperation of Jackson, a man fully capable of en tering into all Lee's designs, and just as able to carry them out in the field. The Federal delay at Yorktown had given Lee time to play on Mr. Lincoln's fears by the active use of the Confederate troops on the Shenandoah. Before the Federal army could reach even Williams burg, McDowell had been ordered, not only to stop 134 EOBEET E. LEE his movement southward, but also to dispatch one half of his force to the assistance of Banks and Fre mont in the Valley. As McClellan approached Eichmond, he was far from sure that he could rely in the future on being reinforced by even the 20, 000 men still left under McDowell's immediate control. He possessed, however, one great advantage : John ston's retreat from the fortified line on the Lower Peninsula having opened the James River as far as Drewry's Bluff, the Federal commander, as his con venience required, either could adopt that stream as a new base of supply, or retain the York Eiver, the old base. By May 24th, he had succeeded in concen trating 105,000 troops on the Chickahominy. Two corps were posted on the stream's south bank, and three on the north ; of which latter, one, under Fitz- John Porter, had been sent forward to Hanover Court-House to drive off a Confederate brigade en trenched there to oppose McDowell's expected ad vance. The Federal army's position astride a swampy river, crossed by few bridges, and flowing through a densely wooded region, was a dangerous one, and justified only by McClellan's hope that Porter, on his extreme right flank, would soon join hands with McDowell's vanguard. At this season, the first heavy rain would flood the streams and make the roads nearly impassable. The meadows on which the camps were pitched were already sodden with moisture ; while the jungles and morasses along the Chickahominy and its tributaries were masses of PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 135 damp luxuriant vegetation. In a few days, the miasmatic atmosphere and the polluted drinking water were certain to prostrate many thousand Federal soldiers with fever and diarrhoea. Porter's success having, for the moment, secm-ed his line of communication with the ' ' White House ' ' on York Eiver, McClellan put off consideration of the question whether it would not be safer to trans fer his base to Harrison's Landing on the James. However, before he could either reinforce or with draw the two corps posted on the Chickahominy' s south bank, under the command of Keyes and Heintzelman respectively, a copious rain began to fall ; and so rapidly did the flood in the stream rise, that all the bridges connecting the separated Fed eral wings were threatened with destruction. John ston, perceiving his adversary's predicament, de termined to take advantage of it. On the 31st, he attacked Keyes at Seven Pines, in the hope of crush ing him and throwing Heintzelman into a panic before reinforcements could cross the river. The actual assault did not begin until two o'clock in the afternoon because his principal lieutenant. Long- street, waited for Huger to come up, although aware that every hour lost would further increase the fall in the Chickahominy' s waters, and thus augment the chances of a large addition from the other side to the Federal forces. When once in action. Long- street and Hill succeeded in driving Keyes back upon Fair Oaks, where Heintzelman was stationed. Tak ing up a new position about six o'clock, the Fed- 136 EOBEET E. LEE erals were able to hold it until darkness ended the battle in that part of the field. In the meanwhile, the Confederate right, led by Johnston in person, had vigorously assaulted the Federal left, but with out success, as by this time, Sumner's corps had crossed the river and joined their hard pressed com rades on the south bank. Johnston having been severely wounded. General G. W. Smith assumed command of the Confederate troops next day. Longstreet was ordered to attack Sumner, but not approving his superior's plan of battle, failed to show energy or promptness ; indeed, on his own responsibility, he sent forward only three brigades, thus precisely anticipating his action on the third day at Gettysburg, just as he, before Seven Pines, had, by his delay, anticipated his action on the second day of the same great battle. Had he advanced on May 31st without stopping a moment for support, Keyes and Heintzelman could have been struck in detail before reinforcements could have crossed the swollen Chickahominy ; and had he, on June 1st, set himself at work in earnest to carry out General Smith's instructions, Keyes' sruiu could have been completed. As it was, the victory of the first day was, on the second, by his half hearted conduct, converted into a repulse. The failure at Fair Oaks, like the far more momentous failure at Gettysburg later on, was directly attribu table to one man's obstinate opinionativeness, amounting practically to insubordination and dis affection. PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 137 Informed of Johuston's inability to retain com mand, Mr. Davis appointed General Lee in his place. The latter arrived on the field the after noon of the battle of Fair Oaks ; and without en deavoring to recover the lost ground, he, that night, drew back the Confederate army to the position which it had occupied on the morning of Seven Pines. The Federals, advancing their outposts nearer the beleaguered city, were soon so close to its confines that its church bells and striking clocks could be easily heard in their camps. At this moment, the Confederate troops were greatly depressed. The discouragement caused by the apparently needless retreat up the Peninsula had been somewhat lightened by the success won at Seven Pines, but this new elation had been dashed by the upshot of Fair Oaks. Nor was this despond ency dispelled by General Lee's appointment to su preme command. His talent as an engineer and organizer was acknowledged, but his capacity for military operations in the field on a large scale was supposed to have been permanently discredited by the history of his campaign in western Virginia. His principal officers were now in favor of drawing back still nearer the city, but as he regarded this as the first step toward the capital's abandonment, which, at that moment of general discouragement, would perhaps have been fatal to the Confederacy, he determined to hold his more advanced position. The impression soon spread that there would be no further orders for retreat ; that the next step indeed. 138 EOBEET E. LEE would be one of firm resistance, if not of bold ag gression. Lee's first act was to employ the 64,000 troops now under his command in throwing up a strong earthwork along his whole line, extending from Drewry's Bluff on James Eiver to New Bridge on the Chickahominy, and thence up that stream's south bank as far as Meadow Bridge. As this long fortification rose, the spirits of the troops grew more cheerful. The General personally supervised the work, and before many days had passed, had won his soldiers' confidence by his imposing pres ence, and careful attention to their wants, — a confi dence confirmed by the skill and energy which he was so soon to show on the battle-field. At this time, but one corps of the Federal army was posted on the Chickahominy' s north bank ; this was Pitz-John Porter's, which was retained there to protect the line of communication with the Federal base on the York Eiver, formed by the York Eiver Railroad. From the beginning, Lee had determined not to await an assault in his entrenchments, but in stead to take offensive aggressive action, in the hope, not simply of forcing the Federal army to abandon the siege, but also, if possible, of breaking it up in its present complicated position. He saw at a glance that the object of attack promising the great est success was Porter's corps, first, because it was separated from its companions by the Chicka hominy; and secondly, because its defeat would signify the rupture of the Federal line of communi- PEND^SULA CAMPAIGN 139 cation, a result that would force the Federal army to retreat under hazardous circumstances. Before starting upon this bold movement, Lee took two important steps : he hurried up heavy re inforcements from Greorgia and the Carolinas, and he dispatched Stuart on a raid to discover Porter's exact defenses on his right flank. Stuart, after a romantic circuit of McClellan's entire army, re ported that this flank had not been fortified, and that it was unprotected by any natural bulwark, such as stream or swamp. In order to divert the Federal commander's suspicions, Lee had already sent two brigades in the most public manner, osten sibly to reinforce Jackson in the Valley, but really to convey instructions to him to march to Ashland with the main body of his troops as rapidly and as secretly as possible. From that point, he was to sweep down into the region between the Pamunkey and Chickahominy Rivers, and while Lee, concen trating on the north bank of the latter stream, should attack Porter's front, Jackson was to assault his unprotected right flank. It was of prime importance that Jackson should advance so fast that McDowell would not have time to recall the troops dispatched to the Valley, and then, with his army reunited, reinforce Porter. Pressing on ahead alone, Jackson arrived at Lee's headquarters on June 23d, and at a conference of generals, all the details of the projected attack were arranged. The plan adopted was not to be carried out until the 26th, by which day it was ex- 140 ROBERT E. LEE pected that Jackson would be able to strike Porter's right flank and break his line of communication with the White House. In the meanwhile, A. P. Hill was to take a position opposite the Meadow Bridge ; and D. H. Hill and Longstreet were to post themselves opposite the Mechanicsville Bridge, one and a half miles below. Magruder, with 28,000 men, was to continue to hold the entrenchments in front of McClellan's main line on the south bank. The active movement on the 26th was to begin with the advance of Jackson's troops, which woidd clear the Meadow Bridge of its Federal defenders ; A. P. Hill would then cross, and marching down stream en enchelon to Jackson, would in his turn clear the Mechanicsville Bridge ; D. H. Hill and Longstreet would follow, the former to support Jackson, the latter, A. P. Hill. It was anticipated that these combined forces would drive Fitz-John Porter from in front of New Bridge, and thus bring the Confederates once more in immediate touch with their comrades behind the adjacent entrenchments on the south bank, now demonstrating with great zeal in order to discour age McClellan from sending reinforcements to his lieutenant on the north bank. The restoration of the connection with Magruder would remove the only dangerous feature of the movement ; namely, the weakening of the earthworks opposite Rich mond. If McClellan intended to take advantage of the withdrawal of the great body of the Confederate troops to break through these earthworks with an PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 141 overwhelming force, he must do so before the Con federate detachments had assaulted Porter ; for if they succeeded in crushing that officer, their line would be a mere extension of the line south of the Chickahominy. Lee's ultimate object was, by the destruction of Porter's corps, and the severance of the Federal army from its base of supply, to force McClellan to retreat down the Peninsula to Fortress Monroe, a difficult country to traverse, and one from which, if vigorously pursued, he might be unable to extri cate his troops. The whole plan was attended with great risks. If McClellan threw his main force on Magruder and drove him out of his entrenchments, Porter's defeat would be no compensation to the Confederates, for the Federal army would be very much nearer to Eichmond, and James Eiver would serve as a base of supply even more convenient than the York. But Lee was compelled to run this hazard. A frontal attack was not to be thought of ; nor would supineness improve his situation. He felt himself fully justified, by his personal knowl edge of McClellan's character, in taking so risky a stop. He was perfectly aware that, while his an tagonist was bold in conception, he was slow in execution, aud disposed to exaggerate an oppo nent's strength ; and that if the attack on Porter was sudden and well sustained, the Federal com mander's overcautious nature would prove deaf to aggressive counsels. Lee's judgment of his adver sary was soon shown to be correct. 142 EOBEET E. LEE Jackson, when he withdrew from the conference on the 23d, rode back in haste to rejoin his troops, but owing to obstructions in the way, and constant brushes with the enemy, was unable to advance quickly enough to perform the part assigned to him for the 26th. The night of that day, he bivouacked without having attacked Porter's right flank, or brought himself in touch with A. P. Hill, although that officer was operating only a few miles away. As the pre-arranged plan required. Hill had taken position opposite Meadow Bridge. With great impatience, he awaited, on the 26th, the sound of Jackson's guns, which was to be the signal for his own advance. No such sound came ; and finally at three o'clock in the afternoon, fearing lest the whole scheme should miscarry, he boldly, and perhaps rashly, assumed the responsibility of moving for ward without any assurance of Jackson's assistance. To bring these officers in touch. General Branch had been ordered to post his troops at a point equally distant from each of the two places where their respective attacks were to begin, and as soon as Jackson arrived on the ground, to inform Hill. But this, Branch, though he knew of Jackson's approach, failed to do ; and instead moved toward the enemy entrenched on Beaver Dam Creek. Hav ing forced his way across Meadow Bridge, Hill advanced rapidly toward the same spot; and al though still unsupported by Jackson, and lacking in artillery, endeavored to storm that strongly forti fied position, an act that ended in a costly repulse. PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 143 During the night. Porter fell back to Gaines' Mill. Here he received additional troops from McClellan, which brought his total force to 36,000 men ; and moreover, he was now in touch with the main army by means of two protected bridges across the Chickahominy. The new position taken up by the corps was one of great natural strength ; it con sisted of a plateau sinking down by a very abrupt slope to a sluggish ditch-like stream at its base, beyond which opened out a valley, from five hun dred to one thousand yards in width, and timbered here and there. The slope was occupied by three lines of infantry, with numerous batteries behind them ; while the crest of the plateau was crowned with heavy artillery. To capture this formidable position, the Confederates would have to charge across the valley, leap over, wade, or bridge the swampy stream, and then carry the slope at the point of the bayonet. The whole movement would be exposed to a heavy flre. Lee, unaware that McClellan had already deter mined to change his base to James Eiver, expected that Porter, assaulted on the right flank by Jack- sou, would be compelled to weaken his centre and left in order to protect the Federal line of com munication with the White House. As this would diminish his power of resistance on the plateau, Lee decided to attack that position in spite of the formidable character of its defenses. A. P. Hill led the assault, and as he was soon checked, Long- street came forward to his support. In the mean- 144 ROBERT E. LEE while, Jackson, who had been joined by D. H. Hill, thinking that the enemy, hard pressed in fr-ont, would be led to retreat into his jaws, in the effort to preserve their White House communications, remained quietly in his first position ; but the sound of the cannonade from the direction of Gaines' Mill becoming heavy and continuous, he began to sus pect that the plan of attack had been changed. No sooner was this conclusion reached, than he advanced at quick step with his whole force, and rushing with characteristic ardor into the battle, turned the swaying tide in favor of the Confederates. The slope and plateau were carried, and Porter was saved from complete destruction only by the confusion into which the pursuit threw the Con federate army ; by the approaching fall of darkness, which made it imiiossible to follow the retreating Federals into a heavy wood where they had taken refuge ; and finally, by the arrival of two fresh Federal brigades, which, forming a line of steel, enabled the fugitives to cross the river in safety. Lee had succeeded in nearly disrupting one Federal corps, and in striking that blow had weakened the morale of the entire Federal army. At the moment too, he supposed that the interruption of the White House communications was of far more sinister con sequence to McClellan than it really was. He, how ever, was fully aware that Gaines' Mill was only the beginning of operations. Should the enemy be per mitted to get away in safety, either to James Eiver PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 145 or to Fortress Monroe, they would soon be rein forced, and perhaps return in greater strength. So far Lee had conducted the campaign with much energy and ability. From this time to its close at Harrison's Landing, a series of mistakes occurred, for which he can only in part be held responsible. In the first place, he did not show great discernment in weighing the probabilities as to what line of re treat McClellan would take. He thought that the chances were better that the enemy would retire to the distant Fortress Monroe rather than to the James River, barely fourteen miles away ; and he even imagined that McClellan might seek to maintain his hold upon the old base at the White House. While the Federal commander was actually engaged in burning the bridges across the Chickahominy and clearing the road to Harrison's Landing, with a view to immediate retirement, Lee was keeping his troops stationary on the river's north bank as more convenient for the enemy's interception in their ex pected march to Fortress Monroe. He even sent Stuart and Ewell to watch the lower bridges to pre vent the Federals from retreating toward York River. Stuart was now tempted to make an ill-con sidered dash upon the White House for the destruc tion of the supplies there, — not the last time that he was to disconcert his commander's plans by an un seasonable love of adventure. Instead of advancing with a rush to break the line of Federal withdrawal to the James, he failed to join the main body of the . Confederate army until after the battle of Malvern 146 ROBERT E. LEE Hill, thus anticipating the fatal error committed by him in the campaign of Gettysburg. General Lee did not overlook the possibility that McClellan might withdraw to the James. He per haps relied with too great confidence on Magruder to inform him of the enemy's first movement. Late on the afternoon of the 28th, the Federal entrench ments were reported to be fully manned, while the roads leading across the Chickahominy were still protected by Federal batteries. It was not until the morning of the 29th that the Confederates started in pursuit, and by that time McClellan had gained an advance of one day and two nights. Lee, however, was still hopeful of striking the Federal army a heavy, if not a fatal, blow before it could find a refuge behind its gunboats in the James Eiver. The plan which he now adopted was full of prom ise, and had there been perfect concert of action would have proved successful. The route followed by McClellan in seeking his new base was broken by only one obstruction, namely, White Oak Swamp, but a serious one, because it was intersected by a single highway. Lee ordered Magruder to march down the Williamsburg Road and assault the retreat ing Federals in the rear ; while Jackson and D. H. Hill, having passed over the Chickahominy by the Grapevine Bridge, were to support the attack. Longstreet and A. P. Hill were to cross higher up by New Bridge, and then to move down the Darby- town Road until they should come upon the right flank of the Federal army at some point between PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 147 White Oak Swamp and James River. Struck on one side of the swamp by Magruder, Jackson, and D. H. Hill, and on the other by Longstreet, A. P. Hill and Huger, Lee was justified in expecting that the enemy, broken into fragments by the two im pacts, woidd lose all power of further combined resistance. Success could be secured only by the closest coop eration, and this turned out to be impossible. First, Jackson and D. H. Hill lost a day in reconstructing Grapevine Bridge, and in consequence left Magruder to attack the Federal rear alone, a fact that resulted in his repulse at Savage's Station. The enemy's rear was thus able to make the dangerous passage of White Oak Swamp unmolested, and as soon as it had crossed and destroyed the bridge, McClellan posted there two divisions under Franklin to stop the Confederate pursuit from that direction. In the meanwhile, the 4th and 5th Federal corps had halted on Malvern Hill in sight of James River, while five divisions, under Sumner and Heintzelman, were stationed between Malvern Hill and White Oak Swamp in order to protect the trains from an assault by Longstreet and A. P. Hill, advancing down the Darbytown and Charles City Roads. When Jackson arrived at White Oak Swamp, he found it impossible to rebuild the bridge in the face of a hot fire from Franklin's batteries. Instead of marching around the south end of the swamp and joining A. P. Hill and Longstreet in attacking the Federal flank, he, contrary to the ordinary impulses 148 ROBERT E. LEE of his energetic character, deemed it wisest to carry out Lee's first orders by remaining quietly in the enemy' s rear ; and he was the more disposed to do this, as Lee was now so near at hand that, had he de sired, he could easily have instructed his lieutenant to move around to Hill's and Longstreet' s assistance. No such orders came, and Jackson's whole force was thus rendered useless at the moment when those two officers were, in succession, assaulting the Federal lines at Frazier's Farm. Huger was also unable to come up owing to the obstructions in his way. Ma gruder, marching and countermarching between Holmes on the extreme right, aud Longstreet in the centre, gave support to neither. Holmes himself had been driven off by the fire of the Federal gun boats, anchored in the James River, and the Fed eral corps entrenched on Malvern Hill. Instead of Jackson, D. H. Hill, Longstreet, Huger, Holmes, A. P. Hill and Magruder, simultaneously in rear, centre, flank, and front, launching, as Lee in tended, a combined force of 75,000 men against McClellan's retreating army, A. P. Hill and Long- street alone assaulted that army with only 20,000 troops. Nor were even these led as one body into battle ; the number attacking together did not ex ceed 10,000. The Confederates were unable to plant themselves athwart the Quaker Road, the Federal line of retreat, and with this failure, Lee's chance of breaking up the Federal army was lost, and at the same time the most promising opportunity pre sented to the South during the whole war, with the PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 149 exception of the early morning of the second day at Gettysburg, of winning its independence by a single stroke. By the dawn of the next day, July 1st, the Fed erals were concentrated on the slopes and crest of Malvern Hill, a position of greater natural strength than the plateau of Gaines' Mill. It was defended by 250 pieces of artillery, among which were the siege train's heavy guns ; and in addition, the Fed eral flanks were protected by the cross fire of the gunboats in James River. As the approaches to the Hill were obstructed by swampy and densely wooded ground, the Confederates could not expect their ar tillery to be of much service, should an assault be made. Lee hesitated to order an advance. The only hope of success by a frontal attack lay in the use of the whole army supported by all the cannon. Jackson urged a flank movement even after the order for an assault in front had been sent out. Lee adopted the suggestion ; but by an error of the staff, the order for the frontal assault was not rescinded ; and before they could be halted, 10,500 men advanced unsupported to attack the entire Federal army. The onset of battle, according to a Federal officer present, was made with the precision of a review, but against a position rendered by na ture and art so strong, and defended by a force so overwhelming, that the Confederates' courage and resolution proved unavailing. They were finally driven back with a loss of 5,000 of their number. But the Federals were too exhausted to make a 150 EOBEET E. LEE counterstroke, and after nightfall, withdrew to Har rison's Landing. Shrinking from an immediate advance through the deep mud of the rain-swept roads, the overworn Confederates did not attempt at once to pursue the retiring foe. Had they promptly seized Erlington Heights, situated in the rear of the Federal camp at Harrison's Landing, and at first unfortified, they would have had McClellan in a dangerous corner, for their artillery could have fired directly down upon his position, while the Federal cannon would have been compelled to shoot upward with a neces sarily less accurate aim. Stuart, pushing ahead of the Confederate main body, ascended the Heights, and having planted one howitzer, and thinking that reinforcements would soon arrive, rashly opened fire with this single piece of ordnance ; but he was soon driven off by a Federal detachment, and the posi tion rendered impregnable against attack. Lee, deeming it unwise to assault the Heights, withdrew his troops to Eichmond. Thus ended the Peninsula Campaign. If we consider the Valley and Peninsula Cam paigns together, it will be clearly perceived that the general result was highly favorable to the Confed erate cause, although Lee had signally failed to ac complish all that he had hoped, not so much in consequence of McClellan's great skill in directing his retreating columns, as of his own inability to control the movements of his own forces. The large armies which the Federal government had sum- PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 151 moned to the field had been struck, as Lee had orig inally designed, in detail : Banks, Fremont and Shields had been defeated ; McDowell had been pre vented from coming to McClellan's assistance ; Mc Clellan himself had, after the partial destruction of one corps, been compelled to retire from a point in sight of Eichmond' s steeples to the protection of his gunboats many miles away, no longer the confident invader, but the anxious pursued, sacrificing in his withdrawal fifty-two pieces of artillery, thirty-five thousand rifles, and a vast quantity of ammunition and stores of all kinds. By these various cap tures, the Confederate army had added enormously to its effective equipment for battle. Hardly less useful, from a military point of view, was the estab lishment of Lee's reputation as a capable strategist, and a resolute and even audacious leader in the field. The Confederate operations in this campaign, however, are open to severe criticism from several points of view. The stiategy was undoubtedly superior to the execution. The combinations were correct and far-seeing, but the manner in which they were carried out was halting and disjointed. There had been only one distinct success, — the victory of Gaines' Mill, which was but the natural result of pitting over 50, 000 men against 36, 000. Lee showed defective reasoning upon probabilities when he al lowed himself to think that his antagonist would re treat to Fortress Monroe. Why should that com mander do this when James Eiver, patroled by the Federal fleet, was but fourteen miles away to serve 152 EOBEET E. LEE as a new base ? Eetreat to Fortress Monroe not only would have been more dangerous, because more prolonged, but also a confession of absolute failure on McClellan's part, which the condition of his army with 75,000 fresh men did not justify Lee in im agining his opponent would make. At Harrison's Landing, that army would still be practically in sight of Eichmond, and McClellan might not incor rectly assert that his withdrawal from the Chicka hominy was merely "a strategic change of base." The expectation that, in retreating to the James, instead of to Fortress Monroe, he could advance such a claim, no doubt largely influenced a man of his self-esteem in taking that step ; and knowledge of this side of his character in itself should have served more than it did to guide his opponent in divining his next movement. Had Lee, as he should have done, deemed it more probable from this, as well as from every other point of view, that McClellan would withdraw to James River rather than to Fortress Monroe, he would have earlier devised means for the rupture of the Federal right flank at Frazier's Farm ; and might perhaps have blocked altogether the line of retreat to James River, thus forcing McClellan to recross the Chickahominy, with Jackson, D. H. Hill, and Stuart in front, and Magruder, Huger, A. P. Hill, Longstreet, and Holmes behind. Had McClellan begun his retreat to Harrison's Landing one day sooner, as he might have done, he would doubtless have reached that point without finding the jieceg- PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 153 sity to fight a single, — certainly not more than one, — rear-guard action ; and this at Malvern Hill, a position of extraordinary strength, as shown by the battle which took place there. But even the error of supposing that McClellan would retreat to Fortress Monroe rather than to Har rison's Landing would not, from the Confederate point of view, have affected the campaign's issue so seriously had Lee's carefully weighed plan for a concerted pursuit of the enemy, when their line of withdrawal was known, been carried out. For this he cannot be held strictly accountable beyond his failure to summon Jackson to Frazier's Farm, barely four miles away, when it was seen that that officer could not make the direct passage of White Oak Swamp in the teeth of Franklin' s batteries. The lack of combination on that day over the whole field of operations was due primarily to the Confederate army ' s imperfect staff service. The region in which the several detachments were marching was over grown with dense woods and penetrated by few roads. It would have been difficult for the cooperat ing columns to converge with perfect accuracy as to hour and place even if the staff had possessed good maps, or been led by reliable guides ; but as both were lacking, divergence and confusion re sulted, increased by the staff's own practical inex perience at this time, when so many of the Confed erate officers trained in military schools for this branch of service had been drawn away for the per formance of regimental duty. 154 EOBEET E. LEE That the Federal army finally escaped with the loss of 16,000 men was not entirely due to the er roneous or defective tactics of its opponent. Throughout the campaign, the Federal troops had fought with extraordinary courage and tenacity. They showed just as much bravery and staunchness at Malvern Hill as at Gaines' Mill. The rout and demoralization of Bull Eun were conditions of the past, a fact that might well have dashed the sat isfaction which the Confederates derived from the general results of their operations. CHAPTEE VI SECOND MANASSAS AND SHARPSBURG On June 26th Mr. Lincoln had ordered the consoli dation into one large army of the three small armies commanded respectively by Fr6mont, Banks, and McDowell ; aud at its head, he placed General Pope, an officer who had recently won some dis tinction in the West. After the battle of Gaines' Mill, it became impracticable for this new army to unite with McClellan by land, and it was not thought advisable for it to do so by sea, as Washington would thereby be left open to invasion by way of either Manassas or Harper's Ferry. As a means of guarding the capital, and also of creating a diver sion in McClellan's favor. Pope was directed to move his troops toward Gordonsville, with the ulti mate design of cutting at that point the Confederate railway communication with the Valley. It was anticipated that Lee would seek to prevent this by weakening Eichmond' s defenses, which would give the army on the James an opportunity to capture the city. On July 7th, Banks reached Culpeper, the place where the several detachments of Pope's army were to concentrate. As the Federal authorities had ex pected, the southward movement of their troops 156 EOBERT E. LEE caused Lee to dispatch several divisions, under Jackson, to Gordonsville. The Confederate general now stood between two Federal armies, the one numbering 50,000 men, the other 80,000. Until McClellan should show his hand, Lee thought it un wise to remove the main body of his troops from their camps at Richmond ; but, in order to cause McClellan's withdrawal from James River, by play ing on Mr. Lincoln's apprehensions for Washing ton's safety, he decided to increase the number of troops with Jackson, so as to enable the latter to begin an aggressive campaign northward from Gor donsville. That officer was gradually reinforced until he found himself at the head of 24,000 men. Now, it was necessary, not only to bring about McClellan's retirement, but also to strike the Fed eral army under Pope a destructive blow before he could unite with it. Such a blow, Jackson could not hope to inflict with 24,000 troops, but if able to attack in detail the several detachments of the enemy before thej"^ had had time to concentrate atCul- peper, he might deliver a stroke that would hasten McClellan's retirement, and thus quickly bring Lee on the ground for a joint assault on Pope before the other Union army could march to his aid from the Potomac. Jackson advanced rapidly northward, and at Cedar Mountain defeated Banks ; but on moving forward, he found that the road was barred by an overwhelming Federal force, and he, there fore, fell back to Gordonsville to await the arrival of Lee, now, in consequence of McClellan's with- MANASSAS AND SHARPSBURG 157 drawal from James River, no longer apprehensive for Richmond's safety. In the meanwhile. Pope had been ordered by the Washington authorities to remain at Culpeper. On August 11th, Lee, accompanied by Longstreet, joined Jackson at Pisgah Church on the south bank of the Rapidan. His aim was to attack and defeat Pope's army before McClellan could come up from Acquia Creek, for should the two Federal forces be able to unite, the numerical predominance in their favor would destroy all prospect of Confederate success. The Confederate army embraced about 55,000 men, which put it on an equal numerical footing with Pope's alone. Only a few hours after Lee's arrival, he ascended Clark Mountain, and from its signal station, looked down on the principal Federal encampment, situated at the base of Slaugh ter's Mountain, barely fifteen miles away. Thou sands of tents were scattered over the face of that part of the landscape ; smoke was rising peacefully from the sutlers' fires ; the cavalrymen had unsad dled their horses and were resting in the shade ; while the infantry were moving about freely and carelessly. The scene's whole aspect showed un mistakably that Pope was still unaware of the presence of the Confederate army, hidden away from sight, as it was, by the intervening rise of ground. The enemy's most vulnerable section was their left wing, because spread out to a point only six miles distant. It was finally arranged that Stuart, 158 ROBERT E. LEE having with his cavalry moved swiftly around to Rappahannock Station in Pope's rear, should there cut his line of railway communication, while the infantry, having crossed the Rapidan, should strike the Federal position squarely in front. It happened that a part of the cavalry was absent, and Lee, un heeding Jackson's advice to the contrary, decided to await its return. The opportunity was thus lost. A spy, in the interval of postponement, informed Pope of the Confederate troops' presence, and the capture of Stuart's adjutant- general and dispatch box revealed the fact that they embraced almost the entire opposing army. In alarm. Pope immediately drew back to the north bank of the Rappahannock. On the 19th, when the haze began to melt away from the landscape, the Confederate commander, from Clark Mountain, saw only an abandoned camp in the foreground, while far away in the distance, the enemy's rear-guard was discovered vanishing toward the north. For the moment the prospect of defeating Pope before McClellan could come up seemed to have been lost beyond recovery. How was it possible to strike the former's army a blow in the short interval that must pass before the latter' s arrival ? The new position occupied by the Federals was more difficult of assault than the old ; if attacked in front and worsted. Pope would simply fall back toward Wash ington until reinforced, and then return in greater strength than ever. Was it practicable, by stealing to the rear of his new position, to break the line of MANASSAS AND SHARPSBURG 159 his communications, cut off his army from assistance, and throw it into a confusion that might render it a comparatively easy prey ? If this were possible at all it could be done only by a turning movement from the north. Lee, before deciding upon his final plan, sent Stuart, at the head of his cavalry, across the Rappahannock to burn the railway bridge over Cedar Creek situated at the Federal back ; but this could not be accomplished owing to the wooden structure's saturation by the heavy rains. Stuart, however, succeeded in capturing dispatches which showed the strength of Pope's army, his designs for its disposition, his expectations as to reinforce ments, and, above all, his purpose to fall back from his present entrenchments on the Rappahannock. If the Federal army was to be crushed, it must be done at once. The Federal troops were now con centrated on the turnpike connecting Sulphur Springs on the river's north bank with Gainesville, a small village east of Warrenton. Their right flank was protected by the closure of the bridges and fords of the river ; their left, by the columns advancing from Washington. Behind the long Federal line, rose the bulwark of the Bull Euu Mountains, a range overgrown with dense forests and penetrated by few roads. Lee and Jackson, the night of August 24th, con sulted as to the best plan of overcoming the advan tage of this strong position. The whole Confederate army could not pass to the Federal rear without its withdrawal from its station on the river's south 160 EOBEET E. LEE bank being discovered and reported by the Federal outposts. As it would require forty-eight hours for that army to march up the Eappahannock and thence over the Bull Run Mountains to Gainesville or Manassas, Pope would have ample time to draw back, and thus continue to keep his opponent in his front, while he himself would be so much nearer to a junction with the reinforcements now daily ex pected. The two Confederate generals determined to divide their forces, with the ultimate intention of uniting on the field of battle. Jackson was to move northward to the upper fords of the Eappa hannock, and then wheeling to the east, descend from the Bull Run range upon Manassas, in the rear of the Federal army. Lee, remaining in his old position was to make a demonstration in order to divert Federal suspicion ; and then, when assured by his cavalry of Jackson's successful passage of the mountains, was to follow in his footsteps. The two wings were to join at some point south of Thorough fare Gap. It was a bold and hazardous plan, for Pope, by closing up that Gap as soon as Jackson had got through, could apparently prevent Lee from supporting his lieutenant when attacked by the entire Federal army. But there was another pass to the northeast of Thoroughfare, and it was clearly understood by the two Confederate com manders that, should Jackson be hard-pressed without Lee being able to break through Thorough fare, and come to his aid, he was to fall back to Aldie's Gap and join Lee west of the mountains. MANASSAS AND SHARPSBURG 161 At dawn on August 25th, Jackson started upon his celebrated march. The whole Confederate army did not exceed 55,000 men, and now one-half of its number were about to plunge boldly into a region occupied by over 100,000 hostile troops, probably, in a few days, to be swelled to 150, 000 by reinforce ments from Washington. Their haversacks con tained only three days' cooked rations, for they had determined to rely for their chief subsistence on the green corn now maturing in the fields, on such ripe fruits as were to be plucked in the orchards, and on a small herd of cattle driven in their rear. All baggage was left behind. During the first day, a distance of thirty-six miles was traversed. The column, in passing rapidly along, was observed from a Federal signal station, but it was surmised that this was the first stage of a retreat toward the Valley. That night the little army bivouacked under the canopy of the open sky, and the stars had hardly begun to grow dim in the heavens the next morning, when the march was re sumed, with redoubled ardor and energy. Ascend ing to the summit of Thoroughfare Gap, they saw from afar, rolling away mile upon mile, the broad plains of Manassas shining in the glare of the un clouded summer sun. Descending, they advanced at double quick toward Gainesville, where they were joined by Stuart's large body of cavalry. From that point, instead of marching straight to Manassas, his real objective, now a vast storehouse of Federal supplies and munitions of war, Jackson 162 EOBEET E. LEE wheeled to the right toward Bristoe Station, a spot nearer the Federal army, and directly in its rear. The seizure of this place would prevent Pope from throwing forward a large detachment to cut off the Confederate line of withdrawal after the destruction of the stores at Manassas. Bristoe Station having been captured, two regiments, accompanied by the cavalry, were dispatched to Manassas, and there began the work in hand at once. They were soon joined by the rest of the little army, with the ex ception of one division. When Pope heard that Jackson's corps, which he had at first taken for a small raiding party, had planted itself athwart his line of communications, he hurriedly drew back from the Eappahannock in force toward Gainesville, with the view of concen trating for his daring opponent's destruction. This movement made it safe for Lee to break up his camp on the river's south bank, and hasten onwaid to reunite with his lieutenant east of the Bull Eun Mountains. Expecting his commander's advance, and aware that, should he remain at Manassas, he would be isolated, and perhaps overwhelmed by the Federal army, now numbering, since the arrival of the fifth and third corps, from 70,000 to 80,000 men, Jackson retreated in the direction from which he knew that Lee was approaching. Pope, deluded by his own wishes and hopes, pre sumed that his antagonist would make a stand at Manassas, and therefore instead of keeping his troops in a position where, with one arm, he could MANASSAS AND SHAEPSBUEG 163 hold off Lee, while, with the other, he could crush Jackson, set practically his whole force in motion toward that place. "March at the earliest blush of dawn," so ran his order; " we will bag the whole crowd if we are prompt and expeditious." But the converging Federal corps found no trace of the Confederate general at Manassas except the smoking ruins of the supplies and munitions. It was re ported that he had retreated toward Centreville, but no trace of him was to be found there either. What had become of the wily and furtive foe? Jackson had really been falling back westward while Pope had been searching for him northward. After sweeping around the Federal flank, cutting the Federal line of communications, and applying the torch to a vast quantity of Federal clothing, food, ammunition, and other articles of war, he had now planted himself within twelve miles of Thor oughfare Gap, almost in sight of Lee's advancing column. But Jackson was not satisfied with these achieve ments alone. They did not constitute the real ob ject of his great march; that object was to seize Pope by the flank, like a bulldog, and by holding on, prevent him from escaping before Lee could come up and give the coup de grace. The Union general must be crushed before McClellan could arrive with reinforcements, but so long as he could continue to retreat at will, that hope must be aban doned. With the purpose of finally stopping him, Jackson, halting at Groveton, sprang upon the first 164 EOBEET E. LEE Federal division which passed that way, — a very bold act, as he was then unaware that Lee and Longstreet had forced the passage of Thoroughfare Gap ; indeed, that wing of the Confederate army, when night closed the short engagement, was only twelve miles off. There were not less than 70,000 Federal troops still marching and countermarching in his vicinity in an active search for his where abouts ; but it did not occur to Jackson, now that darkness had fallen, that it would be more prudent to fall back for the support of the approaching column. His purpose remained unchanged : — he would not budge an inch before that column's arrival on the ground to give the finishing blow, although the entire force at his disposal for the enemy's detention did not exceed 18,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and forty pieces of artillery. Concentrating his men behind the deep cuttings and steep embankments of an unfinished railway, he calmly awaited the stroke which he expected to receive the next day. Nor did his anticipations prove incorrect ; early on the following morning, an assault was made by the large Federal force which Pope, confident that his opponent was re treating, had sent forward to hold him until heavy reinforcements could arrive for his destruction, the very fate which that opponent had planned to inflict on him. In a few hours, 18,000 additional Federal troops deployed on the ground ; and later, there were further accessions of strength. Lee and Longstreet, unknown to Pope, had now reached the extreme MANASSAS AND SHAEPSBUEG 165 right of the Confederate position. Five gallant and determined assaults in all were made on the Confederate extreme left, but without success. The Federal commander, still unaware of Longstreet' s presence on the right, ordered Fitz-John Porter to march around what he imagined to be Jackson's unprotected flank in that quarter and strike the Confederate position in the rear. Porter, recog nizing the proposed movement's impracticability with such a force to break through in his front, reported the situation's real character to his supe rior, who, disbelieving his lieutenant, renewed his peremptory orders for the movement to begin ; but it was now too late, as night was fast approach ing. During Porter's inaction, Lee, observing a favor able opportunity to strike the Federal left wing, directed Longstreet to advance his troops at once. With that opinionativeness which he had pushed almost to the point of insubordination at Fair Oaks, and was to repeat on the second and third days at Gettysburg, this officer obstinately opposed his chief's wishes, and instead of vigorously attacking the weak force in front of him, confined himself, with Lee's reluctant consent, to a reconnaissance to secure a good position for an assault on the follow ing morning. Had Pope fallen back, as he should have done, to the naturally strong line of Bull Eun, and there awaited the appearance of the large rein forcements which he was expecting, Longstreet' s action in practically refusing to carry out his com- 166 EOBEET E. LEE mander's orders would have given the battle of Second Manassas the character of a mere repulse of the Federal right wing by Jackson's corps. Another conflict on the line of Bull Eun, with the Federal troops firmly entrenched, and greatly strengthened by the arrival of additional corps, might have been fatal to every prospect of Con federate success. As it was, the last day's battle was brought on simply by Pope's hallucination that the Confederate army was really retreating, and that, if vigorously pursued, might be over whelmingly defeated. It is a fact of great significance as touching the characters ofhis two principal lieutenants, that, pre vious to Jackson's death, Lee assigned all independ ent movements to that officer's leadership, while he himself always accompanied Longstreet' s corps, as if he thought this to be the one requiring his imme diate supervision. And yet, as we perceive from the record of the first day at Second Manassas, not even his presence, known wishes, and almost formal instructions, could overcome his subordinate's in veterate tardiness and his pertinacious loyalty to his own opinions. Unless Longstreet happened to assent fully to the advisability of the orders he re ceived, he had, from the very beginning of his ad vancement to high command, a way of thwarting his chief's designs by his slowness and half-hearted- ness in executing them. This characteristic was fatal to the Confederate hopes at Fair Oaks; it might have been still more fatal at Second Manas- MANASSAS AND SHAEPSBUEG 167 sas ; and was disastrous in the extreme at Gettys burg. At dawn on August 31st, the Federals were seen to be massed on the rising ground situated directly in front of the Confederate position. Lee decided to allow Pope to begin the battle, and he was the more inclined to do this as he was momentarily expecting the arrival of D. H. Hill's, McLaws's and Walker's divisions, which had been left at Eichmond to watch McClellan's last retiring movements. Pope still thought that Lee was not yet on the field, and that Jackson was falling back, an impression ap parently confirmed by the discovery that, during the night, the latter had taken a new position in a wood further in the rear. At twelve o'clock, the first Federal line, composed of 20,000 men, was ordered to push forward in pursuit, while a body of 40, 000 was concentrated behind them ready to march up to their sujjport on the instant. Not sat isfied with such great strength, Pope, still ignorant of the presence of Longstreet' s corps, began to weaken his left by calling to the centre a large pro portion of Porter' s troops. As the Federal first line moved with great gallantry across an open meadow to assault the Confederates, that part of Jackson's corps in their immediate front advanced from its new station in the wood, and again planted itself behind the railway cuttings and embankments. Volleys in rapid succession were poured into the faces of the enemy as they came on, while their ranks were also torn and smashed by a terrific cross- 168 EOBEET E. LEE fire of artillery and musketry. In spite of the de struction thus caused, the Federals marched, with the firmest courage, up to the very muzzles of the Confederate guns ; but the concentrated frontal and lateral fusillade now grew too deadly to be resisted, and they were forced to fall back. Twice the assault was renewed, with unsurpassed bravery, and as often repulsed. A like success was won by the remainder of Jackson's corps in another part of the field. It was now four o'clock in the afternoon. De pressed by the failure of their previous attempts to capture the Confederate positions ; discouraged by their heavy loss in killed and wounded ; and ex hausted by their exertious during two days of fight ing, the Federals were indisposed to renew the battle. Lee promptly seized the opportunity for a great counterstroke. His right wing, commanded by Longstreet, having taken no part in the conflict, was eagerly holding itself in readiness to advance. An order was dispatched to Jackson to bring his corps in close touch with Longstreet' s ; and when this had been effected, the entire Confederate line, four miles in length, leaped forward simultaneously at a signal to drive the enemy from the field. Every regiment, squadron, and battery in the Confederate army participated at first in the move ment of the long gray ranks ; but so rapidly did the infantry traverse the ground that the artillery was unable to keep up, a fact that had a vital influence on the ultimate issue of the battle. As if pressed MANASSAS AND SHAEPSBUEG 169 forward by an avalanche's irresistible weight, the Federals yielded position after position aU along their front. Jackson succeeded in capturing Mat thew Hill, situated ouly fourteen hundred yards from Stone Bridge, the main line of the Federal re treat over Bull Eun. Had Longstreet also succeeded in capturing Henry Hill, access to the crossing would have been blocked from both sides, and a panic would probably have ensued in the already more or less confused masses of the retiring enemy. The absence of artillery made the attack on the last plateau futile in the face of the determined resistance. Darkness soon began to fall, and the Federals, cloaked by it, withdrew to Centreville, their confi dence partially restored by the opportune arrival of 20,000 fresh troops under Sumner and Franklin, accompanied by abundant stores and supplies. Threatened next day with an attack in his rear. Pope retreated to Fairfax Court-House ; and he escaped a disastrous defeat at Chantilly only by the intervention of a heavy thunder-storm, which, for a time, stopped operations on both sides. Still fear ful lest he should be outflanked, he finally withdrew behind the fortifications of Alexandria. With the exception of Chancellorsville, Second Manassas constitutes the greatest victory of General Lee's military career. Like Chancellorsville, it was a masterpiece of offensive strategy, and like Chan cellorsville also, it was won by the prompt, ener getic, daring, and skilful cooperation of " Stone wall " Jackson. Here for the first time on the same 170 EOBEET E. LEE field, the two Confederate generals are seen plan ning and striving together, not so much as superior and subordinate, — which was the relation they dis tinctly bore during the Peninsula campaign, where Jackson's conduct was unequal to his previous and after reputation, — but as the alter ego of each other, as a double executive but a single head. From the moment that Jackson broke camp on the Eappa hannock, on the morning of August 25th, until the great counterstroke began on the second day at Ma nassas, he was operating on his own responsibility and on his own initiative. He was simply Lee's double in another part of the field, upon whose judgment and dexterity his superior relied with as great confidence as he did upon his own. When at Fredericksburg, "Stonewall" sent for instructions to Lee, who said, ' ' Go, tell General Jackson that he knows as well what to do as I," one of the most generous compliments ever paid by a commander to a lieutenant. The bold march to the enemy's rear at Manassas was the first great turning movement (unless the op erations on Porter's right wing at Gaines' Mill can be so characterized) ever made by the Army of Northern Virginia ; the last was at Chancellorsville. Lee never ventured upon such a stroke after Jack son's death because he knew that it required the qualifications possessed by that officer to carry it through successfully. Lee has often been criticised for dividing his army before Second Manassas with the intention of unit- MANASSAS AND SHAEPSBUEG 171 ing it on the field of battle, — two operations that vi olated the fundamental maxims of the greatest of all masters of war. Napoleon. Success under such cir cumstances has been pronounced by Moltke to be the most brilliant of military achievements. It should be remembered, however, that Lee had a phenomenally energetic and resourceful lieutenant to carry out his design, and also a very rash and impulsive opponent to overcome, — one who, in his eagerness to capture the isolated corps, would, in all probability, leave Thoroughfare Gap open, or at least not take steps to close Aldie's Gap further north, by which "Stonewall" could easily retire beyond his grasp, should Lee fail to break through the mountain wall. Moreover, so important did both Lee and Jackson consider an assault upon Pope, before McClellan could come up, that they thought it not unwise to run serious risks in order to bring him to battle. By audacity alone could the numerical disparity between the two combatants be equalized, and it happened that an audacious pol icy was equally congenial to the tastes of both men. Lee has also been censured for his failure com pletely to disperse the Federal troops during their retreat from Bull Eun ; but after Second Manassas, as after his later victories, reinforcements, hurried up with great promptness, soon restored the numer ical superiority of the enemy. Had Lee broken up McClellan's army at Frazier's Farm, and no peace in consequence had followed, there was still Pope's army in northern Virginia to subdue ; had he des- 172 EOBEET E. LEE troyed Pope at Second Manassas, McClellan was still behind the fortifications of Washington. Never theless, the general results of the operations from Gaines' Mill to Chantilly were calculated to inspire the Confederates with greater confidence and stimu late them to even greater efforts for the advance ment of their cause. Practically, that mighty host, whose tramp had resounded from the Chickahominy to the Eapidan, had been driven beyond the con fines of Virginia. By a dramatic reversal of posi tions, it was now not McClellan listening to the ringing bells and chiming clocks of Eichmond, but Lee looking down from the hills of Fairfax on the flaming dome of the Capitol at Washington. Dur ing his last two campaigns, he had captured so many rifles of the most improved patterns that he was able to supply every soldier in his ranks with one : at Manassas alone, he had taken twenty thousand, in addition to thirty pieces of artillery ; had destroyed a vast quantity of stores and munitions of war ; had seized 7,000 prisoners; and killed or wounded 13,- 500 men. Such success in the face of great numer ical odds not unnaturally raised the moraZe of the Confederate army to a high pitch, while it corre spondingly lowered that of the Federal. Previous to these two campaigns, Mr. Davis's conviction that the Confederacy's proper military policy was to stand on the defensive had very gen erally prevailed. But it was now perceived that the Federals' vast numerical superiority was ulti mately just as likely to overwhelm the Confederate MANASSAS AND SHAEPSBUEG 173 armies on Southern as on Northern soil ; that the consequences of defeat were just as disastrous, while the consequences of victory were far less favorable to the Confederate cause, since the enemy was able to retreat to some protected base like Harrison's Landing or Washington. Moreover, it was now clearly recognized that the only hope of overcom ing the disparity in number of men and in resources would be by beating the foe in detail, and the chances were hostile to the accomplishment of this purpose should that foe simply be awaited on Southern soil rather than sought for in the North. So fixed was the North's determination to conquer the Confederacy it was unlikely that this feeling would be gradually weakened by a succession of de fensive battles, which would only remotely bring home to the people the horrors of war. Both Lee and Jackson now thought that a decisive victory on Northern soil alone would ensure at one blow an acknowledgment of Southern independence. Jack/ son had held this opinion from the first ; and if Lee had not done so as soon, his practical experience as commander-in-chief had soon driven him to the like conclusion. The time seemed ripe for such an inva sion, now that the two Federal armies operating in the East had been assaulted in turn, and their morale sensibly lowered. These two armies, after the de- f.;>at at Second Manassas, had been merged under McGlf'llan's leadership ; but a very large proportion of the newly combined force consisted of recruits, 174 EOBEET E. LEE who, before their enlistment, had never fired a musket. There were yet other reasons which seemed to make an invasion of the North the wisest course to adopt. In the first place, some conspicuous success iu the Bast was needed to restore the Confederacy's declining fortunes on western fields. Owing to the increased strictness of the blockade, and the ad vance of the Federal fleets of gunboats up all the western rivers, there was a growing prospect that Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana, the chief provi sioning department for the Southern armies, and an important recruiting ground, would be virtually lost to the cause. Moreover, an invasion of the North would compel the Federal government to withdraw the troops still stationed at Martinsburg and Har per's Ferry, thus leaving the Shenandoah Valley un exposed to incursions, and, therefore, free to send a great quantity of grain and beef for the support of Lee. It was also thought that the passage of the Po tomac, the Federal army being pressed back, would encourage the people of Maryland openly to show their sympathy with the Confederacy by hurrying to reinforce the advancing columns, and aiding them with supplies of food, arms, and ammunition. Above all, it was hoped that the invasion, by car rying to the very doors of the Northern people, the perils and terrors of actual warfare, would tend to spread among them a spirit that would oppose all further attempts to conquer the South. In the face of these different motives justifying an MANASSAS AND SHAEPSBUEG 175 invasion, there were several conditions calculated to discourage such a movement. Firstly, owing to the commissary department's deficiencies, the Con federate soldiers were wretchedly equipped for so exhausting a march ; their shoes, when they had any at all, were, iu consequence of the long tramps from Gaines' Mill to Second Manassas, worn almost to shreds, while their clothes were scanty aud ragged. Secondly, a considerable number had been so often wounded in the previous series of battles that they ought properly to have been furloughed, or sent back to serve as a homeguard ; a still greater number were suffering in health from the free use of green food snatched from corn-fields and orchards along the road and eaten raw. All needed rest after the two arduous campaigns just ended. Deficient clothing, lack of shoes, physical infirmities, great fatigue from previous marches, — all these drawbacks were certain to lower the men's efficiency while op erating in a country never before explored by them, and one broken by mountain ranges and spurs. Hardly had Lee crossed the Potomac, at the head of barely 55,000 troops, when the evil consequences of these unfortunate conditions began to show them selves. Thousands of soldiers, unable to keep up with the main body by reason of lacerated feet or diarrhetic weakness, straggled behind in its wake, until they were strung out all the way from the Potomac to Sharpsburg, in which battle hardly two- thirds of the original invading force took part. Those remaining in the ranks presented, in most in- 176 EOBEET E. LEE stances, an unkempt appearance for men of such ex traordinary courage and constancy : their hats were brimless ; their belts consisted of strands of rope ; their shoes were rude moccasins fashioned out of rawhides ; their coats and trousers when not hang ing in tatters were, by exposure, stained to every color. It was an army of ragamuffins, but raga muffins of undaunted hearts, the firmest nerves, and an unconquerable spirit ; to whom discomforts were nothing in the scale, if by a keen eye in firing a musket, and a strong arm in wielding a sword, they could win the South's independence. When Lee crossed the Potomac, Harper's Ferry was occupied by a Federal garrison of 8,000 men ; he, however, confidently expected that, as he ad vanced toward Frederick and Hagerstown, these troops, recognizing their untenable position, would retire northward. During the operations in Vir ginia, the Alexandria and Orange Eailroad had been used as the Confederate line of communication, but as soon as the army entered western Maryland, it became necessary to shift that line to the Shenan doah Valley. Should the Federal garrison remain at Harper's Ferry, its presence might interfere with the safe transportation of the Confederate recruits, ammunition, and other supplies, only conveyable to Shepperdstown by that route. When it was found that, in accord with orders from Washington, — un approved, however, by McClellan, — the Federal troops would not be withdrawn, the question was presented to Lee whether or not he should reduce MANASSAS AND SHAEPSBUEG 177 the place before seeking battle with the forces of the enemy, now moving toward Frederick with great caution because unable to penetrate the screen formed by Stuart's cavalry. It would require 25,000 men to capture Harper's Ferry, and both Jackson and Longstreet were opposed to the army's division with the enemy so near at hand ; and their view was doubtless the correct one. Nothing but the certainty that, by leaving the garrison undisturbed, the sup ply of ammunition would be cut off would have jus tified such an expedition. When Lee invaded Pennsylvania the following year, he did not en deavor to dislodge the force then holding the same post, and neither danger nor inconvenience resulted. Nor would either have done so now had he listened to his lieutenants' advice. Exaggerating the importance of removing the ob struction, he thought that the expedition under con sideration would be rendered safe, first, by the ex cessive caution and tardiness marking all McClel lan's military operations ; and, secondly, by the swiftness and energy characterizing Jackson in the performance of a dangerous enterprise. Lee argued that McClellan was now advancing with more than his usual slowness and timidity ; that Stuart could be trusted to maintain for some time longer the screen which hid the Confederate movement from the enemy's view ; and that, before the Northern commander could discover that the Confederate army had been divided, Jackson would be able, not only to reduce the garrison at Harper's Ferry, thus 178 EOBEET E. LEE removing all danger of the Southern line of com munication being interrupted, but also to reunite his corps with the main body of the troops, await ing his return at some convenient point west of South Mountain. It is quite probable that Lee's hazardous plan would have been successfully carried out had not an unexpected incident occurred. As soon as he reached a decision, he sent to the several command ers copies of a general order touching the intended movements of the various parts of his army during the next few days. One of these copies, wrapped around a handful of cigars, was picked up by a Federal soldier, who, with his comrades, was occu pying the site of D. H. Hill's recent encam]3ment. This paper was at once delivered to McClellan and revealed to him, not only the proposed reduction of Harper's Ferry and the division of the Confederate forces, but also the position of every important de tachment. " I have all the plans of the rebels," he exclaimed with natm^al exultation, "and will catch them in their own trap." Never in the course of the war was such an opportunity presented to a Federal commander for the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia in the hour of its strength at one blow. Had McClellan advanced at once, he could quite probably have overwhelmed Longstreet's corps before Jackson had been able to hurry back from Harper's Ferry, and could then have turned upon Jackson's corps with equal success. But this military Hamlet, when all the cards were in his MANASSAS AND SHAEPSBUEG 179 hand, and the hour for prompt and energetic action had arrived, began characteristically to hesitate, as if he thought that the order was designed merely to deceive and mislead him. Fortunately for the Confederate cause, Lee was informed of the lost paper's fate in less than four teen hours after its discovery. At this moment, he himself was marching toward Hagerstown with Longstreet's corps. The crest of the South Moun tain range, which lay between him and McClellan's advancing army, had already been occupied by Stuai't's cavalry, while D. H. Hill's division was encamped at Boonesboro not far away. There were two gaps in the range, namely. Turner's and Cramp - ton's, and if the Federals were to be held off at arm's length until Jackson could hasten back from Harper's Ferry, then both must be vigorously de fended, so that McClellan, if not entirely stopped in his approach from the east, might at least be greatly delayed. That commander had received the copy of the lost order on September 13th, but it was not until the 14th that he began to move, and then by no means rapidly. As soon as Lee knew his plans had been disclosed, he ordered Longstreet to retrograde to South Moun tain for Stuart's and D. H. Hill's support ; but be fore that officer could traverse the distance, which he did with characteristic slowness, consuming ten hours in making thirteen miles, the Confederates and Federals had come in conflict in both the passes. It was particularly important that Crampton Gap 180 EOBEET E. LEE should be blocked, as its opening would at once allow McClellan to throw a heavy force across the roads by which Jackson's corps would seek to reach the main army. By five o'clock in the afternoon, Franklin, at the head of a large detachment, had broken in and occupied the summit. In Turner's Gap, where, owing to Longstreet's arrival, the numerical disparity was not so great, the Confeder ates were able to hold their ground until darkness fell. The day's advantage for their side was that the Federal advance had been delayed twenty-four hours, but this had been gained only by the loss of 3,400 men, the temporary rupture of many regiments and a distinct lowering of the morale of that part of the Confederate army, which was further depressed by the retreat at night to the line of Antietam Creek. The sense of defeat was, however, soon largely counterbalanced by the news of Jackson's success. As Lee was taking position at Sharpsburg, he was informed that his lieutenant, having captured Harper's Ferry with 12,520 prisoners, 13,000 small arms, and seventy-three pieces of artillery, was hurrying forward to rejoin him. Lee now debated whether it would not be best for him to withdraw his troops across the Potomac and take an entrenched position in Virginia. The sec tion engaged had not yet fully recovered from the depression caused by their discomfiture at South Mountain ; the ranks of the entire army had been seriously depleted by straggling ; and the whole of the corps sent to Harper's Ferry was still absent. MANASSAS AND SHAEPSBUEG 181 Above all, the ground he now occupied was marked by what might prove to be a fatal disadvantage. A large river, not easily fordable, flowed just back of his position, and defeat would mean, if not the de struction of his whole force, the loss of all his artillery. Longstreet, wisely on the whole, urged retreat. Jackson, on the contrary, favored making a firm stand, and Lee, being of the same bold temper, so decided. Their reasons for adopting a course apparently so imprudent were, first, that the Confederate army was composed altogether of veteran troops, whilst the Federal consisted either of raw recruits, or of men who had been defeated in the Peninsula and Second Manassas campaigns. Secondly, that the Confederate artillery, having been recently reorgan ized, was never before in so efficient a condition. Thirdly, that, if a victory should be won, the Federal troops could be pursued to far more advantage than after Second Manassas, when they had Washington's fortifications to retire behind for protection, and a second army to come to their assistance ; even the fall of the capital, Baltimore, and Philadelphia might follow, with overwhelming political as well as mili tary consequences. Fourthly, that the Confederates were at this time highly successful in the West : a victory in the East would redouble the North's despondency, and by strengthening the peace party, render the issue of the approaching Federal elections unfavorable to the war's continuation ; cause an im mediate diminution in the Federal Western forces 182 EOBERT E. LEE in the effort to increase the Eastern, a fact that would make it easier for General Bragg to clear Tennessee, and even Kentucky, of invaders ; and, by removing the Federal pressure on Maryland, en courage that state to send thousands of recruits to the Southern army. Fifthly, that, as it would be a tacit confession of defeat for the Confederate troops to retreat across the Potomac without giving battle, the general effect of the movement, in depressing the Southern and elating the Northern people, would be almost as marked as if those troops had been beaten in the field. And, finally, that McClel lan would be left undisturbed to strengthen his forces, until, on the resumption of hostilities, the disproportion in Federal favor would be far greater than it was even now. The country lying between Boonesboro and Sharpsburg consisted of corn and meadow land, intersected by excellent roads. Had McClellan ad vanced in force promptly and energetically, he might have attacked the Confederate position by noon of the 15th, a time when little resistance could have been offered. Not until then did even his skirmishers appear. By the following morning, his army was on the ground, but, during the daj^, he was so busy in placing his different corps that it was sunset when he ordered two of them to cross the Antietam, which flowed between the opposing lines. In the meanwhile, the principal part of Jackson's corps had arrived on the fleld, after an exhausting night march. Hill, with several jthou- MANASSAS AND SHARPSBURG 183 sand men, still remained at Harper's Ferry. Had McClellan attacked with vigor even by noon of the 16th, the movement would have been sure of suc cess. As it was, he was that day content simply to prepare for an assault on the next. Apparently, he thought his slowness would, in the end, be compen sated for by his greatly superior force ; as his cav alry and infantry numbered 87,164 men, supported by 276 guns, while the Confederates numbered only 35,000 infantry, and 4,000 cavalry, supported by but 194 guns. McClellan, however, perhaps not unwisely, weakened his actual fighting strength by holding in reserve a very large section of his army to resist his antagonist's forward movement, if he himself was unsuccessful in front, or to make a great counterstroke, should his own advanced corps triumph. Lee had posted his army to extraordinary advan tage on the opposite heights of Sharpsburg. His right was stationed about a mile southeast of thetown ; and from this point, his line of battle ran parallel to the turnpike uniting Sharpsburg with Hagers town. On the left, the line curved back, in the form of a rough angle, until it reached the Potomac. Owing to a great bend in that stream, both the right and left wings rested on the river. The An tietam, which flowed in front of the greater part of the line, was crossed by four bridges. It was by the one situated on the extreme Confederate left that the two Federal corps advanced after sunset on the 16th, Their passage was unopposed, and at a 184 ROBERT E. LEE point not far beyond the creek, they bivouacked, with the intention of attacking Jackson's corps, which formed the Confederate left wing, next morn ing. The original plan adopted by McClellan was first to assault that wing with a heavy force ; if the movement succeeded, to follow it up with an assault by his left on the Confederate right ; and if that also succeeded, then to drive his centre against the Confederate centre. The battle began at sunrise with the advance of Hooker's corps ; and so fierce was the ensuing con flict that this officer afterward stated that the corn growing over a part of the ground, thirty acres in extent, was cut down by the bullets as if by the blade of a scythe. By half-past seven o'clock, his troops had been worsted, but the other corps, under Mansfield, moving forward, succeeded in forcing Jackson to fall back to a second position, where his line, instead of being bent, as formerly, into an angle exposed to cross fire, was almost straight, and, therefore, more easily defended. Owing to McClel lan's general plan, Lee, not being anxious for his left and centre, was able to dispatch heavy rein forcements to Jackson's aid ; but this accession of strength was counterbalanced by the arrival of 18,000 fresh Federal troops, who at once renewed the battle. This detachment being thrown into con fusion by an unexpected attack, the Confederates rushed forward as the whole Federal line wavered ; but just as they were most disorganized by their owu rapid advance, they were coufropted by twp MANASSAS AND SHARPSBURG 185 fresh Federal brigades, and subjected to a hot artil lery fire. Stopped iu their course, they were forced to withdraw to their former position. This ended the contest on the left, where 30,000 Federal troops, supported by 100 guns, had been foiled, and, for a short time, swept back in rout by 20,000 Confeder ates, supported by forty guns. His right wing having failed, McClellan, instead of ordering his left to attack next, as originally planned, pushed forward his centre, which soon drove Longstreet back to the turnpike situated in his rear ; but here that officer doggedly planted his foot, and as the Federals, being unsupported, were unable to dislodge him, the opposing forces in this quarter spent the rest of the day in a state of inaction. Burnside, in command of the extreme left wing, was now ordered to move. After much delay, three of his divisions succeeded in crossing the Antietam on that side of the field, and taking positions on the ridge situated just beyond it. Having thus out flanked the Confederate right, they began to roll the opposing line back upon Sharpsburg. Had this movement continued, the larger part of the Confed erate army would have been in imminent danger of being huddled up in hopeless confusion ; but from this peril it was saved by A. P. Hill's opportune arrival at the head of 3,000 men, who, assaulting the Federals in reverse, not only stopped their ad vance, but also compelled them to retreat across the Antietam. Thus ended the battle of Sharpsburg, for the time 186 ROBERT E. LEE it lasted the most sanguinary of the whole war. The loss in killed and wounded amounted to sixteen per cent, of the entire forces engaged on both sides. It is related that the Federal patrol passing into a field where the fighting had been especially desperate imagined, in the veiling darkness of the night, that they had surprised a Confederate brigade. " There in the shadow of the woods lay the skirmishers, their muskets beside them ; and there, in regular ranks, lay the line of battle sleeping, as it seemed, the profound sleep of utter exhaustion. But the first man that was touched was cold and lifeless, and the next and the next. It was the bivouac of the dead." A Confederate council of war was held after the close of the battle. Even Jackson advised retreat into Virginia. Having listened quietly to the ex pression of each lieutenant's opinion, Lee rose in his stirrups, and said: "Gentlemen, we will not cross the Potomac to-night. If McClellan wants to fight in the morning, I will give him battle again." The only precaution which he took was to draw a part of his line back to a range of hills situated west of Sharpsburg, a position more defensible than the one previously occupied. Having been joined next day by six or seven thousand stragglers, he considered his army sufficiently strong to adopt the offensive, and it was only when he found, by the report of Colonel S. D. Lee, one of his most capable artillery officers, that the extreme Federal right wing's position, — the only position possibly turnable, — was too formi- MANASSAS AND SHARPSBURG 187 dable to be outflanked, that he abandoned all thought of the initiative. Informed during the day that Mc Clellan was receiving heavy reinforcements, and ex pecting none himself, he, that night, retired across the Potomac, without the loss of a gun or wagon, and with no serious attempt on his antagonist's part to interrupt or confuse the movement. Sharpsburg was as distinctly a Confederate as Malvern Hill had been a Federal victory ; in each case, the party repulsing an attack finally retreated. In its larger aspects, however, this battle was a Confederate defeat ; it checked the invasion of the North, from which so much to the South's political and military benefit was expected to follow, and it gave Mr. Lincoln a favorable opportunity to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. Lee himself was not dissatisfied with the general results ; if, for no other reason, because it showed that he could rely on his soldiers' valor in the teeth of the most dis heartening odds, and on their firmness aud con stancy even when their most sanguine hopes were frustrated. From a tactical point of view, Sharps burg was, in some respects, the greatest of his mili tary achievements ; not only in the beginning had he posted his tioops to the utmost advantage for repelling the assaults of an enemy so much superior in number, but during the course of the battle, in spite of the hostile masses of infantry and artillery in front of his whole line, he had moved detachments from point to point where the need of their aid was most pressing. His right wing alone had been in a 188 ROBERT E. LEE very critical position because that was the last at tacked, when his resources in fresh troops on the ground had been exhausted. McClellan's management of his army had shown far less skill. He attacked, not in combination, but in succession, and in succession was repulsed. He really fought three different battles, and from the beginning to the end of the conflict only two- thirds of his army was engaged. Like Hooker at Chancellorsville, he was thinking less of winning a victory than of guarding his army from a possible rout. CHAPTER VII FREDERICKSBURG AND CHANCELLORSVILLE After crossing the Potomac, Lee drew back to the neighborhood of Winchester. McClellan, with characteristic prudence, did not attempt to follow at once, although urged to do so by Mr. Lincoln, now doubly anxious for the Federal army to win a victory, as it would silence those persons at the North who condemned the Emancipation Proclama tion. Here, as after Gettysburg, the Federal Presi dent overlooked the fact that the commander on the ground, with practical experience of the Con federates' power of resistance in the face of an almost overwhelming preponderance, was the best judge as to the wisest course to pursue. McClellan at once began to reorganize and strengthen his forces, and whilst thus busy, Stuart made a raid entirely around his encampments to find out whether he was taking steps to send a special detachment against Richmond. None such being reported, Lee decided to remain quiet until his antagonist's plan was revealed ; whether it should be to cross the Potomac west of the Blue Ridge, and move straight up the Shenandoah Valley in the Confederate army's track, or to pass between that army and Richmond by marching east of the Ridge toward Culpeper and Gordonsville. 190 ROBERT E. LEE McClellan determined to follow the latter course, and by the end of October, his forces were concen trated near Warrenton. As soon as the Federal troops crossed the Potomac, Lee advanced Long- street's corps over the mountains to Culpeper, but retained Jackson's in the Valley. The two were thus posted sixty miles apart. Once more, he had divided his forces practically in the presence of the enemy, now numbering 125,000 men, supported by 320 guns. Not less than 225,000 Federal soldiers were at this time stationed within two or three days' journey of Washington, and if necessary, could be merged in one body at short notice. To prevent this great host from combining and begin ning an aggressive campaign, with Richmond as its immediate goal, Lee kept Jackson in a position where he could at any moment rush down the Valley, pass the Blue Ridge, cut the Federal line of com munication, and even attack Washington. The mere possibility of such an invasion would make the Federal commander doubly slow and cautious in advancing southward. Lee was again seeking to neutralize iu a measure his opponent's numerical advantage by playing upon his fears and sense of prudence. Should McClellan after all de cline to be stopped by Jackson's threatened rupture of his line of communication, then Lee could easily draw Longstreet back to Gordonsville, where Jack son's corps would, iu a few days, be able to join him by a march across the mountains. Before McClellan could advance from Warrenton, FREDERICKSBURG 191 he was superseded by Burnside, one of his lieu tenants, an act that was to cost the Federal cause dear. In spite of his excessive prudence and slow ness, his inveterate disposition to exaggerate his opponent's strength, and a certain boyish super ciliousness and tactlessness in dealing with Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton, McClellan was at this time the ablest, most experienced, and most popular Federal officer in the East. He had taken com mand of the Federal army when the war was a novelty and the fighting power had to be organized and set in motion. His super-caution was excusable when it is recalled that Washington's safety was absolutely dependent upon his army's success in foiling all the efforts of the Confederacy's two greatest soldiers, Lee and Jackson, to capture that city, which would have carried with it vast political consequences, such as the certain discourage ment of the North, the probable intervention of foreign powers, and the possible early recognition of Southern independence. Sharpsburg was prac tically an important Federal victory, even if it did not save the Union, as McClellan asserted, and on that account, if on no other, he was entitled to less summary treatment. If it was a mistake to remove so capable an officer at this critical moment, that mistake assumed a still more serious character when Burnside, a man of many winning personal qualities, but one who justly thought himself incompetent for so responsible a post, was appointed in his place. The new com- 192 ROBERT E. LEE mander's first act reflected a degree of prudence even greater than that his predecessor had shown : — he abandoned the plan of marching upon Rich mond by way of Culpeper and Gordonsville for that of advancing by way of Fredericksburg ; nor was this unwise, for by making Acquia Creek on the Potomac his base of supply, he removed at a stroke all danger of Jackson's cutting his line of communi cation. The question now arose. Should the Confederate army be concentrated on the southern heights over looking Fredericksburg in order to oppose the Fed eral passage of the Rappahannock, or should it be posted in an entrenched position behind the North Anna River, there to await the enemy's arrival? Every strategic consideration led Lee and Jackson to favor the latter course. At the North Anna, the Federal troops would be thirty-six miles farther away from their base. It is true that the chance of a counterstioke there would not have been much greater than at Fredericksburg, owing to the Federal superiority in number of men and guns ; nor would repeated attacks upon the retreating rear-guard have caused serious losses. But the Federal army, if defeated at North Anna would, in falling back, have to traverse a more or less open country, and in doing so, would, in the confusion of their withdrawal, find it difficult to protect their line of communication from a flank march, or to beat off fierce assaults upon their wings. In such a retreat, Jackson and Stuart could have swept FREDERICKSBURG 193 around to their front, striking hard at every step, while Lee and Longstreet pressed relentlessly upon the centre from behind. The worst depression which the North felt during the whole period of the war was caused by the defeat at Fredericksburg. How much greater that depression would have beeu, had the Army of the Potomac met with another Gaines' Mill, followed, not by a Frazier's Farm, but by an overwhelming Confederate victory. In concentrating at Fredericksburg, Lee could look forward to reaping few fruits of victory, should one be gained there. The line of hills situated on the Rappahannock's north bank furnished, not only a position for the use of artillery in resisting a coun terstroke, but also a refuge for defeated troops re treating from the plains below. Moreover, it would be impossible for a Confederate detachment to out flank the discomfited enemy, safe across the river once more, or to cut their line of communication with Acquia Creek. At Fredericksburg, the cav alry's fierce energy would have to chafe in inaction, while even the infantry's impetuosity must be put under partial restraint. There was but one reason to doubt the advisability of concentrating behind the North Anna : would Burnside so late in the season (for it was now December) advance as far toward Eichmond as that stream? Lee argued that he would, because he had been appointed to press the Federal operations with extraordinary vigor in response to the North's impatience. Unfortunately for the Confederacy, Mr. Davis 194 ROBERT E. LEE still clung to the idea that a purely defensive policy was the wisest one ; that the soundest hope of South ern independence lay in the chance of foreign inter vention ; and that military should bend to political considerations. An additional reason which led him to disapprove of the concentration on the North Anna was that a wide area of country rich in sup plies of food would be left open to Federal invasion. It was to be expected, however, that, should Burn side be driven back, his occupation of this region would be only temporary, and that he would also be too busy with his campaign to make sweeping incursions. Every interest of the Confederacy re quired that the judgment of Lee and his lieutenants should prevail in such a crisis, and that military should override political reasons. There was but one ground of hope for the Southern people in their struggle for independence, namely, the success of their armies. The anticipation of foreign aid was a mere hallucination. There is just reason to think that the Confederacy would have fared far better on several occasions, and this was one of them, had Lee .shown more firmness in insisting that the strategical demands of the situation should be paramount. We have seen that he sometimes yielded to his corps commanders' unseasonable opposition to his wishes, as, for instance, to Longstreet's at Second Manassas. Apparently, his sense of subordination to Mr. Davis as the governmeut's military and civil head alike, was so strong that he never seriously antagonized, as Jackson would undoubtedly have done, the military FEEDEEICKSBUEG 195 measures of that too masterful and self-confident ex ecutive ; and the consequence was that now, as after Cold Harbor later on, the Confederate cause suffered. Before December had fairly set in, Burnside had concentrated his army at Falmouth opposite Fred ericksburg. In a short time, Stafford Heights, which, from the north bank below the town, com manded the plain on the south bank, had been en trenched and armed with heavy artillery to assist the Federal forces when they should cross the river to attack the Confederate position on the southern line of hUls. These hills, which possessed great natural strength, being broken by ravines and streams, extended about six miles, at a distance from the Eappahannock ranging from 1,500 to 3,000 yards. Longstreet's corps occupied the ground nearest the town, with his centre resting on Marye's Heights. Jackson, at first stationed near the river's lower reaches, moved up before the battle began, and joined hands with Longstreet's right wing. The latter was strongly fortified ; rifle pits and shelter trenches had been dug along his front, which was also protected by abatis. Jackson, on the other hand, after changing his position, did not have time to throw up earthworks. Lee would not have prevented the Federal army from crossing the river even if it had been in his power to do so. An assault on the Confederate po sition was almost certain to be repulsed, and should the Federal troops fall back in great confusion, there would be a chance of delivering a successful counter- 196 EOBEET E. LEE stroke in spite of the artillery fire from Stafford Heights. Burnside' s first intention was to pass the Eappahannock by the fords above the town, and at tack the Confederate flank and rear ; but concluding that his advance from that quarter might be stopped at the stream, he decided upon a frontal assault. On December 11th, a Federal detachment attempted to throw a pontoon bridge over the river opposite Fredericksburg, a purpose for a time frustrated by Barksdale's brigade of Mississippians, which with drew only after the town had been fiercely bombarded and four regiments had crossed. Three additional bridges having been laid down over the stream's lower reaches, six corps were able to pass by the morning of the 13th and take position on the ground beyond, while a large body of troops under Hooker was held in reserve on the north side. Having seen from his signal stations that Jackson was separated from Longstreet by a wide gap (for at this time the two had not joined hands), Burnside planned to strike the former a blow before the latter could give aid, and then strike the latter in turn ; but, as already stated, Jackson, before the first blow was delivered, had posted his corps close to Longstreet's right wing. When the Federals, in two great bodies, under Franklin and Sumner respectively, began their march across the plain, the whole landscape was veiled in a heavy fog. The Confederates from the southern heights could at first distinguish no objects below them, but they could hear the sound of the FEEDEEICKSBUEG 197 regular footfall of the approaching ranks, the dull roll of the artillery wheels, the quick and sharp words of command, and the soil swell of martial music. Soon the sun begau to dispel the mist, aud a stirring panorama was revealed ; across the plain, 85,000 troops were seen advancing, as if participat ing in some grand parade, with bayonets shining in the morning light, aud regimental flags flaunting the breeze above a sea of dark blue uniforms. In the background, there rolled away to the horizon the sere or blackened landscapes of early winter, broken toward Stafford Heights by great wreaths of white smoke as the caunon there hurled projectiles over the heads of the Federal hosts against the Confed erates' elevated position. Jackson had massed his 30,000 men in three lines, one behind another, with a front of twenty-six hundred yaids, strengthened by a succession of bat teries. There was but one weak point : near his right centre, a coppice projected from the wood where most of his troops were posted, and ran down the slope about a quarter of a mile. This coppice was undefended because supposed to be too much of a brake and a marsh to be penetrated by hostile troops. To Franklin had been assigned the duty of attack ing Jackson's corps. Thinking that only a small part of that corps occupied the hills next to Long- street's position, he halted his division, 55,000 strong, in the plain, and sent Meade foi-ward, with only 4,500 men, to drive a wedge between the two 198 EOBEET E. LEE Confederate wings. The progress of this detach ment was stopped for some time by Captain Pelham, of Stuart's horse artillery, who, turning two guns against their ranks, continued to shoot until his am munition was exhausted, when he was forced to re tire. Meade then advanced under the protection of a heavy artillery fire, but was soon driven back by the unexpected outburst of Jackson's line of frontal batteries. Again Meade advanced, reinforced by Gibbon, and supported by the main body of the Fed eral artillery close up on his right and left. Enter ing the projecting and undefended coppice, he quickly pushed through aud fell on the Confed erate troops posted on one side of it, while Gibbon, following him, fell on those posted on the other side. The Confederate first line was thrown into confusion, and the second was about to share the same fate, when Jackson ordered his third to advance and clear the wood. Exhausted, unsupported, reduced in number, and disorganized by the pursuit and the intricacies of the ground, the Federals were forced back by this movement. Six Confederate brigades followed them down the slope with a rush, and were stopped only by the fire of the concentrated Federal artillery. Meade and Gibbon had lost 4,000 men in killed and wounded. During the progress of these operations, Sumner, whose division numbered 35,000 men, had been as saulting Marye's Heights, a position practically im pregnable. Its foot was protected by a stone wall, and its slope by rifle pits and batteries, tier upon FEEDEEICKSBUEG 199 tier, while it could be approached only across open ground fully exposed to artillery and musketry fire. Against this position, strengthened by all that art and nature could supply, two Federal corps, with a degree of courage never surpassed in the history of warfare, threw themselves, only to fall back after suffering an appalling loss ; indeed, two of every five men belonging to the attacking column had been killed or wounded. A second assault was also re pulsed, but the Federal troops again fell back in good order. By three o'clock, Franklin's and Sum ner's divisions, shattered and disheartened, had re tired beyond the range of the Confederate artillery. Why was no counterstroke delivered as at Second Manassas? If delivered at all, it must have beeu done before the Federals, having recovered from the confusion of their defeat, could strengthen their lines for resistance ; and it must also have been done by the whole Confederate army acting in concert to the very minute. In the first place, no previous ar rangement for a counterstroke had been made by holding back a body of fresh troops to head the movement ; and, in the second, Jackson and Long- street were so widely separated that neither could know at once what had occurred in cither's front ; nor could Lee keep them informed, owing to the battle-field's extensive area and the obstructions to the view. A simultaneous advance was impractica ble and if disjoin tly made, the movement was certain to end in disaster. Moreover, Lee had to reckon with the batteries stationed on Stafford Heights, which, un- 200 EOBEET E. LEE less the pursuers could commingle with the pursued, would be able to fire upon them with deadly effect. Nor was the presence of the river in the Federal rear likely to be a Confederate advantage, since the stream, being crossed by four bridges, really afforded four different exits from the plain. Lee, so far from thinking of a counterstroke the first day, prepared himself against a second assault ; and this he again expected the next day when he found that the Federals had not retreated from the plain. Had this second assault been made and badly repulsed, he had planned to follow it up with a counterstroke, to be delivered so quickly as to disconcert the fire of the artillery across the river. It was not until the third night after the battle that the enemy withdrew to the north side of the Rappa hannock. Thus ended the battle of Fredericksburg, a victory which proved, as both Lee and Jackson had antici pated, to be barren of any real fruit, owing to the Federals' ability to fall back without endangering their flanks or their line of communication. Had the Confederates been fighting for time, Fredericks burg would have been highly useful to their cause, but what they really sought was the destruction of the Army of the Potomac. No permanent advantage had resulted from the Peninsula Campaign, or from Second Manassas, aud none would result from Fredericksburg, for the same reason ; — namely, the Federal army would, in a few months, be able to resume the field, with every vacancy in FEEDEEICKSBUEG 201 its ranks filled up by a new recruit, and with every captured cannon replaced by a new piece of artillery. The knowledge of their continued numerical superiority alone would be sufficient to restore the courage of the defeated troops. Men who could charge right up to the muzzles of their enemy's guns, as the Federals had done at Second Manassas and Marye's Heights, were not less brave and steadfast than the Southerners who had resisted them. Give them equally skilful leaders, and their very numbers would probably overwhelm all oppo sition. No one was more clearly aware than Lee himself that the Confederate reserves in men and supplies were steadily declining, and that barren victories would deplete the remaining resources almost as thoroughly as modified defeats. Purely defensive measures were no more in accord with his judgment than they were with Jackson's, for both knew that such measures would never bring the North to terms, and that the only hope of doing so must lie either in the destruction of the Army of the Potomac on Southern, or in its decisive defeat on Northern, ground. With these convictions, Lee, visiting Eichmond, laid before Mr. Davis a plan for an aggressive cam paign north of the Potomac as soon as the spring should open. Had this plan been carried out at that time, he would have had Jackson's invaluable assistance, and both would have been able to profit by the mistakes made during the first invasion of 202 EOBEET E. LEE Maryland. Lee found Mr. Davis under the impres sion that the Northern people were so discouraged by the repulse at Fredericksburg that they would soon abandon the contest ; and that, before thirty days had passed, the Confederacy's independence would be recognized by foreign powers. He did not share this delusion. It is quite possible that he would have moved northward in the spring with out Mr. Davis's entire approval had not Longstreet, with three divisions, been withdrawn from his army after the battle of Fredericksburg in order to protect Eichmond, supposed to be threatened with invasion by way of Newberne, N. C, and Suffolk, Va. When the campaign of Chancellorsville opened, Longstreet was engaged in an injudicious expedition against the latter place, and by his ab sence prevented Lee, not only from marching toward the Potomac, but also from deriving any more ad vantage from the victory of Chancellorsville than from the one gained at Fredericksburg. The draw back which diminished the force of all his greatest successes, namely, the lack of a sufficient number of men to follow them up promptly and energetically, was here exaggerated to a degree never before or afterward equaled. The winter of 1862-3 was passed in quiet by both armies: the one posted on the heights north of Fredericksburg ; the other on the line of hills situ ated south of the town. Burnside was soon super seded by Hooker, an officer so pugnacious that he was known by the sobriquet of "Fighting Joe," a FEEDEEICKSBUEG 203 reputation confirmed by his boldness in the early half of the approaching campaign, but lessened by his over-caution in the latter part. He soon had uuder his command an army of 130,000 men, which he esteemed so highly that he pronounced it "the finest on the planet." His artillery service em braced 428 guns. To oppose this host so completely armed, Lee could marshal barely 57,000 men and 170 guns. The disparity was even greater than in the campaign of Shai-psburg. As soon as spring opened. Hooker took the final steps to carry out the plan of operations which he had matured ; aud had it been executed with the ability and boldness with which it was conceived, it might have led to a great Federal triumph. Pru dently rejecting the suggestion that he should throw his whole force across the river below Fredericks burg, and make a frontal assault on Lee's entrench ments, he decided to divide his army into three parts for three separate attacks. The first, consist ing of his cavalry under Stoneman, 10,000 strong, was ordered to advance to Gordonsville to cut the Confederate line of communication with the Valley over the Central Eailway ; and having accomplished this, to march to the rear of Lee's centre, with a view to breaking connections with Eichmond by way of the Fredericksburg Eailway. The second part consisting of a large body of troops under Sedgwick, was ordered, after crossing the Eappa hannock some distance down stream, to hold the Confederate right wing in its position until the third 204 EOBEET E. LEE part, under the commander-in-chief himself, could pass over by the upper fords and strike Lee in the rear of his left. It was hoped that the Confederates would be crushed between the upper and nether mill stones of Hooker and Sedgwick, while Stoneman would shut off the fugitives from their only road of retreat. Hooker did not consider the division of his army injudicious, as one wing of it alone was stronger than all Lee's forces combined, while the other was nearly as strong. Sedgwick led across the river at least 40,000 men and Hooker at least 70,000; in addition, 11, 000 were stationed at Banks' Ford on the north side in easy reach, while the Third Corps was so posted that it could come to the aid of either Hooker or Sedgwick according to the greater need. By the night of April 30th, the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps had been concentrated at Chan cellorsville, a spot about ten miles southwest from Fredericksburg. The surrounding country having once been a mining district, the original forest had been cut down to supply the furnaces, and its place had been taken by a dense growth of scrubby oaks, pines, and chinquapins. It was a wild and lonely brake spreading out twenty miles in one direction and fifteen in the other, and broken only here and there by a small narrow field under cultivation. A few roads, some running southwest toward Gor donsville, and others north toward the Eappahan nock' s upper fords, intersected this gloomy region ; FEEDEEICKSBUEG 205 but the principal passages were merely rude tracks made in hauling the wood used in smelting. Chancellorsville, represented by a single farm house, possessed no strategic importance beyond the fact that several public roads converged at that point. Here, as elsewhere in this vast thicket, the environment was entirely unsuitable for military operations. In getting his army so far. Hooker had shown both skill and energy, although the move ment did not quite deserve his public characteriza tion as a "succession of splendid achievements." "Our enemy," he announced in a proclamation, ' ' must either ingloriously fly, or come out from be hind his defenses and give us battle on our owu ground, where certain destruction awaits him." And in private conversation, he declared with con fidence that "the Confederate army was the legiti mate property of the Army of the Potomac." To overcome the obstructions to reconnaissances, he had established signal stations on every high point, and had sent up three captive balloons ; while, by means of a telegraph line to Falmouth, he promptly obtained full knowledge of every Confederate move ment on the hills south of Fredericksburg. Stuart, who had wisely refrained from following Stoneman, kept Lee thoroughly informed of the Federal right wing's advance. What course should he pursue? If he remained quietly where he was, it was a matter of only a few hours before Hooker would fall iu overwhelming force on his flank. The Confederate army could not strike the Federal line 206 EOBEET E. LEE of communication with Acquia Creek because it would be practically impossible to cross the river below Fredericksburg in the teeth of Sedgwick and the strong fortifications on Stafford Heights, still occupied by the enemy. Hooker confidently an ticipated that Lee would retreat to the North Anna ; and perhaps it would have been wiser had he done so. But he never retreated before the battle was fought. The only question which now seriously distracted him was, Which should he strike first, Sedgwick or Hooker ? In the beginning Jackson was iu favor of concen trating the whole Confederate army, and hurling it against Sedgwick's column, which had now crossed the river. Although Lee preferred that Hooker should be attacked first, so great was his con fidence in his lieutenant's judgment that he finally consented to a change of plan ; but after a more careful inspection of the ground, Jackson acknowl edged the correctness of his chief's original view. No sooner was this conclusion reached than steps were taken by the two for the obstruction of Hooker' s further advance, if not for his overthrow. The first was to turn the faces of the bulk of the Confederate troops toward Chancellorsville ; the second to station Early, with 10,000 men, on Marye's Heights, wilh orders to block the way for Sedgwick, or at least to delay his progress until the main Federal army had beeu defeated. History furnishes few examples of a movement equal in audacity to this one : — the advance of an army of 45,000 men against one of FEEDERICKSBURG 207 70,000, with another of 40,000 in the Confederate rear eager to pursue and attack. On the morning of May 1st, the day following the concentration of Hooker's army at Chancellorsville, a heavy mist, falling upon the face of the country, shut out the view from signal station and captive balloon ; and under its cloak, Jackson, was able, without being observed, to join the force which Lee had thrown back from his left wing toward Chan cellorsville to oppose Hooker's expected approach from that point. This force had already erected a line of earthworks and logs along the crest of a wooded ridge looking out over a contracted area of open fields, — a position nattu'ally strong and easily defended toward the west, as it allowed the Confed erate artillery to sweep the ground in that quarter, and gave the Federals little room for deploying their guns. Should Sedgwick, however, beat down Early's resistance, he would be able to attack in the rear simultaneously with Hooker's assault in front. Jackson perceived this weakness as soon as he came up, and at once ordered the troops to abandon the works and advance toward Chancellorsville by the two roads running in that direction through the labyrinth of gloomy thickets. Hooker had by this time decided to discontinue the offensive movement so successfully carried out as far as Chancellorsville. He was no longer marching to ward Fredericksburg, but instead had taken a strong position in the midst of the vast undergrowth, to which he had retrograded as soon as informed of the 208 EOBEET E. LEE check to his vanguard caused by Jackson's approach in force. His left wing now rested on the Eappahan nock ; the Second Corps held the turnpike uniting Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg ; the Twelfth, forming the centre, protected Chancellorsville itself ; the Third occupied Hazel Grove, an open plateau situated west, southwest of that point ; while on the extreme right of the right wing was stationed the Eleventh Corps. The line was shaped like an obtuse angle : one division of it fronted directly toward the east ; the other toward the south. The breastworks consisted of logs piled together, with abatis blocking the approaches. The few roads running straight to the fortifications were com manded by the full sweep of the artillery fire. Hooker, though assisted by his balloons and sig nal stations, was nevertheless greatly hampered by his cavalry's absence, to which fact some of the timidity which he now exhibited after his first bold movement, was attributable. Lee, on the other hand, was admirably served at this critical juncture by Stuart, whose conduct throughout this campaign was marked by great prudence, sound judgment, and extraordinary energy. Finding when he arrived before the enemy's lines, that Hooker had assumed a purely defensive atti tude, and had no intention of abandoning it, Lee quietly sought to discover a weak point in the Fed eral position. He resembled a hunter, who, having driven his prey to bay, leisurely turns from side to side to detect the spot in its body most vulnerable FEEDEEICKSBUEG 209 to the stroke of the knife. Such a spot was soon reported by his indefatigable horsemen. In skirt ing the extreme right, Fitzhugh Lee observed that that part of the Federal army was protected only from an attack in front. Struck on its exposed side, it might be driven back on the centre, to the certain confusion and possible rout of the entire army, and to the probable rupture of its line of re treat to the fords of the Eappahannock. To accom plish this, the Confederate forces would have to be divided on the field of battle, and under circum stances far more perilous than those attending the same manoeuvre at Second Manassas ; for here one- half of the Confederate army would have to sweep entirely across the Federal front to reach the point of attack on the extreme right. For the execution of so critical a movement, the country's peculiar character was very well suited, but in spite of the screen of thickets, the Federal outposts' suspicions might be aroused and the purpose of the march divined and thwarted. Lee, however, relied with confidence on the combined prudence and celerity with which Jackson would conduct it to ensure its success ; and the result proved his anticipation to be correct. An interview between the two occurred on the night of May 1st in a grove of oak and pine, and here the general details of the proposed manoeu vre were determined. At four o'clock, the next morning, Jackson began the last and boldest of his flank marches. His force, consisting of 26,000 men, passed in review before 210 EOBEET E. LEE Lee, who, with his staff, had halted at the roadside. Gravely saluting his commander, Jackson stopped for a moment to exchange a few words, and then moved rapidly forward ; thus was withdrawn for ever from Lee's sight, one whom he had followed with so much chivalrous fidelity, that great lieuten ant whose fame will always be interwoven with his own. The line of march first ran down a rude lum ber road pointing southward toward the Catharine Furnace ; thence west, southwest to the Brock Eoad pointing northward toward theEappahannock ; then up this highway to the turnpike making eastward toward Chancellorsville ; and down this turnpike to the spot where the unsuspecting Eleventh Corps was stationed. The cavalry led the procession of in fantry, which, in one great column ten miles long, was strung out across the Federal front. It was with a sense of elation that the troops ad vanced. Although not yet aware of the goal their general had in view, they were nevertheless certain that some daring enterprise was on foot. As they marched on, they could hear behind them the roar of cannon as McLaws and Anderson, with 17,000 troops under Lee's own eye, demonstrated against the Federal lines in order to divert suspicion from the flanking column. But as that column passed south of the Hazel Grove plateau, its presence was detected by the Federal troops entrenched on that height, and information of the fact was sent to Hooker, who, because it was reported that the re tiring troops were followed by a long train of wag- FEEDEEICKSBUEG 211 ons, not unnaturally leaped to the conclusion that Lee had begun to retreat toward Gordonsville. It was supposed that he was taking this route because his line of withdrawal toward Bowling Green had been blocked by Sedgwick, who was also thought to be thundering in his rear. Nevertheless, Hooker was prudent enough to warn Slocum and Howard on the extreme right to guard against a flank attack. Sickles left the Federal breastworks and attempted to drive a wedge through the advancing column. Jackson hardly stopped to repel the assault ; indeed, he was pleased to have caused it, as such a move ment was likely to weaken the Federal extreme right, which in fact it did, by tempting Howard, who com manded there, to take part in it. Having struck the Brock Eoad pointing north, the column wheeled sharply to the right, and moved by that route until it arrived at what was known as the Plank Eoad, one of the two public highways, — the turnpike being the other, — which ran parallel toward Chancellorsville. It had been Jackson's original intention to advance down this road until Howard's position was reached, and attacking the Federal army in reverse, to roll its left wing on its centre. He halted the column at the crossing, and accompanying Fitzhugh Lee to a neighboring hill, from thence saw the whole of Howard's corps re posing in the opening below, with no indication that the Confederates' presence was as yet even suspected. The men were gathered in small groups in the rear of the breastworks : some engaged in conversation ; 212 EOBEET E. LEE others in smoking and playing cards ; others in kill ing beeves, or preparing the evening meal. Jackson, having decided to attack in the rear as well as on the flank, dispatched the largest section of his troops farther up the Brock Eoad to the point where it was crossed by the turnpike running toward Chancellorsville. The final movement then began ; — while these troops advanced eastward along the turnpike, the cavalry and the " Stonewall Brigade," serving as a screen, also marched eastward along the parallel Plank Eoad. At the end of a mile, line of battle was formed. At this hour. Hooker, How ard, and Sickles were firmly convinced that Jackson was in full retreat. Hooker had, indeed, so tele graphed one of his corps commanders ; but he was soon rudely undeceived. A few minutes brought the Confederates sharply upon the sentries of the extreme right, and raising a yell, they rushed for ward through the undergrowth, sending the hares, foxes, and deer scurrying before them. The first Federal brigade to feel the impact was overwhelmed ; the second, which bravely sought to stay the rout, was dispersed. The first position was now captured, but the advance did not pause. By seven o'clock, the whole of the Eleventh Corps had been driven back in great confusion toward the centre. Jackson had now pressed his column forward in the rear of the Federal army to a point only a mile and a half distant from Chancellorsville, and barely half a mile from a road debouching into the only highway by which the Federal troops could draw FEEDEEICKSBUEG 213 back to the fords of the Rappahannock. If the latter road could be seized, as seemed practi cable, owing to the fact that Sickles in the centre had that morning marched so far southward in order to interrupt the Confederate movement, then Jackson could plant himself firmly behind the enemy, while Lee occupied a like position in front. Nor would the Federal predicament be greatly modi fied by the presence of the reserves at the fords in Jackson's rear. The situation would then have been highly dramatic : first, Jackson standing be tween the Federal reserves and Hooker ; next. Hooker, between Jackson and Lee, and last, Lee, between Hooker and Sedgwick. But the flanking column in advancing through the dense under growth became so disorganized by the rapid pursuit in the now fast-falling darkness that it was found necessary to reform the line before the march upon the road leading to the fords could be resumed. While this was going on, Jackson, accompanied by members of his staff, rode forward to reconnoitre. It was now eight o'clock, and the rising moon dimly lighted up the intricacies of the wood, but not sufficiently to allow objects to be distinguished clearly even at a short distance. Returning, the small body of horsemen received full in the face a volley of musketry from a company which had mistaken them for Federal skirmishers. So seriously was Jackson wounded that on being brought within his own lines, he was unable to give any further orders, His chief lieutenant, A. P. 214 ROBERT E. LEE Hill, also had been disabled ; and his guide, Bos- well, killed. No one was aware of the commander's plans, and the whole corps had to be halted until Stuart, many miles away, had been summoned to assume direction. It was then too late to press for ward to the road running to the fords. Howard took advantage of the long delay to recall Sickles, and the two, reforming and strengthening their lines, were able to bar the further advance that night of the fatigued Confederate column. By dawn next morning (May 3d), new Federal breastworks had been thrown up, while the road to the fords was firmly held by a fresh corps which had been hurried across the river. It was the Con federate army, not the Federal, which was now in a dangerous position, for a gap of two miles inter vened between its left wing and its right ; and within this gap the enemy, far outnumbering their foe, were firmly entrenched. Moreover, Sedgwick had received peremptory orders to break down all barriers, and move up to Hooker's support. There was, therefore, an imminent prospect that Lee, as Hooker had originally planned, would be caught between the upper and nether millstones. But the Federal commander was not thinking of the offen sive, — all his energies seemed to be bent only upon securing a road for retreat. Instead of fiercely assaulting Lee, he ordered the erection of a second line of breastworks in his own rear, and as soon as it was finished, he began to retire from the Hazel Grove plateau, the key to his position, — a movement FEEDEEICKSBUEG 215 which not only left the field open to Stuart to join hands with Lee, but also abandoned to him an elevation from which the Confederate artillery could fire down on the Federal entrenchments toward the east. In a short time. Hooker had concentrated 37,000 men behind the breastworks in the rear of Chancellorsville, and during the rest of the battle, these troops did not fire a musket, although their comrades in the front line were for hours exposed to the fierce attack of the now combined Confed erate army, and were finally compelled, after a prolonged resistance, themselves to faU back be hind these fortifications. Lee was about to assault this new position, which lay nearly a mile back of the old, when he was in formed that Sedgwick had stormed Marye's Heights, and was rapidly advancing to join Hooker. The order for a forward movement was at once recalled, and a strong detachment under McLaws sent to bar the further progress of this foe. The two met in the vicinity of Salem Church, and so vigorously were the Federals pressed, that they were thrown upon the defensive as their only means of securing the line of retreat to Banks's Ford. Next day, Lee having arrived in person on the ground, Sedgwick found himself in a position of great peril, with Early attacking his rear, and Lee and McLaws his front and flank. Forced to draw back, he took advantage of nightfall, all the darker for a heavy fog, to retreat to the north'side of the Eappahannock. During the two days' fighting. Hooker had not 216 EOBEET E. LEE ventured to leave his entrenchments either to assault Lee or to reiuforce Sedgwick. His army of 60,000 men had been held in check by 20,000, while the remainder of the Confederate forces were engaged in the battle with his lieutenant, which was to decide the final issue of the campaign. Having driven Sedgwick across the river, Lee returned to Chancellorsville, but a heavy rain made it impos sible for him to advance upon the Federal position that day, and Hooker, as soon as night fell, pru dently withdrew beyond the Eappahannock. Thus ended the battle of Chancellorsville, the greatest of Lee's victories from a purely tactical point of view. As with all his other triumphs, however, the numerical disparity prevented him from converting the Federal retreat into a rout, or striking in the confusion at the enemy's line of com munication. From the beginning. Hooker seems to have been dispirited by his opponent's offensive attitude. After his bold and rapid concentration at Chancellorsville, instead of pushing eastward with energy to strike the Confederate rear while Sedgwick assaulted the front, he allowed himself to be checked without difficulty by Jackson's advance. Even at that early stage of the campaign, his first thought appeared to be to keep open his line of retreat, and, therefore, his tactics were directed, not toward conquest, but self-defense. When he saw Jackson's column marching across his front, he exultantly concluded that the enemy were with drawing ; but not even this stimulating delusion FEEDEEICKSBUEG 217 caused him to strike the retiring foe a blow in the rear, delivered not by one corps, as he tried to do, but by the larger part of his army. Lee, who still remained behind, and was in a weakened condition, might at least have been attacked in force. But Hooker's mind was now entirely occupied with the supposed necessity of maintaining his fortified posi tion in order to avoid defeat. When his right wing had been thrown into con fusion by Jackson's sudden onset, and the Federal centre was also in imminent danger of being rolled up, aud the road to the fords blocked. Hooker, uuder cover of darkness, acted with much promptness and energy in restoring the situation ; but next morning, instead of assaulting one or the other of the now separated wings of the Confederate army, he under took to draw back the greater section of his own forces to a new line of entrenchments in his rear, as if his one object was merely to preserve an open passage. And, afterward, when his entire army was concentrated behind this new line, instead of attacking Stuart, iu Lee's absence, at Salem Church, he made not the slightest movement until the latter' s return, and then one of retrogression at night across the river simply to avoid his antagonist's last spring. Having a commander who was so easily dispirited to overcome, it seems quite probable that, had Jack son, before being disabled, succeeded in seizing the road to the fords and thus cutting off, or at least impeding the enemy's line of retreat, the Confederate army would have inflicted an appalling reverse on 218 EOBEET E. LEE the Federals, in spite of the fact that the latter were still nearly twice as numerous. The Confederacy reached the highest point of its fortunes the night when Hooker retreated to the north bank of the Ealppahannock ; from that hour, these fortunes were really to decline, although heroic valor and constancy long deferred the end. The only hope of success lay in the employment of the tactics used so conspicuously at Chancellorsville ; but when Jackson fell, Lee was left without a single officer possessing the extraordinary qualifications necessary for carrying out the bold and hazardous manoeuvres required to overcome the enemy's enormous superi ority in number of men and in material resources. Those great turning movements, whether suggested by Jackson or not, were as consonant with Lee's military genius as with "Stonewall's." There is in the whole history of modern warfare hardly a more melancholy contrast from the Southern point of view than that presented in the comparison of Chancellorsville with Gettysburg, the next great battle : the one, the consummation of genius in con ception, and of energy in execution ; the other, even finer and more daring in conception, and yet in exe cution a failure simply because the celerity, vigor, boldness, and perfect sympathy of Jackson had been replaced by the opinionativeness, obstinacy, pro crastination, and practical insubordination of Long- street. Lee's moral greatness was never more strikingly displayed than during and after the battle of Chan- FEEDEEICKSBUEG 219 cellorsville. At the moment when the Confederate troops were slowly driving their opponents from in front of the farmhouse at that point, and, in moving by their commander, were saluting him with tri umphant hurrahs, a note was handed Lee from Jackson, in which the wounded general congratu lated him on the victory. "I shall never forget," says Colonel Marshall, of his staff, "the look of pain and anguish that passed over his face as he listened. With a voice broken with emotion, he bade me say to General Jackson the victory was his, and that the congratulations were due to him." "Had I had my choice," Lee himself wrote, some what later, "I would for the good of the country have fallen in your place." At first, there was ground for hoping that Jack son's wound would not prove fatal ; his left arm was amputated and his condition for a time prom ised a quick recovery. Lee allowed no day to go by without sending his famous lieutenant an affec tionate message. "TeU him," he said, " to make haste and get well, and come back to me as soon as he can. He has lost his left arm, and I have lost my right." And when Jackson died, no one mourned his loss more keenly than Lee, the man who was most capable of understanding his genius for war, and who trusted most to that genius for the success of the cause so dear to the hearts of both. Throughout their association, only the most perfect mutual confidence had been displayed ; not a cloud arose to obscure their admiration and respect for 220 EOBEET E. LEE each other. "Lee," remarked Jackson on one oc casion, "is a phenomenon. He is the only man I could follow blindfold." Never but once did a word approaching criticism of his generous and high-minded commander cross his lips ; when Lee's letter attributing to him the brilliant victory at Chancellorsville was read to the wounded soldier, as he lay on his sick bed, he replied gently, " General Lee is very kind, but he should give the glory to God." After the war, Lee repeatedly ex pressed his conviction that, had he had Jackson with him at Gettysburg, he would have won a de cisive victory, and such a victory there, he thought, would have resulted in Southern independence. CHAPTEE Vin the GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN Perhaps it was not unnatural that, after the great victory at Chaucellorsville, Mr. Davis should have been sanguine that Mr. Lincoln would be compelled by the triumph of the peace party at the North, or by the active intervention of foreign powers, to recognize the independence of the South ern states. In reality, this victory weakened the determination of the Northern war party less than had Fredericksburg, simply because the Fed eral prospects in the West were at this time far more promising. Vicksburg was now threatened with capture, and should it fall, the Confederacy would be split in two, and its principal field for recruits and provisions lost. Lee apparently never hoped that the South would succeed by standing permanently on the defensive ; and he was as sure of this after the battle of Chancel lorsville as he had been before. Nothing but Long- street's absence, as we have seen, prevented him from crossing the Potomac before that battle was fought ; and hardly had the smoke rolled away from the field when he resumed his purpose, all the stronger now that his troops had been encouraged to the highest pitch by a succession of victories. He 222 EOBEET E. LEE felt confident that, could he repeat the triumph of Chancellorsville on Northern soil, the impression which it would make on the Northern people would be far more disheartening than that caused by any disaster in the previous course of the war. He also expected, by a march that would threaten Wash ington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia all at once, to force the transfer to the East of a large propor tion of the troops then besieging Vicksburg ; and finally, by moving into the fertile regions of Pennsyl vania, where his army could easily find subsistence, he would relieve the drain upon the over-run fields of Virginia. Lee's general plan of campaign was to cross the Blue Eidge to the Shenandoah Valley, and having forded the Potomac, to march down the Cumberland Valley perhaps as far north as Harrisburg and then wheel toward the East. By holding the passes of the South Mountain, he would be able to check the enemy's attempts to break his line of communica tion. His army, now that Longstreet's detachment had again joined him, consisted of some 57,000 foot and 9, 000 horse, supported by 250 guns. The in fantry had recently been reorganized into three corps, under Longstreet, Ewell, and A. P. Hill re spectively ; Pendleton was in charge of the artillery arm, and Stuart of the cavalry. Stuart had shown great capacity as Jackson's suc cessor at Chancellorsville, and in the pending cam paign the Confederacy would have been far better served had he been in command of the First Corps, THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN 223 for, if not the ablest, he was certainly the most en ergetic of all Lee's remaining lieutenants. Ewell was an officer of experience, but not of great talent ; Hill had experience and talent, but was disposed to be rash, a trait that brought on the battle of Gettys burg prematurely ; while Longstreet, though a brave and vigorous officer when actually engaged, had qual ities that entirely unfitted him to act as Lee's chief subordinate in such a campaign as was now contem plated. He was known even to his own soldiers as "Peter the Slow." In nearly every great move ment of the Army of Northern Virginia previous to the invasion of Pennsylvania, this characteristic of his had been exhibited : for instance, in the march to Seven Pines ; in the march from the Eappahannock to Gainesville ; in the march from the neighborhood of Hagerstown to Boonesboro ; and again after Gettys burg, in the march from Gordonsville to the Wilder ness, where he was wounded and practically ended his military career, though he was present during the retreat to Appomattox. But a more unfortu nate trait still, as bearing upon his usefulness in the approaching campaign, was a tendency to be opin- ionative to the point of insubordination. By June 12th, the Confederate army was strung out between Fredericksburg and the Valley. Forty miles intervened between the different corps ; Ewell was near Winchester and Longstreet at Culpeper Court-House, while Hill still held his ground at Fredericksburg in order to watch Hooker's move ments. Lee was fully aware that, with Ewell in po- 224 EOBEET E. LEE si tion to march upon Washington from Harper's Perry, Mr. Lincoln would never permit the Federal army to undertake a campaign against Eichmond ; and this anticipation proved correct, for its com mander, on June 13th, fell back toward Manassas and Centreville in order to protect the capital. Hill at once broke camp and followed in Longstreet's track, while Stuart, after an engagement at Brandy Station, marched forward east of the Blue Eidge toward the Bull Eun Mountains to screen the ad vance of the Confederate iufantry. As soon as the Federals occupied Leesburg, he withdrew to the spurs of the Blue Eidge. By this time, Ewell had entered the Cumberland Valley, but it was not un til Lee saw that Hooker would be content with simply keeping between him and Washington, with out assuming the offensive, that he finally decided to lead the rest of his army over the Potomac and to move slowly northward. Lee had urged Mr. Davis to form a second army, uuder Beauregard, for the purpose of threatening Washington, as he knew that this would cause Mr. Lincoln to diminish Hooker's force, and thus in crease the chance of Confederate victory on the soil of Pennsylvania. But Mr. Davis declined to follow these counsels, on the ground that, should Rich mond's defenses be weakened by the home-guard's reduction, it would be liable to invasion from Fort ress Monroe, — an error of judgment that was to have important consequences. An error of judgment not less serious was com- THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN 225 mitted by Stuart, who had been empowered to cross the Potomac either at Shepherdstown on the west side of the Blue Ridge, or at some point on the east side, but in the rear of the Federal army. He was, however, expected to keep his force between that army and Lee's, so as to serve as a screen. No doubt, Lee would have given Stuart more specific instructions had not that great cavalry leader acted with such prudence and sagacity in the use of his horsemen just before the battle of Chancellorsville began ; but unfortunately for the Confederate cause, he was now to prove himself the Stuart of the Chicka hominy rather than the Stuart of the Rappahannock. Instead of placing himself between Lee and Hooker, and serving as the eyes of the Confederate army, he allowed the spirit of mere adventure to carry him within three miles of Washington, and then had to ride as far north as Carlisle in order to pass the barrier of the Federal army, now interposed between him and Lee. He arrived on the field of Gettys burg too late to change the course of events ; and it was due to his absence up to the night of the second day's battle that the original plan of cam paign was entirely disarranged. Lee reached Chambersburg on June 27th, and here he issued a proclamation sternly prohibiting the destruction or appropriation without compensation, of private property on any pretext whatever. " It must be remembered," he said, "that we make war only on armed men." That this order was fully obeyed by the troops is proven by the testimony of 226 ROBERT E. LEE foreign officers who accompanied the Confederate army. "I saw no straggling into the houses," records Colonel Freemantle, of England, "nor were any of the inhabitants disturbed or annoyed by the soldiers." This action was the more remarkable in the light of the feeling of acute resentment which IJrevailed among the Southern people at this time : one influential section urged that the North should now suffer retaliation for the terrible losses and privations caused by the invasion of Southern soil ; while another declared that the devastation of Penn sylvania would be as fully justified by the necessities of war, supposed or real, as the confiscation of their slaves by the Emancipation Proclamation. But General Lee took a different view : he intended, he said, to conduct the war in harmony with Christian Xjrinciples, and no wrongs committed by individual enemies would excuse any departure from those principles ; he, therefore, deliberately set his face against the indulgence of a spirit of revenge now that he had the power to ravage one of the most fertile parts of the North. As soon as Hooker heard that Lee's entire army had passed the Potomac, he crossed that stream himself, and advanced in a northeasterly direction. His object was not simply to keep his army between Lee and the Federal capital ; he was also watching for an opportunity to strike at the Confederate line of communication, a matter of vital importance to his opponents at that great distance from their base. As he marched, he spread out the bulk of his THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN 227 troops iu the shape of a fan, with the outer circle facing westward, while he dispatched Slocum to discover a vulnerable point in the Confederate rear. These plans, however, were reversed as soon as Meade was nominated to the chief command : Slo cum was called back to the main army, which halted at a point where it could easily bar the road to Philadelphia, should Lee continue to move north ward ; or to Baltimore, should he wheel sharply to the east. Lee, apprehensive lest a further advance toward Harrisburg should endanger his communications, ordered his three corps, now widely separated, to concentrate at Cashtown, situated on the east side of the South Mountain range not far from Gettys burg. Ewell at this time was in the vicinity of Carlisle. Cashtown was chosen because, in case of a repulse, the wagon trains could be safely trans ferred through the gap at that point to the Cumber land Valley, and the passage closed against the enemy. Meade also had selected his ground for the ap proaching battle ; this lay on the line of Pipe Creek, twelve miles southeast of Gettysburg, a posi tion of great natural strength. Had Stuart been present with Lee at this critical hour, the Confed erates would certainly have been able to choose the time, but not so certainly the place of conflict, for it was not likely that Meade would have abandoned Pipe Creek and advanced against his opponent, awaiting him at Cashtown. The wisest policy, as 228 ROBERT E. LEE he knew, was to remain where he was, since time was a factor of no importance to him stationed in his own country, in easy reach of supplies, and occupying an entrenched position between the enemy and Washington. Moreover, he justly an ticipated that Lee's energetic character would prompt him ultimately to seek his antagonist and fight rather than withdraw to Virginia without a battle. Cashtown and Pipe Creek were separated by a distance of twenty miles. It was merely by acci dent that the two armies came into collision at a point nearly equidistant from each of these two previously selected positions. On June 30th, Petti- grew' s brigade, leaving Cashtown, marched toward Gettysburg in the hope of obtaining there a much needed supply of shoes ; but, unknown to them, that town was already in the possession of a detachment of Federal cavalry. Pettigrew, after a sharp brush with the enemy, fell back and rejoined A. P. Hill, who, somewhat rashly, determined next day to reconnoitre, without anticipating, as he should have done, that such a movement might lead to the viola tion of General Lee's orders not to bring on a battle until all the Confederate army was up. The con centration in the neighborhood of Cashtown was still incomplete. Heth, who was sent forward, struck, not far from Gettysburg, a division of the First Corps, which had been moved up from the Federal main army as soon as Meade was informed of the presence of Confederate troops in the vicinity THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN 229 of that town. Pender soon joining Heth, the com bination gave their side the preponderance. Eey- nolds, the Federal commander, was killed. By one o'clock in the afternoon, two divisions of the Fed eral Eleventh Corps had arrived on the field, while its third was left to hold Cemetery Eidge, a strong position situated immediately south of Gettysburg. A sharp combat was in progress when Ewell, who, with two divisions, had soon come up to reinforce Pender and Heth, attacked the left flank of the Eleventh Corps and drove it back, a stroke that ex posed the First Coi-ps' right wing, which, in con sequence, finding itself in imminent danger of being cut off from its line of retreat to Cemetery Eidge, retired upon that point in a state of great confusion. During the com-se of these events, Hancock, who had been sent forward to report on the advisability of concentrating the entire Federal army at Gettys burg, reached Cemetery Heights, and one of his first acts was to take possession of Culp's Hill, south west of the town, a position commanding Cemetery Heights from that side. Had Ewell pressed on with energy, he could easily have seized the latter before night fell, for, at that time, the Federal force hold ing it did not exceed 6,000 men. Lee, who had come up in the afternoon, observing through his field glass the enemy retreating in confusion over the hills behind the town, sent Ewell a verbal order to advance and capture the Eidge, if " he deemed it practicable," but to avoid bringing on a general battle, as Longstreet's corps was still many miles 230 EOBEET E. LEE away. In his cavalry's absence, Lee had been un able to ascertain whether the Federal troops en gaged in the fight just ended were isolated detach ments, or detachments in touch with the main Fed eral army. Left to his own decision, and alarmed by the re ported approach of a large Federal force, a piece of news turning out to be false, Ewell decided to await the arrival of one of his divisions which had not yet come up ; but when this division at last appeared, it was six o'clock, and the Twelfth Fed eral Corps, supported by a part of the Third, had arrived on Cemetery Heights and taken position near their comrades. Had Hill, whose corps had suffered most severely in the day's battle, been willing to attack at once in cooperation with Ewell, the Heights might still have been captured before nightfall ; but he preferred to remain inactive until Anderson's division should join him, and when this occurred, it was too dark to advance in force. If Hill and Ewell had moved forward and seized the Eidge, no further fighting would have taken place at Gettysburg ; Meade would have simply drawn his entire army back to Pipe Creek. The mo7-ale of his troops, however, would have been sensibly lowered by their ill success. The Confederates' failure to pur sue led Hancock, who saw the defensive possibilities of Cemetery Eidge, to urge the Federal army's im mediate concentration on those heights, advice jus tified by the issue, but not in itself wise, as the Fed eral commander would have discovered, had the THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN 231 Confederate army taken advantage of the unexam pled opportunity which the movement presented to strike their opponents in detail. Meade arrived on the ground late at night, and, though he adopted his lieutenant's advice, did not do so with con fidence. By twelve o'clock the same night (July 1st), the three Confederate corps were encamped either at Gettysburg, or within four miles of the town, in a position where, if they should act with promptness and energy, they could throw themselves upon the enemy by the first sign of dawn, before which hour it would not be possible for all the Federal corps to reach the Eidge ; — in fact, they would be strung out all the way from Pipe Creek and beyond to Gettys burg. When the first streak of light appeared iu the sky on the morning of July 2d, there were posted on Cemetery Eidge the remnants of the defeated First and Eleventh Corps, a part of the Third, and the whole of the fresh Twelfth Corps. Four miles away was the Second, which did not arrive until seven o'clock ; nine miles away was the Fifth ; and twenty-five miles away was the Sixth, the largest and finest of all. Had the Confederate army attacked at any time before seven o'clock, which was entirely feasible, it would have found itself confronted by not more than one-half its number. These, expelled from their entrenchments, would have been pressed back upon the advancing Second Corps, who, in all probability, would have been thrown into confusion by their retreating comrades, and the whole body 232 EOBEET E. LEE driven back upon the forward columns of the Fifth and Sixth Corps. Could Lee have dictated the position of his oppo nents, he could hardly have done so to greater advantage to himself. The absence of his cavalry, instead of proving a perilous drawback, had led to a combination of circumstances far more favorable to his wishes than anything which could have oc curred had that cavalry been present. Who was responsible for the loss of the greatest opportunity ever presented to the Confederate army to defeat the enemy in detail ? After sunset on July 1st, Lee held a conference with EweU aud his two division commanders, Early and Eodes. As their troops were on the grouud, while Longstreet had bivouacked four miles away, Lee was anxious that they should begin the attack next morning with an assault on the Federal right extending as far as Culp's Hill ; but they urged that the weak point in the Federal line lay on the left, and that against this, the first movement should be directed. Lee received the suggestion with evidences of disapproval, not because he thought it unsound from a military point of view, but because the officer who would have to carry it out was then four miles distant from the scene of proposed action, and was notoriously the most dila tory of all his lieutenants. ' ' Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets into position," he re marked thoughtfully iu weighing the suggestion, ' ' but he is so slo w. " Piuall y , ho wever , in an evil mo- THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN 233 ment for the Confederacy, Lee adopted it. When the conference broke up, it was clearly understood that Longstreet was to attack the Federal left at the earliest moment practicable next morning, and the sound of his cannon was to be the signal for Ewell to hurl his corps against the Federal right, and for Hill, to move against the Federal centre. Greneral Pendleton, chief of the artillery, a clergy man whose integrity was never seriously questioned by any one who knew him, states that Lee, in an interview with Longstreet the same night, held while he himself was present, ordered an advance against the Federal left at sunrise, — an entirely practicable movement, as Longstreet's corps was then encamped only four miles from Gettysburg. Longstreet denied that he received such instruc tions, but whether he received them or not (they were precisely those, it may be asserted parenthet ically, which a commander even of ordinary alert ness would have given), no one was more clearly aware than himself that by celerity alone the oppor tunity presented to the Confederates to overwhelm the foe in detail could be seized and used. " Time on this occasion," as he himself admitted, "was more than cannon balls." Unfortunately for the Southern cause, no specific orders in writing were drawn up for his direction, for it was General Lee's habit to give verbal orders, and allow his officers to be guided largely by circumstances in carrying them out. This was well with such a soldier as Jackson ; it was not well with such a soldier as Long- 234 EOBERT E. LEE street, bravfi. aud vigorous though he always was in action. Students of Jackson's career can easily imagine what that incarnation of energy would have done had he been in Longstreet's place on the night of July 1st. No orders to march at daybreak would have been needed by him ; by dawn, his corps would have been confronting Cemetery Hill ready to advance up its slopes at the first sound of the bugle. So plain was the course to be pursued on the morning of July 2d, that not even Longstreet, slow as he was, would have failed to carry it out had not another unfortunate characteristic come into play. As has already been stated, he was extremely opin- ionative, and he took it into his head (apparently in a desire to bear to Lee the peculiar executive relation in flank movements which Jackson had borne) that Cemetery Hill should not be assaulted from in front, but the whole position of the enemy turned. Nor would he yield when Lee offered strong reasons to show the inadvisability of such a manoeuvre. The first of these reasons was that, in the cavalry's absence, it would be a very perilous step to penetrate farther into a region occupied in force by the Federals. A flank march, to be suc cessful even under the most favorable circumstances, must be made with great rapidity and with more or less secrecy. How could the infantry advance swiftly without horsemen when they themselves would have to reconnoitre on all sides at once, and when the head of the column might be crushed at any moment by an unexpected assault of the THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN 235 enemy? Secondly, even if Lee should be able to thrust himself between Meade and Washington or Baltimore, the Federal army's line of communica tion would not really be cut, for one part of the North would still be open behind it ; Meade could still stand quietly on the defensive, or what would be worse, strike at Lee's base of supply, already jeopardized by the forward movement. Nor could Lee take a position on Seminary Ridge, opposite Cemetery Heights and await an assault, since he was absolutely dependent on the country behind him for food, and that country had already been depleted by the passage of his army. It would not at best furnish a support for more than four or five days, should he remain stationary ; nor could he afford to disperse his troops far afield in order to collect provisions. Moreover, the longer the two armies stood face to face, the more reinforcements Meade was certain to receive, until, finally, the preponderance in his favor would be so enormous that, like Grant later at Petersburg, he could, with ease, sweep around his antagonist's flank at the very hour he assailed that antagonist's front. The character of the entire situation justified Lee in ordering Longstreet to march against Cemetery Eidge at the earliest practicable moment on the morning of July 2d. But that officer, instead of entering heartily into his commander's plan as soon as his own was overruled for sound reasons, acted as if his principal object was to prove what an ex cellent prophet he was. Had he gone deliberately 236 EOBEET E. LEE to work to thwart Lee's purposes, he could not have done so more successfully. Had not his conduct on the second and third days at Gettysburg been of a piece with his conduct at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, he might justly be suspected of disaffection to the Southern cause. It is no exaggeration to say that the fate of the Confederacy turned absolutely on what he should do between the hours of 4:30 and 7 a. m. on July 2d. Promptness in concentrating in front of Cemetery HiU during those fateful one hundred and fifty minutes, would have enabled Lee to defeat the enemy in detail. A triumph at Gettys burg might not, after all, owing to the capture of Vicksburg, have led to Southern independence ; but, in looking back on the war, there seems just reason to think that the only hope of that independence lay in a great victory won on this field. Had Longstreet advanced to battle at 4:30, the hour of dawn at this season, he would have found im mediately in his front Geary's division alone ; had he advanced at five o'clock, he would have found the Federal position on the left of the First Corps entirely undefended. By seven o'clock, the Second Corps had reached the Eidge, but even with this reinforcement the Federal entrenchments were still assailable. Bound Top and Little Bound Top, in command of the Federal line in reverse, could still have been seized without difficulty — being then unoccupied — and permanently held, a fact which would ultimately have forced Meade to retire to Pipe Creek. THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN 237 It was not until 8 a. m., nearly three hours after the sun had risen, that the main body of Long- street's corps arrived at Gettysburg, although they had only four miles to traverse. Lee, who had been on horseback since daybreak, and chafing under the delay, had been forced to look on help lessly as reinforcements poured into the Federal en- trenchmeuts. By that hour, two additional corps had joined the four already on the ground, and 65,000 men looked down upon the Confederate army. These new bodies of troops had come up from a greater distance than Longstreet's. Instead of marching forward at once, this officer further in flamed his chief's impatience by renewing his argu ments in favor of a flank movement, although they had been fully canvassed and rejected the night be fore. "The enemy is here," exclaimed Lee; "if we don't whip htm, he will whip us." In a sinister moment for his cause, he permitted himself so far to be influenced by his lieutenant's reluctance as to send Colonel Venable, of his staff, to find out whether Ewell, now that he had been able to examine by daylight the enemy's line in front of him, still thought it inadvisable to begin the battle by an as sault on the Federal right. Ewell reported that the position was now too strong to be assailed with any prospect of success, and this conclusion was con firmed by Lee himself, who rode over and inspected it in person. Eeturning to Longstreet, he, at eleven o'clock, gave that officer a positive order to advance. It 238 EOBEET E. LEE was then, perhaps, too late to dislodge the combined corps posted on Cemetery Eidge before the remain ing ones could come up ; but the two Bound Tops could still have been captured, and Meade's posi tion thus rendered in the end untenable. Law's brigade not yet having joined Longstreet, the latter assumed the responsibility of disobeying the com mand for an immediate attack until that brigade should appear, although he must have known that additional time thus offered the enemy to hurry up the absent corps, was certain only to in crease the disproportion between the Confederates and the Federals, even after Law's arrival. For every one hundred men Longstreet could obtain by waiting, the Federals would obtain two hundred, or even more, and the last numerical disparity of the opposing forces would necessarily be greater than the first. Although on the night of July 1st, Longstreet was encamped only four miles from the battle-field ; although, by eight o'clock, he had got the whole of his corps, with the exception of one brigade, in front of Cemetery Eidge, it was not until one in the afternoon that he put his troops in motion ; and it was not until four that he was in a position to make the attack which should have been made at least eleven hours earlier. At that moment, a Federal corps, which, when its march began, was thirty -four miles from Gettysburg, had reached the field, and the whole Federal army was now ready to repel assault. It was no longer in Lee's power THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN 239 to defeat the enemy in detail. Even if he could carry Cemetery Eidge by storm, his troops would be too fatigued and broken to undertake a rapid march upon Washington and Baltimore. By his slowness and practical disloyalty to his chief. Long- street had created a condition, which, had it existed in the morning, would have caused Lee to adopt a flank movement in spite of the perils that would have accompanied it. If Longstreet had had such an object secretly in view, it was now too late to realize it, for the two armies were in actual touch, and it was less dangerous to attack than to retreat. The Federal position was very strong naturally, and had been made still stronger by art. It was shaped like a rude fish hook. The head of the prong, bent southeast, consisted of Culp's Hill ; the shaft, of the Eidge itself; and the barb, of two small mountains known as Bound Top and Little Bound Top. The capture of Culp's Hill would have weakened the Federal hold on Cemetery Heights, because it would have exposed the Federal rear ; while the capture of the Bound Tops would have enabled the Confederates to bombard the Heights in reverse, which, besides doing deadly execution in itself, would have given powerful support to a frontal attack. On its western side. Cemetery Eidge fell gradually to an undulating valley, and then the ground as gradually again rose, until it formed Seminary Eidge about a mile distant, where the main body of the Confederate army was posted. Ewell's corps, on the extreme left, faced Culp's Hill, 240 EOBEET E. LEE or the top of the fish hook ; Hill's corps, in the cen tre, the main Eidge or the middle of the shaft ; and Longstreet, on the extreme right, the Bound Tops, or the two barbs. When the battle began, the Federals were not oc cupying Bound Top, although a corps was stationed in its rear. Little Bound Top, likewise unoccu pied, was somewhat better protected by an angle in the Federal position, which made that part, as was soon shown, highly vulnerable to attack. This angle, which was really a mile in front of the Fed eral army's main line, was held by Sickles' corps, and the ground he stood upon wasknown as the Peach Orchard. Lee was not aware when Longstreet as sailed this advanced body of troops, a movement which opened the battle, that the Fifth Corps, en trenched behind them, really formed that section of the enemy's main line. The convex shape of the Federal position gave Meade the advantage of oper ating on interior lines about two and a half miles long, a fact that enabled him to hurry forward rein forcements to any threatened point in much less time than could the Confederates, who operated on exte rior lines, five miles in extent. The latter, indeed, could move only along a circumference, as the roads in their front were exposed to the Federal ar tillery fire. The length of their lines, held as they were by only 60,000 men, made the establishment of a reserve impracticable, and it also rendered a con certed movement from one end to the other almost impossible. It was not a position which Lee would THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN 241 have taken had his cavalry been present before the fighting began. Longstreet was ordered to open the battle by at tacking the corps posted in the Peach Orchard, and having turned its fiank, to roll it back along the Emmittsburg Eoad, skirting the orchard, until the whole was pressed in confusion on the Federal cen tre. While this movement was in progress, Ewell was to assail the Federal right, and, if possible, roll this wing back on that point also. About four o'clock in the afternoon, these two projected assaults began simultaneously. Ewell's was ouly partially successful ; Johnson's division was able to seize and hold one of the Federal lines of entrenchment on Culp's Hill, but the other two divisions accomplished nothing. In the meanwhile, Longstreet had deployed in front of the Peach Or chard. The brigade on his extreme right was posted not far from Bound Top. It was reported to its general by a small force sent forward to recon noitre, that this height as well as Little Eouud Top was unoccupied. The general promptly in person informed his division commander of this fact, and earnestly demonstrated the ease with which the Fed eral left might be turned from that point. An aide- de-camp was dispatched to Longstreet, but although General Lee could have been quickly communicated with, that officer merely returned the reply that he had been ordered to advance against the enemy down the Emmittsburg Eoad (which was in the op posite direction) and that these instructions must be 242 EOBEET E. LEE obeyed. Thus the opportunity of seizing the two Tops waslost by the action of a subordinate who, in the morning, had not hesitated to assume the responsibil ity of violating Lee's command to move into battle at once ; and who now, when a similar use of his discretion would have been of extraordinary advan tage to the Southern cause, preferred to play the part of an unthinking machine in carrying out or ders which Lee would have been the first to modify, had he been informed at once of the di\'isional com mander's report. The sharp fight at a later hour for the same gen eral position, when, by Warren's promptness in as suming to act on his own judgment. Little Bound Top had been occupied by the Federals, would seem to show that Longstreet fully understood the vital relation it bore to Confederate success. With the two Round Tops in his possession, the whole of the Federal left wing, as soon as Sickles was defeated, could have been pressed back on the centre. While Longstreet was assailing Sickles' left. Hill was assailing his right. Humphreys' division, in changing front, was forced back to the Eidge, and the battle was restored for the Federals at that point only by the forward rush of reinforcements. Wright's brigade, after piercing the Federal centre, succeeded iu penetrating as far as the Eidge, but were compelled to relinquish their hold by a vig orous charge of the foe. Wilcox's brigade actually reached the crest, but, like their comrades, were finally driven back. Had these two brigades been THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN 243 firmly supported by Pender's and Anderson's, also of Hill's Corps, it is not improbable that the Fed eral centre would have been permanently split in two. Hill's management of the operations in his section of the fleld was marked by neither prompt ness nor energy, aud the ground gained there was soon lost by his feeble action. Both on the Confed erate left and centre, the excellent opportunity exist ing or created for the enemy's defeat in their front was permitted by Hill's weakness and Longstieet's perversity to pass unused. The general result of the second day's operations over the whole field, however, was not unfavorable to the Confederate cause. Taking it in connection with the first day's victory, Lee was justified in thinking that the courage of the Federal army was so shaken that a vigorous, concerted attack on its lines the following morning stood such a chance of success as to warrant its being made ; and he was the more convinced of this because the positions gained on the right along the Emmittsburg Road would enable his artillery to render the assaulting columns more assistance than they had previously. Ewell, as we have seen, had captured a portion of Culp's Hill on the extreme left, which would be of great advantage in continuing the attack in that section of the field. Early, on that side, and Wright and Wilcox in the centre, would have beeu able to hold the positions on the Ridge which they had reached, had they been promptly supported in force. Stuart's cavalry had arrived, aud Pickett's 244 EOBERT E. LEE division, consistiug of 5,000 fresh troops, had also come up. What point in the Federal line should be first assailed on the following morning? Such was the question presented to Lee on the night of the 2d, Not the extreme Federal left, for that was peculiarly strong, owing to the possession of Little Round Top. Moreover, success in that quarter would not seriously interfere with Meade's road for retreat in case he was expelled from the Eidge. Lee soon saw that the Federal centre was the real point to be attacked. His plan was to drive one half of his army like a wedge through this section of the Fed eral position ; then, with a part of the same forces wheel sharply to the left, and, if possible, annihilate the Federal right wing, thus closing the line of Fed eral withdrawal toward Baltimore ; and when this had been accomplished, turn to assist the other part of the wedge, which had been ordered to hold the Federal left wing at bay. The entire movement would be both bold and haz ardous, but had it been carried out with the vigor aud concert shown at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville, its triumphant consummation was far from impos sible. At this moment, Lee recognized as clearly as he had always done that the only hope of Southern independence lay in the delivery of an overwhelm ing stroke, and that in delivering such a stroke, great risks must be taken. Even a second Chancellors ville might, by following so soon upon two other defeats, tend to weaken the North's determination THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN 245 to continue the war. Lee knew that he was now too close to his opponent to make a successful flank march with the view of cutting his communi cations ; nor could he retreat without such a con fession of failure as would destroy the whole moral effect of the invasion. To Pickett's and Pettigrew' s (Heth's) divisions was assigned the duty of forming the sharp end of the wedge to be driven through the Federal centre. These troops were to be backed up by Anderson's division, while Hill was to hold other reinforce ments in readiness to march to their assistance at once. Hood and McLaws, of Longstreet's corps, were directed to make a demonstration against the extreme left, and at the right moment join in the attack on the centre. As the assaulting column advanced, its front was to be protected by the over head fire of Hill's and Longstreet's batteries, and also of a part of Ewell's, while its flanks were to be supported by artillery pushed forward as the troops pressed on. This artillery was to be propelled into the expected breach and to aid in widening it. During the progress of these operations on the right and in the centre, Ewell, on the extreme left, was to be assaulting the Federal line immediately in his front. Unfortunately for the Confederacy, Lee, on the third day as on the second, was forced to rely prin cipally upon Longstreet for the achievement of his main purpose. On the second day, as we have seen, that officer had disconcerted his chiefs plans by 246 ROBERT E. LEE his slowness in reaching the battle-field ; by his para lyzing opposition to that chief's wishes ; by his dis regard of the command to move at eleven o'clock ; and, finally, by his machine-like loyalty to an order which Lee would have extolled him for modifying on his own responsibility. On the third day, Long- street was to exhibit an even more insubordinate spirit ; and by his obstinacy and perversity, to de prive the South of what was to be its last but greatest chance of winning its independence. At daybreak, on July 3d, the third day of the battle, the Federals anticipated a portion of Lee's plan by assaulting his left wing. As Ewell's par tial hold on Culp's Hill threatened their line of retreat in case of repulse, and also exposed their reserve artillery to capture, it was of vital impor tance that the position occupied by the Confederates should be retaken ; and this, after a sharp contest, the Federals were able to do. This success, by se curing Meade's line of withdrawal, reduced the chances of an overwhelming disaster, should Lee drive his antagonist from his entrenchments on Cemetery Ridge. At 9 a. m., three hom'S before the struggle on the Confederate left ceased, the column which was to make the assault on the Federal centre was lying behind Seminary Ridge ready to move forward at the first signal. It was necessary that the advance should begin while the enemy opposite the Confed erate left were engaged with Ewell ; but it was not until after one o'clock in the afternoon, when the THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN 247 fighting iu that part of the field had ended, leaving the Federals there free to strengthen their centre, that Pickett and Pettigrew received the signal to charge. The heavy cannonade preceding the move ment had served only to exhaust the Confederates' ammunition without really demoralizing the enemy. Instead of advancing under the supporting fire of their own batteries on Seminary Eidge, the assault ing column swept on, with the guns on the heights in their rear silent. The distance to be traversed spread over about fourteen hundred yards. First, the column de scended a slope of Seminary Eidge, and having crossed the narrow undulating valley at its foot, be gan to ascend the gentle slope of Cemetery Heights. About half way, the Federal artillery in front started to play with fatal effect on the breasts of the approaching ranks, while the batteries on Little Bound Top poured an equally deadly fire into their flanks. Owing to the waste of powder in the can nonade, only some fifteen or eighteen guns could be sent forward with the column to protect it on each side, and thus these brave men were practically un supported by artillery. Notwithstanding this fact, Pickett's division car ried the enemy's first line, and a small company, led by General Armistead, rushing forward, seized sev eral cannon planted between it and the second line ; but, with the fall of that gallant officer, they were soon driven back behind the shelter of the stone wall which had served as a breastwork for the 248 EOBEET E. LEE first. This was the moment when, according to General Lee's plan, not less than 20,000 additional men were to advance from the Confederate side. With these reinforcements pressing on toward the breach, or keeping the wings of the Federal army from converging upon it ; and with the entire artil lery arm at play, either in widening the breach it self, or in diverting assistance from the Federals at that point, there was no reason why the wedge should not have penetrated far enough to split the Federal centre, and throw it to right and left in confusion. But neither troops nor guns came to the column's support. Pettigrew was soon foiled ; and Pickett, who had lost 3,395 men killed, wounded or captured in a total of 4,500, had no alternative but to fall back to the Confederate main line. Why had Pickett and Pettigrew been left to fight an entire army without assistance? Although Longstreet had been empowered to send forward the whole of Anderson's division, only two brig ades participated in the battle ; and with equal supineness, he had used but two of Pender's divi sion of Hill's corps. Hood's and McLaws's divi- rAons, instead of first demonstrating against the Fed eral left, and then vigorously assaulting it or the centre at the critical moment, had been entirely oc cupied in protecting their wagon train from a dash of a few brigades of Federal cavalry. In the pres ence of 60,000 men looking quietly on, as if at some grand military review, Longstreet had sent 15,000 men to death or capture, without really attempting THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN 249 to give them the strong aud prompt support called for by General Lee's express orders, aud by the dic tates of common sense. As soon as the remnants of the assaulting column straggled back, Lee exerted himself in person to re form his lines at that point, and in a very short time, the Confederate right and centre were prepared to resist with vigor a counterstroke, had one been made. Meade, however, was satisfied merely to throw his cavalry on his opponent's flank in order to cut down the infantry, should they show signs of confusion ; but the horsemen were so firmly received that they were forced to withdraw. It was not until the second night after the final stiuggle that Lee set his trains in motion. Meade was so convinced that this was the first step toward a flank march for the purpose of drawing him away from Cemetery Heights, that he instructed his sub ordinates not to bring on another battle. Not until the morning of the 5th did the retreat of the rear guard begin. The withdrawal of the army was due to no loss of morale ; had it remained on Seminary Eidge, it would have been entirely lacking iu ordi nary supplies, while its communications with Har per's Ferry, upon which it depended for ammuni tion, would have been in danger of severance. It was not until the 6th that Meade, abandoning his entrenchments, followed in Lee's track ; but the pur suit was so feeble that there was little effort to at tack even the rear-guard. A rise in the waters of the Potomac forced Lee, before crossing, to take up 250 EOBEET E. LEE a position in order to repel an assault, should one be made; but without serious molestation, he, on the 13th, withdrew into Virginia. Thus ended the Gettysburg campaign. The losses during the three days' battle amounted in various ways to 21,451 men on the Confederate side, and to 23, 003 on the Federal. Four Federal general offi cers and five Confederate were killed, and thirteen Fed eral and nine Confederate wounded. Excepting the third day's struggle, when only about one-fifth of the Confederate army was engaged, the result as a whole had not been unfavorable to the Southern cause ; that army had at least inflicted as much damage as it had received, and had then safely retreated at its leisure. In its larger aspects, however, the battle of Gettysburg was a heavy blow to Southern hopes, as, for the second time, the invasion of the North had terminated in failure. The Army of Northern Virginia, justly regarded as the Confederacy's chief instrument for winning its independence, had, for a time at least, been comx)letely balked in its attempt to win that independence by a single stroke when all the circumstances appeared highly auspicious. The fall of Vicksburg, by isolating so vast a sec tion of Confederate territory, undoubtedly gave to the issue of this great battle, a gloomier significance than it deserved. From the Southern point of view, its most depressing feature after all was, not that it compelled Lee to retreat across the Potomac for the second time, but that it revealed his entire lack of a lieutenant upon whom he could rely, as he had THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN 251 relied upon Jackson, for the prompt and skilful ex ecution of his plans. All the apprehensions raised by that general's death were confirmed by this campaign, although the disconcerting part played by Longstreet was not fully known at the time. Careful observers had now only too much reason to expect that subsequent campaigns would illustrate the same deficiency to an even more conspicuous degree. General Lee's moral greatness was exhibited as strikingly at Gettysburg as at Chancellorsville. At Chancellorsville, as we have seen, he attributed to Jackson all the credit of the victory; at Gettysburg, he assumed all the discredit of the defeat. "It is all my fault," he exclaimed to Pickett when that gallant officer returned to the lines on Seminary Eidge, outraged to tears by the failure to support his division. "It is all my fault, and you must help me out of it the best you can." From the larger point of view, General Lee was right in attributing the defeat to himself, for it was principally due to his habit of showing an almost excessive consideration for the feelings, wishes, and opinions of his corps commanders that at least one of them ventured upon liberties of action, which he would not have indulged in had his chief insisted more sternly on his own suprem acy. Several observers who stood close to Lee during the war testify that, out of sheer kindness of heart and amiability of temper, he was too gentle in dealing with incompetent or perverse subordi- 252 EOBEET E. LEE nates. Had Jackson, a man always intolerant of inefficiency, and permitting no departure from his instructions, or even a show of opposition, been Longstreet's commander at Gettysbm-g, no time would have been wasted by him in arguing with his opinionative and procrastinating lieutenant on the morning of July 2d. There would have been but one order — "March," — which would have been received and carried out without question. Only one council of war was ever summoned by Jackson, and it would ha^'e been better for the Confederacy had Lee also acted so exclusively on his own judgment that his most self-complacent officers would have recognized the hopelessness of trying to alter his resolution. Leaving his balking lieutenant and riding off to find out whether Ewell could not, after all, make the first attack (Federal reinforcements, in the meanwhile, streaming into the entrenchments on Cemetery Hill), Lee pre sents a spectacle well calculated to lower his repu tation as a determined and energetic leader of men. Longstreet was clearly entitled to his own opinion, but that he should have permitted this opinion, after it had beeu overruled, to govern his conduct throughout the battle was an act of dis loyalty which even he, with all his self-esteem, would not have committed had he beeu serving under a chief of more unbending temper. Aware that Longstreet did not enter heartily into his plans, why did Lee rely upon him for the per formance of so vital a task ? As we have seen, on THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN 253 the night of July 1st, Lee was anxious for Ewell to begin the attack next morning, simply because Longstreet, whose corps was then four miles away, "was so slow." He consented to be overruled only when he was convinced that the first assault should be directed against Cemetery Eidge from the right aud not from the left. Longstreet arrived on the battle-field last, and it was due to this characteristic fact that he had to be posted in the position from which the first advance against the enemy was to be made. Moreover, when he had once entered a fight, no one struck with greater determination and pertinacity, and he showed this admirable quality at the Peach Orchard on the second day of the battle. Hill, on the other hand, exhibited there decided feebleness. On the third day, Lee was again com pelled by the mere force of circumstances to rely upon Longstreet. The practical insubordination as well as the slowness marking his conduct before the battle of the second day began, was, doubtless, not forgotten by Lee ; but the vigorous assault on Sickles had naturally modified the unfavorable impressions caused by those acts. Ewell was stationed at the other end of the field, and Hill, who was nearer at hand, was known to be inferior to Longstreet in skill and experience in handling large bodies of troops. Neither, therefore, could be considered for the task of the third day. Had Longstreet been a Federal officer, and had he supported that side at Gettysburg as he sup ported the Confederate, he would have been tried 264 EOBEET E. LEE for disobedience and incompetence, and dropped from the roll. Such was the fate which overtook Burnside, Porter and Franklin for offenses far less serious; such was the fate which also overtook Warren until he was reinstated by Grant. But Lee, if he ever really thought of court-martialing his refractory lieutenant, of which there is no proof, shrank from doing so, because he was assured of Longstreet's loyalty to the South, appreciated his valuable services in the past, and recognized that his degradation would arouse resentment in his corps, and perhaps, in some measure, alienate the support of Georgia, the state justly claiming him as one of its most distinguished citizens. Nothing was to be gained by sowing dissension, now that it was so urgent that all should act as one for the advancement of a cause whose prospects had sud denly darkened. If distrustful of Longstreet, why did not Lee assume personal charge of the operations assigned to that officer ? And why did he show so much less tactical ability at Gettysburg than he had at Sharpsburg? As we have seen, the position at Sharpsburg was taken after a careful examination of the ground with a special view to its tactical advantages. At Gettysburg, on the other hand, he had no choice ; the battle began by accident, and he was forced to arrange his troops in the fleld as he found it, a condition which compelled him to shape his lines in a manner that greatly hampered concert of action, even if it did not render such THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN 255 concert impracticable. When once a commander has given his general orders in battle, he has to rely on his lieutenants' intelligence and energy to exe cute them. He cannot personally execute his own orders. Should a subordinate show a lack of judg ment, skill and spirit, then it is rarely in his com mander's power to remedy the deficiency. And if that subordinate also undertakes to question the wisdom of his superior's general directions, and, in consequence, to act with a supineness and half- heartedness tantamount to insubordination, as Long- street did at both Fair Oaks and Gettysburg, not to mention the first day at Second Manassas, it is not often that the situation can be saved by the com mander's personal intervention, simply because the opportunity for striking a successful blow during the actual operations on the battle-field is so soon lost. Not even Napoleon himself could always hold his lieutenants iu hand, as Waterloo revealed ; nor could McClellan at Sharpsburg, nor Lee at Gettys burg, in some respects the two most momentous battles ever fought on our western continent. It is a fact of singular interest that, after Gettys burg, both Lee and Meade were influenced by the course of events to offer their resignations as the commanders of their respective armies : Meade because Mr. Lincoln was dissatisfied at the safe re treat of the Confederate forces ; Lee because the tone of the Southern press seemed to intimate that the failure of the campaign had shaken the public confidence in his military capacity. In a very 256 EOBEET E. LEE touching letter to Mr. Davis, he expressed his will ingness to transfer the command to some "younger and abler man." "I know," he added, "he will have as gallant and brave an army as ever existed to second his efforts, and it will be the happiness of my life to see at its head a worthy leader, one who can perform more than 1 cau hope to perform, and all that I have wished." He complained of no one but himself. "My eyesight is not perfect," he said, ' ' and I am so dull that, in attempting to use the eyes of others, I find myself often misled." Mr. Davis replied that " to request him to find some one more fit for command, or who possessed more of the confidence of the army or of the reflecting men of the country, was to demand an impossi bility. ' ' And such was the universal opinion of the Southern people. CHAPTEE IX wilderness to COLD HARBOR Lee, after crossing the Potomac, drew back slowly to the Eapidan, where his army reposed during the next three months. Meade, in the meanwhile, was stationed near Culpeper Court-House. At the end of this interval, there began between the two a campaign of manoeuvres, ranging over the entire region between the Eapidan and Bull Eun. Lee, on one occasion, followed his opponent as far as Chantilly, almost in sight of the spires of Washing ton. " I could have thrown him further back," he wrote, "but saw no chance of bringing him to battle, and it would have only served to fatigue our troops by advancing further. I should certainly have endeavored to throw him north of the Po tomac, but thousands of my troops were barefooted, thousands with fragments of shoes, and all without overcoats, blankets, or warm clothing. I could not bear to expose them to certain suffering and an un certain issue." In November, Meade sought, by a rapid and secret march, to surprise the Confederate army, now preparing to retire into winter quarters, but still greatly spread out. Lee, informed by Stuart of the movement in time, promptly concentrated his 30,000, 258 EOBEET E. LEE veterans and 150 guns behind log breastworks erected on the densely wooded south bank of Mine Eun. His original army, like Meade's, had recently been reduced by the dispatch of a large detachment to the West. When the Federal troops arrived in front of the quickly-devised fortifications, they found the barrier too strong to be assailed with hope of success, and they quietly withdrew to Culpeper Court-House. Winter now setting in in earnest, military operations in the eastern theatre of war came to an end for the year. In the following March, before the campaign in Virginia opened, occurred the great battle of Mis sionary Eidge, a victory of more far-reaching con sequences than Gettysburg, and the real turning point of the war, because it assured the Federal supremacy in the West, where the Confederacy was ultimately to be conquered. The fall of Vicksburg, the battle of Missionary Ridge, and the retreat of the defeated Confederates to Dalton had left the entire area of the South outside of Georgia, the two Carolinas, Florida, and the lower half of Virginia iu the enemy's possession. The Federals were now able to concentrate two great armies, — one against the forces in north Georgia, now led by Johnston ; the other against the forces on the Eapidan, still led by Lee. Grant, having beeu appointed the Fed eral commander-in-chief, elected to assume personal direction of the troops then stationed at Culpeper Court-House ; on his arrival there, in the spring of 1864, he found himself at the head of 120,000 men WILDEENESS TO COLD HAEBOE 259 supported by 316 pieces of artillery, against whom, Lee, now joined by Longstreet, fresh from the cam paign in East Tennessee, could marshal only about 60,000 men and 224 pieces of artillery. These he had spread out all the way from Orange Court- House to Gordonsville, as he could not anticipate precisely where the first blow would be struck. In Grant, Lee was confronted by a much greater antagonist than any he had previously fought. In tenacity, resolution, vigor, and energy, the newly ap pointed chief was incontestably the first of all the Federal commanders. The record of no other was adorned with such a series of triumphs as those which he had won at Fort Donelson, Vicksburg and Missionary Eidge. In his manner of warfare, he resembled some mighty driving ram, relentlessly directed against the opposing army. All the ac counts which we have of his private life prove that he was a man of more than ordinarily kind heart and affectionate disposition, and yet in the campaign reaching from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, he, in his unyielding determination to restore the Union at all costs, no more hesitated to send his soldiers to slaughter than if they had been so many automa tons of wood or stone. It was the stern spirit of his Covenanter forefathers that disclosed itself in this apparently reckless sacrifice of human lives for the accomplishment of a supreme purpose. But vig orous and rapid aud continuous as were the strokes which he delivered, the Army of Northern Virginia was to be destroyed, not so much by what he achieved 260 EOBEET E. LEE in the East as by what Sherman and Thomas accom plished in the West. No Missionary Eidge, no Nashville, were to tarnish Lee's career after Grant's arrival any more than they had tarnished that career before. Grant himself was too wise to depreciate his op ponent ; from the beginning, he saw that there was but one way of vanquishing Lee ; namely, by the res olute and persistent use of the almost inexhaustible Federal reserves in men and material regardless of their destruction. The Army of Northern Virginia had not simply to be defeated, — it had practically to be destroyed before it would yield. During the campaign's early stages, Grant announced his gen eral plan to be "to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources until by mere attrition, if by nothing else, there would be nothing left for him" but to submit. He knew that the Federals could better afford to lose ten men and five cannon in battle than the Confederates one man and one cannon. A vainer, more ambitious, aud a less sincere commander would never have used such plain and blunt words ; but Grant's pur pose was to save the Union, not to advance his own reputation by exploiting beforehand strategical and tactical schemes in which pure genius aud not num bers was expected to play the first part. He went about that purpose with a singleness and directness that was utterly oblivious of all personal pretension. "Wherever Lee goes," he wrote to Meade, "there you will go too." Lee was to be the objective, not WILDERNESS TO COLD HAEBOE 261 Eichmond, and if, after Cold Harbor, (perhaps ear lier), he abandoned this policy, he did so only because he discovered that his opponent could not be over whelmed even by the most lavish expenditure of the unlimited Federal resources. He declared, before crossing the Rapidan, that he would strike the enemy between that river aud Richmond, "if Lee will stand." Whatever doubt he had entertained as to the latter' s attitude was soon dispelled. Be fore many days had passed, instead of Grant going "where Lee was," it was Lee who was following close in Grant's track, and, in the end, always inter posing between him and the Confederate capital. Three courses were open to Grant on the threshold of the campaign: he could throw his army across the Rapidan and make a frontal assault on Lee's en trenchments ; he could move around the Confederate left ; or he could skirt the Confederate right. A di rect attack, doubtful of issue at best, was certain to be attended with heavy loss of life. An advance around the left would ouly cause Lee to fall back on a line that would bring Grant no nearer Richmond. If, on the other hand, the Union leader could out flank the Confederate right, he would be able, not only to plant his army firmly between Lee and Rich mond, but also to force Lee to join battle in the open country, where superior numbers were more likely to prevail. It is true that in such a movement, Grant would have to abandon the Orange and Alex andria Railroad, then his base of supply ; but it would require only about ten days' rations, which 262 ROBERT E. LEE could be easily transported, before he would be in a position, after passing through the Wilderness, to form a new base on the Rappahannock ; and as he came nearer Richmond, he knew that he could shift that base, first to the York, and then to the James. By the night of May 4th, the whole of the Federal army, with a part of its wagon train, had crossed the Rapidan. Lee did not attempt to dispute the passage. Why did he not take advantage of its con fusion to attack ? Because he had not forgotten the opportunity which Hooker, about twelve months before, by a similar plunge into the same thickets, though further east, gave the Confederates to destroy their enemy. The respective strength of the two antagonists was just as disproportionate then as it was now, and Lee hoped that the peculiar topog raphy of the country would again serve him equally well in neutralizing the numerical disparity. Grant would have to traverse about ten miles of jungle before he could emerge into an open region. This jungle, like the one surrounding Chancellors ville, had been formed by the use of the original growth of trees in feeding the now extinct fires of lo cal iron furnaces. There were the same scraggy pines, scrub oaks, stunted hazel, and bristling chin quapins, in the midst of which the soldiers of the two armies were invisible to each other at half musket range, and generally not discernible even at half the length of a battalion. This wild region of deep shadow was haunted only by the bat, owl, and whippoorwill, the hare, fox, and deer. Here and WILDERNESS TO COLD HAEBOE 263 there, the surface uuder the heavy cloak of bushes was broken by a narrow ravine, through which a rivulet flowed to the Eapidan ; and here and there also, a little light found its way through the cuttings made in clearing the tracks for hauling wood to the smelters. The district was intersected by ouly two public highways, namely, the turnpike and the plank road that ran from Orange Court-House, by way of Chancellorsville, to Fredericksburg. The Confederate commander was well content to see the Federal troops entangled in the intricacies of this wild tract ; first, because its topography was fully known to him, and, secondly, because it would entirely obstruct the use of cavalry aud artillery, — two arms in which Grant possessed au almost over whelming superiority. Lee, without difficulty, could have assailed the first half of the Federal army as soon as it had crossed the Eapidan, but to do so was to forego the chance of destroying the whole when it should become involved in the dense thickets on the south bank. In order to draw the enemy still deeper into the labyrinth, he, for a time, held back his own men out of sight under cover of the gloomy undergrowth ; but at the moment Grant was congratulating himself that he would be able to pass the Wilderness unmolested, and, without the loss of a man, plant his entire force beyond the Con federate right wing, a rush was made for his flank. Lee did not pause even for Longstreet to come up from Gordonsville, but attacked the entire Federal army with Hill's and Ewell's corps alone. From 264 EOBERT E. LEE this hour, that army, as long as it remained in the Wilderness, resembled a great boar charging in the underbrush the mastiffs which had brought him to bay. Longstreet, who had only twelve miles to traverse, should have arrived on the ground that afternoon (May 5th), but instead did not appear until the next morniug. During that interval, owing to his being away, the two corps engaged had been unable to strike the separated Federal wings an effective blow, and one had been on the edge of disaster. The co operation of the whole Confederate army, small enough as a whole, compared with its antagonist's, was necessary to success. Grant, aware of Long- street's absence, sought to overwhelm Hill and Ewell before they could be reinforced. Hancock threw himself on Hill, and a fierce contest, attended with equal fortune to each side, ensued until night fell. Ewell, who had taken the precaution to erect breast works, was able, not only to repel the enemy's as sault in his front, but also to drive him back some distance. That night the two armies held the posi tions which they had occupied in the morning, but Hancock had the foresight to protect his approaches by a strong line of entrenchment. At dawn of the second day, Sedgwick aud War ren advanced to attack Ewell, and Hancock, Hill. Burnside was ordered at the same time to press be tween the two Confederate corps, and then wheel to right or left as seemed best, and strike one or the other. Ewell stood firm in spite of the vigor of the WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR 265 assault. Hill, confident that he would soon be rein forced by Longstreet, had neglected to throw up en trenchments in imitation of Hancock, and when at tacked, was driven back in confusion. Lee observ ing this, rode forward to rally the troops. Just at this critical moment, the first division of Longstreet's corps came upon the ground at double quick. It was a body of Texans, and as they passed the com mander-in-chief they saluted him with loud cheers ; but it was not until they had advanced some distance that they perceived his intention to accompany them. "Go back, General Lee," rang out all along the charging line. "Go back; we will not go on unless you go back." A sergeant seized his bridle- rein and turned his horse in the direction of the rear. Yielding with reluctance to his men's en treaties, he slowly withdrew to a safer position. In a few minutes, Hancock, whose rapid forward movement had caused some confusion in his own ranks, was stopped and finally driven back, but reforming, advanced again. Longstreet, taking advantage of the shelter offered by the cuttings of a disused railway penetrating that part of the forest, sent four brigades to assail Hancock's flank. Struck unawares, that section of the Federal line was thrown into disorder ; aud this soon extending to the remainder of Hancock's corps, the whole body, in considerable confusion, retreated behind the log breastworks, which fortu nately for them, had been erected during the previous night. Longstreet ordered a general as- 266 ROBERT E. LEE sault on these entrenchments, but as he rode for ward to overlook the movement, he was by mistake shot at by his own men, and so severely wounded that he had to be carried off the field. The delay iu substituting a new commander gave the Federals time to strengthen their fortifications and to bring up reinforcements. Though successful at first in their next attack, the Confederates were finally baffled and retired. In the meanwhile, the dry leaves and brushwood underfoot having been set on tire by the repeated volleys, the gloom of the thick undergrowth was lit up by the flames, which caught the wounded and the dead in their progress, and cast a pall of smoke over the whole of the strange battle-ground. The total result of the second day's contest was that Sedgwick and Warren had been checked, Burnside driven back to his original position, and Hancock repulsed and shut up in a precarious situ ation. At an expense of 10,000 meu, the Confeder ates had inflicted a loss of 17, 666 on their opponents. Had Burnside, Hooker, or McClellan been in com mand of the Army of the Potomac, it would, most probably, have now retreated to the Rappahannock. But Grant was made of firmer metal ; and he never for a moment forgot his numerical superiority. Rejecting a frontal attack as hopeless, he decided to move again to the left, a step made prac ticable only by the Federal command of the sea ; for, had the Eappahannock, York, and James been closed by Confederate cruisers, the Army of the WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR 267 Potomac would have been compelled to retire through an intricate region to its only possible base, the Orange and Alexandria Eailway. As it was, although but seven days' rations remained, and thousands of wounded had to be transported by wagon, it was Grant's safest course to advance east ward ; and in adopting this course, he was prob ably thinking more of his new line of communica tion by water than of the capture of Eichmond. In spite of the depression which the latter event would have caused in the South, and in spite also of the loss of the valuable workshops and foundries situ ated in that city, it would undoubtedly have greatly prolonged the Confederacy's existence had Grant now succeeded in thwarting and keeping his army between Lee and that point. Had the Confederate capital been removed, after the battles iu the Wil derness, to Danville or Ealeigh, Lee's movements would no longer have been complicated by the strategical drawback of having to defend Eichmond, and consequently he would have fallen back slowly to the line of the upper Staunton Eiver to be nearer Johuston's army and the mountains, instead of being gradually drawn into the military morass of Petersburg, and there deprived forever of all power of uniting with that army when the coalition be came imperative. Lee, justly appreciating Grant's indomitable will and indefatigable persistence, and aware that he enjoyed his government's full confidence, and would be backed by its entire resources, felt no surprise 268 EOBERT E. LEE when Stuart reported that the Federal wagon train was moving, not northward, but eastward. Know ing that this was the first step toward a second flank march, Lee acted so energetically that, when the Federal Fifth Corps reached Spottsylvania on the morning of May 8th, it found the Confederate First Corps entrenched in front to bar its passage. Although Grant, by his first movement in the Wilderness, had succeeded in outflanking Lee, the latter, by his success in that battle, had gained such a position that he was now able to swing his army entirely round and plant it squarely in the Federal path. The region in which the new operations began possessed more open spaces than the one so recently abandoned, and consequently there was more room for active manoeuvres, and less obstruction in the use of cavalry and artillery. Lee's main line rested on a ridge crossing the neck of land between the Po and the Ny. His eye for the strongest defensive points in the topography of a country was never more clearly shown ; here, as at Sharpsburg, the ground selected was exactly adapted to the number of his troops. If Grant attacked in front, he would expose his army to the risk of being repulsed with great slaughter ; if on the flank, he would first have to make, across one or the other of the two streams, a reconnaissance in force that was liable to be over whelmed before reinforcements could be hurried up. Such was the fate which nearly overtook one corps that boldly ventured to pass. WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR 269 The only weak point in the Confederate line con sisted of a salient resembling the inverted letter U projected northward. This salient, about a mile long and half a mile wide, was defended, on its west ern side, by Rodes's division of the Second Corps, and on its eastern by Johnson's. Its vulnerable ness caught Grant's watchful eye at once, and he ordered it to be attacked by three divisions drawn up in double lines, supported at a distance of one hundred paces by twelve battalions formed in four lines. The centre was to make the rush, while each wing distracted the enemy in its immediate front. Breaking from the cover of a wood where it had been concealed, the column swept over the first line of Confederate entrenchments, and even succeeded in seizing the second; but, exhausted and unsup ported, after capturing 1,200 prisoners and twenty guns, was driven back by a counterstroke delivered by Confederate brigades in reserve. At first, they held on to the front line of breastworks, but at night abandoned it. Grant, not discouraged by the loss of 4,000 men in the previous attempt, decided to attack the apex of the salient with a greater force. An assaulting column, 20,000 strong, was formed just before day break of the 12th, in front of that position, which, according to the report of a deserter from Johnson's division stationed there, had been greatly weakened in anticipation of another flank movement by the Federal army. The artillery withdrawn had, how ever, really been returned. Although suspecting 270 ROBERT E. LEE the Federal design from noises overheard, the divi sion was unable to withstand the assault when made, owing to the confusion caused by a heavy fog, which, at that early hour, enveloped every object. The great Federal wave, having over whelmed the whole division, swept on irresistibly until it seemed as if the entire Confederate army would be split in two ; but, fortunately for Lee, in making the salient, he had taken the precaution to throw up a line of entrenchments at a distance of half a mile in the rear. When the Federal column reached .this point, the battalions had become mixed aud the entire force was in a state of disorder. It was a critical moment for the Confederates. General Lee, recognizing the peril and wishing to inspire his troops by his presence, placed himself at the head of General Gordon's column about to make a charge. That officer, seizing his bridle, ex claimed : "This is no place for you. General Lee." " Is it necessary for General Lee to lead this charge ? ' ' he then cried out to his men. "No! No! "was the unanimous response from the ranks ; " we will drive them back if General Lee will only go to the rear." As he withdrew, greatly touched by their devotion, Gordon rode to the head of the division, and in that ringing voice which had been so often heard above the storm of battle, shouted: "Forward, march, and remember your promise to General Lee." The Federals were slowly pressed back to a spot which came to be known as the Bloody Angle from the desperate character of the struggle that took place WILDERNESS TO COLD HAEBOE 271 there. The ground was soon covered with heaps of dead and wounded, and the very trees were cut down by the volleys of bullets. Eodes and Gordon were reinforced by only three brigades, and although their troops, now separated from the enemy by a breastwork of logs alone, were assailed in front and enfiladed in reverse by the Federal artillery, they could not be dislodged. As soon as darkness fell, however, they raised a new line of entrenchments in their rear, and to this they withdrew before daybreak. The Federals had lost 6,800 men, and the Confed erates 4,600, in addition to the prisoners belonging to Johnson's division captured in the first Federal rush. The balance of success in the entire opera tions favored the Southern side. Eepulsed on both flanks. Grant was left in his original position by the new line of Confederate earthworks across the salient. Eecognizing that a frontal assault on this new line would fail, he de cided to manoeuvre for an advantage. Hardly stop ping to rest his fatigued and shattered troops, he ordered a large force to be concentrated on the fol lowing night (May 13th), at a point from which the Confederate right might be outflanked ; but before this point could be reached, several miles had to be traversed, and the Federal corps, instead of being in position by the next morning, were strung out in a state of exhaustion along the whole interval. Confederate troops were hurried up to the right wing, and the Federal plan had to be abandoned. Deferring further operations for three days. Grant 272 EOBEET E. LEE then decided to manoeuvre again ; but this time he ordered an attack on the Confederate centre, which he supposed had been weakened by the withdrawal of forces to protect the right. On the contrary, it had been strengthened by Lee, now put on his guard by the previous movement, and when the Federal troops came on, they were soon repulsed. Thus ended the series of battles at Spottsylvania, a series that made up a short campaign of unexam pled fury. It would be difficult to discover in the history of the entire war a course of operations in which the Confederate soldier's high qualities shone more brilliantly. Johnson's division, it is true, had been surprised, but every other assault had been successfully resisted, every breach had been promptly filled, and every broken line restored. The Con federate action had been characterized by extraor dinary alertness, firmness, and resourcefulness ; the Federal, by unsurpassed vigor, courage, and per sistency. This series of battles, which resembled somewhat the series afterward occurring around Petersburg, revealed the vital importance of not im posing on the Confederate army the permanent de fense of one point. As long as that army was mobile, its opponent could not gain time to erect formidable fortifications. Without Eichmond to guard, Lee would have been in Meade's advan tageous position before the battle of Gettysburg : he could have awaited attack behind temporary breastworks, easily held or abandoned as circum stances required. WILDEENESS TO COLD HAEBOE 273 The Confederate army's invincibility while en gaged in the mobile defensive was silently acknowl edged by Grant, when, on the 20th, notwithstand ing the arrival of 40,000 fresh troops, he disappeared from Lee's front as completely as if no Federal sol dier had ever been seen there. As he marched east ward, he pushed one corps forward a very consid erable distance, in the hope that his energetic opponent would be tempted to attack before throw ing up entrenchments. But Lee, moving on the in terior lines, was satisfied to take position behind the North Anna Eiver, with a view of disputing the passage, should Grant seek to force it. It was here for the first time during the campaign that he ob tained reinforcements, which, however, numbered barely 9,000 men. From the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, the entire addition to his strength did not exceed 14,400. His army was now further weak ened by the absence of his cavalry in pursuit of Sheridan, sent by Grant to break up the Virginia Central and Eichmond and Fredericksburg Eailroads iu the Confederate rear. It was during this raid that Stuart, dispatched to intercept that officer, was killed. Lee, when he halted behind the North Anna, ex tended his troops in an almost straight line some distance back from the river, but parallel with it. Two bridges spanned the stream opposite his right wing, while a ford was situated opposite his centre, and another about two and a half miles beyond his left. Grant, on arriving, advanced a corps across 274 ROBERT E. LEE the river by this more remote ford, and as these troops at once threw up entrenchments, the Confed erates were prevented from driving them back. Had not sickness confined Lee to his tent at this mo ment, the assault of his soldiers, which lacked ^igor, would perhaps have proved successful. Grant, en couraged, dispatched a second corps to the first's as sistance, and a third was moved across the bridge opposite the Confederate centre. As their opponents were posted in a straight line with their several commands more or less separated, there would ap parently be no difficulty in uniting the three Federal corps after the last two had also passed over the stream ; but this anticipatiou was thwarted by a curious manoeuvre of Lee : He drew back his troops after the manner of closing an umbrella, with the point resting upon the river ; thus a double line, shaped like an obtuse angle, intervened be tween the two Federal corps stationed on the Con federate left, and the one Federal corps stationed on the Confederate right. The only way in which either Federal wing could reinforce the other would be by crossing the river twice, an operation that Would consume three hours. A favorable opportunity of assailing the three iso lated Federal corps was now presented, but Lee was too ill to utilize it. " We must strike them," he ex claimed on his sick bed, ' ' we must strike them. We must never let them pass us again." There was, however, no Jackson to take his place. Even Longstreet, not yet recovered from his wound, was WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR 276 absent. Never had there been a more conspicuous illustration of the fact that Lee was the heart and mainspring of his army. Grant, perceiving their danger, withdrew on the night of May 26th, the isolated corps. Again, he moved to the left, and again Lee followed on the in terior lines. The Southern troops now took a posi tion so near Richmond that Grant would be tempted to leave the Pamunkey far behind him ; detained on that river, he would be led to reinforce Butler at City Point for an attack on the capital ; but if de tained on the Totopotomoy further inland, he would be unable to do this with the same ease. Moreover, Lee, by posting his army near Richmond, placed it where it could promptly assist that city's defenders, should Butler advance from the Appomattox. He had a force of only 45,000 men to repel the attack of the Federal army, numbering 112,000. Grant now could not move to the left without leav ing Richmond behind, a fact that shook his temper so far that he was led, as if by uncontrollable pas sion, to do what he himself afterward keenly re gretted ; namely, to advance directly on Lee's en trenched lines at Cold Harbor. Before the end of an hour, 13,000 Federal dead and wounded lay strewn on the ensanguined ground in front of the Confederate breastworks. A command to renew the assault, transmitted through the regular channels to the private soldiers, was received in silence, or fol lowed by a feeble demonstration. Bank and file that had stoically bared their breasts to the previous 276 ROBERT E. LEE storm, tacitly declined to make so useless a sacrifice a second time ; nor was this any reflection on their bravery and fortitude, but rather a proof of their correct instinct in protesting against such a reckless course. Thus, in a rain of blood, was ended this terrible campaign. No wonder that Grant decided to aban don his original plan of " fighting it out on this line if it took all summer." The season was just begin ning, and yet here was Grant, the incarnation of courage, firmness, and persistency, instead of going " where Lee was," as he had directed Meade to do, finding himself compelled to throw out a thick screen of cavalry to prevent Lee from intercepting him as he made a wide detour in order to break into Rich mond, if possible, by the back door of Petersburg. In other words, after the appalling slaughter of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, and Cold Harbor, the Federal commander was forced to do what he might have done in May without the loss of a single soldier. In reviewing the operations from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy, it is seen that, during their prog ress. Grant made four great flank movements in his effort to plant himself between Lee and Richmond, and he ended with a fifth in the advance to the James, when he had foregone all hope of breaking through the line of Confederate steel. His primary object had been to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia ; but failing in that, to compel it to aban don the defense of its capital. In every battle, his force, both in men and artillery, was double that of WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR 277 his opponent, and at times it was nearly treble. In spite of this fact, he had been baffled by Lee in every instance, and had the two armies been nearer numerical equality, the Federal would probably have been driven back in a shattered condition to the defenses of Washington. As it was, Lee, by the close of the campaign, had succeeded in killing and wounding as many Federal soldiers as he himself possessed men ; in other words, one in nearly every three of the Federal army had been either destroyed or disabled by its determined antagonist. Had the Federal troops inflicted the same loss on their oppo nents, the Confederate army would have been anni hilated. As a rule, Lee remained throughout the campaign on the defensive ; first, because his force was too small as compared with Grant's to allow him to assume the offensive : and, secondly, because he saw that the enemy did not shrink from attacking his entrenchments. His attitude resembled Meade's at Gettysburg and was precisely what the situation called for. At North Anna, however, sickness alone prevented him from assailing the isolated Federal corps ; and after Cold Harbor, Grant was saved from a counterstroke only by the rapidity with which he effected a change of base. Lee, from start to finish, had exhibited extraordinary skill in running his de fensive lines ; at Spottsylvania, at North Anna, and at Cold Harbor alike, his opponent could not manoeuvre against his flanks without crossing diffi cult streams, and thus dividing forces. In all the po- 278 ROBERT E. LEE sitions taken by Lee, he had relied as much on the country's topography as on the strength of his own entrenchments. From one point of view alone had the campaign proved favorable to the Federal cause. If Grant was right in seeking to destroy the Confederate army by attrition, then that organization had undoubtedly been seriously reduced by his blows ; but the same end could have been attained just as quickly by his sitting down permanently at Spottsylvania, and there repeating his frontal assaults until Lee's entire army had been killed or disabled. It is true that ten Fed eral soldiers would have perished to one Confederate, but what of that when the North could have better afforded to sacrifice ten than the South one ? It is quite possible, however, that the Federal troops, after a series of unsuccessful attacks, accompanied by heavy loss, would have finally declined, as they did at Cold Harbor, further to make so appalling a sacrifice. Swinton acknowledges that, at the close of the campaign, the Army of the Potomac, " shaken in its structure, its valor quenched in blood, and thou sands of its ablest officers killed or wounded was the Army of the Potomac no more." And General Francis A. Walker, in his history of the Federal Second Corps, one of the very bravest partici pating in the conflict, declares that when this corps turned its face southward after Cold Harbor, "something of its pristine virtue had departed un der the terrific blows that had been showered on WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR 279 it. . . . Its casualties had numbered more than 400 a day for the whole period since it had crossed the Rapidan. Moreover, the confidence of the troops in their leaders had been severely shaken. They had again and again been ordered to attacks which the very privates in the ranks knew to be hopeless from the start. They had seen the fatal policy of assault all along the line persisted in even after the most ghastly failure, and they had almost ceased to expect victory when they went into battle." When Grant set out for the James, there was con siderable danger that the war party at the North would yield to the longing for peace which now, like a wave, swept over the Northern people, deeply de pressed by the unexampled sacrifices of the last campaign. Federal success in the West alone, in some degree, restored the hope of final triumph. Had the contest been confined to the East, and to the armies of Lee aud Grant, the feeling of confi dence would perhaps not have returned : for never was the devotion to their commander stronger in the hearts of the Army of Northern Virginia than after the victory of Cold Harbor ; never was their admiration for his genius higher ; never were they themselves more steadfast, or more self-reliant ; never so capable of offering a successful resistance to the enemy's advance, had that enemy been restricted to the Army of the Potomac. CHAPTER X SIEGE OF PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX Lee had never approved the view that Richmond's defense was imperative, not for strategic or even economic, but for political reasons. As soon as the capital's retention ceased to offer strategic advan tages, he considered it unwise to hold it longer. It is true that Richmond contained numerous mills, foundries, and workshops, which only grew more valuable as the territory stiU under Confederate control shrank in area ; but had the policy of pro tecting the city at all hazards adopted at the begin ning, been afterward abandoned, and similar estab lishments erected in other cities, like Danville or Ealeigh, more remotely situated from the Federal main lines of communication, the Confederate government's existence would, perhaps, have been indefinitely prolonged. The capital's successful defense until the end un doubtedly gave greater dignity to that government within its own borders, but it exercised no influence whatever in inducing foreign'powers to recognize the Confederacy, the only substantial political benefit which could be expected to flow from it. The de fense of Washington as the Federal capital was a much more practical measure, for its capture would quite certainly have been followed by the recogui- PETEESBUEG AND APPOMATTOX 281 tion of the Confederacy and the removal of the blockade, two acts that, sooner or later, would have brought about Southern independence. After the battle of Cold Harbor, there was not the smallest prospect of foreign intervention, so that Eichmond's abandonment would not have diminished the chance of success from the operation of favorable influences abroad, for there were no such influences at work. In continuing his defense of the capital, all that Lee could expect was that, by repeating the slaugh ter of his last campaign, he might so shock Northern sensibilities that the peace party would finally pre vail ; but this hope, he knew, was dependent upon the Western army's securing an equal success, which was far from certain. Unless this success could be won by both armies during the next twelve months, the Confederacy's fast declining resources could not endure the strain to which they were now subjected, and must collapse altogether. No one foresaw more clearly than Lee the final consequences of suffering Grant to concentrate be low Eichmond. "We must destroy the Federal army before they get to James Eiver," he exclaimed to General Early immediately after Cold Harbor. " If they get there, it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere question of time. " Once established south of the Appomattox, behind impregnable en trenchments, that army, he knew, could be recruited at leisure, as its line of communication, being a great waterway, could not even be threatened. The unlimited resources in the East at Grant's disposal 282 EOBEET E. LEE could, in such a position, be gradually accumulated until they would become overwhelming ; aud the more slowly he operated, the more certain was he of being ultimately assisted by the Federal western army, first, indirectly by its narrowing the field of Confederate supply and conscription ; and afterward, directly by its joining hands with the forces in Virginia. But the evils to be expected from a siege were not confined to the ever- increasing Federal numerical superiority ; Lee was fully aware that his troops' morale was far more apt to be lowered by such a siege than by a strenuous campaign in the open field. It would be a life of equal exposure, but of less active enterprise to serve as a diversion. Starvation would overshadow the permanent trenches more darkly even than the temporary ; there would be more time for the soldiers to become discouraged by brooding over the South's declining prospects ; and desertions would grow more common, either because the priva tions would seem more unbearable, or because the dangers overhanging the families at home, through the advance of the other Federal armies, would ap pear closer at hand. Had Lee, after Grant's safe arrival at the James, followed the suggestions of his own judgment, in stead of dispatching Early to the Valley to oppose Sigel and Hunter, and afterward to threaten Wash ington, he would have retired toward the upper waters of the Staunton, where the foothills were pe culiarly adapted to defensive operations. There he PETEESBUEG AND APPOMATTOX 283 could have guarded the sources of supply in the Confederacy's remaining territory, and in an emer gency joined hands with Johnston. Had his army been mobile, not only could it have staved off star vation without difficulty, for there was no lack of food in the country, but it could have constrained Grant to diminish his fighting force by leaving be hind, on an ever-lengthening line, large detachments to defend his communications in a hostile region. Lee had just reason for asserting that had he been able to entrench his troops in the back hills, he could have prolonged the war for twenty years. Mr. Davis was chiefly responsible for the two acts that precipitated the Confederacy' s flnal destruction ; namely, the continued defense of Eichmond after Cold Harbor, and the displacement of Joseph E. Johnston before Atlanta. Prudence and caution were the qualities needed in handling the Western army at this time, and these were qualities which Johnston possessed in an extraordinary degree ; had he remained in command, it is not probable that Sherman would have been allowed to reach the sea without vigorous opposition. With Johnston ob structing the Federal advance upon Atlanta, and Lee planted firmly in the region south of Lynch burg, Sherman's march through Georgia and Sheri dan's raid in the Shenandoah Valley would not have occurred so soon, if at all. It was these two events alone that assured the reelection of Mr. Lincoln and the triumph of the Northern war party : the one was made possible by Mr. Davis's removal of Johnston ; 284 EOBEET E. LEE the other by his insistence upon the defense of Rich mond, of which the siege of Petersburg was merely the closing incident. On April 4th of the following year, after Mr. Davis had been compelled to abandon Richmond, he issued at Danville a proclamation in which he declared that the South "had now entered on a new phase of the struggle. Relieved from the necessity of guarding particular points, our army will be free to move from point to point to strike the enemy in detail far from his base. ' ' These words were penned before the writer had been informed of the closing scene at Appomattox ; but even had that event not occurred so soon, they came too late to aid the Con federacy's moribund cause. Had this proclama tion been issued before the siege of Petersburg be gan, although the spirit of the Southern people would have been depressed by the evacuation of Richmond, the spirit of the Northern people cor respondingly elated, and the Confederate resources in munitions of war seriously crippled, nevertheless the life of the Confederacy would have been pro longed, and the South would have gained, if not in dependence, pacification on terms that would have secured her readmission to the Union on a footing of perfect equality, with compensation for her emancipated slaves. Instead of resuming her old position as a conquered country, she would have re entered the circle of states with all the prestige of the most heroic struggle recorded in modern times. It was unfortunate for the Confederacy that Lee PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX 285 at this supreme hour could not have been as perti nacious as Mr. Davis in insisting upon carrying out his own plans. His influence with the Southern people was never more commanding than after Cold Harbor, and yet never apparently was he, the South's only pillar of fire, more subservient to the authorities in Richmond, who, at that fateful mo ment, were of less real importance to the cause than an equal number of the humblest privates in the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee was not a man to act in a half-hearted way when he found himself out of sympathy with the tasks imposed on him by his civil and military superiors ; he now threw him self into the measures necessary for Richmond's de fense with all the ardor, energy, and singleness of purpose distinguishing his conduct in the great campaign so recently closed. During the previous spring, Butler, at the head of 36,000 men, had occupied Bermuda Hundred at the mouth of the Appomattox, with the intention of first cutting Richmond's southern communica tions, and then forming a junction with the Army of the Potomac north of that city. Breaking camp on May 16th, he was soon attacked by Beauregard with a much smaller force, and driven back to his entrenchments in the narrow peninsula between the Appomattox and the James. Having fortified the neck of this peninsula, Beauregard dispatched two divisions and one brigade to Lee, then posted be hind the North Anna River. Butler, however, was able to escape from " his hermetically sealed bottle" 286 ROBERT E. LEE by sending troops across the Appomattox on an un successful expedition against Petersburg. This occurred on June 9th. In a few days, the advance corps of Grant's army began to cross the James. As soon as the First Corps, consisting of 17,000 troops, with a division of cavalry, had got over, Butler ordered it to renew the attack on Petersburg, whose defenses at this time were con fined to a circle of redans, connected by infantry parapets, drawn at a distance of two miles from the boundaries of the town. The assault by this van guard was partially successful. The First Corps was soon reinforced by the Second, and had the two attacked at once with vigor, Petersburg would now have fallen, and with the aid of the troops hurried up by Grant, permanently held. The Confederate com munications with the South by way of the Weldon Eailroad would have been immediately cut, and Eichmond's evacuation made necessary, — if not at once, then at the end of a few weeks. The whole course of subsequent operations would have beeu diverted from the channel they actually followed, and Lee enabled to enter upon the unhampered cam paign which was the only hope of prolonging the Confederacy's existence. In response to the wishes of the Confederate authorities he, for a time, might have attempted to defend Eichmond, but the Federal army, by working around toward the Danville Eail road, would soon have compelled him to retire either along that railway, or the one running toward Farm ville. PETEESBUEG AND APPOMATTOX 287 The Federal failure to capture Petersburg on June 15th, though apparently a Confederate success, was in reality, as the event was to prove, a blow to Southern prospects. The Confederate army was still elated by the issue of the campaign ending with Cold Harbor. There was perhaps not an officer or private in it who did not thiuk that the defense of Petersburg was ordered more for political than for military reasons, and who, aware of this fact, would have felt no discouragement had it now fallen. But that result was to be deferred until the waning strength of the Confederacy had been completely sapped. Concentrating 14,000 infantry in the city, and rapidly constructing a new line of entrenchments, Beauregard was thus able, on the 17th, successfully to resist a fierce assault by nearly the whole Federal army ; but after night fell, he retired to a third line of breastworks, erected in the rear at a distance varying from 500 to 1,000 yards. Hill's corps ar riving on the following day, a second assault by three Federal corps was repulsed. Grant, by these different attacks, had lost about 10,000 men. He now, for the first time, it would seem, perceived that the frontal assault was proportionately far more destructive to his own army than to Lee's, and that a succession of similar repulses would, by shaking confidence in his capacity, quite probably subject him to the fate of McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker and Meade. The danger of defeat was now greater than ever, as it was ouly too plain that the 288 EOBEET E. LEE new recruits were, in fire and resolution, quite un equal to the veterans who had passed through the last campaign. These recruits had unwisely been formed into separate regiments instead of being dis tributed among the old. Grant had two great objects in view in his plan of capturing Eichmond ; first, to break up the Central Eailway, the Confederate line of western communi cation, and secondly, the Weldon road running south from Petersburg. This would leave only the Eichmond and Danville and the Sonthside Eailways to support the Confederate army ; but with the two former roads in Federal hands. Grant knew that Lee would be forced to retire in order to escape invest ment. His attempt to destroy the Central Eailway had for a time failed ; Sheridan was checked at Trevilians by Hampton, and Hunter driven by Early into West Virginia. Nor were his own efforts to seize the Weldon Eailway crowned with immediate success. Having abandoned the frontal attack, by which alone that road might have been captured at a single blow, he doubtless expected only slow re sults from the new plan he had now adopted. Lee held Petersburg in such a manner that all the railroads entering the city were fully protected by the interposition of his entrenchments. In order to get around to the Confederate flank, where the Weldon Eoad came out on its way toward the Carolinas, it was necessary for Grant to throw up breastworks running first directly southward, and then, at a certain point, turning and running PETEESBUEG AND APPOMATTOX 289 directly westward. These breastworks must be so strong that they could be easily held by a compara tively small force while his main body should be en gaged at the western end in seizing new ground for the extension of eutreuchments, behind which they might crawl nearer and nearer to the railway. The line of Federal fortifications in front of Petersburg was perhaps the strongest of its length ever erected on the North American continent. All the engineer's art was exhausted in its construction. It was a system of gigantic redans chained together by powerful parapets, whose approaches were ob structed by heavy abatis, the whole defended by siege guns as well as by ordinary artillery. Back of this great earthwork ran a telegraph line to hasten the transmission of orders from centre to wing with a view to perfect concert of action. Practically, the obstacle formed by the presence of James Eiver to the dispatch of troops from wing to wing was re moved by the laying of a large pontoon bridge ; while the railroad connecting Petersburg with City Point afforded rapid means for the distribution of the enor mous supplies of food, clothing, and ammunition almost daily arriving at the latter place in fleets of transports for the use of the Federal army. On the other hand, Lee, who, in the end, must draw out his line thirty-five miles in order to defend both Petersburg and Eichmond, had few facilities for sending instructions quickly, or for concentrat ing his troops promptly to repel attack on a partic ular point ; but even if he had possessed such facili- 290 ROBERT E. LEE ties, the force at his disposal was relatively so small that he could strengthen resistance at one spot only by dangerously weakening it at another. It was upon this fact that Grant, who was determined to use his numerical superiority to the fullest, counted most confidently for ultimate success. The first point which he wished to seize was the Weldon Rail way, and to accomplish this, he, throughout the siege, had recourse to attempted surprises of Lee's left wing on the north side of the James. Every Confederate soldier called away from the right wing to meet these attacks, only made it less difficult for the opposing Federal force there to jpush its line of earthworks farther toward the goal. So enormous was the numerical disproportion be tween the two armies that Grant had at his beck several corps, which, without weakening his own position anywhere, he could move from right to left, or left to right as he chose. Lee could do this only by practically denuding his line at some one point. And yet down to the battle of Five Forks, many months after the siege began, he baffled every effort of his energetic and persevering antagonist either to surprise or outflank him ; and this, too, with troops steadily diminishing in number and suf fering from prolonged exposure, without proper clothing, and on the verge of starvation. The radical alteration in Grant's manner of warfare, as illustrated in his operations before Petersburg, con stitutes the most remarkable tribute ever paid to the firmness, valor, and constancy of the Army of PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX 291 Northern Virginia, and to the genius and energy of its commander. The first great Federal turning movement began on June 21st. The Second and Sixth Corps were ordered to advance from the western end of the Federal entrenchments and endeavor to seize the Weldon Railway. In marching, a large gap, owing to the character of the country traversed, arose be tween the two bodies of troops. Hill took prompt advantage of the opportunity which this presented ; leaving Wilcox's division to protect the railroad from the Sixth Corps's attack, he fell with Mahone's division upon the Second's exposed flank, and suc ceeded in rolling it up from left to right. After a heavy loss this corps was able to resume the posi tion it had held in the morning, but next day, it again advanced and reoccupied the entrenchments thrown up before Hill's assault. Another perma nent step westward was thus taken by the Federal army. In the meanwhile, the Sixth Corps had beeu able to plant itself within a mile and a half of the Weldon Railway, but could press forward no farther. Wilson, dispatched at the head of 5,500 horse men on a raid to destroy the Richmond and Dan ville Railroad, met with even less success in accom plishing his principal object. Stopped at Staunton River by the firm resistance of the local militia, he was, on his return, compelled to make a wide detour, harassed at every step by the horsemen of W. H. F. Lee. In attempting to evade Hampton, who stood 292 EOBERT E. LEE in his way, he ran upon Fitzhugh Lee, posted at Reams Station with one cavalry division and two infantry brigades. In the battle that followed, he lost 1,500 men and twelve pieces of artillery, and it was only by a circuitous route that the remnant of his force was able to regain the main army. The heat now became excessive, and Grant de cided to make no further flank movements for the present. He was the more inclined to relax, as his army had been weakened by the dispatch of a large body of troops to Washington to defend that city from the incursion of General Early, who had even then reached its first line of fortifications. At this moment, the Federal capital was in more danger of falling than the Confederate. But if Lee had hoped that he would be able, by that campaign, to arouse Mr. Lincoln's apprehensions and thereby reduce the size of the Federal army in front of Petersburg to a point which would permit him gradually to trans fer his own troops to Piedmont, if not to the Valley itself, that expectation was soon dispelled by the declining fortunes of Early's small command. The manoeuvre causing McClellan' s recall from Harrison' s Landing could not now be successfully repeated. Disappointed in his first flank movement, Grant resumed, with increased energy, the work of ex tending his entrenchments on the left, and advanc ing his siege operations in the centre. It was no longer the man of Missionary Ridge and Spottsyl vania, the bold, resolute, and even reckless flghter, but rather a new McClellan of the Chickahominy, PETERSBUEG AND APPOMATTOX 293 more reliant on siege guns and breastworks than on the sword and musket. He now even descended to burrowing to produce a breach in the enemy's forti fications ; a mine, 511 feet in length and charged with eight thousand pounds of powder was ex cavated to a point situated directly under a Con federate bastion. The plan adopted was to rush a large body of men through the opening as soon as the explosion occurred, and seize the rising ground situated not far behind this part of the Confederate entrenchments. In order to weaken the Southern defense at this spot, Grant dispatched the Second Corps to the north side of the James for the pur pose of threatening Eichmond in that quarter. Lee, to meet this new danger, at once withdrew all troops from the fortifications of Petersburg except one cavalry and three infantry divisions. Informed of this by spies. Grant thought the hour had come for setting off the mine. He was not aware that his operations were known to the Con federates, and that a line of batteries had been erected behind the threatened salient which would hurl shells into the advancing column's face and flank simultaneously. The explosion occurred at 4:40 in the morning, a regiment of Confederate soldiers was blown up, and a crater 150 feet in length, 60 in width, and 25 in depth formed. Two or three hundred yards of the Confederate line on each side of this great hole had to be abandoned at once ; but before the assaulting column could enter the breach, the defenders, rallying, began to 294 EOBEET E. LEE assail the advancing ranks with their batteries, aud the Federals, while able to seize the deserted en trenchments next to the crater, found it impossible to occupy the rising ground in the rear. The first three divisions attacking had been com posed of white troops ; a fourth, composed of black, now came forward, but iu a few minutes many of the negro soldiers, appalled by the terrible cannon ade, took refuge iu the great hole. The Eighteenth Corps, advancing to their support, succeeded in carrying a part of the Confederate line on the right, but were forced to retire in consequence of a panic seizing their comrades on the left, which soon in volved themselves. One brigade alone stood its ground, but in a short time, by Mahone's vigorous action, this part of the assaulting column also was compelled to retreat. No Federal troops now re mained within the Confederate lines except those who had fallen or jumped into the crater. Al together 4,000 had been killed or disabled in the unfortunate enterprise. Although Lee was constantly threatened with at tack by Grant along his Petersburg and Eichmond lines, he did not hesitate to reinforce Early operating in the Valley. Sheridan had been appointed to the Federal command in that quarter, and for his op ponent's little army of 12,000 men, had 40,000 to show, a disproportion which could ultimately lead to but one result, unless Early should develop the energy, promptness, and resourcefulness of a second " Stonewall " Jackson. By this time, Lee had aban- PETEESBUEG AND APPOMATTOX 295 doned all hope of being able gradually to draw off his own army, detachment by detachment, to the foothills, by comj)elling Grant to weaken his lines on the Appomattox. In retaining Early in the Valley, his object seems now to have been simply to prevent Sheridan from cooperating with Grant by a march upon Eichmond from the north side, or by a grand cavalry sweep from Lynchburg to Danville, and thence eastward toward Weldon, in order to cut all the Confederate lines of communication with the Carolinas and Georgia. It is doubtful whether either of these apprehended movements would have been as permanently injuri ous to Confederate prospects as the upshot of the Valley campaign. Sheridan's success was the most powerful of all the influences that revived the hopes of the Northern war party, and assured Mr. Lin coln's reelection. Taken with Sherman's march to the sea and Hood's defeat at Nashville, it signified the early and final ruin of the Southern cause. Perhaps, it would have been wiser had Lee in per son assumed command of the Confederate troops stationed in the Valley, as his presence there would certainly have led Grant to weaken his army before Petersburg to a greater extent than any other course of action on his antagonist's part. Grant must have been afraid that Lee, in dispatch ing to Early's assistance as many men as he could spare, had such a design in mind, for he now began to repeat his attacks on the Confederates with extra ordinary vigor, seemingly to show his opponent the 296 EOBEET E. LEE danger to which such a loss of strength exposed him. To produce the impression that he was withdrawing troops for Washington's defense. Grant sent the Second Corps to City Point as if to embark, but, after nightfall, transported it up the river to the vicinity of Chaffin's Bluff to join the Tenth Corps in au assault on the Confederate entrenchments in that quarter of the field. Lee, suspecting his antago nist's object, hurried Mahone's infantry and two cavalry divisions to the spot he expected to be at tacked, aud these, combining with the troops already on the ground, found no difficulty in stopping the Federal advance. Grant, however, ordered Han cock to remain on the north side in order to induce Lee to retain there the reinforcements drawn from his extreme right, as this would leave that part of the Confederate line, — the most vital of all, as com manding the Confederate base of supply, — in a weakened condition, and, therefore, the more ex posed to disaster. No incident during the siege shows more plainly than this manoeuvre the Federal numerical superi ority and the necessity on Lee's part of constant vigilance to neutralize the disparity. When Grant, on August 18th, sought to take advantage of the supposed diminished strength of his opponent's right by advancing Warren's Corps to the Weldon Eoad for the purpose of tearing it up, Lee, by hur rying back Mahone's division, and bringing for ward every available man, was able to disconcert the movement for a time. It was not long, how- PETEESBUEG AND APPOMATTOX 297 ever, before the Federals succeeded in pushing their line of entrenchments up to the railway ; but the Confederates were still able to use the road by send ing their wagons by a circuit to a point some miles to the southward. An attempt by Grant to break up the railway so far toward Weldon as to make it useless even by wagon, met with severe disaster at Beams Station, where the Federal force was saved from destruction only by Hancock's gallantry. This put au end for some time to the Federal effort to close the Weldon Eailroad. Disconcerted on one side. Grant, with character istic persistency, turned almost immediately to the other. Transporting to the James's north bank a part of two corps, with a cavalry division, he suc ceeded, on August 30th, in capturing Fort Harrison, but was repulsed before Fort Gilmer. Lee having hurried up reinforcements from his extreme right to resist this attack, Grant, following his usual plan, took advantage of the reduced strength in that quarter to advance Warren in force across the Wel don Eailroad to seize the Boydton Turnpike, a point nearer to the Sonthside Eailway, and also one whose possession would make the Confederate circuit by wagon to the Weldou longer and more difficult. Driven back at first by Hill, Warren returned next day aud threw up a new line of entrenchments, which were afterward connected with the main line now reaching as far as the Weldon Eailroad. Grant, thinking that he was now in position to seize the Southside Eailway, detached for that pur- 298 EOBEET E. LEE pose 32,000 infantry, with a cavalry division, a force nearly equal to the entire Confederate army. A part of this body, commanded by Hancock, in advancing against the bridge at Burgess Mill, ex posed its flank to assault, and was driven back in great confusion. Only a retreat at night saved it from fui'ther disaster, as the Confederates under Hill were rapidly concentrating to strike a second blow. A simultaneous attack had been made on the Confederate entrenchments on the James's north bank, but this had been attended with even heavier loss. Thus, in Federal discomfiture, the operations before Petersburg and Eichmond were closed for the winter. During five months, Grant had been persistently and energetically attempting to compel Lee to abandon the defense of Eichmoud. He had made three great flank attacks on the Confederate right wing, and three on the left ; and these movements to left and right respectively had, as a rule, been practically simultaneous, or at least following so closely upon each other as to make possible the ut most use of the necessity thus imposed on Lee to weaken one part of his line in order to strengthen another. In each manoeuvre. Grant had been firmly opposed, and his success had not been proportionate to his numerical superiority ; indeed, all that he had accomplished on his right had been the capture of Port Harrison, and on his left, the extension of his entrenchments across the Weldon Eailroad, without, however, closing that road, beyond a few miles, to PETEESBUEG AND APPOMATTOX 299 Confederate possession. The principal frontal as sault, that at the crater, had been repelled with heavy Federal losses. Had the influences brought to bear to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia been confined to those set at work by the Army of the Potomac alone, it seems quite certain that the life of the former organization would have been greatly, perhaps indefinitely, prolonged. But there were other factors now operating which were to be even more effective in terminating its existence. First, the end of Confederate conscription had been reached. Enrolment, which began with per sons between the ages of eighteen and thirty -five, had, in February, 1864, been extended to persons between the ages of seventeen and fifty. "They have robbed the cradle and the grave to get their present force," said Grant during the progress of the siege. But even if conscription had not already been carried so far, the spirit of the Southern people at large toward the end of 1864, was so depressed it is not likely that any addition to the army would have added materially to its efficiency. It was ob served that the new conscripts in the trenches at Petersburg, who had joined the ranks with the hope less feeling prevailing outside, were an element of weakness and not of strength. The number of de sertions steadily increased ; chiefly, however, be cause the advance of Sherman's army had made so many of the soldiers anxious for the safety of their families residing on the line of that devastating march. 300 EOBEET E. LEE Lee, in February, 1865, advocated the enlistment of negroes, and the Confederate Congress assented, but the measure was passed too late to be of use. Had it been adopted early in the war, as it should have beeu, the field of Federal enrolments would have been sensibly curtailed, and the Confederate armies supplied with a body of troops, who, in re turn for their freedom, would have fought at least as well for one side as the other. By the end of the winter of 1864-5, the force under Lee did not exceed 37,000 men. At this moment. Grant had in hand, or in easy reach, not less that 150,000 ; 20,000 addi tional could, in a few days, be brought up from the Valley ; while Thomas, who had overwhelmed Hood at Nashville on November 15th, would, by an ad vance through southwest Virginia, as he designed, be able to swell the whole number to 200,000. Sher man was approaching from Savannah with 80,000 more. Against this combined host, under the leadership of Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and Thomas, Lee and Johnston, together, could oppose only 65,000 troops. Secondly, the Army of Northern Virginia was now only half-fed, half-clothed, and half-shod. Six hundred Confederate soldiers behind the fortifi cations of Petersburg received hardly as much food as was supplied to one hundred Federals. The daily single ration did not exceed one pound of flour, and one-quarter of a pound of beef. Not infrequently, three days would pass without any distribution of meat at all. lu some regiments, not more than PETEESBUEG AND APPOMATTOX 301 fifty men were in possession of shoes, while the great majority wore clothes held together by the rudest patching. Hopeless of reinforcement ; exposed to sleet and snow in the trenches ; lacking in nourishing fare ; scantily clad ; without proper medicines in case of sickness ; and racked by the thought that their loved ones at home might soon be subjected to all the perils raised by the Federal armies' advance from the West and South, it seems extraordinary that the Army of Northern Virginia should, after the winter of 1864-5 set in, have continued at all to maintain its organization in the face of the over whelming numbers in its front. The soldiers must have known that the Confederate cause was doomed to complete destruction. The constancy which they showed under such dreadful circumstances was due principally to their devotion to Lee. "I can but describe his influence," records Colonel Marshall, of his staff, " by saying that such was the love aud veneration of the men for him, that they had come to look upon the cause as General Lee's cause, and they fought for it because they loved him. To them, he represented cause, country, and all." In obedience to the proclamation which he issued at this dark hour, they continued to "oppose con stancy to adversity, fortitude to suffering, and courage to danger." As the dark cloud was rolling up from the South, carrying in its bosom a storm of destruction, more bLi.sting than any which ever issued from the Libyan 302 EOBEET E. LEE deserts, Lee was appointed on February 9, 1865, commander-in-chief of all the Confederate armies. The power of the office was conferred too late. He, however, still hoped to strike an effective blow, iu conjunction with Johnston, by attacking Sherman in North Carolina before Grant could come up, and then turning upon Grant, inflict a disaster upon his army also. It was a desperate expectation, but the only one possibly tenable ; continuation in the trenches of Petersburg signified ruin as soon as Sherman could trample down Johnston, aud assail Lee in the reai-. The Confederate leader would have abandoned his position in February, but for the emaciated condition of his draught animals, and the almost bottomless mud of the roads at that season. By this time, the Federal entrenchments had been extended as far westward as Hatcher's Eun. The Southern line of defense was now drawn out to thirty-five miles, aud hardly one thousand men to the mile remained for its protection. In order to cause the withdrawal of Federal troops from the path of his proposed retreat by creating an urgent need for their presence in a distant part of the field, Lee, on March 25th, directed Gordon to lead an assaulting column against Fort Steadman, situated near the Federal centre. The fortification was captured, but the effort to seize the hill in the rear failed ; no fresh troops were moved up to Gor don's support ; and he was compelled to evacuate the ground he had won. Grant, suspecting Lee's general design, now concentrated on the extreme left PETEESBUEG AND APPOMATTOX 303 an enormous force to obstruct, if not to close, the Confederate line of retreat. He had beeu heavily reinforced during the winter, and Sheridan, when the spring opened, had also joined him, after driv ing the last remnant of Early's army from the Val ley. Never was he in so good a position to make a powerful simultaneous attack all along the Confeder ate entrenchments with his stationary corps, while he hurried forward several mobile ones to strike a particularly heavy blow at some selected point. As soon as Lee detected Grant's movement of troops westward, he did not hesitate to weaken still further his attenuated infantry line in order to strengthen his extreme right, always the most im portant part of his position. Fitzhugh Lee' s cavalry was also dispatched to Five Forks in the same direc tion to oppose Sheridan, now stationed on the Federal left, and here he was soon joined by five iufantry brigades under Pickett and a cavalry force under W. H. F. Lee and Eosser. Together Pickett aud Fitzhugh Lee drove a part of Sheridan's com mand, in great confusion, back to Dinwiddie Court- House, where Sheridan himself, with much difficulty, had been resisting attack ; and so precarious did his position now become that as soon as night arrived, he sent for reinforcements in order to insure his owu safe return to the Federal army. When darkness fell, the Confederates went back to Five Forks, where very unwisely they occupied ground exposed on three sides, including the side facing their line of retreat. By next morning (April 1st) the enemy 304 EOBEET E. LEE had concentrated, and now iu ovei-whelming num bers confronted them from these three sides. Iu vain, the Confederates strove to break through. Crushed by the treble collision, they gave way and the few escaping death or capture, dispersed in the woods. Such was the consequence of Pickett's fatal mistake in halting in an unprotected position four miles away from the main Confederate line. The Federals were now able to seize the Southside Eailroad, which made the further retention of Petersburg by the Confederates impracticable. Grant, afraid lest his antagonist should throw the greater part of his army on Sheridan in order to clear the road for retreat, begau at ten o'clock the same night a fierce artillery fire along the whole of his line ; and this was followed up next morning (April 2d) by a determined assault, which forced Lee to draw his troops back to the entrenchments situated within the city's boundaries. " It has hap pened as I told them at Eichmond it would," he re marked somewhat bitterly to a staff officer as he slowly retired to this last refuge ; "the line has been stretched until it has broken." That night, he withdrew from Petersburg at the head of a force barely numbering .30,000 men. They had not gone far when they observed in the heavens toward Eich mond the reflection of a great conflagration, for that city had been evacuated and set on fire. It was with a feeling of relief that the soldiers found them selves once more in the open fields. The trees were now budding, and the grass springing up luxuri- PETEESBUEG AND APPOMATTOX 305 antly. The freshness and beauty of nature inspired the commander, officers, and privates alike with new hope, which, however, was destined soon to be dashed. It was Lee's intention to retire southward by the Eichmond and Danville Eailroad. On arriving at Amelia Court-House, where food had beeu ordered to be accumulated, he found none, and a day was lost in scouring the country for a supply. When the advance again began, Sheridan had succeeded in barring the liue of retreat to Danville, and Lee was compelled to strike across country to Farmville on the Southside Eailway, in the hope of uniting with Johnston on the south bank of the Staunton Eiver in Pittsylvania County. Although the only ration which could now be given to each soldier was a handful of raw corn, no word of discontent reached the commander's ears. The army resumed its march in silence, but with no apparent diminution of confidence. The roads being heavy, and the streams swollen, the wagon train ahead made very slow progress, and at every turn the troops behind had to halt and to beat off the Federal attack, now directed against both rear and flank. At Sailor's Creek, what remained of one corps and a part of another, were surrounded and made prisoners by the swarming pursuers, but the main body pressed bravely on under Lee in person. Upon passing Farmville, where for the first time after leaving Petersburg, proper food was obtained, he succeeded in repulsing Humphreys's corps, 306 ROBERT E. LEE which obstructed his path; but the delay thus caused enabled Sheridan to advance and capture the Con federate supplies accumulated at Appomattox Court-House. When Lee reached this point, he found that large bodies of cavalry and infantry had been posted athwart his line of retreat. He de cided, however, to make one more effort to break through the cordon of 75,000 men now surrounding him ; but when, on the morning of the 9th, Gor don and Fitzhugh Lee drove back the horsemen, they found themselves confronted with an impene trable mass of foot soldiery. Such was the last military movement of the Army of Northern Virginia, now dwindled to 8,000 men with arms in their hands ready for duty. Lee had succeeded in reaching a point one hundred miles from the place of starting, and it is the testimony of all who saw him during the retreat, that never had he appeared more grandly heroic. "All eyes were raised to him for deliverance," one witness has recorded. "He alone was expected to provide food for the starving army, and rescue from a powerful and eager enemy. Under the accumula tion of difficulties, his courage seemed to expand, and wherever he appeared, his presence inspired the weary with renewed energy to continue the toil some march. During these trying scenes, his coun tenance wore its habitual calm, grave expression. Those who watched his face to catch a glimpse of what was passing in his mind could gather thence no trace of his inner sentiments. ' ' PETERSBUEG AND APPOMATTOX 307 Indeed, his courage never failed him. Believing the troops' extrication to be hopeless, some of his officers, in order to lighten his responsibility and soften the pangs of defeat, suggested through Gen eral Pendleton that negotiations should be opened for the surrender of the remnants of the army. This was only a few days before the surrender actually occurred. "We have yet too many bold men to think of laying down our arms," was his reply ; and when Grant made a similar suggestion at Farmville, he answered that " he did not think the emergency had yet arisen" to justify submission. Lee was really relying upon a bold front to secure the best terms. When it was argued that this might be soonest effected by the dispersion of his troops in guerilla warfare, he replied: "No, that will not do. It must be remembered we are Christian peo ple. We have fought this fight as long and as well as we knew how. We have been defeated. For us as a Christian people, there is but one course to pursue. We must accept the situation. These men must go home and plant a crop, and we must proceed to build up our country on a new basis." "How easily I could get rid of this and beat rest," he said to a member of his staff in a moment of profound depression. " I have only to ride along the line and all will be over. But it is our duty to live, for what would become of the women and chil dren of the South if we were not here to protect them ? " And again he said in the same sad hour : "Human virtue should be equal to human ca- 308 EOBEET E. LEE lamity," a sentiment illustrated in his own condtict throughout the remainder of his life, to a degree never before or since surpassed. When he per ceived that the end could no longer be staved off, he bent his spirit to the inevitable. "O General," exclaimed some one to him when he an nounced his intention of giving up his sword, ' ' what will History say of the surrender of this army in the field?" "That is not the question," he replied. "The question is, is it right? If it is right, I will take all the responsibility." As man aud patriot. Grant, like Lee, was fully equal to all the highest demands upon character in that searching hour. The victor bore himself with as much true dignity as the vanquished. No one understood more thoroughly than he the valor, fortitude, and constancy of the Army of Northern Virginia. To have that army at his mercy at last might well have raised undisguised exultation in his mind, and also called up irrepressible visions of the most dazzling political honors. If such natural and justifiable thoughts occurred to him, there is no proof of the fact. " I felt like anything," he him self said, " rather than rejoicing at the downfall ot a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and suffered so much for their cause," — generous-hearted words that will be cherished by all his reunited countrymen to the remotest generations. Through out those memorable scenes he remained, what he had always been, — quiet, modest, unpretending, and 'magnanimous. " His whole object," according to PETEESBUEG AND APPOMATTOX 309 a distinguished Confederate officer who was present, "seemed to be to mitigate as far as lay in his power the bitterness of defeat and to soothe as far as he could the lacerated susceptibilities of Lee." As for the Confederate commander, he bore him self uuder those sad and trying circumstances with his usual flrmness and dignity, without a trace of temper or mortification. " His demeanor," says a member of General Grant's staff, present at the interview, " was that of a thoroughly self-possessed gentleman, who had a very disagreeable duty to perform, but was determined to get through with it as well and as soon as he could." Dressed in a new uniform, with an ornate sword at his side, the striking beauty of his person made his quiet but imposing bearing all the more memorable. There was no offer of the sword, as the provisions of the surrender permitted the retention by the Confederate officers of their side arms. When Lee returned to his own lines, he was re ceived with a shout of welcome, which died into a sad silence when his recent mission was recalled. With head bare and tears flowing down his cheeks, he said, " Soldiers, we have fought through the war together. I have done the best for you I could." The men crowded about him. Many wept ; while hundreds attempted to take his hand or touch his person, or even his horse. Overcome by his veter ans' grief, he said to an officer present : "I could wish that I were numbered with the slain of the last battle. No," he interrupted himself, "we must 310 EOBEET R LEE live for our afflicted country." Not many hours afterward, he issued a touching farewell addressed to his heroic army. The next day he set out for Eichmond. When on the second morning, a little group of horsemen appeared on the farther side of the pontoon bridge at that place, the rumor began to spread through the city that General Lee was among them. Hundreds, silent and bareheaded, gathered along the route he must take on his way to his residence. "There was no excitement," says an eye-witness, "no hurrahing, but as the great chief passed, a deep, loving murmur, greater than this, arose from the heart of the crowd. Taking off his hat, and simply bowing his head, the man, great in adversity, passed silently to his own door. It closed on him, and his people had seen him for the last time in battle harness." CHAPTEE XI AFTER THE WAR During forty years, General Lee had been a sol dier subject, more or less, even when highest in com mand, to the control of superior authority. Now, for the first time after reaching manhood, he was to become a private citizen, and to assume absolute direction of his own actions. Never during his whole career were the grander features of his char acter more conspicuous than in these closing years passed far from the heroic influences of the battle field ; the serene patience, sublime resignation, august dignity, ripe wisdom, and calm magnanimity that marked this last period were unsurpassed even in his own previous lofty and well-poised life. He set for his unfortunate Southern countrymen an ex ample of unrepining submission to the inevitable, manly recognition of the practical duties confront ing them in thefr changed circumstances, and firm hopefulness for the future, which exercised a pro found influence in aiding them to pass safely through the first decade following the war, that social, political and economic Valley of the Shadow of Death. The loyalty to his own people, state, and kindred which led him to support the South when the war began, now made him insensible to every induce- 312 EOBEET E. LEE ment to remove to a foreign land. " I look forward to better days," he wrote in September, 1865, "and. trust that time and experience, the great teachers of men under the guidance of an ever-merciful God, may save us from destruction, and restore to us the bright hopes and prosperity of the past. The thought of abandoning the country and all that must be left in it is abhorrent to my feelings, and I prefer to struggle for its restoration, and share its fate rather than give up all as lost." In the same spirit, he answered an English nobleman who had in vain urged him to accept a mansion and an estate in England "commensurate with his individual merits aud the greatness of an historic family." Similarly also he replied to some of his old com rades in arms who, thinking of entering Maxi milian's service in Mexico, had sought his counsel. "Unless prevented by circumstance or necessity," said he to them, ' ' it would be better for Southern ers to remain at their homes aud share the fate of their respective states." Not only was he firmly resolved to stay aud to share all the sorrows and afflictions of the Southern people, but he also refused to increase their distress, by becoming an applicant for office, appearing in public ceremonies, or participating in public dis cussions, to inflame the suspicious temper of the party now controlling the country. When urged in 1867 to allow his name to be used as a candidate for the governorship of Virginia, he declined on the ground that his consent would be perverted into a AFTEE THE WAE 313 means of fanning Northern animosities against the state, and thus make more difficult the position of those "whose prosperity and happiness were so dear to him." "If my disfranchisement and pri vation of civil rights would secure to the citizens of Virginia the enjoyment of civil liberty and equal rights under the Constitution, I would willingly ac cept them in their stead." To General Hampton, after the close of the war, he declared that, in offering his sword to the South, he was pursuing the only course that for him would have beeu devoid of dishonor. " If all were to be done over again," he added, " I would act in pre cisely the same manner." But this clear recogni tion of the duty of the past hour did not for one moment blind him to the duty of the present ; namely, the acceptance of the result of the armed conflict as the final settlement of the controversies that had precipitated it. "The questions which for years were in dispute between the states and general government and which unhappily were not decided by the dictates of reason, but referred to the decision of war, having been decided against us," said he, "it is the part of wisdom to acquiesce in the result and of candor to recognize the fact." "The interests of the state," he declared on the same occasion, ' ' are the same as those of the United States. Its prosperity will rise or fall with the wel fare of the country. The duty of its citizens then appears to me to be too plain to admit of a doubt. AU shotdd unite in honest efforts to obliterate the 314 EOBEET E. LEE effects of war and restore the blessings of peace. They should remain, if possible, in the country ; promote harmony and good feeling ; qualify them selves to vote and elect to the state and general legislature wise and patriotic meu, who will devote their abilities to the interests of the country and the healing of all dissension. I have invariably recom mended this course since the cessation of hostilities, and have endeavored to practice it myself." It was asserted at the time, and with truth, that General Lee did more to incline the scale of South ern public opinion in favor of a frank and manly acceptance of the situation than all the Federal gar risons then stationed in that section, and no one acknowledged this more candidly than his great and generous antagonist. Grant, in his report of 1864-5. It was no hollow or temporizing truce on General Lee's part, but like all the other acts of his life, was characterized by the clearest good faith and by the most unswerving honor. In order to promote an object touching so closely the safety and happiness of the Southern people, he was prepared to sacrifice even his own most sacred feelings where no question of principle was involved. Personally, General Lee was indifferent as to whether he was pardoned by the Federal Administration or not ; to appear in the attitude of a suppliant to the men then in control at Washington must have been singularly painful and revolting to one who had been governed by a profound sense of duty in all his conduct and who was assured of the essential AFTEE THE WAE 315 justice of his cause. But he refused to allow the violent protest of his natural emotions to stand in the way. His petition for the benefit of the Am nesty Proclamation, from which not the slightest advantage could accrue to him personally, which in his heart he must have regarded with disdain, and which he was aware would expose him to the censure of many Southerners, was one of the noblest, most disinterested, and most unselfish acts of his life. Knowing that tens of thousands of his old soldiers, besides civilians, were compelled to apply for par don, so as to obtain the civil rights necessary for the retrievement of their owu and their states' for tunes, he thought that his own example would diminish their mortification in seeking relief from their disabilities. He had shared their dangers and glory ; he once more conquered his own spirit iu order to share their humiliation. That the Southern people have risen from the ruin that followed the war is due to the fact that they had the good sense and strength of character to learn those lessons of self- discipline, of devotion to the duties and tasks of the hour, and of confi dence in the future, which General Lee inculcated to the last year of his life. Nor was he content simply to strengthen their determination to restore their own and their states' fortunes; his whole influence was also untiringly directed toward the cultivation among them of a kindly feeling for the Northern people in spite of the exasperating policy of the then dominant party. 316 EOBEET E. LEE "True patriotism," he urged, " sometimes requires of men to act exactly contrary at one period to that which it does at another, and the motive which im pels them, the desire to do right, is precisely the same. The circumstances which govern their action change, and their conduct must conform to the new order of things. History is full of illustrations of this. Washington himself is an example of this. At one time, he fought against the French, under Braddock, in the service of the King of Great Britain ; at another, he fought with the French at Yorktown under the orders of the Continental Con gress of America against them [the British]. He has not been branded by the world with reproach for this, but his course has been applauded." Now, the writer of these words had special reasons for harboring rancor against the Northern people. His beautiful home at Arlington, associated with the most sacred recollections of his life, had been seized, its relics of the Lee, Custis and Washington families dispersed, aud its lawns converted, as though in a spirit of calculated vindictiveness, into a soldiers' cemetery. When informed that the en tire estate had been appropriated by the local au thorities, on the ground that $207 of taxes had not beeu paid "by the owner in person," and then turned over to the possession of the War Depart ment, General Lee quietly remarked : "I should have thought that the use of the grounds, the large amount of wood on the place, the teams and wagons, and the sale of the furniture of the house would AFTEE THE WAE 317 have been sufficient to pay the taxes.'' And his only comment on the transfer of the Washington relics to the National Museum was : "I hope their presence at the capital will keep in the remem brance of all Americans the principles and virtues of Washington." It was the man who had these personal deprivations to inflame his mind and harden his heart against the North, that wrote : "I have too exalted an opinion of the American people to believe that they will consent to in justice." "All controversy," he said as early as August, 1865, "will only serve to prolong angry and bitter feeling and postpone the period when reason and charity may resume their sway." " I know of no surer way to exact the truth," he declared, "than by burying contention with the war." When Gen eral Early thought of drawing up a memoir of his owu career, Lee urged him to omit ' ' all epithets or remarks calculated to excite bitterness or ani mosity between different sections of the country." And in the same spirit he wrote to Mrs. Davis : " I have thought from the time of the cessation of hostilities that silence aud patience on the part of the South were the true course, and I think so still. Controversy of all kinds will, in my opinion, only serve to continue excitement and passion, and will prevent the public mind from the acknowledgment and acceptance of truth. These considerations have kept me from replying to accusations made against myself, and induced me to recommend the same to 318 EOBEET E. LEE others." " All true patriots, North and South," he said later on, "will unite in advocating that policy which will soonest restore the country to tranquillity aud order, and serve to perpetuate true republican ism." A clergyman having in his presence spoken with great bitterness of the North, General Lee followed him to the door as he was leaving the room. "Doctor," said he in his most earnest tones, " there is a good old Book which I read and you preach from, which says, ' Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, aud pray for them that despitefuUy use you.' Do you think your remarks this evening were quite iu the spirit of that teaching? " And he added, "I have fought against the people of the North because I be lieved they were seeking to wrest from the people of the South their dearest rights, but I have never cherished toward them bitter or vindictive feelings, and have never seen the day that I did not pray for them." And on another occasion, when several of his friends, exasperated by the unrelenting spirit which seemed to be reflected in the Eeconstructiou Acts, then recently passed, burst out in his hearing into a heated invective against the authors, Lee quietly took up from the table before him a copy of a Persian poet and read aloud the following lines : — " Learn from yon Orient shell to love thy foe. And stud with pearls the hand that brings thee woe ; Free, like yon rock, from base vindictive pride| Emblaze with gems the wrist that rends thy side ; AFTER THE WAR 319 Mark where yon tree rewards the stony shower With fruit nectarious or the balmy flower ; All nature cries aloud, shall men do less Than love the smiter or the railer bless? " "May not we," he asked, in putting down the book, ' ' who profess to be governed by the principles of Christianity, rise at least to the standard of the Mohammedan poet, and learn to forgive our enemies?" Nor was this large and tolerant spirit confined to mere words. Once, he was seen standing at his gate conversing with a man very plainly clad, who ap peared highly gratified by the courtesy of his recep tion, and who turned away evidently delighted. " After exchanging salutations," the narrator of the story records, "General Lee said, pointing to the retreating form, ' .That is one of our old soldiers, who is in necessitous circumstances.' I took it for granted that it was some veteran Confederate, when the noble-hearted chieftain quietly added, 'He fought on the other side, but we must not think of that.' I afterward ascertained (not from General Lee, for he never alluded to his charities) that he had not only spoken kindly to this old soldier, who had fought on the other side, but had sent him on his way rejoicing in a liberal contribution to his necessities." As General Lee's private means had been dissi pated by the war, and Mrs. Lee had been deprived of the Arlington estate by Federal appropriation without compensation, it became imperative for him 320 ROBEBT E. LEE to adopt some calling that would assure a support for those members of his family still dependent on him. Agriculture having always had a singular charm for him, although, from his military preoc cupations, he was without practical experience iu it, his first inclination was to secure a small farm and devote his energies to its cultivation. " I am look ing for some quiet little home in the woods," he wrote General Long, ' ' where I can procure shelter and my daily bread, if permitted by the victor." "I want to get into some grass country," said he, ' ' where the natural product of the land will do much for my subsistence." Leaving Eichmond, where he could enjoy no seclusion, owing to the constant attentions paid him, General Lee retired to a country house near Carters- ville, iu Cumberland County, placed at his disposal by a friend. Offers of assistance continued to pur sue him even here ; money, land, corporation stock, — all were pressed upon him in proposed return for the mere endorsement of his name in setting differ ent enterprises on foot. But not for a moment would he consent to receive remuneration, except for services actually performed ; and none of the schemes submitted to his consideration appealed to his inclinations. It was not until the presidency of Washington College at Lexington, Va., was offered him, that he showed any disposition to accept. The institution at this time possessed only a local reputation, and its financial prospects were un promising. Its faculty consisted of but four pro- AFTEE THE WAE 321 fessors, while the number of its students did not ex ceed forty. Lee was, perhaps, influenced favorably to entertain the proposal that he should become its official head by its association with the name of Washington, and its remoteness from the lines of ordinary tiavel ; doubtless, too, it was an advan tage in his eyes that, in building up the insti tution, he would build practically from the founda tion. The obscurity and poverty of the college were not weighed by him in reaching a decision. "I soon discovered," says Bishop Wilmer, who spoke to him about the acceptance of the presidency, "that his mind towered above these earthly distinctions ; that in his judgment, the cause gave dignity to the institu tion, and not the wealth of its endowment, or the renown of its scholars ; that this door, and not an other, was opened to him by Providence, and he only wished to be assured of his competency to fulfll this trust, and then make his few remaining years a comfort and blessing to his suffering coun try." It was to general education that General Lee looked most hopefully for the rehabilitation of the Southern states. ' ' I consider, ' ' he said, ' ' the proper education of the Southern youth one of the most important objects now to be attained, and one from which the greatest beneflts may be expected. Nothing will compensate us for the depression of the standard of our moral and intellectual culture, and each state should take the most energetic measures 322 EOBEET E. LEE to revive the schools and colleges, and, if possible, to increase the facilities for instruction." He earnestly declared, in accepting the presidency of Washington College, that "it was the hope of doing something for the benefit of the young men of the South that had led him to take his present office." And after he had entered upon the per formance of its duties, he refused to allow himself to be drawn away by the most seductive offers. It was proposed at one time to place him at the head of a New York firm representing Southern com merce in that city, at a salary so large that he would have been able, not only to live in comfort himself during his remaining years, but also make ample provision for his family. "I am grateful," here- plied, " but I have a self-imposed task which I must accomplish. I have led the young men of the South in battle ; I have seen many of them die on the field. I shall devote my remaining energies to training young men to do their duty in life." When General Lee was first offered the presidency of the college, he unselfishly weighed the possibility of his acceptance bringing down upon the institu tion the hostility of the North, and, therefore, clouding its prospects of usefulness. "I think it the duty of every citizen in the present condition of the country," said he, "to do all in his power to aid in the restoration of peace aud harmony, and in no way to oppose the policy of the state or general government directed to that object. It is particu larly incumbent on those charged with the instruc- AFTEE THE WAE 323 tion of the young to set them an example of sub mission to authority, and I could not consent to be the cause of animadversion on the college." His apprehensions having been shown to be groundless, he entered upon the duties of his new office with that lofty conscientiousness, untiring energy, and firm devotion to the task of the hour which had distinguished him at every previous stage of his career. It has been justly said by one who knew him that "there was something grand in the spec tacle of a man so famous in the world settling down at the head of an obscure college, in a remote country town, to perform the duties of a noble but arduous profession, without a shadow of discontent or gloom, and with nothing in his de meanor to show that he had not spent his life in the teaching and management of youth." Throughout his presidency, he never for a mo ment forgot the purpose which had led him irre sistibly to accept so responsible a position. That purpose, to use his own words, was " to educate Southern youth into a spirit of loyalty to the new conditions, and the transformation of the social fabric which had resulted from the war, and only through a peaceful obedience to which could the future peace and harmony of the country be re stored." In one of his official reports, he referred in a tone of personal distress to the college's urgent wants, such as, for instance, the need of a larger apparatus for the laboratories, and of a more vo luminous library, and then dwelt wistfully upon 324 EOBEET E. LEE what might be accomplished by a more liberal en dowment, for, said he, "we must look to the rising generation for the restoration of the country." It should always be remembered that these de voted labors, these far-sighted efforts of General Lee for the advancement of Southern education were begun and carried on by him during the dark est hour of the South's history, when her people were not only sunk in the deepest poverty by their recent losses, but were further harassed and em bittered by the senseless and unnatural attempt of the Eepublicau party to place them in the complete control of their former slaves. All these humiliating and exasperating featm'cs of their lot only caused him to consecrate himself with the greater zeal and ardor to his self-imposed task of educating Southern youth in order to hasten the arrival of those happy and prosperous days which he never ceased to an ticipate with confidence. General Lee was well-fitted for his new office by the possession, not only of high moral and intel lectual qualities, but also of practical experience. For a few years, as we have seen, he had filled with distinction the somewhat similar post of super intendent of the Academy at West Point. He had acquired regular and systematic habits by long military service, while his commanding reputation and impressive presence strengthened his influence in directing and controlling so large a body of young men. From the hour he assumed charge, he sought to raise the standards in the various departments AFTEE THE WAE 325 until the institution could offer the ripest education to all who would take advantage of the facilities extended. His great name soon drew a crowd of students from all parts of the South, and as their number increased, the larger means thus afforded enabled him, with the cooperation of the faculty, to establish new chairs, to elect additional professors, and to widen the scope of the different courses of study. Finally, by his active encouragement, a complete system of schools was put iu operation, and under his personal guidance and inspiration was carried on with entire harmony, and with extra ordinary fruitfulness. The highest powers of the teachers for instruction, as well as of the young meu for acquisition alike seemed stimulated by the con sciousness of his appreciative and unremitting supervision of their efforts. He was not satisfied to give a mere general super intendence to the college's affairs ; he watched with a discerning eye, not only the progress of each class as a whole, but also the standing of its individual members. The name of every man was known to him. On one occasion, a list having been read in his presence at a faculty meeting, one name struck him immediately as being unfamiliar to his ear. He asked that it should be repeated ; still he did not recognize it. "I have no recollection of a stu dent of that name," said he iu a tone of self- reproach. " It is very strange that I have forgotten him. I thought I knew every one in college. How long has he been here ? " An investigation revealed 326 EOBEET E. LEE that the student had only recently arrived, and had been entered on the rolls during General Lee's temporary absence. So unbounded was his influence over the minds of the young men, even beyond the collegiate limits, that an appeal from him, in the face of some indis cretion, which the heat and excitability of youth made them prone to commit, always had a restrain ing power. He would issue an address to them as a body, — "general orders" they laughingly termed it, — in which he would seek to dissuade them, by urging the submission of their conduct to the test of the highest principles ; and so overwhelming was the effect of his words that no student was ever tolerated by his fellows who ventured to disregard so urgent a request from their beloved president. During one of his campaigns. General Lee had contracted a severe sore throat, which gradually led to rheumatism of the heart sac ; and by October, 1869, this had assumed the dangerous form of chronic inflammation in that part of the body. In the fol lowing spring, he was, with great difficulty, per suaded to spend some weeks in Florida and Georgia, in the hope that the change to a warmer climate would alleviate the disease. Being reluctant to in crease, by his absence, the burden of work that was already borne by the other members of the faculty, he offered his resignation, which, however, the trus tees declined to accept. During his journey through the South, he was received with every proof of affection and honor by all classes of citizens ; but. AFTEE THE WAE 327 with characteristic modesty, he shrank from show ing himself to the crowds that assembled to greet him at every available point. "Why should they care to see me?" he replied on one occasion, when urged to appear on the platform of his car. " I am ouly a poor old Confederate." During his absence a large sum was appropriated by the trustees of the college for the erection of a residence for his use during his life, with remainder to Mrs. Lee; and an annuity of $3,000 was settled on him, to pass, after his death, to members of his family. On his return, he declined to accept the residence, save as the president's official home, while the annuity was refused altogether, — acts which simply recalled his course, when, during the war, he was offered a handsome house in Eichmond by the municipal authorities of that city. General Lee derived no permanent benefit from his Southern visit ; nor was any improvement ob tained by a sojourn at the Hot Springs of Virginia during the summer of 1870. The following Sep tember he resumed his duties at the college. One rainy and chilly afternoon of that month, heat- tended a meeting of Grace Church vestry, of which he was au active and zealous member. He had only his military cloak as additional clothing to protect him from the cold dampness of the room. One of the questions discussed related to an increase of the rector's salary. A deficit already due was quietly assumed by General Lee, although representing a much larger sum than could be justly expected of 328 EOBEET E. LEE him in proportion to the other members of the body. Eeturning home, he found that his family had been awaiting him for some time, before sitting down to tea. Approaching the table to say grace, he endeavored to articulate, but failing, silently took his seat. Removed to his bed, he lingered, with one brief rally, until October 12th, when he breathed his last. It would be impossible to find words that would describe these closing hours more impressively than those used by Colonel William Preston Johnston, an eye-witness : "As the old hero lay in the darkened room, or with the lamp and hearth fire casting shadows upon his calm, noble front, all the massive grandeur of his form and face and brow remained, and death seemed to lose its terrors, and to borrow a grace and dignity in sublime keeping with the life that was ebbing away. His great mind sank to its last repose almost with the equal poise of health. The few broken utterances that evinced at times a wandering intellect were spoken under the influence of the remedies administered ; but as long as con sciousness lasted, there was evidence that all the high controlling influences still ruled ; and even when stupor was laying its cold hand on the intel lectual perceptions, the moral nature, with its com plete orb of duties aud affections, still asserted itself. A Southern poet has celebrated in song those last significant words, 'Strike the Tent,' and a thousand voices were raised to give meaning to the uncertain sound when the dying man said, with emphasis, AFTER THE WAR 329 ' Tell Hill he must come up. ' These sentences serve to show most touchingly through what fields the im agination was passing; but generally his words, though few, were coherent, and for the most part, the silence was unbroken." General Lee's remains were interred in the College Chapel at Lexington, and there now rests above his tomb a beautiful rectmibent effigy of himself, the work of Valentine, one of the most distinguished sculptors of Virginia. In all parts of the South, the news of his death was received with the grief that accompanies a poignant personal loss. Nor was this feeling of sorrow confined to his own people ; wherever throughout the world heroic achievement, self-sacrificing patriotism, loftiness of spirit, a majestic character, and a pure and disciplined life, were respected and admired, men paused to pay in silent thought a tribute to the memory of Robert Edward Lee. CHAPTER XII MILITARY GENIUS In presenting a general estimate of Lee's great ness, it will be necessary to weigh separately his military career and his private character, although the latter iu the natm-e of things, largely shaped the former. First, let us consider his military career. Lee combined in himself, in an extraordinary degree, the qualities of a great organizer, a great strategist, and a great tactician. It was through his unremit ting energy and practical knowledge as a disciplin arian that the raw and inexperienced troops of 1861 were trained to carry out the operations cul minating in the battle of First Manassas. The same capacity for organization was exhibited by him in the rapidity and thoroughness with which he reformed his army after the close of each campaign ; most notably after Sharpsburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. It was due, perhaps, to his suggestion, certainly to his approval, that the sub-divisions of that army were from the beginning made upon a principle which, by its logical simplicity, assured the highest degree of efficiency for the whole body. It was only in the artillery arm that au important change was made as the war progressed, and then simply to bring that branch more in harmony with MILITARY GENIUS 331 the spirit of the admirable system already govern ing the other branches of the service. Not less conspicuous was Lee's ability as a tacti cian — an ability increased by his unerring insight into the idiosyncrasies of his opponent for the time being. His movements in front of the enemy were always governed more or less by his reliance upon his knowledge of these idiosyncrasies. Lee ma noeuvred one way in McClellan's presence ; another in Pope's ; yet another in Hooker's ; and still an other in Grant's. In Grant's presence, he. would not have weakened his right in order to strengthen his left as he did on a large scale at Gaines' Mill, aud on a small at Sharpsburg ; nor, had he had that resolute and fearless antagonist iu front of him at Second Manassas, would he perhaps have staked the fate of his army upon a great flank march ; nor would he perhaps have repeated so dangerous an operation at Chancellorsville. But never in his whole military career did he display larger tactical capacity than when opposed by Grant himself, simply because the persistent ac tivity of that determined commander kept his an tagonist in a state of continuous alertness. At the close of the battles in the Wilderness, Lee swung his troops entirely around in front of the enemy's advancing columns, and afterward, by a successful counter-movement, marked by even greater celerity, anticipated every secret attempt of the foe to con centrate at some one point to right or left. At the North Anna, he compelled Grant to withdraw his 332 ROBERT E. LEE army by a manoeuvre, which, by separating its two wings, rendered their cooperation practically im possible. At Petersburg, his divination was even more unerring. Although the disparity in the enemy's favor was as four to one, and that enemy could hurry from wing to wing a large body of men without weakening the main line, Lee, by rapid con centration, was able, through a siege that lasted for nine months, to meet every attack not only on his front, but also on his flanks ; and he gave way in the end only when his soldiers were too reduced in number to hold their entrenchments longer. Nor was he content simply to repel assault, if the opposing force was not too overwhelming. During the entire war there was no finer example of the counterstroke than the one delivered by him at Second Manassas. In spite of the greater peril, this would have been repeated at Fredericksburg, had he not expected a second attack the day after the battle ; and it would certainly have beeu repeated at the North Anna, had he not been disabled by sickness. On no field was his tactical ability more strikingly exhibited than at Sharpsburg. Whether or not, it was a mistake to have made a stand there, he, after the battle began, used his resources in troops with consummate skill ; nor does he deserve the less credit for that skill because it was ouly Hill's opportune arrival that saved him from a great disaster on his left. His disposition of the different corps revealed that discriminating eye for topography, which he was to display to a still more MILITARY GENIUS 333 extraordinary degree in the campaign from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor. The least commendable of all his battles, from the tactical point of view, was Gettysburg ; but this was attributable to the fact that the unexpected collision with the enemy placed him, by an accident inca pable of being remedied, in the possession of ground so peculiarly shaped that it was impossible to com municate rapidly from wing to wing, and thus to move his several corps in perfect concert according to the exigencies of the moment. Moreover, the physical obstructions to harmonious cooperation were vastly increased by the practical insubordination of his chief lieutenant, whose conduct would have disor ganized any plan, however otherwise easy of ex ecution. "In the course of battle," Lee once re marked, " my direction is of more harm than use. I must then rely on my division and brigade com manders. I think and I act with all my might to bring up my troops to the right place at the right moment. After that, I have done my duty." No one was more fully aware of this fact than Long- street, and his refusal on the second day to occupy the Round Tops while still undefended, simply be cause he had instructions to move his corps toward another quarter of the field, was an act of perversity that reflected no honor upon him as an officer, though conforming to general orders. But it is as a strategist that Lee will take the highest rank in military history. From this point of view, there is reason to think he will be finally 334 ROBEET E. LEE accepted as the foremost commander produced by the war. Jackson, among Southern generals, may have surpassed him in energy and celerity, in the vigor of his strokes, and in power to enforce disci pline ; but in strategical conception, Lee had no superior, probably no equal among his contempo raries. "A great strategist," says Colonel Hender son, "is one who carefully calculates ways and means, — the men at his disposal ; food, forage, and ammunition ; the forces to be detached for political purposes ; who also calculates the different factors of the problem, — strength and disposition of the enemy ; roads, railways, fortresses, weather, natural features, morale of the opposing armies, character of the opposing general, and facilities for supply." The object of strategy is to concentrate in superior force at the decisive point, i. e., the battle-field, aud, at the same time, to prevent the enemy from con centrating there. Both Lee and Jackson saw with equal clearness that the only hope of winning Southern independ ence lay in strategical combinations that would, on the battle-fleld at least, equalize the respective re sources of the two opponents. It was a rule with each of these commanders never to attack against heavy odds, if, by any possible manoeuvring, he could hurl his own force against a part, and that the weaker part of the enemy ; in other words, each strove to compensate by extreme mobility for his numerical inferiority. Had Lee been equal in numerical strength to his antagonists, he would MILITAEY GENIUS 335 never have followed the example set by McClellan and Hooker in retaining a large proportion of their respective armies in a second line for mere defense in case the first was defeated. At Sharpsburg, one- third of the Federal troops remained inactive in the rear ; and at Chancellorsville, this over-cautious conduct was repeated. On both battle-fields, every Confederate soldier participated in the actual fight ing. So essentially aggressive was Lee's military genius that even in his purely defensive campaigns, he al ways exhibited that spirit at the first promising op portunity. Over-prudent in his tactics during the operations in West Virginia, even then he was full of daring in his strategy. It is true that he after ward opposed Johnston's bold suggestion to gather a great army at Eichmond, and end the war at a stroke in the swamps of the Chickahominy by the overwhehning defeat of McClellan; but when he him self was appointed to the command, he practically adopted that suggestion before advancing on the Federal right wing at Gaines' Mill. His boldest strategical achievement during the Peninsula cam paign, however, was accomplished in the use of Jackson's troops in the Valley, while he himself was stiU stationed at Eichmond as Mr. Davis's mili tary adviser. By thus reducing McClellan's avail able force one-third, he made it possible to attack a part of that force with success and drive the whole back to James Eiver. The same far-seeing strategy that led him to order Jacksou to march against 336 EOBERT E. LEE Banks at Winchester, prompted him to dispatch the same officer to Gordonsville, with the design of alarming the Federal Administration at Washington so far as to recall McClellan from Harrison' s Landing ; and when that end had been attained, he, for the purpose of recovering the opportunity lost at Clark Mountain, to destroy Pope's army, deliberately divided his troops in front of the enemy, marched one part of them to that enemy's rear, and united the whole again on the field of battle. The great flank movement at Chancellorsville was a still bolder operation of the same nature, as it was carried out under his opponent's very eyes, and with a second Federal army threatening to advance in his rear at any moment. There, he not only divided his army again on the field of battle, but he left one- half of it to be exposed to the crushing impact of Hooker in front aud of Sedgwick behind. The situation was even more dangerous than that at Sharpsburg, where, at the head of 39,000 men, he accepted the gage of battle from 90,000, with a deep liver practically cutting him off from his only pos sible line of withdrawal in case of defeat. That Lee weighed and calculated with great care all the chances even iu his boldest movements is shown by his prudence and caution in remaining in position after the Federal recoil at Fredericksburg, where a reckless or impulsive general would not have resisted the temptation to strike the defeated enemy in the plain below, in spite of the fierce can nonade from the Stafford Heights, aud the open road MILITAEY GENIUS 337 to the pontoon bridges. The hazards of his two in vasions of the North, with such a small force to preserve unbroken his lines of communication, caused him to guard almost too thoroughly, as in the capture of Harper's Ferry, for instance, against every contingency. In both he was thwarted by in- flueuces which it was impossible to anticipate : first, by the loss of the general order before Sharpsburg ; and, secondly, by Longstreet's procrastination and obstinacy on the second day at Gettysburg, and by his practical disobedience of instructions on both the second and third days. Subsequent to that battle, Lee showed even supe rior caution, not because the numerical disparity in his opponent's favor was greater than ever, but be cause there was left no officer who approached Jackson in boldness, skill, and energy in carrying out his commander's designs, or in ability to sug gest designs which had not occurred to that com mander. It was not simply that Lee, after Gettys burg, had Grant, the most vigorous and courageous of the Federal leaders, in his front ; in the deadly struggle from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, more than one opportunity arose, which, had he had Jackson at hand, he would have promptly used, but which he allowed to pass because, for the execution of such dangerous manoeuvres, he could trust only to a lieutenant with "Stonewall's" characteristics. If Lee possessed such extraordinary qualifications as an organizer, tactician, and strategist, why did he fail to win with his sword the independence of 338 EOBEET E. LEE the South ? Prom Gaines' MiU to Petersburg, his career was marked by no great catastrophe. The check at Malvern Hill was a check delivered by a retreating rear-guard ; the repulse at Cemetery Eidge was the repulse of 15,000 men only, after two days' success on the part of all the Confederate forces ; the overthrow at Five Forks was the overthrow of one uusupported detachment cut off from the main body. There was no Missionary Eidge, no Nashville, no Waterloo in the history of the Army of Northern Virginia ; no defeat, not even a repulse, of the whole body at once. Why was it then that, after infiicting on the Army of the Potomac great disasters, as at Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, or after repulsing furious assaults, as at Sharpsburg, Spottsylvania, and Cold Harbor with almost unparalleled slaughter, he was unable to reduce the North to the mood of making peace ? The causes of his failure to do so were the subor dination by the Confederate government of all mili tary requirements to the supposed political necessity of holding Eichmoud ; the enormous disparity in number of men and in quantity of material and sup plies in favor of the Federal army ; the lack of a highly trained corps staff, and the general preva lence of a somewhat loose discipline among the officers aud troops, more particularly in the early years of the war ; certain personal qualities of Lee himself; and finally, and most conspicuously, the inefficiency of the Confederate leadership in the West, MILITAEY GENIUS 339 As already pointed out, the selection, for the capital, of a city situated as near the ocean high ways as Eichmond, was the Confederate govern ment's flrst serious mistake. The next, and this was au error of even graver character, was to make the retention of that city the central policy upon which was to turn every movement of the Eastern army. Apart from aU other considerations, such a policy was certain to invest its fall with fatal significance ; it was practically staking the existence of the new republic upon an ability to prevent the capture of one little town of a few thousand inhabitants. Had the capital been established at some interior point, like Ealeigh or Danville, where the necessary work shops and foundries could soon have been erected, or, what would probably have beeu wiser, at At lanta, a city lying in a mountainous country, and remote from any natural highway to serve as a liue of communication, it would have been far more dif ficult for the Federals to seize it, had it been de fended with the valor, resolution, and constancy distinguishing the operations around Eichmond. Eichmond was situated upon a great stream which the Confederates could never really have hoped to close. One Federal army escaped destruction by retreat to the protection of this stream ; another, by this means, was able to take a position less than twenty miles from the capital, and to hold it with out the slightest apprehension as to the interrup tion of their communications. As early as 1862, when Jackson was eager to lead 340 EOBEET E. LEE his victorious troops from the Valley into Maryland, he was warned to " keep always in view the proba bility of an attack upon Eichmond from either the north, or the south, when a concentration of forces would become necessary." Had that city not beeu the capital before the battle of Fredericksburg, Burnside might have been drawn far from his base toward Charlottesville, where, with his line of com munications exposed to severance, a retreat after defeat might have been attended with an over whelming Federal disaster. Had Richmond not been the capital after the battles in the Wilderness, Lee could have slowly retired toward the hills south of Lynchburg, and with the advantages of that position, and with a mobile army, could, as he him self stated, have prolonged the war indefinitely. As the head of the civil administration, it was perhaps natural that Mr. Davis should have relied too much on political influences to secure the tri umph of the Confederacy. He never entirely lost the hope of foreign intervention, and he thought correctly that this hope would be at once dispelled altogether by the abandonment of the city formally adopted as the capital. A peripatetic president and cabinet would present a spectacle so devoid of dig nity as to lose all foreign respect. On recalling the events of the Revolution, he remembered the aid given by France, but he forgot that, during that war, no city was made of permanent importance to the cause of the patriots, and that one after another the towns of the struggling republic, from Boston to MILITARY GENIUS 341 Savannah, fell into British possession without, in the slightest degree, affecting the fiual issue of the contest. From the beginning to the end of hostili ties, the Confederacy had but one real ground of hope, namely, the success of its armies. Lee, and not Davis, shotdd have enjoyed supreme power in deciding all questions of military expediency ; and no political considerations should have been per mitted to over-ride obvious military necessities. Lee was compelled to bear the heavy burden of military responsibility alone, and yet at no time was he in absolute control of the general move ments of his own troops ; in the last resort, he had to submit to the dictation of Mr. Davis and his ad visers, a monstrous contradiction, apart from mere political theory, when practically upon his unham pered judgment depended the very existence of the government they represented. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider the dis parity in number of men, and in quantity of ma terial and supplies. "It will be difficult," General Lee himself remarked after the close of the war, " to make the world believe the odds against which we fought." At Sharpsburg, the numerical superi ority of the Federal army over the Confederate, was more than two to one ; and at Chancellorsville, the disproportion was as great. In the battle of the Wilderness, the disparity began at more than two to one, and but for the slaughter of the Northern soldiers from that point to the end of the battles at Spottsylvania would have grown to more than three 342 ROBEET E. LEE to one after 40,000 recruits had joined Grant at the latter place. In order successfully to resist odds apparently so overwhelming, Lee was compelled to use on these battle-fields in mere defense of his position every soldier in his ranks. No heavy reserve could be held back to invade the enemy's entrenchments with a counterstroke at the auspicious moment. "The country has yet to learn," he wrote, "how often advantages secured at the expense of many valuable lives have failed to produce their legitimate results by reason of our inability to prosecute them against the reinforcements which the superior num bers of the enemy enabled him to interpose between the defeat of an army and its ruin. More than once most promising opportunities have been lost for want of men to take advantage of them, and victory itself has been made to put on the appearance of de feat because our diminished and exhausted troops have been unable to renew a successful struggle against fresh numbers of the enemy." And again he said when looking back upon the war : " The force which the Confederates brought to bear was so often inferior in numbers to that of the Federals that the more they followed up the victory against the position of the enemy's line, the more did they lay themselves open to being sur rounded by the remainder of the enemy. It was like a man breasting a wave of the sea who, as rapidly as he clears a way before him, is enveloped by the very water he has displaced." MILITAEY GENIUS 343 With her own teeming population to furnish re cruits, with abundant funds to secure mercenary European troops in addition, and with tens of thou sands of former slaves also to enrol, cotdd the North have paid a more remarkable tribute to the valor, fortitude, and constancy of the decimated armies of the South than by declaring medicines contraband of war, and refusing to exchange prisoners, — acts of apparent inhumanity which she could justify only by proclaiming the supreme necessity of restoring the national authority at all costs ? "I offered to General Grant," said Lee, "to send into his lines all the prisoners within my department provided he would return me man for man, and when I informed the Confederate authorities of my proposition, I was told that, if it was accepted, they would place all the prisoners at the South at my disposal. But my proposition was not accepted." Why was it not accepted ? Was it because Mr. Lincoln and General Grant were personally more indifferent to suffering than Mr. Davis and General Lee? Not so. It was not accepted because the Federal authorities had correctly concluded that the South could be subdued only by annihilation, and that the Federal government must not shrink even from such ruthless expedients to accomplish this end. Such was the principle on which Sherman's devastation of Georgia and the Carolinas, and Sheri dan's of the Valley were, according to their own recorded professions, carried out. In other words, impoverished as the South now was from every 344 EOBEET E. LEE point of view, it was uevertheless declared by these two commanders, with the approval of Grant and Mr. Lincoln, that she could not be conquered until her remaining territory had been swept far cleaner of all resources than by a plague of Egyptian locusts. The privations from which Lee's army suffered long before the March to the Sea began, necessarily diminished its efficiency to an appreciable degree. It was due as much to a lack of shoes as to sickness from the use of improper food that so large a num ber of the Confederate troops were unable to arrive with the main force on the field of Sharpsburg. It was due, also, to a lack of shoes that the unfortunate movement which brought on the battle of Gettys burg was made ; and it was due, too, to the want of clothing of all kinds that Lee was unable, iu Oc tober, 1863, to undertake a third invasion of the North. One who stood by the roadside and watched 10,000 men under Hood pass on their way to the Eappahannock in the autumn of that year, has written: "Such rags and tags as we saw now! Nothing was like anything else ! Most garments and arms were such as had been taken from the euemy. Such shoes as they had on ! Such tin pans and pots as were tied to their waists, with bread and bacon stuck in the ends of their bayonets." "I think the sublimest sight of the war," said General Lee, "was the cheerfulness aud alacrity exhibited by this army in the pursuit of the enemy under all the trials aud privations to which it was exposed." MILITARY GENIUS 345 As we have seen, the soldiers, during the campaign of Second Manassas, were forced to rely upon the orchards and corn-fields along the line of march to supplement their regular rations ; and in the winter of 1863-4, it was often necessary to restrict the troops to half rations ; while during that of 1864^5, they were not infrequently on the verge of actual starvation. We must consider, too, the lack of rigid discipline in the army at large, and the absence of a highly trained corps staff. The Army of Northern Vir ginia, like aU the other armies engaged on either side in the great conflict, was a mass of volunteers, who, unlike European soldiers, had not previously received a thorough military training. Hostilities began so suddenly and unexpectedly that there was no time to subject the troops to prolonged drilling, and an extended series of sham manoeuvres. The Southern soldier had the defects of his virtues ; his very independence of spirit and strength of indi viduality, the result of the free and active life which he had led before enrolment, only caused him to submit the more impatiently to disciplinary re straints, though ready to endure without a murmur every form of hardship and want. He did not re sent the exercise of authority over his movements when his intelligence showed its reasonableness ; but if not, his first disposition was to follow his own in clination, and refuse compliance. This inborn self-assertiveness, while it increased the army's efficiency in some ways, seriously dimin- 346 ROBERT E. LEE ished it in others. It was as characteristic of the officers as of the rank and file. ' ' The greatest diffi culty I find," said General Lee on one occasion, in a tone of complaint unusual with him, " is in caus ing orders and regulations to be obeyed. This," he added, "arises not from a spirit of disobedience, but of ignorance." "The spirit which animates our soldiers," he said on another occasion, "and the natural courage with which they are so liberally endowed have led to a reliance on these good quali ties to the neglect of measures that would increase their efficiency and contribute to their safety." It was in some degree due to this impatience under re straint that straggling became so conspicuous a feature of every Confederate march. Could the Army of Northern Virginia have been handled more like a machine, without losing the fire and resolution generated in the whole by the highly de veloped individuality of each soldier, it could have been used by its commander more successfully iu both combination and manoeuvre. Lee was forced to console himself with the thought that the superior intelligence and sturdy spirit of both officer and private were some compensation for the disinclina tion of both to submit to the strict discipline which alone made possible perfect unity of action. The deficiencies of the corps staffs were also a seri ous obstruction to success. Many of the most ac complished officers of the Army of Northern Vir ginia were to be found among the members of these staffs ; particularly was this so with the commander- MILITARY GENIUS 347 in-chief s, which included such men as Colonels Walter H. Taylor, Charles S. Venable, and Charles Marshall, besides others equally entitled, by their high quaUfications, to special designation. But conspicuous efficiency was not general, not from lack of zeal and intelligence, which were universal, but simply from want of previous military training. Naturally, the shortcomings were more observable during the first years of the conflict than later, when the staff had been educated to a far greater degree of usefulness by the practical experience ac quired in the rough school of actual war. Perhaps, there never was a contest in which the demand for the services of such a body was more constant and urgent than during these Eastern cam paigns, because the ground fought over was so cov ered with heavy forests, and, in some places, so overgrown with dense thickets, that, without such assistance, manoeuvre and combination were alike impossible. The great disadvantages created by the physical obstructions confronting the troops at every turn could be overcome only by the prompt and ac curate conveyance of orders from one wing or de tachment to another. Whether this was done well or ill depended entirely upon the ability and train ing of the staffs charged with the performance of that vital task. Perhaps the most promising op portunity ever presented to Lee to annihilate the Army of the Potomac, was at the battle of Frazier's Farm, and yet that battle proved a failure for the Confederacy because he was able to concentrate on 348 EOBEET E. LEE the ground only 20,000 men instead of the 75,000 called for by the combination which he had so care fully planned, and which would have beeu entirely practicable had the corps and detachments been kept in touch by well-trained and organized staffs, such as belong to every European army. In some measure, Longstreet's delay after one o'clock, in taking position opposite the Peach Orchard, on the second day at Gettysburg was due to inefficient staff support ; and other specific instances might be mentioned. Again, the final failure of the Army of Northern Virginia was, to a certain extent, attributable to the defects of Lee's own virtues. Bather than give pain to a subordinate whose devotion to the Confederate cause was unquestionable, he would overlook grave shortcomings in that subordinate's conduct even though likely to be repeated at the next critical moment. He preferred to retain an officer in a re sponsible position which he was incapable of filling properly, rather than wound his pride, and tarnish his reputation by removing him. This was a weak ness which Jackson never exhibited. But in Lee's defense it should be remembered that, as the com mander of an army drawn from all parts of the South, it was necessary for him to exercise extra ordinary tact and forbearance in order to allay the jealousies of each state, so easily aroused by any i'magined slight to its representatives in that army. As unity and harmony were justly deemed by him to be all important to the Confederacy, he often en- MILITAEY GENIUS 349 dured what was repugnant to his own judgment rather than, by obeying its dictates, indifferent to consequences, sow possible seed of discord and dis sension. It was not simply by his great military talents that Lee won the respect and devotion of his officers and men ; it was also by that patient and consider ate spirit, — that disposition to make allowances, — which never failed him even under the most ex asperating circumstances. " I agree with you," he wrote to General Hood in 1863, " in believing that our army would be invincible if it could be properly organized and officered. There were never such meu in an army before. They will go anywhere and do anything if properly led. But there is the difficulty — proper commanders. Where can they be obtained ? But they are improving, constantly improving. Eome was not built in a day, nor can we expect miracles in our favor." This spirit of over-tolerance was indirectly re sponsible for the destruction of the Confederacy's last but most promising opportunity of winning in dependence. Justly believing that his lieutenants were as interested as himself in defeating the enemy, Lee always allowed them a wide latitude in the exercise of their discretion, and was ever anxious to receive and weigh their respective opinions as to the wisdom of any movement he was considering. This attitude of mind, which was undoubtedly carried too far, encouraged in one of his principal lieutenants a spirit that, on more than one occasion. 350 EOBEET E. LEE led to practical insubordination. Longstreet's con duct on the first and second days at Gettysbm-g was made possible only by the lenient and yielding way in which Lee had borne with his previous opinion ativeness, tardiness, and perversity. Such conduct would never have been indulged in by that officer had he, during the same length of time, been serv ing under either Grant or Jackson ; for he would have known that, should he venture upon a half hearted support, or no support at all to the orders of those commanders, he was certain to meet with the fate of Garnett, Porter, Franklin, and Warren. General Lee evinced a sublime self-forgetfuluess iu assuming all the responsibility for the repulse at Gettysburg on the third day, but had he beeu less disposed, after similar events, to accept as his own the acts of obstinate and self-complacent subordi nates, those subordinates would have been slower in giving rein to their obstructive qualities. Jackson did not always approve of his commander's deci sions, — witness his opposition in the beginning to the expedition against Harper's Ferry during the Sharpsburg campaign, — but when once he was ordered to march, he performed the task assigned him with as much vigor and alacrity as if the plan had been first suggested by himself ; and that is the course pursued by every true soldier and faithful lieutenant. It seems contradictory that, although Lee tolerated in a corps commander difference of opinion stretched to the point of practical insubordination, he was, to MILITAEY GENIUS 351 an extraordinary degree, subservient to the authority of Mr. Davis as the head of the Confederate Admin istration. Accustomed to military discipline almost from his youth, he looked upon obedience to his official superior as the cardinal principle, the very keystone, of his profession. "I am a soldier," he said to General Gordon near the close of the war, when urged to use his influence in ending a hope less contest. " It is my province to obey the orders of the government, and to advise and counsel with the civil authorities only upon questions directly affecting this army and its defense of the capital and country." And so far did he press this attitude of non-interference that, apparently, he made no protest against Johnston's removal from the command of the forces operating north of Atlanta, although that un wise act was probably regarded by him with strong disapproval. It was entirely foreign to his nature to assume any form of responsibility that did not legitimately belong to him ; and he particularly shrank from ever encroaching on a field from which the military authorities were expressly ex cluded by constitutional provision. It must be re- caUed, also, that he was peculiarly indebted to Mr. Davis, who, when his military reputation was under a cloud, in consequence of the unsuccessful campaign in western Virginia, had, by appointing him to the command of the Army of Northern Virginia, given him the opportunity to enter upon his great career. . But not one of the obstructions that had to be overcome by Lee, whether subordination of strate; 352 EOBEET E. LEE gical necessities to political considerations, disparity in number of men and in quantity of munitions and supplies, imperfect discipline among the soldiers at large, deficient training on the part of the corps staffs, or the over-leniency and generosity of the commander himself, was so influential in leading up to the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as the Western army's failure, almost from the be ginning, to maintain its ground. This was the re sult of incompetent leadership, as the men who fought on the Confederate side in that field, were of precisely the same quality as those who, under Lee himself, won so many victories in the East. Unfor tunately for the Southern cause, the decisive battle fields were situated, not in Virginia, but iu Tennessee. Appomattox was the result, not of Gettysburg, but of Missionary Eidge. With the exception of Chicka mauga, a temporary triumph, and of the first day at Shiloh, which was reversed by the second, the Western army's career was marked ouly by disasters. From the fall of Fort Donelson on to the evacua tion of Atlanta, the superior resources of its Federal antagonist told to a degree never observed in Vir ginia until after the abandonment of the lines of Petersburg. The victory of Missionary Eidge rendered it safe for Grant to transfer a large body of troops to the East in order to strengthen the Army of the Potomac; while the capture of Atlanta made it possible for Sherman to march through Georgia and the Carolinas and destroy the last remaining granary of the Con- MILITARY GENIUS 353 federacy. These two separate movements brought to bear on the Army of Northern Virginia two powerful destructive forces, which, taken together, proved frresistible. Had Jackson survived Chan- cellorsviUe and been placed in command of the Western army, the victory of Chickamauga would most probably have been pressed so energetically that no Missionary Ridge would have followed ; no reinforcements would have been sent from the West to the Army of the Potomac ; and Sherman would have been too much engaged in holding his position iu Tennessee to descend upon Atlanta through the hiUs of north Georgia. Grant, the ablest, most vigorous, and most determined of the Federal com manders, would have been detained in the vicinity of Chattanooga, and Lee would have been left to oppose Meade, until that officer, defeated iu his turn, should be succeeded by one who perhaps pos sessed still less boldness, energy, and native talent. Looking back upon the history of the war from the Confederate point of view, it now seems clear that, after the battle of Missionary Ridge, the Southern aim should have been, not independence, but the acquisition of the most liberal terms for re- admission to the Union. The psychological moment occurred when Grant recoiled from Lee's entrench ments at Cold Harbor. Had the ripest practical statesmanship then prevailed in Confederate cabinet and Congress, causing a dispassionate scrutiny of the ultimate chances of failure, the indirect over tures which Mr. Lincoln made in the hour of hia 354 ROBERT E. LEE own and the North's profound depression would have been accepted, the Southern people would have returned with full compensation for their slaves, to be expended iu restoring their wasted resources ; with the brilliant prestige of their long and heroic struggle for independence to raise their political in fluence to the highest point in our national history ; and with complete power to fix the emancipated negro's status in harmony with the dictates of their own experienced judgment. The era of Eecon structiou, with its shameful and embittered memo ries, would never have intervened, and all the dan gerous precedents established in the hour of uncon trolled passion would have been rendered forever nugatory by their practical revocation. There is no evidence that General Lee favored the acceptance of the Federal advances, but when we study the history of his life after the close of the war, the conclusion seems irresistible that, had he been free at that time to show the practical wisdom, the conciliatory spirit, and the perfect foresight which he evinced when the country had been re united by ruthless force alone, the South would stand indebted to him for the most beneficent act of statesmanship that could ever have beeu recorded iu her history, and his name would be equally dear to the Northern and Southern people for closing the gaping wounds of a common country, with honor to all the states, and with humiliation to none. CHAPTEE Xin GENERAL CHARACTER The very qualities that diminished General Lee's ability to perform the part of a successful revo lutionary leader were such as to adorn his character in private life. Profound religious feeling was the foundation of that character ; it gave its complexion to all his thoughts, and, consciously or uncon sciously, governed all his actions, whether trivial or important. If Southern independence was to be won only by violating Christian principles or the dictates of humanity, he would never have consented to become the Confederacy's military instrument in bringing it about, however ardently he might have desired its attainment. No such cynical sentiment as "omelettes cannot be made without breaking eggs " could ever have been uttered or approved by him. Never during his invasions of hostile terri tory would he have inaugurated or countenanced a course of devastation involving the innocent and helpless, even had he thought that such a course would perhaps cripple the enemy beyond recovery. Not even the suggestions of a just and natural re sentment provoked him to reprisals, because the indulgence of such a feeling would have imparted to the war a spirit of wanton cruelty and savagery 356 EOBEET E. LEE which he abhorred. The burning of Chambersburg by General Early, in retaliation for General Hunter's use of the torch in the Valley (that city, knowing the alternative, having declined to pay the money tribute levied on her in consequence of those bar barities) was done without General Lee's knowledge, authority, or approval. As we have seen, he posi tively refused, during the retreat from Petersburg, to disperse his army in guerilla warfare, because, however effective this might be toward securing more favorable terms in the final pacification, it would lead to courses radically repugnant to the Christian and humane principles which he was de termined to uphold to the last ditch. Indeed, his religious feeling seemed only to be intensified by the Confederacy's declining fortunes. The profound impression made upon him by the Gettysburg campaign, and his less hopeful outlook on the future thereafter, are clearly revealed in the deeper and more fervent religious tone of his cor respondence from that date to the end of the con test. He seemed to lean more on Providence the more Providence appeared to be deserting his cause. When the Confederacy finaUy sank in ruins, it was this unshaken trust in God, this confidence in Divine wisdom, that inspired him with calm res ignation to the inevitable as well as with a san guine expectation of a happier day for the Southern people. So deep was this trust and so firm this confidence that not even the relentless Acts of Ee- construction aroused in him bitterness or animosity GENEEAL CHAEACTEE 357 toward the North. That era of submersion was to him but a passing wave of darkness ; the light from Heaven would be obscured only for a time. It was natural that a man guided in his entire conduct by religious principles shotdd, at aU costs, and in spite of every temptation, have been loyal to his conception of duty from the beginning to the eud of his life. The boy, who, with a gravity beyond his years, devoted every moment not engaged in study, to brightening the hours of an invalid mother, was the father of the man, who, putting aside all proffers of Federal honors, and disregard ing the loss of home aud estate, obeyed the call of his native commonwealth, defended her soil up to the exhaustion of his last resource, and then used his influence to promote peace and harmony and to spread abroad a hopeful spirit. "I never in my life saw in General Lee the slightest tendency to self-seeking," said Mr. Davis. " It was not his to make a record ; it was not his to shift the blame to other shoulders, but it was his, with an eye fixed upon the welfare of his country, never faltering, to follow the line of duty to the end." And Mr. Stephens has recorded: "What I had seen Gen eral Lee to be at first, childlike in simplicity, and unselfish in his character, he remained unspoiled by praise and success." Indeed, no feeling of personal ambition seemed at any time to animate him. When, in the spring of 1861, the Confederate seat of government was removed to Eichmond, he lost his position as su- 358 EOBERT E. LEE preme commander of the Virginia troops, a reduction which the Confederate authorities at first greatly feared would diminish his zeal for the cause. When sounded by Mr. Stephens, he simply replied : ' ' I am willing to serve anywhere where I cau be useful." Before his appointment to the leadership of the Army of Northern Virginia, in succession to Johnston, he occupied the least conspicuous post filled by any Confederate officer of equal rank. His military reputation had been seriously lowered by the campaign in western Virginia, and not advanced by his achievements as an engineer along the south Atlantic coast because unknown to the general public ; and yet at no time, in word or action, did he give any sign of dissatisfaction or discontent. Undepressed by events that clouded his private fortunes, he was never elated by events that covered those fortunes with a dazzling radiance. In either situation, he displayed equal greatness of mind and soul. Which was the sublimer moral act, to attribute, in the intoxicating hour of success at Chancellorsville, all the glory of the victory to Jackson, or in the depressing hour of failure at Gettysburg, to assume all the responsibility for the repulse, which really belonged to Longstreet ? This spirit of generosity was shown just as conspicuously in his relations with less distinguished subordinates ; the officers of inferior rank who rose to prominence under him were always certain to receive more rather than less credit than was their due for their services to the Confederate cause. GENERAL CHAEACTEE 359 Another phase of the same spirit was exhibited in his attitude toward the enemy : he was never heard to express himself with rancor regarding the North even during the progress of the war. He always spoke of the opposing army as "those people." This spirit of moderation toward his foes was illustrated with singular beauty in an incident that occurred at Gettysburg, after the close of the battle. "I was badly wounded," says a private of the Army of the Potomac. " A ball had shattered my left leg. I lay on the ground not far from Cemetery Eidge, aud as General Lee ordered his retreat, he and his officers rode near me. As he came along I recognized him, and though faint from exposure and loss of blood, I raised up my hands, looked Lee in the face, aud shouted as loud as I could, ' Hurrah for the Union.' The general heard me, looked, stopped his horse, dismounted, and came toward me. I confess I at first thought he meant to kill me. But as he came up, he looked down at me with such a sad expression on his face, that all fear left me, and I wondered what he was about. He extended his hand to me and grasping mine firmly and looking right into my eyes, said, ' My son, I hope you will soon be well.' If I live a thousand years, I will never forget the expression on General Lee's face. Here he was defeated, retiring from a field that cost him and his cause almost their last hope, and yet he stopped to say words like those to a wounded soldier of the opposition, who had taunted him as he passed by. As soon as the 360 EOBERT E. LEE general had left me, I cried myself to sleep there upon the bloody grouud." There have been few Americans who have had as much reason as General Lee to indulge a spirit of pride. Possessed of an ancestry illustrious for their achievements in both peace and war ; able to look back upon a career of his own unsurpassed, perhaps unequaled, in the military history of the English- speaking race ; connected by descent and marriage with the family of the New World's greatest hero ; distinguished throughout life by his manly beauty, imposing presence, and courtly manners ; and en joying the worldly advantages of the highest social position, popular respect and admiration, as well as a sufficiency of personal estate even after the loss of his beautiful home, — would it have been surprising had this man, endowed with all these things to stimulate his egotism, shown in one form or an other, some conspicuous evidence of self-esteem? Simple, modest, and humble-minded he began ; simple, modest, and humble-minded he ended, an unbroken record of the most perfect consistency. Though decisive in character, and of passions far fiom weak, it was rare indeed, that he lost control of himself, and then, as a rule, only when provoked by some glaring instance of moral delinquency. Such an instance occurred in the course of his flrst invasion of the North. A stringent proclamation prohibiting pillage had been issued. Coming sud denly upon a half-starved soldier, who was sneak ing off with a squealing pig under his arm, Lee be- GENERAL CHARACTER 361 came greatly incensed at so palpable a proof of disobedience to his commands, and having directed the arrest of the man upon the spot, had him sent under guard to Jackson's corps, to which he be longed, with an order for his immediate execution. Jackson, thinking that the Confederate army was already small enough, placed the unlucky culprit iu the front rank at Sharpsburg, where he bore himself with such gallantiy that he was afterward pardoned. Lee was remarkable for an unblemished purity iu his conversation as well as in his conduct. One associated with him continuously from boyhood to old age has recorded that, throughout that long in tercourse, filled as it was with the most intimate and unguarded moments, he had never heard one word issue from Lee's lips which might not have been spoken in the presence of the most modest aud refined woman. "His correctness of demeanor and language," says Joseph E. Johnston, a man, who, from his own elevated character, was fully capable of judging his great contemporary, "and attention to all duties, personal and official, and a dignity as much a part of himself as the elegance of his person, gave him a superiority which everybody acknowl edged in his heart." "I saw strong evidence of the sympathy of General Lee's heart after the first engagement of our troops in the Valley of Mexico," remarks the same distinguished commander. " I had lost a cherished young relative in that action known to 362 ROBERT E. LEE him only as my relative. Meeting me, he suddenly saw in my face the effect of that loss, burst into tears, and expressed his deep sympathy as tenderly in words as his lovely wife would have done." Nor did this power of entering into the feelings of others stop at men. From youth upward, he had been particularly fond of horses and dogs. Many of the most interesting anecdotes of his early life relate to the self-sacrificing pains which he took to promote the welfare of his children's numerous pets. His celebrated horse, Traveler, which bore him through so many of his campaigns, was always treated by him with as much care and affection as if he were a member of the family. "Traveler is my only companion, I may also say, pleasure," he wrote to his daughter from Lexington, during a va cation when he happened to be alone. "He and I, whenever practicable, wander out in the mountains and enjoy sweet confidence." All suffering animals that came under his notice never failed to appeal to his acute sense of com passion. This feeling on his part was beautifully illustrated in a scene which occurred in the lines below Richmond during the siege of Petersburg. "He was visiting a battery," says a member of his staff, who has related the anecdote, "and the sol diers, inspired by their affection for him, gathered near him in a group that attracted the enemy's fire. Turning toward them, he said, in his quiet man ner : ' Men, you had better go farther to the rear ; they are firing up here, and you are exposing your- GENERAL CHARACTER 363 selves to unnecessary danger. ' The men drew back, but General Lee, as if unconscious of danger to him self, walking forward, picked up some small object ou the ground, and placed it on the limb of a tree above his head. It was afterward perceived that the object for which he had thus risked his life was an unfledged sparrow that had fallen from its nest. It was a marked instance of that love for the lower animals and deep feeling for the helpless which he always displayed." It was but natural that a man whose heart was such a well-spring of kindness, tenderness and sympathy, should have won, to an extraordinary degree, the respectful love of his social inferiors, whether his owu servants or not, who were fre quently in his presence. It is related that, in early life, he accompanied one of his mother's slaves to the far South in the hope that the change to a warmer and dryer climate would cure or alleviate the puLmonary disease from which he was suffering. During the darkest hours of the Reconstruction era, when the animosities between the whites and blacks were so much inflamed, the negroes, of their own spontaneous accord, were always eager, on every occasion, to manifest their profound reverence for his person. " When he approached, either walking or mounted," we are told, " they would stop, bow politely, and stand until he had passed. He never failed to acknowledge their salutes with kind and dignified courtesy." Of his devotion and thoughtful consideration for 364 ROBERT E. LEE the members of his family, the beautiful record re cently given to the world by his youngest son fur nishes innumerable examples. "To my mother, who was a great invalid from rheumatism for more than ten years," writes Captain Lee, " he was the most faithful attendant and tender nurse. Every want of hers that he could supply, he antici pated, and whenever he was in the room, the privi lege of pushing her wheeled chair into the dining room or out on the verandas, or elsewhere about the house, was yielded to him. He sat with her daily, entertaining her with accounts of what was doing in the college, and the news of the village, and would often read to her in the evening. For her, his love and care never ceased, his gentleness and patience never ended." And what was true of his relations with his wife was equally true of his relations with his children. His family life was rich in all that the heart affords, full of tender yet discriminating indulgence, and marked by au un ceasing enjoyment of the pure and simple round of domestic pleasures and amusements. In his owu home, he was the embodiment of hospitality, his manner always charmingly affable, his conversation often quietly humorous, and at all times inter esting and unaffected. No one would have recog nized in the man as he appeared under his own roof, the cold and austere leader who had so recently directed the movements in great battles. In intercourse with strangers. General Lee's natural dignity was such that he could repel or at- GENERAL CHARACTER 365 tract as seemed to him proper. To them, he often appeared reserved and silent, but no one who ap proached him without presumption could justly im pute to him a want of kindness and consideration. " I shall never forget his sweet winning smile," says Lord Wolseley, who was introduced to him in camp only a short time after the battle of Sharpsburg, "nor his clear honest eyes that seemed to look into your heart whilst they searched your brain. I have met many of the great men of my time, but Lee alone impressed me with the feeUng that I was in the presence of a man who was cast in a grander mould aud made of different and flner metal than all other meu. He is stamped upon my memory as a being apart and superior to all others in every way, — a man with whom none I ever knew and very few of whom I have read was worthy to be classed. I have met but two men who realized my ideas of what a true hero should be, — my friend, Charles Gordon, was one ; General Lee, the other." " Forty years have come and gone since our meet ing," the same distinguished soldier remarks in his recently published autobiography, " yet the majesty of his manly bearing, the genial, winning grace, the sweetness of his smiles, and the impressive dignity of his old-fashioned style of address come back to me amongst the most cherished of my recollections. His greatness made me humble, and I never felt my own individual insigniflcance more keenly than I did in his presence." No impartial mind can dwell upon General Lee's 366 ROBERT E. LEE character without recalling Washington's ; nor is the similarity to be wondered at, for being natives of the same county and state, the dispositions of both men had been shaped by the influences of the same physical surroundings, the same social life, and the same general ancestry. Each was the consum mate flower of all that was most elevated in slave in stitutions. Earnest, sedate, and studious even in boyhood, both had assumed the duties of manhood when others of their own age were still in a state of dependence. A commanding presence, and an equally commanding personal dignity, were com mon to both almost from their youth down to their last hours. Both were remarkable for a combina tion of moral and intellectual qualities so evenly balanced and so exquisitely proportioned that no one quality over-shadowed or dwarfed another. Equally characteristic of both were their perfect in tegrity and probity in every relation and iu every situation of their lives. Both were endowed with that supreme gift of mind and soul, which raises up one man among ten millions to be a historical leader of men. Lee possessed the greater military genius, but it was Lee, not Washington, who was ultimately unsuccessful ; strangely alike in their characters and in their careers, they were strangely uulike in their final destinies. But in spite of his failure to establish their nationality with his sword, aud in spite, also, of their own reconciliation with the new order, the memory of Lee remains second only to Washing- GENERAL CHARACTER 367 ton's in the affection, honor, and veneration of the Southern people. This is not merely because he sacrificed home, estate, and the prospect of the most dazzling honors to come to their assistance in their most critical hour ; nor because he is forever associated with their proudest recollections of the most heroic period in their history ; nor because in character and conduct he was a model of all that was lofty, upright, and manly. They love and re vere his memory also because the whole spirit of his public and private life (which appears only the more admirable the more carefully it is scrutinized), refutes the indiscriminate aspersions cast upon their social system during the existence of slavery, and vindicates them from the charge that, in the struggle for what they deemed their right of local self-gov ernment, they were animated merely by a desire to perpetuate an institution repugnant to the growing humanity of the age. General Lee's part in the war was such as to en dear his memory to the Southern people alone, but the advice which he gave and the personal example which he set after Appomattox should confine property in his fame to no one division of the Union. The moderation, foresight, and wisdom displayed by him after the close of hostilities swells his figure to the proportions of a hero common to North and South alike. It was Mr. Lincoln's lamentable fate to be cut off by the assassin before he could fully develop this character ; nor is it by any means cer tain whether, with all his tact, sagacity and patri- 368 EOBERT E. LEE otism, he could have offered any successful re sistance to the policy of that sinister group of men who were responsible for the passage of the Acts of Reconstruction. It was General Lee's happier lot, on the other hand, to perform a work in reconciling the Southern people to the new conditions confront ing them, which, as time goes on, is seen to have had indirectly as deep a significance and influence from a national as from a local point of view. Harmony, repression of rancor, recognition of a common destiny, in short, nationality, was the bur den of his counsels even when the South was passing through the exasperating period of Reconstruction. He looked beyond the dismal present to the con tented and prosperous future, and was the prophet as well as the leader of his people. During the time that General Lee was playing this great r61e of reconciler, there was not another man of the first order of distinction, either in the North or the South, who had risen to the same level of patriotism. He anticipated by many years the spirit which has at last produced national peace, concert and unity. His words urging concUiation, forbearance, and oblivion of the surviving hatreds of the past, and his example of a life quietly de voted to the duties of the present hour, were as a guiding light set upon a hill for all men to see and follow. And that Ught will continue to burn against the background of our national history, because, if for no other reason, it will never cease to lift up and strengthen the minds and hearts of the South- GENERAL CHARACTER 369 ern people, who, under the Providence of God, are destined, with the growth of their states in wealth and population, to be restored to that commanding position in the Union of their fathers which they occupied before the great war. BIBLIOGRAPHY Allen, Colonel William. Army of Northern Virginia in 1862 ; 1892. Anderson, Colonel Abchbr. Robert Edward Lee, an Ad dress Delivered at the Unveiling of the Equestrian Monument in Richmond, 1890. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. (4 volumes. ) 1887. Chestnut, Je., Mes. John. Diary from Dixie, 1905. Cooke, John Esten. Life of General Robert E. Lee, 1871. Davis, Jefpeeson. Rise and Fall of the Confederate Govern ment. (2 volumes.) 1881. Dodge, Colonel Theodobe A. Bird's-eye View of our Civil War, 1897. GoBDON, Genebal John B. Reminiscences of the Civil War, 1904. Grant, General U. S. Personal Memoirs, 2d edition, 1895. Henderson, Lieutenant-Colonel G. F. E. "Stonewall" Jackson and the American Civil War, 1899. Hood, General John B. Advance and Retreat, Personal Experiences with the U. S. and C. S. Armies, 1880. Hughes, R. M. General Johnston, Great Commander Series, 1893. Johnston, General Joseph E. Narrative of Military Opera tions Directed During the Late War with the States, 1874. Jones, Rev. J. William. Personal Reminiscences, Anecdotes and Letters of General R. E. Lee, 1875. IjES, General Fitzhugh. General Robert E. Lee, Great Conuuander Series, 1894. BIBLIOGRAPHY 371 Lee, Captain Robert E. Recollections and Letters of Gen eral R. E. Lee, 1904. Long, General A. L. Memoirs of R. E. Lee, 1886. Longstreet, General James. From Manassas to Appomat tox, Memoirs of the Civil War, 1896. McCabe, Captain W. Gordon. Siege of Petersburg. An Address Delivered before the Association of Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan, General George B. McClellan's Own Story, 1887. Official Records of the Confederate and Union Armies. Rhodes, James F. History of United States from Compro mise of 1850. Ropes, John Codman. Story of the Civil War, 1894. Roy ALL, William L. Gettysburg Campaign, United Service Magazine XV. Southern Historical Society Publications. Stephens, Alexander H. A Constitutional View of the Late War between the States, 1868. Swinton, William. Campaigns of the Army of the Poto mac, 1866. Taylor, Colonel Walter H. Four Years with General Lee, 1878. White, Rev. Heney A. Robert E. Lee and Southern Con federacy, Heroes of the Nation's Series, 1897. Wilson, Woodeow. Division and Reunion, 1891. Wolseley, Viscount. The Story of a Soldier's Life. (2 vol umes.) 1903. Wood, W. B., and J. E. Edmonds. A History of the Civil War in the United States, 1905. INDEX Abolition, 70, 73, 74, 79, 87. Acquia Creek, 157, 192-193, 206. Alabama, 101. Aldie's Gap, 160, 171. Alexandria, 27, 169. Amelia Conrt-House, 305. Anderson, General, 119, 210, 230, 243, 245, 248. Apaches, 59. Appomattox Court-House, 306. Arkansas, 82, 98, 174. Arlington, 28, 32-34, 39, 61- 63, 84-86, 316. Armistead, General L. A., 247. Ashland, 139. Atlanta, 108, 339. Baltimore, 57, 181, 222, 227, 235, 239, 244. Banks, General N. P., 128, 131-133, 151, 155. Banks's Ford, 204, 215. Barksdale, General, 196. Beauregard, General P. G. T., 111-112, 114-116, 224, 285, 287. Bermuda Hundred, 285. Blair, F. P., 86, 89. Boonesboro, 179, 182. Bowling Green, 211. Bragg, General Braxton, 182. Branch, General, 142. Brandy Station, 224. Bristoe Station, 162. Brown, John, 40, 62, 63, 76- 77, 82. Bull Run, battle of, see First Manassas ; mountains, 159, 160, 162, 224. Burnside, General A. E., 55 ; at Sharpsburg, 185 ; suc ceeds McClellan, 191 ; at battle of Fredericksburg, 195 et seq. ; superseded, 202 ; part in battle of the Wilder- ne.ss, 264, 266. Butler, General B. F., 285. Calvert, Eleanor, 32. Cameron, Simon, 89. Carlisle, 225, 227. Carricksford, 116. Carter family, 24, 25. Carter, Ann Hill, 24, 35. Carter, Robert, 24. Cashtown, 227-228. Cedar Mountain, battle of, 156. Centreville, 113, 163, 169.224. Cerro Gordo, battle of, 46-48. Chambersburg, 225, 356. Chancellorsville, town, 205, 208, 210-212, 215-216, 262- 263 ; battle of, see Chapter VII. Chantilly, 257; battle of, 169. Chapultepec, 53-54. Charleston, 125-126, 129. Cheat Mountain, 118, 121- 123. Chickahominy River, 131, 134-146. Churubusco, 52. INDEX 373 City Point, 296. Clark Mountain, 157. Comanche Indians, 59. Confederacy, disadvantages to overcome, 97 e^seg.,- advan tages possessed by, 102 ; its line of coast defense, 126; highest point of its for tunes, 218. Contreras, 50, 52. Coosawhatchie, 126. Coyoncan, 53. Crampton Gap, 179. Culpeper Court House, 155- 156, 189, 223, 257-258. Cumberland Island, 22; Val ley, 224, 227. Custis, G. W. P., 32-33, 56, 61, 85. Custis, Mary, see Lee. Cnstia, Nellie, 37. Dalton, 258. Danville, 284, 295, 305, 339. Davis, Jefferson, 58, 78 ; ap points military officers at beginning of the war, 107 ; names Lee as military ad viser, 110-111 ; opposes in vasion of the North, 114 ; appoints Lee to chief com mand in western Virginia, 117 ; insists upon defense of Richmond, 131 ; appoints Lee commander of Army of Northern Virginia, 137 ; disapproves of stand on North Anna River, 194 ; anticipates foreign interven tion after battle of Fred ericksburg, 202 ; sanguine of peace after Chancellors ville, 221 ; refuses to form second army before battle of Gettysburg, 224; de clines to accept Lee's resig nation, 256 ; his policy ot defending Richmond criti cised, 283-284 ; relies too much on political influence, 340. Dinwiddie Court-House, 303. Drewry's Bluff, 134, 138. "Dungeness," 23. Early, General Jubal A., 206-207, 215, 232, 243, 281- 282, 292, 294, 317, 356. Emerson, R. W., 75. Erlington Heights, 150. Ewell, General R. S., 132, 145-146, 222-223, 227, 229- 230, 232, 233, 237, 239, 241, 243, 245-246, 264. Fair Oaks, battle of, 135- 136 ; see battle of Seven Pines. Falmouth, 195, 205. Farmville, 305. Floyd, General John B., 116, 121. Forts, Hamilton, 41 ; Harri son, 297 ; Monroe, 40, 111, 141, 144-145, 151-152. Franklin, General W. B , 147, 169, 180, 196-199, 254. Frazier's Farm, battle of, 148. Fredericksburg, town, 131, 192-196, 202-205, 207, 223, 263; battle of, 195-201, 221. Fredericktown, 176-177. Freemantle, Colonel, 226. Fremont, General J. C, 128, 131-132, 151, 155. Fugitive Slave Law, 78. Gainesville, 159, 162. 374 INDEX Garnett, General R. S., Ill, 115. Garrison, William Lloyd, 70, 73 75 Georgia, 101, 114, 124, 139. Gettysburg, town, 227-229, 231, 237; for battle, see Chapter VIII. Gibbon, General, 198. Gordon, General John B., 270- 271 302. Gordonsville, 155-156, 189, 203, 211, 259. Grant, General U. S., 55, 108 ; appointed commander-in- chief, 258; career in West, 259 ; plan of Wilderness campaign, 260-261 ; crosses Rapidan, 262-263 ; checked in the Wilderness, 265-266 ; attacks at Spottsylvania Court-House, 268-272; at North Anna River, 273 ; crosses the James River, 286; plans before Peters burg, 288; sends troops from Petersburg to Wash ington, 292 ; explodes mine, 293-294 ; concentrates troops at Five Forks, 303 ; forces Lee to abandon Pe tersburg, 304 ; receives Lee's surrender, 308 ; re port on condition of South, 1865, 314. Greene, General Nathanael, 21, 23. Hagerstown, 176, 179, 183. Halliwell, Mr., 36, 37. Hampton, General Wade, 288, 291, 313. Hancock, General W. S., 229- 230, 264-266, 296-298. Harper's Ferry, 62-63, 110- 111, 116, 174, 176-178, 180, 182, 224, 249. Harrisburg, 222, 227. Harrison's Landing, 135, 145, 150-151, 173. Hayne, E. Y., 69. Heintzelman, General, 135- 136, 147. Heth, General H., 228. Higginson, T. W.. 77. Hill, General A. P., at battle of Mechanicsville, 139-142 ; at battle of Frazier's Farm, 148; at Harper's Ferry, 182; at battle of Sharps burg, 185 ; wounded at Chancellorsville, 213-214 ; part in Gettysburg cam paign, 222-223, 228, 230, 233, 240, 242-243, 245; part in Wilderness cam paign, 264-265 ; opposes Federal advance at Peters burg, 291 ; defeats Warren, 297, Hill, General D. H., 135,140, 144, 146-148, 167, 178-179. Holmes, General, 111, 148. Hood, General John B., 245, 248, 295, 300, 344, Hooker, General Joseph, 55 ; advance at battle of Sharps burg, 184 ; appointed com mander of Army of Potomac, 202; concentrates at Chan cellorsville, 203-204; right wing driven in, 212 ; forti fies his second line, 214 ; retreats across Rappahan nock, 216 ; moves north ward after Chancellorsville, 224 I crosses the Potomac, 226; superseded, 227. Howard, General O. O., 211- 212. INDEX 375 Howe, S. G., 77. Huger, General, 111, 135, 147-148. Humphreys, General A. A., 242, 305. Hunter, General, 282, 288. Indians, 58-61. Jackson, Andrew, 37. Jackson, General H. R., 116, 119. Jackson, General Thomas J., advocates destructive pol icy, 105 ; opposes evacuation ot Harper's Ferry, 116 ; op erations in Shenandoah Valley, 132-133 ; outflanks Porter on the Chickahom iny, 139-144; at White Oak Swamp, 146-148; at Malvern Hill, 149; defeats Banks at Cedar Mountain, 156 ; marches to Pope's rear, 160-163 ; at second battle of Manassas, 163-169 ; expedition against Harper's Ferry, 177 et seq.; part in battle ot Sharpsburg, 182- 185 ; stationed in the Val ley, 190 ; part in battle of Fredericksburg, 195-199 ; advances to Chancellors ville, '206-207 ; flank march, 209 el seq.; wounded, 213; death, 219-220; character istics, 233, 252, 334, 347. James River, 98, 134, 143, 145-148, 151, 266, 289. Janney, John, 95. Jefferson, Thomas, 19, 82. Johnson, Reverdy, 54. Johnston, General A. S., 58, 61. Johnston, General Edward, 132, 241, 269, 271. Johnston, General Joseph E., 58, 111, 116; at first battle of Manassas, 112-114; re treats behind the line of the Rappahannock, 129 ; re treats up the Peninsula, 134; attacks McClellan on the Chickahominy River, 135; wounded, 136; in command at Dalton, 258.° his removal, 283. Johnston, William Preston, 328. Kearney, General, 42, 52. Kentucky, 73, 182. Keyes, General, 135. Lafayette, Marquis de, 21. Law, General, '238. Lee, Ann Carter, see Carter. Lee, Arthur, 17. Lee, Charles, 24. Lee, Fitzhugh, 209, 211, 292. Lee, Francis Lightfoot, 17,27. Lee, G. W. Custis, 92. Lee, Henry, 18, 20 et seq. Lee, Mary Custis, 32, 39, 85, 90. Lee, Matilda, 18. Lee, Philip, 17. Lee, Richard, Sr., 15, 16. Lee, Richard, Jr., 16. Lee, Richard Henry, 17, 19, 27. Lee, Robert E., Jr., 105, 364. Lee, Smith, 45. Lee, Stephen D., 186. Lee, Thomas, 17, 18. Lee, William H. F., 30, 291, 303. Lee, General Robert E., an cestors, 15 et seq. ; early in- 376 INDEX fluences in life of, 28, 30- 31 ; boyhood, 35, 36 ; at West Point, 37-38; mar riage, 39 I at Fortress Mon roe, 40 ; with General Wool in Mexico, 42-43; at Vera Cruz, 44-45; at Cerro Gordo, 46-48 ; explores the Pedrigal, 49-52 ; part in operations at Contreras, Churubusco and Chapulte pec, 52-54; superintendent of West Point Military Academy, 58 ; stationed in Texas, 59-60; captures John Brown at Harper's Ferry, 62 ; motives in join ing the Confederacy, 84 et seq. ; appointed commander of Virginia troops, 95 ; or ganizes Confederate troops, 109 ; campaign in western Virginia, 118 et seq.; in charge of Southern coast defenses, 124-126 ; takes command ot Army of North ern Virginia, 137 ; attacks McClellan's right wing, 138-144 ; checked at Mal vern Hill, 149 ; attacks Pope at Second Manassas, 164-166 ; successfully re sists McClellan's assaults at Sharpsburg, 181 et seq; fa vors opposing Burnside at North Anna River, 192- 194 ; battle of Fredericks burg, 195-201 ; battle of Chancellorsville, 205-216; advances into Pennsylvania, 222 ; proclamation at Cham bersburg, 225 ; concentrates at Cashtown, 227 ; reasons for opposing flank march at Gettysburg, 234-235; re treats into Virginia, 249 ; offers his resignation, 255 ; takes position on the Rapi dan, 257 ; attacks Grant in the Wilderness, 263; op poses Federals at Spottsyl vania Court-House, 268- 272; on the North Anna River, 273 ; his attitude to ward holding Richmond after Cold Harbor, 280 et seq. ; defense of Petersburg, 287 et seq. ; difficulties to be overcome, 299 et seq. ; appointed commander-in- chief, 302 ; abandons Peters burg, 304 ; retreats to Appo mattox, 305 et seq. ; surren ders, 306 et seq. ; discourages emigration of Southerners after war, 312 et seq. ; con demns sectional bitterness, 316 ; becomes president of Washington College, 320; health declines, 326 ; death, 328. Letcher, Governor John, 94, 109. Lincoln, Abraham, 79, 89, 90 ; objects to McDowell joining McClellan, 130; policy of protecting Washington, 131- 132 ; orders Pope to advance toward Culpeper, 155 ; is sues Emancipation Proclam ation, 187; urges McClel lan, after battle of Sharps burg, to pursue Lee, 189 ; relations with McClellan, 191; dissatisfied with Meade, 255; influences en suring his reelection, 283; death, before he could be come a peacemaker, 367, Longfellow, H. W., 75. INDEX 377 Longstreet, General James, at battle of Seven Pines, 135- 136 ; operations before battle of Gaines' Mill, 140-143; at battle of Frazier's Farm, 146-148; at Thoroughfare Gap, 164; part in battle of Second Manassas, 165-169; opposes expedition against Harper's Ferry, 177 ; at South Mountain, 179 ; part in battle of Sharpsburg, 181-185 ; of Fredericksburg, 195-199; expedition against Suffolk, 202 ; starts upon Gettysburg campaign, 222- 223 ; slowness in second day's battle, 232-233; fa vors flank march, 234-235 ; at the Peach Orchard, 241 ; part in third day's battle, 245-248 ; campaign in Ten nessee, 259 ; part in battle ot the Wilderness, 265-266 ; characteristics, 166, 218, 223, 350. Loring, General, 116. Louisiana, 174. Lowell, J. E., 75. Lynchburg, 295. Madison, James, 26, 82. Magruder, General John B., 50, 111, 140, 146-148. Mahone, General William, 291 294 296. Malvern Hill, battle of, 147, 149. Manassas, town, 160-163,224; battle of First, 110-112; battle of Second, 165-168. Mansfield, General, 184. Marshall, John, 19, 83. Marshall. Colonel Charles, 219, 301, 347. Martinsburg, 174. Marye's Heights, 195, 198, 206, 215. Maryland, 26, 67, 73, 82, 113, 174, 176, 182, 202. Matamoras, 41. McClellan, General George B., 55, 89, 113- 114, 116, 118, 128 ; plan of invasion of the South, 129- 130 ; concentrates on the Chickahominy, 134 ; battle of Gaines' Mill, 141-144; retreats to the James River, 145; battle of Malvern Hill, 150; withdraws from the Peninsula, 156; reinstated in command of all the Fed eral forces in the East, 173 ; advances to South Moun tain, 180 ; battle of Sharps burg, 182 et seq. ; concen trates at Warrenton, 190; superseded, 191. McDowell, General Irwin, 111, 131-134, 139, 151, 155. McLaws, General L., 167, 210, 215, 245, 248. Meade, General George G., 55 ; part in battle ot Fred ericksburg, 197-198; ap pointed commander of Army of Potomac, 227 ; decides to concentrate at Gettysburg, 230-231; advantages of his position, 235, 239, 240 ; fol lows Lee, 249 ; offers his resignation, 256; at Mine Run, 257. Mechanicsville, battle of, 142. Mexico, City of, 46-48, 56. Miles, General Nelson A., 113. Missionary Ridge, battle of, 258-259, 352 et seq. 378 INDEX Mississippi River, 40, 99, 126. Missouri, 73. Molino del Eey, battle ot, 53. Monroe, James, 26. Mount Vernon, 32. Nashville, battle ot, 300. Newberne, 202. New England, 66-67, 74. New Orleans, 129. New York State, 65. North Anna Eiver, 192, 206, 273. North Carolina, 73, 82, 114, 124, 139, 258. Orange Court-House, 259, 263. Pamunkey River, 139. Parker, Theodore, '77. Parkersburg, 116. Patterson, General, 113. Peace Conference, 82. Pedrigal, 49-51. Pelham, Captain, 198. Pender, General, 229, 243, 248. Pendleton, General W. N., 222, 233. Petersburg, 102, 267, 286 et seq. Pettigrew, General J. J., 228, 245, 247-248. Philadelphia, 181, 222, 227. Pickett, General George E., 243, 245, 247-248, 251, 303 et seq. Pierce, Franklin, 52-53. Pillow, General, 50-51. Pipe Creek, 227-228, 230-231, 236. Pocotaligo, 126. Pope, General John, 55 ; takes command at Culpeper, 155- 157 ; falls back to the Eap pahannock River, 158 ; moves against "Stonewall " Jackson, 162-163 ; attacks Jackson at Manassas, 164 ; defeated, 165. Port Eoyal, 125. Porter, General Fitz-John, 134-135, 138, 140-144, 165, 170, 254. Potomac Eiver, 33, 126, 175, 180, 182-183, 186, 190, 202, 221-222, 225-226, 249. Preston, General William, 54. Eandolph, Peyton, 19. Rapidan River, 157, 257-263, 279. Rappahannock River, 98, 126- 127, 158, 162, 192 et seq., 203, 208, 210, 213, 216, 218, 262, 266. Reams Station, 292, 297. Reynolds, General, 118, 121- 122, 229. Richmond, 95, 108-109, 129- 130,141,151,192,224,261- 262, 267, 280 et seq. Riley, General, 47-48. Roanoke Island, 125. Rodes, General R. E , 232, 269, 271. Romancoke, 86. Rosecrans, General W. S., 118, 120-122. Rosser, General, 303. Bust, Colonel, 119-120. Sailor's Creek, 305. Salem Church, battle of, 215. San Antonio, 60 ; Hacienda of, 49, 52. Santa Anna, General, 42, 44, 46. INDEX 379 Savage's Station, battle of, 147. Savannah, 126, 129. Scott, General Winfield, 44- 46, 51-54, 83, 88, 90, 93. Secession, constitutional as pect of, 64-66 ; economic causes of, 66-70; moral causes of, 74-77 ; general causes, 81. Sedgwick, General, 203-205, 213-215, 264, 266. Seven Pines, battle of, 135. Sewell's Mountain, 121. Seward, William H., 79. Sharpsburg, battle of, 174 et seq. Shenandoah Valley, 29, 111, 128, 131-133, 174, 176, 189, 222-223. Shepherdstown, 176, 225. Sheridan, General Philip H., 273, 288, 294 et seq., 303, 305 et seq. Sherman, General William T., 102, 260. Shields, General, 53, 151. Shirley, 25, 29. Sickles, General Daniel E., 211-214, 240, 242. Sigel, General, 282. Slaughter's Mountain, 157. Slavery, 66, 70-73, 76, 80, 83, 86-87. Slocum, General, 211, 227. Smith, Gerrit, 77. Smith, General 6. W., 136. Smith, General Persifer, 53. South Carolina, 65, 101, 114, 124, 139, 258. South Mountain, battle of, 179. Spotswood, Governor Alex ander, 16, 29. Stafford Heights, 195 et teg., 206. Stanton, Edwin M., 191. Stoneman, General, 203-205. Stowe, Mrs. H. B., 76. Stratford, 18, 25-29. Stuart, General J. E. B., at Harper's Ferry, during Brown raid, 63; ride around McClellan, 139 ; expedition against White House on the York River, 145 ; at Erlington Heights, 150 ; operations on the Eap pahannock, 158 ; at Cedar Creek, 159; screens Lee's advance into Maryland, 176; at South Mountain, 179; raid across the Poto mac after battle of Sharps burg, 189 ; part in battle of Chancellorsville, 206, 208, 215 ; screens Lee's advance toward Pennsylvania, 224; raid before battle ot Gettys burg, 224-225; arrives at Gettysburg, 243 ; reports to Lee Meade's advance to ward Mine Eun, 257; be fore Spottsylvania Court- House, 268 ; death, 273. Suffolk, 202. Sulphur Springs, 159. Sumner, General E. V., 58, 136, 147, 169, 196-199. Swinton, William, 278. Tayloe, Colonel Walter H., 347. Taylor, General Zachary, 42, 83 Tennessee, 73, 80, 82, 98, 182. Territories, struggle for the, 77-78. 380 IITOEX Texas, 59, 174. Thomas, General George H., 260, 300. Thoroughfare Gap, 160-164, 171. Turner's Gap, 179. Turner, Nat, 40. Twiggs, General, 47-48. Venable, Colonel Charles S., 237, 347. Vera Cruz, 44. Vicksburg, 221-222, 236, 250, 258 Virginia, 12-14, 28, 65, 73, 82-83, 86, 114, 186, 250, 258. Walker, Genebal Fean- cis A., 278. Warren, General G. K., 242, 254, 264, 266, 297. Warrenton, 1.59, 190. Washington, George, 19, 20- 21, 25, 32, 82, 90, 366. Washington, Martha, 32. Washington, city, 33. 62, 82, 110, 113-114, 128-129, 131- 132, 155, 158, 172-173, 181, 190-191, 222, 224-225, 228, 235, 239, 292. Washington College, 31, 320 et seq. Webster, Daniel, 69. Westmoreland County, 25, 28. West Point Military Academy, 37, 58, 107. West Virginia, 80, 98, 111, 115 et seq., 123, 128. White House, 30, 32, 86, 135, 140, 143-145. White Oak Swamp, 146-147. Whittier, John G., 75. Wilcox, General, 242, 291. Wilderness, operations in, 261-263. Williamsburg, 133. Wilson. General, 291. Winchester, 111, 189, 223; battle of, 133. Wise, General Henry A., 116, 120. Wolseley, Viscount, 365. Wool, General J. E., 42. Worth. General, 40, 50-51. Wright, General M. J., 242. York Eiver, 134, 138, 145, 262, 286. Yorktown, 133. i . ft* -*ti ^ ' : - ' ' I ¦ if \f^-i t^fi"