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YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

GOVEENMENT BUILDING AT WASHINGTON, OCCUPIED BY THE STATE, WAE, AND NAVY DEPAETMENTS.

Full Official History

OF

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
WRITTEN OVER THE WIRES IN THE DISCHARGE OF PUBLIC DUTY
By the Highest Authorities of the Government, Heads of Departments and Bureaus
of State, War and Navy, Cabinet Secretaries, the Adjutant General, the
Commanders of Fleets and Armies in Active Service, and the
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The Earliest Example of Historical Work Wrought from the Records Automatically Authentic,
of the Inner Truths of War, with the Latest Facilities of Scientific Inventions

The Figut-s Touched with Life and the Scenery with Colors

by MURAT HALSTEAD »«%
Author of "The Story of the Philippines," "Our New Possessions," "History of American Expansion," "The
Story of Cuba," "Our Country in War." "The White Dollar," "The Life of
William McKinley," "The Conventions of 1860," etc.

Superbly Illustrated with Half-tone Engravings, Made from Many Photographs Taken by Signal Service
Photographers Expressly for This Work; and by Reproductions of Official Maps and
Plans of Battles, Campaigns, Fortifications and Ships, Prepared by the
War and Navy Departments of the United States.

SOLD BY SUBSCRIPTION ONLY

Copyrighted, 1899, By
H. L. BARBER,
Chicago, 111., U.S. A.

£715
H--5 (LC)

The engravings in this volume were
made from original photographs, and are
specially protected by copyright; and no
tice is hereby given, that any person or
persons guilty of reproducing or infring
ing upon the copyright in any way will
be dealt with according to*law

to the
fjistory 2Hakers of the Uniteb States,
tEbe Prestbent, Che Cabinet, Che Congress
anb tfye
• Officers anb <£nlisteb HTen
of the
American Ctrmy anb Hany,
3X>hose Deebs Officially IDrittcu
3n Action
(Ire ^ecorbeb in Chese Pages,
Cbiteb by the Author;
A Wav for humanity in the
ZTame of £iberty
Became One of Beneficent Conquest,
imposing Duties of (Emancipation anb Dominion,
Abbing to th,e Broab £anbs of tfye ^ree,
Spanning tfye Continent,
Che 3slanbs of tfye. Southern Seas,
XDIjilc the (Energy of the Conquerors
JDas UTerciful to tfye Panquisljeb
$ot the Startling Strokes of Conclusive Dictory
Brought the Stnift Return
Of th,e Security of
peace.

THE PUBLISHERS' PREFACE.

The Full Official History of the War with Spain is, in essentials, com
posed exclusively of material for which the highest authorities of the govern
ment of the United States are responsible. The true way to impart to
biography its greater charm is to use the words of the person portrayed, and
the better way to write history is in the authoritative language of its makers.
Modern inventions have afforded such facilities for communication
between capitals and camps, the departments of war and navy, and the com
manders of armies and fleets in action, that there is centralization of supreme
command, and the work of war, as well as of diplomacy, is absolutely in the
hands of the Great Officer, charged by the Constitution of the United States
with the command-in-chief of our armed forces, naval and military. This
wise provision of the republican form of government significantly subordinates
all generals and admirals to the Chief Magistrate of the nation, conclusively
as the colonel of the regiment is the superior of the captains of the companies
that compose it.
When the flag of this country flies over the White House, the President
is there in the discharge of public duty, and near the executive mansion,
westward, in an immense building, are grouped the departments of State,
War, and Navy, through which our government comes in contact, whether in
peace or war, with the nations of the earth. Thus within a small space are
gathered the executive offices and appliances of the American people.
The wires in the White House place the President in touch with all the
departments represented in his Cabinet and joined to the wonderful web spun
round the world, over which is wrought the mighty magic of telegraphy; and
in the recent war the defense of our coast,' and the offense of our ships and
battalions in the Indies, East and West, the President was constantly in swift
and sure communication with the front — and no word of his is found that did
not command and cheer the advance and testify his courage and vigilance.
13

14 THE PUBLISHERS' PREFACE.
The intelligence of the world's business day by day — the order and reports
of affairs, large and small, flash continually on the wires, and from the begin
ning of history there has been no material of and for it, comparable with the
dispatches reduced to writing at both ends of the lightning lines. Never in
all the countless experiences of mankind was the story of a war recorded and
made definite and certain by the leading actors in it as in our combat with
Spain that began and was fought to a finish in the year 1898. It was the
first case of the kind, and this book is in a striking degree the fruit of it. All
enlightened peoples participated in our current information, but the gen
eral dependence was on formal reports — statements in greater part always,
and, as a rule, prepared entirely for the public by officers for their superior
officers, or writers of features for the press, according to the colors or the
theories that the proprietorship of the papers preferred.
The inner truths, passing clouds, transient impressions, local atmosphere,
the very tints of the scenery, were in the private and confidential telegrams,
official and pertinent as possible — words of command and of explanation,
admonition and suggestion, that passed between the President, the Cabinet
Secretaries, the Heads of Bureaus, the Adjutant-General, and the Generals
and Admirals Commanding. These were incessantly interchanged, and will
be forever the highest authority as to the points contested. It is what a man
wrote on the spot, the immediate, unrevised impression, that will be called
forth to settle disputes. Each dispatch is a flash-light of the scene as it was
— with every attribute and incident of verity. There are thousands of them in
the reports of the War and Navy Secretaries, and in the bureaus and in the
Adjutant-General's office especially, filling bulky volumes, and given to the
public with unprecedented candor. Such a thing as this library of revelations
of bottom facts, no matter whom they helped or hurt, never before was pre
sented to the people. The volumes printed from bales of telegrams, inestima
ble as evidence and incontestable, are supported by marvels of photography.
The kodaks had the effect upon ships and armies in activity of the kinetoscope.
It is aptly stated in the title-page of this book that there is in The Official His
tory of the War with Spain, automatic accuracy. There is the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, told infallibly by the greatest energies
and illuminants of the universe, electricity and sunshine.
The author's embarrassment was the excessive riches of the matter with
which the astonishing official publications are filled, surpassing all example

THE PUBLISHERS' PREFACE. *5
alike in quality and quantity. He has brought to his unprecedented task of
the presentation in popular form of this Full Official History, the expert train
ing of long and laborious journalism. \
The Official History of the War with Spain is the first of its kind among
historical volumes — because the appliances of modern invention affording the
facilities have not existed and been employed through other wars; and as
surely as it is the earliest of the official character it bears, it is the forerunner
of the war books that tell the truth in the future — in which the instrumentali
ties of our advanced civilization will make conspicuous the sacred veracity of
history; when the fiction that betrays and the formalities that obscure will be
eliminated from the established record of deeds great and good; and the
measure in which men accomplish them, so that there will be gain and glory
through the solid simplicity of faultless justice.
The imperfections of the historical work are admitted, but the surpassing
excellence of the material embodied is manifest in these pages.
THE PUBLISHERS

president Mckinley and his cabinet.

MURAT HALSTEAD, THE AUTHOR.

THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

In modern wars the relations between the staff correspondents of the
newspapers, and the staff officers of the armies engaged, have been under
stood, by those who have knowledge of the administration of the Press and
that of the military establishments, as full of difficulty; and there has been no
approximation to a satisfactory solution of the embarrassments found in the
course of our recent experiments. One of the vital matters when nations lift
the sword against each other is to restrict the circulation of intelligence, and
the incessant increase of wires whose business is to convey news over conti
nents and under seas, magnifies the problem of the adjustments of military
necessities and the rights of the people represented by the Press. Inferior as
Spain was in resources to the United States, the fact that for some weeks she
knew the movements of our ships, and we were largely mystified as to the
location of her squadrons, placed us at a disadvantage. If there had been
equality in the naval strength of the belligerents, the one where the current
intelligence was irrepressible would have been exposed to dangers in the dark,
from which the one capable of suppressing the swift diffusion of truth would
have been exempt. As it was, we credited the Spaniards with greater activities
than they undertook, and felt unwarranted apprehensions of aggressive adven
tures on their part. The maneuvers of Cervera's fleet of swift cruisers for a
time caused great perplexities. It was not absolutely ascertained for some
time that Cervera was in Santiago harbor. We were slow in making out that
his supplies were so scanty he was constrained to go there as a refuge, instead
of making the port of Cienfuegos, and having railroad connection with
Havana. A rumor of Spanish cruisers detained our troops when embarked at
Tampa for Santiago. There were Spanish gunboats on the Pacific Ocean
thought capable of -attacking some of our transports, and Admiral Dewey was
watchful more than three months to prevent attempts of the Spaniards
at Manila to attack his ships with torpedoes. Once he had news that a
19

2o THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
superior Spanish fleet was in the Red Sea on the way to the Philippines. It
was known in Spain better than in the United States that General Merritt was
on the Newport with three tons of "gold coin, and that our transports, with
more than a thousand men on each, were steaming westward on the twentieth
parallel of latitude. Cervera's fleet was expected to sail from the Cape Verde
Islands to intercept the Oregon, which ran out of her way eastward of the
West Indies and appeared off the coast of Florida. If we should have war
with a power whose sea force is strong as our own, on either or both our
ocean fronts, there would be, for the sake of fair-play for public safety, an
imperative requirement that the Press should not publish — that the wires
should not carry — information of the movements of our ships of war. Gen
eral Sherman said the attack upon his left wing by Johnston in North Caro
lina, when on his way from Savannah to Washington, was caused by an item
in the shipping news of the New York Tribune, that a ship loaded with forage
had cleared for Newberne. It is not wise, however, for military or naval
commanders to regard the items the papers contain from day to day. The fact
that four ships of war, believed to be American, were seen from the coast of
Luzon was stated in a Manila paper on the day before Dewey surprised those
who were presumably defenders of the harbor.
The Press of the United States largely took very extraordinary attitudes
with respect to the war of our country with Spain. It was the belief of sev
eral great journals and journalists that they must be held accountable for the
state of hostilities. They assumed airs of authority as to its management,
its objects; and, as General Halleck wrote on the back of a letter of good
advice from an able editor, "Halstead M. writes — how this war should be
carried on." The Press, in its most ostentatious illustrations of public policy,
gave as much prominence to views aS to news, and pursued the cultivation
and vindication of theories with even greater warmth and energy than they
gathered and displayed from day to day the incidents of intelligence that
were of the nature of information about the conduct of hostilities. In no war
that ever took place did the Press go so expensively into the enterprise of
reporting the current history, through special representatives, employ so many
young men of courage and talent as historians on the spot, as in this Spanish-
American combat of three and one-half months. The sums of money spent in
newspaper enterprise were enormous. The expense account of the Asso
ciated Press was unexampled. Several newspaper proprietors employed

THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 21
steamers for their personal convenience and to supply newspaper service such
as never before was imagined. It is said the foundation of the fortune of the
Rothschilds was much augmented by the success of a representative of the
house, who witnessed the ruin of Napoleon's army at Waterloo, and had luck
in catching a boat, landing in England, hastening to London aijd using his
knowledge in the market. If the fashion of last summer is to prevail, the
time will come when the war correspondents will be a factor in the physical
force of armies in the midst of operations ; and when there are contentions as
to supremacy in "sea power," the private yachts of the newspapers, and the
spectators, may outnumber the battleships and their crews. After all the
prodigious effort and extravagance of the Press to assist in various ways and
with a variety of means to carry on the late war, and shape it according to
their policy, the general result is not symmetrical. There are many imposing
fragments, but they are at once colossal and sinister, not an edifice — not a
structure with cornerstones and walls that reveal an architect, but a Stone-
henge, massive yet fragmentary, — features stalwart without sequence but
significant, — a stoneyard clogged with roughly-cut pillars and chips of rock
that need the hammer and chisel and mortar. It is not a case of building
wiser than the builders knew, but of not working on the straight pursuit of
truth, — not building according to knowledge. There has been an indulgence
in personalities and conceits, in phantoms, the very vanities of morbid fancies.
There has been in the work of the Press mechanical obstacles not over
come — wasteful haste in slamming at the world daily chapters constructed not
to enlighten but to startle — not to lay each day a brick of fact — but to erect a
tower of Babel, no matter if.it leaned like that of Pisa, or tottered to ruin
before the design was achieved — the whole subordinated to the principle that
accuracy is not so important as precedence — that no matter about the yester
days, the great day is always this afternoon or to-morrow. The magazines
have been picture galleries, many of the paintings brilliant — some splendid
strokes with pen and pencil ; but one would not go to the galleries of Ver
sailles, — rather to the libraries and official records and the files of newspapers
that tell their respective stories in a representative way, for the history of
France. The certainty that the history of the war of the United States and
Spain in 1898 has not been written as a whole and in due proportion, has been
for some time obvious to observers of experience, and students faithful to
facts.

22 THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
The task of historical writing has been remarkably simplified by the open
door policy of the President and his Cabinet, in officially telling the people
"the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," the secrets of a war
in its evolution in the drift of events at first glacial, then torrential, "shooting
Niagara" inj;o the whirlpool, in the course of preparations and plans, the con
duct of campaigns, the talk over wires from battle-fields to the White House
and the War Department — all this never until now has been so unreservedly
placed before the world. It does not seem to be in the way of the newspapers
to go back and enrich their columns with the sweeping confidences that the
government of the people has made to the people — but it seems that the task
of writing a Full Official History of the War with Spain is distinctly in the line
of the work of one who has had the training of many years in the valuation
and presentation in condensed and consecutive form, of the news of the
times. It is this precisely that the author of this volume proposed in the
beginning of his task, gaining confidence in the accomplishment of it, which
is as attractive, he feels, as he hopes it may be useful — as the treasures stored
in the ample and open official records are revealed rich in the golden ore of
history — imperishable in truthfulness and excellent in testimony — that our
country in the expansion of victory is supported by the might of its manliness
and the grace of its womanliness, going to the front accepting a call of
duty, gaining land for the people — providing the resources of all climes for
the hereafter of the Republic that is stronger for order than monarchy — with
a freedom that is fairer than the anarchies that the broods of oppression con
ceive — lifting up for the children of the people the flag of the free, all the
brighter because it floats over the Indies, Asiatic and American, and the
Hawaiian and Aleutian archipelagoes — and above all this the radiant atmos
phere of the righteousness that exalts men and nations. MURAT HALSTEAD.

-**&

S'*j/k4

INTRODUCTION.

Since Spain lost her colonies on the American continents it has been in
evidence that she must lose her islands, unless the character of her govern
ment and people should be so changed as to radically reform her colonial
system. The wars of independence by Mexico, Peru, Chili, Argentina, and
the central and northern South American 'States, were caused by like griev
ances and marked by the same characteristics. The tedious tragedies of the
redemption from Spanish misrule southwest of us have common distinctions,
kindred features, familiar paths trampled with bloody footsteps, marking the
march of destiny — the trail of the serpent over all ! Spain, not unaware of her
fatality, but without ability to change her course, has long consciously con
fronted the doom that has overtaken her. It was the foreshadowed misfortune
in Cuba that embittered the Spaniards, who could read on the map that dis
plays the West Indies and the Atlantic and Gulf coast of the United States,
the inevitable, irresistible attraction of gravitation of the bulk of the conti
nent for the islands of the seas southeast. As certainly as we shall dominate
the Gulf, and have won and maintained with the sword, all from the keys of
Florida to the mouth of the Rio Grande, the great island of Cuba will be
Americanized and our possession, the other Indies will be leagued with her,
and accept our protection, glad to be our dependencies — this by the processes
of the principles of our dominion and the growth of our homes. In due time
it will be as evidently the order of nature and the course of empire, that we
shall supersede European influences, and wield the sovereignty of peace over
the islands, that were the prizes of the living Western nations of the older
civilization beyond the Atlantic for three centuries, as that we have acquired,
assimilated and Americanized the Mississippi valley and the Pacific slope ; and
the great Republic as an armed nation will be an empire of peace. We shall
not permanently have the enmity of Spain because we have gained the islands
she has lost. If she had wisely administered the government of her depend-
23

24 INTRODUCTION.
encies she would have sustained the position they once gave her of the fore
most of the kingdoms, but the fact that neither the people of Spain nor the
colonies had rights the crown was bound to respect, caused the combination
of greed and cruelty, corruption and tyranny, that has wrought the downfall
of Spain abroad and her decline at home. The peninsula is still rich in
resources, and the people, in ceasing to waste their energies in the oppression
of others, may teach themselves the lessons of orderly liberty, that will restore
their country to the prosperity that has perished and the dignity that disap
peared when pride became pretension. The Spanish people, carried into a
war that was hopeless, have not been found lacking in devotion to their
country, and the honor of the Spanish arms has been upheld by the valor of
their soldiers, when their ranks were so steadfast that it conferred glory upon
the American army that overcame them ; and the chivalry of Cervera will be
held in honorable remembrance by the generous manhood that overmatched
him and rescued his slaughtered sailors from their burning and sinking ships.
More than once Cuban influences have profoundly impressed the politics of
the great organizations through which the American people govern them
selves. The commanding votes in the government of the Union of our States
were once, in the words of Abraham Lincoln, "half free and half slave" ; and
the States involved in the peculiar domestic institution were dominated by its
influences. The issue was made that the slave system must hold the balance of
power in the Senate, if nowhere else, and by consolidated force prevent the
predominance of the free States by holding in one of the essential factors of
the government, a veto power. Cuba was wanted, as Texas and California
were, in this interest. In the case of the great State on the Gulf and the great
State on the Pacific, the increase of territory, the extension of our boundaries,
profited the cause of the larger liberty. The foundations of the Republic were
broadened, even the urgency of the slave propaganda magnifying the area of
freedom. It was in the interest of possessing Cuba to preserve the balance
that the power identified with slavery might not be successfully assailed in the
JStates, that the claim the constitution carried slaves into the territories, until
forbidden by State sovereignty thereon founded, was made, that the Ostend
conference was called and the manifesto bearing that name promulgated by
the assembled American ministers, to Spain, France and England  and the
influence of the very able Mr. Soule, of Louisiana, turned the tide in the Cin
cinnati National Convention of the Democracy in 1856, from Douglas to

INTRODUCTION. 25
Buchanan, making incalculable changes in the history of the country so far as
incidents and individuals are concerned. The direction of the general
movements of mankind, it is safe to say, must have been about the same,
though possibly varying widely in time, place and circumstance. Humanity
does not stagnate, though there are centuries that are as years. The Ostend
Conference, though composed of men of high place in diplomatic functions,
did not partake of the nature of the proceedings of diplomacy. If the motive
of the meeting was to open negotiations with Spain for the purchase of Cuba,
the words employed were too pungent. If the purpose was to provoke war
the expression was awkward. Spain was not seriously influenced beyond an
agitation that was effusive in lofty language. It was the United States that
was deeply disturbed. Filibustering in the name of Cuban liberties" became
a romantic occupation of American adventures, some of which were con
ducted and advertised as festivals. The sailing of the ill-fated Critten
den expedition from New Orleans was without shadow of concealment, and
the Spaniards were especially well-informed. Spanish spies are believed to
have largely personally conducted the enterprise. The Virginius affair was
flagrant, and resulted in an execution at Santiago that was a massacre. There
never was, however, any rational question as to the character of the filibuster
ship. The scene of this tragedy has witnessed a desperate battle, in, which the
blood of a thousand American soldiers was shed, the surrender of a Spanish
army ; and those rugged hills and rocky shores were shaken by a cannonade
that destroyed a Spanish fleet. The place of the sacrifice is" under the Stars
and Stripes! It has been known in Spain for half a century that the United
States would pay liberally for Cuba and Porto Rico, but the Spanish cabinets
have been too sensitive about the public opinion of the country, made danger
ous to rulers by Carlists and anarchists, to transact business on its merits.
The masses of Spaniards were not informed of the power of the American.
nation. In this they have been accompanied by the bulk of the people of
other nations, whose average enlightenment it would perhaps be discourteous
to doubt. It must be confessed, however, that Americans have not thoroughly
measured and comprehended themselves, though it has often been in the
minds of our people that such armies as were put into the field by the Nation
and the Confederacy, a generation ago, would, all marching one way, be equal
to self-defense, no matter how large the coalition against us, and competent to
conquer a bigger world than Alexander overcame.

26 INTRODUCTION.-
Cuba as a Spanish possession represented the worst form of European
dominion in the Americas, and the growth of a great nation in North Amer
ica, defiantly independent of the great Powers of Europe, was an increasing
threatening of the inheritance of the mediaeval monarchy that held the fairest
of American islands situated within a few hours of our shores, that as our
influence augmented in proportion to our power, the airs and the water, the
winds and the waves, would waft in unison the magnetic doctrine that the
lands of America, whether drained by vast rivers or surrounded by seas,
should be the property of America. Cuba and the United States had attrac
tions for each other, and while there was obvious the reciprocity of nations,
there was a racial antagonism — an effervescence of contentious civilization — a
repulsion of conditions and friction of characteristic institutions.
If it had not been for Cuban politics Stephen A. Douglas would have held
the Democratic party together, deferring the time for the summons to arms
to fight out the "irrepressible conflict" ; and then our great heroes and states
men would have had other names than those now of highest fame, names
now not known, for it is the personal genius of republican government that
great men are developed by events, and are representatives of the masses, and
revealed by movements they do not originate and that widen into magnitude
like streams running riverward.
Cuba, in the mouth of the Mediterranean of our hemisphere, was a vol
cano. The explosion of the Maine in the harbor of Havana was an indigenous
eruption. It was in the chemistry of the conditions. Repeatedly we were
on the verge of war. Hostilities between the United States and Spain were
for half a century a question of time. During the administration of Millard
Fillmore, we were so near a collision with England and France about Spanish-
Cuban affairs that there was a state paper from the pen of John J. Critten
den, of Kentucky, that even yet has the alarm-bell ring in its sentences. We
quote from Mrs. Chapman Coleman, the daughter and .biographer of Mr.
Crittenden :
"In 185 1 Mr. Webster was Secretary of State and Mr. Crittenden
Attorney-General in Mr. Fillmore's cabinet. Mr. Webster's health failed,
and he was compelled for awhile to withdraw from Washington, and during
this vacation Mr. Crittenden was Acting Secretary of State. At that time an
expedition of about five hundred men escaped from New Orleans, and landed
upon the island of Cuba. They were soon captured, and many of them

INTRODUCTION. 27
executed, and M. Sartiges, Minister of France, communicated to the United
States government that the French government had issued orders to its ships
of war to prevent by force any adventurers of any nation from landing with
hostile intent on the island of Cuba. The British government gave notice
also to the State Department that it had issued similar orders to its naval
force. The following is the letter addressed by Mr. Crittenden (then Acting
Secretary of State) to M. Sartiges. A distinguished gentleman who has occu
pied a high position in this government has written to me that this diplomatic
letter was pronounced perfect in tone and style, and would compare favorably
with any paper which had ever emanated from the State Department:
"Department of State, Washington, October 22, 185 1.
"The undersigned, Acting Secretary of State of the United States, has
the honor to remind M. de Sartiges, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, that in the interview which he had
with him on the 8th instant, he stated that he might have occasion to address
him in writing on the subject of the information which M. de Sartiges then
communicated, that the French government had issued orders to its ships of
war, then in the West Indies, to give assistance to Spain, and to prevent by
force any adventurers of any nation from landing with hostile intent on the
island of Cuba. Having imparted that information to the President, the
undersigned has now the honor, by his direction, to address M. de Sartiges in
regard to it. ' '
We quote the paper in part :
"M. de Sartiges is apprised that a few days prior to the interview
adverted to the charge d'affaires of her Britannic Majesty had given to this
Department official notice that his government had issued similar orders to its
naval forces. The President had regarded this as a matter of grave impor
tance, but its gravity is greatly increased by the concurrence and cooperation
of France in the same measure. It cannot be doubted that those orders have
been occasioned by the recent unlawful expedition of less than five hundred
men, which, having evaded the vigilance of this government, and escaped
from New Orleans, were landed by the steamer Pampero upon the island of
Cuba, and were soon captured, and many of them executed.
"The geographical position of the island of Cuba in the Gulf of Mexico,

28 INTRODUCTION.
lying at no great distance from the mouth of the River Mississippi, and in the
line of the greatest current of the commerce of the United States, would
become, in the hands of any powerful European nation, an object of just
jealousy and apprehension to the people of this country. A due regard to
their own safety and interest must, therefore, make it a matter of importance
to them who shall possess and hold dominion over that island. The govern
ment of France and those of other European nations were long since officially
apprised by this government that the United States could not see without con
cern that island transferred by Spain to any other European state; President
Fillmore fully concurs in that sentiment, and is apprehensive that the sort of
protectorate introduced by the orders in question might, in contingencies not
difficult to be imagined, lead to results equally objectionable.
"The system of government which prevails most generally in Europe is
adverse to the principles upon which this government is founded, and the
undersigned is well aware that the difference between them is calculated to
produce distrust of, if not aversion to, the government of the United States.
Sensible of this, the people of this country are naturally jealous of European
interference in American affairs. And although they would not impute to
France, now herself a republic, any participation in this distrustful and
unfriendly feeling towards their government, yet the undersigned must repeat
that her intervention in this instance, if attempted to be executed, in the only
practicable mode for its effectual execution, could not fail to produce some
irritation, if not worse consequences. The French cruisers, sailing up and
down the shores of the United States to perform their needless task to pro
tect Cuba and their ungracious office of watching the people of this country as
if they were fruitful of piracies, would be regarded with some feeling of
resentment, and the flag they bore — a flag which should always be welcome
to the sight of Americans — would be looked at as casting a shadow of
unmerited and dishonoring suspicion upon them and their government. The
undersigned will add that all experience seems to prove that the rights, inter
ests, and peace of the continents of Europe and America will be best pre
served by the forbearance of each to interfere in the affairs of the other.
The government of the United States has constantly acted on that principle
and has never intermeddled in European questions. The President has
deemed it proper to the occasion that his views should be fully and frankly

INTRODUCTION. 29
presented for the friendly consideration of M. de Sartiges and his govern
ment, in order that all possible precautions may be used to avert any mis
understanding, and every cause or consequence that might disturb the peace
or alienate, in the least, the sentiments of confidence and friendship which
now bind together the republics of the United States and France. The
undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to M. de Sartiges the
assurance of his very distinguished consideration.
"JOHN J. CRITTENDEN."
Spanish diplomacy had been at work with England and France, and en
gaged them to interference with the United States filibusters. Spain had man
aged to persuade the governments of the two countries that she was engaged
in the abolishment of the slave trade, and that this was preparing the way for
emancipation, while the United States was a slave power and wanted the
extension of slavery, as was witnessed by the enterprise of lawless expedi
tions. Mr. Crittenden's vigorous protest was presently followed by a notifi
cation from England and France that the dangerous orders had been
revoked. It requires only the simple recitation of the facts to demonstrate
that the triple alliance of the powers most interested, traditionally, his
torically, politically and commercially, in the West Indies against the United
States, was a most grave affair. Hardly less so was the Black Warrior Case,
that culminated in a war message from President Franklin Pierce — appended :
XXXIIId Congress, 1st Session. Ex. Doc. No. 76.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Transmitting a Report in Reference to the Seizure
of the "Black Warrior."
March 15, 1854.
To the House of Representatives :
In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the
10th inst, I herewith transmit a report containing all the information
received at the Department in relation to the seizure of the Black Warrior, at
Havana, on the 28th ultimo.
There have been, in the course of a few years past, many other instances
of aggression upon our commerce, violations of the rights of American citi
zens, and insults to the national flag, by the Spanish authorities in Cuba, and

3° INTRODUCTION.
all attempts to obtain redress have led to protracted and as yet fruitless
negotiation. The documents in these cases are voluminous, and, when prepared, will
be sent to Congress.
Those now transmitted relate exclusively to the seizure of the Black
Warrior, and present so clear a case of wrong that it would be reasonable to
expect full indemnity therefor, as soon as this unjustifiable and offensive con
duct shall be made known to her Catholic Majesty's Government; but similar
expectations, in other cases, have not been realized.
The offending authority is at our doors, with large powers for aggression,
but none, it is alleged, for reparation. The source of redress is in another
hemisphere; and the answers to our just complaint, made to the home
government, are but the repetition of excuses rendered by inferior officials to
their superiors, in reply to representations of misconduct. The peculiar situ
ation of the parties has undoubtedly much aggravated the annoyances and
injuries which our citizens have suffered from the Cuban authorities, and
Spain does not seem to appreciate, to its full extent, her responsibility for the
conduct of these authorities. In giving very extraordinary powers to them
she owes it to justice, and to her friendly relations with this government, to
guard with great vigilance against the exorbitant exercise of these powers,
and, in case of injury, to provide for prompt redress.
I have already taken measures to present to the government of Spain the
wanton injury of the Cuban authorities, in the detention and seizure of the
Black Warrior, and to demand immediate indemnity for the injury which has
thereby resulted to our citizens.
In view of the position of the island of Cuba, its proximity to our coast,
the relations which it must ever bear to our commercial and other interests, it
is vain to expect that a series of unfriendly acts infringing our commercial
rights, and the adoption of a policy threatening the honor and security of these
States can long consist with peaceful relations.
In case the measures taken for amicable adjustment of our difficulties
with Spain should unfortunately fail, I shall not hesitate to use the authority
and means which Congress may grant, to insure the observance of our rights,
to obtain redress for injuries received, and to vindicate the honor of our
flag. In anticipation of that contingency, which I earnestly hope may not arise,

INTRODUCTION. 31
I suggest to Congress the propriety of adopting such provisional measures as
the exigency may seem to demand. FRANKLIN PIERCE.
Washington, March 15, 1854.
This message is one of the most trenchant that has emanated from our
Executive Department of the Government. It is a plain suggestion to Con
gress to give the President authority to make war on Spain. It did not have
the desired effect, as it produced comparative peace. It is another illustration
that the United States has long been subjected to the inconvenience of a
house on fire next door. There was a time in the course of the negotiations
in the Virginius case that President Grant assembled a powerful fleet at Key
West. This was so soon after the war of the sections and states that we had
a strong array of war ships.
We quote from the report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1874, page 9, the
official record of the mustering of a squadron at Key West, to promote Span
ish-Cuban negotiations. Here is a passage of Secretary Robson's report :
"The North Atlantic Station. — At the date of the last report the whole
available force of the navy which could be put afloat on the Atlantic Ocean
was under orders to reinforce this station. In addition to the regular force as
stated in the last report, every available wooden and iron-clad ship in
ordinary was dispatched as rapidly as it could be put in order and properly
manned and organized. The Lancaster and the Ticonderoga were recalled
from the South Atlantic, and the whole European fleet from the Mediter
ranean, and ordered to concentrate at Key West. The force thus concen
trated on the Station consisted of the Franklin, Minnesota, Wabash, Colorado,
Lancaster, Brooklyn, Congress, Worcester, Alaska, Ticonderoga, Canan-
daigua, Shenandoah, Juniata, Ossipee, Wachusett, Powhatan, Wyoming,
Kansas, Shawmut, Sangus, Mahopac, Manhattan, Ajax, Canonicus, Dictator,
Despatch, Pinta, Fortune, and Mayflower; and Rear-Admiral Case, as senior
officer present, assumed command, in pursuance of orders to that effect, Jan
uary 3, 1874, the date of his arrival at Key West. Rear-Admiral Scott
remained in command of a division.
"The causes which led to this concentration of force were generally and
briefly alluded to in my last report, and it may now be proper, in order to
complete the record of the action of the navy in connection with the Virginius
affair, to recite the more prominent of the proceedings in relation thereto in
wl ich it took part."

32 INTRODUCTION.
It was while the American fleet of thirty ships of war was at Key West
that the proceedings in the case of the Virginius were closed by the agree
ment of Spain to surrender the captured ship, a filibuster taken on the high
seas, to salute the American flag restored to her, and pay an indemnity. The
United States at this time had not resumed specie payments or established
high credit, while the great fleet at Key West was enough to shake the stock
market and alarm men of business in general, and President Grant was not
moved by the demand that Spain should have been attacked. Spain was
stronger then than now in her European relations, though suffering from
home disorders.
The chapter of this volume that is of "The American Minister in Madrid"
refers particularly to the period of General Sickles and General Cushing.
The latter was a man of genius in literature and law, the former a man of
affairs who made the closest approach to doing business with the Spaniards,
proposing the purchase of the Spanish rights in the West Indies, and suggest
ing that we might pay $125,000,000. It was believed. in Madrid at the time
that Marshal Prim, the Spanish Premier, was about to sell Cuba and ' Porto
Rico, asking for the two islands $200,000,000, and it is the opinion of General
Sickles that Prim's assassination was on that account. The influence behind
the assassins was so strong that they were protected. The act of murder is
not attributed to a patriotic emotion, but to the resentment of a corrupt circle
that Cuba should not be retained for the harvesting of plunder by favorites.
Prim was the foremost man of his time in his country.
Many Spaniards knew when rushing into war with us their country would
be better off to sell Cuba than to exhaust all resources in a hopeless combat,
and yet they did not know the weakness of their country. The swift destruc
tion of their fleets and the surrender of the armies were stunning surprises.
The military government of Cuba under Gomez, with a civil accompaniment
of inferior consideration, embarrassed all advances to Spain looking to the
relinquishment of Cuba, because the Cubans were in the way, and the Gomez
policy of destroying industries to deprive the Spaniards of revenue to carry on
the war, and recruit the insurgent forces by annihilating the chances of peace
ful occupation, impoverished Cubans, so that they could have no credit unless
their bonds were guaranteed by the United States; and that could not be done
on a basis of bloody ashes. Cuban combinations were meant to force this
country to make war upon Spain, and while they were being worked, that

INTRODUCTION.

33

accommodation should be impracticable, the blowing up of the Maine made
peaceful solution impossible, and with the inflammatory conditions excited,
the inevitable conflict was, to our disadvantage, for the moment precipitated,
when the situation was not more serious than when there were Cuban crises
during: the administrations of Fillmore, Pierce and Grant.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Publisher's Statement  13-15
Preface   J9-22
Introduction  . . .  23-33
List of Illustrations   43-50
List of Maps, Charts, Plans, Drawings, etc. . . .  5I-52
CHAPTER I.
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN.
American Good Will for Spain — The Situation in 1869 — The Sickles and Prim Negotiation
— Prim Willing to Sell Cuba — "The Honor of Spain" — Diplomatic Papers That
Should Be Studied — Spain Sends an Army to Cuba — The Valmaseda Proclamation —
The Wrongs of Cuba — We Must Find the Real People of Cuba  53-73
CHAPTER II.
THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN IN OUR CENTENNIAL YEAR FEARED WAR.
A Remarkable Correspondence — Suggestive of the Doom of Spanish Rule — The Gradual
Approaches of the Spanish War — A Circular Claiming the Cuban Rebellion Was
Crushed — Cushing as Master of Ceremonies — General Grant's Personality . . . 74-97
CHAPTER III.
THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN.
European Newspaper Comment on the Cuban-Spanish-American Situation Twenty-two
Years Ago — Not Much New in Later Commentary — "Stable Government" Not a New
Phrase — Cuban Troubles Those of Inheritance — Disastrous Influences of the Rebel
Policy of the Torch — Suggestion of Bombardment of Our Cities by Spaniards . . 98-1 13

CHAPTER IV.
THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA.
The Stir about it in Europe — The Money Resources of Spain Stated by Minister Cushing
— Europe against Our Intervention in Cuba — The Filibuster Hostility to President
Grant— The London Times on Hamilton Fish — A Minister Promises Too Much . . 114-130
CHAPTER V
THE DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS OF THE PENINSULA AND OF CUBA.
Some Testimony That Is Not Partial to Cuban Insurgents — Caleb Cushing on Inherent
Spanish Character— More Than One Kind of Our Naturalized Citizens — A List of
Them and of Claims — Conflicting Testimony as to Cuban Armies — Two Picturesque
Witnesses  131-175
34

GENERAL NELSON A. MILES, COMMANDER OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

THE "IOWA." IN COMM.VND OF " FIGHTING BOB " EVANS. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. S. Johnston, New York.)

TABLE OF CONTENTS. 37
CHAPTER VI.
THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA.
The Food Supplies in Cuba — Introduction of the Torch by the Insurgents— Garcia's Fine
Army with an Engineer Corps — The Double Tax on Sugar-Making — Spanish Methods
of Making War — The Policy of Annihilation — A Government in Light Marching
Order  176 193
CHAPTER VII.
GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA.
The Conservative Administrations of Grant, Cleveland and McKinley — A Variety of
"American Citizens" in Havana — Judicious Discrimination of Consulate Authorities
— A Young Man Who Gave Himself Away — The Brave Stand of the President against
Bulling the Market for Bonds Issued on a Basis of Bloody Ashes ... . . 194-205
CHAPTER VIII.
THE ACTUAL EXPERIENCE AND SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA.
Two Parties of Malignants — The Firm Stand of the President at the Beginning of the
War — A Study of the Historical Truth of the Situation — The President's Language
Contrasted with That of the Fire Bugs — Extreme Views of Senators Davis, Daniel,
Foraker, and Others — The Fury of the War Party — Cuban and Spanish Desperadoes
—The Massacre of the Maine — The Findings of the Courts — List of the Lost on the
Ship . . . ...... 206-228
CHAPTER IX.
THE SAN DOMINGO TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION.
The Policy of Maximo Gomez, and the Famine in Cuba — The Reports of American
Consuls in Cuba on the Cane Burning and Its Relation to the Starvation of the People
— The Agent of the Cubans in Arms Justified Barbarism — The Testimony of Our
Consuls that the Gomez Policy was the Cause of the Death of Thousands — Direct
Evidence of Blackmail Taxes, and the Anxiety of Cuban People to Be Annexed to the
United States — The Desperado Orders by Gomez before Weyler Came to Cuba . . 229-243
CHAPTER X.
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
The Declaration of War — The President's Call upon Congress to Take Action — Fit and
Few Words — The Constant Scramble in Congress for the Cuban Ghost-Dance Govern
ment — The Official Text of the President's War Proclamations— The Navy Had First
to Take Command of the Seas — The Timely Dispatches from the Navy Department-
Making Ready for War — Major-General Miles and His 50,000 Cubans . . . 244-274
CHAPTER XI.
THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY TOLD BY THOSE WHO WON IT.
The Battle of Manila Bay— Confidential Information from Madrid, Showing Spanish Con
fidence in Their Navy— Rapid Exchange of Cables between Dewey and Long-
Energetic Inquiry in the Navy Department — Everything Rushed from the Start —

38 TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Dewey's Masterly Movements and Immortal Victory — The Official Reports Full of
Stories of the Battle That Will Be News to the People — Details of Uncommon Value
¦ — Spanish Official Report Exceedingly Interesting — Admiral Montejo was not Sur
prised, but Fired First — The Celebrated Breakfast Caused by a False Alarm . 277-308

CHAPTER XII.
AFTER THE MAY-DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY.
Dewey's Cables During the Time He Held the Harbor with the City of Manila under His
Guns — Dispatches Full of History and Rich in Personal Characteristics — Authentic
Information from the Inside — The Official Story — Dewey's Unfavorable Opinion of
Cubans — Capture of the City — Trouble with Aguinaldo — Our Ships and Crews . 309-328
CHAPTER XIII.
THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON.
The People Instructed for the Army by the Experience of the Navy —The Run from
Washington State to Florida — Splendid Spirit of the Men — The Fearful Storm in the
Straits of Magellan — The Threat of Destroying a Spanish Torpedo Boat at Rio — The
Finish Alone and in Good Form, and Famous the World Over  329-338
CHAPTER XIV.
„ THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF wA.
Putting the Army into the Combat — The Plans of Campaign — The Proposed Waiting and
Equipping Policy of the Major-General Commanding — His Strange Confidence in the
Cuban Story of an Army of 50,000 Rebels to Help Us — Reasons Why We Could Not
Wait Six Months after Declaring War before Striking Decisively with the Army 341-352
CHAPTER XV.
THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF WAR.
Activity in the War Department before the Declaration of War — The Precautionary Policy
of the Major-General Commanding — Differences of Opinion in High Places about an
Early Invasion of Cuba — Importance of Healthful Camps — The Dangers of Water
Supplies — The Inside History of a Troubled Time — Shafter's Sagacity as to the
Importance of a First Engagement — The Demand for a Competent Army Enforced.353-367
CHAPTER XVI.
THE PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS.
Admiral Cervera Sailed into the Unknown, and Became a Mystery and a Menace  He
Appeared and Disappeared, and Was at Last. Found at Santiago by Commodore
Schley — Imperative Demands for Information Answered — The Orders of General
Shafter and Plans of General Miles — Dramatic Scenes at Tampa — Just as the Great
Fleet Was Sailing Another Spanish Hoodoo Fleet Was Announced— After All, a
Prosperous Voyage and Easy Landing  368-383

TABLE OF CONTENTS. 39
CHAPTER XVII.
THE SHARP STRAIN OF THE STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO.
General Miles as a Loyal Soldier — Shaffer's Fine Voyage and Safe Landing — The First
B'ood in Battle — Rush of Supplies and Reinforcements to the Army — Alger Wants
Shaffer to "Get a Good Ready" — Why Siege Guns Were Not Unloaded — Work Cut
Out for the Regulars — Parallel with the British Siege of Havana — The Sword Had to
Be Swift to Save from Pestilence  384-399
CHAPTER XVIII.
THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO.
The Supreme Test of American Valor — The Thin but Steady Regular Line, and the
Essential Assistance by the Foremost Volunteers — The Whole Story from the First
Skirmish to the Last Assault Told in War Office Dispatches far More Interesting
than the Formal Reports of the Officers and More Sensational than the Lurid Chap
ters in the Journals — Their Publication an Admirable Example of the Candor of the
Authorities — An All-Night Watch for News at the White House — Shaffer's Memor
able Third and Fourth of July  400-416
CHAPTER XIX.
THE STRANGE STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER OF SPAIN.
The Cables That Passed Between Sagasta, Blanco, Cervera, Correa and Linares During
the Crisis of the Spanish War in Cuba — A Diary Telegraphed from Santiago to
Havana, Giving the Inside of Spanish Affairs from the Attack to the Surrender — Cer
vera Not Well Fitted Out, Forced to Flight, Protesting that He Was Going to Destruc
tion — The Cables Are a Gallery of Paintings of Spanish Character .... 417-453
CHAPTER XX.
THE SANTIAGO SITUATION AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE.
Cipher Dispatches — Too Much Publicity — Shatter Demands the Help of the Navy, and is
Supported by the War Department — He Heard Firing at Midnight and Hoped it Was
Sampson — Garcia's Men Who Were Always Going to Do Something To-morrow —
"Terrible Fight" July 1st — Reinforcements, Lighters and Tugs Wanted — An Ener
getic Rush to Aid Shatter, but Not by the Navy— Cable Direct to Corbin— The
Yellow Fever Appears — Preliminaries to the Capitulation — The President Sticks to It
that Spaniards Must Unconditionally Surrender — Fortunate Arrival of Miles in the
Blue Rams  454-473
CHAPTER XXI.
THE LESSON FOR THE COUNTRY OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO.
Value of the Reports of the Inspector-General — His Keen Suggestions and Brilliant
Sketches with Expert Information — Tribute of Breckenridge to Shafter — The Volun
teers in Camps — Chickamauga as an Illustiation — The Location of the Wrongs That
the Soldiers Suffered Unduly— We Must Build Regiments as We Do Battleships— The
Fault cf Poor Preparation Not Personal — Let Congress for the Country Mend It 474-491

4° TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER XXII.
THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET.
The Cape Verde Squadron Smashed, Burned and Sunk, and Admiral Sampson Makes a
Present of the Wrecks to the Nation — The Reports of the Admiral and Commodore
Schley — Their Difference in Opinions, Methods and Manners — Intensely Interesting
Extracts from Reports by Captains and Executive Officers — A Series of Startling
Pictures — Admiral Cervera's Official Lamentation — Extracts from the Spanish Diary
of Uncommon Value — The Story of Fugitives from the Fleet Who Found Their Way
to the Spanish Trenches — Admiral Omits to Improve Opportunity of His Life . . 492-520
CHAPTER XXIII.
THE SCENES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.
The Appearance of General Miles at Santiago — His Moral as well as Military Force —
Spanish Obstinacy in the Negotiation for Capitulation — The Iron Hand at Washing
ton — The Practical Question Was How Much Would Victory Cost Us? — The Spanish
Case Was Hopeless — They Sought to Save their Military Honor — The Scenes and
Terms of the Surrender — An Inspector-General's Picturesque Story — Telegrams That
are Photographs — The President's Proclamation of Principles and Purpose in Cuban
Government — Comparative Proportions of Great Surrenders . . ... 523-543
CHAPTER XXIV.
THE JOINT WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA.
The Reasons Why Admiral Dewey Remained After Destroying the Spanish Fleet — Why
There Was Not a Slaughter at Manila Like That at Santiago— The Old Fort That
Was the Key of the City — The American Army Drove the Spaniards and Dusted the
Insurgents Out of the Way — A Very Neat Job — We Did Not Make War on the Span
iards for the Sake of the Tagalos  544-567
CHAPTER XXV.
THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN.
The Preliminary Plans and Movements of General Miles — Sharp but Courteous Corre
spondence with General Shafter, Closing Cuban Experiences — Place of Landing in
Porto Rico Changed at Sea — The Progress of the Campaign Closed by the Peace
News — The Constant and Conclusive Success of the American Arms — Some of the
Cablegrams that Passed that Remain of Interest  568-578
CHAPTER XXVI.
AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA.
The Casualties at Santiago — Haste to Ship the Spaniards to Spain and the Americans
North— The Parting of the Armies That Met in Bloody Strife— Shaffer's Opinion of
Immunes — A Curious Proclamation from Spanish Soldiers — 23,726 Spanish Soldiers
Surrendered — American Volunteers Begging to be Hurried to the Front While the
War Lasted, and When It Was Over They Wanted to Go Home  581-599

TABLE OF CONTENTS. 41
CHAPTER XXVII.
THE PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.
The Marvelous Improvement of the Artillery on Our Ships of War— The Splendid Equip
ment of the Several Vessels — Full Particulars of the Armament of All Our Ships —
Vigilance of the Ordnance Bureau to Continue Progress — The Thirteen-Inch Guns to
Be Superseded in the New Navy by Twelve-Inch — Important Recommendations — The
Way the Navy Was Prepared to Win — Plans for Continued Progress — The Spanish
Side as Seen and Described by One of Her Officers — Hopes and Happenings in
Bombarded Santiago — Service of Cervera's Fleet — Mystery of the Merrimac — Earth
quake-Throwing Vesuvius — German Opinion — Work of the Marines .... 600-629

CHAPTER XXVIII.
THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
Its Organization and Numbers Before and During the War — Strength and Location of
the Several Army Corps — The Distribution of the Military Forces and Their Numbers
— Casualties During the War, in Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines — Deaths in the
Camps — The Incidents of Hardship and the Yellow Scandals — Spanish Account of the
Valor of Their Troops and Story of the Conflict — Scarcity of Provisions— Cruel
Battles of El Caney and San Juan — Suffering in Santiago . .... 630-657

CHAPTER XXIX.
THE INSURGENTS OF CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES IN ARMS.
Our Relations With and Responsibilities for Them — T,he Cuban Soldiers Found on the
Pay Roll — A Military Service of Importance and the Only One Performed by
Armed Cubans in Our War — The Spanish Account of It — Cubans Kept 3,500 of the
Best Toops of Spain Away from El Caney — Testimony Taken at Paris by the Ameri
can Commission of the True Character of the Philippines— General Merritt, General
Greene and Major Bell State the Facts  658-667

CHAPTER XXX.
THE TREATY OF PEACE.
The Official Terms in Which the Spaniards Sued for Peace and Accepted the Demands
of the Peace Protocol of August 12 — "The Demand Strips Us of the Very Last
Memory of a Glorious Past" — The Treaty Commissioners That Met in Paris — Official
Text of the Treaty of Peace of December 10 — The Spaniards Contend That the
Philippine Insurgents Constantly Change the Status Quo and that the Americans
Must Stop Them — Contention that the Transfer of Sovereignty Meant Transfer of
rjgbts — Protracted Debate Over the Cuban Obligations — Claim the Capture of Manila
Was Not Lawful — Insinuation that General Merritt Had Heard of the Protocol Before
Storming the Town — Spaniards Able and Adroit — Americans Firm but Courteous
 The Official History of the Preparation of the Peace Protocol — The Part Taken by
the President— His Strong Hand Felt in Paris . . . 668-731

4 =

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXXI.
REVIEW OF THE WAR AND THE COMMISSION ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT.
Importance of a Day Lost or Gained — The Protocol Was the Treaty — Military Com
missions to Arrange the Spanish Evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico — Appearance of
the Cuban Army — Narrow Margins on Which the War Was Ended so Speedily —
Inspiration of Dewey's Victory — Energy in Following It Up — Outbreak of Criticism
on the Conduct of the War as Soon as It Was Over — The Commission of Investigation
Appointed by the President — Extraordinary Interest in the Action of the Commission
and Its Authoritative Report — Weaknesses in Systems and Persons Not Spared —
Origin and Extent of the Canned Meat Controversy — Fault Found in High Places
— The Army, Regular or Volunteer, of and for the People  732-751
CHAPTER XXXII.
THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS.
The Spanish Peninsula Too Narrow to Sustain the Crown System Over Continental
Colonies — The Loss of Her Archipelagoes Has Been the Logic of Her Experiences —
Comparative Expansion of England and the United States — Our Magnificent Growth
Across the Continent the Greatest of National Triumphs — Our Arms Around the World
— Our Bugle Call and British Drum-Beats Following the Course of the Sun — The
Whispering Wires that Unite the Nations — The Malay Revolt Against Liberty for
Tyranny — The Ghastly Demagogy that Meddles with the Army — Pleasing Prospects
of Our Possessions Except the Philippines — The Aguinaldo Conspiracy and Tagalo
War — The Motives and Malice of It — American Arms Without Stain — Our Soldiers
Without Reproach  752-764

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. PAGE
Frontispiece — Government Building at Washington, Occupied by the State, War, and
Navy Departments.
i— President McKinley and His Cabinet  17
2 — Murat Halstead, the Author  18
3— General Nelson A. Miles, Commander of the United States Army  35
4 — The "Iowa," in Command of Fighting Bob Evans  36
5 — Queen Regent and Boy King of Spain  45
6 — Stewart L. Woodford, Minister to Spain When War Was Declared  46
7 — Tablet Commemorating the Execution of the "Virginius" Prisoners. One of the
Early Causes of the War with Spain  63
8 — Admiral Dewey under the "Olympia's" Big Guns  64
9 — Admiral Dewey and Staff on the "Olympia"  64
10 — The Cathedral at Santiago  81
11 — Kiosk in Main Plaza at Ponce, Porto Rico  82
12 — The Captain-General's Palace in Havana  99
13 — The Plaza in Ponce, Porto Rico  100
14 — Artillery Wagon Park, Porto Rico  100
15 — Church and Palms in Juana, Porto Rico  100
16 — Captain Bethel and General ErnstReconnoitering in Porto Rico  100
17 — The Military Hospital in Ponce, Porto Rico  105
18 — Battery B, Fourth Artillery, in Action in Porto Rico  106
ig — Fire Department Building, Ponce, Porto Rico  106
20 — On the Picket Line in Porto Rico  106

44 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. PAGE
21— Catholic Church in Ponce, Porto Rico  106
22 — Leading Cuban Generals Who Commanded Insurgent Forces in Cuba  115
23 — Military Telegraph Office and Barracks at Ponce, Porto Rico  116
24 — Fortifications of San Juan, Porto Rico  121
25 — The Quay, San Juan, Porto Rico  122
26 — General Blanco, Who Commanded Spanish Forces in Cuba  139
27 — La Perla Theatre in Ponce, Porto Rico  140
28 — A Picket Squad of Cuban Soldiers  145
29 — General Castellio and Staff  145
30 — Plaza in Santiago, Cuba  146
31 — Group of Native Women in Ponce, Porto Rico  146
32— Battery F of the Fifth Artillery  155
33 — A Dwelling in Santiago  155
34 — Effect of Torpedo Explosion in "Vizcaya"  ,  155
35 — 5.5-inch Gun and Cartridge on "Vizcaya"  155
36 — The Major, His Adjutant, Orderly, and Wife  156
37 — Partial View of Arsenal, Facing the Bacoor, in Cavite, Philippines  156
38 — Cuadrilleros, or Rural Guards, in the Philippines  161
39 — The Princess Promenade, San Juan, Porto Rico  1C2
40 — City of San Juan, Porto Rico  i7g
41 — Street of the Cross, San Juan, Porto Rico  180
42 — Market Women of Porto Rico  185
43 — A Porto Rico Country House  186
44 — Major-General Fitzhugh Lee, Consul at Havana When War Was Declared  195
45 — The Sea Wall of San Juan, Porto Rico  ig6
46 — Horses Loaded with Maloja, in Matanzas, Cuba  201
47 — The Yumuri River at Matanzas, Cuba  202
48 — The United States Battleship "Maine"  219
49 — Captain Sigsbee, Who Commanded the Ul-Fated "Maine"  220
50 — Funeral of the Victims of the "Maine" Disaster  225
51 — The Court of Inquiry into the Fate of the "Maine," in Session  226
52 — Quarter-Deck of the U. S. S. "Brooklyn"  235
53 — Fire-room of the U. S. S. "Brooklyn"  236
54 — A Fruit Vendor in Havana  241
55 — Twelve-Inch Breech-Loading Mortars, Weight 28,980 Pounds Each  ;  242

QUEEN REGENT AND BOY KING OF SPAIN.

STEWART L. WOODFORD, MINISTER TO SPAIN WHEN WAR WAS DECLARED.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 47
PAGE
56 — The Flying Squadron  259
57 — Admiral Dewey as Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, United States Navy  260
58 — Guns Used by United States Infantry, Breech Closed  265
59 — Guns Used by United States Infantry, Breech Open  265
60 — United States Light Artillery at Port Tampa  266
61 — Artillery Practice at Port Tampa  266
62 — Deck View of the U. S. S. "Indiana"  275
63 — Regiment in Heavy Marching Order at Camp Alger  276
64 — Admiral Dewey's Fleet That Won the May-day Victory in Manila Bay  2S1
65 — Admiral Dewey, the Hero of Manila  282
66 — Admiral Montijo, Commander of the Fleet That Admiral Dewey Sunk  299
67 — Views of the Navy Yard at Cavite, Philippines  300
68— The Arena, Constructed of Bamboo, in Which Bull Fights Are Given at Manila  305
69 — Views in and around Manila  306
70 — Views in the Philippines, Mostly in and around Manila  315
71 — Views from the Philippines  316
72 — Native Method of Plowing — Scene in the Province of Batangas, Philippines  321
73 — A Country Marriage in the Philippines  322
74 — Captain Clark, of the "Oregon," in His Office  339
75 — The "Oregon," the Bulldog of the Navy  340
76— Transport "Newport," of the Philippine Expedition, Leaving San Francisco  345
77--Regiment Breaking Camp at Camp Alger  346
78— United States Volunteer in Full Marching Order  355
79 — Model of Guns Used on Aft Decks  356
So — Ten-Inch Disappearing Gun Carriage, Model of 1896, Buffington-Ciozier System  356
81— Daiquiri, Where Our Troops Landed in Cuba  361
82 — The Beach at Daiquiri  361
83 — The Pier at Daiquiri  361
84— A Part of Daiquiri, Cuba  361
85 — The Way Milk Is Sold and Delivered in Havana  362
86 — Chart Showing Daily Positions of the American Fleet in the Campaign Against the
Spanish Squadron in Cuban Waters  379
87 — Daily Positions of the Spanish Squadron in Cuban Waters, Under Admiral Cervera.... 3S0
88  Third Light Artillery Going into Camp, on Their Way to the Front, Six Miles from
Siboney  35

48 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. PAGE
Sg— General Hawkins, Who Led the Famous Charge of the First Brigade at San Juan,
July ist, 1898  386
go— Capron's Battery in Action in Their Position in General Lawton's Division  395
91 — Wounded on their Way to Dressing Place at the Battle of San Juan  396
92— Artillery Men Trying to Locate the Enemy's Batteries While under Fire  401
93— General Wheeler and General Sumner in the Latter's Headquarters before Santiago 402
94— The Church at El Caney  419
95— Scene in a Field Hospital after the Battle of San Juan  420
g6— Bombproofs Thrown Up by Rough Riders to Protect Them from Spanish Shell and
Shrapnel  425
97_Colonel Roosevelt's Men Cooking Their First Dinner at Daiquiri ; Fried Bacon and
Hard Tack the Menu  426
98— Grave of Captain Wetherell, Who Fell in the Famous Charge of San Juan Hill  435
0g_"Oquendo," Starboard Side, Showing Exit of Thirteen-Inch Shell  436
100 — "Oquendo," Starboard Side, as Abandoned  436
I0I — Views of the Notorious Prison at Santiago  441
102 — Cast Iron Projectiles Used in the Navy  442
103— Petty Officers of the U. S. S. "New York"  443
I04 — Stone Fort at El Caney. Effect of Cannonading  45g
105 — Snap Shot of General Shatter in the Field  460
106 — American Troops in Santiago. Relief of the Guard  465
107 — Scene on the Wharf at Santiago de Cuba  466
108 — Crushing-Mill on a Sugar Plantation in Cuba  475
IOg — Valley of the Yumuri River, Cuba  47',
IIO — A Group of Spanish Prisoners before Santiago  481
in — Col. John Jacob Astor. of Astor Battery Fame, near Spanish Trenches  482
112 — The Naval Heroes of Santiago  49g
113 — Wreck of "Reina Mercedes," and Estrella Battery, Santiago  ,  500
114 — Admiral Cervera, Who Commanded the Ill-Fated Spanish Fleet at Santiago  505
115 — Side of the "Cristobal Colon" after the Battle  50b
n6 — Bow of the "Vizcaya." After the Santiago Battle  515
117 — Forecastle of the "Oquendo" ; Showing Sinking of Spar Deck  516
11S — "Vizcaya," after the Santiago Battle, Showing the Results of American Gunners'
Marksmanship  521
119 — "Cristobal Colon" a* Finally Abandoned  522

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 49
PAGE
120 — Santiago de Cuba, North Half, as Seen from the Bay  539
121 — Entrance to Harbor at Santiago de Cuba; "Merrimac" Shown in the Foreground  540
122 — Generals Miles and Shatter on Board Headquarters Boat "Seguranca"  545
123 — Tree Under Which Surrender of Spanish Forces at Santiago Was Made  546
124 — Major-General Thomas M. Anderson and Staff, in Command of First Division,
Eighth Army Corps, at Manila  555
125 — Rift in the Jungles that Line the Coast of the Philippines  556
126— Roadway in Botanical Gardens, Manila  556
127 — The Road to the Cemetery in Tansa, Province of Iloilo  561
128 — Landscape View Showing Beauty and Luxuriance of Vegetation in the Philippines... 562
i2g — United States Transports in the Harbor of Ponce, Porto Rico  579
130 — The Citadel at Ponce, Porto Rico  580
131 — A Corner in the Market of Santiago, Cuba  585
132 — Head of Pack Train Leaving San Luis for Manzanillo  586
133 — Sugar Mill. Scene of the San Luis Riot November 4, 1898  595
134 — Soldiers in Insurgent Army of Cuba  595
135 — The Palace of Santiago, Cuba  5g6
136— Effect of Eight-Inch Shell through Port Head of "Vizcaya"  601
137— Starboard Side of "Vizcaya." After the Battle  601
138 — A Cuban Plowman  602
I3g — Sword Ordered by Congress to be Given Admiral Dewey as a Token of the Nation's
Gratitude  6kj
140 — Bust of Columbus, Found on "Cristobal Colon." Now in War Department at
Washington  620
141 — Department Headquarters of United States Army at Santiago  637
142 — General W. F. Randolph  638
143— Bob Wrenn and Billy Larned  63S
144— Train of Pack Mules  638
145 — Sergeant Dan Hewitt, Hero of Caloocan  63S
146 — View Inside of the Trenches  655
147— Camp at Port Tampa  655
148 — Headquarters in the Field  655
149— View of the Trenches  655
150 — Loading Pack Mules  65O
151 — A Cuban Villa  656

So LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. PAGE
152 — Placing Guns into Position  656
153 — Members of the Ninth Cavalry, Colored  656
154— The Battlefield of San Juan, July 2, 1898  673
155 — "Maria Teresa," Showing Hole in 5.5-Inch Gun Shield, Inner View  674
156 — The American Peace Commissioners  681
157 — The Spanish Peace Commissioners  684
158 — "To George Dewey, with the Compliments of the President, Congress and the People
of the United States"  691
159 — Major-General Thomas M. Anderson, Commander of First Division, Eighth Army
Corps, at Manila  .,  6g2
160 — General E. S. Otis and Staff on Porch, Malacanan Palace, Manila  709
161 — Malacanan Palace and Pasig River, Manila  710
162 — General Otis and Staff in Dining Room of Malacanan Palace, Manila  710
163 — Signatures of American and Spanish Peace Commissioners to Treaty of Peace  727
164 — Last Joint Session of American and Spanish Peace Commissioners at Paris  728

\

V V

i/^r

'Ml

MAPS, CHARTS AND PLANS. PAGE
I — Map of Santiago and Vicinity, Showing Intrenchments and Positions of the Fifth
Army Corps, U. S. Army, and Those of the Spanish  403
2 — Plan Showing Position of Both Armies before Santiago, July 3, 1898  408
3 — Official Diagram Showing Plan of Naval Battle off Santiago, July 3, 1898  493
4 — Official Sketch Showing External Injuries Sustained by the "Brooklyn" at Santiago,
July 3, i8g8  495
5 — Official Sketch Showing External Injuries Sustained by the "Iowa" at Santiago,
July 3, 1898  495
6 — Official Diagram Showing Where the Spanish Vessels Were Abandoned off Santiago,
July 3, 1898  497
7 — Official Sketch Showing Damage Done to Chain Locker by a Spanish Shell, July 3,
1898  501
8 — Official Plan of "Vizcaya," Showing Approximate Location of Hits and Probable Size
of Projectiles  503
g — Official Plan of "Oquendo," Showing Approximate Location of Hits and Probable Size
of Projectiles  503
10 — Official Plan of "Maria Teresa," Showing Approximate Location of Hits and Probable
Size of Projectiles  507
n — Official Plan of "Cristobal Colon," Showing Approximate Location of Hits and Prob
able Size of Projectiles  507
12 — Plan Showing Stations of American Fleet at Santiago before the Battle, July 3  518
13  Official Map Showing Plan oi American and Spanish Trenches before Manila in
Ancmct TRnR  ._.  ,    cc

52 MAPS, CHARTS AND PLANS. PAGE
14 — Official Map Showing Country South of the Pasig River and West of the Paranaque
River, in Which the Military Operations before Manila Were Conducted in August,
1898  559
15 — Official Sketch Showing Positions of First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Corps, in
Operations against Manila, August, 1898  563
16 — Map of Porto Rico, in Colors, from Latest Government Survej-s  765
17 — Map of Cuba, in Colors, from Latest Government Surveys  7"7
18 — Map of Hawaii, in Colors, from Latest Government Surveys  769
ig — Map of the Philippine Islands, in Colors, from Latest Government Surveys  771

CHAPTER I.
The Origin of the War Between the United States and Spain.
American Good Will for Spain— The Situation in i86g— The Sickles and Prim Negotiation-
Prim Willing to Sell Cuba— "The Honor of Spain"— Diplomatic Papers that Should be
Studied — Spain Sends an Army to Cuba — The Valmaseda Proclamation — The Wrongs ot
Cuba— We Must Find the Real People of Cuba.
More than four centuries after the discovery of the West Indies by Chris
topher Columbus, there was in the celebration of that event in the vanished
yet memorable White City at Chicago, a revelation to the nations and
people accustomed to regard us as a mass of material rudely fashioned, of the
advance of American art and the accomplishments of our higher civilization.
There was also manifest, to the students of the progress of mankind, a tre
mendous force of public opinion, and an augmented excellence in character
and fervor of expression, of a distinctive national character, clean cut and
glowing with public pride and patriotism. One of the features of the celebra
tion was the kindly popular sentiment respecting Spain, and a regard for the
people of the peninsula of Europe that enters the Atlantic. One of the
treasured and consecrated figures shining in our traditions was Isabella, the
friend of Columbus (who offered to pledge her jewels that he might sail west
ward and expand the area of cultivation and Christianity) — Columbus, the
first of our heroes, not a Spaniard, but one who gave Spain a new world and
his ashes, whose incomparable discoveries became august through the ages by
the misfortunes that closed his illustrious life in gloom. The pen of Wash
ington Irving made the Alhambra dear to Americans, and in the mellow
splendor of his pages the ancient romantic traditions and tragic histories of
the land of Cervantes were enriched in a golden atmosphere like that of the
53

54 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.
masterpieces of Murillo. The descendants of Columbus, coming by way of
Havana; the Princess of the royal reigning house of Spain; and the chosen
ships of her navy, were welcomed to our shores, homes and harbors, and
entertained with a superb hospitality, so profuse that the fault of its pomp
was forgiven on account of its sincerity. Almost forgotten were the stories of
Spain's cruelties; nearly effaced from American soil the crimson of her foot
steps. The olden grandeur of Spain was for the youth of our country a
fascinating story, half history, half romance. So far as we knew how far we
were misjudged by Spain, our resentment was softened by remembrance of
her fallen fortunes, and compassion for austere vanity and solemn conceit that
was content with ignorance. We were even hopeful of Spanish Republican
ism. There was something that Whittier sang, "The north wind told to the
pines, the wild duck to the sea." It was that the Lord was showing signs the
slaves should sometime be free. There were many signs that the day was
soon coming that Cuba should be free, and few Americans have ever doubted
that the freedom of Cuba meant she was to be under the wing of the Great
Republic of the North. This was written when the island first grew green in
the summer seas, and the Americas emerged from chaos. This was not a
secret held in the mind of Spain, though an arrow piercing the Spanish heart.
Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, whose grandson fell foremost in the
charge of the Rough Riders at Santiago, wrote July 29, 1869, to General
Sickles at Madrid in terms that equally well described that time and the situa
tion in 1897. The official synopsis of the State papers describes the communi
cation of Mr. Fish in these terms: "The insurrection of Cuba is causing
great devastation, and will result, if continued, in the destruction of the
productive capacity of the island. Reasons why the United States have a
peculiar interest in the fortunes and prosperity of the island. Contest one for
self-government and freedom. Self-government for every part of the Ameri
can hemisphere and freedom from transatlantic rule a growing sentiment in
the United States. This has been recognized by other powers. Spain may,
with honor, recognize it and treat for the surrender of her rights in Cuba."
Marshal Prim's reply on behalf of Spain was that he recognized the
inevitable termination of colonial relations in America, but Spain could not
be reconciled to that till hostilities ceased. General Sickles replied that Spain
was not asked to treat with insurgents, but with a friendly power and old
ally. Prim responded that the United States might be assured of the good

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 55
faith of Spain, but that the insurrection had not assumed proportions that
could require a government to treat during hostilities. The insurgents held
no port or ships, and had no army that offered or accepted battle. The
language of Mr. Fish in writing to Mr. Sickles at this juncture was: "It can
no longer be a question of national dignity, nor can the proper pride or the
just susceptibilities of a great power refuse to consider the question of a
voluntary severance of past relations between itself and distant possessions.
Spain herself was one of the first of the great European powers to cede volun
tarily its distant colonial possessions, for she transferred Louisiana to France
and subsequently ceded Florida to the United States."
The Secretary proceeded: "The strife still continues in Cuba. It has
already marked its track by devastation and ruin — towns sacked, houses
burned, plantations destroyed, and lives lost. On either side the war has
been one of desolation, and, if continued, must result in the entire destruction
of a large part of the productive capacity of the island as well as of an
immense amount of property and of human life.
"It is not impossible that the Cubans may be conquered, if Spain devotes
her whole energies to the work; but they can never again be contented,
happy, faithful, or quiet subjects of that power. Assuming that Spain may
eventually subdue the present insurrection, she will find herself in possession
of a devastated and ruined territory, inhabited by a discontented people.
The enlightened statesmen of Spain cannot fail to appreciate that the feelings
and the affections of the entire native population of the island are not only
estranged, but they are deeply hostile to the continuance of Spanish rule.
Nor can they fail to recognize the advancing growth of that sentiment which
claims for every part of the American hemisphere the right of self-govern
ment and freedom from transatlantic dependence.
"England, bound as she has been to the traditions of the past, tenacious
as she has been of her possessions, and conservative of all her rights and
interests, has recognized the force of this feeling, and has anticipated events
by granting self-government to her North American provinces. Denmark,
approving the policy of the separation of colonies from the parent state, is
endeavoring to part with her insular possessions."
The example of Russia in selling Alaska was pertinently quoted.
In a striking picture of recent conditions the fate of Porto Rico was fore
shadowed by Secretary Fish June 29, 1869: "The same causes which have

5^ THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.
produced the present convulsion in Cuba exist latent, in Porto Rico, and may
be fanned into flames hereafter should free government and a system of free
labor be brought in immediate contact with that island by establishing them
in Cuba. It is not improbable, therefore, that the cabinet of Madrid may
think it wise to determine the political condition of both islands at the same
time." There is close correspondence between the situations of 1869 and of 1897
in the relations of the United States and Spain, respecting the final disposition
of the Cuban question. The ten years of civil war in Cuba had been in prog
ress one year when Secretary Fish sent a special observer and negotiator to
Madrid and wrote Minister Sickles to propose to the Spanish government the
purchase of Cuba, which was not, it should be well remarked, received as
intolerable insolence, but as a business affair to be given the most considerate
attention. The Spanish executive authorities were cautious and sensitive,
but consoled by the customary diplomatic flatteries, and after shrinking from
the attitude of expectant but favorable attention, resumed the use of tentative
phrases, suggesting additional offers of compensation, always saying much of
the essential requirements of the dignity and honor that must be at all
hazards maintained. Marshal Prim, after stacing that Spain had lost Cuba
practically, and desiring to know how much would be paid for the relinquish
ment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba and Porto Rico, discovered and
declared that his colleagues were less inclined than himself to entertain that
form of finding a solution of the making of peace in Cuba by the abandonment
of the island. The Spanish statesman knew that Minister Sickles had been a
factor in the Ostend Conference, and intimately associated with the influences
that made James Buchanan President of the United States, and that it
could hardly be accidental Sickles had been chosen Minister of the United
States to Spain, by President Grant, who looked to intervention and the
annexation of Cuba, and whose military prestige had so considerably been
manifested in our international affairs. Two telegrams from General Sickles
to Secretary Fish signify too much to allow omission :
"August 1, 1869.— Communicated to Prim informally basis of convention.
He pressed me to say how much Cuba and Porto Rico would give. I said I
had no instructions, and suggested one hundred and twenty-five millions as
probable. Prim said Spain might arrange preliminaries with United States
and concede autonomy of Cuba and Porto Rico for satisfactory equivalent as

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 57
soon as hostilities ceased. He promised to bring the whole subject before the
council to-night. "
"August 6, 1869. — Prim says sudden illness of Secretary of State has
delayed reply."
In conversation with Senor Silvela, a few days after the delay on account
of the sudden illness of the Secretary of State, Senor Silvela said to Minister
Sickles: "The liberal party in Spain finds itself, to its own infinite regret,
forced into a seeming sympathy with the reactionary party in Cuba; and the
liberals of Cuba, who ought to be its firm friends, are converted, by the
fatality of the situation, into its bitterest enemies. There is no sentiment
dearer to the hearts of the liberal leaders than that of freedom to all men; yet
they stand before the world, in this Cuban conflict, as opposed to self-govern
ment and resisting the abolition of slavery." He considered the insurrection
as a most deplorable misfortune and' mistake, both for Cuba and for Spain,
saying :
"If a way could be found to settle all these questions in such a manner as
to do justice to Cuba, without infringing upon the honor of Spain, the govern
ment would be greatly gratified. There is no intention or desire among the
liberals of Spain ever again to w^ork (exploiter*) the island of Cuba on the old
selfish system. It has been their constant hope and wish to grant to the
Cubans the administration of their own affairs and the full fruits of their own
labor, preserving their commercial connections, and some shadow of their
political relations."
Before the utterance of these somewhat vague but pleasing sentiments,
marked with the sonorous cadence of the diplomacy of Spain, with which her
decline and fall as a great nation has been accompanied from the beginning
of her decadence to the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the Minister
evaded with the necessary courtesies the line of business conversation in
which Marshal Prim had indulged. On the day after the interview of General
Sickles with the Minister of State, who had infinite regrets that the posi
tion of the liberal party was so painfully involved with the Cuban insurrection,
the Minister General made a "prescribed visit of ceremony" to Marshal Prim,
the President of the Council of the Ministers of Spain, and the Marshal,
"with much animation and even warmth of manner, protested that Spain
would not entertain the suggestion of an armistice with the insurgents, nor
consider the question of the independence of Cuba, while the insurgents were

58 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.
in arms against the government; that Spain would grant a full and complete
amnesty as soon as the insurgents laid down their arms ; and that being done,
the whole subject would be open for consideration; that he was disposed to
meet the question frankly and practically ; that perhaps he was somewhat in
advance of the views of his colleagues, but he had no doubt they were unani
mous in the hope that the influence of the United States might be successfully
exerted to relieve the question from the embarrassments which now sur
rounded it. " He added that, in regard to emancipation, Spain would prefer
to leave that matter to the Cubans themselves, saying, "That is your glory in
America, the reward of your philanthropy, and we do not wish to deprive yau
of it." The Marshal repelled the idea of a conference in Washington, in which
Spain, Cuba and the Cubans should be represented, asserting that Cuba could
be heard only through the deputies elected to the Cortes, adding that Spain
might deal with the United States but not with Cuba. The next day Marshal
Prim notified General Sickles that Spain "accepted the good offices of the
United States." This was on impossible conditions, viz., that the Cuban
insurgents should lay down their arms, Spain to give amnesty full and com
plete, Cubans by universal suffrage to vote on the question of independence,
and if the majority were for it, the Cortes consenting, — Cuba should pay satis
factorily, guaranteed by the United States, safe conduct through Spanish lines
to be given when preliminaries were settled. After the good offices of the
United States had been accepted by Marshal Prim, President of the Council of
Ministers, Senor Silvela, Minister of State, was restoied to health, and Gen
eral Sickles says: "I expressed my regret that the Spanish government, by
choosing to treat the subject as a purely legal question to be settled by their
own forms of procedure, had apparently closed the door to any arrangement
by which the good offices of the United States could be made immediately
effective." The reply of the Minister of State was with great animation, and he
thought the view Minister Sickles took was precisely wrong — for securing
simultaneous disarmament and amnesty was "a great step in advance," and
then Mr. Silvela "entered upon a very full analysis of Article 108 of the
Spanish Constitution." The American Minister did not follow upon that but
pointed out that a "practical view should be taken," and something should be
done speedily, as there would be "complications increasing the difficulties of

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 59
reaching an accommodation." Mr. Silvela referred to "the present temper
and spirit of the Spanish people," which would not permit haste. This was
doubtless true then, and never novel.
This is the Section of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy— of the
transmarine provinces :
"Article 108. — The Cortes Constituyentes shall reform the present sys
tem of government in the transmarine provinces when the deputies of Cuba or
Porto Rico shall have taken their seats, in order to extend to the same, with
the modifications that shall be deemed necessary, the privileges set forth in
the Constitution." The memorandum of the conversation between the Spanish Minister of
State and Minister Sickles August 10, 1869, was signed by Manuel Silvela and
D. E. Sickles, and contained passages reporting the former, whose familiar
flavor soon impresses the student of the negotiations that they proceed to "no
thoroughfare." We quote them as illustrative of the fine flowing evasions of
the literature of Spanish diplomacy: "After the revolution of September had
taken place, and conformably to the principles thereby proclaimed, Spain
would already have given all constitutional liberties to Cuba if the unfortu
nate insurrection of Yara and the cry of 'Death to Spain,' uttered, by some
Cubans, had not alienated the sympathies of the nation and obliged the
government to accept the impolitic contest to which it was provoked ; that a
good proof of its desire to settle in a liberal sense the question of the Antilles
is shown not only by the election of the deputies of Porto Rico, who are to
take their seats in the Cortes Constituyentes at their next session, but also by
the 108th Article of the Constitution, in which, notwithstanding the period in
which it was adopted, it was provided that the concurrence of the deputies of
that province is necessary to fix the future form of government of the island.
"In view of these indisputable facts, and taking account of and appreci
ating the traditional pride of the Spanish people, the government considers that
it can come to no definite decision in regard to the political situation and
future government of the island of Cuba, until the insurgents lay down their
arms and cease the struggle.
"This being done, the government is disposed to grant a full and gener
ous amnesty to the insurgents, and when quiet is established, to proceed to
the freest election of representatives of Cuba.
"The national dignity being thus preserved intact, and it being practi-

60 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.
cable to comply with the article of the Constitution, the moment will have
arrived for concerting with its representatives the necessary measures in rela
tion to the legal future of the island of Cuba, submitting them to the indis
pensable approbation of the Constituent Cortes.
"In conclusion, if the United States, by their natural influence in America,
are able to contribute to the cessation of the effusion of blood, in the pacifica
tion of the island of Cuba, and its entrance, by the election of its deputies,
into the exercise of its rights, the government of Spain cannot but be grateful
-for these good offices."
Secretary Fish, August 16th, telegraphed General Sickles to "urge accept
ance on basis proposed by the United States. ' ' These were :
i. The independence of Cuba to be acknowledged by Spain.
2. Cuba to pay to Spain a sum, within a time and in a manner to be
agreed upon by them, as an equivalent for the entire and definite relinquish
ment by Spain of all her rights in that island, including the public property of
every description. If Cuba should not be able to pay the whole sum at once
in cash, the future payments, by installments, are to be adequately secured
by a pledge of the export and the import customs duties under an arrange
ment to be agreed upon for their collection, in trust, for the purpose of secur
ing both the principal and interest of those installments until their final
discharge. 3. The abolition of slavery in the island of Cuba.
4. An armistice pending the negotiations for the settlement above
referred to.
Secretary Fish telegraphed that the Spanish proposition that the insur
gents should lay down their arms as a preliminary was "incapable of attain
ment," and the ascertainment of the Cubans by a vote "impracticable because
of the disorganization of society," and the prevalent terrorism, "the violence
and insubordination of volunteers." The will of the majority had been
"recognized and admitted."
On the date of this important dispatch of Secretary Fish (August 16,
1869), General Sickles wrote to him at length, marking the dispatch "as confi
dential for obviously prudential reasons." He reported General Prim as
saying some of his colleagues did not realize as he did "the difficulty of carry
ing on a Avar in America," and they had great deference for the popular
sentiment in Spain, which would sacrifice blood and money for honor. Mr.

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 61
Silvela, a lawyer and leader, inclined to a purely legal view, while as for him
self he would say to the Cubans, "Go, if you will; make good the treasure you
have cost us, and let me bring home our army and fleet, and consolidate the
liberties of Spain." The Marshal, President of the Council, added, with
much animation, that the great difficulty in the way was the defiant attitude
of the insurgents; that here was the mistake of the United States, in propos
ing an armistice and asking Spain to treat on the basis of independence with
insurgents with arms in their hands; and he added, emphatically, "I am sure
no human power could obtain from the Spanish people the most insignificant
concession as long as the rebellion maintains its footing."
The reply of General Sickles stated the case with uncommon brevity and
force in these words :
"No one appreciated more highly than the President, " and it should be
remembered the President was General Grant, "the elevated tone of the Cab
inet of Madrid, and that he would be the last to make any proposal derogatory
to the honor of Spain ; that in his view a measure that would stop the indis
criminate sacrifice of life and property in Cuba, pending negotiations for
ulterior arrangements, was prompted as well by considerations of humanity as
of policy; that Great Britain had recognized the independence of the United
States simultaneously with the cessation of hostilities, and that if, as I was
glad to be assured, the future relations of Cuba to the mother country
admitted of adjustment hereafter on the basis of the independence of the
colony, then surely some means might be devised by which, without offense
to Spain, the conflict could be arrested pending the negotiations with the
United States, a friendly power offering its good offices to promote a settle
ment." To this the General added "with emphasis" that there was a "press
ure of events, ' ' and President Grant was embarrassed by the delay, and that
"unless Spain was prepared to forego whatever advantage might be gained
through the mediation of the United States, prompt action was necessary."
General Sickles concluded this communication, which substantially summarizes
the negotiations of this interesting period of our Cuban solicitudes and con
troversies, with this valuable paragraph of personal side-light:
"Observe the duplex form the negotiation receives in the Spanish
Cabinet. The reserve of the Minister of State and the frankness of the
President of the Council are in striking contrast. The explanation is to be
found as well in the solicitude of the Minister of State to hold a position

62 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.
easily defended in the Cortes, if the negotiation fail, as in the characteristics
of the men ; one deals with the question as a successful revolutionary leader
wielding almost absolute power, the other purely as a jurist and a parliamen
tarian. ' '
The dispatch of General Sickles to Mr. Fish, dated Madrid, August 20,
1869, has unusual historical importance. On that day General Sickles had
met General Prim by appointment, who said he was ready to argue upon the
basis of an arrangement contemplating the independence of Cuba, but that he
could not give to the arrangement the sanctions of a treaty, nor submit the
propositions to the Cortes for their ratification while the insurgents were in
arms; he said he had no doubt that whatever might be the result of the con
flict, Cuba would eventually be free; that he recognized with hesitation the
manifest course of events on the American Continent and the inevitable
termination of all colonial relations in their autonomy as soon as they were
prepared for independence ; but that no emergency and no consideration
would reconcile Spain to such a concession until hostilities ceased.
The American Minister reminded the President of the Spanish Council
"that Austria had transferred Venice to France, and assented to its imme
diate transfer to Italy, before peace was declared; that the independence of all
the American States had been recognized at one time and another during the
progress of hostilities ; and that in coming to an agreement with the United
States on the subject Spain would not treat with the insurgents, but with a
friendly power, offering its good offices to an old ally." To these and like
amplifications of the argument the President of the Spanish Council replied
with great earnestness and emphasis: "Let the United States be assured of
the good faith and the good disposition of Spain, and especially of the frank
ness and sincerity with which the President of the Council has promised to
treat with the Cabinet at Washington, on the basis of the independence of
Cuba, as soon as it is possible to do so consistently with the dignity and honoi
of Spain; formidable as the insurrection of Cuba may become, it has not yet
approached the proportions of any of those conflicts in which governments
have found themselves constrained to treat during hostilities. The Cuban
insurgents hold no city or fortresses; they have no port, no ships; they have
no army that presumes to offer or accept battle ; and now, before the period
arrives for active operations, when Spain will send the ample reinforcements
she holds in readiness, it is only necessary for the Cubans to accept the assur-

TABLET COMMEMORATING THE EXECUTION OF THE "VIRGINIUS" PRISONERS, ONE OF THE EARLY CAUSES OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN.

By Courtesy of Frank R. Roberson.
ADMIRAL DEWEY UNDER THE "OLYMPIA'S" BIG GUNS.

By Courtesy of Frank R, Roberson.
ADMIRAL DEWEY AND STAFF ON THE "OLYM^JLfL*

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 6

0

ance of the United States, given on the faith of Spain, that they may have
their independence by laying down their arms, electing their deputies, and
declaring their wish to be free by vote of the people."
This conversation is able on both sides and sheds a strong light upon
the Cuban-Spanish situation for a quarter of a century, reaching from
the time since the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain
was signed.
In the course of the amplification of the conversation (August 20, 1869, of
General Prim and General Sickles), the Spanish General said, "Between the
revolutionary movements by which the Republics of the Western Continent
gained their independence, and the Cuban insurrection, there was a vast
difference." In the examples quoted, "negotiation was resorted to after cam
paigns had been fought, and battles lost and gained; they had armies in the
field and organized governments supporting them. We see nothing of this in
Cuba; only mere roving bands, who fly when they are pursued, and who have
never been found in numbers sufficient to give or accept battle. It is very
possible that in the lapse of time the insurrection may become more formi
dable ; it may raise armies ; it may take cities and fortified places ; it may
demonstrate, what has not yet been in any way demonstrated, that it is sup
ported by the majotity of the population. In that case Spain will have some
thing tangible to treat with. But we hope to avoid all this bloodshed,
disaster, and ruin by making some amicable arrangement now. It is impos
sible for us to treat with Cubans now, but the United States, when once
convinced of the good intentions and good faith of the Spanish government,
can then assure the Cubans that by following the programme I have indi
cated, they can have their liberty without firing another shot."
The reply of Mr. Fish by telegram, August 24, was:
"Washington, August 24, 1869. — The propositions of Spain are incom
patible with any practicable negotiation. The representatives of the insur
rectionary government are necessary parties to a negotiation. Free
communication through the Spanish lines is immediately necessary.
"The United States cannot ask the insurgents to lay down their arms
unless the volunteers are simultaneously effectually disarmed, and in good
faith disbanded. This, if practicable, would require time. We want to
arrest the destruction of life and property, and to stop the outrages and annoy
ances to our citizens. An armistice would effect this immediately, and the

66 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.
terms of the compensation to be made to Spain by Cuba could . then be
arranged between them under the mediation of the United States.
"You may say that we deem an armistice indispensable to the success of
any negotiation. Spain may in honor grant this at the request of the United
States, and in deference to the wishes of a friendly power, whose good offices
she is willing to accept. This, being done, negotiations can immediately be
opened that will probably result in peace, and her receiving a fair compensa
tion." This dispatch might have closed the negotiation, though there was a
great deal more correspondence. There was a resulting difficulty then as later
and now in the intangibility of the ostentatious Cuban government. It was
unfortunate that there was on both sides a strained sense of the necessity of
much formality, and there were far-reaching consequences that could net be
measured with exactness and weighed as fixed and determining events for
many days. The Spaniards might have recognized as something sufficiently
formidable to demand their business as well as distinguished consideration,
the bands of guerrillas who were so desperate and tenacious that a treaty was
made with their leaders nine years later. Statesmanship in Spain could have
saved the desolation of the island and the infliction of frightful calamities
upon a million people who were innocent of political crime and of military
belligerency. Spain did not close the ten years' war without negotiating
with insurgents who did not put up their arms, and the vain presumption that
caused long delay cost her dearly.
The words, "honor of Spain," that stood there obstructive, were often
unrealities. The Spanish excitement about the rumors that the Cubans would
be recognized as belligerents was not called for. They would themselves
more than their enemies have been gainers by the acknowledgment of the
United States that the Cubans were belligerents. If the claim of the Spanish
Premier that there was a vast difference between the Cuban revolt and the
revolutions that resulted in the independent States established in Spanish
America was a detail in part true, then there should- have been no objec
tion to overlooking it. The grievances of the people of Cuba are the same as
those of the Mexicans and the Central and Southern Americans ; and there
stands the poetic record that "freedom's battle once begun, bequeathed
from bleeding sire to son, though baffled oft, is always won." The decision
of the United States government, U. S. Giant, President, and Hamilton Fish,

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 67
Secretary of State, pronounced against the concession of belligerency to the
Cubans, was on the grounds generally that the Spaniards rested their protest
upon. The impossible issue, according to the correspondence, was imaginary.
The study of our diplomatic correspondence, however, fails to be convincing
that the government of the United States left nothing undone, to deal with
Marshal Prim, taking him at his word that for a sum of money not extortionate
or extravagant, the Cubans might have had their liberties under the protective
possession of the United States without firing a gun after September, 1869.
In the twenty-nine years that have passed, Cuba, no matter how made free,
would have been Americanized and ours — and the most prosperous island in
the world, instead of the most desolate and horror-haunted.
Mr. Fish, September 15th, telegraphed the Minister of Spain: "Omit
ting the plebiscite, can the President of Council give assurance that if the
United States induced the insurgents to lay down arms, and deputies to the
Cortes be elected by Cuba, that the Cortes will grant independence? The
plebiscite is impracticable, because in the present circumstances and conditions
of the island a popular vote can be no indication of the popular will."
There is an abiding embarrassment in Cuba, in the lack of means to
record reliably the popular will. The telegram of the 15th approached the
practical too nearly to be accepted as possible, but on September 25th a
dispatch from the Minister at Madrid catalogued the following fair promises:
"Resume of interview last evening with President of Council:
"Plebiscitum not insisted upon. Election of deputies required by consti
tution ; indispensable preliminary to independence. Measures already taken
to disarm volunteers simultaneously with cessation of hostilities. Severe and
positive order given to stop the scandalous execution of captives and like
cruelties. General de Rodas promises to do so at all hazards.
"A decree will be promulgated forthwith for the gradual abolition of
slavery. Government will proceed with liberal reforms without waiting for
termination of war."
But at this hopeful opening Spain insisted that our offer of mediation
should be withdrawn, for "the Spanish^ Cabinet distinguish between mediation
and good offices. To prevent recognition of belligerents they seem anxious
to hold us to our offer of good offices, while declining mediation as long as
there is hope of suppressing insurrection. ' '
October 1, 1869, the Spanish Cortes met. The United States' offer of

68 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.
"good offices" was withdrawn, and Mr. Silvela wrote to General Sickles that
the Spanish government would not have consented to the independence of
Cuba, because, even if they had wished it, it was "not within their compe
tence to consent to a dismemberment of the territory of this monarchy, With
out the permission and the authorization of the Cortes; but the Cortes, far
from permitting and authorizing this, manifested by a unanimous resolution of
their permanent commission that they were ready to lend their entire support
to the government, in an elevated and dignified policy in the Cuban question,
calculated to preserve the integrity of the territory and the national honor."
September nth Secretary Fish telegraphed the Minister of the United
States to Spain :
"We hope there is no truth in the rumor that Spain is about to send
additional troops to Cuba. It would exhibit a want of confidence in the pend
ing negotiation that might compel the withdrawal of the offer of this govern
ment to attempt a reconciliation. It might prolong the struggle, and the
destruction of life and property, with questionable influence on the result. It
certainly would embarrass the negotiations. ' '
The Secretary requested to be advised of the sending of additional Span
ish troops to Cuba. The answer to this dispatch was in the form of a news
paper publication as follows, correctly described by Mr. Sickles in transmitting
a translation as an "interesting document."
(From the Gaceta, December 5, 1869.)
"The President of the Council said: 'Last Saturday Senor Navarro y
Rodrigo addressed certain inquiries to the minister of war which I could not
answer immediately. I said, however, that there had gone to Cuba thirty-
thousand men, and to-day I will read a statement of land and sea forces, and
of the material which has gone to Cuba since the revolution, because this
proves the vitality and energy of the government and of all Spain exercised
in the preservation of the island of Cuba.
"'The first forces which went there were 771 volunteers; then 5,400
men of the regular service , afterwards the series of battalions which were
asked for by General Dulce* (may he rest in peace!) ; 1,000 went from Baza,
1,000 from Chiclana, 1,000 from San Quintin, and 1,000 from Simancas, who
were so thoroughly equipped that they were about to take the field imme
diately on their arrival. Since that the successive departures have reached a
* Driven from Cuba by the Volunteers

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 6y
total of 2&, 966 of the army of the peninsula; of marines, 2,600; of recruits,
1, 371 ; and of volunteers, 9,563; which gives a total of 34,500 men, according
to the accompanying statement. I would call attention to the fact that this
immense sum would represent a great effort for any nation whatever.
" 'There have gone also 14 ships of war, among them two iron-clad
frigates; a complete equipment for a regiment of mountain artillery, with 24
pieces, 24 caissons for artillery of 8 centimeters bore; 20 Krupp steel guns,
of 8 centimeters bore; 4,000 projectiles for the same; 5,000 kilograms of
powder; 7,400,000 cartridges of 14^ caliber, model of 1857 and 1859; 1,000,-
000 metallic cartridges for needle guns ; 10,500,000 caps; 15,000 kilograms of
lead; 9,600 carbines, model of 1857; 3,600 muskets, model of 1859; 8,000
Enfield rifles ; 3,000 Berdan; 500 short carbines; 1,000 lances; 2,000 sabers. ' "
Estimate of the Spanish forces composing the "Army of Cuba," compiled
from the statement published in La Iberia of December 26, 1869, and from
semi-official sources of information. The strength of battalions, batteries,
and squadrons conforms to the regulations of the Spanish service :

INFANTRY.
Eight regiments of infantry of the line, two bat
talions of eight hundred each  12,800
Twenty-five battalions of light infantry, one thou
sand each  25,000
Two battalions of the guard — all veterans — one
thousand each  . . 2,000
Two battalions of militia (estimated)  1,600
Eleven battalions of infantry, organized in Cuba
(estimated to be of the same strength as penin
sular light infantry)  11,000
 52,400
ARTILLERY.
One regiment, two battalions of four batteries each
— eight companies .  1,000
One regiment of mountain artillery, two battalions
of four batteries each — eight companies . . . 1,000

7© THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.
Field artillery being organized, force not stated.
CAVALRY.
Twenty-five squadrons — fifty companies of one hundred and
fifty each (full strength in Spanish army)  7,5°°
ENGINEERS.
One battalion — ten companies of one hundred and fifty each 1,500
MARINES.
Four battalions  4,000
67,400
Beside these forces in the field, there are more than forty
thousand volunteer troops doing garrison duty . . . 40,000
Grand total  107,400
RECAPITULATION.
Infantry, fifty-six battalions .  52,000
Artillery, four battalions, sixty-four guns  2,000
Cavalry, twenty-five squadrons  7,5°°
Engineers, one battalion .  i,5°°
Marines, four battalions  4,000
Volunteers doing garrison duty  40,000
Total  107,400
Responding to these figures, correctly described as "interesting," Secre
tary Fish, January 26, 1870, made the following very interesting and pertinent
statement and suggestion :
"The public interest felt in the United States in the Cuban struggle has
decreased since the flagrant violations of laws by the agents of the insurgents
became known, and alienated the popular sympathy.
"Had the Cuban Junta expended their money and energy in sending to
the insurgents arms and munitions of war, as they might have done con
sistently with our own statutes and with the law of nations, instead of devoting"
them to deliberate violation of the laws of the United States; and had they,
in. lieu of illegally employing persons within the dominion of the United States

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. n
to go in armed bands to Cuba, proceeded thither unarmed themselves to take
personal part in the struggle for independence, it is possible that the result
would have been different in Cuba, and it is certain that there would have
been a more ardent feeling in the United States in favor of their cause, and
more respect for their own sincerity and personal courage. ' '
But the Secretary, as if foreseeing the emergency that confronted Presi
dent McKinley, twenty-eight years after, remarked over the contention
regarding the belligerency demanded, for and against :
"Should Spain, after her great and exhaustive effort, fail to restore a state
of peace on the island, the President must reserve to himself a complete
liberty of action in that event."
The favored Spanish method of putting down rebellion, the knowledge of
which, no doubt, caused the inquiries of Secretary Fish about troops from
Spain to pacificate Cuba, is found in the following proclamation of evil fame :
(From the Diario de la Marina, April 29, 1869 — Translation.)
"The Redactor (of St. Jago de Cuba), in its number of 21st instant, pub
lishes the following important proclamation of General Count Valmaseda:
"Inhabitants of the country! The reinforcements of troops that I have
been waiting for have arrived; with them I shall give protection to the good,
and punish promptly those that still remain in rebellion against the govern
ment of the metropolis.
"You know that I have pardoned those that have fought us with arms;
that your wives, mothers, and sisters have found in me the unexpected pro
tection that you have refused them. You know, also, that many of those I .
have pardoned have turned against us again.
"Before such ingratitude, such villainy, it is not possible for me to be the
man that I have been; there is no longer a place for a falsified neutrality; he
that is not for me is against me, and that my soldiers may know how to
distinguish, you hear the order they carry :
" 1st. Every man, from the age of fifteen years, upward, found away from
his habitation (finca), and does not prove a justified motive therefor, will be
shot. "2d. Every habitation unoccupied will be burned by the troops.
"3d. Every habitation from which does not float a white flag, as a signal
that its occupants desire peace, will be reduced to ashes.
"Women that are not living at their own homes, or at the house of their

72 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.
relatives, will collect in the town of Jiguani, or Bayamo, where maintenance
will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will be conducted
forcibly. "The foregoing determinations will commence to take effect on the 14th
of the present month. El Conde de Valmaseda.
"Bayamo, April 4, 1869."
This proclamation offered an ample reason for the objection, which was
regarded as somewhat obstinate, of the insurgents to throw down their arms,
if promised by Spain "simultaneous amnesty." However "liberal," accord
ing to their views, the Spanish ministers and commanding officers in the army
might be, there were many things that displayed the implacable temper of
the populace of Spain, and of the Spanish volunteers in Cuba. The spirit of
the volunteers was shown in deposing Captain General Dulce June 2, 1869.
Mr. Hall, consul at Matansas, reported the governor of that important juris-
• diction thrown out by the volunteers because he was a friend of Dulce and
refused to deliver up to them an insurgent; and it appeared to be a part of
their programme to displace every Cuban holding any official position what
ever, as also every "peninsular" Spaniard whose family connections might
lead him in any way to sympathize with the natives of Cuba. These incidents
identify the character of the Cuban insurrection with the movements in con
tinental colonies. Mr. Plum, Consul at Havana, wrote Mr. Fish, two days
after the deposition of Dulce :
"On the 2d instant, a captain-general of Cuba was displaced from his
command by the resident Spaniards of the island. This event, without
precedent here, opens an epoch in the history of this Spanish possession.
Some fifty years ago a similar event occurred in Mexico. An insurrection had
been for some time in progress there, and either induced by the course of
events at home, or from dissatisfaction at the conduct of the war, the resident
Spaniards deposed the viceroy. A new viceroy was sent out, but arrived too
late, and no other representative of the mother country ever succeeded to the
place. The resident Spaniards there, as soon as they cut loose from entire
obedience to the home authorities, turned the scale in favor of independence."
The core of the subject was stated by Mr. Plum, describing the business men
of the island : ' ' They incline to the idea of taking the management of affairs
here, in the name of the mother country, more or less in their own hands.
They are residents, identified to a great extent with the prosperity of the

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.

73

island, having their business and their property here, and as the island has
to pay its own expenses, contributing largely, many of them, to the burden
of the support of the war, both by their money, and now by their time as
volunteers. They desire to see the war ended, and to have the former tran
quillity, upon which their prosperity depends, restored. They may believe,
especially as liberal institutions are urged in Spain, that they have as full
right and are as capable to manage the affairs of the island, of which they
are the loyal residents, as officials without any local interests or responsibili
ties, sent out from home to make their fortunes from the public revenues, not
in commerce and industry, here. Yet, until now the resident Spaniards in
business or having property here have had little more chance than the native
Cubans to participate in the government of the island. All the offices, mainly,
have been filled by frequently renewed officials, sent out for the purpose from
Spain. The consequence has been that the public burdens are felt to be
unnecessarily increased, and now the feeling has been engendered that the
military operations against the insurrection have not been energetically con
ducted by those who, if they fail here, not having any identification with the
island, simply return home to the mother country, leaving the Spanish resi
dents to their fate, or, in some instances, it may be believed that these officials
have been too lenient, or have inclined too much in favor of the insurrection,
which, if it is successful, would place the control of the island in native Cuban
rather than resident Spanish hands."
It is in these men, not of the Spanish residents, the volunteers or the
professional rural insurgents, that the United States will find the people of Cuba
capable of political organization and policy. It should be the popular under
standing in this country that there is a distinction between the people of Cuba
and the representatives of the New York Junta, a community of Cubans who
should not be allowed to monopolize the patriotism of the island or to have
exclusive charge of its resources.

CHAPTER II.
The American Minister to Spain in our Centennial Year Feared War.
A Remarkable Correspondence — Suggestive of the Doom of Spanish Rule— The Gradual
Approaches of the Spanish War — A Circular Claiming the Cuban Rebellion was
Crushed — Cushing as Master of Ceremonies — General Grant's Personality.
Mr. Cushing attached the greatest importance to the meeting of General
Schenck and Lord Derby, even disturbing Secretary Fish with a lurid dream
of war, if England did not stand shoulder to shoulder with us. This was a
matter evidently in which Mr. Cushing took his intellectual exercises too
seriously. He conferred fully with the British Minister to Spain, on the even
ing of December 5, 1875, and the Minister, whose words were expected to
be so momentous, was found of the opinion that "the present is a very
unfavorable moment for attempting intervention, friendly or other, between
Spain and the insurgent Cubans. People in Spain are now animated and
hopeful as to both civil wars, in view of the large reinforcements recently sent
to Cuba, of the pacification of Valencia and Cataluna, and of the extensive
military preparations for moving on the positions of the Vasco-Navarrese.
Spain needs, he thinks, to be left to try the experiment of the operations of
this winter. They are not likely to succeed, at least not in Cuba; and if
interfered with now, she will attribute the failure which is to come not to her
own weakness or the strength of the insurgents, but to the disturbing action
of the United States. But, left to herself, and thus failing, she will then feel
discouraged in proportion as she now feels exalted, and will be in the mood
to listen to judicious counsels, whether coming from the United States or
from Great Britain.
' 'These remarks of Mr. Layard could not fail to impress me, and so much
the more, in consonance as they were with the views expressed in my note of
the 30th of October.
"The impression which Lord Derby's observations to General Schenck
74

THE 'AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 75
make on my mind is that of a disposition on the part of the British govern
ment to aid us in a mediatory form rather than as a cooperator in the exercise
of forcible pressure on Spain.
"Our advance to Great Britain in the present question insures good offices
at least, and may go further. ' '
Nothing turned out precisely as Mr. Cushing feared and prophesied, but
there was no effacement of his superb complacency, and no abatement in the
course of his admirable confidence. January 4th he wrote in his international
capacity to the State Department:
"Speculation is active as to the ultimate question of what the United
States will do if left alone by other powers — whether the President will inter
vene by force, and if so, whether in armed alliance with Spain, or whether in
arms against her and in aid of the insurgents, which it is assumed would be
war. Observation of what is going on at the present time in Constantinople
respecting Bosnia and Herzegovina, and what occurred there formerly in the
matter of Greece, leads many persons to anticipate the development of a
similar series of incidents at Madrid as respects Cuba. "
Nothing in the newspapers escaped Mr. Cushing. The journals of
Madrid, Paris, London and New York were searched with ceaseless assiduity.
One day Mr. Cushing reviewed the London Times, the next the Madrid
sheets were scrutinized and annotated. The Galignani Messenger and the
Havas Agency were mustered in and reviewed. Even the dispatches from
Philadelphia to the London Times could not escape, and at last the Minister
appeared as a New York newspaper expert in the paragraph annexed :
"A letter, purporting to be addressed from Madrid to the New York
Herald of the 15th ultimo, puzzles me. Supposing that the pretense of inter
view with Mr. Canovas del Castillo and Mr. Ruiz Gomez, two of the Spanish
gentlemen plainly alluded to, is fictitious, yet the fact remains that although
the Herald has a correspondent here, yet he did not arrive until after the
date of this letter ; and no American has been here capable of entering so
minutely or intelligently into the question at issue. On the other hand, it is
not easy to suppose (although it is possible) that with the aid of some Span
iard of considerable political and juridical experience, such as are continually
passing between Spain and Cuba, the letter may have been got up in New
York. ' 'On the whole, although the letter contains errors of fact and of language

76 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN.
which a Spaniard of the instruction of Mr. Ruiz Gomez, for instance, would
not have committed, still the matter of the letter may have been prepared
here by some Spaniard of intelligence desirous of thus making his views
known to the people of the United States, and sent to New York to be worked
into its present shape in the office."
Of course, it is improbable that Mr. Cushing, in the plenitude of his
labors, could have dictated the production of the mysterious letter that puzzled
him, but it is not impossible. The facilities of journalism are equal to inven
tions even more involved than this presumption.
Speedily Mr. Cushing quoted "the Epoca ministerial journal," and El
Cornista, El Tempo, The Cologne Gazette, and the Presse of Vienna, took
turns of examination along with New York and London papers, and January
8 and 10, 1876, the annexed papers were produced:
(Mr. Cushing to Mr. Fish.)
"Legation of the United States, Madrid, January 8, 1876. — Sir: The
ministerial journals of last evening continue to rejoice over the tenor of the
communique" of the Marquis de Molins, reported in my No. 748, of the 4th
instant. "They now publish a variation by way of New York and London, as
follows :
" 'The [American] government admits having sent to the European
Powers a circular respecting the affairs of Cuba.
" 'It denies having proposed a confederation of Cuba and Porto Rico
under a Spanish governor, but it does not publish the text of the circular. '
"All this, pursue the journals in question, is nothing but the document
so coldly received by the Powers to which it was read by the representatives
of the United States.
"But, nevertheless, in the very same journals appears the following tele
graphic item, which seems likely to put a new face on things, namely:
" 'Berlin, January 7. — It is positively asserted that the German govern
ment shows itself favorable to the American circular relative to Cuba, in conse
quence of the injuries which the present situation of the island involves to the
commerce of Germany. '
"I hear nothing further as to the alleged intentions of Great Britain.
"I have, etc., C. CUSHING.
"P. S. — Since the above dispatch was written the London Times has come

THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 77
to hand, containing a telegram from Vienna, which is annexed. It is con
fused, illogical, and incorrect, like all such telegraphic reports.
"If 'Cuba' is a European question, of 'incalculable consequences,' as
the telegram asserts, then you had good cause to consult Europe, and Europe
has good cause to act in the premises."
(Mr. Cushing to Mr. Fish.)
"Legation of the United States, Madrid, January 10, 1876. — Sir: I annex
translation of an article from the Cronista, a serious ministerial paper,
containing a very formal semi-official denial of the alleged concurrence
of Germany in the suggestion by the United States of intervention in Cuba.
"There is report here of the capture of a German vessel charged with
supplying arms to rebels in the Filipinas. Count Hatzfeldt informs me that
he has no information respecting the affair, but apprehends it will be the
occasion of unpleasant controversy.
"I annex translation of an article on the subject from a ministerial jour
nal of respectability, the Tiempo.
"I have the honor, etc., C. CUSHING."
(Translation of article from El Cronista of January 8, 1876.)
"A dispatch of the Agenda Fabra from Berlin, which we published yes
terday, as did our contemporaries, gave news, which would be grave if true,
that the German government showed itself favorable toward the American
circular referring to Cuba, because of the damage brought upon German
commerce by the condition of the island.
"Duly informed, we are able to assert that the statement referred to is
not true, and that the Cabinet of Berlin continues to express the greatest
sympathies for our country.
"The circular of the Government of the United States has not met with
a favorable reception from any European power."
(Translation of article from El Tiempo of January 8, 1876.)
"We again call the attention of the government toward our possessions in
the Philippine Archipelago. We know that the enemies of Spanish integrity
rest not, although their affairs in London have recently assumed a bad aspect,
and that the English government looks upon them with suspicion.
"Upon that immense network of islands of Oceanica belonging to Spain
they have fixed their vision. They do not overlook that these offer excellent

78 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN.
positions, and they will take advantage of every opportunity to snatch some
one of the rich pearls of so precious a jewel.
"There, more than anywhere, will they direct their efforts, because else
where they will find immediate opposition from first-class powers. If there
be vigilance, more than sufficient is Spanish patriotism against all conspir
acies, native or foreign; and not for a moment do we doubt that there will be
such (conspiracies), as is proved by the news which gives rise to these lines."
Mr. Cushing' s frequent translations from Spanish papers were full of
information, and certainly gave the Secretary of State the phases of the public
opinion of Madrid, and so clear were they that they lighted up later events.
The Epoca of Madrid, January 14, 1876, said of the Cubans: "The only
thing we know for certain is that the religion of the insurgents is idolatry,
which must be very gratifying for the traitors, who, in order to escape merited
chastisement, go to swell the ranks of the rebels." And here is an editorial
article from El Cronista, Madrid, January 14, 1876: "The right which is now
the right of Spain in the affairs of Cuba is so clear and so patent that it could
not fail to have been recognized, even though shamefacedly and in private
circles, by the President of the United States, General Grant. We were right
in asserting, as we have repeatedly done, that the parliamentary curvets
(excarceos) of the government of the American Republic with respect to the
question of Cuba, obeyed, rather than its own opinions, electoral machina
tions, and the pressure of the filibuster element, so numerous in the United
States. "We say this apropos of an important piece of news which we received
to-day by the Cuban mail. A Habana paper publishes correspondence from
New York, in which it is positively said that the President of the United
States has declared in private circles that he considers the independence of
the island of Cuba as impossible, and that its annexation to the United States
would cause immense injuries to the country.
"The island of Cuba, not being able to govern itself well as an independ
ent and sovereign State, could still less do so as an autonomic semi-State, and
in such circumstances it were in every way impossible for Spain to reserve to
herself a protectorate which, without positive benefit to Cuba, would drag the
mother country into the most serious complications within and without this
territory. "To prove this absolute impossibility so many considerations throng

THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 79
to the subject that it is no small task to select the prominent ones. In the
island of Cuba there exists an immense majority which does not desire separa
tion, which does not desire annexation, which does not desire autonomy,
which wishes to keep on in the same conditions as those in which they have
lived with respect to the mother country. In the island of Cuba there exists
a slender minority which is split up into 'independents,' 'annexationists,'
and 'autonomists.' The immense majority reject autonomy, which would
weaken their ties with the mother country. The independents and the annex
ationists are not content with autonomy, which does not satisfy their aspira
tions. The autonomists would be the only ones left satisfied, but they are so
few in number that they would lack moral and material strength.
"The Eco de Cuba, then, is right: the Great Antilla is not fitted to be
anything save what it has been hitherto. Thus it is that the right of Spain is
supported by every kind of reason based upon expedience. Therefore, in
spite of all the efforts of the ambitious ojalateros (sans-culottes) of New York,
and in spite of the misdeeds of the criminals of the Managua, the island of
Cuba will continue to be a Spanish province.
Mr. Cushing had a conversation with the Spanish Minister of State, who
said that "the United States could desire nothing in the sense of peace, good
government, or liberty in Cuba," that the Spanish government did not want
moie than we desire. This made an impression upon Mr. Cushing' s mind,
that may or may not have been intended, nevertheless, it seemed to him that
"the inner thought behind the words" was:
"If the United States, whether by the use of their naval squadron
or by landing troops, intervene by force to prevent Spain from subduing
the insurrection in Cuba, that is war, and Spain must, of necessity, fight, at
whatever cost and ultimate loss, or cease to hold up her head as an independ
ent nation in Europe or America.
"But if the view of the United States is to act by mediation in behalf of
the insurgents, to induce them to lay down their arms, to make acceptable
terms for them, to secure the execution of these terms, to provide for the
introduction of good government and the abolition of slavery in officious
concert or in formal treaty with Spain, then Spain is ready to meet the United
States half-way in such action, to receive, and even invite, their interposition
in the affairs of Cuba.
"The impression on my mind to this effect was so strong as to half tempt

80 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN.
me to say, 'Will you then accept our mediation?' But I restrained myself, in
the doubt whether my present instructions would justify me in thus committing
the United States.
"I limited myself, therefore, to thanking him cordially for the frankness
and friendliness which seemed to inspire what he said, and to assure him that
I would lose no time in communicating the same to you, as nearly as possible
in his own words, and regretting that no mere written report could do justice
to the impressiveness of oral representation.
"He then referred briefly to the mere robber character of what there is
now in insurrection in Cuba, composed of scattered parties of negroes and
mulattoes, without the slightest pretension to any government — directed, so
far as they had any general direction, by foreigners, mere desperado adven
turers, without right or stake in the country (I interrupted him here to say
there were no citizens of the United States among them, to which he assented,
and then continued), engaged in mere plunder and incendiarism, not in war —
the worst form of that tendency to guerrilla hostilities in the place of the
regular warfare which the Spaniards inherited from their remote Celtiberian
progenitors, and which, if one of the glories, was not the less one of the
national calamities, of Spain.
"But of all this, he said, the President's message showed that we in the
United States had a clear conception ; and he added that neither such bad
foreigners as Maximo Gomez in the Managua, nor worse Spaniards like
Miguel Aldama in New York, could ever make of Cuba any better republic
than Hayti; and that appeared to be their only purpose — to ruin where they
could not rule.
"It was impossible forme conscientiously to contradict these apprecia
tions, and therefore, I could but listen attentively, and, when he had con
cluded, take leave, assuring him that he would be informed at once when my
expected instructions should arrive in Washington.
"The concluding remarks of Mr. Calderon y Collante's suggest to me
some considerations, which you will permit me to subjoin by way of
commentary. "The Spaniards have great qualities, as many a page in their history
demonstrates, but they have also the defects of those qualities ; and my dis •
patches have not been sparing in the exhibition of those defects, such as
intolerance of opinion, exaggerated individualism, ill-regulated ambitions

oQ

OH(AO CmWozo 111HO¦<N<

THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 83
dispositions to pronunciamentos, insurrection, civil war, and especially guer
rilla warfare."
No man of his generation exceeded Mr. Cushing in knowledge of the
current history of the world, and his intimate acquaintance with the Spanish
language and people gives what he had to Say as Minister to Spain during the
closing years of General Grant's administration a force and sharpness of appli
cation having much more than official weight, and his papers are full of
matter in which the interest abides. The way the desperate antagonism in
Cuba between the peninsular and Cuban Spaniards arose is thus sketched by
Mr. Cushing: "When the insurrection in French Santo Domingo put an end to the
cultivation of sugar and coffee there, that cultivation passed to Cuba; it flour
ished there, with the consequent development of slavery and the slave trade ;
how overflowing wealth ensued, and with it came ill-directed education,
unwholesome ambitions, and traitorous plots of annexation to the United
States, not for the promotion of liberty, but for the security of slavery; how,
thereupon and therefore, came acts and measures of angry repression on the
part of Spain.
"If the Cuban emigrants in the United States are a proper sample, as
they possibly may be, of the better Cuban Spaniards, what are we to think of
those of average or inferior degree?
"While those emigrants have made themselves ridiculous in spending their
time in quarreling with one another in the newspapers and in public meetings,
instead of fighting the common enemy in the field, they have rendered them
selves odious by their systematic violation of the law of the land of their
asylum, and the acts of fraud and perjury which that implies, and by their
frantic hostility to the government of the United States.
"Meanwhile, we see what the insurgents at home are, after six years'
experience — incapable, as the President so clearly shows, of independence,
unworthy even of the concession of belligerence.
"If the emigrants in the United States were now in Cuba, if the insur
gents in arms were to lay down their arms, could they and the rich sugar-
planters and merchants of the seaports of the western part of the island, with
or without anterior solution of the slavery question, live in peace together as
a republic based on free popular suffrage, which is the only intelligible con
ception of a republic? To me it seems impossible. To say nothing of Santo

84 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN.
Domingo, we may look to the case of Jamaica, where, without any civil war
to embitter men against one another, with generously regulated emancipa
tion, with a colonial policy just, nay, amicable and even kind, it has been
found impossible to maintain the existence of well-ordered society except by
the constant exercise of paternal authority on the part of the metropolis.
"All which leads me to the conclusion that the United States would have
an immense task on their hands in undertaking the pacification of Cuba alone
and by hostile force, inferring the necessity not only of a fleet and an army of
operations, but also of occupation to keep the peace, but might well con
tribute efficiently to the result in cooperation with Spain."
In February, 1876, Mr. Cushing wrote: "The concentration of ships of
war at Port Royal impresses the Spaniards as a menace against Spain.
They say : 'We have not made any naval demonstrations in the waters of the
Antilles; we have done nothing to call for defensive preparations on the part
of the United States, and we are unable to account for these naval prepara
tions of theirs unless intended for the invasion of Cuba in aid of the insurgents,
in imitation of the action of Navarino. '
"Their suspicions in this respect stand greatly in the way of more friendlv
diplomatic negotiation in the sense of mediation.
"Now, as to the naked question of intervention or mediation in Cuba, the
only foreign minister here who speaks to me in a helpful spirit is Mr.
Layard. "
Mr. Cushing did not seem to see that "mediation" was a dream. How
ever, it is clear that the policy of the most able Minister was severely against
intervention, and he no doubt felt the necessity of an affirmative policy.
Through Mr. Layard, the British Minister, appeared in 1876, as through
other representatives of English policy in 1897, the sympathy of the Empire
of Great Britain with our tentative as with our finally positive measures of
intervention in Cuba. La Politica, Madrid, February 4, 1876, contained a
long editorial on "American Affairs," referring especially to the agitation in
Europe caused by the policy of President Grant to invite European coopera
tion. The government of the United States, "having passed to its represent
atives in Europe a note to the end that, without having a copy of it, may be
read to the European Ministers of Foreign affairs."
The effect of this note was, La Politica explains, "to discover immediately
the impression that would be produced by its interference, direct or indirect,

THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 85
in the relations of Spain with her Antillean province." The Spanish journal
accuses American filibusters of responsibility for the insurrection in Cuba
and provinces: "When all the combustibles have been accumulated for a conflagration,
and the blaze has been kept knowingly stirred up, it is a rare sight to see
those who have done all this lamenting the ravages of that fire, shrinking
appalled from its horrors, and clamoring before Europe for the rights of
humanity. ' '
After further sarcasm of the sort comes this:
' 'What remains besides that which has been set forth to serve as a sup
port to the United States in order to pretend to the direct or indirect inter
vention which they propose? In our conception, it has for its basis no other
thing than the eternal tendency which, from the beginning of the century and
from one motive or another, has been ever manifested by the partisans of the
Monroe Doctrine — a policy which served to rend from Mexico the greater
part of her territory ; a policy which has ever been sought to deprive Spain
of the brightest jewel of her crown, of the jewel which symbolizes a world of
memories for the nation which discovered America.
"The notes of Mr. Henry Clay to Mr. Everett, in 1825, to the end that
Spain should conclude the wars of Mexico and Colombia for the sake of
humanity; subsequently those of Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Saunders, Minister in
Madrid, for the purchase of Cuba for one hundred millions of dollars, recom
mending him to get it as cheap as possible; the mission of Mr. Soule-; the
Ostend Conference ; the refusal of the United States to subscribe the compro
mise with England and France to guarantee to Spain the possession of the
island of Cuba, and a thousand other antecedents which we might evoke, if
the scope of this article permitted us to So so, are the key to explain this
stroke of humanity with which the United States present themselves before
Europe, soliciting its moral cooperation to end the war in Cuba."
The conclusion of this article is the same as the last communication from
the Spanish Minister, DuPuy de Lome— that "what is undoubtedly indis
pensable as a measure of salvation is that this insensate insurrection in Cuba,
which gives rise to so many conflicts, be terminated as soon as possible. ' '
The 30,000 soldiers Spain had sent tc Cuba to crush the rebellion here
referred to, and the sum of the need of Spain was to make an end of the
insurrection by crushing military forces. And yet the war dragged on two

86 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN.
years, and terminated in a treaty with the insurgents, who were, according to
Spanish report, well convinced with hard cash that the time had arrived to be
pacificated. The question most discussed in Madrid, Mr. Cushing stated in a letter
dated February 18, 1876, was as to the kind of "intervention" the United
States meant to make in the affairs of Cuba and Spain, whenever, if they did
ever intervene, and he said :
"In this connection there is much comment on the line of action pursued
by the intervening powers in the matter of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as being
the reverse of that pursued by the same powers in the matter of Greece.
seeing that in the latter case the demonstration of force was against Turkey
and in favor of her rebels ; while in the former it is against the rebels and in
favor of Turkey, as manifested by the concentration of Austrian troops in
Croatia and of a fleet of the allies off Ragusa, in the avowed purpose of com
pelling the impenitent and persistent insurgents to accept the terms of reform
arranged at Constantinople."
That is to say, the Spaniards wanted to know — so diplomatic were our
forms of expression, as Mr. Cushing modulated them, that Spain wanted to
know whether the threatened intervention was to be on her behalf or for the
Cubans. At thjs time the Spanish Minister of State sent, a diplomatic circular
to the Powers of Europe and the United States, giving the following account
of the beginning of the insurrection, that is now popularly characterized as
the ten years' war:
"The first cry of insurrection was raised at Yara, an unimportant town
situated in the eastern department of the island, on the nth day of October,
1868, immediately after the receipt of the news of the revolution begun at Cadiz
on the 17th of September, and consummated at Madrid on the 29th of the same
month. The leaders of the rebellion availed themselves of the preparations
which they had doubtless previously made, and of the favorable circumstance
that the government had not more than 7,500 troops all told on the island at
the time, and that, too, for a territory peopled by 1,400,000 inhabitants, and
having an area of 12,000 square miles, including the keys and the adjacent
islands. The flag of the independence of the island was not raised at the
outset, much less that of annexation to any other State. The only cries
were, 'Hurrah for Prim!' that general being there regarded as the leader of
the Spanish revolution, and 'Hurrah for the revolution!' Thus it was that

THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 87
many joined in the insurrection who, while really loving Spain, thought that
the only object had in view was a political change, and, subsequently repent
ing when they became aware of the tendency which the enemies of the country
were seeking to give to the movement, voluntarily took up arms against it."
The Spanish circular admits that the movement in Cuba for secession
carried away a part — not the greater part — of the white population, "espe
cially the ¦ unreflecting and rash youth, ' ' but the secession movement was
disguised as a "desire of securing reforms" — but it became evident this was a
pretext. The contest was carried on with a certain regularity, both parties
respecting property, until the insurgent leader and soldiers became barbarous
in their methods.
However, at this time — February, 1876 — after eight years' war, "of the
leaders of the secession movement, Cespedes, the Agramontes, Cavada,
Donato, Marmol, Castilla, Mola, the Betancourts, the Angueros, Jesus del
Sol, Bembeta, Salome Hernandez, Marcono, Inclan, Goicuria, Rosas, and
others, all of whom were Cubans, and really opposed to Spain, not one is now
living. Of those who have succeeded them in the command not a single
one is a Cuban. Maximo Gomez, the principal one, and Modesta Diaz, the next
in importance, are Dominicans; Rulof is a Pole; the person known by the nick
name of 'el Inglesito' is an Englishman; and the rest, who are now few in
number on account of the great diminution of the insurgent forces, are
adventurers from various countries, without antecedents, and having no inter
est in the island. The same may be said of almost all the insurgents. Their
forces now consist of negroes, mulattoes, Chinese, deserters from the bat
talions which were formed provisionally in Santo Domingo during our brief
rule there, and a few independent bodies which were formed in Spain during
the most disorderly period of the revolution, and which were larely composed
of the most turbulent elements of the country, and it may be confidently
asserted that there are to-day not more than eight hundred white natives of
Cuba with arms in their hands in the insurgent ranks. "
Here is manifested the Spanish policy which has been pursued to the
present hour, to convince the great Powers of Europe that the release of Cuba
from Spanish rule was necessarily to make of the island a greater San
Domingo — and it is due the truth to say the way the insurgents carried on the
war that was resumed by Marti and Gomez, has countenanced the malignant
representation by the Spaniards. The destruction of the agricultural indus-

88 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN.
tries of the island was not in the interest of liberty, damaged Spaniards less
than Cubans, and was barbaric, very largely accountable for the famine, and
chargeable with much of the hideous suffering of the innocent in the camps of
the reconcentrados. The diplomatic circular of Spain goes on to say that the
insurgents were destroyers, while the Spaniards were preservers, and that it
would be a "great error to suppose that the Cuban emigrants to the United
States, who took good care to keep out of harm's way themselves," would be
able to constitute a government. Those insurgents who were brave enough
to face death on battlefields had fallen or surrendered.
In this circular the naval and land forces of Spain were set forth — ' 'forty-
five vessels of all classes, with a nominal force of 4,770 horses, 135 cannon,
and 2,426 seamen, 55 battalions, 6 regiments of cavalry, 2 of artillery, 1 of
light field troops, 1 company of naval mechanics, 3 regiments of civil guards
men, 1 sanitary brigade, 1 battalion of engineers, 33 companies of skirmishers,
2 squadrons of dragoons, and 1 transport brigade, making altogether a total
of 273 chiefs, 3,054 officers, 68,115 soldiers, 8,478 horses, 462 mules, and 42
pieces. Since the foregoing enumeration was made, moreover, 10,370 men
have embarked for the island.
"There are also the volunteer bodies, consisting of natives of the Penin
sula and Cubans, amounting to upward of fifty thousand men. These last
figures are official and irrecusable, and show what is the true spirit of the
island and its adhesion to the mother country ; for while the Cubans who are
fighting for the insurrection are less than one thousand in number, those who
have voluntarily taken up arms against it number more than forty thousand. "
The volunteers in Cuba have all the while been Peninsular Spaniards,
given, by the policy of discrimination against Cuban Spaniards, places that
should be filled by the natives of the island. This has been one of the most
odious forms of oppression. At this point in the circular there was an effort
to explain "one fact" that might seem incomprehensible to those not familiarly
acquainted — and that "the duration of the contest, in spite of the disparity
existing between the forces of the contending parties." As this is a matter
that has perplexed Americans from the beginning of the Cuban conditions
that interested them, we are sure the official explanation of that mystery will
be read with exceedingly great interest.
The Spanish Minister of State said: "Cuban rebels are, for the most
part, negroes and mulattoes, who do not experience the ordinary necessities of

THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 89
civilization. They are able to live in the jungles and deserts of the island,
and thence fall upon estates and other property like birds of prey, pillaging
and applying the torch of the incendiary. They live on the fruits of the
country, such as the plantain and others which grow spontaneously in that
fertile soil. Salt, and hogs and other animals are so numerous that they are
everywhere met with, and serve as food." There is a considerable amount of
truth in this, but the prominence given the "negroes" is exaggerated. It is
true, however, that the black men in the insurgent forces endured the hard
ships of guerrilla warfare in the Cuban jungles, in a greater proportion than
their white compatriots, so that when the American army landed in Santiago,
were in the eastern province of the island, the numbers of white Cuban sol
diers were a small percentage, the whites generally finding occupation as
officers. And the explanatory fact is mentioned in the circular.
"The Baracoa district, having an extent of ninety miles, had but forty-two
inhabitants, while there was about the same number in Las Tunas and the
territory which separates the Mayari district from Guantanamo. The aver
age number of inhabitants to the square geographical league throughout the
island is 350. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that the insurgents
should be able to sustain themselves as nomadic tribes in a country of such a
character — uncultivated, almost a wilderness, extremely broken and moun
tainous, and covered with immense forests which cannot even be set on fire
by reason of their constant and extraordinary humidity. Thus it is that they
have never, been able to establish even the shadow of a government."
There is a good deal of explanation in this, but it does not cover the
whole ground of the mysterious incompetency of 100,000 Spanish troops in
Cuba to overcome the bands of guerrillas led by Garcia in the eastern or more
revolutionary end of the island. The circular we have been quoting con
tinues: "If the insurgents were regular troops and carried on a civilized
warfare, the contest would long since have been ended by two or three
battles. The matter, however, becomes one of much greater difficulty when
they avoid all fighting save from an ambuscade, and run and hide when they
see our troops, in order to meet again in their lurking places when the danger
is past. It is thus seen why it has never been possible to entirely destroy
the so-called palenques, or bands of fugitive negroes, who have fled from the
estates, and who seek refuge in the aforesaid Baracoa district."
It was many years after this that Maximo Gomez made a march of five

90 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN.
hundred miles through the island, burning cane fields, and the inconsiderate
boast of the insurgents was that the red skies displayed the progress of the
army of liberation. It was an unhappy association that the cause of freedom
should have been identified to that extent with a raid of devastation.
The ministerial circular continued: "In the western department there
were and still are — for, far from diminishing, their number was increased dur
ing the war — 1,070 sugar estates, while in the central department there were
but 1 02, and in the eastern 200. The quantity of sugar produced in the first-
named department amounted to 500,000,000 kilograms, which quantity has
also been increased, while that of the second only amounted to 17,000,000, and
that of the third to 35,250,000 kilograms. The quantity of tobacco produced
in the western department is 44,000 quintals, in the central department only
5,500, and in the eastern 252,000. It must be remembered that in the terri
tory comprised between Pinar del Rio and Guanajay, in the first of those
departments, the exquisite tobacco known as that of La Vuelta de Abajo is
exclusively produced. The price of this tobacco is constantly increasing, ^and
is much higher than that produced in the eastern depaitment, which is a
second-class article. The quantity of coffee produced in the western depart
ment amounts to 3,750,000 kilograms, and that of the central department to
3,750, and that of the eastern to 5,000,000. Finally, the value of the cattle of
all kinds in the western department is 2,000,000 pesetas, or $4,000,000; in the
central and eastern departments, $1,000,000 each. It is therefore seen that
the real wealth and the bulk of the population of the island of Cuba are in the
western department, which has scarcely suffered at all from the insurrection,
and which, for the most part, has remained perfectly tranquil."
All this official appeal to the Powers of Europe has been proven by events
to have been utterly inadequate. The war was carried into the extreme
eastern end of Cuba. Maximo Gomez was at a point on the coast, west of
Havana, when Captain-General Weyler landed, from which he could see the
Morro Castle light, and counted the guns of the salute.
Secretary Fish was constant in urging Mr. Cushing to force upon the
Spaniards an impression of the danger of American "intervention." That he
was influenced in this instance by the personal views of President Grant
there is inner evidence — and yet it has been a part of the filibuster creed to
hold that General Grant was too careful, and to assert that his conservation
comprehended caution in the extreme. There is a close parallel between the

THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 91
bearing of President Grant and that of President McKinley in the earnestness
with which each sympathized with the Cuban cause. Grant failed to discover
a public duty in the recognition of either the independence of the Cuban
insurgents' Republic, or the belligerent rights of an organization that had no
ports and no courts or fixed places of official residence or certainty^of areas of
authority. Mr. Cushing found it necessary to explain repeatedly why he did not
press the impending intervention, and his first point was that no Power in
Europe would join with us. England had limited her cooperation to "good
offices." Lord Derby wanted, in his talk with General Schenck, "postpone
ment of definite action," and repelled in various forms of expression the idea of
any pressure, and he instructed the British Minister to Spain that there should
be "no thought of mediation" until after Spain had been further unsuccessful
in trying to suppress the Cuban insurrection with her own forces. Charged
by Secretary Fish with evading the great question of intervention by confin
ing talk to "our particular griefs," Mr. Cushing stated the Spanish Minister
introduced and dwelt upon our "private griefs," and did so evidently to
evade the general question of the condition of Cuba as distinguished from our
affairs. Mr. Cushing did not think it a convenient occasion "then and there
to push him on the question of intervention." Mr. Cushing had supposed
there was to be no pressure for intervention until it was known what action
the Powers would take. "Why else invoke their moral support?"
Mr. Cushing, at this point having concluded his defense for not pushing
intervention, advanced aggressively to the instruction of the State Depart
ment in these embattled paragraphs :
"The interests of Spain and of the United States in Cuba are identical.
At present we derive great net benefits from it; she, none. The imminent
destruction of its productiveness would be alike disastrous to her and to us.
"She is willing enough to confide in us if we will let her. The proof of
that is to be found not in profession (although that we have), but in the
analysis of the diplomatic relations of Spain with other powers, contained in
previous dispatches. In fine, whatever causes of grief or jealousy she has
against us, she has greater against others. Nevertheless, she is now anxious
and suspicious with regard to the United States. She knows that thousands
of bad Spaniards (called Cubans), having a holy horror of the smell of gun
powder, have fled to 'snug harbor' in New York, Key West, and New

92 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN
Orleans, have been dedicating themselves there for years, by distribution of
bonds, by speeches, newspapers, solicitations, exaggerated claims, violations
of law, and in every other possible way, to the task of embroiling the two
governments in war, and are the efficient authors of all our troubles with her,
directly or indirectly, including the tragedy of the Virginius.
"I dread emigrant rebels. How fatal were the French emigres to Prussia
in the early years of the French Revolution ! How frequently the Jacobites
involved France in fruitless hostility with England ! How the refugee Poles
lured Napoleon I. to his destruction by Russia, and refugee Mexicans
Napoleon III. to the commencement of his destruction in America! I do not
yet forget the picture of the disastrous intrigues of the rebel emigrants of the
Greek Republics, more prejudicial to their friends than to their enemies, as
drawn by the masterly hand of Thucydides, or of those of the Italian
Republics, so graphically described by Guicciardini and Machiavelli.
"God forbid that these dishonored men, who prate of the independence
of Cuba, without manliness or courage to fight for it, preferring the safer
occupation of trading in bogus bonds and calumniating the President and
yourself, should succeed in making our country the instrument of their
rancorous hatred of their own country, Spain.
"In this connection, be it remembered that the President's message
asserts the absolute non-existence in Cuba at the present time of the essential
elements of an independent State, and thus proclaims this fact to the world.
"Then, Spain is told every day, by leading newspapers of the United
States, that the object of our naval preparations is to force the hand of Con
gress and of the people by producing some casus belli for electoral purposes;
and although nobody really believes what newspapers say, yet they have their
effect in the propagation of mischievous irritations and dangerous suspicions,
as so /well exposed in the late remarkable speech of Prince Bismarck in the
German Reichsrath.
"I meet all these things as well as I may by pointing to the kindly assur
ances contained in your note of November 5, in the President's message, and
in sundry special dispatches, such as your No. 281, notwithstanding their
being dispatches of complaint against acts or omissions of the Spanish govern
ment. "But the obstacles which thus far it has been impossible for me to get
over are in the insolent assumption of the knots of Spanish traitors in New

THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 93
York and Paris, who presume not only to dictate to Spain, but also to the
United States, and in the impracticable character of the Dominican chiefs of
the insurgents in Cuba.
"If you can answer for them, there is no hope for peaceful and har
monious action between the two nations, to the end of peace, emancipation,
and good government in Cuba, by the mediation of the United States, with
or without the aid of Great Britain or German}-.
"As for these European powers, suffer me to say, 'Timeo Danaos et dona
ferentes. ' "
Mr. Cushing saw the Russian Minister, who was polite and vague and not
informed, but "he spontaneously offered good offices and friendly advice, if
this course should be in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor;" not, Mr.
Cushing added, a very satisfactory reservation. This diplomat was "profuse
in the utterance of courtier expressions, and in professions of sympathy with
the United States;" and yet he represented to others that the United States
was pressing Spain as a means of forwarding private claims! That, of course,
was his ignorance. March 1, 1876, Mr. Fish wrote Mr. Cushing: "Discovery
and long occupation have made the island of Cuba a possession of Spain, and
the United States has no desire to disturb the relations which result there
from. Part of the territory of the one power, it is the seat of immense trade
for the other. But it has been found up to the present time impossible to
conquer a peace by force of arms, and every suggestion that amnesty, reform,
and the certainty of good government might be effective where force has
failed has been repelled. More than six years ago such was the condition of
affairs, and it remains the same to-day."
Mr. Cushing wrote March 2d that the President's message had a"~salutary
effect, that Spain "has been made more pliant by the confidence in the
message of the disinterestedness of our government and in our recognition of
the non-existence in Cuba at the present time of the necessary elements of
independence." And Spain longed to have peace.
Mr. Cushing sent March 7th a summary of the criticisms of the Spanish
Press- in these terms:
"Much is said of the discreditable character and acts of the pretended
directors of the rebellion in New York, who, it is charged, are mainly occu
pied in criminal intrigues against the peace of the United States.
"It is alleged that most of the reclamations put forward by the

94 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN,
United States are for slave property, to the discredit of our emancipation pro
fessions. "Much is alleged as to the dishonest character of the citizenship of the
claimants; most of them Spaniards of recent naturalization, few of whom,
it is said, ever had bona fide residence in the United States.
"The Minister of State has more than once alluded to this point in terms
the more disagreeable for being founded on truth."
On July u, 1876, Mr. Cushing administered "some observations of a
consolatory tendency" to Secretary Fish, "in reference to the non-success of
your earnest efforts to meliorate the condition of things in Cuba. First,
neither party to the contest in Cuba was disposed to listen to the counsel of
wisdom and friendship." The true cause and character of maladministration
in Cuba was that "the governors are incapable of conducting and the governed
equally incapable of receiving good government. They are all Spaniards
alike, as General Prim so often said, whether you call them Peninsulars or
Cubans. And (to say nothing of the colored population) it is not the best of
the Spaniards, Creole or Peninsular, which constitutes the population of Cuba.
Have there been rebellions in Cuba, guerrilla warfare, burnings, sacking of
towns, military executions, deportations, embargo of private property, banish
ments, suspension of suffrage, arbitrary domination of captains-general? So
all these things have been occurring in Spain. She has had nought else for
more than sixty years but alternations betwixt anarchy and despotism. The
few periods of comparative, but transient, tranquillity she has enjoyed during
the reign of Queen Isabel were due to the mere usurpation of two great
generals, Narvaez and O'Donnell, to whose administrations of the sword men
look back now as to the halcyon days of Spain. Since the dethronement of
Queen Isabel — that is, during the very period of the civil war in Cuba — there
has not only been civil war in Spain, but, simultaneous therewith, a rapid
succession of provisional and experimental governments, each destitute of
inherent stability, and every one of which subsisted only by means^ of irre
sponsible dictatorships, except that of King Amadeo alone, who fell simply,
as men say, because he was the only man in Spain scrupulously faithful to his
oath and obstinately adhesive to the constitution of the country.
"And yet, constitutionally honest as he was, his ministers betrayed him
and assassins (not yet punished) fired on him on a bright moonlit evening in
one of the most frequented and brilliantly lighted streets of Madrid. Possibly

THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 95
if Prim had not been assassinated in the street (by men, they also not yet
punished), Spain might have been saved from her extremest days of misery,
the cantonal insurrection, but that is doubtful, since the misfortunes of Spain
and of Cuba are conditions of the national character, as manifested alike in
Spain and in all Spanish America.
"For, let me repeat, the governors and the governed, all the same in
race, and with defects aggravated in the latter by tropical life and by associa
tion with slaves, are at least equally to blame for the calamities of Cuba.
"In fine, looking at the subject from the point of view of the interests of
the United States, which alone is of account in the face of a civil contest
where both parties are deaf to the counsels of friendship and to considerations
of sympathy and humanity, it seems to me that w^e have much to lose and
nothing to gain by compromising ourselves in the matter of Cuba, it being
superabundantly evident that, whether as to Lopez and his companions laboring
professedly to betray their country to a foreign nation for the promotion of
slavery, or in case of Aldama and his associates, laboring to betray it to the
same nation for the gratification of personal resentment and. ambition, they all
have but one thought as respects us, namely, to make a cat's paw of our gov
ernment, while ready to emulate, on the earliest possible opportunity, the
'sublime ingratitude' of Schwartzenberg. C. CUSHING."
This formidable indictment of Spain and Spaniards is made the more
tremendous by the proof in the Madrid dispatches of the author that he was
not a partisan of the Cuban insurgents, but distrusted them and was high-
tempered against their representatives in the United States. As to "inter
vention" in Cuba, it was never perfectly defined until President McKinley did
it, in his message so coldly received by the warlike element in Congress,
when he calmly stated the situation in which it would be necessary to "inter
vene with force," and intervention with force is war — and was war.
Of course, there was no change in the Spanish system. Mr. Cushing by
mail mentioned that the Spanish Minister of State said he would not have
consented to leave the post of minister of grace and justice, which best suited
him as a lawyer and a magistrate, and to take that of state, which was out of
the line of his lifetime pursuits, "save only in the hope of being able to cooper
ate with me in healing all differences, in order to do which he counted much
on our long-standing personal friendship and mutual confidence ; that he had
carefully read and considered the contents of your No. 266, and must confess

96 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN.
that the United States had good reason to complain, not only of unjustifiable
acts on the part of the local authorities of Cuba, but of the delays and half-
measures of the Spanish government to accord redress ; that the local admin
istration of Cuba, civil and military alike, had, in his conception, been greatly
injurious to the interests of Spain herself, even more than to the United
States; that, as a jurist, he repudiated on principle the sequestration of the
property of foreigners in Cuba; that if the Spanish note of the 15th ultimo
should prove acceptable to the President as a basis, he should be prepared to
take up each individual grief as presented, and consider and decide promptly ;
that while not able conscientiously to admit that by the letter of the treaty
civil courts were stipulated for to the exclusion of military, yet he was ready
so to arrange the ground of controversy in that relation as to put an end to all
reasonable complaint in the premises on the part of the United States.
"I could but declare the high gratification it afforded me to receive from
his lips the communication of these just and elevated statements, which it
would be my pleasure to transmit immediately to my government."
Mr. Cushing could not fail to exercise his brilliant imagination on the
international aspects of the questions arising in our relations with Spain;
he quoted an article in the Epoca newspaper that seemed to be inspired by
the government, and set it forth in a series of flashing fancies as follows:
"The definite references of the Epoca to my interview with Mr. Calderon
y Collantes on the 30th, and to the telegrams received from Mr. Mantilla,
sufficiently show that the Epoca received its information from some member
of the government.
"I have never mentioned the contents, date, or even existence of your No.
266 to anybody except Mr. Calderon y Collantes, not even to Mr. Layard,
until he came to speak to me concerning it, on the 1st instant, by telegraphic
direction from Lord Derby, as reported in another dispatch.
"Of course, all which the Epoca says of the contents of that note must
have been derived from the government.
"Four things are, it seems to me, worth noting in that article:
"1st. In speaking of your No. 266, it undertakes to characterize the first
part, devoted to the exposition of particular grievances, but makes no allusion
to the second part.
"2d. It gives quite a novel turn to the question of intervention and the
relations of Great Britain to that subject, supposing it to be on the part of

THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN.

97

some 'great continental Power' between the United States and Spain. I have
no knowledge, nor any ground of conjecture even, as to what Power is thus
intended. Is it Germany? Or France? Or Russia?
"3d. The Epoca seems to put forward the article of the Herald by way
of insinuating the opposition of Great Britain to any positive action of ours on
the side of Cuba.
"4th. It is observable that the Epoca, thus inspired by the government,
does not speak excitedly, or otherwise betray signs of irritation on the part of
the government on occasion of the suggestion of our possible intervention, ex
nominej-^as intimated in your instructions, and also expressly in the oral
;-tatement made by me to Mr. Calderon y Collantes."
Secretary Fish was constant and strong in urging Mr. Cushing to force
upon the Spaniards an impression of the danger of American "intervention."
That he was influenced in this insistence by the personal views of President
Grant there is inner evidence, and yet it has been a part of the filibuster
creed to hold that General Grant was too careful, and to assert that his con
servatism comprehended caution in the extreme.

CHAPTER III.

The Old, Old Story in Spain.

European Newspaper Comment on the Cuban-Spanish-American Situation Twenty-two Years
Ago — Not Much New in Later Commentary — "Stable Government" Not a Ne^Phrase —
Cuban Troubles Those of Inheritance — Disastrous Influences of the Rebel Policy of the
Torch — Suggestion of Bombardment of Our Cities by Spaniards.
Considerable agitation was produced in the diplomatic circles of Europe
by the steady pressure of Secretary Fish with his instructions to Minister
Cushing to bring the Spaniards to conclusions. Repeatedly the Secretary
had to qualify the forms of expression of the several ministers intrusted with
copies of the formal paper. Mr. Baker was admonished that he had been too
strenuous in St. Petersburg in making the most of a prince's politeness, and
explained that he quoted the Russian Prince Gortchakoff by an almost
unconscious recollection. Mr. Orth, at Vienna, over-played his part a shade,
and a supplementary direction was that he should not require a .reply in
writing to his suggestive communication. The Vienna Presse, of January 5,
1876, contained this expression of Austrian pulchritude:
"North America labors vigorously and incessantly to make the Cuban
question an international one, and to elevate it to the position of a burning
one before the Spanish arms can succeed in making it disappear from the
world. To-day it is announced by telegram from New York that the note of
the government of the United States to the Powers relative to Cuba proposed
the union of Cuba and Porto Rico under one Spanish governor-general. The
European diplomacy, which was enlightened with the hearing of the extraor
dinarily long American document — a copy of the same was not left — might
be not disagreeably astonished to learn what actually might be the small
meaning of the long discourse. The omission of every conclusion in the
document of Mr. Secretary Fish was until now everywhere remarked ; he had
hitherto excused the- European governments from the duty of giving an
98

W

I

ARTILLERY WAGON PARK, PORTO RICO.

CAPT. BETHEL AND GEN. ERNST RECONNOITERING
IN PORTO RICO.

THE PLAZA IN PONCE, PORTO RICO.

CHURCH AND PALMS IN JUANA, PORTO RICO.

THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. ^i
answer to the Washington Government, and the Madrid government did n,'.
this time require, as with the message of President Grant, to answer with a
formal memorandum. Substantially, the long and short of the American note
was to the effect that the insurrection in Cuba must come to an end. It was
careful to represent, in constantly recurring phrases, that no individual inter
est of any kind had actuated the United States, who positively had not the
least thought of appropriating the Pearl of the Antilles."
As there was a Caflist war on hand, it did not seem to the European
governments a striking opportunity to be especially urgent in demands that
Spain should mend her ways in Cuba. There was at least propriety in the
precedence of home rule. The edge of the policy set forth by Mr. Fish was
that Spain should make a finish of the Cuban war by abandoning the attempt
to conquer the island, if military success was impracticable. Precisely the
contention of the Secretary was the thing not possible for Spain — and, there
were many insinuations abroad that President Grant was playing for a third
term by contriving a war with Spain. The London Times, January 24, 1876,
put in this weighty observation apropos of the stirring communications of
Mr. Fish:
"This remarkable correspondence can hardly fail to excite American
politicians, not because there is likely to be any difference of opinion in the
United States as to the iniquities of Spain, but because the policy of inviting
the cooperation of the European powers is a bold departure from the political
traditions of the United States. The invitation has not been addressed to
Great Britain alone, but also to the governments of France and Italy, -and to
the three Empires. This is manifestly an abandonment of the 'Monroe
Doctrine,' which has so long controlled American policy, and has discon
nected it, at all events in theory, from the general web of political interests
throughout the civilized world. To exclude from the American continent not
only every advance by annexation or colonization of the monarchical powers
of Europe, but every direct .influence of those governments for good or evil,
was in substance the political dogma which takes its name from President
Monroe. This monstrous pretension at the time when the Democratic party
and the slave power were in close alliance had nearly assumed an aggressive
form, and if events had not checked and rebuked it, would probably have
tempted the Union into a ruinous filibustering policy.
"The civil war prevented the United States from actively asserting the

102 THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN.
Monroe Doctrine, though the intervention of France, England, and Spain in
the affairs of Mexico, excited vehement protests on the other side of the
Atlantic. But Mr. Fish's invitation to the European powers, recognizing, as
it does, the fact that the nations of Europe have interests to watch and defend
on the American continent, marks very distinctly the progress of the people of
the United States in political good sense. It is sheer folly for any country,
however powerful and however confident in its destiny, to take upon itself to
wall off half the world, and say to the commonwealth of nations, 'You have
nothing to do with all on this side. ' The claim is as inadmissible as that of
the Holy See to partition the unknown lands of the East and the West
between Spain and Portugal."
The Pall Mall Gazette, January 25, 1876, editorially called attention to
the statement that Mr. Fish communicated the substance of his instructions
"on th2 eve of the November elections," and presented an essay dwell
ing with varied application upon the difficulties of the establishment of a
"stable government" in Cuba.
It has not been forgotten that at the time President McKinley used the
phrase, "stable government," the members of Congress distinguished for
high temperature held that it was fatally lacking in propriety, because the
word "government" was not qualified by "Republican form," which was the
only sort of thing we could endure. We quote the Pall Mall Gazette :
"Whatever force there may prove to be in the plea that General Grant
must be elected President a third time in order to carry on a war with the
Vatican, there is seemingly no popular conviction that it is worth while to
provoke a war with Spain in order to overcome the prejudice against a third
term. It does not indeed require any keen political acumen to detect the
difficulties which surround both the alternatives suggested in Mr. Fish's dis
patch. It is a cheap exercise of international officiousness to hope that Spain
may spontaneously adopt measures for the organization of a stable and satis
factory system of government in Cuba, but if Mr. Fish had to state in words
what the measures in question should be, the impossibility of framing them
would be at once apparent. If Spain succeeds in putting down the insurrec
tion, a stable government of a certain kind may be established. If the
United States go to war and annex Cuba, a stable government of a certain
kind may be established.
"But to talk of a stable government in an island in which the passions

THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. 103
excited by quarrels of race, of color', of social position, have raged with
scarcely any restriction for more than five years, while proclaiming in the
same breath the impropriety of these passions being subdued by the hand of
any external power, is to use words which have no meaning. The concession
of independence to Cuba might mean peace as between the mother country
and her emancipated colony, but it would not mean peace in Cuba itself. On
the contrary, it would only mean war, renewed with greater determination, and
conducted with greater fierceness, between the insurgents and that part of
the population which, as Mr. Fish very truly puts it, 'has sustained and
upheld, if it has not controlled, successive governors-general. ' How this con
flict would end we do not pretend to say, but is safe to predict that while it
lasted it would be characterized by yet greater atrocities, and inflict yet greater
annoyances on foreign residents than the war which has gone on so long.
"After a time the exhaustion of resources and the partial extermination
of the fighting population would bring active hostilities to an end; but the
experience of West Indian and South American independence does not make
their subsequent resumption at all unlikely. It is to create this sort of
wilderness within sight of the United States that the American people were
invited to run the risk of a war with Spain. For that a war with Spain
involves very grave risk to the United States is undoubted. At the outset of
a contest which can only be carried on at sea, the comparative wealth, num
bers, and resources of the combatants go for little, except so far as they are
embodied in actual ships.
"The power of Spain, such as it is, is so embodied; the power of the
United States is not; and it is at least possible that the first act of a war
between the two countries might be the bombardment of every American
seaport. It does credit to the good sense of the American people that they
have not cared to run this risk for the doubtful benefits of annexing an island
which they do not want and being ruled for four years longer by General Grant. ' '
The recklessness of a large portion of this utterance does not remove the
pertinence of the discussion of the troublesome responsibilities attendant upon
governing Cuba — even after the Spanish have departed, and when the chances
of the bombardment of our ports seem to be very remote. We have Cuba
under the American flag, and it is there the symbol first of order, for the state
of the country demands the direct care of the military method of preserving
the peace of society.

104 THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN.
The domination of Spain in Cuba for four centuries and six years has
stamped upon the people characteristics that will not for a long time cease
from troubling, and the first installment of difficulty comes in the extravagant
presumption of the insurgents, who have throughout the warfare that the
Spaniards have been too sluggish to suppress, failed utterly in candor with
the friends of the freedom of Cuba, and they have with system grievously
falsified the situation. The cause of Cuba would have been far better pre
sented if the truth had been told, but sensations, red and yellow — the colors of
Spain — were in endless demand by those engaged in the preparation of
bulletins, the primary purpose of which was to bring on war between the
United States and Spain, assuming that we would conquer the island and turn it
over to the first comers claiming to have provided a Republican Cuban govern
ment. It is fortunate that we are pledged to give Cuba, as the first fruits of
victory, a "stable government." Stability is the first necessity. The only
way of redeeming the promise of stability is through military government,
and that must continue until we have discovered the constituency of a
"stable government." It was the policy of Maximo Gomez to annihilate
the two great industries in Cuba — sugar and tobacco production — and he did
it ruthlessly, that the Spaniards might be impoverished. In a greater degree
he has made the Cubans poor. He desired to combine-with the desolation of
the cane and tobacco fields the abolishment of peaceable occupation, so that
the laboring men could be driven to fight with him. The disorganization of
civilization was, with this stroke of barbarism, made complete. Notwith
standing the armies under Gomez declined in numbers and active service, and
he has been more and more cautious in actual warfare, content to hold areas
of tropical wilderness by scattered squads with a system of speedy-dispersion
and concentration. Maceo was hard pressed in Pinar del Rio, west of Captain-
General Weyler's trocha, and for months had maintained against great odds,
with high courage and consummate address, a combat in the theretofore
unviolated Paradise of tobacco, hoping for the return of Gomez from the
east, where after his wonderful westward march he receded to the mountains
and swamps, in whose shelter it was the explanation of friends that he was
gathering a host of freedom to swoop down upon Havana, after the manner
of many Key West bulletins, relieving Maceo from the strain of a situation of
desperate hardihood. The more certain it was that Gomez could only move
from one obscure retirement to another, the wilder grew the Key West music

THE MILITARY HOSPITAL AT PONCE, PORTO RICO.

BATTERY B, 4TH ARTILLERY, IN ACTION IN PORTO RICO.

ON THE PICKET LINE IN PORTO RICO.

FIRE DEPARTMENT BUILDING, PONCE, PORTO RICO.

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN PONCE, PORTO RICO.

THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. io7
on the wires announcing the invincible hero proceeding by forced marches on
the way to Havana, which certainly he would assault in a few days! This
methodical fabrication was in its nature the same discovered in the official
Spanish dispatches. The truth was not valued on either side. Maceo fell fh
a skirmish after he had crossed Weyler's trocha and met four hundred men
who were advised of his coming. He was not "lured" by the Spaniards
under a flag of truce and assassinated, as stated with ^ill the pomp of fiction.
He rode up to the firing when a Spanish column was, not unexpectedly,
encountered, and was killed by a Mauser bullet through the neck. The story
of his betrayal and murder was frantically worked, in the hope that Ameri
cans might be exasperated to madness and rushed headlong into war. The
Spanish falsehood for this incident was that there was a "battle" in which
the soldiers of Spain were most brave and that the rebels were routed, Maceo
falling in the midst of the affray. The "battle" was a skirmish-line affair,
over- in a few minutes, and Maceo's men, recovering his body, gave it secret
burial. With his fall the aggressive impulse of the insurgents ceased, with
the exception of the operations conducted in the eastern provinces by General
Garcia. There was no intermission, however, in the triumphant chapters of
militant Cuban literature, transmitted from Key West. The Cuban army, as
it appeared when the American army landed in Cuba, was not what had been
represented, and it was evident that there had been deliberate deception
carried on by the Cuban Bureau of Intelligence, specially provided for its
effect upon the American people. However, the Gomez policy had been
successful in stopping work in the fields, and the "troops" of the Cuban
government were willing to receive rations from the American army of
liberation, but they were resolute to retain their arms until they could find a
paymaster ; and they will not go into another rebellion while their names are
on a payroll. It is their misfortune that under the guidance of Gomez they
destroyed the industries of their country that Spain might be harmed, but
made themselves poor indeed.
When the ten years' war in Cuba began in 1868, there were less than
seven thousand Spanish regulars on the island, and after reinforcements, one
hundred thousand strong, had been sent across the Atlantic, neither the
military nor the civil administration of Spain in the last of her great provinces
had been improved. The sharpest offense that could be given the Spaniards
was to propose as a tentative alternative that the insurgents should have

io8 THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN.
rights as belligerents, and yet the greatest army any nation ever transported
three thousand miles was year after year unable to report decisive progress in
campaigns of pacification. There was not a public man in Spain who did not
know that the one thing needful to the Spanish cause in Cuba was military
success, and there was an army of regulars that should number nearly or
quite one hundred thousand, with firemen, policemen and volunteers nearly
fifty thousand, and a s^varm of gunboats and ships of war forming a coast
guard; and yet there were no results from the presence of this immense
array which was consuming the life of Spain. The Spanish Cabinet and
diplomatic representatives prayed for military success to build a hope upon,
but the only victories for the Spaniards were the extension of deserts, the
spread of famine, and the stalking abroad of pestilence. The distance from
Spain to Cuba was greater than the fleets or legions of the Romans covered,
and the British armies that crossed the Atlantic in the attempted subjugation
of the thirteen revolted colonies, never showed fifty per cent of the numerical
strength of the Spaniards of the regular army in Cuba. The Spanish volun
teers were additional, and yet, until in the final strife that preceded the
armed intervention of the United States, the western provinces of Cuba were
not seriously molested, and the sugar and tobacco crops up to that time
increased. It is only in the studies of Spanish character, both in the penin
sula and the island, by Caleb Cushing, our Minister to Spain in the closing
years of Grant's administration, that the phenomenon of the inability of the
Spanish forces to take a vigorous initiative is explained. The military
capacity of the Spanish race has in modern times been almost exclusively
defensive. The side that has the privilege of ambuscades and can pursue the
strategy and the tactics of evasion, elusion and procrastination is unconquer
able, except- by soldiers of a tougher fiber and a more alert and determined
spirit in advancing upon concealed foes than themselves. The Cubans
could no more fight battles with Spanish regulars in the open field than the
Spaniards could fight the French in regular order in the warfare with
Napoleon. Wellington found his 'Spanish allies, during the Peninsular war,
uncertain and fantastic, as the American generals discovered the Cubans,
who emerged from the swamps and mountains when Shaffer's divisions were
climbing the hills of Santiago, alternately scorched and drenched, and
stricken with ghastly fevers. It turned out that the Spaniards, ineffectual in
attacking the Cuban guerrillas in familiar fastnesses, when intrenched

THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. 109
behind entanglements of barbed wire, were keen and steady as defenders,
standing up to their work manfully; but their courage in resisting assaults
was no more testimony that their colonial system was not disastrous infamy,
than the success of the Cubans in bushwhacking was evidence that they had
organized a Republic and should resume the art of government where the
Spaniards left it.
All there was of the Cuban question that concerned us was thrashed over
during the ten years' war, 1868-78. Out of a hundred thousand men the
Spaniards then had in Cuba, they lost seventeen thousand from sickness in
1877, and the next year treated with the armed insurgents, bribing some,
cajoling others, promising all things with a broad profusion that was proof
they attached no value to their words. There was peace for a few years —
that is, there were intrigues in place of skirmishes, when, as has been the
stated custom in the stories of Spanish colonial conflicts, the stipulations of
reformation without jDerformance having run their course, hostilities were
resumed at the old stands in the- well-known ways, with the usual Junta in
New York, and the regular equipments all around. This time the brain that
organized the customary outbreak was in a civil capacity Jose1 Marti, with
Maximo Gomez as the militar}' chieftain, supreme in general direction, and
Antonio Maceo, a soldier of personal daring and many high qualities. Early
in the conflict Marti, exposing himself to encourage followers, was slain, and
within two years the two Maceos, plunging into desperate situations,
perished. The chieftains of the insurgents invaded eastern Cuba in small
boats, finding their way from Hayti to appointed Cuban coves, where friends
awaited them, and it was not long before the development that a revolt against
the Spaniards of the Peninsula, of a more sanguinary and destructive nature
than ever, had been encountered. The constant cry of the Spanish through
the years of bloody contention was that the Cuban rebels would, if it was in
their power, make of the splendid island an enlarged San Domingo — and the
horrors of French experience were recited to terrorize all who were unwilling
to accept barbarism as freedom. The Spanish cartoons on display in Havana
always represented the rebellion as personified by a black man, uncouth and
horrid, torch and knife in hand, grossly threatening Cuba drawn as a beauti
ful white woman; Uncle Sam — an unwieldy hog with snout and tail, a
starry hat and striped coat-tails and trousers — instigating the black monster to
violence. It was the Gomez policy to accept this issue by the use of the

no THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN.
torch, and the war took on a dreadful aspect, in widespread plantation fires
rolling westward, the fiery clouds of conflagrations consuming the cane fields
and mills, and finally the tobacco houses stored with leaves precious as fine
gold. The insurgents burned the better houses and laid waste the areas of
black and red sugar and tobacco land, whose cultivation had yielded mar
velous opulence. In turn the Spaniards burned the humbler dwellings and
the villages they could not garrison. The Cubans were accomplished horse
men, and domestic animals and the fruit trees afforded the shifty, irregular
cavaliers food supplies. The Spaniards slaughtered the horses and .cattle they
could not ride or drive away, and the sheep and pigs it was inconvenient to
capture and hold in pens were massacred. On both sides there was infuriated
savagery, and the wretched camps, where famine and pestilence made war
most hideous, were the result. The responsibility rested upon both parties
to the interminable conflict of barbarities. Weyler and Gomez were the
representative men of this diabolical warfare. More and more, the people in
Cuba of intelligence equal to understanding that there must be order before
prosperity could be restored, and that authority must be found and applied,
not committed to the everlasting confusion and reprisals of the partisans of
vengeance, before the restoration of hopefulness would be rational, were
persuaded and convinced that with the people of the United States and their
army and navy must rest the responsibility, and in them be found the
capacity for saving jurisdiction. The Cuban Republic, if the island
should be turned over to the Key West and New York colonies, and the
bands that are in arms looking for money that they may continue to be an
army, and play the part the Spaniards have played out, would make the
fruition of American sacrifices the extension of unmitigated San Domingo
terrors. It is the first obligation of the United States in possession of Cuba,
to American civilization, to use the force necessary to prevent this consum
mation, most devoutly to be deprecated, and the fact should be fearlessly
presented, discussed without hesitation, declared without the shadow of
misgiving, that the correct policy of our country is and always has been that
of the ultimate annexation of Cuba. The island wants American rule, and
not a continuance of the Spanish styles of tyranny, corruption and spoliation,
whether direct or indirect. We did not make war in Cuba for our health, and
in the island of the palm and the orange, coffee and cane, tropic woods and
iron ores, of fruits and flowers, birds and fishes of surpassing beauty and

THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. m
utility, the government must change hands actually and the wholesome heal
ing American influences prevail through stable government under the law
sustained by the American people, armed and puissant.
The correspondence of our. State Department has for a generation been
unnecessarily littered with disavowals of the logic of history and the teachings
of geography on this subject of the occupation and possession of Cuba by and
for ourselves. We would at any time have paid Spain one hundred millions
of dollars for the island, and twenty-five millions for Porto Rico, and the
actual trouble, deeper than any other in embarrassing the negotiations, has
been the necessity of providing a large margin for the middleman. It
would be a strange official transaction in Spain, and one certain to decline "and
perish by the way, if there were not a reserved fund amounting to a large
percentage for the gentlemen who took the risks of the delicate antecedent
manipulations. The Cuban Republic — that is, the civil side of the guerrilla
war — lost the opportunity to gain the first foothold and title to the island,
and finance the rebellion when under the Gomez policy, of destroying Spanish
resources by desolating Cuban plantations; the credit of the country itself,
with all its wealth of plantations, was annihilated. Cuba might have been
purchased by Cubans, if the war had not been made a sacrifice of civilization.
Cuba, with the sugar and tobacco fields preserved, would have been good for
a loan of $150,000,000, at 6 per cent. The customs of the two principal ports
guaranteed in the hands of American appointees for the interest on the bonds
— $100,000,000 purchase money, and the $50,000,000 judiciously distributed, it
is demonstrated that the Cubans by themselves could never have freed them
selves. Whatever good there was, or harm, in extinguishing the $150,000,000
scheme belongs" to the torches of Gomez, but in the fires of the plantations
were consumed the one opportunity for the Republic of Cuba to become, in
the language that so often rings around the walls of the halls of Congress,
one of the nations of the earth. The insurgents burned their ability to
establish a stable government. We, the people of the United States, only,
have the will and the power to dispose of the sovereignty of Cuba, and the
duty of our destiny confronts us upon that line, and imposes upon us the
accomplishment of the purposes of the war, upon which we entered with
generous sentiments, unprepared save in the reserved forces of our inherent
strength — the war which we conducted speedily to a triumphant and glorious
conclusion.

U2 THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN.
During the twenty years following our centennial celebration of the
declaration of our independence, when we were seeking in the courts of
Europe cooperation in demanding of Spain actual concessions that would
prevent her exhaustion in a struggle that the character of her people made
them incapable of conducting to success — -or to terminate at all — the prestige
of the Spaniards as a nation has declined, while our advancement has been
incessant, and conspicuous. The statistics of our progress have notified all
whom - it might concern that here was one of the great Powers, and that
when she came to the front there would be none to dispute her right to be
heard at the ends of the earth, and at the opening and closing of great ques
tions. The Spanish people should not be decried, but rather there ought to
be free affirmation that they made extravagant sacrifices for Cuba of the
young men of the country, and called upon the last scrap of credit — indeed, of
everything but her incompetent pride and prejudice — to save the province.
Spain was the less reasonable because dealing with her children. The quali
ties of those in the name of liberty insurgents were the same possessed by
the oppressors whose perpetual outcry was of the dignity and honor of Spain,
both of which were perverted from the ways of wisdom in which were alone
the paths of peace. Spain had not appreciated human decadence, or esti
mated the proportions of our gigantic consolidation of force. She counted a
great army and many ships of war, and in the course of her many years of
strife in Cuba she had relied upon bulk and severity, not upon the keenness
of weapons and the relentless energies that strike quickly and pursue without
sleep a fixed purpose to the end. The Spanish armies were handled in
columns, like droves of patient cattle. The men were excellent soldierly
material, but there was the taint of corruption in every detail of the manage
ment, and the marches to and fro were without a common purpose, or a
special object. The Spanish soldiers were not instructed to go into the fire,
to penetrate the hearts of ambuscades with rushes of steel. They were not
equipped for mobility, and the fairest of islands, with the gift of beauty and
endowment of riches, was ill provided with roads, a deadly disability for
Spanish columns. Finding themselves at last committed to war with the
United States, and presently realizing that they were overmatched, the Span
ish statesmen remembered the diplomatic situation of twenty years before,
when no court in Europe countenanced President Grant's administration in
putting a pressure upon Spain to part with Cuba, except upon the condition of

THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. it 3
an impossible conquest of the island for herself. It was the last reliance of
the Spaniards that there would be European intervention to fix limitations
upon our ambitious aggrandizement. When Spain sued for peace she soon
became conscious that the woild was changed. She had expended herself
upon her own faults in Cuba, and had to surrender islands as she had given up
continents. It was for her an old story. The Powers that were aloof when
Secretary Fish pleaded so ably and with perseverance for intervention in the
name of peace in Cuba, and gave Spain two decades to adjust the affairs that
she claimed as her own, refused to intervene in behalf of Spain beaten down,
and there was something more than the wreck of her fleets and the captivity
of her armies or the poverty of her treasury. She was primarily accountable
for the elements of discordance that brought woe and ruin upon the island
and humiliation upon the peninsula, and the cruelties of the system of warfare
pursued on both sides were her own. Even more, it was the fault of the
misgovernment of Spain at home and abroad that the world was shocked by
incidents of atrocity incredible with other surroundings, from the individual
ferocities of slaughter and the vengeful, remorseless, cowardly executions, to
the massacre of the crew of the Maine! The consensus of human judgment
had declared, after four hundred years, the execution of sentence of death
upon the colonial system of Spain.

CHAPTER IV.
The Ten Years' War in Cuba.
The Stir About It in Europe — The Money Resources of Spain Stated by Minister Cushing —
Europe Against Our Intervention in Cuba — The Filibuster Hostility to President
Grant — The London Times on Hamilton Fish — A Minister Promises Too Much.

The Senate of the United States, March 24, 1896, requested the State De
partment to furnish the papers relating to the-"mediation" or "intervention" of
the United States, between Novembers, 1875, and "the date of the pacification"
of Cuba in 1878. The resolution called for the letter of the Secretary, Hamil
ton Fish, to Minister Caleb Cushing, of the date of November, 1875, and all
notes, dispatches, and telegrams, so far as compatible with the public inter
est. Mr. Fish said that when Mr. Cushing departed for Madrid, apart from
the generally unsatisfactory state of things in Spanish relations, there were
several prominent questions unadjusted, the' settlement of which was deemed
necessary before affairs with Spain could be- established in a satisfactory way.
Among these questions, Mr. Fish said some arose from the embargo and con
fiscation of estates of American citizens in Cuba in violation of treaty obli
gations, and the claims arising out of the capture of the Virginius, including
the trial and punishment of General Burriel. It had not been pretended, so
far as the Secretary was aware, that any legal justification for these wrongs
had been attempted on the part of the authorities of Spain, or that the pro
ceedings in Cuba were defended or upheld.
On the contrary, pursuant to the decree issued by the government on the
12th of July, 1873, the illegality and indefensible character of the acts were
admitted, "and the embargoes ordered to be removed and the property
restored. This decree was at first received in Cuba with calm indifference
not even published or adverted to, and the proceedings of the authorities were
in no notable respect changed thereby."
This shows the protracted power of the inertia of Spain. Mr. Fish cited
in this connection specimen cases, and the promises of the Spanish Ministers
114

LEADING GENERALS WHO COMMANDED INSURGENT FORCES IN CUBA.

THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 117
unperformed, and the Secretary remarked the simple mention of the facts, of
"the promises made and repeated, the assurances given from time to time, that
something should be done, the admission of the justice of the demands of this
country, at least to the extent of expressing regret for these wrongs and
promising redress, followed as they have been by absolutely no performance,
and no practical steps whatever toward performance, need no extended com
ment. " He added:
"In the cases of embargo and confiscation, not only have wrongs been
long since done, but continuing and repeated wrongs are daily inflicted. The
authorities of Spain in Cuba, during all this time, have been and are using the
revenues of the confiscated or embargoed estates, appropriating much of
the property itself, and in some cases executing long leases, or actually mak
ing sales, either on the allegation that taxes were due or without any excuse
whatever. "In the cases of arrest and punishment, citizens of the United States, in
like manner, have undergone punishment because the authorities of Spain do
not meet the issue and decide the question." This ought to have been like a
live coal on the Spanish back, but there were no results.
After referring to the Virginius case, and the payment of a sum of
money by Spain, settling claims of English and American citizens, the
Secretary added impressively:
"I regret to say that the authorities of Spain have not at all times appre
ciated our intentions or our purposes in these respects, and, while insisting
that a state of war does not exist in Cuba and that no rights as belligerents
should be accorded to the insurrectionists, iiave at the same time demanded
-for themselves all the rights and privileges which flow from actual and
acknowledged war.
"It will be apparent that such a state of things cannot continue. [But
they did nearly twenty-three years, long after the honorable career of Mr.
Fish had terminated. — Editor. J It is absolutely necessary to the maintenance
of our relations with Spain, even on their present footing, that our just
demands for the return to citizens of the United States of their estates in
Cuba, unincumbered, and for securing to them a trial for offenses according
to treaty provisions and all other rights guaranteed by treaty and by public
law, should be complied with.
"Whether the Spanish government, appreciating the forbearance of this

uS THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA.
country, will speedily and satisfactorily adjust the pending questions, not by
the issue of empty orders or decrees without force or effect in Cuba, but by
comprehensive and firm measures which shall everywhere be respected, I
anxiously await further intelligence.
"Moreover, apart from these particular questions, in the opinion of the
President the time has arrived when the interests of this country, the preser
vation of its commerce, and the instincts of humanity alike demand that some
speedy and satisfactory ending be made of the strife that is devastating Cuba.
"A disastrous conflict of more that seven years' duration has demon
strated the inability of Spain to maintain peace and order in an island lying at
our door. Desolation and destruction of life and property have been the only
results of this conflict.
"The United States sympathizes in the fact that this inability results in a
large degree from the unhappy condition of Spain at home and to some extent
from the distractions which are dividing her people. But the fact remains.
Added to this are the large expanse of ocean separating the peninsula from
the island and the want of harmony and of personal sympathy between the
inhabitants of the territory of the home government and those of the colony,
the distinction of classes in the latter between rulers and subjects, the want of
adaptation of the ancient colonial system of Spain to the present times and to
the ideas which the events of the past age have impressed upon the peoples
of every reading and thinking country."
The aggravations of the case of Spain in provoking the United States to
take summary methods have not been stated with greater force than in these
quiet sentences. There are two other passages necessary to complete the
statement of facts, with the calm solidity that bears down opponents, with
the inherent moderation that shows the weaknesses of the exaggeration that
impairs the integrity of true strength. The note of Mr. Fish to Mr. Cushing
was duplicated to General Schenck, Minister of the United States to England,
who was instructed to read it to Lord Derby, and Cushing was directed to
wait for the result of the effort to obtain the cooperation of England. Mr.
Cushing was of the judgment that this letter of instructions from Secretary
Fish was dangerous, and might result in war. To this effect he wrote a letter
and sent a telegram November 25th, saying in the letter he "almost wished"
his instructions "were less specific." He said the condition of Spain was a
temptation to her to go to war.

THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 119
Many of the most thoughtful men in Spain, he affirmed, really longed for
a foreign war as the only efficient remedy for the domestic dissensions that
distracted the country.
"Moreover, the statesmen of the country foresaw that on the close of the
war in the North (the Carlist conflict), which cannot fail to come in the course
of the winter or early in the spring, there will be an army of two or three
hundred thousand men to dispose of, with its officers, who will be but too
much disposed to dominate in public affairs and push the civilians into the
background." In addition to which, there was a multitude of "unthoughtful
men, proud, angry, resentful, who would gladly rush into a war with the
United States." Finally, there were "the mercenary, the ambitious, the
declasses and the bad, to whom war presents the usual attractions. 'Multis
utile bellum,' says Sallust."
More than this, Mr. Cushing declared: "It is the received opinion in
Spain that for the commencing period of a war she has a more efficient navy
than ours," and, "In these circumstances, if Great Britain declines to
cooperate with us, Spain will, at the least, despatch to Cuba at once a large
fleet laden with troops, there to await the eventualities of diplomacy, and
she may break off relations, with a hostile appeal to the European Powers."
In his telegram of November 25th, General Cushing said of the mission of
General Schenck to sound Lord Dei by, that if England joined us Spain would
"succumb in sullen despair," but if England stood off Spain would think she
had the sympathy of Europe, especially as by her note of the 15 th she had
gone to "the ultimate point in satisfaction of each of the particular griefs of
the United States." Mr. Cushing urgently pressed the Secretary, "in
proportion" as he "desired peace," to give explicit and specific replies in
regard "to certain most needful instructions he would ask for by telegraph if
a negative answer came from Great Britain." In case of that negative
answer, Cushing cabled: "There will be war, and a popular though desper
ate one on the part of Spain, unless she can be convinced that the real and
true object of the contemplated measure is to prevent war, as I understand it
to be intended. But to ward off war will exact the steady exercise of all my
personal influence here (which my colleagues tell me is great), and will require
that influence to be efficiently backed by my government both here and at
Washington. I am to 'obey orders though it break owners, ' as the shipmasters
say."

'20 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA.
The Spanish note to Mr. Cushing contained proposals for adjustment for
existing differences between the United States and Spain. Its substance was
telegraphed to Mr. Fish by Mr. Cushing November 16, 1875. It had no
reference to mediation or intervention by the United States in the affairs
of Cuba. November 27th, Cushing was telegraphed that in consequence of his
telegram Schenck was instructed to delay the reading of the Cushing instruc
tions to Derby! and the Secretary said the instruction was "not intended to be
minatory in any sense, but in the spirit of friendship."
Mr. Cushing was a man of extraordinary range of information and a
faculty of literary expression very rare. His paper addressed to the State
Department on the financial situation of Spain is an excellent example. We
quote in full :
"Madrid, November 26, 1875. — The finances of Spain are in a. very bad
condition, simply for want of credit in the stock market of Europe.
"Nevertheless, she is enabled to carry a large floating debt by loans on
short time, say six months or a year, and to renew the bonds as they fall due
by merely adding the interest to the mass of such floating debt.
"But she has considerable resources in reserve for times and occasions of
desperation. "1st. The Bank of Spain possesses a large metallic fund which the
government could and would seize upon in such emergency, in imitation of
what Great Britain did in wars of the French Revolution.
"2d. There is really much wealth in the country, and it would be drawn
forth in a war with the United States. Patriotic gifts would come in, forced
loans would be submitted to, and the domestic capitalists -would more freely
advance to the government.
"3d. Spain might' recur to forms of credit which all other nations resort
to in the last necessity, as we ourselves did in the legal-tender act. The
process would begin with indefinite issue of bills of the Bank of Spain in the
whole country, instead of, as now, in the province of Madrid alone ; and would
extend to the issue of treasury notes or certificates. To be sure, such action
would speedily raise the price of gold, but not to a higher point than it
reached with us in similar circumstances.
"Meanwhile, the augmented circulation would serve, as it did with us, to
prompt new enterprises, and thus add to the actual productive resources of

— 

FORTIFICATIONS OF SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.)

THE QUAY, SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.)

THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 123
the country, not only in industries dependent on war, but in mines and in
undeveloped agriculture, to the ultimate advantages of Spain.
"The Spaniards are a people preeminently sober in food and drink,
economical, and enduring under privations and hardships — as you may infer
from the wages of labor, which vary according to the quality from two to
three or four pesetas a day, where, in the United States, similar labor would
be reckoned at the same number of dollars. Hence, armies are contentedly
supported here, and always have been, so cheaply as to constitute a real addi
tion to the relative military resources of Spain. The contrast in this respect
between Spanish and English soldiers struck the Duke of Wellington.
"I note these facts as being material and important in the present
question. That is, we must not confide in a deficiency of financial resources
standing in the way if Spain be hard pushed and stirred up to make sacrifices
in case of a war with the United States.
"And the finances of Spain are not in a much worse condition than they
were in the time of Charles V. and his successors of the Austrian dynasty.
Great loans were rarer then than now. Spain relied much on wealthy Jews
for anticipations, although Jews and Gentiles, in the matter of money lending,
incurred hazards quite in proportion to the profits, as illustrated in the hard
ships of the Jews in Spain and the case of Jacques Cceur in France. In truth,
the Fuggers of Augsburg are among the few houses of that class which
remain to this day. Hence the terrible financial straits which the Philips —
II., III., and IV. — were constantly suffering in Spain. Nevertheless, they
sustained great wars all over the world.
"I add that, according to telegrams received from Havana, the mission of
Mr. Rubi has already produced important results, so that he is able to make
assurance of having equalized the revenue and the expenditures and of under
taking to pay regularly all current obligations after the 1st of January.
"I have, etc., — C. Cushing."
Of this it is now to be remarked that Spain has exhausted all these
resources, and if it is the opinion of that country that the honor of the nation
is saved, there should be no disputation of that consolation.
Mr. Cushing reports his interview with the Spanish Minister of State on
November 30th, saying, "A little to my surprise, he took the whole matter
very coolly," notwithstanding possible "intervention" was expressly men
tioned. The Minister of State said Spain was not in a hurry to go to war

I24 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA.
with the United States, and was assured the United States was not in a
hurry to go to war with Spain. In his remarks to the Spanish Minister of
State, Mr. Cushing said: "In the hope that the contents of the Spanish note
maybe satisfactory, the President desists from the concrete purpose expressed
in the dispatch of the 5th and substitutes a proposition which is merely expect
ant. Meanwhile, I am charged in the first place to explain to you confi
dentially what will be the actual text of the message. The President will
discountenance the concession of the recognition of either independence or
belligerence to the insurgents of Cuba; he will allude to the injuries inflicted
upon the United States and on their citizens b)T the prolonged struggle in
Cuba, and the absence as yet of clear indications of its termination; he will
intimate, as an ulterior necessity, intervention, unless positive results be soon
reached, but he will abstain from advising it at present.
"I am instructed to deliver to you a copy of the said dispatch of the 5th
instant, written before the delivery to me of the Spanish note, and, as is to be
supposed, without knowledge of the intention of the government of His
Majesty. "This dispatch is not conceived in any minatory sense, but on the con
trary, in a spirit of friendship, as a notice of a pressing necessity, which may
force the President in given circumstances from which he desires to save him
self and desires Spain to aid him in escaping them."
This is an entertaining example of Mr. Cushing's views for obeying the
letter of his instructions, and imparting to his conversation a spirit of concilia
tion in contradiction of the administration of » the State Department. He
certainly succeeded in conveying the intimation of intervention, and the fact
of the impatience of Pi esident Grant, in terms so gentle that there was no
agitation. Mr. Cushing knew well the current ideas of the Spaniards, their
understanding that they had a navy superior to ours in the seventies, and the
ultimate capacity of the government to find money for war purposes, but
there had not been within the range of his observation any experience that
would warrant the anticipation of public opinion on the Peninsula for giving
up the distant colonies. But with all his versatile astuteness, Mr. Cushing
could send this effusive telegram :
"Madrid, December 4, 1875. — Brief important interview with Minister of
State. He takes office solely in the hope of settlement with us ; has carefully
read your 266; admits our grievances; is opposed in principle to sequestra-

THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 125
tion of property of foreigners; condemns the delays of redress; will take up
and promptly settle each case; will remove all cause of complaint as to
treaty; reprobates conduct of local authorities in Cuba as more injurious to
Spain than to the United States. Cushing."
The filibuster opinion that President Grant and his Cabinet were guilty
of a conservation touching closely timidity toward the Spaniards for their
misdemeanors in Cuba, has had such free course that it has in some degree
affected the popular intelligence and caused discoloration and distortion of
affairs. The truth is President Grant did not respect the style of war-making
of the champions of the Cuban cause with whom he came in contact. He
understood perfectly that it was the policy of the insurgents in Cuba to cause
by any means war between the United States and Spain and repay this
country with a supercilious show of gratitude — the leaders in the war out of
the island to assume the prerogatives and largely resume the methods of the
peninsular Spaniards, so that the difference between the government over
thrown and that established would be the sort of reform the fox referred to
when he asked that the old swarm of fleas be allowed to remain, for the fresh
ones would be the greater bloodsuckers. The filibuster expeditions were
arranged and expected to cause the United States to rush into war. The
demand for belligerent rights was expressly to increase the chances of conflict.
This story is a generation old. It has been duplicated within recent years,
and the game was being played with ever augmenting audacity, when the
catastrophe of the Maine influenced public opinion and the hour struck for the
settlement long deferred. The demand that the Maine should be sent to the
harbor of Havana was started by those who hoped something would happen to
make trouble, and the Spaniards, infatuated with their own animosities and
verbose imbecility, played to the hand of the insurgents, for the lapse of time
had taught them folly only; and when some of them were able to comprehend
the power of the United States they thought of two things — the very small
army of this country, the inefficiency of our military systems for the speedy
mustering of our strength in the field, the deficiency of our docks for handling
war ships and the slight our demagogues had put upon both army and navy.
Our immense reserve of public spirit was not at. all comprehended. The
Spaniards had deceived themselves as to our character. They really believed
we were not a warlike people. They forgot that we had taken grand lessons
of war in fighting each other — had kept for four years an unparalleled war

J26 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA.
school. Of course, there were Spaniards not so stupid as to suppose we should
be unable to get upon our feet, with old boys enough to teach the young ones
— but Spain felt herself after all her experiences of ill-fortune a great Euro
pean power, and had faith that we would be called to account by the same
combination of monarchs that throttled poor Greece, while Turkey reduced
the plethora of the Greeks by blood-letting. The difference between life and
death in nations was not appreciated by the moribund. The Spaniards read
in the modern diplomatic history of their country, took courage from the
attitude of the great monarchies when President Grant had them sounded as
to "intervention" by the United States in the affairs of Cuba. Then none
were pronounced in our favor, and the whole trend of monarchial opinion was
against our policy, which, though well guarded in civil language, meant that
the young American giant was ascertaining his strength, and proposing, per
haps deeply innocent but probably after meditation, the disturbance of the
old scales in which the balance of power, understood to be the higher law of
the military nations, had been adjusted. Only the very well informed in this
country had a realizing sense of the persistent push of the purpose of inter
vention in Cuba if jDeace was not restored that took place in our centennial
year. That was the epoch in which we were incomparably engaged in cele
brating ourselves and at the same time the State Department was hard at
work, and the courts of Europe incessantly but quietly advised of our tend
encies to put forth our hands and stop the desolation of the noblest of
American islands lying in a commercial and military sense at the mouth of the
Mississippi, whose valley is the heart of America. The Spaniards wanted to
know whether we would interfere for or against the insurgents, who no more
then than now had commanded the admiration of competent witnesses, and
deserved a good deal of what Mr. Cushing said of them, because they and
their peninsular Spaniards had so many faults in common. How very much
this article from the Evening Standard of London, January 29, 1876, reads as
if it might have appeared two years instead of twenty-two years ago :
"The Cuban insurrection is as long-lived as the Carlist revolt. There' is
no calculating the amount of blood and treasure which have been drawn from
the mother country to restore quiet to the island within the past few years.
Reinforcements of troops have been sent periodically from Cadiz and San-
tander, not a tithe of whom will ever see Spain again ; captain-general suc
ceeds captain-general with the regularity of clockwork, and notwithstanding

THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 127
the end never is, but always to be. The insurgents are beaten on the average
twice a month, yet somehow they always turn up in excellent health and
spirits as if they thrived on repeated defeat. It is very difficult to get at the
truth about Cuba; but one prediction maybe made with safety: As long as
Don Carlos parades Navarre and the Vascongadas, the pacification of Cuba
will be adjourned. No Spaniard with the spirit of a true hidalgo will allow
for a moment in public controversy that his country can part with the island,
and yet there is scarcely one traveled and educated Spaniard, we venture to
affirm, who will not admit in the intimacy of private conversation that his
country can not hold the island."
The London Times, of January 26th, said:
"In Europe at least there will be a tendency to do injustice to Mr. Fish's
indictment of Spain, precisely for the reason which may render it effective
among his own countrymen. When American diplomacy states a complaint,
it usually makes a large call on those general terms of invective which please
half-educated readers, but shock the taste and rouse the suspicions of the more
fastidious students.
"Critical minds are apt to fancy that the rhetoric has been framed for the
purpose of touching the Americans themselves, and when they mentally
translate it into scholarly English they tend to cut away much of the truth as
well as to improve the style. We speak the more frankly because Mr. Fish
seeks to obtain the moral support of European countries in his contest with
the Spanish Minister of foreign affairs respecting the civil war in Cuba. He
would, we assure him, have been much more effective if he had given specific
examples of the wrongs or hardships suffered by his countrymen and left his
readers to supply general phrases of indictment. Nevertheless, there need be
no doubt that his charges are substantially just, and the truth itself so grave
as to need little ornament from rhetoric.
"In Cuba Spain owns one of the fairest and most fertile islands in the
world, and it has been detestably misgoverned. While we have allowed our
colonies to rule themselves in their own way, Spain has persisted in keeping
Cuba in the same state of tutelage as when she herself was the greatest power
in the world, and when the very idea of colonial rights had scarcely arisen.
The island has been dependent on the will of a government changed every
few years by a pronunciamiento or a popular revolution. It has been used as
a place of honorable banishment for unruly soldiers. The dangerous spirits

128 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA.
of the army have been sent to Cuba to be kept out of mischief, and they have
let loose in the colony the temper which had been found perilous at home.
Freed from responsibility, they have often displayed a repetition of that
domineering spirit, that contempt of the rights of others, and that cruelty
which once added dark chapters to the history of the Spanish conquest. The
slaughter of the crew of the Virginius was ah act which would have been quite
natural three centuries ago, but which, when committed in our time, seems
wonderful on account of its folly as well as of its atrocity. If the author of
such a deed had been an Englishman, he would assuredly have been hung;
yet he is still at liberty, and we believe he has still some kind of command.
"We cannot wonder that Mr. Fish, who speaks for a people as proud in
their own way as the Spaniards and immeasurably more powerful, should
peremptorily demand the trial of General Burriel. America has also many
other causes of complaint. Her citizens owned much property in Cuba, and
a great deal of it has been confiscated by the Spanish government. Restitu
tion has been promised and evaded. "
It is amusing to note the London Times giving lessons in English to the
Honorable Hamilton Fish. The Times had to say, January, 1876, further:
"If the documents just presented to Congress are serious at all, they are
most important documents, and we incline, after making every allowance for
the necessities and peculiarities of President Grant's position, to believe that
they are more serious than is generally imagined. It is perfectly possible
that General Grant has decided in his own mind that he will not quit office
without inflicting punishment on Spain, and that he has renewed his com
plaints with an intention of making them heard, and that he is now deliber
ately warning Congress, the American people, and the European States that
he means to have either redress or war.
"He may be trifling with the world, but it is much more probable that he
is not; and if he is not he is taking precisely the steps European diplomatists.
would expect. He is demanding definitely and distinctly a just thing, the
trial of General Burriel, which the Spanish government cannot, without risk
ing a collision with the volunteers, concede, except on paper. He is telling
Madrid in the plainest words he can use that unless he can obtain redress he
shall propose to resort to force.
"It seems to us that to imagine President Grant, with a Democratic
majority in the House of R'epresentatives, a great Spanish fleet in the harbor

THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 129
of Habana, and the Presidential convention almost at hand, is doing all this in
order to court a slap in the face from Madrid, a slap which, unresented, would
send him on his retirement into a discredited obscurity, is almost absurd ; and
if he is in earnest the situation is most serious. It is all very well to talk of
the American Constitution and the Democratic majority and the absence of
material preparations in the United States. The President can order any
movement, either of fleet or army, that he pleases. The Spaniards are in no
humor to bear interference, and if they defy the Union neither Democrats nor
Republicans will remember party squabbles. They might refuse the Presi
dent his third term, and might be ready to hang him, but they would plunge
into war with none the less fierceness and carry it on with none the less
decision." This is a character sketch not quite friendly, but written after some
studies that did not lead to total darkness.
Mr. George H. Boker, Minister to Russia, wrote from St. Petersburg,
January, 1875, that Prince Gortchakoff was warmly sympathetic with the
United States, and seemed surprised at the patience and the forbearance with
which our government had acted, not only toward the government of Spain,
but toward the more easily approached provincial authorities of Cuba. He
said, significantly, that history does not show us that this has been the usual
conduct of strong powers toward weaker ones. He commended the reluctance
which the government of the United States seemed to feel in proceeding to
serious measures with a country in the distracted condition of Spain, and he said
that this last act, the laying of the question before the great powers for their
consideration and possible action, was a display of candor and of magnanimity
on our part that was almost without precedent in international affairs, and the
prince was good enough to say it set forever at rest the report that the United
States "had views of territorial extension in the direction of Cuba." And
Gortchakoff told Boker that the course of Spain would depend altogether upon
the action of the British government, and the representations which might be
made by it at the court of Madrid, regarding the unsatisfactory relations
between the United States and Spain. He said that the combined influence
of all the other powers was not equal to that of Great Britain with the Spanish
government. The Hon. George P. Marsh had a full conversation at Rome in
December, 1875, with Mr. Viscomti Venosta, and stated that "the editorial

i3° THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA.
tone of many journals in the United States, and that of many articles
in journals not professedly advocating the annexation, was prompted by fraud
ulently naturalized Cubans, refugees, and other persons interested in severing
the connection between Spain and Cuba ; that I knew no reason to think that
the general population of the United States, still less the more enlightened
and patriotic classes, desired the possession of the island. ' ' And Mr. Marsh
referred, by way of illustration, to the pretense of French, and to some extent
of Italian, journals that the intervention of the Emperor Napoleon III. in
Mexico was rendered necessary by the ambitious views of the United States in
regard to territorial extension, and pointed out that "after the capture of the
City of Mexico by General Scott we were virtually in possession of the whole
country, and could have retained it if we had so desired, but that we volun
tarily surrendered it, retaining only California, and some other territory then
thought to possess little value, and paying to Mexico a large sum as an
indemnity. " The painstaking of Mr. Marsh to free Americans from the charge
of wanting more land seems to show that gentleman to have been more
amiable in his sentiments than accurate in his observations.

*r-.:~>~ .

\ <¦ ¦ .-- «•¦¦.. 4

CHAPTER V.
The Duty of Fair Play to the Spaniards of the Peninsula
and of Cuba.
Some Testimony That is Not Partial to Cuban Insurgents — Caleb Cushing on Inherent
Spanish Character — More Than One Kind of Our Naturalized Citizens — A List of Them
and of Claims — Conflicting Testimony as to Cuban Armies — Two Picturesque
Witnesses. There is no duty plainer in writing the story of the conflict between the
United States and Spain than that of showing fair play to the people who
were so signally discomfited, and whose weaknesses have been uncovered by
war. The Hon. Caleb Cushing had the lawyer's accomplishment of stating a
case for friend or foe with little reference to personal judgment, and he
always presented the facts that were the frame of his argument with a vivid
ness peculiarly his own. In April, 1876, he took occasion to say, in the
course of his correspondence with the State Department, that "all our
troubles with Spain have been incidents of the delirium tremens of anarchy
and revolution which seized upon her in 1868, involving civil war in Cuba, in
the northern provinces, indeed all over the peninsula." Mr. Cushing pro-
ceeded to say that all Madrid believed that "faulty as has been the adminis
tration of Spain in Cuba, most of the maladministration has been the logical
effect of the factious, ungovernable, and traitorous spirit and conduct of the
Cubans themselves, rebellious, as all Spaniards are prone to be, by their hered
itary national character." Beyond this it was alleged that "no repressive
measures would ever have been adopted in Cuba but for the frequent rebel
lions or attempted rebellions there in times of complete order, tranquillity,
and prosperity, as in 1823, 1829, 1837, and 1854, including the infamous acts
of Narciso Lopez in twice recruiting armed foreign adventurers to invade the
island, the worst of all forms of treason." This, however, is not the judicial
department of the kind of which Mr. Cushing is speaking, but is the presenta-
131

132 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
tion of one side — that which was bitterly wrong — by one who was for the
moment the passionate advocate of those whose case he was stating. In the
next paragraph Mr. Cushing says all Americans bear witness, after seeing
both Cubans and Spaniards that "Cubans are Spaniards, with all the faults of
Spaniards in aggravated degree; and whereas discontent is the habit in
Spain, and violence the ordinary manifestation of discontent — whereas in
Spain opposition parties systematically pursue the practice of quarreling with
any and all governments, however well-intentioned these may be, and deliber
ately provoking measures of repression in order to have pretext to declaim
against oppression and tyranny — so the Spaniards say it always has been in
Cuba." Herein, however, Mr. Cushing loses sight of the teachings of
American history. What he says of the excessive faults of the Cubans, would
have applicability and would not be quickly and confidently contested, if the
Spaniards had not been troubled in other colonies the same as in Cuba. The
Cubans are Spaniards as the Mexicans, Peruvians, Chilians, and the rest of
the free and independent States of what was once Spanish America were —
but it was not the delirium tremens of 1868 that moved Mexico, Bolivia,
Argentina, and all the rest of the American Spanish to rise up against the
Spaniards of the peninsula. The methods of Cuban rebellions were disagree
able in the extreme, especially when they followed the examples of the ways
and means of Spanish repression. We believe it to be true that the Spaniards
thought it a justifiable act of war to fire the cane fields of Cubans known to be
against the perpetuity of Spanish rule in the island, before Gomez carried the
torch through the provinces of Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio. Mr.
Cushing drew a picture of the state oi Spanish politics in a letter reviewing
the debate in the Cortes on the address to the king, saying it mainly con
sisted of easy exhibition of the inconsistencies, the errors and the crimes, the
tergiversations, pronunciamientos, treasons, and insurrections of which all
parties have heretofore been guilty, as, one after the other, they attained the
giddy heights of political power, or sank into the depths of angry, impatient,
and factious opposition. In these mutual recriminations of parties, in this
general settlement of political account between successive governments and
administrations — which has only served to show that all of them, as they rose
ascended on the ruins of their country, and, as they fell, left behind a deplor
able deficit of wisdom and usefulness to the debit of each — the home
government of Spain passed through all the disorders of the dissolution of

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 133
greedy and corrupt tyranny and in the colonial wars following the Napoleonic
occupation. The one binding tie in the peninsula became the oppression of the
American Spaniards. Hence, at last, the chaos Cushing sketches, and out of
a series of revolutions came an horrible confusion of cruelties.
In a general' review of the diplomatic .situation in Europe, written in
March, 1876, Mr, Cushing closed:
"I stand behind the players here and see the cards they are playing. It
is not our game. We can do much with Spain, but it will have to be done on
our own ground. We have no cause, in my belief, to expect aid from the
European Powers, not even from Great Britain. The problem rather is to
work out our own policy in such way as to avoid obstructions on the part of
those powers."
It was in 1878 that the Spaniards came to the conclusion, as the insurrec
tion had lasted ten years, and one hundred thousand regular soldiers could not
overcome it by force, that the rebels might be heard as to terms of peace with
out giving up their arms, and the result was the peace of Zanjon, negotiated
with the insurgent leaders by Martinez Campos. The latest and last of the
insurrections against the rule of the Spaniards broke out in February, 1895. In
the twenty years before the United States and Spain found themselves at war,
there had been in Cuba over thirteen years' warfare and less than seven of the
comparative reduction of flagrant disorders characterized as peace. Martinez
Campos was regarded as the great military chieftain of Spain, and his country
men did not care to inquire too particularly into the preliminaries to the peace
of Zanjon. He was commissioned as soon as the war broke out afresh in Feb
ruary, 1895, to put down the rebellion, and heavy masses of troops were
hurried from the peninsula to the island. The old field marshal of Spain
began his work with an appearance of confidence and exceptional vigor. It
was soon ascertained that the spirit of the insurgents was more implacable
than ever — that they had larger forces and better equipments, and were more
resolute and desperate than on former occasions — while Campos was in the
field there was sharp skirmishing — indeed, some of the fighting was the most
severe that ever occurred in the island, until the American army moved upon
Santiago. Campos made a strenuous effort to confine the scenes of warfare to
the three eastern provinces, as had been the case from 1868 to 1878, but
Gomez had a large following, horses were abundant, sugar carts numerous,
and there was food in the pastures and fruity forests.

i34 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
He did the unexpected thing moving west, and succeeded in opening new
, ions for devastation. Campos, with the utmost use of steamers and rail-
ays, and his superior forces, could not check the adventurous rush of the
swarm with Gomez, whose right arm was the indomitable Antonio Maceo.
The Spaniards were exasperated by their failures, and furious that the rebels
had broken all bounds and records. The flood marks of rebellion were wider
and higher than in the ten years ; and then Campos was not killing prisoners
in satisfactory numbers. He was attempting to carry on war according to the
usages of civilization, and that was not the way the Spaniards desired to make
peace. The prestige of the soldier faded rapidly, and there were fierce
demands from the volunteers, of whom there were eleven -regiments in
Havana alone, for more bloodshed, not in battle, but in executions. A change
was called for both in Madrid and Havana. Campos was recalled, and General
Weyler designated for the vacancy, Ex-Captain-General Marin serving ad
interim. The news of Weyler's appointment filled the Cubans with horror,
and at once the steamers for all ports on the Gulf, and for Key West, Savan
nah, Charleston and New York, were crowded with fugitives. Weyler was
already a man of terrible reputation. He had been in the ten years' war a
lieutenant-colonel in charge of a Spanish column, distinguished for the per
sonal havoc that was committed in its marches. He was boastful of his body
guard of black men, and always ready to receive men of color in camp or in
the palace. He was alternatively claimed as and accused of being a Repub
lican ! There were many stories of his personal participation in outrages of
an incredible nature, not a few of them physically impracticable. It is in this
sort of fiendish romance that Spaniards and Cubans revel, as the only ade
quate expression of their astonishing animosities. The evil most keenly
anticipated by the Cuban sympathizers in Havana from Weyler was that he
would issue decrees ordering and commanding all business men to show their
colors — to be explicitly for or against Spain in Cuba, and condone evasions
only upon spending their fortunes in bribes rather than awaiting the more
summary processes of execution and confiscation. Life and fortune might be
preserved for a time by this giving up everything on the installment plan.
The Cuban ladies were shocked by the very name of Weyler, saying there was
no safety where he was for the innocent. There was a panic, and when Weyr-
ler was announced at Porto Rico, there was wild haste to get away to
Yucatan, Venezuela, Mexico, or the United States. There was reported a

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 135
blood league among the Cubans, the purpose being the assassination of the
new captain-general the moment he set foot on the soil of Cuba. He was
duly warned but unmolested, and his safety was accounted for by the repre
sentation that those who had sworn to sacrifice themselves that the monster
should die, were convinced that such an act as the murder of a captain-
general would be injurious to the Cuban cause, and that the better way was
to stand well with sympathetic public sentiment.
There was little time lost in the development of General Weyler's policy.
It was rigorous and remorseless. He denied for a time the charges of
cruelty, protested that he did not approve as many executions as Campos had
done. His proceeding did not vary much from the regular course of Spanish
suppression of rebellion, but never before had the system of the Spaniards in
pacificating colonies been exhibited to the world in so strong a light. As the
line was drawn between those true and false to the peninsular Spaniard, it
became evident that the people of Cuba were almost unanimously against
Spain. On the side of the peninsula were the Spanish army and navy, the
swarms of office holders, and their subordinates, the volunteers given the
situations that should be occupied by the Cubans, the contractors and all busi
ness men who made money out of the war — the officials of all descriptions,
the sycophants of power, and those still striving by complacency to avoid the
rugged issues of responsibility. The Spanish army was so numerous that
garrisons were in all the considerable towns, and there were thousands of little
forts ; and some sugar plantations were paying taxes and assessments to Wey
ler and Gomez alike. The people at large outside the fortified lines were
against Spain, with few exceptions. Weyler could not get information about
the movements of insurgents, but there was not a Spanish column in motion,
that was not signaled. The stones in the road and the trees by the wayside
told from day to day of all Spanish activity. There was not a country store,
not a magazine for the rebellion — not a swift pony or a fat pig, a drove of
cattle or sheep, a tree full of fruit, or a potato patch, that was not contraband
of war. The country houses and villages that the insurgents spared were fired
by the Spaniards, and the massacre of domestic animals and destruction of
food supplies of all kinds, made way for famine. It was the Spanish policy to
make the country untenable by bodies of hostile irregulars.
The peasantry were not allowed to till the fields, and this was the answer
to the rebel burning of cane and tobacco. As the Cubans at large gave the

136 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
news of Spaniards moving about, the country people were concentrated
under the supervision of the regular garrisons. On both sides the conduct of
the war forced this result, and due accountability was not admitted by
either. Those who were wild for war between the United States and Spain
found fault with the Spaniards alone, and the first material undertaking in the
war by our country for humanity was in sending food to those perishing by
starvation and medicine to those wasted by the plague of fever. It was plain
to all observers that after all the sacrifices the Spaniards had made for Cuba
they would conquer the island only by the annihilation of the elements of the
prosperity that once had remarkable celebrity. Weyler's greatest military
effort was to pen Maceo in the west end, by a fortified line— trocha — twenty-
one miles long, the narrowest part of the island. Maceo broke through just
before his death, but when he was gone the western province was generally
quieted. There were the accustomed bulletins about the achievements of the
successors of Maceo, but there were none who answered that description.
The sheer weight of the Spanish columns was felt by their antagonists and the
strength of the rebellion had largely declined, though holding a great deal
of territory. There were symptoms of exhaustion all around, but on "Horror's
head horrors" accumulated. That the insurgents took a part in forcing these
dreadful issues is certain — for the devastation of plantations for five hundred
miles was the visible sign of the memorable campaign of Gomez, the Domin
ican Commander-in-Chief. The Spanish government, March i, 1897,
addressed to the Hon. Hannis Taylor, the American Minister, a communication
of explanation of the arrest of certain alleged citizens of the United States
captured and taken to Santiago de Cuba, suspected of being American spies.
When released they each claimed damages in the sum of ten thousand dollars.
The defense was that the arrest of these people was not for landing in Cuba,
but "at the beginning of a formidable insurrection," when "on every point of
the coast landed large and small expeditions — arrived from several ports
and shores of the Mexican Gulf. Many of those who afterwards took a
part in the rebellion as chiefs, rank soldiers, and scouts, came precisely
from Haiti, as is well known, using small crafts similar to that of the
claimants. In no other manner did the well-known chief, Antonio Maceo,
join the insurgent bands, and so great was the number of those who used
this means of coming to and going from the island that I do not consider it
venturesome to say that at a certain time there was a regular communication

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 13?
by means of small crafts and open boats between Cuba and the Antilles and
the nearest keys."
One of the most frequent irritations manipulated to increase the strain
upon the relations of the United States and Spain was the arrest by Spanish
authorities of naturalized American citizens. The Senate of the United
States, December 21, 1896, directed a report of all naturalized citizens
arrested since the breaking out of the insurrection in Cuba February 24, 1895.
There were seventy-four such persons. The Secretary of State of the United
" States, Mr. Olney, in sending the list, said :
"Passports, certificates of naturalization, registration in the consulates of
this government on the island of Cuba, and service on ships sailing under the
flag of the United States, having been alike accepted by our consular officers
and the Spanish authorities as prima facie evidence of citizenship, establishing
the rights of the claimants to the treatment secured to our citizens under our
treaties and protocols with Spain, it has been deemed advisable to include in
the subjoined list all persons of the classes referred to who have been arrested.
"Of the 74 persons arrested, 7 have been tried, namely: Nos. 1, 36, 70, 71,
72, 73, and 74. In the cases of 2 of these (Nos. 1 and 36) appeals have been
taken, and in the cases of the other 5, the Competitor prisoners, a new trial
has been ordered.
"Thirty-six persons arrested have been released after the charges against
them had been investigated and found to be baseless.
"Eighteen have been expelled from the island, after periods of confine
ment lasting from a few days to nearly a year in the case of Jose' Aguirre (No.
2); while 17 cases are still pending. The charges against 14 of the 17 are as
follows :
"Nos. 31 and 35, sedition and rebellion.
"No. 38, rebellion.
"Nos. 37, 40, 61, and 62, rebellion with arms in hand.
"No. 43, purchase and concealment of arms and ammunition.
"No. 53, disorderly conduct and insults to Spain.
"Nos. 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74, landing arms from Competitor for insurgents.
"In the remaining three cases (Nos. 35, 47, and 52), the nature of the
charges having not yet been ascertained, demand has been made both at
Habana and Madrid that they be at once formulated and communicated, or
that prisoners be released."

138 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
We present in full the list of American citizens, native and naturalized,
arrested and imprisoned in Cuba since February 24, 1895, to date, stating also
cause of arrest, charges, place of confinement, whether ' tried, released,
deported, or cases jDending :
1. Julio Sanguily, 49 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878; arrested
February 24, 1895 ; charge of rebellion; tried November 28, 1895 ; found guilty
and sentenced to life imjDrisonment; case appealed to supreme court, Madrid.
Was also tried on charge of participation in the kidnapping of the sugar planter
Fernandez de Castro, in 1894, by the late bandit, Manuel Garcia, and
acquitted. Tried for the second time December 21, 1896, for rebellion, the
case remanded from Spain, and again sentenced December 28 to life imprison
ment ; an appeal taken. Has been imprisoned in the Cabana fort.
2. Jose Marie Timoteo Aguirre, 52 years; native of Cuba; naturalized
1881; arrested February 24, 1895; charge of rebellion; confined in Cabana
fort; acquitted and deported September 6, 1895; went to the United States.
3. Francisco Peraza, arrested at Sagua, March 2, 1895 ; charge of partici
pation in the robbery of some cattle; released March 4, 1895.
4. Francisco Carrillo, 45 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1891;
arrested at Remedios on February 24, 1895, upon a gubernative order for not
having inscribed himself in the register of foreigners in any province of the
island; confined in Cabana fort; released and deported to United States
May 29, 1895.
5. Juan Roderiguez Valdez, native of Cuba; naturalized 1876; arrested
at Puerto Principe April 5, 1895; released April 6.
6. Justo Gener, 68 years; native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at
Matanzas April 6; released April 9, 1895.
7. Jose Maria Caraballo, 42 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1877;
arrested at Matanzas April 6; released April 9, 1885.
8. Manuel Fuentes, 33 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1889; corre
spondent New York World; arrested at Caimanera April 30, 1895; released
May 4, 1895, on condition that he return to United States.
9. Manuel Vargas, arrested at Remedios July 3, 1895; released and
expelled July 13, 1895; charged with being an agent of the insurgents, etc.;
naturalized. 10. Domingo Gonzalez y Alfonso, 42 years; native of Cuba; naturalized
1876; arrested at Quivican July 3, 1895; expelled Septembers, 1895, for the

GENERAL BLANCO, WHO COMMANDED SPANISH FORCES IN CUBA.

LA PERLA THEATRE IN PONCE, PORTO RICO.

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 141
reason that his presence in the island is a source of danger to the govern
ment. 11. Victoriano Bulit Perez, 33 years, native of Cuba, of American par
ents; arrested at Sagua July 12, 1895; accused of "proposing treasonable
acts"; released November 8, 1895.
12. Joseph Ansley, 56 years; born in Habana, of American parents;
arrested at Sagua August 26, 1895; charge, "presence prejudicial to peace of
island"; deported to United States September 21, 1895.
13. Aurelio Ansley, 34 years; son of Joseph Ansley. Same as above.
14. Luis Ansley, 30 years; son of Joseph Ansley. Same as above.
15. John A Sowers, 65 years; native of Virginia. Same as above.
16. Carlos M. Garcia y Ruiz, 28 years; born in the United States;
arrested at Sagua September 7, 1895; accused of attempting to join the insur
rectionists; released October 7, 1895.
17. Jose Martinez Gonzalez, 45 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1873;
arrested at Sagua September 12, 1895; charge of riding on railroad without
paying fare; no evidence against him; released September 19, 1S95.
18. Mariano Rodriguez Zayas, native of Cuba; arrested Habana Septem
ber 17; released September 19, 1895; naturalized; no charges.
19. Jose Martinez Mesa, 41 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878;
arrested at Habana September 17, 1895; released September 19, 1895; no
charges. 20. Eugene Pelletier, 42 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1877;
arrested at Cienfuegos December 5, 1895; charged with recruiting for the
insurrection; released, under surveillance, May 17, 1896.
21. Joseph J. Trelles, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Matanzas
December 24, 1895; released December 26, 1895; no charges.
22. Manuel M. (or W.) Amieva, 39 years; native of Cuba; naturalized
1878; arrested at Matanzas December 24, 1895, as a suspect; released Decem
ber 31, 1895; no charges.
23. Solomon, Chas. S., native of the United States, arrested and
released. 24. Marcos E. Rodriguez, 57 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1875;
arrested January 17, 1896, on board American steamship Olivette; charge,
aiding the rebellion, sedition, etc. ; released April 1, 1896.
25. Louis Someillan, Sr., 58 years; born in Cuba; naturalized Key

142 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
West, 1878; arrested January 17, 1896, at Habana; released April 1, 1896;
charge, aiding rebellion, sedition,, etc.
26. Louis Someillan, Jr., 36 years; born in Habana, son of above;
arrested January 17 at Habana; released April 1, 1896; charge, aiding rebel
lion, sedition, etc.
27. Ladislao Ouintero, born in Key West; made a prisoner of war
February 22, 1896, at Guatao, where he had been wounded by Spanish troops;
released April 11, 1896.
28. Walter Grant Dygert, 25 years; born in the United State's; arrested
February 23, 1896; imprisoned at Guines; supposed to be insurgent leader El
Inglesito; finally released and sent to United States April 24, 1896.
29. Rev. Albert J. Diaz, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at
Habana April 16, 1896, charged with forwarding rebel correspondence; con
fined at police headquarters; expelled April 16, 1896; accused of abetting
insurrection. 30. Alfred Diaz; brother of above; arrested, same charge; both of the
Diazes were released April 22, 1896, on condition of leaving the country;
went to Key West.
31. Joseph L. Cepero, native of Cuba; naturalized 1881; arrested
prior to January 20, 1896, on board steamer from Cienfuegos to Bata-
bano; case now pending before civil court Santa Clara; confined in Santa
Clara jprison ; charge, sedition, rebellion, etc.
32. Luis Martinez, arrested about March 1, 1896; charged with treason
able correspondence; released April 13, 1896, on $400 bail; naturalized 1873.
33. William A. Glean, native of Cuba, of American parents; arrested at
Sagua April, 1896; charge, rebellion; military jurisdiction inhibited in favor
of civil July 28, 1896; released and returned to the United States.
34. Louis M. Glean, brother of the above; same as above.
35. Frank J. Larrien, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Cardenas
May 15, 1896; case pending; charges not made known.
36. Louis Someillan, 58 years; native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested
July 7, 1896, for second time; charge, aiding rebellion; turned over to civil
courts, is confined in city prison; trial held January 8, 1897; sentenced Jan
uary 13 to imprisonment in chains for life; appeal taken.
37. Manuel Fernandez Chaqueilo, 19 years; native of Key West; cap
tured July 9, 1896; was the companion of Charles Govin; is in Cabana fort;

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. *43
case pending, under military jurisdiction; charge, "rebellion with arms in
hand. ' '
38. George W. Aguirre, 25 years; born in the United States; captured
by a Spanish gunboat July 10, 1896; case pending before civil court of Jaruco;
confined in Cabana fort; charge of rebellion.
39. Samuel T. Tolon, 45 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878;
arrested on board American steamer Seneca September 3, 1896; incommunicado
twenty-two days; charged with being a delegate to the Cuban Junta; released
and deported September 30, 1896; went to New York.
40. Oscar Cespedes, 20 years; native of Key West; captured without
arms in insurgent hospital near Zapata swamp about September 5, 1896;
imprisoned at San Severino fort, Matanzas; question of competency between
military and civil jurisdiction decided in favor of military; case pending.
41. Francisco E. Cazanas, arrested as suspect at Matanzas October 14,
1896; released October 16, 1896.
42. Alfredo Hernandez, 44 years; native of Matanzas; naturalized 1876;
arrested at his house at Habana September 6, 1896; suspicion of being
concerned in the insurrection ; expelled September 23, 1896 ; went to Key West.
43. Antonio Saurez Del Villar, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at
Cienfuegos September 5, 1896; charged with purchase and concealing of arms
and ammunition; case sent to civil jurisdiction December 23, 1896; in prison
at Cienfuegos; case pending.
44. Jose Curbino, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Rincon, Sep
tember 18, 1896; surrendered to military authorities without arms; released
and is residing at Santiago de las Vegas.
45. Joseph Austin Munoz, native of New Orleans; arrested at Matanzas
September 18, 1896; released September 19; claimed that arrest was by
mistake. 46. Ramon Rodriguez, native of Cuba ; naturalized; arrested September
20, 1896, upon requisition from governor of Matanzas; had been in insurrec
tion ; surrendered and failed to report regularly ; sent to Cardena and released.
47. Esteben Venero, 22 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1895;
arrested at Los Palos (Habana province) about September 22, 1896; charges
not stated; Captain-General asked for evidence of American citizenship on
December 9, which was sent him ; case pending cognizance of military or civil
jurisdiction.

i44 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
48. Adolfo Torres, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested October 4, at
Sagua; charges not stated; release ordered November 23, 1896, question of
competency not established; released November 26, officer remarking, "We
have no charges against you."
49. Esteben Cespedes (colored), born in Cuba; naturalized Key West,
1891; arrested October 13, 1896, charged with naniguismo (voodoo); expelled
November 7, and went to Key West.
50. Ramon Crucet, 48 years; born in Cuba; naturalized 1873; arrested
in Colon November 1, 1896; charges, public censure .of acts of Spanish
government; released December 18, 1896; no grounds of complaint.
51. Louis Lay, 18 years; native of Cuba, of American parents ; arrested
November 9, 1896, during a raid upon a social club in Regla; confined in
Cabana fort; case ordered to be transferred to civil court at Guanabacoa,
December 23; charges, aiding rebellion. Released January 15, 1897.
52. Jose Gonzalez, 63 years; native of Bejucal, Cuba; naturalized 1882;
arrested at Las Mangas November 10, 1896, taken to prison at Pinar del Rio;
charges not yet made known to consulate-general, Habana.
53. Theodore L. Vives, native of Cienfuegos; naturalized 1891; arrested
November 19, 1896; charges, first disorderly conduct and then insults to
Spain; case pending cognizance of military or civil jurisdiction; is confined
in jail. 54. Henry J. Delgado, native of the United States; captured about
December 10, 1896, at an insurgent hospital in Pinar del Rio province, after
having been ten weeks in a hut sick; sent to Havana to Cabana fort; removed
to hospital December 2S, 1896, where, our consul-general reports, he received
best medical attention; died in hospital January 19, 1897.
55. Gaspar A. Betancourt, 63 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1877;
arrested December 26, 1896, confined at police headquarters incommunicado
charged with sedition.
56. Fernando Pino Hernandez, 19 years (colored); native of Key West,
charged with naniguismo (voodoo) ; ordered to be expelled December 30,
1896; will be sent to Key West.
5 7 . Amado Pino Hernandez, 2 1 years ; brother of the above ; same as above.
58. Jos6 Antonio Iznaga, native of Cuba; naturalized; expelled in
August, 1896; no report.
59. August Bolton, naturalized 1893.

***«*

A PICKET SQUAD OF CUBAN SOLDIERS.

GENERAL CASTELHO AND STAFF.

PLAZA IN SANTIAGO, CUBA.

GROUP OF NATIVE WOMEN IN PONCE, PORTO RICO.

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 147
60. Gustave Richelieu, naturalized 1870; taken in a boat near Santiago
de Cuba about February 23, 1896; released from prison about March 1, 1896;
subsequently rearrested and recommitted for leaving Guantanamo without
permission ; consul considers second arrest an excuse for detention ; release
granted shortly after.
61. Frank Agramont, and 62, Thos. Julio Sainz, arrested with arms in
their hands, May, 1895; charge, rebellion; to be tried for armed insurrection
against the government ; Santiago de Cuba.
63. John D. Ferrer, no evidence against him; released March 23, 1896;
naturalized at New York, 1878.
64. Pedro Duarte; 65, Jorge Calvar, and 66, Ramon Romagosa, arrested
at Manzanillo for alleged conspiracy in insurrection; expelled August 11, 1896.
It will be noted that there was a strong tendency displayed by naturalized
citizens, whose names did not themselves declare American ancestry, to par
ticipate in the contested affairs of Cuba. In the case of the men who crossed
from Haiti to Cuba in a fishing boat, they obtained able counsel, and we find
it stated respecting the Spaniards, by this gentleman in a letter to the State
Department :
"The euphuistic palaver and the circumambient correspondence of the
Spanish authorities thinly veils a deliberate purpose to advisedly disregard
these obligations. ' '
This language of the counsel of naturalized citizens, it may be observed,
while possibly circumambient, is not cast in the circumlocution molds of the
curved palaver of stately diplomacy.
The claims stacked in the State Department, brought before the Senate
in January, 1897, were in the order following:
August Bolten, arrest and imprisonment ........$ 10,000.00
John D. Ferrer, arrest and imprisonment .... . . 25,000.00
Mrs. C. J. Diaz de Clarke, property losses  116,335.00
John F. Java, property losses . .... ..... 90,585.00
Jose" Ignacio Toscano, property losses . . . ... 15,000.00
Pedro Plutarco Ortiz, property losses  84,000.00
F. J. Cazanas, property losses  39,843.00
Jose" G. and Jose M. Delgado, property losses  178,534.00
J os£ Antonio Iznaga, property losses  156,500.00
Ricardo Machado, property losses  . 64,900.00

148 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
Francisco Seiglie, property losses . . . . . . $778,510.00
Jose Rafael de les Reyes y Garcia and wife, property losses . . 729,161.00
Frederick P. Montes, property losses .  160,000.00
George L. 'La.y, property losses  value of horse
Andres L. Terry, property losses  334,905.00
John A. Sowers, arrest, imprisonment, and expulsion .... 200,000.00
Perfecto Lacosti, property losses  652,900.00
Wm. A. and Louis M. Glean, imprisonment  150,000.00
Wm. A. Glean, property losses  4,668.00
Louis M. Glean, property losses  7,547.00
Whiting & Co., property losses  60,240.00
Mrs. A. L. Whiting, property losses  ^ 17,000.00
J. B. Carillo de Albornoz, property losses  36,000.00
Ignacio Larrondo, property losses  129,472.38
Cristobal N. Madan, property losses and personal injuries . . 88,000.00
Antonio A. Martinez, property losses .  35,000.00
Joaquin P. Cruz and wife, property losses .  70,000.00
George W. Hyatt, property losses  285,490.54
Manuel A. R. Morales, property losses  275,000.00
Peter Dominguez, expulsion  10,000.00
Teresa Joerg, property losses . .  2,500.00
James A. Glean, property losses  . 28,425.00
Peter S. Rodriguez, property losses  40,796.00
Antonio M. Jimenez, property losses  19,158.45
Pedro C. Casanova, property losses .  40,400.00
Pedro C. Casanova, personal injuries .  40 000.00
Walter G. Dygert, arrest and imprisonment  100,000.00
Frederick A. Libbey, property losses .  23,166.00
Jose1 M. Caraballo, property losses .  90,470.00
Jos6 M. Caraballo, arrest, imprisonment, etc  60 000.00
Angel Gronlier, property losses  34,779.00
Albert V. de Goicouria, property losses  130,000.00
Rosa A. Maragliano, property losses  30000.00
Juana M. C. de Maragliano  25,000.00
J. de Armas y Armas, property losses  69,525.00
Maximo M. Diaz, property losses  10 000.00

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. J49
Wm. W. Gay, expulsion  $ 25,000.00
Thomas R. Dawley, arrest, imprisonment, etc  100,000.00
George Fortier, property losses  32,450.00
L. F. Marejon y Marquez, property losses  15,000.00
Wm. G. Thome, property losses .  25,000.00
M. D. J. Garcia y Pino, executrix, etc., property losses . . . 200,000.00
Manuel Prieto, property losses ...  58,850.00
Gustave Richelieu, imprisonment . .  a fair indemnity
Miguel de la Vega y Gener, property losses  71,683.00
J. Sanchez y Coba, property losses .  16,290.00
F. J. Terry y Dorticas, property losses  202,952.50
J. C. de Albornoz O'Farrill, property losses  106,105.49
A. C. de Albornoz O'Farrill, property losses  130,703.12
Heine Safety Boiler Co. , property losses  27,316.80
R. M. y de la Cruz, property losses .  not stated
Francisco Rionda (Central Tuinucu Sugar Cane Manufacturing
Co.), property losses  527,480.20
Charles Rosa, property losses  882,840.00
Rabel & Co., property losses  75,785.00
Joseph M. Duenos, property losses  15,000.00
P. P. de Leon, property losses-  379,000.00
J. F. de Cossio, property' losses . .  20,000.00
Peter E. Rivery, personal injuries  suitable indemnity
Samuel T. Tolon, personal injuries  50,000.00
Samuel T.Tolon, property losses  100,000.00
Adolphus Torres, imprisonment  25,000.00
A. L. Terry y Dorticos and A. E. Terry, property losses . . . 81,888.00
A. E. Terry, property losses . . .  110,500.00
Frederick L. Craycraft, personal injuries . . .... 25,000.00
Thomas E. Rodriguez, property losses, banishment, etc. . . . 61,000.00
Oscar Giguel, property losses .  100,000.00
Jose Tur, property losses  251,500.00
Adolf o Santa Maria, property losses  120,803.32
Enrequita Santa Maria, property losses  94,953-32
Joseph M. Fernandez, property losses  61,115.61
Geprge Becket, property losses  75,000.00

150 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
Manuel F. Lopez, killing of son, S. N. Lopez  $100,000.00
Adolfo Torres, arrest and imprisonment  25,000.00
There was a great deal of Cuban investigation by committees of Congress,
the object of which seemed to be to persuade the American people that Amer
ican captives were subjected to indignities that must be compensated, and to
celebrate the glories of the armies of the rebellion. In truth, there were
several kinds of American citizens, and a large assortment of insurgents;
and any resinous wood that could be thrown where it would flame for
war was welcome and pitched on the fire. The American people need first of
all for their own sake, to sift the truth about the Cuban people, and see how
many of those who were so rapid to be naturalized citizens before the war are
faithful Americans after the war; and to what extent the Cuban Republic, as
it was magnified by the mysteries around it in the war, may claim that they
have acquired title to the country, for which they speak with and of authority.
As to the number of troops in the field for Cuba, Mr. Frederick W. Lawrence,
May 20, 1896, said: "Generals Gomez and Maceo have now under their
command in the neighborhood of 100,000 men, whose numbers would be very
largely increased if the men who desire to form them could pass through the
Spanish lines." The imagination of Mr. Lawrence must have been pro
foundly affected. He said: "General Gomez, with nearly 30,000 men, is
marching westward, and has reached a point in Matanzas close enough to the
city of Havana to cause great trepidation." This was a dream. Gomez
never had one-half of 30,000 men, and at this time was not marching west
ward, and there was no trepidation at Havana about him. Mr. Lawrence
thought Havana could be taken easily, and added: "In the opinion of mili
tary men whom I have seen, defenses of Habana are totally inadequate to
protect the city from an invasion on the land side." The only protection the
capital has from an attack by land are a few insignificant stockade forts
erected around the outskirts and garrisoned by poorly equipped, undrilled,
half starved volunteers, who, during the hours when they are off duty, may
be seen in the streets of Habana asking alms of citizens, like ordinary beggars.
It seems incredible that such men would succeed in holding Habana against
an attack by such fighters as the Cubans under General Gomez have 011 more
than one occasion proven themselves to be." It seems strange that an intel
ligent man could believe these assertions, that would be ridiculous if they
had not been a part of the war whoopery that was for a time a leading feature

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 151
with our public men who wanted war in a few minutes. If Gomez had 30,000
men, what happened to them when our 18,000 all told landed and lost
1,500 men, killed, wounded and missing, in carrying Spanish positions near
Santiago? Mr. Lawrence was deceived. The 30,000 troops of Gomez, the
nearly 100,000 thundering at the gates of Havana, were an array of impostures,
the object of which was to subordinate the United States to Cuba, and play
second fiddle to Gomez with the army of the United States. We fortunately
escaped from the consequences of the conspiracy of falsification, and we are
indebted to the solid sense of the President for the escape. There was good
' fighting done with slender forces in Pinar del Rio by Maceo, but Gomez
"Oriented" himself and was hors de combat. Where did he bury his 100,000
heroes, or what otherwise became of them? Mr. Lawrence was good enough
to add: "Up in the mountains the leaders of the army of the Republic have estab
lished ranches, where men are engaged in breeding and raising cattle for
food purposes. The raising of vegetables is also encouraged by the Cuban
commanders, and in addition to this means of subsistence they have the native
food plants that grow in wild profusion all over the island.
"From this it will be readily understood that no matter how long the war
should last, or how much privation they might suffer in other directions, the
Republican army will never suffer dangerously from lack of food."
They did not seem to be flush of provisions when they first struck our
troops in Santiago. We quote again from Mr. Lawrence :
' ' The Cubans have been accused of incendiarism in a criminal sense because
they have destroyed sugar cane, tobacco, mills, and plantations. They insist
that they should not be regarded as criminals, but that the orders which the
commanders issued for the destruction of the island were justifiable war
measures. "I have personal knowledge that in a great many cases the plantations
have been destroyed with the consent of the owners. In fact, a great number
of owners of plantations that have been destroyed informed me personally that
they had invited the Cubans to do so because they did not want to grind their
cane, and thereby supply revenues to the Spanish government."
The cane-burning was barbarian, inflicting immense losses upon the
Cubans, destroying the only chance they had of really providing a govern
ment.

152 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
The Rev. A. J. Diaz saw the armies of Maceo and Gomez — great crowds
of men, Maceo seven or eight thousand, Gomez ten thousand, and Mr. Aguirre
had an army.
"Q. Now, what class of people did that army consist of? — A. The best
class of young men in Habana, generally.
"Q. Do you mean the Province of Habana?- -A. No; the city.
"Q. Aguirre's command consists mostly of city boys, does it? — A. Yes,
sir. "Q. How many were there? — A. He had at that time about 2,000; that
was his escort.
"Q. He had others? — A. Oh, yes. He had in the province 10,000 or
15,000 men, scattered all over the Province of Habana in different camps.
"Q. Now, what kind of people did the army of Maceo appear to be? — A.
Very fine people, too; white people; doctors, lawyers, druggists.
"Q. Intelligent people? — A. Intelligent people.
By Senator Davis:
"Q. What kind of people were the private soldiers in Maceo's army? — A.
Well, they have some colored people, too — many — and they have some of these
intelligent people as private soldiers, a great many of them people who do not
want any rank; just wanted to be soldiers, just to do that in the democratic
line to encourage others."
There are fifteen thousand city boys from Havana, eh ! What happened
to them? What were they doing when Blanco was fortifying the city?
Senator Morgan wanted to know how many Spanish troops were in Cuba
in the May before we attacked Spain, and Dr. Diaz said:
"A. -I think they have in Cuba only about 70,000 or 80,000 soldiers. I do
' not think they have more than that.
"Q. How many have come there since this war broke out? — A. Nearly
150,000 to 180,000.
"Q. What has become of the balance of them? — A. Well, a great many
of them have been killed, and many of them have joined the rebels.
"Q. Joined the rebels? — A. A great many of them; yes, sir."
Dr. Diaz was hard at it to make up a rebel army of about 100,000 men,
but having mustered them in he has never been able to find ten per cent of
them. The mighty Cuban armies had arms! We quote again from the
examination of Dr. Diaz :

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 153
"Q. Do the Cubans get any arms and ammunition from the villages cr
people? — A. Yes; they get them from Habana.
"Q. How do they get them? — A. Exactly, I do not know the way they
manage it, but I know they get all they need."
Mr. William D. Smith was once a soldier in the United States army. He
was examined by Senator Morgan June 3, 1897. He joined Gomez, he says,
in the midst of a battle. The Cubans lost 68 killed and no wounded. The
Cubans dug up 180 dead Spaniards by order of Gomez, and reburied them at
once. He wanted to count the dead. Mr. Smith was a gushing talker. He said:
"There were 242 engagements I have been in with General Gomez, besides
little skirmishes I did not count. It is a dash and a few shots, and get out of
the way where they outnumber you. There were 242 engagements where he
stood his ground and camped on the ground of the Spaniards, the last engage
ment just a few days before I left, when General Gomez and General Weyler
met for the first time.
"Q. Where was that?— A. At La Reforma.
"Q. A sugar estate? — A. No, sir; not a sugar estate; it is a cattle range;
the most beautiful place, I think, in La Villias. It is General Gomez's favor
ite camping ground, because his son was born there.
"Q. How did the last battle wind up? — A. General Weyler withdrew the
troops and went to Puerto Principe, and Gomez camped on the ground.
"Q. How many troops were engaged? — A. Gomez had 1,500, or pos
sibly 2,000 — I am trying to get this as near right as possible — I do not want to
overestimate. The Spanish had 20,000 men — General Weyler had 20,000
troops with him.
"Q. 20,000 'in bodies within reach of each other?— A. No, sir; 20,000 men
right in the fight at one time ; not in a mass, in any one body, but he had
20,000 in columns. The fighting down there requires explanation. It seems
ridiculous that 1,500 men would stand and fight 20,000, but the Spaniards
always march in a column of 1,000 men and one piece of artillery — one cannon.
They came into Reforma in twenty different directions. The trap was being
laid by General Weyler to capture General Gomez. The General was cog
nizant of it for two weeks, and waited for them to come. The way he fought
those 20,000, he would have 100 men fight one column, and 50 men fight
another column, and 100 men fight another, and 75 still another column, and
so on, and he stood them off like that. I have known 10 Cubans to hold a

154 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
Spanish column of 1,000 men until General Gomez could get together his;
impedimenta and get out — hold them at a dead standstill. I account for it
by the reason that the Spaniards thought that there was a trap, an ambuscade,
and they would not run into it. That is General Gomez's tactics; he has done
it several times.
"Q. What is the area of that estate? — A. Between ten and twelve thou
sand acres.
"Q. What were the losses in the battle of La Reforma? — A. The last one?
"Q. Yes, sir. — A. The Cuban losses were 26, I think, killed, during the
two days' fighting.
"Q. How many days? — A. Two days.
"Q. How many wounded? — A. The wounded it is hard to estimate. We
never know the exact number wounded, because so many are wounded who
do not pay any attention to it. I saw one man wounded who was shot with a
Mauser bullet, which passed right through him, and we never knew anything
about it for two days. That seems almost miraculous, but it is true. I sup
pose you have seen that Mauser bullet. The lead is covered by some metal.
I can show you a wound that you would have said, if it had happened with
any other cartridge, that I would have had to have an amputation. One
went right through my ankle, and I was only in the hospital two hours — long
enough to have it done up. The bullet does not make any fracture. I have
never seen a case of amputation since I have been on the island, and it does
not cause septicaemia. There is the wound [exhibiting]. The bullet entered
here [pointing to his ankle], and came out there. I was never laid up a min
ute. The doctor in camp simply dressed it with iodoform and a little anti
septic. That is why I say it is almost impossible to give an exact account of
the wounded. "Q. About how many? — A. I should say 50 or 75.
"Q. What was the loss to the Spaniards? — A. Their loss was 180 or 185
killed, and the wounded we never know, although in getting here after leav
ing camp I ran across a practico — that is, a guide — and he told us he had
guided General Weyler's forces across the Rio Sassa, and he got it from the
soldiers that they had 300 or 400 wounded.
"Q. Weyler was in personal command on the one side and Gomez on the
other at that time? — A. Yes, sir; the first time they had ever met. The
New York Sun gave an account of it.

BATTERY F OF THE 5TH ARTILLERY.

EFFECT OF TORPEDO EXPLOSION IN "VIZCAYA."

A DWELLING IN SANTIAGO.

5.5-INCH GUN AND CARTRIDGE ON "VIZ.CAYA,"

THE MAJOR, HIS ADJUTANT, ORDERLY, AND WIFE.

PARTIAL VIEW OF THE ARSENAL, FACING THE BACOOR, IN CAVITE.

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 157
"Q. Where did Gomez's troops camp after that battle? — A. At Reforma,
on the battlefield. He has always marched over the battlefield since I have
been with him.
"Q. General Gomez is commander in chief of the Cuban army? — A. He
calls himself the general in chief. The commander in chief is Cisneros
Betancourt. "Q. Under whom does he hold his commission? — A. Under the Cuban
government. He has a diploma, the same as I have — I have seen it — only, of
course, with different names and grades.
"Q. Do all the officers hold their commissions from the civil government?
— A. Everything above a captain.
"Q. Does Gomez make report to the civil government? — A. Daily. They
may not get them daily, but there is a daily report made by Gomez to the
civil government. He makes them up, and every two or three days they are
sent by couriers. Of course, there may be a jump of a day or two.
"Q. Does he report for his own command or entire army? — A. For the
entire army.
"Q. The army, then, is divided into  ? — A. Into six army corps."
This old soldier should have been at the head of the literary bureau at
Key West. Examined by Senator Morgan, he said:
"Every Cuban on the island of Cuba, unless he has run away and got
under the protection of the Spanish government, is supposed to have a gun in
his hand or be working for those who have a gun ; and they do it with a roya.
good will. These men work ten hours a day; the pacificos go to the moun
tains and till the soil. I saw in Trinidad, where there were 15 or 20 acres on
the slope of the mountains where they have.cut the timber down and planted
sweet potatoes, and you can kick out sweet potatoes as large as that cuspidor.
I have not eaten a meal on the island without having all I wanted, and the
finest honey and beef and sweet potatoes. Gomez is husbanding the beef,
and I think he has enough to last time immemorial. They are only allowed
to kill what is actually consumed. The same can be said of the horses ; all
under the control of the Cubans are in depositos. He does not allow a soldier
to ride a mare, only geldings ; that is in case the war is prolonged, so that
they may have their horses. They systematically propagate horses, mules,
and cattle. "Q. From your knowledge of resources of Cuba and its power to produce

158 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
animal life, how long do you think that the Cuban government could sustain
an army of fifty or sixty thousand men? — A. Under the plan or system they
are working now, I do not know why they should not support it for ages. I
know that the cattle are apparently just as many as when I went there a year
ago, and more vegetables, because they have been accumulating them all the
time. The civil government works at that all the time, and there are more
of them than a year ago.
"Q. How are the women and children provided for? — A. Those in the
interior — their husbands, the pacificos — the rule is: The civil government
allows one man to provide food for every five women and children. These
can be five women, or one woman and four children, but it allows one man to
stay away from the army — or a portion of the time — one man for five women
and children. That is the civil law. And they have their houses in these
mountains, and they raise their pork and vegetables, and a great many of the
women work in the shops where they are making clothes for the soldiers. In
one portion of this shop there was a great number — I never counted them —
daughters of the Cubans in the field and their wives, in there making clothes.
I have seen 10,000 suits of clothes at one time, piled out there. That includes
a pair of pants, a coat, and shoes.
"Q. Is the Cuban army well fed? — A. The best I ever saw in any army.
I have not had a meal — and that applies to the army, when I say myself I
mean all — I have not had five meals on the island — — -
"Q. What? — A. There have not been five meals on the island when I
have not had my coffee and sugar. I say sugar ; sometimes we had honey in
place of the sugar 
"Q. Where is the coffee raised? — A. Certain kinds -of coffee grow wild in
this province of Santa Clara. In these Trinidad hills there is one vast forest
of coffee, where I have seen coffee on the ground two inches thick — on the
ground rotting.
"O. Is it good coffee? — A. It is fair coffee. It is not the best coffee.
Their best coffee is not the very best grade of coffee 
"Q. It makes a good, wholesome beverage? — A. Yes, sir; it is good
enough, so that when the soldiers don't get it they growl considerably.
"Q. You would say the army is well fed?— A. Yes, sir; I hardly think
that expresses it; they have luxuries.
"Q. Take the body of the Cuban army, the white people in it, are they

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 159
as intelligent as the average of people in the rural districts here — what we
call backwoods of the United States? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Are they patriotic? — A. As much so as any class of people I ever
saw. So much so that I not only heard General Gomez and the government
and the officers, but I have heard private soldiers talk. I will say that there
is not a man in the escort or in the Victoria regiment that I have not heard an
expression from similar to this: That before they would lay down their arms
they would let every Spaniard in Spain walk over their dead bodies, and they
would not accept anything but absolute independence. If you want to make
them angry, talk autonomy to them. They say they have been caught once,
but they will never be the fish to be caught again with the same bait. And I
have heard Gomez say that they should be glad to have the United States
recognize them, but that they will keep up the war until they secure inde
pendence if it takes twenty years to do it.
"Q. Is there any considerable proportion of native Americans in the
Cuban army? — A. I do not think there is over 20 in the arm)\"
Mr. Smith, once upon a time of Ohio, with a record of over two hundred
battles alongside General Gomez — in one of which 20,000 Spaniards under
Weyler were defeated by 1,500 Cubans — gave this account under pressure of
cross-examination of the escort of the famous Dominican chieftain :
"I was appointed a captain in Gomez's escort, where they are all officers,
appointed over the heads ' of old Cubans who have been in the service for
years — some of them with him in the ten-year war — appointed second in
command, jumping over all the others, and there is no jealousy of me.
'.'Q. About what is the strength of that escort? — A. From 70 to 90.
"Q. All officers? — A. Yes, sir. With the exception of myself, there is no
man in it who has got in except through some special act of bravery. They
are General. Gomez's body-guard. He goes into an engagement, and they are
first into the fight and the last to leave, and, by reason of that, I know they
have from 10 to 15 or 20 in the hospital, and they have nearly all been
wounded more than once. I have never been wounded except the once.
"Q. What is the strength of this Victoria regiment? — A. When it came
into Las Vegas it was 142 ; when I left there, the other day, they were all,
with the exception of 38, in the hospital, wounded."
Mr. Smith went so far as to describe Cubitos. The Cuban President, he
said, had headquarters at Nahassa — and proceeded :

160 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
"Q. The same place you call Cubitos? — A. It is in. the vicinity. Nahassa
is a very level piece of, country, a beautiful river running through it, and fine
grass for the horses. Cubitos is a little back of it."
It will be observed that Cubitos was the only place Mr. Smith did not
know all about, and Cubitos is the capital of this land of milk and honey, fat
cattle and sweet potatoes as big as cuspidors. But it is a "little back. "
Did the Cubans have a coast-guard? Oh, yes — to be sure they had — and
Smith told all about it, though he thought his talk might hurt. He said:
"There is a continuous guard of armed men around that island, called the
coast-guard. They are fully armed, with plenty of ammunition.
"Q. About how many men? — A. I presume in that coast-guard about
5,000 men. They fight if necessary, but it is a complete chain of guards.
Now, there are several reasons for that guard. The Cuban government has a
perfect line of communication, as I say, all through the island. They also
have a perfect line of communication with the United States."
Mr. George Bronson Rea, of Brooklyn, was examined June n, 1897.
He was an electrical engineer and newspaper correspondent,, and before the
war had charge of an electrical light plant. January 18, 1896, he took the
field with Gomez in Pinar del Rio. After being with Gomez for a month he
joined Maceo, was with him six months, and then slipped through the Span
ish lines, visited New York, and returned in January, 1897, to Cuba, and was
with Gomez until the middle of April. Asked how great an army Gomez had,
Mr. Rea said: "About 150 under his personal command — the escort and the
Victoria regiment — each about 80 men." The grand army of Gomez in the
province of Santa Clara was in "two divisions and various regiments." Mr.
Rea proceeded to give an intelligible story of Gomez's forces, at the time the
oratory of senators was seeking to subordinate the United States to this mili
tary pastmaster. "I can in one minute," said Mr. Rea, "give the total
accurately." This was a frightful menace, but it had to go! Mr. Rea said:
"This recent campaign of Gomez in the eastern part of La Villas has been
carried out by the first division of what they call the fourth army corps,
divided into three brigades: The brigade of Remedios, about 800 men; the
brigade of Sancti Spiritus, about 600 men; and the brigade of Trinidad,
about 400 men. There are three more brigades, composing the second
division: That of Cienfuegos, about 500 men; the brigade of Sagua, about 400
men; and the brigade of Villa Clara, probably 500 more. That is all in that

CUADRILLEROS, OR RURALGUARDS, IN THE PHILIPPINES,

THE PRINCESS PROMENADE, SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 163
province. In the province of Matanzas there are very few insurgents;
indeed, I think they could be safely estimated at about 400 or 500 men in the
whole province. In the province of Havana, probably at the present time
there are 2,000 insurgents. Last November — or October, I meant to say — I
was down in the province of Havana about one month or a month and a half,
and then there were about that number, and the force has not augmented.
Contrary to all stories as to their number, the force has not increased. I
left Maceo in Pinar del Rio with 6,000 men. The number of men in the east
ern part of the island is — what I have said already in regard to the western
part can be relied on, but in the eastern part of the island I would not like to
give any testimony to be depended upon as accurate — as to my opinion as to
the number of men, there are, I should judge, probably about 4,000 or 5,000
men in the two eastern provinces.
"Q. What provinces? — A. Santiago de Cuba and Camaguey. The total
I have not figured, but in my estimation they do not exceed 25,000 armed
men on the island. ' '
Of this 25,000 armed Cubans, four thousand were of Maceo's forces,
and they dwindled after his death. /
An effort was made by the examiners to show Mr. Rea was not the
friend of the Cubans, but he had simply been telling the truth, and put
down the land army of the Cuban commander-in-chief at one hundred and
fifty men in hand, the rest scattered so as to scare the Spaniards a little
everywhere. We quote the report:
"Q. As far as the Spanish were concerned, you were watched? — A. Yes,
sir; I suppose, if caught, I should have suffered the fate of Govin.
"Q. What did they do with him? — A. They chopped him up.
"Q. Have you any knowledge of that? — A.. Yes, sir; no personal knowl
edge. "Q. Whence is your information derived? — A. From two persons who
were with him; one Lieutenant-Colonel Mirabal and the other Colonel Gordon
— both dead now. They were in a fight between MaJor Valencia, who had 60
or 80 men, and the Spaniards under General Ochoa from Jaruco. It took
place near the sugar estate of Jiquiabo, and, as generally the case in a little
fight, the Cubans, after firing a few volleys, got out of the way, and Govin,
never having been in a fight before, found himself alone and the Spaniards
very close to him. They told me that Govin, when he saw he was to be cap-

164 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
tured, walked forward to meet the Spanish column to surrender, hoping his
American citizenship would help him in this case; but it seems that his
papers — parties told me who said they were watching and saw it done (but I
do not attach much importance to the statement myself, because I never saw
a Cuban that would stay near a Spanish column long enough to watch much)
— but they said the papers were torn up and thrown in his face, and he was
tied to another man and taken to San Mateo and kept there all night, and the
next morning as they were led out to march to Jaruco he was untied from
the other prisoner and fastened to a tree and chopped up with machetes. "
Govin was killed, Rea said, because he was an American. Rea added that
he did not carry a revolver, for he could get out of the way when the Spaniards
came "by keeping up with the Cubans." He once engaged in hostilities to
this effect, though a man of peace:
"I directed Gomez once how to burn out a locomotive, and that is all. I
took no actual hand in it; I told the old man how they could do it, and men
— Cubans — went to work and did it. That is as far as my experience in
helping the insurgents has ever gone.
"Q. What do you mean by burning out a locomotive — destroying it? — A.
Yes, sir. If the water gets low and the fire is kept going, it will burn out the
tubes and then it will not stand the pressure.
"Q. He had captured the locomotive, and wanted to destroy it? — A. Yes,
sir. He asked me how to do it — he knew I was an electrical engineer — and I
gave him the benefit of my experience.
"Q. Did you give him the benefit of your experience in firing dynamite
shells? — A. No, sir.
"Q. You knew how to do it? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did he ever ask for your assistance? — A. Maceo intimated as much
to me once or twice, but I thought I was not there to do that; I was there as
a neutral, and it was not my business. They have had a few foreigners come
there to show them how to blow up railroad trains and use dynamite
cartridges, and they have treated them badly, in such a way as to disgust
them and drive them away. A Frenchman came along and was to show the
Cubans how to make dynamite — and there was also a powder maker. Two
bombs were prepared, but the Cubans were jealous, as the bomb-maker was
going to get some glory, and so only eighteen men were sent to help him.
The bombs were exploded, and when the engine went off the track they had a

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 165
couple of hand bombs which they were to throw into the train, but when the
engine was derailed and the Spanish soldiers poured out of the cars the
Cubans got scared and ran away and left the Frenchman alone. He got
away safe, but was disgusted, and left them. "
Evidently the way Mr. Rea talked was not what the investigators
wanted, but the cross-examination helped the story of the witness.
By Mr. Morgan :
"Q. How many fights have you been in, did you say? — A. More or less,
about 80 ; not counting little shooting scrapes.
"Q. How many? — A. About 80, not counting shooting scrapes.
"Q. In how many battles have the Cubans held the ground? — A. I have
only seen the Cubans advance twice.
"Q. I only speak of holding the ground. — A. They may hold the ground
temporarily — for one minute or ten minutes or fifteen.
"Q. I mean after the battle is over. — A. They generally come back after
the Spaniards give up the pursuit.
"Q. After the pursuit? — A. Yes, sir. I was with Antonio Maceo in
those fights around Tapia, and we had about a dozen of them, hot and heavy.
He would wait until the Spaniards came up, and from one hilltop he would
hold them back until they grew too strong for him and then retreat to the
next hilltop, going back and back until the Spaniards would give it up after a
while and retire, getting tired of the conflict.
"Q. When they got tired, Maceo would come back? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Who would win the battle? — A. I would call it a draw. There is
one strange thing about it; I rarely saw a Cuban killed."
These distasteful accounts of Cubans are like those that came out of the
conversation of the private American soldiers who met both Spaniards and
Cubans at Santiago.
Mr. Rea was asked why the rebels ought to be in the open, as he had said
they were hiding themselves too much in Matanzas province, and he answered,
' ' To subsist, ' ' for they had to go to the cultivated zones for vegetables. Asked
whether it was not in those zones where people were starving, the witness
contumaciously said, "The starvation business has been exaggerated"; and
he proceeded to tell how the sweet potato — the boniato — would grow by itself:
"Q. Suppose the worst for the Cubans, can not they plant boniatos; and
when not assailed by the Spaniards can not they live? — A. Yes, sir; they can,

1 66 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
and to a certain extent they do, but in the province of La Villas they have
shown a wasteful spirit by eating all they have to-day, and never giving a
thought of to-morrow.
"Q. Maybe they want to prevent Weyler from getting it? — A. The
Cubans recognize, too, that they must have enough to eat if they want to wait
until the United States intervenes and recognizes them. ' '
Senator Morgan does not seem to have made much headway with this
young man. The examination proceeded :
"Q. Pinar del Rio — how did you subsist there with 6,000 men [Rea's
estimate of Maceo's forces]? — A. I left Pinar del Rio last year, last October.
The northern part of the province, from Mariel to a point called La Mulata,
cattle had about disapjueared. There were a few corralled in the hills by the
Cubans. Vegetables had completely disappeared, except those planted around
the Spanish forts. The cane fields had been burnt ; there was not a stalk of
cane standing. It was a devastated country in every* sense of the word. This
was not done by the Cubans, but by the Spaniards, to take away the fodder
for the Cuban cavalry, and the fire spread in all directions; to the thickets,
and palm grovee, and everywhere else. Antonio Maceo sent every three
nights an armed force of men with the impedimenta (two or three hundred
unarmed men) down near Cabanas to bring the boniatos out, or, in lieu of
that, they went to the zones of cultivation near the large fortified sugar
factories La Linza and Bramales, between Cabanas and Bahia Honda, where
there were also a few vegetables. In through the hills, at that time, Antonio
Maceo had quite a large number of vegetables planted. He was a very prac
tical man, who saw ahead more than any of the rest, and he took all the
impedimenta, probably 1,500 men, and he set them to work planting sweet
potatoes, so he must have had quite a sufficient supply to last him that cam
paign in the hills. Along the southern coast, or the part of Pinar del Rio
lying south of the Cordillera, there was quite a supply of cattle, and, in fact,
all south of the railway was grazing ground, and large cattle ranches were
scattered throughout the country, but I should not think there was many
cattle left at the present time, because the policy of Weyler, when he found
that he could not corner the Cubans, was to destroy their means of subsist
ence ; and all cattle found in the hills and 011 the plains have been killed.
"Q. About how many troops had Weyler? — A. About 40,000.
"Q. And Maceo about 6,000? — A. Yes, sir.

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 167
"Q. It appears the Spaniards, then, were engaged in raising potatoes to
feed Maceo's command, principally? — A. Yes, sir; in this case.
"Q. Whenever they got out of potatoes they sent out and got them from
under the fort? — A. That is right.
"Q. If I understood you correctly, there was never a battle-ground that
Maceo's command did not return to after the battle was over? — A. No, sir;
there were several occasions where he came back, especially in that country of
Pinar del Rio, where the hills are. In the open country he never came back.
I was with Antonio Maceo when he returned after the first invasion of Pinar
del Rio and had so many big fights in Havana province. There was where I
joined him, and during the month or more I was with him in this section,
there was a constant succession of fights, one after the other, and we could not
come back and camp where we were the day before. It was simply one con
tinuous skirmish, day after day, moving from place to place. ' '
One thing Mr. Rea did not approve. The insurgents in Matanzas hid
themselves in the swamps too much— "could not establish prefectos in Havana
or Matanzas provinces. ' '
"Q. Why? — A. Because the country is very open. They have a few in
the swamps, but in the provinces of Havana and Matanzas it is practically
impossible to hold a prefectora.
"Q. You say it is open? — A. It is the open country of that island.
"Q. Because the Spaniards hold the towns? — A. Because the towns are
close together and the Spanish columns are continually on the move, and
there are no hills and nooks where they can hide themselves in any force,
except along the southern coast in these swamps, which are terrible places to
live in. The insurgents cannot hold out in the province of Matanzas a day.
"Q. Is it not a fact that they are holding out? — A. Well, if you want
to immerse yourself in the swamp and stay there you are holding out, but
you are not doing anything.
"Q. But they are still there?— A. Yes, sir.
"Q. The Spanish have not driven them out? — They have driven them
off the open country* where they ought to be."
The judicial examiners stood up for the patriots immersed in the swamps,
and would not consent that those fighting by immersion were not conquering
heroes, though in hiding until they wanted beef they hooked it from the
Spaniards. Maceo was the real great fighting man of the rebellion. Rea

168 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
spoke of the concentration of the Cubans — of their forcing the Spaniards into
the towns at first. Asked to explain, he said :
"When the invasion reached the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio
(I was in the island from the time the revolution broke out), when the Cubans
reached these provinces, they found a large majority of the people living
there were Spanish storekeepers, clerks, etc., many belonging to the volunteer
corps. (All Spaniards coming to Cuba have to belong to the volunteer corps. )
If they have not served in Spain, they join the volunteers to free themselves
from the enforced military service which all have to suffer in Spain. Also in
Pinar del Rio the large bulk of the population are Canary Islanders, not
Cubans, and all stanch supporters of the Crown, and belong to the volunteer
corps. A large majority of the tobacco planters are also Canary Islanders, as
are also many of the sugar planters in Havana and Matanzas. The Cubans
commenced their career of — well, they really commenced the atrocities them
selves then. The Spaniards of the volunteer corps were taken and hung, and
the trail of Bermudez could be followed by the bodies of those who were hung
on the trees.
"Q. Did you ever see an instance of that kind? — -A. Yes, sir; two of
them — three of them.
"Q. Where? — A. The first was on the sugar estate of Santa Teresa, in
the province of Havana. The second — hold on, he was not a Spaniard, he was
a Cuban — I believe, near Rio Bayamos, also in the province of Havana. In
the province of Pinar del Rio, while I did not see them, I know of the case
where Bermudez hung 2 1 — everybody spoke of it — 2 1 to one tree, of these
Spanish volunteers.
"Q. Who was Bermudez? — A. Bermudez led the vanguard of Maceo's
army during the invasion. Bermudez was a bandit before the war, and is
called, among the people who lived in the fields, the Weyler of the Cubans.
"Q. What has become of him? — A. He is still there, if he did not die of
his wound, received just before Maceo crossed the trocha. I do not mean to
say that this was approved by Maceo, for when Maceo found that so many
people had been killed, he deprived Bermudez of his command.
"Q. It was done by a bandit? — A. An ex-bandit; but he was a colonel in
the Cuban army. <
"Q. He was deprived of his command by Maceo? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Because of these outrages? — A. Yes, sir. Antonio Maceo and all the

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 169
rest of these Cuban chiefs, when they got this invasion finished, or had
carried their revolution to the far western part of the province, started to
organize their various zones and appointed local chiefs. One of the first steps
of these local chiefs was to eliminate from the country people all those who
had Spanish tendencies. All who lived in the country who were in any way
suspected of Spanish sympathy and all who belonged to the volunteer corps,
were ordered to the towns and their houses were burned over their heads.
That started the concentration business. When Weyler began his concentra
tion, there was not a man living in the open fields who was not at least
morally, if not openly, a Cuban insurgent. A man to live in the fields has to
work for the Cuban government, and. plant vegetables for them, and he is,
technically, an insurgent, living under the laws of the Cuban prefecto, and he
has to acknowledge their authority or go to the town. They give no choice.
"Q. They do not kill him, but send him to town? — A. They do not kill
them. They have hung several for various little offenses.
"Q. What kind of offenses? — A. One fellow in the province of Havana, a
Cuban colonel — Col. Raul Arango — invited me once to a double hanging.
One man he had ordered to town, and had been seen outside afterwards, and
he was going to catch him and hang him 
"Q. Treat him as a spy? — A. I suppose so. The other man was to be
hung because he had taken cattle into town without permission.
"Q. Treated him as a spy also? — A. The cattle were his own. If they
catch any one who is giving help to the Spaniards they string him up.
"Q. The Cubans treat those who are not with them as the enemies of the
Republic? — A. Yes, sir. It was only recently, in the province of Villa Clara,
that I called Gomez's attention to it, and asked him what he meant, and if it
was his policy. Around the small town of Fomento the Spaniards had not
operated for a long time. It was about the beginning of Weyler's campaign,
in the month of January or February. There were probably 100 families, or
800 individuals, living within a radius of, say, 3 leagues of this town — all little
farmers, most of them Cubans and insurgent sympathizers working for the
cause. Many were families of the insurgents where the men were out fight
ing. To show that Gomez is bound to force this concentration business him
self, these-people were ordered several times to vacate their homes and either
go to the towns or to the hills. They did not obey. I believe the order was
given twice, and still they* did not notice it. Major Herrera — a Cuban major

170 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
— was given orders by Brigadier Bravo, of Trinidad, to burn the houses of
everyone and thus force them to move. The orders were carried out, and the
houses of these people were looted and burned, and their money and valuables
taken away by their own countrymen. These people left destitute, and a
great many, enraged at the treatment they received, went to the town and
joined the local guerrillas. I reported it to Gomez, and asked if that was his
policy, as he was always decrying the Spaniards for employing these methods.
He said: 'Those people would not get out of there, and I did it as a humane
measure. The humanity consists in forcing them to go away, because if they
stay there the Spaniards will come along and kill them. ' The idea is to get
the people out of the country. It is just as much to Gomez's ends as to those
of the Spaniards not to have too many people around. It is only because he
is at present in a- country where there are no people, or where there are no
pacificos living, that he is able to elude the vigilance of the Spaniards. This
policy was not started recently, but long ago, and Weyler has taken the same
precaution as Gomez had done previously.
"Q. Around what town was this? — A. Fomento.
"Q. After they had their houses burnt, they joined the guerrillas? — A. A
great many, as they were enraged at the treatment they received at the hands
of those they thought their friends.
"Q. Do you know — y*ou have had good opportunity for observing — have
you known any case where Gomez or Maceo, or any other Cuban general, has
caused prisoners captured either in battle or out of battle to be shot? — A. I
once had occasion to write about the conduct of Lieut. Col. Frederico Nunez,
in the province of Pinar del Rio. He captured five Spanish soldiers on the
estate Susi, near Cayajabos, and strung them up.
"Q. Did Maceo know of that? — A. No; he was very indignant about it
when he heard of it.
"Q. What did he do about it? — A. Reprimanded him, I guess.
"Q. What was the excuse for doing it? — A. I forget the excuse. There
was quite a little talk about it. He had some trouble with General Arolas at
the time, and there was something behind it; I could not explain.
"Q. Did he do it as an act of retaliation upon some Spanish general?
—A. No.
"Q. Because they were spies? — A. No.
"Q. Well? — A. He might have done it because they were spies. He

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. "171
captured them near the trocha, as Cayajabos was the first town outside the
trocha. "Q. How did Maceo know about them? — A. Nunez made the report himself.
"Q. Made the report that he captured them and hung them? — A. Yes,
sir. You asked me did I know anything. I have a copy of an official docu
ment of one of these executions, committed by a Cuban sub-chief without the
knowledge of his superiors. Here is a letter from Juan Ducasse, commanding
the southern brigade of the province of Pinar del Rio.
"Q. No, sir. — A. 'I have notice that you have verified some executions
in the district under my command without my previous knowledge  '
"Q. Who was that from? — A. Ducasse to his subordinate. 'I direct this
present letter to you so that in the future you will abstain from doing this
without filling all the legal requirements that are necessary in such cases.
Please acknowledge the receipt of the present letter. ' This was, as I say,
sent by Ducasse to one of his subalterns (Maj. Thomas Murgado) who had
caused a couple of pacificos to be executed.
"Q. In every case the act, when it came to the knowledge of the com
mander, was disapproved and rebuked — the man sometimes deprived of his
rank? — A. Yes, sir. In another case I had the confession of a man who did it.
Dr. Rojas Sanchez was a commander in Zayas's force. He boasted of having
been given eight prisoners to deliver to the Spanish authorities, and openly
bragged that only four got there.
"Q. Did he say he reported that fact to his commanding officer? — A.
No, sir.
"Q. He kept that concealed? — A. Yes, sir; to show that Zayas was acting
in good faith, when he made a big raid into the town of Esperanza, near Santa
Clara city, this same major openly boasted that he refused to go into the town
unless given permission to use his machete on all pacificos, and Zayas would
not allow him to go in, but ordered him to stay outside the town. A story
comes to my mind 
"Q„ A story I don't care about. — A. It is not a story; it was told to me
by two soldiers 
"Q. I don't care about putting in this record the stories 
"A. I am perfectly convinced of it."
It was a great point that the investigating senators did not care about
stories.

17* DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
"Q. How do you know any orders were given by any Cuban officer to
loot and burn, to machete the men, but respect the women? Do you know
that order was ever given? — A. I have heard it at La Palma. I have been at
attacks on towns, and I have heard the order to loot and burn the town, but
to respect women and children. The reason Maceo suffered such a defeat at
Palma was because he put in all his unarmed men to assist in looting, they
were so anxious to get clothing. His men were nearly naked.
"Q. You went as an electrical engineer when you first went to Cuba? —
A. Yes, sir.
"Q. How long did you work at that? — A. Until the year after the war
began. "Q. Establishing telegraph lines? — A. No, sir; putting up electric light
plants." There was much anxiety about Mr. Rea's occupation, but his answers
were clear and to the point, and the more he was examined, the greater
amount of truth, as in this case :
By Mr. Davis:
"Q. Do you not understand that those concentrados are mostly women
and children and old men? — A. I do not understand that at all.
"Q. Have you ever witnessed one of those places?— A. I saw just as many
young men as there were old men.
"Q. When? — A. Just before I came home — a few months ago.
"Q. Men that have come in from the country — Cubans? — A. I saw just
as many young men as old men. The Cuban who has his country at heart
— who was a patriot — went out during the first year. Those who have joined
during the last year have been forced out by various circumstances — by lack
of food, by persecutions of the Spaniards, etc. All the Cubans who had
money when this war broke out came to the United States, and are carrying
on the war from here. Leaving out those who rose up against Spain during
the first year of the outbreak, the men carrying on this war in the island are
those who could not help themselves or had no money to get away. This
insurrection was going on for a year in the provinces of Camaguey and Santa
Clara, and those in the west did not have the nerve to take up arms.
"Q. Did you ever have any difficulty with Gomez? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What was it? — A. It is quite a long story. General Gomez and I
were very good friends until — I do not say he is a bad friend of mine now, but

DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 173
he treated me very badly. He did not treat me as he had others. He
treated Scovil much better. He offered him twenty men to help him get
through, and did not offer me any.
"Q. What do you mean by impartial manner? — A. He showed partiality
to the others.
"Q. In what month or in what year did this partiality begin? — A. When
I first met the old man.
"Q. What other correspondents were in the camp? — A. Sylvester Scovil,
correspondent of the World.
"Q. He treated him better than you?— A. Yes, sir.
"Q. That continued until you ceased all relations with him? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Now you can go on and make any statement you want to. — A. I had
been away from him to Trinidad. I saw things that astonished me — that
ought not to have taken place in the Cuban government. I saw many things
that would work against them if printed and prove detrimental to their char
acter. Among other things Smith and I witnessed — not exactly witnessed,
but we were within half a mile of the town of Paredes. At 1 o'clock at night
the Cubans attacked the town. There were 16 Spanish soldiers in the garri
son — in one fort 5, in another 9, in another 2. They attacked the town and
captured two forts, and there were but 5 Spaniards to deal with, when some
one raised the cry, 'Here comes the Spaniards,' and they ran out of the town,
leaving their dead and wounded. The Cuban commander made a report to
Gomez, saying he had gained a big victory, while exactly the opposite was the
case. He left his dead and wounded in the streets and ran away. Also,
Smith and I had experience with the 'majas' or unarmed men, who live in the
hills and steal the food from the pacificos and respect no one's authority. We
also had seen several cases on the part of the government prefectos, who
would not attend to their business. When I got to Gomez's camp, the old
man asked me, very honestly, 'How about your trip?' I said, 'I have not
enjoyed it very much;' and I went on to explain what I had seen. I told the
old man, for his benefit, what I had seen, and Smith did also, and the old man
was quite interested until finally he got mad and walked away ; and I talked
some with the other officers and made some criticisms on what had passed and
that they did not know anything about. Gomez came to me after supper
when I was passing through the camp, and said, 'What do you mean, Mr.
Rea, by telling me all these things that you saw on that trip?' In the after-

174 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS.
noon before that he came to me and said, 'You have told me these
things, I suppose, because you sympathize with me and want them cor-'
rected.' Afterwards he called to me and asked what I meant by it, and I
told him again what I had said before. He said it was not true, and I told him
it was not my habit to lie.
"Q. Was Smith in the camp? — A. Yes, sir..
"Q. Did you call on him to corroborate you? — A. No, sir; Smith is
afraid of the old man. Gomez said, 'What did you mean by saying my
brigadier made a false report?' and I said that he did make a false report if
he had said that he won a victory, after he had run away and left his dead
and wounded. He said, 'What do you think of it, and what are you going to
write about it?' I said, 'I am to write the truth,' and he said that I had no
business to write the truth.
"Q. Did he make any point that you had made the same statements that
you made to him to the various men in his command? — A. No, sir; the various
men in his command have made these statements to him. He got very mad
about it, and said that if I wrote these stories he would shoot me. I looked at
him in surprise. I thought perhaps the old man might take it into his head to
do it then. I said that it was a pretty serious thing to shoot a man, especially
an American, and he answered that as the United States or nobody else had
recognized him as a belligerent, and his status was that of a bandit, he would
shoot me, and that he could not be held responsible. After awhile he calmed
down, and we parted very comfortably. In the morning Gomez, in the front
of all his forces, started again on the American Congress, the New York
Herald, the American public, Grover Cleveland, and everybody else, and I
told him I could not stand it any longer. He said all we cared about it
was what we could get out of it or the money we might make.
"Q. What did you say about that? — A. I said he was way off — that is not
exactly what I said.
"Q. Give us exactly. — A. I said, 'General Gomez, you are very unjust.
You very well know that if the United States should set its foot down, and cut
off your chance of getting arms and ammunition, your revolution could not
last' "Q. Was that between you and Gomez alone? — A. No, sir; the whole
army was there — that is, the whole of the army he had, 150 men and staff.
"Q. They heard it all?— A. Yes, sir. After it was all over they came to

DUTY OF FAIR "PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 175
me and tried to smooth it over. I said they could not smooth it over until
the old man apologized. Smith was there, and was very mad. He went up
to Gomez and told him that he must stop abusing Americans or he would
resign. "Q. Did he give a reason for this? — A. Because he had insulted the
nation and Americans.
"Q. Smith did not show he was very much afraid of the old man, then?
— A. No, sir.
"Q. He didn't like it?— A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you leave Gomez after this incident? — A. About an hour after
wards. "Q. Did you leave his camp then? — A. About an hour afterwards.
"Q. Did you report these facts to your paper? — A. To the paper, yes,
sir; I did not publish them. I did not know whether I was right in publish^-!
ing them or not. The old man made these remarks to me, and raised the
dickens for no cause whatever. He was quite put out because, I suppose, the
old fellow thought we ought to have been arrested and put in prison by the
Spanish government, so as to raise an issue between that government and our
own. "Q. Did you say anything about the partiality he had shown to other cor
respondents? — A. No, sir; I never said a word about it. He was comparing
me with the other correspondents. He said that it would be a very good
thing if Scovil or I were arrested, and then the United States government
would get into trouble with Spain in regard to it, and he made the same
remark that morning, and he made a comparison between Scovil and myself,
and I said: 'General, the day I get arrested by the Spaniards, I don't think it
will cause a war that will redound to your benefit. '
"Having read and corrected the above statement, I hereby sign the
same. GEO. BRONSON REA,
"355 Sixth Avenue, Brooklyn, N. Y."

CHAPTER VI.
The Two Sorts of Spaniards in Cuba.
The Food Supplies in Cuba — Introduction of the Torch by the Insurgents — Garcia's Fine
Army with an Engineer Corps — The Double Tax on Sugar Making — Spanish Methods
of Making War — The Policy of Annihilation — A Government in Light Marching Order.

The importance of Mr. Rea's testimony is in the fact that it has been
substantially confirmed by the revelations made in the American conquest of
Cuba. The insurgents have been found generally as Mr. Rea represented,
with the exception, perhaps, that he was occasionally excited by his sense of
humor, and as the cue of the Commission was to deal with the Cubans as
saints and martyrs, this exuberance was discouraged. However, the efful-
gency of Mr. Smith may be accepted as compensation. The Spaniards and
the Cubans made war upon the same general principles, with the exception of
the treatment of prisoners and wounded. The cruelty of the Spaniards in
dealing with those combatants was systematic and rarely allowed an instance
of mercy. The Cubans as a rule did not torture helpless enemies, and they,
seldom "chopped up" prisoners, but the humane purposes of the leaders were
often evaded. It was plain policy on the part of the Cubans to deal tenderly
with the disabled and spare those who had surrendered, for they hoped to
have their hospitals respected. Dr. Diaz states as within his personal knowl
edge that Martinez Campos favored the ministrations of the Red Cross, but
Weyler held charitable attention was due Spaniards only. Cubans, however,
used the torch without hesitation, and at last were mad with the illusion that
when property was destroyed the Spaniards were the exclusive sufferers. The
Cuban zeal for everlasting war faded perceptibly during the last year of the
struggle. Mr. Rea estimated that when Maceo's western army gradually
disappeared after the fall of their one magnetic leader, there were not more
than twenty thousand Cubans in the army, while the whole force of the Span
iards was not less than 135,000 men. Mr. Rea was asked the question:
176

THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 177
"Q. Have you any way of accounting for the fact that the Cubans —
according to your estimate being only 25,000 strong — have been able to pre
vent the 135,000 Spaniards from running over and destroying them? — A. You
cannot lick a man if he will not let you, or if he runs away from you all the
time. "Q. Cuba is bounded by the sea on every side, and is patrolled by the
navy of Spain? — A. There are a great many hills and woods, etc. A body of
1,000 men does not take up much space. That is the reason Gomez has divided
his men into bodies of about 150 men, so he can get into the woods.
"Q. If his force does not shrink considerably, how long can he protract
this struggle? — A. As long as he has anything to eat.
"Q. What are his resources for feeding his forces? — A. When I left the
province of La Villas, .two months ago, the eastern rjart, where Gomez is, had
quite a. large number of cattle, owing to the reason that it is a grazing coun
try, quite the reverse to the western provinces, which are devoted to the
culture of cane and tobacco. The eastern provinces of La Villas and Cam-
aguey are devoted to cattle and grazing, the eastern part of La Villas espe
cially. While he had plenty of cattle to last him, economically, for about a
y*ear, he had no potatoes, no vegetables, of any account."
In Matanzas there were practically no insurgents. The few existing took
refuge in the swamps, and subsisted chiefly on a species of jutia or racoon
and crocodile steaks — no vegetables and no cattle, except as they could forage
on the Spaniards. There were wild dispatches, however, day by day, about
the wonderful war going on in Matanzas.
The most unreserved of the admirers of General Gomez is Capt. W. D.
Smith, who was also an admirer of Garcia, and gave in his sworn testimony
the account of the army of the "Oriente" :
"Garcia has the finest equipped army* on the island. His chief of staff is
General Menocal, a very good engineer, who speaks very good English. He
has organized an engineer corps; he has got a signal corps; he has got his
cavalry and his artillery, and his engineer corps is pretty fine, too. It is right
up to date. Any one who ever told me before I went down there that the
Cubans had a good engineer corps I would have laughed at him, but it is
true. ' '
The insurgent troops that came out of the woods at Santiago were there
fore the very flower of the Cuban army. Smith bestowed upon the Cubans,

178 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA.
finding what was wanted, more than 60,000 men, saying, "They can put in
the field a little over 60,000 men." As for Gomez personally:
"General Gomez called me the morning I left there, and said: 'I want to
speak to you. There have been false reports, and some may say to you that I
have been sick.' Gomez is a man over 70 years old. He put his hand on the
pommel of his saddle and vaulted right over, and put his other hand on and
vaulted right back again. He said to me, 'You do .that,' and I told him that
I had business elsewhere. 'A sick man cannot do that, ' he said. "
The way Gomez harassed the Spaniards is thus, according to Captain
Smith :
"Just the moment Gomez gets news that a column has left Sahcti
Spiritus or any other fort he marches toward that column and they meet. I
have never known Gomez to lie idle when there was a Spanish column out;
when they meet there is a fight right off. At night the Spaniards halt, and
Gomez retires a mile or so. The Spaniards dare not put out a picket at night ;
their only guard is in their camps. Just as quick as dark comes, Gomez
details an officer with 15 or 20 men to keep that camp awake, firing into them
all night, and then at daybreak Gomez attacks the camp, and so on, and they
are fighting all day and night, and so on. Whenever they go into camp there
are 15 or 20 men more keeping them awake all night, and the result is that
the Spanish troops are exhausted, and obliged to return to the town for
rations or from fatigue.
"Q. The Spanish commanders are obliged to go back for provisions? — A.
Yes, sir.
"Q. Is the island of Cuba, in the places which were not cultivated, heavily
timbered? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Forests dense? — A. Yes, sir; some of the finest forests the eye ever
saw ; thousands upon thousands of acres of the finest mahogany, stretching as
far as the eye can see. ' '
Mr. Stephen Bonsai, journalist, described the policy of the concentration
of the peasantry. The orders were issued October, 1896, and, "Every peasant
and every person living in the four western provinces outside the garrison
towns were driven into stations of concentration, their houses were all burnt,
their crops and the palm trees destroyed, all the roots that grew — yams, etc.
— were dug up, with the idea, many of the officers told me, to rob insurgent
bands in these so-called 'pacified' provinces of the means of subsistence."

CITY OF SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.)

STREET OF THE CROSS, SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.)

THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 181
In the four western provinces there were twenty sugar estates protected,
by regular and irregular Spanish troops, paid by the sugar men. Where
there were twenty sugar estates, there had been 200, and: "You go along
through the western provinces and you can see the standing chimneys" — all
the great machinery burned ! There is a close relationship that should be in
mind between the sugar estate burning and the concentration abomination.
No matter how much the Spaniards were paid to protect the sugar estates,
they were burned unless the rebels were paid also. That is, there had to be
"two taxes paid to the two governments." Mr. Bonsai say's sometimes a
man who paid a thousand soldiers would refuse to pay the Gomez tax, and
"the crop was always burned." This happened to an American named
Stillman. "He was somewhat sluggish and his crop was burned." This was
the bottom of the policy of the insurgent commander in chief. He would
allow the Spanish to make sugar if the cause of liberty got a share of the
blackmail that was impartial as it was infamous.
Mr. Bonsai was asked whether the payment of sugar protection was an
open bargain, and he said:
"It was a bargain. It was arranged at the palace in Havana, and they
had to pay extra- there. It was a written contract. They had to juay extra to
keep the comandante sweet. It cost them a pretty penny to have this garri
son. Every man had to — the way they did this, they would have these places
declared strategic points. That was the way the Spaniards would excuse the
fact that they were having large bodies of troops in places where they were
absolutely of no use. So Mr. Atkins or the sugar planters would go to
Havana and have breakfast with the Marquis Palmerola, and have a talk,
and have their places declared a strategic point, and the Captain General
would order a certain number of troops there until further orders, with the
understanding that the proprietor would pay so much bounty. I visited one
estate where there were a thousand men.
By Mr. Davis:
"Q. What estate? — A. Azpeztequia, on the southern coast, belonging to
the Marquis, now in Madrid, and who belongs to the constitutional or tory
party in Cuba. It had eighty forts defending it.
"Q. Eighty forts? — A. Fortines. They look like forts in Sebastopol, a
game we used to play when I was a boy 
"By Mr. Morgan:

i82 THE. TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA.
"Q. Did you learn whether this destruction of sugar plantations was the
work of one side exclusively or both?— A. I think it was both sides. It is a
rather difficult question, because they have each changed their policy. The
Spanish idea the first year of the war, the last campaign, as announced over
his own signature by Mr. Dupuy de Lome, was to make the sugar crop.
That was to show that the revolution was merely local and of little impor
tance. This letter was published in the New York Herald, being the ideas of
the representative of the Spanish government in the United States, and at
that time they took steps to protect the sugar estates to the best of their abil
ity. Azpeztequia was the first man to fortify his estate. As soon as they
found out, as they did a year and a half ago, while the first sugar crop was
making, that even the most loyal Spaniard, being a business man, was per
fectly willing to pay 50 cents a bag for the sugar he made to the insurgents, or
to the Cuban prefecto — when they found out that the people they were pro
tecting were paying taxes into the patriot treasury they concluded it would
be a good thing to destroy all the sugar.
"By Mr. Davis:
"Q. By 'them' you mean the Spanish? — A. Yes, sir. This year they
have done nothing for the sugar people, because they knew all the sugar
people, whether American, French, German, or the most loyal Spaniard,
were paying tribute on their prospective crop to the insurgent local repre
sentatives. It is so easy to burn cane. One man can burn cane, and 4,000
can not stop it. So the policy of the Spanish government in Cuba on the
sugar question changed entirely. Last year it was to make the crop ; this year
they think to hurt the Cubans more by destroying it."
It should be carefully observed that the cane conflagrations became so
fashionable that the Spaniards participated like the others, but few people
have reflected that in this war with the torch, the incendiary San Domino-o
method of destroying all that fire w*ould burn, the worst of the atrocities of
the war had their origin — and Weyler and Gomez will be held participants in
the crime as far as history enlightens men. Mr. Bonsai said in his evidence
about the perishing people crowded around the Spanish garrisons — a horrible
example being at Matanzas:
"Judge Day asked me two or three days ago, I do not suppose confi
dentially, what would happen if the Spanish government should change its
policy and drive these people back to the places whence they came. I said

THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 183
that many would die on the way ; that many more would die of starvation after
they arrived.
"Q. And very few would survive? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. So it is death to stay, and death to go back to their homes? —
A. Yes, sir."
It does not occur to ever3*body, as it certainly should, that this horrible
system of warfare never was known in Cuba until General Gomez led his
columns five hundred miles through the island, burning plantations; the Cuba
Libre journals in New York setting forth in glowing terms that the ruddy
skies were the token of the triumphant progress of the liberating army.
There was no devastation like this in the ten years' war from 1868 to 1878!
That was comparatively civilized. The firebrand was thrown in 1896 in
the name of freedom, and the end was blackmail, famine, pestilence, and
death. The leaders in this were not the Spanish, but the Cuban officers.
The Spaniards did not at first throw fire, but they followed the San Domingo
example and became destroyers, as the insurgents were. The very Cubans
who began this desperado work, complaining bitterly because their own fashion
was imitated, are the foremost and most venomous of the enemies of the United
States, insisting that their government of shadows and army of false pretenses
must be consoled with money for the horrors they themselves so largely
originated. The Spaniards are said to have avowed that they had a policy of
extermination. This is in Mr. Bonsai's testimony:
"The Spaniards say that the policy of what they call 'kindness' has
failed, and that now they have quite made up their minds that the only thing
is extermination ; that there will never be peace on the island as long as there
are any of these Cubans left, or any considerable number of them.
"Q. The policy is then to exterminate? — A. Yes, sir; and they are not at
all squeamish about admitting it.
"Q. They propose to destroy the peasant population? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And then to repopulate with Spanish? — A. Yes, sir. They have
already exterminated one race, and Las Casas tells how they did it. They
will probably follow the same methods with the Creole race.
"Q. None of the Indians are living? — A. No, sir; within forty years of
taking possession by the Spaniards, the Caribbean or Giboney race quite disap
peared, although they had numbered 400,000 or 500,000, in a generation and
a half."

184 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA.
But why did the Cubans introduce into this war the lurid features of bar
barism, the firebrand with which the meanest savage can lay in ashes the
proudest monuments of civilization — the greater achievements of art, the
grandest realizations of the creative forces of industry? "The Cuban
Republic" has this question to answer before the people of the United States,
who have now to deal not with the peninsular Spaniards, but with Spaniards of
the island who are not an improvement on the old stock. We know well how
freely the Spaniard has shed blood, how he has for a century stained his
colonies with red rivers, how cruel, haughty, revengeful he has been, but
what we want to ascertain absolutely now is whether he has precedence as an
incendiary and freedom reached by sacrifice of fire? By whom. was laid waste
the production of one million tons of sugar per annum in Cuban plantations?
The peninsular Spaniards did not do that savagery. Mr. Bonsai said:
"General Weyler is not unpopular among what you might call the most
powerful section of the Spaniards in the island of Cuba. On the contrary, he
is quite popular. He is just the man they want. They believe with him in
command this policy of extermination will be carried out to its logical con
clusion. I remember, in Santa Clara, in the Club of Merchants, in the town
of Santa Clara— it was at the time when it was proposed that Gen. Martinez
Campos should come to Cuba — they said to me, these men of influence,
unanimously, that 'if Martinez Campos comes to the island of Cuba- and
makes any proposition of compromise, as he had before, we will shoot him in
the streets of Havana. We do not want General Weyler removed, because he
is our man. He is bloodthirsty, and he is the man we want.' "
Certainly! The tale of bloodthirstiness is the old, old Spanish story, and
Weyler was a man of blood. But was he the first of the firebugs in this war?
Why deny Gomez the credit of the premier firebrand policy? Dr. F. B. Winn
said there were 4, 700 insurgent troops at his time in Havana province, and
the concentrados numbered about 80,000 "paisonos — farmers."
"Q. What class of people constitute these concentrados? — A. Small
farmers, renters, what we would call in this country*, I suppose, tenant
farmers ; a good many storekeepers. Out there they have these small stores
scattered all over the country. It is a very old country, and near the sugar
plantations or in the thickly settled community they would have five or six of
these small grocery stores to sell groceries, small articles, and drinks, etc.  to
sell everything; and those people have been scattered and their stores burned.

MARKET WOMEN OF PORTO RICO. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.)

ifeC

A PORTO RICO COUNTRY HOUSE. (Copyrighted, 1898, by J. M. Jordan.)

THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 187
They are loyal; but the greater part of the concentrados are little farmers who
were unable to get out of the island, and did not care to join the insurgents,
and wanted to get to town ; lived in bad houses, which the Spaniards burned.
The Spaniards burned all these houses, all the wooden houses.
"Q. Was that generally through the province of Havana, the burning of
houses of the common people? — A. Complete; all burnt; none left standing.
"Q. None at all? — A. None at all; not a house left standing outside of
the fortification. ' '
This was the first of the Spanish answers to the sugar plantation firebug
crusade. The famine followed.
"Q. Are these little palm leaf huts furnished with any furniture or con
veniences for living? — A. No, sir. Some have a chair — you can get a chair
pretty near any place in the island. I could camp any place in the province
and have a chair to sit down on in five minutes. The whole island is strewn
with chairs, sewing machines, tables, and household articles, etc.
"Q. Broken out of the houses? — A. Yes, sir. These concentrados can
not come out for them, and they make their chairs and provide the houses
pretty well.
"Q. By whom has this wreck of the houses been conducted and carried
on? — A. The large stone houses, of which there were a good many in that
province — the wealthy people's houses — were destroyed by the insurgents, as
they regarded them as possible fortifications for the Spanish army. The little
wooden houses, the small houses, were destroyed by the Spaniards."
Dr. Winn gave a most interesting and important account of the "sur
rendered people, " saying:
"They are people who came to America, ran away from Cuba to America,
and came to the Junta and were a charge on the Junta, and to get them off
their hands they sent them back to the insurgent lines. For the most part
they were young men who lived in Havana; dudes, as we would call them
here; some bachelors, with a diploma from a college. They would come back
to Cuba with their diplomas and call themselves captains, majors, and colo
nels, and they would come up and represent themselves to the men who have
been fighting in the field for two years, and they would say: 'We come from
the Junta, and you get us a horse and a negro and we want commands in the
army, ' and the officers would say : ' You get yourself a horse and a negro, if
you want them, and get to fighting, ' and they would fight for a day or two,

188 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA.
and then slip into the brush and wait their chance to come into the Spanish
lines. There is another class of presentados called maja, who are in the
woods. They took to the woods when the orders of concentration came.
They are supposed to be there to fight when arms are sent to them. When
arms are furnished them, they are ordered to the force to fight. About 40 per
cent of them sneak into the first town and surrender. They will not sur
render until they have a gun, but when they have a gun it is a sort of guaranty
for them. That is another kind of presentados. "
The doctor gave this unquestionable statement of the way a Spanish
column searches a thick wood for Cuban hospitals, that they may chop up the
wounded with machetes :
"I at one time got out of the woods before the soldiers got in, and sat on
a hill 300 or 400 yards away and watched them go into the woods. The chief
stopped about 300 yards from where they entered the brush, and the infantry
marched up and all the officers stood back, and the sergeant or lieutenant or
small officers ordered the men in. The men marched up to the brush, and
then they would hesitate, and these officers would draw* their canes — they
nearly all carry canes — or some of them machetes, and they would whip them
in. They would grab a man by the arm and strike him with a cane and drag
and push him in. By the time a man got a little ways in he would cry 'Viva
Espagnol, ' and then the others would follow, and they would all rush in and
set the houses afire, and yell and raise the mischief generally, and those on
the outside would run up and try to set the brush afire, try to set the whole
army afire, as it looked to me. If it had been dry brush, like American
undergrowth, they would have burnt the entire army up.
"Q. By brush do you mean trees and bushes that have been cut down?
— A. No, sir; it is short growth that has not been cut down."
Dr. Danforth, of Milwaukee, for a year physician to Cisneros, President
of Cuba, was examined June, 1897, and when a,sked the favorite question
about the mysterious Cuban capital, he said:
"They have had no capital until about the 1st of February of this year,
and then they put up a number of houses at Aguira, about three leagues to
west of the city of Wymero, in Puerto Principe, and they established that as
the seat of government.
"Q. Were they not at Cubitos? — A. No, sir.
"Q. Have they ever been driven out of their seat of government by the

THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 189
Spaniards? — A. Not up to the time I left; but I will tell you in candor that
all the Spaniards have to do, if they want to, is to march 100 men down there
and drive the Cubans out. I was there on the 29th of April, and they had
but 8 men in the capital.
"Q. Is there any regular postal service? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. In what manner is it conducted? — A. On this plan: They have the
prefects of these districts, and they act as distributing officers in the postal
service, I believe.
"Q. They are from 3 to 6 leagues apart? — A. Yes, sir. All the people
in their districts are coming and going to and from their place. They usually
risit the prefects at least once every* week or two to get mail. ' '
"Once every week or two" was the regular mail service of this country
with a capital city containing eight men and located for several months where
It was the greater part of the time visible only by the all-searching eye of
Omnipotence. Dr. Danforth is a gentleman of large figures. He estimated the
Spanish forces in Cuba at 300,000 men — the Cubans about one in ten.
As to food :
"In Camaguey, where I was, they have boniato, or sweet potatoes. Some
times they will have yucca, sometimes plantains, sometimes cochanchilla, a
mixture of honey and hot water. Sometimes they will have coffee, sometimes
they will not have anything except, perhaps, meat.
"Q. How about their supply of meat? — A. It is ample.
"Q. Where is that obtained? — A. Everywhere, anywhere. By the laws
of the Cubans, by the law of the land, it is a fact that the Cuban rulers
declared, when this war first started, that all horses and all cattle in the
island, wherever found, were to be regarded as public property. The result
is you can find cattle everywhere in Camaguey. I do not believe I have
ever ridden three miles without seeing more or less cattle. The yucca grows
without any care at all. They have also a great many bananas, or plantains,
as they are termed, growing at Cubitos at the present time. They have a great
many of those, and they send over from the rest of the province every once
in a while to secure several mule loads of the yucca and plantain, or boniato
— the sweet potato.
"Q. I do not understand about that plant yucca. Is that a plant which
grows in moist soil, like a radish? — A. No, sir; it belongs to the family of

ioo THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA.
tubers, I believe. It is the root, and the root will increase in size, and will
weigh anywhere from 5 to 100 pounds. They are very large.
"Q. Is it palatable and nutritious? — A. Indeed, it is. It is just about like
our Irish potato ; just about the same thing.
"Q. Do they cook it in the same way as Irish potatoes? — A. Yes, sir; they
cut it up and put it in water and allow it to boil just about as with Irish
potatoes. "Q. It comes out mealy? — A. No, sir; it comes out in the original pieces,
very nicely done — mealy and nice to the taste.
"Q. They eat it with salt, just as you would an Irish potato? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. That food does not require cultivation? — A. No, sir.
"Q. Grows indigenous? — A. Yes, sir; wherever you chance to put it.
"Q. I have been interested, too, in another thing, and that is, what is
the production of hogs in the island of Cuba? — A. They have an immense
number. Contrary to the custom in the United States, they allow them to
run wild, and they eat whatever they find. I do not know exactly what they
do live on, but they live very well. They have what they call hog dogs, and if
you want a hog you call the dogs ,and they will take after the'hogs, and after
chasing them around, the dogs will seize them by the ears and maintain their
hold until the man comes up, and then they tie their legs together and sling
him across the saddle and take him to the house and kill him.
"Q. They are in good condition? — A. Always.
"Q. Have the Spanish ever attempted to drive them out of there? — A.
Never as yet, up to the time I left Cuba, although one day there was word
sent that a Spanish column of 4,000 men was only a league and a half off
and we had orders to get our horses up and saddled, and everything on
them, ready to start at a moment's notice. However, it proved to be
a false rumor.
"Q. And where is the treasury of the government .kept? — A. That is
somewhat complex. The treasurer of the government is Mr. Pina, and he
receives and disburses all moneys, and as fast as he will get on hand any
considerable store of money that money is sent, I believe, to New York, in
some way or another, to the Junta, and there is used for the purposes that are
best calculated to help the revolutionists.
"Q. In the meantime, where does he keep his money; where does he
have it for safe-keeping? — A. In the chests.

THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 191
"Q. Carried with the government? — A. Yes, sir; with the President's escort.
"Q. Carried along with the archives? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. About what proportion of the Cuban army is negroes? — A. Well, I
should say less than 50 per cent. I do not know howmuch less, but less than
50 per cent.
"Q. As a rule, are the negroes under white officers, white Cuban officers?
— A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Are they good soldiers? — A Yes, sir; very good, indeed; and
splendid fighters, too."
It is agreeable to hear that the money, gathered, we presume, chiefly
through what we may call the supplementary sugar tax, was shipped to the
New York Junta. The wars of independence of Spanish colonies were always
a competition of -Juntas, the original Spaniards holding that they were the
divinely appointed ruling class. It was in Cuba only that the insurgents got
ahead of the regulars in the use of fire — and this was ominously under lead of
the military chieftain from the east end of Haiti.
We have followed the testimony taken by the Senate committee of investi
gation sufficiently to show the character of the war in Cuba, and have
endeavored to apportion judicially the measures of the degrees of the respec
tive responsibilities for the peculiar horrors of the conflict between the
antagonists. There was an awful accumulation of evidence of unparalleled
atrocities. We have to so far acknowledge the rights of the belligerents as to
admit the consanguinity of the combatants. We shall quote in addition to the
passages that truly set forth the situation of the woeful island during the last
year before the American intervention and participation in war, only a few
lines from the statement of Mr. C. F. Koop, of Boston, who described fearful
brutalities on the cars by Spanish officers:
"Q. You can state some of the instances which impressed you as being
characteristic of the situation. — A. One of the saddest, if not the saddest
sight I saw was the case of a woman who stood in front of a hotel in Santa
Clara, and who dropped dead when I handed her a piece of bread. That was
the saddest sight I saw on the whole trip.
"Q. Did she undertake to eat it? — A. She dropped the baby which she
had in her arms, grabbed the piece of bread which I handed her, drove her
teeth into it and fell over dead. She had a baby in her arms and two little
children hanging on to her skirts.

192 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA.
"Q. What became of the baby she let drop? — A. The baby died that
night or the next morning. I found out in the morning that it had died; and
the other two children died a day or two afterwards.
"Q. Died of starvation? — A. Yes; starvation."
Mr. Koop was a man traveling in the tobacco business, and he expressed
the opinion that the true purpose of the Spaniards in herding the farmers in
the "Zones" of cultivation was to cause them to perish of fevers and starva
tion. We quote:
"Q. Do the Spanish treat the Cubans with repugnance? — A. They feel
that a Cuban is worse than a dog.
"Q. You think, then, that the purpose of the regulation was really to
starve these people to death? — A. Yes; the sole purpose. It is well known
that 900,000 of those natives were forced in from their homes, and out of that
number 500,000 have died already. Therefore, the results have proved the
motive. "Q. What was the apparent relation between the soldiers and these
reconcentrados, or did the soldiers seem to have any sort of human regard for
them? — A. Many of the soldiers are low spirited and absolutely incapable of
having such resentment, because, in the majority of cases, they were mere
boys and in such a condition as to be hardly able to take care of themselves.
The repugnance was largely among the officers and the Spanish guards, which
is the flower of the army. They are in better condition than the common
soldiers. The Home Guard, picked men, are also in better condition.
"Q. What is the feeling of this class that are in better condition — what is
their feeling towards these poor reconcentrados, as you saw it? — A. There is
a sort of a feeling between them that they would eat at one another's table, if
they could. If one had anything, they would give it to the other. There
was no animosity among the ordinary soldiery of the Spanish army. "
During the examination of witnesses by Senators to ascertain accurately
the state of the island, much attention was given any one who had ever been
in or about the Cuban capital, and anything that supported the view that the
Cubans had a civil government somewhere in the woods was dwelt upon and
made impressive as possible. This was with a view of jrutting the Cubans to
the front as constituting a Republic. There was found, to the satisfaction of
the pro-Cuban party, that there was an organization camped in a secluded
spot, in light marching order, with a President, and a cabinet and all the

THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 193
formal appurtenances. As the Cubans could not maintain themselves at any
particular port, they were given to magnifying the formalities and celebrating
the functional equipments of their government and to claiming for it a "com
plete" postal system, and also an all-encircling coast guard, but this machine
lacked a great deal of perfection, and indeed the uses to which it was
applicable were rather in anticipation than jperformance — like the Cuban army
in the later months before the United - States declared war. The far-sighted
organizers remote from the scenes, seeing that they had ready a government
to claim the sovereignty to be wrested by our arms from the Spaniards, set
up an official ring as the people of Cuba, with power to mortgage the bloody
ashes of the island, and assume to rule when their turn came as the Spaniards
had done. The history of the island in the future must depend in a compre
hensive way upon the dealing with the professors of official Cubanism, by the
government of the United States, whose specific promise to the people of
Cuba and the United States and all civilized men, was and remains to estab
lish a "stable government." The immediate necessity is that the possessions
with which Spain has parted are to be subordinated to our military forces,
under the inviolable guaranties of "the faith and honor of the army of the
United States."

==: i

CHAPTER VII.

General Lee's Consul-Generalship in Cuba.
The Conservative Administrations of Grant, Cleveland and McKinley— A Variety of "Ameri
can Citizens" in Havana — Judicious Discrimination of Consulate Authorities — A Young
Man who Gave Himself Away— The Brave Stand of the President against Bulling the
Market for Bonds Issued on a Basis of Bloody Ashes.
The consul-generalship of General Fitzhugh Lee, at Havana, lapping the
national administrations of President Cleveland and President McKinley, was
an important incident in the development of the public opinion and official
policy of the United States in the affairs of Cuba. The lines pursued by
President Cleveland and the State papers of Secretary Olney did not depart
widely from those of the concluding administration of President Grant and
the grave and powerful but reserved communications from Secretary Fish,
whose correspondence from Ministers Daniel Sickles and Caleb Cushing at
Madrid was marked by individual distinctions so strong that their letters are
a most valuable source of interior intelligence, indispensable to a correct
understanding of -the course of events from the Ostend manifesto to the
declaration by the United States of war against Spain. There is to be
marked the consistent straightforwardness of the administrations of - General
Grant, Grover Cleveland and William McKinley, in the performance, under
circumstances of constant difficulty, of our duty toward Spain as a friendly
power in the maintenance of our international obligations. Though this was
a subject of a great deal of polite writing and speaking by the diplomatic
representatives of Spain, it was a fact perfectly within the scope of the intel
ligence of the American people that the popular feeling in Spain was that we
encouraged filibusters and were considerably accountable for the Cuban
insurrections that were so disastrous to the credit of the Spaniards. Our
people did, of course, sympathize with the Cubans, and entertained no doubt
that Spain would and should lose the island, as Mexico, Peru, and the rest of
194

MAJOR-GENERAL FITZHUGH LEE, CONSUL AT HAVANA WHEN WAR WAS DECLARED.

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GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. 197
the continental Spanish-American States were lost. The interests the United
States had in Cuba Were presented with extraordinary force in the course of
the later of the ten years' war, by Secretary Fish, whose pen had the poten
tiality of representing his own great ability and the Presidency of Grant.
There was a deep impression made upon Spain, in the course of this cor
respondence, but it was not, on the whole, conciliatory, for it clearly was a
warning that the time could not be far distant when the United States would
intervene in Cuba. The Spaniards had two hopes — one that they might over
come the rebellion, and the other that Europe would support their Cuban
sovereignty against that which would naturally seem to the monarchies
American aggression. President Grant, while pressing Spain to take decisive
action, was not fortunate in opportunity, because his period of executive power
was coincident with a series of Spanish revolutions, but he urged that it was
the duty of other nations to sustain our tentative advances, and associated
with this appeal to the powers was necessarily the strict observance of the
conventionalities of the usages of the strong governments with respect to
declarations of independence and the recognition of belligerent rights. , Mr.
Cleveland's conservatism on this subject remained unshaken, and the assaults
of the literary laborers in the filibuster cause were disregarded without indica
tions of uneasiness, while the anxious urgency of the Cuban agents that they
should be considered the representatives of a Republican form of government
found no countenance in the White House or the State Department. The
Cuban desire was for right of belligerency, and it was supported by exaggera
tions of all shams of Cuban organization, the general and particular purpose
being to gain recognition of rights as combatants, and to manage that condi
tion so as to drive the United States to make war with Spain. The State
Department, in the closing months of Cleveland's administration, was in doubt
as to the eondition of Cuba, holding that there was no reliable information
from that quarter, positively nothing that called for action by the nation.
The naturalized citizens of the United States in Cuba had, to a distinct
degree, been actuated in declaring their intentions by the hope of protection
in time of political trouble, and many of them were disposed to interpret as
among their privileges as American citizens, exemption from punishment
when they interfered with Spanish rule. The more persistent they were in
getting into dangerous places, the more intense their appreciation of the
duties toward them as Americans, of the representatives of the government of

198 GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA.
the United States. They laid special claim to the protection of the Consulate
of the United States at Havana, and were there very frequently with griev
ances. It was not, as a rule, in proportion to the dimensions of their actual
wrongs that they were insistent in presenting them; _and if their affair was
insignificant they were apt to become exasperating. The office of the Con
sulate was well jarovided for matters of business, but it was not redolent of the
flavor most pleasing to the Cubans who were sympathetic with the insurrec
tion. Consul-General Ramon O. Williams had long been a man of affairs
in Havana, and had an extensive acquaintance and many friendly relations
with Spaniards. He was an expert in the obligations of his office, and knew
every point of the law. The Spanish language was familiar to him, and he
had for some time contemplated resigning his official rjlace, in which case Vice
Consul Joseph A. Springer was the best equipped man for the succession in
case the ordinary promotion for long and effective service was considered.
Mr. Springer was thoroughly informed, had facile command of the Spanish
language, was learned in the laws, and familiar w*ith the customs of the
people. As Cuba became the center of news-interest in the United States, the
Havana hotels were thronged with correspondents of the newspapers of Amer
ica and Europe, with their interpreters and secretaries, and the office of the
Consul-General was a much favored rendezvous. It became manifest to the
young gentlemen in the service of the press that all "American citizens" were
not alike welcome; and that a naturalized Cuban, who had never been out of
the island, and had shown a talent for the intrigues indigenous in an insurgent
atmosphere, was not rjromptly waited upon when he desired United States
officials to find his valuable mule confiscated as a bearer of burdens of
smuggled goods — struck a chilling frost when making known his claim upon
the great Republic that should have felt much complimented when the citizen
ship of the sufferer was for the fortieth time vociferated. Omissions on the
part of Williams or Springer to find a lost mule, or something of that nature,
were liable to be celebrated in some of the most famous journals that ever put
forth their leaves for the help of the human race. One young man, whose
passage had been paid to Havana by the Spanish Consul in New York, to
write the stories to please Spain, and whose appetite for gold increased with
indulgence, caused him presently to hate Spanish, and then to offer his serv
ices as a spy, to report on other correspondents, and give away their confi
dence — this versatile youth took it upon himself to lecture Consul-General

GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. 199
Williams as to the use he made of law books, and instruct him in the detail of
official duty. He also denounced Williams to his face, and encountered no
incivility. Some time later the young man was disturbed to find out that Mr.
Williams had in his desk a few scraps of paper that proved the Spanish rela
tions of his assailant, but scorned to strike him down with his own letters.
President Cleveland concluded some months later to accept the resignation
of Mr. Williams, which he had on file to be used when convenient, and to
appoint to fill the vacancy General Lee. Undoubtedly this was a judicious
selection. Fitzhugh Lee was, in the first place, a man of good nerve, and
of military experience. He was a Southern man, and the Spaniards would
not be able to deceive him with their perpetual protestation that they were
engaged in putting down a negro insurrection ; and he was a man of such
home distinction that he could not be easily turned from his purposes by
that which was said of him pro or con. President McKinley had made known
before his inauguration that he would call an extra session of Congress. He
had no personal desire to avoid the presence of Congress, but was sincerely of
the judgment that the members were of incomparable utility as the Senators
of the several States, and direct representatives of the people. The course of
the Cleveland administration, in doing things and refraining to do other things,
so as to leave unembarrassed by action the successors upon whom must fall the
weight of responsible decisions, was well considered and in excellent form,
and General Lee had shown so cleverly* and with such serious deportment his
sense of the high duties committed to him that he was continued in office, and
gained more and more the confidence of his countrymen. He supported
forcibly the first movement of the government in the McKinley administration
demanding the speedy trial or release of the American citizens under arrest,
and the resolute tone with which this policy was presented had an immediate
influence. At the same time, there was less of the friction of frivolous mani
festations that were expressly intended to aggravate contentions. There was
a change in Captain-Generals in Cuba; General Weyler, having been identified
with so much that was oppressive and exasperating, was withdrawn and Gen
eral Blanco, a more gracious character, with a better military reputation,
substituted; and Blanco's policy presently was shaped so as to placate, if
practicable, the rising indignation of the people of the United States. These
thin°-s were believed to make for the preservation of peace, rather than to
cause war between the United States and Spain; and hence the fierce agitation

200 GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA.
of the Cuban war party, whose hopes and struggles were to fight, and they
became ferocious at the thought of peace. They were soon in a super-heated
state, and as incessant as Red Indians rubbing sticks of wood together to
kindle a fire, to communicate their incandescence to Congress. The Presi
dent's message December 6, 1897, was a State paper of excellent temper, and
of the profoundest logic, legal and historical, and yet it did not favorably
impress our public men and papers who insisted the time had come for war,
and inconsiderate of our unjDrepared situation in a military sense, chafed
against all restraints of composure.
President McKinley's message to the Fifty-fifth Congress, assembled in
regular session, stated the most important problem with which the government
was called upon to deal in its foreign relations concerned its "duty toward
Spain and the Cuban insurrection." The President referred to the disquieting
prospect that Spain's weak hold upon the island might lead to the transfer of
Cuba to a continental ptower, and the declarations of policy that any change
must be in the direction of "independence or acquisition by or through pur
chase." The ten years' war was outlined in a few sentences, with the Peace
of Zanjon, and the "present insurrection in February, 1895" — its "remark
able increase" and "tenacious resistance against the enormous forces" that
Spain massed against it. The offer of friendly offices in 1876 had failed. No
mediation on our part had been accepted. The' answers were: "There is no
effectual way to pacify Cuba unless it begins with the actual submission of the
rebels to the mother country. " The President denounced the cruel policy of
concentration initiated in February, 1896, that depopulated the districts com
manded by the Spanish armies. He proceeded, after characterizing this policy
as cruel, to say of it : "The agricultural inhabitants were herded in and about
the garrison towns, their lands laid waste, and' their dwellings destroyed.
This policy the late Cabinet of Spain justified as a necessary measure of
war and as a means of cutting off supplies from the insurgents. It has
utterly failed as a war measure. It was not civilized warfare. It was
extermination." The part of the Cuban leaders in burning out the civiliza
tion of the island to cut off Spanish resources was not mentioned, for it was the
President's basis of operations that there was no responsible Cuban o-0vern-
ment to deal with. The persecution of American citizens had especially
aroused the President, and he did not feel it incumbent upon him to investi
gate naturalization papers. His first duty was "to make instant demand for

HORSES LADEN WITH MALOJA, IN MATANZAS, CUBA.

THE YUMURI RIVER AT MATANZAS, CUBA.

GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. 203
the release or speedy trial of all American citizens under arrest, and before the
change of the Spanish Cabinet in October last twenty-two prisoners, citizens
of the United States, had been given their freedom." Then came the work of
charity. The message of the President very seriously recited the develop
ments of the situation leading up to the most grave utterance that ever came
from a chief magistrate of this country, touching our international obliga
tions as Americans, and the conservative propriety of our interest in the peace
of communities of the neighborhood.
The culmination of the message was in this paragraph: "Sure of the
right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only by upright and
patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the govern
ment will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of American
citizens, and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies
a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear
to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and
humanity, to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and
only because the necessity* for such action will be so clear as to command the
support and approval of the civilized world."
The remarkable words were ' 'to intervene with force. ' ' Spain well knew
what the four words signified, but those eng'aged in shouting war cries in Cuba
and this country were not satisfied. They had been screaming for years
against General Grant and Grover Cleveland, because they did not accept the
New York Junta as a nation, entitled to use the arms of the United States for
the faction in Cuba that sought with our aid to supersede the Spaniards.
President McKinley offended the filibusters when he declared: "The wise
utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of December 7, 1875,
are signally relevant to the present situation in Cuba, and it may be whole
some now to recall them." This, of course, was simple treason to the
Republic of Cuba. President Grant said, and President McKinley quoted with
approbation, these words: "A recognition of the independence of Cuba being,
in my opinion, impracticable, and indefensible, the question which next pre
sents itself is that of the recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the
contest." More than this, President McKinley said: "In a former message
to Congress I had occasion to consider this question, and reached the con
clusion that the conflict in Cuba, dreadful and devastating as were its inci
dents, did not rise to the fearful dignity of war." In a word, the President

204 GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA.
did not propose to use the United States for the pretended Cuban Republic,
and that was the very pith of the Cuban war party's position. The President,
instead of floundering into war headlong for the Cuban incendiaries, who pre
pared at once to destroy property and issue certificates of bonded indebtedness,
made a last sincere and pressing effort to defer war, and so far as was pos
sible interpreted events as helpful for the preservation of peace. He said he
regarded the recognition of belligerency of the Cuban insurgents as "now
unwise and therefore inadmissible" — and he held that "a hopeful change has
supervened in the policy of Spain toward Cuba. A new government has taken
office in the mother country. It is pledged in advance to the declaration that
all the effort in the world cannot suffice to maintain peace in Cuba by the
bayonet; that vague promises of reform after subjugation afford no solution
of the insular problem ; that with a substitution of commanders must come a
change of the past system of warfare for one in harmony with a new policy. ' '
These were the promptings and teachings of a generous heart, and there
was behind them the wisdom of expediency, for if we were drifting to war, we
would be great gainers by the time occupied. All the American citizen
prisoners in Cuba were released. There could be nothing lost save as to the
Cuban Republic, and bonds based on the naked chimneys, monumental of
ancient and prosperous industry! ' The President was in position to say:
' 'Not a single American citizen is now in arrest or confinement in Cuba of
whom this government has any knowledge. The near future will demonstrate
whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace', just alike to the
Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately
involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency
of further and other action by the United States will remain to 'be taken.
When that time comes that action will be determined in the line of indispu
table right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving or hesitancy, in the
light of the obligation this government owes to itself, to the people who have
confided to it the protection of their interests and honor, and to humanity."
There was behind the President all the powers of the people, and all the
dignities of decency and civilization ; and the grim necessity of which he had
knowledge exceeding others — for, if war was just ahead, we should not make
haste to get into it without preparation.
There was an ignorant and inflammatory public opinion — part vanity and
part malice — fed by the falsehoods of Spanish Cubans through the convenient

GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. 205
wires, and it was foolishly and wantonly and insolently wrong, as regards the
conditions under which we were moving to encounter in Cuba — first, the
rainy season; second, the sweltering venom of the yellow fever; third,
insufficient water supplies and inadequate facilities for the water transportation
even of our regular army and the articles requisite to its higher efficiency.
Last, but not least, there was not abroad in our country understanding of the
fighting abilities of the Spaniards on the defensive, or the fruitfulness of the
soil that made starvation outside prisons a tedious task — for we could only
blockade the ports. The marvels of the soil and sky of Cuba in providing
food remained, and not until the full story of the war is read will the people
at large be truly informed of the endowments of the island, golden in all but
the yellow metal. The Cuban Spaniards and American filibusters were rank
with violence that would have been ludicrous if it had not closly approached
criminality, because the President held open to the last hour it was practicable
the door that led to the paths of peace. It was Cuban influence that burnt the
sugar plantations that did not yield the Republic a special tax, that branded
the insurrection with the San Domingo mark, and redoubled outcries for
recognizing independence, on preposterous grounds, granting belligerency,
and putting firebrands wherever there was fuel for war.

_/\

CHAPTER VIII.
The Actual Experience and Sentiments of the People of Cuba.
Two Parties of Malign ants — The Firm Stand of the President at the Beginning of theWar —
A Study of the Historical Truth of the Situation — The President's Language Contrasted
with that of the Fire Bugs — Extreme Views of Senators Davis, Daniel, Foraker, and
Others — The Fury of the War Party — Cuban and Spanish Desperadoes — The Massacre
of the Maine — The Findings of the Courts — List of the Lost on the Ship.

The public sentiment in Havana did not easily appear to strangers. It
was of vital consequence to those who were owners of real estate or engaged in
business, surrounded with families, to assume an attitude as far as permissible
from partyism — to be moderate in all things, cultivate good will, put out, as
a form of consenting to the conditions, the Spanish colors, wear dress suits on
occasions of ceremony, welcoming General Weyler, for example. There
were those who took the risks of avowed sympathy with the insurgents, but
they had reasons for refraining from active service. One of the ways of
preventing persecutions was in the susceptibility of many holding Spanish
commissions to the acceptance of concessions in cash or its equivalent.
The processes of protection in the city were like those that prevented the
burning of a few cane fields and mills, and the dispersion of the carts and
horses that were an important part of the equipment of plantations — that is,
the payment of a double tax. There were those who communicated with the
avowed rebels in Key West, New York, and elsewhere, and the Spanish
officials were complacent about that. The price of taking a small package of
"private" letters to the United States post office was a five dollar Spanish gold
piece. Often Spanish or insurgent officers were transported to and fro from
Havana — visiting the United States — at regular rates, according to the rank of
the travelers. Under this system it was not difficult to account for adventures
that were touched up with superficial mystery. What was the need of daring
when bribery was so facile? Heroism was as marketable as, Mauser cartridges
206

SENTIMENTS' OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 207
at Morro Castle ! The men of sincerities ascertained that there were deplor
able disadvantages in persistent integrity. There were two besetting dangers
for an honest man. One was to give mortal offense to the important Span
iards by telling the truth of them — and the other was to insult the civilian
insurgents by truthfulness respecting them, the capital crime being to doubt
the ability of the government in the woods to issue bonds, command armies,
and exercise all the supreme functions of a national sovereignty. Those who
absorbed this fictitious officialism held that it was treason to question their
regularity, and they were sure as possible of everything and in a state of
infallibility all the time. It was- highly criminal to fail in faith in any false
hood invented in and telegraphed from the Florida bureaus. It was the most
wicked way of being treasonable to Cuba Libre to hesitate to believe that the
New York Junta and the literary manufactures, carried on outside Cuba with
the making of Havana cigars, were not the veritable and the only people of
Cuba. One development of scoundrelism in Cuba fostered another. The
canker of corruption in the Spanish service was not unknown among the
Cubans. There were pecuniary reasons for the protraction of the war.
There is a real people of Cuba behind all this. There is also a real Spanish
manhood that is not revealed in this outrageous distemper of dishonesty. If
one got the unreserved confidence of true Cubans- — those who in spite of mis-
government had made the island prosper — the truth would break out about in
this way: "We have been taxed regularly and irregularly, by the Spaniards
and the rebels — double taxed in custom houses — forced to pay for things done
and undone — compelled to pay all sorts of soldiers and loafers to care for
us, openly and secretly — have everything offered now as always for money —
and are refused justice in any case without it. Now we are exhausted. Our
money is gone. We are not politicians. This is a rich country. There is no
end of money to be made here. We only want order — no matter whether
under a monarchy or a republic — anything so that we can do business. We
know that if the Spanish conquer the island and rule it again we shall be
ruined utterly. We are almost in a condition of beggary now. It will be
very little, if any, better for us if these fellows who claim to have a Cuban
government should become the masters of the island. They will ruin us just
the same as the Spaniards. In either case we are reduced to poverty, and
shall be without hope. We have one chance — that we shall sometime soon —
very soon, before it is too late for us and our children — become a part of the

208 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA.
United States." Notwithstanding the terrible indictment of the Spanish
colonial system, of which the last and worst development was in Cuba, by the
President in his message of December, 1897, it would have been impossible
to have framed a paper more disturbing and alarming to the managers of the
Cuban policy than the whole document as it appeared with its plain use of the
plain words "intervention with force." The Cuban holders of commissions
or diplomas, as they say, wanted intervention with force, to be sure, but for
them, in their way. The programme was for the United States to make the
war and finish it and turn over the island to the Cuban republic. There was a
huge speculation in this contrived to be at the expense of the United States,
and President McKinley's straightforward course was an interference. One
of the Cuban outcries had been stifled. It was that crowds of "American
citizens" were imprisoned and not tried. That was at an end. Weyler was
gone like a gory scapegoat, and Blanco had arrived, dressed in regimentals
that he gave assurance were white robes. He made an impression that there
was a real meaning behind his good words. He seemed to be taking himself
in earnest. The Spanish language was not exhausted. The President
appeared to have hopes that his policy of peace could prevail.
It was necessary that there should be something done in Havana to
change the current. There was always under Spanish rule a chance for a
panic there. The vindictive volunteers were ever ready for the indulgence
of resentments. They hated the Blanco style, and opposed it with the same
malignity that their extreme opposites — the firebug patriots — denounced the
pacific President of the United States. They discovered that the American
citizens in Havana were in peril, that they needed ships of war to protect
them ! That was one of the cultivated alarms always ready for an emergency*.
The incendiaries had. failed to impress General Lee. There was a solidity
about his composition that gave them sore grief. Lee was fearless and posi
tive as against Spanish misconduct toward American citizens, no matter how
defective their title might be. He acted on the face of the papers — but the
incandescent Cuban officialism did not appeal to him strongly. He did not
submit himself to those people or take them into his confidence. He was an
American, not a Cuban, but he could not see, as the United States and
Spain were in friendly relations, officially, why there should not be one of our
ships of war in the Havana harbor — on the like terms of those of the favored
nations. The Cuban theory that our war ships were wanted in the harbor to

SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OP CUBA. 209
protect Americans was unsound. The real want was to use and display our
ships of war so as to promote the war conspiracy! It was certain that if we
sent ships to Havana waters to rest there as fixtures we would sacrifice many
lives to the pestilential influences of that spot where centuries of filthiness have
made provision for plagues of fever. It was clear also to any observer that if
there were Americans in personal danger, a ship of war more or less could
not save them, for the ships would necessarily be out of the way of the resorts
of the city, and under the German guns with which the old forts and the new
fortifications were armed. It was provided that there should be arranged
an exchange of courtesies between Spanish and American ships of war, and
two ill-fated cruisers were appointed, the Maine to visit Havana and the
Vizcaya to call at New York.
The malignants on both sides in Cuba, the extreme peninsular Spaniards,
and the extreme Cuban Spaniards, the filibusters and adventurers, were joyful
over the massacre 01 ;he Maine, and used the awful story to fan the smolder
ing embers of war into a conflagration. They were aided by the Cuban war
party in the United States, and a great, irresistible wave of emotion that was
deeper than anger, and of indignation that rises like the ocean uplifted by an
earthquake and rolls mighty billows upon distant shores. It was the Presi
dent's duty, and he performed it, to be clear headed for the country, to hold
the balances of judgment serenely higher than the sphere of the tempests. It
is not often in the annals of mankind that a man has had a loftier and broader
responsibility to discharge, and the President, awed by the overmastering
sense of the destiny upon him, was not disquieted and depressed, but calmed
and elevated by the magnitude of events, as became a President of the people,
and there were those who would have belittled, the days as they passed with
sound and fury, and cheapened themselves with hatefulness and fancies that
haste and clamor would be thought identical with the expression of serious
duties, — and the sensationalists displayed themselves on fire lines and
illuminated the distortions of their own insignificance. In proportion as the
people of the United States knew war and were of general intelligence, they
sustained with their moral sympathy and political force the equipoise of the
Executive Department; they commended the request of Captain Sigsbee of
the Maine for a suspension of public opinion as to that catastrophe, and the
deliberate reserve of the President, accepting the tenders of courtesies of
Spanish military and naval civil authorities in the way of regrets and condo-

210 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA.
lences for the victims of the Havana harbor explosion. In the message of the
President May nth, after quoting state papers of Cleveland and Jackson, and
reciting once more the hideous situation in Cuba and the elements of danger
and disorder, he said these had been ' ' strikingly illustrated by a tragic event
which has deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already
transmitted to Congress the report of the naval court of inquiry on the
destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana during the night
of the. 15th of February. The destruction of that noble vessel has filled the
national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave
sailors and marines and two officers of our navy, reposing in the fancied
security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death, grief and want
brought -to their homes, and sorrow to the nation.
"The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commands the
unqualified confidence of the government, was unanimous in its conclusion
that the destruction of the Maine was caused by an exterior explosion, that of
a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That
remains to be fixed.
"In any event, the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior cause,
is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intoler
able. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish government
cannot assure safety and security to a vessel of the American navy in the har
bor of Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there."
Further, dwelling in this connection on recent diplomatic correspondence,
"A dispatch from our Minister to Spain, of the 26th ultimo, contained the state
ment that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs assured him positively that
Spain will do all that the highest honor and justice require in the matter of
the Maine. The reply above referred to of the 31st ultimo also contained an
expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration all the
differences which can arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by
the note of the Spanish Minister at Washington of the 10th instant, as
follows :
" 'As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of views
between the reports of the American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that
the facts be ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, whose
decision Spain accepts in advance. '
' ' To this I have made no reply. ' ' Nothing was wanted of Spain's experts.

SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 211
The date of this message was within ten days of the declaration of war,
and the President closed in these words, that will ever reflect honor upon him :
"I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take
measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the
government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the
establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and
observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the
security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval
forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.
"And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the
starving people of the island I recommend that the distribution of food and
supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public
Treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.
"The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I
have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which
is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by
the Constitution and the law, I await your action.
"Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, official
information was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of
Spain directs General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to pro
claim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have not
yet been communicated to me.
"This fact, with every other pertinent consideration, will, I am sure, have
your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are
about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspira
tions as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it will be
only another justification for our contemplated action."
It does not seem, now that the war is over, fairly and swiftly won, that
there was lacking in this measured language anything becoming the dignity
of the United States, the spirit of resolve and sacrifice of the people at large,
or any sign of negligence in the discharge of the tremendous functions of the
Presidential office. The words "contemplated action" were of deep meaning.
There was something of injustice, for a time, in the criticisms of the
course of the President, of the steadfast, imperturbable demeanor with which
he met the extraordinarily exacting demands upon him, but the people pres
ently knew, not from spoken words or through the pomps of complacency, but

212 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA.
the deeds that were wrought from day to day, that their Chief Magistrate, the
Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, was at the front and never
flinched under fire. There appeared in the message, April n, this passage of
solemn caution — then justified— now amply vindicated:
"I said in my message of December last, 'It is to be seriously considered
whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of
statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its
favor. The same requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered
when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in question ; for no less
positive test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser; while, on the
other hand, the influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal
policy of the recognizing State, which form important factors when the recog
nition of belligerency is concerned, are secondary, if not rightly eliminable,
factors when the real question is whether the community claiming recognition
is or is not independent beyond peradventure.
"Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be wise or
prudent for this government to recognize at the present time the independence
of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such recognition is not necessary 'in order
to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit
this country* now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba
might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward
the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be
subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be
required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a
friendly ally.
"When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a govern
ment capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a
separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper forms and
attributes of nationality, such government can be promptly and readily recog
nized and the relations and interests of the United States with such nation
adjusted." This excellent medicine was a bitter dose in the bellies of the Cubans who
were doing their fighting out of the island whose soil was contested. Among
the forces the President was obliged to restrain from misadventure was the
report of Mr. Davis, of the Committee on Foreign Relations, who paraded
several resolutions of Congress. Mr. Davis said one-third of the people of

SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 213
Cuba in the eastern end of the island were subordinate to the insurgent gov
ernment and "that third of population pays taxes to them, serves in their
armies, and in every way supports and is loyal to them. This situation has
existed ever since the first few months of the war. The armies of SjDain
under Campos, Weyler, and Blanco, successively have been repelled in every
invasion that they have attempted of the eastern half of the island. The cause
of Spain has continually grown weaker, and that of the insurgents has grown
stronger. ' '
This was not warranted. It was the acceptance of the exaggerations of
the Spanish Cubans, and it was the temporary misfortune of the country that
this falsified current history could not be as conclusively exposed as it has been
by the accounts of the army and navy of the United States. Throughout the
able and ingenious report of Mr. Davis, the injudicial element cropped out,
and the absence of the impartial spirit, that gives due weight to all facts, is evi
dent in the omission of the truth that the insurgent forces were the first to
use the torch and originated the savage policy of desolation.
The President was equal to the firm presentation of the truth: "As I
said in my message of last December, it was not civilized warfare ; it was
extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and
the grave. Meanwhile, the military situation in the island had undergone a
noticeable change. The extraordinary activity that characterized the second
year of the war, when the insurgents invaded even the hitherto unharmed
fields of Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and destruction up to the walls of the
city of Havana itself, had relapsed into a dogged struggle in the central and
eastern provinces. The Spanish arms regained a measure of control in Pinar
del Rio and parts of Havana, but, under the existing conditions of the rural
country, without immediate improvement of their productive situation.
Even thus partially restricted, the revolutionists held their own, and their
conquest and submission, put forward by Spain as the essential and sole basis
of peace, seemed as far distant as at the outset."
Here is the exercise of the judicial faculty. Mr. Davis reported: "It is
the opinion of this committee that the time to interpose has arrived; that
intervention which will stop the war and secure the national independence of
Cuba should at once take place. ' '
• Even this was not going far enough. The annexed document is an
essential part of the record:

2U SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA.

"VIEWS OF MINORITY.
"The undersigned members of said committee cordially concur in the
report made upon the Cuban resolutions, but we favor the immediate recogni
tion of the Republic of Cuba, as organized in that island, as a free, independ
ent, and sovereign power among the nations of the world.
"DAVID TURPIE.
"R. Q. MILLS.
"JNO. W. DANIEL.
"J. B. FORAKER."
There was for a time a formidable following of this doctrine, which was an
effusion of passion' and an apotheosis of imposture, and it will claim a fixed
place in the popular recollection, to mark the danger escaped, showing that
when the Senate tottered on the edge of a precipice, the quality of public
safety was found in the House. Far beyond all other investigating commit
tees, the army of the United States discovered the whole truth, and there are
clouds of witnesses that our recognition of the Cuban "Republic" as an estab
lished government would have been a degradation of ourselves. This does
not imply that the Cuban insurgent forces are not largely composed of brave
and honest men, and that there is not capacity in them to participate in good
government, but all that concerned them was subjected to competitive
deceptions from the peninsular and insular people who had the same habits of
both misapprehending and misrepresenting themselves and prevaricating,
whether as friends or foemen. The Cuban cause would have been greatly'
benefited if it had been truthfully served, though nothing could have excused
or even considerably extenuated the confirmation of the Spanish accusation of
following the precedent of San Domingo, a cause that produced heroes and
yet bequeathed to the world a startling lesson of the crimes that may be com
mitted in the name of liberty, the barbarism of which license is productive.
However, the greater crimes in the Indies have had their origin jn the
wrongs inflicted upon labor paid with the lash, and the greed of the strong in
consuming the earnings of the weak.
The events immediately preceding the blowing up of the Maine are pre
sented in the dispatches passing between Consul-General Lee and Secretary of
State Day. January 12, 1898, mobs, led by Spanish officers, attacked the

SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 215
offices of three newspapers advocating autonomy. The autonomists were
rhetoricians, who thought reform could be founded in fine words. Mobs, on
the 13th, shouted against Blanco and for Weyler; the palace and consulate
were guarded. General Lee thought if Blanco could not control the situation,
"or if Americans and their interests are in danger, ships must be sent;" and
it was added they must be ready to move promptly. Quiet prevailed for a
few days. January 24th Mr. Day telegraphed Mr. Lee :
"It is the purpose of this government to resume friendly naval visits at
Cuban ports. In that view the Maine will call at the port of Havana in a day
or two. Please arrange for a friendly interchange of calls with authorities."
Lee telegraphed at once :
"Advise visit be postponed six or seven days, to give last excitement
more time to disappear. Will see authorities and let you know result. Gov
ernor-General away for two weeks. I should know day and hour visit."
Mr. Day responded, 24th:
"Maine has been ordered. Will probably arrive at Havana sometime
to-morrow. Cannot tell hour ; possibly early. Cooperate with authorities for
her friendly visit. Keep us advised by frequent telegrams."
The next dispatch from Lee was on January 25th, that the "authorities
profess to think United States has ulterior purpose in sending ship — would
obstruct autonomy, produce excitement, probably demonstration;" and they
asked that the Maine should not be sent until instructions could be received
from. Madrid, and the closing words of the dispatch were that the authorities
said, "If for friendly motives, as claimed, delay unimportant." On the same
day, "Ship quietly arrived" at eleven in the morning. There was no demon
stration. Spanish commanders called on the commander of the Maine, and
salutes were exchanged. It will be observed that the first feeling of the
Spaniards was unfriendly to the Maine, and this was succeeded by civility.
General Lee, with Captain Sigsbee, and two officers, called on the acting
f' aptain-General January 27th, and the following day Lee telegraphed:
"Acting Governor-General Parrado and staff went with me this morning
to return visit of Sigsbee. Inspected the Maine, were entertained and given
the appropriate salute. Expressed pleasure at their reception and admiration
for the splendid battleship."
On the 4th of February the Secretary of the Navy thought it "not prudent
for sanitary reasons" to remain long in Havana. If there was another vessel

216 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA.
than the Maine sent, what kind of a ship should it be? Lee replied same
day:
' ' Do not think slightest sanitary danger to officers or crew until April o'r
even May. Ship or ships should be kept here all the time now. We should
not relinquish position of peaceful control of situation, or conditions would be
worse than if vessel had never been sent. Americans would depart with
their families in haste if no vessel in harbor, on account of distrust of preser
vation of order by authorities. If another riot occurs, will be against
Governor-General and autonomy, but might include anti- American demonstra
tion also. First-class battleship should replace present one if relieved, as
object lesson and to counteract Spanish opinion of our Navy, and should have
torpedo boat with it to preserve communication with Admiral."
February nth Lee telegraphed: "Sigsbee attended General Blanco's
reception with me last night. This morning paid him and others of govern
ment officials visit. ' ' The next telegram in order was :
(General Lee to Mr. Day.)
"Havana, February 16, 1898, 12:30 p. m. — Maine blown up and destroyed
to-night at 9:40 p. m. Explosion occurred well forward under quarters of
crew; consequence many were lost. It is believed all officers saved, but
Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Cause of explosion yet to be
investigated. Captain-General and Spanish army and navy officers have
rendered every assistance. Sigsbee and most of his officers on Ward steamer
City of Washington. Others on Spanish man-of-war and in city. Am with
Sigsbee now, who has telegraphed Navy Department."
On the 8th of January General Lee wrote Secretary Day:
"I estimate that probably 200,000 of the rural population in the provinces
of Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara have died of starvation
or from resultant causes, and the deaths of whole families almost simultane
ously or within a few days of each other, and of mothers praying for their
children to be relieved of their horrible sufferings by death, are not the least
of the many pitiable scenes which were ever present. In the provinces of
Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba, where the 'reconcentrado order' could
not be enforced, the great mass of the people are self-sustaining. ' '
The following is one of General Lee's inclosures :
"Statistics of death rate in Santa Clara (a town of 14,000 inhabitants) :

SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 217

1890  578
1891  720
1892  596
1893  619
1894  687
3895  872

1896 (epidemic of yellow fever
among army and Cubans) . 1,417

5,489
1897 (no epidemic) .... 6,981

(1,492 more than in seven previous years.)"
After the funeral civilities over the victims of the Maine, the Spanish
officials found, through a Naval Board of inquiry, March 22d:
"That the character of the proceedings undertaken and respect for the
law which establishes the absolute extra territoriality of a foreign war vessel
have prevented the determination, even by conjecture, of the said internal
origin of the disaster, to which also the impossibility of establishing the
necessary communication either with the crew of the wrecked vessel or
the officials of their government commissioned to investigate the causes
of the said event, or with those subsequently intrusted with the issue, has
contributed. "Sixth. That the interior and exterior examination of the bottom of the
Maine, whenever it is possible, unless the bottom of the ship and that of the
place in the bay where it is sunk are altered by the work which is being
carried on for the total or partial recovery of the vessel, will prove the
correctness of all that is said in this report; but this must not be
understood to mean that the accuracy of these present conclusions requires
such proof." t
The United States naval court of inquiry, convened by Rear-Admiral
Montgomery* Sicard, in pursuance of orders of the Department, found
that: "The destruction of the Maine occurred at 9:40 p. m., on the 15th day of
February, 1898, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored
to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were
two explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very short but dis
tinct interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a
¦marked degree at the time of the first explosion. The first explosion was
more in the nature of a report like that of a gun, while the second explosion
was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume. This second explosion
was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or
more of the forward magazines of the Maine.

2i8 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA.-
" At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point n}4 feet from. the
middle line of the ship, and 6 feet above the keel when in its normal position,
has been forced up so as to be now about 4 feet above the surface of the
water, therefore about 34 feet above where it would be had the ship sunk
uninjured. "The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V-shape (a.), the after
wing of which, about 15 feet broad and 32 feet in length (from frame 17 to
frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same
plating, extending forward.
"At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent
into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating.
This break is now about 6 feet below the surface of the water, and about 30
feet above its normal position.
" "In the opinion of the court this effect could have been produced only by
the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame
18 and somewhat on the port side of the ship.
"The court finds that the loss of the Maine on the occasion named was
not in any respect due to fault or negligence On the part of any of the officers
or members of the crew of said vessel.
"In the opinion of the court the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of
a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the
forward magazines.
"The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for
the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons."
There is no rational question that the condition of the wreck of the Maine
demonstrates the first explosion was exterior, and that exempting the higher
Spanish officers from the charge of guilty knowledge, there must have been
some concerned who had official information and responsibility. We give
the official casualty list on the Maine. It far exceeds in extent of fatalities all
the losses of the American navy in all the service of our squadrons in the
annihilation of the fleets of Montijo and Cervera at Manila and Santiago, and
all the combats with the shore batteries of Cuba and Porto Rico:
"U. S. S. Maine, 1st rate, blown up in Havana harbor, February 15, 1898.
List of officers, sailors, and marines on board of the U. S. S. Maine, who were
killed or drowned when that vessel was wrecked in the harbor of Havana,
February 15, 1898, or who subsequently died of their injuries."

THE UNITED STATES BATTLESHIP "MAINE."

CAPTAIN SIGSBEE, WHO COMMANDED THE ILL-FATED "MAINE."

SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 221
(The men marked with an asterisk (*) died subsequently of injuries
received when the U. S. S. Maine was destroyed.)
OFFICERS.
Jenkins, Frederick W. , lieutenant.
Merritt, Darwin R., assistant engineer.

SAILORS.

Adams, John T. , coal passer.
Aitken, James P., boatswain's mate,
first class.
Anderson, John, boatswain's mate,
second class.
Andersen, Holm A., coal passer.
Anderson, Charles, landsman.
Anderson, Gustav A. , seaman.
Anderson, John, seaman.
Anderson, Axel C, seaman.
Andrews, Frank, ordinary seaman.
Anfindsen, Abraham, cockswain.
Anglund, Bernhard, blacksmith.
Auchenbach, Harry, fireman, second
class.
Barry, John P., apprentice, first class.
Barry, Lewis L., coal passer.
Baum, Henry S. , landsman.
Becker, Jakob, chief machinist.
Bell, John R., cabin steward.
Blomberg, Fred, landsman.
Bookbinder, John, apprentice, second
class.
Boll, Fritz, bayman.
Bonner, Leon, seaman.
Brinkman, Heinrich, seaman.
Brofeldt, Arthur, chief gunner's mate.
Bruns, Adolph C. , quartermaster, third
class.
Burns, Edward, coal passer.
Burkhardt, Robert, quartermaster,
second class.

Butler, Frederick F., machinist,
second class.
Boyle, James, quartermaster, first
class.
Clarke, James C, shipwright.
Caine, Thomas, blacksmith.
Cameron, Walter, seaman.
Carr, Herbert M., gunner's mate,
second class.
Caulfield, William R. B., landsman.
Chingi, Suke, mess attendant.
Christiansen, Charles A., fireman,
first class.
Clark, Thomas, coal passer.
Cochrane, Michael, fireman, first class.
Cole, Thomas M., bayman.
Coleman, William, ordinary seaman.
Coleman, William, fireman, second
class.
Conroy, Anthony, coal passer.
Cosgrove, William, fireman, second
class.
Curran, Charles, cockswain.
Dahlman, Berger, seaman.
Dennig, Charles, seaman.
Donoughy, William, ordinary sea
man.
Drury, James, fireman, first class.
Edler, George, seaman.
Eiermann, Charles F. W., gunner's
mate, first class.
*Erikson, Andrew V., seaman.

222

SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA.

SAILORS— Continued.

Etts, John P., seaman.
Evensen, Karl, seaman.
Fadde, Charles F. J., apprentice,
first class.
Falk, Rudolph, oiler.
Faubel, George D., chief machinist.
Fewer, William J., boatswain's mate,
second class.
Finch, Trubie, apprentice, first class.
*Fisher, Frank, ordinary seaman.
Fisher, Alfred J. , oiler.
Flaherty, Michael, fireman, first class.
Fleishman, Lewis M., seaman.
Flynn, Patrick, fireman, second class.
Fougere, John, coal passer.
Fountain, Bartley, boatswain's mate,
first class.
Frank, Charles, apprentice, first class.
Furlong, James F., coal passer.
Gaffney, Patrick, fireman, first class.
Gardner, Frank, coal passer.
Gardner, Thomas J., chief yeoman.
Gorman, William H., ordinary sea
man.
Gordon, Joseph F., fireman, first class.
Graham, James A., chief yeoman.
Graham, Edward P., coal passer.
Grady, Patrick, coal passer.
Greer, William A., apprentice, first
class.
Griffin, Michael, fireman, second
class.
Gross, Henry, landsman.
Grupp, Reinhardt, coal passer.
Hallberg, John A. , oiler.
Hamburger, William, landsman.
Hamilton, Charles A., apprentice,
first class.
Hamilton, John, chief carpenter's
mate,

Hanrahan, William C, cockswain.
Harris, Edward, water tender.
Harris, Millard F., quartermaster,
third class.
Harley, Daniel O'C. fireman, second
class.
Harty, Thomas J., coal passer.
Hassell, Charles F., gunner's mate,
third class.
Hauck, Charles, landsman.
Hawkins, Howard B., ordinary sea
man.
Hennekes, Albert B., gunner's mate,
second class.
Herriman, Benjamin H., apprentice,
first class.
*Holzer, Frederick C, ordinary sea
man.
Holm, Gustav, boatswain's mate,
second class.
*Holland, Alfred J., cockswain.
Horn, William J., fireman, first class.
Hough, William L., landsman.
Hughes, Patrick, fireman, first class.
Ishida, Otogiro, steerage cook.
Johansen, Peter C, seaman.
Johnson, Charles, ordinary seaman.
Johnson, John W., landsman.
Johnsson, Peter, oiler.
Johnson, George, coal passer.
Jones, Thomas J., coal passer.
*Jectson, Harry, seaman.
Jencks, Carlton, gunner's mate, third
class.
Jernee, Fred, coal passer.
Just, Charles F., apprentice, first
class.
Kane, Michael, coal passer.
Kay, John A., machinist, first class.
Kelly, Hugh, coal passer,

SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA.

223

SAILORS — Continued.

Kelly, John, coal passer.
Keskull, Alexander, seaman.
Keys, Harry J., ordinary seaman.
Kihlstrom, Fritz, ordinary seaman.
Kinsey, Frederick E., machinist,
second class.
Kinsella, Thomas F., machinist,
second class.
Kitagata, Yukichi, warrant officers'
cook.
Kniese, Frederick H., machinist,
first class.
*Koebler, George W., apprentice, first
class.
Kranyak, Charles, apprentice, first
class.
Kruse, Hugo, painter.
Laird, Charles, master-at-arms, third
class.
Lambert, William, Fireman, second
class.
Lancaster, Luther, boatswain's mate,
second class.
Lapierre, George, apprentice, first
class.
Lawler, Edward, coal passer.
League, James M., chief yeoman.
Lee, William J., apprentice, first class.
Leene, Daniel, coal passer.
Lees, Samuel, ordinary seaman.
Leupold, Gustav, fireman, second
class.
Lewis, John B., water tender.
Lewis, Daniel, oiler.
Lieber, George, apprentice, first
class.
Lorenzen, Jorgen J., oiler.
Louden, James W., apprentice, second
class.
Lowell, Clarence E., ordinary seaman.

Lund, William, cockswain.
Lydon, John T., ordinary seaman.
Lynch, Matthew, coal passer.
Lynch, Bernard, fireman, first class.
Malone, Michael, fireman, second class.
Marshall, John E. , landsman.
Marsden, Benjamin L., apprentice,
first class.
Martensson, Johan, gunner's mate,
third class.
Mason, James H., landsman.
Matiasen, Carl, seaman.
Matza, John, coal passer.
Meilstrup, Elmer M. , ordinary sea
man.
Merz, John, landsman.
Mero, Eldon H., chief machinist.
Miller, George, seaman.
Miller, William S., apprentice, second
class.
Mobles, George, cockswain.
Moore, Edward H., coal passer.
Monfort, William, landsman.
Moss, Gerhard C, machinist, first
class.
Moss, John H., landsman.
Mudd, Noble T., seaman.
Murphy, Cornelius, oiler.
McGonigle, Hugh, fireman, second
class.
McManus, John J., fireman, second
class.
McNiece, Francis J., coal passer.
Nielsen, Sophus, cockswain.
Nielsen, John C, seaman.
Nolan, Charles M., gunner's mate,
third class.
Noble, William, fireman, second class.
Nagamine, Tomekichi, mess attend
ant.

224

SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA.

SAILORS— Continued.

Ohye, Mas, mess attendant.
Ording, Gustav C, carpenter's mate,
third class.
O'Connor, James, chief boatswain's
mate.
O'Hagan, Thomas J., apprentice, first
class.
O'Neill, Patrick, fireman, second
class.
O'Regan, Henry H., water tender.
Paige, Frederick, landsman.
Palmgren, John, seaman.
Perry, Robert, mess attendant.
Phillips, Francis C, apprentice, first
class.
Pinkney, James, mess attendant.
Porter, John, coal passer.
Powers, John, oiler.
Price, Daniel, fireman, first class.
Quigley, Thomas J., plumber and
fitter.
Quinn, Charles P., oiler.
Reilly, Joseph, fireman, first class.
Reiger, William A., gunner's mate,
first class.
Rising, Newell, coal passer.
Robinson, William, landsman.
Roos, Peter, sailmaker.
Rushworth, William, chief machinist.
Safford, Clarence E., gunner's mate,
first class.
Salmin, Michael E., ordinary seaman.
Schroeder, August, ordinary seaman.
Scott, Charles A., carpenter's mate,
second class.
Scully, Joseph, boiler maker.
Seery, Joseph, fireman, first class.

Sellers, Walter S. , apothecary.
Shea, Patrick J., fireman, first class.
Shea, Thomas, landsman.
Shea, John J., coal passer.
Sheridan, Owen, fireman, second class.
Shillington, John H., yeoman, third
class.
Simmons, Alfred, coal passer.
*Smith, Carl A., seaman.
Smith, Nicholas J., apprentice, first
class.
Stevenson, Nicholas, seaman.
Sugisaki, Isa, wardroom steward.
Sutton, Frank, fireman, second class.
Suzuki, Kashitara, mess attendant.
Talbot, Frank C. , landsman.
Tehan, Daniel J., coal passer.
Thompson, George, landsman.
Tigges, Frank B. , coppersmith.
Tinsman, William H., landsman.
Todoresco, Constantin, fireman, first
class.
Troy, Thomas, coal passer.
Tuohey, Martin, coal passer.
Walsh, Joseph F., cockswain.
Wallace, John, ordinary seaman.
Warren, John, fireman, second class.
White, Charles O., chief master-at-
arms.
Whiten, George, seaman.
White, Robert, mess attendant.
Wickstrom, Johan E., seaman.
Wilson, Albert, seaman.
Wilson, Robert, chief quartermaster.
Wilbur, George W., apprentice, first
class.
Ziegler, John H., coal passer.

aHW>t"1 o HK H

O H

C^5H
KHs to-

W

THE COURT OF INQUIRY INTO THE FATE OF THE "MAINE" IN SESSION.

SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA.

227

MARINES.

Wagner, Henry, first sergeant.
Bennet, John, private'.
Botting, Vincent H., private.
Brosnan, George, private.
Burns, James R., private.
Brown, James T., sergeant.
Dierking, John H., drummer.
Downing, Michael J., private.
Johnson, Charles E., private.
Jordan, William J., private.
Kean, Edward F., private.
Kelly, Frank, private.
Lauriette, George M., private.
Losko, Peter A., private.

Monahan, Joseph P., private.
McDermott, John, private.
Newton, C. H., fifer.
Newman, F. J., private.
Richter, A. H., corporal.
Roberts, James H., private.
Schoen, Joseph, corporal.
Stock, H. E., private.
Strongman, James, private.
Suman, E. B., private.
Timpany, E. B., private.
Van Horn, H. A., private.
Warren, Asa V., private.
Wills, A. O., private.

LIST OF OFFICERS, SAILORS, AND MARINES ON BOARD
OF THE U. S. S. MAINE WHO WERE SAVED.
Capt. Charles D. Sigsbee, commanding.
Lieut. Commander Richard Wainwright.
Lieuts. George .F. W. Holman, John Hood, and Carl W.- Jungen.
Lieuts. (Junior Grade) George P. Blow, John J. Blandin.
Naval Cadets Jonas H. Holden, Watt T. Cluverius, Amon Bronson, and
David F. Boyd, Jr.
Surg. Lucien G. Heneberger.
Paymaster Charles M. Ray.
Chief Engineer Charles P. Howell.
Passed Assistant Engineer Frederic C. Bowers.
Assistant Engineer John R. Morris.
Naval Cadets (engineer division) Pope Washington and Arthur Crenshaw.
Chaplain John P. Chidwick.
First Lieut, of Marines Albertus W. Catlin.
Boatswain Francis E. Larkin.
Gunner Joseph Hill.
Carpenter George Helms.
Pay Clerk B. McCarty.

SAILORS.

Allen, James W., mess attendant.
Anderson, Oskar, cockswain.
Awo, Firsanion, steerage cook.

Bergman, Charles, boatswain's mate
first class.
Bloomer, John H., landsman.

228

SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA.

SAILORS— Continued.

Bullock, Charles H., gunner's mate,
second class.
Cahill, Francis D., landsman.
Christiansen, Karl, fireman, first class.
Cronin, Daniel, landsman.
David, George, ordinary seaman.
Dolan, John, seaman.
Dressier, Gustav J., apprentice, first
class.
Durckin, Thomas J., ordinary seaman.
Flynn, Michael, seaman.
Foley, Patrick J., apprentice, first
class.
Fox, George, landsman.
Gartrell, William M., fireman, first
class.
Hallberg, Alfred, cockswain.
Ham, Ambrose, apprentice, first class.
Harris, Westmore, mess attendant.
Heffron, John, ordinary seaman.
Herbert, John, landsman.
Herness, Alfred B., gunner's mate,
third class.
Hutchings, Robert, landsman.
Johnson, Alfred, seaman.
Kane, Joseph H., landsman.
Kushida, Katsusaburo, warrant of
ficers' steward.
Lanahan, Michael, landsman.
Larsen, Peder, seaman.
Larsen, Martin, seaman.
Load, John B., master-at-arms, third
class.

Lohman, Charles A., coal passer.
Mack, Thomas, landsman.
Matsen, Edward, ordinary seaman.
Mattisen, William, ordinary seaman.
Melville, Thomas, coal passer.
Mikkelsen, Peter, seaman.
Moriniere, Louis, seaman.
McCann, Harry, seaman.
McNair, William, ordinary seaman.
Panck, John H., fireman, first class.
Pilcher, Charles F., ordinary seaman.
Rau, Arthur, seaman.
Reden, Martin, seaman.
Richards, Walter E., apprentice,
second class.
Rowe, James, ship's cook, fourth class.
Rusch, Frank, ordinary seaman.
Schwartz, George, ship's cook, first
class.
Shea, Jeremiah, coal passer.
Teackle, Harry, seaman.
Thompson, William H., landsman.
Toppin, Daniel G., wardroom cook.
Turpin, John H., mess attendant.
Waters, Thomas J., landsman.
Webber, Martin V., landsman.
White, John E., landsman.
Williams, James, gunner's mate, third
class.
Williams, Henry, cabin cook.
Willis, Alonzo, apprentice, second
class.
Wilbur, Benjamin R., cockswain.

MARINES.

Anthony, William, private.
Coffey, John, private.
Galpin, C. P., private.
Germond, C. V., private.
Lutz, Joseph, private.

Thompson, T. G., corporal.

Loftus, Paul, private.
McDevitt, William, private.
McGuinness, William, private.
McKay, Edward, private.
Meehan, Michael, sergeant.

•it*-/;.'

-BS-^^f*^- *tw*iM ¦>*>.,

CHAPTER IX.

The San Domingo Torch in Aid of the Cuban Rebellion.
The Policy of Maximo Gomez, and the Famine in Cuba— The Reports of American Consuls
in Cuba on the Cane Burning and its Relation to the Starvation of the People— The
Agent of the Cubans in Arms Justified Barbarism— The Testimony of Our Consuls that
the Gomez Policy was the Cause of the Death of Thousands — Direct Evidence of Black
Mail Taxes and the Anxiety of Cuban People to be Annexed to the United States.— The
Desperado Orders by Gomez Before Weyler Came to Cuba.
One of the well remembered circumstances of the agitations that preceded
the declaration of war with Spain a few days was the intensity with which the
champions of the freedom and independence of the Republic of Cuba demanded
the reports that the American-Cuban consuls had furnished the State De
partment, respecting the Spanish policy of the malicious extermination of
the Cuban people, and there was a clamor because it was held to be prudent
to revise those papers, or withhold them for a few days, in order that the Span
iards might not find, in the official statements of the consuls, reasons that
would seem to demand the slaughter of writers of truth about the island.
There were two or three days' waiting, when the consuls were withdrawn
from their posts, and preserved, events following so fast that what they had to
say about Cuban affairs has never received very much attention. The real
character of the documentary evidence will, as a rule, be in the nature of news
to those who read this volume. The newspapers having the country in charge
and having undertaken the management of the war, had not much space to
give Cuban outrages when once there was assurance that we were going to
war with the Spaniards.
On the day the Maine was blown up, February 15, 1898, General Lee
wrote to President McKinley, enclosing a letter from the insurgent General
Maximo Gomez, without date, in which the general said:
"The revolution, as absolute master of the country, has never prohibited
any citizen, whatever his nationality, from earning his living, and it has hap-
229

230 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION.
pened that as soon as the barbarous concentration decree was promulgated
innumerable families have left and still leave the city for the field, impelled by
hunger to wrest from the fruitful Cuban vegetation the means of relieving the
most pressing needs of life. Those unhappy beings ignore the fact that if the
Spaniards, by steel and privation, have shrouded their hearths in mourning,
so also it might be said that the flora of Cuba was in mourning, devastated by
the bullet and torch. ' '
It must, of course, have been a solemn occasion when General Gomez
referred to the "torch," at the same time claiming that he had done nothing
to prevent the gaining of a livelihood by any* man. When the Hon. T.
Estrada Palma, in 1895. December 7th, wrote to the Secretary of State Rich
ard Olney, he made a statement of points upon which he asked "that the rights
of belligerency be accorded them by your government;" and he stated many
propositions and elucidated many* principles, but gave the greater part of his
interesting narrative to the achievements of Gomez, especially the celebration
of his campaign against Captain-General Martinez Campos, who was as a fact
pretty roughly handled. The strategy of fire by the military Commander-in-
Chief was given a good deal of space; and as far east as Santa Clara Mr.
Palma mentions that "a most important work of the forces" under Gomez,
"which occupied considerable time and caused many encounters with the
enemy, was the destruction of telegraph and telephone communications and
railroads, of which there are many lines or branches in this district." Of
course, this was just preparing the island to enter upon a superior course of
internal improvements, but Gomez had everything his own way, the Spanish
not interfering, and we quote Mr. Palma's report: "Early in July he issued
the first of the now famous orders relative to the sugar crop, and announced
his intention of marching through Santa Clara and into Matanzas in the
winter in order to superintend the carrying out of his decrees." This is an
official avowal to the Secretary of State of the United States by the authorized
agent of the Cubans in arms, of the beginning of the destruction of the greatest
industry in the richest island in the world — and as Gomez marched westward
the skies over Cuba were flushed with fire, so that the red glow was visible at
once from the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. We continue to quote
from Mr. Palma — page 8, following the demand of the U. S. Senate commit
tee, that Cuba should at once take her place as a sovereign sister among the
nations of the earth.

TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 231
"It was not the intention of General Gomez when he planned his winter
campaign, to march on and lay siege to the capital, his only object being to
prevent the grinding and export of the sugar crop and the consequent flow of
treasure into the Spanish coffers, and to demonstrate to the world that he
could control the provinces and enforce his orders.
"While this march of the main bodies of troops westward has been carried .
on, the Cuban forces of the other army corps have also succeeded in carrying
out the orders concerning sugar cane and preventing the establishment of
Spanish lines of communication."
We suppose that it must have been simply the modesty of Gomez that he
did not "lay siege" to Havana. That was undoubtedly the way to fire Cuba
— or it would have been if it had not been for the regulation of the sugar busi
ness with "the torch." But Gomez wrote to President McKinley on the day
of the Maine massacre that he never interfered with a day's work that was to
get a living.
Mr. Palma describes in his letter to Mr. Olney that the Cuban army con
sisted of five army corps, and says: "The first two corps consist of 26,000
men, mostly infantry; the third, of about 4,000 men, mostly cavalry; the
Fourth and Fifth Corps consisted before the late invasion of Gomez of over
20,000 men, both infantry and cavalry, which force has been considerably
increased in these last days."
Now, here was a magnificent army of liberation of 50,000 men, with more
coming, and arms and ammunition pouring in, and a good supply, as Mr.
Palma mentions, of artillery. What had become of them when Maximo
Gomez was thundering at the gates of Havana two hundred and fifty miles
away, with his body-guard and the Victoria regiment, eighty men in each of
the august regiments? And where were the first, and second, fourth and fifth
army corps of ten thousand men, at least, in each, with 4,000 cavalry to boot,
and field pieces galore? Where were those glittering hosts when our small army
of 17,000 men landed near Santiago to cooperate with the Cuban cavaliers and
legionaries? Why did not Gomez take his swelling ranks, already victorious
in setting on fire hundreds of plantations, and set up a republic sure enough?
The particular object in gathering the Cuban consuls' reports was to
kindle a blaze with them like that of a flaming cane field, so as to fan high the
blasts of war with the intelligence, indisputable because official, of the horrors
of the camps where the small farmers were passing away with fevers and

232 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION.
starvation, the grim results of the desolation of the plantations of sugar and
tobacco. Now, General Lee believed in the sincerity of Captain-General
Blanco, and his chief of staff, Pando — believed they honestly sought to make
an end of the famine, and in a letter from Lee to the Secretary of State, Day,
November 23, 1897, we find the perfectly frank and true story of the situation:
"First. The insurgents will not accept autonomy*.
"Second. A large majority of the Spanish subjects who have commer
cial and business interests and own property here, will not accept autonomy,
but prefer annexation to the United States rather than an independent repub
lic or genuine autonomy under the Spanish flag.
"Third. The Spanish authorities are sincere in doing all in their power
to encourage, protect, and promote the grinding of sugar. The grinding
season commences in December.
"Fourth. The insurgents' leaders have given instructions to prevent
grinding wherever it can be done, because by diminishing the export of sugar
the Spanish government revenues are decreased. It will be very difficult for
the Spanish authorities to prevent cane burning, because one man at night
can start a fire which will burn hundreds of acres, just as a single individual
could ignite a prairie by throwing a match into the dry grass. "
Precisely, and just as a fool or a fiend can burn a house or a city. Notice
the reference to Spanish subjects wanting to be citizens of the United States.
Mr. A. C. Brice was the consul at Matanzas, and wrote, January 17,
1898: "The scenes of misery and distress daily observed are beyond belief.
Here is one out of hundreds. In a family of seventeen living in an old lime
kiln, upper part of city limits, all were found dead except three, and they
barely alive. ... A few of the strongest of these people have been sent
out to sugar plantations, which expect to grind. They get 30 cents per day
and board themselves.
"A few plantations are grinding cane. In every case they are heavily
guarded by Spanish troops, and have paid insurgents for so doing. Was
shown a letter from insurgent chief to owner of a large plantation, in which
the price demanded for grinding was 2,000 centones ($10,600 United States
gold). It was paid. To make crop of sugar this season money, oxen, and
laborers must be had. I am, etc., A. C. BRICE,
"United States Consul."

TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 233
Here we see what was the great principle of "the torch" to which Gomez
refers in such a dainty way in his letter through Lee to the President. He
was an insurgent chief who wanted $10,000 United States gold for a permit to
make sugar on one plantation ; and the perishing Cubans of the famine camps
could have had work if this blackmail tax had been paid to the Republic of
Cuba. The torch of liberty was to light the flames of total destruction in a
great cane mill that offered employment to the starving — if the machinery
moved without a rebel permit ; and yet Gomez would not allow restraint upon
working- for a livelihood — except in a case where $10,000 American gold was
wanted to send to New York for patriotic purposes. Some of our great
Statesmen have discovered in Gomez a second George Washington, but closely
studied there is to be found some difference between the two men.
Mr. Hyatt, U. S. Consul at Santiago de Cuba, writing November 20,
1897, said:
"The Spanish residents of the island are becoming very outspoken in
favor of closing the war and annexation to the United States. There are
numerous inquiries among them of how they can become citizens of our
Government. There are also quite a number of Spanish soldiers making the
same inquiry. The business Spaniards here declare that they are tired of
doing business at a loss, and that peace and prosperity can only come by
annexation. Many are greatly disappointed that the United States consul
cannot make American citizens of them at once.
"With highest, etc., PULASKI F. HYATT,
"United States Consul."
Decembers, 1897, Mr. Hyatt wrote: "Mr. Rigney, an American sugar
planter near Manzanilla, was preparing to grind during the coming season.
A few nights since the insurgents fired seven cannon shots among his build
ings, one ball passing through the roof of his house. Americans were hope
ful that they would be allowed to make their crop, and several are making
ready to do so ; but the action of the insurgents toward Mr. Rigney gives the
problem a doubtful aspect. It may have been a personal matter against Mr.
Rigney. The number of destitute Americans fed by this consulate decreased
from 89 to 64, but is again on the increase."
It is to be taken into consideration that here is another consular report of
Spanish residents wanting to become Americans, through "annexation to the
United States." We think it entirely probable that these people may soon

234 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION.
know enough to help govern themselves. Spanish soldiers are making the
same inquiry. Here it is mentioned as a matter of business that as insurgent
cannon balls were fired to stop sugar making, the destitution of American
citizens was-on the increase. The connection between fire and famine is
distinctly made.
American Consul McGarr, writing from Cienfuegos, January 10, 1898:
"Consulate of the United States, Cienfuegos, January 10, 1898. — Sir: All
the sugar mills in this consular jurisdiction, 23 in number, have been grind
ing since the first of the month, and at the busy centrales the various indus
tries incident to the gathering of the crop and the manufacture of sugar are
in full and steady operation.
"Several of the principal estates are owned by American citizens and cor
porations, and most of their skilled employes are brought from the United
States. "The demand for labor on the sugar estates has drawn from the towns a
great portion of the unemployed laborers and given employment to the male
'concentrados,' many of whom were in a state of enforced idleness and
destitution. As a consequence, few of them are now seen here, and the labor
'congestion' has been relieved.
"Small predatory parties of insurgents make frequent attempts to fire the
cane fields, and it requires constant and active vigilance to prevent their
destruction. The dry weather and the high winds prevailing at this season
render it a simple matter for one person (who can easily conceal himself in
the tall cane) to start a conflagration that will, unless promptly extinguished,
destroy hundreds of acres in a few hours.
"Hence the almost impossibility, with the utmost watchfulness and using
every practicable safeguard, to prevent some loss of cane by the fires started,
often under cover of darkness, by the stealthy incendiaries familiar with the
locality and always on the alert for an opportunity to apply the torch.
"The sugar crop is the support of all classes, and especially of the labor
ing class,* and should it be in large part destroyed a famine in reality would
be inevitable.
"lam, etc., OWEN McGARR,
"United States Consul."
This does not seem to have been exactly what was expected in the
consular reports, but it is extremely pertinent and valuable, and it could never

QUARTER-DECK OF THE U, S, S, "BROOKLYN.'

FIRE ROOM OF THE U. S. S. "BROOKLYN."

TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 237
have had a greater opening for usefulness than just now, as the flag of the
United States is raised over Cuba.
The Consul, Mr. Hyatt, at Santiago de Cuba, writing December 21, 1897,
said: "As yet planters are all at sea as to whether they will grind cane or not.
It is no secret that they will have to make terms with the insurgents if they
do, and I understand that an agreement by which 50 cents per bag, or about
15 cents per 100, will be paid for Cuban hands off. Planters say this will
leave them no profit, but leave their plantations in better order for future
operations. "The three Rivery brothers, American citizens and owners of coffee,
cocoa, and orange groves, are about to return to their places. They are abso
lutely penniless, and say they would have surely starved but for the food
issued from this consulate. I shall continue to supply them with food, and
issue a month's rations of such food as rice, beans, codfish, crackers, etc. , as
their homes are over 30 miles away. "
The letter following, from a historic place, is of historical importance :
(Mr. Hyatt to Mr. Day.)
"Consulate of the United States, Santiago de Cuba, January 12, 1898. —
Sir: I deem it a duty to lay before the honorable Department of State the
situation here as affecting American interests, and to inclose herewith an
order issued by command of General Maximo Gomez, and a translation of the
same, forbidding the grinding of the sugar crop for the years 1897 and 1898.
"In this part of Cuba, so far as I can learn, all idea of making a sugar
crop is entirely abandoned.
"I regret to say that the stoppage of industries, from present appearances,
will not halt at the sugar crop, but coffee and other agricultural crops fall
under the same ban.
"I had hoped that, after the reconcentration order was revoked, through
the energetic action of the present administration-, we would find no trouble
in reinstating American industries ; but it appears that all of the benefits that
should have accrued to our citizens are thwarted by the action of the insur
gents, who refuse to allow them to return to their sugar, coffee and other
estates. The Pompo Manganese mines, owned by Americans, which would

238 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION.
at the present time be a very profitable investment if allowed to operate,
are also being held up by the same power.
"The three Rivery brothers, whom I informed you recently I was about to
assist in returning to their coffee and fruit estates, got there only to find they
could not go to work until permission was obtained from the insurgent com
mander, which permission seems doubtful, I myself, as I understand my duty,
being inhibited from rendering them any assistance at this point.
"These, with several sugar estates within my consular district, are held
up and becoming more worthless than before.
"It is beyond the power of my pen to describe the situation in eastern
Cuba. Squalidity, starvation, sickness, and death meet one in all places.
Beggars throng our doors and stop us on the streets. The dead in large num
bers remain over from day to day in the cemeteries unburied.
"Very respectfully, PULASKI F. HYATT,
"United States Consul."
The connection between the blackmail, sugar burning policy of the insur
gents reaffirmed by Gomez, and the "squalidity, starvation, sickness and
death" is absolutely established.
Mr. Walter B. Barker, writing November 20, 1897:
"As to grinding the present crop, I have interviewed most of the largest
planters in this consular district, who stated that unless assured of immunity
from the insurgent chief — Gomez — they would not jeopardize their property
by attempting to grind. ' '
"Consulate of the United States, Sagua la Grande, December 15, 1897. —
Sir: Thinking it may interest the Department, I have the honor to transmit
herewith clippings from a leading Spanish journal published in Havana,
. . . calling attention to the inability of the mills to grind in the Province
of Santiago de Cuba, which is one of r the obstacles to grinding in this (Santa
Clara) province, where the planters are not able to pay tribute required by
the insurgents. "The grinding season being at hand without preparations having been
made dissipates all hope of -a beginning.
"Not to grind the present crop, small as it must be, will bring distress far
greater than can be imagined.
"I am, etc., WALTER B. BARKER, "Consul."

TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 239
(Mr. Barker to Mr. Day.)
"Consulate of the United States, Sagua la Grande, December 28, 1897. —
The suffering and destitution among the concentrados ... is fearful, and
must continue to grow worse.
"How could the situation be otherwise, since the island is producing
absolutely nothing, save some growung cane, and at the same time completely
exhausted of all food. Relief alone can be obtained from the outer world
in the way of charitable contributions.
"This — Santa Clara — province is capable at this season of producing,
perhaps, two-thirds of whatever cane might be made in the entire island.
"To grind this cane without interruption would be the means of saving
the lives of thousands who, without this or outside aid within the next thirty
to fifty days, must die of actual hunger. Over a month since, the planters
were officially advised of Spain's inability to provide protection in order to
operate their mills. This leaves the sugar growers entirely in the hands of
the Cubans in revolt, as to whether they will be allowed to grind without
hindrance or fear of total destruction of their property. I know that strict
orders have been given to subordinate commanders under no circumstances
must mills be permitted to grind, under penalty of violation of the order
iorth destruction of property.
"Without contributions of food and medicine from the outer world, and
at once, a sacrifice of lives will ensue, the responsibility for which no Chris
tian people can face.
"I am, etc., WALTER B. BARKER, Consul."
Here is the proof in consular reports that were expected to fill the
United States with horror toward the Spaniards, furnishing the proof that the
insurgents, carrying on their blackmail war upon industry, refused to save
thousands of lives by permitting sugar making.
"Consulate of the United States, Sagua la Grande, January 31, 1898. — At
my suggestion several families returned to the American-owned 'Central
Santa Anna, ' the owner having been forced to abandon the property in order
to prevent further spoliation of the mill machinery. Although a government
guard is stationed on the place, they (former tenants) were ordered to leave.

240 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION.
day by a band of insurgents, killing 14 and wounding 5 of the guerrillas paid
by the estate to protect the operatives. Seven laborers were killed, the
insurgents leaving two of their dead.
"An adjoining estate, the property of the British consul, was also attacked,
the growing cane burned. This precludes further attempts to grind, as men
cannot be induced to work while the insurgents roam at will over the country.
"lam, etc., WALTER B. BARKER, Consul."
We do not say that Maximo Gomez meant to inflict famine upon Cuba,
for he probably had the barbarian instinct that led him to think that to fling
firebrands was a way of announcing liberty. He issued a proclamation dated
at Sancti Spiritus, November 11, 1895, placing the responsibility, as he said,
for the great ruin he was about to inflict, upon "passive" people. He added:
"This people cannot hesitate between the wealth of Spain and the liberty
of Cuba. Its greatest crime would be to stain the land with blood without
effecting its purposes because of puerile scruples and fears which do not con
cur with the character of the men who are in the field."
July 1, 1895, at Najasa Camaguay, Gomez issued an address to the plant
ers and cattle ranchers:
"Whereas, all exploitations of any product whatsoever are aids and
resources to the Government that we are fighting, it is resolved by the
General-in-Chief to issue this general order throughout the island that the
introduction of articles of commerce, as well as beef and cattle, into the towns
occupied by the enemy, is absolutely prohibited. The sugar plantations will
stop their labors, and whosoever shall attempt to grind the crop notwith
standing this order, will have their cane burned and their buildings demol
ished." Any one disobeying this order was to be considered an enemy and
"treated as a traitor." Gomez also issued a peremptory order as follows:
"Headquarters of the Army of Liberation, Territory of Sancti Spiritus,
November 6, 1895. — Animated by the spirit of unchangeable resolution in
defense of the rights of the revolution of redemption of this country of colo
nists, humiliated and despised by Spain, and in harmony with what has been
decreed concerning the Subject in the circular dated the 1st of July, I have
ordered the following:
"Article I. That all plantations shall be totally destroyed, their cane and
outbuildings burned, and railroad connections destroyed.

A FRUIT VENDOR IN HAVANA.

12-INCH BREECH-LOADING MORTARS. WEIGHT, 28,980 POUNDS EACH.

TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 243
"Ait. II. All laborers who shall aid the sugar factories — these sources
of supplies that we must deprive the enemy of — shall be considered as traitors
to their country.
"Art. III. All who are caught in the act, or whose violation of Article
II. shall be proven, shall be shot. Let all chiefs of operations of the army of
liberty comply with this order, determined to unfurl triumphantly, even over
ruin and ashes, the flag of the Republic of Cuba.
"In regard to the manner of waging the war, follow the private instruc
tions that I have already given.
"For the sake of the honor of our arms and your well-known courage and
patriotism, it is expected that you will strictly comply with the above orders.
"M. GOMEZ, General-in-Chief.
"To the chiefs of operations: Circulate this."
, Here we have the official announcement of the policy of firebugs, as that
of liberation, and it is the confirmation of this firebug policy that is now thrust
like a torch in the face of the United States, in the name of freedom and
independence.

CHAPTER X.

The Way the War Business was Handled.
The Declaration of War — The President's Call upon Congress to Take Action — Fit and
Few Words — The Constant Scramble in Congress for the Cuban Ghost Dance Govern
ment—The Official Text of the President's War Proclamations -The Navy had First to
Take Command of the Seas — The Timely Dispatches from the Navy Department, Mak
ing Ready for War — Major General Miles and his 50,000 Cubans.
A considerable number of members of Congress were slow in appreciating
the excellence of the attitude of the President in holding fast the last chances
of peace and at the same time urging forward as part of the same policy works
of charity and preparations for w*ar. He was better understood and held in
higher esteem during a few days of agitation, abroad than at home, and the_
general consent of civilized nations that the international position of our
country was unassailable, that contributed to our success, was in a great
measure due to the propriety of the course of the President, which presently
consolidated public sentiment in all the States, and appealed with dignity to
the Powers, whose interest became as intelligible as it was indisputable.
Especially was the far-sighted thoughtfulness of the President comprehended
and respected in England, and through all the months of exciting trial and
straining tests we felt the firm grasp of her friendly hand, and the growth of
mutual regard stronger than treaties, because it was the genuine self-evidence
of the kindred blood of the nations, and that their joint influence would be
without conventions one of the mightiest in the betterment of the world.
The weight of the President's message of April nth was felt to be over
whelming in gravity and import. He said, "I ask Congress to authorize and
empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination
of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and
to insure in the island the establishment of a stable government." The words
had been picked for their places, and were "stable." There was wanted,
244

THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 245
the President added, a government in Cuba "capable of maintaining order
and of observing its international obligations — insuring- peace and tranquillity,
and the security of its citizens as well as its own." This was just as plain as a
proclamation could have been written, that the ghost dance of the Cuban
Republic was not what was wanted — that their government was a gang not to
be put in possession by our arms of the island they had devastated with the
torch. The next words were that the President wanted the authority of Con
gress "to use the military and naval forces of the United States" — and this
as might be "necessary for those purposes." The next four sentences were
clear as shafts of white light, keen as steel, and terminal, "The issue is now
with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every
effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors.
Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution
and the law, I await some action." These were the words of truth and
sobriety. The country was the stronger for this soberness, and knew it.
There was no need to quote Grant and Jackson, but it was done, and well
done. There was no question as to the commander and pilot of the Ship of
State. On the 13th of April the House resolved for immediate intervention,
334 to 19. The terms of the resolution were tinged with the preliminary
temper, but the business was in the words: "The President is hereby author
ized and directed to intervene at once, to stop the war in Cuba." The Presi
dent's words were not, in the part of the resolution that was definite and
certain, far departed from. The purpose of the intervention was defined to
be "permanent peace and order," and "establishing by the free action of the
people" a "stable and independent government of their own," and the Presi
dent was empowered to use the army and navy for that purpose. But the
filibuster war party strove to twist into the texture of the proceedings an
advertisement of the intended Republic, and a quit claim deed to its pro
fessional managers; the scramble was for this perversity. There was a joint
resolution that "the United States government hereby recognizes the inde
pendence of the Republic of Cuba." This was defeated, 191 to 150. The
Senate, with a whereas about the Maine, resolved, "That the people of the
island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent." It was
amended to read, "That the people of the island of Cuba of right ought to be
free and independent." The House voted, yeas 178, nays 156. The next day
the President wrote on the joint resolution engrossed on parchment,

246 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
"Approved, William McKinley, April 20, 1898." The passports of the Span
ish Minister were dated the same day, and the next day the American
Minister left Madrid, handing the interests of the American citizens and
affairs to the Minister of England. The President's blockade message was of
the date of April 25th. The call for volunteers, in the aggregate 125,000, was
on the 23d of April, and it was certified as done by the President, by John
Sherman, Secretary of State.
"MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
"Transmitting Copies of Correspondence Recently Had with the Representa
tive of Spain in the United States, with the United States Minister at
Madrid, and through the Latter with the Government of Spain, Showing
the Action Taken under the Joint Resolution Approved April 20, 1898. —
April 25, 1898. — Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
ordered to be printed.
"To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America: — I transmit to the Congress, for its consideration and appropriate
action, copies of correspondence recently had with the representative of
Spain in the United States, with the United States Minister at Madrid, and
through the latter with the government of Spain, showing the action taken
under the joint resolution approved April 20, 1898, 'for the recognition of the
independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain
relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and with
draw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the
President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United
States to carry these resolutions into effect. '
"Upon communicating to the Spanish Minister in Washington the demand
which it became the duty of the Executive to address to the government of
Spain in obedience to said resolution, the Minister asked for his passports and
withdrew. The United States Minister at Madrid was in turn notified by the
Spanish Minister for foreign affairs that the withdrawal of the Spanish repre
sentative from the United States had terminated diplomatic relations between
the two countries, and that all official communications between their respect
ive representatives ceased therewith.
"I commend to your especial attention the note addressed to the United
States Minister at Madrid by the Spanish Minister for foreign affairs on the

THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 247
21st instant, whereby the foregoing notification was conveyed. It will be per
ceived therefrom that the government of Spain, having cognizance of the
joint resolution of the United States Congress, and in view of the things
which the President is thereby required and authorized to do, responds by
treating the reasonable demands of this government as measures of hostility,
following with that instant and complete severance of relations by its action,
which by the usage of nations accompanies an existent state of war between
sovereign powers.
"The position of Spain being thus made known and the demands of the
United States being denied with a complete rupture of intercourse by the act
of Spain, I have been constrained, in exercise of the power and authority
conferred upon me by the joint resolution aforesaid, to proclaim, under date
of April 22, 1898, a blockade of certain ports of the north coast of Cuba, lying
between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and of the port of Cienfuegos on the
south coast of Cuba; and further, in exercise of my constitutional powers and
using the authority conferred upon me by the act of Congress approved April
22, 1898, to issue my proclamation, dated April 23, 1898, calling forth volun
teers in order to carry into effect the said resolution of April 20, 1898. Copies
of these proclamations are hereto appended.
"In view of the measures so taken, and with a view to the adoption of
such other measures as may be necessary to enable me to carry out the
expressed will of the Congress of the United States in the premises, I now
recommend to your honorable body the adoption of a joint resolution declar
ing that a state of war exists between the United States of America and the
Kingdom of Spain, and I urge speedy action thereon, to the end that the
definition of the international status of the United States as a belligerent
power may be made known, and the assertion of all its rights and the main
tenance of all its duties in the conduct of public war may be assured.
"WILLIAM McKINLEY.
"Executive Mansion, Washington, April 25, 1898."
No. 1.
Mr. Sherman to Mr. Woodford.
(Telegram in Cipher.)
"Department of State, Washington, April 14, 1898— Tuesday noon. —
House of Representatives, 324 to 19, passed yesterday afternoon resolution
authorizing and directing the President to intervene at once to stop the war

248 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
in Cuba, with the purpose of securing peace and order there and establishing
by the free action of the people thereof, a stable and independent government
of their own, and empowering him to use the land and naval forces to execute
that purpose. Senate committee on Foreign affairs reported yesterday reso
lution declaring that the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought
to be, free and independent, demanding that Spain relinquish authority and
government in Cuba and withdraw land and naval forces therefrom, and
empowering the President to use Army and Navy and militia to carry reso
lutions into effect. It will probably be decisively voted to-day. Ultimate
resolution in conference can not now be forecast, but will doubtless direct
intervention by force, if need be, to secure free Cuba. The situation is most
critical. JOHN SHERMAN."

No. 2.
Mr. Day to Mr. Woodford.
(Telegram, in part cipher.)
"Department of State, Washington, April 17, 1898. — The Senate, Satur
day evening, by 67 votes to 21, passed a resolution amending all of the House
resolution after the enacting clause. It declares as follows :
" 'Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled :
" 'First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought
to be, free and independent, and that the government of the United States
hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of
that island.
" 'Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government
of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba,
and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.
" 'Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United
States and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the
several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions
into effect. ''Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island,

THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 249
except for the pacification thereof, and assei'ts its determination when that is
accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people.'
"The House has taken a recess until 10 Monday morning, when vote will
be taken on concurring in the Senate amendments. If the House non-concurs,
conference follows. Ultimate form of resolution cannot yet be foreseen.
"Sunday morning, 1 o'clock. DAY, Acting."

No. 3.
Mr. Day to Mr. Woodford.
(Telegram, in cipher.)
"Department of State, Washington, April 19, 1898. — At 3 this morning,
after prolonged conferences, the Senate and the House of Representatives
adopted the joint resolution the text of which was telegraphed to you Satur
day night, omitting from the first section the words 'and that the government
of the United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and
lawful government of that island.' Vote in Senate, 42 to 35 ; in House, 310
against 6.
"An instruction will be telegraphed you later, immediately on the Presi
dent signing the joint resolution. In the meantime you will prepare for
withdrawal from Spain, and notify consuls to be ready for the signal to leave.
If any consul is in danger, he may quietly leave at his discretion.
"DAY."

No. 4.
Mr. Woodford to Mr. Day.
(Telegram, in cipher.)
"Madrid, April 20, 1898. — Have received telegram of Tuesday morning;,
am prepared to withdraw ; have notified consuls to be ready.
"WOODFORD."

No, 5.
Mr. Sherman to Mr. Woodford.
(Telegram, plain.)
"Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1898.— You have been
furnished with the text of a joint resolution voted by the Congress of the
United States on the 19th instant (approved to-day) in relation to the pacifica-

250 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
tion of the island of Cuba. In obedience to that act the President directs, you
to immediately communicate to the government of Spain said resolution, with
the formal demand of the government of the United States that the govern
ment of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island
of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.
In taking this step the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island
except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is
accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people
under such free and independent government as they may establish.
"If by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 23d day of April, instant,
there be not communicated to this government by that of Spain a full and
satisfactory response to this demand and resolution whereby the ends of peace
in Cuba shall be assured, the President will proceed without further notice to
use the power and authority enjoined and conferred upon him by the said
joint resolution to such extent as may be necessary to carry the same into
effect. SHERMAN."

No. 6.
Mr. Sherman to the Spanish Minister.
"Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1898. — Sir: I have the
honor to communicate to you a copy of an instruction sent this day to the
United States Minister at Madrid, by telegraph, in obedience to a joint reso
lution of the Congress of the United States of America in relation to the
pacification of the island of Cuba, approved this day, of which a copy is
hereto annexed.
"I avail myself of this opportunity to repeat to you the assurances of my
highest consideration. JOHN SHERMAN."
"Joint Resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of
Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its authority
and government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval
forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the
United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to
carry these resolutions into effect.
"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS* HANDLED. 251
States of ^America in Congress assembled, First. That the people of the
island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.
"Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government
of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba
and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.
"Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United
States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of
the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these reso
lutions into effect.
"Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island
except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is
accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.
"Approved, April 20, 1898."

No. 7.
Spanish Minister to Mr. Sherman.
(Translation.)
"Legation of Spain, Washington, April 20, 1898. (Received 11:35 a-
m.) — Mr. Secretary: The resolution adopted by the Congress of the United
States of America and approved to-day by the President is of such a nature
that my continuance in Washington becomes impossible and obliges me to
request of you the delivery of my passports.
"The protection of Spanish interests will be intrusted to the French
Ambassador and to the Austrian- Hungarian Minister.
"On this occasion, very painful to me, I have the honor to renew to you
the assurances of my highest consideration. "LUIS POLO DE BERNABIJ."

No.
Mr. Sherman to the Spanish Minister.

"Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1898.— Mr. Minister:
have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of this day's date, i

I

252 THE WAY*THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
which you state that the resolution adopted by the Congress of the United
States of America, and to-day approved by the President, is of such a nature
as to make your continuance in Washington impossible and constrains you to
request that your passports be given you. You add that the protection of
Spanish interests is intrusted to the Ambassador of France and the Minister
of Austria- Hungary.
"In response to your request I have the honor to hand you a passport for
yourself, your family, and your suite. I beg also to inform you that arrange
ments have been made for a guard to attend you during your presence in the
territory of the United States.
"Sincerely regretting the step that you have felt constrained to take, I
avail myself of this opportunity to again tender you the assurances of my
highest consideration. JOHN SHERMAN."

Copy of passport handed to Minister Polo de Bernabe.
No. — .) United States of America.
"To all to whom these presents shall come greeting: Know ye that the
bearer hereof, Senor Don Luis Polo de Bernabe, Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of Spain to the United States, is about to travel
abroad, accompanied by his family and suite.
"These are therefore to request all officers of the United States, or of any
State thereof, whom it may concern, to permit them to pass freely, without
let or molestation, and to extend to them friendly aid and protection in case
of need. "In testimony whereof, I, John Sherman, Secretary of State of the United
States of America, have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Department of State to be affixed at Washington, this 20th day of April, A. D.
1898, and of the independence of the United States of America the one hun
dred and twenty*-second.
"(Seal.) SHERMAN."

No. 9.
Mr. Sherman to Mr. Woodford.
(Telegram, in part cipher.)
"Department of State, April 20, 1898.— Senor Polo de Bernabe", Spanish
Minister to the United States, upon being informed, shortly before noon

THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 253
to-day, of the action of this government taken in pursuance of the resolutions
of Congress of April 19, 1898, has asked for his passports. In compliance with
his request passports for himself, his family, and suite have been handed him,
with assurances of safety while within the territory of the United States.
"Unless previously handed your passports, you will be expected to
remain near the Court of Spain till Saturday noon of this week, and unless by
that day and hour some communication is received from the government of
Spain which you deem will be satisfactory to this government, you will ask
for your passports and safe conduct. • SHERMAN. "

No. 10.
Mr. Woodford to Mr. Sherman.
(Telegram, received in cipher.)
"Madrid, April 21, 1898. (Received 9:02 a. m.) — ;Early this (Thursday)
morning, immediately after the receipt of your open telegram and before I
had communicated same to Spanish government, Spanish Minister for Foreign
Affairs notified me that diplomatic relations are broken between the two
countries, and that all official communication between their respective repre
sentatives has ceased. I accordingly asked for safe passport. Turn legation
over to British embassy and leave for Paris this afternoon. Have notified
consuls. ' '

No. 11.
Mr. Woodford to Mr. Sherman.
(Telegram.)
"United States Legation, Madrid, April 21, 1898. — Following is text of
official note received this morning at 7 :3o o'clock from Spanish Minister of
State :
" 'In compliance with a painful duty, I have the honor to inform your
excellency that, the President having approved a resolution of both Chambers
of the United States which, in denying the legitimate sovereignty of Spain
and in threatening armed intervention in Cuba, is equivalent to an evident
declaration of war, the government of His Majesty has ordered its Minister in
Washington to withdraw without loss of time from the North American ter
ritory with all the personnel of the legation. By this act the diplomatic rela
tions which previously existed between the two countries are broken off, all

254 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
official communication between their respective representatives ceasing, and
I hasten to communicate this to your excellency in order that on your part
you may make such dispositions as seem suitable.
" 'I beg of your excellency to kindly acknowledge the receipt of this note,
and I avail myself, etc' WOODFORD."

No. 12.
Mr. Woodford to Mr. Sherman.
(Telegram.)
"Madrid, April 21, 1898. (Received 3:01 p. m.) — Following is text of my
reply to official note received this morning at 7:30 o'clock from Spanish Min
ister of State :
" 'I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt this morning of your note
of this date informing me that the Spanish Minister at Washington has been
ordered to withdraw with all his legation and without loss of time from North
American territory. You also informed me that by this act diplomatic rela
tions between the two countries are broken off, that all official communica
tion between their respective representatives ceases. I have accordingly this
day telegraphed the American Consul-General at Barcelona to instruct all the
consular representatives of the United States in Spain to turn their respective
consulates over to the British consuls and to leave Spain at once. I have
myself turned this legation over to Her Britannic Majesty's embassy at
Madrid. That embassy will from this time have the care of all American
interests in Spain. I now request passports and safe conduct to the French
frontier for myself and the personnel of this legation. I intend leaving this
afternoon at 4 o'clock for Paris. I avail myself, etc'
"WOODFORD."

No. 13.
(Blockade of Cuban Ports.)
By the President of the United States of America.
"A PROCLAMATION.
"Whereas, by a joint resolution passed by the Congress and approved
April 20, 1898, and communicated to the government of Spain, it was

THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 255
demanded that said government at once relinquish its authority and govern
ment in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba
and Cuban waters ; and the President of the United States was directed and
empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and
tc call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several
States to such extent as might be necessary to carry said resolution into
effect; and
"Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the President of the
United States deems it necessary to set on foot and maintain a blockade
of the north coast of Cuba, including all ports on said coast, between
Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast
of Cuba: "Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States,
in order to enforce the said resolution do hereby declare and proclaim that
the United States of America have instituted and. will maintain a blockade of
the north coast of Cuba, including ports on said coast between Cardenas and
Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba, afore
said, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and the law of nations
applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be posted so as to prevent
the entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. Any neutral ves
sel approaching any of said ports, or attempting to leave the same, without
notice or knowledge of the establishment of such blockade, will be duly
warned by the commander of the blockading forces, who will indorse on her
register the fact, and the date, of such warning, where such indorsement was
made ; and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter any blockaded port,
she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceed
ings against her and her cargo as prize as may be deemed advisable.
"Neutral vessels lying in any of said ports at the time of the establish
ment of such blockade will be allowed thirty days to issue therefrom.
"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
"Done at the city of Washington, this 22d day of April, A. D. 1898, and
of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.
"(Seal.) WILLIAM McKINLEY.
"By the President:
"JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State. "

256 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
• No. 14.
(Call for Volunteers — Spain.)
By the President of the United States.

"A PROCLAMATION.
"Whereas a joint resolution of Congress was approved on the twentieth
day of April, 1898, entitled 'Joint resolution for the recognition of the inde
pendence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spair
relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and with- *
draw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the
President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United
States to carry these resolutions into effect ;' and
"Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled 'An act to provide for tempo
rarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of
war, and for other purposes,' approved April 22, 1898; the President is author
ized, in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue his proclamation calling for
volunteers to serve in the Army of the United States:
"Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, by
virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, and deem
ing sufficient occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and hereby do
call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 125,000, in order to carry
into effect the purpose of the said resolution ; the same to be. apportioned, as
far as practicable, among the several States and Territories, and the District
of Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years, unless
sooner discharged. The details for this object will be immediately communi
cated to the proper authorities through the War Department.
"In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
"Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-third day of April, A. D.
1898, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and
twenty-second. "(Seal.) WILLIAM McKINLEY.
"By the President: JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State."

THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 257

PROCLAMATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT RELATING TO THE
WAR WITH SPAIN.
(Blockade of Cuban Ports.)
By the President of the United States of America.
"A PROCLAMATION.
"Whereas, by a joint resolution passed by the Congress and approved
April 20, 1898, and communicated to the government of Spain, it was
demanded that said government at once relinquish its authority and govern
ment in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba
and Cuban waters; and the President of the United States was directed and
empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and
to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several
States to such extent as might be necessary to carry said resolution into
effect; and
"Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the President of the
United States deems it necessary to set on foot and maintain a blockade of the
north coast of Cuba, including all ports on said coast between Cardenas and
Bahia Honda and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba:
"Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United Stales,
in order to enforce the said resolution, do hereby declare and proclaim that
the United States of America have instituted, and will maintain a blockade of
the North coast of Cuba, including ports on said coast between Cardenas and
Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba, afore
said, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and the law of nations
applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be posted so as to prevent
the entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. Any neutral vessel
approaching any of said ports, or attempting to leave the same, without notice
or knowledge of the establishment of such blockade, will be duly warned by
the commander of the blockading forces, who will indorse on her register the
fact, and the date, of such warning, where such indorsement was made ; and
if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter any blockaded port, she will be
captured and sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceedings against
her and her cargo as prize, as may be deemed advisable.

258 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
"Neutral vessels lying in any of said ports at the time of the establish
ment of such blockade will be allowed thirty days to issue therefrom.
"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
"Done at the city of Washington, this 22d day of April, A. D. 1898, and
of the independence of the United States, the one hundred and twenty-
second. "(Seal.) WILLIAM McKINLEY.
"By the President.
"JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State."

(Call for Volunteers — Spain.)
By the President of the United States.

"A PROCLAMATION.

"Whereas, a joint resolution of Congress was approved on the twentieth
day of April, 1898, entitled 'Joint resolution for the recognition of the independ
ence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relin
quish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its
land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the Presi
dent of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States
to carry these resolutions into effect, ' and
"Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled 'An act to provide for tempo
rarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of war
and for other purposes,' approved April 22, 1898; the President is authorized,
in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue his proclamation calling for vol
unteers to serve in the Army of the United States :
"Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States,
by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, and
deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and hereby
do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 125,000, in order to carry
into effect the purpose of the said resolution; the same to be apportioned, as
far as practicable, among the several States and Territories and the District

ADMIRAL DEWEY AS CHIEF OF BUREAU OF EQUIPMENT, UNITED STATES NAVY.

THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 261
of Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years, unless
sooner discharged. The details for this object will be immediately communi
cated to the proper authorities through the War Department.
"In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
"Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-third day of April, A. D.
1898, and of the independence of the United States the one-hundred and
twenty-second. "(Seal.) WILLIAM McKINLEY.
"By the President:
"JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State. "

(War with Spain — Maritime Law.)
By the President of the United States of America.
"A PROCLAMATION.
"Whereas, by an act of Congress, approved April 25, 1898, it is declared
that war exists and that war has existed since the 21st day of April, A. D.
1898, including said day, between the United States of America and the
Kingdom of Spain; and
"Whereas, it being desirable that such war should be conducted upon
principles in harmony with the present views of nations and sanctioned by
their recent practice, it has already been announced that the policy of this
government will be not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules of
the Declaration of Paris:
"Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States of
America, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the
laws, do hereby declare and proclaim :
"1. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of con
traband of war.
"2. Neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not liable to confiscation
under the enemy's flag.
"3. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective.
"4. Spanish merchant vessels, in any ports or places within the United
States, shall be allowed till May 21, 1898, inclusive, for loading their cargoes

262 THE. WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
and departing from such ports or places; and such Spanish merchant vessels,
if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue their
voyage, if, on examination of their papers, it shall appear that their cargoes
were taken on board before the expiration of the above term ; Provided, that
nothing herein contained shall apply to Spanish vessels having on board any
officer in the military or naval service of the enemy, or any coal (except such
as may be necessary for their voyage), or any other article prohibited or con
traband of war, or any dispatch of or to the Spanish government.
"5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to April 21, 1898, shall
have sailed from any foreign port bound for any port or place in the United
States, shall be permitted to enter such port or place, and to discharge her
cargo, and afterward forthwith to depart without molestation; and any such
vessel, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue
her voyage to any port not blockaded.
"6. The right of search is to be exercised with strict regard for the rights
of neutrals, and the voyages of mail steamers are not to be interfered with
except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of a violation of law in respect of
contraband or blockade.
"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
"Done at the city of Washington, on the twenty-sixth day of April, in
the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the
independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.
"(Seal.) WILLIAM McKINLEY.
"By* the President:
"ALVEY A. ADEE, Acting Secretary of State."

(Second call for Volunteers — Spain.)
By the President of the United States.
"A PROCLAMATION.
"Whereas, an act of Congress was approved on the twenty- fifth day of
April, 1898, entitled 'An act declaring that war exists between the United
States of America and the Kingdom of. Spain,' and
"Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled 'An act to provide for tem
porarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in

THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 263
time of war and for other purposes, approved April 22, 1898; the President is
authorized, in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue his proclamation for
calling for volunteers to serve in the army of the United States :
"Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States,
by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, and
deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and hereby
do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 75,000 in addition to the
volunteers called forth by my proclamation of the twenty-third day of April,
in the present year; the same to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among
the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, according to
population, and to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged. The pro
portion of each arm and the details of enlistment and organization will be
made known through the War Department.
"In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
"Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-fifth day of May, in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the
independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.
"(Seal.) WILLIAM McKINLEY.
"By the President:
"WILLIAM R. DAY, Secretary of State. "

(Blockade — Southern Cuba and San Juan, Puerto Rico. )
By the President of the United States.
"A PROCLAMATION.
"Whereas, for the reasons set forth in my Proclamation of April 22,
1898, a blockade of the ports on the northern coast of Cuba, from Cardenas to
Bahia Honda, inclusive, and of the port of Cienfuegos, on the south coast of
Cuba, was declared to have been instituted ; and
"Whereas, it has become desirable to extend the blockade to other Span
ish ports: "Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, do
hereby declare and proclaim that, in addition to the blockade of the ports
specified in my Proclamation of April 22, 1898, the United States of America

264 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
has instituted and will maintain an effective blockade of all the ports on the
south coast of Cuba from Cape Frances to Cape Cruz, inclusive, and also of
the port of San Juan, in the Island of Porto Rico.
"Neutral vessels lying in any of the ports to which the blockade is by the
present Proclamation extended, will be allowed thirty da)*s to issue there
from, with cargo.
"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the Seal
of the United States to be affixed.
"Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-seventh day of June, A.
D. 1898, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and
twenty-second. "(Seal:) WILLIAM McKINLEY.
"By the President:
"J. B. MOORE, Acting Secretary of State."
The various departments of the government of the United States have
performed the part of a government by the people, of and for the people, in
giving full information of the conduct of the war with Spain. The policy of
candor has prevailed. Since nations lifted the sword against each other there
has been no war more obstinately and weakly, though vindictively, provoked
than that which Spain insisted upon with the United States. Notwithstanding
a remarkable lack of preparation in military matters, owing to the unthinking
habit as to the possible occurrence of speedy and costly war measures forced
upon us— a habit in the indulgence of which as a political luxury Congress
fairly represented and competed with the people— the war was a wonderful
success. The Spaniards had in their colonies that we assailed ten regular soldiers
to every man of our regular army, and they were thoroughly supplied with
rifles, almost equal in range, and better supplied with fixed ammunition than
ours, and field artillery up to date. They had for many years been of the
opinion that they would sometime in this generation have to fight us for the
West India Islands, and so had in their calculations pitted their navy against
that of the United States, with results in their minds flattering to themselves.
As long ago as during the second administration of General Grant, it was
Spanish public opinion, with which there was general concurrence in Europe
with the possible exception of England, that we were not a match for Spain at
sea. This idea was based upon the estimation in which Europe held the
lighter class of vessels for war purposes— the smaller cruisers, the gunboats

GUNS USED BY UNITED STATES INFANTRY. BREECH CLOSED.

GUNS USED BY UNITED STATES INFANTRY. BREECH OPEN.

UNITED STATES LIGHT ARTILLERY AT PORT TAMPA.

ARTILLERY TARGET PRACTICE AT PORT TAMPA.

THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 267
torpedo boats and torpedo destroyers. In these Spain certainly outnumbered
us. But our naval men had not lost time in their studies of the squadrons of
the greater sea powers, and fortunately they had early reached the conclusion
that the battleship able to cross the great oceans was the old reliable style of
combatant, and that comparatively a few guns of very high power, supported
by rapid-fire guns, stood many chances of proving the most effective combina
tion that could be devised. It seems to be established by our experience that
two battleships — say the Oregon and the Iowa — could have sunk, without
receiving a serious scratch, all the torpedo and destroyer and light cruiser
boats in the Spanish navy. There were twelve gunboats in the squadron of
the Spaniards in the Philippines that did not in the war period show sign of
existence, though they were invited to adventure by our transports on the
Pacific, bearing practically unarmed regiments. It is characteristic of modern
wars that they are practically short, owing to the rapidity with which orders
are sent by telegraph and troops by railways and steamers ; and the concen
trated destructiveness of monster war ships, and rapidly mobilized armies, are
such enormous consumers of men and money that expenses in active opera
tions cannot long be endured.
However, our war with Spain was fought to a finish in a fortnight and a
hundred days, and we had a procession of triumphs from start to end. It may
have been a fault that victory became too monotonous for some of our men,
prepared as they presumed to draw prizes, and for the journalism of fragmen
tary distortion that covers all countries wrapped up in newspapers and yet is
adapted only to sea serpents, earthquakes and the land where earthquakes
abide and typhoon and the cyclone are at play, and no music is tolerated that
is gentler than the calliope. There never was as much that was difficult
accomplished in warfare in the same time as by this country, with so small a
loss of life, or more gratifying acts of good conduct in which heroes came
from all ranks in the service, and yet there is a literature of criticism of the
conduct of the war. It is the ordinary fortune of war that the exposures,
fatigues and privations of camp life and the march cost more lives than are
lost on battlefields, but for these things our country seemed to be least
prepared, and feeling sure abundant provision was made for the soldiers,
there have been disappointments demanding victims, and we have volumes of
testimony taken by the commission appointed by the President to investigate
the business of the War Department in the war with Spain.

268 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
The report of the Major-General commanding the army, Nelson A. Miles,
contains this passage:
"At the commencement of the war the problem was largely a naval one,
and until the question of superiority between our navy and the Spanish navy,
or such naval forces as might be furnished by any other European pow*er or'
combination of powers supporting the Spanish government, was determined,
military operations had to be determined by the success or failure of our naval
forces. I was fully convinced that should our navy prove superior the posi
tion of the Spanish army in Cuba would be rendered untenable with a mini
mum loss of life and treasure to the United States."
It was the first certainty of the war that the command of the sea must
be settled before military operations took place outside our own lines. The
navy Department had its work cut out for it — knew what was on hand, the
possibilities, where the ships were and how manned and equipped, and three
months in advance of the declaration, precautionary orders were issued. Many
of them are presented in the Appendix Report of the Bureau of Navigation,
and these are described as "only part of the more important precautionary
orders issued by the Department," and as "orders not elsewhere included."
This further preface is given :
"No attempt has been made to indicate the vast amount of work done by
the bureaus and offices of the Department in putting ships and yards in the
highest state of efficiency and in purchasing and manufacturing war material.
Arrangements for purchases abroad began in February, but the correspond
ence in relation thereto is so voluminous that it is not published."

Washington, January 16, 1898.
Selfridge, Villefranche-sur-Mer:
Retain men on this enlistment. Detailed instructions by mail.
LONG.

Washington, January 11, 1898.
Helena, Funchal, Madeira:
Secret and confidential. In view of recent events, it is considered advisa
ble to delay departure from Funchal. Can you obtain good berth behind
breakwater for a considerable time? LONG.

THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 269
Washington, January 17, 1898.
Chester, Cincinnati, Montevideo, Uruguay:
Secret and confidential. Affairs are very disturbed at Cuba. It is con
sidered advisable to change the disposition of ships. Announce unofficially
your intention to proceed with the Cincinnati and Castine (on) cruise to north
ward for exercise and drill, and to visit the most northern part of the South
Atlantic Station. As soon after as possible, without thereby causing com
ment, proceed to Para, Brazil, at discretion, and there await further orders.
LONG.

Washington, January 17, 1898.
Helena, Funchal, Madeira:
Proceed to Lisbon, Portugal, at discretion, and there await further orders.
LONG.

Washington, January 17, 1898.
Wilmington, Basseterre, Guadeloupe:
Delay execution of orders of December 9 for the present. Cruise in
Windward Islands, not touching at Spanish ports. Will keep in telegraphic
communication. About February 14 proceed to La Guayra, and there await
further orders. Do not detach Ensigns Bretherton and Dayton. LONG.
(The orders of December 9 directed the Wilmington to proceed to the
South Atlantic Station.)

Washington, January 26, 1898.
Selfridge, Villefranche :
Orders were sent by* steamer of January 19 naval force on European
Station, proceed to Lisbon after February 2. Orders have been issued to
Commander of Helena. Will remain until further orders at Lisbon. LONG.

Washington, January 27, 1898.
Dewey, Olympia, Yohohama, Japan:
Retain until further orders the crew of the squadron whose terms of
enlistment have expired. CROWNINSHIELD.

270 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
Washington, February 17, 1898.
Cincinnati, Para, Brazil:
The Cincinnati and Castine proceed to such ports as you think best to the
north of Para, Brazil. Keep in telegraphic communication with Washington. LONG.

Washington, February 24, 1898.
Bunce, Navy Yard, New York :
Keep closest watch on submarine boat. Inform captain of Vizcaya about
her. If in your judgment circumstances warrant it, seize her. Learn, if pos
sible, from Nixon or otherwise where she has gone and what interest controls
her. LONG.
Washington, February 25, 1898.
Howell, Lisbon:
Secret and confidential. Keep the squadron at such port as it may be in
(Lisbon) until further orders. Keep filled with coal. ROOSEVELT.

Washington, February 25, 1898.
Dewey, Hongkong:
Secret and confidential. Order the squadron, except Monocacy, to Hong
kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war, Spain, your
duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast,
and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia until
further orders. ROOSEVELT.

Washington, February 26, 1898.
Wilmington, La Guaira:
Proceed to Barbados and report for duty to the Commander in Chief
United States Naval Force on South Atlantic 'Station. LONG.

Washington, February 26, 1898.
Chester, Barbados:
Keep full of coal, the best that can be had. When Castine has been
docked, order her to Barbados. Wilmington has been ordered to Barbados.
LONG.

THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 271
And on this February 26th — two months before the war was on, Miller,
Honolulu; Howell, Lisbon; Dewey, Hongkong; Sicard, Key West, were tele
graphed by the Secretary of the Navy, "Keep full of coal, the best that can be
had." There was no stinting about that. Uncle Sam's ships were not to be
caught without coal. From January 27th to April 7th, there were four cables
for the Navy Department to Dewey. Hongkong: First, hold enlisted men
whose terms were expired, for further orders; second, go to Hongkong; third,
in case of war see that the Spanish fleet does not get away; fourth, keep full
of coal, then offensive operations in Philippine islands. Keep Olympia! All
this five weeks before the war was declared. Keep full of coal, was reiter
ated. April 7th, Dewey, Hongkong, was told in plain terms to "prepare for
action. ' '

Washington, March 3, 1898.
Navy Yard, League Island :
Enlist seamen, firemen, and petty officers for general service for crews of
Columbia and Minneapolis. Direct commanding officers of those vessels to
get them in readiness for service at sea. CROWNINSHIELD.
(Note. — Enlistments under this and following order exceeded quota
established by law.)

Washington, March 3, 1898.
Navy Yards, Brooklyn, Boston:
Enlist seamen, firemen, and petty officers for general service for crews of
Columbia and Minneapolis. CROWNINSHIELD.

Washington, March 3, 1898.
Navy Yard, Mare Island, Cal. :
Order Mohican, navy yard, Mare Island, to receive on board ammunition
now there for the naval force on Asiatic Station ; then proceed at once to
Honolulu and transfer to the Baltimore. As soon as Mohican arrives Balti
more will leave for Hongkong. Orders by mail. When will Mohican be
ready? L0NG'

272 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
Navy Department, Washington, March 4, 1898.
Sir: The Department has this date directed, by telegraph, that the
ammunition now at the navy yard, Mare Island, intended for the Asiatic
Station and for the U. S. F. S. Baltimore, shall be shipped to that vessel by
the Mohican. You will please prepare the Mohican to receive this ammuni
tion and have her proceed to Honolulu at the earliest practicable date.
Very respectfully, JOHN D. LONG, Secretary.
Commandant Navy Yard, Mare Island, Cal.

Washington, March 7, 1898.
Brooklyn, La Guayra:
The situation is getting worse. Proceed without delay to Hampton
Roads. LONG'
'Note.  The above order was in contemplation of the formation of the
Flying Squadron.) Washington, March 9, 1898.
Sicard, Key West:
Not to expend ammunition, target practice or as a test, until further
orders. LONG.

Washington, March 12, 1898.
Howell, Lisbon :
Direct Bancroft to proceed at once to Norfolk. Direct Helena to proceed
at once to Key West. LONG.

Washington, March 14, 1898.
Howell, Lisbon, Portugal:
Proceed at once to Newcastle-upon-the-Tyne. Upon arrival communi
cate immediately with the United States naval attach^ at London. Hoist
United States flag upon Amazonas and Abreu. Appoint to the command of
former Lieut. Commander A. P. Nazro and sufficient officers and crew of the
San Francisco. Proceed to New York. San Francisco to convoy. Utilize
your staff watch duty. LONG,

THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 273
Washington, March 15, 1898.
Chester, Barbados:
Order the squadron to proceed to Port Antonio. The Annapolis left
yesterday from Curacao (for a) cruise to the northward, to arrive not later
than March 31 at Key West. I could not communicate by telegraph, and he
does not know the altered situation. Try to intercept and direct to proceed
to Hampton Roads, Va. LONG.
(The Annapolis had left on a practice cruise with apprentices on board, ana
was to remain at sea for seventeen days. )

Washington, March 17, 1898.
Sicard, Key West, Fla. :
.Send Texas and Massachusetts to Hampton Roads, Va., without delay.
LONG.
(Note. — The above order was issued to carry on the formation of the
Flying Squadron.) Washington, April 4, 1898.
Sampson, Key West, Fla. :
Be ready on receipt of order to take possession of Key West cable and
telegraph office, and to place an officer in charge. He will not permit the
transmission to Cuba of any telegram relating to the action of the President
or Congress. Will be further instructed. The business of the company not
to be interfered with any more it is necessary. The officer assigned upon this
duty must be one discreet and judicious. • LONG.

Washington, April 7, 1898.
Dewey, Hongkong:
Land all woodwork, stores, etc., it is not considered necessary to have for
operations. LONG.
Washington, April 19, 1898.
Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal. :
Send the following cipher message to Admiral Miller by first steamer:
Proceed with your personal staff to San Francisco immediately by steamer.
Order Mohican to San Francisco. Keep Bennington at Honolulu. Bring
squadron records. LONG.

274 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED.
Washington, April 21, 1898.
Navy Yard, Boston, New York, Norfolk, Mare Island:
The naval force on the North Atlantic Station are blockading Cuba.
War has not been declared. War may be declared at any moment.
LONG.
Washington, April 23, 1898.
Schley, Fort Monroe :
Send Minneapolis immediately to Eastport, Me., skirting coast above
Caipe Ann; Columbia to Newport, R. I. Both will receive, upon arrival,
further orders. LONG.

Fort Monroe, April 24, 1898.
Secretary of the Navy, Washington :
Minneapolis and Columbia left at 11 p. m. Saturday night, having pro
ceeded in obedience to orders. SCHLEY.

It should be remembered that while the wires were worked in this way
the world around, a part of the intellectual force of Congress was spent in
getting up time tables and holding stop watches to hurry the President into
war, and the disregard of y*ellow fever and rainy weather and passion to run
our ships. against forts, and land a few of our small force of regulars to aid the
standing army, 50,000 strong, of the free and independent Republic of Cuba.
The Major General commanding, however, refers to "an auxiliary force of
50,000 natives. " As we did not before the battles put ashore twenty thousand
regulars and volunteers, it is our army that would. have been the "auxiliary
force." The natives, we infer, were already in the island, for General Miles
mentions the landing at "the harbor of Banes, on the north coast of Cuba,
which has been held during the war by the Cubans. ' ' This harbor should
have been discovered earlier, for it would have been a great help to the sister
Republic. There was landed, "for the 10,000 Cubans under General Garcia,"
7,500 rifles, 1,000,000 cartridges, 5,000 uniforms and other material." We
presume it was these new and fresh Cuban uniforms that so much impressed
our comparatively small force at Santiago.
M

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CHAPTER XI.

The Story of Dewey's Splendid Victory Told by Those Who Won It.
The Battle of Manila Bay — Confidential Information From Madrid, Showing Spanish Con
fidence in Their Navy — Rapid Exchange of Cables between Dewey and Long — Ener
getic Inquiry in the Navy Department — Everything Rushed from the Start — Dewey's .
Masterly Movements and Immortal Victory — The Official Reports Full of Stories of the
Battle That Will be News to the People — Details of Uncommon Value — Spanish Official
Report Exceedingly Interesting — Admiral Montijo was not Surprised but Fired First —
The Celebrated Breakfast Caused by a False Alarm.

The Bureau of Navigation publishes a communication dated Madrid, the
1 6th of April, 1898, five days before the war opened — the name of the
writer not given. He was evidently a deeply interested and well instructed
observer. Attention is called to an article April 6th, in the Heraldo of
Madrid, that caused much comment. We quote :
"We had an opportunity to-day to talk for a long time with General
Beranger, the last secretary of the navy under the Conservative Cabinet. To
the questions which we directed to him concerning the conflict pending with
the United States he was kind enough to inform us that he confided absolutely
in the triumph of our naval forces. The attack on our island ports is not to
be feared, he said, by an enemy taking advantage of the darkness of night.
The reason of this is that Havana, as well as Cienfuegos, Nuevitas, and San
tiago, are defended by electrical and automobile torpedoes, which can work at
a great distance (have a large radius of action). Sefior Canovas del Castillo.
who did not neglect these things, arranged for, in agreement with me, the
shipping to Cuba of 190 torpedoes, which are surely located in these ports at
present. The transportation and installation of these war machines was in
the charge of the distinguished torpedoist, Senor Chacon. I have already
said that we shall conquer on the sea, and I am now going to give you my
reasons. The first of these is the remarkable discipline that prevails on our
war ships, and the second, as soon as fire is opened the crews of the American
277

278 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.
ships will commence to desert, since we all know that among them are people
of all nationalities. Ship against ship, therefore, a failure is not to be feared.
I believe that the squadron detained at Cape de Verdes, and particularly the
destroyers, should have and could have continued the voyage to Cuba, since
they have nothing to fear from the American fleet. In this class of ships we
are on a much higher level than the United States."
This Heraldo was the most important of the Madrid journals, and the
statement about torpedoes, coming at the juncture it did, is quite striking.
The Madrid correspondent who furnished the Heraldo translation wrote on
that "the press has fed the people with all sorts of nonsense about the
superior bravery of the Spanish sailor, the sujDerior discipline on board the
Spanish ships, and the greater fighting power of the navy. The belief in this
superiority of the Spanish navy over that of the United States accounts, in a
large measure, in my opinion, for the determination to fight us. This opinion
is shared also by many intelligent persons, in fact, I believe, by all Spaniards.
They say they have nothing to lose, they could not be worse off with the war
than without it, as they are about to lose Cuba anyhow; but they can do
incalculable damage to our commerce; seriously injure, if not destroy, our
navy, and, although they would probably be beaten in the end, they will have
taught us a salutary lesson in the meantime. One of the most intelligent,
best-informed Spaniards I have met here, a man who has traveled much, and
claims to have a great admiration for the United States, and who knows much
about our history and resources, a senator from the Kingdom, told me yester
day that the thing that he dreaded most was the long period that the hostilities
would last. He was sure that three years would be the very least that the
struggle would continue."
At this time the Spaniards thought they were rapidly getting their navy
in order, and were in course of preparing Cervera's fleet, which sailed from
the Cape Verdes thirteen days later. The correspondent gave the Spanish
vessels that were believed to be approaching an efficient state. "The torpedo
squadron, consisting of .three destroyers, three torpedo boats, and the con
verted cruiser Cuidad de Cadiz, with the Colon and Maria Teresa, are at the
Cape de Verdes awaiting instructions. It is said that the Colon and Teresa
left Cadiz in such a hurry that they were not properly provisioned. Provisions
and coal have been sent to them. I have no reason to believe that they have
not a full supply of ammunition. The Oquendo and Vizcaya from Porto Rico

THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 279
should arrive at Cape de Verdes to-day. Although I have no definite informa
tion, I believe the Pelayo arrived at Cadiz yesterday, coming from Cartagena.
It was intended that she should go, after a few days' necessary delay in
Cartagena, and it is reported that she was sighted in the Straits of Gibraltar
day before yesterday. The Proserpina, Osado, Destructor, Barcelo,
Retamosa, Habana, Halcon, torpedo boats and destroyers, and the Vitoria,
are now practically ready in Cadiz, awaiting the arrival of the Carlos V. and
the Pelayo. The Alfonso XIII. is also about ready in Cartagena. The
installation for moving the guns by electricity in the Carlos V. is not com
pleted, and I am unable to get at the estimate of the date when she will be
entirely ready for service. It is said on good authority, however, that in an
emergency she could be used at once, working such parts as have not power
applied by hand. Work is being pushed, also, as rapidly as possible on the
Cisneros, but she can hardly be ready for many weeks. The trans-Atlantic
steamers Mexico, Panama, Santo Domingo, San Augustin, and Villaverde,
now in Cuban waters, are being armed as auxiliary cruisers. Nine trans-
Atlantic steamers in Spanish ports at present are also being armed as
cruisers. To this number should be added the Columbia and Normannia,
recently purchased in Germany, and the Giralda, now being converted in
Barcelona. This makes twenty-one auxiliary cruisers concerning which I
have quite definite information. The two steamers bought in Germany were
strengthened there, and are in condition to receive their artillery and crew
when they arrive at Cadiz, which is expected to-day."
Other ships were to be taken by the government, and there were extraor
dinary precautions to prevent the getting out of news about the ships, upon
the assumption that Cervera would do the unexpected. This publication
gives in better form than it has been found elsewhere, the basis of fact upon
which the Spanish rested their anticipations of- successfully disputing our
supremacy at sea.
' The cable was in April kept busy between the Navy Department at
Washington, and Admiral George Dewey at Hongkong. The dispatches run:'
Washington, April 1, 1898.
Dewey, Hongkong:
Fill up with provisions purchased on station; then how many days' pro
visions have you on hand? How much soap and tobacco shall I ship?
LONG.

280 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.
Washington, April 4, 1898.
Dewey, Hongkong:
Can you purchase immediately supply steamer? What will be the cost of?
LONG.

Hongkong, April 4, 1898. Secretary of the Navy, Washington:
I have chartered the British steamer Nanshah, having over 3,000 tons of
coal now on board. Before the outbreak of hostilities can and would purchase
this steamer. I request the earliest information in order to conclude arrange-.
ments. Cannot be made after the outbreak of hostilities. DEWEY.

Washington, April 6, 1898.
Dewey*, Hongkong:
Purchase immediately Nanshan and one more vessel for supplies.
Charge special appropriation. Send the receipts to the Department. Enlist
for special service, if possible, one year, unless sooner discharged, the crew
of. Detach and order assume command of each an officer. Arm if possible.
War may be declared. Condition very critical. LONG.

Washington, April 6, 1898.
Dewey, Hongkong:
The receipt of telegram of April 4 is acknowledged. I approve action.
Expedite delivery. April 6 may be last opportunity. LONG.
Hongkong, April 6, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington, D. C. :
I have purchased Nanshan, and I have engaged her crew. Will detail an
officer for command. I have ordered three officers, 50 men from Monocacy to
fill vacancies here. I hope to get another steamer. . . The receipt of
telegram April 6 acknowledged, to expedite delivery. DEWEY.
It was April 7th that Dewey was cabled by Long, "Land all woodwork."
There was but little more time to lose or use before action. Long's cable was
the equivalent of "Clear for action!" Hongkong, April 9, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington:
I have purchased the British steamer Zafiro, for supplies, for ,£18,000
sterling. I will arm, equip, and man vessel immediately. DEWEY.

ADMIRAL DEWEY'S FLEET THAT WON THE MAY-DAY VICTORY IN MANILA BAY

ADMIRAL DEWEY, HERO OF MANILA BAY.

THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 283
Washington, April 21, 1898.
Dewey, Hongkong:
The naval force on the North Atlantic Station are blockading Cuba. War
has not yet been declared, but may be declared at any moment. I will
inform you. Await orders. LONG.

Washington, April 24, 1898.
Dewey, Hongkong:
War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at
once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly
against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost
endeavors. LONG.

Hongkong, April 25, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
The squadron will leave for Manila, Philippine Islands, immediately upon
the arrival of the United States consul from Manila. DEWEY.

Hongkong, April 25, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
In accordance with the request of the governor of Hongkong, the squad
ron leaves to-day for Mirs Bay, China, to await telegraphic instructions.
Address, Hongkong. I will communicate by tug. DEWEY.
Hongkong, April 27, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
Williams, the United States consul from Manila, has arrived. The
squadron will sail immediately for the Philippine Islands. DEWEY.

Hongkong, May 7, 1898. (Manila, May 1.)
Secretary of the Navy, Washington :
The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately
engaged enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels : Reina Christina,
Castillia, Don Antonio de Biloa, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de
Cuba, General Lezo, Marquis del Duaro, El Curreo, Velasco, one transport,
Isla de Mandano, water battery at Cavite. I shall destroy Cavite arsenal dis
pensatory. The squadron is uninjured. Few men were slightly* wounded. I

284 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.
request Department will send immediately from San Francisco fast steamer
with ammunition. The only means of telegraphing is to the American consul
at Hongkong. DEWEY.

Washington, May 3, 1898.
Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong:
I send hearty congratulations to yourself and your officers and men.
The President highly appreciates your achievement. I await report from
you, on receipt of which further action will be taken and any supplies that
you wish will be forwarded. LONG.

Hongkong, May 7, 1898. (Cavite, May 4.)
Secretary of the Navy, Washington :
I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavite, Philippine Islands,
and destroyed its fortifications. Have destroyed fortifications bay entrance,
paroling garrison. Have cut cable to mainland. I control bay completely,
and can take city at any time, but I have not sufficient men to hold. The
squadron excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss not fully known ;
very heavy; 150 killed, including captain, on Reina Christina alone. I am
assisting and protecting Spanish sick and wounded, 250 in number, in this
hospital, within our lines. Will ammunition be sent? I request answer
without delay. I can supply squadron coal and provisions for a long period.
Much excitement at Manila. Scarcity of provisions on account of not having
economized stores. Will protect foreign residents. DEWEY.

Washington, May 7, 1898.
Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong:
The President, in the name of the American people, thanks you and your
officers and men for your splendid achievement and overwhelming victory.
In recognition he has appointed you acting rear-admiral, and will recommend
a vote of thanks to you by Congress as a foundation for further promotion.
The Charleston will leave at once with what ammunition she can carry.
Pacific Mail Steamship Company's steamer Pekin will follow with ammunition
and supplies. Will take troops unless you telegraph otherwise. How many
will you require? LONG.

THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 285
Washington, May 7, 1898.
Sir: Under the authority of section 1434 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, you have been assigned to the command of , the United States
naval force on the Asiatic Station, with the rank of rear-admiral.
You will hoist the flag of a rear-admiral, will wear the uniform, and will
affix that title to your official signature. Respectfully.
JOHN D. LONG, Secretary.
Commodore George Dewey, U. S. N. ,
Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, Asiatic Station,
U. S. Flagship Olympia.

Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 12.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington:
The following is correct list Spanish vessels destroyed May 1 : Two pro
tected cruisers, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon ; five unprotected cruisers, Reina
Christina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa, Don Juan de Austria, Velasco;
two gunboats, General Lezo, Marquis del Duero; one transport, Isla de
Mindano; one surveying vessel, Argos, both armed. The following have
been captured: One transport, Manila; one gunboat, Callao. DEWEY.

Manila, November 26, 1898.
Secretary Navy, Washington:
Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, and Don Juan de Austria have been raised
and docked. My anticipations as to their value fully realized. Will leave
shortly for Hongkong under their own steam. Constructor Capps deserving
highest commendation. DEWEY.

(Report of engagement of squadron with Spanish forces at Manila Bay.)
"(No. 240. D.) U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station, Flagship Olympia,
Cavite, Philippine Islands, May 4, 1898. — Sir: I have the honor to submit the
following report of the operations of the squadron under my command :
"The squadron left Mirs Bay on April 27, immediately on the arrival of
Mr. O. F. Williams, United States consul at Manila, who brought important
information and who accompanies the squadron.
"Arrived off Bolinao on the morning of April 30, and, finding no vessels

286 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.
there, proceeded down the coast and arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay
on the same afternoon.
"The Boston and Concord were sent to reconnoiter Port Subic, I having
been informed that the enemy intended to take position there. A thorough
search of the port was made by the Boston and Concord, but the Spanish fleet
was not found, although, from a letter afterwards found in the arsenal
(inclosed with translation), it appears that it had been their intention to go
there. "Entered the Boca Grande, or south channel, at 11:30 p. m., steaming in
column at distance at 8 knots. After half the squadron had passed, a battery
on the south side of the channel opened fire, none of the shots taking effect.
The Boston and McCulloch returned the fire.
"The squadron proceeded across the bay at slow speed, and arrived off
Manila at dayhreak, and was fired upon at 5:15 a. m., by three batteries at
Manila and two at Cavite and by the Spanish fleet anchored in an approxi
mately east and west line across the mouth of Bakor Bay, with their left in
shoal water in Zanacao Bay.
"The squadron then proceeded to the attack, the flagship Olympia, under
my personal direction, leading, followed at distance by the Baltimore, Raleigh,
Petrel, Concord, and Boston, in the order named, which formation was main
tained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire at 5 :4i a. m. While
advancing to the attack, two mines were exploded ahead of the flagship, too
far to be effective.
"The squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying
from 5,000 to 2,000 square yards, countermarching in a line approximately
parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but
generally ineffective.
"Early in the engagement two launches put out toward the Olympia with
the apparent intention of using torpedoes. One was sunk and the other
disabled by our fire and beached before an opportunity occurred to fire tor
pedoes. At 7 a. m. the Spanish flagship Reina Christina made a desperate
attempt to leave the line and come out to engage at short range, but was
received with such galling fire, the entire battery of the Olympia being con
centrated upon her, that she was barely able to return to the shelter of the
point. The fires started in her by our shell at this time were not extinguished
until she sank.

THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.

287

"At 7:35 a. m., it having been erroneously reported to me that only 15
rounds per gun remained for the 5 -inch rapid fire battery, I ceased firing and
withdrew the squadron for consultation and a redistribution of ammunition,
if necessary. "The three batteries at Manila had kept up a continuous fire from the
beginning of the engagement, which fire was not returned by this squadron.
The first of these batteries was situated on the south mole head, at the
entrance to the Passig river, the second on the south bastion of the walled
city of Manila, and the third at Malate, about one-half mile farther south.
At this point I sent a message to the Governor-General to the effect that if the
batteries did not cease firing the city would be shelled. This had the effect of
silencing them.
"At 11:16 a. m., finding that the report of scarcity of ammunition was
incorrect, I returned with the squadron to the attack. By this time the flag
ship and almost the entire Spanish fleet were in flames, and at 12:30 p. m. the
squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships sunk, burnt
and deserted. "At 12:40 p. m. the squadron returned and anchored off Manila, the
Petrel being left behind to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats,
which were behind the point of Cavite. This duty was performed by Com
mander E. P. Wood in the most expeditious and complete manner possible.
"The Spanish lost the following vessels:
"Sunk — Reina Christina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa.
"Burnt — Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General
Lezo, Marques del Duero, El Correo, Velasco, and Isla de Mindanao (trans
port). "Captured — Rapido and Hercules (tugs), and several small launches.
"I am unable to obtain complete accounts of the enemy's killed and
wounded, but believe their loss to be very heavy. The Reina Christina alone
had 150 killed, including the captain, and 90 wounded.
"I am happy to report that the damage done to the squadron under my
command was inconsiderable. There were none killed, and only 7 men in the
squadron very slightly wounded. As will be seen by the reports of the com
manding officers which are herewith inclosed, several of the vessels were
struck and even penetrated, but the damage was of the slightest, and the
squadron is in as good condition now as before the battle.

288 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.
"I beg to state to the Department that I doubt if any commander-in-
chief, under similar circumstances, was ever served by more loyal, efficient,
and gallant captains than those of the squadron now under my com
mand. Capt. Frank Wildes, commanding the Boston, volunteered to remain
in command of his vessel, although his relief arrived before leaving
Hongkong. "Asst. Surg. C. P. Kindleberger, of the Olympia, and Gunner J. C.
Evans, of the Boston, also volunteered to remain after orders detaching them
had arrived. "The conduct of my personal staff was excellent. Commander B. P.
Lamberton, chief of staff, was a volunteer for that position, and gave me
most efficient aid. Lieut. T. M. Brumby, flag lieutenant, and Ensign W. P.
Scott, aid, performed their duties as signal officers in a highly creditable
manner. The Olympia being short of officers for the battery, Ensign H. H.
Caldwell, flag secretary, volunteered for and was assigned to a subdivision of
the 5 -inch battery*.
"Mr. J. L. Stickney, formerly an officer in the United States Navy, and
now correspondent for the New York Herald, volunteered for duty as my
aid, and rendered valuable service.
"While leaving to the commanding officers to comment on the conduct of
the officers and men under their commands, I desire especially to mention the
coolness of Lieut. C. G. Calkins, the navigator of the Olympia, who came
under my personal observation, being on the bridge with me throughout the
entire action, and giving the ranges to the guns with an accuracy that was
proven by the excellence of the firing.
'On May 2, the day following the engagement, the squadron again went
to Cavite, where it remains. A landing party was sent to destroy the guns
and magazines of the batteries there. The first battery, near the end of
Sangley Point, was composed of two modern Trubia B. L. rifles of 15 centi
meters caliber. The second was one mile farther down the beach, and con
sisted of a modern Canet 12-centimeter B. L. rifle behind improvised
earthworks. "On the 3d, the military forces evacuated the Cavite arsenal, which was
taken possession of by a landing party. On the same day the Raleigh and
Baltimore secured the surrender of the batteries on Corregidor Island, parol
ing the garrison and destroying the guns.

THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 289
"On the morning of May 4 the transport Manila, which had been aground
in Bakor Bay, was towed off and made a prize.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"GEORGE DEWEY,
"Commodore, U. S. N.,
"Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.
"The Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C."

"U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station, Flagship Olympia, Cavite,
Philippine Islands, July 9, 1898. — Sir: Referring to section 46355 of the
Revised Statutes, I have the honor to forward the following list of the com
plements of the vessels of the enemy destroyed by the squadron under my
command in the battle of Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, taken from the official
list of the Spanish Navy :
Ship. Officers, etc. Total complement.
Reina Christina 
Castilla . . 
Don Juan de Austria 
Don Antonio de Ulloa 
Isla de Cuba . ...
Isla de Luzon 
Marques del Duero 
General Lezo 
Argos 
Velasco  1,796
"The trans- Atlantic Company's steamer Isla de Mindanao was armed and
took part in the battle, and was also destroyed. Her complement is not
known, but it is estimated at 120.
"From the above it appears that the enemy had more men in this engage
ment than the United States squadron. In this connection I beg to invite the
attention of the Department to a letter from the commanding officer of the
Petrel, dated June 26, 1898, which has already been forwarded and which

57

352

52

349

28

179

3i

iS9

31

156

3i

156

18

96

20

"5

21

87

28

H7

290 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.
gives a statement by one of the crew of the Reina Christina, showing that the
crews of the Spanish vessels were largely in excess of the complements given
here. "I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
"GEORGE DEWEY,
"Rear- Admiral, U. S. N.,
"Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.
"The Secretary of the Navy,
"Navy Department, Washington, D. C. "
The lamented Captain Gridley's report of working the Olympia in the
famous action demands a place in history, and is a most realistic picture of the
resources and vicissitudes, the mishaps and the stern work of the flagship:
"(No. 6-C.) U. S. Flagship Olympia, Off Manila, Philippine Islands,
May 3, 1898. — Sir: I have the honor to make the following report of this
ship's engagement with the enemy on May 1 :
"On April 30 we stood down for the entrance to Manila Bay. At 9:42
p. m. the crew were called to general quarters (the ship having been previ
ously cleared for action), and remained by their guns, ready to return the fire
of the batteries if called upon.
"About 11:30 p. m. we passed through Boca Grande entrance of Manila
Bay. The lights on Corrigidor and Caballo islands and on San Nicolas Banks
were extinguished.
"After this ship had passed in, the battery on the southern shore of
entrance opened fire at the ships astern, and the McCulloch and the Boston
returned the fire.
"At 4 a. m. of May 1 coffee was served out to officers and men. At day
break sighted shipping at Manila. Shifted course to southward and stood for
Cavite. At 5 :o6 two submarine mines were exploded near, Cavite bearing
south-southeast, distant 4 miles. At 5:15 battery on Sangley Point opened
fire, but the shell fell short. Other shells passed over us, ranging 7 miles.
At 5 :4i a. m. we opened fire on Spanish ships with forward 8-inch guns,
which were soon followed by the 5-inch battery. A rapid fire was kept up
until the close of the action.
"The range varied from 5,600 to 2,000 yards.
"A torpedo boat ran out and headed for this ship, but was finally driven

THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 291
back by our secondary battery. She came out a second time and was again
repulsed. This time she had to be beached, as several shot had hit her.
"Batteries from Manila fired occasional shots at the ships during the
action, but did no damage.
"At 6 :2o turned to starboard and headed back in front of the Spanish line.
The Olympia led the column three times to the westward and twice to the
eastward in front of the Spanish ships and shore batteries. On one occasion
the Spanish flagship Reina Christina was hit by an 8-inch shell from our for
ward turret and raked fore and aft. At 7 :35 ceased firing and stood out into
Manila Bay.
"The men went to breakfast.
"Many of the Spanish ships were seen to be on fire, and when we returned
at 11:16 to complete the destruction of the Spanish fleet, only one, the Don
Antonio de Ulloa, and the shore batteries returned our fire. The former was
sunk and the latter was silenced.
"At 12 :4o p. m. stood back to Manila Bay and anchored.
"Besides making the ordinary preparations of clearing ship for action, the
heavy sheet chains were faked up and down over a buffer of awnings against
the sides in wake of the 5-inch ammunition hoists, and afforded a stanch pro
tection, while iron and canvas barricades were placed in various places to
cover guns' crews and strengthen moderate defenses.
"The vessel was struck or slightly hulled as follows:
"1. Plate indented 1^ inches starboard side of superstructure just for
ward of second 5 -inch sponson.
"2. Three planks torn up slightly in wake of forward turret on starboard
side of forecastle.
"3. Port after shrouds of fore and main rigging. .
"4. Strongback of gig's davits hit and slightly damaged.
"5. Hole in frame of ship between frames 65 and 66 on starboard side
below main deck rail; made by a 6-pounder.
"6. Lashing of port whaleboat davit carried away by shot.
"7. One of the rail stanchions carried away outside of port gangway.
"8. Hull of ship indented on starboard side 1 foot below main-deck rail
and 3 feet abaft No 4 coal port.
"The forward 8-inch guns fired 23 shells. The ammunition hoist was
temporarily out of commission on account of the blowing of the fuse. The

292 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.
right gun worked well with the electrical batteries. Battery of left gun failed
to explode the primer after the first shot ; also resistance lamp in dynamo cir
cuit broken. Used percussion primers in this gun with good results after the
first shot.
"The after turret fired 13 shells. Had three misfires with battery of right
gun and two with dynamo circuit, as fuses blew out. In renewing fuses they
were immediately blown out; so shifted to percussion primers with good
results. In left gun 1 shell jammed, after which used half-full and half-
reduced charge, which fired it. Battery of this gun gave good results. One
primer failed to check gas.
"The smoke from the 5 -inch battery and from the forward 8-inch guns
gave considerable trouble, and in both turrets the object glass of the telescopic
sights became covered with a deposit from the powder and had to be wiped off
frequently. These are, nevertheless, considered good sights for heavy guns;
but it is recommended that bar sights be installed in case of emergency, as
there is no provision for sighting other than with the telescopes.
"The batteries for 'the 5-inch guns found to be unreliable. Used dynamo
circuit on 3 guns with good results. Ammunition poor. Many shell became
detached from the cases on loading and had to be rammed out from the
muzzle. Several cases jammed in loading and in extracting. Guns and gun
mounts worked well. Fired about 281 5-inch shell.
"The 6-pounder battery worked to perfection, firing 1,000 rounds.
Fired 360 rounds of 1 -pounder and 1,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition.
"From 9:42 p. m. of April 30 till 12:40 p. m. May 1, two divisions of the
engineer's force worked the boilers and engines, keeping up steam and work
ing well, notwithstanding the heat of the fire and engine rooms. The third
division worked at their stations in the powder division.
"The ship needs no immediate repairs, and is in excellent condition to
engage the enemy at any time.
"There were no casualties nor wounded on this ship.
"Where every officer and man did his whole duty there is only room for
general praise. Pay Inspector D. A. Smith, Fleet Pay Clerk Wm. J. Right-
mire, and Pay Clerk W. M. Long all volunteered for and performed active
service not required by their stations. Ensign H. H. Caldwell, secretary to
the commander-in-chief, volunteered for fighting duty and was assigned to the
command of a subdivision of the 5-inch battery. Mr. J. L. Stickney, corre-

THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 293
spondent of the New York Herald (and formerly a naval officer of exceptional
ability), served as a volunteer aid to the commander-in-chief and rendered
valuable assistance in carrying messages and in keeping an accurate account
of the battle. One 6-pounder was manned by a crew of marines, and two
relief crews for the 5-inch guns and two for the 6-pounders acted as sharp
shooters under Capt. W. Biddle, U. S. M. C.
"The range was obtained by cross bearings from the standard compass,
and the distance taken from the chart.
"I am, sir, very respectfully, CH. V. GRIDLEY,
"Captain U. S. N., Commanding U. S.. Flagship Olymj^ia.
"The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Station."
Captain J. B. Coghlan, of the Raleigh, says that at 12:10 a. m., May 1st,
there was a flash as a signal, and five minutes later a shot was fired from El
Saile Island and returned without effect. At 5 a. in., nearly five hours later,
"when the squadron was nearly abreast the city of Manila and the flagship was
turning to pass down toward Cavite, the Lunetta Battery, of apparently heavy
guns, at Manila, opened fire and continued so long as the squadron was in
action. ' ' This was a dangerous battery of Krupp guns, with a large supply
of ammunition. The captain says his vessel was struck but once, "and then
by a 6-pounder shell, which passed through both sides of the whaleboat (above
her water line), and then glanced along the chase of the starboard 6-pounder
on our poop. The gun was not injured, and the whaleboat but slightly, and
she is again ready for service. "
In conclusion the captain says to the admiral: "Permit me to congratu
late you upon the very brilliant victory you achieved over a naval force nearly
equal to your own, and backed by extensive shore batteries of very heavy
guns, and this without the loss of a single life. History points to no greater
achievement. ' '
Captain Asa Walker, of the Concord, says: "In passing the city a big gun
opened on the fleet, to which I replied with two shots. The Concord held her
position in the line until your order to withdraw from action. The Concord
was not hit. The following is a list of the ammunition expended : One hun
dred and fifteen 6-inch full charges, sixty-seven 6-inch reduced charges, six
shrapnel, one hundred and seventy-six 6-inch common shell, two hundred and
twenty 6-pounder cartridges, one hundred and twenty 3-pounder cartridges,

294 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.
and sixty i -pounder cartridges," or seven hundred and sixty-four shots fired.
The executive officer of the Concord reports:
"Three complete turns were made by our squadron in front of the
enemy's line, the ships firing whenever the guns would bear.
"At 7:40 a. m. we ceased firing, in obedience to signal from the com
mander-in-chief, and at 8:10 a. m. the crews went to breakfast. At this time
several of the enemy's ships were in flames and explosions took place on
board one of them ; some were sinking and others withdrawing for protection
behind Caiiacao and Cavite.
"At 12:25 not a Spanish flag was flying in the harbor except from the
staff of the sunken cruiser Don Antonio de Ulloa, submerged behind Sangley
Point; the Reina Christina was a mass of flames, and sunk near the bastion at
Cavite, and the Castilla was burning rapidly in Caiiacao Bay.
"At 1 :45 we started to rejoin the squadron, , but were ordered to go to the
Petrel at Cavite, where she had seen sent to destroy the vessels at the
arsenal. She signaled as we anchored, 'Have destroyed eight vessels here.'
White flags were flying at various points on shore, and there was no longer
any resistance."
Captain Dyer, of the Baltimore, makes a most interesting report, saying :
"At early daylight the fleet had reached a point close up to the shipping
off the city of Manila, when the signal was made, 'Prepare for general
action.' Spanish batteries near Old Manila opened fire at long range at
about the same time. Flagship leading, with port helm, bore down on
the right of Spanish line of vessels, formed in a somewhat irregular crescent
at anchor. "Our column passed down the enemy's line, turning with port helm as
their left was reached, engaging them with starboard battery on the return.
This maneuver was performed three times at distances from the enemy's ships
varying from 2,600 to 5,000 yards, when you signaled to 'withdraw from
action' at 7 :35-
"Upon reaching a convenient distance in the bay, you signaled, 'Let the
people go to breakfast' ; and at 8 140, 'Commanding officers repair on board the
flagship. '
"While on board the flagship I received an order to intercept a steamer
coming up the bay, reported to be flying Spanish colors.
"Soon after starting on this duty I discovered the colors of the stranger

THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 295
to be British, and so reported by signal, you having in the meantime made
general signal to get under way and follow your motions, this ship being at
the time some 2 miles to the south-southwest of the flagship on her way to
intercept the supposed Spanish steamer.
"At 10:55 y°u made general signal, 'Designated vessel will lead,' with
Baltimore's distinguishing pennant, and in a few minutes signal to 'Attack
the enemy's batteries or earthworks' and for fleet to 'close up'; in obedi
ence to which order this ship led in, with starboard helm, to a position off
the Canacoa and Sangley Point batteries and opened fire with starboard
battery at a distance of about 2,800 yards, closing in to 2,200, between which
and 2,700 yards our best work was done, slowing the ship dead slow, stopping
the engines as range was obtained, delivering a rapid and accurate fire upon
the shore batteries and a gunboat just inside of Sangley Point. You
signaled, at 1:20, to 'Prepare to anchor,' and at 1:30, 'Anchor at discretion.'
"The victory was complete."
The executive officer of the Baltimore reports :
"The Baltimore was struck five times, with small projectiles, all of which,
with one exception, exploded or broke up. The most serious hit, happily
attended with no serious injury to any officer or man, came from a 4. 7-inch
steel projectile, which entered the ship's side forward of the starboard gang
way, about a foot above the line of the main deck. It passed through the
hammock netting, downward through the deck planks and steel deck, bend
ing and cracking deck beam in wardroom stateroom No. 5, then glanced
upward through the after engine room coaming, over against the after
cylinder of No. 3 6-inch gun (port), carrying away lug and starting several
shield bolts and putting the gun out of commission;" deflected over to the star
board side, striking a ventilator ladder and dropping on deck. In its passage
it struck a box of 3-pounder ammunition of the fourth division, exploding
several charges, and wounded Lieutenant Kellogg, Ensign Irwin, and 6 men
of the gun's crew — none very seriously. A second shot came in about a foot
above the berth deck, just forward of the blowers, passed through the 'thwart-
ship alleyway, hitting the exhaust pipe of the starboard blower, causing a
slight leak. A third shot struck about 2 feet above the water line on the port
side, abreast bunker B-no, passed into the bunker, cutting blower drain and
main air duct, and exploding in bunker. A fourth shot came in about 6 feet
above the berth deck, starboard side, abreast the forward end of the forward

296 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.
wash room, and broke up in a clothes locker. A fifth struck the starboard
forward ventilator, slightly bending it.
"The upper cabin skylight, the after range finder, and the two whaleboats
hanging at the davits were all destroyed by the shock of discharge from the
8-inch guns of the second division."
Commander E. P. Wood, of the Petrel, reports: "Just as day was break
ing, about 5 o'clock, the shore batteries below Manila began firing. It was
scarcely light enough to distinguish signals from this vessel when flagship
made signal to 'Prepare for action,' so signal was repeated from the Balti
more. During time colli mn was forming and closing up, the batteries from
below Manila were firing. As flagship stood to southward the ships and
batteries at Cavite began their firing, and gradually, as we approached, we
could make out ships under way in harbor and three guns on shore firing."
The Petrel expended in three turns before breakfast: "Ninety-two
6-inch common shells, eighty-two 6-inch full charges, ten reduced charges, and
two hundred and fifty-three 3-pounders. Several times during rounds had to
cease firing on account of smoke and in order to economize ammunition.
"The action of ammunition was exceedingly good. There was expended
during action, one hundred and thirteen 6-inch common shells, three 6-inch
armor-piercing shells, eighty-two 6-inch full charges, thirty-four 6-inch
reduced charges, and three hundred and thirteen 3-pounder ammunition.
Owing to the heat due to firing, the pads swelled and made it very difficult to
lock the breech plug. .Nothing would remedy this save shifting plugs,
replacing hot plug by the one from the other gun which was cool. The wedge
of firing lock jammed frequently, due to hot parts. This was remedied by
shifting locks.
"The percussion primers worked very unsatisfactorily; sometimes four
primers would be expended before one would act. Primers leaked badly,
causing excessive deposit in primer seat, hard extraction, and delay in prim
ing of gun and requiring frequent boring of vent. "
Lieutenant Hughes reports: "The ship was gradually cleared for action,
this work having been begun in Hongkong, when the fore and foretopsails
yards, fore trysail gaff, ladders, diving outfit, part of the running rigging,
etc., were placed on board the transport Nanshan, and completed the day
before the squadron entered Manila Bay. In the operation of preparing the
ship for action certain articles and material in the equipment and construction

THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 297
departments were necessarily thrown overboard. Among these may be men
tioned all of the varnishes, inflammable paints and oils, tar, turpentine, etc.,
lumber, two boats' strong backs, one turpentine chest, one ice chest, one large
hammock box, the carpenter's bench."
Captain Wilder, of the Boston, brought up the rear, and makes a model
report for brevity and prose. He remarks:
"Several shots were fired by the batteries in Manila, and two shots were
given in reply. At 5:35 (a. m.) action with the enemy commenced, and was
continued at varying distances, steaming in a circle, until 7:35 a. m. , firing
with a fair degree of deliberation and accuracy. At times the smoke was
dense, interfering very materially with maneuvering and firing.
"The Spanish fleet and shore batteries replied vigorously, and an attempt
was made with an improvised torpedo boat, but our fire was overpowering and
the enemy received heavy damage and loss.
"In obedience to signal, I withdrew from action at 7:35, and gave the
crew breakfast and rest.
"At 11 :io the action was renewed, and continued until the enemy ceased
firing and his ships were all burned, sunk, or withdrawn behind the arsenal of
Cavite. "It gives me pleasure to bear witness to the courage and resolution of the
Spanish fleet, and to say that they defended themselves creditably."
This report of the working of the guns is interesting:
"There being no quick and accurate method of finding the range, it was
found that a considerable number of the shots apparently fell short. Had the
ship been provided with a range finder the effectiveness of the firing would
have been somewhat increased; as it was, the result was generally good.
After passing the enemy, a countermarch was made, and fire was opened with
the starboard battery. This maneuver was repeated several times, until the
enemy seemed to be silenced. During this part of the engagement full
charges with common shell were used in all guns of the main battery.
The guns generally worked well, but after an hour's fighting it was found that
most of the breech plugs of the 6 and 8 inch guns were expanded by the heat.
so as to make it a somewhat difficult operation to close the breech. After
firing the forward 8-inch for half an hour it was found necessary to put in a
new gas-check pad, and the firing was then continued. The wire breechings
of No. 2 6-inch gun (starboard) were carried away near the end of the firing.

298 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.
The lock of No. 3 6-inch (port) was disabled, and a spare one substituted.
The action was resumed at 11:10 a. m., the starboard battery being first
engaged. The reply was principally from the forts, but these were soon
silenced. Advantage had been taken of the interval to put the battery in
order again. The breechings on No. 2 6-inch were replaced by the gunner's
mate of the division. The guns were still very hot, and the breech plugs
became still harder to work. The forward 8-inch gun was put out of com
mission for about twenty minutes from this cause. At 12:20 the ship was
turned around and the port battery brought into play. At 12 :4o p. m. 'Cease
firing' was sounded, a white flag having been raised at Cavite."
The executive officer, J. A. Howe, says of the officers and men: "Very
few, if any of them, had ever been under fire before, but their cool
ness was remarkable. They were full of zeal, energy, and enthusiasm, and
were untiring. Where the conduct of all was so commendable it would be
impossible to single out any individual for special praise. One noteworthy
feature was the conduct of the Chinese messmen, who were stationed in the
after powder division. While they are usually considered entirely alien in
their ideas, and are not regarded as good fighters, yet in this case they dis
played as much zeal, bravery, and energy as any other person. The uninter
rupted ammunition supply in the after part of the ship was largely due to their
efforts. ' '
In the Spanish official report, Admiral Montijo mentions that he left the
Bay of Manila for Subic with his squadron April 25, at 11 p. m., and had one
wooden cruiser disabled on the way through leaks and disabled machinery.
The admiral found, "with much disgust," of the defense of the western
entrance to Subic, that "the guns which should have been mounted on that
island were delayed a month and a half. This surprised me, as the shore
batteries that the navy had installed (with very little difficulty) at the entrance
of the bay of Manila, under the intelligent direction of colonel of naval artil
lery, Senor Garces, and Lieutenant Beneavente, were ready to fight twenty-
four days after the commencement of the work.
' ' I was also no less disgusted that they confided in the efficacy of the few
torpedoes which they had found feasible to put there.
"The entrance was not defended by torpedoes nor by the batteries of the
island, so that the squadron would have had to bear the attack of the Ameri
cans with its own resources, in 40 meters of water, and with little security.

ADMIRAL MONTIJO, COMMANDER OF THE FLEET THAT ADMIRAL DEWEY SUNK.

VIEWS OF THE NAVY YARD AT CAVITE, PHILIPPINES.

THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 3°i
Our vessels could not only be destroyed, but they could not save their crews.
I still held a hope that the Americans would not go to Subic, and give us time
for more preparations,, but the following day I received from the Spanish
consul at Hongkong a telegram which said: 'Enemy's squadron sailed at 2 p.
m. from the bay of Mira, and according to. reliable accounts they sailed for
Subic to destroy our squadron, and then will go to Manila. '
"This telegram demonstrated that the enemy knew where they could find
my squadron, and that the port of Subic had no defenses."
There was held a council of war, and returned to fight "under less insup
portable conditions" in the bay of Manila, but "not near the City, because far
from defending it, this would provoke the enemy to bombard the plaza, which
doubtless would have been demolished on account of its few defenses. It
was unanimously decided that we should take position in the bay of Caiiacao,
in the least water possible, in order to combine our fire with that of the bat
teries of Point Sangley and Ulloa.
"I immediately ordered Del Rio to concentrate his forces in the most
strategic point of the arsenal, taking every disposition to burn the coal and
stores before allowing them to fall into the power of the enemy. I sent the
Don Juan de Austria to Manila to get a large number of lighters filled with
sand to defend the water line of the Castilla (which could not move) against
the enemy's shells and torpedoes. At 10 a. m. on the 29th I left Subic with
the vessels of my squadron, towing the Castilla by the transport Manila.
"In the afternoon of the same day we anchored in the Gulf of Caiiacao in
8 meters of water. On the following morning we anchored in line of battle,
the Christina, Castilla, Don Juan de Austria, Don Juan de Ulloa, Luzon,
Cuba, and Marques del Duero, while the transport Manila was sent to the
Roads of Bacoor, where the Velasco and Lezo were undergoing repairs.
"At 7 p. m. I received a telegram from Subic announcing that the enemy's
squadron had entered the port at 3, reconnoitering, doubtless seeking our
ships, and from there they had sailed with course for Manila.
"The mail steamer Isla Mindanao arrived in the bay. I advised her cap
tain to save his vessel by going to Singapore, as the enemy could not get into
the entrance probably before midnight. As he was not authorized from the
trans- Atlantic, he did not do so, and then I told him that he could anchor in
shallow water as near as possible to Bacoor.
"At midnight gun fire was heard off Corregidor, and at 2 on the morning

3°2 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.
of the i st of May I received telegraphic advices that the American vessels
were throwing their search lights at the batteries of the entrance, with which
they had exchanged several shots. I notified the commanding general of the
arsenal, Senor Sostoa, and the general-governor of the plaza, Capt. Senor
Garcia Pana, that they should prepare themselves. I directed all the artillery
to be loaded, and all the sailors and soldiers to go to their stations for battle."
Montijo details the tonnage of vessels and the character of guns, to show
the odds in favor of the Americans, adding all his vessels had been -painted
dark gray color, had taken down their masts and yards; and the boats, to
avoid the effects of projectiles and the splinters, had their anchors buoyed and
cables ready to slip instantly. At 5:15 the signal to open the fire of the
Spanish fleet was made, and the American answer came promptly. Montijo
says: "The Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon us numberless
projectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves
almost entirely to fight the Christina, my flagship. A short time after the
.action commenced one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action
all those who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the for
ward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieut. Jos£
Nunez took the wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest commendation,
steering until the end of the fight. In the meanwhile, another shell exploded
in the orlop, setting fire to the crews' bags, which they were fortunately able
to control. "The enemy shortened the distance between us, and, rectifying his aim,
covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. At 7:30 one shell destroyed
completely the steering gear. I ordered to steer by hand while the rudder
was out of action. In the meanwhile, another shell exploded on the poop, and
put out of action 9 men. Another destroyed the mizzen masthead, bringing
down the flag and my ensign, which were replaced immediately. A fresh
shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, destroy
ing the wounded who were being treated there. Another exploded in the
ammunition room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the
working of the hand steering gear. As it was impossible to control the fire,
I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to explode.
"Amidships several shells of smaller caliber went through the smokestack,
and one of the large ones penetrated the fire room, putting out of action 1

THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 303
master gunner and 12 men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the
starboard bow gun; while the fire astern increased, fire was started forward
by another shell, which went through the hull and exploded on the deck.
"The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing until there were
only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing them, as the
guns' crews had been frequently called upon to substitute those charged with
steering, all of whom were out of action.
"The ship being out of control, the hull, smoke pipe, and mast riddled
with shot, or confused with the cries of the wounded; half of her crew out of
action, among whom were 7 officers, I gave the order to sink and abandon the
ship before the magazines should explode, making signal at the same time
to the Cuba and Luzon to assist in saving the rest of the crew, which they did,
aided by others from the Duero and the arsenal.
"I abandoned the Christina, directing beforehand to secure her flag, and
accompanied by my staff, and with great sorrow, I hoisted my flag on the
cruiser Isla de Cuba.
"After having saved many men from the unfortunate vessel, one shell
destroying her heroic commander, Don Luis Cadarso, who was directing the
rescue. "The Ulloa, which also defended herself firmly, using the only two guns
which were available, was sunk by a shell which entered the water line, put
ting out of action her commander and half of her remaining crew, those which
were only remaining for the service of the two guns stated.
"The Castilla, which fought heroically, remained with her artillery use
less, except one stern gun, with which they fought spiritedly, was riddled
with shot and set on fire by the enem3*'s shells, then sunk, and was abandoned
by her crew in good order, which was directed by her commander, Don Alonzo
Algado. The casualties on this ship were 23 killed and 80 wounded.
"The Austria, very much damaged and on fire, went to the aid of the
Castilla. The Luzon had three guns dismounted, and was slightly damaged
in the hull. The Duero remained with one of her engines useless, the bow
gun of 12 centimeters and one of the redoubts.
"At 8 o'clock in the morning, the enemy's squadron having suspended its
fire, I ordered the ships that remained to us to take positions in the bottom of
the Roads at Bacoor, and there to resist to the last moment, and that they
should be sunk before they surrendered.

3°4 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.
"At 10:30 the enemy returned, forming a circle to destroy the arsenal
and the ships which remained to me, opening upon them a horrible fire, which
we answered as far as we could with the few cannon which we still had
mounted. "There remained the last recourse, to sink our vessels, and we accom
plished this operation, taking care to save the flag, the distinguishing pennant,
the money in the safe, the portable arms, the breech plugs of the guns, and
the signal codes.
"After which I went with my staff to the Convent of Santo Domingo de
Cavite, to be-cured of a wound received in the left leg, and to telegraph a
brief report of the action, with preliminaries and results.
"It remains only to say that all the chiefs, officers, engineers, quarter
masters, gunners, sailors, and soldiers rivaled one another in sustaining with
honor the good name of the navy on this sad day.
"The inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron, the
lack of all classes of the personnel, especially master gunners and seamen
gunners; the inaptitude of some of the provisional machinists, the scarcity of
rapid-fire cannon, the strong crews of the enemy, and the unprotected char
acter of the greater part of our vessels, all contributed to make more decided
the sacrifice which we made for our country and to prevent the possibility of
the horrors of the bombardment of the city of Manila, with the conviction that
with the scarcity of our force against the superior enemy we were going to
certain death and could expect a loss of all our ships.
"Our casualties, including those of the arsenal, amounted to 381 men
killed and wounded."
There is a surprising amount of information in the official reports of
Admiral Dewey's famous victory that will be of the nature of novelty to
people at large. The fact becomes prominent that a great deal of credit is
due the Navy Department for its foresight, vigilance, incessant industry in
supplying to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic fleet the news of the day,
cautioning him not to spare expense where there was anything in reach or
sight to aid the fighting ships when the decisive hours came. The conversa
tion between the Navy Department and the Asiatic command was right to the
point. Nothing seemed to escape, or to be misunderstood. The movements
on behalf of the United States were characterized by confidence, certainty of
purpose, promptitude and precision of execution. The Spaniards were hesi-

B.

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THE ARENA, CONSTRUCTED OF BAMBOO, IN WHICH THE BULL FIGHTS ARE GIVEN AT MANILA.

41. Street in the Suburb of La Ermita. 42. Rosario Street in La Ermit-i. 43. Luneta'Square in Manila.
44. Hospital of San Juan de Dios. 45. Manila Cathedral. 46. Royal Street in Malate. " 47. Royal Street
in Santa Ana. 48. Monument of Don Simon de Anda y Salazar in the Malecon Square.
VIEWS IN AND AROUND MANILA.

THE STORY OF DEWEY^'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 3°7
tant, uncertain, confused, and the doom that was upon them was announced
plainly — the one redeeming feature for them being in the personal bravery of
the officers and men. The rottenness of the government of Spain provided
the elements of defeat. The preparations by the Spaniards for the battle con
trast effectively with those of the Americans. Admiral Montijo was
"disgusted" to find nothing done at the vital point for the defense of Subic,
and warned that the Americans were on the way, made haste to Manila
Bay, where he planned his line of defense so as to be flanked by shore
batteries, and yet to spare the city — a strategy afterward sharply resented by
Admiral Dewey when he sent his compliments to the authorities in Manila
with the message that another gun fired at an American ship and the city
would be destroyed. The flanking batteries were of powerful German guns,
several of them firing heavier metal than any in the American squadron, and
they were well located to do- hurt to our ships. Montijo's line had been formed
with reference to them, and he had contrived to be in part protected by shal
lows. He had towed a ship that he calls a floating battery, from Subig, and
sought to protect this machine with other vessels. The Americans stripped
for the battle, their ships and themselves, throwing overboard all that was
inflammable, sparing nothing that would splinter or burn. The Spaniards
were much encumbered with fuel, and the fires kindled by our shells were
inextinguishable. There have been doubts whether the Spaniards were sur
prised by the American visit. They certainly were not. Admiral Montijo
had two days' warning, heard the guns at the mouth of the harbor at mid
night, and made full preparation for the shock that he knew was approaching.
He gave the signal for the firing to commence, and the Americans were
received by two shore batteries and a floating one and the entire Spanish
squadron. The American reply was immediate, and the hour was that of
daybreak. The victory of our ships was so thorough, and the loss on our side
so insignificant, that o,ur countrymen have hardly ascertained how many things
there were to think about, and with what efficacy the hard work was done, or
through what strife with tribulations it was accomplished. The gunners
found out in battle much they had not been familiar with, in handling their
tools. The dreadful and beautiful machines they used were fashioned
delicately as telescopes, and might in several particulars be mistaken for
instruments of science of refined construction and nice adjustments. One
of the words of caution to the men that the Commander-in-Chief made

308 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY.
impressive was that ammunition was not to be wasted. They* were far from
home, and in a protracted engagement might disarm themselves. It was
an erroneous report that only fifteen rounds remained of the ammunition for
the four-inch rapid fire battery that caused the remarkable intermission in
the battle — and the celebrated recess. The boys, it will be remembered,
wanted to finish the job before they had coffee, but the Commander-in-
Chief insisted on breakfast all around, and not a minute was lost. First the
smoke of the firing and the burning ships covered the scene of action, though
the American ships were kept in motion. Second, the guns were so hot it
was hard to work them. Third, the heat was excessive — May is the hottest
month of the year at Manila. The rest was refreshing and reassuring to the
Americans. They saw their victory, and poured in what Admiral Montijo
calls "a horrible fire" that soon closed the conflict with the annihilation of the
Asiatic squadron of Spain.
At 12:40 the flagship signaled "Cease firing. " The resistance of the
Spaniards had ended. There were only the slain and wounded, the wrecks
and ships on fire, the swarms of prisoners and fugitives, the burning houses
at Cavite, the silenced batteries — a battle won whose proud story shall never
fade, the American arms with freshly-wrought splendors on the seas, the flag
of the Great Republic with brightened stars and stripes, the sound of Ameri
can guns ringing around the globe, great news on the streets of the capitals
of all nations, another radiant chapter in our inheritance of glory.

CHAPTER XII.
After the May Day Battle in Manila Bay.
Dewey's Cables during the Time He Held the Harbor with the City of Manila under His
Guns — Dispatches Full of History and Rich in Personal Characteristics — Authentic
Information from the Inside — The Official Story — Dewey's Unfavorable Opinion of
Cubans — Capture of the City — Trouble with Aguinaldo — Our Ships and Crews.

During the days Admiral Dewey was on the way from Mirs Bay to that of
Manila, the news got into circulation that something was to be expected from
our Asiatic squadron. Our ships of war in time of war could not remain in
neutral ports, and those on the coast of China had been ordered to assume the
offensive in the Philippines, especially, it was the early public understanding,
to "remove" the Spanish fleet, so that our commerce on the seas of Asia
might not be assailed or obstructed. We had a very vigilant consul at Hong
kong, who had been at pains to inform himself as to affairs in the Spanish
archipelago, and was favorably impressed by the Filipino insurgents, and
when Admiral Dewey departed on his important errand, his line of communi
cations was "by tng" through the consulate. The first account of the action
in Manila Bay was from the defeated Spaniards, and in the course of explain
ing their misfortunes they confessed to disaster that at length included all the
ships in that part of the world flying the flag of Spain, with the exception of
a few gunboats scattered so far among the islands that they disappeared from
all scenes of action. The immediate impression made by the loss of cable
connection with Manila while it was relating the story that the navy of Spain
had vanished in the Orient, so valiantly defended that the Americans were
"compelled to maneuver repeatedly, " was that the Spaniards had cut the wires
so as to keep the extent of their broken fortunes to themselves. The cable
was cut by order of Admiral Dewey, who selected a suitable place, took
out a section of the cable, coiled it away and buoyed both ends. He first pro
posed to preserve the line for the use of both parties, but the offer was
3°9

3i° AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY,
quickly rejected. After a few hours the minds of the authorities of Spain
were changed, and they sent an acceptance of the conservation of the privilege
of talking to Madrid in exchange for admitting the American Admiral to
equal rights, but it was too late. There was a weary wait for news from
Dewey, and the full orbed intelligence had to travel by dispatch boat to Hong
kong. When the city of Manila fell into our possession the cable was soon
spliced, and money poured into the company at the rate of four dollars a
word. The dispatches by Admiral Dewey through the combination of tugs
and cables, during the intermission in through wire service, and his cable
grams afterward, are so many thunderbolts of history, and the journals gener
ally have been so busily magnifying current matters that this treasury of
solid knowledge has not been attractively displayed, until, thanks to the
Navy Department, it appears in these pages : Hongkong, May 12, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington:
There is little change in the situation since my last telegram. I am
transferring to transports steel breech-loading rifles from sunken Spanish
men-of-war; also stores from arsenal in my possession. I am maintaining
strict blockade. Add Argos to the list of destroyed vessels. El Correo prob
ably El Cano. I send this telegram to Hongkong. ... It has been
reported at Manila that Pelayo and another vessel are en route to Philippine
Islands. DEWEY.

Hongkong, May 15, 1898. (Cavite, May 12.)
Secretary of the Navy, Washington:
I thank the President for my promotion. Forcibly recommend that Com
mander Lamberton, chief of staff; Captains Wildes, the commander of the
Boston ; Coghlan, the commander of the Raleigh ; Gridley, the commander of
the Olympia; Dyer, the commander of the Baltimore; Walker, the commander
of the Concord; Wood, the commander of the Petrel — without whose aid I
could have done nothing, each to be advanced ten numbers. DEWEY.

Hongkong, May 15, 1898. (Cavite, May 13.)
Secretary of the Navy, Washington :
The squadron thanks the President for his message in your telegram of
May 7. I am maintaining strict blockade of Manila by sea, and believe rebels

AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 311
are hemming in by land, although they are inactive and making no demon
strations. Great scarcity of provisions in the city. I believe the Spanish
Governor-General will be obliged to surrender soon. I can take Manila at any
moment. To retain possession and thus control Philippine Islands would
require, in my best judgment, well-equipped force of 5,000 men, although
United States troops sent by Pekin will be very* useful to relieve the Olympia of
guarding Cavite. United States troops should make provision for extremely
hot, moist climate. Spanish force is estimated 10,000 men. The rebels are
reported 30,000 men. I should suggest the Charleston or Pekin bring a few
officers and about 100 men, partly Engineers' Department, to man transport
Manila and captured vessels. I am loading Manila with ordnance from the
Spanish man-of-war. I propose to assign Lieutenant-Commander Singer to
command. Captured on May 12 the Spanish gun vessel Callao attempting to
run blockade; released on parole officers and men. I have plenty of coal for
the present and can purchase more in Chinese ports. Will hold frequent com
munication with Hongkong. One British, one French, two German, one
Japanese men-of-war here observing. Baltimore requires immediately one
Mark IV mount for one 6-inch B. L. R., a supply of extractors for Hotchkiss
3-pounders and for Hotchkiss 6-pounders ; also locks most recent design for
main battery. DEWEY.

Hongkong, May 24, 1898. (Cavite, May 20.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
Situation unchanged. Strict blockade is continued. Great scarcity pre
vails at Manila. Foreign subjects fear an outbreak of the Spanish soldiers.
Arrangements have been made for them to be transferred to Cavite by the
foreign men-of-war, if necessary. Aguinaldo, the rebel commander-in-chief,
was brought down by the McCulloch. Organizing forces near Cavite, and
may render assistance that will be valuable. I do not consider submarine
mines practicable here, on account of great depth and width of bay and
entrance. If attacked by superior force, the squadron will endeavor to give
good account of itself. The American bark Saranac was captured off Iloilo,
Philippine Islands. Upon the arrival of the Charleston with ammunition, I
propose to recapture and to clear the island of small Spanish gun vessels.
When is Charleston expected to arrive? I request you will send to the Asiatic
Station the Bennington and the Yorktown, if possible. Will be more useful

3i2 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY.
than the Philadelphia. How many troops coming here Pekin? When
expected to arrive? I request send provisions for the squadron — 2,000 men
for three months. Also small stores. DEWEY.

Hongkong, May 27, 1898. (Cavite, May 29.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
No change in the situation of the blockade. Is effective. It is impossible
for the people in Manila to buy provisions, except rice. The French men-
of-war must go to Saigon for provisions. It is important that I should know
as early as possible whereabouts and strength of the possible Spanish expedi
tion to the Philippines, and, if possible, that the squadron should be reinforced
with a battleship or armored cruiser. The captain of the Olympia (Gridley)
condemned by medical survey; is ordered home; leave by Occidental and
Oriental Steamship Company's steamer from Hongkong on May 28. Com
mander Lamberton has been appointed to the command of the Olympia.
Steamer has just arrived from Amoy with 3,000 Mauser rifles and great
amount ammunition for Aguinaldo, whose force is increasing constantly.
. . . Bark Saranac is sailing under the British flag; is loading with sugar
at Iloilo for New York. DEWEY.

Hongkong, May 30, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
Aguinaldo, revolutionary leader, visited the Olympia yesterday. He
expects to make general attack on May 31. Doubt ability to succeed. Situa
tion remains unchanged. DEWEY.

Hongkong, June 6, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
The following telegram has been received, addressed United States
consul, Hongkong:
"Direct Captain Hodgson, McCulloch, turn over command Foley*; return
home. CRIDLER."
I request to be informed is this official? DEWEY.
(The reply, through Allen, Acting Secretary, was "official.")

AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 313
U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station,
Flagship Olympia, Cavite, Philippine Islands, June 12, 1898.
Sir: I take pleasure in bringing to the attention of the Department the
zeal and efficiency of Capt. Daniel B. Hodgson, R. C. S., commanding the
McCulloch, while serving in the squadron under my command.
The McCulloch steamed from Hongkong to Manila Bay in the squadron
formation, and ran the batteries at the entrance with the squadron, and while
not in the line of battle at the battle of Manila Bay, was kept near by and in
readiness to assist any vessel that might be disabled.
Since joining my command, and up to the time of his detachment, Cap
tain Hodgson has kept the McCulloch in a high state of efficiency, and ready
to move at a moment's notice, and has made her a valuable auxiliary to the
squadron. I request that the Department will communicate this report to the hon
orable Secretary of the Treasury.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
GEORGE DEWEY,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. N.,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.
The Secretary of the Navy Washington, D. C.

Hongkong, June 6, 1898. (Cavite, June 3.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
Receipt of telegram of May 26 is acknowledged, and I thank the Depart
ment for the expression of confidence. Have acted according to the spirit of
Department's instructions therein from the beginning, and I have entered
into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction. This squadron can
reduce the defenses of Manila at any moment, but it is considered useless
until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession.
DEWEY.

Hongkong, June 6, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
There are no guns of recent design available to mount upon shore, being
without breech mechanism, mounts, or ammunition. There is no telegraphic
communication Bolinao to Hongkong. Have just received 4,500 tons of coal;
I have sufficient coal for two months. Insurgents have "been engaged

314 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY.
actively within the province of Cavite during last week; they have won several
small victories, taking prisoners about 1,800 men, 50 officers; Spanish troops,
not native. I am preparing arsenal and Cavite for the occupation United
States troops, and will have vessel of Cape Engano to meet United States
transports. DEWEY.

Hongkong, June 27, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
Receipt of telegram of June 14 is acknowledged. Aguinaldo, insurgent
leader, with thirteen of his staff, arrived May 19, by permission, on Nanshan.
Established self Cavite, outside arsenal, under the protection of our guns, and
organized his army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a
personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting him in any way
with the force under my command, and on several occasions I have declined
requests that I should do so, telling him the squadron could not act until the
arrival of the United States troops. At the same time I have given him to
understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common
enemy. He has gone to attend a meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose
of forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the
squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been wonderful.
I have allowed to pass by water recruits, arms, and ammunition, and to take
such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Have
advised frequently to conduct the war humanely, which he has done invari
ably. My relations with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence.
The United States has not been bound in any way to assist insurgents by any
act or promises, and he is hot, to my knowledge, committed to assist us. I
believe he expects to capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt
ability, they not yet having many guns. In my opinion, these people are far
superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the
natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races. DEWEY.

Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 12.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically surrounded Manila.
They have taken 2,500 Spanish prisoners, whom they treat most humanely.
They do not intend to attack city proper until the arrival of United States
troops thither; I have advised. Twelve merchant vessels are anchored in the

33. In the Valleys of Carabao. 34. Street in the District of Paco, Manila. 35. Aristocratic Residences
in the Suburbs of San Juan del Monte. 36. Square of Santa Ana in the District of San Sebastian, Manila.
37. View of the Royal Highway of La Concepcion. 38. The King's Wharf , Manila . 39. The Aguilar Barrier
in Tondo, Manila. 40. The Cathedral of Jaro in Ilo-Ilo.
VIEWS IN THE PHILIPPINES, MOSTLY IN AND AROUND MANILA.

17. Royal Street in Lipa, Batangas Province. 18. School of Arts and Commerce in Ilo-Ilo. 19. Molo
Church in Ilo-Ilo. 20. A Filipino Funeral Party in Ilo-Ilo, Grouped Around the Tomb. 21. A View of the
San Sebastian Highway, Manila. 22. Romblon— Capital of the Island of Su Nombre. 23. View of the Paseo-
de Aguadas, Manila. 24. Filipino Carpenters of Ilo-Ilo at Work.
VIEWS PROM THE PHILIPPINES

AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 317
bay with refugees on board under guard of neutral men-of-war; this with my
permission. Health of the squadron continues excellent. The German com
mander-in-chief arrived to-day. Three German, two British, one French, one
Japanese men-of-war now in port ; another German man-of-war is expected.
I request the departure of the Monadnock and the Monterey be expedited.
DEWEY.

Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 13.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
I request the Department will send six months' supplies in all depart
ments, including medical, for the squadron, including McCulloch, Zafiro,
Nanshan, Manila, complement about 50 men, and Callao, complement about
25 men. It is practically impossible to obtain further supplies within the
limits of the station during the war. DEWEY.

Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 12.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
I request the Department send 350 men and 20 marines to fill vacancies
existing to replace men whose terms of enlistment have expired or will expire
before October 1. DEWEY.

Cavite, June 17, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
No change since my telegram of June 12. Have sent the Baltimore,
Cape Engano, Luzon Island, to meet American transports. The health of
the squadron continues excellent. Another French man-of-war has arrived.
DEWEY.

Cavite, June 17, 1898..
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
Commanding officers have no recommendation to make under Revised
Statutes, sections 1407 and 491. All officers and men did their whole duty
nobly, but the nature of the action did not admit of any individual display of
personal heroism. DEWEY.
Hongkong. (Received June 27, 1898.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
No change in the situation since my telegram of June 17. Five German,
3 British, 1 French, 1 Japanese men-of-war in port. Insurgents constantly

3i8 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY.
closing in on city. The United States transports and the Charleston have not
yet arrived. The Baltimore is at Cape Engano awaiting them. Have
received information Cadiz squadron passed Gibraltar Friday morning, June
17, bound eastward. Shall the Monadnock and the Monterey arrive in time?
In my judgment, if the coast of Spain was threatened, the squadron of the
enemy would have to return. One hundred and twenty-one officers, United
States Navy, 6 paymaster's clerks, and 1,709 men were engaged battle of
Manila Bay. DEWEY.

Hongkong, July 1, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
Referring to your telegram of June 21, the crew now on board is more
efficient than new men would be. I consider, however, that in justice to
them, and to prevent discontent, if not dissatisfaction in the squadron, men
whose terms of enlistment have expired should be relieved from duty in this
hot and unhealthful climate as soon as possible. DEWEY.

Hongkong, July 1, 1898. (Cavite, June 26.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
I shall have vessel at Hongkong on or about July 1. The Charleston and
transports have not yet arrived. DEWEY.

\ Hongkong, July 1, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington:
The British bark Austria has gone to Hongkong without cargo. In my
opinion allowing to return to load might give cause for complaint to other
neutral nations whose ships have been warned off. DEWEY.

Hongkong, July 7, 1898. (Cavite, July 4.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
The receipt of telegram is acknowledged. The United States troops have
landed and have been comfortably housed at Cavite, Luzon Island. Insur
gents are still active. The Chinese subjects have been permitted to leave
freely. Cold-storage steamer has not yet arrived. Aguinaldo proclaimed
himself president of the revolutionary republic on July 1. DEWEY.

AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 319
Hongkong, July 13, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
Aguinaldo informed me his troops had taken all of Subic Bay except Isla
Grande, which they were prevented from taking by the German man-of-war
Irene. On July 7 sent the Raleigh and the Concord there; they took the
island and about 1,300 men, with arms and ammunition; no resistance. The
Irene retired from the bay on their arrival. I shall send the Boston Cape
Engano about July 16, to meet second army detachment. It is not practicable
to send Guam. No chartered vessel available. DEWEY.

Hongkong, July 20, 1898. (Cavite, July 17.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
Situation unchanged. Second army detachment arrived to-day. All
well on board. The health of the squadron continues good. No sickness
whatever. I have taken the coal of the British ship Honolulu and I am
retaining her until the port is opened. Have provisions for six months. The
receipt of telegram of July 7 is acknowledged; in view of the information
therein shall retain Pekin and China as auxiliaries. I do not expect the
Monterey before August 5, and the Monadnock ten days later. If necessary,
shall proceed with the squadron to meet the Monadnock to the east Cape
Engano, Luzon. Shall return other transports to the United States as soon
as possible. DEWEY.

Hongkong, July* 30, 1898. (Cavite, July 26.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
Merritt arrived yesterday in the Newport. The remainder of the
expedition is expected within the next few days. Situation is most critical at
Manila. The Spanish may surrender at any moment. Merritt's most diffi
cult problem will be how to deal with insurgents under Aguinaldo, who has
become aggressive, and even threatening toward our army. The Monadnock
was at Honolulu on July 8 ; expected to leave four days later. . . .
DEWEY.

Hongkong, August 1, 1898. (Cavite, July 29.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
Referring to your telegram July 20, strict blockade continues. The
neutral vessels are not allowed to enter. From information, which I consider

32o AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY.
reliable, Spanish Governor-General would surrender to United States forces
at once, if it was not for insurgent complication. In any event, they must
capitulate very soon. Merritt and I are working together to this end. The
remainder of Merritt's forces has not yet arrived. Pekin will leave to-morrow
for San Francisco, Cal. DEWEY.

Hongkong, August 9, 1898-. (Cavite, August 4.)
Secretary of Navy, Washington :
The receipt of telegram of July 26 acknowledged. Have provisions for
three months, fresh; also plenty of coal. Do not need provisions from
Australia. The Monterey and Brutus arrived to-day. DEWEY.

Washington, August 12, 1898.
Dewey, Hongkong:
Peace protocol signed by President. Suspend all hostilities and blockade.
ALLEN.

Washington, August 12, 1898.
Dewey, Hongkong:
The protocol, signed by the President to-day, provides that the United
States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the
conclusion of a treaty, of peace, which shall determine the control, disposi
tion, and government of the Philippines. This is most important. ALLEN, Acting.

The dispatches from Admiral Dewey are at once characteristic and his
torical — strikingly so.
His career during the lonesome months, before Anderson, McArthur,
Greene and Merritt came, was full of dramatic situation, and there is a cutting
sparkle in his cabled words that scintillates intelligence. May 12th he was
"transferring to transports steel breech-loading rifles from sunken Spanish
men-of-war." There is a picture in a sentence. The Admiral "forcibly
recommends" promotions of officers "without whose aid I could have done
nothing." "The squadron thanks the President for his message." In reply
as to whether he "would desire submarine mines," "in case of attack by a

:
¦ '"'"   " S?; ', r ":
NATIVE METHOD OF PLOWING. SCENE IN THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, PHILIPPINES.

A COUNTRY MARRIAGE, PHILIPPINES. MARRIAGE MAKER AND BRIDAL COUPLE IN CARRIAGE,
FOLLOWED BY BAND, ON WAY TO CHURCH.

AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 323
superior force," the answer eight days later was the squadron would
"endeavor to give good account of itself."
Aguinaldo had visited the Olympia and overrated his ability. The
insurgent general had stated he would make a general attack on Manila.
Captain Hodgson, "up to the time of his detachment," had kept his ship
"in a high state of efficiency," and made her "a valuable auxiliary."
The Admiral had entered into no alliance with the insurgents or any*
faction. He declined to cooperate with the fleet in aid of the insurgents.
Aguinaldo had been allowed to help himself at the Spanish arsenal. As the
insurgents were opposed to a common enemy, they were "friends."
Aguinaldo "expected" to take Manila, but had not the force to do it, and never
could have taken it if he had had twenty thousand men at his back. Indeed,
the Spaniards, if they had not been afraid of the American fleet, could have
marched out and raised the siege. The most striking of the sayings of the
Admiral was that he knew familiarly both the Filipinos and Cubans, and
"these people (Filipino) are far superior in their intelligence and more
capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba. ' ' The movement of the
Cadiz fleet was a subject of great interest; and the Admiral, July 17th, said
he would, "if necessary, proceed with the squadron to meet the Monadnock
bo the east of Cape Engano" — the northeast corner of Luzon. The necessity
was in case of the arrival of the Cadiz fleet with battleships, the Monadnock
still lingering on the Pacific. Dewey's idea was that with the two monitors
he would be master of the situation, and prove it by sinking a second Spanish
fleet. Fortune did not favor him to that extent. In a dispatch to Admiral
Dewey, Secretary Long stated, May 20th, mentioning a rumor of Spaniards
sending troops and battleships to the Philippines, that "our means of receiv
ing intelligence from Spain are very untrustworthy." May 29th, Long cabled
Dewey, "There is no Spanish force en route to Philippines." Long tele
graphed, August 1st, report that monks and other prisoners in the hands
of insurgents at Cavite were in' danger of being "unjustly put to death,"
and "this should not. be permitted" if the Admiral was "in a position to pre
vent it. " June 6th Navy Department cabled Dewey, "Cold-storage steamer
from Australia is due about June 20 at Manila, with fresh provisions for the
squadron." And July 26th this comprehensive inquiry was made:
Do you want another fresh provision ship or anything else from Australia?
LONG.

324 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY.
The following cable is a model of compliment and caution :
Washington, May 26, 1898.
Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong:
You must exercise discretion most fully in all matters, and be governed
according to circumstance which you know and we cannot know. You have
our confidence entirely. It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent for
your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or
any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in
the future. LONG.
July 27th the Admiral desired the British foreign office should be
informed of his "deep appreciation" of the services of the British Consul
Walker, who had "performed the trying duties of acting United States consul
during the last three months in a most able and painstaking manner, and has
been of invaluable assistance to me, being my only means of communication
with the Spanish authorities, and the chief agent in the protection of foreign
residents. ' '
The Admiral's account of the fall of Manila was that the city surrendered
"to our land and naval forces after a combined attack" — a "division of the
squadron shelled the forts and intrenchments at Malate, on the south side of
the city, driving back enemy, our army advancing on that side at the same
time. ' '
On the day of the surrender of Manila : Washington, August 13, 1898.
Dewey (care American Consul), Hongkong:
The President desires to receive from you any important information you
may have of the Philippines; the desirability of the several islands; the
character of their population ; coal and other mineral deposits ; their harbor
and commercial advantages, and in a naval and commercial sense which
would be the most advantageous. If you have other information which may
be of value to the government in their negotiations, the President may desire
your presence here. If he should request you to come, take the quickest route
of travel. ALLEN, Acting Secretary of Navy.

Manila, August 20, 1898.
Secretary of the Navy, Washington :
Referring to the Department's telegram of August 13, important islands
are: Colon, Luzon, Panay, Cebu, Negros, Leyte. Others, owing to the

AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 325
nature of the inhabitants, have a small amount of civilization, want of cultiva
tion. They may be neglected, especially isles of southern group. Luzon is
in all respects the most desirable to retain. Contains most important com
mercial ports. Manila is farthest north. Produces all of the good tobacco.
Friendly natives. Civilization somewhat advanced. Not yet developed.
Possible rich minerals. Population, 825,000. Subic Bay best harbor for
coaling purposes and military. Water deep; landlocked; easily defended.
Strategically, command of bay and city of Manila, with arsenal at Cavite,
most valuable. Panay, Cebu, Negros thickly populated, most civilized, and
well cultivated. Iloilo second commercial port; center of sugar trade ; a good
harbor strategically; in view of the situation, good for defense. Cebu third
commercial port ; a good harbor, very desirable. No coal of good quality can
be procured in Philippine Islands. Some has been mined on Cebu, English
company. I trust it may not be necessary to order me to Washington.
Should regret very much to leave here while matters remain in present critical
condition. DEWEY.

Washington, August 27, 1898.
Dewey, Manila:
The President received your telegram, and will respect your wishes and
not direct you to leave your present duty. He desires you to communicate to
General Merritt your views upon the general question of the Philippines,
with such information as you have, and to transmit to the President in writing
by the quickest method (possibly by hand of Merritt) the substance of your
suggestions to Merritt. ALLEN.

There had been no account of the Philippine Islands in which there was as
much said in a few words as Dewey's dispatch of August 20th. The
President was well pleased because the Admiral evidently understood the
critical importance of the situation and wanted to stay at his post. When the
American army entered Manila — and it is to be remembered the action of the
navy prevented heavy loss of life — the insurgents were "dusted out of the
way," driven out of the city while the Spaniards were forced into the walled
portion. There were 8,500 Americans in the army. The Spaniards surren
dered 13,180, and the insurgents mustered about 14,000. As early as July 26th,
the Admiral, who had been judicious in friendliness to Aguinaldo, stated

326 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY.
Merritt's most difficult problem would be in dealing with the insurgents
under Aguinaldo, "who has become aggressive and even threatening toward
our army," and four days after the American army was in possession a joint
dispatch was sent by Merritt through the Navy Department to the Adjutant
General :
Secretary of the Navy, Washington: Hongkong, August 17, 1898.
Send the following telegram :
"To Adjutant General: — Insurgents demand joint occupation of the city.
Inform me how far I shall proceed in forcing obedience of the insurgents in
this matter and others that may arise. Is the government willing to use all
means and . , . the natives to submit to authority of United States? —
Merritt." DEWEY.

Washington, August 17, 1898.
Dewey, Hongkong:
Answering your joint cable, the President directs as follows :
There must be no joint occupation with the insurgents. The United
States, in the possession of city, bay, and harbor of Manila, must preserve
peace, protecting persons and property in the territory occupied by their mili
tary and naval forces. Insurgents and all others must recognize the military-
occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities
proclaimed by the President. Use any means in your judgment necessary to
this end. All law-abiding people must be treated alike. ALLEN.

But the "cable" was not "joint." The line had not been mended, and
Dewey's dispatch boat had to furnish the facilities to Hongkong. Dewey dis
patched Merritt's dispatch with, "Send the following telegram to the
Adjutant General." The return message is plainly the President's own, and
the insurgents were permitted and required to occupy themselves with the
rural department.
The burning question of the Philippines came up in a cable from Consul
Williams to the State Department as follows:
"Large number Spanish priests and civil officers, an element dangerous
to United States, wish to leave for Hongkong. No means of transportation.
Army authorities willing to send transports same via Hongkong, but lack
authority. Will War Department cable me authorization? No expense to
government. Officers all advise measure. WILLIAMS, Consul. "

AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 327
This was sent to the Admiral asking for the President what he thought,
and Dewey's reply was:
"Am advised that in addition to Spanish civil authorities there are about
750 priests, who are anxious to leave the country. Strongly advise that they
be given passage to Hongkong, as they are heartily disliked by the insur
gents, and their departure would tend to appease latter and to promote har
mony. ' '
Information was asked August 29, at the instance of the French Ambas
sador in Washington, as to the treatment of Spanish prisoners ; and Dewey
replies :
"From my observation and that of my officers, the Spanish prisoners are
not treated cruelly by the insurgents, but they are neglected, not from design,
but owing to want of proper food supply, medical outfit, and attendance. ' '
The President directed that Dewey* should, during the suspension of hos
tilities, exert his influence "to restrain insurgent hostilities toward Spaniards,
and while maintaining a position of rightful supremacy as to the insurgents, to
pursue, so far as possible, a conciliatory course to all."
It was a few days before this that General Aguinaldo became careful to
refer matters of account to his "Council. " He put off the part of dictator,
and found it a necessary ceremony to confer a great deal. He took advice as
to the Spanish priests he had captured and imprisoned, concluding to hold
them as hostages. The Belgian Consul at Manila established himself in the
confidence of Admiral Dewey, who wrote that Mr. Audie, knowing the fall of
Manila certain, was "most assiduous in his endeavors to bring about its-sur-
render without loss of life or property." There was a new Governor- General
appointed, because he was for fighting to the end, and the Belgian Consul,
"much to his credit," the Admiral says, overcame the resistance of the
new man, and also "acted as intermediary between the two Governor-Gen
erals on the one hand and General Merritt and myself on the other, carrying
several important communications, among them a message from me to the
Governor-General to the effect that if the numerous batteries on the water
front of the walled city kept silent the city would not be shelled. The effect
of this was the capture of this rich and populous city without loss of life to the
squadron or to non-combatants and with little or none to our army. ' '
If the cable had been in working order from Manila to Hongkong and
beyond during the early days of August, the signing of the protocol would in

328 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY.
all probability have been delayed until the surrender of the city, but the fact
that the capitulation was signed a day later than the protocol, Washington and
Madrid time, did not materially change the situation.
The crushing defeat of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Dewey had a ter
rorizing influence, and the fact that the City would be destroyed as well as the
fleet, influenced all proceedings, and as the Admiral describes, saved the
effusion of blood when the American advance took place. It is curious to
note in the business report by the Admiral of our Asiatic squadron that there
are a good many things the matter with the vessels — "the boiler tubes of the
Boston give out frequently, the Raleigh's engines and boiler are under con
stant repair, and the construction of her fire rooms faulty; the boilers of the
Baltimore are only fair." The squadron has, under Dewey, burned 36,815
tons of coal. The price of 4,000 tons not reported. The 32,813 tons cost
$330,060.71 — of this $96,802.04 was consumed by the Olympia and tenders.
The Admiral grimly says : ' ' Regular target practice was held according
to prescribed methods during the first half of the fiscal y*ear, after which it
was discontinued, the ammunition being needed for war purposes. Especial
attention has been paid to subcaliber practice. The marksmanship in action
was excellent, and during four months in Manila Bay there has been almost
10 sickness. ' '
Vessel. Sick, per cent.
Olympia  1.25
Baltimore  1.24
Boston  2.16
Charleston  2.88
Concord ....... 2.58
McCulloch  8.80
Monadnock  1.16
Monocacy  2.17
Monterey  1. 19
Petrel  2.48
Raleigh  5.77
Total  12 15c, 24

Deaths.

Hospital.

Home

4

36

6

0

18

2

2

9

4

0

12

0

0

3

0

2

7

4

0

22

2

1

19

1

0

18

1

1

0

2

2

!S

2

CHAPTER XIII.
The Object Lesson of the Voyage of the Oregon.
The People Instructed for the Army by the Experience of the Navy— The Run from Washing
ton State to Florida— Splendid Spirit of the Men — The Fearful Storm in the Straits of
Magellan — The Threat of Destroying a Spanish Torpedo Boat at Rio — The Finish
Alone and in Good Form, and Famous the World Over.

The lesson of the War with Spain that will prove most profitable to the
people of the United States, if they accept the teachings of a costly experience,
is the comfort, economy and self-respect of strengthening the army, providing
for it ungrudgingly the arms most approved by the nations in arms, and mak
ing the posts schools of military science and marksmanship with the firearms of
precision great and small. It will not be the part of wisdom to go on scolding
Congress for its neglect of duty to the army. All demagogy aside, and we
find the army has been immensely improved since the close of the war of the
States and sections, and the gradual decline almost to departure of the Indian
question, as an army problem. This is the condition of enlisted men, and
their character. Now thousands of young men go into the army as an occu
pation, and take pride in being soldiers. More than that, they are often
inspired to educate themselves — and they find the zeal of competition and the
flush of accomplishment in target practice, as our pioneer backwoodsmen
rejoiced to excel in "shooting at a mark." There is an art in handling the
modern rifle, that requires training, as certainly as there is skill and deft
ness in perfecting musical gifts. There is a tradition that in the second of our
wars with Great Britain a Kentucky soldier killed an Indian at the measured
distance of a mile. The feat was one of celebrity, and there was much said
for years of the calculations required to give the long-barreled, old-fashioned
gun the correct elevation, how necessary it was that the rifle grooves should
be cut with a care equal to the finest workmanship on a watch, that the ball
should be perfectly round, and equally solid in every part, and the "patch"
329

33o THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON.
that fitted it so that it should be so guided in the initiatory whirl, as not to have
a thread amiss, or too thick or thin, just so that the full force of the powder
would be applied, and the missile sent on its long flight with all possible
mechanical aids — all these- details demanded that the firm nerve, the cool
intelligence, the keen eye, the alert executive will, the steady hand, should
answer to the impulse of the brain of the man. It is not a feat held to be re
markable now to shoot accurately more than a mile. There are many of our
soldiers who could pick an enemy out of a tree top at that distance, and there
ought to be more of them. The improvement of the gun gives a wider scope
and surer chances for the faculties of the man — the thing indispensable. The
advance of the army has been rapid, in quality, in bulk, and in the favor of
the people, who remember that the sword as an emblem, and the rifle as a
fact, should be the weapons of liberty, that despotism with its tools may
not have conceded, through the carelessness or the over-confidence of popular
government, advantages that may be fatal, and are sure to be costly, in
contests with freedom. If republicanism is to win in the world, it must be
stronger in the hands and that which they hold, than empire — even for the
reason that the people should show the capacity for greater realization from
stated resources, when they control and levy upon themselves, than govern
ments of inheritance in which the potency of manhood for the enterprise of
man is classified away. It was well said when the war of the States was over
that the war had legislated.
It has been ascertained that the momentous enactments of war were not
always placed in forms of law, constitutional or other — were not invariably
reduced to writing, and that so far had we advanced in governing by the will
of the people that there was jurisprudence in the instincts of man, efficacy in
traditions and public opinion that will not await the solemnities of deliberate
representative bodies or pause to be valid, until the church or the courts have
given them consecration. The great Republic has recognized that the army
may be of and for the people, and yet not be irregular, spasmodic, undisci
plined — that it is a mathematical establishment and an instrument scientific
as astronomy — just as a modern piece of artillery is wrought to resemble a
telescope, and is aimed at an enemy in the blue distances on land or sea as
stars are found and defined in the abyss in which they are as motes of dust
incandescent in the light of the sun. Much as our army was advanced and
elevated in and by the generation that has just passed between wars, it did

THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON. 331
not gain comparatively as the navy did at the same time in the things that are
the essentials, when the great trials by battle, the Supreme Courts of the last
resort, came to pass like bolts from the blue, in the hours of destiny when the
unexpected happens and is not the more anticipated because it has occurred a
thousand times.
A great American writer of the English language, Captain Mahan, taught
England the significance of the words "Sea Power" — how nations had been
rising to greatness through the ages, with increased velocity and augmented
certainty, as they gained respect and held dominion on the seas, commanding
from stormy waters the fertile shores. It was not inapt that one of our
countrymen made this reassuring revelation to England, for it was in Ameri
can waters, after both France and England had lost their fairest colonies on
the North American continent, that the centuries of conflict between the
greater nations of Western Europe, for supremacy on the central oceans and
over all the world-wide waters, was in the West Indies — the archipelago — *aX
the broad gates of the American Mediterranean — closed in favor of Great
Britain as the mistress of the seas, not to be again contested until we ourselves
are the contestants. It auspiciously transpired, when England's con
sciousness was quickened by Captain Mahan to comprehend her own great
ness, that events were in the air that would bring the English speaking
people nearer each other in sympathy, with broader common interests, than
ever before, and that the greater sea power warmly congratulated us upon our
accession of victories, honors and trophies.
There could have been no more acceptable evidence of the timeliness of
our triumphs than the British cheers that greeted them. We were fortunate
in the high education of our naval officers and in the good will that came down
to us from days of glory long ago for the navy, and developed in a degree of
Congressional enlightenment that seconded the studies of our men of science'
as navigators and constructers, the result being that unprepared for war on
land as we were, when we were swept by currents surveyed long ago, made
wild by recent storms, into the Spanish war, we had the consummate fighting
ships whose names have been added in letters of light to the old rolls of the
records of renown.
Even when we got the navy we did not get the docks and arsenals, that
are the homes of fleets, where they clothe their necks with thunder, and
make ready for glorious enterprise. However, having gotten so much, we

332 THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON.
should go on and remove the factional restraints of conservatism. Sup
pose we, the people of the United States, had done as well for the army as for
the navy — that is, suppose we had just doubled our regiments, troops and
batteries — and then had added a reserve for the field, say 96 guns (Blanco,
the last Spanish defender of Cuba, had 183 pieces of field artillery). Suppose
we had fixed up one port on our southern coast where there was an inex
haustible supply of good water — a dockyard where our battleships could have
been scraped, and we had ascertained the elementary principles of putting an
army on ships, and at the same time arranged for getting them off again — we
would have saved time and expenses, and escaped the friction about small
matters that has distracted the measure of attention due the events that, after
all embarrassments and obstructions, have uplifted our countrymen with the
heroic sentiment that is the charm of history and the vital glow that gives
color to the memory of nations ; imparts a lofty spirit of patriotism, and fills
the atmosphere with the illumination of great and shining deeds that will be
the footsteps of light on the hills of the hereafter of the land, that has almost
hesitated to accept the gifts the gods have provided in the South seas, east and
west, and that came to us with the endowment of the tropics, the affluence of
achievement and the opulence of the beautiful.
The army had to wait on the shore of Florida for the navy to clear the
seas, and it was a superb dramatic scene, for which all the world was a stage,
that while the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic squadron was warned at
Hongkong to clear for action in the Philippines, the battleship Oregon, built
at San Francisco, was called from the North Pacific to make haste around
South America to reinforce the Atlantic fleet, to ward off the stroke which
Spain seemed to be delivering to defend the last of her American possessions.
There was an early and forcible call for the Oregon in this brief but sufficient
telegram : Washington, March 7, 1898.
Oregon, Bremerton, Wash. :
The situation is getting worse. You should go to San Francisco as soon
as possible and get ammunition. LONG.
(Oregon arrived at San Francisco March 9, 1898.)

Washington, March 12, 1898.
Sir : When in all respects ready for sea, proceed, with the vessel under
your command, to Callao, Peru, and await further orders.

THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON. 333
In view of the present critical condition of affairs, the Oregon should
leave San Francisco at the earliest possible date, and arrive at Callao as soon
as practicable. The crew is to be constantly drilled, the passage of the ship not to be
delayed thereby. Very respectfully, JOHN D. LONG, Secretary.
Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Oregon.
(Through Commandant, Mare Island, Cal.)

Washington, March 12, 1898.
Navy Yard, Mare Island, Cal. :
Prepare Oregon for sea with all possible dispatch. Long cruise. Fill
with coal. When will she be ready to sail? LONG.
(On March 17 Capt. C. E. Clark assumed command of Oregon, relieving
Capt. B. J. McCormick, condemned by medical survey.
On March 19 the Oregon left San Francisco for Callao, arriving at the
latter port April 4, 1898, having made an average speed of 10.7 knots.)

Washington, March 22, 1898.
Marietta, Panama, Colombia:
Proceed to Callao, Peru, and make arrangements to coal Oregon upon
arrival. Left March 19 from San Francisco for Callao. LONG.

Washington, March 29, 1898.
Marietta, Callao, Peru:
Contract for best coal to be delivered on board Oregon immediately upon
arrival. Oregon to coal utmost dispatch. You proceed at once to Valparaiso.
It is possible you may take possession of Chilean armored cruiser.
LONG.

U. S. S. Marietta, 3d Rate, Callao, Peru, March 31, 1898.
Sir: I respectfully acknowledge the receipt this day of the Department's
cipher dispatch dated the 29th instant.
In compliance therewith I have made necessary contract for coal for the

334 THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON.
Oregon, and have 750 tons in lighters for her now, which will be placed along
side the moment she arrives.
This vessel leaves to-night for Valparaiso, Chile.
Respectfully,
F. M. SYMONDS,
Commander, U. S. N., Commanding, and Senior Officer Present.
The Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Callao, Peru, April 5, 1898.
Secretary of the Navy, Washington :
Will complete work necessary boilers and engines. Will be ready to sail
Thursday night (7th). I can make Montevideo, perhaps Rio' Janeiro, not
stopping at Valparaiso, and if coal maybe obtained at Sandy Point, Patagonia,
I could make Bahia. CLARK.

Callao, April 6, 1898.
Secretary of Navy, Washington, D. C. :
On account of navigation of Magellan Strait, and reported movements
Spanish torpedo vessel near Montevideo, I should recommend Marietta to
accompany this vessel. If required, I could touch Talcahuana, Chile, for
orders six days after my sailing. CLARK.

Washington, April 6, 1898.
Oregon, Callao, Peru:
Proceed at once to Montevideo or Rio Janeiro. The Spanish torpedo
boat Temerario is in Montevideo. Marietta has been ordered to proceed to
Sandy Point, Patagonia, to arrange for coal. How many tons of coal will you
require? The Marietta and Oregon to proceed together. Keep secret your
destination. Keep secret this message. LONG.
(Oregon sailed from Callao April 7 for Sandy Point.)

Washington, April 7, 1898.
Marietta, Valparaiso:
Oregon leaves to-day from Callao for Sandy Point, Patagonia. Go ahead
and secure 600 tons of coal for her and accompany to the north. The United
States consulates in Cuba have closed. United States Consul-General is
coming home. LONG.

THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON. 335
The authorities at Valparaiso were very cautious and careful in their treat
ment of American ships on the way to the Atlantic at this time. There had
been threats by Spanish residents that the Marietta should be destroyed in the
harbor of the capital of Chile. The commander of the Marietta reported :
"Although we had a patrol boat about the vessel, and made necessary
preparations on board for a night attack, still it was unnecessary, as by orders
of the civil authorities shore boats were not permitted under any pretext to
approach the vessel within 300 meters during the night, and I learned that a
government detective force on shore closely watched suspected localities and
persons." Captain Clark, of the Oregon, writing at Rio Janeiro April 30th, of his run
from Callao, states he left that port April 7th, one boiler under repairs, tak
ing 1,100 tons coal in eighty hours, 100 tons in bags on deck, and reached
the Straits in comparatively good weather, "though a heavy swell, increased
by fresh southerly winds, made the ship pitch heavily, the jack staff some
times disappearing under the solid seas that swept all but the superstructure
deck. The vibrations and the racing of the propellers were very marked at
times, but the condition of affairs and the Department's instructions warranted
a high rate of speed.
"Entered the straits at about 3:30 p. m. on the 16th, and that evening
anchored outside Port Tamar. One of the severest gales of the season broke
before an anchorage could be reached, and as the wind and rain became so
dense that the abrupt shores could not be seen, while no soundings could be
obtained, the Oregon was for a time awkwardly placed. Just before dark the
anchors were let go on a rocky shelf, fringed by islets and reefs, in 38 and 52
fathoms of water, and they fortunately held through some of the most violent
gusts I have ever experienced. ' '
The Oregon made n^ knots an hour, but was, after meeting the Mari
etta, detained by her low rate of speed during the run to Rio. "Owing to the
chance that the Spanish torpedo vessel, the Temerario, might, if war existed,
sight us before dark and get near enough to dispatch a torpedo during the
night, only the leading vessels showed any lights, and these were screened at
the sides. The 8-inch and 6-inch guns were loaded with shell, and ammuni
tion for the rapid-fire guns was kept on deck, four crews in each watch being
stationed at the guns. Orders for the maneuvering of the two ships in the
event of falling in with a suspicious-looking vessel were issued. ' '

336 THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON.
The crews were in high spirits, the engineer officers, for instance, "volun
tarily doubling their watches when high speed was to be made, and the
attempts of men to return to the fire room after being carried out of it
insensible ; and most of the crew, who were working by watches day and night
at Sandy Point, preferred to leave their hammocks in the netting until they
could get the ship coaled. ' '
At Rio was a cable from Long stating war was declared, nine days
before, and to await orders — the Spanish torpedo boat probably on the way
from Montevideo for Rio. On Dewey's great day this dispatch from the Navy
Department showed a sense of apprehension :
"Washington, May i, 1898. — Oregon, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Four Span
ish armored cruisers, heavy and fast, three torpedo boat destroyers, sailed
April 29 from Cape de Verde to the west, destination unknown. Beware of
and study carefully the situation. Must be left to your discretion entirely to
avoid this fleet and to reach the United States by West Indies. You can go
when and where you desire. Nictheroy and the Marietta subject to the
orders of yourself. ' '
Next day Captain Clark was ordered to await orders, and the next that
order was countermanded, and then came the news of the annihilation of the
Spanish Asiatic fleet.
Captain Clark telegraphed May 4th: "Keeping near the Brazilian coast,
as the Navy Department considers the Spanish fleet from Cape de Verde
Islands superior, will be unsuitable. I can coal from the Nictheroy, if
necessity compels it, to reach the United States. If the Nictheroy delays too
much I shall hasten passage, leaving her with the Marietta. Every depart
ment of the Oregon in fine condition."
Clark was impatient, and telegraphed from Bahia May 9th :
"Much delayed by the Marietta and the Nictheroy*. Left them near Cape
Frio, with orders to come home or beach, if necessity compels it, to avoid
capture. The Oregon could steam 14 knots for hours, and in a running fight
might beat off and even cripple the Spanish fleet. With present amount of
coal on board will be in good fighting trim, and could reach West Indies. If
more should be taken here I could reach Key West; but, in that case, belt
armor, cellulose belt, and protective deck would be below water line. Where
abouts of Spanish fleet requested. CLARK."
The next word from the Navy Department was to push on, avoiding the

THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON. 337
Spaniards, but the belief of the Board was that the Oregon would defeat the
Spanish fleet. It was determined not to send ships to assist the Oregon.
Writing on the Oregon at sea, May 18th, Captain Clark said, being advised the
night after his arrival at Rio of the Spanish torpedo boat going to that port,
he sent an officer to the captain in command of the Brazilian flagship and
explained to him, "that the Oregon, a $5,000,000 battleship, might be disabled
or even destroyed by the torpedo vessel of the nation that had blown up the
Maine, and that I relied upon the Brazilian naval forces to prevent any such
act of hostility in their waters, but that if the Temerario entered the harbor
and approached the Oregon with a hostile purpose I must destroy her."
Captain Clark moved further up the bay after delivering this message,
and instructed the commander of the Marietta "to send her steam launch to
the Temerario if she appeared, and inform the commander that if he
approached within half a mile of the Oregon he would be sunk." The Mari
etta was ordered to keep her search light on the vessel all the time.
The Brazilians upon this became extremely vigilant and courteous. The
torpedo boat did not appear, and Captain Clark grew weary of waiting for his
two companions — one slow and one crippled — and the night of May 5th,
"believing that the Department needed the Oregon at the seat of war, and
knowing that if we fell in with a Spanish fleet of superior force, with torpedo
vessels, I must make a running fight of it at full speed, which meant leaving
the Marietta and Nictheroy to escape the best way they could, as even the
former could not be counted a factor in such an encounter," the Oregon
moved on at, high speed, and arrived at Jupiter Inlet, Florida, May 24th, hav
ing made a straight run north from the Brazilian coast beyond the islands,
and then a run west. This congratulatory correspondence followed:
1 Washington, May 26, 1898.
Oregon (through Naval Base, Key West, Fla. ) :
The Department congratulates you, your officers, and crew on the com
pletion of your long and remarkably successful voyage. LONG.

U. S. S. Oregon, 1st Rate, Key West, Fla., May 27, 1898.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the Department's telegram of
yesterday, which was received and read to all hands at muster the same even
ing, causing great enthusiasm and spontaneous cheers. That the officers,
who have labored so faithfully and intelligently to bring the ship around in

33»

THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON.

our efficient condition for fighting and steaming, and especially that the crew,
who individually and collectively have made real sacrifices and who for two
months have asked for nothing but the privilege of doing extra work that
might hasten the progress of the ship, should be mentioned and congratulated,
affords me, as the commanding officer, especial gratification.
Very respectfully, C. E. CLARK,
Captain, U. S. N.. Commanding.
The Secretary of the Navy.
There could be no happier illustration than that furnished by the Oregon,
in the long voyage and subsequent history, of the perfection attained in the
building of our battleships, the superior excellence of their armament, the
high spirit of the crews and the admirable tone and distinction of the officers
equal as always found to all occasions.
It is plain that the confidence of the Navy Department and of Captain
Clark was increased as the voyage of the Oregon progressed. The Captain
was not in luck that he did not meet Cervera's fleet. As instructed by the
experiences of the war — of what the Oregon did, and the fate of the fugitive
ships at Santiago — only a series of accidents that there is no occasion to think
probable would have prevented that ship, single handed, from destroying
the entire squadron reserved for the doom that overtook the fated ships July
3d on the Coast of Cuba west of Santiago.

CAPTAIN CLARK, OF THE 'OREGON," IN HIS OFFICE.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Report of the Secretary of War.
Putting the Army into the Combat — The Plans of Campaign — The Proposed Waiting and
Equipping Policy of the Major General Commanding — His Strange Confidence in the
Cuban Story of an Army of 50,000 Rebels to Help Us — Reasons Why We Could not
Wait Six Months after Declaring War before Striking Decisively with the Army.
The report of the Secretary of War for the year of the war with Spain and
the peace also, is a document necessarily memorable and that has other than
adventitious distinctions. It is remarkable for its fullness and the absolute
fair play given those who have found fault with the administration of the War
Department, and the sweeping frankness with which the true inwardness has
been told, by the insertion of the original dispatches, that tell the bottom
facts. As the war was over when the report was prepared, though the treaty
had not then been signed, there was an unusually early opportunity to take
the public into complete confidence by spreading in plain print the documen
tary truth — the whole truth, too — in the official history of the war. The story
is told now and forever, and if it could be gathered into volumes unabridged,
and' each of the millions of the American people had them to read, without
note or comment, there would be no special occasion, though abundant room,
for this book.
The annual report of the Secretary of War for the year 1898 is in a large
sense the original papers of the history of the Spanish war, which freed the
possessions of Spain from centuries of misrule and from all oppression, except
the things for which all peoples are brought to judgment, aside from disabili
ties that are the fault of misgovernment, inflicted upon the character of the
people themselves. It is impossible that in the flash of a sword, however
mightier it may be than the wand of a magician, the wrongs that are the
growth of centuries shall be dissipated. We may give masses of mankind
equalities of opportunity and they themselves must be responsible for the
34i

342 THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
results. We have cast down the tyrant, and the people are free to rise. We
have possessed lands, and that are resources for the future generations — the
assurances that there is subsistence in the soil, the skies, the waters, and the
sunlight, for the children of God — the toilers that are to be.
The Secretary thus gives the history of the war in a -few words:
"An army of about 250,000 volunteers and recruits for the regulars was
called into existence from civil life, which, with the regular army, made a
total force of 274,717 men. It was organized, armed, and equipped (no
supplies being on hand other than those for the regulars, save Springfield
muskets), and 50,000 men of this force were transported by land and sea to
battlefields in the tropics 12,000 miles apart, where they won their victories
without a single defeat, and all within the period of one hundred and thirteen
days from the declaration of war to signing the protocol. ' '
The report crowds two hundred and thirty-one pages. The report of
the Major General commanding the army, with the accompanying reports of
the commanders of independent expeditions, are given in full by the Secre
tary. Major General Miles, in the course of a few of the first weeks of the
war, produced a series of orders or recommendations, for the preparations
of ideal campaigns, and that which he directed and suggested was persuasive
as well as peremptory, but not in actual* business affairs so precise as to be
convincing that the lines were drawn upon which the work could be done
smoothly. It was not possible to be sure of the detail of a campaign on an
island with a large army of regulars as defenders, before all disputes were
settled as to the command of the surrounding waters. The plans of the
general commanding were of course constructed of material in which theories
played a great part — and it was lost time to be elaborate, before the disap
pearance of the elementary uncertainties. In the proposals of General
Miles there are the marks of vigorous industry and the professional and
technical points of the military business. On the 13th of April, the
General issued a careful expression of his judgment, of which we give this
paragraph ;
"The history of the expedition to the Crimea and to Egypt indicate the
necessity of complete and perfect equipment of each military organization
and the army should be thoroughly and effectively organized in every depart
ment—infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineer corps, signal corps, construction
train for building wharves, piers, etc., and repairing railway tracks and

THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 343
bridges, corduroying roads, etc., pontoon trains and appliances for depot and
reserve trains — in order that upon landing on foreign soil every company,
battery, regiment, brigade, and division shall be in perfect condition, fully
- supplied and equipped to render effective service. Hence the regiments of
infantry, cavalry, and light batteries of artillery should be fully supplied with
tentage, camp equipage, arms, ammunition, intrenching tools, and transpor
tation, with medical supplies, and rations and food for men and animals for
at least six months. The command should also be supplied with field artil
lery, siege guns, howitzers, and mortars for offensive work against any field-
works or fortifications of the enemy, or for the protection of camps and depots
that might be established. ' '
All this is well stated, but it is in the nature of general conversation,
and does not bear the positive edge and point of military direction, but no
doubt it had its value in impressing the people that there was much to do in
preparing for war. The plans of operation of the Major General command
ing will long be read with the deepest interest, but they had a common fault,
requiring too much time for execution April 9th the Major General in com
mand made various recommendations, one of which was, "that at least 22 regi
ments of infantry, 5 regiments of cavalry, and the light artillery be mobilized,
and placed in one large camp where they can be carefully and thoroughly
inspected, fully equipped, drilled, disciplined, and instructed in brigades and
divisions, and prepared for war service. This will give approximately a force
of 30,000 men." This was in addition to other recommendations, and fol
lowed by one "that the President call for a volunteer force from the different
States and Territories of at least 50,000 men, in addition to the above force,
to constitute one army for any offensive movements against the Spanish army
in Cuba, estimated at 150,000 men, of which number 80,000 are reported as
effective for military service. The entire force should be fully equipped with
mountain, field, and siege artillery, and all the appliances and equipments
required for actual war service."
Also there were to be available for any emergency that might arise,
"State troops along the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts," and in addition to
"any emergency" there might be "threatened attacks upon the towns, villages
or cities that are exposed," and "for the concentration of the large force that
may be required in the future. ' ' It was apparent to all that the first thing
was to know whether the sea was to be our basis of offensive operations. If

344 THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
it was, we did not require a diffusion of strength with a view of defending
ourselves. If we invaded Cuba we were not to be invaded or even assaulted
in turn. The one sure thing in the situation was that we had first to dispose
of the Spanish fleets. If Spain was going to fight for Cuba, she had to do it
with her navy, for her available army was there. The Major General wanted
"at least" 30,000 men for one large camp where they should be "carefully
and thoroughly inspected, " and another "at least" 50,000, "to constitute our
army for any offensive movements against the Spanish army in Cuba,"
estimated at 150,000. This would, of course, mean logically the land army
that was in due time to be under the command of the Major General com
manding, and engaged in the reduction Of Havana. Certainly this ambition
of the Commanding General was the logical outlook of his position, the
natural consequence of the impending war, but it was qualified with severe
and repeated warnings that the real work was, with the view of saving the lives
of our soldiers, to be postponed for a considerable time. The contemplation
of the Major General commanding is stated in his official report, with refer
ence to letters to the Secretary of War, that the real "plan" was "harassing
the Spanish forces and doing the enemy the largest amount of injury during
the time necessary for our Navy to demonstrate its superiority — the rainy or
sickly season, and the time actually required to equip and instruct the volun
teer forces with the least possible loss to ourselves. " In that letter he also
asserted the belief as entertained from the first, that "we could secure the
surrender of the Spanish army in the island of Cuba without any great sacri
fice of life. ' ' In the letter here referred to, the General said :
"In my opinion it is extremely hazardous, and I think it would be
injudicious, to put an army on that island at this season of the year, as it
would undoubtedly be decimated by the deadly disease, to say nothing of hav
ing to cope with some- 80, 000 troops, the remnant of 214,000, that have become
acclimated, and that are equipped with 183 guns. And still another element
of extreme danger would be to place an army there with the possibility of
our own navy not being able to keep the waters between our own territory
and that island clear of hostile ships or fleets.
"By mobilizing our force and putting it in healthful camps and using such
force as might be necessary to harass the enemy and doing them the greatest
injury with the least possible loss to ourselves, if our navy is superior to
theirs, in my judgment, we can compel the surrender of the army on the

TRANSPORT "NEWPORT" OF THE PHILIPPINE EXPEDITION LEAVING SAN FRANCISCO.
GENERAL MERRITT ON TUE BRIDGE.

REGIMENT BREAKING CAMP AT CAMP ALGER,

THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 347
island of Cuba with very little loss of life, and possibly avoid the spread of
yellow fever over our own country.
"There is still time, if this is favorably considered, to put a small force of
regular troops, number approximately 18,000 men, in healthful camps until
such time as they can be used on the island of Cuba with safety. "
This was planning, on the 18th of April, to allow all summer for the navy
of the United States to demonstrate its superiority to the Spaniards, and to
put off the aggressive opening of the war six months at least, our troops being
instructed in those healthful camps that were so numerous in the general
understanding in April and so scarce a little later.
After the rainy and sickly seasons were over in Cuba, there was to be one
masterly effort by a grand army perfected in every respect — to consist of
50,000 men at least, to overpower Blanco's 80,000 effectives and 183 guns;
Our ships harassing the Spaniards with their target practice at old forts, we
presume. But the Major General commanding had several reserves to bring
up — the 50,000 men who were to be the one specifically great and authorita
tively conducted army — and one of them was "an auxiliary force of 50,000
natives." Here the Major General commanding (page 20 -of the report of
the Secretary of War) apologizes for the small force comparatively that was
to be ready to move six months later. He says he "deemed it of the first
importance to well equip such force rather than to partly equip a much larger
number." With all possible respect for General Miles, there is evidence here
of unsound calculations. Any expedition beginning with the anticipation that
invaders of Cuba could be reinforced by 50,000 natives would have been
founded on a rotten romance. Our soldiers did not find forces of natives
reliable for the fire lines, when they got ashore at Santiago. There is a cer
tain reserve on the subject, as a more uncertain enthusiasm that has been
countenanced by some of the generals, but the private soldiers tell a different
story. The list of Cuban casualties was 2 killed and 4 wounded, when we
lost 1,500 men.
There is quoted a dispatch from Admiral Sampson to the Secretary of
the Navy and repeated to Miles at Tampa, as follows:
"Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti. — General Miles's letter received through
Colonel Hernandez on June 6. Garcia regards his wishes and suggestions as
orders and immediately will take measures to concentrate forces at the points
indicated, but he is unable to do so as early as desired on account of his

348 THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
expedition to Banes Port, Cuba, but he will march without delay. All of his
subordinates are ordered to assist to disembark the United States troops, and
to place themselves under orders. Santiago de Cuba well fortified, with
advanced intrenchments, but he believes jDOsition for artillery can be taken as
Miles desires. (Approximate) twelve thousand (12,000) regulars and three
thousand (3,000) militia between Santiago and Guantanamo. He has sent
force in order to prevent aid going to Santiago from Holguin. Repeats every
assurance of good will, and desires to second plans. SAMPSON."
The General comments: "It "will be observed that General Garcia re
garded my requests as his orders, and promptly took steps to execute the
plan of operations. He sent 3,000 men to check any movement of the 12,000
Spaniards stationed at Holguin. A portion of this latter force started to
the relief of the garrison at Santiago, but was successfully checked and
turned back by the Cuban forces under General Feria. General Garcia
also sent 2,000 men, under Perez, to oppose the 6,000 Spaniards at Guan
tanamo, and they were successful in their object. He also sent 1,000 men,
under General Rios, against the 6,000 men at Manzanillo. Of this gar
rison, 3,500 started to reinforce the garrison at Santiago, and were en
gaged in no less than thirty combats with the Cubans on their way before
reaching Santiago, and would have been stopped had General Garcia's
request of June 27 been granted. With an additional force of 5,000 men
General Garcia besieged the garrison of Santiago, taking up a trong posi
tion on the west side and in close proximity to the harbor, and he afterwards
received General Shaffer and Admiral Sampson at his camp near that place.
He had troops in the rear, as well as on both sides, of the garrison at San
tiago before the arrival of our troops."
The Major General commanding accepted Cuban stories as facts so far as
to say that Garcia was besieging Santiago, and proceeded to give Garcia one
force of 3,000 men, another of 2,000, another of 1,000 men, and then "with
an additional force of 5,000 men besieged the garrison of Santiago." Here we
have four Cuban armies, in round numbers 11,000 men in all. We know what
15,000 men who were with Shatter have to say about these besiegers of the
garrison of Santiago. They saw only a few scattering bands. Major-Gen
eral-Commanding Miles was incorrectly informed. He did not see and count
the troops, and he did not have reliable intelligence about the thirty combats.
As Garcia obeyed the wishes of General Miles as orders, why did not the

THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 349
American General commanding wish to have the 11,000 men brought in to
crowd the Spaniards somewhat? General Garcia had such Cuban troops as
there were anywhere in sight, excepting the grand army of 160 men under
Gomez, who were constantly encamped for their health in a salubrious part of
the country mountainous in its character. The romantic 50,000 Cuban army
had existed so long in the Key West Bureau, and Gomez was so constantly
thundering at the gates of Havana, from his elevated point of observations in
the mountains of the Cuban Orient, that delusions were propagated and still
find believers. According to the report of the Commanding General of the
United States, as reproduced in the report of the Secretary of War, the plan
of campaign with which he opened was to do the best we could to harass the
Cubans until the rainy season and the sickly season were over, about the
middle of December, four months after the surrender of Spain in consenting
to the terms of the protocol. Then everything was to be perfectly prepared for
a movement with 50,000 men, when the fighting was to be hot and heavy. Of
course, the rainy season and the yellow fever were most serious reasons for
not rushing the war. The President did not want to invade Cuba in the midst
of the yellow fever season, and to subject the troops to the torrential rains
when it was death to sleep on the ground — he wanted to use some time in
preparation, and thought peace might be preserved after all if the people
would consider the actual facts, and be patient, but all that had been over
ruled by Congress. Honorable members wanted to know who was afraid of
the rain. The yellow fever was not a subject of jesting, but there was evi
dence in abundance that the yellow journals were immunes. The Major
General commanding had a wholesome sensibility as to the fatality it would be
to attack Havana as the English did in 1762 in the midsummer — that season
being selected owing to the dread of the hurricanes to be expected in October
and almost always on hand in that month except when Columbus discovered
America. At the same time the Major General commanding held the opinions
expressed in these words from his official report:
"Congregating tens of thousands of men, many of whom were not uni
formed, and scarcely any properly equipped, in great camps away from their
States, rendered it difficult for them to be properly supplied with food, cook
ing utensils, camp equipage, blankets, tentage, medical supplies, transporta
tion, etc., and was to a great extent the cause, in my judgment, of the
debilitating effect upon the health and strength of the men, who were other-

35° THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
wise in good physical condition. The material necessary to clothe and equip
large armies was not even manufactured at that time, and the consequent
condition of the troops for weeks and months was injurious to the commands
in many ways. ' '
What better could have been done under the "plan" of the Major General
commanding does not appear. The analysis and comparison of various plans
of campaigns that were not tried cannot fail to be unprofitable, and it is desir
able to avoid the contentious exercise, for there is a drift in it away from higher
considerations. Many of the suggestions by Major-General-Commanding Miles
were excellent. His orders as a rule were judicious. If they seem sometimes
too vague now, it is to be remembered that the very subjects to which they
related were at the moment foggy. But the plan of waiting as long to pre
pare a force to conquer Cuba as the Army* of the Potomac was held for the
movement on Richmond, was inadmissible, first because public opinion would
not have permitted it ; second, as the event proved, because it was not neces
sary. If there was any doubt of our command of the seas as against
Spain, after Dewey's victory at Manila, it was not in existence after
the Oregon from the North Pacific joined the North Atlantic squadron. The
President's plan was more specific than that of the military head of the
army, and as he was the Commander-in-Chief of the army and the navy, he
tried it and it had the merit of simplicity, proving efficacious. It was to
mobilize the regular army, which was wonderfully well done, and with the
most available volunteer regiments, strike a blow, not at Havana, but at some
other vital point possibly, in Porto Rico, more probably in southern or eastern
Cuba. Major General Miles, among others, had two harbors on the north
shore in his mind. The run of Cervera's fleet into the harbor of Santiago
decided the spot to deliver the blow, and the delivery proved to be the
decisive event.
The President of the United States had more to study than the necessity
of the inspection and instruction of the troops who were called out for a war of
invasion. It required no prophet, civil or military, to tell him that there
were two things apparently much in the mind of Congress that must be
avoided. Our navy, while conclusions with the navy of Spain were untried on
the Atlantic waters, was not to be thrust against the fortresses and stone walls
of Havana. That was not the way to prepare to meet the Spanish fleet,
which was obliged to appear in all available force for the protection of Cuba

THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 35*
and Porto Rico, or abandon at the outset the assertion of the competency of
the kingdom to care for itself. The declaration about the bombardment of
Havana was not worthy to be considered. It was also of common understand
ing, aside from the consecutive production of the current literature of prac
tical politics, that the way to open the war was not, while the West India
waters were in controversy, to scrape together all the transports that could be
found, and land the mass of our soldiers, regular and volunteer — irrespective
of the condition of the latter — in the province of Havana, to enter speedily as
forced marches would carry our columns, into the yellow fever territory, where
there were floods falling from the skies, and the supply of wholesome water
very short indeed. The foremost and most fantastic ideas of campaigning in
Cuba had therefore to be returned marked officially, "Not approved," to the
journals that were happy to believe they were the authors of the war, and
about to finish it after a few days' flurry.
Secretary Seward, in the tentative days between the secession of the
extreme southern States, and the red deluge that swept over the land, assisted
public confidence by coldly studied, airy declarations that the disorder would
be ended in ninety days. The people on both sides of the line about to burst
into fire would have been appalled and shaken if they could have foreseen one
battlefield, where, years later in the struggle, many thousands perished. Mr.
Seward's ninety days will be a byword for centuries, to measure great mis
takes with, but it is questionable whether that acute statesman was ever
mistaken for a minute. It was his duty to be confident, and especially his
calling for the period of initiation, as he was the representative of his
country in affairs international. The parallel case in Cuba was the feeling of
some who possessed dual reputations as soldiers and statesmen, that a three
weeks' blockade of Havana, with an occasional thirteen-inch shell, would
turn over the great city to the United States. In the beginning there was
impatience because our will-power did not seem equal to the immediate con
quest of Cuba, but very soon the immense common sense of the people
asserted itself, upon the proposition that we could afford to wait, and there
was a vivid recollection that we had not been developing the army along
with the navy, and that one of the penalties for the public fault of procrasti
nation was that we had to encounter the expenses and endure the disappoint
ments of delay. The Major General commanding had the hard-earned
reputation of a gallant soldier. Scarred with wounds, an officer who had led

352

THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

his men, sword in hand, on the bloody hillsides sloping north to the Rappa
hannock, and he was firm in the general estimate as a man of bravery, decision
of character, and experience. His various orders, -prognostications and
plans excited interest as they became known, and their influence was in the
correct direction of giving the people intelligence to the effect that the war
was a very serious business, that must be pressed with comprehensive energy,
and that the first lesson was to "learn to labor and to wait." Plans, as plans,
though accompanied with statistics, did not seize the people. What they
wanted was to get at the Spaniards. The first utterance of the Major General
commanding was not believed to be a happy one, for it had a chill in it, and
did not a'ppear to be demanded. It was that we did not want to begin this war
with a Bull Run. Still, this was meant to assist in forming public opinion to
sustain the authorities in the works of preparation. And yet it would have
been a colossal blunder to have held the troops assembled, with our enormous
railroad facilities, in camps all summer. If we couldn't command the sea,
an offensive war was impossible. Clearly we had the sea power. The
prodigious victory of Dewey was the thing needed, to tell the world the true
story, and it satisfied our self-esteem while it demanded action, if not all along
the line, at least wherever the enemy obtruded a mark. It would be ruinous
to linger. We were spending a million dollars a day, and every dollar must
be accounted for. Our regular army could and would shoot a Spanish force
in pieces, as our Asiatic squadron had smashed the fleet of Spain at Manila.
The thing to do was to disregard the maneuvers of the Cape Verde fleet, and
in the east end of Cuba, where the only insurgent forces of any value were
held to be, or Porto Rico, a healthful island abounding in good roads, water,
supplies, and provisions in the fields and woods, strike quick and hard, leav
ing the pen and pool, and pestilence, and famine, of Havana to the Spaniards.
It was so ordered in time and place befitting.

CHAPTER XV
The Early Correspondence of the Department of War.
Activity in the War Department before the Declaration of War— The Precautionary Policy
of the Major General Commanding— Differences of Opinion in High Places about an
Early Invasion of Cuba— Importance of Healthful Camps— The Dangers of Water
Supplies— The Inside History of a Troubled Time— Shaffer's Sagacity as to the Im
portance of a First Engagement— The Demand for a Competent Army Enforced.
"The telegraphic and other correspondence relating to the war," is the
unpretending headline that follows the official reports of the generals having
dependent commands and engaged in actions of importance ; and a remarkable
collection of dispatches and communications appear. The utter candor of this
official publication is displayed in these few introductory words, in the
type that declares the remarks of the Secretary:
"Early in Maya movement upon Havana was contemplated, as it was
believed that the city could be assaulted and captured before the rainy season
set in, but the plan was subsequently abandoned on account of the reported
movements of the enemy's fleet.
"It was proposed to send a portion of the army of invasion from Tampa,
and to gather another part of it at Key West, on account of the close proximity
of the latter place to Mariel, Cuba (a point about 26 miles west of Havana)."
This, the Secretary says, "will be shown by the following dispatches. "
There is a great deal more than this shown in that which is given, and the first
thing one is reminded of in reading the lines that it was believed Havana
"could be assaulted and captured before the rainy season," is that the war
Secretary was warlike from the first day of the war and an opponent of delays,
holding that to strike promptly was the way to do business.
The Spanish fleet had the advantage of associating itself with mysteries.
The Cape Verde squadron appeared in the West Indies and disappeared, and
the Spaniards were able to hide their purposes and the deficiencies of their
ships, by the suppression of intelligence. The presence of a squadron of half
353

3S4 THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR.
a dozen heavily armed cruisers and some torpedo boats that had a reputation
for ability to be destructive far beyond their performance, was a menace, and
caused a suspension of the invasion of Cuba. If Cervera's fleet had returned
to Spain, and there had been a show of mustering the naval force of that
nation for a rush upon the Philippines or into the harbor of Havana, the
course of war events would have been largely changed, though there is no
reason to be persuaded that changed results would have been reached.
Still, the commitment of our army to the siege of Havana would have been a
dangerous first move, for from what we know of the army and armament of
Blanco, his force in the field and the formidableness of his fortifications, it
would have been beyond our strength to take the capital city of Cuba before
the rainy season, and we should have been constrained to fight it out with the
Spaniards in the place where they were most thoroughly prepared, and could
have concentrated their whole army, while our troops would have been
sufferers from insufficient or impure water supplies, and victimized by the
yellow fever. Once occupied in besieging Havana, we could not have aban
doned it, and our ill-prepared regiments must have taken the lines of the
enemy by assault as the way that would save the soldiers from fevers by
shedding their blood. That is to say, the Santiago policy must have been
introduced at an earlier day and on a larger scale ; and while the victory at
Havana the valor and numbers of _our soldiers should have won, might have
been more conclusive than that of Santiago, it must have been more costly.
It is not surprising that the Secretary of War and the Major General com
manding did not come to an agreement on plans of campaign, for it is accord
ing to the weight of the facts in the scales, that in theory of war the General
wanted too much professional elaboration, and the Secretary had a hazardous
confidence the war could be suddenly finished by rushing it and deliver
ing blows with the utmost celerity, assuming the enemy to lack in preparation
for defense, as much as we were wanting in equipage for offense. It was
Cervera's fitful fleet that put an end to the proposed assault upon Havana,
that it might be captured before the rains and the fevers came to destroy the
tens of thousands while the sword devoured its thousands.
The first telegram of the long series is this :
"Headquarters of the Army*, Washington, D. C, May 9, 1898. — The
Major General commanding directs that the following orders be sent by
telegraph to General Wade, at Tampa :

UNITED STATES VOLUNTEER IN FULL MARCHING ORDER.

MODEL OF GUNS USED ON AFT DECKS.

10-INCH DISAPPEARING GUN CARRIAGE. MODEL, 1896.

THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 357
"Direct Major-General Shaffer to move his command, under protection
of Navy, and seize and hold Mariel, or most important point on north coast of
Cuba, and where territory is ample to land and deploy army. Follow up his
command with all the forces sent to you. Troops will be sent you as rapidly
as possible from Chickamauga and other points. Have troops fully equipped;
send abundance of ammunition and ship with them food for men and animals
for sixty days, to be followed by four months' supplies.
"J. C. GILMORE, Assistant Adjutant-General."

There is a certain uncertainty about this, not removed by the words
"ample," to describe "territory," or "rapidly as possible," "fully equipped,"
"abundance of ammunition." There is more cadence than command in this.
It is a flourish of phrases rather than an order. But the Secretary of War
and the Commanding General appear to have started together. Adjutant
General Corbin forwarded the order that the Major-General commanding,
with the approval of the Secretary, directed. Of course this meant the execu
tion of the Havana plan. The first difficulty was the lack of fresh water at
Key West. This interfered w*ith the concentration of a large force there.
The Commanding General, April 15th, had sent orders to all departments.
The generals in the field were designated as follows: Maj. Gen. John R.
Brooke, Chickamauga Park; Brig. Gen. William R. Shaffer, New Orleans, La. ;
Brig. Gen. J. J. Coppinger, Mobile, Ala. ; Brig. Gen. J. F. Wade, Tampa,
Fla. The war telegrams from the war office began to fly April 15th. The first
in order after the preparatory dispatches to the army posts, were these :
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, April 15, 1898.
Brig. Gen. J. F. Wade,
Commanding Department Dakota, St. Paul, Minn. :
With approval of Secretary of War, the Major General commanding army
directs, as necessary for the public service, that you, accompanied by your
adjutant-general, proceed with least practicable delay to Tampa, Fla., to
assume command of troops ordered to rendezvous there. Please designate
officer to perform duties of adjutant-general at department headquarters and
submit names of other staff officers whom you desire to take with you.
H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

35§ THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR.
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, April 15, 1898.
Brig. Gen. J. F. Wade,
Commanding Department Dakota, St. Paul, Minn. :
Referring to previous telegrams on the same subject, the Major-General
commanding army, with approval of Secretary of War, directs, as necessary
for the public service, that you order your chief quartermaster to proceed
immediately and in advance of your own departure to Tampa, Fla. , for the
purpose of selecting suitable ground as a camp for the troops ordered to
rendezvous there for your action on arrival. SCHWAN, A. A. G.
This was a week before the declaration of war. Three days before the
declaration, April 18th, in full view of the impending crisis, the Major-General
commanding put in the strongest terms his admonitions that the troops should
be located in healthful camps, and his opinion that it would be "extremely
hazardous" and injudicious to put an army in Cuba, considering the season of
the year, "as it would undoubtedly be decimated by the deadly disease, to say
nothing of having to cope with some 80,000 troops, the remnant of 214,000,
that have become acclimated, and that are equipped with 183 guns. And
still another element of extreme danger would be to place an army there with
the possibility of our own navy not being able to keep the waters between our
own territory and that island clear of hostile ships or fleets." The feeling of
the Commanding General that the navy might not be able to afford perfect
protection to the army in course of transportation, or after disembarkation on
a hostile shore, was not shared seriously by naval officers whose confidence in
victory over the Spanish was never clouded, but no intelligent persons
could escape the presence of peril in placing the army in Cuba before the
question of commanding the surrounding seas was settled by actual combat or
the retirement of the Spaniards from the scenes of activity. The Major-
General commanding shared in the ordinary expressions of well-informed
public opinion, among which was the spread of the yellow fever in our own
country as an incident of our military expeditions, and he thought it possible
to "compel the surrender of the army on the island of Cuba with very little
loss of life." There was manifestly a reliance in the military mind upon the
blockade which was in the thoughts of all men — and indeed distorted by the
popular imagination. The food productiveness of Cuba had not been realized.
It had, surprisingly, survived the torch, the machete, and the "zones of cultiva
tion," of the desolation of which so much was said.

THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 359
There was "still time," the Commanding General said, "to put a small
force of regular troops, numbering approximately 18,000 men, in healthful
camps until such time as they can be used on the island of Cuba with safety."
Here was the first development of disagreement. The experienced officers
understood the meaning of "healthful camps," but Congress and the country
basked in a state of enthusiasm, and were slow of comprehension of the most
sinister feature of the conditions — the inability of new troops to make use of
their rations and take care of themselves in camps. In the presence of a
combination of the inexperience both of officers and privates, and impractica
bility of providing the articles demanded for nearly a quarter of a million men
turned suddenly into the fields from their habitations, there was no avoidance
of discomfort, and the carelessness of the men in exposing themselves, so -as
to be partially disqualified for instruction, was as certain as the rains and the
changing temperature by day, and night, of the winds. It was much easier to
talk of healthful camps than to find them, and still harder to preserve the
wholesomeness of grounds selected.
The American people in the hurries of their labors in expanding the
cultivation of the continent, building cities and mills, clearing away forests,
establishing the drainage of thickly settled communities, have fallen into
methods of improvement that unfortunately have promoted the washing away
of the fertile properties of the soil — this to a great extent by the inconsiderate
waste of forests — the diminution in volume of the brooks that once turned
grist mills, beautified the country, and were full of food fishes, and the
pollution of living streams from villages, towns, cities, and, above all, manu
factories, wherein the conversion of raw materials into articles involved
chemical and mechanical changes. At the same time, the water supplies for
the centers of concentrated population have been found in dangerous associa
tion with the drainage of impurities.
There were imperative reasons for camps in Florida, that peninsula being
the closest approximation of our land to that of the Spaniards — Cuba being
within a day's run of Tampa. This was fair striking distance. It permitted
the close prognostication of the weather, an exceedingly important advan
tage in the transfer of an army by ships to make a landing that would be in
all probability disputed by heavy masses of infantry and artillery. It was held
that the sojourn of our young men in Florida would in a degree be an
advanced step of acclimatization, a half-way resting place between the fields

360 THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR.
and shops of America, and the trials of the threatening Cuban climate, famous
for its deadly influences upon invading armies, as both Spanish and English
history gave expositions. This memorandum for the Adjutant-General, and
the response of that officer, gave the official history of the direction to General
Shaffer to take command of the regular army that was to be the head of the
spear to penetrate Cuba :
Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C, April 29, 1898.
The Major-General commanding desires that, by letter, Brig. Gen.
William R. Shaffer be directed, upon his arrival at Tampa, Fla., to assume
command of all troops now assembled there.
J. C. GILMORE, Assistant Adjutant-General.

War Department, Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, April 29, 1898.
Brig. Gen. William R. Shaffer, Washington, D. C. :
Sir : Under instructions from the President, the Secretary of War directs
that upon your arrival at Tampa, Fla., you assume command of all the troops
assembled there. Very respectfully, H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.
The water supply deficiency was the first embarrassment encountered.
This was known to be an awaiting woe at Key West, but was not expected to
lurk at Tampa also. General Shaffer's first dispatches disclosed that his
plunge into the task assigned him had located a rising tide of troubles :
Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 7, 1898 — 3:44 p. m.
Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington, D. C. :
Am crowding work of watering and coal transport, and put in pen and
stall for sortie (stock?). Will have it completed Wednesday sure. Many
obstacles to  SHAFTER, Brigadier-General.
(Note. — Telegram apparently not completed.)
Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 7, 1898 — 6:50 p. m.
Adjutant-General, United States Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C. :
Colonel Lawton just returned from Key West. Brings message from
Commodore Watson that water is absolutely necessary; that supply on all
ships is very short, and that if can assist him in getting supply it will be a
great favor to him. A barge, capacity one hundred thousand gallons, can

DAIQUIRI, WHERE OUR TROOPS LANDED IN CUBA.

THE PIER AT DAIQUIRI.

THE BEACH AT DAIQUIRI.

A PART OF DAIQUIRA, CUBA.

•4Z>

aHOSH> H
o oz¦a!oo

HWH

THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 363
start in morning for Key West, towed by one of ships under charter. Cost of
water two cents per gallon. No tug here for hire. Shall I send it?
SHAFTER, Brigadier-General.
The footnote that the telegram of Shaffer appeared to be unfinished is an
example of the thoroughness with which the telegraphic correspondence has
been given to the public. The dispatch had a word evidently of erroneous
writing, and the unbroken termination tells that a work of "watering" was in
progress, and between the words is the easy reading that the work watering
ships was slow, and that the least of the evil consequences was loss of time.
The news from Key West was that those who got further along were faring
worse. Adjutant-General Corbin's reply to Shaffer's dispatch of May 7th, dated
6:50 p. m., about the short water supply at Key West, was rushed the follow
ing morning: Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, May 8, 1898.
General Shaffer, Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla. :
Your telegram concerning water supply for Commodore Watson received,
and Secretary of War directs you to make every possible effort to furnish any
thing and everything to help him along. In this and other cases Secretary of
War approves any action you take, but desires every such order of yours
reported for his information. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.
May 10th, by direction of the Major-General commanding, the invasion of
Cuba was postponed for a week :
Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C, May 10, 1898.
The Major-General commanding directs that the following orders be
telegraphed General Wade, Tampa, Fla. : That the movement of troops to
Cuba is delayed until Monday, May 16, 1898. In the meantime, he will send
the infantry in the ships, with an abundant supply of water and whatever else
is required with them, to Key West, there to disembark. The ships are to
return to Tampa to carry more infantry to Key West, until there are about
12,000 men there. These will move from Key West, to Dry Tortugas and
Cuba, on ships coming from New York. Also, that General Brooke has been
directed to send to Tampa from Chickamauga the Second, Seventh, Eighth,
Twelfth, and Sixteenth Infantry. These can be forwarded to Key West
by any means available. J. C. GILMORE, Assistant Adjutant-General.

364 THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR.
The next day after the order of 12,000 troops to Key West, came to hand
this jarring information about the water supply:
Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May n, 1898.
(Received Washington, 8:12 p. m.)
Adjutant-General United States Army, for Commanding General,
War Department, Washington, D. C. :
Water for large body of troops at Key West is serious question. Abso
lutely no water there. Only water barge from this port, capacity 130,000
gallons, should reach Key West to-morrow with water for navy, and be back
Friday. Transports carry considerable water, but have no way- of distillation.
Is imperative that water be placed in Key West before troops begin to arrive.
Quartermaster-General has been asked to charter, clean, loan, and start
1,000,000 gallons tank steamer with light draft barge for unloading. Dry
Tortugas reported to have brackish water in cisterns. Am now trying to
ascertain quantity and quality. Expect information.
J. F. WADE, Brigadier-General.
On the same day the Major-General commanding directed the troops at
Tampa to be in readiness to ship to Dry Tortugas (ominous name !) to be
there on the morning of the 16th.
Here is an example of a way a rumor appears in an official telegram :
(Telegram. — Rush. — Confidential.)
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, May 13, 1898.
Col. A. S. Kimball, Army Building, New York City:
Report at once any information you have about Spanish war boats onour
coast. Give full information. Hold transports until further orders.
Acknowledge. NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General Commanding Army.
It has often been remarked that as a rule a dispatch is more important at
the delivery than at the receiving end of the wire over which it passes, and
that the magnifying power of a wire is in proportion to its length. A "head-
quaiters" will be more stirred up by a telegram than the personal report of a
scout. An official dispatch increases the phenomenon of long-distance teleg
raphy. The dispatches from Major-General Shaffer were at this period thoughtful
and straight shots. He recommended legislation to enable soldiers on the
field "to exercise the franking privilege as was done during the War of the

THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 365
Rebellion," urged that recruits should join their regiments when they could
be under the control of the officers who would command them, stopped part
of the volunteer regiments at Jacksonville owing to "difficulty of finding suit
able camping ground with abundant water supply. ' '
On this last dispatch Corbin telegraphed that the Secretary of War
wanted "further recommendation on this line as to distribution of troops, with
view to their comfort and their ultimate transport from Tampa."
The Seventy-first New York regiment attracted the attention of Shafter,
who telegraphed: Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 22, 1898.
(Received, Washington, 6:33 p. m.)
Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. :
Upon personal report to me by colonel of the Seventy-first New York
that 300 of his men have never fired a gun, I have ordered 15,000 rounds of
ammunition be given that regiment for target practice. Will do same with
other volunteer regiments that I find uninstructed. SHAFTER, Major-General.
General Corbin telegraphed Shafter asking him to take up and solve the
question of organization of the Fifth and Seventh corps and "do a very great
service." The dispatch from Shafter, one of the important papers, is as
follows : Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 24, 1898.
(Received, Washington, 2:45 P- m-)
The Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. :
Recommend brigades to consist of three regiments of infantry, three
brigades to a division. Regular regiments to be brigaded together, adding
two volunteer regiments to the sixteen regular regiments already here to form
first and second divisions of Fifth Army Corps, the other corps to be formed
in like manner from volunteer regiments. General officers in order of rank of
respective corps to command divisions as fast as organized ; others to com
mand brigades. Staff officers recently appointed to be assigned as far as
practicable with the volunteers, in order to give brigade commanders the
benefit of their experience. The five cavalry regiments here now to be
formed into two brigades of three and two regiments respectively. Should
cavalry volunteer regiments be assigned here, brigades then to be formed
with two regiments each. The number of regiments for each brigade as I

366 THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR.
have indicated is approved by General Wheeler. Other general officers whom
I have consulted agree with me as to the number of regiments to constitute a
brigade. Recommend placing all the regular regiments in one corps, so that
they may be taken first for service in Cuba. If this is not satisfactory, half
of the regulars can be assigned to each corps, and in event of an ad
vance on Cuba the regulars in each corps formed for the advance. I think,
how*ever, that it would be better to have all regulars in one corps. The
light artillery should (remain), as at present, all together under charge of
Colonel Randolph. They should accompany the advance, and then be
assigned one battery to each division and one to cavalry corps, the remainder
to constitute the reserve. If this project is approved, I request early order,
and I will immediately proceed to complete the organization. I have been led
to make the recommendations in view of an early advance, and from the fact
that I believe the first battle will be the decisive one and that the best troops
should bear the brunt, supported as strongly as possible by the volunteers.
SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding.
This dispatch is a model of executive statement and the last sentence not
only contains the outlines of the Santiago campaign, but is marked by the
sagacity* that solved the situation — "the first battle will be the decisive one,
and the best troops should bear the brunt." It was sound military sense in
Shafter to discern six weeks ahead of the fact that the decisive battle would
be the first one, and he wanted no mistake about that. General Shafter thus
emerged from the moonshine of distant speculation, and put himself in the
place of the critical command and mapped the event, without knowing where
on the island the fateful field was located.
In the wars that may hereafter come upon us, this is an example to be
quoted. It is a line of sunlight to be distinguished in the morning, followed
to the noon of victory. The importance of the increase of the regular army
is tremendously increased by the truth, plain now and to be more and more
made known to the comprehensive assimilation of the intelligence gathered by
prescient observation, that the decisive battles will be the first ones or at
least that the losers of the opening engagements will find the cost of the
restoration of fallen fortunes intolerably augmented by the education of
sufficient armies, after the wars are on. In the campaigns of modern warfare
there is no instance but that in our war of States in the United States in
which the winners of the first serious combat were not those who gained the

THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR.

367

closing triumph; and it was a terrible road to travel from Manassas to
Appomattox. In the Crimean war the allies held the field of battle of Alma.
In the Franco-Austrian war Marshal McMahon was the victor at Magenta, and
it was followed by Solferino. The Prussians won the first events in the
advance into Silesia in the combat with Austria, and Sadowa was the finish.
In the Franco-German war the French lost the skirmishes on the frontier, the
battles of Woerth and Saarbriick, and the end was Gravelotte, Sedan, and the
capitulation of Paris. The same fatality was visible in the English invasion
of Egypt, the Chilean assault upon Peru, the Japanese advance into China, the
Turkish humiliation of the Greeks.
These object lessons all tell the same story. They mean the necessity
that is imposed upon a nation of great resources- — a fine place for looting, as
Blucher said of London — to have a competent army; first for the insurance of
peace with dignity and honor, second to guard against the misfortune of
insufficiency at the start when the red flame of war bursts through the roofs
and the walls of the world, and one disaster makes way for another — following
fast and following faster — all modern improvements hastening and extending
the original impulse to ruin. Every decent sentiment of national duty
demands of the people of the United States that they shall be an armed
nation. It turned out at Santiago as Shafter said it would somewhere, that
the decision would be made where the armies of the belligerents first met in
battle array. It was the foresight that f>ut the regulars to the front where the
swords crossed, that enabled us to close the campaign with a clap of thunder
and a blaze of glory.

CHAPTER XVI.

SS^Mm^^Z

The Phantom Fleets of Spain in Cuban Waters.
Admiral Cervera Sailed into the Unknown and Became a Mystery and a Menace — He
Appeared and Disappeared and Was at Last Found at Santiago by Commodore
Schley — Imperative Demands for Information Answered — The Orders of General
Shafter and Plans of General Miles — Dramatic Scenes at Tampa — Just as the Great
Fleet was Sailing Another Spanish Hoodoo Fleet was Announced — After All a Pros
perous Voyage, and Easy Landing.
The fleet of Admiral Cervera sailed from the Cape Verde Islands April
29th, four armored cruisers, and three torpedo gunboats. The destination
could only be conjectured. The surface indications were that the Spaniards
had done the best they could, but the Cadiz squadron was not in form for
fighting. The Cervera fleet was obviously unequal to raising the blockade of
Cuba, and must have for its objective an appearance on our North Atlantic
coast, with the view of exciting an alarm that would be a diversion, or to
maneuver in the West Indies, to disturb the disposition of those destined to
invade Cuba.
The Spanish cruisers had a high reputation for speed, and were undoubt
edly swifter than the fleet of Admiral Sampson, which was limited in move
ment to the rate at which the monitors could be towed, and for a time it was
held by those who gave time to conjecture that the real object of the
Spaniards was to capture the Oregon, whose voyage from the Pacific to the
Atlantic was of universal knowledge, and the interest in it constant and keen.
There was a hawk in the sky, and it might strike anywhere. May 7th Admiral
Sampson was informed at Cape Haitien that the Spanish squadron was
reported at St. Thomas. May 14th the roving cruisers of Spain were off
Curacoa. The bombardment of San Juan, Porto Rico, by Admiral Sampson's
fleet, took place on the 10th of May. On the 22d was received a dispatch from
Key West that Cervera's fleet was in the Santiago harbor. The Naval
Department had information that — we quote the Secretary of the Navy  the
368

PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 369
"Spanish fleet had munitions of war destined for the defense of Havana, and
was under imperative orders to reach Havana, Cienfuegos, or a port connected
with Havana by rail; and that as Cienfuegos appeared to be the only port ful
filling the conditions, the Flying Squadron would be instructed upon arrival
at Key West to proceed to Cienfuegos. Instructions were at the same time
given to Admiral Sampson to increase the Flying Squadron by such armored
ships as he might deem desirable."
It turned out that for a time Cervera's fleet, which had taken refuge at
Santiago, .because short of coal and provisions, occupied the attention of
both our superior squadrons, and detained the army that was going to Cuba.
May 27th, the Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War: "If the Span
ish fleet is in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, I expect absolute information to
that effect from our naval commanding officer at any moment. On receipt
of that information, the movement to Santiago should be made without a
moment's delay, day or night," and of this he had advised Admiral Sampson
and Commodore Schley. The Secretary telegraphed Sampson :
"If Cervera's division is proved to be in Santiago, it is intended to make
immediately a. descent upon that port with 10,000 troops, landing about eight
miles east of port. You will be expected to convoy the transports, probably
fifteen or twenty, ,going in person and taking with you New York, Indiana,
Oregon, and as many smaller vessels with good batteries as can possibly be
gathered. ' '
This was partly in apprehension of the torpedo vessels. The blockade of
Havana was to be provided for by the monitors and gunboats.
The Secretary's telegram to Commodore Schley was:
"The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively whether
Cervera's division is in Santiago harbor, as, if so, an immediate movement
against him and the town will be made by the navy and a division of about
10,000 of our troops, which are all ready to embark. Your difficulties regard
ing coaling must be surmounted by your own ingenuity and perseverance.
This is a crucial time, and the Department relies upon you to give quickly
information as to Cervera's presence, and to be all ready for concerted action
with the army. Two colliers have been ordered to St. Nicolas Mole."
The coast line of Cuba is almost as long as that of our country on the
Atlantic. The island is nearly eighteen hundred miles from east to west, and
there are many islands and reefs. Blockading vessels looking for a hostile

370 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS.
fleet are surprising consumers of coal, and battleships are, as a rule, hard to
coal unless in comfortable quarters. Commodore Schley was not convinced
as quickly as others that the Cape Verde fleet was at Santiago, and hesitated
whether to go to Key West for coal. He knew that if Cervera was to give
relief to the city of Havana, he must do it from Cienfuegos, within easy reach
of the capital by rail, and that if he was aggressive. But Cervera, instead of
seeking enemies, was striving to elude them, and secure coal and provisions
for his men, do what was possible in the way of clearing his ships to restore
their much declined speed. The Commodore, however, concluded after he
had sent out dispatches that he was going to Key West, that his first duty was
to find certainly* that Cervera was or was not at Santiago^ and wisely
turned his ships about and drove them east. May 28th he cabled from
Kingston :
"Have been unable absolutely to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen,
Brooklyn from collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad weather since leav
ing Key West. The Brooklyn alone has more than sufficient coal to proceed
to Key West ; cannot remain off Santiago present state squadron coal account.
Impossible to coal leeward Cape Cruz in the summer, all owing to south
westerly winds. Harvard reports coal sufficient for Jamaica; leaves to-day- for
Kingston; reports only small vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole. Minne
apolis only coaled for Key West; also Yale, which tows Merrimac. Much to
be regretted, can not obey orders of Department. Have striven earnestly;
forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan passage. Cannot
ascertain anything respecting enemy positive. Obliged to send Eagle —
admitted no delay — to Port Antonio, Jamaica; had only 25 tons of coal.
Will leave St. Paul off Santiago de Cuba. Will require 10,000 tons of coal at
Key West. Very difficult to tow collier to get cable to hold."
On the same day* Long telegraphed : Washington, May 28, 1898.
Harvard, care American Consul, Kingston, Jamaica:
Following must be delivered to Schley as soon as possible; utmost
urgency. Unless it is unsafe, your squadron Department wishes you to
remain off Santiago, so can not you take possession of Guantanamo, occupy
as a coaling station? If you must leave, are authorized to sink collier in the
mouth of harbor if you can obstruct thereby, but if not so used and not
necessary to you, it would be desirable to leave her Nicholas Mole or vicinity.

PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 371
You must not leave the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba unless it ^ .nsafe your
squadron, or unless Spanish division is not there. ' LONG.
Sampson to Long, Key West, May 28 :
"He has sufficient coal aboard, undoubtedly, to keep sea for some time,
as all except Iowa left here full. The importance of absolutely preventing
departure of Spanish squadron of paramount importance, and demands the
most prompt and efficient use of every means."
May 29, Sampson to Long:
"The failure of Schley to continue blockade must be remedied at once if
possible. There can be no doubt of presence of Spanish division at Santiago. ' '
Long to Schley, May 29:
"Schley, Mole Haiti. (Also sent to Port Antonio and to Kingston,
Jamaica).— It is your duty to ascertain immediately if the Spanish fleet is in
Santiago and report. Would be discreditable to the navy if that fact were not
ascertained immediately. All military and naval movements depend upon
that point. ' '
Schley to Long:
"Off Santiago de Cuba, May 29, 10 a. m. — Enemy in port. Recognized
Cristobal Colon, Infanta Maria Teresa, and two torpedo-boat destroyers
moored inside Morro, behind point. Doubtless the others are here. I have
not sufficient coal."
Long to Sampson, 29:
"Schley has seen the Spanish fleet at Santiago." Washington, May 29, 1898.
Cotton, U. S. S. Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica:
Return to Schley- with this message. Hold on at all hazards. New York,
Oregon, and New Orleans are on the way. St. Louis and Yankee just leaving
New York for Santiago, via Nicholas Mole. Two more colliers en route.
LONG.

Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica: Washington, May 30, 1898.
Deliver Schley following: Where are the other two armored cruisers,
Spanish fleet? When discovered, please report promptly. Commander-in-
Chief North Atlantic Station has started to join you. LONG.
Commodore Schley made for Santiago in good time. The tone of the
Sampson and the Long dispatches was not that of approval of the Commo
dore's disability from lack of coal. The Secretary asked, on the 30th of May,

372 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS.
where the two armored cruisers of Spain Schley had not seen were. Schley
had seen two of the four cruisers, and the two torpedo boats — and reporting
them by name, added, "Doubtless the others are here." Of course, that was
according to the probabilities, but it was necessary to be sure of all the Span
iards, — and so the energetic Secretary cautioned: Washington, May 31, 1898.
Sampson, care Cable Office, Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti:
It is essential to know if all of four Spanish armored cruisers in Santiago,
as our military expedition must wait for this information. Report "as soon as
possible. LONG.
Schley's answer, May 31st, mentioned that he needed more picket boats
very badly, and he added: "Have seen one more vessel of the Vizcaya class
in port." The Commodore would not, however, swear it was the Vizcaya.
On the 29th Sampson had come around to this:
"Telegram just received from Schley shows that he is to-day blockading
Santiago de Cuba, and will continue to do so until coal supply has been
reduced to safe limit for large ships."
Two days later Schley was telegraphing from in front, of Santiago.
"Smooth sea here now." The waves were not running so high, but Schley
had not seen all the Spanish cruisers, and it would not do to let any of them
get out when our transports were on the wing.
The Secretary of the Navy had a slight attack of Cuban stories delivered
in this official form : Washington, May 30, 1898.
Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica:
Deliver following to Schley: Sagua, 25 miles east of Santiago, is reported
a good place for landing, and that the insurgents have entire possession of
this vicinity, and some horses of their cavalry are kept about a mile inland.
From thence it has been reported easy to reach the heights in the rear of
Santiago, commanding view of the whole harbor, without any probability of
meeting with the Spanish forces. For miles the road is mountainous, and
after this very fair. LONG.
The subsequent proceedings at Santiago did not show that the reports to
the Secretary that he sent on to Schley w*ere strictly accurate. The Cuban
cavalry of the coast guard did not muster in force when wanted, and the
heights in the rear of Santiago were not "easy to reach" without meeting

PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 373
several Spaniards, and right in the neighborhood the Cubans to sacrifice
their lives for their Republic were not reported as numerous, and never were
found by* burial parties. But Admiral Sampson proceeded to Santiago
waters, on this dispatch from Long dated May 29th: "Department thinks it
very desirable that you carry out recommendation to go yourself with two
ships to Santiago de Cuba;" and the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic
squadron certified to "a reliable Cuban" as follows: Mole Haiti, June 4, 1898.
Secretary of the Navy, Washington :
* Off Santiago, June 3. — Some observations made to-day by a reliable
Cuban, in accordance with my instructions, made four armored vessels and
two torpedo destroyers at Santiago. At that time repairs and more coal
needed by them. SAMPSON.
This made up the full list of the Spanish fleet seen in the harbor of
Santiago. The Secretary of the Navy, on May 31st, wanted to know from the War
Department, as there seemed to be a movement of the army at hand, "what
means are to be employed by the War Department for landing the troops,
artillery, horses, siege guns, mortars, and other heavy objects, when the
pending military expedition arrives on the Cuban coast near Santiago. "
It was pointed out that the crews of the armored ships "ought not to be
fatigued by the work incident to landing troops, stores, etc." They were
going to have to remove Spanish mines and to meet the Spanish fleet in
action, and so must not be overworked. The boys were eventually able to
help themselves ashore, but the transfer from the ships to the land was not
accompanied with facilities of the most modern sort. We were a shade
deficient in that line, but the men were shifty and glad to swim ashore when
boats were scarce, but they left their supplies.
It seemed that the time for action had arrived, and that the personal tele
grams of General Corbin and the cipher dispatch to General Shafter following
made the start of the embarked army definite and certain :
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, May 30, 1898 — 11:30 p. m.
Major-General Shafter, Tampa, Fla. :
My telegram just now said important telegram would reach you in a few
minutes. It may be an hour before I can have it ready, but no more.
H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

374 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS.
War Department, Washington, May 30, 1898.
(Sent in cipher May 31, 1898, 2:30 a. m.)
Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter, Tampa, Fla. :
With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your
command on transports, proceed under convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of
Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as
your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it onto
the high ground and bluffs, overlooking the harbor, or into the interior, as shall
best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there ; and cover the navy as
it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or with the aid of the navy
capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago Harbor.
You will use the utmost energy to accomplish this enterprise, and the govern
ment relies upon your good judgment as to the most judicious use of your
command, but desires to impress upon you the importance of accomplishing
this object with the least possible delay. You can call to your assistance any
of the insurgent forces in that vicinity, and make use of such of them as you
think advisable to assist you, especially as scouts, guides, etc. You are
cautioned against putting too much confidence in any persons outside of your
troops. You will take every precaution against ambuscades or surprises or
positions that may have been mined or are commanded by the Spanish forces.
You will cooperate most earnestly with the naval forces in every way, agree
ing beforehand upon a code of signals. Communicate your instructions to
Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. On completion of this enterprise,
unless you receive other orders or deem it advisable to remain in the harbor
of Santiago de Cuba, reembark your troops and proceed to the harbor of Port
de Banes, reporting by the most favorable means for further orders and future
important service. This with the understanding that your command has not
sustained serious loss and that the above harbor is safe for your transports and
convoy. When will you sail?
By command of Major-General Miles :
H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.
Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 31, 1898 — 11:58 a. m.
Gen. H. C. Corbin, Washington, D. C. :
Telegram received 3 :4s this morning now being deciphered. Your boy
will go with me, and I shall take same care of him I would my own. Much
love. SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding.

PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 375
On the 27th of May General Miles had addressed a letter to the Secretary
of War, saying he thought it would be advisable to "land transports with a
strong force, " and so on, and with army and navy together capture the harbor,
garrison and fleet at Santiago. If this happened prematurely, the General
argued," We will be able to land a superior force, and I believe that a combined
effort will result in capturing the island, with its garrisOn, provided it is done
before it can be reinforced from Spain. The distance from Key West to
Porto Rico is 1,040 miles, and from Cadiz, Spain, to Porto Rico, it is atfout
4,000 miles. The possession of Porto Rico would be of very great advantage
to the military, as it would cripple the forces of Spain, giving us several thou
sand prisoners. It could be well fortified, the harbor mined, and would be a
most excellent port for our navy, which could be speedily relieved from any
responsibility in the charge of that port, as we could leave a sufficient garrison
to hold it against any force that might be sent against it."
After this there was to be "a movement toward the west," and a base
found at Nuevitas along the Puerto Principe railroad — insurgents to be
supplied with the usual "abundance of arms and munitions of war," our
people acting in conjunction "with the forces of Lieutenant- General
Garcia^ and General Gomez" — and the general gave this cheerful reassur
ance: "These movements, in my judgment, can all be accomplished during the
rainy season, through a country comparatively free from yellow fever, well
stocked with cattle, and having grass sufficient for our animals. While this is
being accomplished our volunteer army will be prepared to land in the vicinity
of Mariel, Havana, or Matanzas in sufficient force to complete the capture or
destruction of the Spanish forces upon the island of Cuba. The advantage of
this movement will be that the army and navy will act in concert and close
unison. ' '
Another recommendation was that this would not divide the navy, and
the General adds: "I believe that the entrance to the port of Cienfuegos can
be obstructed or blockaded by one or two monitors to better advantage than
to send the army there, where it would have to meet a strong garrison, which
is already there."
The only detail neglected is as to the two monitors. The General does
not say whether they should be allowed to float — if they may be said to float
— or sunk altogether; and the General does not say whether the "close unison"

376 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS.
of the army and navy could be best secured by himself or Admiral Sampson
becoming Commander-in-Chief of both Army and Navy. Of course, the only
real objection to this happy adjustment would be that the Constitution of the
United States is an instrument that reserves the command in chief of the sail
ors and soldiers, afloat and ashore, to the President alone. In the instructions
sent by General Miles to General Shafter from Washington, May 31, 2:30 a.
m. , Shafter was told to move his army as his judgment might dictate, "onto
the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior."
Shafter being thus instructed, the Major-General left for Tampa at once,
arriving June 1st.
The first bulletin from the Major-General commanding, General Miles,
after his arrival at Tampa was that men were working night and day, and
there was an important and gratifying telegram to the effect that "Dorst,
Captain," had at Port Banes, northern coast, directly opposite Santiago,
"landed over 400 armed and equipped Cubans; 1,300,000 rounds ammuni
tion, Springfield and Remington; 7,500 Springfield rifles; 20,000 rations,
besides large quantities equipment and clothing; 24 horses; 74 mules."
As for Spanish troops there were 40,000 in the province of Santiago, and
"nearly 1,000 insurgent troops" had arrived at Banes, a favorite resort, no
doubt, of the Cuban navy ! General Miles reported favorably June 2d as to
work going on, saying: "The working force at Tampa has been divided into
three reliefs, each working eight hours during the twenty-four, nine ships
being loaded at one time."
Rear 'Admiral Sicard recommended that to secure secrecy as to army
movements, "the commanding officer of the army in Tampa and of the navy
at Key West be directed to seize and detain all press boats, of whatever
character, in those ports, and to prevent their following the expedition, plac
ing, if necessary, a file of soldiers or marines on board to enforce obedience;
and likewise that the commanding naval officer of the convoy be directed, in
case a press boat joins the fleet, to take charge of her and compel her to
remain until he reaches the Commander-in-Chief, who shall also detain her so
long as he thinks expedient to do so. ' '
Orders were issued accordingly. Shafter telegraphed that the difficulties
in loading could not be appreciated. General Miles illustrated the embarrass
ments: "Fifteen cars loaded with uniforms were sidetracked 25 miles away
from Tampa, and remained there for weeks while the troops were suffering

PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 377
for clothing. Five thousand rifles, which were discovered yesterday, were
needed by several regiments. Also, the different parts of the siege train and
ammunition for same, which will be required immediately on landing."
It was the next day that Admiral Sampson cabled that the Merrimac was
in the channel, and Cervera "safely bottled up." The Secretary of the Navy
says in his report that when Sampson arrived off Santiago he found "Schley's
squadron in column to the westward of the mouth of the harbor," and "on June
3rd an attempt was made to close the harbor by sinking across its entrance the
collier Merrimac. This attempt, though unsuccessful in its object, was dar
ingly executed. It is now one of the well-known historic marvels of naval
adventure and enterprise, in which Naval Constructor Hobson and his men
won undying fame."
The President became impatient and wanted to know why there was so
much delay in getting off. Shafter replied, June 5th, 6:32 a. m., that "delays
occur that, cannot be prevented or foreseen" — and, "Siege guns have only
been assembled late this evening. They will be loaded on cars to-night and
sent to transports early in the morning, and the loading rushed. Will begin
putting men on to-morrow p. m., if possible, and be ready to start Monday
night or Tuesday morning. The last of the troops from Chickamauga are
expected to-night. Officers engaged in loading transports have worked night
and day. The main cause for delay has been' the fact that great quantities of
stores have been rushed in promiscuously, and with no facilities to handle or
store them. The last 10 miles before reaching the wharf is a single track,
and very narrow place in which to work. The capacity of this place has been
greatly exceeded. Could have put the troops on and rushed them off, but not
properly equipped as I know the President wishes them. I will not delay a
minute longer than is absolutely necessary to get my command in condition
and start the earliest moment possible."
June 5th General Miles telegraphed that the delay had been caused
"through no fault of any one connected with it," and contained the principal
part of the army, "which for intelligence and efficiency was exceeded by no
body of troops on earth." The General requested "ample protection" for
this command from the navy while at sea — and he added: "This
enterprise is so important that I desire to go with this army corps, or to
immediately organize another and go with it to join this, and capture position
No. 2."

37» PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS.
General Miles telegraphed the day following that theie should be "a
few regiments well equipped at Camp Alger." The words "few" and
"well" here are not of military precision — but the general proposition stands
good. Admiral Sampson had, on June 7th, "silenced works quickly without
injury of any kind. ' ' The general opinion is after the war that this sentence
should have read, "without injury of any kind to the works." The Admiral
also remarked: "If 10,000 men were here, city and fleet would be ours within
forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement.
If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from the fleet. "
This observation was not confirmed by Shaffer's experience with 18,000
men. Santiago was a hard, hot nut to crack.
The night of June 7th the Secretary of War telegraphed Shafter: "The
President directs you to sail at once with what force you have ready, ' ' and
Shaffer's reply was worthy the occasion: Tampa, Fla., June 7, 1898 — 9 p. m.
Secretary of War, Washington :
I will sail to-morrow morning. Steam cannot be gotten up earlier.
There is loaded to-night one division of infantry (9 regiments), 16 companies
of dismounted cavalry, 4 light batteries, 2 siege batteries artillery, 2 companies
of engineers, and the troops from Mobile. I will try and get on the rest of
the cavalry and another division of regular infantry by morning. I will sail
then with whatever I have on board. SHAFTER, Major-General.

Executive Mansion, Washington, June 7, 1898.
General Shafter, Tampa, Fla. :
About how manyT men will you have ready by morning?
CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Port Tampa, Fla. (direct), June 7, 1898—10:15^. m.
Adjutant-General Corbin :
I expect to have 834 officers, 16,154 men on transports by daylight, and
will sail at that hour. SHAFTER.
General Miles telegraphed that the last of the troops from Chickamauga
"arrived thismorning and hurried to the steamers."

North AUaxiticFleel « — X K X H
Ftymg Squadron tHInmni
Spanish Squadron ^ ,* ,* .,« ,' r<
mm

The positions shown ore those of die Flagship us
each ta.se except that the Spanish positions are
">°satak,nfrmU„h,6„f(t,c„>,iillColoii

CHART SHOWING DAILY POSITIONS OF FLEET IN CAMPAIGN AGAINST SPANISH SQUADRON UNDER ADMIRAL CERVERA, FROM MAY 15, 1898,
TO JULY 3, 1898. REDUCED FROM MAP PREPARED BY NAVY DEPARTMENT.

DAILT POSITIONS OF SPANISH SQUADRON UNDER ADMIRAL CERVERA, FROM APRIL 9. 1898, TO JULY 3, 1898. REDUCED FROM MAP
PREPARED BY NAVY DEPARTMENT FROM LOG OF "CRISTOBAL COLON."

PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 381
This was a remarkable situation, and the next thing was a startling
shift of scenery : War Department, Washington, D. C, June 8, 1898.
Major-General Shafter, Tampa, Fla. :
Wait until you get further orders before you sail. Answer quick.
R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

Port Tampa, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 4:06 p. m.
R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
Message received. Vessels are in the stream, but will be able to stop
them before reaching the Gulf. SHAFTER, Major-General.
War Department, Washington, June 8, 1898.
Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla. :
The reason for countermanding order you will find in the following.
The order was given at the request of the Navy Department by direction of
the President: "Key West, June 8. — Spanish armor cruiser, second class, and Spanish
torpedo-boat destroyer seen by Eagle, Nicholas Channel, Cuba. — Remey. "
"Key West, June 8. — Last cipher just came by Resolute, just arrived; was
pursued by two vessels, Nicholas Channel, Cuba, last night. Shall I order
Indiana and all available cruisers to coast of Cuba? More detail to follow. —
Remey."

Tampa, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 11:42 p. m.
Hon. Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
If that report is true, those Spanish vessels could be within six hours of
the loaded transports now, and there to-morrow. Have ample measures
been taken by the navy to insure their safety? MILES, Commanding.
General Miles took advantage of the interval to submit several questions,
suggestions and plans of campaign. He rattled the Secretary of War.
June 9th, 6:50 p. m. : "Think it would be well to announce that the army
got on board transports and started, as they did yesterday. Say nothing
about its being recalled, but let our naval vessels go over the course that our
transports would have gone over, with the hope of finding those Spanish
ships." Now, the General wanted to know whether the presence of Spanish war

382 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS.
vessels didn't render it extremely hazardous to send troops on transports until
the Spaniards were "captured, destroyed or driven away." The General
wanted to know whether he should go on with the organization of Expedition
No. 2.
The reply of the President was : War Department, June 9, 1898.
Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla. :
The President directs me to say that no change of plan will be made - that
Expedition No. ¦> must be organized as rapidly as possible. We are looking
for transports, and are satisfied the navy will take care of that problem. Give
nothing out. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
General Miles at once had another plan — not a change in the plan, but a
new one, right from the mint. It took hold heartily of the navy, and awak
ened its drowsy consciousness thus :
Tampa, Fla., June 9, 1898 — 2:45 P- m-
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
It seems that it is a naval problem jet unsolved, and it might be advis
able for the command now on board transports to have the protection of the
entire navy to convoy it to number 1, number 2, or Nuevitas, or, if this is
considered too hazardous, then keep the troops in healthful camps, as they are
now, and assist the navy to destroy the Spanish fleet. There are here 25
good steamers that could be used to carry water, coal, and supplies, guns,
revolving cannon, and mortars, etc. , and they could be added to the force of
the navy. It seems strange to be suggesting that the army assist the navy in
this way, but I am sure we would receive most loyal support when the waters
are safe for crossing with the army.
MILES, Major-General, Commanding Army.

There was talk of disembarking the troops, but Shafter said it was not
practicable. They could not be encamped comfortably, but were taken off in
detachments to exercise. June 17th it was stated that the expedition should
get under way and meet convoy at Rebecca Shoal.
Port Tampa, Fla., June 10, 1898 — 9:30 p. m.
Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington, D. C. :
Practically all the transports have been in canal, where men have had
free access to shore, and they have been off the greater part of two days.
This afternoon all but eleven of the transports have been drawn a short dis-

PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 383
tance into the stream, where the men are much more comfortable than in the
canal, with excellent facilities for swimming and keeping clean. The com
mand is being increased only by recruits, of which there are several hundred,
the exact number of which will be telegraphed you in the morning, and by
one troop of cavalry mounts. The transports now here are practically filled,
though it might be possible to get one more regiment of volunteer infantry
on. Will be able to tell to-morrow, when -a rearrangement of some of the
troops will be made. If I find it possible to take another regiment I prefer
the Thirty-second Michigan. SHAFTER,
Major-General, United States Volunteers, Commanding.
June 12th, 7:18 p. m., Shafter telegraphed Corbin:
"Have consulted with senior naval officer present, who says we must
have daylight to get down to lower bay. Will start the transports at daylight
to-morrow, and with good luck will meet convoy from Key West before
Wednesday noon."

Port Tampa, Fla., June 13, 1898 — 1:10 p. m.
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
Steamers are moving out to sea and should be away by 1 o'clock.
MILES, Major-General.

Playa del Este, via Haiti.
(Received at Washington June 22, 1898, 6:22 p. m.)
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
Off Daiquiri, Cuba, June 22, 1898. — Landing at Daiquiri this morning
successful. Very little, if any, resistance. SHAFTER.

CHAPTER XVII.
The Sharp Strain of the Struggle at Santiago.
General Miles as a Loyal Soldier— Shafter's Fine Voyage and Safe Landing— The First
Blood in Battle— Rush of Supplies and Reinforcements to the Army— Alger Wants
Shafter to "Get a Good Ready"— Why Siege Guns were not Unloaded— Work Cut Out
for the Regulars— Parallel with the British Siege of Havana— The Sword Had to be
Swift to Save from the Pestilence.

The credit is due General Miles of pulling steadily in the harness.
When one of his suggestions did not take root, he was soon ready with
another. If one of his campaigns on paper was blown away in the morning,
he was as fertile as ever in the evening. He saw, after the Santiago expedition
was under way, that it was the primary enterprise, and would in all ways take
precedence, and he was ready and willing to go on with number two. If he
was not to command in Cuba, he was persevering for Porto Rico. His plans
might be subjected to all trials except that of being tried, but his loyalty
as a soldier was never impeachable. In all aspects of his versatility
he was facing to the front. If he thought it wise to wait, he said so at
large and in particular, but when the word was to go, he was up and doing at
the tap of the drum, buttoned and buckled, alert and stepping out to the
music. In his contentions with the critics he can always say that his faults
were in words, and the facility with which they are flashed about the world,
but his feet were rather jubilant than laggard, and the toes of his boots
pointed to the enemy. When Shafter's fleet sailed down the bay, General
Miles telegraphed the War Department the hour and the minute- — June 14,
1898, 10:30 a. m. — when "the last one was out of sight," and he mentioned
an auxiliary cruiser, that would go in six hours, and for a wonder the Major-
General commanding did not know the destination of the boat. This was
signed simply, "Miles, Commanding," but his command at the moment was
"out of sight" so far as the regular army was concerned. Major-General
384

THIRD LIGHT ARTILLERY GOING INTO CAMP, ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT, SIX MILES FROM SIBONEY,

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GENL. HAWKINS WHO LED THE FAMOUS CHARGE OF THE 1ST BRIGADE AT SAN JUAN,
JULY 1ST, 1898.

SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 387
Brooke telegraphed the Adjutant-General of the army July 14th that he was
"directed to fully equip 15,000 men for duty elsewhere, " and he wanted to
know whether "the ordnance equipment for 23 regiments" was on the way to
the Chickamauga Park, or likely to arrive soon. This was to the point.
Miles, commanding, telegraphed the Secretary of War June 14th, 9:50 p. m.,
that he thought their "telegrams crossed in transit," not at all an improbable
conjecture^ — though what happened when they collided has not yet been the
subject of an investigation. But the fact Miles wanted to get through was
that one-half the "troops for No. 2" — the army for Porto Rico — were at
Tampa, "fully equipped and drilling every day as artillery. Siege trains,
balloons, heavy ammunition, commissary and quartermaster's stores" were
also there.
Balloons and everything all ready, Shafter w*as sailing on the blue sea
under the indigo sky of the subtropics. There had been a change at Tampa,
— there were 21 feet of water, and nine ships could load at a time. Just at
this hour Inspector-General Breckenridge made a call for officers in these
terms, addressing himself to the Secretary of War:
"Regular officers are sadly needed among volunteers, but regular organi
zations are also already suffering from paucity of officers. Regular organiza
tions furnish a remarkably fine training school for officers and all that can be
so trained are already needed. Can not regular service be immediately
supplied with all the junior officers the, law allows, especially as the good of
the service evidently demands it? Then additional second lieutenants can
increase the numbers now so greatly needed. It must be evident to all now
that we need a larger perfectly trained and equipped force, especially officers,
and the best place for quick training is among the regulars. It would be well
if we had several hundred more regular officers immediately."
On the 15th of June the Secretary of War concluded he must see Major-
General-Commanding Miles speedily and telegraphed "Important business
requires your presence here; report at once," and at 5:23 p. m. General Miles
was able to say over the wire, "I leave by the first train, 7:20 this evening,"
and the telegrams, which are of the kinetoscope order, show that he was in
three days transacting business from the Washington army headquarters in
the usual way. Telegrams show vigorous work in the camps preparing the
volunteer troops. General Coppinger, June 26th, telegraphed that cars were
being as rapidly unloaded as delivered by railroads. Some days 70 were

388 SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO.
unloaded, then only 13, because they could not be placed. There were in cor
rals 1,811 unassigned mules, and there were 1,791 assigned draft mule and
15 Red Cross ambulances.
Shafter, Major-General Volunteers, commanding, telegraphed:
"Playa del Este, via Haiti, June 25th, 2:45 P- m- —Daiquiri, 23. — Had
very fine voyage, lost less than 50 animals, 6 or 8 to-day; lost more putting
them through the surf to land than on transports. Command as healthy as
when we left. Eighty men sick. Only deaths 2 men drowned in landing.
Landings difficult. Coast quite similar to that in vicinity of San Francisco,
and covered with dense growth of bushes. Landing at Daiquiri unopposed.
All points occupied by Spanish troops; heavily bombarded by navy to clear
them out. Sent troops toward Santiago and occupied Juragua City, a natur
ally strong place, this morning. Spanish troops retreating as soon as our
advance was known. Had not mounted troops or could have captured them
¦ — about 600 all told. Railroad from there in. Have cars and engine in pos
session. With assistance of navy disembarked 6,000 men yesterday and as
many more to-day. Will get all troops off to-morrow, including light artillery
and greater portion of pack train, probably all of it, with some of the
wagons ; animals have to be jumped to the water and towed ashore. Had
consultations with Generals Garcia,, Rader, and Castillo, 1 p. m. of 20th, 20
miles west of Santiago. These officers were unanimously of the opinion that
landing should be made east of Santiago. I had come to the same conclusion.
General Garcia promises to join me at Juragua City to-morrow with between
3,000 and 4,000 men, who will be brought from west of Santiago by' ships of
the nav57 to Juragua City and there disembarked; this will give me between
4,000 and 5,000 Cubans, and leave 1,000 under General Rabi to threaten Santi
ago from the west. General Kent's division is being disembarked this after
noon at Juragua City, and will be continued during the night. The assistance
of the navy has been of the greatest benefit, and enthusiastically given.
Without them I could not have landed in ten days, and perhaps not at all, as
I believe I should have lost so many boats in the surf. At present want
nothing. Weather has been good. No rain on land, and prospects for fair
weather. ' '
There is not a sentence lost in this dispatch. It is not long, and tells all.
If General Garcia came with between three and four thousand Cubans, he
would have between four and five thousand of them. So there must have been

SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 3&9
about 1,000 already in the neighborhood ready for rations. A few of the
Cubans had a skirmish with the Spaniards — no casualties reported. The first
fighting was when General Young, with 964 officers and men, one squadron of
the First cavalry, one of the Tenth cavalry and two of the "First U. S. Volun
teer cavalry, on the morning of the 24th, became engaged with Spaniards
entrenched in a strong position at La Guasimo, three miles from Siboney on
the Santiago road. General Shafter says in his official report:
"The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but were driven from the field
with considerable loss. Our own loss was 1 officer and 15 men killed; 6
officers and 46 men wounded. The reported losses of the Spaniards were 9
killed and 27 wounded. The engagement -had an inspiriting effect upon our
men, and doubtless correspondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now
plainly demonstrated to them that they had a foe to meet who would advance
upon them under a heavy fire delivered from entrenchments. General
Wheeler, division commander, was present during the engagement, and
reports our troops, officers and men, fought with the greatest gallantry. This
engagement gave us a well-watered country farther to the front, on which to
encamp our troops. ' '
In his telegram fo the Adjutant-General about this affair, General Shafter
said: "The Spaniards occupied a very strong, intrenched position on a high
hill. The firing lasted about an hour, and the enemy* was driven from his
position, which is now occupied by our troops, about a mile and a half from
Sevilla. The enemy has retired toward Santiago."
One sees in the telegrams following the opening fight that there was
intense interest and exertion in the War Department. The army was com
mitted irrevocably to the Santiago stroke, and it was seen that there was to be
the fight of the war. Coppinger wires, June 25th, 6:35 p. m., in answer
to inquiries as to what could be done to reinforce Shafter: "If transports and
ammunition are provided, I can shijD 629 officers and 12,860 men from Tampa.
No transports have reported to me. I understand there are five transports
and two ocean tramps at Port Tampa. "
Corbin telegraphs Cojjpinger to know "whether in the transports at Port
Tampa there are two or three lighters that can be sent at once to Genera-1
Shafter. Having lost one going over, the tug he has is not sufficient to meet
demands of the. service. Time is essence of situation, and an immediate
answer is desired. ' '

39° SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO.
There is evidence here that the War Department was alive to the fact that
Shafter might need help. As to the ships at Tampa, there were seven, "capac
ity about 5,000 men, if loaded and shipped at once. This will, however, be
increased when the boats are fitted up. At present there are but two boats
which are in proper condition to load and ship and get maximum results. '
The Secretary of War made a memorandum June 25th, that 15,000 men
were to be taken from Chickamauga, and 12,000, if so many were fit, from
Coppinger's command, Snyder's division to embark at once to go as soon as
convoy could be had, to reinforce Shafter at Santiago. Orders were issued to
establish telegraphic communication between Shafter's headquarters and cable
stations. Corbin telegraphed Shafter, June 28th:
"From Mobile the large steam tug Nimrod and light draft lighters Ben,
Ora, and Tourat, have been ordered to get out of Mobile just as soon to-day as
possible, going with all dispatch, taking into consideration the safety of the
lighters. The depot quartermaster at Tampa has been ordered to send the
Bessie to report to you. The Bessie is a steam lighter, and sister to the
Laura. General Duffield will arrive on the Yale to-morrow morning with
1,300 men. Balance of his brigade left Fort Monroe this morning. Orders
have been given to have a division sent you from Tampa this week. The
wagon transportation will leave to-morrow."
There were anxious inquiries already about the remains of our dead and
questions raised whether bodies could be embalmed, which was not possible.
The Secretary of War telegraphed that the parents of Hamilton Fish and
others were "very desirous of recovering the bodies of their boys." June 27th
Alger telegraphed Shafter: "Have you landed the siege guns?" and the order
on this telegram was "rush." Two light batteries, Lemly's and Macomb's of
the Seventh Artillery, at Fort Mayer, Va., were ordered to Tampa — and the
six light batteries at Tampa were ordered on fastest steamers immediately,
but this was subject to "when convoy arrives" — as there might be Spanish
gunboats hiding in the many shady places looking for an unarmed transport.
Alger had telegraphed Shafter that he hoped he would "take time to get a
good ready." Shafter's reply was from Siboney, J*ne 27th: "Will not act
hastily, though I believe I can take the place within forty-eight hours, but I
fear at considerable loss of life. There is no necessity for haste, as we are
growing stronger and they weaker every day. The health of the command is
reported to me by the surgeon as remarkable. Outside of the wounded there

SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 391
are to-day less than 150 men sick. So far no wounded have died, and but two
men of disease since leaving Tampa. Am very glad to know that tugs and
lighters are on the way. Hospital steamer Relief is all that we need at
present." The roads were dusty, and a position was taken within three miles of
Santiago, and in plain view of the town! June 28th the convoy was ready at
Key West, and Corbin asked Coppinger what he had ready to go next day,
and the answer was, "Six batteries, 800 recruits for Shafter's infantry, and
the First Illinois. ' ' Incidentally these telegrams passed :
Playa del Este, June 28, 1898 — 4:15 p. m.
Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington:
Daiquiri, Cuba, June 27. I have just been shown a telegram from
Greely to Major Greene, of my staff, requesting daily confidential reports of
operations of my command. I have ordered him never to send any report
relating to my command that is not first submitted to me. I do not under
stand by what authority General Greely presumes to ask confidential informa
tion from a member of my staff. SHAFTER, Major-General.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, June 28, 1898.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Your telegram of this date concerning giving of information fey staff
officers has been read by the Secretary of War, and your action therein is
approved by him, without any reservation whatever.
H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.
The inference is that General Greely, who was censor of the press dis
patches, wanted points to make his duties of suppression clear, and was not
guarded as to the form of stating the desire. The rush and urgent telegrams
were now flying day and night. The form of "Acknowledge receipt and
report execution" appears frequently.
Shafter wanted, June 28th, "Thirty-six sides Lutigo leather ; 36 sides har
ness leather; 50 pounds copper rivets, one-half inch; 5,000 pounds mule
shoes, Nos. 2 and 3; 500 pounds nails, horseshoe No. 6; 6 shoeing hammers;
24 rasps, farriers'; 12 coils five-sixths rope; 12 coils three-eighths rope ; 12
hand punches, saddlers'; 1,200 yards canvas, 72-inch, heavy; 1,200 yards
canvas, 22 -inch; 2 small field forges for pack train; 2 small anvils for pack

392 * SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO.
train; 35 dozen snaps, i^-inch, with guard. The 22-inch canvas is to make
oversacks for carrying forage."
Here is one of the Commanding General's telegrams:
"Siboney, Cuba, June 28, 5 p. m. Have just learned 8,000 Spaniards are
en route herefrom Manzanillo with pack train and beef cattle on the hoof;
probably 54 miles from here to-day; advancing at the rate of 12 miles per
day." This was probably from a "reliable Cuban" who wanted reinforcements
and rations. Corbin telegraphed June 29th from Washington:
"Six transports will leave Port Tampa this evening for Santiago.
Specialist and Unionist carrying artillery horses and artillery guard. The
Comanche will carry artillerymen, the Hudson infantry recruits for your com
mand. The City of Macon and Gate City will take First Illinois and such
cavalry recruits and signal corps as can be loaded."
Coppinger telegraphed the Adjutant-General June 29th, 12 :i5, replying
to telegram that deducting troops about leaving on transports there were at
Tampa — "infantry, 12,661; cavalry, 4,693; cavalry horses, 5,000; heavy artil
lery, 917; horses, 378; signal corps, 147; also about 160 men awaiting dis
charge and unequipped recruits belonging to General Shafter's command,
and about 150 tons of regimental and company property, and tentage left
by General Shafter with the cavalry, being about 1,000 tons of prop
erty of 'all kinds. Quartermasters estimate 4,300 mules, 840 cavalry and
artillery horses, 921 Cuban horses, 1,000 tons hay, 500 tons oats, and 12,000
tons coal; about 1,000 tons miscellaneous quartermaster's property, ordnance
material, and forage with siege train; 1,200 tons commissary stores and prop
erty; about 4,000 tons ordnance."
There was great inquiry as to Shafter's slowness in getting the siege
artillery to the front, and he cabled the Secretary of War :
"I have not yet unloaded the siege guns, but will do so as soon as I can.
I do not intend to take them to the front until we are stopped or need them.
It is going to be a very difficult undertaking to get them up, and if attempted
now would block the road. I have four light batteries at the front, and they
are heavy enough to overcome anything the Spaniards have. If we have to
besiege the town I will get the guns up. The advance picket is now within
2^ miles of Santiago. Officers making reconnoissances were within \y2
miles to-day, and met with no opposition. ' '

SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 393
There was a necessity as imperious as can arise in the affairs of a great
nation in days of destiny, that the blow the United States had to strike Spain
when declaring war upon her, must be delivered as soon after the declaration
as was mechanically practicable. Owing to national inattention and the con
servatism of Congress, the army in hand that was efficient was small. Under
the circumstances, it was a success that in the end proved to be the assurance
of speedy and complete victory and honorable and triumphant peace, to get
together and embark in time, when the actual beginning of the war was in May,
so considerable an army as that which sailed and made a prosperous voyage
under Shafter.
The mobilization of this force and its embarkation and disembarkation
would have been wholly impracticable if it had not been for the construction
just in time of our battleships that gave us the unequivocal superiority over
Spain at sea, and the improved character of the regular army. Thorough as
the confidence of the country has been in our volunteer military system, the
people are educated by* the Spanish war as never before, not to depend upon
it to the exclusion of an army j^repared to meet emergencies that may strike
us by cablegrams, through orders flying in the twinkling of an eye by tele
graph. We had not the force to attack Havana at the time the .Santiago army
scrambled through the Cuban surf to remove Spain from the Americas. If
we had landed in the west instead of the east end of the island, as was at first
proposed, we could undoubtedly have made the landing and held the ground,
though there would have been hard fighting to do that, and our regular army
could not have marched straight to Havana. The Santiago campaign demon
strates that. Blanco would have opposed us with from fifty to sixty thousand
men, and 150 guns, and on several fortified lines. It would have been neces
sary to hasten the embarkation of all the volunteers, fairly armed, in all the
Southern camps, to aid the regulars in advance, and we would have had
seventy thousand men attacking Havana in the rain and the yellow fever.
We could have produced in and about the city of Havana the horrors of the
besieged Jerusalem as described by Joseph us, and repeated in our camps the
awful experiences of the English, the New Englanders, and the New Yorkers
and New Jersey men who conquered Cuba by taking Havana in August, 1762.
The change of the point of attack from Havana to Santiago saved tens of
thousands of our fellow citizens from Cuban graves, but it was the cost of the
war and not its eventual substantial fortunes, changed by the determination

394 SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO.
that hung upon the will of the President, who had the genius of good sense
to choose the better way. The change made the sea voyage 1,000 miles
instead of 200, and a fearful augmentation of difficulties that forced delays,
forcing upon Shafter's army the deadly demand of storming the lines of the
enemy instead of crushing them with siege artillery.
To those who have not ascertained this vital point the story of the cam
paign is a nightmare dream of bloody blundering. Given the understanding
that interprets the circumstances, the conquest of Santiago, while an enter
prise that was hazardous, was a deed of the highest military accomplishment.
The exertions of the government through its respective departments to pro
vide for the army of the invasion of Cuba were something gigantic. To go
from Tampa to the west end of Cuba was like a voyage from New York to
Norfolk, but from Tampa to Santiago, the excursion was equal to the journey
from Philadelphia to Havana. Aware of the certainty of wounds and sick-,
ness, the steamer John Engliss was purchased for $450,000, and fitted up as a
hospital ship at a cost of $136,851.11, and named the Relief. She was pro
vided with every appliance, as the Quartermaster-General comprehensively as
well as particularly states, "for the ease, comfort and treatment of the sick
and wounded. The interior was remodeled; electric plant for light and
purifying, sterilizing and laundry plants, and two steam launches were pro
vided. '-' The launches were like cradles, to carry the helpless men from the
shore to the ship.
After the first of July there were chartered on the Atlantic coast the
steamers Wanderer, La Grande Duchesse, Tarpan and Ute, for the transpor
tation of troops and supplies to Cuba and Porto Rico, and with these the
tonnage was 111,000 tons, the carrying capacity 250,000 men.
The Quartermaster-General reports:
"The carrying capacity of the chartered steamships employed in connec
tion with General Shafter's army for the invasion of Cuba was not found
adequate to promptly transport the number of troops, in addition to that
army, required for Cuba and Porto Rico, and it therefore became necessary to
increase the number of transport vessels with larger carrying capacity for men
and animals, with bilge keels to prevent rolling, and thus make the ships
more comfortable for stock.
"Congress being averse to admitting foreign ships to American registry,
the Secretary of War decided to direct the purchase of vessels, and have them

CAPRON'S BATTERY IN ACTION IN THEIR POSITION IN GENERAL LAWTON'S DIVISION.

WOUNDED ON THEIR WAY TO DRESSING PLACE AT BATTLE OF SAN JUAN.

SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 397

fitted up to meet the needs of the army for the safe and comfortable transpor
tation of men and animals and the transportation of army supplies. Fourteen
large steamships were purchased and fitted up for carrying men, animals,
freight, etc. The following is a list of these vessels :

Name of Vessel

Panama No. i 
Port Victor, No. 2 
Rita, No. 3 
Mohawk, No. 20 
Mobile, No. 21 
Massachusetts, No. 22.
Manitoba, No. 23 
Minnewaska, No. 24...
Mississippi, No. 25 
Michigan, No. 26 
Roumanian, No. 27 
Obdam, No. 30 
Berlin, No. 31 
Chester, No. 32 

Total.

Tonnage

Cost

2,085

$ 41,000

2,792

175,000

2,194

125,000

5,658

660,000

5,78o

660, 000

5,673

660,000

5,673

660,000

5,796

660,000

3,732

350,000

3,722

350,000

4,126

240,000

3,656

250,000

5,641

400,000

4,770

200,000

61,298

5,431,000

Class

...Freighter 
 do 
 do 
.Combination ..
 do 
 do 
 do 
 do 
 do 
 do 
 do 
..Troop ship....
 do 
 do 

Carrying Capacity

Officers Men Animals

10
25 15
So
SoSo So
100 40 40
45 50
75

720

400
400 701.)
1,0001,000
1,000 1,600
1,200 8O0800
1,1001,300
2,000

12,700

I.OOO1,000
1,000
1,000 1,000 SooSoo 50
100

6,750

"Eight of these vessels were provided with refrigerators for the transpor
tation of fresh meat, seven of them having a capacity of 1,000 tons each.
Two, the Panama and the Rita, were captured by the navy, and were pur
chased by this Department after having been condemned as prizes by the
proper courts and offered for sale.
"All of these were merchant vessels and were temporarily fitted up as
army transports to meet the urgent demands of the service for which purpose
an expenditure of $178,018.37 was made.
"The fleet of transport ships which was concentrated at Port Tampa, Fla.,
in June last for the transportation of the army of General Shafter to Cuba,
consisting of 38 vessels, including 2 water boats, 3 steam lighters, 1 collier,
and 1 tug, had been fitted out for a voyage to the vicinity of Havana, distant
about 400 miles; 2 decked barges were also provided by the Engineer Depart
ment. One of the steam lighters, the tug, and a decked barge failed to reach
Cuba. "Upon embarkation of the troops it was found that the vessels would not
safely and comfortably carry more than about 16,000 men with their 2,295
animals, equipments, ammunition, subsistence, and medical supplies, on a
voyage of 1,000 miles."

398 SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO.
To relieve the fighting soldiers and the seamen from the heavy task of
landing supplies — the very line of labor that exhausted and sickened the
British when they were besieging Havana — the Quartermaster's Department
entered "into contract with the firm of D. Van Aken & Co., of New York
City, to fit out an expedition with a large force of mechanics of various trades,
and laborers, with machinery, such as pile drivers, implements for construc
tion of docks and railways, with the necessary materials — iron and lumber —
for building docks, lighters, repairing railroads and engines. The company
was furnished the steamship Panama and two fine ocean tugs, the Gladisfen,
which was chartered, and the Gypsum King, which was purchased." This
outfit afforded great aid and relief.
The English expedition which assailed and captured Havana in 1762 was
not as large as Shafter's army. The force of Lord Albemarle was only
11,351 men. The vessels of the squadron numbered 203, including "six ships
with the baggage of general officers," 93 transports and 43 ships of the line;
and 1,000 negroes were purchased to relieve the troops of drudgery, and with
the provincials and the sailors saved the enterprise from failure.
Colonel Humphre)*, Chief Quartermaster, worked hard at Tampa and
Santiago, and says of the transports that began to arrive early in May at
Tampa, that they were as fast as reported, "fully coaled and watered and
policed, and later fitted with bunks and stalls for the comfort of men and
animals. The loading of the transports began at once, and was carried on
speedily and systematically. This was, at best, difficult, owing to the limited
wharf facilities. The place affords, in all particulars, most insufficient facili
ties for fitting out the many ships and embarking so large a force. The load
ing of all classes of stores was completed at 11 a. m of June 6th, and by 9 p. m.,
June 8th, the troops were all onboard and the expedition was fully embarked.
The departure, however, was delayed until June 14th, by reason of a report
made by the naval authorities that the Spanish war vessels were seen in
Nicholas Channel. The transports when sailing were in good order but not
in so prime condition as when the troops and animals were embarked. ' '
No effort was spared, no cost counted in any department, or nook, or
corner of the government of the United States, to assist the plain purpose of
the Shafter expedition. The General recited the facts of the bitter fight of
the 24th, in which out of 964 our loss was 16 killed and 52 wounded in an hour.
The loss of the enemy reported 9 killed and 27 wounded; that the engagement

SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO.

399

had "inspirited the men." They were hardy men who believed that they had
tried the tether of the enemy* under circumstances that were and would be
characteristic of the campaign, and that they could win out, but the effect at
Washington — and it is well that it was so — was to hurry telegrams that all get
ready instantly to reinforce the army at Santiago. That the fighting right at
hand would be of the severest nature, with the fearful climate and the dread
ful ambuscades to contend with, was already clear. Moreover, the certainties
were that the few Cubans who had emerged from their mysteries could not be
relied upon for hot work, and that the Spaniards were well armed and abun-
. dantly supplied with ammunition, that their Mauser rifles and smokeless
powder were haunting as a superstition, and that they would in shelter do
things to truly save the military character of their country from contempt.
There was also a deep conviction of danger that Shafter needed more men, and
that the quicker they could reach him the surer the result for us, and the
smaller the expenditure of the blood of the heroic few. The United States
is a mighty nation, and there was that in the air more fiery than "the
rocket's red glare" in the song of the banner, but while the people waited
with anxiety and the trains rumbled, and there were busy scenes at the ports,
and the volunteers were massed and rushed to the rescue, while steamers
blackened the sky and whitened the waters, as they throbbed through the
waves to the scene of the conflict, the brunt of the battle was to be borne by
the thin lines already in the sultry forests and on the steep hillsides where
the boys stood in disciplined devotion, the siege guns not ashore, incredible
toil the only way to get forward to those ready to famish the necessaries
of life. Then arose the specter of the ghastliest fever that blights the strong,
and so the breasts of the boys and the steel they bore must be driven home
by stormy rushes, that the sword might win the salvation it was vain to
hope for when the pestilence surely on the wing would swoop down upon
the bivouacs of the brave.

4;

*

CHAPTER XVIII.
The Field Fighting for Santiago.
The Supreme Test of American Valor — The Thin but Steady Regular Line, and the Es
sential Assistance by the Foremost Volunteers — The Whole Story from the First*
Skirmish to the Last Assault Told in War Office Dispatches Far More Interesting
than the Formal Reports of the Officers and More Sensational than the Lurid Chap
ters in the Journals — Their Publication an Admirable Example of the Candor of the
Authorities — An All-Night Watch for News at the White House — Shafter's Memorable
Third and Fourth of July.

The President sent thanks to General Shafter and his army for "the gal
lant action" of the 24th June. On the 26th the Secretary of War communi
cated to General Miles that with the least possible delay an expedition would
be organized under the immediate command of Major-General Brooke,
"composed of three divisions taken from the troops best equipped in the First
and Third Army Corps, and two divisions from the Fourth Army Corps, for
movement and operation against the enemy in Cuba and Porto Rico. The
command under Major-General Shafter, or such part thereof as can be spared
from the work now in hand, will join the foregoing expedition," and the
whole was to be commanded in person by General Miles, who was to place
himself "in close touch with the senior officers of the navy in those waters,
with the view to harmonious and forceful action. " This telegram was sent on
the day of the assignment of General Miles to the Porto Rico occupation:
Washington, June 26, 1898.
Maj. Gen. W. R. Shafter, Commanding United States forces in Cuba:
In burying the dead, be sure and detail a competent officer to have a
map made giving resting place of each, so that friends can find the remains
of their loved ones. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
There have been serious perplexities about the graves. It is true that
they were sometimes shallow, because the men detailed to dig them were so
weak from the heat and affected by exposure to the sun and rain that they
400

ARTILLERY MEN TRYING TO LOCATE THE ENEMY'S BATTERIES WHILE UNDER FIRE.

GENERAL WHEELER AND GENERAL SUMNER IN THE LATTER'S HEADQUARTERS BEFORE SANTIAGO.

?3MBB0 B*— <
Q t-3 I— I
QB C > I— i
>
QO

REDUCED FROM OFFICIAL PLAN PREPARED BY WAR DEPARTMENT.

4^ o

404 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO.
could not wield the grave-digger's tools more than a very few minutes at a
time. Another reason exists for some of the lost graves, which were identified
by bottles tightly corked, containing the name, organization and home of the
deceased, and buried close by the remains. There was also an external
identification — strong stakes driven at the head of the graves and marked so
as to be intelligible. Some of the stakes were removed by Santiago refugees
and Cubans who professed to be soldiers, because it was convenient to make
use of them to cook coffee. This was resented by our soldiers to the point of
shooting several of the miscreants informally, but the mischief was done.
On the 29th the advance pickets were within a mile and a half of Santi
ago, and Shafter was expecting to put a division on the Caney road between
that place and Santiago on the 1st of July, also "advance on the Sevilla road to
the San Juan road, and possibly beyond," and Garcia with 3,000 men was to
"take the railroad north of Santiago and prevent Pando reaching the city. ' ' The
figures of Garcia's force show that the "scatterment" he reported of his fol
lowers when the time came to show them up had not been reformed alto
gether. Still his army greatly outnumbered that of the Commander-in-Chief
Gomez, who for strategic reasons kept only 150 men about his person, holding
the others in reserve in the recesses of the wilderness, where no human eye
beheld them when the cane burning orgies were over. June 30th the First
Illinois, 1,200 men, sailed from Tampa, also Shafter's regular recruits, some
hundreds, and two hundred thousand rations. Certainly the government was
doing all that could be done.
The advance of the 1st of July developed the enemy and Shafter tele
graphed 9:34 a. m: "Action going on, but firing only light and desultory —
began on the right near Caney— Lawton's division." The movement was on
the northeast of Santiago. But the light firing deepened, and then its desul
tory character changed. July 1st was a bloody day. The first dispatch from
the field to the War Office was :
Siboney. — Had a very heavy engagement to-day, whichlasted from 8 a.
m. till sundown. We have carried their outer works and are now in possession
of them. There is now about three-quarters of a mile of open country
between my lines and city. By morning troops will be intrenched and con
siderable augmentation of forces will be there. General Lawton's division
and General Bates's brigade, which have been engaged all day in carrying El
Caney, which was accomplished at 4 p. m., will be in line and in front of

THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 4°S
Santiago during the night. I regret to say that our casualties will be a-bove
400. Of these not many are killed. W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General.
The second dispatch added significance to the story of the fight "from 8
a. m. till sundown": Playa del Este, via Haiti.
(Received at Washington July 2, 1898 — 1:12 a. m.)
Adjutant -General, Washington:
Headquarters near Santiago de Cuba, 1. — I fear I have underestimated
to-day's casualties. A large and thoroughly equipped hospital ship should be
sent here at once. Chief surgeon says he has use for 40 more medical officers.
Ship must bring launch and boat for conveying wounded.
W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General, Fifth Corps.
The response from Washington was that the hospital ship and medical
officers would be sent "as soon as possible," and was confident of "ultimate
complete success." The Secretary of War suggested the navy could "help"
in the care of the wounded.
July 1st, the President disapproved of a "plan" by General Miles to at
once capture the Isle of Pines. The Major-General commanding had thought
that subject all over, and concluded that it would be the very thing to take the
celebrated retreat of the pirates in the Pines, as :
"It is said to have the most delightful climate in the West Indies, being
entirely free from yellow fever. It can be made extremely useful for the
establishment of a hospital and a camp of prisoners, and, also, eventually, as
a base for supplying the Cubans, and possibly for the cavalry operations on
the main island of Cuba.
"I think the one steamer now at Tampa can, with a battery of artillery,
and one regiment of infantry, take the island, land from two to six months'
supplies, and return to Tampa inside of ten days, when the steamer would be
ready to be used for any future military purpose. "
This was one episode of the day. Another was, Brooke telegraphed from
Chickamauga he was "pressing the whole corps for movement. " The return
of as many transports as possible from Santiago was ordered "at once." July
3d, at 5:25 p. m., there was a telegram from Tampa to the Adjutant-General:
"General Randolph and six light batteries on the Comanche and two
English 9-knot transports, and the First District of Columbia infantry, on
the Catania, have sailed for Key West to-day."

406 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO.
At- 7:55 p. m., Coppinger telegraphed from U. S. Camp, Florida:
"Specialist, with 225 horses, and Unionist, with 300 horses and 2 mules,
both carrying artillery material and 75 men each, sailed at 8:35 this morning.
The Comanche, with General Randolph and balance of men of the six light
batteries and 50 horses, left at 11:40. The first two are 9-knot freight
ers; the Comanche is a 16-knot boat. The Catania, with the First District
Volunteers, less Captain Looker's company, remaining here as provisional
engineers, left at 12:30 p. m. "
The Adjutant-General was advised: "Depot quartermaster has conferred
with us as to movement Tampa to Savannah. Both Florida railroads have
sent to Chickamauga their passenger equipment, which is being held in readi
ness for movement from there. We can get together equipment for the rough
riders, but it would simplify matters if you could order Chickamauga move
ment to begin at once, and we could use that equipment to carry the 5,000
- troops to Savannah. ' '
The first of July, 1898, was Friday. On Sunday morning the Secretary
of War sent a telegram to the general commanding the army assailing Santi
ago that shows as distinctly as a tremor of the earth is recorded by a seis
mometer, the strain of the critical hours :
"Executive Mansion, Washington, July 3, 1898 — 1:56 a. m.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este:
(To be forwarded at once to headquarters in the field.)
The following is just received — midnight — from sources unofficial:
"Cervera has been ordered to- shell the town (Santiago) when Americans
get possession. All foreign consuls have been notified to retire at that time
to places of safety outside of city. ' ' This information may or may not be
correct, but is sent for your consideration. We are awaiting with intense
anxiety tidings of to-day. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
The President was up all night. There was no news, and it was hard
to have faith that it was good to hear nothing.
This is the Secretary's telegram, of the up-all-night-after-the-battle vigil
at the White House : War Department, July 3, 1898.
Major-General Shafter, Commanding United States Forces, Cuba:
I waited with the President until 4 o'clock this morning for news from
you relative to Saturday's battle. Not a word was received, nor has there been

THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 407
up to this hour, 11a.m., except an account of the battle of Friday, upon which
I congratulate you most heartily. I wish hereafter that you would interrupt
all messages that are being sent to the Associated Press and others, and make
report at the close of each day, or during the day if there is anything of
special importance, at once. The Relief left New York yesterday. She has
17 surgeons aboard, and will come to you as quickly as possible.
R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
The Relief was the scientifically provided hospital ship, purchased and
fitted out in anticipation for such an emergency, but too late to go with the
expedition. Playa del Este, via Haiti.
(Received Washington, July 4, 1898 — 12:15 a. m.)
, General Alger, Washington :
Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, Cuba, 3. — Did not telegraph, as I was too
busy looking after things that had to be attended to at once, and did not wish
to send any news that was not fully confirmed; besides, I was too much
excited myself. The Spanish fleet left the harbor this morning and is
reported practically destroyed. I demanded surrender of the city at 10 o'clock
to-day. At this hour, 4:30 p. m., no reply has been received; perfect quiet
along the line; situation has been precarious on account of difficulties of
supplying command with food, and tremendous fighting capabilities shown by
the enemy from his almost impregnable position. SHAFTER, Major-General.
This dispatch tells the story that Shafter had been sorely tried. The
forceful candor of his way of putting things is well illustrated here, but he
had suffered from illness and despondency, and in the darkest hour he sent
this dispatch, which is a remarkable contribution to the full story of historical
events: Playa del Este, July 3, 1898. (Received Washington, 11:44 a- m.)
The Secretary of War, Washington :
Camp near Sevilla, Cuba, 3. We have the town well invested on the
north and east, but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it we find it of
such a character and the defenses so strong it will be impossible to carry it by
storm with my present force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing
about 5 miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between the
San Juan River and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero, so as to get our sup-

408

THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO.

SKETCH OF THE POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON JULY 3.

REDUCED FROM OFFICIAL PLAN PREPARED BY WAR DEPARTMENT.

THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 409
plies, to a large extent, by means of the railroad, which we can use, having
engines and cars at Siboney. Our losses up to date will aggregate 1,000, but
list has not yet been made. But little sickness outside of exhaustion from
intense heat and exertion of the battle of the day before yesterday and the
almost constant fire which is kept up on the trenches. Wagon road to the
rear is kept up with some difficulty on account of rains, but I will be able to
•use it for the present. General Wheeler is seriously ill, and will probably
have to go to the rear to-day. General Young also very ill; confined to his
bed. General Hawkins slightly wounded in foot during sortie enemy made
last night, which was handsomely repulsed. The behavior of the regular
troops was magnificent. I am urging Admiral Sampson to attempt to force
the entrance of the harbor, and will have consultation with him this morning.
He is coming to the front to see me. I have been unable to be out during the
heat of the day for four days, but am retaining the command. General
Garcia reported he holds the railroad from Santiago to San Luis, and has
burned a bridge and removed some rails ; also that General Pando has arrived
at Palma, and that the French consul with about 400 French citizens came
into his lines yesterday from Santiago. Have directed him to treat them with
every courtesy possible. SHAFTER, Major-General.
The dismal lines in this telegram are relating to the serious consideration
of retirement — "withdrawing about five miles." A five mile retreat could
not have changed American destiny, but it would have smashed a great deal
of highly wrought red, white and blue china. The Secretary of War struck
the right keynote when he finally got the news in his dispatch — firm, quiet,
strong words that will be long held in honorable remembrance :
War Department, Washington, July 3, 1898 — 12:10 p. m.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Your first dispatch received. Of course, you can judge the situation
better than we can at this end of the line. If, however, you could hold your
present position, especially San Juan heights, the effect upon the country would
be much better than falling back. However, we leave all that matter to you.
This is only a suggestion. We shall send you reinforcements at once.
R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
On this memorable July 3d, Alger requested that the transports returned
should be ordered by the commander of the fleet, "directing that the fastest
vessels sail with all possible speed to Port Tampa, in order' that they may get

410 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO.
a supply of coal and water, and commence loading before the others arrive,
thus saving time." This was "pushing things" — to use two of Phil. Sheridan's
words as he put them. At two o'clock in the afternoon of July 3d, Shafter
telegraphed :
"Camp near Santiago, 3. — Large quantities of underclothing and shoes,
enough for entire army, are badly needed. ' '
The response the next day was:
St. Paul leaves New York Wednesday direct for Santiago with Eighth
Ohio, and underclothing, shoes, stockings, and duck suits for your whole
army. How are you, Wheeler, Young, and others?
R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
But to go back a day :
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 3, 1898 — 5 p. m.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
You can have whatever reinforcements you want. Wire what additional
troops you desire, and they will be sent as rapidly as transports can be
secured. In addition to the 2,700 troops now en route from Tampa, the St.
Paul and Duchess will leave Newport News not later than Wednesday, with
3,000 troops of Garretson's brigade; the St. Louis, Yale, and Columbia will
sail probably from Charleston, carrying 4,000 more, and others will be sent
from Tampa as you may request. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

War Department, Washington, July 3, 1898.
General Shafter, Commanding United States Forces, Cuba:
We are forwarding reinforcements to you this week. How is your
health? Do you think that some one should come to relieve you? Are you
going to be able to. stand through? What do you think? Be very careful of
yourself. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
This was a delicate but decided suggestion that Shafter's resignation
was the thought of the War Department and the country.
Early in the morning of the 4th of July there was this good news in the
war office, in reply to the "suggestion" of Alger to Shafter that he had better
not yield any ground, but hold what he had got:

THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 4"
Playa del Este, via Haiti.
(Received Washington, July 4, 1898 — 1:16 a. m.)
The Honorable Secretary of War, Washington :
Headquarters Fifth Corps, 3. — I shall hold my present position.
SHAFTER, Major-General.
Holding his present position meant two things. A little later Shafter
felt better, as this witnesses : Playa, July 4, 1898.
(Received Washington July 4, 1898 — 9:30 a. m.)
The Adjutant-General's Office, U. S. Army, Washington:
Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago. — Your telegram inquir
ing about my health just received. I am still very much exhausted. Eating
a little this p. m. for the first time in four days. The good news has inspired
everybody. When the news of the disaster of the Spanish fleet reached the
front, which was during the period of truce, a regimental band that had
managed to keep its instruments on the line, played "The Star-Spangled
Banner" and "There will be a hot time in the old town to-night," men cheer
ing from one end of the line to the other. Officers and men, without even
shelter tents, have been soaking for five days in the afternoon rains, but all
are happy. SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. A.
The American eagle has a fashion of flying high on the 4th of July, and
this was no exception. There are two dispatches from General Shafter that
should be printed together — the following : Playa del Este, via Haiti.
(Received Washington July 3, 1898 — 7 p. m.)
Secretary War, Washington:
Camp near Santiago, 3. — Lieutenant Allen, Second Cavalry, is just in from
my extreme right, which is on the railroad running north from Santiago and
which overlooks the entire bay. Lieutenant Allen states that Cervera's fleet
was in full view until nearly 10 o'clock this morning, when it proceeded down
the bay, and shortly afterwards heavy firing was heard. Duffield, at Siboney,
has just telephoned me that Captain Cotton, of the Harvard, just sent him
word that Admiral Sampson had signaled Cervera had come out and had
escaped, and that he was in pursuit. The Harvard immediately left. The
French consul informed General Garcia, into whose lines he went yesterday,
that Admiral Cervera had stated that he would run out at 10 o'clock this

412 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO.
a. m., and that was the hour Allen witnessed his departure. Cervera told
such consul it was better to die fighting than blow up ships in harbor.
SHAFTER, Commanding.

Playa del Este, via Haiti.
(Received Washington July 3, 1898 — 7:31 p. m.)
Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington :
Camp near Santiago, Cuba 3. — Early this morning I sent in a demand
for immediate surrender of Santiago, threatening bombardment to-morrow.
Perfect quiet on lines for one hour. From news just received of escape of
fleet am satisfied place will be surrendered. SHAFTER, Commanding.
It was very good of the French consul to inform General Garcia when
Cervera was to go out, and Shafter was quick and hair-triggered in his
rebound, demanding the surrender of Santiago within the same day that he
had considered a fall-back of five miles. The following is the text of the
demand: Headquarters United States Forces,
Near San Juan River, Cuba, July 3, 1898 — 8:30 a. m.
To the Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba :
Sir: I shall be obliged unless you surrender to shell Santiago de Cuba.
Please inform the citizens of foreign countries and all women and children
that they should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. Army.
The reply of Jose Toral, the Spanish commander at Santiago, was:
"I advise the foreigners and women and children that they must leave
the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning. It is my duty to say to you
that this city will not surrender, and that I will inform the foreign consuls
and inhabitants of the contents of your message."
The British, Portuguese, Chinese, and Norwegian consuls came to Gen
eral Shafter's lines and asked if non-combatants could occupy the town of
Caney and railroad points, and wanted until 10 o'clock of the 5th instant
before the city was fired on. "They claim"- — we quote Shafter — "that there
are between 15,000 and 20,000 people, many of them old, who will leave.
They ask if I can supply them with food, which I cannot do for want of
transportation to Caney, which is 15 miles from my landing."

THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 413
Shafter concluded that solely in the interest of the poor women and chil
dren he would delay the bombardment until noon of the 5th, if in the interval
no demonstration was made on the American lines, and added in com
municating this to the Secretary of War :
"I do not know that these extreme measures which I had threatened be
justifiable under the circumstances, and I submit the matter for the action of
the President. The little town of Caney will not hold one thousand people,
and great suffering will be occasioned to our friends, as we must regard the peo
ple referred to; and it is now filled with dead and wounded, the dead still
unburied. The consuls tell Dorst that there are not to exceed 5,000 troops in
the city. I can hold my present line and starve them out, letting the non-
combatants come out leisurely as they run out of food, and will probably be
able to give such as are forced out by hunger food to keep them alive. I
await your orders. ' '
The Secretary of War responded, early in the morning of the 4th :
"While you would be justified in beginning to shell Santiago at expira
tion of time limit set by you, still under the conditions named in your dispatch
and for humanity's sake the postponement of the bombardment to noon of
July 5th is approved."
And later the Secretary continued to Shafter:
"You are the best judge of the situation, and all the country has every
faith in your wisdom. How are you physically, anyway?"
The dispatch from Shafter, showing depression so deep he was consider
ing retirement to a line abandoning five miles of lands and territory, continued
to disturb, if not dismay, the War Office, as this telegram perfectly expresses:
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 4, 1898.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
After conference with the President and the Secretary of War, I am
directed to say your continued illness brings sorrow and anxiety. In case you
are disabled, General Wheeler would, of course, succeed to command. His
illness, which we also regret, is feared to be so serious as to prevent his
assuming command. You must determine whether your condition is such as
to require you to relinquish command. If so, and General Wheeler is dis
abled, you will order the next general officer in rank for duty to succeed you
and to take up the work in hand. It is not expected that our forces will make
assault until they are ready. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

4U THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO.
The reply was not thoroughly reassuring, but raised the pressure of
severe anxiety that might take the form of duty to order . the resignation of
the officer who was ill. Playa del Este, via Haiti.
(Received Washington, July 6, 1898 — 5:40 a. m.)
Adjutant-General, Washington :
Camp near Santiago, Cuba, 5. — I am not at present so much ill as
exhausted from the intense strain that has been on me for last two months.
I am also suffering from an attack of gout, which prevents me from moving
about. I have, however, the whole business in my hand, and am managing
it through able staff officers. When I do have to give up I will of course
follow your order, but I hope to be better soon. SHAFTER.
This day, July 6th, the Commanding General at Santiago was notified that
"Hobson and men" were to be exchanged, and the next day Shafter had the
pleasure of telegraphing :
"Lieutenant Hobson and all his men have just been received safely in
exchange for Spanish officer and prisoners taken by us. All are in good
health except two seamen, convalescent from remittent fever."
The apprehensions of General Shafter as to the safety of his position when
he considered falling back were in some degree accountable by the state of his
health. He was seriously sick. He is a man of uncommon bulk, and the
climate was to him unexpectedly trying. He could not endure the full power
of the sun, and suffering from an attack of gout was an additional burden.
The line the American troops occupied on the Friday night when there
was such an oppression in the atmosphere was, as General Shafter described
it, "very thin." So exhausting had been the experiences of the day, so many
men had been killed and wounded, and so many had been overcome by heat,
or fatigued into disability, and the carrying of the wounded to the rear had
been a grievous labor, demanding many bearers, that in the judgment of
most competent officers not more than three thousand of our men were in a
defensive position. The question was whether the Spaniards would advance,
and there was concern on that subject. General Joseph Wheeler, instead of
yielding to his illness, managed to shake it off, and was on the thin line
encouraging the men, and expanding his conviction to them that they were
safe from an attack by the Spaniards they had driven before them ; that the
Spaniards would not dare to fling themselves against our position, and must

THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 415
get the worst of it if they did. But the line, considering its great extent, was
thin, but good as the "thin red line" the British held against the solidRussian
masses, good stuff as they were, at Balaklava and Inkerman. The four dis
patches following display the exact lines of the conditions:
Playa del Este, via Haiti.
(Received at Washington July 5, 1898 — 7 a. m.)
Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington :
1 :o7 p. m. Headquarters United States forces near San Juan River,
Cuba, 4. — I regard as necessary that the navy force an entrance into the har-
~1oor Santiago not later than 6th instant, and assist in the capture of the place.
If they do, I believe the place will surrender without further sacrifice of life.
SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. Volunteers.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 5, 1898 — 11:20 a. m.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Secretary of War instructs me to say that the President directs that you
confer with Admiral Sampson at once for cooperation in taking Santiago.
After the fullest exchange of views, you will agree upon the time and manner
of attack. By command Major-General Miles: H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 5, 1898 — 3:10 p. m.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Your telegram this date has been submitted to the President. After con
sideration, the Secretary of War directs me to say that it is evident from your
several reports that you do* not consider your force strong enough to make a
successful assault upon the Spanish army entrenched in Santiago. This
being the case, it is the part of wisdom to await reinforcements, the embarka
tion of which you have already been advised. As you have already been
advised, you must be judge of the time and manner of assault. The Presi
dent has directed that you and Admiral Sampson have a conference and
determine a course of cooperation best calculated to secure desired results with
least sacrifice.
By command Major-General Miles :
H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

416 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO.
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 6, 1898 — 2:30 p. m.
Maj. Gen. W. R. Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
The Secretary of War is anxious to know what prospect there is of breaking
through the mines. He would be very glad, even with a delay, to have coopera
tion of the navy, thus saving many lives. The St. Paul, sailing from New
York to-day, has nearly everything you asked for. The lighters, sent a long
time since, ought to be with you by this time. We are trying to make
arrangements for light-draft steam vessels for carrying orders, etc., to be sent
you as quickly as possible. Can you not procure from the navy steam
launches to aid you in landing supplies and carrying dispatches while we are
getting crafts of our own for that object. It is expected you will communi
cate freely, setting forth any assistance that can be given you in the way of
suoplies of any kind.
By command Major-General Miles: H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.
General Shafter, when his Santiago Fouth of July was but fifteen minutes
old — 12:15 a. m. — had accounted for being too busy to telegraph the current
intelligence to the President and Secretary of War, who waited in vain
until four in the morning, that he did not want to be sending what might not
be confirmed, and there was a further embarrassment in "the tremendous
fighting capabilities shown by the enemy." The words that followed — "from
his almost impregnable position" — did not take away the great compliment
which ought to be useful to Spain in her home rule, for the good positions,
though they may be defended by fighting men instinctively, are not found
marked out and made almost impregnable accidentally.

' V i^I^?>"V'-

CHAPTER XIX.

The Strange Story of the Secret Official Cipher of Spain.
The Cables that Passed Between Sagasta, Blanco, Cervera, Correa and Linares During the
Crisis of the Spanish War in Cuba — -A Diary Telegraphed from Santiago to Havana,
Giving the Inside of Spanish Affairs from the Attack to the Surrender — Cervera not Well
Fitted out, Forced to Flight, Protesting that he was Going to Destruction — The Cables
Are a Gallery of Paintings of Spanish Character.
In association with the official history of the war between the United
States and Spain, as recorded in our departments of War and the Navy, and
published officially for the information of all nations and people, we are
indebted to the journalistic investments in the news of the day — the liberal
purchase of intelligence in the market — for the unquestionably authentic
cable and wire dispatches of the Spanish Cabinet, the Premier and Ministers
of War and Navy ; General Blanco, Admiral Cervera, the military commander
of the defenders of Santiago, the spies of Spain in Canada, and others, com
municating with each other, privately and confidentially, in the crisis of the
struggle between the several storm centers of the Spaniards — Madrid, Santi
ago and Havana — stating without reservation the "true inwardness" of their
most important trusts, exposing their own shams, expressing facts, exchang
ing opinions, giving orders, embodying the secrets of State, camp, field, fleet
and city. These cablegrams and telegrams are simply the Spanish war
secrets revealing, presenting nakedly their fears and hopes, jealousies and
sentiments, public and personal. The grim privacies of many wars have been
revealed, after the lapse of many years, in the examination of musty papers
from personal collections, and the disturbance in pigeon holes of reserved
documents, too momentous to trust to the world until the generation of their
production was gone and the freshness of their significance made dull by the
4i7

418 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
passage of time, but this ancient history was stinted, not merely by public and
personal policy, but on account of the limitations of 'the methods in old times
of exchanging facts and ideas, and of the preservation in permanent form of
the precise words of conversations, and therefore the inexactness of all ways of
conveying messages. The introduction of telegraphy, the almost universal
use of the wire, and the reduction of messages to writing, changes many con
ditions and contributes mechanically to the veracity of the wonderfully com
plete material of history, never so strikingly illustrated as in this volume, the
purpose of whose author is to tell the story of the war in the words of those
whose deeds are celebrated; not the elaborated after- thoughts of the actors,
but their hot words in action. Here are thousands of snap shots, true as the
Kodak, picturing the thoughts of men responsible for decisions in masterful
minutes, setting forth strongly as if painted in colors the strokes of will power
that were materialized in events. It seems almost incredible that we have
already in print the records of Spain's unhappy war, as written by those who
were the chieftains entrusted with the fleets and armies of the kingdom, in
the capitals of Spain and Cuba, and in Santiago, the city made memorable, in
bombardments, by modern ships of old style fortresses, and desperate battles
afloat and ashore, in which both sides had blood on their hands and breasts.
The dispatches that we give were the discovery of the New York Journal,
and of course made their first appearance in the pages of that paper. There
are two facts that account for this publication, and the first in order may be
mentioned now that the flag of the United States floats over Cuba.
The telegraphic operators on the island did not, as a class,, regard the
Spanish cause or officers with favor, and they and other young men having
the handling of instruments for the transmission and the transfiguration of
intelligence were like minded. Many a Spanish secret was clicked away
according to the Morse alphabet, or conveyed by the soundless signals with
forefingers that experts give and take. An operator says to a reporter, both
telegraphers, at a way-station on a railroad, for instance, as a message with
pith in it is on the wire: "Here, listen to this!" and the sounds are translated
into characters that are imperishable, if that which they contain has the
indestructible vitality of truth. Then the Spanish official is apt to be cor
rupted by the large latitude with which he interprets the word concessions.
There was a time when, as a matter of business, cartridges sold to the insur
gents were carried out of Morro Castle in market baskets. A golden key

/

0^

THE CHURCH AT EL CANEY.

SCENE IN A FIELD HOSPITAL DURING THE BATTLE OF SAN JUAN.

STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 421
unlocks more secrets in Spain than in countries where officialism is less firmly
commissioned and strictly classified.
The Journal was able to say:
"Very interesting are the almost daily bulletins of movements of the
American army and navy from the Spanish spies at Montreal. The originals
of these documents have been kept in the Captain-General's safe in Havana, and
were copied from the original Spanish by a Journal representative, and were
then carefully translated into English. The Journal has in its possession
full copies in the original Spanish. ' '
We give preference in the order of presentation of the dispatches to the
story of Santiago as cabled from Captain Dedemonte, the commander of the
naval station at Santiago, to Admiral Ventura Manterola, at the Navy Yard,
Havana :
April 12, 1898. — Molins and Galicia will probably leave on Saturday.
Both went to-day to arrange the defense at the mouth of the harbor, which the
Mercedes had been guarding. They planted the first group of torpedoes this
morning, and began work on the second group.
April 14. — Ship arrived to-day with 6,000 tons of coal.
April 24. — I have requested permission to extinguish the lights at the
mouth of the harbor.
April 21. — The first line of electric torpedoes is ready.
April 28. — The Mercedes has sent ashore her 16-centimeter Hontoria
guns. The huts in which are stationed the men who guard the torpedoes are
defended with a Nordenfeldt and four machine guns, all served by sailors from
the Mercedes. May 1. — Two lines of electric torpedoes are now fully installed.
May 9. — Two 16-centimeter Hontoria guns have been added to the Zocapa
fortifications. German steamer Polaria has arrived with a case of explosives.
May 5. — Since one o'clock this morning two ships, believed to be Ameri
can, have been standing off the mouth of the harbor. One of them, with all
her lights shaded, approached within a pistol shot of Morro. As soon as she
was discovered by the tug on guard there she turned and fled, and was later
seen to exchange signals with the other. I think they were trying to cut the
cable. It is not probable that they were endeavoring to destroy the submarine
torpedoes. At dawn neither of them could be seen.
May 18. — A small vessel, which looked like the one that tried to cut the

422 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
cable, and a large transatlantic steamer, converted into a war ship, have
exchanged shots with the forts at the mouth of the harbor. No damage was
done on either side. At 4 o'clock this afternoon both ships sailed away.
The light at Morro Castle has been extinguished.
May 19.- — Maria Teresa, Oquendo, Colon, Vizcaya, and Pluton have just
entered Port.
May 23. — Four ships of the enemy are reported.
May 25. — At dawn this morning two of the enemy's ships captured an
English steamer.
May 26. — Six of the enemy's ships reported. Although the squadron has
taken on 1,300 tons of coal, yet it has not enough.
May 31. — Blockading fleet has just finished firing on the batteries at the
mouth of the harbor. The enemy kept up the firing for an hour and a half.
Not one of our men even wounded, and no damage whatever done. It is
believed that Iowa and another ironclad were badly injured, and another of
the ships set on fire. All of their big ships engaged in the fight. Our Colon
enfiladed the entrance to the canal with a disastrous fire, as did the guns of the
Mercedes, which had been mounted on land. Our ships in the harbor also
took part, throwing a number of projectiles at a high elevation. Grand
enthusiasm ; excellent feeling.
June 1. — Crew of the Mercedes thanks you most sincerely for your con
gratulation. I recommend very highly for promotion the brave Ensign
Venancia Nardiz, who commands the land battery; his companion, Ricardo
Bruguedas, and Artillerist Antonio Raga.
June 3. — The enemy's ship Merrimac tried to force the entrance at half-
past three this morning. She was discovered in her attempt, and Morro
immediately opened fire upon her, followed in lively fashion by the inner
fortress of the fort, and by the battery manned by the sailors from the Mer
cedes. The Mercedes and the two torpedo boat destroyers later joined the
combat. Our disastrous fire sunk the ship in the channel. It does not wholly
block the entrance. No damage whatever was done to us. We captured a
lieutenant and seven sailors.
June 4. — The squadron has exhausted the stock of powdered coal.
June 5. — The squadron needs at least seventeen hundred tons of coal to
refill its bunkers.
June 6.— Announcement of the landing of the enemy at Aguadores was

STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 423
an error of Morro. Firing was exceedingly lively by the squadron for three
hours. No damage done to ships of our squadron, but six w*ere killed on the
Reina Mercedes; among them was Lieutenant-Commander Don Emilio
Acosta. Three were seriously wounded, and a large number only slightly.
Among the latter were Ensign Alexandro Bolino, temporarily on the Reina
Mercedes, and the boatswain.
June 7. — In battle yesterday Reina Mercedes was badly injured. She was
twice set on fire by shells of the enemy. Lieutenant-Commander dead.
June 9. — Nineteen ships reported.
June 11. — Seventeen ships reported.
June 12. — Seventeen ships reported.
June 13. — Thirteen ships reported.
June 14. — Early this morning enemy's ships opened fire on the batteries
at the mouth of the harbor. Three ships took part. R. Bruquetas and two
marines slightly wounded. At midnight the batteries fired at random at the
enemy's ships. Fourteen ships now on the blockading stations.
June 16. — During the bombardment to-day one sailor was seriously
wounded and three others slightly so, while one marine and one sailor, both
stationed on the Mercedes, were killed. Fourteen ships on" the blockading
station. According to Morro, the dynamite crusier Vesuvius here since
yesterday. June 17. — The ship Sumefido (?) has been sunk in the middle of the
canal, near Zocapa Point. It does not obstruct the passage of large ships.
She was sunk in twelve fathoms of water.
June 18. — The form of the blockading line is that of an arch, whose
points rest on Punta Cabrera, on the west, and Aguadores on the east. The
ships of the enemy are all the time appearing and disappearing toward the
east. An night they flood the coast and the entrance of the harbor incessantly
with light from the electric searchlights, and when they are on blockading
duty they never station themselves farther than eight miles from Morro, while
at Cabrera and Aguadores they stand in as close as three. There are four
teen ships now on the line. Our wounded are doing well. It is exactly a
month to-day since they fired the first shot against us. Since that time they
have discharged over four thousand projectiles, causing us no material dam
age whatever, and only insignificant injuries.
June 21. — The Admiral of our squadron has had more Bustamente tor-

424 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
pedoes planted in the harbor. Since last night four were placed between
Cayo Smith and the ship Sumerfido (?), and three between that ship and Punta
Solado. At 3 :5o o'clock this afternoon thirty-nine ships of the enemy returned
unexpectedly. They had sailed early this morning, going eastward. There
are sixty now in sight from Morro. The thirty-nine that left early this morn
ing had large bodies of troops on board of them. I have reason to believe that
they expect to land at once at Guantanamo.
(Several other dispatches sent during later hours of the afternoon a.nd
night of this date, June 21st, indicate thjat the lookout man at El Morro was
kept busy tallying our ships by the frequent departures of transports.)
June 22. — According to information received from El Morro, the enemy
began embarking troops early this morning at Berracos, while their ships kept-
up a furious bombardment of the coast, El Morro and the battery at the
mouth of the harbor.
June 23. — In front of the mouth of the harbor are eight iron-clads, two
torpedo boats, and the Vesuvius and eight transports, the remainder up to
71 having gone down the coast. We believe that the landing of troops is
continuing. June 24. — Twenty-two ships blockading the port. The remainder up to
63 are at Baiquiri. Others are bombarding the coast.
The Admiral has caused the Mercedes to be anchored within the harbor.
He says he now has provisions for sixty days.
June 25. — Alvarado has provisions for forty-five days.
I learn from the Military Governor that the troops of the enemy must
have suffered very severely from the fire of our men, who compelled them to
abandon their position.
June 26. — In one storehouse alone there are 4,800 rations at the disposal
of Admiral's squadron. Forty-two ships in sight on station. El Morro says
that last night Vesuvius fired two dynamite shells, which completely destroyed
the house of the torpedo officer and caused great injury in the fortress, result
ing in three sailors of the Reina Mercedes being wounded.
June 27. — Morro says that Vesuvius fired three more dynamite shells last
night, but they did no damage, for they* fell in the water.
July 1. — Since early this morning a battle has been in progress with more
or less vigor between our troops and the enemy, lasting until 2 o'clock this
afternoon. A few shells fell in the city, causing great commotion. A few of

ow

**^ ' s

.. -v. . .

BOMBPROOFS THROWN UP BY ROUGH RIDERS TO PROTECT THEM FROM SPANISH SHELL- AND SHRAPNEL.

COL. ROOSEVELT'S MEN COOKING THEIR FIRST DINNER AT DAIQUIRI. FRIED BACON AND HARD TACK THE MENU.

STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 427
the ships fired at an elevation with the object of hitting the ships of our
squadron, but failed to do so. I have not yet learned of the result of the
battle on land. Captain Bustamente, of the navy, is seriously wounded. It is
said that General Vara del Reye was killed, together with many other officers,
and that many officers have also been wounded. Killed and wounded among
the troops will reach a high figure. General Linares was also wounded. Day
before yesterday squadron of the enemy captured steamer which was
endeavoring to enter this port. A captive balloon was sent up from the
camp of the enemy and inspected our advance positions and probably
harbor also.
July 2. — The battles on land and sea were renewed this morning, the
squadron of the enemy firing on the batteries of the fort, and our ships. The
firing is spirited. At 8 o'clock the firing ceased. Our losses were three killed
and three wounded — at the Reina Mercedes battery at Punta Gorda. Among
the wounded are Ensign Peina and a sailor from the Mercedes. The Zocapa
battery has been silenced.
July 3. — Our squadron has left. It was met outside by a very sharp fire
from the enemy's ships. It has apparently succeeded in running the block
ade, going out of sight of land in a westerly direction.
June 4. — One hundred and eight members of the crews of the Pluton,
Terror and Infanta Maria Teresa have arrived here. Not a single officer
among them. Nobody has. any definite news of the Admiral. Military
Governor has sent a cablegram for the General-in-Chief, instructing me to
sink at the mouth of the harbor the Reina Mercedes. This will be done
to-night. Enemy bombarded again to-day. Enemy apparently intends to force the
port. I have confidence in the first line of electric torpedoes, but there are
only four in the second line, the rest having been raised to enable our squad
ron to pass out. I have proposed to the Military Governor to sink the Reina
Mercedes across the channel in eight fathoms of water. He is now consulting
with the General-in-Chief. Reina Mercedes is without armament, crew or
officers, her batteries having been sent to the mouth of the harbor. Her boil
ers are worthless. I consider our situation as grave.
July 5. — There are twenty-four ships of the enemy in sight at dusk.
Reina Mercedes was sunk at the mouth of the harbor by the guns of the
enemy.

428 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
July 10. — At 9 o'clock this morning there were twenty-four ships of the
enemy on blockading station, and an abundance of American troops on land.
Rebels on every side of us also. Although the bombardment has ceased, it
seems that there is a suspension of hostilities, but for what purpose I do not
know. From half-past 4 to half-past 6 the firing between our troops and the
enemy has been exceedingly lively. A few projectiles fell among the ships of
the squadron and the land batteries. We drove the enemy from the first line
of trenches. Our loss not heavy. Our men behaved with rare courage. If
we had had an abundance of ammunition we would have inflicted a severe
blow on the enemy.
July 11. — Random firing between the advanced lines of both sides. Two
ironclads at the mouth of the harbor, two in Baiquiri and fifteen at different
points toward the east. From 9 to 2 the enemy's ships have been firing on
the city, using projectiles of large caliber, but a majority of them fell short of
their mark and exploded in the bay. Several buildings were damaged.
July 12. — Situation the same, but firing has ceased for the sake of a
parley. July 13. — Both sides have agreed to cease firing till 12 o'clock to-morrow.
July 16. — Suspension of hostilities continued, General Toral holding con
ferences with American General. I believe that the capitulation, in the event
of that being the result of the conferences, will be on the basis of the repatria
tion of our men and those of the squadron and the Reina Mercedes. Number
of people dying from hunger and the like is increasing. Military Governor has
issued a decree against pillage, robbery and incendiarism. There are in Cuba
to-day 50,000 Americans, sixty cannon, the squadron and the rebels.
July 17. — The city has capitulated, and over it and the Alvarado the
American flag has been raised. Thus ends my authority, as well as that of
my associates on this naval station.

This diary is only remarkable because it was written day by day in
Santiago and sent to Havana, and shows the shifting shades of the situation.
We reproduce, according to their dates, the Spanish cipher cables that the
Journal certifies are accurate and careful translations from the original Span
ish copies of the cipher dispatches, as they were received or sent by Captain
General Blanco:

STORY OF TPIE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER, 429
Admiral Cervera reports his arrival at Santiago :
Santiago, May 19, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
Arrived to-day in this port, where the entire squadron, desirous of cooper
ating in defense of the country, has the pleasure of saluting you.
CERVERA.

Linares, at Santiago, reports Cervera's squadron: May 19, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
Cervera's squadron arrived here at 7 o'clock this morning, the Maria
Teresa flying the flag of the Admiral. The Colon brings neither her forward
nor stern guns, not having been able to mount them. The squadron is com
posed of the cruisers Teresa, Oquendo, Vizcaya and Colon, .the torpedo boat
destroyers Pluton and Furor, and two steamers of the Transatlantic Line.
The Terror remained in Martinique, repairing the damages sustained on the
voyage. The Alicante is with the Terror. They both need coal and pro
visions. By reason of the increase in consumption caused by the arrival of
the squadron, the provisions of this place will only hold out until the end of
June. LINARES.

Blanco cables Cervera can't fight: Havana, May 20, 1898.
General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid :
Cervera's squadron has arrived at Santiago de Cuba, without the Terror,
which remained at Martinique with the Alicante, both blockaded by the ships
of the enemy*. The squadron comes without provisions or coal, which it will
take on there, but it will not be able to remain a long time, since it would
expose itself to be blockaded, thus shutting itself off completely and limiting
itself to the scant resources of the city If it had brought the Pelayo and the
Carlps Quinto and a flotilla of torpedo boats, it would be able to attempt
something important and to contribute powerfully to the defense of the island.
Reduced as it is, however, it will be obliged to avoid a combat as much as
possible, limiting itself to maneuvers which will not expose it to dangers, but
which, on the other hand, cannot produce great results. The squadron has
not brought with it any transport, either with coal or provisions, which would
have been as advantageous for us as arms and ammunition. The question of

43° STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
provisions threatens to be very serious, for hardly enough remains for one
month. The efforts which I have been making to obtain supplies have thus
far been without success. The only thing that can be done is to arm some
fast transatlantic steamers and send them to run the blockade, advising me of
the probable date of their arrival, so that we may distract the attention of the
enemy. I have to-day issued a decree suppressing all the duties on merchan
dise and making every port of the island free. I consider it indispensable
that the squadron of Cervera be reinforced as much as possible, and that the
torpedo boat destroyers be sent here to increase our strength. I am assured
on good authority that the enemy plans invasion with 28,000 men next week.
BLANCO.

Linares's impressions of Cervera's fleet: Santiago, May 20, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
Yesterday, when I gave an account of the number of ships and their
classes composing the squadron, I did not send you my impressions, expecting
to confer with the Admiral, because I supposed that you were fully informed.
Neither here nor in the Peninsula is there available a better squadron than
that of Cervera, who says that he can only be reinforced with the Carlos
Quinto, but no cruiser, nor the Pelayo. If they have continued mounting
their old armament they could not be expected to strengthen the other
vessels, since they would lack the facilities for coping with vessels enjoying
modern equipments. As it now stands, Cervera's squadron cannot go out
and search a battle. It will have to limit itself to maneuvering cleverly in
order not to compromise any portion of our naval power. If it remains here
long enough it will be blockaded, and thus completely shut off from com
munication, and reduced to the scant resources of this place. It is my duty
to lay before you clearly the situation and to assure you that I will meet. all
the dangers of the situation with all energy. However, the government
should know the real state of affairs, so that if the naval forces and the army
should be unable to accomplish anything, the failure will not be attributed to
lack of skill and bungling. I have furnished to the squadron 2,400 tons of
coal, 600 from the San Luis Railroad Company's storehouse, and 1,800 from
the Yuruago and Baiquiri mines. LINARES.

STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 431
Spanish government's understanding of Cervera's position:
Madrid, May 21, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
In the name of the government I thank you for your congratulation in
regard to the safe arrival of Cervera's squadron. The Admiral says that he
expects to provision it in as short a time as possible, because it is his opinion
that that place (Santiago) will shortly be in a very difficult position. He,
however, asks that reinforcements be sent to him. Assure him that the
government appreciates the gravity of affairs, and is fully alive to the
situation. CORREA.

Spanish Consul at Montreal tells of Schley's departure: Montreal, May 22, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Madrid:
Schley's squadron has sailed for the south of Cuba. It is composed of
four monitors and a coast defense vessel. BONILLA.

Blanco reports a British collier: Havana, May 22, 1898.
General Linares, Santiago:
I have information that the American battleship Iowa and the American
cruiser Brooklyn and two other large ships and three small ones are off
Cienfuegos. I have also to inform you that an English ship loaded with coal
has sailed from Curacoa for Santiago. BLANCO.

Spying on our fleets: Santiago, May 23, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
The two ships of the enemy which withdrew yesterday, going westward,
returned this morning with another cruiser. LINARES.

Havana. May 23, 1898.
General Linares, Santiago:
The Indiana, the New York, Montgomery, Dolphin, Wilmington, and
three other cruisers, left the blockading station off Havana to-day.
BLANCO.

432 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
Santiago, May 23, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
The squadron will leave to-morrow morning. I do not know what direc
tion it will take. It is said it will abandon the coasts of Cuba.
LINARES.

Montreal, May 23, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
Four powerful war ships sailed on the 21st, with instructions to find and
destroy Cervera's squadron. The Cincinnati and Vesuvius have been sent to
patrol the Yucatan Channel. BONILLA

Havana May 24, 1898
General Linares, Santiago:
Be sure and notify me of departure of squadron. Am eager to learn of
its departure. BLANCO.

Cervera decides to stay at Santiago : Santiago, May 24, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
Cervera, after having consulted with the commanders of his various ships,
has been to see me. He has decided to remain here until assured that he
will not be pursued by the Americans when he endeavors to leave the port.
He will wait until they make a move on Porto Rico. He thinks it will be
best to go to Curacoa. Unless the future movements of the enemy should
change the situation he does not think it would be well to go to Cienfuegos, a
point which is connected with Havana and other places with resources and
provisions. A few ships could close the narrow mouth of this port and render
difficult for an indefinite time a departure from it. Thus the American forces
would be permitted to resume without embarrassment the attack on Havana,
with the moral advantage of having rendered our squadron useless. LINARES.

Blanco's wishes for success: Havana, May 24, 1898.
General Linares, Santiago:
Your observations regarding the squadron very acceptable. If it had
gone to Cienfuegos it would certainly have entered that port without incident.
Your situation is certainly difficult to-day, for the reasons which you indicate,

STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 433
but it is to be hoped that the ingenuity and valor of your Admiral and other
chiefs will enable a departure from there to be made with success, for which I
offer you again my sincerest wishes. BLANCO.

Cervera warned against being "bottled up" : Havana, May 24 1898.
General Linares, Santiago:
Oregon arrived to-day at Key West. The flying squadron will move upon
Santiago to-day, and Sampson expects to arrive to-morrow. Report to
Cervera that he may take steps to prevent himself from being shut up in the
harbor. BLANCO.

Blanco encourages Madrid : Havana, May 27, 1898.
General Corea, Minister of War, Madrid :
Cervera's squadron has made a great impression on the Americans. They
have dispatched seven ships to Santiago. BLANCO.

Spanish Consul sends word of Hobson's plan: Montreal, May 27, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
Believing that our squadron is in Santiago, the government of the United
States is thinking of sinking large hulks at the entrance of the bay after the
destruction of the fortifications. I advise that notice of this be sent to our
squadron. The American government announces an agreement with Maximo
Gomez. It is said that a steamer will touch at Key West very soon to take on
an expedition, which will disembark at various points. BONILLA.

Correa, Minister of War, much pleased : Madrid, May 30, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
The belief that General Linares is not in cable communication with you
and the interruption of the telegraphic land line cause us to notify you that we
will expect you to send us information of the Eastern Department and of
Cervera as you may receive it. The last paragraph of your dispatch has
created a very favorable impression on the government. CORREA.

434 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
Plot to smash Dewey: Madrid, June 3, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
The very serious situation in the Philippines compels us to send there
ships and reinforcements of troops as soon as possible. In order to be able to
cope with the squadron of the enemy in Manila, it will be indispensable to
send there a squadron that is not inferior. Now there are only two ships of
war there, and one of them, I think, cannot pass the canal. The only thing
that we can do is to send such ships of Cervera's squadron as may be able to
leave Santiago, but before adopting a resolution to that effect the government
desires to know your opinion as to the effect that would be produced in the
people of Cuba by the withdrawal of Cervera's squadron. This move would
be only temporary, and, once the object was obtained in the Philippines, the
squadron would return to Cuba without loss of time and strongly reinforced.
CORREA.

Blanco says withdrawal of Cervera's fleet would mean the loss of Cuba:
Havana, June 3, 1898.
General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid :
I would be lacking in my duty if I should conceal from you the fact that
the departure from these waters of Cervera's squadron would produce here
such a dismal effect that I doubt if I would be able to cope even with force
with the situation that it would provoke. The volunteers at present, primed
to their utmost by reason of the smallness of Cervera's squadron and sus
tained in their exaltation by the hope of the arrival of reinforcements from
one moment to another, would arise in a body on learning that instead of rein
forcements the ships that are here would leave. It would necessitate the
shedding of considerable blood, even if the army would agree to fire upon the
volunteers, which I doubt. In that case the loss of the island by reason of
the terrible uprising which would thus be caused would follow. That is my
opinion, and I express it without any exaggeration. So my conscience directs
— and permit me to add that in my judgment the salvation of Spain and of the
dynasty is here in Cuba, and here, therefore, you ought to send as many ships
as you possibly can. If the Indians of the Philippine Islands are loyal, they
ought to be sufficient to save that country. If they are not loyal there is no
means of saving the Philippines. BLANCO.

GRAVE OF CAPTAIN WETHERILL WHO FELL IN THE FAMOUS CHARGE OF SAN JUAN HILL,

"OQUENDO," STAEBOARD SIDE, SHOWING EXIT OF 13-INCH SHELL.

' OQUENDO," STARBOARD SIDE, AS ABANDONED.

STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 437
Cervera's Marines ordered to land: Havana, June 13, 1898.
General Linares, Santiago:
In order to resist the attack on Santiago, either by sea or by land, the
marines of Cervera's squadron should be landed and the rapid fire guns, and
they, it seems, could be also used to good effect. BLANCO.

Blanco asks authority over Cervera: Havana, June 21, 1898.
General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid :
I have regretted very much that the independence enjoyed by Cervera's
squadron has prevented me from intervening in the matter of its operation
notwithstanding the fact that on me will fall whatever the consequences may
be, especially as since the arrival of the squadron in Santiago and its pro
longed stay there I have had to change the campaign. If at least he had
endeavored to put himself in communication with me, with Linares, or
Admiral Manterola, chief of the navy yard in Havana, it is probable that
between us all we would have found a more advantageous solution of the
problem than that which is offered to-day, namely, either an unequal combat
within the harbor or a dash through the enemy's line for either Haiti or
Jamaica, where, in turn, they would be again shut up. It would be prefer
able, perhaps, to come to Cienfuegos or Havana, which is possible at the pres
ent time, or to go -back to Spain if there is no possibility of being reinforced.
It is better to take all these risks rather than to remain shut up in Cuba and
to be compelled to surrender because of hunger. "The situation is very grave,
and I do not doubt that the government will order in these critical times that
which will be best for the country and the throne. Permit me, however, to
suggest, with all respect, the advisability of combining all military action in
the present war, decreeing that in me shall reside all authority as command
ing chief of all the forces, both land and water, operating in these parts.
BLANCO.

Cervera told of a good time to escape : Havana, June 24, 1898.
General Linares, Santiago :
Tell Admiral Cervera that I desire to know his opinion of the situation
and his plans. Tell him I think that he ought to leave as soon as possible for
whatever port he may think most advisable, because his position in that

438 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
harbor, in my opinion, is as dangerous as it can possibly be. Last night alone
there were seven ships there, while in Cienfuegos there were only three, and
here there were nine, in spite of which the Santo Domingo and Montevideo,
which left at 2 o'clock in the morning, were able to run the blockade with
ease. BLANCO

Madrid, June 24, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
The squadron of blockading ships being reduced to seven at Santiago, the
government thinks this would be an excellent occasion for our squadron to
endeavor to make its escape. CORREA.
Cervera's view of the situation: Santiago, June 25, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco,
(Through Admiral Manterola, Chief of the Navy Yard), Havana:
Since my last dispatch to you, I have received a letter from General
Linares, transmitting to me a dispatch from you, in which you say you desire
to know my opinion on the situation. In my former letter I indicated what it
was, and on the present occasion I shall go into details. It is not true that the
blockading squadron has even been reduced to only seven ships. Even the
six principal ones represent a force three times greater than mine. The lack
of long-range guns in the fortifications at the mouth of the harbor prevents us
from keeping the American ships at a great distance. It therefore happens
that they are always near to the mouth Of the harbor, and with their strong
searchlights they make it impossible for me to escape, except by giving them
battle and overpowering them. In my judgment, an attempt to leave this
port would surely involve the loss of the squadron, the death of a majority of
the crews of all the ships, a course which I would never take upon myself,
but if you order it I will execute it. In my opinion, the loss of the squadron
was settled when I was ordered to come here, so that the present grievous
situation is not a surprise to me. You will command whether or not we shall
go forward to this sacrifice, which I think will be useless.
CERVERA.

Admiral Cervera a subordinate :
Santiago, June 25, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
The government orders me to place myself under your orders, in accord-

STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 439
ance with the decree of November 13, 1872, which I do with the greatest of
pleasure, believing it to be my duty, and I shall explain to you the condition
of the squadron.
Of three thousand shells for the Hontoria guns of fourteen centimeters,
only six hundred and twenty are available, the others being absolutely useless,
not having been replaced by good ones because of the lack of facilities at the
time of our departure from Spain. Two Hontoria guns of fourteen centi
meters on the Oquendo are not good, and I have ordered them changed for
others. The greater number of the quick matches are useless, as they lack
their caps. The Colon is without her main batteries. The Vizcaya's bottom
is foul, and the ship has therefore lost her speed. The Maria Teresa has no
guns for landing parties, and those of the Vizcaya and Oquendo are worthless.
Moreover, we have very little coal and provisions for the month of July. The
blockading squadron is four times superior. Therefore, our attempt to leave
this port would mean our immediate, absolutely sure destruction. A great
part of my crews are on land, reinforcing the garrison there. On the 23d I
considered it to be my duty to place before the government the information
contained in the following telegram: "The enemy is at sea. He has captured
Baiquiri. To-day he will surely capture Siboney, in spite of the brilliant
defense which will be offered. Yesterday five battalions left Manzanillo.
They will arrive in time to prolong the agony, for I very much doubt if they
will be able to save the city. As it is absolutely impossible for the squadron
to escape under these circumstances, I expect to offer all the resistance in my
power in the event of necessity, and to destroy the ships as a last resort. ' '
This is the expression of my opinion, which agrees with the opinion of the
commanders of all my ships. I await your instructions.
CERVERA.

General Blanco orders Cervera out (copyright, 1898, by W. R. Hearst) :
Havana, June 26, 1898.
Admiral Cervera, Santiago :
Your two telegrams received. I reciprocate highly the satisfaction which
you express at being placed under my orders, and I consider myself highly
honored, and I desire that you shall regard me more as a companion than as
a chief. It appears to me that you exaggerate somewhat the difficulties of
leaving Santiago. There is no necessity of fighting. All that you are asked

44° STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
to do is to escape from that prison in which the squadron now finds itself, and
I do not think it is impossible, if, you take advantage of opportune circum
stances, such as a dark night, stormy weather, etc. Thus you might be able
to mock the vigilance of the enemy and to take whatever course you might
deem best. Moreover, in the case of your being detected, remember that the
aim at night is uncertain, and although you may sustain some damage, yet
they would be trivial when the saving of the ships is taken into consideration.
You tell me that the loss of Santiago is assured, in which case you would
destroy the ships — and this is all the more reason why you should endeavor to
escape, since it is always preferable for a soldier to succumb in a battle where
he would have many chances of success. For my part, I repeat that I think
it would be very difficult, indeed, even admitting the strength of the enemy's
ships, that leaving the port on a dark night and taking advantage of a good
opportunity, the departure or temporary reduction of the enemy's squadron
for any purpose, they would cause much damage. A proof of this is the
departure of the Montevideo and Santo Domingo from this port, with nine
ships on the blockading station, the departure of the Purisima Concepcion
from Casilda, with three, and the arrival of the Regina Christina in Cienfu
egos, with three also. If your ships should be captured in any way whatever
in a Cuban port, the effect in all the world would be disastrous and the war
would then be held to be ended in favor of the enemy. To-day all the nations
of the earth have their eyes fixed on your squadron, and in it is wrapt up the
honor of the nation, as I am sure you understand. The government is of the
same opinion. The situation offers no doubt to my mind, for indeed, I have
great confidence in the success of it. I shall leave completely to your discre
tion the course which you will have to take, even though some ships will have
to be sacrificed. As a favorable sign I will say to you that the captain of the
German cruiser Geier has expressed the opinion that the squadron can effect
its departure from Santiago without exposing itself to great risks. BLANCO.

Admiral Cervera's reply to Blanco: Santiago, June 27, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
Your cable of yesterday received. Many thanks for your very kind words.
I ought to bow to your judgment without discussing it, the more so, having
already given you my full opinion after mature reflection. I have always

£ Morro Gunr. {$|H?

VIEWS OF THE NOTORIOUS PRISON AT SANTIAGO.

CAST IRON PROJECTILES USED IN THE NAVY.

PETTY OFFICERS OF THE U. S. S. "NEW YORK."

STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 443
believed that there were more competent sailors than I, and I am very sorry
that none of them can come to take command of the squadron, making me his
subordinate. I consider your telegram as an order to leave the port, and in
consequence I shall ask General Linares to re-embark the forces which were
landed from my ships in conformity with your orders. I beg you to confirm
the order to leave the port, because it is not stated in explicit terms, and I
should be very sorry not to interpret your orders correctly.
CERVERA.

Santiago, June 28, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
Impossible to reerhbark troops from Cervera's ships until the arrival of
reinforcements. LINARES.

Madrid presses Cervera to escape : Madrid, June 26, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
The government believes that on the first opportunity offering all the ships
of the squadron, or those whose condition would lead to the hope that they
may be able to save themselves, should leave the port, and that the Admiral
should be given full liberty to take whichever direction he pleases.
CORREA.

Blanco orders a postponement of the fleet's "departure" :
Havana, June 28.
Admiral Cervera, Santiago :
I desire to improve as much as possible the situation in Santiago. I am
doing all I can to send you rations, and if I can get them I will send you
more reinforcements, thus prolonging the defense and perhaps raising the
siege, with the result of saving the squadron. In the event of not securing
reinforcements for you, you will have to leave the port in spite of the diffi
culties, which I recognize. My decision is that the squadron remain there
quietly until the rations are received, watching a favorable opportunity to
depart, going wherever y*ou may think convenient, but in the event of affairs
becoming grave, even to the rjoint of your believing the fall of Santiago to be
imminent, the squadron must leave immediately as best it can, its destination

444 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
to be determined by you and the distinguished officers who command the
ships, and undoubtedly they will confirm with their acts the reputation which
they enjoy. BLANCO.
Cervera accepts his doom : Santiago, June 28, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
Your telegram received. Please repeat it from the word "grave" to the
end of the sentence, as I do not understand it perfectly at that point. All
the rest will be complied with as well as possible, notwithstanding the fact
that the scarcity of coal will make it difficult. These ships require twelve
hours of firing up, and if the fires are ready to enable them to take advantage
of any opportunity which may offer, they will each burn up fifteen tons a day ;
but I believe I understand the purport of your order, which is that if I can
get a favorable opportunity we shall make the best of it, and if not, at the last
hour it is to be done even though the loss of the squadron will be inevitable.
CERVERA.

Blanco orders Cervera to leave : Havana, July 1, 1898.
Admiral Cervera, Santiago:
I have learned of the advance made by the enemy in spite of the heroic
defense of the troops at Santiago, and in accordance with the opinion of the
government you must reembark those of your crew who were landed, and
you must take advantage of the earliest possible opportunity to leave the port
with all your ships. You are to follow whatever course you may consider
opportune, and you are authorized to leave there any of your ships which,
because of its slowness or for other reasons, would have no chance of saving
itself. I must inform you that in Cienfuegos there are only three blockading
ships and at Havana nine, none of them of any importance. BLANCO.
Cervera seeks delay: Santiago, July 1, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
As a continuation of my cable of yesterday, I have to inform you that
General Linares has answered me that he cannot return the sailors because
they occupy positions on the firing line and in the trenches, and that if they
are removed the Americans would be able to advance through the places thus

STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 44 5
vacated. Without these men the squadron cannot leave the port. I request
further instructions from you. CERVERA.

Santiago, July i, 1898. ¦
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
From General Toral you know of the battle of to-day. General Toral
thinks that the withdrawal of my sailors would result in the loss of Santiago,
and without them I cannot attempt to escape. My opinion is the same as
that of Toral, and our departure would in that event be like a flight. My cap
tains also think so. Send instructions for which I have asked. CERVERA.

Squadron given twelve hours to leave : Havana, July 2, 1898.
Admiral Cervera, Santiago:
Ship with the greatest haste all your sailors and leave immediately with
the squadron. BLANCO.
(In his own handwriting Blanco added the following words to this dis.
patch, writing them on the back of the telegram: "Twelve hours only are
necessary for Cervera to get ready.")

Madrid approves: Madrid, July 3, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
Instructions given to Cervera are approved. CORREA.

General Toral, of Santiago, reports Cervera's flight: Santiago, July 3, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
At half -past nine this morning Cervera's squadron departed in perfect for
mation, firing like the devil on the ships of the enemy, including the Indiana,
Massachusetts, Iowa, Texas, Brooklyn, New York, and a number of con
verted yachts, which were near the mouth of the harbor. After an hour of
sharp firing our squadron disappeared from sight, going toward the west,
having maneuvered with the greatest celerity and without losing a single
minute. The enemy's squadron was thrown into confusion and w*as not able
to approach our ships, notwithstanding their superiority, and it was only after
our squadron had run the blockade that, the enemy's ships followed in pur
suit. I regret to have to report the loss of the two torpedo boat destroyers,

446 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
One of them ran on the rocks near Punta Cabrera, and the other received such
injuries, including the loss of its rudder, that it was in vain that it endeavored
to return to port. Attacked by a ship of the enemy, it sustained the battle
and then was compelled to ship its crew in two boats. One of them was
captured, while the other reached the shore. A short time afterward the
destroyer blew up. From Morro it was impossible to see whether the crew of
the one that was stranded at Punta Cabrera was able to save themselves. As
this battle, which was distinguished by heroic conduct on the part of all our
sailors, much to the glory of our navy, may awaken in the Admiral command
ing the enemy's squadron a desire to force the entrance to the harbor and
bombard the city, which I think would be easy, I have decided to block the
mouth of the harbor. TORAL.

Cienfuegos ordered to congratulate Cervera : Havana, July 3, 1898.
General Aguirre, Military Commander, Cienfuegos:
Make preparations for the reception of the squadron commanded by
Admiral Cervera, which left Santiago this morning, and which may arrive at
any moment at Cienfuegos. Facilitate the Admiral with whatever he may
need, and congratulate him for me for the distinguished victory over the
enemy. BLANCO.
First news of the squadron's destruction: Santiago, July 3, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
A number of shipwrecked sailors from the destroyers and one from the
Maria Teresa presented themselves this evening in Zocapa Castle. The sailor
from the Maria Teresa said that when far from Santiago ,that cruiser was lost,
and that the Oquendo was on fire at the time. A number of other sailors
from the Maria Teresa have made their way here. It is not known what has
been the fate of the Admiral. TORAL.

Santiago, July 4, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
The American General tells me that our squadron has been destroyed
and that Cervera is a prisoner. TORAL.

STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 447
Madrid hears of the squadron's fate: Havana, July 4, 1898.
General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid :
According to advices received from the military commander of Santiago
de Cuba, a number of sailors from the Maria Teresa have arrived here, and
they say that their ship, the Oquendo, the Pluton and the Furor were beached,
with fire on board, and that the Colon and Vizcaya were lost to sight with the
enemy in full pursuit. BLANCO.

Cervera reports his capture : Playa del Este, July 5, 1898.
Captain General Blanco, Havana:
I left Santiago de Cuba yesterday morning with all the squadron, and,
after an unequal combat and against forces more than three times greater
than my own, my entire squadron was destroyed, I having given orders to run
them on the rocks. The Maria Teresa, the Oquendo and the Vizcaya blew
up, and the Colon, according to information given me by the Americans,
beached and turned over, and the destroyers were sunk. I am not yet aware
of the number of lives lost, but it will undoubtedly exceed six hundred dead
and many wounded, although not in such a great proportion. We, the sur
vivors, are all prisoners of the Americans. My men behaved with the greatest
courage, and they won the plaudits even of the enemy. The commander of
the Vizcaya was permitted to retain his sword. I am highly pleased with the
generosity with which they treated us. Villamil is among the dead, and I
believe that Lagaza was also killed. And among the wounded is Eulate.
We have lost everything, and need funds. CERVERA (a prisoner at that time).

Blanco tries to shift blame : Havana, July 5, 1898.
Admiral Cervera, Playa del Este :
I have read your telegram with great sorrow, and I admire the bearing of
the chief officers and crew. Perhaps if you had selected some other hour to
leave port the result would have been different. Sampson says in his tele
gram that he has not suffered more than three killed and wounded. Is that
possible? Tell me what funds you need, and where and how I can remit to

448 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
you. I beg you, as well as all the chiefs and officers and men- under your
command, to receive the expression of my lively interest and desire to allevi
ate your situation to the full extent of my ability. BLANCO.

Madrid cables "great joy": Madrid, July 6, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
The departure of the squadron has caused great joy here. CORREA.

Blanco advises holding out: Havana, July 8, 1898.
General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid:
The army, always ready for any sacrifice for the sake of the nation,
remains intact up to the present time, and is still full of spirit, for it is main
taining itself in Santiago de Cuba with vigor. After many brilliant battles,
in which, although some ground has been lost, every inch of territory was
disputed with great valor, severe losses have been inflicted upon the enemy.
It is my opinion that the majority of the military classes would listen with
little patience to any peace proposition, much less to any projDosition for the
abandonment of territory which the army has been defending so valorously.
With provisions and ammunition we could maintain our position for many
months, and still render very dear the victory to our enemies, although the
absolute possession of the sea, which the Americans enjoy, will make life
painful for the lack of food, battles extremely difficult by reason of the
scarcity of ammunition, and hamper the government considerably, because of
the frequent disturbances of public order, which will result from a famishing
condition on the part of the people. To sum up, then, permit me to say
that the army in general desires war for the honor of arms as well as for its
own honor, and that it would be exceedingly sorrowful to them to abandon to
the enemy without fighting a land which it has been preserving for so many
long years at the cost of its own blood. That is the opinion I also hold, and
that I have always held. BLANCO.

Blanco's tribute of admiration to Cervera: Havana, July 9, 1898.
Admiral Cervera, Care French Consul, New York:
Insisting on my desire to alleviate the condition of those brave defenders
of the nation who so valorously succumbed in unequal combat, and to whom

STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 449
as to you, I offer a tribute of admiration, I beg you to let me know what sum
of money you need, and where I can send it to you,. which end and to save
time I am directing this telegram to the care of the French Consul in New
York- BLANCO.

Madrid, July 14, 1898.
General Blanco, Havana:
Your telegram received. CORREA.

Prime Minister Sagasta's appeal: Madrid, July 12, 1898.
Blanco, Governor-General, Havana:
Absolute masters of the siege, the Americans, knowing by experience
how costly it has been to them to engage our brave soldiers in battle, will
limit themselves in the future to extending and strengthening the blockade
and to bombarding ports, at the same time detaching ships to attack Porto
Rico, the Canaries, the Balearic Islands, and even cities on the coast of the
Peninsula, expecting that, aided by the Indians, they will secure possession of
the Philippines, and surely also disturb public order in the nation. The
unmistakable duty of any government is to avoid such great and such
irremediable evil by seeking by all means the end of such an unequal and
disastrous combat. Peace could be obtained to-day on conditions that would
be accepted and honorable to the army. But once Cuba has been reduced by
starvation, Manila lost, a part, if not all, of Porto Rico occupied and the most
important cities on our coast bombarded, it will not be possible to think of
peace. The discomposure and ruin of this calamitous country would be the
result. I trust that in view of these reasons you and the generals under your
orders, to whom our institutions and, above all, our country, are so dear, will
know how to respond to the discipline of the ever valorous army, and to
render obedience to the resolutions of the government regarding peace. I
await with anxiety your reply which I beg you to send me with all possible
¦ haste. SAGASTA.

Correa explains Madrid's position: Madrid, July 12, 1898.
Captain-General Blanco, Havana:
Your telegram No. 202 received. I am surprised that the honor of your
indomitable army being already saved, as undoubtedly and to the admiration

450 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
of the whole world, as well as to the great glory of the nation, it has been, that
the forces at Santiago persist in continuing a war in which they surely can
gain no more laurels nor arrive at any other result than that of being com
pelled to surrender in a short time for lack of provisions and ammunition. It
is not to be believed that the enemy, being fully aware of the lamentable
conditions existing among the troops at Santiago, will be in any hurry to
suffer or risk new losses, especially since being able, by means of the block
ade, to prevent any help being sent from here, they can possess themselves of
the island without new sacrifices of blood on their part.
Neither can I explain to myself your tenacity in maintaining a position in
an ungrateful land which repels us and makes itself odious to us by its desire
to separate itself from the mother country. I should think that the army
would prefer the grief of abandoning it to the ruin and desolation which such
a disastrous persistency would bring to this unfortunate country, which, in
view of the future which awaits it, is clamoring for peace with honor, the pres
ent being the time when it could be secured.
But let it be whatever it will, and without ceasing to feel in the bottom of
my heart the real pride of a Spaniard and a soldier in the exalted sentiments
of your unrivaled army, I conceive and deduce that it will not permit its
noble aims to interfere with discipline, and that the soldiers will never forget
their duties of obedience and submission to the decrees of the government,
giving such attention to them as will be sure to preserve the honor of the
army. I therefore believe that whatever may be the decrees of the government
the army will execute them, and that it will not pretend to constitute itself a
danger to the nation, thus bringing upon itself the great misfortune of hav
ing to surrender for lack of provisions and other means of sustaining itself.
I nevertheless desire to have an absolute assurance of this, and this you
alone can give me. Be so kind as to let me have it as soon as possible, for
these are critical moments. CORREA.

Havana, July 13, 1898.
General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid:
The matters you discuss in your confidential telegram No. 107, addressed
to me, being of supreme gravity and importance, and as the majority of the
generals are absent at the front from their commands, it will not be possible

STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 451
for me to answer you before to-morrow. Please excuse this short delay,
which I trust will be for the better. BLANCO.

Blanco demands a continuation of the war : Havana, July 14, 1898.
Senor Sagasta, Prime Minister, Madrid:
The ruling opinion in the army in Cuba, in which we the generals all
share, demands a continuation of the war. We believe that the honor of the
army demands several more sacrifices, but the army will never present itself
an obstacle to the fulfillment of the orders of the government, which it will
obey, as it is its duty to do. Profoundly grateful on my part for the very
flattering phrases which you direct to me in your telegram of the 12th, it is
exceedingly painful for me to inform 5*ou that I can no longer continue at
the head of this army in the event of the government deciding to sue for
peace. BLANCO.

Havana, July 14, 1898.
General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid:
The ruling opinion of the army, which we the generals all share, is for
the continuation of the war, believing that enough has not yet been done for
the preservation of its honor. It would therefore view with shame the
abandonment of the island which it is occupying and defending with such
bravery, but you may be sure that it will respect the orders of the govern
ment, and will not oppose its decisions. This much the generals promise you.
In these most difficult circumstances I beg to assure you of my best wishes.
BLANCO.

Blanco reports Santiago's fall: Havana, July 17, 1898.
General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid :
The surrender of Santiago was effected this morning without any inter
vention whatever of my authority, according to information which I have
transmitted to you. In spite of this dismemberment of the island, the army
continues spirited and the war can be continued if you will only send us pro
visions, which would be advisable under ships flying a neutral flag, seeking
;\?.o the means of sending us ammunition. The fall of Santiago has no true

452 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.
military importance, and it can be said that the war has not in reality begun
yet. Several days ago I issued orders for the concentration of the divisions of
Holguin and Puerto Principe to maneuver according to the movements of the
enemy. The decisive campaign will have to be fought out on this side of the
trocha, and the enemy will have to suffer very severe losses in order to pene
trate this section. BLANCO.

These dispatches are confessions of the incompetency of the Spaniards for
peace or war. The colonial system that stimulated their arrogance disturbed
their balances, and they became profligates in public business. The fatal loss
was that of the honesty of the servants of the government in dealing with the
people, and the immediate natural consequence was the people became false
to their government — hence disorderly revolution.
The character of Spain was impaired by her injustice to her colonies.
The degradation that she imposed upon them reacted on herself. It has
appeared in weakness for the preservation of domestic order, as well as in
asserting her ancient authority beyond the lines of the peninsula; and it
has been still more signally displayed in fighting a foreign foe. The dis
patches of Sagasta, Blanco, Cervera, Correa and Linares, telegrams
written in the cipher code of Spain, are in every sense official. They betray,
as hardly anything else could, the decadence of the country, not only in the
facts they reveal, but in the fact of publicity. There is no doubt that it was
public opinion in Spain, for years before the war with us came, that the Span
ish navy was more powerful than that of the United States — that they had
battleships superior to ours in armor and arms, cruisers that were swifter and
equally staunch, and torpedo boats and destroyers that greatly overmatched
our gunboats. It was the policy of the Government to misinform the people.
It appears in the plain English of the secret Spanish cipher that the fleets
of Spain were largely shams. They failed in the equipments essential in
modern warfare. They had but one thing left. On the defensive — not asked
to brave the terrors of bushwhacking, the honor of the Spanish infantry, once
equal to any in Europe, was sustained, and the crews of the doomed ships at
Manila and Santiago, beaten and crushed, burning and sinking, behaved with
intrepidity to the last. Spain was not able to send east or west a squadron
that could cope with ours, and the only advantage they got from their navy
was that they had so deceived themselves as to persuade others that their

STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER.

453

illusions were real, and we were for a time embarrassed by apprehensions.
We made the safe mistake of over-valuing the ability of our enemy, and
yet we had so neglected our army that the fate of the day at Santiago
depended upon a thin and strained line. The Spaniards dealt with themselves
badly when they believed the fancies that were the foolishness of their pride,
and as their last step before collapse was taken, their condition was incom
prehensible by them. When Cervera was ordered from Madrid and Havana
to flee from Santiago, there was no real plan that had a promise in it, of more
than a few days' respite from ruin, for the utmost success expected was that
some of the fugitives might get into the harbor of Cienfuegos.

¦j~ >

('&M

CHAPTER XX.

The Santiago Situation After the Spanish Fleet was Gone.
Cipher Dispatches — Too Much Publicity— Shafter Demands the Help of the Navy, and is
Supported by the War Department— He Heard Firing at Midnight and Hoped it was
Sampson — Garcia's Men who were Always Going to do Something To-morrow — ¦
"Terrible Fight" July ist — Reinforcements, Lighters and Tugs Wanted — An En
ergetic Rush to Aid Shafter, but not by the Navy — Cable Direct to Corbin — The
Yellow Fever Appears — Preliminaries to the Capitulation — The President Sticks
to It that Spaniards Must Unconditionally Surrender — Fortunate Arrival of Miles in
the Blue Rains.
The anxieties of the War Office to receive the very latest news from
General Shafter's headquarters during the fighting at Santiago, and at the
same time to so far control the publications about the battles as to interfere
with recklessly panicky communications, caused repeated "hurry" sugges
tions from Washington and orders to send that which was important in cipher.
The following dispatches have the effect of a searchlight:
Playa del Este, July 4, 1898 — 1:13 a. m.
Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:
Camp near Santiago, 3. — I will send important dispatches hereafter in
cipher, when possible, but you must understand that we have no time to
spare, no facilities for the work. Messages sent you this afternoon would
require until to-morrow to workout. Captain Alger is 10 miles from here;
also my staff officer in charge of cipher is absent, on duty.
SHAFTER, Major-General.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 4, 1898 — 1 :45 a. m.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Secretary War directs me to say for you to exercise your own judgment
about using cipher and not inconvenience yourself in any way, as it is fully
understood how you are occupied. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.
Captain Alger, the son of the Secretary, was an expert in ciphers, but
454

AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 455
there was no time for the exercise of his skill, and there was a good deal of
circulation of intelligence.
The extreme activity enforced upon the army headquarters in the field
may perhaps account for this paragraph in the report of Admiral Sampson,
explaining that he did not refuse to endeavor to force his way into the Santi
ago Harbor. The Admiral was aroused to remark: "I here, moreover,
would animadvert upon the apparently extraordinary openness with which
every detail of hope, effort, or suggestion on the part of the army has
been published. The unwisdom of such procedure is too manifest for
discussion. ' '
When Cervera's fleet was smashed, burned, wrecked on the rocks, and Shaf
ter was demanding the surrender of the Spanish garrison, the wires were ting
ling with hotly rushed telegrams driving the officers in charge of transportation
by rail and steamers to hasten reinforcements and supplies to sustain the boys
who had been in the thick of the fight, and were waiting through the long
days of a truce, subject to the vicissitudes of calculations whether they
should be thrown in storming columns upon the Spanish lines, to save them
from the fearful blight of the yellow fever. July 5th, Shafter said if Sampson
would force an entrance to the harbor, which did not seem to ordinary obser
vation utterly bej*ond reason after the annihilation of Cervera's fleet, the city
would be taken "in a few hours." If the army was to take it, 15,000 troops
were "wanted speedily, " and it was not certain about the landing, "as it is
getting stormy." The "sure and speedy" way, the General said, was
"through the bay" — and Shafter wired he was "now in position" to do his
part. The President wanted cooperation between the army and navy, and
telegraphed accordingly.
July 5th, Shafter wired: "Navy should go Santiago Harbor at any cost.
If they do. I believe they will take the city and all the troops that are there.
If they do not, the country should be prepared for heavy losses among our
troops. ' '
Meantime, Shafter had talked wi^h the French Consul and others, and
concluded to "keep up fire on the trenches," but not on the town, for "if it
was simply a going out of the women, and to outside places where they could
be cared for, it would not matter much, but now it means their going out to
starve to death or be furnished with food by us, and the latter is not possible
now. ' '

456 AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE.
The General wanted the Secretary's views very much, and the President
interposed— if that may be said of one whose hand was all the time visible and
busy and nigh — that "it was the part of wisdom to await reinforcements, the
embarkation of which you have already been advised," and Shafter and
Sampson were directed to "have a conference and determine a course
of cooperation," that there might be secured "desirable results with the least
sacrifice." As an example of the promotion of movement in spite of difficulties, we
quote General Wilson at Chickamauga, July 5th, 3 145 p. m. :
"Just leaving for Charleston. No signal officers or men. No engineers'
supplies. No intrenching tools, and no funds for any of the supply depart
ments, except commissary. Please arrange at Charleston to meet these
requirements. Place to my credit at Charleston at least $5,000 for each
department, total, $30,000, with check books."
Here is a stirring suggestion from the Adjutant-General's office that the
army might get along without the navy:
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 5, 1898 — 4:30 p. m.
Maj. Gen. W. R. Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Your telegram concerning the navy entering Santiago Harbor is
received, and your action thoroughly approved. The Secretary of War
suggests that if the navy will not undertake to break through, take a trans
port, cover the pilot house in most exposed points with baled hay, attach an
anchor to a towline, and, if possible, grapple the torpedo cables, and call for
volunteers from the army- — not a large number — to run into the harbor, thus
making a way for the navy. Before acting, telegraph what you think of it.
One thing is certain ; that is, the navy must get into the harbor, and must
save the lives of our brave men that will be sacrificed if we assault the enemy
in his intrenchments without aid. This is strictly confidential to you.
H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.
Shafter's dispatch to the Adjutant-General on the same day mentioned the
large number of women and children coming out of Santiago, and touched the
harp again as to Sampson :
"Heavy firing about midnight, which continued an hour, at entrance to
bay. Don't know cause. Hope it was Sampson clearing the entrance of
torpedoes. Appearance of fleet in harbor will settle Santiago."

AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 457
Admiral Sampson goes into an exhaustive explanation of his relations
with General Shafter at Santiago, and it is of exceeding interest. The
General commanding the exrjedition testified in terms of enthusiastic appreci
ation, that the landing of the troops was handsomely supported by the fleet.
The disagreements developed after the battles of the ist and 2d of July*, and
became intensified when the fleet of Spain ceased to be a factor in the war.
The Admiral had met General Garcia, who thought he had "4,000 men back
in the country," and he "left behind him 3,000 men." The Admiral seemed
to think that these forces made 7,000 men, but the surface show is that 3,000
men were counted twice in order to make up the 7,000. The 4,000 men
were about forty-five miles away, and as General Miles would say, perfectly
"equipped in every respect," the Florida expedition that landed at Banes
having supplied all deficiencies. The Admiral paid this compliment to the
insurgent chieftain in a letter to the Secretary of War:
"My impressions of General Garcia are of the most jileasant character.
He is a large, handsome man, of most frank and engaging manners, and of
most soldierly appearance. He remained some time on board, though, unfor
tunately, so seasick that he was obliged to lie down during the whole of his
visit." There is no opportunity lost in paying compliments to the Cubans, but
the 50,000 auxiliary forces General Miles put down in his first plan of cam
paign did not materialize. The few that came were "amply provided" with
food and enjoyed the change — eating abundantly and leaving fighting to the
Americans. June 26th the Admiral dispatched to the Secretary of War:
"Channel was not obstructed by the Merrimac, and we must be prepared
to meet the Spanish fleet if they attempt to escape. I am preparing torpedo
attack in order to hasten their destruction. Regret to resort to this method
because of its difficulties and small chance of success,, torpedo boats being
subject to small arms and rapid-fire guns from the shore for a long distance.
I should not do this were present force to be kept here, as it now insures a
capture which I believe will terminate the war. ' '
The explanation of the last line is that it was proposed to send some of
the heavy ships to attack Spain.
June 30th Shafter sent Sampson a communication dated Camp near San
Juan River, as follows:

458 AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE.
"Sir: I expect to attack Santiago to-morrow morning. I wish you would
bombard the forts at Aguadores in support of a regiment of infantry which I
shall send there early to-morrow, and also make such demonstration as you
think rjroper at the mouth of the harbor, so as to keep as many of the enemy
there as possible."
July ist Shafter sent his compliments to Sampson, saying:
"General Shafter's compliments to Admiral Sampson. Wishes him to
keep up his fire on Santiago on the water front. Enemy has 6-inch guns
there, annoying us very much in our moves. Our troops watching within a
hundred yards of city on the east side. Will assault at daylight to-morrow
morning." On this day Sampson's official report states: "The New York and
Oregon took up position and fired a number of 8-inch shell over the hills in
the direction of Santiago and the ships in the bay. using a range of from 3^
to 4 miles."
Shafter recognized the shooting in these uncertain terms: "A few shells
of large size fell some distance behind our lines to-day. It is hardly possible
that they come from your ships, but I cannot account for them unless they
come from the enemy's navy."
Shafter's rejDort to Sampson of the battle of July ist is brief but forcible:
"July 2. — Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now strongly intrenched
about three-fourths of a mile from town. I urge that you make effort
immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which
are already very heavy. You can .now operate with less loss of life than I can.
Please telephone answer."
Lieutenant Staunton telephoned Shafter: "Admiral Sampson has this
morning bombarded forts at entrance of Santiago, and also Punta Gorda
Battery inside, silencing their fire. Do you wish further firing on his part?
He began at 5:30, finished at 7:30. Your message to him here. Impossible
to force entrance until we can clear channel of mines — a work of some time
after forts are taken possession of by your troops. Nothing in this direction
accomplished yesterday by the advance on Aguadores."
Shafter telephoned in return: "It is impossible for me to say when I can
take batteries at entrance to harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those
which we have been pitted against, it will be some time and a great loss of
life. I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a destructive fire

STONE FORT AT EL CANEY. EFFECT OF CANNONADING.

SNAP SHOT OF GENERAL SHAFTER IN THE FIELD.

AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 461
as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over 500 men. By all means
keep up fire on everything in sight of you until demolished. I expect, how
ever, in time and with sufficient men, to capture the forts along the bay.'*
Sampson reports that he wrote General Shafter and "began making
preparations to countermine, and, with the object of arranging an attack upon
the batteries at the entrance, a visit was arranged to General Shafter, so that
the matter might be thoroughly discussed, and combined action take place. I
had in view the employment of the marines for an assault on either the Morro
or Socajpa battery, while at the same time assaulting the defenses at the
entrance with the fleet."
In his letter to Shafter at this time Sampson said: "Our trouble from the
first has been that the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation
mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships
if we attempted to enter the harbor, and by the sinking of a ship the object of
the attempt to enter the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of
further progress on our part.
"It was my hope that an attack on your part of these shore batteries,
from the rear, would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.
"If it is yOur earnest desire that we should force our entrance, I will at
once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours
would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.
"We have in our outfit at Guantanamo 40 countermining mines, which I
will bring here with as little delay as possible, and if we can succeed in
freeing the entrance of mines by their use, I will enter the harbor.
"This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time.
"It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships which has until
now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port. "
This was written on the day before the incident of the departure and
removal of Cervera's fleet. The distance Admiral Sampson was from the
scene of action is accounted for in his official statement in these quiet terms
suppressing sensibility :
"I started the morning of the 3d July, by prearrangement, to confer with
the General as to a plan of combined attack, but this conference was pre
vented by the battle with the Spanish fleet."
Later the Admiral made a more particular statement as follows:
"In consequence of General Shafter's request for assistance, a consultation

462 AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE.
was arranged to take place the morning of July 3, and horses were sent to
Siboney for that purpose. I started for Siboney about 9 o'clock, but the sortie of
Admiral Cervera's fleet, of course prevented my carrying out the arrangement.
"The plans which I had proposed laying before General Shafter, and
which had been very thoroughly discussed on board by myself and staff,
included the countermining of the harbor entrance, the immediate entrance
of the fleet, and the carrying of the Morro by assault with a thousand marines
landed in Estrella Cove; or, using the marines for carrying the western bat
tery, the Morro to be attacked by a detachment of the army, the advance
being from the direction of Aguadores. Orders had been sent to Guantanamo
June 28th ordering up the Resolute, with a view of using the mines stored on
board of her.
"These facts are given to show how early the matter of forcing the har
bor entrance was taken in hand with a view to assisting the army. My own
views had always been that the first effort of the army should have been
toward the carrying of the batteries at the harbor entrance to enable us to
enter and countermine without a loss of ships, and this was, in fact, the view
of General Shafter when he first arrived, as expressed to my chief of staff
when he first went on board the headquarters ship, and also stated by
General Shafter on consultation with General Garcia and myself at Acerraderos
the same day. The reasons for change on his part I do not know. ' '
General Shafter's Fourth of July greeting to Admiral Sampson must
appear with all the tassels on it : Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, July 4
Admiral Sampson, Commanding United States Navy Forces:
Through negligence of our Cuban allies, Pando, with 5,000 men, entered
the city of Santiago last night. This nearly doubles their forces. I have
demanded their surrender, which they refuse, but I am giving them some
wounded prisoners and delaying operations to let foreign citizens get out, and
there will be no action before the 6th and perhaps the 7th. Now, if you will
force your way into that harbor the town will surrender without any further
sacrifice of life. My present position has cost me 1,000 men, and I do not
wish to lose any more. With my forces on one side and yours on the other 
and they have a great terror of the navy, for they know they cannot hurt you
— we shall have them. I ask for an early reply. Very respectfully,
WM. R. SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. V

AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 463
On this the annotation of the Admiral is:
"This dispatch shows a complete misapprehension of the circumstances
which had to be met.
"On the night of July 4, the Reina Mercedes was sunk by the Spaniards
in a manner which would certainly obstruct the larger ships and possibly the
smaller ones. Extensive shore batteries were known to exist, and if our
smaller vessels were sent in and were sunk, either by the mines or by the fire
of the batteries, the harbor would be effectually closed to us. It was
essential to the new scheme of attack of this mine field that the positions occu
pied byr the eastern and western batteries should be carried, and this was the
scheme of action first proposed by General Shafter in his discussion with my
chief of staff, who was sent by me to meet General Shafter the day of his
arrival. The chief of staff carried with him a chart of the harbor and
explained the situation, stating that it was regarded by us as a movement of
primal importance that these points should be carried before any attention
was paid to the city. The possession of these points insured the destruction
of the mines by us, the entrance of our heavy ships in the harbor, and the
assault on Admiral Cervera's squadron inside. To this General Shafter gave
most cordial assent, and stated that he had no intention of attacking the city
proper, that here (pointing to the entrance) was the key to the situation, and
that when we had this we had all. This was repeated in his interview with
General Garcia at Acerraderos. "
Shafter's few days before Santiago were full of troubles— for instance:
Playa, July 7, 1898 — 2:05 p. m.
Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:
The failure to have tugs and lighters for use in handling the fleet is of so
serious a nature that I must again refer to it. Transports go off miles from
shore and there is no way of reaching them or compelling them to come in.
It is a constant struggle to keep them in hand. Had it not been for the
lighter Laura, the army could not have moved. It is with the greatest diffi
culty that one day's food can be issued at a time.
SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding.
Two more dispatches of the 7th show it was a bad day :
Playa, July 7, 1898 — 4:50 p. m.
Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:
Had consultation with Sampson. Navy disinclined to force entrance

464 AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE.
except as a last resource. They will bombard the city, which is within easy
range of their big guns, beginning at noon of the 9th, and if that is not effect
ive, after twenty-four hours, will then force entrance with some of the
smallest ships. I still have hopes they will surrender. Made a second
demand on them yesterday, calling attention to the changed conditions
because of the loss of the Spanish fleet, and offering to give them time to con
sult their home government, which General Toral has accepted, asking that
the British consul return to the city with employes of the cable company to
permit "him to do so. Meanwhile, I hope my reinforcements will arrive. Not
one in sight yet except the 200 recruits for the Second Infantry, who came a
week ago. As a last resource I will try running in transports. I do not
consider my force sufficient to warrant an assault on the city, though I believe
it would be successful, but at a fearful loss. Of course, it would be criminal
to hope for the end to be gained, which is merely the capture of a few thou
sand men, and when we see we are getting them by siege. Nothing has yet
been seen of tugs, lighters, and launches promised ten days ago.
SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding.

Playa, July 7, 1898—4:55 p. m.
Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:
When ought I to expect reinforcements? They sadly needed. Nothing
in sight to-day. SHAFTER, Major-General.

War Department, July 7, 1898 — 5:30 p. m.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
The President directs that you order transports to stand in by the shore
and enforce demand, so that they may be able to get supplies more easily.
We are distressed about the tugs and lighters, which were ordered long since
and ought to have reached you before now. Your long dispatch concerning
second demand on city received and approved. We will be very glad if you
can finish up that work without another assault.
By order Secretary of War: H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 7, 1898.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
One tug should reach you to-day. A large, powerful one leaves New

AMERICAN TROOPS IN SANTIAGO. RELIEF OF THE GUARD.

AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 467
Orleans to-night. Fifty laborers went on the St. Paul, leaving New York to
day, and stevedores are on boats going to you.
H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Playa del Este, via Haiti, July 7, 1898 — 7:42 p. m.
Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:
Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, Camp near Santiago, Cuba, 7.— Please
send some fast ship from nearest point with 100 stevedores, 100 drivers, and
as many medicines and dressings as can be obtained. It is reported to me
medicines are very scarce. Two steam launches should be bought. Too
much trouble to get things from navy, and we have but partial control of
them when we do get them. This is not a matter to be put off. Sent 90,000
rations ashore to-day. SHAFTER, Major-General.

Playa del Este, July 7, 1898 — 8:35 P- m-
Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:
Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago, Cuba. — The hospital
ship Relief just arrived with a large amount of medical stores. Want the
teamsters, stevedores, and steam lighters as wired you, and the sooner they*
can be gotten here the better. W. R. SHAFTER.
General Miles left Washington at 10:40 the night of July 7th on the way
to Santiago and Porto Rico, with instructions not to supersede Shafter if he
was able for duty. At Rockhill, South Carolina, he telegraphed the Secre
tary of War request "20,000 .30 caliber rifles, using government ammunition,
be sent at once, to be used at Santiago or other places, with strong canvas
web belts and ammunition, and that all troops sent to Cuba be supplied with
smokeless powder rifles. The Winchester and Remington companies furnish
arms and ammunition. The Lee rifle does good service for the navy.
Horstman's, military dealers, Philadelphia, has 12,000 Mauser rifles and
ammunition for sale. Modern rifles can be obtained from other parties."
Corbin telegraphed Miles: "There are 12,000 Krag-Jorgensen rifles at
Tampa available, with 1,800,000 rounds of ammunition, with larger amount in
hands of General Shafter at Santiago. The output of new ammunition of this
caliber is 250,000 rounds per day."
July 8th Corbin telegraphed Shafter : "Do you recommend the arming of

46S AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE.
Henry's division, or any other volunteers of your command, with Krag-
Jorgensen rifles? We have 1,800,000 rounds of ammunition at Tampa, and
manufacture 250,000 per day, so you may know what the supply will be.
What are your wishes?"
Shafter replied: "By all means arm in field Henry's division and the
volunteer regiments now here with Krag-Jorgensen rifle. The use of black
powder instantly brought volleys against regiments using Springfield, and was
very demoralizing on those regiments."
The President's telegram to Shafter on the battle of July ist got lost on
the wires, and was repeated on the 8th as follows:
"The President directs me to say you have the gratitude and thanks of
the Nation for the brilliant and effective work of your noble army on Friday,
July 1. The steady valor and heroism of officers and men thrill the American
people with pride. The country mourns the brave men who fell in battle.
They have added new names to our roll of heroes."
The fact is not obscure in the official dispatches, that General Shafter was
exceedingly anxious to have the Spaniards in Santiago surrender to him.
Indeed, when he made the demand he was sick and despondent, and his
correspondence with Admiral Sampson shows that he was not in high spirits.
July 9 at 1 p. m. , he got a proposition from the commandant in Santiago to
march out of the city with arms and baggage, not to be molested until he
reached Holguin, surrendering the territory to the Americans. This, Shafte'r
remarked, was, as the Spaniards stated it, to save the city and avoid useless
bloodshed. Shafter closed his communication: "This will give me another
day to get up troops from Siboney, the first transports of reinforcements hav
ing just arrived. In my opinion, they will have to surrender unconditionally
very soon after I open fire on them."
The General received this conclusive dispatch :
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 9, 1898 — 1:50 p. m.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Your telegram setting forth terms on which the enemy will evacuate
Santiago has been submitted to the President by the Secretary of War, who
instructs me to say that you will accept nothing but an unconditional sur
render, and should take extra precautions to prevent the enemy's escape.
By order Secretary of War: H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 469
Playa del Este, via Haiti, July 9, 1898 — 9 p. m.
Secretary of War, Washington :
Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago. — I forwarded General
Toral's proposition to evacuate the town this morning without consulting any
one. Since then I have seen the general officers commanding divisions, who
agree with me that it should be accepted. First, it releases at once the har
bor; second, it permits the return of thousands of women, children, and old
men, who have left the town fearing bombardment, and who are now suffer
ing where they are, though I am doing my best to supply them with food ;
third, it saves the great destruction of property which a bombardment would
entail, most of which belongs to Cubans and foreign residents ; fourth, it at
once relieves the command, while it is in good health, for operations else
where. There are now three cases of yellow fever at Siboney, in Michigan
regiment; and if it gets started, no one knows where it will stop. We lose by
this simply some prisoners we do not want and the arms they carry. I
believe many of them will desert and return to our lines. I was told by sen
tinel, who deserted last night, that 200 men want to come, but were afraid our
men would fire upon them. W. R. SHAFTER, General.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July gt 1898 — 11:15 p. m.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
In reply to your telegram recommending terms of evacuation as proposed
by the Spanish commander, after careful consideration by the President and
Secretary of War, I am directed to say that you have repeatedly been advised
that you would not be expected to make an assault upon the enemy at Santi
ago until you were prepared to do the work thoroughly. When you are ready*,
this will be done. Your telegram of this morning said your position was
impregnable, and that you believed the enemy would yet surrender uncondi
tionally. You have also assured us that you could force their surrender by
cutting off the supplies. Under these circumstances your message recom
mending that Spanish troops be permitted to evacuate and proceed without
molestation to Holguin is a great surprise and is not approved. The responsi
bility* of destruction and distress to the inhabitants rests entirely with the
Spanish Commander. The Secretary of War orders that when you are strong
enough to destroy the enemy and take Santiago that you do it. If you have
not force enough, it will be dispatched to you at the earliest moment practi-

470 AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE.
cable. Reinforcements are on the way, of which you have already been
advised. In the meantime, nothing is lost by holding the position you now
have and which you regard as impregnable. Acknowledge receipt.
By order of the Secretary of War: H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.
The annexed telegram is of no little significance :
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 9, 1898 — 11:20 p. m.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
It is suggested that all official telegrams, particularly those requiring
action, be addressed to the Adjutant-General. This will insure more prompt
action, as the office is kept open twenty-four hours a day.
H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.
General Corbin has. been likened to the engineer of a locomotive, or the
fireman. He certainly fed the fires and pulled the lever day and night, and
did a grand work, being on duty about two-thirds of the twenty-four hours
per day. July 10th Shafter telegraphed Corbin, 1:30 a. m. : "If two lighters and
tugs have arrived, navy must have them. They have not, up to sundown,
reported at Siboney or Daiquiri."
The tug and lighters had stuck at Guantanamo, and the Quartermaster-
General asked the naval authorities to send them to Shafter, who "needs them
badly." Shafter telegraphed July 10th, 2:50 p. m., that his position was
impregnable against attack, but he had not troops enough to surround the
town, adding, "The Cuban troops are not to be depended upon for severe
fighting." General Wilson telegraphed from Charleston, as he was about
sailing for the seat of war, that if they had to go out of sight of transports
there would be a paralysis by the absence of Miles.* Corbin caught this on
the first bounce, and replied: "The transports that will take the First Bri
gade of your division will carry, in addition to the men, 800 mules, without
interfering with the comfort of soldiers. General Brooke has been directed to
send you your wagon transportation. ' '
July nth Shafter telegraphed: "Navy fired few shots from the sea near
Aguadores. Effect not perceptible." Major General Miles commanding
arrived off Santiago July 12th. On the next day Corbin telegraphed him:
"Contracting party, with steamship, two powerful sea tugs, steam sea-
* Not the Commanding General.

AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 47*
going barges, and fleet of lighters, supplied with timber, iron, bolts, black
smith's outfit, pile-drivers, derrick, etc., for dock building, also ioo mechanics
and skilled laborers and 250 common laborers, will sail from New York late
to-morrow afternoon or early Thursday morning direct for Santiago. ' '
General Miles never knew heavier rains. Shafter telegraphed, if
.rains continued roads would be impassable. There had been "no attempt
to enter the harbor by the navy. They should be required to make a
determined effort at once." If roads stopped rations, the town would have to
be assaulted. Jos£ Toral, commander of the forces in Santiago, July 12th
wanted a solution that would leave the honor of his troops intact, and Shafter
asked the Adjutant-General:
"Will any modification of the recent order be permitted? I have been
perfectly satisfied that he can be taken, but if he fights, as we have reason to
believe he may, it will be at fearful cost of life; and to stay here with disease
threatening may be as great loss from that cause. The suffering of the
people who left the town is intense. I can only supply food enough to keep
them from starvation, and if blue rains continue I do not know how long I can
do that." The reply was there could be no modification of former orders. General
Miles telegraphed July 13th, the Spanish General "offers to surrender Santi
ago province, force, batteries, munitions of war., etc., all except the men and
small arms. Under ordinary circumstances would not advise acceptance, but
this is a great concession, and would avoid assaulting intrenching lines with
every device for protecting his men and inflicting heavy loss on assaulting
lines. The siege may last many weeks, and they have the provisions for two
months. There are 20,000 starving people who have fled the city and were
not allowed to take any food.
Behind this urgency were 100 cases of yellow fever in the army* and the
certainty of its rapid increase. The Secretary of War wrote- to the Secretary
of the Navy requesting him to order the fleet off Santiago to force its way into
the bay. The reasons for immediate action were these: "First, the very
heavy rains that are falling almost constantly have made the roads nearly
impassable and threaten to cut off our supply of provisions for the army in the
trenches altogether; second, the rains are making the holding of our lines
almost impossible, as the trenches are filled with water; third, the lives of our
men are in great danger from yellow fever, which has broken out among our

472 AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE.
troops and is spreading rapidly, and, fourth, the character of the works of the
enemy is such that to take them by assault would be a terrible sacrifice of
life." General Shafter's position before Santiago after the Spanish fleet was
extinguished was dangerous. There can be no doubt of it. The strain upon
our small army in fighting through tropical jungles, with insufficient artillery,
under the frightful fire from Mauser rifles of range almost equal to field guns,
using smokeless powder, so that the messenger of wounds and death seemed
to be a killing storm from clear air, had been almost unbearable. The kill
ing and wounding of more than 1,500 men was unexpected, and for that reason
made the greater impression, though the percentage of loss was but a fraction
of that often suffered on both sides when our national and confederate armies
confronted each other. Shafter's illness was distressing, and, his dispatches
show, affected his moral as well as physical condition. He hung on with
fierce resolution to his job, but gave the impression in the War Office of an
uncertain quantity, so that he was admonished daily by inquiries as to his
health, that there was the gravest personal solicitude about him, and several
times he was pressed as to what should be done if he had to give up. It could
not well be told at a distance what percentage of a sick man's petulance and
fanciful confidence there -was in his asserted betterments in health. His pro
posal at the close of the hardest fighting to yield five miles of ground seemed
like the retreat across the Rappahannock after Chancellorsville, and there was
a crispness in the calm phrase in which the Secretary of War cabled that it
would be much better to stay where he was. He thought so himself on the
Fourth of July. Though George Washington was a paroled prisoner on that
date at Fort Necessity, it was when he was a young man, before the conse
cration of the day. That the navy was not doing what it might to help the
siege, when there was no more blockading to do, was an opinion Shafter
shared with the country. The slender army had lost in killed, wounded,
missing, sick and exhausted, 2,000 men, and the navy two killed and six
wounded. The evidence was not easily made to appear of a full performance of
duty, though the entrance to the harbor of Santiago was very narrow and
strongly fortified, and a Spanish ship had been sunk July 4th to block the way
against our battleships. Farragut and Dewey disregarded torpedoes, but the
former lost a ship with its crew at Mobile, and the latter had a broad
entrance to Manila Bay. The conditions were certainly not the same at New

AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 473
Orleans, Mobile and Manila, but in those cases the navy was foremost in the
fray, and gloriously cleared the jpath for the army; so it was not unreasonable
to feel that the spirit of aggression at Santiago in handling our ships was not
according to the most illustrious precedents. General Shafter, however, had
been painfully willing to allow the Spanish troops to get away, without insist
ing upon the "U. S. " preliminary insisted upon at Fort Donaldson by U. S.
Grant, that of "unconditional surrender," but the President supplied the
deficiency, and used the very words, as there were none suitable or stronger.
Shafter had been keenly disappointed by the Cubans, who became at last
more numerous than valuable when they were fed, armed, clothed, and
treated with much consideration, but they* were still deficient in every military
service but that of scouting, and managed to be in at the coffee and out of the
fight. They were not adapted, as Shafter said, to severe fighting. They let
Spaniards into Santiago, and did not help to put them out. The fifty thou
sand Cubans General Miles had regarded as one wing of his grand army when
he planned a great campaign, dissolved, except in a small way, when their
bodies needed nourishment. However, as General Miles arrived late at
Santiago, and did not take command, for he found Shafter able to ride, he
managed to retain his early kindness for the Cubans as soldiers. The last and
worst blow to Shafter was the dreadful presence and rapid development of the
yellow fever, with the "blue rains," the torrents from the skies that threat
ened the pork and cracker line. It cannot be denied that there was a combi
nation of discouraging circumstances. General Miles, according to his soldierly
way, supported the views of Shafter, and gave him wholesome encouragement.
Indeed, the arrival of the General at Santiago was as timely as it had been
carefully and wisely planned. The presence of the military head of the army
of the United States meant to the Santiago Spaniards that while they were
utterly forsaken, all the forces that seventy million people could array were
centering there. The arrival of the head of the army was an appeal to the
imagination, and the watchmen of the beleaguered city at the signal stations
by the sea reported fifty-seven ships, many of them swarming with
troops. General Jose Toral had to say in his explanation that, in his opinion,
the garrison could have held the reserve lines against Shafter's army, but
there was no hope as against the fresh forces pouring in. And so Santiago
surrendered. "All is well that ends well. "

"V— jf's^^jit&ZS^^&B^

CHAPTER XXI.
The Lesson for the Country of the Hills of Santiago.
Value of the Reports of the Inspector-General — His Keen Suggestions and Brilliant Sketches
with Expert Information — Tribute of Breckenridge to Shafter — The Volunteers in
Camps — Chickamauga as an Illustration — The Location of the Wrongs that the Sol
diers Suffered Unduly — We Must Build Regiments as We do Battleships — The Fault
of Poor Preparation not Personal— Let Congress for the Country Mend it.
*
There is extraordinary value, professional and literary, in the official
papers of Major General of Volunteers, Inspector General J. C. Breckenridge.
His military intelligence is constantly manifested in what he says, and his
vigor of expression presents information clear-cut and in a strong light, the
outlines sharp, the color vivid. He said of the earliest military expedition
out of this country, that to Santiago, that it was composed of "the flower of
the American army" — and writing as it was getting under way, he said:
"Despite the newspaper freedom of assertion, its purpose is said to be
definitely known to but few, but it is doubtless worthy of its high, quality.
America has no fighting force of equal size, worthy to represent her, if this is
not. Every general and line officer has come up through the different grades
in her military service, and is as ripe as any we have for their respective com
mands ; and many of the staff officers have had broad experience perhaps even
in their present particular positions. The adaptability of Americans is illus
trated by the admirable work being done by many officers outside their own
legitimate field. Officers of the line are doing every kind of staff duty in a
manner it is impossible to too highly appreciate. The elasticity and adven-
turousness of youthful vigor may occasionally be somewhat lacking, and the
siege artillery material may lack preliminary adjustment and practice in
expeditions seaward, or even in the ordinary experience in the practical
maneuvers of large bodies of men, and under a questionable policy is partic
ularly deficient in military transportations. An immobile army is ridiculous.
474

CRUSHING MILL ON A SUGAR PLANTATION IN CUBA.

pD«"W!>

M
aEBW
O J

THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 477
"Many foreign countries are also studying every detail and the varying
phases of this expedition with most critical care, for few are exempt from
similar possibilities. The Fifth Corps is not alone in need of all the benefits
that can be gleaned from such experience ; the whole army should derive full
advantage from it. The difficulties have been immense, and have been over
come with remarkable energy. Only the ultimate result can fully approve
how well or how ill every possible contingency has been provided for and
met. The careful, painstaking preparation and study of every detail of the
problem to be met, and the persistent exertion to fully meet it to the utmost
limit of the powers of a great department of the government, and with the
combined provision and united effort of every bureau, which was so admirably
illustrated in the naval expedition to the Philippines, is, of course, also to be
expected in this."
One of the lessons of the war of the sections and states was sharply
applied by General Breckenridge to this:
"It is believed that special attention should be called to the general
absence of intrenching tools as a regular part of the equipment of the troops.
Hardly any intrenching tools, save the usual small number of picks and shovels
for public purposes, accompany this expedition ; though this nation, in the war
of the rebellion, brought the use of hasty intrenchments into such prominence
as to materially affect the tactics and strategy of its armies. If the use of the
bayonet or other makeshifts for this purpose was formerly inadequate, it is
no longer so. The modern shelter trench for skirmishers is normally 2^ feet
in thickness, for protection against the penetration of modern small arms, and
this would seem to require the use of a tool specially adapted for the purpose
required. So patent has this need become that one young company com
mander is said to have purchased masons' trowels at Tampa, for the use of his
company in Cuba."
In regard to the volunteers, General Breckenridge refers to their "zeal,
rare intelligence and adaptability and the having of many of them in some of
the more excellent schools of the National Guard," and remarks that these
qualities are evident all along the line, and that "every advantage should be
taken of all the military instruction which our military system affords, and
perhaps full use is not being made of the graduates of our hundred of military
colleges, nor of the army itself as a training school for young officers.
Doubtless we could promptly commission several hundred bright y*oung citi-

478 THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO.
zens in our regular regiments, and put them into thorough training immedi
ately, and so release and utilize more of the superbly trained regular officers,
and have them serve with, and perhaps command, volunteer regiments and
brigades — men of the age of Sheridan and Custer when they won their fame
— and we could attract many more graduates of our military colleges into
places of command; so the whole situation might be benefited and much less
discomfort be felt and quicker efficiency for battle be attained. Already
there is progress everywhere. The work is devolving upon the better officers,
and a general insight as to how and when it is to be done and the best way to
do it is spreading rapidly. ' '
This was especially applicable to the first stage of preparation in the
camps, and meant for the encouragement of those bearing the burdens of
those preliminaries. ,The General struck a common experience in this state of
things at Chickamauga Park in May: "The worst from some States are better
equipped than the best from others, and they are apt to know how to continue
to get things. The struggle and delay in supplies is still apparent, and the
more inexperienced suffer." In one division were two regiments without
arms, and "some other regiments have none for 30 to 40 per cent of men, and
guards walk posts with wands. Many rifles, especially older models, even if
not already unserviceable, can hardly be expected to last through a campaign.
An issuing arsenal and repair shop seem needed. "
On the way to Tampa the General wrote that "brigade and division com
manders, rather under than over 45 (alert, vigorous, and experienced, but not
stale), are especially needed for instruction and leading an improvised army to
promptly and successfully meet the requirements of the modern battle lines,
and well-instructed staff officers for these subordinate commands, even if not
so young, are also needed. There are almost none with the brigades."
General Breckenridge urged striking Spain a blow at home in order to
make an impression on her where she lives, "and if possible the solar plexus
blow, now that the pace is set." July 25th the General wrote: "Daiquiri
having been selected, the landing could not have been effected with less loss,
and the movements of the troops thereafter were merely limited by the speed
with which supplies could be gotten from the vessels, even with the advan
tage of Siboney also, both of which were little more than indentations on an
open coast without landing facilities. And it was seldom, indeed, that the
supplies were brought up to the fighting lines in any great excess of their

THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 479
immediate needs, and the entire absence of the usual comforts and conven
iences of even the simplest army life during the whole of this expedition, and
sometimes medical essentials, even in the hour of utmost need, was one of the
most marked features of the landing."
In a few sentences the General gives the story of the fighting on land for
Santiago: "The remarkable marksmanship of our trained soldiers was hardly more
exploited than the gross ignorance of our recruits. The books say that it
ought not to be possible to successfully assault in front unshaken, still more,
well-fortified infantry, under modern conditions. But in this instance dis
mounted cavalry, as well as its confrere of the infantry arm, did, without
bayonets, successfully assault infantry posted on commanding ground, behind
water, well intrenched, valiant and unshaken, and the severity of the task is
indicated by the list of casualties, as compared with the actual numbers
the immediately opposing trenches will hold. And when the fight was over,
though successful everywhere, we had no reserves.
"Doubtless, through telegrams and otherwise, there have been sufficient
indications of the intense strain in the whole military situation on the field of
operations which led to the consultation at the El Poso house on the night of
July 2d, and to some of the general officers favoring a retrograde movement
during the day or two prior to our intrenchments taking shape and the
armistice being agreed upon, which latter remained almost unbroken until the
surrender. Probably it is now evident to all that it was far better to stand
steadfast, and perhaps quite possible to advance rather than retreat, so near
the 4th of July; and certainly we have demonstrated our ability to hold our
own. Indeed, the fighting of this army came up to the highest expectations,
and accomplished results beyond what it is usual to expect of a force so
constituted. ' '
General Breckenridge has been quoted without authority as having given
personal encouragement to General Shafter in moments of doubt as to the
demands of the hour, and to have been steadily urgent to stand firm until the
word could be given to advance, and some of the language quoted above may
be taken to refer to his exertions and confirm in part the general statement of
his timely tenacity. His accounts of the fighting days contain this reference
to the action of Las Guasimas :
"The First and Tenth regiments of regular cavalry (dismounted)

480 THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO.
deployed, and charged up the hill in front; the First Volunteer Cavalry
deployed upon the other or ridge road from Siboney, which forks at' this point
with the valley road, and charged in flank on the left, driving the enemy from
his position, but not until we had sustained severe losses in both killed and
wounded. Our forces pushed on, and at nightfall occupied a line a mile or
more in advance of the position occupied by the enemy in the morning. The
conduct of the troops, both white and colored, regular and volunteer, was
most gallant and soldierly, and General Young's dispositions, plan, and execu
tion were skillful, dashing, and successful."
The soil of the portion of Cuba containing the battlefields, he says, "is
rich and supports a luxuriant growth of trees, brush, and vines, making a
chaparral rather noticeably thorny and poisonous, that is often impossible to
penetrate unaided by the machete. The streams in this vicinity are for the
most part readily fordable, except for a few hours immediately after heavy
and long-continued rains. The roads become then almost impassable, but dry
up very quickly."
The movements of the troops were between the fighting days favored by
the moon'; and many hours of the night were useful for changes that could
not have been possible in darkness. In the preliminaries to the battle of El
Caney, "General Ludlow's brigade took up a position west of the village, in
order to cut off the retreat of the Spaniards when they should be driven out
and attempt to retreat to the city of Santiago. But with soldierly instinct and
admirable effect, he closed in upon the defenses of the village, and his white
sailor hat became a target for the enemy during the hours he hugged the
blockhouses on his flank of the well-defended village."
The artillery was on this occasion served with great effect. The division
commander, between one and two, directed the battery "to concentrate its
fire upon the stone fort, or blockhouses, situated on the highest point in the
village on the northern side, and which was the key point to the village.
This fort was built of brick, with walls about a foot thick, about 45 by 35 feet,
with semicircular bastions diagonally opposite each other. The practice of
the artillery against this was very effective, knocking great holes into the fort
and rendering it untenable."
At about 6.30, after the El Caney fight, "General Lawton went forward
with his staff to find and definitely locate the position which his troops were to
occupy, and continued along the road to within about a mile of the city, when

.

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COL. JOHN JACOB ASTOR, OF ASTOR BATTERY FAME, NEAR SPANISH TRENCHES.

THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 483
he was fired into by the Spanish pickets. He then returned and sent forward
a strong patrol of Cubans to find out the condition of affairs. He then
reported the matter to corps headquarters and waited until about 2:30 a. m.,
and not receiving any report from the Cubans, or any further direction from
headquarters, he started forward again, and was ordered to take a position
on the right."
Nothing was heard from the Cubans after they were directed to do some
thing. General Breckenridge says:
"Firing was kept up during the whole of the 2d of July by both sides, our
troops having thrown up hasty intrenchments in many positions the night
previous. During the 2d of July there were a great many casualties, result
ing not entirely from aimed fire, but from bullets clearing the crest of our
intrenchments and going far beyond, striking men as they were coming up to
gather into position, or as they were going back and forth, bringing water,
caring for the wounded, and so on. Many casualties also resulted from the
fire of sharpshooters, stationed in trees with such thick foliage that the sharp
shooters could not be seen. It seemed incredible that men should be so
reckless as to remain within our lines and continue firing, and it was believed
by many that what was reported to be fire from sharpshooters was simply
spent bullets that came over the crest of our works. But I and the members
of my staff can testify to the fact that,' in many places along the road leading
up to the center of our lines, the sharp crack of the Mauser rifle could be heard
very close to the road; and there were all the usual indications of the near
and selected aim against individuals. Scouting parties were sent out from
time to time to get hold of these fellows, and a number of them were captured
or shot. It was not until a day or two afterwards, however, that they were
all cleared out.
"On the morning of the 2d, three batteries of artillery went into action
near San Juan, right behind the infantry intrenchments, and about 600
yards from the enemy's intrenchments. Firing black powder, instead
of smokeless, they, of course, instantly drew all fire in that vicinity, and
being unable to work the guns, were obliged to withdraw. The question
as to smokeless powder, intrenchments, and batteries of both light and
siege artillery, were matters of the highest moment to the men most nearly
exposed to the steady fire from the intrenched lines, so admirably laid out
and stoutly defended as in this fight. During the night of the 2d our troops

484 THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO.
continued intrenching on a crest from 500 to 1,500 yards distant from the
crest occupied by the Spanish intrenchments, and in more cases having higher
command. The Spaniards made an attack on the night of the ad upon our
lines, which was repulsed with very little loss to ourselves."
These are remarkable accounts of Spaniards, who not only remained
within our lines to do sharp-shooting from tree tops, but ventured upon a
night attack. General Breckenridge says the bravery of the Spanish soldier
fighting on the defensive is beyond doubt, and the Mauser rifle "an excellent
and rapid weapon," while the smokeless cartridge adds to its special efficacy.
It is loaded with five cartridges at a time, held in a clip "detached from the
belt and placed in the rifle in one motion."
The account General Breckenridge gives of the Cubans is discriminating
and judicial, and we quote the words herewith :
' ' In the beginning the Cuban soldiers were largely used as outposts on our
front and flanks. There has been a great deal of discussion among officers of
this expedition concerning the Cuban soldiers and the aid they have rendered.
They seem to have very little organization or discipline, and they do not, of
course, fight in the battle line with our troops.
"Yet in every skirmish or fight where they are present they seem to have
a fair proportion of killed and wounded. They were of undoubted assistance
in our first landing, and in our scouting our front and flanks. It is not safe,
however, to rely upon their fully performing any specific duty, according to
our expectation and understanding, unless they are under the constant super
vision and direction of one of our own officers, as our methods and views are
so different, and misunderstanding or failure so easy."
The General says: "We were told when we entered upon this campaign
that it was necessary above all things not to sleep on the ground, and hammocks
were recommended to secure this end. Some were seen in the original bales
on the transports, and it is doubtful whether the soldiers could have carried
hammocks in addition to what they already had to carry. Even such heavy
intrenching tools as were on hand were felt to be a burden. The Kahki
quickly loses its shape and dandy color, and is not strong enough to withstand
thorns. There were many lost packs, and apparently the Cubans and the
sick found some comfort from the owners' loss. Bayonets were found
useless in this war except to dig with.
"It has certainly been clearly demonstrated that smokeless powder is an

THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 485
absolute necessity for both small arms and field guns. Often we fought for
hours against an invisible enemy who was firing fatally upon us all the time.
The volunteers, as soon as the Springfields were fired, at once revealed their
position and drew the fire of the enemy, besides hiding the enemy from their
view. They found it difficult to contend with an invisible enemy, pouring in
an effective fire from a position impossible to determine.
"The Spanish blockhouse is ubiquitous and a more elaborate structure
than we had been led to expect. It has the air of an evolution during a course
of years for dominating an inimical and insurgent country at every high point
and crossroad. It is usually placed upon a commanding position and affords
a lookout, the lower part built of stones and earth, and two tiers of fire, and
the upper part of wood, the top of the parapet being the top of the stone wall,
so that up to the height of the breast there is complete protection against
small-arms fire.
"Around the blockhouses and connected with it by intrenchments are
sometimes several successive lines of field intrenchments. These intrench
ments are very narrow in profile, and instead of earth being thrown to the
front it is more often thrown to the rear, to one side, so that the protection in
front of the trench is natural solid earth. The soil is of such a nature that it
will stand almost vertical in its natural condition, so that the slope of the
trench is very slight.
"Such a trench as this is extremely difficult to injure, even in artillery
fire, and it is extremely difficult to reach men in the intrenchments, as they
are thoroughly protected, even from artillery fire, by crouching. The
trenches are usually very short, so that there is not much chance of bringing
an enfilading fire upon them.
"The old Springfield seemed a begrimed and suicidal blunderbuss upon
the battlefield. Of course it can still administer death to enemies, like the
obsolete cannon in the enemy's trenches did to us, as a pitiful makeshift.
"Among the telling features frequently remarked upon by those present
were the conspicuous gallantry of the gray-haired officers (General Hawkins
at San Juan and Captain Haskell at the Caney blockhouse), when they led
their commands to the final assaults, and the courage and conduct of the
colored troops and First United States Volunteers seemed always up to the
best. The admiration certain other organizations also elicited from their
comrades was noticeable where all were such good soldiers."

486 THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO.
The concluding lines of the report of the battles of Santiago by the
Inspector General are personal. General Lawton is referred to as in "every
exigency of campaign and battle capable of adequately performing more than
was ever assigned to him, though some of the severest military tasks and
duties were performed by him. This judgment still stands well established,
though the command of a division of regulars and the front and swinging right
wing of an invading and assaulting army has been intrusted confidently to his
.command. The reserve force and quiet self-control with which every step in
action was conducted equaled his proverbial energy, endurance, courage, and
tenacity." General Shafter is characterized as of phenomenal force and activity, and,
"if permitted me, it seems due that I should bear willing testimony to the
remarkable energy, decision, and self-reliance which characterized General
Shafter's course during this distinguished military adventure throughout its
arduous course to its most honorable conclusion. At every stage of this
proceeding General Shafter was the dominant spirit at the scene of action.
"Oppressed with sickness and overweighted with responsibilities and care,
he carried the fate of his army to a successful and glorious issue. And any
precedent is rare where, amidst such natural obstacles and dangers and
limited means and opposing defenses, a more numerous, well disciplined, and
gallant force capitulated to invaders who had upon their fighting line a smaller
force than that surrendered. The glory of this belongs to General Shafter
and his army and the administration sustaining it. And whatever influence
was felt from this army toward the driving out and destruction of the Spanish
fleet may also go to its credit."
That the volunteers who got to the front at Santiago were of the same
sort that have established themselves in the public confidence and the favor
able opinion of the masters and leaders of armies, goes without saying. They
were, as a rule, under the direction of men who knew something of the busi
ness of war, but suffered from inexperience. They were hurried from
camps that had not been found particularly healthful, because the sorrows of
embarrassing troubles that could not be provided against, were encountered
everywhere the men were gathered for the instruction of discipline and the
accouterments of army life. They in the flush of enthusiasm chose officers
who could not draw requisitions or give the convenient tips for the ameliora
tion of hardships or even the preparation of rations for consumption. The

THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 487
average thought of the average citizen of the United States was, when Chick
amauga Park became a camp for volunteers, and regulars too, it was an ideal
selection for the schooling into soldiership of an army of the people. It was
the battle-ground that in a higher degree than any other — all points included
— had illustrated the devoted spirit and desperate endurance of American
manhood on the fields smitten under the stress of the grim game of war.
There were higher percentages of losses of both sides at Chickamauga, on
those terrible and glorious Sep^rnber days, that all then and now living
in this country remember so well, and that those born since, here and else
where, must know all about if they would comprehend the perseverance of
valor, and the capacities of sacrifice, that is in the nerve of the men of the
nation, and it seemed that our young men assembled there from the States
north and south, whose regiments lost most heavily by the stream that the
Creeks called "the river of death" (Chickamauga), would find in the atmos
phere an inheritance of the inspiration of heroism.
In the order of recommendations was the presence a few miles to the
north of the splendid River Tennessee, and on the spot was the Cherokee
Spring, pouring forth an unfailing pure broad stream, that managed with
knowledge and energy and guarded with vigilance would water an army
greater than that of Xerxes. There was also the mountain air of Georgia,
and the farmers' fields and the breezy woods, and great spaces where army
corps could be mustered and put through their evolutions.
Even into this paradise of soldiers' schools came plagues of flies and other
plagues, and with the Chickamauga River and the Crawfish Spring and wells
by the score, each yielding inexhaustible supplies of the better beverage of
man, there were bitter complaints of the water as well as of the insects.
There was, counting all the circumstances of the crisis, no quick and certain
help for these things. They must all be considered in the argument for a real
army, not necessarily for a monstrous host, but a sufficient force to prevent
the awful expensiveness of the profligate system of accepting challenges to
war, or galloping into it, as the unthinking horse goes to battle, headlong
and squandering in a few summer weeks, and then with disappointing results,
the substance of the people, the gain of laborious and thrifty years and the
lives of the youth just grown up into usefulness.
In those profuse outlays that the zeal of patriotism and the pride of
manliness and the gracious sympathies of womanliness call for irresistibly

488 THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO.
and without stint, there cannot be full compensation found. JLost time is
irrecoverable, and we have put off for the mystical to-morrows those pro
visions for bad weather that must come to us as to all others, and that the
story of every age foreshadows.
If we had been as presciently thoughtful for the army as on behalf of the
navy we would not have depended in the days big with destiny in July, 1898,
upon the thin lines of indomitable sufferers, who stormed and held the hills
beyond Santiago and were a great salvation. If we had been really ready for
entrance upon such a campaign, as all other nations of thirty per cent of our
ability, with the exception of China, are, we would have sent troop ships with
lighters and tugs, laborers, and all the well known wants of such an enter
prise and the requirements of life in southern Cuba. We would have had
shipped a narrow-gauge railroad, rails, cars, locomotives, engineers, all but
conductors, with expert railroad builders to put it down, and our soldiers could
have been and would have been supplied with full rations and medicines, their
packs delivered on the firing lines with all their shelter tents, blankets,
tobacco, and all the other little comforts, the sum of which is so great, and
along with these full advanced, swiftly placed, and provided long range and
rapid fire guns to sweep away the Spanish blockhouses and score and search
the ridges, thickets and ditches with an intolerable flight of iron hail.
But such things cannot be extemporized at Tampa, Camp Alger, Chicka
mauga, or anywhere else. What artillery might have done may be seen in
what one battery did at El Caney. It was only with extreme exertion that
the fateful battery that prepared the victory was placed where it wiped away
the Spaniards with their smokeless Mausers, that scourged our lines as if with
swarms of hornets, flying from invisible nests with stings of death. Our
shells smashed their blockhouses, killing the defenders, or the decisive charge
could not have been made.
Our Congress, and it is another way of saying our public opinion, seeing
our ocean and gulf coasts exposed to modern squadrons, and apprised of the
nature and power of the armaments of the great powers abroad, made the
navy more than the army a non-partisan and non-sectional matter, and appro
priations were, after due discussion, given for battleships, a fact that stands out
and shines forth in honor of the States that are far from salt water, or
the mountains where the rivers run to the great river, the Father of floods and
the greater ocean of the globe. The national American spirit was abroad in

THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 489
them, and they began in time the magnificent machines of steel, that are fit
for ocean service, bearing enormous burdens, endowed with prodigious forces,
equipped with thunderbolts as volcanoes are — such marvels of mechanism as
the Oregon, her voyages no less renowned than her fights, and her speed
sends her where her artillery smashes the foe that stands or flees. Gigantic
embodiments like this could not be built and sent booming forward and
back, around Cape Horn, from Washington to Florida, and New York to
Manila, unless for years the furnaces flamed and the hammers rang.
Now, if Congress will come to the realizing sense that it takes as long to
make out of our matchless material of men a battle regiment, as it does to
delve in the mines for iron and coal and build a battleship, and construct a
navy, we shall no more be grieved over the privations of the camps, as well
as the perils of those who form the fire line. When the thunders of hostile
guns deliver the messengers of death and immortality in the ranks of our
heroes, we shall not again mourn that precious lives were lost, that might
have been saved by the aggregate will and wisdom of the people at large,
whose government we have and whose army is their own — their flesh and
blood, as the navy is bone of their bone. Regular regiments must be
enlisted, officered, drilled and altogether uplifted to competency, and live to
the straight line and the broad precept of faith and glory of the fathers — as the
steel broadsides from which the far-flashing guns send their armor-piercing
bolts, and the crackling shells that light the stormy gloom of battle.
There was a great wrong in that our army at Santiago was so small and
so poorly furnished when they stood between the nation and humiliation, and it
is to be hoped the war has educated us so that we have surely located the
fault and seriously mean to find and apply the remedy that experience has
once more revealed. Was it the negligence, the indifference, the incompe
tency, the ruthless selfishness, the ambition that would deal destruction,
hoping to harvest lucrative reputation and forward private ends, of the
Secretary of War, the Major-General who commanded the army of the United
States, the Adjutant-General of the army, the Major-General Commanding
at Santiago, or the Adjutant-General or some commissary or quartermaster?
Those who answer yes belittle the great and grave facts. It is due the
dignity of the country that the tirade of personalities, in and outside journal
ism, the screeching demagogues, in and out of public life, the chatter of
speculators in unwholesome exciting agitations should cease. There are

49° THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO.
before us volumes of reports of investigation, all of which must be useful, and
yet all could have been spared, but for the fact that there was a popular
demand for fair and full information as to the grievances of all who had stepped
forward to serve the country whether they reached the fire line or not.
The "clamor for investigation" was one of the forms of the appearance
of public opinion that the records of the war demanded "army reform."
Unquestionably that is true judgment, and the concrete mass of it, hammered
down to a solid proposition, is that the regular army should be enlarged, and
that the improvements of recent years having such excellent and admirable
results in the army already, shall be extended and continued.
Concerning the innumerable incidents of a disagreeable, distressing and
exasperating nature that have aroused indignation, and provoked unseemly
differences and recriminations, there is to say that the Santiago expedition
was, with the exception of the invasion of Mexico, the first ever undertaken
by our military organizations in a tropical country, and that Vera Cruz was
not so distant or difficult a point to disembark and meet the enemy as Santi
ago. More than this, the pressure of time was not so acute in Mexico as in
Cuba, nor was the race with the yellow fever so close.
It was not the Spaniards in front that shook the fortitude of General
Shafter, but the precarious nature of the landing. He realized the peril of
bad weather in the obliteration of inadequate roads, the exhaustion of those
who were handling the supplies, the certainty that the army would melt away
if a regular siege was attempted ; that it was unable to dig trenches, stewed
in the heat by day, or soaked by rains and chilled at night. Sleeping on the
ground because the hammocks could not be carried, the soldiers knew that
they were being saturated with poison. Unable to charge through the sultry
air and thorny thickets upon the Spanish intrenchments and entanglements,
bearing packs and tools, blankets and tents, for the ways were steep and
the heat horrible, our boys stripped for the fighting, and were nearly
naked, and yet must sleep in the mud. It was hard to say which was the
worst trial — the burning sun or the pouring rain by day, or the chill earth and
the heavy dew by night.
It is no wonder the Commanding General, himself ill, viewed with dismay
the prospect of the total failure of the wretched roads, and thought seriously
of falling back, or letting the Spaniards go on easy terms.
The surroundings justified apprehension, and the wires at Washington

THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO.

491

sent only firm words, and spurred fainting resolution, while the country was
in a frenzy of wrath that war was a horror and glory so dearly won, that the
machinery that made up and moved armies was broken here and there under
the stress of unaccustomed emergencies.
The victory was won at last, and the teachings of its costliness will have
a value beyond price if there is consent that the truth is true, and the remedy
easily in the hands of Congress ; and if there is a victim demanded, let the
sacrifice be the folly that has found favor with many, that we are not as other
people, amenable to the laws of progress and of destiny, and to the domestic
and international obligations, to be armed that we may defend ourselves, by
taking care that we are ready for war if a foeman seeks us or we have to go
beyond the seas to find him, for the field is the world in war for warriors as
well as for the preachers of peace. The sword has its missions divine.

CHAPTER XXII.
The Day of Doom for Cervera's Fleet.
The Cape Verde Squadron Smashed, Burned and Sunk and Admiral Sampson Makes a
Present of the Wrecks to the Nation — The Reports of the Admiral and Commodore
Schley — Their Difference in Opinions, Methods and Manners — Intensely Interesting
Extracts from Reports by Captains and Executive Officers — A Series of Startling
Pictures — Admiral Cervera's Official Lamentation — Extracts from the Spanish Diary
of Uncommon Value — The Story of Fugitives from the Fleet Who Found Their
Way to the Spanish Trenches — Admiral Omits to Improve Opportunity of His Life.

Admiral Sampson announced the destruction of Cervera's fleet in the
following message: July 3, 1898.
Secretary of the Navy, Washington :
The fleet under my command offers the nation as a Fourth of July
present the whole of Cervera's fleet. It attempted to escape at 9:30 this
morning. At 2 the last ship, the Cristobal Colon, had run ashore 75 miles
west of Santiago and hauled down her colors. The Infanta Maria Teresa,
Oquendo, and Vizcaya were forced ashore, burned, and blown up within 20
miles of Santiago. The Furor and Pluton were destroyed within four miles
of the port. SAMPSON.
The President and Secretary of War responded in these telegrams:
Executive Mansion, Washington, July 4, 1898.
You have the gratitude and congratulation of the whole American
people. Convey to noble officers and crews, through whose valor new honors
have been added to the American Navy, the grateful thanks and appreciation
of the Nation. WILLIAM McKINLEY.

Navy Department, Washington, July 4, 1898.
The Secretary of the Navy sends you and every officer and man of your
fleet, remembering equally your dead comrade, grateful acknowledgment of
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• 494 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET.
your heroism arid skill. All honor to the brave. You have maintained the
glory of the American Navy. - JOHN D. LONG-
On the second day of July Admiral Sampson had arranged to meet Gen
eral Shafter to consult about the cooperation of the army and navy, and was
on his flagship New York, four miles east of his usual position, three miles
east of the harbor entrance, going on that errand. Commodore Schley, on his
flagship Brooklyn, was two miles west of the harbor and the flight of the
Spaniards' fleet was his way. Admiral Sampson says the speed of the Spanish
vessels was from eight to ten knots as they came out "shrouded in the smoke
from their guns," and "turned to the westward in column, increasing their
speed to the full power of their engines, " firing vigorously upon the block
ading vessels. The American crews were at Sunday quarters for inspection
and "cheered as they sprang to their guns," those in range opening fire in
eight minutes. The Admiral relates that the New York toward the end of
the chase made sixteen and one-half knots, but "was not, at any time, within
the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to
receive the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and
to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be
attempting to escape from the Gloucester. ' '
"It was," the Admiral says, "the heavy vessels that speedily over
whelmed and silenced the Spanish fire. " The Brooklyn and Texas "had at
the start the advantage of position," and "the Brooklyn maintained this lead;"
the Oregon, however, "steaming with amazing speed from the commencement
of the action, took first place. The skillful handling and gallant fighting of
the Gloucester excited the admiration of everyone who witnessed it," says
Admiral Sampson, and her fire upon the destroyer was "accurate, deadly and of
great volume. " At 11:15 the Vizcaya was on fire, "turned in shore and was
beached at Assenderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, burning fiercely and with
her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode." The
Admiral says the rescue of prisoners, including wounded, "from the burning
Spanish vessels was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant con
duct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve
ammunition were exploding,_ and it was not known at what moment the fire
would reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was
running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers
and men until their work of humanity was complete. ' '

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496 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET.
The Cristobal Colon is called by the Admiral "the best and fastest
vessel" of the Spaniards. The Brooklyn and Oregon, overhauling her slowly,
opened fire at 12:50 and an Oregon shell struck beyond her, and at 1:20 she,
the last survivor of the fleet, hauled down her colors and ran ashore forty-
eight miles from Santiago. This fine ship, not injured by shots or fire, was
treacherously sunk by the opening and breaking of her sea valves and
Sampson says: "When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat,
she was pushed by the New York bodily up on the beach, the New York's
stem being placed against her for this purpose — the ship being handled by
Captain Chad wick with admirable judgment. ' '
It is the opinion of the Admiral that the blockade had been made so
"stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from
making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the
attempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the com
manding officer of the Cristobal Colon. ' '
The special feature of the blockade was the search light, and of it the
Admiral says: "To the battleships was assigned the duty, in turn, of
lighting the channel. Moving up to the port, at a distance of from one to
two miles from the Morro — dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere
1 — they threw a search light beam directly up the channel, and held it steadily
there. This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel, for half a mile
inside of the entrance, so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could
be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the search light ship
was always a matter of surprise to me ; but they never did. Stationed close to
the entrance of the port were three picket launches and, at a little distance
farther out, three small picket vessels — usually converted yachts — and,
when they were available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this
arrangement there was at least a certainty that nothing could get out of the
harbor undetected.
"After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish
admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance
was reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battleship was placed
alongside the search light ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel
in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship should appear. The com
manding officers merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which
they entered into this plan and put it into execution. The Massachusetts,

THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 497

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498 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET.
which, according to routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo,
like the others had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better
fate than to be absent that morning. ' '
On the point of absence that morning the Admiral was naturally sensitive,
as he happened to be fated to have placed himself out of the combat on
business that was the most important matter on hand until the Spaniards
sought to escape. The Admiral only mentions Commodore Schley to say that
he did not modify an order that officer issued, giving the Spanish officers their
personal effects. Of course it was unpleasant and unfortunate for the
Admiral to be out of the combat, but this was not in any sense a fault, and
as he had been sharply critical of the Commodore for a miscalculation as to
the movements of the Spanish fleet, it would have been handsome to have
pleasantly characterized the good fortune of Schley in being so well placed,
and as this has been quite visible there has been a strong public feeling that
there should be made up to the Commodore anything lacking in the apprecia
tion of his services on the great occasion by his superior in rank — and the
frigid temperature of the Admiral toward the officer and ship leading the way
in the running fight, is compensated by superheated admiration.
Admiral Sampson's remark on the failure of the fire of the Spanish ships
is highly interesting. He says: "Our loss was one man killed and one
wounded, both on the Brooklyn. It is difficult to explain this immunity
from loss of life or injury to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the
best type, but Spanish gunnery is poor at the best, and the superior weight
and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced
their fire. This is borne out by the statements of prisoners and by
observation. The Spanish vessels as they dashed out of the harbor, were
covered with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily diminished in
volume and soon almost disappeared. The fire from the rapid-fire batteries
of the battleships appears to have been remarkably destructive. An
examination of the stranded vessels shows that the Almirante Oquendo
especially had suffered terribly from this fire. Her sides are everywhere
pierced and her decks- were strewn with the charred remains of those who
had fallen. ' '
The preparations the Admiral had made for contingencies of the blockade
were remarkably thorough. June 7th he ordered: "The weather permitting,
three picket launches, detailed from the ships of the squadron each evening,

THE NAVAL HEROES OF SANTIAGO.

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50^ THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET.
will occupy positions one mile from the Morro, one to the eastward, one to
the westward, and one to the south of the harbor entrance. On a circle
drawn with a radius of two miles from the Morro will be stationed three
vessels — the Vixen to the westward, from one-half to one mile from the shore,
the Suwanee south of Morro, and the Dolphin to the eastward, between one-
half mile and one mile from the shore. The remaining vessels will retain the
positions already occupied ; but they will take especial care to keep within a
four-mile circle.
"All vessels may turn their engines whenever desirable, to keep them
in readiness for immediate use, and while so doing may turn in a small
circle, but without losing proper bearing or distance.
"The signal for an enemy will be two red Very lights fired in rapid suc
cession. If the enemy is a torpedo boat, these two red lights will be followed
by a green light. ' '
In this connection attention was called in the strongest terms to the
impatience of the service — closing: "The end to be obtained justifies the
risk of torpedo attack, and that risk must be taken. The escape of the
Spanish vessels at this j uncture would be a serious blow to our prestige and
to a speedy end. of the war. "
The duties of each ship were minutely defined. Three battleships took
turns of two hours each during the dark hours in keeping one search light
directly on the harbor entrance. The order of June 8th closes with this
admonition :
"Attention is called to bad and careless handling of seach lights. Last
night some of the lights were kept high in the air, and were again swept
rapidly from side to side. Under such circumstances a search light is worse
than useless.
"The beams must be directed to the horizon, and must be moved very
steadily and slowly. Not less than three minutes should be employed in
sweeping through an arc of 90 degrees.
"The best way to discover a torpedo boat is by its smoke, and even this
will not be seen unless the light is very well handled."
Commodore Schley reports: "The concentration of fire of the squadron
upon the ships coming out was most furious and terrific, and great damage
was done them."
As to the close of the combat he says: "The Oregon having proved

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504 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET.
vastly faster than the other battleships, she and the Brooklyn, together with
the Texas and another vessel which proved to be your flagship, continued
westward in pursuit of the Colon. This pursuit continued with increasing
speed in the Brooklyn, Oregon and other ships, and soon the Brooklyn and
Oregon were within long range of the Colon, when the Oregon opened fire
with her 13-inch guns, landing a shell close to the Colon. A moment after
wards the Brooklyn opened fire with her 8-inch guns, landing a shell just
ahead of her. Several other shells were fired at the Colon, now in range
of the Brooklyn's and Oregon's guns. Her commander, seeing all chances
of escape cut off, and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun and
struck her flag at 1:15 p. m., and ran ashore at a point some 50 miles west of
Santiago harbor. Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time. I
would mention, for your consideration, that the Brooklyn occupied the most
westward blockading position, with the Vixen, and, being more directly in
the route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed for some minutes,
possibly ten, to the gun fire of three of the Spanish ships and the west
battery, at a range of 1,500 yards from the ships and about 3,000 yards from
the batteries, but the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly, soon
diverted this fire and did magnificent work at close range.
"I have never before witnessed such deadly and fatally accurate shooting
as was done by the ships of your command as they closed in on the Spanish
squadron, and I deem it a high privilege to commend to you, for such action
as you may deem proper, the gallantry and dashing courage, the prompt decis
ion, and the skillful handling of their respective vessels of Captain Philip,
Captain Evans, Captain Clark, and especially of my chief of staff, Captain
Cook, who was directly under my personal observation and whose coolness,
promptness, and courage were of the highest order. The dense smoke of the
combat shut out from my view the Indiana and the Gloucester, but, as these
vessels were closer to your flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was
under your immediate observation. The torpedo boats were destroyed early in
the action, but the smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say
to which vessel or vessels the credit belongs. This, doubtless, was better seen
from your flagship. "
The one American killed, G. H. Ellis, Chief Yeoman, and the one
wounded, J. Burns, fireman, in the engagement, were on the Brooklyn, and
the Commodore says: "The marks and scars show that the ship was struck

ADMIRAL CERVERA, WHO COMMANDED THE ILL-FATED SPANISH FLEET AT SANTIAGO.

SIDE OF THE "CRISTOBAL COLON." AFTER THE BATTLE.

OFFICIAL PLANS SHOWING APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF HITS AND PROBABLE SIZE OF PROJECTILES.

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508 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET.
about twenty-five times, and she bears in all forty-one scars as the result of
her participation in the great victory of your force on July 3, 1898. The
speed-cone halyards were shot away, and nearly all the signal halyards. The
ensign at the main was so shattered that in hauling it down at the close of
the action it fell in pieces.
"I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory to the
squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to
contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us."
There is a strong contrast between the reports of the Admiral and the
Commodore, that appears most positively in the references the distinguished
officers make to each other. There is something that approaches neglect in
the observations of Sampson and it is difficult to say whether the
repetitions in Schley's remarks as to the excellent views the Admiral had
at various times of the combat, have a tone of courteous attention or
patronage rather too highly flavored to be pleasant to the taste. The Com
modore says that in conversation with Captain Eulate of the Vizcaya and
Commodore Canheras of the Colon he learned the Spanish Admiral's scheme
was to concentrate all fire for awhile on the Brooklyn and the Vizcaya to ram
her, in hopes that if they could destroy her the chance of escape would be
increased, as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship of our squadron.
This explains the heavy fire mentioned and the Vizcaya 's action in the earlier
moments of the engagement. The execution of this purpose was promptly
defeated by the fact that all the ships , of the squadron advanced into close
range and opened an irresistibly furious and terrific fire upon the enemy's
squadron as it was coming out of the harbor.
Captain Cook of the Brooklyn, adds: "The Brooklyn was engaged with
the three leading ships of the enemy, which were forging ahead, the
Texas, Iowa and Indiana keeping up a heavy fire, but steadily dropping
astern. The Oregon was keeping up a steady fire and was coming up in the
most glorious and gallant style, outstripping all others. It was an inspiring
sight to see this battleship, with a large white wave before her, and her
smokestacks belching forth continued puffs from her forced draft. We
were making fourteen knots at the time, and the Oregon came up off our
starboard quarter at about 600 yards and maintained her position, though
we soon after increased our speed to fifteen knots, • and just before the
Colon surrendered were making nearly sixteen."

THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. s&9
Captain Cook adds: "The 8-inch guns worked satisfactorily; some
trouble and delay was caused by jamming of locks. The turrets worked
well. The 5 -inch battery gave great trouble with the elevating gear. At
the end several were rendered useless for battle. Two are bulged at the
muzzle. This ship should have new elevating gear for 5 -inch as soon as
practicable. We fired 100 rounds of 8-inch, 473 of 5-inch, 1,200 of 6-pounder,
and 200 of 1 -pounder ammunition."
Captain Clark of the Oregon says of the firing of the ship: "We
soon passed all of our ships except the Brooklyn, bearing the broad
pennant of Commodore Schley. At first we only used our main battery,
but when it was discovered that the enemy's torpedo boats were following
their ships we used our rapid-fire guns, as well as the 6-inch, upon them with
telling effect. As we ranged up near the sternmost of their ships she
headed for the beach, evidently on fire. We raked her as we passed, pushing
on for the next ahead, using our starboard guns as they were brought to
bear, and before we had her fairly abeam, she too was making for the beach.
The two remaining vessels were now some distance ahead, but our speed had
increased to sixteen knots and our fire, added to that of the Brooklyn, soon
sent another, the Vizcaya, to the shore in flames. The Brooklyn signaled,
'Oregon, well done. ' Only the Cristobal Colon was left, and for a time it
seemed as if she might escape; but when we opened with our forward turret
guns and the Brooklyn followed she began to edge in toward the coast
and her capture or destruction was assured. As she struck the beach
her flag came down and the Brooklyn signaled, 'Cease firing,' following
it with 'Congratulations for the grand victory, thanks for your splendid
assistance.' "
The effect of a shot on the Texas is thus stated by an executive officer :
"A shell of about 6 inches in diameter entered the starboard side above
the main deck near top of hammock berthing immediately forward of ash-
hoist, angle of entrance being about 20 degrees forward of the beam; shell
apparently exploded immediately after passing through the outer plating of
hammock berthing, passing into the forward air shaft to forced draft blower,
destroying doors of both air shafts and the adjacent bulkheads. Several
pieces passed through the doorway of after shaft and penetrated the after
bulkhead of the shaft. The mass of shell pieces passed on through
bulkhead and casing of starboard smoke box, producing an aperture

510 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET.
therein, irregular in form, measuring about 3 feet vertically, 2 feet fore and
aft. The ash hoist machinery was badly damaged."
The effect upon the Texas of her own guns this officer relates: "The
steel deck has in several places become separated from the beams through
the stretching or breaking of rivets, and there are now leaks in several
places. "The rivets securing the head of midship stanchions to the web of
beams of frames 55 and 56 have been sheared off.
"The condition of starboard side of the main deck is attributed partly to
the firing of the 12-inch turret guns over the deck during the engagement,
as mentioned in my report of June 6, but mainly by similar causes during the
battle of yesterday.
"The marked increase in the injuries to the deck may be attributed not
only to the repetition of great strains over a surface whose support was already
weakened, but to an increase in the charge of powder ; i. e. , reduced charge
previously used to full charge used during this battle.
"I am of opinion that the framing of the deck in this ship is too light to
permit the further firing of the 12 -inch guns over the decks without serious
injury." The reason given by Admiral Sampson for ordering the Indiana to turn
back when the Brooklyn had the Colon well in hand is: "There were still
some armed vessels remaining in the harbor of Santiago — at least two, and we
did not know then how many more — which could have come out in the
absence of the fleet and produced great havoc among the troopships, which
were defenseless in the absence of an armed vessel. "
Commodore Eaton of the Resolute says of the fire of the Indiana
which he had an excellent opportunity to observe: "As the Vizcaya came
out, I distinctly saw one of the Indiana's heaviest shells strike her abaft the
funnels, and the explosion of this shell was followed by a burst of flame
which, for the moment, obscured the after part of the Vizcaya.
"The Cristobal Colon, as soon as she was clear of Morro Point, fired her
first broadside at the Indiana.
"The Oquendo, in coming out, also fired her first broadside at the
Indiana, and I could see some of the Indiana's shells strike the Oquendo
as she steamed south.
"Following close astern of the Colon and the Oquendo came the destroyer

THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 5"
Furor, and I distinctly saw her struck by an 8-inch or 13-inch shell from the
Indiana, which was followed by an explosion and flames on board of the
Furor. "The Spanish officers who were prisoners from the Colon and the Vizcaya
have since told me that the fire from the Indiana and the Oregon as the}*
passed from the harbor was deadly in its destructiveness, and that although
the Colon escaped with small injury, due to her greater speed and being in a
measure covered by other ships, the Vizcaya was hopelessly crippled before
she had gone a mile from the Morro. ' '
The way the Iowa dealt destruction to the Maria Teresa — Admiral
Cervera's flagship — is thus related by Captain Evans: "When it was certain
that the Maria Teresa would pass ahead of us, the helm was put to starboard,
and the starboard broadside delivered at a range of 2,500 yards. The helm
was then put to port and the ship headed across the bow of the second ship,
and as she drew ahead the helm was again put to starboard and she received
in turn the full weight of our starboard broadside at a range of about 1,800
yards. The Iowa was again headed off with the port helm for the third ship,
and as she approached the helm was put to starboard until our course was
approximately that of the Spanish ship. In this position at a range of 1,400
yards the fire of the entire battery, including rapid-fire guns, was poured into
the enemy's ship.
"The fire of the main battery of this ship when the range was below 2,500
yards was most effective and destructive, and after a continuance of this fire
for perhaps twenty minutes it was noticed that the Maria Teresa and Oquendo
were in flames and headed for the beach. "
The ammunition expended by the Iowa was: 12-inch semi-armor- piercing
shell, with full charges, 31; 8-inch common shell, with full charges, 35.4-inch
cartridges, common shell, 251; 6-pounder cartridges, common shell, 1,056;
1 -pounder cartridges, common shell, 100.
Captain Evans says of his crew that they were "magnificent" and "so
long as the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen ; but
when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American
women." The Gloucester had a special combat with the Spanish torpedo destroyers
and the executive officer reports an exchange of fire between automatic guns:
"The monotonous reports of an automatic gun could be heard after the 2,500

Si2 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET.
yard range was passed and the zone of fire could be distinctly traced by a
line of splashes describing accurately the length of the ship and gradually
approaching it. But at a distance, variously estimated from 10 to 50 yards,
the automatic firing suddenly ceased. It was afterwards found to be from a
1 -pounder Maxim, and the execution aboard would have been terrible during
the few minutes that must have elapsed before the ship was sunk had the
fire reached us. Meanwhile the service of our own guns was excellent, and
at range of 1,200 yards, the two 6-millimeter automatic Colt rifles opened
on the enemy."
When the fight was over there was found "a horrible state of affairs"
on the Furor. "The vessel was a perfect shambles. As she was on fire and
burning rapidly, they took off the living and then rescued all they could find
in the water and on. the beach. The Pluton was among the rocks in the surf
and could not be boarded, but her crew had made their way ashore or were
adrift on life buoys and wreckage. These were all taken on board. I have
since learned that the New York passed a number of men in the water who
had doubtless jumped overboard from the destroyers to escape our fire. All
these were probably drowned.
"While this work was going on several explosions took place on the
Furor, and presently — at about 11:30 — she threw her bows in the air, and
turning to port slowly sank in deep water."
The Spanish lieutenants Cabellero and Bustamente commanded the
Spanish destroyers, so summarily destroyed, and escaped. Cabellero of the
Pluton says that when the Furor sank "We were making a great deal of
water; we continued close to the shore to reach Punta Cabrera, and when we
were close to the headland which it forms, we received a 3 2 -centimeter
projectile which exploded the forward group of boilers, blowing up the whole
deck and cutting off communication between the two ends. She then veered
to starboard and struck on the headland, tearing off a great part of the bow.
The shock threw her back some distance ; then she struck again. I jumped
into the water and reached the shore.
"I climbed up on the headland of Punta Cabrera and lay there for about
fifteen minutes, during which the fire continued. When it was at an end I
went into the mountains and gathered up such personnel of the ship as I
met — about 20 or 25 — and with them I went around a small hill for the pur
pose of hiding from the coast and took the road to Santiago de Cuba, avoiding

THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 513
the roads and seeking the densest thickets and woods. The pilot, on pretext
that the road which I was following was not a good one, left us and did not
again put in an appearance. We continued walking in an easterly direction
— some clothed, others naked, and the rest half clothed — for two hours, resting
now and then, and trying to keep close to the coast."
"This troop of fugitives reached the Spanish trenches that night. Busta
mente of the Furor reported that one of the American projectiles struck one
of the hatches of the boiler ventilators, thereby reducing the pressure and
consequently the speed of the ship. By this time the projectiles were
falling on board in large numbers. One of the shells struck Boatswain
Duenas, cutting him in two; one part fell between the tiller ropes,
interrupting them momentarily, and it was necessary to take it out in pieces.
Another projectile destroyed the engine and the servo-motor, so that the
ship could neither proceed nor maneuver. Another had struck the after
shell room, exploding and destroying it.
"Our torpedoes had their war heads on and were ready to be used, but we
did not launch them because we were never at a convenient distance from
the enemy. Under these circumstances the commander of the destroyers,
Captain Fernando Villaamil, gave orders to abandon the ship, and I with
part of the crew jumped into the water, about three miles from the coast. In
the water, one of the men near me, I believe the first boatswain, was struck by
a bullet in the head and buried in the water forever. The ship in the mean
time, after a horrible series of explosions, went down. When we reached the
land, we went in an easterly direction towards Santiago. Shortly after we
met Lieutenant Caballero and with him and his men we reached Santiago."
The Heraldo of Madrid, August 2 2d, published the report of Cervera.
He says the Brooklyn was "on account of her speed the vessel most
dreaded" and when the departure was effected "we steered the prearranged
course in view of the disadvantages that existed for us, which became evi
dent as soon as the exit had been accomplished. The enemy's fire produced
terrible damages on board the Infanta Maria Teresa, destroying the
elements of defense — among others the net for protection against fire. In this
critical moment the captain of the ship, Senor Concas, fell wounded, and it
was necessary to withdraw him, I taking command of the vessel, because it
was impossible to find the second commandant of the Maria Teresa.
Immediately afterwards they reported to me that my cabin was burning

5i4 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET.
in consequence of an explosion. The fire soon became very great and ignited
other parts of the ship. I gave orders to my aid to flood the after magazines,
but it was impossible. Dense clouds of smoke impeded walking in the
passages and practicing any kind of operations. In this situation I could only
think of beaching the ship, and did so, running aground on Punta Cabrera.
The contest was impossible on our side, and there was nothing more to be
done but to save as much as possible. I thought to lower the flag, but that
was not possible on account of the fire, which prevented all operations. In
these anxious moments two boats came to the aid of the Maria Teresa, into
which a number of us jumped. Those that were not dying were saved with
nothing. "The Teresa lowered a small boat, which sank before_it could be of any
service. Subsequently they succeeded in launching a steam launch, but this
also sank after making one voyage to the beach. I succeeded in saving
myself with nothing, two sailors helping me, one named Andres Sequeros
and the officer D. Angel Cervera, all of us arriving on board the American
ship Gloucester naked. At this time we were all naked.
"It remains to communicate to you that our enemies behaved toward
us with great chivalry, providing us with good clothes, and suppressing
almost entirely the usual hurrahs, to prevent hurting our self-respect. The
3d day of July has been to us a horrible disaster, as I had foreseen. The
number of the dead, nevertheless, is less than what I feared. The country
has been defended with honor, and the satisfaction of the duty done leaves
our conscience tranquil."
According to the purser of the Oquendo, the history of this ill-fated ship
was as follows : "The unequal battle became more so when a hostile projectile
entered the forward turret, killing the whole personnel, with the exception of
one gunner, who was badly wounded. Of the 14-cm. battery 2 guns only
remained in action, and these fought with incomparable energy. The after
turret was soon without a commanding officer; he had been killed as he
opened the door, being almost asphyxiated inside of the turret. There were
two fires on board the Oquendo, one in the orlop deck forward, which was
soon gotten under control, and the other in the stern, which could not be sup
pressed, the pumps failing to give water. From the very beginning of the
battle the 14-cm. ammunition hoists failed to work. When oar commander,
Mr. Lazaga, saw that the fire could not be controlled and that all the guns

BOW OF THE "VIZCAYA," AFTER THE SANTIAGO BATTLE,

THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 5r7
were out of action, he prepared to beach the ship, first giving orders to
discharge all -the torpedoes in order to prevent the enemy from approaching.
Driven to the last extreme, and after consulting with all the officers present,
he ordered the flag to be hauled down. The second and third commanders
and three lieutenants had already been killed, and while Mr. Lazaga was
directing the rescue of the crew he gave his own life for his country. The
men of the Oquendo witnessed calmly and without becoming terrified, the
constant explosions on board, determined above all things that the enemy
should not set foot on the ship."
The secret cipher official telegrams of the Spanish premier, Sagasta, the
Captain General of Cuba, Blanco, the Minister of the Navy of Spain, and the
military commander of Santiago, given in the chapter of this book relating to
them, should be read in- connection with the extracts from our own official
papers, touching the Santiago expeditions and the battles on land and sea.
The two collections of the papers that are of absolute sincerity, verity and
inwardness, perfect the accounts of the episode that was demonstrative that
the fortunes of the war were all against Spain. This was so certain, that it
would have been irrational not to surrender. The secret ciphers of the
Spanish officers complete the explanation of the almost incredible inferiority
of the ships of Spain as against ours. Admiral Cervera was not duped by
vanity on this subject and did not condescend to boastfulness, or conceal the
truth from those higher than himself in authority, yet he confessed after the
annihilation of his squadron that he would not have believed the ships he
commanded could have been knocked in pieces so rapidly. The fire of the
American fleet was overwhelming — battleships, protected cruisers, gunboats,
heavy and light, participating with equal vigor, efficiency and immunity
from harm.
The identification of the Spanish ships of war in the harbor of Santi
ago de Cuba as Admiral Cervera's fleet was reported by Commodore
Schley. The War Department was able to inform General Miles,, then at
Tampa, of it, on the 2nd of June, one month and one- day before the day
of the doom of the squadron. The movements of the Spanish cruisers and
torpedo boats commanded by Cervera, had been managed with such skill to
prevent their precise location that they had an extraordinary degree of the
public attention and there was the gravest concern that they might be located
and that no pains should be spared to put them out of the possibility of action.

5i8

THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET.

The campaign plans in Cuba were disturbed by the existence of Spanish
war ships in West India waters. One swift and heavily armed cruiser could
sink an army of unprotected transports. The news that the flitting squadron
of Spain had become fugitives and taken refuge in Santiago Bay was of the
greatest consequence. The next thing was to assemble off Santiago an over
whelming blockading fleet, and this done, the organization was in two
squadrons :
First squadron (under the personal command of Admiral Sampson) : New
York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter.
Second squadron (Commodore Schley) : Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas,
Marblehead, Vixen.

Morro.

Zm.
'J Vixen.

\ J Brooklyn.
V

2m. ,

Mayflower. I /
i
kl
> Nen Orleans. I -'

\, \

New

Porter \ 1/
v /
York. |/'

\|Mm. Zona. Oregon.^ ^''

The order was : "The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keep
ing about six miles from the Morro in the daytime, and closing in at night, the
lighter vessels well in shore. The first squadron will blockade on the east
side of the port, and the second squadron on the west side. If the enemy tries
to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor
to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel."
One thing that contributed greatly to the success of the blockade was the
use of search lights held steadily on the mouth of the harbor. The diagram

THE -DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 5J9
annexed was drawn to accompany the order of battle, dated June 2nd, and
shows the method of the formation.
The Spanish Office of Naval Intelligence has published the diary of
Lieutenant Jose" MuUer y Tejeiro, second in command of Naval forces of the
province of Santiago de Cuba. We quote the opening passages :
"On the 1 8th of May the first hostile ships were sighted from the Morro
of Santiago de Cuba and the first gunshots were heard, which since that date,
for the space of two months, have hardly ceased for a single day.
"On the following day, the 19th, the Spanish fleet, commanded by Rear
Admiral Cervera, entered with very little coal, which it was absolutely
necessary to replenish.
"From that time on I have kept an exact diary * * * of everything I
saw, or that came to my notice, or that passed through my hands in my official
capacity, or that I knew to be accurate and trustworthy."
A part of the entry, under the date of July the 4th, has special significance:
"July 4. — Opposite the mouth of the harbor, the New York, Brooklyn,
Indiana, Massachusetts, Minneapolis, Vesuvius, 1 yacht, and 17 merchant
vessels. At 8 p. m. the cruiser Reina Mercedes started up.
"As the interior of the harbor did no longer have the safeguard of the fleet,
as the Bustamente torpedoes {six of them) had been taken up so that the fleet
could go out and had not yet been replaced, and as, finally, the first line of mines
no longer existed, the commander of marine decided — General Toral also being
of his opinion — to sink the Mercedes (the only ship that was suitable for that
purpose) in the narrow part of the channel ; consequently the commander of
the cruiser received orders to do so. Hurriedly, for time was pressing, the
wounded and sick from the lost fleet were transferred to the steamer Mejico,
which had been converted into a hospital, and hoisted the flag of the Red
Cross. Important papers that had been saved, memoranda, portable arms.
beds, and the most necessary things, were taken off the Mercedes, and at 8
p. m., with her commander, Ensign Nardiz, a few engineers, the necessary
sailors, and Pilots Apolonio Nunez and Miguel Lopez, started toward the
entrance, with her bow anchor and stern spring on the cable ready."
The ship was sunk under a heavy fire by the American fleet, but the
Spanish diary we quote says: "Unfortunately, the ship did not come to lie
across the channel, because it seems a projectile cut the spring on the cable;
the sacrifice was useless and the harbor was not obstructed. Yet it was not

520 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET.
entirely useless, since the enemy could not take possession of her, as she is
all riddled by bullets which she received that night, and I do not believe she
can ever again be used."
One thing that is of the utmost importance and that has escaped critical
notice, is the fact that when Admiral Sampson ordered the Indiana to turn
back to protect our transports, he missed the opportunity of his life. He
was alarmed quite unnecessarily by the fancy that there was danger more
Spanish war ships would come out and avenge the loss of Cervera's squadron.
That was not, after the experiences of the day, possible. The Admiral was
right to turn the Indiana back from the pursuit, but wrong in not discon
tinuing the long chase after the Brooklyn and Oregon, then steadily overhaul
ing the Colon. There was no business demand for the Admiral to be a per
sonal spectator of the surrender of the Colon, and to hold a reception for
the prisoners. It is plain now, and ought to have been then, that the Indiana should
have gone in where the Spaniards came out. There were no torpedoes to
fear. The batteries were not alarming — would not have been to Farragut or
Dewey or Lord Nelson. The torpedoes had not been replaced, the mines no
longer existed. Our fleet was not damaged. The Indiana and New York
should have gone at full speed for the open door, signaling the battleships to
follow, and the Fourth of July would have seen the harbor and city in pos
session of the fleet, and the Spanish army's surrender must have been
immediate and unconditional, There was a gate of glory open, unseen.

'VIZCAYA," AFTER THE BATTLE, SHOWING RESULTS OF AMERICAN GUNNERS' MARKSMANSHIP.

THE "CRISTOBAL COLON," AS FINALLY ABANDONED.

CHAPTER XXIII.

The Scenes and Significance of the Surrender of Santiago.
The Appearance of General Miles at Santiago— His Moral as well as Military Force-
Spanish Obstinacy in the Negotiation for Capitulation — The Iron Hand at Washing
ton—The Practical Question was, How Much Would Victory Cost Us?— The Spanish
Case was Hopeless — They Sought to Save their Military Honor — The Scenes and
Terms of the Surrender — An Inspector General's Picturesque Story — Telegrams that
are Photographs — The President's Proclamation of Principles and Purpose in Cuban
Government — Comparative Proportions of Great Surrenders.
It was July 7th that the Major-General commanding the army of the
United States left Washington City for the seat of war in Cuba, and with the
aid of a fast train to Columbia, South Carolina, and a "special" for Charles
ton, took the "Yale," having 1,500 troops aboard, and arrived at Santiago on
the morning of the nth, finding Admiral Sampson bombarding the Spaniards
at the mouth of the harbor, but not forcing his way in, as Shafter desired.
The General was en route four nights and three days.
There had been a good deal of conjecture whether the real intention of
the war office in hastening the transit of the head of the army from the
national capital to the scene of action, might not to be to supersede Shafter,
who was a sick man, sorely perplexed ; and within the horizon of the popular
observation there were heavy clouds, though the navy of the Spaniards was
no longer considered. The purpose of General Miles — his plan presumably—
was to assist in the capture of Santiago and press on. to Porto Rico, precisely
that which he did. Santiago was to him a spectacular episode.
The General commanding the United States army and the Admiral com
manding the North Atlantic squadron soon got together. General Miles
desired to land troops west of Santiago, and make a diversion in that quarter,
the Cubans not getting up in our fashion of fighting. In his note to Samp
son, Miles did not take into view that a force comprising the greater part of
fifty or sixty thousand Cubans ought to be, according to his original plan,
523

524 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.
somewhere in the neighborhood to storm the Spaniards out of Santiago.
Shafter had cabled Miles July 4th: "I am delighted to know that you are
coming that you may see for yourself the obstacles which this army had to
overcome. My only regret is the great number of gallant souls who have
given their lives for our country's cause."
A telegram of congratulation sent by General Miles July 3d was read at
the head of each of the regiments that had been engaged. Miles told Samp
son that he desired the cooperation of the navy in the west end movement, and
Sampson cordially acquiesced, offering every assistance of his fleet to
cover the debarkation of the troops and also to enfilade the Spanish position
with the guns of the ships.
It will be noted that it was the plan of Miles, and not the plan of Shafter,
in which Sampson so cordially acquiesced. There was one thing about which
the Admiral held positive opinion, and that was, as the Spaniards had done
what the gallant Hobson had not, blockaded the mouth of the harbor, he
did not mean to risk the sinking of a battleship in attempting a "no thorough
fare. " After meeting Sampson, Miles went on shore and communicated with
Shafter, who said he had troops enough to hold his position, and Miles gave
the orders for the movement on the west.
The next morning, July 12th, Miles rode to Shaffer's headquarters, and
the news of the arrival of the Major-General commanding was sent the Spanish
General, also the fact that large reinforcements had arrived, and that others
were on the way, and that Shafter and Miles desired to meet him between the
lines at any time agreeable to him. The Spanish General courteously replied
that he would see the American generals at 12 o'clock on the following day.
On that day Shafter announced "nervousness" in the army on account of the
yellow fever, "which is among us certainly, twenty-nine new cases yesterday
and probably one hundred and fifty all told."
General Toral had been seen and "a good impression made on him," and
Shafter supplemented that information with these words: "I will open on
him at twelve noon to-morrow with every gun I have and the assistance of the
navy with thirteen-inch shells. " The Spanish General agreed to surrender on
the basis of being returned to Spain — the proposal including all eastern Cuba.
There were about 12,000 Spanish troops in Santiago, and as many at other
points. The Spaniards were eagerly urgent to be allowed to have their arms
shipped with them.

-THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 525
July 16th the Spaniards surrendered, the main point with them being
th it they were to go home with their side arms and that they were to take
with their military archives, the arms they had so valiantly defended.
General Shafter did not seem to think it an essential matter whether the old
Spanish guns went to Spain or not, but Secretary Alger insisted that it was
not possible to concede that the arms should go. The letter of General Toral
notifying Shafter of Blanco's acceptance of the terms that had been definitely
agreed upon, was wired to the Adjutant-General of the United States at
Washington by the American General commanding in the field, who added:
"I have stood the delay, as I believe it will come out all right, and a fight
which we can have at any time will cost a lot of men." The letter was as
follows : Santiago, Cuba, 14.
General in Chief of the American Forces.
Honored Sir : His excellency the general in chief of the army of the island
of Cuba telegraphs from Havana yesterday at 7 p. m. the following: "Believ
ing that business of such importance as the capitulation of that place should
be known and decided upon by the government of His Majesty, I give you
notice that I have sent the conditions of your telegram, asking immediate
answer, and enabling you also to show this to the general of the American
army to see if he will agree to await the answer of the government, which can
not be as soon as the time which he has decided, as communication by way of
Bermuda is more slow than Key West. In the meanwhile your honor and the
general of the American army may agree upon capitulation on the basis of
returning to Spain." I have the honor to transmit this to you that in case
you may find the foregoing satisfactory he may designate persons representa
tive of himself, who, with those in my name, may agree to the clauses of
capitulation upon the basis of return to Spain, accepted already in the begin
ning by the general in chief of this army. Awaiting a reply, I am,
Very respectfully, your servant, JOSE TORAL,
Commanding, Chief of the Fourth Army Corps.
July 14th, 3 :24 p. m., General Miles telegraphed Toral had formally surren
dered on the understanding that his troops should be returned to Spain.
The General pronounced that this was "very gratifying'' — and "General
Shafter and the officers and men of this command are entitled to great credit
for their sincerity, fortitude, and in overcoming almost insuperable obstacles

526 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.
which they encountered. A portion of the army has been infected with yellow
fever." Then came to the Santiago army headquarters this important dispatch
from the White House : Executive Mansion,
Washington, July 15, 1898 — 12:35 P- m-
Major-General Shafter, Camp before Santiago, Cuba: _
Have you received the absolute surrender of the enemy? We are await
ing the conditions with impatience. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
Shafter announced that the discussion as to terms lasted until ten o'clock
the night of the 14th, and was to be settled on the evening of the 15th at 9 :3o,
and that the great point of the Spaniards was to have their arms "shipped to
them." It was not possible for them to fail to complete arrangements. The
following telegrams complete the links of the chain of events :
Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, July 15, 1898 — 4:45 p. m.
Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este :
Secretary of War suggests, is it not possible that Toral is gaining time to
get reinforcements that may be on the way to assist him?
H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Playa del Este, via Hayti.
(Received at Washington July 15, 1898 — 9 p. m.)
Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington :
Headquarters near Santiago, Cuba, 15. — I do not believe that Toral is
trying to gain time in hopes of getting reinforcements. Cubans have forces
in vicinity of all Spanish troops. Toral asked to-day to send messages to
Guantanamo and to Palmas to notify Spanish troops of condition. Wheeler,
Lawton, and Miley are thoroughly convinced that they are earnest, and they
have been in consultation with the Spaniards twenty-four hours. Am told by
reliable persons Santiago the Spanish officers are greatly pleased at the
thought of going home, but generals are afraid of the consequences with
themselves unless terms of surrender are sanctioned by the Madrid govern
ment SHAFTER, Major-General.
Executive Mansion, Washington, July 15, 1898—5:59 p. m.
Major-General Shafter, Camp near Santiago, Playa:
Is it not possible that you are entertaining the proposition of permitting
the Spanish to carry away their arms? Such a suggestion should be rejected

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 527
instantly. You have been instructed the terms of surrender acceptable to the
President, and they must be concluded on these lines.
R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

Playa del Este, via Hayti.
(Received Washington July 15, 1898 — 11:20 p. m.)
Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington:
Headquarters near Santiago, 15. — I do not entertain the proposition for
the Spanish to retain their arms. They are to surrender them absolutely
immediately after articles of capitulation are signed, but they beg, as an act of
consideration to them, that I will intercede with my government that they be
shipped with them to Spain. I regard this as a small matter that in no way
binds the government, but is one I would not let stand between clearing 20,000
Spanish soldiers out of Cuba, or leaving them there to be captured later, and
probably with much loss to ourselves. SHAFTER, Major-General.
The text of the terms agreed upon is as follows:
Terms of the military convention for the capitulation of the Spanish forces
occupying the territory which constitutes the division of Santiago de Cuba,
and described as follows : All that portion of the island of Cuba east of a line
passing through Aserradero, Dos Palmas, Cauto Abajo, Escondida, Tanamo,
and Agtiidora, said troops being in command of Gen. Jose' Toral, agreed upon
by the undersigned commissioners: Brig. -Gen. Don Federico Escario, lieuten
ant-colonel of staff; Don Ventura Fontan, and, as interpreter, Mr. Robert
Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, appointed by General Toral, com
manding the Spanish forces on behalf of the kingdom of Spain, and Maj.-Gen.
Joseph Wheeler, U. S. V.; Maj.-Gen. H. W. Lawton, U. S. V.; and First
Lieut. J. D. Miley, Second Artillery, A. D. C, appointed by General Shafter,
commanding the American forces, on behalf of the United States:
1. That all hostilities between American and Spanish forces in this dis
trict absolutely and unequivocally cease.
2. That this capitulation includes all the forces and war material in said
territory. 3. That the United States agrees with as little delay as possible to trans
port all the Spanish troops in said district to the kingdom of Spain, the troops
being embarked, as far as possible, at the port nearest the garrisons they now
occupy.

528 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.
4. That the officers of the Spanish army be permitted to retain their side
arms and both officers and private soldiers their personal property.
5. That the Spanish authorities agree to remove, or assist the American
navy in removing, all mines or other obstructions to navigation now in the
harbor of Santiago and its mouth.
6. That the commanders of the Spanish forces deliver, without delay, a
complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the Spanish forces in
above-described district to the commander of the American forces; also a
roster of said forces now in said district.
7. That the commander of the Spanish forces, in leaving said district, is
authorized to carry with him all military archives and records pertaining to
the Spanish army now in said district.
8. That all that portion of the Spanish forces known as volunteers, mov-
ilizadoes, and guerrillas who wish to remain in the island of Cuba are permitted
to do so upon condition of delivering up their arms and taking a parole not to
bear arms against the United States during the continuance of the present war
between Spain and the United States.
9. That the Spanish forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba with
honors of war, depositing their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed
upon, to await their disposition by the United States government, it being
understood that the United States commissioners will recommend that the
Spanish soldier return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended.
10. That the provisions of the foregoing instrument become operative
immediately upon its being signed.
Entered into this 16th day of July, 1898, by the undersigned commission
ers, acting under instructions from their respective commanding generals and
with the approbation of their respective governments. JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General, United States Volunteers.
H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, United States Volunteers.
J. D. MILEY,
First Lieutenant, Second Artillery, A. D. C. to General Shafter.
FEDERICO ESCARIO.
VENTURA FONTAN.
ROBERT MASON.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 529
The President sent this eloquent message of congratulation :
Washington, D. C, July 16, 1898.
General Shafter, Commanding, Front near Santiago, Playa:
The President of the United States sends to you and your brave army the
profound thanks of the American people for the brilliant achievements at
Santiago, resulting in the surrender of the city and all of the Spanish troops
and territory under General Toral. Your splendid command has endured not
only the hardships and sacrifices incident to campaign and battle, but in stress
of heat and weather has triumphed over obstacles which would have overcome
men less brave and determined. One and all have displayed the most con
spicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the nation. The hearts of the
people turn with tender sympathy to the sick and wounded. May the Father
of Mercies protect and comfort them. WILLIAM McKINLEY.

Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, July 17, 1898 — 9:55 a. m.
General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Your telegram saying that our flag would be hoisted in Santiago at 9 this
morning was received by the President and Secretary of War and members of
the Cabinet with a sense of profound satisfaction. This feeling is general
with all the people. I hope you are well. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Shafter telegraphed Corbin :
"Upon coming into the city I discovered a perfect entanglement of
defenses. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first day, it would have cost
5,000 lives to have taken it."
Major and Inspector-General Reade reported:
"Fighting famine and fever extorted from even such a man as Col. Theo
dore Roosevelt the statement: 'Twenty-five per cent of my Rough Riders
can't carry a pail of water from the creek to the trenches. No man can decry
me or my regiments, but we must accede to the next proposition from the
enemy.' One characteristic of our soldiers is their unwillingness to go uppn
the sick report. The regulars do duty when really not fit to perform it, but
they do duty all the same. Regiments have a pride in maintaining on paper
a small percentage of sick."

530 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.
General Reade wrote this most interesting account of the raising of the
flag of the United States over the Governor's Palace of the ancient capital of
Cuba. It was 9 o'clock in the morning of July 17th. Within a few feet of Gen
erals Shafter, Wheeler and Kent "were three officers wearing Panama hats,
dressed in cotton, having narrow stripes of blue and white; their hats had
rosettes on the side, and they wore either top boots of black leather or white
canvas slippers," and "a fine looking man with a gray moustache was General
Toral, who saluted General Shafter like a graceful, dignified soldier."
"Just then Lieutenant Miley, Fifth Artillery, aid-de-camp to General
Shafter, dashed to the rear, shouting to an orderly to 'Bring up the sword.'
After some delay, a sword, having the belt and slings twisted around the hilt,
was handed to General Shafter. It was then bv him turned over to General
Toral. Our trumpets then sounded, after which, by Captain Brett's order, the
hundred cavalry executed left front into line, forming in single rank, on our
left, facing some dismounted Spanish infantry soldiers, armed with Mauser
rifles. The lines were not fifty yards apart.
" 'Present sabers!' by our cavalry was immediately followed by a like com
pliment by the Spanish. It was then 9:25 o'clock. General Toral shouted
out something in Spanish. The Spanish trumpets then sounded a march.
We were then told by Mr. A. C. Nunez that the tune was played only for the
King of Spain or the Captain-General of Cuba. We were also told that the
soldiers facing our cavalry comprised the bodyguard of General Toral. A
little later the Spanish infantry forged down the road, eastward, without their
rifles, to the point where the Thirteenth Regiment, United States Infantry,
received them as prisoners of war. I counted them. Their number was 330.
"As they filed along I wheeled my horse and noted trifling things. They
had to step over the vulture-picked carcass of a horse lying in the road.
Across the tall Guinea-Panama grass came the warbling trill of a mocking
bird, imitating the 'Plant! plant' chut, chut-a-dee!' so familiar to the New
England ears. A few hundred feet to the westward, hiding Campo de Marte
from sight, the crest was lined with the now empty trenches, from which
thousands of guns had belched torrents of lead at the United States lines,
after the First Division had assaulted, captured and held Fort San Juan, the
principal Spanish stronghold, during the seventeen days of battle and siege,
which had cost us, in killed and wounded, nearly 2,000 officers and men.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 53*
"All of the Americans were silent for perhaps two or three minutes. After
General Toral's surrendered bodyguard had passed us our generals led the
way through a gap that had been made in the wire-fence, and we filed out into
the road leading to Santiago. In order to get there, distance about two miles,
we had to pass through the outlying military suburb called Campo de Marte.
It is made up entirely of barracks, military storehouses, and hospitals.
"These latter are very large buildings, and throughout the siege numerous
white flags, each having the red cross, sacred to neutrals, had fluttered prom
inently from the roof of every hospital. No doubt the charge will be made
that during the siege our forces did not respect, but fired upon and into the
buildings displaying the Geneva flag.
"Thousands of us can testify to two facts: First, that the most damaging
battery of artillery of the enemy, one shell from which put eleven men of the
Sixteenth United States Infantry out of action, was so located that our return
fire imperiled the hospital buildings ; second, that the trenches of the enemy
were, in part, directly between these hospital buildings and our own trenches,
so that the direct return fire of our infantry brought the hospitals, Geneva
flags and all, into line.
"Moreover, in the course of our triumphal entry from the field of surren
der to Santiago, through Campo de Marte, we noted that the hospitals had
trenches about them, close in, and the street barricades of tierces filled with
earth; also the barbed-wire entanglements were constructed with evident
defensive purposes by the enemy if driven from their outer intrenchments.
The structures were carefully scanned to see if their plastered surfaces showed
any bullet marks. Few indications were observable of bullet impact or pene
tration. "The cavalcade of army officers passed Spanish refugees who were wend
ing their way back into town. Most were afoot. A few carretas, two-wheeled
vehicles, drawn by a single mule or Cuban pony in shafts, were passed. Some
had as many as ten children huddled in one ; only one four-wheeled carriage,
a sort of barouche, hauled by a pair of undersized Cuban ponies, contained
one or two adults and eight or ten juveniles. The streets are mostly paved
and quite narrow, not wide enough for a field battery of artillery.
"Santiago is built upon a siding. Some of the houses were built of brick,
then plastered; some were built of adobe, or sun-dried brick, and then plas
tered ; some were mud-and-stick houses. Many had blue fronts. The front

532 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.
doors were of double or triple layers of wood studded with nails and of great
strength. Many resembled a jail entrance, because supplemented with iron
doors. Barred windows were common. Nearly every residence showed both
door and window gratings, from behind which many women and children
peered at us; a few men also peered. Shops were numerous, but the major
ity were closed on July 17.
"Here and there floated the flag of a foreign consulate. The Spanish flag
was not anywhere seen. Soldiers were numerous. At the principal street
corners armed sentinels with Mauser rifles were posted. They appeared to be
doing police patrol duty. All of the Spanish privates were what we term
undersized men. We passed sad-eyed women, scowling-eyed women, and
coquettish-eyed women. Many of these latter smiled at the procession of
American officers from second-story balconies. As a rule, the women were
thin, uncomely, and slatternly; only a few had their hair neatly arranged ;
less than five per cent wore mantillas; their faces were more wan than
handsome. "Absolutely naked children stood in doorways, on the balconies, in win
dows, or in the streets. A general paucity existed of decent clothes or
necessities. Numerous starveling cats and kittens were visible. On the
ground porch of one house a burro was lariated to the front door. More
negroes, I should call them, than Spaniards were seen. Lines of refugee
Cubans, carrying bundles, pails, furniture, even trunks, upon their heads
were seen. All appeared to be entering the city, none departing. Perhaps
they were of the 15,000 non-combatants who fled from Santiago to avoid the
perils of the bombardment. A few, a very few, led or drove poor-looking "
milch cows.
"We were impressed by the marked physical contrast between the under
sized, wiry, cotton-clad Spanish soldiers and our men. Nobody braced up, so
far as I noticed. I was surprised to see so many well-stocked stores, although
the warehouses of the pawnbrokers were more abundantly filled with furniture
and other household belongings than any. Santiago has several stores whose
shelves display what good judges say are $10,000 worth of general merchandise
on sale. There is a hardware store in Santiago de Cuba carrying a $20,000
stock of goods. One warehouse had 500,000 pounds of rice in 200-pound
sacks. Great quantities of olive oil, mostly in tin cans, are on hand.
"We had heard such touching tales of the general destitution prevailing in

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO . 533
*
Santiago, as, for instance, that the Spanish soldiers were subsisting on horse
meat to avoid starving, that the evidences of sale goods were especially
noted. Capt. E. F. Taggart, commissary of subsistence, United States Vol
unteers, also called my attention to a kind of parched barley put up in metal-
lined cans.
"But to resume. Reaching a plaza, the generals dismounted, we of the
staff following suit. All in order of rank entered a large building. For a few
minutes we wandered about without let or hindrance. This is what I saw:
Tiled floors, marble freshly wet. The floors of the halls and the rooms that
I visited were not all alike. Some had black and white tiles alternating.
Some of the rooms had planked floors. All of the windows had Venetian
shutters. All of the rooms were cool. The windows had lambrequins. There
were also portieres, and an abundance of chairs — arm-chairs, cane-seated, and
cane-backed. "In the great reception room was a life-sized oil painting, probably of some
Spanish Queen. Quantities of bamboo furniture, iron-barred windows, glass
chandeliers, crystal pendants of the old style, something like mother's can
delabra, marble-topped tables, green-topped tables, irresistibly suggestive of
poker, several cheval glasses six feet high outside the frame, and perhaps four
feet six inside, were conspicuous. Strolling back, I passed into bedrooms.
There were no closed doors. The beds all had canopies. Decorated china
toilet sets, eau de quinine, puff boxes, 'Roger Gallet' French soap.
"Servants were engaged in setting a table for ten. It had a floral center
piece, cut-glass decanters, three sizes of wine-glasses, and the usual china and
cutlery appointments of civilization. Later our ranking generals lunched
there. An electric push button hung on the wall of the hall."
This is official, and more, a bit of color, and an admirable pencil painting.
A little before noon the generals and their respective staffs' massed in the
Plaza facing the governor's palace. On the roof of the palace were three
officers — Lieutenant Miley held the halyards attached to our national flag. It
was about the size of the recruiting or storm flag, only shorter. General
Chambers McKibben was with a military band behind, and gave the command
"Present arms," and the command was repeated by General Breet just as
twelve o'clock chimed out of the cathedral clock — the flag, our flag, was raised
to the top of the staff, the band played "The Star-Spangled Banner." Three
cheers called for by a soldier were given General Shafter.

534 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.
The Inspector-General Reade, from whom we have quoted, writes a shock
ing account of the sick army after its movement when the city surrendered, to
get out of the infected camps :
"The change of camping ground demonstrated sadly the enfeebled condi
tion of our men. They straggled along the roads ; some fell out and pros
trated themselves anywhere where shade could be obtained. Some of General
Ames's men, Thirteenth Infantry, completed the march and then dropped
unconscious or went crazy. He has a wall tent as his headquarters and for
personal occupancy. In that tent he sheltered and cared for several exhausted
or delirious privates. He said that during his entire military experience and
command, 1861 and succeeding years, he never saw as heavy a percentage of
used-up men. Unless more food and a greater variety of food is furnished
these soldiers their condition will become pitiable indeed. They also need to
be relieved of the necessity of having to travel a mile and a half for a canteen
full of water.
"They have no camp kettles; all were left aboard the transports 25th of
last month, and have remained at Siboney, twelve miles from here, ever since.
Ditto as to extra clothing. They need better shelter than shelter tents. All
canvas beyond what could be carried upon the person was ordered left behind
when the army of invasion left the transports. That was June 24th and 25th.
The tents are still on the vessels, and it is much to be hoped that they will be
landed at Santiago, together with other supplies. Major McLaughlin, com
manding Sixteenth United States Infantry, says that his men can no longer
stomach canned bacon.
"According to the statement, soldiers vomit at the sight of a label having
printed on it the name of Libby or Armour. They lived on it during a sea
voyage of eighteen days; have lived on it since, and now want some nourish
ing food that their stomachs can retain. Major McLaughlin says that he
would like vinegar and tobacco for his regiment. Regarding vinegar,
Colonel Miner, commanding Sixth United States Infantry, says: 'My men
drank what vinegar was issued them like hungry wolves.' The officer last
named says that what is issued as canned beef is refuse from which all nour
ishment has been extracted. Dr. Calhoun says that it is not possible for
officers to buy pure lime juice at twenty-seven cents per large bottle. He
believes that the article sold by the Subsistence Department as such is
injurious.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 535
"Asst.-Surg. W. D. McCaw, Medical Department, on duty with the Sixth
United States Infantry, reports that symptoms of scurvy are showing them
selves in certain fever cases, and asks that issue be made of vinegar, onions,
potatoes, tomatoes, etc. Dr. McCaw states that he has not shelter or canvas
enough for his sick. Wants cans of beef extract. He predicts that a startling
increase in the sick list will occur, due to lack of the essentials, food and rest,
and proper clothing. All of the indications sustain this prediction, and the
sooner the sick are placed aboard transports, the better. ' '
Such was the sad state of United States troops after the Spaniards, made
hopeless by the loss of their fleet and overawed by the arrival of our reinforce
ments, surrendered.
The exchange of observations between General Shafter and Admiral
Sampson put a strain on their courtesies as the siege of Santiago was
about to terminate. The Secretary of the Navy cabled Sampson that the
Commanding General of the army and the Secretary of War requested "that
navy force harbor." The matter was left to the discretion of the Admiral,
"except that the United States armored vessels must not be risked. — Long."
Sampson cabled that published telegrams of General Shafter reflected on the
navy, and added: "I wish the Department and the President to understand
that the first requisite to opening harbor of Santiago de Cuba is the occupa
tion of forts and intrenchments at its entrance guarding mine fields, and that
the general has never made a move to do this, although before his army
landed he stated that such was the primary object of his operations. ' ' '
The next thing was the capitulation. Sampson, informed of articles
about to be agreed upon, wanted the stipulation added that the Spaniards
should remove all torpedoes from the harbor entrance and the harbor itself.
Miles had Sampson signal that he should send ashore an officer to represent
him "during negotiations for evacuation." The use of the word "evacuation"
is an indication that Miles did not think unconditional surrender could be
exacted. Sampson wished to know when his representative was wanted and
where he could get a horse.
The next signal from shore to flagship was that Santiago had been surren
dered, and then Shafter signaled, "Hitch in negotiations. We may have to
fight them yet." July 10th Shafter telegraphed "Surrendered," and asked
whether a navy representative would be sent, and Miles telegraphed that
there was "a little delay," but the Spaniards had surrendered "in a formal,

536 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.
positive manner." A copy of the agreement was sent Sampson, who, quoting
the Commanding General's communication, says: "The foregoing certainly
shows clearly the most absolute joint action, and I took for granted that we
should be joint signatories of any capitulations, as is customary in all services
in such circumstances."
The Admiral's representative, Captain Chadwick, "arrived at the front at
the earliest hour it was possible for him to do so, and informed General
Shafter of my expectancy in the matter, but General Shafter peremptorily
refused. The convention had already been signed, and he stated as one
reason that nothing had been said of the army in my report of the fleet action"
of July 3d. There would have been as much reason for mentioning the navy
in the report of the land action of July ist, when assault was made by our
army on the Spanish lines.
"No mention was made of the shipping in the capitulations, and Captain
Chadwick informed General Shafter that all Spanish ships would be regarded
by us as property to be turned over to the navy. He said he would refer such
a matter to the Secretary of War, but that, of course, could have no bearing
upon what I considered my duty in the matter, particularly in the view of our
late experience of Spanish perfidy in regard to injury of ships, which, in my
opinion, made it necessary to look after their safety at once. I thus, after the
hauling down of the Spanish flag, sent prize crews on board the gunboat
Alvarado and to the five merchant steamers in the harbor. An officer of the
army was found on board the Alvarado, who stated he had been sent to take
charge of her, whereupon I addressed the following letter to General Shafter:
" 'U. S. Flagship New York, July 17, 1898.
" 'Sir : Upon sending in an officer to take charge of the captured Spanish
gunboat, the Alvarado, it was found that one of your officers was on board,
evidently with the expectation of taking charge of her. It should hardly be
necessary to remind you that in all joint operations of the character of those
which have resulted in the fall of Santiago all floating material is turned over
to the navy, as all forts, etc., go to the army. I have been lying within 500
yards of the Morro, from which the Spanish flag was hauled down at 9 o'clock
and upon which the United States flag has not yet, at 2 p. m., been hoisted
Although my forces have frequently engaged these forts and yours have not
exchanged a shot with them, I await the arrival of a detachment of your

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 537
troops to take possession, as they must eventually occupy them. I expect the
same consideration.
" 'I request that you will relieve Lieutenant Caruthers of the duty given
him, as I have directed Lieutenant Marble to assume command of the
Alvarado. Very respectfully, etc. '
"Early on the morning of the 18th I received from the senior naval
officer in the harbor a paper sent him, of which the following is a copy:
" 'Santiago, July 17, 1898.
" 'Lieutenant Doyle can keep his men on the ships for the night, and in
the morning one of the tugs will get up steam and transfer him with his
officers and men to their respective ships. C. McKIBBINS,
" 'Brigadier-General, Commanding.' "
The Admiral quoted this, and remarked:
"I will not enter into any expression of surprise at the reception of such
a paper. "No mention of the shipping was made in the articles of capitulation,
though I specially requested that it be included by my message to you of
July 13th.
"Our operations leading to the fall of Santiago have been joint, so directed
by the President and so confirmed by their character. All propriety and
usage surrenders the floating material in such cases to the naval force, and I
have taken possession of it.
"I am unable to recognize the authority of the Secretary of War over my
actions. I have telegraphed to the Secretary of the Navy and await his
instructions. "In the event of a difference of opinion between the departments, the
question will, of course, be decided by the President of the United States;
until then my prize crews must remain in charge, and I have so directed.
"Very respectfully,
"W. T. SAMPSON, Rear Admiral U. S. N.
"Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.
"Maj.-Gen. W. R. Shafter, U. S. V.,
"Commanding Fifth Army Corps."

Shafter's explanation of his refusal to allow a naval officer's signature on
the capitulation agreement is this :

53§ THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.
"Santiago, August i, 1898.
"I do not acknowledge the authority of the Secretary of the Navy in the
matter in which you wire me. The surrender of Santiago was made to me by
General Toral in person, in surrendering verbally all the prisoners and public
property of Spain in the district commanded by him, and I accepting the
same in the presence of troops representing all the respective armies. The
details for carrying this into effect were arranged by three commissioners on
each side. These articles were signed by the respective commissioners in
duplicate, one copy of handed to General Toral and the other was sent by me
to the Secretary of War. Neither General Toral nor myself signed them.
Certainly could not and -would not permit these articles to any officer for
signature, my own not being affixed, and 'I shall protest to the Secretary of
War against your signature to that document. I respectfully invite your
attention to the fact that no claim for any credit for the capture of Cervera and
his fleet has been made by the army, although it is a fact the Spanish fleet did
not leave the harbor until the investment of the city was practically completed,
and Cervera had sufficient losses on land on July 1 and 2, notably among
them his chief of staff. W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General."
The President's proclamation of the 18th of July was of a character. that
gives it permanent interest. It is the foundation of the policy of the
government of the United States with respect to Cuba, which is by the treaty
of peace with Spain our military possession. President McKinley's declaration
is aS follows: "Adjutant-Getteral's Office,
"Washington, July 18, 1898 — 6:30 p. m.
"General Shafter, Santiago, Cuba:
"The following is sent you for your information and guidance. It will
be published in such manner in both English and Spanish as will give it the
widest circulation in the territory under your control:
" 'To the Secretary of War:
" 'Sir: The capitulation of the Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba and in
the eastern part of the province of Santiago, and the occupation of the
territory by the forces of the United States, render it necessary to instruct
the military commander of the United States as to the conduct which he is to
observe during the military occupation.
" 'The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, NORTH HALF AS SEEN FROJl THE BAY.

ENTRANCE TO HARBOR AT SANTIAGO DE CUBA. -MERRIMAC'' SHOWN IN THE FOREGROUND.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 5.; i
the severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the estab
lishment of a new political power. Under this changed condition of things, the
inhabitants, so long as they perform their duties, are entitled to security in
their persons and property, and in all their private rights and relations. It is
my desire that the inhabitants of Cuba should be acquainted with the purpose
of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this
regard. It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the army of occupa
tion to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come, not to
make war upon the inhabitants of Cuba, nor upon any party or faction among
them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their
personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active, aid or by
honest submission, cooperate with the United States in its efforts to give
effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support and
protection. Our occupation should be as free from severity as possible.
" 'Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme,
and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the
municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of
person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered
as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of
things, until the)* are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent;
and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in
force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they
were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible,
to be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials
connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the supremacy
of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land, as
between man and man, under the supervision of the American commander-
in-chief. The native constabulary will, so far as may be practicable, be pre
served. The freedom of the people to pursue their accustomed occupations
will be abridged only when it may be necessary to do so.
" 'While the rule of conduct of the American commander-in-chief will be
such as has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt measures of a
different kind, if, unfortunately, the course of the people should render such
measures indispensable to the maintenance of law and order. He will then
possess the power to replace or expel the native officials in part or altogether,
to substitute new courts of his own constitution for those that now exist, or to

542 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.
create such new or supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In the
exercise of these high powers the commander must be guided by his judg
ment and his experience and a high sense of justice.
" 'One of the most important and most practical problems with which it
will be necessary to deal is that of the treatment of property and the collection
and administration of the revenues. It is conceded that all public funds and
securities belonging to the government of the country in its own right, and all
arms and supplies and other movable property of such government, may be
seized by the military occupant and converted to his own use. The real
property of the State he may hold and administer, at the same time enjoying
the revenues thereof, but he is not to destroy it save in the case of military
necessity. All public means of transportation, such as telegraph lines,
cables, railways, and boats belonging to the State may be appropriated to
his use, but unless in case of military necessity they are not to be destroyed.
All churches and buildings devoted to religious worship and to the arts and
sciences, all school houses, are, as far as possible, to be protected, and all
destruction or intentional defacement of such places, of historical monuments,
or of archives, or of works of science or art, is prohibited, -save when required
by urgent military necessity.
" 'Private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to
be respected, and can be confiscated only for cause. Means of transportation,
such as telegraph lines and cables, railways and boats, may, although they
belong to private individuals or corporations, be seized by the military
occupant, but, unless destroyed under military necessity, are not to be
retained. " 'While it is held to be the right of the conqueror to levy contributions
upon the enemy in their seaports, towns, or provinces which may be in his
military possession by conquest, and to apply the proceeds to defray the
expense of the war, this right is to be exercised within such limitations that
it may not savor of confiscation. As the result of military occupation the
taxes and duties payable by the inhabitants to the former government become
payable to the military occupant, unless he sees fit to substitute for them
other rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the government. The
moneys so collected are to be used for the purpose of paying the expenses of
government under the military occupation, such as the salaries of the judges
and the police, and for the payment of the expenses of the army.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 543
" 'Private property taken for the use of the army is to be paid for, when
possible, in cash at a fair valuation ; and when payment in cash is not
possible receipts are to be given.
" 'All-ports and places in Cuba which may be in the actual possession of
our land and naval forces will be opened to the commerce of all neutral
nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, upon payment
of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of
importation. " 'WILLIAM McKINLEY.'
"By order Secretary of War: "H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General."
The Spanish soldiers surrendered at Santiago by General Toral with the
approval of Captain-General Blanco and the Spanish government outnumbered
two to one the combined armies of Burgoyne and Cornwallis surrendered at
Saratoga and Yorktown, and w*ere a larger force than was engaged on either
side in our two wars with England, and forty per cent greater than the
armies of Taylor that crossed the Rio Grande and won at Monterey and
Buena Vista; and of Scott, the conqueror of the city of Mexico, who unfurled
over the "Halls of the Montezumas" the flag that now floats at Havana.

CHAPTER XXIV.
The Joint Work of the Army and Navy at Manila.
The Reasons Why Admiral Dewey Remained After Destroying the Spanish Fleet — Why
there Was Not a Slaughter at Manila Like that at Santiago — The Old Fort that Was the
Key of the City —The American Army Drove the Spaniards and Dusted the Insurgents
Out of the Way— A Very Neat Job— We Did Not Make War on the Spaniards for the
Sake of the Tagalos.

We have seen in the official communications by cable between the
Secretary of the Navy of the United States and the Commander of the
American fleet on the Asiatic station, that before the declaration of war
there were forceful and particular preparations to strike a blow at the
Spaniards in the East Indies as soon as the war hurricane broke in the West
Indies. The great possessions of Spain in Asian waters seemed almost
literally at the end of the world, and were little known. The duty confided
to Admiral George Dewey was first the protection of American commerce
with China and Japan from the Spanish squadron known to be maintained at
Manila, and in the channels and harbors of the Philippines, and it was
strongly expressed over the wires from Washington to the squadron of U. S.
cruisers at anchor in Hongkong harbor that the way to defend our commerce
on the other side of the globe, was to destroy the Spanish war ships.
There was extraordinary energy in the Navy Department. Mr. Long,
the Secretary, is a man of high attainments and forecasting intellect. He
had for Assistant Secretary, Governor Theodore Roosevelt of New York, who
was a grizzly-bear killer before he was a Rough Rider; and indeed the
strong, keen and brilliant character that was a dominant factor in the admin
istration of the Navy, itself a high school of heroes. —
Admiral Dewey was substantially instructed to clear for action and strike
the squadron of Spain before the declaration of war. "Fill up with coal 
the best to be had," was the first order issued that had the ring of battle
544

GENERALS MILES AND SHAFTER ON BOARD HEADQUARTERS BOAT "SEGUBANCA.'

TREE UNDER WHICH SURRENDER OF SPANISH

WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 547
thunder in it. Coal is even more essential in providing a war ship for active
service, than gunpowder. There is no more inert mass of matter than a
battleship without steam. With coal steam can be raised, and the ponderous
structure of iron becomes a thing of life that parts the waters with enormous
power, and drives through stormy seas, an engine of wrath and violence,
crushing whatever floats in its way, but the utmost accurate range of a
rifle is half a dozen miles.
"Fill up with coal — the best to be had" is a good phrase, the very thing
for a beginning. It was followed up and the Spanish Asiatic fleet in a few
days passed away. It will be a welcome task for Americans to tell the story
of the glory of the battle of the Bay of Manila, for the gallant Dewey and
his captains bold, and sailors and gunners, and all the officers and crews,
the Chinese waiters included, who waited on the boys at the flaming guns
with ammunition as cheerfully as they served the tables at one time — but we
have to recite another story now.
When Admiral Dewey left Hongkong he had no home for his ships
nearer than San Francisco. He had no boarding house, no tavern in which
he could take his time and his ease. He found himself on the evening of the
first of May destroyer of a fleet, the conqueror of a broad bay with heavy
batteries still frowning upon him from the shores, a great city held by an
army of thirteen thousand men amply armed under his guns, a litter of
wrecks where the fleet of his enemies had been, his own command less
numerous than the crews of the ships he had annihilated and his ammunition
seriously reduced by hours of rapid firing, it being one of the characteristics
of war ships that they consume stores of powder, shells and bolts at a rate
never in old times thought possible.
What should he do? Run to Singapore and be permitted to take coal
enough to move him to the next port and so on home, getting into American
waters in two months, leaving a lot of Spanish gunboats known to be hidden
about the islands to go out and prey upon our commerce? Or would it be
the better way to hold the Bay of Manila, make it a place of shelter for his
fleet and a base of operations, implying as the situation did, that we had
gained command of a group of islands extensive as New York, Pennsylvania
and New Jersey, one of them more spacious than the State of Ohio, the
group rich as our Gulf States? The Admiral of course remained, and announc
ing that he would lay waste the city if again fired on, established a con-

548 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA.
dition that was satisfactory until the re-enforcements, the ships, provisions,
coal and fixed ammunition cabled for after the Spanish fleet was removed,
arrived. The alternative to go away and allow the Spanish gunboats to do us a
great mischief was not chosen. The Admiral could have proceeded to Singapore
and cabled for further orders, but it was cheaper and stronger to stay, hold
Cavite, use the insurgents to employ the Spaniards, protect our interests as a
nation, and "possess" what his artillery dominated. The Administration did
not order him to sail away from islands equal in soil, climate, minerals, fruits
and agricultural productions to all the West Indies. The Admiral saw no
departure from duty in the service of a Republican government, in a conquest.
As for the government of the people by a majority of the heads or hands shown
we cannot profess to do that indiscriminately, and never have done so. We
depend upon votes, but it is desirable to mix votes with brains before casting
them, and to measure the rights of the people by the American standard,
and base the qualifications of statehood in an indissoluble union, upon
American manhood.
The Admiral had to stay at Manila, and he was glad to stay. He could
not in honor get away, either to leave the Spaniards in possession, or to turn
over the civilized communities to the insurgents, whose first idea was to
avenge in a few months the wrongs that had been endured for centuries. The
United States is like the Admiral. It has a duty to preserve order until there
appears a people capable of caring for themselves and governing themselves.
Those who have that capacity will not begin the redemption of their race by
acts of barbarism — -neither of robbery, nor brutal destructiveness. The same
class of people who were always distressed by more territory, terrified because
they were so much superior to others that the country ought to be small and
select for their special use and fashioned according to their personal
peculiarities, which were not of generous proportions, grieved over Dewey's
protection of his own and the national honor.
We have a territorial system that will serve excellently as a colonial
system, for the assimilation of elements from regions remote, and we can
govern them through our executive and legislative departments with such
measure of military force as may be necessary to preserve peace and
promote tendencies to civilization. There is no hurry about more states.
Indeed it would be a sound conservation to refuse henceforth to organize

WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 549
territories into states, unless they are so Americanized as to come into our
Union so naturally that opposition would be to antagonize ourselves and
assail the precedents that are behind our laws and customs.
The President of the United States has sustained Admiral Dewey and
honored him at every step, from the first day of the war when they made
their acquaintance intimate over the cable, but he reserved one decision until
he was able to consult public opinion. That was what we should do with the
Philippines when the time came to make the treaty that must follow the war
with Spain. All questions w*ere settled in the Protocol but that of the Spanish
East Indies. That was absolutely but not expressly referred to the matured
judgment of the citizens of the United States and the result was the decision
that we should hold the islands. There are but few against the verdict. If
there had been a popular vote on it the majority would have been ten
millions to keep the prize so gallantly won. Those opposed to raising
the objections are, the survivals of the antique ideas of the delightful
symmetry of small countries and the delicious refinement of little things,
and in addition there are those who think that they can gain something by the
vulgarity of figuring on the twenty millions of indemnity to Spain, the
expense of three weeks of war ; and there is the soft, flabby demagogy of
suffering for the sake of the people we have relieved from the Spanish yoke.
The line that we draw is that we are quite prepared to consent to the
government of Cuba by Cubans and of the Philippines by the Filipinos, but
we hold they would improve rapidly in the art of government by the
experience of liberty under our guidance. We shall not fight them as against
self-government, but they must not fall prey to a class of Spaniards inferior to
those who fought for Spain, and of Malay chiefs, whose vanity, inflamed by
possible prosperity and modified by material aid, is conspicuous with gilt and
titles of distinction. We want to find the real people of the islands of
Cuba and Luzon, and others, and we have not evidence that Aguinaldo and
Gomez are men of the people. They are powerful in letters and proclamations
that have the tropical features of literature, so floridly tinctured that it
needs, to assume a wholesome aspect, to be tinged with the tones and
strengthened with the American air of the North Temperate Zone.
We are content that the islanders in question shall have the government
that pleases them, as soon as they show that they have a people whose
policy has not been that of firebugs, and ravenous seekers of spoil. There

55° WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA.
are people in Cuba and Luzon; let them step to the front. Distinction in
superstition or accomplishment in assassination are not sufficient to constrain
the United States to set up mutual administration and speculation societies
of insurgents as a ruling class who shall govern over us as well as the
Cubans and the Filipinos. This insufficiency is not held in favor by those
who studied the art of government in swamps and the thorny underbrush of
the wilderness. Those both in Cuba and Luzon who are threatening us with
guerrilla warfare, if we do not submit to their presumption, appear, as the war
manifested, to have voracity for the official privileges, the Spaniards enjoyed,
and would be willing, in consideration of our war of humanity, to aid us in a
zealous and lucrative manner to carry on the government of the United
States. The elementary principles of the policy of expansion, are to improve the
opportunities that occur for the appropriation of more land for the people,
our people — we the people of the United States. George Dewey held the
prize he won and William McKinley has sustained him handsomely for the
sake of the people, and the people will stand with them while there is land
for labor and power for guns.
Admiral Dewey knew General Merritt was coming. He had helped
Aguinaldo against the Spaniards, but had ignored or opposed his fantastic
pretensions. Then the insurgent chief was pleased to be, in the language of
the Admiral, "threatening" toward Americans. The chief is surrounded by
a queer assortment of fanatics, some of whom hold that he has a "charm"
that makes him proof against bullets and poison, but he has to obtain the
consent of certain persons before he can do anything. The great grievance
against the Americans by the insurgents was, after the Spaniards surrendered
Manila, that they were not allowed to enter the town in triumph and indulge
the passions of revenge and looting.
They had been boasting that they could take Manila, but that was not in
their power. It was the fleet of the United States in the bay that allowed
the insurgents to blockade the city. It was the fleet too, that by drawing
the line between the city and Forte Malate, preserving the former and
crushing the latter, broke the Spanish line of defense without such loss of life
as occurred at Santiago. We were the master of Manila with a loss small
compared with the experience of carrying trenches in Cuba, because the navy
forced the mouth of the harbor and made an end of the fleet in the bay with-

WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. .55 J
out harming the city In storming the Spanish lines after the naval bombard
ment had cleared the entrance by the shore, the American forces were
about one-third the Spaniards and Filipinos counted together. With two
divisions of our troops engaged, one drove the Spanish and the other held
back the insurgents. It was a divided duty and a double job, and an
altogether artistic and effective piece of work. This event took place, it will
be remembered, after the Protocol negotiated by the French Minister had
been signed, but before knowledge of peace had reached the Oriental seat of
war. One of the dangers in sending an American army across the Pacific was
that there were loose Spanish gunboats, that might attack transports that
were without convoys or effective batteries and crowded with troops.
When the peril was realized, there were in several instances rifled cannon
mounted on deck and men trained to handle the guns. General Greene pre
pared the China in her voyage out to Manila with rifles that it was believed
would stand off a gunboat, and the same provision was made on the boat that
carried Major General Otis, who had an artillery company of regulars on board,
but the steamers with the soldiers, while stanch in encountering bad weather,
were frail vehicles to be extemporized for ships of war. The voyages
were according to orders on lines easily followed. This cable will explain
the method: Washington, June 27, 1898.
Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong:
The Monadnock sailed June 25 from San Francisco, accompanied by collier
Nero. Was ordered to proceed at utmost speed safely possible, and stops as
short as possible, and to make the best of way to a point 600 nautical miles
east true from Cape Engano, and thence to run to the west true until up to
Cape Engano. If then she has not received from you a message to the
contrary, she will proceed at once to Manila. This enables you to meet the
Monadnock or to send a message to her within 600 nautical miles of Cape
Engano, if you desire to do so. Furthermore, General Merritt's third division
of transports will leave about June 27 from San Francisco with about 4,000
men and not convoyed, but he has been advised to make and to sail the
600 knots east and west line as described for the Monadnock. LONG.
The Spaniards were not enterprising, and there was no danger visibly

552 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA.
threatened. Admiral Dewey was kept well advised of the movement of
reenforcements. The Secretary of the Navy cabled him June 18th: "Second
division of the army expedition, about 3,500 men, in four steamers, sailed
from San Francisco [at] noon on June 15. The army estimates they will
make average speed 10 knots per hour, and touch two days at Honolulu.
Sustained sea speed seems doubtful."
June 25th the Secretary cabled Dewey via Hongkong: "Second army
division, Gen. F. V Greene commanding, left San Francisco to touch at
Honolulu and Guam. Estimated to arrive at Guam July 10 and expects to
meet convoying vessel from you at Guam. If practicable, send one. If you
cannot do, then charter vessel and send naval officer Guam. Inform com
manding officer expedition to come to Engano or Manila without convoy.
The War Department states Greene would not touch Guam, but now
announces he will touch there."
The Secretary of the Navy cabled:
"The Spanish fleet from Cadiz passed Cape Bon, going to the east, June
22, 3 p. m. Expected to go to Manila. Comprise Pelayo, Emperor Carlos
V., three torpedo-boat destroyers, three auxiliary armed steamers, and seven
transports. In all 15 sail.
"Monterey and the collier sailed [for] Manila from San Diego on June 11.
The Monadnock and the collier will follow June 20 if possible. Could not you
have a vessel at Hongkong to receive notice concerning Spanish fleet
passing Suez?"
June 29th Long wired to Dewey as follows: "The different re
enforcements sent to you are as follows: First army detachment and the
Charleston sailed May 21 from San Francisco via Honolulu and Guam.
Estimated sea speed, 10 knots. The Monterey sailed June 11 from San Diego,
Cal., via Honolulu and Guam, probably estimated sea speed, 10 knots per
hour. The Monadnock sailed June 25 from San Francisco for Honolulu and
then direct. Estimated sea speed, 6 knots per hour, perhaps more. Third
army detachment sailed June 27 from San Francisco; was recommended to
go direct. Squadron under Watson, the Iowa and Oregon, the Yankee and
the Dixie, the Newark and the Yosemite, and four colliers preparing with
all possible dispatch Tx> start for Spanish coast. The Spaniards know this."
Twenty thousand tons of coal were reported to be aboard supply vessels
for the war boats announced to Dewey June 27th in these terms-

WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 553
"Camara's fleet arrived off Port Said June 26, and is reported by our agent
there as follows: Pelayo, Carlos V., Audaz, Osada, Proserpina, Patriota, 12-
guns, and three unarmed transports, Colon, Covadonga, and San Francisco.
They will coal immediately — to be supplied by Cory Brothers, whose agents
are Savon Bazui. ' '
There was according to all appearances a serious line of business in this
movement, but it evaporated. Dewey's purpose was to evacuate the harbor at
Manila if the Spanish fleet, too strong to fight without getting the worst of it,
should pass into the China Sea and reach the Babujan Islands north of
Luzon. Long's cable to Dewey July ist is proof of this.
General Merritt, Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine expedition, sailed
from San Francisco June 29th and arrived at Cavite, Manila Bay, July 25th.
General Thomas M. Anderson was in command of the United States troops
up to that time, his headquarters being in Cavite. General F. V Greene
with his brigade was encamped along the bay near the village of Paranague,
"about five miles by water and twenty-five miles by the roads from Cavite,
and a strip as described by General Merritt, "of sandy land running parallel
to the shore of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but owing to the
great difficulties of landing supplies, the greater portion of the force had
shelter tents only and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being
situated in a low, flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun
or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at
this season."
General Merritt was "at once struck by the exemplary spirit of patient,
even cheerful, endurance shown by the officers and men under such circum
stances, and this feeling of admiration for the manner in which the American
soldiers, volunteer and regular alike, accept the necessary hardships of the
work they have undertaken to do, has grown and increased with every phase
of the difficult and trying campaign which the troops of the Philippine
expedition have brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion."
The General found that the left or north flank of Greene's command
"extended to a point on the 'Calle Real,' about 3,200 yards from the outer
line of Spanish defenses of the city of Manila. This Spanish line began at
the powder magazine, or old Fort San Antonio, within a hundred yards of
the beach and just south of the Malate suburb of Manila, and stretched
away to the Spanish left in more or less detached works, eastward, through

554 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA.
swamps and rice fields, covering all the avenues of approach to the town and
¦encircling the city completely. "
This fact was the key of the defensive position of the Spaniards and their
lines were formidable. There were marshes, rice fields and trenches, and mud
barricades, and the advance would have to be over open ground, covered
completely by the Spanish rifle fire. The position of the Spaniards was
stronger than that of Santiago, for here they were well protected and
storming columns could not be sheltered in the least, but the old fort by the
seaside was not tenable under the fire of the American fleet. As to General
Aguinaldo, whose forces had surrounded the city with irregular skirmish
lines, and who was publishing proclamations of independence and belief that
he was about to capture Manila, he seems to have thought it was General Mer
ritt's object in coming to place the United States army at the disposition of
the insurgent Junta. General Merritt says in his official report that at the
time of his arrival "the entire edifice of executive and legislative department
and subdivision of territory for administrative purposes had been accomplished
at least on paper, and the Filipinos held military possession of many points
in the islands other than those in the vicinity of Manila.
"As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services
as subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully
contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and
state that 'the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and
immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,' I did not
consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader
until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not
until then be in position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in
the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.
"For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were
pressed and military operations conducted without reference to the situation
of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully
established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the
Spanish intrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road, on the ex
treme Spanish right, we were under no obligations, by prearranged plans of
mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held by the insur
gents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and
suburbs."

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS M- ANDERSON AND STAFF, IN COMMAND OF 1ST DIVISION 8TH ARMY CORPS AT MANILA.

RIFT IN THE JUNGLES THAT LINE THE COAST OF THE PHILIPPINES.

ROADWAY IN BOTANICAL GARDENS, MANILA.

WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 55;

/£at.tk=

REDUCED FROM OFFICIAL PLAN PREPARED BY WAR DEPARTMENT.

558 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA.
At the part of the defenses of Manila that must be carried to possess the
city, the insurgents were gathered in considerable numbers and had imper
fectly intrenched themselves, occupying space that they had not the capa
bility of using offensively. Under General Merritt's instructions General
Greene, by finesse and crowding, dispossessed the Filipinos from the grounds
they could not use with decisive advantage, and advanced the trenches, coming
into sharp conflict with the Spaniards, who used at Santiago the Mauser and
Remington rifles, the former especially with smokeless powder, and there were
no men so brave as not to admit that when under this fire the tingling whir
of the projectiles was "very disagreeable."
The expenditure of cartridges by the Spaniards was a surprise, but the
astonishment cleared up when the}* finally surrendered 22,000 stand of arms
and 10,000,000 cartridges. The usual supposition that the Spaniards were on
the point of starvation was contradicted by the presence of large quantities of
rice. The fatal flaw of the Spanish position, the one that demoralized them
so that they were even intimidated by the insurgents, was, that the city was
under the guns of the American fleet. If they opened their batteries for the
defense of Manila on our fleet, they knew the shells from our heavy ship-guns
would fire the town ; and they were also aware that our gunners had the
range of objects in the city, the walled city in particular, so that they could,
as one of them said, "aim at the batteries on the point and hit the Arch
bishop's palace every shot. "
Nothing had escaped the vigilance and studious observation of our naval
officers The commander of each ship had his orders in case the signal to
destroy Manila was made, and knew the spot where he was to go, and the
angle at which the guns were to be fired and the direction the shells were
to take to sweep the streets and smash buildings. There was apparently
nothing out of the sight of Admiral Dewey. The Spaniards were guided in
their treatment of him by their experience with him. They judged what he
would do by what he had done. He had an understanding with them that as
long as the ships were not fired upon he would not shell the city, and this was
construed during the siege by American troops, to mean that the fighting
ashore was exempt from attention by the Lavetta battery and the fleet. This
was no secret. Everybody knew all about it, except some of the report
ers who interpreted the old peace basis Dewey had established, to mean there
was a bargain between the armies that the fighting was to be a sham, and

WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 559

COPY OF MAP
nilllBBD Tfl tgililDIH officers.
2nd BRIG., 2nd OIV., 8th ARMY CORPS,
ON auousT 12. 1MB

BRIG GEN F V GREENE,

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MA P
PAix-ema *f""M'M.'"{":'*!l--

REDUCED FROM OFFICIAL PLAN PREPARED BY WAR DEPARTMENT.

560 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA.
therefore the fight a fake. The old convention was not disturbed and that
was all. The Spaniards fought all they could.
General Greene had entered actively into the work of opening trenches
to drive out the Spaniards and found he was losing men in the long range
Mauser fire, and that at the same time the troops were harassed exceedingly
by the torrents of rain to which they were exposed, and he became impatient
for the action of the navy. General Merritt sympathized with him and officers
waited upon Admiral Dewey to urge opening fire upon the enemy by the
ships of war. The army and navy are sometimes sensitive as to their relative
rights and duties, as there is but one man, the President, whose authority to
command both is given in the Constitution of the United States itself, and
Admiral Dewey was not approached to invite his immediate cooperation in
the manner to which he was accustomed. There was no serious disagree
ment, but a rub, not of flint and steel, but of two edges of steel, slight but
distinct. General Greene, one of the old friends of the Admiral, was able to
make an adjustment that was satisfactory to all. The leading feature was
that the combined action of the army and navy should be defined for the per
fection of a giant plan, and meantime, if the position of our troops was
endangered, and General Greene burned a blue light as arranged, the fleet
should proceed to bombard the town. The emergency did not arrive.
The surrender of Manila was demanded, that the foreign residents and
women and children might find places of safety. The Spanish answer was a
refusal to submit, but an admission that the non-combatants had no place
to go. This was correctly interpreted, that the Spanish officers were aware of
their helplessness, but felt that they must make a show of fight in deference
to public and official opinion at home. It was the same notion that had
possessed the Spanish officers when they were in the act of surrendering San
tiago, to be so pathetic in their insistence that they should have their arms
shipped with them.
When General Merritt had 8,500 men in position he thought the time had
come to strike and had a meeting with the Admiral. The correspondence
followed relative to the capitulation of Manila, and a joint note by Merritt and
Dewey opened it. Merritt, when the wording of the letter was discussed
proposed to give time to get the non-combatants out of the way of harm or the
city at a given hour be bombarded. This was changed by the Admiral with
the cheerful consent of the General to read that "the defenses" of the city

THE ROAD TO THE CEMETERY IN TANSA, PROVINCE OF ILO-ILO.

LANDSCAPE VIEW SHOWING BEAUTY AND LUXURIANCE OF VEGETATION IN THE PHILIPPINES.

WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 563
h

REDUCED TROM OFFICIAL PLAN PREPARED BY WAR DEPARTMENT,

564 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA.
would be bombarded. This kept up the truce as to the pacific attitude of the
fleet and the city batteries with respect to each other. General Merritt
officially says : "The seacoast batteries in defense of Manila are so situated
that it is impossible for ships to engage them without firing into the town, and
as the bombardment of a city filled with women and children, sick and
wounded, and containing a large amount of neutral property, could only be
justified as a last resort, it was agreed between Admiral Dewey and myself
that an attempt should be made to carry the extreme right of the Spanish line
of intrenchments in front of the positions at that time occupied by our troops,
which, with its flank on the seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the navy.
"It was not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case the
enemy should hold it in strong force, until the navy had made practicable
breaches in the works and shaken the troops holding them, which could not be
done by the army alone, owing to the absence of siege guns. This is indi
cated fully in the orders and memorandum of attack hereto appended. It was
believed, however, as most desirable, and in accordance with the principles of
civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive the enemy out of
his entrenchments before resorting to the bombardment of the city.
'About 9 a. m. on that day our fleet steamed forward from Cavite and
before 10 a. m. opened a hot and accurate fire of heavy shells and rapid-fire
projectiles on the sea flank of the Spanish intrenchments at the powder
magazine fort, and at the same time the Utah batteries, in position in our
trenches near the 'Calle Real,' began firing with great accuracy."
At 10:25 a. m. the fleet had done its work, so that when our troops
advanced at that hour the fort, which was the key of the city, was found
deserted; also the flanking trenches, but the second line of the Spaniards was
defended for a few minutes, and among our men killed was the soldier who
pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own.
General Merritt records his "appreciation of the admirable manner in which
the orders for attack and the plan of occupation of the city were carried out
by the troops exactly as contemplated. I submit that for troops to enter under
fire a town covering a wide area, to rapidly deploy and guard all principal
points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the insurgent forces pressing for
admission, to quietly disarm an army of Spaniards more than equal in num
bers to the American troops, and finally by all this to prevent entirely all
rapine, pillage, and disorder, and gain entire and complete possession of a

WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 565
city of 300,000 people, filled with natives hostile to European interests, and
stirred up by the knowledge that their own people were fighting in the outside
trenches, was an act which only the law-abiding, temperate, resolute Ameri
can soldier, well and skillfully handled -by his regimental and brigade com
manders, could accomplish."
The insurgents were "dusted out of the way," and there was developed
among them a good deal of resentment. Three days after the Spaniards had
surrendered, the final article of the capitulation being :
"This city, its inhabitants, its churches, and religious worship, its educa
tional establishments, and its private property of all descriptions, are placed
under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army. ' '
That is to say, on the 16th the President's proclamation directing a suspension
of hostilities was cabled.
The casualties in the Army of the United States during the operations
before Manila were seventeen enlisted men killed, ten officers and ninety-six
enlisted men wounded. The insurgents were much irritated because they were
not permitted to be joint occupants of the city. They have continued their
false pretenses of ability to capture Manila, but the only thing to say of
that is that it would be extremely discreditable to the military spirit of the
Spaniards that they, when equal in numbers to the native assailants, allowed
themselves to be driven into Manila, holding only the suburbs, but for the
facts the Filipinos had been supplied with arms by the Americans and allowed
to help themselves at the arsenals of Cavite to cannon and ammunition, and the
Spaniards were aware when their fleet was destroyed and our fleet anchored
in the bay and reinforcements had arrived, that the Americans were masters
of the situation. The Spaniards were disheartened by the fire of the Ameri
can fleet on the first of May, which was more rapid, certain and crushing than
they imagined possible. It was this special dejected condition of the Span
iards and their general weakness on the offensive that caused them to permit
the insurgents to press upon them and at last forced surrender.
It was necessary to suppress the Filipinos in their ardent desire to assume
the role of eonquerors at the expense of the Americans, precisely as it has
been required by common sense and decent humanity to chill the tropical
temper of the alleged Cuban army, since their bombardment of Havana
by Key West reports of fake fights was extinguished by the news of
the surrender of the Spanish armies and the obliteration of Spanish

566 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA.
fleets by the American army and navy on the shores of Cuba — the Cubans
looking on.
General Merritt's proclamation to the people of the Philippines was a
document concerning the construction of which the Filipinos were not con
sulted. The General used this language assuring "the people" of the islands
— not alone the army that was of far more considerable force than appeared to
represent the Cuban "Nation," when they were excited to do military work-
but all the peaceably disposed people, that "so long as they preserve the peace
and perform their duties toward the representatives of the United States they
will not be disturbed in their persons and property, except in so far as may be
found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the
benefit of the people of the Philippines."
Here are the paragraphs of promise in the proclamation:
"The government established among-you by the United States is a
government of military occupation and for the present it is ordered that the
municipal laws, such as affect private rights of persons and property, regulate
local institutions and provide for the punishment of crime, shall be considered
as continuing in force so far as is compatible with the purposes of military
government, and that they be administered through the ordinary tribunals
substantially as before occupation, but by officials appointed by the govern
ment of occupation.
"The Port of Manila, and all other ports and places in the Philippines
which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces, will be
open, while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of all
neutral nations as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, and
upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the
time of the importation. ' '
There is a likeness between the disturbance of mind of General Aguin
aldo at Manila and that of General Garcia at Santiago, a great difference to
note in the men. Both Aguinaldo and Garcia wanted to participate as repre
sentatives of an independent power in an American triumph. Also they
desired to figure in the procession, to participate in the ceremonies, to put
their names into the papers as parties to the transaction.
The insurgents wanted at Manila and Santiago, after an almost impercep
tible show of themselves in the fields during the sieges, to have a joint occu
pation. General Garcia expected to be Governor of Santiago, General

WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 567
Aguinaldo would be dictator at Manila. In the two cities the military
supremacy of the United States tolerated no companionship. The Americans
had conquered in Cuba and Luzon, and divided authority and responsibility
with no pretenders to statesmanship, given to proclamations as in the Philip
pines ; and not even a character heroic as that of Garcia could be made an ex
ception to an imperative and inviolable rule.

CHAPTER XXV.
The Porto Rico Campaign.
The Preliminary Plans and Movements of General Miles — Sharp but Courteous Correspond
ence with General Shafter, Closing Cuban Experiences — Place of Landing in Porto
Rico Changed at Sea — The Progress of the Campaign Ended by the Peace News — The
Constant and Conclusive Success of the American Arms — Some of the Cablegrams that
Passed that Remain of Historical Interest.

We have been at pains to trace the plans and the movements, of the Major
General Commanding from, the earliest evolutions of campaigns in his mind
to the surrender of Santiago; and we have found that he began with the idea of
thoroughly preparing a great arm)* of fifty thousand in a mass, to be sup
ported by a Cuban auxiliary force of equal number and reinforcements as
might be required. It was in the General's view absolutely necessary to keep
the main body of our troops out of Cuba until the rainy season was over and
the virulence of the yellow fever had abated. This meant the commencement
of decided operations in the late autumn, and it was proposed to strike blows
meantime at the Isle of Pines, Porto Rico and the north shore of the east end
of Cuba, and also clear the West India seas of Spanish ships so that all salt
water would serve for a secure basis of operations. However, it was held to
be essential that we should use our regular army of something over twenty
thousand effective soldiers as soon as our sea power was established, and press
the organization, equipment and advancement of volunteers, so as to push
forward and aid whatever enterprises lingered, owing to the lack of numbers
of the regular force
The country could not have tolerated the course of preparations that the
Commanding General recommended, and he was overwhelmed by the Admin
istration and the course of events. It was the visible line and logic of the plan
of the Commanding General, that while movements of secondary consideration
interested the public and harassed and damaged the Spaniards, the grand
army, to be commanded by himself, should be in due time landed in the west
568

THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 569
end of Cuba, and move under his personal direction upon Havana, after the
pestilence and the floods from the skies had abated. As a military mechanism
this plan of the Major-General was perfect, and as the country was not pre
pared for putting in motion great armies within a few weeks, there was no
difficulty in presenting for the course of proceedings contemplated a very fair
seeming sort of argument, but science had to yield to a sense of exigency and
the war was ended before, as General Miles desired to manage it, the real
struggle should be made, and Havana was captured- by the destruction of
Cervera's fleet, and the surrender of armies of Spain, one thousand and ten
thousand miles away from the capital of Cuba.
Just when it had been determined to strike Spain in Porto Rico and the
insurrectionary end of Cuba, on the north side of the island by preference,
the retreat of the fleet of Cervera to the harbor of Santiago forced the dispatch
to that city of our regular army and concentrated there our Atlantic fleet with
the exception of the vessels necessary to preserve the legal existence of the
blockade of the principal ports of the island. General Miles was present at
the embarkation of the troops at Tampa and saw plainly what Shafter had
already made out as a tendency, that the most important campaign of the
war would be when the land forces of the hostile nations first came in
conflict, and the Major-General expressed his liking to take personal charge of
the enterprise, but it did not seem according to usage or just to deprive
Shafter of his assignment when he had been the first officer of his rank on the
ground, and General Miles was recalled to Washington as Shafter was sailing,
and took in hand the Porto Rico campaign (No. 2) to overrun that wholesome
and beautiful island.
He arrived at Santiago in time to make a perceptible impression on the
enemy, whose surrender, as rescue was impossible, could soon be exacted by
overwhelming forces. The next thing was to hasten the movement of the
victorious soldiers who had sickened under the exposure in the infected villages
and the horror-haunted camps upon the soil whose rankness made it poisonous.
Then General Miles gathered a competent force and sailed for Porto Rico.
Commander C. H. Davis, of the U. S. S. Dixie, reported to Admiral Sampson,
from Guantanamo, Cuba, August 2d, giving information regarding the
island of Porto Rico, "gathered, by me on my recent visit to the island, partly
through intercourse with natives and" residents, and partly through personal
observation, as follows:

570 THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN.
"There are about 7,000 regular Spanish troops on the island. The num
ber of volunteers and irregular troops is indefinite, but those would not count
against our invading force, as popular sentiment in the island is overwhelm
ingly in favor of the United States. The people struck me as being superior
intellectually to the Cubans.
"After the occupation of Guanica and Ponce by our navy and army the
Spanish forces began to concentrate on San Juan de Porto Rico, the seat of
the colonial government. This will be the last stronghold of Spanish
authority on the island. It will be difficult to take San Juan by a land invest
ment unsupported by the fleet.
"General Miles' headquarters are now at Ponce. All transports are being
collected there and reinforcements, material, and baggage landed as rapidly
as possible. The troops which landed at Guanica will march overland to
Ponce to join the main army. I understand that General Miles' plan of cam
paign is an advance in force across the island from Ponce to San Juan and a
regular investment of that place. The distance is about 60 miles in a straight
line. It must be much more by the windings of the road. The roads are good.
"The natives assured me that General Miles would meet with very little
opposition before reaching the vicinity of San Juan. San Juan is the key to
the island. It would be the natural policy of the enemy to concentrate for its
defense. The Governor- General of Porto Rico has telegraphed Madrid that
he cannot hold the colony for Spain unless strongly reinforced, and San Juan
is already beginning to suffer for want of food. The people of the country
would rise against the Spanish authority if stimulated. The Spanish official
class and Spanish sympathizers will take refuge in San Juan, which may be
regarded as a purely Spanish city. General Miles cannot hold the island until
he takes the city of San Juan de Porto Rico and compels the surrender of the
colonial government.
"I am strongly of the opinion that San Juan de Porto Rico could be taken
by the fleet under your command and by a coup de main without the assistance
of the army and in advance of its approach from the south and the complete
conquest of the island of Porto Rico accomplished by this means. The plan
would be to send a flag of truce in advance of the fleet with the usual notice
of bombardment. The monitors might occupy the western end of the line
and engage the batteries on and to the westward of Morro Point. The battle
ships and cruisers would continue the line from the position of the monitors

THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 57*
easterly nearly to Necambron Point and bombard the city itself and the land
defenses and suburbs, and command the road by which alone egress may be
had from the city.
"Two or three light-draft vessels mounting 5 -inch guns stationed near El
Soquoron could sweep and destroy San Antonio bridge and its approaches and
command the San Antonio Channel and Isla Grande. The landing force of
marines, convoyed by gunboats, could land a mile to the westward of Paloseco
and occupy the shore on the west side of the harbor within easy range of the
town for field pieces, automatic guns, and small arms, or the marines could
be held in reserve to land and garrison the town on its reduction by the fire
from the ships, whose volume would, I believe, insure an immediate surrender
of the city and with it the possession of the whole island, or would entirely
destroy the place."
There is something very clever and positive about this, but the Navy was
not destined to pick up the golden sheaves in the harvest field of glory.
Before getting away from Cuba General Miles had this interesting and
instructive correspondence with General Shafter.
Headquarters of the Army, Playa del Este, July 17, 1898 — 7 p. m.
General Shafter:
What is the condition of your command to-day? Sent you report of medical
board, with direction for changing camps, etc. If it is thought more advisable
to move troops to fresh camps on the foothills or mountain sides, and surgeons
advise, act accordingly.
The St. Paul should be unloaded immediately, and every transport
unloaded and returned as soon as possible, as they are needed.
MILES, Major-General Commanding.

Siboney, July 17, 1898—8:48 p. m. (Received July 18, 1898.)
General Miles, On Board Yale:
Letters and orders in reference to movement of camp received and wili
bekarried out. None is more anxious than myself to get away from here. It
seems, from your orders given me, that you regard my force as a part of your
command. Nothing will give me greater pleasure than serving under you,
General, and I shall comply with all your requests and directions, but I was
told by the Secretary that you were not to supersede me in command here. I

572 THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN.
will furnish the information called for as to condition of command to Gil-
more, Adjutant-General, Army Headquarters. SHAFTER, Major-General.

Headquarters of the Army,
Playa del Este, July 18, 1898. (Sent about 11 :3o a. m.)
General Shafter:
Telegram received. Have no desire and have carefully avoided any
appearance of superseding you. Your command is a part of the United
States Army, which I have the honor to command, having been duly assigned
thereto, and directed by the President to go wherever I thought my presence
required, and give such general directions as I thought best concerning mili
tary matters, and especially directed to go to Santiago for a specific purpose.
You will also notice that the order of the Secretary of War of July -13 left the
matter to my discretion. I should regret that any event should cause you or
any part of your command to cease to be a part of mine.
NELSON A.MILES,
Major-General Commanding.
Half an hour later than the date of the above Miles wrote to the Secretary
of War, that he thought it "important to go direct to Pt. Fajardo, Cape de
San Juan," and he wanted "a strong, fast, sea-going dispatch boat to be sent
to Porto Rico, " and he also wanted Keif er's Division, from Miami, Florida, "or
troops from Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and Florida, ' ' as
"a part of the command of Porto Rico." Before leaving Siboney he said in
general field orders No. 1 of the Santiago army: "Under drenching storms,
intense and prostrating heat, within a fever-afflicted district, with little com
fort or rest, either by day or night, they pursued their purpose of finding and
conquering the enemy. Many of them, trained in the severe experience of the
great war, and in frequent campaigns on the western plains, officers and men
alike exhibited a great skill, fortitude, and tenacity, with results which have
added a new chapter of glory to their country's history. Even when their
own generals in several cases were temporarily disabled, the troops fought^n
with the same heroic spirit until success was finally achieved.
"In many instances the officers placed themselves in front of their com
mands, and under their direct and skillful leadership the trained troops of a
brave army were driven from the thickets and jungles of an almost inaccessible

THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 573
country. In the open field the troops stormed intrenched infantry, and car
ried and captured fortified works with an unsurpassed daring and disregard of
death. By gaining commanding ground they made the harbor of Santiago
untenable for the Spanish fleet, and practically drove it out to a speedy
destruction by the American navy. ' '
The General proceeded to say: "While enduring the hardships and
privations of such a campaign, the troops generously shared their scanty food
with the 5,000 Cuban patriots in arms and the suffering people who had fled
from the besieged city."
It should be stated that if there were five thousand native troops seen by
the American forces, the Spaniards did not get sight of that number of them.
The General continued: "With the twenty - four regiments and four
batteries, the flower of the United States army, were also three volunteer
regiments. These, though unskilled in warfare, yet, inspired with the same
spirit, contributed to the victory, suffered hardships, and made sacrifices with
the rest." Instead of going to Pt. Fajardo, Porto Rico, General Miles concluded
to land at Guanica. The reason the General assigned for this change, which
was a surprise, he states: "As all cablegrams concerning our landing place
had passed over foreign cables, and as it was important to deceive the enemy
(who, I afterwards learned, were marching to and intrenching the ground we
were expected' to occupy, at the very time we were taking possession of the
southern coast of Porto Rico)."
While at sea, he wrote to Captain Higginson: "Our objective point has
been Pt. Fajardo or Cape San Juan, but so much time has occurred since the
movement was decided in that direction and such publicity has been given the
enterprise, that the enemy has undoubtedly become apprised of our purpose.
While it was advisable to make a demonstration near the harbor of San Juan
near Pt. Fajardo, or Pt. Figueroa, I am not decided as to the advisability of
landing at either of these places, as we may find them well occupied by strong
Spanish forces. If we draw them to that vicinity, we might find it judicious
to quickly move to Puerto Guanica, where there is a deep water near the shore
—four and one half fathoms— and good facilities for landing. "
The correspondence of the General makes clear the completeness of his
information. The General says in his report to the Secretary of War that he
arrived off Guanica near daylight July 25th, and entered the harbor unopposed.

571 THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN.
"The guns of the Gloucester, Commander Wainwright commanding, fired
several shots at some Spanish troops on shore. The landing of the marines,
sailors, and our troops immediately commenced, and after a short skirmish
the Spanish troops were driven from the place, and the flag of the United
States was raised on the island.
"In this, and in subsequent movements, I was very ably and cordially
assisted by the navy, which rendered invaluable aid in disembarking troops
and supplies from the transports, using their steam launches to tow the
lighters loaded with men and animals from the transports to the shore. Ten
lighters were captured at Guanica and seventy at Ponce. "
Major-General Wilson arrived July 27th. Commander Davis of the Dixie
entered the Port of Ponce on the same day and found it was not fortified. In
order to encourage the dissatisfaction with the Spaniards on the island, Gen
eral Miles issued a proclamation "To the Inhabitants of Porto Rico," stating
that our war against Spain was "in the cause of liberty, justice and human
ity," and the United States forces "came bearing the banner of freedom," and
he closed with this sounding sentence, equal to the Spanish style in sonorous
phrase: "This is not a war of devastation, but one to give to all within the
control of its military and naval forces the advantages and blessings of enlight
ened civilization. "
The General seems to have hit his audience squarely. Major-General
Brooke arrived July 31st. There were several sharp skirmishes on August
8th, 9th and 10th. In the affair of the 9th the Spanish commanding officer
and the second in command were killed and one hundred and sixty-seven
prisoners taken. There were six engagements during the campaign when at
Asomante, on the 12th of August, the artillery of General Wilson's com
mand began shelling the enemy's position preparatory to an advance in front,
while a rear attack was to be made by General Ernst's brigade. This com
mand was under arms and ready to move August 13th, when orders were
received suspending hostilities.
July 30th General Miles telegraphed from the Port of Ponce of the prog
ress of the Porto Rico campaign: "We have now landed in a perfectly
healthy country, well settled, and where, if necessary, a large amount of beef
can be obtained, and also transportation.
"Marching across country, rather than under the guns of the fleet, will
have in every way a desirable effect upon the inhabitants of this country. At

THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 575
least four-fifths of the people will hail with great joy the arrival of United
States troops, and requests for our national flag to place over public buildings
come in from every direction.
"This is a prosperous and beautiful country. The army will soon be in
mountain region; weather delightful; troops in best of health and spirits;
anticipate no insurmountable obstacles in future results."
July 31st the General telegraphed: "Volunteers are surrendering them
selves with arms and ammunition. Four-fifths of the people are overjoyed at
the arrival of the army; 2,000 from one place have volunteered to serve with
it. They are bringing in transportation, beef cattle, and other needed sup
plies. The custom house has already yielded $14,000."
General Miles remarked by wire August 2d: "Abundance of beef,
cattle, coffee, sugar, and supplies of that character can be obtained in the
country. Request that no more fresh meat be sent, as it cannot be used more
than a day from the coast. I also recommend that the manufacture of Spring
field rifles, .45 -caliber ammunition, all white canvas tentage and black leather
equipments of every description be discontinued, as they are obsolete and
should not be part of the army equipment. ' '
August 3d General Alger replied: "As you ought to know, the last
caliber .45 Springfield rifle was manufactured in ninety-three. Smokeless
powder cartridges are now being manufactured and will be forwarded. I sug
gest that you get along with what the government has on hand. "
August 14th General Miles telegraphed from "near Los Morias; notice on
map our troops occupy best part of Porto Rico. They were moving in such
strong column in concert that nothing could check their progress. They
would have occupied the entire island within four days if they had not been
stopped by order to suspend hostilities."
One of the difficulties of the war was the scarcity of supplies of pure
water, and the vehement demand for it. At last, as the original difficulties
had passed away in great measure, there was a gleam of humor in the four
brief dispatches appended : New York, August 26, 1898 — 12:51 p. m.
Hon. H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. :
Please see that Troops A and C, New York Volunteer Cavalry, about to
embark on return voyage from Ponce, are not overcrowded and are supplied
with abundance of water. T. C. PLATT.

576 THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN.
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, August 26, 1898 — 11 p. m.
Hon. T. C. Piatt, Manhattan Beach Hotel, Long Island:
Will give instructions that A and C troops are not crowded on return
voyage Pray tell me when they took to water?
H. C CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

New York, August 26, 1898 — 2:25 p. m.
Henry C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. :
Troops A and C, New York Volunteer Cavalry, are coming home from
Ponce. Please do not overcrowd, and give them plenty of water.
GILBERT E. JONES.

Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, August 26, 1898 — 11 p. m.
Gilbert E. Jones, 222 Madison Avenue, New York City:
I will see that your darling pets are not crowded, but since when did they
take to water? H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

This is in another vein : New York, August 26, 1898 — 4:33 p. m.
Adjutant-General Corbin, War Department, Washington, D. C. :
Please wire Porto Rico to find when schools will be open.
D. BUTTERFIELD.
Corbin replied, Porto Rico cables "School opened August 15th."
Ponce, August 8, 1898 — 1 :5o p. m.
Adjutant-General, Washington :
Replying to General Butterfield's inquiry concerning public schools in
Porto Rico, there are 546 public and 38 private. GILMORE.
The schools opened two days after the Stars and Stripes appeared as the
sovereign standard of Porto Rico.
General Butterfield was instrumental in sending a large supply of the
Stars and Stripes to Porto Rico, and they were gladly received.
Ponce, via Bermuda, August 21, 1898 — 7:28 p.m.
Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:
The arrangements for supplying flags through Butterfield and Bakewell,
Lafayette Post, satisfactory. The larger of the sizes sent will be acceptable.
Please notify them. NELSON A. MILES, Major-General.

THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 577
Ponce, via Bermuda, August 14, 1898 — 9:30 p. m.
Secretary of War, Washington:
Messrs. Potter, Van Rennsaller, Vanuxem, and Groff arrived on private
yacht May with load of supplies, which will greatly contribute to the comfort
of the troops, and especially the sick and wounded. They also brought a
large number of American flags, which have been sent to the different towns
and cities, and soon will be waving over the best part of Porto Rico. The
action of these patriotic and philanthropic gentlemen, and the National Relief
Commission, which they represent, is highly appreciated by a grateful army,
while the display of our national colors will give great joy to the people.
NELSON A. MILES, Major-General Commanding.

Ponce, via Bermuda, August 21, 1898 — 8:05 p. m.
Secretary of War, Washington :
Everything accomplished that could be desired. Only details to be
arranged by commission for evacuation of Spanish troops. Some Spanish
troops now marching to San Juan preparatory to embarking for Spain. I
have 106 guns, mortars, and howitzers, field and siege. I intended to use
at San Juan if Spanish had not been captured outside, which our troops
were doing. These available if needed elsewhere. Among number are ten
light, very powerful dynamite guns. If desirable, any of above, with ammu
nition and men, can be shipped, via New Orleans and San Francisco, to
Manila. I expect very soon to return to Washington. MILES.
General Miles said in concluding his report: "The success of the enter
prise was largely due to the skill and good generalship of the officers in
command of the different divisions and brigades. Strategy and skillful tactics
accomplished what might have occasioned serious loss to achieve in any other
way. The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded and captured was nearly ten
times our own, which was only 3 killed and 40 wounded. Thus the island of
Puerto Rico became a part of the United States. It embraces nearly 3,700
square miles, and has a population of nearly a million souls.
"It is gratifying to record that during the war not a single defeat has
been met, and not a prisoner, color, gun or rifle has been captured by the
enemy. In this respect the war has been most remarkable, and, perhaps,
unparalleled. Under all circumstances and in spite of many most trying

'578 THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN.
difficulties the troops have maintained the fortitude of the American character
and the honor of their arms. ' '
After planning many campaigns it was not the good fortune of General
Miles to conduct the one which he commanded to the surrender of the army of
opposition. Suddenly there was peace. The "war drums throbbed no
longer." It is conceded that when the intelligence that Porto Rico was ceded
to us by Spain, reached the Commanding General he had played to the win
ning point a very handsome game of war chess, and had announced checkmate
in three moves, though nearly all the pieces were on the board.

UNITED STATES TRANSPORTS IN THE HARBOR OF PONCE, PORTO RICO.

THE CITADEL AT PONCE, PORTO RICO.

CHAPTER XXVI.

After the Fighting Was Over in Cuba.
The Casualties at Santiago— Haste to Ship the Spaniards to Spain and the Americans
North— The Parting of the Armies that Met in Bloody Strife— Shafter's Opinion of
Immunes— A Curious Proclamation from Spanish Soldiers— 23,726 Spanish Soldiers
Surrendered— American Volunteers Begging to be Hurried to the Front While the
War Lasted, and When it was Over They Wanted to Go Home.
The fighting in Cuba with the Spaniards was at an end when the sur
render of the Spanish army took place. The report of casualties in the
United States army in the actions of July 1, 2, and 3 were: killed, 23 officers
and 208 enlisted men; wounded, 80 officers and 1,203 men; missing, 81 men;
and there was included in a supplementary return 15 additional names, the
grand total being, killed, wounded and missing, 1,610. General Miles, before
going to Porto Rico, stated in a telegram :
"There is not a single regiment of regulars or volunteers with General
Shafter's command that is not infected with yellow fever, from one case in
the Eighth Ohio to thirty-six cases in the Thirty-third Michigan. After
consulting with best medical authorities, it is my opinion that the best mode
of ridding the troops of the fever will be as I have directed, namely, the
troops to go up as high into the mountains as possible, selecting fresh camp
every day. If this does not check the spread of the disease, the only way of
saving a large portion of the command will be to put them on transports and
ship them to New England coast. ' '
The sanitary report August 14th at Santiago, telegraphed the Surgeon-
General, was: sick, 2,715; fever cases, 1,506; new cases, 129; number of fever
cases returned to duty, 226. August 16th General Shafter wired General
Corbin reporting taking customs duties, $20,000 on the day before, and
$19,000 that day, $80,000 since occupation.
General Shafter reported on Cuban and immune regiments as follows:
581

582 AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA.
"I have asked no questions whatever wmether a man was a Cuban or a
Spaniard. Most of the officials are Cuban officers, or Cuban born. I hope that
in a short time things will quiet down. The whole trouble here is that there
is nothing for men to do in the country. It has absolutely returned to its wild
state, and has got to be settled and made anew. The attitude of the pro
nounced Cubans is hostile. They so far show no disposition to disband and
go to work, and until 'they do there will be trouble, for they have got to live,
and they will have to live by robbery — there is no other, way. A dual govern
ment can't exist here; we have got to have full sway of the Cubans. It is
sincerely to be hoped that wise counsels will prevail among the Cubans, and,
as war is no longer possible to them except with ourselves, that they will
resume their peaceful vocations and without delay, but it is hard for those
who have been living by violence and without working to resume their former
conditions. The immune regiments that have reached here are, I think,
among the worst that I have ever seen, being poor material, without discip
line, vicious, and degraded. I think it will be necessary to muster them out
as soon as danger from disease is over, and replace them with better men."
At Baracoa and Suquade Tonamo there were surrendered 7,756 officers
and men, 2,321 stands of arms, 413,000 rounds of ammunition, and five
Krupp guns. The Spaniards had not heard then of the destruction of
Cervera's fleet, and thought Dewey had been whipped at Manila.
The telegrams following show exertions made to succor the sick and send
home the boys no longer needed at the front:
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, August 18, 1898.
Commanding Officer Twenty-third Kansas VolunteerTnfantry, Topeka, Kans. :
Secretary of War directs that you proceed by rail with your regiment
fully armed and equipped, to New York city, in time to reach there next
Wednesday, 24th instant, to embark upon a transport to be provided to take
your command to Santiago, where, upon arrival, you will report to the
commanding general, Department of Santiago, for duty. Communicate with
the chief commissary at Omaha, Neb., concerning your travel rations and
with chief quartermaster at the same point for your transportation. Take
every precaution for the comfort and convenience of your men, and sufficient
stores of all kinds for the journey. Acknowledge receipt, and communicate
to this office from time to time progress in execution.
HEISTAND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 583
Santiago de Cuba, via Haiti, August 19, 1898 — 1:15 a. m.
Pierson, War Department, Washington :
Tell Secretary Alger I appreciate to the greatest possible extent his
responsive and practical sympathy. His suggestions are better than I had
asked, and are promptly adopted. If the Clinton is unloaded in time, I will
leave here Saturday morning. Will take 40 mules. Fago here. Need two
additional wagons and harness for all my mules. Please give me some horse
feed from here. CLARA BARTON.

Camp Wikoff, Montauk Point, N. Y., August 19, 1898 — 6:30 p. m.
Adjutant-General, U. S. A. , Washington, D. C. :
Many sick on Mobile. Ship is at pier and sick men being taken to hospital
in ambulances. The well men will remain aboard until weather clears. We
are providing for them. I specially request that Colonel Weston be ordered
to-day to be chief commissary here ; if not permanently, until organization is
perfected. I have arranged to have full benefit of services of Generals
Young, Rand, and Williston. They are active and efficient.
JOSEPH WHEELER, Major-General.

Pennsylvania Depot, Jersey City, N. J., August 20, 1898 — 9:i8 a. m.
Adjutant-General Corbin, Washington, D. C. :
Reported arrival of Mobile with 1,600 on board; 300 sick; 2 died on the
way. She ought never to have carried over half the number. This is
against positive orders, which were to give men plenty of room and
crowd no ship. Have to investigate at once. Cable Shafter. Relief here.
Order her to Santiago to-morrow. The hospital ship Missouri will sail
Monday. R- A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
Corbin telegraphed Alger :
"Find the Mobile had carrying capacity of 1,000 men and like number of
animals. As there were no animals it is not thought that the ship was over
crowded. Have wired General Shafter your instructions that abundant room
be given on every transport. Also informed him of the reported bad condi
tion of the Mobile. ' '
Shafter telegraphed :
"Referring to your telegram about overcrowding the Mobile, her captain
reported that, loaded as she was, going to Porto Rico he could carry 3,000

584 AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA.
men, and that he could carry 2,000 comfortably, therefore did not consider a
few less than 1,700 as too many. Ship was carefully inspected by a board of
officers, and Dr. Ives, a member of the board, states it was not overcrowded.
Accommodations for officers were, however, somewhat deficient. The large
number of deaths can probably be accounted for by the fact that this brigade
took nearly all their sick with them-. Greatest care has been taken in this
respect. Transports have been loaded with from 200 to 300 men less than the
same ship brought down. ' '
The total number of Spaniards who surrendered in and about Santiago
was 23,726. The following very curious Spanish document from the depart
ing Spaniards seems to show a Spanish preference for United States soldiers
over Cubans in arms: Santiago, via Haiti, August 22, 1898 — 11:17 p. m.
H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington:
The following letter has just been received from the soldiers who are now
embarking for Spain :
"To Major-General Shafter, Commanding the American Army in Cuba. —
Sir: The Spanish soldiers who capitulated in this place on the 16th of July
last, recognizing your high and just position, pray that through you all the
courageous and noble soldiers under your command may receive our good
wishes and farewell, which we send them on embarking for our beloved
Spain. For this favor, which we have no doubt you will grant, you will gain
the everlasting gratitude and consideration of 11,000 Spanish soldiers, who
are your most humble servants.
"PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO, Private of Infantry."
Also the following letter addressed to the soldiers of the American
Army :
"Soldiers of the American Army: We would not be fulfilling our duty as
well-born men, in whose breasts there lives gratitude. and courtesy, should we
embark for our beloved Spain without sending to you our most cordial and
sincere good wishes and farewell. We fought you with ardor, with all our
strength, endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the slightest rancor or
hate toward the American nation. We have been vanquished by you (so our
generals and chiefs judged in signing the capitulation), but cur surrender and
the bloody battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for resentment
against the men who fought us nobly and valiantly. You fought and acted in

A CORNER IN THE MARKET, SANTIAGO, CUBA.

HEAD OF PACK TRAIN LEAVING SAN LUIS FOR MANZAN [LLA.

AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 587
compliance with the same call of duty as we, for we all but represent the
power of our respective States.
"You fought us as men, face to face, and with great courage, as before
stated, a quality which we had not met with during the three years we have
carried on this war against a people without religion, without morals, without
conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but,
hidden, spot their noble victims from ambush and then immediately fled.
This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this unfortunate land. You
have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the'
armies of the most civilized nations of the world, have given honorable burial
to the dead of the vanquished, have cured their wounded with great humanity,
have respected and cared for your prisoners and their comfort, and, lastly, to
us whose condition was terrible, you have given freely of food, of your- stock
of medicines, and you have honored us with distinction and courtesy, for after
the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony.
"With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all, there remains but
to express our farewell, and with the greatest sincerity we wish you all happi
ness and health in this land which will no longer belong to our dear Spain,
but will be yours, who have conquered it by force and watered it with your
blood, as your conscience called for, under the demand of civilization and
humanity, but the descendants of the Congo and of Guinea, mingled with the
blood of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers, these
people are not able^to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will find it a
burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized communities.
"From 11,000 Spanish soldiers.
"PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO,
"Soldier of Infantry, Santiago de Cuba, 21st August, 1898."
SHAFTER, Major-General.
Three days later, August 25th, Shafter cabled the War Office: "Com
mand all embarked this morning except Twenty-fourth United States
Infantry, detachment of recruits for First Illinois Volunteer Infantry, and a
part of the Ninth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, all of which will embark
to-morrow morning on transport now here," and at noon of August 25th
General Shafter sailed for Montauk Point, where he arrived September 1st,
and wrote the Secretary of War September 3rd :
"I am very sorry not to be able to come to meet you and the President

588 AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA.
on your arrival this morning, but I am still in detention camp, and yesterJ.-*'.
for the first time, had considerable fever. I am feeling much better, how
ever, this morning, though rather weak. ' '
The American armies that fought at Santiago hastened away to East
Long Island, where there was at least pure air and sand, and the Spaniards
were glad to go home. The captive Spaniards far outnumbered the conquer
ing Americans, and the Fifth Corps was disbanded.
(General Orders, No. 50.) Headquarters Fifth Army Corps,
Camp Wikoff, Long Island, October 3, 1898.
In compliance with instructions of this date from the Secretary of War,
the disbandment of the Fifth Army Corps is hereby announced.
The short and successful campaign of this corps before Santiago de Cuba
will fill a brilliant page in the history of our country.
By command Major-General Miles. E. J. McCLERNAND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
The official dispatches are full of evidence of the high spirit of the young
men of the country, showing in a special and striking way the eagerness, as
the war seemed about to close, to find some fighting to do before the end
came. The War Office received a shower of telegrams soliciting the privilege
of being in the last events of the war, if peace had to come. The following
are specimens of these patriotic messages:
Chickamauga Park, Ga., August 1, 1898 — 11:05 a. m.
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
In assigning troops and officers to expedition for Porto Rico, won't you
allow the State of Texas a representation and give me a command with at
least one Texas regiment? J. R. WATIES, Brigadier-General.'
Austin, Tex., August 1, 1898 — 12:48 p. m.
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
I respectfully indorse the request of Brigadier-General Waties.
C. A. CULBERSON, Governor.

St. Louis, Mo., August 1, 1898 — 1:25 p. m.
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.
Dear General Alger: If you can, send Fifth Missouri with General Wade.
Company H is Sons of Veterans company, and the regiment is first class.
JNO. W. NOBLE.

AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 589
Indianapolis, Ind., August 1, 1898 — 2:10 p. m.
Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary, Washington, D. C. :
The One Hundred and Fifty-eighth Indiana was among the first to reach
Chickamauga. Only three regiments have been there longer. Will be
obliged if they can go with Wade; they are a splendid lot of men.
CHAS. W. FAIRBANKS.

Rockbridge Alum Springs, Va., August 1, 1898 — 3:20 p. m.
Secretary Alger, Washington, D. C. :
Please send Fifth Missouri to Porto Rico. My son, Ralph, lieutenant,
Company F, that regiment, anxious to join expedition. JOHN J. INGALLS.

New York, August 1, 1898 — 8:10 p. m.
Gen. H. C. Corbin, War Department, Washington, D. C. :
Do send the First Missouri, now at Chickamauga, to the front with
General Wade. This regiment are nearly all St. Louis boys. There is a
tremendous appeal from influential men in St. Louis in their behalf. Why
not send them with General Wade? R. C. KERENS.

Indianapolis, Ind., August 1, 1898 — 8:45 P- m-
Hon R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
I earnestly urge acceptance of the One Hundred and Fifty-eighth Indiana
regiment, now at Chickamauga,' for the Porto Rico expedition.
JESSE OVERSTREET.

Fort Grant, Ariz., August 1, 1898—10:33 p. m.
Gen. H. C. Corbin, Washington, D. C. :
Will the Adjutant-General help in the matter referred to in my official
message of to-day? Have written so many letters and made so many efforts
in other ways that I venture to address him personally and beg his assistance.
GRESHAM, Captain.

Fort Grant, Ariz., August 1, 1898 — 10:30 p. m.
Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington, D. C. :
One hundred and thirty-seven men and one officer, constituting L and
M troops, Seventh Cavalry, at this post, beg to be part of the 50,000 volun-

590 AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA.
teers to occupy Porto Rico, Cuba, and Philippines. They are a fine set of
men, fairly drilled, equipped, and most eager to go to the front. Shortage
of officers can be supplied if necessary by good non-commissioned officers.
GRESHAM,
Captain, Seventh Cavalry, Commanding L and M troops.

St. Louis, Mo., August i, 1898 — 5:05 p. m.
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
The undersigned respectfully urge that the First Regiment Missouri
Volunteers be included in General Wade's selection for Porto Rico service.
HENRY ZIEGENHEIN, Mayor.
CHRIS SHARP,
President Merchants' Exchange.
JNO. C. WILKINSON,
President Business Men's League.
L. D. KINGSLAND,
President Manufacturers' Association.
I. W. MORTON,
President Commercial Club.

French Lick, Ind., August i, 1898 — 5:30 p. m.
Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
The men and officers of One Hundred and Fifty-eighth Indiana Regiment
urgently request that they be detailed for Porto Rico expedition, and I second
their request. DAVID TURPIE.

Van Wert, Ohio, August 2, 1898 — 1 :i2 a. m.
Hon. R, A. Alger, Washington, D. C. :
Second Ohio was one of the first regiments mustered. They beg to go to
Porto Rico. I earnestly urge their prayer. G. L. MARBLE.

Minneapolis, Minn., August 2, 1898 — 11:45 a- m^
Hon. R. A. Alger, Washington, D. C. :
Minnesota boys at Chickamauga impatient to go to front. Can you not
befriend them and place them where they may face the foe? Their sires

AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 591
fought and fell at Gettysburg. If there be more fighting, their sons seek the
field of honor and danger. • W. H. EUSTIS.

Prescott, Ark., August 2, 1898 — 11:45 a- m-
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
I sincerely trust you will allow the Arkansas troops to participate in
the Porto Rico expedition. THOS. C. McRAE.

Northfield, Minn., August 2, 1898 — 11:49 a- m-
Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary, Washington:
Respectfully urge that Fourteenth Minnesota Regiment be sent on Porto
Rico expedition. Men anxious to go. Sincerely hope you will.
JOEL P. HEATWOLE,
Member Congress, Third District.

North Tonawanda, N. Y., August 2, 1898 — 12 m.
Hon. George D. Meiklejohn,
Assistant Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
If possible, please have Third Regiment New York Volunteers included
in Porto Rico expedition. J. P. LINDSAY.

Little Rock, Ark., August 2, 1898 — 1:31 p. m.
Hon. G. D. Meiklejohn, Washington, D. C. :
Please do all you can to have First Arkansas, now at Chickamauga,
ordered out with next expedition. HENRY M. COOPER.

Little Rock, Ark., August 2, 1898 — 2:02 p. m.
Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
Second Arkansas, Colonel Cook, anxious to go with General Wade. Will
highly appreciate it if you will give Arkansas boys a chance for active service.
A. S. FOWLER.
JOHN McCLURE.

Port Chester, N. Y., August 2, 1898 — 3:08 p. m.
General Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
Eighth New York most anxious for immediate service. Can't you send
them to Porto Rico and oblige them and yours?
JOHN MURRAY MITCHELL.

592 AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA.
Atlanta, Ga., August 2, 1898 — 3:18 p. m.
Gen. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
Please favor number of your Georgia friends by sending First Georgia to
the front. W. H. JOHNSON.

Eureka Springs, Ark., August -2, 1898 — 4:03 p. m.
Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
Officers and men of First and Second Arkansas Volunteers, now at Chick
amauga, are ready and anxious to go to Porto Rico. Hope you can send
them. J. H. BERRY.

Indianapolis, Ind., August 2, 1898 — 4:15 p. m.
Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
I cordially indorse Colonel Durbin's application to have the One Hundred
and Sixty-first Regiment Indiana Volunteer attached to General Wade's
expedition to Porto Rico. JAMES A. MOUNT, Governor.

Indianapolis, Ind., August 2, 1898 — 4:16 p.m.
Hon. H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. :
I cordially indorse Colonel Durbin's application to have the One Hundred
and Sixty-first Indiana Volunteer Infantry attached to General Wade's expe
dition to Porto Rico. JAMES A. MOUNT, Governor.

Chattanooga, Tenn., August 2, 1898 — 7:50 p. m.
Gen. Henry C. Corbin, Washington, D. C. :
Third Brigade, including Second Ohio, want to be sent to Porto Rico. I
was transferred on assurance that my brigade would move. Others are work
ing to supersede us. Can't you push us along to join our commander?
ABE S. BICKAM.

Minneapolis, Minn., August 2, 1898 — 1 :o5 p. m.
Hon. G. D. Meiklejohn:
The Fourteenth Minnesota, now at Chickamauga, very anxious to go to
Porto Rico next expedition. Won't you see that they go?
L. FLETCHER.

AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 593
New York, August 3, 1898 — 1 p. m.
Gen H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C. :
If you have the disposition to confer lasting favor upon me and friends of
Fourteenth New York, Wilder's regiment, please send same to Porto Rico.
The command full, well equipped. Its career in yo,ur hands.
HENRY H. ADAMS.

St. Paul, Minn., August 4, 1898.
Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
It is thought by our people that one of the Minnesota regiments at
Chickamauga ought to be sent to Porto Rico, and I think so, too.
C. K. DAVIS.

Augusta, Me., August 4, 1898 — 1:37 p. m.
Gen. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
I earnestly recommend the sending of General Mattocks and his brigade
to Porto Rico, and his appointment to the military and civil governorship.
E. C. BURLEIGH.

Bangor, Me., August 4, 1898 — 2:06 p. m.
Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
General Mattocks earnestly desires his brigade, including Maine regi
ment, be ordered to Porto Rico. Hope you w*ill send his brigade.
C. A. BOUTELLE.

New York, August 4, 1898 — 5 :56 p. m.
Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :
We respectfully request and urge that our well-drilled and able-bodied
Fourteenth New York Regiment, commanded by a Regular Army officer,
Colonel Wilder, be included in any command to be sent to Porto Rico or into
active service. No regiment better fitted or commanded.
C. P. Huntington, F. D. Tappin, Howard Gould, W. L. Strong,
Edward E. Poore, H. W. Cannon, Charles A. Moore, R. A. C. Smith,
Charles Stewart Smith, J. Edward Simmons, Dumont Clark, and 25
others.
This telegram tells the story about the going home of the sick soldiers
from Cuba.

594, AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA.
Santiago de Cuba, August 14, 1&98 — 12:41 a. m.
H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. :
Rio Grande, Seneca, and Comanche, with Ninth and Tenth Cavalry, Fourth
and Twenty-fifth Infantry all loaded, and will go out this afternoon unless
hurricane, of which reports have been had as blowing south of Jamaica, pre
vents. The Breakwater, City of Macon, and Arkadia will go to-morrow with
two light batteries and Twelfth and Seventeenth Infantry. One of the hard
est rainstorms we have yet had is raging this afternoon. Am getting the sick
left behind in very comfortable condition. Two thousand Spanish troops to
be loaded to-morrow, and only other ship that is in as soon as it can coal,
probably two- days. My own health is excellent ; not been better for years.
Hope to get troops off so as to be able to start the latter part of the week for
the United States. As you see, number taken sick rapidly decreasing for
lack of fuel, nearly all of three divisions having left, but we have a large
number of sick men. Are doing the very best by them possible. Will ship
400 convalescents on Catania Monday. SHAFTER, Major-General.
It was a great mercy peace was made so soon as to allow those who were
ready to perish from Cuban fevers to go where the sanitary conditions were
good and hope helped to save. In this telegram is a cheerful tone and happy
promise : Montauk, N. Y., August 14, 1898 — 2:15 p. m.
Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C. :
Sailed from Santiago, Cuba, Monday last, 8th instant; arrived this morn
ing. Condition of troops on board (Sixth and Thirteenth Infantry, regulars)
much improved by voyage ; no new cases of sickness developed ; no yellow
fever; no deaths. A. AMES,
Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding.
The emergency for moving the troops north, even from Florida, is seen
in the telegram of General Rogers, Chief of Artillery, from Tampa,
August 7th:
"The Secretary of War having stopped the further shipment of the siege
train to General Miles, I now request instructions as to the disposition to be
made of the batteries serving with the train, the ordnance material, and quar
termaster's transportation. There are about 1,800 men, 1,300 animals, and a
large amount of artillery material collected here. A considerable time will

SUGAR MILL. SCENE OF SAN LUIS RIOT, NOV. 4, 1898.

SOLDIERS IN INSURGENT ARMY OF CUBA.

THE PALACE AT SANTIAGO, CUBA.

AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 597
be necessary to complete the shipment of the command. After consulting
with General Coppinger and the. chief surgeon, I report that the condition of
health of the men and animals requires their removal at once from the South,
and if it is considered advisable to maintain any portion of this siege train for
service or future instructions, I am of the opinion that the interests of the
service will be subserved by moving it to a point at least as far north as
Washington. The chief surgeon, Fourth Army Corps, informs me that the
sanitary conditions at Jacksonville, Fernandina, or other points along Gulf or
South Atlantic coast would not afford relief from conditions existing here ;
also that there are many cases of typhoid fever in camp, and although it is
the healthiest camp at Tampa, a rapid depletion of the command may be
expected from this disease, if not from infection."
There was much of wholesome significance in this brief telegram :
Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, August 13, 1898 — 11:30 p. m.
General Shafter, Santiago : — You may discontinue press censorship.
H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.
The Surgeon-General issued a circular the wisdom of which has been
shown by experience. He said:
' ' No doubt typhoid fever, camp diarrhoea, and probably yellow fever are
frequently communicated to soldiers in camp through the agency of flies,
-which swarm about fecal matter and filth of all kinds deposited upon the
ground or in shallow pits, and directly convey infectious material, attached to
their feet or contained in their excreta, to the food which is exposed while
being prepared at the company kitchens or while being served in the mess
tent. It is for this reason that a strict sanitary police is so important. Also
because the water supply may be contaminated in the same way or by surface
drainage. "It is unsafe to eat heartily or drink freely when greatly fatigued or over
heated. "Ripe fruit may be eaten in moderation, but green or over-ripe fruit will
give rise to bowel complaints. Food should be thoroughly cooked and free
from fermentation or putrefactive changes."
The Surgeon-General said, in accounting for sickness in" the army, that the
strength of the many men was undermined by dissipation, the temptations of

59§ AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA.
great cities, and though there was supposed to be inspection, so many men
were found in the camps unfit for service, from causes existing prior to enlist
ment, that special arrangements had to be made for their discharge.
Soon after the newly raised levies were aggregated in large camps sickness
began to increase progressively from causes that were so general in their oper
ation that scarcely a regiment escaped. These may largely be referred to
ignorance on the part of officers of the principles of camp sanitation, and
of their duties and responsibilities as regards the welfare of the enlisted men
in their commands. Medical officers, as a rule, were also without experience
in the sanitation of camps and the prevention of disease among troops. The
few who knew what should be done were insufficient to control the sanitary
situation. Officers and men in these camps were rife for war, and drill, parades,
practice marches, and military camp duties occupied the whole of their time
and energies. Considerations of domestic economy and sanitation in the com
panies and regiments were not given proper attention, and men who were
being taught to meet the enemy in battle succumbed to the hardships and
insanitary conditions of life in their camps of instruction.
The sites of certain of the camps have been instanced in the newspapers
as the cause of the sickness which was developed in them ; but a review of the
whole situation shows that it was not the site, but the manner of its occupa
tion which must be held responsible for the general spread of disease among
the troops. The density of the military population on the area of these con
tracted camps prevented the possibility of a good sanitary condition. Camps
of this character may be occupied for a week or two at a time without serious
results, as in the case of National Guardsmen out for ten days' field practice
during the summer, but their continued occupation will inevitably result in
the breaking down of the command by diarrhoea, dysentery, and typhoid fever.
Practically nothing was done to make the men comfortable or to remedy
the insanitary conditions until these were brought to the attention of the
Secretary of War, by inspectors sent out by special orders from the War
Department. Then the camps held for so long were abandoned, but not before
the manifestations of typhoid infection w*ere rife in them. New sites were
carefully selected, regimental camps were expanded, company tentage
increased, and board flooring provided. Then, for the first time, the troops
went into camps suitable for continued occupation.

AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 599
Malarial fevers added to the sick lists of camps in Florida and of Southern
regiments in the camps in Georgia and Virginia.
It was typhoid fever which broke down the strength of the commands
generally, the outbreak becoming distinctly manifest in July. Sporadic
cases appeared in most of the regiments in May and June, these cases having
been brought in many instances from the State camps. In fact, some regi
ments, as the Fifteenth Minnesota, suffered more from this disease at their
State rendezvous than any of the regiments in the large Federal camps.
In view of the necessity for the return of the troops of the Fifth Army
Corps from Santiago, Cuba, preparations were made for encamping them at
Montauk Point, Long Island. These included the establishment of temporary
tent hospitals, not only for the treatment of the large number of sick brought
by each command, from Cuba, but for the isolation and treatment of those
from transports lying under the suspicion of yellow fever infection.
The difficulties in the way of administering the affairs of the detention
hospital were very great, owing to the rapidity with which the transports
followed each other in their arrival. As many as four reached the Point on
some days from August 13 to 31, most of them bringing sick requiring
detention for medical observation. But the sick men were as well cared for
and as comfortable in their cots here as afterwards when transferred to the
general hospital at Montauk Point.
The Secretary of War remarks under this head: "The Red Cross and
other relief associations contributed in a very large degree to the care and
comfort of our sick soldiers, and should receive the grateful thanks of the
nation for the work they so nobly and unselfishly performed."
Thousands of valuable lives were saved by the wonderful intelligence and
energy displayed in shifting the fever infected troops from Santiago to East
Long Island, and it was one of the rare things in history that so much
courage,- address and liberality, as well as executive ability, have been displayed
in war with such beneficent results in saving, not destroying heroic men.

CHAPTER XXVII.
The Public Opinion That Advanced the Navy.
The Marvelous Improvement of the Artillery on Our Ships of War — The Splendid Equip
ment of the Several Vessels — Full Particulars of the Armament of All Our Ships —
Vigilance of the Ordnance Bureau to Continue Progress — The Thirteen-Inch Guns
to be Superseded in the New Navy by Twelve-Inch — Important Recommendations
— The Way the Navy Was Prepared to Win — Plans for Continued Progress — The
Spanish Side as Seen and Described by One of Her Officers — Hopes and Happenings
in Bombarded Santiago — Service of Cervera's Fleet — Mystery of the Merrimac —
Earthquake-Throwing Vesuvius — German Opinion — Work of the Marines.

Nations abroad have persistently undervalued our navy, and remember
ing the great armies with which our sectional and state war was fought,
have over-estimated our military resources immediately available. This
country has been slow in the construction and equipment of battleships, but
there has been thoughtful and highly-educated service in the Navy Depart
ment. We have been fortunate in secretaries of the navy, for many years,
and the organization of the several bureaus has been exceptionally strong,
alert , and progressive. The very costly experiments of England, France,
Germany, Italy and Russia in armored vessels and high-power guns, have
been intelligently followed by our naval experts, and the lessons attainable
regarded studiously and developed.
It happened, not by accident, that as we turned out first-class fighting
ships, in hull, armor and machinery, there were ready for them guns that
were formidable weapons of the finest finish, and in the hands of marksmen
capable of being more destructive at greater distances than any of which
there were records of the armament for sea-firing of other powers. The
traditions of our navy were so brilliant that its history appealed especially to
the pride of the people, and to the imagination of all our countrymen.
When the voting tests came it was apparent that the dwellers in the
Mississippi valley and the mountains, on the head-waters east and west of the
600

EFFECT OF 8-INCH SHOT THROUGH PORT HEAD OF "VrZCAYA.'

STARBOARD SIDE OF "VIZCAYA." AFTER THE BATTLE.

z<i
ao

y?-''I,^'i S

PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 603
Great River, had idealized the ocean and were fonder of the ships and sailors
they never saw than the inhabitants of lands watered by tidal rivers and beside
the sea, to whom salt water and the iron leviathans of the great deep were
familiar. The grandeurs and mysteries of the oceans are profounder and
more fascinating to mountaineers and those whose homes are in the green
valleys far from the surf, than to those who have been rocked from infancy on
the waves or looked out in all stages of life upon the majestical expanses of
mighty waters.
It is not the boy or girl who sees the Atlantic or Pacific every day, or so
often that the splendors have faded in fancy, who, looking out toward sunrise
or sunset from the shore, thinks of it that the first land over there eastward is
Spain, or there westward is Asia. The youth born a thousand miles inland is
fired by the first glimpse of the everlasting glory of the ocean, and thinks of
the galleys of the Carthaginians and Romans, the galleons of the Spaniards,
or the privateers and thundering liners of England. The votes of the moun
tain states, those of the central valley, will join those from the borders of the
Gulf of Mexico and from the "unsalted seas" of the North and from the ocean
fronts, to put the nation behind the navy.
, Looking over the .reports of the Bureaus, to the Congress that adjourned
in war to meet in peace, we find much information that re-assures us that the
care taking of the navy that has been so superbly justified in the conflict with
Spain, is the manifestation of a system that is to be continued, a part of the
permanent policy of the people of the United States.
The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance reports, October 1, 1898, the total
guns ordered for the navy were 790. Of these four 10-inch and two 6-inch
guns were "lost on the Maine." Of the 790 guns ordered thirty-nine were at
the date of the report completed, and 131 forgings were ordered. Of the
13-inch guns there are assigned four each to the Indiana, Massachusetts,
Oregon, Kearsarge, Kentucky, Illinois, Alabama and Wisconsin. The num
ber of guns completed, with their calibers, were as follows: 13-inch, 35
caliber, 29; 12-inch, 35 caliber, 14; 10-inch, 30 caliber, 24; 10 inch, 35 cali
ber, 2; 8-inch, 30 caliber, 9; 8-inch, 35 caliber, 65; 8-inch, 40 caliber, 2;
6-inch, 30 caliber, 123; 6-inch, 35 caliber, 6; 6-inch, 40 caliber, 43; 5-inch, 30
caliber, 2; 5-inch, 40 caliber, 171; 4-inch, 40 caliber, 130; 4-inch, 50 caliber, o.
The total is 620 guns. A "caliber" is the calibers of the length of the gun.
The total guns for the new navy are 564. Of these 133 are 4-inch, 8 are

604 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.
4.7-inch, 127 are 5-inch, 160 are 6-inch, 74 are 8-inch, 18 are 10-inch, 4 are
12-inch, and 32 are 13-inch. The total number of guns, made, in progress,
or ordered, is 790, 237 being 4-inch, 199 are 5-inch, 197 are 6-inch, 83 are
8-inch, 26 are 10-inch, 14 are 12-inch, and 34 are 13-inch. The new navy get
544 guns — old vessels, 18; training ships, 19; available for auxiliary cruisers
or reserves, 209. The batteries of the New Orleans and Albany were pur
chased with those vessels, and are to be considered separately from our own
proportion. The full strength of our navy is shown with admirable intelli
gence in the table following:

BATTERIES PLACED ON VESSELS PURCHASED, CHARTERED
AND TURNED OVER TO THE NAVY BY
OTHER DEPARTMENTS.

d SIturtften
S

Type.

Main battery.

Secondary battery.

Name.

A a
so

A ua

y
.5 4-

<U
T3 a09"

uVa3Oft
0Oi

u
.2 CO

V
-a a30ft
--*

u(U
¦-a C3Oft

<U
a 3
00*
¦33

u
•a a0
0a.

u
•V a30a

4,
s .
a
-*

s
^ 1-
a"
co

.ss
.O 3

0

Tons. 289

Yacht 
Cruiser 

6
2
4
266
44
I
62
2
2
5
Yacht 
Cruiser 
2
2
3
6
Buffalo 
7,50O7,500 594
492 173136192506
786
11,550 545
494
494 185175
14 19
10
do.
Yacht 
do.do. 
10
2
4
Eagle 
2
6
2
Free Lance. . .
do.do. 
2
2
do 
do.
8
26
4
2
4 82
3
12 1
66
2
4
2
4
10
Gloucester. . . .
2
16
Yacht 
do.do.do. do 
do.
Cruiser 
1
1
24 2
3 1
2 1
2
22 1
4 I
6
Hist 
6
Kanawha ....
2
9 26
Mayflower ....
2,690 273
18
Yacht 
Cruiser 
4
4
6
Panther 
14 7
16
Prairie 
625
7,500 194
850
315
do.do. 
Yacht 
do. 
IO
2
I
I
3
2
4
do 
do. 
3 1
3
4
1
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.

605

Batteries Placed on Vessels Purchased, Chartered and Turned Over to the
Navy by Other Departments — Continued.

aa<ua ftto
S

Type.

Main battery.

Secondary battery.

Name.

.3 3

u
.2 in

A up

C
*U a3Oft

a30ft
0

.3 0
.2CO

1-'¦Va30 ft

0ft

1-<u
¦0 a 3
0 ft
to

V
¦a a3
00,
c4

¦0 33OP.

a .
— v
a"

£1aa*'

V •
.S3« 3

0

Tons.
16,000 16,000 546302
1,700 27I
800 750
H,550 7,500 879
7,500 I87
296

Cruiser 

4 6
I
8
6
2 6
4 4 6
6 1
"6 2 3
4 1
2
.,
12
St. Paul 
do. 
18
Sylph 
Viking 
Yacht
5
do.do.
6 I
2I
4 2 I
8
I
2
213
6
13
Yacht 
do.do.
8
10
4 8
4
2
6
Yale
8
6
16
do.
222 11
18
Yacht
9
10
iS
Tug 
do
2
5
do.
2
2
2
516
2 1
2
6
do. 
do. 
do.
1
1
Chocktaw ....
Iroquois 
151I98
702
11
11
2
111
2 27
do. 
do
2
1
2
I
1
Piscataqua ....
Powhatan ....
156571
63I
401 677 194
2
1
2
4
4
22 1 1
IIII
3
do. 
do
3
1
2 1
2
3
Tacoma 
Tecumseh ....
Vigilant 
155196
214
441 300
2
1
I
11
2
2
1
15
1
Wompatuck ...
462
I
5
2 1
3
4 2
2
1
4 3
Alexander. . . .
6,7827,492
4
2
5
2
5,834
2
2
4
2
3
City of Pekin .
East Boston . .
Hannibal 
2
2
4,l8l
32 1
3
2
4
2
6
do
1
6
2
2
606 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.

Batteries Placed on Vessels Purchased, Chartered and Turned Over to the
Navy by Other Departments — Continued.

a aurt
*ftS

Type.

Main

battery.

Secondary battery
Name.
.3 03
a
A 0 a
4,
uV a3
0a
6<o
UOJ
•a 330ft
6
A 03
CO
uV
¦a a3011
4-
V
•a c 30a.
en
u
OJ
¦0 33
Oft
03
V
•a a3
0&
cc
V
•a B3O
ft
a .
'a""
a
'a" CO
V -
.S B
j= 3
a M
S
3 0
Hector 
Tons.
do. 
do. do. 
do. do. 
do.do.
Collier 
Collier 
do 
do 
do. 
4 2 2
2 2
4 22
2
4,8573,375 6,<>34
4 2
Leonidas 
2
Marcellus 
Merrimac ....
7,500
4,9254,640 2,9753,712 5,420
5,294
4,7292,549
Nero 
4 3
Niagara 
Pompey 
Resolute 
3 22222
Saturn 
Scindia 
2 2
4 2
4
Southery 
Sterling 
Supply 
Supplv ship 
Vulcan 
3,543 174
250 174
980
1,280 397525
370
1,600 620 700
2,185
do. 
I
32 1
22
26
I
2 2
2 I
22 2
Calumet 
I
Hamilton ....
I
' I
33 7
Hudson 
do. do. 
Manning ....
McCulloch....
I
36
2
2
do.do 
Morrill 
22
2
6
do. 
6
Woodbury. . . .
do. 
Light-house tender
do. 
do. 
I
7
Armeria 
Mangrove ....
2
4
II2
5
7 7
• 6
do 
Fish commission
do.
67
I
2
Fish Hawk . . .
6
Total 107 ships
24
1
2
160
ft"
10
20
70
576
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.

607

-ASSIGNMENT OF SECONDARY BATTERIES— THE SMALLER
GUNS FOUND EXCEEDINGLY EFFECTIVE IN THE
ACTUAL SERVICE WE HAVE RECENTLY
EXPERIENCED.

Chicago 
Boston 
Atlanta 
Dolphin -. 
Newark 
Charleston ....
Yorktown 
Petrel 
Baltimore 
Olympia 
Texas 
Vesuvius 
Cushing 
Philadelphia . .
San Francisco.
Concord 
Bennington . . .
Monterey 
Cincinnati 
Raleigh 
Montgomery . .
Detroit 
Marblehead . . .
Bancroft 
New York ....
Puritan 
Miantonomoh . ,
Amphitrite. . . .
Monadnock . . .
Terror 
Machias 
Castine 
Katahdin 
Indiana 
Massachusetts. Oregon 
Columbia 
Ericsson 
Minneapolis . . .
Iowa 
Brooklyn 
Nashville 
Wilmington Helena 
"Foote 
Rodgers 
Winslow 
Annapolis 
Vicksburg 
Newport . .

14-pound-

6-pound-

4
14

666
2 8
6
22 2
24
44
20 2020 12
1220 12 444

3-pound-

1-pound-

37-mil-
limeter

47-mil limeter

Ma
chine guns.

Field
guns.

Total

608 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.
Assignment of Secondary Batteries — Continued.

Princeton 
Wheeling 
Marietta 
Kearsarge 
Kentucky 
Porter 
Du Pont  -. 
Rowan 
Monongahela 
Alert 
Essex 
Alliance 
Lancaster 
Vermont 
Hartford 
Adams 
Michigan 
Ranger 
Pensacola 
Pinta 
Illinois 
Alabama 
Wisconsin 
Marion 
Dahlgren 
Craven 
New Orleans 
Topeka 
Albany 
Farragut 
Davis 
Fox 
Morris 
Talbot 
Gwin 
Mackenzie 
McKee 
Fern 
Torpedo boat No. 19 
Torpedo boat No. 20 
Torpedo boat No. 21 —
Total 

14-pound-

6-pound-

4
4 4
20
20

2 2
4
46 1
44 6
4 1
161616 6

10 4

3-pound-

472

I 62

1-pound-

37-mil-
limeter

233

47-millimeter

Ma
chine guns.

39

I
22I
2
2 I
2 II
2
444 2

Field
guns.

2 140

73

Total.

3232 44
4 8
7
9 8
13 5
7
8
10 6 55
262626 11 4
4
24 7
24 4 3
3 31 1
1
1
3
444

1,023

The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Charles O'Neil, reports:
"Since the date of last report, 112 guns of various calibers from 4 to 13
inch have been completed at the naval gun factory, viz. : Sixteen 4-inch, fifty-
four 5-inch, twenty-nine 6-inch, one 12-inch, and twelve 13-inch, and thirty-
three 6-inch and two 8-inch guns of ordinary type have been converted into
quick-firing guns.
"Thirty-seven 4-inch guns and mounts under contract with private firms

PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 609
nave also been partly completed. Forgings have been ordered for five
8-inch, twenty 5-inch, twenty-six 4-inch, and one 3-inch (14-pounder) guns.
"While no material change has been made during the year in the general
system of construction of guns under manufacture, new designs have been
prepared for future guns of all calibers, calculated to insure a much greater
muzzle energy than is now obtained from guns of the same caliber at present
in service. The first of these new guns will be installed on board the battle
ships Maine, Ohio, and Missouri, and on board of the four harbor-defense
monitors authorized at the last session of Congress.
"The guns and mounts and their appurtenances in service have been
severely tested during the recent war, and it is gratifying to be able to report
that their performance has been in general thoroughly satisfactory. Some
minor defects in the details of some of the mounts for guns of small caliber
developed, and were quickly, or are being, corrected.
"Reports have been received from the various vessels as to the perform
ance of their ordnance, and the general tenor of them has been that guns,
mounts, turrets, and ammunition worked well. That such should be the case
in so complex a structure as is a battleship and its equipment is certainly
gratifying. Improvements are constantly being made, and each new vessel is
superior to her predecessor in many details of her armament and ordnance
outfit." It is proposed in future to expand the electric plant in our ships. This
is owing to the "facility of running cables as compared with steam, pneumatic
or hydraulic pipes, the absence of heat, perfection of control and ease of
manipulation," of which electricity is susceptible. The electric system is
"immeasurably preferable to any other which depends upon long leads of
pipes under high pressure with numerous packed pistons, valves and
joints." One great advantage of the use of electricity is because it is in a barely
perceptible degree heating. There must, of course, be an auxiliary sys
tem to serve when wires are broken. "Guns in turrets," the Chief of
Ordnance says, "operated by electric power can be more accurately laid upon
and made to follow a moving target than when operated by steam, hydraulic,
or pneumatic power. There are no water pipes to freeze, no steam pipes to
burst, and no delay in obtaining a full working pressure, and no troublesome
or noisy exhaust pipes to deal with. ' A burnt-out fuse can be quickly

610 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.
replaced or a broken wire repaired, and as the wires can be led below the
armored deck, there is little liability of the latter becoming necessary.
"Guns of over four inches in caliber are fitted with attachments for using
either electric or percussion primers, but the Bureau will use only percussion
ammunition in guns of and below five inches in caliber." The electric firing
is preferable, but the production more elaborate and the faults more difficult
to locate. The fuses of shells are to be made more sensitive, as it can be done
safely. The Chief of Ordnance reports :
"All new guns of and above four inches in caliber are fitted' with tele
scopic sights, and in addition an auxiliary horizontal bar sight is supplied to
ship in place of the telescope in case of accident to the latter.
"As the weakest part of a turret is its sighting hood, in which has hitherto
been located the only means of sighting the turret guns, the Bureau has
decided to attach to all turret guns a bar sight to be used through a slit in the
armor, in addition to the telescope in the sighting hood. A 6-inch projectile
at moderate range would probably destroy any sighting hood if fairly struck,
and, while the turret and guns might still be intact, the means of sighting
would be gone.
"The Bureau has in process of manufacture at the Naval Gun Factory ioo
heavy i -pounder automatic guns, nearly half of which are practically com
pleted. These guns fire at the rate of 250 shots per minute, but are nearly as
heavy and as large as a 6-pounder, and have the disadvantage of using their
ammunition from belts, which is always a source of more or less trouble."
The 1 -pounder guns are regarded as useful for boats but not for ships.
The 6-pounder semi-automatic gun is favorably considered. One was
recently fired one thousand rounds without hitch or failure. This class of
weapon is especially meant for torpedoes and torpedo boat destroyers. We
quote again the report:
"A new high-powered 3-inch gun (14-pounder) has been designed, calcu
lated to have a muzzle velocity of 3,000 foot-seconds, and the forgings for the
type gun have been ordered. A new mount is also being made for this gun.
"Several years ago when the Bureau began the manufacture of rapid-
firing guns, it had two 6-inch guns made with the ordinary obturator and
quick-working breech mechanism operated by a lever, which worked admir
ably, but as brown powder alone was then in vogue, it was considered neces
sary to use a brass case to contain the charge to prevent fouling of the powder

PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 6n
chamber, and in order that sponging the gun might be dispensed with ; hence
the general adoption of the brass cartridge case for all rapid-firing guns. The
advent of smokeless powder has changed the conditions, and fouling of the
bore and sponging are no longer factors in the case, and the Bureau has
recently designed, built, and tested a 6-inch rapid-firing gun that does not
require a brass cartridge case ; and this will be a feature of all 6-inch rapid-
firing guns hereafter. In smaller calibers, where the ammunition is complete
and handled as a whole — that is, where the projectile is inserted in the case —
the brass cases will be retained to facilitate rapidity of loading. The new
type of 6-inch gun is 45 calibers in length and weighs 8 tons, and is designed
for a muzzle velocity of 3,000 foot-seconds."
It is evident throughout this remarkable report that the Ordnance Bureau
was never more active than now in progressive work, and has made a study
with a view to improvements of every pertinent incident in the recent war.
Decisive as was the efficiency attained, there is a fine enthusiasm to cultivate
advantages and to reach conclusions from experiments. There is made a
constant srudy of experimental battle order indicators and range finders. The
nice questions as to the thickness of armor and how it shall be located are
under consideration. The merits of turrets are also discussed. "The lessons
of the day," the report says, "indicate that the greatest execution (except
against the heaviest armor) may be expected from the quick firing guns of
small caliber." The larger the gun the greater the sacrifice of space and
weight. Heavy guns in turrets are a recognized necessity, but the turret is
horribly hot and the field of view from the sighting hood limited, and the
1 3 -inch gun is not popular as it was; and these paragraphs show that an
important change has been substantially decided upon after "much thought"
has been bestowed.
"Heretofore the 13-inch rifle of 60^ tons weight, 35 calibers in length,
having a muzzle velocity of 2,400 foot-seconds, with smokeless powder, and a
capacity to penetrate with a capped projectile 19 inches of face-hardened armor
at a distance of 2,500 yards, has been regarded as the best type for the heavy
turret guns of our first-class battleships, and all heretofore built (excepting
the Iowa, which has 12-inch guns), have been equipped with guns of this class.
"The development of the 12-inch gun has been so great and its power so
much increased that the Bureau is of the opinion that hereafter it will be the
maximum caliber that it will be advisable to install on future battleships,

612 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.
and that these should be supplemented by an auxiliary battery of 6-inch
quick-firing guns in casemates, with a secondary battery of 6-pounders and
1 2 -pounders. "The reduction in weight of the 12-inch gun alone is not great, being but
7^ tons less than is that of the present 13-inch gun; but the reduction in the
size of and consequently in the weight of the turrets, barbettes and ammuni
tion is very great. ' '
There has been a notable exemption from mishaps during the hurry and
inexperience of the war, in the handling of fixed ammunition, this notwith
standing "the recent grea* increase of our naval force, by the introduction of
so many new and untrained officers and men, seriously aggravated the danger
of mistakes and accidents, and the urgent pressure."
Among the most urgent recommendations by the Bureau is that a uni
form caliber and standard small-arm cartridge should be adopted for the
army, navy, Marine corps, and militia. The gratifying statement is made
that the "resources of the country to supply war material were scarcely
touched, and unquestionably there is no limit to the amount that can be pro
cured of all kinds, in case of need, provided time is not too important a
factor. " And the way to provide that time is not too important a factor is to
improve the times of peace to prepare for those of war.
One of the great features has been the old style "columbiads, " a genera
tion ago our most powerful shooting iron, and the pyramids of cannon balls.
In the report under review this appears:
"While a number of smoothbore guns were prepared for service, none
were put in use during the late war except such XV -inch guns as were on
board the coast-defense monitors. The Bureau is convinced that it is useless
to longer retain the old cast-iron smoothbore guns that are on hand in large
numbers at all the navy yards with their mounts and ammunition, and will
take steps to have them surveyed with a view to disposing of them, as no
contingency is likely to arise which could render them of any use whatever,
and it is useless to regard them as a part of the country's naval assets."
Here is the official presentation of the fact that the old smoothbores and
their big pot-metal bullets are as obsolete as the monstrous thunderers of the
Hellespont and those used in the siege of Constantinople that first illustrated
the power of gunpowder; and the huge marble balls that were held to be the
most irresistible missiles ever hurled at a ship or wall. The better way to get

PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 613
rid of the old smoothbores and spheres made for cannonades that will never
come, is to give them away to every town, village and schoolhouse where they
would be held to be decorative and markers of the events that testify the
progress of the times.
In the annual report of the superintendent of the naval gun factory at
the United States navy yard at Washington is this honorable mention of the
workingmen :
"The extraordinarily large amount of inspection and other work done in
the short time of six months could not have been accomplished except for the
prompt and ready compliance of the various mechanics to the instructions
received and attention to their work, and taking into account the relative
number of hours worked, fully 20 per cent more has been accomplished than
ordinarily the case, and the men did more work in the same time under the
stimulus of a patriotic object to be gained."
In giving an account of the work turned out in the gun factory at the
navy yard, this paragraph, related to the one above, occurs :
"Of the above guns, twenty 6-inch, thirty-three 5-inch, and sixteen 4-inch
40 caliber guns have been built since the declaration of war against Spain,
and sixteen ordinary 6-inch guns have been converted into rapid fire. ' This
represents about one year's work on ordinary working hours."
Under the head of "Sights" there is this very interesting statement of
work: "Since March 1, twenty-eight 6-inch pedestal mounts, sixty- seven 5 -inch
pedestal mounts, and twenty 4-inch recoil slides have had telescope sights
adjusted; eight 6-inch recoil mounts, two 5-inch pedestal mounts, three 4-inch
pedestal mounts, two 4-inch recoil mounts, and fifteen of . the American
Ordnance Company's mounts have had their telescope sights readjusted on
the mounts; two Mark I 4-inch guns, two Mark I 5-inch guns, six Mark III
6-inch guns have had their bar sights overhauled and readjusted on the guns;
six telescope sights were adjusted to the Princeton's 4-inch pedestal mounts,
when her mounts were overhauled, and top carriages replaced and all the
auxiliary bar sights above mentioned have been made.
"This large amount of work in the sighting line has never before been
accomplished in any one year, and it has been done in five months by often
working on Sundays, including the twenty-four hour work of week days."
In addition to the showing of the high spirit and effective zeal of the

614 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.
mechanics, this declares that our workmanship, now so celebrated, is to have
all possible facilities for improvement.
Of the class -of seamen gunners this is said :
"The men have generally exhibited zeal and intelligence, and fully
appreciate the benefits to be derived from making a good record in study and
work, much of which has been due to the examples set by the instructors,
who have given a great deal of their time out of work hours in explaining and
helping in difficult matters. Much of the ambition of the present class seems
to be due to the fact that three of the instructors are seamen gunners with
warrant rank. ' '
Of the smokeless powder manufactory it is remarked :
"A small-arm powder promising satisfactory results when cut and
graphited after twenty hours' drying in the sheet between blotting paper has
been made and tested. This powder has a dried grain of o.on to 0.012 inch
thickness. Experiments are now in progress for the manufacture of this
powder on a larger and more economical scale.
"Experimental work on i-pounder, 6-pounder, and 3-inch powders have
included nitration, kind and proportion of metallic nitrates, composition of
solvent, proportion of solvent to dry ingredients, dimensions of strips, and
methods of manufacture.
"Marked improvements have been made recently in the methods of manu
facture of these thin ribbon powders. Pyrocellulose as a base and ether alco
hol as a solvent has been used only in experiments. But little data was
available as a guide to the regular manufacture of smokeless powder for the
various calibers.
"In addition to various experimental work, smokeless powder has been
manufactured, October 1, 1898, as follows:
6-pounder  Rounds, 10,351
3-inch  " 13,008
i-pounder  . " 2,623
"With the beginning of the hostilities a demand was made for special
countermines for use in the operations of the fleet.
"Suitable mine cases, primer cases, etc., were designed, and orders for
the construction of the heavy mine cases were placed with two separate
establishments.

PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 615
"Mine cases were sent to the station as fast as they were made. They
were quickly loaded, and all other parts and appurtenances of the outfit were
assembled rapidly.
"Loading was begun within five days, and within ten days from the
receipt of the order forty mines were loaded with guncotton and ready for
shipment. ' ' The countermining outfit sent to the North Atlantic fleet included forty
mines (each containing about 530 pounds of gun cotton), with 18,000 feet of
insulated electric cable, and all necessary ropes, batteries, buoys, primers,
testers, exploders, and instructions for handling them in five separate parts;
They were loaded with 21,160 pounds of gun cotton. The total boxed weight
of this outfit was 37,186 pounds."
Commander A. B. Condin, Inspector of Ordnance, at the proving ground,
Indian Head, Maryland, says:
'The supply of smokeless powder has been small in comparison with the
needs of the service, though considerable quantities of 5 and 6 inch powder
have been supplied. There seems to be no difficulty in supplying an entirely
satisfactory powder. Trials are necessary to determine the size of grain
suitable for each caliber, in order to reach a combination of burning all the
powder in the charge, high velocity, and moderate pressures.
"Large numbers of armor-piercing projectiles of all calibers have been
tested during the year; very few rejections have been necessary. A distinct
improvement in the quality of these projectiles is a gratifying evidence that
the makers are making every endeavor to carry out the clause of their con
tract which binds them to supply the best article possible and to incur any
expense necessary for this purpose. There is on the ground here a hand
some array of projectiles of all main battery calibers which have stood very
severe tests and are absolutely unaltered in dimensions."
The Secretary of the Navy gives in his annual report the names of the
auxiliary vessels purchased, their names before and after purchase, the date
of purchase, the purchase price, and the previous owners. This would seem
to the senatorial current historian great news, if pulled out of the pigeon
holes by a committee of investigation, but it is quite commonplace now.
The Hornet was purchased from Henry M. Flagler for $117,500; the
Mampatuck from the Standard Oil Company for $65,000; the Mayflower from
the Ogden Goelet estate for $430,000; the Nictheroy, El Cid, renamed

616 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.
Buffalo, from the Brazilian government for $575,000; the Amazonas, renamed
New Orleans, from the Brazilian government for $1,429,215; the Almirante
Abru, renamed the Albany, from the Brazilian government for $1,205,000;
the Merrimac from the Hogan Line for $342,000. The Gloucester, purchased
from Pierpont Morgan, price $225,000, was in the thick of the fight at San
tiago, and a very effective vessel. H. M. Hannah sold the Comanche, which
came out the Frolic, for $115,000.
The number of enlisted men in the navy was raised during the war from
12,500 to 24,123. The maximum fighting force of the navy, classified, was as
follows: Battleships (first class), 4; battleships (second class), 1; armored
cruisers, 2 ; coast defense monitors, 6 ; armored ram, 1 ; protected cruisers,
12; unprotected cruisers, 3; gunboats, 18; dynamite cruiser, 1; torpedo
boats, n; vessels of old navy (including monitors), 14. Auxiliary navy:
auxiliary cruisers, 11; converted yachts, 28; revenue cutters, 15; lighthouse
tenders, 4; converted tugs, 27; converted colliers, 19; miscellaneous, 19.
The Secretary's report says that in contemplating the work during the
past year "the country as well as the service has cause for congratulation in
the results which have followed, and which have been so generally approved,
and in the further fact that no personal feeling has arisen to mar the glorious
victories and magnificent work of the service."
The casualties of the Navy are shown in the following table:

9
11 3

10

Number of casualties. Killed. Wounded.
Action of Manila Bay  9 o
Action of Cienfuegos  12 1
Action off Cardenas .... 8 5
Action off San Juan, Porto Rico . . 8 1 7
Engagement at Guantanamo, Cuba .22 6 16
Engagement off Santiago (June 22) . 10 1 9
Engagement off Santiago (July 3)
Eagle (July 12) 
Bancroft (August 2) 
Amphitrite (August 6) 
Yankee (August n) 
Total  84 17 67
Efforts to improve the signal system are earnestly pressed by the Navy
Department, guided by the experiences of the war, and yet this example of

PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 617
,i*hat was done between the fleet and army at Santiago indicates that this
important work is pretty well done.
Signal messages received and sent :
July 11, 7:50 a. m. Shore to ship: "General Shafter's compliments to
Captain Chadwick, and he wishes fire commenced early this morning. Two
maps have been sent to Admiral Sampson which give the distance to the
cathedral. . . ."
8:10 a. m. From ship to shore: "We are about to commence firing; will
fire very slowly, and wish every shot reported. ' '
8:40 a. m. From flag to shore: "Where did that shot fall?"
8:45 a- m- From shore to flag: "We are waiting report from front."
9 a. m. From flag to shore: "Ask front if fall of shot was observed."
9:15 a. m. From flag to shore: "Next shot will be fired at 9:25; keep
sharp look-out. ' '
9:30 a. m. From shore to ship: "Your shot fell 200 yards east of Del
Loute Hospital. Shot should be directed half mile farther west."
9:45 a. m. From ship to shore: "Give us the fall as quickly as possible."
9:50 a. m. From shore to ship: "Second shot was well placed. A
vigorous bombardment until 12 noon requested."
10:20 a. m. From ship to Vesuvius: "Fire shot every five minutes. Our
shot are falling right, using range 8,500 yards, NNW., from our position."
11:25 a. m. From ship to Vesuvius: "Please fire three shots every five
minutes. ' '
11:25 a. m. From ship to shore: "How is our firing?"
11:32 a. m. Shore to ship: "Striking city, with no apparent result. I
think firing with big guns should begin. — Shafter."
11 :4o a. m. Ship to shore r*"" Shall we cease firing at 12 o'clock?"
11 :45 a. m. Vesuvius to flag: "Do you know how shells are falling?"
U:5oa. m. From flag to Vesuvius: "Striking in city."
12 m. Shore to ship: "Please continue firing with heavy guns until one
o'clock; then cease firing until further orders."
12 :35 p. m. "General Castillo reports that Santa Anna church has been
turned into a powder magazine. — Shatter. "
12:45 p. m. Shore to ship: "The church is west of Reina Mercedes
Barracks. Discontinue at once; am going to put up a flag of truce.—
Shafter."

618 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.
4:45 p. m. Vesuvius to flag: "General Shafter states fire from ships
very accurate, shell falling in city. Lines have been advanced. Flag of truce
went forward to demand unconditional surrender. Will communicate with
""you fully directly to Aguadores as to time of firing and result of truce."
The congratulatory paragraphs in the annual report of the Chief of the
Bureau of Construction and Repair are full of the dignities of moderation in
the statement of a great and signal success that is conspicuous before the
world :
"The behavior of all classes of our naval vessels throughout the various
conditions of war under which.they served during the past months is a source
of gratification to the Bureau, in which the designs of the greater part of
them have been' developed. The many complicated and inter-dependent
considerations involved in the several classes, together with the large amount
of petty detail, could not but afford opportunity for criticism from various
standpoints, as well as for actual errors of judgment in applying too little or
too great weight to any of the many considerations referred to.
"Moreover, the lack of reliable data regarding the behavior of the modern
ship of war in action lent a very considerable amount of uncertainty to the
expectations regarding the conduct of our own vessels in an engagement with
the enemy. Although the results of the encounters in which our fleets have
engaged demonstrated their superiority so overwhelmingly as to throw doubt
upon the value of any deductions which might be made therefrom, the
behavior of all classes of vessels, both in action and in general service 'on the
blockade, appears to have been such as to thoroughly demonstrate their
integrity and their suitability for the service for which they were designed."
The work of Lieutenant Jose" Muller, of the Spanish navy, contains much
that is of the deepest interest of the conditions within Santiago, and the
means and details of her defense. The best artillery the Spanish had was
taken from the cruiser, the "Reina Mercedes," and Lieutenant Muller says
there was substantially no other artillery, and "we who witnessed and sus
tained the blockade of Santiago, feel satisfaction and pride in being able to say
that we kept the American fleet, notwithstanding its power and the number of
its guns, for seventy days, namely, from May 18 to July 17, in front of the
mouth of the harbor, on the sea, and at a respectable distance from our bat
teries, which they were unable to silence, and not daring to force the entrance.
"It is only just to say, and I take pleasure in doing so, that this result is

SWORD ORDERED BY CONGRESS TO BE GIVEN ADMIRAL DEWEY AS A TOKEN OP THE NATION'S GRATITUDE.

BUST OF COLUMBUS, FOUND ON "CRISTOBAL COLON." NOW IN WAR
DEPARTMENT AT WASHINGTON.

PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 621
due, in the first place, to the cruiser Reina Mercedes, under the command of
Captain Rafael Micdn, and in the second place, to our fleet anchored in the
bay, and which the enemy would have had to fight after forcing the harbor,
provided they had succeeded in doing so, but they do not appear to have
thought of it."
Further information will show the gallant Spaniard that it was not for the
lack of thinking of it that it was not attempted. The Mercedes was detained
at Santiago by bad boilers, when on the way to Havana. The Lieutenant
remarks of Spanish belief in their fleets before the trial by battle :
"When the war between Spain and the United States became a fact, it is
hard to tell how much was said and written about the Spanish fleet, or rather,
fleets; everybody knows of the thousands of items which appeared in the
newspapers concerning the purchase of ships, to such an extent that, if all
could have been believed, our navy would have been vastly superior to that
of the United States, in number and quality. And this is so true that the
least optimistic, the most reasonable people, those whom we considered best
informed as belonging to the profession, and who knew to a certain extent
what we could expect, counted on not less than eight battleships leaving the
Peninsula." When Cervera ran into Santiago May 19, famishing for coal, and hoped to-get
it and get away, it was "one of those beautiful mornings that are so frequent
in tropical countries; not the slightest breeze rippled the surface of the water,
not the least cloud was to be seen in the deep blue sky, and still, notwith
standing all that the local papers have said, very few were the people who
came down to witness the arrival of the ships. With the exception of the
official element and a small number of Peninsulars, the arrival of our warships
inspired no interest, nor even curiosity."
The Peninsulars alone were enthusiasts. Coaling facilities were such
'that the fleet was detained until blockaded. The troops required 360,000
rations a month, enough with economy for half a month. This would seem
to mean that there were 24,000 troops, but this must be a miscalculat on. As
to the business men, this example is sufficient :
' ' The man who had the contract of furnishing water at the bay, relying
on the letter of his contract, tried to charge the ships of the fleet for the
water which they were getting at Las Cruces pier, this water being the
property of the American company of the Juragua mines, for which the

622 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.
Spanish government could therefore not contract, and was conveyed on board
by means of the water pipes, which are there for that purpose, the pump
being kept going night and day by the soldiers of Colonel Borry's column.
Nearly all the ships took over 500 pipes of water each, which, at 4 pesetas a
pipe, amounts to several thousand dollars. The contractor in question,
whose name I do not wish to remember, is from the Peninsula, a captain of
volunteers, and, as he says himself, "a better Spaniard than Pelayo.' "
Before the siege was over this writer says there was famine in Santiago,
and many persons starved to death. He saw a man at the entrance to the
Brook House who "died because he had nothing to eat," and "horses, dogs
and other animals were dying from hunger in the streets and public places,
and the worst thing was that their carcasses were not removed. I also saw
— this is significant on account of the fatal consequences that might follow — I
saw, I repeat, a dog throw himself upon a smaller one and kill and devour
him. The water from the aqueduct had been cut off, and the city was
exposed to the danger of the dogs going mad. ' '
The Lieutenant continues: "We who belonged to the captaincy of the
port finally dined, breakfasted and slept there — or rather, did not sleep there,
for there never was a night when it was not necessary to transmit to the
Admiral two or three urgent papers, orders, or other cablegrams, at all
hours, and the telephone did not stop a minute and did not give us any rest."
Of what service to Spain was the Spanish fleet in Santiago? This ques
tion Lieutenant Muller answers:
"Compelling the enemy to sustain with superior forces the blockade of
Santiago de Cuba, with all its difficulties and dangers. While our ships were
in port, safe from the ordinary dangers of the sea, using hardly any coal, not
exhausting their engines, and waiting for a favorable opportunity to
maneuver, when and as best they could, the hostile fleet was obliged to cruise
on the coast day and night, using a great deal of coal, constantly doing sea
service, which is always laborious, especially in time of war, exhausting their
engines, and exposed to the danger of having to abandon the blockade in case
of a storm from the south or east, still more if the season of cyclones should
come." And, "If it had been possible for us, besides the ships that were at
Santiago, to have two at Cienfuegos, for instance, and two more at Nuevitas,
which ports are well suited for placing lines of torpedoes, owing to their nar
row entrances, there is no doubt but that the Americans, who, outside of the

PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 623
ships they had in the Philippines, had sent their w*hole fleet to the island of
Cuba, would have had to blockade those three ports with forces superior to
ours and to keep watch at Key West if they did not want to expose themselves
to a serious disaster, or would have had to force one of the ports, thereby
exposing- themselves to a hecatomb ; and we only need think of the number of
their ships to understand that they could not successfully threaten so many
points ; though they only had to deal with Santiago and had almost all the
ships of the fleet in front of it, they would have found it necessary to desist
from taking the offensive. "
The Americans, the Spaniards thought, never before Santiago lacked
secret information, and the sinking of the Merrimac was a mystery to the
Spaniards. The Spanish writer visited Hobson to take his deposition, and
Hobson wanted to know why the British Consul was not present, as he had
charge of the American Consulate, and also, "by whose authority he was
being examined; and he stated that, since he had been taken prisoner by
Admiral Cervera himself in his own boat (as was true), it was his understand
ing that he could and should answer only Admiral Cervera, or some one
delegated by him. And although all this was said in the very best form and
with a thousand protestations of his respect and deference for me, it did not
prevent our positions from being reversed, and far from my asking the pris
oner questions, it was he, on the contrary, who asked them of me.
"I told him so, asking him through the interpreter to state categorically
whether he was disposed to answer. He replied he was ready to answer the
questions which he thought he ought to answer, but not those which he
deemed untimely. Therefore, and in order not to lose time, I at once asked
him one question which I knew beforehand he would refuse to answer,
namely, by whose order and for what purpose he entered the harbor; he
replied : ' By order of Admiral Sampson ; the second part I cannot answer. ' I
then deemed my mission at an end. ' '
Having finished with Hobson, the Spanish officer stood on the esplanade
in front of the Morro and admired the American fleet. It was a beautiful
evening, and seventeen American ships were in sight. June 6th the Ameri
can fleet opened fire, and "it was so intense and the shots followed each other
in such quick succession that it might have seemed like a fusillade if the
mighty thunder of guns can be compared with the crackling of small arms.
"By 9 o'clock it became somewhat slower, shortly after reaching again the

624 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.
same intensity, then decreasing once more at 10:15, and again becoming
terribly intense.
"At 2 p. m. there arrived at the royal pier a boat from the Reina Mer
cedes, towed by her steam launch, with Lieutenant Ozamiz, bringing three
seriously wounded sailors, who were taken to the military hospital. This
officer reported the death of Commander Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann,
second in command of the cruiser, and of five sailors; also, that Ensign
Molins, one boatswain, and several other sailors had been wounded."
* Again, the writer says, "the fire resembled one prolonged thunder," and
he "had no idea that any firing could be as terrific as that of those ten ships,"
and he "does not believe the bombardment of Sebastopol and Alexandria
could be as terrible as that suffered at Santiago." It was computed that the
Americans fired eight thousand projectiles. The belief of the writer was that
the insurgents had located everything, and he was sure when he saw the aim
of the Americans, who fired so close to the Maria Teresa and Vizcaya, that it
was a miracle they were not hit. The Mercedes, though protected by a hill,
was hit thirty-five times.
"Commander Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann was directing the extinguish
ing of the fire in the forecastle, when a large shell cut off his right leg at the
hip and also his right hand, mutilating him horribly. But he lived for half an
hour after that, and kept on looking after the fire, as I was told by Mr. Ozamiz,
who was close to him in those critical moments. I do not like to think of it ;
he had been a fellow-student of mine at college, and our old friendship had
always remained the same. As there was no safe place in the ship, his body
was placed on a cot and taken to the Socapa coast ; five soldiers who had been
killed the same day were also carried there, and all of them w*ere covered
with the flag which they had been defending and for which they had died.
"The large projectiles shot through the space across the bay, causing a
tremendous noise which only those who heard it can understand • some fell on
the opposite coast (to the westward), raising, as they exploded, clouds of dust
and smoke ; others could not be seen falling, which proves that they must have
dropped in the hills at a great distance. This explains that they did not only
reach the city, but went thousands of meters beyond.
"The inhabitants of Cay Smith had to take refuge in the northern part,
which is very abrupt, and many were in the water up to the waist; if they
had not gone there, most of them would have been killed, for nearly all the

PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 625
dwellings which were located in the southern part suffered from the effects of
the shells. The following day the Cay was abandoned. ' '
June 2 ist it was found out that forty-two ships had during the day before
sailed and proceeded eastward. They were the transports bearing Shafter's
army, on June 23.
"Opposite the Morro entrance, and at a distance of about six miles from
it, 8 battleships, 2 destroyers, the Vesuvius, and 8 merchant vessels. The
rest, as many as 63, continued the landing on the coast, protected by some of
the war ships.
"Every night, with great regularity (between n and 2), the Vesuvius
threw her three dynamite bombs on the batteries at the mouth of the harbor,
with the greatest humanity possible, for it will be remembered that such was
the pretext of this war. For that purpose she would come close to the coast,
accompanied by another ship, usually a battleship — for the mission of the
Vesuvius is only the offensive, she has no defensive qualities — and as soon as
she was within convenient distance she would discharge three tubes at regular
intervals. If the projectiles dropped close to a battery its ruin was
certain, for one must see the effects of one of these projectiles to under
stand them.
"This ship is the only one of her class; her projectiles and the apparatus
throwing them are not known, and she has made her d£but here. One of the
projectiles which fell on the northern slope of the Socapa tore up trees right
and left for a distance of about 20 meters. From a certain distance, as I could
see the day I went to the Mercedes, it looked as though a road had been
opened across the mountain.
"Another, which fell a short distance from the one just referred to, made
an excavation, not very deep, but very wide ; I was told that it would hold
twenty horses. ' '
The sound of the battle in which Cervera's fleet perished is thus related:
"A terrific cannonade commenced, such as I have never heard, nor will prob
ably ever hear again, a cannonade more intense than that of June 6, a thing
which I believed impossible, shaking the building, thundering through the air.
I could not think coherently. I kept looking at Mr. Bustamente like an
imbecile, and he looked at me and didn't say a word. I felt something that
commenced at my feet and went up to my head, and my hair must have stood
on end. Then suddenly, without taking leave, I went out, got on my horse

626 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.
and rode down the hill at breakneck speed, and I hardly understand how it
was that I did not break my neck. I arrived at the captaincy of the port,
where I found them all, from the commander of marine to the last clerk, with
emotion painted on every face, and all looking in the direction of the mouth
of the harbor. The noise caused by the gunshots, which the mountains and
valleys echoed, was truly infernal and comparable to nothing."
The pilot who took out the Spanish flagship tells of his personal experi
ence. His name is Miguel Lopez, and he says:
"I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Cervera, who was as
calm as though he had been at anchor in his own cabin, and was observing
the channel and the hostile ships, and only said these words:
" 'Pilot, when can we shift the helm?' He had reference to turning to
starboard, which could only be done after we had passed Diamante Bank.
After a few seconds he said :
" Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm.'
" 'I will advise you, Admiral,' I answered.
"A few moments later I said: 'Admiral, the helm may be shifted now.'
"In a moment the Admiral, without shouting, without becoming excited,
as calm as usual, said: 'To starboard,' and the next minute, 'Fire!' At the
same moment, simultaneously, the two guns of the turret and those of the
port battery fired on a ship which seemed to me to be the Indiana. I thought
the ship was sinking. I cannot tell you, Don Jose, all that passed. By this
time there were already many dead and wounded in the battery, and I believe
that in spite of the water that was in the ship she was already on fire then.
The Admiral said to me :
" 'Good-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay you, because
you have earned it well.' And he continued to give orders."
It was for eight hours believed in Santiago that Cervera's fleet had
escaped. There was at first four great clouds of smoke. The mountains, as
the ships passed westward, presented a view of the sea except from a few
points, and no ship was burned or disabled within the range of vision. The
Spanish officers confirmed the view taken by Admiral Sampson of the value
of the incessant use at night of the searchlights.
The effect of the cannonades by the fleet was more serious when we read
the Spanish story than in the American accounts. The reason Cervera ran
into Santiago harbor was lack of coal, and the reason he did not get out at first

PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 627
was because he could not fill the bunkers in time. There was scarcity of
baskets to handle coal, for one thing. The American fleet came in force to
Santiago because the Spanish fleet was there, and our army arrived because
the fleets were there. Hence the fame forever of Santiago.
Rear Admiral Pluddeman, of the German navy, has published critical
"comments" on the main features of the command in Spain, and we have a
translation from the November number of the Marine Rundschau. The
Admiral opens with the remark that there is nothing in the events of the war
which might lead to a radical revolution of present ideas, but while the war
has "enriched former experiences," no essentially new appliances have been
made use of. The torpedo and ram have not been used, but they have no
doubt been found less formidable in fact than in imagination. Torpedoes
have been tried and found wanting, and it appears that in the state of
efficiency of artillery the use of the ram has become, like cavalry charges
upon steady infantry with magazine long-range rifles, impracticable.
The supremacy of the battleship, with a few heavy guns and a greater
array of secondary batteries, is hardly disputed. The Oregon would have
great chances to destroy all the torpedo boats and torpedo boat destroyers
that could be launched against her. There is a general conviction that our
thirteen-inch guns are too big, that eight and ten inch guns to the same
amount of weight are better, and that the smaller rapid-fire guns are weapons
that have a way of doing a greater share of execution than the huge steel
tubes that shiver and shatter their own foundations.
It is said by the Admiral that many of our shells did not explode, and our
Navy Department is already making provision for more sensitive shells.
Our monitors are slightingly spoken of, and Admiral Sampson thought he
found them a nuisance, holding back his fleet, yet the Monterey and the
Monadnock crossed the Pacific Ocean, and Admiral Dewey was extremely
glad to add them to his squadron, for they gave him the ability to smash
batteries that had caused him uneasiness, and if Camara's fleet had appeared
in the waters of Asia, he proposed to wait for the monitors on the way before
undertaking the sinking^of a second Spanish squadron.
The Colonel Commandant of the United States Marine Corps states:
"During the war 57 vessels had marine guards, varying in strength from
80 down to 6 men, making a total of 2,055 enlisted men at sea. There were
623 in the battalion and 50 at Key West, making a total of 2,728."

628 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.
A battalion of marines saw very active service at Guantanamo. Land
ing on the ioth of June at Guantanamo Bay, they were on the nth attacked
by a superior force of Spaniards, and a constant fire was kept up for three
days. The bay was important, as it was the only one where the vessels could
take shelter in the hurricane season. The necessity for the marines to hold
their position is stated in the official report of the commander: "Owing to the
dense undergrowth, affording safe shelter to the Spanish sharpshooters, it
would have been impossible for the vessels, by shelling the shore, to keep the
enemy from harassing those on board the ships with their Mauser rifles to
such an extent as to make it dangerous for them to remain there. ' '
Admiral Pluddeman has written critically on the matters of interest in
our naval experience, and says of Guantanamo: "In the entrance of Guanta
namo Bay the Americans found quite a number of mines. These might have
caused considerable damage if they had operated, for the Americans entered
the bay without any precautionary measures, and the screws of the Marble-
head tore two of the mines loose from their anchorages so that they rose to
the surface of the water. Then the whole bay was systematically searched
for mines. This was done on June 21 by the boats of the Marblehead and
Newark. Four steam launches, under the fire of Spanish infantry hiding on
the shore, fished up thirteen mines on the first day with light chains they
were towing. The ships, of course, fired on the hostile position, which was
soon abandoned.
"During the next few days thirty-five more mines were found and taken
ashore. These proved to be charged with 120 pounds of guncotton each.
Many of them showed evidences of having been in contact with ships' bottoms
or screws, but the firing mechanism was not capable of operating. The
fuses showed such grave defects that it was quite evident that the work of
constructing them had not been done under the supervision of a superior.
"The mines raised in Santiago Harbor after the surrender of the place
proved on the whole to be in better condition. Still, the outer row contain
ing contact mines was of doubtful value. One mine was found, for instance,
in which half of the guncotton had been burned, leaving no doubt that it had
been in contact with some object — probably the Merrimac — and that the fuse
had acted, but that the guncotton charge had become spoiled.
"The second row of mines (electric) was in pretty good condition, and
might easily have destroyed one or more ships if an attempt had been made

PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY.

629

to force the entrance. These latter mines contained a charge of 200 pounds
of guncotton each. All the mines in Guantanamo as well as Santiago Bay
were thickly overgrown with barnacles and seaweeds. ' '
This covers a point of some delicacy, owing to the controversy over the
management of the fleet off Santiago in confining the assaults at the mouth of
the harbor to cannonading. A study of the whole matter of the reports from
both sides leads to the conclusion that Admiral Sampson was right in his
objection to Shafter's change of plans after arrival, the weak point of the
defense being at the mouth of the harbor, which could have been forced
easily if troops had been landed to drive the Spaniards from their lower
batteries, those of the old guns on the castle not being serious in modern war
fare. It appears, however, that the dangers of driving into the mouth of the
harbor were not as great as imagined. All experiences with Spanish tor
pedoes and mines discredit them, and plainly, if after Cervera's fleet had dis
appeared during the hours the harbor was open, the only grave peril was in
the navigation of the difficult channel. However, it was Secretary Long's
order that a battleship should not be "risked," but he evidently did not mean
a literal interpretation of the caution.
It is ungracious to find fault systematically, and to award praise in stinted
measure of either Sampson or Shafter, when the closing scenes were the
annihilation of the fleet of Spain and the surrender of her army and of the
ancient capital of Cuba; however, the distinguished Admiral and General
are responsible for the rather fierce exchange of letters that so grounded and
inflamed controversy that the grounds upon which it was established and the
temper with which it was conducted cannot be neglected. The abundance of
glory is insufficient to establish harmony.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

The Army of the United States.

Its Organization and Numbers Before and During the War — The Strength and Location
of the Several Army Corps— The Distribution of the Military Forces and their Num
bers—Casualties During the War, in Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines — Deaths
in the Camps — The Incidents of Hardship and the Yellow Scandals — Spanish Account,
of the Valor of their Troops and Story of the Conflict — Scarcity of Provisions— Cruel
Battles at El Caney and San Juan — Suffering in Santiago.
The regular army of the United States at the beginning of the war with
Spain was composed of 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men. Of general
officers and staff corps there were 532, with 2,026 enlisted men; cavalry, 437
officers, 6,047 enlisted men; artillery, 288 officers, 4,486 enlisted men;
infantry, 886 officers, enlisted men 12,828.
The army was increased in March and April, 1898. In the 'four months
following the declaration of war with Spain, the enlisted men in the regular
army numbered, in May, 41, 934; June, 49,SI3; July, 53,93*; August, 56,365.
These figures include 5,365 men of the hospital corps. The regular officers
were 2,191 in May, and 2,323 in August. The enlistments in the regular
army were, in May, 9,569; June, 9,311; July, 6,586; August, 3,400. There
were 387 regular officers appointed in the volunteer army. There were 15
major-generals, 45 brigadier-generals, 86 officers of volunteer regrments.
The enlisted men in the infantry of the volunteer army were, in May, 118,580;
June, 153, 355; July, 203,461; August, 188,947.
The searching care taken in filling the ranks of the regular army appears
in a strong light in the remarkable figures of this paragraph from the Ad
jutant-General's report:
Of the 29,521 accepted applicants, 24,490 were native born and 5,031 of
foreign birth; 27,140 were white, 2,345 colored, and 36 Indians (scouts). The
enlistments numbered 24,248, and the reenlistments, 5,273. Excluding
reenlistments, the percentage of native-born applicants for original enlistment
was 87, the balance being naturalized citizens. The reports show that the
630

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 631
recruiting officers making the 29,207 enlistments embraced in the first two
items of the foregoing list rejected 98,277 applicants — a little over 77 per cent
of the number seeking enlistment — as lacking in legal, mental, and moral or
physical qualifications; 5,209 of these were rejected as aliens, and 4,788 for
illiteracy. The aggregate strength of the regular and of the volunteer armies foi
each of the months of May, June, July and August was as follows :
May — Officers. Enlisted men. Grand total.
Regular army . . . 2,191 41, 934 44,125
Volunteer army . . . 6,224 118,580 124,804
Aggregate . .
June- Regular army . .
Volunteer army . .
Aggregate . .
July- Regular army
Volunteer army . .
Aggregate . .
August —
Regular army . .
Volunteer army . .
Aggregate . . . 11,108 263,609 274,717
The Adjutant-General's report states that May 31, a month and tei\ days
after the declaration of war, nearly 125,000 volunteers were mustered into
service, and "the suspension of hostilities, resulting from the short but bril
liant operations of the army against Santiago, Cuba, leading to its capture and
of that of the Spanish forces defending the city, the surrender of Spanish
troops in Porto Rico, no less than the successful operations of our troops in
the Philippines, led to the determination to muster out 100,000 men, nearly
one-half of the entire volunteer force, and the first order looking to that end
was issued on the 18th of August."
The Adjutant-General speaks of the delicate duty of selecting the organi
zations to be mustered out, it being impossible "to preserve the absolutely
correct arithmetical proportion, in the first instance, to the State quotas, and,
in the second to the actual number of troops from the several states, ' ' and he

8,415

160,514

168,929

2,198 7,169

49,5*3
153,355

51,7"
160,524

9,367

202,868

212,235

2,327
8,633

53,93i
203,461

56,258
212,094

10,960

257,392

268,352

2,323
8,785

56,365
207,244

58,688
216,029

632 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
adds: "Since the signing of the Protocol the officers and men' of the volunteer
regiments have remained at their posts of duty, in most cases at great per
sonal sacrifice. That they have done this cheerfully and without complaint
makes it all the^more desirable that a speedy increase of the regular army be
provided for in order that the volunteers may be released from further service
and be allowed to return to their peaceful vocations."
Relating to staff organization, the Adjutant-General remarks: "If, as
recommended, additional officers are given the line of the army, so as to give
plenty of trained officers for staff duty in time of war, the main objection will
have been met; and it is doubtful. if, under all the conditions peculiar to this
government, a general reorganization of the staff, or the adoption of new
systems, will be found to be desirable; certainly nothing radical should be
entered upon.
"Under the present system, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan conducted
great and successful campaigns; it has worked well in our Indian wars, and
it is confidently asserted that, when the work of the staff departments in this
war is more fully understood, it will receive the approval of military men and
of the people generally. That there can be improvements in many ways
there is no doubt; that this should be done as the result of experience is also
true." The regiments of the regular army, with few exceptions, got their orders
to proceed to southern points April 15th, and considering the situation of the
army, the extent of territory over which the posts were scattered in small
detachments, the movements of concentration were executed with remarkable
swiftness, order and ease. It was an excellent lesson of mobilization, and the
complete success of this initial step made practicable the stroke at Santiago
which proved fatal to Spanish pretension, preventing a lingering schooling of
volunteers in the several camps for a greater enterprise under the Major-
General Commanding, to resemble the important instruction imparted when for
many months of "masterly inactivity" under McClelland all was "quiet on
the Potomac." The infantry regiments' changes were made in the general
shifting in this order :
First United States Infantry, California, to New Orleans.
Second United States Infantry, Montana and North Dakota, to Chicka
mauga Park, Ga.
Third United States Infantry, Minnesota, to Mobile, Ala.

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 633
Fourth United States Infantry, Illinois, to Tampa, Fla.
Fifth United States Infantry, Georgia, to Tampa, Fla.
Sixth United States Infantry, Kentucky, to Tampa, Fla.
Seventh United States Infantry, Colorado, to Chickamauga Park, Ga.
Eighth United States Infantry, Wyoming, to Chickamauga Park, Ga.
Ninth United States Infantry, New York, to Tampa, Fla.
Tenth United States Infantry, Oklahoma, to Tampa, Fla.
Eleventh United States Infantry, Missouri and Arkansas, Mobile, Ala.
Twelfth United States Infantry, Nebraska, to Chickamauga Park, Ga.
Thirteenth United States Infantry, New York, to Tampa, Fla.
Sixteenth United States Infantry, Idaho and Washington, to Chicka
mauga Park, Ga.
Seventeenth United States Infantry, Ohio, to Tampa, Fla.
Eighteenth United States Infantry, Texas, to New Orleans. La.
Nineteenth United States Infantry, Michigan, to Mobile, Ala.
Twentieth United States Infantry, Kansas, to Mobile, Ala.
Twenty-first United States Infantry, New York, to Tampa, Fla.
Twenty-second United States Infantry, Nebraska, to Tampa, Fla.
Twenty-third United States Infantry, Texas, to New Orleans, La.
Twenty-fourth United States Infantry, Utah, to Chickamauga Park, Ga.
. Twenty-fifth United States Infantry, Montana, to Chickamauga Park, Ga.
Company E, Engineers, West Point, to Tampa, Fla.
Seven army corps were formed by order of the President, May 7th, com
bining both regulars and volunteers, and the Philippine expeditionary force
was June 21st the Eighth Corps. The First and Third corps were organized
at Camp Thomas, Ga., Major-General John R. Brooke commanding the First,
and Major-General James F. Wade the Third. The combined strength of
these corps, on the last day of the month of April, May, June, July and
** ' W Officers. Enlisted men.
April  383 6,328
May  2,191 42,036
June  2,004 56,544
July  1,563 42,260
August  436 12,725
In July the First Division of the First Corps, under General Wilson, was
detailed for duty in Porto Rico, and August 22 the Second and Third divisions
of that corps were sent to Lexington, Ky., and Knoxville, Tenn., respectively.
The Third Army Corps was transferred early in September to the camp
established at Anniston, Ala., and by the end of the month but a small
detachment remained at Camp Thomas, Ga.

634 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
The Second Corps, Major-General William M. Graham commandingr
was organized at Camp Alger, Virginia, and removed when that camp was
discontinued in July to Camp Meade, Middletown, Pa. The Strength of the
Corps was : Officers. Enlisted men.
May  9°3 i7,4°6
June  887 22,624
July  802 21,373
August  768 20,686
The headquarters of the Fourth Corps, Major-General John J. Coppinger
commanding, were at Mobile, and the strength present was:
Officers. Enlisted men.
May  343 7,456
June  763 20,053
July  54» 13,485
August  413 9,933
The Fifth Army Corps, Major-General William R. Shafter commanding,
was organized June 7th at Tampa, and embarked for Santiago June 14th.
The strength of this corps for the months indicated was as follows :
Officers. Enlisted men. •
May  769 i5,657
June  791 14,945
July  840 18,619
August  518 M,347
This corps, seventy days after embarking from Tampa, was returned to
the United States, owing to the prevalence of sickness. They had in the
meantime received the surrender of nearly double their number of Spaniards
at Santiago. The Sixth Corps was not organized. General Wilson, who was to have
commanded it, was assigned to the first division of the first corps.
The Seventh Corps was commanded by Major-General Fitzhugh Lee.
Its strength was : Officers. Enlisted men.
May  496 8,847
June  78i 18,375
July  9°9 23,193
August  1,025 27,817
The Eighth (Philippine Corps), Major-General Wesley Merritt command
ing, sailed from San Francisco for Manila in seven expeditions, the first,
under General Thomas Anderson, 115 officers and 2,386 enlisted men. They

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

635

sailed May 25th and arrived June 30th. The second expedition, General F.
V. Green, 158 officers and 3,428 men, sailed June 15th and arrived July 17th.
The third expedition, General Merritt, 197 officers and 4,650 enlisted men,
sailed June 27th and 29th, and arrived July 25th and 31st. The fourth, Gen
eral E. S. Otis, 42 officers and 1,640 enlisted men, sailed July 15th and arrived
August 2 ist. The fifth expedition, Colonel H. C. Kessler, 54 officers and
1,294 men, sailed July 19th and arrived August 24th.
The sixth expedition, General H. G. Otis, sailed July 23d and arrived
August 24th, 50 officers and 846 men. The seventh expedition, Lieutenant-
Colonel Lee Stover, 25 officers and 814 enlisted men, sailed July 29th and
arrived August 31st. The total of the seven expeditions was 641 officers and
15,058 enlisted men. Since that date, October 19, 27, 28 and 30, the troops
that sailed for Manila were 99 officers and 2,565 men. The grand total of
United States officers and enlisted men who have made the voyage from San
Francisco to Manila is 17,363.
The subjoined table exhibits the strength and distribution of the Army of
the United States through the Spanish war:
RESUME OF STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS.

Command.

Department of California 
Department of Colorado 
Department of Columbia 
Department of Dakota 
Department of the East 
Department of the Gulf 
Department of the Lakes 
Department of the Missouri 
First and Third Corps 
Second Corps 
Fourth Corps 
Fifth Corps 
Seventh Corps 
Eighth Corps (Dept. of Pacific)
Porto Rico 
Department of Santiago 
At State Camps, en route, at
recruiting stations, on fur
lough, etc 

May.

O

45 2124
530
230 18
23
2,191 903 342769
496 636

¦3 a

2,176 956
431 (,62
12,093 4,921 221 757
42,036 17,406 7,456
15,657 8,847
13,179

33,7i6

ifi
O

87
3938 16
586
232 3120
2,004 867763
791 781865

2,227

1,7161,250 997 722
15,576 5,792 59759i
56,544
22,62420,058 14,94518,375
22,124

20,957

July.

o

70
41
41 67
577
249 2820
1,563 802 54S
890
909917 377

1,7451,3291,256
2,056
17,240 7,228 646 598
42,26021,378 13,48518,619
23,193
22,536 9,oS4

74,739

August.

o

100 40
43 32
804
280 20 19
438 768
413 518
1,025 899641 299

4,771

•3 a

2,39° 1,5161,416 955
23,248 7,262 185522
12,725
20,688 9.933
14,347
27,81722,046 16,332 6,74 8

95,479

Grand total..

8,415

160,514

9,367

202,868

10,960

257,932

11,108

263,609

636 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
Casualties. — The following is a statement of the several actions in which
United States troops were engaged during the war with Spain, and of the
losses sustained by them from April 21 to August 13, 1898:
Operations in Cuba. — May 2 : Point Arbolitos, Companies E and G,
First Infantry, under Capt. J.H. Dorst, Fourth Cavalry. No casualties.
Siege and Surrender of Santiago, June 22 to July 17. (Maj.-Gen. Wil
liam R. Shatter, commanding Fifth Army Corps) :
June 24. — La Quasina: Cavalry division, Maj.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler,
commanding. Second Cavalry Brigade, Brig. -Gen. S. B. M. Young.
Present for duty, June 20, 74 officers and 1,067 enlisted men. Killed, one
officer and 15 enlisted men; wounded, 6 officers and 44 enlisted men.
Officers killed and wounded, 7. Killed: Capt. A. K. Capron, First
United States Volunteer Cavalry. Wounded: Majs. J. M. Bell, First
Cavalry, and A. O. Brodie, First United States Volunteer Cavalry; Capts. T.
T. Knox, First Cavalry, and J. H. McClintock, First United States Volunteer
Cavalry; First Lieuts. G. L. Byram, First Cavalry, and J. R. Thomas, Jr.,
First United States Volunteer Cavalry.
July 1-12. — Operations against Santiago, embracing the actions at San
Juan, El Caney, and Aguadores, July 1-3, and actions around Santiago,
July 10-12. Present for duty, June 30, 858 officers and 17,358 enlisted
men. Killed: 22 officers and 222 enlisted men; wounded, 93 officers and 1,288
enlisted men.
Officers killed and wounded, 122. Killed: Col. C. A. Wikoff, Twenty-
second Infantry; Lieut. -Col. J. M. Hamilton, Ninth Cavalry; Maj. A. G.
Forse, First Cavalry; Capts. C. W. Rowell, Second Infantry; A. M.
Wetherill, Sixth Infantry; John Drum, Tenth Infantry; T. W. Morrison,
Sixteenth Infantry, and William O'Neill, First United States Volunteer
Cavalry; First Lieuts. W. E. Shipp and W. H. Smith, Tenth Cavalry; J. G.
Ord, Sixth Infantry; G. H. Field, Second Massachusetts Infantry; Second
Lieuts. J. J. Bernard, Fourth Infantry; E. N. Benchley, Sixth Infantry; T.
A. Wansboro, Seventh Infantry; L. H. Lewis, Ninth Infantry; W. A.
Safer, Thirteenth Infantry; D. M. Michie, Seventeenth Infantry; J. A.
Guerney and J. N. Augustin, Twenty-fourth Infantry; H. L. McCorkle,
Twenty-fifth Infantry, and Acting Assistant Surgeon H. W. Danforth, who
was on duty with Ninth Cavalry.

DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS OF UNITED STATES ARMY AT SANTIAGO.

!&&.

GENERAL W. F. RANDOLPH.

BOB WRENN AND BILLY LARNED.

¦«EJsE- ' * * -»*'"-" v f ¦?' ' »« ' '*-*'• * .-\ ¦,?¦

TRAIN OF PACK MULES.

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 639
Wounded: Brig. -Gen. H. S. Hawkins. Lieut. -Cols. Henry Carroll,
Ninth Cavalry; H. C. Egbert, Sixth Infantry; W. S. Worth, Thirteenth
Infantry; J. T. Haskell, Seventeenth Infantry; E. H. Liscum, Twenty- fourth
Infantry; J. H. Patterson, Twenty-second Infantry. Majs. H. W. Wessells,
Third Cavalry; T. J. Wint, Tenth Cavalry; J. H. Smith, Second Infantry;
A. W. Corliss, Seventh Infantry; S. H. Lincoln and R. I. Eskridge, Tenth
Infantry; P. H. Ellis, Thirteenth Infantry, and W. C. Hayes, First Ohio
Cavalry. Capts. H. L. Mills, A. A. G. Volunteers (first lieutenant, First
Cavalry); G. K. Hunter and G. A. Dodd, Third Cavalry; J. B. Kerr -and A.
P. Blocksom, Sixth Cavalry; C. W. Taylor, Ninth Cavalry; John Bigelow,
Jr., Tenth Cavalry; C. D. Parkhurst, Second, Artillery; W. J. Turner,
Second Infantry; Z. W. Torrey and G. B. Walker, Sixth Infantry; J. B.
Jackson, Seventh Infantry; R. C. Van Vliet, Tenth Infantry; James
Fornance, J. B. Guthrie, and H. G. Cavanaugh, Thirteenth Infantry; William
Lassiter, W. C. McFarland, and T. C. Woodbury, Sixteenth Infantry; H. B.
Moon and J. B. Rodman, Twentieth Infantry; F. B. Jones, J. J. Crittenden,
and Theodore Mosher, Twenty-second Infantry; A. C. Ducat and J. J.
Brereton, Twenty-fourth Infantry; W. S. Warrener, Second Massachusetts
Infantry, and Capt. M. J. Henry, commissary of subsistence volunteers.
First Lieuts. Arthur Thayer, A. C. Merrillat, and O. B. Meyer, Third
Cavalry; W. S. Wood, Ninth Cavalry; R. L. Livermore, E. D. Anderson,
and M. H. Barnum, Tenth Cavalry; W. C. Neary, Fourth Infantry; J. S.
Grissard, Seventh Infantry; J. R. Seyburn, Eighth Infantry; Carl Koops,
Tenth Infantry; A. B. Scott, Thirteenth Infantry; S. W. Dunning, Sixteenth
Infantry; W. M. Dickinson, Seventeenth Infantry; G. J. Godfrey, Twenty-
second Infantry; H. G. Lyon and J. E. Brett, Twenty-fourth Infantry; R.
C. Day and J. . A. Carr, First United States Volunteer Cavalry. Second
Lieuts. W. C. Short, Sixth Cavalry; F. R. McCoy, T. A. Roberts, H. C.
Whitehead, and H. O. Williard, Tenth Cavalry; B. H. Wells and W. J. Lutz,
Second Infantry; J. H. Hughes, Fourth Infantry; L. H. Gross, C. N.
Purdy, John Robertson, R. S. Turman, and W. H. Simons, Sixth Infantry;
H. A. Lafferty, Seventh Infantry; -M. C. Saville, Tenth Infantry; W. E.
Dove and Clark Churchman, Twelfth Infantry; L. S. Sorley and R. E.
Spence, Sixteenth Infantry; B. F. Hardaway, Seventeenth Infantry; F. R.
Meade, Twenty-first Infantry; W. H. Wassell, Twenty-second Infantry;
Albert Laws, Twenty-fourth Infantry; J. S. Murdock and H. L. K~innison,

640 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
Twenty-fifth Infantry; D. J. Moynehan and C. D. Hapgood, Second Massa
chusetts Infantry; W. E. Trull, Seventy-first New York Infantry; D. J.
Leahy and H. K. Devereaux, First United States Volunteer Cavalry, and
Acting Second Lieut, (cadet M. A.) Ernest A. Haskell, First United States
Volunteer Cavalry.
Operations in Porto Rico, July 25 to August 13 (Maj.-Gen. Nelson A.
Miles, commanding) :
July 25. — Guanica road: 1 officer and 3 enlisted men wounded.
August 5. — Guayamo: 4 enlisted men wounded.
August 8. — Four miles north of Guayamo: 5 enlisted men wounded.
August 9. — Near Coamo: 6 enlisted men wounded.
August 10. — Hormigueros: 1 enlisted man killed; 1 officer and 15 enlisted
men wounded. Officer wounded: First Lieut. J. C. Byron, Eighth Cavalry,
A. D. C. to General Schwan.
August 12. — Pass near Arbonito: 2 enlisted men killed; 2 officers and 3
enlisted men wounded. Officers wounded: Capt. F. T. Lee, Third Wisconsin
Infantry, and Lieut. J. P. Hains, Third Artillery.
August 13. — At crossing of the Rio Prieto, near Las Marias: No
casualties. The total casualties in Porto Rico were 3 enlisted men killed and 4
officers and 36 enlisted men wounded.
Operations in Manila, Philippines, July 30 to August 13 (Maj.-Gen.
Wesley Merritt, commanding) :
July 30 - August 5. — -In the trenches before Manila: Thirteen enlisted
men killed; 7 officers and 57 enlisted men wounded.
Officers wounded : Capts. C. V. Hobbs, Third Artillery, Reinhold Richter,
First California Infantry, and J. A. Loar, Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry;
First Lieuts. E. F. Davis, First California Infantry, and R. D. Laird, Tenth
Pennsylvania Infantry; Second Lieuts. A. J. Buttermore and G. L. Gordon,
Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry.
August 13. — Assault on Manila: 4 enlisted men killed; 3 officers and 39
enlisted men wounded.
Officers wounded: Capts. Oscar Seabach, A. W. Bjornstad, and First
Lieut. C. G. Bunker, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry.
The^total casualties in Manila were: 17 enlisted men killed, 10 officers and
96 men wounded.

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

641

Grand total of casualties in killed and wounded during the war with

Spain :

-Killed —

-Wounded -

Where —
Cuba . .
Porto Rico
Manila . .

Enlisted
Officers. men.

23

237 3
17

Officers. 99 4
10

Enlisted men.
1,332 3696

Total

• • • 23 257 113 1,464
The number of deaths from all causes, between May 1 and September 30
inclusive, as reported to the Adjutant-General's office up to October 3, were:
Killed, 23 officers and 257 enlisted men; died of wounds, 4 officers and 61
enlisted men; died of disease, 80 officers and 2,485 enlisted men. Total, 107
officers and 2,803 enlisted men, being an aggregate of 2,910 out of a total
force of 274,717 officers and men, or a percentage of ixIIt-
Statement showing the embarkation of Spanish prisoners, officers, and
enlisted men, and the wives of officers and their children over 5 years of age,
priests, monks, and sisters of charity, from Cuba to Spain, as reported to the
Quartermaster-General's office by Mr. Solon F. Massey, agent, Quarter
master's Department:

Name of vessel.

Where
embarked.

o

<+^

V

Number of persons.

O

¦3 0

aSO

Alicante 
Isle de Luzon 
Covadonga 
Villaverde 
Isla de Panay 
P. de Satrustegui..
Montevideo 
Cheribon 
Colon 
Colon 
Leo XIII 
San Ignacio 
Leonora 
Ciudad de Cadiz. ..
San Augustin 
.San Francisco 

Santiago Santiago SantiagoSantiago Santiago
SantiagoSantiagoSantiago Santiago GuantanamoGuantanamo Guantanamo Guantanamo GuantanamoGuantanamo Guantanamo

Aug. 9
Aug. 14
Aug. 16
Aug. 19
Aug. 19
Aug. 22
Aug. 25
Aug. 27
Aug. 28
Aug. 30
Sept. 1
Sept. 3
Sept. 6
Sept. 12
Sept. 17
Sept. 17

38
137109 52
99
128 136 18
100 23
113 5915 53
65 IS

1,0692,0562,148 565
1,5992,3592,108 905
1,316 726
2,209 1,4081,118

800 588

1,107
2,193 2,257 617
2,4872,244 923
1,416 749
2,322 1,467 i,i33 53
865606

1
16
34 18*93i 53 12
36 3
51 n.)

5
2445 16 7
3769 2523 2
5710

13

1,1242,237 2,336 651
1,7292,5552,368 960
¦,475 754
2,430 1,4991,133 86
910 617

Total..

1,163 20,974122,137

331

348

27 22,

642

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

Principal camps of United States troops, dates of establishment, and
number of deaths by disease, accidents, etc., at each to September 30, as
reported to the Adjutant-General's Office:

Camps —
Camp Thomas, Chickamauga Park, Ga. . .
Camp Cuba Libre, Jacksonville, Fla.
Tampa, Fla. ... . . .
Cuba (not including killed or died of wounds)
At sea, en route from Cuba to Montauk Point
Camp Wikoff, Montauk Point, N. Y.
Manila, Philippine Islands . .
Porto Rico ... ....
Camp Alger, near Falls Church and vicinity
Camps in San Francisco
Camp Poland, Knoxville, Tenn.
Camp Shipp, Anniston, Ala.
Camp Meade, near Middletown, Pa
Camp Hamilton, Lexington, Ky.
Camp Wheeler, Huntsville, Ala. .
At posts, minor camps, etc.

Total

Date of

establishment.

Deaths

Apr. 14

425

May 26

246

May 2

56

June 22

427

Vug. and Sept.

87

Aug. 7

257

June 30

63

July 25

137

May 18

107

May 7

139

Aug. 21

23

Sept. 3

12

Aug. 24

64

Aug. 23

29

Aug. 17

35

378

2,485

The report of the Quartermaster-General, M. J. Ludington, gives an idea
of the magnitude of the problem of supplying an army of 275,000 men with
the machinery and stores provided for an army of 25,000. The General says:
"This Department set upon this task without a moment's delay; every
known expedient was at once resorted to with a view to obtaining the neces
sary quartermaster supplies. Many difficulties were in the way. Contracts
were promptly entered into for all the articles of clothing and camp equipage
for which there would be an early" demand, great care being taken to prevent
the supply of articles of inferior quality. The kerseys and flannels of stand
ard quality used for making army blouses and trousers were not to be had in
the market, and it was necessary to have them manufactured. In the mean
time, the Department, as far as possible, endeavored to procure articles con
forming as nearly as practicable to existing standards, but had to resort, at
first, to some extent, to the purchase of dark-blue trousers, so that the men
might be quickly supplied. ' '

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

643

The peace and war figures of the principal articles purchased or con
tracted for are instructive when the two periods are contrasted :

July 1, 1897, to
Apr. 30, 1898, 10
months peace
period.

May 1, 1898, to
Aug. 15. 1898, 3!4
months war
period.

22,000

546,338

274,232

77,000

230,000

31,601

31,59°

50,000
43,340
1,056,990
153,169
18,040
476,7°5
11,000
588,800
129,000
32,925
325,385
548,634
76,093
27,95°
782,303
1,996,699
40,006
150,942
Blankets, wool 
Blouses 
Caps, forage ....
Canvas, fatigue coats . . .
Canvas fatigue trousers, pairs
Drawers, canton flannel, pairs
Drawers, summer, pairs .
Field and summer uniforms
Hats, campaign ....
Leggins . . ....
Overcoats 
Ponchos, rubber ....
Shirts, dark blue flannel
Shoes, barrack, pairs
Shoes, calfskin, pairs .
Stockings, cotton, pairs
Stockings, woolen, pairs
It is not surprising to learn that "the shoes procured at the outbreak of
hostilities, and which were found to be essential for the immediate equipment
of the organizations then being rapidly mustered into service, did not conform
altogether to the newly adopted army shoe."
This does not look like inattention: "The clothing of part of the troops
returning from Cuba was ordered to be destroyed to prevent contagion, and
the issue to each of the men, free of charge, of another suit in lieu of the one
destroyed was authorized. Similar issue was also made to the men in hos
pitals whose clothing was destroyed for the same reason."
There is much said in few words in this paragraph :
"Fourteen ships were chartered to June 30, 1898, on the Pacific coast,
having a total tonnage of 41,152 and carrying capacity of 629 officers and 13,059
men, with their complete outfit of camp and garrison equipage, arms, ammu
nition, medical and subsistence stores for a voyage of over 7,000 miles. " And
this was without a serious accident. The movements of troops up to Septem
ber 15 was: to Cuba, 28,195; to Porto Rico, 17,460; to Manila, 16,405; to
644 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
Honolulu, 629; returned from Cuba, 21,686; returned from Porto Rico, 5,541;
civilian employes transported, 2,920; the total being 92,863.
A resume" of the work done by the Quartermaster's Department at
Tampa in the short space of four months is as follows: Army corps equipped,
2; freight cars handled (loaded or unloaded), 13,239; officers and men trans
ported, 66,478; horses and mules transported, 15,309; horses and mules
received, 11,389; horses and mules issued, 9,919; wagons "set up," 604;
teams "broken out" (6 mules), 141; teams "broken out" (4 mules), 520; pack
trains equipped, 2 1 ; wagons and ambulances repaired, 699 ; transports fitted
out, 33; transports cleared, 78.
The Quartermaster in his general summary observes : "Practically every
thing needed for the largely increased army had to be purchased or manu
factured and then transported to the numerous camps."
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1898, transportation was furnished
for 709,617 persons, 60,632 animals, and 1,529,585 tons of war material.
One of the public complaints, widespread and bitter, of the disadvantages
to which our soldiers were exposed when facing the enemy at Santiago and
Manila, was that the Spaniards had the advantage of us in smokeless powder,
and that their rifle, the Mauser, was an excellent long-range gun. General
D. W. Flagler, Chief of Ordnance, gives in his report to the Secretary of
War this interesting information :
"The especial advantage of the magazine rifle is its reserve of five
cartridges in the magazine, the very important advantage of its flatter tra
jectory, and the lighter weight of its ammunition, which enables the soldier
to carry more cartridges. The most serious defect of the Springfield rifle
during the war was the fact that at the origin nothing but charcoal powder
could be furnished for it. As rapidly as possible this defect was overcome,
and the manufacture of smokeless ammunition for the caliber .45 rifle was
carried on extensively. The large reserve of Springfield rifles on hand will
be supplied with smokeless-powder cartridges should their use become neces
sary in the future, a use which is not now anticipated. The arms, however
are being cleaned and repaired and made fit for service as rapidly as
turned in.
"Reports of officers who were in the Santiago campaign, as received by
a special board which proceeded to Montauk Point to investigate the subject
confirm the excellence of the magazine rifle, caliber .30, in all respects!

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 645
Notwithstanding rough usage, unusual exposure in a bad climate, which pre
vented the exercise of the usual care in preserving the arm, the breech
mechanism is reported to have worked smoothly and well."
The American magazine rifle has had fastened upon it the name Krag-
Jorgensen. General Flagler says:
"At Springfield Arsenal there were manufactured up to June 30, 1898,
some 30,000 magazine rifles, 12,000 magazine carbines, an output of about
11,000 more than during the last fiscal year, but this does not show the large
increase incident to the war. The maximum was not reached until August
13, when about 370 per day, or over 100,000 per year, were being manufac
tured. The average daily output before March 15 was about 120. This out
put was gradually increased to the maximum by working double shifts of men
and putting them on as rapidly as was practicable. The utmost output at
Springfield with the present plant would not exceed about 500 per day. In
February the manufacturers were given orders to work on smokeless powder to
their full capacity. Under these orders, with the charcoal powder obtained,
the amount on hand brought the supply up to a reasonably safe point. The
first issues of powder for field and siege guns were made from charcoal powder
on hand; but before the end of May the supply of smokeless powder was
ready, and this was issued thereafter. ' '
The Secretary of War remarks :
"The supply of powder was a most troublesome question at the outbreak
of the war. There are only two establishments in this country which manu
facture smokeless powder, and they own patents upon the process. These,
however, like all other companies called to aid the government, responded
with alacrity, ran their works day and night, and produced in a short time an
ample supply. The same can be said for all manufacturers of tents, cloth
ing, all kinds of guns, cartridges, and other war material, and but for their
most energetic exertions we would have been sadly deficient."
The Secretary recommends that there should be 500,000 magazine rifles
in our arsenals. General Greeley, in his report on the Signal Service, says
the work of the corps "affords a beautiful example of the rapidity and
efficiency with which electrical communications can be established and main
tained between military posts and advancing armies when the commanding
general of such armies takes proper equipments," and instances: "The peace
protocol reached the outposts of Generals Brooke. Wilson, and Henry within

646 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
thirty-three minutes of the time it was received at Ponce, and thus prevented
battles at two points where the troops were moving out."
One hundred and seventy miles of line were operated in Porto Rico when
the end of the war came. General Greeley says :
"Cables had to be manufactured to order, steamer chartered, cable gear
obtained, and the Chief Signal Officer opened negotiations with commercial
telegraph companies whereby the whole system would be harmonious. As a
result of two months' labor, the Signal Corps opened a station at Cainanera,
Guantanamo Bay, June 20, a day in advance of the landing of General
Shafter's army, and wfthin five minutes telegraphically of the Executive
Mansion and War Department."
The pages of this volume given to telegrams prove that this marvelous
connection between the President and headquarters in the field did not, as has
been the rule in wars, cripple the armies, taking the initiative out of the gen
erals commanding and confronting the enemy, but, on the contrary, energized
them, and constantly facilitated rather than retarded the decisive movements.
Next to the belated and scandalous disturbance about fresh meat, there
was the most disheartening palaver and clamorous outcry relating to water
in the camps, and the spot selected to overwhelm this storm was the camp at
Chickamauga Park. And yet twenty-seven wells were drilled through the
solid rock underlying the park, though springs abounded. General H. V.
Boynton, of the Park Commission, says:
"By casing and surrounding the wells at the surface with masonry set in
hydraulic cement, surface contamination was rendered impossible. While
this work was in progress an emergency pipe line, designed primarily to pro
vide water for cooking, for the large number of animals, and for washing, was
recommended and authorized by the Secretary of War, and constructed by the
engineer of the park. The intake was established on Chickamauga Creek at
the farthest point of park ownership of the stream, and above any possible
wash from the camps, in spite of all that has been asserted to the contrary.
This stream is fed entirely from mountain springs, and the valley it flows
through is exceptionally clean and wholesome. Ten miles of mains and
laterals were expeditiously laid, furnishing abundant water to nearly all the
camps, and shower baths for all who cared to arrange them.
"All the springs and wells on the park, and the water of the pipe line,
were analyzed by competent chemical authority as soon as any question was

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 647
raised as to the purity of the water supply, and all in use by troops pro
nounced fit for domestic use, except two wells, which at first were regarded
as doubtful, and their use stopped, but which were found by more thorough
analyses to be good. The pipe-line water was twice analyzed chemically, and
once bacteriologically by Dr. C. F. Craig of the army, a recognized authority,
and pronounced good. While the water supply of the park was abundant and
wholesome, the outcry against it, though not based on analyses, became so
general as to lead to much hauling of spring water for considerable distances,
to the great inconvenience of the troops and the hospitals, and the unneces
sary disturbance of the country. ' '
There is no doubt that a good deal of bad stuff called "beef" was sent to
the army, and it has been decorated with the descriptive word "embalmed,"
while it is asserted that "chemicals" were used, and frightful fluids injected
— something different from the common chemistry of salt, we infer. The
magnificent energies of the modern journalism were largely bestowed upon
this chemical terror, and after a war into which the Administration of the
Government was forced whenv there was a plentiful lack of preparation and
through which the Nation passed triumphantly, there was a sensation that
rivaled the Dreyfus scandal in France, but fortunately Americans are less
excitable and fantastic in expression than Frenchmen.
The motive forces of the emotion seemed to spring from the soil where
there was a failure to cultivate the primary opportunities in the season when
the seed was sown for the harvest of events. The personalities that figured
in the unseemly proceedings need not be noticed. They were embodiments of
vanities and other weaknesses of ostentation that lacks substantiality. The pose
of passion that was full of tears and has a tendency to tatters may be forgiven
sooner than the pride that stooped to folly and fancies cloudy campaigns.
Napoleon and Wellington had tormenting troubles with the providers of
provisions, meats in particular, for their armies, and prescribed the shooting
of the commissaries ; and Patrick Henry heaped an immortality of ridicule
upon a contractor who had sold beef to the old Continentals, filling the air
with cries of "Beef, beef!" Some of the journals that in their majestic pre
sumption not only conducted the war, but claimed the honor of causing it,
and indulged in the tropical luxuriance of their imagination, sounded the
brasses, and blowed the wind about their luxuriant theme.
There was enough shown of carelessness, experimental or speculative, or

648 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
of a lack of executive intelligence in discrimination, to warrant anger, but the
exaggeration of details that offend, distort and magnify until wrath is wasted
in weariness, and there is a stage set with strange scenery, reminding one of
the poetry of a lunatic describing a wilderness in which his mind was lost:
"Yonder indigenous endogen wave
Banner-like blades from a mystical bole,
And with a vigor perennial, brave
Boreal blasts from the Alien pole."
Fresh meat is hard to manage in hot countries in good form, whatever
may be the experimental chemistry of speculation. The ship anchored near
est the flagship of Admiral Dewey in Manila Bay was a Belgian cold-storage
iron steamer from Australia, filled with frozen beef and mutton. A boat-load
of it was conveyed to the deck of the Olympia every day, placed on and cov
ered by a sail, that it might slowly thaw. If the flesh is released from the ice
suddenly, if cooked before the process of thawing is complete, it turns black
and cannot be eaten, loses flavor and acts like something "embalmed." Let
the thaw occur gradually, and the beef and mutton become — it is the
Admiral's word — "delicious."
The fact as to the embalmed beef is that, as it was known the meat of
steers became ill-flavored in from twelve to sixteen hours, there was offered
an experiment in fresh meat alleged to have been prepared so that it would
remain good seventy hours. It was referred to General Young, who reported
against the experiment. Then permission was asked to put some of it on two
transports for trial. That was granted. The experiment failed, and the
stuff was thrown overboard.
Lieutenant Jose Muller is the Spanish officer who called on Lieutenant
Hobson in Morro Castle and insisted upon asking him questions with an air of
severity, but was questioned himself, and it finally developed that he had been
playing a part of intimidation, he and Hobson separating as good friends in
pleasant fellowship. His account of the battles and capitulation of Santiago
de Cuba is valuable, and we quote from his work passages of interest to the
American army and all students of its history. He says of the situation of
the city in the middle of June :
"One of the first articles that gave out was flour, and no bread could be
baked. Hardtack (galleta) was used instead, but only a few people could pay
for it; there was no milk to be had, indispensable for the sick and for babies

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 649
The soldiers commenced to eat bread made of rice and rice boiled in water,
which weakened them very much ; and though they were not suffering actual
hunger, everybody knew that calamity was not far off and was inevitable, for
no provisions could be expected, either by land or sea."
It was the scarcity of provisions, Lieutenant Muller says, that "compelled
General Linares to defend the line, which, beginning at Ermitano and pass
ing through El Caney, San Miguel de Lajas, Quintero Hill and the hills of La
Caridad and Veguita, would protect the railway to Sabanilla and Moron and
the aqueduct. If the troops could have maintained this line, they would not
have suffered for lack of water, as they did in some positions, nor would the
food, as long as we remained in possession of the cultivated region, have been
reduced to rice bread and rice boiled in water, which the soldiers could not
stand and which made them unfit for active operations. There was nothing
left in Santiago except rice, and only 500,000 extra cartridges outside of the
regular supply of the soldiers, namely, 150 each; for although there were
many more included in the surrender of the Park, they are of the Remington,
Argentine Mauser, and other types, and of calibers differing from those of the
Spanish Mauser, which is the weapon carried by almost all of our forces. Of
course, 150 cartridges are used up very rapidly.
"If El Caney and the San Juan position had not been taken we should not
have lost our communications with the cultivated region, nor would the
aqueduct have been cut, and it is easy enough to understand how much these
two things hadjto do with later events.
"The ships would no doubt have reduced the city to ashes and ruin, but
there would have been water and more provisions, and the army would have
been able to maintain itself and fight, at least until the last cartridge was gone. ' '
Here the lamentation comes in that the insurgent Cubans had held back
Escario's column, with which it is assumed that the long line could have been
maintained on the 27th of June.
"The Vesuvius had discharged two bombs the preceding night, one com
pletely destroying the house of the lighthouse keeper, the other seriously
damaging the fortress, wounding three sailors of the Mercedes, and a soldier
of the garrison." And yet the German Admiral who has been writing of the
lessons of America for the benefit of our countrymen pronounces the dyna
mite boat as without value. The Spaniards by watching the transport ships
Vere able to tell approximately the number of the Americans on hand.

650 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
This account is given of the numbers and organization of the defenders
of Santiago :
"The advance post of Caney (a league and a half — about 6 miles — from
the city), in command of General Vara del Rey, was defended by three com
panies of the battalion 'Constitucidn' (the 29th), one company of guerrillas
on foot, in all 430 men, 40 soldiers of the Santiago regiment, and 50 of the
mobilized troops, being a total of 520 men.
"The line of the precinct (9 kilometers), extending from Dos Caminos del
Cobre, west of the city, to the fort of Punta Blanca, to the east, on the sea
shore, was defended by the following forces:
Corps of sailors from the fleet (four second companies) . . 458
Four companies of the Provisional Battalion of Puerto Rico . 450
Talavera Battalion, No. 4 (Peninsular) .... . . 850
. Four companies of the San Fernando Battalion, No. 11 . . 440
Total, army  2,198
Three companies of mobilized troops  330
Volunteers  440
Total  2,968
"Also a small number of gunners, for there was not a sufficient number
to serve the guns installed. It may therefore be said that there were, in
round numbers, 3,000 men. This was the fighting force." There was also
the cavalry, the firemen and 970 men at the mouth of the harbor.
The Spanish story of the battles of El Caney and San Juan is intensely
interesting. General Vara del Rey had 520 men, with two Plasincia guns,
and the position of San Juan was occupied by 250 men. They claimed that
General Wheeler had 12,000 men, a remarkable exaggeration. Another
statement is that Wheeler's command was 3,500 men, supported by another
brigade, "while Colonel Chaffee, with 2,000 men, attacked the hill and fort of
San Juan. " Lieutenant Muller says:
"The Americans, it must be acknowledged, fought that day with truly
admirable courage and spirit. The houses of El Caney, which General Vara
with his 520 men converted into as many fortresses, threw forth a hail of pro
jectiles upon the enemy, while one company after another, without any pro
tection, rushed with veritable fury upon the city. The first company having
been decimated, another appeared, then a third, and still another, and those

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 651
soldiers resembled moving statues (if I may be permitted that expression for
want of a better) rather than men ; but they met heroes, and although the
houses had been riddled with bullets by the artillery and musketry, and
although the streets were obstructed with dead and wounded, El Caney had
been converted into a veritable volcano, vomiting forth lava and making it
impossible to go near it.
"Both sides being short of forces and out of breath, almost without having
stirred from their relative positions, the battle ceased for some time, and
General Vara del Rey took advantage of this circumstance to have his sol
diers re-form the lines and again get ready for the battle.
'General Linares, who was repulsing the attacks at the position of San
Juan, upon learning the result of these assaults, warmly congratulated the
handful of lions in these words: 'When the American army attacked El Caney
they had not counted on a general of Vara del Rey's stamp and on troops as
fiery and inured to warfare as those he had under his command. '
"The fighting commenced once more, and the enemy attacked again and
again, being always repulsed, but as we had no reserve forces, and the
Americans, on the contrary, had a great many, the battle was no longer pos
sible under these circumstances. The General was wounded almost simul
taneously in both legs by two musket balls, and as he was being carried away
on a stretcher, the bullets falling around him like hail, he was killed by a
third one, at the same moment as two of the men who were carrying him.
"The greater part of the commanders and officers (among them two rela
tives of the General) were dead or wounded, as also* the majority of the sol
diers. Finally, at 7 p. m., the commander being dead and those 520 men
having been reduced to less than 100, and most of these slightly wounded and
bruised, that handful of heroes, for want of forces and a commander, retreated
from the site, which for ten hours they had been defending without being able
to get any reinforcements, for there were none to be had, and the enemy
occupied the position in which he in his turn had made such a bold attack."
Only eighty of the 520 Spaniards who fought at El Caney returned. The
Spaniards organized and entrenched at San Juan, and "the Americans
attacked about noon with cannon, machine gun and musket fire. The Spanish
position became critical," as "one half of the officers had fallen under the
action of the lead that was pouring down upon the line. The enemy was
advancing in large and compact masses, firmly resolved to take the positions,

652 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
but Baquero, the brave soldier who had distinguished himself- so highly in the
campaign, was there, keeping up by his example the spirit of the troops,
almost annihilated by hunger and fatigue, and decimated by the clouds of bul
lets and grapeshot.
"At this critical moment the cavalry was ordered to advance rapidly in
order to protect the retreat of Colonel Baquero's forces and save the artillery
if possible. Lieutenant-Colonel Sierra hastened to carry out the order, as
Commander Arraiz had done before him at San Juan.
"The line which General Linares commanded personally now formed the
vanguard. With his assistance the General's aids and his chief of staff had to
organize the remnants of the first line.
"It was necessary to maintain that position at any cost, for its loss would
give the enemy free entrance into the city. The brave men of the first line
were retreating. Colonel Baquero had disappeared, killed, no doubt, when he
led that retreat under the hail of grapeshot and lead. The enemy was
advancing in compact masses, and rushing upon what was now the first line.
Fortunately, the fire of our infantry, accurately aimed, compelled the Ameri
cans to recede, and they retreated behind the positions of San Juan. At that
moment General Linares and the brave commander of infantry, Arraiz, fell
wounded ; the latter officer, who had already shed his blood at Cacarajicara,
was one of the most beautiful examples of the army.
"The San Juan forces tried once more to recover themselves. Others came
to their assistance, among them the company of marines which had been
stationed at the Plaza de Toros with Captain Bustamente ; but the enemy was
already strongly occupying the position, our forces were scant, and success
was impossible. ' '
The Spanish writer speaks of "the cruel battles of El Caney and San
Juan." At 3:30, at the Plaza de Dolores, he met General Linares. He was
on a stretcher being carried to his house. The battle was at an end, and
"many commanders and officers were arriving all tired out and almost dying
from thirst." The Spanish hospital was near the trenches, and "musket
balls were falling in great quantities in the court and on the roof. Later on
shells were flying in all directions." The loss of El Caney was the loss of
both provisions and water by the Spaniards, and the writer we are quoting
gave up the ghost of a chance in these words :
"We had to confine ourselves to the defense of the precinct, knowing full

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 653
well that, though the sad end might be held off for a day or two longer, there
was no possibility of avoiding it."
He claims that the Americans were inspired by the fighting of the Span
iards with respectful admiration; and says the Americans did not after the ist
of July expose themselves as on that day, but "entrenched themselves and set
up their artillery as fast as they received it, and did not again come out from
behind their fortifications." And "it was difficult to convince them that only
520 men had been defending El Caney for ten hours. When doubt was no
longer possible, their admiration had no limits. When the}* entered Santiago
de Cuba the American soldiers and ours looked upon each other without any
prejudice or jealousy, perhaps because they knew that both had fought like
brave men, and whenever the Americans saw one of our men of the Twenty-
ninth (the number of the battalion 'Constitucidn,' which had defended the
city, and has been referred to so many times) they would call him, look at
him, and treat him with great admiration, wondering, perhaps, how so simple
a soldier could do such great things.
"The men of the Twenty-ninth, known to have done something worth
doing, were loved and feasted by every one and spent whole hours with the
Americans, who did not understand them, but applauded everything they said,
on the assumption, perhaps, that he who is brave must also be bright.
"Incidents like these I saw, not once, but a hundred times, and they have
made me believe and say what I have stated. I may be mistaken, but I do
not believe it, because I have also noticed that the Yankees treat the insur
gents, although they are their allies, very differently."
According to their own list, the casualties of the Spaniards were:
Killed: Brigadier-General Joaquin Vara del Rey, 3 commanders, 12
officers, and 78 men.
Missing: Colonel of Infantry Jose Baquero, 4 officers, and 116 men.
The Colonel was probably killed, but this could not be verified.
Prisoners: Two officers.
Wounded: Lieutenant-General Arsenio Linares Pombo, 6 commanders,
30 officers, and 339 men.
(Among the wounded officers was Colonel of Engineers Caula and Colonel
of Artillery Ordonez). Total, 595.
The Spanish story of the siege is that the Americans opened fire by land
and sea. "Each hour that elapsed fortified the circle that enclosed us," and

654 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
in the night the Americans "kept up most incessantly a violent musket and
terrific gun fire," bombarded the city, dismounted one of the two effective
guns on the Socapa, and on the 2d of July the companies of the fleet
embarked, and "a pilot was sent to each one of the ships, which latter took in
their boats and steam launches and loosened the spring on their cables, and
the gunboat Alvarado, which had come out of the slip and was afloat, raised
at night the six Bustamente torpedoes that were obstructing the channel to
the west. Everything indicated, without leaving room for doubt, that the
fleet was about to go out; but when and how?" That question was answered
the next morning. Even that night the Spaniards believed there was a fleet
coming from Spain to the rescue of Santiago. On the next day after the
destruction of Cervera's fleet, July 4th, Lieutenant Muller says, the Mercedes
was sunk to obstruct the harbor channel.
"As the interior of the harbor did no longer have the safeguard of the
fleet, as the Bustamente torpedoes (six of them) had been taken up so that the
fleet could go out, and had not yet been replaced, and as, finally, the first line
of mines no longer existed, the commander of marine decided — General Toral
also being of his opinion — to sink the Mercedes."
This took place about noon, the harbor having been open twenty-four
hours for our victorious and unharmed squadron, and one of the two
guns that fought our fleet at the mouth of the harbor was dismounted. If
advantage had been taken of the situation, the controversy between Shafter
and Sampson, representing the army and the navy, might have been
avoided. After the departure of Cervera's fleet from the harbor, and from life, the
streets of Santiago were "dark as wolves' dens," and infested by robbers.
General Toral issued a decree that, "All soldiers who shall destroy or set on
fire buildings or property, or commit any acts of violence on persons, shall be
punished by confinement in the penitentiary for life, after previous degrada
tion, in conformity with Article 239 of the Code of Military Justice. The
penalty of death shall be imposed upon the instigators, or persons employing
soldiers for this purpose."
This was dated July 16. On the 10th the Americans opened a lively fire
from their trenches, and the fleet also. The Spanish loss was 7 killed and 47
wounded. A single shell from the fleet completely ruined a house in the city
Twenty-three projectiles fell within a small space. On the 12th of July

VIEW INSIDE THE TRENCHES.

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,

Vy,-. : .:..  ^_ 

v> .v.:

.'-,' ¦'.-.- -•*vr

CAMP AT PORT TAMPA.

VIEW OF THE TRENCHES,

LOADING PACK MULES,

PLACING GUNS INTO POSITION,

A CUBAN VILLA.

MEMBERS OF THE 9TH CAVALRY, COLORED,

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 657
General Linares, wounded and in his bed, telegraphed the Commander-in-Chief
and Minister of War :
"The situation is' fatal; surrender inevitable; we are only prolonging the
agony; the sacrifice is useless; the enemy knows it, fully realizing our situa
tion. Their circle being well established, they will exhaust our forces without
exposing theirs as they did yesterday, bombarding on land by elevation with
out our being able to see their batteries, and from the sea by the fleet, which
has full advices, and is bombarding the city in sections with mathematical
accuracy. "There is a limit to the honor of arms, and I appeal to the judgment of
the government and the whole nation ; for these long-suffering troops have
saved that honor many times since the 18th day of May, when they sustained
the first bombardment.
"If it should be necessary to consummate the sacrifice for reasons which I
ignore, or if there is need of some one to assume the responsibility of the
denouement anticipated and announced by me in several cablegrams, I offer
myself loyally on the altar of my country for the one purpose or the other,
and I will take it upon myself to perform the act of signing the surrender."
The vaunted volunteers fought well in the first battle, but became dis
couraged, and many of them put away their uniforms and guns and retired.
The Spanish historian says of the scenes after the surrender: "When a
Yankee officer of artillery and another of engineers took possession of the
Morro, they inquired about the defenses and artillery of the fort. 'There
they are, ' said the governor, pointing to the land batteries and old guns. The
American officers did not believe him ; personally they went all over the place
in search of guns and more important works of fortification. And when they
had convinced themselves that they had been told the truth, they exclaimed:
'That fleet' (pointing to Admiral Sampson's) 'has no excuse for not having
gained possession of the harbor and defeated the city and its defenses in so
many days.' "
It is perfectly apparent by the Spanish accounts that the sufferings, the
exposures and privations of the defenders of Santiago were even greater than
those of the assailants, and the situation, regarded after the battle of El Caney
and the flight of the fleet, as. not containing a chance of success. On each
side there was surprise and apprehension at the proven fighting qualities of
the other.

CHAPTER XXIX.

The Insurgents in Arms of Cuba and the Philippines.
Our Relations with and Responsibilities for Them— The Cuban Soldiers Found on the
Pay Roll — A Military Service of Importance and the Only One Performed by Armed
Cubans in Our War— The Spanish Account of It— Cubans Kept 3,500 of the Best
Troops of Spain Away from El Caney — Testimony Taken at Paris by the American
Commission of the True Character of the Philippines— General Merritt, General
Greene and Major Bell State the Facts.
All the Spaniards in Cuba during the dreary wars that culminated in the
decisive struggle between the United States and Spain, were not engaged in
the cause of the Peninsulars. The insular Spaniards were not in many
respects unlike their oppressors and antagonists. Though in conflict about
government, their idea about systems of governing were kindred. The hope
of better days in Cuba is in the people of the island, not in either wing of the
Spaniards. The supporters of the Junta closely resemble in views of adminis
tration the representatives of the regency. The destroyers of the industries
of Cuba, that were prosperous under misgovernment, are themselves the vic
tims of false education, and are incapable of organizing reformation.
Liberty with order, fair play for all, and integrity in official life, is not
within the comprehension of those who burned the cane and trampled the
tobacco. Those golden productions were transferred from Hayti to Cuba,
while the horrors of barbarism ruined the former island, when the abolition of
slavery established anarchy; and in the latter and greater island the inherit
ance of the torch has perished by the torch in the hands of the Dominican
chieftain, Maximo Gomez.
It is the repeatedly expressed opinion of Admiral Dewey that the Fili
pinos are more capable of self-government than the Cubans, and they might
be that if we confounded the Cuban name with the Key West and New York
syndicates, gotten up in the old Junta form, and employed with the facility of
658

INSURGENTS OF CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 659
experience, in the accomplishments of the pomps and vanities of the Spanish
language, including the fables of history and the follies of freedom.
Gomez had two objects in firing the fields from which the wealth of the
island he invaded from Dominica comes — one was to destroy property, because
it was an expression of civilization, and the other to destroy labor, because
he wanted men to abandon the productive occupations to become destroyers.
General Miles expected 50,000 Cubans to line up with his grand army for
the siege of Havana, but there would not have been as many of them there as
appeared at Santiago. They have, however, materialized in regard to the
pay-roll, and Gomez and his bodyguard and recruits after the war assume
that they are a people and that the object of the United States in conquering
the island was to give it up to thereto rule after the manner of the Spaniards.
The difference between one class of Spaniards and another, in the cultivation
of the art of government, does not matter much to the cultivators of the soil
and the managers in the ways of enterprise that are conducted according to
the methods of civilization and yield fruitful harvests to the labor that gains
bread in the sweat of the face.
No doubt it was the judgment of Gomez of Dominica that the way to free
fertile land was to burn the crops, and that one savagery must be met by
another, one victim of an outrage compensated by another victim. The
Cubans burned the fine houses and the Spaniards the cottages, and both sides
plied the chopping-knife to massacre domestic animals. This was the broad
road of bloody ashes to famine.*
In the Philippines we do not have as many Spaniards of any sort as in
Cuba, but the Malay makes up for any lack of the elements of mischief; and
the Tagalo rivals the Cuban Spaniard as an adventurer to claim what the
sword of America has conquered. He wanted joint occupation of Manila, and
tickled himself that he was about to make reprisals in days of the accumulated
wrongs of centuries. If he had been logical in action he would have applied
the torch to the city instead of firing the country, and the property of Eng
lish, Germans, and Chinese would have been burned in the name of liberty,
after the capacity of the insurgents for booty had been determined by the
occurrence of physical exhaustion.
There is a notable difference in the racial questions between the isles of
Cuba and Luzon. There is no negro blood in the Philippines. The Spanish
monarch for whom they were named did not permit African slavery in his

660 INSURGENTS OF CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES.
Indian possession, but Spanish officialism is the same in the East Indies as in
the West. Incidents in the cities of Manila and Santiago, under military
government, will indicate the likeness.
Some of the men of affairs of Manila were importing goods upon which
there were duties, and they were so accustomed to paying their respects to the
officers who consented to the importations, in pecuniary compliments, that
they did not know any other style of transacting business. They gathered a
few hundred new Mexican dollars, and for several days carried it around in
bags to find "the right man," to whom was to be confided the little testimonial
of their respectful confidence, and they asked many tentative questions, and
began to feel at last that their modesty must have become offensive. When,
at last, they referred in plain terms to the custom of the country, and their
desire to conform to it, and were told they would be forgiven just once but
never more, there was amazement. The deputation of gentlemen tottered
away bearing bright silver dollars refused, and then they wondered whether
they did not make a mistake in not having their silver converted into gold.
In Santiago there was a little dinner party in which the representative of
the American Republic was entertained, and his guests had arranged for him
a pleasant surprise. They wanted to do certain things in which they judged
money was to be made, and they were provided with thousands, when the
Manila people had but hundreds, and when the time for talking came, they
offered their visible means according io the ancient Cuban custom, and heard
the incredible response that the Americans did' not do public business in that
way, that the request they made was proper and there was no reason why
they should pay a dollar for the privilege, for it was already their right, and
they must not allow such a mistake to occur again, for if it did they would be
held to have committed a misdemeanor.
The Cuban army on the pay-rolls, hearing that money was rolling in at the
custom houses, had no notion of going home to work, and of course they held
that the Americans were shoveling the cash into their own pockets. They
no doubt believed they were entitled to pay for several years' picnics, and
would go back to the Ten Years' War rather than have nothing to be so
unhappy about, as to take away their appetite for employment. These
are examples of Asiatic and African sentimentalities and of the thrift of
the mixed races, as developed under Spanish instruction' for a dozen
generations,

INSURGENTS OF CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 661
In a Spanish pamphlet translated and issued by the office of Naval Intel
ligence, Lieut. Jose" Muller y Tejrio, the writer on the battles and capitulations
of Santiago de Cuba, there is evidence of the usefulness of the Cubans in the
neighborhood of Santiago. It is stated by the Spanish officers that the
insurgents firing from ambush on Escario's column, "succeeded in delaying
its march long enough so that it could not arrive before the first of July.
Fate is not always just." It is important in fairness to the Cuban soldiery to
give what the Spanish reinforcements on the way to Santiago have to say of
the opposition they met. The Spaniards' column, commanded by Escario,
arrived in Santiago July 3d after marching fifty-two leagues; the troops nearly
all the way "had to march in single file, opening the way with machetas."
Their starting place was Man Janillo, and the column comprised a total of
3,752 men. On the Yara River and camping at dark, the Spanish diary, the
one we quote, says: "The column had been harassed all day, especially while
preparing to encamp, when the enemy opened a steady, lively fire, which
lasted ten minutes, killing one man and wounding three." The next day the
column had one man killed and one wounded.
Bayamo^ the stronghold of the insurgents, was taken with a rush and
without loss, and "we learned afterward that the enemy had ten killed and
nine wounded. " On the 28th, "the rebels appeared again," and near the town
of Baire they "opened a galling musket fire. Colonel Ruiz, the second in com-
mand,of the column, was wounded and his horse killed under him, four soldiers
killed and five wounded." On the 29th the column rested and had three more
wounded. On the 30th there was hot skirmishing, the rebels numerous.
The Spanish losses during the day were five killed and ten wounded, among
the latter the captain. July ist there was a sharp fight at Aguacate. The
Spanish diary says:
"The enemy did not wait to be surprised, but opened fire at once from
Aguacate hill, the station of our heliograph, and adjoining hills to the right
and left in an extensive intrenched line. Our soldiers maneuvered as though
on drill, and advancing steadily, two-thirds of the column entered the battle,
and that hail of lead which strewed death in its path was not sufficient to
make them retreat or even check them. Calmly, with fearless heroism, they
advanced, protected by the frequent and sure fire of the artillery, and skill
fully guided by their chiefs, and with the cry, 'Long live Spain!' and charging
with bayonets, they simultaneously took those heights which were so difficult

662 INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES.
and dangerous to scale, beating the enemy into precipitate retreat, so that
they could not gather up their dead and wounded.
"Seventeen dead were left on the field, also ammunition of -various mod
ern types. There were moments during that battle when the tenacity of the
enemy and the order with which they fought gave the impression that they
belonged to our own column. This report spread rapidly and reached Colonel
Escario's ears, who, fearing that this might really be the case, gave orders to
suspend the fire, and tried to make himself known by bugle signals. But this
precaution was useless, and the commander, becoming convinced that he was
fighting rebel forces, ordered the attack to be renewed and the hostile posi
tions to be taken.
"To do the enemy justice, it must be stated that they defended these
well-chosen positions with persistency and in good order, and that they rose
to unusual heights that day, making this the fiercest battle which we sustained
on the march from Manzanillo to Santiago, and one of the most remarkable
ones of the present campaign. Our casualties consisted of 7 dead, and 1
lieutenant and 42 privates wounded. Large pools of blood on the battlefield
showed the severe chastisement the enemy suffered."
The 3d of July the troops started at 2 a. m. and got to Santiago with
"slight skirmishes," and "here it was learned that on the same day our fleet
had gone out in search of death;" and the column "had arrived at the post of
honor after a supreme effort and after victoriously crossing the Alps of Cuba.
It is not to be wondered at that, when they came in sight of the city, they
took off their hats, and with tears in their eyes opened their lips in a unani
mous shout of 'Long live Spain!' which rose spontaneously from those noble
hearts. "The casualties during the whole march were 1 Colonel, 2 officers, and 68
privates wounded and 27 killed. Twenty-eight thousand six hundred and
seventy Mauser cartridges had been used, and 38 rounds of artillery fired."
The insurgent troops in this case were of Garcia's command, and the
Spanish column of less than four thousand men had forced their way through
the most rebellious part of the island and arrived just when the fighting was
over. Garcia's estimate of his forces opposed to Escario has been counted
as five thousand men. There were not so many, but they made a resistance
that kept Escario from being on the Spanish lines at El Caney, Santiago.
The Spanish pamphlet says: "When 520 men maintained themselves at

INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 663
El Caney for ten hours, and 250 at San Juan for four hours, if Escario could
have been there that day, so that there had been 3,000 men more in our lines,
neither El Caney nor San Juan would have been lost, though attacked by
almost the whole hostile army." The detention of Escario was the best
work done for us during the war by the Cubans, and indeed the only impor
tant diversion they made, and justice demands full credit shall be awarded.
The statements made before the American Commission at Paris may be
classed as the most striking presentation of the attitude of the Philippine
insurgents that has been given. General Merritt was before the Commission
August 4th, and was first asked about General Frank V. Greene, of whom he
said : "He was out on the lines all the time, and took a great deal of interest in
investigating with the citizens and soldiers. He knew some of the ranking
officers, although he did not know Aguinaldo nor have anything to do with
him. It was part of my policy that we should keep ourselves aloof from
Aguinaldo as much as possible, because we knew trouble would occur from
his wanting to go to Manila at the time of its surrender. ' '
General Merritt said further he would greatly rely on General Greene's
judgment, who "wrote the best and most authentic — the best received — book
on the Russian-Turkish war published yet. He is a man who reads a great
deal, quite a student, a very bright man."
General Greene's memorandum, made August 27th, and handed General
Merritt, opened with these trenchant statements :
"If the United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war will
immediately ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The insurgents were
furnished arms and the moral support of the navy prior to our arrival, and we
cannot ignore obligations, either to the insurgents or to foreign nations, which
our own acts have imposed upon us. The Spanish government is completely
demoralized, and Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of resurrection.
Spain would be unable to govern these islands if we surrendered them.
Spaniards individually stand in great fear of the insurgents. The Spanish
government is disorganized and their treasury bankrupt, with a large floating
debt. The loss of property-has been great. On the other hand, the Filipinos
cannot govern the country without the support of some strong nation. They
acknowledge this themselves, and say their desire is for independence under
American protection ; but they have only vague ideas as to what our relative

664 INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES.
positions would be— what part we should take in collecting and expending the
revenue and administering the government.
"The hatred between the Spanish and natives is very intense, and cannot
be eradicated. The natives are all Roman Catholics and devoted to the
church, but have bitter hatred for monastic orders — Dominican, Franciscan,
and Recollects. They insist that these be sent out of the country or they will
murder them. These friars own the greater part of the land, and have grown
rich by oppressing the native husbandmen."
General Merritt said the Philippines would have to be educated up to
self-government, and he added: "They want a protectorate, but they do not
exactly understand what that means. Their idea is that they should collect
the revenues and keep them in their treasury, and that we should be at the
expense of maintaining an army and a navy there for their protection, which
is the kind of a protectorate they would like very much. "
Major Frank Barnes stated: "The masses of the people will accept our
government as soon as they understand the form of government that we
would offer. The people are for the most part easily controlled by proper
methods, the essence of which can be expressed in two words — justice and
firmness. I have definite information also that at least three or four of the
leading men of the provinces to the north and east of Manila are not at all in
harmony with those in authority around Manila."
It was the opinion of the Major that if a few of the ambitious chieftains
were disposed of, those who controlled the insurgent army, "the masses of
the people could be handled without difficulty. At the present it is my opin
ion that these chieftains find themselves in a difficult position on account of
the promises made to their followers in regard to looting, Manila, said promises
being so far unfulfilled. Their troops have been serving up to the present
time almost without remuneration, promises being made that their reward
would come when Manila capitulated. I have availed myself of every oppor
tunity to talk with natives and half-castes, both in the insurgent territory and
in Manila. I find that many of them would be perfectly willing to accept an
American government, and many of them are very anxious that we, should
take full possession of the islands. Many others hold to the desire of the
insurgent chiefs for a Philippine government under the protection of the
United States."
Major J. F. Bell, of the Bureau of Information, reported to General Mer-

INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 665
ritt in Manila Bay, that Aguinaldo had about $200,000, and in Baccoar
$220,000 in public funds. Major Bell catalogues and describes the leaders
among Aguinaldo's following in this highly interesting way:
"Aguinaldo. —Honest, sincere, and poor, not well educated, but a natural
leader of men, with considerable shrewdness and ability; has the power of
creating among the people confidence in himself, and is undoubtedly a very
popular man, highly respected by all ; but there are many better educated and
richer natives who do not think he has sufficient education or experience to
be a suitable president. He was a 'little governor' of a small town in one
of the provinces. It is also said that he was a school teacher, but I have
been unable to verify this assertion.
"There is no Secretary of State, the place being kept open for one Caye-
tano S. Arellano, a prominent native citizen who is said to be the best lawyer
and best man among the native prominent men. He is now in Pagsanjan,
and has been repeatedly sent for, but does not return, stating as an excuse
that he cannot get through Santa Cruz, which is held by the Spanish. He is
an avowed annexationist, and does not believe the Filipino people sufficiently
advanced in the arts and laws of civilization to govern themselves.
"Baldomero Aguinaldo, a first cousin of Don Emilio, is Secretary of War,
and is a swelled dunce, and was once a schoolmaster.
"Mariano Trias, an educated, honest man, of mediocre capacity, is Secre
tary of the Treasury. He was the Vice-President of a former revolution, and
of all the insurgent leaders, he stands next to Aguinaldo in popularity with
the people. "Leandro Y. Barra, a lawyer and good, honest man, is Secretary of the
Interior. "One Estefan de la Rama, a rich and educated man, who speaks English,
is commandante de marina, or commander-in-chief of the navy. He is
reported honest and capable.
"Aguinaldo's interpreter and secretary is one Escamilla, a good linguist,
speaking Latin, French, Spanish, and English — Spanish fluently and English
well, to my personal knowledge. He was a teacher of the piano in Hong
kong, and is one of the best interpreters I have ever seen.
"One Malabini, a student of law and notary public, honest, but not espe
cially talented, is one of his councilors. There is a prominent and wealthy
citizen of this city who is also a councilor, but I prefer not to mention his

666 INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES.
name. He is an avowed annexationist, and sincerely hopes the Americans
may remain here.
"Don Felipe Agoncillo is a highly respected lawyer, and has for some
time been the Filipino agent in Hongkong. I understand it is he who has
been designated by Aguinaldo to go to Paris and America to represent the
insurgent cause.
"C. Sandico, a skilled and well-educated machinist, who speaks English
quite well, is a prominent man, and coadjutor of Aguinaldo. His present
commission is to appear on behalf of political prisoners before the officer
charged with investigating such cases. He has been generally useful to
Aguinaldo as a delegate and negotiator with Americans.
"Lieut. -Gen. Emiliano Riego De Dios, the military governor of Cavite,
is said to be an honest man, but with little education.
"Major-General Ricati, in command of operations along the southern zone
of trenches, appears and is said to be a well-meaning, honest man, with a
fair education. "Maj.-Gen. Pantelon Garcia, in command of operations along the north
ern zone, is not educated very well, but is an able, honest, polite, and agree
able man, who has been a schoolmaster of the primary grade.
"Brig. -Gen. Pio Del Pilar, a vicious, uneducated ignoramus and highway
robber. "General Estrella, commanding the military forces in Cavite, has the
credit of being an honest man with little education.
"Brigadier-General Mascardo, fairly educated and honest, but possesses
little ability.
v"Gen. Gregorio Del Pilar is young, well educated, and honest, but with
little experience. He belongs to a wealthy family of Nueva Ecija.
"General Noriel, an honest, fairly educated, well-meaning, reasonable,
and agreeable fellow, who has done good service and gained the reputation of
a good soldier.
"Colonel Montenegro, a very conciliatory fellow to meet. Young, small,
and well educated. Speaks French, English, and Spanish, the latter fluently ;
the others very well. He is a considerable of a 'talk a heap.' Is 'kinder' hon
est and was a clerk in Lalla's hotel, where he received his lessons in honesty.
"There are other leaders of lesser grade whom it is hardly necessary to
mention here. Aguinaldo has many adjutants, most of whom are young,

INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 667
smart, and well educated. In fact, nearly all of the adjutants of all the
generals belong to the jeunesse doree Filipino, in whom insurrectionary ideas
seem to breed spontaneously. They are all bright, ambitious, active, and
well educated. Among them is one Captain Arevela, Noriel's adjutant, who
is a dentist, having learned his profession from an American, who also taught
him very good English. He has always possessed great partiality for
Americans. ' '
Note. — It appears, however, that Maximo Gomez, the old soldier of fortune, has in the
schools of misfortune been taught the lessons of sorrow, and when throwing off his reserve
after the war was over he knew the light of reason when he saw it, and was not disposed to
join in playing a bunco game upon the people of the United States. He may yet exploit his
ambition to found a confederacy of the West Indies, but he has shown great dignity and com
mands respect by his qualities of statesmanship.

--=?«,>-

CHAPTER XXX.

The Treaty of Peace.
The Official Terms in Which the Spaniards Sued for Peace and Accepted the Demands
of the Peace Protocol of August 12 — "The Demand Strips Us of the Very Last Memory
of a Glorious Past" — The Treaty Commissioners that Met in Paris — Official Text of
the Treaty of Peace of December 10 — The Spaniards Contend that the Philippine
Insurgents Constantly Change the Status Quo and that Americans Must Stop Them —
Contention that the Transfer of Sovereignty Meant Transfer of Debts— Protracted
Debate over the Cuban Obligations — Claim the Capture of Manila was not Lawful —
Insinuation that General Merritt had Heard of the Protocol Before Storming the
Town — Spaniards Able and Adroit — Americans Firm but Courteous — The Official
History of the Preparation of the Peace Protocol — The Part Taken by the President
—His Strong Hand Felt in Paris.
The government of Spain, on July 22, 1898, submitted through the
Ambassador of France a message to the President, saying Spain, wished to
show again that in this war, as well as in the one she carried on against the
Cuban insurgents, she had but one object, "the vindication of her prestige,
her honor, and her name." She had desired to "spare the great island from
the dangers of premature independence," and her sentiments were rather
inspired by ties of blood than by her interests. "Spain," the message con
tinued, "is prepared to spare Cuba from the continuation of the horrors of
war if the United States is likewise disposed." This paper was signed by
the Spanish Minister of State, the Duke of Almodovar del Rio. In reply
Secretary Day wrote, July 30th :
"The President witnessed with profound disappointment the frustration of
his peaceful efforts by events which forced upon the people of the United
States the unalterable conviction that nothing short of the relinquishment by
Spain of a claim of sovereignty over Cuba which she was unable to enforce
would relieve a situation that had become unendurable.
"For years the government of the United States, out of regard for the
susceptibilities of Spain, had by the exercise of its power and the expenditure
of its treasure preserved the obligations of neutrality. But a point was at
length reached at which, as Spain had often been forewarned this attitude
668

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 669
could no longer be maintained. The spectacle at our very doors of a fertile
territory wasted by fire and sword, and given over to desolation and famine,
was one to which our people could not be indifferent. Yielding, therefore, to
the demands of humanity, they determined to remove the causes in the effects
of which they had become so deeply involved. ' '
Secretary Day proceeded to state substantially the points of the Protocol
that was the basis of the treaty of peace. The reply from Madrid, August
7th, by the Minister of State, was:
"The necessity of withdrawing from the territory of Cuba being impera
tive, the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this territory shall not
have fully reached the conditions required to take rank among other sovereign
powers, provide for rules which will insure order and protect against all risks
the Spanish residents, as well as the Cuban natives still loyal to the mother
country. "In the name of the nation the Spanish government hereby relinquishes
all' claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and engages to the irremeable
evacuation of the island, subject to the approval of the Cortes — a reserve
which we likewise make with regard to the other proffered terms — just as
these terms will have to be ultimately approved by the Senate of the United
States. "The United States require, as an indemnity for or an equivalent to the
sacrifices they have borne during this short war, the cession of Porto Rico and
of the other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies,
and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the
Federal government.
"This demand strips us of the very last memory of a glorious past, and
expels us at once from the prosperous island of Porto Rico and from the
Western Hemisphere, which became peopled and civilized through the proud
deeds of our ancestors. It might, perhaps, have been possible to compensate
by some other cession for the injuries sustained by the United States. How
ever, the inflexibility of the demand obliges us to cede, and we shall cede, the
island of Porto Rico and the other islands belonging to the Crown of Spain in
the West Indies, together with one of the islands of the archipelago of the
Ladrones, to be selected by the American government.
"The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be
quite indefinite."

670 THE TREATY OF PEACE. -
Secretary Day put the case of the United States in these simple and
effective terms to the Spanish Minister of State, before the submission of the
terms, referred to with such pathetic dignity in the letter of submission by
the Duke of Almodovar del Rio :
"As the result of the patriotic exertions of the people of the United
States, the strife has, as your excellency observes, proved unequal, inclines
the President to offer a brave adversary generous terms of peace.
"The President, therefore, responding to your excellency's request, will
state the terms of peace which will be accepted by him at the present time,
subject to the approval of the Senate of the United States hereafter.
"Your excellency in discussing the question of Cuba intimates that Spain
has desired to spare the island the dangers of premature independence. The
government of the United States has not shared the apprehensions of Spain
in this regard, but it recognizes the fact that in the distracted and prostrate
condition of the island, aid and guidance will be necessary, and these it is pre
pared to give. ' '
Secretary Day was precise in drawing the Protocol, and yet the Spaniards
persuaded themselves that they could find much in it, especially in the clause
about the Philippines, susceptible of construction remote from the purpose of
the President. August 12th the French Ambassador addressed these lines to
the American Secretary of State :
"Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to inform you that I have
just received, through the intermediation of the Department of Foreign
Affairs at Paris, a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which the Duke of
Almodovar del Rio announces to me that, by order of Her Majesty the Queen
Regent, the Spanish government confers upon me full powers in order that I
may sign, without other formality and without delay, the Protocol whereof the
terms have been drawn up by common accord between you and me. ' '
The instrument that made this authorization regular was the following:
DON ALFONSO XIII.,
BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING OF SPAIN, AND
IN HIS NAME AND DURING HIS MINORITY,
DONA MARIA CRISTINA,
QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM.
Whereas it has become necessary to negotiate and sign at Washington a
Protocol in which the preliminaries of peace between Spain and the United ..

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 671
States of America shall be settled, and as it is necessary for me to empower
for that purpose a person possessing the requisite qualifications: Therefore,
I have decided to select, after procuring the consent of His Excellency the
President of the French Republic, you, Don Julio Cambon, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic in the United
States of America, as I do, by these presents, select and appoint you to pro
ceed, invested with the character of my plenipotentiary, to negotiate and sign
with the plenipotentiary whom His Excellency the President of the United
States of America may designate for that purpose the aforesaid Protocol.
And I declare, from the present moment, all that you may agree upon,
negotiate, and sign in the execution of this commission acceptable and valid,
and I will observe it and execute it, and will cause it to be observed and
executed as if it had been done by myself, for which I give you my whole full
powers in the most ample form required by law. In witness whereof I have
caused these presents to be issued,, signed by my hand, duly sealed and
countersigned by the undersigned, my Minister of State. Given in the palace
at Madrid, August n, 1898.
(L. S.) MARIA CRISTINA.
JUAN MANUEL SANCHEZ Y GUTIERREZ DE CASTRO,
Minister of State.
The city of Manila fell into our hands two days after the suspension of
hostilities, and during the discussion of the Commissioners at Paris the
Spaniards made a plea that as Admiral Dewey cut the cable, the failure to
get the news at Manila before the Americans possessed the town was an
American fault. The report of the French Ambassador of his interviews with
the President was much quoted by the Spanish Commissioners, but the
American Commissioners were inflexible from the first for the plain mean
ing of the treaty.
OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH SPAIN,
SIGNED DECEMBER 12, 1898:
The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of
Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso XIII., desiring to end a
state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose
appointed as plenipotentiaries :
The President of the United States,

672 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and
Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States ;
And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain,
Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of the Senate ; Don Buenaventura
de Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and ex-Minister of the Crown; Don
Jose de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes, and Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court ; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, General of
Division; Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers,
which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the
matters before them, agreed upon the following articles :
Article I.
Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.
And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the
United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last,
assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result
from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.
Article II.
Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other
islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of
Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones. Article III.
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine
Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line :
A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of
north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi,
from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-
seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along
the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude
east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes
(40 45' ) north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty-
five minutes (40 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of
longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35')
east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and

THE BATTLE-FIELD OF SAN JUAN, JULY 2, 1898.

¦ MARIA TERESA," SHOWING HOLE IN 5.5-INCH GUN SHIELD, INNER VIEW,

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 675
nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119- 35') east of Greenwich to the
parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7" 40') north, thence
along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes (70 40')
north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree
meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the inter
section of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hun
dred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich,
and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of
longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.
The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars
($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of
the present treaty. Article IV.
The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the
exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and
• merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships
and merchandise of the United States. Article V.
The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send
back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war
on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers
in question shall be restored to them.
Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty,
proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms
similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for
the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the
Protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are
completely executed.
The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam
shall be completed shall be fixed by the two governments. Stands of colors,
uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibers, with their carriages
and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and materials and supplies of
all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines
and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclu
sive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defenses, shall remain in
their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the

676 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the
meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement
between the two governments on the subject shall be reached.
Article VI.
Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners
of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offenses, in con
nection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with
the United States.
Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners of
war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all
Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.
The government of the United States will at its own cost return to Spain
and the government of Spain will at its own cost return to the United States,
Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their.
respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them,
respectively, under this article. Article VII.
The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity,
national and individual, of every kind, of either government, or of its citizens
or subjects, against the other government, that may have arisen since the
beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifi
cations of the present treat)*, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of
the war. The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens
against Spain relinquished in this article.
Article VIII.
In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III, of this treaty,
Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the
West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the
buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other
immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public
domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case
may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect
impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 677
of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private estab
lishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal
capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced
or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals
may be.
The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all
documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that
may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such
archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be
furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally
observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the
islands above referred to.
In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also
included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in
respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the
islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and prop
erty of -their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully pre
served, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to
require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills
and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may
be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in
the islands aforesaid. Article IX.
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over
which Spain by the present treaty, relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty,
may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either
event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of
such property or of its proceeds ; and they shall also have the. right to carry
on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they
remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain by making, before a court of record within a year from the date of
the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance ; in default of which declaration they shall be held
to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in
which they may reside.

678 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the terri
tories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.
Article X.
The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes
her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.
Article XL
The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty
cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well
as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside,
pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the
right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens
of the country to which the courts belong.
Article XII.
Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications
of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules :
1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individuals,
or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect to which
there is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be
deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form b}* competent authority
in the territory within which such judgments should be carried out.
2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date men
tioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in
which they may then be pending or in the court that may be substituted
therefor. 3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme
Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to
be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment- but
such judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be com
mitted to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose.
Article XIII.
The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by
Spaniards in the island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other
ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty,

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 679
shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary, and artistic works,
not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to
¦be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to
be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.
Article XIV.
Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and
places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relin
quished or ceded by the present treaty. Article XV
The government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to
the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of
all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and ton
nage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the
coastwise trade.
This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given
by either government to the other. Article XVI.
It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United
States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof ;
but it will upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any government
established in the island to assume the same obligations.
Article XVII.
The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty
the Queen regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Wash
ington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.
In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this
treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.
Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.
[Seal] WILLIAM R. DAY. [Seal] EUGENIO MONTERO RIOS.
[Seal] CUSHMAN K. DAVIS. [Seal] B. DE ABARZUZA.
[Seal] WILLIAM P. FRYE. [Seal] J. DE GARNICA.
[Seal] GEO. GRAY. [Seal] W R DE VILLA URRUTIA.
[Seal] WHITELAW REID. [Seal] RAFAEL CERERO.

68o THE TREATY OF PEACE,
When the conference met at Paris, October ist, the President of the
Spanish Commission stated he was charged by his government to lay before
the American Commission a proposition of a pressing nature. It was that the
status quo was altered and continued to be with daily increasing gravity "to
the prejudice of Spain, by the Tagalo rebels who formed an auxiliary force to
the regular American troops, and the Spanish Commission demanded of the
American Commissioners that the American forces in the Philippines must
proceed fully and absolutely to restore the said status quo, and must abstain
from preventing by any means, direct or indirect, the restoration thereof by
the Spanish authorities and forces in the territory not occupied by those of
the United States." The commissions of American Plenipotentiaries were in
these terms:
William McKinley, President of the United States of America, to all
who shall see these presents, Greeting: Know ye, that reposing special trust
and confidence in the integrity and ability of William R. Day, of Ohio, I do
appoint him a Commissioner Plenipotentiary of the United States, under the
Protocol signed at Washington of the 12th da}* of August, 1898, to negotiate
and conclude a Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, and do
authorize and empower him to execute and fulfill the duties of this Commis
sion, with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right
appertaining, during the pleasure of the President of the United States.
In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent, and
the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.
Given under my hand at the city of Washington the 13th day of Septem
ber in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight,
and the 123rd year of the Independence of the United States of America.
Signed: WILLIAM McKINLEY.
By the President:
Signed: J. B. MOORE, Acting Secretary of State.
The Commissions of the other American Plenipotentiaries were in the
same form, their names being as follows :
Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota.
William P. Frye, of Maine.
George Gray, of Delaware, and
Whitelaw Reid, of New York.

-1XH
> o
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Whitelaw Reid.

Mr. Moore, Secretary. Senator Frye.
Senator Gray. Wm. Day, President.
THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSIONERS.

Senator Dayis.

682 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
FULL POWER OF AMERICAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES.
William McKinley, President of the United States of America, to all who
shall see these presents, Greeting:
Know Ye: That, reposing special trust and confidence in the Integrity,
and Ability of the Honorable William R. Day, of Ohio, lately Secretary of
State of the United States, the Honorable Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota,
a Senator of the United States, the Honorable William P. Frye, of Maine, a
Senator of the United States, the Honorable George Gray, of Delaware, a
Senator of the United States, and the Honorable Whitelaw Reid, of New
York, lately Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to France, I do
appoint them jointly and severally to be Commissioners on the part of the
United States under the Protocol signed at Washington on the twelfth day of
August, 1898, to negotiate and conclude a Treaty of Peace between the
United States and Spain, hereby empowering them jointly and severally to
meet the Commissioners appointed or to be appointed under said Protocol on
behalf of Spain, and with them to negotiate and sign a Treaty of Peace
between the United States and Spain, subject to the ratification of their
government; and the said Commission to hold and exercise during the pleas
ure of the President of the United States for the time being.
In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent and
the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.
Given under my hand at the city of Washington this 13th day of Septem
ber, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight,
and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred
and twenty-third. Signed: WILLIAM McKINLEY.
By the President: Signed: J. B. MOORE, Acting Secretary of State.
The authorization of the Spanish Commission was in the terms and form
following :
DON ALFONSO XIII.,
BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING OF SPAIN, AND
IN HIS NAME AND DURING HIS MINORITY,
DOftA MARIA CRISTINA,
QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM:
Whereas the occasion has arisen for the concluding between Spain and
the United States of America a Treaty of Peace, and it being necessary that
to such end I should duly confer authority upon persons who shall merit my

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 683
royal confidence, and you, Don Eugenio Montero Rios, Knight of the Worthy
Order of the Golden Fleece, decorated with the Collar of the Royal and dis
tinguished Order of Charles III., President of the Senate, ex-Minister of the
Crown, ex-President of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, Academician of the
Moral and Political Sciences, embody the characteristics which meet the
requirements of the case. I have therefore chosen and appointed, and by these
presents do choose and appoint you to the end that, pursuant to the stipula
tions of Article V. of the Protocol signed in Washington on the twelfth day of
the month of August last, and invested" with the character of my Plenipo
tentiary, you may in unison with the other Plenipotentiaries I have appointed
under this date and those who may be designated by the President of the
United States for the same purpose, confer and agree upon what may be best
and most advisable. And everything you may so confer and agree upon,
negotiate, conclude and sign, I now confirm and ratify, I will observe and
execute, will cause to be observed and executed, the same as if I myself had
conferred and agreed upon, negotiated, ^concluded and signed it, for all of
which I confer upon you ample authority to the fullest extent required by law.
In witness whereof I have caused these presents to issue signed by my hand,
duly sealed and attested by the undersigned, my Minister of State.
Given in the Palace of Madrid on the twenty-second day of September of
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. Signed: MARIA CRISTINA.
Signed: JUAN MANUEL SANCHEZ Y GUTIERREZ DE CASTRO,
Minister of State.
The commissions and full powers of the other Spanish Plenipotentiaries
here in the same form; their names and titles fully given. The Crown
Minister led the list : Don Buenaventura Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom
and some time Ambassador and Minister of the Crown. Another Commis
sioner was: Don Jose de Garnica y Diaz, Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of Justice, Deputy of the Cortes, Member of the General Codification
Commission, ex-Vice-President of the Congress of Deputies; and most dis
tinguished by his title was: Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Knight
Grand Cross of the Royal Order of Isabel the Catholic, Knight Commander
of the Royal and Distinguished Order of Charles III., decorated with the
White Cross of the second class of Naval Merit, Grand Cross of the Dutch
Lion of the Netherlands, Oak Crown of Luxemburg, the Majidieh of Turkey,

684

THE TREATY OF PEACE.

MTOEMMMM

THE SPANISH PEACE COMMISSIONERS.

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 6S5
Knight Commander of the Legion of Honor of France, of the Concepcion de
Villaviciosa of Portugal, decorated with the Cross of the second class of the
Bust of Bolivar, Knight of St-Maurice and St-Lazarus of Italy, of the Crown of
Prussia, of the Crown of Christ of Portugal, Licentiate in civil and canonical
law, and through competitive examination, in administrative law Academician
Professor of the Royal Academy of Jurisprudence and- Legislation, my Min
ister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of the Belgians.
John Bassett Moore of New York was appointed Secretary and counsel to
the Commissioners oithe United States. In his reply to the opening prop
osition of the Spanish Commission relating to the aggressions of the
Tagalo rebels, Mr. Moore said: "The American Commissioners can see
nothing but a proposal and demand to divert the conference from the object
for which it has met to the consideration of a subject which properly belongs
to the two governments, and not to the Commissioners here assembled.
The American Commissioners do not intend to intimate that the proposal w'as
made with this design, but they think it evident that this would be the neces
sary result of its discussion." And "The American Commissioners, with a
view to prevent the diversion and failure of the present negotiations, as well
as on the ground of a want of power, deem themselves obliged to reply that
the questions involved in the present proposals and demands of the Spanish
Commissioners having heretofore been presented to the government of the
United States and answered in notes of the Department of State, any further
demands as to military operations in the Philippines must be addressed by the
government of Spain to the government of the United States at Washington,
and consequently that they cannot join in the proposed declarations."
To this the Spanish Commissioners replied that they understood it was
their "duty to make known to the American Commissioners that if the status
quo existing in the Philippines on August 12 last, far from being restored,
continues to be disturbed to the prejudice of Spain, the government of Her
Catholic Majesty, and in her name its plenipotentiaries in this conference,
reserve the right to act as they may deem the rights of Spain shall require,
since they cannot conceive how the treaty of peace they are charged with
arranging with the American Commissioners upon the immutable basis of
the Protocol of Washington of August 12 last, can be concluded if this basis is
being constantly altered in. one of its parts, and continually to the greater
prejudice of Spain. "

686 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
The first words of the Treaty of Peace of December 10, 1898, are : "Spain
relinquishes all claims of sovereignty over and title to Cuba," and the
island upon evacuation by Spain was to be occupied by the United States,
' and while the occupation lasted the United States assume and discharge
the obligations that under international law resulted from the fact of its
occupation for the protection of life and property." The second article
is simply that "Spain ceded" certain islands, including Porto Rico and
Guam. The Spanish Commission began by claiming that under the Protocol of
Peace with the United States it was our duty to see that "the insurgents in the
Philippines did not change the situation." This shadowy point was sus
tained with an elaboration of phrases, and discussed by the American Com
mission as curtly as the courtesies of peace-making permitted. Of course the
Spaniards reserved all rights of protest.
The Spanish Commission proceeded to propose articles as an amendment
to the proposals of the American Commissioners on the subject of the relin
quishment by Spain of sovereignty over Cuba and the cession of Porto Rico.
The first article presented by the Spaniards was that the relinquishment and
cession was to be accepted by the United States, "that they may in their
turn transfer it at the proper time to the Cuban people upon the conditions
established in this treaty" ; and the second article was that the relinquishment
and transfer embraced :
"First. All the prerogatives, powers, and rights, which, as an integral
part of the sovereignty, belong to Her Catholic Majesty both over the island
of Cuba and over its inhabitants.
"Second. All charges and obligations of every kind in existence at the
time of the ratification of this treaty of peace, which the Crown of Spain
and her authorities in the island of Cuba may have contracted lawfully in the
exercise of the sovereignty hereby relinquished and transferred, and which
as such constitute an integral part thereof. "
The English of this was that the United States should pay the debts Spain
had charged to Cuba. Article Third of the Spanish propositions detailed the
property, immovable and other, to be relinquished, and Article Fourth made
the material proposal more definite, saying :
"First: The charges and obligations to be transferred must have been
levied and imposed in constitutional form and in the exercise of its legitimate

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 687
powers by the Crown of Spain, as the sovereign of the island of Cuba, or by
its lawful authorities in the exercise of their respective powers prior to the
ratification of this treaty.
"Second: The creation or establishment of such charges or obligations
must have been for the service of the island of Cuba, or chargeable to its own
individual treasury."
Article Fifth was :
"Pursuant to the provisions of the foregoing Article, there shall be
embraced in the said transfer all debts, of whatsoever kind, lawful charges,
the salaries or allowances of all employes, civil and ecclesiastical, who shall
continue to render services in the island of Cuba, and all pensions in the civil
and military services and of widows and orphans; provided that they conform
to the requirements prescribed in the foregoing Article."
Therefore the "relinquishment" was interpreted to provide that the pen
sions and salaries of the priests, among others, should be paid by the United
States until turned over to the people of Cuba as a part of their free inherit
ance. The American Commission rejected (October 11) the Spanish articles,
and filed a memorandum reciting the Peace Protocol, saying:
"In the place of the unconditional relinquishment agreed to in the
Protocol, it is proposed that the relinquishment now offered shall embrace all
charges of every kind which Spain and her authorities in Cuba have lawfully
contracted heretofore, and may hereafter contract, prior to the ratification of
the treaty of peace; and these 'charges and obligations,' past, present and
future, which it is proposed to 'transfer' to the United States, are declared to
include debts, civil and ecclesiastical salaries, and civil and military pensions,
ostensibly in arrears, as well as yet to accrue.
"To the American Commissioners this appears to be not a proposition to
'relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba,' but in substance a
proposition to 'transfer' to the United States and in turn to Cuba a mass of
Spanish charges and obligations.
"It is difficult to perceive by what logic an indebtedness contracted for
any purpose can be deemed part of the sovereignty of Spain over the island
of Cuba. In the Article proposed it is attempted to yoke with the transfer of
sovereignty an obligation to assume an indebtedness arising out of the rela
tions of Spain to Cuba. The unconditional relinquishment of sovereignty by
Spain stipulated for in the Protocol is to be changed into an engagement by

688 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
the United States to accept the sovereignty burdened with a large mass of
outstanding indebtedness.
"It is proper to say that if during the negotiations resulting in the con
clusion of the Protocol Spain had proposed to add to its stipulations in regard
to Cuba such as those now put forward, the proposal, unless abandoned,
would have terminated negotiations.
"The American Commissioners, therefore, speaking for their govern
ment, must decline to accept the burden which it is now proposed shall be
gratuitously assumed.
"The American Commissioners further observe that in Article III. of the
draft there is a negative clause, by which property not belonging to the Crown
of Spain is excepted from the proposed relinquishment and transfer of
sovereignty. In one respect this exception appears to be unnecessary, and in
another illogical. So far as it affects the question of legal title it is unneces
sary, since such title, if not held by Spain, would not pass to the United States
by Spain's transfer of sovereignty. On the other hand, so far as it affects the
question of sovereignty, it is illogical, since the sovereignty, which includes
the right of eminent domain, would, if excepted from the relinquishment,
remain with Spain. We would thus have the singular spectacle of Spain
relinquishing her sovereignty over property belonging to the Crown, but
retaining it over all other property.
"Thus again we should witness the utter defeat of the explicit engage
ment in the Protocol that Spain would 'relinquish all claim of sovereignty
over and title to Cuba.'
"In the articles presented by the American Commissioners there were
stipulations in relation to archives and official records, which stipulations were
intended to secure, and, as the American Commissioners believe, would
effectually secure, the object of preserving and of furnishing to those in inter
est evidence of title to property in the islands in question.
"In the articles submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, it is provided
that documents and papers relating to sovereignty to be found in the archives
of the Peninsula shall be furnished to the United States; also 'copies of such
portions of other documents and papers relating to other subjects foreign to
the island of Cuba and the sovereignty aforesaid as may exist in the said
archives. '
"It is difficult for the Americans to understand this latter clause ; perhaps

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 689
its exact meaning is not conveyed in the English translation of the Spanish
text. "It is to be further observed that in the provisions of the Spanish articles
relating to the furnishing of record evidence of titles to lands in Cuba and
Porto Rico, it is stipulated that the archives and records shall be at the dis
posal of the United States 'with the same rights and obligations as now attach
to them while at the disposal of the Spanish government and its said (insular)
authorities.' This restriction, the object of which is not perceived, would
seem to limit the control over archives and official records, after Spain's relin
quishment of sovereignty, to the same power, both in kind and in extent, as
was formerly possessed by the Spanish government. This appears to be
inconsistent with the right of control which every sovereign power should
possess over its archives and official records.
"All the conditions and qualifications above referred to are by general
reference incorporated in the articles relating to the cession of Porto Rico and
other islands in the West Indies, and render these articles equally inadmissible. ' '
It would.be troublesome to find a more conclusive "annex" to a "Proto
col" than this. The Spanish Commission came back with a memorandum
that displayed the resources of their noble language. First they defined the
difference between "relinquishment" and "abandonment," saying:
"The government of the American Union never demanded that the Span
ish government abandon (abandonar) the sovereignty over Cuba, but that it
relinquish (renunciar) the same, so that the island should become independ
ent. It so appears from the diplomatic correspondence in the possession of
the government of Her Catholic Majesty relating to the negotiation between
the two contracting parties prior to the declaration of war. It was also thus
declared by the American Congress in the Joint Resolution of April 19 last,
subsequently approved by the President of the United States. The first
clause of that resolution reads 'that the people of Cuba are and of right
ought to be free and independent.' "
There followed the official text of the Protocol in Spanish, and remarks:
"To undertake to explain the essential difference which according to the
elementary principles of public international law and the usage of nations
exists between the abandonment (abandono) and the relinquishment
(renuncia) of sovereignty, would be to offend the intelligence of the learned
American Commissioners.

690 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
"Abandoned territories can of right be acquired by the first occupant,
while relinquished territories necessarily pass unto him to whom relinquish
ment is made. And the United States demanded that Spain relinquish in
order that the Cuban people might become independent.
"Although it is true that the United States of America demanded this
of Spain in the present case, they also demanded that such relinquishment
must be made through them. The United States were to receive the island
of Cuba and retain the possession thereof, governing it until its pacification
was secured, asserting its 'determination to leave [no one can leave what he
does not hold] the government and control of the island to its people, as soon
as the said pacification is accomplished.' So was it solemnly set forth in
Section 4 of the Joint Resolution of the American Congress and in the des
patch of the Secretary of State to the American Minister at Madrid. And
if the United States are not to leave the government and control of the
Island until the pacification thereof is accomplished it is self-evident that in
the meantime the United States are called upon to administer the one and
retain the other. ' '
This was followed by learned observations about the rights of sovereignty
and the variance of the ancient world with the modern and Christian world,
the maxims observed by cultured nations and the eternal principles of justice,
more or less labored, and of vague application, saying :
"The special obligations of the particular territories ceded which were
contracted by its legitimate authorities, in 110 single case, not even in those
treaties in which the victor has shown himself most merciless towards the
vanquished, have the individual and separate charges and obligations of a
ceded territory failed to pass therewith. Thus it may be considered as an
absolutely essential condition that the cession of territory carries with it the
cession of the departmental, communal, and, generally speaking, individual
obligations and debts of the ceded territory. "
The "great conqueror of the century" (Napoleon) never dared to violate
this eternal rule of justice and, "The territories discovered by Columbus and
other illustrious Spanish explorers who have rendered such great, though not
always appreciated, services to civilization being divided into vice-royalties
and captaincies-general, each of these small states collected its own revenues
and met its own expenses, or contracted obligations to meet the necessities of
its own separate government ; and when one of these territories found itself

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"TO GEORGE DEWEY, WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS AND
THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES."

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS M. ANDERSON, COMMANDER OF 1ST DIVISION STH ARMY CORPS AT MANILA.

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 693
with a permanent deficit, as was the case in the island of Cuba, the nearest
sister-colony came to its rescue. The vice-royalty of Mexico, from 1766 to
1806, annually assisted the island of Cuba with heavy sums for its govern
mental needs and the development of its natural resources, at the time unex-
ploited, which expenses it could not, at such time, meet from its own
revenues. Not less that 108 millions of pesos came into Cuba from Mexico
during that period, this assistance being known in the Spanish colonial admin
istration under the name of 'Situado de Mexico.' "
The Spanish Commission proceeded to state that grave errors were fallen
into "owing to the Spanish colonial system being unknown." The Spanish
Commission at this point paid this tribute to the Spanish- American peoples:
"What has been said up to this point regarding the nature of the colonial
obligations and those bound thereby, has never been disregarded (to their
honor be it said) by the Spanish-American peoples. They achieved their
independence through their own efforts, and the majority of them, before
Spain had recognized it, had by prior and solemn act of their legislatures,
declared as their own and as having preference those debts which the Crown
of Spain had contracted during the continuance of its sovereignty for the
service of such territories, and which debts were recorded in their respective
treasury books.
"Very few of the Spanish-American republics delayed so honorable a
declaration until the mother country had recognized their independence, as
was said by the Argentine Republic in the treaty concluded with Spain on
September 21, 1863, and by Uruguay, in that concluded on July 19, 1870: 'Just
as they acquired the rights and privileges belonging to the Crown of Spain.
they also assume all its duties and obligations.'
"Note that the Spanish-American republics without exception recognized
and assumed as their own these debts of every kind whatsoever, specifying
them in the treaty of peace with Bolivia of July 21, 1847, wherein it is stated
that they 'include all debts for pensions, salaries, supplies, advances, trans
portation, forced loans, deposits, contracts, and any other debt incurred during
war times or prior thereto, chargeable to said treasuries; provided they were
contracted by direct orders of the Spanish government or its constituted
authorities in said territories. '
"Spain did not recognize the independence of any American state which
had previously been her colony save upon this condition, which those states

694 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
spontaneously incorporated in their respective treaties, as of right they
should. "Her right and her dignity will not permit her to recognize — without this
condition, which now more than ever if possible is still just and proper — the
independence of the Cuban and Porto Rican peoples, which they have not
been able to achieve by their own unaided efforts."
The Spanish Commission desired a modification of the sentence in the
American Commissioners' Protocol No. 4, that the Spanish Article was a
proposition not to relinquish sovereignty, but to "transfer to the United
States a mass of Spanish charges and obligations," and modification was
desired "on the ground that it might be thought to imply that they were not
acting in good faith. " Out of deference to the Spanish Commissioners this
was changed, though the sentence did not sustain the Spanish construction, to
read, "a mass of charges and obligations which, in the opinion of the Ameri
can Commissioners, properly belong to Spain." October 14th the American
Commission replied to the Spanish Commission as to the distinction between
relinquishment and abandonment, the contention being based upon the fact
that "in the various documents referred to the United States required Spain to
'relinquish' her sovereignty, but did not demand that she 'abandon' it.
"A distinction is thus made between a 'relinquishment' and an 'aban
donment'; and it is argued that while 'abandoned territories' become
derelict, so that they may be acquired by the first occupant, 'relinquished
territories' necessarily pass to him to whom relinquishment is made.
"The American Commissioners are unable to admit that such a distinc
tion between the words in question exists either in law or in common use.
"The word 'relinquish,' as defined in the English dictionaries, means 'to
give up the possession or occupancy of; withdraw from; leave; abandon;
quit' Again: 'to renounce a claim to; resign; as, to relinquish a debt.'
"On the other hand, we find in that great monument of Spanish learning,
the law dictionary of Escriche (Diccionario de Legislation y Jurisprudencia),
under the word 'renunciar,' which the Spanish memorandum declares to be
the equivalent of the French word 'renoncer' (used in Spain's version of the
Protocol) and of the English word 'relinquish,' the following definition: 'The
voluntary giving up of a right exercised or expected to be exercised, or of a
thing held or possessed or expected to be held or possessed.' "
Commenting upon this definition, Escriche says: "The relinquishment

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 695
differs from the cession in that the latter requires for its completion the con
currence of the wills of the grantor and the grantee and a just cause for the
transfer, while the former is perfect with only the will of the relinquisher.
The effect of the relinquishment is confined to the abdication or dropping of
the right or thing relinquished. The effect of the cession is the conveyance
of the right to the grantee."
The American Commissioners noted the declaration in the Spanish
memorandum that there was no purpose now to transfer with the sovereignty
of Cuba and Porto Rico a proportional part of the national debt of Spain, but
"only the obligations and charges attaching individually to the islands," which
obligations and charges it likens to the local debts which pass with ceded ter
ritory; but it appears, however, by the explanation given in the memorandum
of the origin of these charges and obligations, and of the manner in which
they were contracted, that they included the whole of what is commonly
called the Cuban debt. And it was shown that this debt did not exist
prior to 186 1, and the American memorandum concluded with the statement
that the government of the United States had at a great sacrifice of life and
treasure prosecuted a conflict to cause the relinquishment by Spain of sover
eignty over Cuba, and one of the results was the unconditional agreement
embodied in the first article of the Peace Protocol that Spain "will relinquish
all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba," and "upon the simple fulfill
ment of that stipulation the American Commissioners are obliged to msist. "
The formation of the Cuban debt was thus related by the Commissioners:
"The revenues of the island were, as a rule, far more than sufficient to
pay the expenses of its government, and produced in each year a surplus.
This surplus was not expended for the benefit of the island, but wai sent to
Madrid. The surpluses thus disposed of amounted, from 1856 to _86i in
clusive, to upwards of $20,000,000.
"In 1864, in order to meet the national expenses of the attempt *.¦> 'rein
corporate' San Domingo into the Spanish dominions, and of the 'expedition to
Mexico,' the Spanish authorities issued bonds to the amount of $3,000,000.
Subsequently new loans were made, so that the so-called Cuban debt had
swollen by 1868 to $18,000,000.
"In that year the ten years' war for Cuban independence broke out, a war
produced by causes so generally conceded to be just as to need no exposition
on this occasion. All the expenses of this war were imposed upon Cuba, so

696 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
that in 1880, according to a statement made at Madrid in that year by a Span
ish Secretary for the Colonies, the so-called Cuban debt amounted to upwards
of $170,000,000. "Subsequently the Spanish government undertook to consolidate these
debts, and to this end created in 1886 the so-called Billetes hipotecario's de la
Isla de Cuba, to the amount of 620,000,000 pesetas, or $124,000,000. The
Spanish government undertook to pay these bonds and the interest thereon
out of the revenues of Cuba, but the national character of the debt was shown
by the fact that, upon the face of the bonds, 'the Spanish nation' (la Nacidn
Espafiola) guarantee their payment. The annual charge for interest and
sinking fund on account of this debt amounted to the sum of 39,191,000
pesetas, or $7,838,200, which was disbursed through a Spanish financial insti
tution, called the Banco Hispano-Colonial, which is said to have collected daily
from the custom house at Havana, through an agency there established, the
sum of $33,339.
"In 1890 a new issue of bonds was authorized by the Spanish government
to the amount, as it is understood, of 875,000,000 pesetas, or $175,000,000,
with the same guarantee as before, apparently with a view to refund the prior
debt, as well as to cover any new debts contracted between 1886 and 1890. It
seems, however, that only a small number of these bonds had been disposed of
when, in February, 1895, the last insurrection and movement for independence
broke out. The government of Spain then proceeded to issue these new
bonds for the purpose of raising funds with which to suppress the uprising, so
that those outstanding on January 1, 1898, amounted, according to published
reports, to 858,550,000 pesetas, or $171,710,000. In addition to these a further
loan, known as the 'Cuban War Emergency Loan,' was, as the American
Commissioners are advised, floated to the amount of 800,000,000 pesetas or
$160,000,000, represented by what are called 'five per cent peseta bonds.'
"Although it does not appear that any mention is made in these bonds of
the revenues of Cuba, it is understood that they are regarded in Spain as
properly constituting apart of the 'Cuban debt,' together with various unliqui
dated debts, large in amount, incurred by the Spanish authorities in opposing
by arms the independence of Cuba.
"From no point of view can the debts above described be considered as
local debts of Cuba or as debts incurred for the benefit of Cuba. In no sense
are they obligations properly chargeable to that island. They are debts

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 697
created by the government of Spain, for its own purposes and through its own
agents, in whose creation Cuba had no voice. ' '
In reply to this the Spanish Commission asserted that, "as a general rule,
the island of Cuba has not since its discovery covered its own expenses.
"As long as Spain kept the American colonies the island was sustained
by the pecuniary aid of her sisters and specially by that of the Vice-Royalty
of Mexico. In this century, for a very few years, she had a surplus, thanks
to the development of her natural resources, at last obtained through this
assistance, and it is true that this surplus was turned over to the treasury of
the Peninsula. But with this exception it is patent that the general accounts
of the Spanish state from 1896-1897 show that the treasury of the Peninsula
advanced to Cuba, in the years preceding that recent period, a sum amounting
to 429,602,013.08 pesetas. There also appears an advance to Porto Rico of
3,220,488.67 pesetas, and to Santo Domingo 1,397,161.69 pesetas.
"The prosperity of Cuba was of short duration; for the greater part of
the time from the days of Columbus, by reason either of the scarcity of its
inhabitants or of the slavery of the black race, which formed the majority, or
lastly because Spaniards preferred to colonize other parts of America, the
island was unable to develop its natural resources ; and it was nevertheless
constantly necessary to expend in the island the large sums which were
required for the establishment of reform and the creation of the institutions
which are the essential conditions of modern life."
The Spanish Commission protested against an assertion in the American
memorandum that the insurrections in Cuba were the outcome of just griev
ances, and regretted that such an assertion should have been made. The
American Commission "would surely, and with good reason, regret that the
Spanish Commission should say anything here without an imperative necessity
of the justice of the rebellions of the natives of the immense American territory
which the United States had so often to suppress with an iron hand, and if it
should also say anything of the right by which the Southern States attempted
to break the federal bond by the force of arms. ' '
It was "very natural," the Spaniards proceeded, "that the American
Commissioners should not have such accurate knowledge as is requisite for
precise judgment of the acts of the Spanish administration in the Peninsula or
in its colonies.
"And we find a confirmation of this in the facts.

698 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
"In regard to the argument against the recognition of a certain part of
the Cuban debt, on the ground that the rebellion of a minority of the Cuban
people to obtain their independence was just, we have only to make the fol
lowing remark :
"The insurgent minority, it is true, rose up in arms to secure the inde
pendence of the island. The United States erroneously believed that their
cause was just, and by force of arms caused it to prevailagainst Spain. But
now the facts have shown that Spain was right, as the United States them
selves have had to recognize that the Cuban people are not as yet in such con
ditions as are necessary to entitle them to the enjoyment of full liberty and
sovereignty. It is upon this ground that the United States have decided to
withhold from that people the said privileges and to hoid them under Ameri
can control, until they become able to enjoy that liberty prematurely
demanded by them."
In order to define the debts the Americans should assume the Spaniards
presented an article, providing:
"All pecuniary charges and obligations outstanding upon the ratification
of this treaty of peace which, after a minute examination into their origin,
purpose and the conditions of their creation, should be held, pursuant to strict
law and undeniable equity, to be distinct from such as are properly and
peculiarly chargeable to the treasury of the Peninsula, and to have been
always properly and peculiarly Cuban.
"To make the strict examination provided for in the foregoing paragraph,
the two High Contracting Parties shall name a Commission of competent and
impartial persons in the manner to be determined in the proper article of this
treaty. ' '
As to the powers of the Commissioners, the Spanish Commission quoted
the Secretary of State and the President, as follows:
"After the three conditions which the Secretary of State at Washington,
replying on July 30 last to the message of the government of Her Catholic
Majesty of the 2 2d of the said month, proposed to Spain for the termination of
the war, he said: 'If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their entirety
commissioners will be named by the United States to meet similarly author
ized commissioners on the part of Spain for the purpose of settling the details
of the treaty of peace and signing and delivering it under the terms above
indicated. ' These details do not appear to be circumscribed to the archipelago.

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 699
"The very President of the American Republic in the conference he held
on August 10 with the Ambassador of France, representing Spain for the time
being, made an absolute distinction between the Protocol and the treaty of
peace, stating that the former should only be a mere preliminary document
which should have no object or effect other than to record without any delay
the agreement of the two governments upon the principles themselves of the
peace, and that, therefore, it would not be necessary to reserve therein either
the rights of the Cortes or those of the Federal Senate, who were charged
only with the ratification of the final treaty.
"The President, it is true, spoke of the Philippine question to state that it
was reserved for the Paris conference; but he never said, or even intimated,
that this subject should be the only one to be treated by this conference "
This was followed up with these interesting observations:
"The American Commission, in order to sustain its inadmissible opinios.
regarding the abandonment by Spain of the island of Cuba, relies on the
difference which appears in the Protocol itself. They say that Spain agreed
to cede only Porto Rico to the United States, while she bound herself to relin
quish the island of Cuba. From this they deduce that the effects of the obli
gation of Spain with respect to one are broader than with respect to the
other. We have already proved, by the very text of the draft of articles
presented by the said gentlemen that when they drew it up they did not even
perceive this difference in the effects with respect to Spain. The difference,
nevertheless, is well understood under another aspect. The United States
made a demand on Spain and afterwards declared war on her that Cuba might
become free and independent. And it is clear that having conquered they
could not demand that the 'island be ceded to them, ignoring the liberty and
independence thereof, as this would give cause to the world to believe that
such liberty and independence had not been the true cause of the conflict.
They did not make the same demand regarding Porto Rico, and did subse
quently claim the sovereignty of the latter island and of the others surround
ing Cuba (which will render impossible its independence without the will and
gracious consent of the United States, which will always have it at their
mercy owing to their control over the islands surrounding it like a band of
iron) in the way of indemnity for the expenses of the war and of the damages
which they said American citizens had suffered during the colonial
insurrection. This is the natural explanation of why in the Protocol the

700 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
sovereignty of one island appears as relinquished and that of the others
as ceded. ' '
The Spaniards proceeded to state the fact that we had repeatedly paid
for land, citing the cases of Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico and Alaska, and
now we were demanding from Spain, in the way of war indemnity, not only
the cession of islands but additionally that the burdens which encumbered
them, "as well as their sister Cuba, be thrown upon the mother country, who
with her own hands introduced them into the life of the civilized world. "
In concluding their very lengthy and able memorandum the Spanish
Commission remarked, with eloquent impressiveness, it is only fair to say :
"It results, in recapitulation, that the only question up to now in existence
between the two Commissions and awaiting their decision is a question of
money, which as far as one of the High Contracting Parties is concerned is
relatively of secondary importance. That question is the one which relates
to the colonial debt.
"The Spanish Commissioners understand that a question of such a nature
as this cannot fail to be solved satisfactorily between two parties, one of
which is the greatest nation of the new world, immensely rich and" prosperous,
blessed with inexhaustible resources, whether due to nature or to the
prodigious activity of its inhabitants, which on the other hand acquires by this
treaty territories of great importance, and thereby fulfills an aspiration of its
policy in America, while the other party is a great and noble nation of the old
world, a cordial friend of her late antagonist in days for her more prosperous,
but now impoverished through the misfortunes heaped upon her during the
century which is about to terminate; whose treasury is overburdened by
obligations, and for whom the present treaty will mean the solemn confirma
tion of the loss of the last remnants of her American empire, although through
her discovery of the new world she was instrumental in the very existence of
the Great American Republic, and to the enrichment of the modern nations,
perhaps at the expense of her own welfare and to the detriment of the full
development of the great elements of wealth accumulated in her own bosom
but neglected through her desire preferentially to attend to her colonies
creatures who like others in the order of nature enlist the utmost solicitude
on the part of their mother, who feeds and supports them at the sacrifice of
her own welfare."
In replying to this remarkable manifesto in a memorandum, which is

THE TREATY OF PEACE, 701
marked by the passionate dignity of an uncommon and transcendent sorrow,
the American Commission said that in offering the precise stipulations of the
Protocol they "sought to put aside the controversy raised by the Spanish
proposals as to the relinquishment of sovereignty and the assumption of the
Cuban debt, and to afford the Spanish Commissioners an opportunity to meet
them on the common ground of what the two governments had unmistakably
agreed to. It was and is now apparent that on the composite subject, as the
Spanish Commissioners consider it to be, of the relinquishment of sovereignty
over Cuba and the assumption of the Cuban debt, the views expressed on the
one side and on the other are irreconcilable, and that, unless some common
ground is found, the conference is at an end. In this crisis the American
Commissioners conceived that both sides might, without any compromise of
principle or of opinion, agree that, instead of amplifying the words of the
Protocol, or substituting for them argumentative stipulations, they would
execute the promise in the words in which it was made. They -regret that
the Spanish Commissioners rejected this conciliatory proposition.
"The Spanish Commissioners, in the memorandum now under considera
tion, recur to the distinction which they have sought to make between the
words 'abandon' and 'relinquish.' On this verbal question, which was
raised by the Spanish Commissioners in their memorandum of the nth of
October, the American Commissioners find no occasion to add anything to
what they have already said ; but they feel called upon to repel the imputa
tion that they have sought either to leave Cuba in a derelict condition or to
evade any responsibility to which their government is by its declarations or
its course of conduct committed. ' '
Touching the Spanish claims that they had made recent "advances" to
Cuba, the American Commission observed:
"It is to be regretted that details were not given. But, by the very term
'advances' it is evident that the Spanish memorandum does not refer to gifts,
but to expenditures for the reimbursement of which Cuba was expected ulti
mately to provide ; and the American Commissioners do not doubt that these
expenditures were made for the carrying on of the war, or the payment of war
expenses, in Cuba.
"When the American Commissioners, in their memorandum of the 14th
instant, referred to the Cuban insurrection of 1868 as the product of just
grievances, it was not their intention to offend the sensibilities of the Spanish

702 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
Commissioners, but to state a fact which they supposed to be generally
admitted. They might, if they saw fit to do so, cite the authority of man)
eminent Spanish statesmen in the support of their remark.
"The American •Commissioners have read without offense the reference
in the Spanish memorandum to the Indian rebellions which it has been
necessary for the United States to suppress, for -they are unable to see any
parallel between the uprisings of those barbarous and often savage tribes,
which have disappeared before the march of civilization because they were
unable to submit to it, and the insurrections against Spanish rule in Cuba,
insurrections in which many of the noblest men of Spanish blood in the island
have participated.
"Nor are the American Commissioners offended by the reference of the
Spanish memorandum to the attempt of the Southern States to secede. The
Spanish Commissioners evidently misconceive the nature and the object of
that movement. The war of secession was fought and concluded upon a
question of constitutional principle, asserted by one party to the conflict and
denied by the other. It was a conflict in n© respect to be likened to the
uprisings against Spanish rule in Cuba.
"The American Commissioners are unaware of the ground on which it is
asserted in the Spanish memorandum that the United States has been com
pelled to admit that the Cuban people are as yet unfit for the enjoyment of
full liberty and sovereignty. It is true that an intimation of such unfitness
was made in the note of the Spanish government on the 22d of July last.
The government of the United States, in its reply of the 30th of July, declared
that it did not share the apprehensions of Spain in this regard, but that it
recognized that in the present distracted and prostrate condition of the
island, brought about by the wars that had waged there, aid and guidance
would be necessary."
The Spaniards had said publicists had declared that the thirteen original
colonies of the United States had paid Great Britain ^15,000,000. The Amer
icans replied :
"The American Commissioners are not acquainted with the works of the
publicists who maintain that the thirteen original United States paid to Great
Britain ^15,000,000 sterling, presumably for the extinguishment of colonial
debts. The American Commissioners, however, feel no interest in the
matter, since the statement is entirely erroneous. The preliminary and

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 703
definitive treaties of peace between the United States and Great Britain of
1782 and 1783 were published soon after their conclusion, and have since been
republished in many forms. They are the only treaties made between the
two countries as to American independence, and they contain no stipulation
of the kind referred to. "
The American memorandum closes with these simple sentences :
"If it could be admitted, as is argued in the memorandum submitted by
the Spanish Commissioners, that the United States in this relation stands as
the agent of the Cuban people, the duty to resist the assumption of these
heavy obligations would be equally imperative. The decrees of the Spanish
government itself show that these debts were incurred in the fruitless
endeavors of that Government to suppress the aspirations of the Cuban people
for greater liberty and freer government. "
The next move of the Spaniards was to assume and assert a policy in the
cases of the Philippines and the West Indian islands. The reply of the
American Commission was:
"The American Commissioners are not disturbed by this charge of incon
sistency, since they deem it obviously groundless. They based their demands
in regard to Cuba and Porto Rico upon the precise terms of the Protocol,
because it was in those very terms that the United States had made its
demands and Spain had conceded them, by promising to 'relinquish all claim
of sovereignty over and title to Cuba,' and to 'cede' to the United States Porto
Rico and certain other islands. The United States, in insisting upon the
words of the Protocol on these subjects, merely asked that the precise con
cessions of Spain be made good.
"In the case of the Philippines, the United States, except as to the bay,
city, and harbor of Manila, confined itself to demanding that the subject
should be left in the widest and fullest sense for future negotiations. While
it did not, with the exception referred to, demand specific concessions, it
reserved and secured the right to demand them. Its position, therefore, is,
not that its present demands in respect of the Philippines were specifically set
out in the Protocol, but that they are justified by and included in the right which
it therein expressly reserved and secured to make demands in the future."
The Spanish Commission had been sensitive from the first meeting of the
Commissioners about the fate of the Philippines, and protested October 17th
against the sending of American reinforcements to Manila, the president of

704 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
the Spanish Committee stating "that he had received from his government a
telegram referring to reports to the effect that two American men-of-war
were about to leave American ports with reinforcements of troops for the gar
rison at Manila, and that Spanish prisoners in the possession of the Tagalos
are ill-treated." But the telegram was not read.
There is a curious passage in one of the memorandums, charging that
General Merritt, "after the Protocol was signed, contrary to what had been
agreed upon, forcibly took possession of Manila," and in the terms of the
capitulation the words occurred "or when the American army evacuates,"
and the Spanish memorandum goes on to say :
"In the conference held on August 4 last, between Mr. Cambon,
Ambassador from France, and President McKinley, in the presence of the
United States Secretary of State, Mr. Cambon made some remarks as to the
session of Porto Rico in compensation for the expenses of the war, and the
President, showing himself inflexible upon that point, repeated his assertion
that the Philippine question was the only one not finally settled in his mind.
It was then that Mr. Cambon asked for an explanation about the meaning of
the above cited phrases in Article III. of the Protocol, relating to the Philip
pine Archipelago, as the language of said Article might lend itself to inspire
fear in Spain in regard to her sovereignty over these islands. President
McKinley answered him, verbatim, as follows :
" 'I do not want any ambiguity to be allowed to remain on this point.
The negotiators of both countries are the ones who shall resolve upon the
permanent advantages (notice that he said "advantages," and not "rights")
which we shall ask in the archipelago, and decide upon the intervention (con-
trole), disposition and government of the Philippine Islands.'
"He further said: 'The Madrid government can rest assured that up to
now nothing is decided a priori, in my own mind, against Spain, nor do I
consider anything decided by it against the United States.'
"Is it therefore doubtful that on the 12th of August, when the Secretary
of State of the United States signed the Protocol, the President of the United
States had no idea of demanding from Spain the cession to the United States
of her sovereignty over the archipelago?"
There was further comment upon the President's open-mindedness as to
the Philippines, and this gave rise to the most interesting episode of the
arduous and contentious negotiations, which, stated by the American Com-

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 7°5
mission, in constant communication by the cable with the President himself,
has every authenticity of authority, and is official history. The Spanish Com
mission had gone so far as to say that on the 13th of August, "General Mer
ritt, commander of the American forces in Manila, and the Admiral of the
fleet in that bay, demanded the surrender of the place, and as its authorities
did not agree thereto, the said forces opened fire on the San Antonio Abad
powder magazine and on the trenches which defended the city on the land
side, unnecessarily causing a considerable number of losses to the Spanish
forces, who would have peacefully delivered the city over to the Americans
in obedience to the third basis of the Protocol that they might hold it as a
guaranty pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace.
"General Merritt entered Manila by force, he made prisoners of war of its
garrison made up of eight or nine thousand men, he took possession of the
public funds and the collection of taxes, including customs receipts, he named
as Intendant General and Administrator of the Public Treasury, and Tax
Collector, the officers of his army he saw fit, thereby displacing the Spanish
officials. He relieved the Spanish Commander of the civil guard charged with
. the maintenance of public order; he constituted military courts ; he opened
the port of Manila and all the other ports of the Philippines in the possession
of his land and naval forces to the commerce of his nation and of neutral
nations, conditioned on the payment of the dues in force at the time of his
arrival, which were collected by his officials. All of this is recorded in the
preliminary minute of the capitulation of August 13, in the capitulation of the
14th itself, in the proclamation of General Merritt of like date, in his orders of
the 22d and 23d of the same month, and in the others dictated by the Ameri
can authorities and officials in Manila.
"The Spanish government remonstrated to that of Washington through
the French Embassy against everything that occurred there on August 29 and
the 3d and nth of September last, repeating such remonstrances since and
down to the present time, signally insisting upon the immediate release of the
garrison held prisoners in Manila and upon the return of their arms, since, on
the one hand, it could not send reinforcements from the Peninsula to the
archipelago, nor would the United States look favorably upon such an
action, and, on the other hand, it needed those forces to liberate the thou
sands of Spanish prisoners of the Tagalo insurgents, victims of their ill-treat
ment and to combat and dominate that insurrection of its own subjects. The

706 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
remonstrances of the Spanish government have been up to the present fruit
less. These acts are daily assuming a worse phase. On September 21
Captain W. P. Moffatt, appointed by the American Provost Marshal in charge
of the Bilibid prisons, with authority to regulate the entrance and release of
all kinds of prisoners, released two, named Silvestre Lacoy and Marcos
Alarcon, charged with the offense of highway robbery; two others charged
with desertion; six charged with contempt of authority; another charged
with assault and robbery, and three others charged with homicide. As is
seen, all these prisoners were in jail for common crimes. This unheard-of
act was communicated to the government of Her Catholic Majesty by the
Commandant General's Office of the station of Manila."
The American Commission says of this: "The American Commissioners
are loth to assume that the Spanish 'proposition' employs these words for the
purpose of intimating that General Merritt could at the time of the capture
of Manila have had knowledge of the Protocol. It is a fact doubtless well
known to the Spanish government that on the 16th of August last, four days
after the signature of the protocol, and four days before the receipt at Wash
ington of the news of the capture and capitulation of Manila, the Depart
ment of State addressed to the French Ambassador a note soliciting the
consent of the Spanish government to the restoration of cable communica
tion between Manila and Hongkong, in order that continuous telegraphic
connection with the Philippines might be reestablished."
The Spaniards descended from their pose of dignity in this instance. The
President of the United States could just as well have forced the cession of
the Philippines as of Porto Rico, but deemed it his duty to refer the question
of our permanency in the archipelago to the people of the United States.
The raid of the Spanish Commission upon the facts as to the Philippines
exhibits a weakness that takes away sympathy from the Commissioners when
representing the misfortunes of their country; they were from the beginning
conscious that however adroit their ability, or vigorous their protests the
inevitable end was Spain's surrender.
There is compensation for the general reader in the narration the Ameri-
can'Commissioners give of the part of the President in the preparation of the
Peace Protocol.
The President on the 26th of July received a note asking him to name the
terms on which peace might be obtained. This note was presented to the

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 707
President of the United States on the 26th day of July, 1898, by Mr. Cambon,
Ambassador of the French Republic at Washington, authorized to make the
application, and represent the Spanish government in the subsequent negotia
tions which, led up to the execution of the Protocol. At that meeting, the
President received the note, of July 22 from the Spanish government, and
advised Mr. Cambon that after consultation with his Cabinet he would pre
pare an answer which could be transmitted to the Spanish government. On
July 30, following, the terms of peace having been carefully considered and
agreed upon by the President and his Cabinet, the President, received Mr.
Cambon at the Executive Mansion in Washington, at which meeting were
also present Mr. Thi6bault, Secretary of the French Embassy in Washington,
and the then Secretary of State of the United States. The answer of the
President to the communication of the Spanish government, dated July 30,
1898, was then read to Mr. Cambon. This note was in the exact form in
which it was afterwards signed and delivered to Mr. Cambon to be sent to the
Spanish government, with a single exception. After some discussion of the
terms of the note as to Cuba, and Porto Rico, and other West Indian islands,
Mr. Cambon said he did not know what the Spanish government would desire
as to the Philippines, and no matter what the note might say as to the Com
mission, the Spanish government would regard the purpose of the United
States as being fixed to acquire not only Cuba and Porto Rico, but the Philip
pines as well. The President said that as to the Philippines the note
expressed the purposes of this government, and their final disposition would
depend upon the treaty to be negotiated by the Commissioners and ratified by
the interested governments.
After further discussion, in which the President reiterated that the
treaty must determine the fate of the Philippines, and the note of the Presi
dent on that subject reading then as now with the single exception that the
word "possession" was then in Article III., so that it read "control, possession
and government of the Philippines," where it now reads "control, disposition
and government of the Philippines," Mr. Cambon said that the word "pos
session" translated into Spanish in such a way as to be regarded as of a
severe and threatening nature, and suggested a change in that word. He
suggested the word "condition. " The President declined to change the word
except for a word of similar import or meaning. The word "disposition"
oeing suggested, after considerable talk the President consented that that

7o8 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
word, not changing the meaning, being indeed a broader one and including
possession, might be substituted. Thereupon the note at the close of the
interview of July 30, in exactly the form it was originally cast with the
single change of the word "disposition" for "possession," was delivered to
Mr. Cambon to be communicated to the Spanish government.
On Wednesday, August 3, in the_ afternoon, Mr. Cambon having inti
mated a desire for a further interview with the President, another meeting
between the same persons was held at the Executive Mansion. Mr. Cambon
said the Spanish government had received the answer of the President, and
that it was regarded by Spain as very severe. After asking a modification as
to Porto Rico, to which the President promptly answered that he could not
consent, Mr. Cambon said there was a disposition to believe in Spain that the
United States intended to take the Philippine group ; that the Spanish govern
ment appreciated that reforms were -necessary in the government; that Amer
ican privileges should be granted ; but that Spanish sovereignty should not be
interfered with was a matter which Spain would insist upon. The President
answered that the question of Cuba, Porto Rico and other West India islands,
and the Ladrones, admitted of no negotiation; that the disposition of the
Philippine Islands, as he had already said to Mr. Cambon, must depend upon
the treaty which might be negotiated, and that he could not make any change
in the terms theretofore submitted. Mr. Cambon called attention to the
wording of the note as to the possession of the city, bay and harbor of Manila
to be retained during the pendency of the treaty, and asked what was to be
done with them afterwards. The President said that must depend upon the
terms of the treaty.
This is the same interview alluded to in the memorandum of the Span
ish Commissioners as having occurred on the 4th of August. It in fact
occurred on the afternoon of August 3, the difference in date arising from the
fact, no doubt, that it was reported on the 4th of August. This could make
but little difference, as there was but one interview at that time.
In reporting the conversations, and comparing the memoranda made by
Mr. Cambon with those made by the representative of the American govern
ment then present, it must be borne in mind that Mr. Cambon did not speak
or understand English, but communicated with the President through the
medium of an interpreter, his Secretary, and that neither of the American
representatives understood or spoke the French language. Making this allow-

Gen. Hughes. Capt. Murray. Gen. Otis. Lieut. Sanders. Lieut.-Col. Barry.
GENERAL E. S. OTIS AND STAFF ON PORCH OF MALACANAN PALACE, MANILA.

MALACANAN PALACE AND PASIG RIVER, MANILA.

GENERAL OTIS AND STAFF. DINING ROOM. MALACANAN PALACE. MANILA.

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 711
ance, it is perfectly apparent that the American President, even in the version
reported and transcribed in the memorandum of the Spanish Commission, at
all times maintained that the treaty of peace should determine the control,
disposition and government of the Philippines The President did say that
the Philippine question was the only one left open for negotiation and settle
ment in the treaty. It is undoubtedly true that it was not then fully settled
in his own mind as to what disposition should be made of the Philippines.
Had it been, there would have been nothing to leave to negotiation and
;ettlement in the treaty. It was the purpose of the President in everything
written and spoken of to leave to the negotiators of the treaty the most ample
freedom with reference to the Philippines, and to settle, if their negotiations
should result in an agreement, the control, disposition and government of
those islands in the treaty of peace. When Mr. Cambon spoke of Spain's
purpose to retain sovereignty over those islands, the President did say he
wanted it clearly understood that no ambiguity should remain upon that
point, but that the whole matter should be decided as set forth in the treaty
of peace, which should determine the control, disposition and government of
the Philippine Islands. He certainly did not use the word "intervention," nor
limit the subject of negotiation to "advantages" in the Philippines; nor could it
be claimed that any report was made to the Spanish government of the precise
English words used by the President. In the same paragraph quoted in the
memorandum of the Spanish Commission in which it is said he used the
words above quoted, it is added that the President also said the negotiators
should decide upon the "intervention" (controle), disposition and government
of the Philippine Islands. Even this version of the conversation is ample
proof that the President showed no uncertainty as to the scope and meaning of
the terms used. He did say in substance, in reply to the inquiry of Mr.
Cambon as to whether the United States had -prejudged the matter of the
Philippine Islands and the rights to be acquired therein by the United States,
that the case had not been prejudged either as to the United States or as to
Spain. The whole matter would be left to the Commission for negotiation,
and to be settled by the treaty of peace. In the meantime, the United States
would insist upon holding Manila as laid down in the note, and its disposition
thereafter would depend upon the terms of the treaty. This is reported in
the quotation in the Spanish note as, the utterance of the President that "the
Madrid government can rest assured that up to now nothing is decided a

712 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
priori in my own mind against Spain, nor do I consider anything decided by
it against the United States." This may not be an unfair interpretation,
though not the exact words used by the President. It shows clearly that he
did not regard the United States as limited to 'advantages in the Philippines,'
but the whole matter, being undecided in the President's mind, was left open
in accordance with the terms of the note. The case was not decided in
advance in any of its aspects either for or against either government.
Great stress was laid in the Spanish memorandum upon the allegation
that the President had not then determined to take the Philippine group, and
indeed did not intend to do so. It is utterly immaterial to inquire as to
what either government would then have insisted upon. There was a mutual
agreement that the question should not then be decided. Opportunity for
full investigation was reserved, the final conclusion to be arrived at as the
result of the negotiations then in progress, in the treaty of peace to be con
cluded. Further conversation as to the number of Commissioners, the place of
meeting, et cetera, terminated the interview.
On the afternoon of August 9, Mr. Cambon, having received the note of
August 7 sent by the Duke of Almodovar, called by appointment at the
Executive Mansion in Washington, at which interview were present the same
parties as at the last meeting. The part of that note which relates to the
Philippines, in the exact terms in which it was then presented in English text
by the French Ambassador to the President of the United States, is as
follows :
"The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be
quite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United States
believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor and the city of
Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, cannot be that of con
quest, since in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet
in spite of the siege established on land by a native supported and provided
for by the American Admiral, Manila still holds its own, and the Spanish
standard still waves over the city. On the other hand, the whole Archipelago
of the Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain.
Therefore, the government of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of
Manila should constitute a guaranty. It is stated that the treaty of peace
shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines •

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 713
but as the intentions of the Federal government by regression remain veiled,
therefore the Spanish government must declare that, while accepting the third
condition, they do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the
Archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms as the
condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their natives may
render desirable.
"The government of Her Majesty accepts the third condition, with
the above mentioned declarations.
"Such are the statements and observations which the Spanish govern
ment has the honor to submit in reply to your Excellency's communication.
They accept the proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes of the
Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties.
"The agreement between the two governments implies the irremeable
suspension of hostilities and the designation of Commissioners for the purpose
of settling the details of the treaty of peace and of signing it, under the terms
above indicated."
It is translated in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners in-
language differing somewhat from the terms of the note as presented to the
President. In the translation in the memorandum it is said that the treaty
shall determine "the intervention, disposition and government of the Philip
pine Islands." In the note as presented to the President it reads, "It. is stated
that the treaty of' peace shall determine the control, disposition and govern
ment of the Philippines." The word "entire" precedes "sovereignty" in the
translation embodied in the Spanish note.
It is true that, taking these words of the Duke of Almodovar either as
they were conveyed to the President of the United States, or as they were
quoted in the Spanish proposition, it may be argued that they did no more than
reserve to Spain the right to maintain that she did not in advance of the
negotiations for peace -renounce her sovereignty over the Archipelago. She
did this, by her own declaration, for the reason that the intentions of the
United States were "veiled"; clearly perceiving that by the terms of the
demand the United States would have the right, if it saw fit to exercise it, to
ask that she yield her sovereignty over the group, and that her sovereignty
was thus put in jeopardy, she took the precaution to say that she did not
intend, in assuming the chance of such a demand, to concede it in advance.
The American Commissioners did not deny that this might be a fair con-

714 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
struction of this particular paragraph of the Duke's note. The representa
tives of the United States were not willing, however, to leave anything to
construction. When, therefore, the Duke's answer was read to the President
it was immediately objected to by him and the Secretary of State, in that it
was vague and indefinite, purporting to accept the terms laid down in the note
of the United States, while requiring some modification. In referring to the
Philippines, while in one paragraph it stated the acceptance of the terms, in
another it seemed to retain the full right of sovereignty, with such reforms,
etc., as that government might see fit to grant. The unsatisfactory character
of this answer is more clearly shown when in the subsequent part of the same
note, not quoted in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners, it was
said without qualification that they (the Spanish government) accepted the
proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Corfes of the Kingdom, as
required by their constitutional duties. In the part of the note referred to
above it is said 'the Spanish government must declare that, while accepting
the said condition, they do not a. priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain
over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators, etc. ' These contradictory
statements were called to the attention of Mr. Cambon, and made the note, as
was said to him, unsatisfactory to the United States.
It is to be observed, as has already in effect been pointed out, that even
the terms of this note were inconsistent with the claim later put forward that
Spanish sovereignty should not be interfered with, for the length to which the
statement went in the note is that the Spanish government does not a priori
relinquish entire sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago, thus leaving it
clearly to be inferred that the Spanish government recognized that the
negotiations resulting in a treaty might require a relinquishment of Spanish
sovereignty consequent upon such negotiations.
Mr. Cambon, having heard the objections raised by the American
representatives to the note, asserted that allowance must be made for different
translations which the note had undergone in course of transmission, and to
the desire of the Spanish government to express regret at the loss of its
colonies; and he was very confident that it was the intention to accept the
terms of the United States. It was then suggested by the American repre
sentatives that if this was true, and the note was to be regarded as a full
acceptance, the best way to settle the matter was to put the terms in the
shape of a definite Protocol, which the President would authorize the Secre

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 715
tary of State to sign for the United States, Mr. Cambon to submit to the
Spanish government the exact terms of the Protocol, to which an answer Yes
or No could be had; and if the Spanish government accepted the Protocol,
that would end the controversy. Mr. Cambon concurred in this view, and
said if the Protocol was drawn up in proper form he would submit it to the
Spanish government, and if authorized would execute it on its part.
On that evening, August 9, the Protocol was prepared in the State
Department at Washington, and taken to the Executive Mansion, where it
was submitted to the President and members of the Cabinet there present.
On the morning of August 10 Mr. Cambon called at the State Department at
Washington, a draft of the Protocol was submitted to and approved by him,
and put into French by Mr. Thidbault, Secretary of the French 'Embassy at
Washington, and experts in the State Department. It was carefully com
pared with the English text, and then telegraphed by Mr. Cambon to t he
Spanish government. On the same day, August 10, the note of the Secre
tary of State enclosing the Protocol was sent to Mr. Cambon in Washington.
This note, it is said, contained the admission of the Secretary of State of the
United States that the note of the Duke of Almodovar of August 7 "contained
in its spirit the acceptance by Spain of the conditions proposed by the United
States." The best answer to this obvious misconstruction of the terms of the
note of the Secretary of State is in the text of the note itself, which is as follows:
"Department of State, Washington, August 10, 1898.
"Excellency: Although it is your understanding that the note of the
Duke of Almodovar, which you left with the President on yesterday after
noon, is intended to convey an acceptance by the Spanish government of the
terms set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo as the basis on which the Presi
dent would appoint Commissioners to negotiate and conclude with Com
missioners on the part of Spain a treaty of peace, I understand that we concur
in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transfor
mations which it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by
telegraph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it has reached the hands
of the President, entirely explicit.
"Under these circumstances, it is thought that the most direct and certain
way of avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a Protocol to be signed by
us as the representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain, the
terms on which the negotiations for peace are to be undertaken.

7i6 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
"I therefore enclose herewith a draft of such a Protocol, in which you will
find that I have embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of
the 30th ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations for the appointment of
Commissioners to arrange the details of the immediate evacuation of Cuba,
Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies,
as well as for the appointment of Commissioners to treat of peace.
"Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.
"(Signed) WILLIAM R. DAY.
"His Excellency, M. Jules Cambon, etc."
In this note, so far from saying that the Secretary of State of the United
States understood that the note of the Spanish government of August 7
accepted the American terms, it is distinctly said: "Although it is your (Mr.
Cambon's) understanding that the note of the Duke of Almodovar is intended
to convey the acceptance by the Spanish government of the terms set forth in
my note of the 30th ultimo, . . I understand that we concur in the
opinion that the Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transformations
which it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by tele
graph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it reached the hands of the
President, entirely explicit. "
Here it is distinctly stated that the Secretary of State and Mr. Cambon
concurred that the note was not entirely explicit. Was it then to be expected
after all this careful negotiation that a note which the American representatives
contended did not accept the terms of the United States, and which both
negotiators agreed was not explicit, was to be received as a satisfactory
answer to the American demand? Not so.
"Under these circumstances it was thought that the most direct and cer
tain way of avoiding misunderstanding was to embody in a Protocol to be
signed by the representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain,
the terms on which the negotiations for peace were to be undertaken. "
This is a most emphatic and definite declaration that the note of August
7 was not satisfactory, and that it was the purpose of the United States to
leave nothing open to misunderstanding, but to embody, in a contract so plain
that dispute would be forever foreclosed, the exact terms upon which negotia
tions for peace would be undertaken. The note goes on to say: "I therefore
enclose herewith a draft of such a Protocol, in which you will find that I have

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 7*7
embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of the 30th ultimo,
together with appropriate stipulations for the appointment of Commissioners,
etc." What does this note mean? Does it admit the construction that the
proposal was intended to embody the acceptance of August 7, reserving Span
ish sovereignty? It is definitely settled, as a perusal of the document will
show, that the Protocol embodied, not the uncertain and equivocal terms of
the note of August 7, but the precise terms stated in the note of the American
government of July 30. This note to Mr. Cambon enclosed the Protocol just
as it was written and just as it was signed by the parties. It would seem, if
ever an attempt was fairly made to have a clear understanding, if ever all
precautions were taken which could leave no room for misunderstanding,
such was the course pursued in this case.
It is thus seen how utterly groundless was the declaration in the Spanish
"proposition" that, in order to determine the meaning of the Protocol, it is
necessary to "bear in mind . . the negotiations carried on between the
two parties which culminated in this agreement, and in which the interpreta
tion of the latter had been given beforehand and officially!" In the corre
spondence thus invoked by the Spanish Commissioners as an interpretation of
the Protocol, the two governments did not contemplate the execution of such
an instrument; and if the response of the Spanish government to the Ameri
can demands had taken the form of a simple acceptance, no Protocol would
have been made. The first suggestion of such an instrument was that made
in the interview in which the Spanish response was declared to be unsatisfac
tory. It was because the Spanish response was unacceptable that the United
States demanded a Protocol. And it was upon this rejected response that the
Spanish argument for the limitation of the clear scope and meaning of the
Protocol was built.
If further "proof of the soundness of the position of the United States
were needed, it would be found in a most convincing form in the telegram
sent by Mr. Cambon to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. See the
French 'Yellow Book' referred to in the Spanish memorandum, telegram
number 9, Mr. Cambon to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
"No. 9. — M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at
Washington, to M. Delcass6, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
"Washington, August 10, 1898.
"The Federal government has decided to state precisely (pre"ciser), in a

718 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
Protocol, the bases upon which the peace negotiations must, in its judgment,
be entered upon.
"I send you herewith this document, which I shall thank you to transmit
to the Spanish government. (Signed) J. CAMBON."
In this telegram, which was immediately communicated to the Spanish
government, and which led to the telegram to Mr. Cambon authorizing him to
sign the Protocol, followed by full power from the Queen Regent to Mr.
Cambon to that effect, Mr. Cambon distinctly says, not that the American
government had accepted the note of August 7, or in any wise agreed to such
reservations as were contained therein, but that "the Federal government has
decided to state precisely (pr£ciser), in a Protocol, the bases upon which the
peace negotiations must, in its judgment, be entered upon."
It thus clearly appears that the bases of peace negotiations were to be
determined ' by the instrument which was enclosed, and which it was under
stood put in definite terms the ultimate agreement of the parties.
It was because the answer made in the note of August 7 was rejected by
the United States, and for this reason alone, that hostilities were not upon
the receipt of that note declared to be suspended; and it remained for the
Spanish Commissioners in their "proposition" to advance for the first time in
behalf of their government the suggestion that such a declaration should then
have been made. It was not so made because that note was not received as
an acceptance of the American demands. Hostilities were declared to be sus
pended only upon the signature of the Protocol.
The correspondence quoted in the French "Yellow Book, " no less than
the subsequent communications from Mr. Cambon to the American govern
ment, shows distinctly that with the exact terms of this Protocol before it, the
Spanish Government, on the nth instant, and subsequently by full power of
the Queen Regent, authorized Mr. Cambon to execute the Protocol in behalf
of Spain. Observe the language of the note of Mr. Cambon to the American
Secretary of State of August 12, 1898:
"Embassy of the French Republic in the United States,
"Washington, August 12, 1898.
"Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to inform you that I have just
received, through the intermediation of the Department of Foreign Affairs at
Paris, a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which the Duke of Almodovar

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 719
del Rio announces to me that, by order of Her Majesty the Queen Regent,
the Spanish government confers upon me full powers in order that I may
sign, without other formality and without delay, the Protocol whereof the
terms have been drawn up by common accord between you and me. The
instrument destined to make regular the powers which are thus given to me
by telegraph will be subsequently addressed to me by the post.
"His Excellency the Minister of State adds that in accepting this
Protocol, and by reason of the suspension of hostilities which will be the
immediate consequence of that acceptance, the Spanish government has pleas
ure in hoping that the government of the United States will take the neces
sary measures with a view to restrain (empecher) all aggression on the part of
the Cuban separatist forces.
"The government of the Republic having, on the other hand, authorized
me to accept the powers which are conferred upon me by the Spanish govern
ment, I shall hold myself at your disposition to sign the Protocol at the hour
you may be pleased to designate.
"Congratulating myself upon thus cooperating with you toward the
restoration of peace between the two nations, both friends of France, I beg
you to accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the fresh assurances of my very high
consideration. (Signed) JULES CAMBON."
In the light of these facts, it appears there was absolutely no foundation
for the claim that the American government accepted the Spanish reservations
so far as they are contained in the note of the Duke of Almodovar of August
7. Had that note been only a distinct and unqualified acceptance of the terms
as contained in the American note of August 30, it would have been
unnecessary to require that all uncertainty and doubt would be removed by
reducing into few and simple terms, which it was believed could never be
misunderstood, the final agreement of the parties. So far from remaining
unanswered, the note of August 7 was declared unsatisfactory when pre
sented to the President. Thus ended the attempt to come to an agreement
by correspondence; and it was decided that a Protocol should embody the
ultimate terms.
The Spanish government telegraphed the amplest authority to Mr.
Cambon to execute it. We were then remitted to the terms of the Protocol
itself.

720 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
The American government was at a loss to know how stronger terms could
have been used to evidence the purpose of the President to keep open the
most full and absolute right to deal with and determine the dominion over the
Philippine Islands. This was the purpose of inserting the third article of the
Protocol, which embodied the terms of the third demand of the United
States, as set forth in the note of July 30 of the American government to the
Duke of Almodovar, wherein it is said: "Third. On similar grounds the
United States is entitled to occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila
pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the con
trol, disposition and government of the Philippines."
What are these similar grounds? They are to be found in the next
preceding paragraph of the note of July 30, in which the President says that,
though not then making any demand for pecuniary indemnity, nevertheless
he could not be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States inci
dent to the war, or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons
and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore,
require the cession to the United States, and the immediate evacuation by
Spain, of the Island of Porto Rico, etc. On similar grounds, to wit, among
others the right of the United States to have indemnity for its losses, the
United States would hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the con
clusion of a treaty of peace, which should determine the control, disposition
and government of the Philippines.
How could the United States receive indemnity in whole or in part from
the control, disposition and government of the Philippines, if Spanish
sovereignty was not to be touched? It is difficult to conceive what terms
could have been used which would more clearly have evidenced the purpose
of the parties to afford the fullest latitude in dealing with the Philippine ques
tion. The treaty was to determine not alone the control, disposition and
government, but at the same time had full power to determine all that is
implied in control, disposition and government. Certainly the word "control"
was not used here in the senseof "register" or "inspection," but in its broader
sense of "authority or command; authority over; power over; the regulation
or rule of. ' '
What word could be broader than "disposition," which has practically the
same meaning in both the French and English languages? "The disposal of;
distribution of; alienation of; definite settlement of; ultimate destination."

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 721
We have in these two words, then, authority over, dominion of, final and
ultimate destination of the subject matter. What is "government" but the
right of administration, or exercising sovereignty, the direction, the political
management of a state? Either of these terms implies power of interfering
with sovereignty. Taken together, they give the fullest scope in dealing with
all power, governmental, territorial and administrative.
It is not argued in the Spanish "proposition" that these words should
have a narrow meaning so far as disposition and government are concerned,
but transcribed into the French language it is sought to give a narrower
meaning to the word "control. " It must be construed in the connection in
which it is found in the Protocol, in its broader sense of power or dominion.
"Noscitur a sociis" is a legal maxim which applies to the discussion or
determination of the meaning of phrases. "Control" associated with disposi
tion and government of territory might have a very different significance
w*hen used in another relation in its less familiar meaning of "inspection or
register." The word "disposition" used in another association might have an
entirely different meaning, and a meaning which, in connection with govern
ment and control, would deprive it of all sense.
The American government, then, felt itself amply supported in its
right to demand the cession of the Philippines with or without concessions,
relying upon either the exact terms of the Protocol, or those terms interpreted
in the light of negotiations, oral and written, which led to its execution.
The Commissioners of the United States noticed with regret that an
attempt had been made in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners to
invoke the high authority of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in the
interpretation of the Protocol, so as to exclude therefrom- all mention of the
right of the treaty to deal with the control, disposition and government of
the Philippines. In the French "Yellow Book" cited by the Spanish Com
missioners, it is apparent that as early as the 10th of August the French
government was in possession of the exact terms of the Protocol, transmitted
in the note of that date of its Ambassador, Mr. Cambon. Would anybody
believe that in summing up this note the Minister would intentionally omit
one of the most essential parts of the Protocol?
The note No. 19, referred to, is no part of the negotiations; its purpose
was merely to advise the Ambassadors of the French Republic at London,
St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, etc., of the result of the action of the repre-

722 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
sentative of France in bringing about a suspension of hostilities, and the
preliminary agreement as to peace, between two nations toward which the
French government was actuated by feelings of humanity and mutual friend
ship. In this note it is said that the points upon which both parties had
reached an agreement were set forth in a Protocol. In stating the contents of
that instrument, doubtless through inadvertence, it was not stated that the
treaty should determine the control, disposition and government of the
Philippines. The attention of the Minister being called to this matter by the Ameri
can Ambassador in Paris, he very promptly corrected any misapprehension
which might exist as to his despatch. This appears in the following letter
from the American Ambassador, which was received by the American Com
missioners : "Ambassade des Etats-Unis, 18, Avenue Kl£ber,
"Paris, November 5, 1898.
"Dear Sir: I beg to inform you that I saw the French Minister of For
eign Affairs in regard to that portion of the reply of the Spanish Peace Com
missioners in which they refer to a letter sent by him to the French
Ambassadors dated August 15, 1898, which appears in the French 'Yellow
Book,' and attempt to construe the language used therein as an interpretation
of the French Minister of the meaning of the Protocol, and speak of the
unquestionable moral weight of the testimony therein given by him regard
ing that instrument. He assured me emphatically and unreservedly that the
letter 'referred to was intended to be simply a brief resume of the general
features of the preliminary peace negotiations carried on between the two
belligerents, and that he did not attempt to quote the precise language of the
Protocol. He disclaimed any intention of giving any views of his own
regarding it, having no authority for so doing, and declared that the brief
mention contained in his letter could in no wise be construed as an interpre
tation b)' him of the terms or meaning of that instrument. He promised that
he would at once send to the French Ambassadors the full text of the Protocol
in order that they might be informed of its conditions in extenso, and that
there might be no ground for misapprehension as to its terms.
"The Minister repeated what he had said several times before, and
which I know to be true, that he and his government had all along observed
a strict and impartial neutrality between the two powers which were negotiat-

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 723
ing, being equally friendly to both, and that he intended to continue the
observance of such neutrality. Very truly yours,
"(Signed) HORACE PORTER.
"Hon. William R. Day,
"President of the American Peace Commission, Paris."
It was stated that the occupation of Manila was to be only temporary.
The Protocol, so far as it relates to the Philippines, is itself provisional.
It expressly provides for the doing of certain things pending the conclusion
of a treaty which is in this particular to supersede it. Had it provided for
the permanent occupation of Manila by the United States, it would have
withdrawn the Philippines to that extent from the sphere of future negotia
tion. The most presentable and seemly of the pleas of the Spanish commission
for shouldering the Cuban debts upon the United States as an obligation of
the transferred sovereignty, to be handed over to the Cubans if they became a
nation, was this:
' ' In the memorandum which we are now answering, the singular affirma
tion is made that the mortgage created by the two issues above named can
be called more properly a subsidiary guarantee, and that the party principally
bound to pay is the Spanish nation. Undoubtedly the American Commission
in making this affirmation had not before its eyes Article II. of the Royal
Decree of May 10, 1886, authorizing the issue of 1,240,000 hypothecary bonds
of the Island of Cuba, or the 2d paragraph of Article II. of the Ro3'al Decree
of September 27, 1890, authorizing the issue of 1,750,000 hypothecary bonds
of the same island. Both texts read literally the same thing, and it will be
sufficient for us to transcribe one of them. Their language is as follows:
'The new bonds shall have the direct (especial) guarantee of the customs
revenue, stamp revenue of the island of Cuba, direct and indirect taxes now
levied or to be levied there in the future, and the subsidiary (general) guar
antee of the Spanish nation. They shall be exempt from all ordinary and ex
traordinary taxes, etc' "
Unquestionably, from the accustomed foundations for the building of
nations, in material facts, it would have been simpler and stronger for the
President to have demanded the cession of Cuba as of Porto Rico, but the effu
sion of Congress when it rushed to war had made difficulty in that direction,
and the President had deftly and sturdily resisted the torrent that was driving

724 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
him upon the rock of the recognition of the national character of the Cuban
faction that had monopolized the functions of the ancient Spanish Junta system,
and the notorious Key West bureau of misinformation. The President was
greatly wdse in this, and in referring the Philippine question to the sober
second thought of the people of the United States. He did not exert to the
utmost the expression of his tremendous power, for that might have been
mistaken for imperialism. He followed the high and holy traditions of our
form of republicanism, and has been the faithful embodiment of the will of
the people; and more than that, he has sought to know their will.
He had faith in the people of Cuba, taught in schools of sorrow to take
their part in a system of self-government, but he has not confounded the
Cubans in the United States engaged in finance with credit based upon the
ashes of the conflagration kindled by Gomez with the people of Cuba, who
would restore the opulent industries of the island. A people of Cuba exist,
and they are not entirely or principally those who have appeared in the phan
tom armies that ambuscaded and terrorized the Spanish columns with agility
and mystery. The people of Cuba are not those who, after applying the torch to the
cane fields and the tobacco leaves, that come visible wealth from the red and
black soil and the indigo sky of the island, have mustered under the banner
of the torch of San Domingo, ready for the American pay-roll, and also to
make war for, the poor plunder the island affords after the visitation of fire,
that impoverished Cuba rather than the Peninsula of Spain. It is true that
the deliberation of the President and people of the United States and the
characteristic delays associated with the dignities of the Senate, allowed the
Tagalos of Luzon to strike for a rule despotic and superstitious dictatorship
of their own under a man who may be a soldier but is not a statesman; and
this is in harmony with the stated courses of the methods of the people who
do govern themselves.
It would have been happy if the Senate had ratified at once the splendid
treaty with Spain, the fitting crown of a war of triumphs, but time is needed
for obtaining the consensus of a multitude of wills trained in the individu
alities of free politics under popular dominion. The delay was mischievous,
but the recompense is in the greater strength that comes at last, indicating
one of the primary and grander truths of republicanism, that it is stronger
than the imperialism that rests upon despots and dynasties that are degenerate.

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 725
The country is indebted no less to the military energy of General Mer
ritt than to the brilliant ability and tenacity of Admiral Dewey, for the
victories in which but little of the blood of the victors was spilled, for our
possession of the capital of the Philippine Archipelago. General Merritt
forced the fight, and Admiral Dewey smashed the defense by the seaside of
Manila so that the storming of the town became a spectacle rather than a
combat, and he was just in time. Neither the Spanish nor the American
Commission seemed to have been perfectly informed or quite ingenuous in
their information and use of the cable, the disability of which at one time
caused delay, and at another hastened conclusion.
The cable was cut by Dewey after the Spaniards had refused to neutralize
its service, and a piece was taken out of it, the operators were scattered and the
instruments gone, so that if both sides had been agreed some time must have
elapsed before resumption of business. And things that might readily have
happened would have vastly changed the Philippine situation — if Dewey had
departed after destroying the Spanish fleet, and if Merritt had not rushed the
American army, the smaller of the three forces in and about the city, so that
he had the Spanish army captives in the walled city, and the Filipino forces
relegated to the country, before the peace Protocol was announced.
The Spanish Commissioners' solemn sentences became grotesque touching
this phase of the subject, and the American people took their time and way to
find their sovereign will and pleasure, as to the disposition of the Philippines,
and their commandments will henceforth be executed both in the East and
the West Indies.
CEREMONIES CONCLUDING THE WAR WITH SPAIN.
Actually, the war with Spain that began with the battle of the bay of
Manila, May 1, concluded August 13, with the capitulation of the city of
Manila, the Protocol of Peace having been signed in Washington two days
before, the fact, in the broken condition of the cable, not being known in the
Philippines until transmitted in dispatch boat from Hongkong. The declara
tion of war by the United States was on the 21st of April. The official close
of the war was on April 11, the period of a legal state of hostilities lacking
ten days of a year. The importance of fixing the date is in the effect the
formal end of the war has upon the terms of enlistment of our volunteers.
The ceremony of the restoration of a state of peace under the law was the

726 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
exchange of ratifications in the reception room of the White House. The
exact time was April n, 3 p. m. Among the witnesses attracted by the his
toric character of the event were man}* members of the Cabinet and officials
prominent in the Administration gathered at the White House. These
included Secretaries Hay, Wilson and Hitchcock; Senator Davis, one of the
Peace Commissioners who negotiated the treaty; Assistant Secretaries Hill,
Adee and Cridler, of the State Department; Acting-Secretary of War Meikel-
john, Adjutant-General Corbin, Solicitor-General Richards, Hon. Wayne
MacVeagh, and Mr. Sidney Smith, Chief of the Bureau of Diplomatic Cor
respondence, State Department, who -had prepared the American copy of the
treaty. A few minutes in advance the French Ambassador, M. Cambon,
arrived, in company with M. Thiebaut, the First Secretary of the Embassy,
the latter bearing the Spanish copy of the peace treaty. Mr. McKinley
cordially greeted the Ambassador, and, after a brief exchange of well-wishes,
the formal ceremony began. The President stood back of the large desk
presented to the government by Queen Victoria, while Secretary Hay and
Ambassador Cambon occupied places at the desk. Around this central group
were ranged the Cabinet officers and others, and officials of the household.
The powers of M. Cambon and Secretary Hay were examined, a protocol con
cerning the day's ceremony signed, and other formalities concluded. These
preliminaries took some time, so that it was nearly 3: 30 before the actual
exchange began. The signing of the protocol of exchange occurred at 3 : 28
p. m., Ambassador Cambon signing for Spain, and Secretary Hay for the
United States. The protocol was in French, and briefly recited the circum
stances leading up to the exchange. This cleared the way for the exchange
itself, constituting the final act. The President took from the desk the
American copy of the treaty, handsomely engrossed, bound in dark blue
morocco, and encased in a black morocco portfolio, and handed it to M.
Cambon. At the same time M. Cambon handed to the President the Spanish
copy of the treaty, also engrossed, bound in morocco and encased in a maroon-
colored morocco box. There were deferential bows as each received from the
other this final pledge of peace. This exchange of ratifications occurred at
3: 35 p. m. The President was the first to speak. "Mr. Ambassador," said
he, "I will issue my proclamation at once."
M. Cambon thanked the President for the promptness with which the
proclamation followed. This ended the ceremony, and after brief felicitations

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SIGNATURES OF AMERICAN AND SPANISH PEACE COMMISSIONERS TO TREATY OF PEACE.
Signal Service Officers Expressly for This History,
)j.-y .rwix-iji^uon o-r frjcate Department at Washington.
LAST JOINT bESSION AT PARIS OF THE AMERICAN AND SPANISH PEACE COMMISSIONERS, AT WHICH THE TREATY OF PEACE WAS SIGNED.

THE TREATY OF PEACE. 729
the Ambassador and other officials withdrew. Secretary Hay took with him
the Spanish copy of the treaty and deposited it in the archives of the State
Department. M. Cambon cabled the Spanish government of the final restora
tion of peace, and made known that the American copy of the treaty would be
forwarded through the French Foreign Office.
PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION.
After the ceremony connected with the exchange of the ratification of the
peace treaty, President McKinley issued the following proclamation :
Whereas, A treaty of peace between the United States of America and
Her Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son, Don
Alfonso XIII, was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries
at Paris on December 10, 1898, the original of which is in the Spanish lan
guage, is word for word as follows:
(Here full text of treaty is included.)
And, whereas, The said" convention has been duly ratified on both parts,
and the ratifications of the two governments were exchanged in the city of
Washington on April 11, 1899; now, therefore,
Be it known, That I, William McKinley, President of 'the United States
of America, have caused the said convention to be made public, to the end
that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and ful
filled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington, April n, in the year of our Lord 1899,
and of the independence of the United States 123.
WILLIAM McKINLEY.
By the President: JOHN HAY, Secretary of State.
There is something in the documents exchanged that is characteristic of
the two countries. The Spanish copy now in our possession is handsomely
engrossed on parchment in old English script, with wide double columns, one
in Spanish and the other in English. Its binding is of red morocco, heavily
embossed in gold, which gives the effect of the yellow and red colors of
Spain. The United States copy held by Spain is neat and simple, the text in
parallel columns, the left in English and the right in Spanish, surrounded by

730 THE TREATY OF PEACE.
a narrow border of the national colors. The document is enclosed in a cover
of dark blue morocco, with the great seal of the United States upon the face
and a decorative design in gilt.
The Official Gazette of Madrid of April 16 contains a royal decree
appointing the Duke de Arcos to be Spanish Envoy Extraordinary and Min
ister Plenipotentiary to the United States. The decree also creates consulates
at Havana, Manila, Iloilo, San Juan de Porto Rico, and Cienfuegos.
Senor Larrea, now Spanish Consul at Antwerp, is transferred to Havana;
Senor Bouila, now at Shanghai, is appointed to Manila, and Senor Uriarte goes
to Antwerp. The Hon. Bellamy Storer, Minister of the United States, has
been chosen to represent the United States at the Spanish court.
General orders of the date of April 12 look to the disbandment of the
volunteer forces. The War Department makes this announcement :
"To be continued in service or appointed under Section 13 of the Act of
March 2, 1899, which authorizes the President to appoint or continue in serv
ice Brigadier-Generals not exceeding one for every 4,000 enlisted men actually
in service and Major-Generals not exceeding one for every 12,000 enlisted
men: "General officers of Volunteers — Maj.-Gen. William R. Shafter, Maj.-
Gen. Elwell S. Otis.
"Brigadier Generals — James H. Wilson,. Fitzhugh Lee, Joseph Wheeler,
John C. Bates, Samuel B. M. Young, H. W. Lawton, Adna R. Chaffee, Wil
liam Ludlow, Leonard Wood, George W. Davis, Theodore Schwan, Robert
H. Hall, Loyd Wheaton, Frederick D. Grant.
"To be continued in service under the clause of Section 15 of the act of
March 2, 1899, which authorizes the President to enlist temporarily in service
for absolutely necessary purposes in the Philippine Islands volunteers, officers
and men, individually or by organizations, now in those islands:
"General Officers of Volunteers— Maj.-Gen. H. W. Lawton, Maj.-Gen.
Arthur MacArthur, Brig. -Gen. Charles King, Brig.-Gen. Robert P. Hughes
Brig.-Gen. Samuel Ovenshine, Brig.-Gen. Irving Hale."
It would be, now that peace is declared, a great saving to the government
and relieve the Department of the necessity of sending more troops to
the Philippines if the volunteers there could be largely retained. Under the
law the service of the volunteer organization terminated with the declaration
of peace, but the act of Congress provided that volunteer organizations might

THE TREATY OF PEACE.

73i

remain in the volunteer service six months thereafter if they so desired. At
the end of that time, however, they were to be mustered out whether they so
desired or not. The volunteers now in the Philippines have gained so much
experience in the field and have become so well adapted to the service
required against the insurgents that it has been thought important to induce
them to ree'nlist in the regular service, either at the present time by demand
ing their discharge from the volunteer army, or to do so at the expiration of
the six months after the declaration of peace.
Volunteer organizations enlisted in the regular army as organizations
would therefore bring with them their officers as now assigned. As an
inducement to the volunteers to reenter the service of the government, it has
been proposed to pay to all reenlisting their full travel allowance for land
and sea travel from place of discharge to place of previous enlistment.
The adjournment of Congress by limitation on the 4th of March pre
vented the accomplishment of an adequate establishment of the army. If it
had not been for this incompetency there would have been no anxiety to
extend the terms of volunteer enlistments. Fighting men enough, however,
will be found to take care of the property and the honor of the country,
naval and military.

CHAPTER XXXI.
Review of the War and the Commission on the Conduct of the
War Department.
Importance of a Day Lost or Gained — The Protocol Was the Treaty — Military Commissions to
Arrange the Spanish Evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico — Appearance of the Cuban
Army — Narrow Margins on Which the War Was Ended so Speedily — Inspiration of
Dewey's Victory — Energy in Following It Up — Outbreak of Criticism on the Conduct of
the War as Soon as it Was Over — The Commission of Investigation Appointed by the
President — Extraordinary Interest in the Action of the Commission and Its Authoritative
Report — Weaknesses in Systems and Persons not Spared — Origin and Extent of the
Canned Meat Controversy — Fault Found in High Places — The Army, Regular or Volun
teer, of and for the People.
One loses a day on the way from Washington City to Manila. The line
on which going westward we must correct the almanac, by dropping a day, is
the 180th meridian. When it is midnight in London it is noon of the same
day on longitude 180 degrees west, or half-way around the world. Whatever
time the magic 180th degree is struck going west, the next day is sponged off.
If you get there Tuesday, there is no Wednesday that week. And going east
there are two of the days on which the mysterious meridian is encountered.
The point of this in association with the war is that if we count time to China
as we find it coming east, the order of Admiral Dewey to destroy the Spanish
fleet was just a little too sharp on time for the actual declaration of war, but
if we count on the westward course, the declaration was in time to fairly cover
the direction to sink the Spaniards. Either way we go, there was no time
lost. It was 103 days from the naval battle before Manila to the signing of
the Protocol August 12. Our war with Spain was for 100 days, with a maro-in
of two days, counted as the sun keeps time. It was hard to realize for a while
that the Protocol was truly the Treaty of Peace — that the rest was debate on
details, and painstaking to weigh and measure and adjust points of difference
and formulate the settlement. When Santiago surrendered, Spain was van
quished. Her fate was declared the day it was determined that she could not
732

REVIEW OF THE WAR. 733
contest with us the command of the sea. It was impossible to defend Porto
Rico and Cuba if the Spanish armies in those islands were isolated, for the
power to overcome them was in the United States, and would be employed.
As to the signing of the treaty at Paris, or its ratification at Washington and
Madrid, those formalities were needful to legalize action taken. The Protocol
was actual peace, but there was a legal continuation of a state of war; and in
the first hundred and ten days of this situation there had been mustered out
and discharged from the military service an average of one thousand men per
day. The order to muster out one hundred thousand men was issued on the
18th of August, less than a week after the proclamation announcing the pro
tocol and suspending hostilities. The administration was as prompt to take
advantage of peace, when the war was over, as it had been swift to execute
the mandate of war at the beginning. Military committees to superintend the
evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and the adjacent islands were forthwith
appointed; for Cuba, Major-General James F. Wade, Rear- Admiral William
T. Sampson, Major-General Matthew C. Butler; for Porto Rico, Major-Gen
eral John C. Brooke, Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley, Brigadier-General W.
Gordon — who soon afterwards met the Spanish commissioners at Havana and
San Juan respectively. Porto Rico was evacuated and the American flag was
up on August 1 8th. The task of evacuating Cuba proceeded slowly. The
American flag was raised on Morro Castle and the Governor General's palace,
January ist, at which time twenty-two thousand Spanish troops remained
in the vicinity of Cienfuegos.
While the war was on there was general solicitude that the freedom of
speech and facility of the press should not be abused to harm the cause of the
country. There was a great deal of eccentricity in the press, but it consisted
in excessive military energy, with the accustomed "instructions" to the com
manders of the active fleets and armies. There was a steady flight of accusa
tions of favoritism, those whose chosen ones were not favored opening fire on
the others who were at the front, as a personal favor, it was said. The harm
done was not considerable. The journal that might have reported the pres
ence of Cervera's fleet in Santiago Harbor, when he could only go there to be
bottled up, would have been forgiven, even by admirals on the look-out, for
audacity of pushing in and pointing to the enemy. The usually season
able vehemence of partisans skirmishing for position in future civil campaigns
was reduced to inoffensiveness while the fighting was going on, and the Presi-

734 REVIEW OF THE WAR.
dent's cares were lessened by the loyal moderation of the great mass of his
countrymen who had not lined up with him in national affairs until the bugles
called for the blue and the gray to put on the uniform of the country and
keep step to the national music. The naval victories without loss of life, and
the undervaluation of Spanish soldiers as fighting men, on a defensive line,
caused the casualty lists of our troops engaged in the Santiago battles to be a
surprise that shocked the country, and the illness of General Shafter was
charged to his stoutness, and the frank statements he made of his depressions
and misgivings were so distressing to the people that the great results attained
were not regarded as compensation for loss, though the extraordinary success
gained will have a permanent place in the records of decisive battles. The
sweeping naval victories of the Americans from Cavite to Santiago, ninety-
five days, were so uniform in character, there was a feeling that the Spaniards
were unworthy to be considered steady enough to furnish a test of our high
quality, and soon there was much said by the perverse about the feebleness
of the foe. It is, however, the established truth that the Americans were well
commanded, fought in the highest form on all occasions, and in addition to
good conduct were attended by good fortune. If the regular army had not
been massed at Tampa to strike the southern coast of Cuba, in spite of the
rainy and fever seasons, the volunteers must have been held in camps of
instruction until there was frost on the cotton fields, or suffered from the
Cuban soil and climate immense losses; and military operations against
Havana on a very large scale would have been frightfully costly. When,
however, the volunteers were engaged, they would have been so prepared
and disciplined that they could have closed the campaign quickly. One of
the reasons why Admiral Schley was strongly of the opinion that Cervera
would put into Cienfuegos was because he knew that port was less than two
hundred miles from Havana, and that with the railroad all the available
troops of the west end might be rapidly gathered to meet invaders. If Cervera
had been in Cienfuegos instead of Santiago the regular army of the United
States would have been unable to do the work they accomplished at Santiago,
which was isolated, and yet we had no strength to spare in forcing the sur
render. One Spanish column of less than three thousand had a sharp struggle in
getting to Santiago just too late to hold lines the loss of which was irretriev
able. At Cienfuegos, the concentration of forces on both sides must have
amounted to fifty thousand men on each side, and the war would have been

REVIEW OF THE WAR. 735
protracted. It was one of the things carrying conviction in the first place
that Cervera, at liberty to make choice, would prefer Cienfuegos to Santiago,
unless he might have believed the very assurance of preference could make
the latter port for the Spanish service dangerous, as any American commander
would naturally be on the watch at that place. Sampson and Schley were
agreed about this for a time, and it is possible Cervera gave himself the bene
fit of the idea. The retreat of Cervera into Santiago was an admission of the
naval incapacity of Spain, unless we can believe that he ran for coal where he
thought Americans were unlikely to look for him, and when he was located
the American forces followed. Frequently in the congressional debates, ban
quet and platform speeches,, and comments of the press, the idea is advanced
that the military lesson of the war is that the regular army should be rigor
ously reduced to a scanty force, as the fact of efficiency of volunteers devel
oped in a few months proves their reliability. No American who knew
enough of his country to warrant him in views of her resources in war ever
disparaged volunteers. The truth is we must depend upon them in great
wars, but we require enough regulars to handle a sharp sword promptly, to
avoid the necessity for hurried and therefore exceedingly exhaustive prepara
tions. We happened to have regulars enough, such was the ease with which
men were assembled from remote posts, to deliver a blow that ended the war
before the mustering corps of volunteers could be provided with that which
they must have to fortify themselves to take the field, and it will always be to
the credit of the volunteers that the surrender at Santiago was not so much
the result of what had occurred as the visible evidence that the winners of San
Juan and El Caney were but the advanced guard of the grand armyof the
United States. There was no doubt of the ultimate result. Loss of time was
loss of life. The army that did the fighting was almost disbanded in the
moment of victory. As there were but five hundred and twenty defenders of
El Caney, it is clear that if Escario 's column of nearly three thousand effec
tives had arrived three days earlier the army of Shafter could not have carried
the hills that were so stoutly held. That would have meant waiting for rein
forcements, and by every hour of detention the sacrifice of scores of brave
men. The plan of campaign that was to deal the crushing blow with the
regular army without waiting for the thorough equipment of the volunteers
in great force, could not have succeeded if Spanish reinforcements had got in,
until the Americans were also strengthened, and the failure to give the

736 REVIEW OF THE WAR.
decisive stroke then would have made certain the loss of thousands of our
men where hundreds sufficed. Each week's delay implied disaster for us.
On the critical night of the -Santiago campaign, when General Wheeler was on
the long, thin line held by not more than three thousand men, all extremely
weary, needing precisely the encouragement the game old confederate gave
them, that the Spaniards were whipped and dared not assume the aggressive,
for their losses were greater in proportion than ours, and their exhaustion and
privation equal— if the Spaniards could then have had Escario's column
massed and sent it forward, the chances were largely in favor of driving us,
and regaining the water supply of the city and access to the country for food
supplies to supplement rations exclusively of rice. It is a close question
whether the continued presence of Cervera's fleet might not alone have post
poned the surrender of the city and province of Santiago for an additional
month and greatly reduced the moral effect of the final victory of our arms—
the deadly climate and the pestilential fevers sweeping away our heroes by
thousands. We then should have won Santiago as the British did Havana in
1762, and with like losses. More than half the British and Provincial army
perished. After the loss of two fleets and two armies by the Spaniards— it
was as clear to all Europe as to ourselves that the Spanish army in Manila
could not escape, but must be captives. After the fleet that was essential to
its support was annihilated and our troops on the way arrived, the continu
ance of the war under those misfortunes was impossible for Spain;' and
she sued for peace, accepting subsequently the terms of unconditional sur
render. The debates at Paris were able, but not essential. The policy of the
Protocol was after the fall of Santiago. That depended upon the conclusive
triumph with the regular army. The event trembled in the balance. We
refer to the regulars especially and distinctively, for the military policy of the
President turned upon the blow that might be delivered by them. Only three
volunteer regiments were at the front at Santiago. The transportation was
limited, and the movement on the ragged edge of critical circumstance. The
volunteers were eager for the fray, but none knew better than themselves that
they needed time to be educated up to the requirements of the high standard
they hold in history.
The Aguinaldo war around Manila has but repeated the experiences that
give confidence in the volunteer system, but the objection to it is that it can
never be ready to meet the grave and sudden emergencies. Time is the most

REVIEW OF THE WAR. 737
expensive item in war and the appropriation of money and manhood for the
regular army making it equal to abrupt occasions would be economical.
There was good fortune as to the time and place of the decision of the war in
Cuba. If Cervera had been able to fill his coal bunkers within a few days
after arriving in West India waters he might have entered Havana Harbor,
and that would have forced us to attack the city, a work too extensive for the
regulars — indeed, involving several corps of volunteers. It was the inspiration
of the May-day victory of Admiral Dewey that caused the inauguration of
the Santiago campaign, and in this relation the beginning and end of the
war are closely linked. The President said, in his annual message, of Dewey's
battle :
"The effect of this remarkable victory upon the spirit of our people and
upon the fortunes of the war was instant. A prestige of invincibility thereby
attached to our arms, which continued throughout the struggle. Reinforce.
ments were hurried to Manila under the command of Major-General Merritt,
and firmly established within sight of the capital, which lay helpless before
our guns." The "prestige of invincibility" was the thing, and the glory of
Dewey is not so much in the fact that when he came within range of the
Spanish fleet he destroyed it, because he took all the chances of torpedoes
and mines, land batteries and of the disabilities that might be inflicted upon
his ships, seven thousand miles from a home port. He found the torpedoes
harmless. Fortune favored the brave. If a torpedo had blown up the Olym
pia or one or two of the cruisers, the result of the day might not have been so
influential. If several vessels had been disabled, the situation of the admiral
could not have been described by any softer term than precarious. The dis
tinguishing points of the war stand out like mountains. It is easy to trace the
impulses behind the actions closing in successes that ended the combat. The
reinforcements for Dewey were sent with energetic celerity, and the fall of
Manila two days after the Spanish surrendered in the Protocol, an event
unknown to the combatants, was due to the animation with which the War
Department pressed all advantages. The official statement of the President,
giving the facts of supporting the navy by the army at the most remote scene
of the warfare, is in these terms :
"On the 7th day of May the government was advised officially of the vic
tory at Manila, and at once inquired of the commander of our fleet what
troops would be required. The information was received on the 15th of May,

738 REVIEW OF THE WAR.
and the first army expedition sailed May 25 and arrived off Manila June 30.
Other expeditions soon followed. ' '
When the war was over, the good management, vigilance, precision and
strong grasp upon affairs first in order became first in the minds and hearts of
the people, and of moment to every fireside, but extensively held to be the
commonplace consequence of the lavish use of the resources of the country;
and there followed a flood of turbid accusation. The banners bright with
victory were clouded with fogs. The origin of these was our unprepared
state and the confusion was unavoidable. There was also, owing to impera
tive haste, a great deal of waste, — and yet the official history of the war can'
never be read by a citizen of intelligence and temper of justice without sur
prise that in all departments so much was done so well.
There never was a war more speedily conducted to a successful and satis
factory end than that of the United States with Spain; and j*et when it was
done there was an epidemic of complaint, and the President answered the
clamor, which was loud and long enough to show a serious public interest, by
appointing a commission. General Dodge was chosen president. The follow
ing were the members :
General Grenville M. Dodge, Iowa, President; Col. James A. Sexton,
Illinois; Col. Charles Denby, Indiana; Capt. Evan P. Howell, Georgia;
Ex-Governor Urban A. Woodbury, Vermont; Brig-Gen. John M. Wilson,
Chief of Engineers, U. S. A.; Gen. James A. Beaver, Pennsylvania; Maj.-
Gen. Alexander McD. McCook, U. S. A.; Dr. Phineas S. Conner, Ohio;
Richard Weightman, Secretary; Lieut.-Col. F. B. Jones, Chief Quartermaster
of Volunteers, Disbursing Officer; Maj. Stephen C. Mills, Recorder.
The specific duty of this body was "to investigate the conduct of the War
Department in the war with Spain." A great mass of testimony was taken,
and there were many precautions to get witnesses who would give all the
information they possessed, and to find those who could speak from personal
knowledge. Three press associations were represented in the reporters pres
ent during the proceedings. The Secretary of War, the Adjutant-General,
the Quartermaster-General, and the Surgeon-General were requested to
transmit all the complaints received by them touching the administration of
their respective departments. This was promptly done. Public invitation
was given September 27th to all persons "having knowledge or belief of any
official wrong or dereliction" — a most sweeping call — to submit their state-

REVIEW OF THE WAR. 739
ments in writing, accompanied by such collateral proof or information as
might be at their -disposal. This call met with a remarkable response.
Hundreds of affidavits, letters, newspaper clippings, editorial articles, and
sermons were received, all of which were thoroughly and laboriously exam
ined. The strong purpose of the commission to get all the facts appears in
the determination that in the examination of witnesses the strict rules of evi
dence as applied in legal proceedings should not be adhered to, but consider
able latitude allowed. The way investigation of the whitewashing fashion is
conducted is by rigid adherence to the rules of evidence, the question perpetu
ally pressed being: What do you know of your own knowledge? That is a
tight stopper upon any expression that is excellent in suggestion but not in
legal form. There were nearly five hundred witnesses examined. The
report of the commission has disposed of the frivolous fad for a time prev
alent of challenging the good faith of the members. The commission finds
that there was too much "red tape" in the departments, too much "paper
work," and recommends that there should be more preparation for future
wars by Congress, and also suggests retired officers might be utilized. Sum
ming up the results of the war, the commission gives the official figures of 23
officers and 250 men killed, and 113 officers and 1,464 men wounded in the
field, while the deaths from all causes from May 1 to September 30, a period
of five months, were 107 officers and 2,803 men. The total strength of the
army was 274,717, so that the' death rate was a fraction over 1 per cent.
The commission says in the official report of its labors and findings :
"No man or woman who has stated to us that he or she had any
material matter touching the subject of our inquiry to communicate has
been refused a hearing, and there has been no evidence before us that any
one in or connected with the War Department has dishonestly received
a dollar. "We have made persistent efforts to secure the attendance of persons to
whose names rumor has attached an allegation that they knew of corruption
of officials in the War Department, but these men have either denied the
statements attributed to them, or have maintained silence when invited to tell
what they know. ' '
This criticism and recommendation are important: "The routine work in
the departments, in our opinion, is far beyond what is necessary, and each
year seems to increase it. The methods employed make it almost impossible

740 REVIEW OF THE WAR.
to transact business promptly. The heads of all departments, officers of large
depots, chiefs of staff departments, corps and divisions have necessarily been
obliged to give attention to details which, should have been given to matters
of larger moment. No well-regulated concern or corporation could transact
business satisfactorily under such regulations as govern the staff departments,
and the fact that every officer of each of the staff departments holding a
responsible position has been forced to ignore routine demonstrates the neces
sity of a new form. "
A significant utterance is the following: "For many years the divided
authority and responsibility of the War Department has produced friction, for
, which, in the interest of the service, a remedy, if possible, should be applied.
The constitution makes the President commander-in-chief of the army, and
he cannot transfer that authority to any other person. The President selects
the secretary of war, who has his confidence and is his confidential adviser.
The commanding general is assigned to duty as such by the President, and
under the miltary laws of the United States his duties are defined as follows :
"The command exercised by the commanding general of the army, not
having been made the subject of statutory regulation, is determined by the
order of assignment. It has been habitually composed of the aggregate of
the several territorial commands that have been or may be created by the
President. The military establishment is under orders of the commanding
general of the army in that which pertains to its discipline and military con
trol. The fiscal affairs of the army are conducted by the secretary of war
through the several staff departments. (Par. 187, A. R., 1895.)
"AU'orders and instructions from the President or secretary of war relat
ing to military operations or affecting the military control and discipline of
the army will be promulgated through the commanding general. (Par. 188,
A. R., 1895.)"
Lieutenant-General Schofield, who has probably had as much experience
and given the question as much thought as any one in our country, says in
substance :
"Recent experience has served to confirm all the results of my lifelong
study and large experiences that the proper position for the senior officer of
the army on duty at Washington is not that of the commanding general, a
position which is practically impossible, but that of commander-in-chief,
which means, in fact, chief of staff to the President. The title of general-in-

REVIEW OF THE WAR. 741
chief was a permanent one during the entire history of the country up to the
time when General Grant became lieutenant-general.
"When I became commanding general I addressed to the President a
letter in which I pointed out to him what had been the result of my study and
experience, and saying that the only way was to abandon entirely — which I
did during my seven years of service — all pretenses of being the commanding
general, and to content myself with acting as the chief of staff of the army
under the secretary of war and the President. The result was that perfect
harmony prevailed during my time, and I did exercise a legitimate influence
in command of the army, this because I did not claim to exercise anything
that the law did not give me.
"The President must have the same power of selection of his general -
in-chief as he has of his secretary of war. Without this there can be no
guaranty that he will give, or that the secretary of war will place in the
general-in-chief that confidence which is necessary to perfect harmony.
"Neither the President nor the secretary of war should have in the
command of the army an officer who is not working in harmony with
him." The work of General Corbin attracts the attention of the commissioners.
His services were of the greatest importance. He was the engineer of order,
the fireman who kept the furnace roaring, raised steam power, and strove
with a giant's strength to subjugate chaos. The report says of him:
"The adjutant-general testifies that there had not been a deficiency of one
dollar reported on the part of a volunteer staff officer, and that he wished to
make it a matter of record that in the distribution of many millions of dollars
during this war there was yet to be made the first charge of defalcation
against an army officer, regular or volunteer.
The remarks upon the War Department, referring directly to the Secre
tary of War, are :
"The records of the War Department, which have been laid before us,
show that the Secretary of War extended to all chiefs of bureaus cordial and
full support, and promptly responded to every proper demand made upon him
by commanding officers.
"No testimony has been presented showing intentional neglect of duty or
any attempt to serve personal interests.
"The charges made that the Secretary of War was pecuniarily interested

742 REVIEW OF THE WAR.
in contracts, purchases and other transactions of the War Department have
been thoroughly investigated and found baseless.
"In the judgment of the commission there was lacking in the general
administration of the War Department during the continuance of the war
with Spain that complete grasp of the situation which was essential to the
highest efficiency and discipline of the army.
"The commission has refrained from criticising certain of the heads of
bureaus for not having acted with foresight in preparing their various depart
ments for active war before war was declared, because it has appeared that
the national defense fund provided by the act of March 9, 1898, was not made
available for use except for the navy and for coast defenses and the expendi
tures incident thereto until after the declaration of war."
The commission has not spared the weak places in the War Department,
beginning with paper work, asking for the strengthening of the administra
tion by the employment of retired officers, many of whom are among the most
capable in the country and as well fitted in the sixties for the higher responsi
bilities and performance of the tasks of elucidation and the removal of
entanglements as the active service officers between forty and sixty years of
age. The sudden multiplication of the numerical force of the army by ten,
and the requisition for supplies in the same proportion, the material to be
discovered if not created, necessarily involved occasional gorges in the chan
nels, such as occur in rivers that are choked with ice or timber. One of the
worst was the gorge at Tampa, and with all the high rank and gilded talent
gathered there, the man to clear the way was not found, and we hear from
the commanding general of the army, himself present, that his remedy for
improper rations of meat was to have droves of cattle shipped to the seat of
war. If this had been done it would have been necessary to have sent the
steers to Cuba and left the soldiers in Florida to overcome by perfect rest on
the sand the waste of physical force by the debilitating atmosphere of
the floral peninsula. The commission spares not the lack of transportation,
the nerveless slump into a bottomless pit of disorder that prevented prompt
ness in embarkation, reduced dangerously the strength of Shafter's army,
notified the Spaniards of our plans and incapacities, and nearly spoiled the
expedition, upon which depended the grave decision whether we would have
to wait for winter or force the fighting. The commissioners say with a
moderation of language that stings where epithets would be found totally

REVIEW OF THE WAR. 743
insufficient, that "the condition of the railroad congestion during the early
portion of the time Tampa was occupied by troops seems unparalleled, show
ing an almost inexcusable lack of executive ability on the part of those charged
with the loading, unloading and handling of the trains."
It is the judgment of the commissioners that ships should have been
"seized," because when the transports had been assembled, supposed to be
equal to carrying 25,000 men, it was found that their capacity had been largely
overrated, and it was impossible to carry on them, without great discomfort
and danger, more than 16,000 men, with their equipments, artillery, ammuni
tion, subsistence, medical supplies, and 2,295 animals, for a voyage of 1,000
miles. It is not, however, even hinted by the commission that a fleet ought to
have been impressed to bear burdens of living beef to be cast ashore as wanted
by the army ! The following from the commissioners' report is full of phrases
that imply more than they express :
"In spite of the efforts of the quartermaster's department, many of these
vessels were poorly equipped with speeding accommodations; the sinks in
many instances were inconvenient and insufficient, and some of the vessels
were badly ventilated and filled with disagreeable odors. It has been stated
that had the fleet encountered a severe storm while en route for Cuba the dis
comfort would have been intense, and there might have been loss of life.
"The quartermaster's department ought to have been able to more
thoroughly equip these vessels, and surely it should have been more certain of
their carrying capacity.
"It has been noticed that the ships were not loaded systematically, as for
example, a battery with its guns and horses would be placed on one vessel,
and its ammunition on another. The Second, Seventh and Seventeenth
Regular Infantry were each divided up, and portions in each case sent on
three different vessels.
The expedition was detained until, if we had been opposed by a keen and
enterprising enemy, we could hardly have escaped the misfortunes so con
spicuously invited. The horrible bungling extended to the handling of the
medical supplies, and yet in that department, in spite of manifest omissions,
"a vast deal of good work was done by medical officers, high and low, regular
and volunteer, and there were unusually few deaths among the wounded and
sick." At last Shafter sailed, got away from the sphere of false and foolish
rumor, Spanish war ships flitting like the Flying Dutchman, and the steam

744 REVIEW OF THE WAR.
launches and lighters to land the troops and stores, frightfully deficient at
the start, lost by the way. The commission points to the facts at the bottom
of the muddy pool in this trenchant paragraph :
"That the shortcomings in administration and operation may justly be
attributed, in large measure, to the hurry and confusion incident to the
assembling of an army of untrained officers and men, ten times larger than
before, for which no preparation in advance had been or could be made,
because of existing rules and regulations."
If Captain-General Blanco had been a man of aptitudes and initiative
equal to decisions in a few hours, and to stimulating the disturbance of the
sullen lethargy of his countrymen, and had possessed the quality of illu
mination from his own brain, he would have acted upon the safe presump
tion that Santiago was the objective point of the American army. The move
ment of our war ships had revealed that to the observant, and he should have
hurried his best troops to the rescue, and seen to it that the landing of
Shafter's army was resisted to the last extremity of the defenders. That was
the Spaniards' chance. Such a policy would have given the army tumbled
upon unfit vessels infinite trouble, and made the advance upon the land
defenses of Santiago for some time impossible. We owe a great debt to the
stolidity that amounts often to stupidity in the Spanish commanders. The
quality of Spaniards who wait to be attacked, if there are officers who stay
with the men when the fire storms beat upon them, is, as our troops found on
the Santiago hills, as good as that the infantry of Spain celebrated in the
middle ages. The march of Escario's column that reached Santiago a few
hours too late makes known that if the young Spaniards are bravely led they
will go far, clearing their way through ambuscades swarming with sharp
shooters. The manifestations of the manliness of the Peninsulars mean that
there is still hope for Spain in her people.
As soon as we have a congress elevated to the understanding of the
economy in the efficiency of the army as well as of the navy, and the necessity
of preparation for war in time of peace, it will appear in the halls of national
legislation that the work of the commission of investigation of the conduct of
the War Department during the war is a document of extraordinary nature,
full of information that should be the basis of reforms that will amount to
reconstruction. The time will certainly come when this will be done, and the
longer the delay the greater price we must pay for the indispensable reforma-

REVIEW OF THE WAR. 745
tion. In one matter the commission does not seem to have been as incisive,
critical and certain in its work, or as comprehensive and accurate in its sug
gestions as in general. We refer to the "embalmed beef." There must
have been present in the minds of the commissioners on that subject a con
sciousness of the prejudiced motives and questionable methods of the accusers,
in regard to the "roast beef" thrown upon the army and thrown into the sea,
that imparted a certain reluctance to say anything that would palliate the
impropriety apparent in the noisy aggressiveness that sought to inflict per
sonal injuries and promoted reckless exaggerations, detrimental to the public
service and hostile to a great American industry, thereby giving aid and com-*
fort to factions at home that cannot be respected as animated by sincerities,
and enemies abroad of our export commerce, or those careless of hurting
business reputation. The cautiousness of this temperament of care in the
commission is to be accepted as far as it goes, but the expression following
does not cover the case :
"Many samples of refrigerated beef furnished to the army have been sent
by the commission to the chemists of the Agricultural and Interior depart
ments for careful chemical examination. The result of the analysis has been
reported to us in twenty-nine cases, and in no specimen examined has either
boric or salicylic acid or other deleterious chemicals been found. In view of
the facts set forth, the commission is of the opinion that no refrigerated beef
furnished by contractors and issued to the troops during the war with Spain
was subjected to or treated with any chemicals by the contractors or those in
their employ." The veracity of this statement is not to be questioned, for it
has obviously limitations of applications, but that it is misleading is shown in
the headline under which it appears in a reputable journal— this:
"WAR COMMISSION HOLDS ARMY REFRIGERATED BEEF TO
BE PURE."
The word "pure" should be more carefully guarded, and held too precious for
doubtful employment.
The commission says of the canned beef: "Occasionally an inferior
article was found. But the records of the army prove that canned beef has
been used for many years." The commissioners attempted to confine them
selves in the public regard to their actual and not constructive findings in
these terms: "In considering questions concerning canned meats it is not the

746 REVIEW OF THE WAR.
duty of the commission to inquire into the character, kind or condition of the
canned meats that may be in use in this country. Our specific duty is to
give an opinion as to the quality of those furnished the soldiers during th;
recent war with Spain. ' ' Delicacies of distinction are not, however, a notice
able feature in the work of the press, exploited with the headlining that adver
tises news highly seasoned, and presented in a style believed to be alluring,
and certainly for sale. A letter is presented showing that the boiled or roast
canned meat question was not up in the army during the Spanish war for the
first time. The date is October 18, 1897, and the document as follows:
War Department, Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, D. C, Oct. 19, 1897.
W. Clarke Marshall, Produce Exchange, 6646 Wentworth Ave., Chicago.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication
of the 19th ultimo to the Secretary of War, giving information regarding the
proper food to be taken to the sufferers in Alaska, and also for the subsistence
of the troops there, and ascribing the sickness in that locality to the use of
salt meats, and in reply thereto the Secretary of War desires me to call atten
tion to the following remarks of the Medical Department of the army, in
which the major-general commanding the army concurs:
"Canned meats put up by reputable firms are wholesome and have the
full nutritive value of the meat contents, and in the absence of fresh meat are
to be preferred to any of the three substitutes suggested by the writer. Meat,
when salted, loses a certain proportion of its albuminoids and extractives, but
what remains is valuable as food, and has no specific influence in the produc
tion of scurvy. With hard bread, bacon, pea meal, and an occasional issue of
fresh beef, or in its absence canned meat, a dietary of a satisfactory force
value can be provided. To these there should be added for the prevention of
scurvy occasional issues of potatoes, onions or canned vegetables, or in their
unavoidable absence, dessicated vegetables and dried fruit."
Very respectfully, W. H. CARTER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
All the above in quotation is the indorsement upon the letter of Mr.
Marshall, signed by C. Smart, deputy surgeon-general, U. S. A. The
indorsement of the major-general commanding is in the following words:

REVIEW OF THE WAR. 747
Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C, Oct., 18, 1897.
The major-general commanding concurs in the remarks of the deputy
surgeon-general, fourth indorsement. J. C. GILMORE
Assistant Adjutant-General.
The "major-general commanding" here referred to is Major-General
Nelson A. Miles.
The commission reports :
"On the 2 1 st day of December last Major-General Nelson A. Miles, upon
the written request of the president of this commission, appeared before it.
He refused to be sworn, as all other witnesses had been except one, who
affirmed, stating that he would make his statements without being sworn and
was responsible for what he said. He proceeded, and for the first time in the
history of this investigation the allegation was made that refrigerated beef
issued to the troops had been chemically treated.
"In the statement, revised by himself, General Miles said:
'There was sent to Porto-Rico 337 tons of what is known as so-called
refrigerated beef, which you might call embalmed beef. '
"He proceeded to read a communication from Dr. W. H. Daly, major and
chief surgeon, United States volunteers, on his staff, bearing date of Septem
ber 21, 1898, wherein Dr. Daly stated that:
" 'In several inspections I made in the various camps and troopships at
Tampa, Jacksonville, Chickamauga and Porto Rico, I found the fresh beef to
be apparently preserved with secret chemicals, which destroy its natural
flavor, and which I also believe to be detrimental to the health of the troops. '
"Although Dr. Daly swears that he informed General Miles about the ist
of August, 1898, that he suspected that the refrigerated beef was chemically
treated, it does not appear that the general informed the War Department that
an officer of his staff had made this discovery, nor does it appear that he at
the time ordered any of the officers under his command to probe to the bottom
an allegation which, if true, concerned the health of 275,000 soldiers of the
United States. It appears from the report of Dr. Daly, which he handed to
General Miles October 21 last, that he then specifically stated that the refriger
ated beef furnished to the troops was 'apparently chemically treated.'
"It does not appear that when this charge was made, October 21, it hav
ing been already made to him in August, 1898, that General Miles communi-

74» REVIEW OF THE WAR.
cated to you or the Secretary of War or to the commissary general the belief
or suspicion entertained by him that refrigerated meat, dangerous to health,
was issued every day to the troops, in failure to do which there was dereliction
of duty. It is true that on September 20 he had directed that an order should
be issued asking for reports relative to meats issued, but the order specifically
mentions 'canned fresh roast beef,' and nothing else, and it was the reports
received in answer to this that were presented in abstract by the general at
the time of his appearance before the commission and since.
"In his report Dr. Daly does not make the all-important statement that
he had already chemically analyzed any meat, although he suggests that such
analysis should be made. He does state that in the several inspections made
by him at Tampa, Jacksonville, Chickamauga and Porto Rico he 'found the
fresh beef to be apparently preserved with secret chemicals.' He said that at
Ponce the. beef he examined 'was also of the same character, being appar
ently preserved by injected chemicals.' <
"For months, as it appears, Dr. Daly concealed the commission of a crime
affecting men under his charge, whom, as an officer and a physician, he was
bound to protect. ' '
After setting forth in full force the miscellany of mistakes and the genius
displayed for blunders so gross as to add an additional sense of misery to the
lot of mankind, in the embarkation of the Shafter expedition, the commission
states the result that closed the scenes of that decisive movement, with this
paragraph :
"The result of the Santiago campaign was the complete realization of the
several objects contemplated — the capture of the city with its fortifications and
munitions of war, together with immense supplies of foodstuffs and ammuni
tion (the former estimated by General Wood at 1,200,000 rations) ; the sur
render of the entire province of Santiago de Cuba, with all the troops
garrisoning the same, amounting, as already stated, to between 23 000 and
24,000; the destruction of the navy of Admiral Cervera's fleet after its
departure from the harbor, and general demoralization of the Spanish forces
and the discomfiture of the Spanish government and people, leading almost
immediately to overtures for, peace by Spain." There is nothing in the
splendid story of American soldiers that exceeds this, telling how the valor
and fortitude, the patience under privation and hardihood of endurance
tenacious of duty, overcomes even that solid but diversified stupidity

REVIEW OF THE WAR. 749
against which-, it is a saying of ancient acceptance, even the gods fight in
vain. The commission reports in closing that "notwithstanding the haste with
which the nation entered upon the war with Spain, the resulting and almost
inevitable confusion in bureau and camp, the many difficulties of arming,
assembling and transporting large bodies of hitherto untrained men, the
carrying on of active operations in two hemispheres, the people of the United
States should ever be proud of their soldiers, who, cooperating with their
sailors, in less than three months put an end to Spanish colonial power
enfranchised oppressed peoples, and taught the world at large the strength
and nobility of the republic. ' '
There was taken in the investigation of the varieties of beef prepared
with a view of preservation, statements that increased the public feeling about
the wrong done soldiers in supplying them with food that was unwholesome.
In handling the subject there were introduced remarks supposed to be humor
ous, to the effect that the regular soldiers were so accustomed to imperfec
tions in rations that their stomachs were prepared for anything, and there
were jocose imputations that the volunteers would, as they became veterans,
cease to strive against the diet demanded by the "paper work" that is obstruc
tive and establishes conditions of famine in a land of plenty and the midst of
abundance. The complaints of soldiers that were not fairly dealt with were
very often put in this effective way: "We know that Uncle Sam pays for the
things we ought to have, but that there is a way of getting the freight cars on
the side track as at Tampa, and sailing away without the necessaries of life. ' '
There will sometime be traced to the investigation of the conduct of the War
Department in war, and the report of the commission, the existence of laws
and regulations promoting the welfare of our citizens who bear arms for the
country. The commission does not state along with the notice of the use of
canned beef in Alaska, commended on the authority of General Miles, notice
of the decisive distinction between the arctic and the tropical climates. It
is to be remembered there is no great care necessary for the preservation of
meat in Alaska. There is no trouble about refrigeration. The northern end
of the earth is extremely frozen. It is different in the Indies. It has come
to pass that the word "experiment" as applied to keeping meat fresh is a
terror. What "experiment" with the meat of the boys in blue, white
or yellow! One might as well "experiment with the bread and butter

75=> REVIEW OF THE WAR.
of the people!" However, experiments relate closely to experience, and
the lamps by which wise men find the paths of safety and keep in them
are those that have been tried, that is, experimented with. The canned meats
that were good in Old England and New England, excellent on the European
continent, were "unfit" in our new possessions of the tropics. The fresh
meat in Porto Rico — the island abounds in cattle — was complained of because
it was "too fresh. " It had to be eaten almost as soon as the life was out of the
carcasses, or not at all, for there was no way of cooling it. General Miles could
not take refrigerator cars along with him. In a few hours after the butcher
had pursued his profession the fresh meat was spoiled. The way the flies
pitched upon it to deposit their eggs was something surprising. There were
"experiments with beef" — awful as it appears in the newspapers, the fact is
substantially undeniable — to cure it so that it would be "fit" for seventy hours.
That was all claimed for the stuff that at the end of twenty-four hours had to
be turned into the sea. The War Department did not order it. General
Egan reported against it. If General Miles got a whiff of it the fact is with
out official celebration, or any sort of -good and regular standing. It is not
surprising that there was general confidence in the canned meat of well-known
brands, but that failed fast under the tropical test. The notorious investiga
tions into the processes in this country of canning meats will ultimately have
aTfavorable influence in marketing them, for there will be no experiments of
preservation untried, and American manufacturers will rise to the occasion in
the canning of meats and vegetables good in all climates. The people of the
tropics have the advantage over us in their habits of nourishing themselves.
They are but light consumers of meat, and a portion of rice, well set up with
garlic and pepper, and a banana, is a satisfactory ration. The Cubans and
Filipinos want "hot stuff" rather than "heavy" stuff, and do not find out that
there is a kind of both hot and heavy food. Americans in the tropics have
much to learn in the accommodation of themselves to the conditions of the
country so as to be comfortable. The thing is not to abandon the use of
meat, but to reduce the quantity of it consumed. One reason for this is the
trouble in preservation of fresh meat. If there is ever found a deep and
healthful solution of the problem it must be done by Americans. The beef
scandals and conundrums, and the whole long list of our recorded trials that
were made sore by grievous errors that ought to have been avoidable, and pro
voking incapacities— putting our armies into the field and failing to provide for

REVIEW OF THE WAR.

75i

them before going or to help them there, as should have been done on behalf
of a great, liberal and loving people — surely that which has been revealed
will have the respectful attention of the people and of the Congress, and sub
stantially that which is demanded by the distinguished commission will be
done. The army, regular or volunteer, is of the blood, brain and bone of the
people, and is for the people.

CHAPTER XXXII.

The Occupation of Our New Possessions.
The Spanish Peninsula too Narrow to Sustain the Crown System Over Continental Colonies —
The Loss of Her Archipelagoes Has B^n the Logic of Her Experiences — Comparative
Expansion of England and the United States — Our Magnificent Growth across the Con
tinent the Greatest of National Triumphs — Our Arms Around the World — Our Bugle Call
and British Drum-Beats, Following the Course of the Sun — The Whispering Wires that
Unite the Nations — The Malay Revolt Against Liberty for Tyranny — The Ghastly
Demagogy that Meddles with the Army — Pleasing Prospects of Our Possessions Except
the Philippines — The Aguinaldo Conspiracy and Tagalo War — The Motives and Malice of
It — American Arms without Stain — Our Soldiers without Reproach.
The logic of the war with Spain was that we should possess her American
colonies and, of course, occupy them. She had ceased for a generation to
hold continental land, outside the western peninsula of Europe, so long con
tested by the great tribes of adventurous nations, of the earliest periods of
which there are histories. The Carthaginians, Romans, Goths, and Moors
successively were masters of the extraordinary resources of the country, with
a charming climate and fertile valleys, mountains rich in minerals, rivers
romantic in story and name, that became the home of one of the most enter
prising and dominating races of men. The tragedies of Spain for two thou
sand years have exceeded even those of Italy. There came to her through
Columbus the greatest of new possessions that ever were grasped by any
people, the immeasurably endowed Americas. Columbus died neglected and
poor, for the greed of the crown of Spain, through the viceroys and their
rapacious followers, did not spare the illustrious discoverer or the inoffensive
races that were to have been converted to Christianity, but were slauo-htered
by taskmasters. The American colonies poured wealth into the Peninsula
but the system -of governing by the Crown, so that neither the people of Spain
nor the natives of the new land they occupied, had rights that were respected
gave up the priceless fortunes conquered or inherited, to favorites of the
administrators of the affairs of the kingdom, and their cruelty and profligacy
752

THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 753
prepared the way for the horrible wars that established the independence of
the Spanish American States ; and Spain ultimately gave far more in gold and
blood for the lands she ruled beyond her borders than she gained by her
mastery of the most opulent portions of the earth. Before we of the United
States became greatly interested in the decline of Spain and began to feel that
we"nad duties and destinies involved in the final break-up of her pretensions of
dominion and power, the American continents were freed from her rule, and
her only hold upon the mainland beyond her boundaries between the Pyrenees
and the Atlantic was a penal colony upon the African shore, near Gibraltar.
She still held several archipelagoes, the Balearic, Canary, Philippine, Caroline
and Ladrone islands, Cuba and Porto Rico.
If the war had lasted another hundred days, the Americans would have
taken all the Spanish islands, those European and African as well as Ameri
can and Asiatic. The beautiful groups in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic,
off the coast of Africa, would have been possessions for our people, stripping
Spain down to the bones of the old Peninsula. The fate of the Spanish colo.
nies is not quotable as an example for nations holding lands abroad, for it is
not to be assumed that any of -them, the United States least of all, would in a
system of administration exclude the people, both at home and abroad, from
all rights the officials of the government and their classified assistants need
regard. Spain of old was too narrow a basis, both in land and people, to sup
port a colonial expansion that included continents. The wonder is that this
pyramid on its apex stood so long. If we had confined our republic to the
Atlantic tide-water region, from South Carolina to Massachusetts, and had
undertaken to colonize Africa and Australia, the popular contention might
well have been that we were attempting a task beyond our strength. We
have done a greater work of expansion that any other nation has accomplished
— in our increase from the original thirteen colonies of England to the repub
lic that does what no other power can boast — occupies the whole breadth of the
American continent between the greater oceans of the globe. If there are
exceptions, we name Mexico and Canada, and they hardly, extensive and
respectable as they are, can be classed with us. We have also the entire
northern line of the central sea of the Americas ; and the further we. have
moved west, the more rapid our growth has been north and south. There
has for some years been a feeling among our people who believe themselves
conservative that we were hasty in the admission of territories as states,

754 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS.
because we gave some thinly inhabited regions disproportionate power in the
national Senate. The specifications of evil anticipated, however, passed away
and the fact that our states are continuous across the continent must be hailed
as auspicious because the majestic links of statehood make an incomparable
bond of union. There is another bond that has been in full view since we
assumed the responsibility devolved upon us by the victory of our arms in
Asiatic waters— the sentiment that accords with a gigantic nationality has been
developed on both the ocean boundaries of the republic where we find our
selves one of the influences that shall shape the future of Asia. That the ages
to come will find Asiatic commerce an increasing factor in the progress of the
world there is reason to believe. We cross the Pacific on errands to our new
possessions, in less time than our grandfathers occupied in Atlantic voyages
between America and Europe ; and while our troops on the way to Manila are
reviewed on parade at Malta, our warships homeward bound through the
Mediterranean exchange salutes with the remnants of the Spanish navy,
where the thunder of the guns of Trafalgar was heard. The Pacific coast
will take on a new growth, and the influence of the states on the Pacific,
whatever the transitory aberrations of miscalculating men may be — the Pacific
influence will be for the expansion of the foundations of our power in Asia.
No European nation, not even England or Russia, is so marked out for
domination, according to our wisdom of the appropriation of opportunity, as
ourselves. We have three Pacific states, the immense territory of Alaska,
the Aleutian Archipelago, that stretches westward far along the Siberian
coast, many of the islands most valuable; and now, beyond all question, the
Hawaiian group, a splendid acquisition, a part of the Ladrones, and the
Philippines, equal alone to all the West Indies. We have in these possessions
the potentiality of American civilization in contact with that of ancient Asia.
Marco Polo will be famous forever for his stories of the glories of Japan, and
the fancy of Columbus, one of the rare adventurers whose imagination
became executive, was inflamed by him to sail westward in search of the
Indies. Yet he missed in his estimation of the bulk of the world the con
tinents and islands of America. The West Indies were found by ships whose
sails were filled with trade winds westward blowing. The Indies west are
eastward, not westward, to us. The East Indies were named in the same
way, for it was known in the huge vagueness that wrapped the known
and the unknown in the same clouds that south and east of Asia were the

THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS, 755
Indies. The caravans carried Indian stories, superstitions and merchandise
across the Arabian deserts. Palmyra was a green island in a sea of sand, and
sprung from trade that found a channel from the further east. The northern
Italian cities grew from this golden seed grain, and flourished when the prom
ise of the Cape of Good Hope became a gorgeous realization, and then faded
because the oceans were spread not to divide but to unite the great divisions
of land. London and Lisbon profited. England took unto herself the empire
of India, and bearing "the white man's burden," became sovereign of the
mighty waters, master of colossal shores and countless millions, feeding her
grandeur with a colonial system that made her capital the greatest of cities,
and her trade the despair of the nations. She was enriched by the expansion
that made Spain poor. The English speaking races have gained the gift of
colonization that the Latin nations lost. The United States waited long to
take herself consciously, — and conspicuously before all spectators, the world
the stage, humanity the audience, — her own high place among the powers of
the world-wide affairs, not in a way that was ostentatious, but with the simple
directness that is fitting for strength, the clear purpose power warrants, the
majestical graciousness that an open, honorable purpose yields and wields.
An order was cabled two-thirds of the way around the world, facing the
sun from Washington, to destroy a fleet that menaced our commerce, and in a
week the order was obeyed ; and that was literally firing guns around the
world. Since that day we have sent our regiments east and west, steaming
into the morning skies from New York, and into the sunsets from San Fran
cisco. Our troopships, going opposite ways, have met in Manila. Those that
departed eastward will sail on until they come home from the west! This far
exceeds the British drumbeat that follows the sun. The American bugles
have been heard morning and evening on the Atlantic and Pacific, the Medi
terranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Sea of China. The boys
are upholding the faith and honor of the army and the navy, carrying the flag
of America, keeping step to her lofty music, extending the beneficence of
Americanism, their field that of the apostles,— the world.
The campaign for suitable legislation in Congress to meet the changed rela
tions of the country to the armed nations, was like that at Santiago in the fact
it was necessary to do a great deal of arduous work within strict limitations of
time or make costly sacrifices. Success at Santiago— and there was a meas
ure of it there, striking in proportion, for there were many chances of failure

756

THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS.

— the American victory at the critical point and certain crisis of the war,
depended upon the things that must be done in sharply defined hours, or
disastrous expenditure of life and treasure would have been demanded, in
addition to that which sufficed. Congress expired on the 4th of .March. It
was important not to have that body convened in extra session. A fashion of
extra sessions is to be' deprecated, because the industrially productive people
need intervals of repose from heated terms of politics, when the National cap
ital should be the scene rather of executive labor than legislative agitation.
The President was bound by his convictions of what the public prosperity de
manded, to call an extra session, a fortnight after his inauguration, of the Con
gress, whose house was elected on the same day with his own popular election.
There were decisive reasons why it was undesirable to follow the precedent
with the second Congress of his term. The protracted debates on the ratifica
tion by the Senate of the treaty with Spain were injurious in the mere matter
of time lost, and yet more unfortunate because the nature of the discussion
raised doubts even among enlightened peoples, as to the stability of the pur
pose of the government of the United States in regard to the new posses
sions, while the Tagalo conspirators were encouraged to believe that if they
made war upon our troops we would be persuaded that the government of the
Philippines should be turned over from the Spaniards to the martial law of
Tagalo tyrants, burning to be more desperate and destructive, avaricious and
violently oppressive, than the Spaniards. The world is a neighborhood of
nations, and a whispering gallery over wires. Dr. Rizal, the ablest and most
cultivated of Filipino writers, prepared in the form of a short story a tale of
the telephone, the leading idea of which was that long-distance telephonic
communication was established between Madrid and Manila and so perfected
that the priests in the two cities talked with facility, and the Spanish priests
at home were wretched to find that the friars in Luzon were so unworthy, and
it was decided by the priests of Spain they should fast and pray for their
brethren at the other end of the wire that carried their voices on wings of fire.
The representatives of the Tagalos were free, while in Paris in attendance on
the treaty commission, to cable by way of Hongkong whatever representations
they saw fit of the attitude of the Americans. There have been for several
years centers of Philippine hostility to Spain in Paris and Hongkong, and
some of those finding employment in planning revolution had a good deal of
money, were liberally educated, and employed the cables. When the Treaty

THE OCCUPATION- OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 757
of Peace was signed at Paris the Filipino commissioner appeared in Wash
ington, and of course was still using cables to inform Aguinaldo by way of
private Hongkong messages ; and if the matter sent was not too flagrant and
vicious it passed direct through Manila to the eastward station where the
committee that they call an assembly met. That Agoncillo overestimated the
influence of the Americans opposed to our ratification of the Spanish treaty,
and regarded their utterances as an appeal to the Filipino army to take the
offensive, and destroy the steadfastness of the American people, so that con
gressional and other incendiary talk fanned the embers into a flame to be
quenched in blood, is an unexaggerated statement of indisputable fact. The
most serious and incurable difficulty that besets us when we are anxious to
make peace w*ith the swarming Tagalos is that they have no comprehension of
our solicitude for pacification, other than that we are preparing the way for
our submission to them. That is precisely the way the paths to peace are
obstructed. The very proclamations that the President meant to give assur
ances of the purpose of our government to deal liberally and generously with
the Philippines, and the orders issued by General Otis pursuant to the advices
he received of the eminently pacific disposition of the American government,
excited the Tagalos, and influenced them, just because the President
announced his sense of responsibility, and thereby presumed to question the
dictatorship of Aguinaldo. Further, the Filipinos were persuaded that they
had only to strike a blow at our army to disturb the peace of this country.
The President had shown anxiety to avoid bloodshed, and while the insurgents
were intrenching themselves and mounting guns to enfilade our lines, our
sentinels were subjected to the grossest insults and taunted night and day.
This aggressive effrontery continued until the attack was made in force, and
then the Tagalos got a lesson that was a surprise to them. They had been
accustomed when they thought they were besieging Manila, to open fire for a
few hours, and then to rest, regarding the proceeding heroic and to be
resumed at pleasure. The Americans rushed for them, and put them to flight
and slaughter. The result of the effervescence of factions in our Congress and
country after the war was over except in a legal sense, w*as to furnish fire for
the fuel accumulated with false pretenses by the Tagalos, and substitute a war
with the Filipinos for that with the Spaniards, and at the same time cut down
and put aside the army bills, thus encouraging Indian disorders, and other
manifestations of hatred and contempt for the authorities. It was possible,

758 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS.
however, to save for a time the regular army as it is and give to the discretion
of the President power to raise troops enough, as appeared to Congress, to aot
on the defensive, until the law-making power should come together in regular
session or be called by the President, if that seemed the lesser evil. Congress
was good enough to provide for an ad interim army. The President was not
commanded — that is, not yet — to throw away the weapons the constitution
placed in his hands. There is hardly enough of the army to take care of the
military property accumulated in the fortifications and camps, seaside and
other, and thinly occupy our vast possessions so that the peace and dignity of
the United States may not be unfavorably affected. Fortunately the military
arm of the nation does not need to be strongly displayed in Porto Rico and
Hawaii, and it is a coincidence that the absence of insurgents is in precisely
those places in which our authority is not limited as to time. Porto Rico has
been ceded to us, the schools opening under the American flag, the people
shouting in joyous response to the salutes with which the flag was received,
and the band played the Star Spangled Banner. We annexed Hawaii in spite of
the outcries of those who had profited by the occupation of the monarchy that
was surrounded by as many rings as Jupiter has moons. A ship of war or
two and a few companies of regulars are enough to keep order there. The
people accept it as a fact, as it is, that the annexation is irrevocable. The
way to cause disturbance is to question that fact, but it will not be questioned
any more until the army submits to the mob. It will be the duty of Congress
to make liberal appropriations for the equipment of the old forts at the prin
cipal ports of Porto Rico, with modern artillery, — and as the naval officers
agree that the eight and ten inch guns are great enough for battleships, and
that the five-inch and small rapid-fire artillery are the most serviceable afloat
we will have and to spare a splendid assortment of our eleven, twelve and
thirteen inch thunderers to mount ashore. Porto Rico, the Pacific coast and
Hawaii should absorb them. In Cuba we were fortunate not to open the
war with Spain by accepting as fact the Key West fiction about the repub
lic of Cuba. That wonderful oganization was apparently gotten up expressly
for the issue of bonds and postage stamps. There was a coast-guard and
postal system, also a capital city, and an army, accounts of which reminded
one of that described in the alliteration, "An Austrian army awfully arrayed. "
The American statesmen who have used Cuba as a live coal on their brains
thought it important to have the republic recognized to assist in placing loans,

THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 759
take command of our armies, and accept rations from our hands. The Cuban
Assembly was like that in the Isle of Luzon, representative of a clique, a
faction, a gang, not at all of the people. Both gangs, that of Cuba and that
of Luzon, are representative only of Spanish misgovernment and the deform
ities of an administration by royal favorites for immigrant stipendiaries. In
the character they asserted for themselves, that of representatives of the
people, they were self-evident impostors. It was held to be high public policy
to disclaim ambition to annex Cuba to the United States, and it seems prob
able the precaution of that profession was wise, for it does much to smooth
the way for the final complete absorption of Cuba in the United States. In no
other way than by pursuing the path of American reserve, and respect for
the orderly expression of the Cuban people when they emerged from the
chaos of war and made themselves felt, could the Assembly have been so dis
credited as it is by its own acts. That body was so wild with folly as to take
issue with the one man whose power of character, will and fame crush them
when they charge him with their own faults. They are shattered by the col
lision, while their animosity inflicted no scratch or stain on the Cuban chief.
The intelligence and high-toned public spirit of Martinez Gomez has redeemed
the faults of his campaigning, which was that of fighting Spaniards with
their own weapons, and burning the fairer places of the island to free it from
woes greater than poverty, of hopeless strife with corrupt and venomous
oppression. The stand of Gomez for the freedom of the people from false
debts was full of the dignity of heroic devotion, sympathy with those really
liberated and their true liberators, and scorn for all who would convert the
cause of the country into a source of profitableness for pretenders. The
future of Cuba too largely depends upon this one-man power, for Gomez is
old and worn. The people of the island have acclaimed him one of them
selves, though a Dominican, and his leadership is one he cannot abdicate, for
there is no hand but his to guide the sorely-stricken Cubans to the peace of a
stable government that the people may voice their aspirations with authen
ticity and efficacy.
There was, in the Congressional debate on the array bill in association
with the current events of the Filipino war, many things said by the opposi
tion that would be entirely deplorable if the standard of intelligence was that
of the Tagalos, who must be convinced that Americans are, in view of the
warfare that engages their attention around Manila, about to engage in a civil

;6o THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS.
war at home. One member said war with Aguinaldo could have been avoided
if the President had stated he was not going to subjugate them, and this
congressman had "mused much" upon the "embattled farmers" who "fired
the shot heard round the world," and "wondered if there was anywhere out
along the firing line around Manila a spot that looked like Concord Bridge."
This is a direct instigation of the assassination of American soldiers doing
their duty at Manila. This incident occurred when the President cabled
within three weeks of the naval battle of Manila that it would be the duty of
the commander of the American expedition to "publish a proclamation
declaring that we came not to make war upon the people of the Philippines, "
but to "protect them in their homes, their employments and in their personal
and religious rights." The proof is perfect that Aguinaldo was false and
malicious, a conspirator, hostile all the while to Americans, seeking to deceive
and make use of them, to help him with his followers to take the place of the
Spaniards as robbers of the people, and tyrants irresponsible and unappeas
able. Mr. Wildman, consul at Hongkong, wrote the State Department that
Aguinaldo arrived in that city on the day after Dewey's May-day victory, and
added: "It was May ioth before I could obtain permission from Admiral
Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the U. S. steamer McCulloch." It was
three weeks after the battle when Aguinaldo arrived at Cavite. Just at this
time a proclamation was issued at Hongkong by the Philippine insurgents
saying: "Where you see the American flag flying, assemble. They are our
redeemers!" May 20, Williams, consul, wrote: "General Aguinaldo told me
to-day that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held as a
colony of the United States of America." While Aguinaldo was at Hong
kong his "compatriots" there busied themselves getting up statements tender
ing their allegiance to the United States. Here is an example :
To the President of the United States of America :
Claudio Lopez, merchant and proprietor and vice-consul of Portugal at
Iloilo, native of the Philippine Islands, emigrant to this colony of Hongkong
for political causes, exposes with great consideration :
Having known the history and constitution of the noblest liberal and
rightful nation of the United States of America, he, for the present, adheres
to the Government in annexing his country, and considers that it will be for
him a great honor to join his country as an additional star to the always vie-

THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 761
torious flag of the United States of America and to count him as one of its
citizens. Hongkong, 9th May, 1898. (Signed) CLAUDIO LOPEZ.
This was prepared a week after Aguinaldo's arrival at Hongkong, when
the news of Dewey's victory had been received, and a week before he gave
permission for the Malay tribesman, who had accepted Spanish money to
accept a Spanish peace for his people, to take passage in a United States
ship, return to the country he had left for his country's good, as the sequel
shows. There was a struggle without intermission to get the State Depart
ment and Admiral Dewey to consent to an alliance with Aguinaldo and his
"government." This was persistently the policy of our consuls at Hong
kong, Manila and Singapore, who were active in the presumed management
of the man who had been deported, cash in hand, as the Spanish prom
ised to reform if he would take his share of the country and go away. He
knew as well then the nature of the reforms of Spain as he does now.
He was, until the American admiral allowed him to appear at Cavite, a
professor of Americanism. What he secured through the intervention of
our consuls was to advertise himself under the auspices of the United States
forces, and the Tagalos presumed he was running the United States.
Very soon he became of the opinion that it was his mission to permit and
direct the operation of our fleet and army, and he has ever since been violent
as an "ally" of the United States, whose "dictatorship" was of such a nature
he was called upon to "order and command" all manner of men. The State
Department of the United States several times by cable and mailed letters
ordered the consuls to omit negotiations. This was before the war. When it
was in the air after the war, they were "cordial" with Aguinaldo that they
might "influence him for good. ' '- He was playing upon them a sinister game.
Mr. Wildman, however, had written February 22, 1898, that the Spanish cap
tain-general at Manila was asserting he had pacified the islands, so that he
could return to Spain with that to his credit, when the truth was "certain
rebel leaders were given a cash bribe of $1,650,000 to consent to public depor
tation to China. This bribe and deportation only multiplied claimants, and
fanned the fires of discontent." It was Aguinaldo who got the money. The
sort of peace he secured was described by his friend, Consul Williams, in
these words; "On Friday morning, March 25, a meeting of natives was being

762 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS.
held near my consulate in Manila, the natives being unarmed. The building
was surrounded by police and military, the meeting broken up, twelve natives
wantonly shot to death, several wounded, and sixty-two taken prisoners.
Saturday morning, March 26, the sixty-two prisoners were marched in a body
to the cemetery and shot to death, although it was shown that several were
chance passers-by or employes in ships adjoining, not being in attendance at
the meeting." We quote again from Mr. Williams: "I was in Hongkong
September, 1897, when Aguinaldo and his leaders arrived under contract with
the Spanish government' They waited until the ist of November for the pay
ment of the promised money and the fulfillment of the promised reforms.
Only $400,000, Mexican, was ever placed to their credit in the banks." It
was on the 3d of November Mr. E. Agoncillo, "late minister of foreign affairs
in Aguinaldo's cabinet," tried to make a secret bargain with the United
States for arms, and was willing the United States should make some money.
"There has been a systematic attempt to blacken the name of Aguinaldo and
his cabinet," Mr. Williams wrote later, "on account of the questionable
terms of their surrender to Spanish forces a year ago this month. ' ' Mr. Wil
liams proceeded to argue that Aguinaldo had not sold himself. This was a
part of the "diplomatic dealing" with the conspirator who was at work to use
the Americans, civil and military, to further his plan for setting up a dictator
ship. Aguinaldo was like the frozen reptile in the fable, found by a wood
man, and warmed before the fire, stung his benefactor. This preposterous
Tagalo serpent began to show his fangs at an early date. The first United
States troops, under General Thomas Anderson, arrived at Manila to rein
force Dewey June 30th, and the second expedition, under General Green, July
22d. July 28th Aguinaldo wrote Anderson:
"I consider it my duty to advise you of the un desirability of disembarking
North American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the
Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because, as no formal
agreement yet exists between the two nations, the Philippine people might
consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a viola
tion of its rights.
"I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the
Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because of this I
take the liberty of indicating to your excellency the necessity that, before dis
embarking, you should communicate in writing to this government the places

THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 763
that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people
may be advised in due form and [thus] prevent the commission of any trans
gression against friendship."
There could not have been anything more insolent than this imagined,
but Aguinaldo was soon able to surpass it, expressing astonishment that
Americans wanted wood, horses and cattle, and meant to take them if not sold
at a fair price. Presently the snaky conspirator, who sought to absorb all the
offices of tyranny, claimed it as a virtue that he had "permitted" the Ameri
cans in Manila to obtain pure water, and he began his openly aggressive
course that culminated in the war he forced. It was, he held, a condescension
to say that the Americans had hastened the revolution by destroying the
Spanish fleet! As for himself, he and his 14,000 men, which he represented
as 37,000, did nothing toward taking Manila. The American fleet silenced
the fort by the seashore that was the key of the city, and the American col
umns, the line of defense broken, entered with slight loss. Then because the
Tagalos were not allowed to jointly occupy the place they had not contributed
to conquer, there was the claim that we had ill-treated our "ally." The
President telegraphed Admiral Dewey, May 26: "You must exercise discre
tion most fully in all matters, and be governed according to circumstances
which you know and we can not know. You have our confidence entirely.
It is desirable, as far as possible and consistent for your success and safety,
not. to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands
that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future. ' ' This was the
product, of course, of the consular correspondence which had gone far in
sympathy and flattery. The Admiral replied:
"I thank the Department for the expression of confidence. Have acted
according to the spirit of the Department's instructions therein from begin
ning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any fac
tion. This squadron can reduce the defenses of Manila at any moment, but
it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to
retain possession. DEWEY."
August 15th Consul Wildman telegraphed State Department:
"The Spanish consul received dispatch Sunday ordering the surrender of
Manila. Shall I offer to deliver personally and save more delay? Believe can
be of service to Dewey, should Aguinaldo make trouble. WILDMAN."

764 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS.
This telegram from Wildman was thus answered by the Secretary:
"* Spanish consul should deliver dispatch in his own way. Take no action
-especting Aguinaldo without specific directions from this Department."
Mr. Wildman finally discovered that Aguinaldo, with whom he had
labored hard and long, was treacherous, and wanted to take possession of the
country and be the reigning tyrant vice the Spaniards, and at last in ignorance
and vanity mistaking the character of the American army and people, made
war with the swarm of deluded men of his tribe, not for liberty, but to set up
a personal despotism. We have to liberate the people of the Philippines
twice, from the Spaniards and from the Tagalos. The American arms have
not been tarnished in either conflict, but brightened and glorified in the same
good cause, keeping clear and shining on high, the faith and honor of the
army and navy of the United States and the absolute integrity of the national
government. It was not possible to avoid the war with a tribe of Malays who
answered generosity with resentment, charity with malice, and forbearance
with vindictiveness. They are not fighting for personal or public rights, but
for a savage sovereignty, that they may spoil and slay for the sake of robbery
and revenge. No reproach rests upon Americans for their conduct at Manila.
Under difficult circumstances they have been admirable. There has not been
a day since May 1, 1898, when they could have left the Philippines with honor,
for they could not provide for peace except by force. The degradation of
submissiveness suggested — the abandonment of duty and decency — it is
impossible to conceive of our countrymen.

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INDEX.

PAGE
Abarzuza, Don Buenaventura  083
"Abondanar" and "Renunciar" quibble over terms  689
Almodovar, Duke of  713
Ambiguity avoided in preparing Peace Protocol  711
American plenipotentiaries; their powers   6S2
American Commissioners not offended by Spanish memorandum regarding Indian rebel
lions and seceding Southern States  702
American Commissioners uphold Merritt  706
American Government accepted no Spanish reservations  719
American Secretary of State's correspondence with Marshal Prim  55
American Proposal to purchase Cuba  56
American Minister to Spain  74
American appeal to European Powers proves inadequate  90
Americans not believed warlike by Spaniards  125
Americans arrested and charges  137
American citizens of two kinds in Cuba  198
American prisoners in Cuba released  204
American eagle flew high on the Fourth of July  411
American troops had a line "which was very thin"  414
American army receives grateful letter from defeated Spaniards  5S4
American army at Santiago small and poorly furnished  489
Americans' handsome behavior according to Cervera  514
Americans' occupy Jamaica and Ponce  570
American fire from fleet "one prolonged thunder"  624
After the May-day battle in Manila Bay  309
After the fighting was over in Cuba  581
Alleged American citizens  137
Administrations, conservative, of Grant, Cleveland and McKinley  194
Advance of the first of July  404
Agoncillo, Don Felipe  665
Aguinaldo calls on Dewey  312
773

774 INDEX, PAGE
Aguinaldo organizes army under protection of Dewey's guns  314
Aguinaldo, according to Dewey, unable to capture Manila  314
Aguinaldo proclaims himself President  318
Aguinaldo becomes aggressive  319
Aguinaldo and General Merritt  ,  554
Aguinaldo described by Major Bell  ".  665
Aguinaldo, Baldamero, Secretary of War  .,  665
Aguinaldo's treachery  761
Aguira, seat of Cuban Government  188
Aguirri, General, at Cienfuegos, is ordered by Blanco to congratulate Cervera on his
victory  446
Aguacate Hill, where Cubans made a valiant stand  661
Alger, R. A., Secretary of War, directs that graves be properly and surely marked  440
Alger, General, urges Shafter to hold his own  409
Alger urges joint action of Army and Navy  417
Alger, Secretary, thanked by Clara Barton  583
Arevella, Captain, dentist, soldier  667
Annexation of Cuba the correct policy  no
Anxiety for latest news from Shafter's headquarters  454
Army of the United States should have most approved arms  329
Army seizes prizes in harbor claimed by Navy  536
Army of the United States  630
Army corps, officers and men  633
Army rifle, Krag-Jorgensen, its excellence  644
Arellano, Cayetano S., avowed annexationist  665
Art in handling modern rifle  o2n
Artillery and its great effect  4g0
Assaults believed to have been impossible under modern conditions  470
Authorization of the Spanish Peace Commissioners  ,. 682
Azpeztequia fortifies his estate  __ j32
Bombardment of American ports suggested  I0,
Brice, A. C, Consul at Matanzas, writes of starvation  232
Barker, Walter B., Consul of Sagua la Grande, tells of inability to grind sugar crop  238
Baranger, General, sure of Spain's success  277
Brumby, T. M., Lieutenant, commended by Dewey  288
Bombardment of San Juan, Porto Rico  ,,^0
Blanco says withdrawal of Cervera's fleet would mean loss of Cuba  .04
Blanco orders Cervera to land marines  .„_
Blanco asks authority over Cervera 
Blanco advises Cervera when to escape  ...
Blanco orders Cervera out of harbor 

INDEX. 775
PAGE
Blanco postpones fleet's "departure"  443
Blanco orders Cervera to- leave  444
Blanco advised by Cervera withdrawal of his sailors would mean loss of Santiago  445
Blanco gives Cervera twelve hours to leave Santiago  445
Blanco advised of Cervera's departure and loss of two torpedo boats  445
Blanco orders General Guirri at Cienfuegos prepare to receive Cervera and con
gratulate him on his "distinguished victory"  446
Blanco tells Madrid fate of Cervera's squadron  447
Blanco receives report of Cervera of his capture  447
Blanco tries to shift blame for Cervera's defeat  447
Blanco advises Madrid to hold out against Americans  448
Blanco's tribute of admiration to Cervera  448
Blanco appealed to by Sagasta for help towards peace  449
Blanco has Madrid's position explained to him by Correa  449
Blanco demands of Sagasta continuation of the war  451
Blanco cables Cervera can't fight  429
Blanco advises Correa army still wants to fight  451
Breckenridge on need of regular officers among volunteers  387
Breckenridge, General J. C, his military intelligence  474
Breckenridge, and what should be done with the volunteers  477
Breckenridge tells of landing, Daiquiri  478
Breckenridge's story of the fighting at Santiago  479
Breckenridge's account of El Caney  483
Breckenridge's account of Cubans  484
Burss, Fireman J., wounded on Brooklyn in fight with Cervera  504
Brooklyn hit many times  504
Brooklyn most dreaded by Spaniards  513
Black powder and its dangers  483
Bravery of the Spaniards  484
Baltimore struck five times  295
Biddle, Captain W., U. S. M. C, performed valuable services  283
Belief in her navy accounts for Spain's determination to fight  278
Boker, Geo. H., Minister to Russia, writes of sympathy there  129
Burning of houses  187
Bureau of Ordnance — additional guns  608
Bureau of Construction and Repair, report of  614
Bombardment by Sampson according to Santiago Spaniards  628
Belief in Santiago that Cervera had escaped  626
Battleship, its supremacy  627
Boynton, General H. V., on water supply at Chickamauga Park  646
Beef supplied army, and scandal  647

776 INDEX. PAGE
Beef and the truth about it  647
Banquero, Colonel, his bravery  652
Bustemente, Captain, fights valorously for Spain  652
Bell, Major J. F., catalogues Philippine leaders  664
Centennial Exhibition and relations between the two Governments  54
Cushing, Caleb, as a newspaper reader  75
Cushing's indictment of Spain and Spaniards  94
Cushing, Caleb, studies of Spanish character explained  108
Cushing's, Caleb, state papers and their importance  114
Cushing's, Caleb, views as to obeying the letter of his instructions  124
Cushing, Caleb, put diplomatic facts with a lawyer's impartiality  131
Carlist war made Europe slow to intervene in Cuba  101
Campos, Martinez, negotiates Peace of Zanjon  133
Campos, Martinez, attempts to quell outbreak of hostilities in 1895  133
Campos, Martinez, replaced by General Weyler  134
Claims stacked in State Department and damages asked  147
Conduct of Cuban troops as witnessed by G. B. Rea  165
Concentration of peasantry described by Stephen Bonsai, journalist  178
Camaguey filled with cattle  189
Consulate at Havana  198
Caldwell, Ensign H. H., volunteer, commended by Dewey  288
Calkins, Lieutenant C. G. , navigator of Olympia, stood on bridge with Dewey. Highly
commended by him  288
Coghlan, Captain J. B. , of the Raleigh, on Manila victory  293
Cubans inferior to Filipinos, according to Dewey  314
Cuban Government at Key West  657
Cuban Government at New York  657
Cuban army on the pay-roll  660
Cuban question thrashed over during Ten Years' War  109
Cuban Republic at Key West and New York affair  II0
Cubans according to General Breckenridge  484
Cuban cavalry on the coast guard did not muster in force  372
Cuba's one great aid  661
Cuba and her expenses  696
Cuba is freed  672
Cuba should have been ceded as-Porto Rico was  723
Cuban debt related by commissioners  5„5
"Cuban War Emergency Loan"  gng
Clark, Captain C. E., assumes command of Oregon  334
Clark, Captain of the Oregon, warned of Cape de Verde fleet  336
Clark, Captain, cables could beat off and cripple Spanish fleet  336

INDEX. 777
PAGE
Captain Clark at Rio de Janeiro warns Captain in command of the Brazilian flagship that
he would blow up Spanish torpedo boat in the harbor if she approached the Oregon ... 337
Captain Clark acknowledges congratulations received by crew with "enthusiasm and
spontaneous cheers"  ^37
Captain Clark of the Oregon tells of his ship in action  509
Correspondence of the Department of War  353
Camps in Florida  35o
Cervera reported at Santiago  368
Cervera reported ordered to shell Santiago when Americans got possession  406
Cervera's position at Santiago is understood by the Spanish Government  431
Cervera warned against being bottled up  433
Cervera's marines ordered to land  437
Correa advises chance for Cervera's escape  438
Cervera told of a good time to escape  437
Cervera says attempt to escape would mean loss of squadron and men  438
Cervera advises Blanco he is under his orders  438
Cervera tells of bad condition of his ships  439
Cervera ordered out of harbor by Blanco  43g
Cervera's pathetic telegram requesting positive orders from Blanco before leaving
Santiago  440
Cervera pressed by Madrid to escape  443
Cervera's departure postponed by Blanco  443
Cervera accepts his doom  444
Cervera ordered to leave by Blanco  444
Cervera seeks delay  444
Cervera advises Blanco withdrawal of sailors would mean loss of Santiago  444
Cervera given twelve hours to leave  445
Cervera reports to Blanco his capture  447
Cervera paid tribute of admiration by Blanco  448
Cervera's report of his defeat  513
Cervera sails from Cape Verde Islands  368
Cervera famished for coal  621
Cervera's fleet as seen in Spanish eyes before the disaster of Santiago  278
Cervera reports his arrival at Santiago  429
Cervera at crucial moment  626
Corbin, Adjutant-General, telegraphs re-inforcements are coming  410
Corbin, H. C. , sends remarkable telegram to Shafter about entering harbor with transport
armored with baled hay  456
Chancom transported and installed torpedoes in Cuba  'i  277
Corruption in Spanish army and navy  •  II2
Correspondence of the Department of War  357

778 INDEX. PAGE
Cambon, Ambassador from France, his conversations with President  704
Cambon, Don Julio, French Ambassador, negotiates peace for Alphonso XIII  668
Cambon and Day concurred in believing note explicit  716
Cambon's instrument of authorization  670
Cadiz fleet starts for Manila  323
Captain Cook of the Brooklyn tells story of the naval battle  508
Capitulation  527
Casualties in the army operating against Spaniards in Manila  565
Casualties at Santiago  581
Clara Barton thanks Secretary Alger  583
Cabellra, Lieutenant, tells of the destroyer's destruction  512
Canovas del Castillo shipped torpedoes to Cuba  277
Correa explains to Blanco Madrid's unfortunate position  449
Conference interrupted by Cervera's departure  461
Cavalry dismounted and its work  479
Chaparral about Santiago  480
Cable cut by Dewey gave us Philippine archipelago  725
Carter, Assistant Adjutant-General, Letter from  746
Corruption of Spanish contractor  621
Casualties  ,  636
Casualties in Santiago  636
Casualties in Porto Rico  640
Casualties in Manila  640
Camps of United States troops  642
Chickamauga Park and water supply  646
Craig, Dr. C. F., analyzes Chickamauga water  647
Constitution, twenty-ninth Spanish regulars crack fighters  653
Conclusion  725
Congressional effusions make great trouble  723
Country's debt to General Merritt  725
Country indebted to Admiral Dewey  725
Ceremonies Concluding the War with Spain  725
Commission to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department  738
Derby, Lord, and Gen. Schenes meet  74
Death of Marti  IOg
Death of colonial system of Spain  ri„
Duty of fair play to the Spaniards of the Peninsula and Cuba  ^j
Diaz, Don Jose Garnica y  6g,
Diaz, Rev. A. J., tells of immense armies of Gomez and Maceo  152
Death to those helping Spaniards  jgq
Defeat called victory by Cubans  I7,

INDEX. 779
PAGE
Dr. Danforth describes Cuban capital  188
Death in Cuba  211
Different character in explosions of the Maine  217
Day, Secretary, telegraphs Consul-General Lee  215
Declaration of War, President places issue with Congress  245
Day, Secretary, splendidly replies in the name of the President  668
Day to Woodford  248
Day states substantially points of protocol  668
Day to Woodford, Telegram in Cipher  249
Day Lost or Gained, Importance of in Closing the War  732
Dewey's splendid victory  277
Dewey charters British steamer  280
Dewey purchases British steamer Zafiro  280
Dewey announces departure for Manila  283
Dewey threatened with Cervera's squadron  308
Dewey's simple announcement of his victory over Spanish fleet  . 283
Dewey congratulated by President and Secretary of the Navy  284
Dewey announces securing naval station at Cavite  .*.  284
Dewey congratulated in the name of American people  284
Dewey made Rear- Admiral  285
Dewey sends correct list of Spanish vessels destroyed  285
Dewey announces raising and docking three Spanish vessels  285
Dewey's official report of the engagement of his squadron with the Spanish fleet  285
Dewey happy to report none killed — squadron but slightly damaged  287
Dewey's praise of officers and men  288
Dewey doubts if any Commander-in-Chief was ever served by more loyal and gallant
captains  288
Dyer, Captain, of the Baltimore, makes a most interesting report  294
Defeated Spaniards give first account of action in Manila Bay  309
Dewey cuts cable, after first proposing to preserve the line for the use of both Americans
and Spaniards, which was rejected by the enemy  309
Dewey thanks President for promotion, and recommends advancement on list of his
commanding officer  310
Dewey's estimate of troops necessary to control Philippine Islands  311
Dewey sends warning troops should be provided for extremely hot, moist climate  311
Dewey cabled if attacked by superior force squadron would endeavor to give good account
of itself  3n
Dewey asks for whereabouts and strength of possible Spanish expedition against him  312
Dewey receives call from Aguinaldo  312
Dewey's high commendation of Captain Daniel B. Hodgson  ,.... 313
Dewey allows Aguinaldo to organize his army under the protection of his guns  314

780 INDEX. PAGE
Dewey doubts Aguinaldo's ability to capture Manila  3M
Dewey believes Filipinos more capable of self-government than Cubans  ?. 314
Dewey's anxiety for arrival of monitors  3J8
Dewey announces arrival of United States troops  ,  318
Dewey's duty at Manila  547
Dewey sustained by the President  566
Dewey feared by Spaniards  .'  508
Dewey's trust in monitors  627
Dewey announces arrival of General Merritt  319
Dewey announces Aguinaldo is becoming aggressive  319
Dewey receives announcement of Peace Protocol  320
Dewey's dispatches are characteristic and historical  320
Dewey entered into no alliance with Philippine insurgents  323
Dewey believed could beat Cervera with addition of two monitors  323
Dewey in few words tells President all about Philippines  325
Dewey, his country's indebtedness to him  725
Difficulty in loading transports for Santiago  376
Daiquiri landing unopposed  388
Difficulties" in the Santiago campaign  39g
Departure of American fleet told to Blanco  430
Destroyers destroyed at Santiago  512
Destruction of the Maine  210
Diminutive forces of Cuba according to G. B. Rea  160
Daiquiri and the landing there  47 S
Day of doom for Cervera's fleet  ,  483
De la Rama, One Estefan, described  665
Dedios, Lieut-Gen. Emiliano, Military Governor Cavite  666
Del Pilar, Brigadier-General  666
Destruction of Cervera's fleet as seen from shore  625
Deference to Spanish Commissioners  694
Dictionary and interpretation of Peace Protocol  694
"Disposition" and "possession," President's change of wording  707
Duke de Arcos appointed Spain's Minister to the United States  730
European" press comment on Cuban-Spanish-American situation in 1S76  98
European powers hold off during war of 1898  IIC,
European monarchies relied on by Spain  I26
Exodus Cubans through dread of Weyler  „ ,
Experience and sentiments of the people of Cuba  206
Events immediately preceding the blowing up of the Maine  214
Extra territoriality of foreign war vessel prevented Spaniards investigating Maine disaster 217
El Caney and General Ludlow  g

INDEX. 78i
PAGE
El Caney according to Breckenridge  483
European powers addressed by American Government regarding intervention  76
Evans, J. C, brave conduct at Manila  288
Evans, Captain Bob, on the Iowa's performance  511
Ellis, Chief Yeoman G. H., killed on Brooklyn in fight with Cervera  504
Eaton, Commodore, of the Resolute, on the naval fight  510
Exterior explosion the verdict  210
Eyermann, Emilio de Acosta y, killed on Mercedes  624
Embalmed beef  648
Eighth (Philippine) corps  „  634
Expeditions to Philippines  635
Escario's column delayed by Cubans  -.  661
Escario's desperate advance to gain Santiago  661
Escario's delay, according to Spaniards, lost Santiago  663
Escamillo, Aguinaldo's secretary  665
Estrella, General  666
Exact terms of note relating to Philippines  712
Evacuation of Porto Rico  733
Evacuation of Cuba  733
Fish, Secretary of State Hamilton, on former Cuban insurrection  54
Filibuster expeditions intended to rush United States into war  125
Fish, Hamilton, instructed in English by London Times  128
Fish, Hamilton  194
Firebrand and Freedom  183
Five-dollar Spanish gold piece sent private letter to United States  206
Florida Literary Bureau  207
Field Fighting for Santiago  407
Foreign countries closely studied Santiago expedition  477
Fifth Army Corps and its lesson to the whole army   477
"Fill up with coal — the best to be had"  544
Fleet and army cooperate at Manila  446
Filipinos more capable of self-government than Cubans, according to Dewey  314
Filipino Commission in Washington  ".  757
Filibusters accused of responsibility for Cuban insurrection  85
Famine in Santiago  622
Flagler, Gen. D. W., Chief of Ordnance, on magazine rifle  644
Fight at El Caney and Spanish version  649
Fight at San Juan and Spanish version  .'.  649
Fourth Corps  634
Fifth (Santiago) Corps  634
Free exercise of religion  678

782 INDEX. PAGE
Former colonies of Spain and their independence in relation to the treaty  693
Great Britain's attitude in the Ten Years' War  74
Guerrilla tactics and length of Cuban War  89
General Grant was conservative  97
Grant's third term desire alleged to cause America's proposed intervention  102
Gomez, Gen. Maximo, his annihilation of Cuban industries  104
Gomez and the torch  IID
Gomez's two objects in firing fields  659
Gomez attacks American Government, press and President  174
Gomez's letter to Gen. Lee claiming insurgents kept no one from earning a living  229
Gomez's address to planters and cattle ranchers  367
Gridley, Captain, his report of the Olympia  290
General Greely on Signal Service  645
Guantanamo and splendid behavior of the Marines  628
Guantanamo Bay ..filled with mines  628
Grant's poor opinion of Cuban war-making  125
Greene, Gen. Frank V., wins Merritt's highest praise  663
Greene's fear of anarchy in the Philippines  663
Garcia, Pantelon, Major-General  666
Garcia, Gen., his troops do good work in retarding Spaniards  662
"Honor" of Spain stood in the way of peace during Ten Years' War  66
Helping Spaniards meant death  169
Hogs easy to catch in Cuba  190
Hyatt, Pulaski F., Consul at Santiago, writes regarding annexation  233
Hyatt, Consul, writes of distress due to Gomez's order forbidding grinding of sugar crop ... 237
House of Representatives resolves for immediate intervention  245
Hughes, Lieutenant, reports Battle of Manila  288
Howe, J. A., praises officers and men in naval engagement at Manila  298
Hodgson, Capt. Daniel B., highly commended by Dewey  313
Humanity in withholding bombardment of Santiago  413
Hobson, Lieutenant, and men exchanged  414
Humphrey, Colonel, Chief Quartermaster at Tampa, on the Santiago transports  398
History of the war in a few words  342
"History points to no greater achievement"  293
Intervention of European Powers  76
Investigation by Congressional Committees  150
Isle of Pines and General Miles' plan of capture  405
Intrenching tools should be regular part of equipment of troops  477
Intervention  203
Insurgents of Cuba and the Philippines in arms  658
Indemnity claims mutually relinquished by United States arid Spain  676

INDEX. 783
PAGE
Interview between President and Ambassador Cambon  708
Junta's divinely appointed ruling class  191
Joint work of Army and Navy at Manila  544
Joint resolution demanding that Spain relinquish its authority in Cuba  250
Jurisdiction of the courts  678
Koop, C. F., of Boston, describes brutality of Spanish officers  191
Killed wounded Cubans  188
Kindelberger, C. P. , assistant surgeon of the Olympia, volunteered, was attached, com
mended  414
Key West and shortness of water  360
Key West Bureau of Misinformation  724
"Keep full of coal"  270
London Times claims United States departed from political traditions  101
London Times dares to give lessons in English to Hamilton Fish  128
Lawrence, Frederic W., on number of insurgent troops  150
List of officers, sailors and marines killed in the Maine disaster  221
Logan, Gen., his division carries El Caney  257
Linare's impression of Cervera's fleet  43°
Linares telegraphs Blanco can't give up Cervera's help  429
Linares, General, defense of his line  649
Lesson for the country of the hills of Santiago  474
Lessons of the War  ¦  735
Las Guasimas and the fighting there as told by Gen. Breckenridge  479
Ludlow's Brigade at El Caney  ,  480
Lawton highly commended by Breckenridge  486
Long's telegrams to naval officers scattered about the world  268
Long, Wm., Pay Clerk, performed active service, commended  268
Long, Secretary, cables Dewey  279
Long notifies Dewey war has begun  283
Long telegraphs Oregon to get ready  332
Long to Schley  37*
Long anxious to know if all Cervera's fleet are at Santiago  372
Lamberton, Commander Chief of Staff B. P., volunteered and praised by Dewey  288
Luneta battery, Manila, use Krupp guns  293
List of the sick and dead of the American fleet at Manila  328
Lee, Consul-General, telegraphed by Day  215
Lee's Consul -Generalship  x94
Lee's eminent fitness  Ig9
Lee's letter to Secretary Day regarding situation  232
Las Guasimos Spaniards make desperate resistance  263
Long's high attainments  544

784 INDEX. PAGE
Lopez, Miguel, Cervera's pilot, tells of departure from harbor  626
Ludington, Quartermaster-General M. J., shows magnitude of problem supplying big
army  642
Limit to the honor of arms  657
Logic of the War with Spain  752
Maceo's death and the truth  107
Marti's death  log
Maceo breaks through trocha  136
Maceo's death according to Cubans and Spaniards  136
Money of Cuban treasury sent to New York  190
Manner of forcing Spanish soldiers into the brush  188
Malignance on both sides in Cuba  209
Maine destruction  210
Maine sent to Havana  ¦  216
Maine disaster, those killed  221
McGarr, Owen, Counsel at Cienfuegos, writes of cane grinding and attempts to fire fields 234
Message from the President transmitting correspondence between Spain and the United
States  24&
Montijo, Admiral, reports his defeat  298
Manila falls  325
Manila fleet resumes regular target practice in captured bay  328
Mahan, Captain, taught English significance of "sea power"  331
McCormick, Capt. D. J., condemned by Medical Survey, relieved of command of Oregon 333
Miles, Major-General Nelson A., reports on work done by bureaus and officers  268
Miles and his ideal campaign  342
Miles believed in a big Cuban army  344
Miles' unfortunate reference to Bull Run  352
Miles plans to capture Santiago  375
Miles pulls steadily in the harness and is ready with suggestions  384
Miles telegraphs Spanish General to surrender  47I
Miles appears at Santiago  52„
Miles and Shafter get together  -23
Miles believed in Cuban Army which failed to materialize  523
Miles arrives at Shafter's headquarters  -24
Miles' coming impresses Spaniards  ,2 ,
Miles' plans and movements in Porto Rico campaign  55I
Miles sails for Porto Rico  ,-69
Miles desires cooperation of navy at San Juan, Porto Rico  570
Miles changes his plans at sea owing to leak of information  c?.
Miles' completeness of information  .
Miles' sonorous proclamation to Porto Ricans  ,,....,.,  374

INDEX. 785

Miles' idea of Cuban aid  659
Miley, Lieutenant, raises flag over Santiago  532
Merritt's, General, fight after protocol was signed  704
Merritt upheld by American Commission  706
Merritt, country indebted to him  72;
Merritt decides time to strike  560
Merritt and Aguinaldo  554
Merritt's proclamation to Filipinos  566
Merrimac follows up Cervera  253
Merrimac did not obstruct channel  457
Merrimac, her sinking a mystery to Spaniards  623
Mauser rifle  644
"Monitors slightingly spoken of by Puddeman  627
Marietta ordered to join Oregon  333
Marine Corps and its work  627
Mines that did not explode  628
Marksmanship of trained soldiers compared to that of the volunteers  479
Map of positions of vessels on blockade duty  5*8
Malay as a factor in the Philippines  659
Malabani, Counsellor, described  665
Montenegro, Colonel  666
Manterola  ,  421
Madrid presses Cervera to escape  443
Madrid's "Great Joy," believing Cervera's escape  448
Madrid hears of Santiago's fall  «• 457
Merchant vessels of both countries receive same treatment  675
Moore, John Bassett, Secretary to the Commission  685
Military Committees to Superintend the Evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico  733
Minister to Spain Appointed  73°
Newspaper correspondents at Havana  198
Naval Court of Inquiry reports on Maine disaster  217
No effort spared by the Government  399
Naval officers, their vigilance and studious observation  554
Nunez, Lieutenant-Col. Frederico, hangs five Spanish captives  170
Nunez reproved by Maceo  17*
Noriel, General  666
Origin of the war between the United States and Spain  53
Old, old story of Spain  98
Olney, Secretary  *94
Oregon, object lesson of voyage  329
Oregon, telegraphed to get ready  332

786 INDEX.

Oregon commanded by Capt. C. E. Clark  333
Oregon leaves San Francisco  333
Oregon's coal contracted for at Callao'  333
Oregon reaches Callao  334
Oregon warned of Spanish torpedo-boat Temerrario  334
Oregon meets a storm  '.  •  335
Oregon reaches Port Tamar  335
Oregon learns war declared at Rio Janeiro  336
Oregon delayed by Marietta Nictheroy  336
Oregon at Rio Janeiro, Brazilians become vigilant  337
Oregon arrives at Jupiter Inlet, Fla  337
Oregon Congratulated by Secretary Long  337
One American killed in naval battle of Santiago  504
Overcrowding transport Mobile  583
Oregon's splendid performance at Santiago  •  594
Organization and numbers of United States army  630
Officers killed and wounded  636
Officers continued in service  73°
One of the Ladrones ceded  669
Our Pacific Possessions  754
Prim, Marshal, foresaw end of Spain's colonial possessions  54
Prim's correspondence with American Secretary of State  55
Prim and Sickles confer  .'  59
Pall Mall Gazette claims United States proposed intervention due to General Grant's
desire for third term  .,  102
Peace of Zanjon  133
Peace conference meets at Paris  680
President Cleveland and state papers of Secretary Olney  194
President Grant, Secretary Fish, Daniel Sickles and Caleb Cushing  194
President McKinley, Gen. Fitzhugh Lee  194
President's Message to the 45th Congress  200
President's message asking powers to terminate hostilities between Spain and Cuba  211
Pesident's proclamation regarding Maritime law  261
President's proclamation calling for volunteers  262
President's proclamation extending blockade  263
President asked information from Dewey as to the value of the Philippine Islands  324
President approves war resolution of Senate and House  246
President's proclamation blockading Cuban ports  2j4
President praises army for work of July ist  468
President thanks General Shafter and his army  274
President offers brave adversary "generous terms of peace"  670

INDEX. 787
PAGE
President's commissions to Peace Commissioners  680
President misrepresented by Spanish Commissioners  699
President's words with Ambassador Cambon  704
President's open-mindedness as to Philippines  704
President's part in preparation of Peace Protocol  706
President and cabinet meet French Ambassador  ,... 715
President was greatly wise  724
President instructs Shafter to accept nothing but unconditional surrender  338
President congratulates Sampson and navy at Santiago  494
President's proclamation of July 18 showing policy of Government toward Cuba  538
President sustains Dewey  549
President's Message on Dewey's battle  737
Preparations to strike Spaniards in East Indies  544
Policy o' expansion  550
Philippines and their boasting  550
Porto Rico campaign  568
Porto Rico ceded  669
Porto Rico is ceded to the United States  :  672
proclamations of the President relating to war with Spain  257
Plot to smash Dewey  434
Passport handed Spanish minister  252
Philippine insurgents demand joint occupation of Manila  326
Phantom fleets of Spain in Cuban waters  244
Palma, T. Estrada, asks for rights of belligerents  230
Palma on Gomez' orders relative to sugar crop  230
"People of the island of Cuba of right ought to be free and independent"  245
Pluddeman, Rear Admiral German Navy, comments on naval battle at Santiago  627
Powder and its supply  645
Philippine idea of "fixing" custom house officers  660
Philippines' hatred of monastic orders  664
Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States  672
Philippines and the Commissioners  703
Passionate dignity of Spaniards  701
Porter, Horace, his note to American Commissioners  722
Prisoners are released by United States and Spain  676
Properly rights  678
Proclamation of Peace by the President  729
Quartermaster-General's report on steamships that carried Shafter's army of in
vasion  394
Quartermaster's department at Tampa, its work  644
Reforms for Cuba proposed in 1869  59

788 INDEX. PAGE
Risk of war to United States through bombardment of American sea-ports pointed out
by British critics  103
Recruits, Cuban, came in small crafts from Hayti  136
Rea, George Bronson, examined  160
Rea's difficulties with Gomez  172
Resources of Cubans  177
Real Cubans would join United States  207
Report of Mr. Davis' committee on foreign relations  212
Recognition of Republic of Cuba  214
Rigney, American sugar planter, assaulted by Cubans and estate damaged  233
Recognition of independence of Republic of Cuba defeated  245
Regular officers needed among volunteers  387
Reports of Sampson and Schley and their contrast  508
Rough Riders sick  529
Reed, Inspector General, writes of sick soldiers  '.  534
Remarkable letter from Spanish soldiers about to sail for Spain  584
Rightmire, W. J., Fleet Pay Clerk, performed active service, commended  292
Roosevelt, Col. Theodore, his famous dispatch to Dewey  270
Roosevelt, Theodore, his brilliant record as assistant Secretary  544
Read, Gen., describes raising of flag over Governor's palace  530
Reina Mercedes' creditable work  621
Regular regiments and their stations  633
Relations and responsibilities for insurgents  658
Ruiz, Colonel, wounded by Cubans  661
Real people of Cuba  724
Ratifications of the Treaty of Peace Exchanged at Washington  726
Report of Commission to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department  73g
Report on Beef by Investigating Commission  74c
Sampson says Schley had sufficient coal  37I
Sampson's army delayed by phantom fleets  3gj
Sampson arrives at Daiquiri  ,g,
Sampson partially explains refusal to force Santiago harbor  455
Sampson explains relations with Shafter  4,.
Sampson and Shafter were to consult when Cervera's departure interrupted  461
Sampson's plans for Shafter to take forts at harbor entrance  462
Sampson announces destruction of Cervera's fleet  4q2
Sampson congratulated by President and Secretary of Navy  d„2
Sampson's absence on duty during the destruction of Cervera's fleet  4q4
Sampson's preparations in event of attempt to escape  ,Qg
Sampson gives reasons for ordering Indiana to turn back  . ,I0
Sampson failed to see an open gate to glory  ,-20

INDEX. 789
PAGE
Sampson agreed with Miles rather than Shafter  524
Sampson did not sign articles of capitulation  535
Santiago a hard nut to crack  378
Santiago's fall reported by Blanco  439
Santiago's situation after Spanish fleet was gone  454
Santiago Harbor open to Sampson for twenty-four hours  654
Santiago plan of pacifying American custom-house officers  660
Sandico, C. , coadjutor of Aguinaldo  666
Sanitary report of Santiago  581
San Domingo torch in aid of Cuban rebellion  229
San Juan de Porto Rico key to the situation  570
Scoundrelism in Cuba  ,  207
Scott, Ensign W. P., commended by Dewey  288
Schley telegraphed to locate Cervera  371
Schley disobeys orders  370
Schley ordered to remain off Santiago  370
Schley reports to Long that enemy is at Santiago  371
Schley's departure cabled from Canada to Madrid and Cuba  431
Secretary of War's report  341
Seventy-first New York with men who had never fired a gun  36 5
Searchlight special feature of blockade  496
Service of Spanish fleet at Santiago  ,  622
Second corps  634
Seventh corps  634
Shafter directed to seize and hold Mariel  357
Shafter directed to assume troops at Tampa  360
Shafter recommends army formation by brigades  365
Shafter's executive statements and sagacity — "First battle will be the decisive one"  367
Shafter ordered to proceed to Santiago  374
Shafter in need of help  391
Shafter and his army thanked by the President  400
Shafter reports casualties  405
Shafter urges Sampson to force the entrance of the harbor  409
Shafter suggests a retreat  409
Shafter's resignation suggested  410
Shafter improves in health  411
Shafter demands surrender of Santiago  412
Shafter insists navy enter harbor  455
Shafter explains relations with Sampson  457
Shafter announces to Sampson he will attack Santiago, and wishes fleet to aid attacking
Aquadores  458

790 INDEX. PAGE
Shafter's compliments to Sampson  458
Shafter advises Sampson of terrific fighting and wants his aid  458
Shafter's idea Sampson must force harbor  462
Shafter's Fourth of July greeting to Sampson  462
Shafter notifies Washington of scarcity of medicines  467
Shafter notifies Government of the appearance of yellow fever  469
Spanish officers to surrender Santiago  471
Shafter's serious position before Santiago  472
Shafter reports on Cuban and Immune regiments  533
Shafter displeased with Immunes  533
Shafter at Camp Wycoff  587
Shafter's change of plans in relation to his difficulties with Sampson  629
Sherman to Woodford  247
Sherman to Woodford  249
Sherman to Spanish Minister  250
Sherman to Spanish Minister  251
Sherman to Woodford announcing Spanish Minister given passport  252
Schenck, Gen., and Lord Derby meet  74
Sharp strain of the struggle at Santiago  384
Shafter characterized by Breckenridge  486
Schley's report of victory  ,. 502
Shafter's explanation of his refusal to allow a naval officer's signature on capitulation
agreement  538
Scandal about beef  647
Sagasta appeals to Blanco to help towards peace  449
Shafter wants to know why navy cannot work under fire like army  458
Shafter cheered by his soldiers  533
Shells not sensitive enough  629
Ships chartered on Pacific coast  643
Shower of telegrams soliciting chance to serve in war  588
Sickles and Prim confer  ;  59
Sickles, Daniel  ig4
Sicard, Rear Admiral, seeks for secrecy as to army movements  376
Siboney, the heavy engagement there  404
Signal service  645
Smith, D. A., Pay-Inspector, active service, commended  4t8
Spain would not confer until Ten-year-war-Cubans laid down arms  58
Spain sends more troops to Cuba  69
Spain explains that length of war is due to the guerilla tactics of Cubans  89
Spain's losses in Cuba  IOg
Spain's fear of a second San Domingo  IOg

INDEX. 79i
PAGE
Spain longed for foreign war during Carlist conquest  119
Spain's belief in her navy during Ten Years' War  119
Spain's finances in 1875  120
Spain confident of triumph with her naval force  404
Spain's character impaired by injustice to her colonies  452
Spain pleads for peace through France  668
Spain would spare Cuba  '.  668
Spain gives up Cuba  669
Spain cedes Porto Rico  669
Spain stripped of "last memory of a glorious past"  669
Spain is paid twenty million dollars  675
Spain cedes Porto Rico to the United States  672
Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over, and title to Cuba  672
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago of the Philippine Islands-..  672
Spain's commercial rights in Philippine Islands  -.  675
Spain releases prisoners  676
Spain wished United States to pay her debts  687
Spain's claim that United States erred in believing Cuban cause just  698
Spain's pitiful plea  f.  700
Spain's Minister to the United States appointed  730
Spain too weak to maintain a Colonial System  752
Spaniards did not believe Americans warlike people  125
Spaniards relied upon European monarchies  126
Spaniards at Manila signaled approach of American fleet shortly after midnight  293
Spaniards surrender at Manila  211
Spaniards testify to valor of American troops  650
Spanish volunteers hung by Cubans  168
Spanish manner of seeking hospitals to kill wounded  188
Spanish wish to investigate Maine wreck  217
Spanish claim electoral machinations make United States hostile  78
Spanish inability to conquer Cuba explained by Cushing  108
Spanish Minister to Sherman  251
Spanish squadron defeated at Manila, officers and men  290
Spanish fleet and its mystery  ,  353
Spanish phantom fleet reported to General Miles  364
Spanish cruisers reputation for speed  368
Spanish war secrets revealed through secret cablegrams  4*7
Spanish general agreed to surrender  524
Spanish sharpshooters and their bravery  484
Spanish defenders of Santiago  650
Spanish blockhouses  485

792 INDEX. PAGE
Spanish story of El Caney and San Juan  649
Spanish trenches  485
Spanish casualties  653
Spanish claim President had not determined to take Philippines  712
Spanish Commission protests  697
Spanish plenipotentiaries; their names and titles  683
Spaniards attempted to divert object of commission  685
Spaniards objected to General Merritt  705
Spanish soldiers sent back to Spain- through Treaty of Peace  675
Spaniards in conquered territory may preserve allegiance to crown of Spain  677
Springfield arsenal  645
Straightforwardness of three administrations  194
Statistics of death-rate at Santa Clara  217
Starvation due to burning policy  238
Story of Santiago as cabled from Dedemonte to Admiral Ventura Mantelora  421
Strain on courtesies between Shafter and Sampson  535
Stars and Stripes popular in Porto Rico  576
Staff organization  632
Strange story of the official secret cipher of Spain  417
Strength of regular and volunteer armies  631
Stars and Stripes over Santiago  530
Stickney, J. L., Correspondent New York Herald, rendered "valuable service to Dewey" 388
Sugar producers paid tribute to Cubans and Spaniards  181
Superior accuracy of fire won naval battle of Santiago  498
Smallness of American army at Santiago  489
San Juan according to General Breckenridge  483
Sampson refuses to enter Santiago harbor until mines are removed  458
Santiago and its supplies during siege  649
Status quo bothered Spaniards  685
Senate created trouble through slowness to ratify  724
Storer, Bellamy, appointed Minister to Spain  730
Torch, and its awful cost to Cuba  ITI
Ten Years' War in Cuba  II2
Two sorts of Spaniards in Cuba  I77
Treatment of alleged American citizens in Havana Consulate  Iy8
"To intervene with force"  20,
Transportation of Spanish or insurgent officers at regular rates according to rank  206
Telegrams that made necessary sending of Maine to Havana  ... 216
Target practice at Manila  3,r
Transports, their cost of purchase, tonnage and carrying capacity of officers and men  397
Toral, Gen. Jose, sends foreigners out of the city  4I2

INDEX. 793
PAGE
Telegraph operators in Cuba opposed to Spanish cause  418
Toral advises Blanco of capture of Cervera's squadron, and loss of two torpedo boats  445
Toral sends Blanco first news of Cervera's squadron's destruction  446
Toral ready to surrender if army allowed to go out of city with arms and baggage  470
Texas hit by big shells  509
Tejeiro, Lieutenant Jose Muller y, tells of removal of mines from Santiago harbor  519
Taggart, Capt. E. F., tells of sustenance Spaniards had  533
Table giving assignment of secondary batteries  608
Tejeiro, Lieutenant Jose Muller y, on Spanish artillery  618
Tejeiro on Spanish belief in their fleets  621
Tejeiro attempts to interview Hobson  623
Tejeiro tells of terrible Vesuvius  625
Tejeiro gives example of Cuban usefulness to United States  661
Table giving grand total of casualties  641
Table showing sending home of Spanish prisoners  641
Table showing peace and war figures on army goods  643
Table showing strength of regular and volunteer armies  631
Table giving strength and distribution of troops  635
Transportation furnished soldiers  644
Telegrams connecting President and armies in the field  646
Trias Mariano described  665
Terms relating to Philippines indefinite, according to Spaniards  669
Text of the Treaty of Peace with Spain  671
Twenty-ninth Spanish regiment, its valor  653
Treaty of Peace  668
Treaty of Peace: Articles I, II, III  672
Treaty of Peace: Articles IV, V  675
Treaty of Peace: Articles VI, VII, VIII  676
Treaty of Peace: Article IX  677
Treaty of Peace: Articles X, XI, XII, XIII  678
Treaty of Peace: Articles XIV, XV, XVI, XVII  679
United States to send back Spanish soldiers  :  675
United States gives Spain commercial rights in Philippine Islands  675
United States pays Spain twenty million dollars  675
United States releases prisoners  676
United States did not pay Great Britain to extinguish colonial debts  702
Valmaseda's brutal proclamation  71
Virginius case  ZI7
Volunteers force out Campos  134
Volunteers praised by General Breckenridge  349
Vegetable food of Cubans  189

794 INDEX. PAGE
Views of minority asking immediate recognition of Republic of Cuba  214
Valparaiso authorities careful in their treatment of American ships  335
Vessels and the assignment of secondary batteries  608
Vesuvius dynamite shells terrified Spaniards  625
Valor of American troops testified by Spaniards  650
Vara del Rey, General  :  651
Vara, Leandro y, described  665
Villa, de — Urrutia, Don Wencesnao Ramirez  683
Volunteer System, The  736
Way the war business was handled  ,  243
Woodford's reply to Day  249
Woodford to Sherman, announcing that he had asked for passport  253
Woodford to Sherman, giving official note from Spanish Minister of State  253
Woodford to Sherman, text of official note from Spanish Minister of State, and Woodford's
instruction to United States consular representatives to turn over consulates to British
consuls  254
"Where every officer and man did his whole duty there is only room for general praise"... 292
Wakler, Capt. Asa, of the Concord, tells of the Manila fight  293
Wood, Commander E. P., of Petrel, reports  293
Wilder, Captain, of the Boston, makes a model report for brevity and prose  297
What it would have cost to have attacked Blanco at Havana  393
Wheeler, General, praises gallantry of the troops  389
Wheeler seriously ill  409
Wheeler to succeed in command if Shafter continued sick  413
Wheeler shakes off his illness  414
Weyler, General, succeeds Campos  134
Weyler's reputation  134
Weyler's remorseless policy  135
Weyler's attempt to pen Maceo  136
Winn, Dr. F. B., tells of insurgents and concentrados  184
Williams, Raymon O., Consul General at Havana  ig8
Wilson, Major-General, arrives in Porto Rico  574
Wounded  639
Yellow fever at Siboney  469
Yellow fever prevalent  581
Young commanders needed  478
Yara River, fight there  661

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